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USAID Evaluation Highlights No. 55


Agriculture and the Environment: In Jamaica, a Study in Contrasts


March 1996

(PN-ABS-545)


Summary


USAID has supported sustainable agricultural development in

Jamaica since the late 1970s, primarily through two projects: the

Integrated Rural Development project (IRDP) and the Hillside

Agriculture project (HAP). The projects used dramatically

different approaches to addressing soil and water conservation

problems--with dramatically different results. IRDP promoted

construction of terraces along hillsides using heavy equipment,

whereas HAP promoted planting of perennial trees (mainly coffee

and cocoa) using hand labor.  


IRDP introduced an inappropriate conservation technology, costly

and ill suited to local conditions. It could claim virtually no

positive results or benefits, whether biophysical, economic,

environmental, or social. In contrast, HAP has reached 9,550

beneficiaries and affected nearly 7,000 acres of hillside land.

Two million coffee and cocoa trees have been resuscitated; 1

million seedlings have been planted; and more than 10,000 direct

erosion-control measures have been carried out. Coffee production

has nearly doubled, and cocoa production has nearly tripled in

project areas. Because perennial trees were planted primarily on

land not the most susceptible to erosion, plantings served mainly

to prevent future erosion problems rather than to solve existing

ones. 


The positive results of HAP can be attributed to three factors:

1) conservation measures and production technologies USAID

introduced were simple, relatively inexpensive, and already

familiar to the farmers, and they required few changes in

existing practices; 2) participants had secure land tenure and a

positive attitude toward farming; and 3) because participants

were provided free seedlings, free fertilizer, and free advice,

they had a strong incentive to adopt improved production

practices and conservation measures for maximum profit. 


HAP was effective also because it reached the population it

intended to benefit, a population not limited to the smallest or

the poorest farmers and including both men and women. Although

the economic rate of return was less than originally estimated

(primarily because expected increases in coffee yields were

overestimated), it still is respectable. But program benefits may

not be sustainable because local institutions are not in place to

ensure delivery of agricultural inputs or technical advice.  


Background


Jamaica's most important environmental problem, the one affecting

the largest number of people, is degraded watersheds. Watershed

degradation leads to topsoil loss, which in turn leads to 1)

reduced agricultural productivity and use of more chemical

fertilizer and 2) reduced rainwater retention by the soil, faster

runoff, and more flooding.


Jamaica is particularly susceptible to watershed degradation

because 80 percent of the land surface is hilly or mountainous.

Of the island nation's 33 watersheds, 19 were badly eroded by

1993. About half of Jamaica's land area is used for agriculture.

In the absence of soil conservation measures, agriculture is the

principal cause of watershed degradation.  


In May-June 1994, a three-member team from the Agency's Center

for Development Information and Evaluation visited Jamaica to

assess the impact of USAID support of sustainable agriculture

activities. The team based its findings on a review of documents,

especially past evaluations; on structured interviews with people

in Jamaica knowledgeable about USAID programs in sustainable

agriculture; and perhaps most important, on visits with 28

farmers at 11 subproject sites to assess impact on intended

beneficiaries. 


USAID's Assistance Approach


USAID has supported soil conservation measures in Jamaica since

the late 1970s, primarily through two projects. They are the

7-year $22.2 million Integrated Rural Development project (1977-84), of which the Agency contributed $11.4 million, and the

10-year $10.0 million Hillside Agriculture project (1987-97), of

which USAID is contributing the full amount. 


The projects used dramatically different approaches to addressing

environmental concerns and soil and water conservation problems,

and they had dramatically different results. IRDP used heavy

earth-moving equipment to construct terraces, ditches, and

waterways (often made of concrete) to control soil erosion on

steeply sloping terrain. The treated land was then planted with

crops. In contrast, HAP provided tree crops (primarily coffee and

cocoa seedlings), which when planted on steep hillsides both

helped control soil erosion and provided farmers with income. HAP

also introduced improved agricultural technologies and

conservation practices associated with production of tree crops.

They included resuscitating trees, constructing ditches, and

planting vegetative barriers. The assessment, therefore, is a

study in contrasts. 


Evaluation Findings


The evaluation assessed projects relative to their

implementation, impact, and performance.


Project Implementation


Conservation technologies. As mentioned, conservation

technologies introduced under the two projects differed markedly.

IRDP promoted construction of bench terraces--level platforms 11

to 26 feet deep--using heavy equipment, whereas HAP promoted

planting of trees using manual labor. The former was expensive;

the latter, cheap. The former was complex; the latter, simple.

The former was clearly inappropriate, as some farmers actually

lost productive land (they had to remove crops to make way for

the terraces); the latter was familiar to most farmers and

consistent with existing cropping patterns. 


Education and awareness. Attempts to create greater awareness

among the rural population about long-term negative effects of

watershed degradation had little effect on the rate at which

farmers adopted conservation technologies introduced under either

project. Farmers adopted the technologies not because of

potential long-term benefits resulting from less soil erosion but

because of near-term benefits promised to those who participated.

IRDP paid farmers cash to construct terraces; HAP gave farmers

seedlings, fertilizer, and technical advice as long as they

agreed to plant the seedlings, use the fertilizer, and take the

advice. Near-term benefits (whether in cash or kind), not

awareness about watershed degradation, induced farmers to adopt

the conservation technologies. 


Institution building. Both projects sought to strengthen

institutions to help ensure sustainability of conservation and

production activities. IRDP directed its efforts at the national

level by providing technical assistance and training for

extension officers in the Ministry of Agriculture. It also

strengthened agricultural institutions that provide marketing and

credit services. In contrast, HAP assumed, optimistically, that

capacity already existed at such institutions as the Coffee

Board, Cocoa Board, and Rural Agricultural Development Authority

(the Agriculture Ministry's extension service) to deliver

agricultural inputs and market outputs and provide technical

advice.


IRDP established local-level development committees, but these

did not emphasize farmer involvement and were short lived.

Created to identify beneficiaries, the committees in practice

failed to involve ordinary farmers. They included only a few

local leaders and did not endure beyond the life of the project.


For its part, HAP required farmer involvement through groups

called local management committees. The committees were

established to select beneficiary farmers and provide regular

management. Serving on them were influential farmers and other

members of the local community. As with IRDP, however,

participation was weak. Committees generally ceased functioning

after subprojects ended.


One criterion the committees used to select beneficiaries under

HAP was whether they owned the land on which perennial tree

seedlings would be planted. Perennial trees represent a long-term

investment. Secure land tenure was necessary to ensure that

farmers would reap the rewards of that investment 15 or 20 years

down the line. However, because formal land tenure security was a

criterion for participation, poorer farmers who might hold land

under family tenurial arrangements were excluded.


Issues of land tenure were also important under IRDP. The premise

was that construction of terraces and successful soil management

required the cooperation of farmers owning adjacent plots of

land. Despite this, no mechanisms were designed to ensure such

cooperation. Farmers participated on a strictly individual basis.


Policy environment. During much of the period 1977-84, when IRDP

was implemented, the political environment was geared more toward

ensuring jobs for members of the party in power than toward

protecting the environment. An expensive centralized bureaucracy

was established to implement IRDP, and bureaucrats cared more

about political patronage than watershed development. They

embraced, moreover, a top-down approach to management and

developed a rigid blueprint for solving farmers' conservation

problems. 


By contrast, the political environment during the period 1986-94,

corresponding with HAP, was more conducive to supporting

environmental programs and other development activities.

Especially since the early 1990s, the Government of Jamaica has

begun to give environmental issues the attention they deserve. It

has, for example, elevated political responsibility for

environmental concerns to cabinet status (the minister of

environment and housing), created the Natural Resources

Conservation Authority, and published its National Environmental

Action Plan. In addition, policies designed to promote economic

liberalization and deregulation have helped create an environment

in which farmers are better able to increase financial returns to

export-crop production. Some observers might assume the policies

to be antienvironment; in point of fact, though, they provide

incentives for small farmers to plant erosion-controlling cocoa

and coffee trees. The policies were initiated in the mid-1980s.


Program Impact


The Hillside Agricultural project has yielded positive results,

partly because farmers were already aware of the technologies

introduced and partly because their adoption required no major

change in farmers' cropping patterns. The most widely adopted

technologies were resuscitating coffee and cocoa trees and

increasing the density of perennial tree crops. But other soil

conservation practices were adopted as well. Many farmers, for

example, began leaving plant material on the soil surface as

mulch to reduce sheet erosion, increase water infiltration, and

improve soil fertility. Farmers constructed ditches and wooden

barriers and reinforced contour ridges to control water runoff.

And they used gully plugs--dams consisting of rocks, sticks, and

the like--to reduce water velocity in channels that drain fields

and roads. 


Biophysical impact. HAP has affected nearly 7,000 acres of

hillside land on which 2 million coffee and cocoa trees have been

resuscitated, 1 million seedlings have been planted, and more

than 10,000 direct erosion-control measures have been carried

out. Primarily, though, the project has emphasized land already

in perennial crop production rather than land characterized by

the most severe erosion problems. 


The Integrated Rural Development project attempted to introduce a

conservation technology that, as it turned out, was wholly

inappropriate. The project had a short-term detrimental effect on

soil fertility in at least some fields where bench terraces were

built. The heavy equipment used to construct terraces disturbed

the topsoil, making the land less fertile and less suitable for

agricultural production than it was before. Elsewhere, the effect

was, at best, neutral, because terraces and waterways were

abandoned or neglected by farmers. 


Two elements of IRDP, though, did succeed. There was

reforestation of land on steep slopes. Extensive pine stands

thrive in some IRDP areas as a result of the project, and timber

is being used for commercial purposes. And in some cases

effective contour trenches were constructed under the project.


Economic impact. HAP has clearly had a positive impact on

agricultural production. According to farmers interviewed by the

evaluation team, coffee production increased from less than the

national average of 20 boxes an acre to almost 30. Likewise,

cocoa production increased from 8 or 10 boxes an acre to about

30. The increases were due to higher yields from existing trees

(the result of resuscitation, fertilizer application, and use of

improved practices) and planting seedlings more densely. The

extent to which increased production translated into increased

income depended on, among other things, world market prices for

coffee and cocoa.


Environmental and social impact. HAP's impact on the environment

is less clear. That is partly because before-and-after data have

not been collected and partly because HAP was implemented on land

that was not the most susceptible to erosion. HAP may have had a

positive impact on the short-term food security of participating

farmers (since they could use any increase in income to buy

food). It also improved farmers' long-term social security (since

perennial trees provide an annual source of income to the owner

for 15 to 20 years).


IRDP could claim none of these economic, environmental, or social

benefits. It did not contribute to increased agricultural

production, increased income, or increased social security. With

a few exceptions, it did not contribute to environmental

stability. 


Program Performance


HAP was generally effective and efficient, but its sustainability

is questionable.


Effectiveness 


As of January 1994, HAP had reached 9,550 beneficiaries farming

6,789 acres--on average, about two thirds of an acre per farmer.

Most hillside farms in Jamaica are small (70 percent are less

than 5 acres and 95 percent are less than 10 acres), but HAP

(through the local management committees) did not deliberately

attempt to reach the smallest or poorest farmers. To the

contrary, it sought those who 1) had secure land tenure, 2) were

young (the average age of Jamaican farmers is relatively high, 55

years), and 3) were dedicated in their work. Because of these

criteria, the more marginal farmers (including widows and other

women) were infrequently selected. 


All participants, regardless of farm size or income level,

received the same benefit: enough seedlings and fertilizer to

cover not more than 1 acre of land, which could not be valued

above J$3,500 per beneficiary (later reduced to J$2,500). In

instances where sale of incremental coffee or cocoa production

generated additional income, there is no evidence that the

husband benefited more than the wife or vice versa. Interviews

with farmers provided convincing evidence that additional income

was treated as family income and shared between the two.


Although production has mounted, the extent to which farmers have

been able to increase their incomes has depended on international

market prices and the foreign exchange rate. In recent years,

both coffee and cocoa prices have fallen on the international

market. Because of a devaluation, though, most farmers

(especially those who grow coffee) were receiving more for their

product (in local currency) in 1994 than before the project

began. But devaluation also means imported commodities, such as

fertilizer, will cost more.


Despite price fluctuations on the world market, it is unlikely

most farmers will cut down or abandon their coffee and cocoa

trees. Farmers are risk-averse. Perennial tree crops provide

insurance against other crop failures, and they afford security

in old age. 


Efficiency


As stated, IRDP did not contribute to increased agricultural

production, nor did it reduce soil erosion or enhance the

environment. From an economic point of view, the costs of the

program ($22.2 million) were greater than the benefits. HAP was

judged economically feasible in 1987 when it was designed. The

estimated internal rate of return ranged from 9 percent to 22

percent, depending on assumptions concerning adoption rates,

commodity prices, wage rates, and yield increases. 


But the economic analysis overestimated yield increases for

coffee, the most important component, by a factor of 2 or 3. It

assumed coffee yields would increase to 144 boxes an acre by the

end of year 7 and 192 boxes an acre by the end of year 9. In

actuality, yields were about 30 boxes per acre at the end of year

7, and potential yield is at best 120 to 150 boxes per acre.

(When internal rates of return were recalculated under the

assumption coffee yields were one half those projected in the

1987 analysis, they were substantially lower, ranging from 6 to

18 percent, and benefits of the project were cut in half.) 


Sustainability and Replicability


A general absence of local institutions to provide agricultural

inputs, markets, and technical advice seriously threatens the

long-term sustainability of the Hillside Agricultural project.

Sustainability will be enhanced to the extent these needs can be

met by revitalized national institutions (such as the Coffee

Board), redirected local institutions (such as the church or

common-interest groups), or private companies.


A few churches, cooperatives, and nongovernmental organizations

continue to provide agricultural inputs in some areas, but that

is the exception. And although a well-established marketing

system for coffee and cocoa is operated by the commercial

parastatals, they operate less efficiently than the private

sector. As a result, over the long run the farmer is paid less

for his crop than he otherwise would be. The main institution

charged with providing technical support to farmers is the Rural

Agricultural Development Authority, the extension arm of the

Ministry of Agriculture; but RADA is not equipped with the staff

or the budget to provide services farmers actually need. 


As for financial sustainability, so long as farmers receive

attractive financial returns, they are likely to work

aggressively to obtain the inputs and services they need.

However, in a small island nation, financial returns depend in

large part on the international market.


To the extent HAP is sustainable institutionally and financially,

it is also replicable. That is, technologies introduced under the

project can be replicated by neighboring farmers as long as they

have access to seedlings and fertilizer, markets, and a price

that covers costs of production and ensures a profit.


Lessons Learned


Farmers are more likely to adopt production technologies and

conservation practices that 1) are simple, 2) are relatively

inexpensive, 3) are already familiar to them, and 4) require few

changes in their existing practices. All four conditions were

satisfied under HAP. First, improved production practices

(including pruning and trimming and applying fertilizer) and

improved conservation practices (planting trees and using

ditches, grass barriers, and the like) were simple to adopt.

Second, seedlings and fertilizer were provided to farmers free.

Third, most farmers were familiar with perennial trees

(especially coffee and cocoa) because they were already growing

them. And fourth, farmers did not need to alter their existing

cropping system to plant trees. By contrast, technologies and

practices promoted under IRDP were complex, expensive, and

unfamiliar, and they required changed practices.


Farmers have a greater incentive to adopt improved technologies

and practices when it is likely they will reap significant

benefits relatively quickly, within a year or two.  The farmers

adopted improved practices partly because inputs were free and

provided near-term benefits. New coffee and cocoa seedlings do

not yield for three or four years, but resuscitation of existing

trees (damaged by hurricane or suffering from neglect) almost

doubled yields within two years.


Sustainable programs in hillside farming are likely to be more

successful when farmers 1) have secure land tenure, 2) have a

positive attitude toward farming, and 3) are young. Local

management committees developed under HAP sought to select

participant farmers who would most likely be successful,

regardless of whether they were large holders or small, male or

female, rich or poor. The committees themselves determined that

hillside farmers would be most successful when they met the above

criteria. 


The long-term viability of programs designed to increase

production of traditional export crops such as coffee and cocoa

depends on international markets. Production is up, but world

prices have been falling in recent years. Many farmers stop using

fertilizer when they have to pay the full market price (as

participating farmers will when the project phases out). Future

devaluations, if they occur, will also discourage fertilizer use.

This will adversely affect yields, jeopardizing the long-term

viability of the program.


It is better to prevent a problem such as soil erosion in the

first place than to cure the problem later on. In most areas

under HAP, farmers did not cite soil erosion as a major problem.

Nevertheless, Jamaica's steep hillside terrain is clearly a

candidate for severe watershed degradation. By promoting

perennial tree crops, HAP is preventing future soil erosion

problems as much as it may be solving existing ones. 


Strong local-level institutions and beneficiary participation are

needed to ensure the long-term sustainability of both production

practices and conservation measures. IRDP made little effort to

strengthen local institutions. By contrast, HAP encouraged farmer

beneficiaries to participate in design of subprojects and

promoted organization of farmer groups, including local

management committees. When HAP subprojects were phased out,

however, the local organizations dissolved. In the absence of

these groups, many farmers found it difficult to buy inputs,

obtain technical advice, or market their products. As a result,

the long-term sustainability of the conservation and production

activities initiated under HAP is questionable. 


The need to provide public education and support public awareness

about soil erosion and environmental degradation never ends. Both

IRDP and HAP made major efforts to inform hillside farmers about

the problems of soil erosion. Public meetings were held to

explain why it is important to plant trees and how HAP could help

farmers maintain their trees. Even though farmers' decisions to

conserve came from near-term benefits rather than environmental

awareness, many Jamaicans, at both the national and local level,

believe public education about environmental matters is important

and needs to be emphasized. That suggests the need for continual

and broadened campaigns in the future--especially as free

seedlings, fertilizer, and advice continue to be phased out.


This Evaluation Highlights, by Donald G. McClelland of USAID's

Center for Development Information and Evaluation, summarizes the

findings of the study Sustainable Agriculture and the

Environment: Jamaica Case Study, CDIE Working Paper No. 216, by

Donald G. McClelland, Noel Beninadi, and Concepcin del Costillo.

The study is part of a five-country program evaluation. The

working paper and this highlights can be ordered from the DISC,

1611 N. Kent Street, Suite 200, Arlington, VA 22209-2111;

telephone (703) 351-4006; fax (703) 351-4039; Internet

docorder@disc.mhs.compuserve.com. Editorial and production

services provided by Conwal, Inc.