Before the
Federal Communications Commission
Washington, D.C. 20554


In the Matter of

Application by SBC Communications Inc., 
Southwestern Bell Telephone Company,
And Southwestern Bell Communications
Services, Inc. d/b/a Southwestern Bell Long 
Distance 

Pursuant to Section 271 of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996
To Provide In-Region, InterLATA Services
In Texas

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CC Docket No. 00-65


MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

   Adopted:  June 30, 2000	Released:  June 30, 2000

By the Commission:  Commissioner Furchtgott-Roth concurring and issuing a statement.

Paragraph

I.	INTRODUCTION	1
II.	BACKGROUND	8
A.	STATUTORY FRAMEWORK	8
B.	HISTORY OF THIS APPLICATION	12
C.	TEXAS COMMISSION AND DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE EVALUATIONS	17
III.	ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK	21
A.	OVERVIEW	21
B.	COMPLIANCE WITH UNBUNDLING RULES	28
C.	SCOPE OF EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD	34
1.	Procedural Framework	34
2.	Ex Parte Submissions	41
D.	FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING COMPLIANCE WITH STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS	43
1.	Legal Standard	44
2.	Evidentiary Case	47
IV.	COMPLIANCE WITH SECTION 271(C)(1)(A)	59
A.	BACKGROUND	59
B.	DISCUSSION	60
V.	CHECKLIST COMPLIANCE	61
A.	CHECKLIST ITEM 1  INTERCONNECTION	61
1.	Non-Pricing Aspects of Interconnection	61
2.	Pricing of Interconnection	79
B.	CHECKLIST ITEM 2  UNBUNDLED NETWORK ELEMENTS	91
1.	Operations Support Systems	92
2.	UNE Combinations and Other Issues	213
3.	Pricing of Network Elements	231
C.	CHECKLIST ITEM 3  POLES, DUCTS, CONDUITS AND RIGHTS OF WAY	243
1.	Background	243
2.	Discussion	245
D.	CHECKLIST ITEM 4  UNBUNDLED LOCAL LOOPS	246
1.	Background	246
2.	Discussion	251
E.	CHECKLIST ITEM 5  UNBUNDLED LOCAL TRANSPORT	331
1.	Background	331
2.	Discussion	332
F.	CHECKLIST ITEM 6  UNBUNDLED LOCAL SWITCHING	336
1.	Background	336
2.	Discussion	337
G.	CHECKLIST ITEM 7	343
1.	911 and E911 Access	343
2.	Directory Assistance/Operator Services	345
H.	CHECKLIST ITEM 8  WHITE PAGES DIRECTORY LISTINGS	352
1.	Background	352
2.	Discussion	355
I.	CHECKLIST ITEM 9  NUMBERING ADMINISTRATION	359
1.	Background	359
2.	Discussion	361
J.	CHECKLIST ITEM 10  DATABASES AND ASSOCIATED SIGNALING	362
1.	Background	362
2.	Discussion	364
K.	CHECKLIST ITEM 11  NUMBER PORTABILITY	369
1.	Background	369
2.	Discussion	371
L.	CHECKLIST ITEM 12  LOCAL DIALING PARITY	373
1.	Background	373
2.	Discussion	375
M.	CHECKLIST ITEM 13  RECIPROCAL COMPENSATION	378
1.	Background	378
2.	Discussion	379
N.	CHECKLIST ITEM 14  RESALE	387
1.	Background	387
2.	Discussion	388
VI.	SECTION 272 COMPLIANCE	394
A.	BACKGROUND	394
B.	DISCUSSION	395
1.	Structural, Transactional, and Accounting Requirements of Section 272	397
VII.	PUBLIC INTEREST ANALYSIS	416
A.	OVERVIEW	416
B.	COMPETITION IN LOCAL EXCHANGE AND LONG DISTANCE MARKETS	419
C.	ASSURANCE OF FUTURE COMPLIANCE	420
1.	Performance Remedy Plan	422
2.	Key Elements of the Enforcement Plan	423
D.	OTHER ARGUMENTS	431
VIII.	SECTION 271(D)(6) ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITY	434
IX.	CONCLUSION	437
X.	ORDERING CLAUSES	438

APPENDIX A:  LIST OF COMMENTERS

APPENDIX B:  SWBT OSS OVERVIEW


I. INTRODUCTION
1. On April 5, 2000, SBC Communications Inc., Southwestern Bell Telephone 
Company, and Southwestern Bell Communications Services, Inc. d/b/a Southwestern Bell Long 
Distance (collectively, SWBT) filed its second application for authorization under section 271 of 
the Communications Act of 1934, as amended,  to provide interLATA services in the State of 
Texas.   Although SWBT initially filed for in-region, interLATA authority for the State of Texas 
on January 10, 2000,  that application was withdrawn at SWBTs request.   We therefore take no 
action with respect to SWBTs first application.  In this Order, we grant SWBTs second 
application to enter the in-region, interLATA market in Texas based on evidence that SWBT has 
taken the statutorily required steps to open its local exchange and exchange access markets to 
competition.
2. This approval marks, for the first time, an application that is supported by both the 
Department of Justice and relevant state commission, in this case the Texas Public Utility 
Commission (Texas Commission).  The success of this application is due, in large part, to the 
extensive review conducted by both the Department of Justice and the Texas Commission.
3. We applaud the efforts of the Texas Commission, which has expended significant 
time and effort overseeing SWBTs implementation of the requirements of section 271.  For 
more than two years, the Texas Commission has worked with SWBT and competing carriers to 
identify and resolve a number of key issues related to SWBTs compliance with the Act.  As a 
result of the Texas Commissions efforts, competition has taken root, and is expanding in local 
telecommunications markets, which ultimately benefits consumers.  The Texas Commission 
utilized a number of effective methods to ensure that the local markets in Texas are open to 
competition today, and will remain so in the future.  Of particular note, the Texas Commission 
ensured that its section 271 review process was open to participation by all interested parties, and 
supplemented its review of the operational readiness of SWBTs OSS with an independent third 
party test.    As part of its section 271 review, the Texas Commission also developed clearly 
defined performance measurements and standards, and adopted a performance remedy plan to 
discourage backsliding.  In a continuing effort to refine and monitor performance measurements, 
the Texas Commission has a six month review process in place.  The Texas Commission is 
currently considering modifying existing measurements and adding new measurements based on 
input from SWBT and competing carriers.  
4. In addition to overseeing SWBTs implementation of the requirements to section 
271 approval, the Texas Commission has actively implemented our rules issued under section 
251, including the Commissions pricing standards and the rules relating to advanced services.  
Moreover, to address the concerns raised by the Department of Justice and commenters with 
respect to SWBTs initial application, the Texas Commission conducted a further review with 
respect to a number of key section 271 issues.  Because of those efforts, this second application 
by SWBT is an improvement over its first one, especially in those areas identified as deficient by 
the Department of Justice in its evaluation of SWBTs first application.  Furthermore, we accord 
the Texas Commissions verification of SWBTs compliance substantial weight based on the 
totality of its efforts and the extent of expertise it has developed on section 271 issues. 
5. The fact that SWBT has implemented the competitive checklist in Texas can be 
seen in the degree of entry into the local exchange market.  According to SWBT, it has 
unbundled more than 302,000 loops (including nearly 244,000 loops as part of an unbundled 
network element platform or UNE-P).   SWBT also reported resale of approximately 349,000 
access lines to competitors (including 191,000 residential lines).   The Department of Justice 
estimates that competitors have captured approximately eight percent of access lines in SWBTs 
territory in Texas.  
6. In addition to competition for voice services, SWBT provisioned nearly 7,000 
unbundled loops to broadband competitors for provision of xDSL services.   Although this is 
only a fraction of SWBTs ADSL customer base in Texas,  recent implementation of our line 
sharing requirements will give xDSL providers additional opportunities to compete for 
residential and small business customers on an equal footing with SWBTs separate affiliate for 
advanced services.   Monthly order volumes for unbundled xDSL-capable loops are steadily 
increasing,  as are UNE-P volumes.  Additionally, another branded player for voice services
WorldComjoined AT&T in the Texas market in April with a focus on residential customers. 
7. As we noted in the Bell Atlantic New York Order, the grant of this application 
merely closes a chapter.  It does not end the story.  SWBT must continue to comply with the 
checklist obligations set forth in section 271, and the separate affiliate requirements of section 
272.  As noted throughout this Order, should the evidence demonstrate that SWBT ceases to 
comply with the requirements of the Act, enforcement action may be appropriate.   Most 
notably, section 271(d)(6) authorizes the Commission to suspend or revoke the authorization 
granted herein. 
II. BACKGROUND
A. Statutory Framework
8. In the 1996 Act, Congress conditioned BOC provision of in-region, interLATA 
service on compliance with certain provisions of section 271.   Pursuant to section 271, BOCs 
must apply to this Commission for authorization to provide interLATA services originating in 
any in-region state.   Congress has directed the Commission to issue a written determination on 
each application no later than 90 days after the application is filed. 
9. To obtain authorization to provide in-region, interLATA services under section 
271, the BOC must show that: (1) it satisfies the requirements of either section 271(c)(1)(A), 
known as Track A or 271(c)(1)(B), known as Track B; (2) it has fully implemented the 
competitive checklist or that the statements approved by the state under section 252 satisfy the 
competitive checklist contained in section 271(c)(2)(B);  (3) the requested authorization will be 
carried out in accordance with the requirements of section 272;  and (4) the BOCs entry into in-
region, interLATA market is consistent with the public interest, convenience, and necessity.  
The statute specifies that, unless the Commission finds that these four criteria have been 
satisfied, the Commission shall not approve the requested authorization. 
10. Section 271(d)(2)(A) requires the Commission to consult with the Attorney 
General before making any determination approving or denying a section 271 application.  The 
Attorney General is entitled to evaluate the application using any standard the Attorney General 
considers appropriate, and the Commission is required to give substantial weight to the 
Attorney Generals evaluation. 
11. In addition, the Commission must consult with the relevant state commission to 
verify that the BOC has one or more state approved interconnection agreements with a facilities-
based competitor, or a Statement of Generally Available Terms and Conditions (SGAT), and that 
either the agreement(s) or general statement satisfy the competitive checklist.   Because the 
Act does not prescribe any standard for Commission consideration of a state commissions 
verification under section 271(d)(2)(B), the Commission has discretion in each section 271 
proceeding to determine the amount of weight to accord the state commissions verification.   
The Commission has held that, although it will consider carefully state determinations of fact 
that are supported by a detailed and extensive record, it is the Commissions role to determine 
whether the factual record supports the conclusion that particular requirements of section 271 
have been met.   As noted in the Introduction, we accord the Texas Commissions verification of 
SWBTs compliance substantial weight based on the totality of its efforts and the extent of its 
expertise on section 271 issues.  Like the New York Commission, whose section 271 verification 
we also accorded substantial weight, the Texas Commission directed a lengthy, rigorous and 
open collaborative process with active participation by Commission staff and competitive 
LECs.   The Texas Commission also developed a comprehensive performance measurement and 
remedy plan, which it continues to monitor and refine.   In addition, the Texas Commission has 
taken the lead on a number of emerging technical and legal issues related to provisioning of 
xDSL-capable loops.  We thus place substantial weight on the Texas Commissions comments in 
this matter, as they reflect its role not only as a driving force behind these proceedings, but also 
as an active participant in bringing competition for local telecommunications services to Texas.
B. History of this Application
12. In March 1998, SWBT filed with the Texas Commission a draft application to 
provide in-region, interLATA authority in the State of Texas.   On April 7, 1998, after a number 
of technical conferences and collaborative meetings, the Texas Commission concluded that 
SWBT had not demonstrated compliance with the requirements of section 271(c).   Shortly 
thereafter, on June 1, 1998, the Texas Commission issued Order Number 25 in which it listed 
129 key issues that needed to be resolved before it could recommend approval of SWBTs 
application.   
13. To facilitate the resolution of the issues identified in Order Number 25, the Texas 
Commission invited SWBT and interested competing carriers to participate in a series of 
collaborative meetings and workshops and technical conferences, known as the Texas 271 
Collaborative Process.   During this process, staff of the Texas Commission, SWBT, and 
competing carriers worked collaboratively to identify and resolve a number of key issues related 
to SWBTs compliance with section 271, including the operational readiness of SWBTs OSS, 
and the development of a performance monitoring and enforcement mechanism.   Another key 
component of the Texas Commissions section 271 proceeding was the development and 
adoption of a model interconnection agreement, which is referred to as the Texas 271 
Agreement or T2A.   The Texas Commission ensured that its collaborative process was open 
to participation by all interested parties and, as a result, received and reviewed a massive record 
of public comments.
14. In connection with its review of the operational readiness of SWBTs OSS, the 
Texas Commission retained Telcordia (formerly Bellcore) to conduct an independent third party 
evaluation of SWBTs OSS.   The Telcordia test was intended to address a multitude of issues, 
including the ability of SWBTs OSS to handle commercial volumes of orders, and SWBTs 
implementation of the performance measurements that had been approved by the Texas 
Commission during its collaborative process.   Following the completion of initial and follow-up 
testing,  Telcordia issued a final report, in which it concluded that SWBTs OSS were 
operationally ready to handle commercial volumes of transactions. 
15. Upon concluding that all outstanding issues relating to SWBTs compliance with 
section 271 had been resolved, the Texas Commission voted at its December 16, 1999 open 
meeting to unanimously support SWBTs section 271 application. 
16. As noted above, on January 10, 2000, SWBT filed an application with this 
Commission to provide in-region, interLATA service in the State of Texas.  On April 5, 2000, 
SWBT filed an extensive supplement to its January 10 Application.   Recognizing that such new 
evidence was filed shortly before the expiration of the 90-day statutory deadline, in its April 5 
filing, SWBT requested that the Commission restart the clock on its January 10 Application.   
Alternatively, SWBT asked the Commission to treat its supplemental filing as: (1) a withdrawal 
of the January 10 Application; and (2) a resubmission of a new application, which incorporates 
both the January 10 and April 5 filings.   On April 6, 2000, the Commission granted SWBTs 
alternative request to withdraw its January 10 Application and to initiate a new application 
pursuant to section 271 based on the record generated in response to the January 10 and April 5 
filings.   Throughout this Order, the January 10 filing will be referred to as the Texas I 
Application, and the April 5 filing will be referred to as the Texas II Application.
C. Texas Commission and Department of Justice Evaluations
17. The Texas Commission submitted its evaluation of SWBTs Texas I and Texas II 
Applications to this Commission on January 31, 2000  and April 26, 2000,   respectively. The 
Texas Commission advises the Commission that SWBT has taken the statutorily required steps 
to open its local markets to competition.   Specifically, the Texas Commission states that SWBT 
has met its obligation under section 271(c)(1)(A) by entering into interconnection agreements 
with at least 17 competing carriers that are serving residential and business customers either 
exclusively or predominantly over their own facilities.   In addition, the Texas Commission 
states that the record developed in the Texas proceeding establishes that SWBT has a legal 
obligation, under its interconnection agreements and state-approved tariffs, to provide the 14 
items required under section 271s checklist, and that SWBT is meeting its legal obligation to 
provide these 14 items. 
18. In its evaluation of SWBTs Texas II Application, the Texas Commission 
acknowledges the Department of Justices finding that SWBTs initial application was deficient 
in certain critical areas.    To address these concerns, the Texas Commission states that it 
conducted a further review.  Specifically, the Texas Commission states that it reexamined the 
evidence with respect to: (1) the integration of SWBTs pre-ordering and ordering interfaces; (2) 
the coordination, timing and quality of SWBT hot cut process; and (3) SWBTs provisioning 
of loops used by competing carriers to provide advanced services.   Based on the evidence 
presented in SWBTs Texas I Application, and its further review, the Texas Commission 
concludes that SWBT has taken the statutorily required steps to open its local markets to 
competition. 
19. The Department of Justice filed its evaluation of SWBTs Texas I Application on 
February 14, 2000.    In this evaluation, the Department of Justice recommended that SWBTs 
application be denied.   The Department of Justice submitted evaluations of SWBTs Texas II 
Application on May 12  and June 13, 2000.   In its May 12 evaluation, the Department of 
Justice concluded that SWBTs performance with respect to interconnection trunking had 
sufficiently improved to alleviate its concerns with respect to this issue.   It stated, however, that 
it would provide the Commission with its analysis of SWBTs performance in providing DSL-
capable loops, hot cuts for analog loops, and UNE-platform after it had reviewed SWBTs April 
performance data.  In its June 13, 2000 evaluation, the Department of Justice recommends 
approval of SWBTs application to provide long distance service in Texas, subject to certain 
qualifications.   
20. In recommending approval of SWBTs Texas II Application, the Department of 
Justice notes that SWBT has addressed many of the deficiencies associated with its first 
application.  More specifically, the Department of Justice concludes that SWBT has significantly 
improved the process by which it measures and reports its performance in providing unbundled 
loops for DSL services, and has demonstrated improvement in its ability to provision DSL-
capable loops in a nondiscriminatory manner.   Indeed, the Department of Justice concludes that 
recent data indicate that SWBT is now providing parity under virtually all measures relating to 
the provisioning of DSL loops.   The Department of Justice further finds that SWBT has 
demonstrated improvement in cutting over a loop to a competing carrier through both the 
coordinated hot cut (CHC) and frame due time (FDT) processes.   Finally, the Department of 
Justice states that commercial data with respect to competing carriers ability to compete via the 
UNE-platform are encouraging.  Indeed, the Department of Justice notes that entry by competing 
carriers using the UNE-platform has increased steadily over the last few months.
III. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
A. Overview
21. As part of our determination that SWBT has satisfied the requirements of section 
271, we consider whether SWBT has fully implemented the competitive checklist in subsection 
(c)(2)(B).   In demonstrating compliance with each item on the competitive checklist, a BOC 
must demonstrate that it has a concrete and specific legal obligation to furnish the item upon 
request pursuant to state-approved interconnection agreements that set forth prices and other 
terms and conditions for each checklist item, and that it is currently furnishing, or is ready to 
furnish, the checklist item in quantities that competitors may reasonably demand and at an 
acceptable level of quality. 
22. Section 271 conditions authorization to enter the long-distance market on a 
BOCs compliance with the terms of the competitive checklist, and those terms generally 
incorporate by reference the core local competition obligations that sections 251 and 252 impose 
on all incumbent LECs.  In a variety of proceedings since 1996, this Commission has discharged 
its statutory authority to issue comprehensive rules and orders giving specific content to those 
obligations, often in considerable detail.  In determining whether a BOC applicant has met the 
local competition prerequisites for entry into the long-distance market, therefore, we evaluate its 
compliance with our rules and orders in effect at the time the application was filed. 
23. Despite the comprehensiveness of our local competition rules, there will 
inevitably be, at any given point in time, a variety of new and unresolved interpretive disputes 
about the precise content of an incumbent LECs obligations to its competitors, disputes that our 
rules have not yet addressed and that do not involve per se violations of self-executing 
requirements of the Act.  Several commenters seek to use this section 271 proceeding as a forum 
for the mandatory resolution of many such local competition disputes, including disputes on 
issues of general application that are more appropriately the subjects of industry-wide notice-and-
comment rulemaking.  Indeed, those commenters would apparently compel this Commission to 
resolve those disputes in this proceeding, and to resolve each one in favor of SWBT, as a 
precondition to determining that SWBT has met the statutory obligations of section 271.  
24. The position of those commenters is irreconcilable with this statutory scheme.  
There may be other kinds of statutory proceedings, such as certain complaint proceedings, in 
which we may bear an obligation to resolve particular interpretive disputes raised by a carrier as 
the basis for its complaint.   But the section 271 process simply could not function as Congress 
intended if we were generally required to resolve all such disputes as a precondition to granting a 
section 271 application. 
25. First, Congress designed section 271 proceedings as highly specialized, 90-day 
proceedings for examining the performance of a particular carrier in a particular State at a 
particular time.  Such fast-track, narrowly focused adjudications -- generally dominated by 
extremely fact-intensive disputes about an individual BOCs empirical performance -- are often 
inappropriate forums for the considered resolution of industry-wide local competition questions 
of general applicability.  If Congress had intended to compel us to use section 271 proceedings 
for that purpose, it would not have confined our already intensive review to an extraordinarily 
compressed 90-day timetable.  
26. Second, Congress designed section 271 to give the BOCs an important incentive 
to open their local markets to competition, and that incentive presupposes a realistic hope of 
attaining section 271 authorization.  That hope would largely vanish if a BOCs opponents could 
effectively doom any section 271 application by freighting their comments with novel 
interpretive disputes and demand that authorization be denied unless each one of those disputes 
is resolved in the BOCs favor.  Indeed, if that were the required approach, the BOCs would face 
enormous uncertainty about the steps they need to take to win section 271 authorization, and they 
would therefore lose much of their incentive to cooperate in opening their local markets to 
competition in the first place.  That result would disserve the public interest in greater 
competition in both local and long-distance markets, and it would defeat the congressional intent 
underlying this statutory scheme.
27. Finally, simply as a matter of statutory construction, few of the substantive 
obligations contained in the local competition provisions of sections 251 and 252 are altogether 
self-executing; they rely for their content on the Commissions rules.  That is most obviously true 
in the case of our legislative rules under section 251(d)(2) identifying what network elements 
should be made available,   but it is also true of our many other rules and orders giving content 
to the broadly-worded provisions of the 1996 Act.  Our rules vary with time, redefining the 
statutory obligations that govern the market.  Just as our long-standing approach to the 
procedural framework for section 271 applications focuses our factual inquiry on a BOCs 
performance at the time of its application, so too may we fix at that same point the local 
competition obligations against which the BOCs performance is generally measured for 
purposes of deciding whether to grant the application.  Nothing in section 271 or any other 
provision of the Act compels us to require a BOC applicant to demonstrate compliance with new 
local competition obligations that were unrecognized at the time the application was filed.  
B. Compliance With Unbundling Rules
28. One element of the required showing, as explained in more detail below, is that 
the applicant satisfies the Commissions rules governing unbundled network elements.  It is 
necessary to clarify the aspects of the new rules governing incumbent LECs unbundling and line 
sharing obligations with which we expect SWBT to demonstrate compliance in this proceeding.  
We note that both the UNE Remand Order and the Line Sharing Order introduced new rules 
which did not become binding until after SWBT filed its second section 271 application for 
Texas, on April 5, 2000.   We conclude that, for the purpose of evaluating compliance with 
checklist item 2, we require SWBT to demonstrate that it is currently in compliance with the        
 
rules in effect on the date of filing, but do not require SWBT to demonstrate that it complies with 
rules that become effective during the pendency of its application.
29. We emphasize that, on an ongoing basis, SWBT must comply with all of the 
Commissions rules implementing the requirements of sections 251 and 252 upon the dates 
specified by those rules.  This includes such rules that have taken effect since the date SWBT 
filed its application, such as the new unbundling rules that became effective on May 18, 2000.
30. In the Local Competition First Report and Order, the Commission established a 
list of seven unbundled network elements (UNEs) which incumbent LECs were obliged to 
provide.   This obligation was codified in section 51.319 of the Commissions rules (rule 319).  
In January 1999, the Supreme Court vacated rule 319 and instructed the Commission to revise 
the standards under which the unbundling obligation is determined and to reevaluate the network 
elements subject to the unbundling requirement.   On November 5, 1999, we released the UNE 
Remand Order, in which we reevaluated the unbundling obligations of incumbent LECs and 
promulgated a new rule 319, pursuant to the Supreme Courts direction and sections 251(c)(3) 
and 251(d)(2) of the Act.  With certain exceptions, the new rule 319 and other requirements set 
forth in the UNE Remand Order took effect on February 17, 2000, 30 days after publication in 
the Federal Register.   The remaining aspects of the new rule 319 did not take effect until 120 
days after the publication date, or May 18, 2000.   Therefore, on April 5, 2000, when SWBT 
filed its re-application for section 271 authorization in Texas, certain aspects of the new rule 319 
were not yet in effect.
31. In order to demonstrate compliance with checklist item 2, SWBT must 
demonstrate that it complies fully with those portions of the new rule 319 that took effect in 
February 2000, and thus were binding on the date SWBT filed this second application.  Indeed, 
in the Texas I proceeding, SWBT had already committed to demonstrate compliance with the 
requirements of the UNE Remand Order that took effect in February 2000.   No commenter has 
objected to SWBTs position.
32. For the purpose of evaluating whether its application satisfies section 271, we do 
not require SWBT to demonstrate that it complies with those portions of the new rule 319 that 
took effect in May 2000.  Although SWBT, like all other incumbent LECs, was required to 
comply with rule 319 in May 2000, we believe it would be unfair to require SWBT to 
demonstrate compliance with rules that become effective after it submits an application for 
section 271 authorization, in advance of the effective date for other incumbent LECs.  In 
addition, were we to require SWBT to supplement the record with additional evidence 
demonstrating its compliance with the new UNE Remand rules once they became effective on 
May 18, 2000, such a re-opening of the record would be administratively complicated and 
inconsistent with our well-established procedural framework for section 271 applications.   A 
similar procedural situation was presented in the Bell Atlantic New York proceeding.  Bell 
Atlantic filed its application for section 271 authorization in New York after the UNE Remand 
Order had been adopted but before it had taken effect and, thus, at a time when no binding 
section 319 rule was in effect.   Bell Atlantic suggested, and we agreed, that it would be 
reasonable for the Commission to use the original seven network elements identified in former 
rule 319 in evaluating compliance with checklist item 2 of its application.   We declined to 
require Bell Atlantic to demonstrate compliance with the new rule 319 because we recognized 
that the new rule would not take effect until after the release of the Bell Atlantic New York Order, 
and because we believed it would be unfair to require Bell Atlantic to demonstrate compliance 
with new rules weeks or months before the rule became binding on other incumbent LECs.  We 
thus find SWBTs approach to rule 319 to be reasonable, and consistent with our analysis in the 
Bell Atlantic New York Order. 

33. For similar reasons, as discussed below, we do not require SWBT to prove that it 
has implemented the OSS and other loop facility modifications necessary to accommodate 
requests for line sharing as required in the Line Sharing Order. 
C. Scope of Evidence in the Record
1. Procedural Framework
34. Section 271 proceedings are, at their core, adjudications that the Act requires the 
Commission to complete within ninety days of the application filing.  The statute also requires us 
to consult with the Department of Justice and the relevant state commission in reviewing the 
application.  In the context of this statutory framework, the Commission has established 
procedural rules governing BOC section 271 applications.   Among other things, these rules 
provide an opportunity for parties other than the Department of Justice and the relevant state 
commission to comment on section 271 applications.
35. Under our procedural rules governing BOC section 271 applications, we expect 
that a section 271 application, as originally filed, will include all of the factual evidence on which 
the applicant would have the Commission rely in making its findings.   An applicant may not, at 
any time during the pendency of its application, supplement its application by submitting new 
factual evidence that is not directly responsive to arguments raised by parties commenting on its 
application.   This includes the submission, on reply, of factual evidence gathered after the initial 
filing.  In an effort to meet its burden of proof, however, a BOC may submit new factual 
information after the application is filed, if the sole purpose of that evidence is to rebut 
arguments or facts submitted by other commenters.   The new evidence, however, must cover 
only the period placed in dispute by commenters and may, in no event, post-date the filing of the 
comments (i.e., day 20).   In the event that the applicant submits new or post-dated evidence in 
replies or ex parte filings and the evidence is not directly responsive to commenting parties, we 
retain the discretion to start the 90-day review process anew or to accord such evidence no 
weight.  
36. This precedent has served the Commission well by deterring incomplete filings 
from the BOCs.  In particular, the rule is designed to prevent applicants from presenting part of 
their initial prima facie showing for the first time in reply comments.   The rule has enabled us 
properly to manage our own internal consideration of the application and ensures that 
commenters are not faced with a moving target in the BOCs section 271 application.  We 
continue to believe, as a general matter, that it is highly disruptive to our processes to have a 
record that is constantly evolving.  We emphasize, however, that our precedent makes clear that 
this rule is a discretionary one.   
37. We do not expect that a BOC, in its initial application, will anticipate and address 
every foreseeable argument its opponents might make in their subsequent reply comments, but 
we have previously stated that a BOC must address in its initial application all facts that the BOC 
can reasonably anticipate will be at issue.  Through state proceedings, BOCs should be able 
reasonably to identify and anticipate certain arguments and allegations that parties will make in 
their filings before the Commission. 
38. In addition, the Commission has found that a BOCs promises of future 
performance to address particular concerns raised by commenters have no probative value in 
demonstrating its present compliance with the requirements of section 271.   In order to gain in-
region, interLATA entry, a BOC must support its application with actual evidence demonstrating 
its present compliance with the statutory conditions for entry, instead of prospective evidence 
that is contingent on future behavior.  Thus, we must be able to make a determination based on 
the evidence in the record that a BOC has actually demonstrated compliance with the 
requirements of section 271.  Changes or upgrades (e.g., development of new processes for 
providing access to checklist items) that post-date the application will not be relied upon for 
checklist compliance, but may provide us with further assurances that the applicant will continue 
to satisfy the conditions of market entry in the future.  
39. With this procedural framework in mind, we find it appropriate to consider in 
connection with this application SWBTs Texas performance data for the month of April 2000, 
even though the month contains a few days that extend beyond the comment filing date, April 26, 
2000.  We believe that it would be administratively burdensome and would not result in any 
material change to the submitted data if we were to formalistically require SWBT to omit the last 
four days of April from its reports for the purposes of this proceeding.  SWBTs state-approved 
procedures are geared toward generating performance reports on a monthly basis, and 
competitive LECs have become accustomed to receiving them in the same form.
40. Moreover, generation of a special report, e.g., covering only the dates from April 
1 to April 26, 2000, would pose a greater risk of manipulation or miscalculation and would 
presumably make it more difficult for competitive LECs to compare the reported data with their 
own records, which they have become accustomed to receiving in monthly reports.  We find the 
monthly performance reports created in the ordinary course of business and according to 
established procedures to be inherently more reliable than any abbreviated report.  In addition, 
submission of a second set of April performance data (consisting of hundreds of pages of nearly 
duplicative material) would make an already voluminous and complex docket even more difficult 
for interested parties to follow.  Additionally, a partial month of data arguably would be less 
valuable for examining trends from previous full months.  For these reasons we do not believe 
that any party to this proceeding is prejudiced by our decision to include consideration of the last 
four days of SWBTs April performance reports.
2. Ex Parte Submissions
41. Under the procedural rules governing section 271 applications, we strongly 
encourage parties to set forth their views comprehensively in their formal submissions (i.e., Brief 
in Support, oppositions, supporting comments, etc.), and not to rely on subsequent ex parte 
presentations.  At the same time, the Commission expressly provided that parties may file ex 
partes.  Our procedural Public Notice thus clearly contemplates that parties may file written ex 
partes, when appropriate, to clarify the record.   We take this opportunity to clarify that like 
reply comments, ex partes must be directly responsive to arguments raised by parties 
commenting on the application.  Such ex partes may, however, elaborate on, or provide 
additional explanation or detail in response to requests from Commission staff or in direct 
response to post-reply ex parte filings.
42. Nothing in our procedural rules or past precedent precludes the Commission and 
the staff from requesting clarification or an explanation about information or data contained in 
the filings specified above.  Indeed, our procedural Public Notice expressly recognizes that the 
Commission may request additional information from the applicant, as the page limit for ex 
partes does not apply to written material filed in response to direct requests from Commission 
staff.   It is critical to the agencys deliberative process that the Commission and staff fully 
understand the evidence and arguments presented in the BOCs section 271 application, 
arguments raised in opposition, and responses made by parties on reply.  Accordingly, the 
Commission retains the discretion to request additional information from the applicant or other 
parties that elaborates on positions set forth in the original application, comments, or reply 
comments.   We emphasize that we are not departing from our view that the applicant should set 
forth its position in a clear and concise manner in its formal filings.  However, it is imperative 
that, as part of the Commissions deliberative process, we have the ability to engage in an 
ongoing dialogue with parties to ensure that we have a clear and accurate understanding of the 
information contained in all formal submissions. 
D. Framework for Analyzing Compliance with Statutory Requirements
43. In this section, we discuss two aspects of the framework for analyzing compliance 
with the statutory requirements of section 271.  First, we discuss the legal standards we have 
enunciated in past orders for determining whether a BOC is meeting the statutory 
nondiscrimination requirements.  Second, we discuss the evidentiary requirements of a BOCs 
section 271 application and, in particular, the types of showings we will find probative in 
deciding whether a BOC has met the statutory standards.
1. Legal Standard
44. In order to comply with the requirements of section 271s competitive checklist, a 
BOC must demonstrate that it has fully implemented the competitive checklist in subsection 
(c)(2)(B).  In particular, the BOC must demonstrate that it is offering interconnection and 
access to network elements on a nondiscriminatory basis.   Previous Commission orders 
addressing section 271 applications have elaborated on this statutory standard.  First, for those 
functions the BOC provides to competing carriers that are analogous to the functions a BOC 
provides to itself in connection with its own retail service offerings, the BOC must provide 
access to competing carriers in substantially the same time and manner as it provides to itself.  
Thus, where a retail analogue exists, a BOC must provide access that is equal to (i.e., 
substantially the same as) the level of access that the BOC provides itself, its customers, or its 
affiliates, in terms of quality, accuracy, and timeliness.   For those functions that have no retail 
analogue, the BOC must demonstrate that the access it provides to competing carriers would 
offer an efficient carrier a meaningful opportunity to compete. 
45. We do not view the meaningful opportunity to compete standard to be a weaker 
test than the substantially the same time and manner standard.  Where the BOC provides 
functions to its competitors that it also provides for itself in connection with its retail service, its 
actual performance can be measured to determine whether it is providing access to its 
competitors in substantially the same time and manner as it does to itself.  Where the BOC, 
however, does not provide a retail service that is similar to its wholesale service, its actual 
performance with respect to competitors cannot be measured against how it performs for itself 
because the BOC does not perform analogous activities for itself.  In those situations, our 
examination of whether the quality of access provided to competitors offers a meaningful 
opportunity to compete is intended to be a proxy for whether access is being provided in 
substantially the same time and manner and, thus, is nondiscriminatory. 
46. Finally, we note that a determination of whether the statutory standard is met is 
ultimately a judgment we must make based on our expertise in promoting competition in local 
markets and in telecommunications regulation generally.  We have not established, nor do we 
believe it appropriate to establish, specific objective criteria for what constitutes substantially 
the same time and manner or a meaningful opportunity to compete.  We look at each 
application on a case-by-case basis and consider the totality of the circumstances, including the 
origin and quality of the information before us, to determine whether the nondiscrimination 
requirements of the Act are met.  Whether this legal standard is met can only be decided based on 
an analysis of specific facts and circumstances.
2. Evidentiary Case
47. We have set forth above the analytical framework that we use in assessing 
whether a BOC has demonstrated compliance with the statutory requirements of section 271.  At 
the outset, we reemphasize that the BOC applicant retains at all times the ultimate burden of 
proof that its application satisfies all of the requirements of section 271, even if no party files 
comments challenging its compliance with a particular requirement.   
48. The evidentiary standards governing our review of section 271 applications are 
intended to balance our need for reliable evidence against our recognition that, in such a complex 
endeavor as a section 271 proceeding, no finder of fact can expect proof to an absolute certainty. 
While we expect the BOC to demonstrate as thoroughly as possible that it satisfies each checklist 
item, the public interest standard, and the other statutory requirements, we reiterate that the BOC 
needs only to prove each element by a preponderance of the evidence, which generally means 
the greater weight of evidence, evidence which is more convincing that the evidence which is 
offered in opposition to it.  
49. As we held in the Second BellSouth Louisiana Order, we first determine whether 
the BOC has made a prima facie case that it meets the requirements of a particular checklist item. 
The BOC must plead, with appropriate supporting evidence, facts which, if true, are sufficient to 
establish that the requirements of section 271 have been met.  Once the BOC has made such a 
showing, opponents must produce evidence and arguments to show that the application does not 
satisfy the requirements of section 271, or risk a ruling in the BOCs favor.  
50. When considering commenters filings in opposition to the BOCs application, we 
look for evidence that the BOCs policies, procedures, or capabilities preclude it from satisfying 
the requirements of the checklist item.  Mere unsupported evidence in opposition will not 
suffice.   Although anecdotal evidence may be indicative of systemic failures, isolated incidents 
may not be sufficient for a commenter to overcome the BOCs prima facie case.  Moreover, a 
BOC may overcome such anecdotal evidence by, for example, providing objective performance 
data that demonstrate that it satisfies the statutory nondiscrimination requirement. 
51. We will look to the state to resolve factual disputes wherever possible.  Indeed, 
we view the states and the Department of Justices roles to be similar to that of an expert 
witness.  Given the 90-day statutory deadline to reach a decision on a section 271 application, 
the Commission does not have the time or the resources to resolve the enormous number of 
factual disputes that inevitably arise from the technical details and data involved in such a 
complex endeavor.  Accordingly, as discussed above, where the state has conducted an 
exhaustive and rigorous investigation into the BOCs compliance with the checklist, we may give 
evidence submitted by the state substantial weight in making our decision.
52. To make a prima facie case that the BOC is meeting the requirements of a 
particular checklist item under section 271(c)(1)(A), the BOC must demonstrate that it is 
providing access or interconnection pursuant to the terms of that checklist item.  In particular, a 
BOC must demonstrate that it has a concrete and specific legal obligation to furnish the item 
upon request pursuant to state-approved interconnection agreements that set forth prices and 
other terms and conditions for each checklist item, and that it is currently furnishing, or is ready 
to furnish, the checklist item in quantities that competitors may reasonably demand and at an 
acceptable level of quality. 
53. The particular showing required to demonstrate compliance will vary depending 
on the individual checklist item and the circumstances of the application.  We have given BOCs 
substantial leeway with respect to the evidence they present to satisfy the checklist.  Although 
our orders have provided guidance on which types of evidence we find more persuasive, we 
reiterate that we remain open to approving an application based on other types of evidence if a 
BOC can persuade us that such evidence demonstrates nondiscriminatory treatment and other 
aspects of the statutory requirements.   In past orders we have encouraged BOCs to provide 
performance data in their section 271 applications to demonstrate that they are providing 
nondiscriminatory access to unbundled network elements to requesting carriers.   We have 
concluded that the most probative evidence that a BOC is providing nondiscriminatory access is 
evidence of actual commercial usage.  Performance measurements are an especially effective 
means of providing us with evidence of the quality and timeliness of the access provided by a 
BOC to requesting carriers. 
54. A number of state commissions, including Texas, have established a collaborative 
process through which they have developed, in conjunction with the incumbent and competing 
carriers, a set of measures, or metrics, for reporting of performance in various areas.   Through 
such collaborative processes, Texas has also adopted performance standards for certain functions, 
typically where there can be no comparable measure based on the incumbent LECs retail 
performance.  We strongly encourage this type of process, because it allows the technical details 
that determine how the metrics are defined and measured to be worked out with the participation 
of all concerned parties.  We also strongly support the efforts of state commissions to build and 
oversee a process that ensures the development of local competition that Congress intended.  An 
extensive and rigorous evaluation of the BOCs performance by the states provides greater 
certainty that barriers to competition have been eliminated and the local markets in a state are 
open to competition.
55. We caution, however, that adoption by a state of a particular performance standard 
pursuant to its state regulatory authority is not determinative of what is necessary to establish 
checklist compliance under section 271. We recognize that metric definitions and incumbent 
LEC operating systems will likely vary among states, and that individual states may set standards 
at a particular level that would not apply in other states and that may constitute more or less than 
the checklist requires.  Therefore, in evaluating checklist compliance in each application, we 
consider the BOCs performance within the context of each respective state.  For example, where 
a state develops a performance benchmark with input from affected competitors and the BOC, 
such a standard may well reflect what competitors in the marketplace feel they need in order to 
have a meaningful opportunity to compete.   
56. We emphasize that, because the Commission is statutorily required to determine 
checklist compliance, we must independently evaluate whether a BOC is fulfilling the 
nondiscrimination requirements of section 271.  Nevertheless, in making our evaluation we will 
examine whether the state commission has adopted a retail analogue or a benchmark to measure 
BOC performance and then review the particular level of performance the state has required.  If 
the state commission has made these determinations in the type of rigorous collaborative 
proceeding described above, we are much more likely to find that they are reasonable and 
appropriate measures of parity.  Accordingly, we are inclined to rely on such standards and 
measurements in our own analysis but may reach a different conclusion where justified.
57. In determining that SWBT has satisfied each element of the competitive checklist, 
we rely, among other factors, on performance data collected and submitted by SWBT.  Several 
commenters challenge the validity of certain data submitted by SWBT, however, including 
performance data collected and reported pursuant to the performance measurements developed 
under the auspices of the Texas Commission.   We reject the contention that SWBTs data are 
generally invalid because they have not been audited, and thus cannot be relied upon to support 
its application.  We note that the data submitted by SWBT in this proceeding have been subject 
to scrutiny and review by interested parties.  To a large extent, moreover, the accuracy of the 
specific performance data relied upon by SWBT is not contested.  Where particular SWBT data 
are disputed by commenters, we discuss these challenges in our checklist analysis, below.  In 
such instances, we first look to the results of data reconciliations between SWBT and competing 
carriers.  In other instances, we examine data collected and submitted by commenters in addition 
to SWBTs data.
58. The determination of whether a BOCs performance meets the statutory 
requirements necessarily is a contextual decision based on the totality of the circumstances and 
information before us.  There may be multiple performance measures associated with a particular 
checklist item, and an apparent disparity in performance for one measure, by itself, may not 
provide a basis for finding noncompliance with the checklist.  Other measures may tell a different 
story, and provide us with a more complete picture of the quality of service being provided.  
Whether we are applying the substantially same time and manner standard or the meaningful 
opportunity to compete standard, we will examine whether any differences in the measured 
performance are large enough to be deemed discriminatory under the statute.  For this reason, and 
because standards established by the Texas Commission are not necessarily determinative of 
checklist compliance, we note that SWBTs failure of individual performance measurements 
does not, in itself, warrant denial of this application. 
IV. COMPLIANCE WITH SECTION 271(C)(1)(A)
A. Background
59. In order for the Commission to approve a BOCs application to provide in-region, 
interLATA services, a BOC must first demonstrate that it satisfies the requirements of either 
section 271(c)(1)(A) (Track A) or 271(c)(1)(B) (Track B).   To qualify for Track A, a BOC 
must have interconnection agreements with one or more competing providers of telephone 
exchange service . . . to residential and business subscribers.   The Act states that such 
telephone service may be offered  . . . either exclusively over [the competitors] own telephone 
exchange service facilities or predominantly over [the competitors] own telephone exchange 
facilities in combination with the resale of the telecommunications services of another carrier.  
The Commission concluded in the Ameritech Michigan Order that, when a BOC relies upon 
more than one competing provider to satisfy section 271(c)(1)(A), each carrier need not provide 
service to both residential and business customers.  
B. Discussion
60. We conclude that SWBT demonstrates that it satisfies the requirements of Track 
A based on the interconnection agreements it has implemented with competing carriers in Texas. 
Specifically, we find that AT&T, Birch, CoServ, ETS, Optel, Sage, and KMC all provide 
telephone exchange service either exclusively or predominantly over their own facilities to 
residential subscribers and to business subscribers.    The Texas Commission also concludes 
that SWBT has met the requirements of section 271(c)(1)(A).   None of the commenting 
parties, including the competitors cited by SWBT in support of its showing, challenge SWBTs 
assertion in this regard. 
V. CHECKLIST COMPLIANCE
A. Checklist Item 1  Interconnection
1. Non-Pricing Aspects of Interconnection
a. Background
61. Section 271(c)(2)(B)(i) of the Act requires a section 271 applicant to provide 
[i]nterconnection in accordance with the requirements of sections 251(c)(2) and 252(d)(1).   
Section 251(c)(2) imposes a duty on incumbent LECs to provide, for the facilities and 
equipment of any requesting telecommunications carrier, interconnection with the local exchange 
carriers network . . . for the transmission and routing of telephone exchange service and 
exchange access.   In the Local Competition First Report and Order, the Commission 
concluded that interconnection referred only to the physical linking of two networks for the 
mutual exchange of traffic.   Section 251 contains three requirements for the provision of 
interconnection.  First, an incumbent LEC must provide interconnection at any technically 
feasible point within the carriers network.   Second, an incumbent LEC must provide 
interconnection that is at least equal in quality to that provided by the local exchange carrier to 
itself.   Finally, the incumbent LEC must provide interconnection on rates, terms, and 
conditions that are just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory, in accordance with the terms of the 
agreement and the requirements of [section 251] and section 252. 
62. To implement the equal-in-quality requirement in section 251, the Commissions 
rules require an incumbent LEC to design and operate its interconnection facilities to meet the 
same technical criteria and service standards that are used for the interoffice trunks within the 
incumbent LECs network.   In the Local Competition First Report and Order, the Commission 
identified trunk group blockage and transmission standards as indicators of an incumbent LECs 
technical criteria and service standards.   In prior section 271 applications, the Commission 
concluded that disparities in trunk group blockage indicated a failure to provide interconnection 
to competing carriers equal-in-quality to the interconnection the BOC provided to its own retail 
operations. 
63. In the Local Competition First Report and Order, the Commission concluded that 
the requirement to provide interconnection on terms and conditions that are just, reasonable, and 
nondiscriminatory means that an incumbent LEC must provide interconnection to a competitor 
in a manner no less efficient than the way in which the incumbent LEC provides the comparable 
function to its own retail operations.   The Commissions rules interpret this obligation to 
include, among other things, the incumbent LECs installation time for interconnection service  
and its provisioning of two-way trunking arrangements.   Similarly, repair time for troubles 
affecting interconnection trunks is useful for determining whether a BOC provides 
interconnection service under terms and conditions that are no less favorable than the terms and 
conditions the BOC provides to its own retail operations. 
64. Competing carriers may choose any method of technically feasible 
interconnection at a particular point on the incumbent LECs network.   Incumbent LEC 
provision of interconnection trunking is one common means of interconnection.  Technically 
feasible methods also include, but are not limited to, physical and virtual collocation and meet 
point arrangements.   The provision of collocation is an essential prerequisite to demonstrating 
compliance with item 1 of the competitive checklist.   In the Advanced Services First Report 
and Order, the Commission revised its collocation rules to require incumbent LECs to include 
shared cage and cageless collocation arrangements as part of their physical collocation 
offerings.  To show compliance with its collocation obligations, a BOC must have processes 
and procedures in place to ensure that all applicable collocation arrangements are available on 
terms and conditions that are just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory in accordance with 
section 251(c)(6) and our implementing rules.   Data showing the quality of procedures for 
processing applications for collocation space, as well as the timeliness and efficiency of 
provisioning collocation space, helps the Commission evaluate a BOCs compliance with its 
collocation obligations. 
b. Discussion
65. We conclude, as described below, that SWBT demonstrates it provides equal-in-
quality interconnection on terms and conditions that are just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory 
in accordance with the requirements of sections 251(c)(2) and as specified in section 271.  We 
further find that SWBT meets its burden of proof that it designs its interconnection facilities to 
meet the same technical criteria and service standards that are used for the interoffice trunks 
within its own network.  We also find that SWBT makes interconnection available at any 
technically feasible point, and that it is providing collocation in Texas in accordance with the 
Commissions rules.  We note that the Texas Commission finds that SWBT has satisfied all 
aspects of this checklist item.    
(i) Interconnection Trunking 
66. Based on our review of the record, we are persuaded that SWBT provides 
competing carriers with interconnection trunking that is equal-in-quality to the interconnection 
SWBT provides to its own retail operations, and on terms and conditions that are just, 
reasonable, and nondiscriminatory.   SWBT makes interconnection available in Texas through 
interconnection agreements, including its state-approved T2A agreement.   SWBT receives 
orders for interconnection trunks through the Access Service Request (ASR) process, and accepts 
ASRs through an electronic application-to-application interface, through a proprietary OSS 
system, and through manual orders.   SWBT provides performance data to measure the quality 
of interconnection service provided to competing carriers.   
67. Trunk Blockage.  In prior section 271 applications, we relied on trunk blockage 
data to evaluate a BOCs interconnection quality.   SWBTs performance data demonstrates that 
in the months leading up to its Texas II application, SWBT provided interconnection that is 
equal-in-quality to the interconnection it provides in its own network.  Specifically, SWBTs 
statewide performance data measuring the percentage of calls blocked on outgoing traffic (trunk 
blockage from SWBT end office and tandem to competitive LEC end office) demonstrates that in 
the three months immediately preceding its Texas II section 271 application, SWBT was in 
compliance with the relevant benchmark established in Texas (i.e., blockage not to exceed one 
percent on these trunks).   
68. We find that allegations of some competitive LECs, that they have been unable to 
obtain the number of interconnection trunks they requested in a timely manner appear to be the 
exception rather than the rule.  Indeed, as we discuss throughout this section, we find that 
SWBTs performance data indicate that it is providing nondiscriminatory interconnection 
trunking.  To the extent there may have been some problems with trunk provisioning,  we agree 
with the Department of Justice that such issues have been adequately resolved.  
69. Competitive LECs allege that they have encountered problems ordering trunks 
from SWBT which has resulted in blockage on competitive LEC networks, in some cases leading 
to customer complaints and lost or forgone sales.   TWTC, which provided the most extensive 
history of its blockage problems, stated that its most severe blockage occurred in Houston during 
the conversion of the SWBT and TWTC interconnection facilities from one-way to two-way 
trunks during the second half of 1999.    TWTC acknowledges that the blocking ended in mid-
October, 1999.   Furthermore, we note that SWBT implemented improvements approved by the 
Texas Commission during supplemental proceedings in November and December 1999 to 
respond to competitive LEC concerns. As stated above, SWBT meets the state benchmark for 
PM 70 for January, February, March and April.   We also note that, as of October, over 75% of 
the trunks provisioned in Texas were two-way trunks.   In the future, if competitive LECs allege 
that blocking is occurring on outgoing calls from the competitive LEC network to the BOC 
network, and that such blockage is not being captured by the state-approved performance 
measure, then competitive LECs should provide evidence, such as reliable performance data, 
along with a showing of why the BOC is responsible for the blockage. Should such evidence 
develop in the future in Texas, we will consider whether enforcement action pursuant to section 
271(d)(6) is warranted.
70. Missed Due Dates.  We find that other aspects of SWBTs performance data 
further indicate it is providing nondiscriminatory interconnection trunking in Texas.  SWBTs 
performance data concerning the percentage of missed due dates for provisioning of 
interconnection trunks show that in the months preceding its Texas II application, SWBT 
provided parity or better performance to competitors.   Recently implemented modifications in 
reporting give us added assurance that SWBT will continue to provide timely installation of 
interconnection trunks.  In response to competitive LEC concerns that the performance 
measurement does not capture held orders,  the Texas Commission implemented a new 
measure, PM 73.1, to capture the percentage of held interconnection trunk orders greater than 90 
calendar days.   SWBT asserts that there were no held orders greater than 90 days between 
January and March.   We find that SWBT has satisfied the benchmark.  Further, commenters 
have not raised any new allegations of inadequate or overlong trunk provisioning.  We note that 
the Department of Justice agrees that SWBTs performance is satisfactory with respect to this 
measurement.  
71. Average Installation Intervals.  SWBTs performance data that measure the 
average time for installation of interconnection trunks demonstrate that SWBT meets the state 
benchmark in February, March and April.   We have considered the concerns of the 
Telecommunications Resellers Association and others in addition to the Department of Justice, 
and find that the extensive review by the Texas Commission of SWBTs operational processes 
and empirical performance data satisfactorily addresses their concerns.   We therefore reject the 
concerns raised in the record regarding SWBTs average installation interval performance as 
those concerns relate largely to last years performance.  The data submitted as part of the instant 
application indicate SWBT meets the state benchmark.    
72. In conclusion, our decision that SWBT satisfies the requirements of this checklist 
item is based on the following: its trunk group blockage rates for competitors pass the state 
benchmark, its rate of missed due dates for trunk installations is lower for service to competitors 
than for service to itself, and its average time to install interconnection trunks passes the state 
benchmark. 
(ii) Collocation
73. SWBT has demonstrated that its collocation offering in Texas satisfies the 
requirements of sections 271 and 251 of the Act.  SWBT provides physical and virtual 
collocation through a state-approved tariff.   In its application, SWBT indicates that shared, 
cageless, and adjacent collocation options are available in Texas, and that it has taken other steps 
to implement the collocation requirements contained in the Advanced Services First Report and 
Order.   SWBT provides terms for physical collocation in its physical collocation tariff, as well 
as in a physical collocation handbook that it incorporates into the tariff by reference.   SWBTs 
collocation performance data indicate that SWBT processed requests for collocation within time 
frames established by the Texas Commission.  SWBT stated that it has provided 655 physical 
collocation arrangements in 166 different SWBT central offices in Texas.  Except where a 
competitive LEC places a large number of collocation orders in the same 5-business day period, 
SWBT responds to each request within 10 days.   SWBT provides three measurements 
(disaggregated into various submeasures) for collocation:  Percentage of Missed Collocation Due 
Dates (PM 107), Average Delay Days for SWBT Missed Due Dates (PM 108), and Percent of 
Requests Processed within the Tariffed Timelines (PM 109).  Where data points are available, 
SWBTs data indicates it meets the measures for the months of January, February, and March.  
74. SWBT makes virtual collocation available through its virtual collocation tariff, 
with notification and installation intervals for all tariffed equipment established in SWBTs 
Interconnectors Collocation Services Handbook for Virtual Collocation.   In addition, SWBT 
states that competitive LECs may negotiate custom-tailored interconnection arrangements on 
request.   The Texas Commission agrees that SWBTs revised physical collocation offerings 
comply with the Advanced Services Order.   Further, SWBTs collocation offering underwent 
an active and thorough review at the state level. The Texas Commission addressed the 
provisioning of collocation space and established standard provisioning intervals for caged, 
cageless, and virtual collocation. 
75. We disagree with ALTS and the CLEC Coalition that SWBTs practice of walling 
in its own equipment as a reasonable security measure violates our collocation rules.     Our 
rules as they existed at the time of filing did not explicitly prohibit this practice.   Therefore, we 
find that these allegations do not rise to the level of non-compliance for this checklist item.   In 
addition, we believe that Metromedia Fiber Network Services (MFNS) alleged difficulties 
negotiating collocation arrangements with SWBT are best resolved through the section 252 
negotiation and arbitration process or through the section 208 complaint process.   
(iii) Technically Feasible Points of Interconnection
76. We conclude that SWBT provides interconnection at all technically feasible 
points, and therefore demonstrates compliance with the checklist item.  SWBT asserts that it 
makes each of its standard methods of interconnection available at the line side or trunk side of 
the local switch, the trunk connection points of a tandem switch, central office cross-connect 
points, out-of-band signaling transfer points, and points of access to UNEs.   SWBT 
demonstrates that it has an approved state interconnection agreement that spells out readily 
available points of interconnection, and provides a process for requesting interconnection at 
additional, technically feasible points.   
77. We disagree with AT&T that SWBT has violated its obligation to permit 
competing carriers to select interconnection points.   The existing language in the 
interconnection agreement between SWBT and AT&T states that in each SWBT exchange area 
in which AT&T offers local exchange services, the parties will interconnect their network 
facilities at a minimum of one mutually agreeable point of interconnection.   This portion of 
the interconnection agreement between SWBT and AT&T, however, was negotiated and, 
therefore, does not have to comply with section 251.   Consequently, AT&Ts experience does 
not constitute evidence of a failure by SWBT to provide interconnection at all technically 
feasible points for purposes of section 271 review.  
78. Section 251, and our implementing rules, require an incumbent LEC to allow a 
competitive LEC to interconnect at any technically feasible point.  This means that a competitive 
LEC has the option to interconnect at only one technically feasible point in each LATA.   The 
incumbent LEC is relieved of its obligation to provide interconnection at a particular point in its 
network only if it proves to the state public utility commission that interconnection at that point 
is technically infeasible.   Thus, new entrants may select the most efficient points at which to 
exchange traffic with incumbent LECs, thereby lowering the competing carriers costs of, among 
other things, transport and termination.   Indeed, section 251(c)(2) gives competing carriers 
the right to deliver traffic terminating on an incumbent LECs network at any technically feasible 
point in the network, rather than obligating such carriers to transport traffic to less convenient or 
efficient interconnection points.   We note that in SWBTs interconnection agreement with 
MCI (WorldCom), WorldCom may designate a single interconnection point within a LATA.  
Thus, SWBT provides WorldCom interconnection at any technically feasible point, and section 
252(i) entitles AT&T, or any requesting carrier, to seek the same terms and conditions as those 
contained in WorldComs agreement, a matter any carrier is free to take up with the Texas 
Commission.  
2. Pricing of Interconnection
a. Background 
79. As discussed above, checklist item 1 requires a BOC to provide interconnection 
in accordance with the requirements of sections 251(c)(2) and 252(d)(1).   Section 251(c)(2) 
requires incumbent LECs to provide interconnection at any technically feasible point within the 
carriers network  on rates, terms, and conditions that are just, reasonable, and 
nondiscriminatory.   Section 252(d)(1) requires state determinations regarding the rates, terms, 
and conditions of interconnection to be based on cost and to be nondiscriminatory, and allows the 
rates to include a reasonable profit. 
80. Interconnection trunking, physical and virtual collocation, and meet-point 
arrangements are among the technically feasible methods of interconnection.   Shared cage and 
cageless collocation arrangements must be part of an incumbent LECs physical collocation 
offerings.   To comply with its collocation obligations, an incumbent LEC must make 
collocation arrangements available on rates, terms, and conditions that are just, reasonable, and 
nondiscriminatory.   The Commissions pricing rules require, among other things, that 
incumbent LECs provide collocation based on the total element, long-run, incremental cost 
(TELRIC). 
81. Although the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit stayed the 
Commissions pricing rules in 1996,  the Supreme Court restored the Commissions pricing 
authority on January 25, 1999.   In reaching its decision, the Court acknowledged that section 
201(b) explicitly grants the FCC jurisdiction to make rules governing matters to which the 1996 
Act applies.   Furthermore, the Court determined that section 251(d) also provides evidence of 
an express jurisdictional grant by requiring that the Commission [shall] complete all actions 
necessary to establish regulations to implement the requirements of this section.   The Court 
also held that the pricing provisions implemented under the Commissions rulemaking authority 
do not inhibit the establishment of rates by the states.   The Court concluded that the 
Commission has jurisdiction to design a pricing methodology to facilitate local competition 
under the 1996 Act, including pricing for interconnection and unbundled access, as it is the 
States that will apply those standards and implement that methodology, determining the concrete 
result. 
b. Discussion
82. Based on the evidence in the record, we find that SWBT offers interconnection in 
Texas to other telecommunications carriers at just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory rates, in 
compliance with checklist item 1.   SWBT states that it provides interconnection at TELRIC-
based rates that are just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory.   SWBT provides terms for 
physical collocation in its physical collocation tariff, as well as in a physical collocation 
handbook that it incorporates into the tariff by reference.   SWBT makes virtual collocation 
available through its virtual collocation tariff.   SWBT says it will also negotiate custom-
tailored interconnection arrangements on request.   According to SWBT, TELRIC-based 
charges apply to custom work even if no rate has been established previously.   SWBT states 
that it pro-rates its site preparation charges and allocates them based on the percentage of the 
total space each competitive LEC uses.   SWBT also says that it pro-rates its collocation 
charges so that the first competitive LEC to enter the premises is not responsible for all the site 
preparation costs. 

83. The Texas Commission states in its evaluation that SWBT has satisfied the 
requirements of checklist item 1.   According to the Texas Commission, SWBT provides 
interconnection trunking at just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory terms and conditions.   The 
state commission says that SWBT makes interconnection available through the Texas 
Commission-approved 271 agreement, and that the Texas-approved physical and virtual 
collocation tariffs comply with sections 251 and 271 of the Act.   
84. We stress that we place great weight on the Texas Commissions active review of 
SWBTs pricing elements in its 271 application.  The Texas Commission has encouraged active 
and open participation by all carriers in setting rates through numerous proceedings, reviewed 
costs studies and conflicting testimonies, arbitrated pricing issues and incorporated its findings 
into interconnection agreements, and has demonstrated its commitment to applying the pricing 
standards of sections 251 and 252 of the Act as implemented by our rules.  
85. As the Texas Commission explains, [t]he collocation tariffs contain interim rates, 
subject to true-up, for all aspects and methods of available collocation.   AT&T argues that the 
interim nature of these rates proves fatal to SWBTs application in light of our discussion of 
interim rates in the Bell Atlantic New York Order.   We disagree.  In that order, we stated that:
a BOCs application for in-region interLATA authority should not 
be rejected solely because permanent rates may not yet have been 
established for each and every element or nonrecurring cost of 
provisioning an element.  We believe that this question should be 
addressed on a case-by-case basis.  If the uncertainty caused by the 
use of interim rates can be minimized, then it may be appropriate, 
at least for the time being, to approve an application based on the 
interim rates contained in the relevant tariff.   
86. We concluded that the interim nature of Bell Atlantics xDSL rates posed no 
obstacle to the approval of its application.  We reasoned that the xDSL rate dispute was relatively 
new, that the New York Commission has a track record of setting other prices at TELRIC rates, 
and that the interim rates would be subject to a refund or true-up once final rates were set.   
Although we noted that competitive [u]ncertainty will be minimized if the interim rates are for a 
few isolated ancillary items, we did not say that the disputed items must be ancillary in character 
to ensure compliance with the checklist. 
87. This case again presents the question of the significance of interim rates for 
purposes of adjudicating a section 271 application.  We again conclude that the section 271 
process could not function as Congress intended if we adopted a general policy of denying any 
section 271 application accompanied by unresolved pricing and other intercarrier disputes.  Our 
experience has demonstrated that, at any given point in time at which a section 271 application 
might be filed, the rapidly evolving telecommunications market will have produced a variety of 
unresolved, fact-specific disputes concerning the BOCs obligations under sections 251 and 252. 
BOCs and their competitors can be expected to take opposite positions in those disputes, and the 
adjudicated resolution ultimately will often fall somewhere in between the positions of the 
opposing parties.  If uncertainty about the proper outcome of such disputes were sufficient to 
undermine a section 271 application, such applications could rarely be granted.  Congress did not 
intend such an outcome.
88. The 1996 Act authorizes the state commissions to resolve specific carrier-to-
carrier disputes arising under the local competition provisions, and it authorizes the federal 
district courts to ensure that the results of the state arbitration process are consistent with federal 
law.   Although we have an independent obligation to ensure compliance with the checklist, 
section 271 does not compel us to preempt the orderly disposition of intercarrier disputes by the 
state commissions, particularly now that the Supreme Court has restored our pricing jurisdiction 
and has thereby directed the state commissions (and the federal courts on review) to follow our 
pricing rules in their disposition of those disputes.  For those reasons, the mere presence of 
interim rates will not generally threaten a section 271 application so long as an interim solution 
to a particular rate dispute is reasonable under the circumstances, the state commission has 
demonstrated its commitment to our pricing rules, and provision is made for refunds or true-ups 
once permanent rates are set.   As discussed below, the interim rates in dispute here meet that 
standard.
89. AT&T argues that the interim nature of SWBTs collocation rates demands that 
we deny the section 271 application.   We disagree.  As we explained in the Bell Atlantic New 
York Order, we examine interim rates under section 271 on a case-by-case basis.   We conclude 
that the state has made reasonable efforts to set interim collocation rates in accordance with the 
Act and the FCCs rules.  The Texas Commission set the interim rates pursuant to TELRIC 
standards so that competitive LECs could obtain collocation while the state incorporated the 
Commissions findings in the March 31, 1999, Advanced Services Order.   AT&T argues that 
the interim caged collocation rates are not TELRIC-based, and stem instead from outdated tariffs 
that include costs for things such as asbestos removal and separate entryways that the FCC has 
since deemed improper.   AT&T admits, however, that the Texas Commission reduced one of 
the elements of the caged collocation rates by 30 percent to accommodate that fact.   AT&T 
argues that the reduction is insufficient to conform the caged collocation rates to TELRIC 
standards,  but we view it as a reasonable attempt by the state commission to set an interim 
TELRIC-based rate pending its final determination.  Moreover, the Texas Commission based the 
majority of the interim rates, at least with regard to physical collocation, from a TELRIC model 
developed by AT&T and MCI, albeit with some modifications. 
90. The Texas Commission has set up a schedule to set permanent rates, and has 
indicated to the parties that the interim rates are subject to a refund or true-up, an approach 
apparently urged by AT&T.   AT&T acknowledges that the Texas Commission has directed use 
of the AT&T/MCI model in setting permanent physical and virtual collocation rates.   Further 
cost studies were due April 12, 2000, and a hearing was scheduled for June 15-16, 2000.   
Based on the record, we believe that the Texas Commission has taken a reasonable approach.  
We conclude that the uncertainty surrounding the interim rates has been minimized, and we have 

confidence that the Texas Commission will set permanent rates that are in compliance with the 
Act and our rules.  Consequently, we find that SWBT has met its obligations under this checklist 
item.   
B. Checklist Item 2  Unbundled Network Elements
91. Our analysis under checklist item 2 addresses whether SWBT satisfies its 
obligation to provide nondiscriminatory access to unbundled network elements pursuant to 
section 251(c), at prices that meet the requirements of section 252(d).  As discussed above, the 
Commission has identified a number of UNEs, including operations support systems (OSS), that 
incumbent LECs must make available under section 251(c)(3) as of the filing date of this 
application.   In this section, we address whether SWBT provides access to OSS and to 
combinations of UNEs in accordance with section 251(c)(3) and our rules.   We recognize, as 
we have in prior section 271 orders, that the duty to provide nondiscriminatory access to OSS 
functions is embodied in other terms of the competitive checklist as well.   Aside from OSS, the 
other UNEs that SWBT must make available under section 251(c)(3) are also listed as separate 
items on the competitive checklist, and are addressed below in separate sections for each 
checklist item. 
1. Operations Support Systems
a. Background
92. Incumbent LECs use a variety of systems, databases, and personnel (collectively 
referred to as OSS) to provide service to their customers.   The Commission consistently has 
found that nondiscriminatory access to OSS is a prerequisite to the development of meaningful 
local competition.   For example, new entrants must have access to the functions performed by 
the incumbents OSS in order to formulate and place orders for network elements or resale 
services, to install service to their customers, to maintain and repair network facilities, and to bill 
customers.   The Commission has determined that without nondiscriminatory access to the 
BOCs OSS, a competing carrier will be severely disadvantaged, if not precluded altogether, 
from fairly competing in the local exchange market.    
93. Section 271 requires the Commission to determine whether a BOC offers 
nondiscriminatory access to OSS functions.  Section 271(c)(2)(B)(ii) requires a BOC to provide 
nondiscriminatory access to network elements in accordance with the requirements of sections 
251(c)(3) and 252(d)(1).   The Commission has determined that access to OSS functions falls 
squarely within an incumbent LECs duty under section 251(c)(3) to provide unbundled network 
elements under terms and conditions that are nondiscriminatory and just and reasonable, and its 
duty under section 251(c)(4) to offer resale services without imposing any limitations or 
conditions that are discriminatory or unreasonable.   The Commission must therefore examine a 
BOCs OSS performance to evaluate compliance with section 271(c)(2)(B)(ii) and (xiv).   In 
addition, the Commission has also concluded that the duty to provide nondiscriminatory access 
to OSS functions is embodied in other terms of the competitive checklist as well.   Consistent 
with prior orders, we examine SWBT's OSS performance directly under checklist items 2 and 14, 
as well as other checklist terms.     
94. As part of its statutory obligation to provide nondiscriminatory access to OSS 
functions, a BOC must provide access that sufficiently supports each of the three modes of 
competitive entry envisioned by the 1996 Act  competitor-owned facilities, unbundled network 
elements, and resale.   For OSS functions that are analogous to those that a BOC provides to 
itself, its customers or its affiliates, the nondiscrimination standard requires the BOC to offer 
requesting carriers access that is equivalent in terms of quality, accuracy, and timeliness.   The 
BOC must provide access that permits competing carriers to perform these functions in 
substantially the same time and manner as the BOC.   The Commission has recognized in 
prior orders that there may be situations in which a BOC contends that, although equivalent 
access has not been achieved for an analogous function, the access that it provides is nonetheless 
nondiscriminatory within the meaning of the statute. 
95. For OSS functions that have no retail analogue, the BOC must offer access 
sufficient to allow an efficient competitor a meaningful opportunity to compete.   In assessing 
whether the quality of access affords an efficient competitor a meaningful opportunity to 
compete, we will examine, in the first instance, whether specific performance standards exist for 
those functions.   In particular, we will consider whether appropriate standards for measuring 
OSS performance have been adopted by the relevant state commission or agreed upon by the 
BOC in an interconnection agreement or during the implementation of such an agreement.   If 
such performance standards exist, we will evaluate whether the BOCs performance is sufficient 
to allow an efficient competitor a meaningful opportunity to compete.  
96. We analyze whether SWBT has met the nondiscrimination standard for each OSS 
function using the two-step approach outlined in prior orders.  First, we determine whether the 
BOC has deployed the necessary systems and personnel to provide sufficient access to each of 
the necessary OSS functions and whether the BOC is adequately assisting competing carriers to 
understand how to implement and use all of the OSS functions available to them.   We next

assess whether the OSS functions that the BOC has deployed are operationally ready, as a 
practical matter.   
97. Under the first inquiry, a BOC must demonstrate that it has developed sufficient 
electronic (for functions that the BOC accesses electronically) and manual interfaces to allow 
competing carriers equivalent access to all of the necessary OSS functions.   For example, a 
BOC must provide competing carriers with the specifications necessary for carriers to design or 
modify their systems in a manner that will enable them to communicate with the BOCs systems 
and any relevant interfaces.   In addition, a BOC must disclose to competing carriers any 
internal business rules  and other formatting information necessary to ensure that a carriers 
requests and orders are processed efficiently.   Finally, a BOC must demonstrate that its OSS is 
designed to accommodate both current demand and projected demand for competing carriers 
access to OSS functions.   Although not a prerequisite, the Commission continues to encourage 
the use of industry standards as an appropriate means of meeting the needs of a competitive local 
exchange market.      
98. Under the second inquiry, we examine performance measurements and other 
evidence of commercial readiness to ascertain whether the BOCs OSS is handling current 
demand and will be able to handle reasonably foreseeable future volumes.   The most probative 
evidence that OSS functions are operationally ready is actual commercial usage.   Absent 
sufficient and reliable data on commercial usage, the Commission will consider the results of 
carrier-to-carrier testing, independent third-party testing, and internal testing in assessing the 
commercial readiness of a BOCs OSS.   Although we do not require OSS testing, a persuasive 
test will provide us with an objective means by which to evaluate a BOCs OSS readiness where 
there is little to no evidence of commercial usage, or may otherwise strengthen an application 
where the BOCs evidence of actual commercial usage is weak or is otherwise challenged by 
competitors, The persuasiveness of a third-party review, however, is dependent upon the 
qualifications, experience and independence of the third party and the conditions and scope of the 
review itself.    If the review is limited in scope or depth or is not independent and blind, we 
will give it minimal weight.
b. Discussion
99. For the reasons discussed more fully below, we conclude that SWBT has 
demonstrated that it provides nondiscriminatory access to its OSS.  The Commission consistently 
has found that nondiscriminatory access to OSS is a prerequisite to the development of 
meaningful local competition, as well as providing access to other checklist items.   For 
example, new entrants must have access to the functions performed by the incumbents OSS in 
order to formulate and place orders for network elements or resale services, to install service to 
their customers, to maintain and repair network facilities, and to bill customers.  The evidence 
presented in this record shows that SWBT provides nondiscriminatory access to OSS pre-
ordering, ordering, maintenance and repair, and billing functions.  We base these findings 
primarily on evidence in the record of SWBTs actual commercial performance, including 
SWBTs performance measurements developed under the auspices of the Texas Commission.  In 
addition, we find that the Telcordia third-party test provides some additional evidence of the 
functionality and capability of SWBTs OSS.  We also find that SWBT has instituted a change 
management process that will help to ensure that changes to SWBTs OSS interfaces do not 
impede a carriers ability to access critical OSS functions.  
100. Although the Department of Justice identified several areas of concern regarding 
the performance and readiness of SWBTs OSS in the Texas 1 proceeding,  it recommends 
approval of SWBTs second application and states that it is encourag[ed] by recent 
developments with respect to OSS.  The Department of Justice nonetheless expresses lingering 
concerns about several allegations raised by competitive LECs.   We address each of these 
concerns below.  Based on evidence submitted in this second proceeding, including evidence 
demonstrating that SWBTs performance has improved in several critical areas, we find that the 
areas of concern identified by the Department of Justice do not merit denial of SWBTs 
application, and conclude that SWBT has demonstrated that it provides nondiscriminatory access 
to its OSS.
c. Independent Third Party Testing
101. The Texas Commission retained Telcordia (formerly Bellcore) as an independent 
third party to oversee a carrier-to-carrier test of the operational readiness of SWBTs OSS and to 
evaluate the efficacy of the documentation and other processes SWBT makes available to 
competing carriers in Texas.   With the help of the Technical Advisory Group (TAG), a group 
composed of the Texas Commission, several competitive LECs, and SWBT, Telcordia developed 
a Master Test Plan that outlined the general structure of the testing, and framed the specific 
requirements necessary for testing certain SWBT systems.   The test consisted of a 
functionality test designed to evaluate and validate the ability of SWBTs OSS systems to 
process different types of orders, and a capacity test designed to evaluate the ability of SWBTs 
systems to handle reasonably foreseeable volumes of orders.   The actual tests of SWBTs OSS 
were conducted using electronic interfaces certain carriers had already developed for 
interconnecting with SWBTs systems.   Telcordias role was to validate the test design, 
monitor the test execution, validate the test results, and report the results of the testing.   We 
applaud the Texas Commission for its significant role in developing a third-party test in Texas, 
for its oversight of Telcordias review of SWBTs OSS readiness, and for its continuing role in 
ensuring that SWBT provides access to its OSS in a non-discriminatory manner.    We continue 
to encourage strong state participation in ensuring that the BOCs OSS can support competitive 
entry into the local markets.
102. We view independent third party testing as a useful tool in determining whether a 
BOCs deployment of OSS is nondiscriminatory.  While there may be several ways to design and 
conduct a meaningful third party test, we have recognized that the persuasiveness of such a test is 
dependent on the conditions and scope of the review, and we thus encourage BOCs to pursue 
comprehensive OSS testing.  The findings of a third party tester may be necessary to assess 
whether a BOC is providing nondiscriminatory access to its OSS, particularly if other evidence, 
such as data reflecting actual commercial usage, is not presented by the applicant.  As we have 
stated previously, however, we consider actual commercial usage to be the most probative 
evidence that a BOC is providing nondiscriminatory access to its OSS.   We thus first examine 
actual commercial usage in making our determination in this matter.
103. We find that the third party test conducted by Telcordia provides evidence of the 
functionality and capacity of SWBTs OSS in several important areas.   At the same time, 
however, we agree with several commenters and the Department of Justice that the Telcordia test 
was limited in scope and depth.   This is not to say, as some commenters contend, that SWBTs 
application is inadequate.  Rather, this finding simply means that, in those substantive areas not 
covered by the Telcordia test, we will rely instead on other evidence, such as actual commercial 
usage, to assess whether SWBT provides nondiscriminatory access to its OSS.  Throughout the 
following analysis, we describe various aspects of the Telcordia test, and identify the specific 
portions of the test upon which we rely.  We also explain where we are unable to rely on 
Telcordias findings, such as when we find that a particular issue was not covered by the test.  
104. Several commenters also challenge the blindness of the test process and 
Telcordias independence, and argue that Telcordias findings thus should be given little 
weight.   We note, however, that the Texas Commission played an active role throughout the 
testing process and acted as test manager.   The Texas Commission also describes specific 
efforts that were taken to maintain testing blindness.   Based on our review of the evidence in 
the record describing the test process, and on the assurances provided by the Texas Commission, 
we find that the results of Telcordias test, in certain areas, provide meaningful evidence that is 
relevant to our analysis of SWBTs OSS. 
d. Change Management Process
105. We conclude that SWBT demonstrates that it provides the documentation and 
support necessary to provide competing carriers nondiscriminatory access to its OSS.  SWBT 
makes this demonstration by showing that it has an adequate change management process in 
place in Texas. The record also reflects that SWBT has adhered to its change management 
process over time.  As a result, we find that SWBT provides access to its OSS in a manner that 
allows an efficient competitor a meaningful opportunity to compete.
(i) Background
106. Competing carriers need information about, and specifications for, an incumbents 
systems and interfaces to develop and modify their systems and procedures to access the 
incumbents OSS functions.   Thus, in order to demonstrate that it is providing 
nondiscriminatory access to its OSS, a BOC must first demonstrate that it has deployed the 
necessary systems and personnel to provide sufficient access to each of the necessary OSS 
functions and . . . is adequately assisting competing carriers to understand how to implement and 
use all of the OSS functions available to them.   By showing that it adequately assists 
competing carriers to use available OSS functions, a BOC provides evidence that it offers an 
efficient competitor a meaningful opportunity to compete.   As part of  this demonstration, the 
Commission will give substantial consideration to the existence of an adequate change 
management process and evidence that the BOC has adhered to this process over time. 
107. The change management process refers to the methods and procedures that the 
BOC employs to communicate with competing carriers regarding the performance of, and 
changes in, the BOCs OSS system.   Such changes may include updates to existing functions 
that impact competing carrier interface(s) upon a BOCs release of new interface software; 
technology changes that require competing carriers to meet new technical requirements upon a 
BOCs software release date; additional functionality changes that may be used at the competing 
carriers option, on or after a BOCs release date for new interface software; and changes that 
may be mandated by regulatory authorities.   Without a change management process in place, a 
BOC can impose substantial costs on competing carriers simply by making changes to its 
systems and interfaces without providing adequate testing opportunities and accurate and timely 
notice and documentation of the changes.   Change management problems can impair a 
competing carriers ability to obtain nondiscriminatory access to UNEs, and hence a BOCs 
compliance with section 271(2)(B)(ii). 
(a) Discussion
108. In evaluating whether a BOCs change management plan affords an efficient 
competitor a meaningful opportunity to compete, we first assess whether the plan is adequate.  In 
making this determination, we assess whether the evidence demonstrates: (1) that information 
relating to the change management process is clearly organized and readily accessible to 
competing carriers;  (2) that competing carriers had substantial input in the design and 
continued operation of the change management process;  (3) that the change management plan 
defines a procedure for the timely resolution of change management disputes;  (4) the 
availability of a stable testing environment that mirrors production;  and (5) the efficacy of the 
documentation the BOC makes available for the purpose of building an electronic gateway.   
After determining whether the BOCs change management plan is adequate, we evaluate whether 
the BOC has demonstrated a pattern of compliance with this plan. 
109. We disagree with commenters that argue that SWBTs failure to implement a 
change management plan that is identical to the one adopted by Bell Atlantic in New York is a 
basis for concluding that SWBTs change management plan is inadequate.   Indeed, because an 
effective change management plan is based on collaboration between a BOC and the carriers 
operating in its territory, we do not expect such plans to be identical in every state.  The fact that 
SWBTs and Bell Atlantics change management plans are different, yet equally allow the 
smooth and effective transition from one EDI release to another, is persuasive evidence that more 
than one type of change management plan is adequate for the purpose of demonstrating 
compliance with the requirements of section 271. 
(i) Adequacy of Change Management Plan
110. SWBTs current change management process became effective in September 
1999.   We find that this process, which is the result of collaborative efforts between SWBT and 
competing carriers, provides an efficient competitor a meaningful opportunity to compete.   As 
an initial matter, we note that SWBTs change management documentation is clearly organized 
and readily accessible to competing carriers.  The basic change management process is 
memorialized in a single document entitled SWBT Competitive Local Exchange Carrier 
(CLEC) Interface Change Management Process (Change Agreement).   This document sets 
forth the process and procedures that govern the introduction, modification, and retirement of 
OSS interfaces.   The change management plan is designed to accommodate five different types 
of changes:  emergency changes; regulatory changes; changes in industry standards; changes 
initiated by SWBT; and changes requested by competing carriers.  The dates and timelines 
associated with each type of change are clearly reflected in the change management 
documentation.   The basic change management agreement, and any modifications thereto, are 
made available to competing carriers through SWBTs website. 
111. We further note that SWBTs change management process provides for 
substantial input from competing carriers.  For example, the document provides for regularly 
scheduled change management meetings between SWBT and competing carriers.   The 
Agreement further requires SWBT to provide competing carriers with a 12-Month Development 
Plan, which reflects SWBTs plans for future OSS modifications.  Moreover, the plan provides 
for feedback from competing carriers on proposed changes, and indicates that change releases 
will be based on consensus among the parties.   We further note that the Change Agreement 
includes a schedule for the distribution of draft specifications or business rules, receipt of 
competing carrier comments on the documentation, and distribution of final documentation that 
is based on the consensus of the parties. 
112. We also find that SWBTs change management process includes many elements 
that provide assurances that changes to existing OSS interfaces will not disrupt competing 
carriers use of SWBTs OSS.  Specifically, the plan includes a process whereby competing 
carriers can decide whether or not to implement a new release (i.e., go/no go vote), and a 
process for identifying and resolving issues related to the change management process in a timely 
manner.   Unresolved change management disputes could impede a carriers ability to access 
the BOCs OSS, which, in turn, hampers that carriers ability to serve its customers.   It, 
therefore, is critically important that change management disputes are handled expeditiously.  We 
would be hesitant to find that a BOC has an adequate change management process in place if the 
change management plan does not define a mechanism for change management disputes to be 
handled in a timely manner.  Finally, we note that the change management plan includes a 
requirement that SWBT support the current and most recent versions of software for its EDI 
Ordering and EDI/CORBA pre-ordering interfaces (i.e., versioning).    Although versioning 
has not yet been implemented in Texas, the record indicates that versioning will be implemented 
in connection with the next EDI release, which is expected to occur in August 2000. 
113. Some commenters argue that SWBT cannot rely on the change management plan 
described above to demonstrate compliance with section 271 because it has not been used in 
connection with a major EDI release,   and has not been fully implemented.   These 
commenters argue that section 271 compliance must be based on the two different change 
management plans SWBT actually has used over the past year.  As noted above, the current plan 
became effective in September 1999.  Any EDI releases that were implemented prior to this time 
were governed by a process that initially became effective in June 1998.   According to some 
carriers, SWBTs former change management plan was inadequate because it failed to include 
several elements that competing carriers regard as critical to their ability to modify and test 
changes on its side of the interface.   WorldCom further maintains that SWBT should b

required to implement performance measurements to ensure that SWBT will comply with the 
Change Agreement in the future. 
114. We reject each of the foregoing claims.  First, contrary to these carriers 
assertions, the record indicates that SWBT has followed the procedures outlined in its current 
change management plan since September 1999.  In fact, this process was successfully used in 
connection with the EDI releases that were implemented on October 23, 1999, January 15, 2000 
releases.   Although the evidence indicates that these releases were not substantial, we note that 
the timelines, processes, and procedures set forth in the Change Agreement must be followed 
regardless of the scope of the release.  We thus find that SWBTs successful use of the current 
change management plan in connection with any EDI release is instructive in determining 
whether the change management plan in place in Texas affords competing carriers a meaningful 
opportunity to compete.  We recognize that there may be circumstances in which it is necessary 
to assess a BOCs ability to implement at least one significant software release.   Indeed, given 
the nature and scope of the change management issues that could arise in connection with major 
software releases, we find that such a demonstration may be critical to another section 271 
applicants demonstration that the change management plan it has in place is adequate.  The 
evidence presented in this proceeding, including that SWBTs change management plan was 
used successfully for at least two EDI releases, and Telcordias findings that SWBTs change 
management process is effective, provides a sufficient basis upon which to determine whether 
the methods and procedures SWBT employs to communicate with competing carriers regarding 
OSS system performance and changes is adequate.
115. We recognize, as some commenters point out that, contrary to the documented 
change management plan, SWBT has not yet implemented versioning.  As we previously have 
recognized, versioning is one of the most effective means of ensuring that system changes and 
enhancements do not adversely affect a carriers ability to access the BOCs OSS.   Given its 
importance, we find that versioning is integral to a section 271 applicants demonstration that the 
change management plan it has in place affords competing carriers a meaningful opportunity to 
compete.  We do not find, however, that the lack of versioning has deprived carriers of a 
meaningful opportunity to compete in Texas, or otherwise demonstrates that the SWBTs change 
management process is inadequate.  We reach this conclusion on the basis of evidence 
demonstrating that SWBT has employed a number of other mechanisms to ensure the timely and 
effective transition from one EDI release to another.  Should future evidence demonstrate that the 
resources SWBT makes available to assist carriers in EDI implementation and release testing 
become less effective before versioning is implemented, this may serve as a basis for concluding 
that its change management plan is inadequate, thus leading to a conclusion that the requirements 
of section 271 are not satisfied.
116. As noted above, SWBT has in place a number of mechanisms to ensure that 
releases are implemented in a timely and effective manner.  Indeed, as we explain more fully 
below, SWBT notifies competing carriers of all system changes and enhancements well in 
advance of the target implementation date.   In addition, SWBT provides numerous other 
information and human resources to competing carriers to ensure successful EDI 
implementation.   We further note that the go/no-go vote procedure that has been in effect in 
Texas since July 1999.   We find that this procedure, which permits any carrier that will be 
adversely affected by the implementation of a release to request that it be delayed, minimizes any 
adverse consequences associated with the lack of versioning.   Given the effectiveness of these 
tools in ensuring the orderly implementation of EDI releases in the past, we reject AT&Ts 
contention that the lack of versioning in Texas exposes competing carriers and their customers to 
an unreasonable risk.   Should the facts reveal at a later time that carriers are forced to 
transition to a new release prematurely, thereby impeding their ability to access SWBT OSS, 
enforcement action may be appropriate.  Indeed, we find that scrutiny of SWBTs change 
management procedures is particularly important until versioning is fully implemented. 
117. Second, while we agree with competing carriers that the change management plan 
that was in place prior to September 1999 was deficient in a number of respects,  this plan is not 
relevant to our determination of whether SWBT presently satisfies the requirements of section 
271.  Indeed, in determining section 271 compliance, we review the adequacy of the change 
management plan that is in place at the time the section 271 application is filed.  We further 
review whether the BOC has demonstrated a pattern of compliance with this plan.  As noted 
above, SWBT has adhered to an adequate change management plan in connection with the past 
three EDI releases.  We do not expect any change management process to remain static.  Rather, 
a key component of an effective change management process is the existence of a forum in which 
both competing carriers and the BOC can work collaboratively to improve the method by which 
changes to the BOCs OSS are implemented.  This certainly is the case in Texas where, as a 
result of concerns raised by competing carriers and to accommodate process improvements 
recommended by Telcordia, SWBTs change management process has evolved over time.  We 
believe it would be unreasonable to evaluate SWBTs section 271 compliance based on a change 
management process that it no longer follows.
118. Finally, we disagree that the existence of performance measurements is the only 
basis upon which to ensure that a BOC will comply with the requirements of section 271, 
including the requirement that it adhere to its documented change management plan.  Indeed, we 
note that, the Texas Commission has been extensively involved in the development of the Texas 
change management plan, and continues to handle disputes related to the change management 
process effectively and expeditiously.   Moreover, pursuant to section 271(d)(6), the 
Commission retains the authority to enforce the requirements of section 271, even after such 
authority has been granted.  Given the extensive oversight of the Texas Commission, and this 
Commissions continuing enforcement authority under section 271(d)(6), we have no reason to 
believe that SWBT will disregard its obligation to maintain in Texas a change management plan 
that affords competing carriers a meaningful opportunity to compete.  Evidence that SWBT fails 
to adhere to the agreed-upon change management process, thereby depriving competing carriers 
of a meaningful opportunity to compete, may result in an enforcement action under section 
271(d)(6).
(ii) Documentation Adequacy
119. We conclude that SWBT makes available sufficiently detailed interface design 
specifications to enable competing carriers to modify or design their systems in a manner that 
will enable them to communicate with the SWBTs systems and any relevant interfaces.   We, 
therefore, conclude that the EDI implementation and design specifications that SWBT makes 
available afford an efficient competitor a meaningful opportunity to compete.  Competing 
carriers raise various arguments with respect to the adequacy of SWBTs EDI interface 
development documentation.   We believe that many of the issues cited by commenters (such as 
SWBTs failure to provide a comprehensive, customized set of SWBT-specific EDI 
documentation) are important, and under a different set of circumstances, could seriously 
undermine a section 271 applicants assertion that it provides nondiscriminatory access to its 
OSS. 
120. Under the facts of this proceeding, however, we find that SWBTs documentation 
is adequate for the purpose of building an EDI gateway, and therefore affords an efficient 
competing carrier of a meaningful opportunity to compete.   As an initial matter, we agree with 
SWBT and the Texas Commission that the adequacy of SWBTs documentation is demonstrated 
by the fact that several competing carriers have constructed and are using EDI interfaces in a 
commercial environment.   As SWBT explains, sixteen carriers are in production using 
SWBTs EDI interface gateway, and additional carriers are in the process of testing EDI 
requirements.   The fact that many of these carriers are placing high volumes of orders via EDI 
with relatively few rejects significantly undermines the assertion that these carriers EDI 
implementation efforts have been unsuccessful.  Indeed, these carriers actual commercial 
experiences indicate that SWBTs EDI documentation is sufficient.
121. We further note that SWBT makes available to competing carriers a vast number 
of resources for the purpose of EDI implementation.   For example, each competing carrier 
operating in Texas is assigned an SWBT Account Manager, who is responsible for managing and 
assisting with all activities pertaining to the carriers working relationship with SWBT for local 
service.   In addition, through its Information Services (IS) Call Center and OSS CLEC Support 
Team, SWBT is able to offer personalized assistance to carriers that experience OSS-related 
problems.   Other resources provided by SWBT include interactional, OSS-related websites.   
Although not decisional in this case, we note that SWBT recently engaged the services of 
General Electric Global Exchange Services (GXS) to provide to competing carriers several hours 
of OSS-related technical assistance at no charge to the competing carrier.   
122. Telcordias findings provide additional support for our conclusion that the 
documentation and resources provided by SWBT enable competing carriers to implement 
successfully EDI.  As part of the Texas Commissions third-party test, Telcordia performed an 
assessment of the usefulness of the documentation and related materials SWBT makes available 
to competing carriers for the purpose of implementing EDI.   In its Documentation Analysis 
Report, Telcordia concluded that the resources made available by SWBT for the purpose of EDI 
implementation are clear and comprehensive, and conform to applicable OBF pre-order and 
ordering guidelines.   Telcordia further found that the resources SWBT provides to competing 
carriers are easy to use and readily available to competing carriers.   According to Telcordia, 
these findings were confirmed by the competing carriers it interviewed in connection with its 
documentation review.   Indeed, in its Documentation Report, Telcordia noted that competing 
carriers consistently commented upon the responsiveness of SWBT employees to their concerns 
and issues raised during EDI implementation. 
123. Moreover, many of the issues related to EDI implementation, including the 
adequacy of SWBTs EDI documentation, are discussed fully and openly during regularly 
scheduled meetings between SWBT and competing carriers.  The record indicates that, when a 
competing carrier expresses a concern about SWBTs EDI documentation, SWBT responds to 
their concerns in an effective and timely manner.   Given these findings, we are convinced that 
any problems associated with SWBTs EDI documentation are minimal, and can be easily 
overcome.
124. We further note that, other than AT&T, no carrier claims that its EDI 
implementation efforts were unreasonably complicated, or accompanied by unreasonable 
expense and delay.  With respect to AT&T, we are persuaded by SWBTs claim that many of the 
problems associated with AT&Ts development efforts are unique to AT&T.  Indeed, although 
AT&T claims that it took several years for it to construct an EDI gateway, other competing 
carriers were able to establish connectivity with SWBTs EDI ordering gateway within a few 
months after receiving the EDI implementation documentation.  In fact, SWBT explains that 
Allegiance Telecom implemented electronic bonding within 90 days of commencing the EDI 
implementation process.    Moreover, there is some evidence in the record that suggests that 
AT&T itself is at least partially responsible for some of the problems it experienced during the 
early stages of its EDI implementation.  
125. Finally, SWBT has convincingly explained that many of the problems associated 
with the EDI documentation utilized by AT&T have been resolved,  and therefore should not 
similarly limit another carriers gateway development efforts.  Indeed, we note that, through 
functionality testing, Telcordia indirectly tested the OSS documentation SWBT supplies to 
competing carriers.   When testing activities revealed the need for improvements to the 
documentation, Telcordia verified SWBTs implementation of those changes.   Telcordias 
functionality review, therefore, provides additional indirect evidence that most of the problems 
related to SWBTs EDI documentation have been resolved.  We further note that, on April 11, 
2000, SWBT initiated a documentation meeting with competing carriers.   As a result of the 
concerns expressed by competing carriers during this meeting, SWBT implemented various 
improvements to assist carriers in accessing and utilizing its system documentation.   Under our 
procedural framework, the process improvements that resulted from this meeting are not relevant 
to our determination of whether SWBT satisfies the requirements of section 271.  We do note, 
however, that we are supportive of these and other steps taken by SWBT to facilitate entry into 
its local markets by competing carriers.
(iii) Notification Adequacy and Timeliness
126. It is critical that a BOC provide timely, complete, and accurate notice of 
alterations to its systems and processes.  Indeed, without timely notification and documentation, 
competing carriers are unable to modify their existing systems and procedures or develop new 
systems to maintain access to a BOCs OSS, which, in turn, impedes a carriers ability to serve 
its customers.   Previously, in reviewing a BOCs change management process, we examined 
whether the BOC established a pattern of compliance with the relevant notification and 
documentation intervals in its Change Agreement.   In making this determination, we relied, in 
part, on the performance measurements associated with the BOCs compliance with the dates and 
timelines set forth in its Change Agreement.  In this application, however, there are no 
performance measurements associated with SWBTs compliance with its documented change 
management process.  We thus limit our analysis of SWBTs compliance with the change 
management process to competing carriers actual commercial experiences.  As noted above, we 
do not rely on the processes and procedures set forth in SWBTs former change management 
plan in evaluating SWBTs compliance with the requirements of section 271 because we find 
that this plan is inadequate.  We further note, however, that the notification intervals set forth in 
the former and current change management plans are essentially the same.   Thus, in evaluating 
whether SWBT provides change management notification and documentation in a reasonable and 
timely manner, we assess whether SWBT has demonstrated a pattern of compliance with the 
intervals associated with both the current and former change management plans.
127. Based on the evidence presented in the record, we conclude that SWBT has 
demonstrated a pattern of compliance with its documented change management processes and 
procedures.  As a preliminary matter, we find that the change management notification and 
documentation intervals set forth in SWBTs change management plan are reasonable because 
they provide competing carriers with sufficient time to prepare for changes to SWBTs interfaces 
and systems.   Given our finding, as explained more fully below, that SWBT has demonstrated 
a pattern of compliance with these reasonable intervals, we conclude that SWBT provides 
competing carriers with change management notification and documentation in a manner 
sufficiently timely to allow an efficient competitor a meaningful opportunity to compete.
128. Our conclusion that SWBT generally has adhered to the reasonable timeframes set 
forth in its change management plan is based on the evidence in the record and Telcordias 
findings.  As part of the Texas Commissions third-party test, Telcordia assessed whether SWBT 
adhered to the notification intervals set forth in the change management plan in connection with 
the August and October 1999 EDI releases.   With respect to these releases, Telcordia found 
that SWBT generally followed the documented change management process.   More 
specifically, Telcordia found that SWBT distributed change management notification and 
documentation in a manner consistent with the intervals set forth in the Change Agreement,  
and that other activities outlined in the Change Agreement were carried out by SWBT in a 
reasonable and timely manner. 
129. We disagree with AT&T and WorldCom that SWBTs failure to follow strictly 
the intervals set forth in the Change Agreement has deprived competing carriers of a meaningful 
opportunity to compete.   As an initial matter, we note that, whenever SWBT has introduced 
changes outside the intervals set forth in the change management plan, it has followed the 
exceptions process, which is specifically defined and provided for in the agreed-upon change 
management plan.   Pursuant to the exceptions process, each change SWBT has sought to 
introduce under an expedited timeframe was discussed fully and openly at change management 
and other meetings held between SWBT and competing carriers.  In addition, competing carriers 
were notified of the proposed changes via Accessible Letter.   Thus, competing carriers were 
provided with timely notice of each exceptions change, and were given reasonable opportunity to 
comment and object.   The record indicates that, when competing carriers express concerns 
about particular changes, SWBT has shown a willingness to accommodate their concerns.   
130. Moreover, any carrier that would be affected by the change could have delayed the 
implementation of the release by invoking the go/no-go vote policy.  Given that no carrier 
objected to SWBTs implementation of the exceptions changes, we give little weight to the 
assertion that SWBTs implementation of such changes impeded competing carriers ability to 
compete.  Finally, we note that, in many instances, the changes implemented by SWBT pursuant 
to the exceptions process were for the purpose of accommodating system changes or 
enhancements specifically requested by competing carriers, or mandated by regulatory 
authorities.   Accordingly, we find that, despite its use of the exceptions process, SWBT is 
implementing its change management plan in a way that provides adequate and timely notice to 
competing carriers.  The evidence further demonstrates that SWBT sufficiently accommodates 
competing carriers change management concerns.  At the same time, we expect SWBTs use of 
the exceptions process should decrease as the changes requested by competing carriers and 
mandated by regulatory authorities are successfully implemented.
131. We caution BOCs against the use of any process that would effectively nullify the 
standard procedures outlined in the formal change management documentation.  Indeed, as 
several commenters point out, part of the problem with deviating from the standard timelines set 
forth in the Change Agreement is that it requires competing carriers to make substantial changes 
to their systems within a significantly abbreviated timeframe, which could increase the risk of 
error.   There is no evidence in this proceeding, however, that SWBTs use of the exceptions 
process has adversely affected competing carriers ability to access SWBTs OSS after new 
releases were implemented.  Indeed, in view of the number of competing carrier-requested and 
regulatory-mandated changes SWBT has had to implement over the past year, we find that 
SWBTs use of the exceptions process was limited to instances in which it was both necessary 
and unavoidable.  We further find that SWBTs exceptions process is reasonable given that that 
competing carriers are afforded an adequate opportunity to comment upon and object to each 
exceptions change.
(iv) Testing Environment
132. As part of a sufficient change management process, a BOC must provide 
competing carriers with access to a stable testing environment to certify that their OSS will be 
capable of interacting smoothly and effectively with the BOCs OSS.   In addition, prior to 
issuing a new software release or upgrade, the BOC must provide a testing environment that 
mirrors the production environment in order for competing carriers to test the new release.   If 
competing carriers are not given the opportunity to test new releases in a stable environment 
prior to implementation, they may be unable to process orders accurately and provision new 
customer services without delays.   Moreover, the failure to provide a testing environment that 
mirrors production can result in competing carriers transactions succeeding in the testing 
environment but failing in production. 
133. SWBTs current test environment was made available to competing carriers on 
November 1, 1999.   SWBT represents that that its current testing environment is sufficiently 
stable because it dedicated solely to testing by competing carriers.   More specifically, SWBT 
explains that, in contrast to the testing environment that existed prior to November 1999, where 
the testing environment was shared between SWBT developers and testers and competing 
carriers, the current testing environment is physically separate from the production environment 
and is made available for the exclusive use of competing carriers.   SWBT asserts that the 
stability of its testing environment is further demonstrated by the fact that internal testing of the 
release is completed before it is made available to competing carriers.   According to SWBT, its 
testing environment adequately mirrors the production environment because the functionality of 
the test environment is the same as the production environment and returns data in the identical 
fields and format.   In further support of its assertion that its testing environment is adequate, 
SWBT points out that its test plan defines a process whereby SWBT and competing carriers 
jointly develop testing scenarios and timeframes.
134. We conclude that SWBTs test environment affords competing carriers an 
adequate opportunity to test SWBT OSS changes prior to implementation.  We, therefore, find 
that the testing environment SWBT makes available provides competing carriers with a 
meaningful opportunity to compete.  Specifically, we find that the record demonstrates that 
SWBTs testing environment is stable, adequately mirrors the production environment, affords 
competing carriers an opportunity to develop test decks of representative pre-ordering and 
ordering transactions, and offers the extended testing periods that competing carriers need for 
EDI implementation and new release testing.  We base this conclusion on the experience of the 
competing carriers that used the current testing environment to implement EDI and to test the 
January 15, 2000 release.  The record indicates that three carriers that used the new test 
environment for EDI implementation achieved production status,  and that two carriers used the 
new testing environment without substantial difficulty to test the requirements associated with 
the January 15, 2000 release.   Thus, we find that the recent evidence from commercial usage 
suggests that SWBTs testing environment works in the manner represented in its application. 
135. In concluding that SWBTs testing environment is adequate, we recognize that 
SWBTs testing environment was not tested by a third party.  Although such a test would have 
provided us with useful evidence concerning the adequacy of the testing environment SWBT 
makes available to competing carriers, we reject AT&Ts assertion that the absence of third party 
test is basis for concluding that SWBTs section 271 application is deficient.  Indeed, we find 
that the commercial evidence, as described above, is sufficient for the purpose of evaluating the 
adequacy of the testing environment SWBT makes available to competing carriers. 
136. AT&T is the only commenter that raises several specific concerns with respect to 
the adequacy of SWBTs EDI testing environment.  One of its primary arguments is that 
SWBTs EDI testing environment is deficient because it does not mirror the production 
environment.  In support of this assertion, AT&T maintains that, in SWBTs EDI testing 
environment, test orders do not flow-through as they would during production, but instead are 
manually monitored by SWBT as they progress through the testing process.   AT&T claims that 
this approach is problematic because it denies competing carriers an opportunity to assess how 
the release will affect new or existing flow-through capability, and deprives competing carriers of 
an opportunity to assess how the relevant systems will actually respond in a production 
environment.   AT&T further states that, because SWBTs test environment does not take 
orders through the posting cycle in billing, but only through service order creation, it fails to 
predict adequately problems that could occur in production.  In support of this claim, AT&T 
points to evidence suggesting that certain problems are discovered only after competing carriers 
have moved into production. 
137. We agree with AT&T that a BOCs failure to provide a testing environment that 
adequately mirrors production may deny competing carriers a meaningful opportunity to 
compete.  Such a failure is of particular concern in this case in view of the fact that SWBT has 
not yet implemented versioning.  As AT&T explains, an inadequate test environment coupled 
with the lack of versioning is particularly problematic because it forces competing carriers to use 
a new EDI release in the production environment without any assurance that they can submit 
orders successfully, and without the ability to continue using the previous release. 
138. The record demonstrates that there are two notable differences between SWBTs 
testing and production environments.  First, SWBTs test environment does not test flow through 
or response times, but only evaluates application functionality.   Second, the record indicates 
that SWBTs test environment does not evaluate the ability of an order to post to billing.   With 
respect to the first issue, AT&T appears to argue that, for purposes of demonstrating compliance 
with the requirements of section 271, a BOC must  provide a testing environment that is identical 
to its production environment.  The record indicates, however, that competing carriers are able to 
test adequately OSS changes prior to their implementation as long as the testing and production 
environments perform the same key functions.  In this regard, we note that, although SWBTs 
testing and production environments are not identical, the vast majority of carriers are able to 
achieve production status and test new releases without substantial difficulty.  Thus, despite any 
differences between the testing and production environments, the totality of the evidence 
indicates that SWBTs testing environment is adequate.  We further agree with SWBT that this 
approach to managing its testing environment does not harm, but ultimately benefits competing 
carriers because it allows SWBT to quickly identify and resolve errors found during testing. 
139. As noted above, we find that another notable difference between SWBTs testing 
and production environments is that the testing environment does not evaluate the ability of an 
order to post to billing.  The record further indicates, however, that this practice has not 
significantly impeded any carriers ability to submit orders, or otherwise access SWBTs OSS 
after the new release has been implemented.  The record indicates that there were some problems 
associated with the January 15, 2000 release.   Specifically, the record indicates that after the 
January 15 release was implemented, orders that were pending at the time the release was 
implemented failed to post.   In addition, LVAS, a downstream system, did not properly 
populate product tables.   AT&T argues that these problems could have been discovered if 
SWBT conducted end-to-end testing (i.e., testing from order creation to posting to billing). 
140. SWBT explains, however, that these problems were not due to its failure to 
conduct end-to-end testing environment, but instead occurred because the production system did 
not update certain tables in a timely manner.   The record indicates that corrective measures 
were implemented within four days of the release being implemented.   On the basis of these 
findings, we conclude that the problems that occurred in connection with the January 15, 2000 
release do not represent a systemic failure in SWBTs ability to provide access to its OSS.  
Rather, we find that SWBT has convincingly demonstrated that the problems associated with the 
January 15, 2000 release were isolated, did not significantly impede any carriers ability to serve 
its customers, and should not recur in connection with future releases.
141. We are further encouraged by the fact that SWBT has expressed a willingness to 
run a test through to the billing cycle.   Although not decisional to our analysis, we note that 
end-to-end testing should provide further assurance that SWBTs testing environment affords 
competing carriers an adequate opportunity to assess whether the new release will function as 
intended.  We emphasize that the adequacy of a BOCs testing environment is a critically 
important area for demonstrating compliance with the requirements of section 271.  Thus, if the 
evidence demonstrates that SWBTs testing environment is inadequate for the purpose of EDI 
implementation and release testing, thereby depriving competing carriers of a meaningful 
opportunity to compete, enforcement action under section 271(d)(6) may be appropriate.
142. In arguing that SWBTs test environment is deficient, AT&T further claims that 
SWBT fails to provide a standard validation test deck, and that, as a result, competing carriers 
must compile new test accounts each time a new release is implemented.   We find, however, 
that the evidence in the record simply does not support this claim.  To the contrary, the evidence 
indicates that SWBT provides competing carriers a reasonable opportunity to develop test 
transactions that will enable them to determine whether the new release produces expected 
results.  SWBT points out, for example, that the test plan permits competing carriers to develop 
their own test scenarios based upon their own business requirements.   SWBT further states 
that, upon request, it will provide a competing carrier with test scripts that are specific to the new 
functionalities it wishes to implement.   Although SWBT requests that competing carriers 
provide information on their test scenarios before new release testing begins, this appears to be a 
reasonable method of managing test transactions because it affords SWBT an opportunity to 
access whether the appropriate types of accounts are available before testing begins.   SWBT 
further explains that this practice is beneficial because it helps to minimize the delay that may be 
caused when a carrier submits a test order that does not have the required characteristics.   
Given these findings, which indicate that these practices ultimately benefit competing carriers, 
we reject AT&Ts contention that the test deck SWBT offers for the purpose of testing is 
deficient.
143. Other than AT&T, the only comments in the record concerning the adequacy of 
SWBTs test environment were raised by the Department of Justice.  In its evaluation of the 
Texas I Application, the Department of Justice noted that competing carriers had complained 
about the lack of a stable testing environment.   Although the Department of Justice opined that 
SWBTs performance may have been flawed in this area, it stated that it lacked sufficient 
evidence to determine the extent to which this, and other issues, may impede competition in the 
future.   It, therefore, recommended that the Commission reserve judgment on this issue.   
Unlike the circumstances that existed with respect to the Texas I Application, we find that there 
is sufficient evidence in the instant record to determine whether SWBTs testing environment is 
sufficiently stable.  Indeed, as noted above, SWBT implemented a new testing environment in 
November 1999, which, according to SWBT, is much more stable than the testing environment it 
used prior to this time. 
(v) Training, Technical Assistance, and Help 
Desk Support  
144. We conclude that SWBT demonstrates that it provides the technical assistance 
and help desk support necessary to give competing carriers nondiscriminatory access to its OSS. 
SWBT has created a Local Service Center (LSC) that provides competing LECs with a single 
point of contact for issues regarding ordering, billing, and collections related to interconnection 
facilities, resold services and UNEs.   The LSC assigns a work group to each competitive LEC 
customer to provide competing LECs with access to service representatives and managers to 
handle service requests and any associated issues for pre-order, order and billing.   Service 
representatives in these groups undergo several months of training.  
145. In addition, SWBTs Local Operations Center (LOC) supports the provisioning of 
UNEs, interconnection with SWBTs local network, and resold services as well as any 
maintenance and repair functions requested by competing carriers.   Within the LOC there is a 
Customer Action Support Team, (CAST) that provides competing LECs with additional 
technical support and assists in the resolution of operational issues pertaining to pre-ordering, 
ordering, provisioning, maintenance and OSS.   SWBT states that it tracks incoming trouble 
volumes on an hourly basis that allow it to ensure that the LOC is always adequately staffed.   
In addition, the evidence demonstrates that SWBT trains its carrier-customers on the LSC/s 
procedures, and engages in ongoing consultation with competing carriers regarding operational 
practices and service issues.   SWBT has also established an Information Services (IS) Call 
Center that serves as the Help Desk, answering questions regarding access to SWBT systems 
and applications and helping to resolve information technology problems.  SWBT also SWBT 
provides extensive training for competitive LEC employees,  and provides on-line assistant 
through its Internet site. 
146. In view of the foregoing evidence, which demonstrates that SWBT provides 
efficient competitors a meaningful opportunity to compete by enabling them to understand how 
to implement and use all of the OSS functions available to them, we reject claims that SWBTs 
training, technical assistance and helpdesk support is inadequate.   We agree with commenters 
that a third-party test that includes an evaluation of BOC support organizations and personnel 
would provide us with additional assurance that these resources are available and commercially 
ready to support competing carriers seeking access to the BOCs network.  In this proceeding, 
however, there is sufficient evidence to evaluate SWBTs support organizations without the need 
for a third party test.  Moreover, there is no evidence of poor performance by SWBTs support 
personnel.  Nor does the record indicate that SWBT support organizations provide discriminatory 
treatment to competing carriers.  For these reasons, we disagree with those commenters who 
claim that the lack of a third party evaluation of SWBTs technical assistance and help functions 
indicate that SWBTs section 271 application is deficient.

e. Pre-Ordering
147. Based on the evidence in the record, we conclude that SWBT demonstrates that it 
provides nondiscriminatory access to OSS pre-ordering functions.  Specifically, we find that 
SWBT demonstrates that:  (i) competing carriers successfully have built and are using 
application-to-application interfaces to perform pre-ordering functions; (ii) competing carriers 
are able to integrate pre-ordering and ordering interfaces; (iii) its pre-ordering systems provide 
reasonably prompt response times; (iv) these interfaces are consistently available in a manner that 
affords competitors a meaningful opportunity to compete; and (v) SWBT offers 
nondiscriminatory access to OSS pre-ordering functions associated with determining whether a 
loop is capable of supporting xDSL advanced technologies.  
(i) Discussion
148. The pre-ordering phase of OSS generally includes those activities that a carrier 
undertakes to gather and verify the information necessary to place an order.   Given that pre-
ordering represents the first exposure that a prospective customer has to a competing carrier, it is 
critical that a competing carrier is able to accomplish pre-ordering activities in a manner no less 
efficient and responsive than the incumbent.   Most of the pre-ordering activities that must be 
undertaken by a competing carrier to order resale services and UNEs from the incumbent are 
analogous to the activities a BOC must accomplish to furnish service to its own customers.  For 
these pre-ordering functions, SWBT must demonstrate that it provides requesting carriers access 
that enables them to perform pre-ordering functions in substantially the same time and manner as 
its retail operations.   For those pre-ordering functions that lack a retail analogue, SWBT must 
provide access that affords an efficient competitor a meaningful opportunity to compete.   In 
prior orders, we have emphasized that providing pre-ordering functionality through an 
application-to-application interface is essential in enabling carriers to conduct real-time

processing and to integrate pre-ordering and ordering functions in the same manner as the 
BOC. 
149. Pre-Ordering Functionality.  We find that SWBT offers requesting carriers access 
to an application-to-application interface, DataGate, for the pre-ordering functions that SWBT 
provides to itself.  The DataGate interface is based on SWBTs proprietary pre-ordering 
functionality, and allows competing carriers to acquire pre-ordering information using their own 
software programs or applications.  SWBT states that it provides competing carriers with access 
to all of the necessary technical specifications and documentation for its DataGate interface.   
The DataGate interface allows competing carriers to perform a wide range of pre-ordering 
functions for both resale services and UNEs.  Specifically, carriers are able to use DataGate to:  
(1) retrieve CSRs; (2) validate addresses; (3) select and reserve telephone numbers; (4) determine 
services and features available to a customer; (5) obtain due date availability; (6) access loop 
qualification information; (7) view a customers directory listing; (8) determine dispatch 
requirements; (9) retrieve local primary intraLATA carrier (LPIC) and primary interexchange 
carrier (PIC) list; (10) access the Common Language Location Identifier (CLLI) for the serving 
central office; and (11) verify channel facility assignment.  
150. SWBT also offers access to pre-ordering functions through EDI and CORBA 
interfaces, which are based on industry standards.   The availability of these interfaces is 
beneficial to competing carriers in Texas and we encourage SWBT to continue to develop them 
and promote their use.  These interfaces do not form the basis of our decision that SWBT meets 
the nondiscrimination requirements for OSS pre-ordering functions, however, because SWBTs 
evidentiary showing in this proceeding is insufficient to allow such a determination.  Although 
SWBT offers evidence on the functionality available through EDI and CORBA,  there is 
insufficient evidence to find that, in Texas, these interfaces: (i) can be used in a commercial 
setting; (ii) are stable and reliable; and (iii) provide nondiscriminatory response times. 
151. With respect to actual commercial usage, SWBT demonstrates that competing 
carriers successfully have built their systems to connect with SWBTs DataGate interface.  
SWBT states that at least five carriers are in production in Texas using DataGate for pre-
ordering.   A review of performance data submitted by SWBT confirms that carriers currently 
are using DataGate to perform six of the pre-ordering transactions listed above.   While 
Telcordia did not test the functionality of SWBTs pre-ordering interfaces,  we note that the 
evidence of actual commercial usage supports SWBTs claim that these functions are made 
available to competing LECs.  Moreover, we reject commenters claims that SWBTs pre-
ordering interfaces are functionally deficient.  First, AT&T complains that a particular pre-
ordering function  SWBTs telephone number assignment system  has the potential to 
discriminate against competing LECs.   AT&T does not claim, however, and the record does 
not suggest, that such discrimination actually takes place, and thus we do not conclude 
competing LECs are denied nondiscriminatory access to this pre-ordering function.  Should we 
receive evidence of such discrimination in the future, we shall take appropriate enforcement 
action under section 271(d)(6).  We address commenters claims relating to integration and loop 
qualification information in the following subsections.
152. Integration.  SWBT has demonstrated that its application-to-application interfaces 
allow competing carriers to integrate successfully pre-ordering information obtained from the 
DataGate interface into the ordering process and the carriers back office systems.   The 
Commission has explained previously that a BOC with integrated pre-ordering and ordering 
functions for its retail operations must provide competing carriers with access to the same 
capability.  Indeed, we have noted that the inability to integrate may place competitors at a 
disadvantage and significantly impact a carriers ability to serve its customers in a timely and 
efficient manner.   Thus, in order to demonstrate compliance with checklist item 2, the BOC 
must enable competing carriers to transfer pre-ordering information (such as a customers 
address or existing features) electronically into the carriers own back office systems and back 
into the BOCs ordering interface.  We do not simply inquire whether it is possible to transfer 
information from pre-ordering to ordering interfaces  we assess whether the BOC enables 
successful integration.   We clarify that a BOC has enabled successful integration if 
competing carriers may, or have been able to, automatically populate information supplied by the 
BOCs pre-ordering systems onto an order form (the local service request or LSR) that will 
not be rejected by the BOCs OSS systems.
153. As an initial matter, we note that our analysis of integration is complicated in this 
instance by the fact that SWBT has chosen not to provide parsed address information at the 
preordering stage, but instead returns this information to competing LECs in an undifferentiated 
(or concatenated) string of alphanumeric characters.   In order to transfer seamlessly the 
unparsed address information onto an order, competing LECs must first write a program which 
parses the undifferentiated string of numbers and words into the specific fields required on the 
order form.  Because successful parsing is thus a necessary component of successful integration, 
we must determine whether SWBT enables carriers to implement a parsing program that allows 
the seamless transfer of information from pre-ordering to the ordering stage.   Of course, a BO

that provides address information in a parsed format would not need to make this complicated 
showing. 
154. We conclude, based on the totality of evidence in the record, that SWBTs 
DataGate pre-ordering interface can be successfully integrated with SWBTs EDI ordering 
functions.  In reaching this conclusion, we rely primarily on evidence, submitted both by 
competing LECs active in Texas and by SWBT, that carriers have been able to successfully 
integrate certain pre-ordering and ordering functions in a commercial setting. Specifically, while 
several carriers in this proceeding claim to have encountered substantial difficulties in achieving 
full, successful integration, the record contains statements from at least two carriers indicating 
that they have been able to integrate pre-ordering and ordering functions.  We also rely on the 
results of a customized third party review conducted in April 2000, in which Telcordia found that 
documentation and other information provided by SWBT enabled it to mechanically integrate 
address information received in a pre-ordering inquiry into the ordering process.  Finally, we 
recognize that SWBT has hired GE Global eXchange Services to provide additional technical 
assistance relating to integration, free of charge, to any competing LEC that requests this 
additional help. 
155. In terms of commercial usage, SWBT submits that at least two competing LECs, 
Sage Telecom and Navigator Telecommunications, have successfully integrated pre-ordering 
functions.   Both of these competing LECs have confirmed on the record in this proceeding that, 
by interfacing with SWBTs DataGate system, they are able to transfer information received 
electronically from SWBT directly into their internal systems and into the ordering process.  
Specifically, Sage reports that, using documentation and technical support from SWBT, it has 
designed its systems to electronically transfer information contained in the CSR, including 
address information, directly onto an order.   Similarly, Navigator reports that it has developed 
systems to electronically transfer information from the CSR to the ordering process, including 
service and feature codes, but not address information.   Because service address information is 
not required for orders that migrate customers from SWBT retail to resale service, this level of 
integration apparently allows Navigator to complete orders for resale service with minimal 
human intervention.   AT&T apparently also has developed a program that parses address 
information drawn from DataGate, and integrates pre-ordering information directly into its 
ordering process.   Unlike Sage and Navigator, however, AT&T does not characterize its 
integration efforts as a success.
156. An analysis of these carriers order rejections indicates that they have achieved 
substantial success in their parsing and integration efforts.  We note that a high reject rate may 
indicate that a carrier has not successfully integrated its pre-ordering and ordering functions, 
particularly where rejects are attributable to integration or parsing difficulties.   In this instance, 
however, we note that Sage and AT&T have been able to achieve low reject rates  50 percent 
lower than any other carrier using EDI for ordering in Texas.   Most significantly, data 
submitted by SWBT indicates that, for the past three months, a relatively low percentage of 
orders submitted by both Sage and AT&T are rejected for address-related reasons.   These data 
indicate that both Sages and AT&Ts parsing and integration efforts have enabled them to 
submit orders that generally survive address edits.
157. We disagree with AT&T that the problems it has encountered in a commercial 
setting indicate that SWBTs systems cannot be integrated.  AT&T explains that, due to 
deficiencies in the documentation SWBT makes available to assist carriers in integrating their 
systems, it has had to devote substantial resources to correcting parsing problems on its orders.  
Specifically, AT&T states that it must take the unnecessary step of carefully pre-screening orders 
before they are transmitted to SWBT, and that it must spend an inordinate amount of time and 
resources processing and resolving address-related rejects.   Nevertheless, we reject AT&Ts 
assertion that SWBT is substantially responsible for its integration difficulties.   As an initial 
matter, Sages commercial experience indicates that successful integration is possible.  There 
also is evidence in the record that AT&Ts address-related rejects are relatively low, and that 
some of AT&Ts address-related rejects may be unrelated to parsing problems.   This suggests 
that, contrary to AT&Ts assertions, its integration efforts have in fact been successful.
158. In addition to the evidence pointing towards successful integration in a 
commercial setting, we also rely on the customized integration test performed by Telcordia.  The 
Texas Commission explains that Telcordia was retained in April 2000 to review the 
documentation and other information available to competing LECs and determine whether this 
information enables a competing LEC to parse and integrate information obtained from SWBTs 
pre-ordering systems into the ordering process.   Telcordia reports that it used documentation 
and other information obtained from SWBT to develop a program that automatically parsed and 
transferred information, including address information, obtained through the pre-ordering process 
directly onto an LSR.   We conclude that this supplemental functionality test, performed at the 
specific request of the Texas Commission in order to augment the record in this proceeding, 
provides us with additional assurance that competing LECs should be able to write a parsing 
program which enables integration efficiencies.
159. We disagree with AT&T and WorldCom, who argue that Telcordias conclusions 
merit little weight in this analysis.  AT&T and WorldCom suggest that Telcordias test is 
unreliable because it did not involve the actual submission of orders, and did not appear to test a 
broad range of address scenarios.   While this type of additional testing would certainly have 
bolstered Telcordias conclusion, and in fact may be critical to another BOCs section 271 
application, we note that Telcordias test does not stand alone in this instance and supplements 
evidence of integration in a commercial setting.   AT&T and WorldCom also note that 
Telcordia tested whether it could integrate address information received via the EDI pre-ordering 
interface, rather than the DataGate interface upon which SWBT relies to demonstrate 
nondiscriminatory access to pre-ordering functions.   Telcordia subsequently explained, in a 
submission in this proceeding, that the task of parsing and integrating address information 
obtained via EDI is functionally the same as parsing address information received directly from 
DataGate.   We thus find that Telcordias evaluation is useful to demonstrate that effective 
parsing can occur with respect to information provided by SWBT through its pre-ordering 
interfaces.
160. As noted above, we base our conclusion that SWBTs systems can be integrated 
on carriers actual commercial experiences and Telcordias findings.  As further evidence that 
successful integration can continue to occur in the future, we are encouraged by the recent steps 
SWBT has taken in this area.  Specifically, we note that SWBT has recently implemented a 
programming change which will virtually eliminate address-related rejects received by competing 
LECs on most types of orders.   As of May 2000, SWBT no longer requires carriers to populate 
the service address fields on orders that convert a retail or resale customer to UNE-P service.  
Even the relatively low levels of address-related rejects received by AT&T and Sage should thus 
be reduced even further.  Although this enhancement occurred after it filed this application, and 
therefore is not decisional, it provides assurances that carriers that have yet to attempt integration 
should be able to avoid the burden of receiving and processing a large number of address-related 
rejects.   To the extent that competing carriers, in the future, present evidence that undermines 
our finding that SWBTs pre-ordering and ordering systems may be integrated  such as evidence 
that they are unable to avoid rejects attributable to inadequacies in SWBTs documentation or 
systems  then we may consider an enforcement action under section 271(d)(6).   
161. Finally, we recognize that SWBT has engaged GE Global eXchange Services 
(GXS) as a third party expert to provide high-level consulting advice to competing carriers that 
seek to integrate pre-ordering and ordering functions.   We believe that GXS may provide 
valuable assistance to competing LECs seeking to design or improve their ordering systems to 
maximize the functionality offered by SWBT.
162. Interface Response Times and Availability.  We find that SWBT demonstrates that 
it provides requesting carriers access to pre-ordering functionality in a manner that allows an 
efficient competitor a meaningful opportunity to compete.  Specifically, we have held previously 
that an interface that provides responses in a prompt timeframe, and is stable and reliable, is 
necessary for competing carriers to market their services and serve their customers as efficiently 
and at the same level of quality that SWBT provides to itself.   With respect to the timeliness of 
pre-ordering responses using DataGate, we note that the Texas Commission established 
benchmark standards rather than identifying a retail analogue.   We accept the Texas 
Commissions determination regarding these time intervals, which were established with input 
from competing carriers, and conclude that performance satisfying these benchmarks would 
provide competing carriers a meaningful opportunity to compete.
163. Performance data from January 2000 to April 2000 demonstrate that SWBT 
consistently satisfies the Texas Commissions benchmark standards for timeliness of various

pre-order inquiries.   Correspondingly, commenters have not argued that SWBT fails to provide 
timely responses to pre-ordering inquiries.
164. We further conclude that SWBTs interfaces are available in a stable and 
consistent manner, which affords an efficient competitor a meaningful opportunity to compete.  
SWBT reports the percentage of time its DataGate interface is available based on its scheduled 
available hours.   SWBT has satisfied the Texas Commissions benchmark of 99.5% 
availability for five of the last six months.   The one exception was March 2000, where the 
DataGate interface was available 98.5% of the time.  While interface outages may substantially 
inconvenience competing carriers and harm competition, we conclude that the March 
performance appears to be an isolated incident, when viewed against the backdrop of 
performance that consistently satisfies the Texas Commissions benchmark.  Moreover, we note 
that commenters generally do not assert that SWBTs DataGate interface is unreliable.  
165. Access to Loop Qualification Information.  We find that SWBT demonstrates that 
it offers nondiscriminatory access to OSS pre-ordering functions associated with determining 
whether a loop is capable of supporting xDSL advanced technologies.   As discussed above, for 
the purposes of this proceeding, we evaluate whether SWBT is in compliance with the regulatory 
requirements in place on the date of its section 271 filing, and do not consider whether SWBT 
complies with the new loop qualification requirements that took effect on May 18, 2000.   In 
this regard, as in the Bell Atlantic New York Order,  we will consider whether SWBT provides 
requesting carriers equivalent access to the loop qualification functionality that it provides to 
itself.
166. SWBT provides three avenues for competing carriers to obtain loop make-up 
information.  First, SWBT provides carriers real-time electronic access, through the Verigate and 
DataGate interfaces, to its database containing theoretical loop make-up information that is 
based upon the standard loop design for the longest loop in the end users distribution area.   
Second, for actual loop make-up information stored in SWBTs electronic systems, SWBT 
enables carriers to submit requests via fax or email.  SWBT explains that its retail representatives 
request loop qualification information from SWBT operations via email as well.   Third, to 
access loop make-up information that is not stored by SWBT in an electronic format, competing 
LECs may request a manual search of engineering records.   Requests for a manual look-up are 
submitted via Verigate or DataGate directly to SWBTs engineering operations, and no longer 
involve SWBTs local service center (LSC) as an intermediary.  Once the manual search has 
been completed, the information will be updated in the mechanized loop qualification system, 
and the competing LEC will have the option of receiving the loop qualification results via email 
at this point, or may instead query the mechanized loop qualification system using Verigate or 
DataGate. 
167. We find that these mechanized and manual processes provide competing carriers 
access to loop qualification functionality in substantially the same time an manner as SWBTs 
retail operations.  Specifically, where loop make-up information resides in an electronic format 
within SWBTs systems and is accessible by SWBTs retail operations, SWBT enables 
competing LECs to request access to this information via the same channels as SWBTs retail 
operations.   Where this information resides in engineering records, and is accessible by 
SWBTs retail operations only via a manual look-up, competing LECs also may request a manual 
look-up.  Moreover, SWBTs performance data reflect that it provides responses to competing 
LEC requests for loop information in substantially the same time as for itself.  In three of the last 
four months, SWBT has returned competing LEC loop qualification requests, on average, in less 
time than it takes to respond to requests from its retail operations.   
168. We applaud the Texas Commissions ongoing efforts in resolving issues emerging 
from the Covad/Rhythms DSL arbitration in Texas, including issues relating to access to 
information used by carriers at the pre-ordering stage.  Specifically, we note that the Texas 
Commission is overseeing implementation of the internal firewall that SWBT was required to 
establish under the Covad/Rhythms Arbitration Award as a means to ensure nondiscriminatory 
access to competitively significant information.   SWBT has submitted several versions of its 
firewall plan and the Texas Commission has twice instructed SWBT to modify these plans.   
Most recently, on June 23, 2000, the Texas Commission required SWBT to make two minor 
adjustments to its latest firewall plan, which the Commission had previously approved on May 
8, 2000.   We disagree with Covads suggestion that full compliance with this aspect of the 
Covad/Rhythms Arbitration Award is a prerequisite of satisfying the competitive checklist.   
Indeed, in requiring SWBT to make modifications in its June 23, 2000 Order, the Texas 
Commission did not indicate that SWBT fails to provide competing carriers equivalent access to 
the loop qualification functionality it provides to itself.  Rather, this modification indicates that 
the Texas Commission is still in the process of ensuring that SWBT fully satisf[ies] the 
concerns identified in the Covad/Rhythms Arbitration Award.   As stated above, the evidence 
before us in the instant proceeding demonstrates that SWBT provides nondiscriminatory access 
to its OSS, in compliance with the statute and our rules.


f. Ordering
169. In this section we address SWBTs ability to provide access to its OSS ordering 
functions to competing carriers.  We conclude that, based on all the evidence in the record, 
SWBT demonstrates that it provides nondiscriminatory access to its ordering systems in 
accordance with the requirements of section 271. 
(i) Discussion
170. We find that SWBT demonstrates, with performance data and other evidence, that 
it provides nondiscriminatory access to the key aspects of a BOCs ordering systems, as 
identified in our prior section 271 orders.   Specifically, SWBT has shown that: (i) it is able to 
return timely order confirmation and rejection notices; (ii) its systems flow-through a high 
percentage of orders without manual handling, at a rate that is comparable overall to the flow-
through rate for its retail services; (iii) the mechanized orders that do not flow-through are 
handled in a reasonably prompt and accurate manner; (iv) the mechanized and manual 
components of its ordering systems are scalable to accommodate increasing demand; (v) it 
provides jeopardy notices in a nondiscriminatory manner; and (vi) it provides timely order 
confirmation notices.   Because most of these ordering functions lack a direct retail analogue, 
our standard of review is to determine whether SWBTs systems and performance allow an 
efficient carrier a meaningful opportunity to compete.  For those functions of the ordering 
systems for which the Texas Commission has identified a retail analogue, we shall assess 
whether SWBT provides competing carriers with access to its OSS systems in substantially the 
same time and manner as it provides to its retail operations.
(a) Order Confirmation Notices
171. We conclude that SWBT is providing timely order confirmation to competing 
LECs in Texas.  The Commission, in prior section 271 orders, has held that the functionality 
encompassed by order confirmation notices is a very important element of the ordering process, 
and that data demonstrating that they are provided in a timely manner is a key consideration for 
assessing whether competitors are allowed a meaningful opportunity to compete.   We find that 
SWBT is providing timely order confirmation notices to competing LECs in Texas that use EDI 
and LEX for resale and UNE-P ordering.  For both types of orders, SWBT has consistently met 
the Texas Commissions standard of returning 95% of confirmation notices within five hours of 
submission of the order (and within 24 hours for complex business orders).   These data 
indicate that, in only one month, April 2000, did SWBTs performance for EDI orders drop 
below the benchmark to 94.1 percent.   Because this performance is barely below the 
benchmark, and because SWBT had satisfied the standard for the preceding seven straight 
months, we conclude that SWBTs performance in this area satisfies the nondiscrimination 
standard and provides competitors with a meaningful opportunity to compete. 
172. We also conclude that SWBTs performance with respect to order confirmation 
notice timeliness for unbundled loop orders submitted electronically meets the nondiscrimination 
requirement.  SWBT is required to report its performance in this area separately for orders 
submitted via EDI and those submitted via LEX, and also is required to divide loops into those 
ordered with a ported number, and those without, and a separate category for xDSL-capable 
loops.  SWBTs performance with respect to stand-alone loops has been consistently above the 
95 percent benchmark for the last five months, for both the EDI and LEX interfaces.   
Moreover, the average time to return confirmation notices for stand-alone loop orders generally 
has been under two hours for these months.   The percentage of confirmation notices returned 
within five hours for orders of loops with a ported number also has been generally satisfactory, 
and has consistently been near or above the 95 percent benchmark during the last three months.  
Finally, as discussed in more detail below in part V.D, we conclude that SWBT provides 
satisfactory performance for xDSL capable loop orders, returning 96 percent of order 
confirmation notices within 24 hours for orders submitted via EDI, and 94 percent within 24 
hours for LEX orders. 
173. Furthermore, we do not find that SWBTs order confirmation process itself is 
flawed, as urged by several commenters.  ALTS/CLEC Coalition, for example, argues that 
SWBT sends an unacceptably high volume of jeopardies after sending an order confirmation 
notice, and that this is evidence that SWBTs systems send order confirmation notices 
prematurely, before fully checking on the availability of facilities and due dates.   We conclude 
that there is insufficient evidence in the record to indicate that SWBTs process is discriminatory. 
Moreover, SWBT explains that it uses the same systems to check facilities availability for retail 
orders as it does for competing carriers orders.   Accordingly, we conclude that SWBTs 
system for returning order confirmation notices allows competing carriers a meaningful 
opportunity to compete.


(b) Reject Notices
174. We conclude that SWBT provides competing carriers with timely order rejection 
notices in a manner that allows competing LECs a reasonable opportunity to compete.  SWBT 
provides carriers with two types of rejects:  mechanically-generated reject notices, which are 
returned over the same interface used to submit the order, and manually-generated rejects, which 
are returned via a separate graphical user interface.   SWBTs performance data demonstrates 
that it consistently has satisfied the Texas Commissions one-hour standard for timely return of 
mechanically-generated reject notices.   Prompt return of these reject notices by SWBT 
minimizes delays associated with order rejections, and enables competing carriers to correct and 
resubmit these orders in a timely manner.
175. We also conclude that SWBTs performance with respect to manually-generated 
rejects satisfies the nondiscrimination standard.  SWBT has returned manually-generated rejects, 
on average, in under eight hours for February, March, and April 2000, and its performance has 
shown improvement during this period even as overall order volumes have increased.    We 
recognize that SWBT has satisfied the Texas Commissions strict five hour standard in this area 
only once in the last three months.  We nonetheless conclude that SWBTs ability to return 
manually-generated rejects in an average of five to eight hours provides efficient competing 
carriers a meaningful opportunity to compete, particularly in light of the fact that most rejects are 
mechanically-generated and are returned in under an hour.   Finally, we agree with SWBT that 
the long average processing time reported in December 1999 and January 2000 do not accurately

reflect average performance for live orders submitted in those months, and had little or no 
competitive impact. 
176. We disagree with several commenters who suggest that SWBTs reject rate 
indicates that it fails to provide nondiscriminatory access to its ordering systems.   We note that 
the Texas Commission did not establish a reject rate standard, and neither has this Commission 
previously engaged in a parity or direct benchmark analysis of a carriers overall reject rate.  We 
have, however, indicated that we will not hold a BOC accountable for rejects that occur for 
reasons within a competing LECs control.   As in the Bell Atlantic New York Order, we note 
that order rejections in this instance vary widely by individual carrier, from 10.8 percent to higher 
than 60 percent.   We find that such a wide variation in the individual reject rates strongly 
implies that the care a competing carrier takes in submitting its orders makes a significant 
difference in the rate at which its orders are rejected.  In light of this variation, we conclude that 
the overall reject rates faced by competing carriers in this instance on orders submitting via the 
EDI interface do not appear to indicate flaws in SWBTs OSS systems or processes. 
177. In reaching the foregoing conclusion, we note that some commenters argue that 
address-related rejects delay orders and impose additional costs on competing carriers, and are 
largely attributable to SWBT.  Specifically, competing carriers argue that these unavoidable 
address-related rejects can be attributed to two causes:  parsing/integration difficulties, and 
mismatches between SWBTs two primary address databases  PREMIS and CRIS.   As noted 
above, SWBT denies that any address-related rejects are related to parsing/integration 
difficulties.  SWBT does not dispute, however, that some address-related rejects may be due to 
discrepancies between PREMIS and CRIS.   Even assuming that some of the responsibility for 
address-related rejects may be attributed to SWBT, we do not find that competing carriers have 
been deprived of a meaningful opportunity to compete.  Indeed, evidence in the record indicates 
that fewer than five percent of carriers orders are rejected for address-related reasons, which 
suggests that, despite any address-related rejects, carriers have been largely successful in 
submitting their orders.  In view of our finding that reject rates correlate to the care a carrier takes 
in submitting its orders, and given that the low level of address-related rejects in Texas does not 
deprive an efficient competitor of a meaningful opportunity to compete, we decline to further 
address carriers numerous and specific claims regarding the nature and scope of address-related 
rejects in SWBTs systems.
178. We recognize that SWBT and several commenters agree that an order process 
enhancement implemented by SWBT in May 2000  the TN Ordering change  will reduce the 
number of rejects.   Specifically, this change obviates the need for carriers to list an end users 
address on orders involving the migration of an end-user from retail or resale to UNE-P service.  
This provides us with additional assurances that competing LECs will be able to further reduce 
their reject rates and avoid the potentially time-consuming task of resolving address-related 
rejects.  We note that this enhancement should be particularly beneficial to carriers such as 
WorldCom who plan to increase volumes considerably in offering service to the mass market.   
Although several carriers have expressed concern that the TN Ordering change will shift the 
burden of manually resolving database mismatches from competing LECs to SWBT (thus 
creating the potential for delays, if SWBT is unable to handle the workload), the evidence in the 
record does not indicate that the increased burden on SWBT will be substantial. 
(c) Flow-through Rate
179. In prior section 271 orders, the Commission used order flow-through  as a 
potential indicator of a wide range of problems that we consider in determining whether a BOC 
provides nondiscriminatory access to its OSS.   We have not considered flow-though rates as 
the sole indicia of parity, however, and thus have not limited our analysis of a BOCs ordering 
processes to a review of its flow-through performance data.  Instead, we have held that factors 
such as a BOCs overall ability to return timely order confirmation and rejection notices, 
accurately process manually handled orders, and scale its systems are relevant and probative for 
analyzing a BOCs ability to provide access to its ordering functions in a nondiscriminatory 
manner.   Moreover, we have consistently stated that a BOC is not accountable for orders that 
are rejected or fail to flow through due to competing carriers mistakes. 
180. We conclude that the flow-through rate reported by SWBT indicates that SWBTs 
systems are capable of achieving high overall levels of order flow-through.   Specifically, 
SWBT reports a higher than 96 percent flow-through rate for orders submitted via EDI.   In 
other words, over 96 percent of EDI orders that are designed to flow through, and that are not 
rejected, are processed through the ordering systems without manual intervention.  Even when 
considering all orders (and not just orders designed to flow-through), SWBT demonstrates that a 
high percentage of its orders are processed without manual intervention. 
181. We disagree with commenters who argue that SWBTs performance with respect 
to flowing through UNE loop orders is inadequate.   We recognize that additional data 
submitted by SWBT confirms that UNE loop orders flow through at a considerably lower rate 
than UNE-P or resale orders submitted via EDI.  As noted above, however, the Texas 
Commission established a method of comparing retail and competing LEC flow-through rates in 
the aggregate (combining all resale and UNE orders), and SWBT has satisfied this level of 
performance.  While we may conclude that failure to provide parity or benchmark performance 
for a single sub-category of service constitutes a failure to provide nondiscriminatory access to 
OSS, we do not find this to be the case here with respect to flow-through.  As we have stated in 
prior section 271 orders, a BOCs ability to return timely order confirmation and rejection 
notices, accurately process manually handled orders, and scale its systems is more relevant and 
probative for analyzing the BOCs ability to provide access to its ordering functions than a 
simple flow-through analysis.  Indeed, as explained in this section, the record before us supports 
a finding that SWBT is able to perform these key ordering functions in a timely and accurate 
manner.  We thus find that the relatively low flow-through rate for UNE-loop orders is not, in 
itself, an indication that competing carriers are denied nondiscriminatory access to SWBTs 
ordering systems and processes.  
182. Several competing LECs assert that manual order processing by SWBT, including 
the manual creation of service orders, can inject errors into the process which causes delays and 
may lead to provisioning errors.   Although SWBT does not provide performance data 
regarding the accuracy of orders created and handled manually by SWBT,  evidence in the 
record indicates that SWBT has procedures in place to ensure the accuracy of these manual 
processes.   In addition, Telcordia concluded that SWBT employs a comprehensive approach 
for the detection and analysis of manual data entry errors, with a goal of reducing manual data 
entry errors.   We also note that the performance data concerning trouble reports within 10 or 
30 days of installation suggests that SWBT is provisioning orders accurately.   Thus, while 
some commenters allege generally that orders are provisioned inaccurately, the evidence does not 
support a conclusion that such inaccuracies are attributable to processing errors by SWBT 
personnel.  Moreover, we recognize that SWBT demonstrates a high overall flow-through rate, 
which necessarily means that relatively few mechanically-submitted orders will fall out for 
manual processing.  Where an applicant is unable to demonstrate a high flow-through rate, and 
thus manual processing of mechanized orders is more common, we may require more extensive 
data with respect to this issue.  
183. Finally, we disagree with commenters contentions that, notwithstanding the 
relatively high flow-through rates and low overall level of manual processing, SWBTs OSS will 
be unable to accommodate reasonably foreseeable increases in commercial order volumes.  We 
note that Telcordia tested the capacity of SWBTs OSS systems in July 1999 and determined that 
SWBT could handle projected first quarter 2000 volumes.   This conclusion is generally 
supported by SWBTs performance data, which indicates that SWBT has maintained on-time 
performance for key functions notwithstanding steadily-increasing daily order volumes.   We 
recognize, as AT&T points out, that SWBT employed a policy in January and February 2000 of 
manually processing only 500 of AT&Ts orders per hour.   We reject AT&Ts assertion, 
however, that this policy indicates that SWBT is unable to handle reasonably foreseeable 
commercial order volumes.  Indeed, SWBT explains that it instituted this policy in direct 
response to actions taken by AT&T.  Specifically, for several days in January and February 2000, 
AT&T altered its normal practice of submitting orders on a real time basis, and instead saved its 
orders and submitted them all at once  thus sending more than ten times its order volume in a 
single hour.    SWBT states that, although AT&Ts practice did not cause its systems to fail, its 
ability to process orders efficient[ly] was impeded.   There is no evidence in the record 
indicating that SWBTs policy has impeded any carriers ability to compete.  Moreover, we note 
that AT&T no longer uses the ordering practice that triggered SWBTs policy.   We thus find 
that SWBTs policy for processing AT&Ts orders, under these circumstances and in light of 
these findings, was a reasonable method of ensuring that its ability to provide nondiscriminatory 
access to all competing carriers is not impaired, and is not a basis for finding that SWBTs OSS 
is not scalable.
(d) Jeopardy Notices
184. We conclude that SWBT provides jeopardy notices (i.e., notice that a service 
installation due date will be missed) to competing carriers in a nondiscriminatory manner.  
SWBT provides two types of jeopardy notifications to competing carriers.  First, SWBT provides 
mechanized jeopardy notifications to competing carriers via LEX or EDI if it determines, after a 
service appointment is scheduled, that the necessary facilities are unavailable.   SWBT explains 
that this no facilities available jeopardy notice is the only type of jeopardy notification it 
provides within its retail operations.  SWBT provides a second type of electronic jeopardy 
notification in certain instances other than no facilities available, and sends these notices over a 
web-based GUI.  SWBT explains that these GUI jeopardies include, for example, instances 
where a dispatch technician is unable to access an end users property or discovers that additional 
driving instructions are needed.   SWBT states that there is no retail equivalent for this second 
type of jeopardy notice.
185. We conclude that SWBT provides no facilities jeopardy notices to competing 
carriers and to its own operations in the same time and manner.  SWBT demonstrates that it 
utilizes the same databases and returns the notices real-time using the electronic ordering 
interface used to submit the order.   Commenters do not provide any indication that these no 
facilities electronic jeopardy notices are not created and returned promptly after SWBT 
determines that facilities are unavailable.  We also conclude that SWBTs process for returning 
other jeopardy notifications via GUI provides efficient carriers with a meaningful opportunity to 
compete.   We disagree with carriers who suggest that flaws in SWBTs jeopardy process  
specifically, that too many orders receive jeopardies and that jeopardies are sent too late in the 
ordering process  deny carriers a meaningful opportunity to compete.   First, the record does 
not support carriers claims that SWBT returns an unreasonably high number of jeopardy 
notifications.  SWBT has submitted data indicating that less than five percent of all carriers 
orders result in the issuance of jeopardy notices.   While we recognize that jeopardies may lead 
to delays in the ordering process, the record does not indicate that competing carriers customers 
feel the impact of such delays in Texas.  Moreover, SWBT is held accountable, through its 
performance measurements, for instances where SWBT-caused jeopardy situations result in 
missed due dates.  As discussed below in section V, SWBT misses fewer due dates for 
competing LECs than it does for its own retail operations, across almost all categories of service. 
186. Carriers also contend that SWBTs GUI jeopardies include errors that should 
have been identified earlier in the ordering process, before an order confirmation notice is 
returned and before a due date is established.   We note, however, that many of the GUI 
jeopardies reflect circumstances that could only be detected at the provisioning stage  such as a 
situation where a technician is unable to access the end users premises, or requires additional 
driving directions.  Moreover, we agree with SWBT that carriers may seek process changes to 
implement additional up-front edits, where possible, to reduce the number of jeopardies received 
by competing LECs. 
(e) Completion Notices
187. We conclude that SWBT provides order completion notification in a 
nondiscriminatory manner.   In this case, SWBT has not indicated whether it provides 
completion notification information to its retail operations.  The Texas Commission did not 
identify a retail analogue, but instead established a benchmark against which SWBTs 
performance in this area is to be compared.   We accept the Texas Commissions approach and 
will assess whether SWBT provides completion notification sufficient to allow an efficient 
competitor a meaningful opportunity to compete.   We have recognized that such a notice can 
play the crucial role of informing the carrier that it can begin billing the customer for service and 
addressing any maintenance problems experienced by the customer.   The timely provision of

such notices thus can directly impact a competing carriers ability to serve its customers at the 
same level of quality that SWBT provides to its retail customers.  
188. We base our finding that SWBT provides sufficient order completion notification 
on SWBTs provision on Service Order Completion notices to competing carriers.  The Texas 
Commission established a performance standard requiring SWBT to return 97 percent of 
completion notices within one day of work completion.   SWBT has satisfied this standard for 
each of the last three months for orders submitted via EDI.   SWBTs performance for LEX 
orders has not met the Texas Commissions standard for these months, but has been improving 
and was only 0.2 percent below the benchmark in April 2000.   Moreover, considering EDI and 
LEX orders together, SWBTs performance exceeded 97 percent in April 2000.  Based on the 
level of overall performance, and the steady improvement in LEX performance, we agree with 
the Texas Commission that SWBTs provision of completion notices allows competing LECs a 
reasonable opportunity to compete.   Finally, although AT&T argues that SWBTs performance 
with respect to AT&Ts UNE loop orders is lower than these aggregate figures, we do not find 
that this demonstrates a systemic problem with SWBTs OSS or that competing carriers are 
denied a meaningful opportunity to compete. 
(f) Other Issues
189. LIDB.  We conclude that SWBT enables carriers to update customer information 
contained in SWBTs Line Information Database (LIDB) in substantially the same time and 
manner as its retail operations.  LIDB contains end user information that is used to enable calling 
card and collect calls, information used for branding operator and directory assistance calls, and 
also customers interLATA and intraLATA PIC.   SWBT provides carriers two ways to update 
LIDB records:  first, a carrier may use the initial LSR requesting service to trigger a LIDB 
update; and second, where a carrier must update LIDB records for an existing customer, updates 
may be batched and submitted to SWBT via one of two electronic interfaces.   
190. WorldCom asserts that SWBTs LSR process for updating carriers LIDB 
records is flawed.  Specifically, based on its initial experience in sending live orders, WorldCom 
reports that SWBT consistently fails to complete the LIDB updates in a prompt and accurate 
manner.   While we share the concern expressed by the Department of Justice on this issue,  
we conclude that the record does not support a finding that SWBT fails to provide a mechanism 
for updating LIDB records in a nondiscriminatory manner.  As an initial matter, we note that 
there is no indication that these particular LIDB updating errors actually harmed WorldComs 
customers in any way.   Furthermore, SWBT explains that the delays and incorrect updates 
identified by WorldCom were caused by a particular type of manual error committed by SWBT 
personnel.   SWBT states that it has resolved this problem, having retrained its LSC 
representatives and implemented other safeguards to protect against a recurrence of these 
mistakes.   We rely on SWBTs assertion that it has correctly identified the root cause of this 
problem, and thus expect that the changes SWBT has implemented remedy the problem and 
essentially eliminate errors in processing LIDB updates.  If a carrier were to demonstrate, in the 
future, that SWBT continues to cause LIDB records to be updated incorrectly or late, and that

these problems are competitively harmful, SWBT may be subject to enforcement action under 
section 271(d)(6).   
191. Posting Process.  We also conclude that SWBT posts competing LECs orders 
to its billing systems in a manner that gives efficient competitors a meaningful opportunity to 
compete.  This posting process involves establishing the end users new billing relationship 
and, for orders involving the transfer of an existing customer from SWBT to a competing carrier, 
it also involves terminating the existing billing relationship.  The Texas Commission has 
established a performance metric to measure the percentage of competing carriers orders posted 
to SWBTs billing systems prior to the competing carriers next bill period, and compares 
SWBTs performance in this area for competing carriers to its performance in posting orders on 
the retail side.   According to the performance data, SWBT has consistently posted over 98 
percent of carriers orders to its billing systems in time for the next billing cycle.   While 
commenters note that SWBTs performance was slightly out-of-parity in the first two months of 
this year, they do not establish that the slight difference reflected in the performance data is 
competitively significant or reflects a systemic problem in SWBTs OSS.   We thus conclude 
that SWBT provides nondiscriminatory performance in this area.
192. Several carriers nonetheless complain that double billing has occurred in isolated 
instances, and that they are harmed by such billing mistakes.   The Commission previously has 
found that double billing, which results from failure to terminate promptly the BOCs existing 
billing relationship, is compelling evidence that a BOCs OSS for ordering and provisioning of 
wholesale services is not operationally ready.   SWBT has established procedures for 
automatically updating its billing systems  and manual processes to attend to orders that do not 
update properly.   The Texas Commission concluded that SWBT has adequate billing processes 
in place which minimize the likelihood of double billing.   While we do not discount the 
potential harm of double-billing on affected customers, there is insufficient evidence of double 
billing in this instance to indicate that SWBTs systems process for updating its billing records is 
discriminatory.
193. Loss Notification Reports.  AT&T also reports that it recently has discovered 
instances in which SWBT fails to provide timely loss notification reports, which signal 
competing carriers that a customer has migrated to another LEC.   AT&T explains that this 
failure caused it improperly to continue billing 99 customers in April 2000 who apparently had 
switched to back to SWBT or to another LEC.  We note that AT&T is entitled to receive these 
loss notification reports pursuant to its interconnection agreement with SWBT, which sets out in 
detail the procedure by which AT&T is able to request these reports.   While we recognize that 
failure to provide loss notification reports may impact customers and impede a competitive 
carriers ability to compete, we also recognize that AT&T does not indicate whether it has 
registered to receive these reports as necessary under the interconnection agreement.  There is 
thus no basis for finding that SWBT has failed to follow the loss notification procedures 
contained in its interconnection agreement, or is otherwise at fault for these missing loss 
notification reports.  Also, because no other carrier suggests that SWBT fails to provide these 
notices, there is nothing to suggest that this is a systemic problem.  We reject AT&Ts claim, 
then, that these circumstances warrant a finding that SWBT has failed to provide 
nondiscriminatory access to its OSS.
g. Provisioning
194. In this section we conclude that, overall, SWBT provisions competing LEC 
customers orders for resale and UNE-P services in substantially the same time and manner as it 
provisions orders for its own retail customers.   Consistent with our approach in prior section 
271 orders, we examine SWBTs provisioning processes, as well as its performance with respect 
to provisioning timeliness (i.e., missed due dates and average installation intervals) and 
provisioning quality (i.e., service problems experienced at the provisioning stage).   We note, 
however, that SWBTs electronic processes for provisioning UNE-P orders may falter when 
handling orders that contain address-related discrepancies that are not resolved by SWBTs front-
end edits.  SWBT concedes that mismatched addresses can disrupt the normal order process 
flow, but indicates that its process for manually catching and correcting such errors are adequate 
to minimize the occurrence of service outage.  We note that customer-affecting problems arising 
from these address discrepancies appear to be rare, and conclude that these process failures, 
standing alone, do not warrant a finding that SWBT fails to provide nondiscriminatory access to 
its provisioning functions. 
195. Provisioning Processes.  Based on the evidence in the record, we conclude that 
SWBT demonstrates that it provides nondiscriminatory access to its provisioning processes.  
Specifically, we find that SWBT provides competitive LECs and its retail operations with 
equivalent access to information on available service installation dates.   For orders that do not 
require a dispatch technician to complete, SWBT asserts that it makes available the same set of 
standard provisioning intervals for competing carriers and its retail representatives.   Dispatch 
orders, on the other hand, are routed to SWBTs provisioning systems and assigned a technician 
in the same manner as SWBT retail orders requiring a technician.   We also find that SWBTs 
processes provide requesting carriers with the same level of confidence as its own retail 
operations that the due date promised to customers will be the actual due date that the BOC 
assigns to the order when it is processed.  
196. We conclude that SWBT provisions orders for resale POTS and specials to 
competitors in substantially the same time and manner that it provisions equivalent orders to 
itself.  Specifically, SWBT provides performance data showing that it provisions resale service at 
parity with its own retail operations.  First, SWBT demonstrates that it misses fewer competitive 
LEC customer appointments for installing resale POTS and special services, and provisions such 
service within equivalent average intervals, compared to appointments and service for its own 
retail customers.   Second, SWBT demonstrates that the quality of installations provided to 
competitors customers is very close to parity, or above parity, compared to similar work 
performed for its own retail customers.   We further note that the Texas Commission concludes, 
based on this performance data, that SWBT provisions resale services in a nondiscriminatory 
manner. 
197. Based on a review of corresponding performance measurements for UNE-P 
service, we conclude that SWBT also provisions competing LEC orders for these network 
combinations in the same time and manner as it provisions equivalent retail services.  
Specifically, the record evidence demonstrates that SWBT is meeting the service installation 
dates for competitive LEC customers at higher rates than for its own retail customers, and 
completes these competing LECs orders, on average, in less time than it completes analogous 
retail orders.   SWBTs performance data also indicates that it provisions UNE-P orders at 
generally the same level of quality (i.e., with a comparably low level of troubles reported within 
the first ten days after installation) as it provisions analogous retail service.   Specifically, while 
SWBT reported slightly more installation-related troubles associated with UNE-P orders 
requiring no field work than for analogous retail orders in February 2000, it reported better than 
parity performance for March and April 2000.   We also note that SWBTs performance with 
respect to UNE-P orders requiring field work reflects an installation-related trouble rate than is 
very slightly higher than the analogous retail rate.   We conclude that this level of disparity is 
minimal, however, and does not indicate that SWBT fails to provision competing LEC orders in 
the same time and manner as its own. 
198. Address Discrepancies and Service Outages.  Evidence submitted by SWBT and 
various commenters indicates that the normal order flow may be disrupted if a UNE-P order 
contains an address discrepancy that is not detected during the initial editing process.   
Specifically, SWBT uses a three order process under which it splits a carriers LSR into three 
separate sub-orders, each of which performs different tasks  such as provisioning and billing 
functions  in SWBTs back office systems.  SWBT explains that it populates one of the orders 
with the address submitted by the competing LEC, and takes the address for the remaining two 
orders from one of its internal address databases.  If these addresses are not exactly consistent 
(and SWBT has explained scenarios where they may not be consistent),   SWBTs process for 
automatically relating these three service orders fails and the three orders become 
disassociated.   SWBT explains that one of these disassociated orders will act as a 
disconnect order and cut off the customers dial tone unless SWBT promptly intervenes and 
manually reunites the three orders.   SWBT does not dispute that the potential exists for order 
disassociation leading to service outage, but explains that it has implemented a manual process to 
monitor for disassociated orders, which enables it to manually re-associate orders and prevent 
outages. 
199. We conclude, based on evidence submitted by SWBT and commenting parties, 
that service outages attributable to problems with the three order process are very rare, and thus 
do not warrant a finding that SWBT fails to provision UNE-P orders in substantially the same 
time and manner as it provisions equivalent retail services.  We recognize that the Texas 
Commission has reviewed allegations and evidence of UNE-P outages and concluded that the 
occurrence of such outages is minimal.   We agree with the Texas Commission in this matter: 
evidence submitted by carriers in this proceeding indicates that, at present, service outages 
associated with UNE-P conversions are relatively infrequent, and thus does not lead us to a 
different conclusion.  We recognize that one commenter alleges that 5.6 percent of UNE-P orders 
experience a loss of service at installation, and another claims a 2.8 percent outage rate.    
SWBT disputes these figures, however, and offers evidence indicating that, for these two 
carriers, the occurrence of outages resulting from errors in its OSS was actually less than one 
percent.   While it is difficult to resolve conclusively these disputed claims, we find that 
SWBTs evidence, along with the prior determination of the Texas Commission, sufficiently 
refutes these claims.  If, however, such outages rise to a level that impedes a carriers opportunity 
to compete, we will take appropriate enforcement action under section 271(d)(6).
200. In addition, we note that several commenters raise other complaints about 
problems which they attribute to the three-order process.  The CLEC Coalition, for example, 
blames imperfections in SWBTs three-order process for other service-affecting problems such 
as loss of long distance service, loss of vertical features, loss of outbound calling, double billing 
and inability to call certain local numbers.   While we do not discount the impact such 
problems would have on customers, we find that commenters did not document some of these 
problems, while others appear to be infrequent.  We thus conclude that these problems do not 
warrant a finding that SWBT fails to provide nondiscriminatory access to its provisioning 
systems and processes.  Finally, several commenters, including CompTel, argue that the three 
order process is inherently discriminatory, as it unlawfully splits already-combined elements 
apart and puts them back together.   We disagree with this characterization of SWBTs three-
order process  SWBT does not require carriers to order or pay for the network elements 
separately, nor does SWBT physically separate and reassemble the network elements.  SWBT 
has explained that the three orders simply correspond to different functions that must be 
completed in its back office systems. 
h. Maintenance & Repair
201. We conclude that SWBT demonstrates that it provides nondiscriminatory access 
to maintenance and repair OSS functions.  First, we find that SWBT has deployed the necessary 
interfaces, systems, and personnel to enable requesting carriers to access the same maintenance 
and repair functions that SWBT provides to itself.  We then conclude that SWBTs systems 
allow carriers to access those functions in substantially the same time and manner as SWBTs 
retail operations.  We further find that SWBT restores service to customers of competing carriers 
in substantially the same time and manner as it restores service to its own customers.  Finally, we 
conclude that SWBT performs maintenance and repair work for customers of competing carriers 
at substantially the same level of quality that it provides to its own customers.
(i) Background
202. As part of its obligation to provide nondiscriminatory access to OSS functions, 
SWBT must provide requesting carriers with nondiscriminatory access to its maintenance and 
repair systems.   A competing carrier that provides service through resale or unbundled network 
elements remains dependent upon the incumbent LEC for maintenance and repair.  Because 
SWBT performs analogous maintenance and repair functions for its retail operations, it must 
provide competing carriers access that enables them to perform maintenance and repair functions 
in substantially the same time and manner as SWBT provides its retail customers.   
Equivalent access ensures that competing carriers can assist customers experiencing service 
disruptions using the same network information and diagnostic tools that are available to SWBT 
personnel.   Without equivalent access, a competing carrier would be placed at a significant 
competitive disadvantage, as its customer would perceive a problem with SWBTs network as a 
problem with the competing carriers own network. 
(ii) Discussion
203. Functionality.  We conclude that SWBT offers maintenance and repair interfaces 
and systems that enable a requesting carrier to access all the same functions that are available to 
SWBTs retail representatives.  SWBT provides competing carriers with several options for 
requesting maintenance and reporting troubles.  Competing carriers may electronically access 
SWBTs maintenance and repair functions for UNE-Loop, UNE-Platform, and resale through the 
Graphical User Interface Toolbar Trouble Administration interface (Toolbar) or the application-
to-application Electronic Bonding Trouble Administration interface (EBTA).   Both the EBTA 
and Toolbar interfaces flow directly into SWBTs back-end OSS systems and enable competing 
carriers to perform the same functions, in the same manner, that SWBTs retail operations 
perform.   SWBT also offers requesting carriers non-electronic access to its maintenance and 
repair functions through the SWBT Local Operations Center (LOC).   The LOC handles all 
competing carrier repair and maintenance requests for UNEs, resale, and interconnection. 
204. WorldCom complains that it is precluded from accessing SWBTs EBTA 
interface for a new customer until that customers order has posted to SWBTs wholesale billing 
systems.   Without this ability, WorldCom notes that it cannot use EBTA to submit trouble 
tickets or perform loop tests on the day service is provisioned, and possibly for several days 
thereafter.  WorldCom has the option of using the Toolbar interface for these installation-related 
trouble situations, or may call SWBTs Local Operations Center (LOC) to report troubles in 
such circumstances.   While reliance on these alternative means of accessing SWBTs 
maintenance and repair OSS undermines the efficiency and convenience of using EBTA, we 
conclude that these alternative processes are adequate and enable carriers that rely on EBTA to 
access SWBTs OSS in substantially the same time and manner as SWBT retail.   In addition, 
SWBT reports that, as of June 20, 2000, it has lifted this restriction on access to EBTA, thereby 
enabling WorldCom to submit trouble tickets on the completion date prior to posting of the 
order.   We expect that SWBT will implement this change for other carriers using EBTA as 
well. 
205. Interface Response Times.  We further conclude that SWBTs maintenance and 
repair interfaces and systems process trouble inquiries from competing carriers in substantially 
the same time and manner as SWBT processes inquiries concerning its own retail customers.   
To compete effectively in the local exchange market, competing carriers must be able to diagnose 
and process customer trouble complaints with substantially the same speed and accuracy that 
SWBT diagnoses and processes complaints from its retail customers.  A slower process can lead 
to customer perception that the competing carrier is a less efficient service provider than the 
BOC.  SWBT has provided evidence of the transaction times for its Toolbar interfaces that 
indicates it responds to competing carrier requests for maintenance and repair inquiries in 
substantially the same time as it does for itself.    Moreover, we note that no commenter has 
asserted otherwise.
206. Time to Restore.  We conclude that SWBT repairs reported troubles competing 
carriers in substantially the same time and manner that it repairs troubles reported by its own 
customers.  The Commission has stressed that a BOC is obligated to repair troubles for a 
customer of a requesting carrier in substantially the same time that it takes to repair problems 
experienced by its own customers.   For example, because a reliable telephone line may be 
crucial for a business customer to conduct its business, the Commission has emphasized the 
importance of timely resolution of trouble reports from a competing carriers business 
customers. 
207. We base our finding of nondiscriminatory restoration time on SWBTs 
performance data.  SWBTs performance data for December 1999 through April 2000 indicates 
that, for both resale and unbundled network elements, SWBT repaired troubles reported by 
customers of competing carriers, on average, in substantially the same time that it repaired 
troubles reported by its own retail customers.   In addition to SWBTs performance with respect 
to average restoration intervals, we note that SWBT is able to meet a comparable number of 
repair commitments for competing carriers (in the resale POTS and UNE-P service 
categories) as for its own customers.   This level of performance is substantial evidence that 
SWBT responds to trouble reports and restores service in substantially the same time and manner 
for competing carriers as for itself.  Accordingly, we find that the performance measurements 
provide compelling evidence that SWBT responds to competitors trouble complaints in 
substantially the same time and manner that it responds to its own customers complaints.
208. The one service category for which SWBT has not consistently performed repair 
functions for competing LECs and its retail operations in substantially the same time and manner 
is resale specials  particularly SWBTs resold Voice Grade Private Line service and ISDN 
products.   SWBTs performance data indicates that, for these two services, SWBT generally 
has taken two or three hours longer to perform repairs for competing LEC customers than for its 
own customers.   In this instance, however, we conclude that this difference in repair time is not 
competitively significant because it is so slight.  In addition, we view these two performance 
measurements in the context of SWBTs strong overall maintenance and repair performance for 
resale services (described above).  We thus conclude that SWBTs performance with respect to 
these two service offerings does not indicate that SWBT fails to repair troubles in substantially 
the same time and manner for retail and wholesale customers.
209. Quality of Work Performed.  We also find that SWBT demonstrates that it 
performs maintenance and repair work for customers of competing carriers at the same level of 
quality as it performs for its retail customers.  A competing carriers customer may become 
dissatisfied if the customer experiences frequent service problems, especially repeated troubles.  
In determining the quality of maintenance and repair work performed by SWBT for competing 
carriers, we examine the rate of trouble reported by customers of competing carriers as compared 
with SWBTs own retail customers, as well as the rate of repeat reports of trouble.  SWBTs 
performance data reveals that competing carriers customers generally reported the same or lower 
rate of troubles, for both resold services and UNE-P, as SWBTs retail customers.   Similarly, 
performance data on the rate of repeat trouble reports submitted by competing carriers are 
generally lower than for SWBTs retail customers.   Based on the foregoing, we conclude that 
SWBT provides nondiscriminatory access to its maintenance and repair functions.
i. Billing
210. We conclude that SWBT provides nondiscriminatory access to its billing 
functions, based on an assessment of its billing processes and its Texas performance data.  
Competing carriers need access to billing information to provide accurate and timely bills to their 
customers.   SWBT is obligated to provide competing carriers with complete and accurate 
reports on the service usage of competing carriers customers in substantially the same time and 
manner that SWBT provides such information to itself.  To do so, SWBT provides competing 
carriers with billing information through the Usage Extract process and carrier bills.   The 
Usage Extract itemizes usage records for competing carrier customers, while carrier bills serve as 
a monthly invoice that incorporates charges for all of the products and services provided to a 
competing carrier by SWBT.  Similar mechanisms are used to provide billing information to 
SWBTs retail operations. 
211. We find that the performance standards and measurements established by the 
Texas Commission and developed in conjunction with SWBT and competing carriers are 
appropriate measures of SWBTs ability to provide competing carriers with usage data in 
substantially the same time and manner that SWBT provides such information to itself.   
SWBTs performance data indicate that, during the period from December 1999 to April 2000, 
SWBTs actual commercial performance consistently satisfied these standards for usage data 
timeliness and accuracy.   The one exception occurred in February 2000, when SWBT returned 
only 91.3 percent of daily usage feed records within six days, falling short of the 95 percent 
standard.   SWBT explains that its performance in this month was affected by the one-time 
recovery and return of missing records from September, October and November 1999.   We 
recognize that lost records, and even late records, can cause direct financial harm to competing 
carriers.  In this instance, however, we note that SWBT claims to have fixed the underlying 
problem,  and further note that carriers do not dispute that the problem has been fixed.  Based 
on these factors, and because SWBTs performance was satisfactory for the two preceding and 
two subsequent months, we conclude that SWBT does not discriminate in the provision of usage 
feeds to competing carriers.
212. Although several commenters complain that SWBTs performance with respect to 
wholesale bills is inadequate, the record does not indicate that SWBTs performance in this area 
deprives carriers a reasonable opportunity to compete.  As noted by the National ALEC 
Association and other commenters, we recognize that SWBT has failed to satisfy the standard for 
timeliness of wholesale bills sent to resellers for three of the last five months.   SWBT offers a 
separate explanations for each failure, suggesting that unique one-time occurrences caused the 
disparate results, and that the incident in March also delayed SWBTs own retail bills.   
Commenters have not disputed SWBTs explanations, and we recognize that SWBT reported 
100 percent on-time performance for February and April 2000.  AT&T further complains that 
SWBT does not report whether it provides timely wholesale bills for its UNE-P orders.   
Neither AT&T, nor any other competing LEC (other than the resellers discussed above) suggests 
that it actually receives such bills late or has been harmed by late bills.  While we do not 
minimize the importance to carriers of receiving wholesale bills in a timely manner, the record 
does not reflect that carriers, overall, are not receiving wholesale bills in a timely manner.  We 
thus conclude that SWBT does not discriminate against competing carriers in the provision of 
wholesale bills.
2. UNE Combinations and Other Issues
213. In this section, we conclude that SWBT provides nondiscriminatory access to 
combinations of unbundled network elements.  We also reject allegations that SWBT imposes 
unreasonable and discriminatory restrictions on certain types of combinations.  Finally, we reject 
allegations that SWBT places restrictions on intellectual property associated with UNEs that 
contravene its obligations under the Act.
a. Background
214. In order to comply with the requirements of checklist item 2, a BOC must show 
that it is offering [n]ondiscriminatory access to network elements in accordance with the 
requirements of section 251(c)(3) . . . .   Section 251(c)(3) requires an incumbent LEC to 
provide, to any requesting telecommunications carrier . . . nondiscriminatory access to network 
elements on an unbundled basis at any technically feasible point on rates, terms and conditions 
that are just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory . . . .   Section 251(c)(3) of the Act also 
requires incumbent LECs to provide unbundled network elements in a manner that allows 
requesting carriers to combine such elements in order to provide a telecommunications service. 
215. In the Ameritech Michigan Order, the Commission emphasized that the ability of 
requesting carriers to use unbundled network elements, as well as combinations of unbundled 
network elements, is integral to achieving Congress objective of promoting competition in local 
telecommunications markets.   Using combinations of unbundled network elements provides a 
competitor with the incentive and ability to package and market services in ways that differ from 
the BOCs existing service offerings in order to compete in the local telecommunications 
market.   Moreover, combining the incumbents unbundled network elements with their own 
facilities encourages facilities-based competition and allows competing providers to provide a 
wide array of competitive choices.   Because the use of combinations of unbundled network 
elements is an important strategy for entry into the local telecommunications market, as well as 
an obligation under the requirements of section 271, we examine section 271 applications to 
determine whether competitive carriers are able to combine network elements as required by the 
Act and the Commissions regulations. 
b. Discussion
(i) Combinations of Unbundled Network Elements
216. Based on the evidence in the record, SWBT demonstrates that it provides 
requesting telecommunications carriers with nondiscriminatory access to unbundled network 
elements (UNEs) at any technically feasible point.  We also conclude that SWBT provides access 
to UNEs in a manner that allows requesting carriers to combine those elements, and that SWBT 
provides access to preexisting combinations of network elements.  We base our conclusion on 
evidence of actual commercial usage, and also on SWBTs legal obligation to provide such 
access as established in the T2A.
217. The record indicates that SWBT, as required by the Texas Commission, provides 
a variety of methods that allow competitive carriers to combine unbundled network elements.  
For example, in addition to the standard physical and virtual collocation arrangements, SWBT 
provides alternative collocation arrangements such as shared collocation cages, common cage, 
and cageless collocation arrangements.   Where space for physical collocation is not available, 
SWBT also permits competing LECs to collocate their equipment in adjacent controlled 
environmental vaults or huts.  Moreover, competitive LECs may request other technically 
feasible methods of combining UNEs that are consistent with the provisions of the 1996 Act and 
other governing statutes and decisions.    For example, SWBT will provide interested 
competitive LECs access to a secured frame room (or cabinet, where space constraints require) 
that is set aside for accomplishing the necessary connections. 
218. The record also indicates that SWBT provides access to combinations of network 
elements in compliance with our UNE rules.    SWBT has a legal obligation, under certain 
existing interconnection agreements and the T2A to provide access to preassembled 
combinations of network elements, including the loop-switch port platform combination (known 
as the UNE platform or UNE-P) and the Enhanced Extended Loop (EEL), a combination of loop 
and transport facilities. 
219. We disagree with arguments of several competing carriers that SWBTs ordering 
process for UNE-P is per se discriminatory and violates rule 315(b)s prohibition against 
separating individual network elements that are already combined.   These parties assert that 
rather than migrating pre-existing combinations of elements as is, SWBTs ordering process 
functionally disconnects the existing service configuration in the switch and replaces it with a 
new configuration established by the competitive LECs local service request.  According to 
these parties, SWBTs three-order process results in service outages and disruptions for their 
customers, negatively impacting the competitive carriers ability to compete in the local 
market.  
220. Rule 315(b) forbids an incumbent LEC from separating network elements that are 
already combined to provide a service.   SWBT is not separating network elements in this 
context.  Instead, SWBT engages in a billing software change in order to establish service on 
behalf of a competitive LEC.  In particular, for SWBT to migrate a customer to a requesting 
carrier using the UNE platform, it must enter a software change that instructs its systems that the 
customer no longer belongs to SWBT, identifies the new provider for that customer, and changes 
billing instructions accordingly.  We find that SWBTs ordering process that converts its retail 
customer to a requesting carriers UNE platform customer through a software change does not 
involve separation of combined network elements, and therefore is not prohibited by rule 315(b).
221. For the same reason, we find that SWBTs ordering process is not per se 
discriminatory.  The record shows that SWBTs ordering system is designed to link orders to 
flow through its systems together.  Thus, if SWBTs ordering process operates as SWBT claims 
it is intended to operate, the three orders would be processed simultaneously and the change 
would be imperceptible to the end-user customer.  As described in the OSS section supra, SWBT 
is providing nondiscriminatory access to OSS ordering functions as evidenced by its performance 
data.  Therefore, we conclude that SWBT is meeting its statutory obligation of providing 
nondiscriminatory access regardless of the specific type of ordering process it has chosen to 
implement.
222. Finally, we note that the Department of Justice expressed concern about two 
recent disturbing allegations by competing LECs regarding limitations on the availability of 
UNE-P.   Based on our review of these allegations and evidence in the record, we conclude that 
SWBT satisfies its statutory obligation to provide access to UNE-P on a nondiscriminatory basis. 
First, AT&T alleges that SWBT refuses to provide fiber-to-the-curb lines originating from a 
central office in Richardson, Texas to competitive LECs on a UNE-P basis, making them 
available only on a resale basis.   While SWBT concedes that some orders for UNE-P over 
fiber-to-the-curb architecture were improperly rejected, it states that it completed other orders 
and that the improper rejections have not recurred since February 2000.    Moreover, SWBT 
explains that these rejections resulted from mistakes made by individual personnel and do not 
reflect its official policy.  SWBT also submitted copies of internal procedures for completing 
such orders. 
223. Second, Global Crossing alleges that SWBT has stonewalled Global Crossings 
request to convert its resale customers in Texas to UNE-P service.   We have previously stated 
that we will not withhold section 271 authorization on the basis of isolated instances of alleged 
unfair dealing or discrimination under the Act.   In this instance, we do not find that the incident 
cited by Global Crossing constitutes a pattern of discriminatory conduct or undermines our 
overall conclusion that SWBT provides nondiscriminatory access to combinations of network 
elements.   Moreover, we note that SWBT now acknowledges that resale-to-UNE-P 
conversions are covered by Global Crossing/Frontiers current interconnection agreement in 
Texas, and SWBT suggests that it is willing to resolve this issue promptly. 


(ii) Access to the Enhanced Extended Link
224. Section 251(c)(3) of the Act imposes on incumbent LECs such as SWBT the 
obligation to provide nondiscriminatory access to unbundled network elements.   AT&T and 
other commenters assert that SWBT places unreasonable and discriminatory restrictions on a 
combination of the loop and transport network elements (also known as an enhanced extended 
link or EEL) in violation of this statutory requirement.   We disagree.
225. In a further notice of proposed rulemaking that accompanied the UNE Remand 
Order, we requested comment on the legal and policy implications of allowing interexchange 
carriers to gain access to the EEL solely for the purpose of providing special access to their 
customers at UNE-based rates, thereby avoiding an incumbent LECs tariffed special access 
service.   We were specifically concerned that such access would imperil the universal service 
subsidies implicit in the access services provided by incumbent LECs.   In our Supplemental 
Order in the same proceeding, we exercised our authority to protect universal service during 
periods of regulatory transition by issuing a substantive rule temporarily conditioning an 
interexchange carriers access to the EEL on the interexchange carriers provision of a significant 
amount of local exchange service, in addition to exchange access service, to given customers. 
226. On June 2, 2000, we clarified and extended that interim measure in a 
Supplemental Order Clarification, establishing safe harbor guidelines for what constitutes a 
significant amount of local exchange service.    In that order, we explained that, in addition to 
the universal service concerns underlying the Supplemental Order itself, we had not conducted 
an impairment analysis under section 251(d)(2) specifically addressing a carriers access to the 
EEL for purposes of competing in the exchange access market.   The need for such an analysis, 
we observed, was particularly important in light of the Supreme Courts recent invalidation of 
our previous implementation of the impairment standard as insufficiently rigorous.   We 
found that we needed additional time to complete that empirical inquiry, and we explained that 
incumbent LECs have no statutory obligation to provide the EEL solely or primarily for use in 
the exchange access market unless and until we exercise our legislative rulemaking authority 
under section 251(d)(2) to impose that obligation.   We specifically rejected, on the basis of our 
long-standing experience in this area, the contention that this temporary constraint on access to 
the EEL would enable incumbent LECs to engage in price squeezes or other anticompetitive 
conduct once they enter the long-distance market. 
227. We disagree with WorldComs claim that SWBT has imposed discriminatory and 
unreasonable restrictions on access to EELs.   WorldCom points to three requirements that 
SWBT places on access to EELs:  (1) collocation; (2) refusal to permit commingled traffic; and 
(3) certification by the competitive LEC that the leased UNEs will carry only certain patterns of 
traffic.   First, as we indicated in the UNE Remand Order and in the Supplemental Order 
Clarification, collocation is a reasonable requirement for access to EELs.   Secondly, under the 
three safe harbor circumstances described in the Supplemental Order Clarification, incumbent 
LECs are allowed to prohibit commingling.  As we stated in that order, we are not persuaded that 
removing the prohibition in those local usage options would not lead to the use of unbundled 
network elements by interexchange carriers solely or primarily to bypass special access 
services.   Finally, certification is not an unreasonable requirement for implementing the 
Supplemental Order, where we expressly stated that competing carriers using EELs must provide 
a significant amount of local exchange service.   In fact, all three of the safe harbor 
circumstances described in the Supplemental Order Clarification for determining whether a 
requesting carrier is providing a significant amount of local exchange service call for 
certification by the requesting carrier.  
228. There is no indication in the record that SWBT has imposed any restriction on 
access to EELs that conflicts with our specific guidance in the Supplemental Order.  Because the 
substantive interim rules we have adopted in our orders on this subject define the nature of 
SWBTs statutory obligations, SWBTs adherence to them cannot constitute a basis for finding 
noncompliance with the checklist.  It would be quite unfair to a BOC applicant to deny it 
approval to compete in the long-distance market on the basis of conduct that, in other 
proceedings, we have explicitly authorized.  For the section 271 process to work, potential BOC 
applicants must have a reasonable degree of certainty about what they need to do to bring 
themselves in compliance with the statutory requirements, and they therefore need to be able to 
rely on our rules for appropriate guidance.
(iii) Intellectual Property Rights for UNEs
229. We reject AT&Ts assertion that SWBT places restrictions on intellectual 
property associated with UNEs in violation of sections 251(c)(3) and 252(d)(1) of the Act.   
Furthermore, AT&T appears to believe that SWBT has an obligation to protect competitive 
LECs that lease network elements from intellectual property liability.   AT&T notes that SWBT 
could eliminate the problem by agreeing to indemnify competitive LECs using UNEs in a 
manner equivalent to SWBT against any intellectual property liabilities that competitive LECs 
may incur from that use. 
230. We recently addressed the intellectual property rights surrounding UNEs in our 
Intellectual Property Order released April 27, 2000.   In that order, we declared that section 
251(c)(3) requires an incumbent LEC such as SWBT to use its best efforts to obtain coextensive 
intellectual property rights associated with UNEs from a vendor on terms and conditions that are 
equal in quality to the terms and conditions under which the incumbent LEC has obtained its 
rights.   SWBT has stated that it will fully comply with the Intellectual Property Orders 
requirement to use best efforts to obtain coextensive third-party intellectual property rights for 
competitive LECs using UNEs.   Additionally, the T2A provides that the terms of the 
Intellectual Property Order control over language in the T2A that AT&T asserts is 
discriminatory.   We therefore find that SWBT does not insist on language in its interconnection 
agreements that violates its obligation to provide nondiscriminatory access to UNEs under 
section 251(c)(3) or 252(d)(1) of the Act, as AT&T argues.  Moreover, the Intellectual Property 
Order did not require that incumbent LECs indemnify competitive LECs for any intellectual 
property liability associated with their use of UNEs, and we do not find that unwillingness to 
provide such indemnification would necessarily constitute a violation of the Act.  All that the 
nondiscrimination principle requires in this context is that the incumbent LEC utilize its best 
efforts to obtain coextensive third party intellectual property rights for competitive LECs in the 
use of unbundled network elements.
3. Pricing of Network Elements
a. Background
231. Checklist item 2 of section 271 states that a BOC must provide 
nondiscriminatory access to network elements in accordance with sections 251(c)(3) and 
252(d)(1) of the Act.   Section 251(c)(3) requires local incumbent LECs to provide 
nondiscriminatory access to network elements on an unbundled basis at any technically feasible 
point on rates, terms, and conditions that are just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory.   Section 
252(d)(1) requires that a state commissions determination of the just and reasonable rates for 
network elements shall be based on the cost of providing the network elements, shall be 
nondiscriminatory, and may include a reasonable profit.   Pursuant to this statutory mandate, the 
Commission has determined that prices for UNEs must be based on the total element long run 
incremental cost of providing those elements.   The Commission also promulgated rule 
51.315(b), which prohibits incumbent LECs from separating already combined elements before 
providing them to competing carriers, except on request.  Starting in September 1996, the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit stayed and then vacated the Commissions pricing rules, 
and in 1997 it vacated Rule 51.315(b)  The Supreme Court restored these rules, however, on 
January 25, 1999.   
232. SWBTs initial application noted that it assessed a number of nonrecurring 
charges on UNE orders.  SWBT assesses a $2.56 nonrecurring service order charge for each 
UNE order.   SWBT also assesses a separate, nonrecurring charge for each stand-alone element 
ordered.   When a requesting carrier orders UNEs that are already combined in SWBTs 
network, SWBT assesses the sum of the nonrecurring charges for the applicable UNEs.  Thus, in 
an order for a pre-combined residential platform containing a two-wire analog loop, the 
applicable charges were: 1) a $2.56 nonrecurring service order charge, 2) a $15.03 nonrecurring 
two-wire analog loop charge, 3) a $1.27 nonrecurring port charge, and 4) a $4.17 nonrecurring 
cross-connect charge, for a total of $23.03 in nonrecurring charges.   In an order for a 
combination of elements not already assembled in SWBTs network, SWBT assessed an 
additional $16.35 nonrecurring central office access charge (COAC). 
233. While the Eighth Circuit decision invalidating our rule 315(b) was in effect, the 
Texas Commission approved these charges.   AT&T and WorldCom appealed to a federal 
district court in Texas the state commissions decision on the nonrecurring charges, including the 
COAC, contending that they constituted non-cost based glue charges.   The district court 
affirmed the Texas Commissions decision, also while the Eighth Circuits decision was in 
effect.   AT&T and WorldCom then appealed to the Fifth Circuit.   On February 24, 2000, the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit remanded AT&T and WorldComs appeal to the 
Texas Commission for further proceedings in light of the Supreme Courts decision in Iowa 
Utilities Board.   The Eighth Circuit and the Texas Commission are currently considering 
whether the Supreme Courts decision in Iowa Utilities Board and our rules obligate SWBT to 
combine UNEs in new combinations as ordered by competitors.   The Texas Commission is 
also considering whether SWBT is entitled to impose the nonrecurring charges on competitive 
LEC orders for existing UNE combinations and whether SWBTs current nonrecurring charges 
are adequately supported by cost documentation as required by the Telecommunications Act and 
our rules. 


b. Discussion
234. COAC.  SWBT states that the COAC is assessed on UNE combinations and 
enhanced extended loops (EELs) that do not already exist in combined form in SWBTs network, 
and thus require work by SWBT.   SWBT argues that the COAC is not subject to sections 251 
and 252 of the Act,  and opposed the remand to the Texas Commission on this issue.   
According to SWBT, the COAC is not subject to the Commissions forward-looking 
methodology because the Supreme Court held only that incumbent LECs cannot separate already 
combined elements before providing them, not that they must combine separate UNEs.   AT&T 
and WorldCom challenge the COAC as a non-cost-based glue charge.   They state that the 
COAC is not based on the cost of combining UNEs, but has its basis in a retail tariff that SWBT 
charges to cover central office activity to its retail customers.   AT&T and WorldCom contend 
that the COAC double-recovers costs recouped through the nonrecurring charges assessed on the 
individual elements,  as well as the retail fees for central office. 
235. In its 1997 ruling, the Eighth Circuit invalidated rules 315(c) through (f), which 
required incumbent LECs to provide network elements in new combinations requested by a 
competing carrier.  The Supreme Court did not specifically review that aspect of the Eighth 
Circuit's holding, which is, therefore, binding on us unless and until it is vacated.  We are also 
precluded by the Eighth Circuits holding from denying this application on the ground that 
SWBT has somehow violated the Act by setting particular pricing conditions on the provision of 
UNE combinations that, under the Eighth Circuits decision, it need not provide at all.  For this 
reason, we have not examined the prices associated with the UNE combinations that SWBT is 
not required to provide.  The Eighth Circuit is currently considering whether to revive rules 
315(c) through (f) on remand from Iowa Utilities Board, and the Texas Commission has been 
asked to consider the underlying new combinations issue on remand from the Fifth Circuit.

Given the current state of the law, those proceedings are the appropriate forums for resolving 
disputes such as the one at issue here.  
236. Nonrecurring charges other than the COAC.  As previously discussed, we are 
reluctant to deny a section 271 application because a BOC is engaged in an unresolved rate 
dispute with its competitors and the relevant state commission, which has primary jurisdiction 
over the matter, is currently considering the matter.   Instead, as we have explained, interim rate 
solutions are a sufficient basis for granting a 271 application when an interim solution to a 
particular rate dispute is reasonable under the circumstances, the state commission has 
demonstrated its commitment to our pricing rules, and provision is made for refunds or true-ups 
once permanent rates are set.  SWBTs 271 application easily meets that standard.  
237. The dispute over the nonrecurring charges other than the COAC has evolved 
significantly since SWBT filed its initial application.    The practice that AT&T now challenges 
is a policy under which SWBT withholds collection of the relevant charges, effectively imposing 
an interim charge of zero on the nonrecurring items that form the basis of AT&Ts complaints, if 
the competing carrier agrees to be bound by any true-up the Texas Commission might order on 
remand from the Fifth Circuit.    That interim solution, which AT&T chose to reject, is 
reasonable given the legal uncertainty that has surrounded these charges since the Supreme 
Courts 1999 decision in Iowa Utilities Board.  SWBT has agreed to an interim solution that 
gives its competitors the current benefit of the doubt on these rates, subject only to the possibility 
that the Texas Commission, and ultimately the federal courts, might someday find that a charge 
greater than zero is required by the Act or our rules.  AT&T is poorly positioned to complain 
about that solution.  Because the Texas Commission and the federal courts must be presumed to 
apply the law correctly, those carriers face uncertainty about the imposition of a true-up only to 
the extent that they reasonably believe that they may in fact have a legal obligation to pay 
something greater than a charge of zero.  No carrier is immune from the effect of futur

resolutions of disputed issues, and, under the circumstances, the objection of AT&T on this point 
is entirely insufficient to warrant a denial of SWBTs application. 
238. In light of the Fifth Circuit remand and SWBTs offer to impose an effective 
interim rate of zero for the nonrecurring charges in dispute, therefore, we need not preempt the 
Texas Commissions ongoing inquiry into whether those charges comply with section 251 of the 
Act or our pricing rules.  The Texas Commission has established a schedule to set permanent 
rates for all nonrecurring charges, and has indicated to the parties that the interim rates are 
subject to a true-up.  The Texas Commission is currently reviewing whether SWBT is entitled to 
impose nonrecurring charges for existing UNE combinations and whether there is adequate cost 
support for SWBTs proposed nonrecurring charges as required by the Telecommunications Act 
of 1996 and our rules.   Interested parties will have an opportunity to challenge the cost-based 
nature of the rates proposed by SWBT in the proceeding before the Texas Commission.   
239. The situation we confront here is similar to the situation we confronted in the Bell 
Atlantic New York Order on the issue of interim rates.   As in that proceeding, the rate dispute 
here is fairly new, the relevant state commission has demonstrated a commitment to TELRIC, 
and provision will be made for retrospective rate adjustments once permanent rates are set.  
Moreover, SWBT has agreed to set an effective interim rate of zero, subject to true-up, pending 
resolution of this dispute.  Because we are confident that the Texas Commission will reach an 
appropriate result consistent with our rules, we conclude that SWBT has met its obligations 
under this checklist item.  We also observe that in any context in which prices are not set in 
accordance with our rules and the Act, we retain the ability to take a variety of enforcement 
actions and will not hesitate to do so.   
240. xDSL Rates.  Covad argues that SWBT has not met the requirements of checklist 
item (ii) because it does not have final, TELRIC-based rates for charges relating to the 
installation and conditioning of xDSL-capable loops.   The Texas Commission, in the Mega-
Arbitration, set permanent charges for xDSL-capable loops.   After reviewing the permanent 
rates set in the Mega-Arbitration, the arbitrator for the Covad/Rhythms arbitration agreement set 
interim charges, subject to true-up, that are the exact xDSL rates that Covad proposed.   The 
Texas Commission is now conducting a proceeding to set permanent xDSL rates based on cost 
studies that SWBT submitted at the direction of the Texas Commission arbitrator. 
241. As discussed previously, interim rate solutions are a sufficient basis for granting a 
section 271 application when an interim solution to a particular rate dispute is reasonable under 
the circumstances, where the state commission has demonstrated its commitment to our pricing 
rules, and provision is made for refunds or true-ups once permanent rates are set.  It is evident 
from a review of the Covad/Rhythms arbitration proceeding that the interim xDSL rates are a 
reasonable interim solution to this fairly recent dispute, the Texas Commission has established a 
track record of setting interim xDSL rates that are cost-based, and the rates are subject to a 
retroactive rate adjustment.   We are confident that the Texas Commission will ultimately set 
permanent, cost-based xDSL rates that comply with our rules.  Under these circumstances, we 
find that SWBT has met the requirements of checklist item 2 with respect to its xDSL rates.
242. Promotional Discounts. AT&T also asserts that promotional discounts on 
unbundled loop and platform orders for telecommunications carriers serving residential 
customers that SWBT offers are discriminatory and in violation of the Act.   These promotions 
arise out of SBCs merger with Ameritech.   We found in the SBC/Ameritech Merger Order 
that these promotions will bring more competitive offerings to residential customers.   We also 
found that these promotional offerings are offered to all telecommunications carriers on a 
nondiscriminatory basis.   Our findings in that order answer AT&Ts concerns here, and in any 
event, it would be quite unfair to penalize SWBT in this proceeding for acting in accordance with 
those findings. 
C. Checklist Item 3  Poles, Ducts, Conduits and Rights of Way
1. Background
243. Section 271(c)(2)(B)(iii) requires BOCs to provide [n]ondiscriminatory access to 
the poles, ducts, conduits, and rights-of-way owned or controlled by the [BOC] at just and 
reasonable rates in accordance with the requirements of section 224.   In the Local 
Competition First Report and Order, the Commission interpreted section 251(b)(4) as requiring 
nondiscriminatory access to LEC poles, ducts, conduits, and rights-of-way for competing 
providers of telecommunications services in accordance with the requirements of section 224.   
In addition, we interpreted the revised requirements of section 224 governing rates, terms, and 
conditions for telecommunications carriers attachments to utility poles in the Pole Attachment 
Telecommunications Rate Order.  Section 224(f)(1) states that [a] utility shall provide a cable 
television system or any telecommunications carrier with nondiscriminatory access to any pole, 
duct, conduit, or right-of-way owned or controlled by it.   Notwithstanding this requirement, 
section 224(f)(2) permits a utility providing electric service to deny access to its poles, ducts, 
conduits, and rights-of-way, on a nondiscriminatory basis, where there is insufficient capacity 
and for reasons of safety, reliability and generally applicable engineering purposes.


244. Section 224 also contains two separate provisions governing the maximum rates 
that a utility may charge for pole attachments.   Section 224(b)(1) states that the Commission 
shall regulate the rates, terms, and conditions governing pole attachments to ensure that they are 
just and reasonable.   Notwithstanding this general grant of authority, section 224(c)(1) states 
that [n]othing in [section 224] shall be construed to apply to, or to give the Commission 
jurisdiction with respect to the rates, terms, and conditions, or access to poles, ducts, conduits 
and rights-of-way as provided in [section 224(f)], for pole attachments in any case where such 
matters are regulated by a State.   As of 1992, nineteen states had certified to the Commission 
that they regulated the rates, terms, and conditions for pole attachments.   However, none of the 
five states in which SWBT is a LEC, including Texas, has elected to regulate poles, ducts, 
conduits, and rights-of-way.  
2. Discussion 
245. Based on the evidence in the record, we conclude that SWBT provides 
nondiscriminatory access to the poles, ducts, conduits, and rights-of-way at just and reasonable 
rates in compliance with section 271(c)(2)(B)(iii), and thus satisfies the requirements of checklist 
item 3.   The Texas Commission concludes that SWBT provides nondiscriminatory access to 
poles, ducts, conduits, and rights-of-way at just and reasonable rates that comply with the Act 
and Commission rules.   No commenter raised allegations challenging SWBTs compliance 
with this checklist item.
D. Checklist Item 4  Unbundled Local Loops 
1. Background
246. Section 271(c)(2)(B)(iv) of the Act, item 4 of the competitive checklist, requires 
that a BOC provide [l]ocal loop transmission from the central office to the customers premises, 
unbundled from local switching or other services.   The Commission has defined the loop as a 
transmission facility between a distribution frame, or its equivalent, in an incumbent LEC central 
office, and the demarcation point at the customer premises.   This definition includes different 
types of loops, including two-wire and four-wire analog voice-grade loops, and two-wire and 
four-wire loops that are conditioned to transmit the digital signals needed to provide service such 
as ISDN, ADSL, HDSL, and DS1-level signals.   
247. In order to establish that it is providing unbundled local loops in compliance 
with section 271(c)(2)(B)(iv), a BOC must demonstrate that it has a concrete and specific legal 
obligation to furnish loops and that it is currently doing so in the quantities that competitors 
demand and at an acceptable level of quality. 
248. A BOC must also demonstrate that it provides nondiscriminatory access to 
unbundled loops.   Specifically, the BOC must provide access to any functionality of the loop 
requested by a competing carrier unless it is not technically feasible to condition the loop facility 
to support the particular functionality requested.   In order to provide the requested loop 
functionality, such as the ability to deliver ISDN or xDSL services, the BOC may be required to 
take affirmative steps to condition existing loop facilities to enable competing carriers to provide 
services not currently provided over the facilities, with the competing carrier bearing the cost of 
such conditioning.   The BOC must provide competitors with access to unbundled loops 
regardless of whether the BOC uses integrated digital loop carrier (IDLC) technology  or similar 
remote concentration devices for the particular loops sought by the competitor.  Again, the costs 
associated with providing access to such facilities may be recovered from competing carriers. 
249. SWBT states that through February 2000, it provisioned to competing carriers 
more than 54,000 loops on a stand-alone basis and over 203,000 loops as part of pre-assembled 
loop/port combinations.   In order to demonstrate that it provides nondiscriminatory access to 
these loops, SWBT submitted performance data relating to its loop provisioning and maintenance 
and repair functions for competing carriers.  These data are disaggregated by loop type into 
several categories for both voice grade loops and loops capable of transmitting the digital signals 
necessary to support high-speed data services.  In light of the variety of SWBT performance data, 
our analysis of checklist item 4 does not focus on any single performance measurement or any 
single type of loop.  Instead, we examine the data for all the various loop performance 
measurements, as well as the factors surrounding the development of these performance 
measurements, in order to evaluate in the aggregate whether SWBT provides local loops in 
accordance with the requirements of checklist item 4.
250. The focus of our analysis in this section is on the provisioning and maintenance 
and repair of stand-alone loops.  In particular, we address voice grade loops provisioned both as 
hot cut loops and as new stand-alone loops.  We also address xDSL-capable loops and high 
capacity loops (e.g., DS1 loops).  Because provisioning and maintenance and repair functions for 
pre-assembled loop/port combinations are more similar to processes used to provide resale tha

those used to provide unbundled loops, we address loop/port combination issues in our 
discussion of checklist item 2.
2. Discussion
251. Like the Department of Justice and Texas Commission,  we conclude that 
SWBT demonstrates that it provides unbundled local loops in accordance with the requirements 
of section 271.   Specifically, we find that SWBT demonstrates that it provides voice grade 
unbundled loops through hot cut conversions  in a manner that offers an efficient competitor 
a meaningful opportunity to compete.  Similarly, we find that SWBT provides competing carriers 
with voice grade unbundled loops through new stand-alone loops in substantially the same time 
and manner as it does for its own retail service.  We also conclude that SWBT demonstrates that 
it provides xDSL-capable loops and high capacity loops to competing carriers in a 
nondiscriminatory manner.  
252. To reach these conclusions, we evaluate a variety of SWBT performance 
measurement data disaggregated by loop type.  From these data,  we calculate that in February, 
March, and April 2000, mass market voice grade loops, which may be provisioned by hot cuts or 
through new stand-alone loops,  were 77, 74, and 71 percent of all unbundled stand-alone loops 
ordered by competing carriers.  During the same period, xDSL-capable loops increased from 19 
percent of all unbundled stand-alone loops ordered by competing carriers in February 2000 to 23 
and 27 percent of all unbundled stand-alone loops ordered by competing carriers in March and 
April 2000.  At the same time, DS1 high capacity loops have remained between 1 and 4 percent 
of all unbundled loops ordered by competing carriers in Texas.  Although we examine unbundled 
loops in this disaggregated way, we base our conclusion on SWBTs unbundled stand-alone loop 
provisioning overall.  Thus, even if SWBTs performance appears lacking in a particular area, we 
examine the circumstances surrounding any shortfall, as well as SWBTs performance in 
aggregate, to reach our conclusion that checklist item 4 is met.
253. As described above, the Texas Commission developed SWBTs performance 
measurements and standards in a collaborative state proceeding with substantial input from 
competing carriers.   When possible, the Texas Commission elected to compare SWBTs 
service to competing carriers using unbundled loops directly to the level of service provided to 
SWBTs retail operations.   Thus, where the Texas Commission determined that a retail 
analogue is appropriate and uses this analogue in its evaluation, we examine SWBTs 
performance by determining whether it provides unbundled local loops to competing carriers in 
substantially the same time and manner as it does to its retail customers.   Where, however, the 
Texas Commission determined that no comparable retail function exists, the level of SWBT 
service provided to competing carriers is tested against benchmarks developed in the 
collaborative state proceeding.   In these instances, we examine SWBTs service to competing 
carriers in terms of whether its performance affords efficient competitors a meaningful 
opportunity to compete.


254. In determining that SWBT satisfies checklist item 4, we rely, among other factors, 
on performance data collected and submitted by SWBT.  Several commenters challenge the 
validity of SWBTs performance data generally, and loop performance data in particular.   As 
described above,  we reject this general contention because the data submitted by SWBT in this 
proceeding have been subject to substantial scrutiny and review by interested parties.  Where 
commenters dispute specific data, we discuss these challenges in our analysis.  In such instances, 
we look to the availability of data reconciled under the auspices of the Texas Commission, 
specific evidence presented by commenters, and the record as a whole, in order to determine the 
appropriate weight to accord the challenged data.
a. Voice Grade Stand-Alone Loops
255. SWBT provisions unbundled voice grade local loops to competing carriers in 
three distinct forms.  First, SWBT provisions stand-alone loops to competing carriers through 
conversions of active loops to the carriers collocation space.  These loop cutovers, or hot cuts, 
make it possible to transfer an active SWBT customers service to a competing carrier.  Second, 
if SWBT does not presently service the customer on the lines in question, a competing carrier 
may obtain a new loop from SWBT.  In this case, the customer receives service on a second 
loop from a competitive carrier and not from SWBT, while it may choose to retain SWBT on the 
original line.  For both new loops and conversions of existing customers, when loops are 
provisioned on a stand-alone basis, the competing carrier obtains only the transmission facility 
between SWBTs central office and the customers premises.  Third, SWBT provisions loops as 
part of a platform of network elements.  What follows below is a discussion of the provisioning 
and maintenance and repair of hot cut loops and new stand-alone loops.  Because provisioning 
and maintenance and repair functions for loops provisioned as part of a platform are more similar 
to processes used to provide resale than those used to provide unbundled loops, we address them 
in checklist item 2.
(i) Hot Cut Loop Provisioning
256. Like the Department of Justice, we find that SWBT demonstrates that it provides 
unbundled hot cut loops through the conversion of active customers from SWBT to competing 
carriers, in accordance with the requirements of checklist item 4.   The ability of a BOC to 
provision working, trouble-free loops through hot cuts is critically important in light of the 
substantial risk that a defective hot cut will result in competing carrier customers experiencing 
service outages for more than a brief period.   Moreover, the failure to provision hot cut loops 
effectively has a particularly significant adverse impact on mass market competition because they 
are a critical component of competing carriers efforts to provide service to the small- and 
medium-sized business markets.   
257. At the outset, we reject the argument made by some commenters that SWBT fails 
to meet the standards we developed in the Bell Atlantic New York Order.   With each 
application we are presented with a different set of circumstances:  new and differently defined 
performance measurements, state proceedings with different histories, new processes by which 
BOCs perform necessary functions for competing carriers, and new competing carrier concerns.  
Although the hot cut timeliness and quality issues we assess remain consistent, the evidence 
presented will vary from one application to the next.  For instance, unlike Bell Atlantic, SWBTs 
hot cut processes are divided into two methods, and these two methods are reflected in separate 
performance measurements.  As described in more detail below, some of SWBTs performance 
measurements are reported on a per loop basis, rather than the per order basis used by Bell 
Atlantic with some of its performance measurements.  In many cases, such differences are the 
product of state proceedings where provisioning processes and performance measurements were 
developed and refined with input from both the BOC and competing carriers.  These differences 
can make direct comparison with the performance discussed in prior orders difficult, if not 
impossible.  As a result, although our hot cut inquiry here examines the same criteria as our 
inquiry in the Bell Atlantic New York Order, we necessarily base our conclusion on the evidence 
presented in this application.  In particular, we evaluate SWBTs hot cut process, and the 
timeliness and quality of the hot cuts it provides to competing carriers.  
258. The Texas Commission reasonably determined that there is no retail equivalent to 
a hot cut, and no commenter contends otherwise.  Thus, as in the Bell Atlantic New York Order, 
the appropriate standard is whether the BOC provides unbundled loops through hot cuts in a 
manner that offers an efficient competitor a meaningful opportunity to compete.   In a footnote 
in one of its comments, AT&T proposes an ostensibly different standard, under which a BOC 
would be required to demonstrate that it has provided the fewest number of outages and best on-
time performance that it is technically feasible and commercially reasonable for the BOC to 
achieve.   Because AT&T does not explain how such a test would operate in practice or how, 
if at all, it would differ from our traditional standard for BOC activities that lack a retail 
analogue, we conclude that AT&Ts passing reference to this issue provides no basis for 
departing from our traditional approach. 
259. Hot Cut Process.  SWBT makes available two hot cut processes: the fully 
coordinated hot cut (CHC) process and the frame due time (FDT) hot cut process.  CHC orders 
are manually handled in SWBTs order processing center and require intensive coordination and 
communication between SWBT and the competing carrier during the actual cutover from SWBT 
to the competing carrier.   FDT hot cuts require both SWBT and the competing carrier to 
perform necessary work at pre-arranged times, with no communication required at the time of the 
hot cut.   Unlike CHC orders, FDT orders are capable of flowing through SWBTs order 
processing center without manual work by SWBTs representatives.   Although in the past 
SWBT has represented that the CHC process is too resource-intensive to support commercial 
levels of demand for lower volume loop orders,  SWBT now states that it has sufficient 
resources to process competing carriers orders in a timely and efficient manner, regardless of 
which method they choose.   Thus, competing carriers have their choice of two alternative 
processes in every case, allowing them to pick the process that best fits their resources and 
priorities.   At present, slightly more than half of all hot cuts are performed with the FDT 
process; the remainder are performed with the CHC process. 
260. Upon review of SWBTs present representations regarding CHC availability and 
the lack of recent competing carrier evidence suggesting otherwise, we conclude that competing 
carriers may freely choose between the CHC and FDT hot cut processes.   Although some 
commenters maintain that SWBT cannot handle high volumes of CHC orders, they offer little or 
no current evidence to demonstrate that this continues to be true.   With respect to the more 
recent evidence that AT&T offers to support this conclusion, namely AT&Ts experience with 
erroneous CHC order rejections for invalid due dates, we conclude that it is insufficient to 
warrant a determination that the CHC process is not capable of handling current demand.  The 
only evidence AT&T provides is a statement by SWBT in an e-mail regarding CHC rejections 
that SWBT cannot provide a limitless number of CHC orders.   In light of its stated 
commitment in the same e-mail to make[] every effort to accommodate all requested dates and 
times for CHC orders, this is not, by itself, substantial evidence that SWBTs process cannot 
manage competing carrier demand for CHCs.   Moreover, the e-mail indicates that SWBT 
actively is working with AT&T to resolve its CHC rejection problem.  In any event, should 
future SWBT hot cut capacity constraints limit competing carrier access to unbundled voice 
grade loops, we shall take appropriate enforcement action at that time.
261. We emphasize that competing carriers can now choose freely between the CHC 
and FDT hot cut processes, because we conclude that the evidence in this proceeding indicates 
that it is only through the CHC process that SWBT is able to provision unbundled hot cut loops 
in accordance with the requirements of checklist item 4.  In the discussion that follows, we find 
that SWBT demonstrates it provisions CHCs in a timely manner and at an acceptable level of 
quality, with a minimal service disruption and a minimum number of troubles following 
installation.  We also find that SWBT demonstrates that it provisions FDT hot cuts in a timely 
manner and with a minimum number of troubles following installation.  Problems, however, 
remain with respect to FDT hot cut service disruptions, and therefore we do not find that SWBT 
provisions hot cut loops through the FDT process in accordance with the requirements of 
checklist item 4.  Yet, because the FDT process is still chosen by competing carriers in 
significant numbers, we discuss the FDT process in conjunction with the CHC process below.
262. Hot Cut Timeliness.  We conclude that SWBT demonstrates that it can complete a 
substantial percentage of CHCs and FDT hot cuts it provisions within a reasonable time 
interval.   Under the performance measurement developed by the Texas Commission, and 
approved at its December 16, 1999 open meeting, SWBT hot cut performance is measured 
according to the percentage of hot cut loops in orders of less than 25 lines that SWBT completes 
within a specified time window.   The Texas Commission adopted an interim benchmark, under 
which 100 percent of these cutovers must be completed within 2 hours of the scheduled start 
time.   This standard applies to both CHC and FDT hot cuts.   The performance data SWBT 
submitted with its application indicate that SWBT completed between 98 and 99 percent of all 
CHCs within 2 hours from February through April 2000.   During the same time period, these 
data indicate that SWBT completed between 92 and 99 percent of FDT hot cuts within 2 hours.  
263. In response to criticism regarding the accuracy of SWBTs hot cut data, the Texas 
Commission issued orders requesting SWBT and competing carrier reconciliation of various 
SWBT self-reported hot cut performance measurement data.   Because we believe data 
reconciled under the auspices of a state commission, with the participation of both competing 
carriers and the BOC, to be reliable evidence of a BOCs performance, we accord these data 
substantial weight.   Moreover, the reconciled data include information on SWBTs ability to 
perform both CHCs and FDT hot cuts within a 1 hour interval.   In addition to these reconciled 
data, SWBT presented data from competing carriers that were reconciled, combined with SWBT 
data from competing carriers that did not participate in the reconciliation.  Because we find that 
this aggregated presentation is the most accurate overall picture of SWBT performance in Texas, 
we use it to evaluate SWBTs hot cut loop timeliness.
264. We find that the aggregated data demonstrate that SWBT can provision a 
substantial percentage of competing carrier CHC and FDT hot cut loops within a 1 hour interval. 
These aggregated data indicate that during December 1999, and January and February 2000, 
SWBT completed an average of 90 percent of all CHC loops from orders with less than 11 lines 
within 1 hour and an average of 94 percent of all FDT hot cut loops from orders with less than 11 
lines within 1 hour.  Moreover, in its reply comments, SWBT developed similar data for March 
and April 2000, that demonstrate that during these two months, SWBT completed an average of 
93 percent of all CHC loops from orders with less than 11 lines within 1 hour and an average of 
96 percent of all FDT hot cut loops from orders with less than 11 lines within 1 hour.   We find 
this evidence sufficient to overcome the claims of competing carriers that SWBTs hot cut 
provisioning is not performed in a timely manner and therefore affects their ability to obtain and 
retain customers.  
265. We acknowledge that some commenters raise concerns with respect to the way 
SWBT measures the interval for its completion of hot cut loops.  First, some competing carriers 
criticize SWBT and the Texas Commission for using a measurement based on individual loops, 
rather than orders.   Although these commenters insist that a loop-based measurement  is a 
more charitable representation of SWBTs performance than a measurement based on orders, we 
do not find their arguments persuasive.  A measurement based on loops and not orders is not 
systematically more generous to the BOC, because it is possible for the percentage of loops 
completed within an interval to be lower than the percentage of orders completed within the same 
interval.  As SWBT points out, whether one approach is stricter than the other depends upon the 
extent to which delays occur on multiple lines in the same order.   Moreover, we agree with the 
Texas Commission that performance measurements are not necessarily one size fits all, and 
conclude that it is the more prudent course for this Commission to recognize reasonable 
measurements adopted by state commissions as a part of a state proceeding that included both 
BOC and competing carrier input. 
266. Finally, some commenters criticize SWBTs interim hot cut timeliness 
performance measurement because the business rules indicate that the interval ends when the 
SWBT technician completes the hot cut, excluding the time it takes for the SWBT technician to 
call the competing carrier to indicate that SWBT completed work on the CHC cutover.   At the 
outset, we note that this criticism does not apply to FDT hot cuts, because no such call is required 
when this process is used.  With respect to CHCs, we find that this concern is misplaced, because 
communication between SWBT and the competing carrier is already required at the time of the 
CHC.   Although beyond the scope of this order, we note that SWBT and competing carriers 
recently agreed to revise the business rules so that the conversion interval will end after the 
SWBT technician has notified the competing carrier that the cutover is complete. 
267. Hot Cut Quality.  We further conclude that SWBT demonstrates that it provisions 
CHCs at a level of quality that offers efficient competitors a meaningful opportunity to compete. 
Upon review of the evidence in the record regarding hot cut installation quality, and specifically 
the outage rate associated with failed SWBT CHCs, and the trouble rate following CHC 
installation, we find that SWBT demonstrates that it provisions CHCs to competitors in a manner 
that meets the requirements of the checklist.  Although we find that SWBTs performance with 
respect to troubles following FDT hot cut installation meets the requirements of the checklist, we 
find that the outage rate associated with failed SWBT FDT hot cuts does not.
268. Outages.  We conclude that the record demonstrates that the CHC process SWBT 
makes available to competing carriers minimizes service disruptions that may significantly affect 
competing carriers end-user customers.  As a result, we conclude that SWBT demonstrates that 
the level of outages competing carriers may experience as a result of failed SWBT CHCs is 
sufficiently small to provide an efficient competitor with a meaningful opportunity to compete.
269. A comprehensive reconciliation of AT&Ts hot cut outage data conducted under 
the auspices of the Texas Commission demonstrates that SWBTs CHC process minimizes 
service disruptions experienced by competing carrier customers who are provisioned service via 
hot cut loops.  Because no performance measurement exists to capture all SWBT-caused hot cut 
outages, the Texas Commission developed the Provisioning Process Improvement Group (PPIG) 
to reconcile SWBT and competing carrier data relating to unexpected hot cut service outages.   
As a result of PPIG efforts, a joint affidavit was filed with the Texas Commission by SWBT and 
AT&T with reconciled outage data for December 1999, and January and February 2000.   In 
addition, SWBT filed an affidavit with the Texas Commission reflecting the PPIG reconciliation 
for March 2000 that is consistent with AT&Ts representation of the March 2000 PPIG data in its 
reply comments.   Furthermore, the Texas Commission filed an ex parte letter with this 
Commission indicating the results of the April 2000 PPIG data reconciliation.   As with our 
discussion of SWBTs hot cut timeliness data, we review these reconciled data on a per loop 
basis. 
270. Because the PPIG data reveal that during the period from December 1999 through 
April 2000, an average of less than 5 percent of all CHC loops that SWBT provisioned to AT&T 
resulted in end-user service outages caused by SWBT provisioning failures, we conclude that 
SWBT makes available a hot cut process that provides efficient competitors with a meaningful 
opportunity to compete.   We find this outage rate low enough to reject competing carrier 
arguments that high CHC outage rates caused by SWBT provisioning failures make it difficult 
for them to obtain and retain customers.   We acknowledge, however, that this average excludes 
outages directly related to a one-time Telcordia software problem (SOAC) that affected outage 
rates in February 2000.  Although some commenters criticize this exclusion,  we find that these 
outages were an unusual one-time problem based on a vendors software defect.   The Texas 
Commission concludes that this problem has been rectified and will not affect SWBTs future 
performance.   Furthermore, AT&T acknowledged the scope of the SOAC outage problem and 
its impact on the PPIG data in the joint affidavit.   
271. We acknowledge that the reconciled PPIG data demonstrate a higher outage rate 
associated with the FDT hot cut process than the CHC process.   Furthermore, we acknowledge 
that in the past SWBT has encouraged competing carriers to use the FDT process for all but large 
volume loop orders, or orders provisioned outside of normal business hours.   At present, 
however, SWBT makes both the CHC and FDT hot cut processes equally available to competing 
carriers.   Moreover, SWBT provides the FDT process to competing carriers free of charge, 
despite the fact that FDT conversions require most of the same SWBT labor as CHC 
conversions.   In addition, the mechanized nature of the FDT process makes it a less labor-
intensive option for competing carriers than the CHC process.   If, despite these conveniences, 
any competing carrier finds FDT outage rates too high, they are free to use the alternative CHC 
process.
272. Because we find that the CHC process affords efficient competitors a meaningful 
opportunity to compete, and that this process is now widely available to all competing carriers, 
we do not find the fact that SWBT has developed an alternative, mechanized process with a 
higher incidence of competing carrier end-user customer outages to be fatal to this application.  
The record reflects that SWBT is working to further refine the FDT process so that it becomes a 
viable option for more competing carriers in the near future.   We do not wish to discourage 
SWBT, or any other incumbent, from developing new processes to provision unbundled loops.  
As the Texas Commission points out, no one is benefited if this Commission discourages 
incumbents from developing potentially more efficient systems or processes, just before or 
during the pendency of their section 271 application.   
273. Finally, we commend the Texas Commission for developing a new outages on 
conversion performance measurement in its April 2000 work sessions with SWBT and 
competing carriers.   This measurement will capture the percentage of CHC and FDT circuits 
for which competing carriers submit a provisioning trouble report on the day of the conversion, 
or by noon on the following day.   The Texas Commissions action effectively provides an 
outage measure that AT&T and other competing carriers have indicated is important to them.   
This addition to the Texas performance measurements also will render it unnecessary to perform 
the sort of manual, time-consuming review and assessments that have been performed under the 
auspices of the PPIG and are described above.   We believe this measurement will be a useful, 
standardized way for competing carriers to assess FDT and CHC outage rates in the future and 
will enable competing carriers to determine which method better suits their business plans. 
274. Installation Troubles.  We conclude that SWBT demonstrates that competing 
carrier end users experience only very low rates of installation troubles on lines provisioned by 
CHCs and FDT hot cuts. From December 1999 through March 2000, competing carriers 
experienced troubles within 7 days after installation on an average of only 1.5 percent of CHCs 
and 2.3 percent of FDT hot cuts.   When the CHC and FDT processes are combined, competing 
carriers experienced troubles within 7 days following installation on an average of only 1.9 
percent of all hot cut loops.   As a result, we find that SWBT installs hot cuts of quality 
sufficient to provide an efficient competitor with a meaningful opportunity to compete. 
275. Other Hot Cut Issues.  We reject AT&Ts allegation that SWBT fails checklist 4 
because of problems with the pricing of the CHC hot cut process.   The Department of Justice 
concludes that SWBT passes this checklist item.   It states, however, that it has continuing 
concern regarding SWBTs CHC charges because they are significant in amount and notes 
that the record does not contain any justification of them as appropriately cost-based.   AT&T 
asserts that: (1) SWBT fails to identify relevant time and materials charges imposed during the 
CHC process; (2) fails to identify its cost studies to support these charges; (3) fails to prove that 
the Texas Commission considered or approved these charges; and (4) does not impose these 
charges for all hot cuts, which proves that the CHC charges are actually penalties.   
276. SWBT disputes each of AT&Ts allegations.  First, SWBT asserts that it has 
adequately identified its time and material charges imposed during the CHC process, and that the 
terms of these charges are contained in both the UNE price schedule of AT&Ts interconnection 
contract and in the T2A agreement.   SWBT also responds that these rates are cost-based and 
were arbitrated by the Texas Commission as part of its Mega-Arbitration.   Additionally, SWBT 
asserts that as part of its rate case, the Texas Commission considered SWBTs cost studies 
relating to the CHC process.   SWBT also disputes AT&Ts allegation that the CHC rates are 
imposed in a punitive manner.  SWBT states that it has waived the Texas Commission-approved 
charges for its alternative hot cut method, FDT, in order to make that process an attractive 
optional offering for competitive LECs.   SWBT contends, however, that offering one hot cut 
method free does not make the alternative method punitive, as both options are equally 
available.   
277. Because of its demonstrated commitment to our pricing rules, the Texas 
Commissions determinations are entitled to a presumption of legitimacy.   AT&T provides no 
basis for disputing SWBTs observation that the CHC charges were arbitrated by the Texas 
Commission as part of its Mega-Arbitration proceeding.  Thus, AT&Ts challenge to the cost 
basis of these charges (and there could be no other legally relevant type of challenge) is in reality 
a challenge to the pricing determinations of the Texas Commission.  AT&T has altogether failed 
to establish a record for challenging the Texas Commissions rulings on this point or to explain 
with particularity how it believes the Texas Commission may have erred.  In short, AT&T has 
not laid a proper foundation that would justify this Commission in second-guessing the Texas 
Commissions exercise of its pricing jurisdiction.
(ii) New Stand-Alone Loop Provisioning
278. We find that SWBT demonstrates that it provisions new unbundled stand-alone 
voice grade loops in accordance with the requirements of checklist item 4.  As described above, 
when SWBT does not presently service the customer on the line in question, a hot cut loop is not 
required.  Instead, a competing carrier may obtain a new loop from SWBT, which requires that a 
technician be dispatched to the customers premises in order to complete the installation.
279. First, we find that SWBT systems afford competing carriers access to appointment 
dates that is equivalent to the access provided to SWBT representatives serving retail customers. 
SWBT represents that SORD provides competing carriers with the same access to available due 
dates as that afforded to SWBTs retail operations.   SWBT also represents that the same due 
date database is used for both competing carrier and SWBT retail orders.   No commenters 
claim otherwise.
280. We also conclude that SWBT provisions new unbundled stand-alone loops to 
competing carriers in substantially the same time and manner as it does for its own retail service. 
From February through April 2000, SWBT missed a lower percentage of 8.0 dB loop installation 
due dates requiring field work for competing carriers than it did for its own retail service.   With 
respect to loop quality, during the same period of time, the 8.0 dB loops that SWBT installed for 
competing carriers experienced a comparable percentage of trouble reports as SWBTs own 8.0 
dB loops.   Although these performance data do not exclusively address the provisioning of new 
stand-alone 8.0 dB loops, they do include the provisioning of such loops.  Moreover, we note that 
no commenter has criticized this aspect of SWBTs performance.  Therefore, we find that SWBT 
provisions new voice grade loops in accordance with the requirements of checklist item 4.  
(iii) Maintenance and Repair of Voice Grade Loops
281. Like the Department of Justice, we conclude that SWBT demonstrates that it 
provides maintenance and repair functions for unbundled local loops provisioned to competing 
carriers in substantially the same time and manner as it does for its own retail customers.   
During the period from December 1999 through April 2000, SWBT met a greater percentage of 
unbundled loop repair due dates for customers of competing carriers than for its own retail 
customers.   In addition, during the same period, the average time to repair unbundled loops for 
competing carriers was consistently and significantly lower than the time that SWBT took to 
repair such loops for its own customers.   Furthermore, during the same period, competing 
carriers and SWBT experienced a comparable percentage of repeat trouble reports for unbundled 
loops.   Thus, we find that SWBT provides nondiscriminatory maintenance and repair services 
for the unbundled loops that it provides to competing carriers.   
b. xDSL-Capable Loops
282. We conclude that SWBT demonstrates that it provides unbundled local loops for 
the provision of xDSL services in a nondiscriminatory manner.  At the outset, we note that 
xDSL-capable loops are a substantial and growing portion of all unbundled loops provisioned by 
SWBT to competing carriers.   We also note that in our Bell Atlantic New York Order, we 
stated that we would find it most persuasive if future applicants under section 271 . . . make a 
separate and comprehensive evidentiary showing with respect to the provision of xDSL-capable 
loops.  In doing so, we set forth the evidence that an applicant may use to demonstrate that it 
provides xDSL-capable loops to competing carriers in a nondiscriminatory manner.  First, the 
Commission stated that 271 applicants could demonstrate that they are providing 
nondiscriminatory access to xDSL-capable loops through comprehensive and accurate reports of 
performance measures.   As we noted in our Bell Atlantic New York Order:
we emphasize our strong preference for a record that contains data measuring a 
BOCs performance pursuant to state-adopted standards that were developed with 
input from the relevant carriers and that include clearly-defined guidelines and 
methodology . . . Accordingly, we encourage state commissions to adopt specific 
xDSL loop performance standards measuring, for instance, the average 
completion interval, the percent of installation due dates missed as a result of the 
BOCs provisioning error, the timeliness of order processing, the installation 
quality of xDSL loops provisioned, and the timeliness and quality of the BOCs 
xDSL maintenance and repair functions. 
Second, the Commission indicated that the establishment of a fully operational separate 
affiliate for advanced services may provide significant evidence of 
nondiscrimination.  
283. We commend the Texas Commission for its extensive consideration of xDSL-
capable loop issues and development of specific xDSL-capable loop performance standards 
before SWBT filed its application.  We also commend the Texas Commission for its efforts to 
include competing carriers in this process.  As a result, we have for the first time in a section 271 
application a complete record of a BOCs xDSL-capable loop performance from which to assess 
the provisioning of nondiscriminatory access to xDSL-capable loops.
(i) xDSL-Capable Loop Performance   
284. Like the Department of Justice, we conclude that SWBT demonstrates that it 
provides nondiscriminatory access to xDSL-capable loops through its existing performance 
measurement data and other evidence it presents in its application.   Consistent with our 
statements in the Bell Atlantic New York Order, we analyze competing carrier access to SWBT 
xDSL-capable loops on the basis of performance measurements and standards adopted by the 
Texas Commission in a state proceeding.  Specifically, we review SWBTs xDSL-capable loop 
order processing timeliness, the timeliness of SWBTs xDSL capable loop installation and 
percentage of SWBT-caused missed due dates, the quality of the xDSL-capable loops SWBT 
installs, and the timeliness and quality of the maintenance and repair functions SWBT provides 
to competing carrier xDSL-capable loops.  In nearly all areas, recent performance data indicate 
that SWBT offers competing carrier nondiscriminatory access to xDSL-capable loops.  Viewed 
as a whole, the recent performance data confirm that SWBT, although it has not yet achieved 
perfection, has met its general obligation to provide competing carriers with nondiscriminatory 
access to xDSL-capable loops and has satisfied the requirements of the checklist.  If in the future, 
however, SWBT performance deteriorates and restricts competing carrier access to unbundled 
xDSL-capable loops in a discriminatory manner, we note that we may take appropriate 
enforcement action pursuant to section 271(d)(6).  
285. As a preliminary matter, we note that competing carriers in Texas rely principally 
on two types of unbundled xDSL-capable loops: the xDSL loop and the BRI ISDN loop.   The 
Texas Commission developed separate loop-type performance measurement categories for xDSL 
loops (including, but not limited to, loops provisioned for ADSL, HDSL, and SDSL services) 
and BRI ISDN loops, which are used by competing carriers to provide IDSL services.  For the 
discussion of SWBT performance that follows, we refer to xDSL loops and BRI ISDN loops 
collectively as xDSL-capable loops.  When discussing the separate categories of performance 
measurements, we refer to xDSL loops and BRI loops.
286. Order Processing Timeliness.  We conclude that SWBT demonstrates that it 
provides order processing for xDSL-capable loops in a timely manner that provides an efficient 
competitor with a meaningful opportunity to compete.  We reach this conclusion on the basis of 
the nondiscriminatory access to loop qualification information that SWBT provides competing 
carriers, SWBTs ability to process competing carrier FOCs in a timely manner, and SWBTs 
substantial implementation of xDSL-capable loop processing changes required by the Texas 
Commission.  
287. First, we find that SWBT demonstrates that it offers nondiscriminatory access to 
OSS pre-ordering functions associated with determining whether a loop is capable of supporting 
xDSL technologies.   As described in greater detail in our discussion of checklist item 2, we 
find that the mechanized and manual processes in place at the time SWBT filed its application 
enable requesting carriers to access loop qualification information in substantially the same time 
an manner as SWBTs retail operations.  In fact, in the period from February through April 2000, 
the average time for SWBT to return competing carrier loop qualification requests was 
consistently lower than the average time for SWBT to return such requests to its own retail 
operations.  
288. Second, we find that performance data demonstrate that SWBT processes 
competing carrier LSRs for xDSL-capable loops in a timely manner that provides efficient 
competitors with a meaningful opportunity to compete.  For instance, in both March and April 
2000, SWBT returned 94 percent of competing carrier FOCs within 24 hours for xDSL-capable 
loops ordered via LEX and 96 percent of competing carrier FOCs within 24 hours for xDSL-
capable loops ordered via EDI.   
289. In large part, our finding that SWBT processes competing carrier xDSL-capable 
loop orders in a timely fashion is the product of the Texas Commissions comprehensive review 
of SWBTs methods and procedures for offering xDSL-capable loops in the Covad/Rhythms 
arbitration.   The Covad/Rhythms arbitration award culminated a year-long effort to resolve 
interconnection disputes related to SWBTs xDSL-capable loop ordering practices for competing 
carriers, consolidated by the Texas Commission under section 252(g) of the Act.   In the course 
of this arbitration, the Texas Commission ordered SWBT to implement substantial changes to its 
xDSL-capable loop ordering process.   In addition, at the Texas Commissions December 16, 
1999 open meeting, SWBT made a series of related commitments to implement xDSL-capabl

loop ordering process changes in order to secure the support of the Texas Commission for its 
section 271 application.   
290. We conclude that SWBT performance data demonstrate that in recent months, 
with the substantial implementation of these changes, competing carriers can order xDSL-
capable loops in a timely manner.   Through numerous affidavits and supporting attachments, 
SWBT demonstrates step-by-step how it complied with the requirements of the arbitration and 
put in place the terms and conditions the Texas Commission found necessary to provide 
competing carriers with nondiscriminatory access to xDSL-capable loops.   Notably, SWBT 
describes how it has dismantled the binder group management system it had developed to 
mechanically segregate ADSL-based services from other data services.   Although some 
commenters contend that more work needs to be done by SWBT before the Commission can find 
that it has fully complied with its legal obligations, we find that these allegations are insufficien

to rebut the strong combination of performance data and affidavit evidence that SWBT presents 
to demonstrate its order processing timeliness.   
291. Average Installation Interval.  We find that SWBT installation interval data 
demonstrate that it provisions xDSL loop orders in substantially the same time and manner as it 
does for its own retail service.  We also find that SWBT installation interval data demonstrate 
that it provisions BRI loop orders in a sufficiently timely manner for an efficient competitor to 
have a meaningful opportunity to compete.  
292. xDSL Loops.  In February, March, and April 2000, SWBT generally provisioned 
competing carrier orders for xDSL loops in less time than it did for its own retail customers, 
regardless of whether or not loop conditioning was required.   Covad, however, questions the 
accuracy of these performance data, claiming that many of its loop orders are missing from this 
performance measurement.   Yet, Covad fails to acknowledge that the business rules associated 
with this measurement expressly permit the exclusion of competing carrier loop orders 
requesting an installation interval longer than the standard offered interval.   In addition, earlier 
problems with the accuracy of the data in this performance measurement were corrected after 
SWBT discovered a minor processing error resulting in accidental exclusions.   Finally, we 
find further confirmation of the timeliness of SWBT xDSL loop provisioning in other 
performance data demonstrating a low rate of missed installation due dates for competing carrier 
xDSL loops. 
293. BRI Loops.  With respect to BRI loops, the Texas Commission did not establish a 
retail analogue, but instead established a 3 day target interval for order installation.   
Accordingly, we assess SWBTs performance on the basis of whether or not it offers efficient 
competitors a meaningful opportunity to compete.  As the Department of Justice notes, in recent 
months, SWBT has provisioned competing carrier BRI loop orders in progressively fewer and 
fewer days.   In fact, in April 2000, when volumes of BRI loop orders were more than twice as 
high than in any previous month, SWBT was able to provision such orders in an average of 2.8 
days, within the 3 day target established by the Texas Commission.   This represents substantial 
improvement from January 2000, when the average was 6.7 days.   Furthermore, we note that 
the shortest installation interval offered to SWBTs retail for BRI loops is 5 days and may be as 
long as 10 days if loop conditioning is required.   This is substantially longer than the 3 day 
interval that applies for competing carriers.  Thus, we conclude that recent performance indicates 
that efficient competitors have a meaningful opportunity to compete.  
294. Covad, however, urges the Commission to recognize that it has a contractual right 
to a 3 day installation period and that historically SWBT has not met this interval.   Our inquiry, 
for purposes of this application, is whether SWBT provides competing carriers with a meaningful 
opportunity to compete.  SWBTs failure to meet this 3 day interval with Covad does not 
preclude a finding of overall compliance with item 4 of the checklist, in light of SWBTs 
improving performance in this area and the longer installation interval SWBT provides for its 
own retail service.  
295. Percentage of Installation Due Dates Missed Due to BOC Provisioning Error.  
We find that SWBT demonstrates with its missed due date performance data that it installs 
xDSL-capable loops for competing carriers in substantially the same time and manner that it 
installs xDSL-capable loops for its own retail service.  This finding further buttresses our 
conclusion regarding SWBT installation intervals that is described above.
296. xDSL Loops.  As a preliminary matter, although the Texas Commission originally 
established SWBT DS1 loops as the appropriate retail analogue for competing carrier xDSL 
loops in this performance measurement, neither the Texas Commission, nor any carriers 
participating in this proceeding encourage us to use the DS1 analogue.   Accordingly, we 
confine our review to the standard presented in SWBTs performance data: a straightforward 
comparison between xDSL loops provisioned to competing carriers and xDSL loops provisioned 
to SWBTs own retail service.  We note that this is the comparison used in the Texas 
Commissions evaluation, and addressed by the commenters.  
297. Although in the past SWBT had some difficulty meeting competing carrier xDSL 
loop due dates,  more recent data indicate that SWBT has since remedied this problem.  In 
March 2000, SWBT missed a comparable percentage of xDSL loop due dates for competing 
carriers as it did for its own retail services, and in April 2000, SWBT missed less than 3 percent 
of competing carrier due dates, and 11 percent of the due dates for its own retail service.   Thus, 
we find that SWBT now meets installation due dates for competing carriers in a 
nondiscriminatory manner.
298. BRI Loops.  Although in the past SWBT had some difficulty meeting competing 
carrier BRI loop due dates,  more recent data indicate that SWBT has since remedied this 
problem.  In both March and April 2000, SWBT missed fewer competing carrier BRI loop due 
dates for competing carriers than for its own retail service.   Notably, in April 2000, SWBT 
missed 20 percent of its own retail service BRI loop due dates and only 9 percent of such due 
dates for competing carrier BRI loops. 
299. Loop Quality.  We find that SWBT demonstrates that it provisions xDSL-capable 
loops to competing in a manner sufficient to meet the requirements of checklist item 4.  As the 
Commission has noted in the past, trouble reports within 30 days are indicative of the quality of 
network components supplied by the incumbent LEC.   Moreover, advanced services 
customers that experience substantial troubles in the period following installation of a xDSL-
capable loop are unlikely to remain with a competing carrier.
300. xDSL Loops.  For reasons described above with respect to missed installation due 
dates, we confine our review of xDSL loop quality to the standard presented in SWBTs 
performance data: a straightforward comparison between xDSL loops provisioned to competing 
carriers and xDSL loops provisioned to SWBTs own retail service.   Although in the past 
SWBT has had some difficulty provisioning xDSL loops without more troubles following 
installation that their own retail xDSL loops,  more recent data indicate that SWBT has since 
remedied this problem.  In both March and April 2000, SWBT provisioned xDSL loops to 
competing carriers with comparable trouble rates in the 30 days following installation.   For 
instance, in April 2000, just over 4 percent of both SWBT and competing carrier xDSL loops 
experienced troubles in the 30 day period after installation. 
301. BRI Loops.  Like the Department of Justice, we acknowledge that some 
performance issues remain with respect to troubles following the installation of competing carrier 
BRI loops.   We find that these issues arise from the fact that competing carriers use BRI loops 
for IDSL service,  which makes provisioning work more difficult than that required for the 
ISDN service that SWBT provisions using BRI loops.   SWBT maintains that these technical 
difficulties associated with supporting IDSL, combined with the short 3 day installation interval, 
are responsible for trouble rates greater than those SWBT experiences with its retail ISDN 
service.  We also find that SWBT is working with competing carriers and equipment vendors t

 solve this problem.   As suggested by Rhythms, SWBT is testing a new card for its digital loop 
carriers that will support IDSL service.   
302. Under these circumstances, we find that the differences reported in SWBT 
performance data between the way BRI loops are provisioned for SWBTs ISDN service and 
competing carrier IDSL service do not demonstrate discriminatory treatment.  We note that the 
Department of Justice reaches the same conclusion.   In light of SWBTs efforts to remedy this 
problem, reasonable questions regarding the appropriateness of a straightforward comparison 
between troubles following installation for IDSL and ISDN service, and SWBTs competing 
carrier xDSL-capable loop record overall, we conclude that SWBT demonstrates that it 
provisions BRI loops of a quality sufficient to meet the requirements of checklist item 4. 
303. Maintenance and Repair.  We conclude that SWBT demonstrates that it provides 
maintenance and repair functions for competing carrier xDSL-capable loops in a manner 
sufficient to meet the requirements of checklist item 4.
304. xDSL Loops.  SWBT demonstrates that it provides maintenance and repair for 
competing carrier xDSL loops in substantially the same time and manner as it does for its own 
retail customers.  With respect to timeliness of maintenance and repair, in both February and 
April 2000, the average time to repair competing carrier xDSL loops was substantially less than 
the average time SWBT took to repair its own retail xDSL loops.   SWBT also demonstrates 
that it provides the same quality of xDSL loop repair service to competing carriers as it does for 
its own retail service.  In the period from February through April, 2000, SWBT and competing 
carrier xDSL loops have experienced a comparable repeat trouble rate. 
305. BRI Loops.  Like the Department of Justice, we acknowledge that some 
performance issues remain with respect to the timelines of BRI loop maintenance and repair.  As 
discussed above with respect to BRI loop trouble rates, SWBT maintains that technical 
difficulties associated with supporting IDSL are responsible for the longer average repair times 
for competing carrier BRI loops.   If SWBT discovers that a competing carrier intends to use a 
particular BRI loop to deliver IDSL services, the loop may need to be redesigned or reassigned to 
avoid using equipment and facilities that support ISDN services but are not compatible with 
IDSL technology.   This can adversely impact the repair time for competing carrier BRI loops 
used for IDSL service, and it draws into question the reasonableness of comparing average IDSL 
repair time with the average time in which SWBT repairs its own retail BRI loops.   At the 
same time, SWBT is working with competing carriers to improve its BRI loop performance.   
Under these circumstances, we find that the differences reported in SWBT performance data 
between the average time to repair competing carrier BRI loops and SWBT retail BRI loops do 
not demonstrate discriminatory treatment.  
306. At the same time, we find that SWBT demonstrates that it now provides the same 
quality of BRI loop repair service to competing carriers as it does for its own retail service.  
Although in the past SWBT has had some difficulty provisioning BRI loops without more repeat 
troubles than SWBT retail BRI loops, more recent data indicate that SWBT has since remedied 
this problem.  In both March and April 2000, competing carrier BRI loops had fewer repeat 
troubles than did SWBTs own retail BRI loops.   In light of these performance data and 
SWBTs ongoing efforts to improve its BRI loop performance, as well as reasonable questions 
regarding the appropriateness of a straightforward comparison between time to repair IDSL and 
ISDN service, and SWBTs competing carrier xDSL-capable loop performance overall, we 
conclude that SWBT provides maintenance and repair for BRI loops provisioned to competing 
carriers in a manner sufficient to meet the requirements of checklist item 4.
(ii) Separate Subsidiary
307. SWBTs implementation of a separate subsidiary for advanced services in Texas 
is not a decisional factor regarding compliance with section 271 because, for reasons described in 
the xDSL section supra, SWBT has carried its burden of demonstrating nondiscrimination with 
an evidentiary showing of performance to its wholesale xDSL customers.  In this section, 
however, we address commenters allegations that SWBTs relationship with its separate 
subsidiary for advanced services violates its nondiscrimination obligations under the Act.  We 
disagree that these allegations constitute grounds either for finding noncompliance with checklist 
item 4 or for denying SWBTs section 271 application.
(a) Background
308. SWBTs parent company, SBC, is required as a result of the SBC/Ameritech 
Merger Order to set up a separate affiliate for advanced services throughout its 13-state region.  
The purpose of the separate affiliate structure is to ensure nondiscriminatory provisioning of key 
inputs for advanced services.   In order to comply with the merger conditions, SBC has 
established SBC Advanced Solutions Inc. (ASI) to provide retail and wholesale advanced 
services in Texas and other SBC states (Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Kansas, Missouri, 
Nevada and Oklahoma). 
309. In order to minimize any disruption to the efficient and timely delivery of 
advanced services to customers, SWBT was permitted a reasonable period to transition to 
steady state provisioning of advanced services through ASI.   ASIs interconnection 
agreement with SWBT in Texas, which is modeled after the T2A, became effective January 7, 
2000.  On March 13, 2000, ASI began processing all new requests for frame relay and cell relay 
services in Texas.   Approximately 10 percent of these new requests require a UNE loop (4-wire 
digital or DS-1 loop) to connect the customer premises to the frame relay/cell relay switch port.  
ASI has been processing LSRs in Texas to order these loops from SWBT using the same EDI 
interface that is available to competitive LECs to order unbundled loops.   ASI submits an 
Access Service Request (ASR) for special access for the other 90 percent of orders where the 4-
wire digital loop or DS-1 is used to connect the customer premises to a frame/cell switch port 
outside the wire center for the customers local exchange service.   ASI submits the ASR to 
SWBT utilizing the same processes, procedures, and interfaces as unaffiliated frame relay and 
ATM service providers. 
310. As for ASIs ADSL services, ASI stated that it would continue to engage in 
interim line sharing until May 29, 2000, at which time SWBT would make line sharing 
generally available.   In order to address criticism in the Texas I record that ASI was not 
ordering xDSL-capable loops as its competitors were doing, ASI pledges in SWBTs Texas II 
application to order 280 unbundled loops per month that are capable of providing ADSL 
service.   ASI stated that it would begin to order xDSL-capable loops on April 6, 2000 and 
would continue to do so until line sharing was made generally available, submitting LSRs to 
SWBT for processing in the same manner that SWBT provisions unbundled loops to competitive 
LECs.   Furthermore, ASI asserts that when line sharing became available, ASI began ordering 
the HFPL UNE (high frequency portion of the loop) from SWBT utilizing the same interfaces 
and paying an equivalent price as competitive LECs.   
(b) Discussion
311. AT&T and other commenters assert that SWBT has engaged in discrimination 
favoring its advanced services separate affiliate in a number of ways.  These assertions fall into 
two broad categories:  (1) those attacking the separate affiliate structure permitted under the 
merger conditions;  and (2) those alleging that SWBT has improperly implemented the merger 
conditions, resulting in preferential treatment for ASI. 
312. As an initial matter, we reject AT&T and TRAs assertions that ASI must be 
deemed a successor or assign of SWBT.   In the SBC/Ameritech Merger Order, we 
established a rebuttable presumption that SWBTs separate subsidiary for advanced services 
would not be considered a successor or assign of the incumbent LEC provided that the incumbent 
and its separate affiliate do not deviate from the requirements of section 272(b), (c), (e), and (g) 
other than in the manner explicitly provided for in the merger conditions.   We incorporate by 
reference our legal reasoning in reaching this conclusion.   As discussed below, there is no 
evidence in the record that SWBT is operating outside the strictures of the merger conditions.  
Accordingly, no commenters have rebutted the presumption we set forth in the SBC/Ameritech 
Merger Order.  Moreover, we find it would be unfair to fault SWBT in the context of the instant 
proceeding for its adherence to the conditions with which it is obligated to comply under the 
terms of the SBC/Ameritech Merger Order.
313. Because we find that ASI is not subject to the obligations of section 251(c), we 
reject TRAs argument that SWBT violates its statutory obligation to make xDSL services 
available at wholesale rates to resellers by providing the service through ASI, its wholly-owned 
subsidiary.   As an incumbent LEC, SWBT only has an obligation to offer for resale at 
wholesale rates those services that it provides to subscribers at retail.   SWBT does not provide 
xDSL services at retail, so it is not obligated to provide these services at wholesale rates.
314. We also reject allegations that the structure of the separate affiliate permits SWBT 
to discriminate on behalf of ASI.  For example, AT&T asserts that SWBTs provision of network 
planning and engineering functions, including use of SWBT employees to arrange for requested 
collocation space for ASI, allows SWBT to unlawfully favor its affiliate over competitors.    
SWBT is permitted, pursuant to the merger conditions, to engage in certain activities for a 
limited transition period.  The Commission found in the SBC/Ameritech Merger Order that 
because SBC/Ameritech had previously been performing these activities on an integrated basis, 
it [would] take some time, both logistically and technically, to remove these functions from the 
incumbent.   Specifically, we concluded that a short transition period would minimize any  
disruption to the efficient and timely delivery of [a]dvanced [s]ervices to customers.   We also 
note that any differences in treatment between ASI and competitors that may occur during this 
transition period would be inherent in the integrated provision of advanced services.  Moreover, 
at the end of the transition period, competitors will have greater protection against discrimination 
than they otherwise would be entitled to if SWBT had continued to provide advanced services on 
an integrated basis.  We find no basis, therefore, for altering our conclusion that SWBT complies 
with the collocation requirements of checklist item 1.
315. Similarly, we also reject commenters objections to ASIs access to non-
transitional services such as OI&M, joint marketing and customer care services, exclusive access 
to line sharing for a limited period, and to our decision to permit the terms of an interconnection 
agreement to suffice for certain transaction disclosure requirements.   These activities, like the 
transitional network planning activities described above, were explicitly permitted under the 
merger conditions.
316. We concluded in the SBC/Ameritech Merger Order that the advanced services 
separate affiliate will not derive unfair advantages from any of the activities that it is permitted to 
engage in with the incumbent LEC.   We disagree, therefore, that SWBTs engaging in these 
activities with ASI constitutes a violation of section 271.  In any event, even if these commenters 
had presented a plausible claim of discrimination, which they have not, they have alleged no 
form of discrimination substantial enough to draw into question SWBTs overall compliance 
with the relevant checklist items.
317. Finally, we also reject allegations that SWBT, in implementing the merger 
conditions, has conducted activities outside the strictures of these conditions, resulting in 
preferential treatment of ASI.   These claims generally appear to describe activity that is, in fact, 
contemplated by the merger conditions.  For example, AT&T is troubled by a SWBT statement 
that it provides certain customer care functions after the sale of ASIs services.   As stated 
above, however, we explicitly found that the sharing of customer care services on an exclusive 
basis is a permitted activity pursuant to the SBC/Ameritech merger conditions.    Similary, IP 
Communications alleges that SWBT has only recently made its Premis database available to 
competitive LECs because ASI needs access to it.  Under the nondiscrimination requirement of 
section 272(c)(1), SWBTs obligation is to give all unaffiliated entities the same goods, 
services, facilities, and information that it gives to its affiliate.   Instead of showing potential 
discrimination, these facts indicate that SWBT is abiding by the relevant nondiscrimination 
obligations.  
318. In addition, we note that even if this allegedly discriminatory activity were 
outside the strictures of the merger conditions, commenters do not describe how such activity 
violates any provision of the competitive checklist.  It seems that, at best, such allegations could 
be relevant, if at all, only to the Commissions predictive judgment whether SWBT will comply 
with the section 272 requirements with respect to its long distance separate affiliate.   Because 
we find no evidence on this record that SWBT is acting outside the confines of the merger 
conditions, however, there is no need to evaluate these claims in the context of our section 272 
analysis below


c. High Capacity Loop Performance
319. We find, based on the evidence in the record, that SWBT demonstrates that it 
provides high capacity loops to competing carriers in a nondiscriminatory manner. With respect 
to average installation interval, the Texas Commission did not establish a retail analogue, but 
instead established a 3 day target for average order installation.  Accordingly, we assess SWBTs 
performance on the basis of whether or not it offers efficient competitors a meaningful 
opportunity to compete.  Although SWBT has had difficulty with meeting this target in the past, 
during March and April 2000, SWBT installed competing carrier DS1 loops in about 3 days, on 
average.   Furthermore, with respect to missed installation due dates, in the period from 
February through April 2000, SWBT missed only slightly more due dates for competing carrier 
DS1 loops than it did for its own retail DS1 service.   In addition, during the same period, the 
average time to repair competing carrier DS1 loops was only slightly higher for competing 
carriers than it was for SWBT.   In light of the lack of commenting parties on these slight 
performance disparities, we do not find these differences competitively significant.  Finally, 
during the period from February through April 2000, competing carriers DS1 loops experienced 
comparable or lesser repeat trouble report rates than did SWBTs own retail DS1 loops.   Thus, 
we find that SWBT provides nondiscriminatory maintenance and repair services for the high 
capacity loops it provides to competing carriers.
320. WorldCom alleges that SWBT will not provide unbundled access to high capacity 
loops, such as OC-3 or OC-12 level facilities.   SWBT, however, offers an optional amendment 
to the T2A that redefines the loop network element to include DS1, DS3, fiber, and other high 
capacity loops to the extent required by applicable law.   Because this language indicates that 
SWBT has a concrete and specific legal obligation to make available as broad a variety of high 
capacity loops as the law requires, and we reject WorldComs arguments.
d. Line Sharing and Other Loop Related Issues
321. Line Sharing.  For the purpose of evaluating whether this application satisfies 
section 271, we do not require SWBT to prove that it has implemented the loop facility and OSS 
modifications necessary to accommodate requests for access to the line sharing unbundled 
network element as required by our December 9, 1999 Line Sharing Order.   Although that 
order became technically effective on February 9, 2000, we acknowledged that it could take as 
long as 180 days from release of our order for incumbent LECs to develop and deploy the 
modifications necessary to implement the new obligations.   This 180 day period concluded on 
June 6, 2000, well after SWBT filed its application.   As with the aspects of the UNE Remand 
Orders revised rule 319 that were not yet in effect at the time SWBT filed its application, we 
conclude that it would be unfair to require SWBT to demonstrate full compliance with the 
requirements of the Line Sharing Order in its initial application, at a time well in advance of the 
implementation deadline established in the Order.  Finally, requiring SWBT to supplement the 
record with new evidence demonstrating its compliance with its line sharing obligations on or 
after June 6, 2000, would necessitate an 11th hour review of fresh evidence and dispose of our 
well-established procedural framework.  
322. Although we set June 6, 2000 as an outside deadline for accommodating requests 
for access to this new line sharing network element, we also established that an incumbent LEC 
had clear obligations to work towards satisfying the line sharing requirements in the weeks 
leading up to this deadline.   We find that SWBT demonstrates significant development and 
operational resources devoted to planning for competing carrier access to the high frequency 
portion of the loop.   We find the depth and scope of this evidence sufficient to overcome the 
speculative concerns of some competing carriers regarding SWBTs line sharing readiness,  and 
reject competing carrier arguments that the Commission should deny SWBTs section 271

application on the basis of its alleged failure to comply with the requirements of the Line Sharing 
Order. 
323. Line Splitting.  Some commenters contend that SWBT has unlawfully hindered 
the ability of competing carriers to use the UNE-P to provide both xDSL and voice services.   
For instance, AT&T argues that SWBT has unlawfully denied AT&T access to SWBTs splitter 
and has thereby made it more difficult for AT&T to use the UNE-P to provide advanced 
services.   The Department of Justice also noted this issue in passing, but it did not suggest that 
the issue casts doubt on the merits of this application.  
324. As a preliminary matter, we note that under the Line Sharing Order, the 
obligation of an incumbent LEC to make the high frequency portion of the loop separately 
available is limited to those instances in which the incumbent LEC is providing, and continues to 
provide, voice service on the particular loop to which the requesting carrier seeks access.   
Thus, the situation that these commenters describe is not technically line sharing, because both 
the voice and data service will be provided by competing carrier(s) over a single loop, rather than 
SWBT.  To avoid confusion, we characterize this type of request as line splitting, rather than 
line sharing.
325. The Commissions rules require incumbent LECs to provide requesting carriers 
with access to unbundled loops in a manner that allows the requesting carrier to provide any 
telecommunications service that can be offered by means of that network element.   As a 
result, incumbent LECs have an obligation to permit competing carriers to engage in line 
splitting over the UNE-P where the competing carrier purchases the entire loop and provides its 
own splitter.   The record reflects that SWBT allows competing carriers to provide both voice 
and data services over the UNE-P.   For instance, if a competing carrier is providing voice 
service over the UNE-P, it can order an unbundled xDSL-capable loop terminated to a collocated 
splitter and DSLAM equipment and unbundled switching combined with shared transport to 
replace its UNE-P with a configuration that allows provisioning of both data and voice service.  
SWBT provides the loop that was part of the existing UNE-P as the unbundled xDSL-capable 
loop, unless the loop that was used for the UNE-P is not capable of providing xDSL service. 
326. AT&T also argues that it has a right to line splitting capability over the UNE-P 
with SWBT furnishing the line splitter.   AT&T alleges that this is the only way to allow the 
addition of xDSL service onto UNE-P loops in a manner that is efficient, timely, and minimally 
disruptive.   Furthermore, AT&T contends that competing carriers have an obligation to 
provide access to all the functionalities and capabilities of the loop, including electronics 
attached to the loop.   AT&T contends that the splitter is an example of such electronics and 
that it is included within the loop element. 
327. We reject AT&Ts argument that SWBT has a present obligation to furnish the 
splitter when AT&T engages in line splitting over the UNE-P.  The Commission has never 
exercised its legislative rulemaking authority under section 251(d)(2) to require incumbent LECs 
to provide access to the splitter, and incumbent LECs therefore have no current obligation to 
make the splitter available.   As we stated in the UNE Remand Order, with the exception of 
Digital Subscriber Line Access Multiplexers (DSLAMs), the loop includes attached electronics, 
including multiplexing equipment used to derive the loop transmission capacity.   We 
separately determined that the DSLAM is a component of the packet switching unbundled 
network element.   We observed that DSLAM equipment sometimes includes a splitter and 
that, [i]f not, a separate splitter device separates voice and data traffic.   We did not identify 
any circumstances in which the splitter would be treated as part of the loop, as distinguished from 
being part of the packet switching element.  That distinction is critical, because we declined to 
exercise our rulemaking authority under section 251(d)(2) to require incumbent LECs to provide 
access to the packet switching element, and our decision on that point is not disputed in this 
proceeding.
328. The UNE Remand Order cannot fairly be read to impose on incumbent LECs an 
obligation to provide access to their splitters.  Indeed, the only discussion of the splitter appeared 
in a discussion of a network element (the packet switching element) that we decided not to 
unbundle, and that discussion at least suggested that the splitter, because it is often part of the 
DSLAM, might properly be considered part of that element as a general matter.  In response to 
petitions for reconsideration of the UNE Remand Order, we have been asked to consider whether 
to impose on incumbent LECs a new obligation to provide access to the splitter, just as we are 
often asked to adjust our unbundling rules in light of industry developments.  In this regard, we 
believe AT&Ts arguments merit prompt and thorough consideration by the Commission, and we 
commit to resolving them expeditiously in our reconsideration of the UNE Remand Order.  The 
fact remains, however, that SWBT had no such obligation during the period covered by this 
application and therefore, any SWBT failure to provide access to the splitter can provide no basis 
for denying this application.  
329. Finally, AT&T suggests in passing that SWBT voluntarily provides the line 
splitter functionality to competing carriers engaging in line sharing with SWBT voice services 
and that it has for that reason incurred an obligation to provide all UNE-P carriers with the same 
option.   Even if AT&T had fully developed this issue, this argument would lack merit and 
would in any event be unripe for our review here.  What AT&T requests is not line sharing, but 
access to the entire loop and the splitter in order to provide both voice and advanced services.  
Line sharing and line splitting present two different scenarios under our rules.  With respect to 
line sharing, we stated in the Line Sharing Order that incumbent LECs have discretion to 
maintain control over the splitter.   With respect to line splitting, as described above, we have 
not imposed any obligation on incumbent LECs to provide access to their splitters.  AT&T 
presents no evidentiary or conceptual basis for concluding that SWBTs practices in these two 
different contexts somehow amount to discrimination against AT&T.  In any event, the parties 
entire dispute on the question of line splitting is a recent development and is subject to further 
negotiation and, if necessary, arbitration before the Texas Commission.   In light of SWBTs 
overall compliance with the relevant checklist items, this newly arising dispute provides no basis 
for rejecting SWBTs application here.
330. Other Issues.  We reject AT&Ts argument that we should deny this application 
on the basis of SWBTs decision to deny its xDSL service to customers who choose to obtain 
their voice service from a competitor that is using the UNE-P.   Under our rules, the incumbent 
LEC has no obligation to provide xDSL service over this UNE-P carrier loop.  In the Line 
Sharing Order, the Commission unbundled the high frequency portion of the loop when the 
incumbent LEC provides voice service, but did not unbundle the low frequency portion of the 
loop and did not obligate incumbent LECs to provide xDSL service under the circumstances 
AT&T describes.  Furthermore, as described above, the UNE-P carrier has the right to engage in 
line splitting on its loop.  As a result, a UNE-P carrier can compete with SWBTs combined 
voice and data offering on the same loop by providing a customer with line splitting voice and 
data service over the UNE-P in the same manner.  In sum, we do not find this conduct 
discriminatory.
E. Checklist Item 5  Unbundled Local Transport
1. Background
331. Section 271(c)(2)(B)(v) of the competitive checklist requires a BOC to provide 
[l]ocal transport from the trunk side of a wireline local exchange carrier switch unbundled from 
switching or other services.    The Commission has required that BOCs provide both dedicated 
and shared transport to requesting carriers.   Dedicated transport consists of BOC transmission 
facilities dedicated to a particular customer or carrier that provide telecommunications between 
wire centers owned by BOCs or requesting telecommunications carriers, or between switches 
owned by BOCs or requesting telecommunications carriers.    Shared transport consists of 
transmission facilities shared by more than one carrier, including the BOC, between end offic

switches, between end office switches and tandem switches, and between tandem switches, in the 
BOCs network. 
2. Discussion
332. Based on the evidence in the record, we conclude that SWBT provides both 
shared and dedicated transport in compliance with the requirements of this checklist item.   The 
Texas Commission also finds that SWBT is in compliance with this checklist item.   
333. We are persuaded that SWBTs data concerning missed due dates for interoffice 
facilities shows that its provisioning of transport to competitive LECs is nondiscriminatory.   
We note that no commenters challenge SWBTs showing concerning the provision of dedicated 
or shared transport, except insofar as the commenters address OSS issues and matters concerning 
the provisioning of the UNE platform, which we address elsewhere.  
334. We disagree with Global Crossings assertion that SWBT fails to provide 
unbundled local transport.    Global Crossing states that in Houston it has an Optical Carrier 
Level-3 (OC-3)  from SWBT that it uses to carry access traffic to its point of presence.  Global 
Crossing alleges that SWBT refused to process orders to carry local exchange traffic over the 
OC-3, but required Global Crossing instead to acquire a separate transport facility to carry purely 
local traffic.  Global Crossing claims that this was an illegal use restriction that constituted a 
refusal by SWBT to provide unbundled local transport.
335. As we found in the Bell Atlantic New York Order, we do not consider the 
provision of special access services pursuant to a tariff for purposes of determining checklist 
compliance.   We do not believe that checklist compliance is intended to encompass the 
provision of tariffed interstate access services simply because these services use some form of the 
same physical facilities as a checklist item.   The fact that the competitive LECs can use 
interstate special access service in lieu of the EEL, a combination of unbundled loops and 
transport, and can convert special access service to EELs, does not persuade us that we should 
alter our approach and consider the provision of special access for purposes of checklist 
compliance.   Nevertheless, to the extent that parties are experiencing problems in the 
provisioning of special access services ordered from SWBTs federal tariffs, we note that these 
issues are appropriately addressed in the Commissions section 208 complaint process. 
F. Checklist Item 6  Unbundled Local Switching
1. Background
336. Section 271(c)(2)(B)(vi) of the 1996 Act requires a BOC to provide [l]ocal 
switching unbundled from transport, local loop transmission, or other services.   In the Second 
BellSouth Louisiana Order, the Commission required BellSouth to provide unbundled local 
switching that included line-side and trunk-side facilities, plus the features, functions, and 
capabilities of the switch.   The features, functions, and capabilities of the switch include the 
basic switching function as well as the same basic capabilities that are available to the incumbent 
LECs customers.   Additionally, local switching includes all vertical features that the switch is 
capable of providing, as well as any technically feasible customized routing functions. 
337. Moreover, in the Second BellSouth Louisiana Order, the Commission required 
BellSouth to permit competing carriers to purchase unbundled network elements, including 
unbundled switching, in a manner that permits a competing carrier to offer, and bill for, exchange 
access and the termination of local traffic.   The Commission also stated that measuring daily 
customer usage for billing purposes requires essentially the same OSS functions for both 
competing carriers and incumbent LECs, and that a BOC must demonstrate that it is providing 
equivalent access to billing information.   Therefore, the ability of a BOC to provide billing 
information necessary for a competitive LEC to bill for exchange access and termination of local 
traffic is an aspect of unbundled local switching.   Thus, there is an overlap between the 
provision of unbundled local switching and the provision of the OSS billing function. 
338. In the Second BellSouth Louisiana Order, the Commission stated that to comply 
with the requirements of unbundled local switching, a BOC must also make available trunk ports 
on a shared basis and routing tables resident in the BOCs switch, as necessary to provide access 
to shared transport functionality.   The Commission also stated that a BOC may not limit the 
ability of competitors to use unbundled local switching to provide exchange access by requiring 
competing carriers to purchase a dedicated trunk from an interexchange carriers point of 
presence to a dedicated trunk port on the local switch.


2. Discussion
339. Based on the evidence in the record, we conclude that SWBT demonstrates that it 
complies with checklist item 6.   Specifically, SWBT demonstrates that it provides: (1) line-side 
and trunk side facilities;   (2) basic switching functions;  (3) vertical features;  (4) customized 
routing;    (5) shared trunk ports;    (6) unbundled tandem switching;  (7) usage information 
for billing exchange access,   and (8) usage information for billing for reciprocal

compensation.   The Texas Commission concludes that SWBT is in compliance with checklist 
item 6. 
340. We reject Z-Tels argument that SWBT has failed to meet this checklist 
requirement.  Z-Tel stated that it is effectively foreclosed from Line Class Code customized 
routing (LCC) because, as stipulated in the T2A interconnection agreement, if a competing 
carrier requests LCC in any local switch where Advanced Intelligent Network custom routing 
(AIN) is implemented, SWBT may establish a rate for the requested LCC, and only if the rate is 
disputed will the Texas Commission set a TELRIC rate.   Z-Tel argued that, given this pricing 
uncertainty, SWBT cannot show that it is providing LCC in accordance with the 271 standard, 
and therefore fails to meet checklist item 6.   To support this conclusion, Z-Tel pointed to the 
Ameritech Michigan Order in which the Commission stated that [t]o be providing a checklist 
item, a BOC must have a concrete and specific legal obligation to furnish the item upon request 
pursuant to a state-approved interconnection agreement that sets forth prices and other terms and 
conditions for each checklist item.   Z-Tel also cited the Second BellSouth Louisiana Order, in 
which the Commission stated that the features, functions, and capabilities of the switch include 
any technically feasible customized routing functions. 
341. Z-Tel appeared to conflate two standards  the sets forth prices, terms, and 
conditions for each checklist item standard from the Ameritech Michigan Order, and the any 
technically feasible standard from the Second BellSouth Louisiana Order  to place an 
unreasonable burden on SWBT.  Carried to its logical conclusion, Z-Tels argument would 
require BOCs to stand ready with fixed prices and terms for any and all technically feasible 
methods of providing a function of a network element.  We find that SWBT meets its obligation 
to provide the customized routing function, because SWBT provides, at fixed prices, terms, and 
conditions, the routing system SWBT itself uses, and makes LCC available, upon request, as 
well.  
342. Z-Tel may consider LCC essential to its business plan.  Taking into consideration 
the availability of alternative elements outside the incumbents network, including self-
provisioning by Z-Tel or acquiring an alternative from a third-party supplier, Z-Tel may decide 
that SWBTs customized switching offering materially diminishes Z-Tels ability to provide the 
services it seeks to offer.   If Z-Tel believes we should include LCC among the specific 
attributes of the switching element, we note that there are venues better suited to airing the 
issue.  
G. Checklist Item 7
1. 911 and E911 Access
a. Background
343. Section 271(c)(2)(B)(vii) of the Act requires a BOC to provide 
[n]ondiscriminatory access to  (I) 911 and E911 services.   In the Ameritech Michigan 
Order, the Commission found that section 271 requires a BOC to provide competitors access to 
its 911 and E911 services in the same manner that a BOC obtains such access, i.e., at parity.   
Specifically, the Commission found that a BOC must maintain the 911 database entries for 
competing LECs with the same accuracy and reliability that it maintains the database entries for 
its own customers.   For facilities-based carriers, the BOC must provide unbundled access to 
[its] 911 database and 911 interconnection, including the provision of dedicated trunks from the 
requesting carriers switching facilities to the 911 control office at parity with what [the BOC] 
provides to itself.  
b. Discussion
344. Based on the evidence in the record, we conclude that SWBT demonstrates that it 
is providing nondiscriminatory access to 911/E911 services, and thus satisfies the requirements 
of checklist item 7.   We note that no commenter disputes SWBTs compliance with this 
portion

of checklist item 7, and that the Texas Commission concludes that SWBT is providing 
nondiscriminatory access to 911/E911. 
2. Directory Assistance/Operator Services
a. Background
345. Section 271(c)(2)(B)(vii)(II) and section 271(c)(2)(B)(vii)(III) require a BOC to 
provide nondiscriminatory access to directory assistance services to allow the other carriers 
customers to obtain telephone numbers and operator call completion services, respectively.   
Section 251(b)(3) of the Act imposes on each LEC the duty to permit all [competing providers 
of telephone exchange service and telephone toll service] to have nondiscriminatory access to  .  . 
 .  operator services, directory assistance, and directory listing, with no unreasonable dialing 
delays.   The Commission implemented section 251(b)(3) in the Local Competition Second 
Report and Order.  
346. We concluded in the Second BellSouth Louisiana Order that a BOC must be in 
compliance with the regulations implementing section 251(b)(3) to satisfy the requirements of 
sections 271(c)(2)(B)(vii)(II) and 271(c)(2)(B)(vii)(III).   In the Local Competition Second 
Report and Order, the Commission held that the phrase nondiscriminatory access to directory 
assistance and directory listings means that the customers of all telecommunications service 
providers should be able to access each LECs directory assistance service and obtain a directory 
listing on a nondiscriminatory basis, notwithstanding:  (1) the identity of a requesting customers 
local telephone service provider; or (2) the identity of the telephone service provider for a 
customer whose directory listing is requested.   The Commission concluded that 
nondiscriminatory access to the dialing patterns of 4-1-1 and 5-5-5-1-2-1-2 to access directory 
assistance were technically feasible, and would continue.   The Commission specifically held 
that the phrase "nondiscriminatory access to operator services" means that .  .  .  a telephone 
service customer, regardless of the identity of his or her local telephone service provider, must be 
able to connect to a local operator by dialing 0, or 0 plus the desired telephone number.    
347. Competing carriers may provide operator services and directory assistance by 
either reselling the BOCs services or by using their own personnel and facilities to provide these 
services.  Our rules require BOCs to permit competitive LECs wishing to resell the BOCs 
operator services and directory assistance to request the BOC to brand their calls.   Competing 
carriers wishing to provide operator services or directory assistance using their own facilities and 
personnel must be able to obtain directory listings either by obtaining directory information on a 
read only or per dip basis from the BOCs directory assistance database, or by creating their

own directory assistance database by obtaining the subscriber listing information in the BOCs 
database.  
348. Although the Commission originally concluded that BOCs must provide directory 
assistance and operator services on an unbundled basis pursuant to sections 251 and 252, the 
Commission removed directory assistance and operator services from the list of required 
unbundled network elements in the Local Competition Third Report and Order.   Checklist 
item obligations that do not fall within a BOCs obligations to provide unbundled network 
elements are not subject to the requirements of sections 251 and 252, including the requirement 
that rates be based on forward-looking economic costs.    Checklist item obligations that do not 
fall within a BOCs UNE obligations, however, still must be provided in accordance with 
sections 201(b) and 202(a), which require that rates and conditions be just and reasonable, and 
not unreasonably discriminatory. 
b. Discussion
349. Based on the evidence in the record, we conclude that SWBT demonstrates that it 
provides directory assistance services in accordance with the requirements of checklist item 7.   
The Texas Commission concludes that SWBT has satisfied the requirements of this checklist 
item. 
350. SWBTs showing withstands the arguments of its opponents regarding this 
checklist item.  With regard to directory assistance, WorldCom asserts that SWBT  violates the 
checklist by charging competitive LECs non-cost-based rates for access to directory assistance 
listings of customers that reside within its region, but outside of Texas (i.e. Arkansas, Kansas, 
Missouri, and Oklahoma).   SWBT denies that it violates this checklist item, because the 
Commission and some state commissions have determined that directory assistance is a 
competitive service subject to market-based pricing, not cost-based pricing.   
351. We find WorldComs assertions unpersuasive.  WorldComs argument that 
SWBTs out-of-state directory assistance services are priced at an anticompetitive level is not 
relevant to a determination of whether SWBT meets checklist item 7 in Texas.  For purposes of 
the instant application, we consider only whether SWBT meets the requirements of section 271 
in the State of Texas.   No commenter has challenged SWBTs rate for directory assistance in 
Texas, and the Texas Commission conclude that SWBT meets this checklist item.   We 
therefore conclude that SWBT meets this checklist item.
H. Checklist Item 8  White Pages Directory Listings
1. Background
352. Section 271(c)(2)(B)(viii) of the 1996 Act requires a BOC to provide [w]hite 
pages directory listings for customers of the other carriers telephone exchange service.   
Section 251(b)(3) of the 1996 Act obligates all LECs to permit competitive providers of 
telephone exchange service and telephone toll service to have nondiscriminatory access to 
directory listings. 
353. In the Second BellSouth Louisiana Order, the Commission concluded that, 
consistent with the Commissions interpretation of directory listing as used in section 
251(b)(3), the term white pages in section 271(c)(2)(B)(viii) refers to the local alphabetical 
directory that includes the residential and business listings of the customers of the local exchange

provider.   We further concluded, the term directory listing, as used in this section, includes, 
at a minimum, the subscribers name, address, telephone number, or any combination thereof. 
354. In the Second BellSouth Louisiana Order, the Commission found that a BOC 
satisfies the requirements of checklist item 8 by demonstrating that it:  (1) provided 
nondiscriminatory appearance and integration of white page directory listings to competitive 
LECs customers; and (2) provided white page listings for competitors customers with the same 
accuracy and reliability that it provides its own customers. 
2. Discussion
355. Based on the evidence in the record, we find that SWBT satisfies the requirements 
of checklist item 8.   The Texas Commission concludes that SWBT complies with this checklist 
item.  
356. We reject allegations that SWBT does not meet this checklist item.  ALTS and the 
CLEC Coalition state that competitive LECs in Texas have experienced problems with SWBTs 
processes for altering customer listings and incorporating changes into the white pages 
directory.   ALTS and the CLEC Coalition also state that some listings are falling out or 
failing to appear for no apparent reason.  In addition, both parties express concern that SWBTs 
performance measurements fail to capture the problems that their members report.   The

Association of Directory Publishers (ADP) support ALTS and the CLEC Coalition, and note that 
inaccurate or incomplete listings in the incumbents database harmed its members as well. 
357. SWBT explains that, at the direction of the Texas Commission, SWBT leaves 
listings unchanged during the resale or UNE provisioning process.  Unless the competitive LEC 
submits a Directory Service Request form stating otherwise, SWBT assumes the white pages 
listing is to remain unchanged.   ALTS, the CLEC Coalition, and ADP did not rebut SWBTs 
explanation in their reply comments.  
358. We conclude there is no evidence to support that the difficulties some competing 
carriers may have encountered with SWBTs processes for altering white pages listings reflect 
systemic defects within SWBTs white pages directory listings procedures.  It appears likely that 
competing carriers perception that listings are falling out may reflect misunderstanding or 
miscommunication between carriers rather than actual failure to list customers in SWBTs white 
pages directory.  We agree with the CLEC Coalition and ADP, however, that irregularities 
involving the white pages are a very serious matter because customers may tend to blame the 
new competitor, rather than the familiar incumbent, for mistakes.   Although we do not hold 
SWBT to a standard of perfection, we note that, if there were a systemic problem involving a 
significant number of listings, it would warrant a finding of noncompliance. 
I. Checklist Item 9  Numbering Administration
1. Background
359. Section 271(c)(2)(B)(ix) of the 1996 Act requires a BOC to provide 
nondiscriminatory access to telephone numbers for assignment to the other carriers telephone 
exchange service customers, until the date by which telecommunications numbering 
administration, guidelines, plan, or rules are established.   The checklist mandates compliance 
with such guidelines, plan, or rules after they have been established. 
360. SWBT does not assign telephone numbers to itself or competitive LECs.  The 
Commission has designated NeuStar, Inc. (NeuStar) as the North American Numbering Plan 
Administrator.   NeuStar is responsible for assigning blocks of 10,000 telephone numbers 
(NXX Codes) to carriers within each area code, and for coordinating area code relief planning 
efforts with state commissions.   SWBT must demonstrate that it adheres to industry numbering 
administration guidelines and Commission rules, including provisions requiring the accurate 
reporting of data to the code administrator. 
2. Discussion
361. Based on the evidence in the record, we find that SWBT satisfies the requirements 
of checklist item 9.   The Texas Commission concluded that SWBT meets the requirements of 
checklist item 9, and no commenter alleges that SWBT has failed to meet such requirements.  
J. Checklist Item 10  Databases and Associated Signaling
1. Background
362. Section 271(c)(2)(B)(x) of the 1996 Act requires a BOC to provide 
nondiscriminatory access to databases and associated signaling necessary for call routing and 
completion.   In the Second BellSouth Louisiana Order, we required BellSouth to demonstrate 
that it provided requesting carriers with nondiscriminatory access to: (1) signaling networks, 
including signaling links and signaling transfer points; (2) certain call-related databases necessary 
for call routing and completion, or in the alternative, a means of physical access to the signaling 
transfer point linked to the unbundled database; and (3) Service Management Systems (SMS). 
   We also required BellSouth to design, create, test, and deploy Advanced Intelligent Network 
(AIN) based services at the SMS through a Service Creation Environment (SCE). 
363. In the Local Competition First Report and Order, the Commission defined call-
related databases as databases, other than operations support systems, that are used in signaling 
networks for billing and collection or the transmission, routing, or other provision of 
telecommunications service.   At that time the Commission required incumbent LECs to 
provide unbundled access to their call-related databases, including but not limited to:  the Line 
Information Database (LIDB), the Toll Free Calling database, the Local Number Portability 
database, and Advanced Intelligent Network databases.   In the UNE Remand Order, we 
clarified that the definition of call-related databases includes, but is not limited to, the calling 
name (CNAM) database, as well as the 911 and E911 databases. 
2. Discussion
364. Based on the evidence in the record, we find that SWBT satisfies the requirements 
of checklist item 10.   The Texas Commission also concludes that SWBT meets this checklist 
item.   
365. We reject Pilgrims assertions that SWBT refuses to provide competitors with 
real-time access to information regarding 900/976 blocking, billing name and address (BNA), 
and credit history, and therefore, SWBT does not fulfill the call-related database requirement of 
item 10.   Pilgrim argues that, because it provides casual calling services  it must make 
snap decisions whether or not a call should be accepted and transmitted.   Therefore, Pilgrim 
maintains, the nature of its business requires real-time access to call blocking, billing name and 
address (BNA), and credit information in order to validate and bill the call.  
366. SWBT states that, regarding 900/976 blocking information, Pilgrim is incorrect, 
and that in fact SWBTs LIDB does provide real-time access to call-blocking information.   
SWBT describes in detail the capabilities of the LIDB system.   Therefore we conclude that, 
contrary to Pilgrims assertion, SWBT makes call-blocking information available on a 
nondiscriminatory basis.   
367. SWBT further states that it has no obligation to release end-users BNA or credit 
history to Pilgrim.   We agree with SWBT that checklist item 10 does not require SWBT to 
share with other carriers the customer-credit information that SWBT has accumulated in the 
course of its business dealings with its customers.  Such information would be considered 
customer proprietary network information (CPNI).   Pilgrim has not established that SWBT is 
under any obligation to share such CPNI with Pilgrim, or that such information is necessary for 
Pilgrim to initiate, render, bill, and collect for telecommunications services.  
368. Pilgrim appears to assert, correctly, that BNA is a call-related database which 
must be unbundled pursuant to section 251(c)(3) of the Act.  As stated above, the Commission 
has defined call-related databases as databases, other than operations support systems, that are 
used in signaling networks for billing and collection or the transmission, routing, or other 
provision of telecommunications service.   Because the BNA database contains the billing 
name and address to validate and bill a telephone call, it clearly meets this definition.   Unlike 
customer-credit information, BNA information is available to competitive LECs that participate 
in the T2A interconnection agreement.   SWBT provides real-time access through a pre-order 
electronic gateway to SWBTs BNA to these competitive LECs.   Pilgrim, therefore, could opt 
into the T2A and gain access to BNA, pursuant to section 252(i) of the Act.   Consequently, we 
find that Pilgrims allegations do not warrant a finding of noncompliance with this checklist 
item.
K. Checklist Item 11  Number Portability
1. Background
369. Section 271(c)(2)(B) of the 1996 Act requires a BOC to comply with the number 
portability regulations adopted by the Commission pursuant to section 251.  Section 251(b)(2) 
requires all LECs to provide, to the extent technically feasible, number portability in accordance 
with requirements prescribed by the Commission.   The 1996 Act defines number portability 
as the ability of users of telecommunications services to retain, at the same location, existing 
telecommunications numbers without impairment of quality, reliability, or convenience when 
switching from one telecommunications carrier to another.   In order to prevent the cost of 
number portability from thwarting local competition, Congress enacted section 251(e)(2), which 
requires that [t]he cost of establishing telecommunications numbering administration 
arrangements and number portability shall be borne by all telecommunications carriers on a 
competitively neutral basis as determined by the Commission. 
370. Pursuant to these statutory provisions, the Commission requires LECs to offer 
interim number portability to the extent technically feasible.   The Commission also requires 
LECs to gradually replace interim number portability with permanent number portability.   The 
Commission has established guidelines for states to follow in mandating a competitively neutral 
cost-recovery mechanism for interim number portability,  and created a competitively neural 
cost-recovery mechanism for long-term number portability. 
2. Discussion
371. Based on the evidence in the record, we conclude that SWBT complies with the 
requirements of checklist item 11.  SWBT provides permanent number portability in 
conformance with Commission regulations and provides interim number portability to competing 
carriers through remote call forwarding, direct inward dialing, and directory number routing 
indexing.   SWBT is presently converting all interim number portability lines to permanent 
number portability and expects that this conversion will be complete by year-end.  The Texas 
Commission also concludes that SWBT satisfies this checklist item. 
372. We reject Global Crossing and the CLEC Coalitions assertions that SWBT fails 
to provide local number portability in a reliable manner.   Global Crossing describes occasions 
where it believes SWBT failed to update its switch translations properly so that calls to Global 
Crossing customers with a ported number were unable to be completed.   Similarly, the CLEC 
Coalition claims that a SWBT local number portability database outage delayed its members 
orders.   Because Global Crossing and the CLEC Coalitions claim appear to be anecdotal and 
unsupported by any persuasive evidence, we conclude that they do not warrant a finding of 
noncompliance of this checklist item. 
L. Checklist Item 12  Local Dialing Parity 
1. Background
373. Section 271(c)(2)(B)(xii) requires a BOC to provide [n]ondiscriminatory access 
to such services or information as are necessary to allow the requesting carrier to implement local 
dialing parity in accordance with the requirements of section 251(b)(3).   Section 251(b)(3) 
imposes upon all LECs [t]he duty to provide dialing parity to competing providers of telephone 
exchange service and telephone toll service with no unreasonable dialing delays.   Section 
153(15) of the Act defines dialing parity as follows:
. . . a person that is not an affiliate of a local exchange carrier is 
able to provide telecommunications services in such a manner that 
customers have the ability to route automatically, without the use 
of any access code, their telecommunications to the 
telecommunications services provider of the customers 
designation . . .  
374. Our rules implementing section 251(b)(3) provide that customers of competing 
carriers must be able to dial the same number of digits the BOCs customers dial to complete a 
local telephone call.   Moreover, customers of competing carriers must not otherwise suffer

inferior quality service, such as unreasonable dialing delays, compared to the BOCs 
customers. 
2. Discussion
375. Based on the evidence in the record, we find that SWBT demonstrates that it 
provides local dialing parity in accordance with the requirements of section 251(b)(3) and thus 
satisfies the requirements of checklist item 12.   The Texas Commission concluded that SWBT 
meets the requirements of this checklist obligation.      
376. We reject Pilgrims argument that because SWBT allegedly denies Pilgrim real-
time access to call-blocking databases, Pilgrim cannot offer its customers the call-blocking 
feature that is available to SWBTs customers, and SWBT thus fails to provide dialing parity as 
required by section 271 of the Act.   Because a customer may place a call through Pilgrim, 
rather than directly through SWBTs switch, it is possible for that customer (or anyone with 
access to the customers telephone) to circumvent the blocking intelligence in SWBTs switch, 
and thereby reach the type of pay-per-call services the customer has asked SWBT to block.   
Thus, Pilgrim argues, the customer suffers inferior quality service by using Pilgrim. 
377. The Commissions dialing parity rules and orders have concerned the ease with 
which a customer may dial an outgoing call, rather than the ease with which customers may 
block the ability to dial calls.   Pilgrim would have us find an ease-of-blocking requirement in 
the Local Competition Second Report and Orders phrase must not otherwise suffer inferior 
quality service.   We are not persuaded that Commission precedent requires such an 
interpretation.  Accordingly, we reject Pilgrims assertion that SWBT fails to meet this checklist 
requirement. 
M. Checklist Item 13  Reciprocal Compensation
1. Background
378. Section 271(c)(2)(B)(xiii) of the Act requires that a BOC enter into "[r]eciprocal 
compensation arrangements in accordance with the requirements of section 252(d)(2).   In 
turn, pursuant to section 252(d)(2)(A), "a state commission shall not consider the terms and 
conditions for reciprocal compensation to be just and reasonable unless (i) such terms and 
conditions provide for the mutual and reciprocal recovery by each carrier of costs associated with 
the transport and termination on each carrier's network facilities of calls that originate on the 
network facilities of the other carrier; and (ii) such terms and conditions determine such costs on 
the basis of a reasonable approximation of the additional costs of terminating such calls.   . 
The Commission has held that ISP-bound traffic is non-local interstate traffic and that the 
reciprocal compensation requirements of section 251(b)(5) of the Act . . . do not govern inter-
carrier compensation for this traffic.   The Commission specified that state commissions may 
impose reciprocal compensation obligations for ISP-bound traffic, or may decline to require the 
payment of reciprocal compensation and may adopt another compensation mechanism while the 
Commission developed final rules in an ongoing proceeding.   On March 24, 2000, the D.C. 
Court of Appeals vacated this ruling and remanded it for a fuller explanation of why ISP-bound 
traffic is not subject to section 251(b)(5)s reciprocal compensation requirements. 
2. Discussion
379. Based on the evidence in the record, we conclude that SWBT demonstrates that it 
has entered into reciprocal compensation arrangements in accordance with the requirements of 
section 252(d)(2), and thus satisfies the requirements of checklist item 13.  SWBT demonstrates 
that it (1) has in place reciprocal compensation arrangements in accordance with section 
252(d)(2),  and (2) is making all required payments in a timely fashion.   In its brief, SWBT 
states that the Texas Commission established rates for transport and termination in the Mega-
Arbitration,  using a forward-looking TELRIC methodology that complies with Commission 
rules.   SWBT states that pursuant to the T2A, its agreements contain clearly defined 
arrangements for each party to compensate the other for traffic exchanged between their 
networks.   SWBTs interconnection agreements include each partys obligation to account for 
local traffic, as well as any applicable charges.  
380. In the T2A, SWBT offers competitive LECs three opportunities for establishing 
the terms and conditions for reciprocal compensation.   First, a competitive LEC may obtain 
the arbitrated terms in the then-effective SWBT/AT&T interconnection agreement.   That 
agreement expired January 2, 2000.   If a competitive LEC chose this option prior to that date, 
the provisions of the SWBT/AT&T agreement continue to apply until the competitive LEC 
agreement expires.   After the competitive LEC agreement expires, the compensation 
arrangements become bill-and-keep while SWBT and the competitive LEC negotiate and/or 
arbitrate new terms.   SWBT states that the Texas Commission established transport and 
termination rates using a TELRIC methodology.   Under the second alternative, competitive 
LECs and SWBT may mutually exchange local traffic on a bill-and-keep basis pursuant to terms 
approved by the Texas Commission.   Finally, the competitive LEC may choose to negotiate 
and, if needed, arbitrate the terms for reciprocal compensation while operating under the other 
terms of the T2A.   SWBT says that while it is negotiating or arbitrating a reciprocal 
compensation agreement with a competitive LEC, the parties exchange local and internet traffic 
under an interim bill-and-keep arrangement, subject to true-up, as approved by the Texas 
Commission.   The Texas Commission concludes that SWBT meets this checklist item.   The 
Texas Commission states that rates for both tandem- and end-office transport and termination are 
based on a TELRIC methodology. 
381. SWBTs showing withstands the arguments raised by its opponents.  We find 
unpersuasive the claims of the CLEC Coalition and e.spire that SWBTs reported usage data for 
traffic passed between SWBTs and their respective networks is unreliable and incorrect.   
SWBT says it provides competitive LECs that use unbundled local switching with detailed 
records needed to obtain reciprocal compensation for calls originating from SWBT and other 
unbundled switch-based competitive LECs.   SWBT notes that the Texas Commission has 
concluded that SWBTs usage record method is adequate.   The Texas Commission notes that 
if competitive LECs do not wish to use SWBTs particular type of record exchange, they are free 
to choose one of the other two reciprocal compensation options.  
382. SWBT notes that due to technological limitations, it currently cannot track calls 
originating from a third-party facilities-based carrier and terminating to a customer served by a 
competitive LEC using SWBTs unbundled local switches.   In response to the Texas 
Commission's concerns regarding this problem, SWBT and other carriers have implemented an 
interim traffic reporting and compensation mechanism.    SWBT notes that this interim 
compensation mechanism was agreed to by AT&T, WorldCom, and Sage Telecom, approved by 
the Texas Commission, and is included in the T2A.   This interim mechanism will remain in 
effect until a permanent industry solution is found.   SWBT also notes that the carriers 
interconnection agreements provide procedures for addressing billing disputes, and that neither 
commenter has presented its claims to the Texas Commission.   
383. The 1996 Act authorizes the state commissions to resolve specific carrier-to-
carrier disputes arising under the local competition provisions, and it authorizes the federal 
district courts to ensure that the results of the state arbitration process are consistent with federal 
law.   Although we have an independent obligation to ensure compliance with the checklist, 
section 271 does not compel us to preempt the orderly disposition of intercarrier disputes by the 
state commissions.  We believe that e.spire and the CLEC Coalition should bring this fact-
specific dispute before the Texas Commission.  Additionally, we believe that SWBT has made a 
concerted effort to resolve this traffic reporting dispute, has continued to exchange traffic records 
with e.spire during the course of this dispute, and has implemented a reasonable interim traffic 
reporting mechanism while industry groups work toward a permanent industry-wide solution.   
We find that e.spires and the CLEC Coalitions allegations are insufficient to rebut SWBTs 
case.
384. Nor are we persuaded by WorldComs allegations that SWBTs Extended Area 
Service (EAS) additive charge is a non-cost-based fee intended to compensate SWBT for lost 
revenues, in violation of our rules.   EAS enables residential and business customers to extend 
the coverage of their flat-rate local calling area for a set monthly fee.   A customer subscribing 
to EAS pays a higher monthly flat rate in order to have a larger non-toll calling area.   Under 
one-way EAS, a SWBT customer would be able to call another SWBT customer within its 
extended area without paying a toll.  Under two-way EAS, the SWBT subscriber pays a higher 
fee to allow other SWBT customers within the extended calling area to call in without paying toll 
charges.  
385. When either the originating or terminating end user is not a SWBT customer, 
however, EAS will not work.  If a SWBT EAS customer calls a competitive LEC customer in the 
extended area, the competitive LEC ordinarily would charge SWBT terminating access, which 
SWBT would pass on to its SWBT customer.  Similarly, when a competitive LEC customer in 
the extended area calls a SWBT customer, SWBT would charge the competitive LEC 
terminating access, which the competitive LEC would pass on to its customer.  Carriers, 
however, may agree to waive toll charges that would otherwise be assessed.  In the alternative, 
carriers may agree to bill each other a per-minute charge.  WorldCom asserts that the additive 
charge of between 2 and 4 cents per minute is a non-cost-based charge intended to compensate 
SWBT for revenues it once received from EAS customers that have moved to a new entrant.   
As the Texas Commission explains, however, the additive charges are designed to compensate 
the carriers in exchange for their agreement to waive the terminating access they otherwise would 
have received.    The Texas Commission notes that such EAS additives are reciprocal in nature 
and entirely optional.   Therefore, we conclude that WorldCom has not demonstrated that the 
EAS additive violates the section 271 provisions applicable to reciprocal compensation. 
386. Allegiance requests that the Commission determine the appropriate compensation 
arrangement for local and ISP-bound traffic.   Allegiance asserts that the Commission should 
set compensation rates for inter-carrier traffic in accordance with TELRIC.   The Texas 
Commission has determined that Internet-bound traffic from an end user is to be treated under 
the applicable interconnection agreements as if it were local traffic for purposes of reciprocal 
compensation.   SWBT has appealed this determination but states that it will continue to apply 
this method of compensation while required to do so.   We note that Allegiance does not allege 
that SWBT fails this checklist item, but merely requests that the Commission reconsider its 
previous decision to allow states to make determinations regarding reciprocal compensation.  As 
noted above, the D.C. Court of Appeals remanded the Commissions ruling that ISP-bound 
traffic is not subject to section 251(b)(5)s reciprocal compensation requirements.   Because 
Allegiance does not allege that SWBT fails this checklist item, and also because this issue if 
before us again due to the courts remand, we do not address it in the context of a 271 
application.
N. Checklist Item 14  Resale 
1. Background
387. Section 271(c)(2)(B)(xiv) of the Act requires a BOC to make 
"telecommunications services . . . available for resale in accordance with the requirements of 
sections 251(c)(4) and 252(d)(3)."   Section 251(c)(4)(A) requires incumbent LECs "to offer 
for resale at wholesale rates any telecommunications service that the carrier provides at retail to 
subscribers who are not telecommunications carriers."   Section 252(d)(3) requires state 
commissions to determine wholesale rates on the basis of retail rates charged to subscribers for 
the telecommunications service requested, excluding the portion thereof attributable to any 
marketing, billing, collection, and other costs that will be avoided by the local exchange 
carrier.   Section 251(c)(4)(B) prohibits "unreasonable or discriminatory conditions or 
limitations" on service resold under section 251(c)(4)(A).   Consequently, the Commission 
concluded in the Local Competition First Report and Order that resale restrictions are presumed 
to be unreasonable unless the LEC proves to the state commission that the restriction is 
reasonable and non-discriminatory.   If an incumbent LEC makes a service available only to a 
specific category of retail subscribers, however, a state commission may prohibit a carrier that 
obtains the service pursuant to section 251(c)(4)(A) from offering the service to a different 
category of subscribers.   If a state creates such a limitation, it must do so consistent with 
requirements established by the Federal Communications Commission.   In accordance with 
sections 271(c)(2)(B)(ii) and 271(c)(2)(B)(xiv), a BOC must also demonstrate that it provides 
nondiscriminatory access to operations support systems for the resale of its retail 
telecommunications services. 
2. Discussion
388. Based on the evidence in the record, we conclude that SWBT demonstrates that it 
makes telecommunications services available for resale in accordance with sections 251(c)(4) 
and 252(d)(3), and thus satisfies the requirements of checklist item 14.  SWBT states that it is in 
compliance with the requirements of this checklist item,  and the Texas Commission agrees.  
SWBT says that it commits in its interconnection agreements and the T2A to making its retail 
services available to competing carriers at wholesale rates.   In 1995, the Texas Commission 
established a resale tariff to make retail local exchange telecommunications services available to 
resellers at a 5 percent discount.   In its Mega-Arbitration proceeding, conducted after the 1996 
Act was implemented, the Texas Commission used an avoided-cost calculation method 
consistent with the Commissions pricing rules to establish a generally-available discount of 21.6 
percent off SWBTs retail rates.   Competing carriers may thus obtain services from SWBTs 
tariff at a 5 percent discount, or from the T2A or through interconnection agreements at a 21.6 
percent discount.   Competing carriers may purchase SWBTs promotional offerings of 90 days 
or less at the promotional rate, and its promotional offerings of greater than 90 days at the 21.6 
percent discount.   Competing carriers may purchase existing customer specific arrangements 
(CSAs) at either a 5.62 percent or 8.04 percent discount, depending on the type of contract.   
Additionally, competing carriers may purchase at the 21.6 percent discount CSAs to resell to new 
customers.   Pursuant to the terms of the SBC/Ameritech merger, SWBT also offers a discount 
of 32 percent off its retail rate for resold service to residential customers. 
389. SWBT also states that it makes its retail telecommunications services available for 
resale without unreasonable or discriminatory conditions or limitations.   The Texas 
Commission agrees.   According to SWBT, the telecommunications services it offers 
competing carriers for resale are identical to the services it furnishes its own retail customers, and 
competing carriers are able to sell these services to the same customer groups, in the same 
manner.   Competing carriers may also take over existing contracts by purchasing CSAs 
without triggering termination liability charges or contract transfer fees to the end user.   
SWBT permits competing carriers that resell CSAs to meet minimum volume requirements by 
aggregating the traffic of multiple end-user customers, provided that those customers are 
similarly situated to the customer(s) of SWBTs original contract. 
390. SWBTs case withstands the arguments of its opponents.  We are not persuaded 
by the National ALEC Association/Prepaid Communications Association (NALA)s 
unsubstantiated contention that SWBTs resale contracts contain onerous contract terms.   
Specifically, NALA asserts that SWBTs resale contracts: indemnify SWBT against resellers 
customer claims, limiting that liability to a credit or refund if SWBT negligently performs its 
resale services; lack meaningful penalties if SWBT fails to perform its contract obligations; make 
resellers responsible for all sales and related taxes; compel arbitration rather than litigation in 
cases of dispute; fail to guarantee that SWBTs third-party vendor arrangements will not result in 
higher reseller fees; permit SWBT to terminate reseller agreements on an annual basis; and 
require large deposits from resellers.   The Texas Commission provides multiple procedural 
vehicles to address such concerns, and NALA should have first raised these concerns there, 
preferably when it was contemplating entering into the contracts.   For example, if NALA does 
not care for one of SWBTs contract provisions, it may negotiate or arbitrate such provision, or 
otherwise work with the Texas Commission to find an interim solution until a final resolution is 
reached.   Additionally, NALA has not produced evidence to substantiate its claim.  We 
therefore find that SWBTs application withstands this allegation.
391. Nor are we persuaded by NALAs argument that SWBTs resale-related OSS 
charges are discriminatory.  NALA resells SWBTs local service to residential customers with 
poor credit histories in the form of prepaid, flat-rate local telephone service.   SWBT offers a 
virtually identical prepaid package.   NALA alleges that SWBT offers its prepaid home service 
at a price below what NALA . . . members charge, and that it appears that this rate does not 
impute all the charges that SBCs competitors must pay.   Specifically, NALA contends that 
SWBT charges Texas resellers OSS costs, and that it is far from clear whether these OSS 
charges are included in SBCs rates for its Prepaid Home Service.    SWBT responds that the 
charge NALA refers to is not OSS.   Rather, it is a conversion order charge that SWBT 
assesses when a competing carrier converts existing SWBT retail POTS service into a resold 
service.   Alternately, SWBT assesses a service connection charge when a competing carrier 
establishes a new service using resold SWBT service.   The service connection charge, SWBT 
asserts, is the same charge it assesses its retail customers, but resellers receive a 21.6 per cent 
discount.   SWBT asserts that these charges recover the cost of customer service labor 
associated with processing service orders.   The Texas Commission has authorized both of 
these charges.   SWBT also disputes NALAs assertion that it cannot compete with SWBT for 
prepaid home telephone service because SWBT is able to underprice the service.   SWBT notes 
that resellers may purchase its prepaid home telephone service for resale at a discount of either 
21.6 per cent or 32 per cent.   Alternatively, resellers may purchase SWBTs POTS, along with 
those options that constitute a prepaid home service option identical to SWBTs, at a discount.  
We find that NALA provides insufficient information to show that SWBTs service offering is 
discriminatory. 
392. We find unpersuasive the claims of Adelphia,  Allegiance,  e. spire,  and 
KMC  that the Commission should allow customers in long-term contracts to switch to 
competing telecommunications carriers without termination penalties under a fresh look 
argument.  These commenters assert that their customers are reluctant to change carriers if they 
are required to pay termination penalties.   SWBT responds that competitive LECs may resell 
its CSAs without triggering termination liability to the end user.   Additionally, the 
Commission has previously held that although termination liabilities could, in certain 
circumstances, be unreasonable or anticompetitive, they do not on their face cause a carrier to fail 
checklist item 14.   The Commission further found that the absence of a fresh look 
requirement is not a basis for rejecting a section 271 application.   KMC contends that the 
Commission should impose a fresh look requirement on public interest grounds, that is, as part 
of our analysis under section 271(d)(3)(C).   We note that KMC raised an identical issue in a 
Petition for Declaratory Ruling, which is currently pending.   We find, as we did in the Bell 
Atlantic New York Order, that this issue is best addressed in the context of that pending petition, 
and we decline to resolve the issue here.   In any event, our resolution of this issue would not 
cast doubt on SWBTs overall compliance with checklist item 14 because SWBT meets our 
existing resale requirements. 
393. Provisioning.  Based on evidence in the record, we find that SWBT satisfies the 
provisioning requirements of checklist item 14.  As discussed above, SWBT is provisioning 
competitive LECs orders for resale in substantially the same time and manner as for its retail 
customers. 
VI. SECTION 272 COMPLIANCE 
A. Background
394. Section 271(d)(3)(B) requires that the Commission shall not approve a BOCs 
application to provide interLATA services unless the BOC demonstrates that the requested 
authorization will be carried out in accordance with the requirements of section 272.   The 
Commission set standards for compliance with section 272 in the Accounting Safeguards Order 
and the Non-Accounting Safeguards Order.   Together, these safeguards discourage and 
facilitate the detection of improper cost allocation and cross-subsidization between the BOC and

its section 272 affiliate.   In addition, these safeguards ensure that BOCs do not discriminate in 
favor of their section 272 affiliates. 
395. As we stated in the Ameritech Michigan Order, compliance with section 272 is 
of crucial importance because the structural, transactional, and nondiscrimination safeguards of 
section 272 seek to ensure that BOCs compete on a level playing field.   The Commissions 
findings regarding section 272 compliance constitute independent grounds for denying an 
application.   Past and present behavior of the BOC applicant provides the best indicator of 
whether [the applicant] will carry out the requested authorization in compliance with section 
272.     
B. Discussion
396. Based on the record, we conclude that SWBT has demonstrated that it will 
comply with the requirements of section 272.  We address each section 272 requirement below.
1. Structural, Transactional, and Accounting Requirements of Section 
272
397. Section 272(a)  Separate Affiliate.  Section 272(a) requires BOCs and their local 
exchange carrier affiliates that are subject to section 251(c) to provide certain competitive 
services through structurally separate affiliates.   For the reasons described in the subsequent 
section below, we conclude that SBC demonstrates that it will operate in accordance with section 
272(a).
398. The parent company, SBC Communications, Inc., has established one primary 
section 272 affiliate to provide in-region interLATA services in Texas upon gaining section 271 
approval:  Southwestern Bell Communications Services, Inc. (SBCS), which does business as 
Southwestern Bell Long Distance.    At this time, SBCS conducts no business aside from the 
companys calling card operations.  Once earning section 271 approval, SBCS plans to provide 
in-region interLATA services in Texas by reselling wholesale network services of one or more 
unaffiliated providers.   In its application, SWBT demonstrates that it has implemented internal 
control mechanisms reasonably designed to prevent, as well as detect and correct, any 
noncompliance with section 272. 
399. Section 272(b)(1)  Operate Independently.  Based on the evidence in the record, 
SWBT has demonstrated that its section 272 affiliate will comply with section 272(b)(1), which 
requires a section 272 affiliate to operate independently from the Bell operating company.   
The Commission has interpreted the operate independently requirement to impose four 
important restrictions on the ownership and operations of a BOC and its section 272 affiliate:  (1) 
no joint ownership of switching and transmission facilities; (2) no joint ownership of the land 
and buildings on which switching and transmission facilities are located; (3) no provision by the 
BOC (or other non-section 272 affiliate) of operation, installation, and maintenance services 
(OI&M) with respect to the section 272 affiliates facilities; and (4) no provision of OI&M by the 
section 272 affiliate with respect to the BOCs facilities.  We note that our review of SBCSs 
Internet postings, as well as SWBTs cost allocation manual (CAM) and independent auditors 
reports, support our finding.
400. Section 272(b)(2)  Books, Records, and Accounts.  Based on the evidence in the 
record, SWBT demonstrates that section 272 affiliate will comply with the its requirement to 
maintain books, records, and accounts in a manner prescribed by the Commission which shall 
be separate from the books, records, and accounts maintained by the [BOCs].   Although 
initially unclear whether the section 272 affiliate maintained its books, records, and accounts in 
accordance with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), SWBT submitte

additional evidence to demonstrate consistency with GAAP and compliance with the 
Commissions rules.   In addition, we note that no party challenges SWBTs showing.  
401. Section 272(b)(3)  Separate Officers, Directors, and Employees.  Based on the 
evidence in the record, SWBT has demonstrated that its section 272 affiliate will comply with the 
separate officers, directors, and employees requirement of section 272(b)(3).   We note that 
no party challenges SWBTs showing.   
402. Section 272(b)(4)  Credit Arrangements.  Based on the evidence in the record, 
SWBT has demonstrated that its section 272 affiliate will comply with section 272(b)(4), which 
prevents a section 272 affiliate from obtaining credit under any arrangement that would permit a 
creditor, upon default, to have recourse to the assets of [any SBC BOC].   We note that no 
party challenges SWBTs showing.   
403. Section 272(b)(5)  Affiliate Transactions.  Based on our review of its application, 
we conclude that SBC demonstrates that it will comply with the arms length and public 
disclosure requirements of section 272(b)(5) for transactions between its BOCs and its section 
272 affiliate.   Section 272(b)(5) requires that a section 272 affiliate conduct all transactions 
with its affiliated BOCs on an arms length basis, with all such transactions reduced to writing 
and made publicly-available.   Consistent with the Commissions Accounting Safeguards 
Order, all transactions between SWBTs section 272 affiliates and any affiliated BOC are posted 
on the companys Internet homepage within 10 days of the transaction.   To ensure that all 
transactions occur at arms length, SWBT must abide by the Commissions affiliate transactions 
rules.   As noted in previous Orders addressing section 271 applications, the Commission 
evaluates the sufficiency of a BOCs Internet disclosures by referring to its ARMIS filings, its 
cost allocation manuals (CAMs), and its CAM audit workpapers. 
404. SWBT persuades us that its section 272 affiliate will comply with the section 
272(b)(5) public disclosure requirements, including the obligation to post all transactions 
between the BOC and its section 272 affiliate within 10 days of the transaction.   Although our 
preliminary analysis revealed a potentially significant discrepancy between the relevant Internet 
disclosures and SWBTs accounting data, SWBT adequately demonstrated that the discrepancies 
did not adversely impact the timely posting of information on the Internet.   We further note 
that, for certain transactions, SWBT provided additional assurances to show that it met its 
obligations under section 272(b)(5).   Finally, SWBT demonstrates that its section 272 affiliate

meets the Commissions 10-day posting requirement and maintains an audit trail of past Internet 
postings.  
405. Although we are concerned about the specific examples cited by AT&T, we 
conclude that the Internet disclosures of SWBTs section 272 affiliate are, on the whole, 
sufficiently detailed to evaluate compliance with the Commissions rules and to facilitate the 
detection of potential anticompetitive conduct.   As AT&T points out, however, the Internet 
posting for Temporary Projects services provided by SBC to its section 272 affiliate fails to 
provide a comprehensible description of the services at issue,  and several other Internet 
postings contain a similar lack of detail.   Despite these flaws, our in-depth review of the 
relevant Internet disclosures shows that the majority contain sufficient detail, as specified in the 
Accounting Safeguards Order, the Ameritech Michigan Order, and the Second BellSouth 
Louisiana Order.   Finally, we note that SWBTs Internet postings will undergo a thorough and 
systematic review in the section 272(d) biennial audit, which will ensure that any failure to post 
sufficient detail are identified in time for appropriate remedial action.
406. Based on the record evidence, we conclude that SWBT demonstrates that it will 
comply with the affiliate transactions rules, which is necessary to ensure that all transactions 
between a BOC and its section 272 affiliate comply with the statutory arms length 
requirement.   Our review of SWBTs ARMIS data, its CAM, its independent auditors 
workpapers, and the Internet disclosures supports SWBTs showing of compliance with the 
affiliate transactions rules.  Neither the Commissions review of SWBTs accounting information 
nor the audits conducted by independent auditors have revealed discrepancies with SWBTs 
corporate accounting procedures for affiliate transactions in the past three years.  We note that 
the section 272(d) joint Federal-State audit will provide an appropriate mechanism for detecting 
potential anticompetitive or otherwise improper conduct.
407. As a final matter, we are concerned about the confidentiality agreement raised by 
AT&T, but we are persuaded that the agreement does not preclude a showing of compliance for 
SWBT.   AT&T argues that SWBTs nondisclosure agreement  restricts the ability of 
unaffiliated third parties to obtain information about affiliate transactions and to report potential 
noncompliance to the appropriate authorities.   We agree with AT&T that restricting third party 
access to regulatory authorities is improper and that SWBTs nondisclosure agreement might 
deter unaffiliated third parties from notifying the Commission about potential violations of our 
rules.  SWBT persuades us, however, that its current nondisclosure agreement has not adversely 
affected its ability to comply with section 272(b)(5) to date because all transactions were properly 
posted on the Internet.   Competing carriers and others are always entitled to raise potential 
problem areas and seek redress with the appropriate authorities, and that a BOC should not 
attempt to restrict such rights through nondisclosure agreements or other means.
408. Section 272(c)(2)  Accounting Principles.  Based on the evidence in the record, 
SWBT demonstrates that it accounts for all transactions with its section 272 affiliates in 
accordance with the accounting principles designated or approved by the Commission.   In the 
Accounting Safeguards Order, the Commission concluded that complying with the Part 32 
affiliate transactions rules satisfies the accounting requirements of section 272(c), which pertain 
to the BOCs dealings with its separate affiliate.  We agree with SBC that its section 272 
affiliates may share services (except OI&M) provided to its affiliated BOCs by a shared services 
affiliate, but we emphasize that such services are subject to the appropriate non-structural 
safeguards.   
409. Section 272(d)  Biennial Audit.  Based on the evidence in the record, we 
conclude that SWBT demonstrates that it will comply with section 272(d), which requires an 
independent audit of a BOCs compliance with section 272 after receiving interLATA 
authorization.   The section 272(d) biennial audit involves a thorough and systematic 
evaluation of a BOCs compliance with section 272 and its affiliate relationships performed by 
an independent auditor working under the direction of the Commission and state commissions.  
As noted in the Accounting Safeguards Order, once a BOC obtains section 271 approval, the 
Chief of the Common Carrier Bureau will form a joint Federal/State audit team to review the 
conduct of the audit and oversee the activities of the independent auditor.   We view the active 
participation of the state commissions as critical to the success of the biennial audit at ensuring a 
BOCs compliance with section 272.  As noted in previous orders, the section 272(d) biennial 
audit entails an examination into a BOCs affiliate relationships to ensure the company does not 
use its corporate affiliates as improper tools for circumventing statutory obligations.   We stress 
that a BOC cannot circumvent legal and regulatory requirements through its affiliate structure.  
a. Nondiscrimination Safeguards of Section 272
410. Section 272(c)(1)  Nondiscrimination Safeguards.  Based on the evidence in the 
record, we conclude that SWBT demonstrates that it will comply with section 272(c)(1), which 
prohibits a BOC from discriminating in favor of its section 272 affiliates in the provision or 
procurement of goods, services, facilities, and information, or in the establishment of 
standards.  The Commissions nondiscrimination safeguards require a BOC to, among other 
things, provide to unaffiliated entities the same goods, services, facilities, and information that it 
provides to its section 272 affiliate at the same rates, terms, and conditions.   Our review of 
SWBTs internal controls and standard operating procedures shows that SWBT requires its 
section 272 affiliate to adhere to the same procedures for obtaining collocation space required of 
unaffiliated third parties, and that SWBT has procedures to ensure that unaffiliated entities have 
access to information for, among other things, the development of company-internal standards 
and processes.   In addition, we note SWBTs OSS showing demonstrates that it meets the 
requirements of section 272(c)(1) regarding nondiscriminatory provision of information. 
411. Although we agree with AT&T that section 272(c)(1) establishes an unqualified 
prohibition against discrimination, we find that its arguments regarding SWBTs proposed 
intrastate switched access tariffs are moot.   In its comments, AT&T contends that SWBTs 
pricing plan for swtiched access service discriminates against larger interexchange carriers.   
The Texas Commission, however, rejected SWBTs proposed intrastate switched access tariff as 
unlawful for the reasons presented by AT&T.   Because SWBTs proposed tariff is not (and 
will not) be effective, we conclude that AT&Ts argument regarding a violation of the section 
272(c)(1) nondiscrimination safeguards is moot.
412. Section 272(e)  Fulfillment of Certain Requests.  Based on the evidence in the 
record, SWBT demonstrates that it will comply with section 272(e), which requires SWBT to 
fulfill requests for, among other things, telephone exchange and exchange access services from 
unaffiliated entities within the same time period SWBT fulfills such requests for its own retail 
operations.   In addition, section 272(e) also provides that a BOC shall not provide any 
facilities, services, or information concerning its provision of exchange access to the [section 272 
affiliate] unless such facilities, services or information are made available to other providers of 
interLATA services in that market on the same terms and conditions.   Finally, section 272(e) 
places certain accounting and nondiscrimination requirements on BOCs with respect to exchange 
access and facilities or services provided to their section 272 affiliates.   Except for one issue, 
we note that no party challenges SWBTs showing.   
413. As discussed above in the context of the section 272(c)(1) nondiscrimination 
safeguards, AT&T alleges that a SWBT-proposed intrastate switched access tariff violates the 
nondiscrimination safeguards of section 272(e)(3) because it provides volume discounts to a 
limited number of interexchange carriers.   Although AT&T correctly points out that the 
Commissions section 272(e)(3) rules require a BOC to make volume and term discounts 
available on a nondiscriminatory basis to all unaffiliated interexchange carriers, its argument is 
moot because the Texas Commission rejected SWBTs proposed intrastate switched access 
tariffs as unlawful for the reasons presented by AT&T.   Because SWBTs proposed tariff is 
not (and will not) be effective, we conclude that AT&Ts argument regarding a violation of the 
section 272(e)(3) nondiscrimination safeguards is moot.
b. Joint Marketing Provisions of Section 272
414. Section 272(g)(1)  Affiliate Sales of Telephone Exchange Access Services.  Based 
on the evidence in the record, we conclude that SWBT has demonstrated that it will comply with 
the joint marketing provisions of section 272(g)(1).   We note that no party challenges SWBTs 
showing.   
415. Section 272(g)(2)  Bell Operating Company Sales of Affiliate Services.  We 
conclude that SWBT demonstrates that it will comply with section 272(g)(2), which prevents a 
BOC from marketing or selling within its region any interLATA service provided by a section 
272 affiliate absent authorization obtained pursuant to section 271(d).   We note that no party 
challenges SWBTs showing.  
VII. PUBLIC INTEREST ANALYSIS
A. Overview
416. In addition to determining whether a BOC satisfies the competitive checklist and 
will comply with section 272, Congress directed the Commission to assess whether the requested 
authorization would be consistent with the public interest, convenience, and necessity.   We 
conclude that approval of this application is consistent with the public interest.  In reaching this 
determination, we find that compliance with the competitive checklist is itself a strong indicator 
that long distance entry is consistent with the public interest.  This approach reflects the

Commissions many years of experience with the consumer benefits that flow from competition 
in telecommunications markets.
417. Nonetheless, the public interest analysis is an independent element of the statutory 
checklist and, under normal canons of statutory construction, requires an independent 
determination.   Thus, we view the public interest requirement as an opportunity to review the 
circumstances presented by the application to ensure that no other relevant factors exist that 
would frustrate the congressional intent that markets be open, as required by the competitive 
checklist, and that entry will therefore serve the public interest as Congress expected.  Among 
other things, we may review the local and long distance markets to ensure that there are not 
unusual circumstances that would make entry contrary to the public interest under the particular 
circumstances of this application.   Another factor that could be relevant to our analysis is 
whether we have sufficient assurance that markets will remain open after grant of the application. 
While no one factor is dispositive in this analysis, our overriding goal is to ensure that nothing 
undermines our conclusion, based on our analysis of checklist compliance, that markets are open 
to competition.  As discussed below, we conclude that the public interest would be met by grant 
of this application.
418. Finally, we note that a strong public interest showing cannot overcome a failure to 
demonstrate compliance with one or more checklist items.  The Commission is specifically 
barred from limit[ing] . . . the terms used in the competitive checklist,  or forbearing from 
requiring compliance with all statutory conditions under section 271. 
B. Competition in Local Exchange and Long Distance Markets
419. As set forth below, we conclude that approval of this application is consistent 
with promoting competition in the local and long distance telecommunications markets.  
Consistent with our extensive review of the competitive checklist, which embodies the critical 
elements of market entry under the Act, we find that barriers to competitive entry in the local 
market have been removed and the local exchange market today is open to competition.  We 
disagree with commenters arguments that the public interest would be disserved by granting 
SWBTs application because the local market in Texas has not yet truly been opened to 
competition.   Commenters cite an array of evidence which, they argue, demonstrates that the 
local telecommunications market is not open and that competition has not sufficiently taken hold 
in Texas.  For example, commenters allege that the local market in Texas is characterized by:  the 
low percentage of total access lines served by competitive LECs;  the concentration of 
competition in Dallas, Fort Worth, Houston and other urban areas;  minimal competition for 
residential services;  modest facilities-based investment;  and prices for local exchange 
service at the maximum permissible levels under the price caps.   We note that Congress 
specifically declined to adopt a market share or other similar test for BOC entry into long 
distance, and we have no intention of establishing one here.   We further find that the record 
confirms our view, as noted in the Bell Atlantic New York Order, that BOC entry into the long 
distance market will benefit consumers and competition if the relevant local exchange market is 
open to competition consistent with the competitive checklist.   
C. Assurance of Future Compliance
420. As set forth below, we find that SWBTs performance remedy plan provides 
additional assurance that the local market will remain open after SWBT receives section 271 
authorization. The Commission previously has explained that one factor it may consider as part 
of its public interest analysis is whether a BOC would continue to satisfy the requirements of 
section 271 after entering the long distance market.   Although the Commission strongly 
encourages state performance monitoring and post-entry enforcement, we have never required 
BOC applicants to demonstrate that they are subject to such mechanisms as a condition of section 
271 approval.   The Commission has stated that the fact that a BOC will be subject to 
performance monitoring and enforcement mechanisms would constitute probative evidence that 
the BOC will continue to meet its section 271 obligations and that its entry would be consistent 
with the public interest.   
421. We believe that it is not necessary that a state monitoring and enforcement 
mechanism alone provide full protection against potential anti-competitive behavior by the 
incumbent.  Most significantly, we recognize that the Commissions enforcement authority under 
section 271(d)(6) already provides incentives for SWBT to ensure continuing compliance with its 
section 271 obligations.  We also recognize that SWBT may be subject to payment of liquidated 
damages through many of its individual interconnection agreements with competitive carriers.  
Furthermore, SWBT risks liability through antitrust and other private causes of action if it 
performs in an unlawfully discriminatory manner. 
1. Performance Remedy Plan
422. SWBTs Performance Remedy Plan is part of the T2A standard interconnection 
contract and is available through that agreement.   Under the Plan, SWBT monitors 131 
performance measurements according to set definitions and business rules.   The Performance 
Remedy Plan provides for two classes or tiers of performance penalties.  Tier-1 penalties apply 
to customer-affecting measurements, such as how long it takes to install or restore service.  
Penalties for failure to comply with standards corresponding to these performance measurements 
are paid to competitive LECs receiving the substandard performance and that sign the T2A.   
Tier-2 penalties apply to competition-affecting measurements such as OSS availability, and are 
paid to the Texas State Treasury.   For both tiers the penalties accrue per-occurrence, which 
means that SWBTs damages or fines are calculated according to the number of incidents that 
SWBT delivers non-compliant performance for a particular measurement.   Each measurement 
also is ranked low, medium or high, with the size of the per-occurrence payment tailored 
accordingly.  Tier-1 damages are assessed if a performance measure is out of compliance for 

single month, but Tier-2 fines apply only if a measurement is missed for three consecutive 
months.     
2. Key Elements of the Enforcement Plan
423. Although the details of mechanisms developed at the state level may vary widely, 
we have examined certain key aspects of these plans to determine whether they fall within a zone 
of reasonableness, and are likely to provide incentives that are sufficient to foster post-entry 
checklist compliance.   In our Bell Atlantic New York Order, for example, we predicted that the 
enforcement mechanisms developed in New York would be effective in practice.   Plans may 
vary in their strengths and weaknesses, and there is no one way to demonstrate assurance.   
Through a lengthy collaborative process, the Texas Commission, SWBT and involved 
competitive LECs have arrived at workable measures to sufficiently capture SWBTs wholesale 
performance.   The measures, coupled with a self-executing performance remedy plan (Plan), 
are designed to prevent backsliding.  The Texas Commission was aware of the need to fashion a 
remedy plan that produced sufficient incentives for SWBT to maintain a high level of wholesale 
service, and sufficient disincentives for SWBT to engage in anti-competitive behavior after 
section 271 relief is granted.   As explained below, we conclude the Texas Commission 
established a performance remedy plan that would discourage anti-competitive behavior by 
setting the damages and penalties at a level above the simple cost of doing business.  
424. Total Liability At Risk.  We conclude that the total of $289 million in potential 
penalties placed at risk, on an annual basis, under the performance plans represents a meaningful 
incentive for SWBT to maintain a high level of performance.   We thus disagree with 
commenters that suggest that this amount is insufficient and fails to provide adequate assurance 
of SWBTs compliance in the future.   Most fundamentally, we disagree with a basic 
assumption made by several commenters:  that liability under the Plan must be sufficient, 
standing alone, to completely counterbalance SWBTs incentive to discriminate.   The 
performance plans adopted by the Texas Commission do not represent the only means of 
ensuring that SWBT continues to provide nondiscriminatory service to competing carriers.  In 
addition to the $289 million at stake under this Plan, as noted above, SWBT faces other 
consequences if it fails to sustain a high level of service to competing carriers, including:  federal 
enforcement action pursuant to section 271(d)(6); liquidated damages under dozens of 
interconnection agreements; and remedies associated with antitrust and other legal actions.
425. Performance Measurements and Standards.  Performance measurements are 
intended to ensure that the reporting mechanism provides a benchmark against which new 
entrants and regulators can measure performance over time to detect and correct any degradation 
of service rendered to new entrants.   Several commenters contend that the performance 
measurements fail to capture certain problems competitive LECs experience in their relations 
with SWBT.   In reply, SWBT defends the scope and meaningfulness of its measurements.  
Through a collaborative process SWBT has increased the number of performance measurements 
from 66 at the time of its initial filing before the Texas Commission to the 131 measurements in 
place at the time of filing this section 271 application.   Moreover, the plan is not static, and we 
recognize that the Texas Commission presently is considering modifying existing measurements, 
and adding new measurements based on input from both SWBT and competitive LECs.  For 
example, SWBT and competitive LECs are developing additional performance measurements for 
provision of DSL-related services.   In addition, in response to competitive LEC concerns that 
aspects of interconnection trunking measurements give an incomplete portrayal of SWBTs 
actual performance, the Texas Commission has implemented a new measurement, PM 73.1 
(concerning missed due dates), and is considering modifications to PM 78 (concerning average 
installation intervals) during its April 2000 performance review.   This continuing ability of the 
measurements to evolve is an important feature because it allows the Plan to reflect changes in 
the telecommunications industry and in the Texas market.  
426. Structural Elements of the Plan. The structural elements of the Plan appear 
reasonably designed to detect and sanction poor performance when it occurs.  Commenters have 
raised specific criticisms, arguing, for example, that the Plan fails to deter targeted discrimination 
directed against individual competing carriers,  and does not include penalties that escalate 
with the magnitude or duration of the performance shortfall.   These criticisms do not 
undermine our overall conclusion that the Plan provides a meaningful incentive to provide 
nondiscriminatory performance in the future.  We find it significant that the Texas Commission 
considered and rejected most of these arguments. 
427. Self-Executing Mechanism.  The performance monitoring and enforcement 
mechanisms appear to be reasonably self-executing, and are generally comparable to the 
mechanisms we found satisfactory in the Bell Atlantic New York Order.   Specifically, we note 
that SWBT is required to provide performance data by the 20th day of the month following the 
reporting month, and is required to make payments, if necessary, by the 30th day following the 
due date of the performance measurement report for the month in which the obligation arose.   
We further note that the Plan provides for expedited dispute resolution in certain carefully 
designated circumstances.   AT&T argues that because the Texas Commission has not 
provided guidance regarding waiver terms comparable to that set forth by the New York 
Commission, the Plan invites litigation by SWBT.   We have said that a waiver process, if not 
narrowly limited to a discrete set of circumstances and subject to time constraints, could have 
such an impact.   Should the Texas Commission suspect any party of abusing the dispute-
resolution procedures provided in the Plan, we are confident the Texas Commission will take 
appropriate action.
428. Data Validation and Audit Procedures.  The Department of Justice states, and we 
agree, that the reliability of reported data is critical, and that properly validated metrics must be 
meaningful, accurate, and reproducible.   In particular, the raw data underlying a performance 
measurement must be stored in a secure, stable, and auditable file if we are to accord a remedy 
plan significant weight.  
429. Several commenters allege that SWBTs performance data is generally 
unreliable.   SWBT states that its performance data collection, storage, and reporting practices 
are verifiable, and are conducted according to contemporaneously published business rules.  
Further, SWBT replies that its data collection methods and procedures were verified by 
Telcordia, and that Telcordia confirmed that SWBT collects and reports data in a manner 
consistent with the state-approved business rules.   While Telcordia did make several 
recommendations regarding SWBTs data control mechanisms, we note that SWBT has agreed to 
implement each of these measures.   We also note that the Texas Commission, in collaboration 
with competitive LECs and SWBT, is currently reviewing a document concerning SWBTs 
internal data collection procedures.   Because the Performance Remedy Plan rests entirely on 
SWBTs performance as captured by the measurements, the credibility of the performance data 
should be above suspicion. 
430. Accounting Requirements.  Consistent with our accounting rules, antitrust 
damages  and certain other penalties paid by carriers,  SWBT should not reflect any portion 
of penalties paid out under the Plan as expenses in the revenue requirement for interstate 
services.  As we noted in the Bell Atlantic New York Order, such accounting treatment ensures 
that ratepayers do not bear, in the form of increased rates, the costs of penalties paid out under 
the Plan in the event that SWBT fails to provide adequate service quality to competitive LECs.  
D. Other Arguments
431. We recognize that commenters raise several other concerns which, they contend, 
support a finding that grant of this application is not in the public interest.  These arguments do 
not convince us that grant of this application would be inconsistent with the public interest.  
Several commenters offer specific allegations that SWBT has engaged in anti-competitive 
behavior.   We have previously stated that we will not withhold section 271 authorization on 
the basis of isolated instances of allegedly unfair dealing or discrimination under the Act.   In 
this instance, we do not find that the various incidents cited by commenters constitute a pattern 
of discriminatory conduct that undermines our confidence that SWBTs local market is open to 
competition and will remain so after SWBT receives interLATA authority.   
432. Several commenters urge the Commission to deny SWBTs application on the 
grounds that SBCs investment in a network architecture commonly known as Project Pronto is 
discriminatory because it favors the business plans of ASI.   For example, competing carriers 
claim that SWBTs Project Pronto architecture will deploy digital loop carrier systems in remote 
terminals fed by fiber optic cables and will not permit competing carriers to line share the loops 
served by those remote terminals.   At the same time, SWBT contends that the investments of 
its parent company will bring broadband services to the vast majority of residential and small 
business customers in its operating area and that the benefits of these infrastructure changes will 
be available to all xDSL service providers on equal terms.   We acknowledge the importance of 
competing carrier concerns regarding Project Pronto and the impact that Project Pronto may 
ultimately have on a number of the section 271 checklist items (e.g., interconnection, unbundled 
local loops).  The record before us, however, does not demonstrate that Project Pronto has 
resulted in a showing of noncompliance with any checklist item.   To the extent that SWBT 
utilizes Project Pronto in such a way that it results in non-compliance in the future, however, we  
may take appropriate enforcement action pursuant to section 271(d)(6).
433. We disagree, as stated above, with commenters that believe that a section 271 
application is an appropriate forum to consider instituting a fresh look policy (to provide an 
opportunity for retail and wholesale customers to exit without penalty long term contracts that 
the carriers have voluntarily entered into with SWBT).   Moreover, we also reject concerns that 
the Texas Commission has limited regulatory authority over SWBT because of legislation 
enacted by the Texas Legislature in 1999.   The Texas Commission notes that the legislation

does not limit the Texas Commissions authority or any competitors ability to challenge rate 
changes or service offerings by SWBT.   
VIII. SECTION 271(D)(6) ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITY
434. Section 271 approval is not the end of the road for SWBT in Texas.  The statutory 
regime makes clear that SWBT must continue to satisfy the conditions required for  
approval   after it begins competing for long distance business in Texas. To this end, Congress 
gave the Commission additional post-approval enforcement powers to address possible 
backsliding by SWBT and other BOCs.  This authority is critical to the statutory design that 
local market are  and remain  open to competition, and evidences Congresss recognition that a 
BOCs incentives to cooperate with its local service competitors may diminish in a given state 
once the BOC obtains section 271 approval in that state.   As we stated in the Bell Atlantic New 
York Order, [s]wift and effective post-approval enforcement of section 271s requirements  is 
essential to achieve Congresss goal of maintaining conditions conducive to achieving durable 
competition in local markets. 
435. We described the post-approval enforcement framework, as well as our various 
section 271(d)(6) enforcement powers, in detail in the Bell Atlantic New York Order.   Among 
other things, section 271(d)(6) provides for Commission receipt and review of complaints filed 
by persons concerning alleged failure by a BOC to meet conditions required for long distance 
approval.  It also specifies several enforcement actions that the Commission can take on its own 
motion to address BOC backsliding.  These include monetary forfeitures, as well as suspension 
or revocation of authority to provide long distance service.  We envision exercising our section 
271(d)(6) suspension power, when appropriate, through a standstill order that could prohibit a 
non-compliant BOC from enrolling additional subscribers and from marketing and promoting 
interLATA service  in essence, freezing the BOCs subscriber base as of the date of the order. 
436. Working in concert with the Texas Commission, we intend to monitor closely 
SWBTs post-approval compliance.  We require that SWBT provide us with the monthly Texas 
Aggregated Performance Measurement Reports that it provides to the Texas Commission for at 
least one year from the date of the release of this order, so that we can review SWBT's 
performance to ensure continued compliance with the statutory requirements.  We stand ready to 
exercise our various statutory enforcement powers quickly and decisively in appropriate 
circumstances to ensure that the local market remains open in Texas.  We are confident that 
cooperative state and federal oversight and enforcement can address any backsliding that may 
arise with respect to SWBTs entry into the Texas long distance market. 
IX. CONCLUSION
437. For the reasons discussed above, we grant SWBTs application for authorization 
under section 271 of the Act to provide in-region, interLATA services in the state of Texas.
X. ORDERING CLAUSES
438. Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that, pursuant to sections 4(i), 4(j), and 271 of the 
Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C.  154(i), 154(j) and 271, SWBTs 
application to provide in-region interLATA service in the State of Texas filed on April 5, 2000, 
IS GRANTED.
439. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this Order SHALL BECOME EFFECTIVE 
July 10, 2000.


					FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION


					Magalie Roman Salas
					Secretar

APPENDIX A

SBC Communications Inc, Southwestern Bell Telephone Company
Southwestern Bell Communications Services
271 Application to provide In-region, InterLATA services in Texas

CC Docket No. 00-65

Comments


Allegiance Telecom, Inc  (Allegiance)
Association for Local Telecommunications Services 
(ALTS) & CLEC Coalition (CLEC) Joint Comments
Alliance for Public Technology 
AT&T Corp.
CCCTX, Inc. d/b/a Connect
Competition Policy Institute 
Campaign for Telecommunications Access and 33 Participating Companies
COVAD Communications Company
Competitive Telecommunications Association
Department of Justice
IP Communications
Joint Comments of: Bluestar Network Services, DSLNET, Inc. 
MGC Communications d/b/a MPOWERCommunications, Waller Creek Communications d/b/a 
Pontio Communications Corp
Level 3 Communications L.L.C.
MCI
NorthPoint
Public Utilities Commission of Texas
RCN Telecom Services Inc.
Rhythms Net Connections
Southwestern Tel-Com
Sprint Communications Co.
Telecommunications Resellers Associations 		
Z-TEL Communications 


SBC Communications Inc, Southwestern Bell Telephone Company
Southwestern Bell Communications Services 
271 Application to provide In-region, InterLATA services in Texas 
CC Docket No. 00-65

Reply Comments


Allegience 
Association of Local Telecommunications Services (ALTS)
AT&T
COVAD Communications Company
Department of Justice
Global Crossing Local Services, Inc.
Joint Comments of: Bluestar Network Services, LINK Network, Inc.
DSLNET, Inc MGC Communications d/b/a MPOWERCommunications
Waller Creek Communications d/b/a Pontio Communications Corp
MCI/WorldCom
Pilgrim Telephone, Inc.
Public Utilities Commission of Texas 	
RCN Telecom Services, Inc.
Southwestern Bell Corporation
Telecommunication Resellers Association 

SBC Communications Inc, Southwestern Bell Telephone Company
Southwestern Bell Communications Services 
271 Application to provide In-region, InterLATA services in Texas
CC Docket No. 00-4

Comments


Adelphia Business Solutions (Adelphia)
Allegiance Telecom, Inc.  (Allegiance)
Alliance for Public Technology
Association for Local Telecommunications Services (ALTS)
AT&T Corp. (AT&T)
Bluestar Communications  (Bluestar)
Campaign for Telecommunications Access and 33 Participating Companies
CCCTX, Inc. d/b/a Connect
CLEC Coalition
Communications Workers of America
Competitive Telecommunications Association
COVAD Communications Company
Department of Justice
DSL, Inc.
E.spire Communications, Inc.
Global Crossing
IP Communications
KMC Telecom Inc.
MCI WorldCom, Inc.
Metromedia Fiber Network Services, Inc.
National ALEC Association/Prepaid Communications Association
NorthPoint Communications, Inc.
Pilgrim Telephone, Inc.
Public Utilities Commission of Texas
Rhythms Net
Sprint Communications Co.
Telecommunications Resellers Association
Texas Office of Public Utility Counsel (Texas OPC)
Z-Tel Communications Inc.








SBC Communications Inc, Southwestern Bell Telephone Company
Southwestern Bell Communications Services 
271 Application to provide In-region, InterLATA services in Texas
CC Docket No. 00-4

Reply Comments

Allegiance Telecom, Inc.  (Allegiance)
Association of Directory Publishers
Association for Local Telecommunications Services (ALTS)
AT&T Corp. (AT&T)
BellSouth
Bluestar Communications  (Bluestar)
Campaign for Telecommunications Access and 57 Participating Companies
CCCTX, Inc. d/b/a Connect and Focal Communications 
CLEC Coalition
Communications Workers of America
Competition Policy Institution
Competitive Telecommunications Association
Consumer Federation of America
COVAD Communications Company
Department of Justice
Global Crossing
IP Communications
MCI WorldCom, Inc.
Metromedia Fiber Network Services, Inc.
North Point Communications
Public Utilities Commissions of Texas
Rhythms Net Connections Inc.
SBC
Sprint Communications Co.
Texas Internet Service Providers Association

APPENDIX B
Overview of SWBTs OSS Operations.
1. The process of obtaining resold local services or unbundled network elements 
from SWBT begins with the submissions of a Local Service Request (LSR) by a competing 
carrier.  Upon the submission of an LSR, there are a series of transaction that must take place 
between SWBT and the competing carrier to ensure that the order is completed on time and in 
the manner contemplated by the competing carrier.  For example, SWBT must inform a 
competing carrier of the status of the order as it progresses through its system, and a new entrant 
must have a means of notifying SWBT if the service or network element is not properly installed. 
 Competing carriers may submit LSRs and conduct the various other transactions associated with 
obtaining service or network elements from SWBT through either manual or electronic access to 
SWBTs OSS.  Manual access means that the competing carrier may place an order via facsimile 
and monitor the status of an order by placing a phone call to SWBT.  Electronic access, in 
contrast, means that information is exchanged, and transactions are conducted, between SWBT 
and the competing carrier through the use of electronic interfaces.  
2. SWBT provides competing carriers with access to six primary electronic 
interfaces to access its pre-ordering, ordering and provisioning, maintenance and repair, and 
billing functions.   These interfaces are either application-to-application interfaces or graphical 
user interfaces (GUIs).  Application-to-application interfaces are based on industry guidelines 
and require software development by both SWBT and the competing carrier.  An application-to-
application interface may be integrated with the competing carriers own ordering systems, 
thereby allowing it to control how the application appears to its own sales representatives.  A 
GUI interface, in contract, is a proprietary interface that may not be integrated with the 
competing carriers own systems.  Thus, when a competing carrier obtains information from 
SWBTs GUI-based interfaces, it must retype that information into its own systems.
3. Pre-Ordering.  Before placing an actual order for service, a competing carrier can 
obtain pre-ordering information from SWBT that assists the competing carriers negotiations 
with its end-user customer.   Such preordering information, which is often accessed while the 
customer is on the line, typically includes a customers address and service history, services and 
features available to that customer, telephone numbers, and dates that various services and 
facilities required by the competing carrier will be available.   Competitive carriers can exchange 
preordering information with SWBT by sending a request manually, or by using one or more of 
SWBTs four electronic interfaces that provide access to SWBTs pre-ordering capabilities:  
Easy Access Sales Environment (EASE) for resale services,   DataGate,  Verigate,   and 
Electronic Data Interchange (EDI)/CORBA interface.  
4. Ordering and Provisioning.  Using the information obtained in the pre-ordering 
process, the competing carrier submits a Local Service Request (LSR) using any of four 
electronic interfaces for access to SWBTs OSS ordering/provisioning capabilities:  EASE, 
Southwestern Order Retrieval and Distribution (SORD);  Local service request EXchange 
(LEX);  or SWBTs EDI Gateway.   SWBT reports that, as of the filing date of this application, 
seven carriers were using EDI for ordering and another 15 have tentatively scheduled production 
in the first quarter of 2000.   For those competing LECs that do not choose to utilize an 
electronic interface for ordering, SWBT also accepts service requests by facsimile, courier, U.S. 
Mail, or telephone.  Such manually-submitted LSRs would be processed by a SWBT Local 
Service Center  (LSC) service representative.   
5. Before an actual service order is created in SWBT's systems, the LSR submitted 
by a competing carrier through LEX or EDI must pass a set of edits that check for valid data 
entries and formats, as well as for agreement between various data fields.   An LSR requesting 
unbundled network elements enters through SWBTs EDI Gateway to Local Access Service 
Request (LASR), which edits the LSR for the validity of data and conditions.   If the LSR fails 
the LASR edits, LASR electronically returns an error message to the competing LEC via LEX or 
the EDI Gateway, and the competing LEC must correct the error and resubmit the LSR.   Once a 
service request passes the LASR edits, LASR sends the LSR to FOLDERS,  SLR/Decision 
Support System (DSS),  and to the Mechanized Order Generator (MOG) if the order is MOG-
eligible.  
6. An LSR is MOG-eligible if SWBTs systems are supposed to generate a service 
order automatically, without manual intervention.   Upon receiving a MOG-eligible order, MOG 
performs another series of edits and attempts to create a service order.   If MOG cannot create a 
mechanical service order because of a fatal error, the LASR electronically returns an error 
message to the requesting LEC.   As with a LASR fatal error, the requesting LEC must correct 
the error and resend the LSR.  If MOG cannot create a service order because of a non-fatal error, 
LASR sends the LSR to the MOG error report in FOLDERS and LSR/DSS, and the LSR falls out 
for manual processing by an LSC service representative for creation of a manually-generated 
reject notice.  
7. If the LSR fails LASR or MOG fatal edits, SWBT returns a reject notification on 
LSRs submitted via LEX or EDI.  When an LSR falls out because of a SORD error or non-fatal 
MOG error, a SWBT local service representative manually inputs a reject notification into LASR 
GUI to produce an electronic notification via LEX or EDI.   SWBT sends jeopardy notices to the 
requesting carrier in the same manner. 
8.  If the LSR passes all LASR and MOG edits, MOG creates a service order which 
is sent to Service Order Retrieval and Distribution (SORD) for processing.  SORD performs 
additional edits which may also cause an order to drop out for manual processing.    Once an 
order successfully flows through SORD, SORD distributes the orders to the appropriate back-
office system.  Once an order reaches SWBTs back office systems, it is mixed in and processed 
along with SWBT retail orders.   When all orders for a request are created and distributed 
through SORD, SWBT returns a Firm Order Confirmation (FOC) to the competing LEC.  
9. The FOC contains critical information such as the assigned telephone number and 
the date on which the service will be installed.  If SWBT is unable to fulfill the order by the date 
confirmed on the FOC, it will send either an electronic or manual jeopardy notice to the 
competing carrier.   Electronic jeopardy notification via LEX or EDI is limited to jeopardy 
situations relating to no facilities available.   In all other jeopardy situations, SWBT will 
manually input the jeopardy code into LASR GUI, which then sends an electronic notification to 
the competing carrier via LEX or EDI.   A manual jeopardy notice is sent for reasons such as 
additional information is needed with respect tot he service address or a SWBT technician 
attempting to install the service cannot obtain access to the premises (i.e., no access). 
10. After an order is successfully entered into SORD, SWBT begins the process of 
provisioning the order, or activating the requested service or feature, which may involve 
assigning facilities, updating translations in a switch, and dispatching technicians.  An order 
flows from SORD to the Service Order Analysis and Control (SOAC) system which controls the 
progress of service orders through the provisioning process by distributing the service order to 
other necessary provisioning systems and updating SORD.  From the SOAC, most orders flow 
automatically through the assignment systems, including the Loop Facility Assignment and 
Control System (LFACS), where the appropriate facilities are assigned or reserved for the order.  
Technicians at the central office receive the order and perform any wiring work associated with 
the order.  Orders that require work performed outside are sent via Trunk Integrated Record 
Keeping System (TIRKS) to the Work Force Administration (WFA) systems for dispatch of a 
field technician.  Once the work for the service order is physically completed, a Service Order 
Completion (SOC) notification is sent to the competing carrier.  
11. A competing carrier can monitor  the status of an order using SWBTs 
Provisioning Order Status (POS), which provides a read-only view of the current provisioning 
status for pending service orders.   In addition, SWBT s Order Status, a graphical user interface 
application available to competing carriers from the SWBTs Toolbar.     Order Status displays 
the status of orders relative to the SORD distribution process and enables competing carriers to 
check the status of service orders, view a service order, verify that a service order has been 
completed, or verify that a pending service order has been posted.   The Order remains in 
Originating (O) status until the date the order is physically completed.  Once the work is 
physically completed, the order is sent over SORD distribution, which puts the order into 
Completion (C) status.  
12. SWBT sends a Service Order Completion notice (SOC) when SWBT has 
completed the provisioning work associated with an order.   The SOC is sent to the carrier over 
the EDI interface if the order was submitted via EDI, and over the LEX interface if the order was 
submitted via LEX.  Carriers using EASE for ordering resale services do not receive order 
completion notices.  While the SOC represents notification that provisioning has been 
completed, it is not a notice that the billing systems, or the maintenance and repair systems, have 
actually been updated.  Indeed, the SOC actually is issued before the order is posted to SWBTs 
billing systems, and before the maintenance and repair systems are updated to allow the 
competing LEC full access. 
13. UNE-P Three-Order Process.  As explained above, at a certain point in the 
ordering process, SWBT transforms a competing carriers order (either automatically or 
manually) into one or more service orders which perform different functions in SWBTs down-
stream provisioning and billing systems.  For most resale services and unbundled network 
elements (e.g., an order for a new loop), a single service order is created.  SWBT uses a three-
order process, however, for UNE-P migrations:  a D order, to disconnect and remove the 
customer from the retail billing systems; a C order, to initiate service and add the customer to a 
different billing system; and an N order, to migrate the directory and E911 listings to the 
competing LEC.   The provisioning function for UNE-P migration orders is performed by the 
D and C orders.  SWBT explains that, for its UNE-P provisioning process to perform as 
designed, these two orders must proceed in tandem.  A related order field on each of these 
orders is used to keep these orders together.  This field is populated automatically on service 
orders created mechanically but, for service orders that are typed manually by SWBT personnel 
(i.e., that do not flow through), SWBT personnel must remember to type this field manually.
14. SWBT explains that orders nonetheless become disassociated under two 
circumstances.  First, SWBT may simply fail to populate the related order field on service 
orders that are typed manually, causing the D and C orders to be processed as stand-alone 
orders.   Because the vast majority of UNE-P orders flow through SWBTs systems without 
such manual handling,  however, we note that few orders run the risk of this mistake.  Second, 
SWBTs system is designed to override the related order field (and thus to disassociate the 
orders) if the address on the C order is not identical to the address on the D order.   The 
address on the C order is the address provided by the carrier and has passed through edits to 
ensure that it is consistent with the PREMIS address databese.  The address on the D order is 
taken from the CRIS address database.  
15. There appear to be two different reasons why the C and D orders would 
contain different addresses  neither of which would be detected until the provisioning stage.  
First, the discrepancy may stem from a mismatch between the addresses contained in the 
PREMIS database and the CRIS database.  Competing LECs explain that, for certain orders, they 
have found that the address verified by the PREMIS database is not consistent with the address 
contained in CRIS.   SWBT does not dispute that mismatches exist between its PREMIS and 
CRIS databases.   That SWBTs internal databases contain inconsistencies is not fatal to its 
application:  we note that database inconsistencies may affect SWBTs retail operations as well.  
It is the fact that these inconsistencies result in rejections, delays and service outages, however, 
that causes us concern.
16. A second reason for an address mismatch between D and C orders is that a 
carrier may enter the wrong address on its order (e.g., 4 Elm Street, rather than 44 Elm Street).  
This type of mistake will not be detected until the provisioning stage because the mechanized 
PREMIS edits only check the address listed on the order, and do not verify that the address 
matches the customers name and telephone number.   While this mistake necessarily would 
derive from a competing LECs typographical error, we believe that the failure of SWBTs OSS 
edits to detect such a mistake places a heavy burden on competing LECs to pre-edit their 
orders to ensure that they are accurate.  Indeed, we note that this type of name/address mismatch 
would not be likely to occur on SWBTs retail side.  The system used by SWBT for the bulk of 
its retail orders, EASE, contains detailed up-front address edits that would detect these 
name/address mismatches.  We thus disagree with SWBT that competing carriers are to blame 
for these order disassociations and resultant service outages.
17. Maintenance and Repair.  SWBT provides competing carriers with several options 
for requesting maintenance and reporting trouble for resold local services sand unbundled 
network elements.  If a competing carriers customer experiences service disruptions, the carrier 
can call the LOC where a customer service representative enters a trouble report into SWBTs 
Enhanced Customer Report System (ECRS), which interfaces with SWBTs back-office systems 
involved in maintenance and repair.   The customer service representative then performs a 
mechanized line test (MLT) and provides the results to the competing LEC, along with a due date 
for service repair. 
18. A competing carrier can also create and monitor trouble tickets, access trouble 
history for a line, and request/initiate a test of the customers circuit by submitting electronic 
inquiries through SWBTs proprietary graphic user interface, Toolbar Trouble Administration 
(TBTA),  or through SWBTs Electronic Bonding Trouble Administration Interface (EBTA), an 
application-to-application interface.  The TBTA electronic interface offers the competing carrier 
the same capabilities as SWBTs retail ECRS, the system SWBT retail representatives utilize for 
maintenance and repair activity. TBTA provides competing carriers with the ability to issue 
trouble reports, request and receive MLTs for POTS services and POTS-like UNE combinations 
without initiating a trouble report,  check status on an opened trouble report, obtain trouble  
histories, view a list of open trouble reports, and view a list of closed trouble reports within the 
last 120 days.   Using the TBTA, a competing carrier can issue a trouble report without manual 
intervention.  EBTA offers the same capabilities as ECRS and TBTA, with the exception of 
checking trouble history and viewing the lists of open and closed trouble reports.   Both of these 
electronic interfaces flow into SWBTs back end systems.    
19. Billing.  In order for competing carriers to bill their customers, SWBT provides 
carriers with usage billing information and a process for adjusting or correcting invalid or 
incorrect data.   SWBT provides competing carriers with a choice of five options for obtaining 
electronic access to billing information:  Bill Plus;  EDI for billing;  Carrier Access Billing 
System (CABS); Bill Data Tape (BDT) for UNEs;  Bill Information;  and Usage Extract feed.  
 These interfaces can be used to view SWBTs bill to competitive LECs and specific information 
available from these interfaces can also be used by a competing carrier to bill its end user 
customers.   In addition, SWBT makes available to competing carriers that are reselling SWBT 
products or services, its Customer Record Information System (CRIS), the system SWBT uses to 
bill its own retail products to residential and business customers and create bills for competitive 
LECs.    Competing carriers can also utilize CRIS to bill a few UNE-related services such as 
Interim Number Portability and operator-handled calls. 

CONCURRING STATEMENT OF COMMISSIONER HAROLD W. 
FURCHTGOTT-ROTH

In the Matter of Application by SBC Communications Inc., Southwestern Bell Telephone 
Company, and Southwestern Bell Communications Services, Inc. 
d/b/a Southwestern Bell Long Distance 
Pursuant to Section 271 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996
 To Provide In-Region, InterLATA Services in Texas, CC Docket No. 00-65


I concur in the decision to grant this application by Southwestern Bell Telephone 
Company (SWBT) to provide in-region, inter-LATA services in the State of Texas.  I write 
separately, however, in order to apply my understanding of the statute. 

Application of Sections 251, 252, and 271

As I explained in the decision on Bell Atlantics application to offer long distance service 
in New York, the relationship between the regulatory approval process under section 271 and the 
procedures regarding private interconnection agreements established by sections 251 and 252 is a 
critical one.   Unfortunately, the Commission has not paid close attention to this relationship, and 
its failure to do so has caused the section 271 review process to morph into something quite 
different from the original statutory plan.  The process has turned into a general federal 
regulatory scheme, instead of tracking the contract-based, State-centric model of sections 251, 
252, and 271.  See generally Concurring Statement of Commissioner Harold W. Furchtgott-Roth, 
In the Matter of Application by Bell Atlantic New York for Authorization Under Section 271 of 
the Communications Act to Provide In-Region, InterLATA Service in the State of New York, CC 
Docket No. 99-295 (rel. Dec. 22, 1999) (New York Statement). 

I will briefly reiterate those points that pertain to my analysis here.  First, the text of 
section 271 makes clear that the relevant universe of BOC conduct to be tested in a Track A 
application is not its commercial performance generally, as the Order supposes, but its fulfillment 
of specific interconnection agreements:

With respect to a BOC that "is providing access and interconnection pursuant to one or 
more agreements described in paragraph (1)(A)," as here, it is "such access and 
interconnection [that must] meet[] the requirements of" the competitive
checklist. Id. section 271(c)(2)(A) (emphasis added). Similarly, the statute defines the 
Commissions administrative task under Track A as determining whether the petitioning 
BOC "with respect to access and interconnection provided pursuant to
subsection c(1)(A) has fully implemented the checklist." Id. section 271(d)(3)(A)(i).

New York Statement at para. 6.

Second, in analyzing the RBOCs fulfillment of the checklist under its approved 
interconnection agreements, one should consider the existence of complaints to enforce those 
agreements filed by interconnecting parties with the State Commission.  If CLECs are receiving 
seriously inadequate service under those agreements, one would expect to see them invoke the 
rights and remedies guaranteed to them by sections 251 and 252, including the right to arbitration 
and federal court review.   Accordingly, it has seemed to me that

the most probative evidence of compliance with the checklist  perhaps even prima facie 
proof -- is the absence of disputes arising under section 252 contracts. Conversely, the 
best evidence of noncompliance is the presence of such disputes. Record documentation 
of these disputes, such as complaints filed with State Commissions pursuant to section 
252, would only strengthen that showing.

Id. at para. 23.

In sum, the best case for noncompliance with section 271 under Track A is to be made by 
parties:  (1) with approved interconnection agreements described in section 271(c)(1)(A); (2) 
who legitimately allege that the RBOC is not providing them service pursuant to the actual terms 
and conditions of those agreements; and (3) who have pursued those alleged violations with State 
Commissions pursuant to section 252.

On this record, we have evidence that approaches, but does not meet, this standard.  
Covad Communications, which opposes the instant application, receives interconnection and 
access from SWBT pursuant to a final, Track A interconnection agreement that was arbitrated 
and approved under section 252.  And that agreement appears to provide for the non-
discriminatory provisioning of x-DSL capable loops to Covad.  See Ex Parte Submission of 
Covad Communications (June 27, 2000) (attaching interconnection agreement on DSL).  So far, 
so good.
 
That interconnection agreement, however, was not finalized and operative until February 
of this year.  Although Covad points to findings by Texas arbitrators related to discriminatory 
provisioning of loops by SWBT, those findings were not made in the context of a controversy 
arising under a section 252 contract  that is, in a dispute over the adequacy of SWBTs service 
under the terms of an existing interconnection agreement.  Rather, they were made in the context 
of a petition for arbitration to establish an interconnection agreement and terms thereunder with 
SWBT.   Covad never alleged a breach of performance under a Track A agreement, at the State 
Commission or anywhere else, and the arbitrators findings do not go to SWBTs actual 
performance of an agreement but to the proper drafting of a future agreement.  Such findings, 
then, are not probative of a failure to provide access and interconnection pursuant to a Track A 
agreement. 

AT&T, which also takes service from SWBT under an approved interconnection 
agreement, also opposes the grant of this application.  It argues in this proceeding that SWBT is, 
in various ways, violating the terms and conditions of its interconnection agreement.  See Ex 
Parte Submission of AT&T (June 23, 2000).  For example, AT&T says that SWBT is 
discriminating against it in the provision of unbundled, DSL-capable loops obtained as part of 
the UNE-platform, and that this conduct violates the non-discrimination and other provisions of 
their agreement and section 251.  See id. at page 2 (citing section 55.1 of agreement, providing 
that [a]t the request of AT&T and pursuant to the requirements of the Act, SWBT will offer . . . 
Network Elements to AT&T on an unbundled basis on rates, terms, and conditions set forth in 
this Agreement that are just, reasonable, and non-discriminatory).  Thus, AT&T well 
demonstrated that the conduct that it alleges as a problem under section 271 is conduct to which 
its interconnection agreement directly speaks.  Again, so far so good.

What AT&T has not done, however, is adduce evidence that it has sought enforcement of 
its contractual right to nondiscrimination with the State Commission.  Like Covad, it has 
participated in hearings regarding the content of new, not-yet-entered-into interconnection 
agreements.  See AT&T Ex Parte Submission (June 27, 2000).  But the record does not reflect 
that AT&T has ever asserted that SWBTs provision of access and interconnection under an 
operative agreement was in breach.  As with respect to Covad, there is no showing here that 
AT&T has ever attempted to enforce its contractual rights.

As noted above, CLEC action to enforce an alleged breach of an interconnection 
agreement is evidence of significantly inadequate provisioning of access and interconnection 
under section 252 contracts, which, as I read section 271, is the relevant universe of access and 
interconnection  Accordingly, while both Covad and AT&T make legitimate points here, I still 
view with skepticism assertions of inadequate BOC performance lodged for the first time in the 
section 271 approval process.  Concurring Statement, New York Order.  That is what we have 
with respect to both Covad and AT&T, and I thus find no record evidence of failure by SWBT to 
perform as required under the terms of section 252 contracts.

SBC/Ameritech Merger Conditions

As I stated at the time of the Commissions approval of SBC and Ameritechs application 
to transfer licenses and authorizations under sections 309 and 214 of the Communications Act, I 
believe that some of the conditions applied to the license transfer conflict with specific sections 
of the Act.  In particular, I believe that 

of especial legal concern are those related to carrier-to-carrier promotions.  These 
conditions limit the number of services and facilities that may be offered to competitive 
local exchange carriers (CLECs) on a promotional basis. Once the caps are reached, some 
CLECs will be unable to obtain the same promotional deals as other CLECs. Quite 
simply, carrier-to-carrier promotions will not be available on an equal basis to all 
requesting carriers.  In this way, then, the conditions violate the "nondiscriminatory 
access" requirement of section 251(c)(3), as well as the resale non-discrimination 
requirement of 251(c)(4)(B).

Moreover, the caps directly conflict with the "pick-and-choose" provision of section 252. 
Section 252(i) requires incumbent LECs to "make available [to a CLEC] any . . . service, 
or network element" provided to any other CLEC "upon the same terms and conditions," 
regardless of the level of offering to others. For the reasons given above, the guarantee of 
that section will be unfulfilled as a result of the caps.

Apart from the caps themselves, the underlying discounts on loop rates also offend 
sections 252(i) and 251(c)(3).  These discounts discriminate among CLECs -- in terms of 
prices and offerings -- by creating a situation in which a CLEC that uses an ILEC's 
unbundled switch gets one rate for the loop, but a CLEC that uses its own switch gets a 
discount on the very same loop. 

Separate Statement of Commissioner Harold W. Furchtgott-Roth, Concurring in Part and 
Dissenting in Part, In re Applications of Ameritech Corp., Transferor, and SBC Communications 
Inc., Transferee, CC Docket No. 98-141 (rel. Oct. 8, 1999).

	I personally solicited further comment on the effect of these merger conditions on 
SWBTs section 271 application.  See Separate Statement of Commissioner Harold W. 
Furchtgott-Roth, In the Matter of Application by SBC Communications Inc., Southwestern Bell 
Telephone Company, and Southwestern Bell Communications Services, Inc. d/b/a Southwestern 
Bell Long Distance Pursuant to Section 271 of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 To Provide In-Region, InterLATA Services In Texas, CC 
Docket No. 00-4 (rel. April 6, 2000).  

Some parties addressed this issue.  See Comments of AT&T at 62-64.  As I review the 
record, no party submitted information revelatory of the actual effects of the loop discounts 
required in the Commissions merger Order.  Specifically, the record is ambiguous as to whether 
the cap has been reached or not; and if the cap has not been reached, then price discrimination is, 
at this point in time, just a theoretical possibility.  If, in future long distance applications, a party 
can show that the cap has been reached and differential prices are actually being charged, this 
issue would be live and I would be most willing to pursue it further.  At this point, however, the 
record does not support it. 

*	*	*

	Because I believe that SBWT is providing access and interconnection pursuant to Track 
A agreements as required by those contracts, which in turn incorporate rights available to CLECs 
under sections 251 and 252, I concur in the grant of its application to offer long distance service 
in Texas.

 	47 U.S.C.  271.  Section 271 was added by the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 
Stat. 56 (1996), codified at 47 U.S.C.  151 et seq.  We refer to the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, as 
the Communications Act or the Act.  We refer to the Telecommunications Act of 1996 as the 1996 Act. 	
 	Application by SBC Communications Inc., Southwestern Bell Telephone Company, and Southwestern Bell 
Communications Services, Inc. d/b/a Southwestern Bell Long Distance for Provision of In-Region, InterLATA 
Services in Texas, CC Docket No. 00-65 (filed Apr. 5, 2000) (SWBT Texas I Application); see Comments 
Requested on Application by SBC Communications Inc. for Authorization Under Section 271 of the 
Communications Act to Provide In-Region, InterLATA Service in the State of Texas (CC Docket No. 00-65), Public 
Notice, DA No. 00-750  (rel. Apr. 6, 2000).  Unless an affidavit or appendix reference is included, all citations to the 
SWBT Application refer to SWBTs Brief in Support of Application by Southwestern Bell for Provision of In-
Region, InterLATA Services in Texas.  References to all affidavits or other sources contained in the appendices 
submitted by SWBT are initially cited to the Appendix, Volume, and Tab number indicating the location of the 
source in the record.  Subsequent citations to affidavits are cited by the affiant's name, e.g., SWBT Dysart Aff.  
Comments on the current application are cited by party name, e.g., ALTS Comments.  Documents, such as 
affidavits and declarations, submitted by commenters are cited by the affiant's name and the party submitting the 
affidavit, e.g., AT&T Rhinehart Aff., Covad Goodpastor Decl.  A list of parties that submitted comments or 
replies is set forth in Appendix A. 
 	See Application by SBC Communications Inc., Southwestern Bell Telephone Company, and Southwestern Bell 
Communications Services, Inc. d/b/a Southwestern Bell Long Distance for Provision of In-Region, InterLATA 
Services in Texas, CC Docket No. 00-4 (filed Jan. 10, 2000) (SWBT Texas II Application); see Comments 
Requested on Application by SBC Communications Inc. for Authorization Under Section 271 of the 
Communications Act to Provide In-Region, InterLATA Service in the State of Texas (CC Docket No. 00-4), Public 
Notice, DA No. 00-37  (rel. Jan. 10, 2000).
 	See Letter from James D. Ellis, Paul K. Mancini, Martin E. Grambow, Counsel for SBC Communications Inc., 
to Magalie Roman Salas, Secretary, FCC (dated Apr. 5, 2000) (SBC Apr. 5, 2000 Ex Parte Letter) at 2; see also 
Application by SBC Communications Inc., Southwestern Bell Telephone Company, and Southwestern Bell 
Communications Services, Inc. d/b/a Southwestern Bell Long Distance for Provision of In-Region InterLATA 
Services in Texas, CC Docket No. 00-4, FCC 00-124, Order (rel. Apr. 6. 2000) (SWBT Texas I Withdrawal Order) 
(granting SWBTs request to withdraw its January 10 Application and to initiate a new application pursuant to 
section 271 based on the existing record in CC Docket 00-4 and the new information provided by SBC in its April 5 
filing).
 	SWBT Texas II Reply, App. A-4, Vol. 1, Tab 3, Reply Affidavit of John S. Habeeb (SWBT Texas II Habeeb 
Reply Aff.), Attach. A (reporting 58,704 stand-alone unbundled loops and 243, 922 UNE loop/port combinations 
through March 2000).
 	Id. (reporting resale of 157,700 business lines and 191,040 residential lines through March 2000). Parties to this 
proceeding dispute SWBTs methodology for estimating the number of facilities-based lines that are served by 
competitors (through means other than resale or unbundled loops).  Most, however seem to agree that, at a minimum, 
several hundred thousand access lines are served this way, primarily for business customers in urban areas.
 	Department of Justice Texas I Evaluation at 9 (estimating 840,000  890,000 competitive LEC lines compared 
with 9.6 million SWBT retail lines). 
 	SWBT Texas II Habeeb Reply Aff. Attach. A (reporting 6,978 unbundled loops to xDSL service providers 
through March 2000).
 	Letter from Austin C. Schlick, Kellogg, Huber, Hansen, Todd & Evans, P.L.L.C., to Magalie Roman Salas, 
Esq., Secretary, Federal Communications Commission, CC Docket No. 00-4 at Tab 5 (filed Apr. 21, 2000) (SWBT 
Apr. 21 Ex Parte Letter) (reporting deployment of 36,000 ADSL lines in Texas during the six-month period from 
October 1999 through March 2000); see also SWBT Texas II Brown Reply Aff. (anticipating monthly volume of 
9,000 ADSL orders for SWBTs advanced services affiliate in Texas by June 2000).
 	See Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced Telecommunications Capability and Implementation of 
the Local Competition Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Third Report and Order in CC Docket 
No. 98-147, Fourth Report and Order in CC Docket No. 96-98, FCC 99-355, paras. 4-5 (rel. Dec. 9, 1999) (Line 
Sharing Order).
 	SWBT Texas II Habeeb Reply Aff. Attach. A; SWBT Texas II Application, App., Vol. A, Tab 1, Affidavit of 
John S. Habeeb (SWBT Texas II Habeeb Aff.), Attach. A (reflecting monthly order totals of 1160 loops in January, 
1489 loops in February, and 2166 loops in March).
 	SWBT Texas II Habeeb Reply Aff. Attach. A; SWBT Texas II Habeeb Aff. Attach. A (reflecting monthly order 
totals of 23,338 lines in January, 32,997 lines in February, and 40,750 lines in March).
 	WorldCom, Inc. Texas II Reply at 1.  WorldCom, Inc. changed its corporate name from MCI WorldCom, Inc. 
effective May 1, 2000.  Id. at n.1.  AT&T reported capturing 130,000 local phone customers in Texas over UNE-P 
through March 2000, which represents greater than half of the UNE-P lines served by competitive carriers in Texas.  
AT&T Reports Flat Earnings, Lowers Growth Estimates, Communications Daily (May 3, 2000). 
 	See, e.g., Bell Atlantic-New York Authorization Under Section 271 of the Communications Act to Provide In-
Region, InterLATA Service in the State of New York, File No. EB-00-IH-0085, Order, 15 FCC Rcd 5413, 5414 
(2000) (adopting consent decree after investigation into potential violations of section 271 after grant of in-region, 
interLATA authority).
 	47 U.S.C.  271(d)(6)(A)(iii).
 	We note here that, for the provision of international services, a U.S. carrier must separately receive section 214 
authorization from the Commission.  See 47 U.S.C.  214; see also Streamlining the International Section 214 
Authorization Process and Tariff Requirements, Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd 12884 (1996); Rules and Policies 
on Foreign Participation in the U.S. Telecommunications Market, Report and Order and Order on Reconsideration, 
12 FCC Rcd 23891 (1997), recon. pending.  This requirement applies notwithstanding a BOCs approval under 
section 271 for the provision of in-region, interLATA service originating in a particular state.
 	See 47 U.S.C.  271.
 	Id.  271(d)(3).
 	Id.  271(d)(3)(A).  The critical, market-opening provisions of section 251 are incorporated into the competitive 
checklist found in section 271.  See id.  251; see also Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996, CC Docket No. 96-98, 11 FCC Rcd 15499 (1996) (Local Competition First 
Report and Order), affd in part and vacated in part sub nom, Competitive Telecommunications Assn v. FCC, 117 
F.3d 1068 (8th Cir. 1997) and Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC, 120 F.3d 753 (8th Cir. 1997), affd in part and remanded, 
AT&T v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366 (1999).
 	47 U.S.C.  271(d)(3)(B).
 	Id.  271(d)(3)(C).
 	Id.  271(d)(3); see SBC Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 138 F.3d 410, 413, 416 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
 	47 U.S.C.  271(d)(2)(A).
 	Id.  271(d)(2)(B).
 	Bell Atlantic New York Order 15 FCC Rcd at 3962, para. 20; Application of Ameritech Michigan Pursuant to 
Section 271 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended,  CC Docket No. 97-137, 12 FCC Rcd 20543, 20559-
60 (1997) (Ameritech Michigan Order).  As the D.C. Circuit has held,  [A]lthough the Commission must consult 
with the state commissions, the statute does not require the Commission to give State Commissions views any 
particular weight.  SBC Communications v. FCC, 138 F.3d at 416.
 	Ameritech Michigan Order, 12 FCC Rcd at 20560; SBC Communications v. FCC, 138 F.3d at 416-17.
  	Bell Atlantic New York Order 15 FCC Rcd at 3962, para. 20.
  	Id.
 	Texas Commission Texas I Comments at 2.
 	Texas Commission Texas I Comments at 2.
 	Texas Commission Texas I Comments at 2.
 	Texas Commission Texas I Comments at 2.
 	During the collaborative process, the staff of the Texas Commission worked with SWBT and competing carriers 
to develop a comprehensive set of performance measures and business rules that are intended to capture whether 
SWBT is providing nondiscriminatory service to competing carriers.  The Texas Commission also approved a 
performance remedy plan that is intended to provide financial incentives for SWBT to maintain an open market and 
prevent backsliding.  Pursuant to the Plan, SWBT must compensate either competing carriers or the Texas 
Treasury for noncompliance performance in connection with particular performance measurements.  Texas 
Commission Texas I Comments at 3-4.
 	Texas Commission Texas I Comments at 3.
 	Texas Commission Texas I Comments at 5-6.
 	Texas Commission Texas I Comments at 5.
 	Telcordia issued two reports on the operational readiness of SWBTs OSS.  In its initial report, Telcordia 
presented the results of its functionality and capacity testing and identified issues that warranted further review.  
Texas Commission Comments at 30-31.  The issues identified by Telcordia in its initial report formed the basis of a 
re-test plan.  Id.  Following the completion of a retest, Telcordia issued a final report.   Telcordia Technologies, The 
Public Utility Commission of Texas Southwestern Bell OSS Readiness Report (Sept. 1999) (Telcordia Final Report), 
SWBT Ham Texas I Aff., Attach. A.  Although in its final report, Telcordia concluded that SWBTs OSS were 
operationally ready, it highlighted seven areas in which the Texas Commission should focus to remove service-
affecting issues.  Id. at ES-1, 7.  Specifically, Telcordia recommended: (1) the revision of certain procedures for 
scalability forecasting; (2) the implementation of eleven new performance measures; (3) that the Texas Commission 
expeditiously resolve thirty issues that were identified during the retest; (4) increased automation of the performance 
measure reporting process; (5) increased data security and auditability; (6) confirmation of the effectiveness of 
SWBTs procedures for ordering xDSL-capable loops; and (7) further training for SWBT and competing carriers to 
improve the understanding and use of SWBTs standard methods and procedures.   Id.  After Telcordias final report 
was issued, the Texas Commission worked further with SWBT and competing carriers to resolve the seven issues 
identified in Telcordias final report.  Texas Commission Texas I Comments at 31-32.
 	Telcordia Final Report at 7.
 	Texas Commission Texas I Comments at 7.
 	The supplemental filing included a brief and eight affidavits.  According to SWBT, this new evidence is 
intended to respond to issues and arguments that emerged during the course of the January 10 proceeding subsequent 
to the submission of reply comments on February 22.  SWBT Texas II Application at 1.
 	Letter from James D. Ellis, Paul K. Mancini, Martin E. Grambow, Counsel for SBC Communications Inc., to 
Magalie Roman Salas, Secretary, FCC (dated Apr. 5, 2000) (SBC Apr. 5, 2000 Ex Parte Letter) at 2.
 	Id.
 	See SWBT Texas I Withdrawal Order.
 	The Evaluation of the Public Utility Commission of Texas, CC Docket No. 00-4 (filed Jan. 31,  2000) (Texas 
Commission Texas I Comments).
 	The Evaluation of the Public Utility Commission of Texas, CC Docket No. 00-65 (filed Apr. 26, 2000) (Texas 
Commission Texas II Comments).
 	Texas Commission Texas I Comments at 1.
 	Texas Commission Texas I Comments at 95.
 	Texas Commission Texas I Comments at 10-90.
 	Texas Commission Texas II Comments at 11, 34, 36; see also infra note 55 and accompanying text.
 	Texas Commission Texas II Comments at 1.
 	Id.
 	Evaluation of the United States Department of Justice, CC Docket No. 00-4 (filed Feb. 14, 2000) (Department 
of Justice Texas I Evaluation). 
 	In its evaluation, the Department of Justice concluded that, although SWBT had shown substantial progress in 
opening its local markets to competition, it failed to satisfy the requirements of section 271 in the critical area of 
providing unbundled loops.   Department of Justice Texas I Evaluation at 2.  Specifically, the Department of Justice 
found that SWBTs performance was deficient with respect to providing unbundled loops for advanced services and 
coordinated conversions, or hot cuts.  Id. at 2-3.  In addition to its findings with respect to xDSL and hot cuts, the 
Department of Justice expressed concern about some of the evidence presented by SWBT to demonstrate 
compliance with other section 271 requirements.  For example, the Department of Justice noted that there was 
insufficient evidence in the record to determine whether SWBT could provide interconnection trunks in a timely 
manner, and whether carriers could compete effectively using the UNE-platform.   Id. at 44-49 (interconnection), 49-
53 (UNE-platform).  The Department of Justice recommended that the Commission defer judgment on these issues 
until additional commercial data is available.  Id. at 52-53.  Moreover, the Department of Justice stated that the OSS 
test performed by Telcordia had significant limitations.  In particular, the Department of Justice noted that, due to its 
limited scope and depth, the Telcordia test does not provide evidence that SBC provides adequate wholesale 
services overall to CLECs in Texas.  Id. at 5.
 	Evaluation of the United States Department of Justice, CC Docket No. 00-65 (filed May, 12, 2000) (Department 
of Justice Texas II May 12 Evaluation).
 	Letter from Donald J. Russell, Chief, Telecommunications Task Force, Antitrust Division, Department of 
Justice, to Magalie Roman Salas, Secretary, FCC (dated June 13, 2000) (Department of Justice Texas II Evaluation). 
 	Id. at 5.
 	Id. at 1.  For example, the Department of Justice recommends that the Commission ensure that adequate 
mechanisms exist to resolve emerging issues that will affect competition, such as DSL line sharing and SBCs 
Project Pronto.  Id. at 20.  As the Department of Justice notes, Project Pronto is an SBC network upgrade that will 
employ fiber optic cable and remote terminals to provide DSL services to customers that are out of reach to central 
office digital subscriber line access multiplexers (DSLAMS).  Id. at 7.
 	Id. at 2-8.
 	Id. at 4.
 	Id. at 8-9.
 	See 47 U.S.C.  271(d)(3).  As set forth below, we conclude that SWBT has satisfied the requirements of 
subsection (c)(1)(A) (Track A) and thus merits analysis under section 271(d)(3)(A)(i) of our rules.
 	Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 3973-74, para. 52 (Ameritech Michigan Order). 
 	American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. FCC, 978 F.2d 727 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
 	47 U.S.C.  251(d)(2).
 	See Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Third Report 
and Order and Fourth Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 15 FCC Rcd at 3696 (1999) (UNE Remand Order); 
see also Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced Telecommunications Capability and Implementation of 
the Local Competition Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Third Report and Order, and Fourth 
Report and Order, 14 FCC Rcd 20912 (1999) (Line Sharing Order).
 	The seven network elements set forth in the Local Competition Order were:  (1) local loops; (2) network 
interface devices; (3) local and tandem switching; (4) interoffice transmission facilities; (5) signaling networks and 
call-related databases; (6) operations support systems; and (7) operator services and directory assistance.  See 
Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, CC Docket No. 96-98, 
First Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd 15499 (1996) (Local Competition First Report and Order), aff'd in part and 
vacated in part sub nom. Competitive Telecommunications Ass'n v. FCC, 117 F.3d 1068 (8th Cir. 1997) and Iowa 
Utils. Bd. v. FCC, 120 F.3d 753 (8th Cir. 1997), aff'd in part and remanded, AT&T v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366 
(1999); on remand, Third Report and Order and Fourth Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 15 FCC Rcd. 3696 (1999).
 	47 C.F.R.  51.319. 
 	AT&T Corp.  v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366  (1999).  In reaching this conclusion, the Court held that the 
Commission had not adequately considered the necessary and impair standards of section 251(d)(2) in 
establishing the list of seven network elements.  Id. at 387-92.
 	UNE Remand Order at para. 526.  The order was published in the Federal Register on January 18, 2000.  See 
Revision of the Commissions Rules Specifying the Portions of the Nations Local Telephone Networks That 
Incumbent Local Telephone Companies Must Make Available to Competitors, 65 Fed. Reg. 2542 (2000).  
 	See UNE Remand Order at para 526.  The requirements that were not contained in  51.319 prior to the rule 
being vacated by the Supreme Court in Iowa Utils. Bd. became effective 120 days after publication in the Federal 
Register.  These are:  the requirement to provide access on an unbundled basis to dark fiber as set forth in  
51.319(a)(1); the requirement to provide access on an unbundled basis to subloops and inside wire as set forth in  
51.319(a)(2); the requirement to provide access on an unbundled basis to packet switching in the limited 
circumstances set forth in  51.319(c)(3)(B); the requirement to provide access on an unbundled basis to dark fiber 
transport as set forth in  51.319(d)(1)(B); the requirement to provide access on an unbundled basis to the Calling 
Name Database, 911 Database, and E911 Database as set forth in 51.319(e)(2)(A); and the requirement to provide 
access on an unbundled basis to loop qualification information as set forth in  51.319(g).  Id. n.1040.  We note that 
the T2A already contains provisions addressing many of these items.  SWBT Texas 1 Auinbauh Aff. at para. 86.
 	SWBT Texas I Application at 36-37; SWBT Texas I Auinbauh Aff. at paras. 85-86.  SWBT offers access 
through the T2A to the UNEs defined in the original rule 319.  In addition, SWBT has complied with the UNE 
Remand Orders revised rule 319 by developing revised definitions of the loop, network interface device (NID), and 
interoffice transport network elements, and making these new definitions available to competitive LECs through an 
amendment to the T2A.  Id.  
 	See section III.C.1, infra.
 	Bell Atlantic filed an application for section 271 authority in New York on September 29, 1999.  Bell Atlantic 
New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 3953, para. 1.
 	Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 3966-67, paras. 30-31.
 	See section V.D, infra.  The Line Sharing Order amends the Commissions rules to require incumbent LECs to 
provide, as a network element, access to the high-frequency portion of the local loop to a requesting competitive 
LEC on loops that carry the incumbent LECs basic telephone service.  See Line Sharing Order, 14 FCC Rcd at 
20926, para. 25.
 	See, e.g., Procedures for Bell Operating Company Applications Under New Section 271 of the Communications 
Act, Public Notice, 11 FCC Rcd 19708, 19711 (Dec. 6, 1996) (Dec. 6, 1996 Public Notice); Revised Comment 
Schedule for Ameritech Michigan Application, as amended, for Authorization under Section 271 of the 
Communications Act to Provide In-Region, InterLATA Service in the State of Michigan, Public Notice, DA 97-127 
(Jan. 17, 1997) (Jan. 17, 1997 Public Notice); Revised Procedures for Bell Operating Company Applications Under 
Section 271 of the Communications Act, Public Notice, 13 FCC Rcd 17457 (Sept. 19, 1997) (Sept. 19, 1997 Public 
Notice); Updated Filing Requirements for Bell Operating Company Applications Under Section 271 of the 
Communications Act, Public Notice, DA-99-1994 (Sept. 28, 1999) (Sept. 28, 1999 Public Notice).
 	Sept. 19, 1997 Public Notice at Section B.
 	Id.; Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 3968, para. 34; Ameritech Michigan Order, 12 FCC Rcd at 
20570-71, para. 50.
 	Id.
 	Sept. 19, 1997 Public Notice at Section B; Ameritech Michigan Order, 12 FCC Rcd at 20570-71, para. 50.
 	Id. (citing Jan. 17, 1997 Public Notice).  The Commission subsequently released a procedural public notice 
incorporating this policy for future section 271 applications, see Sept. 19 Public Notice at Section B.
 	Ameritech Michigan Order, 12 FCC Rcd at 20573, para. 54.
 	See Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 3969, para. 36; Ameritech Michigan Order, 12 FCC Rcd at 
20571, para. 51 ([I]f a BOC chooses to submit such evidence . . . we reserve the discretion . . . to accord the new 
evidence no weight in making our determination.); id.at para. 54 ([W]e find that using our discretion to accord 
BOC submissions of new factual evidence no weight will ensure that our proceedings are conducted in such manner 
as will best conduce to the proper dispatch of business and to the ends of justice.); id.at para. 57 (By retaining the 
discretion to accord new evidence no weight . . . . ); id. at para. 59 (Because we will exercise our discretion in 
determining whether to accord new factual evidence any weight, we deny [the motion to strike]); Second BellSouth 
Louisiana Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 20674 (Given the complexity of this data and the fact that interested parties have 
not had an opportunity to address it, we exercise our discretion to accord the information minimal weight.); Dec. 10 
Public Notice at 1 ([I]f parties choose to submit new evidence, [the Commission] retains the discretion to accord 
new evidence no weight.).
 	Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 3969, para. 36; Ameritech Michigan Order, 12 FCC Rcd at 
20575.
 	Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 3969, para. 37; Ameritech Michigan Order, 12 FCC Rcd  at 
20573-74.
 	Sept. 19 Public Notice at Section H (establishing page limitations for ex partes, subject to certain exceptions).
 	Id.
 	Consistent with section 1.1204(a)(b) of our rules, responses to Commission inquiries will generally be placed in 
the record.  47 C.F.R  1.204(a)(b). 
 	Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 3971, para. 44; Ameritech Michigan Order, 12 FCC Rcd at 
20599.
 	47 U.S.C.  271(c)(1)(B)(i), (ii).
 	Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 3971, para. 44; Ameritech Michigan Order, 12 FCC Rcd at 
20618-19.
 	Id.
 	Bell Atlantic New York, 15 FCC Rcd at 3972, para. 47; Application of BellSouth Corporation for Provision of 
In-Region, Inter-LATA Services in Louisiana, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 13 FCC Rcd 20599 at 20635-36, 
para. 57 (Second BellSouth Louisiana Order); Ameritech Michigan Order, 12 FCC Rcd at 20567-68, para. 43. 
 	Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 3972-73, para. 48; Second BellSouth Louisiana Order, 13 FCC 
Rcd at 20638-39, para. 59; Ameritech Michigan Order, 12 FCC Rcd at 20568-69, para. 45. 
 	Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 3973, para. 49; Second BellSouth Louisiana Order, 13 FCC Rcd 
at 20638-39, para. 59.
 	See Ameritech Michigan Order, 12 FCC Rcd at 20569, para. 45 (concluding that greater weight will be attached 
to comments and pleadings supported by an affidavit or sworn statement than to an unsupported contrary pleading); 
see also Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 3972, para. 47.
 	Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 3973, para. 52; Ameritech Michigan Order, 12 FCC Rcd at 
20601-02, para. 110.
 	Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 3974, para. 53; Second BellSouth Louisiana Order, 13 FCC Rcd 
at 20638-39, para. 59.
 	See, e.g., Bell Atlantic New York Order at 3974, para. 53; Second BellSouth Louisiana Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 
20658-59, para. 92; Ameritech Michigan Order, 12 FCC Rcd at 20627-52; Application by BellSouth Corp. et al. 
Pursuant to Section 271 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, to Provide In-Region, InterLATA Services 
in Louisiana, CC Docket No. 97-231, Memorandum Opinion and Order,  BellSouth Louisiana Order, 13 FCC Rcd 
6245, 6258-81, paras. 21-58 (1998) (First BellSouth Louisiana Order); Application by BellSouth et al. Pursuant to 
Section 271 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, to Provide InterLATA Services in South Carolina, CC 
Docket No. 97-208, Memorandum Opinion and Order,13 FCC Rcd 539, 597-634 (BellSouth South Carolina Order).
 	Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 3974, para. 53; Second BellSouth Louisiana Order, 13 FCC Rcd 
at 20655, para. 86; Ameritech Michigan Order, 12 FCC Rcd at 20618, para. 138; 
 	In our Performance Measurements NPRM we proposed a model set of reporting requirements that states could 
adopt to measure whether an incumbent LEC is providing interconnection, resale, and unbundled network elements 
on nondiscriminatory terms.  Performance Measurements and Reporting Requirements for Operations Support 
Systems, Interconnection, and Operator Services and Directory Assistance, CC Docket No. 98-56, Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking, 13 FCC Rcd 12817 (rel. Apr. 17, 1998) (Performance Measurements NPRM).  This 
Commission has not, however, adopted, as a federal requirement, a particular set of metrics or performance 
standards.
 	We also recognize that states may choose to set their performance benchmarks at levels higher than what is 
necessary to meet the statutory nondiscrimination standard.  Bell Atlantic New York Order at para. 55, n.107.
 	See AT&T Texas II Reply Comments at 36 (arguing that SWBT should be required to prove the accuracy and 
reliability of its data collection and reporting processes); AT&T Texas I Pfau/DeYoung Decl. at paras. 15, 25, 56-
58; WorldCom Texas I Comments at 34 (arguing that SWBTs data have not been sufficiently audited and thus are 
unreliable).
 	We thus reject AT&Ts contention that the application should be denied on the ground that SWBT failed to 
satisfy the Texas Commissions parity or benchmark standards for certain Texas performance measurements.  See 
AT&T Texas II Comments at 64.
 	47 U.S.C.  271(d)(3)(A).
 	Id.
 	Id.
 	Ameritech Michigan Order, 12 FCC Rcd at 20589, para. 85.  See also BellSouth Louisiana Order, 13 FCC Rcd 
20633-35 at paras. 46-48.
 	Texas Commission Texas I Comments at 96.
 	Texas Commission Texas I Comments at 95-96.  Although the Department of Justice does not address business 
and residential subscribers separately, it states that competitive LECs have a total of approximately 840,000  
890,000 access lines, representing approximately eight percent of SWBTs Texas market.  Department of Justice 
Texas I Evaluation at 9.
 	47 U.S.C.  271(c)(2)(B)(i); see Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 3977-78, para. 63; Second 
BellSouth Louisiana Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 20640, para. 61; Ameritech Michigan Order, 12 FCC Rcd at 20662-63, 
para. 222.
 	47 U.S.C.  251(c)(2)(A).
 	Local Competition First Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd at 15590, para. 176.  Transport and termination of 
traffic are therefore excluded from the Commissions definition of interconnection.  See Id.
 	47 U.S.C.  251(c)(2)(B).  In the Local Competition First Report and Order, the Commission identified a 
minimum set of technically feasible points of interconnection.  See Local Competition First Report and Order, 11 
FCC Rcd at 15607-09, paras. 204-211.
 	47 U.S.C.  251(c)(2)(C).
 	47 U.S.C.  251(c)(2)(D).
 	Local Competition First Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd at 15613-15, paras. 221-225; see Bell Atlantic New 
York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 3978, para. 64; Second BellSouth Louisiana Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 20641-42, paras. 63-
64.
 	Local Competition First Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd at 15614-15, paras. 224-25.  
 	See Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 3978, para. 64; Second BellSouth Louisiana Order, 13 FCC 
Rcd at 20648-50, paras. 74-77; Ameritech Michigan Order, 12 FCC Rcd at 20671-74, paras. 240-45.  The 
Commission has relied on trunk blockage data to evaluate a BOCs interconnection performance.  Trunk group 
blockage indicates that end users are experiencing difficulty completing or receiving calls, which may have a direct 
impact on the customers perception of a competitive LECs service quality.
 	Local Competition First Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd at 15612, para. 218; see also Bell Atlantic New York 
Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 3978, para. 65; Second BellSouth Louisiana Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 20642, para. 65.
 	47 C.F.R.  51.305(a)(5).
 	Our rules require an incumbent LEC to provide two-way trunking upon request, wherever two-way trunking 
arrangements are technically feasible.  47 C.F.R.  51.305(f); see also Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 
3978-79, para. 65; Second BellSouth Louisiana Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 20642, para. 65; Local Competition First 
Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd 15612-13, paras. 219-220.
 	47 C.F.R.  51.305(a)(5).
 	Local Competition First Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd at 15779, paras. 549-50; see Bell Atlantic New York 
Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 3979, para. 66; Second BellSouth Louisiana Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 20640-41, para. 61.
 	47 C.F.R.  51.321(b); Local Competition First Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd at 15779-82, paras. 549-50; see 
also Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 3979, para. 66; Second BellSouth Louisiana Order, 13 FCC Rcd 
at 20640-41, para. 62.
 	47 U.S.C.  251(c)(6) (requiring incumbent LECs to provide physical collocation); Bell Atlantic New York 
Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 3979, para. 66; Second BellSouth Louisiana Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 20640-41, paras. 61-62.
 	Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced Telecommunications Capability, CC Docket No. 98-147, 
First Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 14 FCC Rcd 4761 (1999) vacated in part, GTE 
Services Corp. V. FCC, Nos. 99-1176 et al. (D.C. Cir. Mar. 17, 2000) (Advanced Services First Report and Order 
or Advanced Services First Report and Order and FNPRM).
 	Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 3979, para. 66; Second BellSouth Louisiana Order, 13 FCC Rcd 
at 20640-41, paras. 183-84 ; BellSouth Carolina Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 649-51, para. 62.
 	Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 3979, para. 66; see Second BellSouth Louisiana Order, 13 FCC 
Rcd at 20640-41, paras. 61-62.
 	Texas Commission Texas I Comments at 10-22.
 	For certain interconnection performance metrics, the Texas Commission established a benchmark standard for 
evaluating SWBTs performance (e.g., percent of trunk blockage and average interconnection trunk installation 
intervals).  For other interconnection measurements, such as percent missed due dates for installation, a parity 
standard is applied.    
 	SWBT Texas I Application App. B (providing interconnection agreements between SWBT and competing 
carriers); SWBT Texas I Application at 74, 77, 80; Texas Commission Texas I Comments at 10.  Several 
competitive LECs raised complaints regarding receipt from SWBT of notices of termination of the T2A.  See ALTS 
and CLEC Coalition Texas II Comments at 14-16; Allegiance Texas II Comments at 3; Z-Tel Texas II Comments at 
5-6; Allegiance Texas II Reply Comments at 2.  SWBT states that by the terms of the T2A it was required to send 
such notices six months prior to expiration of the T2A (which would expire after one year if SWBTs application for 
section 271 authority were not granted).  Because SWBTs application is herein granted, the T2A will remain in 
effect for an additional three years.  See SWBT Texas II Reply at 47-48.  
 	Texas Commission Texas I Comments at 10.
 	SWBT Dysart Texas I Aff. at para. 548 and Attach. A, Measurements 70-78, (Performance Measurement 
Business Rules) (Version 1.6).  SWBT has implemented nine Texas Commission-approved performance measures 
relating to this checklist item, including measures that compare trunk blockage between SWBT and competitive 
LECs (PM 70), measures that capture missed due dates for trunk installations (PM 73), and measures that provide 
data on average installation intervals (PM 78).  Id.; see also SWBT Aggregated Performance Measurement Data No. 
70-78 at 271-No. 70-71-78 (showing performance measurement data for January 2000 through March 2000). 
 	Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 3981-83, paras. 69-72; Second BellSouth Louisiana Order, 13 
FCC Rcd at 20649-50, para. 76; Ameritech Michigan Order, 12 FCC Rcd at 20669-74, paras. 236-245.
 	For SWBT end office to competitive LEC end office, SWBTs statewide data indicate zero (0.0%) trunk 
blockage for the months of January through March.  For SWBT tandem to competitive LEC end office, SWBTs 
data indicate blockage well below the benchmark, 0.1 % for January and February, 0.0% blockage for March.  See 
SWBT Aggregated Performance Data, No. 70-01, 70-02 at 271-No. 70-71 (showing performance measurement data 
for January 2000 through March 2000).  The Texas Commission applied blockage criteria of one percent as a 
benchmark to ensure that the competitive LECs network traffic does not experience the same blockage as SWBTs 
network (citing the disproportionate impact of blocked trunks on new entrants).  Texas Commission Texas I 
Comments at 14; see also SWBT Texas I Dysart Aff. at paras. 543-547.     
 	The Department of Justice initially raised concerns in the Texas I application, which were also raised by the 
competitive LECs themselves, that some competitive LECs had been unable to obtain the number of interconnection 
trunks they needed and that these competitive LECs had difficulty ordering trunks.  See Department of Justice Texas 
I Evaluation at 44-49; see also Department of Justice Texas I March 20, 2000 ex parte at 1, n.2.
 	In its Evaluation of SWBTs Texas II application, the Department of Justice stated that the efforts of SBC, 
competitive local exchange carriers and the Texas PUC appear to have led to improvements in SBCs 
interconnection trunking performance and to a better understanding of trunk provisioning by the various parties to 
the process.  Department of Justice Texas II Evaluation at 5. The Texas Commission reviewed SWBTs trunk 
utilization, forecasting, ordering and provisioning processes, as well as plans to relieve blockage through proper 
cooperative planning between SWBT and competitive LECs.  As a result of this review, SWBT agreed to implement 
improvements relating to trunk forecasts, data collection, application of exclusions, and the process for ordering 
trunks.  SWBT was also permitted to apply certain exclusions in calculating the performance measurements (e.g., 
customer not ready exclusion).  Texas Commission Texas I Comments at 14; SWBT Deere Texas I Reply Aff. at 
para. 11; SWBT Laurie Leathers Texas I Aff. (filed Dec. 14, 1999 in Docket 16251); SWBT Deere Texas I Reply 
Aff. at para. 19; SWBT Dysart Texas I Aff. at para. 56, Attach. K Dysart Aff. (filed Dec. 14 in Docket 16251), see 
also Texas Commission Dec. 16 Open Meeting Transcript at 26-27; 32.
 	CLEC Coalition Texas I Comments at 7-12, TWTC Nick Summit Texas I Aff. as Attach. 4 to CLEC Coalition 
Texas I Comments; TWTC Kelsi Reeves Texas I Aff. as Attach. 5 to CLEC Coalition Texas I Comments; ALTS 
Texas I Comments at 17-23, e.spire Texas I Comments at 3, George Wong Texas I Aff. at 2-4 as Attach. to e.spire 
Texas I Comments; CompTel Texas I Comments at 10-12,  CapRock Jere Thompson Texas I Aff. as Exhibit B to 
CompTel Texas I Comments; NTS Mitch Elliott Texas I Aff. as Exhibit C to CompTel Texas I Comments; Sprint 
Texas I Comments at 62-64.  
 	TWTC Reeves Texas I Aff. at paras. 17-24; TWTC Summit Texas I Aff. at paras. 12-14.
 	TWTC Summit Texas I Aff. at para. 11. SWBT Texas I Application at 79; SWBT Dysart Texas I Aff. at paras. 
549-559.  See also Texas Commission Texas I Comments at 10-22.  SWBT modified its trunk ordering guidelines in 
December 1999.  SWBT agreed to accept orders of 12 DS1s per competitive LEC per day (an increase from eight 
DS1s per day) in each of the four market areas in Texas.  This modification was approved by the Texas Commission 
at its December 16, 1999 Open Meeting.  SWBT Deere Reply Aff. at paras. 7-9.  SWBTs Deere Attach. A to Reply 
Aff. (confidential) reflects all occasions on which SWBT has provisioned eight or more DS1s per day, per 
competitive LEC, per market area from January 1 to February 11, 2000.  It shows SWBT has provided 12 or more 
DS1s per day on at least 18 different occasions.  SWBT has also agreed to accept quarterly forecasts from 
competitive LECs (instead of only semi-annual forecasts accepted previously).  According to the business rule for 
PM 70 (Version 1.6), if a competitive LEC exceeds 25% of its most recent forecast (which must have been provided 
within the last six months), an exclusion applies.  SWBT has agreed to measure the 25% exclusion against forecasts 
provided by competitive LECs on a quarterly basis.  SWBT Deere Texas I Reply Aff. at para. 12; SWBT Dysart 
Texas I Reply Aff. at para. 64; Texas Commission Texas I Reply Comments at 15-16.  See also March 8, 2000 ex 
parte letter from SWBT to Magalie Roman Salas, Secretary, Federal Communications Commission.
 	SWBT Aggregated Performance Measurement Data No. 70-01, 70-2 at 271-No. 70-71 (showing performance 
measurement data for January 1999 through December 1999).  e.spire makes general allegations concerning 
blockage caused by SWBT and SWBTs lack of assistance to e.spire.  e.spire Wong Texas I Aff. paras. 8-12.  
e.spires allegations, however, do not disprove the submitted data showing that SWBT met the benchmark on the 
trunk blocking performance measure (PM 70), as detailed above. 
 	Texas Commission Texas I Comments at 11.  We also note that TWTC acknowledged that the conversion from 
one-way to two-way trunks in Austin was a huge success for both companies.  TWTC Reeves Texas I Aff. at para. 
17.  This is significant because where a competitive LEC does not carry a sufficient amount of traffic to justify 
separate one-way trunks, an incumbent LEC must accommodate two-way trunking upon request wherever technically 
feasible.  Refusing to provide two-way trunking would raise costs for new entrants and create a barrier to entry.  The 
provisioning of two-way trunking arrangements is among the obligations that the Commission concluded in the Local 
Competition Order demonstrated an incumbent LEC was providing interconnection to a competitor in a manner no 
less efficient than the way in which the incumbent LEC provides the comparable function to its own retail operations. 
 Local Competition First Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd at 15612-613, paras. 217-220; see also 47 C.F.R.  
51.305(f).
 	SWBT's percentage of missed due dates: 
PM 73: Missed Due Dates

Jan
Feb
Mar
CLEC
10.4%
4.4%
4.1%
SWBT
60.3%
27.6%
22.5%




See SWBT Aggregated Performance Measurement Data PM 73 at 271-No.73-76 (showing performance 
measurement data for January 2000 through March 2000).  SWBT continues to meet the benchmark in April.   
 	Held orders are orders that SWBT does not process due to lack of interconnection facilities.  A lack of 
interconnection facilities, in turn, could mean that SWBT could not satisfy its interconnection obligation.
 	Texas Commission Texas I Comments at 15.  The interim measure will be finalized as part of the Texas 
Commissions six-month review of performance measurements which began in April 2000.  See Texas Commission 
Dec. 16, 1999 Open Meeting Transcript at 29-31.  CapRock and NTS alleged that the pre-planning process that 
occurs before SWBT officially counts a competitive LECs request as an order (e.g. scheduling of initial planning 
meeting and preparation by SWBT of a Service Planning Document summarizing the requirements specified by a 
competitive LEC), further delays their ability to obtain interconnection trunks (and is not tracked by performance 
measurements).  CompTel Texas I Comments at 10-11, Exhibit C, NTS Mitch Elliot Aff., Exhibit B, Caprock Jere 
Thompson Aff.  SWBT responds that this supposed delay is no more than timely contract preparation.  SWBT Texas 
I Reply Comments at 49.  The Texas Commission stated that NTS and Caprock had never brought their complaints 
to the attention of the Texas Commission, and it did not believe that based on the evidence developed in the Section 
271 proceeding that the complaints of NTS and CapRock indicate systemic problems.  Inasmuch as the Texas 
Commission had little opportunity to investigate those complaints and develop a factual record, we accord them little 
weight.  Texas Commission Texas I Reply Comments at 13-14.   
 	See SWBT Texas I March 17 ex parte Attach. 3; SWBT Texas I February 18 ex parte at 5-6; SWBT Dysart 
Texas I  Aff. Attach. K at 11.  NTS allegation that the orders it submitted in December in Amarillo were held for 
lack of facilities does not constitute evidence demonstrating that SWBT fails to meet the checklist item.  Specifically, 
NTS alleged that when it submitted properly forecasted orders on December 23, 1999, SWBT claimed it did not 
have enough multiplexing equipment available to fulfill NTSs order and that as of its Texas I filing, the trunks were 
still not installed.  SWBT responded that on December 23, 1999, NTS ordered a single DS-3 facility to support its 
interconnection trunks in Amarillo.  SWBT stated that it responded to NTS the same day explaining that SWBT 
lacked facilities to provision the DS-3, but offered to fill the order using DS-1s to provide the same capacity. SWBT 
Texas I ex parte letter of March 22, 2000.  SWBT stated that NTS ordered the DS-1s on January 4, 2000, but twice 
delayed provisioning of these trunks on the basis that NTS was not ready to receive them.  SWBT stated that most 
recently, the trunks were scheduled for delivery between March 14 and March 16, but that NTS indicated on each of 
these dates that it was not ready to accept the trunks.  SWBT Texas I ex parte letter of March 22,2000.  The Texas 
Commission noted on Reply that it will work with SWBT, NTS [and CapRock] in Docket 20400 to ascertain if there 
are problems. However, based on the evidence developed in the section 271 proceeding, the Texas Commission did 
not believe that the complaints of NTS [and CapRock] indicate systemic problems.  Texas Commission Texas I 
Reply.  We agree. 
 	Department of Justice Texas II Evaluation at 5, stating that PM 73.1 reports very few orders held for lack of 
facilities for March 2000.
 	In February, March, and April, SWBT met the 20 business day benchmark with an average installation interval 
of 16.5, 17.4, and 17.3 business days respectively for competitive LECs.  The Texas Commission established a 
benchmark instead of a parity measure because SWBT installs more trunks for competitive LECs than for its retail 
side. Texas Commission Texas I Comments at 16.
 	Department of Justice Texas I Evaluation at 47; Telecommunications Resellers Association Texas I at 9-10, 13; 
Sprint Texas I at 62-64; Sprint Texas II Comments at 46; CompTel Texas II Comments at 2.  We also note that the 
performance measures will be reviewed by SWBT, competitive LECs and the Texas Commission every six months, 
beginning in April 2000, to determine whether they are properly reflecting the behaviors and results needed for a 
sustainable competitive market.  Texas Commission Texas I Comments at 4.  We disagree with the allegation of 
Pontio that its interconnection dispute with SWBT disqualifies SWBT from receiving section 271 authority.  
Specifically, Pontio alleges that SWBT will not provide requested interconnection trunks unless Pontio agrees to an 
amended interconnection agreement that would impose per minute local switching charges.  See Texas II Comments 
of @Link, BlueStar, DSLnet et. al. at 23.  SWBT states that the trunks at issue were provisioned on May 11, 2000 
and the terms to recover the appropriate costs for the use of those facilities are subject to ongoing negotiations with 
Pontio.  See SWBT Texas II Reply at 50.  We believe Pontios alleged difficulties are best resolved through the 
section 252 negotiation and arbitration process.  
 	SWBTs physical and virtual collocation tariffs were revised in connection with the Texas Commissions 
collaborative process and workshops designed to address competitive LEC concerns.  The revised physical and 
virtual collocation tariffs became effective upon state approval October 29, 1999.  See Texas Commission Texas I 
Comments at 16.  SWBTs physical collocation tariff contained a 50 square foot minimum space requirement for 
shared cage collocation.  However, our rules provide that an ILEC must make shared collocation space available in 
single-bay increments or their equivalent, i.e., a competing carrier can purchase space in increments small enough to 
collocate a single rack, or bay, of equipment.  47 CFR  51.323 (k)(1).  We note that SWBT eliminated the 
minimum space requirement and notified competitive LECs through an Accessible Letter of February 29, 2000 that it 
had removed the minimum space requirement.  See SWBT Accessible Letter of February 29, 2000 Clarification of 
minimum cage size for Caged and Shared Cage collocation Kansas, Missouri, Oklahoma, Texas , No. CLEC00-
050.       
 	SWBT Texas I Application at 73-78;  see also Texas Commission Texas I Comments at 16-22.
 	SWBT Texas I Application at 74.
 	SWBT Texas I Application at 75, SWBT Dysart Texas I Aff. at para. 629, SWBT Auinbauh Texas I Aff. at 
paras. 44-45.
 	See SWBT Aggregated Performance Measurement Data PMs 107-109 at 271-No. 107a 109b (showing 
performance measurement data for January 2000 through March 2000).
 	SWBT Texas I Application at 77.  SWBT states that it has completed 40 virtual collocation arrangements in 
Texas.
 	SWBT Texas I Application at 78.
 	SWBTs physical and virtual collocation tariffs have been revised in conformance with the Texas Commission 
recommendations, and address the myriad competitive LEC concerns discussed at length in the Texas Commissions 
collaborative process and workshops.  Texas Commission Texas I Comments at 16.
 	Texas Commission Texas I Comments at 17-18.      
 	ALTS and the CLEC Coalition objected to SWBTs practice of walling in its own equipment as a reasonable 
security measure associated with cageless collocation and then charging competitive LECs for the construction.  
The competitive LECs contended this practice is not contemplated by the Commissions Advanced Services First 
Report and Order.  ALTS Texas I Comments at 24; CLEC Coalition Texas I Comments at 12; see also AT&Ts 
DeYoung Texas I Aff. at para. 327 n.240.  Pending completion of the Texas Commissions rate proceedings, the 
interim rate for security for cageless collocation is zero, subject to true-up.  SWBT argues therefore that as a 
practical matter there is no genuine issue.  See pricing discussion infra at section V.A.2;  SWBTs Auinbauh Texas I 
Reply Aff. at para. 32; see also Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 3987-88, para. 79.  
 	See Petition for Partial Reconsideration or Clarification filed June 1, 1999, Sprint Corporation requests that we 
clarify and further strengthen the collocation rules adopted in the Advanced Services First Report and Order.	 
 	On March 17, 1999, the D.C. Circuit vacated and remanded certain aspects of the Advanced Services First 
Report and Order, including the relevant sections at issue here.  See GTE Service Corp. v. FCC, Nos. 99-1176 et al. 
(D.C. Cir. Mar. 17, 2000).  
 	See MFNS Texas I Comments and Reply Comments.  See also Auinbauh Texas I Reply Aff. at paras. 25-26.  
MFNS filed a section 208 complaint with the Commissions Enforcement Bureau on February 15, 2000 requesting 
that SWBT be directed to provide its Competitive Alternate Transport Terminal CATT interconnection.  That 
complaint was dismissed without prejudice for failure to comply with the Commissions complaint requirements.  
See February 28, 2000 Letter from Radhika V. Karmarkar, Enforcement Bureau, to Karen Nations (MFNS), 
Jonathan E. Canis and David A. Konuch (Kelley Drye & Warren) and Christine Jines (SBC). 
 	SWBT Deere Texas I Aff. at paras. 14; 20-21.  SWBT will provide other technically feasible alternatives using 
the Special Request Procedure set forth in the T2A.  Id. at 14. 
 	SWBT Texas I Application at 73-78.  SWBTs state approved T2A requires SWBT to provide other collocation 
arrangements that have been demonstrated to be technically feasible and in compliance with the Advanced Services 
Order.  The T2A provides a rebuttable presumption of technical feasibility when a collocation arrangement has been 
deployed by any incumbent LEC.  Id. at 17.
 	Specifically, AT&T objects to SWBTs requirement that AT&T establish direct trunks to each central office in 
the Dallas exchange area, which is not served by a local tandem, instead of allowing AT&T to interconnect at the 
access tandem serving the central offices in the Dallas exchange area.  AT&T alleged that SWBTs requirement led 
to a three-month delay in AT&Ts final testing of its telephony-over-cable service in the Dallas area.  See AT&T 
Texas I Comments at 59-60; AT&T Texas I DeYoung Aff. at paras. 20-26; AT&T ex parte of March 8, 2000; 
AT&T Texas II Reply Comments at 49; but see SWBT Deere Texas I Reply Aff. at 24-25; SWBT Texas II ex parte 
of April 26; SWBT Texas II Reply Comments at 50-54.  See also AT&T Texas II ex parte letter of June 13, 2000.
 	See SWBT Deere Texas II Reply Aff., App. A-4 at 5-7; AT&T Texas II Reply Comments, DeYoung/Fettig 
Decl., at 5 n.7. 
 	SWBT Texas II Reply Comments at 53.  SWBT notes that the issues raised by AT&T will be debated before the 
Texas Commission in a pending arbitration between SWBT and AT&T.  SWBT Deere Texas II Reply Aff. App. A-4 
at 7.  We believe that AT&Ts issue is appropriately resolved through the Texas Commissions arbitration process.  
See AT&T Communications of Texas, L.P., TCG Dallas and Teleport Communications, Incs Response to 
Southwestern Bell Telephone Companys Petition for Arbitration, Tex. PUC Docket 22315 at 13-17 (filed April 17, 
2000).
 	In addition, we find that SWBT satisfactorily addresses AT&Ts concern that SWBT does not allow virtual 
collocation if space for physical collocation is available.  AT&Ts DeYoung Texas I Aff. at para. 332; see also 
AT&Ts March 8, 2000 ex parte at 2-3.  SWBT confirms that sections 25 and 26 of SWBTs Virtual Collocation 
Tariff make virtual collocation available to competitive LECs regardless of the availability of physical collocation; 
the restriction to which AT&T refers involves a maintenance and repair option for virtually collocated equipment, 
and such language does not deny virtual collocation as alleged by AT&T.  SWBT Texas I Reply Comments at 51; 
Auinbauh Texas I Reply Aff. at paras. 34-35.
 	See 47 U.S.C  251(c)(2),(3); see also 47 C.F.R. 51.305(a)(2); see, e.g., Memorandum of the Federal 
Communications Commission as Amicus Curiae, US West Communications, Inc., vs. AT&T Communications of the 
Pacific Northwest, Inc. et. al, No. CV 97-1575 JE.
 	47 C.F.R Section 51.305(e); see also Local Competition First Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd at 15602, 15605-
06, paras. 198, 203, 205.
 	See Local Competition First Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd at 15588, para. 172.
 	Local Competition First Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd at 15608, para. 209.
 	See SWBT Texas II Application , App. 5, Tab 45, MCI(WorldCom) Agreement Attach. 4,  1.2.2.  Section 
1.2.2 of the WorldCom Agreement states:  MCI(WorldCom) and SWBT agree that MCI(WorldCom) may 
designate, at its option, a minimum of one point of interconnection within a single SWBT exchange where SWBT 
facilities are available, or multiple points of interconnection within the exchange, for the exchange of all traffic 
within that exchange.  If WorldCom desires a single point for interconnection within a LATA, SWBT agrees to 
provide dedicated or common transport to any other exchange within a LATA requested by WorldCom, or 
WorldCom may self-provision, or use a third party's facilities.  SWBT Texas II Application , App. 5, Tab 45, 
WorldCom Agreement Attach. 4,  1.2.2
 	See 47 U.S.C.  252(i).  Section 252(i) makes these terms and conditions available to all requesting carriers 
despite SWBTs statement that it requires competitive LECs to interconnect in every local exchange area. See 
SWBT Texas II Reply at 50.
 	47 U.S.C.  271(c)(2)(B)(i).
 	47 U.S.C.  251(c)(2).
 	47 U.S.C.  252(d)(1).
 	47 C.F.R.  51.321(b); Local Competition First Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd at 15779-81, paras. 549-53.  In 
a physical collocation arrangement, an interconnecting carrier has physical access to space in the LEC central office 
to connect to the incumbent LEC network.  Id. at 15784, para. 559, and n.1361.  In a virtual collocation arrangement, 
interconnectors designate central office transmission equipment dedicated to their use, but have no right to enter the 
central office and do not pay for incumbent LEC floor space.  Id.  In a meet-point arrangement, the parties negotiate 
a point at which one carrier's responsibility for service ends and the other carriers begins.  See id. at 15778, n.1332.
 	Advanced Services First Report and Order, 14 FCC Rcd at 4783-85, paras. 40-42. 
 	See 47 U.S.C.  251(c)(6); 47 C.F.R.  51.305(a)(5), 51.321(a)-(b); Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC 
Rcd at 3979, para 66.
 	See 47 C.F.R.  51.501-07, 51.509(g); Local Competition First Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd at 15812-16, 
15844-61, 15874-76, 15912, paras. 618-29, 674-712, 743-51, 826.
 	Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC, 120 F.3d 753, 800, 804, 805-06 (1997).
 	AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366 (1999).
 	Id. at 380.
 	Id. at 382.
 	Id. at 384.
 	Id.
 	We note that other unbundled network elements are required pursuant to the checklist, but we discuss them in 
the context of other checklist items.  Additionally, we discuss UNE pricing, including both recurring and non-
recurring charges, in checklist item 2; rates for access to poles, ducts, and conduits in checklist item 3; the pricing of 
directory assistance and operator services in checklist item 7; reciprocal compensation rates in checklist item 13; and 
resale rates in checklist item 14.
 	SWBT Texas I Application at 72, 80; SWBT Texas I Auinbauh Aff at para. 148.
 	See SWBT Texas I Application at 74, 80.
 	Id. at 77.
 	Id. at 78.
 	Id. at 80; SWBT Texas I Auinbauh Aff. at para. 149.
 	SWBT Texas I Application at 80; SWBT Texas I Auinbauh Aff. at paras. 59-60, 63.
 	SWBT Texas I Application at 80; SWBT Texas I Auinbauh Aff. at para. 59-60, 63.
 	Texas I Commission Comments at 10.
 	Id.
 	Id. at 10, 16, 21.
 	See Texas I Commission Comments at 80; Texas II Commission Comments at 55-58; Letter from Donna 
Nelson, Director-Telecommunications, Legal Division, Texas Public Utility Commission to Magalie Roman Salas, 
CC Docket No. 00-65, Attach. 5, Interim Award at 17 (filed June 19, 2000) (Texas Commission June 19 Ex Parte). 
 	Texas I Commission Comments at 21.
 	AT&T Texas I Comments at 41; AT&T Texas I DeYoung Aff. at paras. 317-18, 328.
 	Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 4090, para. 258.
 	Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 4091, para. 259.
 	Compare Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 4090-91, para. 258 with id. at 4091, para. 259.
 	47 U.S.C.  252(c), (e)(6); AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366 (1999).
 	See para. 84, supra (discussion of Texas Commissions commitment to apply pricing standards of sections 251 
and 252 of the Act).
 	AT&T Texas I DeYoung Aff. at paras. 320, 328.
 	Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 4090-91, para. 258.
 	SWBT Texas I Auinbauh Aff. at paras. 6, 40, 149; SWBT Texas I Shelley Aff. at paras. 44-46; SWBT Texas I 
Reply at 50; SWBT Texas I Auinbauh Reply Aff. at paras. 12, 27-28.  See Advanced Services Order, 14 FCC Rcd at 
4771-94, paras. 19-60.
 	AT&T Texas I Comments at 41-42; AT&T Texas I DeYoung Aff. at paras. 320-21, 328 & nn.230, 233.
 	AT&T Texas I DeYoung Aff. at para. 321.
 	AT&T Texas I DeYoung Aff. at para. 322.  According to AT&T, a competitive LEC acquiring a 100-square-
foot caged space would pay $4,166 in interim non-recurring charges and $64 per month in interim recurring charges, 
compared to no non-recurring charges and a maximum of $42.01 per month in recurring charges under the 
AT&T/MCI cost model.  Id.  AT&T says that SWBTs own rate comparison indicates that the interim rates, prior to 
the 30 percent reduction, are approximately twice those produced by the AT&T/MCI model, representing a 
difference of about $14,000 in non-recurring charges for a 100 square-foot cage.  Id. at 323 & nn.235-236.
 	AT&T Texas I DeYoung Aff. at para 320 & n.231.
 	See SWBT Texas I Reply at 50; SWBT Texas I Auinbauh Reply Aff. at paras. 27-29.
 	AT&T Texas I DeYoung Aff. at para. 325.
 	Texas I Commission Comments at 21.
 	We also observe that in any context in which prices are not set in accordance with our rules and the Act, we 
retain the ability to take a variety of enforcement actions and will not hesitate to do so.  See 47 U.S.C.  271(d)(6).
 	See section III.B.1, supra; UNE Remand Order at para. 15. 
 	47 U.S.C.  51.315(b).
 	See, e.g., Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 3990, para. 84.
 	See 47 U.S.C.  271(c)(2)(B) (for example, unbundled loops, transport and switching are listed separately as 
checklist items iv, v and vi).
 	See Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 3989-90, para. 83; BellSouth South Carolina Order, 13 FCC 
Rcd at 585.
 	See Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 3990, para. 83; Second BellSouth Louisiana Order, 13 FCC 
Rcd at 20653; BellSouth South Carolina Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 547-48, 585.
 	See Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 3990, para. 83.
 	Id.
 	47 U.S.C.  271(c)(2)(B)(ii).
 	Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 3990, para. 84.
 	Id.
 	Id.  As part of a BOCs demonstration that it is providing a checklist item (e.g., unbundled loops, unbundled 
local switching, resale services), it must demonstrate that it is providing nondiscriminatory access to the systems, 
information, and personnel that support that element or service.  An examination of a BOCs OSS performance is 
therefore integral to our determination of whether a BOC is offering all of the items contained in the competitive 
checklist.  Id. 
 	Id. at 3990-91, para. 84.
 	Id. at 3991, para. 85.
 	Id.
 	Id.  For example, we would not deem an incumbent LEC to be providing nondiscriminatory access to OSS if 
limitations on the processing of information between the interface and the back office systems prevented a 
competitor from performing a specific function in substantially the same time and manner as the incumbent performs 
that function for itself.
 	See id.
 	Id. at para. 3991, para. 86.
 	Id.
 	Id.  As a general proposition, specific performance standards adopted by a state commission in an arbitration 
decision would be more persuasive evidence of commercial reasonableness than a standard unilaterally adopted by 
the BOC outside of its interconnection agreement.  Id. at 20619-20.
 	See id. at 3991-92, para. 86.
 	Id. at 3992, para. 87; Ameritech Michigan Order, 12 FCC Rcd at 20616; see also Second BellSouth Louisiana 
Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 20654; BellSouth South Carolina Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 592-93.  In making this 
determination, we consider all of the automated and manual processes a BOC has undertaken to provide access to 
OSS functions, including the interface (or gateway) that connects the competing carriers own operations support 
systems to the BOC; any electronic or manual processing link between that interface and the BOCs OSS (including 
all necessary back office systems and personnel); and all of the OSS that a BOC uses in providing network elements 
and resale services to a competing carrier.  Ameritech Michigan Order, 12 FCC Rcd at 20615; see also Second 
BellSouth Louisiana Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 20654 n.241.
 	See Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 3992, para. 88.
 	Id.
 	Id.
 	Business rules refer to the protocols that a BOC uses to ensure uniformity in the format of orders and include 
information concerning ordering codes such as universal service ordering codes (USOCs) and field identifiers 
(FIDs).  Id.; see also Ameritech Michigan Order, 12 FCC Rcd at 20617 n.335.
 	Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 3992, para. 88. 
 	Id. 
 	See id.
 	Id. at 3993, para. 89.
 	Id.
 	Id.
 	See id.; Ameritech Michigan Order, 12 FCC Rcd at 20659 (emphasizing that a third-party review should 
encompass the entire obligation of the incumbent LEC to provide nondiscriminatory access, and, where applicable, 
should consider the ability of actual competing carriers in the market to operate using the incumbents OSS access).
 	See Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 3989-3990, para. 83.
 	See Department of Justice Texas 1 Evaluation at 36 to 52.
 	See Department of Justice June 13 ex parte submission at 17-19.  Specifically, the Department of Justice 
expressed concern about:  (i) the apparent difficulty CLECs have had integrating SBCs pre-order interfaces with 
SBCs ordering interface (see section V.B.1.e, infra); (ii) allegations regarding SBCs inability to provide 
nondiscriminatory access to updating the LIDB database in a timely and accurate manner (see section V.B.1.f.i.f, 
infra); and (iii) disturbing allegations raised by two competing LECs regarding specific recent SWBT conduct in 
Texas (see section V.B.2.b.i, infra).
 	Texas Commission Texas 1 Comments at 5-6, 28-32; SWBT Texas 1 Ham Aff. at para. 251; Telcordia Final 
Report at 1.1.1.
 	Texas Commission Texas 1 Comments at 5 n.7; Telcordia Final Report at  1.1.1.
 	Texas Commission Texas 1 Comments at 5.
 	SWBT Texas 1 Application at 28; Texas Commission Texas 1 Comments at 5; SWBT Texas 1 Ham Aff. at 
para. 256-258.  Seven competitive LECs were test participants in the test.  Only AT&T and WorldCom actively 
participated in testing their EDI interface.  See Telcordia Final Report at  1.1.1.1-1.1.1.2; Transcript of OSS 
Testing Workshop, SBC Application App. D, Vol. 3, Tab 50.
 	Telcordia Final Report at 3.2.4.
 	As we stated in the New York order, rigorous state proceedings can contribute to the success of a section 271 
application.  Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 3958, para. 8.
 	See Bell Atlantic New York Order 15 FCC Rcd at 3974, para. 53; Second BellSouth Louisiana Order, 13 FCC 
Rcd at 20655, para. 86; Ameritech Michigan Order, 12 FCC Rcd at 20618, para. 138.
 	See, e.g., sections V.B.1.e and V.B.1.f, infra.  See also Department of Justice Texas I Evaluation at 4 
(suggesting that Telcordias test has significant limitations, but also provid[es] some evidence of the functionality 
and capacity of SBCs [OSS]).
 	See Department of Justice Texas I Evaluation at 4-7; AT&T Texas I Comments at 74-75, 79-80; WorldCom 
Texas I McMillon & Sivori Decl. at 110; Allegiance Texas I Comments at 9. 17.  In sum, the Department of Justice 
and commenters suggested that Telcordia: (i) tested an inadequate number of transaction scenarios, excluding, for 
example, the provisioning of xDSL capable loops; (ii) did not test SWBTs manual processes or back-end systems; 
(iii) did not adequately test SWBTs change management processes or competitive LEC support organizations such 
as the Help Desk and Customer Service Center; and (iv) did not evaluate the accuracy of the raw data used by SWBT 
to calculate its performance measurements.  Id.  Several parties also argued that the third party test in Texas was less 
comprehensive than the test executed by KPMG in New York, with respect to the Bell Atlantic section 271 process.  
In Bell Atlantics New York application, we treated the conclusions in the KPMG Final Report as persuasive 
evidence of Bell Atlantics OSS readiness based, in part, on the scope and depth of KPMGs review.  Bell Atlantic 
New York Order, at paras. 96-100.
 	See, e.g., WorldCom Texas I Comments at 40; CLEC Coalition Texas I Comments at 5 (arguing that SWBT had 
advanced notice of test scenarios and competitive LECs test participants and used special codes that earmarked their 
test orders); AT&T Texas I Comments at 9 and 73-74 (asserting that SWBT provided much of the content of the 
process review report); AT&T Texas I Dalton/Connolly Decl. at paras. 39-49; Allegiance Texas I Comments at 9 
(stating that Telcordia shared its findings with SWBT before reporting them to the Texas Commission and the 
competing carriers).
 	See Texas Commission Texas I Comments at 28-32.  The Texas Commission explains that its role in the OSS 
readiness test included:  overseeing the development of the functionality and capacity tests, overseeing the test 
process, assisting in the defining of the test scope, ensuring a collaborative process, providing final approval of 
baselined documents with input from the TAG and Telcordia, approving data retention policy for participants [and] 
acting as the test manager.  Id. at 29-30.
 	See Texas Commission Texas I Comments at 30, 38 (describing efforts to maintain testing blindness).
 	Bell Atlantic New York Order at para. 102; First BellSouth Louisiana Order, 13 FCC Rcd. at 6279 n.197; 
BellSouth South Carolina Order, 13 FCC Rcd. at 625 n.467; Ameritech Michigan Order, 12 FCC Rcd. at 20617 
n.334; Local Competition Second Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd. at 19742.
 	Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd. at 3999, para. 102.
 	Id. at 3999-4000, para. 102
 	Id. at 4000, para. 102.
 	Id. at 4000, para. 103.
 	Id.
 	Id. at 4000, para. 103.
 	Id.
 	Id. at 4002, para. 107.
 	Id. at 4000, para. 104.
 	Id. at 4002, para. 108.
 	Id. at 4002-03, paras. 109-10.
 	Id. at 4003-04, para. 110.  In the Bell Atlantic New York Order, we used these factors in determining whether 
Bell Atlantic had an adequate change management process in place.  See id. at 4004, para. 111.  We left open the 
possibility, however, that a change management plan different from the one implemented by Bell Atlantic may be 
sufficient to demonstrate compliance with the requirements of section 271.  Id.
 	Id. at 3999, para. 101, 4004-05, para. 112.
 	As explained more fully in part V.B.1.d(i)(a)(i) infra, some commenters criticize SWBTs change management 
plan because, in contrast to Bell Atlantics change management plan, it has not been used in connection with a major 
release, was not subjected to rigorous third party testing, and fails to include performance measurements to capture 
whether SWBT is complying with the change management notification intervals.
 	See Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd. at 4003, para. 111 (recognizing that various change 
management plans may be adequate to meet the needs of competing carriers).
 	SWBT Ham Texas I Aff. at paras. 307, 314.
 	We note that, as far back as March 1998, SWBT expressed an interest in working jointly with competing 
carriers to establish an effective change control process for EDI.  See SWBT Texas I Application, App. C, Tab 169, 
Affidavit of Liz Ham on Behalf of SWBT at para. 64 (filed Mar. 2, 1998 in Texas Commission Project No. 16251). 
Indeed, at that time, SWBT developed a change control process plan and provided it to AT&T for its review in 
input.  According to SWBT, the purpose of this initial plan was to serve as a starting point to establish a change 
control process between the two companies.  Id.  Beginning in October 1998, at the direction of the Texas 
Commission, SWBT committed to: (1) hold change management meetings on a monthly basis; (2) provide 
competing carriers with the ability to establish the agenda for the meetings; (3) submit the minutes of the meetings to 
competing carriers and allow competing carriers five business days to comment; (4) file minutes of such meetings 
with the Texas Commission; and (5) file a competing carriers comments along with such minutes if such competing 
carriers requested changes were not incorporated by SWBT into the meeting minutes.  Texas Commission 
Comments at 47; see also SWBT Texas I Application, App. C, Vol. 75, Tab 1233, Texas Commission Final Staff 
Report on Collaborative Process at 168 (filed Nov. 18, 1998 in Texas Commission Project No. 16251).
 	SWBT Ham Texas I Aff., App. A-4, Vol. 6, Attach. NN, SWBT Competitive Local Exchange Carrier (CLEC) 
Interface Change Management Process (dated Sept. 23, 1999) (Change Agreement).
 	SWBT Ham Texas I Aff. at para. 308.
 	See Change Agreement  3.3.1-3.3.16 (setting forth timeline associated with changes to application-to-
application interfaces); id. 3.5.1 (defining timeline for changes to graphical-user interfaces).
 	Pursuant to the Change Agreement, SWBT must maintain information relating to the change management 
process on a webpage that is made available to competing carriers (hereinafter referred to as competing carrier 
webpage).  The Change Agreement provides that the competing carrier webpage will contain, at a minimum, the 
following: (1) current version of the Change Agreement; (2) LSR-EDI Joint Release Test Plan Template; (3) log of 
competing carrier change requests; (4) references and/or links to requirements for upcoming releases; and (5) 
SWBTs exceptions to the EDI LSOG Mechanization Specifications.  Change Agreement  8.0.  ALTS and the 
CLEC Coalition argue that modifications to the competing carrier website are necessary.  ALTS/CLEC Coalition 
Texas II Comments at 17.  We are confident that issues such as these will be adequately resolved through the normal 
change management process.
 	Currently, these meetings are held on a monthly basis.  This interval, however, may change in the future.  SWBT 
Ham Texas I Aff. at para. 330.  The record indicates that competing carriers have an active role in the development 
of the agenda for the change management meetings.  As a result of Telcordias findings, SWBT includes an Action 
Item Register in the minutes to the change management meetings.  According to SWBT, this log facilitates the 
tracking of change management issues and notifies all participants of the status of outstanding issues.  Id. at para. 
334.
 	For example, SWBTs Change Agreement defines the procedure by which a competing carrier can submit an 
interface change request to SWBT.  SWBT explains that, in deciding whether to include a competing carriers 
change request in its requirements, it will consider such factors as feasibility, cost, and cost reduction, and user 
benefits.  SWBT Ham Texas I Aff. at para. 318.
 	See infra note 338 and accompanying text.  We further note that the Change Agreement specifies that the change 
management plan is dynamic in nature, and will be managed through regularly scheduled meetings based on group 
consensus.  Change Agreement  1.0.
 	Change Agreement  7.0-7.5 (defining outstanding issue resolution process).
 	Birch Tidwell/Kettler Texas I Aff. at para. 160.
 	Change Agreement  3.4.  These rules provide that the most recent prior release will be maintained in service 
after a new release, allowing competitive LECs to transition to the newest release at their own pace (or alternatively, 
wait to transition to the subsequent release).  SWBT Texas I Application at 34; SWBT Ham Texas I Aff. at paras. 
352-354.  SWBT adopted this versioning policy in response to competitive LEC requests during change management 
meetings.  Id.  SWBT will make available one version of a GUI at any given time.  Id.  3.5.
  	See SWBT Accessible Letter No. CLECSS00-084 (dated June 5, 2000), Attach. 1 to AT&T June 14, 2000 OSS 
Ex Parte Letter.
 	A release is considered major if a change in the Local Service Ordering Guidelines (LSOG) version occurs, or 
substantial new functionality is introduced.  See WorldCom McMillon/Sivori Texas I Decl. at para. 221.
 	AT&T and WorldCom point out, for example, that contrary to the documented change management plan, 
SWBT has not implemented versioning.  AT&T Dalton/DeYoung Texas I Decl. at paras. 37-44; WorldCom 
McMillon/Sivori Texas I Decl. at para. 224.
 	SWBT Ham Texas I Aff. at para. 307 (noting that its former change management plan was made available to 
competing carriers from June 1998 to August 1999).
 	See AT&T Dalton/DeYoung Texas I Decl. at para. 56 & n.26; WorldCom McMillon/Sivori Texas I Decl. at 
para. 218.
 	WorldCom McMillon/Sivori Decl. at para. 219, 223.
 	We further note that the current change management process was used in connection with the May 27, 2000 
release.  SWBT Ham Texas II Aff. at para. 55 (noting that the current agreed-upon change management plan was 
used for all releases implemented in 2000); see also Telcordia Dec. 1999 Change Management Report at 2, 6-8 9 
(concluding that SWBT generally followed the current change management process for the October 23, 1999 
release).  According to SWBT, except for the dates and timeframes that had already passed when it became effective, 
the current change management plan was effective for the October 23, 1999 release.  Specifically, SWBT states that 
joint testing was carried out in a manner consistent with the current change management plan, and the go/no-go vote 
policy was in effect for the October 23, 1999 release.   SWBT Ham Texas I Aff. at para. 314.
 	Letter from Lawrence E. Strickling, Chief, Common Carrier Bureau, to Nancy E. Lubamersky, Executive 
Director, Regulatory Planning, U S WEST, at 2-3 (Sept. 27, 1999) (U S WEST Sept. 27, Letter).
 	Bell Atlantic New York Order at 4002-03, para. 110; U S WEST Sept. 27 Letter at 2.
 	See infra part V.B.1.d(i)(a)(iii).
  	In its Documentation Analysis report, Telcordia noted that competing carriers cited SWBTs human resources as 
the most significant resources for EDI implementation, and that competing carriers were particularly impressed by 
the assignment of numerous, knowledgeable SWBT subject matter experts with wide-ranging areas of expertise 
during the implementation process.  Other resources cited by competing carriers as being helpful for EDI 
implementation included a daily conference call routine, SWBTs Mapping Matrix and LSOR, and the competing 
carrier website.  Id. at 11.
 	SWBT Texas I Application, App. G, Vol. 9, Tab 631 (Modification to the Southwestern Bell EDI/LSR Change 
Control Process-Arkansas, Kansas, Missouri, Oklahoma, Texas, Accessible Letter CLEC 99-097 (July 21, 1999)).
 	While we continue to believe that the existence of a go/no-go vote policy minimizes the need for versioning, we 
agree with AT&T that such a policy does not obviate the need for versioning altogether because, as AT&T explains, 
new releases impact different CLECs differently.  AT&T Dalton/DeYoung Decl. at para. 38.  For example, as 
AT&T points out, [a] defect in a release that will cripple one CLECs ability to convert and support customers may 
have little impact on another CLEC, thus creating the possibility that a go/no go vote will not delay the release.  
Id.
 	AT&T Dalton/DeYoung Texas I Decl. at para. 43.
 	We note that the issue of the availability of versioning was specifically raised before the Texas Commission.  
The Texas Commission ordered SWBT to implement versioning by January 15, 2000, see Texas Commission Order 
No. 5-Re: EDI Version Control (filed July 23, 1998, in Texas Commission Project No. 19000, Attach. 2 to AT&T 
Dalton/De Young Decl.).  Due to subsequent discussions with the Texas Commission, however, SWBT currently 
will not implement versioning until August 2000.  See Letter from Mark A. Haddad, Counsel for AT&T, to Magalie 
Roman Salas, Secretary, FCC (dated June 14, 2000 (AT&T June 14, 2000 OSS Ex Parte Letter), Attach. 1, SWBT 
Accessible Letter, CLECSS00-84 (dated June 5, 2000) (requesting input from competing carriers on its proposal to 
implement the versioning release in August 2000).  We reiterate that, until versioning is fully implemented in Texas, 
the efficacy of SWBTs change management will be carefully scrutinized.
 	For example, the evidence demonstrates that this change management process was developed with minimal input 
from competing carriers and failed to include certain key safeguards that competing carriers believe are essential to 
their ability to modify and test changes on their side of the interface.  In particular, the former change management 
plan did not require SWBT to complete internal testing of the release prior to the commencement of the competing 
carrier testing period, did not permit competing carriers to request that the implementation of the release be delayed 
if problems were encountered during testing (i.e., go/no go vote), failed to include documentation with respect to the 
entrance, exit, and success criteria associated with testing, did not require SWBT to extend the testing period to fix 
errors found during testing, and did not provide for versioning.  See AT&T Dalton/DeYoung Aff. at para. 56 n.26 & 
Attach. 6.
 	The Texas Commission has been actively involved in handling various change management issues through 
Project Numbers 16251 (proceeding addressing SWBT compliance with 271), 19000 (proceeding addressing the 
implementation of the AT&T/SWBT and WorldCom/SWBT interconnection agreements) and 20400 (proceeding 
established to handle change management issues).
 	Ameritech Michigan Order, 12 FCC Rcd. at 20616-17, para. 137.
 	Some commenters point out that SWBT does not provide a set of SWBT-specific EDI interface documentation. 
Instead, SWBT relies on industry standard documents such as the Telecommunications Industry Forum (TCIF) EDI 
Guidelines to notify competing carriers of the requirements necessary to build to its OSS.  SWBT notifies competing 
carriers of the differences between its EDI interface requirements and industry standards through documents entitled 
Accessible Letters.  Several carriers argue that Accessible Letters are an ineffective method of communicating to 
competing carriers the requirements necessary to build to SWBTs systems.  For example, these commenters claim 
that these Accessible Letters do not offer a comprehensive view of all of the differences between industry standards 
and SWBT-specific EDI interface requirements.  See AT&T Dalton/ DeYoung Texas I Decl. at para. 83 (arguing 
that Accessible Letters do not provide a comprehensive view of all differences between industry standards interface 
guidelines and those consistent with SWBTs EDI interface); see also AT&T Chambers/DeYoung Texas II Decl. at 
paras. 39-42 (describing deficiencies with respect to SWBTs EDI documentation).  Other commenters contend that 
that these letters often fail to include critical change management information, are not easily accessible, and often are 
not made available to competing carriers in a timely fashion. See Birch Tidwell/Kettler Texas I Aff. at paras. 163-66.
 	Several commenters suggest ways in which SWBT could improve the quality of its EDI documentation.  See 
AT&T Chambers/DeYoung Texas II Decl. at para. 42.  We are confident that any issues concerning the adequacy of 
SWBTs EDI documentation will be resolved expeditiously and effectively by SWBT through the normal change 
management process.
 	As the Texas Commission explains, in carrier-to-carrier testing, the ability of a competing carrier to build an 
EDI interface capable of pass orders to the BOC is one indicator of the sufficiency of the BOCs documentation. 
Texas Commission Comments at 46.  In this regard, the Texas Commission notes that, any deficiencies in 
documentation appear through the identification of errors.  Id.
 	SWBT Ham Texas II Reply Aff. at paras. 16, 131.
 	SWBT Brainard Texas I Aff. at para. 6.
 	SWBT Ham Texas I Aff. at para. 19.
 	SWBT Ham Texas I Aff. at paras. 20-21.  The IS Call Center answers questions regarding access to SWBTs 
systems and applications, and assists in the resolution of information technology problems experienced by competing 
carriers.  SWBT Ham Texas I Aff. at para. 20.  SWBTs OSS CLEC Support team is available to discuss with 
competing carriers such issues as hardware and software requirements, training needs, and implementation strategies. 
 SWBT Ham Texas I Aff. at para. 30.
 	SWBT Ham Texas I Aff. at para. 36.  The competing carrier website address is <https://clec.sbc.com>.  Id.  
Examples of OSS-relates sites that can be accessed by competing carriers include: (1) Customer Education Website, 
which presents an overview of OSS classes available for competing carriers; (2) IS Call Center Website, which 
assists carriers in the resolution of problems that may arise while accessing SWBTs OSS; (3) Performance 
Measurements Website, from which carriers may view performance reports; and (4) FOC/SOC Online Application, 
which provides carriers currently receiving FOCs and SOCs manually an alternative means for accessing these 
notices.
 	SWBT Ham Texas II Aff. at para. 15; SWBT Ham Texas II Reply Aff. at para. 30.  According to SWBT, GXS 
will assess each individual competing carriers situation, make recommendations relating to inter interface 
architecture and strategy, offer high level requirements, and issue a report detailing the above information to the 
competing carrier.  SWBT Ham Texas II Aff. at para. 15.
 	See SWBT Ham Texas I Aff.., App. A-4, Attach. T, Telcordia Technologies, Southwestern Bell EDI/LSR 
Documentation Analysis (filed Dec. 13, 1999 in Texas Commission Project No. 20000) (Telcordia Documentation  
Report).  Telcordias analysis consisted of three parts.  First, Telcordia compared documentation made available by 
SWBT to general industry resources (e.g., OBF Guidelines with respect to pre-order and order procedures, 
Telecommunications Industry Forum (TCIF) EDI Guidelines with respect to EDI mapping).  Id. at ES-1.  Second, 
Telcordia utilized documentation and resources provided by SWBT to create LSRs and their associated EDI records. 
Telcordia then utilized SWBTs How Am I Doing service to assess and analyze the accuracy of the data created.  
Id. at 3.  Finally, Telcordia interviewed four competing carriers to validate its own findings and identify any 
strengths and weaknesses perceived by those carriers.  Id. at ES-1.  The competing carriers that were interviewed by 
Telcordia were selected by the Texas Commission.  Id. at 1.
 	Telcordia Documentation Report at 8.
 	Telcordia Documentation Report at ES-1, 1.
 	Telcordia Documentation Report at 1.
 	Telcorida Documentation Report at 11(outlining some of the strengths noted by competing carriers).  Although 
some of the competing carriers identified areas in which the EDI implementation process could be improved, 
Telcordia concluded no competing carrier had identified a persistent problem.  Telcordia Documentation Report at 
12.  Indeed, Telcordia noted that all of the carriers errors were corrected after an initial communication to SWBT.  
Id.
 	In its Documentation Report, for example, Telcordia noted that CLEC representatives consistently commented 
on the responsiveness of SWBT employees to their concerns and issues raised during EDI implementation.  
Telcordia Documentation Report at 11.  In fact, Telcordia stated that its analysis revealed that all of the competing 
carriers errors were corrected after initial email or voice conversation with SWBT representative. Telcordia 
Documentation Report at 12.
 	See SWBT Ham Texas I Aff. at para. 111 & Attach. U (announcing that SWBT and Allegiance Telecom were 
able to establish electronic bonding between their two companies within 90 days).
 	See SWBT Ham Mar. 2, 1998 Aff. in Texas Commission Project No. 16251 at para. 62 (noting that AT&T has 
experienced considerable system and training problems within its own operations which have impaired its ability to 
send correct service orders.); id. at para. 63 (noting that AT&T has demonstrated an inability to correct known 
order entry problems which have unduly extended the [service readiness testing] time-frames); see also SWBT 
Application, App. C, Tab. 613, SWBT Ham Apr. 17, 1998 Aff. in Texas Commission Project No. 16251 at paras. 
40-42 (arguing that one reason that AT&Ts EDI implementation plans were delayed is that AT&T initially planned 
to develop a national interface, but then abandoned those plans to develop a regional system).
 	Ham Texas II Reply Aff. at paras. 9-16 & Attach. A.
 	SWBT Ham Aff., Attach. A, Telcordia Technologies, SWBT OSS Readiness Report at 24 (filed Oct. 7, 1999 in 
Texas Commission Project No. 20000).  As Telcordia explained:
This test provides an indirect test of the documentation and may not catch all the ambiguous situations.  
However, the documentation will be much improved since several CLECs used it to implement their 
interfaces.  Thus, the implementation improvements provide for enhancements for the CLEC community.
 	Telcordia Final Report at 24; SWBT Ham Texas I Aff. at paras. 284-87 (noting that every instance of 
inadequate or unclear documentation reported by Telcordia during the course of the third-party test has been 
addressed by SWBT); see also SWBT Ham Texas I Aff. Attach. KK (listing each documentation change made by 
SWBT during the course the Telcordia test).
 	SWBT Ham Texas II Aff. at para. 9.
 	Id. at paras. 9-10; see also SWBT Ham Texas II Reply Aff., Attach. A (providing a summary of the items 
discussed at the documentation meeting and SWBTs responses to these items).
 	Bell Atlantic New York Order at 4005, para. 113.
 	Bell Atlantic New York Order at 4005, para. 114.
 	Compare SWBT Competitive Local Exchange Carrier (CLEC) Interface Change Management Process (dated 
Sept. 1, 1999) with SWBT Change Agreement (dated Sept. 23, 1999). 
 	SWBTs Change Agreement sets forth a timeline for changes to existing interfaces and the introduction of new 
interfaces.  See Change Agreement  3.3.1-3.3.16 (timeline for changes to existing application-to-application 
interfaces); id.  3.5.1-3.5.10 (timeline for changes to graphical-user interfaces); id.  4.2.1-4.2.18 (timeline for 
the introduction of new application-to-application interfaces); id.  4.3.1-4.3.12 (timeline for the introduction of 
new graphical-user interfaces).  Changes are divided into two different categories:  Category One, which refers to 
changes to application-to-application interfaces; and Category Two, which refers to changes to graphical-user or 
proprietary interfaces.  The Change Agreement specifies the timelines associated with each type of change.  In 
general, SWBT shares its plans for changes to its interfaces at change management meetings approximately 9 to 12 
months prior to the target implementation date.  SWBT Ham Texas I Aff. at para. 310; Change Agreement  3.3.2.  
SWBT also provides a high-level view of upcoming Category One changes in a Release Announcement, which is 
delivered to competing carriers via an Accessible Letter approximately 180 days prior to the implementation of the 
change.  SWBT Ham Texas I Aff. at para. 310; Change Agreement  3.3.3.  SWBT must distribute the initial 
requirements associated with Category One changes within 152 to 172 days prior to the scheduled implementation, 
and 21 days prior to the implementation of a Category Two change.  Change Agreement  3.3.8, 3.3.9.  Final release 
requirements must be issued approximately 110 to 130 prior to the implementation of Category One changes, and 14 
days prior to the implementation of a Category Two change.  Release testing, which is conducted in connection with 
Category One changes, typically occurs at least 30 days prior to the implementation of the release.  Change 
Agreement  3.3.14., 4.2.16.  SWBT explains that the process for Category Two changes is different from the 
process followed for Category One changes because the latter requires programming by both SWBT and competing 
carriers and the former does not.  SWBT Ham Texas I Aff. at para. 317.
 	Telcordia issued two reports relative to SWBTs adherence to its change management plan.  SWBT Ham Texas 
I Aff., App. A-4, Vol. 6, Attach. LL, Telcordia Technologies, SWBT Change Control Process Validation Report 
(dated Sept. 1999) (Telcordia Sept. 1999 Change Management Report); id., Attach. MM, Telcordia Technologies, 
SWBT Change Control Process Validation Report (dated Dec. 1999) (Telcordia Dec. 1999 Change Management 
Report).  The first report, which was issued in September 1999, assessed whether SWBT followed its documented 
change management process in connection with the August 1999 release.  See Telcordia Sept. 1999 Change 
Management Report at 6.  The second report, which was issued in December 1999, assessed whether SWBT 
followed its documented change management process in connection with the October 1999 release, and whether 
SWBT had implemented the corrective measures Telcordia recommended in its September 1999 change 
management report.  Telcordia Dec. 1999 Change Management Report at ES-1, 2.
 	Telcordia September 1999 Change Management Report at 5; Telcordia December 1999 Change Management 
Report at ES-1.  Specifically, in its September 1999 Change Management Report, Telcordia noted that the initial 
requirements associated with the August 14, 1999 release were available on February 19, 1999, which was 178 days 
before the actual release.  Telcordia Sept. 1999 Change Management Report at 11.  The final requirements were 
issued to competing carriers on March 31, 1999, which was 136 days prior to the actual release date.  Id.  Telcordia 
noted that minor changes to the final requirements were proposed by SWBT via Accessible Letter on June 17, 1999, 
which was approximately 60 days prior to the implementation of the release.  Telcordia stated, however, that, given 
the scope of this release, it appeared that competing carriers had adequate time to review, comment and prepare 
testing for the changes.  Telcordia Sept. 1999 Change Management Report at 12.  In its Dec. 1999 Change 
Management Report, Telcordia again found that SWBT generally adhered to the timelines set forth in its formal 
change management plan.  See Telcordia Dec. 1999 Change Management Report at ES-1.  In particular, Telcordia 
found that SWBT issued an Accessible Letter on March 5, 1999, announcing its plans implement a release in 
October 1999.  Id. at 6.  The initial requirements associated with the October 23, 1999 release were made available 
to competing carriers on April 26, 1999, approximately 166 days prior to the date of implementation.  Id.  Final 
requirements relative to the October 23, 1999 release were issued by SWBT on June 23, 1999, which was 122 days 
prior to the implementation date.  Id.  The testing environment relative to this release was made available by SWBT 
from September 20, 1999 through October 18, 1999.  Id. at 7.
 	Telcordia Sept. 1999 CMP Report at 11-12.
 	In its reports relative to the August 1999 and October 1999 releases, Telcordia noted that SWBT deviated from 
certain aspects of the formal change management plan.  For example, in its September 1999 Change Management 
Report, Telcordia noted:  (1) SWBTs failure to comply with the timeframes set forth in the Change Agreement with 
respect to competing carriers responses to change management notices; (2) SWBTs failure to provide a test plan in 
connection with the Final Requirements associated with the August 1999 release; (3) a lack of evidence 
demonstrating that competing carriers had input into the development of test cases and a testing schedule; (4) a lack 
of documentation with respect to the entrance and exit criteria associated with release testing; and (5) a lack of 
documentation concerning SWBTs identification and resolution of issues encountered during testing.  Telcordia 
Sept. 1999 Change Management Report at 5, A-28, A-29.  In its December 1999 Change Management Report, 
Telcordia noted that, contrary to the documented change management plan, SWBT did not support versioning.  
Telcordia Dec. 1999 Change Management Report at 6 n.2.  Telcordia noted, however, that such deviations did 
undermine the achievement of the general objectives set forth in the documented change management plan.  
Telcordia Sept. 1999 Change Management Report at 5; Telcordia Dec. 1999 Change Management Report at ES-1.
 	AT&T maintains that SWBT has failed to demonstrate a pattern of compliance with its documented change 
management procedures, and has introduced numerous changes outside the change management process.  See AT&T 
Dalton/DeYoung Texas I Decl. at paras. 54-73 (providing examples of SWBTs failure to follow documented 
change management plan); id. at paras. 45-53 (outlining instances in which SWBT implemented coding changes 
outside of the documented change management process).  AT&T and WorldCom further maintain that SWBT 
improperly introduces a substantial number of changes pursuant to the exceptions process outlined in the Change 
Agreement in order to evade the standard 120-day notification interval set forth in the change management plan.  See 
AT&T Chambers/DeYoung Texas II Reply Decl. at para. 47; WorldCom Texas I McMillon/Sivori Decl. at para. 
221.
 	The Change Agreement, under the heading Exceptions, provides that:
[A]ny agreement to deviate from the normal [change management plan] shall be agreed to unanimously by 
qualified CLECs and SWBT.  If SWBT wishes to propose that a specified change, introduction of a new 
interface or retirement of an interface be handled on an exception basis, it will issue a Release (or Retirement) 
Requirements Exception Accessible Letter, which indicated that it seeks an exception following the conclusion 
of a reply and comment cycle.
Change Agreement  6.2.
 	Since December 20, 1999, SWBT has issued thirteen Exception Accessible Letters.  See SWBT Ham Texas II 
Aff. at para. 57.  WorldCom admits that SWBT is permitted to make these change pursuant to the exceptions 
process, but states that it is concerned that SWBT will make the exception into the rule.  WorldCom 
McMillon/Sivori Texas I Decl. at para. 221.
 	SWBT Ham Texas I Aff. at para. 311.  For example, SWBT discussed these changes at change management 
meetings, and/or issued Accessible Letters seeking comment on such proposed changes.  SWBT Ham Texas I Aff. at 
para. 316.  No competing carrier objected to the implementation of the changes either in the change management 
meetings or in response to the associated Accessible Letter.  SWBT Ham Texas I Aff. at para. 314.
 	For example, the record indicates that a particular edit was removed from the May 27, 2000 release due to 
competing carriers objections.  SWBT Ham Texas II Aff. at para. 58.
 	SWBT Ham Texas II Aff. at paras. 55, 57.  Specifically, SWBT states that:
[C]ompliance with the numerous regulatory mandates issued at the end of 1999 and in January 2000 (e.g., LIDB 
programming, ling sharing, and UNE Remand) have involved massive and complex programming efforts on 
SWBTs part.  In order to meet the timing requirements of these orders, SWBT has had no choice but to 
schedule its releases according to the exception process spelled out in the CMP.
Id. at para. 55.
 	WorldCom McMillon/Sivori Texas I Decl. at para. 221.
 	A stable testing environment means that no changes by the BOC are permitted after the testing period 
commences.  See Bell Atlantic New York Order at 4002-03, para. 109 & n.301.  
 	Id. at para. 109.
 	Id.
 	Id.
 	SWBT Ham Texas I Aff. at para. 338.  SWBT explains that competing carriers were notified of the new test 
environment via Accessible Letter CLECSS99-150.  See id. Attach. SS.
 	SWBT Ham Texas I Reply Aff. at para. 170.  Specifically, in contrast to the test environment that existed prior 
to November 1999 where the testing environment was shared between SWBT developers and testers and competing 
carriers, the current testing environment is physically separate from the production environment and is made 
available for the exclusive use of competing carriers for the purposes of testing.
 	Id.
 	Id.
 	Id. at para. 168.
  	See SWBT Ham Texas I Reply Aff. at para. 171.
  	See SWBT Ham Texas II Reply Aff. at para. 131.  As discussed more fully in paragraphs 139-140, infra, 
although some problems arose in connection with the January 15, 2000 release, the record demonstrates that these 
problems were isolated, were resolved by SWBT in a timely fashion, and did not significantly impede any carriers 
ability to test adequately the release prior to its implementation.
 	AT&T Chambers/DeYoung Texas II Decl. at para. 43.
 	AT&T Dalton/DeYoung Texas I Decl. at para. 77.  
  	AT&T Chambers/DeYoung Texas II Decl. at para. 44; see also Letter from John A. Redmon & David F. 
Werthheimer, Counsel, AT&T, to Magalie Roman Salas, Secretary, Federal Communications Commission, CC 
Docket No. 00-4, at 9-10 (filed Mar. 8, 2000) (AT&T Mar. 8 Ex Parte Letter).
 	Letter from Mark E. Haddad, Counsel, AT&T, to Magalie Roman Salas, Secretary, Federal Communications 
Commission, CC Docket No. 00-65, at 2-3 (filed June 14, 2000) (AT&T June 14 OSS Ex Parte Letter).
 	SWBT Ham Texas II Reply Aff. at para 127.  More specifically, SWBT acknowledges that it manually monitors 
orders as they enter and exit the testing environment, and that its testing environment does not emulate production 
response times.  SWBT Ham Texas I Reply Aff. at para. 168.
 	See AT&T Mar. 8 Ex Parte Letter, Attach. D, Final Minutes for February 8, 2000 Change Management Meeting 
Process MeetingArkansas, Kansas, Missouri, Oklahoma, Texas, at 5-6 (Final Minutes for Feb. 8, 2000 Change 
Management Process Meeting).  During this meeting, SWBT acknowledged that competing carrier joint testing goes 
through service order creation, but not through to billing and provisioning.  Final Minutes for Feb. 8, 2000 Change 
Management Process Meeting at 6.
 	See SWBT Ham Texas I Reply Aff. at paras. 165-69.
 	SWBT Ham Texas II Reply Aff. at para. 130.  For example, in the first change management meeting subsequent 
to the implementation of the January 15, 2000 release, Birch noted that it lost a weeks worth of revenue due to 
problems with the release.  Final Minutes for Feb. 8, 2000 Change Management Process Meeting at 6.
 	Final Minutes for Feb. 8, 2000 Change Management Process Meeting at 6.
 	Id.
 	SWBT Ham Texas II Reply Aff. at para. 130.
 	See Final Minutes for Feb. 8, 2000 Change Management Process Meeting at 6.
 	In response to concerns raised by competing carriers with respect to the testing environment, SWBT stated that 
it would check into the possibility of running a test through to the billing cycle.  Id.
 	AT&T Chambers/DeYoung Texas II Decl. at para. 45.
 	SWBT Ham Texas II Reply Aff. at para. 132 & Attach. RR (Pacific Bell, Nevada Bell, Southwestern Bell and 
Competitive Local Exchange Carrier (CLEC) Joint Release Test Plan Template for Local Service Request (LSR) 
Electronic Date Interchange (EDI), Version 3.0,  2.2 (SWBT/CLEC Joint Release Test Plan)).
 	SWBT Ham Texas II Reply Aff. at para. 132.
 	Id.
 	Id.
 	Department of Justice Texas I Evaluation at 49-50.
 	Id. at 51-52.
 	Id. at 52-53.
 	SWBT Ham Texas I Reply Aff. at para. 170.
 	SWBT Texas I Application at 25; SWBT Ham Texas I Aff. at 19; SWBT Conway Texas I Aff. at paras 5, 12. 
SWBT states that the LSC executes complex transactions that are performed manually for both SWBT retail 
customers and competing carriers, as well as other transactions for competing carriers that prefer to use manual 
processes.  SWBT Application at 25; SWBT Conway Texas I Aff. at paras. 5, 34, 38. 
 	SWBT Conway Texas I Aff. at para. 18.
 	SWBT Application at 25; SWBT Conway Texas I Aff. at paras. 6, 25.  The LSC has a staff of approximately 
600 employees.  Id.
 	SWBT Application at 26; SWBT Conway Texas I Aff. at paras 7, 15.  The LOC has 148 employees and is 
available to competing carriers 24 hours a day, 7 days a week.  SWBT Conway Texas I Aff. at paras. 15-17.
 	Competing carriers can contact the CAST through a hotline that is operational 24 hours a day, 7 days a week.  
SWBT Conway Texas I Aff. at 10.  
 	SWBT Conway Texas I Aff. at para 107.
 	SWBT Application at 25; SWBT Conway Texas I Aff. at paras. 6, 114-117.
 	SWBT Application at 24; SWBT Ham Texas I Aff. at paras. 20-28.  The IS call center is open 24 hours per day, 
7 days per week.  Id.
 	SWBT offers classes on using its electronic OSS interfaces as well as a free workshop that covers both manual 
and electronic ordering processes.  SWBT Ham. Texas I Aff. at paras. 370-74; SWBT Auinbauh Texas I Aff. at 
paras. 154-170. 
 	SWBT Texas I Application at 24-25; SWBT Ham Texas I Aff. at para. 18; see also SWBT Auinbauh Texas I 
Aff. at paras. 171-173.
 	Several parties assert that SWBTs LSC is inadequately staffed and that the personnel is inadequately trained. 
CLEC Coalition Comments at 35-36.  Some commenters further argue that the Telcordia test did not adequately 
address support organizations such as the Help Desk, and Information Services Call Center.  CLEC Coalition 
Comments at 5; But see Texas Commission Evaluation at 46-47 (describing training and documentation.)
 	As explained below, this does not include an evaluation of new loop qualification obligations under rule 319 that 
became effective in May, 2000.  See section III.D, infra.
 	See Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 4014, para. 129; see also Second BellSouth Louisiana Order, 
13 FCC Rcd. at 20660, para. 94 (referring to pre-ordering and ordering collectively as the exchange of 
information between telecommunications carriers about current or proposed customer products and services or 
unbundled network elements or some combination thereof).  In prior orders, the Commission has identified the 
following five pre-order functions: (1) customer service record (CSR) information; (2) address validation; (3) 
telephone number information; (4) due date information; (5) services and feature information.  See Bell Atlantic New 
York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 4015, para. 132; Second BellSouth Louisiana Order, 13 FCC Rcd. at 20660, para. 94; 
BellSouth South Carolina Order, 13 FCC Rcd. at 619, para. 147.
 	Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 4014, para. 129. 
 	Id.; see also; BellSouth South Carolina Order, 13 FCC Rcd. at 623-29 (concluding that failure to deploy an 
application-to-application interface denies competing carriers equivalent access to pre-ordering OSS functions).
 	Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 4014, para. 129.
 	See id. at 4014, para. 130; Second BellSouth Louisiana Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 20661-67, para. 105.
 	See SWBT Texas I Application at 82; SWBT Texas I Ham Aff. at para. 53.
 	See SWBT Texas I Ham Aff. at paras. 52 and 54.  These 11 functions go beyond the seven pre-ordering 
functions previously identified by the Commission.  See Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 4015, para. 
132 (discussing the first seven functions listed above).
 	See SWBT Texas I Application at 82; SWBT Texas I Ham Aff. at para. 68 (explaining that, in addition to 
allowing direct access to DataGate, it is front-ending DataGate, thereby providing an interface that can be used by 
competing carriers that conforms to existing national standards for EDI and CORBA).  According to SBC, this 
allows competing carriers to build their interfaces to national standards, while preserving the background application 
functionality, data content, and performance standards that SWBT has established for DataGate.  Id. 
 	See SWBT Texas I Ham Aff. at paras. 69-70; but see AT&T Texas I Dalton/DeYoung Reply Decl. at 16 
(explaining that, unlike DataGate, EDI and CORBA do not return certain pre-ordering information  CLLI codes and 
NC/NCI information  that is necessary for completing a UNE-P order).
 	SWBTs performance metrics measure the timeliness and availability only of the DataGate and VeriGate pre-
ordering interfaces.  See SWBT Texas I Dysart Aff. at paras. 95-114.
 	See SWBT Texas I Ham Aff. at paras. 66 and 70.
 	See SWBT Aggregated Performance Data, Measurement No. 1 (Average Response Time for OSS Pre-Order 
Interfaces) at 271-1a.  Specifically, the data reflect a significant volume of the following types of pre-order 
transactions:  retrieve CSRs;  validate addresses;  select and reserve telephone numbers; determine services and 
features available to a customer; obtain due date availability; and retrieve local primary intraLATA carrier (LPIC) 
and primary interexchange carrier (PIC) list.  The ability to access loop qualification information at the pre-ordering 
stage is discussed separately, below.  
 	See SWBT Texas I Ham Aff. at para. 268 (recognizing that, rather than test the application-to-application 
DataGate pre-ordering interface as part of its UNE-P functionality test, Telcordia only looked at the VeriGate GUI). 
 We note, however, that Telcordia did assess the ability of the DataGate system to handle a high volume of 
transactions as part of its capacity test.  See id. at para. 290.
 	See AT&T Texas I Dalton/DeYoung Decl. at paras. 104-105 (suggesting that SWBT has the ability to label 
some numbers as available for ILEC and available for non-ILEC and thus would have the ability, if it chose, to 
favor its own operations).
 	SWBT also asserts that three carriers, using software developed by third party vendors, have successfully 
integrated two other pre-ordering interfaces, EDI and CORBA, with EDI for ordering.  See SWBT Texas II 
Comments at 38; SWBT Texas II Ham Aff. at paras. 27-29, and Att. F and G.  There is no corroborating evidence in 
the record (such as commercial usage or statements from these carriers) that these integration efforts have been 
successful.  Moreover, as noted above, SWBT does not demonstrate that its EDI and CORBA interfaces satisfy all 
necessary aspects of our pre-ordering analysis.  We do not need to rely on SWBTs assertions regarding EDI and 
CORBA, however, because we find that SWBTs DataGate interface may be integrated.
 	See Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 4019, para. 137 ([w]ithout an integrated system, a competing 
carrier would be forced to re-enter pre-ordering information manually into an ordering interface, which leads to 
additional costs and delays, as well as a greater risk of error.).
 	See id. at para. 138 (discussing Bell Atlantics evidence that carriers were able to successfully integrate in a 
commercial setting); see also WorldCom Texas II McMillon/Sivori/Lichtenberg Reply Decl. at para. 14 (conceding 
that CLECs can build some form of integrated pre-order and order interface, but indicating that parsing and 
integration difficulties lead to a high reject rate which negates the benefits of integration).
 	See SWBT Texas II Ham Reply Aff. at para. 21; see also AT&T Texas I Dalton/DeYoung Decl. at para. 14.  
Specifically, SWBT explains that, in response to a competing LECs request for a customers information via the 
DataGate pre-ordering interface, it returns address information (including street number, apartment number, street 
name, thoroughfare type and community name) as a string of numbers and words.  Each of these pieces of 
information must be populated in separate fields on the LSR, in accordance with the incumbent LECs pre-ordering 
and ordering business rules.  Other information, including the customer name, telephone number and zip code are 
returned in a parsed format  that is, each separate piece of information is identified by a particular code that can 
be matched to a field on the LSR.
 	Contrary to AT&Ts interpretation of the Bell Atlantic New York Order, see AT&T Texas I Dalton/DeYoung 
Decl. at para. 95, we have not previously stated that a BOC must perform parsing on its side of the interface.  Rather, 
we consider whether integration has been shown to be possible (or has actually been achieved).
 	Indeed, we note that the level of detailed analysis required in this instance was not necessary in the Bell Atlantic 
New York Order because Bell Atlantic returned address information in a parsed format.  See Bell Atlantic New York 
Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 4020, para. 138.
 	See SWBT Texas II Ham Aff. at para. 15.
 	See SWBT Texas II Ham. Aff. at para. 3; Sage March 29 Ex Parte Letter; Navigator March 30 Ex Parte Letter. 
 The Texas Commission observed that other competing LECs may have undertaken steps to integrate these functions, 
but have not come forward.  See Texas Commission Texas II Comments at 6.
 	See Sage March 29 Ex Parte Letter at 1.  Sage has been submitting orders via EDI for at least ten months.
 	See Navigator March 30 Ex Parte Letter at 1; Navigator June 14 Ex Parte Letter at 1. 
 	See Navigator March 30 Ex Parte Letter at 1.  While WorldCom has not provided a clear explanation of its 
integration efforts in this proceeding, the Texas Commission noted that WorldCom has previously stated that it has 
integrated several fields, including the account telephone number.  See Texas Commission Texas II Comments at 6.
 	Although AT&T does not provide a detailed description of the process by which it takes address information 
obtained through pre-ordering and completes an order, AT&T does not suggest that it re-types such information, but 
instead it has endeavored to integrate DataGate with its EDI ordering system.  See AT&T Texas I 
Dalton/DeYoung Decl. at paras. 92-94.  Also, WorldCom confirms that it has integrated certain pre-order fields 
(including account telephone number), but apparently has not attempted to integrate the address fields and instead 
manually re-types them.  See WorldCom Texas II McMillon/Sivori/Lichtenberg Reply Decl. at para. 8.
 	We understand that, if a competing carrier places an incorrectly-parsed address on an order (i.e., a segment of 
the address is placed into an inappropriate field) it will result in a reject with an address-related reject code.  There 
are many other reasons for rejects which have nothing to do with parsing addresses, as evidenced by the hundreds of 
reject codes that correspond to the hudreds of mechanized and manual edits in SWBTs ordering systems.  See 
SWBT Ham Texas II Aff., Att. H.
 	SWBT Texas II Ham Reply Aff. at para. 61 and Att. D-1 (listing carrier-specific reject rates for April 2000).
 	SWBT Texas II Ham Aff., Att. H (listing the percentage of orders that receive each type of reject code, for 
certain carriers and for all carriers in the aggregate).
 	See AT&T Texas I Dalton/DeYoung Reply Decl. at paras. 11, 18-23.
 	See id.
 	See AT&T Texas II Chambers/DeYoung Decl. at paras. 48 and 55.
 	See SWBT Texas II Ham Reply Decl. at paras. 21 and 45 (suggesting that address-related rejects also may result 
from mismatches between SWBTs two internal address databases, PREMIS and CRIS).
 	See Texas Commission Texas II Comments at 7 and Att. 5 (Telcordia Pre-order/Order Integration Analysis). 
 	We note that Telcordia required oral clarification from SWBT on several points in order to complete its work. 
See Telcordia Pre-Order/Order Integration Analysis at 7.  Telcordia recommend[ed] several improvements to the 
documentation so that others will similarly receive such clarification.  Id.  SWBT reports that it has already 
implemented these documentation changes.  See SWBT Ham Texas II Reply Aff. at para. 36.
 	See AT&T Texas II Chambers/DeYoung Decl. at para. 23.  Telcordia explains that, while it did not actually 
send test orders through the editing process, it visually confirmed that each [address] element was in fact populated 
in its correct field. See Telcordia June 13, 2000 Ex Parte Letter at 2.  Telcordia further explained that it formulated 
20 testing scenarios, and also used different combinations of the elements of an address, to ensure that the 
concatenated address information could be parsed correctly.  Id. 
 	A comprehensive third party test of integration functions that includes an assessment of the various steps a 
competitive LECs would take in order to accomplish integration of pre-ordering and ordering functions would 
provide compelling evidence that a BOCs interfaces can be integrated.  In this regard, substantial weight may be 
given to a test where the tester (i) submits a pre-order query; (ii) receives data from the BOC; (iii) auto-populates the 
data into an LSR; and (iv) submits the LSR to the BOC.  SWBT itself identified these four key elements of 
integration testing.  See SWBT Texas II Ham Aff. at para. 14 (outlining steps that typically would be taken by a 
competitive LEC to accomplish integration of pre-ordering and ordering functions).
 	See AT&T Texas II Chambers/DeYoung Decl. at para. 23.
 	Telcordia explained that Datagate . . . concatenated address information is similar to the EDI concatenated 
values.  In both situations, the methodology is the same.  The only difference is in the different coding language 
used.  Telcordia concludes that the programming concept used for the script in parsing EDI files, both non-
concatenated and concatenated values, can also be applied to Datagate . . . files.  See Telcordia June 13, 2000 Ex 
Parte letter at 2-3; see also SWBT Texas II Ham Reply Aff. at para. 33.  We accept Telcordias explanation and find 
that, in this limited instance, its findings relating to EDI have relevance in assessing whether information obtained 
directly from DataGate can be integrated into the ordering process.
 	See SWBT Texas II Ham Aff. at paras. 24 32 and Att. I (SWBT Accessible Letter No. CLECSS00-051, March 
29, 2000).  For these orders, SWBT will suppress the address edits and itself will populate the service address 
contained in the CSR onto competing LECs orders.  SWBT suggests that this change would have eliminated 99.8% 
of AT&Ts address-related rejects in January 2000.  See SWBT Texas II Ham Aff. at para. 27.  Several commenters 
have agreed that this change would likely reduce rejects, particularly those associated with address-related errors.  
See AT&T Texas II Reply at paras. 73-74; WorldCom Texas II McMillon/Sivori/Lichtenberg Decl. at para. 40 (but 
suggesting that this change may have negative consequences as well); see also Sage March 29 Ex Parte Letter at 2.
 	We note that the TN Ordering change will not altogether eliminate the need for carriers to parse address 
information.  See WorldCom Texas II McMillon/Sivori/Lichtenberg Decl. at paras. 35-38; but see SWBT Texas II 
Ham Reply Aff. at paras. 81-83 (explaining that WorldCom overstates the instances in which carriers will have to 
use addresses).  Nonetheless, as noted above, SWBT enables carriers to perform this parsing.
 	The Department of Justice described this system enhancement as one of several significant steps taken 
recently by SWBT to alleviate concerns related to pre-ordering and ordering integration.  See Department of Justice 
June 13 Ex Parte Letter at 18. 
 	See SWBT Texas II Ham Aff. at para. 15; SWBT Texas II Ham Reply Aff. at para. 30.  SWBT explains that 
GXS is familiar with SWBTs systems and ordering rules because they have developed an integrated solution for a 
CLEC in SWBTs region . . . .  GXS has the experience and know-how to evaluate a CLECs technological platform 
and strategy and provide the CLEC with recommendations to insure sucessful integration.  SWBT Texas II Ham 
Reply Aff. at para. 30.
 	See Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 4025 and 4029, paras. 145 and 154.
 	See Texas Commission Texas I Comments at 34.  For example, the benchmark for responding to DataGate 
address verification queries is 4.7 seconds; for requests for telephone numbers, 4.5 seconds; for requests for CSRs, 
6.6 seconds; and for PIC information, 28 seconds.  See SWBT Texas I Dysart Aff., Att. A at 8-9.  We note that 
commenters do not argue that these standards are improperly lenient, although AT&T does suggest that a parity 
comparison would be preferable.  See AT&T Texas I Pfau/DeYoung Decl. at n.102. 
 	See SWBT Aggregated Performance Data, Measurement No. 1 (Average Response Time for OSS Pre-Order), 
and Measurement No. 2 (Response Received Within X Seconds) at 271-No. 1a to 2d.  SWBT has satisfied the 
benchmarks for average response time, as well as percent within X seconds, for each of seven DataGate pre-order 
functions for each of the last six months.
 	See SWBT Texas I Dysart Aff. at para. 111.  We note, however, that SWBT does not specify what the hours of 
availability for its DataGate interface.
 	See SWBT Aggregated Performance Data, Measurement No. 4 (OSS Interface Availability  DataGate) at 
271-No. 4a (100%, 99.7%, 100%, 100%, 98.5% and 99.7% for November 1999 to April 2000, respectively).
 	AT&T notes that SWBTs performance data would not reflect outages or unavailability of an underlying 
database, from which DataGate must obtain data.  AT&T indicates that such an event occurred in November 1999, 
and effectively made it impossible for it to perform pre-ordering functions during the period of outage.  See AT&T 
Texas I Dalton/DeYoung Decl. at paras. 106-108.  We do not find that there is evidence to suggest that the problem 
of subtending database outage is systemic, however, and conclude that SWBTs evidence adequately demonstrates 
the reliability of its DataGate interface.
 	As we have explained in the prior proceedings, because characteristics of a loop, such as its length and the 
presence of various impediments to digital transmission, can hinder certain advanced services technologies, carriers 
often seek to pre-qualify a loop by accessing basic loop makeup information that will assist carriers in ascertaining 
whether the loop, either with or without the removal of the impediments, can support a particular advanced service.  
See Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 4021, para. 140.
 	See section III.B, supra; see also UNE Remand Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 3926, para. 527.
 	See Bell Atlantic New York, 15 FCC Rcd at 4021-22, paras. 140-141.
 	See SWBT Texas II Brown Aff. at para. 18 and Att. D (SWBT Accessible Letter No. CLECSS00-043); see also 
SWBT Texas II Cruz Aff. at para. 33 and Att. E at 1 (SWBT Accessible Letter No. CLEC00-062).
 	See SWBT Texas I Chapman Aff. at para. 26.  We recognize that, as of April 29, 2000, SWBT also began 
providing real-time access via Verigate and DataGate/EDI to this actual loop make-up information.  See SWBT 
Texas II Reply at 17; SWBT Texas II Cruz Aff. at para. 38.
 	See id. at para. 37.
 	See id.
 	See SWBT Texas II Cruz Aff. at para. 33; SWBT Texas I Chapman Aff. at para. 26.
 	SWBT reports that it returned competitive LEC requests for loop make-up information, on average, in 4.34, 
2.63 and 1.72 days in February, March and April, 2000, compared to 3.99, 5.39 and 2.15 days for the same requests 
submitted by its retail operations.  See SWBT Aggregated Performance Data, Measurement No. 57 (Average 
Response Time for Loop Make-Up Information) at 271-No. 57.
 	See SWBT Texas II Reply at 18; Arbitration Award, Petitions of Rhythms Links, Inc. and Dieca 
Communications, Inc. d/b/a Covad Communications Company for Arbitration of Interconnection Rates, Terms, 
Conditions and Related Arrangements with Southwestern Bell Telephone Company, Docket Nos. 20226 and 20272 
(Nov. 30, 1999) (Covad/Rhythms Arbitration Award); Texas Commission January 27, 2000 Open Meeting 
Transcript at 63-67 (Jan. 27 Open Meeting Tr.) (affirming November 30, 1999 decision of Texas Commission 
arbitrator).
 	See SWBT May 11 Ex Parte Letter at Att. 2; Covad June 23 Ex Parte Letter at 2-4.
 	See Covad June 23 Ex Parte Letter at Att. A (Implementation of Docket Numbers 20226 and 20272, Order No. 
13, Docket No. 22165 (Texas PUC, June 23, 2000) (June 23 Arbitration Order)).  In granting reconsideration of 
its May 8, 2000 order approving SWBTs firewall plan, the Texas Commission arbitrators explained that the existing 
firewall plan help[s] to ensure competitive neutrality within SBC, but nonetheless ordered SWBT to make two 
minor adjustments:  (i) to explicitly state the restriction of assigning employees to both wholesale and retail 
responsibilities; and (ii) to explicitly state that the term Competitor Information . . . includes any information 
received from a CLEC, including CLEC customer information, that if provided to SWBTs retail operatiors or 
affiliates, would place SWBTs retail operations or affiliates at a competitive advantage.  Id. at 3-4. 
 	See Covad June 23 Ex Parte Letter at 3. 
 	See June 23 Arbitration Order at 2; see also Covad/Rhythms Arbitration Award at 70 (explaining that the 
firewall plan would provide further assurance that competitively beneficial information is not being passed from 
SWBTs network provisioning operations to its retail service operations.). 
 	See Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 4035, para. 163; see also Second BellSouth Louisiana Order, 
13 FCC Rcd at 20677, para. 117.
 	See Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 4035-4039, paras. 163-166.
 	See id. at paras. 163-164 (discussing order confirmation notices); Second BellSouth Louisiana Order, 13 FCC 
Rcd at 20680, para. 120.  In this instance, as in the Bell Atlantic New York Order, we are not presented with a retail 
analogue for order confirmation notices, and thus assess whether the process and performance offered by the 
applicant enables an efficient competitor a meaningful opportunity to compete.
 	SWBT is required to return 95% of order confirmations (both manually- and mechanically-processed) within 5 
hours of order submission.  See SWBT Texas I Dysart Aff., Att. A at A-13.  For the past five months (December 
1999 to April 2000), SWBT has returned over 95% of order confirmation notices within five hours for Residence 
and Simple Business orders submitted via both LEX and EDI, with only one exception.  See SWBT Aggregated 
Performance Data, Measurement No. 5 (Percent FOCs Received Within X Hours  Mechanized) (Residence and 
Simple Business) at 271-No. 5a and 5c.  While Residence and Simple Business orders include both UNE-P and 
resale POTS orders, SWBT has shown that the vast majority of these orders submitted via EDI are for UNE-P.  See 
SWBT Texas I Ham Aff., Att. X-2; see also SWBT Feb. 14 Ex Parte Letter, Att. 2 (showing that, from September to 
December 1999, order confirmation timeliness for UNE-P orders ranged from 96.48 to 99.13 percent).  As in New 
York, complex business orders and loop orders over a certain size (10 lines in New York and 50 lines in Texas) are 
given a longer processing standard; these orders are relatively low in volume and are not addressed separately here.
 	SWBT Aggregated Performance Data, Measurement No. 5, at 271-No. 5c.
 	The Texas Commission also concluded that SWBT provides timely order confirmation notices.  See Texas 
Commission Texas I Comments at 39-40.  Although the Department of Justice expressed concern in the Texas I 
proceeding that SWBTs late-1999 performance on order completion notices appeared to be deteriorating as 
volumes increased, see Department of Justice Texas I Evaluation at 38-39, we note that SWBTs performance has 
been satisfactory in this calendar year, notwithstanding considerably heightened order volumes.
 	For December 1999 to April 2000, SWBT returned 85.8, 96.2, 98.4, 98.1 and 98.8 percent of confirmation 
notices on orders for stand-alone loops sumbitted via EDI within 5 hours, with corresponding LEX performance at 
97.5, 97.5, 92.9, 98.1 and 97.6 hours.  See SWBT Aggregated Performance Data, Measurement No. 5 (Percent 
FOCs Received Within X Hours  Mechanized) (UNE Loop 1-49) at 271-No. 5b and 5d.  Although SWBTs 
performance in this area was slightly below the benchmark for EDI in December 1999 and for LEX in February 
2000, we note that it surpassed the benchmark for four of the other five months for both interfaces, and thus conclude 
that the single shortfalls do not appear to reflect a systemic problem.
 	For the months of December 1999 to April 2000, SWBT returned order confirmation notices for unbundled loop 
orders in an average of 0.9, 1.2, 2.0, 1.4 and 1.4 hours for LEX, and 2.3, 1.6, 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3 hours for orders 
submitted via EDI.  See SWBT Aggregated Performance Data, Measurement No. 6 (Average Time to Return FOC 
(Hours)  Mechanized) (UNE Loop 1-50) (LEX) at 271-No. 6b, and (EDI) at 271-No. 6d.  SWBTs performance 
for these months with respect to order confirmation notices for UNE-P and resale orders averaged 1.2, 1.0, 1.0, 0.6 
and 0.6 hours for LEX orders, and 0.7, 0.7, 0.8, 5.6 and 1.4 hours for EDI orders.  See SWBT Aggregated 
Performance Data, Measurement No. 6 (Average Time to Return FOC (Hours)  Mechanized) (Residence and 
Simple Business) (LEX) at 271-No. 6a, and (EDI) at 271-No. 6c.  We note that, considering the loop and UNE-P 
orders together, this performance is several hours faster than the average performance reported by Bell Atlantic 
(8.48, 8.84, 6.16 and 6.46 hours for loops and UNE-P combined in June to September, 1999).  Bell Atlantic New 
York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 4037, para. 164, n.506.  In the Bell Atlantic New York Order, we concluded that Bell 
Atlantics ability to process nearly all competing carrier UNE orders in under 24 hours, and a majority of such orders 
within two hours of submission, provides an efficient competing carrier with a meaningful opportunity to compete.  
Id. at para. 164.  We caution that the comparison of performance data between BOCs can be misleading, because the 
measurement methodologies, statistical approaches, definitions, and exclusions may vary in significant ways.  In this 
instance, however, we determine that the comparison is a meaningful one.
 	For the months of December 1999 to April 2000, SWBT satisfied the five-hour standard for 77.7, 92.9, 95.0, 
95.0 and 94.1 percent of loop with ported number orders submitted via LEX, and 93.2, 98.2, 97.1, 96.4 and 96.1 
percent for EDI orders.  See SWBT Aggregated Performance Data, Measurement No. 94 (Percent FOCs Received 
Within X Hours) (Residence and Simple Business With Loop 1-19) at 271-No. 94a and 94c.  In the Texas I 
Proceeding, SWBT explained that its sub-standard performance at the end of 1999, for loops with a ported number, 
was attributable to inadequate training and staffing, and would be cured by retraining and reallocating its workforce. 
See SWBT Texas I Dysart Aff. at paras. 595, 598.
 	See SWBT Aggregate Performance Data, Measurement No. 5.1 (Percent Firm Order Confirmations Relating to 
xDSL-capable Loops Returned within X Hours) at 271-No. 5.1a.
 	ALTS/CLEC Coalition Texas I Reply at 17.
 	See SWBT Texas I Ham Aff. at para. 151.
 	See SWBT Ham Texas I Decl. at para. 147.  Errors detected by mechanized edits automatically result in rejects 
that are returned electronically via LEX or EDI, while errors detected during manual processing result in manually-
generated rejects returned electronically via the LASR GUI interface.  Id.
 	For the months of December 1999 to April 2000, SWBT reports that the average duration between receiving an 
order and returning a mechanically-generated reject notice ranged from 20 to 28 minutes (0.34 to 0.47 hours) for 
orders submitted via EDI  with one exception, March 2000, where the mean time to return was 6.03 hours.  See 
SWBT Aggregated Performance Data , Measurement No. 11 (Mean Time to Return Mechanized Rejects) at 271-
No. 10-11.  SWBT explains that the aberrant performance in March 2000 related only to AT&Ts orders and 
suggests that the ultimate root cause of the delays was a programming change on AT&Ts side of the interface.  See 
SWBT Texas II Ham Reply Aff. at para. 104.  AT&T has not contested SWBTs explanation, and thus we have no 
reason to conclude that this anomalous performance in March 2000 reflects discrimination against AT&T or a 
systemic problem with SWBTs reject notification process.
 	For the months of December 1999 to April 2000, SWBT reports that it returned manually-generated rejects in an 
average of 35.65, 28.47, 7.55, 6.41 and 4.93 hours, respectively.  See SWBT Aggregated Performance Data, 
Measurement No. 10.1 (Mean Time to Return Manual Rejects Received Electronically Via LEX/EDI); see also 
SWBT Ham 2 Reply Aff. at para. 36.
 	We thus disagree with AT&Ts contention that SWBTs failure to satisfy the Texas Commissions strict five-
hour standard proves that SWBTs performance is unsatisfactory.  See AT&T Texas II Chambers/DeYoung Decl. at 
paras. 101-102.  We further note that, while the Texas Commission did not comment on SWBTs improved reject 
processing times in this proceeding, it concluded that SWBTs reject processing performance was satisfactory in its 
Texas 1 Comments.  See Texas Commission Texas I Comments at 25.  
 	SWBT provided a detailed analysis of reject notices provided during these months, demonstrating that the long 
processing times were largely attributable to a handful of extremely tardy reject notices which related to duplicate 
orders that had already been filled months earlier.  See SWBT Texas II Ham Aff. at para. 36; SWBT Texas I 
Conway Aff. at paras. 27-28; SWBT March 31 Ex Parte Letter; see also AT&T Texas II Chambers DeYoung Decl. 
at para. 104.
 	See AT&T Texas II Chambers/DeYoung Decl. at paras. 85 and 98 (arguing that the combined rejection rate of 
30% for LEX and EDI orders in February 2000 is unreasonable by any standard, and that even a rejection rate of 
approximately 20 percent is . . . excessive).
 	See Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 4044, para. 175; Second BellSouth Louisiana Order, 13 FCC 
Rcd at 20673-74, paras. 111-112.
 	See SWBT June 12 Ex Parte Letter, Att. 1; see also Texas II Ham Reply Aff. at Att. D (listing carrier-specific 
reject rates).
 	See SWBT Aggregated Performance Data, Measurement No. 9 (Percent Rejects) at 271-No. 9a.  We 
recognize that a small portion of the recent decline in overall and carrier-specific reject rates may be attributable to 
SWBTs conversion, in mid-January, of certain rejects into jeopardies.  See AT&T Texas II 
Chambers/DeYoung Decl. at para. 93.  We agree with the Texas Commission, however, that the effect of this change 
on overall reject rates appears to be minimal.  See Texas Commission Texas II Comments at 9; SWBT Texas II 
Noland/Dysart Reply Aff. at paras. 73-76.
 	See AT&T Texas II Chambers/DeYoung Decl. at paras. 48 and 58; WorldCom Texas II 
McMillon/Sivori/Lichtenberg Decl. at paras. 17 and 41-48.
 	See SWBT Texas II Ham Reply Aff. at para. 45 (referring to the PREMIS/CRIS mismatch problem and 
indicating that this problem may be responsible for certain address-related rejects).
 	See SWBT Texas II Ham Aff. at paras. 24-32; AT&T Texas II Reply at paras. 73-74; WorldCom Texas II 
McMillon/Sivori/Lichtenberg Decl. at para. 40.
 	We thus believe that WorldComs concerns about processing a high level of address-related rejects will not 
likely be realized.  See WorldCom Texas II Comments at 3; WorldCom Texas II McMillon/Sivori/Lichtenberg 
Reply Decl. at para. 7.
 	SWBTs data indicate that fewer than five percent of all carriers orders submitted via EDI are rejected for 
address-related reasons, which would include orders rejected due to database mismatches.  See SWBT Texas II Ham 
Reply Aff. at Att. H.
 	A competing carriers orders flow-through if they are submitted electronically and pass through SWBTs 
ordering OSS into its back office systems without manual intervention.  See SWBT Texas I Ham Aff. at para. 125; 
Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 4033, n. 488.
 	See Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 4034, para. 162 (Flow-through rates . . . are not so much an 
end in themselves, but rather are a tool used to indicate a wide range of possible deficiencies in a BOCs OSS.). 
 	See Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 4034-4035, paras. 161-163.
 	See Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 4044, para. 175; Second BellSouth Louisiana Order, 13 FCC 
Rcd at 20673-76, paras. 111-115. 
 	We note that SWBTs flow-through rate reflects only those orders that are not rejected, and thus does not alter 
our findings regarding reject rates.
 	See SWBT Aggregated Performance Data, Measurement No. 13 (Order Process % Flow Through) at 271-No. 
13.  We place greater weight on the flow-through capability of SWBTs EDI interface than we do on the less-
sophisticated LEX graphical user interface because EDI is an industry-standard application-to-application interface, 
and thus disagree with AT&Ts suggestion that SWBT should not be allowed to rely primarily on EDI to 
demonstrate that it provides nondiscriminatory access to its OSS ordering functions.  See AT&T Texas II 
Chambers/DeYoung Decl. at paras. 108-109.  In any case, we note that SWBTs flow through rate for orders 
submitted via the LEX interface has ranged from 87.3 to 92.5 percent for December 1999 to April 2000, and 
achieved a better-than-parity rate for the past two months.  SWBT Aggregated Performance Data, Measurement No. 
13 (Order Process % Flow Through) at 271-No.13.
 	Several commenters suggest that SWBTs Measurement 13 overstates its actual flow-through rate and that the 
measurement should be viewed with respect to all orders and not just orders designed to flow through.  See AT&T 
Texas 1 Dalton/DeYoung Decl. at paras. 154-155.  Even under such a total flow-through approach, however, we 
note that SWBTs OSS flow through a high percentage of orders submitted via EDI:  for the months of August to 
December 1999, for example, an average of 84 to 97 percent of all service orders submitted via EDI were able to 
flow through the ordering systems without manual intervention.   SWBT Texas I Ham Aff., Att. X; SWBT Texas I 
Ham Reply Aff., Att. F. 
 	See AT&T Texas I Comments at 67.
 	See CLEC Coalition Texas I Tidwell/Kettler Aff. at para. 22. 
 	SWBTs PM 12 (Mechanized Provisioning Accuracy) excludes mechanized orders that were entered 
manually into SWBTs ordering systems, and no other measurement picks up these orders that did not flow through. 
 See SWBT Texas I Application, Appendix C, Tab 1815 at 54.  In any case, we note that SWBTs performance 
regarding fully-mechanized orders has generally been better than parity.  See SWBT Aggregated Performance Data, 
Measurement No. 12 (Mechanized Provisioning Accuracy) at 271-No. 12.  While SWBTs performance slipped 
noticeably in February and March 2000, SWBT has provided better than parity performance on this metric for all 
other months since August 1999, and achieved 99 percent accuracy in April 2000.  Id.
 	See SWBT Texas I Conway Reply Aff. at paras. 18-19 (explaining internal processes that monitor individual 
employees processing errors). 
 	Telcordia Final Report, Sec. 4.5.4.5.
 	See section V.B.1.g., infra.
 	Telcordia concluded that SWBTs major OSS systems had the capacity at the time of the test to process 
projected first quarter 2000 volumes, or 220,000 orders per month.  Telcordia Final Report at 105-131.  As part of 
this test, Telcordia also concluded that SWBTs systems could handle a peak volume of 2,000 orders per hour.  
Telcordia Final Report at 130.
 	See generally, SWBT Aggregated Performance Data, Measurement No. 13 (Flow Through) at 271-No. 13 
(indicating that competing LEC orders submitted via EDI and LEX more than doubled between January and April 
2000); see also, e.g., id. at 271-No. 5c and 5d (timely order confirmation notices), 271-No. 10.1, 11.1 (improving 
performance for returning manual reject notices).
 	See AT&T Texas II Chambers/DeYoung Decl. at paras. 146-151; AT&T Texas I Dalton/DeYoung Reply Decl. 
at paras. 52-53.  SWBT explains that it no longer applies this limitation to AT&Ts orders.  See SWBT Texas II 
Ham Reply Aff. at para. 94.
 	According to AT&T, it decided to submit all of its orders in once- or twice-daily batches to allow for a final 
internal due date check point that ensure[s] that its outbound EDI files contained valid due dates.  AT&T Texas 
I Dalton/DeYoung Reply Decl. at para. 53 and Att. 25; see also SWBT Texas I Ham Reply Aff. at para. 121.
 	Id. at paras. 117-118.
 	SWBT Texas II Ham Reply Aff. at paras. 93-94.
 	See SWBT Texas I Ham Aff. at para. 151.
 	See id. at para. 152; SWBT Texas I Conway Reply Aff. at para. 22 and Att. B.
 	See SWBT Texas I Ham Aff. at para. 151.
 	SWBT explains that its process for returning these GUI jeopardies was introduced last year, and has been 
amended through the change management process.  See id. at para. 152; SWBT Texas I Conway Reply Aff. at para. 
22.  As noted above, there is no analogous retail process for returning these GUI jeopardy notices. 
 	See AT&T Texas II Chambers/DeYoung Decl. at para. 112; WorldCom Texas II Sivori/Lichtenberg Decl. at 
paras. 58-65.
 	See SWBT Texas II Noland/Dysart Reply Aff. at para. 74 and Att. N (showing that the number of jeopardies as 
a percentage of orders (LSRs) ranged from 3.2 to 5.2 percent in January to March 2000).
 	See AT&T Texas II Chambers/DeYoung Decl. at para. 112; WorldCom McMillon/Sivori/Lichtenberg Reply 
Decl. at para. 60.
 	See SWBT Texas II Ham Reply Aff. at paras. 76-78. 
 	An order completion notice informs a competing carrier that SWBT has completed the installation of the service 
requested by the particular order.   See OSS Appendix for additional details of the SOC process.
 	See Texas Commission Texas I Comments at 40 (benchmark for PM 7); SWBT Texas I Dysart Aff., Att. A at A-
16 (benchmark for PM 7.1).
 	In the Bell Atlantic New York Section 271 proceeding, Bell Atlantic represented that it did not provide 
completion notification to its own retail representatives, and the New York Commission concluded that order 
completion notification lacks a retail analogue.  See Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 4052, para. 187, 
n.591.  Accordingly, rather than assess whether Bell Atlantic provided order completion notification in substantially 
the same time and manner as it provides such information to its retail operations, we assessed whether Bell Atlantic 
provided completion notification sufficient to allow an efficient competitor a meaningful opportunity to compete.  
See id.  To avoid uncertainty on this issue in future applications, we strongly urge applicants to indicate whether they 
provide completion information to their retail operations.
 	See id. at 4052, para. 187 (Until the competing carrier receives a completion notice, the carrier does not know 
that the customer is in service, and cannot begin billing the customer for service or addressing any maintenance 
problems experienced by the customer.).
 	See SWBT Texas I Dysart Aff., Att. 2 at 16.
 	For the months of December 1999 through April 2000, SWBT returned 97.1, 98.2, 98.6, 97.2 and 98.7 percent 
of SOCs within one day of work completion for orders submitted via EDI.  SWBT Aggregated Performance Data, 
Measurement No. 7.1 (Percent Mechanized Completions Returned Within 1 Day of Work Completion) at 271-No. 
7.1. 
 	For the months of December 1999 through April 2000, SWBT returned 87.5, 91.1, 92.9, 95.5 and 96.8 percent 
of SOCs within one day of work completion for orders submitted via LEX.  Id.  
 	See Texas Commission Texas I Reply at 25-26.
 	See AT&T Texas II Chambers/DeYoung Decl. at para. 118 (indicating that SWBT returned completion notices 
within one day of completing its UNE loop orders only 80 percent of the time in January and February 2000).
 	See SWBT Texas I Rogers Aff. at para. 59.
 	See SWBT Texas I Rogers Reply Aff. at para. 20.  SWBT implemented the process allowing competing carriers 
to update an end users LIDB records through the initial order establishing service on January 15, 2000.  Id.  We 
conclude that this new process adequately addresses carriers assertions that SWBTs system used to be 
discriminatory, because carriers may now update new customers records promptly at the time of the order, and no 
longer need to submit the same customer information twice (once on the LSR and again to update LIDB).  See 
WorldCom Texas I McMillon/Sivori Decl. at para. 83; CLEC Coalition Texas 1 Tidwell/Kettler Decl. at paras. 86-
89.
 	See WorldCom Texas II McMillon/Sivori/Lichtenberg Decl. at paras. 66-73 (reporting that it had found LIDB 
processing errors for 19 orders, out of a sample of 60); WorldCom Texas II McMillon/Sivori/Lichtenberg Reply 
Decl. at paras. 26-40 (reporting that it had found LIDB processing errors for 157 orders, out of an additional sample 
of 360).  Most of the errors identified by WorldCom were instances where the customers LIDB records contained 
the wrong intraLATA and/or long distance carrier (PIC).  In some cases, WorldCom was denied access to its 
customers LIDB records, indicating that SWBT had failed to promptly transfer ownership of the records.  Id.
 	See Department of Justice June 13 Ex Parte at 18-19.
 	SWBT indicates that end users are not affected by this particular LIDB problem  delays in updating PIC 
information, which lists the customers long distance carrier.  Specifically, SWBT explains that the PIC listed in 
LIDB has no impact on an end users service, and WorldCom has not disputed this contention or otherwise alleged 
that their customers have been impacted by incorrect PIC updates.  See SWBT Texas II Rogers Reply Aff. at 
paras. 7-8; WorldCom Texas II McMillon/Sivori/Lichtenberg Reply Decl. at paras. 35-38.  WorldCom has also 
suggested that errors in updating another LIDB field (the Account Owner field) could cause their customers to 
receive incorrect branding on directory assistance and operator calls, but alleges only three instances in which this 
actually has occurred.  See WorldCom Texas II Comments at para. 72.  We agree that incorrect branding can harm 
competing carriers, but the record does not reflect that this problem actually has affected competition in Texas.
 	Specifically, SWBT explains that certain service representatives contrary to [SWBTs] processes failed to type 
the Toll File Guide portion (referred to as the N order) of the competitive LECs request in a timely manner.  As a 
result, the portions of the LIDB record which are updated based on the Toll File Guide order also were not updated 
in a timely manner.  See SWBT Texas II Noland/Dysart Aff. at para. 88.
 	See id. at paras. 87-92. 
 	Finally, we disagree with WorldComs contention that the process for updating existing customers LIDB 
records is discriminatory.  See WorldCom Texas I Comments at 4, 14-17; WorldCom Texas I 
McMillon/Sivori/Lichtenberg Reply Decl. at paras. 30-32; see also AT&T Texas I Dalton/DeYoung Reply Decl. at 
n.6.  WorldCom has not demonstrated that the GUI process offered by SWBT is unreasonably burdensome or per se 
discriminatory, and we conclude that this process provides carriers with access to LIDB in substantially the same 
time and manner as SWBT provides for itself.
 	See SWBT Texas I Dysart Aff. at 521 and Att. A at A-28.  While this performance data provides some 
indication that SWBTs systems post completed orders to the billing systems in a timely manner, it does not reflect 
how long (i.e., how many days) it takes most orders to post.  We note with approval that SWBT has committed to 
implement a performance measurement that tracks the average time it takes to post all orders.  Such a measure was 
implemented recently by Bell Atlantic in New York.  See Bell Atlantic-New York Authorization Under Section 271 
of the Communications Act to Provide In-Region, InterLATA Service in the State of New York, File No. EB-00-IH-
0085, Acct. No. X32080004, Order and Consent Decree.
 	SWBTs data for the last five months indicate that it posts an average of 98.15 percent of competing carriers 
orders within the correct billing period, compared to 98.95 percent of its own orders.  SWBT Aggregated 
Performance Data, Measure No. 17 (Billing Completeness) at 271-No. 15, 16, 17.
 	See, e.g., AT&T Texas II Chambers/DeYoung Reply Decl. at para. 74-77.
 	AT&T explains that it reviewed a sample of six orders that had posted late in August 1999 and found that, for 
all six, the customer received a SWBT bill after the order completion date.  See AT&T Texas I DeYoung Decl. at 
paras. 193-196.  It is unclear whether such situations were examples of double billing for the same time period or, 
as suggested by SWBT, were simply cases involving a final SWBT bill covering a prior period before the end user 
switched carriers.  See SWBT Texas I Locus Reply Aff. at paras. 10-13.  In the end, the evidence presented in the 
record does not indicate that SWBTs process of updating its billing systems, or its overall performance in this area, 
deprives an efficient competitor a meaningful opportunity to compete.
 	Ameritech Michigan Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 20618, para. 203. 
 	See SWBT Texas I Locus Reply Aff.. at paras. 10-13; SWBT Texas I Conway Aff. at para. 55 (describing the 
specialized Error Response Team which focuses solely on clearing errors on orders that have been completed but 
fail to post to billing.  SWBT explains that this team prioritizes its work by age of the error and bill dates.).   
 	Texas Commission Texas I Comments at 43.
 	See AT&T Texas II Chambers/DeYoung Reply Decl. at paras. 78-82.
  	See SWBT Texas I Application, App. B, Tab 60 (SWBT/AT&T Interconnection Agreement) at Att. 5, sec. 7 
(loss notification reports associated with resale services) and Att. 10, sec. 7 (loss notification reports associated with 
UNEs).
 	We discuss loop provisioning below.  See section V.D., infra.
 	See Bell Atlantic New York, 15 FCC Rcd at 4058, para. 196.
 	See SWBT Texas I Ham Aff. at para. 187.
 	See id.
 	See id.
 	See id. at para. 189 (noting that SWBT changed the Customer Desired Due Date field on the FOC on only 
3.67% of orders in October 1999).
 	For timely provisioning of Resale POTS orders, we consider the following measurements:  SWBT Aggregated 
Performance Data, Measure Nos. 27-01 to 27-04 (Mean Installation Interval) (POTS  Resale) at 271-No. 27a; id., 
Measure Nos. 29-01 to 29-04 (Percent SWBT Caused Missed Due Dates) (POTS  Resale) at 271-No. 29-a.  For 
timely provisioning of Resale Specials orders, we considered primarily the following measurements:  SWBT 
Aggregate Performance Data, Measure Nos. 43-01 to 43-08 (Average Installation Interval) (Specials  Resale) at 
271-No. 43a-b; id., Measure Nos. 45-01 to 45-08 (Percent SWBT Caused Missed Due Dates) (Specials  Resale) 
at 271-No. 45a-b.  These data indicate that SWBT satisfied the parity standards in the several sub-categories 
(residential and business orders, POTS and specials orders, orders requiring field work and those requiring no field 
work) for each of the past five months (December 1999  April 2000), with only isolated exceptions.  We thus 
conclude that SWBT provisions competing carriers orders for reseale services, overall, in substantially the same 
time as its provisions equivalent retail services.
 	For provisioning quality of Resale POTS orders, we look to SWBT performance data reflecting the number of 
trouble tickets submitted within the first ten days after service is provisioned.  See SWBT Aggregate Performance 
Data, Measure Nos. 35-01 to 35-08 (Percent Trouble Reports on N and T Orders within 10 Days and Percent 
Trouble Reports on C Orders within 10 Days) (POTS  Resale) at 271-No. 35a-b.  SWBTs performance on these 
measurements was generally better than parity.  For provisioning quality of Retail Specials orders, we focus on the 
following performance measurements:  SWBT Aggregate Performance Data, Measure Nos. 46-01 to 46-08 (Percent 
Trouble Reports on N, T, C Orders within 30 Days) (Specials  Resale) at 271-No. 46a-b.  SWBTs performance 
was above parity for each type of resale specials service, with only isolated exceptions.
 	Texas Commission Texas I Comments at 93-94.
 	SWBTs Percent Missed Due Dates performance metric demonstrates that, for the last five months, SWBT 
has consistently met a higher percentage of installation appointments for competing carriers resale and UNE-P 
orders than it has for analagous retail orders.  See SWBT Aggregate Performance Data, Measure Nos. 29-05 and 29-
06 (Percent SWBT Caused Missed Due Dates) at 271-No. 29b.  SWBTs performance data also indicates that it 
provisions competing LECs UNE-P orders, on average, in the same or shorter period of time than it does for its own 
analogous services.  See SWBT Aggregate Performance Data, Measure Nos. 27-05 and 27-06 (Mean Installation 
Interval) at 271-No. 27b.  We recognize that these average completed interval metrics reflect only a portion of 
competing LEC orders, as they exclude orders for which competing carriers request longer-than-standard completion 
intervals.  Combined with the missed due dates metric described above, however, this measurement provides an 
additional indication that SWBT is provisioning UNE-P and resale service in a timely manner, when compared to its 
retail operations.
 	See SWBT Aggregated Performance Data, Measure Nos. 35-09 to 35-12 (Percent Trouble Reports Within 10 
Days) at 271-No. 35c.
 	See id. at 271-No. 35c. 
 	Specifically, for March and April 2000, 4.01 and 5.02 percent of UNE-P orders experienced a trouble report 
within 10 days of installation, compared to 3.13 and 3.68 percent for analogous retail orders.  See id.
 	See Appendix B (OSS Appendix) for a more detailed description of SWBTs provisioning process. 
 	An address mismatch could occur for two reasons.  First, there could be a problem with the address submitted by 
the competing LEC that was not picked up by SWBTs up-front edits.  Second, a mismatch could result from an 
inconsistency between SWBTs two address databases.  See Appendix B.
 	See id.; SWBT Texas I Ham Reply Aff. at para. 73.
 	See id. (if the C and D orders have different addresses, the two service orders will flow through all provisioning 
systems as independent service orders . . . .  The D order will flow on Due Date and disconnect the [customers] 
service.).
 	See id.; SWBT March 10 Ex Parte Letter at Att. 4 (explaining that orders that become disassociated due to an 
address mismatch are routed to the local service center (LSC) for resolution).  SWBTs minutes from a December 
21, 1999 CLEC Users Forum suggest that SWBT planned to implement a new process to address address 
mismatches on January 14, 2000, under which it would create a mechanized report listing UNE-P orders that had 
become disassociated and check the report three times daily.  See AT&T Texas 1 Dalton/DeYoung Reply Aff., Att. 
21 (SWBT Accessible Letter No. CLEC00-002) at 3.  SWBT placed a copy of this mechanized report (an internal 
report currently used by SWBT to detect orders that are at risk of an outage) on the record on March 13, 2000.  
SWBT March 13 Ex Parte Letter, Att. 1.
 	Texas Commission Texas I Comments at 18; see also CLEC Coalition Texas I Tidwell/Kettler (Birch Telecom.) 
Aff. at 63-70 and Att. AA at 3 (explaining to the Texas Commission in November 1999 that the volume of loss of 
dial tone is fairly small).
 	See CompTel May 11 Ex Parte Letter at 1-2 (reporting service disruptions for January to April, 2000); AT&T 
Texas I Dalton/DeYoung Reply Decl. at para. 41 (reporting lost dial tone for August to November 1999).  Birch 
Telecommunications filed an informal complaint with the Texas Commission in September 1999, arguing that 
service outages during the UNE-P conversion process were adversely affecting its ability to compete  but did not 
quantify the frequency of these outages.  See CLEC Coalition Texas I Comments at 27-28.
 	SWBT claims that AT&Ts figure is too high, instead suggesting that fewer than one percent of AT&Ts UNE-P 
conversions in December 1999 and January 2000 resulted in lost dial tone.  See SWBT Texas II Ham Aff. at para. 
31; SWBT March 24 ex parte Letter.  SWBT further claims that, based on its own review of trouble tickets 
submitted by Network Intelligence, that none of the service problems identified by Network Intelligence were 
attributable to the three-order process:  SWBT either found no problem to exist, or determined that the problem was 
attributable to the customers wiring, or SWBTs central office or cable facilities.  See SWBT Texas II 
Noland/Dysart Reply Aff. at paras. 78-83.
 	See CLEC Coalition Texas I Tidwell/Kettler (Birch) Aff. at paras. 81-90.  Birch Telecom complained of other 
problems relating to the UNE-P three-order process which are addressed elsewhere in this Order.  See CLEC 
Coalition Texas I Tidwell/Kettler (Birch) Aff. at paras. 76-91; see section V.B.1.d.1.f, supra (addressing delays in 
posting to billing, double-billing and LIDB update issues).
 	See CompTel Texas II Comments at 3-4; Global Crossing Texas II Reply Comments at 2.
 	Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 4067, para. 212; Second BellSouth Louisiana Order, 13 FCC Rcd 
at 20692; Ameritech Michigan Order, 12 FCC Rcd at 20613, 20660-61.
 	Bell Atlantic New York Order at 4067, para. 212; see also Second BellSouth Louisiana Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 
20692-93.
 	Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 4067, para. 212.
 	See id.
 	SWBT Texas I Ham Aff. at para. 217;  see SWBT Texas I Conway Aff. at paras. 66-68.
 	SWBT Texas I Ham Aff. at 218, 222 and 229.  The Toolbar interface enables carriers to perform the the same 
functions that SWBTs retail operations perform, including: (1) issue trouble reports; (2) conduct a mechanized loop 
test; (3) determine that status of an opened trouble report; (4) check history; (5) view a list of open trouble reports; 
(6) view a list of trouble reports closed within the last 120 days.  Id. at para. 219.  Although the EBTA interface 
provides only functions 1 to 4, this does not reflect a deficiency in SWBTs OSS.  The Commission previously has 
determined that a BOC is not required, for the purpose of satisfying checklist item 2, to implement an application-to-
application interface for maintenance and repair functions  provided it demonstrates that it provides equivalent 
access to its maintenance and repair functions in another manner.  See Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 
4068, para. 215.
 	SWBT Texas I Conway Aff. at para. 65; see SWBT Texas I Ham Aff. at 217.  The LOC is staffed by 165 
employees and is available through a hotline number 24 hours a day, seven days a week.  SWBT Texas I Conway 
Aff. at para. 15, 28, 31.
 	See SWBT Texas I Conway Aff. at para. 65-66.  Since 1996, the LOC has processed over 195,600 POTS 
maintenance reports in Texas and an additional 66,900 reports in the remainder of SWBTs region.  Id. at para. 65.
 	See WorldCom Texas II McMillon/Sivori/Lichtenberg Reply Decl. at paras. 53-56.  We note that carriers raised 
a similar concern in the Texas I proceeding, explaining that SWBTs Toolbar system had the same limitation.  See, 
e.g., AT&T Texas I Dalton/DeYoung Decl. at para. 200; WorldCom Texas I McMillon/Sivori Decl. at paras. 191-
92.  SWBT implemented a change on March 18, 2000, however, which removed this restriction on the use of 
Toolbar and enabled carriers to use the interfaces normal functions for telephone number formatted resale and 
UNE-P services on or after the provisioning due date.  SWBT Texas I Ham Reply Aff. at para. 111 & Attach. K 
(SWBT Feb. 18, 2000 Accessible Letter, No. CLECSS00-018).
 	Id. at para. 224-226; SWBT Texas I Ham Reply Aff. at para. 112.
 	Indeed, SWBTs performance data indicates that carriers have been confronted with a very low number of 
trouble reports within ten days of provisioning, and we would expect the number of troubles occurring before an 
order posts to billing and triggers EBTA availability (which certainly should occur in under ten days) to be even 
lower.  See, e.g., SWBT Aggregated Performance Data, Measurement No. 35 (Percent Trouble Reports on C 
Orders Within 10 Days) (UNE-P) at 271-No.35b (indicating that competing LECs received installation related 
trouble reports on less than one percent of UNE-P orders in March and April 2000).
 	See SWBT June 23 Ex Parte Letter at 9.
 	See SWBT January 21 Ex Parte Letter (maintenance & repair interface response times), Tab 1.
 	See id.
 	Second BellSouth Louisiana Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 20693, para. 147.
 	Id.  
 	For resale POTS, SWBT took less time to repair end user troubles reported by its competitors than those 
involving its own retail customers for virtually all disaggregated sub-categoriesfor business and residential 
customers, for dispatch and nondispatch repair jobs, and for troubles affecting service and those taking a 
customer out of service.  SWBT Aggregated Performance Data, Measurement No. 39 (Receipt to Clear 
Duration) at 271-No. 39a-39b.  The only exceptions were SWBTs performance in February and April, in which it 
reported slightly longer-than-parity intervals to resolve business customers affecting service troubles that did not 
require dispatch.  Id. at 271-No. 39a.  We conclude that these exceptions, particularly when viewed in the context of 
the related metrics that reflect parity performance, do not reflect a systemic problem with SWBTs OSS.  Similarly, 
for UNE-P, SWBT reports shorter repair intervals for its competitors customers than for its own retail customers in 
every sub-category during this same time period.  See SWBT Aggregated Performance Data, Measurement No. 39 
(Receipt to Clear Duration) at 271-No. 39c.
 	For the months of December 1999 through April 2000, SWBT met substantially the same percentage of repair 
commitments for troubles on competing LECs resold and UNE-P lines as it did for comparable retail repair 
commitments.  See SWBT Aggregated Performance Data, Measurement No. 38 (% Missed Repair Commitments) 
at 271-No. 38a-b.  The only exceptions occurred in April 2000, with respect to business POTS troubles (no dispatch) 
and UNE-P troubles (no dispatch).  Because SWBT has reported satisfactory performance for the preceding four 
months in these two areas, however, we do not conclude that this April performance represents a systemic problem.
 	SWBT has achieved parity with respect to VGPL troubles for only one of the last five months and reported that, 
in March 2000, it took an average of 12 hours longer to repair or restore competing LECs VGPL troubles than for 
its own customers.  SWBT Aggregated Performance Data, Measurement No. 52 (Mean Time to Restore) at 271-
No. 52a.  Similarly, SWBT achieved parity with respect to ISDN (BRI) troubles for only one of the last five months 
and reported that, in March 2000, it took an average of almost 14 hours longer to repair or restore competing LECs 
ISDN troubles than for its own customers.  Id. at 271-No. 52b.
 	Calculations using SWBTs reported performance data indicates that, for the last five months other than March 
2000, the parity gap averaged 2.5 hours for Measurement 52-01, and 3.0 hours for Measurement 52-06. 
 	See SWBT Aggregated Performance Data, Measurement No. 37 (Trouble Report Rate) (Resale POTS and 
UNE-P) at 271-No.37, and Measurement No. 54 (Failure Frequency) (Resale Specials) at 271-No. 54a-b.  In only 
a handful on instances did SWBT report a higher trouble rate for competitors than for its retail operations:  
Residence POTS (February 2000), UNE-P (December 1999), resold DSL (December 1999) and UNE-P ISDN 
(April 2000).  Id.  We do not find these scattered discrepancies to be competitively significant for this metric in this 
instance.
 	See SWBT Aggregated Performance Data, Measurement No. 41 (Percent Repeat Reports) (Resale POTS and 
UNE-P) at 271-No. 41, and Measurement No. 53 (Repeat Reports) (Resale Specials) at 271-No. 53a-b.  These 
performance data reveal a statistically-significant disparity in only two instances:  a higher number of repeat reports 
for competitive LECs than for its retail operations for UNE-P in December 1999, and for resold DS1 service in 
January 2000.  We do not find that these results, particularly when viewed against the above-parity performance for 
the other months, indicate a competitively-significant disparity. 
 	Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 4075, para. 226; Second BellSouth Louisiana Order, 13 FCC Rcd 
at 20698, paras. 158-160. 
 	See SWBT Texas I Locus Aff. at paras. 10-11.
 	See id. at paras. 6 and 9.
 	Specifically, the standard adopted by the Texas Commission requires that SWBT transmit 95 percent of its 
Daily Usage Feeds for resale and UNEs to competing carriers within six business days after creation, and 95 percent 
of its wholesale bills within six work days of the bill date.  SWBT Texas I Dysart Decl. at para. 510 and Att. A at A-
30 and A-31.  The Texas Commission also established standards regarding the percent of usage records transmitted 
correctly (95% correct).
 	See SWBT Aggregated Performance Data, Measurement No. 14 (Billing Accuracy), Measurement No. 16 
(Percent of Usage Records Transmitted Correctly) and Measurement No. 19 (Daily Usage Feed Timeliness) at 
271-No. 14, 271-No. 15/16/17, and 271-No. 18/19/20.
 	See id., Measurement No. 19 at 271-No. 18/19/20; see also AT&T Texas II Chambers/DeYoung Aff. at para. 
133. 
 	See SWBT Texas II McLaughlin Reply Aff. at paras. 5-7.
 	See id.
 	See National ALEC Association / Prepaid Communications Association Texas I Comments at 6; AT&T Texas II 
Chambers/DeYoung Reply Decl. at paras. 134-135.  For the months of December 1999 to April 2000, SWBT 
returned 76.3, 92.2, 100, 65.7 and 100 percent of mechanized carrier bills (resale carriers only) within six days of the 
end of the bill cycle.  SWBT Aggregated Performance Data, Measurement No. 18 (Billing Timeliness) at 271-No. 
15/18. 
 	See SWBT March 15 Ex Parte Letter (explaining December 1999 and January 2000 performance); SWBT 
Texas II McLaughlin Reply Aff. at para. 9.
 	SWBTs Measure 18  Billing Timeliness (Wholesale Bill)  covers only resale carriers receiving bills 
electronically (i.e., it covers only those wholesale bills processed through the CRIS system and supplied to 
competing carriers via EDI).  SWBT Application, App. C, Tab 1815 at 59.  Although this document suggests that 
[a] separate measure is produced for carriers ordering UNEs and UNE-P, see id., the record does not reflect that 
such a measure exists.  The Texas Commission did not address the issue of whether carriers are receiving timely 
wholesale bills in its Comments in this proceeding.  See Texas Commission Texas I Comments at 42-45 (discussing 
other aspects of SWBTs billing functions and performance).  We note that Telcordias conclusion that the 
majority of paper and mechanized bills were timely is too vague to merit any waight.  Telcordia Final Report at 8; 
see also id. at 112 (mechanized and paper bills were generally sent/transmitted in a timely manner).
 	47 U.S.C.  271(c)(2)(B)(ii).
 	47 U.S.C.  251(c)(3).
 	Id.
 	Ameritech Michigan Order, 12 FCC Rcd at 20718-19; BellSouth South Carolina Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 646.
 	BellSouth South Carolina Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 646.  See also Local Competition First Report and Order, 11 
FCC Rcd at 15666-68.
 	Bell Atlantic New York Order at para. 230.
 	Id.
 	SWBT Texas I Application at 38; SWBT Texas I Deere Aff. at para. 164; SBC Texas I Application App. A-3, 
Vol. 1, Tab 1, Affidavit of Michael C. Auinbauh at paras. 40, 95-97 (SWBT Texas I Auinbauh Aff.); Texas 271 
Agreement Attach. 6.  The terms and conditions for access to unbundled network elements through physical 
collocation arrangements are set forth in the T2A, which was approved by the Texas Commission.  SWBT Texas I 
Application at 39; SWBT Texas I Deere Aff. at paras, 151-163.  SWBT has provided 655 physical and 40 virtual 
collocation arrangements to requesting carriers.  It has 683 physical and 158 virtual arrangements still pending.  
SWBT Texas I Deere Aff. Attach. E.  Texas 271 Agreement Attach. 6,  2.4.  Competing carriers can obtain tariffed 
collocation pursuant to FCC Tariff No. 73, through SWBTs Texas Collocation Tariffs, or by negotiating the terms 
and conditions for collocation in their interconnection agreements.  SWBT Texas I Auinbauh Aff. at paras. 40-79; 
95-97 and Attachments C, D, E.
 	SWBT Texas I Application at 39; SWBT Texas I Deere Aff. at 80-84; SWBT Texas I Auinbauh Aff. at para. 
66; Texas 271 Agreement Attach. 6,  2.22.
 	SWBT Texas I Auinbauh Aff. at paras. 40, 64, 95-97.  Collocation is not required in order to use this option for 
combining network elements.  Texas Commission Texas I Evaluation at 24.  Furthermore, when competitors order 
UNEs for combining at the secured frame or cabinet, SWBT is required to cross-connect those elements to the frame 
or cabinet at no additional charge.  Id. at 24-25. 
 	See SWBT Texas I Auinbauh Aff. at para. 86.
 	SWBT Texas I Auinbauh Aff. at paras. 87-93; Texas 271 Agreement Attach. 6,  14.2 - 14.4,14.7. In addition, 
under the terms of the Texas 271 Agreement, SWBT will unbundle local loops with unbundled local switch ports for 
competitive LECs to provide service to business customers until at least October 13, 2001 using elements that are not 
currently combined. SWBT Texas I Application at 35 (Texas 271 Agreement obligates SWBT to assemble 
previously uncombined network elements for [competitive LECs] . . . .); SWBT Texas I Auinbauh Aff. at paras. 88, 
91-94; Texas 271 Agreement Attach. 6,  2.4, 14.7; SWBT/AT&T Agreement Attach. 6,  2.4.  After October 13, 
2001, in those SWBT central offices where there are four or more competitive LECs collocated and where SWBT 
has provided unbundled network elements, SWBT may elect not to combine unbundled network elements for a 
competitive LECs business customers when the same UNEs are not already combined in that central office.  If 
SWBT makes such an election, it will provide the requesting carrier with access to a secured frame where the 
competitive LEC can perform its own combining of those elements.  SWBT will provide new combinations of 
unbundled local loop and switching not currently interconnected and functional in SWBTs network for the 
competitive LEC to provide service to residential customers through the full term of the Texas 271 Agreement.
 	See, e.g., CompTel Texas I Comments at 5-6; CompTel Texas I Comments, Exhibit A, Affidavit of Burk 
(CompTel Texas I Burk Aff.) at paras. 1-24; CompTel Texas I Comments, Exhibit B, Affidavit of Thompson 
(CompTel Texas I Thompson Aff.) at para. 26; AT&T Texas I Comments at 57-58; AT&T Texas I Comments, App. 
Vol. IIIA, Tab D, Declaration of DeYoung (AT&T DeYoung Decl.) at paras. 301-302.  See also CLEC Coalition 
Texas I Comments at 26-27. 
 	See discussion supra in OSS section.  SWBTs ordering system separates the requesting carriers local service 
request into three separate orders:  (1) a disconnect or D order instructs SWBTs systems to disconnect the service 
presently installed at the customer location; (2) a new or N order is created that instructs SWBTs systems to 
install new service at the customer location; and (3) a change or C order is created, instructing SWBTs system to 
modify billing for the line.
 	Rule 51.315(b) reads:  Except upon request, an incumbent LEC shall not separate requested network elements 
that the incumbent LEC currently combines.  47 C.F.R.  51.315.  This rule was challenged but upheld by the 
Supreme Court.  AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366 (1999).
 	See Department of Justice June 13 Ex Parte Letter at n.54.
 	See AT&T Texas II Chambers/DeYoung Reply Decl. at paras. 55-62.
 	See SWBT July 23 Ex Parte Letter at 4.
 	See SWBT June 23 Ex Parte Letter at 4 and Att. 13 (confidential).  Although we recognize that earlier remarks 
made by SWBT personnel in a workshop convened by the Texas Commission appear inconsistent with this policy, 
(see AT&T Texas 2 Chambers/DeYoung Reply Aff. at para. 59 and Att. 9), we rely on SWBTs clarification 
provided in its June 23 ex parte letter.
 	See Global Crossing Texas II Reply Comments at 2-3 (accusing SWBT of refusing to allow Global Crossing to 
provide UNE-P service in Texas even though existing agreements expressly provide for the availability of 
unbundled network elements).   
 	See Bell Atlantic New York Order at para. 444; Ameritech Michigan Order, 12 FCC Rcd at 20749.
 	SWBT concedes that one of its account representatives caused this delay by initially insisting that Global 
Crossing/Frontier could not convert its Texas resale customers to UNE-P.  See SWBT June 23 Ex Parte Letter at 4. 
We further note that Global Crossing may choose to address disputes, such as this one, arising out of its 
interconnection agreement with the Texas Commission.  See Texas Commission June 19 Ex Parte Letter at 4 
(welcom[ing] the opportunity to work with [Global Crossing] to resolve any potential issues).
 	See SWBT June 23 Ex Parte Letter at 4.
 	47 U.S.C.  251(c)(3).
 	AT&T Texas II Comments at 59-60; Level 3 Texas II Comments at 7-8; WorldCom Texas II Comments at 37.
 	UNE Remand Order, 15 RCC Rcd at 3914-15, paras. 494-496.  Special access service typically consists of:  (1) 
entrance facilities, which are dedicated transport links from an interexchange carriers point of presence to an 
incumbent LECs switch or serving wire center (SWC); (2) a dedicated transport link from the serving wire center to 
an end office (i.e., interoffice transport); and (3) a channel termination facility from the end office to the end user 
(i.e., the local loop).  Id. at 3912-13, paras. 485, 489.
 	Id. at 3912-13, 3915, paras. 485-489, 496; see also id. at 3915, para. 496 (seeking comment on the policy 
implications for our universal service program of a significant reduction in special access revenues).
 	Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, CC Docket No. 
96-98, Supplemental Order, FCC 99-370 at paras. 4-5 (rel. Nov. 24, 1999) (Supplemental Order); see Competitive 
Telecommunications Association v. FCC, 117 F.3d 1068, 1073-75 (8th Cir. 1997) and MCI Telecommunications 
Corp. v. FCC, 750 F.2d 135, 140 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).  The Supplemental Order extended the terms of the temporary 
constraint imposed in the UNE Remand Order beyond merely the entrance facility portion of special access 
because we had originally underestimated the extent of the policy implications associated with temporarily 
constraining interexchange carriers only from substituting entrance facilities for incumbent LECs special access 
service.  Supplemental Order at para. 4 & n.5 (extending temporary constraint to include combinations of unbundled 
loops and dedicated interoffice transport network elements).  See WorldCom Texas II Comments at 38 (noting that 
our provisional use restriction on UNEs as a substitute for access services was carefully tailored in an effort to 
preserve requesting carriers rights to use UNE combinations for all other telecommunications purposes).
 	Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, CC Docket No. 
96-98, Supplemental Order Clarification, FCC 00-183 at paras. 1, 21-23 (rel. June 2, 2000) (Supplemental Order 
Clarification).
 	See Supplemental Order Clarification at paras. 13-17.
 	Id.
 	Id. at paras. 15-16 & n.50.
 	Id. at paras. 19-20.  The Eighth Circuit upheld a similar determination by this Commission in Southwestern Bell 
Tel. Co. v. FCC, 153 F.3d 523, 548 (8th Cir. 1998).
 	WorldCom Texas II Comments at 37.
 	Id. at 39-41.
  	See UNE Remand Order at para. 486; Supplemental Order Clarification at paras. 22-24.
 	See Supplemental Order Clarification at para. 28. 
 	Supplemental Order at para. 5 & n.9 (noting that allowing requesting carriers to self-certify that they are 
providing a significant amount of local exchange service would not delay their ability to convert facilities to 
unbundled network element pricing).
 	Id. at paras. 22-23.
 	AT&T Texas II Comments at 57.
 	See id.; Letter from Mark E. Haddad, Counsel for AT&T Corp., to Magalie Roman Salas, Secretary, Federal 
Communications Commission, CC Docket No. 00-65 at 1-2 (filed June 27, 2000).
 	AT&T Texas II Comments at 58.
 	Petition of MCI for Declaratory Ruling that New Entrants Need Not Obtain Separate License or Right-to-use 
Agreements Before Purchasing Unbundled Elements, CCBPol. 97-4 & CC Docket No. 96-98, Memorandum 
Opinion and Order, FCC 00-139 (rel. Apr. 27, 2000) (Intellectual Property Order).
 	Id. at para. 2.  The Commission reasoned that the nondiscriminatory access obligation in section 251(c)(3) 
requires incumbent LECs to use their best efforts to provide all features and functionalities of each unbundled 
network element they provide, which includes any associated intellectual property rights that are necessary for the 
requesting carrier to use the network element in the same manner as the incumbent LEC.  Id. at para. 9.
 	SWBT Texas II Reply at 64.
 	Id.; AT&T Texas I Comments, Vol. 4, Tab F, Declaration of Mark Witcher and Daniel P. Rhinehart at para. 16 
(objecting to sections 7.3.2 through 7.3.4 of the T2A).  Section 7.3.5 of the T2A provides that the provisions of the 
Intellectual Property Order shall control over the terms of sections 7.3.2 through 7.3.4.  Id.  Furthermore, any 
disputes between SWBT and the other party to the T2A regarding implementation of the Intellectual Property Order 
are subject to expedited dispute resolution procedures before the Texas Commission.  Id.
 	47 U.S.C.  271(B)(ii).
 	47 U.S.C.  251(c)(3).
 	47 U.S.C.  252(d)(1).
 	Local Competition Order, 11 FCC Rcd at 15844-46; 47 C.F.R.  51.501.  See also Line Sharing Order 
(Commission concluded that states should set the prices for line sharing, as a new network element, in the same 
manner as the state sets prices for other UNEs).
 	See 47 C.F.R.  51.315(b).
 	Iowa Utilities Board v. FCC, 96 F. 3d 1116 (8th Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (temporarily staying the Local 
Competition Order until the filing of the courts order resolving the petitioners motion for stay); Iowa Utilities 
Board v. FCC, 109 F.3d 418 (8th Cir.) (dissolving temporary stay and granting petitioners motion for stay, pending 
a final decision on the merits of the appeal), motion to vacate stay denied, 117 S. Ct. 429 (1996); Iowa Utilities 
Board v. FCC, 120 F.3d 753 (8th Cir. 1997) (vacating the Commissions pricing and combination rules).
 	AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366 (1999).
 	SWBT Auinbauh Texas I Aff. App. Pricing UNE, Schedule of Prices.
 	SWBT Auinbauh Texas I Aff. at para. 140; SWBT Auinbauh Texas I Reply Aff. at para. 141. 
 	SWBT Auinbauh Texas I Aff., App. Pricing UNE, Schedule of Prices.  We note that SWBTs nonrecurring 
charges are substantially higher than those charged by incumbent LECs in other states, as the following table 
indicates:
STATE
RESIDENTIAL LOOP-TO-PORT 
COMBINATION RATES
Florida 
$1.46
New York
$3.73
Connecticut
$1.78
Texas
$23.03

 	SWBT Auinbauh Texas I Aff., App. Pricing UNE, Schedule of Prices. 
 	Texas Commission Texas I Comments at 26; SWBT Auinbauh Texas I Aff. at para. 142.  Rule 315(b) provides 
that an incumbent LEC shall not separate network elements that the incumbent LEC currently combines except upon 
request.  47 C.F.R.  51.315(b).  Although the Supreme Courts review of the Commissions rules in Iowa Utilities 
Board revived rule 315(b), the Court did not review the Eighth Circuits decision regarding rules 315(c) through (f). 
See Iowa Utilities Board, 525 U.S. 366.
 	Texas Commission Texas I Comments at 26; SWBT Auinbauh Texas I Aff. at para. 142; AT&T Rhinehart 
Texas I Aff. at para. 11; WorldCom Price Texas I Aff. at para. 4.  Glue charges are charges competitors pay to 
compensate the incumbent LEC for combining network elements.  We have expressed skepticism regarding the 
lawfulness of such charges in certain circumstances. See, e.g., Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 4092, 
para. 262.
 	AT&T Rhinehart Texas I Reply Aff. at para. 29; SWBT Auinbauh Texas I Aff. at para. 142.
 	SWBT Auinbauh Texas I Aff. at para. 142.
 	Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. AT&T Communications, No. 99-50073, (5th Cir. Feb. 24, 2000).  
 	See Iowa Utilities Board, 525 U.S. 366; Texas Commission, Docket No. 21622, Order No. 1 and Docket No. 
22290, Order No. 5, Consolidating Two Dockets Setting Forth the List of Issues and Schedule for Phase I of the 
Proceeding (April 4, 2000).
 	See Texas Commission, Docket No. 21622, Order No. 1 and Docket No. 22290, Order No. 5, Consolidating 
Two Dockets Setting Forth the List of Issues and Schedule for Phase I of the Proceeding (April 4, 2000).
 	SWBT Texas I Comments at 37-38; SWBT Auinbauh Texas I Aff. at para. 141; SWBT Texas I Reply at 56-57; 
Texas Commission Texas I Comments at 25; SWBT Auinbauh Texas I Reply Aff. at para. 43.
 	SWBT Auinbauh Texas I Aff. at para. 142; SWBT Auinbauh Texas I Reply Aff. at para. 43.
 	SWBT Smith Texas I Reply Aff. at para. 9; SWBT Auinbauh Texas I Aff. at para. 142.
 	SWBT Texas I Comments, App. A-3, Tab 1; SWBT Auinbauh Texas I Aff. at para. 142; SWBT Texas I Reply 
at 56-57.  See also AT&T Rhinehart Texas I Reply Aff. at para. 27.
 	WorldCom Texas II Comments at 35.
 	AT&T Rhinehart Texas I Aff. at paras. 57-58, 60; AT&T Rhinehart Texas I Reply Aff., Att. 2 at paras. 25, 27; 
WorldCom Price Texas I Aff. at para. 16. 
 	AT&T Rhinehart Texas I Aff. at para. 60; WorldCom Price Texas I Aff. at paras. 17-18; WorldCom Texas II 
Comments at 35.
 	AT&T Rhinehart Texas I Reply Aff. at para. 25.
 	WorldCom contends that competitive LECs do not have access to SWBTs network to combine elements and it 
is apparently on that premise that WorldCom infers a requirement that the COAC must be cost-based.  That premise 
is belied by the provision in SWBTs T2A that allows competitive LECs to combine individually ordered network 
elements.  WorldCom Texas II Comments at 35-36; see SWBT Auinbauh Texas I Aff., Att. A, Attachment UNE-TX 
at 2.  Because SWBTs interconnection agreement includes such a provision, competitors have a method, other than 
the COAC, of combining elements that are not previously combined in SWBTs network. 
 	See also part V.A.2 infra, Pricing of Interconnection.
 	AT&T Texas II Comments at 39-42; WorldCom Texas II Comments at 33-34.  AT&T and WorldCom have 
challenged the nonrecurring charges that apply to the pre-existing two-wire analog, loop-to-switch port combination. 
 The application of nonrecurring charges to other combinations of UNEs was not raised by the parties as an issue in 
this proceeding.  
 	AT&T Texas II Reply Comments at 37; AT&T June 14, 2000 Ex Parte Letter to Magalie Roman Salas, FCC 
Secretary, from Mark E. Haddad, Counsel for AT&T.  See SWBT June 27, 2000 Ex Parte Letter to Magalie Roman 
Salas, FCC Secretary, from Edwardo Rodriguez, Jr., SBC Federal Regulatory Executive Director; SWBT Auinbauh 
Texas II Reply Aff. at paras. 41-42. 
 	See SWBT Texas I Reply at 50; SWBT Auinbauh Texas I Reply Aff. at paras. 27-29.
 	See Texas Commission, Docket No. 21622, Order No. 1 and Docket No. 22290, Order No. 5, Consolidating 
Two Dockets Setting Forth the List of Issues and Schedule for Phase I of the Proceeding (April 4, 2000).
 	AT&T Texas II Comments, Exh. G, at 3 (SWBTs April 5, 2000 brief before the Texas Commission).
 	Bell Atlantic New York Order 15 FCC Rcd at 4091, para. 259; see also Section V.A.2, Pricing of 
Interconnection.
 	See 47 U.S.C.  271(d)(6).
 	Covad Texas I Comments at 15.
 	SWBT Texas I Application at 96; SWBT Auinbauh Aff. at para. 144.
 	Covad Texas I Comments, Tab 5, Final Arbitration Award, Docket Nos. 20226, 20272, at 87-88.  See SWBT 
Auinbauh Aff. at para. 144; SWBT April 5 Ex Parte Letter at 14.  
 	Covad Texas I Comments, Tab 5, Final Arbitration Award, Docket Nos. 20226, 20272 at 86-87. The xDSL cost 
study for loop conditioning was due on March 31, 2000 and for loop make-up information was due on May 30, 
2000.
 	Covad Texas I Comments, Tab 5, Final Arbitration Award, Docket Nos. 20226, 20272, at 86-88.
 	AT&T Texas II Comments at 64, n. 62.
 	Applications of Ameritech Corp. and SBC Communications Inc. for Consent to Transfer Control of 
Corporations Holding Commission Licenses and Lines Pursuant to Sections 214 and 310(d) of the Communications 
Act, CC Docket No. 98-141, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 14 FCC Rcd 14712, 14874 at paras. 390-391 (1999) 
(SBC/Ameritech Merger Order).
 	Id. at 14915-15, para. 494.
 	Id. at 14916 at para. 497.
 	At the time SWBT filed its application, SWBT offered competing carriers a second voice grade loop for the 
provision of advanced services at 50 percent of its lowest rate for a voice grade loop.  Because the Commission 
found that this was a reasonable approach until the line sharing requirements took effect, we reject AT&Ts 
arguments otherwise.  SBC/Ameritech Merger Order, 14 FCC Rcd at 14987-92, App. C., paras. 8, 14; SWBT Texas 
II Auinbauh Aff. at para. 5; AT&T Texas II Comments at 21; AT&T Texas II Pfau/Chambers Decl. at para. 13.
 	47 U.S.C.  271(c)(2)(B)(iii).  As originally enacted, section 224 was intended to address obstacles that cable 
operators encountered in obtaining access to poles, ducts, conduits, or rights-of-way owned or controlled by utilities. 
 The 1996 Act amended section 224 in several important respects to ensure that telecommunications carriers as well 
as cable operators have access to poles, ducts, conduits, or rights-of-way owned or controlled by utility companies, 
including LECs.  Second BellSouth Louisiana Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 20706, n.574.
 	Local Competition First Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd at 16073, para. 1156.
 	Implementation of Section 703(e) of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Amendment of the Commissions 
Rules and Policies Governing Pole Attachments, CS Docket No. 97-151, 13 FCC Rcd 6777 (1998) (Pole 
Attachment Telecommunications Rate Order), vacated in part, Gulf Power Company v. FCC, 208 F.3d 1263 (11th 
Cir. 2000).
 	47 U.S.C.  224(f)(1).  Section 224(a)(1) defines utility to include any entity, including a LEC, that controls 
poles, ducts, conduits, or rights-of-way used, in whole or in part, for any wire communications.  47 U.S.C.  
224(a)(1).
 	47 U.S.C.  224(f)(2).  In the Local Competition First Report and Order, the Commission concluded that, 
although the statutory exception enunciated in section 224(f)(2) appears to be limited to utilities providing electrical 
service, LECs should also be permitted to deny access to their poles, ducts, conduits, and rights-of-way because of 
insufficient capacity and for reasons of safety, reliability and generally applicable engineering purposes, provided the 
assessment of such factors is done in a nondiscriminatory manner.  Local Competition First Report and Order, 11 
FCC Rcd at 16080-81, paras. 1175-77.
 	Section 224(a)(4) defines pole attachment as any attachment by a cable television system or provider of 
telecommunications service to a pole, duct, conduit, or right-of-way owned or controlled by a utility.  47 U.S.C.  
224(a)(4).
 	47 U.S.C.  224(b)(1).
 	47 U.S.C.  224(c)(1).  Texas does not regulate the rates, terms, and conditions for pole attachments.  See In re 
Marcus Cable Associates, L.P. v. Texas Utilities Electric Company, P.A. No. 96-002, 12 FCC Rcd 10362, 10365, 
para. 10 (1997); see also States That Have Certified That They Regulate Pole Attachments, Public Notice, 7 FCC 
Rcd 1498 (1992).  The 1996 Act extended the Commissions authority to include not just rates, terms, and 
conditions, but also the authority to regulate nondiscriminatory access to poles, ducts, conduits, and rights-of-way.  
Local Competition First Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd at 16104, para. 1232; 47 U.S.C.  224(f).  Absent state 
regulation of terms and conditions of nondiscriminatory attachment access, the Commission retains jurisdiction.  
Local Competition First Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd at 16104, para. 1232; 47 U.S.C.  224(c)(1); see also Bell 
Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 4093, para. 264.
 	See States That Have Certified That They Regulate Pole Attachments, Public Notice, 7 FCC Rcd 1498 (1992); 
47 U.S.C.  224(f).
 	SWBT Hearst Texas I Aff. at para. 32.
 	 SWBT states that, pursuant to section 224 of the Act, it has negotiated agreements with cable providers for 
access to poles, ducts, conduits, and rights-of-way.  SWBT Texas I Application at 92.  The product of these 
negotiations is contained in SWBTs Master Agreement, which has been incorporated in interconnection agreements 
approved by the Texas Commission.  Id. at 92.  SWBT states that the Master Agreement is available to any 
competitive LEC, and that it will negotiate modifications to the Master Agreement upon request.  Id. at 92-93.  
SWBT states that its Master Agreement and its state-approved interconnection agreements incorporate rates that 
were negotiated with cable operators and comply with the methodology set out in section 224(d)(1) of the Act, as 
well as the cost formula and methodology specified by the Commission.  Id. at 93; see also SWBT Hearst Texas I 
Aff. at para. 32; SWBT Texas I Application App. C, Tab 1233 at 57 (Final Staff Status Report on Collaborative 
Process, Investigation of Southwestern Bell Telephone Companys Entry into the Texas InterLATA 
Telecommunications Market, TX PUC Nov. 18, 1998).
 	Texas Commission Texas I Comments at 48-50.
 	47 U.S.C.  271(c)(2)(B)(iv).
 	Local Competition First Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd at 15691, para. 380; UNE Remand Order, 15 FCC Rcd 
at 3772-73, paras. 166-167, n.301 (retaining definition of the local loop from the Local Competition First Report 
and Order, but replacing the phrase network interconnection device with demarcation point, and making explicit 
that dark fiber and loop conditioning are among the features, functions and capabilities of the loop).
 	Local Competition First Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd at 15691, para. 380; UNE Remand Order, 15 FCC Rcd 
at 3772-73, paras. 166-167.
 	Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 4095, para. 269; Second BellSouth Louisiana Order, 13 FCC Rcd 
at 20637, para. 54.
 	Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 4095, para. 269; Second BellSouth Louisiana Order, 13 FCC Rcd 
at 20712-13, para. 185.
 	Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 4095-96, para. 271; Second BellSouth Louisiana Order, 13 FCC 
Rcd at 20713, para. 187.
 	Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 4095-96, para. 271.
 	IDLC technology permits a carrier to multiplex and demultiplex loop traffic at a remote concentration point and 
to deliver that combined traffic directly to the switch without first separating the individual loops.  Local 
Competition First Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd at 15692, para. 383; UNE Remand Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 3793, 
para. 217.
 	Local Competition First Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd at 15692-93, para. 384.
 	See SWBT Texas II Habeeb Aff. at para. 5, Attach. A; but see Department of Justice Texas I Evaluation at 8-9 
(alleging that SWBT overstates its facilities-based estimates); Allegiance Texas I Comments at 2; Allegiance Texas I 
Howland Decl. at paras. 1-2 (alleging SWBT overstates competing carrier volumes); SWBT Texas I Habeeb Reply 
at paras. 3-10 (refuting Department of Justice and competing carrier allegations regarding SWBTs estimations of 
the volume of competition in Texas).
 	Department of Justice Texas II Evaluation at 1; Texas Commission Texas II Comments at 11-36.
 	As a preliminary matter, we note that SWBT also demonstrates that it has a concrete and specific legal 
obligation to provide unbundled local loops to competing carriers.  Through various interconnection agreements, 
SWBT provisions a full range of unbundled loops, including 2-wire analog loops with 8.0 dB or 5.0 dB loss, 4-wire 
analog loops, 2-wire ISDN digital-grade lines, 4-wire DS1 digital grade lines, and various 2- and 4-wire loops 
capable of offering xDSL services.  In addition, competing carriers may request loops capable of carrying DS3 
signals.  SWBT provides access to stand-alone loops through cross-connects that run from the SWBT distribution 
frame to competing carriers collocation space.  See SWBT Texas I Deere Aff. at paras. 86-88, 151-165; see also 
Interim Award, petitions of IP Communications Corp. to Establish Expedited Public Utility Commission of Texas 
Oversight Concerning Line Sharing Issues, and Covad Communications Co., and Rhythms Links, Inc. against SWBT 
and GTE for Post-Interconnection Dispute Resolution and Arbitration Under the Telecommunications Act of 1996 
Regarding Rates, Terms, Conditions, and Related Arrangements for Line Sharing, Docket Nos. 22168, 22469 (Texas 
PUC June 6, 2000) (setting forth interim interconnection terms and conditions for the high frequency portion of the 
loop).
 	A hot cut entails manually disconnecting the customers loop in the SWBT central office and reconnecting the 
same loop at the competing carriers collocation space.  It also involves coordinated switch software changes at both 
SWBTs switch and the competing carriers switch and the implementation of local number portability.  The 
customer is taken out of service while the hot cut is in progress, thereby making the cut hot, although if the cut is 
successful, the service disruption will last no more than a few minutes.  Thus, ensuring that a hot cut is provisioned 
correctly with coordination between SWBT and the competing carrier is critical because problems with the cutover 
could result in extended service disruption for the customer.  Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 4104-05, 
para. 291 n.925.
 	See SWBT Aggregated Performance Data, Measurement No. 59 (Percent Trouble Reports on N, T, C Orders 
within 30 days) (8.0 dB Loop, 5.0 dB Loop, BRI Loop, DS1 Loop, DSL) at 271-No. 59a-c (calculated from total 
volumes listed on a per loop basis, combining 8.0 dB and 5.0 dB loop performance data to calculate mass market 
voice grade loops which may be provisioned by hot cuts or through new stand-alone loops, and BRI and DSL loop 
performance data to calculate xDSL-capable loops); Letter from Frank S. Simone, Government Affairs Director, 
AT&T, to Magalie Roman Salas, Secretary, Federal Communications Commission, CC Docket No. 00-04 (filed 
Mar. 27, 2000) (AT&T Mar. 27 Ex Parte Letter) (indicating that Performance Measurement No. 59 is reported on a 
per loop basis for all loop types, including 8.0 dB loops).
 	 Well over 50 percent of the stand-alone loops competing carriers purchase from SWBT are hot cut loops.  
Department of Justice Texas II Evaluation at 9.  Compare volumes in SWBT Aggregated Performance Data, 
Measurement No. 59 (Percent Trouble Reports on N, T, C Orders within 30 Days) (8.0 dB Loop, 5.0 dB Loop 
(combined)) at 271-No. 59a-c with Measurement No. 114.1 (Loop Disconnect/Cross Connect Interval) (Local 
Number Portability with Loop-CHC, Local Number Portability with Loop-FDT) at 271-No. 114.1a-b.
 	See supra Part III.D.2; see also Texas Commission Texas I Comments at 1-2. 
 	SWBT Texas I Application at 15.
 	Second BellSouth Louisiana Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 20655, para. 87; see also Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 
FCC Rcd at 4098, para. 279.
 	SWBT Texas I Application at 15.  See generally Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 4098, para. 279.
 	See Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 4095, para. 269; Ameritech Michigan Order, 12 FCC Rcd at 
20619, para. 141.
 	AT&T Texas II Comments at 37-39; AT&T Texas II Reply at 15, 23-36; AT&T Texas I Pfau/De Young Decl. 
at paras. 15, 25, 56-58; WorldCom Texas I Comments at 34.
 	See supra III.D.2.
 	Department of Justice Texas II Evaluation at 1, 11. 
 	Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 4109, para. 299.
 	Department of Justice Texas II Evaluation at 9; Connect! Texas II Comments at 6; AT&T Texas II Depkiewicz 
Reply Decl. at paras. 16-21, Attach. 1-3; Department of Justice Texas I Evaluation at 27; Allegiance Texas I 
Comments at 5; AT&T Texas I DeYoung Decl. Vol. IIIA at paras. 11, 99-102, Attach. 14-16; Letter from Mark E. 
Haddad, Counsel, AT&T, to Magalie Roman Salas, Secretary, Federal Communications Commission, CC Docket 
No. 00-65 at 10 (filed June 8, 2000) (AT&T June 8 Ex Parte Letter).
 	@Link Texas II Comments at 3-4, 6; AT&T Texas II Comments at 26-27, 29; Connect! Texas II Comments at 
4-5; RCN Texas II Comments at 5, 7; AT&T Texas II DeYoung/Van de Water Decl. at paras. 13-25; 51; ALTS 
Texas II Reply at 10-11; AT&T Texas II Reply at 19, 33, 35; AT&T Texas II DeYoung/Van de Water Reply Decl. 
at para. 9; Department of Justice Texas I Evaluation at 33.
 	See Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd 4104, para. 291.
 	AT&T Texas II Comments at 28 n.34.
 	Indeed, AT&T appears to overlook the significance of the lack of a retail analogue in this context.  It appears to 
rely, for example, on the language of section 51.311(b) of the Commissions rules, which requires an incumbent 
LEC, to the extent technically feasible, to afford new entrants with a quality of access to network elements that is 
at least equal in quality to that which the incumbent LEC provides to itself.  47 C.F.R.  51.311(b).  But the 
equality standard of this rule, which varies in application from incumbent to incumbent, applies in contexts where 
(unlike here) there is some retail analogue.  The rule does not impose a general standard of performance.  
 	SWBT Texas I Ham Aff. at para. 134; SWBT Texas I Conway Aff. at paras. 78-79.
 	SWBT Texas I Conway at para. 76.
 	Department of Justice Texas I Evaluation at 27.
 	SWBT Texas I Conway Aff. at para. 79; AT&T Texas I DeYoung Decl. IIIA at paras. 44-47 (citing SWBT 
letters, e-mails, and statements presented to the Texas Commission and Nov. 2, 1999 Texas Commission Hearing Tr. 
at 267 (Gwen Rowling of ICG Communications testified before the Texas Commission that Frame due time, we 
have been asked by Southwestern Bell to start using it.  We didnt come to Bell to do it.  They asked us to start doing 
it . . . .)).  See also AT&T Texas II Reply at 23; @Link et al. Texas II Reply at 5; AT&T June 8 Ex Parte Letter at 
6-7.
 	SWBT Texas II Application at 10; SWBT Texas II Noland/Dysart Reply Aff. at para. 54; SWBT June 23 Ex 
Parte Letter at 3.
 	SWBT Texas II Application at 8; SWBT Texas II Noland/Dysart Reply Aff. at para. 54.
 	In February, March, and April 2000, SWBT performed 1890, 1998, and 1500 CHCs and 2296, 2119, and 1637 
FDT hot cuts.  SWBT Aggregated Performance Data, Measurement No. 114.1 (Loop Disconnect/Cross Connect 
Interval) (Local Number Portability with LoopCHC, Local Number Portability with LoopFDT) at 271-No. 
114.1a-b.
 	We note that the Department of Justice requested that the Commission make this determination.  See 
Department of Justice Texas II Evaluation at 14. See also Texas Commission June 19 Ex Parte Letter at 3 n.7; 
SWBT June 23 Ex Parte Letter at 3..
 	@Link Texas II Comments at 5; Connect! Texas II Comments at 7; RCN Texas II Comments at 8; AT&T Texas 
II Reply Comments at 24; AT&T June 8 Ex Parte Letter at 6 (citing SWBT statements from September and 
November 1999 regarding the availability of the FDT hot cut process and/or the limits of the CHC process).
 	See generally AT&T June 8 Ex Parte Letter at 7, Attach. 8 (e-mail from Bob Bannecker, SWBT, to Sarah 
DeYoung, AT&T (sent May 26, 2000)).
 	AT&T June 8 Ex Parte Letter at Attach. 8 (e-mail from Bob Bannecker, SWBT, to Sarah DeYoung, AT&T 
(sent May 26, 2000)).
 	See, e.g., Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 4114-15, para. 309 (finding that Bell Atlantic was able 
to complete at least 90 percent of competing carrier hot cut orders of fewer than 10 lines within a one-hour interval).
 	Texas Commission Texas II Comments at 13.
 	Texas Commission Texas II Comments at 13.
 	See, e.g., SWBT Aggregated Performance Data, Measurement No. 114.1 (Loop Disconnect/Cross Connect 
Interval) (Local Number Portability with Loop-CHC, Local Number Portability with Loop-FDT) at 271-No. 
114.1a-b.
 	SWBT Aggregated Performance Data, Measurement No. 114.1 (Loop Disconnect/Cross Connect Interval) 
(Local Number Portability with Loop-CHC) at 271-No. 114.1a.
 	SWBT Aggregated Performance Data, Measurement No. 114.1 (Loop Disconnect/Cross Connect Interval) 
(Local Number Portability with Loop-FDT) at 271-No. 114.1b.
 	Order No. 4, Section 271 Compliance Monitoring of Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. of Texas, Project No. 20400 
(Texas PUC Mar. 28, 2000) (Texas Commission Mar. 28 Order); Order No. 9, Section 271 Compliance Monitoring 
of Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. of Texas, Project No. 20400 (Texas PUC May 5, 2000) (Texas Commission May 5 
Order).
 	See Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 4106-07, paras. 294-95.  See also SWBT Texas II 
Application at 31; SWBT Texas II Noland/Dysart Reply Aff. at para. 19.  But see AT&T Texas II DeYoung/Van de 
Water Reply Decl. at para. 15; AT&T June 8 Ex Parte Letter at 15 (alleging that SWBT overstates the Texas 
Commissions involvement in fact finding).
 	AT&T has criticized the 2 hour interval as overly generous.  AT&T Texas II Comments at 35-36; AT&T Texas 
II DeYoung/Van de Water at paras. 60, 105-109.  The Texas Commission is revising its hot cut interval 
measurement.  Loops in orders with less than 11 lines will be assessed using a 1 hour interval and loops in larger 
orders will be tracked against a longer time.  SWBT Texas II Noland/Dysart Reply Aff. at para. 45.
 	SWBT Apr. 25 Ex Parte Letter at Attach. 2 (PM 114.1 Reconciled/Reported Results Summary).
 	These data were developed pursuant to a May 5, 2000 Texas Commission order requesting reconciliation of 
certain SWBT March and April 2000 hot cut data.  We acknowledge, however, they do not reflect the final 
reconciliation.  See SWBT Texas II Noland/Dysart Reply Aff. at para. 15, Attach. B (PM 114.1 
Reconciled/Reported Results Summary) (averaging together March and April 2000 data).  See also Texas 
Commission May 5 Order; AT&T June 8 Ex Parte Letter at 1-2 (criticizing SWBTs unilateral presentation of hot 
cut timeliness data for March and April 2000).
 	CLEC Coalition Texas I Comments at 41-42; RCN Texas II Comments at 11; ALTS Texas I Comments at 33; 
AT&T Texas I DeYoung Vol. IIIA Decl. at paras. 75-81, 128-130.
 	AT&T Texas II Comments at 34; AT&T Texas II DeYoung/Van de Water Decl. at paras. 22, 31, 52; AT&T 
Texas II DeYoung/Van de Water Reply Decl. at paras. 72-81; Department of Justice Texas I Evaluation at 32 n.85; 
Allegiance Texas I Comments at 5-7; ALTS Texas I Comments at 33; AT&T Texas I DeYoung Vol. IIIA Decl. at 
paras. 14, 55, 131-159.
 	By loop-based measurement, we mean data reported on an individual line basis.
 	SWBT Texas II Reply at 34; SWBT Texas II Noland/Dysart Reply Aff. at para. 47 (demonstrating that 
changing from reporting a measurement in loops to reporting a measurement in orders has no consistent impact), 
Attach. K (comparing SWBT hot cut timeliness data for December 1999 through March 2000, finding that of the 
eight reported results (CHC and FDT for the four months), two showed no change when recalculated on a per order 
basis, three showed improvement, and three showed deterioration in SWBT performance).
 	Texas Commission Texas II Comments at 3.
 	AT&T Texas II Comments at 39; AT&T Texas II DeYoung/Van de Water Decl. at paras. 54, 102; AT&T Texas 
II DeYoung/Van de Water Reply Decl. at para. 92; Department of Justice Texas I Evaluation at 31-32 n.84; 
Department of Justice Mar. 9 Ex Parte Letter at 9; AT&T June 8 Ex Parte at 11-13.
 	SWBT Texas I Conway Aff. at para. 84.
 	SWBT Texas II Reply at 33; SWBT Texas II Noland/Dysart Reply Aff. at paras. 11-13; Department of Justice 
Texas II Evaluation at 10 n.26; Department of Justice Texas I Evaluation at 31-32 n.84.  AT&T also contends that 
SWBTs interim performance measurement fails to capture certain delays in switch activation.  AT&T, however, 
presents no data to indicate that this is a recurrent problem.  AT&T June 8 Ex Parte Letter at 13.
 	Texas Commission Texas II Comments at 16; SWBT Texas II Conway/Dysart Aff. at para. 25; SWBT Apr. 25 
Ex Parte Letter at Attach. 3 (Joint Affidavit of Mark Van de Water and Robert Royer, Investigation of Southwestern 
Bell Telephone Co.s Entry Into the Texas InterLATA Telecommunications Market, Section 271 Compliance 
Monitoring of Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., Project Nos. 16251, 20400 at 2 (filed with Texas PUC Apr. 21, 
2000) (PPIG Van de Water/Royer Aff.)).
 	PPIG Van de Water/Royer Aff. at Attach. (CHC and FDT December 1999, and January and February 2000 
outage data charts).
 	Affidavit of Terry R. Hoeven, Section 271 Compliance Monitoring of Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., Project 
No. 20400 (filed with Texas PUC May 18, 2000) (PPIG Hoeven Aff.) (SWBT filing listing PPIG data from March 
2000 reconciliation); SWBT Texas II Noland/Dysart Reply Aff. at Attach. C; AT&T Texas II De Young/Van de 
Water Reply Decl. at Attach. 1 (March 2000 PPIG data summary). 
 	We note that the Department of Justice requested that the Commission confirm the accuracy of the April 2000 
CHC outage data.  Department of Justice Texas II Evaluation at 14.  We find the Texas Commissions endorsement 
of these data, as described in its June 9, 2000 ex parte letter, and as filed by SWBT with the Texas Commission in a 
June 15, 2000 affidavit, is substantial evidence of its accuracy.  Texas Commission June 19 Ex Parte Letter at 3.
 	As described above with respect to hot cut timeliness data, we reject the argument of commenters who contend 
that a measurement based on loops rather than orders is systematically more generous to the incumbent than a 
measurement based on orders.  See supra para. 266.
 	PPIG Van de Water/Royer Aff. at Attach. (CHC and FDT December 1999, and January and February 2000 
PPIG outage charts); PPIG Hoeven Aff. (CHC and FDT March 2000 outage charts); AT&T Texas II DeYoung/Van 
de Water Reply Decl. at Attach. 1 (outages summary, March 2000 data); Texas Commission June 19 Ex Parte Letter 
at 3 (CHC outages from PPIG April 2000 data).  
 	See SWBT Texas II Conway/Dysart Aff. at paras. 10-11; AT&T Texas II DeYoung/Van de Water Decl. at 
paras. 23, 55-59 n.11.  See generally Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 4110-11, paras. 302-03.
 	See, e.g., AT&T Texas II Comments at 31 n.38; AT&T Texas II Reply at 28-29.
 	SWBT Texas II Conway/Dysart at paras. 10-11 (SWBT performance results for February irreversibly affected 
by Telcordia software defect); SWBT Texas II Noland/Dysart Reply Aff. at paras. 23-24 (describing SWBT testing 
procedures to ensure this sort of software problem does not happen in the future).
 	Texas Commission Texas II Comments at 18; SWBT Texas II Conway Aff. at para. 34.
 	PPIG Van de Water/Royer Aff. at Attach. (CHC and FDT February 2000 outage charts).
 	PPIG Van de Water/Royer Aff. at Attach. (FDT December 1999, and January and February 2000 outage charts). 
 
 	See SWBT Texas I Conway Aff. at paras. 79, 86. AT&T Texas II Reply at 23; @Link et al. Texas II Reply at 5; 
See also AT&T Texas I DeYoung Decl. Vol. IIIA at paras. 44-47; AT&T June 8 Ex Parte Letter at 6-7.
 	SWBT Texas II Application at 8-10; SWBT June 23 Ex Parte Letter at 3.  
 	SWBT Texas II Reply at 36-37.
 	SWBT Texas II Reply at 36-37.
 	SWBT Texas II Noland/Dysart Reply Aff. at para. 26 (describing considerable effort SWBT has devoted to 
improving its FDT hot cut performance).
 	Texas Commission Texas II Comments at 14; AT&T June 8 Ex Parte Letter at 2 (acknowledging that FDT hot 
cuts require less coordination than CHCs, with fewer steps and fewer time consuming hand-offs).
 	SWBT Texas II Noland/Dysart Reply Aff. at para. 45, Attach. J.
 	SWBT Texas II Noland/Dysart Reply Aff. at para. 45, Attach. J.
 	See ALTS/CLEC Coalition Texas II Comments at 3-5; AT&T Texas II Comments at 32-33; AT&T Texas II 
DeYoung/Van de Water Decl. at para. 26; AT&T Texas II DeYoung/Van de Water Reply Decl. at paras. 86-90; see 
also AT&T June 8 Ex Parte Letter at 8-9 (expressing concern about the exclusion of outages captured as trouble 
reports following installation); AT&T Texas II Reply at 20; AT&T Texas II DeYoung/Van de Water Decl. at para. 
96 (expressing concern that defective cuts are not captured in existing performance measurements).
 	See AT&T Texas II DeYoung/Van de Water Decl. at para. 77 (characterizing the manual reconciliation process 
as extraordinarily resource-intensive).
 	We note that SWBT presents these data only for December 1999 through March 2000, and as in the Bell 
Atlantic New York Order, they are loop-based data (rather than order-based data).  SWBT Texas II Noland/Dysart 
Reply Aff. at Attach. I.  The Texas Commission established a performance measurement to assess the quality of a 
variety of loops provisioned by SWBT to competing carriers that captures the percentage of troubles within 30 days 
after installation.  Because this is a much longer period than the 7 day period we used to evaluate hot cut quality in 
our Bell Atlantic New York Order and because the data for this performance measurement also includes new loops 
that are not provisioned by hot cuts, SWBT reviewed the underlying data for these measurements and submitted data 
specifically for hot cut loops within 10 days after installation.  In response to AT&T criticism questioning SWBTs 
decision to use a 10 day measurement period, SWBT submitted trouble data for the 7 day period following 
installation identical to the standard discussed in the Bell Atlantic New York Order.  See SWBT Texas II 
Noland/Dysart Reply Aff. at paras. 41-44, Attach. I; AT&T Texas II Comments at 37; AT&T Texas II 
DeYoung/Van de Water Decl. at para. 70.
 	SWBT Texas II Noland/Dysart Reply Aff. at Attach. I.
 	See generally Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 4109, para. 301.
 	AT&T Texas II Reply Comments at 24-25; AT&T Texas II DeYoung/Van de Water Reply Aff. at paras. 27-28; 
AT&T June 8 Ex Parte Letter at 4-6.
 	Department of Justice Texas II Evaluation at 14-15.
 	Department of Justice Texas II Evaluation at 15 n.42.
 	AT&T Texas II DeYoung/Van de Water Reply Aff. at paras. 27-28; AT&T June 8 Ex Parte  Letter at 5.
 	SWBT Texas II Noland/Dysart Reply Aff. at para. 50; SWBT June 23 Ex Parte Letter at 3.
 	SWBT Texas II Noland/Dysart Reply Aff. at para. 50; SWBT June 23 Ex Parte Letter at 3.
 	SWBT June 23 Ex Parte Letter at 3. 
 	SWBT Texas II Noland/Dysart Reply Aff. at para. 50.
 	SWBT Texas II Noland/Dysart Reply Aff. at para. 51; SWBT June 23 Ex Parte Letter at 3.
 	See section V.A.2.
 	SWBT Texas I Ham Aff. at para. 186.
 	SWBT Texas I Ham Aff. at para. 187.
 	In February, March, and April 2000, SWBT missed 3.4, 5.8, and 9.9 percent of competing carrier 8.0 dB loop 
installation due dates involving field work.  During the same time period, SWBT missed 11.3, 11.4, and 12.0 of the 
same installation due dates for its retail service.  SWBT Aggregated Performance Data, Measurement No. 58 
(Percent SWBT Caused Missed Due Dates) (8.0 dB Loop-Field Work) at 271-No. 58a.
 	In February, March, and April 2000, competing carriers experienced troubles within 30 days following 
installation on 5.6, 5.3, and 4.9 of their 8.0 dB loops.  During the same period SWBT retail customers experienced 
troubles within 30 days following installation on 3.1, 3.3, and 3.5 percent of their 8.0 dB loops.  We acknowledge 
that while the trouble rates are comparable, the competing carrier rate is marginally higher.  In light of SWBTs 
unbundled voice grade loop provisioning overall, and the fact that no commenter criticizes this aspect of SWBTs 
performance, we do not find this small difference competitively significant.  SWBT Aggregated Performance Data, 
Measurement No. 59 (Percent Trouble Reports on N, T, C Orders within 30 Days) (8.0 dB Loop) at 271-No. 59a.
 	In this section, we discuss maintenance and repair functions for unbundled hot cut and new stand-alone loops, 
but not xDSL-capable loops and high capacity loops, which are separately addressed in discussions specific to those 
loop types.  See infra  at paras. 303-06, 319-20.
 	In December 1999 and January and February 2000, SWBT missed only 2.6, 0.8, and 1.7 percent of competing 
carrier repair due dates, but 8.3, 7.3, and 6.8 percent of such appointments for its own retail customers.  Although in 
March 2000, SWBT missed 11.1 percent of repair due dates for competing carriers, and only 7.7 percent of such 
appointments for its own retail customers, this proved to be an aberration, because in April 2000, SWBT missed only 
3.3 percent of competing carrier repair due dates and 7.1 percent of such due dates for its own retail customers. 
SWBT Aggregate Performance Data, Measurement No. 66 (Missed Repair Commitments) (2 Wire Analog-8.0 dB 
Loop) at 271-No. 65d-66.  SWBT does not measure missed repair due dates for 5.0 dB loops, which are used much 
less frequently than 8.0 dB loops.  For instance, in April 2000, competing carriers were provisioned 5783 8.0 dB 
loops and only 228 5.0 dB loops.  SWBT Aggregated Performance Data, Measurement No. 59 (Percent Trouble 
Reports on N, T, C Orders within 30 Days) (8.0 dB Loop, 5.0 dB Loop) at 271-No. 59a (reporting total volumes on 
a per loop basis).
 	In February, March, and April 2000, the average time to repair competing carrier unbundled 8.0 dB loops 
requiring dispatch was 5.95, 14.02, and 5.47 hours, respectively.  During the same period, the average time to repair 
SWBT retail 8.0 dB loops requiring dispatch was 24.03, 27.26, and 30.48 hours, respectively.  SWBT Aggregated 
Performance Data, Measurement No. 67 (Mean Time to Restore (Hours)-Dispatch) (8.0 dB Loop with Test 
Access) at 271-No. 67a.  During the same period, SWBT took a nearly comparable amount of time to repair the less 
frequently used 5.0 dB loops requiring dispatch for competing carriers as it did to repair 5.0 dB loops requiring 
dispatch for its own retail customers.  For instance, in February, March, and April 2000, SWBT repaired competing 
carrier 5.0 dB loops in 5.72, 9.39, and 4.08 hours, respectively.  During the same period, SWBT repaired its own 
retail 5.0 dB loops in 4.68, 5.34, and 6.14 hours, respectively.  SWBT Aggregated Performance Data, Measurement 
No. 67 (Mean Time to Restore (Hours)-Dispatch) (5.0 dB loops with Test Access) at 271-No. 67a.
 	In February, March, and April 2000, competing carriers experienced repeat troubles on 13.3, 10.3, and 7.9 
percent of their 8.0 dB loops, while SWBT experienced repeat troubles during the same period on 12.0, 12.2, and 
12.9 percent of its own retail 8.0 dB loops.  SWBT Aggregated Performance Data, Measurement No. 69 (Repeat 
Reports (%)) (8.0 dB Loop with Test Access) at 271-No. 68-69a. In February, March, and April 2000, competing 
carriers experienced repeat troubles on 16.1, 9.3, and 5.9 percent of their 5.0 dB loops, while SWBT experienced 
repeat troubles during the same period on 13.2, 13.3, and 13.0 percent of their retail 5.0 dB loops.  SWBT 
Aggregated Performance Data, Measurement No. 69 (Repeat Reports (%)) (5.0 dB Loops with Test Access) at 
271-No. 68-69a.  We note that for both 8.0 dB and 5.0 dB loops, in the last two months competing carriers have 
experienced fewer repeat troubles on their loops than SWBT has experienced on its own retail loops. 
 	See Texas Commission Texas I Comments at 50, 54 (reviewing missed repair appointments).
 	In February 2000, xDSL-capable loops were only 19 percent of all unbundled stand-alone loops ordered by 
competing carriers.  By April 2000, xDSL capable loops were 27 percent of all such loops.  See SWBT Aggregated 
Performance Data, Measurement No. 59 (Percent Trouble Reports on N, T, C Orders within 30 Days) (8.0 dB 
Loop, 5.0 dB Loop, BRI Loop, DS1 Loop, DSL) at 27-No. 59a-c (calculated from total volumes listed on a per loop 
basis and combining BRI and DSL loop performance data to calculate xDSL-capable loops).
 	Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 4122, para. 330.  We did not require such a showing in New York 
because of the unique circumstances associated with the Bell Atlantic New York application, including the fact 
that the Commissions previous section 271 orders did not address the ordering or provisioning of xDSL-capable 
loops.  SWBT has not argued that such unique circumstances exist in Texas.  See also  Department of Justice 
Texas I Evaluation at 10 n.19.
 	Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 4123-24, paras. 333-35.
 	Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 4123-24, para. 334.
 	Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 4122, para. 331.
 	Department of Justice Texas II Evaluation at 1.
 	An xDSL loop is a continuous copper line from the collocation site in SWBTs central office to the end user, 
which is not equipped with repeaters, the equipment used to increase the transmitted signal.  The ISDN BRI loop 
may include a section of fiber optic cable and should include ISDN repeaters for long loops.  BRI loops are 
sometimes used by competing carriers to provide a slower speed IDSL service where xDSL loops are not available. 
Covad Texas II Rosenstein Decl. at para. 30.  In April 2000, SWBT installed 1445 xDSL loops and 923 BRI loops.  
SWBT Aggregated Performance Data, Measurement No. 58 (Percent SWBT Caused Missed Due Dates) (DSL, 
BRI Loop) at 271-No. 58b-c.
 	Because characteristics of a loop, such as it length and the presence of various impediments to digital 
transmission can hinder certain advanced services technologies, carriers often seek to access basic loop make-up 
information that will assist carriers in ascertaining whether the loop, without the removal of impediments, can 
support a particular advanced service.  See Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 4021, para. 140; UNE 
Remand Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 3884-85, paras. 426-27.
 	In February, March, and April 2000, SWBT, on average, SWBT returned competing carrier loop makeup 
requests in 4.34, 2.63, and 1.72 days, while returning similar requests for its own retail operations in 3.99, 5.39, and 
2.15 days.  SWBT Aggregate Performance Data, Measurement No. 57 (Average Time for Loop Make-Up 
Information) at 271-No. 57.  We also note that in January 2000, the performance measurement was redefined in 
response to Department of Justice criticism, to include the entire time between SWBTs receipt from the competing 
carrier of a request for information relating to loop qualification and the time that such information is returned to the 
competing carrier.  SWBT Texas II Application at 12; SWBT Texas II Chapman/Dysart Aff. at para. 28.
 	SWBT Aggregate Performance Data, Measurement No. 5.1 (Percent Firm Order Confirmations (FOCs) 
Relating to xDSL-capable Loops Returned within X Hours) (Mechanized LSRs-LEX (1-20 Loops), Mechanized 
LSRs-EDI (1-20 Loops) at 271-No. 5.1a.  This performance measurement is relatively new, and not yet approved by 
the Texas Commission, so only March and April 2000 data are available.  See SWBT Chapman/Dysart Texas II Aff. 
at Attach. A; Covad Goodpastor Texas II Decl. at para. 30.  The Department of Justice characterizes SWBTs 
present measuring and reporting of competing carrier FOCs as a significant improvement over SWBTs first Texas 
application.  Department of Justice Texas II Evaluation at 2.
 	Arbitration Award, petitions of Rhythms Links, Inc. and Dieca Communications, Inc. d/b/a Covad 
Communications Company for Arbitration of Interconnection Rates, Terms, Conditions and Related Arrangements 
with Southwestern Bell Telephone Company, Docket Nos. 20226 and 20272 (Texas PUC Nov. 30, 1999) 
(Covad/Rhythms Arbitration Award); Texas Commission January 27, 2000 Open Meeting Transcript at 63-67 (Jan. 
27 Open Meeting Tr.) (affirming November 30, 1999 decision of Texas Commission arbitrator).
 	47 U.S.C.  252(g); Covad/Rhythms Arbitration Award at 1.  The Texas Commission affirmed its decision on 
January 27, 2000 and on February 4, 2000, approved both Covad and Rhythms interconnection agreements with 
SWBT based on the principles established in the arbitration.  Order Approving Interconnection Agreements, 
petitions of Rhythms Links, Inc. and Dieca Communications, Inc. d/b/a Covad Communications Company for 
Arbitration of Interconnection Rates, Terms, Conditions and Related Arrangements with Southwestern Bell 
Telephone Company, Docket No. 20272 (Texas PUC Feb. 4, 2000); Jan. 27 Open Meeting Tr. at 63-67.
 	Covad/Rhythms Arbitration Award 11-17, 34-36, 40, 42-52, 56-65, 78-80 (ordered changes include requiring 
SWBT to provide xDSL-capable loops on demand for xDSL services of the competing carriers own choosing; drop 
arbitrary length and transmission speed restrictions on competing carriers xDSL-capable loops; provide competing 
carriers equivalent access to the loop qualification information available to SWBT retail personnel; and eliminate its 
efforts to segregate and reserve the best loops for SWBT retail customers with its Selective Feeder System binder 
group management).
 	Dec. 16 Open Meeting Tr. at 12-14, 16-17 (changes committed to include eliminating rejection of competing 
carrier xDSL-capable loop orders lacking information categorizing the request in one of seven SWBT Power 
Spectral Density masks; taking requests for loop qualification information via e-mail or fax; developing streamlined 
two-step ordering process for xDSL-capable loops; making available acceptance testing after provisioning; offering 
xDSL-capable loops as is to competing carriers who do not wish to have performed the conditioning SWBT 
recommends; offering loops of less than 12,000 feet without requiring competing carriers to go through the loop 
qualification process; and reaffirming commitment to eliminate the Selective Feeder System).
 	We acknowledge that a recent Texas Commission order required a limited modification to the firewall plan 
developed to ensure competing carriers equivalent access to the loop qualification information available to SWBT 
retail personnel.  Order No. 13, Order Granting Covads Motion to Reconsider Order No. 10; requiring Further 
Modification to SWBTs Modified Plan to Ensure Competitive Neutrality; Requesting Comment; Requesting 
Additional Information Regarding TP 76869 Tx; and Notice of Workshop, Docket Nos. 20226, 20272 ( Texas PUC 
June 21, 2000); Letter from Thomas M. Koutsky, Vice PresidentRegulatory Affairs, Covad, to Magalie Roman 
Salas, Secretary, Federal Communications Commission (filed June 23, 2000).  Because these modifications involve 
further safeguards to ensure the competitive neutrality required by the Covad/Rhythms Arbitration Award, and do 
not reflect a determination by the Texas Commission that SWBT is presently discriminating against competing 
carriers by restricting access to loop qualification information, we conclude that the Texas Commissions recent 
action does not in any way undermine our conclusions in this section.
 	See generally SWBT Meierhoff Texas II Aff. at paras. 8-30 (describing dismantling of selective feeder system 
binder group management designed to reserve binder groups for ADSL); SWBT Chapman/Dysart Texas II Aff. at 
paras. 71-91, SWBT Chapman Texas I Aff. at Attach. F (Jan. 4, 2000 Accessible Letter) (describing modifications to 
ordering process, including, no longer requiring manual loop qualification for xDSL-capable loops under 12,000 
feet, allowing competing carriers to request loop make-up information prior to the submission of an LSR, allowing 
competing carriers to order a loop before the loop qualification process is complete, allowing competing carriers to 
provision xDSL services that do not comply with industry standards, removing xDSL transmission speed limitations 
for competing carriers, and  removing requirement that competing carriers provide a PSD number when requesting 
loop qualification).
 	SWBT Meierhoff Texas II Aff. at paras. 8-30.
 	Covad Texas II Comments at 3, 10-18; NorthPoint Texas II Comments at 6, 9-12; Rhythms Texas II Comments 
at 14; Sprint Texas II Comments at 23-25; Covad Texas II Goodpastor Decl. at paras. 21-63; Covad Texas II Reply 
Comments at 6-10.
 	In February, March, and April 2000, SWBT provisioned competing carrier orders for xDSL loops that did not 
require conditioning in an average of 6.65, 6.02, and 4.98 days, respectively.  During the same period, SWBT 
provisioned orders for xDSL loops that did not require conditioning for its own retail service in an average of 7.63, 
7.78, and 11.36 days, respectively.  In February, March, and April 2000, SWBT provisioned competing carrier 
orders for xDSL loops that required conditioning in an average of 16.34, 10.19, and 10.27 days.  During the same 
period, SWBT provisioned orders for xDSL loops that required conditioning for its own retail service in an average 
of 14.40, 10.67, and 31.50 days.  SWBT Aggregated Performance Data, Measurement No. 55.1 (Average 
Installation Interval-DSL) (Requires No Conditioning, Requires Conditioning) at 271-No. 55.1. 
 	Covad Texas II Comments at 20.
 	See SWBT Performance Measurement Business Rules, Measurement No. 55.1 (Average Installation Interval-
DSL).  See also SWBT Texas II Dysart Reply Aff. at paras. 25-26 (refuting Covads claims of measurement 
inaccuracy); Covad Texas I Comments at 31 (alleging that SWBT systems force Covad to adjust installation dates on 
its xDSL-capable loop order to extend beyond the average interval in order to avoid automatic rejections on orders 
requiring supplements); SWBT Texas I Dysart Reply Aff. at paras. 24-25 (denying Covad allegations).
 	SWBT Texas II Dysart Reply Aff. at 18, 22-35 (correction of exclusion of NorthPoint and Covad data); 
Department of Justice Texas II Evaluation at 3.
 	See generally SWBT Aggregated Performance Data, Measurement No. 58 (SWBT Caused Missed Due 
Dates) (DSL) at 271-No. 58c.
 	SWBT Chapman/Dysart Texas II Aff. at para. 44.  See generally SWBT Aggregated Performance Data, 
Measurement No. 55 (Average Installation Interval (Days)) (BRI Loop) at 271-No. 55a.  
 	See generally SWBT Aggregated Performance Data, Measurement No. 55 (Average Installation Interval 
(Days)) (BRI Loop) at 271-No. 55a; Department of Justice Texas II Evaluation at 5-6 (characterizing recent SWBT 
BRI loop performance as demonstrating impressive progress).
 	SWBT Aggregated Performance Data, Measurement No. 55 (Average Installation Interval (Days)) (BRI 
Loop) at 271-No. 55a.
 	SWBT Aggregated Performance Data, Measurement No. 55 (Average Installation Interval (Days)) (BRI 
Loop) at 271-No. 55a.
 	SWBT Texas II Dysart Reply Aff. at para. 47.
 	Covad Texas II Comments at 25.
 	We note also that in a recent workshop before the Texas Commission carriers agreed the DS1 analogue was not 
appropriate.  Texas Commission Texas II Comments at 29; SWBT Performance Measurement Business Rules, 
Measurement No. 58 (Percent SWBT Caused Missed Due Dates) (listing retail analogues).
 	Covad Texas II Comments at 21 (describing problems with xDSL loop missed installation due dates).
 	In March 2000, SWBT missed 7.7 percent of xDSL loop installation due dates for competing carriers and 6.5 
percent of xDSL loop installation due dates for its own retail service.  SWBT Aggregated Performance Data, 
Measurement No. 58 (Percent SWBT Caused Missed Due Dates) (DSL) at 271-No. 58c.
 	Covad Texas II Comments at 23 (describing problems with BRI loop missed installation due dates).
 	In March 2000, SWBT missed 15.9 percent of competing carrier BRI loop installation due dates and 16.7 
percent of BRI loop installation due dates for its own retail service.  SWBT Aggregated Performance Data, 
Measurement No. 58 (Percent SWBT Caused Missed Due Dates) (BRI Loop) at 271-No. 58b.
 	SWBT Aggregated Performance Data, Measurement No. 58 (Percent SWBT Caused Missed Due Dates) (BRI 
Loop) at 271-No. 58b.
 	Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 4073-74, para. 222 n.711.
 	Texas Commission Texas II Comments at 29; SWBT Performance Measurement Business Rules, Measurement 
No. 59 (Percent Troubles on N, T, C Orders within 30 Days) (citing to list of retail analogues in Measurement No. 
58).
 	Covad Texas II Comments at 21 (describing problems with xDSL loop troubles within 30 days after 
installation).
 	SWBT Aggregated Performance Data, Measurement No. 59 (Percent Troubles on N, T, C Orders within 30 
Days) (DSL) at 271-No. 59c.
 	SWBT Aggregated Performance Data, Measurement No. 59 (Percent Troubles on N, T, C Orders within 30 
Days) (DSL) at 271-No. 59c.
 	 See generally Department of Justice Texas II Evaluation at 4-6.
 	IDSL modems combine the three ISDN circuits into a single 144 kbs data stream, and in order to support this 
use of BRI loops, SWBT central office technicians must avoid using some incompatible slots with certain digital 
loop carriers.  SWBT Chapman Texas II Reply Aff. at para. 31.
 	SWBT Dysart Texas II Reply Aff. at paras. 59-60.  
 	SWBT Dysart Texas II Reply Aff. at para. 59.
 	SWBT Chapman Texas II Reply Aff. at para. 31-32; Letter from Austin C. Schlick, Counsel, SBC, to Magalie 
Roman Salas, Secretary, Federal Communications Commission, CC Docket No. 00-65 at 3 (filed June 6, 2000) 
(SWBT June 6 Ex Parte Letter) (describing xDSL-capable loop workshops addressing BRI loop performance issues, 
attended by SWBT, Covad, Rhythms, NorthPoint, and IP Communications).
 	Department of Justice Texas II Evaluation at 6; Rhythms Texas II Comments at 14; Rhythms Texas II Lopez 
Aff. at para 6; SWBT Texas II Chapman Reply Aff. at paras. 31, 33.
 	Department of Justice Texas II Evaluation at 6.
 	In February and April 2000, competing carrier xDSL loops were repaired in an average of 10.51 and 3.22 hours, 
while during the same months SWBT repaired its own retail loops in an average of 28.65 and 24.08 hours.  In March 
2000, competing carrier xDSL loops were repaired in an average of 14.37 hours, only marginally higher than the 
11.17 hours it took SWBT, on average, to repair its own retail xDSL loops.  SWBT Aggregated Performance Data, 
Measurement No. 67 (Mean Time to Restore (Hours)-Dispatch) (DSL) at 271-No. 67c.
 	In February, March, and April 2000, competing carriers experienced repeat troubles on 11.7, 9.2, and 10.0 
percent of their xDSL loops, while during the same period, SWBT retail experienced repeat troubles on 13.8, 11.1 
and 8.9 percent of their xDSL loops.  SWBT Aggregated Performance Data, Measurement No. 69 (Repeat Reports 
(%)) (DSL) at 271-No. 69c.
 	SWBT Dysart Texas II Reply Aff. at paras. 57, 59-60.
 	SWBT Dysart Texas II Reply Aff. at para. 60.
 	SWBT Dysart Texas II Reply Aff. at para. 60.
 	SWBT Chapman Texas II Reply Aff. at para. 31-32; SWBT June 6 Ex Parte Letter (describing xDSL-capable 
loop workshops addressing BRI loop performance issues, attended by SWBT, Covad, Rhythms, NorthPoint, and IP 
Communications).
 	In March and April 2000, competing carriers experienced repeat troubles on 13.5 and 15.7 percent of their BRI 
loops, while SWBT experienced troubles on 15.6 and 16.9 percent of their own retail BRI loops.  SWBT Aggregated 
Performance Data, Measurement No. 69 (Repeat Reports (%)) (BRI Loop with Test Access) at 271-No. 69b. 
 	See Applications of Ameritech Corp., Transferor, and SBC Communications Inc., Transferee, for Consent to 
Transfer Control of Corporations Holding Commission Licenses and Lines Pursuant to Sections 214 and 310(d) of 
the Communications Act and Parts 5, 22, 24, 25, 63, 90, 95 and 101 of the Commissions Rules, CC Docket No. 98-
141, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 14 FCC Rcd 14712, 14859-67, 14969-99 (1999) (SBC/Ameritech Merger 
Order), appeal docketed, No. 99-1441 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 8, 1999).
 	The merger conditions define advanced services as wireline services (e.g., ADSL, IDSL, xDSL, Frame Relay) 
that rely on packetized technology and have the capability of supporting transmission speeds of at least 56 kilobits 
per second in both directions.  SBC/Ameritech Merger Order, App. C at para. 2.  Circuit-switched services are not 
included, regardless of the technology, protocols or speed used for the transmission of such services.  Id.  ISDN also 
is not included because it is not primarily based on packetized technology. Id.
 	SWBT Texas I Application App. A-3, Vol. 5, Tab 2, Affidavit of Lincoln Brown (SWBT Texas I Brown Aff.) 
at paras. 1, 3.  SBC has in place another affiliate, Ameritech Advanced Data Services (AADS), to offer advanced 
services in Ameritechs service areas in Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio and Wisconsin.  Id. at para. 6.
 	Steady state provisioning refers to provisioning in accordance with the SBC/Ameritech Merger Order conditions 
and after the expiration of an applicable transition period.  See SBC/Ameritech Merger Order, App. C at para. 4.  
During this transition period, SBC may perform certain activities such as line sharing and network planning, 
engineering, design & assignment services on an exclusive basis with ASI. SBC/Ameritech Merger Order, App. C at 
paras. 3(c), 4(n)(1), 4(n)(4).
 	SWBT Texas II Application App. Vol. D, Tab 2, Affidavit of Lincoln Brown (SWBT Texas II Brown Aff.) at 
para. 21.  ASI provides the following advanced services (in addition to ADSL):  Frame Relay, Cell Relay, Virtual 
Point of Presence Dial Access Service (VPOP/DAS) and Native LAN Plus.  SWBT Texas I Brown Aff., Attach. A 
at 1, 3; SWBT Texas I Reply App. A, Vol. A-3, Tab 5, Reply Affidavit of Lincoln E. Brown (SWBT Texas I Brown 
Reply Aff.) at para. 5.
 	SWBT Texas II Brown Aff. at para. 21.
 	SWBT Texas II Brown Aff. at para. 19.  As of April 5, 2000, ASI had received more than 200 requests for new 
frame relay and cell relay services, and had processed approximately 20 LSRs to order UNE loops from SWBT.  Id. 
at para. 21.  ASI noted in reply comments dated May 19, 2000, that none of these orders had yet been provisioned, 
and that the circumstances under which such a service arrangement would be applicable are very limited.  SWBT 
Texas II Reply App. A, Vol. A-1, Tab 3, Reply Affidavit of Lincoln E. Brown (SWBT Texas II Brown Reply Aff.) 
at n.6.  While ASI uses EDI, an application-to-application interface, to order 4-wire digital and DS-1 loops, xDSL 
providers generally use LEX, a graphical user interface, to order xDSL-capable and BRI loops.
 	SWBT Texas II Brown Aff. at para. 20.
 	Id.
 	SWBT Texas II Brown Aff. at para. 23.  The term interim line sharing refers to the fact that under the 
SBC/Ameritech Merger Order, ASI is permitted to engage in line sharing with SWBT on an exclusive basis until line 
sharing is provided to unaffiliated providers of advanced services within the same geographic area.  SBC/Ameritech 
Merger Order, App. C at para. 3(d).  Where SWBT engages in interim line sharing, it is required to provide 
unaffiliated providers of advanced services within the same area discounted Line Sharing Surrogate Charges equal to 
50 percent of the cost of a second loop.  See id. at para. 8(b).
 	SWBT Texas II Brown Aff. at para. 22.
 	Id.  In reply comments, ASI noted that it had ordered 282 unbundled loops in April for the purpose of providing 
ADSL services in Texas, and that as of May 19, 2000, ASI had ordered an additional 187 unbundled loops.  SWBT 
Texas II Brown Reply Aff. at para. 7.  ASI stated that ASI ordered the loops from SWBT utilizing the same 
interfaces and processes as are available to and used by unaffiliated providers.  Id. at para. 8.  For instance, ASI 
performed the pre-order function of obtaining loop qualification information for the 282 loops in April from the 
Complex Products Service Order System (CPSOS), which was made available to competitive LECs beginning April 
5, 2000, and ASI performed the ordering function of submitting manual LSRs to SWBTs Local Service Center.  Id.
 	Id. at para. 9.  ASI anticipated that its initial ordering volume would be approximately 450 HFPL UNEs per day 
in Texas (or 9,000 per month based on 20 working days).  Id.
 	See AT&T Texas II Reply Comments at 17 ([t]he merger conditions pursuant to which ASI was created include 
numerous provisions that allow SBC to discriminate in favor of its affiliate.); AT&T Texas II Comments at 64-70; 
IP Communications Texas II Minter Decl. at paras. 8-11; Sprint Texas II Comments at 19-22; @Link Texas II 
Comments at 10.
 	AT&T Texas II Pfau/Chambers Decl. at para. 84; AT&T Texas II Reply Comments at 17; IP Communications 
Texas II Minter Decl. at para. 9.
 	AT&T Texas II Comments at 64-70; TRA Texas I Comments at 24-30.  We note that TRA filed an appeal of the 
Commissions SBC/Ameritech Merger Order in the D.C. Circuit (Docket No. 99-1441) challenging the 
determination that the separate advanced services affiliate required by merger conditions is not a successor or assign 
of the incumbent LEC for purposes of applying the resale obligation of section 251(c)(4).  AT&T has intervened in 
the pending suit.
 	See 47 U.S.C.  272(b), (c), (e), and (g); see also SBC/Ameritech Merger Order at para. 460, App. C. at para. 3.
 	See SBC/Ameritech Merger Order at paras. 446-76.  Moreover, we note that AT&T has not explained how 
failure to treat ASI as an incumbent LEC has disadvantaged AT&T.  See AT&T Texas II Comments at 65.  
 	TRA Texas I Comments at 24-30.  See also AT&T Texas II Comments at 64-70.
 	47 U.S.C.  251(c)(4)(A).
 	AT&T Texas II Pfau/Chambers Decl. at para. 84.
 	SBC/Ameritech Merger Order at para. 475.
  	SBC/Ameritech Merger Order, App. C at para. 4(n). Recognizing SWBT's section 251 nondiscrimination 
obligations regarding unbundled network elements and collocation, the merger conditions provide that even during 
the transition period, SWBT and ASI were required to operate in a manner that was the "functional equivalent" of 
provisioning advanced services through a fully operational separate affiliate.  SBC/Ameritech Merger Order, App. C 
at para. 6(g).  For example, ASI was required to order from SWBT "facilities and/or services needed to provide 
[advanced services]" rather than having SWBT continue to operate on an integrated basis.  Id. at para 6(g)(3).
 	AT&T Texas II Comments at 69-70; AT&T Texas II Pfau/Chambers Decl. at paras. 83-89; AT&T Texas II 
Reply Comments at 17-18; @Link Texas II Comments at 10; IP Communications Texas II Minter Decl. at para. 10; 
Sprint Texas II Comments at 20.
  	SBC/Ameritech Merger Order at paras. 467-76.
  	See, e.g., AT&T Texas II Pfau/Chambers Decl. at para. 84; AT&T Texas II Reply Comments at 17; IP 
Communications Texas II Minter Decl. at para. 9.
  	See AT&T Texas II Pfau/Chambers Decl. at para. 84 (citing SWBT Texas II Brown Aff. at para. 14).
 	SBC/Ameritech Merger Order at para. 469, App. C. at para. 3(a).
  	47 U.S.C.  272(c)(1).
  	47 U.S.C.  271(d)(3)(C); see section 272 section below.
 	In March and April 2000, SWBT installed competing carrier DS1 loops in an average of 3.0 and 3.5 days.  
SWBT Aggregated Performance Data, Measurement No. 55 (Average Installation Interval (Days)) (DS1 Loop) at 
271-No. 55a.
 	In February, March, and April 2000, SWBT missed 5.8, 13.8, and 12.8 percent of competing carrier DS1 
installation due dates.  During the same period, SWBT missed 4.9, 9.0, and 7.7 of the installation due dates for its 
own retail DS1 service.  SWBT Aggregated Performance Data, Measurement No. 58 (Percent SWBT Caused 
Missed Due Dates) (DS1 Loop) at 271-No. 58b.
 	In February, March, and April 2000, SWBT repaired competing carrier DS1 loops in an average of 5.24, 7.01, 
and 3.96 hours.  During the same period, SWBT repaired its own retail DS1 loops in an average of 3.01, 2.96, and 
3.45 hours.  SWBT Aggregated Performance Data, Measurement No. 67 (Mean Time to Restore (Hours)-
Dispatch) (DS1 Loop with Test Access) at 271-No. 67b.
 	In February, March, and April 2000, competing carrier DS1 loops experienced repeat trouble rates of 12.9, 22.2, 
and 8.5 percent, while SWBTs own retail DS1 loops experienced repeat trouble rates of 19.4, 17.9, and 21.8 
percent.  SWBT Aggregated Performance Data, Measurement No. 69 (Repeat Reports (%)) (DS1 Loop with Test 
Access) at 271-No. 69b.
 	WorldCom Texas II Comments at 41-43.
 	SWBT Auinbauh Texas II Aff. at Attach. C (Amendment 6 to T2A at para. 4.1).
 	Line Sharing Order, 14 FCC Rcd 20912.
 	Line Sharing Order, 14 FCC Rcd at 20982-83, para. 161.
 	Line Sharing Order, 14 FCC Rcd at 20982-83, 21016, paras. 161, 230; 65 Fed. Reg. 1331 (Jan. 10, 2000).
  	See section III.C.1, supra.
 	Line Sharing Order, 14 FCC Rcd at 20982-85, paras. 161-170.
 	SWBT Texas II Cruz Aff. at paras. 5-55; SWBT Texas II Auinbauh Aff. at paras. 3-9; SWBT Texas II 
Auinbauh Reply Aff. at paras. 4-6; SWBT Texas II Chapman Reply Aff. at paras. 41-43.
 	NorthPoint Texas II Comments at 7-12; Rhythms Texas II Comments at 3-10; Covad Goodpastor Texas II Decl. 
at paras. 14-20; NorthPoint Lewandowski Texas II Aff. at paras. 23-29; Rhythms Lopez Texas II Aff. at paras. 2-25.
 	Covad Texas II Comments at 2-3, 7-8; Covad Texas II Goodpastor Decl. at paras. 14-20; IP Texas II Comments 
at 2-4; NorthPoint Texas II Comments at 7-12; NorthPoint Texas II Lewandowski Aff. at paras. 23-29; Rhythms 
Texas II Lopez Aff. at paras. 4-15.  
 	AT&T Texas II Reply Comments at 8-9; IP Communications Texas II Comments at 14; AT&T Texas II 
Pfau/Chambers Decl. at paras. 40-42; IP Communications Texas I Comments at 5.
 	AT&T Texas II Pfau/Chambers Decl. at paras. 29-42.
 	Department of Justice Texas II Evaluation at 7 n.17.
 	Line Sharing Order, 14 FCC Rcd at 20941, para. 13; 47 C.F.R.  51.319(h)(3).
 	47 C.F.R.  51.307(c).
 	We note, however, that nothing in our rules prohibits an incumbent LEC from voluntarily providing the splitter 
in this line splitting situation.
 	SWBT June 6 Ex Parte Letter at 2.
 	SWBT June 6 Ex Parte Letter at 2.
 	For instance, when the UNE platform is part of a DLC or exceeds distance limitations for xDSL service, such 
loops would not be xDSL-capable and could not be provisioned as an xDSL-capable unbundled loop.  In these 
circumstances, modifications to the existing loop or other alternatives would need to provided.  SWBT June 6 Ex 
Parte Letter at 2.  In light of SWBTs representations, we find moot concerns expressed by commenters regarding an 
earlier SWBT proposal to require competing carriers using the UNE-P to order a new loop in addition to the existing 
UNE-P loop in order to ultimately engage in line splitting over the UNE-P.  AT&T Pfau/Chambers Texas II Decl. at 
paras. 29-36; IP Communications Texas I Comments at 5.
 	See AT&T Texas II Pfau/Chambers Decl. at paras. 40-42; see also IP Communications at 12, 14.
 	AT&T Texas II Pfau/Chambers Decl. at para. 41.
 	AT&T Texas II Pfau/Chambers Decl. at paras. 40-42.
 	AT&T Texas II Pfau/Chambers Decl. at para. 40.
 	See 47 U.S.C.  251(d)(2); AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 119 S. Ct. 721, 736 (1999).
 	UNE Remand Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 3776, para. 175.
 	UNE Remand Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 3833, paras. 302-303.
 	UNE Remand Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 3833, para. 303.
 	AT&T Texas II Pfau/Chambers Decl. at para. 42.
 	Line Sharing Order, 14 FCC Rcd at 20940, para. 76.
 	SWBT recently affirmed that it is interested in exploring the use of SWBTs splitters in line splitting 
arrangements and that it views this as a potential business opportunity.  SWBT June 6 Ex Parte Letter at 2.
 	AT&T Texas II Comments at 17-18; AT&T Texas I Comments at 12-13; AT&T Texas I Pfau/Chambers Decl. 
at paras. 27-46.  AT&T specifically points out that when a SWBT customer who had been using SWBTs local voice 
service and xDSL service combined over a single copper loop chose to switch voice service to AT&T, SWBT 
informed the customer that its xDSL service would be disconnected unless the customer switched voice service back 
to SWBT.  AT&T Texas I Comments at 12; AT&T Texas I Pfau/Chambers Decl. at para. 29.
 	47 U.S.C.  271(c)(2)(B)(v).
 	Second BellSouth Louisiana Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 20719, para. 201.
 	Id.  A BOC has the following obligations with respect to dedicated transport:  (a) provide unbundled access to 
dedicated transmission facilities between BOC central offices or between such offices and serving wire centers 
(SWCs); between SWCs and interexchange carriers points of presence (POPs); between tandem switches and SWCs, 
end offices or tandems of the BOC, and the wire centers of BOCs and requesting carriers; (b) provide all technically 
feasible transmission capabilities such as DS1, DS3, and Optical Carrier levels (e.g., OC-3/12/48/96) that the 
competing carrier could use to provide telecommunications; (c) not limit the facilities to which dedicated interoffice 
transport facilities are connected, provided such interconnections are technically feasible, or restrict the use of 
unbundled transport facilities; and (d) to the extent technically feasible, provide requesting carriers with access to 
digital cross-connect system functionality in the same manner that the BOC offers such capabilities to interexchange 
carriers that purchase transport services.  Id. at 20719.
 	Id. at 20719 n. 650.  The Commission also found that a BOC has the following obligations with respect to 
shared transport:  (a) provide shared transport in a way that enables the traffic of requesting carriers to be carried on 
the same transport facilities that a BOC uses for its own traffic; (b) provide shared transport transmission facilities 
between end office switches, between its end office and tandem switches, and between tandem switches in its 
network; (c) permit requesting carriers that purchase unbundled shared transport and unbundled switching to use the 
same routing table that is resident in the BOCs switch; and (d) permit requesting carriers to use shared (or 
dedicated) transport as an unbundled element to carry originating access traffic from, and terminating traffic to, 
customers to whom the requesting carrier is also providing local exchange service.  Id. at 20720, n. 652.
 	SWBT Deere Texas I Aff. at paras. 111-128; SWBT Auinbauh Texas I Aff. at paras. 98-104.    
 	Texas Commission Texas I Comments at 65-69.
 	The relevant state performance measures (disaggregated into various submeasures) indicate very few months 
and regions where more than 10 data points were recorded.  SWBT Texas I Application at 102, SWBT Dysart Texas 
I Aff. at paras. 336, 345, 356, 359-360. Performance data for January through April generally indicate fewer than 10 
data points.  See SWBT Aggregated Performance Data January through April Measurement No. 58 (Percent SWBT 
Caused Missed Due Dates) at 271-No. 58a.  Under the performance remedy plan, SWBT is required to pay 
damages and assessments under Tier 2 for any substandard performance of this measure even if there are fewer than 
ten data points.  Texas Commission Texas I Comments at 68.  For PM 58 (percentage of missed due dates) a parity 
measure, the results for submeasure 58-07(DS1 dedicated transport) indicate a greater percentage of misses for 
competitive LECs than for SWBT for the months of January, February and March. For submeasure 58-14 (analog 
line ports) the data indicate a greater percentage of misses for competitive LECs than for SWBT for the months of 
February and April. SWBT states that competitive LECs may request dedicated transport with levels of capacity 
higher than OC-48 through the Special Request Process.  SWBT Application at 100.  As we noted in Bell Atlantic 
New York incumbent LECs must provide all technically feasible transmission capabilities, such as Optical Carrier 
levels (e.g. OC-3/12/48/96) that the competing provider could use to provide telecommunications service.  Bell 
Atlantic New York Order at para. 337 n.1041.  See also Texas Commission Texas I Comments at 16.
 	See part V.B.1, infra.  MFNS asserts that SWBT failed to unbundle loops and interoffice transport with the 
provision of MFNS dark fiber product.  MFNS Comments at 12-15.  See part V.A.1, infra, where we address MFNS 
comments.  Z-Tel and Connect raised issues regarding SWBTs policies for adopting interconnection agreements 
pursuant to section 252(i) of the Act.  SWBT disallowed both parties from opting into interconnection agreements on 
the basis that the relevant agreements were no longer available for adoption because they had expired or were in the 
notice period for renegotiation.  Connect Texas I Comments at 2-6; Connect Texas II Comments at 2; Z-Tel Texas I 
Comments at 2-9; Z-Tel Texas II Comments at 5-6; SWBT Auinbauh Texas I Reply Aff. at paras. 16-18.  Z-Tel 
alleged that the policies affect Z-Tels ability to purchase shared transport.  While Z-Tels allegation is not directly 
applicable to this checklist item, we caution SWBT that if it fails to recognize the rights of a carrier seeking to opt-in, 
that carrier, in addition to available state remedies, may seek expedited relief from this Commission pursuant to 
section 208.  Local Competition Order, 11 FCC Rcd. at 16141, para.1321; 47 U.S.C.  208.
 	Global Crossing Texas I Comments at 6-7, Global Crossing Laurie Larson Texas I Aff. at para. 12.
 	An Optical Carrier level is a SONET optical signal.  OC-1 is 51.840 million bits per second.  OC-3 equals three 
times OC-1.  NEWTONS TELECOM DICTIONARY 534 (14th ed. 1998).
 	See Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 4126-27, para. 340.
 	Id. at para. 340.  To the extent that Global Crossing is seeking to use combinations of unbundled network 
elements in lieu of tariffed special access services, we have addressed the requirements associated with such use in 
several orders.  See part V.B.2, infra, for discussion of Access to the Enhanced Extended Link.
 	See Bell Atlantic Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 4126-27, para. 340.
 	Id. at para. 341.
 	47 U.S.C.  271(c)(2)(B)(vi); see also Second BellSouth Louisiana Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 20722.
 	Second BellSouth Louisiana Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 20722, para. 207.
 	Id.
 	Id. at 20722-23, para. 207.
 	Id. at 20723, para. 208.
 	Id. at 20723, para. 208 (citing the Ameritech Michigan Order, 12 FCC Rcd at 20619, para. 140).
 	Id. 
 	Id.
 	Id. at 20723, para. 209 (citing the Ameritech Michigan Order, 12 FCC Rcd at 20705, para. 306).
 	Id. (citing the Ameritech Michigan Order, 12 FCC Rcd at 20714-15, paras. 324-25).
 	SWBT Texas I Application at 103 (SWBT furnishes more than 125,000 unbundled switch ports in Texas, 
mostly in combination with unbundled loops.); SWBT Deere Texas I Aff. at para. 140; SWBT Auinbauh Texas I 
Aff. at para. 105.
 	Line-side facilities include, but are not limited to, the connection between a loop termination at a main 
distribution frame, and a switch line card.  Trunk-side facilities include, but are not limited to, the connection 
between trunk termination at a trunk-side cross-connect panel and a switch trunk card.  Second BellSouth Louisiana 
Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 20724 nn.679-680.  See SWBT Deere Texas I Aff. at paras. 130-131.      
 	The basic switching function includes, but is not limited to: connecting lines to lines, lines to trunks, trunks to 
lines, trunks to trunks, as well as the same basic capabilities that are available to the BOCs customers, such as a 
telephone number, directory listing, dial tone, signaling, and access to 911, operator services, and directory 
assistance.  Second BellSouth Louisiana Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 20726 n.690.  See SWBT Deere Texas I Aff. at para. 
132.
 	Second BellSouth Louisiana Order at 13 FCC Rcd at 20726.  Vertical features provide end-users with various 
services such as custom calling, call waiting, call forwarding, caller ID and Centrex.  Id.   See SWBT Deere Texas I 
Aff. at paras. 132, 139.
 	An incumbent LEC must provide customized routing as part of the local switching element, unless it can prove 
to the state commission that customized routing in a particular switch is not technically feasible.  Second BellSouth 
Louisiana Order at 13 FCC Rcd at 20728 n.705.  Customized routing permits requesting carriers to designate the 
particular outgoing trunks associated with unbundled switching provided by the incumbent, which will carry certain 
classes of traffic originating from requesting carriers customers.  See Id. at 20728-29, para. 221.  Customized 
routing is also referred to as selective routing.  Id. at 20728 n.704.  See SWBT Deere Texas I Aff. at paras. 134-137.
 	Local Competition Third Reconsideration Order, 12 FCC Rcd at 12475-79; Ameritech Michigan Order, 12 
FCC Rcd at 20716-17; see also Second BellSouth Louisiana Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 20732, para. 228.  See SWBT 
Deere Texas I Aff. at para. 135.
 	The requirement to provide unbundled tandem switching includes: (i) trunk-connect facilities, including but not 
limited to the connection between trunk termination at a cross-connect panel and a switch trunk card; (ii) the base 
switching function of connecting trunks to trunks; and, (iii) the functions that are centralized in tandem switches (as 
distinguished from separate end-office switches), including but not limited to call recording, the routing of calls to 
operator services, and signaling conversion features.  Second BellSouth Louisiana Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 20733 n. 
732.  See SWBT Deere Texas I Aff. at paras. 142-146.
 	See Second BellSouth Louisiana Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 20733-35, paras. 230-31.  See SWBT Auinbauh Texas I 
Aff. at para. 107.
 	See Second BellSouth Louisiana Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 20735-37, paras. 232-34.  See SWBT Auinbauh Texas I 
Aff. at para. 107.
 	Texas Commission Texas I Comments at 69-72.  See Final Staff Report at 71-75. 
 	Z-Tel Texas I Comments at 10-11; T2A Attach. 6  5.2.3.4.
 	Z-Tel Texas I Comments at 11.  See Ameritech Michigan Order, 12 FCC Rcd at 20601, para. 110. 
 	Z-Tel Texas I Comments at 11.  See Ameritech Michigan Order, 12 FCC Rcd at 20601, para., 110.
 	Second BellSouth Louisiana Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 20722-24, paras. 207-209 (citing the Ameritech Michigan 
Order, 12 FCC Rcd at 20705).
 	T2A Attach. 6  5.2.4.2 and 5.2.3.4.
 	See UNE Remand Order 15 FCC Rcd at 3725, para. 51 (47 U.S.C.  251(d)(2) impairment standard); Id. at 
para. 253 et seq. (Applying impairment standard to switching element).
 	Z-Tel may file a petition for rulemaking, or may seek to include its argument in our pending UNE Remand 
Order reconsideration proceeding.   See Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996, CC Docket No. 96-98, Public Notice, rel. Feb. 28, 2000, 65 FR 12004 (Mar. 7, 
2000).
 	47 U.S.C.  271(c)(2)(B)(vii).
 	Ameritech Michigan Order, 12 FCC Rcd at 20679, para. 256.
 	Id.
 	Id.
 	SWBT Texas I Application at 105-108; SWBT Deere Texas I Aff. at paras. 166-72, 178-81, 184-85, 606-618 
and Attach. A at 124-126 (PM 102-104).
 	Texas Commission Texas I Comments at 72-76.  See also SWBT Texas I Application, App. C, Tab 1233 (Texas 
Commission Final Staff Report at 76-84).
 	47 U.S.C.  271(c)(2)(B)(vii)(II), (III).
 	47 U.S.C.  251(b)(3).
 	47 C.F.R.  51.217; In re Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of the Telecommunications Act 
of 1996, Second Report and Order and Memorandum Opinion and Order, 11 FCC Rcd 19392 (1996) (Local 
Competition Second Report and Order) vacated in part, People of the State of California v. FCC, 124 F.3d 934 (8th 
Cir. 1997), overruled in part, AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 119 S.Ct. 721 (1999); see also, Implementation of the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996: Provision of Directory Listings Information under the Telecommunications Act of 
1934, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, CC Docket No. 99-273 (rel. Sept. 9, 1999) (Directory Listings Information 
NPRM).
 	While both sections 251(b)(3) and 271(c)(2)(B)(vii)(II) refer to nondiscriminatory access to directory 
assistance, section 251(b)(3) refers to nondiscriminatory access to operator services, while section 
271(c)(2)(B)(vii)(III) refers to nondiscriminatory access to operator call completion services.  47 U.S.C.  
251(b)(3), 271(c)(2)(B)(vii)(III).  The term operator call completion services is not defined in the Act, nor has the 
Commission previously defined the term.  However, for section 251(b)(3) purposes, the term operator services was 
defined as meaning any automatic or live assistance to a consumer to arrange for billing or completion, or both, of a 
telephone call.  Local Competition Second Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd at 19448, para. 110.  In the same order 
the Commission concluded that busy line verification, emergency interrupt, and operator-assisted directory assistance 
are forms of operator services, because they assist customers in arranging for the billing or completion (or both) of 
a telephone call.  Id. at 19449, para. 111.  All of these services may be needed or used to place a call.  For example, 
if a customer tries to direct dial a telephone number and constantly receives a busy signal, the customer may contact 
the operator to attempt to complete the call.  Since billing is a necessary part of call completion, and busy line 
verification, emergency interrupt, and operator-assisted directory assistance can all be used when an operator 
completes a call, we concluded in the Second BellSouth Louisiana Order that for checklist compliance purposes, 
operator call completion services is a subset of or equivalent to operator service.  Second BellSouth Louisiana 
Order, 13 FCC Rcd 20740 at n.763.  As a result, we use the nondiscriminatory standards established for operator 
services to determine whether nondiscriminatory access is provided.
 	47 C.F.R.  51.217(c)(3); Local Competition Second Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd at 19456-58, paras. 130-
35.  The Local Competition Second Report and Orders interpretation of section 251(b)(3) is limited to access to 
each LECs directory assistance service.  Id. at 19456, para. 135.  However, section 271(c)(2)(B)(vii) is not limited 
to the LECs systems but requires nondiscriminatory access to . . . directory assistance to allow the other carriers 
customers to obtain telephone numbers.  47 U.S.C.  271(c)(2)(B)(vii).  Combined with the Commissions 
conclusion that incumbent LECs must unbundle the facilities and functionalities providing operator services and 
directory assistance from resold services and other unbundled network elements to the extent technically feasible, 
Local Competition First Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd at 15772-73, paras. 535-37, section 271(c)(2)(B)(vii)s 
requirement should be understood to require the BOCs to provide nondiscriminatory access to the directory 
assistance service provider selected by the customers local service provider, regardless of whether the competitor; 
provides such services itself; selects the BOC to provide such services; or chooses a third party to provide such 
services.  Directory Listings Information NPRM.
 	Local Competition Second Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd at 19464, para. 151.
 	Id. at para. 112.
 	47 C.F.R.  51.217(d); Local Competition Second Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd at 19463, para. 148.  For 
example, when customers call the operator or calls for directory assistance, they typically hear a message, such as 
thank you for using XYZ Telephone Company.  Competing carriers may use the BOCs brand, request the BOC to 
brand the call with the competitive carriers name or request that the BOC not brand the call at all.  47 C.F.R.  
51.217(d).
 	47 C.F.R.  51.217(C)(3)(ii); Local Competition Second Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd at 19460-61, paras. 
141-44.
 	In re Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of the Telecommunciations Act of 1996, CC Docket 
No. 96-98, Third Report and Order and Fourth Further Notice of Proposed Reulmaking (rel. Nov. 5, 1999) (Local 
Competition Third Report and Order) at paras. 441-442.
 	Local Competition Third Report and Order at para. 470.  See generally 47 U.S.C.  251-52.  See also 47 
U.S.C.  252(d)(1)(A)(i) (requiring UNE rates to be based on the cost (determined without reference to a rate-of-
return or other rate-based proceeding) of providing the  network element).
 	Local Competition Third Report and Order at paras. 470-73.  See also 47 U.S.C.  201(b), 202(a).
 	SWBT Texas I Application at 108-110.  SWBT Rogers Texas I Aff. at paras. 3-39; see also SWBT Dysart 
Texas I Aff. at paras. 525-542 and Attach. A at 101-108 (measurements 79-86). 
 	Texas Commission Texas I Comments at 72.  The Texas Commission notes that SWBT has obligated itself to 
provide access to directory assistance and operator services on an unbundled basis at UNE prices to business 
customers for two years and to residential customers for three years, even though the Commission removed these 
items from the required UNE list.  Id. at 74-74.
 	WorldCom Texas I Comments at 56, 57 n.31 (stating that SWBTs rate for in-region, out-of-state directory 
listings is $.0583).  However, in an ex parte letter, WorldCom informs the Commission that it made a factual error 
and should have reported this rate as $.0585.  See Letter from Keith L. Seat, Senior Counsel for Competitive 
Strategies, MCI (WorldCom) Communications Corporation, to Magalie Roman Salas, Secretary, Federal 
Communications Commission, CC Docket No. 00-4 (filed Mar. 14, 2000).
 	SWBT Rogers Texas I Reply Aff. at paras. 11-12.
 	For the same reason, we find that the National ALECs argument that SWBTs directory assistance services in 
California are priced at an anticompetitive level is not relevant to a determination of whether SWBT meets checklist 
item 7 in Texas.  See National ALEC Texas I Comments at 10-11.  See also Bell Atlantic New York Order 15 FCC 
Rcd at 4151,  paras. 398-399 (claim that Bell Atlantic violated Commission rules in other states is not relevant to 
determination of whether Bell Atlantic meets its section 271 obligations in New York).
 	Texas Commission Texas I Comments at 72-73.
 	47 U.S.C.  271(c)(2)(B)(viii).
 	47 U.S.C.  251(b)(3).
 	Second BellSouth Louisiana Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 20748, para. 255.
 	Id.  We note that in the Second BellSouth Louisiana Order, we stated that the definition of directory listing 
was synonymous with the definition of subscriber list information.  Id. at 20747 (citing the Local Competition 
Second Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd at 19458-59).  However, the Commissions decision in a recent proceeding 
obviates this comparison, and supports the definition of directory listing delineated above.  See Implementation of 
the Telecommunications Carriers Use of Customer Proprietary Network Information and Other Customer 
Information, CC Docket No. 96-115, Third Report and Order; Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions 
of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, CC Docket No. 96-98, Second Order on Reconsideration; Provision of 
Directory Listing Information under the Telecommunications Act of 1934, As Amended, CC Docket No. 99-273, 
FCC 99-227, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, para. 160 (rel. Sept. 9, 1999).
 	Id.
 	SWBT Texas I Application at 110-111; SWBT Rogers Texas I Aff. at paras. 40-44, 51-52; SWBT Dysart Texas 
I Aff. at paras. 640-641, 646-648 and Attach. A at 133-136 (PM 110-113).  SWBT demonstrates that it is providing 
white pages directory listings for customers of competitive LECs that are nondiscriminatory in appearance and 
integration, and have the same accuracy and reliability that SWBT provides for its own customers.  SWBT Rogers 
Texas I Aff. at paras. 40-44 (nondiscriminatory appearance, e.g., same size, font, and typeface), and paras. 51-52; 
SWBT Dysart Texas I Aff. at paras. 640-641, 646-648 and Attach. A at 133-136 (PM 110-113) (comparable 
accuracy and reliability).
 	Texas Commission Texas I Comments at 76-78; see Final Staff Report at 85-89. 
 	ALTS Texas I Comments at 46; CLEC Coalition Texas I Comments at 42-44.
 	ALTS Texas I Comments at 46; CLEC Coalition Texas I Comments at 42-43.  
 	See Letter from Austin C. Schlick, Kellogg, Huber et al., Counsel for Applicants, to Magalie Roman Salas, 
Secretary, Federal Communications Commission, CC Docket No. 00-4 at 2 (Feb. 4, 2000) (Austin C. Schlick Feb. 4 
Ex Parte Letter).  SWBT further explains that the Dysart Affidavits characterization of the UNE disconnect (D) 
order as drop[ping] listing information out of the database is . . . incorrect.  See Dysart Texas I Aff.  640.  For 
clarity of the record, all after the first sentence of paragraph 640 of Mr. Dysarts affidavit should be stricken.  Id.  
Accordingly, we take no notice of that portion of the Dysart Texas I Affidavit.  
 	But see ALTS/CLEC Coalition Texas II Joint Comments at 14.  NEXTLINK states that customers listings are 
being dropped out of the database.  NEXTLINK states that the problems appear to be related to orders falling out of 
the automated systems and not being completed by SWBTs back end office systems.  SWBT states that it is 
working with NEXTLINK to investigate any errors in directory listings that may have occurred in connection with 
NEXTLINKs orders but has yet to receive details from NEXTLINK that would allow SWBT to investigate the 
particular orders affected.  SWBT Texas II Reply Comments at 71.  We note that NEXTLINK withdrew its 
opposition to SWBTs application on May 23, 2000.  See Letter To Magalie Roman Salas, Secretary, FCC, from 
NEXTLINK Communications, Inc., dated May 23, 2000. 
 	CLEC Coalition Texas I Comments at 43; ADP Texas 1 Reply at 5.
 	See Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 4045, para. 176.
 	47 U.S.C.  271(c)(2)(B)(ix).
 	Id.
 	In the Matter of Request of Lockheed Martin Corporation and Warburg, Pincus & Co. for Review of the 
Transfer of the Lockheed Martin Communications Industry Services Business, CC Docket No. 92-237, Order, FCC 
99-346 (rel. Nov. 17, 1999).  See generally 47 C.F.R.  52.7-52.19.
 	Administration of the North American Numbering Plan, Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd 2588, 2615; NANP 
Third Report and Order, 12 FCC Rcd at 23042-46; see SWBT Adair Texas I Aff. at paras. 15-18. 
 	See Second Bell South Louisiana Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 20752.  See also, e.g., Central Office Code (NXX) 
Assignment Guidelines (INC 95-0407-008) (revised August 1999).
 	SWBT Texas I Application at paras. 111-112; SWBT Adair Texas I Aff. at paras. 15-18.
 	Texas Commission Texas I Comments at 80 and at n.445 (agreeing with SWBT Adair Texas I Aff., para. 18, 
that SWBT supports and adheres to all relevant rules, regulations, and guidelines established by regulatory agencies 
and industry groups).  See Final Staff Report at 90. 
 	47 U.S.C.  271(c)(2)(B)(x).
 	Second BellSouth Louisiana Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 20753, para. 267.
 	Id. at 20755-56, para. 272.
 	Local Competition First Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd at 15741, n.1126; UNE Remand Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 
3875, para. 403.
 	Local Competition First Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd at 15741-42, para. 484. 
 	UNE Remand Order 15 FCC Rcd at 3875, para. 403.
 	SWBT Texas I Application at 112-115; SWBT Texas I Deere Aff. at paras. 186-226 (describing SS7 
interconnection at paras. 190-194; toll free 800 service database at paras. 198-208; AIN network architecture and 
call-related databases at paras. 209-218); SWBT Texas I Rogers Aff. at paras. 58-71 (describing SWBTs Line 
Information Database (LIDB), Calling Name delivery (CNAM), and Line Validation Administrative System 
(LVAS)).  Competitive LECs access databases through SWBTs signal transfer points in the same manner and by the 
same signaling links that SWBT uses.  SWBT Texas I Deere Aff. at para. 218. 
 	Texas Commission Texas I Comments at 80.  See also Final Staff Report at 91. 
 	Pilgrim Texas I Comments at 19.  See also Pilgrim Texas II Reply Comments.  Pilgrim is an interstate, 
interexchange carrier that offers, among other services, pay-per-call services.  Pilgrim Texas I Comments at 2.
 	By casual calling services Pilgrim means that the consumer does not establish a business relationship and 
subscriber account with the service provider.  Pilgrim Texas I Comments at 3-4.
 	Pilgrim Texas I Comments at 7-8.
 	Pilgrim Texas I Comments at 2-4, 10, 18-19.  See also Pilgrim Texas II Reply Comments.
 	SWBT Texas I Rogers Reply Aff. at para. 14 (All records in SWBTs LIDB are designated so that they will 
indicate non-acceptance of alternately billed 900/976 charges).  See SWBT Texas I Auinbauh Aff. Attach. A at 
Attach 7 (T2A Ordering and Provisioning), 4.2 (Parties to the T2A agreement have access to a pre-order electronic 
gateway that provides Real Time access to SWBTs information systems.).  See also discussion of access to LIDB 
under checklist item II. 
 	SWBT Texas I Rogers Reply Aff. at para. 14; SWBT Texas I Auinbauh Aff. Attach. A at Attach. 6 (T2A 
Unbundled Network Elements) 9.4 et seq. (describing LIDB).
 	Id. 
 	SWBT Texas I Rogers Reply Aff. at para. 14; SWBT Texas I Auinbauh Aff. Attach. A at Attach. 7 (T2A 
Ordering and Provisioning), 4.2. (Parties to the T2A have Real Time access to SWBTs BNA through a pre-order 
electronic gateway).
 	47 U.S.C.  222(f)(1)(B).
 	47 U.S.C.  222(d)(1).
  	Local Competition First Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd at 15741, n. 1126; UNE Remand Order, 15 FCC Rcd 
at 3875, para. 403.
  	Section 51.319(e)(2)(ii) of the Commissions rules list certain databases that  meet this definition, such as Line 
Information Database and Toll Free Calling database, but also states that  the list is not limited to these 
examples.  47 C.F.R.  51.319(e)(2)(ii).
 	SWBT Texas I Auinbauh Aff. Attach. A.7, 4.2 & 4.2.1.
 	SWBT also makes BNA generally available under Tariff No. 73, Section 13 and Texas Access Service Tariff, 
Section 8.  If a customer chooses to receive SWBTs response to the customers request via data tape, the tape is 
mailed on the next business day.  If a customer chooses electronic data transmission (Network Data Mover (NDM)), 
SWBT processes requests up to six times daily.  The data are made available for electronic recovery within 24 hours 
of SWBTs receipt of a customers request.  Letter from Austin C. Schlick, Kellogg, Huber et al., Counsel for 
Applicants, to Magalie Roman Salas, Secretary, Federal Communications Commission, CC Docket No. 00-4 at 2 
(filed March 10, 2000) (Austin C. Schlick March 10 Ex Parte Letter). 
  	47 U.S.C.  252(i). 
 	47 U.S.C.  271(c)(2)(B)(xii).
 	Id. at  251(b)(2).
 	Id. at  153(30).
 	Id. at  251(e)(2); see also Second BellSouth Louisiana Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 20757, para. 274; In the Matter 
of Telephone Number Portability, Third Report and Order, 13 FCC Rcd 11701, 11702-04 (1998) (Third Number 
Portability Order); In the Matter of Telephone Number Portability, Fourth Memorandum Opinion and Order on 
Reconsideration, CC Docket No. 95-116, at paras. 1, 6-9 (Jun. 23, 1999) (Fourth Number Portability Order).
 	Fourth Number Portability Order at para. 10; In re Telephone Number Portability, First Report and Order and 
Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 11 FCC Rcd 8352, 8409-12, paras. 110-116 (1996) (First Number 
Portability Order); see also 47 U.S.C.  251(b)(2).  
 	See  47 C.F.R.  52.3(b)-(f); Second BellSouth Louisiana Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 20758, para. 275; First 
Number Portability Order, 11 FCC Rcd at 8355 and 8399-8404, paras. 3 and 91; Third Number Portability Order, 
13 FCC Rcd at 11708-12, paras. 12-16.
 	See 47 C.F.R.  52.29; Second BellSouth Louisiana Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 20758, para. 275; First Number 
Portability Order, 11 FCC Rcd at 8417-24, paras. 127-140.
 	See 47 C.F.R.  52.32, 52.33; Second BellSouth Louisiana Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 20758, para. 275; Third 
Number Portability Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 11706-07, para. 8; Fourth Number Portability Order at para. 9.
 	SWBT Deere Texas I Aff. at paras. 220-226; Texas Commission Texas I Comments at 84.
 	SWBT Flemming Texas I Aff. at para. 30.; Texas Commission Texas I Comments at 84.
 	Texas Commission Texas I Comments at 82-86.  We also note that the Texas Commission established 
performance measures to capture SWBT provision of both permanent and interim number portability.  In nearly all 
months, SWBT meets the benchmarks established by the Texas Commission for both these measurements.  See 
Texas Commission Comments at 85; SWBT Aggregated Performance Measurement Data, Measurement No. 100 
(Average Time Out of Service for LNP Conversions) at 271-No. 99-101, Measurement No. 101 (Percent Out of 
Service Less than 60 Minutes) at 271-No. 99-101; SWBT Texas 1 Dysart Aff., Att. A at 122-123 (listing Texas 
Commission benchmarks for Measurements 100 and 101).
 	Global Crossing Texas I Comments at 8;  CLEC Coalition Texas I Comments at 44-46. 
 	Global Crossing Texas I Comments at 8.
 	CLEC Coalition Texas I Comments at 44.
 	Based on the Commissions view that section 251(b)(3) does not limit the duty to provide dialing parity to any 
particular form of dialing parity (i.e., international, interstate, intrastate, or local), the Commission adopted rules in 
August 1996 to implement broad guidelines and minimum nationwide standards for dialing parity.  Local 
Competition Second Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd at 19407; Interconnection Between Local Exchange Carriers 
and Commercial Mobile Radio Service Providers, CC Docket No. 95-185, Further Order On Reconsideration, FCC 
99-170 (rel. July 19, 1999).
 	47 U.S.C.  251(b)(3).
 	Id. at  153(15).
 	47 C.F.R  51.205, 51.207.
 	See 47 C.F.R.  51.207 (requiring same number of digits to be dialed); Implementation of the Local Competition 
Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Interconnection Between Local Exchange Carriers and 
Commercial Mobile Radio Service Providers, Area Code Relief Plan for Dallas and Houston Ordered by the Public 
Utilities Commission of Texas, and Administration of the North American Numbering Plan, Second Report and 
Order and Memorandum Opinion and Order, 11 FCC Rcd 19392 at 19400, 19403 (1996) (Local Competition 
Second Report and Order), vacated in part sub nom. People of the State of Cal. v. Federal Communications 
Commission, 124 F.3d 934 (8th Cir. 1997), rev'd, AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366 (1999).
 	SWBT Texas I Application at 118; SWBT Deere Texas I Aff. at paras. 227-230.
 	Texas Commission Texas I Comments at 85-86; Final Staff Report at 97-98. 
 	Pilgrim Texas I Comments at 19-20; Pilgrim Texas II Reply Comments; 47 U.S.C.  271(c)(2)(B)(xii).
 	Pilgrim Texas I Comments at 20 ([i]f a consumer who has requested blocking decides to use one of Pilgrims 
casual calling services, the consumer may unwittingly make calls that could not have been dialed over SWBTs 
network because Pilgrim would not know that the customer wanted those calls blocked.).
 	Id.  
 	See, e.g., Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 
Interconnection Between Local Exchange Carriers and Commercial Mobile Radio Service Providers, Area Code 
Relief Plan for Dallas and Houston Ordered by the Public Utilities Commission of Texas, and Administration of the 
North American Numbering Plan, Third Order on Reconsideration and Memorandum Report and Order, CC Docket 
No. 96-98, FCC 99-243, para. 37 (1999) (recognizing that dialing parity is a defined term in the Act that requires 
that a customer be able to access the carrier of his or her choice without having to use any access codes); see also 
47 U.S.C.  153(15).
 	Pilgrim Texas I Comments at 20; Local Competition Second Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd at 19400, 19403, 
para. 15.
 	47 U.S.C.  271(c)(2)(B)(xiii).
 	47 U.S.C.  252(d)(2)(A).
 	Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications Act of 1996: Inter-Carrier 
Compensation for ISP-Bound Traffic; Declaratory Rulemaking and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, CC Docket No. 
96-98, 14 FCC Rcd 3689 at 3706, n.87 (1999) (Inter-Carrier Compensation for ISP-Bound Traffic Order).
 	Id.
 	Bell Atlantic v. FCC, No. 99-1094 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 24, 2000).
 	SWBT provides reciprocal compensation to competing carriers for the termination of local calls from SWBT 
customers under approved interconnection agreements and tariffs.  See SWBT Texas I Application at 118-119.
 	With regard to the second requirement, we note that section 271(c)(2)(A)(i) requires a showing that a BOC "is 
providing access and interconnection pursuant to one or more agreements . . . or . . . is generally offering access and 
interconnection pursuant to [an SGAT]."  47 U.S.C.  271(c)(2)(A)(i).
 	In its application, SWBT explains that the Texas Commission consolidated arbitrations involving several of the 
largest competitive LECs into a single Mega-Arbitration proceeding, which addressed pricing, interconnection, 
unbundling, and resale issues.  The Mega-Arbitration also served as a forum for SWBT to negotiate with competitive 
LECS and the Texas Commission, and subsequently the Department of Justice, the framework for SWBTs 
performance monitoring program.  SWBT Texas I Application at 3-4.
 	SWBT Texas I Application at 119.
 	SWBT Texas I Auinbauh Aff. at para. 111.
 	SWBT Texas I Application at 119; SWBT Texas I Auinbauh Aff. at para. 111.
 	SWBT Texas I Auinbauh Aff. at para. 19.
 	Id. at para. 113.
 	Id.
 	Id.; see also SWBT Texas I Auinbauh Aff. T2A Attach. 12, Compensation-TX at 2,  1.2.1.
 	SWBT Texas I Auinbauh Aff. T2A Attach. 12, Compensation-TX at 2-3.  Bill-and-keep arrangements are 
those in which neither of two interconnecting carriers charges the other to terminate traffic that originated on the 
other carriers network.  Rather, each carrier recovers from its own end users the cost of both originating traffic 
delivered to the other network and terminating traffic received from the other network.  Local Competition First 
Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd at 16,045, para. 1096.
 	SWBT Texas I Auinbauh Aff. at paras. 19, 113-122.
 	Id.
 	Id. at para. 120.
 	Id.  Pursuant to this option, interexchange traffic, including traffic to a third party, is compensated based on 
applicable access charges.  Internet-bound traffic is specifically recognized as traffic that is bound for a third party, 
and is to be handled as meet-point billed interexchange traffic.  Each party would bill the third party any applicable 
access charges for its portion of the call.  However, internet service providers are exempt from meet-point billing 
under the Commissions Enhanced Service Provider access charge exemption.  Id. at paras. 111, 118-19.
 	Texas I Commission Comments at 86-87.
 	Id. at 87.
 	CLEC Coalition Texas 1 Rowling Decl. at para. 46; e.spire Texas I Comments at 6; e.spire Texas 1 Falvey Aff. 
at para. 5.
 	SWBT Texas I Auinbauh Aff. at para. 122.
 	SWBT Texas I Auinbauh Reply Aff. at paras. 45-46.
 	Texas I Commission Reply Comments at 28.
 	SWBT Texas I Auinbauh Aff. at para. 122.
 	Texas I Commission Comments at 88.
 	Id.
 	Texas I Commission Comments at 88.
 	SWBT Texas I Auinbauh Reply Aff. at para. 46.
 	47 U.S.C.  252(c), (e)(6); AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366 (1999).
 	Id.
 	WorldCom Texas I Comments at 49-50; WorldCom Texas I Price Decl. at paras. 19-25.
 	See, e.g., In re Public Utility Commission of Texas, CC Docket No. 96-13, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 13 
FCC Rcd 3460, 3536, n.384 (1997) (Texas Memorandum Opinion and Order) citing Newtons Telecom Dictionary 
at 221 (1991); see also United States v. Western Electric, 569 F.Supp. 990, 1002 n.54 (D.D.C. 1983).
 	See, e.g., Texas Memorandum Opinion and Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 3536, n.384.
 	WorldCom Texas I Comments at 49-50; WorldCom Texas I Price Decl. at paras. 22-25.
 	Texas I Commission Reply Comments at 29; see also SWBT Texas I Auinbauh Reply Aff. at para. 48.
 	Texas I Commission Reply Comments at 29.
 	We note that SWBT contends that the EAS additive is not a form of reciprocal compensation and is therefore 
not subject to the requirements of section 252(d)(2), but rather is a tool to facilitate retail arrangement options 
between terminating carriers and their end users.  SWBT Texas I Auinbauh Reply Aff. at para. 48.  For the purpose 
of this analysis, we assume, but do not decide, that these EAS charges constitute a reciprocal compensation 
arrangement.
 	Allegiance Texas I Reply Comments Attach. 1, Petition of Allegiance Telecom of Texas, Inc. for Arbitration at 
4 (Allegiance Texas I Reply Comments Attach. 1).
 	Allegiance Texas I Reply Comments Attach. 1 at 4.
 	SWBT Texas I Auinbauh Aff. at para. 111.
 	Id.
 	Bell Atlantic v. FCC, No. 99-1094 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 24, 2000).
 	47 U.S.C.  271(c)(2)(B)(xiv).
 	47 U.S.C.  251(c)(4)(A).
 	47 U.S.C.  252(d)(3).
 	47 U.S.C.  251(c)(4)(B). 
 	Local Competition First Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd at 15966, para. 939; 47 C.F.R.  51.613(b).  The 
Eighth Circuit acknowledged the Commissions authority to promulgate such rules, and specifically upheld the 
sections of the Commissions rules concerning resale of promotions and discounts in Iowa Utilities Board.  Iowa 
Utils. Bd. v. FCC, 120 F.3d at 818-19, affd in part and remanded on other grounds, AT&T v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 
U.S. 366 (1999).  See also 47 C.F.R.  51.613-51.617.
 	47 U.S.C.  251(c)(4)(B).
 	Id.
 	See, e.g., Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 4046-48, paras. 178-81 (Bell Atlantic provides 
nondiscriminatory access to its OSS ordering functions for resale services and therefore provides efficient 
competitors a meaningful oppportunity to compete).
 	SWBT Texas I Application at 120-122; SWBT Texas I Auinbauh Aff. at paras. 126-134, 152.
 	Texas I Commission Comments at 90.
 	SWBT Texas I Auinbauh Aff. at para. 20.
 	Id. at para. 128.
 	Id. at para. 152.
 	Id. at paras. 128, 152.
 	Id. at para. 130.  Pursuant to Commission rules, incumbent LECs do not need to offer for resale short-term 
promotions of 90 days or less, as long as such short-term promotions are not used to evade the wholesale rate 
obligation.  47 C.F.R.  51.613(a)(2)(ii).
 	SWBT Texas I Auinbauh Aff. at para. 134.
 	Id.
 	SWBT Texas I Application at 120; SWBT Texas I Auinbauh at Aff. para. 132.  See also SBC/Ameritech Merger 
Order, 14 FCC Rcd 14712, App. C, Conditions at 15,018-19, paras. 47-49.  These carrier-to-carrier promotions were 
created as a result of the SBC/Ameritech merger.  We concluded in the SBC/Ameritech Merger Order that such 
promotions are beneficial because they encourage the rapid development of local competition in residential and less 
dense areas. Id. at 14874, para. 390. Additionally, we found that the promotions are not discriminatory because they 
are offered to competitors in a nondiscriminatory fashion, allowing all competitive LECs in SBC/Ameritechs region 
to participate.  Id. at 14916, para. 497.
 	SWBT Texas I Auinbauh Aff. at para. 20.
 	Texas I Commission Comments at 91-92.
 	SWBT Texas I Application at 120; SWBT Texas I Auinbauh Aff. at paras. 133-34.
 	SWBT Texas I Auinbauh Aff. at para. 133.
 	SWBT Texas I Application at 121; SWBT Texas I Auinbauh Aff. at paras. 133-34.
  	NALA Texas I Comments at 7-10.
 	Id.
 	See, e.g., SWBT Texas I Auinbauh Aff., Attach. A, T2A, General Terms and Conditions at  9.0 (Dispute 
Resolution).
 	Id.
 	NALA Texas I Comments at 5.
 	Id.
 	Id.
 	Id.
 	Letter from Austin C. Schlick, Kellogg, Huber, Hansen, Todd & Evans, P.L.L.C., Counsel to SBC, to Magalie 
Roman Salas, Secretary, Federal Communications Commission, CC Docket No. 00-4 (filed March 17, 2000) 
(Schlick March 17 Ex Parte Letter), Attach. 2 at 1.
 	Id.
 	Id.
 	Id.
 	Id.
 	Id.
 	Id. at 1-2.
 	Id.
 	Id.  NALA states that its members purchase SWBTs POTS for resale.  NALA Texas I Comments at 2-3.
 	See section V.D.2 for a discussion of TRAs assertion that SWBT does not make xDSL services available to 
resellers at wholesale rates.
 	Adelphia Texas I Comments at 1-2.
 	Allegiance Texas I Comments at 20-23; Allegiance Texas II Comments at 2.
 	e.spire Texas I Comments at 7-10.
 	KMC Texas I Comments at 2-4.
 	See, e.g., KMC Texas I Comments at 2.
 	SWBT Texas I Application at 121; SWBT Texas I Auinbauh Aff. at para. 133; SWBT Texas I Auinbauh Reply 
Aff. at paras. 49-50.
 	Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 4147-48, paras. 389-390.
 	Id.
 	KMC Texas I Comments at 3-4.
 	See In re Establishment of Rules to Prohibit the Imposition of Unjust, Onerous Termination Penalties on 
Customers Choosing to Partake of the Benefits of Local Exchange Telecommunications Competition, Petition for 
Declaratory Ruling, CC Docket No. 99-142 (filed Apr. 26, 1999) (requesting that the Commission declare unlawful 
termination penalties imposed by incumbent LECs, to prohibit enforcement of incumbent LEC termination penalties, 
and to require the removal of incumbent LEC termination penalties from state tariffs until more competition 
develops).
 	Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 4148, para. 391.
 	See sections V.B.1 and 2, supra.
 	47 U.S.C.  271(d)(3)(B).
 	See Implementation of the Accounting Safeguards Under the Telecommunications Act of 1996, CC Docket No. 
96-150, Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd 17539 (1996) (Accounting Safeguards Order), Second Order On 
Reconsideration, FCC 00-9 (rel. Jan. 18, 2000);  Implementation of the Non-Accounting Safeguards of Sections 271 
and 272 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, CC Docket No. 96-149, First Report and Order and 
Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 11 FCC Rcd 21905 (1996) (Non-Accounting Safeguards Order), petition 
for review pending sub nom. SBC Communications v. FCC, No. 97-1118 (filed D.C. Cir. Mar. 6, 1997) (held in 
abeyance May 7, 1997), First Order on Reconsideration, 12 FCC Rcd 2297 (1997) (First Order on 
Reconsideration), Second Order on Reconsideration, 12 FCC Rcd 8653 (1997) (Second Order on Reconsideration), 
affd sub nom. Bell Atlantic Telephone Companies v. FCC, 131 F.3d 1044 (D.C. Cir. 1997), Third Order on 
Reconsideration, FCC 99-242 (rel. Oct. 4, 1999) (Third Order on Reconsideration).
 	Non-Accounting Safeguards Order, 11 FCC Rcd at 21914; Accounting Safeguards Order, 11 FCC Rcd at 
17550; Ameritech Michigan Order, 12 FCC Rcd at 20725.
 	Non-Accounting Safeguards Order, 11 FCC Rcd at 21914, paras. 15-16; Ameritech Michigan Order, 12 FCC 
Rcd at 20725, para. 346.
 	Ameritech Michigan Order, 12 FCC Rcd at 20725; Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 4153, para. 
402.
 	Second BellSouth Louisiana Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 20785-20786 at para. 322; Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 
FCC Rcd at 4153, para. 402.
 	Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 4153, para. 402.
 	Section 272(a) states that a BOC may not provide certain services except through one or more affiliates that 
meet the requirements of section 272(b).  See 47 U.S.C.  272(a)(1)(B).
 	For the purposes of its application to provide in-region interLATA services in Texas, we only address SWBTs 
section 272 showing with respect to one affiliate, SBCS.  We note that SWBT has several other section 272 affiliates 
as a result of its mergers:  Southern New England Telephone Enhanced Services, Inc. (SNET Enhanced Services); 
Ameritech Communications, Inc. (ACI); Ameritech Communications, Inc. of Illinois (ACoI); and Ameritech 
Communications, Inc. of Wisconsin (ACoW).  Our findings do not apply to Advanced Services, Inc. (ASI) because 
ASI is not a section 272 affiliate.  See Rhythms Comments at 62-63.  For a complete description of SWBTs 
corporate affiliates and an organizational chart, see SBC Communications, Inc., COST ALLOCATION MANUAL,  IV 
(Dec. 16, 1999).  
 	SWBT Weckel Aff. at para. 20.
 	SWBT Application at 69-70; SWBT Rehmer Aff. at paras. 51-57 (describing SWBTs section 272 compliance 
efforts, such as a centralized Oversight Team, corporate policies, and training programs), Attach. E (submitting 
corporate memoranda outlining section 272 compliance requirements), F (submitting corporate memoranda 
describing compliance oversight team), and G (submitting section 272 training video), and H (submitting corporate 
section 272 compliance program); SWBT Weckel Aff. at para. 70, Attach. U (submitting compliance policy of 
SBCS).  In addition, SWBT states that it will provide refresher training on section 272 compliance upon earning 
section 271 approval.  SWBT Application at 69-70.   
 	SWBT Application at 63-64 (citing SWBT Rehmer Aff. at paras. 9-19; SWBT Weckel Aff. at paras. 17-21).
 	47 U.S.C.  272(b)(2); 47 C.F.R. 53.203(b); Accounting Safeguards Order, 11 FCC Rcd at 17617-18, para. 
167; Second BellSouth Lousiana Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 20786-89, paras. 323-29; see SWBT Application at 64.
 	SWBT Ex parte (Jan. 19, 2000).  In its ex parte filing, SWBT stated that it section 272 affiliate shares its chart 
of accounts with other non-BOC SBC affiliates.  In addition, SWBT describes the security measures and other 
internal controls to show restricted access to the books, records, and accounts of its section 272 affiliate.  See SWBT 
Larkin Aff. at paras. 9-12.
 	47 U.S.C.  272(b)(3); 47 C.F.R.  53.203(c); Ameritech Michigan Order, 12 FCC Rcd at 20730-31, para. 360; 
Second BellSouth Louisiana Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 20789-90, paras. 329-30; SWBT Application at 64; SWBT 
Rehmer Aff. at para. 19, Attach. B (submitting names of corporate officers and directors); SWBT Weckel Aff. at 
paras. 31-41, Attach. D-Q (listing names of relevant officers and directors), Attach. R (submitting corporate policy 
prohibiting loans of employees).
 	47 U.S.C.  272(b)(4); 47 C.F.R.  53.203(d); Non-Accounting Safeguards Order, 11 FCC Rcd at 21995, paras. 
189-90; see SWBT Application at 65; SWBT Weckel Aff. at paras. 42-44; SWBT Rehmer Aff. at paras. at 20-21.
 	Because SBC Communications owns and controls eight BOCs (i.e., SWBT, Pacific Bell, Nevada Bell, and the 
five Ameritech Operating Companies) and a total of five section 272 affiliates, we clarify that our analysis in this 
order is limited only to SWBT, which is the BOC operating in Texas, and SBCS, which is the section 272 affiliate 
through which SBC Communications plans to provide in-region interLATA services in Texas.  We note, however, 
that SBC must comply with all section 272 safeguards with respect to any transactions between any SBC-owned or 
controlled BOC and any section 272 affiliate.  This would require, for example, SBCS to ensure that any transactions 
with Pacific Bell or the Ameritech operating companies are reduced to writing and made available for public 
inspection in accordance with the Commissions rules.  See ARMIS 43-02 USOA Report, Table I-2 (demonstrating 
that Pacific Bell provided SBCS with approximately $5.27 million worth of services in 1999).
 	47 U.S.C.  272(b)(5); 47 C.F.R.  53.203(e).
 	Accounting Safeguards Order, 11 FCC Rcd at 17593-94, para. 122; Ameritech Michigan Order, 12 FCC Rcd at 
20734-37, paras. 366-73; Second BellSouth Louisiana Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 20790-95, paras. 331-40.
 	See 47 C.F.R.  32.27; Accounting Safeguards Order, 11 FCC Rcd at 17616-17, para. 166; see Second 
BellSouth Louisiana Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 20790-95, paras. 331-39.
 	See Second BellSouth Louisiana Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 20791-92, para. 335; Bell Atlantic New York Order at 
paras. 411-12.  In their Automated Reporting Management Information System (ARMIS) reports, the BOCs provide 
summary information about their transactions with nonregulated affiliates.  See ARMIS 43-02 USOA Report, Table 
I-2, B-4.  In their CAMs, the BOCs disclose the nature, terms, and frequency of their anticipated affiliate 
transactions.  See 47 C.F.R.  64.903; see also SBC Communications, Inc., COST ALLOCATION MANUAL,  V (Dec. 
16, 1999).  Pursuant to the Commissions Part 64 accounting safeguards, all the BOCs receive annual audits of their 
ARMIS data performed by an independent auditor.  47 C.F.R.  64.904.  In addition, the Commission regularly 
reviews the CAMs and the audit materials related to the independent audits, which show the actual dollar amount of 
affiliate transactions that occurred during the audited period.
 	SWBT Application at 65; SWBT Larkin Aff. at paras. 15-24; SWBT Weckel Aff. at paras. 45-70; see ARMIS 
43-02 USOA Report, Table I-2 (demonstrating that SWBT provided SBCS with approximately $ 3.44 million worth 
of services in 1999).  
 	SWBT Ex parte (Mar. 3, 2000).  To review an applicants showing for section 272(b)(5), the Commission 
examines publicly-available accounting and financial data, as well as confidential material obtained through the 
course of routine audits of a BOCs Part 64 CAM.  Our preliminary review of these materials revealed a potential 
discrepancy between the dollar amounts of certain services posted on the Internet and disclosed through the audit 
materials.  In response to Commission inquiry, SWBT explained that there is a lag time in the true-up process it uses 
to reconcile its accounting records, more detailed billing records, and its Internet postings.  More importantly, 
SWBT demonstrated that the transactions at issue were properly posted, and that the discrepancy applied only to the 
total dollar value of the services.  We therefore conclude that the discrepancy did not affect the fundamental showing 
of compliance with the section 272(b)(5) disclosure requirements. 
 	SWBT Ex parte (Mar. 7, 2000) (submitting additional information to show that SBCS posted the transfer of $25 
million worth of switching equipment to the BOC).
 	Id.
 	AT&T Kargoll Aff. at paras. 17-23.
 	AT&T Kargoll Aff. at para. 21 (citing SWBT Temporary Projects at 
<http://www.sbc.com/PublicAffairs/PublicPolicy/Regulatory/affdocs/1619-2.doc>).
 	See id. at paras. 18-20 (addressing the lack of detail contained in Official Communications Services and General 
Agreement for Support Services).
 	Almost all of SBCSs Internet postings contain the detail required by the Commissions rules, including the 
rates, terms, conditions, frequency, the number and type of personnel, and the level of expertise of the personnel 
performing the services.  See Accounting Safeguards Order, 11 FCC Rcd at 17593-94, para. 122; Ameritech 
Michigan Order, 12 FCC Rcd at 20734-37, paras. 366-73; Second BellSouth Louisiana Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 
20790-95, paras. 331-39; see also SWBT Reply at 71.  
 	Second BellSouth Louisiana Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 20794-95, paras. 338-40; Accounting Safeguards Order, 11 
FCC Rcd at 17592, para. 119; 47 C.F.R.  32.27.
 	AT&T Kargoll Aff. at paras. 32-37.
 	See SWBT Larkin Reply Aff. at para. 8.
 	AT&T Kargoll Decl. at paras. 32, 36-37 (citing SWBT Larkin Aff. at Attachment C, para. 5).  Specifically, 
SWBT requires third parties to sign a nondisclosure agreement in order to review SWBTs detailed billing 
information.  See AT&T Kargoll Decl. at para. 32.  SWBTs nondisclosure agreement, however, prohibits any party 
that identifies potential discrimination from disclosing the evidence to a regulatory agency until SWBT has had 30 
days to explain and/or make any changes.  Id. at para. 36.
 	SWBT Larkin Reply Aff. at para. 8 (stating that the nondisclosure agreement has addressed two third party 
reviews of the Internet postings, and that neither such review has resulted in complaints to regulatory agencies).
 	47 U.S.C.  272(c)(2).
 	SWBT has a shared services affiliate that provides services to members of the corporate family. SWBT 
Rehmer Aff. at para. 29, Attach. C (describing services provided by SWBTs shared services affiliate to the SWBT 
section 272 affiliate).  The Commissions accounting safeguards allow certain accounting treatment for services 
provided by a shared services affiliate to members of the corporate family, so long as the shared services affiliate 
only conducts business with members of the corporate family.  See Accounting Safeguards Order, 11 FCC Rcd at 
17607-608, para. 148.
 	47 U.S.C.  272(d); 47 C.F.R.  53.209-213; see SWBT Application at 67-68; SWBT Larkin Aff. at paras. 38-
44; SWBT Weckel Aff. at paras. 71-73.
 	47 U.S.C.  272(d)(1).
 	Accounting Safeguards Order, 11 FCC Rcd at 17629, para. 198.
 	Accounting Safeguards Order, 11 FCC Rcd at 17631, para. 203; Second BellSouth Louisiana Order, 13 FCC 
Rcd at 20794, para. 338; Bell Atlantic New York Order at para. 416.
 	See Covad Reply at 19 (raising concerns about the relationship between SWBTs affiliates).
 	47 U.S.C.  272(c)(1); Non-Accounting Safeguards Order, 11 FCC Rcd at 21997-17, para. 195; Second 
BellSouth Louisiana Order, 13 FCC Rcd 20796-800, paras. 341-50.  The Commission found that the 
nondiscrimination safeguards extend to any good, service, facility, or information that a BOC provides to its section 
272 affiliate, including administrative services and other non-telecommunications goods and services.  Non-
Accounting Safeguards Order, 11 FCC Rcd at 22003-04, para. 210.  The Commission interprets the section 272(c) 
nondiscrimination safeguards broadly.  See id. at 22003, 22007, 22012, 22015-016.
 	Non-Accounting Safeguards Order, 11 FCC Rcd at 22000-01, para. 202.
 	SWBT Rehmer Aff. at paras. 17 (noting that SBCS may negotiate at arms length to obtain collocation space), 
31 (describing procedures for the establishment of company-specific standards), Attach. G (addressing, in training 
video, procedures for collocation and establishing interal standards for products and services).
 	See discussion supra Sections IV.B.1.c, e-f; Second BellSouth Louisiana Order, 13 FCC Rcd 20799, para. 346.
 	AT&T Kargoll Aff. at para. 39 (citing Non-Accounting Safeguards Order, 11 FCC Rcd at 21998, para. 197).
 	AT&T Comments at 87; AT&T Kargoll Aff. at para. 38, n.33.  AT&T contends that SWBTs proposed 
intrastate switched access tariff violated the nondiscrimination safeguards of section 272(c)(1) by allowing a series of 
discounts targetted to small volume interexchange carriers.  AT&T Kargoll Aff. at paras. 338-48.
 	SWBT Reply at 74.
 	47 U.S.C.  272(e)(1); Non-Accounting Safeguards Order, 11 FCC Rcd at 22018-22, paras. 239-45; Second 
BellSouth Louisiana Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 20800-01, paras. 348-50; see SWBT Application at 68-69. SWBT 
demonstrates that it will provide accurate data regarding actual service intervals so that unaffiliated parties can 
evaluate the performance SWBT provides itself and its affiliates and compare such performance to the service 
quality SWBT provides to competing carriers. SWBT Rehmer Aff. at 33-39, Attach. D (submitting report format for 
section 272(e)(1) reporting requirements).
 	47 U.S.C.  272(e)(2).
 	47 U.S.C.  272(e)(3), (e)(4); Second BellSouth Louisiana Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 20802-03, paras. 353-55; see 
SWBT Application at 68-69; SWBT Rehmer Aff. at paras. 40-47; SWBT Larkin Aff. at paras. 15-24.
 	AT&T Kargoll Aff. at para. 40.
 	SWBT Reply at 74.
 	47 U.S.C.  272(g)(1); see SWBT Application at 69; SWBT Rehmer Aff. at para. 50; SWBT Weckel Aff. at 
para. 80.
 	47 U.S.C.  272(g)(2); Second BellSouth Louisiana Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 20804, para. 357; see SWBT 
Application at 69; SWBT Rehmer Aff. at para. 50; SWBT Weckel Aff. at para. 80.
 	47 U.S.C.  271(d)(3)(C).
 	In addition, Congress specifically rejected an amendment that would have stipulated that full implementation of 
the checklist necessarily satisfies the public interest criterion.  See Ameritech Michigan Order, 12 FCC Rcd at 20747 
at para. 360-366; see also 141 Cong. Rec. S7971, S8043 (June. 8, 1995).
 	See Second BellSouth Louisiana Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 20805-06, para. 360 (the public interest analysis may 
include consideration of whether approval . . . will foster competition in all relevant telecommunications markets).
 	47 U.S.C.  271(d)(4).
 	47 U.S.C.  160(d).
 	See, e.g., AT&T Texas I Comments at 89; WorldCom Texas I Comments at 57-61; Sprint Texas I Comments at 
74-78; Sprint Texas II Comments at 48. 
 	See Sprint Texas I Comments at 74-78; Allegiance Texas I Comments at 13; AT&T Texas I Comments at 89; 
WorldCom Texas I Comments at 57-61.
 	See AT&T Texas I Comments at 89; but see SWBT Texas II Reply at 76. 
 	See AT&T Texas I Comments at 89; WorldCom Texas I Comments at 60; Sprint Texas I Comments at 75-76; 
Sprint Texas II Comments at 48-49.
 	See WorldCom Texas I Comments at 58-59.
 	Id. at 61.
 	See Bell Atlantic New York Order 15 FCC Rcd at 4163, para. 427.  This is consistent with the Commissions 
approach in prior section 271 orders.  See Ameritech Michigan Order, 12 FCC Rcd at 20585, para. 77.
 	See Bell Atlantic New York Order 15 FCC Rcd at 4164, para. 428.  
 	See Second BellSouth Louisiana Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 20806; see Ameritech Michigan Order, 12 FCC Rcd at 
20747. 
 	These mechanisms are generally administered by state commissions and derive from authority the states have 
under state law or under the federal Act.  As such, these mechanisms can serve as critical complements to the 
Commissions authority to preserve checklist compliance pursuant to section 271(d)(6).  Moreover, in this instance, 
we find that the extensive collaborative process by which these mechanisms were developed and modified in Texas 
has itself helped to bring SWBT into checklist compliance.
 	See Second BellSouth Louisiana Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 20806.
 	See Bell Atlantic New York Order 15 FCC Rcd at 4165, para. 430.  The Commissions enforcement powers 
include, among other penalties, suspension or revocation of section 271 approval.  47 U.S.C.  271(d)(6)(A).
 	See Bell Atlantic New York Order 15 FCC Rcd at 4165, para. 430; SWBT Texas I Application at 45-47. 
 	SWBT Dysart Texas I Aff. at para. 25.
 	Since the Texas I Application was filed more measurements have been added, notably in measuring performance 
relating to DSL-capable loops and interconnection.  See Texas Commission Texas II ex parte letter of June 19, 2000 
at 1-5; Texas Commission Texas II Reply Comments at 1-3. 
 	SWBT Dysart Texas I Aff. at para. 46.
 	SWBT Dysart Texas I Aff. at para. 46.  The performance measurements in the two tiers overlap substantially, 
with 41 of the 47 Tier-2 measurements also counted as Tier-1 measurements.  SWBT Texas I Reply Comments at 
86.
 	SWBT Dysart Texas I Aff. Attach. H at 9.
 	SWBT Dysart Texas I Aff. Attach. H at 15.
 	Bell Atlantic New York Order 15 FCC Rcd at 4166-67, para. 433.
 	Bell Atlantic New York Order 15 FCC Rcd at 4166-67, para. 433.  This prediction was based on five 
characteristics:  potential liability that provides a meaningful and significant incentive to comply with the designated 
performance standards; clearly-articulated, pre-determined measures and standards, which encompass a 
comprehensive range of carrier-to-carrier performance; a reasonable structure that is designed to detect and sanction 
poor performance when it occurs; a self-executing mechanism that does not leave the door open unreasonably to 
litigation and appeal; and reasonable assurances that the reported data is accurate.  Id. at 433.
 	See Ameritech Michigan Order, 12 FCC 20741-51, para. 393. 
 	See Texas Commission Texas I Evaluation at 98-111.
 	See Texas Commission Texas I Evaluation at 106.
 	Id. at 106.
 	SWBT Dysart Texas I Aff. at para 52.  SWBT set the cap at $289 million annually in response to concerns that 
SWBTs earlier cap was too low.  The cap is based on 36% of  SWBTs net return, and will be recalculated 
annually, but will never exceed $289 million or go below $225 million.  The cap is comparable to the cap we 
deemed adequate for Bell Atlantic in New York.  See Bell Atlantic New York Order at para. 436 n.1332. 
 	See ALTS Texas I Comments at 49-50, 57; AT&T Texas I Comments at 96; WorldCom Texas I Comments at 
66-67, 74-75 (Overall cap is meaningless gesture because it cant be reached short of SWBT shutting down or 
disconnecting every actual or potential competitive LEC customer.)  See also Bell Atlantic New York Order 15 FCC 
Rcd at 4168-69, para. 437 ([A]n overall liability amount would be meaningless if there is no likelihood that 
payments would approach this amount, even in instances of widespread performance failure.).  We note that SWBT 
may commence a show-cause proceeding if SWBTs Tier 1 payments to an individual competitive LEC exceed $3 
million in a month, or payments exceed $10 million to all competitive LECs in a given month.  Texas Commission 
Texas I Comments at 108.  See also ALTS Texas II Reply Comments at 18-19.
 	See Bell Atlantic New York Order 15 FCC Rcd at 4167, para. 435.
 	Bell Atlantic New York Order 15 FCC Rcd at 4169, para. 438; Second BellSouth Louisiana Order, 13 FCC Rcd 
at 20806, para. 363. 
 	See, e.g., ALTS Texas I Comments at 56; AT&T Texas I Comments at 97; AT&T Pfau/DeYoung Decl. at 167-
68; CLEC Coalition Texas I Comments at 42-44; Covad Texas I Comments at 63; WorldCom Texas I Comments at 
73-74; NorthPoint Texas I Comments at 2, 9.
 	SWBT Texas I Reply at 19-27; SWBT Dysart Texas I Reply Aff. at paras. 11, 18, 21, 22; Austin C. Schlick 
Feb. 4 Ex Parte Letter.
 	Texas Commission Texas I Comments at 111.  As of January 10, 2000 SWBT tracked data in 1,874 
submeasures.  SWBT Texas I Brief Attach. 2 at 5. 
 	Covad Goodpastor Texas I Reply Decl. at 4.  See also Texas Commission Texas II Comments at 1-4; Texas 
Commission Texas II Reply Comments
 	See discussion under checklist item 1.  The Texas Commission provides a forum for ongoing modification and 
improvement of the performance metrics.  The Texas Commission reports that a six month review process is in 
place to assure that the plan is not static in nature.  The Texas Commission, in conjunction with SWBT and the 
competitive LECs, will engage in comprehensive review of the performance measures to determine if commercial 
experience indicates that changes are necessary.  Texas Commission Texas I Comments at 105.  The six-month 
review process began in April 2000.  See Texas Commission Texas II Comments at 1-4; Texas Commission Texas II 
Reply Comments at 1-3.  Cf. Bell Atlantic New York Order at para. 438 and nn.1338-1339 (New York Commissions 
steps to ensure that metrics will continue to be developed and refined).
 	See Bell Atlantic New York Order 15 FCC Rcd at 4169, para. 438.
 	See, e.g., WorldCom Texas I Comments at 69.
 	Id. at 69-70. 
 	See Texas Commission Texas I Comments at 106-111; see also Bell Atlantic New York Order 15 FCC Rcd at 
4170-71, para. 440.
 	See SWBT Dysart Texas I Aff. at para. 53; Bell Atlantic New York Order 15 FCC Rcd at 4171, para. 441.
  	See SWBT Dysart Texas I Aff. Attach. H at 12-13.
 	Texas Commission Texas I Comments at 108.  If SWBT delivers non-compliant performance for three 
consecutive months on at least 20% of the measures reported, but SWBT has not incurred more than $1 million in 
damages payable to the competitive LEC, the competitive LEC may commence an expedited dispute resolution 
proceeding to demonstrate why additional damages are appropriate.  If SWBTs Tier 1 payments to an individual 
competitive LEC exceed $3 million in a month, or payments exceed $10 million to all competitive LECs in a given 
month, upon timely completion of a show-cause proceeding, SWBT must pay the balance of damages owed.  Id.; see 
also SWBT Texas I Dysart Aff. Attach. H at 8.    
 	AT&T Texas I Comments at 96; see also CompTel Texas I Comments at 19-20.
 	Bell Atlantic New York Order 15 FCC Rcd at 4171, para. 441.
 	Department of Justice Texas I Evaluation at 5. 
 	Department of Justice Texas I Evaluation at 5; AT&T Texas I Comments at 78.
 	See Allegiance Texas I Comments at 13; AT&T Pfau & DeYoung Aff. at para. 15, 25, 56-58; BlueStar Texas I 
at 5-6; WorldCom Texas I Comments at 33-34; Sprint Texas I Comments at 74-76. 
 	SWBT Texas I Reply Comments at 81.
 	SWBT Dysart Texas I Aff. at para. 76. 
 	Texas Commission Texas I Evaluation at 105, n.607.  We applaud the Texas Commissions ongoing 
commitment to strengthening the Plan, and do not interpret such efforts to call into question the Texas Commissions 
endorsement of the Plan as filed.
 	See SWBT Dysart Texas I Aff. Attach. H at 1.0 (providing for SWBT to collect, analyze, and report 
performance data).
 	See Accounting for Judgments and Other Costs Associated with Litigation, 12 FCC Rcd 5112 (1997); 47 C.F.R. 
 7370(d).  As a general matter, a carriers operating expenses recovered through its rates must be legitimate costs of 
providing adequate service to ratepayers.  See, e.g., West Ohio Gas Co. v. PUC, 294 U.S. 63, 74 (1935); Mountain 
States Tel. and Tel. Co. v. FCC, 939 F.2d 1035, 1044 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
 	In the SBC/Ameritech Merger Order, the Commission held that bill credits provided under the performance 
assurance plan arising from that order shall not be reflected in the revenue requirement of an SBC/Ameritech 
incumbent LEC.  SBC/Ameritech Merger Order App. C at para. 34. 
 	Bell Atlantic New York Order 15 FCC Rcd at 4172-73, para. 443.
 	For example, several commenters suggest that misconduct of SWBT, such as intransigence, delaying tactics, 
perpetual litigation (and sanctionable tactics during litigation, such as destruction of or withholding documents), and 
the refusal to pay reciprocal compensation, undermines confidence in SWBTs post-grant conduct.  See Sprint Texas 
I Comments at 78; BlueStar Texas I Comments at 6; Allegiance Texas I Comments at 14-16; Connect Texas I 
Comments at 6-8; e.spire Texas I Comments at 6; CompTel Texas I Comments at 9; AT&T Texas I Comments at 
89-95; WorldCom Texas I Comments at 62-63; Covad Texas I Comments at 49-50, 58, 60-62; NALA/PCA Texas I 
Comments at 3.
 	See Ameritech Michigan Order, 12 FCC Rcd at 20749, para. 396.  
 	We emphasize that grant of this application does not reflect any conclusion that SWBTs conduct in the 
individual instances cited by commenters is nondiscriminatory and complies with the companys obligations under 
the Communications Act.
 	Project Pronto is a SBC network upgrade that will employ fiber optic cable and remote terminals to provide 
xDSL-capable services to customers that are out of reach of a central office digital subscriber line access 
multiplexers (DSLAMs).  SWBT represents that it will offer competitors nondiscriminatory access to the xDSL 
facilities being deployed in remote terminals.  SWBT Texas II Reply Brief at 26-27; CompTel Texas II Comments at 
5-8; AT&T Texas II Comments at 23-24; AT&T Texas II Pfau/Chambers Decl. at paras. 54-69; AT&T Reply 
Comments at 15-18; Rhythms Texas II Comments at 9-10.
 	Rhythms Comments at 9.
 	SWBT Auinbauh and Lube Texas II Reply Aff. at paras. 6-8, 22-35.
 	A number of parties have raised issues concerning Project Pronto in a number of proceedings before us.  See, 
e.g., Line Sharing Order, 14 FCC Rcd 20912 (recons. pending); UNE Remand Order, 15 FCC Rcd 3696 (recons. 
pending);  Letter from Paul K. Mancini, Vice President and Assistant General Counsel, SBC Communications, Inc., 
to Lawrence E. Strickling, Chief, Common Carrier Bureau (Feb. 15, 2000) ("SBC Waiver Request"); Common 
Carrier Bureau Seeks Comment on SBC's Request for Interpretation, Waiver, or Modification of the SBC/Ameritech 
Merger Conditions, CC Docket No. 98-141, ASD File No. 99-49, Public Notice, DA 00-335 (rel. Feb. 18, 2000).
 	See ALTS Texas I Comments at 62-65; e.spire Texas I Comments at 8-10; Allegiance Texas I Comments at 20-
23 urging fresh look for retail customers only.  See also part V.N, infra, for discussion of fresh look argument.
 	See Allegiance Texas I Comments at 17-18; ALTS Texas I Comments at 50-55; DSL.net Texas I Comments at 
9; ALTS Texas II Reply Comments at 20-22. 
 	Texas Commission Texas I Reply Comments at 27.  The Texas Commission states that the legislation adopts a 
more aggressive timeframe, allowing an offering to go into the market after a 10 day notice to the Texas Commission 
and to all companies that have an effective interconnection agreement with SWBT.  The Texas Commission believes 
that this procedural change is consistent with a more competitive marketplace and has accelerated its review of such 
offerings in order to reflect this change.  Id. at 27.
 	47 U.S.C.  271(d)(6).
 	See generally U S WEST Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 177 F.3d 1057, 1060 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (noting that a 
central purpose of section 271 is to create incentives for BOCs to open local markets to competition), cert. denied, 
120 S.Ct. 1240 (2000).
 	Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 4174, para. 446.
 	See Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 4174-77, paras. 446-453.
 	See 47 U.S.C.  271(d)(6)(A)(iii); Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 4175-76, paras. 448-451.
 	In New York, for example, the New York Public Service Commission and the Commission responded quickly 
with a coordinated, two-pronged enforcement response when Bell Atlantic developed performance problems 
associated with lost or mishandled orders for unbundled network elements submitted electronically by its local 
service competitors.  See Order Directing Market Adjustments and Amending Performance Assurance, Case OO-C-
0008/9 and Case 99-C-0949 (New York PSC, Mar. 23, 2000); Bell Atlantic-New York, Authorization Under Section 
271 of the Communications Act to Provide In-Region, InterLATA Service in the State of New York, File No. EB-00-
IH-0085, Order, 15 FCC Rcd 5413 (2000) (adopting consent decree between Commission and Bell Atlantic that 
included provisions for Bell Atlantic to make a voluntary payment of $3,000,000 to the United States Treasury, 
additional payments if Bell Atlantic failed to meet specified performance standards, and weekly reporting 
requirements to gauge Bell Atlantics performance in correcting the problems associated with its electronic ordering 
systems); Letter from David H. Solomon, Chief, FCC Enforcement Bureau to Edward D. Young, III, Senior Vice 
President  Regulatory, Bell Atlantic, dated June 20, 2000 (advising Bell Atlantic that it appears to the Commission 
to have met the requisite performance standards and that, in the absence of new information indicating that Bell 
Atlantics performance reports are materially inaccurate, Bell Atlantics obligations under the Consent Decree have 
terminated).
 	SWBT Ham Aff. at paras. 10-17, 51-247; Texas Commission OSS Evaluation Master Test Plan  2.2.
 	SWBT provides competitive LECs with several application-to-application interfaces based on an SWBT 
proprietary protocol or on the Electronic Data Interchange/Common Object Request Broker Architecture 
(EDI/CORBA) protocol, as well as graphical user interfaces (GUIs), available from SWBTs Toolbar Platform 
(Toolbar).  SWBT Ham. Aff. at paras. 46-48. SWBTs Toolbar Platform provides access to multiple GUI 
applications using a single standard User ID and password.  Id.  Specifically, SWBTs Toolbar provides access to 
Verigate (for preordering), LEX (for ordering), Order Status (for checking status of orders), Provisioning Order 
Status (for checking provisioning status of pending orders), Trouble Administration (for repair and maintenance) and 
Bill Information (for billing). The Toolbar provides for automated software updates over the users network 
connection. Id.
 	SWBT Ham Aff. at para. 52; Master Test Plan at  4.3.5.1.  Pre-ordering functions that SWBT makes available 
to competitive LECs include: address verification; access to customer service records, customer service inquiries, 
directory listings and Directory Assistance; service and feature availability, access to telephone number assignment, 
due date availability, dispatch requirements, Primary Interexchange Carrier (PIC) and Local Primary IntraLATA 
Carrier (LPIC) list, Access to Common Language Location Identifier for the serving central office; Channel facility 
assignment verification for UNEs.  Id.
 	SWBT Ham Aff. at 51-53
 	SWBT Ham Aff. at para. 53.  SWBT provides a table listing which preordering functions and the capabilities 
that are available in each system. Id.
 	EASE is SWBTs proprietary interface that competing LECs can use for preordering and ordering of resale 
services for residential customers with up to five lines and for business customers with up to thirty lines.  It is the 
same system used by SWBTs own retail service representatives. SWBT Application at 82; SWBT Ham Aff. at 
paras. 5, 31-32.  According to SWBT, EASE integrates ordering and pre-ordering functions into a single application 
and provides competitive LEC resellers the same access to ordering capabilities for resale services that are available 
to SWBTs retail service representatives. SWBT Ham Aff. at para. 55. 
 	DataGate is an application-to-application electronic interface that provides competing carriers with pre-ordering 
functionality for resale services and UNEs.  SWBT designed DataGate to be used by competing LECs that have their 
own software programs or applications.  It allows competing LECs to connect their mechanized OSS directly to 
SWBTs systems, thereby minimizing the need for manual entry of data.  SWBT Ham Aff. at para. 60.  SWBT states 
that the competing LECs can integrate DataGate with SWBTs EDI Gateway to provide an integrated pre-ordering 
and ordering system. Id.  For a discussion of the integratability of these interfaces, see discussion infra at Section 
V.B.1.
 	Verigate is a graphical user interface (GUI)  operating on Windows.  Verigate provides competitive LECs 
access to pre-ordering functions available from SWBTs back office systems (those systems not directly accessed 
by service SWBTs or competitive LEC representatives, but are accessed only through the systems used by those 
representatives).  SWBT Ham Aff. at para. 57.  SWBT states that Verigate was designed for competing carriers that 
want to use the EDI or LEX ordering interfaces, but do not want to develop their own software programs required for 
use of DataGate or EDI/CORBA. 
 	Like DataGate, SWBTs EDI/CORBA is an application-to-application interface that supports both resale 
services and UNEs.   According to SWBT, EDI/CORBA for pre-ordering can be integrated with SWBTs EDI 
Ordering Gateway.  SWBT Application at 82l.  See SWBT Texas Model Interconnection Agreement Attach. 2  2, 
Attach 7  2,4; SWBT Ham Aff. at paras. 51-70.  
 	SORD is the same electronic interface that SWBTs retail service representatives use to create, edit distribute, 
and control requests for changes to customers services and account records.  SORD enables competing carriers to 
perform all ordering functions for resold services and unbundled network elements.  SWBT Ham Aff. at paras. 85-
88.  These functions include certain complex ordering functions for those resold services and unbundled network 
elements that EASE, EDI, and LEX cannot handle. Id.  SORD, however, is a more complex system because it is not 
English language-based. Id. at para. 87.
 	LEX is a graphical user interface (GUI) that is based upon national Ordering and Billing Forum (OBF)/LSR 
guidelines.  It allows competing LECs to electronically submit requests to SWBT for both local resale service and 
UNEs. LEX supports UNE combinations LEX also enables competitive LECs to receive acknowledgments and 
notification of error details from SWBT, and to track the status of their orders. See  SWBT Ham Aff. at paras. 74-99. 
 SWBT provides a list of ordering/provisioning functions and the capabilities available in each system.  Id. at para. 
75.
 	SWBTs EDI Gateway provides an electronic interface that conform to the Ordering and Billing 
Forum/Telecommunications Interface Forum (OBF/TCIF) national guidelines.  It supports the ordering and 
provisioning of both resale and UNEs and can be integrated with either DataGate or EDI/CORBA to provide an 
integrated preordering and ordering system. Both EDI and LEX support the same types of orders for resale services 
and UNEs.  For resale services, LEX and EDI enables the competitive LECs to perform conversions, new connects, 
changes of service, disconnects, and suspend order requests.  For unbundled network elements, LEX and SWBTs 
EDI Gateway allows competing carriers to submit conversions, new connects, changes of service, disconnects, 
outside moves, and record changes orders for unbundled local loops, interim number portability, number portability 
and switch ports.  SWBT Ham. Aff. at paras. 90, 96.  SWBT states that additional electronic interfaces are available 
to order local interconnection trunks, unbundled dedicated transport, and to check the status of service orders.  
SWBT Ham Aff. at para. 74. 
 	See SWBT Ham Aff. at para. 98.
 	SWBT Ham Aff. at para. 74.  SWBT provides a list of ordering/provisioning functions and the capabilities 
available in each system.  Id. at para 75.
 	SWBT Conway Aff. at para. 48.
 	SWBT Ham. Aff. at paras. 138, 166-167.  SWBT Conway Aff. at para. 48.  LASR edits are based on LSR field 
entries as required by OBF and SWBTs internal business rules. SWBT Ham Aff. at para. 138.
 	SWBT Ham Aff. at para. 138.  If the LSR contains a Super Fatal error such as a missing Company Code or 
Purchase Order Number, the competing LEC is required to send a new request with corrections. Id. If the LSR 
contains a Fatal Error the competing LEC can correct the error via a supplemental request.  Id.  An LSR containing 
errors is sent back to the competitive LEC across the same mechanism it was received.  MASTER TEST PLAN at  
2.2.2.3.
 	FOLDERS stores the LSR and displays a MOG indicator if the LSR was also sent to the MOG. FOLDERS is 
used by LSC service representatives to view LSRs and reports generated during the processing of competing 
carriers requests.  SWBT Ham. Aff. at para. 168.
 	LSR/DSS is a workload distribution tool utilized by the LSC for handling manual processes. SWBT Ham. Aff. 
at para. 169.
 	SWBT Ham Aff. at para. 169.  See SWBT Ham Aff., Attachment X-1 for a list of MOG-eligible service.
 	SWBT Ham Aff. at para. 140.  SWBT states that for LSRs that cannot be mechanically generated, competing 
carriers can use SORD, the same system that the LSC service representatives would use on behalf of the competitor 
to manually create those orders that are not currently MOG-eligible. SWBT Ham Aff. at para. 143. 
 	SWBT Ham. Aff. at para 170.  A list of MOG fatal errors are listed in the LSOR.
 	SWBT Conway Aff. at para. 48.  SWBT Ham Aff. at para. 170.  If the non-fatal error was caused by the 
competing LEC, the LSC service representative manually inputs a reject notification via the LASR GUI.  If the non-
fatal error was caused by SWBTs internal processes that do not impact competing LEC entries on the LSR, the LSC 
service representative will create the service order in EASE (if resale) or in SORD.  SWBT Ham Aff. at para. 170.
 	SWBT Ham Aff. at para. 148.  SWBT states that it developed a graphical user interface to allow LSC to 
electronically return manual rejects as an interim measure until it can move LSR resolvable error detection capability 
to LASR. Id.
 	Id. at para. 152.
 	Master Test Plan at  2.2.2.4  SORD provides the service order distribution and assignment processing and 
associated information.  SORD also provides the FOC and SOC notification to the competing carrier via LASR or 
EDI or LEX, whichever mechanism in which it was received.  Id. at  2.2.2.6
 	When a SORD error prevents SORD from distributing the order, the LSC representative electronically sends a 
reject notification to the requesting carrier.  SWBT Ham Aff. at para. 147. 
 	SWBT Ham Aff. at 140-142.  SORD has a separate editing process for service orders.  Those edits that are 
translated and programmed in LASR and MOG as fatal edits can also be programmed by the competing carrier into 
its own side of the EDI Gateway.
 	SWBT Ham Aff. at para 121.
 	SWBT Ham Aff. at paras. 141, 144, 154.  A typical LSR creates multiple orders.  For example, the process to 
convert a retail/resale end user to UNE-P requires the creation of three separate orders from the LSR:  The D order 
is issued to disconnect the CRIS billing for either the SWBT end user or the competitive LEC resale customer; the 
C order is issued to provision the UNE element(s) as the competing carrier specifies on the LSR; and establishes 
CABS billing for the UNE element.  A CRIS N order is issued to keep Directory Listings and E911 in sync and to 
migrate those listings to competing LECs.   All firm order confirmation (FOC) criteria must be met before a FOC is 
returned to the competing carrier.  This would include matches on the following fields:  the LSR number, telephone 
numbers, circuit IDs, or ported numbers. Id.
 	Conway Aff. at para. 42; Ham Aff. at para. 151.
 	Ham. Aff. at para. 151; see also Southwestern Bell Accessible LetterJeopardy Notification Mapping Update, 
No. CLESS00=035 (dated Mar. 12, 1999) (SWBT Mar. 12, 1999 Accessible Letter).  SWBT implemented this 
electronic jeopardy notification process in May 1999.
 	SWBT implemented this manual jeopardy notification process on January 15, 2000.  Prior to this time, if a 
jeopardy condition occurred after a FOC had been sent back to the competing LEC, SWBT would send a post-FOC 
reject to the competing carrier via LASR GUI. 
 	Ham Aff. at paras. 151-152; Southwestern Bell Accessible LetterFinal Requirements Exception Request for 
January 15, 2000 Release at 1 & Attach. 2 (dated Dec. 20, 1999) (SWBT Dec. 20, 1999 (Accessible Letter); see also 
Southwestern Bell Accessible LetterFinal Requirements for June 26th Release (dated Mar. 31, 1999) (SWBT Mar. 
31, 1999 Accessible Letter).  Other manual jeopardy codes include: (1) verify address or provide nearby TN; (2) 
account already convertedsend cancel; (3) invalid CFA; (4) invalid feature detail; (5) invalid TN; (6) invalid due 
date; (7) duplicate LSR; (8) account not eligible for conversion; (9) invalid feature; (10) EU name and TN do not 
match; (11) provide driving instructions; (12) duplicate circuit ID; (13) busy cable ID and channel pair.
 	SWBT Ham Aff. at para. 159.  The completion phase is accomplished mechanically by SORD when all orders 
for a request are completed and the SOC criteria are met, including matches for LSR number, telephone numbers, 
circuit IDs, or ported numbers. Id.
 	SWBT Ham Aff. at para. 122. POS is a graphical user interface application that is launched from SWBTs 
toolbar. Id.  POS displays the status of an order as it relates to the provisioning/dispatching process. Id. at para. 123.
 	SWBT Ham Aff. at para. 122. SWBT provides competing carriers access to its  OSS systems through its 
Toolbar  that serves as a single launching point for access to multiple application using a single standard User ID and 
password.  Id. at para 47.  The Toolbar provides for automated software updates over the users network connection. 
 Id.
 	SWBT Ham Aff. at para. 115.
 	SWBT Ham Aff. at para. 144.
 	SWBT Ham Aff. at para. 145.
 	See SWBT Ham Aff. at paras. 145 and 159 (the SOC is sent once the work for the service order is physically 
completed).
 	See SWBT Ham Decl. at para. 197; see also SWBT Ham Reply Aff. at para. 73 (the D order will disconnect 
the old service.).
 	SWBT identified this as the cause for 8 end users losing dial tone while being converted to AT&T UNE-P 
service in August and September 1999.  See SWBT Ham Reply Aff. at para. 71 (for these UNE-P orders, the 
[related field identifiers] were not properly placed on the service order by SWBTs Local Service Center . . . 
representatives after the orders fell out for manual handling.).
 	SWBT reports that over 95% of UNE-P orders submitted electronically via EDI flow throuh its ordering 
systems without manual handling.  See [discussion in Ordering section].
 	See SWBT Ham Reply Decl. at para. 73 (point7, bullet 3); see also SWBT Ham Decl. at para. 198 (If the end 
user address on the LSR [which is placed on the C order] does not match the address on the existing records in the 
CRIS database, the orders become disassociated.)
 	For example, AT&T notes that the two databases may simply have addresses that are formatted differently (e.g., 
PREMIS lists a street name as Jackson-Keller Road and CRIS lists the street without the hyphen as Jackson 
Keller Road).
 	See Ham Reply Decl. at para. 73 (If the service address provided by the competing LEC on the LSR is a valid 
address [i.e., is consistent with the PREMIS database], but is different from the service address contained on the 
SWBT CSR for the end-user [i.e., the address obtained from the CRIS database], the C and D orders will have 
different addresses.).
 	See WorldCom McMillon/Sivori/Lichtenberg Reply Decl. at para. 26.
 	SWBT Conway Aff. at para. 69.
 	SWBT Conway Aff. at para. 69.
 	TBTA is a GUI used by SWBTs retail business customers and IXCs for maintenance and repair administration 
that offers competing carriers access to SWBTs back office systems.  SWBT Ham Aff. at paras. 218-220. 
 	EBTA is an application-to-application interface that the competing carrier can integrate into its own back office 
systems.  SWBT Ham Aff. at para 218.  SWBT states that due to the complexity and the information technology 
resource requirements of developing an EBTA, larger  competitors are the most likely candidates to utilize the 
SWBT EBTA.  SWBT Ham Aff. at para. 229.
 	SWBT states that the MLT capability is not available for other forms of unbundled network elements 
combinations because MLT is capable of testing only POTS and POTS-like combinations.  SWBT Ham Aff. at para. 
220.
 	SWBT Ham Aff. at para. 219-220.  A user of Trouble Administration can test or report trouble on a line on the 
same day that the order posts to the Customer Access Billing System (CABS).  If a service order has been created 
but errors out prior to posting to CABs a competing carrier attempting to test the line using TBTA will receive an 
Unauthorized to Access error message.  In this situation, the CLEC Handbook instructs the carriers to manually 
report trouble to the LOC.  Id. at paras. 223-225.
 	SWBT Ham Aff. at para. 222.
 	Id. at para. 219.  Currently, EBTA is used by AT&T, WorldCom, and Sprint for interexchange access service 
and by WorldCom and Sprint for local service.  SWBT Texas I Ham Aff. at para. 230.
 	Id.  Thus, when a competing carrier issues a trouble report or requests the current status of an existing report, the 
trouble ticket or status request will be sent to SWBTs back office system with no manual intervention by SWBT. 
SWBT Ham Aff. at paras. 222, 229.
 	See SWBT Ham Aff. at para. 234.
 	Bill Plus is an electronic telephone bill that provides a competing carrier with the same information contained 
on its paper bill.  Bill Pluss various reporting options allow carriers with the capability to analyze its billing data.  
In addition, a carrier can extract the billing data to their internal systems.  See SWBT Ham Aff. at para. 236.
 	EDI for billing is an interface that enables competing carriers to receive their resale services billing data in an 
industry standard electronic format.  The billing data consists of the same information that appears on the competing 
carrier's paper bill for resale service.  SWBT Ham Aff. at para. 238.
 	Bill Data Tape provides to competing carriers, in an electronic format from SWBTs CABs database, the same 
information that would appear on the competing carriers paper bill for unbundled net work elements.  The data is 
offered electronically via direct connection, on tape, on floppy disks, or on microfiche.  SWBT Ham Aff. at para. 
242.
 	Bill Information is a graphical user interface available  from SWBTs Toolbar platform that allows competing 
carriers to view billing data and other information regarding a competing carriers resale services or unbundled 
network elements.  SWBT Ham Aff. at para 243.
 	Usage Extract is a process by which a competing carrier can receive its usage sensitive messages on a daily basis 
for resale services or unbundled network elements.
 	SWBT Ham Aff. at para 234.
 	See Aff. of John A. Locus, App. A-4, Tab 4.
 	Indeed, the arbitration award relied upon so heavily by Covad as evidence of actual discrimination in violation 
of section 251 and 271 is captioned Petition of Rhythms Links, Inc. for Arbitration to Establish an Interconnection 
Agreement with Southwestern Bell Telephone Company and Petition of Dieca Communications, Inc. d/b/a Covad 
Communications Company for Arbitration of Interconnection Rates, Terms, Conditions, and Related Arrangements 
with Southwestern Bell Telephone Company. 

 
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