PROTECTING YOUR COMMUNITY FROM TERRORISM:
The Strategies for Local Law Enforcement Series

Volume 1: Local-Federal Partnerships


PROTECTING YOUR COMMUNITY FROM TERRORISM:
The Strategies for Local Law Enforcement Series

VOL. I: IMPROVING LOCALFEDERAL PARTNERSHIPS

Gerard R. Murphy and Martha R. Plotkin

with

Secretary Edward A. Flynn

Chief Jane Perlov

Special Agent in Charge Kevin Stafford

Chief Darrel W. Stephens







This project, conducted by the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF), was supported by Cooperative 
Agreement #2002-HS-WX-K001 by the U.S. Department of Justice Office of Community 
Oriented Policing Services. Points of views or opinions contained in this document are those of the 
authors and do not necessarily represent the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of 
Justice or the members of PERF.

The opinions expressed are generally those based on the consensus of executive session attendees. 
However, not every view or statement presented in this report can necessarily be attributed 
to each individual participant.

 Police Executive Research Forum,
Office of Community Oriented Policing Services

Police Executive Research Forum
Washington, DC 20036
United States of America
March 2003

ISBN 1-878734-78-4
Library of Congress Number 2003105278

Photos courtesy of (from top to bottom):
The Arlington County (VA) Police Department (13)
Federal Emergency Management Agency (4)
Police Executive Research Forum (5)

Cover Design by David Edelson, PERF
Interior Design by Elliot Thomas Grant, etg Design



CONTENTS

Acknowledgments ............................................................ v

Foreword .................................................................. xi

Chapters

1. Introduction and Background ............................................. 1

2. Major Themes and Issues ................................................. 5

 A Regional Response to Terrorism for Local Law Enforcement Agencies: 
 A Site Visit Summary ..................................................... 15

3. Security Clearances and Information Sharing ............................ 19

 A Commentary on Security Clearances ...................................... 28

4. Joint Terrorism Task Forces ............................................ 31

 Heart of America Joint Terrorism Task Force: 
 The Counterterrorism Executive Board (Kansas City Division) .............. 39

5. FBI Strategies ......................................................... 41

 Difficult Decisions: FBI Priorities ...................................... 49

6. Intelligence ........................................................... 51

 Overcoming Barriers to Intelligence Sharing .............................. 58

7. Multijurisdictional Information Sharing ................................ 61

 Gateway Information Sharing Project: A Site Visit Summary ................ 66

8. Training and Awareness ................................................. 71

 Conclusion ............................................................... 77

 References ............................................................... 79

Appendices

A. FBI Policy and Guidelines .............................................. 83

B. Edwin Delattre Speech: A Reflection on Successful Partnerships ......... 87

C. Participants and Observers List ........................................ 93

 About the Authors ........................................................ 97

 About the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) 
 U.S. Department of Justice .............................................. 101

 About PERF .............................................................. 103



ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

WE WOULD LIKE TO THANK THE MANY INDIVIDUALS WHO CONTRIButed 
to this paper. Their interest in seeing this paper finished is 
reflected in the tremendous time they spent providing advice, 
guidance and recommendations. Any value this paper has to the field is due largely 
to their willingness to answer endless questions and explain the many complex 
issues associated with localfederal partnerships.

First and foremost, we must thank those who 
attended and participated in the executive 
session. (You will find these law enforcement 
leaders listed in Appendix C.) Their collective 
knowledge and insight was truly impressive. 
Just as impressive was their willingness to engage 
in a candid discussion of sensitive issues 
at a forum they knew was going to be based 
on a contentious agenda. Each participant 
outlined critical issues and concerns, but that 
was only the beginning. They were committed 
to understanding each others perspective and 
developing creative solutions to long-standing 
problems. They demonstrated the type of leadership 
that we have come to hope for in all law 
enforcement leaders who are engaged in this 
fight against terrorism.

This paper and the larger project are 
made possible with the Office of Community 
Oriented Policing Services support and guidance, 
under the leadership of Director Carl 
Peed. Project Monitor Amy Schapiro has 
demonstrated patience and support as we have 
developed the template for this series of five 
executive sessions and white papers on local 
law enforcement and terrorism. Ellen Scrivner, 
who has been tasked to the FBI from the COPS 
office, also provided invaluable assistance on 
all phases of the project to date.

Deborah Daniels, Assistant Attorney General 
for the Office of Justice Programs, provided 
important insights at the executive session and 
a thoughtful review of the final product. Edwin 
Delattre, Professor of Philosophy at Boston 


University, graciously spoke to executive session 
participants at a special dinner and was among a 
select group of observers. He also took the time 
to conduct a detailed review of the draft report 
and provided critical feedback and guidance.

We want to thank those who contributed 
to this paper by writing commentaries or sidebar 
pieces: FBI Special Agent in Charge Kevin 
Stafford of the Kansas City, MO, Field Office; 
Police Chiefs Darrel Stephens of Charlotte
Mecklenburg, NC, and Jane Perlov of Raleigh, 
NC; and Massachusetts Secretary of Public 
Safety Edward Flynn. They typify the kind of 
true innovators in law enforcement who will 
ultimately make our nation a safer place to 
live.

Throughout the executive session planning 
and the writing of this paper, a number 
of individuals at the FBI provided essential 
direction and perspective. FBI Director Robert 
S. Mueller, who has repeatedly reached out to 
local law enforcement, endorsed the idea of 
the executive session and made it possible. 
Retired Executive Assistant Director Kathleen 
McChesney identified and recruited FBI participants 
for the session. We thank Charles 
Prouty, who took over her position, helped coordinate 
FBI resources and participated fully 
in the executive session. Assistant Director 
Louis F. Quijas from the FBIs Office of Law 
Enforcement Coordination attended much of 
the session and provided his important support 
for this effort. Special Agent Kathleen 
Timmons in the Office of Law Enforcement 
Coordination also served as our liaison during 
the research and writing portions of this project 
and tolerated our many inquiries. Lisa Michelle 
Keller, an FBI Public Affairs Specialist, 
and Edward M. Shubert, Section Chief of the 
Personnel Security Section, Security Division, 
provided much-needed resources and verified 
facts for the paper that would have taken us 
months to chase down.

A number of law enforcement professionals 
in the St. Louis, Missouri, and Redondo 
Beach, California, areas shared with us their 
innovative programs. In St. Louis, FBI Special 
Agent in Charge Thomas Bush and Metropolitan 
Police Chief Joseph Mokwa allowed us to 
observe their facilities and interview personnel 
and candidly spoke about the successes and 
challenges of the Gateway Information Project. 
St. Louis Police Sergeant Robert Hiemberger 
arranged our visit, consented to our interviews 
and carefully explained complex information 
technologies.

In Redondo Beach, Chief Robert Luman 
graciously hosted our visit. Lieutenant John 
Skipper and City Prosecutor Michael Webb arranged 
all details of our visit and spent long days 
with us as we tried to understand their many 
accomplishments. FBI Supervisory Agent Linas 
Danilevicius of the Long Beach Resident Office 
explained how the JTTF functions. Special 
Agent Supervisor Gary Edgington of CATIC and 
Lieutenant Phillip Hansen and Sergeant John 
Sullivan of the Los Angeles County Sheriffs Office 
detailed their programs as well.

Several members of the PERF staff spent 
countless hours tracking down information, 



reviewing drafts of the paper, and correcting 
mistakes. Executive Director Chuck Wexler 
was instrumental in supporting and facilitating 
the executive session and ensured that 
the no-holds-barred discussion of the issues 
resulted in constructive recommendations and 
a compelling commitment to work together 
in implementing them. Research Assistant 
Judy Lim managed the logistics of the two-day 
event. David Bright helped research many of 
the issues in the report. We owe a thanks to 
Elliot Grant, of etg Design, and PERF staffer 
David Edelson for their design work. But it 
is Research Associate Heather Davies who 
deserves special recognition (maybe a medal) 
for her work on this paper, especially since she 
joined our staff after the executive session was 
held. Heather diligently learned the issues and 
spent many hours working with FBI personnel 
to verify facts and accurately portray them in 
the paper. She kept us on track, proofed every 
word and poured over reams of research materials
all with good humor.

We are sure we have left someone out 
unintentionally. Whoever you may be, and all 
those whom we list above, we thank you. To 
those of you in law enforcement at every level 
of government who work daily to make our 
communities safe from terrorism, we hope this 
paper provides you some of the resources and 
information you have been seeking.




TERRORISM

There is no single, universally accepted definition of terrorism or 
agreement about whether a specific definition applies to a particular 
incident.

The FBI cites the Code of Federal Regulations in defining terrorism as

[t]he unlawful use of force and violence against persons or 
property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian 
population or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political 
or social objectives1 (28 C.F.R. Section 0.85).

This is the definition that will be used for the purposes of this report.


1 The FBI further distinguishes between domestic and international terrorism and cites the legal authority 
for activities used to counter, investigate and prosecute terrorists. See, e.g., FBI Policy Guidelines in Terrorism 
in the United States: 1999 (FBI 2000). Excerpts are provided in Appendix A to this document.



FOREWORD

SEPTEMBER 11, 2001, WAS A TURNING POINT FOR AMERICAN LAW ENFORCEment. 
Immediately following the attacks, local, state and federal law enforcement 
agencies faced service demands, problems and issues that they 
had never seen before. Within the next year, agencies witnessed how those developments 
affected budgets, policies, operational priorities, training and personnel. 
Sweeping reforms were not far behind. The passage of federal and state laws is 
only now being felt, and these mandates will surely continue to instigate additional 
changes in police organizations missions and strategies. Pending federal 
grant and technical assistance programs will also drive significant restructuring, 
as police agencies position themselves to receive that support.

Because of these, and the likelihood of additional 
change agents, the law enforcement 
profession is repositioning itself for how it 
fights terrorism. Many agencies have engaged 
in internal discussions to determine their 
capabilities and responsibilities, and more organized 
discussions have progressed in some 
states. Yet, on a national level, law enforcement 
is just beginning to develop comprehensive 
and detailed strategies for preventing and 
responding to terrorism. Policing as a profession 
is working on ways that the underlying 
principles of community policing can contribute 
to strategies to prevent terrorist activities. 
Finally, law enforcement leaders have not yet 
discussed how counterterrorism responsibilities 
could profoundly affect the policecitizen 
relationships and other positive influences 
of community policing on organizations and 
communities alike.

The Police Executive Research Forum 
(PERF), with funding from the Office of Community 
Oriented Policing Services (the COPS 
Office), will attempt to close those gaps. PERF 
has been providing local law enforcement leaders 
with the opportunity to examine these and 
other issues related to preventing and addressing 
terrorist acts. PERF is providing a series of 
forums for law enforcement chief executives, 
other policing professionals and government 



policymakers to explore, debate and exchange 
information on providing community-policing 
services in a security-conscious world. This 
initiative will produce practical advice for addressing 
immediate problems related to terrorism, 
as well as a framework to guide the 
profession for the next three to five years.

This white paper is the first in a series of 
five that takes on issues of primary concern to 
law enforcement professionals. It is based, in 
large part, on an unprecedented executive session 
that brought together sheriffs, police chief 
executives, FBI Special Agents in Charge and 
antiterrorist experts, and other leading thinkers 
on how law enforcement will deal with the 
new terrorist threat. It was a no-holds-barred 
meeting in which candid debates were conducted 
on the practical and very real concerns 
of those who must make daily decisions about 
how their personnel and other resources will 
be spent to address terrorism and competing 
demands for service. Participants took a hard 
look at how local and federal agencies work 
together and what needs to be done to improve 
cooperation. The result is the agenda set out 
in this paperset by consensus and an urgent 
desire to move our preparedness and response 
forward in these difficult times, without abandoning 
our promise to our communities to address 
crime and disorder. It is one of a number 
of products being developed under this COPS-
supported effort.

PERF will also conduct a national survey 
of law enforcement leaders and a series of four 
additional executive sessions that will address 
such tentative topics as policing multicultural 
communities, bioterrorism, intelligence and 
homeland security. In addition, PERFs project 
team will conduct fieldwork to identify model 
programs and approaches that work to address 
terrorism in a community-policing context 
that others nationwide can tailor to the unique 
needs of their jurisdictions. The result will be 
four more white papers and a comprehensive 
written manual for police agencies.

The COPS Office and PERF are pleased 
to facilitate these forums and other work that 
will provide the profession with opportunities 
to share and develop effective strategies for addressing 
terrorism while continuing to advance 
community policing.

Carl Peed 
Director, COPS

Chuck Wexler
Executive Director, PERF



CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

MORE THAN A YEAR AFTER SEPTEMBER 11, 2001, AMERICAN LAW ENforcement 
is working diligently to prevent the next terrorist attack. 
Will it be enough? Leaders of every law enforcement agency in 
America want to do their part in the fight against terrorism, yet many local police 
are struggling to muster resources, reorient their personnel and carve out new 
relationships with their state and federal counterparts. To complicate matters, 
their efforts lack a strong unifying strategy and coordinated approach with other 
jurisdictions and with agencies at other levels of government.

Local law enforcement agencies, in the face of 
new and uncertain threats to their communities, 
struggle to identify all their responsibilities 
and define their exact role in the nations 
fight against terrorism. The FBI and other federal 
agencies are also faced with new duties and 
priorities, such as expanding their intelligence-
gathering and coordinating functions, as well 
as other counterterrorism efforts. So, while 
every law enforcement agency strives to do 
its part, too many of them are unsure of what 
their part should be. And even those that feel 
certain of their charges must make significant 
changes to their structure, policies, procedures, 
personnel expertise, training and budgetsall 
with only their own guidelines or standards to 
ensure success.

The LocalFederal Partnership

Preventing and responding to terrorism is 
all the more complex because no agency 
can do it alone. The readiness of any one 
agencywhether it is the Lawrence (KS) Police 
Department, the Hennepin County (MN) 
Sheriffs Office, the D.C. Metropolitan Police 
Department, or the FBIis insufficient in the 
face of the potential threat. For more than 125 
years, American law enforcement has been organized 
around the principles of independence 
and decentralization. Some 18,0002 local, state 

2 According to Reaves and Hickman (2002), As of June 2000, State and local governments in the United 
States operated 17,784 full-time law enforcement agenciesthose that employed at least one full-time 
sworn officer with general arrest powers or the equivalent in part-time officers.



and federal agencies operate as autonomous 
entities, often unconnected to those in neighboring 
jurisdictions or at different levels of government. 
The threat of terrorism in Americas 
cities and towns, however, has revealed the 
critical need for improved coordination and 
resource sharingwhether personnel, equipment 
or informationto develop a formidable 
strategy to counter future acts of terrorism.

Local and federal law enforcement agencies 
have worked together for decades to prevent 
and solve crimes: bank robbery investigations, 
kidnappings, financial crimes, cybercrime, 
gangs and drugs. They have coordinated resources 
in the area of crime reporting and 
forensic and laboratory services. And they have 
engaged joint task forces to address a variety of 
crimes that cross jurisdictional boundaries. But 
these partnerships have not fully prepared law 
enforcement for the unprecedented demands 
they face now that international terrorists 
have struck in the United States and threaten 
to do so again. Local and federal law enforcement 
must build on positive past relationships 
and address any remaining impediments to full 
cooperation if they are to truly succeed in carrying 
out their new mandates.

Quote: Everybody here knows from 
experience that domestic 
tranquility and the common 
defense, fundamental purposes 
of government identified in the 
Preamble to the Constitution, 
cannot be achieved when local and 
federal agencies ignore obligations 
they can meet only by working 
together (Speech to Executive 
Session Participants4).

Ed Delattre


The Executive Session

On November 78, 2002, PERF3 convened a 
group for an unparalleled discussion among 
big-city police chief executives; sheriffs; FBI 
experts on terrorism, including several Special 
Agents in Charge (SACs); policymakers; and 
observers in Washington, D.C., to examine 
the localfederal partnership. (See Appendix C 
for a list of the principal participants.) These 
leaders in policing were tasked with developing 
practical guidelines to improve how local 
law enforcement and federal agencies can 
sustain more effective partnerships. The law 
enforcement executives came from jurisdictions 
across the country and were almost 


3 PERF is a nonprofit membership organization of progressive policing professionals dedicated to advancing 
law enforcement services to all communities through experimentation and national leadership. Its 
members serve more than half the nations population, and the organization provides training, technical 
assistance, research, publications and other services to its members and the profession. More information 
about PERF can be found at www.policeforum.org.

4 Delattres speech can be found in Appendix B.



evenly divided between local chiefs and sheriffs 
from cities and counties and FBI SACs and 
Headquarters administrators. Moderated by 
PERFs Executive Director, the session identified 
problems, potential solutions and strategic 
outcomes focusing on public safety and what is 
best for the country. A number of broad topics 
and specific questions related to those topics 
were used to guide the discussions, including 
the following:

 Defining the LocalFederal Partnership

 Federal and Local Law Enforcement 
Needs and Capacities

 Information Sharing Between Local and 
Federal Agencies

 Models of Successful Partnerships

 A Strategy for Improving Partnerships

After a day and a half of high-level discussions, 
the group summarized and reviewed 
its findings to identify areas that required additional 
work and to confirm consensus. The 
meeting was punctuated with a briefing for FBI 
Director Robert Mueller, who came to thank 
the participants for their work on improving 
collaborations and to discuss ideas with participants 
on key issues, including the challenges of 
implementing the groups recommendations.

The White Paper

This paper details the first executive session 
participants major findings and recommendations, 
which were the result of thoughtful deliberation 
and the collective expertise of leaders 
in the fight against terrorism in our communities. 
The priorities are the centerpiece of the 
paper and will receive the most attention. In 
each priority area, various perspectives and 
highlights from the discussions are presented, 
with an emphasis on understanding the true 
nature of the problems and obstacles to effective 
partnerships, as well as recommendations 
for improved collaborations. Additionally, the 
paper includes several sidebar articles that take 
one of two forms: One type of sidebar is authored 
by one of the session participants and 
elaborates on a subject that draws on his or her 
perspectives and experiences. The other type of 
sidebar, written by project staff, describes programs 
that have been identified as potentially 
promising for addressing a vital element of a 
counterterrorism strategy. It is hoped that the 
paper will advance cooperation and coordination 
among law enforcement agencies at all 
levels.



CHAPTER TWO
MAJOR THEMES AND ISSUES

FOR NEARLY TWO DAYS, LOCAL AND FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT EXECUTIVES 
engaged in a forum to dissect their collaboration effortsidentifying how 
to build on successes and address remaining challenges that will advance 
how they can prevent, investigate and respond to terrorist activity. The executive 
session was unprecedented, in both content and style. None of the participants 
could recall a similar national-level gathering of local and federal leaders in a candid 
exchange of ideas on joint law enforcement strategies. Nor could any recall 
a meeting where defensive postures and turf battles were put aside in an honest 
attempt to strengthen this essential partnership. Participants criticisms, explanations, 
descriptions and recommendations were introduced, discussed and debated. 
Ultimately, the group reached consensus on many seemingly intractable issues.

By the end of the first day, the participants 
identified more than 100 critical issues that 
could be divided into two categories: those that 
hindered an effective localfederal partnership 
and those that could improve that partnership. 
By the end of the second day, the list had been 
grouped into 12 priority topic areas, which 
PERF staff were able to refine and aggregate 
further after the session to the seven key priorities 
detailed in this paper. Many timely and 
important issues were beyond the parameters 
of this first executive session, and some issues 
received only a cursory review. Many of these 
topics, however, will be addressed in the five 
additional executive sessions that PERF will be 
facilitating.5

The first priority area addresses the importance 
of effective partnerships as well as 
the manner in which participants should work 
to strengthen them. The remaining six priority 



5 Though the topics have not been finalized, it is expected that four sessions will cover such issues as policing 
multicultural communities, bioterrorism, intelligence and homeland security systems. In addition, a 
final session will be held with support from the U.S. Justice Departments National Institute of Justice to 
examine critical incident management systems in local law enforcement.



areas address specific programs or functions of 
the localfederal partnership. The seven priorities 
are

 Promoting Effective LocalFederal 
Partnerships,

 Security Clearances and Information 
Sharing,

 Joint Terrorism Task Forces,

 FBI Strategies,

 Intelligence,

 Multijurisdictional Information 
Sharing, and

 Training and Awareness.

The participants discussions about each of 
these priority issues also revealed a number of 
recurring and unifying themes that are listed 
below. These themes provide insight into the 
causes of some of the problems and challenges 
that law enforcement partners face. They also 
provide a context in which the discussions and 
recommendations can be more fully understood. 
These themes include concerns with 
the following:

 Accountability

 Awareness

 Communication

 Coordination

 Credibility

 Focus

 Honesty

 Integrity

 Openness

 Proactivity

 Respect

 Trust

 Unified Public Voice

The next section of this chapter is devoted 
to the first priority, as it provides the framework 
for examining the six more specific programmatic 
and issue-specific areas, which are 
detailed in subsequent chapters. Readers will 
observe how the themes listed above are woven 
through many of these discussions and the related 
recommendations for change.

Quote: I agree that this is an 
unprecedented meeting. I have 
never attended a meeting with such 
a candid and productive dialogue on 
how we can work together.

 FBI SAC

Priority One:
Promoting Effective LocalFederal 
Partnerships

Throughout the first executive session, all participants 
emphasized that the need for a truly 
effective localfederal partnership is stronger 
today than ever before. This partnership has 
been productive many times in the past and 
remains vital today; however, it is not without 
its problems and requires additional work to 
realize its full potential. Both the local and 
federal participants admitted that confusion 
over roles, uncertainty about responsibilities, 
breakdowns in communication and even a 



lack of trust have historically been among the 
factors that have plagued partnership efforts 
and recently have placed new strains on it.6 
However, the participants expressed a strong 
resolve to work together to enhance their collective 
ability to protect our communities from 
terrorism.

Information Exchange and Access

Perhaps the cornerstone of this partnership is 
information exchange. Participants acknowledged 
that barriers to information exchange 
exist in all law enforcement agencies, and at 
every level. Barriers may be technological, organizational 
or territorial. They prevail in and 
among local police agencies as well as their 
state and federal counterparts. These barriers 
prevent agencies from sharing with other 
agencies and, just as importantly, from sharing 
information within agencies. There are many 
reasons why so many law enforcement personnel 
are protective of their information. They 
may be reluctant to share information with 
others to ensure protection of their sources or 
the integrity of an investigation, for example. 
Though it is common for individuals and organizations 
to hold information to retain control 
or to obtain a position of power in a collaboration, 
law enforcement must strive to overcome 
the barriers to information exchangebarriers 
that ultimately limit law enforcement effectiveness.


All participants agreed that better information 
exchange is critically needed and suggested 
a number of ideas for improving flow. The 
greatest complaint from all participantslocal 
and federalwas that they received important 
terrorist alert information from CNN before 
their own partners or headquarters (respectively). 
CNN was seemingly picking up information 
in real time, disseminating it faster 
than even federal agencies could. (For more on 
the media, see page 11.) All participants also 
agreed that there may be a misperception that 
the FBI has more detailed, accurate or confirmed 
information than it actually has. FBI 
representatives discussed the overwhelming 
volume of raw data and information that is being 
analyzed and examined at the federal level 
that has not yet yielded the kind of detailed 
direction that local law enforcement is seeking. 
Clearly, greater mutual trust would help 
answer the question about whether valuable 
information is being withheld (and for what 
reason) or whether it simply does not exist.

Participants from the local agencies spoke 
of the need to improve communication and 
information exchange so that they have a better 


6 Certainly local and federal partnerships vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Collaborations may be 
shaped by available local law enforcement resources to conduct investigations on crimes for which there 
is concurrent jurisdiction. Other factors include the length of a working relationship between the current 
police chief executive and SAC, budget issues, size of a jurisdiction and potential targets, personalities, 
organizational culture, history and myriad other features of a particular area. While many of these factors 
were discussed, the groups focus was on developing strategies for resolving problems and challenges that 
could be tailored to a jurisdictions specific needs. 



understanding of when and why federal officials 
are operating in their jurisdictions. They 
seek timely information that will support proactive 
and preventive measures. Local executives 
expressed a need for more information on 
investigations in their own backyards, including 
whom the federal agencies are examining. 
They expressed concerns about operational 
coordination and officer safety. Chiefs and 
sheriffs believe that early notification and information 
sharing would allow local police7 to 
act as a force multiplier for the federal officers, 
in which they could offer help, coordinate undercover 
efforts, not open a parallel operation, 
or back off, if that was required.

While many participants extolled the positive 
working relationships in their own jurisdictions, 
there was a sense within the group that 
issues of trust, organizational culture, history 
of leaks or misuse of information and other 
matters continued to undermine some efforts 
across the country. There was consensus that 
local and federal leaders need to better address 
instances in which information was misused 
in the past and to ensure the integrity of the exchange 
in the future. FBI and local executives 
emphasized the importance of developing relationships 
during times of non-stressbefore 
the crisis strikes. This relationship building 
must include developing processes and protocols 
for information sharing that can prevail 
if there are future personality conflicts. By 
their own admission, the executives believed 
relationships were largely dependent on personalities 
and agreed that how SACs and local 
police officials get along with one another 
will always be a part of the equation. They 
stressed, however, that partnerships must be 
established in ways that can survive executive 
or other key personnel turnover. The information 
must continue to flow regardless of who is 
in charge. The participants agreed that federal 
and local partners need to alert one another to 
perceived problems, obstacles and failures in a 
spirit of cooperation so they can be discussed 
and resolved. The partnerships must be based 
on openness, honesty and trust.

When trust and openness are tenets of 
information exchange, chiefs believe progress 
will be made in ameliorating local law enforcements 
perceptions that the information 
flow is unilateral. One chief, in stressing the 
importance of information exchange, described 
a partnership as a coordinated effort on a continuous 
basis. Unfortunately, the local police 
participants generally felt information is not 
always shared continuously, nor exchanged 

Lets be honest. The FBI just may 
not have the terrorism intelligence 
we are looking for.

Local Law Enforcement Executive

7 Unless referring to a particular agency, the term police is used in the broadest sense and includes both 
police and sheriff organizations. Likewise, the term chiefs refers to all local law enforcement executives.



in a coordinated fashion. Without hearing an 
explanation for these inconsistencies, local 
executives may perceive the failure to share 
information as deliberate.

A number of executives said that the flow 
of information is primarily one-way: Locals 
give more to the federal agencies than they get 
in return. Local officials provide investigative 
information and even intelligence to FBI field 
offices but do not receive similar information. 
That frustration is aggravated by the perception 
that the FBI does not provide feedback on 
how they use the information that locals provide, 
and indeed may classify the information 
that may stymie local police follow-up or parallel 
efforts. Chiefs and sheriffs also indicated 
that the FBI does not always pass along new 
information it develops or receives from other 
law enforcement or national security agencies. 
It should be noted, however, that several local 
law enforcement executives recognized that 
the information exchange between their local 
agencies and the FBI has improved since September 
11.

The FBI officials, however, countered that 
they work under several constraints, including 
the post-Hanssen culture and the concerns 
among agents that they do not inadvertently 
violate nondisclosure agreements, agency policies 
or otherwise endanger a source or investigation. 
They also noted that there may again 
be a misperception that they have better and 
more information than they actually have.

A number of local executives expressed 
concern that federal agencies were using local 
law enforcements lack of security clearances 
as an excuse not to share investigative and 
operational information in a timely manner. 
These concerns are addressed in sections on 
Clearances and Intelligence in more detail 
below and also were raised in the context of assessing 
the Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) 
forums as mechanisms for sharing information. 
As discussed more fully in later sections, 
chiefs are concerned about accountability and 
effectiveness when the JTTF member from his 
or her department cannot share information 
with the chief because the JTTF officer has a 
higher clearance or the police chief executive, 
as yet, has none at all.

There was agreement among the local law 
enforcement and federal agency representatives 
that much of the substantive information 
that chief executives need at the local level can 
be made available through alternative mechanisms 
without needing to invoke the highest 
security clearance protocols.

Building Partnerships Early

The proactive partnerships that participants 
referenced above regarding non-crisis planning 
included suggestions for joint field training exercises, 
Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs), 
media policies and other efforts to determine 
more formally the scope and nature of the partnership. 
Building a strong partnership before a 
critical incident improves the chances that federal 
and local officials will work together effectively 
to manage the incident. If nothing else, 
the participants will at least know one another 



and have a sense of counterparts operations. 
These proactive steps can take place between 
SACs and individual chiefs/sheriffs or through 
local, regional and statewide law enforcement 
associations. Partnership building also requires 
guidelines for how to address offers of assistance
setting parameters for those that are 
accepted and explaining the reasons why some 
offers will not be accepted.

Participants also felt strongly that both 
sides of the partnership need a better understanding 
of the others resources and how 
they may be used to complement partners 
efforts. Local officials stated that they would 
like to have a better understanding of the FBIs 
capabilitiesboth at the organizational and 
field office level. This understanding would 
enhance the potential for federal and local resources 
to be used in a complementary, rather 
than competitive, fashion.

To be effective, local law enforcement 
needs a realistic awareness and understanding 
of FBI capabilities. The FBI SACs provided the 
local police participants with new information 
about the limits to resources they have in their 
field offices and the budgetary requirements 
they must follow that hamper SAC discretion 
about how resources can be allocated among 
their mandates. Too often, they felt, local law 
enforcement perceived that the FBI had unlimited 
resources, such as equipment, personnel, 
computers, funding and information. Specifically, 
SACs said that local executives accuse 
them of holding out, which in reality is a lack 
of communication and education about their 
parameters for sharing information and legal 
mandates on their level of involvement in terrorism 
versus other types of joint jurisdictional 
coordination.

Both federal and local executives expressed 
the need for honesty and accountability in operations. 
Local executives said that when an officer 
screws up or there is a perceived problem, 
the FBI needs to notify local executives right 
away so the problems can be corrected and not 
fester. The SACs said that chiefs and sheriffs 
should do the same thing when agents screw 
up, and even when SACs get it wrong.

Accountability for Chiefs

The executive session provided an opportunity 
for both sides to explain some of the constraints 
under which they operate and to clarify 
the checks and balances inherent in their respective 
positions. For example, the police 
chiefs were mindful of their responsibilities to 
their citizens and their political accountability, 
as well as the effect of their decisions on local 
government operations.

Local law enforcement executives detailed 
what is necessary to protect local infrastructure. 
In addition to their routine threat assessments, 
local officials will also take action 
based on information from federal officials. 
There are tremendous costs and consequences 
for large deployments and resource commitments 
based on others information (even 
the FBIs), so they need to base requests for 
city resources on reliable federal information. 
Chiefs discussed the need to explain to political 



and budget leaders why they must allocate 
the requested resources. A strong partnership 
that is based on open discussions provides the 
clear and timely information needed to make 
proper decisions. At the same time, local executives 
acknowledged that their colleagues 
must not demand too much informationinformation 
that would be nice to know versus 
the information they need to know. As one 
chief stated, I know what it is like to baby-
sit those [individuals in my own jurisdiction] 
who did not need to know information, but 
wanted to.

Failure to base decisions on reliable and 
timely information has consequences for all 
involved. As one chief said, SACs will find 
themselves working with a new chief if elected 
officials dont have information that ultimately 
could have prevented a crisis. The key, again, 
seems to be one of trust. Another chief spoke 
about shutting down a large tourist attraction 
based on information from a SAC on whose 
word he felt he could rely, and he indicated he 
would do it again.

Quote: You cant ask for information that 
is nice to know. We need to only 
request what we need to know.

Local Law Enforcement Executive

Armed with timely and reliable information, 
chiefs felt they would be better able to 
meet their own accountability mandates. 
Chiefs believed they needed to try to build partnerships 
with their own city managers, mayors 
or other oversight authority to ensure that 
any early notice of a potential threat would 
be secure and understood. By explaining how 
they build relationships with political leaders 
that are based on trust and timing, the chiefs 
were able to identify with the demands that the 
SACs must balance.

Media Relations

Complicating issues related to information exchange 
among law enforcement agencies is the 
role of the media. Because this executive session 
convened in the shadow of the Beltway 
Sniper Investigation, there were heightened 
sensitivities about information leaked to the 
mediainformation that ultimately reached 
the public before all involved law enforcement 
agencieswhich held the potential to derail 
the investigation.

All the participants stressed the hazards of 
not receiving threat or investigative information 
from knowledgeable colleagues before the 
media do. The SACs startled some of the local 
officials when they said they too have received 
critical information from CNN before it could 
be communicated through official channels.

Media leaks are a critical problem for both 
federal and local law enforcement and are not 
limited to any one rank. Chiefs and SACs 
spoke about the need to train agents and officers 
about the importance of preventing leaks. 
The group believed that too many law enforcement 
personnel talk too freely, sometimes 
violating disclosure agreements that come 



with security clearances. The media and other 
organizations are using ex-officers to tap old 
friends for information. One chief discussed 
plans to work on securing information through 
training and policy to ensure that sensitive 
investigation issues are not discussed at home 
and with friends.

When the time has come to share information 
with the media, federal and local joint 
operations should rely on pre-established media 
strategies and media relation policies that 
inform the public and retain control over information 
that could damage coordinated efforts. 
Spokespersons and other details should be determined 
to minimize any tensions among the 
partners and so law enforcement can be seen as 
speaking with one voice.

Partnerships Effects on 
Community Policing

Creating a safe nation starts with safe 
streets, began one chief as he spoke about 
the importance and centrality of community 
policing to antiterrorism efforts. Local police 
are partners with the community in addressing 
crime, and now in collecting information that 
might prevent the next terrorist attack. Local 
chief participants voiced their concern that the 
FBI does not always understand the extent to 
which communities hold local chiefs and sheriffs 
accountable for federal agencies actions in 
the community and the importance of local 
police relations with their constituencies.

The local officials believed that community 
policing has provided valuable lessons, relationships 
and approaches that can be applied to 
counterterrorism policing. However, many of 
the local participants were concerned that federal 
officials are not aware of community issues 
when they sweep into a jurisdiction to search for 
an individual or engage in other investigatory 
practices and leave just as quickly. The unintended 
consequence is damage to policecitizen 
relations, particularly in minority communities, 
that took tremendous effort to build through 
community policing.

Citizen engagement and collaborative 
problem solving yield tremendous resources 
that allow local law enforcement to gather information. 
Several ideas were discussed about 
how local law enforcement might assist the 
FBI with engaging and disengaging when in 
their communities. For example, some local 
participants believed the FBI could work with 
the local agencies to have area police officers or 
deputies perform some operations or be counseled 
by local agencies on what has worked 
within their communities that might influence 
federal agency tactics. For example, local law 
enforcement suggested it can provide valuable 
street-level information and employ different 
methods, such as using citizen informants instead 
of paid informants. Planning for how federal 
and local agencies will engage area citizens 
may also involve arrangements for when SACs 
offices are not staffed for action. Arrangements 
may need to be made so that the FBI schedule 
is expanded or it agrees to support local investigators 
if they act on time-sensitive information 
in the middle of the night.


Federal-level investigative tactics should be 
examined, according to local enforcement officials, 
in the light of community-policing principles 
to ensure they will not create problems for 
local law enforcement when an investigation 
is finished. Whether it is the INS, ATF, FBI or 
other federal agency involved in an investigation, 
it is the local chief executive who is held 
accountable by the local community.

The FBI has recognized these concerns, 
and FBI participants expressed their commitment 
to improving community relationships 
in much the same way that local police have 
done through community policing efforts. The 
FBI is trying to work with minority communities 
and hopes to partner closely with local law 
enforcement to show a unified commitment. 
The FBIs Office of Law Enforcement Coordination 
hopes to facilitate this effort by promoting 
the concepts of community-oriented 
policing in the FBI.

Recommendations and Concerns

 A strong localfederal partnership is 
essential to our nations fight against 
terrorism. This partnership should be 
multifaceted, and law enforcement 
must continue to identify ways to work 
together to advance common interests. 
This first executive session is a step 
in the right direction, but similar and 
complementary efforts are continually 
needed, particularly parallel work at the 
localregional level.

 Information exchange and access can 
only be achieved through pre-crisis 
planning, which may involve formal 
mechanisms (MOUs, joint media and 
information dissemination policies for 
joint task forces, and more) to ensure 
that working relationships and roles are 
defined and that they survive changes in 
leadership or personality conflicts.

 Local police and federal officials must 
address any tensions, trust issues and 
misperceptions at the local level. Each 
should inform the other of their respective 
resources, legal mandates, limitations 
and accountability concerns. 
Guidelines for the nature and scope 
of the information that can be shared 
should be detailed as well. Each partner 
must also identify and redress barriers 
to interagency (among same-level agencies 
and between agencies at other levels 
of government) and intra-agency information 
sharing.

 Local and federal partners can be more 
supportive of one anothers efforts to ensure 
appropriate resources and flexibility 
are given SACs, local law enforcement 
chief executives and others coordinating 

Locals need to live and work in 
that community long after the 
investigation and sometimes need 
to repair damaged relationships 
caused by federal investigators.

Local Law Enforcement Executive




the response to terrorism. For example, 
local law enforcement executives (chiefs 
and sheriffs) volunteered to speak to 
their elected representatives about the 
need for strengthening the localfederal 
partnership. The FBI can provide assistance 
to chiefs in developing protocols 
for sharing information with political 
leaders. Local law enforcement executive 
participants also offered to testify 
before Congress and other policymakers 
on behalf of, and with, the FBI to 
address obstacles to coordination and 
to ensure resources can be effectively 
deployed where they are most needed.

 Federal law enforcement (FBI, INS, 
DEA, ATF and others), the Department 
of Homeland Security and local agencies 
must work more closely to ensure 
that federal engagement and disengagement 
of area residents does not damage 
existing local policecitizen relations 
or otherwise undermine community-
policing principles. Local and federal 
partners must work to realize community 
policings potential to provide 
all of law enforcement with valuable 
information and strategies for fighting 
terrorism.



A REGIONAL RESPONSE TO TERRORISM FOR LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES:
A Site Visit Summary8

By their own admission, officials in the Redondo Beach Police Department (RBPD) recognize that 
the odds of international terrorists striking their community are slim. Yet even slim chances require 
enhancing agency preparedness. Situated midway between Los Angeles International Airport 
(LAX) and the Port of Los Angeles (POLA), and home to a number of potential terrorist targets 
such as an oil refinery, electricity power plant, regional shopping mall, defense contractors and 
beachfront tourist attractions, this agency of 105 personnel in southwest Los Angeles County has 
fashioned a comprehensive program that other midsize local law enforcement agencies across the 
nation may want to study and replicate.

The RBPD counterterrorism program is predicated on two approaches: developing internal 
resources and participating in four terrorism task forces,9 each organized at a different level of government. 
By fully developing its internal resources, RBPD officers believe they are better prepared 
to prevent and respond to a terrorist attack. RBPDs participation inand in some cases leadership 
oftask forces has enabled its officers to develop a network of intelligence and investigative 
resources that culminated with the assignment of a detective to GITMO (the Camp X-Ray prison 
for al Qaeda operatives at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Station) to interrogate prisoners.

The attacks of September 11 caused local law enforcement agencies to ask, What can we 
do? RBPD personnel believed they had a place to look, if not an outright answerThe South 
Bay Police Chiefs Advisory Group.10 This group has a history of close cooperation. In fact, prior to 
September 11, 2001, one of the South Bay agencies was developing a plan to convene an advisory 
group to examine transnational crime. After the attacks, the focus of the proposed advisory group 
shifted to terrorism (one of the previously recognized transnational crimes). The Chiefs Group 
agreed with the plan for an advisory group and formed the South Bay Police Chiefs Terrorism 
Advisory Group chaired by RBPD Lieutenant John Skipper.

The advisory group adopted the following two goals as the foundation for its deliberations and 
recommendations:

 Integrate with and complement existing or emerging efforts at the 
federal, state and local levelsavoiding duplicating efforts.

 Examine and develop a response to the unique needs of the South Bay.

The advisory group then identified 10 categories of issues11 and appointed working groups 

8 This description was compiled by PERF project staff after conducting a January 2003 site visit; interviewing 
personnel from local, state and federal law enforcement agencies; and reviewing available 
literature on the programs.

9 The task forces are the South Bay Police Chiefs Terrorism Advisory Group, the FBI Long Beach JTTF, 
the LA County Sheriffs Terrorism Early Warning Group and the California Anti-Terrorism Information 
Center.

10 Members of the group include police departments from Redondo Beach, El Segundo, Gardena, Hawthorne, 
Hermosa Beach, Inglewood, Manhattan Beach, Rancho Palos Verdes and Torrance. Combined, 
they have nearly 900 sworn officers.

11 The 10 issue categories are Terrorism Task Forces, Training, Threat Assessment, Information Sharing 
and Analysis, Contingency Planning, Explosive Device Detection, SWAT Capabilities, Communications, 
Cyber-Terrorism and Resources.


of subject-matter experts from the participating departments to examine each issue. Within 45 
days of receiving its charge, the advisory group had submitted nearly 100 recommendations 
to the chiefs, and within 90 days many of them were being implemented. Many of the recommendations 
have resulted in improved capabilities and new initiatives, while work continues 
on others. Recommendations in two of the categoriesTerrorism Task Forces and Information 
Sharing and Analysishave been especially successful and could be replicated or tailored by 
other agencies.

Terrorism Task Forces

One of the first and most successful efforts of the South Bay Group was integrating with other 
terrorism task forces in the Los Angeles area, especially the Long Beach JTTF. Prior to September 
11, the FBI Long Beach Resident Office did not have a JTTF, but a more limited National Security 
Squad with 8 Special Agents. However, because RBPD wanted to work with other agencies, it contacted 
the Long Beach Office and offered to detail an officer who would act as a liaison to all South 
Bay agencies. That offer was accepted on October 5, 2001, and later that month, a Torrance officer 
became the second South Bay member on the Squad.

Both South Bay detectives became fully credentialed, cross-designated federal officers with Top 
Secret clearances. The detectives work in the JTTF office and are treated like FBI Agents in virtually 
all aspects of case assignment and management. Although the local officers have Top Secret 
clearance, they do not always have the same level of access to information that Agents do. Several 
JTTF members stated that lifting this restriction would improve investigative effectiveness without 
compromising security.

The Squad was designated a JTTF when the Bureau implemented plans to increase the number 
of JTTFs. The Task Force now includes participants from the LAPD, the LASO and the Long 
Beach PD, as well as investigators from the U.S. Navy, U.S. Customs, INS and the EPA to work 
with the officers and Agents.

The South Bay personnel on the JTTF have participated in more than 150 terrorism investigations, 
ranging from visa violations to financial support for terrorism, to surveillance and the arrest 
of individuals of known terrorist organizations. In addition to the two assigned officers, South Bay 
departments provide the JTTF with other needed resources. In particular, the local agencies routinely 
provide surveillance teams to the JTTF and on other occasions have provided SWAT teams 
and overtime pay to facilitate investigations. The South Bay involvement included the six-week 
assignment of a RBPD detective to GITMO to interview imprisoned terrorist suspects. The FBI 
and RBPD shared the overtime costs associated with detailing the detective.

In addition to the JTTF, South Bay departments are working closely with two other task forces. 
One of these is the Los Angeles County Terrorism Early Warning Group (TEW). The TEW is 
the intake center for information on terrorism, public order and dignitary security issues for LA 
County. Housed in the LA Sheriffs state-of-the-art Emergency Operations Center, its mission is 
to monitor trends and forecasts indicating terrorist threats or attacks. Unlike the JTTF, the TEWs 
staffing fluctuates according to need. Since October 5, 2001 officers from five South Bay departments, 
including the RBPD, have provided assistance to the TEW on a rotating basis.

A third task force in which South Bay participates is the California Anti-Terrorism Information 
Center (CATIC). CATIC was created after September 11 by the Governor. It serves as the 
central point for law enforcement terrorism intelligence. CATIC provides timely collection, coordination, 
analysis, investigation and dissemination of criminal intelligence information regarding 
terrorist activity to federal, state and local law enforcement agencies. The El Segundo PD assigned 
a sergeant to CATIC who serves as a representative for the nine South Bay departments.


Information Sharing and Analysis

To facilitate South Bay departments coordination, each agency has appointed a Terrorism Liaison 
Officer (TLO). The goal is to have every agency identify one person who will receive information 
regarding terrorism and transnational crime, effectively interpret and assess that information and 
appropriately forward or handle that information. To help the TLOs develop and improve their 
skills, officers from several South Bay departments have developed and provided a three-day TLO 
training course. TLOs are expected to possess the following knowledge and abilities:

 Knowledge of types of criminal activity that provide financial support for transnational 
criminal organizations and terrorism

 Knowledge of community, regional, county, state and federal resources 
dedicated to combating transnational crime and terrorism and how those 
resources can best be used to investigate and deter them

 Knowledge of the structure and current activities of significant trans-
national criminal and terrorist organizations

 Knowledge of foreign prosecution/extradition procedures

 Ability to recognize activity indicative of terrorism and transnational 
crime

 Ability to access international investigative resources such as INTERPOL, 
FBI LEGATS, international law enforcement liaisons, etc.

 Ability to conduct threat assessments regarding evaluating and interpretating 
terrorism and transnational criminal activity information

Because of the sheer size of Los Angeles County and the number of law enforcement agencies,
12 the LA County Sheriffs Office has adopted the South Bay Chiefs recommendation that 
each Sheriffs station appoint a TLO. The Sheriffs Office also is helping other police agencies in 
the county appoint TLOs. To maximize effective information sharing and analysis, the Sheriffs 
Office and the South Bay Chiefs Group are working to appoint a TLO Area Representative (AR) 
for each of the seven mutual aid areas in the county. Each AR would represent several departments 
and would serve at the TEW in a full-time capacity.

Other Successes

Recall that the South Bay Terrorism Advisory Group adopted nearly 100 recommendations. In addition 
to the successes described above, other noteworthy achievements follow. In keeping with its 
two goals, each of these successes either integrated South Bay resources with other federal, state 
and local efforts or improved the capabilities of the South Bay departments.

 Worked with the California POST to create training courses that address 
identified law enforcement needs. To date, the South Bay agencies have 
developed and delivered courses for law enforcement executives throughout 
the state and have developed train-the-trainer curricula for first-responder 
courses.

 Used an existing Serious Crime Reduction Fund to help support threat assessments, 
training, overtime and equipment.

12 Los Angeles County is 4,084 square miles and has a population of 9,902,700 and more than 50 local law 
enforcement agencies. 



 Working with State Assemblyman to pass legislation that would create 
a Terrorism Crime Reduction Fund to further support training and first-
responder resources.

 With members of the business community, established the Foundation 
for Combating Terrorism and Transnational Crime, a nonprofit 501(c)3 
organization that will collect tax-exempt donations to purchase terrorism-
related resources. More than $60,000 has been donated to the Foundation 
at the time of this writing, and it has purchased an explosive detecting 
dog for the L.A. Sheriff and Level C protective equipment for the South 
Bay WMD Response Platoon. It also has sponsored officer exchanges with 
Spain and Northern Ireland.

 Worked with the FBI and U.S. Attorneys office to develop protocols for handing 
off cases related to terrorism, but that are more traditionally criminal in 
nature (e.g., identity theft, narcotics).

 Identified and arranged for threat assessment training from Texas A&M 
University in Torrance for multidisciplinary teams from all of the South Bay 
cities.

 Organized a training course in Weapons of Mass Destruction that was held 
in Redondo Beach. This was the first of six training courses provided statewide 
(includes train-the-trainer component).

 Developed local multidisciplinary terrorism critical-incident plans.

Lessons Learned

At the heart of RBPDs success is a philosophy of service to communities and the profession. 
RBPD has built an extensive informational and operational network with local, county, state and 
federal agencies. Several RBPD staff spoke about the principles they followso fundamental as to 
risk being labeled platitudes. Yet they seem to explain much of RBPDs success in building partnerships 
with other law enforcement agencies.

Have a PlanRBPD studied the issues and developed a written plan with its partners in the 
South Bay Police Chiefs Group. This group of nine agencies first examined their own resources and 
needs and then expanded it to the FBI, the LA County TEW, the State POST and the CATIC.

Focus on Resource BuildingNo single agency has the resources to prevent the next terrorist 
attack. But by recognizing the value that each agency brings, these task forcesespecially the 
JTTFhave been able to overcome many impediments to a successful partnership.

Commitment and Direction from the TopThe South Bay Chiefs Group formed a Terrorism 
Advisory Group and gave it a clear mandate. When the groups recommendations were developed, 
the chiefs provided resources for implementation. In particular, the RBPD has provided resources 
for an officer to be detailed to GITMO and to allow other staff to develop and deliver training programs 
for the State of California.

Keep the Mission FirstWith four task forces at four different levels of government operating 
within 25 miles, failure is a distinct possibility. Egos, disputes and battles over turf and resources 
could easily undermine the success of any one task force or diminish cooperation. Some of these 
obstacles arise at times, and as these task forces grow in size there are greater opportunities for 
barriers to emerge. Yet, the ability of most participants to focus on the missionpreventing the 
next terrorist attackhas kept these task forces on track.



CHAPTER THREE

SECURITY CLEARANCES AND 
INFORMATION SHARING

Introduction

ISSUES RELATED TO SECURITY CLEARANCES AND NONDISCLOSURE AGREEMENTS 
are hot-button concerns for federal and local authorities alikethough often 
for very different reasons. Throughout the executive session, problems associated 
with security clearances were the subject of lively debate and discussion. 
Problems included those involving the process of receiving various clearances and 
how they affect the exchange of information. Generally, local law enforcement 
needs to know more about security clearancesthe types of clearances, what they 
mean, and how they will affect law enforcement operations. They also need to 
understand nondisclosure agreements when they receive clearances, as well as 
similar limitations on federal officials information sharing.

FBI personnel need a more detailed understanding 
of what information and materials can be 
shared as unclassified materials and which can 
be disseminated to those with Secret clearance 
levels. Both sides need to determine how to 
format, package or translate national-level 
information into a form that is more readily 
available and useful for local law enforcement 
investigators and officers.

Quote: I thought I understood security 
clearances, but todays exchange 
really opened my eyes as to how 
they work.

Local Law Enforcement Executive



A Brief History of Security 
Clearances/Executive Orders

Clearance levelsSecret or Top Secret
are based on the need-to-know doctrine, 
which requires an FBI background check be 
conducted for those officials who need to have 
access to national security information that 
has been classified as Confidential or Secret.
13 As stated in the FBI brochure (2002) 
on the Security Clearance Process for State and 
Local Law Enforcement,

 A Secret security clearance may be 
granted to those persons who have a 
need-to-know national security information, 
classified at the Confidential or 
Secret level.

 A Top Secret clearance may be granted 
to those persons who have a need-to-
know national security information, 
classified up to the Top Secret level, 
and who need unescorted access in FBI 
facilities, when necessary [emphasis 
added].

The background investigation process for 
Secret and Top Secret clearances are mandated 
by Presidential Executive Order. The FBI does 
not have the ability to waive these requirements. 
Any reforms that local law enforcement 
might like to see made to the procedures for 
obtaining a clearance would require changing 
the Executive Order. (Indeed, later sections detail 
suggestions that local chiefs would like to 
see made to the process.)

The categories of, and processes for, security 
clearances were developed years ago 
during the Cold War for a very different type 
of threat than what we face today. The executive 
session participants spoke about how the 
new threats to national security and domestic 
tranquility require rethinking the process by 
which security clearances are granted. While 
local law enforcement recognizes and respects 
the critical need to protect intelligence sources, 
every effort should be made to find innovative 
and more expansive efforts to provide local 
law enforcement with the information they 
need to confront terrorist threats in their own 
communities. The challenge for the country 
is to find some mechanism for conveying the 
information in a declassified format or bringing 
local law enforcement more rapidly within 
the classified arena, which will help protect our 

13 An individual applying for employment or for a clearance must fill out a Standard Form 86 (Questionnaire 
for National Security Position). After a successful background check, the candidate will be required 
to sign the Standard Form 312 (Nondisclosure Agreement). The SF 312 form signifies that the individual 
is responsible as a holder of the particular clearance approved to protect national security. These forms are 
available from the Office of Personnel Management. However, each federal agency has supplemental forms 
that may need to be completed in addition to the SF 86 and SF 312. At this writing, these forms are not 
available online. In the near future, these forms will be available for individuals to complete online at the 
website for each federal agency and will be available on the OPM website. At this time, law enforcement 
personnel should obtain a form from their SAC, Security Officer, or the Senior Resident Agent from their 
locale. These individuals will assist law enforcement personnel through the process (FBI Office of Law 
Enforcement Coordination 2003).



counties, cities and towns across the country 
without compromising intelligence sources.

Quote: More than a year after 911, I still 
dont feel like Im in the game. And I 
need to be in the game.

Local Law Enforcement Executive

The Sticking Points

The Office (now Department) of Homeland Security 
has been collecting information on challenges 
that must be addressed to ensure that 
all law enforcement resources are focused and 
coordinated in our fight against terrorism. The 
executive session participants encourage the 
Department of Homeland Security and other 
federal agencies to review the Executive Order 
that currently prevents a more expedited clearance 
process for local law enforcement officials 
and is a barrier to bringing state and local law 
enforcement resources to bear effectively on 
the task before us all.

The Long and Cumbersome Road to 
Clearance

This call for a review was the result of extensive 
executive session discussions about how security 
clearance issues exacerbate localfederal 
tensions and create frustration among local law 
enforcement leaders who perceive the process 
as confusing and impeding critical communication. 
Specifically, chiefs and sheriffs expressed 
frustration about the time required to receive a 
clearance. Several of the executives at the session 
did not yet have clearances. Among those 
were a few chiefs who did not know if their applications 
would yield results of value to justify 
the investment in the process.

The position of local law enforcement 
around the table was that they are trustworthy 
and already engaged in collecting sensitive intelligence. 
As one chief said, Why should we have 
to jump through hoops to prove our integrity? 
There was consensus that chiefs and sheriffs 
want to receive security clearances without the 
usual waiting times to process paperwork. Local 
executives need to know what is happening in 
their jurisdictions regarding threats and investigations 
now and do not want to have to rely 
on a JTTF detective to determine what the local 
law enforcement executive should know.

The session participants suggested the 
following reforms to the Executive Order, FBI 
Guidelines and policies to eliminate the backlog 
and expedite future applications. These 
include shortening the forms, streamlining the 
process, using more retired officers to conduct 
investigations, working with local law enforcement 
to determine who needs a clearance, 
and using existing military or federal agency 
clearances, among others. A number of executives 
questioned whether the entire clearance 
process should be changed, or at least use some 
type of abbreviated approach for police.

FBI personnel spoke about the security 
clearance problem from their perspective. Local 
law enforcement personnel do not always 
complete and return the paperwork, or if they 


do complete it, there are delays in returning it. 
Forms are not always fully or accurately completed. 
And too often local officials apply for 
Top Secret clearances when all they really need 
is a Secret clearance. There is a misperception 
that the FBI has control over the processand 
local law enforcement sometimes believes that 
the process is an affront to their professionalism, 
when it is really just about following mandatory 
authorities.

FBI Follow-Up

Efforts are already underway to address the participants 
recommendations. Executive Order 
12968, which mandates that the FBI follow a 
long and arduous process for granting security 
clearances, has been further scrutinized. Following 
the executive session, the FBI arranged 
for an advisory group of state and local law 
enforcement executives to meet with the Intelligence 
Community Security Directors Forum 
on February 24, 2003, to discuss policies and 
procedures related to the Executive Order governing 
access to classified information and the 
security clearance processes. Representatives 
from the Department of Homeland Security 
and the Associate Director of Central Intelligence 
for Homeland Security were also present. 
The meeting was complemented by a site visit 
to the Central Intelligence Agency. The forum 
was very productivewith discussions of law 
enforcements concerns about the security 
clearance process. The FBI will be discussing 
how best to address them, including possibly 
recommending a change to policies governing 
the security clearance process.14

Different Federal Agencies, 
Different Clearances

Different federal agencies can require a local 
official to obtain a security clearance through 
that particular agency. For example, one local 
executive had two federal security clearances, 
but not one from the FBI. Consequently, the 
FBI would not share classified information 
with him. Another executive had a Top Secret 
clearance for the National Guard, but only a 
Secret clearance from the FBI.

Session participants learned that it is possible 
to have one federal agency transfer its 
security clearance to another federal agency immediately 
if the applicant makes a request.15

14 The participants also discussed how they could work together to address the special training needs of state 
and local law enforcement in the counterterrorism/intelligence arena (Timmons 2003).

15 As an example, the following procedures need to be completed if a police chief has a Department of Defense 
clearance and needs to transfer this clearance to the FBI to work on a task force. The police chief must 
contact the Department of Defense security office and request their clearance paperwork to be transferred 
to the FBI Clearance Access and Data Management Unit. The FBI practices reciprocity; therefore, a background 
check would not be required. An entry is made by the FBI Clearance Access and Data Management 
Unit into the FBI system to recognize that the police chief has an active clearance with another agency. 
The transfer of clearance can take place immediately, usually within that same day (Shubert 2003).

 The same process is used to transfer a clearance from other federal agencies besides the Department 
of Defense to the FBI. The police chief must contact the security office of the federal agency to begin the 



Knowing Sources Versus Acquiring 
Information

Significant portions of FBI investigations into 
terrorist activity may focus on criminal code 
violations. These investigations are not classified, 
and participation in (and knowledge 
of) them does not require a security clearance. 
Conversely, other portions of terrorism 
investigations focus on national security issues 
and are classified. In counterterrorism 
investigations, the sources of information 
and the information-collection methods can 
determine a classification. For example, the 
information sourcemechanical intercept 
versus human sourcecan determine the 
classification. Human source-generated information 
is given higher classification to protect 
his or her identity. Human sources require 
tremendous security. Local law enforcement 
participants also understood that the FBI cannot 
share National Security Agency and other 
certain federal information by law. Even without 
source information, some information will 
still be classified.

Chiefs and sheriffs agreed: They need to 
know that a source is credible and reliable 
when receiving information. They do not always 
need to know the individual or specifics 
of how the information was obtained. This can 
mean the difference between needing a Secret 
(less source information available) and Top 
Secret clearance. Secret clearances can provide 
access to key information and escorted access 
to FBI facilities, which should be sufficient for 
any official not doing regular business at the 
FBI as part of a task force. The discussions revealed 
these important perspectives:

 Chiefs do not always need, and should 
not demand the source of, classified 
information. Information can be shared 
to a greater extent if sources are not 
disclosed. It is the information that is 
critical and need only be put in a context 
that characterizes the source. As one local 
executive said, chiefs and sheriffs 
need to distinguish between need to 
know and want to know. It is important 
to trust the information broker. 
He compared receiving source information 
from the FBI to his days as a narcotics 
officer, when he would not give up 
a source but could still share important 
information. He said that it was more 

FOOTNOTES, CONTD. 
transfer process. In order to expedite a security clearance process of a local law enforcement official with a 
security clearance from another federal agency, the local official should request that the clearance be transferred 
from one federal agency to another, rather than initiating a new application. If a local law enforcement 
chief has the same level of security clearance from another federal agency, transferring the security 
clearance from the other agency is quicker than filling out the paperwork for a new security clearance. 

 A security clearance that is more than five years old must be renewed through a background reinvestigation 
of those past five years. The process would be quicker for the local law enforcement official 
to renew his or her clearance from the other agency before transferring to the FBI, instead of starting a 
security clearance process from the beginning through the FBI (Shubert 2003).



important to know the level of credibility 
of information from someone qualified 
to assess that. The important issue 
for him is to know whether the source 
was reliable, unreliable or untested.

 Some local law enforcement participants 
emphasized that they would want 
to know if the source was in their own 
jurisdiction or a neighboring jurisdiction. 
Such information would allow a 
local law enforcement agency the opportunity 
to link information and contacts 
simply because of their intimate 
knowledge of their local communities. 
Another executive concluded by saying 
that if we know the FBI is operating in 
an area or looking for an individual, the 
local executive can then direct officers 
to track the person without giving them 
the source information.

However, those local antiterrorism specialists 
that require more information on sources 
and more extensive access to detailed information 
will require the higher clearance level. Local 
police officers and investigators assigned to 
a JTTF require a Top Secret clearance, which 
allows them to sit in front of an FBI terminal, 
work on an FBI computer and have access to 
certain federal databases. They may be privy to 
more specifics about sources of intelligence, if 
they need to know. The time required to obtain 
this clearance is six to nine months.

Most chiefs, by their own admission, substantively 
need only a Secret clearance and 
not a Top Secret. The Secret clearance can be 
awarded in 45 days. FBI SACs can also obtain 
an expedited clearance, if necessary. The chief 
may obtain needed information but will not 
obtain the source or methods of the information. 
The SF 86 and SF 312 forms will need to 
be completed, even after the fact, to obtain the 
appropriate clearance.16

Yet local law enforcement felt that a 
greater education effort must be made to ensure 
chiefs, sheriffs, mayors, city managers 
and others in municipal and state government 
understand the nuances of which clearance 
should be sought. Too often, policymakers, 
politicians and even law enforcement within 
their own agencies attach significance to the 
clearance level afforded a chief law enforcement 
executive.

16 A law enforcement chief executive who meets the appropriate criteria may obtain an expedited security 
clearance if exceptional circumstances exist for the granting of an interim Top Secret security clearance 
as part of the FBIs Law Enforcement Executives and Elected Officials Security Clearance Initiative (LEO 
Initiative). Because the United States is at war against terrorism, the FBIs top priority is counterterrorism. 
Executive law enforcement officials who have a legitimate need-to-know to protect the citizens of their 
respective jurisdictions are fulfilling an essential part of the FBIs counterterrorism strategy. There is a 
national security interest in rapidly providing classified information to executive law enforcement officials. 
Additionally, the issuance of an interim Top Secret security clearance will only apply to LEO Initiative 
candidates requiring that clearance. In most cases, law enforcement chief executives will not need a Top 



Perceptions Associated with Different 
Clearance Levels

So the fact that an investigator assigned to a 
JTTF has a Top Secret clearance while the chief 
has only a Secret clearance should not concern 
the chief . . . unless you are the chief.

Elected and appointed local government 
leaders and law enforcement personnel attach 
significance, even status, to the higher of the 
two clearance levels. They might wonder why 
the chief could not get the higher clearance, 
while others in the agency have it. The concern 
that chiefs have relates to their credibility and 
leadership abilities within their community. 
It also has implications for supervising lower-
ranking personnels work on JTTFs and other 
similar assignments. One recommendation 
from a session participant was to tie a clearance 
level to a rank, as it is done in the military. 
Others also advocated a comprehensive 
education effort. All those in governance and 
policing must understand that Top Secret and 
Secret clearances allow access to much of the 
same information. Both Secret and Top Secret 
clearance will ultimately be determined by the 
need-to-know information doctrine.

Nondisclosure Concerns

Another concern with different clearance levels 
is the extent to which information can be 
shared or released among persons with different 
security clearances or with a person lacking 
a security clearance, such as a mayor or city or 
county manager, or even key commanders in 
the law enforcement agency. No one wanted to 
put a commander or JTTF representative on 
the spot, having them try to decide whether the 
information can be shared with their bosses. 
They should not be encouraged to violate a 
nondisclosure agreement (punishable by criminal 
charges and/or termination of clearance),17 
nor do they want to undermine accountability. 


FOOTNOTES, CONT'D.
 Secret security clearance, as a Secret security clearance will suffice to meet their need to protect citizens 
(Shubert 2003).

 However, in the event that an interim Top Secret security clearance is required, the applicant must 
complete a SF 86, Questionnaire for National Security Positions, and two applicant fingerprint cards. The 
applicant must undergo a Single Scope Background Investigation covering a 10-year period. The requirement 
for completing a background investigation has been established by Executive Order 12968 and is 
mandatory for all candidates requiring access to National Security Information. The candidate will be 
interviewed and checks conducted regarding the information provided on the SF 86, local agency checks 
to include internal affairs, verification of birth, credit checks and national agency checks (IE OPM, DCII 
and FBI records). After favorable results are received from these checks, an interim Top Secret security 
clearance will usually be granted within 30 days while the remainder of the background investigation is 
completed. The FBI has established a 180-day requirement to complete the full background investigation. 
The final Top Secret security clearance adjudication will be completed by the FBIs Security Division. Once 
favorably adjudicated for a Top Secret security clearance, the candidate will be briefed and execute an SF 
312 Non-Disclosure Agreement (Shubert 2003).

17 The punishment for unauthorized disclosure is detailed on the nondisclosure form. Also, when obtaining 
a security clearance, the individual is briefed on the sensitivity of the issues. Intentionally disclosing 
information to others not holding security clearances can lead to termination of the individuals security 
clearance and criminal charges by the U.S. Attorneys Office (Shubert 2003). 



Agency personnel at all levels must be briefed 
about the scope and nature of what can be disclosed 
once clearance is obtained.

The FBI will accommodate agencies that 
want their senior administrators to have clearances, 
with the caution that it will take time. 
Chiefs and sheriffs need to say for whom they 
want clearances. Nonetheless, the Nondisclosure 
Agreement is legally binding. Executives 
must also be aware of the impact of nondisclosure 
agreements on individuals with clearances: 
Some FBI agents who wanted to share 
information with local law enforcement and 
others they felt should have the information 
are under scrutiny to determine if that sharing 
was in violation of that agreement.

Conclusion

The conversations on security clearances 
proved enlightening on many fronts but also 
demonstrated that all parties have significant 
frustrations with the issue. Despite this, all 
session participants see security clearances as 
a winnable issue and in that light developed 
the following recommendations.

Recommendations and Concerns

 Local, state and federal law enforcement, 
at all levels, must be better educated on 
the types of clearances, what they mean 
and where to go from here. They must 
then share that information with those 
in state and local governance. FBI and 
other federal personnel need more education 
on what and how things can be 
shared as unclassified materials. Federal 
agency personnel also need more extensive 
guidance about how to format 
information for local law enforcement 
and information for line officers. Then 
local law enforcement must be educated 
on what is available.

 The Executive Order governing security 
clearances should be reviewed and 
changed. Local law enforcement also 
want other administrative and legislative 
actions explored to facilitate the 
clearance process. Specifically, changes 
are needed to expedite the clearance 
process for law enforcement officials.

 It is possible to transfer security clearances 
from one federal agency to another 
if the applicant makes a request. Law 
enforcement officials with a security 
clearance from a federal agency should 
request that the clearance be transferred 
to another federal agency, rather than 
initiating a new application, by contacting 
the Security Office of the federal 
agency for which they currently have a 
clearance.

Quote: If the FBI gets intelligence about 
a specific threat in your backyard, I 
guarantee you will know about it.

FBI SAC



 Local chiefs and sheriffs request that the 
FBI make every effort to reduce the time 
required for Secret clearance from 45 
days to 30 days.

 Local law enforcement personnel should 
also commit to expediting the process. 
First, locals have to complete and return 
the necessary paperwork. They should 
return the forms as quickly as possible. 
Forms must be filled out completely and 
accurately.

 Because most chiefs need only a Secret 
clearance, rather than Top Secret, 
chiefs and sheriffs should apply for the 
Secret clearance. The Secret clearance 
can be awarded in 45 days, whereas 
the Top Secret clearance can require 
nine months. The FBI can expedite a 
chiefs clearance if there are exigent 
circumstances, but the background 
check process will then still need to be 
completed.

 Chiefs should refrain from requesting 
the source of classified information 
when it is not needed. And federal 
agencies, to the extent possible, should 
inform state and local authorities when 
there is information being generated 
from their local communities.

 Local law enforcement officers must 
adhere to nondisclosure agreements.

 Local agencies need to determine who 
in their police departments most need 
clearances and what levels of clearance 
are really needed.

 Local, state and federal partners should 
meet and discuss issues of trust and 
determine the best ways to share information 
through reformatting and other 
methods so that security clearances are 
not a barrier.



A COMMENTARY ON SECURITY CLEARANCES

by Edward A. Flynn, Secretary of Public Safety for Massachusetts and 
former Chief of the Arlington County (VA) Police Department18

When the Pentagon calls 911, it is the Arlington County Police Department that responds.19 And 
that is what we did on September 11, 2001, when my officers and I became first responders to 
the terrorist attack. Since that time, my agency has been immersed in dealing with the domestic 
terrorism threat. Many issues of concern have emerged through that work, and our labors on 
the Joint Terrorism Task Force, that have yet to be resolved. And while much has to be done on 
improving coordination, intelligence-gathering functions, interoperability and other aspects of a 
comprehensive antiterrorist response, we seem continually to come back to the core issues related 
to security clearances for local law enforcement and information sharing among federal, 
state and local authorities.

To be fair, I think the security clearance issue is something of a red herring. If you listen to 
any local police chief, sheriff, director of public safety or other chief executive, you will learn 
that their real concern is that local police perceive that they are not getting information from 
federal agencies, in particular, that might be useful in identifying potential terrorist threats. 
Security clearances are just one symptom of that problem and act as a lightening rod for law enforcements 
ire.

One reason for this state of affairs is that many local police professionals believe that security 
clearance restrictions are sometimes used as an excuse by members of federal agencies not to share 
information with local law enforcement. Chief executives report that they are told they cannot be 
given information because they lack the necessary clearances, but that they are unable to gain that 
clearance in a timely manner. They also report that some members of their own agency, particularly 
officers assigned to terrorism task forces, are unable to report information to the chief because the 
officer has clearance, but the chief does not. As you might imagine, this does not sit well with most 
chief executives. We need to fix the problems associated with police chiefs not receiving their necessary 
clearances, which frankly should not be that hard. Then we can build on the real work that is being 
done to remove remaining obstacles to information sharing among law enforcement agencies.

There were several issues raised at the executive session regarding clearances that seemed to 
resonate with all participants. To put these comments in proper context, I should acknowledge that 
I have been guilty of holding up my own security clearance by not filling out the forms as Chief of 
the Arlington County Police Department,20 though there is plenty of blame to go around. 


18 At the time of the executive session, Flynn was the police chief in Arlington County, Virginia.

19 Interestingly, the media and others have misperceived that the Pentagon is in Washington, D.C., 
when it is really located in Arlington County, Virginia.

20 The writer has since left Arlington County and is now the Secretary of Public Safety for the Commonwealth 
of Massachusetts.



I was, admittedly, petulant about the need to fill out a lengthy form and undergo a detailed process. 
I had already had a tremendous terrorist attack in my jurisdiction; having responded and worked 
intensely on the issues in the months that followed, I felt a bit put out that I now had to jump 
through hoops to get a security clearance. After participating in PERFs executive session, I am 
now penitent and better informed about why the federal agencies must operate as they do. In that 
spirit, I believe efforts should be focused on addressing these three primary concerns:

First, local law enforcement often presumes that federal agencies are withholding detailed, 
relevant and important information, for any number of reasons.21 I am not convinced that this is 
the case. The FBI is learning to get back into the intelligence-gathering game just as we are, and we 
must acknowledge that the information just may not be there sometimes. Then, we need to work 
on issues of mutual trust so that we can share what information there is, while retaining necessary 
security and integrity. There have been instances we can all recall when we got information 
from CNN before the FBI. This can only be resolved through improved coordination, cooperation 
and accountability. There are old relationships and agency cultures that must be overcome to 
make this happen. And we must ensure that federal agents are not hiding behind clearances as the 
reason for not sharing information that could be properly given to local law enforcement if packaged 
correctly. We need to share information, whether through executive committees of JTTFs or 
other means, by presenting the information in ways that may not require clearances at the highest 
levels.

Second, I never fully realized that you could get the same substantive information with a Secret 
clearance that you can with a Top Secret clearance. We dont all need computer terminal access 
at the FBI. We dont need to know the precise source of significant information, only whether the 
source is credible, reliable and other more basic characterizations of the source. We also need to 
educate our own officers, city and county leaders, and others who attach importance to the security 
levels one has so that chief executives will be more comfortable seeking a Secret clearance (which 
can be granted much more expediently than a Top Secret clearance). If, in time, a chief executive 
feels he or she needs a higher-level clearance, it could be pursued at a later time.

Third, we need to work with the federal agencies to make the process less painful for police 
chief executives. This would acknowledge that federal agencies find the chief executives input 
and involvement valuable to our joint efforts and want to share information with them. We need 
to request changes to legal authorities and regulations, whether White House Executive Orders or 
agency mandates, that place unnecessary burdens on the process for providing law enforcement 
professionals with clearances. Then we must identify who really needs the clearances and fill out 
the paperwork accurately and completely to expedite the process further. This can only happen in 
an atmosphere of mutual trust and respect.

We are more than a year past the terrorist attacks, and Im not alone when I say that local law 
enforcement executives do not feel like they are in the game. If we fix the clearance issue, we will 
be one step closer to using local law enforcement as they should be usedfull partners in the fight 
against terrorism.

21 We should not underestimate how fear of disciplinary or legal action can affect officers/agents decision 
to share information. Nondisclosure agreements; the threat of losing a job, or worse, in the wake 
of the Hanssen investigation; and confusion around exactly what level of information can be shared 
are all factors in that decision. 



CHAPTER FOUR

JOINT TERRORISM TASK FORCES

Introduction

THE FIRST JOINT TERRORISM TASK FORCE (JTTF) BEGAN IN 1980 IN 
New York City with 11 NYPD officers and 11 FBI special agents. The 
concept behind the JTTF was to combine the efforts and resources of 
federal and local law enforcement to focus on persistent or nefarious criminal activity. 
By September 11, 2001, there were 35 JTTFs in operation. Since that date, 
the number has grown to 66 (Mueller 2003a, 2003b).

A Force Multiplier, But Too Limited

While the JTTFs can be an effective force 
multiplier, the executive session participants 
were concerned that they have been inadequate 
for sharing information and conducting 
investigations related to terrorist threats. This 
consensus resulted in two alternative recommendations: 
First, the local law enforcement 
agencies could advocate for a complementary, 
but different, forum in which they would get 
the level and type of information they are seeking. 
Or second, they could advocate for reforms 
to the JTTFs that would bring them closer to 
their intended purpose.

A JTTF Alternative?

Some participants suggested that while JTTFs 
are beneficial, law enforcement needs complementary 
mechanisms for handling terrorism 
investigations. The FBI does not have unlimited 
resources and cannot provide all the support 
local law enforcement needs. They contend 
that JTTFs are not the panacea to localfederal 
information sharing and cannot effectively deal 
with the comprehensive information-gathering 
and analysis required to address terrorism, even 
with every local or state agency giving another 
10 command-level law enforcement officers to 
the effort. They are simply too limited by the 



number of personnel and resources they have. 
The typical JTTF model dictates that only a 
small number of local investigators are 
involved, which constrains the information flow 
within local departments.22 Local members on 
JTTFs also cannot always debrief their own 
commanders because of the security clearance 
restrictions described in the previous chapter. 
Accordingly, this group of participants felt that 
these task forces are not the answer to local 
law enforcements need for additional information 
on strategy, tactics and counsel on a wide 
range of issues. They proposed that chiefs need 
a complementary or additional forum to be 
effective decisionmakers and leaders on threats 
to their communities. Without an alternative 
forum, the limited nature of the JTTFs will 
continue to keep local law enforcement from 
being completely in the game.

JTTF Reforms: Fixing Whats Broken

Alternatively, some participants said that a 
different or complementary forum was not 
needed, but rather the focus should be on 
strengthening the existing JTTFs, including 
securing additional resources. Both these FBI 
officials and chiefs agreed that they need to 
make a stronger commitment to the JTTFs. 
They involve too few law enforcement officers 
and do not draw on the full capabilities that 
local law enforcement can bring to the table. 
These participants posit that the FBI should 
work more closely with local law enforcement 
to identify local investigators who can 
be pulled into investigations on an as-needed 
basis. Other federal agencies, such as INS and 
ATF, should also participate more. Local chiefs 
need to commit more qualified and committed 
personnel as well. The effectiveness of JTTFs 
depends on local executives assigning and leaving 
officers on JTTFs, which FBI officials have 
said has been a problem in the past. Given the 
strain on resources, local agencies are finding 
it difficult to assign personnel solely to JTTFs, 
particularly when there are other task forces in 
the same jurisdiction that require staffing as 
well. This local police commitment has also 
been derailed at times by a cyclical problem in 
which local executives are unwilling to commit 
more than minimal resources because 
they perceive they will get little back from 
their investment. But their investment cannot 
pay off until they commit resources to a JTTF 
that will, in turn, ensure valuable and practical 
information will flow back to the local police 
executive.

22 There are 56 FBI field offices, each of which chairs a Joint Terrorism Task Force. Each JTTF includes 
members of such other federal agencies as INS, Customs, CIA and ATF, as well as state and local law 
enforcement. There are an additional 10 satellite JTTFs that are affiliated with the 56 field office JTTFs. 
Homeland Security is included as well. The mission of the JTTFs is to identify and target for prosecution 
terrorists and terrorist organizations planning or carrying out terrorist acts occurring in or affecting a 
geographic region and to apprehend individuals committing such acts. These task forces substantially increase 
the resources and scope of the effort to prevent terrorist attacks but also substantially enhance collecting 
and sharing real-time information, fundamental to effective intelligence support (Mueller 2003a, 
2003b; Timmons 2003). 



Information that the JTTFs provide to local 
law enforcement must be as timely as possible 
to make certain local agencies will stay 
involved. Another effort that would promote 
long-term local agency involvement would 
include developing a formal mechanism for 
providing regular briefings to, and ensuring accountability 
by, participating agencies. Several 
local executives suggested developing a briefing 
format similar to Compstat meetings used by 
local agencies. (See also, the Intelligence chapter 
for an in-depth discussion of the executive-
briefing issue.) All can agree on one point: The 
JTTFs generally lack the structure, appropriate 
number of analysts and administrative personnel 
to support investigators and other critical 
resources.

Quote: If one of our officers doesnt carry 
his weight, the SAC should let us 
know so we can address it.

Local Law Enforcement Executive

While there are varying degrees to which 
participants believed their JTTFs have been 
effective, JTTF reformers are driven by their 
commitment to these task forces and to improving 
them to meet the needs of local agencies. 
These participants believe that JTTFs 
provide the proper venue for international terrorism 
investigations. They advocate for a centralized 
structure and believe the JTTF is the 
best current mechanism. Information needs to 
rest in a single place, and the JTTF provides 
that forum. They are concerned that a different 
or complementary forum might undermine the 
JTTFs, provide confusion and redundancy, and 
further drain limited resources. One local chief 
said that he depended on his JTTF representative 
and trusted him to share information that 
the chief needed to know. I feel he has enough 
law enforcement expertise to make those decisions, 
said the chief.

Their bottom line: The focus should be on 
using the JTTF as the primary investigative 
mechanism, but with an eye toward improving 
it. For example, a resident agent teamed with 
local officers (some on a part-time basis) can be 
an ancillary part of a JTTF. Smaller local agencies 
should at least establish a point of contact 
for JTTFs.

How JTTFs Can Use Local Resources

Though the issue of supporting the current 
JTTFsversus a complementary forum to 
JTTFswas not fully resolved, the executive 
session participants went on to discuss reforms 
that would make the current JTTFs more effective. 
The first proposed change involved improving 
federal agencies understanding of how 
local enforcement resources could be used in 
a mutually beneficial manner. In return, local 
agencies would make the greatest commitment 
possible.

Local law enforcement is still not being 
used by the FBI after September 11, a chief 
insisted. Others agreed, citing examples of how 
their offers to provide investigators to the federal 
agency and/or the JTTF were turned down. 


(Executives from large local agencies described 
how they could make dozens and even hundreds 
of investigators available to the JTTF, 
though other chiefs said they could not afford 
to deploy additional investigators.) And some 
of the SACs mentioned that they have struggled 
with how to incorporate the resources 
they were offered. All agreed that there should 
be better communication to local agencies that 
included the reasons why offers of assistance 
are being refused.

Ultimately each JTTF, individually, will 
need to determine how best to use local resources. 
The proper determination will probably 
depend on local agency size. Generally, 
larger agencies should be more involved in 
JTTFs. Medium-size agencies may be able 
to provide additional investigators on an ad 
hoc basis. Expanding a JTTF beyond a metropolitan 
area could include relying upon an 
ancillary group of local officers who are cleared 
and briefed as needed. They might attend big 
briefings or address specific issues or tasks but 
are not committed to the task force. This may 
also be a good approach to share information 
with smaller cities. At minimum, however, session 
participants suggested that local agencies 
should be prepared to make a short-term commitment 
to assigning an investigator to see 
how JTTF investigators work the cases. Some 
liaison between JTTFs and local agencies may 
be needed to help JTTF investigators remain 
effective.

Briefing Chiefs

Local executives expressed frustration about 
not knowing about JTTF investigations, especially 
those that occur in their own jurisdiction. 
They said that in some cases they could not get 
full briefings because they lacked the proper security 
clearance. Other local law enforcement 
participants said that they have to rely on the 
investigators they assign to the JTTF for updates 
because they were not getting direct briefings 
from the SAC. In response, several SACs 
said they now can brief local executives on the 
number of individuals in the executives city 
that are under scrutiny.

Quote: I dont want a PowerPoint 
presentation after the fact, I want 
to know what is going on in my 
own city.

Local Law Enforcement Executive


Several SACs and chiefs spoke about using 
an executive committee to their JTTF. With 
this model, the executive committee might include 
the SAC, chiefs and sheriffs who contribute 
officers to the JTTF, and possibly others. 
All members of the executive committee would 
have at least Secret security clearances. The executive 
committee would serve as a governing 
board, assessing JTTF activities and conducting 
planning on terrorism issues. They would 
receive fewer operational details than their investigators 
assigned to the task force but would 
still get useful information from meeting on 


a regular basis. Several session participants 
employ such a model and believe it effectively 
provides more comprehensive and regular 
briefings to local and state law enforcement, 
while maintaining the integrity of sources and 
investigations.23

One area that an executive committee 
needs to emphasize is succession planning 
for its JTTF. Turnover among SACs and local 
executives, as well as the addition of new 
members, requires developing protocols for 
bringing in and orienting new members. Such 
long-term planning would help to formalize 
relationships that can survive turnover and 
personality conflicts.

Apart from an executive committee, the 
participants spoke about the need for more 
regular communication among law enforcement 
agencies in a region. For example, the 
FBI could regularly brief an identifiable and 
specific group of local police officials. In addition, 
investigators and officers should receive 
overview information about the role of the 
JTTF, perhaps through roll call training. Again, 
there appeared to be consensus that significant 
information could be shared if properly formatted 
or presented in such a way that security 
clearances would not be necessary. Valuable 
information can be conveyed, if properly packaged 
by federal agencies, to local law enforcement 
personnel who do not have security 
clearances.

Task Force Redundancy

While discussing the JTTFs, several participants 
cautioned that law enforcement runs 
the risk of having too many task forces. The 
existence of terrorism task forces at the local, 
county, state and federal levels could lead to 
less coordination and loss of information. One 
participant said, I would prefer to have one 
single task force with the FBI coordinating it. 
Local executives also emphasized their resource 
limitations, especially in light of redundant 
federal task forces (i.e., FBI, ATF, SS, HIDTA, 
INS) addressing the same crime problems (i.e., 
cybercrime, drugs, gangs and other issues). Local 
law enforcement warned that they may not 
be able to continue to contribute resources to 
all these task forces.

U.S. Attorney Task Forces

The U.S. Attorneys Anti-Terrorism Task 
Forces (ATTFs) also were the focus of executive 
session participants concern. ATTFs were 
initiated after September 11. Careful consideration 
is needed to ensure that the ATTFs do 
not duplicate the work of JTTFs and pull critical 
resources, such as analysts and equipment, 
from the JTTFs. Indeed, some participants 
suggested that the ATTFs should be working 
closely with the JTTFs, with the U.S. Attorney 
becoming part of the executive committee.

23 The executive committees that some JTTFs have at this time do not follow a single model but are tailored 
to meet the unique needs of a jurisdiction, as participants stated they should be.



Coordinating JTTF

The FBI has created a national-level JTTF 
(NJTTF) that operates out of Washington, 
D.C., and is available to help resolve problems 
a local JTTF may experience. The NJTTF is 
staffed by officers from 30 different federal, 
state and local agencies and operates out of the 
FBIs Strategic Information Operations Center. 
The NJTTF brings a needed national perspective 
and focus to the local task forces. It acts as 
a point of fusion for terrorism information by 
coordinating the flow of information between 
FBI Headquarters and the other JTTFs located 
across the country, as well as among the agencies 
represented on the NJTTF and other government 
agencies, such as the Department of 
Homeland Security (Mueller 2003a, 2003b).

Participants cautioned against overcentralizing 
information in this coordinating task force. 
It is important that the NJTTF send important 
information to the field offices and then provide 
them the latitude to make decisions about personnel, 
investigative focus and priorities that are 
consistent with local crimes and issues. Local 
executives spoke of the lessons that community 
policing has provided about moving decision-
making and operational activities to lower levels.

Federal Inconsistency

Local law enforcement agencies are also concerned 
that federal resources must be better 
used by local authorities. One concern they 
mentioned was that at a time of stretched 
federal resources from which they can draw, 
some are duplicative. For example, some training 
programs on specific topics (e.g., hazardous 
materials response, weapons of mass destruction) 
are offered by more than one federal 
agency in the same area (such as FEMA, ODP), 
while in other areas, training is not offered. A 
better needs assessment for local law enforcement 
should be conducted, and federal agency 
training and technical assistance should be assessed 
to minimize duplication. The problem 
is less critical than the duplication of task 
forces but should still be addressed, especially 
in light of plans to increase training by federal 
agencies, including the FBI.

Conclusion

The JTTFs have been effective (though the 
extent varies among jurisdictions) but can 
be improved significantly if they are made a 
higher priority, receive additional resources 
and have better direction and governance.24 Local 
law enforcements resources should be used 
to their full potential, and every effort should 
be made to eliminate redundancy and other 
drains on personnel. In return, local law enforcement 
should attempt to make a stronger 
commitment to JTTFs and work with others to 
create an executive committee or other means 

24 A strong cautionary note is needed, however. When developing criteria and guidelines for what information 
should be collected and shared among law enforcement agencies, every effort must be made to protect 
those guidelines because they provide a roadmap to intelligence collection efforts and could help those 
trying to infiltrate law enforcement.



to expedite information sharing among law enforcement 
partners.

Recommendations and Concerns

 JTTFs can be an effective force multiplier, 
but the primary concern is 
that they are currently inadequate for 
sharing information and conducting investigations 
related to terrorist threats. 
While some participants recommended 
complementary mechanisms to better 
share information and coordinate 
investigations with local law enforcement, 
many pushed for reforms that 
would make the current JTTFs more 
effective.

 Additional resources should be provided 
to the JTTFs, and both the FBI and chiefs 
need to make a stronger commitment to 
make the JTTFs more successful.

 Additional investigators, analysts and 
administrative staff are needed, either 
through direct assignment by local police 
and the FBI or supported through 
federal grant funds.

 The JTTFs need to consider alternative 
approaches to using the investigative resources 
that local law enforcement can 
provide on an as-needed basis.

 The JTTFs should establish a governing 
board in the form of an executive committee 
composed of the Field Office SAC 
(or Assistant Director in Charge) and 
local chiefs, sheriffs, directors of public 
safety and other key law enforcement 
personnel. This forum would ensure 
proper information sharing, commitment, 
accountability and coordination.

 The executive committees should develop 
a succession plan for their respective 
JTTFs that considers turnover in the 
chief executive positions, reassignment 
of officers and agents, and other local 
issues.

 Information produced by the JTTFs 
should be prepared and presented so 
that it has the greatest local relevance 
and is user friendly for local law 
enforcement.

 JTTFs should design and implement a 
Compstat-like process that would be the 
centerpiece for regular briefings and for 
ensuring accountability by participating 
agencies. Local agencies should designate 
a liaison to the appropriate JTTF if 
they do not have a permanent member 
on it. Likewise, FBI officials should encourage 
and accept these liaisons. These 
liaisons will facilitate the development 
of relationships among local agencies 
and JTTF personnel and provide a point 
of contact when needed by the JTTF.

 Federal law enforcement agencies 
should limit the number of redundant 
task forces (e.g., drugs, financial crimes, 
cybercrimes) or realize that the effectiveness 
of these task forces could be 
harmed by the inability of local law enforcement 
to keep supplying personnel 
and resources.



 The U.S Attorneys Anti-Terrorism Task 
Forces (ATTFs) should work closely 
with the JTTFs to reduce duplication 
of efforts, reduce the omission of necessary 
steps, ensure that resources are not 
drawn away from the JTTF, and coordinate 
effective strategies. The U.S. Attorney 
should be a key member on the 
proposed JTTF executive committee.

 In many regions, federal resources (task 
forces, specific training) are abundant 
and sometimes redundant, while in 
other regions they are lacking altogether. 
Chiefs, sheriffs and SACs all stressed the 
need for strategic planning to achieve 
greater consistency and coordination.



HEART OF AMERICA JOINT TERRORISM TASK FORCE: 
The Counterterrorism Executive Board (Kansas City Division)

by Kevin Stafford, Kansas City Special Agent in Charge (SAC)

On December 16, 2001, the FBIs Kansas City Division (KCD) officially created the Heart of 
America Joint Terrorism Task Force (HOA JTTF). The task force was created to effectively and efficiently 
develop, analyze and disseminate intelligence and to work cases involving international 
and domestic terrorism matters in Kansas and western Missouri. Consistent with FBI national 
priorities, the primary mission of the HOA JTTF is to prevent acts of terrorism and to respond 
to, investigate and prosecute individuals or groups involved in acts of terrorism. The HOA JTTF 
comprises FBI Special Agents and full-time task force officers from 19 different federal, state, 
county and municipal law enforcement/intelligence agencies. HOA JTTF personnel are located in 
the Kansas City headquarters office, as well as in several resident agencies.

On February 4, 2002, the SAC established the Counterterrorism Executive Board (CEB). Initially, 
the CEB was composed of agency heads from 19 federal, state, county and municipal law 
enforcement organizationswith each assigning a full-time investigator to the HOA JTTF. As it 
has evolved, membership in the CEB has been modified to include individuals who bring unique 
subject-matter expertise that enhances the tactical and strategic capabilities of the CEB. Currently, 
representatives from eight federal agencies; five state agencies, including the Directors of 
Homeland Security for both Kansas and Missouri; and 10 local agencies constitute the CEB. Also 
included on the Board is Dr. Joseph Waeckerle, a nationally recognized medical expert on weapons 
of mass destruction and emergency medicine.

The CEB was created to ensure that federal, state, county and municipal law enforcement 
officials receive critical terrorism threat intelligence concerning their territorial responsibilities 
in the most thorough and expeditious manner and, most important, are given the opportunity 
to provide operational input on how those threats could be addressed. The CEB meets on an as-
needed basis, but no less than quarterly. As of January 2002, the CEB has formally met six times. 
Classified information is disseminated personally by the SAC or through agency investigators assigned 
to the JTTF, who then brief their agency head. All members of the CEB maintain a Secret or 
Top Secret security clearance. The CEB addresses the concerns that many PERF executive session 
participants voicedthat local law enforcement chief executives wanted more direct, substantive 
briefings and effective mechanisms to contribute to the work of their JTTF and coordinate their 
efforts with federal and state agencies.

To address investigative matters that will arise in the event of hostilities, the CEB recently 
developed (and is in the process of implementing) satellite command posts to handle unclassified 
investigative leads that the KCD receives or develops. These command posts, referred to 
as Intelligence Integration and Regional Operation Centers (IIROICs), will support the KCDs 
Crisis Management Center (CMC) by providing more human resources, including staffing additional 
telephone banks, and handling unclassified leads. As this paper goes to press, the FBI 
anticipates that all investigative activities conducted by the IIROICs will be assigned and coordinated 
through Rapid Start,25 operated at the KCDs CMC. The IIROCs are based in locations 

25 Rapid Start is a computer database designed to organize a large volume of case information to include 
tracking leads, subjects, victims and witnesses. Reports can be obtained through Rapid Start such as how 
many leads are assigned or unassigned, how many leads are outstanding, and to whom the leads are assigned. 
Rapid Start also has full-text search capability. Searching in the database assists in preventing the 
duplication of leads.



where the KCD experienced a high concentration of terrorism-related leads during the last two 
years, specifically in Overland Park, Kansas; Jefferson City, Missouri; Springfield, Missouri; and 
Wichita, Kansas. There are 865 federal, state, county and municipal law enforcement agencies in 
the KCD territory. The territory includes all of Kansas and the western two-thirds of Missouri. 
These centers will provide appropriate coordination of intelligence and will pool area resources and 
address future leads in a timely manner. Leads are documented in the Rapid Start database, which 
will facilitate coordination among law enforcement agencies within the territory.

Advice for Establishing a CEB

All law enforcement agencies that have provided full-time task force members need to be included 
in the CEB. Additionally, the CEB should include individuals who are capable of providing unique 
tactical and strategic expertise to assist in the development of JTTF investigative strategies. The 
overall effectiveness and efficiency of law enforcement counterterrorism efforts can be significantly 
enhanced by involving a select group of federal, state, county and municipal law enforcement executives 
in the operations decisions of select JTTF investigation initiatives, rather than making 
them merely the passive recipients of intelligence information.

Conclusion

The level of cooperation among CEB members in sharing intelligence and participating in operational 
decisions on counterterrorism cases has significantly improved the JTTFs strategic and tactical 
capabilities. The CEB integrates and enhances the intelligence and operational capabilities 
of all federal, state, county and municipal law enforcement and provides a unique forum for the 
exchange of ideas as well as the sharing of information and personnel resources.



CHAPTER FIVE

FBI STRATEGIES

Introduction

SINCE SEPTEMBER 11, TERRORISM PREVENTION AND INVESTIGATIONS HAVE 
become the top priority for the FBI. Many local and state law enforcement 
agencies include that duty among their highest priorities as well. 
How federal and local law enforcement assume these new responsibilities, while 
managing existing responsibilities, received significant attention from the executive 
session participants.

Match Priorities to Expertise

According to participants, the FBI and other 
federal partners need to reassess their priorities 
and the strategies they use to achieve them 
within the context of the new threat of domestic 
terrorism. They, like all law enforcement 
agencies, need to ask, Where is our greatest 
value to communities, and how do we use our 
unique expertise?

Enormous expectations are now placed on 
the FBI to deal with a wide range of problems, 
particularly since its focus was broadened in the 
1980s to deal with drugs and violent crime. The 
FBI has been given concurrent jurisdiction for 
myriad traditionally state and local crimes, which 
puts them in the position of providing services 
that make them too much like local policeand 
thats not a good use of their resources.

Due to their expertise, the FBI should have 
a much narrower focus, particularly when state 
and local law enforcement authorities have the 
capability to address those crimes that have been 
the subject of recent federalization. FBI Headquarters 
should establish broad categories and 
standards but provide the flexibility that would 
allow FBI field offices to work with local law enforcement 
to establish priorities consistent with 
the needs of local jurisdictions. The FBI should 
not be doing traditional local police streetwork 
but should focus on those efforts that bring the 
most value to communities for the investment.

Quote: Local law enforcement must 
understand that the FBI doesnt 
have unlimited resources.

FBI SAC



Some, but not all, local participants suggested 
that the FBI should not be involved in 
investigating bank robberies or drug cases, 
except at higher levels to target financial networks. 
Rather, the FBI priorities should be on 
criminal activities for which local law enforcement 
does not have extensive expertise, such 
as the following:

 Comprehensive information collection 
and analysis, which includes being a 
conduit for information exchange at the 
national level. Law enforcement needs 
federal support to identify and examine 
patterns or trends nationwide.

 Financial crimes.

 Drug trafficking that crosses local jurisdictional 
boundaries.

 Identity theft.

 Cybercrime.

The FBIs operational priorities should 
take into account the size, resources and expertise 
of other agencies in their jurisdiction. 
Chief law enforcement executives and SACs 
will need to assess the situation and make a 
determination that is responsive to the specific 
needs of the jurisdiction. Currently, according 
to one SAC, they do not have that flexibility. 
Another SAC said FBI national priorities call 
for field offices in larger cities to focus on national 
terrorism and spend less time on drugs, 
gangs and other traditional crimes. But the FBI 
resource allocation restrictions do limit their 
further flexibility (described more fully in the 
section below on FBI Restrictions regarding the 
TURK system). SACs want to fill information, 
resource or operational voids that local law enforcement 
identifies. They need to learn from 
local law enforcement where FBI resources are 
most needed and then determine how they can 
work together to arrange those allocations.

Local law enforcement ultimately may 
receive more assistance in the areas in which 
they lack the expertise or national collection 
mechanisms. Still, they must be prepared to 
undertake those criminal investigations that 
some federal offices have conducted for the 
past decade, but from which they may now 
withdraw. For example, nationally, the FBI has 
about 1,800 agents for financial crime investigations. 
The FBI and local law enforcement 
may need to team up more to overcome diminishing 
federal resources for these and other 
traditional crimes and jointly decide where 
they should be directed. The FBI Director sets 
national priorities, but SACs should be able to 
determine local needs.

FBI Reliance on Local Expertise

As stated in the previous chapter, FBI agents 
by themselves cannot prevent another terrorist 
attack and want to learn more about how to 
integrate resources that local agencies can offer. 
One SAC stated, I need every officer, DMV 
officer, campus police and others on the front 
line to gather and share their information.

FBI SACs who participated in the session 
want to rely upon the knowledge and contacts 
that reside with local law enforcement. Local 



law enforcement officers are the experts on 
local areas and crime problems. Participants 
agreed that the FBI and each local law enforcement 
agency need to complement one 
anothers expertise. One SAC said, I need 
close working relationships with investigators/
detectives in local agencies. Consequently, a 
few SACs believed some of their FBI colleagues 
may be reluctant to pull out of drug and gang 
investigations because they fear losing contacts 
with local agencies. A chief countered that the 
FBI could lose contacts in some areas but 
would gain other contacts associated with their 
more focused responsibilities.

Local law enforcement can facilitate information 
gathering among community groups 
with whom they have good relationships. 
Community advisory boards that include Arab 
and Muslim members, for example, can be 
brought together for meetings with the FBI to 
provide information. Community relations are 
important for the FBI and can be strengthened 
by working with local law enforcement. This 
will only fortify the FBIs ties with local law 
enforcement personnel.

SAC Tenure

SACs face a tremendous challenge trying to 
integrate local law enforcements resources 
and needs while implementing FBI programs 
in response to national priorities. This is exacerbated 
by job turnover, with a typical SAC tenure 
of only two to three years in a field office. 
The frequent turnover makes it difficult for 
each new SAC to integrate into existing groups 
and to develop partnerships with local law enforcement. 
According to one SAC, It takes two 
years just to build partnerships and get comfortable 
working with local counterparts. The 
consensus of the executive session participants 
is that the recommended tenure for SACs in a 
field office should be five years.

The real challenge for law enforcement, 
however, is to try to formalize relationships 
between local and federal counterparts, so that 
personality-based partnerships do not diminish 
when SACs and local law enforcement 
positions turn over.

Communication Channels

Communication between the FBI and local law 
enforcement is critical but sometimes difficult. 
One SAC spoke about working with 450 chiefs 
and sheriffs, which makes consistent communication 
difficult. Currently, he relies upon 
emails, which may be the best approach until 
a more systematic means of communication is 
possible. Of course, he clarified, he still relies 
on phone calls to chiefs or sheriffs in the face 
of an immediate threat.

Quote: I need every officer, DMV officer, 
campus police and others on the 
front line to gather and share their 
information.

FBI SAC




Quote: State and local law enforcement 
do not need the FBI, as much as 
the FBI needs state and local law 
enforcement. . . . The FBI needs 
the information that local law 
enforcement has on community 
issues and crime problems, and 
we need to identify what local law 
enforcement needs from us.

FBI SAC

Another SAC spoke about setting up a 
schedule of monthly meetings with local executives. 
This has improved communication 
and has facilitated the exchange of information 
among a number of cities. Also, new National 
Law Enforcement Telecommunications System 
(NLETS) messages provide weekly updates.

Other SACs spoke about how they try to 
provide and participate in training and educational 
programs that involve local law enforcement. 
One telling example of the potential 
success of this approach was an example in 
which a local police officer who received such 
training was able to identify and report valuable 
information to the JTTF gathered during 
a routine eviction resulting from a landlord
tenant dispute.

Other FBI Restrictions

Currently, the FBI is operating under a number 
of constraints that affect its ability to conduct 
investigations and share information. Some 
are legal, some are administrative and some 
are cultural, reflective of what one SAC called 
the Post-Hanssen Climate.

Legal Parameters

The Privacy Act26 and the U.S. Attorney General 
Guidelines on General Crimes, Racketeering 
Enterprise and Terrorism Enterprise 
Investigations (Ashcroft 2002a) limit law 
enforcements collecting information on activities 
that are considered expressions of First 
Amendment Rights.27

The FBI can investigate criminal activity 
but has been restricted from collecting and keep-
ing information related to First Amendment-
protected activities. State and local law enforcement 
can, unless expressly prohibited, collect information 
about individuals and their affiliations 
that the FBI has been prohibited from amassing. 
For example, the FBI could not collect and retain 
information about white supremacists or other 
groups at high risk for criminal activity. Some 
state police could collect that information and 
run it against the FBI database, but the FBI could 
not then retain that information. However, as one 
chief pointed out, state laws and consent decrees 
on cases from the 1970s sometimes limit local 



26 Pub. Law No. 93579.

27 A copy of the guidelines can be found at www.usdoj.gov/olp/generalcrimes2.pdf.



police agencies abilities to keep that information 
as well. Law enforcement at every level must be 
diligent in researching any legal limitations on 
their intelligence collection, analysis and retention 
capabilities and then share that information 
with their partners.

The Patriot Act28 has eased some of these 
restrictions. The FBI can now attend public 
rallies to monitor extremist functions and 
events, even if no crime has been committed 
and no terrorist links are confirmed. The FBI 
can now look in chat rooms and visit public 
domain websites. But there are still legal limits 
to what they can do, which are delineated in 
the Attorney Generals Guidelines on Federal 
Bureau of Investigation Undercover Operations 
(Ashcroft 2002b).29 Some of these limitations 
may not apply to state and local police. 
FBI session participants expressed their desire 
to share all the information they can. But there 
are legal impediments and criminal sanctions 
regarding their release of information.

Administrative Constraints

Generally, the SACs believed that local law 
enforcement operates under the misperception 
that the FBI has more information than it actually 
has. This is not a matter of hoarding; we 
just dont have the information, commented 
one SAC. However, several local executives said 
that the FBI would be well served to better educate 
local law enforcement about what they can 
collect and retain and what they cannotas 
well as administrative protocols that seem to 
slow investigations and what local law enforcement 
might do to ameliorate these barriers.

During the discussion on investigative protocols, 
one of the SACs mentioned that they 
must continually monitor investigative assignments 
to ensure consistency with the Time 
Utilization Record Keeping System (TURK 
System). The existence of the TURK System 
was a revelation for the local executives. This 
system requires SACs to allocate investigators 
and resources according to predetermined formulas 
tied to budget allocations. End-of-year 
utilization must match the budget. Only minimal 
deviation is permitted because future budget 
allocations are tied to the extent to which 
SACs adhered to previous projections. The 
SACs explained how the TURK system keeps 
them from allocating resources to meet emerging 
or new crime problems. For example, if a 
SACs budget requires that 20 percent of the 
resources be spent on bank robberies, even if 
the local agencies have bank robbery investigations 
under control, they cannot reallocate that 
money to terrorism-related efforts.

One chief noted that the U.S. Attorneys 
seem more independent than SACs and that 
perhaps they could help with modifying the 
TURK System. Discussions revealed that the 

28 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct 
Terrorism (Pub. Law No. 10756).

29 This document can be found at www.usdoj.gov/olp/fbiundercover.pdf.



U.S. Attorneys are indeed more independent, but 
that they also influence what SACs can do with 
investigative resources. Sometimes the SACs 
and U.S. Attorneys want to pursue different investigations, 
and these may further diverge from 
the priorities of Headquarters. Though there 
was some concern about whether this issue has 
been adequately addressed, session participants 
believed it was worth examining.

Perhaps the most significant administrative 
constraint the FBI is attempting to overcome 
is outdated information technology. The 
FBI is embarking on a three-year effort to implement 
technologies that facilitate better organization 
and analysis of information, as well 
as employee access to this information. This 
program includes providing each employee 
with the hardware and software to function in 
a desktop environment, installing high-speed 
connections linking FBI offices, and developing 
investigative software applications to improve 
information management functions.

Other administrative constraints include 
the need to address a comprehensive Department 
of Justice Management Review of four 
functional areas of the FBI: organizational 
structure/mission, information technology policies 
and practices, personnel policies and procedures, 
and crisis management procedures. In 
addition to this Management Review, the FBI 
has been making significant changes, including 
appointing four Executive Assistant Directors, 
instituting an Office of Law Enforcement Coordination 
and a variety of other changes that 
require time and resources to implement.

Organizational Culture

In response to the arrest of former FBI Special 
Agent Robert Hanssen for espionage, the FBI 
convened a committee of Headquarters and 
field office executives to evaluate the FBIs 
internal security practices. This committee 
made numerous recommendations to improve 
the FBIs ability to prevent, detect, investigate 
and correct security policy violations. The primary 
recommendation was to create a Security 
Division, under the leadership of an Assistant 
Director. Other recommendations are intended 
to promote better understanding of and compliance 
with security policies, including awareness 
initiatives. The FBI also has expanded 
its polygraph program, increased background 
re-investigations and initiated routine audits 
and verification of need-to-know information
all while transforming the organization 
to fight terrorism. These changes are having 
profound effects on the organizational culture, 
just as they are on the organizational structures 
and administrative systems.

Conclusion

The FBI is making significant efforts to confront 
its culture and the challenge of organizational 
change. Some session participants 
believe there is still a culture within the FBI 
and other law enforcement agencies that rewards 
information hoarding, secrecy and wariness 
of partnering with others. Organizational 
change is difficult, and the participating local 
law enforcement chief executives understand 
the demanding implementation path that 



must be followed. They expressed a desire to 
assist the FBI in its endeavors. They know it 
is very hard to adapt to a new mission, change 
the organization and make significant changes 
to the organizational infrastructure. Together, 
participants believed they could assist their 
partner agencies through the growing pains 
and implementation problems that affect organizational 
capabilities to respond to cooperative 
enforcement efforts.

Recommendations and Concerns

 The FBI and local law enforcement 
should reach consensus on strategies 
to prevent and investigate criminal 
activities that are consistent with the 
capabilities, resources and authority 
at each level of government. Local law 
enforcement and field offices should use 
their expertise to collaboratively develop 
strategies consistent with local needs 
and priorities.

 The FBI should use its expertise to focus 
on such counterterrorism and criminal 
activity as cybercrime, financial crime, 
identity theft and other crimes that affect 
multiple jurisdictions. In large cities 
at least, the FBI should, in consultation 
with local law enforcement, determine 
whether to reduce its emphasis on bank 
robberies, violent crime, gangs and 
street-level drug sales. If local agencies 
can support the shift, the FBI can focus 
more on providing local agencies with 
valuable terrorism information.

 The tenure of SACs in field offices should 
be increased to five years to provide the 
necessary stability and expertise to effect 
long-term change and oversee complex 
efforts. The FBI should also develop a 
survival guide for SACs based on best 
practices among local law enforcement 
executives and SACs that would help 
with succession planning, building local 
partnerships and more.

 Law enforcement at all levels also must 
be aware of legal mandates that prohibit 
certain activities. Local law enforcement 
must be particularly vigilant about researching 
past consent decrees, state 
laws and ordinances that would limit 
intelligence collection and retention efforts. 
They must also be aware of federal 
limitations to stave off their personnels 
perceptions that the FBI is simply being 
uncooperative.

 FBI SACs could be more effective if given 
additional resources and flexibility. 
SACs should have more discretion in 
determining their investigative priorities 
and should do this in a way that is 
consistent with local needs and issues.

 The FBI should examine and assess 
the overall effectiveness of its TURK 
System. Local law enforcement can support 
these efforts to ensure they allow 
flexibility in response to changing crime 
patterns.

 The FBI should broaden the investigative 
categories that govern field office 



activities to provide SACs more latitude 
in counterterrorism investigations.

 Law enforcement agencies at all levels 
must educate one another about organizational 
obstacles, and efforts to address 
them, that may affect cooperative 
efforts. Local executives have extensive 
experience with organizational change 
that could be valuable to the FBI.



DIFFICULT DECISIONS: FBI PRIORITIES

by Darrel W. Stephens, Chief of Police, Charlotte-Mecklenburg, NC

The PERF/COPS Executive Session provided a unique opportunity for police chiefs and FBI executives 
in America to engage in an important conversation about their expectations of one another 
and to address the enormous challenges facing law enforcement in the future. Since 911, Homeland 
Security responsibilities have been added to the long list of expectations for law enforcement 
at the federal, state and local levels. Few would say that any law enforcement agency possessed 
adequate resources to address these expectations prior to 911, and most would agree they are still 
lacking. But for the FBI, the challenge is particularly onerous, as their number-one priority is to 
Protect the United States from terrorist attack.30 How is the FBI going to meet this challenge with 
11,000 Special Agents2,500 fewer sworn officers than the Chicago Police Department and about 
28 percent of the total number of sworn officers in the NYPD?31 The simple answer is they cannot 
achieve that priority without at least three reforms32and even then there are no guarantees.

These three reforms are

 stronger and more effective working relationships with state and local 
police,

 significant enhancements in technological capabilities, and

 more focused efforts on a much narrower list of responsibilities and 
priorities.

The focal point of this commentary is on the last.

In the wake of 911 and the appointment of Director Robert Mueller, the FBI identified and 
announced on May 2, 2002, 10 priorities.33 A reorganization plan announced the same day indicated 
that 3,718 agents (34% of the 11,000 special agents) would be assigned to antiterrorism 
investigations. Of these, 518 were moved from other criminal investigative assignments (most 
from drug investigations, violent crime and white collar crime), and the plan included hiring an 
additional 900 agents. Nevertheless, the priorities continued to encompass virtually everything 
the FBI was doing prior to 911, albeit fewer resources would be devoted to non-terrorism 
investigations.34 

30 As stated on the FBI website at www.fbi.gov/priorities/priorities.htm.

31 As stated on the FBI website (www.fbi.gov) and Chicago PD website (www.ci.chi.il.us/
CommunityPolicing/AboutCPD/Organization/Overview.html).

32 There are others, but these three seem most critical to me. 

33 1. Protect the United States from terrorist attack

 2. Protect the United States against foreign intelligence operations and espionage

 3. Protect the United States against cyber-based attacks and high-technology crimes

 4. Combat public corruption at all levels

 5. Protect civil rights

 6. Combat transnational and national criminal organizations and enterprises 

 7. Combat major white-collar crime

 8. Combat significant violent crime

 9. Support federal, state, local and international partners

 10. Upgrade technology to successfully perform the FBIs mission

 (www.fbi.gov/priorities/priorities.htm)



This is a good start to be sure, but simply does not go far enough because the priorities 
continue to suggest the FBI can do it all.

The debate continues across the nation about whether the FBI should move away from bank 
robberies and violent crime and drug investigations (areas in which there is concurrent jurisdiction 
with local law enforcement). In most cases the FBI gives the impression it will continue doing 
all the things it has done beforejust, perhaps, in fewer cases than before and more selectively. 
The time is long overduewell before 911 for the FBI (and other federal law enforcement agencies)
to resolve the strategic question of what activities the FBI should sustain to provide the 
greatest value for America, given its unique capabilities and authority. Local law enforcement can 
be supportive of these decisions, particularly if they are based on collaborative problem solving between 
municipal and county police executives and their area SACs. These are decisions that need 
national direction but require some flexibility at the SAC and local level. It is not entirely the FBI 
that causes priorities to include everythingmany chiefs like having them involved with drugs, 
bank robbery, violent crime and more. The chief executives have just as much, perhaps more, difficulty 
establishing priorities than the FBI. We want it both waysthat is part of the reason why 
we have the dilemma of the FBI having to be everything to everyone.

The question of federal jurisdiction and involvement was not given sufficient thought when 
the drug enforcement authority of the DEA was also given to the FBI. Nor did the country engage 
in thoughtful discourse in the late 1980s and early 1990s, when many violent crimes were 
federalized. These significant policy changes were made for political expediencynot thoughtful 
responses to how these national problems might be most effectively addressed using the full range 
of law enforcement and other resources available to the nation. Though decisionmakers seem to 
be a little more thoughtful on terrorism, they are frightfully close to following the same course.

Does the FBI need to be engaged in violent crime, drugs or bank robbery investigations? What 
capabilities do they bring to these investigations that do not exist at the local level? If there is 
a role, what should that be? The most appropriate role would be to focus on supporting the investigations 
of those cases that cross state boundaries. There is an enormous void in local law 
enforcements tracking and analysis capabilities for crimes that are committed by offenders who 
move from one part of the country to anothersuch as federal agencies critical role in the D.C. 
sniper shootings. As with terrorism intelligence, connecting the dots among the cases proved to 
be very difficult. The same may also be true in more rural areas where local law enforcement resources 
are limited.

Is there a federal role in creating a system for tracking unsolved homicides on a national basis 
or other crimes like bank robbery, identity theft or money laundering? There are examples already
NCIC and IAFISin which the unique capability of federal law enforcement has enhanced 
the ability of police agencies across the nation to deal more effectively with crime.

There is no easy answer to determining FBI priorities and resource allocations. But we must 
recognizejust like local police agenciesthat the FBI has limited means and that they must be 
effectively applied to those areas in which they will have the greatest impact on domestic security 
and on filling gaps where local law enforcements resources and authority do not exist. To do that, 
it is important that the FBI and political leaders re-engage in a national dialogue that asks the 
tough questions about what the most strategic and best use of their critical and unique resources 
should be.

 34 See abcnews.go.com/sections/us/DailyNews/fbi_restructure020529.html and www.cnn.com/2002/US/05/
29/fbi.reorganization/.



CHAPTER SIX

INTELLIGENCE

Introduction

THE EXECUTIVE SESSION PARTICIPANTS DISCUSSED SUCCESSES AND PROBlems 
with collecting, analyzing and disseminating intelligence.35 A 
recurring theme was law enforcements need for more valuable and 
comprehensive education, training and awareness, reflecting their desire to be 
more effective as they get back into the intelligence business. This forum provided 
participants with an opportunity to identify the pressing issues that law enforcement 
faces. The more detailed exchange of ideas on the intricacies of the intelligence 
function in policing was beyond the parameters of this first gathering. That 
discussion will occur at an upcoming executive session dedicated to the topic.


35 It is important to be aware of the differences between information and intelligence. As noted in the 
IACP Criminal Intelligence Sharing Report (2002), intelligence is the combination of credible information 
with quality analysisinformation that has been evaluated and from which conclusions have been 
drawn. As one expert has argued, Information [consists of] scattered bits of data, whereas intelligence is 
information that has been filtered, distilled and analyzed . . . [it is] something that can be acted upon . . . 
[it is] what managers need to make decisions (Kahaner 1997).

 Intelligence sharing requires law enforcement agencies first to conduct and then share analysis. 
The intelligence generation and sharing has multiple stages wherein law enforcement and other collaborating 
agencies must be able to plan, gather, collate, analyze, manage, disseminate and then use intelligence 
data. Criminal intelligence is data that can be used proactively for strategic and tactical purposes 
(IACP 2002).



Shared Intelligence

The primary concern among participants 
was the extent to which intelligence is shared 
among law enforcement agencies. This sharing, 
the executives stressed, needs to occur within 
agencies, between agencies at the same level and 
among agencies at all levels of government.

Quote: We have opened access to 
intelligence, and we want to put all 
area intelligence in one building. We 
make 100,000 arrests per year, have 
great intelligence, but dont have a 
way to share the information.

Local Law Enforcement Executive

Failures to share information are not 
unique to the localfederal partnership and 
sometimes plague coordination among local 
jurisdictions. Even information-sharing 
problems among divisions in the same agency 
have slowed the effective dissemination of information, 
whether they are the result of a lack 
of common databases or an unwillingness to 
share criminal intelligence with fellow officers. 
These problems exacerbate information sharing 
among local, state and federal agencies. 
Addressing the barriers to internal and external 
sharing will ensure that more relationships 
and patterns are detected.36

Local police, for example, can provide vehicle 
stop information around sites where other 
agencies have observed people taking notes 
about the area or pictures of monuments or 
potential targets. Local and state law enforcement 
can help connect the dots to places where 
the FBI is intercepting calls or investigating 
individuals. Participants believe that we must 
find ways to share the information with those 
who need it and figure out the accountability 
issues that will ensure it happens without 
compromising sources, investigations or other 
law enforcement personnel.

The consensus was that the FBI should be 
the primary conduit for intelligence analysis 
and exchange on a national level. But they 
cannot do it alone. The professionat all 
levelsneeds to improve its ability to analyze 
and share intelligence. With every agency fully 
engaged, progress can be made in addressing 
interagency sharing. For example, several local 
executives spoke about the need for receiving 
more intelligence on security threats. Citing 
the need to plan and respond immediately, as 
well as to work with political and other government 
leaders, the chiefs and sheriffs stressed 
the need for more timely briefings. This was 
cited as an excellent example for improving 
federallocal partnerships.

Another mechanism that could facilitate 
intelligence sharing among agencies is to 



36 The ability to share information internally and externally will also be dependent on technology reforms 
that promote sharing and interoperability, as well as advances in information collection protocols and 
records management processes. 



develop protocols for regional briefings, including 
some that might include a Compstat-like component. 
The mapping and geographic analysis 
functions could be invaluable for keeping executives 
apprised of ongoing threats and investigations. 
It would also prompt those involved 
to consider what other information they could 
provide to the model to complete the picture.

Intelligence Functions: 
Back to Basics

The participants were candid about the extent 
to which all of law enforcement needs to learn 
more about the intelligence function, beginning 
with how to collect information and then 
how to share and store it.

For example, chiefs and sheriffs indicated 
that officers are still uncertain about precisely 
what information they should look for that 
might indicate terrorist activity. There are 
obvious signs, of course, but there also may be 
more subtle indicators that routine patrol and 
special units could detect if properly trained. 
Detectives and investigators may possess valuable 
information without knowing it and may 
not know how to share information because 
they have never had adequate terrorism intelligence 
training. Most local law enforcement 
officers have never been in the intelligence 
business, and many remember the abuses of 
decades past that must be avoided this time 
around. And because agencies lack qualified 
analysts, equipment, policies, training and 
other essential resources, they may not be sure 
about how to develop an intelligence function.

As discussed more fully in the chapter on 
security clearances, there are legal mandates 
that will prohibit some information sharing or 
disclosure, and others that will preclude retaining 
certain intelligence. Local law enforcement 
executives also need to distinguish between 
need to know and nice to know when requesting 
information from the FBIyou cant ask 
for everything. After a long discussion about 
source information, the local executives generally 
agreed that they do not need to know the 
sources, just whether the source is credible 
and the implications of the intelligence for 
the public safety of a local jurisdiction. In fact, 
one SAC said that local officials should always 
insist on a characterization of the source. Similarly, 
local executives must begin to determine 
what information is appropriate for different 
levels and functions in local law enforcement. 
Not all information is equal.

Quote: We may need a new model for the 
intelligence function, because our 
old model had some problems.

Local Law Enforcement Executive


Re-Engineering Intelligence

Local law enforcement needs help in re-
engineering the intelligence function. Many 
local agencies are looking for expert counsel 
about how to re-establish intelligence units
units that were once disbanded in the wake of 





civil rights and privacy abuses in the 1960s and 
1970s.37

The FBI could play a key role in providing 
assistance based on its own efforts to reorient 
its intelligence function. Other resources may 
be available, too. At the time this Executive Session 
was held, one of the only significant pieces 
of relevant federal legislation was the Patriot 
Act. On November 15, 2002, the Homeland 
Security Act became law, with the potential to 
alter how law enforcement intelligence is collected, 
analyzed and disseminated. This Act 
empowers the newly created Department of 
Homeland Security to establish an Office of 
Information Analysis under the direction of an 
Assistant Secretary, who has the authority to review 
and make recommendations for improvements 
in sharing law enforcement information 
and intelligence within the federal government 
and between the federal government and state 
and local law enforcement.38

Intelligence units of the past were focused on 
traditional crimes, not domestic terrorist threats. 
Todays law enforcement now has a compelling 
need to connect with other local agencies 
across the country and with federal agencies 
in an unprecedented waywhich requires FBI 
involvement. Most agencies experience difficulties 
performing intelligence functions and have 
varied approaches to overcoming the many barriers 


37 Police officials say that laws, regulations, court decisions and ordinances created in the 1970s and 1980s 
to halt law enforcements previous abuses in scrutinizing citizens without evidence that a crime was committed 
now prevent them from reconnoitering at mosques and other settings where terrorists may plot 
attacks. On October 26, 2001, President Bush signed the USA Patriot Act (Pub. Law No. 10756), which 
gave new powers to both domestic law enforcement and international intelligence agencies and eliminated 
some previous court oversight.

 For example, in 2003, New York City Police Commissioner Raymond W. Kelly lauded the overturning 
of a federal court decree, the Handschu agreement, governing the limits on police surveillance of citizens. 
The decree prohibited police from photographing and carrying out surveillance of political demonstrations. 
Under the decree, to infiltrate lawful political and social organizations, police must establish there is suspected 
criminal activity and gain the permission of a special three-person authority to act. On February 
12, 2003, U.S. District Court Judge Charles Haight expanded NYPDs powers to carry out surveillance of 
political organizations by overturning the Handschu agreement. Judge Haight stated that the restrictions 
placed upon the NYPD as a result of the spying and intimidation of the 1960s addressed different perils 
in a different time (Weiser 2003). The 1985 consent decree order stemmed from a lawsuit brought in 
1971 over the infiltration of the Black Panther Party by members of the NYPDs Red Squad. In the 1950s, 
that squad compiled large files on political meetings of left-leaning organizations and photographed and 
collected information on personal and business affairs of prominent liberals and others, then shared that 
information with the FBI and Congress to compile a list of suspected communist sympathizers. 

 Municipal mandates have a similar effect. For example, nearly a quarter-century ago, after discovering 
that the Seattle Police Department of that time had an intelligence unit that kept files on the public, 
the City Council passed an ordinance forbidding such police activity. Todays Seattle Police Department 
believes the ordinance may create obstacles to their efforts to track individuals who pose a genuine terrorism 
threat. In the words of Seattles Police Chief, the ordinance is one whose time has passed (Powell 
2002; Moss and Fessenden 2002).

38 Homeland Security Act of 2002, U.S. Public Law 296, 107th Cong., 2d sess., 15 November 2002. Department 
of Homeland Security Act Public Law 107296 can be found at www.dhs.gov/interweb/assetlibrary/
hr_5005_enr.pdf. The Department of Homeland Security Reorganization Plan, dated November 25, 
2002, is available online at www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/11/reorganization_plan.pdf.



to effective implementation. For example, the 
NYPD hired a former CIA expert and has sent 
investigators to the Middle East and other places 
of long-standing terrorist activity where intelligence 
gathering has been a way of life for law 
enforcement (Rashbaum 2002; Cooper 2002). 
Obviously, not every agency can or will go this 
far. Local law enforcement needs models and 
approaches that will align with their resources, 
systems and unique jurisdictional needs. These 
intelligence operations cannot bring the rest of 
their services to a standstill. They still need to focus 
on the crime problems in cities and counties, 
as well as the new threat. The endeavor can seem 
overwhelming, and not everyone knows how to 
begin the process.

And while the FBI can provide some guidance 
based on their efforts in the last year to 
step up their terrorism intelligence efforts, it is 
important to remember that this is relatively 
new to them as well. Most field offices have 
not had a long-standing terrorism intelligence 
function, and those that did collect intelligence 
typically targeted more traditional criminal activity. 
Still, there are lessons learned that can be 
shared with local law enforcement, and the FBI 
is working to develop a national Office of Intelligence 
and a strategic intelligence function. 
Local law enforcement needs to stay abreast of 
these developments and the FBIs capacities to 
conduct information analysis and exchange.

The FBI and local law enforcement should 
collaboratively develop collection standards 
so that raw information can be more easily 
integrated and used. Likewise, the FBI should 
partner with state and local agencies to provide 
intelligence information in a format that is 
more useful to local law enforcement and, to 
the degree possible, keeps the access to information 
out of the clearances-only arena.

U.S. Attorney General Guidelines

The FBI operates under the U.S. Attorney 
Generals Guidelines on terrorism enterprise 
investigations and FBI undercover operations.39 
These guidelines direct the FBIs criminal investigations, 
including the circumstances for 
beginning an investigation, permissible scope, 
duration, subject matters and objectives. Following 
the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks 
on the United States, these guidelines 
were reviewed, modified and reissued. Still, 
both federal and local executives wondered 
whether enough changes had been made to the 
guidelines to allow for the proper initiation of 
investigations of persons or activities that appear 
to be a direct threat to communities.

Local law enforcement representatives 
called for additional reforms to the U.S. Attorney 
General Guidelines on terrorism investigations 
and undercover operations. Recognizing the 
political realities and obstacles to such reform, 

39 The Attorney Generals Guidelines on General Crimes, Racketeering Enterprise and Terrorism Enterprise 
Investigations (Ashcroft 2002a) is available online at www.usdoj.gov/olp/generalcrimes2.pdf; The Attorney 
Generals Guidelines on Federal Bureau of Investigation Undercover Operations (Ashcroft 2002b) is available 
online at www.usdoj.gov/olp/fbiundercover.pdf.



the local executives still believed that additional 
changes would significantly affect public safety. 
One local representative used an example of a 
Saudi-sponsored mosque that has engaged in 
recruiting individuals since 1988 to fight in Afghanistan. 
This local agency, without a dedicated 
intelligence function but through traditional 
criminal investigations, has uncovered information 
about the activities at the mosque that 
might have been useful to the FBI. (The FBI was 
previously unable to initiate a more thorough 
investigation because there was no evidence of 
a crime.) Situations such as this cause confusion 
and concern among law enforcement at all 
levels. Several FBI SACs expressed significant 
frustration with trying to change and interpret 
the guidelines, especially when they seem to 
contradict current FBI policies.

Quote: We are struggling to do it right, 
not to keep it from you. It is difficult 
to vet all the information, get it 
processed and get it passed on to 
you.

FBI SAC


Conclusion

If the FBI gets information that indicates a 
significant level of a threat in a local jurisdiction, 
local chiefs and sheriffs will know about 
it, one SAC insisted. There must be greater 
understanding of the enormity of the task in 
collecting and analyzing tremendous amounts 
of information.

The problems of developing and maintaining 
effective intelligence functions are extensive 
and largely beyond the purview of this first executive 
session. Session participants are, however, 
committed to changing internal and external 
processes and mechanisms to ensure better information 
collection and sharing. All acknowledged 
that the road ahead is filled with barriers 
that can be overcome only with extensive training, 
education and awareness for all law enforcement 
personnel. Legal and agency mandates 
must be examined to ensure compliance and 
the proper balance between individual rights 
and law enforcements needs to ensure public 
safety. The FBI, while in a key coordinating role, 
must work collaboratively with state and local 
law enforcement to facilitate information dissemination 
and analysis, as well as intelligence 
archiving. Many of these specifics will surely be 
addressed in the future executive session dedicated 
to exploring these issues in detail.

Recommendations and Concerns

 Law enforcement agencies at all levels 
need technical assistance and training 
on recreating and re-engineering their 
intelligence functions, including the 
FBI. They must be aware of past abuses 
and take necessary steps to avoid misstepping 
or violating any legal or agency 
mandates. Overly restrictive mandates 
should be re-examined and considered 
for reform.

 The FBI should continue to be the 
primary law enforcement conduit for 


intelligence analysis and exchange on 
a national level, working in conjunction 
with local and state law enforcement. 
All law enforcement agencies must cooperate 
with the Department of Homeland 
Security to improve the analysis 
and dissemination of law enforcement 
information and intelligence.

 Federal, state and local law enforcement 
agencies must implement information 
sharing mechanisms that include 
regional briefings, some Compstat-like 
components and other steps that will 
help eliminate barriers to information 
exchanges. Agencies must examine 
their internal, cross-jurisdictional and 
localfederal processes to reduce technological, 
organizational and policy-related 
obstacles to sharing.

 The FBI should continue to make its 
Office of Intelligence a top priority. This 
office should seek to collect, analyze 
and disseminate information and intelligence 
that is relevant for and usable by 
local law enforcement.

 The law enforcement community needs 
to ensure that the FBI has adequate resources 
and flexibility to fulfill its coordinating 
and intelligence functions.

 Local law enforcement needs federal 
grant support for developing the intelligence 
function, including hiring 
intelligence analysts and having them 
trained to professional standards with 
assistance from the FBI.



OVERCOMING BARRIERS TO INTELLIGENCE SHARING

by Chief Jane Perlov, Raleigh (NC) Police Department

The collection, analysis and dissemination of information regarding terrorist threats and investigations 
is central to law enforcements effectiveness in fighting terrorism. If we fail to manage this 
information, we risk any number of problems, including being overwhelmed with too much information, 
poor information sharing and feedback among agencies, and a lack of accountability for 
investigations. Ultimately, our inability to exchange information will diminish law enforcements 
motivation to work as a team in this new environment.

Insufficient resources and the absence of a model for using intelligence to guide operations 
hamper terrorist information and intelligence sharing among agencies. This demands that we develop 
a mechanism for sharing information and increasing accountability. Local law enforcement 
has had significant success in using some aspects of Compstat to accomplish these goals, and we 
may find that it has applicability for terrorism threats and investigations.

One Possible Solution

The regional JTTFs and the National JTTF should explore the feasibility of developing a Compstat-
like process that would be used to track investigations and to keep state and local counterparts 
apprised of developments. The operating principle would be to ensure information and intelligence 
exchanges in a controlled environment among the individuals who need it.40

Terrorstat could improve a SACs ability to manage terrorism investigations among investigators, 
improve accountability among individual investigators and among participating agencies, 
and serve as the platform to facilitate information sharing among SACs, chiefs and sheriffs.

Terrorstat would enable a JTTF to collect information in a centralized location and determine 
the status and geographic location of a variety of investigations. It would serve as a regional (and 
potentially national) clearinghouse for investigative information and intelligence and would require 
regular input from all participating law enforcement agencies.

The computer system driving the center would require the flexibility to show regional and national 
trends as well as individual operations and events. Mapping and graphing tools would provide 
law enforcement officials with a clear perspective of counterterrorism activities. The system 
would have data-mining capabilities for analysts. On the walls could be large screens, pinpointing 
terrorist threats, investigations and other operations in progress.41

Regularly scheduled meetings would serve as a forum for different levels of briefings for investigators 
and administrators from federal and local law enforcement agencies. The briefings could 
be tailored, depending on the audience, from Top Secret to Secret and even to the level of public 
information.

40 The analogy to Compstat operations is limited, of course, by the lack of incident data in terrorism investigations. 
But many of the other aspects of tracking enforcement activities and other oversight functions 
may be applicable to coordinated counterterrorism efforts.

 41 A similar system currently in operation is the Los Angeles County Regional Criminal Information Clearinghouse 
(L.A. CLEAR), which is the foundation for the California Anti-Terrorism Information Center 
(CATIC). 



The immediate benefits of such a system would be improved information sharing among and 
within agencies, improved accountability and a higher quality of intelligence production. This will 
allow for improved cooperation and coordination among law enforcement agencies in local, case-
specific operations and at the national level for a more effective counterterrorism strategy.

Admittedly, this is a brief description of what Terrorstat could look like, and many details are 
lacking. However, it hopefully presents a concept that can spur additional ideas about how law 
enforcement can improve its ability to coordinate terrorism investigations and share information 
among investigators and executives.



CHAPTER SEVEN

MULTIJURISDICTIONAL INFORMATION SHARING


Introduction

JURISDICTIONAL LINES DO NOT CONSTRAIN CRIME, AND CITY AND STATE borders 
do not hold back terrorism. Because violence respects no boundaries, 
law enforcement at all levels of government must improve information sharing 
and analysis. It is a complex proposition with more than 17,000 local agencies 
governed under principles of autonomy and decentralization. Add to this context 
the differences among state governing structures, the varying mandates and organizational 
makeup of federal agencies, and the other components of the justice 
system with whom law enforcement coordinateswhether parole, probation, 
courts, corrections or those who work on offender reintegration into the community. 
Each agency has potentially valuable information that can be shared among 
agencies at the same local, state or federal agency level, and among those levels as 
well. Until those agencies link and analyze that information, critical patterns and 
early warning signs may remain overlooked.

Criminal justice practitioners and scholars 
have long recognized that the criminal justice 
system is not a system at all, but a group of 
loosely connected, independently operating 
organizations. This lack of system is perhaps 
nowhere more evident than in the lack of effective, 
coordinated law enforcement information 
sharing mechanisms nationwide. That is not 
to discount the significant progress made in the 
past 10 years to develop such mechanisms. In 
fact, there are many promising models. There 
is not, however, as yet a comprehensive, coordinated 
system that is functioning nationwide 
for law enforcement agencies at every level.

A number of local jurisdictions have developed 
integrated information systems that 
allow agencies to share criminal and investigative 
information and to facilitate analyses of 



criminal activity that is not limited to one jurisdiction.
42 Several examples follow that were 
discussed by executive session participants. 
They are not presented here as an exhaustive 
list of programs, for there are surely many additional 
promising approaches, but they do 
serve as illustrations of the types of efforts being 
made to better integrate information and 
analysis functions among law enforcement 
entities.

 Hampton Roads CRIMESThis 
software system enables police officers 
from seven jurisdictions to access 
criminal justice information systems 
from desktop computers and laptops. 
The system relies on powerful search 
engines that query the existing records 
management systems of the participating 
law enforcement agencies (McKay 
2002).43

 Chicago CLEARThis is a Web-
deployed system that pushes customized 
information to users in real time. 
Relying upon a data warehouse and 
sophisticated records management 
systems, CLEAR allows the analysis 
of beat-level crime problems; predictive 
analysis to identify likely next targets; 
and online information on offenders, 
victims, arrests, evidence/property and 
similar cases. This system facilitates 
timely and effective investigations. 
CLEAR has enormous potential applicability 
outside of Chicago. Already, 
more than 120 agencies contribute 
their criminal records to CLEAR, and 
the Chicago Police Department has 
been identified as the statewide data 
warehouse for Illinoiss 1,200 law enforcement 
agencies.44

 Minnesota CriMNetWhen completed, 
CriMNet will be a secure intranet 
system that links Minnesotas 
1,100 criminal justice jurisdictions by 
using shared business practices and 
a standard computer language. Using 
CriMNet, any officer, prosecutor or probation 
or corrections official can obtain 
complete criminal history information 

42 Readers interested in regional crime mapping can see Mapping Across Boundaries: Regional Crime Analysis 
(LaVigne and Wartell 2001) for detailed information on multijurisdictional systems, including case studies 
that focus on implementation, decisionmaking on software, hardware, data sharing and privacy agreements. 
Model Memoranda of Understanding are also included. It highlights San Diegos ARJIS system, 
which is being examined by the FBI as a pilot site for possible localfederal information sharing, as well as 
those in Delaware, Baltimore, Orange County and Virginia. (See www.policeforum.org/pubs.html.)

43 For more information on the Hampton Roads CRIMES project, see www.templarcorp.com/crimes.htm.

44 See Chapman et al. (2002) for more information (available online at www.cops.usdoj.gov). A PowerPoint 
presentation, The Power of Technology: Working Together to Combat Crime and Terrorism, was delivered 
to PERF and COPS staff on March 20, 2002, by Barbara B. McDonald, Deputy Superintendent, and 
Ron Huberman, Executive Director of the Chicago Police Department. 



on suspects and criminals throughout 
the state.45

These few examples should serve to demonstrate 
that the characteristics of effective regional 
information-sharing systems require that data be 
entered only once but used many times, that the 
systems are part of the operational systems of the 
participating agencies and that they allow generalized 
query and reporting functions.46

The benefits of such integrated systems 
include developing unified strategies to reduce 
crime, eliminate criminal justice system 
bottlenecks, increase accountability among 
criminal justice agencies and provide a more 
complete picture of offender activity from arrest 
to sentencing. It is essential, however, 
that law enforcement remember the ultimate 
effectiveness of these systems is dependent on 
protecting their security and integrity.47

Current Federal Systems Open to 
State and Local Law Enforcement

Law Enforcement On-Line (LEO) is a virtual 
privacy network that contains significant sensitive 
but unclassified information. It is a Web-
based system that is free for all levels of police 
and administered by the FBI. LEO has been 
interfaced with The Regional Information 
Sharing System Network (RISSNet) and is 
divided into six geographic regions. LEO will 
soon interface with Open Source Information 
System (OSIS). Sensitive but Unclassified 
(SBU) intelligence information will be merged 
with RISSNet, including OSIS commercial databases, 
OSIS-encrypted SBU email, the State 
Department visa database and other databases. 
Any law enforcement executive, analyst or officer 
can access the system if registered with 
both LEO and RISSNet.

Special Interest Groups (SIGs) are also on 
LEO, which includes all of at least one SACs 
state and local chiefs. This allows for quick communication 
among all the group participants. 
This has been proposed as a model for other field 
offices to use when communicating sensitive 
information. Accordingly, the FBI is considering 
establishing a SIG on LEO for each field office.

Quote: Without adequate security 
protections, regional information 
systems are potential targets for 
bad guys.

Local Law Enforcement Executive

45 For more information on the Minnesota CriMNet project, see Streit (2001) and Harrison (2002) or www.
crimnet.state.mn.us. 

46 Chicago is one of the agencies that employed a process mapping approach to determine where there were 
data entry redundancies and other inefficiencies before the CLEAR project was implemented. More information 
on this process is detailed in Fraser et al. (1998).

47 The details of how these systems work and the costs and obstacles to engaging them are largely beyond 
the purview of this paper. However, PERF will host a future session on regional information systems and 
intelligence sharing.



NCIC also has a Violent Crime and Terrorism 
Offender (VICTOF) section that includes 
information on violent criminals and many 
of the GITMO prisoners. Local police now 
have access to pending investigations, and preliminary 
investigative files will soon be located 
there. Officers checking NCIC will receive a 
message that the FBI is looking for this individual 
and that the officer should arrest the 
person but also notify the FBI.

Current Inadequacies

Some of the information about federal resources 
was new to the local executives, which 
reflected the need for the FBI and other federal 
agencies to continue their efforts to notify and 
educate local law enforcement about available 
information.

Still, the central theme of the discussion 
on this issue was that current systems are 
simply inadequate. While progress is being 
made in certain regions, the lack of a national 
information sharing system severely limits the 
ability of law enforcement to prevent and investigate 
terrorism.

Local executives expressed their concern 
that unless the FBI becomes more involved in 
the local regional information systems, their 
value will be limited. The FBI is allowed to 
use these systems for investigative purposes 
but does not contribute to them or provide local 
agencies access to the federal investigative 
files. Several FBI field offices, at the time of this 
writing, are working to develop protocols for 
sharing investigative files. With greater federal 
involvement, local executives believe that law 
enforcement could create a national database 
that goes beyond what LEO and NLETS currently 
provide.

An intermediate step to developing a national 
information network is developing and 
improving these regional systems. The anticipated 
result would be an effective national database 
and analysis system. Law enforcement 
at all levels are concerned about maintaining 
security and safeguarding privacy and civil 
rights, but the consensus at the executive session 
was that a national database is within 
reach.

Pilot-Testing FBI Information 
Sharing with State and Local 
Law Enforcement

Pipelines for sharing information are one issue. 
Another issue is what is in the pipeline. For the 
first time, the FBI is contributing automated 
investigative case files (up to Secret classification) 
to a regional information sharing system 
involving local and state agencies.

The FBI is pilot-testing the JTTF Information 
Sharing Initiative in St. Louis, San Diego, 
Spokane, Norfolk and Baltimore. The St. Louis 
system is an interesting example because it includes 
investigative files and information from 
the FBI, a multistate effort that includes the 
Illinois State Police, and the St. Louis County 
and St. Louis Metropolitan Police Departments. 
INS and Customs may also participate. 
The Illinois U.S. Attorney, the FBI SAC and local 
police chiefs serve on the Governing Board.



Within St. Louis is an intelligence center 
where analysts from around the region participate 
and provide the means to access their 
agencys files. Each analyst checks his or her 
own agencys databases. A sergeant from the 
St. Louis Police Department runs the St. Louis 
Gateway Intelligence Center. The Oracle-based 
system uses iMap and other analysis software 
to connect information dots. Public source 
information, such as Lexis/Nexis, can be used 
with the system. Access is based on four levels 
of classification, ensuring that sensitive information 
is available only to those with the 
appropriate clearances. The FBI Office of Intelligence 
and the National JTTF will have access 
to this system.

The FBI representatives stated that this is 
still a pilot project, and additional funding is 
needed for the other four pilot sites and for any 
further expansion. This experiment has produced 
many good ideas, and the network has 
the potential to be used as a Compstat-style 
briefing and accountability system.48

Recommendations and Concerns

 The need for more effective national data-
bases is critical, and local/state regional 
information-sharing networks can serve 
as a cornerstone for homeland security 
to detect patterns and warning signs that 
span jurisdictional boundaries.

 Local law enforcement needs to share 
information in forums in which federal 
agencies not only participate, but also 
contribute.

 The Gateway Information Sharing Project 
in St. Louis and the remaining sites 
in the JTTF Information Sharing Initiative 
hold promise for improving the 
sharing of criminal information among 
federal, state and local law enforcement.

 The Gateway project and other multi-
jurisdictional efforts should remain 
top priorities for the FBI and the Department 
of Justice and should receive 
the resources necessary for continued 
development and effective evaluation. 
These approaches could serve as the 
foundation for improving and expanding 
the intelligence function in local law 
enforcement.

 Proper security controls and standards 
must be established to ensure that information 
is secure and that access is possible 
for local law enforcement agencies.

Quote: The SACChief relationship is 
critical to building effective 
information-sharing systems.

FBI SAC

48 Because these systems are potential targets, it is essential that security certification and standards be 
met before moving forward.



GATEWAY INFORMATION SHARING PROJECT:
A Site Visit Summary49

Description

A regional electronic database will allow local, state and federal law enforcement agencies to share 
information with each other in the St. Louis area. The system will use data from local and state 
agencies in two statesIllinois and Missourieffectively allowing agencies to analyze and map 
data without regard for jurisdictional boundaries. This database is truly exceptional because the 
FBI will contribute to the system, making its investigative files available to local and state agencies 
for the first time.

The effort to get the systemcalled the Gateway Information Sharing Projectup and running 
has taken six years. The process has not always been smooth, with false starts caused by inadequate 
funding or simply the magnitude of the effort. Along the way, it has endured such problems 
as agencies being reluctant to contribute to the system and retrieving extracted information after 
downloading. Despite these obstacles, the system is scheduled to go online by Spring 2003 and 
has the potential to change dramatically the way law enforcement agencies investigate crime and 
cooperate with one another.

Notably, the system has the potential to provide the local JTTF with robust intelligence tools 
for retrieving and analyzing information. Access to classified information will be limited to those 
with the proper clearances. Already, JTTF members are experimenting with fields that will allow 
them to retrieve and analyze information unique to a potential terrorist investigation. The system 
may become more powerful when other federal agencies in the St. Louis area enter their case information 
as well.

Each of the participating agencies will simply export their information to the system in the 
same format that they collect it. None of the agencies will have to develop new forms and reports 
or even modify their existing ones. Rather, the search and analytical features of the system will 
translate the data into one format for the end users. For example, the fact that every participating 
agency uses a different identifier for a Smith and Wesson handgun is inconsequential.

Investigators will be able to search the data by text, as well as such elements as people, location, 
property, events and alerts to retrieve information from other cases. In addition, they can 
search individual agency databases or the entire database. Once gathered, the system has the ability 
to analyze the information in a variety of ways, including link analysis and geographic mapping. 
Combined with other public domain analytical systems, the Gateway Project has the potential to 
let officers look at information in new ways. Ultimately, the power of the system is that it will 
allow officers to ask questions about data or look at information in a way that previously was inconceivable. 
Rather than merely spitting out data elements, the system will let officers ask why? 
and what does this mean?then help provide them with the answers. In this way, the system can 
be more than just an information-sharing network; it can be a powerful intelligence network to 
prevent and reduce local crime and fight terrorism.

Lessons Learned

Although the system is not yet operational, those who have been building itsome for as long 
as six yearshave learned a number of lessons that could help others who endeavor to build a 
similarly complex system. Some of those lessons are presented below. The order of these is not as 

49 This description was compiled by PERF project staff after conducting a January 2003 site visit, interviewing 
personnel from local and federal law enforcement agencies, and reviewing available literature on the 
project. 



important as the realization that they will be visited and revisited throughout the design, building 
and implementation phases.

1. System Complexities

First and foremost, all of the participants must understand the complexities of a multiagency 
information management system. Many agencies struggle to design, implement and manage an 
information system. When 5, 10 or 15 agencies try to integrate information systems, the problems 
can be far more complex.

In the design stage, take all participants concerns into account. Inevitably, someone will feel 
slighted for being left out of decisions or information exchanges. Some members may feel insecure 
when confronted with the expertise or experiences of other agencies. Still others will be reluctant 
to share information and will need time to acclimate to this new approach.

While this system will allow agencies to continue using their current forms and reports for 
collecting information, it is likely that these agencies will have to develop some new policies and 
procedures or modify existing ones. In addition, policies must be developed for managing the information 
system. The process and timeline for developing or modifying policies must be coordinated 
with the systems development. Agencies have to be careful about sending mixed messages 
regarding official policies, traditional ways of conducting business and the changes that are needed 
to keep the system moving forward.

The FBI should be involved but need not be a participating agency right away. First, the system 
should be built with local and state agencies to create a sound foundation. Once it is up and running, 
then involve the FBI to access and submit their data. In those cases in which federal agency 
culture has traditionally discouraged sharing information with local law enforcement, it is better 
to focus first on building a system before trying to change that agencys culture.

2. Executive-Level Commitment

Executive-level commitment may be the most critical element for success. Without that commitment 
and the agency support and resources that flow from that commitment, the system will be 
plagued with problemsif not outright failure.

Ownership is a critical issue. Specifically, agencies must balance the ownership of their agency 
information with their shared ownership of the system. An information/intelligence system based 
on shared resources requires that agency decisionmakers overcome jealousies of turf and zealous 
protection of their information so that the system can flourish. Conversely, they must develop 
and foster a shared sense of ownership for the system. There are successful models of agencies 
that have retained the necessary ownership of their data while working collaboratively in multi-
jurisdictional systems.

A Governing Board composed of agency chief executives is the best approach for decision-
making. But members must make allowances for executive-level transitions. The chances are, 
given the tenure of law enforcement chief executives, that one or more of the participating agencies 
will undergo a change of leaders. Sometimes, those leaders may be the strongest champions of the 
system; other times they may be the loudest naysayers. In any event, the remaining leadership 
will need to adapt.

3. Trust

Once a commitment has been made to develop a system, building and living up to trust among 
agencies is crucial. One of the mistakes that can undermine trust is starting too fast or too big. It 
is better to start small with a core group of committed agencies and build from there. However, it 
is important to demonstrate to other interested agencies that the system can grow.



Realize that some agencies will have more experience and better judgment than others on appropriate 
information sharing. Give everyone time to adjust. Conversely, those agencies that are 
cautious have to be careful not to stand in the way of progress.

Keep expectations for the success of the system realistic so that frustrations, when they arise 
(and they will), can be diffused.

Keep egos in check, especially those of representatives from larger agencies. Maintain a positive 
outlook and remain patient while problems are resolved.

4. Expertise

Involving the right people in the system design is critical. This means including people at different 
levels of the various organizations, such as chief executives, computer and information technology 
specialists, crime analysts and end users. This also means involving people with varying levels 
of knowledge and expertise of information technology and computers. System design reliance on 
individuals without sufficient computer knowledge is self-defeating, because they will not even 
understand the systems potential. Likewise, over-reliance on computer experts may severely limit 
the systems ability to provide end users with valuable information. Involve attorneys and information 
systems experts early, so that the system can be built according to the security standards 
of relevant accrediting bodies.

Beyond hardware and software concerns, identify individuals who understand and can span 
the different organizational cultures that may be involved in the project. A local police department, 
a county sheriffs office, a state police agency and the FBI may have very different missions and 
approaches to achieving them. A few individuals who know how these agencies conduct business 
can make valuable contributions to the projects ultimate success.

Also, identify and retain the expertise necessary to make the system work once it is operational. 
A regional information system can store and produce, on demand, enormous amounts of complex 
information. At the same time, current technology makes that information easily portable, 
available to thousands of officers on laptops and PDAs. Someone needs to be able to make sense 
of this information, whether it is educated crime analysts using sophisticated tools or officers who 
receive enough training to do more than just enter and retrieve discrete data elements. This is especially 
important if the system is expected to evolve into an intelligence network with predictive 
capabilities. Without analytical expertise, agencies will continue to suffer from the big ears, small 
brain syndrome and may eventually overwhelm officers with too much information.

5. System Security and Information Quality

Important questions need to be asked about system security and quality control. These questions 
need to be posed early in the design so that they can be incorporated into the system. Basic questions 
include the following:

 Who will be allowed access to the system?

 Who will monitor the system?

 Who will be responsible for quality control of information placed in the system?

 Who will purge the system of bad data?



Beyond these basic questions are hundreds more that will need to be asked and answered. 
These questions need to be asked and answered early because they will affect the system design 
and how it operates. An important realization is that ultimately this will be a system designed and 
used by humans. Where mistakes are inevitable, administrators should strike a balance between 
their fear of sharing information and more effective law enforcement. Some law enforcement personnel 
will misuse the system, perhaps in a small way, perhaps in a great way. Everything should 
be done to prevent it, but accept that it will happen and have responses in place that address the 
behaviorensuring that an individual action will not derail a system with tremendous potential 
for addressing crime and threats of terrorism.



CHAPTER EIGHT

TRAINING AND AWARENESS


Introduction

THE ISSUES INVOLVED IN REORIENTING LAW ENFORCEMENT TOWARD A 
counterterrorism mission are complex and unprecedented. Local, state 
and federal law enforcement professionals agree that education and 
training that is practical, focused and effective is critically neededfrom the line 
officer to the executive.

Training on terrorism-related issues must 
start early in an officers career and be continuous.
50 Some officers, primarily veterans, have 
had access to emergency-responder training 
and some antiterrorism training that has been 
further developed since September 11. Some of 
the training was offered by FEMAs Office of 
National Preparedness (ONP), Office of Justice 
Programs (OJPs) Office of Domestic Preparedness 
(ODP) and the FBIs National Domestic 
Preparedness Office (NDPO).

A number of training programs are under 
consideration and development by many federal 
agencies. The OJP is working with ODPnow 
operating within the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS)to coordinate training 
programs. The FBI is assisting this effort by 
reviewing these training programs. In addition, 
OJP will continue to evaluate the existing curricula 
related to weapons of mass destruction 
and other terrorism-related issues. OJP also 
indicated to executive session participants that 



50 For the purposes of this paper, the term officer will be used to describe all street-level personnel, including 
sheriffs deputies, state troopers and others on the front lines of law enforcement.




the office would like to be able to provide more 
funding to state and local law enforcement for 
antiterrorism training, education and awareness 
programs. Other organizations, including 
the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) and the 
COPS Office, are considering the development 
of training programs for local law enforcement. 
BJA has convened a Counter-Terrorism Working 
Group that will identify and review counter-
terrorism training programs.51 And the FBI is 
planning to implement a train the trainer 
program for Special Agents who will eventually 
provide intelligence gathering and analysis 
training to local officers.


Officer Training and Knowledge

Executive session participants agreed that 
officers generally do not know enough about 
domestic and international terrorist groups, 
including their history. They also lack training 
on the signs and indicators of terrorist 
activity. Street-level officers and investigators 
are given little guidance about what to look for 
and may not realize when they come across 
information that could reveal a potential terrorist 
act.

Quote: Im prepared to send 400 
detectives to a training program, 
but none exists.

Local Law Enforcement Executive

The challenges are significant. For example, 
officers need training on identifying 
the disenfranchised individual who poses a 
threat as much as the organized terrorist cell. 
The individuals on the fringe are energized 
by rhetoric and may strike out on their own, 
which make them particularly difficult to detect 
and stop.

This is not like training on a new piece 
of equipment; law enforcement is taking on a 
function it has never performed before. While 
they have some experience in intelligence gathering, 
though not always an auspicious one, 
even that differs from the unique threats of 
domestic terrorism by internationally directed 
forces. Many agencies have not engaged in intelligence 
functions in years and may not know 
where to begin. Even many of those agencies 
that have an intelligence function will need 
assistance on the best means for information 
gathering, analysis and intelligence retention 
related to potential terrorist activities.52

Information Sharing and Release

Officers are not always given a complete understanding 
of what information can be shared 



51 The Working Group has developed a website (www.counterterrorismtraining.gov) that provides comprehensive 
information about counter-terrorism training opportunities, related materials and website links. 

52 For examples of materials recently released by a federal agency, see Introduction to International Terrorism 
for State and Local Law Enforcement (FBI 2001a) and Introduction to Domestic Terrorism for State and 
Local Law Enforcement (FBI 2001b)two CD-ROMs produced by the FBIs Operational Training Unit in 
consultation with the Counter-Terrorism Division. At this writing, they can be obtained from all local FBI 
field offices. 



with citizens or how to present it. More important, 
officers sometimes lack guidance on how 
to ensure that information is kept confidential 
and the importance of preventing leaks. Executive 
session participants agreed that this aspect 
of training cannot be overlooked. As mentioned 
earlier, one participants local agency 
is planning a training program at the time of 
this writing to ensure that sensitive investigation 
issues are not discussed at home or with 
friends and former officers who mayunwittingly 
or knowinglyreveal sources and critical 
information.

Federal Resources

In addition to learning about what training 
programs federal agencies offer, state and local 
law enforcement must be more aware of what 
federal agencies can bring to a partnership. As 
part of their training, local law enforcement 
personnel need a deeper understanding about 
federal agencies (FBI, INS, DEA, ATF, Secret 
Service and others) capabilities and resources. 
In addition, they must have a keener understanding 
of federal limitations, such as Privacy 
Act considerations, as well as administrative 
protocols that can limit federal investigative 
authority and ability to share information.

Local law enforcement is not alone. There 
are many deficiencies at all levels of government 
in our knowledge and skills to deal with 
the kinds of threats our nation faces today. 
Some of these were highlighted by executive 
session participants as follows.

Federal Agency Training

The local law enforcement executives were 
most concerned about the INSs, FBIs and 
other federal agencies lack of experience with 
community policing and how it can be used for 
community engagement, information gathering, 
prevention and investigations. Just as they 
need to better understand federal capabilities 
and limitations, these executives believed federal 
agencies that operate in their jurisdictions 
would benefit from a greater appreciation of 
the time and effort required for local law enforcement 
to build effective communication 
networks and trust with communities. They 
want federal agencies to understand how just 
one poorly planned investigation can ruin 
years of local law enforcement outreach and 
undermine future community engagement 
needed for effective policing and counter-
terrorism work.

Executive-Level Training

The role of the local law enforcement executive 
has changed dramatically, as it has for his or 
her colleagues at the state and federal levels. 
One chief said, I dont adequately understand 
all the issues related to the kinds of questions 
raised by the community. Chiefs and sheriffs 
who attended the session believe they and their 
peers need more resources and information to 
be effective leaders in the fight against terrorism. 
Many believed they have few resources 
that provide the education necessary to confidently 
deal with the terrorist threat. There is a 
need, at least initially, to better understand the 



Muslim and Arab communities culture and 
needs, as well as their greatest concerns. They 
must also comprehend the thinking and motivation 
that drives those most likely to engage 
in violence against American targets.53

Local law enforcement executives also need 
assistance in making expensive and varied decisions 
to support their personnel as they address 
terrorist threats. For example, determining which 
types of equipment and technology alone to purchase 
for counterterrorist operations can be overwhelming. 
Each decision about a HazMat suit 
or apparatus, a software package to track leads, 
a communication program or countless other 
acquisitions require extensive researchoften 
with minimal benchmarks or standards to guide 
them.54 The FBI, the COPS Office and OJP can 
play a key role in helping navigate these decisions 
and providing police professionals with needed 
support. The FBI and other federal agencies are 
also able to provide insights and training on how 
to determine priorities for which types of equipment 
and technology to acquire first and under 
what circumstances.

Conclusion

A comprehensive assessment of law enforcement 
professionals needs must be completed 
quickly. This first executive session did not provide 
the time or opportunity to detail that inventory, 
though future sessions are planned that will 
identify training needs in specific areas, such as 
intelligence, policing multicultural communities 
and indicators of terrorist activities.

Recommendations and Concerns

 Additional training and education is 
needed at all levels within local, county, 
state and federal law enforcement. 
Agencies should consider joint training 
to the fullest extent possible. Local 
law enforcement (as well as county and 
state) and federal agencies must volunteer 
their resources to each other, as well 
as invite one another to provide training 
and participate in classes. Local law 
enforcement participants, in particular, 
called for SACs to volunteer to share 
their expertise and materials at meetings 
and training programs, instead of 
waiting to be invited.

Quote: We need education and awareness 
programs for all ranksfrom the 
officer to the chief.

Local Law Enforcement Executive

53 A BJA- and ODP-funded project has attempted to fill this void with an upcoming publication, The Police 
Executives Terrorism Bookshelf (Goldfarb and Karchmer 2003). Another resource on counterterrorism 
training is available online at www.counterterrorismtraining.gov.

54 In November 2002, NIJ published its Guide for the Selection of Personal Protection Equipment for Emergency 
First Responders: NIJ Guide 102-00. The guide is available online at www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/
191518.pdf. 



 There is a need to address redundancy 
and quality of all training programs to 
ensure they are practical and specific 
and meet the needs of local law enforcement. 
Federal assistance and coordination 
would facilitate this process.

 Training must be introduced for academy 
and in-service programs, and continuously 
updated.

 Law enforcement agencies at all levels 
of government must work together to 
increase their ability to preserve critical 
policecitizen relations, particularly 
with minority communities, and to 
safeguard the progress and promise of 
community policing.

 Chiefs, sheriffs and other law enforcement 
executives need a greater awareness 
and understanding of international 
terrorism and how it might manifest 
itself in their jurisdictions.

 Local and state law enforcement executives 
need to increase their knowledge of 
federal agencies and resources. (For example, 
the recent Montgomery County 
(MD) sniper case made many local law 
enforcement executives aware of a federal 
serial sniper law that would put 
additional federal resources at the local 
agencies door).55 They must also have a 
mutual understanding of the legal and 
organizational limitations that can affect 
law enforcement partnerships.

 Patrol officers and investigators need 
training on indicators and signs of terrorist 
activity and what to do with that 
information.

 Intelligence officers and analysts need 
training. Law enforcement should share 
training programs, resources and expertise 
at all levels.

 Along with training programs, local and 
federal law enforcement should develop 
and exchange model policies, programs 
and procedures on counterterrorism 
investigative protocols, as well as standards 
and guidelines on first-responder 
technology and equipment.

55 The law provides (28 USC 33, 540B)

 Sec. 540B. Investigation of serial killings 

 (a) In General. 

 The Attorney General and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation may investigate serial killings 
in violation of the laws of a State or political subdivision, if such investigation is requested by the head 
of a law enforcement agency with investigative or prosecutorial jurisdiction over the offense.

 (b) Definitions. In this section: 

 (1) Killing. The term killing means conduct that would constitute an offense under section 1111 of 
title 18, United States Code, if Federal jurisdiction existed. 

 (2) Serial killings. The term serial killings means a series of three or more killings, not less than one 
of which was committed within the United States, having common characteristics such as to suggest the 
reasonable possibility that the crimes were committed by the same actor or actors. 

 (3) State. The term State means a State of the United States, the District of Columbia, and any commonwealth, 
territory, or possession of the United States.



CONCLUSION

MORE THAN A YEAR AFTER SEPTEMBER 11, 2001, AMERICAN LAW EN-
forcement is working diligently to prevent the next terrorist attack. 
Will it be enough?

This paper began by posing that question, yet 
we cant possibly know the answer until law 
enforcement is put to the testcertainly not 
a desired measure. Perhaps the better question 
is, Will law enforcement at all levels be able 
to come together to produce an unprecedented 
coordinated strategy for addressing terrorism? 
The proceedings of the Executive Session on 
LocalFederal Partnerships detailed in this 
paper demonstrate that local and federal law 
enforcement leaders are determined to work 
together to strengthen their existing partnerships. 
Their discussions and recommendations 
reflect their recognition that domestic security 
is dependent on every law enforcement agency 
joining together and that agencies at every level 
have a critical role to fill. As we have seen, that 
role can vary dramatically, depending on the 
authority, responsibilities and size of the law 
enforcement agencies involved.

The key to successful partnerships seems 
to be a mutual understanding of one anothers 
role in preventing terrorism and one anothers 
limitations. This executive session demonstrated 
that comprehensive knowledge of 
what other law enforcement agencies can do is 
sometimes lacking and that potential partners 
must take time to learn the specifics about 
resources and strategies. Only then can productive 
efforts be undertaken. This executive 
session allowed the participants to exchange 
information and dispel misperceptions in a 
candid and constructive forum. Their efforts 
acknowledged in this paper will hopefully enable 
other agencies to begin the same process 
of removing obstacles to effective localfederal 
partnerships.

The paper touches on countless issues and 
recommendations. Not every issue had a ready 
solution, and the participants were constrained 


by the limited time they had to examine the 
issues and propose solutions. Many of these 
will be addressed in future executive sessions, 
working groups and other forums.

The recommendations are just that
recommendations. They are not the last word 
on a perceived problem, but a proposed approach 
or course of action. The recommendations also 
vary in their scope and practicality. Some, such 
as regional information sharing systems, will require 
months or years of work by large numbers 
of individuals in multiple jurisdictions. Others 
can be accomplished fairly easily. Still others 
may never be implemented because of their 
complexity or changed circumstances.

For many of the recommendations, ownership 
was not assignedthat is, the possible 
implementation of the recommendation can 
rest with any number of law enforcement 
agencies at the federal and local level. Recommendations 
for improving training can begin 
immediately in agencies large and small. And 
recommendations for JTTF Executive Committees, 
as described in Chapter 4, can be 
explored by any of the JTTFs or it could be a 
required policy change on the national level by 
the FBI. Like many of the recommendations, 
implementation will need to be tailored to the 
unique needs of a jurisdiction.

Executive session participants expressed 
their hope that the issues and recommendations 
they raised will serve as the starting point 
for ongoing discussions and advance the debate 
and agenda nationwide. This Executive Session 
on LocalFederal Partnerships was just the first 
in a series of discussions on the national scene 
that PERF is coordinating on how local law 
enforcement, operating in a community policing 
context, will assume counter-terrorism 
responsibilities. Other sessions may focus on 
such topics as policing immigrant communities, 
bioterrorism, intelligence and homeland 
security systems. All sessions are premised on 
a single set of principles: Community policing 
has enabled local law enforcement to creatively 
address complex issues and resolve seemingly 
intractable problems regarding crime, disorder 
and quality of life. Community policing has 
provided police and sheriff agencies with a 
variety of resources and methods to improve 
their effectiveness. And community policing 
can help law enforcement prevent and respond 
to terrorist incidents by drawing on community 
contacts and citizen involvement. Law 
enforcement knows that citizens will continue 
to need help addressing crime and disorder. 
The threat of terrorist attacks, unfortunately, 
does not stop the flow of calls to 911 or address 
community concerns about violence in 
their neighborhoods. For law enforcement to 
continue performing their crime-fighting and 
antiterrorism roles, they must make the most 
of their resources, partnerships and other assets 
found in community policing approaches. 
It is in this spirit that this white paper has been 
presented.



REFERENCES

Ashcroft, John. 2002a. The Attorney Generals 
Guidelines on General Crimes, Racketeering 
Enterprise and Terrorism Enterprise 
Investigations. U.S. Department of Justice. 
Available online at www.usdoj.gov/olp/
generalcrimes2.pdf.

Ashcroft, John. 2002b. The Attorney Generals 
Guidelines on Federal Bureau of Investigation 
Undercover Operations. U.S. Department 
of Justice. Available online at 
www.usdoj.gov/olp/fbiundercover.pdf.

Chapman, Robert, Shelly Baker, Veh Bezdikian, 
Pam Cammarata, Debra Cohen, 
Nancy Leach, Amy Schapiro, Matthew 
Schider, Rita Varano (Community Policing 
Development, Office of Community 
Oriented Policing Services) and Rachel 
Boba (Police Foundation, Washington, 
D.C.). 2002. Local Law Enforcement Responds 
to Terrorism: Lessons in Prevention 
and Preparedness. U.S. Department 
of Justice, Office of Community Oriented 
Policing Services. Available online at 
www.cops.usdoj.gov.

Cooper, Michael. 2002. Spy Chief to Run 
Police Intelligence. New York Times, 25 
January, sec. B, p. 3.

Fatah, Alim A., John A. Barrett, Richard D. 
Arcilesi Jr., Charlotte H. Lattin, Charles 
G. Janney and Edward A. Blackman. 
2002. Guide for the Selection of Personal 
Protection Equipment for Emergency 
First Responders: NIJ Guide 102-00. 
U.S. Department of Justice, National 
Institute of Justice. Available online at 
www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/191518.pdf.

Federal Bureau of Investigation. 2001a. Introduction 
to International Terrorism for 
State and Local Law Enforcement. CD-
ROM. Federal Bureau of Investigations 
Operational Training Unit in consultation 
with the Counter-Terrorism Division.

Federal Bureau of Investigation. 2001b. Introduction 
to Domestic Terrorism for State 
and Local Law Enforcement. CD-ROM. 
Federal Bureau of Investigations Operational 
Training Unit in consultation with 
the Counter-Terrorism Division.

Federal Bureau of Investigation. 2002. Security 
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Federal Bureau of Investigation. 2000. Terrorism 
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and Robert Wasserman. 1998. Challenge 
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Goldfarb, Michael, and Clifford Karchmer. 
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Research Forum. (Publication 
pending).

Harrison, Blake. 2002. Fighting Crime with 
Information. State Legislatures, January 
2002, pp. 2830. For more information 
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www.crimnet.state.mn.us.

International Association of Chiefs of Police. 
2002. Criminal Intelligence Sharing: A 
National Plan for Intelligence-Led Policing 
at the Local, State and Federal Levels: Recommendations 
from the IACP Intelligence 
Summit. U.S. Department of Justice, 
Office of Community Oriented Policing 
Services, Cooperative Agreement number 
2002-CK-WX-K1001.

Kahaner, Larry. 1997. Competitive Intelligence: 
How to Gather, Analyze and Use 
Information to Move Your Business to the 
Top. New York: Simon and Schuster, pp. 
2021.

LaVigne, Nancy, and Julie Wartell. 2001. Mapping 
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Analysis. Washington, D.C.: Police Executive 
Research Forum.

McDonald, Barbara B., and Ron Huberman. 
2002. The Power of Technology: Working 
Together to Combat Crime and Terrorism. 
A PowerPoint presentation delivered 
to PERF and COPS staff on 20 March.

McKay, Jim. 2002. Jumping the Jurisdictional 
Fence. Government Technology, October 
2002, pp. 42 and 66. For more information 
on the Hampton Roads CRIMES project, 
see www.templarcorp.com/crimes.htm.

Moss, Michael, and Ford Fessenden. 2002 New 
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Mueller, Robert S., III. 2003a. Statement for 
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Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
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Powell, Michael. 2002. Domestic Spying 
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APPENDIX A

FBI POLICY AND GUIDELINES

IN ACCORDANCE WITH U.S. COUNTERTERRORISM POLICY, THE FBI CONSIDERS 
terrorists to be criminals. FBI efforts in countering terrorist threats are 
multifaceted. Information obtained through FBI investigations is analyzed 
and used to prevent terrorist activity and, whenever possible, to effect the arrest 
and prosecution of potential perpetrators. FBI investigations are initiated in accordance 
with the following guidelines:

 Domestic terrorism investigations are 
conducted in accordance with The Attorney 
Generals Guidelines on General 
Crimes, Racketeering Enterprise, and 
Domestic Security/Terrorism Investigations. 
These guidelines set forth the 
predication threshold and limits for investigations 
of U.S. persons who reside 
in the United States, who are not acting 
on behalf of a foreign power, and who 
may be conducting criminal activities in 
support of terrorist objectives.

 International terrorism investigations 
are conducted in accordance with The 
Attorney General Guidelines for FBI 
Foreign Intelligence Collection and Foreign 
Counterintelligence Investigations. 
These guidelines set forth the predication 
level and limits for investigating 
U.S. persons or foreign nationals in the 
United States who are targeting national 
security interests on behalf of a foreign 
power.


Although various Executive Orders, Presidential 
Decision Directives and congressional 
statutes address the issue of terrorism, there is 
no single federal law specifically making terrorism 
a crime. Terrorists are arrested and convicted 
under existing criminal statutes. All suspected 
terrorists placed under arrest are provided access 
to legal counsel and normal judicial procedure, 
including Fifth Amendment guarantees.

Definitions

There is no single, universally accepted definition 
of terrorism. Terrorism is defined in the 
Code of Federal Regulations as . . . the unlawful 
use of force and violence against persons or 
property to intimidate or coerce a government, 
the civilian population, or any segment thereof, 
in furtherance of political or social objectives. 
(28 C.F.R. Section 0.85)

The FBI further describes terrorism as either 
domestic or international, depending on 
the origin, base and objectives of the terrorists. 
This report uses the following definitions:

 Domestic terrorism is the unlawful use, 
or threatened use, of force or violence by 
a group or individual based and operating 
entirely within the United States or 
its territories without foreign direction 
committed against persons or property 
to intimidate or coerce a government, 
the civilian population or any segment 
thereof, in furtherance of political or 
social objectives.

 International terrorism involves violent 
acts or acts dangerous to human life 
that are a violation of the criminal laws 
of the United States or any state, or that 
would be a criminal violation if committed 
within the jurisdiction of the United 
States or any state. These acts appear 
to be intended to intimidate or coerce a 
civilian population, influence the policy 
of a government by intimidation or coercion, 
or affect the conduct of a government 
by assassination or kidnapping. 
International terrorist acts occur outside 
the United States or transcend national 
boundaries in terms of the means 
by which they are accomplished, the 
persons they appear intended to coerce 
or intimidate, or the locale in which the 
perpetrators operate or seek asylum.

The FBI Divides Terrorist-Related 
Activity into Three Categories:

 A terrorist incident is a violent act or an 
act dangerous to human life, in violation 
of the criminal laws of the United States 
or of any state, to intimidate or coerce a 
government, the civilian population or 
any segment thereof, in furtherance of 
political or social objectives.

 A suspected terrorist incident is a potential 
act of terrorism for which responsibility 
cannot be attributed to a known 
or suspected group. Assessment of the 
circumstances surrounding the act determines 
its inclusion in this category.



 A terrorism prevention is a documented 
instance in which a violent act by a 
known or suspected terrorist group or 
individual with the means and a proven 
propensity for violence is successfully 
interdicted through investigative activity.

Note

The FBI investigates terrorism-related matters 
without regard to race, religion, national origin 
or gender. Reference to individual members of 
any political, ethnic or religious group in this 
report is not meant to imply that all members 
of that group are terrorists. Terrorists represent 
a small criminal minority in any larger social 
context.



APPENDIX B

EDWIN DELATTRE SPEECH:
A Reflection on Successful Partnerships

GOOD EVENING. I AM INDEED HONORED BY CHUCK WEXLERS INVITAtion 
to offer a brief reflection on your discussion today of how to establish 
and improve local and federal partnerships to combat terrorism. Having 
taught sessions on ethics in the FBI Academy at Quantico, the Federal Law 
Enforcement Training Center at Glynco and a wide range of federal law enforcement 
agencies since 1981; having spent time on the streets with police in most of 
Americas major cities since 1975; and having taught sessions in state and local 
police academies over a period now of almost 30 years, I have thought for more 
than two decades about how to secure the most effective cooperation between and 
among local, state and federal police and law enforcement agencies and individuals. 
I have asked this question, and written about it, while feeling a deep sense of 
kinship with and permanent debts of gratitude to local and state police and also 
federal law enforcement personnel. The question of effective partnerships has deserved 
our attention for at least half a century, and it demands our attention now.

I imagine that at least some of you came to 
todays meeting suspecting that a good bit of 
fur might fly about turf and past failures and 
finger-pointing. I think others in law enforcement 
who should have been here did not come 
because they feared just that.

For several reasons, I did not believe that 
we would spend the day in squabbling and recrimination 
about failures in local and federal 
cooperation. First, the list of participants convinced 
me that everyone in attendance would 
already be concentrating on safeguarding the 


public from terrorist atrocities and not on past 
grievances. Second, nobody on that list would 
believe that the history of federal/local interaction 
and cooperationbusiness as usualhas 
been good enough to secure, as much as is reasonably 
possible, the public safety. Everybody 
I expected to see here knows from experience 
that domestic tranquility and the common 
defense, fundamental purposes of government 
identified in the Preamble to the Constitution, 
cannot be achieved when local and federal 
agencies ignore obligations they can meet only 
by working together. Third, I expected serious, 
productive conversation today because crisis 
and adversity, exposure to savage attacks on 
noncombatants and the resolute efforts of 
enemies to destroy us and our loved ones and 
neighbors tend to bring out the best in people 
like you, people who live their lives willing to 
go in harms way to protect others.

Witnessing todays conversationand it 
was a conversation, where you all listened to 
one another, and not a mere exchange, where 
everybody sat around busily thinking what he 
or she would say next instead of listeningwas 
on the one hand tremendously encouraging. 
On the other hand, it reminded me of opportunities 
lost. Conversations like this one should 
have been earnestly pursued throughout the 
past 50 years or more, and they have not been. 
Even with the spectacular advances in policing 
and law enforcement professionalism in our 
lifetimesfueled in part by shared educational 
programs at Quantico and elsewhereit has 
taken our vulnerability to terrorist atrocity 
to lead us to such demanding and imperative 
conversations as we had today.

Todays conversation was encouraging, at 
times inspiring, because the stakes are so high 
for us as a people and for our way of lifeand 
yet nobody in the room flinched. The discussion 
was dead serious, but not humorless. 
There was among us a sense of proportion 
about the peril and mass destruction which 
terrorist states, cells and individuals will inflict 
on us if they can. We saw unblinking clarity 
about the danger from the intelligence agencies 
of terrorist states: Iran, Iraq, Syria, Sudan, Yemen 
and Libya and problems directly related to 
Saudi Arabia. We heard candid accounts of the 
limits imposed on local/state/federal partnerships 
by applicable laws, executive findings, 
regulations and sanctions, some of which will 
have to be changed.

In short, we saw serious people at their 
best today. Sixty years ago, Walter Lippmann 
said that nothing is worse for the human soul 
than being dispensed on nothinghaving no 
demanding work to do. Well, today we saw 
adults who are accustomed to doing difficult 
work talking forthrightly about even more 
difficult work they have to do together. As 
Abraham Lincoln insisted in 1858, A house 
divided against itself cannot stand. So too 
now, with the house of local, state and federal 
law enforcement.

Make no mistake: Talk is not cheap. Neither 
is it enough. Tomorrow, you are to articulate 
principles to follow together, and that task 
is not just about talk. It is about the actions 


you need to take and the habits of shared purpose 
you need to forge in order to form federal/
local partnerships you can trust. Those habits 
and purposes have to outlast any particular individuals 
tenure as a chief or a commissioner 
or a SAC, or as one of the leaders of an Executive 
Task Force or Joint Terrorism Task Force or 
a center or system for intelligence sharing.

I know of no substitute for the personal 
respect and sense of reciprocity between individuals
liking each other helps, tooon 
which successful partnerships are built. But 
you cant prevent turnoversometimes even 
rapid turnoverin leadership, and so you need 
ethos as well as ethics: a sense among yourselves 
and your subordinates that a partnership 
is not an episodic thing, along with a shared 
commitment to keep your accounts with each 
other straight.

When I first started on the streets with 
cops in Toledo, Ohio, long ago, I watched 
grandfathers, fathers and sons all in uniform 
at the same time. And what the older taught 
the younger about conduct unbecoming a cop 
came in the words, We dont do that here. 
The same thing is necessary for partnerships. 
We have to have a clear understanding of what 
we do and dont do here. Partnerships require 
habits of reciprocity that secure durable trust.

I take the first principle to be drawn from 
todays conversation to be simple. All of 
youchiefs, SACs, central administrators in 
the FBIneed to say systematically to others 
in positions of authority and power what you 
said to one another today. You need to speak 
in one voice to mayors, legislators at all levels, 
governors, the White House. Your voice, your 
lucidity, on what you have to do together and 
cannot accomplish separately, and on the steps 
in legislation, regulation and policy necessary 
for you to do your work, is essential to the 
public safety. You need one voice on the fundamentals, 
and you may already have found 
something of it here, something to build on in 
addition to personal friendships and cooperative 
working histories. This principle applies, 
no matter what shape or what size a federal 
Department of Homeland Security may take.

The second principle is also straightforward. 
Keep yourselves abreast of the major 
reports being published on homeland security, 
policing and law enforcement. The Brookings 
Institute Press has just published Protecting 
the American Homeland. It says, Key to any 
successful prevention against future attacks 
will be the effective use of information technology 
for the collection, sharing, and deployment 
of key data (p. 2). We have to link the databases 
of various law enforcement and intelligence 
agencies . . .  (p. 3), but the NCIC does 
not contain information about immigration 
status or minor crimes. . . . (p. 42). The report 
says the FBI doesnt need 450 new agents to 
perform its counterterrorism mission. It needs 
5,000 (p. 38).

A task force of the Council on Foreign 
Relations co-chaired by former senators Gary 
Hart and Warren Rudman has just published 
America Still UnpreparedAmerica Still in 
Danger. It says, 650,000 local and state police 




officials continue to operate in a virtual 
intelligence vacuum, without access to terrorist 
watch lists provided by the U.S. Department of 
State to immigration and consular officials. . . . 
(p. 9). First responderspolice, fire, emergency 
medical technician personnelare not prepared 
. . . Their radios cannot communicate with one 
another. . . . (p. 10). Each state needs a twenty-
four hour operations center . . . that can provide 
access to terrorist watch lists information via 
real time intergovernmental links between local 
and federal law enforcement. . . . (p. 11). 
When it comes to combating terrorism, the police 
officers on the beat are effectively operating 
deaf, dumb, and blind (p. 19).

The Task Force on National Security in the 
Information Age of the Markle Foundation has 
just published Protecting Americas Freedom 
in the Information Age. Co-chaired by Zoe 
Baird (failed candidate for attorney general 
during the Clinton administration) and James 
Barkdale, the report vaunts a Department of 
Homeland Security; calls for a widespread, systematic 
network of information technology to 
be used in all relevant institutions in the public 
and private sectors; and claims that the FBI 
should not be the lead agency in establishing 
domestic priorities in intelligence acquisition 
and sharing.

I have read these reports, and so will others 
who make decisions about policy and law. With 
all due respect to those reports authors, there 
was a great deal more knowledge, wisdom and 
front line experience in the Colonial Room of 
the Mayflower Hotel today than I have found 
in these reports. Even though there is enormous 
detail in some of the reports, and issues 
are raised that go far beyond todays discussion, 
you should know what is in them. You 
are better positioned to comment on the truth 
and falsity of claims about policing and law 
enforcement than anyone else, and the public 
cannot afford for others to be speaking for you 
or instead of you. I admit that academic reports 
tend to become shelf paper, but that does not 
mean they are without influence in the short 
run. Accordingly, youor people to whom you 
delegate the authorityhave to track these 
publications and have to take initiative in commenting 
on them. The alternative is to become 
accustomed to watching others influence and 
make decisions that you have good reason to 
consider unwise and ineffective.

You do have something to learn from 
scholars or academics and philosophers. An 
analogy may be useful. When a scholar sets out 
to write a dissertation or a book, he or she has 
to do research and scholarship, gathering intelligence 
from everywhere it is likely to be found. 
Then he has to organize it, make it permanently 
accessible to himself in such ways that 
he can, at will, know what he knows. Nobody 
can remember it all. Then he has to figure out 
how all this data, information and knowledge 
fit together. He has to be able to connect the 
dots. And then he has to write the book: He 
has to put all that intelligence in a form that 
others can use, make sense of, rely on, and he 
has to continue to go on learning from others 
at the same time. Thats one microcosm of the 



intelligence/information/working partnership 
macrocosm you have to build.

You asked and replied to good questions 
today. You asked and told one another what 
you expect and need in the way of partnerships 
across local, state and federal jurisdictions. You 
can benefit from asking also, as in the Golden 
Rule, What would I want from me, if I were 
in his shoes, or hers? Your duties are not so 
remote from each other as to be impenetrable 
to such questions.

For those of you who are eager to know 
more about terrorism, the mind sets of terrorists, 
their history, heres a short list. Read 
Michael Ledeens new book, The War Against 
the Terror Masters: How it Happened. Where 
We Are Now. How Well Win. That may lead 
you to read Niccolo Machiavellis classic on 
war and politics, The Prince, first published in 
1532. Ledeen relies heavily on Machiavelli in 
his own strategic and tactical thinking.

Rent the 1967 movie The Battle of Algiers. 
The film deals with the years 1955 through 
1960 in Algiers, shows that a war against terrorism 
is a war for intelligence and analysis 
of information, and implies that whoever acquires 
the most advance knowledge, either by 
infiltration or interrogation, wins. By showing 
how the terrorists prevailed against the French, 
the film advocates the belief that sufficiently 
determined terrorists cannot be defeated. The 
French used compassion, bribery, torture and 
the guillotineand still lost. We have a much 
more difficult international challenge than the 
French did, with all sorts of language barriers 
they did not have to face, and yet we cannot in 
the end simply withdraw and call it quits.

Read The Last Summer of Reason: A Novel, 
by Tahar Djout. He was assassinated by terrorists 
at the age of 39, and his book published 
posthumously in 2001 by Ruminator Books. 
It is a window to terrorist self-righteousness 
and fanaticism. And read What Went Wrong: 
Western Impact and Middle Eastern Response 
by Bernard Lewis, professor emeritus at Princeton 
and the most important western scholar 
of Islam. It is an Oxford University Press book. 
Along with the CD produced by the FBI on terrorism 
and how to combat it described today, 
and educational sessions led by FBI counterterrorism 
people, a trove of knowledge is available 
to all of us. You dont need to read a library full, 
either.

Whats the principle? The principle is that 
knowing what we dont know is as important 
as knowing what we do knowthat is, having 
the guts to admit what we dont know 
and then asking those who do know to help 
us learn what we need to know. We saw a lot 
of that today. Tomorrow is not too early to establish 
real educational arrangements. There 
is no need for delay on that, anymore than 
in making the calls proposing executive task 
forces and studying the models of intelligence 
centers described today. There is a corollary to 
the principle: Some learning, some of the need 
to know, cannot be delegated. Thats why Joint 
Terrorism Task Forces cannot do the work of 
an executive task forceno matter how useful, 
even indispensable, they are.



Let me say a few last words about resolve 
and constancy of purpose. In the midst of 
Shays Rebellion in 1786 and 1787, George 
Washington wrote to James Madison to express 
his profound fear that the peril to the country 
was so great that the United States might collapse. 
Madison replied that he allowed himself 
a measure of hope. The great historian Katherine 
Drinker Bowen wrote later, It was like 
Madison to realize that the situation was too 
serious for despair. So it was, and so it must 
be with us.

We are going to suffer losses and heartaches 
and missed opportunities, and we are going to 
make mistakes, because we are human and 
fallible. We will suffer casualties, because the 
terror masters and the homicidal fanatics who 
do their will are ruthless and shrewd and they 
exempt no one from the domain of targets. The 
fight against terrorism will, I think, be long, 
perhaps perpetual, and certainly a factor in 
our way of life. We will get better and better at 
traveling that road, especially if we refuse to be 
deterred by frustration and roadblocks and red 
tape that should have been avoidable but were 
not. Our situation is certainly too serious for 
despair.

During the years when I worked in Washington, 
I learned a good bit about resolve and 
constancy from my friendship with Admiral 
Elmo Zumwalt. We had a lot to talk about. My 
wife and I had lost a child to bubonic plague, 
and Bud Zumwalts son was fighting a long-
odds battle against cancer, probably caused by 
exposure to Agent Orange. Bud Zumwalt had 
commanded the brown water navy in Vietnam 
and had ordered the use of Agent Orange in 
a desperate attempt to protect his men from 
deadly fire along river shores. Again and again 
the media asked the Admiral, How do you 
live with the fact that your son and others who 
served under you are dying because of your 
decision to use Agent Orange? And he always 
replied that he had done the best he could to 
protect his men and then added, I keep leaning 
forward.

Thats what resolve and constancy take. 
Thats the most fundamental principle of all. 
We have to keep leaning forward. Today may 
suggest that we can do considerable leaning 
together.

Thanks very much.

Edwin J. Delattre
Professor of Philosophy
College of Arts and Sciences
Boston University



APPENDIX C

PARTICIPANTS AND OBSERVERS LIST

Participants

Peter Ahearn
Special Agent in Charge
FBI Buffalo Division

David Bejarano
Chief
San Diego Police Department

Mark Bullock
Deputy Assistant Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Patrick Carroll
Commissioner
New Rochelle Police Department

Arthur Cummings
Section Chief
Counterterrorism Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Deborah Daniels
Assistant Attorney General
U.S. Department of Justice
Office of Justice Programs

Rocco Diina
Commissioner
Buffalo Police Department

William Eubanks56
Manager of Global Security
Eli Lilly and Company

Paul Evans
Commissioner
Boston Police Department

Ed Flynn57
Secretary
Executive Office of Public Safety
Commonwealth of Massachusetts

William Gore58
Chief Investigator
San Diego District Attorneys Office

Harold Hurtt
Chief
Phoenix Police Department

Tom Manger
Chief
Fairfax County (VA) Police Department

Patrick McGowan
Sheriff
Hennepin County (MN) Sheriffs Office

Charles Moose
Chief
Montgomery County (MD) Police Department 



56 Previously, SAC FBI Headquarters.

57 Previously, Chief of Arlington County (VA) Police Department.

58 Previously, SAC FBI San Diego Division.



Edward Norris59
Superintendent of State Police
Office of Maryland State Police

Dan Oates
Chief
Ann Arbor Police Department

Ronald Olin
Chief
Lawrence (KS) Police Department

Jerry Oliver
Commissioner
Detroit Police Department

Robert Olson
Chief
Minneapolis Police Department

Carl Peed
Director
Office of Community Oriented 
Policing Services
U.S. Department of Justice

Jane Perlov
Chief
Raleigh Police Department

D. Strebel Pierce
Special Agent in Charge
FBI Minneapolis Division

Charles Prouty
Executive Assistant Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Louis Quijas
Assistant Director
Office of Law Enforcement Coordination
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Charles Ramsey
Chief
DC Metropolitan Police Department

Mike Rolince
Special Agent in Charge
FBI Washington Field Office

Prentice Sanders
Chief
San Francisco Police Department

Ken Senser
Assistant Director
FBI Security Division

Kevin Stafford
Special Agent in Charge
FBI Kansas City Division

Darrel Stephens
Chief
Charlotte-Mecklenburg (NC) Police 
Department

Chris Swecker
Special Agent in Charge
FBI Charlotte Division

Charlene Thornton
Special Agent in Charge
FBI Phoenix Division

Observers

Lorie Sharpe Day
Director
Office of Intergovernmental Affairs
U.S. Department of Justice

Edwin Delattre
Professor of Philosophy
Boston University

Heather Fong
Deputy Chief
San Francisco Police Department

Brian Forst
Professor
Justice, Law and Society
American University


59 Previously, Commissioner of the Baltimore (MD) Police Department.



Thomas Frazier
Executive Director
Major City Chiefs Association

Mike Fry
General Counsel
Montgomery County (MD) Police Department

Charles Goodwin
Special Assistant
Law Enforcement Services Branch

Greg Harris
Principal Deputy Director
Office of Intergovernmental Affairs
U.S. Department of Justice

Sara Hart
Director
National Institute of Justice
U.S. Department of Justice

Lisa Keller
Public Affairs Specialist
Office of Law Enforcement Coordination
Federal Bureau of Investigation

David Klinger
Associate Professor
University of MissouriSt. Louis

Ed Maguire
Associate Professor
George Mason University

Steve Mastrofski
Director
Administration of Justice Program
George Mason University

Lois Mock
Social Science Analyst
National Institute of Justice
U.S. Department of Justice

Richard Nedelkoff
Director
Bureau of Justice Assistance
U.S. Department of Justice

Tony Pate
Senior Research Associate
Cosmos Corporation

Melinda Pengel
Deputy Chief
San Francisco Police Department

Steve Rickman
CNA Corporation

Ellen Scrivner
Office of Law Enforcement Coordination
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Michael Seelman
Office of Law Enforcement Coordination
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Kathleen Timmons
Special Agent
Office of Law Enforcement Coordination
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Bryan Vila
Director
Crime Control and Prevention 
Research Division
National Institute of Justice
U.S. Department of Justice

Dick Ward
Director
Bureau of Justice Assistance
U.S. Department of Justice


COPS Office
1100 Vermont Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20530

Beverly Alford
Assistant Director

Karl Bickel
Sr. Policy Analyst

Dave Buchanan
Assistant Director

Pam Cammarata
Deputy Director

Rob Chapman
Sr. Social Science Analyst

Joe Kuhns
Deputy Director

Carl Peed
Director

Tim Quinn
Deputy Director

Dana Rollocks
Intergovernmental and Public 
Liaison Specialist

Maria Carolina Rozas
Assistant Director

Amy Schapiro
Sr. Social Science Analyst

Juliette White
Acting Assistant Director

PERF Staff
1120 Connecticut Avenue, NW
Suite 930
Washington, DC 20036
Phone: 202.466.7820
Fax: 202.466.7826

Lisa Carroll
Research Associate

Lorie Fridell
Director of Research

Cliff Karchmer
Director of Program Development

Judy Lim
Research Assistant

Gerard Murphy
Senior Research Associate

Rebecca Neuburger
Membership/Marketing Coordinator

Martha Plotkin
Director of Communications

Camille Preston
Senior Research Associate

Melissa Reuland
Senior Research Associate

Chuck Wexler
Executive Director



ABOUT THE AUTHORS


Gerard R. Murphy

Senior Research Associate

Mr. Murphy has more than 20 years experience 
in law enforcement research and practice. He 
currently directs a number of PERF projects, 
including Community Policing in a Security 
Conscious World, An Assessment of the 
Beltway Sniper Task Force, and Case Studies 
of Law Enforcment Responses on September 
11. Previously, he was Director of Planning 
and Research for the Baltimore County (MD) 
Police Department. His primary responsibilities 
included developing and implementing the 
departments strategic plan, researching and 
developing all department policies, managing 
federal and state grants, and serving as the 
agencys accreditation manager. Prior to holding 
that position, he was the Assistant to the 
Police Chief for eight years. In that capacity 
he worked for three chiefs, providing policy 
advice and guidance and undertaking a variety 
of special projects to improve organizational 
efficiency. In addition, during his entire tenure 
with the department, he served as executive director 
of the Baltimore County Police Foundation. 
Murphy holds a masters degree in public 
policy, has completed extensive work towards 
his doctorate in public policy and is a graduate 
of Federal Executive Institute.

Martha R. Plotkin

Director of Communications and 
Legislative Affairs

Martha Plotkin has more than 15 years of experience 
writing and researching criminal justice 
issues. She currently directs PERFs publications 
program, which produces an average of 
six publications and papers each year on myriad 
policing issues. Plotkin also directs the media 
and legislative programsproviding briefings, 
testimony, editorials and other information 
to the press and policymakers. An attorney, 
Plotkin also works on amicus briefs and other 
legal issues affecting police agencies. She is the 
author of A Time for Dignity and other articles 
and training materials on the police response 
to elder abuse, is co-author of Police and the 
Homeless: A Status Report and editor of Under 
Fire: Gun Buy-Backs, Exchanges and Amnesty 
Programs. She has managed and continues to 
contribute to research projects on the police 
response to special populations and victims.

Secretary Edward A. Flynn

Edward A. Flynn is the Secretary of Public Safety 
for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. His 
responsibilities include oversight of the state 
police, National Guard, the department of 
corrections, homeland security, emergency 


management and police training. Previously he 
was police chief in Arlington County, Virginia; 
Braintree, Massachusetts; and Chelsea, Massachusetts. 
He was credited for modernizing 
these departments and implementing community 
policing. His early career was spent in the 
Jersey City Police Department, where he was 
promoted from patrol officer through the ranks 
of sergeant, lieutenant, captain and inspector.

Chief Flynn is a member of the board of 
directors for the Police Executive Research Forum 
and is a recipient of the prestigious Gary P. 
Hayes Memorial Award for Police Leadership. 
He is on the board of directors of the national 
bipartisan anticrime organization Fight Crime: 
Invest in Kids and is a member of the Administration 
of Justice Advisory Committee at 
George Mason University.

He holds a bachelors degree in history 
from LaSalle University in Philadelphia and a 
masters degree in criminal justice from John 
Jay College of Criminal Justice in New York; 
he also has completed all course work in the 
Ph.D. program in criminal justice from the 
City University in New York. Chief Flynn is 
a graduate of the FBI National Academy and 
the National Executive Institute and was a 
National Institute of Justice Pickett Fellow at 
Harvards Kennedy School of Government.

Chief Jane Perlov

Chief Jane Perlov is in her second year as chief 
of the Raleigh, North Carolina, Police Department. 
The New York native is one of a handful 
of women chiefs of police in North Carolina.

A graduate of the John Jay College of 
Criminal Justice, Columbia Universitys Police 
Management Institute and the Senior Management 
Institute for Police, Chief Perlov brings 
an extensive background in law enforcement 
and public safety to her current post. Chief 
Perlov joined the ranks of New Yorks finest in 
January 1981. A distinguished career with the 
NYPD took her from assignments in Harlem 
to Times Square and from the rank of police 
officer to deputy chief.

The Commonwealth of Massachusetts 
called in January 1999, and Perlov answered to 
serve on the Governors Cabinet as Secretary 
of Public Safety until August 2001. She won 
praise from law enforcement, fire fighters and 
emergency workers from her work guiding the 
response from the Commonwealth when six 
firefighters were killed in a tragic warehouse 
fire and building collapse in December 1999.

In September 2001, she was selected as chief 
of Raleighs 700-plus-member department.

With her work have come honors and 
accolades. She had been selected as one of 
Twenty-Five People to Watch in New York 
City in 1998 by the New York Daily News, 
One of Ten Women To Watch in 1999 by 
Jewish Women International and Ten People 
to Watch in 2002 by the Raleigh (North Carolina) 
News and Observer.

She lectures on Community Policing and 
Crime Strategies to both national and international 
groups.



Special Agent in Charge Kevin Stafford

Special Agent in Charge Kevin Stafford was 
born July 5, 1954, in Jacksonville, Illinois. 
He earned a bachelors degree in business administration, 
economics and psychology from 
Illinois College in 1976; a masters degree 
in business administration from the University 
of Illinois in 1980; and a law degree from 
Southern Illinois University School of Law 
in 1985. Stafford is a member of the Illinois 
and Missouri bars. He was sworn in as a 
deputy sheriff in the Morgan County Sheriffs 
Department, Jacksonville, Illinois, in 1974, 
where he served as a dispatcher from 1975 to 
1976. In 1976, he joined the Jacksonville, Illinois, 
Police Department as a patrolman and 
was promoted to a detective in 1980, where he 
served until 1981.

Stafford entered on duty with the FBI 
as a Special Agent on July 23, 1983; upon 
completion of training at the FBI Academy, 
he was assigned to the Kansas City Division. 
He subsequently served as a Special Agent in 
the New York Division from 1986 to 1987; a 
Supervisory Special Agent in the Office of the 
General Counsel, FBI Headquarters (FBIHQ), 
Washington, D.C., from 1987 to 1990; and a 
Supervisory Special Agent in the Organized 
Crime/Drug Intelligence Section, Criminal 
Investigative Division (CID), FBIHQ, from 
1990 to 1992. In 1992, Stafford was transferred 
to the Baltimore Division, Maryland 
Metropolitan Office, where he served as the 
Senior Supervisory Resident Agent until 
1997.

In January 1997, Stafford was designated 
as the Assistant Special Agent in Charge of 
the San Antonio Division, McAllen Resident 
Agency, where he served until October 1998. 
Between October 1998 and May 2001, he 
served as the Chief of the Drug Section, CID, 
and FBIHQ. On March 20, 2001, Stafford was 
selected by Director Louis J. Freeh to be the 
Special Agent in Charge of the Kansas City 
Division.

Chief Darrel W. Stephens

Darrel W. Stephens was appointed Charlotte-
Meklenburg (NC) Police Chief in September 
1999. He was the City Administrator for the 
City of St. Petersburg, Florida, for more than 
two years after accepting the position in June 
1997. He was responsible for day-to-day oversight 
and management of all city operations 
and a workforce of more than 3,000 employees. 
He also served as Police Chief in St. Petersburg 
from December 1992 to June 1997. He spent 
most of his career in policing, including six and 
a half years as executive director of PERF. He 
began his career in 1968 as a police officer with 
the Kansas City, Missouri, Police Department, 
which included a 10-month visiting fellowship 
at the National Institute of Justice in 1972. He 
became the assistant police chief in Lawrence, 
Kansas, in 1976. In 1979 he accepted the 
Largo, Florida, police chiefs position. In 1983 
he took the police chiefs position in Newport 
News, Virginia, where that department became 
nationally recognized for its work with 
problem-oriented policing that provided much 



of the foundation for community policing. He 
has co-authored several books and published 
many articles on policing issues. He holds a 
bachelors degree in administration of justice 
from the University of MissouriKansas City 
and a masters degree in public administration 
from Central Missouri State University.



ABOUT THE OFFICE OF COMMUNITY ORIENTED 
POLICING SERVICES (COPS)
U.S. Department of Justice

THE OFFICE OF COMMUNITY ORIENTED POLICING SERVICES (COPS) WAS 
created in 1994 and has the unique mission to directly serve the needs 
of state and local law enforcement. The COPS Office is an innovative 
agency that has been the driving force in advancing the concept of community policing 
through the creation of locally driven problem-solving strategies and police-
community partnerships. COPS is responsible for one of the greatest infusions of 
resources into state, local and tribal law enforcement in our nations history.

Since 1994, COPS has invested $9.6 billion to add community policing officers to the nations 
streets, enhance crime fighting technology, support crime prevention initiatives and advance community 
policing nationwide. COPS funding has furthered the advancement of community policing 
through community policing innovation conferences, the development of model practices, pilot 
community policing programs and applied research and evaluation initiatives. COPS has also positioned 
itself to respond directly to emerging law enforcement needs. Examples include working 
in partnership with departments to enhance police integrity, promoting safe schools and combating 
the methamphetamine drug problem and recently homeland security efforts.

Through its Fiscal Year 2003 grant programs, COPS is assisting and encouraging local, state 
and tribal law enforcement agencies to enhance their homeland security efforts. Traditional COPS 
programs such as Universal Hiring (UHP) will give priority consideration to those applicants that 
demonstrate a use of funds related to terrorism preparedness or response through community policing. 
The COPS in Schools (CIS) program has a mandatory training component that will include 
topics on terrorism prevention, emergency response and the critical role schools can play in community 
response. In addition, COPS is developing interoperability and overtime programs that 
will assist in addressing the homeland security demands that inevitably fall to law enforcement.



The COPS Office has made substantial investments in law enforcement training. COPS created 
a national network of Regional Community Policing Institutes (RCPIs) that has revolutionized 
law enforcement training. Most recently the RCPIs have been focusing their efforts on developing 
and delivering homeland security training. COPS also supports the advancement of community 
policing strategies through the national training delivery system provided by the Community Policing 
Consortium. Furthermore, COPS has made a major investment in research which makes 
possible the growing body of substantive knowledge covering all aspects of community policing.

These substantial investments have produced a significant community policing infrastructure 
across the country as evidenced by the fact that more than two-thirds of the nations law enforcement 
agencies have sought COPS grants and were awarded funding. The COPS Office continues 
to respond proactively by providing critical resources, training and technical assistance to help 
state, local and tribal law enforcement implement innovative and effective community policing 
strategies.



ABOUT PERF

THE POLICE EXECUTIVE RESEARCH FORUM (PERF) IS A NATIONAL PROFESsional 
association of chief executives of large city, county and state law 
enforcement agencies. PERFs objective is to improve the delivery of 
police services and the effectiveness of crime control through several means:

 the exercise of strong national leadership,

 the public debate of police and criminal issues,

 the development of research and policy, and

 the provision of vital management and leadership services to police agencies.

PERF members are selected on the basis of their commitment to PERFs objectives and principles. 
PERF operates under the following tenets:

 Research, experimentation and exchange of ideas through public discussion and debate are 
paths for the development of a comprehensive body of knowledge about policing.

 Substantial and purposeful academic study is a prerequisite for acquiring, understanding 
and adding to that body of knowledge.

 Maintenance of the highest standards of ethics and integrity is imperative in the improvement 
of policing.

 The police must, within the limits of the law, be responsible and accountable to citizens as 
the ultimate source of police authority.

 The principles embodied in the Constitution are the foundation of policing.

Categories of membership also allow the organization to benefit from the diverse views of 
criminal justice researchers, law enforcement at all ranks and other professionals committed to 
advancing law enforcement services to all communities.



Additional color copies of this report can be downloaded free of charge at 
www.policeforum.org/terrorismwp.html