UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
       NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD
                 WASHINGTON, D.C.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  x
                                     :
PUBLIC HEARING IN THE MATTER OF:     :
                                     :  No. DCA
COLLISION AND DERAILMENT OF          :  99-MR-003
AMTRAK 59, THE CITY OF NEW ORLEANS,  :
WITH AN EASTBOUND TRACTOR,           :  Volume II
SEMI-TRAILER AT RAILROAD/HIGHWAY     :
GRADE CROSSING NEAR BOURBONNAIS,     :  Day II
ILLINOIS ON MARCH 15, 1999           :
                                     :
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  x

                       Tuesday, September 14, 1999

                       The Guildhall
                       The Ambassador West Hotel
                       The Wyndham Grand Hotel
                       Chicago, Illinois
          The Public Hearing in the above-entitled 
matter resumed, at the Ambassador West Hotel, The 
Guildhall, 1300 North State Parkway, Chicago, Illinois, 
pursuant to adjournment, at 9:00 a.m., before the Board 
of Inquiry of the National Transportation Safety Board.

APPEARANCES:
     THE BOARD OF INQUIRY:

          GEORGE W. BLACK, JR., Chairman
          National Transportation Safety Board

          JAMES S. DUNN,
          Hearing Officer

          ROBERT C. LAUBY, Director
          Office of Railroad Safety

          BARRY SWEEDLER, Director
          Office of Safety Recommendations and
          Accomplishments

          CLAUDE HARRIS, Deputy Director
          Office of Highway Safety

APPEARANCES: (Continued)

     THE TECHNICAL PANEL:

          TED TURPIN, Operations Specialist
          Office of Railroad Safety

          DR. GERALD D. WEEKS, Chief
          Human Factors Division
          Office of Railroad Safety

          RICHARD DOWNS, Survival Factors
          Specialist, Office of Railroad Safety

          RUBEN PAYAN, Signal Specialist
          Office of Railroad Safety

          BURT SIMON, Human Performance Specialist
          Office of Highway Safety

          BYRD RABY, Heavy Vehicle Specialist,
          Office of Highway Safety

          THOMAS JACKY, Event Recorder Specialist
          Office of Research and Engineering

          MIRIAM KLOEPPEL, Transportation Research
          Analyst, Office of Research and
          Engineering

     PUBLIC INFORMATION OFFICER

          TERRY WILLIAMS

     ADMINISTRATIVE AND TECHNICAL SUPPORT

          Evelyn Hemingway

APPEARANCES: (Continued)

     PARTIES TO THE HEARING:

     NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER CORPORATION
       (AMTRAK):

          LEE W. BULLOCK, President, Amtrak
            Intercity

          TRAVIS HINTON, Chief Operating Officer,
            Amtrak Intercity

          CHRIS BLACK, Director, Public Affairs

          T. MICHAEL KERRINE, Associate General
            Counsel, Tort Litigation

          GEORGE BINNS, General Manager,
            Standards and Compliance

          PETER HALL, Director of Safety, Amtrak
            Intercity

          MARK MEANA, Director of Safety,
            Corporate

          CLAYTON BROWN, Assistant Vice-President,
            Corporate Operations

     CANADIAN NATIONAL/ILLINOIS CENTRAL RAILROAD:
          ED HARRIS, Vice-President,
            Midwest Division

          JOHN PRENDERGAST, Risk Manager

          CHARLES WEBSTER, General Counsel, U.S.

          JOHN SHARKEY, General Manager,
            Communications and Signals

APPEARANCES (Continued)
     CANADIAN NATIONAL/ILLINOIS CENTRAL RAILROAD:
          (Continued)

          MYLES TOBIN, Vice-President,
            U.S. Legal Affairs

          BOB KEENE

     FEDERAL RAILROAD ADMINISTRATION:

          DAVID BLACKMORE, Deputy Regional
            Administrator

          ALLAN HALSTROM, Principal Inspector,
            Indianapolis

          JEFF THOMAS, Signal and Train Control
            Inspector, Chicago

          ROBERT MYERS, Assistant Grade Crossing
            and Trespass Manager, Chicago
          PATTY SMITH, Grade Crossing and Trespass
            Manager, Chicago

     FEDERAL HIGHWAY ADMINISTRATION:
          RUDY UMBS, Chief, Safety Design Division

     ILLINOIS COMMERCE COMMISSION:

          MICHAEL STEAD, Rail Safety Program
            Administrator

          JOHN BLAIR, Railroad Safety Specialist

          STAN MILEWSKI, Railroad Safety
            Specialist

          DON RICHARDSON, Railroad Safety
             Specialist, State Coordinator,
             Illinois Operation Lifesaver

     BROTHERHOOD OF LOCOMOTIVE ENGINEERS:

          WILLIAM C. WALPERT, Vice-President

          JOHN P. TOLMAN, Special Representative,
            International Division

          LARRY JAMES, Coordinator, Education and
            Training Department

          CARL FIELDS, Safety Task Force

          TOM O'BRIEN

APPEARANCES: (Continued)

     UNITED TRANSPORTATION UNION:

          THOMAS P. DWYER III, Director

     MELCO TRANSFER, INC.:

          MELVIN MARSHALL

          JUDY MARSHALL

          BRAD PURCELL, Counsel for Melco
            Transfer, Inc.

                 C O N T E N T S
                                              PAGE
Opening Remarks                                218
Sworn Testimony of John Sharkey                218
  Examination by the Technical Panel           219
  Examination by the United Transportation
    Union                                      265
  Examination by the Canadian
    National/Illinois Central Railroad         266
  Examination by the Illinois Commerce
    Commission                                 270
  Examination by the Brotherhood of
    Locomotive Engineers                       271
  Examination by the Board of Inquiry          275
Sworn Testimony of Mark R. Corbo               296
  Examination by the Technical Panel           297
  Examination by Melco Transfer, Inc.          323
  Examination by the Brotherhood of
    Locomotive Engineers                       325
  Examination by the Board of Inquiry          327

Sworn Testimony of Michael Harshbarger         343
  Examination by the Technical Panel           344
  Examination by Amtrak                        368
  Examination by the Brotherhood of
    Locomotive Engineers                       371
  Examination by the Board of Inquiry          372
  Further Examination by the
    Technical Panel                            375   

Sworn Testimony of Lee Bullock
    and Mark Meana                             378
  Examination by the Technical Panel           379
  Examination by the Federal Railroad
    Administration                             395
  Examination by the Brotherhood of
    Locomotive Engineers                       396
  Examination by the United Transportation
    Union                                      398
  Examination by the Board of Inquiry          399

           C O N T E N T S (Continued)
                                              PAGE
Sworn Testimony of John Blair                  411
  Examination by the Technical Panel           412
  Examination by the Brotherhood of
    Locomotive Engineers                       429
  Examination by the United Transportation
    Union                                      430
  Examination by Amtrak                        431
  Examination by the Board of Inquiry          431

Sworn Testimony of Clayton Brown,
    Bruce George, and Rudolph Umbs             451
  Examination by the Technical Panel           453
  Examination by the United Transportation
    Union                                      494
  Examination by the Illinois Commerce
    Commission                                 496
  Examination by the Board of Inquiry          501
Adjournment                                    529

              P R O C E E D I N G S
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  Good morning.  The good news 
is I don't have a long boilerplate the second day.  The 
bad news is I have a long one to read at the end of 
tomorrow.
          I think we had a very productive day 
yesterday.  We certainly got into the record some 
information we did not have before, and I think we got 
it in a more concise way than it was in some of the 
previously recorded and transcripted statements.
          So, are you ready, Mr. Dunn?
          MR. DUNN:  Yes.
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  Proceed.
          MR. DUNN:  The National Transportation Safety 
Board calls Mr. John Sharkey.
         SWORN TESTIMONY OF JOHN SHARKEY
          MR. DUNN:  Mr. Sharkey, for the record, would 
you state and spell your full name.
          MR. SHARKEY:  John Sharkey; J-o-h-n, 
S-h-a-r-k-e-y.
          MR. DUNN:  Who are you employed by?
          MR. SHARKEY:  The Canadian National/Illinois 
Central Railroad.
          MR. DUNN:  For how long have you employed by 
the Canadian National/Illinois Central Railroad?
          MR. SHARKEY:  We have just merged on July 1st 
of this year, but I have been with the railroad, 
Illinois Central, for 27 years.
          MR. DUNN:  What are your duties and 
responsibilities?
          MR. SHARKEY:  I am General Manager of 
Communications and Signals.  I direct the activities of 
the Signal Department at this time and at the time of 
the accident, I am active in engineering and 
engineering organizations.  I am and charged with 
procedures; maintenance inspections; tests, compliance 
with those; and the design of signal systems.
          MR. DUNN:  You were involved in the 
investigation of the accident at Bourbonnais?
          MR. SHARKEY:  Yes, I was.
          MR. DUNN:  You were a part of the signal 
crew?
          MR. SHARKEY:  Yes.
          MR. DUNN:  At this time, I will turn the 
questioning over to our Technical Panel, Mr. Ruben 
Payan.
        EXAMINATION BY THE TECHNICAL PANEL
          MR. PAYAN:  Good morning, Mr. Sharkey.
          MR. SHARKEY:  Good morning.
          MR. PAYAN:  Let's start off with a little 
history of the equipment at McKnight Road.
          Can you provide a history of the active 
warning devices that have been installed at McKnight 
Road?
          MR. SHARKEY:  Yes.
          The original installation of the active 
warning devices was in December of the 1968 pursuant to 
an order of the Illinois Commerce Commission to install 
automatic flashing light signals and short arm gates.
          The term "short arm gates" was used at that 
time to differentiate what had been the previous 
practice of installing long gates which extended 
completely across a roadway.  So, those were installed 
in 1968.
          There was a modification to the track 
circuits in 1987, whereby we changed an overlay type, 
an audio frequency overlay type circuit from a 
non-modulated circuit to a modulated circuit in 1987.
          In September of 1990, we installed 12 inch 
flashing lights at the location.  Previous to that, the 
state standard was 8 3/8 inch bravos (phonetic).  That 
was part of a state-wide program.  Pursuant to a 
Commerce Commission order, we installed Clovis bravos 
(phonetic).
          In January of 1992, we changed the control 
equipment from a -- there was a constant warning timed 
device originally installed there.  It was a GCP model 
400.  We changed those to the latest, the GCP Model 
3000, in January of 1992 pursuant to a Commerce 
Commission order.  That is the equipment that is there 
today.
          There has been some software upgrades in that 
microprocessor type equipment since its original 
installation in 1992.  So, what we have there today is 
control circuits of GCP 3000s and flashing light 
signals and short arm gates.
          MR. PAYAN:  You mentioned several other types 
of warning devices.
          Can you describe what other types the 
Illinois Central/Canadian National uses at their other 
railroad crossings that are not experimental and that 
are in actual use?
          MR. SHARKEY:  Are you saying from an 
historical perspective?
          MR. PAYAN:  Historical and currently being 
used.
          MR. SHARKEY:  Historically, active warning 
devices began with what we call an auto flag, commonly 
referred to as a wig-wag.  It was a device with a disk 
that had a red light in it that swung back and forth.  
Those began to be installed in the 1890s.
          The conventional flashing light signals began 
to be installed back in the early 1900s, 1910.  The 
gates were patented in 1938, so the type of gate 
mechanisms we have -- the earlier models went back to 
the late 1930s.
          The conventional type flashing light signals 
are what is used at most crossings that are signal 
track crossings.  Flashing light signals with gates are 
used at crossings where you have multiple main tracks 
or there is a possibility of a sight obstruction due to 
a train or a curve or something like this.
          Flashing light signals are used to warn the 
motorist, to get the motorist stopped, and the gate is 
used to supplement that to keep the motorist stopped.
          MR. PAYAN:  Is that a railroad definition or 
a state law or do you know?
          MR. SHARKEY:  Well, the state law in Illinois 
provides that flashing light signals for the motorist 
are analogous to the stop sign -- stop and then proceed 
if it is safe to do so -- and with gates, it is an 
absolute stop similar to a stop light.
          MR. PAYAN:  As far as the age of technology, 
where does the equipment at McKnight Road fall into?
          MR. SHARKEY:  It is the latest in current 
levels in technology.
          MR. PAYAN:  State of the art?
          MR. SHARKEY:  Yes.
          MR. PAYAN:  You mentioned GCP.
          Can you explain what that means?
          MR. SHARKEY:  It is a grade crossing 
predictor.  It is what is generically called a constant 
warning timed device.  It is a device that is a 
microprocessor-based electronic transceiver that is 
hooked up to the rails at the crossing.
          It puts a low frequency voltage out on to the 
track.  It puts it out with a constant current 
transmitter, and it is tuned to a -- perhaps slide one 
might be appropriate.
          MR. PAYAN:  Are the slides we are using now 
from the signal factual, from one the attachments?
          MR. SHARKEY:  Yes.
          (Pause in the proceedings.)
          MR. PAYAN:  Maybe we can come back to that.
          Can you explain what the process is that is 
used to determine which crossings will get active 
warning devices?
          You mentioned the ICC order in several 
places.
          MR. SHARKEY:  Yes.
          The Illinois Commerce Commission is 
responsible for crossing devices in the State of 
Illinois in conjunction with the Illinois Department of 
Transportation.
          In accordance with the Manual on Uniform 
Traffic Control Devices, the selection and 
determination of warning devices is determined by the 
highway authority with jurisdiction over the road.
          MR. PAYAN:  Does the railroad have a say in 
this process?
          MR. SHARKEY:  The railroads will participate 
in meetings at the crossing of diagnostic surveys under 
Federally funded projects or stipulated agreement 
meetings or meetings with the Illinois Commerce 
Commission.
          MR. PAYAN:  Do you know what factors are used 
to determine which crossings and what equipment will be 
used?
          MR. SHARKEY:  I believe the warrants would be 
that on multiple track railroads, for sure, you would 
have flashing light signals and gates.  On single track 
railroads, it may depend on the speed.  Each state has 
different warrants.  In Illinois, right now, the 
projects are calling for gates.
          MR. PAYAN:  How about warning time?
          How much warning time is required?
          How much warning time is provided for an 
approaching train?
          MR. SHARKEY:  The minimal warning time 
recognized for any crossing would be 20 seconds minimum 
warning time.  At this particular crossing, we achieved 
25 seconds warning time.
          MR. PAYAN:  Is that a railroad standard or 
ICC requirement to measure it by seconds?
          MR. SHARKEY:  It started out as being an 
Association of American Railroads recommended practice, 
and it was adopted into the Manual on Uniform Traffic 
Control Devices in, I believe, 1978.
          So, basically the HFWA adopted the railroad 
signal practices from the Association of American 
Railroads in 1978, and now, it is considered part of 
that standard to be 20 seconds minimum.
          MR. PAYAN:  If we could get back now to the 
operation, could you give us a description of the 
operation of the warning devices?
          MR. SHARKEY:  What we have here is a stretch 
of track.  In the center here of the slide is McKnight 
Road.  What we are showing is about a nine thousand 
foot stretch of track to the north left just towards 
Chicago, Illinois, and south goes down to the right.
          This is the stretch of traffic in the 
vicinity, and it is kind of a schematic diagram of the 
tracks at McKnight Road.  We have Saint George Road to 
the north and Larry Powell Road to the south.  If we 
could come in from this section right here possibly 
(indicating).
          What we have is a constant warning timed 
device at McKnight Road.  It is an electronic 
transmitter, receiver located at the crossing; and it 
transmits out these signals.
          Here, it schematically represents a 
termination shunt that terminates the signal from that 
transceiver.  So, with no train around, there is a 
voltage from the transmitter impressed on to the track.
          The microprocessor device, the constant 
warning timed device, the GCP-3000, looks at that 
signal on the track, and that is a normal condition 
with no train around.
          As the train passes these termination shunts 
on either side, the voltage that is on the track, due 
to the train wheels across the track circuit, forms 
basically a short circuit to the that signal.
          As the train approaches, there is this 
voltage level as this train would come in that would 
decrease linearly towards the crossing.  There is a 
reference level of a hundred when everything is normal. 
 That is what it is calibrated up to be.
          As the train approaches, that reference level 
goes down to zero at the crossing when it is linear.  
So, what that level does is it basically is 
proportional to the distance the train is away from the 
crossing.
          The rate of change of that level is 
proportional to the velocity of the train.  So, by 
knowing distance and knowing velocity, we know when the 
train is going to arrive at the crossing.  That is the 
way this device calculates when to activate the warning 
devices.
          MR. PAYAN:  The voltage on the rail is always 
on there; is that correct?
          MR. SHARKEY:  Yes.
          MR. PAYAN:  What happens if it loses power?
          MR. SHARKEY:  Then it will deactivate, which 
would be the same result as if it detected a train 
approaching.  It is a closed circuit.  It is a normally 
energized circuit that would de-energize in the event 
of a train.  You would get the same indication if there 
is a malfunction, that same indication as if a train 
was coming.
          MR. PAYAN:  Can the amount of warning time be 
affected in any way once a train is approaching?
          MR. SHARKEY:  The devices today are devices 
of such a nature that the warning time is very 
consistent.  If the train slows down, once it is 
detected and the unit says the train is going to be at 
the crossing in 25 seconds, if the train slows down, 
naturally, the warning time is going to get longer 
because it has already made its prediction.
          If the train speeds up, the warning times 
would get proportionally shorter for the change in 
speed.  So, if there is acceleration or deceleration, 
warning times may be affected.
          MR. PAYAN:  Can we get into how the gates 
operate?
          MR. SHARKEY:  Yes.
          MR. PAYAN:  What activates the gate?
          Can you explain how that works?
          MR. SHARKEY:  If we could back out a little 
bit.
          The lower track is the main track, the track 
that Train 59 was on that night.  What we have is a 
track circuit that goes with our wayside signals, and 
we have signals about nine thousand feet north of the 
crossing and another set of signals about six thousand 
feet south of the crossing.
          We have a track circuit in there where you 
can employ that track circuit to as act as a redundant 
part of the system.  What we do is from a circuit at 
the end, we repeat the information that there is no 
train on that track back to McKnight Road via an audio 
frequency overlay circuit.  If we could zoom in on that 
center portion, the lower portion of McKnight Road.
          So primarily for Track One, the main track, 
we have the 1XR, which is the crossing relay for the 
one track; and in this, we have two paths that can hold 
up or energize this relay -- relay being an 
electromechanical device.  It is part of our logic 
circuit.  So, we have two paths that are holding this 
up.
          So, the first thing that happens is a 
southbound train would deactivate 1 WAR, which is a 
wrap circuit, that long wrap circuit.  This contact 
would open, but the relay would remain energized 
through the outputs of our grade crossing predictor.
          When the grade crossing predictor detects 
that the train is going to be the prescribed time from 
the crossing, this contact would open thereby 
de-energizing the 1XR.  That starts off basically -- 
can you turn that?
          (Adjustment of Diagram.)
          MR. SHARKEY:  It starts somewhat of the chain 
reaction.
          Over here, to the right, over to this lower 
right portion, here, we have the 1XR on the top line.  
When that contact opens, it drops the crossing control 
relay to the main crossing.  Basically, we have one 
relay for Track One and one relay for Track Two, the 
side track.
          When that de-energizes, it opens the two 
relays over here (indicating).  In the lower right-hand 
corner is what is called the XR-GPR.  That relay I am 
referring to, all these relays are normally energized, 
so if there is an open wire or if anything goes wrong 
in the circuitry, it will go to its restrictive state 
and cause the flashers to operate.
          So, this XR is normally energized.  Then the 
XR one will start dropping or de-energizing so it 
starts the change.  If a wire opened in that circuit, 
the same thing would happen.
          So what happens is when a train is detected 
at the 1-XR, we end up dropping the XR-GPR.  With that 
de-energized, it turns on the lights.  So, that is what 
starts the lights flashing, and at that point, the bell 
begins to ring.
          The relay above it, the XRPR, is what we 
refer to as a slow release relay.  When you take the 
energy off of the coil of the relay, the XRPR remains 
energized for four seconds, and that is what gives us 
our gate delay time.
          So, the lights start flashing first, and then 
four seconds later, the gates start to descend.  I 
think yesterday we saw some, I guess, some confusion 
and conflicting talk about gates going down or being 
down.
          What I prefer to talk about is the gate 
starting to descend, and that happens about four 
seconds after.  The minimum prescribed by the Manual on 
Uniform Traffic Control Devices is three seconds.
          MR. PAYAN:  Can you explain what an XR-1 
monitors and the XPR and an XGR or XRGPR?
          MR. SHARKEY:  The XR would be that the 
crossing control circuits, when it is energized and the 
crossing control circuits do not sense an approaching 
train.  The XRPR would be to give our gate delay time, 
and when that relay de-energizes is when the gates 
start to descend.
          The XR-GPR is the relay that would, when it 
is de-energized, that would light the lights through a 
flash relay that alternates the lights back and forth.
          MR. PAYAN:  The XR is the one that gets the 
signal from the controller, from the GCP?
          MR. SHARKEY:  That is the one that is the 
main relay for sensing an approaching train.
          MR. PAYAN:  Once the XGPR tells the gates to 
start, can you explain how they are finally put into a 
horizontal position?
          MR. SHARKEY:  Okay.  I believe that would be 
slide two.
          What we have here is some cables going from 
the control house out to the various flashing light 
signals, and the lower square on the bottom is the 
actual gate mechanism or the gate motor.
          How this operates, that XR relay actually 
keeps the motor control relay in the upper left-hand 
corner energized.  When you de-energize the XR, it 
de-energizes this motor control relay which turns on 
the motor, and the motor starts to drive, from the 90 
degree position, the gate arm to the horizontal 
position.
          Through a series of contacts on the rotating 
shaft inside the gate mechanism, we get various angular 
deflexions of the gate arm.
          When the motor drives the gate down, it 
starts to accelerate because it is going to accelerate 
from motor motion and from gravity because the gates 
are counter-weighted to be heavy to where they will 
fall; but normally, the gate is held in the up 
position.
          There is actually energy on a ratchet and 
gear train here that is called a hold-clear mechanism. 
 So actually, we hold the gates in the up position and 
then allow them to descend when we take energy off of 
the motor control relay.
          MR. PAYAN:  If you lose energy, would that 
affect the gate?
          MR. SHARKEY:  If we lose energy completely, 
like if all the cables were severed, the gate would 
lower by gravity to a horizontal position.
          MR. PAYAN:  So, you drive it down?
          MR. SHARKEY:  We drive it from the 90 degree 
position to the 50 degree position.  Then at that 
point, one of the contacts opens.  Then what we do is 
the armature of the motor actually acts like a 
generator at that point, and it is turning and it is 
causing the electricity to flow through a resistor that 
is in the gate mechanism that actually acts as a 
braking motion.
          Then went it gets down to the final five 
degree position, there is a contact that opens up or 
closes, and then we actually put a short circuit across 
that armature to act like a brake.
          It is called a dynamic braking at that point, 
and that is why you see a gate mechanism come down 
fairly smoothly.  Then when it gets down to the last 
five degrees, it seems to hesitate and then gradually 
lower down to the horizontal position.
          MR. PAYAN:  Yesterday, we heard Mr. Nieves 
testify he saw the gate hit or strike the truck.
          How does that affect the gate operation if it 
hits something midway down?
          MR. SHARKEY:  Well, below the 50 degree mark, 
it is going to be trying to go down by gravity at that 
point.  So, it is going to strike it and not try to 
force its way down.  If it is above the 50 degree, then 
the motor is going to drive and try to continue to push 
the gate down to at least the 50 degree mark.
          MR. PAYAN:  There is no reset where it will 
automatically come on if it can't go down?
          MR. SHARKEY:  No.
          It doesn't hit something and then restore it. 
 It is not like a garage door.
          MR. PAYAN:  It will just continue down?
          MR. SHARKEY:  Yes.
          MR. PAYAN:  I would like to get into a little 
bit of the maintenance.
          How often does the Canadian National/Illinois 
Central inspect its railroad active warning devices?
          MR. SHARKEY:  At least once a month.
          MR. PAYAN:  When was the last inspection at 
McKnight Road?
          If you could, tell us what that consisted of.
          MR. SHARKEY:  Let me refer to the Signal 
Factual Report.  The last monthly inspection was on 
February 24th of 1999 at 1400 hours.  The maintainer -- 
the signal personnel that are responsible for 
maintaining signals on the territory -- the maintainer 
would check the housings to make sure they were secure 
and padlocked; check the wire and cable for mechanical 
injury; check the signs to make sure they were in good 
condition and visible.
          The flashing light signals, he would activate 
the flashing light signals; look at the light units to 
make sure all the bulbs operated and that they were 
visible and properly aligned; that the units were 
clean.
          There is no traffic signal interconnected at 
this crossing, so that is not applicable.  If a gate 
arm or gates are used, check the gate length to make 
sure it is proper out to the middle of the street; and 
that there is correct timing, in other words, that 
three seconds minimum gate delay time.  Then he would 
check the stand-by power.
          Signal systems are backed up by battery 
back-up, so that there is a battery on the circuit at 
all times that is being charged.  There would be an 
operating battery that would operate the grade crossing 
predictor equipment.  Then there would be a light 
battery that would power the light circuits so if you 
have a power outage, you have stand-by power.  He would 
check the power.
          He would check these reference levels on the 
GCP.  In this case, the reference level was 97 on both 
tracks, and it remains true.  That is what he checked.
          He did replace the flasher relay at that 
time.  It is not noted exactly what the failure was, 
but he replaced the flasher relay at that time.  Maybe 
there was something he found on his inspection, but it 
was not anything that was reported to the railroad.
          MR. PAYAN:  Was that the only exception 
found?
          MR. SHARKEY:  He did repair the belt.
          Again, he makes a notation that he repaired 
it.  It doesn't say what was what the problem was.
          MR. PAYAN:  He looks at that once a month you 
said?
          MR. SHARKEY:  Yes.
          MR. PAYAN:  We go to post-accident.
          Do you recall what time you arrived on the 
scene on March 15th?
          MR. SHARKEY:  It was a few minutes after 
midnight on the 16th.
          MR. PAYAN:  Could you describe what you saw 
when you arrived.
          MR. SHARKEY:  Well, the emergency operation 
was quiet.  I came down Route 50 parallel to the tracks 
coming from the north.  So, there was all of the 
ambulance activity staged at the Carter Lumber Company. 
 I parked my car down on Route 50 and then walked.
          I identified myself when I walked in.  Then I 
walked down the back road towards the crossing.  The 
train was stopped on the crossing as we have seen in 
the exhibits.  There were three or four cars on the 
crossing north.  At that time, our maintenance 
personnel and the field management personnel had just 
completed a download of the data recorder.  We had 
conversed on car phones while we were en route.
          I told them I wanted about three or four 
people to go into the signal house, download the event 
recorder, look but don't touch anything except for the 
process of downloading the event recorder, then do 
that, and lock the house back up.  I got there, and 
they had just completed that and gave me the disk of 
the recorder print-out.
          MR. PAYAN:  Can you explain what the event 
recorder print-out indicated?
          MR. SHARKEY:  The event recorder indicated we 
had 26 seconds warning time on the grade crossing 
predictor and that the actual events indicated that 
there was 25 seconds operation between the time the XR 
de-energized and the time the island circuit was 
occupied.
          MR. PAYAN:  You said 25 seconds.
          Is that the time the computer saw the train 
or the actual flashing of the lights?
          MR. SHARKEY:  That would have been from the 
time that the XR relay de-energized, saying that the 
predictor saw the train, until the train occupied the 
island circuit, which was a short track circuit that 
extended about 60 feet north of the crossing.
          There is a positive section of the track 
circuit transmitter talking to the receiver at that 
point where it shunts that voltage to absolute zero, 
and that is called a 90 circuit.  At that point, we 
just had to determine the elapsed time.
          MR. PAYAN:  Can you give us a view of the 
post-accident testing and the results of that?
          MR. SHARKEY:  Basically, nothing was done 
until later the next day after NTSB personnel arrived. 
 We went back in and downloaded the event recorder 
again.  Nothing had changed because there had been no 
subsequent train moves or trains at the crossing.
          We had considerable damage to one of the 
signals, so that had to be replaced before we were able 
to put the circuits back in service.  We finally opened 
up the crossing Wednesday night.
          We went through our annual and our monthly 
inspection again as part of our post-accident tests.  
We checked the predictor.  A rail was broken, so at 
that point, the predictor circuit was de-energized and 
the gates were down and the flashers were flashing.
          We also did a relay test.  All those relays I 
referred to were individually tested to make sure they 
were within specifications.  Wiring going to the gates 
were checked to make sure they had proper insulation 
and resistance and there wasn't heavily damaged cables. 
 The relays and the cables all checked appropriate.
          MR. PAYAN:  How about the unit itself, the 
predictor itself?
          What tests were done on it?
          MR. SHARKEY:  We observed train movements 
after we put it back in service after train service was 
restored.
          Subsequently to that, the manufacturer sent 
engineers to the site to look at the location.  The 
unit was taken out of service and sent back to the 
manufacturer's plant where each board was individually 
tested to see if it was compliant with their test 
procedures.
          MR. PAYAN:  Were you notified of any 
exceptions taken?
          MR. SHARKEY:  No.
          MR. PAYAN:  You mentioned some damage to the 
equipment.
          Can you briefly explain what kind of damage 
you found or that you witnessed when you arrived?
          MR. SHARKEY:  What we see here is an end view 
of the west gate looking south.
          MR. PAYAN:  The west gate, is that the first 
gate or the second gate the trucker would have 
encountered?
          MR. SHARKEY:  This would have been the first 
gate the truck came to (indicating).  To the south, we 
see the derailed Amtrak cars.
          When I arrived on the scene -- you cannot see 
it in this photo, but up above, up on the mast is where 
we have the flashing light signal units; there are two 
units, 12-inch flashing light units facing west, and 
two flashing light units facing east -- there was only 
one unit that was still intact.  It was the front 
light, the south light.  You can barely see the bottom 
both of it here.  It was in its proper position.  The 
other three flashing light units were broke off at the 
aluminum elbow that comes out the junction box.
          When I arrived, two of the lights were 
hanging by their wires and spinning in the wind.  One 
of the light units was completely missing.  It was 
later found about a hundred feet north of the crossing.
          The crossbuck sign, the X sign that is on the 
flashing light signal and gate mast, it has a cast 
bracket that holds it to the mast, and that cast 
bracket was broken, and the crossbuck was laying on the 
ground.
          The belt can be seen here laying on the 
ground.  Let's see what else is at the top.  The 
counter-weight arm.  There is a counter-weight that 
extends on an arm, and it goes out horizontal when the 
gate is horizontal.  That counter-weight arm was broken 
off.  The counter-weight was laying on the ground just 
below the signal.
          It was noted that the counter-weight, except 
for the casting, the arm with it physically being 
cracked and broke off, that there was no other damage 
to counter-weight.  I will get back to that in a 
moment.
          Further down on it, this is the gate 
mechanism that has the motor in the center mast, and 
there is a gate arm that comes out.  This is the type 
of arm.  There was a wooden gate arm.  It was basically 
two boards that we refer to as baseboards that tied to 
a tongue.  They bolt together in kind of a "V" shape.
          The baseboard on the field side -- I will 
refer to field side versus track side -- the baseboard 
on the field side was cracked through the first bolt 
holes which bolts it to the tongue and the field 
baseboard.
          The gate tongue, again, was cracked right 
here (indicating), but nothing had fallen off.  What we 
see are the lights hanging down, and we see the board 
is broke, but we don't a gate arm laying on the ground.
          MR. PAYAN:  Where is the light normally 
seated?
          MR. SHARKEY:  There will be a light on the 
tip.  It looks like there is a junction box there that 
you can barely see.  Then there is another junction 
box.  There are three lights on the gate arm.  The one 
at the end of the gate stays on all the time, and the 
other two flashing units are seated with the flashing 
light signals up on the mast.
          There were signs where the -- there is a 
concrete foundation, and there is a junction box on the 
base where the mast fits in and then the base bolts to 
the foundation.  There were signs of the base being 
struck by the rebar.
          The bolts were, where the base connects to 
the foundation, the bolts were bent so that when we 
knew it was time to replace the signal, we actually had 
to replace the foundation also.  So, there was evidence 
of the whole signal being hit and the impact causing 
basically a shoving movement in the southwesterly 
direction.
          I think everybody was very good.  I believe 
that, you know, it was the base being hit that caused 
all this fracture to the metal parts on top.  That 
motion from the gate being shoved in a southwesterly 
direction could also have caused some of this fracture 
on the gate because if it would be an impact more or 
less of a whiplash that the tip would want to remain at 
rest, and it would brake in that same direction.
          One of things we were concerned about, and 
that we had testimony yesterday about, was gates 
possibly bouncing along the truck.  We had visually 
observed the bottom of the gate, and we didn't appear 
to see any marks where the gate appeared to be bouncing 
along the rebar.
          Later in the week, we actually put wooden 
boards back on the gate and purposely dropped it on to 
a load of steel that the truck drove, and there were 
marks.  Those similar type of marks were not on the 
gate that was in service after the accident or at the 
time of the accident.
          That pretty well describes the damage to this 
gate mechanism.  It took severe impact at the base.  We 
note that we still have a gate arm here, and I believe 
that with the base being struck directly below the gate 
arm, it somewhat indicates that the steel that hit came 
in on an arc, coming in underneath the gate arm rather 
than going down.
          Obviously, it didn't go down through gate arm 
to get to the base, so it had to go slowly on some arc. 
 That may be able to help determine where the position 
of the rear of the truck was at the time of the 
accident.
          MR. PAYAN:  Thank you.  Mr. Jacky has some 
questions for you.
          MR. JACKY:  Thank you.
          Good morning Mr. Sharkey.
          MR. SHARKEY:  Good morning.
          MR. JACKY:  You mentioned before that the 
signal at McKnight Road has what you called an event 
recorder on there.
          Could you give us a general description of 
the recorder, what it records, and what it recorded on 
to?
          MR. SHARKEY:  There are basically two types 
of devices within this constant warning time cabinet 
that gives us a recording.  There is a keyboard display 
that is shown in the Signal Factual Report that 
actually is an LED type of print-out that shows this 
same information that we see down at the bottom.
          MR. JACKY:  That is Attachment One of the 
Signal Factual, which is Exhibit 3A just for 
information.
          MR. SHARKEY:  The information we see down at 
the bottom, 26, that is the warning time that would be 
shown on the keyboard display.  There is a detected 
speed, island speed, and an average speed that is also 
shown on the keyboard display that is represented by 
the numbers 73, 71 and 68, these numbers down here 
(indicating).
          That is also shown on this keyboard display. 
 That is an independent calculation within the unit.  
That information is fed over to a recorder.  This 
information that we are seeing here is what is captured 
and recorded.  So, we have different -- we have times 
shown here and different numbers, and what they 
represent right in here (indicating) is numbers on a 
recorder interface card that we use to input different 
relay positions into the recorder card.
          For instance, number one over here on the 
left, this line right here (pointing) indicates 
everything is back to normal.  When the one disappears, 
that is the time that, that wrap circuit de-energized.
          Let's see; on pin two, it is the Track One 
GCP sensing the train.  So here, we see two -- at that 
point in time, we see two, three, and four disappearing 
at the same time, the same seconds.
          That is basically our One Track constant 
warning time device, the 1XR, and what I have referred 
to as the XR disappearing.  That is what would start 
the chain reaction of both the lights turning on, which 
is noted by this, actually, item ten.
          MR. JACKY:  What would be the first 
indication to the recorder or to the signal that the 
train is approaching?
          MR. SHARKEY:  Number one disappearing at 
9:16:57.
          That indicates the clock on the recorder was 
slow by approximately 29 minutes.  So, the times that 
we see here are really closer to 9:47.  When we 
adjusted the time on the recording device, we found out 
it was 29 minutes and 18 seconds slow.  So, 29 minutes 
and 18 seconds need to be added to all these times to 
come up with the actual.
          MR. JACKY:  The elapsed time should be 
accurate?
          MR. SHARKEY:  The elapsed time is accurate, 
yes.
          So at this point, we detect a train.  So, at 
41, we detect a train.  At 45, item eight disappears, 
and eight happens to be the XRPR, which is the relay 
that de-energizes, to de-energize the relay in the gate 
mechanism which starts it now.
          So, there is a four second interval between 
when the flashers would start here and when the gate 
would start to descend.  So, the next thing that we see 
disappear is five, and five is the One Track island 
circuit.  So, that is the circuit that extends about 60 
feet north of the crossing.
          When the train enters that circuit, then the 
five disappears here so there is, what, 21 seconds 
elapsed between when the gate starts to descend and the 
train gets to the island circuit, which is 
approximately the time of impact.
          MR. JACKY:  How long would it take 
approximately for the gates to descend, assuming they 
were not obstructed by any obstacle?
          MR. SHARKEY:  Normally within ten seconds.
          The reason we do not have a gate down 
indication on here is that the gate mechanisms are not 
set up to have that extra contact in them that could be 
used to record that the gate is down to a certain 
position.
          In fact, depending on which scenario you 
believe, if the gate bounced along the truck, the gate 
would have never got down.  It never would have 
indicated that because it was obstructed.  You know, it 
would have been prevented from getting down to, say, 
five degrees or whatever.
          So, at what point do we determine down is 
down?  What we have to do is rely on the control 
circuitry and look at different failure mechanisms and 
probabilities.
          MR. JACKY:  Which leads me to my next 
question:  If there was something in the crossing such 
as a vehicle or an obstacle that was preventing the 
gates from coming all the way down, would the event 
recorder record that?
          How would that be recorded on the event 
recorder?
          MR. SHARKEY:  All we know on this event 
recorder is that the energy was removed off of the 
control relay and the gate mechanism, which would cause 
it to start down.  If the gate was obstructed, this 
would not detect it or record it.
          MR. JACKY:  If there were a vehicle across 
the crossing without touching the gate or having the 
gates touching the vehicle, but if the vehicle, say, 
had its tires or something across the track, would that 
be indicated on the event recorder at all?
          MR. SHARKEY:  No.
          MR. JACKY:  You mentioned that in this case 
for the accident train, the signal provided a 26 second 
warning time.
          Could you explain to us on the print-out 
where that comes from?
          MR. SHARKEY:  The 26 is indicated right here 
as being the warning time that the predictor sensed its 
output disappearing to the time it sensed the island 
circuit disappearing, and that is 26 seconds there.  
The times along the left between when the XR relay 
dropped and the island relay dropped was 25 seconds.
          There could be a slight, because we are going 
through a chain of three relays energizing, there is a 
slight time delay in a fraction of a second.  What is 
happening here is that the recording device is 
truncating the times.
          If something happened at 25.9, it rounds it 
down to 25.  If something happened at 26.1, it is going 
to round it down to 26, so that is why we get a second 
deviation here.
          MR. JACKY:  I think you mentioned previously 
the signal at McKnight Road is programmed or designed 
to provide a 25 second warning time; is that correct?
          MR. SHARKEY:  Yes.
          MR. JACKY:  In the Factual, it mentions there 
is a 30 second time that was programmed into signal 
computer.
          Could you explain the difference there?
          MR. SHARKEY:  Yes.
          There is an equipment reaction time that is 
involved.  When we designed it, I think we designed 
that equipment reaction time.  It is supposed to take 
three or four seconds for the equipment to make its 
prediction.
          So, what we are saying by setting up our 
termination shunts at 30 seconds and we are setting up 
our programming at 30 seconds, it will give us at least 
25, which gives us a buffer time above 20 seconds 
minimum that is prescribed by the   MUDC.
          MR. JACKY:  Ultimately, when you determine 
what warning time you would like to have for that 
individual signal or grade crossing predictor, how is 
that physically entered into the signal?
          MR. SHARKEY:  The same keypad display that 
has the 26 seconds shown on it is used as a keypad, and 
it is used for programming the device.
          MR. JACKY:  So, the maintenance person would 
enter in 30 seconds on the keypad?
          MR. SHARKEY:  (Nonverbal response.)
          MR. JACKY:  You also mentioned earlier 
something about average speeds for the train.
          Could you indicate to us on the event 
recorder print-out where that would come into play?
          MR. SHARKEY:  We have the approach speed, the 
detected speed, island speed, and the average speed.  
Honestly, there is a three up there, and I think the 
next witness may be better able to talk to those, but 
there are three different speeds that the unit records.
          Two of them are snap shot in time, and one is 
an integration over time to get the average speed.  
What we are seeing here is some deceleration.
          Again, these are electronically derived from 
the slope of that line that I talked about, that 
reference point.  So, it is not the same as the speed 
that you are going to see on the event recorder.  This 
is generally used for maintenance.
          The idea was to be able to tell whether, if 
we had a shorter warning time or a longer warning time, 
we would see if it was accelerating train or a 
decelerating train.
          Unfortunately, it was never intended to be an 
accurate speed, but more of an indication of 
acceleration, deceleration or accident speed.  It 
indicates a deceleration.
          MR. JACKY:  Do you have any knowledge as to 
exactly how those speeds are calculated within the GCP?
          MR. SHARKEY:  I think I would rather defer to 
the next witness.
          MR. JACKY:  I asked you before about whether 
there were any cars or vehicles, if they were in the 
signal, how that would be handled by the recorder.  You 
have mentioned the damage to the signal itself.
          If a vehicle were to, say, drive through the 
actual gate or break the gate, would that be indicated 
on the event recorder at all, to your knowledge?
          MR. SHARKEY:  No.
          MR. JACKY:  Within the Signal Group Factual 
Report, it indicates that on the day of the accident, 
there was an incident of false activation.
          Are you aware of that or the nature of that?
          MR. SHARKEY:  Do you know exactly where?
          MR. JACKY:  Yes.
          It is on page nine in paragraph number four. 
 The paragraph starts (reading) McKnight Road incident 
reports were reviewed for 1998 and 1999.
          MR. SHARKEY:  I show that as paragraph three.
          MR. JACKY:  I'm sorry.  In yours, it would be 
paragraph number three?
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  Tom, what were you looking 
at?
          MR. JACKY:  It is the, Signal Group Factual, 
3A.
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  I have that here.  It is a 
little thick.
          MR. JACKY:  It is Exhibit 3A, paragraph 
number four.  In the information Ruben has put in front 
of me, it shows it as being paragraph number three.
          MR. SHARKEY:  Yes, I can explain that.
          MR. JACKY:  Okay.
          MR. SHARKEY:  What we did on Wednesday 
morning, the 17th, is we, Pat Sullivan (phonetic), of 
the NTSB and Dave Flower (phonetic) of Amtrak, and I, 
we went up to our Homewood offices, the railroad, and 
went to our CNS control center where we dispatch the 
maintainers out to sites that we receive a malfunction 
report.
          I went there the computer's database 
personally, and I looked at any report that we had 
about McKnight Road.  They are shown in the subsequent 
pages.
          After the accident, we called our signal 
personnel through the CNS control center, so there was 
an entry in the computer saying that yes, there was an 
accident, and we called out all this personnel.  It was 
not a malfunction report.  It was just the fact we had 
a work out open on McKnight Road because of the 
incident.
          MR. JACKY:  What history of false 
activations, to your knowledge, does the system or the 
signal system at McKnight Road have?
          MR. SHARKEY:  Again, that is shown in the 
Signal Factual Report.  I guess it says seven, 
including there was, then six previous, and they were 
all in the early part of 1998.
          We had a false activation due to a defective 
card, and the maintainer cleared it.  That was January 
of 1998.
          We had a another incident in here that listed 
McKnight Road, and I included it.  In fact, those are 
my handwritten notations on all these reports as I went 
through and analyzed the data.
          There was a report on March 14th of 1998.  
There was a tracking indication on.  Since it stated 
that there was something found near McKnight Road, I 
included it.  It was not an actual malfunction.
          On April 23rd of 1998, the west gate was 
down, and the maintainer replaced the armature brush in 
the motor of the gate mechanism.  So, that was a false 
activation.
          May 20th of 1998, we had an alleged false 
activation.  It was not confirmed.  When the maintainer 
arrived, everything was working as intended.  
Frequently, we get those types of reports if there are 
switching moves or if somebody doesn't see a train go 
across a crossing, things like that.
          On June 10, 1998, there was a false 
activation.  It was will open bond wire that had the 
island circuit out.  That caused the high EC levels.  
So, that was the false activation.
          Then July 24th of 1998, we had a tripped 
circuit breaker.  They had confirmed there was a false 
activation.  We would have had the gates down and 
flashing or the gate down and the lights dark without a 
train on the crossing.  That was a result of the 
tripped circuit breaker.  So, the last malfunction that 
was reported at that crossing was July 24, 1998.
          MR. JACKY:  Thank you.
          What programs does the Canadian 
National/Illinois Central have to do ensure the 
continued operation of the signal systems on the 
railroad?
          What I mean by that is, Are there any efforts 
by the railroad to go and look at the print-outs from 
the event recorders and determine that, based on the 
information that is recorded, the signal is operating 
properly and giving the requisite warning times?
          MR. SHARKEY:  Well, as part of the of annual 
inspection and tests which we have to determine that 
the warning times are proper, that can either be given 
or done by recorders or it can be done by observation 
or it can be done through a calculated simulation type 
mode where you go out there and simulate it between the 
distances.  So, on an annual basis, we have to confirm 
that.  That is a part of the FRA regulations and the 
234 rules.
          On a monthly basis, the maintainers will go 
on the reserve and fix them.  If there are errors at 
all, if there have any been any problems, they would 
also show up as an error on this keypad display.
          As a practice of going through the 
recordings, they are time consuming, as you can see 
just going through this one, and generally, it would be 
done on an exceptional basis.  If there was a 
malfunction reported, somebody would look back to 
determine it, they could find out from the recorder 
device.
          MR. JACKY:  If there was a malfunction, if 
there was an incident reported, would the records from 
that signal recorder be kept on file?
          MR. SHARKEY:  Not as a matter of record.
          MR. JACKY:  Those are all the questions I 
have.  Mr. Raby has a couple more questions.
          MR. RABY:  Good morning, Mr. Sharkey.
          MR. SHARKEY:  Good morning.
          MR. RABY:  For a little clarification, if you 
could, please, the island circuit, you stated the 
island circuit extends some 60 foot north of the 
crossing?
          MR. SHARKEY:  Yes.
          MR. RABY:  For accident reconstruction and 
things, I need a reference point for the crossing.
          Is that the edge of the roadway or edge of 
the timbers, it would be in between the tracks?
          MR. SHARKEY:  Generally, we refer it as 
clocking the center line of the crossing.
          MR. RABY:  The center line of the crossing?
          MR. SHARKEY:  Yes, sir.
          MR. RABY:  This island circuit, what is its 
function?
          MR. SHARKEY:  It is what we refer to as a 
positives section of detection.  There is a transmitter 
given the frequency of one hooked up to the wires one 
side of the track to a receiver hooked up to the wires 
on the other side of the crossing so that there is 
approximately 120 foot track circuit that, when it is 
de-energized, there is no time-out feature, that the 
gates would remain down.  It is also used for resetting 
some internal calculations on the circuitry inside the 
flash.
          MR. RABY:  The timing of the signals, I would 
like to get some clarification on that if I could.  The 
Federal Railroad Administration says the lights or the 
signals must be activated for a minimum of 20 seconds 
before what?
          MR. SHARKEY:  The arrival of the training at 
the crossing.
          MR. RABY:  At what point is at the crossing?
          MR. SHARKEY:  I take it to be the edge of the 
street.
          MR. RABY:  The edge of the street?
          So regardless of the speed of the train 
approaching, the regulations say the warning lights 
must be on for a period of 20 seconds before the train 
arrives at the edge of the crossing?
          MR. SHARKEY:  For a normal through train, 
yes.  Under a switching condition, there are alternate 
means where the train crew --
          MR. RABY:  With the predictor system, that 20 
seconds is to the edge of the crossing for a three 
train?
          MR. SHARKEY:  For a three train, it would 
generally be to the edge of the island.
          MR. RABY:  So, the 20 second FRA regulation 
really don't apply to the island circuit.
          MR. SHARKEY:  I don't quite understand that.
          MR. RABY:  If a switching engine was pulling 
a grain car out of that siding, when it hits the island 
circuits, the lights come on?
          MR. SHARKEY:  Correct.
          MR. RABY;  There is no timing sequence 
involved?
          MR. SHARKEY:  Correct.
          MR. RABY:  They come on, the gates come down?
          MR. SHARKEY:  That is correct.
          If a train stopped just outside the island 
circuits, the gates would recover.  Then if it went to 
proceed across the crossing, it would be possible for 
it to get to the crossing in less than 20 seconds 
depending on the distance, but it would activate the 
signal at the edge of the island circuit.
          MR. RABY:  That is kind of what I said.
          The 20 seconds doesn't apply in the island 
circuit?
          MR. SHARKEY:  Correct.
          MR. RABY:  The timing sequence then outside 
of the island circuit is programmed into the computer, 
the predictors?
          MR. SHARKEY:  Yes.
          MR. RABY:  For my understanding, I want a 
clarification.
          Then that timing sequence never changes 
regardless of train speed?
          MR. SHARKEY:  It is designed to provide a 
relatively uniform warning time.  If you have perfect 
conditions, perfect constant speed of the train, never 
varying conditions of the electrical circuit, yes, you 
would have a constant warning time.  That is part of a 
theoretical within a practical.  You are going to get 
some minor variations.
          MR. RABY:  The variations would be result of 
relays or something like that or some kind of equipment 
lag?
          MR. SHARKEY:  Yes.
          What we are talking about is an electrical 
circuit that uses two rails of the wires.  So that 
would be two wires laying on the ground, and you are 
going to get variations in moisture content and things 
like that affect them slightly.  We are just talking 
about in the one or two second range.
          MR. RABY:  I was thinking that only applied 
to the computation of speed, the calculation of speed 
that the predictor makes.
          Once it determines a speed of the train, then 
it knows where that train started the computation at, 
the point of the tracks.  From then on, it doesn't 
really pay too much attention to that.
          If it detects a 79 a mile an hour train, then 
its only next job is to know when to turn on that 20 
second or whatever that timing signal is, 25 seconds, 
to start it so that the motorist has 26 seconds, 25 
seconds before the front of that train reaches the edge 
of that crossing.
          MR. SHARKEY:  I guess what I was trying to 
say is that there could be variations that were where 
it is trying to determine that distance, that can 
change by atmospheric conditions slightly in the train 
speed calculations.
          You know, it is not exact stop watch type of 
calculation that are used for the traffic signals.  The 
 yellow is four seconds, and the green is so many 
seconds.  It is not that precise because it is making a 
calculation based on the track circuit conditions.
          MR. RABY:  It is still not clear to me.  I 
understand what you said, but it is not clear to me 
that, that applies the whole time that train is 
traveling down to that crossing.  That would only apply 
at the beginning when it senses the train and it has to 
determine the speed and it knows how far up the tracks 
that its shunt is.  So, it already knows that distance 
down to the crossing.
          It really only needs to know the speed of the 
train and the time, and then through computation and 
calculations, it says I got to turn the switch on in 
the next second or the next five seconds, or the next 
timing sequence.  Then it starts a timing sequence.
          Isn't that independent of everything else or 
is that continually changed?
          MR. SHARKEY:  When you said the shunt, are 
you talking about the termination shunt that is out 
there a fixed distance?
          MR. RABY:  3,400 feet or something.
          MR. SHARKEY:  What it is actually doing is 
looking at the train shunt and making a calculation as 
to the distance to the train.  It is not timing -- it 
is not saying the train is doing 79 miles an hour and 
once it gets past this point, I will count down.  It is 
not making that type of calculation.
          What it is doing is looking at the distance 
to the train and the velocity of the train and making 
that calculation.  So, that point can move slightly.  
It is not making an elapsed time calculation.  It is 
not a five seconds after I sense him go by the 
termination shunt, I am going to drop the gate because 
he is going so fast.  It is not making that type of 
calculation.
          Again, perhaps the next witness from the 
manufacturer of the equipment might be better able to 
answer your question.
          MR. RABY:  The gates, on the monthly test, 
are these gates exercised; meaning are they each 
individual gate, or together?
          Are they turned on and looked at and watched, 
timed to see if they perform within specifications?
          MR. SHARKEY:  Yes.
          MR. RABY:  You mentioned mechanical relays.  
It looks like you have quite a few mechanical relays.
          Is that the state of art today in railroad 
signaling, mechanical relays rather than solid state?
          MR. SHARKEY:  They are both used.  It depends 
on different philosophies of thought.  An 
electromechanical relay gives you very excellent 
electrical isolation and some immunity from lightning 
damage and things like that where you can get some 
isolation.  It is kind of a hybrid of electronic 
outputs and some mechanical relays for isolation.
          MR. RABY:  I do understand sometimes 
mechanical relays do stick or fail to make contact.  I 
was wondering if the reliability was still there and 
that you were satisfied, that the railroad is satisfied 
the mechanical relays have a reliability to satisfy to 
use the, to continue to use them.
          MR. SHARKEY:  Yes,
          In fact, I believe it was about 15 years ago, 
with these same types of relays, the FRA Administration 
basically relaxed their testing interval because of the 
high degree of reliability of these types of relay.
          MR. RABY:  Those are all the questions I 
have, Mr. Sharkey.
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  Anything on follow-up?
          (No response).
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  The United Transportation 
Union is up.  Questions, sir?
  EXAMINATION BY THE UNITED TRANSPORTATION UNION
          MR. DWYER:  Mr. Sharkey, is there a minimum 
or a maximum time from the time the light for the gates 
to come down?
          Is there a standard for that?
          MR. SHARKEY:  The gate should not start its 
descent for a minute of three seconds.  It can take 
longer for the gate to start to come down, and the gate 
must be down five seconds prior to the arrival of the 
train.  So as long as things are working in that range 
-- that is the operating range.  Those are minimums and 
maximums.
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  Mr. Marshall, MELCO?
          MR. MARSHALL:  No questions.
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  Thank you, sir.
          Amtrak, Mr. Bullock?
          MR. BULLOCK:  We don't have any questions.
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  The Canadian 
National/Illinois Central Railroad?
           EXAMINATION BY THE CANADIAN
        NATIONAL/ILLINOIS CENTRAL RAILROAD
          MR. ED HARRIS:  Mr. Sharkey, you went through 
some of the description of the false activations that 
occurred earlier in 1998.
          Can you explain the difference between a 
false activation and an activation failure?
          MR. SHARKEY:  Yes.
          A false activation is when the signals are 
activated without a train approaching.  An activation 
failure is the failure of the signals to activate when 
a train is approaching.  In other words, it doesn't 
give the 20 second warning or fails to give any warning 
at all.
          MR. ED HARRIS:  Thank you.
          When you put up the chart indicating the 
times of the -- and we are talking basics here -- the 
circuitry changes and the activation of the lights and 
activation of the gates, you had mentioned the clock 
had not been properly set; is that correct?
          MR. SHARKEY:  Yes.
          MR. ED HARRIS:  The elapsed times when you 
did your retest and your team did their activities, the 
elapsed times remained accurate?
          MR. SHARKEY:  Yes.
          Maybe I should clarify that what we did to 
reset the clock and establish what time this recording 
device determined impact to be or determined that the 
island circuit was occupied was the morning, the 
Wednesday morning.  This was this would be the 17th.
          We were out with the signal team, and I used 
my cell phone to dial in through our switchboard to our 
National Bureau of Standard time, and with the keypad 
display, we could see what time the recording device 
was set to.
          We held up the phone and listened for the 
beep and determined we got the standard time, and that 
is where we determined the 29 minutes and some seconds 
that the clock was off.  Then we recalibrated the unit 
to that time and changed, basically to be able to add 
that time on to the recorder time to come up with the 
9:47 or the approximate time of 9:47.
          MR. ED HARRIS:  Thanks for that 
clarification.
          As you were going through the times, based on 
Train Number 59's approach to the circuitry, the lights 
became or started flashing approximately 25 seconds 
prior to the train getting to the grade crossing; is 
that correct?
          MR. SHARKEY:  That is correct.
          MR. ED HARRIS:  You also mentioned that four 
seconds later, after Train 59 hit the circuitry, the 
gates would have started to come down and your records 
indicate that as well?
          MR. SHARKEY:  That is correct.
          MR. ED HARRIS:  You also mentioned that after 
that four seconds and the gates began to come down, the 
gates would have been in the down position 
approximately nine or ten seconds after that?
          MR. SHARKEY:  Yes.
          MR. ED HARRIS:  Based on the calculation of 
the initial 25 second warning or the activation of the 
lights, the gates would have been down approximately 10 
seconds prior to the accident; correct?
          MR. SHARKEY:  That is correct.
          MR. ED HARRIS:  Mr. Sharkey, we have looked 
at the exhibit that indicated the tremendous force in 
which the rebar hit the signal mast, through which the 
west gates were attached to.  There are two other 
exhibits on file that indicate some broken gates.
          Do you recall seeing those exhibits?
          MR. SHARKEY:  Yes.
          MR. ED HARRIS:  In your opinion, in the 
regard to which the gates had been broken both on the 
west and east side of the grade crossing, particularly 
the east side, that the gates were broken while the 
trucks was going through the crossing or across the 
crossing?
          MR. SHARKEY:  That was the appearance of the 
east gate right here, and there was the appearance it 
was broken in an easterly direction.
          MR. ED HARRIS:  We heard Mr. Nieves yesterday 
give testimony that it was his opinion that the truck 
did, indeed, drive around the gates.
          Do you recall that?
          MR. SHARKEY:  Yes.
          MR. ED HARRIS:  The way these gates are 
broken, is that indicative of the same comment Mr. 
Nieves made?
          MR. SHARKEY:  Yes, it is.
          MR. ED HARRIS:  I have no further questions.
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  It was getting pretty close 
to lawyering there.  I am not entirely sure I would 
characterize what Mr. Nieves said the way you did, but 
the record will speak for itself.
          The Federal Railroad Administration?
          MR. BLACKMORE:  No questions.
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  Federal Highway 
Administration?
          MR. UMBS:  No questions, thank you.
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  The Illinois Commerce 
Commission?
 EXAMINATION BY THE ILLINOIS COMMERCE COMMISSION
          MR. STEAD:  Mr. Sharkey, you mentioned before 
that the typical crossing signal system is provided 
with battery back-up power; is that correct?
          MR. SHARKEY:  Yes.
          MR. STEAD:  What would happen to the system 
is if all power was lost, both the primary commercial 
AC power and the back-up power?
          MR. SHARKEY:  If all was lost, the gates 
would be not flashing, but the gate arms would lower to 
the horizontal position.
          MR. STEAD:  They would go down?
          MR. SHARKEY:  Yes.
          MR. STEAD:  One other question:  The relay 
that closes to provide power to the automatic flashing 
light signals, was that recorded by the event recorder?
          MR. SHARKEY:  Yes.
          MR. STEAD:  What did the recorder show?
          MR. SHARKEY:  It showed that we had the 1XR, 
the XR, all four of those relays, the three relays, the 
XR and the XR-GPR, which is the relay, that, when it 
de-energizes, it puts energy to the lights; that they 
are released at the same time.
          MR. STEAD:  Thank you.
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  The Brotherhood of 
Locomotive Engineers?
               EXAMINATION BY THE
       BROTHERHOOD OF LOCOMOTIVE ENGINEERS
          MR. WALPERT:  Mr. Sharkey, you have explained 
to us the difference between activation failures and 
false activations, and you have indicated there had 
been seven previous activation failures prior to the 
date of the accident; is that correct?
          MR. SHARKEY:  No, it is not.
          MR. WALPERT:  What is?
          MR. SHARKEY:  We had seven total work orders 
in our control center.  I think I will have to go 
through them again, but there were no activation 
failures.  There were a couple of disk errors, at least 
one.  We will go through it again.  That is the best 
way to do it.
          We had a false activation in January of 1998. 
 We had one report that was not a malfunction of the 
crossing at all, but a track light on the dispatcher's 
panel in March.  We had a false activation in April due 
to the armature brush.  That is two false activations.
          We had an alleged false activation that was 
not confirmed that was cleared on arrival in May.  We 
had a confirmed false activation June 10th due to the 
time clock.  That is three.  We had a confirmed false 
due to a tripped breaker in July.
          So, we had four false activations in early 
1998; no activation failures, and in three of the 
incident reports, one involved the accident itself and 
calling out maintainers for that.  One was not 
confirmed, and the third had nothing do with the 
crossing.  There were seven reports in our computer, 
but they were four false activations.
          MR. WALPERT:  Thank you for clarifying that 
for me.
          Do I understand correctly then the only way 
of knowing of the false activations would be by the 
reports filed?  There is no not being reported on the 
-- go ahead.
          MR. SHARKEY:  They may be recorded, but what 
was difficult, what we -- you know, normally we would 
get a report if it was a false activation.  Sometimes, 
what is difficult is to determine if it is a train move 
or switching move or something like that from the 
recording device.
          MR. WALPERT:  Subsequent to the accident, do 
you have any reports of activation failures?
          MR. SHARKEY:  Yes.
          MR. WALPERT:  Could you tell us how many?
          MR. SHARKEY:  There were three.
          MR. WALPERT:  Were those investigated?
          MR. SHARKEY:  Yes.
          MR. WALPERT:  What was the determination of 
that investigation?
          MR. SHARKEY:  There was one incident that 
involved a warning time that was shorter than normal 
due to a high resistance bond in the track panels that 
were put in place right after the derailment.  
Subsequently, the panels were welt welded back in.
          There was an incident while we were testing a 
circuit and making a change at the street.  We were 
upgrading the control circuitry at a street, two 
streets to the north of a TR-37, which is a new 
circuit.  During the test period, a switcher came out 
for something and thought the crossing was protected, 
and it was not.  We filed that as an activation 
failure.
          Then there was a situation where a grain car 
was leaking soy meal.  It has tendency to cause a 
coating on the subsequent axles in that car, and we had 
a momentary loss of shunt.  While the train was 
transferring some crossings, the gates started up and 
went back down.
          MR. WALPERT:  Subsequent to the accident, 
have there been any reports of false activations to 
your knowledge?
          MR. SHARKEY:  I don't recall.
          MR. WALPERT:  Let me ask you this question:  
How does the engineer on an approaching train determine 
if the warning devices are activated correctly?
          MR. SHARKEY:  On the side of flashing light 
signal heads, there are, sometimes they are referred to 
as peep sites.  That is basically a clear lens on the 
side of the flashing light signals where you can see 
the flashing lights.  There is a white light coming 
through the side of the flashing light signal.
          MR. WALPERT:  Are there any virtual cab 
signals the engineer could observe to ascertain that 
the signals are working properly upon approaching those 
signals?
          MR. SHARKEY:  No, sir.
          MR. WALPERT:  If a signal may malfunction, is 
there any way that an engineer, a locomotive engineer, 
could know that a signal had malfunctioned without 
actually observing the signal on approaching it?
          MR. SHARKEY:  I am not sure I fully 
understand you.
          MR. WALPERT:  Is there any visual observation 
in the cab or any signal that may be radio or otherwise 
that may be sent to the locomotive engineer or the cab 
to let him know that the signal at the crossing may 
have malfunctioned?
          MR. SHARKEY:  No.
          MR. WALPERT:  Those are all the questions I 
have.  Thank you.
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  Thank you, sir.
          Mr. Sweedler?
       EXAMINATION BY THE BOARD OF INQUIRY
          MR. SWEEDLER:  Good morning, Mr. Sharkey.
          Earlier in your testimony, you mentioned that 
after the accident, you had proceeded to the signal 
house and downloaded the event recorder and then locked 
the house or the cabinet; I am not sure which.
          MR. SHARKEY:  I didn't personally do that.  I 
instructed the field management personnel to proceed 
and do that.
          MR. SWEEDLER:  I am just curious, and the 
reason I am asking this question is you are probably 
aware the Safety Board has had some difficulty with 
locomotive event recorders.
          We now have an understanding that with event 
recorders, nothing is to be done with them until the 
Safety Board or the FRA actually arrives on the scene 
and actually witnesses or actually do the downloading. 
 I am wondering if anything could be done to the 
recording of what occurred with the signaling system by 
downloading it or doing anything else to it.
          My question is:  Should it be locked until 
the authorities arrive so you can do this together with 
the authorities?
          MR. SHARKEY:  Well, I guess fortunately or 
unfortunately, and I would say fortunately, I have 
never gone through a situation like this before to 
where I was involved in the NTSB coming out.
          It was a judgment call on my part to make 
sure we did preserve what evidence we did have in the 
event something else could have went wrong to eradicate 
the information.  We were able to reproduce the exact 
same recording in the presence of the NTSB afterwards.
          MR. SWEEDLER:  Do you think in the future it 
might be a good policy to not do that until the FRA or 
the NTSB is on the scene?
          MR. SHARKEY:  Yes.
          MR. SWEEDLER:  Have there been any changes to 
the crossing equipment since the accident?
          MR. SHARKEY:  As I stated, we removed the 
grade crossing predictor that was not in service and 
had it tested.  Subsequently, we obviously put another 
one in its place, and that is the way it remains.
          MR. SWEEDLER:  I understand you had video 
recorders or cameras at the crossing for a period of 
time.
          MR. SHARKEY:  Yes.
          MR. SWEEDLER:  Could you tell us what their 
purpose was and are they still there or what did you 
learn from having them there?
          MR. SHARKEY:  In the weeks and days after 
things were put back in service and everybody left town 
and the road was opened, we were getting various 
reports of various types of malfunctions at the 
crossing.  It was at McKnight to the south or to the 
north.
          Basically, our field people were running out 
there all times of day or night doing downloads to find 
out that it was somebody complained four hours ago and 
it was the switcher switching, and that is what they 
saw.  So, it became another way of recording what was 
going on.
          When a switching move occurs, the recorder 
just indicates that the train hit the island circuit.  
It doesn't indicate when the train hit the edge of the 
crossing, so an engine switching could pull up on the 
island circuit, and it shows a ten second warning.
          There were also reports of vandalism.  We had 
reports of people throwing things at trains, and we 
were hoping to capture just anything.
          MR. SWEEDLER:  Can you tell us what you did 
capture?
          MR. SHARKEY:  We never captured anybody 
throwing anything.  We did observe the one incident, 
the incident that I talked about with the loss of shunt 
with the grain car.  By basically reviewing the films, 
that is how we determined that it was the grain car 
losing soy meal, and we were able to identify the car 
from the photograph and go back and verify that.
          MR. SWEEDLER:  Were you able to pick up 
anybody driving around the gates?
          MR. SHARKEY:  I personally did not review 
every film.  I didn't refer to many at all.  I don't 
recall.  There were times when the county sheriff tried 
to ask us whether a person had stole a truck at the 
crossing.  The police were starting to ask us to use it 
for other law enforcement purposes.
          MR. SWEEDLER:  Are the cameras still in 
operation?
          MR. SHARKEY:  I am not certain.
          MR. SWEEDLER:  Are there any other plans to 
modify or upgrade the whole system at this particular 
crossing?
          MR. SHARKEY:  Right now, I don't know of any. 
 I don't know if the Commerce Commission has any plans 
or if the OT has any plans.  Nobody has brought 
anything forward.
          MR. SWEEDLER:  Thank you.
          That is all I have.
          MR. CLAUDE HARRIS:  Good morning, Mr. 
Sharkey.
          MR. SHARKEY:  Morning.
          MR. CLAUDE HARRIS:  I want to ask you a 
couple of questions.
          Could you tell us a little bit about whether 
or not the east gate operates independent of the west 
gate?
          MR. SHARKEY:  The east gate receives its 
control relay internal to -- that gate mechanism is 
energized off the same circuit as the west gate.  So 
that relay, I am referring the XRPR, energizes it and 
sends the signal basically to both gates to be 
energized at the same time.
          MR. CLAUDE HARRIS:  Is there separate 
information recorded for the operation or activation of 
each gate?
          MR. SHARKEY:  No; it is working off one 
common control circuit.
          MR. CLAUDE HARRIS:  Essentially, what you are 
saying is the information recorded would be applicable 
to both gates' operation?
          MR. SHARKEY:  Correct.
          MR. CLAUDE HARRIS:  Did now notice any 
discrepancies on the east gate in your review of the 
post-accident information?
          MR. SHARKEY:  The only thing was a piece 
approximately a foot and a half long that was broke off 
at the tip.  That was the only damage.
          MR. CLAUDE HARRIS:  No other items in terms 
of the operation of the gate at all?
          MR. SHARKEY:  No; it operated correctly.
          MR. CLAUDE  HARRIS:  Let's talk a little bit 
about the west gate.
          Did you have an opportunity to review the 
gear box of the west gate?
          MR. SHARKEY:  Briefly, yes.
          MR. CLAUDE HARRIS:  Could you briefly 
describe what your observations were?
          MR. SHARKEY:  It appeared that the gear train 
was okay, that it would rotate and things.  It was not 
damaged beyond repair inside that we could tell.  The 
counterweight arms and different parts of it were broke 
off, but the gear train appeared to be intact, and 
everything appeared in order inside.
          MR. CLAUDE HARRIS:  Any witness marks on the 
gear teeth in the box itself?
          MR. SHARKEY:  Not that I know of.
          I probably didn't look though.  I am not 
familiar with what you are asking me.
          MR. CLAUDE HARRIS:  You mentioned earlier 
about the damage to the west gate.
          Would the event recorder identify damage that 
was made to it in any form or shape at this point?
          MR. SHARKEY:  No, sir.
          MR. CLAUDE HARRIS:  Essentially, other than 
physical examination, there would be no mechanism that 
would record the damage beyond your visual 
observations?
          MR. SHARKEY:  Correct.
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  Mr. Dunn?
          MR. DUNN:  Exhibit 2D shows the west gate.
          What did all the destruction, not to the 
gate, but to the rest of the mechanism?
          What do you think hit it, the train truck or 
the rebar?
          MR. SHARKEY:  I think the rebar hitting the 
base of the signal caused such a violent impact that it 
shook the signal and basically snapped all these parts. 
 That scrap has been broke off.
          MR. DUNN:  It was the rebar that hit the 
pole?
          MR. SHARKEY:  Yes.
          MR. DUNN:  The problems that were shown on 
the video that you had, did the computer verify these 
as a problem?
          MR. SHARKEY:  Yes; they correlated exactly.
          MR. DUNN:  The last question is:  With all 
your tests you did and your simulations and everything 
else that was down out there, did those gates, on March 
15, 1999, work, from what your tests showed, as they 
should have?
          MR. SHARKEY:  Yes; with a high degree of 
engineering certainty, I would say those gates operated 
as intended.
          MR. DUNN:  Thank you.
          I have no further questions.
          MR. LAUBY:  Mr. Sharkey, I have a couple of 
questions for clarification.  I would like to know a 
little bit more about the gate mechanism.
          Specifically, can gates come down at 
different speeds?
          MR. SHARKEY:  Yes.
          MR. LAUBY:  What would affect them?
          MR. SHARKEY:  There is the resistance units 
that I mentioned as an adjustment inside the gate, and 
when the gate is descending and the motor is driving it 
down, if those resistors were adjusted differently, 
they would have slightly different times.
          MR. LAUBY:  How slight are we talking about?
          MR. SHARKEY:  They would be adjusted so they 
would come down together within a second.
          MR. LAUBY:  Do the gates come down by gravity 
for the most part?
          MR. SHARKEY:  Well, they are driven down by 
the motor from 90 degrees to 50 degrees.  Then below 50 
degrees, it would be by gravity.  The force exerted on 
it is controlled through that resistor network and how 
it acts as a dynamic snub on the armature of the motor, 
intended to brake it, act as a brake.
          MR. LAUBY:  If you take power off the gates 
and they drop naturally, are they going to come down 
faster or slower than the programmed drop?
          MR. SHARKEY:  Usually faster.
          MR. LAUBY:  When you come up to the island 
circuit, you energize the island circuit or you shunt 
the island circuit with a switch engine, does the three 
or four second delay still apply to the gates after the 
flashing lights come on?
          MR. SHARKEY:  Yes, it does.
          MR. LAUBY:  Yesterday you heard testimony 
from Mr. Fosburgh, who talked about the gates.  He said 
he never noticed the gates or the lights activated.  We 
also heard from Mr. Nieves, who indicated he felt the 
lights and the gates came on simultaneously after the 
truck was already up on the track.
          Is there any engineering explanation?
          Is there some failure or some reason that 
could happen that you know of in your experience?
          MR. SHARKEY:  You want to maybe divide that 
into one scenario?  It might be easier.
          MR. LAUBY:  Sure; that would be fine.
          Let's start with the testimony of Mr. 
Fosburgh, that he witnessed no activation whatsoever.
          MR. SHARKEY:  Actually, I thought what he 
clarified in one of your questions at the end was the 
fact that he didn't notice the signals on.  I think he 
tried to --
          MR. LAUBY:  Let's back up.  Let's go to Mr. 
Nieves who seemed a little bit more certain about what 
he saw.  He came down to our display here and showed 
the position of the truck, and he indicated the 
position of the train.  He felt he witnessed the lights 
come on.
          I believe he also said they came on, the 
gates dropped, and the lights came on simultaneously.
          My question is:  As an engineer, is this 
possible, this scenario?
          MR. SHARKEY:  I would say no.
          I think there was confusion as to what he 
observed.  There is that relay delay time that is going 
to cause the gates to start down.  That relay was 
tested afterwards, and it was consistent with those 
timers.
          The probability of something like that 
happening once and not being repeated, I would say that 
would be very rare from an engineering standpoint.  I 
cannot really think of a scenario where that would have 
occurred.
          MR. LAUBY:  To your knowledge, there is no 
failure of a relay or a component or a shunt that could 
cause this equipment to act in that manner?
          MR. SHARKEY:  I would say that there would 
have to be so many things going wrong at once never to 
be repeated again.  I believe there was a four second 
delay between the time that the lights activated and 
the gates started to descend.
          MR. LAUBY:  Let me ask you a couple of 
questions about the event recorder.
          Basically, the information gathered from the 
signal event recorder, does this agree with the 
statements of the witnesses we heard yesterday?
          MR. SHARKEY:  It I would say it completely 
agrees the Troy Schultz, the crane operator.  Mr. 
Schultz talked about seeing the lights on, picking up 
his scrap, seeing the glow of the headlight; rotating 
to the right, dropping his load, and looking to the 
left and seeing the impact.
          In the tests we did that Friday night, I 
believe the times averaged somewhere in the 23 to 26 
second range.  Even if we compensate or try to 
compensate for cold oil versus hot oil, the fact that 
he didn't see the lights come on, he noticed the lights 
on.
          I was part of taking his statement that 
Friday afternoon, and he talked about not seeing the 
gate, but believed it was down.  Some of his comments 
didn't come out on the tape that I recall.  I was 
there.  Even if the motions on Friday night were 
slower, I think it is totally consistent with what he 
said, that the 26 second warning was accurate.
          He also went on to talk about the glow of the 
headlight, of being up south of the grain elevator, and 
he said it was approximately a half mile.  Well, the 
distance from the center line of McKnight Road to the 
center line of Saint George Road where that grain 
elevator is just south of is just over 2,700 feet.  So, 
that is totally consistent with his statement.
          The statement of Mr. Fosburgh, I believe if 
we say that the truck was getting up close to the 
crossing when the lights came on, the truck would have 
obstructed Mr. Fosburgh's view of the signals on the 
east side of the crossing.
          I am not sure why he didn't see the signals 
on the west side of the crossing.  There are several 
electric poles or whatever on the west side between 
approximately where he was according to one exhibit.  
So, I am not sure why he didn't notice the lights on.  
In the last questions you asked him, I believe he said 
that he did not see the gates not on.
          As far as Mr. Nieves' testimony, I think 
there is a little bit of difficulty in maybe sensing 
distance when you are looking down the road and trying 
to judge where the truck is compared to where the 
stopped cars or the signals are.  So, I am not sure if 
it is totally out of character or inconsistent with 
what he said.
          I believe if we judge that the truck was 
probably going slower, that the timing is consistent 
with Mr. Nieves' testimony.
          MR. LAUBY:  The event recorder we have on 
this system, have you ever known the event recorder not 
to agree with the physical movements or physical 
occurrences at a crossing?
          MR. SHARKEY:  No, sir.
          MR. LAUBY:  Have you ever seen a discrepancy 
in your career between what the event recorder says has 
happened at the crossing scene?
          MR. SHARKEY:  No.
          That particular recording device has been 
available since early 1991 I believe.  As far the 
times, especially the elapsed times of the events, it 
is consistent.
          MR. LAUBY:  The incident we had, the two 
activation, I guess three activation failures we had 
since the accident at that crossing, did the event 
recorder reflect the occurrence as it was viewed on 
videotape?
          MR. SHARKEY:  Yes and consistent with what 
the train crews reported, yes, the event recorder 
matched.  If it was a short point in time, it matched. 
 If it was a loss of shunts when the train was 
traversing the crossing, it matched.
          MR. LAUBY:  There was no discrepancy between 
what physically happened and what the event recorder 
recorded?
          MR. SHARKEY:  That is correct.
          MR. LAUBY:  Thank you very much.
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  Thank you, Mr. Lauby.
          What is the voltage that goes through this 
activation relay to turn on the lights and to activate 
the gate?
          I guess there are two different relays for 
that.
          What is the voltage?
          MR. SHARKEY:  There is a 12 volt, a basic 
enamel 12 volt circuit.
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  Basically, everything 
operates at the crossing of 12 volts.
          Is it a DC circuit?
          MR. SHARKEY:  Yes.
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  The reason for that is so 
you can have battery back up if you lose commercial 
power?
          MR. SHARKEY:  Yes; that is correct.
          The battery chargers are, the crossing 
batteries are very similar to how a car works.  Instead 
of an alternator, we have battery chargers that are 
keeping the batteries charged and supplying the 
majority of the motor.
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  So it always operates off 
the battery, and you use the AC, the commercial power, 
just to charge batteries?
          MR. SHARKEY:  Correct.
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  That is a fail safe 
operation?
          MR. SHARKEY:  Yes, it is.
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  With regard to this, Mr. 
Jacky got into this a little bit, and some of questions 
I had from the media and my own questions have to do 
what you were recording on the event recorder.  I 
understand it is a lot easier to measure or to monitor 
these relays than it is to monitor the physical 
movement of something like a gate.
          That would require some kind of switch that 
is activated when the gate got all the way down out at 
the crossing, which means it would require two wires 
running back to the house, isn't that correct, if you 
wanted to monitor the gates?
          MR. SHARKEY:  Yes, it is.
          I would like to point out that the wiring 
going to the gate is consistent with the original gate 
design before recorders and stuff were ever conceived.
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  I am talking about the 
future now.  We are sort of progressing into what are 
we going to do in the future.
          It would seem to me it would be useful, 
certainly from an investigatory standpoint, but really 
even from a monitoring standpoint and maybe you could 
even use it in court, if you did have something that 
would physically sense the full extension of the gates 
and the activation of the lights.
          MR. SHARKEY:  Yes.
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  Obviously, this opens up 
whole areas of discussion.  We have already talked 
about the relays.
          It has been my experience as a traffic 
engineer, the traffic signals, that low voltage relays 
do last a long time as opposed to what we used to have 
when the same equipment as 110 volt relays, AC relays, 
which arced and caused problems.
          There was a question I had earlier about what 
you would not go to low switches like we did in traffic 
signals.  I think I know the reason:  It is cheaper and 
it is more reliable than a lower voltage is.
          Is that correct?
          MR. SHARKEY:  Yes, it is.
          It is a very specially designed relay.  The 
contact makeup does not fail and arc when you weld the 
contact shut and stuff like they do in a normal 
electrical contact.  These are very fail safe devices.
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  I would suggest, however, 
this is great to have this event recorder, but if it 
doesn't actually sense the actuation, but rather just 
the impulses, that does leave always this question 
about did it really work.  That is more an observation 
on my part than it is anything else.
          MR. SHARKEY:  Yes.
          In fact, we have started to add a contact in 
the gate mechanisms now that closes at five degrees so 
that we could have a circuit.  In our new 
installations, yes, we do have to run additional wire.
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  I saw when I was visiting 
there when we met on the crossing a few weeks ago that 
you did have video cameras.  I believe you got them on 
the first crossing north.
          Was the Indian Oaks or something like that?
          MR. SHARKEY:  Saint George Road.
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  Saint George Road is the one 
just past north of the grain elevator?
          MR. SHARKEY:  That is correct.
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  Are they on that crossing to 
the south, just south of the steel mill also, the video 
cameras?
          I didn't look.
          MR. SHARKEY:  They were, yes.
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  So, you have three?
          MR. SHARKEY:  Yes.
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  I actually saw, when I was 
sitting watch the crossing, a man come out on Saturday 
or Sunday and change the videotapes.
          Did he save -- I guess I am trying to figure 
out what happens to those videotapes.
          Does anybody review them or do you not look 
at them unless you get a complaint?
          MR. SHARKEY:  In general, it is based on a 
complaint basis.  We just tape them over.  We rotate 
them and over-write them.  They last 24 hours by the 
way they are recorded.
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  You mentioned a few moments 
ago that something you used to monitor back home was 
the broken gate reports and their correlation to gate 
running.
          How many sets of broken gates did you say you 
have had in past years at this location?
          Do you recall?
          MR. SHARKEY:  I don't recall there being one 
in that period of early 1998 where we had the 
malfunctions or any --
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  Just any time.
          MR. SHARKEY:  I don't recall that we have had 
any broken gates.
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  You have had no previous 
broken gates at this location?
          MR. SHARKEY:  No.
          I mean I looked back.  Our records went back 
to January of 1998.
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  Do you find that is usually 
a good indication there is a considerable problem with 
that at other crossings?
          MR. SHARKEY:  Yes.
          If the control circuitry is doing what it is 
intended to do and consistent with type of train 
operations switching, that will minimize broken gates 
if you have properly designed circuitry at the 
location.
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  Where are the pieces of the 
gate now, the original the wooden pieces and the gear 
mechanism from the west gate?
          Where are they physically located?
          MR. SHARKEY:  The wooden gate arm is on the 
west side, and the tip on the east side of it, I think 
a portion was cut off, and it was taken by the Illinois 
State Police.
          The gate mechanism itself on the west side, 
we asked if there was any need to keep it since it was 
damaged beyond repair for that type of equipment.  It 
was indicated that there was no reason to keep it, so 
it has been disposed of.
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  Are you sure it is disposed 
of or is it just lying around somewhere?
          MR. SHARKEY:  I don't know.
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  I would like to ask you, if 
you could find that, I would like for you to send it to 
us and let us look at it.
          MR. SHARKEY:  I was told it was scrapped.  
Sometimes, there is a time delay.  I can't verify the 
type of physical handling it has had in the meantime.
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  If you could find it -- it 
should be pretty easy to identify -- I would ask that 
you send that to us and let us complete this issue that 
Claude raised a minute ago.  Since it has been raised, 
I think we need to look at it in Washington in our 
Metallurgic Department.
          MR. SHARKEY:  You are looking for marks on 
the gear teeth?
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  We are looking for anything 
we could find.
          The gate arms, are they still in the 
possession of the police?
          MR. SHARKEY:  Not to my knowledge.
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  Thank you for your 
testimony.
          Are there any issues raised that either of 
the parties would like to talk more about or the 
technical panel here?
          (No response.)
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  Hearing none, thank you.  I 
think you helped me understand the track circuit better 
than I did before.  You did a good job of explaining 
that.  Thank you very much.
          (Witness excused.)
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  Let's take a 20 minute 
break, please.
          (Recess from 10:58 a.m. to 11:30 a.m.)
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  Would you like to swear the 
witness, please.
         SWORN TESTIMONY OF MARK R. CORBO
          MR. DUNN:  Mr. Corbo, for the record, would 
you please state your full name and spell it for us.
          MR. CORBO:  Yes, sir.
          My name is Mark Corbo.  M-a-r-k is my first 
name, and C-o-r-b-o is my last name.
          MR. DUNN:  Who are you employed by?
          MR. CORBO:  Safetran Systems Corporation.
          MR. DUNN:  What do they do?
          MR. CORBO:  Think manufacture railroad 
signaling electronics equipment.
          MR. DUNN:  What are your duties and 
responsibilities at Safetran?
          MR. CORBO:  I manage the technical support 
engineering group at our electronics division.  Our 
primary responsibility is to support crossing control 
products pretty much from the time they are released 
from product development through their entire life as a 
salable product and actually after we stop 
manufacturing them.
          MR. DUNN:  Thank you very much.
          I will now turn the questioning over to our 
Technical Panel, Mr. Ruben Payan.
   EXAMINATION CONDUCED BY THE TECHNICAL PANEL
          MR. PAYAN:  Mr. Corbo --
          MR. CORBO:  Good morning.
          MR. PAYAN:  Good morning.
          I would like to start with if you could tell 
us approximately how many units of this type are 
currently in operation?
          MR. CORBO:  Yes, sir.
          We have shipped approximately 20,000, 3000 
systems.
          MR. PAYAN:  This is worldwide?
          MR. CORBO:  Yes; we market our products 
worldwide.
          MR. PAYAN:  As far as Safetran Corporation 
and all its types of crossing control devices that it 
manufactures, where does the GCP-3000 range as far as 
available technology?
          MR. CORBO:  The 3000 is our current top of 
the line crossing control device.  It utilizes 
microprocessor technology, and to this point in time, 
it is the most technologically advanced product we have 
offered for sale for crossing control.
          MR. PAYAN:  Mr. Sharkey provided a brief 
operational description.
          Could you provide us some additional 
description of the crossing predictor of the GCP-3000?
          MR. CORBO:  As was mentioned by Mr. Sharkey, 
the key defining factor of our system is that we 
transmit any "C" signal down the rails or we utilize 
the rails as a circuit.
          In order for this process to work, we depend 
on a constant current transmitter.  The result of 
transmitting this current into the rail or into the 
track circuit gives you a generated voltage.  The 
receiver of the 3000 monitors this voltage.
          In terms of when a train enters the bounds of 
the circuit, which is the defined by determination 
shunts which Mr. Sharkey pointed out, the received 
voltage is going to change in a downward direction.  
This is because of the both mechanical and electrical 
characteristics of the train's axle.  It actually 
shorts out some of the rail or the circuit load.  It 
causes a reduction in voltage.
          The processor of the 3000 monitors both the 
amplitude of this voltage and also the rate of change 
of this voltage.  The amplitude is representative of 
distance from the crossing, and the rate of change of 
this voltage is represented in the velocity of train.
          When both of these factors are taken into 
account and when the train is a programmed amount of 
time from the crossing, we will extinguish our relay 
drive output which is normally then translated to 
operating the warning system.
          MR. PAYAN:  Once the microprocessor 
calculates the speed of the train and makes a 
prediction of when to activate the crossing, does it 
continue to monitor the approaching train?
          MR. CORBO:  Yes.
          The actual processing for or train detection 
process is a continuing operation that occurs actually 
regardless of the presence of a train or if the train 
is, in fact, moving.  So, it is continuous.
          MR. PAYAN:  What is the microprocessor?
          How does it handle a train that stops on the 
approach?
          MR. CORBO:  The 3000 system has what we call 
a time-out feature.  Assuming that the warning system 
has been initiated, when the processor determines that 
the train has stopped, it will, after a calculated 
time, will start a time-out process.  At the end of 
this time-out process, we will resupply the relay 
output from the system, which would then cause the 
warning system to clear.
          MR. PAYAN:  Basically de-activating the 
crossing?
          MR. CORBO:  Correct.
          MR. PAYAN:  Does it restart if the train 
moves again?
          MR. CORBO:  It would restart assuming the 
movement is toward the crossing.
          MR. PAYAN:  It knows the difference if the 
train is moving towards the crossing or away?
          MR. CORBO:  Yes.
          We actually utilize the, if you will, whether 
the rate it changes upward or downward to determine the 
direction of movement.
          MR. PAYAN:  Can you tell us what the data 
recorder module is and what it is used for?
          MR. CORBO:  The 3000 that I inspected from 
McKnight Road contained an 80,015 data recorder.  This 
device is manufactured primarily for assistance to 
maintenance or field forces.
          MR. PAYAN:  Can you describe how the data 
recorder interface assembly fits into that?
          MR. CORBO:  The data recorder interface, 
which is the 80025, allows the data recorder to monitor 
up to 16 digital inputs external to the 3000.  
Commonly, these monitor the contacts of the relays.
          MR. PAYAN:  Where is that data stored?
          MR. CORBO:  The data is stored in memory on 
the 80,015 card itself.
          MR. PAYAN:  How often and when is the data 
recorded or how is it time stamped?
          MR. CORBO:  There are really two types of 
data that are recorded.  There is the external data and 
the internal data.  Essentially, to answer your first 
question, how often, it is recorded when there is a 
message initiated.  So, it is, again, a continuous 
monitoring process.  Time stamp wise, all data that is 
recorded is time and date stamped.
          As I believe mentioned earlier, we record to 
the last full second.  So in other words, if a 
recording came in, in that one second, plus .3 seconds 
more than that, we would record it to that one second 
mark.
          MR. PAYAN:  I would like to kind of clarify: 
 For the microprocessor, the GCP-3000's clock, and the 
recorder clock, is it possible for the time that events 
happened and the times that are recorded to be 
different?
          Does the recorder module have a clock of its 
own?
          MR. CORBO:  The recorder module actually has 
it own clock and handles the time and date stamp 
activity.  That is something, as Mr. Sharkey mentioned, 
that you adjust to the particular time.
          MR. PAYAN:  Is it possible for the recorder 
to record 26 seconds of warning time and the computer 
to provide a shorter warning time?
          MR. CORBO:  I don't quite understand what you 
are asking.
          Because warning time is a message fed from 
the GCP, there is no action taken on that message by 
the data recorder other than to assign a time and date 
stamp.  It just records the information which it is 
fed.
          MR. PAYAN:  The recorder is just told to 
record?
          MR. CORBO:  Right.
          The recorder is essentially a monitoring 
device.  It does not actively process any of the 
information which is fed to it other than assigned a 
time and date.
          MR. PAYAN:  Are there any measures that 
Safetran uses to measure the reliability of these 
units, the GCP-3000, any standard measure?
          MR. CORBO:  Pretty much the industry required 
standard, if you will in other words, what our 
customers ask of us when they are utilizing one of our 
products is mean time between failure.
          MR. PAYAN:  Could you explain what that 
means?
          MR. CORBO:  That is pretty much the number of 
hours or the amount of time that a system would be 
expected to operate before a failure occurs.
          MR. PAYAN:  Do you know what mean time 
between failure is for the 3000?
          MR. CORBO:  Based on 1998 numbers, it is 
better than 60,000 hours.
          MR. PAYAN:  Post-accident, Safetran was asked 
to verify the set up at McKnight Road.
          Could you tell us what you checked and the 
results of those tests?
          MR. CORBO:  Yes.
          April 15th actually was the day we were on 
site to look at the unit.  We inspected the plans to 
see if the system programming made sense based on what 
we could see, and no exceptions were noted in that 
respect.
          Then we went about actually looking at some 
of the parameters of the 3000 which was in operation at 
the time, and again, no exceptions were noted.
          Then actually, a key part of it which, of 
course, as you know, ducking between the rain drops, 
that taking over the course of the whole day, we also 
watched several train movements, and the system 
performed as designed.
          MR. PAYAN:  Following the field test, you 
also factory tested the unit.
          Could you describe what the analysis of that 
or what the outcome of those tests were?
          MR. CORBO:  The outcome was that the system 
performed as designed, and we took no exceptions.
          MR. PAYAN:  As far as the recorder module and 
each circuit board, were any exceptions taken?
          MR. CORBO:  None.
          MR. PAYAN:  Mr. Jacky has some additional 
questions for you.
          MR. JACKY:  Good morning, Mr. Corbo.
          MR. CORBO:  Good morning.
          MR. JACKY:  I would like to ask you a couple 
of questions, first of all, in regards to how the GCP 
or the Grade Crossing Predictor determines what the 
train's speed is and get a little more detail into 
that.
          If you will, as the train is coming down the 
track, my understanding is that at some point some 
distance from the actual grade crossing, there is a 
shunt.  Then when the train's axles actually cross 
through that shunt, the predictor starts, seems to 
change the amplitude of the voltage that is on the 
current or on the rails and also the rate of change of 
the current or voltage that is on the circuit.
          How long in time does it take for the Grade 
Crossing Predictor to determine what the train speed 
is?
          MR. CORBO:  Are you looking for it takes an 
action after that or just that process by itself?
          MR. JACKY:  Just that process by itself at 
this point.
          MR. CORBO:  Generally, up to four seconds 
from the time it first detects motion or movement.
          MR. JACKY:  In terms of physically, the 
train, is it considered to be the absolute front axles 
of the train that are actually causing this or is it 
just the entire length of the train or as the greater 
portions of the train enter, pass the shunt I should 
say, that actually provides the change in the amplitude 
of the voltage?
          MR. CORBO:  Effectively, we are looking at 
the front axle of the train.  There is generally no 
further calculation other than the front axle.
          MR. JACKY:  Once the Grade Crossing Predictor 
determines what the speed of the train is, how long 
does it take then for the predictor to act upon that 
speed?
          MR. CORBO:  It depends upon the distance from 
the crossing and what the speed is.  It could, for a 
high speed train for the particular location, react 
within the same four second time frame.  If it were a 
train, for example, running approximately one third 
speed for that particular area, it would wait a 
significant amount of time until the train was actually 
the programmed time from the crossing.
          MR. JACKY:  In this case, let's focus for a 
second on this train or a train that would going the 
same approximate speed, approximately 79 miles an hour.
          MR. CORBO:  Okay.
          MR. JACKY:  The distance that the originating 
shunt would be north of that signal would be -- that 
distance would be based upon what factors then?
          MR. CORBO:  The desired operation time of the 
warning system plus what we call a system reaction 
time, which is generally four seconds for the 3000, and 
then an area which I cannot determine based on this 
location would involve clearance time additional 
seconds for traffic to clear across; for example, a 
double track crossing or width.
          So, you would add up those total number of 
seconds, and then based on district speed, put your 
termination shunt at that particular point.
          MR. JACKY:  Then you mentioned it takes the 
Grade Crossing Predictor approximately or up to four 
seconds to determine the train's speed.
          Are those four seconds added into the 
programmed warning time that is entered into the keypad 
of the GCP?
          MR. CORBO:  No.
          The programmed warning time that the user 
puts into system via the keypad actually reflects the 
amount of time that you want the warning system to 
operate or the flashers to operate.
          MR. JACKY:  I guess I don't understand that.
          If I am programming in 30 seconds into the 
keypad, are you saying then that it would take 30 
seconds of activation or for gate activation or --
          MR. CORBO:  If 30 seconds were programmed 
into the 3000, you would get, assuming you had adequate 
physical distance for your high speed train moves, you 
would get 30 seconds of operation from the warning 
system or at least our output would extinguish 30 
seconds prior to the train's arrival.
          MR. JACKY:  The 30 seconds of operation would 
not necessarily mean, or the start of that operation 
would mean the start of the GCP working as opposed to 
the start, say, of the relay being open to move the 
lights and the bells on a crossing?
          MR. CORBO:  Right.
          The time programmed in reflects the period of 
time that our relay output is extinguished.
          MR. JACKY:  One more question just so I have 
it certain:  Would that mean that the train would have 
entered past the shunts approximately 34 seconds prior 
to hitting the signal or the grade crossing, or would 
it mean 30 seconds from the time that the -- it would 
be 30 seconds from the time that the train first passed 
those shunts?
          MR. CORBO:  Again, the shunt only establishes 
our circuit limits, the termination shunt.  Our system 
initiates operation or removes relay drive when the 
train is a programmed number of seconds from the 
crossing.
          That distance from how far he is into the 
circuit or gone past the termination shunt varies 
according to, obviously, the speed of the train and how 
long that the approach limit actually is.
          MR. JACKY:  How often is the amplitude of the 
voltage and the rate of change in the amplitude 
sampled?
          Is that actually sampled or is it constantly 
monitored by the grade crossings system?
          MR. CORBO:  It is a sampling process.
          MR. JACKY:  Do you know what the sampling 
rate is?
          MR. CORBO:  I believe it is 16 times a 
second.
          MR. JACKY:  I would like to put up the 
print-out from the signal event recorder if possible, 
and I would like for you to go through, if you will, 
and show us on the print-out for the --
          MR. CORBO:  Give me a second to practice with 
the pointer here.  I can't see too much.
          Can anybody in the back see it?
          (Audience responds.)
          MR. CORBO:  I will talk about it.
          MR. JACKY:  We have one over here that we 
could probably provide to you.
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  Out of curiosity, what 
happened to the one from yesterday?
          (Audience responds.)
          MR. CORBO:  That, at least I can see it.
          MR. JACKY:  Mr. Sharkey walked us through 
what the different signal changes and things like that 
are.  What I would like to direct your attention to are 
the warning time and also the different speeds that are 
placed upon there.
          What I would like to do is get a sense of, or 
if you could please, explain to us how the Grade 
Crossing Predictor determines the speeds that are -- 
where they are listed on there and how the Grade 
Crossing Predictor determines those speeds.
          MR. CORBO:  I think the best thing is to 
refer to my earlier statement that this is really meant 
as a maintenance tool, and the specific area where that 
is of importance is with our speed read-outs.  That is 
a relative number, and our design is just to give 
maintenance personnel a relative idea.  For example, 
for this area (indicating), this would be considered a 
fast train.
          Can we expand this out a little bit and look 
at the rest of the page, please?  You will notice at 
that time top here, we have a slower train, probably a 
freight, in this neighborhood, but it is a train 
relatively running 30 miles per hour.  That is the 
general goal of the information.
          The three speeds that we do provide are 
detected speed, which is the first speed.  That is an 
instant or snapshot read-out taken out of our 
continuing process.  The middle speed is the average 
speed of the train, which is more of a continuous 
average calculation from the time the system predicts 
or starts the warning system until he arrives at the 
island.  Then the last is the island speed which is, 
again, a snapshot speed.
          As Mr. Sharkey pointed out, the information 
that we are really interested in or we could get from 
this gives you a general or rough idea that the train 
is accelerating or decelerating.  Then you could 
translate that over to the warning time, which is a 
precise measurement which is from the time we 
extinguish relay drive until the time the island drops 
or the train reaches the island circuit.
          MR. JACKY:  So then in your opinion, would 
there be any basis for comparing the speeds that are 
listed there, those average speeds, against the speed 
that may have been recorded by an event recorder on a 
locomotive?
          MR. CORBO:  I would say I really can't answer 
that because I am not aware of the other types of 
recorders.  I just know ours gives you a relative idea, 
but it was not really intended to be a precise, down to 
feet per second accuracy for speed.
          MR. JACKY:  You would not be surprised then 
if those speeds were to be different from another 
source measuring a locomotive speed?
          MR. CORBO:  No, other than I will say this:  
This is relatively accurate; okay?
          I think I showed the one that we are talking 
about, the bottom train.  Go to the right, please.  
Okay.  This tells us or tells me that the train in 
question was moving certainly faster or around 70 miles 
an hour.  You know, beyond that, I am not willing to 
say, but I do know that is different than a train 
moving 50 or 40.
          MR. JACKY:  Conversely then, the warning time 
there, is that considered to be a relative time also or 
a relative measurement also or would that be more 
exact?
          MR. CORBO:  That is, our warning time is an 
exact measurement, which is from the time we extinguish 
our relay output until the island is extinguished or 
the train, in other words, reaches the island.  That 
reflects that amount of time, 26 seconds in this case.
          MR. JACKY:  Thank you.
          My next question is -- Mr. Payan asked you a 
couple of questions about recording the information, 
and just for clarification:  To your knowledge is there 
any or what is the recording delay from the time that, 
or is there any recording delay on the Grade Crossing 
Predictor computer or recording module?
          MR. CORBO:  What are you looking for?
          MR. JACKY:  Just in that the time?  Let me 
back up.  The times that are stamped within the 
recorder are the times, I believe you testified that 
those are the times that are the information is 
recorded on the recorder?
          MR. CORBO:  Right; received by.
          MR. JACKY:  Would you expect there to be any 
difference in the time that it is received by from the 
time that the change is monitored or noticed by the 
GCP?
          MR. CORBO:  I am not sure I quite understand 
how to answer that question because the way the 
recorder works -- could we put that back up, please?
          This on the right side here (indicating) is 
what we call the message section, okay.  In fact, in 
this case, its message has a T-1 train move.  Those 
items or the entries in the right portion of the 
recorder screen here reflect messages fed to the data 
recorder from the predictor or from the processor of 
the 3000, and they are logged in when they are 
received.
          In fact, there is an interrogation process 
that continually occurs between the 3000's processor 
and the data recorder.
          MR. JACKY:  If I have a, in a signal entered 
a 30 second warning time into the Grade Crossing 
Predictor, would you expect at any time or any 
situation to actually see on the print-out a 30 second 
warning or will that always be less than the programmed 
warning time?
          MR. CORBO:  Help me here.
          Of all the 3000s I have walked up to or what?
          MR. JACKY:  No.
          I would say in any general case, would you 
expect -- if I typed in a 30 second warning time into 
any one of the processors, would there be a condition 
where the warning time, as it is computed, will 
actually be 30 seconds exactly or will it, because of 
time delays and the time it takes to sense the speed of 
the train, will that warning time always be less than 
30 seconds?
          MR. CORBO:  It really depends on train 
operations as Mr. Sharkey was discussing this morning.
          If you have a location where the trains 
typically run at a constant speed and do not change 
speeds at least during the inbound portion of the 
approach, I would expect to see a very large number of 
30 second warning times.
          On the other hand, if this is a location that 
has train variances due to, for example, signals where 
trains run on yellows and then catch a green so they 
change speeds, that would cause a variation in the 
times.  Then of course, if you have the presence of 
switches or switching trains -- locals, if you will -- 
that will give you a great variation in the times that 
I would expect to see.
          MR. JACKY:  I have no further questions, but 
Mr. Raby has a question.
          MR. RABY:  Good morning, Mr. Carbo.
          MR. CORBO:  Good morning, sir.
          MR. RABY:  Just one question:  Earlier 
Chairman Black asked Mr. Sharkey about the description 
of the voltage of the system.  I believe I heard 12 
volt, a battery, and the only AC in the system was in 
the charger that kept the battery charged.
          You indicated a few minutes ago that it is an 
AC signal going up to that shunt; correct?
          MR. CORBO:  Correct; the actual signal that 
3000s transmitter produces is an AC signal.
          MR. RABY:  I am still having trouble 
understanding this timing sequence.
          If you have to meet a standard, the FRA says 
20 second minimum warning time for the motorist before 
the train enters that crossing, and you determine that, 
that point is the edge of the roadway of the crossing, 
not the island circuit which is some 60 feet from the 
center of the roadway of the crossing towards the 
direction the trains come from, and if you program 30 
seconds into this computer box, why don't you get 30 
seconds on the print-out?
          Why doesn't event recorder give you 30 
seconds?
          Why doesn't the system give you 30 seconds so 
the event recorder can record 30 seconds?
          MR. CORBO:  I had hoped I had kind of 
answered that with Mr. Jacky in terms of it is really 
dependent on the types of movements the trains are 
making as to whether or not you get the precise or 
programmed time.
          MR. RABY:  The regulation says you must give 
20 seconds of time.  It doesn't say depending upon the 
operation of the trains.  That is what I thought this 
co-processor, this computer system, the constant 
warning, that is what it did.  That was the advantage 
of it, that it will always give whatever timing you 
program into it.  That is what this computer is 
supposed to do.
          The old system that didn't have the constant 
warning.  Then the speed of the train, they had to set 
the time to compute to the highest speed of the train 
so that when the highest speed train came through, they 
met the 20 second regulation, and when a slow train 
came through, it may be on for a minute.
          MR. CORBO:  Right.
          MR. RABY:  I thought that was the advantage 
of the constant warning system, that it would not 
require then the motoring public to get impatient, go 
around gates and things, that they would always have a 
20 second minimum wait time regardless of the speed of 
train.
          You are telling me or at least I am 
understanding and what I am hearing is yes, but still 
we get a variation.  I don't see why a computer cannot 
compute the speed of the train and determine when to 
start that 20 second or whatever is computed or been 
set up for this, but I will use the 20 seconds to keep 
a standard here for a baseline.
          That computer only has to say, Okay, I looked 
at the train; it is running 50 miles an hour, so I know 
where I need to start that 20 second time sequence so 
at the end of 20 seconds, the nose of that train or the 
front axle of that train is at the edge of that 
crossing.
          So, if that motoring public is at least 
sitting there, he never has to wait more than 20 
seconds for a train, whether it is doing 30 miles an 
hour, 50 miles an hour, of 79 miles an hour.  That is 
the way I understand it.  If I am wrong, please correct 
me.
          MR. CORBO:  You are correct except the 
proviso with certainly Safetran's equipment, we will 
provide a constant warning time with a constant speed 
train.  So, the train has to be moving at the same 
speed for essentially the entire inbound portion to the 
street in order to get a constant or, if you will, 
consistent warning operation.
          MR. RABY:  I understand that.  I was being 
very basic in saying the 20 seconds and making 
assumptions the most simple situations.
          Then if the train does decelerate in that 
time frame, of course, they will have more than 20 
seconds.  If they accelerate in that time frame -- 
excuse me, not time frame, but in that space beyond 
that or the calibration where the equipment calibrates 
the speed, detects the speed, then if he accelerates as 
in I think was found in Fox River Grove, then the time 
signal was less than the amount.
          Barring that, and I assume that is why then 
things like -- in order to meet the 20 second minimum, 
there are variances in the length of vehicles, the 
speed of vehicles, the width of the crossing of more 
than one track, and that is why 30 seconds was put in 
here, so that this crossing and this railroad could 
always meet that minimum standard of 20 seconds because 
of the variables there.  The time line should be the 
same.
          I guess that is where I am having trouble 
understanding why that computer, once it determines the 
speed and even though it monitors the speed on through 
until it hits the island circuit, it doesn't, if I 
understand correctly, it doesn't -- any information it 
receives after that initial computation is made, it 
doesn't reflect the timing sequence.
          It didn't go in and say, Wait a minute; I am 
in the middle of a timing sequence.  The lights came 
on, but you know, I am going to wait eight seconds 
before I start the gate down because I have got some 
new information that came to me after I made that 
initial assessment of speed out there.
          MR. CORBO:  The best thing I can tell you is 
the 3000 itself has one control output, and that is 
extinguished when we indicate the train is an amount of 
time away from the crossing.  After that process has 
taken place, there is nothing else the system can do.  
It is not capable of doing anything different.
          MR. RABY:  That is kind of what I understand.
          In other words, to simplify it, once the 
timing, once it starts the light circuit on and that 
timing sequence begins, whatever it is, 30 seconds, 26 
seconds, or whatever it is, then that is it.  That 
clock ticks its off, starts ticking off, and in four 
seconds, it says, Okay, gates start down.
          Then gate itself knows the physical features 
of the gate takes eight seconds, but it doesn't do 
that.  It starts, and that is the end of it until the 
island circuit says the train has passed, and you can 
shut everything off now.
          MR. CORBO:  What are you looking for?
          MR. RABY:  Why the print-out says 26 seconds 
when you programmed in 30 seconds, where is that four 
seconds?
          What happened to the four seconds?
          MR. CORBO:  Actually, I can explain that for 
at least under the one train move.  This is, again, 
assuming that the train in question was constant speed.
          The approaches for McKnight Road I believe 
are 3,460 feet, at least that is the information I am 
aware of. That translates out to approximately 30 
seconds of time at 79 miles per hour.  When you 
subtract the up to four second reaction time that the 
3000 takes to calculate that it does, in fact, have an 
inbound train, you end up with 30 minus four which is 
26.  So relatively speaking, I believe this acted 
correctly or as designed.
          MR. RABY:  In looking at the exhibit, the 
print-out exhibit, the recorder print-out, does that 
four seconds you are talking, about how does that 
equate in the other train movements that are recorded 
there?
          MR. CORBO:  I am not sure what --
          MR. RABY:  In other words, in the accident 
train, the recorder says it had the signal warning time 
activated for 26 seconds.
          If you take your four seconds as you just 
stated, your four second computation time the computer 
would take, that would equal 30 seconds.
          Would that be the same if you move up the 
scale there?
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  That is not the accident 
train.  It is further down.
          MR. RABY:  The 26 second is the accident 
train.  If you go up to the next T-1 above that, it 
says you have 25 seconds signal time, and you had 
approach speed 69 miles an hour, 25 and 4 is 29.  So, 
that is one second off.
          Let's go up to the next one where it says 33 
seconds of warning time for T-1.  The train was running 
34 miles an hour, and we have three seconds more than 
the warning, than the programmed warning.
          MR. CORBO:  It is difficult to speculate here 
because no one was around.  What I do know in the case 
of the 33 second warning time or what appears to be the 
case is that train possibly decelerated through the 
approach, but again, that is speculating since we were 
not there.
          MR. RABY:  Is that 33 seconds based on when 
the train arrives at the island crossing signal shunt 
point?
          MR. CORBO:  Our time measurement is from when 
we extinguish relay drive, which starts the warning 
system, until the island extinguishes or drops out.
          MR. RABY:  That is all I have, Mr. Chairman.
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  Thank you.
          MR. PAYAN:  No further questions.
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  Would the parties mind if 
we, because of a witness' scheduling issue, we need to 
go on with this.
          The first questioner up is Mr. Marshall of 
Melco.
       EXAMINATION BY MELCO TRANSFER, INC.
          MR. MARSHALL:  I am going to go back Mr. 
Sharkey a little bit here.  Maybe I had some confusion; 
I don't know.
          During his statement, first off, he said 
those gates were put in, in 1968 originally; during a 
conversation or a questioning of Mr. Lauby, that he 
made a mistake when they asked whether or not extra 
recording stuff could be put on the gate; he said no 
because the wiring was from the original install and 
would not habitate the building.
          My question at this point to Mr. Corbo is:  
Do his systems work efficiently with wires that are 31 
years old?
          MR. CORBO:  I guess the only way I can answer 
that question is the 3000 is dependent upon good 
electrical connections between its location in the 
house and the rail in order for it to operate as 
designed.  We have no evidence that it was not 
operating as designed, so we can assume, at least in 
this case, that the wiring was good.
          MR. MARSHALL:  Thank you.
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  Amtrak?
          MR. BULLOCK:  We have no additional 
questions.
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  Thank you.
          The CNIC?
          MR. ED HARRIS:  We have no additional 
questions as well.
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  Federal Railroad?
          MR. BLACKMORE:  No questions.
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  Federal Highway?
          MR. UMBS:  No questions.
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  Illinois Commerce 
Commission?
          MR. STEAD:  We have no questions.
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  Brotherhood of Locomotive 
Engineers?
               EXAMINATION BY THE
       BROTHERHOOD OF LOCOMOTIVE ENGINEERS
          MR. WALPERT:  I have one question.
          Mr. Corbo, how long is the data stored on the 
data recorder module?
          MR. CORBO:  It really depends on conditions, 
but I guess what you are asking is how long does the 
memory last, and the 80,015 is battery backed up and 
relatively will hold memory for longer than one year.
          MR. WALPERT:  What happens at the end of the 
year period?
          Is it over-ridden?
          MR. CORBO:  Well, the way I took your 
question is to how long is the data stored.
          MR. WALPERT:  Yes.
          MR. CORBO:  Over-writing has to do with 
filling the memory space, which is really a different 
issue.
          MR. WALPERT:  Let's look at each one 
separately.
          MR. CORBO:  Okay.
          MR. WALPERT:  The first issue, how long it is 
stored, is one year.
          When does the over-write of the data come 
into effect?
          MR. CORBO:  The 80,015 has a 3000 event sized 
memory, so when you have filled up the 3000 events, you 
will then begin to over-write over the oldest event in 
memory.  That really depends on the location as to how 
frequently that occurs.
          MR. WALPERT:  Can you explain to me why the 
location would affect it?
          MR. CORBO:  It has to do with the number of 
events that take place in a given time.
          MR. WALPERT:  Thank you.
          MR. CORBO:  You're welcome.
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  United Transportation Union?
          MR. DWYER:  We have no questions, Mr. 
Chairman, but I would like to say we share Mr. Raby's 
concern about the variation in warning time, 
particularly in view of the fact that on that slide, 
there seems to be a constant rate of deceleration 
between both trains.
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  Okay; noted.
    EXAMINATION CONDUCTED BY BOARD OF INQUIRY
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  Mr. Sweedler?
          MR. SWEEDLER:  I have no questions, Mr. 
Chairman.
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  Mr. Harris?
          MR. CLAUDE HARRIS:  No questions.
          MR. DUNN:  I have no questions.
          MR. LAUBY:  I have got some questions.
          I want to go over a couple of things.
          Would you tell us how long has the GCP-3000 
been in service.
          MR. CORBO:  I guess probably since 1988 or 
1989 when we started shipping significant numbers of 
them.
          MR. LAUBY:  Can you give us a thumbnail 
sketch of what type of problems you experienced in 
introducing this in the railroad industry and putting 
it in the field, what type of problems you had to 
overcome?
          MR. CORBO:  Actually, I cannot really because 
that was not my area, to introduce the system.  So, I 
am really not the person to consult with.
          MR. LAUBY:  Do you know if there were field 
problems in developing it, putting it in the field, and 
getting it to work?
          MR. CORBO:  Again, I am really not in a 
position to answer that.
          MR. LAUBY:  I want to talk just for a second 
about this timing issue.  I am trying to get the timing 
issue straight in my own mind.
          I am going to make a couple of statements, 
and if you could, tell me yes or no if that is the way 
it works.  My understanding is on this particular 
train, the limitation and the time is due to the 
distance to the shunt, the 3,460 feet.
          Is that a limitation on the warning time that 
you would get?
          MR. CORBO:  It, for general circumstances, 
limits you to the maximum amount you can get, yes.
          MR. LAUBY:  If the distance to this shunt was 
extended beyond 3,460 feet, if it was out at, let's 
say, 6,000 feet just for the sake of discussion, what 
type of warning time would your system give for a train 
coming at 79 miles per hour?
          MR. CORBO:  Then I would expect to see much 
closer to the programmed time.
          MR. LAUBY:  The 30 second?
          MR. CORBO:  Right.
          MR. LAUBY:  You mentioned that to go 3,460 
feet, it takes a train going 79 miles per hour how long 
to go that distance?
          MR. CORBO:  Approximately 30 seconds.
          MR. LAUBY:  Approximately 30 seconds?
          So when the train actually enters this area, 
it is already time to turn the gates and lights on, is 
that correct, based on the system if you were 
programmed for 30 seconds?
          MR. CORBO:  Yes, correct.
          MR. LAUBY:  Why can't the system do that?
          MR. CORBO:  Because we have this built in 
what we call reaction time which is as long as four 
seconds.  The reason that we have that is to ensure 
that we do, in fact, have an inbound train movement.
          In other words, you need to make a 
calculation of the speed of the train, and you want to 
deal with it over a, if you will, several second period 
to make sure you are not responding to momentary 
stimulus.  So, this is our way of doing two things.
          It gives you a little better precision or 
consistency in the warning time observed, and also, it 
gives you a benefit making the system what we call 
noise immune so you get a smaller number of false 
activations due to outside stimulus.
          MR. LAUBY:  As a train traveling 79 miles an 
hour enters the shunt, the first thing your system does 
is to detect the speed?
          MR. CORBO:  Right.
          MR. LAUBY:  It does this over a period of 
four seconds?
          MR. CORBO:  Uh-huh.
          MR. LAUBY:  If the system is set up to give 
30 seconds warning time and now 4 seconds of that 30 
seconds is gone, how does the system react to that?
          MR. CORBO:  Well, at the end of the -- when 
the system has adequately determined that it had an 
inbound train at the maximum speed, it will then 
extinguish the output.
          MR. LAUBY:  It immediately takes action to 
turn the equipment on?
          MR. CORBO:  Correct.
          MR. LAUBY:  What about a train going, let's 
say, 60 miles an hour?
          MR. CORBO:  Okay.
          MR. LAUBY:  What would it do then?
          MR. CORBO:  Again, it takes four seconds to 
accurately register that you have an inbound train, and 
then now since the train is moving 60 and we are 
dealing with which our 6,000 or 3,400 example, the 
system will now wait although it is monitoring the 
inbound movement, it will wait until the amplitude of 
the voltage is sufficient to indicate that the train is 
now 30 seconds out at 60 miles per hour.
          MR. LAUBY:  So, it still used the first four 
seconds to determine the speed of the train; is that 
correct?
          MR. CORBO:  Correct.
          MR. LAUBY:  Then it waits until the 
appropriate time the energize the gates and lights so 
that there is a full 30 seconds; is that correct?
          MR. CORBO:  Right, except I don't really like 
the term wait.  It is actually continuing the 
calculation.  It is just that the train is not, in 
fact, 30 seconds out.
          MR. LAUBY:  There is no need to drop the 
gates immediately at that point?
          MR. CORBO:  Correct.
          MR. LAUBY:  Let's take one more example.  
Let's take 40 miles an hour, which is approximately 
half the speed, half the maximum speed.
          So, at 40 miles an hour, we still have a 
constant 34,060 feet distance to the shunt, and at this 
speed, we have 60 seconds rather than 30 seconds, 60 
seconds from the time the train enters the area of the 
shunt until it gets to the crossing.
          Would you just step through and tell me a 
train coming at constant speed of 40 miles an hour, how 
would your system would react?
          MR. CORBO:  How about we take it from the 
standpoint of viewing it on the keypad like you were 
standing there watching the operation of the system.
          When the train enters the approach limits or 
--
          MR. LAUBY:  Again, we are 60 seconds from the 
crossing.
          MR. CORBO:  Right.
          When the train enters the approach limits or 
the EZ value, which Mr. Sharkey mentioned is one 
hundred when there are no trains occupying the circuit, 
it would begin to decrease slowly at first downward.
          The next thing that would take place is there 
would be what we have.  A motion LED would extinguish 
on the transceiver card.  That would tell you, what 
that tells you as a maintenance person is, We are, in 
fact, we are seeing an inbound train, and you are 
assuming at this point that it is not yet 30 seconds 
from the crossing because the warning system has not 
been initiated.
          MR. LAUBY:  Let me clarify this a little bit 
to compare it better to what I have in my head.
          If the train is coming at 40 miles an hour 
and it goes over that shunt or 60 seconds from the 
crossing, during the first four seconds that, that 
shunt, that it passes that shunt, after that four 
seconds, does your system know that train is traveling 
40 miles an hour?
          MR. CORBO:  Correct.
          MR. LAUBY:  It will continue to monitor the 
speed of that train as it continues down the track?
          MR. CORBO:  Correct.
          MR. LAUBY:  My impression is it will wait.  
From when it knows its point at 40 miles an hour, it 
will continue monitoring, but 26 seconds after it has 
the speed, it will trigger the gates and lights?
          MR. CORBO:  Correct, assuming a constant 
speed too.
          MR. LAUBY:  That would leave 30 seconds from 
the time the gates and lights start until that train 
enters the circuit, is that correct, or enters the 
crossing?
          MR. CORBO:  Technically, right, although we 
actually, as I said, we measure to the island, not the 
--
          MR. LAUBY:  To the island circuit then, which 
is just 60 feet shy of the --
          MR. CORBO:  Correct.
          MR. LAUBY:  So, there may be a couple of 
seconds either way depending on that island circuit.
          This system is fairly accurate based on a 
constant speed entering the circuit; is that a correct 
statement?
          MR. CORBO:  Correct.
          MR. LAUBY:  How accurate would you say it is?
          These are perfect trans that travel at a 
given speed with no variation, no acceleration, no 
deceleration.
          MR. CORBO:  That is a hard one.  I don't know 
that -- we don't certainly publish a specification, but 
just to offer a guess, I would say three to four 
seconds variance would be not unusual.
          MR. LAUBY:  Three to four seconds?
          My lest question:  This methodology that you 
use to determine speed where you put an AC signal on 
the rails, send it out, it gets shunted by the 
locomotive, and it comes back, you look at variation in 
voltages, and this is a constant current AC signal that 
goes out.
          You look at variations of voltages, and you 
look at variations in amplitude to determine the 
location; right?
          How did you end up with this system?
          Why do you use this system?
          MR. CORBO:  Actually, this was a research 
process initiated by the Southern Pacific Railroad with 
Stanford Research Institute around 1959 or 1960.  They 
instituted the research into what became this process, 
how, using the constant current transmitter 
transmitting voltage down the rail and detecting the 
train's axle, shunting that voltage.
          After about, I believe it was around two 
years of research, they developed the basic methodology 
of how you would build a predictor, if you will.  Then 
the Southern Pacific Railroad wanted to use these 
devices, so they offered to a contract to various 
manufacturers for bid -- would you build this for us?
          One of Safetran's predecessor companies, Mark 
Ward Industries, was the successful bidder on that 
contract.  So, they produced the first version of a 
predictor around 1962 or thereabouts.
          MR. LAUBY:  So this technology has been 
around for a long time; is that correct?
          MR. CORBO:  The basic track interface 
technology, correct.
          MR. LAUBY:  Does this technology have 
advantages over other competing technologies as far 
this methodology you use to determine speed?
          MR. CORBO:  I guess I am not really sure 
about competing technologies.
          MR. LAUBY:  What other methods are there to 
determine speed that you know are out there?
          MR. CORBO:  Well --
          MR. LAUBY:  Is this a --
          MR. CORBO:  I guess we are going quite 
hypothetical here, away from, you know, the normal 
process.  Industry standard-wise, we have been doing 
this for 35 years, and I really can't speak to are 
there better ways to do it.
          MR. LAUBY:  In your consideration, is this 
industry standard this methdology?
          MR. CORBO:  What?
          MR. LAUBY:  This method of determining train 
speed, is this the industry standard for the railroad 
industry?
          MR. CORBO:  More or less, right.
          MR. LAUBY:  Thank you very much.
          MR. CORBO:  You're welcome.
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  I have a couple of questions 
here.
          Is the same technology that is used in the 
control circuits for the signals the same signals on 
roads?
          MR. CORBO:  On a general basis no.
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  I am not talking about the 
speed sending.  I am talking about using the tracks as 
a couple a wires on a ground.
          MR. CORBO:  That was true.
          Most of the signal systems today transmit a 
voltage down the rails as well as the crossing control 
systems.
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  Do you think back in 1958 or 
1959, that was one of the reasons the Stanford looked 
at using the track circuitry for this process?
          MR. CORBO:  Since they already knew how to do 
it, I think the main interest, certainly on EZPs part, 
was to eliminate the use of insulated joints which, at 
this time, were used to separate track circuits.
          So by going to the method of an AC signal, 
you now could differentiate by other means other than 
having a physical insulated joint in the track circuit 
or to define the track circuit.
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  Tell me, if you could, how 
many variables -- we have been talking about the 
timing, and I think we probably confused everybody on 
how this system works, at least me.
          What are the variables that you mentioned?
          Speed and rate of change of speed, the system 
variable in producing a time is what I am looking for, 
an ultimate warning time.  You mentioned speed and rate 
of change of speed, acceleration, deceleration.
          What producers are there that might produce a 
higher or lower time?
          MR. CORBO:  The track circuit parameters 
themselves, ballast conditions if you will, and also 
the length of the track circuit, which is one of those 
parameters.
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  When you say ballast and 
such, what you are really saying is there are the 
environmental conditions that would describe the 
electrical properties of the track circuit; in other 
word, humidity, moisture in the ground, temperature, 
all that sort of thing.
          MR. CORBO:  Correct.
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  Do you have any idea, for 
instance, how much those environmental variabilities 
are limited plus or minus?
          MR. CORBO:  No; that is not really anything I 
can tie a quantity to.
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  Does this one index that is 
mentioned, this device is, I guess -- would that one 
hundred index vary with these others, the temperature, 
moisture?
          What happens if it rains?
          What happens to your index if it rains.
          MR. CORBO:  There would be some variation in 
that index if there was rain, for example.
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  Without beating a dead 
horse, what I am trying to get around to is something 
Byrd was talking about.  This is not a precise science, 
and this system is not capable of doing that because 
there are too many variables.
          MR. CORBO:  Correct.
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  It is designed, as I 
understand, to make sure you get more than 20 seconds?
          MR. CORBO:  Yes, sir.
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  I went through the docket 
here.  It is not in the books, but there is a bunch of 
other print-outs apparently from this crossing.  Here 
is a 44 second warning time.  I see a variance in speed 
here of about ten miles per hour worth of variance in 
speed.
          It appears that it was slowing significantly 
during the time period.  There are some constant 
speeds.  Here is one that produced 29 seconds.  It 
looks to be about an average uniform speed of 35 miles 
per hour through the system.  So, they are all over the 
place.
          I guess what I am trying to get across or 
find out is this has to do with variables over and 
above what is set in the computer that the railroad or 
no one else has any control over.
          MR. CORBO:  Correct.
          Can I say one thing also?
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  Sure.
          MR. CORBO:  In my time that I have spent at 
McKnight Road, they do have variable speed trains 
because of this siding track there and the types of 
movements.  So one would tend to expect to see some 
variations as you are pointing out.
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  I spent some time waiting to 
talk to the state's attorney out there a few weeks ago, 
and I sat and watched train and switching movements.  
There is a passing track there, a side track there and 
all kinds of strange maneuvers do occur in this area.  
By the way, they are reflected in the print-outs that 
are in the docket.
          Given the variables in this and since 
apparently no one has looked at this very closely since 
1959 or 1960, as I recall, a few things have changed 
since 1959 or 1960 technology-wise.  They changed in 
1988 when you first produced this device.
          I am wondering if the railroad or signal 
manufacturers have considered looking at video imaging 
technology or has your industry or your company 
considered going to laser radar?
          MR. CORBO:  I can't really speak to the 
precise items that our group is looking at, but yes, we 
are looking at different items.
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  One more question:  
Basically, this is set up, this 30 second wheel setting 
or digital setting -- I guess that it is, in this 
situation, it is a wheel -- they are really never going 
to get that 30 seconds at this location.
          26, 27, 28, depending on these variables, is 
the most they are going to get out of this system, or 
is 26 the most they are ever going to get for a high 
speed train?
          MR. CORBO:  Okay.
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  I should have put that 
parameter in.
          MR. CORBO:  Right.
          I would guess 26 to 27 would be the most you 
would expect to see for a speed limit move at that 
location.
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  A point that I would have to 
make to clarify that, having had some of these 
crossings in my jurisdiction, is that is not 
necessarily bad.  We used to run around 28 or so on 
constant warning crossings before this technology came 
around.
          If you allow the time to be too long, you 
encourage gate running.  Obviously, if it is too short, 
there are some reaction time problems.  So, that is not 
necessarily a bad thing, to have 26 seconds I guess is 
what I am saying.
          It depends on what you choose it to be.  If 
they want it to be predictably 30 seconds, for 
instance, they are going to have to link it to the 
track circuit.
          MR. CORBO:  Correct.
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  Any further redirect or any 
further questions that this discussion has stimulated 
from the parties?  It was a good discussion and a good 
witness.  Thank you very much.  Anybody else?
          (No response.)
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  I appreciate your candor.  I 
think you have tried to answer.  This is not an easy 
area here, and I guess I always knew it was from 
listening to railroad signal engineers try to explain 
them to me back in my last life.
          Fortunately, I had a good electrical engineer 
who was my signal engineer, and he translated it for 
me.  Thank you very much.
          MR. CORBO:  Thank you for inviting me.
          (Witness excused.)
          MR. DUNN:  We were scheduled for lunch, but 
the witness has leave, so I would like to continue.
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  This is the fire chief?
          MR. DUNN:  Yes.
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  We don't want to keep him 
away any more than necessary.
          MR. DUNN:  The National Transportation Safety 
Board at 12:50 calls Chief Michael Harshbarger.
      SWORN TESTIMONY OF MICHAEL HARSHBARGER
          MR. DUNN:  Chief Harshbarger, for the record, 
would you please state your full name and spell it for 
us.
          MR. HARSHBARGER:  Yes, sir.
          My name is Michael L. Harshbarger.  It is 
spelled H-a-r-s-h-b-a-r-g-e-r.
          MR. DUNN:  What is your occupation?
          MR. HARSHBARGER:  I have a dual occupation.  
I am privately in business for myself, and I am, 
secondly, a paid on-call Fire Chief for the Bourbonnais 
Fire Protection District in Bourbonnais, Illinois.
          MR. DUNN:  Were you involved in the accident 
that occurred in Bourbonnais, Illinois on March 15, 
1999?
          MR. HARSHBARGER:  Yes, sir.
          MR. DUNN:  At this time, I will turn the 
questioning over to the Technical Panel, Mr. Richard 
Downs.
        EXAMINATION BY THE TECHNICAL PANEL
          MR. DOWNS:  Thank very, Mr. Dunn.
          Good afternoon, Chief.  Thanks very much for 
appearing at our hearing here.  I appreciate you taking 
the time out of your busy schedule.
          Would you please tell us about professional 
background and role as Chief of the Department in 
Bourbonnais.
          MR. HARSHBARGER:  Yes.
          I am currently a 29 year member of the 
Bourbonnais Fire Protection District.  I began there in 
1969 as a fire fighter.  I advanced through the ranks 
as an engineer.  I was later promoted to lieutenant.  
Approximately in the early part of 1980, I was promoted 
to captain.  I became Assistant Chief in 1989.  I got 
the job of Chief in 1995.
          MR. DOWNS:  Following that, could you please 
give us a quick summary of the Bourbonnais Fire 
Department operations and equipment.
          MR. HARSHBARGER:  Bourbonnais Fire has a 
fleet consisting of three engines, all of which carry 
water in varying amounts, between eight hundred and one 
thousand gallons, and all of which have pumps on them 
capable of pumping 1,000 to 1,500 gallons per minute.
          Additionally, we have a rescue squad truck 
which also carries water and some foam equipment and 
rescue equipment.  We also have two tank vehicles, one 
of which carries 3,450 gallons of water, the other 
which carries 2,000 gallons of water; and we operate 
two advanced life sport ambulances and your brush fire 
cutter.
          MR. DOWNS:  Do you have any aerial ladder 
trucks, platform trucks, or anything like that?
          MR. HARSHBARGER:  No.
          We were presently considering the purchase of 
such a unit, but at this time, we do not have it.
          MR. DOWNS:  Can you give us a quick summary, 
please, of your manpower and staffing?
          MR. HARSHBARGER:  Staffing consists of 45 
paid on-call fire fighters.  All of them are certified 
at some level as a fire fighter two or three or above 
that.  Some of them are certified at substantially 
higher levels of training.
          MR. DOWNS:  When you said "paid on-call," 
does that mean each fire fighter will get paid for a 
specific response, or do they get a minimum wage, so to 
speak, a token reimbursement per the week?
          Exactly how does that work?
          MR. HARSHBARGER:  They are paid a 
reimbursement for each call that they actually attend.
          MR. DOWNS:  Essentially, we have a volunteer 
operation, and a small remuneration is provided to 
allow for, to receive calls.
          Would that be fair?
          MR. HARSHBARGER:  That would be correct.
          There are no career fire fighters on the 
department.
          MR. DOWNS:  What are the typical types of 
calls that your community, that you respond to in your 
community?
          MR. HARSHBARGER:  We respond to approximately 
1,800 calls on an annual basis.  Of the 1,800, 
something in the neighborhood of 1,400 are ambulance 
calls.
          The remaining four hundred are what we call 
fire calls, but in fact may be odor investigations, 
alarm activations.  Automobile accidents are a 
substantial number of those.  So in actual terms of 
fires, we are probably in the area of 50 to 60 a year.
          MR. DOWNS:  They might be typically your 
small structure fire type of event rather than a large 
plant or something?
          Your community does not have any real 
significant chemical operations, things of that sort?
          MR. HARSHABARGER:  That is correct.
          There are no chemical or petrochemical 
operations in our district at all.
          MR. DOWNS:  If you could, please touch a 
little bit on your departmental training.  You 
mentioned the fire fighter one and two level training.
          Can you go a little bit into the amount of 
time it takes to train a typical fire fighter?
          MR. HARSHBARGER:  When a new hire is brought 
on board with the fire department, they are immediately 
put into a school scheduling, which is an Illinois 
State Fire Marshal conducted course.  The completion of 
that course after approximately 12 weeks of both 
classroom and practical training will certify them at 
what is known as a fire fighter two level, which is a 
basic level.
          It teaches them basic fire fighting skills, 
and they then are required to become trained as an 
emergency medical technician at the basic level.  After 
they have attained both these certifications, they are 
then removed or proposed to be removed from the 
probationary status and become a regular line fire 
fighter.
          While they are on probationary status, they 
are typically kept under the wing of more seasoned fire 
fighters in an effort to prevent them from being 
injured while they gain some experience.
          The probationary period will vary, but 
typically, it will last at least a year.  After they 
have been removed from that status, typically, they 
also are encouraged to go on to achieve higher levels 
of education of fire fighters.
          MR. DOWNS:  Maybe you can touch a bit on the 
emergency drills that are conducted periodically.
          MR. HARSHBARGER:  We have a county-wide Fire 
Chiefs Association that has existed for something in 
excess of 30 years.  We have, for the last 15 or so of 
those 30 years, had at least an annual disaster drill 
that is county-wide and involves all of the fire 
departments and, of late, the ESDA agencies, police 
agencies, and the hospitals.
          The original reason for beginning those 
disaster drills is that the two hospitals which are 
located in Kankakee, in the nearby community and County 
Seat of Kankakee County, are required by the Illinois 
Department of Public Health, in order to retain their 
certification as trauma centers, to have a readiness 
drill on an annual basis to prove that they can 
reliably receive patients in some kind or any kind of a 
multi-casualty incident.
          So, that was the reason we began them and 
soon realized that they were a powerful training tool 
for us and for our fire fighters.  So, we have 
consistently on an absolute annual basis for the last 
ten years had at least one a year.
          MR. DOWNS:  Have you had a recent event 
simulation with a railroad scenario involved by chance?
          MR. HARSHBARGER:  In 1997, we had a scenario 
that posed a freight train versus school bus accident 
at the south edge of the City of Kankakee.  We had 
about 25 students from a local college who were posing 
as patients.
          Those patients were triaged on site and then 
transported to each of the two hospitals.  As I recall, 
we included, to add a little extra flavor to that 
particular drill, a tornado in the process of that.
          MR. DOWNS:  To top it all off, right?
          During our initial discussions on the scene, 
you described to me what is called your box alarm 
system.  Perhaps you could, for our listeners, 
elaborate a little bit on that.
          MR. HARSHBARGER:  Our box alarm system was 
borne out the mass casualty incident scenario that we 
drill for.  Its purpose is so that an incident 
commander, when faced with the need for additional 
resources, simply has to refer to either his memory, 
which many times he can do, or to the small cue card 
that he usually would carry with him and ask the County 
Dispatch Center to call out a box alarm or a higher 
level, a 2-11 through as much as a 5-11, to elevate the 
urgency of the alarm so that he doesn't have to go down 
the list and call this community for this and the other 
community for the other thing.
          It is a prescribed lay-out sheet with 
numbers.  An example would be in our fire protection 
district, there are boxcars, approximately five.  One 
of them is for engine companies and fire fighting 
equipment.  That is the one that is called 60-100.  
There is another which calls for tankers.  There is yet 
another which calls for ambulances and rescue 
equipment.
          The district is gridded off in groups so that 
each segment is numbered.  Those segments will, based 
on those numbers, cause a different level of response 
depending upon the alarm called for so that if, in the 
instance, this Amtrak accident, when we called for 
ambulance box 60-900, the dispatch center at Kankakee 
County was able to open a book and knew immediately 
which agencies they were to page and what ambulances 
those agencies were to send.
          MR. DOWNS:  In the Amtrak incident, was the 
box alarm system that was called out, was that the 
highest level that could have been called out for your 
system?
          MR. HARSHBARGER:  We initially called it at 
the box level, and prior to my arrival, based on the 
information I received from the police who were on the 
scene, I elevated to 5-11 level, which yes, is the 
highest level.
          MR. DOWNS:  We will get into that in a little 
bit more detail as we go along.
          You mentioned the incident command system in 
Kankakee County.  Perhaps you could give us a brief 
overview of that.
          MR. HARSHBARGER:  We in Kankakee County use 
the incident command system that is petty much in place 
across the country.  It is a system in which an 
incident commander immediately takes charge of the 
overall incident and then delegates authorities for the 
various sectors that he may need based upon the 
magnitude of the incident.
          In a large incident such as this, there were 
needs for staging for triage, for transportation, for 
medical, for fire suppression, et cetera.  In a small 
incident, we use this on every incident.  A one-car 
automobile accident will still use the same system, and 
they are just simply are not the need for as many 
sectors.
          MR. DOWNS:  In other words, it is a way of 
managing your resources and your responsibilities at 
the scene in terms of perhaps having to call out your 
mutual aid and other resources?
          MR. HARSHBARGER:  That is correct.
          It is an incident management system.
          MR. DOWNS:  Let's move now to the event 
itself.
          On the day of the event, can you please tell 
us what had transpired during the initial response -- 
approximately what time were you called out; what time 
you arrived, and give us a quick overview of the 
initial moments of the dispatch?
          MR. HARSHBARGER:  The initial call was paged, 
I believe, at 9:47 p.m.  I was at an ambulance call 
approximately two miles from the scene.  Two of the 
Bourbonnais police department patrolmen were at 
approximately the same distance, but were in their cars 
on regular patrol and proceeded directly to the scene.
          They, incidentally, monitor our dispatch 
frequencies and answer each fire or ambulance call to 
attempt to give (a), give us information prior to our 
arrival; and (b) to help to mitigate whatever the 
incident may be.
          Patrolman Dave Berkler (phonetic) was the 
first arriving officer on the scene, and I was 
listening by my own radios in my vehicle while I was on 
the way to the scene to information that he was giving 
the dispatch center in terms of what he was seeing and 
what was there, the size of it so to speak.
          MR. DOWNS:  You arrived at the scene moments 
thereafter, and you are proceeded to take control as 
incident center commander?
          MR. HARSHBARGER:  That is correct.
          MR. DOWNS:  Could you please describe for our 
viewers here, our listeners here, what you initially 
saw.
          Again, feel free to refer to any of our 
exhibits.  I believe our exhibits we were calling out 
were 2A, 2B, and 2C.
          MR. HARSHBARGER:  That is right, and if we 
could put up Exhibit 2B on the screen.
          The roadway in the lower left-hand corner of 
the picture, you can see the back of the rescue truck. 
 The rescue truck is heading north along the roadway 
that we approached on, so our view -- it is going to be 
a bit difficult to see -- our view was, let me try the 
other one.
          My view as I approached was of the front end 
of this locomotive (indicating) and the sleeper car 
over the back of it, and basically, from the position I 
parked, the piling of the wreckage over the top of it.
          There was fire present in this general 
vicinity upon my arrival, and there were people exiting 
the back of the diner car and the back of this car 
(indicating) and this one and walking down the road 
toward me and toward the police officers.
          My first impression was an enormous mass of 
people.  It was still quite dark as we arrived there 
and cold.  The temperature was in the lower 20s.  A 
large number of people were in various states of 
undress because they had been asleep or preparing for 
bed.  Nearly none of them had coats on. Several of them 
had no shoes.  Some of them were in night clothes and 
this nature of thing.
          Most of them were helping injured passengers 
down the road toward the police cars, and the police 
officers were putting as many injured as they could in 
their police cars which were, at that point in time, 
located down here approximately where this rescue truck 
is.  Of course, it was not yet on the scene.
          The two police cars had four or five victims 
in them at that time, and our first arriving ambulance 
received the young lady whose foot was amputated.  I 
believe it was a food service Amtrak employee who was 
carrying her down the road.  So, they were put into the 
first arriving ambulance and hustled out of there 
immediately.
          MR. DOWNS:  The balance of your equipment had 
not arrived immediately as I understand it.
          It was a few minutes before all the equipment 
could muster up and get transported over to the scene; 
is that correct?
          MR. HARSHBARGER:  That is correct.
          MR. DOWNS:  That takes about, what, ten 
minutes?
          Would that be your estimation?
          MR. HARSHBARGER:  As much as ten minutes, 
yes.
          Some of the equipment was on the scene at 
about that time, and then of course, some were strung 
along a few minutes after that.
          MR. DOWNS:  You were essentially dealing in 
the dark.  In trying to deal with a situation like 
this, it is very difficult to assess first off.
          Is that a fair assessment?
          MR. HARSHBARGER:  Yes, very much so.
          MR. DOWNS:  Did you find any other persons, 
perhaps good Samaritans, who had been assisting in this 
particular effort when you arrived?
          MR. HARSHBARGER:  Yes.
          On my arrival, there were approximately 35 
workers from the adjacent steel plant who had heard the 
sound of the crash and who had cut through the chain 
link fence that is along side the site.
          If we could change to Exhibit 2B, we would be 
able to see that better.
          MR. DOWNS:  That was 2B.
          MR. HARSHBARGER:  Sorry, 2A.
          This is the crossing area.  This is the road 
we are talking about here (indicating).  There is about 
a six foot high chain link fence that is continuous 
along this entire area, and finally, a gate down to the 
left side off the picture about two or three hundred 
feet.
          The steel workers came out of these buildings 
and cut the fence here (indicating) in two or three 
locations and brought ladders, flashlights, and things 
of that nature and entered the fires and assisted a 
number of the injured out of the fires.
          Some of them were on top of the cars as well, 
and at, incidentally, at great personal risk because 
none of them had any protective clothing on beyond what 
their regular work clothes were.
          There were four of those steel workers who 
were directly inside the dinning car assisting with 
those people who were trapped in there with a 
substantial amount of fire impinging on the of the car. 
 So the bystander participation was instrumental in 
saving several lives I am quite sure.
          MR. DOWNS:  You felt their participation was 
particularly valuable in the incipient moments of the 
first response before the formal fire brigade arrived?
          MR. HARSHBARGER:  No question about it.
          MR. DOWNS:  I believe you were stating before 
that you called out mutual aid that was almost 
instantaneous when you first arrived.
          MR. HARSHBARGER:  Yes.
          Actually, the mutual aid, the boxes were 
called.  The ambulance box was the first that we 
called.  Patrolman Berkler, prior to my having heard 
that, had called for what we call an engine box, which 
would be the fire fighting equipment.
          I echoed that again when I heard that, so 
there were actually two calls for fire fighting 
equipment and, subsequently, a call for tankers because 
we knew that there would not be water readily available 
to that site.  We figured, at least at the outset, we 
would have to bring tank water.
          MR. DOWNS:  Do you remember approximately how 
many total mutual aid companies arrived?
          Was it a county response, multiple counties 
that were down there?
          MR. HARSHBARGER:  It was multiple counties.
          It was every agency in Kankakee County; most 
agencies in Iroquois County, the county immediately to 
the south; and then most agencies as well in Will 
County; some stretched into Cook County into the 
southern suburbs of the City of Chicago.
          MR. DOWNS:  Roughly, the manpower count all 
total from all those responders?
          MR. HARSHBARGER:  I believe 54 agencies and 
360 fire fighters.
          MR. DOWNS:  In your experience and your 
history of dealing with fires, would you describe this 
more or less as kind of a once in a lifetime event, 
something that you would never really expect to 
encounter?
          MR. HARSHBARGER:  Very definitely.
          MR. DOWNS:  Let's get into a little bit of 
detail on the fire.  You mentioned when first arrived 
on the scene, you saw the fire approximate to the 
locomotive itself.  The locomotive was on fire.
          Had the sleeper car to the rear of that 
become involved at that time?
          MR. HARSHBARGER:  Yes, it had.
          However, our immediate size of it, or my 
immediate size of it didn't indicate to me quite the 
magnitude of the fire that was taking place there.
          Could we go back to 2B again, please.
          The sleeper car, the one we nicknamed Ben 
because of the shape of it, was not generally involved 
in the fire on this side, and we were not able to see 
this side very well, nor could we see from the opposite 
side the amount of fire there was.
          The color of the flames and the color of the 
smoke indicated it was a petroleum fed fire.  We were 
sure that it was the diesel fuel from the locomotive 
that was the root of that.  However, the fire was not 
much on the outside of the locomotive at that point.
          It apparently was contained within the body 
of the locomotive, and it was somewhat a chimney effect 
back through the length of it, so that it was creating 
more of a blow torch type of thing through this area 
toward the sleeper car.  That area is where, of course, 
we discovered the majority of the fatalities was 
through the center section.
          MR. DOWNS:  Would it be fair to say that the 
fire started out relatively small and built up over the 
course of time?
          MR. HARSHBARGER:  Yes, I believe it did.
          MR. DOWNS:  Let's get back to water 
resources.
          What were your difficulties in that regard?
          MR. HARSHBARGER:  We have a hydrant from our 
crossing that we saw on the previous slide exactly half 
had a mile south, but back on the east side of the 
track.  So, the initial incoming engine from 
Bourbonnais stopped and dropped a five inch feeder line 
at that hydrant.  It crossed the tracks and come on 
north up this road to a position just behind where this 
truck is parked now and stopped there.
          They had dropped the last of the two thousand 
feet of hose they had on the truck about six hundred 
feet from where they were stopped there.  Another 
engine company from the Village of Bradley, which was 
on the mutual aid box, picked up at that point and laid 
in the remaining six hundred feet and made the 
connection.
          As I said, we called for tankers and the 
tanker box early on because we knew this would take a 
period of time to establish a reliable water supply.  
So, the tanker came in behind the engine and fed both 
the engine and this rescue truck which had the foam on 
it while we were in the process of establishing the 
water supply from the hydrant, but it was 2,600 feet to 
the hydrant.
          MR. DOWNS:  That takes a while to get that 
five inch line established.
          Meanwhile, you used the tankers to feed your 
pumpers to fight the fire?
          MR. HARSHBARGER:  That is correct.
          MR. DOWNS:  You mentioned foam, fire fighting 
foam.
          Again, is that something that is normally 
used for, say, a petroleum based fire?
          Perhaps you could elaborate a little bit on 
that.
          MR. HARSHBARGER:  We carry in our rescue 
truck 20 gallons of foam concentrate to deal primarily 
with highway accidents that might be a 
petrochemical-related issue, but because we have no 
petrochemical issues in our district, nor for that 
matter are there any pretty much county-wide.
          We don't carry large quantities of foam, nor 
do we have a basically foam tank type engine ourselves 
nor, again, has any other agency in our county any 
device that has a large quantity of foam on it.
          MR. DOWNS:  At some point, you did call out 
mutual aid for foam equipment?
          MR. HARSHBARGER:  That is correct.
          We called from two special foam engines from 
two chemical plants that are located within our mutual 
aid box alarm system and are about a 35 minute trip 
away.
          MR. DOWNS:  That is because you ran out of 
foam in fighting the initial attack and you simply ran 
out of the resources and you had to rely upon the 
larger volume?
          MR. HARSHBARGER:  That is correct.
          The thing we experienced was that because the 
fire was primarily contained within the locomotive, we 
were not able to effectively use the foam on it at that 
point.  We were using high pressure fog which would 
knock the fire down, but of course, would not 
extinguish it.
          As major quantities of the diesel fuel leaked 
out on to the ground and outside the body of the 
locomotive, we began to have a much larger volume of 
fire outside.  It was then that the foam was much more 
effective because we could blanket the surface of the 
fire.
          MR. DOWNS:  Could you please tell us about 
some of the difficulties encountered at the scene 
regarding, say, the logistics, establishment of the 
command post, the marshalling of the mutual, and 
anything else that you want to bring up that made this 
fire particularly stubborn to put out.
          MR. HARSHBARGER:  The magnitude of the 
incident and the number of injured as well as the 
number of non-injured but involved people very much 
over-taxed our capability to communicate with each 
other by radio.
          We have known for sometime that we had a 
radio communication system deficiency county-wide and 
have been attempting to address that; but due to 
constraints, capital constraints, I have not been able 
to get it done thus far although this incident has 
prompted some more movement and it would appear that we 
are going to be able to address that.
          Communications was the single greatest 
difficulty we faced because the single radio 
frequencies and the inability to talk on an 
inter-agency basis caused us to have to use runners and 
notes back and forth many of the times.
          MR. DOWNS:  Sounds like it was not a very 
efficient way to do things with the fire ground 
scattered in this large area.
          MR. HARSHBARGER:  It was not.
          An example of that was we had fire fighting 
crews and rescue crews inside the sleeper car with the 
three people, four people who were trapped in that car 
for quite a long period of time.  They were unable to 
communicate with me by radio their need for fire 
screens inside the car because of the fire that was 
passing through the sleeper car and impinging on the 
wall of the dining car.
          Finally, well into the incident, perhaps 40 
or more minutes into the incident, was the first time I 
was able to hear communication from any of the fire 
fighters inside the car because of the mass amount of 
radio traffic that was going on.
          MR. DOWNS:  You mentioned the county is 
attempting to do something about it.
          Does that mean the funding is going to be 
procured and perhaps you are going to get a better 
radio system?
          MR. HARSHBARGER:  It looks favorable.
          Congressman Jerry Weller has sponsored some 
legislation that is presently in committee in the 
Congress that would afford substantial funding for fire 
departments for capital expenditures of that nature and 
would afford us some resources to enhance or virtually 
replace our radio communications system.
          MR. DOWNS:  Let's move for a moment to the 
passenger accounting.
          Did you have any difficulties when you 
arrived on the scene with regard to determining just 
how many people were on the train?
          MR. HARSHBARGER:  Yes.
          We had a major problem with that because 
there was not very good information in terms of the 
number of potential passengers.  We were told at some 
point that there could be as many as four hundred.  
Then we got conflicts to that effect, that it was more 
like two hundred.  It bandied back and forth.
          The largest part of the problem that, that 
posed was one of determining how much more we would 
need in terms of resources for emergency medical 
services and transportation.
          The passenger manifest finally made it to me 
within the first hour, but later in the first hour of 
the incident, where we were able to get a relatively 
accurate number for the number of people that were on 
the train.  Again, it was not accurate at that time, 
but it was much closer.
          MR. DOWNS:  You feel that is a critical piece 
of information, that list or that accounting, for the 
needs of the emergency responders?
          MR. HARSHBARGER:  Yes.
          That was probably the greatest frustration 
because when we did get the manifest, and even on into 
the hours of the following morning, the numbers were 
not completely conclusive.
          One of other problems that we had is a 
situation whereby a person traveling with an infant 
under the age of a year would not be on the manifest at 
all because they didn't have a ticket.
          The other thing we found is that apparently 
the names listed on the manifest were in the name of 
the person who purchased the tickets, so we would see 
the situation where the same name might appear five or 
six times.
          So obviously, we could not have had that many 
people with the same name.  So, we didn't know whether 
we were looking for male, female, young, old, infant, 
or what we were faced with.  So, that was a substantial 
frustration, yes.
          MR. DOWNS:  The next thing I would like to 
touch on a little bit is:  Has your county or your 
village had any training with Amtrak on emergency 
events?
          MR. HARSHBARGER:  We have never had a 
specific training exercise with Amtrak, but have now 
got one set up that will occur in November and will 
encompass about a four hour classroom presentation and 
then an eight hour practical presentation on an actual 
train.  That is going to take place in Kankakee.
          We have invited every agency which was called 
by mutual aid to the March 15th incident and invited 
them to reach out amongst their other neighboring 
agencies and bring as many people as they possibly can 
because we feel there is a great deal we didn't know 
about the equipment that would be very valuable to not 
only us -- hopefully, we will never have to deal with 
this again -- but other agencies and members of other 
agencies very possibly might have to do that.
          MR. DOWNS:  Lastly, in closing, are there any 
lessons learned that you would like to pass on to other 
organizations and agencies regarding this particular 
event?
          MR. HARSHBARGER:  The greatest lesson learned 
here was that training pays off.  No level of training 
could possibly have prepared us or our neighboring 
agencies for the magnitude of this incident.
          However, the training that we did have 
certainly gave us a way of understanding and directing 
what needed to be done a great deal better than we 
certainly would have been prepared had we not trained 
at all.  So, training and more training is always the 
key.
          We always have people moving out of the 
service and new people coming in, so repetitive 
training, while it is not necessarily popular, is a 
very important factor.
          The other lesson I suppose that sticks out 
most strongly in my mind is how valuable the incident 
management system is and how absolutely impossible a 
large-scale incident would be to handle without using 
the simple format of the incident management system.
          MR. DOWNS:  Very good, Chief; thank you very 
much.
          That concludes my questions.
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  Amtrak?
              EXAMINATION BY AMTRAK
          MR. BULLOCK:  Hello, Chief Harshbarger.
          MR. HARSHBARGER:  Good afternoon.
          MR. BULLOCK:  I would just like to, on behalf 
of Amtrak, express my appreciation once again to you 
and to the citizens of Bourbonnais, the emergency 
responders, and all of the citizens in Kankakee County 
that were, in our mind, so tremendous in helping us 
with this.
          It took us about two hours to get down there 
from Chicago, and from the moment we got there, we were 
tremendously impressed by not only the competence that 
the accident was being handled with, but also the care 
and compassion that you all had for our employees and 
for our customers on the train, and we deeply 
appreciate that.
          I would like to know, Chief, when the first 
time was that you actually made contact.  I know I met 
you about ten minutes after I arrived at the scene, but 
that was not until almost 12:30, 12:40 a.m.
          When was the first time you actually made 
contact with somebody from Amtrak at the scene?
          MR. HARSHBARGER:  I can only guess, but I 
would say something in neighborhood of 10:30.
          MR. BULLOCK:  Was that somebody who was on 
the train?
          MR. HARSHBARGER:  Yes.
          MR. BULLOCK:  That was somebody who was on 
the train?
          MR. HARSHBARGER:  It was someone who handed 
me paper work, and they represented it to be from the 
conductor.  He did not identify himself as being the 
conductor.
          MR. BULLOCK:  Was that the reservation 
manifest?  Is that what that was?
          MR. HARSHBARGER:  Yes.
          MR. BULLOCK:  At any time before I got there, 
had anyone made the one eight hundred number available 
to you of our national operations center?
          MR. HARSHBARGER:  No.
          MR. BULLOCK:  I don't have any other 
questions.  Thank you.
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  The Canadian 
National/Illinois Central Railroad.
          MR. ED HARRIS:  No questions other than to 
second Mr. Bullock's comments on the Chief's efforts at 
the tragedy itself and on the outlying communities as 
well too.  Thanks again.
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  The Federal Railroad 
Administration?
          MR. BLACKMORE:  I have no questions, and I 
would also like to third what Mr. Bullock said. I was 
on the scene shortly after that.  I am very impressed 
with the way the response was handled.
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  Federal Highway 
Administration?
          MR. UMBS:  No questions, thank you.
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  Illinois Commerce 
Commission?
          MR. STEAD:  We have no questions.
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  Brotherhood of Locomotive 
Engineers?
               EXAMINATION BY THE
       BROTHERHOOD OF LOCOMOTIVE ENGINEERS
          MR. WALPERT:  How were you contacted by -- 
you mentioned you were contacted by the conductor.
          How were you contacted?
          MR. HARSHBARGER:  I was in an incident 
command center on the roadway that we indicated a while 
ago, and the individual came up to the incident command 
center and identified himself as being from Amtrak and 
handed me a manifest.
          MR. WALPERT:  Thank you that is all I have.
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  The United Transportation 
Union?
          MR. DWYER:  Thank you, Mr. Chairman.  We too 
would like to extend our thanks to the Chief and his 
people, and we have no questions.
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  Mr. Marshall with Melco?
          MR. MARSHALL:  I have no questions, and I 
would like to commend all the people that were in the 
effort of putting out the fire and doing all the 
efforts of making everything as good as they could 
after this disaster.
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  Mr. Sweedler?
       EXAMINATION BY THE BOARD OF INQUIRY
          MR. SWEEDLER:  I have no questions, Mr. 
Chairman.
          Thank you for a job well done.
          MR. CLAUDE HARRIS:  No questions.
          I also want to thank the captain for his 
tremendous work on the scene.
          MR. DUNN:  I have a couple of questions,  
Chief.
          When you arrived on the scene, did any of the 
what I am going to call witnesses come up to you and 
say they had seen what happened?
          Did anyone?
          MR. HARSHBARGER:  No.
          MR. DUNN:  No one did?
          MR. HARSHBARGER:  No.
          MR. DUNN:  Did you know before the accident 
what the role of the NTSB was?
          Did you know who we were?
          MR. HARSHBARGER:  Beyond newspaper 
information from other transportation accidents, no, 
not really.
          MR. DUNN:  That is why I want to thank you 
personally.  I know you were in charge of the 
situation, and I met you and explained to you what we 
do and your cooperation in accepting it as far as we 
are the lead agency in the investigation.
          Normally, that doesn't happen.  It usually 
takes boxing gloves, but your cooperation, I really 
appreciate, and of course, the community and how 
everybody was treated and the way they worked out 
there.  Thank you.  Those are all the questions I have.
          MR. HARSHBARGER:  Thank you.
          MR. LAUBY:  I have just one or two questions, 
Chief.
          This is biggest incident you have ever been 
to; is that accurate?
          MR. HARSHBARGER:  Absolutely.
          MR. LAUBY:  Is there any way to adequately 
prepare for something like this?
          MR. HARSHBARGER:  No, I don't really think 
so.
          No one can be one hundred percent prepared 
for something of that magnitude no matter how large an 
organization they are.  I go back to a comment that I 
believe I heard made which drew a comparison between 
this incident and the drills that we have done many 
times in the past.
          When you do a drill and you transport a would 
be victim and you bandage them all up and they have 
rubber wounds that have been stuck to them and they see 
theatrical blood on them, it makes it really appear 
very real, but nothing can compare to looking at 
someone who really is injured, sometimes mortally 
injured.
          The toll that takes on a human being and the 
rescuer is immense, but again, training, training, and 
training is the key to being able to cope with whatever 
might come your way.
          MR. LAUBY:  Thank you for your good work, 
Chief.  Those are all the questions I have.
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  I, too, come from local 
government, and I think one of the things that I have 
had a chance to observe since I have come to the Board 
is when looking at incidents that literally happen all 
over the United States, one of the things that makes me 
feel really good is to find that everywhere we go, we 
almost invariably find that people like the Chief here 
are out there all over the United States, volunteer 
fire departments full time, part time, whatever.  It is 
amazing to me.
          One comes to mind, a train accident in rural 
Texas, that fire on the overpass down there.  They had 
a plan.  They had an incident command process, and they 
did an excellent job.  Fortunately, it was not a 
passenger train, but they did an excellent job of 
coping with it.
          Devine, Texas I am told did an excellent job 
of coping with that.  We never know when we might need 
your services when we are driving down I-57.  So, thank 
you very much.
          Anything else?
          MR. DOWNS:  One last thing.
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  Anyone else or anybody 
direct?
    FURTHER EXAMINATION BY THE TECHNICAL PANEL
          MR. DOWNS:  Just for the record, Chief, the 
fire was reported initially about 9:47.
          About how long did it take to put the fire 
out?
          MR. HARSHBARGER:  The fire was finally 
extinguished about an hour and 25 minutes into the 
incident.
          MR. DOWNS:  Your forces were on the scene 
until how long in the morning?
          MR. HARSHBARGER:  Approximately three p.m. on 
Tuesday afternoon.
          We left and, of course, went back a number of 
times over that period of time.  I might add, 
incidentally, the representative from the Coroner's 
office arrived on the scene a short time after ten 
o'clock Monday night and didn't leave the scene at all 
until after 11 p.m. Tuesday night.
          MR. DOWNS:  It was a marathon effort by all.
          MR. HARSHBARGER:  It certainly was.
          MR. DOWNS:  Thank you again, Chief.
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  I just was passed along one 
more question to you.
          Have you ever been to another accident at 
this site, this crossing?
          MR. HARSHBARGER:  Yes.
          I was at a grade crossing accident at that 
crossing.  In fact, I think it was the immediately 
previous fatal accident that occurred there.  It was an 
automobile which was likewise eastbound and went around 
the crossing gates and was struck by a northbound 
Amtrak.
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  Thank you, Chief.
          Anything else you would like say to us?
          MR. HARSHBARGER:  I would like to take this 
opportunity to thank all of you for your kind words on 
behalf of my community.  I promise I will take those 
kind words back and share them with all those very 
deserving people.
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  Maybe we will get a few of 
these reporters to send them back by another channel.
          (Witness excused.)
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  Due to the failure of the 
Chairman to observe that we started without the court 
reporter a while ago, we have been delayed a little 
further.  That is my fault.  Nobody told me either.  If 
I am going to be senile, I am going to have get 
nonsenile accomplices up here.  Let's break until about 
2:45 p.m.  Thank you.
          (Recess from 1:32 p.m. to 2:47 p.m.)

         A F T E R N O O N  S E S S I O N
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  Mr. Dunn, will you proceed.
          MR. DUNN:  The National Transportation Safety 
Board calls Lee Bullock please.
  SWORN TESTIMONY OF LEE BULLOCK AND MARK MEANA
          MR. DUNN:  Mr. Bullock, for the record, will 
you please state your full name and spell it for us.
          MR. BULLOCK:  Lee Bullock, L-e-e 
B-u-l-l-o-c-k.
          MR. DUNN:  Who is --
          MR. BULLOCK:  This is Mark Meana, Director of 
Safety for Amtrak East here with me.
          MR. DUNN:  Would you spell your full name for 
us Mr. Meana.
          MR. MEANA:  M-e-a-n-a.
          MR. DUNN:  Mr. Bullock, who are you employed 
by?
          MR. BULLOCK:  I am employed by Amtrak.
          MR. DUNN:  What is your position?
          MR. BULLOCK:  I am President of Amtrak 
Intercity, which is the business unit that has the long 
distance trains, and we are headquartered in Chicago.
          MR. DUNN:  At this time, I will turn the 
questioning over to the Technical Panel, Mr. Richard 
Downs.
          MR. DOWNS:  Thank you, Mr. Dunn.
        EXAMINATION BY THE TECHNICAL PANEL
          MR. DOWNS:  Good afternoon, Mr. Bullock.
          MR. BULLOCK:  Hello, Rick.
          MR. DOWNS:  Would you please tell us about 
your professional background and your role as President 
of Amtrak Intercity.
          MR. BULLOCK:  Sure.
          I have been with Amtrak since 1973.  I 
actually started on board the trains on the East Coast. 
 Since that I time, I have had a variety of positions 
with Amtrak, including positions at Amtrak's 
headquarters in our National Operations Center and 
several line management operating positions at a number 
of locations throughout the Amtrak system.
          Prior to coming to Chicago, I was 
Vice-President of Customer Service responsible for 
operations and delivery of customer service at Amtrak 
West.  Then I came to Amtrak Intercity, the business 
unit, as I indicated earlier, that is headquartered in 
Chicago is responsible for the operation of Amtrak's 
long distance trains.
          I came here in 1996, first as Vice-President 
of Customer Service and Operations.  Then in 1998, I 
became President of the business unit.
          MR. DOWNS:  Maybe you can elaborate for us a 
little bit the difference between Amtrak Intercity and 
other business units.
          MR. BULLOCK:  Yes.
          Approximately five years ago, Amtrak changed 
its organizational structure, and Amtrak, the entire 
company is now composed of three business units.  We 
have the northeast corridor.  Of course, we own much of 
the railroad between Washington and Boston and on the 
West Coast where we have a lot of very active state 
partners in California and Washington particularly.
          We have Amtrak West, and that is a business 
unit on the West Coast.  The rest of the country is 
Amtrak Intercity, and it is really the long distance 
network.  So, our business unit is an organizational 
structure.  The headquarters for Amtrak is still in 
Washington, D.C.
          MR. DOWNS:  These trains basically are your 
long haul passenger trains and most all of them are 
reserved type trains?
          MR. BULLOCK:  That is right; that is correct.
          MR. DOWNS:  This morning, we heard testimony 
about how important it is for the local emergency 
responders to be properly presented with an accurate 
and correct accounting of the reserved passengers on 
trains.
          With that all said and done, tell us about 
the mechanism that Amtrak has in place now to perform 
that.
          MR. BULLOCK:  Right now, Amtrak operates, as 
you indicated, with both reserved and unreserved trains 
throughout the national system.  The train that was 
involved in the collision at Bourbonnais, Illinois, the 
City of New Orleans, is an all-reserved train, an 
overnight all-reserved train.
          Because it is an overnight all-reserved 
train, there is a manifest produced by Amtrak's 
reservations system.  Our reservations system is called 
Arrow, and that system actually produces a passenger 
name, record manifest for all the people who have 
reservations on the train.
          We have traditionally at Amtrak used that as 
our manifest document even during accidents.  I believe 
that -- going back to the accident at Saraland 
(phonetic) -- the recommendation from the NTSB, I think 
that was R-94007, is where the NTSB first put focus on 
this issue of the proper accounting of the human 
beings, the passengers and the employees, on the train.
          When that issue came up, that recommendation 
came out, we turned at that point to start using the 
ticket pouch on the train.  The conductor's ticket 
pouch is under his personal care.
          We have the manifest that says who is 
supposed to get on the train, but we have a lot of 
people who make reservations who actually don't get on 
the train.  So, what the conductor does is he takes 
tickets from everyone.
          So, the on-train manifest, our record of who 
is on that train is really carried today in the ticket 
pouches.  It is a manual system in the ticket pouch.
          Because of the things that, and I think it 
stems back to the recommendation from the Saraland 
accident and the things that we have learned, the 
reservation manifest by itself is really not adequate 
for a proper accounting of the human beings on a train.
          As we have learned the profound importance of 
being able to properly account for everyone on the 
train, we now look at that ticket pouch as our main 
resource document.  As a matter of fact, it is part of 
our go team which went to the site at Bourbonnais.
          Within, I would say, 15 minutes after we 
arrived at the scene, we had recovered the ticket pouch 
and immediately started putting together our passenger 
name record to see who exactly was on the train.  So, 
it is still very much a manual system.
          We still do manual ticket lift on the train. 
 The conductor literally takes people's tickets and 
punches them just like conductors did 30 or 40 years 
ago.  It is exactly the same kind of system that was 
used 30 or 40 years.  So, we are still using that same 
manual system.
          We have made a lot of policy changes and 
continue to make policy changes at Amtrak to improve 
that system so we can do a better job.
          It certainly was not perfect at Bourbonnais, 
and I understand that.  I also had the misfortune to go 
to a lot of other Amtrak derailments, and I also know 
that in this particular case, we did the level best job 
we have ever done, the best job that we have ever done 
in accounting for everybody.
          We had the number of ticketed passengers 
identified within 30 minutes after arrival, so we knew 
the exact number of ticketed passengers in 30 minutes. 
 That was after our arrival at the scene.
          MR. DOWNS:  That raised a good point though 
in that being that Bourbonnais is proximate to Chicago, 
it was somewhat convenient to arrive so to speak.  
Let's say it had happened as in Kingman, Arizona.  You 
had a case where Amtrak is three or four hours away.
          Does that present a problems in that regard 
too?
          MR. BULLOCK:  It certainly does raise more 
difficult questions.  There was an obvious advantage 
because we could get to Bourbonnais quickly.  There is 
no question about that.
          Something else we have also learned because 
of these accidents is part of our emergency response 
procedures now.  Our National Operations Center, which 
is there 24 hours a day, part of our protocol at this 
point is to get a hold of the railroad wherever we have 
an accident, to get a hold of the railroad and ask the 
railroad to get for us the name and the position of the 
incident commander at the scene and get the information 
to that individual, whoever that individual is, to give 
that person our eight hundred number.
          For example, in the case of the incident at 
Bourbonnais, Chief Harshbarger actually ended up 
getting a copy of the manifest that happened to be on 
the train, but we can generate that manifest today by 
e-mail, by fax, by a number of ways of communication.
          By using that eight hundred number and 
getting in quick contact with the incident commander, 
we can let the incident commander know in a moment the 
count of the passengers who were reserved on there.  
So, we know in a moment the number of passengers, the 
count of the passengers who were reserved on the train.
          That is a whole different matter, of course, 
an accounting for every human being who is actually on 
the train and what their disposition is.
          MR. DOWNS:  Let's divert for a moment to 
Amtrak's training program.
          Is it part of the training program where crew 
members are given instructions to the effect that they 
know that fire departments and emergency responders 
will be needing this information promptly and that they 
know they need to seek out and relay this as best they 
can?
          Then to follow up to that, if I may, what if 
the conductor incapacitated or those key crew members 
where you cannot physically find the pouch?
          MR. BULLOCK:  What was your first question?
          MR. DOWNS:  The training.
          MR. BULLOCK:  The training, it actually is a 
part of our what we call prepare training, and that 
prepare course continues to evolve as we learn better 
and more about how to deal more effectively with these 
kinds of situations, but yes, it is very much a part of 
what the obligation of the crew is.
          In the case of Bourbonnais, for example, we 
went where the conductor's office is located on the 
train and recovered it.  We didn't get it from the 
conductor.  We got it from the location where he was.
          MR. DOWNS:  If the conductor and such or even 
that car that is, for example, where the materials are 
physically kept, suppose that car is totally 
inaccessible.  Then you have no, under your current 
procedure, you have no way of getting that information 
short of regenerating it from your home office.
          MR. BULLOCK:  That is absolutely right.
          That is why we have to, and we will talk here 
in a moment, we have to go beyond where we are today; 
there is no question.  That is what our intention is.
          In the event we were unable to find the 
ticket pouch, what our plan would be at that point, 
what our plan is at that point is to, once again, rely 
upon the reservation manifest which is, once again, 
available 24 hours a day, 7 days a week through the 
contact number.  We can make it available, and our 
contact with the incident commander is always through 
the railroads we work with.
          MR. DOWNS:  Perhaps we can go into now 
briefly as to what Amtrak has prepared or planned for 
future technologies in this regard.
          MR. BULLOCK:  Having lived through some of 
these accidents, this is becoming more and more of an 
issue.  Our awareness has grown in how much we need to 
address this issue.  We knew of the need and have been 
working for a couple of years on an automatic system, 
an automated system, an electronic system, a 
computerized system, if you will, on how we are going 
to account for passengers on the train.
          When the Congress actually gave us our 
capital funding -- some of you heard of this, it was 
called the TRA; it was the capital funding for Amtrak 
for two years which we very badly needed that gave us 
access to funds -- one of the first things out of that 
fund for capital investments that we made is we made an 
investment of $24 million and contracted with Motorola 
actually here in Chicagoland to put together an 
automated system.
          What it is, it is a hand-held device.  It is 
very simple.  It is hand-held device that the conductor 
will take with him.  It will scan the tickets, and it 
will scan into the hand-held device the passenger name, 
record of the person's name, and then it can print a 
receipt or it can print a receipt check.
          Then that information can then be -- there is 
a computer on board, a central processing unit that is 
on board the train, and that will be loaded, the 
information from the hand-held device is loaded into 
that computer.
          Then it can be transmitted and hooked into 
our national reservations system.  So, we won't even 
have to get the information directly from the train.  
We will have it available from a number of locations as 
soon as the information gets transmitted from the 
train.
          It is our expectation that the design and 
implementation of this scheduled for 2000.  So, our 
plan is to, by the end of 2000, have this implemented 
throughout the Amtrak system.
          MR. DOWNS:  I believe you submitted an 
exhibit demonstrating and describing your device.
          MR. BULLOCK:  Yes, we have.  We have an 
exhibit.  Actually, we brought the hand-held device 
with us.  Mark has it right here.
          MR. DOWNS:  I believe that is Exhibit 5A.
          MR. BULLOCK:  I think that is what it is.  
That is right.
          It is 14 ounces.  It is shock resistant.  It 
has enormous an amount of capabilities, and this is 
where you scan in the tickets (demonstrating).  This 
will also be connected.
          The conductor will also have a printer that 
he will be able to attach to his belt that will print 
out the seat check or the receipt so he will have a 
printed receipt to give people.  He doesn't have to 
hand write everything like we require them to do today.
          MR. DOWNS:  This will somewhat replace the 
old ticket punch of days gone by.
          MR. BULLOCK:  Yes.
          This is a wonderful device certainly in terms 
of being able to properly account for all the human 
beings who are on the train, but also is designed as a 
fare collection device to make our fare collection 
system more efficient and closer to at least the 20th 
century if not the 21st century.
          MR. DOWNS:  That would work in conjunction 
with the current reservations system as kind of a 
cross-check plus an enlargement or enlightenment of 
that technology?
          MR. BULLOCK:  Yes; they will be tied 
together.
          MR. DOWNS:  To make sure I understand 
correctly, each ticket-taker or conductor or whatever, 
when a person boards the train, let's say in an 
unreserved situation -- there are many passengers who 
will board your train, space providing, of course, en 
route -- they will be able to enter the information on 
the spot, update the database such that, God forbid, 
five minutes later something happens.
          We will have a complete and accurate 
accounting as best as can be reasonably put together; 
is that correct?
          MR. BULLOCK:  That is right; that is correct.
          MR. DOWNS:  In closing, is there anything 
else you would like to present?
          Were there any lessens learned as a result of 
this particular incident that you would like to pass 
on?
          MR. BULLOCK:  Yes.
          There is a couple of things I would like to 
mention.  First of all, I would like to again extend 
Amtrak's deepest sympathy for all of the people who 
suffered in this incident, especially those who 
suffered losses.
          We know it has been a hard healing process, 
and goodness knows, in catastrophic circumstances, one 
never does everything right; but we feel that the vast 
majority of the people who were at Bourbonnais, the 
passengers, our employees, know that if we didn't do 
everything right, they knew that our hearts and our 
minds were in the right place when we got there.
          I guess one of the lessons learned for me out 
of this and something I wanted to mention in this 
hearing, and it, once again, reinforces the importance 
of having a proper accounting of all the human beings 
on the train, and that is the assistance we got from 
the NTSB.
          The family assistance folks were a tremendous 
resource for us, and there were times when I certainly 
felt overwhelmed.  I know the coroner there felt 
overwhelmed.
          Having those folks there to guide us, they 
knew how to get the mobile morgue in and get it in 
quickly; being able to answer questions, the legitimate 
questions people had about survivors and the condition 
of the survivors -- all of those things were incredibly 
important.  The support that they helped guide us 
through was absolutely critical to our being able to 
deal effectively.
          I think we did the best we have ever done as 
a company in this circumstance with regard to dealing 
with our customers and with our employees, but a large 
part of that was due to the family assistance of the 
people from the NTSB who were there to address the 
official responsibility certainly of looking into the 
cause of the accident.
          Also, I guess a lesson learned for me was the 
NTSB, in this case, was also a huge resource for us, to 
help us manage through this very difficult situation.  
So, I want to express Amtrak's thanks to the NTSB for 
that because it was extremely helpful.
          I guess the only other thing that I would 
mention is that because of the facts we learned at 
Bourbonnais and some of these other incidents, we have 
made some other interim policy changes that, as long as 
we have this manual system that we have on the train, 
there is no reason that we cannot have an accurate 
accounting, even with this manual system, of every 
human being on the train, and that is what we are going 
to do.
          We have an interim plan in place until we get 
the sophisticated system that we really badly need.  We 
have interim plan in place that will allow us to, we 
will be able to account for every single person.  It 
will be a requirement.
          It is the policy requirement of our company 
that you will, to ride the train, you will have to have 
a ticket with your name on it.  If you do not have a 
ticket with your name on it, we will ask our conductor 
and support our conductors that they cannot, they will 
not allow people to ride on our trains without some 
form of transportation.
          The conductor will have the authority the 
issue a form of transportation which we are in the 
process of creating now, and that will be part of the 
ticket pouch.  That way, we will the name, the origin 
and destination and the space on the train that, that 
individual is assigned, of all the people on the train.
          That is all of our employees, whether those 
employees were working employees or whether they are 
employees who are commuting from one point to another, 
if it is media folks, if it is railroad officials, it 
doesn't matter who it is, everyone must have some form 
of transportation.  So, I suppose that is one area that 
was a lesson learned for us.
          MR. DOWNS:  You say the new system will be in 
place in the year 2000, next year?
          MR. BULLOCK:  Yes.
          I believe that the design, the first 
implementation will take place in the spring.  Our 
intention is to time that with the beginning of the 
high speed trains, the Acello (phonetic) trains in the 
northeast corridor.  That is where we will really cut 
our teeth on this system, and then we will spread it 
out from there.
          MR. DOWNS:  How long before full 
implementation?
          MR. BULLOCK:  By the end of the year, by the 
end of 2000 throughout the Amtrak system.
          MR. DOWNS:  Thank you.  That concludes my 
questions, Mr. Chairman.
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  I appreciate those comments 
on behalf of NTSB for our family affairs group.  I have 
had the unenviable position of being the first Board 
Member on the first accident after we instituted that 
program, which was a runway accident down here in 
Quincy, Illinois, not too far away.
          I also had the largest one since it occurred, 
which was the Korean Air Flight 801 on Guam.  In Guam, 
we really got to do a favor for the locals because the 
team you mentioned, that we took with us, that deployed 
with us in Guam were really about the only help from 
the forensic pathology standpoint that there was on 
Guam.
          They had considerable military presence, but 
from the standpoint of having forensic and people 
accustomed to coping with that much carnage at one 
time, they were not really equipped, and we were 
pleased to able to render the service.  Thank you very 
much.
          The Canadian National/Illinois Central 
Railroad?
          MR. ED HARRIS:  We have no questions.
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  Federal Railroad 
Administration?
EXAMINATION BY THE FEDERAL RAILROAD ADMINISTRATION
          MR. BLACKMORE:  I have just a couple.
          Do you have anyone that works for the local 
fire departments part time or full time in communities 
along the way?
          MR. BULLOCK:  Absolutely.
          We do somewhere around 50 emergency response 
demonstrations a year, and I think we train.  Mark, you 
can probably help with this.  It is probably around a 
thousand I believe.
          MR. MEANA:  That is correct.
          It is coordinated through our Manager of 
Emergency Preparedness.
          MR. BLACKMORE:  Are they full time or part 
time?
          MR. BULLOCK:  They are full-time people.
          MR. BLACKMORE:  Have you taken any actions to 
promote this eight hundred number, the national 
response number at a higher level than you have done in 
the past?
          MR. BULLOCK:  First of all, it is absolutely 
a part of our protocol.  As I indicated earlier, it is 
part of our emergency response procedure, and it is 
built into our emergency response plan; that, that is 
part of it when we have an emergency, is it to get the 
names, the railroad, the incident commander, and then 
ask the railroad to get that name.  So, that is an 
implemented part of our procedure.
          MR. BLACKMORE:  I have no further questions.
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  Federal Highway 
Administration?
          MR. UMBS:  No questions, thank you.
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  Illinois Commerce 
Commission?
          MR. STEAD:  We have no questions.
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  The Brotherhood of 
Locomotive Engineers?
               EXAMINATION BY THE
       BROTHERHOOD OF LOCOMOTIVE ENGINEERS
          MR. WALPERT:  I have a couple questions.
          Mr. Bullock, in regard to training, our 
operating abilities, specifically, are locomotive 
engineers and conductors trained in how to react in 
emergency situations?
          MR. BULLOCK:  Yes.
          All of our employees are trained with what is 
called Prepare.  We have a Prepare Course, and our 
intention would be to train everyone every two years 
with a Prepare Course.  The Prepare Course kind of 
keeps shifting and changing and growing and getting 
better, but absolutely, the engineers and all the 
operating crews in the train and the conductors as 
well.
          In fact, we like to get as many of them 
trained as early as possible.  So, yes, that is part of 
our training, and it is part of our continuing training 
we are going to be doing for the balance of this year 
and also in 2000.
          MR. WALPERT:  Does part of that training 
include what an engineer, or for that matter, a 
conductor or anyone else on the locomotive cab would do 
in the event they were trapped on the locomotive cab or 
in the cab?
          MR. BULLOCK:  I don't know if it specifically 
addresses what to do.
          I went through the Prepare training course 
myself, and I don't know that it specifically addresses 
that, but there are lots of things to learn there in 
terms of tools and what tools you can access, the 
things you should do, the things you should not do, how 
to respond to fire, when you should try to escape, when 
you should not try to escape.  Those things are 
applicable whether you are in the cab or anyplace in 
the interior of the train.
          MR. WALPERT:  That is all I have.
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  The United Transportation 
Union?
  EXAMINATION BY THE UNITED TRANSPORTATION UNION
          MR. DWYER:  Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
          Mr. Bullock, how will the training center in 
Delaware that you just opened play into this?
          MR. BULLOCK:  Well, the training center is a, 
well, it is a beautiful facility.  I wish I had it in 
Chicago.  It is in Wilmington, Delaware as you have 
indicated.  It is a tremendous resource for us, and of 
course, our long distance trains go all over the 
nation, so we will be doing a lot of the training on 
the East Coast with employees who are crew based in 
that area.
          So, where it makes sense for us to utilize 
that facility, we are absolutely going to do that and 
use the professional services of the trainers who are 
there.
          Also, we have a very active program putting 
together what we call train the trainer programs so 
that we have a wide network throughout the nation of 
people who are capable of teaching this class.  We 
found that the people who are the most capable of 
teaching this class are very often the people who work 
on the trains themselves.
          Very often, it is conductors and engineers.  
Sometimes, it is on-board service staff.  They have all 
shown a great ability to be trained as trainers, and 
they have more credibility actually very often than a 
management trainer does.
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  Melco, Mr. Marshall?
          MR. MARSHALL:  I have no questions.
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  Mr. Sweedler?
       EXAMINATION BY THE BOARD OF INQUIRY
          MR. SWEEDLER:  Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
          Mr. Bullock, Mr. Meana, I am very pleased to 
hear about the new system that you are putting in to 
keep track of your customers.  As Mr. Meana will tell 
you, we have had numerous discussions between Amtrak 
staff and Safety Board staff to try to come up with 
some type of a system that would be useful in this type 
of tragic situation.
          I was wondering if the system that is going 
to be implemented, the one you described, will cover 
all Amtrak trains or just Intercity, will it cover the 
northeast corridor and some of the California commuter 
service or some of the other commuter service?
          MR. BULLOCK:  It is our intention that when 
it is fully implemented, it will cover all of our 
trains because it is also the way that we are going to 
do the ticket list.  This is the way we are going to 
move in how we do the ticket list on all of the trains.
          MR. SWEEDLER:  All this information will 
cover all passengers on all trains and be available, 
not only on the train, but from your center.
          Is that the center in Philadelphia or is it 
located in some other place?
          MR. BULLOCK:  Actually Wilmington, Delaware.
          MR. SWEEDLER:  Thank you, Mr. Bullock.  I 
appreciate it.
          MR. BULLOCK:  I should point out that is 
except for commuter trains and the commuter operations 
that we run, but certainly for all our reserved trains, 
this is how it will be.
          MR. SWEEDLER:  That is what I was getting at.
          It will cover the reserved trains --
          MR. BULLOCK:  Absolutely.
          MR. SWEEDLER:  -- but not the commuter type?
          MR. BULLOCK:  Not the commuter type trains, 
right.
          MR. SWEEDLER:  Have you given thought about 
if there is anything that can be done for commuter type 
operations, or is that too mind boggling to try to --
          MR. BULLOCK:  I will tell you, right now, our 
focus is, with the manual system we have today, our 
focus is right now with the reserved long distance 
train because that is where those are subject to be in 
any remote location anywhere in the country.
          So, that is where our focus is right now.  
The next step is to take it to all the reserved 
service, and that is what we are concentrating on now.
          Since we plan to do the ticket lift with this 
hand-held computer, it is going to give us the ability, 
as long as we can sell the ticket so that the 
information there from an individual, then we will be 
able to filter it.  We will have it in the computer.
          MR. SWEEDLER:  You also mentioned that each 
person with a ticket, the name of the person would be 
on the ticket.  I was thinking about what Chief 
Harshbarger was saying:  The same name appeared four or 
five times, and that person may have purchased five 
tickets.
          You are saying that will not occur with this 
new system?
          MR. BULLOCK:  It will not occur with the new 
system.  As a matter of fact, we have already corrected 
that.  We have changed our reservation system so there 
are individual names for groups.  There are individual 
names.  It is not just names, in other words, of the 
people who buy the tickets; it is the names of the 
people who are going to travel.
          MR. SWEEDLER:  Thank you, sir.
          MR. CLAUDE HARRIS:  No questions, Mr. 
Chairman.
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  Mr. Investigator?
          MR. DUNN:  I have one question:  How is this 
system going to keep track of Amtrak employees that are 
dead-heading on the trains and do not have to buy a 
ticket?
          MR. BULLOCK:  We will have to either have 
them have a ticket that is printed from the computer 
that is specifically designed, which we can do, that 
will be read into the computer; or we have a back-up 
system.  Initially, if we don't have that day one, we 
have the back-up system that will have the names, all 
the names.
          We have the names of the employees on the 
train all the time, and we are making it a requirement. 
 Now, we are making it a requirement if you are 
employee.  In the past, it has not really been a 
requirement.  If you wanted to get to work, you just 
come because you know people, and they let you ride.
          Actually, it is a benefit of working for a 
transportation company, that you can get back and forth 
to work, as your mode of getting back and forth to 
work.  So it is a benefit, and we want people to use 
that benefit, but we need to, because of this very 
issue, require everybody even today to have some form 
of transportation.
          MR. DUNN:  Those are all the questions I 
have.
          MR. LAUBY:  Mr. Bullock, I have a couple of 
questions for you.
          First of all, so I understand, the new 
automated system will not fully be in place until the 
end of the year 2000; is that correct?
          MR. BULLOCK:  That is right.
          MR. LAUBY:  At that point, how many trains do 
you expect to have this on?
          MR. BULLOCK:  All of the trains, all of the 
reserved trains in the system.
          MR. LAUBY:  All the reserved trains will be 
equipped with this technology by the end of the year 
2000?
          MR. BULLOCK:  Yes.
          That would include all of the overnight long 
distance trains as well as, for example, the train like 
the Carolinian that runs.  It doesn't run overnight.  
There are no sleepers on it.  It runs from New York to 
Charlotte, North Carolina from 6 a.m. in the morning 
until 11 o'clock at night, and it would include it 
because that is an all reserved train.
          MR. LAUBY:  Will this include trains like 
your Metroliner service on the northeast corridor?
          MR. BULLOCK:  It will because the Metroliners 
are all reserved as will the new Acello service.  With 
the new trains, that is to be all reserved.
          MR. LAUBY:  These other procedures you put in 
place to make sure everybody on board has a ticket or 
some type of ticket voucher, how long have those 
procedures been put in place?
          MR. BULLOCK:  They are actually not in place 
yet, Mr. Lauby.  They are actually, they are written.  
The procedures are put together, and we have got the 
bulletin put together.  I spent a lot of time working 
on this with a number of people at Amtrak.  We want to 
get this right before we put it out, and it is going to 
into effect in conjunction with our timetable changes 
October 31st.
          MR. LAUBY:  October 31st, everybody who is on 
the train will be accounted for?
          MR. BULLOCK:  Everyone on overnight long 
distance reserved trains, that is right.
          MR. LAUBY:  One final question about this 
technology:  You mentioned you got this from Motorola; 
is that correct?
          MR. BULLOCK:  That is who we ended up 
contracting with, that is right.
          MR. LAUBY:  This technology, is this custom 
made for Amtrak or is this used anywhere else?
          It looks very much like one of those car 
rental set-ups I have seen before.
          Is this that type of technology or is this 
custom?
          MR. BULLOCK:  My understanding is they have 
drawn on other things that they are doing, without 
question, but it obviously is custom-designed for this 
particular person.  I know of no other time that this 
has -- I mean they are saying this is going to be state 
of the art.  I think it is state of the art because 
nobody else has the system yet.  So, it is custom 
designed for us.
          MR. LAUBY:  Thank you very much, Mr. Bullock. 
 That is all I have.
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  I have a couple here.
          Amtrak out here in that particular case, 
don't you call it a host system?
          You are hosted by the Illinois Central in 
this area?
          MR. BULLOCK:  Yes.
          They are a host railroad, and we contract 
with them to operate our passenger trains over their 
property.
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  Do you do anything special?
          Let's take a hypothetical situation.  Let's 
say you are thinking about starting to use Canadian 
National/Illinois Central for a train to Memphis or 
somewhere.
          Do you do anything about looking at their, 
from a risk management standpoint, about looking at 
trackage with regard to hazards associated with all the 
grade crossings along that route?
          MR. BULLOCK:  I can give you an example.  The 
Oklahoma service that we just started, we just 
re-instituted the Oklahoma service for the first time 
in 20 years between Fort Worth and Oklahoma City, and 
the freight carrier involved there is the B.N. Santa 
Fe.
          We had a lot of meetings with their 
engineering folks.  We went down and rode.  We looked 
at everything -- the grade crossings, the track 
conditions, everything, and looked at the speeds that 
were allowed for passenger trains on grade crossings.
          In this case, as a matter of fact, with 
changing grade crossing circuits, we will be able to 
operate at higher speeds, but not until the circuits 
are actually changed.  So, yes, we do that kind of 
work.
          Also in terms of Oklahoma, I have a team of 
people down there who have done emergency response 
training, all of them, down that route.  Since it is a 
new service and they have not had passenger trains 
there for years, it has been very well received by the 
communities down there.  We think it is a real value to 
us, and it is also a real value to them.
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  How about looking at the 
character of the traffic on the crossings?
          The heavy vehicles, in other words, which 
might not be as big a concern to the freight train, but 
in the same sense, you look at them to see if track 
circuits are adequate to handle the speeds, would you 
look at the consequences, again, the hazards associated 
with a crossing like this one in Kankakee or 
Bourbonnais, that has four or five hundred truck trips 
per day on it?
          MR. BULLOCK:  It is not our property.
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  It is your train though, 
isn't it?
          MR. BULLOCK:  It is about absolutely our 
train, but it is not our property.
          On our property, for example, in the State of 
Michigan, where we own a hundred miles of railroad in 
Michigan -- that is the only place we own any really 
significant piece of railroad outside the Northeast 
corridor, and we have 87 grade crossings there -- with 
the help of the State of Michigan, all of those grade 
crossings are protected with gates.  All the public 
crossings are protected with gates.
          What we do is we team up with the rail 
carrier and with the local authorities, the state 
folks, the local folks to work with them.  We convey 
information that our employees provide to us about 
situations at grade crossings, but in terms of us 
actually controlling, we don't have control.
          We look to the property owner and the state 
officials to decide what kind of protection is really 
adequate for the crossings.
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  I think you might have 
missed the point of the question.  I think if I were 
Amtrak, I think it is no accident -- pardon the pun -- 
that the Safety Board spends a lot of time looking at 
Amtrak accidents.
          Have you ever thought about that?  We have.  
That is not on purpose.  We are not just picking on 
you, but it turns out that the most severe grade 
crossing accidents are those that involve a heavy 
vehicle and a passenger train.
          In fact, we spend so much time with you, I am 
wondering if it has not occurred to Amtrak somewhere 
along the line that you might want to look at locations 
where these heavy trucks are in greater numbers like 
this one that had almost one hundred percent heavy 
trucks and maybe take a special look at that with the 
host railroad -- they are involved; they are partners 
in this thing with you, and they are certainly 
represented here today; I am sure they will be 
represented in the litigation associated with it -- 
just to prevent that in advance, not only from safety 
standpoint, but from a risk management standpoint.
          MR. BULLOCK:  I do understand your point.  It 
is very well taken, and absolutely, we have looked at 
that and we try to cooperate whenever we can to work 
with our host railroads or freight partners.
          As I said, we provide information to them.  
We try to help in any way that we can, and we are very 
active, not only in terms of engineering solutions, but 
in terms of education and in terms of supporting 
stronger enforcement.  One thing we think is really 
great about the NTSB briefing is bringing this kind of 
thing out in the open with these issues about grade 
crossings.
          We feel strongly that enforcement needs to be 
a stronger part of how this country addresses issues 
because the places we have seen where local authorities 
have been very strict about the way they approach 
enforcing grade crossing safety and compliance with the 
proper driving behavior has had a wonderful effect on 
reducing accidents.
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  I seem to recall that in 
1974 in Gwinnett County, Georgia.
          MR. BULLOCK:  Is that right?
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  Yes, enforcement.
          Well, just for what it is worth, it struck me 
sometime ago, and I even gathered some statistics here, 
Amtrak is a small fraction of the total miles traveled 
on rail, less than five percent.  The rest of it is 
freight trains.  Yet, your over-involvement in these 
especially catastrophic type of crashes are almost 
always trucks from the physics of the thing.
          One of the reasons I suspect, in this 
accident and in others, is that speed has something to 
do with it.  You are generally 40 to 50 percent faster 
than freight trains running in the area.  I feel if I 
were you, I would want to know where I could expect 
trucks and maybe try to do something about those 
crossings.
          Do you have any else you would like to say on 
the subject?
          MR. BULLOCK:  I do not; thank you.
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  Thank you and thank you for 
your remarks.  We can go to the next one.
          Did anyone else have any secondary questions?
          (No response.)
          (Witnesses excused.)
          MR. DUNN:  The National Transportation Safety 
Board calls Mr. John Blair.  It is 3:35 p.m.
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  Mr. Dunn, proceed.
          SWORN TESTIMONY OF JOHN BLAIR
          MR. DUNN:  Mr. Blair, for the record would 
you please state your full name and spell it.
          MR. BLAIR:  John Blair, B-l-a-i-r.
          MR. DUNN:  Who are you employed by?
          MR. BLAIR:  The Illinois Commerce Commission.
          MR. DUNN:  What are your duties and 
responsibilities with the Illinois State Commerce 
Commission?
          MR. BLAIR:  I am employed as a Senior 
Railroad Safety Specialist, and my duties are to assist 
the Program Director in the implementation of the 
Commission's Rail and Highway Safety Program.
          MR. DUNN:  Were you also involved in the 
investigation of the Amtrak accident in Bourbonnais, 
Illinois?
          MR. BLAIR:  Yes.
          MR. DUNN:  Thank you very much.  I will turn 
the questioning over to Mr. Byrd Raby of the Technical 
Panel.
        EXAMINATION BY THE TECHNICAL PANEL
          MR. RABY:  Thank you, Mr. Dunn.
          Good evening, Mr. Blair.
          Would you describe the function of the 
Illinois Commerce Commission and what the 
responsibility and duties are.
          MR. BLAIR:  In Illinois, the Illinois 
Commerce Commission has the statutory responsibility 
for rail and highway safety.
          MR. RABY:  Would you expand upon that a 
little bit.
          What do the duties include?
          MR. BLAIR:  The duties include administration 
of what is called our Grade Crossing Protection Fund.  
It is a motor fuel tax.  Illinois motor fuel tax monies 
are used to make improvements at rail and highway 
crossings.
          It also involves the oversight of grade 
crossing safety from accident investigations; 
complaints, responding to complaints regarding the 
warning devices, crossing services, restricted view 
weeds and brush.
          It also includes, besides on the engineering 
side, on the education side, we have a state 
coordinator for Operation Lifesaver, who promotes rail 
and highway safety to the general public.
          MR. RABY:  Do you have an inventory of about 
how many grade crossings in the State of Illinois you 
manage or oversee?
          MR. BLAIR:  Yes.
          There are approximately 9,019 public at-grade 
crossings; approximately 2,100 public grade 
separations, rail and highway grade separations; and 
approximately 5,300 private grade crossings.
          MR. RABY:  Of the nine thousand or so public 
crossings, would you know about how many are passive 
and protected?
          MR. BLAIR:  Yes.
          The breakdown is there is approximately 2,300 
which are quipped with automatic flashing light 
signals, and gates; approximately 2,600 which are 
equipped with automatic flashing light signals; and the 
remainder with passive crossbuck signs.
          MR. RABY:  How do you determine which of 
these crossings gets what safety signals?
          MR. BLAIR:  There are different degrees of 
improvements.  The crossings, of course, with 
crossbucks, we are looking at upgrading those to 
flashers and gates crossings.  With just flashers -- 
let's back up.
          The first thing we do is look at the crossing 
to see if there needs to be a crossing or not or 
whether it can be consolidated with other crossings in 
the area and improved; say, three out of five crossings 
and plus two crossings.
          In doing that, we look at the type of trains; 
the volume of the train movements, the vehicular 
volumes; the type of vehicles that use the crossings, 
whether it be large percentages of trucks or hazardous 
materials or school buses.
          We also look at other factors such as 
visibility in the crossing also come into play.  So in 
our overall review, when we are programming a crossing 
for improvement, if it falls into the category of 
upgrading the warning system, if it has crossbuck 
treatment, we would generally upgrade it through 
automatic flashing light signals or gates.  If it is 
has flashers, we do the same.
          Crossings that have automatic flashing light 
signals and gates that are existing, there is a large 
number of those in our state that have been installed 
for over 20 years, and some of them are reaching the 
end of their useful life.  So also part of our program 
is to renew what is out there with the latest 
technology, which is flashing lights, signals, and 
gates and constant warning time circuitry.
          MR. RABY:  How do you determine what level of 
protection is installed at these crossings?
          Do you use a formula or anything?
          MR. BLAIR:  I think what I just described is, 
what we do is -- years ago, we had criteria that we 
used to install just flashing light signals.  Mr. 
Sharkey from Illinois Central touched on it in his 
testimony today.
          A couple of years ago, we changed our 
criteria.  Instead of needing certain warrants to have 
increased protection, we start out with the highest 
level of protection -- automatic flashing lights, 
signals, and constant warning time circuitry.  You need 
warrants to install a lesser protection.
          An example of why we would go with something 
less than flashing light signals and gates, you may 
have industry track with five to ten mile an hour train 
movements that only occur twice a month, and those, 
under diagnostic review, may not work warrant a full 
set of flashing light signals and gates.
          MR. RABY:  Does the make up of the train -- 
in other words, a passenger and freight -- figure into 
your determining what level of protection to provide at 
grade crossings?
          MR. BLAIR:  Yes, they do.
          Historically, I think if you look at in 
Illinois, our program has given an emphasis on 
passenger crossings that are equipped or crossings that 
have passengers trains that operate over them, if you 
look at those crossings in which Amtrak operates over, 
there is approximately 922 crossings.  Of those 922, 62 
percent are equipped with gates.  Now, 13 percent have 
just flashers, and 25 percent are equipped with 
crossbuck signs.
          If you look at all the crossings in the State 
with the Amtrak crossings included, the breakdown is 
about 26 percent that are equipped with gates and 
approximately 29 percent with flashing light signals 
and 45 percent with just crossbuck signs.  So over the 
years, there has been emphasis placed on those 
crossings with passenger trains.
          MR. SWEEDLER:  Those numbers you provided, 
are they for public crossings included or just for all 
crossings?
          MR. BLAIR:  Yes.
          I am just speaking in regards to public grade 
crossings, not private.
          MR. SWEEDLER:  Do you have any data on the 
private crossings, especially the ones that Amtrak 
would utilize?
          MR. BLAIR:  I have data in regards to the 
number of crossings that there are.
          In Illinois, we do not have jurisdiction over 
private crossings.  The state does not.
          MR. RABY:  Are there any corridor improvement 
type safety programs being implemented or planned in 
Illinois?
          MR. BLAIR:  Yes.
          Over the years, the corridor projects have 
been very successful because you can get more crossings 
improved in a shorter period of time.  You can work the 
details out with one contract between the parties.  As 
far as the actual installation, it is easier for the 
railroad to install ten systems, new systems, within 
one corridor than ten systems spread out all over the 
state.
          MR. RABY:  How are highway grade crossing 
improvements funded?
          MR. BLAIR:  In Illinois, they are funded in 
two ways:  The state funds, which come from the motor 
fuel tax; and Federal funding.
          In Illinois, our Governor is a strong rail 
and highway safety advocate, and through his efforts, 
he has been able to increase our funding by over 50 
percent.  During the next five years, our funding has 
increased from 295 million up to 450 million.  Of that 
450 million, approximately 40 million is Federal funds. 
 The rest of it is all state funding.
          MR. RABY:  Do you maintain or collect any 
inventory on these crossings?
          MR. BLAIR:  Yes.
          MR. RABY:  Can you tell me some of the 
parameters that you do collect in this inventory and 
how you collect that information?
          MR. BLAIR:  The inventory monitors different 
fields.  The railroads furnish the information as far 
as the number of trains and the speed of trains.  The 
records within the inventory that we maintain concern 
the ADT and the accidents.
          The number of accidents, we keep track of 
that per crossing.  When there is a change in the 
warning devices, it is submitted to us through the 
railroad, but we follow up on that.  Over the years, 
the inventory file, for whatever reason, some of the 
data has not been updated.
          About a year and a half ago, we initiated a 
project within the State to have contracted out through 
a consulting engineer to make on-site inspections at 
every at-grade crossing, at every public at-grade 
crossing and every public grade separated crossing to 
collect data.  That is on-going now, and it should be 
completed over the next 18 months.
          That information will be used to update our 
inventory file which, in turn, will be provided to the 
FRA for their inventory file.
          MR. RABY:  In your inventory, when you look 
at trucks, do the type of trucks and/or the volume of 
trucks have any particular special consideration when 
you are evaluating a crossing to upgrade or just a 
general diagnostic review, maybe, that you do of the 
crossing?
          MR. BLAIR:  The answer is yes, they do make a 
difference when we are evaluating a crossing that is a 
candidate for improvement.  That is one of the things 
we do take into consideration, is the volume of truck 
traffic.
          MR. RABY:  How often, either through this 
inventory program or whatever oversight of the 
crossings, how often do you review each crossing in the 
state?
          MR. BLAIR:  Well, as I said, right now, we 
have hired, in order to get the job done in a timely 
manner because we do have over nine thousand crossings 
in the state, we have contracted it out, and it should 
be dealt with in about 18 months.
          MR. RABY:  After that program is complete, 
have you established a timetable to look at these 
crossings again or is it built into this program?
          MR. BLAIR:  It is not built into this 
program.
          What I expect is we have got -- we are 
centrally located in Springfield, and we have also, 
through our Department of Transportation, we have nine 
district offices that are spread out through the state, 
and I expect between our resources and our highway, 
Department of Highway and our Department of 
Transportation resources, that we will maintain the 
database from that point forward in that manner.
          MR. RABY:  On grade crossings, the IIC 
oversees them.
          Does it make any difference who owns the 
grade crossing?
          If it is a township or a city, county, or 
state-owned, do you still maintain oversight of the 
grade crossings?
          MR. BLAIR:  That is correct.
          MR. RABY:  Let's take about McKnight Road.
          In this case, who owns the crossing on 
McKnight Road in Bourbonnais?
          MR. BLAIR:  Who maintains the approaches or 
who has jurisdiction for the roadway leading up to the 
crossing?
          MR. RABY:  Yes.
          MR. BLAIR:  I believe on the west side of the 
crossing, it is the Village of Bourbonnais; and on the 
east side of the crossing, it is the township -- I 
don't know if it is Bourbonnais township or not.  I 
think it is.
          Under an agreement, it is my understanding 
that the village maintains the east side of the 
crossing also.
          MR. RABY:  Even though there are two owners 
on each approach, one owner maintains both approaches?
          MR. BLAIR:  That is correct.
          MR. RABY:  What is the level of protection at 
the McKnight Road grade closing?
          MR. BLAIR:  It is automatic flashing light 
signals and gates controlled by constant warning time 
circuitry.
          MR. RABY:  Is that your highest level of 
protection that you have in the State of Illinois?
          MR. BLAIR:  For an at-grade crossing, yes, it 
is.
          MR. RABY:  What has the ICC done as far as 
any new devices or any sort of new technology?
          Have you participated in anything in that 
phase?
          MR. BLAIR:  Yes.
          There are several demonstration projects that 
are in different stages in Illinois.  One is the 
vehicle arrestor barrier project.  We have three test 
sites that are located along the proposed high speed 
rail line between Chicago and Saint Louis.  Those were 
placed in service this year, and they are being 
evaluated.
          We also have three sites which have been 
designated to evaluate photo enforcement type systems 
where they will detect if a motorist violates the 
warning system.  They will take a picture of it and 
send it to the police.
          The state is also involved with a 
demonstration project concerning on-board warning 
systems.  What they do is when you are near a crossing, 
and the warning device is activated, there is an alarm 
inside the car that warns the motorist.
          We have been involved with, after the Fox 
River Grove accident, we have been involved with the 
engineering of interconnect systems where traffic 
signals are interconnected with railroad systems.
          There is a study on-going now with the 
University of Illinois in Ramsey, Illinois with the 
industry and the Illinois Department of Transportation 
concerning enhancements, engineering enhancements that 
can be made to traffic signal systems.
          The last thing that we are involved with in 
the early stages is a proposed demonstration project 
along a high speed rail corridor in cooperation with 
the Union Pacific Railroad, the FRA, and the 
Association of American Railroads, and that is a 
communication-based train control system.
          MR. RABY:  Thank you.  Those are all the 
questions I have.  I think Mr. Payan has some.
          MR. PAYAN:  Good afternoon, Mr. Blair.
          You mentioned heavy trucks were a factor in 
determining whether the grade crossing requires 
improvements.
          How are heavy trucks addressed as far as 
operating requirements where there is heavy truck 
volume?
          MR. BLAIR:  All crossings in Illinois are 
designed to accommodate the tractor trailer movement 
over a grade crossing.
          We have got a stopping and clearing 
visibility chart that is used to determine if there is 
enough time for a vehicle to stop near the crossing and 
proceed across, or as they approach the crossing, see 
the train and be able to brake in a safe manner before 
they reach the crossing.  That chart is based on a 
tractor trailer.  It is not based on a regular vehicle. 
 So, that is considered our worst case scenario.
          As far as truck movements, the concern is 
state-wide.  Many of our crossings are rural crossings, 
and those crossings are used by farm equipment which, 
during certain times of the year, there is a lot of 
movements of grain being hauled over the crossing.  So, 
the concern is at every crossing in the state.
          MR. PAYAN:  Does the ICC enforce their own 
regulations or do they use Federal regulations or 
accommodations?
          How does that work?
          MR. BLAIR:  As far as within the Rail Safety 
Section, we have three track inspectors and two 
hazardous material inspectors, and they enforce the 
Federal track and Hazmat safety regulations.
          MR. PAYAN:  Does the ICC get involved with 
the time requirements?
          Here on McKnight Road, you had a 26 second 
warning.
          Do they mandate change or require any 
different times?
          MR. BLAIR:  Yes, we do.
          Any time there is a change in a warning 
system at a grade crossing in Illinois, the railroad is 
required to submit a request to our office before the 
change.  Depending on what is being changed, if it is a 
simple as relocating a gate because of the track 
removal, then less documentation is needed than if it 
is a full or a new installation of warning devices 
being installed.
          One of the things we look at when the general 
outlines are provided to our office is the amount of 
warning time that is being proposed for the location.  
McKnight Road is a standard two track crossing where 
the MUTCD and FRA minimum of 20 seconds warning time 
applies.
          MR. PAYAN:  Maybe you can clear up some of 
the discussion this morning.
          Does the ICC have a definition or a 
requirement for a constant warning device?
          Is it required to provide the same amount of 
time each time?
          MR. BLAIR:  These warning systems are 
designed to do provide the minimum warning time.  
McKnight Road was designed to provide 20 seconds 
minimum warning time.  That is what it was designed to 
provide for.
          Typically, when a crossing is engineered, 
there will be additional time allowed for equipment 
response which was talked about, the four seconds and 
also, five seconds of just buffer time or a fact or of 
safety.
          The nominal time, the average time we would 
expect to see for a crossing which is the standard 
design in Illinois, McKnight Road would be a standard 
20 second minimum design.  We would expect to see 
average times of around 25 seconds, but the warning 
time is not always going to be 25 seconds.
          It is going to be a couple of seconds more, 
maybe a second or two less, but at no time would we 
expect, if the system was working as designed, for a 
warning time to fall under the 20 second minimal 
warning time.
          With constant warning times, what the control 
circuitry does is if this was a D.C. track circuit 
where the starts or insulated joints are located 
approximately 3,400 feet out from the crossing, if you 
had a slow train, ten miles an hour, approaching the 
crossing, it would hit the start, and instead of 
getting 25 seconds warning time, you would get over 200 
seconds plus the warning time.
          Historically, well, we know what happens when 
there are large amounts of warning time like that:  A 
lot of the motorists get impatient, and they drive 
around the gates.  They won't get hit by the ten mile 
an hour train, but it becomes a pattern, a condition 
for doing that.
          Then when there is a high speed train that 
comes through, they made make the wrong decision and 
get hit.  So with constant warning time controlled 
circuitry, what that does is it reduces the variance in 
warning times.  Instead of 25 seconds to 200 seconds, 
the variance now should be, on average, designed like 
this, probably 22 seconds up to 50 seconds.
          MR. PAYAN:  Post-accident, were you at the 
scene following the accident March 15th?
          MR. BLAIR:  I was on the scene.  I arrived -- 
the accident occurred on Monday -- I arrived on 
Wednesday morning around seven a.m.
          MR. PAYAN:  The Illinois Commerce Commission 
looked at the crossing.
          Were any exceptions taken during the 
operation of the equipment there?
          MR. BLAIR:  I can answer that, but if I could 
back up to the last question.
          We received the call shortly after ten 
o'clock the date of the accident, and we had one of our 
rail and highway safety specialists within an hour's 
drive of the location.  He was contacted and dispatched 
to the scene, and he arrived, I believe, around 11, 
11:30.
          When I received the call, I received it from 
our emergency management, and they had indicated our 
operational EOC, Emergency Operations Center, had been 
opened up to help coordinate the emergency response to 
this incident.  I was requested to come down to their 
command center, and I did that.  That was operational 
until about five a.m. in the morning.  We also had a 
rail safety specialist respond, and he was there at 
seven a.m. on Tuesday the 16th.
          Your question?
          MR. PAYAN:  Were any exceptions taken by your 
field investigators as far as --
          MR. BLAIR:  There were two of us that were 
participating in the NTSB's Signal Group.  As far as 
the operation of the system, there were no exceptions 
taken, no.
          MR. PAYAN:  Those are all the questions I 
have at this time.  Thank you.
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  Federal Railway 
Administration?
          MR. BLACKMORE:  No questions.
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  Federal Highway 
Administration?
          MR. UMBS:  No questions.
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  Illinois Commerce 
Commission?
          MR. STEAD:  No questions.
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  Brotherhood of Locomotive 
Engineers?
               EXAMINATION BY THE
       BROTHERHOOD OF LOCOMOTIVE ENGINEERS
          MR. WALPERT:  Mr. Blair, can you tell me if 
the State of Illinois is testing or contemplating 
testing any kind of new equipment at crossings for 
protection?
          MR. BLAIR:  I think I previously testified 
about five different projects.  I can go over them 
again if you want me to.
          MR. WALPERT:  No, that is not necessary.
          Are those testings proceeding where we will 
see results in the near future?
          MR. BLAIR:  Yes, within the next 24 months.
          MR. WALPERT:  Thank you.
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  The United Transportation 
Union?
  EXAMINATION BY THE UNITED TRANSPORTATION UNION
          MR. DWYER:  Mr. Blair, when you use your 
clarity and visibility chart for semitrailers, can you 
use that, is that related to just single bond trailer 
or is that related to trucks with triple bonds as well?
          MR. BLAIR:  That is a good question.  The 
chart is made up for a standard 65 foot tractor trailer 
I believe, 65 feet or so.
          MR. DWYER:  Do you make any adjustments for 
double bonds?
          MR. BLAIR:  Where the adjustments come in is 
if there are multiple tracks.  Under a ream of 
guidelines, which is American Railroad Engineering and 
Maintenance, there are guidelines as far as recommended 
design warning times when the distance between the 
signal and the far track is greater than 35 feet.  
Under that criterion, one second was added for every 
additional ten feet beyond the 35 feet.
          MR. DWYER:  Thank you, sir.  Those are all 
the questions we have, Mr. Chairman.
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  Melco?
          MR. MARSHALL:  No, I don't have any.
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  Amtrak?
              EXAMINATION BY AMTRAK
          MR. BULLOCK:  Mr. Blair, you mentioned there 
was an increase in funding.
          Is this part of the Illinois First Program, 
and what is that funding specifically?
          Is it funding that relates to the development 
of high speed rail in Illinois, and can you tell me if 
any of that includes money for grade crossing 
separation, actually grade separations?
          MR. BLAIR:  Yes, it is Illinois First money. 
 Portions of that money is set aside for high speed 
rail; as far as additional funds to incorporate 
separations, yes, sir, for rail highway crossing.
          MR. BULLOCK:  That is the only question I 
had.
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  Canadian National/Illinois 
Central?
          MR. ED HARRIS:  We have no questions.
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  Mr. Sweedler?
       EXAMINATION BY THE BOARD OF INQUIRY
          MR. SWEEDLER:  Mr. Blair, I was just 
wondering -- the truck involved in this tragedy, we 
have heard testimony and saw photographs where the 
steel rebar actually extended over the track and coming 
over the trailer both front and back -- in your view, 
would this vehicle have needed a special permit to use 
the roadways of Illinois?
          My implication is if it did need a special 
permit, there would have had to have been special 
arrangements to go across grade crossings.
          MR. BLAIR:  I don't know.
          It appeared that the rebar was about seven 
feet, approximately seven feet longer than the trailer. 
 Whether that would require a special permit, I don't 
know.
          MR. SWEEDLER:  Do you know who in the state 
government would be able to assist us with that?
          MR. BLAIR:  Yes; that is handled by our 
Department of Transportation?
          MR. SWEEDLER:  Maybe we could make some 
inquiries in that department.
          If it did need a special permit, do you know 
of any regulations or rules concerning crossings and 
what types of arrangements would have to be made?
          Does your commission have any requirements?
          MR. BLAIR:  I am not aware of any, sir.
          MR. SWEEDLER:  Thank you, Mr. Blair.
          MR. CLAUDE HARRIS:  Mr. Blair, has the ICC 
done any kind of study of accident rates along this 
particular corridor?
          MR. BLAIR:  I didn't hear all of that.
          MR. CLAUDE HARRIS:  Has your organization 
done any study of accident rates along this particular 
corridor?
          MR. BLAIR:  I have got accident rates with me 
that show that the, I believe that the percentage of 
accidents per number of crossings is fairly close to 
our state-wide average.
          While we are on the subject of accidents, in 
Illinois, I think one thing to measure a program to see 
if you are doing the right things or not is to look at 
the accident history, not for one year, but to go back 
five or ten years.
          In the last ten years, there has been a 
linear decrease in collisions, rail highway collisions 
in Illinois.  In 1989, there were 374.  I will read 
these quickly:  1990, 317; in 1991, 291; 1992, 263; 
1993, 272; 1994, 284; 1995, 262; 1996, 203; 1997, 1985; 
1998, 168.  If you take 1989, we only had 374, and 
compare it to last year's 168, it is about a 45 percent 
reduction.  So, we are pleased with that.
          There is one other thing that you can look at 
as far as accidents.  There is a document that is 
produced by the U.S. Department of Transportation.  It 
is the annual report of railroad safety statistics.  In 
the 1998 prepublished report, which has not been 
released but it is on the web, there is, in Chapter 8, 
page 6, there is a table that shows the number of 
incidents per hundred crossings, and in Illinois, it is 
1.66.  The national average is 1.87.  So, we are below 
national average.
          MR. CLAUDE HARRIS:  Out of those rates you 
quoted, did you look at the types of accidents that 
occurred in your state?
          MR. BLAIR:  Regarding?
          MR. CLAUDE HARRIS:  The types of vehicles 
involved or types of crossings which they occurred at.
          MR. BLAIR:  We do that every year in our 
annual -- we prepare an annual report, and this year, 
it was part of our five year plan, and we break it down 
by those types of things, yes.
          MR. CLAUDE HARRIS:  Do you notice any 
specific trends?
          MR. BLAIR:  None that I am aware of, no.
          MR. CLAUDE HARRIS:  To kind of help you out 
on this, did you notice any over-involvement of any 
specific type of vehicle?
          MR. BLAIR:  Regarding trucks versus --
          MR. CLAUDE HARRIS:  Trucks, cars, buses, 
school buses.
          MR. BLAIR:  I would say no.
          The one thing that you have to be careful on 
trucks is some of the accidents, when they are 
reported, they will show a truck, and it is not a 
tractor trailer truck, it is a pick-up truck.
          We had an incident a few weeks back that came 
in.  It was an Amtrak accident, and it came in.  It was 
a truck collision with an Amtrak train, and it ended up 
it was a pick-up truck.  As far as overall trends, no, 
not that I am aware of.
          MR. CLAUDE HARRIS:  Does your organization 
interact at all with Operation Lifesaver?
          MR. BLAIR:  Yes, it does.
          We have the state coordinator who works out 
of our office, and our program was initiated, I 
believe, in 1976.
          MR. CLAUDE HARRIS:  Are there any specific 
types of programs focused on this particular corridor 
the accident occurred in?
          MR. BLAIR:  I don't know.
          I know that in 1998, there were two about 
2,500 presentations that were given to various groups 
from fire, police, high schools, drivers eds, business 
groups, professional drivers which, would be motor 
carrier truck drivers, senior citizens.
          The Operation Lifesaver Program is very 
active in Illinois.  One of the things they do, there 
is a video workshop type package that was sent out to 
all the companies in Illinois that own school buses or 
operate school buses, and they were also sent out to 
all the driver education teachers to do help inform 
them of the dangers of railroad crossings.
          MR. CLAUDE HARRIS:  Is there special focus on 
commercial vehicles in this program?
          MR. BLAIR:  Yes.
          Through presentations, I think last year 
there were 19 presentations that were given to various 
trucking groups.
          MR. CLAUDE HARRIS:  I want to follow up on a 
question the Chairman asked earlier to another witness.
          Does your organization keep any records on 
gate breakages along active crossings?
          MR. BLAIR:  No.
          MR. CLAUDE HARRIS:  It does not?
          MR. BLAIR:  It does not.
          MR. CLAUDE HARRIS:  You mentioned earlier 
about the study that is currently in progress I guess 
that the ICC is doing on, on-board warning devices.
          Would you tell us a little bit about the 
study and when it is going to be completed.
          MR. BLAIR:  I believe it is a two-year study. 
 I am not sure of the time frame, but it is just now in 
the process of being implemented.
          Again, what it does is there is a select 
group of drivers that is going to be used to observe 
before and after the demonstration project, and they 
will be given a device that will be equipped inside 
their vehicle which will activate a warning device.
          MR. CLAUDE HARRIS:  One last question:  In 
your evaluation of programs along the various grade 
crossings, do you consider re-routing trucks at all?
          When you evaluate the safety effectiveness of 
various programs you have in place for grade crossing 
safety, is re-routing of trucks an issue at all?
          MR. BLAIR:  Re-routing?
          MR. CLAUDE HARRIS:  Vehicle traffic, 
particular trucks, commercial vehicles.
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  Prohibiting trucks from 
certain crossings.
          MR. BLAIR:  No.
          We re-route crossings when we do a 
consolidation through a corridor project.  Where 
crossings are able to be closed, we re-route that 
traffic to adjacent crossings.
          As I indicated before, the warning systems 
that are designed now should accommodate truck driving. 
 We have tractor trailers state-wide as far as with our 
agricultural businesses hauling grain, so we have to be 
concerned about them at all public crossings.
          MR. CLAUDE HARRIS:  Thank you.
          MR. DUNN:  Mr. Blair, I asked you if you 
could give me some information about McKnight Road, and 
that is:  How many cars or trucks or whatever you can 
give me went across that crossing daily?
          MR. BLAIR:  As far as the total count, we 
have got it up to 1,800 vehicles.  The breakdown as far 
as autos versus trucks, we know a substantial number of 
those are trucks.  I don't have a percentage, though, 
to give you.
          MR. DUNN:  You say on average, daily, 1,800 
vehicles, including cars and trucks, went across that 
crossing every day?
          MR. BLAIR:  The traffic count is taken by our 
Department of Transportation highway people, and the 
most recent count they have shows 1,800 vehicles.  That 
would include trucks.  That is for McKnight Road.
          MR. DUNN:  There is no way to get that 
figure, the percentage of cars versus trucks, to me?
          It doesn't have to be today, but is it 
possible to get that information?
          MR. BLAIR:  Yes.
          I think probably the best way to do it is to 
have another count done for that purpose.
          MR. DUNN:  I would appreciate that if you get 
it.
          MR. BLAIR:  Yes.
          MR. DUNN:  One last question, and I asked 
this before:  What should an automobile driver or a 
truck driver do when he approaches a crossing and sees 
the flashing light signals?
          MR. BLAIR:  In Illinois, by state law, once 
the lights start flashing, the motorist is required to 
stop.  So, the truck driver or whatever motorist should 
stop.
          MR. DUNN:  Could a police officer write a 
ticket like it would be a red light?
          MR. BLAIR:  In Illinois, a law was passed a 
couple years ago which increases the fine for motorists 
who violate railroad warning devices from $75.  It is 
now $500 or 50 hours of community service.
          MR. DUNN:  I know you probably don't have 
this, but could you tell me if there were any written 
in the State of Illinois in 1999, traffic violations 
for going --
          MR. BLAIR:  I know they were written.  I 
don't have the number.
          MR. DUNN:  They were written?
          MR. BLAIR:  Yes.
          MR. DUNN:  It is it possible to send me that 
information along with the other, sir?
          MR. BLAIR:  If we have got it, we will send 
it to you.  I will go through our Operation Lifesaver.
          MR. DUNN:  We appreciate it.  Thank you.
          Those are all the questions I have.
          MR. LAUBY:  Mr. Blair, a couple of questions: 
 Early on, you talked about the first thing you do is 
you try to consolidate crossings, put them together and 
close some of those crossings.
          Is that correct?
          MR. BLAIR:  The first thing we do is look at 
the whole area, and that is the one thing you look at. 
 In other words, if you have a corridor with ten 
crossings in it and there are two that are located 
within close proximity to each other and they have 
relatively low vehicular counts, then they would be 
good candidate to close one and direct that traffic to 
the adjacent crossing and upgrade that.
          MR. LAUBY:  Can you tell me how successful 
that approach has been with the Illinois Commerce 
Commission?
          MR. BLAIR:  Illinois, over the years, has 
been very successful.
          I have worked for the Commission for 17 
years, and I have been involved in several projects 
along the Amtrak line between Chicago and Saint Louis 
where crossings were closed and warning devices were 
installed.
          I can say that most of the easy closures in 
Illinois have already been taken care of just because 
of the program that we have had over the last four 
years.
          MR. LAUBY:  Is the number of crossings that 
you have in Illinois decreasing?
          MR. BLAIR:  Through abandonments?
          MR. LAUBY:  Through closures.
          MR. BLAIR:  It has increased through a 
combination of closures and railroad abandonments over 
the last --
          MR. LAUBY:  It has decreased?
          MR. BLAIR:  Decreased.
          MR. LAUBY:  I wanted to talk for a minute 
about McKnight Road.
          To your knowledge, have there been any 
changes to the grade crossing at McKnight Road as far 
as the type of signal equipment, gates, pavement 
markings, signage, anything?
          MR. BLAIR:  Since when?
          MR. LAUBY:  Since the accident.
          MR. BLAIR:  The damaged gate was replaced on 
the west side of the crossing, and pavement markings 
were installed on both approaches.
          MR. LAUBY:  Pavement markings have been 
installed since the accident; is that correct?
          MR. BLAIR:  That is my understanding, yes.
          MR. LAUBY:  Are there any other plans to do 
anything else at that crossing to improve safety?
          MR. BLAIR:  I think we were going to wait 
until after this process has taken place, and then we 
will re-evaluate the warning system there.
          MR. LAUBY:  Which process is that?
          MR. BLAIR:  The NTSB.
          MR. LAUBY:  The investigation or the hearing?
          MR. BLAIR:  The investigation, right.
          MR. LAUBY:  I would encourage you, if you 
have any ideas, not to wait.
          MR. BLAIR:  I can say this:  Other than 
experimental devices, the next option is total grade 
separation.  On this particular line, there are still 
approximately 72 passive crossings, crossings with 
crossbucks, and to build a grade separation, it is 
probably around $3 million.
          So, one of the things we would consider is 
would public safety be better served by upgrading the 
warning systems at approximately 20 crossbuck crossings 
or building one grade separation.
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  Can I interrupt?
          MR. BLAIR:  Yes.
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  You would actually consider 
spending $3 million to build grade separation there 
when there is already one connecting road to other 
existing crossings?
          MR. BLAIR:  No.
          What I am saying is that is one of the things 
that -- the next level of protection is grade 
separation, so that is one of the things we have to 
look at.
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  You are aware there is a 
connection through to a another grade crossing from 
this one parallel to the railroad tracks?
          MR. BLAIR:  It is not total grade separation.
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  No, but it is to another 
crossing.
          MR. BLAIR:  That grade crossing is equipped 
with the same equipment.
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  It is still one less 
crossing.
          MR. BLAIR:  It is one less crossing, but you 
are directing traffic to a system that is identical to 
the system that is at McKnight Road.  So, if we were 
going to close the crossing, we would probably want to 
direct it to a grade separation.
          MR. LAUBY:  Just two more questions:  The 
pavement markings that were added to this crossing, 
could you tell me what type of pavement markings were 
added at McKnight Road?
          MR. BLAIR:  I assume it is compliance with 
the MUTCD.
          MR. LAUBY:  Which would be?
          MR. BLAIR:  "X" with the "RR" on both sides 
in advance of the crossing or the stop bar next to the 
gate.
          MR. LAUBY:  At McKnight, I am not positive, 
but I believe advance signs were already in place.
          MR. BLAIR:  That is correct.
          MR. LAUBY:  Basically, on based on your 
comments, the McKnight Road equipment is state of the 
art, and the next leap is to total grade separation; is 
that correct?
          MR. BLAIR:  Based on today's?
          MR. LAUBY:  Your program.
          MR. BLAIR:  Not our program, based on current 
national standards and warning system standards.  Four 
quadrant gates are still in the demonstration stage.  
There are no standards in the Manual of Uniform Traffic 
Control Devices on four quadrant gates, and there are 
no standards in the ER or REBA concerning four quadrant 
gate systems.
          MR. LAUBY:  What about barriers to prevent 
going around the gates?
          MR. BLAIR:  Do you mean more arrestor 
barriers?
          MR. LAUBY:  Median barriers.
          MR. BLAIR:  Medians, as part of our 
interconnect improvement projects where warning times 
have exceeded 35 seconds, we are installing raised 
medians.
          At a crossing light McKnight Road, which is 
isolated, it would easy to circumvent the raised 
medians versus if it were in a more urban area.
          MR. LAUBY:  That is not an option as far as 
you are concerned?
          MR. BLAIR:  It is an option, but the 
effectiveness, we would have to evaluate.
          MR. LAUBY:  Last question:  With the benefit 
of your experience in the State of Illinois with grade 
crossings and solving problems at various levels and 
various locations, this particular crossing at 
McKnight, do you have any ideas, whether it is within 
Illinois Commerce Commission policy or not, do you have 
any ideas of what might be done at this crossing that 
has the significant truck traffic, steel truck traffic, 
do you have any ideas on what might be done to help 
prevent this type of accident from occurring again?
          MR. BLAIR:  Well, like I said before, based 
on the current warning systems that are available 
today, the standard warning systems, if the crossing 
was going to be enhanced, I think the next level is to 
build a grade separation.
          I don't see how four quadrant gates will help 
prevent an accident that is used by high volumes of 
truck traffic.
          MR. LAUBY:  I am going to ask one more 
question.
          Do you consider right now what we have at 
McKnight Road crossing in Bourbonnais, do you think 
that provides adequate protection knowing the amount of 
train traffic, the type of train traffic, the type of 
vehicle traffic?
          Do you think that is adequate or not?
          MR. BLAIR:  I think if the motorist complies 
with current traffic laws, yes, it is.
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  Isn't that true of every 
crossing?
          MR. BLAIR:  No.
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  So you have got crossings 
where, if you did everything you were supposed to, you 
could still get killed?
          MR. BLAIR:  That is what interconnected 
crossings are about.  There are crossings where 
motorists -- I should strike that.
          Even at interconnected crossings, motorists 
are not supposed to stop on the tracks, but typically, 
the difference is the motorist who drives around the 
gates does that deliberately.  Whereas, some motorists 
get trapped on a crossing because they are stopped in 
traffic.  They don't do it deliberately.  They find 
themselves in that predicament.
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  Mr. Sweedler brought you 
have private crossings, a while ago, of the state.
          You don't have any idea how many private 
crossings there are in the State of Illinois?
          MR. BLAIR:  Yes; there are about --
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  Just yes or no:  You do 
know?
          MR. BLAIR:  Yes.
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  I am sure there are some 
people who would like a break here, so I am trying to 
get through this in a hurry.
          You do know how many there are?
          MR. BLAIR:  Yes.
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  You did tell us that.  Are 
any of those crossings that are near a state route or a 
public road have a traffic signal like Fox River Grove?
          Fox River Grove was not an outside street.  
It was a not a private crossing, but do you have a 
crossing anywhere where there is a signal and a public 
road that is adjacent to a railroad grade crossing?
          MR. BLAIR:  And the private crossing has 
traffic signals?
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  Right; the private road that 
crosses the railroad crossing has traffic signals and a 
state route.
          MR. BLAIR:  And the private railroad crossing 
has warning devices?
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  It might or it might not.
          I am talking about the fact that you have a 
shopping center driveway across from the crossing or 
access to the steel mill.  For instance, McKnight Road 
could very easily be a private road.  It is a dead end 
road.
          MR. BLAIR:  Not that I am aware of.
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  Would you be interested if 
that occurred?
          MR. BLAIR:  Yes.
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  So your inventory of private 
road crossings would capture that information?
          MR. BLAIR:  In Illinois, a shopping center 
type crossing would be public crossings.  Private 
crossings in Illinois are generally farm crossing.
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  This comes from an accident 
that we just got through with in Northern Indiana where 
a private crossing had a traffic signal at a state 
route and an interconnected signal system that the 
state bore no responsibility whatsoever even though 
they may have issued the permit for the traffic signal.
          I was curious.  I wanted to making sure you 
were tracking that.  It seems like you are.
          Do you, in considering your funding, I assume 
you have some sort of risk assessment process before 
you put money into a crossing some sort of a formula of 
volume or such.
          MR. BLAIR:  We use formulas like that --
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  Like a hazard index formula?
          MR. BLAIR:  -- to help in the selection 
process.
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  Is one of the variables in 
that formula truck percent?
          MR. BLAIR:  That is the U.S. DOT Accident 
Depiction Model, and the answer is yes.
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  You get that from the state 
DOT's traffic count inventory system, the percent 
trucks?
          MR. BLAIR:  Right.
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  Does the State of Illinois 
do photo enforcement of railroad grade crossings or 
anything for that matter?
          MR. BLAIR:  We have three demonstration 
projects right now that we are in the process of having 
the hardware installed, and they are two year pilot 
studies.
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  I am really impressed by 
your statistical reduction.  I notice you are in the 
top three states on total number of crossings 
nationwide; you, Texas, and, I guess, California.  That 
is an admirable reduction.  I believe that is it.
          Do any of the parties have any secondary 
questions?
          (No response.)
          (Witness excused.)
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  Thank you very much.
          MR. BLAIR:  Thank you.
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  Let's be back at five 
o'clock.  We have one panel left.
          (Recess from 4:39 p.m. to 4:58 p.m.)
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  Mr. Dunn, proceed.
          MR. DUNN:  The Chairman has informed me we 
are two hours late, but that is because we have had 
good witnesses.  So, we are going to tonight and finish 
the program tomorrow.
          The National Transportation Safety Board 
calls Mr. Bruce George, Mr. Rudy Umbs, and Mr. Clayton 
Brown, and it is 5:04 p.m.
        SWORN TESTIMONY OF CLAYTON BROWN,
         BRUCE GEORGE, AND RUDOLPH UMBS
          MR. DUNN:  I will get a little background 
information from each and then turn your over to our 
Technical Panel.
          Mr. George, for the record, would you please 
state and spell your full name.
          MR. GEORGE:  My name is Bruce George, 
B-r-u-c-e, last name, G-e-o-r-g-e.
          MR. DUNN:  Who are you employed by?
          MR. GEORGE:  I am employed by the Federal 
Railway Administration.
          MR. DUNN:  What are your duties and 
responsibilities?
          MR. GEORGE:  I am the Division Chief for the 
Trespass and Crossing Safety Division.
          MR. DUNN:  Mr. Umbs, for the record, would 
you please state and spell your full name.
          MR. UMBS:  Rudolph M. Umbs, U-m-b-s.  I am 
Chief of the Safety Design Division of the Federal 
Highway Administration.  My office is responsible for 
the Railroad Grade Crossing Program for the Federal 
Highway Administration.  Up until January of this year, 
my group also maintained the Manual on Uniform Traffic 
Control Devices.
          MR. DUNN:  Mr. Brown, for the record, would 
you please state and spell your full name.
          MR. BROWN:  My name is Clayton C. Brown, 
C-l-a-y-t-o-n, B-r-o-w-n.  I am Assistant 
Vice-President of Corporate Operations for the National 
Railroad Passenger Corporation.
          MR. DUNN:  Thank you very much.  I will now 
turn the questioning over to the Technical Panel, and 
Mr. Ruben Payan.
        EXAMINATION BY THE TECHNICAL PANEL
          MR. PAYAN:  I would like to start with some 
questions for Mr. Bruce George.
          You mentioned you were a staff director for 
the grade crossing and trespassing managers?
          MR. GEORGE:  Yes, sir.
          MR. PAYAN:  Could you explain the duties and 
responsibilities of the managers?
          MR. GEORGE:  Of the managers?
          MR. PAYAN:  Yes.
          MR. GEORGE:  Our crossing managers.
          MR. PAYAN:  Yes.
          MR. GEORGE:  Just for background, the Federal 
Railroad Administration added a Crossing Safety and 
Trespass Division manager in each of our eight regional 
offices in 1994.  We never had regional presence for 
that program until then.
          Their functions are to promote crossing 
safety programs; coordinate programs; maintain 
contacts, for example, with the states, with the 
railroads, with local governments with the other modes 
-- the Federal Highway, Federal Transit, and the 
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration.
          They offer good offices to public projects, 
engineers with the railroads and with the local and 
state governments.  They work with police and local law 
enforcement and Operation Lifesaver Programs.  They 
encourage inclusion of crossing safety issues in law 
enforcement programs.
          They promote corridor programs, contacts and 
good offices with the states and railroad such as 
consolidation of crossings, crossing closures.  They 
participate in a Corridor Program if they are invited 
to.  They promote public education and awareness 
programs; for example, Operation Lifesaver; Always 
Expect, the training program which is one of DOT's; the 
industry's Highways or Die Ways Program.
          We work with state Operation Lifesaver 
committees and the coordinators.  They ensure that FRA 
people that are participating in those programs receive 
training and assist in their scheduling.  They work on 
collision and complaint investigations, participate in 
such investigations' report preparation interviews, 
reviews of such reports.
          They make available data to users in local 
and state governments and with the railroads.  They 
provide access to the national database for reports and 
statistics, histories of crossings, and they encourage 
updating of those files.
          In my mind, it is one the best things FRA has 
done in the many years I have been with the Agency in 
terms of promoting crossing safety nationwide.  They 
have managed to keep crossing issues and trespass 
issues in mind peoples' minds, keep people aware of the 
program.  They keep the pot stirred, if you will; we 
won't go away kind of thing.
          We are in the process now of adding eight 
additional assistant managers.  We have been pleased 
with what eight managers have done in the five years 
they have been out there.  Apparently, the Congress has 
been too because we have been given the authority to 
hire eight more.  We are about halfway through that 
process, and it will be done at the end of this year.
          MR. PAYAN:  How does FRA and FHWA delineate 
responsibility for railroad grade crossing safety?
          MR. GEORGE:  How do we divide?
          MR. PAYAN:  Yes.
          What does FRA cover?
          MR. GEORGE:  The role of the Federal Railroad 
Administration in crossing programs is, you know, 
deaths at crossings and crossing collisions are the 
second leading cause of death in real operations, so it 
is a big program for us of high interest.
          We try to promote programs within the Federal 
Government, within the state, and within the local 
government, whether those are engineering programs, you 
know, promoting physical improvements at crossings; 
discouraging new crossings; consolidated existing 
crossings; or education programs; public awareness; 
enforcement programs.
          We provide some of the analytic tools and 
make them available to managers, whether it is within 
the Federal Government, the Federal Highway 
Administration for examine, or state government or 
railroads.  We have the accident histories.  We have 
the national inventory file.
          We conduct and encourage research and 
analysis.  On innovation, we work with Federal Highways 
in that regard, whether that innovation deals with 
hardware or software or procedures.  We work with the 
industry, the states, the counties, the cities, 
academia, current and potential suppliers that are 
willing to innovate.
          The Federal Railway Administration, of 
course, is a regulatory agency overseeing railroad 
safety.  We will regulate where public benefit is 
assured and where universal voluntary compliance is not 
assured.
          For example, in 1995, we implemented 
inspection testing and maintenance rules for crossing 
warning devices.  In 1997, I believe we had a 
requirement for alerting lights on the head end of 
locomotives.  We try to ensure a supportive and 
positive organizational climate within the Department, 
within the administration.
          It really is a one DOT effort, and we work 
with Federal Highways in that regard.  It is an 
inter-modal effort.  It is not just Federal Highways.  
We work with Federal Transit and NTSA as well.  It has 
been a successful effort over the last several years.  
Do you know what I mean?
          I think it has come out earlier that since 
the mid-1970s, the number of collisions is down by 
three quarters.  In the last five years, the number of 
collisions and casualties at crossings is down 30 
percent.
          However, it is still pretty sobering to look 
at numbers like 431 deaths last year in collisions like 
the Bourbonnais collision, and it just reminds us we 
are not done yet.
          MR. PAYAN:  In the scope of your regulations, 
do you cover active warning devices, pavement markings, 
signage?
          MR. GEORGE:  In the scope of our regulations?
          MR. PAYAN:  Yes.
          MR. GEORGE:  We cover active warning devices, 
the inspection, testing and maintenance of those 
devices.
          MR. PAYAN:  Do you also cover advance warning 
signs, pavement markings, and signage?
          MR. GEORGE:  No, sir.
          MR. PAYAN:  Just the active warning devices?
          MR. GEORGE:  Yes.
          MR. PAYAN:  The issue of truck routing, does 
that part of it involve the in restrictions on truck 
routing regarding railroad crossings?
          MR. GEORGE:  We have no authority in truck 
routing, but our regional managers will frequently meet 
with trucking firms and with local call highway 
authorities to discuss truck routing.
          MR. PAYAN:  Has FRA identified any challenges 
as far as truck routing and passed them on to the 
proper authorities?
          MR. GEORGE:  Challenges?
          MR. PAYAN:  Hunt crossings, heavy truck 
volumes, challenges as far as trucks negotiating 
railroad crossings.
          MR. GEORGE:  I would have to talk to our 
individual managers on that, but I am sure we have.
          MR. PAYAN:  The FRA grade crossing closure 
initiative, can you touch briefly on the status of that 
program?
          MR. GEORGE:  Yes.
          A goal was established by our previous 
administrator to close, just set as a national goal to 
see a reduction of 25 percent in the number of 
crossings nationwide.  He set that goal in 1991.
          The current administration came in and 
heartedly endorsed that goal, and we have continued to 
promote that nationally and the regional managers as 
well.  There are over 30,000 fewer crossings out there 
today than when the goal was established, about an 11 
1/2 percent reduction in that time, so we are well 
underway, not going as quickly as we would like, but we 
are making progress.
          MR. PAYAN:  Do you have any numbers for 
Bourbonnais or Illinois?
          MR. GEORGE:  For Illinois?
          MR. PAYAN:  Bourbonnais itself, the city of 
Bourbonnais?
          MR. GEORGE:  No, I don't have any numbers for 
Bourbonnais.  I do for Illinois.  It will take me a 
minute to find them.  It is the kind of thing you can 
never find quickly when you want it.  I have the 
numbers since 1993.  We show crossings reduced in 
Illinois by 2 1/2 percent in that time.  Public 
crossing and private crossings were reduced by 5 
percent.
          MR. PAYAN:  Were any of those in Bourbonnais?
          MR. GEORGE:  No, I don't know.
          MR. PAYAN:  Those are all the questions I 
have.  Mr. Raby has some for you.
          MR. RABY:  If I may, Mr. George, I have a 
couple of questions here for Mr. Umbs, and then I have 
some joint questions between you and Mr. Umbs.
          MR. UMBS:  Yes, sir?
          MR. RABY:  Does the FHWA keep a record of 
truck accidents at highway grade crossings?
          MR. UMBS:  That is maintained by the 
individual states through the FAR System.  That is the 
Fatal Analysis Record System, and that system is 
maintained by the National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration, our sister agency.
          MR. RABY:  Those are FARS records are fatal 
accidents?
          MR. UMBS:  That is correct.
          MR. RABY:  Are there any other forms of just 
accidents maintained that are non-fatal?
          MR. UMBS:  Federal Rail maintains a system.  
I will let Bruce handle that.
          MR. GEORGE:  The railroads are required by 
law to report all contact between nontrack vehicles and 
the user of a highway at a crossing as an accident 
report, and we do maintain a file of those.
          MR. RABY:  Is this record in any way used for 
analysis or for funding for improving grade crossing 
safety?
          Does it have any effect on it?
          MR. GEORGE:  Certainly, it is used for 
analysis.  That is what it is for.
          MR. RABY:  Now, I will ask some joint 
questions.
          Does FHWA and FRA work together to reduce the 
incident of grade crossing accidents, any joint 
programs?
          MR. UMBS:  There is a number of them going 
on.  Bruce is in our office, and we are in Bruce's 
office almost daily talking about different issues.  We 
have at NTSA working on it.
          The big thing that we are doing right now as 
a result of the National Transportation Safety Board's 
investigation of the Indiana crash is we are working to 
come up with a technical working group to identify 
warrants for different types of crossings.
          That is what was done quite a bit, we were 
talking about quite a bit earlier this afternoon:  How 
do you determine whether or not you put up a crossbuck, 
a signal, or a gate?  That is what that group is going 
to be doing.  That is a multiple disciplinary group.
          We have contracted with the Institute of 
Transportation Engineers to be our facilitator, and we 
are getting going on that.  We will have our initial 
meeting in October.  That is one of the major 
activities that we are doing right now.
          MR. GEORGE:  We have worked with Federal 
Highways and Federal Highways with us on some of our 
regulatory issues.  There are some most recently 
published, just on the 2nd of September, revisions of 
the CDL requirements, and FRA was involved in that with 
the Office of Motor Carriers.
          We have our current, the bills submitted by 
both Federal Highway and Federal Rail appropriations 
bills this year have identical language where crossings 
are concerned.  We do coordinate on things like that.  
The Office of Safety and FRA work very closely with the 
Office of Motor Carriers on highway safety and Federal 
Highway construction.
          MR. UMBS:  I have couple of other items if I 
may.
          MR. RABY:  Sure.
          MR. UMBS:  We are looking at post-maintenance 
guidelines for vertical alignment; meaning humped 
crossings.  That was an issue where low-boy trucks are 
getting hung up on crossings, and it is a major issue. 
 We are working with FRA and AER and others to develop 
guidelines.
          The Federal Highway Administration moved 
forward a sign and guidance through the MUTCD working 
with Federal Rail to identify the high profile 
crossings so we have a national uniform sign.  I 
believe that was a recommendation of the Board.
          We also are looking at the Long Island 
Railroad for advanced ITS train communication systems, 
and I believe that will be discussed tomorrow morning. 
 Also, with the legislation, we worked very, very 
closely with Bruce and his staff on legislation.  In 
the last T-20, ISTEA, and then in T-21, we worked out 
different formulas and different funding mechanisms to 
enhance railroad grade crossing safety.
          MR. GEORGE:  Federal Highways will be coming 
out with some proposed changes to the Manual on Uniform 
Traffic Control Devices later this year or early in the 
new year.
          We have worked very closely with them on 
developing those proposals.  They are just proposals at 
this point, but we are going to be addressing the 
issues like terminology definitions, four quadrant 
gates; inventory number signs, one eight hundred number 
signs, high speed train signs, no train horn signs, no 
signal signs, and look for train signs, things like 
that, and we are working very closely together on 
those.
          MR. RABY:  For the audience or for the 
record, would each of you state your department's 
involvement in the Operation Lifesaver program.
          I think it is pretty well known, but for the 
record, a short --
          MR. UMBS:  That is a great organization, and 
I think, well, they have done a lot, a tremendous 
amount to move the education, engineering, and 
enforcement on railroad grade crossings.
          The organization was started in 1972 and 
moved along in Idaho and then moved nationally.  It was 
the Board's recommendation.  Senator Kay Hutchison 
recommended that it go national, and it, in fact, did. 
 In 1986, it was incorporated.  Then the Federal 
Highway Administration began funding it at $300,000 a 
year.  This past authorization with T-21, it is now at 
a half million dollars.
          We work closely with them.  We participate in 
their technical boards and are able to provide input 
with the Operation Lifesaver, and they have just done a 
marvelous job in educating the public and the drivers.
          MR. GEORGE:  The Federal Railroad 
Administration was instrumental when AER and Amtrak and 
RPI got together in 1986 to establish Operation 
Lifesaver Incorporated.  The OL Program that existed 
before that was a national program.
          We made our first grant to Operation 
Lifesaver, Incorporated in 1988, a $69,000 grant, and 
we have subsequently granted them an additional $3.3 
million over the years, the least three years at 
$600,000 per year.
          We also serve on their Program Development 
Council which oversees the direction of the programs 
and provides advice to the management.  You know, they 
just have an infrastructure that is not to be equaled 
with some 200 trainers nationwide, 3,000 trained 
certified volunteers making presentations.  That is a 
resource that we like to draw on and they do make 
available to us when it is necessary to get the word 
out on some issue.
          MR. RABY:  I think, I don't know, but I 
believe possibly the reduction that Illinois has had in 
their grade crossing accidents, I really believe 
Operation Lifesaver had a lot to do with that.  I would 
be remiss if I didn't mention the fact that Mr. 
Sweedler's shop at the NTSB has one of his staff that 
is very dedicated and spends a lots of time, and I know 
supports the Operation Lifesaver.
          When flashing lights come on at active 
crossings, what does it mean to the Federal Highway?
          MR. UMBS:  I am going to refer to the Motor 
Vehicle Code.
          MR. RABY:  That was my next question.
          What does it say?
          MR. UMBS:  The Motor Vehicle Code, which is 
developed by an independent volunteer organization.  
Originally, it was at Northwestern University and has 
subsequently moved to Alexandria, Virginia.  It is a 
not for profit organization.  It is the Uniform 
Committee on Uniform Traffic Laws and Ordinances, and 
it publishes this document.  It also has this document 
on its web site.  So, if anybody wants to do that, it 
does have it on its web site.
          The Uniform Vehicle Codes states that 
(reading) Wherever a person driving a vehicle 
approaches a railroad grade crossing under any 
circumstances stated in this section, the driver of 
such vehicle shall stop within 50 feet and not less 
than 15 feet from the nearest track of such railroad 
and shall not proceed until it is safe to do so.
          (Reading) The foregoing requirements shall 
apply when a clearly visible electronic or mechanical 
signal device gives warning of an immediate approach of 
a railroad train; two, grade crossing is lowered or 
when a human flagger gives or continues to give a 
signal of the approach or passage of a railroad train;
          (Reading) Three, a railroad train approaching 
from within 1,500 feet of a highway crossing emits a 
signal audible from such a distance, and such a 
railroad train, by reason of its speed or nearness of 
such crossing, is an immediate hazard.
          (Reading) Four, an approaching railroad train 
is plainly visible, and is in hazardous proximity to 
such crossing.  It closes with (reading) No person 
shall drive a vehicle through, around, or under any 
crossing gate or barrier at a railroad grade crossing 
while such gate or barrier is closed or is being opened 
or closed.
          That is in their paragraph 11-701, Obedience 
to Signal Indicating Approach of Train; that is 
Obedience to Signal Indicating Approach of Train.
          The role of the Federal Highway 
Administration is to develop the Manual on Uniform 
Traffic Control Devices, to develop and to maintain it. 
 Any changes to this Manual on Uniform Traffic Control 
Devices, which include the pavement, approach pavement 
marking, the signals, the gates, the configuration, is 
to be laid out in here.
          Any changes to this has to go through Federal 
rule-making, and that is where we are right now:  We 
are revising the entire manual.  It has been a 
multi-year effort.  We are coming close to completion. 
 The railroad grade crossing issue will be out by 
December, so a notice of proposed rule-making will be 
out for that section.
          In here, it basically says what the device 
is, not what the driver should do.  This is a guidance 
to a traffic engineer or a highway agency as to what 
they need to do to provide for guidance and regulation 
of the driver.
          So, the manual doesn't tell the driver what 
to do, but does tell the organization what the meaning 
of, what the devices should look like should they 
install them.  So, it is not a driver's manual.
          MR. RABY:  Do you know if all states have 
adopted that manual or the meanings in the manual.
          MR. UMBS:  The Manual on Uniform Traffic 
Control Devices is the national standard and guidelines 
for all traffic control devices on public roads.  The 
Federal manual sets forth these basic guidance and 
standards.  Then each state is required, under the 
Federal Regulations of 23 -- the Code of Federal 
Regulations 23, Highways, requires that each state 
shall adopt that manual for use on the Federal aid 
projects.
          So, all states, to my knowledge, have 
adopted, officially adopted the Manual on Uniform 
Traffic Control Devices or have developed their own 
quite similar to it.  They may exceed the standards, 
but they are not to go less than the standards set 
forth in the manual.
          MR. RABY:  I am filling in today a little bit 
for a colleague of mine, Ron Webber (phonetic), and 
meal meeting with him prior to coming here, we had the 
law for Illinois that states what the vehicle should do 
when the lights come on.  In essence, it says come on 
and stop and stay stopped until the light goes off.
          We checked in the State of Virginia, and 
Virginia says when you come to a flashing light, you 
stop and if it is clear, you can continue on.  They 
sort of treat it like a flashing red light at a traffic 
control.
          So, I guess question is:  Is Virginia, for 
example, following the Uniform Vehicle Code, or is that 
some variation they may have added to it?
          If they have, are you aware of possibly other 
states that may have variances?
          MR. UMBS:  The model Uniform Vehicle Code is 
a model.  The states do not have to follow it, and I 
don't believe any follow it to the letter.  They all 
have adapted parts of the Uniform Vehicle Code.
          So, the Uniform Vehicle Code is really 
outside of the area of the Federal Highway 
Administration because that involves the driver and 
NTSA, which is the National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration.  They are responsible for the driver 
and the rules of the road in that area and work very 
closely with Anne Cutlow (phonetic) as we do.
          So, each state has a right to adopt their own 
laws through their legislation, and we know that state 
laws do change or traffic laws do change are from state 
to state as to what you can do and what you cannot do.
          What you can do in one state may be legal and 
in another state may not be.  That is why we have 50 
sovereign states.  So, that is an issue that goes 
through the state's legislature, and it becomes state 
law.  It is not a Federal law.
          MR. GEORGE:  If I may interject something?  I 
mentioned that the two appropriation bills for Federal 
Rails and Federal Highway had some identical language 
as to the crossings.  One of those provisions, if it 
passes, will direct the Federal Railroad Administration 
to write model legislation for consideration by state 
legislators establishing more uniform state laws 
regarding crossings.
          MR. RABY:  That has been expressed to me that 
there is some concern that we are such a mobile society 
and that people travel so much that they can get 
confused what they do in different states in railroad 
crossings, for example.
          MR. GEORGE:  I think that is exactly where we 
are coming from in asking for that direction from the 
Congress.
          MR. RABY:  A little bit about enforcement at 
grade crossings:  If you know, are there any 
restrictions or does the railroad ever enforce grade 
crossing signal violations?
          MR. GEORGE:  Do the railroads?
          MR. RABY:  The railroad police.
          MR. GEORGE:  Yes, they do.
          There is not a lot of railroad police out 
there.  That is the problem there.  On those railroads 
that have a substantial police force or police force 
enough to do that, especially the ones with a uniformed 
force, they will do that.
          MR. RABY:  They have that authority?
          MR. GEORGE:  Yes, sir.
          MR. RABY:  Are there any incentives or 
programs to beef up enforcement in general, not only 
for the safety of the railroad, but even local police 
or state police?
          Has the Federal Government entered into any 
kind of program or incentives to increase enforcement 
at grade crossings for violations?
          MR. GEORGE:  Under the Presence Program, the 
Department of Justice is trying to encourage the 
fielding of over a hundred thousand more police 
officers.  At least one railroad in the country has 
applied for a grant under that program and received it.
          They have three officers they are going to 
use for -- well, their justification was crossing 
safety and trespass prevention.  We are promoting that 
concept at other railroads.  I don't know if any others 
that have taken advantage of it yet.
          MR. RABY:  I guess the question comes up a 
lot of times about how come we don't use the highway 
traffic signal type of signal at grade crossings.  
Therefore, the traveling public only has only has to 
get used to one type of signal to understand how to 
adhere.
          Could you briefly go over that for the record 
for us and how the MUTCD, what it says about using 
highway grade crossings.
          MR. UMBS:  The Manual on Uniform Traffic 
Control Devices covers the railroad grade crossing 
signals, the configuration, the timing; and it also 
covers traffic signals at intersections which includes 
also again the timing, the visibility, the shape, the 
size, and color.
          Over the years, there has been discussed on 
railroad grade crossings and the use of traffic signals 
versus to replace the common railroad grade crossing 
signals.  There have been studies.  A few studies have 
been done; nothing that I know that has been 
conclusive.
          The study that was done in Tennessee a few 
years ago, about ten years ago, basically said there 
was not much difference between railroad grade 
crossings and traffic signals.  They had installed some 
traffic signals, and people were responding basically 
the same to each.
          One of the things with the Manual on Uniform 
Traffic Control Devices, maybe we are conservative, but 
we like to stay with what the public is used to unless 
we find that is something significantly an enhancement 
to highway safety.
          There has been some discussion over time, and 
right now, the manual is under review and the docket is 
open for comment on the use of traffic signals at 
railroad grade crossings.
          I personally have not seen any movement, 
words from the public or industry, to use traffic 
signals in place of railroad grade crossings.  
Basically, one of the things we believe at the railroad 
grade crossings -- based on existing research and based 
on what has happened over the years, a dramatic 
decrease in the number of railroad grade crossing 
fatalities -- is, as Bruce said, to stay with what the 
public is used to and then also use the traffic signals 
at intersections.
          We could go with traffic signals, but we have 
a massive program now on running red lights.  We are 
not for running red lights.  We don't have a program 
for running red lights.  We have a program to prevent 
the running of red lights.  It is a major problem in 
the United States.
          We have spent millions of dollars.  We have a 
massive campaign to educate the public, educate the 
engineers, and enforcement on the use of proper signal 
timing, proper use of traffic signals, and also what 
you are supposed to do when you come up to a traffic 
signal:  If the light is read red, it means red, it 
means stop.  That is our slogan, Red means stop.
          To take a device now, which we are just 
trying to get the public to stop running red lights, 
and to put them on a railroad grade crossing, I don't 
know if they are going to respect that any more than 
they do.  They know they are running red lights.  They 
run red lights, and that is a massive program right 
know that are trying to address.
          MR. RABY:  Does any of your research or data 
give any thought to why people go around gates at grade 
crossings?
          MR. GEORGE:  The Federal Railroad 
Administration just initiated an effort now on the 
human factors, accident causation study to look into 
that.  We are just getting started on it.
          MR. UMBS:  For the red lights, we did do some 
work in that area.  We did focus groups, and we found 
out that when you run red lights, it is always the 
other person.  The people in our focus groups were 
confident they never ran red lights.  So, we had to 
have a program for the people who run red lights that 
won't identify themselves.
          It appears that people are, in our public 
awareness campaigns, we show that people are impatient, 
and how people were impatient.  Their minds were 
someplace else.  They didn't want to wait.  They knew 
the traffic signal was going to be three minutes, and 
they didn't want to wait three minutes for the traffic 
signal.  So, they just run it.
          We are trying to convey upon the public the 
importance of not running reds lights:  Not only do 
they put themselves in danger, but they put the other 
drivers and pedestrians in danger too.  So, it is a 
complicated issue, and it will be interesting to look 
at what was done and what FRA is going to do.
          I remember a few years ago when I was in 
Michigan -- I was the safety engineer for our division 
office there -- we had met with the railroad all day, 
with the state and the railroad on coming up with great 
traffic, some sort of a signal that would keep people 
from running the signal and going around the gates.  We 
had strobe lights and all sorts of things that we 
worked very, had a long great conversation.
          After the meeting, we were all leaving.  A 
train came through, we were the third car back.  A car 
two cars behind us pulled out, drove around us, and 
then drove around the gate.  I don't know what you 
could do in that situation, but that is something that 
stuck with me for many, many, years -- that is over 20 
years ago -- stuck with we over the years.
          We have to, as traffic engineers, do the best 
we can and make the most realistic signal timing, both 
for traffic control devices and railroad grade 
crossings and realistic traffic for all traffic control 
devices.
          MR. GEORGE:  One of the things they have come 
up with in monitoring crossings, in video monitoring, 
we have seen there is a number of that sort of 
violation.  That is where we concerned the concept of 
using channelization, lane channelization size to keep 
people from changing lanes and going over the opposing 
side track.
          They have done it in North Carolina very 
successfully, and in the State of Washington, they have 
a crossing now that we are monitoring, and the success 
is very high.
          MR. RABY:  When it comes to educating the 
public about grade crossings, do you feel that the 
states cover this well enough in their vehicle drivers' 
manuals and possible the example in the testing they do 
for new drivers?
          Even in the CDL manual, does the CDL manual 
address grade crossing safety?
          MR. GEORGE:  Let me speak to the drivers' 
manual, and I will let Rudy talk about the CDL.
          About three years ago, the National Highway 
Traffic Safety Administration undertook a major effort 
to rewrite portions of the driver's manual, and the 
portion dealing with crossings was included in that.  
That language has been made available as a sample, you 
know, as a model.
          I know at least one a state has adopted it, 
and others usually pick those things up in pieces.  If 
they don't adopt it directly, the fact that it has been 
issued causes them to rethink and review their own, and 
they will sometimes make changes that are favorable, 
but we will see how that goes.
          MR. RABY:  Rudy, do you know if the CDL 
manual puts much credence in it or spends much time 
covering this issue in their manual when drivers 
upgrade to a CDL driver's license?
          MR. UMBS:  The CDL area is handled in another 
office of the Office Highway Safety, Office of Motor 
Carrier and Highway Safety in the Federal Highway 
Administration.  I understand they will be testifying 
before the Board in New Orleans.  I would prefer to 
leave it to those experts to handle the CDL issues.
          MR. RABY:  This was a general question 
because Chairman Black had already indicated earlier 
that we were not going to discuss the individual driver 
CDL situation.
          Maybe you could comment on this, Rudy:  Is 
there any rule-making in progress or just been adopted 
regarding grade crossing laws and CDL driver's license?
          MR. UMBS:  Yes, there has.
          If I could find it, would you mind doing in 
this in order of my stuff.  In the Federal Register 
September 2nd, there was a final rule issued by the 
Federal Highway Administration on of commercial driver 
disqualification provisions.  This will go into effect 
October 4th.
          This is a very significant piece of 
rule-making.  It will have economic and it will have 
safety effects on the trucking and railroad industries. 
 It virtually can take somebody's commercial motor 
vehicles license away.
          It can disqualify a driver for 30 days, 60 
days, and finally 120 days.  They could possibly lose 
their license totally.  The longest would be the second 
conviction for rail grade crossing violations with a 
commercial motor vehicle within three years will result 
in a disqualification of 120 days.  Third within that 
time period would be one year.  This is significant.
          One of the things that it, one of the 
violations -- I believe there are six violations that 
can get you, can get a commercial motor vehicle driver 
a penalty.  One is by parking on, by stopping on the 
tracks.  Regardless of the situation, they are not 
allowed to stop on the tracks.
          This was brought home down in Fort Lauderdale 
a few years ago when a tanker truck was stopped on the 
track and an Amtrak train ran into the gasoline tanker 
truck.  That was in a work zone.
          That resulted some changes to the Manual on 
Uniform Traffic Control Devices talking about how you 
should handle railroad grade crossings and how you 
should handle trucks.  It is very important that we in 
the engineering office provide the best technology we 
can and the best procedures we can.
          So, you are supposed to stop on a track and 
you are not supposed to run, you are not supposed to 
violate a traffic control device at a railroad grade 
crossing.  Those are two of the six.  Again, this is on 
our Internet line, and we can enter this also into the 
record.
          MR. GEORGE:  Just a clarification, and I 
agree this is significant rule-making because there is 
no other CDL violation that results in a 
disqualification on the first offense, and this one 
will.
          Secondly, what it says is if the driver 
violates a law dealing with the crossing.  So, there 
has to be a law in existence.  This new regulation is 
really a penalty schedule.
          It is not law in terms of if the driver, as 
Rudy said, if the driver stops on a crossing, there has 
to be a law on the books in the state that stopping on 
a crossing is against the law first.
          This rule does not make it a violation to 
stop on the crossing.  It just says if you violate a 
state law about stopping on a crossing, you can lose 
your license.  You will lose your license.
          MR. RABY:  That is a big step, I think, in 
the right direction.
          Rumble strips at railroad tracks, has any 
research or any thought been given to the use of rumble 
strips at the approach of railroad tracks?
          MR. UMBS:  We have, right now, the Federal 
Highway Administration has a major program on reducing 
the number and severity for off the road crashes.  
About a third of the fatalities, 13,000 to 15,000 of 
the fatalities, are single vehicles running off the 
road.  What we want to do is keep the driver on the 
road in different ways.  One of them is through rumble 
strips, both the center line and edge line.
          Right now, there is a number of states that 
are using it as a standard practice to install rumble 
strips on the edge line and center line.  The next step 
is also to use rumble strips on the approach of 
railroad grade crossings as you do for approach to toll 
roads or toll plazas in advance of a stop sign.  In 
normally a rural area, you want to alert the driver to 
something unusual.  You could do that.
          When we discussed this within headquarters, 
we felt that it would have to go all the way across the 
road.  It could not just be half of the roadway because 
we felt if it was just approach half of the roadway, 
people would actually drive over to the other side to 
avoid the rumble strips.  We find that to be true on a 
number of things.
          I remember people would drive on the other 
side of really ruff crossings:  Boy, this is a really 
rough crossing.  So, you would see an awful lot of 
people go to the other side.  So, we would want to have 
it go all the way across.  That could be an effective 
approach.  There would be nothing to stop a highway 
agency now from installing them.
          MR. RABY:  Lastly, your opinion, practices 
seem to be very popular.  We like to Europe and see 
what they are doing at grade crossings.
          I wonder if Federal Highways or the Federal 
Railroad Administration has taken a look at any of the 
grade crossing safety programs that are used in Europe 
or any other foreign countries.
          MR. UMBS:  I am going to let Bruce handle 
that because he just got back from a European trip to 
look at that.
          MR. GEORGE:  I didn't just get back.  It has 
been two years.
          Fred Small from the Federal Highway 
Administration and myself and Dr. Steve Roop (phonetic) 
from the Texas Transportation Institute went to Europe 
two years ago in September and met with rail and 
traffic authorities in five different countries in two 
weeks.  It was a bit hectic.
          I could answer specific questions I guess, 
but generally they have problems not unlike our own.  
The trip did dispel some what I call myths or at least 
my perceptions of the things going on in Europe.  
Everybody comes back and tells us they have four 
quadrant gates everywhere, and that is not the case.
          There was one country we were in had two I 
think, and they said they were not putting in any more 
either.  Other countries, a couple of the others, one 
thing they do is a lot of their roads are narrower than 
ours, and with a single gate they are able to close the 
whole road.  So, that amounts to the same thing.
          There is a lot of four quadrant gates, but 
nowhere near the numbers I had been led to believe 
before I had flown there.  I think, in my mind, it 
proves the concept or it certainly doesn't disprove the 
fact that it is a good idea if gates are not doing the 
conventional job, the conventional gates are not doing 
the job, I think four quadrant gates should be in the 
traffic engineer's tool box as a consideration.  There 
was nothing I saw in Europe that would make me feel any 
different about that.
          They are using different techniques for train 
detection on the approach, and I think that is more 
meat for the discussion tomorrow.  We are going to be 
looking at some of the same techniques they are using 
in Europe in this country within the next year in some 
testing out at the test center in Colorado.
          Their grade separation programs, they have 
some construction techniques where they manage to put 
in some major structures while the railroad continues 
to operate which were impressive and we did see.  I 
have heard that kind of technique is being considered 
here as well.
          They do a lot of signing.  The legal side of 
the question is very different in Europe.  The driver 
is almost automatically culpable if he gets hit by a 
train in Europe.  That may change as the railroads 
privatize; I don't know.
          MR. RABY:  Ruben has a couple of questions.
          MR. PAYAN:  Before we go to Mr. Brown, I 
would like to ask Rudy one quick question that I asked 
Mr. George.
          Does the Federal Highway Administration have 
any restrictions or does it play a role on truck 
routing regarding railroad crossings?
          MR. UMBS:  Not to my knowledge.
          MR. PAYAN:  Mr. Raby?
          MR. RABY:  Mr. Brown, you have been sitting 
there all rested I assume and ready to go.
          A little orientation if we could:  How many 
states does Amtrak operate in?
          MR. BROWN:  Amtrak operates in 45 of the 48 
states in the Continental United States.
          MR. RABY:  About how many trains do you 
operate?
          MR. BROWN:  In total?
          MR. RABY:  Total.
          MR. BROWN:  Five hundred.
          MR. RABY:  Do you have any idea how many 
grade crossings you cross over with these trains?
          MR. BROWN:  Thousands.
          MR. RABY:  How about in Illinois 
particularly?
          Would you happen to have a number for that?
          MR. BROWN:  I do not right now.
          MR. RABY:  Let me back up a minute.  I think 
it was established earlier that you operate mostly over 
host railways.
          MR. BROWN:  That is correct.
          We operate approximately 21,600 route miles 
off Amtrak or over other carriers, which represents 
approximately 98 percent of our total route miles.
          MR. RABY:  Member Black asked a couple of my 
questions during the last Amtrak thing, but I was going 
to ask you to go over a scenario when you initiate a 
new route over a host line and how you address the 
safety of your operation over that line.
          MR. BROWN:  Certainly.
          If we were to initiate a new service -- a 
good example Mr. Bullock mentioned earlier in his 
testimony would be our new service into Oklahoma -- we 
would do joint investigations with the railroad of 
record, the home railroad.
          We would actually make trips and do an 
engineering assessment of the track standards and the 
maintenance levels of that railroad and then make, 
along with the funding agency -- in this case, it is a 
jointly funded service with the states -- we would then 
negotiate a contract and develop an operating plan that 
would determine the type of operation, how we would 
operate, and under what conditions.
          Clearly, whenever we are on a host railroad's 
property, we operate according to their operating rules 
and special instructions within the uniform applicable 
codes, general coding in those cases.  Based on the 
level of utility or the maintenance level of that route 
that the home railroad maintains, we act accordingly; 
we operate accordingly.
          MR. RABY:  After you do that initial 
assessment, how often do you do reassessments or 
reviews?
          MR. BROWN:  With some regularity; with pretty 
good frequency.
          We have a corporate policy to try to -- 
actually, it is a goal -- we try to use our track 
geometry vehicle that we own, which is a high-tech 
vehicle that gives all kind of track geometry read-outs 
and conditions on vertical and lateral truss and ride 
quality and things of that nature.
          We try to make a trip over each of our routes 
every two years.  We have had a lot attention recently, 
as you can imagine, with the northeast corridor with 
the introduction of the high speed service, so we are a 
little bit behind.  That is what we try to do on a 
regular basis with our vehicle.
          Naturally interspersed throughout, 
constantly, operating and engineering managers of 
Amtrak on various SBUs make frequent trips over the 
different routes, make analyses, and we are in constant 
contact with the host carriers.  We generally do these 
things in concert with them.  So, there is a constant 
dialogue regarding track conditions, ride quality, 
passenger comfort, those kinds of things.
          MR. RABY:  In regard to grade crossing 
accidents, do you have any statistics on Amtrak and 
grade crossing accidents?
          MR. BROWN:  Yes; I can give you some 
something.
          MR. RABY:  Would you, please.
          Does this include deaths and injuries?
          MR. BROWN:  Yes.
          The facts I have here are part of the FRA's 
annual emergency manual.  So, what I am giving you is 
from the FRA statistics.  They are statistics we report 
to the FRA, and they are a matter of record.
          What would like?
          MR. RABY:  How many grade crossing accidents 
in the last two years or for 1998, 1997?
          MR. BROWN:  In 1997, and I am speaking for 
just Amtrak and this is nationally, Amtrak incurred 176 
incidents in 1997.  We had 170 grade crossing incidents 
in 1998, and the first six months of 1999, we have had 
79 incidents.
          MR. RABY:  You have the injuries?
          MR. BROWN:  Yes, sir.
          In 1997, of the 176 incidents, we incurred, 
we didn't incur, but there were 53 fatalities and a 
total of 140 injuries.
          Now, understand that the large majority of 
those fatalities and injuries were to persons or people 
who were pedestrians or to the occupants of vehicles 
that were struck at a grade crossing.  Very few were 
employees, and to the best of my recollection, the 
incident at Bourbonnais is the first time Amtrak has 
sustained customer fatalities as a result of a grade 
crossing accident.
          In 1998, of the 170 incidents involving 
Amtrak, there were 50 fatalities and 124 injuries; and 
the first six months of 1999, as I said, there were 79 
incidents which included 24 fatalities and 8 injuries.
          MR. RABY:  In your records, do you make a 
break-out between heavy trucks and other vehicles?
          MR. BROWN:  We do have a number of statistics 
on the number of times we have derailed and whether or 
not those were heavy vehicles.  I do not have figures 
here for the -- because of the way we report and the 
way the FRA programs sorts and retains the data, I was 
not able to easily retrieve it, but for example, in 
1997, we had, of the number of grade crossing 
incidents, we had four derailments.
          Of those four derailments, four included 
tractor trailers with a weight over 26,000 pounds.  In 
1998, there were four derailments as a result of these 
accidents, two of which involved tractor trailers at 
that weight definition.
          In the first six months of 1999, we have had 
one incident that resulted in a derailment, and it also 
involved a tractor trailer of over 26,000 pounds.  So 
in the last two and a half years, the number of 
derailments at grade crossings, seven of the nine 
incidents involved heavy vehicles.
          MR. RABY:  Seven out of nine?
          MR. BROWN:  Yes, sir.
          MR. GEORGE:  May I offer that the FRA 
database on accidents does break out cars, trucks, 
trucks with trailers, pick-up trucks, vans, buses, 
school buses, motorcycles, other motor vehicles 
pedestrians, and other.
          MR. BROWN:  I am not sure.
          George, does that include the weight though?
          MR. GEORGE:  No, that does not include the 
weight.
          MR. BROWN:  Many of the incidents do not 
involve a heavy vehicle or a tractor trailer.
          MR. RABY:  We spoke earlier about Operation 
Lifesaver.
          Does Amtrak participate in Operation 
Lifesaver?
          MR. BROWN:  Very much so.
          As was earlier stated, we were one of the 
three agencies in the actual incorporation of Operation 
Red Flag.  We had employees on various councils.  We 
have membership, for example, in the Program 
Development Council.
          As far as our education and our involvement, 
over 200 Amtrak employees or presenters, if you will, 
have received extensive training on public speaking and 
delivery of our process.
          Within the last 18 months, over 500 
presentations and 60 displays have been involved with 
Amtrak participation, which gives us over 360,000 
people contacted in these last 18 months with just 
Amtrak involvement.
          Within the State of Illinois, we have five 
full-time presenters.  So far this year, to date, we 
have made 34 presentations with over 3,000 people 
contacted.
          MR. RABY:  My last question, I guess, is:  
With all this research and in your experience, what 
does Amtrak see that could be done to reduce the number 
of, I am going to be general, Amtrak accidents, and I 
will also be specific, at grade crossings?
          MR. BROWN:  We feel very strongly that the 
answer, the real solution is much more activity and 
involvement in enforcement of existing regulations and 
laws and creation of new laws.  As a corporation, we 
laud and fully support the activity that the FHWA is 
undertaking, and we support the rule-making that 
hopefully is going to be enforceable on October 4th, 
and we fully support that.
          We would like to see more stringent 
application and more stringent laws.  Though we laud 
the work that is being done, we would like to see more 
stringent penalty involved to the operators of these 
commercial vehicles.
          We also would like to see not just civil 
penalties, but criminal processes, prosecution as well 
for repeated violators of the law.
          MR. RABY:  Thank you.
          Ruben?
          MR. PAYAN:  Mr. Brown, just one question:  
Does Amtrak have any program to identify possible high 
risk crossings using reports of close calls of the 
locomotive engineers?
          MR. BROWN:  We do get reports of close calls, 
but we do not have a program that specifically 
identifies those crossings.
          MR. PAYAN:  Do you follow up on any of those 
reports?
          MR. BROWN:  We do.
          MR. PAYAN:  That is all I have, Mr. Chairman.
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  Federal Highway 
Administration?
          MR. UMBS:  No questions.
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  The Illinois Commerce 
Commission?
          MR. STEAD:  We have no questions.
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  The Brotherhood?
          MR. WALPERT:  No questions.
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  United Transportation Union?
  EXAMINATION BY THE UNITED TRANSPORTATION UNION
          MR. DWYER:  Mr. George, I understand that you 
said that this year or last year, Operation Lifesaver 
received $600,000 from the Federal Railroad 
Administration.
          MR. GEORGE:  That is correct.
          MR. DWYER:  That is in addition to 500,000 
that came with T-21?
          MR. GEORGE:  Yes, sir.
          MR. DWYER:  Are there any links between the 
T-21 and state involvement in Operation Lifesaver?
          MR. GEORGE:  Are there any links between T-21 
and state involvement?
          MR. DWYER:  Yes.
          For instance, if the State of Illinois were 
to qualify for Federal funding, which they do, is there 
anything that would require them also to participate in 
Operation Lifesaver to receive those funds?
          MR. GEORGE:  No, not to my knowledge.
          MR. DWYER:  Has the Federal Highway 
Administration or the Federal Railroad Administration 
or the Secretary of Transportation or the 
administrators given any thought to that linkage?
          MR. GEORGE:  I don't know that we have given 
it any thought.
          I consider Illinois to be a reasonably good 
partner for OL, but I should not speak for OL either.  
I do know they are active, and I would just observe 
that it would take legislation to make that kind of 
linkage.  Congress lays down the rules be which those 
funds are distributed.
          MR. DWYER:  My point is that some states such 
as Illinois are exemplary in their involvement, and 
other states take no interest.
          MR. GEORGE:  It does.
          MR. DWYER:  These things don't happen just in 
Illinois.  They happen nationally.  This issue, in your 
own words, is going to have to be addressed by stiffer 
enforcement and education and a part of enforcement.  
So, I would ask that you give that some thought.
          Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  Melco, Mr. Marshall?
          MR. MARSHALL:  I don't have any questions.
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  Amtrak?
          MR. BULLOCK:  I have no questions.
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  Canadian National/Illinois 
Central Railroad?
             EXAMINATION BY CANADIAN
        NATIONAL/ILLINOIS CENTRAL RAILROAD
          MR. ED HARRIS:  Just one question for Mr. 
Umbs:  You have testified that or you have shared your 
frustrations in regard to having motorists stop at stop 
lights or failure to stop at stop lights.  This 
question does not pertain to McKnight Road.
          The passive signal indication or the passive 
crossbuck sign that is installed at many public 
crossings at every railroad across the nation, what 
does that mean to the Federal Highway Administration as 
far as what does it tell the motorist to do?
          MR. UMBS:  Again, the Federal Highway 
Administration sets the regulations for what the 
crossbuck should look like, that there is a crossbuck, 
and it is up to the individual states to make their 
laws for their roads.
          With the exception of the 55 mile per hour 
speed limit, the Federal Government is basically out of 
the setting of what the rules of the road are.  We 
encourage the Uniform Vehicle Code, and we put in the 
signs and markings.
          Our job is to provide the signs and markings 
and traffic control devices for the roadway and to have 
a national uniform standard.  The meaning is that of 
the states.  The states pass those laws.  There is no 
Federal law that is titled that.
          MR. ED HARRIS:  I apologize for that 
confusion.
          In your opinion, do you think it would be 
appropriate to install stops signs in addition to those 
crossbuck indications?
          MR. UMBS:  The Federal Highway 
Administration, in response to T-21, put in the Manual 
on Uniform Traffic Control Devices giving the local 
agencies to the install stop signs without an 
engineering study.  That is in the manual right now, 
and you can do that.
          Earlier, I mentioned the technical working 
group which Bruce is on and Fred Small and a member of 
my staff is on, and as a result of the NTSB's passive 
crossing study they came up with, we are going to be 
developing warrants for stop signs, gates, signals, and 
that is what we are looking at right now.
          That is a good question.  Do we put them up 
all over?  Do we put stop signs?  Do we require 
everybody to stop at a crossing?  That is now the 
option of the local agencies.  If they want to, they 
may do that right now.
          MR. GEORGE:  May I offer something?
          MR. ED HARRIS:  Yes; we would love to hear 
it.
          MR. GEORGE:  I don't think stop signs are a 
panacea.  I don't think they should go everywhere, but 
I think they are under-utilized where highway rail 
crossings are concerned.  I think there should be a lot 
more of them out there than they are now.
          The before and after studies that have been 
done, two studies, have shown a 35 percent reduction in 
collisions when the signs are properly used; and it is 
a relatively inexpensive thing to do.  I just think 
there ought to be more of them out there.
          MR. ED HARRIS:  Not particularly in this 
state, if I may add just to that, because I think the 
important thing we need to address here is railroad and 
crossing safety throughout the United States.
          One of the issues that I had and one of the 
reasons that I had to ask this question is because I 
did personally go to state agencies to asks this very 
question, and I did not get the kind of response I 
thought I would; not this state, but other states that 
we operate in.
          MR. GEORGE:  You need enforcement.  You 
should not put a sign up, any sign, a stop sign or any 
other, unless the local law enforcement officials will 
enforce it.
          I would not ask that they give anything 
extraordinary to this stop sign over any other, but at 
least as much authority, time, effort, if they see a 
violation, that they will pursue it.  I am not saying 
they should sit out there and watch for it unless they 
do that at other stop signs.
          MR. ED HARRIS:  Thank you.
          MR. UMBS:  If I could just respond a little 
to that?  Bruce was so correct in saying when properly 
used, and that is why we are looking at taking that 
passive grade crossing study very seriously at the 
Department of Transportation.  We want to come up with 
warrants.
          We find the stop sign is becoming as common 
as tulips in spring sometimes where every intersection 
in the subdivision has a stop sign.  As a traffic 
engineer, I sometimes sit and watch cars go by.  Very 
few people do that.  I just watch cars go by.  I 
noticed very few of them actually come to a complete 
and legal stop in accordance with the requirements of 
the State of Virginia.
          So when we do put them in, we mean business. 
 That is the important thing.  That is why the red 
light running program is concentrating on engineering: 
 Is it warranted or not, yes or no?  Enforcement, if it 
is warranted, then let's enforce it.
          Then let's tell everybody we are going to go 
out there, with the red light running program, we are 
going to out there at railroad grade crossing, and you 
run that stop sign, we are going to give you a ticket 
for sure.  We will even put cameras.
          I mean the next thing is to put up cameras.  
We do that now within our red light running program, 
and they have shown to be very effective.
          MR. GEORGE:  Federal Highway and Federal Rail 
issued a joint memorandum actually about five years ago 
I think, or four years, on the things we felt should be 
considered in putting up a stop sign and the things 
that would contra-indicated for the utility of the stop 
sign.  The reason it was issued was to promote 
additional stop signs out there.
          MR. UMBS:  Theoretically, if a driver one 
runs a stop sign at a rail crossing, the results are 
disastrous if that is indeed the case, and that is the 
point I am trying to make.
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  I have been trying to 
overcome the temptation to comment on this, having been 
involved in that for 25 or 26 years.
          Bruce, would you like to ask yourself a 
question?
          MR. GEORGE:  Why don't enlighten me as to 
what that question would be?
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  Why don't you say the 
Federal Railway Administration has no questions.  You 
are up is what I am saying.
          MR. GEORGE:  Does the spokesman have a 
question?
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  Did you appoint somebody?
          MR. GEORGE:  No.
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  I'm sorry.
          MR. BLACKMORE:  No questions.
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  Mr. Sweedler?
          MR. SWEEDLER:  I have no questions, Mr. 
Chairman.
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  Claude?
       EXAMINATION BY THE BOARD OF INQUIRY
          MR. CLAUDE HARRIS:  I have a couple of 
questions.  The first two is for Mr. Brown.
          Mr. Brown you mentioned earlier that you do 
participate in the Operation Lifesaver Program.
          I was wondering, to the best of your 
knowledge, is any of this participation targeted to the 
commercial operators.
          MR. BROWN:  Yes.
          We are active in presenting -- actually, we 
have some on-going activities, educational activities, 
in connection with Operation Lifesaver such as Trucker 
on the Train, and we also meet with trucking 
associations, which would include heavy vehicle 
operators as specific markets, as specific customers.  
We even have developed a video called An Engineer's 
Story that specifically target those kinds of markets.
          MR. CLAUDE HARRIS:  Does Amtrak compile any 
date to on gate breakage at active crossings?
          MR. BROWN:  We do on our property, on 
property that we own and maintain.
          MR. CLAUDE HARRIS:  Is that data available to 
the public?
          MR. BROWN:  Yes.
          MR. CLAUDE HARRIS:  Can it be made available 
to us?
          MR. BROWN:  Yes, it can.
          MR. CLAUDE HARRIS:  We would appreciate it 
for the record.
          My two questions are for Mr. George and Mr. 
Umbs:  Are there any specific programs within U.S. DOT 
that specifically address problems at grade crossings 
for commercial vehicles?
          You mentioned broad oversight programs in 
your target areas, but are you specific planning 
anything primarily for targeting commercial vehicles or 
commercial operators?
          MR. GEORGE:  Two or three things come to 
mind.  We are working with Operation Lifesaver.  We 
have agreed in principle with them that we need a new 
film for targeting commercial vehicles.  That is 
something that will be forthcoming, I think, in the 
next several months.
          We have just put out a work with ATA, and 
actually, I think NTSB was involved or at least 
reviewed putting out that trucker safety alert.  I 
noticed a copy of on your table out in the ante room 
there.
          We are looking at, the Federal Railroad 
Administration, and keeping Federal Highways apprised 
of what we are looking at, developing and gathering 
data on high profile crossings, hump crossings.
          There have been some serious collisions 
brought about by vehicles that were high centered on 
crossings which has gotten our attention, and we have 
started to gather data on those crossings one at a time 
and quickly came to the conclusion we could not afford 
to do that, sending out surveyors at each crossing.
          We worked with the Corps of Engineers last 
year and used a helicopter to survey 179 mile corridor 
in North Carolina using a laser infrared scanning 
device that can determine the elevation -- of any 
elevation, but in this case, we were flying the rail 
corridor -- to within two centimeters within the inch 
60 feet either side of the right of way.
          We are using that data working with the 
University of West Virginia to develop a model, a 
computer model that will help us identify crossings 
that have the potential to hang up a vehicle.
          Of course, at some point here in the not too 
distant future, we have to start to gather data on 
vehicles.  This is a case where it takes two to tango, 
and there is no standard out there for vehicles.
          We are not looking for a standard, but we 
want to look for a system of classifications where if 
we can come up with four to six different classes of 
crossings and then the same for vehicles, then you 
could say if you are driving a Class C vehicle, don't 
try to go across a class four crossing or a five 
crossing.
          We will see how it works out, but we are 
trying to gather data at this point for the analytic 
part of the effort.
          MR. CLAUDE HARRIS:  Is this data going to be 
entered the database at this point in time, or are you 
just looking at it --
          MR. GEORGE:  Right now, we are just trying to 
get it, but yes, that would be the long range intent, 
would be to put something in the database.
          Of course, just last year, the Manual on 
Uniform Traffic Control Devices was augmented with a 
sign which identifies, an advance warning sign that 
identifies a high profile crossing.
          That information we have made provision for 
in the inventory, so there will be a flag in there that 
says this crossing is equipped with a high profile 
crossing sign.  I trust a traffic engineer would not 
put that sign up unless the crossing was a high profile 
crossing.
          MR. CLAUDE HARRIS:  We had a lot of testimony 
this afternoon on active warning devices.  Right now, 
there is quite a few devices that are used out there on 
active crossings.
          I am wondering does U.S. DOT have some kind 
of program to try to make these devices more consistent 
nationwide.
          MR. GEORGE:  More consistent nationwide?
          I think the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control 
Devices lays out the standards for what those devices 
will look like.  That is pretty consistent.
          Do you mean in terms of this effort that Rudy 
was talking about, this joint effort, this technical 
working group that is going to be looking at warrants 
-- maybe that is the kind of thing -- so that a given 
situation will warrant a certain kind of warning 
device?
          MR. CLAUDE HARRIS:  Yes or either possibly 
funding to try to upgrade some of the active crossings 
such as the type of devices being used more 
consistently.
          MR. GEORGE:  That really is a statement on 
how they use those Federal funds right now.
          MR. CLAUDE HARRIS:  You are saying you 
provide the guidelines, but you are not getting 
involved in making decisions on the type of funding 
that would that available for upgrading crossings.
          MR. UMBS:  If I could give a little 
background on the Federal funding for railroad grade 
crossings?  It started as program in 1973 under the 
Highway Safety Act.  Prior to that time, Federal funds 
could be used for railroad grade crossings, but there 
was a state decision and they could or they could not 
use Federal funds for railroad grade crossings.
          Then the law came in 1973, and there was a 
requirement that they would receive a certain amount of 
dollars specifically for railroad grade crossings, both 
on the Federal aid system under Section 203 and under 
Section 230, which was off the Federal aid system.  So, 
that was a first major activity that really push at the 
Federal level the uniformity of railroad grade 
crossings.
          We then worked with the states and local 
agencies to use those funds in the most effective 
manner and in setting up a survey.  A survey was first 
required of railroad grade crossing survey was first 
required in 1973, and it is still required now.  So, we 
have the funding available.
          Then along came 1991, ISTEA, that provided 
that 10 percent of the funding must be set aside for 
safety improvements:  Half for railroad grade 
crossings; for high hazard locations.
          That went on until T-21, and T-21 now, has a 
funding issue where they have to spend a given amount 
of money.  That money is based on the number of miles 
they have and the number of railroad crossings.
          I think Bruce was very instrumental in 
helping that where the funding level for railroad grade 
crossings is high to the number -- your funding is high 
to the number of crossings.  So, Hawaii didn't get a 
big chunk of money like they used to.  They only have 
one railroad grade crossing.
           So, there is funding available, and the 
states are required to set aside this money 
specifically for railroad grade crossings.  Half must 
be spent on protective devices, and the other half may 
be spent on other railroad grade crossing activity such 
as structures.
          MR. GEORGE:  It is about $155 million a year.
          MR. UMBS:  They are allowed to, not only with 
$155 million, they are also able to spend regular 
Federal aid money for that plus optional safety money 
may be sent on that.  That optional safety money is 
growing considerably.  So, there is plenty of money 
available.
          MR. CLAUDE HARRIS:  Thank you.
          MR. DUNN:  I have a couple of questions.
          First of all, I have put this report 
together, there is a couple of things I have to ask you 
or one of the Federal people.
          What is T-21?  What does that mean?
          MR. GEORGE:  The Efficiency Act of the of 
21st Century; it is six year funding bill that was 
passed just few years ago.
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  Funding highways in America?
          MR. GEORGE:  Yes.
          MR. DUNN:  How about ISTEA?
          MR. UMBS:  We will give you that exactly.
          MR. DUNN:  That is fine as long as I have it 
sent to me at some time because I am asking for some 
other stuff.
          MR. GEORGE:  Intermodal Surface 
Transportation and Efficiency Act; we will get you 
that.
          MR. DUNN:  Thank you.
          Amtrak gave us some good statistics, and if 
you could tell me the same thing or get it to me for 
1997, the total number of accidents in the United 
States, crossing accidents, do we have that available?
          MR. GEORGE:  Yes, sir.
          That is available on the Net now.
          MR. DUNN:  Can I get it on the record, or is 
it too much trouble to dig up?  As long as it is sent 
to me -- 1997 incidents, fatalities, and injuries, and 
1998, and half a year of 1999.
          MR. UMBS:  Why don't you ask another 
question, and I will look for it.
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  Submit it for the record.
          MR. DUNN:  Would you submit it for the 
record.
          MR. GEORGE:  Certainly.
          MR. DUNN:  That would be 1997, 1998, and half 
a year of 1999.
          My other question was or last question:  We 
have seen how the decline in crossing accidents has 
gone down.
          How about number of people killed?
          Is that going down or is that staying status 
quo?
          MR. GEORGE:  Since 1993, the number of deaths 
have gone down 31.2 percent.  It was 626 in 1993, and 
431 in 1998.  It is down a good chunk in the first six 
months of this year, but I think the late reporting 
will probably bring it up some, so I hesitate to give 
you the number.
          MR. DUNN:  For the record, also submit to me 
how it came down year by year, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996.
          MR. GEORGE:  You can have this.
          MR. DUNN:  Thank you.  Those are all the 
questions I have.
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  Mr. Lauby, would you go 
ahead with your one question.
          MR. LAUBY:  I do have one question for Mr. 
Rudy Umbs.  It is response to your comments on stop 
signs, about how you have seen people totally ignore 
stop signs.  I think we are all familiar with that.
          From my own point of view, I have seen people 
ignore grade crossings and grade crossbucks especially 
over and over where people will, when they do look, 
they are usually in the middle of the tracks and 
looking both ways to make sure nothing is coming.  I do 
think stop signs are more universally understood than 
grade crossing signs.
          I have two teen-aged drivers, and I live in 
the Washington D.C. area, and I don't believe they have 
ever been across a grade crossing.  I don't think they 
have ever seen a crossbuck because we don't have them 
in that area, and least not in the area they are 
exposed to.  They do understand stop signs, and I think 
that is something that is very important that we need 
to look at.
          I have some questions for Mr. Brown about 
Amtrak and Amtrak's programs on grade crossings.
          I would like to ask you:  How closely to you 
monitor what is going on at the grade crossings that 
Amtrak traverses.
          MR. BROWN:  How closely do we?
          MR. LAUBY:  Let me back up.
          Do you have somebody that is responsible at 
Amtrak to know how many crossings there are and where 
they are and what is going on at each crossing, are 
improvements being made or whatever?
          Do you have somebody responsible for that in 
Amtrak?
          MR. BROWN:  Not particularly.
          That really is, that process is done by the 
host carrier.  As far as crossing activity, crossing 
maintenance, that process would owned by our host 
carrier.  On our property, we certainty do the same as 
Mr. Harris' people would on the CNIC.
          MR. LAUBY:  You depend on the host carrier to 
make sure the crossings are safe?
          MR. BROWN:  Basically, that is correct.
          MR. LAUBY:  How do you handle close call 
reports, near-miss reports from your locomotive 
engineers?
          MR. BROWN:  In the case of a train on a 
foreign railroad or on a host carrier, the employee 
would immediately report it to the train dispatcher and 
center.  The appropriate train dispatcher would log 
that report with the host carrier.
          MR. LAUBY:  Does Amtrak get involved at all 
in those reports?
          MR. BROWN:  The host carrier would convey 
that to us, but it is not, to the best of my knowledge, 
it is not a formal structured procedure.
          MR. LAUBY:  Does Amtrak any have any concerns 
about particular crossings where there might be a lot 
of industrial traffic?
          Are there any special crossings that come to 
your mind that Amtrak is especially concerned about?
          MR. BROWN:  Not that I am aware of.
          MR. LAUBY:  Do you know if Amtrak has ever 
made requests to state and local government or to a 
railroad to improve a crossing at a particular 
location?
          By that, I mean improve the protection.  That 
is it.
          MR. BROWN:  I know that we do on our own 
property or property that we are the operator of.  We 
are in close coordination with state and local 
authorities.
          On the northeast corridor, for example, there 
are 11 grade crossings in Connecticut and Rhode Island 
that we are diligently to upgrade, and we work with the 
necessary authorities to eliminate those crossings and 
provide adequate protection.  On the Michigan line, we 
are also active and involved with the states.
          MR. LAUBY:  On the new lines, for example, in 
Oklahoma, you talked a little bit about some of the 
things that went on, and you talked about people being 
involved in it, especially the track maintenance and 
the ride quality, the track conditions, passenger 
comfort.
          When you do open a new line, do you negotiate 
at all with the railroads as far as improvements that 
need to be made on those lines as far as grade crossing 
safety?
          MR. BROWN:  Let me put it this way:  When we 
have a contract with a foreign carrier to operate a 
train, it is operating on an incentive based on our 
presence, the incremental of our being.
          If we are willing to operate at the level of 
maintenance and the level of utility in existence or 
that the carrier has in existence on that route, then 
we would just operate accordingly.
          If we saw a benefit and wanted to make 
increases for our own benefit for speeds -- and 
particularly, at speeds that we are crossing is a good 
example -- then we would bear the cost of the capital 
investment to change the warning devices and the 
circuitry to allow for a higher speed into and through 
the crossing.
          So, it would depend on the various parties, 
what are goals are, and what our needs are.  So, it 
would vary by carrier and by location and by service.
          MR. LAUBY:  One last question, and this has 
to do with not so much the Intercity operation, but 
some of the commuter operations, Amtrak's contract to 
operate some of the commuter lines.
          Do you do anything different on those 
commuter lines than you do on the Intercity, to your 
knowledge?
          MR. BROWN:  It depends, again, on the nature 
of the contract.  If we are just the operator, but do 
not do the track or signal maintenance, it would vary. 
 For example, on the line between San Jose and San 
Francisco, we term it our Peninsula service, we both 
operate and maintain that railroad.
          So, we would maintain it at the direction of 
the joint commerce board, the local governing 
authorities.  We would maintain it at the level that 
they require or that they want to run their service.
          MR. LAUBY:  Just one final follow-up:  As a 
condition of a contract, if you are awarded a contract 
to run a commuter operation, do you know if you have 
ever put any special requirements for grade crossing 
safety or grade crossing improvements as a condition of 
that contract?
          MR BROWN:  That we actually instituted?
          MR. LAUBY:  Yes.
          MR. BROWN:  I don't know, but I can get the 
answer for you.
          My thought would be that the owner or 
regulator of that service would be the one to make that 
determine.  We would build or maintain it to meet their 
requirements, but I will certainly, if you would like, 
I will look into that and answer that question.
          MR. LAUBY:  Thank you.  That would be fine if 
you would do that.  That is all I have.  Thanks.
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  Are you, Rudy, satisfied 
with the quality of the data that you are getting from 
the current NTSA data collection system, FARS, NAS, 
estimates?
          Do you think you can make judgments, for 
instance, on railroad grade crossings based on the 
quality of that data?
          MR. UMBS:  At the national level, all we 
really are working with is the FARS data.  From a 
national perspective, we can look at that data and get 
some general trends.  It is for the individual states 
to set up their record systems so they can extract 
that.  That is what we are working with, is the 
individual states.
          We have staff here in Illinois this week 
working with the Illinois Department of Transportation 
and our field office to improve the record system in 
Illinois.  What we are looking to do is to help each of 
the individual states improve their record system.
          Certainly, by those individual states 
improving their record system, we too can have a better 
system.  We are working with the American Association 
of State Highway and Transportation officials.  We are 
funding a project there that is called TSYM (phonetic), 
transportation safety improvement.  It will get you a 
TSYMs book. We changed it.  It used to be CRISP 
(phonetic), and I used to know what CRISP was.
          Basically, what we are doing is we want to 
have a model system that each state doesn't have to 
re-invent their record systems.  The record systems 
that were very popular in the 1970s for one reason or 
another have disappeared, and they are rebuilding them 
again.
          From a national standpoint, yes, I personally 
would like better data.  It would help me as an 
engineer.  Always, better data is better than less 
data, but we are working with the states.  We want to 
improve the states.
          We have the Iowa model record system.  So, we 
are working on two fronts -- the data collection and 
the data system management -- in order to provide 
better record systems at the state and local levels.
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  At the risk of testifying, 
the FAR system, you realize, of course, is really not a 
statistically significant sample in that you are 
looking at a special accident, the criteria for 
selection of which might have nothing to do with the 
severity of the accident or anything else.
          It might have to do with the ambulance 
service in the area or how quickly they respond, 
whether the fact that the person killed might have 
already had, as my father used to say, one foot in the 
grave and another on a banana peel.
          It really gives, I feel, like a deceptive -- 
it is not good data.  The NAS, which they have chosen 
not to emphasize, of course, is a more representative 
sample.  I think we have got an outstanding 
recommendation of that to NTSA.  I don't know where it 
stands right now.
          Are you familiar with an NTSB recommendation 
that basically recommended increased emphasis on grade 
crossing procedures for truck, bus, CDL exams?
          MR. UMBS:  Which number was that, sir?
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  Number?
          MR. UMBS:  Yes.
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  I don't know.  It was 
written in 1968.
          You are not going to find it, Rudy.  That was 
a trick question.
          MR. UMBS:  I used to handle the NTSB 
recommendations up until the restructuring of the 
Federal Highway Administration in January, but I am not 
familiar with that particular one.
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  Here is one from 1968 that 
says (reading) U.S. DOT Study, Short Range and Long 
Range Programs to Improve Railroad Grade Crossing 
Safety.  That one is 1968 also.  Here is one from 1971, 
(reading) FRA, FHLEA Consider Alternative Railroad 
Grade Crossing Signing and Protection.
          A reporter asked me the other day why it was 
that this was same the thing he had been reporting on 
for 20 years, the same causes, the same everything.  
The same signal equipment is still out there only with 
digital modifications to it.
          We are making some improvements in the 
statistics -- thank that properly to Operation 
Lifesaver primarily plus some other factors -- but the 
fact of the matter is here that this accident that 
brings us here today, what are you going to do about 
this, this sort of accident?
          The other thing that I will ask since the 
chairman isn't here, Federal Highway is giving away 
billions of dollars to the state.  Yet, you seem to be 
not willing to make any prequalifications on that.
          If the states are not enforcing it, if the 
state and locals are not enforcing it, why shouldn't 
the Federal Highway or U.S. DOT have some compunction 
to say before we sign the next check, you demonstrate 
enforcement, not only of this, but of traffic signals 
and other areas?
          Do you get to decide that?
          MR. UMBS:  We don't get to decide.  Federal 
Highway Administration doesn't get to decide that.  The 
money is set aside by Congress through a formula, and 
we are the dispensers of that money.
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  I am just venting a little 
bit, Rudy, because here we have you are saying what 
needs to be done.  You are counting on your partners, 
and congratulations.  This is the first Federal panel I 
have ever seen to only mention the word partner once.
          Partnering is becoming the least common 
denominator.  That is what it means.  As we negotiate 
and whatever we can get a consensus on, whether it is 
good or not, we will do that.  That is very disturbing, 
to see things like this, the death and devastation 
caused by a situation where we have been having 
problems like this for years and years.  Here are all 
the recommendations, go back to the beginning at the 
Safety Board and we cannot seem to get going enough to 
do something about it.
          If you have got, any of you, Mr. Brown, or 
any of you have any ideas about how we can do this, I 
would like hear it them.
          What can we do?
          MR. UMBS:  We have a number of new 
technologies that we have been talking with industry 
on.
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  We are going to hear about 
that tomorrow.
          MR. UMBS:  This is lower tech.  I am a lower 
tech guy.  That is why I handle what I handle.
          The high-tech people are the people who think 
in the future and come up with those things.  They are 
special, and I just try to do it with the here and the 
now with technology that is available today.  We are 
looking at channelization at the crossings.
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  Let's stop right there.  The 
gentleman from the Illinois Commerce Commission, who 
has a better system than a lot of states that I have 
seen, has a pretty profound reduction in incidents over 
the last few years, says it won't help and they could 
not consider it for this particular crossing.
          I, by the way, I used to be a practicing 
traffic engineer.  The first thing I would do with this 
is an extruded curve down the middle for a couple of 
hundred feet, and I would deal with that intersection 
how I had to, and I could stop that problem.  Yet, they 
are not even considering it.
          MR. UMBS:  Like Bruce had mentioned North 
Carolina has had some success with that.  We want to 
have a barrier in there or some sort of separation that 
doesn't create more of a safety than what is in there. 
 So, we would not want to put a concrete barrier up.  
If you put a concrete barrier, then you have a --
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  I am talking about an 
extruded curve, cheap and quick.
          MR. UMBS:  Right, exactly.
          We have delineation.  We have raised pavement 
markings.  We have reflective paint.  We have 
channelizing devices.  The other thing that is proving 
to be quite successful is a new product at pedestrian 
crossings.  When a pedestrian comes to a crossing, 
there are LED lights that are embedded in the pavement, 
and they flash.
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  We are getting off on it.  
We are talking about quick and cheap.
          MR. UMBS:  It is quick and cheap.
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  LEDs and the pavement are 
difficult to maintain.  I know about those.
          I am just saying that something needs to be 
done that can be done in a massive application with 
relatively little money and relatively little design.  
They are out there.  You have already mentioned some of 
them in your testimony.
          I am just wondering what is it is going to 
take to get somebody to implement these, and I would 
think the states, as long as you don't offer them some 
incentive, maybe it could be positive incentive rather 
than negative incentive, but I needed your input on 
that.  Just think about it.
          MR. GEORGE:  I would like get on the record 
that it seems that at the two test locations, I think 
it is one of two now, North Carolina's project, but in 
Spokane as well, we are getting a 75 percent to 80 
percent reduction in violations at crossings where you 
put in a channelization device.
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  Thank you.  That is 
something -- we have had them operating for 20 
something years.  I know we plow snow in the south.  
Actually, we do once or twice.
          MR. GEORGE:  We do in Spokane.
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  It is relatively cheap to 
replace the things if they are just extruded curves in 
the first place.  They are easy to mark.  There are 
some ways it can be done, and I am testifying.
          Let me ask you something, Rudy.  You and I 
are both one of the Indians.  I guess you and I are 
both sort of ex officio, but we see each other there a 
couple times a year at the annual National Committee on 
Uniform Traffic Control Devices.
          Does it bother you really that we say to a 
driver out in Pahira (phonetic) Georgia at the 
intersection of State Routes 142 and 155 that has four 
way stop and has a flashing beacon there, and we flash 
a red beacon, and it means to him or her there that 
they stop and then they go.
          If they flash again with a flashing light on 
a railroad crossing, and here, they are supposed to 
stop and wait before they move under the Uniform 
Vehicle Code.
          Is that a problem?
          MR. UMBS:  For me personally?  I don't have a 
problem.
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  You are a traffic engineer, 
Rudy.
          MR. UMBS:  Right, and a safety engineer.
          For me, when I see a railroad grade crossing 
and I see those lights, I do everything but back up.  I 
saw some fatals, and that is how I am in this, is 
witnessing those as a young child and saying why does 
somebody have so die at a crossing every year?
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  Is that a problem?
          MR. UMBS:  Not to me; I don't see that as a 
problem.
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  You have read the book.  We 
have someone who has immigrated to this country from 
Ireland and has not seen this before.  They had read 
the manual, and the see that flashing light means stop 
then go in one place.  It means stop and wait on the 
train in another place.
          I am just saying are we giving consistent 
signals to people.  Maybe that is the reason we are 
having this difficulty.
          MR. UMBS:  That could be, and that is why we 
need model legislation.
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  Exactly.
          The gate running is a separate issue.  There, 
a person is going in harms way as a result of 
impatience, and that is a different issue that  we have 
to physically restrain.
          I am just wondering if we are giving the 
right message to someone because lots of the crossings 
don't have gates, and there is only a flashing light 
there and the flashing is stop and go.  I assure you 
people who are not traffic engineers, I have some 
problems with that.
          Indeed, there was evidence in the testimony 
from these witnesses, some of these witnesses, the 
truck drivers seem to feel that they could stop and 
then they could go if it was safe.  I think that there 
is a difficulty.  I am done.
          Any follow-up questions?
          It is the Chairman's discretion, I guess, to 
testify a little bit that way, but it gets awfully 
frustrating to us at the Safety Board to provide 
recommendation after recommendation.  Basically, if you 
approached a crossing 25 or 30 years ago, it would look 
exactly the same as it does now.
          We have something that has not worked in the 
last 50 years.  Yet, it is still there, and it is time 
to get creative.
          Yes, sir?
          MR. STEAD:  Mr. Chairman, just to respond to 
your comment about the you use of median barriers, we 
have, just recently, attempted to experiment with 
those.
          It was a failed experiment because we offered 
to purchase and install the quicker, temporary median 
barriers for a community here in Scottville.  At the 
mayor's request, we did that.  They were in a couple, 
three weeks, maybe six weeks tops, and the City Council 
voted them out because they didn't like the look of 
them.
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  I used to have a Council 
too.
          MR. STEAD:  The point being --
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  Once they get sued a couple 
of times, it changes their minds.
          MR. STEAD:  The point being is that we don't 
necessarily have the entire authority to issue the 
requirement to have them installed.  We need some 
cooperation with the local highway agencies.
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  That is an excellent point, 
and I agree with that.  It does take some underpinning 
to do this kind of thing.  Thank you for that input.
          Anyone else?
          UNIDENTIFIED PARTICIPANT:  I have a couple of 
quick questions to Mr. Brown regarding Operation 
Lifesaver if I could very quickly.
          Mr. Brown, you indicated there were a number 
Operation Lifesaver presenters that have been trained 
on Amtrak.  I think you said the number 200.
          Where do you get those employees who become 
Operation Lifesaver presenters?
          MR. BROWN:  From different crafts.
          UNIDENTIFIED PARTICIPANT:  What percentage 
would govern the operating craft, the engineering and 
conductor?
          MR. BROWN:  I really don't know.
          UNIDENTIFIED PARTICIPANT:  Once they are 
trained and sent to the field, I assume to carry the 
message of safety at rail crossings, who are their 
audiences?
          MR. BROWN:  Any number of audiences from 
trucking associations to schools to church groups to 
scouting troops, any organization that they can reach 
literally.
          UNIDENTIFIED PARTICIPANT:  Would you happen 
to know specifically if any Operation Lifesaver 
presenter on Amtrak had spoken to Melco Transfer?
          MR. BROWN:  I cannot answer that, but I can 
certainly investigate it and get back to you.
          UNIDENTIFIED PARTICIPANT:  Either before or 
after the accident?
          MR. BROWN:  Yes, I can check that for you.
          UNIDENTIFIED PARTICIPANT:  I would appreciate 
it.
          CHAIRMAN BLACK:  Thank you, sir.
          We are adjourned until tomorrow morning at 
nine a.m.  Thank you for your patience.
          (Whereupon, at 6:50 p.m., the proceedings 
were adjourned, to be reconvened the following day, 
Wednesday, September 15, 1999, at 9:00 a.m.)

             CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER

          I certify that the foregoing is a correct 
transcript from the record of proceedings in the 
above-entitled matter.

____________________________       October 4, 1999
Elizabeth Hudson Telson
Executive Reporting Company, Inc.

 

 
 

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