DOJ Seal

U.S. Department of Justice 
Office of Community Oriented Policing Services 
COPS 


Inter-Agency Response to
Domestic Violence 
in a Medium Size City 

Erin Lane, M.P.M
Joan Lucera, M.S
Rachel Boba, Ph.D


June 2003 

Office of Community Oriented Policing Services Community Policing/Domestic Violence Test Site Project 


Office of Community Oriented Policing Services 
Community Policing/Domestic Violence Test Site Project: 

Inter-Agency Response to Domestic Violence
in a Medium Sized City 


Erin Lane, M.P.M. 

Joan Lucera, M.S. 

Rachel Boba, Ph.D. 

POLICE FOUNDATION 

Prepared for the U.S. Department of Justice 
Office of Community Oriented Policing Services
Award #98DVWXK015 


June 2002



Table of Contents 

Pages 
List of Tables .....................................................................................ii-iii 
List of Figures ....................................................................................... iv 
List of Maps.............................................................................................v 

Chapter 
1 Introduction...........................................................................................1 
2 Methodology............................................................................................4 
3 Literature Review: Evolution of Domestic Violence as a Policy Issue, 
and History of Domestic Violence Inter-Agency Response .................................................11 
4 History of the Domestic Violence Coordinating Committee: 1987-2000 ...................................28 
5 The Current State of the Domestic Violence Coordinating Committee: 
2000-2001 ..............................................................................................57 
Chapter 5 Appendix: Recommendations for Police Department Responses to Personal 
Violence between Intimates 
6 Police Use of Dual Arrest in Intimate Assault Cases ..................................................85 
Chapter 6 Appendix A: Data Cleaning Table 
Chapter 6 Appendix B: Table of Data Used for Analysis in Columns 
Chapter 6 Appendix C: Table of Data Used for Analysis in Rows 
7 Mapping Reported Intimate Assaults...................................................................139




List of Tables 

													Page 

Chapter 2 

Table 1: Interviewees Agency Affiliations and Domestic Violence Related Job 
Functions................................................................................................6 

Chapter 4 

Table 1: Changes in Agency Policies and Procedures, c. 1991 ............................................41 


Chapter 5 

Table 1: Domestic Violence Service Delivery Community ...................................................62 
Table 2: Number of Reported Working Relationships by Agency..............................................72 


Chapter 6 

Table 1: Demographic Comparison between the Population of the City and the 
Population of Reported Intimate Assaults ................................................................96
Table 2: Distribution of Police Outcomes ................................................................97
Table 3: Victim-Offender Relationship by Race of Offender ...............................................101 
Table 4: Relationship, Offenders Presence, and Arrest by Race...........................................102 
Table 5: Offenders Prior Intimate Violence Arrests......................................................104 
Table 6: Offender Substance Use .........................................................................106
Table 7: Weapon Use......................................................................................107
Table 8: Offense Alleged by Victim.......................................................................107
Table 9: Evidence Collected .............................................................................109
Table 10: Dependent Variable: Dual Arrest ...............................................................113 
Table 11: Dependent Variable: Emergency Protective Order Obtained........................................114 
 


Table 12: Dependent Variable: Evidence Collected.........................................................116 


Chapter 7 

Table 1: Correlation Between Number of Reported Incidents and Percent of Black 
and White in Block Group ................................................................................164 
 


List of Figures 

													Page 

Chapter 4 

Figure 1: Characterization of the History of the Domestic Violence Coordinating 
Committee (DVCC): 1987-2001...............................................................................35 
Figure 2: Laycock and Webbs Typology of Early Partnership Pitfalls.......................................51 
Figure 3: Inter-Agency Tipping Point Factors ...........................................................53 

Chapter 5 

Figure 1: The Domestic Violence Service Community.........................................................64 
Figure 2: Police-Community Domestic Violence Working Relationships........................................71 


Chapter 6 

Figure 1: Police Outcome by Race of Offender..............................................................99 

 


List of Maps 

													Page 

Chapter 7 

Map 1: Patrol Divisions and their Characteristics ........................................................148 

Maps 2 and 3: Kernel Density of Reported Simple and Aggravated Intimate 
Assault per Square Mile...................................................................................151 

Map 4: Frequency of Reported Intimate Assault by Block Group .............................................154 

Map 5: Rate of Reported Intimate Assault by Block Group...................................................156 

Map 6: Reported Intimate Assault and Population Density by Block Group....................................159 

Maps 5 and 7: Rate of Reported Intimate Assault and Median Rent by Block 
Group ....................................................................................................161

Maps 5 and 8: Rate of Reported Intimate Assault and Racial Homogeneity by 
Block Group...............................................................................................163 

Maps 9 and 10: Proportion of Reported Offending to Population by Race.....................................167 

Map 11: Kernel Density of Reported Intimate Assaults with Police Stations and 
Medical Facilities........................................................................................170
 


Chapter 1: Introduction 

Inter-agency work is a key feature of many crime prevention and community safety efforts and 
part of the foundation of modern policing. No longer is crime control viewed as solely the 
purview of the police, but rather as an outcome for which many agencies share responsibility. 
As acceptance of this idea has increased, inter-agency collaborative efforts have multiplied. 
Nowhere have these coordinated community crime control efforts been more fully recognized 
and advanced than in efforts to address domestic violence. 

The present study examines one citys efforts to reduce domestic violence through the 
coordinated work of the city police department and a wide range of criminal justice, social 
services, and community agencies. The city (here, and throughout this report, anonymous) is in 
the mid-Atlantic region of the country, has approximately 200,000 residents, and a police 
department with approximately 700 police officers. This research entailed study of an interagency 
domestic violence coalition, the Domestic Violence Coordinating Committee (DVCC), as 
well as two separate exploratory analyses of the city police departments domestic violence data. 

After presenting the methodology and literature review, the findings of this study are presented 
in two parts. The first part pertains to the history and current state of the DVCC and includes 
Chapters 4 and 5. Chapter 4 is a description of the inception of DVCC and its evolution up until 
the year 2000 when the field research for this project began. Chapter 5 is a description of the 
DVCC at the time of the field research, a description of the domestic violence service 
community of which the DVCC is a part, a discussion of the perspectives about the police 
department expressed by members of the domestic violence service community, and a list of  



recommendations for improving police response to domestic violence developed by the Police 
Foundation. 

The second part is comprised of Chapters 6 and 7. Chapter 6 is an analysis of the practice known 
as dual arrest, where police officers arrest both parties in an intimate assault. This exploratory 
analysis includes comparisons among cases resulting in issuance of a warrant, single arrest, and 
dual arrest as well as logistic regression analysis testing the relationship between case 
characteristics and dual arrest. Chapter 7 explores the utility of spatially analyzing reported 
intimate assault data by using several different methods to map these crimes and compare 
geographic patterns to neighborhood demographic characteristics. 

Because this report covers a wide range of topics within the broad area of domestic violence, it is 
written so that each chapter ties in with the others, but contains a distinct qualitative or 
quantitative analysis that can be read separately. For this reason, each chapter includes its own 
conclusions, references, and in some cases summaries of relevant literature. Therefore, except 
for a general summary of literature on inter-agency domestic violence work, there are no overall 
summaries of literature, references, or conclusions. 

The concern of this project is violence committed against one member of a current or past 
intimate couple by the other, which we refer to as intimate violence. Domestic violence is a 
broader term used to describe intimate violence as well as violence between non-intimate 
familial or household members. In the chapters summarizing literature and describing the 
DVCC, we use the term domestic violence, because this is a term conventionally used by inter 



agency approaches; but regardless of the term used, throughout this report, our subject is intimate 
violence. 



Chapter 2: Methodology 

Overview of Methodologies 

This study was conducted between February 2000 and June 2001, and involved collection and 
analysis of qualitative and quantitative data. Part one of this report presents the qualitative 
findings about the Domestic Violence Coordinating Committee (DVCC) and the domestic 
violence service delivery community. The following section describes the methodology used to 
gather these data and construct these chapters. Part two of this report contains two separate 
quantitative analyses. The methodology of each is included in its respective chapter. 

The data collection process for constructing a thorough view of the DVCC and of the domestic 
violence service community took place between February 2000 and June 2001, and involved the 
collection of historical information about the period between 1986, a date slightly before the 
birth of the DVCC, to early 2001. 

Qualitative Methods 

Qualitative data were gathered using four methods. The first was reviewing literature on interagency 
domestic violence response. The second was observational field research, namely 
attendance at DVCC meetings, ride-alongs with police patrols, a limited amount of observation 
of the domestic violence court docket, and two focus group interviews, each with four police 
patrol officers and supervisors. The third was examination of historical documentation relating 
to inter-agency work in the city, such as meeting minutes, press releases, and newspaper articles. 
The fourth, and primary method, was conducting in-depth interviews with officials from 


agencies across the city involved in domestic violence service delivery (see Table 1 for list of 
interviewees). 

Although the majority of the field research was completed between February 2000 and June 
2001, the research began in August 1999 when Police Foundation researchers began attending 
the monthly DVCC meetings. Attendance continued until June 2001. Attending meetings 
served many benefits. It allowed researchers to gain knowledge about the DVCCs background 
and current role in the domestic violence service delivery community, facilitated development of 
an interviewee list, and allowed researchers to develop a rapport with many DVCC members. 

In-depth interviews to capture the history of events and institutions have a rich pedigree, and 
have been the chosen method for a range of studies of the police and police work (e.g. 
Brookman, Noaks, & Wincup, 1999; Huggins, 1998; Fletcher, 1991; Fletcher, 1995; Websdale, 
1992; Weinberger,1995; Wells & Triplett, 1992). Because the current study examines major 
events and occurrences relating to the DVCC, rather than the minutiae of individual actions and 
conversations, there is good reason to believe that the events portrayed here are reliable. 


Table 1. Interviewees Agency Affiliations and Domestic Violence Related Job Functions 

Interviewees Agency 
1.State Dept. of Health 
2.Domestic Violence Interventions 
3.Hospital Emergency Room 
4.Campus Sexual Assault Program 
5.Battered Womens Shelter (BWS) 
6.Magistrates Office 
7.Office of States Attorney 
8.Victim Witness 
9.Legal Aid 
10.Catholic Charities 
11.Department of Social Services (DSS) 
12.Family Violence Prevention Program/Department of Social Services (FVPP) 
13.Family Violence Prevention Program/Department of Social Services (FVPP) 
14.Family Violence Prevention Program/Department of Social Services (FVPP) 
15.Domestic Violence Responders/Department of Social Services 
16.Campus police from local university 
17.Local agency that conducts research and training in criminal justice topics. 
18.City Police Department 
19.City Police Department 
20.City Police Department 
21.City Police Department 
22.City Police Department 
23.Neighboring citys police department 
24.City government 
25.County domestic violence resource center 
26.Additional personnel 


Interviewees Title, or Domestic Violence Related Job Function 
1. Works with localities to form and monitor fatality review teams. 
2. Founder and director of organization that provides counseling for batterers 
and monitors batterers compliance with court ordered treatment. 
3. Nurse: provides emergency medical services to victims of domestic violence. 
4. Assists students who have been sexually assaulted and promotes sexual assault 
awareness and education to the campus community. 
5. Directs battered womens shelter. 
6. Directs agency that issues warrants and emergency protective orders. 
7. Attorney: prosecutes domestic violence cases. 
8. Supervises unit that provides court information and accompaniment to victims. 
9. Attorney: provides legal services to domestic violence victims on civil 
matters. 
10. Facilitates batterer groups for organization that provides a variety of service, 
including counseling services to victims and perpetrators, and emergency food 
and clothing. 
11. Supervises all DSS direct service units. 
12. Provides counseling and a variety of direct services to domestic violence 
victims. 
13. Places and monitors batterers referred by court to batterer intervention 
programs and other programs as necessary. 
14. Supervises unit that counsels and provides direct service to domestic violence 
victims. 
15. Supervisors DSS unit that responds to domestic violence calls in tandem with 
police to assist domestic violence victims obtain information about and 
services from Social Services. 
16. Supervises the departments response to domestic violence calls on and in 
vicinity of campus. 
17. Provides training in domestic violence to officers locally and throughout the 
state. 
18. Chief. 
19. Assistant Chief. 
20. Detective: supervises Youth and Family Crimes Unit. 
21. Detective located in Youth and Family Crimes Unit. 
22. Sergeant acting unofficially as domestic violence point person. 
23. Chief: provided historical information about the inception and early period of 
the DVCC. 
24. Mayor. 
25. Interviewee provided historical information about the inception and early 
period of the DVCC. 
26. Interviewee was original DVCC coordinator and provides historical 
information about the inception and early period of the DVCC. 


The synthesized history presented here was formed from multiple interviews covering the same 
topics and events, allowing for any clear contradictions to be identified and resolved. There 
were no such contradictions with respect to any major historical events, although as would be 
expected, interviewees expressed differing interpretations of and reactions to these events. This 
is normal in this type of research and there is every reason to believe that what follows is a 
reliable portrayal of events. 

Twenty-four in person and two phone interviews were conducted. As the interviews were semistructured 
in format, they varied in length depending upon the particular respondent (i.e., some 
interviewees had more to say than others). Most interviews took at least one hour, the median 
was approximately two hours, and the longest interview lasted almost four hours. As with most 
research of this nature, a significant amount of time was spent scheduling interviews, followingup 
and rescheduling cancelled interviews, and completing partial interviews when it was 
impossible to complete the interview in one session. With one exception, all persons on the 
interview list were successfully interviewed. 

Between its inception in 1987 and this study, the DVCCs membership had been reconstituted 
many times; thus, interviewing only present members would not provide the information 
necessary to produce a complete review of the DVCCs complicated history. Since the study 
sought to capture many perspectives of the coalition and its history, present members from a 
variety of agencies were interviewed, as were past DVCC members who were no longer city 
residents. The latter were identified as part of a snowball sampling technique in which 
individuals were added to the interviewee list if they were frequently mentioned by other 



interviewees as being instrumental in past phases of the DVCC. 1 Several individuals were 
interviewed whose agencies were conspicuously absent from the DVCC even though their 
agency had a clear role in domestic violence service delivery. 

1 Snowballing is a nonprobability sampling technique typically used when the sampling frame is unknown and 
members can be difficult to locate. One interviewee provides information that leads to another, so that, like a 
snowball rolling down a hill, the sample gathers size and momentum as the research progresses (Babbie, 1998).

A central aim of the present study being to identify the role, activities and working relationships 
of the police, eight of the 26 interviewees were from local police agencies. This included officers 
from the city police department as well as officers from the campus police department of a local 
university. Information about current practices and activities of the police was gleaned from 
interviewees, ride-alongs in patrol cars, frequent contact with police personnel, and two focus 
groups, with four personnel each. The focus groups were conducted in two of the four police 
precincts. One focus group included supervisors as well as officers, and one consisted only of 
officers. 

Developing and Piloting the Interview Instrument 

The interview instrument was developed to capture information on interviewees experiences 
with and opinions about domestic service delivery in the city, emphasizing views on the police.2 
Questions pertaining to the historical evolution of the DVCC were asked to interviewees who 
were knowledgeable about its early period. Also captured were subjects views of the police 
response to domestic violence in the city, the police departments role in inter-agency work 
(including the DVCC), and interviewees impressions and experiences about working with the 



police department. The instrument contains seven sections. These are outlined below, along 
with an overview of the sub-topics covered in each section: 

2 We thank Jane Sadusky of the Battered Womens Project in Minnesota, for useful comments and suggestions 
during the instrument design stage. 

1. Interviewees background in domestic violence work (e.g., how long has interviewee been 
involved with domestic violence work, in what capacity is interviewee involved, and how 
does interviewees role fit into the citys service delivery system). 
2. Interviewees agencys involvement with domestic violence collaboration in general, 
through the DVCC, and with the police (e.g., what role does interviewees agency play in 
domestic violence service delivery, which if any agencies partner, or should partner with 
interviewees, does, and if so, how, does interviewees agency partner with police, and 
what are positive and negative aspects of police partnerships). 
3. Interviewees involvement with the DVCC (e.g., to what extent, if any, does interviewee 
participate in the DVCC, and what is the nature of involvement). 
4. Interviewees knowledge of DVCCs history (e.g., interviewees knowledge and 
perspective of the evolution of the DVCC, reasons for its decline, and whether 
interviewee feels the resurged DVCC will avoid past pitfalls). 
5. Interviewees perceptions of the current DVCC (e.g., what does interviewee feel are the 
positive and negative aspects to the current DVCC, does interviewee feel DVCC is 
meeting victims needs, and does interviewee feel DVCC is inclusive of member 
feedback). 
6. Interviewees knowledge of and opinions about collaborative approaches to domestic 
violence (e.g., what inter-agency collaborations is interviewee aware of in the city, does 
interviewee believe collaborative approaches to domestic violence are effective).  



7. Interviewees views of domestic violence services in the city (e.g., how does the 
interviewee feel the city addresses domestic violence effectively, what improvements 
need to be made, and has the presumptive arrest policy had a positive or negative effect 
on victims). 
The instrument contained 67 separate questions, most of which were open ended. It was pretested 
with three interviewees, which led to several modifications before being fielded with the 
remaining interviewees. The interviews were conducted in a semi-structured manor, allowing 
the interviewer to emphasize the topics most relevant to each interviewees position and 
experience. This allowed the quality and quantity of the information obtained from each 
interview to be maximized. For instance, although derived from the same interview schedule, 
the interview with the city mayor had a different emphasis than that with the police detective. 
All but one interview was conducted by the same interviewer. 



Chapter 3 


Review of Literature: 
Evolution of Domestic Violence as a Policy Issue, 
and History of Domestic Violence Inter-Agency Response

Joan Lucera, M.S.
andErin Lane, M.P.M. 


POLICE FOUNDATION 


Prepared for the U.S. Department of Justice 
Office of Community Oriented Policing Services
Award #98DVWXK015 


June 2002 
 



Chapter 3: Literature Review 

Recognition of Domestic Violence as a Public Policy Concern 

Historically, society tolerated and condoned mens violence against women in intimate 
relationships. It was not until the end of the 19th century that chastisement could no longer be 
used as an acceptable defense to a charge of assault on a woman. Three states adopted anti-wife 
beating laws at that time, making it an offense punishable at the whipping post. Such laws were 
generally in name only, as they were infrequently and unequally enforced. When enforcement 
did occur, the sanctions imposed were mostly deployed against those on the fringes of society; 
usually blacks, vagrants, and the poor (Buzawa & Buzawa, 1990; Melton, 1999). 

By the beginning of the 20th century, the 48 American states as well as most of the Western 
countries had adopted legislation that outlawed wife beating. Through the 1960s and 1970s, 
social mores kept the unspoken approval of violence toward women intact, and nowhere was this 
more evident than in the hands off policy of the criminal justice system (Pence, 1996; Stelans 
& Lurigio, 1995). Police typically were reluctant to respond to domestic violence calls, and such 
calls were considered a low priority. When they did respond, an arrest was not likely to occur, as 
the most common law enforcement response was to separate the parties temporarily, or the use of 
advisement to restore peace and order. Officers felt it was not their business to interfere with 
family matters, and most felt that doing so was not real police work. Arrest and prosecution of 
offenders was generally viewed as a waste of time (Buzawa & Buzawa, 1990; Bryger & Edleson, 
1987; Cordner, Gaines & Kappler, 1996; and Parnas, 1971). Courts often trivialized the victims 
experience, dismissing cases and giving lighter sentences to batterers than offenders who 



committed violent crimes against strangers. Use of these practices meant batterers were very 
rarely held accountable for their actions, thus perpetuating acceptance of violence against women 
(Davis & Smith, 1995). 

The womens movement in the 1970s brought the issue of domestic violence to the forefront as a 
social concern. Grassroots battered womens programs had already begun advocating for 
victims of domestic violence, providing them with safety and openly criticizing the ineffectual 
policies of the criminal justice system. The first hotline for these victims was set up in St. Paul, 
Minnesota, in 1971. The very first shelter for battered women opened in Chiswick, England, in 
1972, with the first American shelter opening shortly thereafter in Pasadena, California (Pence, 
1996; Steinman, 1990). Activists continued to open shelters, counsel victims and batterers, and 
educate the public about domestic violence, all of which led to heightened public awareness of 
the problem and a push to criminalize battering. The pressure was on both legislators and police 
to find and implement more effective solutions. 

Providing female victims of battering with shelter and access to available legal recourse 
continued to be the prime intervention strategies through the late 1970s. Demands for policy 
changes continued, most of them directed at the police because of their role as the first 
responders to battering incidents. Although police departments began to train officers in 
mediation of family violence, these incidents still were not treated as crimes, as police rarely 
made arrests. Advocates called for more attention and sensitivity for victims from the police, 
and for a response that would hold batterers accountable for their actions (Jolin & Moose, 1997; 
Steinman, 1990). 



While many states enacted domestic violence statues, police departments were resistant to the 
changes. The early 1980s brought several civil liability cases against police departments for 
their ineffective response to domestic violence calls. Thurman et al. v. City of Torington (1984) 
was the first case to find the police liable for failure to provide equal protection of the law 
guaranteed by the 14th Amendment. At the same time, Sherman & Berk (1984) published a 
landmark study indicating that arresting batterers was the most effective response to domestic 
violence calls, as it served as a deterrent to subsequent attacks. The groundbreaking findings of 
the Police Foundation, Minneapolis Domestic Violence Experiment concurred with the 
publication of the U.S. Attorney Generals Task Force on Family Violence report (1984) urging 
police to treat domestic assault as a crime. Legal requirements that limited officers from making 
warrantless arrests for misdemeanors they did not see were abolished. In response to the 
mounting political pressure, and with uncharacteristic speed, many police departments in the 
1980s adopted presumptive or mandatory arrest policies for misdemeanor domestic violence 
assaults. Feminist and battered womens groups lauded the change in policies, and these events 
gained recognition for domestic violence as a public policy concern (Gelles, 1993; Steinman, 
1990). 

The Rise of Interagency Crime Prevention Work 

Despite later findings of several replication studies indicating that arrest alone was not a 
deterrent to continued domestic violence (see Dunford, Huizinga, & Elliott, 1990; Hirschell, 
Hutchinson, Dean, Kelley, & Pesackis, 1990), the tide had already turned. Increasing numbers 
of police departments continued to institute pro-arrest policies. Even so, a vicious cycle of 



ineffectual procedures continued: police would not lay charges, prosecutors did not aggressively 
pursue cases; and judges gave lenient sentences or dropped cases altogether (Dutton & 
McGregor, 1991). This fragmented response motivated advocates to develop interventions to 
domestic violence that actively coordinated the work of law enforcement, courts and social 
services. These community intervention projects (CIPs) are system-level strategies designed to 
ensure the responses of all involved agencies remain consistent, and do not overlap. Holding 
offenders accountable and keeping women safe from revictimization are the ultimate goals 
(Edleson, 1991; Gelles, 1993; Pence, 1983; Tolman & Weisz, 1995). 

Coordinated responses began to form such as arrest, aggressive pursuit of prosecutions, and the 
inclusion of the victims in the investigation and sentencing processes. In some projects, court 
mandated treatment for batterers was also an important part of the coordinated law enforcement, 
judicial, and social services efforts (Gelles, 1993). These efforts were in sync with the 
emergence of the community policing concept of proactive law enforcement which began to 
emerge in the early 1980s. By the early 1990s, several coordinated interventions were in place, 
and evaluations of these programs had begun. 

Steinman (1990) examined the effects of a Domestic Violence Coalition in Lincoln, Nebraska, 
that incorporated pro-arrest policies and the commitment of the county attorney to prosecute 
whenever possible, with or without the cooperation of victims. Counseling agencies were also 
part of the Coalition, providing support for victims and batterer intervention programs. His study 
found that arrest alone led to increased violence by offenders, but that arrest in coordination with 
other efforts was a significant deterrent. 



Another study examined coordinated efforts in DuPage County, Illinois (Tolman & Weisz, 
1995). The DuPage, County Domestic Violence Protocol combined a tough law enforcement 
approach with a social work perspective. Pro-arrest policies and aggressive prosecution were 
key, along with victim advocates who offered support and information for the victims about legal 
processes, other support services available, and worked with the prosecution to encourage 
victims cooperation. In addition, mandated participation in a domestic violence treatment 
program was usually required for first-time misdemeanor offenders. The evaluators found that in 
this program, arrest had a deterrent effect for at least 18 months, and recidivism decreased 
progressively for offenders who completed the most protocol levels (arrest, successful 
prosecution, and completion of a batterers program). 

The conclusion drawn from these studies is that coordination of criminal justice efforts can be an 
effective deterrent to domestic violence. This movement coincided with the new community 
policing philosophy, which, in sharp contrast to the traditional incident-based, reactive model of 
policing, takes a proactive approach to crime, and focuses on problem solving through 
partnerships. This philosophy calls for police to work more directly with citizens to solve crime 
problems before they escalate (Davis & Taylor, 1997), and was a good fit with inter-agency 
domestic violence work. 

History of the Coordinated Community Response Approach: The Duluth Model 

The earliest example of a coordinated, comprehensive response identified through a review of 
relevant literature was initiated in Duluth, Minnesota in 1980. This effort, known as the 


Domestic Abuse Intervention Project (DAIP) coordinated the domestic violence response of nine 
agencies, drawing from the areas of law enforcement, criminal justice and human services. The 
purpose was to provide a uniform response to domestic violence calls by creating and 
implementing a common set of policies and procedures that not only limited the discretion of 
individuals handling the cases, but also held them to a minimum standard. This response held 
the offenders accountable and offered them educational and support systems designed to change 
their behavior. Stopping violence against women was the ultimate goal, with victim safety being 
the focus. The DAIP emphasized that even if society did not create battering, it must 
nonetheless accept the responsibility of stopping it (Pence, 1983, p. 252). It was the first 
community intervention project to assign responsibility for ending the violence to the 
community, instead of the victims (Pence, 1983; Pence & Shepard, 1999). 

Before the actual creation of the DAIP, organizers met with administrators from police, city, 
prosecutors, mental health, and other agencies to ask them to join a unique interagency effort, 
and to determine the level of commitment on the part of administrators to that effort. Each 
agency was asked, and agreed, to help reduce repeat domestic violence assaults by developing 
policies and procedures and working together as an interagency coalition. Project organizers 
proposed to coordinate the citys domestic violence response from the initial call to police 
through the end of the courts involvement in each case. Evaluation of the coordinated response 
and problem-solving guidance would also be the responsibility of the DAIP. Once the 
agreement was secured, the three DAIP staff members and local shelter staff worked to construct 
an accurate picture of how the system was supposed to work, how it was actually working, and 
to identify necessary changes in agency procedures to make it work effectively (Pence, 1983; 



1996). Again organizers met with the agency officials to negotiate the basics of each 
departments policy agreement. Once all participating agencies agreed to the protocol, a press 
conference was held to announce the new approach, which went into effect immediately. 

Operation of the Duluth Model 

The intervention process starts when police respond to a domestic violence call. Typically, the 
officers establish probable cause to arrest the batterer, and take him to the jail for booking. 
Officials at the jail then contact the battered womens shelter, tell them about the arrest and 
charge, and give them relevant information for contacting the victim. A volunteer from the 
shelter then visits the victim at home to make a safety plan, explain the court process, and to help 
the victim decide whether to file for an order of protection. The volunteer advocate also talks 
with the woman about appropriate information to give to the judge before the next days 
arraignment. The victim is then encouraged to attend weekly educational groups for battered 
women. Meanwhile, a volunteer from the DAIP goes to the jail to talk to the offender about 
educational groups that can help him address his use of violence (Pence, 1996). 

At the arraignment (depending on whether the defendant pleads not guilty or guilty) either a pretrial 
release interview or a pre-sentence investigation is ordered, both of which involve the victim 
communicating her concerns to the pre-trail release agent or the probation officer. In most cases, 
the judge will base the sentence on the probation officers recommendations. First time 
offenders usually receive a stayed 30- or 60- day jail sentence, and are ordered to attend the 
DAIP 29-week educational program. Once on probation, the batterer has five days to make an 
appointment with the DAIP for assessment (Pence, 1996). 


If an order of protection is handled through the civil court, the abuser is normally not allowed to 
enter the residence for a full year and is ordered to cooperate with the DAIP educational 
program. Once ordered to participate in the educational program, offenders go through intake 
with DAIP staff for evaluation, and attend one orientation and 27 education sessions. If the 
offender violates the order for protection or fails to attend the educational groups, his probation 
may be revoked upon request from project staff. Some, or the entire original jail sentence may 
then be imposed, and the offender will again be ordered to complete the program upon his 
release from jail (Pence, 1996). In addition to the educational program for batterers, the project 
also offers advocacy and support to the victims. The DAIP holds orientation sessions for women 
whose partners are in the program, gives out information about what to do if an abuser reoffends, 
and informs victims of the availability of the shelter. 

From its inception, the DAIP has worked to coordinate the ongoing implementation of the 
project, promote institutional change, and continually monitor the citys criminal justice 
response. Given the wide spread reluctance of the criminal justice system to get involved with 
domestic violence when this program began, it is understandable how the DAIP gained 
recognition and respect for their success in negotiating an agreement between local criminal 
justice agencies to coordinate their intervention efforts. 

Coordinated Community Responses Today 

Duluth set a precedent for coordination of a multi-agency response to domestic violence. This 
community intervention model was the first to use a detailed, complex plan made up of several 



different components organized to perform designated functions working toward a common goal. 
The coordinated responses that developed after the implementation of the Duluth model were 
not so inclusive at first. However, change did occur, albeit slowly, and coordinated responses 
have continued to grow. As the criminal justice system has expanded and improved upon its 
handling of domestic violence, awareness of the complexity of the problem and frustration with 
continually fragmented solutions has increased as well. Out of this awareness and frustration, 
more sophisticated coordinated community responses have emerged. 

Modern collaborative community efforts typically involve an organizing body, such as a 
committee, task force, or non-profit organization, working with a wide base of agencies and 
services in an effort to improve the multi-system response to domestic violence (Clark, Burt, 
Schulte, & Maguire, 1996; Little, Malefyt, & Walker, 1998). Health care providers, religious 
leaders, child welfare agencies, mental health care providers, substance abuse services, school 
officials, and business leaders have all, on some level, recognized the social and moral costs of 
family violence in their communities. Many have also recognized the importance of their role in 
the prevention and intervention of family violence, and in reshaping the response to and attitude 
toward domestic violence. The National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges (1998) 
recommended that communities have a coordinating mechanism that brings together agencies 
and community members in an effort to close gaps in services, to coordinate multiple 
interventions, and to develop interagency agreements and protocols for providing basic services 
to families experiencing both child maltreatment and domestic violence.  



In 1994, the American Medical Association endorsed recommendations from the National 
Conference of Family and Violence: Health and Justice conference workgroups that stressed the 
importance of interdisciplinary collaboration, empowerment of victims, perpetrator 
accountability, violence prevention, and the strengthening of families and communities (Witwer 
& Crawfort, 1995, p.17). This commitment on the part of government and professionals from 
many human and criminal justice service agencies, along with increased public awareness, lends 
support to improved collaborative responses to domestic violence. 

Types and Approaches of Coordinated Community Responses 

While coordinated community responses share a basic goal of ending violence against women 
within their respective communities, not all of these efforts share the same definition or approach 
to reaching their goals. What they do share is the same commitment for change, which 
necessarily requires each collaborative effort to develop commonly held beliefs on violence 
against women, awareness and understanding of each others roles; and a plan for improving the 
system-wide domestic violence response (Little, et al. 1996). A coordinated community 
response can take one of several approaches: 

 Community Partnering  Using this model, a domestic violence or victim services 
program identifies a strategic plan of action and partners with selected community 
agencies and organizations to work on each task identified in the plan. Work groups 
are formed, using the expertise of the members to accomplish the specific task 
assigned to the group. Through each step of the plan, the work is collaborative, with 
the domestic violence program overseeing the groups efforts. The decentralized 
nature of this approach is attractive to the community and professional members who 
 


are not decision-makers in their organization or community. Because membership is 
not limited to executive staff, members may be more likely to volunteer instead of 
being drafted, which can foster team building within the work groups. The work 
groups are focused on problem solving as opposed to being a public forum, which 
may minimize public posturing and turf issues. This approach lends itself to 
management by grassroots organizations, as it does not require a formal 
infrastructure. 

 Community Intervention  These are private sector programs that focus on increasing 
criminal justice system accountability to battered women. The program staff 
develops and monitors the coordinated effort to promote victim safety, hold offenders 
accountable for their use of violence, and increase the public awareness and 
intolerance of domestic violence. Intervention programs provide direct services to 
batterers through outreach, education, and treatment groups throughout the assailants 
experience with the criminal justice system. Many of these programs use the 
curriculum developed by the Domestic Abuse Intervention Project in Duluth. 
Intervention programs can evaluate the effectiveness of the system and make 
necessary modifications, keep open the lines of communication between each 
component, and develop as well as implement system wide protocols and policies. 
 Task Forces or Coordinating Councils  Task forces focus on coordination of all 
components of the criminal justice system to improve systemic practice to end 
violence against women. The task force will conduct a needs assessment of the 
community and produce a report on the most effective practices and identify gaps in 
the system. Each component will then work on creating protocols and compatible  



guidelines for practice within the system. Task forces or councils also function as 
forums for agencies and citizens to work on other collaborative projects, including 
cross-agency training, education, and data collection. Improving communication 
between agencies and coordination of council participants are important functions of 
the task force. 

 Training and Technical Assistance Projects  These projects are designed to inform 
and improve justice and human services practice through training curricula and 
audiovisual materials. Training and assistance is available for every aspect of these 
systems as well as for clergy, educators, health care providers, civic groups, public 
housing staff, and more. 
 Community Organizing  Community activists or domestic violence programs utilize 
these initiatives to invite the general public to actively work together to end domestic 
violence. Their objectives are to include people from all walks of life to be active 
participants in this work, articulate the message that each citizen has a personal 
responsibility to end the violence, and to change societys beliefs and awareness 
about the causes of violence against women as well as what can be done about it. 
This type of coordinated effort has been most successful in engaging communities of 
color and other marginalized populations in working together to end domestic 
violence (Hart, 1995; Little, Malefyt, &Walker, 1998; Pence, 1983). 
Although there is no single ideal of collaboration, recent literature (Little, et al. 1998; Pence & 
Sheppard, 1999) has identified eight components or activities necessary for a successful 
coordinated response: 



1. Creation of a shared philosophical framework on violence toward women; 
2. Establishing best practice policies and procedures for intervention agencies; 
3. Coordination of interagency communication and networking; 
4. Tracking and monitoring of cases to ensure accountability; 
5. Providing supportive community resources and services for victims; 
6. Providing sanctions and rehabilitative services for batterers; 
7. Protecting children who have been exposed to domestic violence; 
8. Evaluation of the coordinated response from the victims points of view. 

Membership and Leadership 

The composition of the formal coordinating body may vary depending on the goals and focus of 
the coordinated response as well as the resources and population of each community. Ideally, 
participants should represent a diverse cross-section of criminal justice and social service 
agencies, as well as other segments of the community that may be affected by the groups 
activities (Mattessich & Monsey, 1992). Members may include law enforcement, local battered 
womens shelters, sexual assault services, mental health services, prosecution, court services, 
local government leaders, child protective services, batterer intervention programs, religious 
leaders, business leaders, health care providers, and members of the press (Burt, Harrell, 
Newmark, Aron, & Jacobs, 1997). 

Some coordinating committees choose to keep the focus narrow and membership limited. For 
example, the Baltimore, Maryland Domestic Violence Coordinating Committee focuses 
primarily on criminal justice issues and activities, with few representatives from other  



community agencies. Membership is comprised of two social service agencies, the citys only 
domestic violence shelter, a sexual assault center, and senior staff from criminal justice agencies 
and judges. In contrast, the San Diego Domestic Violence Council has representatives from over 
20 agencies and individuals, from law enforcement to the military (Clark, et al. 1996). 

The level of staff that participates in the group is another important component of the structure. 
Although many groups have primarily high-level staff, others consist of line workers and 
community members who form at a grass-roots level. An important consideration is whether an 
agency representative is able to make decisions or influence policy within their organization, 
which may allow for quick problem resolution. If not, having the backing and support of their 
agency is critical for successful collaboration within the system. Leadership is another important 
aspect to coordinated community responses. In a study of six coordinated community responses, 
Clark et al. (1996) found that leadership had a definite affect on the amount and ease of changes 
made by the respective groups. In the name of effective coordinated responses to domestic 
violence, agencies that typically have not worked together and frequently hold different views on 
the issue are now required to change their approach and do so cooperatively. This is not an easy 
task, but capable leadership can be the key to effective partnerships. Strong, consistent, and 
reliable leadership can motivate members to seek solutions. Once a dynamic leader is in place, 
stability of that leadership is also important for continuity of the coordinated effort. 

Conclusion 

This paper provides an historical overview of the evolution of domestic violence first into a 
public policy and then into a law enforcement issue. We have briefly reviewed the 


transformation of domestic violence from being considered a private matter to one deserving of 
public condemnation and punishment. We have also reviewed the confluence of this evolution 
with that of inter-agency crime prevention work and community policing, and discussed the 
convergence of these three streams into inter-agency domestic violence collaboration. 

In this condensed overview, we review the many types of inter-agency domestic violence 
collaboration that have developed since the initiation of the Duluth Model in 1980. This 
discussion sets the stage for part one of this report, which is a thorough examination of one citys 
inter-agency response to domestic violence. 


References 

Brygger, M.P., and Edleson, J.L. (1987). Notes From Practice. The Domestic Abuse Project. 
Journal of Interpersonal Violence, vol.2, no. 3, 324-336. 

Buzawa, E.S. and Buzawa, C.G. (1990). Domestic Violence: The Criminal Justice Response 
Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications, Inc. 

Clark, S.J., Burt, M.B, Schulte, M., and Maguire, K. (1996). Coordinated Community Responses 
to Domestic Violence in Six Communities: Beyond the Justice System. Urban Institute, 
Washington, D.C. 

Cordner, G., Gaines, L.K., and Kappeler, V.E. (1996). Police Operations: Analysis and 
Evaluation. Cincinnati, OH: Anderson 

Gelles, R.J. (1993). Constraints Against Family Violence: How Well Do They Work? American 
Behavioral Scientist, v.36, no. 5, 575-586. 

Hart, B.J. (1995). Coordinated Community Approaches to Domestic Violence. Paper presented 
at Violence Against Women Research Strategic Planning Workshop, sponsored by the 
National Institute of Justice in cooperation with the Department of Health and Human 
Services, Washington, D.C. 

Little, K., Malefyt, M.B., and Walker, A.H. (1998). Assessing the Justice System Response to 
Violence Against Women. A Tool for Communities to Develop Coordinated Responses. 
Violence Against Women Office, Washington, D.C. 

Pence, E. (1983). The Duluth Domestic Abuse Intervention Project. Hamline Law Review, 6, 
247-275. 

Shepard, M.F. and Pence, E.L. (1999). Coordinating Community Responses to Domestic 
Violence: Lessons from Duluth and Beyond. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, Inc. 

Sherman, L.W. and Berk, R. A. (1984). The Minneapolis Domestic Violence Experiment. Police 
Foundation Reports, April. 

Steinman, M. (1990). Lowering Recidivism Among Men Who Batter Women. Journal of Police 
Science and Administration, v. 17, no. 2, 124-132. 

Syers, M. and Edleson, J.L. (1992). The Combined Effects of Coordinated Criminal Justice 
Intervention in Woman Abuse. Journal of Interpersonal Violence, v. 7 no. 4, December 1992, 
490-501. 

Tolman, R.M. and Weisz, A. (1995). Coordinated Community Intervention for Domestic 
Violence: The Effects of Arrest and Prosecution on Recidivism of Woman Abuse 
Perpetrators. Crime and Delinquency, v. 41, no.4, 481-495. 


Chapter 4 

History of the Domestic Violence Coordinating Committee: 
1987-2000 

Erin Lane, M.P.M., 
Graham Farrell, Ph.D., 
andJoan Lucera, M.S.


POLICE FOUNDATION 


Prepared for the U.S. Department of Justice 
Office of Community Oriented Policing Services
Award #98DVWXK015 


June 2002 



Chapter 4: History of the Domestic Violence Coordinating Committee: 1987-2000 

Introduction 

This chapter describes the emergence of an entity dedicated to improving inter-agency 
coordination in domestic violence service delivery, the Domestic Violence Coordinating 
Committee (DVCC), then charts its work and activity level from its formation in 1987 to the 
time this research was conducted in 2000. In addition to an overview of the history of the 
DVCC, this chapter includes a discussion of the factors found pertinent for success and failure of 
DVCC, and a concluding section where these themes are drawn into an analytical framework. 
Special attention is given to the role of the police department and its relationships over time with 
the DVCC and with the individual agencies in the domestic violence service community. 

The aim is to identify and present local lessons with broader applicability to the policing of 
domestic violence. The target audience is police chiefs as well as officials from government and 
community agencies involved in inter-agency domestic violence collaboration. The central 
lessons are summarized as follows: 

1. Leadership: Dynamic and committed leadership by one key individual added 
enormous strength and momentum to the inter-agency effort from inception until the 
DVCC was well established. 
2. Membership: (1) Early and steadfast police involvement was critical to the 
productivity of the effort. When this support was withdrawn and ties between the 
police and the DVCC lessened, the DVCCs effectiveness was substantially 
compromised. (2) A wide representation of agencies was important to achieving 
systemic improvement to domestic violence response. (3) The DVCC was most  



successful when members held sufficient rank within their respective agencies to 
make decisions and mobilize resources. The DVCC became ineffectual when 
members were relatively low level. 

3. Structure: Initially the DVCC benefited from an informal structure that allowed the 
groups enthusiasm to flourish productively. Over time the structure solidified, but 
because the group was located advantageously where it was autonomous yet 
supported by a prestigious city office it continued to thrive. When it was relocated to 
a low-profile service provision agency, it declined. 
To some readers, it may appear that these conclusions are self-evident. But this does not mean 
that stating them and exploring the circumstances in which they emerged is unimportant. 
Although perhaps self-evident, the DVCC still fell victim to these pit-falls. 
Further, the apparent obviousness of these lessons does not make them less significant. These 
ideas were critical to the inter-agency effort discussed here and are probably relevant to similar 
efforts elsewhere. Until such apparently simple issues are overcome, it is unlikely that agencies 
will have the opportunity to address the more nuanced issues impeding the efficiency of interagency 
collaborations. In other words, the basics are important and need to be addressed first. 

Background 

Domestic violence is a crime that has gained considerable attention in the last three decades. 
Prior to the 1970s, domestic violence was barely a public concern. The victims, womens, and 
civil rights movements could be viewed as components of an overall social movement, through 
which domestic violence became a major concern for public policy. 


Domestic violence emerged as an important part of policing as a result of the increased 
recognition of wife abuse as a public policy problem in the late 1960s and early 1970s. 
Advocates began calling for the police to be more attentive and sensitive to victims needs and to 
respond in a way that would hold batterers accountable for their actions (Hirschel & Hutchison, 
1992; Jolin & Moose, 1997; Steinman, 1990). At this time, mutli-agency work toward solutions 
for specific crime problems such as domestic violence was a fairly new concept. In 1973, the 
U.S. National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals endorsed multiagency 
work in their report entitled A National Strategy to Reduce Crime, which presented 
recommendations to police, courts, corrections, and community crime prevention on 
implementing new crime-reducing strategies within each area. In the chapter entitled Police, a 
specific section is devoted to recommendations on coordination with other criminal justice 
agencies, which reads in part, 
No element of the criminal justice system completely discharges its responsibility simply 
by achieving its own immediate objectives. The police, the prosecutor, the courts, and 
probation, parole, and corrections agencies must cooperate with each other if the system 
is to operate effectively. This requires an effort on the part of each element to 
communicate with the other elements (National Advisory Commission on Criminal 
Justice Standards and Goals, 1973, p. 89). 

The earliest example of a coordinated, comprehensive response to domestic violence was 
initiated in Duluth, Minnesota in 1980. This effort, known as the Domestic Abuse Intervention 
Project (DAIP) coordinated the domestic violence response of nine law enforcement, criminal 
justice, and human services agencies. The purpose was to provide a uniform response to 
domestic violence calls by creating and implementing a common set of policies and procedures 
that not only limited the discretion of individuals handling the cases, but also held them to a 


minimum standard (Jolin & Moose, 1997; Pence, 1983; Shepard & Pence, 1999; Steinman, 
1990). Limiting individual discretion in this way was considered an important component of 
ensuring that services were provided consistently. 

Following the implementation of the Duluth Model, coordinated responses began to form that 
included arrest, aggressive pursuit of prosecutions, and the inclusion of the victims in the 
investigation and sentencing processes. According to one researcher, this type of collaborative 
effort provided police with an opportunity to implement their most effective response to 
domestic violence in the history of this country (Gelles, 1993). Active participation of the police 
is an integral part of any effective multi-agency response to domestic violence. This is especially 
true in terms of the ability of the police to provide information and expert advice in relation to a 
crime problem. In some areas, local police were instrumental in the initial creation of a more 
coordinated response (Liddle and Gelsthorpe, 1994b). By the early 1990s, several coordinated 
interventions were in place around the country, in which police departments were key partners. 
These themes were especially relevant to the development and success of the subject of this 
chapter, the Domestic Violence Coordinating Committee. 

Findings 

The Emergence of the DVCC 

In the late 1980s, a captain in the homicide unit of the city police department was considering 
how police resources could be most effectively used to reduce the citys high homicide rate, 
which was a top priority of the police department. In reviewing data, he noted that domestic 
violence homicides were often preceded by multiple police visits to the location, and thus, 



concluded that earlier intervention into domestic violence cases provided an opportunity to 
prevent these homicides. Serendipitously, his interest coincided with the inception of an interagency 
domestic violence initiative, the DVCC, which sought to enhance the coordination of 
agencies responding to domestic violence. 

The DVCC was the crystallization of the citys concern about the violent crime rate, which had 
evolved into a focus on domestic violence. This focus gave rise to the DVCC in 1987 when the 
city created a new domestic violence coordinator position to supervise two domestic violence 
counselors based at court; undertake domestic violence public awareness, education, and training 
efforts; and to develop a coordinating council relating to domestic violence issues in the city. It 
is this coordinating council that became the DVCC. 

In 1988 the newly hired coordinator convened a meeting of 24 local agencies that were involved 
in domestic violence service delivery in the city to discuss locally available resources. These 
individuals (including the above mentioned homicide captain) began meeting regularly, and 
ultimately formed a coalition known as the DVCC. The DVCCs membership was broad and 
meetings were well attended. In addition to private attorneys, private clinicians, interested 
citizens, several domestic violence victims, and at least one judge, membership included 
representatives from: 

 Police department 
 Magistrates office 
 Prosecutors office 
 Department of social services 
 Agency that ran the battered womens shelter (BWS) 
 Planned Parenthood 
 Department of public schools 
 Victim/witness program  



 Hospital 
 Mental health department 
 Substance abuse counseling agency 
 Public housing department 

From the start the DVCC had a strong presence in local domestic violence work because most of 
the participants were policy makers in their respective agencies, as well as personally motivated 
to address domestic violence. The fact that coordination of the DVCC was part of the paid 
position of a city employee was also an important factor in its early stability. 

The original DVCC mission, as stated by one of the original members, was to harness the 
efforts of community groups and agencies to identify and reduce the incidence of domestic 
violence, and their strategy was to develop resources and to identify and address gaps in 
service. Another long-time DVCC member, who now runs a private batterer counseling 
organization, reported, the point of the DVCC was to create a bumper so that anyone who 
entered the system at any point will receive services. Establishing a continuity of service was a 
related goal of the DVCC. One of the initial areas of agreement between DVCC members was 
the need to improve service to victims by integrating the criminal justice/law enforcement 
response. Thus, the police departments role in and cooperation with the group was identified as 
critical at the outset. The city police department was particularly active from the beginning, but 
as we shall see, over time the police role declined substantially. 

Between 1988 and 1989, the inter-agency group took shape officially as the DVCC, initiating 
several domestic violence education projects as it did so. After its initial development as an 
informal group, the DVCC obtained official status as a non-profit organization on November 
10, 1988. 


History of the DVCC 1987-2000 

There has been significant variation over time in the number of active committee members, the 
vitality, nature of activities undertaken, and the extent of the DVCCs influence on the local 
community. A graphical characterization of the DVCCs history is shown as Figure 1, where the 
distinct phases of its history are described in language 
intended to capture the essence of these periods, such as heyday and rockbottom. 

Figure 1: Characterization of the History of the Domestic Violence Coordinating 
Committee (DVCC): 1987-2001 

Line Graph Showing Characterization

At its peak, the coalition claimed a plethora of active members working as an influential force in 
the community, while at its low-point, the coalition was all but dormant. Throughout, the DVCC 
has been a community body comprised of an array of local agencies that provide service to 
domestic violence victims and offenders. Because the lessons from the DVCCs times of 
strength and weakness may usefully inform the work of agencies and similar coalitions 



elsewhere, we present a chronology of the life of the DVCC, and explicate the factors associated 
with its productive as well as its dormant periods. 

A. 1987-1988: Background to, Birth of, and Gearing Up of the DVCC 
Strength through Informality 
Describing the early stages of the DVCC, the founder and first coordinator commented about 
membership and organizational strength: 

I think the reason it was as strong as it was, for as long as it was, is because it was a very 
inclusive organization  we had no power and no money, so we didnt have to be 
exclusive. We did not have to set up an artificial hierarchy with a board of directors and 
so on. We could invite the world, and have everybody who showed up be equal. It was 
truly a democratic model for how to run a community-based organization. It involved 
everyone who could possibly be identified as a stake -holder  organizationally and 
individually. We made a really consistent attempt to have constituent involvement, and 
we did have battered women themselves come in and out of the organization. 

The first police representative on the DVCC was a captain when he first became involved with 
the newly forming DVCC, and remained an active DVCC member until his retirement as 
assistant chief six years later. His comments on the initial successfulness of the DVCC echoed 
those of the first coordinator. He suggested that the DVCCs productivity was perhaps because 
there was very little in-between ideas and action, as the group did not have any internal or 
external bureaucratic hoops to jump through prior to taking action. 

Early and consistent police involvement 

In describing the strength and effectiveness of the DVCC, several interviewees explicitly 
attributed much of the success to the strong presence of the Police Department. This support lent 
political legitimacy as well as practical value to the DVCCs efforts. The homicide captain, later 
assistant chief, was the man widely recognized as responsible for initial police interest because 


he was involved from the beginning and ultimately served for years on the DVCCs board of 
directors. His initial motivation for involvement, as noted by himself and others, was a 
professional desire to reduce domestic violence homicides and a belief that working 
collaboratively with domestic violence service agencies was an effective means to that end. 
Many interviewees opined that he had the combination of rank, personal zeal, and professional 
commitment to produce a powerful leverage of police department resources. One significant 
contribution was enlisting the support of the police chief. 

This now-retired police official referred to the police department as one of the original movers 
and shakers in the DVCC. Although reducing the homicide rate was the impetus for the police 
departments involvement with the DVCC, the departments interest grew over time into a 
general commitment to improve domestic violence service delivery. The strong role of the 
police throughout the early and most active years of the DVCC was exemplified by donations of 
meeting room space, funds for printing material, and collection and sharing of crime data. In 
addition, police management exerted pressure on officers to take domestic violence seriously and 
make arrests. For example, supervisors reportedly reviewed officers domestic violence reports 
and followed-up on cases where arrests were not made. 

The close relationship between the Police Department and the DVCC was manifested in several 
ways notably that the DVCC provided training for the police department, at several points in its 
history. First, in 1988, the DVCC provided in-service domestic violence training to police 
department officers, and the department encouraged participation by offering officers continuing 
education credits to attend. The DVCC again trained city police officers between 1990 and 1991 


after a presumptive arrest law went into affect in the state. During this two-year span, the DVCC 
provided in-service training on the new law for all city Police officers (at that time there were 
about 600). The training was an intense half-day session that included in-person testimony by 
domestic violence victims. 

B. 1989-1994: The DVCCs Heyday 
The DVCC became more secure in 1990 when the city managers office obtained a grant to fund 
an employee dedicated to violence prevention. The woman hired to, among other duties, 
develop a domestic violence coordinated council (what became the DVCC) accepted the position 
and continued her role on the DVCC, melding responsibility for coordinating the group into her 
new position. Several interviewees attributed the DVCCs success in becoming central to local 
domestic violence service delivery to her skilled leadership. In addition, the new position within 
the city managers office, provided status, security, and funding to the DVCC. 

From 1989 to 1994 the DVCC was extremely active and visible in the community. Ongoing 
activities included producing domestic violence education materials to insert into utility bills, 
producing and distributing domestic violence resource directories, successfully launching a new, 
coordinated approach to domestic violence, training police officers, YWCA volunteers and 
clergy, producing a video for training police recruits in handling domestic violence, cosponsoring 
a lobby day with a local non-profit domestic violence group, publicizing domestic 
violence awareness month, and hosting mini-conferences. In addition, members represented 
the DVCC at various anti-domestic violence educational/publicity events and appearances 
around the city. 


Mini conferences 
Each year the DVCC put together a series of half-day conferences on a range of domestic 
violence-related topics. Each mini-conference included speakers and workshops around a 
specific domestic violence-related topic. Conference fees were minimal, and conferences were 
always well attended, usually by 25 to 30 people. At least one conference had almost 70 
attendees. Some conferences aimed to enhance participants understanding of the effects and 
implications of domestic violence upon different populations. Other conferences aimed to assist 
professionals meet the needs of domestic violence victims and batterers, by offering training in 
recognizing victimization and information about services available in the city. 

Domestic Violence Initiative (DVI) 
For the first part of the DVCCs existence, members focused on domestic violence education and 
advocacy. As they collaborated together in new ways, questions about domestic violence 
services and response emerged, such as: What accounted for the disparity between the high 
number of domestic trouble calls to which the police department reported responding each day 
and the low number of similar cases heard at juvenile and domestic court each day?; What 
guidelines should magistrates use to determine release times and bond levels?; Why did warrant 
and protective order decisions depend on which magistrate was petitioned?; Are batterer 
counseling programs effective at reducing recidivism, and what was the best way to measure 
results? Once the DVCC was geared up, it was prepared to tackle these questions, as it strove 
to fulfill its original purpose: enhancing inter-agency, domestic violence collaboration. 


With many issues and shortfalls to efficient integrated domestic violence response identified, the 
DVCC set about effecting the improvements they believed were needed. This took the shape of 
a new effort called the Domestic Violence Initiative (DVI). The DVI was launched in 1990 by 
DVCC member and non-member agencies, with the DVCC at the helm. The effort was 
comprised of three main activities: 

 Ensuring that each facet of the law enforcement/court system including police, 
magistrates, prosecutors office, court intake, judges, and service providers, had written 
domestic violence polices and procedures in place. 
 Training for personnel employed in each branch of the criminal justice system. 
 Development of a feedback system for evaluating the effectiveness of the policies and 
procedures. 
Many, if not most, of the key city agencies took part in the DVI, and in doing so, made important 
changes in their domestic violence policies and procedures. These changes are summarized in 
Table 1. 



Table 1: Changes in Agency Policies and Procedures, c. 1991 

Agency 
-Changes in Policy or Procedure 

Police Department
-Produced cards to give to domestic violence victims that included police officer 
information, and other information on legal and social services assistance. 
-Instituted reporting form to be used for tracking domestic violence and ensuring 
that officers took appropriate action. 
-Began feeding information on domestic violence incidents to the battered 
womens shelter for follow-up. 
-Attempted to institute presumptive arrest policy, but could not because other 
agencies did not have similar policy. 
-Launched academy and in-service training for officers in domestic violence and 
victimology. 

Magistrates Office 
-Policy was amended so that arrest warrants were issued for all acts of violence. 

Prosecutors Office
-Institutionalized training for all attorneys in victimology and in assisting victims 
with the court process. 
-Policy changed to prosecute all misdemeanor domestic violence cases and not to 
drop cases at complainants request. 
-Policy changed to refrain from prosecuting complainants for refusal to testify. 
-Procedure changed to meet with complainants before hearings to help them 
understand process and hear their concerns. 

Juvenile and Domestic Court Services 
-Training for intake workers implemented. 
-Policy changed to consolidate cases involving the same individual into one 
hearing, where possible. 
-Complainants seeking protective orders are prioritized over other cases. 

Battered Womens Shelter 
-Began contacting domestic violence victims to offer services and assistance, 
using information provided by police 

Mens Abuse Control Program 
-Changed batterer counseling programs to require a fee instead of being free, since 
experiences suggest that perpetrators take groups more seriously when they have 
to pay. 

Reviewing progress of the Domestic Violence Initiative 
In order for the DVI to be effective, the DVCC believed that regular and systematic reviews and 
documentation of its progress were important, and the requirements to do this were explicitly 
established at the outset. Members of the DVCC assessed and documented the work of the 
initiative in several ways. First, in 1992, they compiled the details of the initiative into a bound 
written volume. The volume included background information about the DVCC and detailed 
descriptions of each participating agencys role in the initiative. 



In 1993 a review of the DVI was held where officials of participating agencies convened to 
monitor, assess, and summarize progress so that participants could see who had done what and 
with what results. The review was attended by influential representatives from key agencies, 
such as the police homicide captain, the chief of police, several judges, the chief magistrate, and 
a variety of local service agencies. Members convened and reviewed areas where community 
services had increased, and agency representatives discussed changes in their agencies. Police 
representatives discussed the filling out of reports, judges talked about their annual training 
sessions, and magistrates reported policy changes. It is unclear for how long these changes 
endured. As will be seen in the next section, the DVCCs vitality dropped off precipitously in 
the few years after the first DVI review. 

In sum, the DVCC began with the appointment of a committed and able leader who had the 
ability to organize members as well as to effectively handle public relations. Once funding was 
secured from the city managers office the DVCC had financial security and political clout. 
Many local agencies became involved and continued their involvement. In particular, the police 
played a prominent role. The DVCC sponsored a range of educational activities and became a 
central figure in the domestic violence service delivery community. At the pinnacle of the 
DVCCs strength, it launched the DVI, which was a multi-agency effort to improve city-wide 
policies and responses to domestic violence. In sum, the formation and success of the DVCC 
was accomplished by a small group of committed actors working at the grassroots level, whose 
efforts were supported by many city agencies. 


C. 1994  Turning Point 
Around 1994-1995 the DVCCs momentum and membership began to wane. There are several 
competing, but not mutually excusive, explanations about what broke the DVCCs stride and 
then perpetuated its decline. The contending explanations are: 

(1) leadership problems, (2) departure of several key members and internal competition, and (3) 
a bureaucratic change within the city that detached the DVCC from the purview and status of the 
city managers office. Together it is likely that these factors came together to produce a turning 
point (c.f. Gladwell, 2001) resulting in the rapid downturn of the DVCC and inter-agency 
domestic violence work in the city. 

Leadership problems 

In 1992, the original chairperson left the city for personal reasons, and responsibility for 
coordinating the DVCC shifted across a series of members elected by the DVCC membership. 
This was a major set-back to the DVCC because all at once it lost two of its most important 
assets: a dedicated, well-connected, and beloved leader, and its explicit connection to the city 
managers office, which had provided funding and status. From this time on, the DVCC did not 
have anyone whose paid job description included coordinating the DVCC. Further, the DVCCs 
status was marginalized after it was no longer under the protective wing of the city managers 
office. 

The original DVCC chairperson was well connected within the city and commonly recognized as 
a dedicated and charismatic leader with ample political savvy to build an effective DVCC 
underpinned with strong community and government support. She was also the only person to 


hold this position as part of paid employment. It may be in large part due to an unavoidable 
comparison with her that none of the three subsequent chairpersons escaped criticism from 
interviewees. Each of them and their role is described in turn below. 

The second DVCC coordinator was purported to be a good leader, but overwhelmed by the 
work. This coordinator lasted one year. The third was an active and longtime DVCC member 
who was said by interviewees to have proved herself again and again, both as hardworking and 
dedicated to the DVCC, and to the cause of addressing domestic violence. Unlike the first 
chairperson, neither the second nor third was mandated to undertake the work as part of their 
paid employment. Hence, in retrospect, it was almost inevitable that the time, energy, and 
commitment they could offer were at a lower level. Nonetheless, this coordinator worked 
diligently for the DVCC both internally within the group and externally by representing the 
DVCC at various media events. Ostensibly, the group remained strong throughout her term, 
though its ties to the city were becoming more tenuous. 

Several interviewees reported that the fourth coordinator was also an extremely diligent and 
driven worker who was passionate about the cause; however, those interviewed felt that her 
strident and caustic manor alienated many would be allies and committee members. At a time 
when the DVCC needed a well-connected leader to mitigate the damage of losing the high-status 
parent of the city managers office, they were led by a woman who focused on community 
outreach and education. With the DVCC drifting and loosing momentum, interviewees reported 
that the DVCC was an unproductive way to spend your time. This may explain why many 
agencies, the police included, began to withdraw from activities and meetings. It did not take 


long until DVCC attendance and membership hit an all time low of four or five members in 
1997-1998. 

Key members move on and there is internal competition among members 
Concurrent with the departure of the first coordinator, several additional central members also 
moved on for various reasons. One of these was the previously discussed police official, who 
moved to become a police chief in another city. He was the primary connection with the police 
department since the outset of the DVCC, and his absence created a void that was never filled. 

The director of BWS and the chief magistrate also terminated their involvement with the DVCC. 
Losing these members who were knowledgeable about, interested in, and committed to the 
DVCC, was a set-back; however, this could have been mitigated if their replacements were of 
comparable stature. Unfortunately for the DVCC, this did not occur. A police sergeant replaced 
the assistant chief. BWS did not designate a definite replacement representative, but instead sent 
staff to the DVCC meetings depending on who was available. The chief magistrate ceased his 
involvement, apparently due to conflicts in the DVCC pertaining to questions about whether his 
agency was responding adequately to domestic violence. Purportedly, he was frequently taken 
to task in DVCC meetings for the unresponsiveness and inconsistency of the magistrates in 
issuing protective orders and warrants. As a consequence of what he felt were personal attacks, 
he terminated his involvement. 

While these developments were in and of themselves harmful to the DVCC, they were indicative 
of a larger problem  a lack of commitment on the part of agencies. A police official familiar 


with the police departments history with the DVCC noted that, for any group to be successful, 
there needs to be buy-in from the department heads. I think thats what the DVCC was lacking. 
and other interviewees also referred to lack of ownership and lack of support as severe 
problems.
Another membership issue, mentioned several times in interviews, was personality conflicts and 
competition among members. One member reported: 


Lack of ownership was the beginning of the downfall. Then the differences in philosophy 
and ideas about the purpose of the group continued that. Personality conflicts did not help 
either. 

Several interviewees commented specifically about the problem of individual agendas, one 
referring to the deteriorating situation as a push  my  own  agenda game. Determining 
which of these dynamics instigated or played the largest role in the decline of the DVCC is 
difficult. As often with such events, the specific sequence of events, or direct consequences of 
any one event, remained unclear even after many in-depth interviews. It is hypothesized that 
many of these factors were inter-related, and the decline due to a combination and confluence of 
them. 

Bureaucratic changes set DVCC adrift 
Initially the DVCC was supported by a funded coordinator position, and a safe location within a 
city agency. Two years after its inception, it gained status and legitimacy when responsibility for 
coordinating the committee was transferred to a new and advantageous location within the city 
government, the city managers office. In 1992, when the original DVCC coordinator resigned 
her position, the strength of the relationship between the DVCC and the city was diminished, 
because her position was not filled, and thus the DVCC no longer had a paid coordinator or an 


explicit connection to the city managers office. This office still supported the DVCC, however, 
by paying for mailings and was still informally connected to the DVCC via an active committee 
member who was employed therein. Time gradually eroded this tenuous connection until late 
1995 when a new city manager reorganized portions of the citys bureaucratic structure, and in 
doing so, severed the last functional connection between the DVCC and the city. At this point, 
there was no longer anyone in the city managers office who was affiliated with the DVCC, 
much less paid to coordinate it. When interviewed for this study, an original member and excoordinator 
stated that the DVCC could not continue when separated from the city managers 
office. 

Police department involvement after the turning point 
After the exit of the assistant chief, police department involvement in the DVCC declined. The 
sergeant tasked to represent the police department on the DVCC worked at the training academy, 
and, for the duration of her time on the DVCC, the committee continued to hold its meetings 
there. When this sergeant was transferred within the police department in 1997, the DVCC no 
longer met in police facilities, and police attendance at DVCC meetings ceased. 

The reduced police involvement with the DVCC also corresponds to the tenure of a new police 
chief, appointed in 1995. When interviewed, the chief stated that he did not believe that police 
involvement with the committee was productive and expressed skepticism about police 
involvement in addressing domestic violence. Several other interviewees stated that the 
subsequent priorities of the police department did not appear to include domestic violence. 



D. 1996-1998  Rock Bottom and The Wilderness Years 
By 1996, DVCC membership had dwindled to four or five members. Some members had 
unrelated personal reasons for moving on. Others, however, simply felt that the group was no 
longer productive. One agency official noted that the DVCC was basically a non-entity. 

While the DVCC was largely absent from the citys anti-domestic violence community, a new 
initiative emerged, which we term, the Family Violence Working Group (FVWG). The police 
department was a leader of the FVWG, which had one purpose: to determine the most effective 
use of domestic violence funds received by the police department from the U.S. Department of 
Justice Office of Community Oriented Policing Services and to spend the funds accordingly. A 
police sergeant in charge of obtaining and administering grants led the group. Other participants 
included representatives from Social Services, the BWS, the Prosecutors Office, the police 
department, and the State Supreme Court. 

Ultimately, the FVWG decided to produce several domestic violence education videos. One was 
to be used for training police recruits in the proper handling of domestic violence calls, and one 
was to help domestic violence victims understand the court process. Two public service 
announcements were also produced, one that warned against committing domestic violence and 
one that provided hotline numbers to victims. As soon as the project was completed, in 1999, the 
FVWG disbanded. In describing the impetus to launch the FVWG, one social services official 
stated: Because we knew the DVCC was not capable of making any decisions, the public 
agencies at that time got together and started the [FVWG]. The scope of the FVWG was quite 
limited and the FVWG was never intended to lead to sustained inter-agency cooperation. Still, 



its existence indicates that inter-agency domestic violence work continued in the city, on some 
level. 

E. 1999-2001  Resurgence 
During 1999, the DVCC began a resurgence. The energy and dedication of several individuals 
with institutional memory of the past success and value of the DVCC lay behind this attempt. 
The revitalization was initiated by a supervisor at Department of Social Services with 
responsibility for domestic violence programming. Realizing that there was no longer a viable 
coordinated response, she tasked a domestic violence worker with leadership experience to get 
the DVCC going again. Subsequently, meetings were held almost monthly, and interest 
reemerged. Almost two years after the process began, the DVCC was on the verge of again being 
an active part of the domestic violence service delivery system. 

While this development is promising, several interviewees expressed concerns about the newly 
emergent DVCC. When asked what made the DVCC weak, one interviewee stated: We [the 
DVCC] dont belong to anybody. There is no supporting agency to fund the group, while 
another opined of the lack of backing from the powers that be. However, at the time of this 
writing, a wide range of agencies were participating in DVCC meetings, including the police 
department, along with individuals who had been committed to the DVCC throughout its history. 
One interviewee reported, At this point the DVCC is 150 times better than it was. 



Discussion and Conclusions 

While the scope of the study does not allow us to identify members specific operational 
decisions and actions that affected the fortunes of the DVCC, it is possible to discern several 
distinct themes. These are that particular aspects to leadership, membership, and group structure 
were critical to making and breaking the DVCC. Most likely a combination of these factors 
converged to initially, make the DVCC successful, and later, after certain key changes, to bring 
about its decline. Initially the DVCC benefited from a skilled leader who was able to focus the 
energy of diverse individuals, into a productive and respected organization. Though the group 
had many dedicated members committed to the cause of addressing domestic violence, upon this 
leaders retirement, none were truly able to fill her shoes, and the void dragged down the forward 
momentum of the DVCC. 

Membership was also an important ingredient in the DVCCs success. For the first several years 
of the DVCCs existence a broad range of agencies were represented in its membership, 
including law enforcement and other criminal justice agencies. While this was the case the 
DVCC was productive and was even able to launch an ambitious multi-agency effort to improve 
response to domestic violence, which involved many agencies engaging in additional training, 
updating policies, and working together toward a more seamless service delivery system. The 
police in particular were very active throughout these early stages. When a few key members, 
representing key agencies left the DVCC, and their agencies were either no longer represented or 
were represented by less committed and or low-status individuals then the momentum was 
further undermined. 


The final factor identified as important to the DVCC is its structure. Initially, the DVCC 
capitalized on its informal structure by allowing the energy of the original members to generate 
and act on ideas. But this does not mean that maintaining this structure was necessary for the 
DVCCs continued success. In fact, the DVCC continued to thrive after the structure became 
more formalized, now benefiting from new advantages, such as a prominent location within the 
citys government where it was autonomous and supported. It was only when it was moved to a 
disadvantageous, non autonomous and non supported location within a service delivery unit 
when structure worked against it and further momentum was diffused. 

Implications for Policing 

In their review of inter-agency crime prevention efforts work, Webb and Laycock (2000) present 
telling summaries of the problems and pitfalls that inter-agency groups often encounter. Their 
insightfulness into partnership pitfalls makes them worth revisiting in the present context, and 
their (vaguely satirical) typology is shown as Figure 2. 

Figure 2: Laycock and Webbs Typology of Early Partnership Pitfalls 

 Whos in charge here? 
 Its not our job, its yours 
 Your priorities are not mine 
 Wed like to help but it would reduce our profits 
 Weve got no money, can we have some of yours? 
 Im in from the local voluntary group  what can I do?  



The Laycock and Webb (2000) analysis was based upon many years of effort implementing local 
inter-agency initiatives, and their discussion goes further than the typology shown here. 
However, the relevance of the pitfalls typology to the present discussion is evident: The DVCC 
in our case study thrived when it overcame the pitfalls, and declined when they gained 
prominence. Many of the specific aspects highlighted by the Laycock and Webb typology were 
evident in the present case study: Competing agendas and personalities, funding issues, 
leadership issues, individual abilities, and political clout, were among the key aspects that 
dictated the rise and fall of the inter-agency domestic violence committee. In the present study, it 
seemed that several of the issues were inter-related: as funding ended, leadership shifted leading 
to problems in the agenda and work of the DVCC. Yet the picture was far more complex than to 
simply conclude that funding is everything. It is important, but it is not everything. Rather, 
efforts need to be made to encourage the convergence of factors that ensure such an inter-agency 
effort becomes, and remains, productive, producing a tipping point. This should typically mean 
ensuring that high-level support is gained in key agencies, particularly the police and social 
services. Where that support is absent, it should be sought via different channels. A reluctant 
police chief might be nudged into action via different approaches: perhaps simply some basic 
lobbying through letters and calls from prominent players in other agencies. 



Figure 3: Inter-Agency Tipping Point Factors 

A. Key Precursors to Development and Growth: 
 Ability: leadership, coordination, knowledge, connections, dedication 
 Motivation and ability to motivate others 
 Other key motivated personnel 
 Financing 
 Political clout 
 Police involvement 

These positive factors were the precursors of a positive cycle of reinforcement that 
meant the DVCC went from strength to strength. 

B. Key Precursors to Decline and Decay: 
 Loss of leadership without equivalent replacement. 
 Loss of financing 
 Loss of political clout (the link to city managers office) 
 Loss of police contact person without equivalent replacement 
 New police chief with old school views on domestic violence 

These negative factors were the precursors of a vicious cycle of decline and decay
that resulted in loss of direction of the DVCC, and ultimately in several years 
without credibility or much activity. 


Stronger means could incorporate applications to the city managers or mayors office, who 
typically have influence upon the police department. 

What are the implications of this study for police departments and anti-domestic violence 
policing efforts across the country? Figure 3 summarizes some of the findings from the present  



study as key tipping point issues that induced the ebb and flow, respectively, of anti-domestic 
violence efforts in the city.3 

The summary factors shown in Figure 3 are taken from our case study of a single city. It shows 
the issues relating to the production of both the positive and negative tipping points in relation 
to the inter-agency domestic violence work and policing. These issues almost certainly have a 
broader relevance to inter-agency domestic violence-related work and police work across the 
nation, as well, perhaps, to more general inter-agency crime control and policing efforts. Police 
departments can clearly benefit from the knowledge and expertise of other agencies in the 
community. At this point we have returned to the opening sentence of this report  inter-agency 
cooperation is a foundation of modern policing. However, we add to this statement the rider that 
the police should make efforts to ensure the convergence of positive tipping point factors, and 
discourage the convergence of negative tipping point factors. Inter-agency cooperation in 
policing needs to be tailored to the local context, individuals, and agencies for it to be 
productive. These are the significant broader implications of the present study for American 
policing. 

3 The tipping point concept is adapted from Gladwell (2000) who used it to refer to a convergence of factors, rather 
than a single factor, producing the momentum for the sharp reduction in the New York City crime rate during the 
1990s.  



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Chapter 5 

The Current State of the Domestic Violence Coordinating Committee: 2000-2001 

Erin Lane, M.P.M. 
and
Joan Lucera, M.S.


POLICE FOUNDATION 


Prepared for the U.S. Department of Justice 
Office of Community Oriented Policing Services
Award #98DVWXK015 


June 2002  



Chapter 5: The Current State of the Domestic Violence Coordinating Committee: 
2000-2001 

Introduction 

Now that the groundwork has been laid in the previous chapter of this report for understanding 
the evolution of the Domestic Violence Coordinating Committee (DVCC) through its first 13 
years of existence, the view is broadened to the DVCC within the context of the domestic 
violence service community. This description is based on the community of agencies involved 
in domestic violence service delivery in the city in 2000 and 2001 and includes examination of 
the working relationships among the agencies in the system, between these agencies and the 
DVCC, and in particular, the role of the police department and its centrality to the DVCC. 

It is the role of the police as well as the domestic violence service delivery communitys 
perception of the police that is the focus of this chapter. This will be addressed by (1) describing 
the DVCC and its role as the explicit inter-agency domestic violence collaboration, (2) 
describing the DVCC member and non member agencies that comprise the domestic violence 
service delivery system, (3) discussing the role of the police department and its officers in 
response to domestic violence, and (4) presenting perspectives of the police by others in the 
domestic violence service community. Overall, these findings indicate that while the police are 
central to responding to domestic violence, not until well into the field work for this study have 
they been involved with the DVCC, and they generally have not been active in interagency 
efforts to improve domestic violence response. 



Findings 

Domestic Violence Coordinating Committee 

Since 1986 the Domestic Violence Coordinating Committee (DVCC) has been the primary locus 
of multi-agency, inter-disciplinary domestic violence service in the city. The DVCC is 
comprised of representatives from city government, non-profit organizations, and religious 
agencies working toward a more comprehensive, integrated, and seamless response to domestic 
violence. The DVCC, as outlined in the previous chapter, has a long history existing since 1987 
as a coalition working to improve the domestic violence service delivery system, as well as to 
educate the public about domestic violence. 

During this period, the strength of the DVCC has waxed and waned. For the first years of its 
existence the DVCC was strong, vibrant, and an influential player in the city. Then, for myriad 
of reasons, its membership and activity level declined substantially. When active, the DVCC has 
served several important functions, most notably being a locus for cross-agency networking and 
inter-agency, multi disciplinary work, and a sponsor of domestic violence education and 
lobbying efforts. In 2000 and 2001, the study period for this research, the DVCC is reenergizing 
and is poised to again be a productive force for domestic violence advocacy and 
education. With membership growing, an organizational structure being put into place, and 
plans for future activities being discussed and formulated, the DVCC is becoming an active 
entity again. 

The DVCCs mission statement states, "We are a group of professionals and concerned citizens 
formed to serve the citizens of [name of city] in the following ways: 



 To encourage the most effective means of community action in identifying and reducing 
the incidence of domestic violence 
 To enhance public awareness of domestic violence and to educate professional [sic] and 
the general public of the aspect of domestic violence 
 To provide a forum for networking and information sharing concerning issues of 
domestic violence" 

Three standing sub-committees called executive, education and membership, as well as ad hoc 
sub-committees that are formed when necessary pursue these goals. The six-person executive 
committee steers the DVCC and handles administrative tasks such as conducting meetings, and 
taking, writing, and distributing minutes. In conjunction with the education committee, several 
sub-committees have recently formed to work on four projects, some of which are ongoing: (1) 
producing an updated service directory, (2) assembling data on domestic violence in the city, (3) 
establishing a recognition program to identify and commend individuals who have handled a 
specific domestic violence case especially well, and (4) organizing conferences on domestic 
violence topics. The membership committee is concerned with building the DVCCs roster and 
particularly with recruiting participants from hitherto unrepresented agencies. An elected 
chairperson creates agendas and presides over meetings. 

The DVCC holds meetings once a month at the juvenile and domestic courthouse. Meetings are 
always an information sharing and networking opportunity. At each meeting, members 
announce a variety of domestic violence related activities and trainings, oftentimes discussing 
legislation soon to be voted on by the state legislature. Members also share literature and report 
on the activities of coordinating committees from neighboring counties. Many DVCC meetings 
include guest speakers, usually from a local agency providing information about their agencys 
domestic violence related activities and role in the domestic violence service delivery system. At  



each meeting, time is set aside for discussing specific domestic violence cases. This provides the 
opportunity for agency representatives, who may have contact with the same case, to gain 
information about aspects of the case of which they may not be aware. 

Membership and Core Members 

Originally, coordinating the DVCC was included in the job description of a city employee who 
left that position in 1992. Within a year of her departure the position was eliminated, and now 
the DVCC is entirely comprised of professionals who volunteer to serve on the DVCC in 
addition to their regular duties. DVCC members include representatives from city and state 
agencies, community non-profit organizations, and religious organizations that work in the area 
of domestic violence service delivery. While there are about 60 individuals who claim some 
cursory involvement with the DVCC, meeting attendance is usually between ten and 15 people. 

Committee membership cannot be precisely defined because participation varies, but there is a 
core group that forms the backbone of the DVCC and an array of individuals and agencies with 
varying levels of commitment and affiliation. Table 1 lists agencies comprising the domestic 
violence service community, showing the members of the DVCC in gray shading. Agencies 
shaded dark gray are those represented on the executive committee of the DVCC and agencies 
shaded light gray are members. We defined agencies as members if they were represented at at 
least one meeting between September 1999 and January 2001. We have identified 25 agencies 
that fit this criterion. 


Table 1: Domestic Violence Service Delivery Community 


Agency 				Agencys Function Pertaining to Domestic Violence 
				(members have *) 

State Dept. of Health*  	Works with localities to form and monitor fatality review teams.
(Chairperson) 

Domestic Violence* 		Provides counseling for batterers and monitors batterers compliance with 
Interventions 			court ordered treatment.
(Vice Chair) 			 

Hospital Emergency Room* 	Provides emergency medical services to victims of domestic violence. 
(Secretary) 

Department of Social* 		Provides counseling and a variety of direct services to domestic violence victims.
Services at court 
(Treasurer) 
 
University sexual assault* 	Assists students who have been sexually assaulted and promotes
service 			sexual assault awareness and education to the campus community. 
(Member at Large) 
 
BWS *				Battered womens shelter: provides safe emergency and temporary 
(Member at Large) 		housing to domestic violence victims. 

Magistrates Office 		Issues warrants and emergency protective orders. 

Prosecutors Office 		Prosecutes domestic violence cases. 

Victim Witness 			Provides court accompaniment and information to victims. 

Legal Aid 			Provides legal services to domestic violence victims on civil matters. 

Catholic Charities 		Provides a variety of service, including counseling services to 
				victims and perpetrators, and emergency food and clothing. 

Family Violence 		Places and monitors batterers referred by court in Batterer
Prevention Program at 		Intervention and other programs as necessary.
Social Services  
 
Catholic Arch Diocese 		Addresses the issue of domestic violence in religious communities. 
Domestic Violence Task 
Force 

Local law enforcement 		Respond to domestic violence calls on and in vicinity of campus;
agency 				assist students who have been sexually assaulted or stalked. 

City Police Department 		First responders to domestic violence calls.

Domestic Violence 		Unit of Social Services that responds to domestic violence calls in
Responders 			tandem with police to assist domestic violence victims obtain 
				information about and services from Social Services. 
 
Criminal Justice 		Conducts research, implements and monitors victim witness 
Information and Services 	programs around the state, and provides police training. 
Center 

Community Corrections 		Provide Probation and Parole officers for offenders, as well as 



				Batterer Intervention Groups. 
Mental Health Authority 	Government program providing mental health counseling and 
				services for victims of domestic violence. 

United Way 			Charitable organization providing funds and services to various 
				groups serving victims. 

Public Defenders Office 	Provide free legal services for perpetrators at trial 

Sheriffs Department 		Deliver warrants and summons to court, provide courtroom security 

Domestic Violence 		Non profit domestic violence advocacy and education group that 
Lobbying and Education 		provides technical assistance to community responses to domestic 
				violence. 

Safe Harbor Shelter 		A shelter for battered women that accepts city residents but is 
				located in a neighboring county 

Juvenile and domestic 
Court 				Handles cases involving juveniles and domestic violence 

The city police department is not shown to be a member of the DVCC because we did not 
observe their representatives attend any meetings during this time. It should be noted, however, 
that in August 1999 police representatives did attend to show a victim assistance video they had 
been involved in creating; additionally, the police department was becoming involved as our 
fieldwork was concluding in January 2001. 



Figure 1 provides a visual view of the domestic violence service community by displaying the 
component agencies visually in relation to their involvement with the DVCC. 

Figure 1: The Domestic Violence Service Community 

Image of Chart Showing These Groups in Relation to One Another
The Domestic Violence Service Community 
DVCC 
Public Defender 
State Department of Health 
Community Corrections 
Mental health Counseling 
FVPP/DSS 
Domestic Violence Responders 
Police Department 
Catholic Charities 
Victim Witness 
Sheriffs Department
J&D Court 
Criminal Justice Services 
United Way 
Safe harbor Shelter 
Magistrate 
BWS Shelter 
City Prosecutors Office 
Legal Aid 
Domestic Violence Interventions 
Hospital 
University Sexual Assault Services 
FVPP/DSS at court 
Catholic Arch Diocese DV Task Force 
DV lobbying and education 
University Police 


In Figure 1 above, the extent to which an agency is involved in the DVCC is reflected in the 
proximity of its icon to the DVCC icon. The six agencies positioned on the circle closest to the 
DVCC icon are those represented on the executive committee. The agencies on the outer circle 
are those with involvement in the DVCC, defined as agencies that were observed attending at 
least one meeting over the study period. Agencies outside these circles have (or at the time when 
we began observation, had) no official involvement in the DVCC. Certain agency icons are 
shaded indicating that an interview with at least one representative was completed for this study. 
In the interview, subjects were asked with which other agencies if any they worked on domestic 


violence. In response to this question the following three agencies were mentioned far more than 
any others: the Police Department, the agency that runs the battered womens shelter (BWS) and 
Department of Social Services (DSS). These are shown in bold. The next section describes the 
function and role of the main elements in the domestic violence service delivery system. 

 Battered Womens Shelter (BWS) 
The BWS operates the only shelter in the city available to battered women, offering them 
temporary stays up to 30 days if space is available at the time of the request. There are also two 
shelters outside the city boundaries that accept city residents. Agencies that work with domestic 
violence victims  especially those whose role begins immediately after incidents such as law 
enforcement, emergency room personnel, and Domestic Violence Responders (described below) 
 rely on the BWS as a resource for emergency shelter for their clients. Agencies that enter the 
picture after the incident also work with the BWS to discuss the status of soon-to-be-discharged 
victims, or to access other services on behalf of their clients. Additional services offered by the 
BWS include two 24-hour hotlines where victims can receive information and referrals, a food 
bank, counseling, court advocacy, training in getting and keeping jobs, access to a medical clinic, 
and legal advice. The BWS is represented on the DVCC by various staff members who are 
interested and available for meetings. 
Batterer Counseling Programs: Office of Community Corrections, Domestic Violence 
Interventions, Catholic Charities, and Behavioral Health Authority 

In the study city, all cases involving misdemeanor domestic violence are heard at the juvenile 
and domestic court. Defendants, especially first time offenders, are often allowed to have their 
cases dismissed if within two years they complete a batterer counseling program managed by the 



Family Violence Prevention Program. This condition can also be a component of sentences. 
Offenders required to cooperate with FVPP must report to the FVPP Social Worker Specialist 
based at court for an assessment of their counseling needs. Based on the assessment results, they 
are placed in one of the many batterer treatment programs available. Once placed in a program, a 
FVPP case manager monitors each offenders compliance with the court order. 

 Several agencies and individuals run batterer groups, which focus on either domestic violence, 
anger management, or substance abuse. Domestic Violence Interventions, Behavioral Health 
Authority, the Office of Community Corrections, and Catholic Charities all offer groups, as do 
several licensed individuals. Many of these agencies are represented on the DVCC including 
Domestic Violence Interventions and Catholic Charities. 

Most groups charge attendees $10 or $15 a session; however, groups offered by the Office of 
Community Corrections (OCC) are free allowing indigent batterers to fulfill their court-imposed 
obligation. Groups are held all over the city and at various times of day and day of week, giving 
batterers every opportunity to find a group. 

 Department of Social Services (DSS) 

 The Department of Social Services (DSS) is a large agency that provides many direct services 
including all types of counseling and assistance with obtaining food stamps and other legal and 
financial aid. DSS houses two units that focus on domestic and family violence, the Family 
Violence Prevention Program (FVPP), and the Domestic Violence Responders Unit. Several 
staff persons from the Family Violence Prevention program participate in the DVCC including 
the unit supervisor and the two court workers. 


The majority of the FVPP  approximately eight workers and a supervisor  is based at the main 
Social Services building in the heart of downtown. Workers at this location assist domestic 
violence victims who have been referred to the unit from court, police, or other units at social 
services. FVPP workers can assist victims by procuring counseling, legal assistance, moving 
expenses, emergency food supplies, and many other forms of financial and service aid. In some 
cases, the FVPP works with victims only once, and in some cases they establish ongoing 
relationships. As mentioned above, case managers in this unit also monitor the compliance of 
batterers who have been court ordered to receive treatment. 

Two additional FVPP workers are based at juvenile and domestic court. One worker counsels 
juvenile offenders and their families. The other administers the batterer counseling and 
monitoring function of the FVPP, which involves assessing the counseling needs of batterers 
(e.g., anger management, substance abuse, or domestic violence counseling) placing batterers in 
appropriate programs, and alerting the court of successful completion or non-compliance. 

The Domestic Violence Responders unit is a DSS immediate response team headquartered at 
downtown Social Services with offices in the police precinct buildings. Domestic Violence 
Responders are social workers who work out of the precinct buildings during evening and 
nighttime hours and who respond to human services needs. Their primary, but not exclusive, 
role is responding to domestic violence scenes reported to police. 

When called, the Domestic Violence Responders work with police officers to provide the best 
possible service and assistance to victims by offering victims a range of information and services 



depending on each victims needs. Domestic Violence Responders are able to offer victims 
vouchers for emergency hotel stays, food, and baby supplies, in addition to crisis counseling and 
comprehensive information about available services. The Domestic Violence Responders also 
serve as a link between the victim and the FVPP where victims can obtain more in depth and 
ongoing assistance. 

City Police Department Domestic Violence Related Activities: Training, Response, and 
Investigation 

The city Police Department is the primary law enforcement agency responding to domestic 
violence in the city. To prepare its officers for this role, the department provides training in the 
proper handling of domestic violence calls as part of the regular academy recruit training. This 
training takes up one day of the 29-week academy and includes: presentations by local domestic 
violence services agencies on what each offers to victims and how officers can mobilize these 
resources; proper procedure for responding to domestic violence calls; and training on the laws 
relating to domestic violence in the state. 

From 1997 through 1998, federal funds were utilized to train officers on new laws mandating a 
pro-arrest policy for domestic violence incidents. This training focused on identifying the 
primary physical aggressor and covered changes in the laws pertaining to Emergency Protective 
Orders. This was the last time a department-wide in-service domestic violence training has been 
conducted. Currently police supervisors or representatives from the Domestic Violence 



Responder program occasionally conduct roll-call trainings for patrol officers, addressing 
procedural issues pertaining to the handling of domestic violence calls. 

In addition, during 1997 and 1998, the police department received a COPS office grant in a 
coordinated effort with the FVPP, the prosecutors office, and the BWS to develop a domestic 
violence training video for police officers, a video explaining the court process for victims, and 
two public service announcements. This training video is still in use at the police recruit training 
academy, and the public service announcements receive occasional television air-time, though 
funds are not available to run the announcements regularly. Although several agencies own 
copies of the video geared toward steering victims through the court process, such as the BWS, 
Victim Witness, and the Police Department, no one could say definitively how often the video is 
actually shown to victims. 

To further assist victims, as discussed above, the police department collaborates with the local 
Department of Social Services on the Domestic Violence Responder program. This involves 
training officers on the functions of the Domestic Violence Responders and encouraging officers 
to call them out in relevant situations. The department also provides Domestic Violence 
Responders office space in several of the patrol division headquarters. When the Domestic 
Violence Responders do not respond with police, officers give victims referrals to a variety of 
resources in the community. 

Domestic violence incident investigation is officially handled by the Police Departments Youth 
and Family Crime Unit. This unit is charged with reviewing domestic violence reports and 


following up in particularly serious cases, or in cases where officers may not have taken the 
appropriate action, (e.g., if the case indicated an arrest should have been made and it was not). A 
supervisor and five detectives staff the unit whose purview includes investigating crimes 
committed by juveniles as well as those classified as domestic violence. Because juvenile 
offenses are prioritized above domestic offenses, however, and because the capacity of this unit 
is limited, domestic violence incidents are rarely investigated. Any follow-up with victims is 
most often handled by the police officers called to the scene who do so of their own accord. 
Recognizing the importance of thorough investigation and follow up with victims, several 
interviewees within the police department stated that a full-time domestic violence investigative 
unit would be immensely beneficial for all involved. 

The Youth and Family Crime Unit is able to review domestic violence cases by examining the 
domestic and family violence reports that are sent through the office on the way to archiving. 
These forms can be used to alert the unit supervisor to cases warranting further follow-up, but as 
discussed above, it is unclear how many or how extensively cases are investigated. The police 
department currently maintains no system for tracking domestic violence cases, offenders, or 
victims outside of its normal record keeping procedures. 

Domestic Violence Working Relationships within the Service Community 

Being the first responders to domestic violence incidents, police officers interact with medical, 
hospital, social service, and shelter personnel, as well as workers at the Emergency Protective 
Order issuing authority. During case follow-up, police provide and share information with 
prosecutors. Clearly, the police are integral to domestic violence response and case handling  



from beginning to end and, in doing so, must interact with other agencies. Yet, paradoxically, 
they are not involved with the DVCC, which, as noted earlier, is the locus of efforts to improve 
inter-agency response to domestic violence. Figure 2 displays the working relationships between 
the police department and the other agencies in the domestic violence network as reported in 
interviews. 

Figure 2: Police-Community Domestic Violence Working Relationships 

Graph Showing Police-Community DV Working Relationships

One important measure of the strength of any multi-agency effort is the number of working 
relationships maintained by its members with other agencies in the network. The responses to 
our interview question: "What other agencies does your agency work with on domestic 
violence?" provide a proxy for identifying the agencies within the service delivery system and 



for assessing the inter-connectedness of those agencies represented in our interviewee sample. 
The more frequently agencies are mentioned in unprompted, self-reported working relationships, 
the more likely they are at the center of the service delivery web. Indeed, we found that several 
agencies received markedly more mentions than others. The tally of these responses is displayed 
in Table 2. 

Table 2: Number of Reported Domestic Violence Working Relationships by Agency 

Agency 						Mentions 
Battered Womens Shelter 			10 
City Police Department 				8 
FVPP (DSS counseling and services for victims) 	8 
City Prosecutors Office 			4 
Domestic Violence Lobbying and Education 	4 
(Others) 					(1, 2 or 3) 

Based on the number of mentions, the city Police Department, the Department of Social 
Services, and the Battered Womens Shelter, appear to be the central agencies in the service 
delivery community. 

Perceptions of the Police Department 

No police representatives were observed participating in the DVCC until the latter part of the 
period of observation and data collection for this study, and in his interview, the chief expressed 
lack of interest in police participation in the DVCC on the grounds that it was not a constructive 
use of officer time. He was doubtful that such organizations are truly collaborative when it 
comes to the police, remarking: 

Usually collaboration means, what else can we find for you to do as police officers? 
All the people who sit around the table and talk about solving problems close up shop at 
5:00, 5:30, but the police are open when the domestic violence incidents are going on. 
Everyone else is closed. It would be a true collaboration if the people with all the ideas 


would come out at 3:00 am and see if their ideas work for the police department like they 
think." 

In the DVCCs heyday, however, the city police departments view of collaborative efforts was 
quite the opposite. In fact, it was a police captain interested in improving the police 
departments handing of domestic violence who was most responsible for the close working 
relationship between the department and the DVCC. At that time, the police department realized 
that something needed to be done to curb the escalating rate of domestic violence-related 
homicides in the city. With the approval and support of the previous police chief, the DVCC 
planned and implemented training for all city police officers on new domestic violence laws and 
developed a family violence form to be completed and submitted for all domestic violence calls 
for purposes of uniformity and tracking. This commitment on the part of the police department 
was frequently cited by former DVCC members and others as one reason for the DVCCs 
success in its formative years, and conversely why without police department support the DVCC 
faltered in later years. 

Perceived commitment of the police department to domestic violence 

Interviewees repeatedly expressed the belief that the police departments absence in the DVCC 
hampered its effectiveness as well as coordinated domestic violence service delivery in general. 
To the question, How would you rate the level of collaboration around domestic violence within 
the city, one interviewee responded, Everyone but the police is doing a good job. When 
asked about the extent of collaboration between her agency and the police department another 
interviewee answered not at all. 


Many interviewees expressed frustration that there is not a police department representative who 
regularly attends meetings or participates in any way on the DVCC. One interviewee 
commented, On all the other domestic violence council meetings I have attended (in two 
surrounding counties) there is always a police officer there discussing recent cases, and how they 
could have been prevented, or what they feel the needs are in the community. Other 
interviewees related a general sense of disconnection between the police department and their 
agency and felt that this would be mitigated if someone from the department participated in the 
DVCC. Many interviewees reported having a much better working relationship with the police 
department in the past. 

Lack of inter-agency communication and absence of police representation on the DVCC were 
the main collaboration-related concerns expressed by non-police interviewees. Many of these 
interviewees expressed the opinion that inter-agency communication in general is lacking with 
the police department. Several commented that this lack of communication perpetuates 
continued misunderstandings among agencies about their respective roles and purviews. An 
interviewee from a local agency talked about the intersection between her work and that of the 
police department. She articulated one issue about working with the police in this way, There is 
a lack of trust from the police about our project, and people fear what will make them look bad. 
Police dont want to participate [in this project]  they just dont trust the process, and they are 
afraid they are going to be blamed. This could be improved if the police would give us the 
information we ask for more consistently. 


When asked about collaboration one non-police department interviewee mentioned not getting 
statistics from the police anymore and expressed a general sense of disconnectedness in this way: 

I would like to get some statistics from the PD, on 911 calls, arrest rates, and conviction 
rates from the courts. It would help to know if there are changes in police policies and 
protocols on handling DV cases. Years ago, the DVCC got all of those reports from the 
police. We had access to forms that police filled out when they went out on a DV call, so 
we could screen the sheets and see what arrests were made, and if an arrest was not made, 
we could question that. I dont know who takes care of those forms now, because they 
were bounced around from agency to agency. That was when the PD representative was 
very involved and gave us whatever we needed. We dont get anything any more...Im 
not sure what the police are doing now. I dont know if they are giving out those cards to 
victims, if they are filling out those reports, if the reports go anywhere, if there is any 
follow-up. When the police do go out and write a report is anyone screening them? Is 
anyone gathering any information from those reports to write a comprehensive report? I 
dont have a clue how well they are doing their job, or what they are doing. I do know 
that we havent done enough to protect women, and the laws are not utilized the way they 
were meant to be. 

This interviewee went on to say, a true collaboration really exists only among three city 
agencies  the Police Department, Department of Social Services, and the court. If they are the 
only ones collaborating, is that true collaboration? Where are the checks and balances with that 
system, and who makes sure it works? Collaboration exists, but it is questionable as to how well 
it works. 

Lack of involvement with the DVCC in particular and lack of inter-agency collaboration in 
general is one of several observations leading to the opinions of many interviewees that the 
police departments commitment to domestic violence is not what it should be. Interviewees 
reported that, domestic violence is not a priority for the police. 

A representative from another local law enforcement agency noted that city police department 
representatives never attend domestic violence training or other relevant events. This source  



states: If you are going to do this work, it is imperative that you attend some of these functions, 
to make contacts, and be able to use those to offer resources to your victims. 

For some non-police department interviewees, the fact that the police department does not have a 
dedicated domestic violence unit formed their impression that the departments commitment to 
domestic violence is lacking. Interviewees mentioned three main functions that such a unit 
would serve: (1) expand the departments capacity to investigate and thoroughly handle domestic 
violence incidents, (2) provide better services to victims, and (3) provide criminal justice 
agencies, service delivery agencies, and individuals with a point of contact within the department 
to direct questions and concerns related to domestic violence as well as to police response in 
general. While the Youth and Family Crime Unit previously discussed is meant to serve at least 
some of these roles, in reality it does not. 

All interviewees were asked whether they thought establishing a domestic violence unit would 
be a positive thing, and 21 out of 23  including four police personnel  stated unequivocally that 
it was a good idea. Notably, many interviewees offered that while it was a good idea, they 
entertained little hope that the police department would establish such a unit. One interviewee 
felt that funding for such positions was possible to obtain and expressed frustration that the 
department was not making any efforts to procure such funding. 

While interviewees felt that a domestic violence unit would be ideal, it was thought that it would 
be beneficial to have even one person in the police department dedicated to domestic violence or 



at least designated as a contact person. A representative from an agency that works closely with 
the police stated: 

[Establishing a domestic violence unit] would definitely be a positive thingif not a 
specialized unit, at least someone who could be a liaison in the department for exactly 
that purpose. For instance, right now in the department there is one particular person 
who deals with fugitives from other states. If you have questions, that is your contact. It 
is not a whole unit, but everyone knows who to go to on that issue. 

Non-police interviewees did mention one sergeant that seems to serve as an ad-hoc contact 
person. This sergeants only domestic violence-related task is training, but his current 
assignment (detective in auto-theft unit) has taken him out of the domestic violence loop. Our 
interviewees were unaware of anyone who can officially or unofficially fill that void. One 
interviewee stated, I dont know who to call, where to go  no point of contact. A 
representative of an agency whose work is directly linked to the police department felt that a 
liaison between her agency and the Police Department would improve communication. She felt 
that increased communication would allow her office to better address some concerns expressed 
by officers about obtaining warrants, as well as making the police departments role clearer. For 
want of a contact within the department, one interviewee who works with batterers leaves 
messages on the crime stoppers line when she gets intelligence about, for example, a batterer 
in possession of a firearm. 

Police Departments Response to Domestic Violence Calls for Service 

In addition to these concerns about the level of collaboration with city agencies and 
organizations (including the DVCC) and the perceived level of commitment to domestic violence 
by the police, interviewees also had concerns about how the police handled domestic violence 
calls. Although none of our questions pertained specifically to the city officers responses to 



domestic violence calls, several interviewees offered comments on this topic. A representative 
from a law enforcement agency whose jurisdiction overlaps the city police departments 
jurisdiction mentioned that differences in the way officers in the two departments are trained to 
handle domestic violence presents a challenge, because in the interviewees opinion, less 
domestic violence follow-through is expected of city police officers. Apparently, confusion 
sometimes results when officers of both agencies respond to the same call since they have 
different views of what action is required, with city police officers usually opting for less action. 

Regarding the presumptive arrest policy in place in the city, there was unanimous support among 
the police and civilian interviewees alike for this policy, although enthusiasm varied. 
Commenting on whether or not the policy has a positive or negative effect on victims, one non 
police interviewee stated: The victims feel reassured that the police do care and are listening. 

Although many civilian interviewees were aware of the law, several expressed doubt about the 
zeal and consistency with which city police officers actually carry it out. One interviewee stated, 
It depends on the officer. Some take it seriously and go by the book, while others just blow it 
off. She associated inconsistent application of the policy with lack of discipline in the ranks, 
stating, The officers need to be held accountable for their actions, which really speak to their 
respect for the chief and his authority. They ignore an executive order from him when they dont 
arrest. 

Other interviewees were generally pleased with their relationship with the police, although 
interviewees acknowledged there was room for improvement. In the eyes of one DSS worker, 
There is still an invisible barrier between the police department and the DSS in general. We 


meet some resistance about becoming a part of an investigation because we are Social Services 
and not police officers. There is an attitude of why do we need a social worker Some feel it 
is redundant to have a second person present at the interview. 

Several interviewees believed that the Domestic Violence Responders program has greatly 
enhanced the working relationship between the police and DSS. One interviewee commented, 
We work well together, and they treat us like family  they call us to come to community events 
and police training. Another interview reflected, That they have opened the divisions to us is 
pretty incredible. The sharing of information and the level of trust is very good, and it works 
both ways. The division commanders are wonderful and are very receptive to our suggestions. 

Finally, interviewees repeatedly expressed the opinion that the city police officers need more 
training in handing domestic violence cases. The following are some of the comments made by 
non-police interviewees regarding training: 

 Get the police more training. 
 Now when I go to the police department they say, oh no, not another domestic violence 
training. Weve had enough training. They may have had the training, but they are still 
not doing it right. Domestic violence is not going to go away, and we have to keep 
pecking at it so we can teach the new blood not to develop the resistance that is dying out 
with the old. 

Civilian interviewees continually expressed how important they felt police department 
participation is within the domestic violence service delivery system. For example, one 
interviewee stated, We share information  often they can find out things I cant, like whether 
someone has a criminal record. By working with the police, we provide better victim services by 
coordinating our response. We help the police understand the victims perspectives, and they 



help us with the legal issues. A representative from one agency put it this way, The police 
have greater access to the public than we do. If an officer goes with me to a home, the person is 
more likely to talk to me than if I went alone. 

The above discussion summarizes the views of the police departments response to domestic 
violence expressed through interviews by members of the domestic violence service delivery 
community. The opinions of non-police department interviewees were mixed. All interviewees 
approved of the departments presumptive arrest policy, and several spoke of positive working 
relationships between themselves and police personnel in patrol districts. Others, however, 
expressed frustration about what they perceived as the departments lack of commitment to 
domestic violence. These interviewees pointed to the absence of personnel actively involved in 
domestic violence case follow-up and investigation, the lack of police department collaboration 
and communication with other agencies involved in service delivery, and the inconsistency with 
which officers apply the presumptive arrest policy. Non-police department interviewees also 
lamented the absence of police involvement in the Domestic Violence Coordinating Committee. 
These interviewees believed that active police department involvement was essential for the 
inter-agency approach to be effective. 

Discussion 

Recommendations submitted to the Police Department 

Toward the end of the field-work of this project, the police department formed a domestic 
violence working group, called the Intimate Partner Initiative,  in partnership with the city 
prosecutors office and several other agencies The goal of this effort was to reduce the number of 



intimate partner homicides through increased timely prosecutions and increased public 
awareness about intimate violence and available assistance. In doing to, the initiative was to 
make a strong point to offenders that the city is taking intimate violence offences seriously. 

The Intimate Partner Initiative began meeting and drawing up a plan for implementing the 
changes deemed necessary to pursue these goals. A Police Foundation field researcher was 
invited to attend and subsequently began serving on the committee. After it became clear that 
the involvement and contributions of this researcher were encouraged, we developed a list of 
recommendations the department could make to improve intimate violence service delivery that 
were based on the interview data. This list is attached as an Appendix to this chapter. The 
recommendations fell into two categories: (1) those that could be implemented quickly and at a 
low cost, with the anticipation of immediate improved results, such as officers always taking 
photographs of injuries; and (2) more long-term solutions that may require money or at least 
additional manpower to implement, (e.g., the formation of a dedicated domestic violence 
investigative unit, or at the very least appointing a domestic violence point person within the 
department). 



Chapter 5 Appendix 


Recommendations for Police Department Responses 
To Personal Violence Between Intimates 



Police Foundation Logo

Recommendations for Police Department Responses to 
Personal Violence between Intimates 


March 2001 

The following is a summary list of recommendations that may inform the work of the 
Interpersonal Violence Reduction Team. It is based on domestic violence research conducted by 
the Police Foundation for the COPS Office of the Department of Justice. This work included 
interviews with police personnel in [study city] and elsewhere; interviews with officials from 
other community agencies; and a review of good practice from other areas. 

The recommendations are in two categories: (A) Simple, tangible, quick-return interventions, 
and (B) Longer-term measures. 

A. Quick-return interventions 

1. Monitored use of photographic evidence. Photographic evidence of violence can 
significantly increase the chances of batterers guilty pleas at court. The PD might 
consider requiring photos to be taken as a follow-up, a few days after a violent incident 
when bruising is more visible. This should be monitored to ensure implementation. 
2. Provision of information to victims. A card or leaflet listing current referral numbers 
could be adopted for mandatory distribution at incidents of domestic interpersonal 
violence. Officers would explain the resources and encourage victims to use them. The 
Second Responders have thousands of copies of a leaflet containing pertinent information 
for victims: numbers for hotlines, police precincts, social services, the YWCA, and more, 
which might be used or adapted for these purposes. 
3. Consistent use of dedicated 911 cell phones for victims. Recent technological 
developments mean that victims known to be at high risk can receive a prioritized, 
informed and incident-specific response from the police. Procedures/protocol to allow 
identification of high-risk victims, use and return of cell phones, and monitoring of use 
and responses, would facilitate this intervention. 
4. Involvement with the Domestic Violence Coordinating Committee. Routine PD 
participation would facilitate communication between agencies, and improve information 
sharing on policies, procedures, and cases. The aim would be to enhance service delivery 
to victims and offenders by all agencies involved. The PD would benefit from the 
cooperation and information from other agencies and from the kudos of consulting the 
community on these issues. 



B. Longer-term measures. 

1. A dedicated Domestic Violence Unit, Detectives, and/or Point Person. Due to the size of 
the intimate interpersonal violence problem, larger cities often have a specialized Domestic 
Violence Unit, dedicated domestic violence detectives, and a liaison person to work with 
agencies and the community: 
 A dedicated Unit could perhaps incorporate much of this work. It would need to be 
sufficiently staffed, and managed at a senior level (perhaps Deputy Chief) to avoid 
marginalization of domestic violence within the department. 
 Specialized Detectives could respond to and monitor cases from first call through 
investigation and prosecution, They could provide follow-up services with victims, monitor 
repeat offenders, and monitor police response (consistent adherence to policies and 
procedure). 
 A domestic violence Point Person could be appointed as a liaison with and contact point for 
other agencies and the community. 
2. Improved and consistent training for all police officers. Training should include understanding 
the needs and viewpoints of victims (to avoid revictimization) and familiarity with available 
resources (to better inform victims). All officers should understand criteria by which an arrest should 
be made. The department could require officers to carry a card listing these criteria, and require them 
to consult it at domestic violence incidents. 
3. Continual Monitoring of pro-arrest policies. Monitoring and control checks is a 
mechanism that can improve compliance with policy and consistency of application. Creating 
and maintaining a database of PD 109 Forms (and checking to ensure they are completed for 
all domestic violence calls) would facilitate this. The compliance of individual officers and 
the PD as a whole can then be monitored. 
4. A domestic violence database. Such a database could allow tracking of repeat callers, 
addresses, victims, and offenders. It could also allow cross-referencing between persons and 
places as well as being used to inform responding officers of the relevant history and 
information. Social Services have an existing database that may inform this work. 

There is a range of literature available on many of these subjects and others, addressing police responses 
to domestic violence. The Police Foundation would be happy to supply the Interpersonal Violence 
Reduction Team with copies of relevant articles upon request.  



Chapter 6 

Police Use of Dual Arrest in Intimate Assault Cases 

Erin Lane, M.P.M. 
and
Rachel Boba, Ph.D. 


POLICE FOUNDATION 


Prepared for the U.S. Department of Justice 
Office of Community Oriented Policing Services
Award #98DVWXK015 


June 2002 




Chapter 6: Police Use of Dual Arrest in Intimate Assault Cases 

Introduction 

In this chapter, we present exploratory findings on dual arrests for intimate partner assaults in the 
study city, which has a primary physical aggressor, presumptive arrest law in effect. Although 
we did not set out to examine the practice of dual arrests in the broader study of which this 
analysis is a part, our interest was peaked by local service providers who repeatedly expressed 
concern about this police action. 

Intimate partner assault refers to violence between male and female couples that are married, 
formerly married, have a child in common, or cohabit. Dual arrest is the arrest of both members 
of the couple and is applied by police officers when they find probable cause to believe an 
assault occurred but are unable to identify a single primary aggressor, or judge both parties to be 
culpable. Similar to other studies that have used police data to identify case characteristics 
correlated with arrest, this study uses supplementary domestic violence reports filled out by 
police officers to identify case characteristics associated with dual arrest. As with any police 
data, the reports available for this analysis are only a portion of the incidents that come to the 
attention of the police, which are only a portion of actual intimate violence. 

There are two components to this analysis. The first is a comparison between characteristics of 
intimate assault by three police actions: warrant, single arrest and dual arrest. We found that 
dual arrest is the least common police action occurring in about 7% of these cases. The 
demographic characteristics associated with dual arrest are more similar to those of arrest cases 



than to those in which a warrant is issued. By several measures, dual arrest cases appear to be 
some degree less serious than those where a single arrest is made. 

The second component uses logistic regression to determine what case and demographic 
characteristics are predictive of dual arrest in comparison to single arrest. Warrant cases were 
not considered for this analysis, in order to focus the analysis on the police decision to make a 
dual arrest instead of a single arrest. We found that the only significant variables were those 
pertaining to victim and offender substance use. In cases where the victim is suspected of having 
taken alcohol or drugs prior to the incident, dual arrest is over three times as likely. Two 
additional logistic regression models were tested to see whether dual arrest was predictive of 
officers obtaining emergency protective orders or collecting evidence. Dual arrest was not found 
to be predictive of these actions. 

Intimate Violence And Dual Arrest 

According to the book Violence in Families, Arrest for domestic violence is perhaps the beststudied 
intervention for family violence (Chalk & King, 1998: 174). Violence in Families 
discusses many studies on the effectiveness of arrest, beginning with the Minneapolis Domestic 
Violence Experiment (Sherman & Berk, 1984), and continuing through the Spouse Abuse 
Replication Program (SARP) studies that replicated it (Berk, Campbell, Klap, & Western, 1992; 
Dunford, Huizinga, & Elliott, 1990; Hirschel & Hutchinson, 1992; Pate & Hamilton, 1992; 
Sherman, Schmidt, Rogan, Smith, Gartin, Cohn, Collins, & Bacich, 1992). While the SARP 
studies, and others have examined whether and under what circumstances arrest is effective, they 
have produced contradictory and inconclusive results (Garner, Fagan, & Maxwell, 1995; 



Melton, 1999; Chalk & King, 1998). Whether this inconclusiveness is due to non-uniformity in 
the applied treatments used in the experiments or because arrest is an effective deterrent for 
certain types of people and situations and not others remains unclear. 

Despite inconclusiveness on the effectiveness of arrest, states have responded to the finding that 
arrest is the most effective deterrent to intimate violence by implementing mandatory arrest laws, 
and police department policies were changed accordingly. A 1997 national summary of 
domestic violence laws revealed that in 23 states arrest for domestic violence incidents is 
mandated in some or all circumstances, and that in an additional six states arrest is officially 
preferred (Institute for Law and Justice, 1997). At least one police department (Concord, NH) 
instituted a mandatory arrest policy independent of state laws (Holmes, 1993). As 
encouragement of police officers to make arrests in intimate violence situations continues, the 
desirability of mandatory arrest policies is being questioned, in part because their effectiveness is 
in doubt and in part because they are thought to effectuate dual arrests, which is considered by 
many to be a problematic outcome (Hamberger, 1997; Holmes, 1993; Law Enforcement News, 
2000; Martin, 1997). 

The underlying assumption of dual arrest is that assaults occur where there is probable cause to 
arrest both parties. On the surface, such a police response appears quite appropriate and useful, 
especially considering research from the 1980s using the Conflict Tactics Scale indicating 
women to have rates of relationship violence as high if not higher than men (Straus & Gelles, 
1990). Yet some advocates argue that acts of violence should be considered in context, rather 
than at face value and believe dual arrest often revictimizes battered women. They claim that 



many women arrested in dual arrest incidents are in fact battered women who participate in 
violence as self-defense or in response to an ongoing pattern of violence that they did not initiate. 
(Martin, 1997; Hamburger, 1997; Law Enforcement News, 2000). Further analysis of the 
Conflict Tactics Scale data supports the advocates claim, showing that although mens and 
womens rates of violence are similar, women tend to suffer more frequent and serious injuries 
from intimate violence (Gelles &Cornell, 1990). 

Additional justification for this view comes from a study by Hamberger (1997) who explored 
womens use of violence in intimate relationships, by studying the culpability of 52 female 
intimate violence arrestees. He found that (1) 51% of women reported that their partners had 
initiated the overall pattern of violence in their relationship, (2) 37% of women reported that 
their partner always initiated individual episodes of violence, 
(3) many of the women who acknowledged initiating violence more often than their partners 
noted that they had begun to use violence after many years of being victimized by their partners, 
and (4) 24 women in the sample reported self-defense/protection as a motivation for their 
violence. Hamberger concluded that 67% of the women in the sample do not appear to be 
husband beaters or mutual combatants. Rather, in many instances, they are, battered women 
who are fighting to defend themselves from an assault by their partners (Hamberger, 1997: 
125). 

While the intention of mandatory arrest policies is to protect victims by ensuring that police 
arrest perpetrators, detractors assert that in practice, officers have interpreted them to mean that 
they must arrest all parties who have engaged in any violence  even in self-defense. William 



Holmes comments, officers may find it easier to arrest both parties than to interpret poorly 
worded statutes or policies. On rare occasions, evidence may even show that the parties are 
mutual aggressors (Holmes, 1993: 105). His implication is that dual arrest is not warranted in 
the majority of cases in which it is applied. It may also be the case that the laws are so broad that 
they do not allow officers discretion in considering the context of the case when making arrest 
decisions. 

The question of how to handle the murkiness of an incident where both participants used 
violence, but perhaps unequally, is of concern to police agencies endeavoring to effectively and 
fairly address intimate violence. A December 2000 article in Law Enforcement News states: 

Reconsidering strategies for reducing domestic violence was on the agenda in a number 
of police agencies last year, particularly with regard to the practice of dual arrest. 
Growing out of mandatory-arrest policies established in the 1980s and early 90s, dual 
arrests often result in the inadvertent arrest of a battered woman who was fighting back 
against her attacker, victim advocates claim  and law enforcement has begun to agree 
with that finding. 

Another example is New Mexicos Violence Against Women Task Forces recommendation 
which comments, Dual arrest trivializes the seriousness of the offense. It may increase the 
danger to the victim because the next time it happens, she may not call the police for fear of 
being arrested herself (New Mexico, Office of the Attorney General, Violence Against Women 
Task Force, 8/17/2001). The federal governments concern about dual arrest is evident in 
solicitations from the Office of Justice Programs for Grants to Encourage Arrest Policies and 
Enforcement of Protection Orders which define eligible recipients as government entities that 
demonstrate that their laws, policies, or practices and their training programs discourage dual 
arrest of the offender and the victim (OJP, 2001). 


While concern about dual arrests is frequently expressed, very few efforts have been made to 
compare the characteristics of cases to which dual arrest is applied to those of other cases. Two 
of these, one conducted by the Connecticut Department of Public Safety and the other by an 
independent researcher, are based on Connecticut State data. Both projects differentiate cases 
resolved by dual arrest from those resolved by single arrest. 

The State of Connecticut Department of Public Safety (CDPS) framed their study of dual arrests 
in the executive summary of the report as follows: 

A major area of concern since the inception of the mandatory arrest requirement 
has been the effects of arrest of all parties involved in a family violence incident, 
or dual arrest. Every evaluation of the family violence law has devoted space to 
dual arrest and has cited it as cause for concern. None of the evaluation projects 
to date have included input from law enforcement as to why dual arrests are made 
and what impact Connecticuts reporting mechanism has on the rate of dual arrest. 

(p.1). 
The CDPS studied the application of dual arrests by analyzing arrest data to draw a comparison 
between dual arrest and single arrest incident characteristics and conducted police officer 
interviews to discern their opinions about mandatory arrest, dual arrest, and the training received 
in family violence.1 The arrest data revealed that in the three years following implementation of 
the mandatory arrest policy, the rate of dual arrests grew disproportionately to the increase in 
total family violence arrests. Analysis of police incident data revealed that dual arrest cases tend 
to be less serious, to involve cohabiting couples, and to involve offenders who are younger than 
those arrested in single arrest incidents. 

1 In this jurisdiction "family violence" generally was the concern, rather than intimate violence, 
which is the interest of the present paper. 



In a separate study, Margaret Martin (1997) examined dual arrest by analyzing a sample of 448 
family violence cases disposed in Connecticut state criminal courts, originating from police 
agencies throughout the state. Her study followed implementation of the statewide mandatory 
arrest policy and compared characteristics of intimate violence cases resulting in single arrest to 
those resulting in dual arrest. Martin found that defendants in dual arrest cases were more likely 
to be female, white, younger, cohabitors (living with but unmarried to partner), and to have less 
serious family violence arrest histories, as well as less serious current charges, than single arrest 
defendants. Dual arrest incidents were also more likely to involve alcohol or drugs and were less 
likely to result in a court conviction. Interestingly, there was evidence of prior victimization 
among 40% of female defendants in dual arrest cases, which lends support to the notion that the 
women arrested in dual arrest situations are likely to be victims themselves. 

The possibility that intimate violence victims may be harmed by policies established to protect 
them underscores the importance of understanding the true effects of policies such as mandatory 
arrest. According to the editors of Violence in Families, the cost and consequences of arrest 
policies merit consideration, specifically in terms of improper or unwarranted arrests (Chalk 
and King, 1998: 178). Quantifying and describing the phenomenon of dual arrests in specific 
localities and overall is important groundwork toward this goal. An evaluation of the Queens 
County, New York Arrest Policies Project includes a recommended strategy for addressing dual 
arrest stating, To best attack the problem, statistics on the extent and nature of dual arrests need 
to be developed (Miller, 1999: 17). While there is a wealth of expressed concern about dual 
arrest, so far there is little quantification and examination of the practice. 



Some states, such as California and Minnesota, have sought to decrease the use of dual arrest by 
including language discouraging it in legislation (National Council of Juvenile and Family Court 
Judges, 2001a; National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges, 2001b). Others such as 
Washington, Alabama, Wisconsin, and New York have modified their intimate violence statutes 
or policies to include directives about identifying a primary physical aggressor (Holmes 1993; 
Sutton, 1999; Alabama Coalition Against Domestic Violence, 2001), and in some cases 
(California), a primary dominant aggressor (National Council of Juvenile and Family Court 
Judges, 2001b). These localities direct officers, through law or policy, to conduct a primary 
aggressor analysis if more than one party in an intimate violence dispute claims to have been 
victimized. Elements of primary aggressor analyses differ, but include considerations such as 
(Alabama Coalition Against Domestic Violence, 2001; Sutton, 1999): 

 Prior complaints of domestic violence, 
 The relative severity of injuries to each person, 
 The likelihood of future injury to each person, 
 Whether one of the persons acted in self-defense, and 
 Consideration of the physical strength of the parties. 

Our analysis seeks to contribute to the discussion on dual arrest by providing an exploratory 
overview of its use in a presumptive arrest jurisdiction with primary aggressor language. 

The Present Analysis 

Using a database of domestic violence police reports, we compare characteristics of cases 
resolved by single arrest, dual arrest, and with a warrant,2 over a two-year period. This 
exploration has two components. First, a descriptive case study of the three officer actions in 


intimate violence incidents in a jurisdiction with a mandatory arrest, primary aggressor law in 
effect, comparing differences between cases addressed with the three possible police actions. 
Second, logistic regression analysis exploring whether certain demographic, history of violence, 
and incident characteristics explain dual arrest, and whether officers taking certain actions in 
handling intimate assault cases is explained by dual arrest. 


2 Police obtain warrants if the offender is not present during their investigation of the crime. In some cases, the 
victim obtains the warrant with or without the assistance of the officer. 

In our study site, violence between intimates was viewed as assault prior to July 1, 1991. That 
date marked the implementation of a new state code making assault against a family or 
household member a crime distinct from other assaults, with its own set of guidelines and 
penalties. The new code stated that officers may arrest without a warrant for an alleged crime 
against a family or household member regardless of whether the violation was committed in the 
officers presence, if the officer established probable cause to believe an offense occurred (State 
Code Section 19.2-81.3, A.). This gave officers permission to arrest for domestic violence 
misdemeanors they did not witness, removing a major restraint on their ability to address 
domestic violence. 

 In 1997, the laws changed again, when a presumptive arrest law was put into place, and the term 
primary physical aggressor introduced with section B of Code Section 19.2-81.3: A lawenforcement 
officer having probable cause to believe that a violationhas occurred shall arrest 
and take into custody the person he has probable cause to believe, based on the totality of the 
circumstances, was the primary physical aggressor unless there are special circumstances which 
would dictate a course of action other than an arrest [italics added]. Following these changes, 
officers were trained to identify primary physical aggressors and were provided guidelines for 
seeking emergency protective orders. 



Methodology and Data 

This analysis draws from domestic violence incident reports, referred to here as (DVRs), which 
officers are required to complete for all domestic violence incidents. The DVRs provide more 
detailed information than the standard criminal incident report, which officers fill out in addition 
to the DVR if a crime has been committed. Information on the DVR includes demographic, 
relationship, and address information on the parties involved; the location, date, and time, of the 
incident; police action taken, presence of children, apparent use of alcohol or drugs by either of 
the parties, weapon use, victim injuries, and whether protective orders were on file. 

In this study, we analyze intimate assaults among persons who are or were married, have a child 
in common, or cohabit.3 We eliminated cases that did not meet the states definition of domestic 
violence, such as violence between same-sex couples. We also eliminated cases where the type 
of police report submitted was other than assault or was unknown, to ensure that we were only 
considering incidents involving assaults, since assault is the predominate charge in intimate 
violence. Applying these steps to the data available to this project produced a database of 1,376 
intimate violence assaults reported to the police department between February 1, 1999, and 
March 31, 2001. This process is laid out in Appendix A. The data used in this analysis are also 
summarized in columns and rows and included as Appendices B and C respectively. 

3 Cohabitors refer here to unmarried couples who live together. 




Findings   

In order to establish a context for the intimate assault data, we compared the DVR data to 2000 
Census data, where possible, for the study city.  The comparison includes demographic data such 
as race and age of individuals as well as type of couple.  See Table 1.  

Table 1: Demographic Comparison between the Population of City  
and the Population of Reported Intimate Assaults 

			City-wide** 	Domestic violence victims 	Domestic violence offenders
Race		Black 	57.2% 		83.1% 				75.7% 
		White 	38.3% 		14.0% 				8.5% 
		Other 	4.5% 		2.0% 				2.8% 
		Unknown 0 		0.9% 				12.9% 

Relationship 	Spouse 	27.1% 		29.2% 				27.9% 
	Female householder 20.4% 	20.4%* 				N/A 

Median Age 		33.9		29.0				31.0* 

This is the percentage of female victims whose relationship to the offender was Child-in-Common." If these 
victims lived with the offender, they would be listed as cohabitors.  It is possible that some of these victims 
live with parents or others rather than heading a household, thus this should be considered only an estimate. 
**Source: 2000 Census data from the Census Website 

These comparisons revealed:

 As a share of the population in the city, blacks are over represented as both victims and 
offenders of intimate violence.  
 Based on the closest estimate that can be made, the percentage of spouses and female-
headed household in the database of intimate assaults is similar to that of city residents.  
 The median age of domestic violence victims is four years less than for the city 
population, and the median age of offenders is two years less.   

Focusing on the population of victims and offenders that comprise this analysis, it is notable how 
unevenly distributed offenders and victims are by race.  Blacks comprise the great majority of 
offenders.  Less than 10% of the offenders are white, and only 2.8% are neither black nor white



(other).  While, in the interest of describing the complete dataset, we present comparisons
between all three race groups, the uneven distribution  especially the small number of other race 
offenders  prevent us from drawing anything but speculative conclusions based on race.    

Three possible police responses to intimate assaults are distinguished in the data: warrant, single 
arrest, and dual arrest, and there are specific conditions under which each outcome generally is 
most likely to occur.  Officers obtain warrants when they find probable cause to believe that one 
person has assaulted another, but the person they have identified as the primary physical 
aggressor is not present at the scene.  When the identified primary physical aggressor is present 
in these circumstances, officers make single arrests. Officers make dual arrests when they have 
probable cause to believe an assault occurred and are unable to determine who is the primary 
aggressor.  Table 2 displays the distribution of police action across these three outcomes, in these 
data.  Dual arrest is the least common outcome, occurring in only 7.3% of reported intimate 
assaults.

Table 2.

Distribution of Police Outcomes 

			Frequency 	Percent 
Warrant 		581 		42.2 
Arrest 			694 		50.4 
Dual arrest 		101 		7.3 
Total 			1376		99.9*

*Percentages do not add to 100 due to rounding. 



Part 1: Comparisons Across Three Police Outcomes 
The first part of this analysis seeks to describe cases to which dual arrest is applied and to 
identify and explore any systematic differences between dual arrest cases and those addressed 
through single arrest or warrant.  To explore case variation by outcome, we present comparisons 
in five categories: (1) demographics, (2) history of violence, (3) case characteristics, (4) incident 
characteristics, and (5) police action.  These results are displayed and discussed below.   

A. Demographics 

The majority of cases in this database involve cohabiting black couples, where the offender is 
male and the victim female.  Ninety-four percent of cases involve male offenders and female 
victims.  The average age of victims is 31 and the average age of offenders is 33  a two-year 
difference that is consistent across all police outcome categories.  While the average age of 
offenders in dual and single arrest categories is the same, offenders in the warrant category are 
on average two years younger.  This difference is also true for victims.  Since many of the 
demographic variables are best described and understood in relation to one another or to other 
variables, the key findings are synthesized and discussed below. Tables displaying all of the 
frequencies and percentages by columns and rows are included in Appendices 2 and 3.   

Of the offenders whose race is known, 86.3 % of the offenders are black, 10.5 % are white, and 
3.2 % are of another race (other).  When examined by police action, an interesting difference 
emerges.  While single arrest was the most common outcome for cases involving black and white 
offenders, among black offenders, the percent disposed by single arrest and by warrant is almost 
equal, whereas among white offenders, the percentage of cases disposed by arrest is much higher 
than the percentage where a warrant was issued. Similarly, the percentage of whites to whom 



dual arrest is applied is greater than that of blacks and other race offenders.  Police outcomes for 
other race offenders are more similar to cases involving black offenders than to white offenders, 
but again, since there were only 41 offenders of other races, 21 who received a warrant, 19 who 
were arrested, and one who was dual arrested, generalizations about this group are tentative.  
Below are three pie charts that display the police outcome by race of offender.     

Figure : 1 Police Outcome by Race of Offender

Black: N= 1,101
Warrant 44%
Arrest 49%
Dual Arrest 7%

White: N= 134
Warrant 24%
Arrest 66%
Dual Arrest 10%

Other Race: N= 41
Warrant 51%
Arrest 46%
Dual Arrest 3%

Since warrant issuance is an outcome applied when the offender is not present during police 
service, these race differences by arrest (single and dual) and warrant may indicate that there is a 
relationship between offender race and offender presence, perhaps through the type of 


relationship with the victim.  For example, couples in certain relationships more often live 
together, such as spouses versus former spouses.  Offenders living with the victim may be more 
likely to be present during police service, compared to offenders who have a home elsewhere.  In 
a study of police action in 189 domestic violence calls, Lynette Feder found that offenders not 
present during police service were more likely to be unmarried (Feder, 1996).  She also found 
that police arrested 44% of offenders who were present when they arrived, and only 8% who 
were not.  We believe it is reasonable to assume that this is the case in the analysis.  Below, we 
explore the relationship between these variables. 

Four, not necessarily mutually exclusive, victim-offender relationships exist in these data, which, 
in a hierarchy from most to least formal, are spouse, former spouse, cohabitants, and child-in 
common.  Clearly, it is possible for any of the couples to have a child in common, not just the 
child-in-common group.  Cases that fit more than one category were placed in the most formal 
category into which they fit.  For example, if a couple has a child together and lives together, 
they would be classified as cohabitors.    

The largest relationship category in these data is cohabitors, who account for 50% of all cases. 
The next largest relationship category is married couples (29% of all cases), then child-in-
common (20%), and the smallest category is former spouses, who accounted for less than 1% of 
cases.  Although the largest share of offenders in all race categories are cohabitors, a greater 
percentage of whites and other race offenders are married than are blacks, while blacks have a 
greater percentage of child-in-common relationships.  Table 3 displays these results. 



Table 3:Victim-Offender Relationship by Race of Offender  

			Black 		White 		Other		Total 
			% 	N 	% 	N 	% 	N 	% 	N 
Spouse 			25.6 	282 	41.0 	55 	41.5 	17 	27.7 	354 
Former Spouse 		.4 	4 	1.5 	2 	4.9 	2 	.6 	8 
Cohabitors 		52.4 	577 	50.0 	67 	51.2 	21 	52.1 	665 
Child in Common 	21.6 	38 	7.5 	10 	2.4 	1 	19.5 	249 

To explore the intersection of race, type of relationship, offender presence during police service, 
and arrest, we assume that spouses and cohabitors live together and that former spouses and 
couples designated as child-in-common do not.  Under this assumption, approximately 78% of 
black offenders, 91% of white offenders, and 93% of other race offenders live together.   

The offender was present in 51% of all cases.  Differences among the race groups are apparent in 
that of cases with black offenders, the offender was present 50% of the time, white offenders, 
62%, and other race, 45 %.  Table 4 displays the results of these variables by race, relationship, 
whether victim and offender live together, and arrest. 


Table 4: 

Relationship, Offenders Presence, and Arrest by Race 

	Relationship			Offender	Offender 	Offender
					lives with	present during	arrested (single
					victim		police service	or dual)

Black	Spouse		25.6% 		78.0% 		50.2% 		56.0%
	Cohabitor       52.4%
	Former Spouse     .4% 
	Child in Common 21.6%  

White	Spouse          41.0% 		91.0% 		61.8% 		76.0% 
	Cohabitor       50.0% 
	Former Spouse    1.5%  
	Child in Common  7.5% 

Other	Spouse          41.5% 		92.7% 		45.2% 		49.0%
	Cohabitor       51.2% 
	Former Spouse    4.9% 
	Child in Common  2.4%  
A lower proportion of black offenders live with the victim, are present during police service, and 
are arrested, than are whites.  Other race offenders are similar to whites in terms of living with 
the victim, but are not in terms of being present for police service and being arrested.  Thus, the 
relationship between these variables appears to work similarly for blacks and whites, but not for 
offenders of other race.  These findings should be considered cautiously, however, because of the 
unequal racial distribution of the data, in particular the small number of offenders of other races.
On the surface, there does not seem to be a direct relationship between race and officers arrest 
decisions; the more important variable seems to be presence during police service, which is 
directly related to arrest across all three race groups. 

In sum, we found average age of single and dual arrest victims and single and dual arrest 
offenders to be more similar to each other than to victims and offenders respectively in cases 
where a warrant was issued.  In warrant cases, victims and offenders are on average two years 


younger than their respective single and dual arrest counterparts.  Police outcome differences by 
race are interesting.  A greater percentage of whites than blacks or other race offenders are single 
or dual arrested.  This may be because a greater percentage of whites are present during police 
service. Racial differences by arrest were also true for dual arrest, while warrant cases again, had 
a different offender make-up.   The distribution of single and dual arrest offenders across types 
of relationships also tended to be more similar than the relationship distribution of warrant cases.    

Based on all the of these demographic measures the characteristics of single and dual arrest are 
more similar to each other than to cases where a warrant is issued.   Regarding dual arrest cases 
specifically, cohabitors have the highest proportion of dual arrests, and in terms of race, whites 
have the highest proportion of dual arrests.  Again, readers are cautioned that the small number 
of dual arrest cases as well as those involving offenders of other races greatly limit the 
conclusions that can be made.

B. History of violence
In differentiating the types of cases more often ending in dual arrest, one question is whether 
dual arrest is generally applied more often in cases where there is a history of violence.  This 
may suggest whether dual arrest is being applied to cases where both parties are using violence 
equally, or, whether it is being applied to parties who acted in self-defense.  If there is a history 
of violence in the relationship, then dual arrest may be more likely a result of self-defense by one 
of the parties. Variables such as whether protective orders were in place (either emergency, 
preliminary, or permanent), or whether the offender has been arrested for domestic violence in 
the past are indications of this  at least indications of past incidents that have come to the 


attention of police.  Given that so much intimate violence is not reported, there are likely many 
other cases in this analysis whose histories of violence are not reflected in these variables.  Even 
if the data were considered complete, since the results of this analysis are ambiguous, no 
conclusions are drawn.

Of the three outcome categories, dual arrest cases have the lowest percentage of protective orders 
in place (4.0%), which could indicate less serious history of violence.  The percentages of 
warrant and arrest cases where protective orders were in place are almost identical (6.4% and 
6.8% respectively).  As displayed in Table 5, most cases had no prior arrests.  The range among 
those that did have prior arrests is 1-15.

Table 5: 

Offenders Prior Intimate Violence Arrests 

		Warrant 	Single Arrest 	Dual Arrest 	Total  
		% 	N 	% 	N 	% 	N 	% 	N 
	None 	77.9 	441 	69.9 	485 	73.0 	73 	73.5 	999 
	One 	14.1 	80 	18.3 	127 	15.0 	15 	16.3 	222 
	Two 	4.8 	27 	8.1 	56 	9.0 	9 	6.8 	92 
Three or more 	3.2 	18 	3.7 	26 	3.0 	3 	3.5 	47 

In terms of prior arrests, dual arrest cases appear more similar to single arrest cases than to 
warrant cases.  The average number of prior arrests among dual arrest cases is .46 and the 
average among single arrest cases is .52.  Warrant cases have an average of .34 prior arrests  the 
lowest of the three.  However, an Anova test on the difference between these means showed 
them not to be significantly different.   



C. Incident characteristics 

To identify the types of incidents in which officers are most likely to arrest both parties, the 
following topics were explored: whether an aggravated or simple assault charge was filed 
(indicating seriousness of incident), substance use by the victim, the offender, both, neither; 
weapon use; what offense the victim alleged; whether the aggressor was present; whether 
children witnessed the incident; and whether medical treatment was administered.  

Aggravated or simple assault 
Officers can classify assaults as simple or aggravated, depending on the seriousness.  Officers 
classified 7.3% of single arrest cases and 6.2% of warrant cases as the more serious type of 
assault, aggravated. Far fewer (3.0%) dual arrest cases were classified as aggravated.    

Substance use 
The DVR contains several questions pertaining to victim and offender substance use.  It asks 
officers to record whether there is evidence of alcohol and or drug use for each member of the 
party.  Since officers recorded very little drug use, suspected drug use was combined with 
suspected alcohol use into a substance use variable for the victim and for the offender.  A third 
variable was created indicating whether both parties were suspected of using substances.  Table 6 
displays these results. 

For all categories, officers reported that 17% of victims appeared to have used substances prior 
to the incident and 34% of offenders.  At least one party appeared to have used substances in 
39% of all cases.  Both the victim and the offender appeared to have used substances in 12.5% of 



all cases.  In 61%, neither party appeared to have used substances.  It is likely that offender 
substance use for the warrant outcome is less accurate than the others, because in many of these 
cases the offender was not at the scene.  Officers may have reported offender substance use 
based on statements made by the victims, who might be disinclined to report drug use.  

Table 6: 
Offender Substance Use 

		Warrant 	Single Arrest 	Dual Arrest 	Total  
		% 	N 	% 	N 	% 	N 	% 	N 
Victim 		9.0 	52 	20.9 	145 	38.6 	39 	17.2 	236 
Offender 	26.2 	152 	41.4 	287 	35.6 	36 	34.5 	475 
Both 		6.0 	35 	15.9 	110 	26.7 	27 	12.5 	172 
Neither 	70.9 	412 	53.6 	372 	52.5 	53 	61.0 	837 

It is notable that of the three outcome categories, dual arrest has the greatest percentage of cases 
where both offender and victim appeared to have used substances prior to the incident.   The 
relationship between dual arrest and suspected substance use by the victim will be explored later 
in the logistic regression section.   

Weapon use 
Officers recorded weapon use in several categories on the DVR: gun, knife, hands and feet, and 
other.  Other includes a range of objects such as vehicles, telephones, hammers, belts, bats, and 
even a baby monitor handset.  Since hands and feet were used in almost every case, this variable 
was not considered.  Overall, a weapon  other than hands and feet  was only used in 12.5% of 
all cases.  Dual arrest was the police outcome category with the highest rate of weapon use, 
followed by single arrest, then warrant (see Table 7).   



Table 7:  
Weapon Use 

Variable	Warrant 	Single Arrest 	Dual Arrest 	Total  
		% 	N 	% 	N 	% 	N 	% 	N 
Gun 		.9% 	5 	2.0% 	14 	1.0% 	1 	1.5% 	20 
Knife 		2.8% 	16 	3.5% 	24 	6.9% 	7 	3.4% 	47 
Other 		8.3% 	48 	7.8% 	54 	8.9% 	9 	8.1% 	111 
Any 		11.7% 	68 	12.8% 	89 	14.9% 	15 	12.5% 	172

Alleged offense 
Simple and aggravated assault were the official charges filed by the police, but on the DVR, 
officers also record what offense(s) was alleged by the victim.  Physical assault was by the 
predominant alleged offense, claimed in 97.3% of cases.  In the remaining 2.7% of cases, victims 
alleged that another offense had been committed by the offender, such as sexual assault, property 
crime, psychological abuse, or offense against a child.  In some cases victims claimed that more 
than one type of offense had been committed; thus the alleged offenses total more than 100% 
across the outcome categories.  These results are displayed in Table 8 on the following page.  
Because there are so few cases where an offense other than physical has been alleged, no 
conclusions about the alleged offense and police outcome are drawn. 

Table 8: 
Offense Alleged by Victim 

Variable		Warrant 	Single Arrest 	Dual Arrest 	Total  
			% 	N 	% 	N 	% 	N 	% 	N 
Physical assault 	96.6 	561 	97.8 	679 	98.0 	99 	97.3 	1339 
Sexual assault 		.2 	1 	0 	0 	0 	0 	.1 	1 
Property crime 		1.7 	10 	1.3 	9 	1.0 	1 	1.5 	20 
Psychological  		1.4 	8 	2.2 	15 	3.0 	3 	1.9 	26 
Offense against child 	.2 	1 	.4 	3 	0 	0 	.3 	4 
Other offense 		.9 	5 	1.7 	12 	0 	0 	1.2 	17 



Children witnessed incident 
Overall, children witnessed 42.8% of the incidents examined here.  This percentage is virtually 
the same across police outcome categories.     

Medical treatment received 
Police reported that medical treatment was administered at the scene or at a hospital after the 
incident in 15.6% of all cases. In an additional 6%, victims reported to officers that they planned 
to see their personal physician.  Cases where warrants were issued had the highest rate of 
receiving medical treatment (17%) closely followed by cases where arrest was made (14.8%).  A
marginally lower rate of medical treatment received (12.8%) was observed among the dual arrest 
cases compared to arrest cases, which could indicate that these cases were generally less serious.  

D. Police action 
The type of discretionally action officers take in intimate violence cases is a useful gauge for 
assessing officers perceptions of the crime.  Variables in this database that capture officer 
discretionary actions are whether they collected evidence and whether they obtained an 
emergency protective order (EPO) for the victim.  

Overall, some type of evidence, such as statements, photographs, 911 tapes, or hospital records 
was collected in 16.3% of cases.  Dual arrest cases had the lowest rate of evidence collection (see 
Table 9). 


Table 9: 

			Evidence Collected 
Variable	Warrant 	Single Arrest 	Dual Arrest 	Total  
		% 	N 	% 	N 	% 	N 	% 	N 
Statements 	6.0 	35 	6.3 	44 	4.0 	4 	6.0 	83 
Photographs 	7.9 	46 	9.2 	64 	7.9 	8 	8.6 	118 
911 Tapes 	0 	0 	.1 	1 	0 	0 	.1 	1 
Hospital records 1.2 	7 	.4 	3 	0 	0 	.7 	10 
Other 		.02 	2 	.06 	8 	.1 	2 	.1 	12 
Any 		15.5 	90 	17.3 	120 	13.9 	14 	16.3 	224 

Officers obtained EPOs in 25.7% of cases overall.  While they obtained them in close to the 
same percentage of warrant (27.4%) and single arrest (25.9%) cases, they did so at the lowest 
level for dual arrest cases (13.9%).  It is not surprising that dual arrest cases have the lowest level
of EPOs, in fact is surprising that there are any in this group.  It indicates that in 13.9% of dual 
arrest cases, the officer was concerned for the safety of one party, even though that party was 
perceived to have committed a violent crime for which they were arrested.   
The previous analysis seeks to differentiate characteristics of intimate assault handled by police 
through warrants, arrest, and dual arrest.  Based on the data, interpretations are offered as to the 
seriousness of dual arrest cases compared to those where an arrest was made or a warrant issued.
These interpretations are highly speculative and limited, because they are based on just a few 
variables which may not be the most relevant ones, and because of the uneven distribution of 
cases in certain of the variable categories.   

In terms of comparing demographic, history of violence, and incident characteristics by police 
outcome, these data indicate that the demographic conditions under which dual arrests are made 
resemble those of arrest more closely than those of warrant.  In terms of case seriousness, dual 


arrest cases appear to be less serious than those resulting in arrest or warrant, in that dual arrest 
cases have the lowest percentage classified as aggravated assault.  Based on history of violence, 
the results are ambiguous, but dual arrest cases appear to have a less serious history than those of 
warrants, and single arrest.  In a slightly higher percentage of dual arrest incidents, a weapon was 
used, compared to the other two outcomes.

Part 2:  Analysis of Dual Arrests Through Logistic Regression 
Dual arrests occur when the police believe both parties participated in the violence and when 
they are unable to identify the primary physical aggressor.  As noted earlier, dual arrest was the 
outcome in 101 of the cases in the sample of 1,376 cases, which is 7.3 %.  While it was the least 
common specified outcome, dual arrests nonetheless accounted for 13.6 % of all arrests in the 
sample, since each incident produced two arrests.

Now that we have presented descriptive data comparing case characteristics of warrant, single 
arrest, and dual arrest, we focus our analysis further by comparing characteristics of single arrest 
cases to those of dual arrest, since these outcomes occur under similar conditions  in both cases 
the offender is present during police service.  This allows for the analysis to be focused on police 
decision making.   

To examine the influence of demographic, history of violence, and incident characteristics, on 
the police decision to make a dual arrest, and since dual arrest events are relatively rare, we use 
logistic regression to examine characteristics associated with dual arrest.  We used the backward 
likelihood method as this is the stepwise method recommended by Andy Field in his SPSS 
statistics textbook (Field, 2000). Stepwise was used to allow us an additional way to compare the 



importance of individual variables.  Using this method, we ran three models with three different 
dependent variables: dual arrest, whether police collected evidence, and whether Emergency 
Protective Orders were obtained.  In the first model we tested whether any of the demographic 
and case characteristic variables explained dual arrest, and in the latter two models we tested 
whether dual arrest explained whether police obtained evidence then whether the police obtained 
an Emergency Protective Order.  In each case the models were run with each set of independent 
variables (demographic, history of violence, and incident characteristics) separately, and then 
together as a full model.  This allowed us to see whether dual arrest is a predictor of either police 
action.  Results of these regression models are displayed and discussed below. 

For each of the three models, we report the Nagelkerke R2, the overall Chi2 , degrees of freedom, 
-2 Log Likelihood, goodness of fit, and the percent correct overall.  Two demographic variables 
are included: relationship of couple, and race of offender.  The relationship variable is dummy 
coded, using spouse as the reference category, so statistics for each of the other categories are 
reported in comparison to the spouse category.  For race, we used black as the reference category 
because the vast majority of offenders were black; thus, white and other race is reported in 
comparison to blacks.  Overall, we found that models did not result in strong goodness of fit 
scores or high R2s; however, in each model there were a few interesting findings worthy of 
discussion.

Model 1: Using Demographic, Case, and Incident Characteristics to Predict Dual Arrest  
In this model, dual arrest is the dichotomous dependent variable, coded as one if there was a dual 
arrest, and zero if there was a single arrest.  A range of explanatory variables is used to describe


demographic, history of violence, and incident characteristics, so that any variables associated 
with dual arrest can be identified.  Regressions for each of these sets of variables, as well as for 
the complete model, are presented below.  

Neither demographic variables, nor history of violence variables are predictors of whether the 
police make a dual arrest, and none of the variables in either group is individually significant.  
Clearly, most of the predictive power of these variables is in the incident characteristics category.  
The model for incident characteristics explains only, 5.9% of the variance in dual arrest, but two 
variables pertaining to suspected substance use are statistically significant.  Dual arrest was 3.3 
times as likely in cases where the victim is suspected of using substances (p<.01), and about half 
as likely when the offender is suspected of using substances (p<.05).  The full model is a better 
fit but the only significant variables remain those pertaining to victim and offender suspected 
substance use.  These results are displayed in Table 10 on the following page.  


Table 10:

				Dependent variable: Dual Arrest  
		Demographics 		Case Characteristics 	Incident Characteristics 	Full model  
		N= 738 			N= 795 			N= 756 				N= 704  
		R2= .006 		R2= .003 		R2= .059 			R2= .073  
		Chi2= 4.6 		Chi2= 1.48 		Chi2= 23.75 			Chi2= 28  
		B Wald sig. Odds 	B Wald sig. Odds 	B Wald sig. Odds 		B Wald sig. Odds 
Demographic 
characteristics
Former Spouse 	-3.9 .09 .75 .02        							-3.4 .07 .78 .03 
Cohabitants 	.18 .50 .48 1.2         							.22 .67 .41 1.2 
Child in Common -.38 .81 .37 .68         							-.18 .16 .68 .83 
White 		-.04 .02 .89 .98         							-.17 .24 .62 .83 
Other 		-1.1 1.1 .30 .34         							-.83 .62 .43 .44 
History of violence 
Prior arrests     			-.55 1.1 .29 .57     					-.20 .02 .90 .99 
Protective order in place     		-.04 .16 .69 .96     					-.30 .30 .58 .74 
Incident characteristics 
Victim substance use         					1.12 19.9 .00** 3.3 		1.2 18.4 .00** 3.3 
Offender substance use         					-.64 5.9 .02* .53 		-.59 4.6 .03* .55 
Any weapon used         					.21 .42 .52 1.2 		.31 .86 .35 1.4 
Medical attention given         				.02 .00 .96 1.0 		-.29 .50 .48 .75 
Aggravated assault filed         				-1.2 3.2 .07 .31 		-.95 2.0 .15 .38  
                
Degrees of freedom 5 			2 			5 				12 
-2 Log likelihood  565.96 		603.8 			543.97 				510.11 
Goodness of fit    734.22 		794.90 			746.23 				686.70 
Percent Correct total 86.9 		87.3 			87.5 				87.2 

Notes: 
** P<.01 
*  P<.05 



Model 2: Using Emergency Protective Order as the Dependent Variable 

Using demographic, history of violence, and case incident, variables to predict whether police 
obtained an Emergency Protective Order produced a relatively weak model, although, of the 
three full models presented here, it has the highest R2 (17%).  Since this analysis focuses on 
dual arrest, we present only the full model rather than also including the partial models in 
which dual arrest is not included (see Table 11 below).

Table 11:

Dependent Variable: Emergency Protective Order Obtained  
					N= 704  
					R2= .17  
					Chi2= 87.19  
					B 	Wald 	sig. 	Odds 
Demographic characteristics 
Former Spouse 				-3.9 	.28 	.59 	.02 
Cohabitants 				-.37 	3.1 	.08 	.69 
Child in Common 			-.56 	2.7 	.09 	.57 
White 					.32 	1.4 	.23 	1.4 
Other 					-1.3 	2.7 	.09 	.25 
History of violence 
Prior arrests 				.06 	.73 	.39 	1.1 
Protective order in place 		2.6	47.8 	.00** 	12.6 
Incident characteristics 
Victim substance use 			-.37 	2.2 	.14 	.69 
Offender substance use 			.42 	4.1 	.04* 	1.5 
Any weapon used 			-.14 	.22 	.64 	.86 
Medical attention given 		-.15 	.20 	.65 	.86 
Aggravated assault filed 		.04 	.01 	.92 	1.0 
Dual Arrest 				-.49 	2.3 	.13 	.61     

Degrees of freedom 			13 
-2 Log likelihood 			693.39 
Goodness of fit 			703.77 
Percent correct of total 		79.26 
Note: 
*  P<.01 
** P<.05


The single strongest predictor of having an EPO obtained is whether a protective order was 
already in place.  This increased the likelihood of obtaining an EPO 12.6 times (P<.01).  Whether 
the offender was suspected of using substances was also significant (P<.05), and increased the 
likelihood 1.5 times. Notably, several demographic variables were almost significant.  In 
comparison to cases involving spouses, all others were less likely to have EPOs obtained. We 
were especially interested in whether dual arrest was a predictor of officers obtaining EPOs.  
This analysis indicates that EPOs are less likely to be obtained in dual arrest situations, but the 
difference is not significant.  Overall, officers were 12.6 times more likely to obtain EPOs when 
protective orders were already in place and were about 1.5 times more likely to do so if the 
offender was suspected of using substances.   

Model 3: Using Whether Officers Collected Any Evidence as the Dependent Variable         
When regressed against whether officers collected any evidence, these same demographic, 
history of violence, and incident variables produce an R2of 8%, indicating a relatively weak 
model.  The regression results are displayed in Table 12 on the next page. 

The strongest predictor of officers collecting evidence is whether medical attention was 
administered, which increased the likelihood of officers collecting evidence 2.2 times (P<.01).  
Having protective orders in place also doubles the odds of officers collecting evidence.  
Interestingly, the other history of violence variable, whether the offender had been arrested
before for domestic violence, is almost significant, but in the opposite direction, indicating that 
officers may be less likely to collect evidence in cases where they are aware of prior intimate 


violence arrests.  As with EPOs, dual arrest was inversely related to whether police collected any 
evidence, but was not significant.  

Table 12:

				Dependent Variable: Evidence Collected  
				N= 704  
				R2= .08  
				Chi2= 38.22  
				B 	Wald 	sig. 	Odds 
Demographic characteristics
Former Spouse 			1.4 	1.2 	.27 	4.2 
Cohabitants 			-.16 	.46 	.49 	.85 
Child in Common 		.52 	2.4 	.12 	1.7 
White 				.45 	2.4 	.12 	1.6 
Other 				.45 	.61 	.43 	1.6 
History of violence  
Prior arrests 			-.25 	3.5 	.06 	.78 
Protective order in place 	.76 	4.4 	.04* 	2.1 
Incident characteristics 
Victim substance use 		.34 	1.6 	.20 	1.4 
Offender substance use 		-.04 	.03 	.87 	.96 
Any weapon used 		.28 	.93 	.33 	1.3 
Medical attention given 	.78 	6.9 	.00** 	2.2 
Aggravated assault filed 	.41 	1.1 	.29 	1.5 
Dual arrest 			-.18 	.28 	.59 	.84 

Degrees of freedom 		13 
-2 Log likelihood 		604.68 
Goodness of fit 		707.22 
Percent correct of total 	83.38 
Note: 
*  P<.01 
** P<.05 

Discussion
Since presumptive and mandatory arrest laws have taken hold, dual arrests have become a more 
common outcome in domestic violence incidents.  This has raised concern among advocates as 
well as police who want to ensure that, to the extent possible, police action protects victims by 


inhibiting revictimization.  Many have expressed concern, however, that dual arrests are being 
applied to victims who acted in self-defense rather than to co-combatants.   

While answering this question is beyond the scope of this study, as the data do not allow for such 
specific conclusions to be drawn, it is possible to speculate based on comparisons between cases 
with different police outcomes.   This first set of comparisons is between all three police 
outcomes and is descriptive.  Second, logistic regression is used to compare cases to which dual 
arrest and single arrest are applied, to ascertain which variables are the best predictors of dual 
arrest.  The logistic regression analysis excludes cases where a warrant was issued instead of an 
arrest being made to focus on the police decision between dual and single arrest.          
 
Dual arrest cases appear in general to be relatively less serious than those where a single arrest is 
made in that, compared to single arrest and warrant cases, they are less often classified as 
aggravated assault, involve medical treatment, or have protective orders in place; however, they 
have about the same average number of prior arrests.  Since advocates worry that dual arrest is 
applied to particularly serious cases where one party if driven to violence in self-defense, and 
these data indicate dual arrest cases to generally be less serious, our data do not support the 
advocates concerns.  However, we must once again caution against drawing definitive 
conclusion from these data.

The logistic regression indicates that overall, the variables included do not fit and are not found 
to be strong predictors of dual arrest.  The two variables that are significant are suspected 
substance use by the victim and by the offender.  Suspected victim substance use tripled the odds 


of dual arrest.   Since dual arrest is applied when officers cannot determine who is most to blame, 
this may indicate that victim intoxication increases the chance that officers view both parties as 
sharing substantial responsibility.  While it is understandable that substance use by both parties 
might indicate mutual guilt to officers, these data do not explain officers decision making.  We 
do not know whether the officers decided upon dual arrest due to true ambiguity, or whether the 
fact that both parties appeared to be using substances was interpreted as mutual responsibility.  
The authors feel that the possibility that officers interpret intoxication to mean complicity in 
violence is important to investigate, as it could have serious negative ramifications for victims. 

To explore the relationship between dual arrest and police action, two additional logistic 
regression models were run with dual arrest as a predictor variable (1) of whether emergency 
protective orders were obtained, and (2) of whether the police collected evidence.  These police 
officer actions are somewhat discretionary, and thus may indicate how serious officers perceive 
these incidents to be.  Dual arrest was not found to be a significant predictor of getting an EPO, 
though this model was the strongest of the three.  The strongest predictor for obtaining EPOs, 
was whether other protective orders were in place at the time, which increased the likelihood 
12.6 times. This makes sense, because if a police officer is informed that protective orders are in 
place, he or she would be expected to consider the case more serious.  Interestingly, an 
offenders record of past intimate violence arrests known to officers is not found to be a predictor 
of whether officers obtain EPOs.  One would think that these cases would appear more serious 
and thus merit EPOs.


In addition, dual arrest was not a predictor of collecting evidence.  Whether medical attention 
was administered was the strongest predictor, which more than doubled the chances of officers 
obtaining evidence.  This outcome is not surprising.  In cases where medical attention is 
administered, either at the scene, or after the victim is transferred from the site by ambulance, 
clearing the call takes much longer, giving the officer more time to collect evidence.  

Additionally, cases where medical attention is given may be the cases most likely to go to court 
where evidence will be needed by the prosecutors.  The fact that the single most common form 
of evidence collected is photographic also may explain this outcome.  Even though photographs 
of property damage or disarray can also be evidence, officers may be more inclined to take 
pictures of visible injuries than property damage, and visible injuries are probably more common 
in victims to whom medical attention is administered.  

One of the most interesting findings in this model is that measures of history of violence are 
contradictory.  One would expect officers to take incidents more seriously and thus to collect 
evidence if there is a history of violence.  This seems to be the case when protective orders are in 
place, where the likelihood of evidence collection more than doubles.  However, in cases where 
the offender has prior arrests for domestic violence, the likelihood of officers collecting evidence 
decreases (odds ratio .78).   One possible interpretation for this is that in cases where officers are 
aware that there are past offenses, officers may feel that the couple is resistant to outside 
assistance and that additional efforts may be ineffectual.


Conclusion
Of vital concern to law enforcement, victim advocates, and the community at large is ensuring 
that current responses to intimate violence do not revictimize the victim.  The question has 
been raised that dual arrest may do just that, by arresting individuals, who, though they 
participated in violence, did so in self-defense and are more accurately classified as victims than 
offenders.  Ascertaining to what extent, if any, this is the case is important in evaluating law 
enforcements response to intimate violence and specifically, its success at assisting and 
protecting victims.  Distinguishing the types of cases in which dual arrest is most likely to be 
applied by officers may not answer this question directly or decisively, but we believe it has 
some utility for shedding light on it.  This is the approach we have employed in the present 
analysis.  Here we have sought to describe characteristics of dual arrest in comparison with those 
resulting in other police outcomes.  We have also conducted analysis to determine whether 
certain case characteristics are predictive of dual arrest.  Based on our data, cases to which dual 
arrest is applied appear to be somewhat less serious. 

We feel that much more needs to be done in this area to replicate as well as expand on our 
findings.  Ideally, further analysis would use a dataset that includes more dual arrest cases to 
allow for greater sensitivity in detecting patterns among dual arrest cases.  We also believe it 
would be useful to compare a dual arrest analysis based on a primary aggressor jurisdiction, such 
as this one, to one based on a non primary aggressor jurisdiction.  In the absence of further 
research on the dual arrest outcome, dual arrests will continue to be made, yet it will be unknown 
whether intended law enforcement goals are being achieved, or whether victims are being 
revictimized by the system that has been sent to help.  Continuing when so much is unknown 


is risking missing opportunities to help victims as well as increasing the chance that victims 
will become alienated from what may be the best protection available to them.  


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Chapter 6 Appendix A 

Data Cleaning Table


Reason for Deletion
Number of records deleted

Entered in database twice.  
110 
The relationship between the offender and victim was non-intimate. 
112 
The relationship was boyfriend/girlfriend  not included in VA code. 
17 
Relationship was noted by officer as unknown.* 
8 
The case accounted for two reports because it was a dual arrest.** 
14 
Police outcome listed as No arrest.  
182 
Police outcome listed as unknown or blank. 
99 
Victim and offender same sex. 
8 
Sex of offender could not be established. 
64 
Type of report not indicated. 
73 
Type of report other than assault (couldn't be recoded). 
13 
Number of cases remaining for analysis 
1,376 

*We deleted cases where the officer recorded the relationship as unknown to ensure that we were only considering 
cases between intimate or past intimate couples.    
**When dual arrests are made, each arrest is assigned its own incident number.  Most officers report dual arrests 
by recording both incident numbers on the same PD 109, since there is a space designated for that purpose.  Some 
officers report dual arrests by completing two forms, one for each offender.  For consistency, we removed from the 
database the second report, leaving us with exactly one record per incident.   


Chapter 6 Appendix B 
Table of Data Used for Analysis in Columns



Percent of Victims and Offenders in Various Demographic Categories by Outcome 

Variable 		Warrant 		Single Arrest 		Dual Arrest 		Total 
			% 	N 		% 	N 		% 	N 		% 	N 
Sex of Offender 
Male 			96.6% 	561 		93.2% 	647 		N/A 	N/A 		93.8% 	1291 
Female 			3.4% 	20 		6.8% 	47 		N/A 	N/A 		6.2% 	85 
Race of Offender 
Black 			90.1% 	485 		83.2% 	534 		85.4% 	82 		86.3% 	1101 
White 			5.9% 	32 		13.9% 	89 		13.5% 	13 		10.5% 	134 
Other 			3.9% 	21 		3.0% 	19 		1.0% 	1 		3.2% 	41 
Average Age 
Average victim age 	29.2 	(559) 		32.4 	(673) 		32.8 	(99) 		31 	(1331) 
Average offender age 	30.6 	(521) 		34.7 	(645) 		34.6 	(95) 		33 	(1261) 
Relationship 
Spouse 			27.0% 	157 		31.1% 	216 		28.7% 	29 		29.2% 	402 
Former spouse 		1.0% 	6 		.6% 	4 		0 	0 		.7% 	10 
Cohabitants 		41.1% 	239 		54.9% 	381 		62.4% 	63 		49.6% 	683 
Child in Common 	30.8% 	179 		13.4% 	93 		8.9% 	9 		20.4% 	281 


History of Violence 
Variable 			Warrant 	Single Arrest 	Dual Arrest 	Total 
 				% 	N 	% 	N 	% 	N 	% 	N 
Protective order in place 	6.4% 	37 	6.8% 	47 	4.0% 	4 	6.4% 	88 
Offender's prior DV arrests 
None 				77.9% 	441 	69.9% 	485 	73.0% 	73 	73.5% 	999 
One 				14.1% 	80 	18.3% 	127 	15.0% 	15 	16.3% 	222 
Two 				4.8% 	27 	8.1% 	56 	9.0% 	9 	6.8% 	92 
Three or more 			3.2% 	18 	3.7% 	26 	3.0% 	3 	3.5% 	47 

Chapter 6 Appendix C Table of Data Used for Analysis in Rows


Incident Characteristics 
Variable 			Warrant 	Single Arrest 	Dual Arrest 	Total 
				% 	N 	% 	N 	% 	N 	% 	N 
Substance Use 
Victim 				9.0% 	52 	20.9% 	145 	38.6% 	39 	17.2% 	236 
Offender 			26.2% 	152 	41.4% 	287 	35.6% 	36 	34.5% 	475 
Both 				6.0% 	35 	15.9% 	110 	26.7% 	27 	12.5% 	172 
Weapon Use 
Gun 				.9% 	5 	2.0% 	14 	1.0% 	1 	1.5% 	20 
Knife 				2.8% 	16 	3.5% 	24 	6.9% 	7 	3.4% 	47 
Other 				8.3% 	48 	7.8% 	54 	8.9% 	9 	8.1% 	111 
Any 				11.7% 	68 	12.8% 	89 	14.9% 	15 	12.5% 	172 
Alleged Offense 
Physical assault 		96.6% 	561 	97.8% 	679 	98.0% 	99 	97.3% 	1339 
Sexual assault 			.2% 	1 	0 	0 	0 	0 	.1% 	1 
Property crime 			1.7% 	10 	1.3% 	9 	1.0% 	1 	1.5% 	20 
Psychological  			1.4% 	8 	2.2% 	15 	3.0% 	3 	1.9% 	26 
Offense against child 		.2% 	1 	.4% 	3 	0 	0 	.3% 	4 
Other offense 			.9% 	5 	1.7% 	12 	0 	0 	1.2% 	17 
Additional Characteristics 
Aggressor present 		7.1% 	41 	82.4% 	572 	90.1% 	91 	51.2% 	704 
Children witnessed incident 	44.8% 	260 	41.1% 	285 	43.6% 	44 	42.8% 	589 
Medical treatment given 	17.0% 	92 	14.8% 	98 	12.8% 	12 	15.6% 	202 



Police Action 
Variable 			Warrant 	Single Arrest 	Dual Arrest 	Total  
				% 	N 	% 	N 	% 	N 	% 	N 
Type of Report 
Aggravated assault 		6.2% 	36 	7.3% 	51 	3.0% 	3 	6.5% 	90 
Simple assault 			93.8% 	545 	92.7% 	643 	97% 	98 	93.5% 	1286 
Evidence Collected 
Statements 			6.0% 	35 	6.3% 	44 	4.0% 	4 	6.0% 	83 
Photographs 			7.9% 	46 	9.2% 	64 	7.9% 	8 	8.6% 	118 
911 Tapes 			0 	0 	.1% 	1 	0 	0 	.1% 	1 
Hospital records 		1.2% 	7 	.4% 	3 	0 	0 	.7% 	10 
Other 				.02 	2 	.06% 	8 	.14% 	2 	.05% 	12 
Any 				15.5% 	90 	17.3% 	120 	13.9% 	14 	16.3% 	224 
Obtained EPO 			27.4% 	159 	25.9% 	180 	13.9% 	14 	25.7% 	353


Victim and Offender Demographic Categories by Outcome 

Variable 			Warrant 	Single Arrest 	Dual Arrest 
 				% 	N 	% 	N 	% 	N 
Sex of Offender 
Male 				43.5% 	561 	50.1% 	647 	6.4% 	83 
Female 				23.55% 	20 	55.3% 	47 	21.2% 	18 
Total				42.2%	581	50.4%	694	7.3%	101
Race of Offender 
Black 				44.1% 	485 	48.5% 	534 	7.4% 	82 
White 				23.9% 	32 	66.4% 	89 	9.7% 	13 
Other 				51.2% 	21 	46.3% 	19 	2.4% 	1 
Total				42.2%	538	50.3%	642	7.5%	96
Relationship 
Spouse 				39.1% 	157 	53.7% 	216 	7.2% 	29 
Former spouse 			60% 	6 	40% 	4 	0 	0 
Cohabitants 			35% 	239 	55.8% 	381 	9.2% 	63 
Child in Common 		63.7% 	179 	33.1% 	93 	3.2% 	9 
Total				42.2%	581	50.4%	694	7.3%	101


History of Violence 
Variable 		Warrant 	Single Arrest 	Dual Arrest 
			% 	N 	% 	N 	% 	N 
Protective order 
in place 		42.0% 	37 	53.4% 	47 	4.5% 	4 
Total			42.2%	581	50.4%	694	7.3%	101
None 			44.1% 	441 	48.5% 	485 	7.3% 	73 
One 			36.0% 	80 	57.2% 	127 	6.8% 	15 
Two 			29.3% 	27 	60.9% 	56 	9.8% 	9 
Three or more 		38.3% 	18 	55.3% 	26 	6.4% 	3 
Total			41.6%	566	51.0%	694	7.4%	100


Incident Characteristics 
Variable 			Warrant 	Single Arrest 	Dual Arrest 
				% 	N 	% 	N 	% 	N 
Substance Use 
Victim 				22.0% 	52 	61.4% 	145 	16.5% 	39 
Offender 			32.0% 	152 	60.4% 	287 	7.6% 	36 
Both 				20.3% 	35 	64% 	110 	15.7% 	27 
Weapon Use 
Gun 				25.0% 	5 	70.0% 	14 	5.0% 	1 
Knife 				34% 	16 	51.1% 	24 	14.9% 	7 
Other 				43.2% 	48 	48.6% 	54 	8.1% 	9 
Any 				39.5% 	68 	51.7% 	89 	8.7% 	15 
Alleged Offense 
Physical assault 		41.9% 	561 	50.7% 	679 	7.4% 	99 
Sexual assault 			100% 	1 	0 	0 	0 	0 
Property crime 			50.0% 	10 	45.0% 	9 	5.0% 	1 
Psychological  			30.8% 	8 	57.7% 	15 	11.5% 	3 
Offense against child 		25.0% 	1 	75.0% 	3 	0 	0 
Other offense 			29.4% 	5 	70.6% 	12 	0 	0 

Aggressor present 		5.8% 	41 	81..3% 	572 	12.9% 	91 
Children witnessed incident	44.1% 	260 	48.4% 	285 	7.5% 	44 
Medical treatment given 	45.5% 	92 	48.5% 	98 	5.9% 	12 


Police Action 

				Warrant 	Single Arrest 	Dual Arrest  
				% 	N 	% 	N 	% 	N 
Type of Report 
Aggravated assault 		40.0% 	36 	56.7% 	51 	3.3% 	3 
Simple assault 			42.4% 	545 	50.0% 	643 	7.6% 	98 
Total				42.2%	581	50.4%	694	7.3%	101
Evidence Collected 
Statements 			42.2% 	35 	53.0% 	44 	4.8% 	4 
Photographs 			39.0% 	46 	54.2% 	64 	6.8% 	8 
911 Tapes 			0 	0 	100% 	1 	0 	0 
Hospital records 		70.0% 	7 	30.0% 	3 	0 	0 
Any 				40.2% 	90 	53.6% 	120 	6.3% 	14 
Obtained EPO 			45.0% 	159 	51.0% 	180 	4.0% 	14 


Dependent variable: Dual Arrest 
			Demographics 		Case Characteristics 	Incident Characteristics 	Full model  
			N= 738 			N= 795 			N= 756 				N= 704  
			R2= .006 		R2= .003 		R2= .059 			R2= .073  
			Chi2= 4.6 		Chi2= 1.48 		Chi2= 23.75 			Chi2= 28  
			B  Wald  sig. Odds 	B   Wald  sig.  Odds 	B  Wald  sig.  Odds 		B  Wald  sig.  Odds 
Demographic 
characteristics
Former Spouse 		-3.9 .09 .75 .02         							-3.4 .07 .78 .03 
Cohabitants 		.18 .50 .48 1.2         							.22 .67 .41 1.2 
Child in Common 	-.38 .81 .37 .68         							-.18 .16 .68 .83 
White 			-.04 .02 .89 .98         							-.17 .24 .62 .83 
Other 			-1.1 1.1 .30 .34         							-.83 .62 .43 .44 
History of violence 
Prior arrests     				-.55 1.1 .29 .57     					-.20 .02 .90 .99 
Protective order in place     			-.04 .16 .69 .96     					-.30 .30 .58 .74 
Incident characteristics 
Victim substance use         						1.12 19.9 .00 3.3 		1.2 18.4 .00** 3.3 
Offender substance use         						-.64 5.9 .02 .53 		-.59 4.6 .03* .55 
Any weapon used         						.21 .42 .52 1.2 		.31 .86 .35 1.4 
Medical attention given         					.02 .00 .96 1.0 		-.29 .50 .48 .75 
Aggravated assault filed         					-1.2 3.2 .07 .31 		-.95 2.0 .15 .38                  

Degrees of freedom 		5 			2 			5 			12 
-2 Log likelihood 		565.96 			603.8 			543.97 			510.11 
Goodness of fit 		734.22 			794.90 			746.23 			686.70 
Percent Correct total 		86.9 			87.3 			87.5 			87.2 

Notes: 
** P<.01 
*  P<.05 


Dependent Variable: Emergency Protective Order Obtained  
					N= 704  
					R2= .17  
					Chi2= 87.19  
					B 	Wald 	R 	Odds 
Demographic characteristics 
Former Spouse 				-3.9 	.28 	.59 	.02 
Cohabitants 				-.37 	3.1 	.08 	.69 
Child in Common 			-.56 	2.7 	.09 	.57 
White 					.32 	1.4 	.23 	1.4 
Other 					-1.3 	2.7 	.09 	.25 
History of violence 
Prior arrests 				.06 	.73 	.39 	1.1 
Protective order in place 		2.6 	47.8 	.00** 	12.6 
Incident characteristics 
Victim substance use 			-.37 	2.2 	.14 	.69 
Offender substance use 			.42 	4.1 	.04* 	1.5 
Any weapon used 			-.14 	.22 	.64 	.86 
Medical attention given 		-.15 	.20 	.65 	.86 
Aggravated assault filed 		.04 	.01 	.92 	1.0 
Dual Arrest 				-.49 	2.3 	.13 	.61      

Degrees of freedom 			13 
-2 Log likelihood 			693.39 
Goodness of fit 			703.77 
Percent correct of total 		79.26 
Note: 
*  P<.01 
** P<.05 


Dependent Variable:  Evidence Collection  
					N= 704  
					R2= .08  
					Chi2= 38.22  
					B 	Wald 	R 	Odds 
Demographic characteristics 
Former Spouse 				1.4 	1.2 	.27 	4.2 
Cohabitants 				-.16 	.46 	.49 	.85 
Child in Common 			.52 	2.4 	.12 	1.7 
White 					.45 	2.4 	.12 	1.6 
Other 					.45 	.61 	.43 	1.6 
History of violence  
Prior arrests 				-.25 	3.5 	.06 	.78 
Protective order in place 		.76 	4.4 	.04 	2.1 
Incident characteristics 
Victim substance use 			.34 	1.6 	.20 	1.4 
Offender substance use 			-.04 	.03 	.87 	.96 
Any weapon used 			.28 	.93 	.33 	1.3 
Medical attention given 		.78 	6.9 	.00 	2.2 
Aggravated assault filed 		.41 	1.1 	.29 	1.5 
Dual arrest 				-.18 	.28 	.59 	.84 

Degrees of freedom 			13 
-2 Log likelihood 			604.68 
Goodness of fit 			707.22 
Percent correct of total 		83.38 
Note: 
*  P<.01 
** P<.05       



Chapter 7 
Mapping Reported Intimate Assault 

Rachel Boba, Ph.D., 
Laura Wyckoff, M.A., 
and Erin Lane, M.P.M. 

POLICE FOUNDATION 

Prepared for the U.S. Department of Justice 
Office of Community Oriented Policing Services 
Award #98DVWXK015 
June 2002 



Chapter 7: Mapping Reported Intimate Assaults 

Introduction
Since the advent of desktop-based geographic information systems (GIS) software, the 
application of spatial analysis to understanding and responding to a variety of crime and public 
safety problems has expanded.  Researchers as well as practitioners have found GIS an 
invaluable tool for examining crime.  For example, researchers have used GIS to study the 
spatial dimensions of various types of crime (Radcliff & McCullagh, 1998; Rogers & Delores, 
1996), and police managers have adopted GIS as a means for understanding and responding to 
crime in their jurisdictions (LaVigne & Wartell, 1998; Taxman & McEwen, 1994; Weisburd & 
McEwen, 1997).  GIS has, however, rarely been used as a tool to examine intimate violence.   

The paucity of spatial applications to the study of intimate violence is easy to understand.  
Researchers and practitioners have been disinclined to spatially analyze intimate violence 
because it is not considered a crime affected by place and environmental characteristics such as 
street lighting, type of road, or even neighborhood crime levels.  Additionally, most types of 
intimate violence data are not well suited for mapping.      

There are many sources of intimate violence data, including victimization surveys, hospitals, 
shelters, and police departments, and each type has shortcomings.  Victimization data are ideal 
for examining the spatial nature of intimate violence because they are the most comprehensive 
and least biased, providing a snapshot of intimate violence across all demographic categories.  
Yet, victimization data do not typically include location information, which is necessary for 
spatial examination.  Another source, hospital records of admissions are biased toward more 



serious incidents because victims without serious physical injuries are unlikely to go to a 
hospital.  Additionally, these records may be incomplete because medical staff may treat a 
patient for injuries without being aware that the injuries resulted from intimate violence.  Even 
when records are complete, confidentiality issues often restrict the availability of these data to 
researchers.  Still another data source is domestic violence shelters.  However, since for a variety 
of reasons most victims do not go to shelters, records of shelter clients reflect only a small 
amount of actual intimate violence.  Confidentiality concerns also make obtaining data from 
helters very difficult.  

Lastly, since police data include only incidents that are reported to the police, they are also 
subject to bias, but they do have two important advantages for spatial analysis.  First, they are 
relatively accessible in that strict confidentiality does not apply, and second, they include 
location information that makes spatial examination possible.  In the exploratory analysis 
presented here, we examine intimate assault reported to the police using spatial analysis methods 
that are frequently applied to other types of crime to determine if these methods are also useful 
for analyzing intimate assault.  We examine intimate assault by frequency, type (simple or 
aggravated), and in relation to several demographic variables commonly considered with crime 
data such as population, population density, race, and median rent, and in relation to locations 
where victims could seek assistance.   

It is important to keep in mind that the incidents comprising this analysis represent intimate 
assaults reported to police, which is a subset of all intimate violence.  In addition to the general
biases of reported intimate assault data, the data used in this study are subject to several 


additional biases.  One important characteristic of intimate violence is its repetitiveness, in that 
violence reoccurs in violent relationships.  Unfortunately, it is not possible to analyze repeat 
addresses in these data because reliable apartment numbers are not present.  Finally, the time 
range of the data used here is March 1999 to February 2001.  It would be appropriate to use 2000 
census data for this analysis, but block group level variables from the 2000 census were not 
available at the time of this examination. 

The Present Analysis 
This is an exploratory spatial analysis of intimate assaults, both simple and aggravated, reported 
to the city police department during a two-year period, using 1990 census data at the block group 
level provided by Environmental Systems Research Institute (ESRI).  Census block group 
boundaries are used as proxies for neighborhoods, allowing for examination of reported intimate 
assault, by neighborhood characteristics such as population, population density, socio-economic 
level, and race.      

Research Questions  
The following are research questions that guide this exploratory analysis. 

1.What is the spatial distribution of reported intimate assaults in this city?  First, we examine 
reported simple and aggravated intimate assault separately, using the kernel density method.  
This method uses point data to determine the relative density of intimate assaults in the city (see 
ESRI, 1996).  Because the demographic data used in the subsequent analyses are aggregated to 


the block group level, the reported intimate assaults are also examined through thematic shading 
of the block groups by number of assaults.   

2.What is the relationship between reported intimate assault and demographic variables 
commonly examined in criminal justice research such as population, population density, socio-
economic level (median rent), and race?

A.What is the spatial distribution of reported intimate assaults by population?  Using the 
block group as the unit of analysis, this analysis shows the rate of intimate assaults by 
population to determine if there are any areas of the city that have relatively higher rates 
of reported intimate assault.  Population is obtained through the census data.  

B. What is the spatial distribution of reported intimate assaults by population density?  A 
question often asked anecdotally about reported intimate assaults is whether areas with 
high population density have relatively higher numbers of reported intimate assault.  The 
assumption is that people who live in closer proximity to others are more likely to hear 
intimate disputes and call the police  thinner walls, more calls.  We examine the 
relationship between population density and number of reported intimate assaults.  To 
determine areas as relatively high population density and high levels of reported intimate 
assaults or the reverse, which also follows the same argument, (i.e., lower density, lower 
number of reported intimate assaults), we break down the distribution of block groups 
into quartiles.  That is, 25% of the distribution of block groups with the highest and 
lowest rates of population density are selected as are the 25% with the highest and lowest 


numbers of reported intimate assaults.    The remaining block groups (that fall into these 
categories for both variables) then are coded into one of the following categories: 

1. High population density/high frequency of reported intimate assaults 
2. Low population density/low frequency of reported intimate assaults 
3. High population density/low frequency of reported intimate assaults 
4. Low population density/high frequency of reported intimate assaults 

These block groups are then mapped to determine their spatial distribution, comparing 
groups #1 and #2 to groups #3 and #4.  Population density is obtained through the census 
data.

C. How does the spatial distribution of the rate of reported intimate assaults by 
population compare to the median rent?  Using the block group as the unit of analysis, a 
map depicting rate of reported intimate assault by population is compared to one 
depicting median rent by block group.  Median rent is obtained through the census data.  

D.How does the spatial distribution of the rate of reported intimate assault compare to 
racial homogeneity of the population?  Again, using the block group as the unit of 
analysis, a map depicting the rate of reported intimate assault by population is visually 
compared to one depicting racial homogeneity.  Racial homogeneity is defined as a block 
groups population being at least 80% one race and is obtained through the census data.   

E.What is the spatial distribution of block groups in which blacks or whites are 
overrepresented as offenders of reported intimate assault?  Another notion in 
criminology is that minorities are overrepresented in phenomena such as arrests, 



convictions, and the prison population.  Is this also true with intimate violence?  
All things being equal, we would expect the proportion of offenders of a given race to be 
equal to that races proportion of the population.  This analysis compares the percent of 
black and white offenders residing in a block group with the percent of black and white 
residents of that block group to determine whether each race is under, over, or equally 
represented in the population of reported offenders.  The maps shade block groups 
according to a ratio of these percentages to determine any spatial pattern.    

3.What is the spatial relationship between reported intimate assault and locations of victim 
assistance?  Localities seeking to ensure that victims are adequately served and protected would 
value knowing where intimate assault occurs in relation to locations where these victims could s
eek assistance.  While reported intimate assaults cannot be thought to accurately describe the 
actual intimate violence problem, they are a starting point.  In this part of the analysis, we present 
a kernel density map showing reported intimate assault in relation to police stations and medical 
facilities.  The reported intimate assault data come from the police department, and the citys 
GIS coordinator provided the hospital, clinic, and police station point data. 

Methodology

This analysis draws data from the citys GIS coordinator, the city police department, as well as 
by ESRI.  The police data come from domestic violence incident reports (DVRs), which officers 
are required to complete for every domestic violence substantiated calls.  They provide 
demographic, relationship, and address data on the parties involved; the location, date, and time, 
of the incident; police action taken, presence of children, apparent use of alcohol or drugs by 


either of the parties, weapon use, victim injuries, and whether protective orders were on file.
This analysis includes only those DVRs in which an aggravated or simple intimate assault has 
occurred  between persons who are or were married, have a child in common, currently cohabit, 
or have cohabited within the previous 12 months.  The citys GIS coordinator provided a layer 
with addresses of hospitals and clinics, a layer with addresses of the four police stations, and a 
layer of the police patrol division boundaries.   

The resulting database contains 1,350 intimate assaults reported between March 1, 1999, and 
February 28, 2001.  The street addresses of the incident were geocoded to the citys street 
centerline files obtained through ESRI, resulting in a geocoding rate of 94% (1223).  Eighty-
two (6%) of the addresses did not geocode.  This is attributed to slightly out-of-date street files 
and, in some cases, to incomplete address information recorded by officers on the DVR form.    

Study City  

The study city is in the mid-Atlantic region of the country, covers approximately 62 square 
miles, and has a police department of approximately 700 sworn officers.  A river runs through 
the city horizontally, and forms the northern border of the largest of the four patrol divisions 
Division D, and the other three, A, B, and C, which are north of the river.  Between 1990 and 
2000 the population decreased from 203,000 to 200,000.  During this time the percent of whites 
decreased from 43% to 38%, the percent of blacks increased from 55% to 57%, the percent of 
Hispanics increased from 1% to 3%, and the other and mixed race category increased from 1% to 
2% (ESRI; City Website).  Map 1 on the next page displays the boundaries of the four patrol 


divisions and provides demographic context to each one.  As noted earlier, we use the 1990 data 
for this analysis. 

Division A is the smallest of the four divisions, covering two square miles, and is the center city 
business district.  This division has the lowest population per square mile of the four police 
patrol divisions (1,700 persons per square mile).  Twenty-four percent of the population is white, 
71% is black, and a small number of Hispanics, Asians, and others make up the remaining 5% 
(Police Departments Web site).  Three percent of the citys reported intimate assault occurs in 
this division.



Map 1: Patrol Divisions and their Characteristics
Image of Map

Patrol Division A
2 square miles
1,700 persons per square mile
24% white
71% black
5% other
3% of city's reported intimate assaults

Patrol Division B
5 square miles
6,134 persons per square mile
9% white
90% black
1% other
27% of city's reported intimate assaults

Patrol Division C
19 square miles
4,463 persons per square mile
54% white
45% black
1% other
21% of city's reported intimate assaults

Patrol Division D
36 square miles
2,318 persons per square mile
46% white
53% black
1% other
49% of city's reported intimate assaults


Within its small, five square miles, Division B has several public housing complexes that are 
well known to the police.  Division B has the highest population density of the four divisions 
(6,134 persons per square mile), and is 90% black, 9% white, and 1% other.  Twenty-seven 
percent of the citys reported intimate violence occurs in this division.   

Division C is the most diverse of the four patrol divisions with three distinct areas.  The northern 
band of this division is similar to Division B, with a good deal of low income, multi-family 
housing. In the southern section, the area closest to the center houses a university, and thus, 
many students.  The wealthiest section of the city is in the southwest portion of this division. 
Division C covers 19 square miles and has a population density of 4,463 persons per square mile.  
This division accounts for 21% of the reported intimate assaults, is 54% white, 45% black, and 
1% other.  It is the only division where blacks are not the majority of residents.   

Division D is the largest of the patrol districts, covering 36 square miles, but has a relatively low 
population density of 2,318 persons per square mile.  Blacks comprise 53% of the population, 
whites 46%, and 1% is made up of other races.  Forty-nine percent of the citys reported intimate 
violence occurs in this division.

Analysis
This analysis explores the spatial distribution of intimate assault in three parts.  The first part 
uses two methods to depict the spatial pattern of citywide reported intimate assault.  Second is a 
spatial examination of reported intimate assault in relation to population, population density, 
median rent and race.  The third part is a visual examination of the spatial patters of intimate 


assault in relation to the locations of police stations and medical facilities  institutions where 
intimate assault victims could seek assistance.    

Our analysis includes two types of maps, kernel density and graduated area. The kernel density 
maps were created using a cell size of 50 feet and a search radius of one mile.  The graduated 
area maps are thematically shaded by census block group.  Six block groups were excluded from 
consideration in the thematically shaded maps.  Five were excluded because they had no 
recorded population in the 1990 census, making rates impossible to compute.  The sixth was 
excluded because its reported intimate assault rate was far outside the distribution due to an 
extremely small population and several reported intimate assaults.     

Part I: Overall Spatial Patterns of Intimate Assault 
Hotspots of Reported Intimate Assault: Maps 2 and 3
In order to (1) identify concentrations of reported intimate assault across block group boundaries, 
and (2) to compare the geographic concentrations of simple intimate assault to aggravated 
intimate assault, we produced kernel density maps of simple (Map 2) and aggravated (Map 3) 
reported intimate assault.  The maps on the next page were created with a cell size of 50 feet and
a search radius of one mile.  Unlike graduated area maps, which consider the map sections (in 
this case block groups) separately, kernel density maps facilitate citywide comparison by 
indicating relative density of activity irrespective of block group boundaries.   


Map of Kernel Density of Reported Simple and Aggravated Intimate Assault per Square Mile


Assaults can be charged as simple or aggravated depending on the seriousness.  Aggravated 
assaults are more serious, and account for only 6.6% of all intimate assault charges in the city.  
To compare the geographic distribution of simple and aggravated assaults, Maps 2 and 3 are 
shown together.  It is important to note that while the density patterns on these two maps can be 
compared their respective magnitudes cannot.  Because there are so many more simple assaults 
than aggravated assaults, it takes many more simple assaults in one area to register as a high-
density area.  As shown in the legends, the hottest areas for simple assault have between 
93.464-97.358 incidents per square mile while the hottest areas for aggravated assault have 
just 8.409-8.759 incidents  a vast difference.

The concentrations of reported intimate assaults across block groups are readily apparent in Map 
2, which, though it only shows simple assaults, is a suitable proxy for all intimate assaults since 
simple assaults are the vast majority of assaults.  This map shows (1) that the highest 
concentration of reported intimate assaults occur in Division B, specifically in the northwest 
section, (2) that there are several areas of lesser concentration in the east of Division D, and (3) 
that there are few reported intimate assaults in the western areas of Divisions C and D.   

These comparisons indicate that the highest concentrations of reported intimate assaults occur in 
the northwest area of Division B, with some lesser concentrations in Division D, and that simple 
and aggravated assaults cluster in similar geographic patterns in the city.  Since these maps show 
the geographic pattern of simple and aggravated assault to be nearly identical, for the remainder 
of the paper they are considered together as intimate assaults.  


Comparing the pattern of simple assaults (Map 2) and aggravated assaults (Map 3) reveals little 
differences in the clustering of these two types of assault.  At first glance some of the aggravated
assault clusters in Division D appear tighter, but this is because there are so few aggravated 
assaults, and just one or two assaults may appear as a cluster.   

Frequency of Reported Intimate Assault by Block Group: Map 4 
To provide a baseline for the analyses by block group demographic characteristics, we created a 
graduated area map displaying frequency of reported intimate assault by block group, which is 
displayed on the next page.  Block groups are shaded in blue with darker hues indicating higher 
frequencies of reported intimate assault.   

This method reveals that many block groups had no reported intimate assault over the two-year 
period.  Many of these block groups are located in the western area of Division C, with a few 
scattered elsewhere in the city.  Comparing this map to Map 2 confirms that the greatest 
concentrations of reported intimate assault are located in the northwest area of Division B and 
that several less intense concentrations are located in Division D.  This map also identifies the 
specific blocks within these areas that have the highest frequencies of intimate assault.  Using the 
maps together can provide a double check to the conclusions drawn based on only one.         


Map of Frequency of Reported Intimate Assault by Block Group


Part 2: Relationship between Reported Intimate Assault and Demographic Variables
Rate of Reported Intimate Assault by Block Group: Map 5 
To examine the geographic distribution of intimate assault while controlling for population, we 
thematically mapped the rate of reported intimate assault per 100,000 persons by block group.  In 
Map 5 on the next page, block groups are shaded in purple by rate of intimate assault, with 
darker hues indicating higher rates.  We used the natural breaks method so that outliers as well as 
clusters of block groups with similar rates could be easily identified.  The median rate is 546 
reported intimate assaults per 100,000 persons for the two years of data.  The mean is 706, and 
the standard deviation is 715.  The high standard deviation indicates that there is a wide range of 
rates across block groups and that outliers are present. 

In terms of the overall distribution of intimate assault, Map 4 showing frequency, and Map 5 
showing rate are very similar, in that the western areas of Divisions C and D have strikingly low 
frequencies of intimate assault and rates per population, and block groups in Division B and in 
some areas of Division D have the highest frequency and rates per population.  Within smaller 
areas, however, the maps show differences.  For example, along the northern border of Division 
B, the frequency map (Map 4) indicates the highest concentration to be in the northwest corner 
of Division B, whereas the rate map (Map 5) indicates the highest concentration to be in the 
northeast corner.  This is also the case along the eastern border of Division D where  


Map of Rate of Reported Intimate Assault by Block Group


Map 4 shows the three block groups to have high frequencies of reported intimate assault, while 
Map 5 shows these block groups to be in different rate categories, reinforcing the importance of 
considering rates when comparing block groups. 

Reported Intimate Assault and Population Density by Block Group: Map 6 
Another demographic characteristic that may be related to reported intimate assault is population 
density.  It is plausible that intimate assault would be reported more often in high density areas
where neighbors cannot help but be aware of each others activities, and thus may more often 
call the police because of disturbances, than in areas where neighbors have more privacy.  To e
xplore the premise that population density is positively related to reported intimate assault, we 
created a map showing block groups with low intimate assault and low population density 
(shaded dark red), low intimate assault and high population density (shaded light red), high 
reported intimate assault and high population density (shaded in dark blue), and high intimate 
assault and low population density (shaded light blue).   

As discussed earlier, we achieved these classifications by ranking block groups in order of 
population density and then by frequency of reported intimate assault, and then grouping them 
into quartiles.  Those block groups in the lowest intimate assault quartile that are also in the 
lowest population density quartile are classified as low/low and shaded dark red.  Those block 
groups in the lowest intimate assault quartile that are in the highest population density quartile 
were classified as low/high and shaded light red.  Those block groups in the highest intimate 
assault quartile that are also in the highest population density quartile are classified as high/high 
and shaded dark blue.  Finally, those block groups in the highest intimate assault quartile that are 


in the lowest population density quartile are classified as high/low and shaded light blue.  Block g
roups that did not fall into any of these four categories are not considered in this examination 
and are not shaded. 

The more block groups in the high/high and low/low categories the more evidence for our 
assumption that intimate assault is positively related to population density.  In Map 6 (on the 
next page) there are a total of 24 block groups that were either dark blue (7) high/high or dark 
red (17) low/low.  All but one of the dark blue block groups is located in the area with the 
greatest concentrations and highest rates of reported intimate assault  the northern areas of
Divisions B and C.  Most of the dark red block groups are concentrated in the western areas of 
the city where the lowest frequencies and rates of domestic violence were observed.  Several of 
these block groups are also in the central, commercial area of the city, Division A.  The 
placement of the dark blue and red block groups fits our expectations about patterns of reported 
intimate assault in relation to population density because it comports with what we observed in 
the previous maps.

Conversely, there were 23 block groups that are either light red (12) low/high or light blue (11) 
high/low.  The light red block groups are mainly in two areas, Division C near the university and 
in Division B on the periphery of the highest concentration of reported intimate assault.  All but 
one of the light blue block groups is in Division D, where most of these light blue block groups 
lie on the edge.  The single light blue block group not in Division D is in Division C, near the 
concentration of reported intimate assault. 


Map of Reported Intimate Assault and Population Density by Block Group


Since only 47 out of 190, or 25% of the block groups fall into any of these categories and the 
breakdown is nearly identical between high/high and low/low and the block groups that are 
mixed (low/high and high/low), no conclusions can be drawn.  The assumption that more 
intimate assaults will be reported in more densely populated areas can neither be supported or 
denied.

Rate of Reported Intimate Assault and Median Rent by Block Group:  
Maps 5 and 7
To explore the relationship between rate of reported intimate assault and socio-economic level 
(here measured as median rent), we compare Map 5 (rate of reported intimate assault) to a 
thematically shaded map showing median rent by block group, Map 7, displayed on the next 
page.  In Map 7, the color green is used to show the median rent category of each block group, 
with darker shades of green indicating higher median rent categories.  The citywide median rent
is $429, and the mean and standard deviation are $426 and $158 respectively, indicating that 
median rents are normally distributed with 68% falling between $268 and $584, and that there 
are not extreme outliers.   

By examining these maps side by side, we found that rate of intimate assault and median rent 
appeared to be inversely related to each other.  Map 5 indicates that block groups with higher 
rates of intimate assault tend to be in the eastern area of side of the city,  where Map 7 indicates 
block groups with lower median rents tend to be and vice versa.  To test this apparent
relationship statistically, we ran a correlation on median rent and rate of reported intimate 
assaults by block group which resulted in a -0.35 Pearson R which was significant at the .01  


Map of Rate of Reported Intimate Assault and Median Rent by Block Group


level  (N=190).  The test indicates that median rent is inversely and significantly related to rate 
block group rate of intimate violence.  In other words, as median rent decreases, the rate of 
reported intimate assault increases.     

Rate of Reported Intimate Assault and Racial Homogeneity by Block Group: Map 5 and 8  
As mentioned in the introduction to this report, race is a demographic variable that is frequently 
considered in criminal justice research.  There are many ways to examine race in relation to 
crime problems, and we employ two.  On the next page we compare Map 5, rate of reported 
intimate assault by block group (discussed earlier), to Map 8, which shows racial homogeneity 
by block group.  We define racial homogeneity as a block groups population being at least 80% 
one single race.  Map 8 contains three racial homogeneity categories.  If the population of a 
block group is at least 80% white it is shaded pink, block groups where blacks make up at least 
80% of the population are shaded purple, and block groups where neither race comprises 80% of 
the population are shaded gray.   

Examination of Map 8 reveals that there are distinct portions of the city where the 80% black 
block groups are clustered (predominately in the northeast in Divisions B and C), and where the 
80% white block groups are clustered (predominately in the western areas of Divisions C and D).  
Racially heterogeneous block groups are scattered around most of the city, mainly in Division D.   

Generally, rates of reported intimate assault tend to be lower in the block groups that are at least 
80% white.  Many of the block groups with the highest rates of reported intimate assault are 
those that are at least 80% black.  The area where the more heterogeneous block groups are, in  


Map of Rate of Reported Intimate Assault and Racial Homogeneity by Block Group


Division D, is also where the rates of reported intimate assault appear to vary the most.  A 
correlation was conducted (see Table 1) to see whether number of reported intimate assaults in 
block groups was correlated with the percent of block group race.  The table indicates that the 
number of incidents in the block group is positively and significantly related to the percent black 
in the block group and significantly inversely related to the percent white in the block group.   

Table 1: Correlation Between Number of Reported Incidents and Percent of   
Black and White in Block Group   

							% Black 	% White 
Intimate assaults 	Pearson Correlation      	0.33   		-0.34  
			Sig. (2-tailed)          	0.00**        	0.00**  
			N 				190.00 		190.00 
** 			Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 

Proportion of Reported Offending to Population by Race: Maps 9 and 10 
To examine race and intimate assault in another way, we explored whether offending by whites 
and blacks was proportionate to their share of the population in each block group.  We created 
maps showing percent of total offending by each race in relation to percent population of each 
race by block group.  That is, all things being equal we would expect the percent of offenders by 
race to match the racial make up of the block group.  For example, if whites make up 50% of the 
population in a block group, we would expect them to make up 50% of the reported offenders.  
But if they make up 75% of the reported offenders, because 75%/50% is 1.5, whites are one and 
a half times as likely to be offenders than would be expected given their share of the population. 
In other words, they would be overrepresented.  Calculations comparing proportion of observed 
to expected offenders were made for whites (Map 9) and for blacks (Map 10) for each block 
group and are illustrated on page 28. 


Maps 9 and 10 are thematically shaded by the ratio of observed versus expected offending by 
block group.  Dark gray shading indicates that offenders of the race displayed are equally 
represented as offenders in that block group, and light gray shading indicates that offenders of 
the race displayed are underrepresented.  The equal representation category captures block 
groups where the expected value is within two tenths of one.  In other words, a ratio of observed 
to expected anywhere between .91 and 1.1 was considered to be equal representation.  Color 
shading indicates that offenders of the race displayed are overrepresented as offenders in the 
block group.  Block groups may be put into the No intimate assault category either because 
there were no intimate assaults reported in that block group, or because there are no residents of 
the race displayed in that block group.  

Taking the entire city into account, we found that blacks are 1.34 more likely to be reported 
offenders than expected given their share of the population.  Whites, on the other hand, are .25 as 
likely, meaning that they are underrepresented as reported offenders compared to their 
proportion of the population.  Specifically, they were 75% less likely to be reported offenders.  
Examination of the maps indicates that there are more block groups throughout the city in which 
black offenders are overrepresented (53), than there are block groups where white offenders are 
overrepresented (13).

In examining Map 9, we found that the relatively few block groups where whites are 
overrepresented tend also to be block groups where the population is at least 80% black  where 


whites are the minority.  In many areas where whites are at least 80% of the population, they are 
underrepresented as offenders.

Map 10, displaying the ratio by block group of observed black offending to expected black 
offending based on the population, shows that block groups where blacks are overrepresented are 
distributed throughout the city in each of the three types of block groups.  In block groups that 
are at least 80% black, blacks tend to be equally represented rather than overrepresented.  This is 
not surprising since it would be more difficult to achieve overrepresention of a race when that 
race comprises such a substantial majority of the population.  It is interesting that both blacks 
and whites seem more likely to be overrepresented as offenders in block groups where they are 
the minority. 


Map of Proportion of Reported Offending to Population by Race


Part 3: Reported Intimate Violence in Relation to Service Providers  
Medical Facilities and Police Stations in Relation to Reported Intimate Assault:  Map 11.

To show the geographic clustering of reported intimate assault in relation to locations where 
intimate assault victims could seek assistance, we created a kernel density map of all reported 
intimate assaults and overlaid it with the locations of hospitals, clinics, and the headquarters of 
the four police divisions.  We also include a cutout of the central city and hotspot (high 
density area of reported intimate assaults) area to make it easier to see all of the locations shown, 
and for closer examination of the sources of assistance near the hotspot.   

Such a comparison can be useful for localities wishing to assess how well the communitys 
needs are being served, by showing where service providers are in relation to crime problems.  
Since these data are reported intimate assaults rather than actual intimate assaults, this 
comparison is an imperfect measure of how well needs are being met, but it still offers an idea of 
how close possible sources of assistance are to concentrations of known intimate assault.
Although analyzing reported crime should not be an end to assessingcommunity service needs, 
it can be a useful beginning.  After all, reported crime tells you where at least part of the problem 
is, and the known part of the problem still needs attention.

Map 11 on page 31 is not meant to be a definitive assessment of victim needs in relation to 
sources of assistance for the reason above, and, because it includes only a selection of possible 
sources of victim assistance.  In this map, hospitals and police stations are self-explanatory, and 
we assume to be locations victims could access on their own or to which they might be 


transported.  Clinics are a different matter, since there are many different types.  We do not have 
enough descriptive information to differentiate between them, and thus cannot distinguish 
between clinics that would be appropriate sources of assistance to victims and those that would 
not. Additionally, there are probably many additional service agencies in the city to which 
victims could appeal for assistance.  This map is meant merely as a general comparison between 
spatial patterns of reported intimate assault and a selection of possible victim assistance 
locations.

Based on the locations that are included, overall it appears that there are many sources of victim 
assistance, including one of the four police stations, in and around the main hotspot area in 
Division B.  Also, there seem to be many more hospitals and clinics throughout Divisions A, B, 
and C, and relatively few in Division D.  Of the eight hospitals in the city, seven are in the 
northern part of the city in Divisions A, B, and C.  Only one is south of the river in Division D, 
where, incidentally, 49% of the reported intimate assaults are generated.  


Map of Kernel Density of Reported Intimate Assaults with Police Stations and Medical Facilities


Discussion
This exploratory examination of the geographic patterns of reported intimate assault has sought 
to examine three questions:  
1. What is the spatial distribution of reported intimate assaults in this city?
2. What is the spatial relationship between reported intimate assault and  
population, population density, median rent and race? 
3. What is the spatial relationship between reported intimate assault and  
locations where victims could seek assistance? 

We addressed the first question by creating kernel density maps showing the spatial distribution 
overall and with graduated area maps showing the spatial distribution using frequency of 
reported intimate assault by census block group.  We found that simple and aggravated assault
had virtually the same pattern even though the magnitude was much different.  The block group 
analysis indicated a similar pattern as the kernel density maps which served as a double check of
our findings.  In general these maps revealed the highest areas of reported intimate assault to be 
the northern area of Division B, and the adjacent area of Division C and the lowest levels of 
reported intimate assault to be the western areas of Divisions C and D adjacent to the river.

To assess the relationship between reported intimate assault and several demographic variables 
commonly used in criminal justice research, we first created a graduatedarea map showing the 
rate of reported intimate assault by block group population.  This map identifies roughly the 
same spatial patterns of reported intimate assault as the map showing frequency of reported 
intimate assaults.  We then explored population density by displaying block groups with the 
highest and lowest population densities and highest and lowest frequencies of reported intimate 
assault to test the theory that areas of high population density generate greater reporting of 


intimate assault.  We did not find strong evidence in support or against our assumption that 
population density was positively related to reported intimate assault.  

To examine median rent and race, we created three comparisons.  First, we compared rate of 
reported intimate assault by block group to median rent by block group, and found a visually 
apparent inverse relationship between these variables.  Areas where block groups had high
median rents tended to be areas where rates of reported intimate assault were low.  Conversely, 
areas where block group median rents tended to be low tended to have high rates of reported 
intimate assault.  This relationship was confirmed statistically through a correction which found 
the variables to be inversely and significantly related.   

We then compared rate of reported intimate assault by block group to block group racial 
homogeneity.  In the study city, block groups with populations of over 80% black tended to be 
located in areas of the city with high block group reported intimate assault rates and block groups 
with populations of over 80% white tended to be in areas with low reported intimate assault 
rates.  This relationship was also confirmed using a correlation between frequency of reported 
intimate assault and percent black or white in the block group.  The lower the percentage of 
whites in a block group, the fewer reported intimate assaults, and the higher the percentage of 
blacks in a block group, the more reported intimate assaults.   

We also examined race by mapping the ratio of each races expected offending to its observed 
offending by block group.  We found that there were many more block groups where blacks 
were overrepresented as offenders of reported assault than where whiteswere reported offenders.



Interestingly, many of the block groups where whites were overrepresented as offenders are 
those comprised of at least 80% black.  The converse is also true for blacks; thus it seems that 
offenders are more likely to be overepresented in block groups where their race is the minority 
(20% or below).  Overall, in this city, our results suggest that blacks are overrepresented as 
offenders of reported intimate assault and whites are underrepresented. 

The last section of this paper explores the relationship between reported intimate assault and 
locations of institutions victims could go for assistance.  We found that many clinics, several
hospitals, as well as one police station are located in and around the densest cluster of reported 
intimate assault, in the northern part of city, in Division B.  On the other hand, only three clinics, 
and one hospital  of the eight in the city  are located in Division D.  We caution against 
drawing conclusions about how well victims are served  because our analysis uses reported 
intimate assault rather than actual intimate assault.  This type of analysis could be very useful if 
victimization or hospital data were used, as these data would provide a more accurate view of 
victims needs which could then be compared to available resources. 

This paper is meant to explore the utility of using GIS to examine intimate violence by testing 
several possible applications of spatial analysis to intimate assault.  While the reported intimate 
assault data analyzed here do not describe the geographic patterns of actual intimate violence, 
they do describe the geographic and demographic patterns of intimate offending known to police, 
thus offering a means for understanding the basis for police officers perceptions of intimate 
violence.  In this case, it is easy to see how officers could get an inaccurate view of intimate 
violence in relation to socio-economic level and race, since the victims and offenders they 
encounter fall into particular categories. 



The majority of the offenders in these reported data are black and living in lower income areas 
(unfortunately two related characteristics).  This does not mean, however, that blacks, or those 
less wealthy have a greater propensity for intimate assault.  These observed preponderances may 
simply be functions of the fact that these individuals tend to live in higher population density 
areas where intimate violence is more likely to be reported to police.  Our efforts to examine this 
issue were inconclusive, but we believe it to be an important subject to explore, especially so that 
individuals with certain characteristics are not unfairly maligned.   

This analysis employs several methods for examining intimate assault data.  While the findings 
of each method generally reinforce each other, there are also small differences.  We believe that 
descriptions of reported intimate assault based on areas of agreement among the maps are more 
reliable than those of areas where the maps indicate slightly different results.   

Conclusion
We hope that the ideas for examining intimate violence spatially presented here will generate 
additional explorations of this topic.  Ideally, future efforts will use hospital or victimization data 
to either replicate our methods or apply new ones.  We believe that such efforts could prove 
useful in improving responses to intimate violence or at least in contributing to a better 
understanding of it.   

Given the ever-increasing importance of GIS as tool for addressing crime, the value of 
determining whether it can usefully be applied to addressing intimate violence is evident.  If 
constructive uses exist, then they should be identified so that agencies responding to intimate 



violence can put them into practice.  On the other hand, knowing that such uses do not exist 
creates an opportunity to direct resources for understanding and addressing intimate violence
 more constructively elsewhere. 



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Taxman, F. & McEwen, T. (1994). High-tech computer mapping and low-tech community 
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Weisburd, D. & McEwen, T. (Eds.). (1997). Crime Mapping and Crime Prevention:Vol. 8.
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