Interim 
Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) 
Program Manual 



August 2002 



 
DISCLAIMER 

In this manual, various materials of different origin have been compiled, 
so that more comprehensive information is available in a single source. 
However, some material is reproduced in its original format, leading to 
some variation in appearance within the document. 


 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 


Page 

I. INTRODUCTION TO THE REP PROGRAM MANUAL.............................................. I-1 


A. Purpose and Scope ...................................................................................................... I-1 


B. Regulatory Basis for the REP Program....................................................................... I-1 


1. Assignment of Responsibility ............................................................................... I-1 


2. Standards and Criteria for Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Preparedness I-2 

3. Procedures for Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Preparedness.................. I-3 


4. Alternative Approaches and Methods................................................................... I-4 


5. Review and Approval of Emergency Preparedness .............................................. I-4 


6. Federal Delegation of Tasks.................................................................................. I-6 


C. Technical Basis for the REP Program......................................................................... I-7 


1. Nature of the Hazard ............................................................................................. I-7 


2. Emergency Planning Zones................................................................................... I-7 


3. Protective Action Guides ...................................................................................... I-9 


4. Protective Actions ................................................................................................. I-10 


D. Decommissioning of Nuclear Power Plants................................................................ I-13 


E. Public Information Materials Review Guidance......................................................... I-15 


II. REP PROGRAM POLICY AND GUIDANCE................................................................ II-1 


Section under review  to be provided when complete. 

III. REP EXERCISE GUIDELINES..................................................................................... III-1 


A. Milestones and Tasks ................................................................................................ III-1 


B. 
Evaluation Areas ....................................................................................................... III-59 
Evaluation Area 1: Emergency Operations Management..................................... III-63 
Evaluation Area 2: Protective Action Decision Making....................................... III-67 
Evaluation Area 3: Protective Action Implementation......................................... III-74 
Evaluation Area 4: Field Measurement and Analysis........................................... III-82 
Evaluation Area 5: Emergency Notification and Public Information................... III-87 
Evaluation Area 6: Support Operation/Facilities.................................................. III-92 


C. Evaluation Area Modules.......................................................................................... III-97 


1. Format of Evaluation Area Modules................................................................... III-97 


2. How to Use the Evaluation Module .................................................................... III-98 


3. How to Write a Narrative.................................................................................... III-98 


4. How to Write an Issue......................................................................................... III-98 


5. Example of How Modules May Be Assigned..................................................... III-99 


6. References ........................................................................................................... III-99 


7. 
Evaluation Area Modules.................................................................................... III-99 
Evaluation Area 1: Emergency Operations Management............................... III-100 
Evaluation Area 2: Protective Action Decision Making................................. III-113 
Evaluation Area 3: Protective Action Implementation................................... III-131 


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August 2002 


Evaluation Area 4: Field Measurement and Analysis..................................... III-157 
Evaluation Area 5: Emergency Notification and Public Information............. III-177 
Evaluation Area 6: Support Operation/Facilities............................................ III-184 


D. REP Exercise Preparation Guides for Evaluators and Team Leaders....................... III-197 


1. Purpose and Organization ................................................................................... III-197 


2. General Guidance for Evaluators ........................................................................ III-197 


3. General Guidance for Team Leaders .................................................................. III-203 


E. American Red Cross Guidance ................................................................................. III-207 


F. Use of State, Tribal and Local Personnel as REP Exercise Evaluators .................... III-221 


G. Exercise Credit .......................................................................................................... III-223 


H. Scenario Options ....................................................................................................... III-231 


I. Correct Issues Immediately....................................................................................... III-235 


J. Evaluation of Emergency Medical Services Drills ................................................... III-237 


K. Post-Exercise Activities and Documentation............................................................ III-239 


APPENDIX A: ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS USED IN REP .......................... A-1 


APPENDIX B: GLOSSARY OF REP TERMS................................................................... B-1 


APPENDIX C: RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS 
PROGRAM POLITY AND GUIDANCE .................................................. C-1 

I. FEMA Documents............................................................................. C-1 


II. 44 CFR Regulations .......................................................................... C-4 


III. Other Agency/Guidance Documents................................................. C-4 


IV. FEMA Guidance Memoranda ........................................................... C-6 


V. FEMA Policy Statements.................................................................. C-7 


VI. Policy and Guidance Clarification: Memoranda and Letter.............. C-8 


Tables 

Table 1: Plume and Ingestion EPZ Characteristics ............................................................. I-9 
Table 2: Generic REP Exercise Tasks................................................................................. III-1 
Table 3: Milestones for REP Exercise Process ................................................................... III-2 
Table 4: Federal Evaluation Process Matrix ....................................................................... III-10 
Table 5: Comparison of Evaluation Areas with NUREG-0654 .......................................... III-12 
Table 6: Assignment of Evaluation Criteria to OROs......................................................... III-19 
Table 7: Detailed Federal Evaluation Process Matrix......................................................... III-227 


Interim REP Program Manual iv August 2002 


Section I  Introduction 

I. INTRODUCTION TO THE REP PROGRAM MANUAL 
A. PURPOSE AND SCOPE 
This manual is intended to be the principal source of policy and guidance for the Federal 
Emergency Management Agencys (FEMA) Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) 
Program. It was developed in response to the REP Strategic Review Steering Committees 
(SRSC) Initiative 1.13 and the recommendations of many of our REP Program partners. It is 
intended to assist State, Tribal, and local governments, as well as FEMA staff, in planning, 
training, exercising, and other emergency preparedness activities in the vicinity of nuclear power 
plant sites. 

Previously issued FEMA Guidance Memorandums, policy memorandums, and some REP series 
documents have been incorporated in this manual and rescinded. Guidance on specific technical 
areas and other REP Program documents that did not lend themselves to incorporation in this 
manual have been retained as technical references. Technical references are listed in 
Appendix C and cited in the applicable section(s) of this manual. The rescinded guidance 
documents are also listed in Appendix C for historical purposes. To the greatest extent possible, 
all future REP Program guidance will be issued as amendments to the applicable section(s) of 
this manual. 

B. REGULATORY BASIS FOR THE REP PROGRAM 
1. Assignment of Responsibility 
FEMA and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) cooperate to promote and regulate 
REP in communities near commercial nuclear power plants. FEMA is the lead Federal agency 
for providing assistance to State, Tribal, and local governments and for review and evaluation of 
State, Tribal, and local REP plans and preparedness (exercises). The responsibilities of FEMA 
and the NRC in this regard derive from executive and Congressional actions following the 
March 1979 accident at the Three Mile Island nuclear power station. 

In Executive Order 12148 and the Presidential Directive of December 7, 1979, the President 
directed FEMA to take the lead in State, Tribal, and local emergency planning and preparedness 
activities with respect to nuclear power facilities. This assignment followed from FEMAs 
statutory role in promoting, funding, coordinating, and providing technical assistance for disaster 
preparedness, as defined in 42 United States Code (USC), Section 5131. 

Congress directed the NRC to establish emergency preparedness as a criterion for licensing 
commercial nuclear power facilities. The NRC Authorization Acts for 1980 [Public Law 
(PL) 96-295] and 19821983 (PL 97-415) establish the linkage between offsite emergency 
preparedness and facility licensing. The acts prohibit the NRC from issuing an operating license 
for a power plant unless it finds that there exists a State, local, or utility plan which provides 
reasonable assurance that public health and safety is not endangered by operation of the facility 
concerned (PL 97-415, Section 5, Volume 96 Congress, U.S. Statutes-at-Large, page 2,069). 
The acts also provide for the NRC to consult FEMA in developing standards for evaluating plans 

Interim REP Program Manual I-1 August 2002 


Section I  Introduction 

[PL 96-295, Section 109(b), Volume 94 Congress, U.S. Statutes-at-Large, page 784] and in 
making individual determinations of reasonable assurance [PL 96-295, Section 109(b), 
Volume 94 Congress, U.S. Statutes-at-Large, page 784]. 

Under these authorities, FEMA and the NRC have issued regulations and guidance, conducted 
reviews, and made licensing decisions regarding nuclear power plants since 1980. Licensed 
facilities were required to submit State, Tribal, and local REP plans for review and to have plans 
in place by April 1, 1981. After that date, if the NRC finds, at any time, that such reasonable 
assurance is not present, and if the Deficiencies are not corrected within 120 days, the NRC 
(under 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part () 50.54[s]) will determine whether the 
reactor shall be shut down until such Deficiencies are remedied or whether other enforcement 
action is appropriate. The NRC bases its findings regarding State, Tribal, and local preparedness 
on a review of FEMA findings and determinations. 

2. Standards and Criteria for Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Preparedness 
FEMA and the NRC have issued regulations outlining the process and standards with which they 
will evaluate REP plans. NRC regulations (10 CFR 50.47) state that the NRC will base its 
findings on a review of FEMAs findings and determinations with respect to offsite emergency 
preparedness; the regulations specify 16 standards that response plans must meet. FEMA 
regulations (44 CFR 350) include the same 16 standards and incorporate by reference the joint 
FEMA/NRC guidance document, in Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological 
Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants (NUREG0654/
FEMA-REP-1, Revision 1, November 1980), cited herein as NUREG-0654. As stated in 
44 CFR 350.5(a): Both the planning and preparedness standards (of 10 CFR 50.47 and 44 
CFR 350.5) and related criteria contained in NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Revision 1 are to be 
used by FEMA and NRC in reviewing and evaluating State, Tribal, and local radiological 
emergency plans and preparedness. 

The planning standards and evaluation criteria contained in NUREG-0654 are used by FEMA, 
the NRC, and other Federal agencies (with clarification, interpretation, and revisions as needed) 
to evaluate whether emergency planning and preparedness at a given site are adequate to protect 
the health and safety of the public living in the vicinity of the nuclear power facility by providing 
reasonable assurance that appropriate protective measures can be taken offsite in the event of a 
radiological emergency... [44 CFR 350.12(b)(1)]. The planning guidance contained in 
Section II of this manual provides explanations of the standards and criteria that apply to Offsite 
Response Organizations and their plans. Certain criteria throughout NUREG-0654 (including 
Planning Standard B  Onsite Emergency Organization) do not pertain to offsite planning and 
preparedness. 

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Section I  Introduction 

3. 
Procedures for Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Preparedness 
FEMA and the NRC have entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that establishes 
policy and terms for mutual cooperation in evaluating emergency preparedness in support of 
nuclear power plants. The MOU was adopted in January 1980 and has been revised three times, 
with the following effective dates: November 1, 1980; April 9, 1985; and June 17, 1993. The 
MOU outlines FEMAs responsibilities in evaluating offsite emergency preparedness and details 
the procedures under which the NRC requests, and FEMA provides, preparedness findings. 

Under the MOU, FEMA may review radiological emergency planning and preparedness and 
provide its findings to the NRC under various circumstances: 

 
As part of the process described in 44 CFR 350, where the Governor of a State has 
submitted site-specific plans for review, FEMA will review planning and preparedness and 
forward its findings to the NRC. 
 
At the request of the NRC, FEMA will provide interim findings on the current state of 
preparedness, based on review of site-specific plans and on exercise performance if an 
exercise has been held. The NRC may, for example, request an interim finding in 
connection with an application for an early site permit under 10 CFR 52 and the MOU. 
 
FEMA may review emergency preparedness at an operating site on its own initiative or at 
the request of the NRC. If FEMA concludes that there is no longer reasonable assurance of 
public protection, it will withdraw approval of preparedness for the site and forward its 
findings to the NRC. The NRC will review FEMAs findings and determine the appropriate 
measures to be taken. If the NRC finds that the state of emergency preparedness does not 
provide reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the 
event of a radiological emergency, the NRC will notify the affected Licensee and start the 
120-day clock for the Licensee to make appropriate changes. During that time, FEMA 
will work with the State, and the NRC will monitor the Licensee to ensure that appropriate 
corrective measures are taken. 
 
In the event of a disaster that may affect emergency response preparedness in the vicinity of 
a nuclear power plant (e.g., a hurricane or earthquake that disrupts roads used for 
evacuation), FEMA may initiate a special review to determine whether preparedness has 
been significantly degraded. The results of such a review will be forwarded to the NRC for 
its consideration in making decisions on the restart or continued operation of the affected 
facility. 
The MOU also describes the joint FEMA/NRC Steering Committee, which is to be the focal 
point for coordination of emergency planning and preparedness and assure coordination of 
plans and preparedness evaluation activities and revise, as necessary, acceptance criteria for 
Licensee, State, and local radiological emergency planning and preparedness [MOU Section IX, 
44 CFR 353, Appendix A (1993)]. Questions about the interpretation of the criteria used for 
evaluating plans and preparedness are to be referred to FEMA Headquarters and, when 

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Section I  Introduction 

appropriate, to the FEMA/NRC Steering Committee to assure uniform interpretation [MOU 
Section III.B, 44 CFR 353, Appendix A (1993)]. 

Pursuant to FEMA policy and procedures, FEMA Regional Office personnel evaluate plans, with 
assistance from Regional Assistance Committee (RAC) members. The Regional RACs consist of 
representatives of Federal agencies that have agreed to assist FEMA in providing technical 
assistance to State, Tribal, and local governments and evaluate REP plans and exercises on the 
basis of their special authorities, missions, and expertise. Reviews of REP plans and 
recommended findings prepared by FEMA Regional Offices are forwarded to FEMA 
Headquarters for final determination by the Associate Director of the National Preparedness 
Directorate. FEMA Headquarters forwards its reviews of the adequacy of the REP plans and 
final findings to the NRC for its use in making licensing decisions. 

4. Alternative Approaches and Methods 
The planning standards outlined in 44 CFR 350.5 and 10 CFR 50.47 are regulatory 
requirements for Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) participating in radiological emergency 
planning and preparedness for commercial nuclear power plant accidents. The evaluation criteria 
listed in NUREG-0654, as clarified and applied by NRC, FEMA, and other Federal agencies, 
represent Federally approved approaches for meeting the intent of the regulatory planning 
standards. Offsite Response Organizations may propose alternative approaches to meeting those 
standards in writing to the appropriate FEMA Regional Office for review. The FEMA Regional 
Offices will forward their recommendations on such proposals to FEMA Headquarters for 
review and approval. FEMA will coordinate the review of proposals with RAC members and 
their agencies Headquarters staff when the issues raised in such proposals involve their agencys 
areas of expertise and missions. FEMA will also coordinate with the NRC and Licensees when 
offsite planning and preparedness issues affect onsite planning and preparedness. When 
appropriate, proposed alternative approaches should be demonstrated during an exercise, and if 
performed successfully, and approved by FEMA, they should become a part of the OROs 
emergency response plan. 

5. Review and Approval of Emergency Preparedness 
FEMA conducts its reviews of State, Tribal, and local radiological emergency preparedness 
according to the provisions of 44 CFR 350. Those regulations define procedures for submitting 
plans for review and approval, as well as other requirements (public meeting and exercise) for 
establishing reasonable assurance of public health and safety. Responsibilities are defined at the 
FEMA Regional and Headquarters levels for evaluation and administrative approval of State, 
Tribal, and local preparedness, including procedures for withdrawal of approval if subsequent 
information indicates that preparedness is no longer adequate. 

The process stipulated by 44 CFR 350 begins when a State applies for approval of its planning 
and preparedness for a particular nuclear power plant site. The State submittal covers both the 
State and appropriate local governments. In States with multiple sites, plans for each site are 
submitted separately. FEMA approval of planning and preparedness is site specific. The 
Governor or designee signs a letter declaring that, in the opinion of the State, the plans are 

Interim REP Program Manual I-4 August 2002 


Section I  Introduction 

adequate to protect the health and safety of its citizens...by providing reasonable assurance that 
State, Tribal, and local governments can and intend to effect appropriate protective measures 
offsite in the event of a radiological emergency (44 CFR 350.7[d]). Application is made to the 
appropriate FEMA Regional Director. 

The Regional Director must acknowledge receipt of the application within 10 days and publish a 
notice in the Federal Register within 30 days. With assistance from the RAC (chaired by 
FEMA), the Regional Director makes a detailed review of the plans submitted and assesses the 
capability of State, Tribal, and local governments to effectively implement the plans through the 
conduct of a joint utility/State/Tribal/local full-participation exercise. The States capability to 
implement the plan includes factors such as adequacy and maintenance of procedures, training, 
resources, staffing, and equipment. The review is conducted according to the planning standards 
and evaluation criteria outlined in 10 CFR 50.47(b), 44 CFR 350.5, and NUREG-0654. The 
Regional Director works with the State to resolve any gaps or Deficiencies identified in the 
review. 

In addition to submitting plans for review, the applicant must conduct at least one joint, full-
participation exercise and hold a public meeting in the vicinity of the plant to review the plan and 
exercise. On the basis of a review of the plans, exercise, and public meeting, the Regional 
Director submits the plan and his or her evaluation to the FEMA Associate Director. The 
material forwarded by the Regional Director should include an evaluation of each planning 
standard set out in 44 CFR 350.5 and other relevant items, including the results of any REP 
exercise, a summary of the Deficiencies identified during the public meeting or exercise(s), 
recommendations made to the State for improvements, and commitments made by the State for 
effecting improvements. 

The Associate Director reviews the plans submitted by the Regional Director as necessary, with 
assistance from the Federal Radiological Preparedness Coordinating Committee (FRPCC) and 
other FEMA offices. The Associate Director approves the plans if he or she determines that they 
are adequate (i.e., provide reasonable assurance) and that State, Tribal, and local response 
organizations are capable of implementing them. Approval (or disapproval) is communicated to 
the Governor, the NRC, and the appropriate Regional Director and is published in the Federal 
Register. 

After approval is granted, FEMA continues to monitor the state of preparedness at each site 
through evaluation of exercises and plan updates. The schedule of required exercises is described 
in the regulations (44 CFR 350.9). If the plan undergoes a significant change as defined in the 
regulations (44 CFR 350.14), the change is processed in the same manner as an initial plan 
submittal. However, the Regional Director may determine that certain procedures, such as 
holding a public meeting or a complete exercise, are unnecessary. In that case, the existing 
approval remains in effect during review of the change. 

If, at any time, the Associate Director determines that the plan is no longer adequate or no longer 
capable of being implemented, he or she advises the Governor of the affected State, the 
appropriate Regional Director, and the NRC. The notification from the Associate Director must 
spell out in detail the reasons for the determination. The State then has 120 days to either correct 

Interim REP Program Manual I-5 August 2002 


Section I  Introduction 

the Deficiencies noted or submit an acceptable plan for correcting them. If a plan for correcting 
Deficiencies is submitted, the Associate Director negotiates with the State regarding the schedule 
for implementing the corrective action plan. If the Deficiencies have not been corrected and an 
acceptable plan has not been submitted after 120 days, or if a plan was accepted but the 
Deficiencies were not corrected by the agreed-upon date, the Associate Director may withdraw 
FEMA approval of the plan and undertake the notifications described above (i.e., the Governor, 
the NRC, and the appropriate Regional Director.) 

6. Federal Delegation of Tasks 
FEMA regulation 44 CFR 351 delineates the responsibilities of each Federal department and 
agency and assigns tasks for providing Federal assistance in radiological emergency planning 
and preparedness measures on the basis of each agencys mission, role, and expertise. On 
October 22, 1980, 44 CFR 351 was initially published for interim use and public comment and 
was subsequently published as a final regulation in the Federal Register on March 11, 1982. The 
following Federal organizations are assigned responsibilities: Department of Agriculture, 
Department of Commerce, Department of Defense, Department of Energy, Department of Health 
and Human Services (Centers for Disease Control, Food and Drug Administration), Department 
of Housing and Urban Development, Department of Justice (Federal Bureau of Investigation), 
Department of State, Department of the Interior, Department of Transportation, Department of 
Veterans Affairs, Environmental Protection Agency, Federal Communications Commission, 
General Services Administration, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and NRC. 

This regulation establishes two formal mechanisms for coordinating the provision of Federal 
assistance to State, Tribal, and local governments: the FRPCC for coordinating Federal agency 
activities at the national level and the nine RACs for coordinating activities at the regional level. 

Interim REP Program Manual I-6 August 2002 


Section I  Introduction 

C. 
TECHNICAL BASIS FOR THE REP PROGRAM 
1. 
Nature of the Hazard 
Radiation is any form of energy propagated as rays, waves, or streams of energetic particles that 
travel through space or a material medium. Nuclear radiation is of concern in REP planning 
because it is typically ionizing radiation, which can damage human cells. 

There are three basic types of ionizing radiation that could pose a radiological hazard during an 
accidental release at a nuclear power plant site: 

 
Alpha radiation is a positively charged particle emitted from the unstable nucleus of a 
radioactive isotope when the neutron-to-proton ratio in the nucleus is too low. Alpha 
particles are highly ionizing, but the particles travel short distances in air (4 centimeters) 
before being absorbed. Alpha particles have a very low ability to penetrate objects; a few 
sheets of paper or the outer layers of skin can stop them. The external hazard from alpha 
particles is minimal, while the internal hazard (when they are inhaled or absorbed) may be 
significant. 
 
Beta radiation is a negatively charged particle emitted from the unstable nucleus of a beta-
unstable radioactive atom. Beta particles usually travel greater distances in air than alpha 
particles (about 2 meters) before being absorbed. Beta particles are more penetrating than 
alpha particles  they can pass through an inch of water or human tissue  but a thin sheet 
of aluminum can stop them. Depending on the radionuclide, beta particles may constitute an 
external radiation hazard, such as skin burns. 
 
Gamma radiation is electromagnetic radiation emitted from the nucleus of a radionuclide. It 
travels a greater distance in air than do either alpha or beta particles before being absorbed. 
Gamma ray radiation is similar to X-rays; dense shielding material, such as lead, is needed 
to absorb it. Gamma-ray radiation is the most common external radiation hazard 
encountered in a radiation incident. Because of their high penetrating power, high-energy 
gamma rays can irradiate the entire human body almost uniformly, and they pose a serious 
external and internal hazard. 
It is important to distinguish between direct exposure to radiation and exposure through 
radiological contamination. A person exposed to a medical X-ray receives direct radiation, but 
the body is not radioactively contaminated. Radioactive contamination occurs when radioactive 
particles are deposited on a persons skin and can be absorbed through the skin or by inhalation 
or ingestion. These considerations form the basis of emergency planning, along with actions 
implemented to protect the health and safety of the public after an accidental radiological release. 

2. Emergency Planning Zones 
The Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) is the area surrounding a nuclear power plant site for 
which plans have been made to ensure that prompt and effective actions can be taken to protect 
the health and safety of the public in the event of an accident or incident at the site. Two types of 

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Section I  Introduction 

EPZs are recognized for planning purposes: the plume exposure pathway EPZ and the ingestion 
exposure pathway EPZ. The characteristics of these two types of EPZs are summarized in 
Table 1. Each type of EPZ is a roughly circular area with the nuclear power plant at the center. 
The sizes of the EPZs represent a technical judgment based on the type and quantity of 
hazardous materials present (source term) and the potential risks where detailed planning is 
needed to ensure adequate response to an emergency. An EPZ may include more than one State. 
Split jurisdictions (i.e., part of the jurisdiction is included in the EPZ and part is not) also exist. 
In these cases, EPZ boundaries are determined on the basis of consultation with all parties 
involved, including the State, Tribal, and local governments, FEMA, and the NRC. In some 
cases, a conservative option is taken, and the entire jurisdiction is included in the EPZ. 

The size of the plume exposure pathway EPZ (about 10 miles) is based on the following 
considerations: 

 
Projected doses from traditional design-basis accidents would not exceed the Protective 
Action Guide (PAG) levels outside the zone; 
 
Projected doses from most core damage sequences would not exceed PAG levels outside the 
zone. 
 
For the worst-case core damage sequences, immediate life-threatening doses would 
generally not occur outside the zone. 
 
Detailed planning within approximately 10 miles would provide a substantial base for 
expansion of response efforts to a larger area, if necessary. 
The size of the ingestion exposure pathway EPZ (about 50 miles in radius, including the 
10-mile-radius plume exposure pathway EPZ) is based on the following considerations: 

 
The downwind range within which contamination may potentially exceed the PAGs is 
limited to about 50 miles from a power plant because of wind shifts during the release and 
travel periods. 
 
Atmospheric iodine (i.e., iodine suspended in the atmosphere for long periods) may be 
converted to chemical forms that do not readily enter the ingestion pathway. 
 
Much of the particulate material in a radioactive plume would have been deposited on the 
ground within about 50 miles from the plant. 
 
The likelihood of exceeding ingestion exposure pathway PAG levels at 50 miles is 
comparable to the likelihood of exceeding plume exposure pathway PAG levels at 10 miles. 
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Section I  Introduction 

TABLE 1 Plume and Ingestion EPZ Characteristics 

Type of EPZ Exposure Sources Size 
Plume Exposure Pathway  Whole-body external exposure to gamma 
radiation from the passing plume and from 
deposited material 
Approximately 
10-mile radius 
 Thyroid exposure through inhalation from the 
passing plume 
 Committed effective dose equivalent exposure to 
other critical organs through inhalation 
Ingestion Exposure Pathway  Ingestion of contaminated water or foods such as 
milk, fresh vegetables, and aquatic foodstuffs 
may result in increased risk of radiation-induced 
cancer to the thyroid, bone marrow, and other 
organs 
Approximately 
50-mile radius 

3. 
Protective Action Guides 
A PAG is the projected dose to individuals that warrants protective actions from an accidental 
release of radioactive materials. Specific protective actions are warranted to prevent or minimize 
the potential dose, which is the future dose calculated for a specified period on the basis of 
estimated or measured initial concentrations of radionuclides or exposure rates that would be 
received by individuals if no protective actions were taken. A PAG does not imply an acceptable 
level of exposure risk; it is used only to minimize the risk from an event that is occurring or has 
already occurred. The following criteria were used to establish PAGs: 

 
Avoid acute health effects. 
 
Keep the risk of delayed health effects within upper bounds that adequately protect public 
health and are reasonably achievable. 
 
Ensure that the health risk from protective actions does not exceed the health risk from the 
dose that would be avoided. 
Separate PAGs have been developed for the early (plume) and the intermediate (ingestion and 
relocation) phases of an incident. The PAG for the early phase, as recommended by 
EPA-400-R-92-001,1 is 1 to 5 rem for evacuation (if possible) or for sheltering (if evacuation is 
not possible). Evacuation is usually initiated at 1 rem. In some situations, however, sheltering is 
recommended on the basis of site-specific conditions, including the type of release. 

Manual of Protective Action Guides and Protective Actions for Nuclear Incidents, U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency, EPA-400-R-92-001, May 1992. 

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Section I  Introduction 

For use during the intermediate phase, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 
(DHHS) and U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) (Federal Register notice dated 
August 13, 1998) have developed ingestion PAGs of 0.5 rem for the committed effective dose 
equivalent (CEDE) or 5 rem for the committed dose equivalent (CDE) to individual tissues or 
organs, whichever is more restrictive. Derived intervention levels (DILs) have been established 
on the basis of a specific set of assumptions  the specific radionuclide concentrations in food 
that are equivalent to the ingestion PAGs. The DILs establish the levels of radioactive 
contamination at which food is not normally permitted into commerce. Responsible officials 
should take protective actions to prevent or reduce the concentration of radioactivity in food or 
animal feed or isolate any food containing radioactivity to prevent its introduction into 
commerce. 

The intermediate-phase relocation PAG, established by EPA-400-R-92-001 is 2 rem total 
effective dose equivalent (TEDE) in the first year. The long-term objectives are to keep doses at 
or below 0.5 rem during each subsequent year after the release and the total dose at or below 
5 rem in 50 years. The relocation PAG addresses post-plume external exposure to deposited 
radioactive materials and inhalation of re-suspended radioactive materials that were initially 
deposited on the ground or other surfaces. 

In addition to the PAGs, separate dose limits have been established for emergency workers, as 
provided in EPA-400-R-92-001. The TEDE for emergency workers who have taken potassium 
iodide (KI) is not likely to exceed five times their measured external dose, as indicated by direct-
reading dosimeters (DRDs), for the more probable and less severe accidents. For example, if the 
external dose measured by a DRD is limited to 5 roentgens (R), the TEDE is not likely to exceed 
25 rem. 

Radiological emergency response plans should include the following dose limits for emergency 
workers: 

 
A limit of 5 rem for all routine emergency activities; 
. 
A limit of 10 rem for protecting valuable property (when a lower dose is not practicable); 
. 
A limit of 25 rem for life-saving activities or protection of large populations (where a lower 
dose is not practicable); and 
. 
A dose greater than 25 rem for life-saving activities or protection of large populations when 
an emergency worker volunteers for the mission and is fully aware of the risks involved. 
These are recommended maximum limits; an organization may decide to adopt lower 
administrative limits as a conservative measure or in special cases. 

4. Protective Actions 
Protective actions are activities conducted in response to an incident or potential incident to 
prevent or minimize the projected radiation dose, when the benefits of the action are sufficient to 

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Section I  Introduction 

offset any undesirable features of the protective action. Each protective action is designed to 
implement one of the following radiation protection principles: decrease time of exposure, 
increase distance from the source, provide shielding from the plume, or limit ingestion of 
contaminated foodstuffs. The protective actions offsite authorities may implement include the 
following: 

 
Evacuation from areas of projected plume passage; 
. 
Shelter in homes or other structures; 
. 
Access control; 
. 
Administration of KI to emergency workers, populations who cannot be evacuated, and, 
where included in the emergency plans, the general public; 
. 
Control of surface contamination; 
. 
Placing livestock on stored feed and protected water; 
. 
Quarantine or exclusion of foodstuffs; and 
. 
Relocation of populations from areas where radiation levels exceed the relocation PAG. 
The appropriate protective action will depend on a number of factors, for example, projected 
beginning of the radiological release, projected duration of the release, composition and direction 
of the release, weather conditions, and time of day (e.g., day versus night). All protective actions 
have the common goal of preventing or minimizing exposure of the public to radiation. 

Interim REP Program Manual I-11 
August 2002 


Section I  Introduction 

Interim REP Program Manual I-12 August 2002 


Section I  Introduction 

D. DECOMMISSIONING OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS 
To Be Developed 
Interim REP Program Manual I-13 August 2002 


Section I  Introduction 

Interim REP Program Manual I-14 August 2002 


Section I  Introduction 

E. PUBLIC INFORMATION MATERIALS REVIEW GUIDANCE2 
A GUIDE TO PREPARING AND REVIEWING 
PUBLIC INFORMATION MATERIALS 
AND 
EMERGENCY ALERT SYSTEM INSTRUCTIONS 
FOR 
RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCIES 


Section I.E (pages I-15 through I-46) supersedes the FEMA draft document A Guide to Preparing and Reviewing 
Public Information Materials and Emergency Alert System Instructions for Radiological Emergencies 

(FEMA-REP-11). Page numbers have been revised to correspond to this manual. 

Interim REP Program Manual I-15 August 2002 


Section I  Introduction 

Interim REP Program Manual I-16 August 2002 


Section I  Introduction 

CONTENTS 


INTRODUCTION................................................................................................................... I-19 


BACKGROUND..................................................................................................................... I-21 


PURPOSE ............................................................................................................................... I-22 


I. PREPARATION OF EMERGENCY PUBLIC INFORMATION MATERIALS ........... I-23 


 A. Audience Analysis and Targeting ............................................................................... I-23 


1. Foreign Language Speaking Population ............................................................... I-23 


2. Special Needs Population...................................................................................... I-23 


3. Farming Population............................................................................................... I-24 


4. Transient Population ............................................................................................. I-25 


 B. Emergency Information Materials .............................................................................. I-25 


1. Emergency Focus and Purpose ............................................................................. I-25 


2. Content of Emergency Information....................................................................... I-26 


a. 10Mile Plume EPZ........................................................................................ I-26 


b. 50Mile Ingestion EPZ ................................................................................... I-28 


3. Organization of Content........................................................................................ I-28 


 C. Comprehensibility ........................................................................................................ I-29 


1. Choice of Document Format................................................................................. I-29 


2. Readability ............................................................................................................ I-30 


3. Graphic Design...................................................................................................... I-31 


a. Typography ..................................................................................................... I-31 


b. Layout and Design .......................................................................................... I-31 


c. Photographs and Art Work.............................................................................. I-32 


d. Color................................................................................................................ I-32 


e. Paper................................................................................................................ I-33 


II. EMERGENCY BROADCAST PROCESS AND INSTRUCTIONS............................... I-33 


 A. Coordination................................................................................................................ I-34 


 B. Content ........................................................................................................................ I-34 


 C. Comprehensibility....................................................................................................... I-36 


1. Language ............................................................................................................... I-36 


2. Brevity................................................................................................................... I-36 


3. Clarity and Coherence........................................................................................... I-36 


4. Consistency and Comprehensiveness ................................................................... I-36 


5. Repetition .............................................................................................................. I-37 


 D. Format ......................................................................................................................... I-37 


E. Delivery....................................................................................................................... I-38 


Interim REP Program Manual I-17 August 2002 


Section I  Introduction 

APPENDICES 

A. Emergency Education and Information Techniques Guidance Checklist................... I-39 


B. Ingestion Exposure Pathway Brochure Checklist ....................................................... I-43 


 C. Reference Materials..................................................................................................... I-45 


Interim REP Program Manual I-18 August 2002 


Section I  Introduction 

A Guide To Preparing and Reviewing 


Public Information Materials 
And 
Emergency Alert System Instructions 
For 
Radiological Emergencies 


INTRODUCTION 

Instructing the public on how to respond in the event of an emergency is a vital element of 
emergency planning and preparedness. The guidance presented in this section is intended to 
promote continued improvements in the content and comprehensibility of informational 
materials distributed prior to an emergency, as well as emergency broadcast instructions, i.e., 
Emergency Alert System (EAS) (formerly the Emergency Broadcast System.) and other 
broadcast media messages, disseminated during an actual emergency. 

Although this guidance will concentrate on radiological emergencies, many of the preparedness 
activities associated with radiological emergencies can also be applied to all other types of 
hazards. Public informational materials concerning commercial nuclear power plant 
emergencies are produced by both the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commissions (NRC) licensees 
and State, Tribal and local governments, often through a combined effort. 

Informational materials should clearly inform members of the public about how they will be 
notified of an emergency and about the steps they could be asked to take in response to the 
emergency. These informational materials should be prepared prior to an actual emergency and 
distributed annually. EAS messages should notify members of the public that an emergency has 
occurred, specify the segment(s) of the population affected by the emergency, and list the actions 
to be taken by the public in response to the emergency. A range of prescripted EAS messages, 
relating to the range of potential emergency situations, should be prepared in advance of an 
actual emergency. Procedures for authorizing and disseminating these messages should also be 
in place prior to an emergency. 

Many factors influence the publics understanding of emergency information materials and 
emergency broadcast instructions. Some of these factors, such as reader interest, knowledge, 
appeal, clarity of content, legibility, visibility, and style, cannot be objectively measured. 
Readability - sentence length and word difficulty - can be objectively measured. 
Comprehensibility is a more difficult concept to quantify because it represents the interplay of 
many variables, including prior knowledge and experience, attitudes toward the subject matter, 
motivation and traditional measures of readability and understanding. The length of emergency 
information materials must also be considered. 

Setting standards for evaluating emergency information is very difficult because some elements 
like graphics and design are not readily quantifiable. Other elements, especially for the hearing 
and sight impaired, are challenging because of the different types of communication available. 

Interim REP Program Manual I-19 August 2002 


Section I  Introduction 

Producing information materials is a creative process and needs a certain latitude within which to 
operate. 

Nonemergency public reading materials, such as newspapers and commercial advertisements, 
are written at grade 79 reading levels. However, because of the high stress level during an 
emergency, emergency informational materials and EAS messages should be written at the lower 
level end of the grade 79 reading level or perhaps even below. 

Interim REP Program Manual I-20 August 2002 


Section I  Introduction 

BACKGROUND 

One of the responsibilities of FEMA is to review offsite radiological emergency preparedness, 
planning, response, and public information materials. In doing so, FEMA assists State and local 
governments in implementing their responsibilities for the safety of persons and property in the 
vicinity of commercial nuclear power plants. FEMA rule, 44 CFR part 350 incorporates the 
planning standards and evaluation criteria from NUREG-0654/FEMAREP1, Revision 1, 
(herein after referred to as NUREG-0654) and establishes the policy and procedures that FEMA 
uses to evaluate and approve State and local offsite radiological emergency response plans and 
preparedness. This evaluation is based on planning standards and evaluation criteria specified in 
NUREG-0654 and its Supplement 1, Final Report, September 1988. Planning Standard G 
addresses the content and dissemination of public information within the Emergency Planning 
Zone (EPZ). 

A major issue that requires further attention is that of emergency broadcast message 
development, content and delivery. Therefore, a section on emergency broadcast messages has 
been added to this document to provide additional guidance on emergency messages and 
instructions for correcting this problem. 

Organizations with assigned offsite responsibilities should alert the public and provide 
emergency instructions and information, as necessary, to address the following: 

(1) the status of the emergency; 
(2) potentially affected populations and areas; and 
(3) protective measures that may be necessary. 
While recognition is made in NUREG-0654 of the use of special alerting mechanisms for 
institutions such as schools, no exceptions for providing emergency alerting and notification of 
the public are set forth in this guidance. Therefore, it is expected that the public will be alerted 
and notified of all protective measures, including precautionary evacuations of schools, unless 
other more definitive guidance is provided. The main reason for this is the importance of keeping 
parents informed of the status of their children throughout the duration of an emergency at a 
commercial nuclear power plant. 

Interim REP Program Manual I-21 August 2002 


Section I  Introduction 

PURPOSE 
This guidance serves two basic purposes: 


(1) to assist State, Tribal and local governments and licensees in preparing or revising 
emergency information materials and emergency broadcast instructions and 
(2) to assist with the review and evaluation of these materials. 
This guidance is divided into two sections: 
I. Preparation of Emergency Public Information Materials, and 
II. Emergency Broadcast Process and Instructions. 
While this information may be applicable to all types of emergencies, the emphasis will be 
placed on communications relating to emergencies at commercial nuclear power plants. 

The two guidance checklists at the end of this document (for plume exposure pathway and 
ingestion exposure pathway) provide a summary of the various recommendations made 
throughout this guidance. 

Interim REP Program Manual I-22 August 2002 


Section I  Introduction 

I. PREPARATION OF EMERGENCY PUBLIC INFORMATION MATERIALS 
A. Audience Analysis and Targeting 
Commercial nuclear power plants are located in areas with varying demographic characteristics. 
Emergency information materials should be based on an analysis of the target population and 
contain information that addresses all aspects, e.g., language spoken, of a site-specific audience 
profile. Information on characteristics of the population is useful for choosing among possible 
distribution methods, including: annual mailings, community meetings, personal visits, mobile 
exhibits, school materials, and videotapes. 

Sometimes, special population groups, such as foreign language speaking populations, mobility 
limited or physically impaired persons, farmers, and transients, live in or commute to the EPZ 
and may have unique information requirements. Any unique information requirements should be 
considered and integrated into the relevant information materials. It is important to recognize the 
need to be flexible when addressing the basic elements of emergency education and information 
materials. 

1. Foreign Language Speaking Population. 
Local circumstances may suggest the need for written materials in a foreign language 
Translation of Public Education Brochures, if the foreign language speaking population of 
voting age exceeds 5 percent of the population of a 10-mile EPZ county or its equivalent, 
emergency preparedness information should be translated into that foreign language. The 
most recent Census data should be used to determine if a foreign language translation is 
required. Consideration should also be given to the percentage of seasonal foreign language 
speaking transients and to demographic changes. 

Alternative efforts may be needed to ensure that the foreign language speaking population 
will have the opportunity, at least annually, to obtain translated information similar to that 
provided to the general population. Such efforts could include special courses of instruction 
for the foreign language community leaders, public meetings featuring a trained foreign 
language speaker, training for leaders of neighborhood organizations, advertisements in 
foreign language newspapers, and oral assistance to individuals through a buddy system. 
Before selecting a method, a judgment should be made about the capability of the foreign 
language speaking population to comprehend English, and consideration should be given to 
the way the population usually receives information. Written materials may not be the only 
means of communication. 

2. Special Needs Population. 
An assessment should be made of the number and types of special needs persons living in the 
area, and their impairments, e.g., mobility, hearing, etc. A system to identify these 
individuals should be developed and confidentially maintained. The frequency of updating 
such an inventory is a local decision, but FEMA recommends at least an annual review. The 
results of that assessment will indicate the need to provide information, at least annually, in 

Interim REP Program Manual I-23 August 2002 


Section I  Introduction 

an appropriate format; for example, oral briefings for those with vision impairments or 
alternative methods of emergency notification for the hearing impaired. 

One way to make this assessment is by using a self-identification card that can be distributed 
with emergency information materials. Other means of identifying members of the special 
needs population are listed in FEMA GM-24, Radiological Emergency Preparedness for 
Handicapped Persons. These resources include national organizations for different groups of 
handicapped or disabled individuals and fire service organizations, since they often provide 
services for handicapped persons. Also, elderly residents who have minor impairments of 
vision that may hinder reading emergency instructions in average print size should be 
considered. 

3. Farming Population. 
Many 10-mile EPZs may include farming populations, food processing facilities or food 
distribution centers. Farmers, food processors and distributors in the EPZ need additional 
instructions on special measures to take for the care and feeding of livestock and the handling 
of food and agricultural products. 

When the 10-mile EPZ encompasses rural farm areas, instructions or references to sources of 
information on the protection of agricultural animals and related food products should be 
included in the information distributed to the public as part of the annual mailing or should 
be separately produced and distributed. 

Arrangements should be made for public information efforts to be directed at farmers, farm 
workers, food processors, and distributors within the 50-mile ingestion exposure pathway 
EPZ in the event of an actual emergency. The State emergency offices, in cooperation with 
the State Extension Offices, should be prepared to deliver written materials, within 24 hours 
of the declaration of the emergency classification level specified in the State plan, to the 
agricultural population in the ingestion pathway EPZ. 

The State Emergency Services Office and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) are other 
sources of basic information on the implementation of agricultural measures and food 
assistance. Other topics may be extracted for publication from the Disaster Handbook for 
Extension Agents, available from county USDA extension offices. Other sources of food and 
agricultural emergency information are the U.S. Department of Energy (airborne contamination 
monitoring); the Environmental Protection Agency (ground contamination monitoring); and the 

U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Food and Drug Administration (food safety 
standards). 
Arrangements should be made to have pre-prepared scripts of emergency information 
available as needed for broadcast via radio, television, and National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) Weather Radio with broadcast arrangements 
pre-planned. Copies of scripts and printed emergency information should be available when 
requested. 

Interim REP Program Manual I-24 August 2002 


Section I  Introduction 

4. Transient Population. 
Another aspect of performing an audience analysis of an EPZ is identifying the transient 
population and its information requirements. Transient populations could include people who 
may be spending time in an isolated location within the EPZ, such as in the woods, parks, or 
on a lake or reservoir, and people who come into the EPZ on an intermittent or one-time 
basis and reside in guest lodgings or motels. 

Basic notices about what the emergency notification signal is and what to do can be handled 
with an ample number of explicit emergency posters or signs of very few words. These signs 
or posters should be placed in carefully chosen locations, such as lodgings, commercial 
establishments, and access points to recreational areas in remote locations. Additional details 
can be handled with a flyer that can be distributed at establishments serving the transient 
population. 

When recreational activities are conducted on private property, steps should be taken to enlist 
the owners cooperation in posting appropriate signs or distributing appropriate information 
to persons who will be on the property. Authorities who provide licenses for recreational 
activities such as fishing, hunting or boating should provide emergency information with the 
license. 

B. Emergency Information Materials 
Recognizing that the large amount of informational materials delivered to the public is 
confusing, it is very important to pay attention to detail when providing the population with 
important information. 

1. Emergency Focus and Purpose. 
Emergency materials should be easily identified. The covers should include: (1) titles that 
indicate that purpose and (2) statements that the materials should be read and retained for use 
in an emergency. The mailing envelope, or the addressed side of the information material if it 
is a self-mailer, also should be clearly labeled to convey the important nature of the enclosed 
emergency materials and the need for retention. 

The introductory passage should state that the primary purpose of the material is to supply 
important information and instructions to follow in an emergency. The material should 
identify the subject matter - a potential emergency at a nuclear power plant, another hazard, 
or a combination of hazards. It should state that the emergency information applies to several 
emergency situations and identify those appropriate to the area. 

The primary emphasis should be on what to do in an emergency with a secondary emphasis 
on public health background information. In short, the most important function of the 
emergency information material should be to provide well-organized and well-displayed 
information about what to do in an emergency. 

Interim REP Program Manual I-25 August 2002 


Section I  Introduction 

2. Content of Emergency Information. 
The content of the emergency information material should provide the target audience with 
all the information necessary for an expeditious response to an emergency. The content must 
be consistent with the State or local plan and the information to be broadcast over the EAS 
stations at the time of the emergency. 

Public relations passages, including letters and quotes from political, agency, or licensee 
officials, should be examined for overall contribution to the objectives of the publication 
before their inclusion in the material. 

When a glossary is included in the material, it should contain only the definitions of terms 
found in the material or used in the emergency broadcast information or other media during 
an emergency. Extraneous terms in a glossary can be confusing and occupy space that can be 
better used. 

a. 10Mile Plume EPZ. 
Emergency information materials should contain the following information: 

(1) 
A clear statement of purpose. 
(2) 
Date of issue and issuing agency. 
(3) 
A document retention statement. 
(4) 
A clear discussion of how EPZ residents will be notified of an emergency and where 
to turn for emergency information. Both the call letters and channels of the radio and 
television stations serving in the EAS or other prompt notification system should be 
identified. 
(5) 
Instructions for Shelter-In-Place. Specific and logically presented instructions 
should be provided. These instructions must be consistent with the State or local 
plan. 
(6) 
Evacuation Instructions. Information related to evacuation preparations and 
procedures including: instructions for securing the home; a list of evacuation 
supplies; suggestions for notifying neighbors and friends; transportation assistance 
information; suggested evacuation destinations including the need (if any) to report 
to reception or relocation centers; and clearly defined evacuation routes and written 
directions to accompany an EPZ evacuation map. 
(7) 
An easy to read EPZ nap. The map should highlight evacuation routes and directions 
and the location of reception centers. Evacuation routes should be clearly labeled 
with road numbers or names that are consistent with the State or local plan and with 
the EAS messages. The map should include a simple map legend and compass rose. 
Interim REP Program Manual I-26 
August 2002 


Section I  Introduction 

(8) 
Provision for determining special needs. The material should include a special 
needs card to be completed and returned by residents needing special assistance 
during an emergency. A tearoff or bound/stapled prepaid postcard may be used for 
booklettype publications. 
(9) 
An emergency assistance telephone number and instructions on its use. (This will 
depend on whether the local emergency plan calls for an emergency telephone 
number or makes other provisions.) Hotline telephone numbers for use during 
emergencies should be distinguished from informational telephone numbers for use 
during non-emergencies. 
(10) Public Inquiry. Public inquiry telephone numbers should be included for use during 
an emergency. 
(11) Provisions for special populations. The material should include emergency 
information consistent with the State or local plan about the care of school children, 
children at day care centers, and private schools, hearing-and mobility -impaired 
persons, and those needing transportation assistance. Supplemental documents 
prepared for special populations should provide basic information on the procedures 
for notifying special populations and details on protective actions. 
(12) Agricultural information, if appropriate to the area. Instructions, or references to 
sources of information, about the protection of livestock and agricultural products 
should be included in the informational material when the 10-mile EPZ 
encompasses rural farm areas, food processing facilities or food distribution centers. 
(13) Information on congregate care or relocation centers. The identification of 
designated congregate care or relocation centers, the evacuation routes leading to 
those centers, and a description of the services and supplies provided by the centers 
should be contained in the informational material. 
(14) Use of radioprotective drugs. Both the shelter and evacuation sections of the 
information material should include an explanation of the use of radioprotective 
drugs such as potassium iodide (if authorized by State or local governments for use 
by the public). 
(15) Educational information. Basic information on radiation should be included in the 
emergency information materials. Detailed information on radiation, plant operation, 
and emergency classification levels may be presented through other non-emergency 
related means. 
(16) Contacts for additional information. 
Include the names, addresses and telephone 
numbers of those agencies that may be contacted for additional information or where 
questions of a non-emergency nature can be answered. 
(17) Blank space for additional information. This is helpful to record important 
information for use during an emergency. 
Interim REP Program Manual I-27 
August 2002 


Section I  Introduction 

b. 50Mile Ingestion EPZ. 
Emergency information for use by the agricultural community should include the following 
information: 

(1) Notification procedures. The information material should identify how members of 
the agricultural community will be notified of an emergency and which protective 
actions should be taken. 
(2) Preventive protective actions. Instructions should be provided for taking preventive 
protective actions for animal feed, water, livestock, milk, poultry and poultry 
products, vegetables and fruits, meat and meat products, grains, honey and soil. This 
information should include personal protection procedures for working in 
contaminated areas or with contaminated products. Precautions related to hunting 
and fishing in contaminated areas should be provided. 
(3) State and local emergency protective actions. Instructions should be provided for 
taking emergency preventive protective actions primarily involving the interdiction or 
condemnation of foods, feeds, or other contaminated products. 
(4) Educational information. Sufficient information should be provided regarding the 
effects of radiation and radioactive material deposits on the human food supply and 
agricultural products to emphasize the importance of taking preventive and 
emergency protective actions. 
(5) Sources of additional information. The information material should identify sources 
where additional agricultural emergency information may be obtained. 
3. Organization of Content. 
The emergency information should use logical, carefully sequenced patterns of organization. 
Presentation of information should be based on the immediacy of the need for that information 
during an emergency. The material should have the following organizational features: 

a. Placement of Emergency Information. 
Emergency information should be positioned in a prominent place at the front of the 
material. This information should be presented according to the chronological sequence 
of events that might occur or in the order of importance and relevance of the information. 
Information on how the population will be notified of an emergency should precede 
information on how to respond. Emergency needs and actions of the general public 
should be addressed before those of special populations. 

Interim REP Program Manual I-28 August 2002 


Section I  Introduction 

b. Placement of Vital Information. 
The presentation of vital emergency instructions should precede all other emergency 
related information. 

c. Self-contained Sections. 
Each topical section within the emergency instructions portion of the material should be 
self-contained. Care should be taken to ensure that the content of a given section does not 
reference information in sections located on other pages. 

d. Placement of Other Information. 
Information that is not directly related to an emergency or to the health and welfare of the 
target audience can be considered educational in nature and should be placed after the 
emergency information. One effective strategy is to remove the bulk of educational 
information to a separate document to ensure the effectiveness of the emergency 
information contained in the primary document. A newsletter format may be a successful 
vehicle for educational information. 

C. Comprehensibility 
Information must be understood and retained if it is to be used when needed in an emergency. 
Clarity and style are important elements. Good graphic design coupled with clear, pertinent text 
has a higher likelihood of being understood and followed by the public. 

1. Choice of Document Format. 
Several types of documents, such as booklets, telephone book inserts, foldouts, brochures, maps 
with text, calendars, and posters, can be effective if issued on a regular basis. Each format has a 
different strength: telephone book inserts can provide excellent positioning and ensure retention; 
posters provide highly visible information to residents or transients who might be otherwise 
difficult to reach; brochures provide detail; and calendars increase the possibility of retention. 
The choice of format should encourage the EPZ population to keep the instructions available. 

The adequacy and appropriateness of the format used will depend on the audience profile, the 
message and other informational materials or programs used as reinforcement, and the general 
distribution strategy. Before choosing a type of format, or combination of formats, decide who 
will receive the message, how it will be received, and what information should be transmitted. 
Some formats may form a part of an overall notification and educational plan. They can be 
effective when used in conjunction with other types of materials. The concept of a major 
emergency information document distributed to the EPZ population and supported by a 
comprehensive program of supplementary materials may be an effective approach to emergency 
preparedness. 

Interim REP Program Manual I-29 August 2002 


Section I  Introduction 

Another format consideration is the size and shape of the evacuation map; it should be large 
enough to be legible and still be manageable in a moving vehicle. Information materials should 
be of sufficient size to be easily used, stored, and found again when needed. 

2. Readability. 
The term readability refers to the ease with which a given passage of text can be read and 
understood. Several formulae have been developed to predict readability and have been validated 
by comprehensive testing. The Dale-Chall formula is appropriate for predicting the readability of 
written emergency information materials. In determining readability, two basic factors should be 
considered: sentence length and vocabulary difficulty. 

The greater the average sentence length, the more difficult the information is to understand. 
More complex and more difficult language usually is associated with longer sentence lengths. 
Sentence length is also related to the complexity of the sentence structure. For example, as the 
number of dependent clauses in a given sentence increases, so does the intellectual sophistication 
needed to comprehend the material. 

The higher the proportion of words classified as difficult, the higher, or more difficult, the 
passage rating will be. Word difficulty affects readability in the following ways: 

(a) Over-reliance on words with three or more syllables increases the difficulty rating of the 
passage. 
(b) Over-reliance on words not found in the Dale-Chall list of familiar words increases 
passage difficulty. The Dale-Chall list has been expanded to include those words that are 
familiar to residents near nuclear power plants. These words are: nuclear, atomic, 
emergency, radiation, transportation, evacuation and sheltering. 
Language usually described, as bureaucratic should be avoided. Language of an overly 
technical, legalistic, formal and official tone is difficult to interpret and should be avoided. 
Everyday terms and expressions should be used wherever possible. It is important to remember 
that terminology familiar to public information preparers and reviewers may not be familiar to 
the public. 

Emergency information materials prepared for the agricultural community will include a variety 
of agricultural terms, the use of which can result in higher readability ratings when evaluated 
using traditional readability formulae. While such terms may not be part of the reading 
vocabulary of the general population, they should be familiar to members of the agricultural 
community. 

The guiding principle in developing readable and easily understood public information materials 
should be brevity, clarity, and simplicity. The use of legalistic and technical language, however 
precise, tends to defeat the purpose of comprehensibility. 

Interim REP Program Manual I-30 August 2002 


Section I  Introduction 

3. Graphic Design. 
Graphic design is one of the more subjective factors affecting comprehensibility. While 
readability can be assessed through the application of formulae, there are no such yardsticks to 
judge graphic design. Effective graphic design reduces the level of effort needed for 
comprehension, motivates interest and makes a clear impression. It can clearly establish the 
purpose of the material while emphasizing the content and meaning of important sections. Since 
written information is picked up in very brief intervals, it is important to provide adequate visual 
relief in text material. 

The cover design provides the best opportunity for motivating interest, establishing personal 
relevance and setting the purpose of the document. 

Experienced graphic designers or other qualified professionals should be involved in the early 
stages of planning emergency public information materials to ensure that the design 
accomplishes its purpose. It should attract attention, communicate the importance of the message 
in the text, and make the message easy to understand. Graphic design elements should 
complement and reinforce the basic message in the text. The design should always reinforce the 
function of a document, strengthen it and make it even more useful. Graphic design relies on the 
careful mix of several elements: 

a. Typography. 
The function of typography is to make the message legible and easy to read. To fulfill 
this function, typography depends on: style (boldface, italics, etc.); font (Boldface, 
Optima, and other type faces); size (6-point, 10-point, 18-point, etc.); and size of column 
or block of type, i.e., how much white space surrounds the type. 

As a general rule, emergency information materials should use text type that is 10-points 
or larger to make it easy to read. Readability research indicates that simple sans serif type 
is easier to perceive than a more elaborate serif or old-world font. There should be a 
comfortable balance between the type and white space between the lines - too little space 
is a strain on the eye; too much prevents the reader from organizing the concepts in a 
logical progression. Generally, the more white space around a column of type, the more 
the words stand out. 

b. Layout and Design. 
The function of layout and design is to present the printed material in a way that will 
attract attention and assist with comprehension. Good design can stimulate and reinforce 
the message and, through clarity, aid in understanding the material. To fulfill its function, 
layout and design rely on: format (choice of pamphlet, brochure, calendar, etc.); size and 
shape of columns and type blocks contained in the printed piece (e.g., justified - straight 
or flush margins, unjustified - right margin ragged); location and size of photographs and 
art work within the publication; type of paper used, and choice of colors. 

Interim REP Program Manual I-31 August 2002 


Section I  Introduction 

Make effective use of type size and font. Use bold and oversize type. Using color and 
shading to further highlight important information is also recommended. Easy-to-read 
materials do not pack too much information into small spaces. Graphic elements that 
reinforce the emergency message and aid in the quick location and comprehension of 
information should be included in the layout and design strategy. Photographs and 
artwork should be located adjacent to corresponding textual passages. An evacuation 
map, for example, should appear whenever possible on the same page as written 
evacuation instructions to prevent flipping back-and-forth between pages. 

Use logical, carefully sequenced patterns of organization. Provide organizational clarity 
with clearly marked headings such as tabs with topic headings, clear outline or question 
and answer text formats, tables of contents in an outline form, marginal topic headings in 
contrasting type sizes, colors, graphic symbols, or other organizational aids. 

c. Photographs and Art Work. 
The purpose of artwork and photographs in graphic design is to enhance the message, offer 
visual materials, and attract readers interest. 

Photographs and artwork should highlight the subject matter that requires the most 
attention. Photographs and artwork can be used in a variety of creative ways to be 
effective. Carefully select the subjects that require highlighting and be sure the printer 
reproduces the artwork or photographs in a way that meets the intent of the material. 

Use of maps, charts and symbols can assist in comprehension. When maps are used, they 
should be developed for use by an unskilled map-reader. The use of color and half-tone 
shading to minimize confusion and highlight the evacuation routes, EPZ sectors, 
reception centers or congregate care facilities can be very effective. Too much detail can 
be as confusing as too little. Evacuation routes and the location of congregate care 
centers, etc. should be checked before publication to ensure that they accurately reflect 
current highway and geographical conditions in the area. Tables and charts should be 
accurately correlated to the text, maps, or other illustrations to which they refer. 

Key symbols or graphic images should be used to identify important concepts or signal 
important sections of emergency information. The use of the universal symbol for the 
handicapped, for example, would aid the handicapped in quickly locating pertinent 
information. These symbols, when used in both a table of contents and correlated 
passages serve to aid in quickly locating needed information. 

d. Color. 
The function of color in printed materials should be to enhance the printed materials by 
making them more attractive, create a particular image, or attract the eye to an important 
passage or figure (map, chart, etc.). Since color can call attention to certain parts of the 
publication or text, it can be used to best advantage in the area of emergency instructions. 
The choice of colors to use should be considered carefully by taking into account the 

Interim REP Program Manual I-32 August 2002 


Section I  Introduction 

color comprehension limitations of color-blind individuals. Where this is a problem, 
specific public information materials should be prepared and provided to these 
individuals. 

e. Paper. 
Paper choice in graphic design serves many functions. It should provide enough 
substance to survive shipping, mailing, and ultimate use. 

Choice of paper stock should give a particular image to the information materials - that of 
importance. The paper choice should result in a good quality printed image, permit the 
clear, crisp reproduction of photographs and art work, result in smooth folds, and fit the 
image of the materials (e.g., use of old-style parchment for high-tech materials on 
satellite technology normally would be inappropriate). 

All graphic design elements should be considered both individually and as they interact 
with each other to produce the desired objectives of the publication. 

II. EMERGENCY BROADCAST PROCESS AND INSTRUCTIONS 
The careful preparation of information and instructions to be made available to the public 
through Emergency Alert System broadcast messages and follow up Special News Broadcasts 
are an essential facet of preparedness. Typically, the EAS is used for this purpose; however, 
other means, such as the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) weather 
service or other broadcast media, may be used. This notification should be made promptly and be 
accompanied by an explanation of the existing situation and accurate statements of the protective 
action decisions (if any). When time constraints for the EAS message limits the inclusion of 
requisite information and instruction to the public, Special News Broadcasts should immediately 
follow the EAS message to include this necessary information and instruction. 

Emergency instructions and informational messages should be clear, succinct and complete; 
demonstrate authority; and be presented in an appropriate style or format. 

Procedures for providing emergency information and instructions are discussed in FEMA-CPG1-
40, Emergency Alert System, and FEMA-CPG-1-41, Emergency Alert System, A Program 
Guide for State and Local Jurisdictions. In addition, pre-distributed emergency public 
information brochures discussed in Section I are an important resource during a radiological 
emergency. With all of these resources available, emergency broadcast messages should be 
information developed with one objective: to provide information on the status of a radiological 
emergency and inform the public about what actions (e.g., evacuation or shelter) they should 
take to protect themselves. By focusing on this objective, emergency broadcast messages can be 
kept relatively short. Thus, broadcasts can provide important instructions quickly and 
instructions can be rebroadcast at periodic intervals. If the emergency situation warrants, Special 
News Broadcasts may be used to better inform and instruct the public. 

Interim REP Program Manual I-33 August 2002 


Section I  Introduction 

A. Coordination 
There should be clear and direct lines of communication between the protective action decision 
making authority, the preparer of emergency broadcast messages, and the person responsible for 
activation of the EAS or other broadcast media and actual delivery of the message. If possible, 
these individuals should be co-located. If not, dedicated telephone lines and committed facsimile 
or modem capabilities should be available to allow both oral communication and transmission of 
hard copy information. Backup communication systems, such as encrypted VHR radios or 
cellular telephones, should be designated and available for this purpose. It is particularly 
important that the person making protective action decisions review emergency broadcast 
messages, preferably a hard copy, prior to broadcast. All parties involved in the alert and 
notification process should thoroughly coordinate their activities relative to the activation of the 
alerting system and development and dissemination of the EAS message. 

This coordination should include information about the scheduled times for alert and 
notification, the essential text of the EAS message, including identification of the emergency 
status and authorized protective action decisions. When possible, hard copies of EAS messages 
should be transmitted to each of the relevant parties prior to broadcast. 

When multiple jurisdictions have authority for emergency broadcast activation, it is important to 
coordinate both message content and the timing of the message delivery. The coordination of 
messages cannot occur unless there is effective communication among all parties responsible for 
providing information to be used in the EAS messages. Ideally, there should be a dedicated 
capability for simultaneous, multiparty communications. This can minimize critical time delays 
in reaching concurrence on EAS messages and in implementing activation procedures. In an 
actual emergency, many radio and television stations will be on the air continuously reporting on 
the status of the emergency and providing supplemental information to the public. Thus, the EAS 
message can be clearly differentiated from other messages and focus on pertinent protective 
actions to be taken by the affected person. 

B. 
Content 
Emergency broadcast messages should be developed to include the following content elements 
as appropriate: 

1. 
Identification of the authority (e.g., governor or mayor) issuing the emergency message. 
2. 
Description of the accident. The nature and extent of the emergency should be described 
in terms understandable to the public and should include ECL status. 
3. 
Subsequent EAS messages should include all new information. 
4. 
Clear identification of the audience. The message should convey who is at risk and for 
whom protection actions are intended through familiar landmark descriptions, e.g., rivers, 
railroad tracks, interstate highways, buildings, local government jurisdictions (counties, 
townships, villages, and towns) or zip codes, and be specified in the plan. If appropriate, 
Interim REP Program Manual I-34 
August 2002 


Section I  Introduction 

reassuring information to guide the actions of those who are not in the immediate area 
where protection actions are warranted may be provided. 

5. 
Information on sheltering. Sheltering instructions should be provided. Instructions should 
be provided for transients as well as information regarding restricted access areas. 
Provisions for children in schools in affected areas should be described. 
6. 
Information on evacuation. Evacuation instructions should include who is to go, where to 
go, and how to get there, i.e., the population at risk, evacuation routes, and the location of 
reception/congregate care centers. When appropriate, the EAS message may include 
information for: 
 
transportation-dependent 
 
handicapped 
 
institutionalized persons 
 
parents regarding their children in school or day care centers 
 
evacuees on ad hoc respiratory protection 
7. 
Emergency hotline telephone numbers should be provided for those needing special 
assistance and for public inquiries. 
8. 
When the administration of radioprotective drugs, e.g., potassium iodide, is 
recommended, procedures for obtaining medication and instructions for its use should be 
provided. 
9. 
When early ingestion pathway protective measures are recommended, instructions for 
their implementation (e.g., wash fruits and vegetables gathered from gardens) should be 
provided. 
10. Instructions to stay tuned to the emergency broadcast stations should include indications 
at the end of the broadcast on the need for a special news broadcast to follow 
immediately or when additional information can be expected. This should be considered, 
even when there is no new information at the next scheduled broadcast. 
Interim REP Program Manual I-35 
August 2002 


Section I  Introduction 

C. Comprehensibility 
1. Language. 
EAS broadcast messages should be presented with clear language that adequately 
conveys the significance of the information while succinctly specifying the needed 
emergency actions. Geographical locations should be expressed in familiar terms, using 
well known references and landmarks. Legal descriptions or map coordinates should be 
avoided. 

2. Brevity. 
Communications specialists indicate that emergency broadcast messages should be as 
short as possible in order for the public to comprehend the content of the messages. 
While it may be possible to develop and broadcast short messages of several minutes in 
length for natural hazards, it is difficult to develop EAS broadcast messages for 
commercial nuclear power plant accidents within this time frame because of the need to 
link protective actions decisions to impacted familiar landmarks and multiple reception 
centers. 

Thus, State and local governments involved in radiological emergency preparedness 
should attempt to develop prescripted emergency broadcast messages that are as short 
and succinct as possible, but sufficient in length to adequately address the items listed in 
Section II.B., as appropriate to the emergency situation and protective action 
implementation. EAS messages are generally up to 2 minutes in length. If the emergency 
situation warrants, Special News Broadcasts may be used immediately following the 
relatively brief EAS message to provide additional information and instruction to the 
public. 

3. Clarity and Coherence. 
Clarity and coherence of content presentation are essential in order to promote prompt 
and appropriate actions. The message should specify the site of the emergency, 
circumstances and other conditions related to the emergency. Emergency broadcast 
messages should provide a smooth flow and logical sequence of information. 

4. Consistency and Comprehensiveness 
The content of EAS broadcast messages should be consistent with the State or local plan, 
annually distributed public emergency information materials, and previously broadcasted 
messages. The message should reference public emergency information materials that 
provide reinforcement and non-vital information. When circumstances dictate that 
information relayed over the EAS broadcast stations differ from that included in 
previously distributed and broadcast emergency information materials, such differences 
should be clearly identified to avoid confusion. 

Interim REP Program Manual I-36 August 2002 


Section I  Introduction 

5. 
Repetition. 
Repetition is also a very important element of an effective EAS broadcast system. 
Effective messages should include repetition of the key information, as well as a 
regularly scheduled repeating of all messages until new information is available and 
messages are updated. Repetitions serve to confirm important information about purpose, 
context, source and emergency actions expected of the public. It is possible that during 
the emergency a radio or television station may provide continuous reporting on the 
response to the emergency. 

D. Format 
Pre-scripted EAS broadcast messages can contribute to important time savings when the rapid 
flow of information is essential. Several things should be considered in selecting a format for 
pre-scripted messages. The chosen format should enable the development of clear, accurate and 
complete messages in a minimum amount of time. 

A decision should be made as to the number of pre-scripted messages that should be prepared. 

Procedures should be established for reviewing messages prior to broadcast to ensure that: 

1. 
The newest or most vital information is presented near the beginning of the message. 
2. 
The message is organized so that all similar information is presented together. 
3. 
Any changes in emergency status or protective action decisions are delineated. 
4. 
Information no longer applicable is deleted. 
5. 
Information contained in the message is consistent. 
6. 
All protective action decisions are contained in the message, including those from earlier 
broadcasts. 
7. 
The status of all affected areas, including any areas where protective actions identified in 
previous broadcasts have been lifted, is presented. 
8. 
Message content is clear and concise. 
9. 
Both new and critical information is repeated within the message. 
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August 2002 


Section I  Introduction 

E. Delivery 
Responsible offsite response organizations should have the capability to provide both an alert 
signal and an instructional message within the 10-mile EPZ within about 15 minutes {exercise 
goal: in a timely manner (urgently and without undue delay)} of the decision by authorized 
offsite officials to activate the alert and notification system. (A possible exception to this exists 
in sparsely populated areas between 5 miles and 10 miles from the nuclear power plant where, in 
exception areas approved by FEMA, the time can be extended to 45 minutes.) This timely-
capability is a critical element of the prompt public emergency notification system. 

The person having the responsibility for physically activating the EAS broadcast station should 
act only after receiving instruction from the designated offsite official vested with the decision-
making authority to issue protective action decisions and authorize activation. 

Timing of alert signals and media message broadcasts should be closely coordinated. Procedures 
should be established to ensure that there is close coordination with parties responsible for siren 
activation (or other alerting mechanisms) and EAS broadcast activation are aware of the 
scheduled time for both events. These procedures should ensure that emergency messages are 
broadcast immediately following cessation of the siren, or at least within five minutes after, siren 
activation. 

It is important that all designated radio and television stations broadcast the message at the 
designated time. The EPZ population should have a listing of EAS broadcast stations and 
instructions to immediately tune to one of these stations when alerted. A capability should exist 
for monitoring these stations to ensure that messages are broadcast at the designated time and 
repeated with the designated frequency, e.g., every 15 minutes. 

A well-coordinated emergency broadcast program requires 24-hour-staffing capability with 
competent and knowledgeable personnel. Individuals tasked with preparation of instructional 
messages and with activation of the EAS broadcast system should be properly trained. They 
should know how, and by whom, they will be notified to initiate the EAS broadcast message and 
activate the EAS broadcast stations. They should be familiar with procedures for: message 
development, coordination of message content and delivery with participating jurisdictions, 
establishment of communication with primary and backup EAS stations and completion of the 
authentication process. Personnel should be properly trained in the operation of their primary and 
backup equipment. This primary and backup equipment, especially equipment necessary for 
emergency broadcast activation, should be checked periodically to make sure that it is 
operational. Substitute personnel should be identified and trained in the event that primary 
personnel are unavailable to perform these tasks. 

In summary, EAS broadcast messages are the primary vehicles for transmitting important 
emergency instructions and information to the public. They should be clear, concise, simply 
stated, and authoritative if they are to be effective. With careful planning and a flexible, 
imaginative approach to the form and content of EAS broadcast messages, this goal can be 
achieved. 

Interim REP Program Manual I-38 August 2002 


Section I  Introduction 

APPENDIX A 

EMERGENCY EDUCATION AND INFORMATION 
TECHNIQUES GUIDANCE CHECKLIST 

The public should be familiar with the general subject matter of commercial nuclear power plant 
emergencies and related emergency procedures. When the public is well informed about nuclear 
power plant emergency procedures, they will better understand written materials and emergency 
instructions. Effective preparedness depends on the existence of an ongoing, comprehensive 
public education effort that well-designed emergency information materials can provide. 

The need for education efforts and activities at the community level increase awareness about 
emergency self-protection. These efforts should go beyond the distribution of materials. The 
following items should be considered when developing or reviewing emergency public 
information and education materials. 

Yes/No Public Information and Education Materials 
______ Information and educational materials have clear emergency focus. They 
explain what to expect and in what sequence, and what actions, in order of 
priority, should be taken. 
______ The content is consistent with the State or local plans, public information 
materials, and EAS broadcast messages. 
______ When the emergency plan calls for an emergency telephone number, it is 
provided with instructions on the procedures to be followed. Hotline 
telephone numbers for use during emergencies are separate from 
information numbers used during non-emergencies. 
______ A contact is provided for additional information. 
______ Rumor control numbers are provided. 
______ Information is provided regarding alert and notification procedures. 
______ Identification of emergency broadcast stations is provided. 
______ A highly visible statement is placed on the cover that identifies the 
materials as emergency instructions or information for use during an 
emergency. 
______ Very basic information on the emergency hazard is included in the 
emergency information materials in order to inform the public of potential 
health implications. 

Interim REP Program Manual I-39 August 2002 


Section I  Introduction 

______ Sheltering is defined according to the State or local plan. 
______ Steps to enhance sheltering should be provided. 
______ Evacuation routes are described in the text and illustrated directions on an 

evacuation map of the EPZ. 

______ 
Transportation provisions are included. 

______ 
School provisions, including guidelines or instructions for parents, are 

included. 
______ Instruction on the care and feeding of livestock, if appropriate to the area, 

is included. 

______ 
Reception centers or congregate care centers are listed. 

______ 
Provisions for the hearing-and mobility-impaired are given. 

______ 
Public education passages, if included, are not distracting. 

______ 
Information regarding emergency classification levels is included. Enough 
educational information on radiation is given to provide an understanding 
of sources and relative effects, or this information is provided in separate 
materials. 

______ 
Information is provided for transients and visitors through appropriate 
means. 

______ 
The system for addressing the needs of special populations is identified. 

______ 
Radioprotective drugs such as potassium iodide (if adopted by State or 
local government agencies for use by the general public) are explained. 

______ 
The public is encouraged to alert neighbors, by means other than the 
telephone, to ensure that they also heard and understood the warning 
signals. 

______ 
Pertinent information is included relative to agricultural interests (farmers, 
food processors, etc.) in the ingestion pathway EPZ. 

______ 
An emergency supplies checklist to have in the home is included. 

______ 
A supplies checklist for use during evacuation is included. 

______ 
Home preparation for sheltering is discussed. 

Interim REP Program Manual I-40 
August 2002 


Section I  Introduction 

______ Home preparation for evacuation is discussed. 
______ General education material, if included, is placed after the emergency 


Sprocedures information. 

______ 
A section on family preplanning is provided. 

______ 
The layout is easy to follow from paragraph to paragraph and from page to 

page. Page and section breaks are consistent with the logic and 
organization of the materials. 

______ 
The information is presented in a logical sequence of topics. The flow of 
information is smooth and not disjointed. 

______ 
Within a given topic, actions to be taken come first, followed by rationale 
or explanation. 

______ 
Vocabulary is simple, comprised of non-technical terms likely to be found 
in the vocabularies of the intended population. 

______ 
Sentences are brief and concise. 

______ 
Typography is easy to read. 

______ 
The cover clearly states that the document contains important emergency 
instructions. 

______ 
The choice of colors is appropriate for colorblind individuals. 

______ 
The reading level is appropriate based on one of the following: 

______ 
The entire emergency procedures section has a reading level of 
grade 9 or below, as characterized by the Dale-Chall readability 
formula or 

______ 
The entire emergency procedures section has a reading level 
equivalent to that of the target audience, as characterized by the 
Dale-Chall readability formula. 

______ 
The format is appropriate for the emergency information included in the 
document, and the size is appropriate. 

______ 
Photographs, maps, charts, tables, and artwork are used effectively to 
enhance the text and are not distracting. 

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August 2002 


Section I  Introduction 

______ 
The various elements of graphic design work together harmoniously to 
achieve the desired effect. 

______ 
The date of issue and the name of the issuing agency are clearly indicated. 

______ 
Blank space is provided in the emergency procedures section for personal 
notes. 

______ 
Key symbols or graphic images are used to assist in locating and/or 
understanding the text. 

______ 
The format encourages retention. 

______ 
Color is used to enhance and highlight important details about the 
emergency information. 

Emergency Alert System Messages 

______ 
Public EAS broadcast instructions have a clear emergency focus and 
explain what to do. 

______ 
Instructions are consistent with the State or local plan, public information 
materials, and previous EAS messages. 

______ 
When the public is referred to written materials, this reference can be 
easily understood. 

______ 
The emergency instructions are released by a recognized State or local 

authority. 

______ 
There is a statement on when this information will be updated. 

______ 
The emergency broadcast messages are presented in a foreign language 

when appropriate. 

______ 
Sentences are brief and easy to understand. 

______ 
Messages are internally consistent. 

______ 
Messages inform the public located within areas under protective action 
decisions and those outside those areas via the use of relevant geographic 
landmark description. 

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August 2002 


Section I  Introduction 

APPENDIX B 

INGESTION EXPOSURE PATHWAY BROCHURE CHECKLIST 
STATE:__________________________________________ DATE:___________________ 
SITE:_______________________________________ FEMA REGION:________________ 
TITLE OF BROCHURE:_______________________________________________________ 
DATE OF BROCHURE:_______________________________________________________ 

AREAS OF REVIEW FOR CONTENT 

1. Does the brochure contain a statement of 
purpose? 
YES NO 
2. Is the content of the brochure consistent with 
the applicable State and local radiological 
response plans? 
3. Is the brochure dated? 
4. Does the brochure identify the issuing agency 
and contact location for obtain additional 
copies of the brochure? 
5. Does the brochure indicate where additional 
information or answers to questions on 
radiological situations can be obtained? 
6. Is there an explanation of emergency protective 
actions performed prior to and during an 
emergency? 
7. Are there examples of emergency protective 
actions to be performed prior to and during an 
emergency? 
8. Are protective actions provided for all types of 
agricultural products in the ingestion pathway 
for the site, including the following: 
a. Milk 
b. Vegetables and Fruits 
c. Meat and Meat Products 
d. Poultry 

Interim REP Program Manual I-43 August 2002 


Section I  Introduction 

 e. Grains 
f. Water 
g. Fish and Marine Life 
h. Honey 
i. Other products 
9. Are the affects of radiation and radioactive 
material deposits on the human food supply 
clearly stated? 
10. Does the brochure explain how the farmers, 
food processors, and distributors will be 
notified of an emergency? 
11. Does the brochure explain how the farmers, 
food processors and distributors will be advised 
of appropriate actions to take? 
12. Are there sources mentioned where further 
information may be obtained during an 
emergency? 
13. Are area EAS Stations listed, including radio 
stations and TV channels? 
14. Are references to EAS Stations positioned in 
prominent places in the brochure? 
15. Are telephone numbers of appropriate 
State/Local Emergency Management and/or 
Agriculture offices included in the brochure? 
16. Is the brochure easy to read and easy to 
understand? 
17. If appropriate, are brochures available in a non-
English language edition? 
18. Does the brochure provide space for personnel 
notes or listing of additional telephone 
numbers, etc.? 

PROVIDE ADDITIONAL COMMENTS ON THE BROCHURE ON AN ATTACHED SHEET 
OF PAPER, IF NECESSARY. 

Interim REP Program Manual I-44 August 2002 


Section I  Introduction 

APPENDIX C 
REFERENCE MATERIALS 


1. 
44 CFR 350, Review and Approval of State and Local Radiological Emergency Plans and 
Preparedness; Federal Register, September 28, 1983. 
2. 
44 CFR 351, Radiological Emergency Planning and Preparedness; Federal Register, 
March 11, 1992. 
3. 
NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP- 1, Rev. 1, Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of 
Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power 
Plants; Federal Emergency Management Agency, Washington, D.C., November 1980. 
4. 
FEMA-REP-14, Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program Exercise Manual; Federal 
Emergency Management Agency, Washington, D.C., September 1991. 
5. 
Guidance Memorandum 20, Foreign Language Translation of Public Education Brochures; 
Federal Emergency Management Agency, Washington, D.C., October 19, 1983. 
6. 
Guidance Memorandum 24, Radiological Emergency Preparedness for Handicapped 
Persons; Federal Emergency Management Agency, Washington, D.C., April 5, 1984. 
7. 
Disaster Handbook for Extension Agents, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Washington, D.C. 
Interim REP Program Manual I-45 
August 2002 


Section I  Introduction 

Interim REP Program Manual I-46 August 2002 


Section II  Policy and Guidance 

II. REP PROGRAM POLICY AND GUIDANCE 
Section under review  to be provided when complete. 

Interim REP Program Manual II-1 August 2002 


Section II  Policy and Guidance 

Interim REP Program Manual II-2 August 2002 


Section III.A  Milestones and Tasks 

III. REP EXERCISE GUIDELINES 
A. MILESTONES AND TASKS 
The Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) exercise process is an interrelated set of 
activities and functions involving many organizations. These activities and functions have been 
consolidated into 22 separate tasks listed in Table 2 below. While the titles of each task reflect 
the activities and functions of all organizations involved in the process, the content of the tasks 
reflects the specific responsibilities of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and 
supporting Regional Assistance Committee (RAC) members. Table 3 gives the milestones for 
the 22 tasks. 

TABLE 2 Generic REP Exercise Tasks 

No. Task 

1. Establish exercise date 
2. Prepare Work Order for Contract Support 
3. Establish exercise evaluation area criteria and extent-of-play 
4. Develop and review exercise scenario 
5. Establish exercise ground rules 
6. Request, assign and confirm evaluators 
7. Arrange logistics 
8. Prepare and distribute evaluator assignment packets 
9. Provide site-specific training to evaluators 
10. Conduct pre-exercise briefing 
11. Document organizational exercise performance 
12. Conduct post-exercise evaluator/participant interview 
13. Debrief exercise evaluators and initiate consultation process 
14. Prepare written evaluation 
15. Conduct post-exercise participants briefing 
16. Conduct the participants meeting that is open to the public 
17. Conduct 350 Approval Process Meeting 
18. Notify state of Deficiencies 
19. Prepare exercise report 
20. Evaluate and report on remedial exercise or drill 
21. Track correction of Areas Requiring Corrective Action (ARCAs) 
22. Track demonstration of exercise evaluation areas 
Interim REP Program Manual III-1 August 2002 


Section III.A  Milestones and Tasks 

Tasks 1  9 and 21 and 22 are the basic exercise planning tasks. Tasks 1  9 should be completed 
with consideration of the results of previous exercises. Tasks 10  16 and 19 and 20 are 
associated with the conduct of exercise and the evaluation of the performance of exercise 
participants. The sequential completion of these tasks is essential for FEMAs consultation with 
involved OROs and for the development of the documentation upon which FEMA findings are 
based. Tasks 18 and 20 should be completed whenever the evaluation of exercise performance 
reveals inadequacies that should be corrected within 120 days of the exercise. These results are 
provided through feedback from Tasks 21 and 22 for one or more previous exercises. 

Task 22 contributes to the overall management of the exercise process by providing critical 
information on the status of the demonstration of objectives in exercises conducted by response 
organizations within six-year periods. 

TABLE 3 Milestones for REP Exercise Process 

Time 
(No later than X days 
before/after exercise) Task Milestone 
365 1 Exercise date established. 
120 2 Preparing work order for contract support 
90 3 Submission of exercise evaluation areas and review of exercise 
evaluation area tracking per Task 22 of previous exercise. 
75 3 Complete FEMA and NRC review of evaluation areas and establish 
extent-of-play agreements. 
60 4 Exercise scenario submitted for FEMA review. 
60 5 Exercise ground rules established. 
45 6 Evaluators requested, assigned and confirmed. 
4 FEMA and NRC review of exercise scenario completed. 
30 7 Logistics arranged. 
15 4 Final scenario adjustments completed. 
14 8 Evaluator packets prepared and distributed. 
1 9 Site-specific evaluator training completed. 
1 10 Pre-exercise briefing conducted. 
Exercise day (ED) 11 Organizational performance during exercise documented. 
ED 12 Post-exercise evaluator/participant interviews conducted. 
ED + 1 13 Post-exercise evaluator debriefing conducted. 
ED + 2 13 RAC Chair initiates consultation process for Deficiencies. 

Interim REP Program Manual III-2 August 2002 


Section III.A  Milestones and Tasks 

TABLE 3 (Cont.) 

Time 
(No later than X days 
before/after exercise) Task Milestone 
ED + 2 14 Evaluation Modules including Narratives and any issues (as 
appropriate) completed and submitted to RAC Chair. 
ED + 2 15 Post-exercise participants briefing conducted. 
ED + 2 16 Participants meeting that is open to the public conducted. 
ED + 2 17 Conduct 350 Approval Process Meeting 
ED + 10 18 Official notification of identified Deficiencies through letter from 
FEMA Regional Director (RD) (consistent with consultation with 
FEMA HQ) to State, NRC HQ, and RAC, with information copy to 
Licensee. 
ED + 20 18 State acknowledges receipt of Deficiency letter and proposes 
schedule for remedial actions. 
ED + 30 19 Draft exercise report provided by region to ORO for review. 
ED + 60 19 Draft exercise report comments due back from ORO to FEMA 
Region. 
ED + 90 19 Final exercise report issued by the FEMA Region. 
ED + 120 20 Remedial exercise or drill conducted and evaluated, as necessary, to 
correct Deficiencies. 
Next biennial exercise 21 Demonstrate correction of exercise ARCAs completed. 
Ongoing 22 Track demonstration of exercise evaluation areas 

Interim REP Program Manual III-3 August 2002 


Section III.A  Milestones and Tasks 

TASK 1: ESTABLISH EXERCISE DATE 

Description 

The date(s) when the REP exercise will be conducted is established through a consultation 
process involving State and local governments, other organizations that will participate in the 
exercise, involved FEMA Regional Offices, RAC members, and the Licensee. When the 
exercise is scheduled, the FEMA Regional Office informs FEMA HQ of the date. The date(s) is 
established to meet specific regulatory requirements. 

Milestone 

The preferred milestone date for completion of this task is 365 days in advance of the exercise. It is 
recognized that as a result of the consultative process described above, this date may be negotiated 
at some figure less than 365 days. It is recommended that the date provide at least six months for 
exercise preparation and planning. Modifications to the agreed-upon date may be necessary to 
accommodate unforeseen scheduling conflicts. 

References 

44 CFR Part 350.9. 

Products 

Specific date(s) on which the exercise will occur. 

Guidance 

For States requesting FEMA approval of radiological emergency plans under the FEMA rule 
44 CFR Part 350, the State, involved local governments, and other support organizations should 
participate in a qualifying exercise. Once the qualifying exercise provision has been met, joint 
exercises should be conducted biennially (i.e., every two years) under the provisions of 44 CFR 
Part 350.9 (c)(1)-(4) and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, F.3, and by December 31 of the second year 
following the exercise. For example, if the first biennial exercise is completed in March 2001, the 
second exercise should be completed by the end of December 2003. 

Interim REP Program Manual III-4 August 2002 


Section III.A  Milestones and Tasks 

TASK 1: ESTABLISH EXERCISE DATE 

Pre-operational exercises, under the NRC rule 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, F.1., shall be 
conducted no more than two years prior to NRC issuing an operating license to Licensees. These 
exercises should be jointly scheduled by involved State and local organizations, 
RAC members, the Licensee, and other responsible parties with FEMA and NRC concurrence. 


When two FEMA Regions are involved in the same exercise, the host Regional Office should have 
the lead FEMA role in establishing dates for exercises. The host Regional Office is the FEMA 
Region where a commercial nuclear power plant is located. 


Interim REP Program Manual III-5 August 2002 


Section III.A  Milestones and Tasks 

TASK 2: PREPARE WORK ORDER FOR CONTRACT SUPPORT 

Description 

Based on the Evaluation Area Criteria selected for the exercise, the RAC Chair/Site Specialist 
determines the number and type of contractor support personnel required for the exercise and 
prepares the Work Order Request. 

Milestone 

This task shall be completed and submitted to FEMA Headquarters 120 days prior to the 
exercise. 

References 

Federal Emergency Management Agency, Radiological Emergency Preparedness Off-Site 
Exercise and Program Support Contract Administration Guidance Manual, September 2000 as 
amended. 

Products 

A completed Work Order which has been prepared in accordance with Section 5 (Processing 
Work Orders) and Appendix A (Boilerplate Sample Exercise Work Order) of the REP Off-
Site Exercise and Program Support Contract Administration Manual. 

Guidance 

Work Orders should be both as simple and as detailed as possible. Particular detail is necessary 
under the Work Required section to insure that the appropriate numbers and types of 
evaluators/support personnel are assigned to fit the specific exercise or task. The Period of 
Performance should be inclusive of the earliest possible date that the Scenario Reviewer 
(Subject Matter Expert  SME) may began work and the latest possible date that report review or 
completion may take place. While the Description section is fairly standard, it is important to 
provide your best estimate of the hours of work needed by the type of support required. 

Interim REP Program Manual III-6 August 2002 


Section III.A  Milestones and Tasks 

TASK 3: 
ESTABLISH EXERCISE EVALUATION AREA CRITERIA AND 
EXTENT-OF-PLAY 

Description 

The RAC Chair establishes a set of evaluation area criteria for each exercise by negotiations with 
OROs, RAC members, and the Licensee. Responsibility for the demonstration of selected 
evaluation area criteria is assigned to various participating OROs. Extent-of-play agreements are 
negotiated, documented, and provided to the evaluator in order to establish the type and level of 
demonstration for all assigned evaluation area criteria. 

Milestone 

The State and Licensee submit evaluation area criteria 90 days prior to the exercise. FEMA and 
NRC Regional Offices should complete their review of exercise evaluation area criteria 75 days 
prior to the exercise. Extent-of-play agreements should also be completed 75 days prior to the 
exercise. 

References 

44 CFR Part 350.2 (j), (k), NUREG-0654. 

Products 

List of specific exercise evaluation area criteria and extent-of-play agreements for each ORO. 

Guidance 

There are two levels of participation in REP exercises, full and partial. Full participation primarily 
refers to each organization demonstrating all of the emergency phase capabilities outlined in its 
plan, including facility and field-based functions. Partial participation primarily means that field 
activities are not demonstrated. 

Plume Pathway Exercises: This guidance applies to exercises when there is no exercise play 
involving the ingestion exposure pathway and relocation, reentry, and return functions (plume-only 
exercises). 

State and local governments should fully participate in an exercise at one site twice every six years. 
For States with more than one site, the State should rotate this full participation among sites and 
partially participate at all the others. Local governments with plume planning responsibilities for 
more than one site may request permission to partially participate. If full participation poses an 
undue hardship on local governments, requests for exemption from full participation should be 
submitted to the FEMA Regional Office, which will in turn forward the request to FEMA 
Headquarters. 

Interim REP Program Manual III-7 
August 2002 


Section III.A  Milestones and Tasks 

TASK 3: 
ESTABLISH EXERCISE EVALUATION AREA CRITERIA AND 
EXTENT-OF-PLAY 

When partially participating in an exercise, States do not need to demonstrate field activities 
(e.g., field radiological monitoring); however, they should demonstrate direction and control, 
communications, accident assessment, and protective action decision-making functions. 

Partial participation by local governments (when approved) means that the organizations 
emergency operating center is activated, but that there is limited demonstration of field activities. 

Out-of-Sequence Demonstrations: Out-of-sequence demonstrations are those activities and 
resources derived from the offsite response plan and included as part of a comprehensive REP 
exercise that can be separated from the exercise. These activities and resources can be treated as 
independent elements of the emergency response. Negotiations during the development of the 
extent-of-play agreement will be used to determine those activities that will be demonstrated out-ofsequence 
with the plume pathway exercise, but will be considered part of it for exercise reporting 
purposes. The RAC Chair makes the final decision on what, if anything, is acceptable for out-ofsequence 
demonstrations. An example of an out-of-sequence demonstration should be the 
evaluation of a reception center which is activated for the purpose of radiologically monitoring and 
decontaminating evacuees. Possible emergency response elements which may be demonstrated outof-
sequence are provided in the Federal Evaluation Process Matrix (Table 4). 

Post-Plume Exercises: This guidance applies to exercises involving post-plume protective action 
decision making and implementation. 

A State should fully participate in the post-plume portion of exercises at least once every six years. 
In States with more than one site, the State should rotate this participation from site to site. Partial 
participation by a State in post-plume activities at sites within that State is not required. During the 
year in which the full-participation post-plume exercise is held at one of the sites, the responsible 
State and local governments should review their plans and procedures for the other sites within the 
State to verify their accuracy and completeness. This review should validate the identification of 
farms, food processors, and distributors. This review and any resultant revisions should be made 
and reported in the Annual Letter of Certification, as part of their annual review and plan update. 

A State that has post-plume-related responsibilities for a site located within its borders and that is 
also within the 50-mile ingestion exposure pathway of a site located in a bordering State should 
partially participate in all of the post-plume-related exercises for those bordering State sites. States 
that do not have a power plant located within their borders, but are located within the 50-mile EPZ 
of a bordering States power plant, should fully participate in at least one exercise every six years. 

Since local governments are not usually required to develop and test post-plume plans and 
preparedness, State officials would be the emergency personnel primarily involved in the post-
plume portion of exercises. However, in some States, local governments have responsibilities that 
require their participation in such exercises. The number and function of personnel needed should 
be sufficient for carrying out those protective action measures that are necessitated by a particular 

Interim REP Program Manual III-8 
August 2002 


Section III.A  Milestones and Tasks 

TASK 3: 
ESTABLISH EXERCISE EVALUATION AREA CRITERIA AND 
EXTENT-OF-PLAY 

accident scenario. Also, organizations fully participating in the post-plume portion of an exercise 
should deploy field teams to secure and analyze media samples as required by the accident scenario. 

As stated above, State officials would be the emergency personnel primarily involved in the post-
plume portion of exercises. The number and function of State personnel needed should be 
determined on the basis of verifying capabilities for carrying out the following responsibilities: 
direction and control, communications, accident assessment, protective action decision making, and 
dissemination of emergency information to the general public and or organizations involved with 
post-plume protective actions. Organizations partially participating in the post-plume portion of an 
exercise need not deploy field teams (e.g., to secure and analyze media samples), as such activities 
can be simulated. 

The REP exercise evaluation area criteria restate, in a functional manner, those planning standards 
and evaluation criteria of NUREG-0654 that can be demonstrated and observed in exercises. Each 
evaluation area criteria refers to ORO capabilities to perform emergency functions, such as 
communicating among response organizations, dose assessment, and alerting and notifying the 
public through implementation of plans. Collectively, these evaluation area criteria cover the full 
range of functional capabilities that should be demonstrated by OROs participating in exercises 
conducted to secure or retain FEMA approval of plans and preparedness under the FEMA rule, 
44 CFR Part 350. 

Some evaluation area criteria are core functions and activities that must be demonstrated during 
each exercise. Some evaluation area criteria focus on fundamental radiological emergency response 
capabilities and should be demonstrated in every exercise by some organizations. The specific 
participating organizations are determined by scenario events and exercise play. This contrasts with 
the evaluation area criteria mentioned above, which should be demonstrated by all organizations in 
every exercise. Evaluation area criteria should be demonstrated at least once every six years by 
every ORO with responsibility for them. 

Other evaluation area criteria focus on important emergency preparedness capabilities that should 
be demonstrated at least once every six years by each organization with responsibility for them, as 
determined by the organizations plans and procedures. To determine the frequency of the 
evaluation area criteria, refer to the Federal Evaluation Process Matrix (Table 4). 

Interim REP Program Manual III-9 
August 2002 


Section III.A  Milestones and Tasks 

TASK 3: 
ESTABLISH EXERCISE EVALUATION AREA CRITERIA AND 
EXTENT-OF-PLAY 

TABLE 4 Federal Evaluation Process Matrixa 

Evaluation Area and Sub-Elements 
Consolidates REP-14 
Objective(s) 
Minimum 
Frequencyb 
1. Emergency Operations Management 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 14, 17, 30 
a. Mobilization Every Exercise 
b. Facilities Every Exercise 
c. Direction and Control Every Exercise 
d. Communications Equipment Every Exercise 
e. Equipment and Supplies to 
Support Operations 
Every Exercise 
2. Protective Action Decisionmaking 5, 7, 9, 14, 15, 16, 17, 26, 28 
a. Emergency Worker Exposure 
Control 
Every Exercise 
b. Radiological Assessment & 
Protective Action 
Recommendations & Decisions for 
the Plume Phase of the Emergency 
Every Exercise 
c. Protective Action Decisions for the 
Protection of Special Populations 
Every Exercise 
d. Radiological Assessment and 
Decisionmaking for the Ingestion 
Exposure Pathwayc 
Once in 6 yrs. 
e. Radiological Assessment & 
Decisionmaking Concerning 
Relocation, Reentry, and Returnc 
Once in 6 yrs. 
3. Protective Action Implementation 5, 14, 15, 16, 17, 27, 29 
a. Implementation of Emergency 
Worker Exposure Control 
Every Exercise 
b. Implementation of KI Decision Once in 6 yrs.d 
c. Implementation of Protective 
Actions for Special Populations 
Once in 6 yrs.e 
d. Implementation of Traffic and 
Access Controlf 
Every Exercise 
e. Implementation of Ingestion 
Pathway Decisions 
Once in 6 yrs. 
f. Implementation of Relocation, 
Reentry, and Return Decisions 
Once in 6 yrs. 

Interim REP Program Manual III-10 
August 2002 


Section III.A  Milestones and Tasks 

TASK 3: 
ESTABLISH EXERCISE EVALUATION AREA CRITERIA AND 
EXTENT-OF-PLAY 

TABLE 4 Federal Evaluation Process Matrix (contd) 

Evaluation Area and Sub-Elements 
Consolidates REP-14 
Objective(s) 
Minimum 
Frequencyb 
4. Field Measurement and Analysis 6, 8, 24, 25 
a. Plume Phase Field Measurements 
and Analysis 
Every Full-
Participation 
Exerciseb 
b. Post-Plume Phase Field 
Measurements and Sampling 
Once in 6 yrs. 
c. Laboratory Operations Once in 6 yrs. 
5. Emergency Notification and Public 
Information 
10, 11, 12, 13 
a.1 Activation of the Prompt Alert and 
Notification System 
Every Exercise 
a.3 Notification of Exception Areas 
and/or Backup Alert and 
Notification System within 45 
Minutes 
Every Exercise  
as needed 
b. Emergency Information and 
Instructions for the Public and the 
Media 
Every Exercise 
6. Support Operations/Facilities 18, 19, 20, 21, 22 
a. Monitoring and Decontamination 
of Evacuees and Emergency 
Workers and Registration of 
Evacuees 
Once in 6 yrs.e 
b. Monitoring and Decontamination 
of Emergency Worker Equipment 
Once in 6 yrs.e 
c. Temporary Care of Evacuees Once in 6 yrs.g 
d. Transportation and Treatment of 
Contaminated Individuals 
Every Exercise 

a See Evaluation Criteria for specific requirements. 

b Each State within the 10-mile EPZ of a commercial nuclear power site shall fully participate in an exercise jointly with the 
licensee and appropriate local governments at least every two years. Each State with multiple sites within its boundaries shall 
fully participate in a joint exercise at some site on a rotational basis at least every two years. When not fully participating in an 
exercise at a site, the State shall partially participate at that site to support the full participation of the local governments. 

c The plume phase and the post-plume phase (ingestion, relocation, reentry and return) can be demonstrated separately. 

d Should be demonstrated in every biennial exercise by some organizations and should be demonstrated at least once every six 
years by every ORO with responsibility for implementation of KI decision. 

e All facilities must be evaluated once during the six-year exercise cycle. 

f Physical deployment of resources is not necessary. 

g Facilities managed by the American Red Cross (ARC), under the ARC/FEMA Memorandum of Understanding, will be 
evaluated once when designated or when substantial changes occur; all other facilities not managed by the ARC must be 
evaluated once in the six-year exercise cycle. 

Interim REP Program Manual III-11 
August 2002 


Section III.A  Milestones and Tasks 

TASK 3: 
ESTABLISH EXERCISE EVALUATION AREA CRITERIA AND 
EXTENT-OF-PLAY 

Prior to the promulgation of the current REP Evaluation Areas Exercise Methodology, REP 
Exercises were evaluated using the Radiological Emergency Preparedness Manual (FEMAREP-
14) and the Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise Evaluation Criteria (FEMAREP-
15). The following table cross-references the Evaluation Areas to the NUREG-0654 
criteria and to the Objectives and Points of Review in FEMA-REP-14 and -15. This should be 
used when analyzing prior exercise reports and results in preparation for an upcoming exercise. 

TABLE 5 Comparison of Proposed Evaluation Areas with NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, 
Rev. 1 Planning Criteria and REP-14/15 Objectives and Criteria 

EVALUATION AREA / Sub-element / Criterion 
NUREG 
-0654 
Criteria 
REP-14/15 
Objective & 
Criterion 
1  EMERGENCY OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 
8,14, 17, 30 
1.a  Mobilization 
1.a.1: OROs use effective procedures to alert, notify, and mobilize 
emergency personnel and activate facilities in a timely manner. 
A.4; 
D.3,4; 
E.1,2; H.4 
1.1, 1.2; 30 
1.b  Facilities 
1.b.1: Facilities are sufficient to support the emergency response. H.3 2.1 
1.c  Direction and Control 
1.c.1: Key personnel with leadership roles for the ORO provide direction 
and control to that part of the overall response effort for which they 
are responsible. 
A.1.d; 
A.2.a,b 
3.1 
1.d  Communications Equipment 
1.d.1: At least two communication systems are available, at least one 
operates properly, and communication links are established and 
maintained with appropriate locations. Communications 
capabilities are managed in support of emergency operations. 
F.1,2 4.1 
1.e  Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations 
1.e.1: Equipment, maps, displays, dosimetry, potassium iodide (KI), and 
other supplies are sufficient to support emergency operations. 
H.7, 10; 
J.10.a,b,e; 
J.11; K.3.a 
2.1; 5.1; 8.2; 
14.2 

Interim REP Program Manual III-12 
August 2002 


Section III.A  Milestones and Tasks 

TASK 3: 
ESTABLISH EXERCISE EVALUATION AREA CRITERIA AND 
EXTENT-OF-PLAY 

TABLE 5 Comparison of Proposed Evaluation Areas with NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, 
Rev. 1 Planning Criteria and REP-14/15 Objectives and Criteria (contd) 

2  PROTECTIVE ACTION DECISION MAKING 5, 7, 9, 14, 15, 
16, 26, 28 
2.a  Emergency Worker Exposure Control 
2.a.1: OROs use a decision-making process, considering relevant factors 
and appropriate coordination, to ensure that an exposure control 
system, including the use of KI, is in place for emergency workers 
including provisions to authorize radiation exposure in excess of 
administrative limits or protective action guides. 
J.10.e,f; 
K.4 
5.1, 5.3; 14.1 
2.b  Radiological Assessment and Protective Action Recommendations and Decisions for 
the Plume Phase of the Emergency 
2.b.1: Appropriate protective action recommendations are based on 
available information on plant conditions, field monitoring data, 
and licensee and ORO dose projections, as well as knowledge of 
onsite and offsite environmental conditions. 
I.8,10; 
Supp. 3 
7.1 
2.b.2: A decision-making process involving consideration of appropriate 
factors and necessary coordination is used to make protective action 
decisions (PADs) for the general public (including the 
recommendation for the use of KI, if ORO policy). 
J.9; 
J.10.f,m 
9.1; 14.1 
2.c  Protective Action Decisions Consideration for the Protection of Special Populations 
2.c.1: Protective action decisions are made, as appropriate, for special 
population groups. 
J.9; 
J.10.d,e 
9.1; 15.1; 16.1 
2.d  Radiological Assessment and Decision-Making for the Ingestion Exposure Pathway 
2.d.1: Radiological consequences for the ingestion pathway are assessed 
and appropriate protective action decisions are made based on the 
ORO planning criteria. 
J.9,11 26.1, 26.2 
2.e  Radiological Assessment and Decision-Making Concerning Relocation, Reentry, and 
Return 
2.e.1: Timely relocation, reentry, and return decisions are made and 
coordinated as appropriate, based on assessments of radiological 
conditions and criteria in the OROs plan and/or procedures. 
I.10; J.9; 
M.1 
28.1, 28.2, 
28.3, 28.4, 
28.5 

Interim REP Program Manual III-13 
August 2002 


Section III.A  Milestones and Tasks 

TASK 3: 
ESTABLISH EXERCISE EVALUATION AREA CRITERIA AND 
EXTENT-OF-PLAY 

TABLE 5 Comparison of Proposed Evaluation Areas with NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, 
Rev. 1 Planning Criteria and REP-14/15 Objectives and Criteria (contd) 

3  PROTECTIVE ACTION IMPLEMENTATION 5, 11, 14, 15, 
16, 17, 27, 29 
3.a  Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control 
3.a.1: The OROs issue appropriate dosimetry and procedures, and manage 
radiological exposure to emergency workers in accordance with the 
plan and procedures. Emergency workers periodically and at the 
end of each mission read their dosimeters and record the readings 
on the appropriate exposure record or chart. 
K.3.a, 3.b 5.1, 5.2 
3.b  Implementation of KI Decision 
3.b.1: KI and appropriate instructions are made available should a 
decision to recommend use of KI be made. Appropriate record 
keeping of the administration of KI for emergency workers and 
institutionalized individuals is maintained. 
J.10.e 14.1, 14.3 
3.c  Implementation of Protective Actions for Special Populations 
3.c.1: Protective action decisions are implemented for special populations 
other than schools within areas subject to protective actions. 
J.10.c,d,g 15.1, 15.2 
3.c.2: OROs/School officials implement protective actions for schools. J.10.c,d,g 16.1, 16.2, 16.3 
3.d  Implementation of Traffic and Access Control 
3.d.1: Appropriate traffic and access control is established. Accurate 
instructions are provided to traffic and access control personnel. 
J.10.g,j 17.1, 17.2, 17.3 
3.d.2: Impediments to evacuation are identified and resolved. J.10.k 17.4 
3.e  Implementation of Ingestion Pathway Decisions 
3.e.1: The ORO demonstrates the availability and appropriate use of 
adequate information regarding water, food supplies, milk and 
agricultural production within the ingestion exposure pathway 
emergency planning zone for implementation of protective actions. 
J.9,11 27.1 
3.e.2: Appropriate measures, strategies and pre-printed instructional 
material are developed for implementing protective action decisions 
for contaminated water, food products, milk, and agricultural 
production. 
J.9,11 11.4; 27.2; 
27.3 
3.f  Implementation of Relocation, Reentry, and Return Decisions 
3.f.1: Decisions regarding controlled reentry of emergency workers and 
relocation and return of the public are coordinated with appropriate 
organizations and implemented. 
M.1,3 29.1, 29.2, 
29.3, 29.4 

Interim REP Program Manual III-14 
August 2002 


Section III.A  Milestones and Tasks 

TASK 3: 
ESTABLISH EXERCISE EVALUATION AREA CRITERIA AND 
EXTENT-OF-PLAY 

TABLE 5 Comparison of Proposed Evaluation Areas with NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, 
Rev. 1 Planning Criteria and REP-14/15 Objectives and Criteria (contd) 

4  FIELD MEASUREMENT AND ANALYSIS 6, 8, 24, 25 
4.a  Plume Phase Field Measurement and Analyses 
4.a.1: The field teams are equipped to perform field measurements of 
direct radiation exposure (cloud and ground shine) and to sample 
airborne radioiodine and particulates. 
H.10; 
I.7,8,9 
6.1; 8.1, 8.2 
4.a.2: Field teams are managed to obtain sufficient information to help 
characterize the release and to control radiation exposure. 
I.8,11; 
J.10.a; 
H.12 
6.3, 6.4 
4.a.3: Ambient radiation measurements are made and recorded at 
appropriate locations, and radioiodine and particulate samples are 
collected. Teams will move to an appropriate low background 
location to determine whether any significant (as specified in the 
plan and/or procedures) amount of radioactivity has been collected 
on the sampling media. 
I.9 6.4, 6.5; 8.3, 
8.4, 8.5, 8.6 
4.b  Post Plume Phase Field Measurements and Sampling 
4.b.1: The field teams demonstrate the capability to make appropriate 
measurements and to collect appropriate samples (for example, 
food crops, milk, water, vegetation, and soil) to support adequate 
assessments and protective action decision-making. 
I.8; J.11 24.1 
4.c  Laboratory Operations 
4.c.1: The laboratory is capable of performing required radiological 
analyses to support protective action decisions. 
C.3; J.11 25.1, 25.2 

Interim REP Program Manual III-15 
August 2002 


Section III.A  Milestones and Tasks 

TASK 3: 
ESTABLISH EXERCISE EVALUATION AREA CRITERIA AND 
EXTENT-OF-PLAY 

TABLE 5 Comparison of Proposed Evaluation Areas with NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, 
Rev. 1 Planning Criteria and REP-14/15 Objectives and Criteria (contd) 

5  EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION AND PUBLIC INFORMATION 10, 11, 12, 13 
5.a  Activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System 
5.a.1: Activities associated with primary alerting and notification of the 
public are completed in a timely manner following the initial 
decision by authorized offsite emergency officials to notify the 
public of an emergency situation. The initial instructional message 
to the public must include as a minimum the elements required by 
current FEMA REP guidance. 
10 CFR 
Part 50, 
Appendix 
E.IV.D; 
E.5,6,7 
10.1 
5.a.2: [RESERVED] 
5.a.3: Activities associated with FEMA approved exception areas (where 
applicable) are completed within 45 minutes following the initial 
decision by authorized offsite emergency officials to notify the 
public of an emergency situation. Backup alert and notification of 
the public is completed within 45 minutes following the detection 
by the ORO of a failure of the primary alert and notification system. 
Appendix 
3: B.2.c; 
E.6 
10.2, 10.3 
5.b  Emergency Information and Instructions for the Public and the Media 
5.b.1: OROs provide accurate emergency information and instructions to 
the public and the news media in a timely manner. 
E.5,7; 
G.3.a; 
G.4.c 
11.1, 11.2, 
11.3; 12.1, 
12.2; 13.1, 13.2 

Interim REP Program Manual III-16 
August 2002 


Section III.A  Milestones and Tasks 

TASK 3: 
ESTABLISH EXERCISE EVALUATION AREA CRITERIA AND 
EXTENT-OF-PLAY 

TABLE 5 Comparison of Proposed Evaluation Areas with NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, 
Rev. 1 Planning Criteria and REP-14/15 Objectives and Criteria (contd) 

6  SUPPORT OPERATION/FACILITIES 18, 19, 20, 21, 
22 
6.a  Monitoring and Decontamination of Evacuees and Emergency Workers and Registration of 
Evacuees 
6.a.1: The reception center/emergency worker facility has appropriate 
space, adequate resources, and trained personnel to provide 
monitoring, decontamination, and registration of evacuees and/or 
emergency workers. 
J.10.h; 
J.12; 
K.5.a 
18.1, 18.2, 
18.3, 18.4, 
18.5; 22.1, 22.2 
6.b  Monitoring and Decontamination of Emergency Worker Equipment 
6.b.1: The facility/ORO has adequate procedures and resources for the 
accomplishment of monitoring and decontamination of emergency 
worker equipment, including vehicles. 
K.5.b 22.1, 22.3 
6.c  Temporary Care of Evacuees 
6.c.1: Managers of congregate care facilities demonstrate that the centers 
have resources to provide services and accommodations consistent 
with American Red Cross planning guidelines. (Found in MASS 
CARE  Preparedness Operations, ARC 3031) Managers 
demonstrate the procedures to assure that evacuees have been 
monitored for contamination and have been decontaminated as 
appropriate before entering congregate care facilities. 
J.10.h; 
J.12 
19.1, 19.2 
6.d  Transportation and Treatment of Contaminated Injured Individuals 
6.d.1: The facility/ORO has the appropriate space, adequate resources, 
and trained personnel to provide transport, monitoring, 
decontamination, and medical services to contaminated injured 
individuals. 
F.2; H.10; 
K.5.a,b; 
L.1; L.4 
20.1, 20.2, 
20.3, 20.4, 
20.5; 21.1, 
21.2, 21.3, 21.4 

Interim REP Program Manual III-17 
August 2002 


Section III.A  Milestones and Tasks 

TASK 3: 
ESTABLISH EXERCISE EVALUATION AREA CRITERIA AND 
EXTENT-OF-PLAY 

Steps for Completion of Task 3 

This task should be completed in five steps, as described below. 

Step 1: 
Determine evaluation area criteria to be demonstrated. This step should be 
completed under the following guidance. All evaluation area criteria should be 
included automatically in each pre-operational exercise for a utility seeking an 
operating license from the NRC. 

In the event that one or more State or local governments within the area covered by 
the offsite plan for that site are not participating in planning or preparedness for the 
site, the Licensee Offsite Response Organization evaluation area criteria should 
provide compensatory plans for the State/local government and demonstrate the 
implementation of this plan in the exercise, as provided for in the NUREG 
0654/FEMA-REP-1 Rev. 1, Supp. 1. 

Each exercise conducted for 350 approval at a site with an operating license should 
demonstrate all fundamental response and supporting activities. 

Each exercise may also include one or more evaluation area criteria as necessary, to 
make sure that all OROs that need to demonstrate evaluation area criteria do so at 
least once every six years. 

Step 2: 
Identification of the responsible OROs for each evaluation area criteria 
included in the exercise. This step initially entails identification of the responsible 
OROs for each evaluation area criteria, based upon their plans. Normally, the plans 
assign responsibilities for multiple emergency response functions to individual 
response organizations. Exercise planners should analyze all evaluation area criteria 
and the set of emergency functions in order to make appropriate assignments for 
evaluation area criteria to responsible OROs. 

Demonstration frequencies for evaluation area criteria are shown in the matrix in 
Table 4. Table 6, Assignment of Evaluation Criteria to OROs, shows a generic 
example of where various evaluation criteria might be demonstrated and evaluated. 
The RAC Chairperson and site specialist should review all processes to determine 
which evaluation criteria should be assigned to a given location at a particular site. 
It will vary from site to site and exercise to exercise, depending upon the plans and 
the extent-of-play. It is important that all locations that are involved be assigned the 
evaluation area criterion to cover their portion of the process. For example, at site X, 
the State EOC prepares the press releases for the Joint News Center (JNC), but they 
are released at the JNC. Therefore, both the State EOC and the JNC should have 
Evaluation Criterion 5.b.1 which addresses whether OROs provide accurate 
information and instructions to the public and the news media in a timely manner. 

Interim REP Program Manual III-18 
August 2002 


Section III.A  Milestones and Tasks 

TASK 3: ESTABLISH EXERCISE EVALUATION AREA CRITERIA AND EXTENT-OF-PLAY 
TABLE 6 Assignment of Evaluation Criteria to OROs 

Location/Function 
ELEMENT/Sub-Element STATE DOSE FTC FCP EPZ IPZ RAD LAB JPIC 
EOC ASSESS F TEAMS F TEAMS 
1. EMERGENCY OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT1.a. Mobilization X X X X X X X 
1.b. F acilities X X X X X 
1.c. Direction & Control X X X 
1.d. Communications E quipment X X X X X X X 
1.e. E quipment & S upplies to s upport operations X X X X X X X 
2. PROTECTIVE ACTION DECISION MAKING 
2.a. E mergency Worker E xpos ure Control X X X X X X X X 
2.b. R adiological As s es s ment & P AR s & P ADs X X X X 
2.c. P rotective Action Decis ions for X X X 
S pecial P opulations 
2.d. R adiological As s es s ment & Decis ion Making X X 
for Inges tion E xpos ure 
2.e. R adiological As s es s ment & Decis ion Making X X 
for R elocation, R e-enty and R eturn3. PROTECTIVE ACTION IMPLEMENTATION 
3.a. Implementation of E mergency Worker Control X X X X 
3.b. Implementation of KI Decis ions X X X X X 
3.c. Implementation of P ADs for for S pecial X X 
P opulations 
3.d. Implementation of T raffic and Acces s Control X X 
3.e. Implementation of Inges tion P athway Decis ions 
3.f. Implementation of R elocation, R e-entry and X 
R eturn Decis ions4. FIELD MEASUREMENT and ANALYSIS 
4.a P lume P has e F ield Meas urement & Analys is X X X 
4.b. P os t P lume F ield Meas urement & Analys is X X X X X 
4.c. Laboratory Operations X 
5. EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION and 
PUBLIC INFORMATION 
5.a. Activation of P rompt Alert and Notification X X 
5.b. E mergency Information and Ins tructions for the X X 
P ublic and the Media6. SUPPORT OPERATIONS/FACILITIES 
6.a. Monitoring and decontamination of E vacuees 
andE mergency Workers and R egis tration 
of E vacuees 
6.b. Monitoring and Decontamination of Emergency 
Worker E quipment 
6.c. T emporary Care of E vacuees 
6.d. T rans portation and T reatment of Contaminated 
Injured Individuals 

Interim REP Program Manual III-19 August 2002 


Section III.A  Milestones and Tasks 

TASK 3: 
ESTABLISH EXERCISE EVALUATION AREA CRITERIA AND 
EXTENT-OF-PLAY 

Step 3: Develop extent-of-play agreements with responsible OROs. For purposes of this 
Manual, extent-of-play refers to the degree that actions taken by responsible OROs 
in response to exercise events should conform to those actions that would be taken, 
under the plan, in an actual emergency. 
Extent-of-play agreements should be documented for all OROs seeking to simulate 
demonstration of specific evaluation area criteria. These agreements should specify 
the simulation approved for each evaluation area criteria for all participating 
organizations. Extent-of-play agreements should take into account the provisions 
regarding field activities in partial-participation exercises, as previously described. 
Step 4: Granting of Exercise Credit 
See Exercise Credit, manual section III.G. 
Step 5: Correcting issues immediately. During tabletop exercises, drills and other 
demonstrations conducted out of sequence from an integrated exercise, if FEMA and 
the ORO agree, the FEMA evaluator may have the participants re-demonstrate an 
activity that is determined to be not satisfactorily demonstrated. Immediate 
correction of issues in an integrated exercise is authorized only if it would not be 
disruptive and interrupt the flow of the exercise and affect other Evaluation Areas. 
The determination for which REP functions and activities could be candidates for re-
demonstration should be agreed upon during the extent-of-play negotiations. 

Interim REP Program Manual III-20 
August 2002 


Section III.A  Milestones and Tasks 

TASK 4: DEVELOP AND REVIEW EXERCISE SCENARIO 
Description 

The scenario for a simulated nuclear power plant accident is developed jointly by the State and 
Licensee and submitted to NRC and FEMA Regional Offices for review. The FEMA RAC Chair 
reviews the scenario to confirm that the source term and scenario events are adequate to drive the 
agreed-upon exercise evaluation area criteria and extent of play. 

Milestone 

State and Licensee scenario developers jointly submit the scenario to FEMA at least 60 days prior to 
the exercise. The RAC Chair completes review of the scenario at least 45 days before the exercise. 
Final scenario adjustments to ensure adequate demonstration of evaluation area criteria are made by 
the State and Licensee at least 15 days prior to the exercise. 

References 

NUREG-0654. 

Products 

Exercise scenario. 

Guidance 

The exercise scenario should include plant conditions and offsite consequences sufficient to drive 
activities necessary for the demonstration of the agreed-upon exercise evaluation area criteria. 

The State and Licensee should develop a scenario for submission to FEMA and the NRC that 
includes the following information: 

 
A chronology of all key events; 
 
A narrative description of exercise events and activities; 
 
Meteorological data and forecasts; and 
 
Radiological data, e.g., characteristics of release, projected dose, exposure rates, and 
concentrations in the environment. 
Interim REP Program Manual III-21 
August 2002 


Section III.A  Milestones and Tasks 

TASK 4: DEVELOP AND REVIEW EXERCISE SCENARIO 

The radiological data should be supported by and compatible with plant conditions and the 
associated potential for releases or simulated releases. In the absence of a simulated release, 
controller inject data should be developed to drive activities that require simulated exposure rates or 
concentrations in the environment. 

The following guidance is provided for the development of exercise scenarios for play related to 
evacuation, sheltering, administration of potassium iodide (KI), decontamination, control of 
contaminated food and water, relocation, reentry, and return. Doses and distances should be 
contextually determined in accordance with the following: 

 Specific organizational plans, 
 The geographical location of involved jurisdictions, 
 The status of demonstrated evaluation area criteria within six-year periods, 
 The identification of uncorrected Areas Requiring Corrective Action (ARCAs), and 
 Other exercise-specific considerations 
Use of decision criteria. Exercises are designed to enable OROs to demonstrate the capability to 
make decisions on appropriate actions to protect the public and emergency workers using 
procedures and decision criteria established in the plans. The evaluation area criteria to be 
demonstrated and the corresponding extent-of-play should be agreed upon and documented in a 
pre-exercise agreement by the State and FEMA prior to initiating the development of a scenario 
(Task 3). 

Demonstration of decisions to implement evacuation and sheltering necessitates special 
consideration. Initial decisions to evacuate and shelter are typically based on plant conditions and 
associated recommendations by the Licensee. These decisions usually prescribe evacuation to a 
predetermined distance (e.g., a two-mile radius and five miles in downwind sectors almost always 
converted to pre-planned geographic areas) and sheltering (or staying indoors waiting for additional 
instructions) to a greater distance. Subsequent decisions to evacuate and shelter are typically based 
on a comparison of projected dose to the PAG, where the projected dose is calculated based on a 
simulated release or field measurement data (including meteorological data and forecasts) provided 
by controller injects. For these subsequent decisions, the projected dose should exceed the 
evacuation and sheltering PAGs to a distance greater than the initial recommendation, but not 
beyond the boundary of the plume pathway EPZ. 

For each evaluation area criterion to be demonstrated in an exercise, the accident scenario should be 
sufficient to drive exercise play for the participating jurisdictions, in accordance with the extent-ofplay 
agreements. The distance from the nuclear power plant that a particular decision criterion (e.g., 
PAG) should be exceeded is contextually determined by the location of the jurisdictions designated 
to demonstrate the activity. For example, if controls on milk or food crops will be demonstrated, the 

Interim REP Program Manual III-22 August 2002 


Section III.A  Milestones and Tasks 

TASK 4: DEVELOP AND REVIEW EXERCISE SCENARIO 

PAGs should be exceeded in areas that involve production or processing of these products. 
Radiological data to support controller injects should be provided as part of the scenario. 

It is not necessary to exceed all PAGs in order to demonstrate implementation of an action. For 
example, to demonstrate a decision to evacuate, either the thyroid or TEDE PAG may be exceeded. 

The following guidance applies scenario criteria to specific aspects of REP exercise play. 

1. 
Plume pathway exercise play: This guidance applies when there is no demonstration of 
ingestion pathway exercise play, relocation, reentry, or return (so called plume-only 
exercises). There are two basic approaches to satisfying the evaluation area criteria and 
extent-of-play agreements for plume-only exercises. The preferred approach entails an 
integrated exercise where the accident scenario includes a combination of plant conditions 
and a simulated release of radioactive materials into the environment. In such an approach, 
the source term corresponding to the simulated release and resultant dose projections should 
be of sufficient magnitude and distance to drive the demonstration of exercise evaluation 
area criteria and extent-of-play for the participating jurisdictions in accordance with the pre-
exercise agreements. While this approach postulates a simulated release into the 
environment, initial protective action decision making and implementation should be based 
on plant conditions alone. Subsequent decisions to evacuate and shelter are typically based 
on a comparison of projected dose to the PAG, where the projected dose is calculated based 
on a simulated release or field measurement data (including meteorological data and 
forecasts) provided by controller injects. For these subsequent decisions, the projected dose 
should exceed the evacuation and sheltering PAGs to a distance greater than the initial 
recommendation, but not beyond the boundary of the plume pathway EPZ. 
For exercise play related to the use or nonuse of KI for emergency workers, scenarios 
should contain sufficient radioiodine release to force participating jurisdictions to make 
decisions whether or not to use KI. It is not necessary for scenarios to exceed the PAG for 
KI to adequately test decision making for its use or nonuse by emergency workers For 
jurisdictions that have opted to include the use of KI as a supplement to evacuation and/or 
sheltering for the general public, scenarios must include sufficient radioiodine to exceed the 
PAG once in the six year cycle for each offsite jurisdiction. With respect to the distribution 
of KI for emergency workers, it is generally not necessary to exceed the PAG for KI since 
distribution of KI is effected during the early stages of an emergency to permit its use prior 
to exposure by the emergency workers. 

Plume pathway scenario option: An alternative approach to satisfying evaluation area 
criteria and extent-of-play agreements for plume-only exercises is to base decisions on plant 
conditions with potential for release but with no simulated release of radiological materials 
from the plant. In such a scenario, plant conditions alone may be used to drive exercise play 
for all initial protective action decision making and implementation. 

Interim REP Program Manual III-23 
August 2002 


Section III.A  Milestones and Tasks 

TASK 4: DEVELOP AND REVIEW EXERCISE SCENARIO 

Subsequent protective action decision making and implementation would be based 
on a combination of plant conditions and controller injects. Controller injects would 
be used to drive components of field exercise play requiring contamination or 
exposure rates. Examples of such components are as follows: 

 
Dose projection, 
 
Decisions to decontaminate people and equipment, 
 
Emergency worker use and understanding of established turn back values, and 
 
Field monitoring. 
Under this alternative approach, OROs affected by the plume (as determined by the exercise 
scenario and in accordance with extent-of-play agreements) should implement appropriate 
and timely protective actions in accordance with the PAG strategies set forth in the plans. 

Certain conditions should be met for FEMA to approve such an approach. (1) The involved 
OROs cannot have a FEMA-cited Deficiency related to protective action decision making in 
the last exercise. (2) Scenarios should be designed to sustain potential projected doses for a 
sufficient period of time to drive OROs to implement protective actions. Such scenario 
designs would preclude OROs from waiting out the scenario in order to avoid making 
decisions on the implementation of protective actions. Failure of responsible OROs to take 
appropriate and timely protective actions may result in FEMA citing a Deficiency, even in 
the absence of a simulated release during the exercise. (3) The scenario should contain 
simulated contamination or exposure rates in the form of controller injects to drive field 
exercise play components requiring them. (4) If the OROs have opted to use KI for the 
general public, Criterion 3.b.1 cannot have been selected for demonstration. 

The plume pathway exercise play option set forth above should not be used for exercises in 
which ingestion and/or relocation, reentry, and return pathway exercise play is carried out 
because of the need to have simulated deposition of radioactive materials for these activities. 
Additional scenario options include: 

a. 
States may demonstrate their post-plume phase capabilities more frequently than the 
required once every six years. 
Offsite response organizations may conduct post-plume phase exercise activities 
(i.e., ingestion, relocation, recovery and return activities) more than the required once 
every six years. Post-plume phase activities may be performed in connection with a 
plume exercise, or they may be separated. If separated, the plume phase technical 
data may be extended into post-plume activities. However, the bases for performing 
the post-plume phase activities may be derived from other technical data discrete 
from what was used in the previous plume exercise. Regardless of where the activity 

Interim REP Program Manual III-24 
August 2002 


Section III.A  Milestones and Tasks 

TASK 4: DEVELOP AND REVIEW EXERCISE SCENARIO 

is generated or derived (e.g., the previous plume exercise or a new scenario), a 
pre-exercise briefing is necessary to ensure that all response organizations (Federal, 
State, Tribal, and local) are uniformly cognizant of these data and assumptions. 
When the post-plume phase is an extension of the previous plume phase exercise, the 
briefing should include the protective action decisions made during that exercise. If a 
new scenario is used, the briefing should include discussion of the data, information, 
and controller injects necessary for the development of protective action decisions as 
a point of departure for the post-plume phase exercise. 

Demonstration criteria for this option would be the same for any post-plume phase 
exercise. 

b. 
Mini-scenarios may be developed to support the increased participation of local 
responders. 
Mini-scenarios, sometimes referred to as controller injects, can provide increased 
participation by State (at times), Tribal, and local response organizations during lulls 
in the primary radiological response activities. For example, a HAZMAT mini-
scenario incident would require an immediate response. 

Mini-scenarios may be useful in enhancing exercise play for offsite emergency 
response organizations. However, they should be designed to not detract from the 
primary goals, technical analysis, and time line of the primary scenario. 

c. 
Exercises may begin at any of the four Emergency Classification Levels (ECLs) 
and/or an ECL may be skipped to reflect a fast-breaking event. 
Events triggering an offsite response may be designed to initiate exercise play at any 
ECL and/or provide for the skipping of an ECL(s). Skipping ECLs can make for more 
interesting and less predictable scenarios. To drive the offsite response, an event must 
reach the General Emergency classification. If the event does not result in a simulated 
release of radioactivity, controller injects must be provided to allow evaluation of 
field monitoring activities. 

It is recommended that scenarios for exercises and drills be varied to enhance training 
and provide for a more realistic response. Scenarios for drills should be independent 
of the scenario used for the exercise. 

d. 
The plume and post-plume phases of the exercise may be separated by days or 
months. 
Plume and post-plume activities may be separated. Separating post-plume from 
plume activities would provide OROs with additional time for performing these 
activities more comprehensively. 

Interim REP Program Manual III-25 
August 2002 


Section III.A  Milestones and Tasks 

TASK 4: DEVELOP AND REVIEW EXERCISE SCENARIO 

e. 
State, Tribal, and local governments may provide a representative who is involved in 
exercise planning on a confidential basis and is not a member of the response team. 
This confidential representative or a trusted agent could provide input to enhance 
development of the scenario and extent of play, and, therefore, enhance exercise play. 
A confidential representative/trusted agent is a member of an ORO who may 
participate substantially in the exercise design but must agree not to divulge exercise 
confidences to potential players or others involved with the exercise. A confidential 
representative/trusted agent cannot be a member of the response team unless the ORO 
has a shortage of personnel that could play in the exercise. If a confidential 
representative/trusted agent is used in the exercise, he/she should not be in roles that 
would be compromised by the knowledge of confidential information and must agree to 
not use confidential exercise information until it is released. For example, a primary 
decision maker would not work as a confidential representative/trusted agent, but a 
traffic/access controller, reception center monitor, dispatcher, or dose assessment team 
member could be a confidential representative/trusted agent. 

2. 
Post-plume exercise play: For post-plume exercise play, exercise scenarios should 
incorporate simulated offsite deposition exceeding the PAGs for food and/or water, as 
expressed in the plan. The deposition should exceed the PAGs in areas where typical food 
or water produced in the area would be found, but not outside the ingestion pathway EPZ. 
The deposition should contain both short-lived (e.g., iodine and other typical fission 
products) and long-lived radionuclides (e.g., cesium). The areas to be affected by the 
radioactive plume and consequent ground deposition should be contextually determined, 
based on the participating jurisdictions and specific organizational evaluation area criteria to 
be demonstrated. 
For relocation, reentry, and return exercise play, the scenario should incorporate simulated 
offsite deposition that exceeds the relocation PAGs set forth in the plan in the jurisdictions 
specified in the extent-of-play agreement. For relocation activities, the projected dose is 
calculated for the first year, any subsequent year, and fifty years. The source term should 
contain both short-lived and long-lived radionuclides such as cesium to prevent waiting out 
decay to avoid relocation decisions. A cesium-134 plus cesium-137 to iodine-131 ratio in 
the range of 0.2 to 0.6 is recommended. However, sufficient additional relatively short-
lived radionuclides should be included so that the first year relocation dose is the controlling 
dose. 

Interim REP Program Manual III-26 
August 2002 


Section III.A  Milestones and Tasks 

TASK 4: DEVELOP AND REVIEW EXERCISE SCENARIO 

It is recommended that ingestion, relocation, reentry, and return exercise play be integrated 
within the same exercise, because of the similar scenario requirements of exercise play. 

FEMA Regional staff should use this guidance in reviewing and approving scenarios. 
FEMA and NRC Regional staff should coordinate the scenario review and notify the 
involved State(s) and Licensee of any necessary modifications. If scenarios do not meet 
these criteria, meetings should be conducted with all involved parties to identify and agree 
upon scenario modifications. If agreement cannot be reached, assistance should be 
requested from FEMA and NRC Headquarters. 

Interim REP Program Manual III-27 August 2002 


Section III.A  Milestones and Tasks 

TASK 5: ESTABLISH EXERCISE GROUND RULES 
Description 

A set of basic ground rules for the conduct of the exercise is established by the RAC Chair, NRC 
Regional Office, participating OROs, and the Licensee. These rules pertain to the operation and 
control of the exercise, safety of all exercise participants, roles (player, controller, evaluator, etc.), 
actual emergencies, compliance with legal requirements, exercise closeout procedures, and meeting 
schedules. 

Milestone 

The exercise ground rules are generally established 60 days before the exercise. 

References 

GM PR-1. 

Products 

Detailed exercise ground rules. 

Guidance 

The exercise ground rules should contain basic rules and guidelines for the following 
considerations. 

1. Operation and control of the exercise 
a. Identity, authority, and role of the senior exercise controller 
(1) Initiation of exercise 
(2) Resolution of conflicts 
(3) Closeout of exercise 
b. Role of exercise controllers at the various exercise locations 
(1) Injection of exercise messages, events, and data 
(2) Resolution of exercise-related conflicts 
Interim REP Program Manual III-28 August 2002 


Section III.A  Milestones and Tasks 

TASK 5: ESTABLISH EXERCISE GROUND RULES 

(3) Suspension/termination of scenario events 
c. 
Role of exercise evaluators 
(1) Interview players 
(2) Request copies of information, logs, sign-in sheets, and status boards 
(3) 
Provide feedback to exercise participants during post-exercise 
evaluator/participant interviews 
2. 
Federal, State, and local laws, regulations, ordinances, statutes, and legal requirements 
applicable to exercise 
a. 
Authority of police and sheriffs department officials 
b. 
Traffic laws 
c. 
Laws, regulations, statutes, etc., that may apply or be of importance to the exercise 
participants 
d. 
Rules for personnel and property safety 
3. 
Priority of actual emergencies over exercise play 
4. 
Role of volunteer agencies and players 
5. 
Closeout procedures 
a. 
Release of emergency workers 
b. 
Completion of emergency actions as necessary 
c. 
Decision-making process 
6. 
Expected player and agency attendance at and participation in exercise-related meetings 
Interim REP Program Manual III-29 
August 2002 


Section III.A  Milestones and Tasks 

TASK 6: REQUEST, ASSIGN AND CONFIRM EVALUATORS 

Description 

The RAC Chair determines the number of evaluators and expertise needed and makes assignments 
of evaluators to response organizations and exercise evaluation area criteria. 

Milestone 

This task is completed 45 days before the exercise. 

References 

44 CFR Part 350; 10 CFR Part 50; NUREG-0654. 

Products 

List of evaluator names, employing agencies, and their specific assignments in terms of response 
organizations and exercise evaluation area criteria. 

Guidance 

The RAC Chair should recruit evaluators for all FEMA-evaluated exercises and drills subject to the 
following. 

 
At least one evaluator should be assigned to each of the following organizations: State 
and county Emergency Operations Center(s) (EOC), State health agency, joint 
information center or equivalent, other locations where State and/or county officials 
have significant emergency functions, and all subcounty jurisdictions (e.g., cities, 
boroughs, towns, townships, and villages). However, if resources are limited and 
evaluators cannot be provided for all subcounty jurisdictions, then FEMA Headquarters 
should be notified. In such cases, the number of evaluators may be reduced, but not 
below the threshold of providing evaluators for at least one-third of the subcounty 
jurisdictions. The number of evaluators assigned to each jurisdiction should be 
commensurate with the number and extent-of-play of evaluation area criteria being 
demonstrated. 
 
In some cases, it may be necessary to assign an evaluator to more than one subcounty 
jurisdiction. However, an evaluator should not be assigned to more than two subcounty 
jurisdictions. In such situations, players should not be told prior to the exercise which 
jurisdictions will be evaluated by FEMA. The evaluators may be assigned to specific 
jurisdictions or they may be permitted to rotate from one jurisdiction to another, not to 
exceed two jurisdictions. 
Interim REP Program Manual III-30 
August 2002 


Section III.A  Milestones and Tasks 

TASK 6: REQUEST, ASSIGN AND CONFIRM EVALUATORS 

 
The RAC Chair or designee should ensure that all evaluators have attended the REP 
exercise evaluation course offered by FEMAs Emergency Management Institute and 
have observed at least one REP exercise with a trained evaluator. 
In cases where State and local governments choose to participate on an annual basis at a given site, 
FEMA may evaluate such exercises, if requested by the participating OROs, and if FEMA resources 
are available. 

Assignments for evaluators. Assignments for offsite evaluators are made by the RAC Chair or his 
or her designee. Evaluators may be assigned to evaluation teams headed by a team leader. The 
function of the team leader is to coordinate evaluator activities, including assign evaluator locations, 
brief evaluators on exercise scenario and extent-of-play agreements, arrange pre-exercise visits to 
assigned locations, distribute evaluator assignment packets, instruct evaluators on the use of REP 
Exercise Evaluation Methodology Evaluation Forms and Narrative Summaries, and debrief team 
members prior to departure. 

Interim REP Program Manual III-31 
August 2002 


Section III.A  Milestones and Tasks 

TASK 7: ARRANGE LOGISTICS 
Description 

The RAC Chair schedules meetings with exercise evaluators, NRC Regional Staff, OROs, and the 
public/media. These meetings should include pre-exercise evaluator training, pre-exercise briefing 
for Licensee/OROs, post-exercise participants briefing, and a public meeting. 

Milestone 

Logistics are arranged and ORO, Federal, and Licensee players, evaluators, controllers, etc., are 
notified at least 30 days prior to the exercise. 

References 

None. 

Products 

Schedules and locations of events and meetings for the exercise and recommended lodging 
locations for participants. 

Guidance 

Logistical information should include a schedule of meetings for the exercise and their locations, as 
well as maps indicating the locations of the plant, meeting sites, and participating OROs, along with 
specific directions on how to get to these locations. Recommended lodging locations and directions 
should also be included. 

Interim REP Program Manual III-32 August 2002 


Section III.A  Milestones and Tasks 

TASK 8: PREPARE AND DISTRIBUTE EVALUATOR ASSIGNMENT PACKETS 
Description 

The RAC Chair provides a packet to each evaluator with information on his or her assignment, the 
exercise, schedule, and logistics. 

Milestone 

Packets are distributed to evaluators 14 days prior to the exercise. 

References 

None. 

Products 

Evaluator packet. 

Guidance 

The evaluator assignment packet includes specific evaluator assignments. The packet should also 
provide the following materials: 

 
Portions of the ORO plans applicable to each assignment; 
 
State and local Emergency Alert System (EAS) operational plans, when applicable; 
 
List of team leaders, if any; 
 
Schedule of activities (agenda); 
 
Information on ARCA from previous exercise; 
 
Amendments to previously provided logistical information (Task 7) or evaluator-
specific information regarding lodging, meetings, and assigned locations; 
 
Log forms or blank paper for taking notes; 
 
Relevant Evaluation Forms and Narrative Summaries; 
 
Relevant portions of the evaluation area criteria; and 
 
A copy of extent-of-play agreements for assigned evaluation area criteria. 
Interim REP Program Manual III-33 
August 2002 


Section III.A  Milestones and Tasks 

TASK 8: PREPARE AND DISTRIBUTE EVALUATOR ASSIGNMENT PACKETS 

In addition to the materials listed above, the RAC Chair should consider including the following 
materials in the evaluator packets: 

 A listing of all exercise evaluators and their assigned evaluation area criteria, 
 Description of the scenario, 
 Applicable guidance materials, and 
 Relevant portions of the previous exercise evaluation report. 
Interim REP Program Manual III-34 August 2002 


Section III.A  Milestones and Tasks 

TASK 9: PROVIDE SITE-SPECIFIC TRAINING TO EVALUATORS 
Description 

The RAC Chair provides site-specific training to evaluators. 

Milestone 

Training of evaluators should be completed one (1) day before the exercise as part of the pre-
exercise briefing or in a separate session. 

References 

None. 

Products 

None. 

Guidance 

Prior to the conduct of an exercise, evaluators should be knowledgeable of ORO plans and 
procedures and be experienced and trained in REP exercise evaluation procedures. For a given 
exercise, there may be unique considerations for which the evaluators should receive additional 
training. In such cases, the FEMA RAC Chair should be prepared to offer training in these areas. 
The training may be offered separately or as part of the pre-exercise briefing. 

Factors that might prompt the need for pre-exercise evaluator training include: 

 
Recent and significant revisions to emergency plans and procedures; 
 
Differences among OROs involving authority, protective action decision making, or 
other aspects of emergency preparedness and response; 
 
Unique evaluator protocols required for specific evaluator assignments; and 
 
The need for specific guidance on the conduct of post-exercise evaluator and participant 
interviews (Task 12). 
Interim REP Program Manual III-35 
August 2002 


Section III.A  Milestones and Tasks 

TASK 10: CONDUCT PRE-EXERCISE BRIEFING 
Description 

The RAC Chair conducts pre-exercise briefing for exercise evaluators, ORO control staff, and 
Licensee representatives to discuss the scenario and specific exercise activities. 

Milestone 

The pre-exercise briefing should be conducted one (1) day before the exercise. 

References 

None. 

Products 

None. 

Guidance 

At the pre-exercise meeting, the RAC Chair should brief participants on: 

 Exercise schedule; 
 Concept of operations for offsite response; 
 New or unique features of offsite response plan and procedures; 
 Exercise scenario; 
 Extent-of-play agreements; 
 Exercise ground rules; 
 Evaluator assignments; 
 Evaluator team structure; 
 Guidelines for completion of the Evaluation Modules with Narratives; 
 Evaluator protocol; 
 Immediate correction of issues; 
 Providing immediate preliminary feedback; 
Interim REP Program Manual III-36 August 2002 


Section III.A  Milestones and Tasks 

TASK 10: CONDUCT PRE-EXERCISE BRIEFING 

 
Expected evaluator submissions (including copies of available logs, messages, etc., from 
the evaluators sites) and delivery times; 
 
Requirements for attendance of evaluators at post-exercise meetings; and 
 
Release of evaluators. 
Guidance for Evaluator Protocol 

Evaluator protocol consists of the following: 

1. 
Evaluator role: Evaluators should be unobtrusive recorders of events. They should 
watch and listen to exercise play and record their observations without interfering with 
exercise activities. 
2. 
Interaction with participants: It is often necessary for evaluators to ask participants 
questions during the exercise in order to gather key information about exercise play. 
However, evaluators must be careful not to interrupt the participants in their response 
activities. Evaluators should word questions so that the player is not inadvertently 
prompted to perform actions that might otherwise be overlooked. If agreed upon prior 
to the exercise (see Task 3, Steps for Completion of Task 3, Step 5), issues may be 
corrected immediately. (Also see Section III.I, Correct Issues Immediately.) 
3. 
Media interactions: Evaluators should direct all media inquiries regarding the exercise 
evaluation process to the RAC Chair or designated FEMA Public Information Officer. 
Evaluators should obtain the telephone number of the RAC Chair at the pre-exercise 
meeting. If a meeting for the public is scheduled after the exercise, evaluators may give 
media representatives the time and location of the meeting. Evaluators should never 
provide evaluation status or express any personal opinions on the exercise or nuclear 
power to the media while in the role of evaluator. Evaluators should simply state 
politely that they are unable to provide any information on the status of the exercise 
evaluation. 
4. 
Actual emergencies: Actual emergencies take precedence over exercise play. In such 
cases, evaluators should document the circumstances. In the event that an evaluator 
experiences a personal emergency that requires diversion from evaluation duties, he or 
she should contact the RAC Chair, team leader, or other FEMA authority, if possible. 
Interim REP Program Manual III-37 
August 2002 


Section III.A  Milestones and Tasks 

TASK 10: CONDUCT PRE-EXERCISE BRIEFING 

5. 
Pre-exercise site visits: It is advisable for evaluators to visit their assigned evaluation 
location prior to the beginning of the exercise. This is to ensure that the evaluator can 
find the assigned location and knows how long it will take to get there. The evaluator 
may wish to visit with the personnel at the evaluation location to ensure that questions 
they may have on plans and procedures are resolved prior to the exercise. In addition, 
other, non-scenario, housekeeping items could be covered, allowing the evaluator the 
opportunity to follow the flow of exercise play without interruption. This visit should 
not take place in the case of unannounced exercises to avoid alerting players to the 
upcoming exercise. RAC Chairs will instruct exercise players whether or not to make 
pre-exercise site visits. 
6. 
Evaluator dress: Evaluators should consult with the RAC Chair or team leaders 
regarding appropriate dress for particular assignments. 
Interim REP Program Manual III-38 
August 2002 


Section III.A  Milestones and Tasks 

TASK 11: DOCUMENT ORGANIZATIONAL EXERCISE PERFORMANCE 
Description 

A joint exercise is conducted by participating OROs and the Licensee. Under direction of the 
RAC Chair or designated team leaders, evaluators collect data on the demonstration of exercise 
evaluation area criteria. This is the first step in the evaluation of exercise performance. 

Milestone 

The milestone for this task is the scheduled exercise date(s). 

References 

NUREG-0654; 44 CFR Part 350.9; 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E., IV., F., 1.-5; and the FEMA REP 
Exercise Preparation Guide (EPG). 

Products 

There are three products of this task: 

 
Information and records produced by the exercise participants such as sign-in sheets, 
message logs, status boards, and copies of Emergency Alert System (EAS) messages 
and press releases; 
 
Evaluator observations and data for use in Evaluation Modules and Narrative 
Summaries; and 
 
A time line of exercise events as observed by the evaluator. 
Guidance 

Use of the REP Exercise Preparation Guide (EPG) by evaluators. The REP EPG is structured to 
enable an evaluator to gather information on the plans and procedures of participating organizations 
for each applicable evaluation criterion demonstrated at an assigned location. 

Evaluation Module. Completed Evaluation Modules and Narratives for each exercise provide a 
composite set of information on the overall performance of all participating organizations for all 
applicable evaluation area criteria. Evaluation Modules are usually completed during or 
immediately after the termination of exercise play. Results of the post-exercise evaluator/participant 
interview may be necessary to properly complete the Evaluation Modules and Narratives. In 
collecting data for the Evaluation Modules and Narratives, the guidelines below should be followed. 

Interim REP Program Manual III-39 
August 2002 


Section III.A  Milestones and Tasks 

TASK 11: DOCUMENT ORGANIZATIONAL EXERCISE PERFORMANCE 

A multipage Evaluation Module is provided for each criterion. Each module contains information 
that indicate to evaluators what to look for to evaluate that criterion. The Evaluation Criteria are 
based on the planning standards of NUREG-0654. Each criterion is linked to a NUREG-0654 
planning standard and evaluation criterion. 

The six Evaluation Areas and associated criteria contained in this document represent all 
capabilities needed by Offsite Response Organizations to effectively respond to radiological 
emergencies at commercial nuclear power plants. For each involved organization, evaluators will 
evaluate only those evaluation areas and criteria that pertain to the organizational capabilities to be 
demonstrated, as set forth in extent-of-play agreements. 

For those criteria that can be answered by selecting yes, no, or N/A, evaluators should choose the 
appropriate response based on the following intended meanings and usages. 

 
For some criteria, yes indicates that the evaluator views the demonstrated performance 
as consistent with the applicable NUREG-0654 planning standards and evaluation 
criteria and corollary FEMA Exercise Guidance. 
 
For some criteria, no indicates that the evaluator views the demonstrated performance 
as inconsistent with the applicable NUREG-0654 planning standards and evaluation 
criteria and corollary FEMA Exercise Guidance. 
 
N/A stands for not applicable and should be used to designate that the indicated 
activity or function was not required to be demonstrated by an organization either 
because the organization was not responsible for the activity or function under its 
emergency plan and procedures or scenario events did not require the organization to 
demonstrate the activity or function. Regional Assistance Committee (RAC) Chairs, to 
the extent possible, should designate all N/A responses on Evaluation Forms for each 
evaluation area criterion prior to each exercise. The RAC Chair N/A designations 
should be based on the specific activities and functions not being required by 
organizations under their emergency plans and procedures or specified as not required in 
pre-exercise agreements. 
The criteria contained in the evaluation area criteria are intended for use during exercises. However, 
there are a number of criteria that pertain to activities and resources that can be evaluated prior to 
exercises. Some examples of such activities and resources are as follows: facility resources, 
quantities of KI, the availability of congregate care resources, and the availability of certain types of 
equipment and instruments that support emergency operations. Accordingly, RAC Chairs may 
evaluate such activities prior to or during exercises. 

In those criteria, each evaluator is asked to determine if the demonstration criteria were successfully 
met. 

Interim REP Program Manual III-40 
August 2002 


Section III.A  Milestones and Tasks 

TASK 11: DOCUMENT ORGANIZATIONAL EXERCISE PERFORMANCE 

Narratives. The Narrative contains the evaluators observations about the adequacy of 
demonstrated performance in the context of the specific evaluation area criterion to be 
demonstrated. 

Narratives generally require more time to develop than Evaluation Modules. Results of the postexercise 
evaluator/participant interview (Task 12) and debriefing of exercise evaluators (Task 13) 
may be necessary to properly complete the Narratives. Guidelines for the preparation of the 
Narratives are found in Task 14. 

Interim REP Program Manual III-41 August 2002 


Section III.A  Milestones and Tasks 

TASK 12: CONDUCT POST-EXERCISE EVALUATOR/PARTICIPANT INTERVIEW 

Description 

Evaluators interview participants, as necessary, in order to complete their evaluation, ensuring that 
they have covered all the points in the extent-of-play for the criteria assigned to them. Evaluators 
may also solicit participant comments, questions, and suggestions. At the discretion of the RAC 
Chair, the evaluators may then summarize their observations of exercise play for the participants. 

Milestone 

The post-exercise participant interview is completed immediately following the end of exercise 
play. In exercises lasting more than one (1) day, interviews may be completed at the close of each 
days exercise play. 

References 

None. 

Products 

Data for use in Evaluation Modules and Narratives. 

Guidance 

A brief post-exercise interview of exercise participants may be conducted by evaluators, as needed, 
to gather information for completion of the Evaluation Modules. If desired by the RAC Chair, 
evaluators may also provide a general summary reflecting the strengths and weaknesses of 
demonstrated evaluation area criteria. During this discussion, both the evaluators and the 
participants may provide their overall impression on the quality of the demonstration. At this time, 
however, evaluators should not classify exercise issues as Deficiencies or ARCAs. An exercise 
issue is a problem in organizational performance that is linked with specific NUREG-0654 
standards and applicable evaluation criteria. Applicable NUREG-0654 planning standards and 
evaluation criteria are cited in all evaluation area criteria to aid evaluators in establishing these 
linkages. There are two categories of exercise issues: Deficiencies and ARCAs. The classification 
of exercise issues should be made by the RAC Chair (in some cases in consultation with FEMA 
Headquarters) only after feedback has been received from all exercise evaluators and participants. 

Interim REP Program Manual III-42 August 2002 


Section III.A  Milestones and Tasks 

TASK 13: DEBRIEF EXERCISE EVALUATORS AND INITIATE CONSULTATION 
PROCESS 

Description 

Following the exercise, the RAC Chair conducts a post-exercise evaluator debriefing. Evaluators 
meet with team members and FEMA staff to summarize exercise observations and documentation 
and to identify exercise issues. A specific chronology of exercise events, or time line, is compiled 
to provide a frame of reference for evaluating exercise performance and time-sensitive activities 
such as alert and notification. Timing and format of the debriefing are determined by the RAC 
Chair. A consultation process among the RAC Chair, OROs, RAC members, and FEMA and NRC 
Headquarters is initiated to discuss exercise issues and determine appropriate corrective actions. 

Milestone 

The post-exercise evaluator debriefing should take place as soon after the conclusion of the exercise 
as possible (i.e., within one (1) day of the exercise). The consultation process should be initiated 
within two (2) days of the exercise date. 

References 

None. 

Products 

Consolidated chronology of exercise events (time line). Data for use in Evaluation Modules and 
Narratives. 

Guidance 

As soon as possible after the exercise, the RAC Chair should convene the evaluators for a debriefing 
on the exercise. The purposes of the debriefing are to secure accurate and complete information 
from evaluators, which serves as the basis for the preliminary assessment to be presented at the 
participants briefing, and to determine if any issues were identified that might be classified as 
Deficiencies. 

Interim REP Program Manual III-43 August 2002 


Section III.A  Milestones and Tasks 

TASK 13: DEBRIEF EXERCISE EVALUATORS AND INITIATE CONSULTATION 
PROCESS 

If, as a result of this debriefing, the RAC Chair determines that there is a potential for classifying an 
exercise issue as a Deficiency, the RAC Chair must immediately notify the REP Branch, FEMA 
Headquarters by telephone of this possibility. This initial notification should be followed within two 

(2) days by a written description of the issue and the reasons why the RAC Chair believes that it 
may be classified as a Deficiency. FEMA Headquarters staff will, in turn, notify NRC Headquarters. 
The FEMA Regional Office will promptly initiate a consultation process with OROs, members of 
the RAC, and FEMA Headquarters. FEMA Headquarters will apprise NRC Headquarters of any 
exercise issues. The purpose of the consultation process is to: 

 
Classify exercise issues; 
 
Determine appropriate remedial actions, including remedial exercises, drills, or other 
actions; and 
 
Determine which organizations should be involved in remedial actions. 
Interim REP Program Manual III-44 
August 2002 


Section III.A  Milestones and Tasks 

TASK 14: PREPARE WRITTEN EVALUATION 
Description 

Following the exercise, evaluators prepare written evaluations of organizational performance and 
narratives of their observations for each demonstrated exercise evaluation area criteria. These 
materials are submitted to the RAC Chair. 

Milestone 

Written evaluations are prepared as soon after the conclusion of the exercise as possible, but no later 
than two (2) days after the exercise. At the discretion of the RAC Chair, this task may be performed 
before the evaluator debriefing (Task 13). 

References 

44 CFR Part 350.9. 

Products 

Completed Evaluation Modules and Narratives. 

Guidance 

Based on data collected during the exercise and post-exercise evaluator/participant interview, 
Evaluation Modules should be completed for each assigned evaluation area criteria. Evaluation 
Modules should be completed according to the guidelines contained in Task 11. 

Narratives for each assigned evaluation area criterion should be developed using completed 
Evaluation Modules for the evaluation area criteria and results of the evaluators debriefing 
(Task 13). The following guidelines should be followed by evaluators when preparing Narratives. 

Narratives: Narrative forms are provided in the Evaluation Packet. Since this form is used for all 
criteria, it should be reproduced by FEMA Regional staff and attached to each Evaluation Module 
distributed to an evaluator. 

In the Narrative, an evaluator should address the demonstration of each evaluation area criterion 
with respect to the applicable demonstration criteria outlined in the evaluation area criteria. The 
evaluator should address both the positive and/or negative aspects of the exercise demonstration. 

For time-sensitive functions and activities, the evaluator should address these activities and the 
corresponding demonstration times in the Narrative(s) for both positive and/or negative 
demonstrations. 

Interim REP Program Manual III-45 August 2002 


Section III.A  Milestones and Tasks 

TASK 14: PREPARE WRITTEN EVALUATION 

Based upon the submissions of evaluators, the RAC Chair should develop a time line that correlates 
protective action recommendations with established emergency classification levels (ECLs) and 
times. The recommended approach is to array this information in the form of a matrix for ease of 
interpretation. 

The evaluator should include a description of observed performance of evaluation area criteria and 
organizations for which an ARCA was assigned in the previous biennial exercise. The evaluator 
should also identify and describe all exercise issues (see definition in Task 12). 

For each exercise issue, the evaluator should recommend corrective actions. Examples of 
recommended corrective actions are training of emergency staff, repairing or replacing faulty 
equipment or instruments, and emergency plan and procedure modifications. 

In describing exercise issues and recommending corrective actions, evaluators should not classify 
the issues as Deficiencies or ARCAs. Also, evaluators should not specify time frames for the 
correction of exercise issues. The RAC Chair will classify issues, determine whether evaluation 
area criteria were met, and specify time frames for the correction of exercise issues (where 
applicable) based on a review of the total documentation compiled for the exercise. 

Interim REP Program Manual III-46 August 2002 


Section III.A  Milestones and Tasks 

TASK 15: CONDUCT POST-EXERCISE PARTICIPANTS BRIEFING 
Description 

The RAC Chair meets with participants to present a preliminary assessment of the exercise. The 
participants usually present a critique of their own performance as well. This meeting provides a 
means of summarizing and clarifying the results of the exercise. 

Milestone 

This meeting is conducted as soon after the conclusion of the exercise as possible, but no later than 
two (2) days after the exercise. 

References 

44 CFR 350.9(a) and (d). 

Products 

None. 

Guidance 

As soon as possible, the RAC Chair should meet with the NRC team leader and other involved 
Federal personnel to coordinate and arrange for Federal participation in the joint briefing of exercise 
participants. 

Within 48 hours of the completion of the exercise, the RAC Chair should meet with the exercise 
participants to discuss the preliminary results of the exercise. This briefing is conducted by the 
RAC Chair in accordance with 44 CFR Part 350.9(a) and (d). Other FEMA and RAC personnel 
may attend and participate in this briefing, as determined by the RAC Chair. 

The recommended agenda for this meeting is as follows: 

 
Review of onsite actions (presented by NRC). 
 
Presentation of Licensee views. 
 
Review of offsite activities by RAC Chair, including the option of the RAC Chair asking 
evaluation team leaders or specific evaluators to make presentations regarding their 
observations. 
Interim REP Program Manual III-47 
August 2002 


Section III.A  Milestones and Tasks 

TASK 15: CONDUCT POST-EXERCISE PARTICIPANTS BRIEFING 

 
Presentation of OROs views. 
 
Review of Federal response, if applicable, by RAC Chair. 
 
Question and answer period. 
 
The presentations should provide a brief integrated overview of the highlights of the 
exercise. They include commendations for good performance and a preliminary 
assessment of strengths and weaknesses of the demonstration. At this stage, no attempt 
should be made to classify issues as Deficiencies or ARCAs. 
Interim REP Program Manual III-48 
August 2002 


Section III.A  Milestones and Tasks 

TASK 16: 
CONDUCT THE PARTICIPANTS BRIEFING THAT IS OPEN 
TO THE PUBLIC 

Description 

Following the exercise, the RAC Chair conducts a public meeting attended by representatives of 
FEMA, NRC, other appropriate Federal agencies, exercise participants, and interested members of 
the public and media. 

Milestone 

The meeting should be conducted within two (2) days after the exercise. 

References 

44 CFR Part 350.9(e). 

Products 

None. 

Guidance 

For all biennial exercises: The FEMA Regional Director shall conduct a meeting in the vicinity of 
the power plant to discuss the evaluation of the exercise. Notice of this meeting should be published 
seven days prior to the exercise date in the local newspaper with the largest circulation in the area, 
or other comparable media, at the discretion of the FEMA Regional Director. The meeting should 
include representatives of participating OROs, the NRC, and other appropriate Federal agencies. 
Members of the public and media may attend as observers. During the meeting, the FEMA 
Regional Director should provide an overview of the exercise, along with his or her observations. 
Comments from RAC members and other evaluators may be solicited, at the discretion of the 
FEMA Regional Director. When discussing problems in organizational performance, Regional 
officials should not classify these problems as Deficiencies or ARCAs. 

The FEMA Regional Director should solicit and respond to verbal questions and comments during 
the meeting. At the discretion of the Regional Director, written comments from the public and 
media may be accepted during or after the meeting. A copy of each written submission, along with 
a written response, should be retained by the FEMA Regional Office. The results of the meeting 
and any written comments received should be taken into consideration by the FEMA Regional 
Director in his or her evaluation of the exercise. 

At the discretion of the FEMA Regional Director, this meeting may be combined with the postexercise 
participants briefing (Task 15). 

Interim REP Program Manual III-49 
August 2002 


Section III.A  Milestones and Tasks 

TASK 16: 
CONDUCT THE PARTICIPANTS BRIEFING THAT IS OPEN 
TO THE PUBLIC 

For remedial exercises: At the discretion of the FEMA Regional Director, a public meeting may 
be conducted following a remedial exercise. The purpose of such a meeting is to acquaint the 
public and media with any significant plan amendments and to discuss the results of the remedial 
exercise. If such a meeting is conducted, it should be conducted in the same manner as meetings 
held in conjunction with biennial exercises that take place after the initial 350 qualifying exercise. 

Interim REP Program Manual III-50 
August 2002 


Section III.A  Milestones and Tasks 

TASK 17: CONDUCT THE 350 APPROVAL PROCESS 
Description 

Following the 350 qualifying exercise, the RAC Chair conducts a public meeting attended by 
representatives of FEMA, NRC, other appropriate Federal agencies, exercise participants, and 
interested members of the public and media. 

Milestone 

The meeting should be conducted within two (2) days after the exercise. 

References 

44 CFR Part 350.10. 

Products 

A transcript of the meeting is required for qualifying exercises held for initial 350 approval. 

Guidance 

The scope and public notice provisions of the public meeting depend on whether or not the exercise 
is a qualifying exercise held for formal 350 approval. 

For initial FEMA 350 approval exercises: Following the qualifying exercise conducted for 
formal 350 approval, the FEMA Regional Director or his/her designee (usually the RAC Chair), 
must conduct at least one public meeting in the vicinity of the power plant. The purpose of this 
meeting is to: 

 
Acquaint the public with the content of State and local emergency response plans, 
 
Explain how the exercise tests the capability of State and local governments to 
implement their emergency response plans, 
 
Answer questions about FEMAs review of the plans and the exercise, and 
 
Receive suggestions from the public concerning changes or improvements in the plans. 
Interim REP Program Manual III-51 
August 2002 


Section III.A  Milestones and Tasks 

TASK 17: CONDUCT THE 350 APPROVAL PROCESS 

The meeting may be chaired by the FEMA Regional Director or by the State. The FEMA Regional 
Director should assure that representatives from appropriate OROs and the Licensee appear at such 
meetings to make presentations and answer questions from the public. 

Notice of this meeting must be published in the local newspaper with the largest circulation in the 
area or other comparable media, at the discretion of the FEMA Regional Director. This notice 
should be published on at least two (2) occasions, one at least two weeks before the meeting and the 
other within a few days of the meeting. Local radio and television stations should be notified of the 
meeting at least one week in advance. Representatives from the NRC and other appropriate Federal 
agencies should be invited to participate in these meetings. 

The meeting should be professionally recorded and a transcript of the meeting made available, upon 
request by interested parties, within three working days. The transcript should include a list of all 
individuals involved in the meeting, along with their organization, occupational affiliation, and 
place of residence. This list should include all Federal, State, local, and Licensee officials and 
representatives, as well as all members of the general public and media who ask questions, make 
comments or suggestions, or otherwise participate. A copy of the official transcript should be 
maintained in the FEMA Regional Office. Additional copies may be distributed to the State, the 
Licensee, and local communities, at the discretion of the FEMA Regional Director. 

The transcript of the public meeting and documentation of any requisite follow up actions should be 
included in the 350 preparedness evaluation package submitted by the FEMA Regional Director to 
the FEMA Assistant Director for Readiness, Response and Recovery Directorate. 

If a plan amendment is submitted after the public meeting has been conducted that, in the opinion of 
the FEMA Regional Director, significantly changes the context or nature of the planning (e.g., a 
change in the EPZ that results in the inclusion of additional jurisdictions), another such public 
meeting should be convened to discuss the amendments to the plan. 

During the meeting, the FEMA Regional Director should provide an overview of the exercise, along 
with his or her observations. Comments from RAC members and other evaluators may be solicited, 
at the discretion of the FEMA Regional Director. When discussing problems in organizational 
performance, Regional officials should not classify these problems as Deficiencies or ARCAs. 

The FEMA Regional Director should solicit and respond to verbal questions and comments during 
the meeting. At the discretion of the Regional Director, written comments from the public and 
media may be accepted during or after the meeting. A copy of each written submission, along with a 
written response, should be retained by the FEMA Regional Office. The results of the meeting and 
any written comments received should be taken into consideration by the FEMA Regional Director 
in his or her evaluation of the exercise. 

Interim REP Program Manual III-52 August 2002 


Section III.A  Milestones and Tasks 

TASK 18: NOTIFY STATE OF DEFICIENCIES 

Description 

Following the consultation process, and within 10 days of the exercise, the RAC Chair notifies the 
State of any problems in organizational performance that have been classified as Deficiencies. If no 
Deficiencies in organizational performance were identified, then this task does not apply. 

Milestone 

Within two (2) days of the exercise, the RAC Chair initiates consultation with FEMA Headquarters, 
RAC members, and the State in order to identify potential Deficiencies. As a result of this 
consultation process, and within 10 days of the exercise, the Regional Director forwards a letter to 
the State informing it of identified Deficiencies and the actions needed to correct the problem(s). 
The State acknowledges receipt of this letter and within 20 days of the exercise proposes a schedule 
for remedial actions. The State may also respond to both the classification of Deficiencies and the 
time frames for completing corrective actions. 

References 

44 CFR Part 350.9. 

Products 

Letter to State informing of Deficiencies and required corrective actions. 

Guidance 

The RAC Chair, following completion of the consultation process, will determine whether, in fact, 
there are Deficiencies in organizational performance. A Deficiency is defined as an observed or 
identified inadequacy of organizational performance in an exercise that could cause a finding that 
offsite emergency preparedness is not adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate 
protective measures can be taken in the event of a radiological emergency to protect the health and 
safety of the public living in the vicinity of a nuclear power plant. Because of the potential impact 
of Deficiencies on emergency preparedness, they should be corrected within 120 days through 
appropriate remedial actions, including remedial exercises, drills, or other actions. 

In the event that Deficiencies are identified, the RAC Chair should prepare a letter to the State for 
the Regional Directors signature, which will include: (a) jurisdictions affected, (b) description of 
Deficiency(ies) identified, (c) remedial actions required to correct the identified Deficiency(ies), and 

(d) time frame for completion of required remedial actions. 
The extent of participation by OROs in a remedial exercise or drill shall be determined by the 
FEMA Regional Director or his/her designee (usually the RAC Chair). Some factors to consider in 
this determination include the following: 

Interim REP Program Manual III-53 August 2002 


Section III.A  Milestones and Tasks 

TASK 18: NOTIFY STATE OF DEFICIENCIES 

 
Results of the consultation process initiated after the exercise. 
 
OROs demonstrate only those activities necessary for correction of the Deficiency(ies). 
 
To the extent possible, participation in remedial exercises should be limited to the OROs 
having the Deficiency(ies). 
 
If the corrective action performed by an ORO cannot be demonstrated without the 
involvement of other OROs, their participation should be at a level necessary to confirm 
the correction of the Deficiency(ies). If this includes participation by the Licensee, the 
Licensees participation should be arranged through the host NRC Regional 
Administrator. 
Copies of the letter should be provided to FEMA Headquarters, the appropriate NRC Regional 
Office, and the Licensee. FEMA Headquarters will provide a copy of the letter to NRC 
Headquarters. 

Within 20 days of the exercise date, the State is requested to acknowledge receipt of the Deficiency 
letter, respond to its comments, and provide a schedule for completion of the remedial actions. 

The primary reason for providing formal documentation of identified Deficiencies to States is to 
facilitate prompt correction of these identified problems. While it is FEMAs intent to provide this 
formal documentation to States within 10 days, there may be circumstances where this time frame 
may not be met. However, through the consultation process initiated immediately following each 
exercise, all involved exercise participants will be made aware of significant issues and problems 
that necessitate prompt correction. Subsequent formal notification of Deficiencies more than 
10 days after the exercise date should not, therefore, preclude the prompt correction of Deficiencies 
within 120 days. 

Interim REP Program Manual III-54 
August 2002 


Section III.A  Milestones and Tasks 

TASK 19: PREPARE EXERCISE REPORT 

Description 

Following the exercise, the RAC Chair prepares a draft exercise report based on materials 
developed and collected by the evaluators during the exercise and input from the post-exercise 
participants and public meetings. The draft exercise report is submitted to the OROs and the RAC 
for review and comment. A final exercise report addressing these comments is prepared and 
provided to the State, RAC, NRC Headquarters, and Licensee. 

Milestone 

Within 30 days of the exercise date, the RAC Chair submits a draft exercise report to the OROs for 
review and comment. Within 60 days of the exercise, The OROs provide comments on the draft 
report to the FEMA Region. Within 90 days of the exercise, the final report is issued. 

References 

Post-Exercise Activities and Documentation (Section III.K of the manual). 

Products 

Draft and Final exercise reports. 

Guidance 

The exercise report represents a detailed account of the exercise and its evaluation. It includes a 
detailed description of the exercise findings. In addition to the Deficiencies and ARCAs identified 
in the draft and final exercise report, the final exercise report may also identify and describe Areas 
Recommended for Improvement (ARFI). An ARFI is defined as an aspect of emergency 
preparedness that could be improved. While FEMA encourages OROs to address concerns related 
to identified ARFIs, they do not need to be corrected to secure or maintain FEMA 44 CFR Part 350 
approval. 

Interim REP Program Manual III-55 August 2002 


Section III.A  Milestones and Tasks 

TASK 20: EVALUATE AND REPORT ON REMEDIAL EXERCISE OR DRILL 

Description 

Correction of Deficiencies identified in an exercise is demonstrated in a remedial exercise/drill or by 
other remedial actions, within 120 days of the exercise date. The RAC Chair prepares a separate 
evaluation report of the remedial exercise, drill, or other remedial actions within 30 days of the 
remedial action. As an alternative, if the remedial action is completed in time, it may be 
incorporated in the final exercise report. 

Milestone 

The remedial action should take place within 120 days of the exercise. The RAC Chairs evaluation 
of the remedial action should be completed within 30 days of the remedial action, if not 
incorporated into the final exercise report. 

References 

44 CFR Part 350.2 (l), 350.9 (a), (b), (c)(5); 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, F. (4). 

Products 

Remedial exercise evaluation, either as part of the final exercise report or in a separate remedial 
action evaluation report. 

Guidance 

Any problems in organizational performance observed in remedial exercises should be classified by 
the RAC Chair according to the classification scheme used for exercise issues (i.e., Deficiency and 
ARCA). 

If evaluation of the remedial exercise or other remedial action indicates that the Deficiency(ies) 
have been corrected, no further action is required. If, on the other hand, the evaluation indicates that 
the organization did not adequately demonstrate correction of the identified Deficiency(ies), one of 
the following actions will be taken. 

 
If FEMA has not approved offsite planning and preparedness for the subject site under 
44 CFR Part 350, FEMA should schedule another remedial exercise, and the NRC may 
consider enforcement actions. 
 
If FEMA has approved offsite planning and preparedness for the subject site under 
44 CFR Part 350, FEMA may initiate steps to withdraw the 350 approval and schedule 
another remedial exercise under the provision of 350.13, and the NRC may consider 
enforcement actions. 
Interim REP Program Manual III-56 
August 2002 


Section III.A  Milestones and Tasks 

TASK 21: TRACK CORRECTION OF AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION 
(ARCAs) 

Description 

ARCAs observed or identified in an exercise are tracked by the RAC Chair to ensure correction in 
future exercises. In planning for the next exercise, evaluation area criteria and extent-of-play 
provisions are reviewed in light of the need to demonstrate correction of identified ARCAs. 

Milestone 

Corrective actions on the ARCAs not demonstrated in a remedial exercise will be verified at the 
next exercise, if not sooner. 

References 

None. 

Products 

Log or other documentation of outstanding ARCAs. 

Guidance 

The RAC Chair should document and track all ARCAs to ensure that they are corrected at the next 
exercise, if not sooner. In planning for the next exercise, the exercise scenario, evaluation area 
criteria, and extent-of-play agreements should be reviewed in light of the need to demonstrate 
correction of ARCAs. Deficiencies must be corrected within 120 days and are documented either in 
the draft exercise report or a separate remedial action evaluation report, depending on when the 
remedial action was conducted. 

Interim REP Program Manual III-57 August 2002 


Section III.A  Milestones and Tasks 

TASK 22: TRACK DEMONSTRATION OF EXERCISE EVALUATION AREA 

Description 

The RAC Chair establishes procedures to track each exercise evaluation area criteria to document 
that OROs demonstrate evaluation area criteria according to the frequencies established in the 
matrix (Table 4). 

Milestone 

Continuous. 

References 

NUREG-0654. 

Products 

Table or other record of current status of exercise evaluation area criteria, including the dates of 
those exercised successfully and those still needing to be exercised successfully during the current 
six-year period. 

Guidance 

As described in Task 3, evaluation area criteria are demonstrated at various frequencies. Some are 
demonstrated during each exercise, others are demonstrated based on the scenario, but all must be 
demonstrated at least once in a six-year period by all OROs responsible for the activities and 
functions. 

In tracking evaluation area criteria, the RAC Chair should establish a list of evaluation area criteria 
for which OROs have responsibility. For any given organization, this will depend on the 
breakdown of responsibilities between State and local governments and, if applicable, utility OROs 
for the particular site involved. A cumulative record should be kept for OROs, identifying for each 
exercise which evaluation area criteria were scheduled to be demonstrated and which were 
demonstrated successfully. 

A Radiological Emergency Preparedness Database has been developed. The database tracks the 
demonstration of all exercise evaluation area criteria and may be used by RAC Chairs to satisfy the 
provisions of this task. 

Interim REP Program Manual III-58 August 2002 


Section III.B  Evaluation Areas 

B. EVALUATION AREAS 
The following section of this manual contains the methodology used in the evaluation of all drills 
and exercises of off-site emergency response plans in support of a commercial nuclear plant by 
evaluators from the Federal Emergency Management Agency, other Federal Agencies, FEMA 
contractors, and any state, local, or Tribal evaluators. Exercises and drills are used by FEMA to 
determine the adequacy of offsite radiological emergency preparedness for commercial nuclear 
power plant accidents. The evaluation process has evolved over the years in format but the 
regulatory basis remains unchanged. 

The regulatory basis and standards for the Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) program 
exercises/drills are addressed in 44 CFR Parts 350, 351, and 352; 10 CFR Part 50; and the 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)-FEMA Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) dated 
June 19, 1993, and contained in 44 CFR 353, Appendix A. These documents establish FEMAs 
responsibility to review, evaluate, and approve State and local radiological emergency plans and 
preparedness and evaluate exercises of them. FEMA and the NRC use both the standards and 
related criteria contained in NUREG-0654 in reviewing and evaluating off-site response 
organizations radiological emergency plans and preparedness. 

Planning Standard N of NUREG-0654 states that Periodic exercises are (will be) conducted to 
evaluate major portions of emergency response capabilitiesand deficiencies identified as a 
result of exercisesare (will be) corrected. Evaluation criterion N.a.1 defines an exercise as 
an event that tests the integrated capability and a major portion of the basic elements existing 
within emergency preparedness plans and organizations. Planning Standard N criteria are 
predicated on the presumption that exercises will be conducted as set forth in NRC and FEMA 
rules and in exercise evaluation guidance. 

A Federal Register notice was issued in 1996 requesting comments on the Radiological 
Emergency Preparedness program. Based on those comments, several recommendations were 
made to FEMA Headquarters. The first recommendation was to streamline the program and 
eliminate the current exercise checklists and inconsistencies between regions. As a result of that 
recommendation, the new exercise evaluation methodology was developed to minimize exercise 
issue inconsistencies among regions, and to make the evaluation less dependent upon 
prescriptive criteria and more results oriented. 

The six evaluation areas with their sub-criteria are based on the 16 planning standards of 44 CFR 
350 that are further defined in NUREG-0654, Rev. 1. The evaluation areas reflect current policy 
and guidance on what is required for the successful demonstration during an exercise. The new 
evaluation areas reflect FEMAs shift towards a more results oriented approach to the 
evaluation process. In other words, the accomplishment of the mission (result) is more important 
than the means used to achieve the result. 

REP exercises/drills are designed to test the capability of offsite response organizations (OROs) 
to protect public health and safety through the implementation of their emergency response plans 
and procedures under simulated accident conditions. NOTE: ORO refers to State, Tribal, and 
local governments, licensee emergency response organizations, and other supporting agencies. 

Interim REP Program Manual III-59 August 2002 


Section III.B  Evaluation Areas 

The Evaluation Areas were designed to allow the evaluator to focus more on observing and 
recording exercise/drill events as they occur. 

It is essential that the approved evaluation area modules be used in all REP exercises and drills 
and that no modifications be made without prior approval by FEMA Headquarters. 

The six Evaluation Areas are:

 1. Emergency Operations Management 
2. Protective Action Decision-Making 
3. Protective Action Implementation 
4. Plume Phase Field Measurements and Analyses 
5. Emergency Notification and Public Information 
6. Support Operations/Facilities 
Contained within each of these Areas are specific sub-elements and evaluation criteria. It is the 
responsibility of the Regional Office to assign the various criteria to each facility and/or function 
that is to be evaluated. Table 6, Assignment of Evaluation Criteria to OROs, found in 
section III.A, Milestones and Tasks, provides examples of criteria that may apply at some 
locations. Tracking of when these facilities and/or functions have been evaluated, with which 
evaluation criteria, and the status of that demonstration is also the responsibility of each FEMA 
region. 

1. Emergency Operations Management 
Sub-element 1.a. - Mobilization 
Criterion 1.a.1 


Sub-element 1.b.  Facilities 
Criterion 1.b.1 


Sub-element 1.c.  Direction and Control 
Criterion 1.c.1 


Sub-element 1.d  Communications Equipment 
Criterion 1.d.1 


Sub-element 1.e.  Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations 
Criterion 1.e.1 

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Section III.B  Evaluation Areas 

2. Protective Action Decision-Making 
Sub-element 2.a.  Emergency Worker Exposure Control 
Criterion 2.a.1. 

Sub-element 2.b.  Radiological Assessment and Protective Action 
Recommendations and Decisions for the Plume Phase of the 
Emergency

 Criterion 2.b.1 
Criterion 2.b.2 


Sub-element 2.c.  Protective Action Decisions Consideration for the Protection 
of Special Populations 
Criterion 2.c.1 

Sub-element 2.d  Radiological Assessment and Decision-Making for the 
Ingestion Exposure Pathway 
Criterion 2.d.1 

Sub-element 2.e  Radiological Assessment and Decision-Making Concerning 
Relocation, Reentry, and Return 
Criterion 2.e.1 

3. Protective Action Implementation 
Sub-element 3.a.  Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control 
Criterion 3.a.1 

Sub-element 3.b.  Implementation of KI Decision 
Criterion 3.b.1. 


Sub-element 3.c.  Implementation of Protective Actions for Special Populations 
Criterion 3.c.1 
Criterion 3.c.2 

 Sub-element 3.d  Implementation of Traffic and Access Control 
Criterion 3.d.1 
Criterion 3.d.2 

 Sub-element 3.e.  Implementation of Ingestion Pathway Decisions 
Criterion 3.e.1 
Criterion 3.e.2 

Sub-element 3.f  Implementation of Relocation, Reentry, and Return Decisions 
Criterion 3.f.1 

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Section III.B  Evaluation Areas 

4. Plume Phase Field Measurements and Analyses 
Sub-element 4.a.  Plume Phase Field Measurements and Analyses 
Criterion 4.a.1 
Criterion 4.a.2 
Criterion 4.a.3 

Sub-element 4.b  Post Plume Phase Field Measurements and Sampling 
Criterion 4.b.1 

 Sub-element 4.c.  Laboratory Operations 
Criterion 4.c.1 


5. Emergency Notification and Public Information 
Sub-element 5.a  Activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System 
Criterion 5.a.1. 
Criterion 5.a.2.  RESERVED FOR FUTURE USE 
Criterion 5.a.3 

Sub-element 5.b.  Emergency Information and Instructions for the Public and the 
Media 
Criterion 5.b.1 

6. Support Operations/Facilities 
Sub-element 6.a.  Monitoring and Decontamination of Evacuees and Emergency 
Workers, and Registration of Evacuees 
Criterion 6.a.1 

Sub-element 6.b.  Monitoring and Decontamination of Emergency Worker 
Equipment 
Criterion 6.b.1 

Sub-element 6.c.  Temporary Care of Evacuees 
Criterion 6.c.1 


Sub-element 6.d.  Transportation and Treatment of Contaminated Injured 
Individuals 
Criterion 6.d.1 

Interim REP Program Manual III-62 August 2002 


Section III.B  Evaluation Areas 

EVALUATION AREA 1 

Emergency Operations Management 

Sub-Element 1.aMobilization 

 Intent 

This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that Offsite Response 
Organizations (OROs) should have the capability to alert, notify, and mobilize 
emergency personnel and to activate and staff emergency facilities. 

Criterion 1.a.1: OROs use effective procedures to alert, notify, and mobilize 
emergency personnel and activate facilities in a timely manner. (NUREG-0654, A.4; 
D.3, 4; E.1, 2; H.4) 

Extent of Play 

Responsible OROs should demonstrate the capability to receive notification of an 
emergency situation from the licensee, verify the notification, and contact, alert, and 
mobilize key emergency personnel in a timely manner. Responsible OROs should 
demonstrate the activation of facilities for immediate use by mobilized personnel when 
they arrive to begin emergency operations. Activation of facilities should be completed in 
accordance with the plan and/or procedures. Pre-positioning of emergency personnel is 
appropriate, in accordance with the extent-of-play agreement, at those facilities located 
beyond a normal commuting distance from the individuals duty location or residence. 
Further, pre-positioning of staff for out-of-sequence demonstrations is appropriate in 
accordance with the extent-of-play agreement. 

All activities must be based on the OROs plans and procedures and completed as they 
would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-
of-play agreement. 

Sub-Element 1.bFacilities 

 Intent 

This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that Offsite Response 
Organizations (OROs) have facilities to support the emergency response. 

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Section III.B  Evaluation Areas 

Criterion 1.b.1: Facilities are sufficient to support the emergency response. 
(NUREG-0654, H.3) 

Extent of Play 

Facilities will only be specifically evaluated for this criterion if they are new or have 
substantial changes in structure or mission. Responsible OROs should demonstrate the 
availability of facilities that support the accomplishment of emergency operations. Some 
of the areas to be considered are: adequate space, furnishings, lighting, restrooms, 
ventilation, backup power and/or alternate facility (if required to support operations). 

Facilities must be set up based on the OROs plans and procedures and demonstrated as 
they would be used in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in 
the extent-of-play agreement. 

Sub-Element 1.cDirection and Control 

 Intent 

This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that Offsite Response 
Organizations (OROs) have the capability to control their overall response to an 
emergency. 

Criterion 1.c.1: Key personnel with leadership roles for the ORO provide direction 
and control to that part of the overall response effort for which they are responsible. 
(NUREG-0654, A.1.d; A.2.a, b) 

Extent of Play 

Leadership personnel should demonstrate the ability to carry out essential functions of the 
response effort, for example: keeping the staff informed through periodic briefings and/or 
other means, coordinating with other appropriate OROs, and ensuring completion of 
requirements and requests. 

All activities associated with direction and control must be performed based on the 
OROs plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, 
unless otherwise noted above or indicated in the extent-of-play agreement. 

Sub-Element 1.dCommunications Equipment

 Intent 

This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that Offsite Response 
Organizations (OROs) should establish reliable primary and backup communication 
systems to ensure communications with key emergency personnel at locations such as the 
following: appropriate contiguous governments within the emergency planning zone 

Interim REP Program Manual III-64 August 2002 


Section III.B  Evaluation Areas 

(EPZ), Federal emergency response organizations, the licensee and its facilities, 
emergency operations centers (EOC), and field teams. 

Criterion 1.d.1: At least two communication systems are available, at least one 
operates properly, and communication links are established and maintained with 
appropriate locations. Communications capabilities are managed in support of 
emergency operations. (NUREG-0654, F.1, 2) 

Extent of Play 

OROs will demonstrate that a primary and at least one backup system are fully functional 
at the beginning of an exercise. If a communications system or systems are not 
functional, but exercise performance is not affected, no exercise issue will be assessed. 
Communications equipment and procedures for facilities and field units should be used as 
needed for the transmission and receipt of exercise messages. All facilities and field 
teams should have the capability to access at least one communication system that is 
independent of the commercial telephone system. Responsible OROs should demonstrate 
the capability to manage the communication systems and ensure that all message traffic is 
handled without delays that might disrupt the conduct of emergency operations. OROs 
should ensure that a coordinated communication link for fixed and mobile medical 
support facilities exists. The specific communications capabilities of OROs should be 
commensurate with that specified in the response plan and/or procedures. Exercise 
scenarios could require the failure of a communications system and the use of an alternate 
system, as negotiated in the extent-of-play agreement. 

All activities associated with the management of communications capabilities must be 
demonstrated based on the OROs plans and procedures and completed as they would be 
in an actual emergency, unless otherwise noted above or in the extent-of-play agreement. 

Sub-Element 1.eEquipment and Supplies to Support Operations 

 Intent 

This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that Offsite Response 
Organizations (OROs) have emergency equipment and supplies adequate to support the 
emergency response. 

Criterion 1.e.1: Equipment, maps, displays, dosimetry, potassium iodide (KI), and 
other supplies are sufficient to support emergency operations. (NUREG-0654, 
H.7,10; J.10.a, b, e, J.11; K.3.a) 

Extent of Play 

Equipment within the facility (facilities) should be sufficient and consistent with the role 
assigned to that facility in the OROs plans and/or procedures in support of emergency 
operations. Use of maps and displays is encouraged. 

Interim REP Program Manual III-65 August 2002 


Section III.B  Evaluation Areas 

All instruments, should be inspected, inventoried, and operationally checked before each 
use. Instruments should be calibrated in accordance with the manufacturers 
recommendations. Unmodified CDV700 series instruments and other instruments 
without a manufacturers recommendation should be calibrated annually. Modified 
CDV-700 instruments should be calibrated in accordance with the recommendation of the 
modification manufacturer. A label indicating such calibration should be on each 
instrument or calibrated frequency can be verified by other means. Additionally, 
instruments being used to measure activity should have a range of readings sticker 
affixed to the side of the instrument. The above considerations should be included in 

4.a.1 for field team equipment; 4.c.1 for radiological laboratory equipment (does not 
apply to analytical equipment); reception center and emergency worker facilities 
equipment under 6.a.1; and ambulance and medical facilities equipment under 6.d.1. 
Sufficient quantities of appropriate direct-reading and permanent record dosimetry and 
dosimeter chargers should be available for issuance to all categories of emergency 
workers that could be deployed from that facility. Appropriate direct-reading dosimetry 
should allow individual(s) to read the administrative reporting limits and maximum 
exposure limits contained in the OROs plans and procedures. 

Dosimetry should be inspected for electrical leakage at least annually and replaced, if 
necessary. CDV138s, due to their documented history of electrical leakage problems, 
should be inspected for electrical leakage at least quarterly and replaced if necessary. 
This leakage testing will be verified during the exercise, through documentation 
submitted in the Annual Letter of Certification, and/or through a staff assistance visit. 

Responsible OROs should demonstrate the capability to maintain inventories of KI 
sufficient for use by emergency workers, as indicated on rosters; institutionalized 
individuals, as indicated in capacity lists for facilities; and, where stipulated by the plan 
and/or procedures, members of the general public (including transients) within the plume 
pathway EPZ. 

Quantities of dosimetry and KI available and storage locations(s) will be confirmed by 
physical inspection at storage location(s) or through documentation of current inventory 
submitted during the exercise, provided in the Annual Letter of Certification submission, 
and/or verified during a Staff Assistance Visit. Available supplies of KI should be within 
the expiration date indicated on KI bottles or blister packs. As an alternative, the ORO 
may produce a letter from a certified private or State laboratory indicating that the KI 
supply remains potent, in accordance with U.S. Pharmacopoeia standards. 

At locations where traffic and access control personnel are deployed, appropriate 
equipment (e.g., vehicles, barriers, traffic cones and signs, etc.) should be available or 
their availability described. 

All activities must be based on the OROs plans and procedures and completed as they 
would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-
of-play agreement. 

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Section III.B  Evaluation Areas 

EVALUATION AREA 2 

Protective Action Decision Making 

Sub-Element 2.aEmergency Worker Exposure Control 

 Intent 

This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that Offsite Response 
Organizations (OROs) have the capability to assess and control the radiation exposure 
received by emergency workers and have a decision chain in place, as specified in the 
OROs plans and procedures, to authorize emergency worker exposure limits to be 
exceeded for specific missions. 

Radiation exposure limits for emergency workers are the recommended accumulated 
dose limits or exposure rates that emergency workers may be permitted to incur during an 
emergency. These limits include any pre-established administrative reporting limits (that 
take into consideration Total Effective Dose Equivalent or organ-specific limits) 
identified in the OROs plans and procedures. 

Criterion 2.a.1: OROs use a decision-making process, considering relevant factors 
and appropriate coordination, to ensure that an exposure control system, including 
the use of KI, is in place for emergency workers including provisions to authorize 
radiation exposure in excess of administrative limits or protective action guides. 
(NUREG-0654, K.4, J.10. e, f) 

Extent of Play 

OROs authorized to send emergency workers into the plume exposure pathway EPZ 
should demonstrate a capability to meet the criterion based on their emergency plans and 
procedures. 

Responsible OROs should demonstrate the capability to make decisions concerning the 
authorization of exposure levels in excess of preauthorized levels and to the number of 
emergency workers receiving radiation dose above pre-authorized levels. 

As appropriate, OROs should demonstrate the capability to make decisions on the 
distribution and administration of KI as a protective measure, based on the OROs plan 
and/or procedures or projected thyroid dose compared with the established Protective 
Action Guides (PAGs) for KI administration. 

All activities must be based on the OROs plans and procedures and completed as they 
would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-
of-play agreement. 

Interim REP Program Manual III-67 August 2002 


Section III.B  Evaluation Areas 

Sub-Element 2.b.Radiological Assessment and Protective Action Recommendations and 
Decisions for the Plume Phase of the Emergency 

 Intent 

This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that Offsite Response 
Organizations (OROs) have the capability to use all available data to independently 
project integrated dose from exposure rates or other information and compare the 
estimated dose savings with the protective action guides. OROs have the capability to 
choose, among a range of protective actions, those most appropriate in a given 
emergency situation. OROs base these choices on PAGs from the OROs plans and 
procedures or EPA 400R92001 and other criteria, such as, plant conditions, licensee 
protective action recommendations, coordination of protective action decisions with other 
political jurisdictions (e.g., other affected OROs), availability of appropriate in-place 
shelter, weather conditions, and situations that create higher than normal risk from 
evacuation. 

Criterion 2.b.1: Appropriate protective action recommendations are based on 
available information on plant conditions, field monitoring data, and licensee and 
ORO dose projections, as well as knowledge of onsite and offsite environmental 
conditions. (NUREG-0654, I.8, 10 and Supplement 3) 

Extent of Play 

During the initial stage of the emergency response, following notification of plant 
conditions that may warrant offsite protective actions, the ORO should demonstrate the 
capability to use appropriate means, described in the plan and/or procedures, to develop 
protective action recommendations (PAR) for decision-makers based on available 
information and recommendations from the licensee and field monitoring data, if 
available. 

When release and meteorological data are provided by the licensee, the ORO also 
considers these data. The ORO should demonstrate a reliable capability to independently 
validate dose projections. The types of calculations to be demonstrated depend on the 
data available and the need for assessments to support the PARs appropriate to the 
scenario. In all cases, calculation of projected dose should be demonstrated. Projected 
doses should be related to quantities and units of the PAG to which they will be 
compared. PARs should be promptly transmitted to decision-makers in a prearranged 
format. 

Differences greater than a factor of 10 between projected doses by the licensee and the 
ORO should be discussed with the licensee with respect to the input data and assumptions 
used, the use of different models, or other possible reasons. Resolution of these 
differences should be incorporated into the PAR if timely and appropriate. The ORO 
should demonstrate the capability to use any additional data to refine projected doses and 
exposure rates and revise the associated PARs. 

Interim REP Program Manual III-68 August 2002 


Section III.B  Evaluation Areas 

All activities must be based on the OROs plans and procedures and completed as they 
would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-
of-play agreement. 

Criterion 2.b.2: A decision-making process involving consideration of appropriate 
factors and necessary coordination is used to make protective action decisions 
(PAD) for the general public (including the recommendation for the use of KI, if 
ORO policy). (NUREG-0654, J.9, 10.f, m) 

Extent of Play 

Offsite Response Organizations (OROs) should have the capability to make both initial 
and subsequent PADs. They should demonstrate the capability to make initial PADs in a 
timely manner appropriate to the situation, based on notification from the licensee, 
assessment of plant status and releases, and PARs from the utility and ORO staff. 

The dose assessment personnel may provide additional PARs based on the subsequent 
dose projections, field monitoring data, or information on plant conditions. The decision 
makers should demonstrate the capability to change protective actions as appropriate 
based on these projections. 

If the ORO has determined that KI will be used as a protective measure for the general 
public under offsite plans, then the ORO should demonstrate the capability to make 
decisions on the distribution and administration of KI as a protective measure for the 
general public to supplement sheltering and evacuation. This decision should be based on 
the OROs plan and/or procedures or projected thyroid dose compared with the 
established PAG for KI administration. The KI decisionmaking process should involve 
close coordination with appropriate assessment and decision-making staff. 

If more than one ORO is involved in decision-making, OROs should communicate and 
coordinate PADs with affected OROs. OROs should demonstrate the capability to 
communicate the contents of decisions to the affected jurisdictions. 

All decision-making activities by ORO personnel must be performed based on the OROs 
plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless 
noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-of-play agreement. 

Sub-Element 2.cProtective Action Decisions Consideration for the Protection of Special 
Populations 

 Intent 

This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that Offsite Response 
Organizations (OROs) should have the capability to determine protective action 
recommendations, including evacuation, sheltering and use of potassium iodide (KI), if 
applicable, for special population groups (e.g., hospitals, nursing homes, correctional 

Interim REP Program Manual III-69 August 2002 


Section III.B  Evaluation Areas 

facilities, schools, licensed day care centers, mobility impaired individuals, and 
transportation dependent individuals). Focus is on those special population groups that 
are (or potentially will be) affected by a radiological release from a nuclear power plant. 

Criterion 2.c.1: Protective action decisions are made, as appropriate, for special 
population groups. (NUREG-0654, J.9, J.10.d, e) 

Extent of Play 

Usually, it is appropriate to implement evacuation in areas where doses are projected to 
exceed the lower end of the range of PAGs, except for situations where there is a high-
risk environment or where high-risk groups (e.g., the immobile or infirm) are involved. In 
these cases, examples of factors that should be considered are: weather conditions, shelter 
availability, availability of transportation assets, risk of evacuation vs. risk from the 
avoided dose, and precautionary school evacuations. In situations where an 
institutionalized population cannot be evacuated, the administration of KI should be 
considered by the OROs. 

Applicable OROs should demonstrate the capability to alert and notify all public school 
systems/districts of emergency conditions that are expected to or may necessitate 
protective actions for students. Contacts with public school systems/districts must be 
actual. 

In accordance with plans and/or procedures, OROs and/or officials of public school 
systems/districts should demonstrate the capability to make prompt decisions on 
protective actions for students. Officials should demonstrate that the decision making 
process for protective actions considers (that is, either accepts automatically or gives 
heavy weight to) protective action recommendations made by ORO personnel, the ECL 
at which these recommendations are received, preplanned strategies for protective actions 
for that ECL, and the location of students at the time (for example, whether the students 
are still at home, en route to the school, or at the school). 

All decision-making activities associated with protective actions, including consideration 
of available resources, for special population groups must be based on the OROs plans 
and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted 
above or otherwise indicated in the extent-of-play agreement. 

Sub-Element 2.d.Radiological Assessment and Decision-Making for the Ingestion Exposure 
Pathway 

 Intent 

This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that Offsite Response 
Organizations (OROs) have the means to assess the radiological consequences for the 
ingestion exposure pathway, relate them to the appropriate PAGs, and make timely, 
appropriate protective action decisions to mitigate exposure from the ingestion pathway. 

Interim REP Program Manual III-70 August 2002 


Section III.B  Evaluation Areas 

During an accident at a nuclear power plant, a release of radioactive material may 
contaminate water supplies and agricultural products in the surrounding areas. Any such 
contamination would likely occur during the plume phase of the accident and, depending 
on the nature of the release, could impact the ingestion pathway for weeks or years. 

Criterion 2.d.1: Radiological consequences for the ingestion pathway are assessed 
and appropriate protective action decisions are made based on the OROs planning 
criteria. (NUREG-0654, J.9, J.11) 

Extent of Play 

It is expected that the Offsite Response Organizations (OROs) will take precautionary 
actions to protect food and water supplies, or to minimize exposure to potentially 
contaminated water and food, in accordance with their respective plans and procedures. 
Often such precautionary actions are initiated by the OROs based on criteria related to the 
facilitys Emergency Classification Levels (ECL). Such actions may include 
recommendations to place milk animals on stored feed and to use protected water 
supplies. 

The ORO should use its procedures (for example, development of a sampling plan) to 
assess the radiological consequences of a release on the food and water supplies. The 
OROs assessment should include the evaluation of the radiological analyses of 
representative samples of water, food, and other ingestible substances of local interest 
from potentially impacted areas, the characterization of the releases from the facility, and 
the extent of areas potentially impacted by the release. During this assessment, OROs 
should consider the use of agricultural and watershed data within the 50-mile EPZ. The 
radiological impacts on the food and water should then be compared to the appropriate 
ingestion PAGs contained in the OROs plan and/or procedures. (The plan and/or 
procedures may contain PAGs based on specific dose commitment criteria or based on 
criteria as recommended by current Food and Drug Administration guidance.) Timely 
and appropriate recommendations should be provided to the ORO decision-makers group 
for implementation decisions. As time permits, the ORO may also include a comparison 
of taking or not taking a given action on the resultant ingestion pathway dose 
commitments. 

The ORO should demonstrate timely decisions to minimize radiological impacts from the 
ingestion pathway, based on the given assessments and other information available. Any 
such decisions should be communicated and, to the extent practical, coordinated with 
neighboring and local OROs. 

OROs should use Federal resources, as identified in the Federal Radiological Emergency 
Response Plan (FRERP), and other resources (e.g., compacts, nuclear insurers, etc.), if 
available. Evaluation of this criterion will take into consideration the level of Federal and 
other resources participating. 

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Section III.B  Evaluation Areas 

All activities must be based on the OROs plans and procedures and completed as they 
would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-
of-play agreement. 

Sub-Element 2.e.Radiological Assessment and Decision-Making Concerning Relocation, 
Reentry, and Return 

 Intent 

This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that Offsite Response 
Organizations (OROs) have the capability to make decisions on relocation, Reentry, and 
return of the general public. These decisions are essential for the protection of the public 
from the direct long-term exposure to deposited radioactive materials from a severe 
accident at a nuclear power plant. 

Criterion 2.e.1: Timely relocation, reentry, and return decisions are made and 
coordinated as appropriate, based on assessments of the radiological conditions and 
criteria in the OROs plan and/or procedures. (NUREG-0654, I.10; J.9; M.1) 

Extent of Play 

Relocation: OROs should demonstrate the capability to estimate integrated dose in 
contaminated areas and to compare these estimates with PAGs, apply decision criteria for 
relocation of those individuals in the general public who have not been evacuated but 
where projected doses are in excess of relocation PAGs, and control access to evacuated 
and restricted areas. Decisions are made for relocating members of the evacuated public 
who lived in areas that now have residual radiation levels in excess of the PAGs. 
Determination of areas to be restricted should be based on factors such as the mix of 
radionuclides in deposited materials, calculated exposure rates vs. the PAGs, and field 
samples of vegetation and soil analyses. 

Reentry: Decisions should be made regarding the location of control points and policies 
regarding access and exposure control for emergency workers and members of the 
general public who need to temporarily enter the evacuated area to perform specific tasks 
or missions. 

Examples of control procedures are: the assignment of, or checking for, direct-reading 
and non-direct-reading dosimetry for emergency workers; questions regarding the 
individuals objectives and locations expected to be visited and associated time frames; 
availability of maps and plots of radiation exposure rates; advice on areas to avoid; and 
procedures for exit including: monitoring of individuals, vehicles, and equipment; 
decision criteria regarding decontamination; and proper disposition of emergency worker 
dosimetry and maintenance of emergency worker radiation exposure records. 

Responsible OROs should demonstrate the capability to develop a strategy for authorized 
Reentry of individuals into the restricted zone, based on established decision criteria. 

Interim REP Program Manual III-72 August 2002 


Section III.B  Evaluation Areas 

OROs should demonstrate the capability to modify those policies for security purposes 
(e.g., police patrols), for maintenance of essential services (e.g., fire protection and 
utilities), and for other critical functions. They should demonstrate the capability to use 
decision making criteria in allowing access to the restricted zone by the public for various 
reasons, such as to maintain property (e.g., to care for farm animals or secure machinery 
for storage), or to retrieve important possessions. Coordinated policies for access and 
exposure control should be developed among all agencies with roles to perform in the 
restricted zone. OROs should demonstrate the capability to establish policies for 
provision of dosimetry to all individuals allowed to re-enter the restricted zone. The 
extent that OROs need to develop policies on Reentry will be determined by scenario 
events. 

Return: Decisions are to be based on environmental data and political boundaries or 
physical/geological features, which allow identification of the boundaries of areas to 
which members of the general public may return. Return is permitted to the boundary of 
the restricted area that is based on the relocation PAG. 

Other factors that the ORO should consider are, for example: conditions that permit the 
cancellation of the Emergency Classification Level and the relaxation of associated 
restrictive measures; basing return recommendations (i.e., permitting populations that 
were previously evacuated to reoccupy their homes and businesses on an unrestricted 
basis) on measurements of radiation from ground deposition; and the capability to 
identify services and facilities that require restoration within a few days and to identify 
the procedures and resources for their restoration. Examples of these services and 
facilities are: medical and social services, utilities, roads, schools, and intermediate term 
housing for relocated persons. 

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Section III.B  Evaluation Areas 

EVALUATION AREA 3 

 Protective Action Implementation 

Sub-Element 3.aImplementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control 

 Intent 

This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that OROs should have 
the capability to provide for the following: distribution, use, collection, and processing of 
direct-reading dosimetry and permanent record dosimetry; the reading of direct-reading 
dosimetry by emergency workers at appropriate frequencies; maintaining a radiation dose 
record for each emergency worker; and establishing a decision chain or authorization 
procedure for emergency workers to incur radiation exposures in excess of protective 
action guides, always applying the ALARA (As Low As is Reasonably Achievable) 
principle as appropriate. 

Criterion 3.a.1: The OROs issue appropriate dosimetry and procedures, and 
manage radiological exposure to emergency workers in accordance with the plans 
and procedures. Emergency workers periodically and at the end of each mission 
read their dosimeters and record the readings on the appropriate exposure record 
or chart. (NUREG-0654, K.3.a, b) 

Extent of Play 

OROs should demonstrate the capability to provide appropriate direct-reading and 
permanent record dosimetry, dosimeter chargers, and instructions on the use of dosimetry 
to emergency workers. For evaluation purposes, appropriate direct-reading dosimetry is 
defined as dosimetry that allows individual(s) to read the administrative reporting limits 
(that are pre-established at a level low enough to consider subsequent calculation of Total 
Effective Dose Equivalent) and maximum exposure limits (for those emergency workers 
involved in life saving activities) contained in the OROs plans and procedures. 

Each emergency worker should have the basic knowledge of radiation exposure limits as 
specified in the OROs plan and/or procedures. Procedures to monitor and record 
dosimeter readings and to manage radiological exposure control should be demonstrated. 

During a plume phase exercise, emergency workers should demonstrate the procedures to 
be followed when administrative exposure limits and turnback values are reached. The 
emergency worker should report accumulated exposures during the exercise as indicated 
in the plans and procedures. OROs should demonstrate the actions described in the plan 
and/or procedures by determining whether to replace the worker, to authorize the worker 
to incur additional exposures or to take other actions. If scenario events do not require 
emergency workers to seek authorizations for additional exposure, evaluators should 
interview at least two emergency workers, to determine their knowledge of whom to 
contact in the event authorization is needed and at what exposure levels. Emergency 

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Section III.B  Evaluation Areas 

workers may use any available resources (e.g., written procedures and/or coworkers) in 
providing responses. 

Although it is desirable for all emergency workers to each have a direct-reading 
dosimeter, there may be situations where team members will be in close proximity to 
each other during the entire mission and adequate control of exposure can be effected for 
all members of the team by one dosimeter worn by the team leader. Emergency workers 
who are assigned to low exposure rate areas, e.g., at reception centers, counting 
laboratories, emergency operations centers, and communications centers, may have 
individual direct-reading dosimeters or they may be monitored by dosimeters 
strategically placed in the work area. It should be noted that, even in these situations, 
each team member must still have their own permanent record dosimetry. Individuals 
without specific radiological response missions, such as farmers for animal care, essential 
utility service personnel, or other members of the public who must re-enter an evacuated 
area following or during the plume passage, should be limited to the lowest radiological 
exposure commensurate with completing their missions. 

All activities must be based on the OROs plans and procedures and completed as they 
would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-
of-play agreement. 

Sub-Element 3.bImplementation of KI Decision 

 Intent 

This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that Offsite Response 
Organizations (OROs) should have the capability to provide radioprotective drugs for 
emergency workers, institutionalized individuals, and, if in the plan and/or procedures, to 
the general public for whom immediate evacuation may not be feasible, very difficult, or 
significantly delayed. While it is necessary for OROs to have the capability to provide KI 
to emergency workers and institutionalized individuals, the provision of KI to the general 
public is an ORO option and is reflected in OROs plans and procedures. Provisions 
should include the availability of adequate quantities, storage, and means of the 
distribution of radioprotective drugs. 

Criterion 3.b.1: KI and appropriate instructions are available should a decision to 
recommend use of KI be made. Appropriate record-keeping of the administration of 
KI for emergency workers and institutionalized individuals is maintained. 
(NUREG-0654, J.10.e) 

Extent of Play 

Offsite Response Organizations (OROs) should demonstrate the capability to make KI 
available to emergency workers, institutionalized individuals, and, where provided for in 
the ORO plan and/or procedures, to members of the general public. OROs should 
demonstrate the capability to accomplish distribution of KI consistent with decisions 

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Section III.B  Evaluation Areas 

made. Organizations should have the capability to develop and maintain lists of 
emergency workers and institutionalized individuals who have ingested KI, including 
documentation of the date(s) and time(s) they were instructed to ingest KI. The ingestion 
of KI recommended by the designated ORO health official is voluntary. For evaluation 
purposes, the actual ingestion of KI is not necessary. OROs should demonstrate the 
capability to formulate and disseminate appropriate instructions on the use of KI for those 
advised to take it. If a recommendation is made for the general public to take KI, 
appropriate information should be provided to the public by the means of notification 
specified in the OROs plan and/or procedures. 

Emergency workers should demonstrate the basic knowledge of procedures for the use of 
KI whether or not the scenario drives the use of KI. This can be accomplished by an 
interview with the evaluator. 

All activities must be based on the OROs plans and procedures and completed as they 
would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-
of-play agreement. 

Sub-element 3.cImplementation of Protective Actions for Special Populations 

 Intent 

This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that Offsite Response 
Organizations (OROs) should have the capability to implement protective action 
decisions, including evacuation and/or sheltering, for all special populations. Focus is on 
those special populations that are (or potentially will be) affected by a radiological 
release from a nuclear power plant. 

Criterion 3.c.1: Protective action decisions are implemented for special populations 
other than schools within areas subject to protective actions. (NUREG-0654, 
J.10.c, d, g) 

Extent of Play 

Applicable OROs should demonstrate the capability to alert and notify (for example, 
provide protective action recommendations and emergency information and instructions) 
special populations (hospitals, nursing homes, correctional facilities, mobility impaired 
individuals, transportation dependent, etc.). OROs should demonstrate the capability to 
provide for the needs of special populations in accordance with the OROs plans and 
procedures. 

Contact with special populations and reception facilities may be actual or simulated, as 
agreed to in the Extent of Play. Some contacts with transportation providers should be 
actual, as negotiated in the extent of play. All actual and simulated contacts should be 
logged. 

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Section III.B  Evaluation Areas 

All implementing activities associated with protective actions for special populations 
must be based on the OROs plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an 
actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-of-play 
agreement. 

Criterion 3.c.2: OROs/School officials implement protective actions for schools. 
(NUREG-0654, J.10.c, d, g) 

Extent of Play 

Public school systems/districts shall demonstrate the ability to implement protective 
action decisions for students. The demonstration shall be made as follows: At least one 
school in each affected school system or district, as appropriate, needs to demonstrate the 
implementation of protective actions. The implementation of canceling the school day, 
dismissing early, or sheltering should be simulated by describing to evaluators the 
procedures that would be followed. If evacuation is the implemented protective action, all 
activities to coordinate and complete the evacuation of students to reception centers, 
congregate care centers, or host schools may actually be demonstrated or accomplished 
through an interview process. If accomplished through an interview process, appropriate 
school personnel including decision making officials (e.g., superintendent/principal, 
transportation director/bus dispatcher), and at least one bus driver (and the bus drivers 
escort, if applicable) should be available to demonstrate knowledge of their role(s) in the 
evacuation of school children. Communications capabilities between school officials and 
the buses, if required by the plan and/or procedures, should be verified. 

Officials of the school system(s) should demonstrate the capability to develop and 
provide timely information to OROs for use in messages to parents, the general public, 
and the media on the status of protective actions for schools. 

The provisions of this criterion also apply to any private schools, private kindergartens 
and day care centers that participate in REP exercises pursuant to the OROs plans and 
procedures as negotiated in the extent-of-play agreement. 

All activities must be based on the OROs plans and procedures and completed, as they 
would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-
of-play agreement. 

Sub-Element 3.d.Implementation of Traffic and Access Control 

 Intent 

This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that Offsite Response 
Organizations (OROs) have the capability to implement protective action plans, including 
relocation and restriction of access to evacuated/sheltered areas. This sub-element 
focuses on selecting, establishing, and staffing of traffic and access control points and 
removal of impediments to the flow of evacuation traffic. 

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Section III.B  Evaluation Areas 

Criterion 3.d.1: Appropriate traffic and access control is established. Accurate 
instructions are provided to traffic and access control personnel. (NUREG-0654, 
J.10.g, j) 

Extent of Play 

OROs should demonstrate the capability to select, establish, and staff appropriate traffic 
and access control points, consistent with protective action decisions (for example, 
evacuating, sheltering, and relocation), in a timely manner. OROs should demonstrate the 
capability to provide instructions to traffic and access control staff on actions to take 
when modifications in protective action strategies necessitate changes in evacuation 
patterns or in the area(s) where access is controlled. 

Traffic and access control staff should demonstrate accurate knowledge of their roles and 
responsibilities. This capability may be demonstrated by actual deployment or by 
interview, in accordance with the extent-of-play agreement. 

In instances where OROs lack authority necessary to control access by certain types of 
traffic (rail, water, and air traffic), they should demonstrate the capability to contact the 
State or Federal agencies with authority to control access. 

All activities must be based on the OROs plans and procedures and completed as they 
would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-
of-play agreement. 

Criterion 3.d.2: Impediments to evacuation are identified and resolved. 
(NUREG-0654, J.10.k) 

Extent of Play 

OROs should demonstrate the capability, as required by the scenario, to identify and take 
appropriate actions concerning impediments to evacuation. Actual dispatch of resources 
to deal with impediments, such as wreckers, need not be demonstrated; however, all 
contacts, actual or simulated, should be logged. 

All activities must be based on the OROs plans and procedures and completed as they 
would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-
of-play agreement. 

Sub-Element 3.eImplementation of Ingestion Pathway Decisions 

 Intent 

This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that OROs should have 
the capability to implement protective actions, based on criteria recommended by current 
Food and Drug Administration guidance, for the ingestion pathway zone (IPZ), the area 

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Section III.B  Evaluation Areas 

within an approximate 50-mile radius of the nuclear power plant. This sub-element 
focuses on those actions required for implementation of protective actions. 

Criterion 3.e.1: The ORO demonstrates the availability and appropriate use of 
adequate information regarding water, food supplies, milk, and agricultural 
production within the ingestion exposure pathway emergency planning zone for 
implementation of protective actions. NUREG-0654, J.9, 11) 

Extent of Play 

Applicable OROs should demonstrate the capability to secure and utilize current 
information on the locations of dairy farms, meat and poultry producers, fisheries, fruit 
growers, vegetable growers, grain producers, food processing plants, and water supply 
intake points to implement protective actions within the ingestion pathway EPZ. OROs 
should use Federal resources as identified in the FRERP, and other resources (e.g., 
compacts, nuclear insurers, etc.), if available. Evaluation of this criterion will take into 
consideration the level of Federal and other resources participating in the exercise. 

All activities must be based on the OROs plans and procedures and completed as they 
would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-
of-play agreement. 

Criterion 3.e.2: Appropriate measures, strategies, and pre-printed instructional 
material are developed for implementing protective action decisions for 
contaminated water, food products, milk, and agricultural production. 
(NUREG-0654, J.9, 11) 

Extent of Play 

Development of measures and strategies for implementation of IPZ protective actions 
should be demonstrated by formulation of protective action information for the general 
public and food producers and processors. This includes either pre-distributed public 
information material in the IPZ or the capability for the rapid reproduction and 
distribution of appropriate reproduction-ready information and instructions to predetermined 
individuals and businesses. OROs should demonstrate the capability to 
control, restrict or prevent distribution of contaminated food by commercial sectors. 
Exercise play should include demonstration of communications and coordination 
between organizations to implement protective actions. Actual field play of 
implementation activities may be simulated. For example, communications and 
coordination with agencies responsible for enforcing food controls within the IPZ should 
be demonstrated, but actual communications with food producers and processors may be 
simulated. 

All activities must be based on the OROs plans and procedures and completed as they 
would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-
of-play agreement. 

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Section III.B  Evaluation Areas 

Sub-Element 3.fImplementation of Relocation, Reentry, and Return Decisions 

 Intent 

This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that Offsite Response 
Organizations (OROs) should demonstrate the capability to implement plans, procedures, 
and decisions for relocation, Reentry, and return. Implementation of these decisions is 
essential for the protection of the public from the direct long-term exposure to deposited 
radioactive materials from a severe accident at a commercial nuclear power plant. 

Criterion 3.f.1: Decisions regarding controlled Reentry of emergency workers and 
relocation and return of the public are coordinated with appropriate organizations 
and implemented. (NUREG-0654, M.1, 3) 

Extent of Play 

Relocation: OROs should demonstrate the capability to coordinate and implement 
decisions concerning relocation of individuals, not previously evacuated, to an area 
where radiological contamination will not expose the general public to doses that exceed 
the relocation PAGs. OROs should also demonstrate the capability to provide for short-
term or long-term relocation of evacuees who lived in areas that have residual radiation 
levels above the (first-, second-, and fifty-year) PAGs. 

Areas of consideration should include the capability to communicate with OROs 
regarding timing of actions, notification of the population of the procedures for 
relocation, and the notification of, and advice for, evacuated individuals who will be 
converted to relocation status in situations where they will not be able to return to their 
homes due to high levels of contamination. OROs should also demonstrate the capability 
to communicate instructions to the public regarding relocation decisions. 

Reentry: OROs should demonstrate the capability to control Reentry and exit of 
individuals who need to temporarily re-enter the restricted area, to protect them from 
unnecessary radiation exposure and for exit of vehicles and other equipment to control 
the spread of contamination outside the restricted area. Monitoring and decontamination 
facilities will be established as appropriate. 

Examples of control procedure subjects are: (1) The assignment of, or checking for, 
direct-reading and non-direct-reading dosimetry for emergency workers; (2) questions 
regarding the individuals objectives and locations expected to be visited and associated 
timeframes; (3) maps and plots of radiation exposure rates; (4) advice on areas to avoid; 
and procedures for exit, including monitoring of individuals, vehicles, and equipment, 
decision criteria regarding contamination, proper disposition of emergency worker 
dosimetry, and maintenance of emergency worker radiation exposure records. 

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Section III.B  Evaluation Areas 

Return: OROs should demonstrate the capability to implement policies concerning return 
of members of the public to areas that were evacuated during the plume phase. OROs 
should demonstrate the capability to identify and prioritize services and facilities that 
require restoration within a few days, and to identify the procedures and resources for 
their restoration. Examples of these services and facilities are medical and social services, 
utilities, roads, schools, and intermediate term housing for relocated persons. 

Communications among OROs for relocation, Reentry, and return may be simulated; 
however all simulated or actual contacts should be documented. These discussions may 
be accomplished in a group setting. 

OROs should use Federal resources as identified in the FRERP, and other resources (e.g., 
compacts, nuclear insurers, etc.), if available. Evaluation of this criterion will take into 
consideration the level of Federal and other resources participating in the exercise. 

All activities must be based on the OROs plans and procedures and completed as they 
would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-
of-play agreement. 

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Section III.B  Evaluation Areas 

EVALUATION AREA 4 

Field Measurement and Analysis 

Sub-Element 4.aPlume Phase Field Measurements and Analyses 

 Intent 

This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that Offsite Response 
Organizations (OROs) should have the capability to deploy field teams with the 
equipment, methods, and expertise necessary to determine the location of airborne 
radiation and particulate deposition on the ground from an airborne plume. In addition, 
NUREG-0654 indicates that OROs should have the capability to use field teams within 
the plume emergency planning zone to detect airborne radioiodine in the presence of 
noble gases and to detect radioactive particulate material in the airborne plume. In the 
event of an accident at a nuclear power plant, the possible release of radioactive material 
may pose a risk to the nearby population and environment. Although accident assessment 
methods are available to project the extent and magnitude of a release, these methods are 
subject to large uncertainties. During an accident, it is important to collect field 
radiological data in order to help characterize any radiological release. Adequate 
equipment and procedures are essential to such field measurement efforts. 

Criterion 4.a.1: The field teams are equipped to perform field measurements of 
direct radiation exposure (cloud and ground shine) and to sample airborne 
radioiodine and particulates. (NUREG-0654, H.10; I.7, 8, 9) 

Extent of Play 

Field teams should be equipped with all instrumentation and supplies necessary to 
accomplish their mission. This should include instruments capable of measuring gamma 
exposure rates and detecting the presence of beta radiation. These instruments should be 
capable of measuring a range of activity and exposure, including radiological 
protection/exposure control of team members and detection of activity on the air sample 
collection media, consistent with the intended use of the instrument and the OROs plans 
and procedures. An appropriate radioactive check source should be used to verify proper 
operational response for each low range radiation measurement instrument (less than 1 
R/hr) and for high range instruments when available. If a source is not available for a 
high range instrument, a procedure should exist to operationally test the instrument 
before entering an area where only a high range instrument can make useful readings. 

All activities must be based on the OROs plans and procedures and completed as they 
would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-
of-play agreement. 

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Section III.B  Evaluation Areas 

Criterion 4.a.2: Field teams are managed to obtain sufficient information to help 
characterize the release and to control radiation exposure. (NUREG-0654, H.12; I.8, 
11; J.10.a) 

Extent of Play 

Responsible Offsite Response Organizations (OROs) should demonstrate the capability 
to brief teams on predicted plume location and direction, travel speed, and exposure 
control procedures before deployment. 

Field measurements are needed to help characterize the release and to support the 
adequacy of implemented protective actions or to be a factor in modifying protective 
actions. Teams should be directed to take measurements in such locations, at such times 
to provide information sufficient to characterize the plume and impacts. 

If the responsibility to obtain peak measurements in the plume has been accepted by 
licensee field monitoring teams, with concurrence from OROs, there is no requirement 
for these measurements to be repeated by State and local monitoring teams. If the 
licensee teams do not obtain peak measurements in the plume, it is the OROs decision as 
to whether peak measurements are necessary to sufficiently characterize the plume. The 
sharing and coordination of plume measurement information among all field teams 
(licensee, Federal, and ORO) is essential. Coordination concerning transfer of samples, 
including a chain-of-custody form, to a radiological laboratory should be demonstrated. 

OROs should use Federal resources as identified in the Federal Radiological Emergency 
Response Plan (FRERP), and other resources (for example, compacts, utility, etc.), if 
available. Evaluation of this criterion will take into consideration the level of Federal and 
other resources participating in the exercise. 

All activities must be based on the OROs plans and procedures and completed as they 
would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-
of-play agreement. 

Criterion 4.a.3: Ambient radiation measurements are made and recorded at 
appropriate locations, and radioiodine and particulate samples are collected. Teams 
will move to an appropriate low background location to determine whether any 
significant (as specified in the plan and/or procedures) amount of radioactivity has 
been collected on the sampling media. (NUREG-0654, I. 9) 

Extent of Play 

Field teams should demonstrate the capability to report measurements and field data 
pertaining to the measurement of airborne radioiodine and particulates and ambient 
radiation to the field team coordinator, dose assessment, or other appropriate authority. If 
samples have radioactivity significantly above background, the appropriate authority 
should consider the need for expedited laboratory analyses of these samples. 

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Section III.B  Evaluation Areas 

OROs should share data in a timely manner with all appropriate OROs. All methodology, 
including contamination control, instrumentation, preparation of samples, and a chain-ofcustody 
form for transfer to a laboratory, will be in accordance with the OROs plan 
and/or procedures. 

OROs should use Federal resources as identified in the FRERP, and other resources (for 
example, compacts, utility, etc.), if available. Evaluation of this criterion will take into 
consideration the level of Federal and other resources participating in the exercise. 

All activities must be must be based on the OROs plans and procedures and completed 
as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the 
extent-of-play agreement. 

Sub-Element 4.bPost Plume Phase Field Measurements and Sampling

 Intent 

This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that OROs should have 
the capability to assess the actual or potential magnitude and locations of radiological 
hazards in the IPZ and for relocation, Reentry and return measures. This sub-element 
focuses on the collection of environmental samples for laboratory analyses that are 
essential for decisions on protection of the public from contaminated food and water and 
direct radiation from deposited materials. 

Criterion 4.b.1: The field teams demonstrate the capability to make appropriate 
measurements and to collect appropriate samples (e.g., food crops, milk, water, 
vegetation, and soil) to support adequate assessments and protective action decision-
making. (NUREG-0654, I.8; J.11) 

Extent of Play 

The OROs field team should demonstrate the capability to take measurements and 
samples, at such times and locations as directed, to enable an adequate assessment of the 
ingestion pathway and to support reentry, relocation, and return decisions. When 
resources are available, the use of aerial surveys and in-situ gamma measurement is 
appropriate. All methodology, including contamination control, instrumentation, 
preparation of samples, and a chain-of-custody form for transfer to a laboratory, will be 
in accordance with the OROs plan and/or procedures. 

Ingestion pathway samples should be secured from agricultural products and water. 
Samples in support of relocation and return should be secured from soil, vegetation, and 
other surfaces in areas that received radioactive ground deposition. 

OROs should use Federal resources as identified in the FRERP, and other resources (for 
example, compacts, utility, nuclear insurers, etc.), if available. Evaluation of this criterion 

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Section III.B  Evaluation Areas 

will take into consideration the level of Federal and other resources participating in the 
exercise. 

All activities must be must be based on the OROs plans and procedures and completed 
as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the 
extent-of-play agreement. 

Sub-Element 4.cLaboratory Operations 

 Intent 

This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that Offsite Response 
Organizations (OROs) should have the capability to perform laboratory analyses of 
radioactivity in air, liquid, and environmental samples to support protective action 
decision-making. 

Criterion 4.c.1: The laboratory is capable of performing required radiological 
analyses to support protective action decisions. (NUREG-0654, C.3; J.11) 

Extent of Play 

The laboratory staff should demonstrate the capability to follow appropriate procedures 
for receiving samples, including logging of information, preventing contamination of the 
laboratory, preventing buildup of background radiation due to stored samples, preventing 
cross contamination of samples, preserving samples that may spoil ( for example, milk), 
and keeping track of sample identity. In addition, the laboratory staff should demonstrate 
the capability to prepare samples for conducting measurements. 

The laboratory should be appropriately equipped to provide analyses of media, as 
requested, on a timely basis, of sufficient quality and sensitivity to support assessments 
and decisions as anticipated by the OROs plans and procedures. The laboratory 
(laboratories) instrument calibrations should be traceable to standards provided by the 
National Institute of Standards and Technology. Laboratory methods used to analyze 
typical radionuclides released in a reactor incident should be as described in the plans and 
procedures. New or revised methods may be used to analyze atypical radionuclide 
releases (for example, transuranics or as a result of a terrorist event) or if warranted by 
circumstances of the event. Analysis may require resources beyond those of the ORO. 

The laboratory staff should be qualified in radioanalytical techniques and contamination 
control procedures. 

OROs should use Federal resources as identified in the FRERP, and other resources (for 
example, compacts, utility, nuclear insurers, etc.), if available. Evaluation of this criterion 
will take into consideration the level of Federal and other resources participating in the 
exercise. 

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Section III.B  Evaluation Areas 

All activities must be based on the OROs plans and procedures and completed as they 
would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-
of-play agreement. 

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Section III.B  Evaluation Areas 

EVALUATION AREA 5 

Emergency Notification and Public Information 

Sub-Element 5.aActivation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System

 Intent 

This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that OROs should have 
the capability to provide prompt instructions to the public within the plume pathway EPZ. 
Specific provisions addressed in this sub-element are derived from the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (NRC) regulations (10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E.IV.D), and 
FEMAREP10, Guide for the Evaluation of Alert and Notification Systems for 
Nuclear Power Plants. 

Criterion 5.a.1: Activities associated with primary alerting and notification of the 
public are completed in a timely manner following the initial decision by authorized 
offsite emergency officials to notify the public of an emergency situation. The initial 
instructional message to the public must include as a minimum the elements 
required by current FEMA REP guidance. (10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E.IV.D and 
NUREG-0654, E.5, 6, 7) 

Extent of Play 

Responsible Offsite Response Organizations (OROs) should demonstrate the capability 
to sequentially provide an alert signal followed by an initial instructional message to 
populated areas (permanent resident and transient) throughout the 10-mile plume 
pathway EPZ. Following the decision to activate the alert and notification system, in 
accordance with the OROs plan and/or procedures, completion of system activation 
should be accomplished in a timely manner (will not be subject to specific time 
requirements) for primary alerting/notification. The initial message should include the 
elements required by current FEMA REP guidance. 

Offsite Response Organizations (OROs) with route alerting as the primary method of 
alerting and notifying the public should demonstrate the capability to accomplish the 
primary route alerting, following the decision to activate the alert and notification system, 
in a timely manner (will not be subject to specific time requirements) in accordance with 
the OROs plan and/or procedures. At least one route needs to be demonstrated and 
evaluated. The selected route(s) should vary from exercise to exercise. However, the 
most difficult route should be demonstrated at least once every six years. All alert and 
notification activities along the route should be simulated (that is, the message that would 
actually be used is read for the evaluator, but not actually broadcast) as agreed upon in 
the extent-of-play. Actual testing of the mobile public address system will be conducted 
at some agreed-upon location. The initial message should include the elements required 
by current FEMA REP guidance. 

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Section III.B  Evaluation Areas 

For exercise purposes, timely is defined as the responsible ORO 
personnel/representatives demonstrate actions to disseminate the appropriate 
information/instructions with a sense of urgency and without undue delay. If message 
dissemination is to be identified as not having been accomplished in a timely manner, the 
evaluator(s) will document a specific delay or cause as to why a message was not 
considered timely. 

Procedures to broadcast the message should be fully demonstrated as they would in an 
actual emergency up to the point of transmission. Broadcast of the message(s) or test 
messages is not required. The alert signal activation may be simulated. However, the 
procedures should be demonstrated up to the point of actual activation. 

The capability of the primary notification system to broadcast an instructional message 
on a 24-hour basis should be verified during an interview with appropriate personnel 
from the primary notification system. 

All activities for this criterion must be based on the OROs plans and procedures and 
completed as they would be in an actual emergency, except as noted above or otherwise 
indicated in the extent-of-play agreement.

 Criterion 5.a.2: [Reserved] 

Criterion 5.a.3: Activities associated with FEMA approved exception areas (where 
applicable) are completed within 45 minutes following the initial decision by 
authorized offsite emergency officials to notify the public of an emergency situation. 
Backup alert and notification of the public is completed within 45 minutes following 
the detection by the ORO of a failure of the primary alert and notification system. 
(NUREG-0654, E. 6, Appendix 3.B.2.c) 

Extent of Play 

Offsite Response Organizations (OROs) with FEMA-approved exception areas 
(identified in the approved Alert and Notification System Design Report) 510 miles 
from the nuclear power plant should demonstrate the capability to accomplish primary 
alerting and notification of the exception area(s) within 45 minutes following the initial 
decision by authorized offsite emergency officials to notify the public of an emergency 
situation. The 45-minute clock will begin when the OROs make the decision to activate 
the alert and notification system for the first time for a specific emergency situation. The 
initial message should, at a minimum, include: a statement that an emergency exists at the 
plant and where to obtain additional information. 

For exception area alerting, at least one route needs to be demonstrated and evaluated. 
The selected route(s) should vary from exercise to exercise. However, the most difficult 
route should be demonstrated at least once every six years. All alert and notification 
activities along the route should be simulated (that is, the message that would actually be 
used is read for the evaluator, but not actually broadcast) as agreed upon in the extent-of-

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Section III.B  Evaluation Areas 

play. Actual testing of the mobile public address system will be conducted at some 
agreed-upon location. 

Backup alert and notification of the public should be completed within 45 minutes 
following the detection by the ORO of a failure of the primary alert and notification 
system. Backup route alerting only needs to be demonstrated and evaluated, in 
accordance with the OROs plan and/or procedures and the extent-of-play agreement, if 
the exercise scenario calls for failure of any portion of the primary system(s), or if any 
portion of the primary system(s) actually fails to function. If demonstrated, only one 
route needs to be selected and demonstrated. All alert and notification activities along the 
route should be simulated (that is, the message that would actually be used is read for the 
evaluator, but not actually broadcast) as agreed upon in the extent-of-play. Actual testing 
of the mobile public address system will be conducted at some agreed-upon location. 

All activities for this criterion must be based on the OROs plans and procedures and 
completed as they would be in an actual emergency, except as noted above or otherwise 
indicated in the extent-of-play agreement. 

Sub-Element 5.bEmergency Information and Instructions for the Public and the Media 

 Intent 

This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that Offsite Response 
Organizations (OROs) should have the capability to disseminate to the public appropriate 
emergency information and instructions, including any recommended protective actions. 
In addition, NUREG-0654 provides that OROs should ensure that the capability exists for 
providing information to the media. This includes the availability of a physical location 
for use by the media during an emergency. NUREG-0654 also provides that a system 
should be available for dealing with rumors. This system will hereafter be known as the 
public inquiry hotline. 

Criterion 5.b.1: OROs provide accurate emergency information and instructions to 
the public and the news media in a timely manner. (NUREG-0654, E. 5, 7; G.3.a, 
G.4.c) 

Extent of Play 

Subsequent emergency information and instructions should be provided to the public and 
the media in a timely manner (will not be subject to specific time requirements). For 
exercise purposes, timely is defined as the responsible ORO personnel/representatives 
demonstrate actions to disseminate the appropriate information/instructions with a sense 
of urgency and without undue delay. If message dissemination is to be identified as not 
having been accomplished in a timely manner, the evaluator(s) will document a specific 
delay or cause as to why a message was not considered timely. 

Interim REP Program Manual III-89 August 2002 


Section III.B  Evaluation Areas 

The ORO should ensure that emergency information and instructions are consistent with 
protective action decisions made by appropriate officials. The emergency information 
should contain all necessary and applicable instructions ( for example, evacuation 
instructions, evacuation routes, reception center locations, what to take when evacuating, 
information concerning pets, shelter-in-place instructions, information concerning 
protective actions for schools and special populations, public inquiry telephone number, 
etc.) to assist the public in carrying out protective action decisions provided to them. The 
ORO should also be prepared to disclose and explain the Emergency Classification Level 
(ECL) of the incident. At a minimum, this information must be included in media 
briefings and/or media releases. OROs should demonstrate the capability to use language 
that is clear and understandable to the public within both the plume and ingestion 
pathway EPZs. This includes demonstration of the capability to use familiar landmarks 
and boundaries to describe protective action areas. 

The emergency information should be all-inclusive by including previously identified 
protective action areas that are still valid, as well as new areas. The OROs should 
demonstrate the capability to ensure that emergency information that is no longer valid is 
rescinded and not repeated by broadcast media. In addition, the OROs should 
demonstrate the capability to ensure that current emergency information is repeated at 
pre-established intervals in accordance with the plan and/or procedures. OROs should 
demonstrate the capability to develop emergency information in a non-English language 
when required by the plan and/or procedures. 

If ingestion pathway measures are exercised, OROs should demonstrate that a system 
exists for rapid dissemination of ingestion pathway information to pre-determined 
individuals and businesses in accordance with the OROs plan and/or procedures. 

OROs should demonstrate the capability to provide timely, accurate, concise, and 
coordinated information to the news media for subsequent dissemination to the public. 
This would include demonstration of the capability to conduct timely and pertinent media 
briefings and distribute media releases as the situation warrants. The OROs should 
demonstrate the capability to respond appropriately to inquiries from the news media. All 
information presented in media briefings and media releases should be consistent with 
protective action decisions and other emergency information provided to the public. 
Copies of pertinent emergency information (for example, Emergency Alert System 
[EAS] messages and media releases) and media information kits should be available for 
dissemination to the media. 

OROs should demonstrate that an effective system is in place for dealing with calls to the 
public inquiry hotline. Hotline staff should demonstrate the capability to provide or 
obtain accurate information for callers or refer them to an appropriate information source. 
Information from the hotline staff, including information that corrects false or inaccurate 
information when trends are noted, should be included, as appropriate, in emergency 
information provided to the public, media briefings, and/or media releases. 

Interim REP Program Manual III-90 August 2002 


Section III.B  Evaluation Areas 

All activities for this criterion must be based on the OROs plans and procedures and 
completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise 
indicated in the extent-of-play agreement. 

Interim REP Program Manual III-91 August 2002 


Section III.B  Evaluation Areas 

EVALUATION AREA 6 

 Support Operation/Facilities 

Sub-Element 6.aMonitoring and Decontamination of Evacuees and Emergency Workers 
and Registration of Evacuees 

 Intent 

This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that Offsite Response 
Organizations (OROs) have the capability to implement radiological monitoring and 
decontamination of evacuees and emergency workers, while minimizing contamination 
of the facility, and registration of evacuees at reception centers. 

Criterion 6.a.1: The reception center/emergency worker facility has appropriate 
space, adequate resources, and trained personnel to provide monitoring, 
decontamination, and registration of evacuees and/or emergency workers. 
(NUREG-0654, J.10.h; J.12; K.5.a) 

Extent of Play 

Radiological monitoring, decontamination, and registration facilities for 
evacuees/emergency workers should be set up and demonstrated as they would be in an 
actual emergency or as indicated in the extent-of-play agreement. This would include 
adequate space for evacuees vehicles. Expected demonstration should include 1/3 of the 
monitoring teams/portal monitors required to monitor 20% of the population allocated to 
the facility within 12 hours. Before using monitoring instrument(s), the monitor(s) should 
demonstrate the process of checking the instrument(s) for proper operation. 

Staff responsible for the radiological monitoring of evacuees should demonstrate the 
capability to attain and sustain a monitoring productivity rate per hour needed to monitor 
the 20% emergency planning zone (EPZ) population planning base within about 12 
hours. This monitoring productivity rate per hour is the number of evacuees that can be 
monitored per hour by the total complement of monitors using an appropriate monitoring 
procedure. A minimum of six individuals per monitoring station should be monitored, 
using equipment and procedures specified in the plan and/or procedures, to allow 
demonstration of monitoring, decontamination, and registration capabilities. The 
monitoring sequences for the first six simulated evacuees per monitoring team will be 
timed by the evaluators in order to determine whether the twelve-hour requirement can be 
met. Monitoring of emergency workers does not have to meet the twelve-hour 
requirement. However, appropriate monitoring procedures should be demonstrated for a 
minimum of two emergency workers. 

Decontamination of evacuees/emergency workers may be simulated and conducted by 
interview. The availability of provisions for separately showering should be demonstrated 
or explained. The staff should demonstrate provisions for limiting the spread of 

Interim REP Program Manual III-92 August 2002 


Section III.B  Evaluation Areas 

contamination. Provisions could include floor coverings, signs and appropriate means 
(for example, partitions, roped-off areas) to separate clean from potentially contaminated 
areas. Provisions should also exist to separate contaminated and uncontaminated 
individuals, provide changes of clothing for individuals whose clothing is contaminated, 
and store contaminated clothing and personal belongings to prevent further contamination 
of evacuees or facilities. In addition, for any individual found to be contaminated, 
procedures should be discussed concerning the handling of potential contamination of 
vehicles and personal belongings. 

Monitoring personnel should explain the use of action levels for determining the need for 
decontamination. They should also explain the procedures for referring evacuees who 
cannot be adequately decontaminated for assessment and follow up in accordance with 
the OROs plans and procedures. Contamination of the individual will be determined by 
controller inject and not simulated with any low-level radiation source. 

The capability to register individuals upon completion of the monitoring and 
decontamination activities should be demonstrated. The registration activities 
demonstrated should include the establishment of a registration record for each 
individual, consisting of the individuals name, address, results of monitoring, and time 
of decontamination, if any, or as otherwise designated in the plan. Audio recorders, 
camcorders, or written records are all acceptable means for registration. 

All activities associated with this criterion must be based on the OROs plans and 
procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless otherwise 
indicated in the extent-of-play agreement. 

Sub-Element 6.bMonitoring and Decontamination of Emergency Worker Equipment 

 Intent 

This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that Offsite Response 
Organizations (OROs) have the capability to implement radiological monitoring and 
decontamination of emergency worker equipment, including vehicles. 

Criterion 6.b.1: The facility/ORO has adequate procedures and resources for the 
accomplishment of monitoring and decontamination of emergency worker 
equipment, including vehicles. (NUREG-0654, K.5.b) 

Extent of Play 

The monitoring staff should demonstrate the capability to monitor equipment, including 
vehicles, for contamination in accordance with the Offsite Response Organizations 
(OROs) plans and procedures. Specific attention should be given to equipment, 
including vehicles, that was in contact with individuals found to be contaminated. The 
monitoring staff should demonstrate the capability to make decisions on the need for 

Interim REP Program Manual III-93 August 2002 


Section III.B  Evaluation Areas 

decontamination of equipment, including vehicles, based on guidance levels and 
procedures stated in the plan and/or procedures. 

The area to be used for monitoring and decontamination should be set up as it would be 
in an actual emergency, with all route markings, instrumentation, record keeping and 
contamination control measures in place. Monitoring procedures should be demonstrated 
for a minimum of one vehicle. It is generally not necessary to monitor the entire surface 
of vehicles. However, the capability to monitor areas such as radiator grills, bumpers, 
wheel wells, tires, and door handles should be demonstrated. Interior surfaces of vehicles 
that were in contact with individuals found to be contaminated should also be checked. 

Decontamination capabilities, and provisions for vehicles and equipment that cannot be 
decontaminated, may be simulated and conducted by interview. 

All activities associated with this criterion must be based on the OROs plans and 
procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above 
or otherwise indicated in the extent-of-play agreement. 

Sub-Element 6.cTemporary Care of Evacuees 

 Intent 

This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that Offsite Response 
Organizations (OROs) demonstrate the capability to establish relocation centers in host 
areas. The American Red Cross (ARC) normally provides congregate care in support of 
OROs under existing letters of agreement. 

Criterion 6.c.1: Managers of congregate care facilities demonstrate that the centers 
have resources to provide services and accommodations consistent with American 
Red Cross planning guidelines. (Found in MASS CAREPreparedness Operations, 
ARC 3031). Managers demonstrate the procedures to assure that evacuees have 
been monitored for contamination and have been decontaminated as appropriate 
prior to entering congregate care facilities. (NUREG-0654, J.10.h, J.12) 

Extent of Play 

Under this criterion, demonstration of congregate care centers may be conducted out of 
sequence with the exercise scenario. The evaluator should conduct a walk-through of the 
center to determine, through observation and inquiries, that the services and 
accommodations are consistent with ARC 3031. In this simulation, it is not necessary to 
set up operations as they would be in an actual emergency. Alternatively, capabilities 
may be demonstrated by setting up stations for various services and providing those 
services to simulated evacuees. Given the substantial differences between demonstration 
and simulation of this objective, exercise demonstration expectations should be clearly 
specified in extent-of-play agreements. 

Interim REP Program Manual III-94 August 2002 


Section III.B  Evaluation Areas 

Congregate care staff should also demonstrate the capability to ensure that evacuees have 
been monitored for contamination, have been decontaminated as appropriate, and have 
been registered before entering the facility. This capability may be determined through an 
interview process. 

If operations at the center are demonstrated, material that would be difficult or expensive 
to transport (e.g., cots, blankets, sundries, and large-scale food supplies) need not be 
physically available at the facility (facilities). However, availability of such items should 
be verified by providing the evaluator a list of sources with locations and estimates of 
quantities. 

All activities associated with this criterion must be based on the OROs plans and 
procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above 
or otherwise indicated in the extent-of-play agreement. 

Sub-Element 6.dTransportation and Treatment of Contaminated Injured Individuals 

 Intent 

This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that Offsite Response 
Organizations (OROs) should have the capability to transport contaminated injured 
individuals to medical facilities with the capability to provide medical services. 

Criterion 6.d.1: The facility/ORO has the appropriate space, adequate resources, 
and trained personnel to provide transport, monitoring, decontamination, and 
medical services to contaminated injured individuals. (NUREG-0654, F.2; H.10; 
K.5.a, b; L.1, 4) 

Extent of Play 

Monitoring, decontamination, and contamination control efforts will not delay urgent 
medical care for the victim. 

Offsite Response Organizations (OROs) should demonstrate the capability to transport 
contaminated injured individuals to medical facilities. An ambulance should be used for 
the response to the victim. However, to avoid taking an ambulance out of service for an 
extended time, any vehicle (e.g., car, truck, or van) may be utilized to transport the victim 
to the medical facility. Normal communications between the ambulance/dispatcher and 
the receiving medical facility should be demonstrated. If a substitute vehicle is used for 
transport to the medical facility, this communication must occur before releasing the 
ambulance from the drill. This communication would include reporting radiation 
monitoring results, if available. Additionally, the ambulance crew should demonstrate, by 
interview, knowledge of where the ambulance and crew would be monitored and 
decontaminated, if required, or whom to contact for such information. 

Interim REP Program Manual III-95 August 2002 


Section III.B  Evaluation Areas 

Monitoring of the victim may be performed before transport, done enroute, or deferred to 
the medical facility. Before using a monitoring instrument(s), the monitor(s) should 
demonstrate the process of checking the instrument(s) for proper operation. All 
monitoring activities should be completed as they would be in an actual emergency. 
Appropriate contamination control measures should be demonstrated before and during 
transport and at the receiving medical facility. 

The medical facility should demonstrate the capability to activate and set up a 
radiological emergency area for treatment. Equipment and supplies should be available 
for the treatment of contaminated injured individuals. 

The medical facility should demonstrate the capability to make decisions on the need for 
decontamination of the individual, to follow appropriate decontamination procedures, and 
to maintain records of all survey measurements and samples taken. All procedures for the 
collection and analysis of samples and the decontamination of the individual should be 
demonstrated or described to the evaluator. 

All activities associated with this criterion must be based on the OROs plans and 
procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above 
or otherwise indicated in the extent-of-play agreement. 

Frequency for Evaluation of New Criteria 

The REP-14 objectives were evaluated at the frequency described on Pages C-2.3 and 
C-2.4 of REP-14. Adoption of the new Exercise Evaluation Areas renders these pages 
obsolete. Table 4, Federal Evaluation Process Matrix, in section III.A, Milestones and 
Tasks, establishes the minimum frequency with which each of the Exercise Evaluation 
Area criteria would be exercised. FEMA is open to ORO proposals to voluntarily 
exercise certain criteria more frequently than the minimums shown in Table 4. 

Interim REP Program Manual III-96 August 2002 


Section III.C  Evaluation Area Modules 

C. EVALUATION AREA MODULES 
1. Format of Evaluation Area Module 
The Module has three main pages; the sub-element and criterion, the narrative, and the issues 
section. 

The first section of the module is the header that the evaluator must complete. 
Following the header is the name of the Evaluation Area and the specific sub-element and 
criterion for that particular module. The criterion lists all the NUREG planning elements that 
pertain to the particular sub-element. If an exercise issue is identified it is the responsibility of 
the evaluator to assign the specific NUREG element(s) to the issue. 

There is only one question on the modules: Was the Criterion adequately demonstrated? The 
evaluator has to decide one of three choices: yes, no, or not applicable. If the answer is NO, then 
all exercise issues should be addressed on the Issues page: one Issue page per issue. 

YES means that the criterion was adequately demonstrated. If the demonstration 
included a deviation from the plan, then an issue page should be written with a 
recommendation to change the plan. The narrative should have a description of what 
occurred. 

NO means that the criterion was not adequately demonstrated and that the action or 
inaction did/could have an effect. If there is no effect, there is no exercise issue 
(i.e., Deficiency or Area Requiring Corrective Action). 

N/A means not applicable and is used to designate that the activity or functions was 
either (1) not required to be demonstrated or (2) the scenario did not drive the actions to 
provide the opportunity to demonstrate this activity. (In the event a module is assigned 
and the facility does not have that responsibility, the RAC Chair should be notified so 
that it may be deleted from that facility in the Regions tracking system.) 

The intent further describes the criterion. Each sub-element has an Extent-of-Play establishing 
what is to be observed to adequately demonstrate this criterion. There can also be a Regional 
Extent-of-Play in addition to the basic one. A Regional Extent-of-Play is an agreement between 
the FEMA Regional office and applicable OROs regarding modifications to the basic extent-ofplay. 
Optimally, both would be included in the evaluator packet on this form. 

The second page is the Issue for Criterion page. The evaluator for each issue must complete this. 
It will be the decision of the RAC Chairperson whether the issue would be considered a 
Deficiency, ARCA, plan issue, or not an issue. There are five elements that must be addressed in 
writing an issue: Condition, Possible Cause, Reference, Effect, and Recommendation. 

The third page is the narrative. Here the evaluator presents the observations regarding this 
particular component of the exercise process. The narrative should include who, what, when, 
why, where, and how. Any previous outstanding Area Requiring Corrective Action (ARCA) 
that is corrected during the exercise must be identified and discussed how it was adequately 

Interim REP Program Manual III-97 August 2002 


Section III.C  Evaluation Area Modules 

demonstrated and whether the evaluator considers it closed. If an ARCA was not adequately 
demonstrated the evaluator must also describe why it was not adequately demonstrated. Should 
there be any new issues identified, the evaluator must describe these in the narrative. 

2. 
How To Use the Evaluation Module 
The Module should be reviewed prior to arriving at the evaluation site. During the exercise/drill 
the evaluator should observe and take notes. Assuming the evaluator is familiar with the REP 
Exercise Preparation Guide, there is no need to take the evaluation module to the location. The 
evaluator is thus freed up to observe, take notes, and ask questions. Afterwards, the module 
should be reviewed again while preparing the narrative of what was observed and the conclusion 
of whether the criterion was adequately demonstrated or not. 

3. How To Write a Narrative 
As the eyes and ears of the RAC Chairperson, the evaluator must write a complete narrative of the 
activities observed during the exercise. However, it is imperative that the narrative be explicitly 
geared to the particular criterion and sub-area, e.g., Mobilization should not include a discussion of 
direction and control or EAS messages. 

As a guide, the evaluator should prepare the narrative by considering who, what, when, why, 
where, and how to describe activities. Any outstanding ARCAs should be addressed and the 
discussion should include how the ARCA was corrected and closed or why it should remain open. 
New exercise issues require a discussion of what occurred. The narrative should support the 
evaluators yes or no. 

4. How To Write an Issue 
In addition to being included in the narrative, all new and continued exercise issues must have an 
Issues page completed. Completion of this page will also assist the evaluator in organizing 
events and thoughts that led to the issue being identified. The issue has five components to it 
that the evaluator must complete. 

1. 
Condition: describe the inadequacy 
2. 
Possible Cause: what created the issue - responsibility 
3. 
Reference: cite the NUREG-0654 element (see module criterion and select the 
appropriate one, cite regulation, and plan, if appropriate) 
4. 
Effect  a discussion of what resulted or could have resulted due to this issue 
5. 
Recommendation: suggestions on how to correct the issue 
REMEMBER: evaluators do not classify issues. Only the RAC Chairperson has that authority. 

Interim REP Program Manual III-98 
August 2002 


Section III.C  Evaluation Area Modules 

5. Example of How Modules May Be Assigned 
Evaluation modules are rarely stand alone at any evaluated facility or function. Rather there 
will be a combination of modules for the evaluator to complete. Regions have pre-identified 
what evaluation modules are required at each facility/function that is to be evaluated. An 
example of what may be assigned is as follows: 

School  out of sequence Ambulance Local or County EOC

 1.e.1; 1.e.1; 1.a.1; 2.a.1; 3.c.2; 5.a.3; 
3.a.1; 3.a.1; 1.b.1; 2.c.1; 3.d.1; 5.b.1 
3.b.1; 3.b.1; 1.c.1; 3.a.1; 3.d.2; 

3.c.2. 
6.d.1 1.d.1; 3.b.1; 3. f.1; 
1.e.1; 3.c.1; 5.a.1; 
6. References 
1. 44 CFR Part 350 
2. 44 CFR Part 351 
3. 44 CFR Part 352 
4. 10 CFR Part 50 
5. NUREG-0654/FEMA REP-1, Revision 1 
6. NUREG-0654/FEMA REP-1, Revision 1, Supplement 3 
7. NRC/FEMA Memorandum of Understanding 
8. Federal Register, April 25, 2002 
7. Evaluation Area Modules 
The Evaluation Area Modules are provided in the remainder of this section. 

Interim REP Program Manual III-99 
August 2002 


Evaluator: Team Leader: Date: 
Site: Assignment: Previous ARCA? 


EVALUATION AREA 1 Emergency Operations Management 

Sub-element 1.a.  Mobilization 

Criterion 1.a.1: OROs use effective procedures to alert, notify, and mobilize emergency 
personnel and activate facilities in a timely manner. 
(NUREG-0654, A.4; D.3, 4.; E.1, 2; H.4) 


 
Was this criterion adequately demonstrated? 
Yes _____ No _____ N/A _____

 If No, identify all exercise issues by addressing the elements listed on the attached 
ISSUES FOR CRITERION form. Remember, if there is no effect or potential effect, 
there is no exercise issue. 

 
Reminder: Provide a complete evaluator packet to the Team Leader with a written 
narrative summary, time line of observations, and all forms and information used during 
the exercise. Cite outstanding performance where observed. 
THE FOLLOWING INTENT AND EXTENT-OF-PLAY INFORMATION IS PROVIDED 
FOR GENERAL REFERENCE ONLY. CONSULT THE SITE-SPECIFIC EXTENT-OF-PLAY 
AGREEMENT AND YOUR TEAM LEADER FOR HOW IT APPLIES TO YOUR 
ASSIGNED LOCATION. 

Intent 

This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that Offsite Response 
Organizations (OROs) should have the capability to alert, notify, and mobilize emergency 
personnel and to activate and staff emergency facilities. 

Extent-of-play 

Responsible OROs should demonstrate the capability to receive notification of an emergency 
situation from the licensee, verify the notification, and contact, alert, and mobilize key 
emergency personnel in a timely manner. Responsible OROs should demonstrate the 
activation of facilities for immediate use by mobilized personnel when they arrive to begin 
emergency operations. Activation of facilities should be completed in accordance with the 
plan and/or procedures. Pre-positioning of emergency personnel is appropriate, in accordance 
with the extent-of-play agreement, at those facilities located beyond a normal commuting 
distance from the individuals duty location or residence. Further, pre-positioning of staff for 

Interim REP Program Manual III-100 
August 2002 


Evaluator: Team Leader: Date: 
Site: Assignment: Previous ARCA? 


out-of-sequence demonstrations is appropriate in accordance with the extent-of-play 
agreement. 


All activities must be based on the OROs plans and procedures and completed as they would 
be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-of-play 
agreement. 

NARRATIVE SUMMARY FOR CRITERION: 

(EVALUATOR MUST WRITE A NARRATIVE AND INSERT IT HERE.) 

ISSUES FOR CRITERION: 

(Address the following elements:)

 Condition (describe the inadequacy):

 Possible Cause (what is responsible): 

 Reference (cite the specific NUREG-0654 element, regulation, etc.): 

Interim REP Program Manual III-101 August 2002 


Evaluator: Team Leader: Date: 
Site: Assignment: Previous ARCA? 


 Effect (what resulted, or could have resulted, from this issue): 

 Recommendation (how to correct it): 

Interim REP Program Manual III-102 August 2002 


Evaluator: Team Leader: Date: 
Site: Assignment: Previous ARCA? 


EVALUATION AREA 1 Emergency Operations Management 

Sub-element 1.b  Facilities 

Criterion 1.b.1: Facilities are sufficient to support the emergency response. 
(NUREG-0654, H.3) 

 
Was this criterion adequately demonstrated? 
Yes _____ No _____ N/A _____ 

If No, identify all exercise issues by addressing the elements listed on the attached 
ISSUES FOR CRITERION form. Remember, if there is no effect or potential effect, 
there is no exercise issue. 

 
Reminder: Provide a complete evaluator packet to the Team Leader with a written 
narrative summary, time line of observations, and all forms and information used during 
the exercise. Cite outstanding performance where observed. 
THE FOLLOWING INTENT AND EXTENT-OF-PLAY INFORMATION IS PROVIDED 
FOR GENERAL REFERENCE ONLY. CONSULT THE SITE-SPECIFIC EXTENT-OF-PLAY 
AGREEMENT AND YOUR TEAM LEADER FOR HOW IT APPLIES TO YOUR 
ASSIGNED LOCATION. 

Intent 

This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that Offsite Response 
Organizations (OROs) have facilities to support the emergency response. 

Extent-of-play 

Facilities will only be specifically evaluated for this criterion if they are new or have 
substantial changes in structure or mission. Responsible OROs should demonstrate the 
availability of facilities that support the accomplishment of emergency operations. Some of 
the areas to be considered are: adequate space, furnishings, lighting, restrooms, ventilation, 
backup power and/or alternate facility (if required to support operations). 

Facilities must be set up based on the OROs plans and procedures and demonstrated as they 
would be used in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the 
extent-of-play agreement. 

Interim REP Program Manual III-103 
August 2002 


Evaluator: Team Leader: Date: 
Site: Assignment: Previous ARCA? 


NARRATIVE SUMMARY FOR CRITERION: 

(EVALUATOR MUST WRITE A NARRATIVE AND INSERT IT HERE.) 

ISSUES FOR CRITERION: 

(Address the following elements:)

 Condition (describe the inadequacy):

 Possible Cause (what is responsible): 

 Reference (cite the specific NUREG-0654 element, regulation, etc.): 

 Effect (what resulted, or could have resulted, from this issue): 

 Recommendation (how to correct it): 

Interim REP Program Manual III-104 August 2002 


Evaluator: Team Leader: Date: 
Site: Assignment: Previous ARCA? 


EVALUATION AREA 1 Emergency Operations Management 

Sub-element 1.c  Direction and Control 

Criterion 1.c.1: Key personnel with leadership roles for the ORO provide direction and 
control to that part of the overall response effort for which they are responsible. 
(NUREG-0654, A.1.d; A.2.a, b) 

 
Was this criterion adequately demonstrated? 
Yes _____ No _____ N/A _____

 If No, identify all exercise issues by addressing the elements listed on the attached 
ISSUES FOR CRITERION form. Remember, if there is no effect or potential effect, 
there is no exercise issue. 

 
Reminder: Provide a complete evaluator packet to the Team Leader with a written 
narrative summary, timeline of observations, and all forms and information used during 
the exercise. Cite outstanding performance where observed. 
THE FOLLOWING INTENT AND EXTENT-OF-PLAY INFORMATION IS PROVIDED 
FOR GENERAL REFERENCE ONLY. CONSULT THE SITE-SPECIFIC EXTENT-OF-PLAY 
AGREEMENT AND YOUR TEAM LEADER FOR HOW IT APPLIES TO YOUR 
ASSIGNED LOCATION. 

Intent 

This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that Offsite Response 
Organizations (OROs) have the capability to control their overall response to an emergency. 

Extent-of-play 

Leadership personnel should demonstrate the ability to carry out essential functions of the 
response effort, for example: keeping the staff informed through periodic briefings and/or 
other means, coordinating with other appropriate OROs, and ensuring completion of 
requirements and requests. 

All activities associated with direction and control must be performed based on the OROs 
plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless 
otherwise noted above or indicated in the extent-of-play agreement. 

Interim REP Program Manual III-105 
August 2002 


Evaluator: Team Leader: Date: 
Site: Assignment: Previous ARCA? 


NARRATIVE SUMMARY FOR CRITERION: 

(EVALUATOR MUST WRITE A NARRATIVE AND INSERT IT HERE.) 

ISSUES FOR CRITERION: 

(Address the following elements:) 

Condition (describe the inadequacy):

 Possible Cause (what is responsible): 

 Reference (cite the specific NUREG-0654 element, regulation, etc.): 

 Effect (what resulted, or could have resulted, from this issue): 

 Recommendation (how to correct it): 

Interim REP Program Manual III-106 August 2002 


Evaluator: Team Leader: Date: 
Site: Assignment: Previous ARCA? 


EVALUATION AREA 1 Emergency Operations Management 

Sub-element 1.d  Communications Equipment 

Criterion 1.d.1: At least two communication systems are available, at least one operates 
properly, and communication links are established and maintained with appropriate 
locations. Communications capabilities are managed in support of emergency operations. 
(NUREG-0654, F.1, 2) 

 
Was this criterion adequately demonstrated? 
Yes _____ No _____ N/A _____

 If No, identify all exercise issues by addressing the elements listed on the attached 
ISSUES FOR CRITERION form. Remember, if there is no effect or potential effect, 
there is no exercise issue. 

 
Reminder: Provide a complete evaluator packet to the Team Leader with a written 
narrative summary, timeline of observations, and all forms and information used during 
the exercise. Cite outstanding performance where observed. 
THE FOLLOWING INTENT AND EXTENT-OF-PLAY INFORMATION IS PROVIDED 
FOR GENERAL REFERENCE ONLY. CONSULT THE SITE-SPECIFIC EXTENT-OF-PLAY 
AGREEMENT AND YOUR TEAM LEADER FOR HOW IT APPLIES TO YOUR 
ASSIGNED LOCATION. 

Intent 

This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that Offsite Response 
Organizations (OROs) should establish reliable primary and backup communication systems to 
ensure communications with key emergency personnel at locations such as the following: 
appropriate contiguous governments within the emergency planning zone (EPZ), Federal 
emergency response organizations, the licensee and its facilities, emergency operations centers 
(EOC), and field teams. 

Extent-of-play 

OROs will demonstrate that a primary and at least one backup system are fully functional at 
the beginning of an exercise. If a communications system or systems are not functional, but 
exercise performance is not affected, no exercise issue will be assessed. Communications 
equipment and procedures for facilities and field units should be used as needed for the 
transmission and receipt of exercise messages. All facilities and field teams should have the 

Interim REP Program Manual III-107 
August 2002 


Evaluator: Team Leader: Date: 
Site: Assignment: Previous ARCA? 


capability to access at least one communication system that is independent of the commercial 
telephone system. Responsible OROs should demonstrate the capability to manage the 
communication systems and ensure that all message traffic is handled without delays that 
might disrupt the conduct of emergency operations. OROs should ensure that a coordinated 
communication link for fixed and mobile medical support facilities exists. The specific 
communications capabilities of OROs should be commensurate with that specified in the 
response plan and/or procedures. Exercise scenarios could require the failure of a 
communications system and the use of an alternate system, as negotiated in the extent-ofplay 
agreement. 

All activities associated with the management of communications capabilities must be 
demonstrated based on the OROs plans and procedures and completed as they would be in 
an actual emergency, unless otherwise noted above or in the extent-of-play agreement. 

NARRATIVE SUMMARY FOR CRITERION: 

(EVALUATOR MUST WRITE A NARRATIVE AND INSERT IT HERE.) 

ISSUES FOR CRITERION: 

(Address the following elements:) 

Condition (describe the inadequacy):

 Possible Cause (what is responsible): 

Interim REP Program Manual III-108 August 2002 


Evaluator: Team Leader: Date: 
Site: Assignment: Previous ARCA? 


 Reference (cite the specific NUREG-0654 element, regulation, etc.): 
Effect (what resulted, or could have resulted, from this issue): 

 Recommendation (how to correct it): 

Interim REP Program Manual III-109 August 2002 


Evaluator: Team Leader: Date: 
Site: Assignment: Previous ARCA? 


EVALUATION AREA 1 Emergency Operations Management 

Sub-element 1.e  Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations 

Criterion 1.e.1: Equipment, maps, displays, dosimetry, potassium iodide (KI), and other 
supplies are sufficient to support emergency operations. 
(NUREG-0654, H.7, 10; J.10.a, b, e; J.11; K.3.a) 


 
Was this criterion adequately demonstrated? 
Yes _____ No _____ N/A _____

 If No, identify all exercise issues by addressing the elements listed on the attached 
ISSUES FOR CRITERION form. Remember, if there is no effect or potential effect, 
there is no exercise issue. 

 
Reminder: Provide a complete evaluator packet to the Team Leader with a written 
narrative summary, timeline of observations, and all forms and information used during 
the exercise. Cite outstanding performance where observed. 
THE FOLLOWING INTENT AND EXTENT-OF-PLAY INFORMATION IS PROVIDED 
FOR GENERAL REFERENCE ONLY. CONSULT THE SITE-SPECIFIC EXTENT-OF-PLAY 
AGREEMENT AND YOUR TEAM LEADER FOR HOW IT APPLIES TO YOUR 
ASSIGNED LOCATION. 

Intent 

This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that Offsite Response 
Organizations (OROs) have emergency equipment and supplies adequate to support the 
emergency response. 

Extent-of-play 

Equipment within the facility (facilities) should be sufficient and consistent with the role 
assigned to that facility in the OROs plans and/or procedures in support of emergency 
operations. Use of maps and displays is encouraged. 

All instruments, should be inspected, inventoried, and operationally checked before each use. 
Instruments should be calibrated in accordance with the manufacturers recommendations. 
Unmodified CDV700 series instruments and other instruments without a manufacturers 
recommendations should be calibrated annually. Modified CDV-700 instruments should be 
calibrated in accordance with the recommendation of the modification manufacturer. A label 

Interim REP Program Manual III-110 
August 2002 


Evaluator: Team Leader: Date: 
Site: Assignment: Previous ARCA? 


indicating such calibration should be on each instrument or calibrated frequency can be 
verified by other means. Additionally, instruments being used to measure activity should 
have a range of readings sticker affixed to the side of the instrument. The above 
considerations should be included in 4.a.1 for field team equipment; 4.c.1 for radiological 
laboratory equipment (does not apply to analytical equipment); reception center and 
emergency worker facilities equipment under 6.a.1; and ambulance and medical facilities 
equipment under 6.d.1. 

Sufficient quantities of appropriate direct-reading and permanent record dosimetry and 
dosimeter chargers should be available for issuance to all categories of emergency workers 
that could be deployed from that facility. Appropriate direct-reading dosimetry should allow 
individual(s) to read the administrative reporting limits and maximum exposure limits 
contained in the OROs plans and procedures. 

Dosimetry should be inspected for electrical leakage at least annually and replaced, if 
necessary. CDV138s, due to their documented history of electrical leakage problems, 
should be inspected for electrical leakage at least quarterly and replaced if necessary. This 
leakage testing will be verified during the exercise, through documentation submitted in the 
Annual Letter of Certification, and/or through a staff assistance visit. 

Responsible OROs should demonstrate the capability to maintain inventories of KI sufficient 
for use by emergency workers, as indicated on rosters; institutionalized individuals, as 
indicated in capacity lists for facilities; and, where stipulated by the plan and/or procedures, 
members of the general public (including transients) within the plume pathway EPZ. 

Quantities of dosimetry and KI available and storage locations(s) will be confirmed by 
physical inspection at storage location(s) or through documentation of current inventory 
submitted during the exercise, provided in the Annual Letter of Certification submission, 
and/or verified during a Staff Assistance Visit. Available supplies of KI should be within the 
expiration date indicated on KI bottles or blister packs. As an alternative, the ORO may 
produce a letter from a certified private or State laboratory indicating that the KI supply 
remains potent, in accordance with U.S. Pharmacopoeia standards. 

At locations where traffic and access control personnel are deployed, appropriate equipment 
(e.g., vehicles, barriers, traffic cones and signs, etc.) should be available or their availability 
described. 

All activities must be based on the OROs plans and procedures and completed as they would 
be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-of-play 
agreement. 

Interim REP Program Manual III-111 August 2002 


Evaluator: Team Leader: Date: 
Site: Assignment: Previous ARCA? 


NARRATIVE SUMMARY FOR CRITERION: 

(EVALUATOR MUST WRITE A NARRATIVE AND INSERT IT HERE.) 

ISSUES FOR CRITERION: 

(Address the following elements:) 

Condition (describe the inadequacy):

 Possible Cause (what is responsible): 

 Reference (cite the specific NUREG-0654 element, regulation, etc.): 

 Effect (what resulted, or could have resulted, from this issue): 

 Recommendation (how to correct it): 

Interim REP Program Manual III-112 August 2002 


Evaluator: Team Leader: Date: 
Site: Assignment: Previous ARCA? 


EVALUATION AREA 2 Protective Action Decision Making 

Sub-element 2.a  Emergency Worker Exposure Control 

Criterion 2.a.1: OROs use a decision-making process, considering relevant factors and 
appropriate coordination, to ensure that an exposure control system, including the use of KI, 
is in place for emergency workers, including provisions to authorize radiation exposure in 
excess of administrative limits or protective action guides. (NUREG-0654, K.4, J.10. e, f) 

 
Was this criterion adequately demonstrated? 
Yes _____ No _____ N/A _____

 If No, identify all exercise issues by addressing the elements listed on the attached 
ISSUES FOR CRITERION form. Remember, if there is no effect or potential effect, 
there is no exercise issue. 

 
Reminder: Provide a complete evaluator packet to the Team Leader with a written 
narrative summary, timeline of observations, and all forms and information used during 
the exercise. Cite outstanding performance where observed. 
THE FOLLOWING INTENT AND EXTENT-OF-PLAY INFORMATION IS PROVIDED 
FOR GENERAL REFERENCE ONLY. CONSULT THE SITE-SPECIFIC EXTENT-OF-PLAY 
AGREEMENT AND YOUR TEAM LEADER FOR HOW IT APPLIES TO YOUR 
ASSIGNED LOCATION. 

Intent 

This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that Offsite Response 
Organizations (OROs) have the capability to assess and control the radiation exposure 
received by emergency workers and have a decision chain in place, as specified in the OROs 
plans and procedures, to authorize emergency worker exposure limits to be exceeded for 
specific missions. 

Radiation exposure limits for emergency workers are the recommended accumulated dose limits 
or exposure rates that emergency workers may be permitted to incur during an emergency. 
These limits include any pre-established administrative reporting limits (that take into 
consideration Total Effective Dose Equivalent or organ-specific limits) identified in the OROs 
plans and procedures. 

Interim REP Program Manual III-113 
August 2002 


Evaluator: Team Leader: Date: 
Site: Assignment: Previous ARCA? 


Extent-of-play 

OROs authorized to send emergency workers into the plume exposure pathway EPZ should 
demonstrate a capability to meet the criterion based on their emergency plans and 
procedures. 

Responsible OROs should demonstrate the capability to make decisions concerning the 
authorization of exposure levels in excess of preauthorized levels and to the number of 
emergency workers receiving radiation dose above pre-authorized levels. 

As appropriate, OROs should demonstrate the capability to make decisions on the 
distribution and administration of KI as a protective measure, based on the OROs plan 
and/or procedures or projected thyroid dose compared with the established Protective Action 
Guides (PAGs) for KI administration. 

All activities must be based on the OROs plans and procedures and completed as they would be 
in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-of-play 
agreement. 

NARRATIVE SUMMARY FOR CRITERION: 

(EVALUATOR MUST WRITE A NARRATIVE AND INSERT IT HERE.) 

ISSUES FOR CRITERION: 

(Address the following elements:) 

Condition (describe the inadequacy): 

Interim REP Program Manual III-114 August 2002 


Evaluator: Team Leader: Date: 
Site: Assignment: Previous ARCA? 


 Possible Cause (what is responsible): 

 Reference (cite the specific NUREG-0654 element, regulation, etc.): 

 Effect (what resulted, or could have resulted, from this issue): 

 Recommendation (how to correct it): 

Interim REP Program Manual III-115 August 2002 


Evaluator: Team Leader: Date: 
Site: Assignment: Previous ARCA? 


EVALUATION AREA 2 Protective Action Decision Making 

Sub-element 2.b.  Radiological Assessment and Protective Action Recommendations and 
Decisions for the Plume Phase of the Emergency 

Criterion 2.b.1: Appropriate protective action recommendations are based on available 
information on plant conditions, field monitoring data, and Licensee and ORO dose 
projections, as well as knowledge of onsite and offsite environmental conditions. 
(NUREG-0654, I.8, 10 and Supplement 3) 

 
Was this criterion adequately demonstrated? 
Yes _____ No _____ N/A _____

 If No, identify all exercise issues by addressing the elements listed on the attached 
ISSUES FOR CRITERION form. Remember, if there is no effect or potential effect, 
there is no exercise issue. 

 
Reminder: Provide a complete evaluator packet to the Team Leader with a written 
narrative summary, timeline of observations, and all forms and information used during 
the exercise. Cite outstanding performance where observed. 
THE FOLLOWING INTENT AND EXTENT-OF-PLAY INFORMATION IS PROVIDED 
FOR GENERAL REFERENCE ONLY. CONSULT THE SITE-SPECIFIC EXTENT-OF-PLAY 
AGREEMENT AND YOUR TEAM LEADER FOR HOW IT APPLIES TO YOUR 
ASSIGNED LOCATION. 

Intent 

This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that Offsite Response 
Organizations (OROs) have the capability to use all available data to independently project 
integrated dose from exposure rates or other information and compare the estimated dose 
savings with the protective action guides. OROs have the capability to choose, among a range of 
protective actions, those most appropriate in a given emergency situation. OROs base these 
choices on PAGs from the OROs plans and procedures or EPA 400R92001 and other 
criteria, such as, plant conditions, licensee protective action recommendations, coordination of 
protective action decisions with other political jurisdictions (e.g., other affected OROs), 
availability of appropriate in-place shelter, weather conditions, and situations that create higher 
than normal risk from evacuation. 

Interim REP Program Manual III-116 
August 2002 


Evaluator: Team Leader: Date: 
Site: Assignment: Previous ARCA? 


Extent-of-play 

During the initial stage of the emergency response, following notification of plant conditions 
that may warrant offsite protective actions, the ORO should demonstrate the capability to use 
appropriate means, described in the plan and/or procedures, to develop protective action 
recommendations (PAR) for decision-makers based on available information and 
recommendations from the licensee and field monitoring data, if available. 

When release and meteorological data are provided by the licensee, the ORO also considers 
these data. The ORO should demonstrate a reliable capability to independently validate dose 
projections. The types of calculations to be demonstrated depend on the data available and 
the need for assessments to support the PARs appropriate to the scenario. In all cases, 
calculation of projected dose should be demonstrated. Projected doses should be related to 
quantities and units of the PAG to which they will be compared. PARs should be promptly 
transmitted to decision-makers in a prearranged format. 

Differences greater than a factor of 10 between projected doses by the licensee and the ORO 
should be discussed with the licensee with respect to the input data and assumptions used, the 
use of different models, or other possible reasons. Resolution of these differences should be 
incorporated into the PAR if timely and appropriate. The ORO should demonstrate the 
capability to use any additional data to refine projected doses and exposure rates and revise 
the associated PARs. 

All activities must be based on the OROs plans and procedures and completed as they would 
be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-of-play 
agreement. 

NARRATIVE SUMMARY FOR CRITERION: 

(EVALUATOR MUST WRITE A NARRATIVE AND INSERT IT HERE.) 

Interim REP Program Manual III-117 August 2002 


Evaluator: Team Leader: Date: 
Site: Assignment: Previous ARCA? 


ISSUES FOR CRITERION: 

(Address the following elements:) 

Condition (describe the inadequacy):

 Possible Cause (what is responsible): 

 Reference (cite the specific NUREG-0654 element, regulation, etc.): 

 Effect (what resulted, or could have resulted, from this issue): 

 Recommendation (how to correct it): 

Interim REP Program Manual III-118 August 2002 


Evaluator: Team Leader: Date: 
Site: Assignment: Previous ARCA? 


EVALUATION AREA 2 Protective Action Decision Making 

Sub-element 2.b.  Radiological Assessment and Protective Action Recommendations and 
Decisions for the Plume Phase of the Emergency 

Criterion 2.b.2: A decision-making process involving consideration of appropriate factors 
and necessary coordination is used to make protective action decisions (PAD) for the 
general public (including the recommendation for the use of KI, if ORO policy). 
(NUREG-0654, J.9, 10.m, f) 

 
Was this criterion adequately demonstrated? 
Yes _____ No _____ N/A _____

 If No, identify all exercise issues by addressing the elements listed on the attached 
ISSUES FOR CRITERION form. Remember, if there is no effect or potential effect, 
there is no exercise issue. 

 
Reminder: Provide a complete evaluator packet to the Team Leader with a written 
narrative summary, timeline of observations, and all forms and information used during 
the exercise. Cite outstanding performance where observed. 
THE FOLLOWING INTENT AND EXTENT-OF-PLAY INFORMATION IS PROVIDED 
FOR GENERAL REFERENCE ONLY. CONSULT THE SITE-SPECIFIC EXTENT-OF-PLAY 
AGREEMENT AND YOUR TEAM LEADER FOR HOW IT APPLIES TO YOUR 
ASSIGNED LOCATION. 

Intent 

This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that Offsite Response 
Organizations (OROs) have the capability to use all available data to independently project 
integrated dose from exposure rates or other information and compare the estimated dose 
savings with the protective action guides. OROs have the capability to choose, among a range of 
protective actions, those most appropriate in a given emergency situation. OROs base these 
choices on PAGs from the OROs plans and procedures or EPA 400R92001 and other 
criteria, such as, plant conditions, licensee protective action recommendations, coordination of 
protective action decisions with other political jurisdictions (e.g., other affected OROs), 
availability of appropriate in-place shelter, weather conditions, and situations that create higher 
than normal risk from evacuation. 

Interim REP Program Manual III-119 
August 2002 


Evaluator: Team Leader: Date: 
Site: Assignment: Previous ARCA? 


Extent-of-play 

Offsite Response Organizations (OROs) should have the capability to make both initial and 
subsequent PADs. They should demonstrate the capability to make initial PADs in a timely 
manner appropriate to the situation, based on notification from the licensee, assessment of plant 
status and releases, and PARs from the utility and ORO staff. 

The dose assessment personnel may provide additional PARs based on the subsequent dose 
projections, field monitoring data, or information on plant conditions. The decision-makers 
should demonstrate the capability to change protective actions as appropriate based on these 
projections. 

If the ORO has determined that KI will be used as a protective measure for the general public 
under offsite plans, then the ORO should demonstrate the capability to make decisions on the 
distribution and administration of KI as a protective measure for the general public to 
supplement sheltering and evacuation. This decision should be based on the OROs plan 
and/or procedures or projected thyroid dose compared with the established PAG for KI 
administration. The KI decision-making process should involve close coordination with 
appropriate assessment and decision-making staff. 

If more than one ORO is involved in decision-making, OROs should communicate and 
coordinate PADs with affected OROs. OROs should demonstrate the capability to 
communicate the contents of decisions to the affected jurisdictions. 

All decision-making activities by ORO personnel must be performed based on the OROs 
plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted 
above or otherwise indicated in the extent-of-play agreement. 

NARRATIVE SUMMARY FOR CRITERION: 

(EVALUATOR MUST WRITE A NARRATIVE AND INSERT IT HERE.) 

Interim REP Program Manual III-120 August 2002 


Evaluator: Team Leader: Date: 
Site: Assignment: Previous ARCA? 


ISSUES FOR CRITERION: 

(Address the following elements:) 

Condition (describe the inadequacy):

 Possible Cause (what is responsible): 

 Reference (cite the specific NUREG-0654 element, regulation, etc.): 

 Effect (what resulted, or could have resulted, from this issue): 

 Recommendation (how to correct it): 

Interim REP Program Manual III-121 August 2002 


Evaluator: Team Leader: Date: 
Site: Assignment: Previous ARCA? 


EVALUATION AREA 2 Protective Action Decision Making 

Sub-element 2.c Protective Action Decisions Consideration for the Protection of Special 
Populations 

Criterion 2.c.1: Protective action decisions are made, as appropriate, for special population 
groups. (NUREG-0654, J.9, J.10.d, e) 

 
Was this criterion adequately demonstrated? 
Yes _____ No _____ N/A _____

 If No, identify all exercise issues by addressing the elements listed on the attached 
ISSUES FOR CRITERION form. Remember, if there is no effect or potential effect, 
there is no exercise issue. 

 
Reminder: Provide a complete evaluator packet to the Team Leader with a written 
narrative summary, timeline of observations, and all forms and information used during 
the exercise. Cite outstanding performance where observed. 
THE FOLLOWING INTENT AND EXTENT-OF-PLAY INFORMATION IS PROVIDED 
FOR GENERAL REFERENCE ONLY. CONSULT THE SITE-SPECIFIC EXTENT-OF-PLAY 
AGREEMENT AND YOUR TEAM LEADER FOR HOW IT APPLIES TO YOUR 
ASSIGNED LOCATION. 

Intent 

This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that Offsite Response 
Organizations (OROs) should have the capability to determine protective action 
recommendations, including evacuation, sheltering and use of potassium iodide (KI), if 
applicable, for special population groups (e.g., hospitals, nursing homes, correctional facilities, 
schools, licensed day care centers, mobility impaired individuals, and transportation dependent 
individuals). Focus is on those special population groups that are (or potentially will be) affected 
by a radiological release from a nuclear power plant. 

Extent-of-play 

Usually, it is appropriate to implement evacuation in areas where doses are projected to 
exceed the lower end of the range of PAGs, except for situations where there is a high-risk 
environment or where high-risk groups (e.g., the immobile or infirm) are involved. In these 
cases, examples of factors that should be considered are: weather conditions, shelter 
availability, availability of transportation assets, risk of evacuation vs. risk from the avoided 

Interim REP Program Manual III-122 
August 2002 


Evaluator: Team Leader: Date: 
Site: Assignment: Previous ARCA? 


dose, and precautionary school evacuations. In situations where an institutionalized 
population cannot be evacuated, the administration of KI should be considered by the OROs. 

Applicable OROs should demonstrate the capability to alert and notify all public school 
systems/districts of emergency conditions that are expected to or may necessitate protective 
actions for students. Contacts with public school systems/districts must be actual. 

In accordance with plans and/or procedures, OROs and/or officials of public school 
systems/districts should demonstrate the capability to make prompt decisions on protective 
actions for students. Officials should demonstrate that the decision making process for 
protective actions considers (that is, either accepts automatically or gives heavy weight to) 
protective action recommendations made by ORO personnel, the ECL at which these 
recommendations are received, preplanned strategies for protective actions for that ECL, and 
the location of students at the time (for example, whether the students are still at home, en 
route to the school, or at the school). 

All decision-making activities associated with protective actions, including consideration of 
available resources, for special population groups must be based on the OROs plans and 
procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or 
otherwise indicated in the extent-of-play agreement. 

NARRATIVE SUMMARY FOR CRITERION: 

(EVALUATOR MUST WRITE A NARRATIVE AND INSERT IT HERE.) 

Interim REP Program Manual III-123 August 2002 


Evaluator: Team Leader: Date: 
Site: Assignment: Previous ARCA? 


ISSUES FOR CRITERION: 

(Address the following elements:) 

Condition (describe the inadequacy):

 Possible Cause (what is responsible): 

 Reference (cite the specific NUREG-0654 element, regulation, etc.): 

 Effect (what resulted, or could have resulted, from this issue): 

 Recommendation (how to correct it): 

Interim REP Program Manual III-124 August 2002 


Evaluator: Team Leader: Date: 
Site: Assignment: Previous ARCA? 


EVALUATION AREA 2 Protective Action Decision Making 

Sub-element 2.d.  Radiological Assessment and Decision Making for the Ingestion 
Exposure Pathway 

Criterion 2.d.1: Radiological consequences for the ingestion pathway are assessed and 
appropriate protective action decisions are made based on the OROs planning criteria. 
(NUREG-0654, J. 9,11) 

 
Was this criterion adequately demonstrated? 
Yes _____ No _____ N/A _____

 If No, identify all exercise issues by addressing the elements listed on the attached 
ISSUES FOR CRITERION form. Remember, if there is no effect or potential effect, 
there is no exercise issue. 

 
Reminder: Provide a complete evaluator packet to the Team Leader with a written 
narrative summary, timeline of observations, and all forms and information used during 
the exercise. Cite outstanding performance where observed. 
THE FOLLOWING INTENT AND EXTENT-OF-PLAY INFORMATION IS PROVIDED 
FOR GENERAL REFERENCE ONLY. CONSULT THE SITE-SPECIFIC EXTENT-OF-PLAY 
AGREEMENT AND YOUR TEAM LEADER FOR HOW IT APPLIES TO YOUR 
ASSIGNED LOCATION. 

Intent 

This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that Offsite Response 
Organizations (OROs) have the means to assess the radiological consequences for the 
ingestion exposure pathway, relate them to the appropriate PAGs, and make timely, 
appropriate protective action decisions to mitigate exposure from the ingestion pathway. 

During an accident at a nuclear power plant, a release of radioactive material may 
contaminate water supplies and agricultural products in the surrounding areas. Any such 
contamination would likely occur during the plume phase of the accident and, depending on 
the nature of the release, could impact the ingestion pathway for weeks or years. 

Interim REP Program Manual III-125 
August 2002 


Evaluator: Team Leader: Date: 
Site: Assignment: Previous ARCA? 


Extent-of-play 

It is expected that the Offsite Response Organizations (OROs) will take precautionary actions to 
protect food and water supplies, or to minimize exposure to potentially contaminated water and 
food, in accordance with their respective plans and procedures. Often such precautionary actions 
are initiated by the OROs based on criteria related to the facilitys Emergency Classification 
Levels (ECL). Such actions may include recommendations to place milk animals on stored feed 
and to use protected water supplies. 

The ORO should use its procedures (for example, development of a sampling plan) to assess 
the radiological consequences of a release on the food and water supplies. The OROs 
assessment should include the evaluation of the radiological analyses of representative 
samples of water, food, and other ingestible substances of local interest from potentially 
impacted areas, the characterization of the releases from the facility, and the extent of areas 
potentially impacted by the release. During this assessment, OROs should consider the use of 
agricultural and watershed data within the 50-mile EPZ. The radiological impacts on the food 
and water should then be compared to the appropriate ingestion PAGs contained in the 
OROs plan and/or procedures. (The plan and/or procedures may contain PAGs based on 
specific dose commitment criteria or based on criteria as recommended by current Food and 
Drug Administration guidance.) Timely and appropriate recommendations should be 
provided to the ORO decision-makers group for implementation decisions. As time permits, 
the ORO may also include a comparison of taking or not taking a given action on the 
resultant ingestion pathway dose commitments. 

The ORO should demonstrate timely decisions to minimize radiological impacts from the 
ingestion pathway, based on the given assessments and other information available. Any such 
decisions should be communicated and, to the extent practical, coordinated with neighboring 
and local OROs. 

OROs should use Federal resources, as identified in the Federal Radiological Emergency 
Response Plan (FRERP), and other resources (e.g., compacts, nuclear insurers, etc.), if 
available. Evaluation of this criterion will take into consideration the level of Federal and 
other resources participating. 

All activities must be based on the OROs plans and procedures and completed as they would 
be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-of-play 
agreement. 

Interim REP Program Manual III-126 August 2002 


Evaluator: Team Leader: Date: 
Site: Assignment: Previous ARCA? 


NARRATIVE SUMMARY FOR CRITERION: 

(EVALUATOR MUST WRITE A NARRATIVE AND INSERT IT HERE.) 

ISSUES FOR CRITERION: 

(Address the following elements:) 

Condition (describe the inadequacy):

 Possible Cause (what is responsible): 

 Reference (cite the specific NUREG-0654 element, regulation, etc.): 

 Effect (what resulted, or could have resulted, from this issue): 

 Recommendation (how to correct it): 

Interim REP Program Manual III-127 August 2002 


Evaluator: Team Leader: Date: 
Site: Assignment: Previous ARCA? 


EVALUATION AREA 2 Protective Action Decision Making 

Sub-element 2.e.  Radiological Assessment and Decision Making Concerning Relocation, 
Reentry, and Return 

Criterion 2.e.1: Timely relocation, reentry, and return decisions are made and coordinated as 
appropriate, based on assessments of the radiological conditions and criteria in the OROs 
plan and/or procedures. (NUREG-0654, I.10; J.9; M.1) 

 
Was this criterion adequately demonstrated? 
Yes _____ No _____ N/A _____

 If No, identify all exercise issues by addressing the elements listed on the attached 
ISSUES FOR CRITERION form. Remember, if there is no effect or potential effect, 
there is no exercise issue. 

 
Reminder: Provide a complete evaluator packet to the Team Leader with a written 
narrative summary, timeline of observations, and all forms and information used during 
the exercise. Cite outstanding performance where observed. 
THE FOLLOWING INTENT AND EXTENT-OF-PLAY INFORMATION IS PROVIDED 
FOR GENERAL REFERENCE ONLY. CONSULT THE SITE-SPECIFIC EXTENT-OF-PLAY 
AGREEMENT AND YOUR TEAM LEADER FOR HOW IT APPLIES TO YOUR 
ASSIGNED LOCATION. 

Intent 

This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that Offsite Response 
Organizations (OROs) have the capability to make decisions on relocation, Reentry, and return 
of the general public. These decisions are essential for the protection of the public from the 
direct long-term exposure to deposited radioactive materials from a severe accident at a nuclear 
power plant. 

Extent-of-play 

Relocation: OROs should demonstrate the capability to estimate integrated dose in 
contaminated areas and to compare these estimates with PAGs, apply decision criteria for 
relocation of those individuals in the general public who have not been evacuated but where 
projected doses are in excess of relocation PAGs, and control access to evacuated and 
restricted areas. Decisions are made for relocating members of the evacuated public who 
lived in areas that now have residual radiation levels in excess of the PAGs. Determination of 
areas to be restricted should be based on factors such as the mix of radionuclides in deposited 

Interim REP Program Manual III-128 
August 2002 


Evaluator: Team Leader: Date: 
Site: Assignment: Previous ARCA? 


materials, calculated exposure rates vs. the PAGs, and field samples of vegetation and soil 
analyses. 

Reentry: Decisions should be made regarding the location of control points and policies 
regarding access and exposure control for emergency workers and members of the general 
public who need to temporarily enter the evacuated area to perform specific tasks or 
missions. 

Examples of control procedures are: the assignment of, or checking for, direct-reading and nondirect-
reading dosimetry for emergency workers; questions regarding the individuals objectives 
and locations expected to be visited and associated time frames; availability of maps and plots 
of radiation exposure rates; advice on areas to avoid; and procedures for exit including: 
monitoring of individuals, vehicles, and equipment; decision criteria regarding decontamination; 
and proper disposition of emergency worker dosimetry and maintenance of emergency worker 
radiation exposure records. 

Responsible OROs should demonstrate the capability to develop a strategy for authorized 
Reentry of individuals into the restricted zone, based on established decision criteria. OROs 
should demonstrate the capability to modify those policies for security purposes (e.g., police 
patrols), for maintenance of essential services (e.g., fire protection and utilities), and for other 
critical functions. They should demonstrate the capability to use decision making criteria in 
allowing access to the restricted zone by the public for various reasons, such as to maintain 
property (e.g., to care for farm animals or secure machinery for storage), or to retrieve 
important possessions. Coordinated policies for access and exposure control should be 
developed among all agencies with roles to perform in the restricted zone. OROs should 
demonstrate the capability to establish policies for provision of dosimetry to all individuals 
allowed to re-enter the restricted zone. The extent that OROs need to develop policies on 
Reentry will be determined by scenario events. 

Return: Decisions are to be based on environmental data and political boundaries or 
physical/geological features, which allow identification of the boundaries of areas to which 
members of the general public may return. Return is permitted to the boundary of the 
restricted area that is based on the relocation PAG. 

Other factors that the ORO should consider are, for example: conditions that permit the 
cancellation of the Emergency Classification Level and the relaxation of associated 
restrictive measures; basing return recommendations (i.e., permitting populations that were 
previously evacuated to reoccupy their homes and businesses on an unrestricted basis) on 
measurements of radiation from ground deposition; and the capability to identify services and 
facilities that require restoration within a few days and to identify the procedures and 
resources for their restoration. Examples of these services and facilities are: medical and 
social services, utilities, roads, schools, and intermediate term housing for relocated persons. 

Interim REP Program Manual III-129 August 2002 


Evaluator: Team Leader: Date: 
Site: Assignment: Previous ARCA? 


All activities must be based on the OROs plans and procedures and completed as they would 
be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-of-play 
agreement. 

NARRATIVE SUMMARY FOR CRITERION: 

(EVALUATOR MUST WRITE A NARRATIVE AND INSERT IT HERE.) 

ISSUES FOR CRITERION: 

(Address the following elements:) 

Condition (describe the inadequacy):

 Possible Cause (what is responsible): 

 Reference (cite the specific NUREG-0654 element, regulation, etc.): 

 Effect (what resulted, or could have resulted, from this issue): 

 Recommendation (how to correct it): 

Interim REP Program Manual III-130 August 2002 


Evaluator: Team Leader: Date: 
Site: Assignment: Previous ARCA? 


EVALUATION AREA 3 Protective Action Implementation 

Sub-element 3.a  Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control 

Criterion 3.a.1: The OROs issue appropriate dosimetry and procedures, and manage 
radiological exposure to emergency workers in accordance with the plans and procedures. 
Emergency workers periodically and at the end of each mission read their dosimeters and 
record the readings on the appropriate exposure record or chart. (NUREG-0654, K.3.a.b) 

 
Was this criterion adequately demonstrated? 
Yes _____ No _____ N/A _____

 If No, identify all exercise issues by addressing the elements listed on the attached 
ISSUES FOR CRITERION form. Remember, if there is no effect or potential effect, 
there is no exercise issue. 

 
Reminder: Provide a complete evaluator packet to the Team Leader with a written 
narrative summary, timeline of observations, and all forms and information used during 
the exercise. Cite outstanding performance where observed. 
THE FOLLOWING INTENT AND EXTENT-OF-PLAY INFORMATION IS PROVIDED 
FOR GENERAL REFERENCE ONLY. CONSULT THE SITE-SPECIFIC EXTENT-OF-PLAY 
AGREEMENT AND YOUR TEAM LEADER FOR HOW IT APPLIES TO YOUR 
ASSIGNED LOCATION. 

Intent 

This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that OROs should have the 
capability to provide for the following: distribution, use, collection, and processing of direct-
reading dosimetry and permanent record dosimetry; the reading of direct-reading dosimetry by 
emergency workers at appropriate frequencies; maintaining a radiation dose record for each 
emergency worker; and establishing a decision chain or authorization procedure for emergency 
workers to incur radiation exposures in excess of protective action guides, always applying the 
ALARA (As Low As is Reasonably Achievable) principle as appropriate. 

Extent-of-play 

OROs should demonstrate the capability to provide appropriate direct-reading and permanent 
record dosimetry, dosimeter chargers, and instructions on the use of dosimetry to emergency 
workers. For evaluation purposes, appropriate direct-reading dosimetry is defined as dosimetry 
that allows individual(s) to read the administrative reporting limits (that are pre-established at a 

Interim REP Program Manual III-131 
August 2002 


Evaluator: Team Leader: Date: 
Site: Assignment: Previous ARCA? 


level low enough to consider subsequent calculation of Total Effective Dose Equivalent) and 
maximum exposure limits (for those emergency workers involved in life saving activities) 
contained in the OROs plans and procedures. 

Each emergency worker should have the basic knowledge of radiation exposure limits as 
specified in the OROs plan and/or procedures. Procedures to monitor and record dosimeter 
readings and to manage radiological exposure control should be demonstrated. 

During a plume phase exercise, emergency workers should demonstrate the procedures to be 
followed when administrative exposure limits and turnback values are reached. The 
emergency worker should report accumulated exposures during the exercise as indicated in 
the plans and procedures. OROs should demonstrate the actions described in the plan and/or 
procedures by determining whether to replace the worker, to authorize the worker to incur 
additional exposures or to take other actions. If scenario events do not require emergency 
workers to seek authorizations for additional exposure, evaluators should interview at least 
two emergency workers, to determine their knowledge of whom to contact in the event 
authorization is needed and at what exposure levels. Emergency workers may use any 
available resources (e.g., written procedures and/or coworkers) in providing responses. 

Although it is desirable for all emergency workers to each have a direct-reading dosimeter, 
there may be situations where team members will be in close proximity to each other during 
the entire mission and adequate control of exposure can be effected for all members of the 
team by one dosimeter worn by the team leader. Emergency workers who are assigned to low 
exposure rate areas, e.g., at reception centers, counting laboratories, emergency operations 
centers, and communications centers, may have individual direct-reading dosimeters or they 
may be monitored by dosimeters strategically placed in the work area. It should be noted 
that, even in these situations, each team member must still have their own permanent record 
dosimetry. Individuals without specific radiological response missions, such as farmers for 
animal care, essential utility service personnel, or other members of the public who must reenter 
an evacuated area following or during the plume passage, should be limited to the 
lowest radiological exposure commensurate with completing their missions. 

All activities must be based on the OROs plans and procedures and completed as they would 
be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-of-play 
agreement. 

Interim REP Program Manual III-132 August 2002 


Evaluator: Team Leader: Date: 
Site: Assignment: Previous ARCA? 


NARRATIVE SUMMARY FOR CRITERION: 

(EVALUATOR MUST WRITE A NARRATIVE AND INSERT IT HERE.) 

ISSUES FOR CRITERION: 

(Address the following elements:) 

Condition (describe the inadequacy):

 Possible Cause (what is responsible): 

 Reference (cite the specific NUREG-0654 element, regulation, etc.): 

 Effect (what resulted, or could have resulted, from this issue): 

 Recommendation (how to correct it): 

Interim REP Program Manual III-133 August 2002 


Evaluator: Team Leader: Date: 
Site: Assignment: Previous ARCA? 


EVALUATION AREA 3 Protective Action Implementation 

Sub-element 3.b  Implementation of KI Decision 

Criterion 3.b.1: KI and appropriate instructions are available should a decision to 
recommend use of KI be made. Appropriate record-keeping of the administration of KI for 
emergency workers and institutionalized individuals is maintained. (NUREG-0654, J. 10. e) 

 
Was this criterion adequately demonstrated? 
Yes _____ No _____ N/A _____

 If No, identify all exercise issues by addressing the elements listed on the attached 
ISSUES FOR CRITERION form. Remember, if there is no effect or potential effect, 
there is no exercise issue. 

 
Reminder: Provide a complete evaluator packet to the Team Leader with a written 
narrative summary, timeline of observations, and all forms and information used during 
the exercise. Cite outstanding performance where observed. 
THE FOLLOWING INTENT AND EXTENT-OF-PLAY INFORMATION IS PROVIDED 
FOR GENERAL REFERENCE ONLY. CONSULT THE SITE-SPECIFIC EXTENT-OF-PLAY 
AGREEMENT AND YOUR TEAM LEADER FOR HOW IT APPLIES TO YOUR 
ASSIGNED LOCATION. 

Intent 

This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that Offsite Response 
Organizations (OROs) should have the capability to provide radioprotective drugs for 
emergency workers, institutionalized individuals, and, if in the plan and/or procedures, to the 
general public for whom immediate evacuation may not be feasible, very difficult, or 
significantly delayed. While it is necessary for OROs to have the capability to provide KI to 
emergency workers and institutionalized individuals, the provision of KI to the general 
public is an ORO option and is reflected in OROs plans and procedures. Provisions should 
include the availability of adequate quantities, storage, and means of the distribution of 
radioprotective drugs. 

Extent-of-play 

Offsite Response Organizations (OROs) should demonstrate the capability to make KI available 
to emergency workers, institutionalized individuals, and, where provided for in the ORO plan 
and/or procedures, to members of the general public. OROs should demonstrate the capability to 

Interim REP Program Manual III-134 
August 2002 


Evaluator: Team Leader: Date: 
Site: Assignment: Previous ARCA? 


accomplish distribution of KI consistent with decisions made. Organizations should have the 
capability to develop and maintain lists of emergency workers and institutionalized individuals 
who have ingested KI, including documentation of the date(s) and time(s) they were instructed 
to ingest KI. The ingestion of KI recommended by the designated ORO health official is 
voluntary. For evaluation purposes, the actual ingestion of KI is not necessary. OROs should 
demonstrate the capability to formulate and disseminate appropriate instructions on the use of 
KI for those advised to take it. If a recommendation is made for the general public to take KI, 
appropriate information should be provided to the public by the means of notification specified 
in the OROs plan and/or procedures. 

Emergency workers should demonstrate the basic knowledge of procedures for the use of KI 
whether or not the scenario drives the use of KI. This can be accomplished by an interview 
with the evaluator. 

All activities must be based on the OROs plans and procedures and completed as they would 
be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-of-play 
agreement. 

NARRATIVE SUMMARY FOR CRITERION: 

(EVALUATOR MUST WRITE A NARRATIVE AND INSERT IT HERE.) 

ISSUES FOR CRITERION: 

(Address the following elements:) 

Condition (describe the inadequacy): 

Interim REP Program Manual III-135 August 2002 


Evaluator: Team Leader: Date: 
Site: Assignment: Previous ARCA? 


 Possible Cause (what is responsible): 

 Reference (cite the specific NUREG-0654 element, regulation, etc.): 

 Effect (what resulted, or could have resulted, from this issue): 

 Recommendation (how to correct it): 

Interim REP Program Manual III-136 August 2002 


Evaluator: Team Leader: Date: 
Site: Assignment: Previous ARCA? 


EVALUATION AREA 3 Protective Action Implementation 

Sub-element 3.c  Implementation of Protective Actions for Special Populations 

Criterion 3.c.1: Protective action decisions are implemented for special populations other than 
schools within areas subject to protective actions. (NUREG-0654, J.10.c, d, g) 

 
Was this criterion adequately demonstrated? 
Yes _____ No _____ N/A _____

 If No, identify all exercise issues by addressing the elements listed on the attached 
ISSUES FOR CRITERION form. Remember, if there is no effect or potential effect, 
there is no exercise issue. 

 
Reminder: Provide a complete evaluator packet to the Team Leader with a written 
narrative summary, timeline of observations, and all forms and information used during 
the exercise. Cite outstanding performance where observed. 
THE FOLLOWING INTENT AND EXTENT-OF-PLAY INFORMATION IS PROVIDED 
FOR GENERAL REFERENCE ONLY. CONSULT THE SITE-SPECIFIC EXTENT-OF-PLAY 
AGREEMENT AND YOUR TEAM LEADER FOR HOW IT APPLIES TO YOUR 
ASSIGNED LOCATION. 

Intent 

This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that Offsite Response 
Organizations (OROs) should have the capability to implement protective action decisions, 
including evacuation and/or sheltering, for all special populations. Focus is on those special 
populations that are (or potentially will be) affected by a radiological release from a nuclear 
power plant. 

Extent-of-play 

Applicable OROs should demonstrate the capability to alert and notify (for example, provide 
protective action recommendations and emergency information and instructions) special 
populations (hospitals, nursing homes, correctional facilities, mobility impaired individuals, 
transportation dependent, etc.). OROs should demonstrate the capability to provide for the needs 
of special populations in accordance with the OROs plans and procedures. 

Interim REP Program Manual III-137 
August 2002 


Evaluator: Team Leader: Date: 
Site: Assignment: Previous ARCA? 


Contact with special populations and reception facilities may be actual or simulated, as 
agreed to in the Extent-of-play. Some contacts with transportation providers should be actual, 
as negotiated in the extent-of-play. All actual and simulated contacts should be logged. 

All implementing activities associated with protective actions for special populations must be 
based on the OROs plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual 
emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-of-play agreement. 

NARRATIVE SUMMARY FOR CRITERION: 

(EVALUATOR MUST WRITE A NARRATIVE AND INSERT IT HERE.) 

ISSUES FOR CRITERION: 

(Address the following elements:) 

Condition (describe the inadequacy):

 Possible Cause (what is responsible): 

Interim REP Program Manual III-138 August 2002 


Evaluator: Team Leader: Date: 
Site: Assignment: Previous ARCA? 


 Reference (cite the specific NUREG-0654 element, regulation, etc.): 

 Effect (what resulted, or could have resulted, from this issue): 

 Recommendation (how to correct it): 

Interim REP Program Manual III-139 August 2002 


Evaluator: Team Leader: Date: 
Site: Assignment: Previous ARCA? 


EVALUATION AREA 3 Protective Action Implementation 

Sub-element 3.c  Implementation of Protective Actions for Special Populations 

Criterion 3.c.2: OROs/School Officials Implement Protective Actions For Schools. 
(NUREG-0654, J.10.C, D, G) 

 
Was this criterion adequately demonstrated? 
Yes _____ No _____ N/A _____

 If No, identify all exercise issues by addressing the elements listed on the attached 
ISSUES FOR CRITERION form. Remember, if there is no effect or potential effect, 
there is no exercise issue. 

 
Reminder: Provide a complete evaluator packet to the Team Leader with a written 
narrative summary, timeline of observations, and all forms and information used during 
the exercise. Cite outstanding performance where observed. 
THE FOLLOWING INTENT AND EXTENT-OF-PLAY INFORMATION IS PROVIDED 
FOR GENERAL REFERENCE ONLY. CONSULT THE SITE-SPECIFIC EXTENT-OF-PLAY 
AGREEMENT AND YOUR TEAM LEADER FOR HOW IT APPLIES TO YOUR 
ASSIGNED LOCATION. 

Intent 

This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that Offsite Response 
Organizations (OROs) should have the capability to implement protective action decisions, 
including evacuation and/or sheltering, for all special populations. Focus is on those special 
populations that are (or potentially will be) affected by a radiological release from a nuclear 
power plant. 

Extent-of-play 

Public school systems/districts shall demonstrate the ability to implement protective action 
decisions for students. The demonstration shall be made as follows: At least one school in 
each affected school system or district, as appropriate, needs to demonstrate the 
implementation of protective actions. The implementation of canceling the school day, 
dismissing early, or sheltering should be simulated by describing to evaluators the procedures 
that would be followed. If evacuation is the implemented protective action, all activities to 
coordinate and complete the evacuation of students to reception centers, congregate care 
centers, or host schools may actually be demonstrated or accomplished through an interview 

Interim REP Program Manual III-140 
August 2002 


Evaluator: Team Leader: Date: 
Site: Assignment: Previous ARCA? 


process. If accomplished through an interview process, appropriate school personnel 
including decision-making officials (e.g., superintendent/principal, transportation 
director/bus dispatcher), and at least one bus driver (and the bus drivers escort, if applicable) 
should be available to demonstrate knowledge of their role(s) in the evacuation of school 
children. Communications capabilities between school officials and the buses, if required by 
the plan and/or procedures, should be verified. 

Officials of the school system(s) should demonstrate the capability to develop and provide 
timely information to OROs for use in messages to parents, the general public, and the media 
on the status of protective actions for schools. 

The provisions of this criterion also apply to any private schools, private kindergartens and day 
care centers that participate in REP exercises pursuant to the OROs plans and procedures as 
negotiated in the extent-of-play agreement. 

All activities must be based on the OROs plans and procedures and completed, as they 
would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-ofplay 
agreement. 

NARRATIVE SUMMARY FOR CRITERION: 

(EVALUATOR MUST WRITE A NARRATIVE AND INSERT IT HERE.) 

ISSUES FOR CRITERION: 

(Address the following elements:) 

Condition (describe the inadequacy): 

Interim REP Program Manual III-141 August 2002 


Evaluator: Team Leader: Date: 
Site: Assignment: Previous ARCA? 


 Possible Cause (what is responsible): 

 Reference (cite the specific NUREG-0654 element, regulation, etc.): 

 Effect (what resulted, or could have resulted, from this issue): 

 Recommendation (how to correct it): 

Interim REP Program Manual III-142 August 2002 


Evaluator: Team Leader: Date: 
Site: Assignment: Previous ARCA? 


EVALUATION AREA 3 Protective Action Implementation 

Sub-element 3.d.  Implementation of Traffic and Access Control 

Criterion 3.d.1: Appropriate traffic and access control is established. Accurate instructions 
are provided to traffic and access control personnel. (NUREG-0654, J.10.g, j) 

 
Was this criterion adequately demonstrated? 
Yes _____ No _____ N/A _____

 If No, identify all exercise issues by addressing the elements listed on the attached 
ISSUES FOR CRITERION form. Remember, if there is no effect or potential effect, 
there is no exercise issue. 

 
Reminder: Provide a complete evaluator packet to the Team Leader with a written 
narrative summary, timeline of observations, and all forms and information used during 
the exercise. Cite outstanding performance where observed. 
THE FOLLOWING INTENT AND EXTENT-OF-PLAY INFORMATION IS PROVIDED 
FOR GENERAL REFERENCE ONLY. CONSULT THE SITE-SPECIFIC EXTENT-OF-PLAY 
AGREEMENT AND YOUR TEAM LEADER FOR HOW IT APPLIES TO YOUR 
ASSIGNED LOCATION. 

Intent 

This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that Offsite Response 
Organizations (OROs) have the capability to implement protective action plans, including 
relocation and restriction of access to evacuated/sheltered areas. This sub-element focuses on 
selecting, establishing, and staffing of traffic and access control points and removal of 
impediments to the flow of evacuation traffic. 

Extent-of-play 

OROs should demonstrate the capability to select, establish, and staff appropriate traffic and 
access control points, consistent with protective action decisions (for example, evacuating, 
sheltering, and relocation), in a timely manner. OROs should demonstrate the capability to 
provide instructions to traffic and access control staff on actions to take when modifications in 
protective action strategies necessitate changes in evacuation patterns or in the area(s) where 
access is controlled. 

Interim REP Program Manual III-143 
August 2002 


Evaluator: Team Leader: Date: 
Site: Assignment: Previous ARCA? 


Traffic and access control staff should demonstrate accurate knowledge of their roles and 
responsibilities. This capability may be demonstrated by actual deployment or by interview, 
in accordance with the extent-of-play agreement. 

In instances where OROs lack authority necessary to control access by certain types of traffic 
(rail, water, and air traffic), they should demonstrate the capability to contact the State or 
Federal agencies with authority to control access. 

All activities must be based on the OROs plans and procedures and completed as they would 
be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-of-play 
agreement. 

NARRATIVE SUMMARY FOR CRITERION: 

(EVALUATOR MUST WRITE A NARRATIVE AND INSERT IT HERE.) 

ISSUES FOR CRITERION: 

(Address the following elements:) 

Condition (describe the inadequacy):

 Possible Cause (what is responsible): 

Interim REP Program Manual III-144 August 2002 


Evaluator: Team Leader: Date: 
Site: Assignment: Previous ARCA? 


 Reference (cite the specific NUREG-0654 element, regulation, etc.): 

 Effect (what resulted, or could have resulted, from this issue): 

 Recommendation (how to correct it): 

Interim REP Program Manual III-145 August 2002 


Evaluator: Team Leader: Date: 
Site: Assignment: Previous ARCA? 


EVALUATION AREA 3 Protective Action Implementation 

Sub-element 3.d.  Implementation of Traffic and Access Control 

Criterion 3.d.2: Impediments to evacuation are identified and resolved. 
(NUREG-0654, J.10.k) 

 
Was this criterion adequately demonstrated? 
Yes _____ No _____ N/A _____

 If No, identify all exercise issues by addressing the elements listed on the attached 
ISSUES FOR CRITERION form. Remember, if there is no effect or potential effect, 
there is no exercise issue. 

 
Reminder: Provide a complete evaluator packet to the Team Leader with a written 
narrative summary, timeline of observations, and all forms and information used during 
the exercise. Cite outstanding performance where observed. 
THE FOLLOWING INTENT AND EXTENT-OF-PLAY INFORMATION IS PROVIDED 
FOR GENERAL REFERENCE ONLY. CONSULT THE SITE-SPECIFIC EXTENT-OF-PLAY 
AGREEMENT AND YOUR TEAM LEADER FOR HOW IT APPLIES TO YOUR 
ASSIGNED LOCATION. 

Intent 

This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that Offsite Response 
Organizations (OROs) have the capability to implement protective action plans, including 
relocation and restriction of access to evacuated/sheltered areas. This subelement focuses on 
selecting, establishing, and staffing of traffic and access control points and removal of 
impediments to the flow of evacuation traffic. 

Extent-of-play 

OROs should demonstrate the capability, as required by the scenario, to identify and take 
appropriate actions concerning impediments to evacuation. Actual dispatch of resources to 
deal with impediments, such as wreckers, need not be demonstrated; however, all contacts, 
actual or simulated, should be logged. 

All activities must be based on the OROs plans and procedures and completed as they would 
be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-of-play 
agreement. 

Interim REP Program Manual III-146 
August 2002 


Evaluator: Team Leader: Date: 
Site: Assignment: Previous ARCA? 


NARRATIVE SUMMARY FOR CRITERION: 

(EVALUATOR MUST WRITE A NARRATIVE AND INSERT IT HERE.) 

ISSUES FOR CRITERION: 

(Address the following elements:) 

Condition (describe the inadequacy):

 Possible Cause (what is responsible): 

 Reference (cite the specific NUREG-0654 element, regulation, etc.): 

 Effect (what resulted, or could have resulted, from this issue): 

 Recommendation (how to correct it): 

Interim REP Program Manual III-147 August 2002 


Evaluator: Team Leader: Date: 
Site: Assignment: Previous ARCA? 


EVALUATION AREA 3 Protective Action Implementation 

Sub-element 3.e  Implementation of Ingestion Pathway Decisions 

Criterion 3.e.1: The ORO demonstrates the availability and appropriate use of adequate 
information regarding water, food supplies, milk, and agricultural production within the 
ingestion exposure pathway emergency planning zone for implementation of protective 
actions. (NUREG-0654, J.9, 11) 

 
Was this criterion adequately demonstrated? 
Yes _____ No _____ N/A _____

 If No, identify all exercise issues by addressing the elements listed on the attached 
ISSUES FOR CRITERION form. Remember, if there is no effect or potential effect, 
there is no exercise issue. 

 
Reminder: Provide a complete evaluator packet to the Team Leader with a written 
narrative summary, timeline of observations, and all forms and information used during 
the exercise. Cite outstanding performance where observed. 
THE FOLLOWING INTENT AND EXTENT-OF-PLAY INFORMATION IS PROVIDED 
FOR GENERAL REFERENCE ONLY. CONSULT THE SITE-SPECIFIC EXTENT-OF-PLAY 
AGREEMENT AND YOUR TEAM LEADER FOR HOW IT APPLIES TO YOUR 
ASSIGNED LOCATION. 

Intent 

This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that OROs should have the 
capability to implement protective actions, based on criteria recommended by current Food 
and Drug Administration guidance, for the ingestion pathway zone (IPZ), the area within an 
approximate 50-mile radius of the nuclear power plant. This sub-element focuses on those 
actions required for implementation of protective actions. 

Extent-of-play 

Applicable OROs should demonstrate the capability to secure and utilize current information on 
the locations of dairy farms, meat and poultry producers, fisheries, fruit growers, vegetable 
growers, grain producers, food processing plants, and water supply intake points to implement 
protective actions within the ingestion pathway EPZ. OROs should use Federal resources as 
identified in the FRERP, and other resources (e.g., compacts, nuclear insurers, etc.), if available. 

Interim REP Program Manual III-148 
August 2002 


Evaluator: Team Leader: Date: 
Site: Assignment: Previous ARCA? 


Evaluation of this criterion will take into consideration the level of Federal and other resources 
participating in the exercise. 

All activities must be based on the OROs plans and procedures and completed as they would 
be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-of-play 
agreement. 

NARRATIVE SUMMARY FOR CRITERION: 

(EVALUATOR MUST WRITE A NARRATIVE AND INSERT IT HERE.) 

ISSUES FOR CRITERION: 

(Address the following elements:) 

Condition (describe the inadequacy):

 Possible Cause (what is responsible): 

Interim REP Program Manual III-149 August 2002 


Evaluator: Team Leader: Date: 
Site: Assignment: Previous ARCA? 


 Reference (cite the specific NUREG-0654 element, regulation, etc.): 

 Effect (what resulted, or could have resulted, from this issue): 

 Recommendation (how to correct it): 

Interim REP Program Manual III-150 August 2002 


Evaluator: Team Leader: Date: 
Site: Assignment: Previous ARCA? 


EVALUATION AREA 3 Protective Action Implementation 

Sub-element 3.e  Implementation of Ingestion Pathway Decisions 

Criterion 3.e.2: Appropriate measures, strategies, and pre-printed instructional material 
are developed for implementing protective action decisions for contaminated water, food 
products, milk, and agricultural production. (NUREG-0654, J.9, 11) 

 
Was this criterion adequately demonstrated? 
Yes _____ No _____ N/A _____

 If No, identify all exercise issues by addressing the elements listed on the attached 
ISSUES FOR CRITERION form. Remember, if there is no effect or potential effect, 
there is no exercise issue. 

 
Reminder: Provide a complete evaluator packet to the Team Leader with a written 
narrative summary, timeline of observations, and all forms and information used during 
the exercise. Cite outstanding performance where observed. 
THE FOLLOWING INTENT AND EXTENT-OF-PLAY INFORMATION IS PROVIDED 
FOR GENERAL REFERENCE ONLY. CONSULT THE SITE-SPECIFIC EXTENT-OF-PLAY 
AGREEMENT AND YOUR TEAM LEADER FOR HOW IT APPLIES TO YOUR 
ASSIGNED LOCATION. 

Intent 

This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that OROs should have the 
capability to implement protective actions, based on criteria recommended by current Food 
and Drug Administration guidance, for the ingestion pathway zone (IPZ), the area within an 
approximate 50-mile radius of the nuclear power plant. This sub-element focuses on those 
actions required for implementation of protective actions. 

Extent-of-play 

Development of measures and strategies for implementation of IPZ protective actions should be 
demonstrated by formulation of protective action information for the general public and food 
producers and processors. This includes either pre-distributed public information material in the 
IPZ or the capability for the rapid reproduction and distribution of appropriate reproduction-
ready information and instructions to pre-determined individuals and businesses. OROs should 
demonstrate the capability to control, restrict or prevent distribution of contaminated food by 
commercial sectors. Exercise play should include demonstration of communications and 

Interim REP Program Manual III-151 
August 2002 


Evaluator: Team Leader: Date: 
Site: Assignment: Previous ARCA? 


coordination between organizations to implement protective actions. Actual field play of 
implementation activities may be simulated. For example, communications and coordination 
with agencies responsible for enforcing food controls within the IPZ should be demonstrated, 
but actual communications with food producers and processors may be simulated. 

All activities must be based on the OROs plans and procedures and completed as they would 
be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-of-play 
agreement. 

NARRATIVE SUMMARY FOR CRITERION: 

(EVALUATOR MUST WRITE A NARRATIVE AND INSERT IT HERE.) 

ISSUES FOR CRITERION: 

(Address the following elements:) 

Condition (describe the inadequacy):

 Possible Cause (what is responsible): 

Interim REP Program Manual III-152 August 2002 


Evaluator: Team Leader: Date: 
Site: Assignment: Previous ARCA? 


 Reference (cite the specific NUREG-0654 element, regulation, etc.): 

 Effect (what resulted, or could have resulted, from this issue): 

 Recommendation (how to correct it): 

Interim REP Program Manual III-153 August 2002 


Evaluator: Team Leader: Date: 
Site: Assignment: Previous ARCA? 


EVALUATION AREA 3 Protective Action Implementation 

Sub-element 3.f  Implementation of Relocation, Reentry, and Return Decisions 

Criterion 3.f.1: Decisions regarding controlled reentry of emergency workers and 
relocation and return of the public are coordinated with appropriate organizations and 
implemented. (NUREG-0654, M.1, 3) 

 
Was this criterion adequately demonstrated? 
Yes _____ No _____ N/A _____

 If No, identify all exercise issues by addressing the elements listed on the attached 
ISSUES FOR CRITERION form. Remember, if there is no effect or potential effect, 
there is no exercise issue. 

 
Reminder: Provide a complete evaluator packet to the Team Leader with a written 
narrative summary, timeline of observations, and all forms and information used during 
the exercise. Cite outstanding performance where observed. 
THE FOLLOWING INTENT AND EXTENT-OF-PLAY INFORMATION IS PROVIDED 
FOR GENERAL REFERENCE ONLY. CONSULT THE SITE-SPECIFIC EXTENT-OF-PLAY 
AGREEMENT AND YOUR TEAM LEADER FOR HOW IT APPLIES TO YOUR 
ASSIGNED LOCATION. 

Intent 

This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that Offsite Response 
Organizations (OROs) should demonstrate the capability to implement plans, procedures, and 
decisions for relocation, Reentry, and return. Implementation of these decisions is essential 
for the protection of the public from the direct long-term exposure to deposited radioactive 
materials from a severe accident at a commercial nuclear power plant. 

Extent-of-play 

Relocation: OROs should demonstrate the capability to coordinate and implement decisions 
concerning relocation of individuals, not previously evacuated, to an area where radiological 
contamination will not expose the general public to doses that exceed the relocation PAGs. 
OROs should also demonstrate the capability to provide for short-term or long-term 
relocation of evacuees who lived in areas that have residual radiation levels above the (first-, 
second-, and fifty-year) PAGs. 

Interim REP Program Manual III-154 
August 2002 


Evaluator: Team Leader: Date: 
Site: Assignment: Previous ARCA? 


Areas of consideration should include the capability to communicate with OROs regarding 
timing of actions, notification of the population of the procedures for relocation, and the 
notification of, and advice for, evacuated individuals who will be converted to relocation status 
in situations where they will not be able to return to their homes due to high levels of 
contamination. OROs should also demonstrate the capability to communicate instructions to the 
public regarding relocation decisions. 

Reentry: OROs should demonstrate the capability to control Reentry and exit of individuals 
who need to temporarily re-enter the restricted area, to protect them from unnecessary 
radiation exposure and for exit of vehicles and other equipment to control the spread of 
contamination outside the restricted area. Monitoring and decontamination facilities will be 
established as appropriate. 

Examples of control procedure subjects are: (1) The assignment of, or checking for, direct-
reading and non-direct-reading dosimetry for emergency workers; (2) questions regarding the 
individuals objectives and locations expected to be visited and associated timeframes; (3) maps 
and plots of radiation exposure rates; (4) advice on areas to avoid; and procedures for exit, 
including monitoring of individuals, vehicles, and equipment, decision criteria regarding 
contamination, proper disposition of emergency worker dosimetry, and maintenance of 
emergency worker radiation exposure records. 

Return: OROs should demonstrate the capability to implement policies concerning return of 
members of the public to areas that were evacuated during the plume phase. OROs should 
demonstrate the capability to identify and prioritize services and facilities that require 
restoration within a few days, and to identify the procedures and resources for their 
restoration. Examples of these services and facilities are medical and social services, utilities, 
roads, schools, and intermediate term housing for relocated persons. 

Communications among OROs for relocation, Reentry, and return may be simulated; however 
all simulated or actual contacts should be documented. These discussions may be accomplished 
in a group setting. 

OROs should use Federal resources as identified in the FRERP, and other resources (e.g., 
compacts, nuclear insurers, etc.), if available. Evaluation of this criterion will take into 
consideration the level of Federal and other resources participating in the exercise. 

All activities must be based on the OROs plans and procedures and completed as they would 
be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-of-play 
agreement. 

Interim REP Program Manual III-155 August 2002 


Evaluator: Team Leader: Date: 
Site: Assignment: Previous ARCA? 


NARRATIVE SUMMARY FOR CRITERION: 

(EVALUATOR MUST WRITE A NARRATIVE AND INSERT IT HERE.) 

ISSUES FOR CRITERION: 

(Address the following elements:) 

Condition (describe the inadequacy):

 Possible Cause (what is responsible): 

 Reference (cite the specific NUREG-0654 element, regulation, etc.): 

 Effect (what resulted, or could have resulted, from this issue): 

 Recommendation (how to correct it): 

Interim REP Program Manual III-156 August 2002 


Evaluator: Team Leader: Date: 
Site: Assignment: Previous ARCA? 


EVALUATION AREA 4 Field Measurement and Analysis 

Sub-element 4.a  Plume Phase Field Measurements and Analyses 

Criterion 4.a.1: The field teams are equipped to perform field measurements of direct 
radiation exposure (cloud and ground shine) and to sample airborne radioiodine and 
particulates. (NUREG-0654, H.10; I.7, 8, 9) 

 
Was this criterion adequately demonstrated? 
Yes _____ No _____ N/A _____

 If No, identify all exercise issues by addressing the elements listed on the attached 
ISSUES FOR CRITERION form. Remember, if there is no effect or potential effect, 
there is no exercise issue. 

 
Reminder: Provide a complete evaluator packet to the Team Leader with a written 
narrative summary, timeline of observations, and all forms and information used during 
the exercise. Cite outstanding performance where observed. 
THE FOLLOWING INTENT AND EXTENT-OF-PLAY INFORMATION IS PROVIDED 
FOR GENERAL REFERENCE ONLY. CONSULT THE SITE-SPECIFIC EXTENT-OF-PLAY 
AGREEMENT AND YOUR TEAM LEADER FOR HOW IT APPLIES TO YOUR 
ASSIGNED LOCATION. 

Intent 

This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that Offsite Response 
Organizations (OROs) should have the capability to deploy field teams with the equipment, 
methods, and expertise necessary to determine the location of airborne radiation and 
particulate deposition on the ground from an airborne plume. In addition, NUREG-0654 
indicates that OROs should have the capability to use field teams within the plume 
emergency planning zone to measure airborne radioiodine in the presence of noble gases and 
to detect radioactive particulate material in the airborne plume. In the event of an accident at 
a nuclear power plant, the possible release of radioactive material may pose a risk to the 
nearby population and environment. Although accident assessment methods are available to 
project the extent and magnitude of a release, these methods are subject to large 
uncertainties. During an accident, it is important to collect field radiological data in order to 
help characterize any radiological release. Adequate equipment and procedures are essential 
to such field measurement efforts. 

Interim REP Program Manual III-157 
August 2002 


Evaluator: Team Leader: Date: 
Site: Assignment: Previous ARCA? 


Extent-of-play 

Field teams should be equipped with all instrumentation and supplies necessary to 
accomplish their mission. This should include instruments capable of measuring gamma 
exposure rates and detecting the presence of beta radiation. These instruments should be 
capable of measuring a range of activity and exposure, including radiological 
protection/exposure control of team members and detection of activity on the air sample 
collection media, consistent with the intended use of the instrument and the OROs plans and 
procedures. An appropriate radioactive check source should be used to verify proper 
operational response for each low range radiation measurement instrument (less than 1 R/hr) 
and for high range instruments when available. If a source is not available for a high range 
instrument, a procedure should exist to operationally test the instrument before entering an 
area where only a high range instrument can make useful readings. 

All activities must be based on the OROs plans and procedures and completed as they would be 
in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-of-play 
agreement. 

NARRATIVE SUMMARY FOR CRITERION: 

(EVALUATOR MUST WRITE A NARRATIVE AND INSERT IT HERE.) 

ISSUES FOR CRITERION: 

(Address the following elements:) 

Condition (describe the inadequacy): 

Interim REP Program Manual III-158 August 2002 


Evaluator: Team Leader: Date: 
Site: Assignment: Previous ARCA? 


 Possible Cause (what is responsible): 

 Reference (cite the specific NUREG-0654 element, regulation, etc.): 

 Effect (what resulted, or could have resulted, from this issue): 

 Recommendation (how to correct it): 

Interim REP Program Manual III-159 August 2002 


Evaluator: Team Leader: Date: 
Site: Assignment: Previous ARCA? 


EVALUATION AREA 4 Field Measurement and Analysis 

Sub-element 4.a  Plume Phase Field Measurements and Analyses 

Criterion 4.a.2: Field teams are managed to obtain sufficient information to help characterize 
the release and to control radiation exposure. (NUREG-0654, H.12.; I.8., 11.; J.10.a.) 

 
Was this criterion adequately demonstrated? 
Yes _____ No _____ N/A _____

 If No, identify all exercise issues by addressing the elements listed on the attached 
ISSUES FOR CRITERION form. Remember, if there is no effect or potential effect, 
there is no exercise issue. 

 
Reminder: Provide a complete evaluator packet to the Team Leader with a written 
narrative summary, timeline of observations, and all forms and information used during 
the exercise. Cite outstanding performance where observed. 
THE FOLLOWING INTENT AND EXTENT-OF-PLAY INFORMATION IS PROVIDED 
FOR GENERAL REFERENCE ONLY. CONSULT THE SITE-SPECIFIC EXTENT-OF-PLAY 
AGREEMENT AND YOUR TEAM LEADER FOR HOW IT APPLIES TO YOUR 
ASSIGNED LOCATION. 

Intent 

This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that Offsite Response 
Organizations (OROs) should have the capability to deploy field teams with the equipment, 
methods, and expertise necessary to determine the location of airborne radiation and 
particulate deposition on the ground from an airborne plume. In addition, NUREG-0654 
indicates that OROs should have the capability to use field teams within the plume 
emergency planning zone to detect airborne radioiodine in the presence of noble gases and to 
measure radioactive particulate material in the airborne plume. In the event of an accident at 
a nuclear power plant, the possible release of radioactive material may pose a risk to the 
nearby population and environment. Although accident assessment methods are available to 
project the extent and magnitude of a release, these methods are subject to large 
uncertainties. During an accident, it is important to collect field radiological data in order to 
help characterize any radiological release. Adequate equipment and procedures are essential 
to such field measurement efforts. 

Interim REP Program Manual III-160 
August 2002 


Evaluator: Team Leader: Date: 
Site: Assignment: Previous ARCA? 


Extent-of-play 

Responsible Offsite Response Organizations (OROs) should demonstrate the capability to 
brief teams on predicted plume location and direction, travel speed, and exposure control 
procedures before deployment. 

Field measurements are needed to help characterize the release and to support the adequacy 
of implemented protective actions or to be a factor in modifying protective actions. Teams 
should be directed to take measurements in such locations, at such times to provide 
information sufficient to characterize the plume and impacts. 

If the responsibility to obtain peak measurements in the plume has been accepted by licensee 
field monitoring teams, with concurrence from OROs, there is no requirement for these 
measurements to be repeated by State and local monitoring teams. If the licensee teams do 
not obtain peak measurements in the plume, it is the OROs decision as to whether peak 
measurements are necessary to sufficiently characterize the plume. The sharing and 
coordination of plume measurement information among all field teams (licensee, Federal, 
and ORO) is essential. Coordination concerning transfer of samples, including a chain-ofcustody 
form, to a radiological laboratory should be demonstrated. 

OROs should use Federal resources as identified in the Federal Radiological Emergency 
Response Plan (FRERP), and other resources (for example, compacts, utility, etc.), if 
available. Evaluation of this criterion will take into consideration the level of Federal and 
other resources participating in the exercise. 

All activities must be based on the OROs plans and procedures and completed as they would 
be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-of-play 
agreement. 

NARRATIVE SUMMARY FOR CRITERION: 

(EVALUATOR MUST WRITE A NARRATIVE AND INSERT IT HERE.) 

Interim REP Program Manual III-161 August 2002 


Evaluator: Team Leader: Date: 
Site: Assignment: Previous ARCA? 


ISSUES FOR CRITERION: 

(Address the following elements:) 

Condition (describe the inadequacy):

 Possible Cause (what is responsible): 

 Reference (cite the specific NUREG-0654 element, regulation, etc.): 

 Effect (what resulted, or could have resulted, from this issue): 

 Recommendation (how to correct it): 

Interim REP Program Manual III-162 August 2002 


Evaluator: Team Leader: Date: 
Site: Assignment: Previous ARCA? 


EVALUATION AREA 4 Field Measurement and Analysis 

Sub-element 4.a  Plume Phase Field Measurements and Analyses 

Criterion 4.a.3: Ambient radiation measurements are made and recorded at appropriate 
locations, and radioiodine and particulate samples are collected. Teams will move to an 
appropriate low background location to determine whether any significant (as specified in 
the plan and/or procedures) amount of radioactivity has been collected on the sampling 
media. (NUREG-0654, I.9) 

 
Was this criterion adequately demonstrated? 
Yes _____ No _____ N/A _____

 If No, identify all exercise issues by addressing the elements listed on the attached 
ISSUES FOR CRITERION form. Remember, if there is no effect or potential effect, 
there is no exercise issue. 

 
Reminder: Provide a complete evaluator packet to the Team Leader with a written 
narrative summary, timeline of observations, and all forms and information used during 
the exercise. Cite outstanding performance where observed. 
THE FOLLOWING INTENT AND EXTENT-OF-PLAY INFORMATION IS PROVIDED 
FOR GENERAL REFERENCE ONLY. CONSULT THE SITE-SPECIFIC EXTENT-OF-PLAY 
AGREEMENT AND YOUR TEAM LEADER FOR HOW IT APPLIES TO YOUR 
ASSIGNED LOCATION. 

Intent 

This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that Offsite Response 
Organizations (OROs) should have the capability to deploy field teams with the equipment, 
methods, and expertise necessary to determine the location of airborne radiation and 
particulate deposition on the ground from an airborne plume. In addition, NUREG-0654 
indicates that OROs should have the capability to use field teams within the plume 
emergency planning zone to detect airborne radioiodine in the presence of noble gases and to 
measure radioactive particulate material in the airborne plume. In the event of an accident at 
a nuclear power plant, the possible release of radioactive material may pose a risk to the 
nearby population and environment. Although accident assessment methods are available to 
project the extent and magnitude of a release, these methods are subject to large 
uncertainties. During an accident, it is important to collect field radiological data in order to 
help characterize any radiological release. Adequate equipment and procedures are essential 
to such field measurement efforts. 

Interim REP Program Manual III-163 
August 2002 


Evaluator: Team Leader: Date: 
Site: Assignment: Previous ARCA? 


Extent-of-play 

Field teams should demonstrate the capability to report measurements and field data pertaining 
to the measurement of airborne radioiodine and particulates and ambient radiation to the field 
team coordinator, dose assessment, or other appropriate authority. If samples have radioactivity 
significantly above background, the appropriate authority should consider the need for 
expedited laboratory analyses of these samples. 

OROs should share data in a timely manner with all appropriate OROs. All methodology, 
including contamination control, instrumentation, preparation of samples, and a chain-ofcustody 
form for transfer to a laboratory, will be in accordance with the OROs plan and/or 
procedures. 

OROs should use Federal resources as identified in the FRERP, and other resources (for 
example, compacts, utility, etc.), if available. Evaluation of this criterion will take into 
consideration the level of Federal and other resources participating in the exercise. 

All activities must be must be based on the OROs plans and procedures and completed as 
they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the 
extent-of-play agreement. 

NARRATIVE SUMMARY FOR CRITERION: 

(EVALUATOR MUST WRITE A NARRATIVE AND INSERT IT HERE.) 

Interim REP Program Manual III-164 August 2002 


Evaluator: Team Leader: Date: 
Site: Assignment: Previous ARCA? 


ISSUES FOR CRITERION: 

(Address the following elements:) 

Condition (describe the inadequacy):

 Possible Cause (what is responsible): 

 Reference (cite the specific NUREG-0654 element, regulation, etc.): 

 Effect (what resulted, or could have resulted, from this issue): 

 Recommendation (how to correct it): 

Interim REP Program Manual III-165 August 2002 


Evaluator: Team Leader: Date: 
Site: Assignment: Previous ARCA? 


EVALUATION AREA 4 Field Measurement and Analysis 

Sub-element 4.b  Post Plume Phase Field Measurements and Sampling 

Criterion 4.b.1: The field teams demonstrate the capability to make appropriate 
measurements and to collect appropriate samples (e.g., food crops, milk, water, vegetation, 
and soil) to support adequate assessments and protective action decision-making. 
(NUREG-0654, I.8; J.11) 

 
Was this criterion adequately demonstrated? 
Yes _____ No _____ N/A _____

 If No, identify all exercise issues by addressing the elements listed on the attached 
ISSUES FOR CRITERION form. Remember, if there is no effect or potential effect, 
there is no exercise issue. 

 
Reminder: Provide a complete evaluator packet to the Team Leader with a written 
narrative summary, timeline of observations, and all forms and information used during 
the exercise. Cite outstanding performance where observed. 
THE FOLLOWING INTENT AND EXTENT-OF-PLAY INFORMATION IS PROVIDED 
FOR GENERAL REFERENCE ONLY. CONSULT THE SITE-SPECIFIC EXTENT-OF-PLAY 
AGREEMENT AND YOUR TEAM LEADER FOR HOW IT APPLIES TO YOUR 
ASSIGNED LOCATION. 

Intent 

This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that OROs should have the 
capability to assess the actual or potential magnitude and locations of radiological hazards in the 
IPZ and for relocation, Reentry and return measures. This sub-element focuses on the collection 
of environmental samples for laboratory analyses that are essential for decisions on protection of 
the public from contaminated food and water and direct radiation from deposited materials. 

Extent-of-play 

The OROs field team should demonstrate the capability to take measurements and samples, at 
such times and locations as directed, to enable an adequate assessment of the ingestion pathway 
and to support reentry, relocation, and return decisions. When resources are available, the use of 
aerial surveys and in-situ gamma measurement is appropriate. All methodology, including 
contamination control, instrumentation, preparation of samples, and a chain-of-custody form for 
transfer to a laboratory, will be in accordance with the OROs plan and/or procedures. 

Interim REP Program Manual III-166 
August 2002 


Evaluator: Team Leader: Date: 
Site: Assignment: Previous ARCA? 


Ingestion pathway samples should be secured from agricultural products and water. Samples 
in support of relocation and return should be secured from soil, vegetation, and other surfaces 
in areas that received radioactive ground deposition. 

OROs should use Federal resources as identified in the FRERP, and other resources (for 
example, compacts, utility, nuclear insurers, etc.), if available. Evaluation of this criterion 
will take into consideration the level of Federal and other resources participating in the 
exercise. 

All activities must be must be based on the OROs plans and procedures and completed as they 
would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-ofplay 
agreement. 

NARRATIVE SUMMARY FOR CRITERION: 

(EVALUATOR MUST WRITE A NARRATIVE AND INSERT IT HERE.) 

ISSUES FOR CRITERION: 

(Address the following elements:) 

Condition (describe the inadequacy):

 Possible Cause (what is responsible): 

Interim REP Program Manual III-167 August 2002 


Evaluator: Team Leader: Date: 
Site: Assignment: Previous ARCA? 


 Reference (cite the specific NUREG-0654 element, regulation, etc.): 

 Effect (what resulted, or could have resulted, from this issue): 

 Recommendation (how to correct it): 

Interim REP Program Manual III-168 August 2002 


Evaluator: Team Leader: Date: 
Site: Assignment: Previous ARCA? 


EVALUATION AREA 4 Field Measurement and Analysis 

Sub-element 4.c  Laboratory Operations 

Criterion 4.c.1: The laboratory is capable of performing required radiological analyses to 
support protective action decisions. (NUREG-0654, C.3; J.11) 

 
Was this criterion adequately demonstrated? 
Yes _____ No _____ N/A _____

 If No, identify all exercise issues by addressing the elements listed on the attached 
ISSUES FOR CRITERION form. Remember, if there is no effect or potential effect, 
there is no exercise issue. 

 
Reminder: Provide a complete evaluator packet to the Team Leader with a written 
narrative summary, timeline of observations, and all forms and information used during 
the exercise. Cite outstanding performance where observed. 
THE FOLLOWING INTENT AND EXTENT-OF-PLAY INFORMATION IS PROVIDED 
FOR GENERAL REFERENCE ONLY. CONSULT THE SITE-SPECIFIC EXTENT-OF-PLAY 
AGREEMENT AND YOUR TEAM LEADER FOR HOW IT APPLIES TO YOUR 
ASSIGNED LOCATION. 

Intent 

This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that Offsite Response 
Organizations (OROs) should have the capability to perform laboratory analyses of radioactivity 
in air, liquid, and environmental samples to support protective action decision-making. 

Extent-of-play 

The laboratory staff should demonstrate the capability to follow appropriate procedures for 
receiving samples, including logging of information, preventing contamination of the 
laboratory, preventing buildup of background radiation due to stored samples, preventing cross 
contamination of samples, preserving samples that may spoil (for example, milk), and keeping 
track of sample identity. In addition, the laboratory staff should demonstrate the capability to 
prepare samples for conducting measurements. 

The laboratory should be appropriately equipped to provide analyses of media, as requested, 
on a timely basis, of sufficient quality and sensitivity to support assessments and decisions as 
anticipated by the OROs plans and procedures. The laboratory (laboratories) instrument 

Interim REP Program Manual III-169 
August 2002 


Evaluator: Team Leader: Date: 
Site: Assignment: Previous ARCA? 


calibrations should be traceable to standards provided by the National Institute of Standards 
and Technology. Laboratory methods used to analyze typical radionuclides released in a 
reactor incident should be as described in the plans and procedures. New or revised methods 
may be used to analyze atypical radionuclide releases (for example, transuranics or as a result 
of a terrorist event) or if warranted by circumstances of the event. Analysis may require 
resources beyond those of the ORO. 

The laboratory staff should be qualified in radioanalytical techniques and contamination 
control procedures. 

OROs should use Federal resources as identified in the FRERP, and other resources (for 
example, compacts, utility, nuclear insurers, etc.), if available. Evaluation of this criterion 
will take into consideration the level of Federal and other resources participating in the 
exercise. 

All activities must be based on the OROs plans and procedures and completed as they would 
be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-of-play 
agreement. 

NARRATIVE SUMMARY FOR CRITERION: 

(EVALUATOR MUST WRITE A NARRATIVE AND INSERT IT HERE.) 

Interim REP Program Manual III-170 August 2002 


Evaluator: Team Leader: Date: 
Site: Assignment: Previous ARCA? 


ISSUES FOR CRITERION: 

(Address the following elements:) 

Condition (describe the inadequacy):

 Possible Cause (what is responsible): 

 Reference (cite the specific NUREG-0654 element, regulation, etc.): 

 Effect (what resulted, or could have resulted, from this issue): 

 Recommendation (how to correct it): 

Interim REP Program Manual III-171 August 2002 


Evaluator: Team Leader: Date: 
Site: Assignment: Previous ARCA? 


EVALUATION AREA 5 Emergency Notification and Public Information 

Sub-element 5.a  Activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System 

Criterion 5.a.1: Activities associated with primary alerting and notification of the public 
are completed in a timely manner following the initial decision by authorized offsite 
emergency officials to notify the public of an emergency situation. The initial instructional 
message to the public must include as a minimum the elements required by current FEMA 
REP guidance. (10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E.IV.D and NUREG-0654, E. 5, 6, 7) 

 
Was this criterion adequately demonstrated? 
Yes _____ No _____ N/A _____

 If No, identify all exercise issues by addressing the elements listed on the attached 
ISSUES FOR CRITERION form. Remember, if there is no effect or potential effect, 
there is no exercise issue. 

 
Reminder: Provide a complete evaluator packet to the Team Leader with a written 
narrative summary, timeline of observations, and all forms and information used during 
the exercise. Cite outstanding performance where observed. 
THE FOLLOWING INTENT AND EXTENT-OF-PLAY INFORMATION IS PROVIDED 
FOR GENERAL REFERENCE ONLY. CONSULT THE SITE-SPECIFIC EXTENT-OF-PLAY 
AGREEMENT AND YOUR TEAM LEADER FOR HOW IT APPLIES TO YOUR 
ASSIGNED LOCATION. 

Intent 

This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that OROs should have the 
capability to provide prompt instructions to the public within the plume pathway EPZ. Specific 
provisions addressed in this sub-element are derived from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
(NRC) regulations (10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E.IV.D), and FEMAREP10, Guide for the 
Evaluation of Alert and Notification Systems for Nuclear Power Plants. 

Extent-of-play 

Responsible Offsite Response Organizations (OROs) should demonstrate the capability to 
sequentially provide an alert signal followed by an initial instructional message to populated 
areas (permanent resident and transient) throughout the 10-mile plume pathway EPZ. Following 
the decision to activate the alert and notification system, in accordance with the OROs plan 
and/or procedures, completion of system activation should be accomplished in a timely manner 

Interim REP Program Manual III-172 
August 2002 


Evaluator: Team Leader: Date: 
Site: Assignment: Previous ARCA? 


(will not be subject to specific time requirements) for primary alerting/notification. The initial 
message should include the elements required by current FEMA REP guidance. 

Offsite Response Organizations (OROs) with route alerting as the primary method of alerting 
and notifying the public should demonstrate the capability to accomplish the primary route 
alerting, following the decision to activate the alert and notification system, in a timely manner 
(will not be subject to specific time requirements) in accordance with the OROs plan and/or 
procedures. At least one route needs to be demonstrated and evaluated. The selected route(s) 
should vary from exercise to exercise. However, the most difficult route should be demonstrated 
at least once every six years. All alert and notification activities along the route should be 
simulated (that is, the message that would actually be used is read for the evaluator, but not 
actually broadcast) as agreed upon in the extent-of-play. Actual testing of the mobile public 
address system will be conducted at some agreed-upon location. The initial message should 
include the elements required by current FEMA REP guidance. 

For exercise purposes, timely is defined as the responsible ORO personnel/representatives 
demonstrate actions to disseminate the appropriate information/instructions with a sense of 
urgency and without undue delay. If message dissemination is to be identified as not having 
been accomplished in a timely manner, the evaluator(s) will document a specific delay or 
cause as to why a message was not considered timely. 

Procedures to broadcast the message should be fully demonstrated as they would in an actual 
emergency up to the point of transmission. Broadcast of the message(s) or test messages is 
not required. The alert signal activation may be simulated. However, the procedures should 
be demonstrated up to the point of actual activation. The capability of the primary 
notification system to broadcast an instructional message on a 24-hour basis should be 
verified during an interview with appropriate personnel from the primary notification system. 

All activities for this criterion must be based on the OROs plans and procedures and 
completed as they would be in an actual emergency, except as noted above or otherwise 
indicated in the extent-of-play agreement. 

Interim REP Program Manual III-173 August 2002 


Evaluator: Team Leader: Date: 
Site: Assignment: Previous ARCA? 


NARRATIVE SUMMARY FOR CRITERION: 

(EVALUATOR MUST WRITE A NARRATIVE AND INSERT IT HERE.) 

ISSUES FOR CRITERION: 

(Address the following elements:) 

Condition (describe the inadequacy):

 Possible Cause (what is responsible): 

 Reference (cite the specific NUREG-0654 element, regulation, etc.): 

 Effect (what resulted, or could have resulted, from this issue): 

 Recommendation (how to correct it): 

Interim REP Program Manual III-174 August 2002 


Evaluator: Team Leader: Date: 
Site: Assignment: Previous ARCA? 


EVALUATION AREA 5 Emergency Notification and Public Information 
Sub-element 5.a  Activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System 
Criterion 5.a.2: [RESERVED] 

 
Was this criterion adequately demonstrated? 
Yes _____ No _____ N/A _____

 If No, identify all exercise issues by addressing the elements listed on the attached 
ISSUES FOR CRITERION form. Remember, if there is no effect or potential effect, 
there is no exercise issue. 

 
Reminder: Provide a complete evaluator packet to the Team Leader with a written 
narrative summary, timeline of observations, and all forms and information used during 
the exercise. Cite outstanding performance where observed. 
THE FOLLOWING INTENT AND EXTENT-OF-PLAY INFORMATION IS PROVIDED 
FOR GENERAL REFERENCE ONLY. CONSULT THE SITE-SPECIFIC EXTENT-OF-PLAY 
AGREEMENT AND YOUR TEAM LEADER FOR HOW IT APPLIES TO YOUR 
ASSIGNED LOCATION. 

Intent 

[RESERVED] 

Extent-of-play 

[RESERVED] 

Interim REP Program Manual III-175 
August 2002 


Evaluator: Team Leader: Date: 
Site: Assignment: Previous ARCA? 


NARRATIVE SUMMARY FOR CRITERION: 

(EVALUATOR MUST WRITE A NARRATIVE AND INSERT IT HERE.) 

ISSUES FOR CRITERION: 

(Address the following elements:) 

Condition (describe the inadequacy):

 Possible Cause (what is responsible): 

 Reference (cite the specific NUREG-0654 element, regulation, etc.): 

 Effect (what resulted, or could have resulted, from this issue): 

 Recommendation (how to correct it): 

Interim REP Program Manual III-176 August 2002 


Evaluator: Team Leader: Date: 
Site: Assignment: Previous ARCA? 


EVALUATION AREA 5 Emergency Notification and Public Information 

Sub-element 5.a  Activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System 

Criterion 5.a.3: Activities associated with FEMA-approved exception areas (where applicable) 
are completed within 45 minutes following the initial decision by authorized offsite 
emergency officials to notify the public of an emergency situation. Backup alert and 
notification of the public is completed within 45 minutes following the detection by the 
ORO of a failure of the primary alert and notification system. (NUREG-0654, E. 6, 
Appendix 3.B.2.c) 

 
Was this criterion adequately demonstrated? 
Yes _____ No _____ N/A _____

 If No, identify all exercise issues by addressing the elements listed on the attached 
ISSUES FOR CRITERION form. Remember, if there is no effect or potential effect, 
there is no exercise issue. 

 
Reminder: Provide a complete evaluator packet to the Team Leader with a written 
narrative summary, timeline of observations, and all forms and information used during 
the exercise. Cite outstanding performance where observed. 
THE FOLLOWING INTENT AND EXTENT-OF-PLAY INFORMATION IS PROVIDED 
FOR GENERAL REFERENCE ONLY. CONSULT THE SITE-SPECIFIC EXTENT-OF-PLAY 
AGREEMENT AND YOUR TEAM LEADER FOR HOW IT APPLIES TO YOUR 
ASSIGNED LOCATION. 

Intent 

This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that OROs should have the 
capability to provide prompt instructions to the public within the plume pathway EPZ. Specific 
provisions addressed in this sub-element are derived from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
(NRC) regulations (10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E.IV.D), and FEMAREP10, Guide for the 
Evaluation of Alert and Notification Systems for Nuclear Power Plants. 

Extent-of-play 

Offsite Response Organizations (OROs) with FEMA-approved exception areas (identified in the 
approved Alert and Notification System Design Report) 510 miles from the nuclear power 
plant should demonstrate the capability to accomplish primary alerting and notification of the 
exception area(s) within 45 minutes following the initial decision by authorized offsite 

Interim REP Program Manual III-177 
August 2002 


Evaluator: Team Leader: Date: 
Site: Assignment: Previous ARCA? 


emergency officials to notify the public of an emergency situation. The 45-minute clock will 
begin when the OROs make the decision to activate the alert and notification system for the first 
time for a specific emergency situation. The initial message should, at a minimum, include: a 
statement that an emergency exists at the plant and where to obtain additional information. 

For exception area alerting, at least one route needs to be demonstrated and evaluated. The 
selected route(s) should vary from exercise to exercise. However, the most difficult route 
should be demonstrated at least once every six years. All alert and notification activities 
along the route should be simulated (that is, the message that would actually be used is read 
for the evaluator, but not actually broadcast) as agreed upon in the extent-of-play. Actual 
testing of the mobile public address system will be conducted at some agreed-upon location. 

Backup alert and notification of the public should be completed within 45 minutes following 
the detection by the ORO of a failure of the primary alert and notification system. Backup 
route alerting only needs to be demonstrated and evaluated, in accordance with the OROs 
plan and/or procedures and the extent-of-play agreement, if the exercise scenario calls for 
failure of any portion of the primary system(s), or if any portion of the primary system(s) 
actually fails to function. If demonstrated, only one route needs to be selected and 
demonstrated. All alert and notification activities along the route should be simulated (that is, 
the message that would actually be used is read for the evaluator, but not actually broadcast) 
as agreed upon in the extent-of-play. Actual testing of the mobile public address system will 
be conducted at some agreed-upon location. 

All activities for this criterion must be based on the OROs plans and procedures and 
completed as they would be in an actual emergency, except as noted above or otherwise 
indicated in the extent-of-play agreement. 

NARRATIVE SUMMARY FOR CRITERION: 

(EVALUATOR MUST WRITE A NARRATIVE AND INSERT IT HERE.) 

Interim REP Program Manual III-178 August 2002 


Evaluator: Team Leader: Date: 
Site: Assignment: Previous ARCA? 


ISSUES FOR CRITERION: 

(Address the following elements:) 

Condition (describe the inadequacy):

 Possible Cause (what is responsible): 

 Reference (cite the specific NUREG-0654 element, regulation, etc.): 

 Effect (what resulted, or could have resulted, from this issue): 

 Recommendation (how to correct it): 

Interim REP Program Manual III-179 August 2002 


Evaluator: Team Leader: Date: 
Site: Assignment: Previous ARCA? 


EVALUATION AREA 5 Emergency Notification and Public Information 

Sub-element 5.b  Emergency Information and Instructions for the Public and the Media 

Criterion 5.b.1: OROs provide accurate emergency information and instructions to the 
public and the news media in a timely manner. (NUREG-0654, E. 5, 7; G.3.a, G.4.c) 

 
Was this criterion adequately demonstrated? 
Yes _____ No _____ N/A _____

 If No, identify all exercise issues by addressing the elements listed on the attached 
ISSUES FOR CRITERION form. Remember, if there is no effect or potential effect, 
there is no exercise issue. 

 
Reminder: Provide a complete evaluator packet to the Team Leader with a written 
narrative summary, timeline of observations, and all forms and information used during 
the exercise. Cite outstanding performance where observed. 
THE FOLLOWING INTENT AND EXTENT-OF-PLAY INFORMATION IS PROVIDED 
FOR GENERAL REFERENCE ONLY. CONSULT THE SITE-SPECIFIC EXTENT-OF-PLAY 
AGREEMENT AND YOUR TEAM LEADER FOR HOW IT APPLIES TO YOUR 
ASSIGNED LOCATION. 

Intent 

This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that Offsite Response 
Organizations (OROs) should have the capability to disseminate to the public appropriate 
emergency information and instructions, including any recommended protective actions. In 
addition, NUREG-0654 provides that OROs should ensure that the capability exists for 
providing information to the media. This includes the availability of a physical location for 
use by the media during an emergency. NUREG-0654 also provides that a system should be 
available for dealing with rumors. This system will hereafter be known as the public inquiry 
hotline. 

Extent-of-play 

Subsequent emergency information and instructions should be provided to the public and the 
media in a timely manner (will not be subject to specific time requirements). For exercise 
purposes, timely is defined as the responsible ORO personnel/representatives demonstrate 
actions to disseminate the appropriate information/instructions with a sense of urgency and 
without undue delay. If message dissemination is to be identified as not having been 

Interim REP Program Manual III-180 
August 2002 


Evaluator: Team Leader: Date: 
Site: Assignment: Previous ARCA? 


accomplished in a timely manner, the evaluator(s) will document a specific delay or cause as to 
why a message was not considered timely. 

The ORO should ensure that emergency information and instructions are consistent with 
protective action decisions made by appropriate officials. The emergency information should 
contain all necessary and applicable instructions (for example, evacuation instructions, 
evacuation routes, reception center locations, what to take when evacuating, information 
concerning pets, shelter-in-place instructions, information concerning protective actions for 
schools and special populations, public inquiry telephone number, etc.) to assist the public in 
carrying out protective action decisions provided to them. The ORO should also be prepared 
to disclose and explain the Emergency Classification Level (ECL) of the incident. At a 
minimum, this information must be included in media briefings and/or media releases. OROs 
should demonstrate the capability to use language that is clear and understandable to the 
public within both the plume and ingestion pathway EPZs. This includes demonstration of 
the capability to use familiar landmarks and boundaries to describe protective action areas. 

The emergency information should be all-inclusive by including previously identified 
protective action areas that are still valid, as well as new areas. The OROs should 
demonstrate the capability to ensure that emergency information that is no longer valid is 
rescinded and not repeated by broadcast media. In addition, the OROs should demonstrate 
the capability to ensure that current emergency information is repeated at pre-established 
intervals in accordance with the plan and/or procedures. OROs should demonstrate the 
capability to develop emergency information in a non-English language when required by the 
plan and/or procedures. 

If ingestion pathway measures are exercised, OROs should demonstrate that a system exists 
for rapid dissemination of ingestion pathway information to pre-determined individuals and 
businesses in accordance with the OROs plan and/or procedures. 

OROs should demonstrate the capability to provide timely, accurate, concise, and 
coordinated information to the news media for subsequent dissemination to the public. This 
would include demonstration of the capability to conduct timely and pertinent media 
briefings and distribute media releases as the situation warrants. The OROs should 
demonstrate the capability to respond appropriately to inquiries from the news media. All 
information presented in media briefings and media releases should be consistent with 
protective action decisions and other emergency information provided to the public. Copies 
of pertinent emergency information (for example, EAS messages and media releases) and 
media information kits should be available for dissemination to the media. 

OROs should demonstrate that an effective system is in place for dealing with calls to the 
public inquiry hotline. Hotline staff should demonstrate the capability to provide or obtain 
accurate information for callers or refer them to an appropriate information source. 

Interim REP Program Manual III-181 August 2002 


Evaluator: Team Leader: Date: 
Site: Assignment: Previous ARCA? 


Information from the hotline staff, including information that corrects false or inaccurate 
information when trends are noted, should be included, as appropriate, in emergency 
information provided to the public, media briefings, and/or media releases. 

All activities for this criterion must be based on the OROs plans and procedures and 
completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise 
indicated in the extent-of-play agreement. 

NARRATIVE SUMMARY FOR CRITERION: 

(EVALUATOR MUST WRITE A NARRATIVE AND INSERT IT HERE.) 

ISSUES FOR CRITERION: 

(Address the following elements:) 

Condition (describe the inadequacy):

 Possible Cause (what is responsible): 

Interim REP Program Manual III-182 August 2002 


Evaluator: Team Leader: Date: 
Site: Assignment: Previous ARCA? 


 Reference (cite the specific NUREG-0654 element, regulation, etc.): 

 Effect (what resulted, or could have resulted, from this issue): 

 Recommendation (how to correct it): 

Interim REP Program Manual III-183 August 2002 


Evaluator: Team Leader: Date: 
Site: Assignment: Previous ARCA? 


EVALUATION AREA 6 Support Operation/Facilities 

Sub-element 6.a  Monitoring and Decontamination of Evacuees and Emergency 
Workers, and Registration of Evacuees 

Criterion 6.a.1: The reception center/emergency worker facility has appropriate space, 
adequate resources, and trained personnel to provide monitoring, decontamination, and 
registration of evacuees and/or emergency workers. (NUREG-0654, J.10.h; J.12; K.5.a) 

 
Was this criterion adequately demonstrated? 
Yes _____ No _____ N/A _____

 If No, identify all exercise issues by addressing the elements listed on the attached 
ISSUES FOR CRITERION form. Remember, if there is no effect or potential effect, 
there is no exercise issue. 

 
Reminder: Provide a complete evaluator packet to the Team Leader with a written 
narrative summary, timeline of observations, and all forms and information used during 
the exercise. Cite outstanding performance where observed. 
THE FOLLOWING INTENT AND EXTENT-OF-PLAY INFORMATION IS PROVIDED 
FOR GENERAL REFERENCE ONLY. CONSULT THE SITE-SPECIFIC EXTENT-OF-PLAY 
AGREEMENT AND YOUR TEAM LEADER FOR HOW IT APPLIES TO YOUR 
ASSIGNED LOCATION. 

Intent 

This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that Offsite Response 
Organizations (OROs) have the capability to implement radiological monitoring and 
decontamination of evacuees and emergency workers, while minimizing contamination of 
the facility, and registration of evacuees at reception centers. 

Extent-of-play 

Radiological monitoring, decontamination, and registration facilities for evacuees/emergency 
workers should be set up and demonstrated as they would be in an actual emergency or as 
indicated in the extent-of-play agreement. This would include adequate space for evacuees 
vehicles. Expected demonstration should include 1/3 of the monitoring teams/portal monitors 
required to monitor 20% of the population allocated to the facility within 12 hours. Before using 
monitoring instrument(s), the monitor(s) should demonstrate the process of checking the 
instrument(s) for proper operation. 

Interim REP Program Manual III-184 
August 2002 


Evaluator: Team Leader: Date: 
Site: Assignment: Previous ARCA? 


Staff responsible for the radiological monitoring of evacuees should demonstrate the 
capability to attain and sustain a monitoring productivity rate per hour needed to monitor the 
20% emergency planning zone (EPZ) population planning base within about 12 hours. This 
monitoring productivity rate per hour is the number of evacuees that can be monitored per 
hour by the total complement of monitors using an appropriate monitoring procedure. A 
minimum of six individuals per monitoring station should be monitored, using equipment 
and procedures specified in the plan and/or procedures, to allow demonstration of 
monitoring, decontamination, and registration capabilities. The monitoring sequences for the 
first six simulated evacuees per monitoring team will be timed by the evaluators in order to 
determine whether the twelve-hour requirement can be met. Monitoring of emergency 
workers does not have to meet the twelve-hour requirement. However, appropriate 
monitoring procedures should be demonstrated for a minimum of two emergency workers. 

Decontamination of evacuees/emergency workers may be simulated and conducted by 
interview. The availability of provisions for separately showering should be demonstrated or 
explained. The staff should demonstrate provisions for limiting the spread of contamination. 
Provisions could include floor coverings, signs and appropriate means (for example, 
partitions, roped-off areas) to separate clean from potentially contaminated areas. Provisions 
should also exist to separate contaminated and uncontaminated individuals, provide changes 
of clothing for individuals whose clothing is contaminated, and store contaminated clothing 
and personal belongings to prevent further contamination of evacuees or facilities. In 
addition, for any individual found to be contaminated, procedures should be discussed 
concerning the handling of potential contamination of vehicles and personal belongings. 

Monitoring personnel should explain the use of action levels for determining the need for 
decontamination. They should also explain the procedures for referring evacuees who cannot 
be adequately decontaminated for assessment and follow up in accordance with the OROs 
plans and procedures. Contamination of the individual will be determined by controller inject 
and not simulated with any low-level radiation source. 

The capability to register individuals upon completion of the monitoring and 
decontamination activities should be demonstrated. The registration activities demonstrated 
should include the establishment of a registration record for each individual, consisting of the 
individuals name, address, results of monitoring, and time of decontamination, if any, or as 
otherwise designated in the plan. Audio recorders, camcorders, or written records are all 
acceptable means for registration. 

All activities associated with this criterion must be based on the OROs plans and procedures 
and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless otherwise indicated in the 
extent-of-play agreement. 

Interim REP Program Manual III-185 August 2002 


Evaluator: Team Leader: Date: 
Site: Assignment: Previous ARCA? 


NARRATIVE SUMMARY FOR CRITERION: 

(EVALUATOR MUST WRITE A NARRATIVE AND INSERT IT HERE.) 

ISSUES FOR CRITERION: 

(Address the following elements:) 

Condition (describe the inadequacy):

 Possible Cause (what is responsible): 

 Reference (cite the specific NUREG-0654 element, regulation, etc.): 

 Effect (what resulted, or could have resulted, from this issue): 

 Recommendation (how to correct it): 

Interim REP Program Manual III-186 August 2002 


Evaluator: Team Leader: Date: 
Site: Assignment: Previous ARCA? 


EVALUATION AREA 6 Support Operation/Facilities 

Sub-element 6.b  Monitoring and Decontamination of Emergency Worker Equipment 

Criterion 6.b.1: The facility/ORO has adequate procedures and resources for the 
accomplishment of monitoring and decontamination of emergency worker equipment, 
including vehicles. (NUREG-0654, K.5.b) 

 
Was this criterion adequately demonstrated? 
Yes _____ No _____ N/A _____

 If No, identify all exercise issues by addressing the elements listed on the attached 
ISSUES FOR CRITERION form. Remember, if there is no effect or potential effect, 
there is no exercise issue. 

 
Reminder: Provide a complete evaluator packet to the Team Leader with a written 
narrative summary, timeline of observations, and all forms and information used during 
the exercise. Cite outstanding performance where observed. 
THE FOLLOWING INTENT AND EXTENT-OF-PLAY INFORMATION IS PROVIDED 
FOR GENERAL REFERENCE ONLY. CONSULT THE SITE-SPECIFIC EXTENT-OF-PLAY 
AGREEMENT AND YOUR TEAM LEADER FOR HOW IT APPLIES TO YOUR 
ASSIGNED LOCATION. 

Intent 

This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that Offsite Response 
Organizations (OROs) have the capability to implement radiological monitoring and 
decontamination of emergency worker equipment, including vehicles. 

Extent-of-play 

The monitoring staff should demonstrate the capability to monitor equipment, including 
vehicles, for contamination in accordance with the Offsite Response Organizations (OROs) 
plans and procedures. Specific attention should be given to equipment, including vehicles, that 
was in contact with individuals found to be contaminated. The monitoring staff should 
demonstrate the capability to make decisions on the need for decontamination of equipment, 
including vehicles, based on guidance levels and procedures stated in the plan and/or 
procedures. 

Interim REP Program Manual III-187 
August 2002 


Evaluator: Team Leader: Date: 
Site: Assignment: Previous ARCA? 


The area to be used for monitoring and decontamination should be set up as it would be in an 
actual emergency, with all route markings, instrumentation, record keeping and 
contamination control measures in place. Monitoring procedures should be demonstrated for 
a minimum of one vehicle. It is generally not necessary to monitor the entire surface of 
vehicles. However, the capability to monitor areas such as radiator grills, bumpers, wheel 
wells, tires, and door handles should be demonstrated. Interior surfaces of vehicles that were 
in contact with individuals found to be contaminated should also be checked. 

Decontamination capabilities, and provisions for vehicles and equipment that cannot be 
decontaminated, may be simulated and conducted by interview. 

All activities associated with this criterion must be based on the OROs plans and procedures 
and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise 
indicated in the extent-of-play agreement. 

NARRATIVE SUMMARY FOR CRITERION: 

(EVALUATOR MUST WRITE A NARRATIVE AND INSERT IT HERE.) 

ISSUES FOR CRITERION: 

(Address the following elements:) 

Condition (describe the inadequacy): 

Interim REP Program Manual III-188 August 2002 


Evaluator: Team Leader: Date: 
Site: Assignment: Previous ARCA? 


 Possible Cause (what is responsible): 

 Reference (cite the specific NUREG-0654 element, regulation, etc.): 

 Effect (what resulted, or could have resulted, from this issue): 

 Recommendation (how to correct it): 

Interim REP Program Manual III-189 August 2002 


Evaluator: Team Leader: Date: 
Site: Assignment: Previous ARCA? 


EVALUATION AREA 6 Support Operation/Facilities 

Sub-element 6.c  Temporary Care of Evacuees 

Criterion 6.c.1: Managers of congregate care facilities demonstrate that the centers have 
resources to provide services and accommodations consistent with American Red Cross 
planning guidelines. (Found in MASS CARE - Preparedness Operations, ARC 3031). 
Managers demonstrate the procedures to assure that evacuees have been monitored for 
contamination and have been decontaminated as appropriate prior to entering congregate 
care facilities. (NUREG-0654, J.10.h, J.12) 

 
Was this criterion adequately demonstrated? 
Yes _____ No _____ N/A _____

 If No, identify all exercise issues by addressing the elements listed on the attached 
ISSUES FOR CRITERION form. Remember, if there is no effect or potential effect, 
there is no exercise issue. 

 
Reminder: Provide a complete evaluator packet to the Team Leader with a written 
narrative summary, timeline of observations, and all forms and information used during 
the exercise. Cite outstanding performance where observed. 
THE FOLLOWING INTENT AND EXTENT-OF-PLAY INFORMATION IS PROVIDED 
FOR GENERAL REFERENCE ONLY. CONSULT THE SITE-SPECIFIC EXTENT-OF-PLAY 
AGREEMENT AND YOUR TEAM LEADER FOR HOW IT APPLIES TO YOUR 
ASSIGNED LOCATION. 

Intent 

This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that Offsite Response 
Organizations (OROs) demonstrate the capability to establish relocation centers in host areas. 
The American Red Cross (ARC) normally provides congregate care in support of OROs 
under existing letters of agreement. 

Extent-of-play 

Under this criterion, demonstration of congregate care centers may be conducted out of 
sequence with the exercise scenario. The evaluator should conduct a walk-through of the center 
to determine, through observation and inquiries, that the services and accommodations are 
consistent with ARC 3031. In this simulation, it is not necessary to set up operations as they 
would be in an actual emergency. Alternatively, capabilities may be demonstrated by setting up 

Interim REP Program Manual III-190 
August 2002 


Evaluator: Team Leader: Date: 
Site: Assignment: Previous ARCA? 


stations for various services and providing those services to simulated evacuees. Given the 
substantial differences between demonstration and simulation of this objective, exercise 
demonstration expectations should be clearly specified in extent-of-play agreements. 

Congregate care staff should also demonstrate the capability to ensure that evacuees have 
been monitored for contamination, have been decontaminated as appropriate, and have been 
registered before entering the facility. This capability may be determined through an 
interview process. 

If operations at the center are demonstrated, material that would be difficult or expensive to 
transport (e.g., cots, blankets, sundries, and large-scale food supplies) need not be physically 
available at the facility (facilities). However, availability of such items should be verified by 
providing the evaluator a list of sources with locations and estimates of quantities. 

All activities associated with this criterion must be based on the OROs plans and procedures 
and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise 
indicated in the extent-of-play agreement. 

NARRATIVE SUMMARY FOR CRITERION: 

(EVALUATOR MUST WRITE A NARRATIVE AND INSERT IT HERE.) 

ISSUES FOR CRITERION: 

(Address the following elements:) 

Condition (describe the inadequacy): 

Interim REP Program Manual III-191 August 2002 


Evaluator: Team Leader: Date: 
Site: Assignment: Previous ARCA? 


 Possible Cause (what is responsible): 

 Reference (cite the specific NUREG-0654 element, regulation, etc.): 

 Effect (what resulted, or could have resulted, from this issue): 

 Recommendation (how to correct it): 

Interim REP Program Manual III-192 August 2002 


Evaluator: Team Leader: Date: 
Site: Assignment: Previous ARCA? 


EVALUATION AREA 6 Support Operation/Facilities 

Sub-element 6.d  Transportation and Treatment of Contaminated Injured Individuals 

Criterion 6.d.1: The facility/ORO has the appropriate space, adequate resources, and 
trained personnel to provide transport, monitoring, decontamination, and medical services 
to contaminated injured individuals. (NUREG-0654, F.2; H.10; K.5.a, b; L.1, 4) 

 
Was this criterion adequately demonstrated? 
Yes _____ No _____ N/A _____

 If No, identify all exercise issues by addressing the elements listed on the attached 
ISSUES FOR CRITERION form. Remember, if there is no effect or potential effect, 
there is no exercise issue. 

 
Reminder: Provide a complete evaluator packet to the Team Leader with a written 
narrative summary, timeline of observations, and all forms and information used during 
the exercise. Cite outstanding performance where observed. 
THE FOLLOWING INTENT AND EXTENT-OF-PLAY INFORMATION IS PROVIDED 
FOR GENERAL REFERENCE ONLY. CONSULT THE SITE-SPECIFIC EXTENT-OF-PLAY 
AGREEMENT AND YOUR TEAM LEADER FOR HOW IT APPLIES TO YOUR 
ASSIGNED LOCATION. 

Intent 

This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that Offsite Response 
Organizations (OROs) should have the capability to transport contaminated injured 
individuals to medical facilities with the capability to provide medical services. 

Extent-of-play 

Monitoring, decontamination, and contamination control efforts will not delay urgent medical 
care for the victim. 

Offsite Response Organizations (OROs) should demonstrate the capability to transport 
contaminated injured individuals to medical facilities. An ambulance should be used for the 
response to the victim. However, to avoid taking an ambulance out of service for an extended 
time, any vehicle (e.g., car, truck, or van) may be utilized to transport the victim to the 
medical facility. Normal communications between the ambulance/dispatcher and the 
receiving medical facility should be demonstrated. If a substitute vehicle is used for transport 

Interim REP Program Manual III-193 
August 2002 


Evaluator: Team Leader: Date: 
Site: Assignment: Previous ARCA? 


to the medical facility, this communication must occur before releasing the ambulance from 
the drill. This communication would include reporting radiation monitoring results, if 
available. Additionally, the ambulance crew should demonstrate, by interview, knowledge of 
where the ambulance and crew would be monitored and decontaminated, if required, or 
whom to contact for such information. 

Monitoring of the victim may be performed before transport, done enroute, or deferred to the 
medical facility. Before using a monitoring instrument(s), the monitor(s) should demonstrate 
the process of checking the instrument(s) for proper operation. All monitoring activities 
should be completed as they would be in an actual emergency. Appropriate contamination 
control measures should be demonstrated before and during transport and at the receiving 
medical facility. 

The medical facility should demonstrate the capability to activate and set up a radiological 
emergency area for treatment. Equipment and supplies should be available for the treatment 
of contaminated injured individuals. 

The medical facility should demonstrate the capability to make decisions on the need for 
decontamination of the individual, to follow appropriate decontamination procedures, and to 
maintain records of all survey measurements and samples taken. All procedures for the 
collection and analysis of samples and the decontamination of the individual should be 
demonstrated or described to the evaluator. 

All activities associated with this criterion must be based on the OROs plans and procedures 
and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise 
indicated in the extent-of-play agreement. 

NARRATIVE SUMMARY FOR CRITERION: 

(EVALUATOR MUST WRITE A NARRATIVE AND INSERT IT HERE.) 

Interim REP Program Manual III-194 August 2002 


Evaluator: Team Leader: Date: 
Site: Assignment: Previous ARCA? 


ISSUES FOR CRITERION: 

(Address the following elements:) 

Condition (describe the inadequacy):

 Possible Cause (what is responsible): 

 Reference (cite the specific NUREG-0654 element, regulation, etc.): 

 Effect (what resulted, or could have resulted, from this issue): 

 Recommendation (how to correct it): 

Interim REP Program Manual III-195 August 2002 


Section III.C  Evaluation Area Modules 

Interim REP Program Manual III-196 August 2002 


Section III.D  Exercise Preparation Guides 

D. REP Exercise Preparation Guides for Evaluators and Team Leaders 
1. Purpose and Organization 
The REP Exercise Preparation Guide is to assist evaluators, including Team Leaders, to prepare 
for a radiological emergency response exercise. The guide is to be used during pre-exercise 
preparations, not during the exercise itself. The REP Exercise Preparation Guide (EPG) has 
three parts: (1) General Guidance for Evaluators, (2) General Guidance for Team Leaders, and 

(3) Guidance for Preparing to Evaluate Specific Evaluation Areas and Criteria. The third part, 
Guidance for Preparing to Evaluate Specific Evaluation Areas and Criteria, is not included in this 
manual. None of these guides are to be completed and submitted to FEMA as part of the 
documentation of an evaluation assignment. 
2. General Guidance for Evaluators 
The General Guidance for Evaluators on the following pages includes the basic tasks and 
responsibilities for all evaluators starting from the time they receive their evaluator packet until 
the exercise has ended and they have been released. Therefore, General Guidance for Evaluators 
should be included in all evaluator packets. FEMA Regional Offices may add to or modify the 
document to accommodate regional or exercise-specific variations in tasks and responsibilities. 

Interim REP Program Manual III-197 August 2002 


Section III.D  Exercise Preparation Guides 

REP EXERCISE PREPARATION GUIDE 
GENERAL GUIDANCE FOR EVALUATORS 
When you receive your evaluator packet: 

1. 
Review the contents of the packet and the transmittal letter. (Call the designated 
point of contact if you have any questions.) 
2. 
Check your assignment(s). Does your expertise fit this assignment? Does this 
assignment require your coordination with an evaluator in another location? 
3. 
Inform point-of-contact of any potential conflict of interest you may have. 
4. 
Make travel arrangements and follow instruction given in the pre-exercise letter or 
memorandum regarding lodging. (NOTE: Return time may depend on exercise 
outcome). 
5. 
Using the Pre-Exercise Evaluator Preparation Guide for each of your assigned 
Evaluation Criteria, review the plan, procedures, and extent-of-play and prior issues. 
6. 
Develop a list of actions expected at your location for your assignment(s); e.g., by 
Emergency Classification Level (ECL). 
7. 
Identify questions for clarification during the pre-exercise meeting. 
8. 
Record related work hours on appropriate form (if applicable). 
9. 
Bring appropriate clothing for the season and assignment. For most exercise 
locations this means appropriate business attire. 
10. 
Bring a laptop computer and printer, if available. Work products should be provided 
in Word 2000 format. 
Pre-Exercise Tasks: 

1. 
Attend pre-exercise meeting(s) and ensure that you have completed tasks 1-8 above 
(if not already completed). 
2. 
Attend team meeting(s); clarify extent of your assignment(s). 
3. 
Obtain any change-pages to the evaluator packet. 
4. 
Ask exercise questions related to the extent-of-play while State, county and utility 
representatives are present at the pre-exercise meeting, if appropriate. 
Interim REP Program Manual III-198 
August 2002 


Section III.D  Exercise Preparation Guides 

REP EXERCISE PREPARATION GUIDE 
GENERAL GUIDANCE FOR EVALUATORS 
Pre-Exercise Tasks (contd): 

5. 
Obtain answers to any outstanding questions you may have during your team 
meeting(s), especially any that you have concerning extent-of-play requirements and 
demonstration issues. 
6. 
Know approximate Emergency Classification Level times per the scenario (provided 
in the evaluator packet and/or in the pre-exercise meetings). 
7. 
Know responsibilities for gathering player-produced documents (logs, sign-in rosters, 
etc.) 
8. 
Establish method of reporting time, e.g., 24-hour clock, and synchronize watches. 
9. 
Confirm time to be at evaluation location. 
10. 
Obtain contact number(s) for emergencies, media inquiries, significant exercise 
issues, etc. (Usually the Regional Assistance Committee [RAC] Chair or designee.) 
11. 
Review exercise policy on immediate correction of potential issues during exercise 
play. Determine the RAC Chairs instruction on re-demonstration, i.e., does the RAC 
Chair need to approve a re-demonstration or may the Team Leader or Evaluator make 
that determination? 
12. 
Review regional policy on preliminary direct feedback to exercise participants. 
13. 
Confirm information on post-exercise meetings to provide to exercise participants. 
14. 
Locate evaluation site and determine travel time. 
15. 
Understand regional expectations regarding narratives and issues. 
16. 
Understand the review process and deadlines for work products. 
During the exercise: 

1. 
Wear appropriate business attire (exceptions to business attire will be discussed by regional 
personnel). Wear identification badges if instructed to do so at the pre-exercise briefing. 
2. 
Arrive at your assigned location at least 15-30 minutes prior to any scheduled activity. 
Interim REP Program Manual III-199 
August 2002 


Section III.D  Exercise Preparation Guides 

REP EXERCISE PREPARATION GUIDE 
GENERAL GUIDANCE FOR EVALUATORS 
During the exercise (contd): 

3. 
Upon arrival, introduce yourself to the controller and key participants. 
4. 
Prior to the start of exercise play, the team leader or other designated individual should 
arrange to receive copies of all logs, messages (including Emergency Alert System [EAS] 
messages), sign-in rosters, notification forms and other materials developed during the 
exercise. Do not leave your location without these, unless instructed otherwise! 
5. 
While focusing on your particular assigned criteria, be sure to also observe and record as 
much of the pertinent activity as possible outside of your primary area of responsibility. 
6. 
Develop a detailed time record for observed events. 
7. 
Remain as unobtrusive as possible: 
 
Remember that people present at your location are aware that you are evaluating 
them; they want to do a good job; they may be nervous and apprehensive; try to put 
them at ease and establish a good rapport from the outset. 
 
If you have questions about exercise play, refer to the exercise controller at your 
location or other designated contact. 
 
Refer questions from media to the designated contact. 
8. 
Never reveal the scenario to the players. 
9. 
Remember that your job during the exercise is to observe and document, not to participate in 
or interfere with exercise play: 
 
Do not give instructions or orders during the exercise; 
 
Do ask questions as needed to complete your evaluation; 
 
Be sure to ask questions at the appropriate times so that you are not interrupting the 
staff or prompting them to take actions they may have forgotten; 
 
Remember an actual emergency always takes precedence over exercise activities. 
10. Avoid use of ORO communications equipment that could interfere with the players. 
Interim REP Program Manual III-200 
August 2002 


Section III.D  Exercise Preparation Guides 

REP EXERCISE PREPARATION GUIDE 
GENERAL GUIDANCE FOR EVALUATORS 
During the exercise (contd): 

11. REMEMBER: Evaluators have no authority to terminate the exercise. 
12. As soon as the exercise is terminated: 
 
Meet with your team and develop initial positive and negative observations; 
 
Present preliminary direct feedback to exercise participants, including: (1) Thank the 
participants for their part in the exercise. (2) Provide positive comments to the 
participants (3) Provide recommendations for improvement based on your experience 
and describe the problems that you saw. Remember: Do not classify these problems 
with the terms Deficiency, Area Requiring Corrective Action (ARCA), or 
Planning Issue. 
 
Provide participants with the time and place of post-exercise meetings. 
After the Exercise: 

1. 
Attend post-exercise evaluator debriefing meetings, as required. 
 
Be prepared to provide input to the exercise timeline, if applicable. 
 
Be prepared to discuss the problems you identified with the exercise play at your 
location, if applicable. 
 
Discuss your evaluation with the other evaluators previously identified to develop the 
complete picture of the play. 
2. 
Write Reports (Narratives and Issues) and complete within the time frame specified. 
 
Be SURE of the facts you record. 
 
Write legibly on all handwritten items such as timelines, timesheets, etc. (Please bring 
a laptop to type reports, if possible. Work products should be provided in Word 2000 
format.) 
Interim REP Program Manual III-201 
August 2002 


Section III.D  Exercise Preparation Guides 

REP EXERCISE PREPARATION GUIDE 

GENERAL GUIDANCE FOR EVALUATORS 

After the Exercise (contd): 

 
The narrative summary should be a logical discussion of events that support your 
recommendation that the criterion was or was not adequately demonstrated. This 
discussion must include who, what, when, where, why and how, as applicable to the 
criterion you are evaluating. All issues should be described in the narrative and in a 
detailed, stand-alone write-up of the issue. 
 
Use exact names of facilities, organizations and titles of participants (not their names) 
and compare with those specified in the plan. Verify all spellings and use only 
approved and accurate acronyms and define them in your text. 
 
Do not draw conclusions without supporting facts, for example, state No evidence of 
annual calibration not instruments were not calibrated. 
 
PREVIOUS ARCAs: State whether previous ARCAs have been resolved and the 
corrective action demonstrated. A detailed discussion of the actions accomplished to 
resolve the ARCA must be provided. 
 
UNRESOLVED ARCA: If the ARCA has not been resolved, indicate this as an 
Unresolved ARCA. Describe in detail the reason for this conclusion. 
 
NEW ISSUE: If there is a new issue, the discussion must address the following 
elements: condition, possible cause, reference (include specific references; e.g., 
NUREG-0654, plans or procedures), effect or potential effect and recommendation. 
 
The review process will be discussed during the pre-exercise briefing. 
 
Prior to release from the exercise, submit your completed evaluation modules and the 
following materials to your Team Leader: 
1. 
Evaluator logs and timeline; 
2. 
All copies of player logs, messages, etc., collected at your location (if directed 
to do so by your Team Leader); 
3. 
Your evaluator binder; 
4. 
Any other material supporting issues you have identified; 
5. 
Time sheets with regular and overtime, as specified by the Region; and 
6. 
Other materials required by the Region. 
Interim REP Program Manual III-202 
August 2002 


Section III.D  Exercise Preparation Guides 

3. General Guidance for Team Leaders 
The General Guidance for Team Leaders on the following pages includes the basic tasks and 
responsibilities for the position starting from the time the Team Leader receives the evaluator 
packet until the exercise has ended and they have been released. Therefore, General Guidance 
for Team Leaders should be provided in the evaluator packets for all Team Leaders. It is 
anticipated that the FEMA Regional Offices will add to or modify the document to accommodate 
regional- or exercise-specific variations in tasks and responsibilities. 

Interim REP Program Manual III-203 August 2002 


Section III.D  Exercise Preparation Guides 

REP EXERCISE PREPARATION GUIDE 

GENERAL GUIDANCE FOR TEAM LEADERS 

Team Leaders have all the responsibilities listed for evaluators. In addition, the following 
tasks are to be performed. Any Regional differences or preferences should be discussed 
during the initial evaluators briefing. 

1. 
Attend all meetings as assigned. 
2. 
Arrange meetings with team prior to and after the exercise. 
3. 
Arrange pre-exercise site visit, if applicable. 
4. 
Using the REP Exercise Preparation Guide for each Evaluation Criterion assigned to the 
team, review with the team members, the plan, procedures, and extent-of-play and prior 
issues provided. 
5. 
Ensure that all evaluation criteria and prior issues are assigned to team members. 
6. 
Resolve team members questions. 
7. 
Oversee immediate correction of issues (re-demonstration). 
8. 
Collect potential exercise issues from team members. 
9. 
Review team members evaluations of outstanding previous issues. 
10. Consolidate timeline information for the team, if applicable. 
11. Obtain talking points from team members and prepare and present post-exercise 
presentations, if applicable. 
12. Provide input on issue classification and attend meetings as requested by the FEMA RAC 
Chair. 
13. Provide guidance and support to team members. 
14. Facilitate the observation of critical activities by team members. 
15. Track and monitor the timeliness of team members narrative write-up submissions. 
Interim REP Program Manual III-204 
August 2002 


Section III.D  Exercise Preparation Guides 

REP EXERCISE PREPARATION GUIDE 

GENERAL GUIDANCE FOR TEAM LEADERS 

16. Coordinate: 
 Collection of documents, 
 Post-exercise debriefing, and 
 With other Team Leaders on common/related issues or evaluation areas. 
17. Provide input on performance of evaluators. 
Interim REP Program Manual III-205 August 2002 


Section III.D  Exercise Preparation Guides 

Interim REP Program Manual III-206 August 2002 


Section III.E  American Red Cross 

E. AMERICAN RED CROSS GUIDANCE 
[An excerpt from American Red Cross, Disaster Services Regulations and Procedures 
Mass Care  Preparedness and Operations ARC 3031 Apr. 19873] 

Contents (abridged) 

Part X. Preparedness for Radiological Emergencies 

1. Planning Concepts 
2. Mass Shelters 
3. Reception Centers 
4. Voluntary Evacuations 
5. Special Health Concerns 
Attachment 5-A Guidelines for Establishing Shelters 
Attachment 5-B Guide for Shelter Managers 
Table 1  Staffing Requirements, Mass Care Facility 

X. PREPAREDNESS FOR RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCIES 
In recent years significant emphasis has been placed on the need for off-site emergency planning 
around fixed nuclear facilities in the United States. Planning for radiological emergencies is 
required by law, supported by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and conducted by state and county governments and planning 
firms with which they may contract. 

In radiological emergencies, the Red Cross role in support of state and county governments is 
limited to conducting mass shelter and mass feeding operations in government-designated 
facilities during evacuations. Consequently, many Red Cross chapters in states with currently 
licensed nuclear reactors are responsible for working with their local governments to make plans 
for mass care during such emergencies. 

Administrative Regulations (ARC 3003) sets forth the basis for providing Red Cross services 
following radiological emergencies in which there is or may be company liability or insurance 
coverage or both. General guidelines relating to chapter preparedness for radiological emergencies 
are contained in Chapter Preparedness and Disaster Operations (ARC 3027). The purpose of this 
section is to provide chapters with specific details concerning Mass Care planning for these 
disasters. 

Section X of ARC Procedure 3031 has been reformatted to more closely follow the format of this document and 
does not appear as originally submitted by the American Red Cross. The content has not been changed. 

Interim REP Program Manual III-207 August 2002 


Section III.E  American Red Cross 

Planning Concepts 

In the event of an accident at a fixed nuclear power reactor within the United States, the facility 
operator, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and the state government make an immediate 
assessment of the incident and ongoing evaluations of its potential outcome. They determine which 
of four emergency action levels the accident warrants. The four levels, beginning with the least 
serious, are unusual event, alert, site area emergency, and general emergency. These levels provide 
a standardized method of describing the seriousness of the accident and determining appropriate 
actions that government agencies and the Red Cross should take. 

During a site area emergency or general emergency, steps may be taken to protect people living near 
the facility from potential or actual radiation release. Several possible protective actions may be 
taken. People may be sheltered inside their homes, offices, and other buildings if a release has 
already occurred or if a release is imminent but is expected to be of short duration. In this situation 
it is better to protect people by keeping them indoors-sheltered by the building from exposure-than 
risk their exposure while attempting to evacuate the area. 

Another protective action involves the evacuation of people potentially threatened by a release. 
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has determined evacuation areas to include a specific 
radius around each facility. This area is called the plume exposure pathway emergency planning 
zone (EPZ). Areas in which this EPZ is located are called risk areas, while those into which 
people would be evacuated are called host areas. 

Chapters involved in radiological emergencies requiring evacuation would receive support from 
the national sector. However, chapters in designated host areas are responsible for preplanning 
mass care operations for radiological emergencies with the appropriate local government agency, 
and-at the very least-initiating these services if an accident should occur. Chapters that fall 
totally within risk areas have no responsibility for providing mass care in their jurisdiction, but 
they may be asked to assist in evacuating the elderly and hospitalized and residents of nursing 
homes. Volunteer and paid staff who reside or work within the EPZ would evacuate as directed 
by local officials during such an emergency. 

Mass Shelters 

Although Red Cross chapters are responsible for selecting facilities for mass shelters in other 
types of disasters, in radiological emergencies this responsibility falls to the host area 
government. In preparing a radiological emergency response plan, the responsible government 
agency is required to plan for a sufficient number of mass shelters within the host area to 
accommodate 50 percent of the population in the EPZ. 

To support government efforts during radiological emergencies, the Red Cross may assume 
primary responsibility for operating mass shelters. Therefore, chapters need to actively 
participate in the planning activities of their local government, or of those firms responsible for 
planning, to ensure that designated mass shelter facilities meet Red Cross standards, that an 
emergency mass care facility survey is completed for each designated facility, and that written 
agreements are in place for the use of these facilities. Once all of the host area mass shelters 

Interim REP Program Manual III-208 August 2002 


Section III.E  American Red Cross 

within the chapter jurisdiction have been designated, the chapter is responsible for ensuring that 
a sufficient number of personnel are trained as shelter managers, shelter workers, and health 
services workers and are available to initiate mass care operations in shelters. If it has sufficient 
resources, the chapter should also plan to continue operating the shelters. 

The operation of shelters in radiological emergencies should not vary significantly from their 
operation in natural disasters. There may, however be certain special health concerns relating to 
these emergencies, such as potential exposure of evacuees to radiological release and the 
emotional impact of this threat on the shelter population. (See Special Health Concerns later in 
this section.) 

Shelter managers, nurses, and other mass care personnel being prepared to respond to 
radiological emergencies must have a basic understanding of the effects and characteristics of 
these emergencies, since misconceptions may lead personnel to misunderstand their role and the 
potential effects of the accident. The training course Providing Red Cross Disaster Health 
Services in Radiation Accidents (see ARC 3076-R) and various local training programs are 
available to prepare mass care personnel. 

In planning for mass shelters with the appropriate government agency, chapters should 
encourage the inclusion of certain instructions in written materials distributed to the public 
concerning response to radiological emergencies. The public should be advised in the event of 
evacuation to bring bedding, clothing, infant care items, and prescription medications with them 
to the shelter They should also be advised as to pet care. 

Reception Centers 

Most response plans for radiological emergencies specify that reception centers or staging points 
be set up along evacuation routes. These facilities may  

 
Provide radiological monitoring and decontamination of evacuees. 
 
Provide special information to evacuees. 
 
Direct evacuees to the proper mass shelter facilities. 
 
Register people who have left their homes. (This procedure may have subsequent 
legal implications relating to claims against the plant operator.) 
The appropriate government agency is directly responsible for establishing and operating these 
centers. The Red Cross needs to assign a liaison worker to each of these facilities, however, to 
monitor and assist in controlling the flow of evacuees to mass shelters. It is important that this 
liaison worker be able to communicate with the chapter headquarters and mass shelter facilities. 
If necessary, this communication may be through use of the Red Cross or amateur radio system. 

As part of their mass care preparedness planning, chapters in whose jurisdiction reception centers 
have been designated should appoint liaison personnel and assign communications equipment to 
the centers. Any other services the chapters may choose to provide at these centers should be 
arranged for only after all of the chapters mass care responsibilities at designated mass shelter 
facilities have been met. Refer to Administrative Regulations (ARC 3003) for information 
concerning company liability in radiological emergencies. 

Interim REP Program Manual III-209 
August 2002 


Section III.E  American Red Cross 

Voluntary Evacuations 

During radiological emergencies it is likely that some people living near the nuclear facility will 
evacuate before an official recommendation to do so is given. Additionally, some people who 
live beyond the designated risk area will evacuate if evacuation is recommended. Although no 
one would be turned away from a mass shelter facility because they did not reside within the 
designated risk area, chapters must consult with the appropriate national sector office before 
establishing a mass care facility specifically for such groups. 

If evacuees seek shelter from areas beyond those designated, host areas chapters should direct 
them back into the host area if feasible. Otherwise they should contact the appropriate national 
sector office. When a large number of evacuees are seeking shelter outside the designated host 
area, the chapter may establish mass shelters with the concurrence of the operations 
headquarters. 

Special Health Concerns 

The major health concern unique to radiological emergencies is that people may suffer radiation 
exposure and contamination. The appropriate government agency is responsible for radiological 
monitoring and decontamination. Red Cross involvement in these activities is limited to  

 
Seeing that Red Cross volunteer and paid staff are monitored as necessary. 
 
Alerting the appropriate government agency when evacuees arriving at shelters have 
not been monitored or when evacuees show signs of illness that might be related to 
radiation exposure. 
Plans for radiological emergencies usually specify that radiological monitoring and 
decontamination be done at reception centers or special staging points. This procedure is 
desirable because evacuees would then enter host areas and mass shelters without the possibility 
of contaminating others. However, monitoring and decontamination are sometimes planned for 
the same facilities specified as mass shelters. Chapters directly involved in government planning 
should advocate that monitoring and decontamination activities be located at reception or staging 
centers. 

When these activities must occur at shelters, it is crucial that decontamination activities and 
evacuees who have not yet been monitored be strictly segregated from those who have been 
monitored. Procedures used to decontaminate evacuees may involve the removal and disposal of 
clothing. Chapters may not provide new clothing to evacuees without the approval of the 
operations headquarters. In their preparedness planning, chapters should seek to involve 
governmental and other voluntary organizations capable of providing used clothing as well as 
other needed supplies and service. 

Interim REP Program Manual III-210 
August 2002 


Section III.E  American Red Cross 

Attachment 5-A GUIDELINES FOR ESTABLISHING SHELTERS 

In time of disaster, the Red Cross is responsible for providing temporary housing for persons 
who are unable to make their own arrangements. Disaster shelters are of two types: mass 
shelters and individual shelters. A mass shelter is a large facility used to provide temporary 
shelter for groups of disaster victims. An individual shelter is an arrangement whereby a family 
is temporarily housed in a hotel, apartment, or other rental unit at the expense of the Red Cross. 
Before setting up a mass shelter, a chapter should attempt to house families in individual shelters 
or with relatives, friends, or other persons offering space. Since a shelter provides only a 
temporary means of caring for people, plans should be made to close the shelter as quickly as 
possible. Families are best able to recover from the effects of a disaster when they are in their 
own living quarters. 

The Shelter Committee 

The chapters shelter committee is responsible for organizing and operating shelters when they 
are required. The committee is responsible for identifying facilities to be used, designating space 
within the shelter for specific uses, and acquiring the necessary supplies and equipment. 

Predisaster Planning 

For shelters to function effectively, chapters must plan for them before disaster strikes. The 
chapters written disaster plan should include  

 
Surveys of buildings suitable for use as shelters, along with written confirmation of 
their availability. Agreements with building owners and managers should specify 
how the building will be maintained and who will pay for utilities and repair of 
damage. 
 
A list of equipment that the Red Cross is permitted to use in each building identified 
as a potential shelter. 
 
Other supplies and equipment that will be needed and how they can be obtained. 
 
A plan for training volunteers to operate the shelter. 
All parties involved should have written copies of building surveys and agreements. 

Potential Problems 

In planning for shelters, chapters need to be aware of potential problems that may arise in their 
operation: 

 
Sanitation problems may develop if facilities are inadequate for the number of 
persons being housed. 
 
Victims may exhibit behavioral problems because of stress. 
 
Costs of operating the shelter are likely to be significant. 
 
Some families may be slow in making plans to leave the shelter. 
Interim REP Program Manual III-211 
August 2002 


Section III.E  American Red Cross 

Shelter Requirements 

To be effective as a shelter, a facility should  

 
Be located reasonably near victims homes. 
 
Be safe and healthful. 
 
Have an adequate supply of drinking water. 
 
Have adequate toilet and bathing facilities. 
 
Have facilities for cooking, serving, and storing food. 
 
Be accessible to public transportation. 
 
Have adequate fire and police protection. 
Services Provided at the Shelter 

Every shelter must have Red Cross shelter management coverage on a 24-hour basis. The Red 
Cross provides shelter occupants with the following services: 

 
Full meals and afternoon snacks if facilities in the shelter are inadequate, food is 
prepared and served elsewhere. 
 
Individual assistance and counseling. The Red Cross provides occupants with help in 
solving disaster-related problems such as the need for transportation and permanent 
housing. 
 
Emergency medical services. Nursing services are available at all times, and shelter 
occupants are referred to a physician as required. 
 
A specific area for sleeping. Occupants are provided with cots and blankets. 
 
Recreation services. Activities are provided to relieve tensions and improve morale 
of occupants of all ages. Appropriate recreation activities include movies, television, 
games, and crafts. 
Services in support of the shelter effort include scheduling of staff, record keeping; purchase, 
storage, and maintenance of supplies; and enforcement of safety, fire, and sanitation regulations. 

Allocation of Space 

The shelter manager is responsible for allocating space in the facility for the following purposes: 

 
Registration of shelter occupants 
 
Family assistance 
 
Shelter managers office 
 
Nurses office 
 
Sleeping accommodations with family units together (40 to 60 square feet per bed) 
 
Food service area 
 
Restrooms and bathing facilities 
 
Storage area for occupants possessions 
 
Nursery 
Interim REP Program Manual III-212 
August 2002 


Section III.E  American Red Cross 

Shelter Registration 

A Disaster Shelter Registration form (Form 5972) should be completed for each family 
registering at the shelter. If copies of these forms are not immediately available, the following 
information on each family should be recorded on an index card: 

 
The last, first, and middle names of the head of household and spouse, and the wifes 
maiden name. 
 
Names and ages of all family members. 
 
Any health problems of family members. 
 
The familys pre-disaster address. 
 The date the family arrived at the shelter. 
When a family leaves the shelter, the following information should be recorded: 
 
The date the family departs. 
 
Their post-disaster address. 
Essential Shelter Needs 

Equipment needed in a shelter includes cots and blankets, chairs, tables, drinking cups, hot plates 
for warming baby formula, brooms, trash cans, loudspeakers, Red Cross flags, emergency 
equipment such as candles, lanterns, flashlights, and generators, and a telephone. Shelter 
supplies needed include soap, towels, toilet tissue, disposable diapers, and cleaning items such as 
detergent and soap. Office supplies needed include a telephone, carbon paper, disaster forms, 
cards, file folders, paper, paper clips, and pencils. For a more complete list of items that should 
be prepacked in a shelter managers kit, see Attachment 4. 

Staffing the Shelter 

The shelter committee is responsible for assigning volunteers to operate the shelter. The number 
of volunteers needed depends on the number of occupants per shelter. Shelter staff in addition to 
the shelter manager and medical staff may include Family Service workers, feeding staff, a 
storekeeper, and maintenance staff. The shelter manager has the following responsibilities: 

 
To initiate and maintain housing, feeding, health, and recreational services within the 
shelter. 
 
To inventory supplies and equipment before the shelter opens. 
 
To arrange for round-the-clock supervision of the shelter. 
 
To assign and schedule workers in the shelter. 
 
To maintain utility and janitorial services. 
 
To obtain, store, distribute, and safeguard shelter supplies and equipment. 
 
To maintain records of borrowed and purchased equipment, and to keep all receipts. 
 
To keep records of shelter activities and compile reports to be submitted to the 
chapter chairman or other responsible person. 
 
To coordinate all Red Cross activities in the shelter. 
 
To close the shelter. All borrowed property should be returned, and a receipt for their 
return should be secured. Buildings and grounds must be clean. 
 
To inventory supplies and equipment when the shelter closes. 
Interim REP Program Manual III-213 
August 2002 


Section III.E  American Red Cross 

Attachment 5-B GUIDE FOR SHELTER MANAGERS 

Shelter Operation 

This material is planned to serve as a guide and check list for the individual responsible for 
opening a school, public building, church, or other facility to be used for the reception and care 
of disaster victims. 

The shelter manager should be someone familiar with the building to be used: its size, facilities, 
and day-to-day level of supplies. If the shelter is a school, the principal or a designated member 
of his staff may serve under agreements in effect between the school board and the Red Cross. 
Authorization for use of the school as a shelter should be made through normal school district 
channels. 

The regular staff working in the building  faculty as well as office, cafeteria, and maintenance 
staffs  should be the primary resource for personnel to operate the shelter, as they have the 
most complete knowledge of the facility and can best safeguard against damage and misuse. The 
shelter manager may expect full support from the chapter to provide needed equipment, supplies, 
and additional staff. The Red Cross will pay for food and other supplies on hand that are used in 
the shelter as well as additional supplies required. 

Mass care shelters are generally intended to operate for a limited time  one to four days. In 
most instances, shelter residents are able to return to their homes within a short time or to locate 
other housing. The remaining families can be assisted by Family Service workers in solving this 
problem. 

While in operation, the shelter must meet a multitude of human needs both physical and 
psychological under adverse conditions. The young, old, ill, employed, and unemployed all have 
special needs to be met through recreation, medical services, transportation, maintenance, and 
social work services available through the shelter. 

Duties of the Shelter Manager 

Pre-Disaster Planning 

Chapters are responsible for identifying and planning for shelters, and predesignated shelter 
managers should participate in this activity. Such preparedness comprises  

1. Developing a plan for the operation of the buildings to include: 
 A survey of the building. 
 A floor plan of the building and grounds, and use of space. 
2. Estimating the resources and supplies necessary to operate the shelter based on its capacity: 
 Type and quantity of supplies such as soap, towels, and cleaning equipment. 
 Food and cooking equipment. 
 Provision for bedding and medical and first aid supplies. 
Interim REP Program Manual III-214 August 2002 


Section III.E  American Red Cross 

3. 
Estimating additional staff needed for actual operations including support staff from other 
disaster committees. 
4. 
Planning a method of registering each person housed in the shelter. (Last name first, pre-disaster 
home address.) 
Note. The shelter manager may appoint one or more assistants for any of the above duties. 
However, they are all ultimately the responsibility of the shelter manager. 

At a Time of Disaster 

After being officially notified to open a building for the shelter, the shelter manger should: 

1. 
Proceed immediately to the building. 
2. 
Establish and maintain contact with Red Cross disaster headquarters. 
3. 
Alert basic staff and activate the building. 
4. 
Arrange the building for operation, and inventory supplies and equipment. Prepare 
rooms for receiving people and for other purposes. 
5. 
Order supplies and equipment from Red Cross disaster headquarters and report any 
need for support such as medical services. 
6. 
Recruit additional personnel. (Disaster victims in the shelter may be recruited.) 
7. 
Begin feeding beverages and snacks as soon as the shelter opens, and begin regular 
meal service as soon as possible. 
8. 
Keep in constant touch with the shelter chairman at disaster headquarters, giving 
progress reports and a daily count of persons housed and fed. 
9. 
Arrange for the care of pets, if necessary. 
Shelter Reception and Registration 

The shelter manager is responsible for ensuring that a simple record is kept of every person who 
is housed in his shelter. He may delegate this responsibility to one or more assistants as needed. 

At the reception desk, the family or individual should be assigned to an appropriate lodging area. 
They should proceed to the registration desk before going on to their lodging area. 

Shelter registration cards (Form 5972) should be used if available. If not, plain 3x5 inch cards 
may be used for this registration. The following information is needed: 

1. 
Last, first, and middle names for husband and wife (include wifes maiden name) 
2. 
Names and ages of all family members 
3. 
Any health problems 
4. 
Pre-disaster address 
5. 
Date arrived in the shelter; date departed 
6. 
Post-disaster address 
Registration cards should be made in duplicate. One copy is for the shelter managers files, and 
one copy is sent to disaster headquarters for the Welfare Inquiry section. If it is not practicable 
to make cards in duplicate, an alphabetical list of shelter occupants can be submitted. 

Interim REP Program Manual III-215 
August 2002 


Section III.E  American Red Cross 

When victims move from the shelter, it should be so indicated on the registration cards, and 
disaster headquarters should be notified. 

It is important that people be registered as soon as they arrive in the shelter, or as soon as 
practicable. (This is not to be confused with registration of families for individual assistance, i.e., 
Family Service.) 

Food 

In general, feeding for a shelter operation falls into one of two categories: (1) feeding within the 
shelter, where cafeteria facilities already exist, and (2) the arrangement to feed persons in a 
nearby commercial establishment. (In some instances, it may be feasible to create temporary 
kitchen and feeding equipment within the shelter.) 

The shelter manager is administratively responsible for feeding people housed under his 
management. The shelter manager may have the use of staff that normally operate the cafeteria, 
or may have to rely on food delivery by other units of the Mass Care function. 

The shelter manager is responsible for maintaining a daily count of people fed within his shelter 
and reporting this information to Red Cross headquarters. 

The person in charge of feeding will arrange for someone to receive, store, issue, and keep 
records of supplies. 

Shelter occupants can assist as cooks helpers and servers, and can serve on the cleanup crew. 
Hot meals should be provided twice a day. Additionally, a midday lunch should be provided for 
children, the aged, expectant and nursing mothers, workmen, and disaster victims doing heavy 
work. 

Special diet problems will be handled as recommended by medical and nursing staff on duty at 
the shelter. 

Menus will be planned in terms of foods available, with perishable foods being used first. 
Sufficient food should be prepared to provide second servings. USDA foods may be available, 
subject to approval by appropriate government agencies (e.g., school administration) and Red 
Cross authorities. 

Medical and Nursing 

The Red Cross is responsible for providing adequate medical and nursing services in all Red 
Cross operated shelters to care for the sick and injured, protect the health of residents, and 
supervise the sanitation of the shelter. 

The Red Cross chapter is responsible for providing competent Disaster Health Services staff in 
each shelter. If such staff is unavailable, the shelter manager should assign someone with 
knowledge of first aid to provide limited care. In the absence of qualified medical staff, all 

Interim REP Program Manual III-216 August 2002 


Section III.E  American Red Cross 

medical problems should be referred to a local emergency room or physician. In such an event, 
the shelter manager must retain records of individuals  a description of their ailment or injury 
and the medical facility used. 

Child Care 

If a shelter remains open for more than a day or two, a child-care facility should be considered in 
order to ease the burden on parents. The shelter manager will designate someone to be 
responsible for childcare. 

Recreation 

If large numbers of persons are housed in the shelter, and if the shelter operation is prolonged, it 
is advisable to provide recreation facilities. It is the shelter managers responsibility to decide 
when and if recreation is needed. He may appoint one or more persons to develop appropriate 
recreational activities. 

The shelter manager may call upon resources at disaster headquarters for assistance in providing 
recreational supplies such as films, newspapers, equipment, games, and TV sets. 

Shelter Maintenance 

The shelter manager will designate someone to be responsible for building maintenance and 
upkeep. The staff normally responsible for the facility may be available for this purpose. Shelter 
residents should, however, be asked to assist. Necessary activities include the following: 

1. 
Acquire additional supplies and equipment such as furniture, safety and cleaning 
equipment, and tools. 
2. 
Arrange for daily janitorial service. 
3. 
Arrange for the installation of additional temporary facilities such as showers and 
toilets. 
4. 
Move furniture as necessary. 
5. 
Prepare and supervise the use of the grounds and yard for parking and recreation, if 
necessary. 
6. 
Maintain a system of record keeping to facilitate returning the building to its original 
condition upon closing, and document any damages and related expenses. 
Floor Plan and Space Allocation 

In the allocation of space, consideration should be given to the following needs: 

 
Managers office 
 
Emergency medical care 
 
Feeding area 
 
Reception and registration 
 
Storage of food and supplies 
 
Possible storage of occupants belongings 
 
Childcare 
Interim REP Program Manual III-217 
August 2002 


Section III.E  American Red Cross 

 Rest room for staff (in larger shelters) 
 Family Service interviewing area 
 Recreation areas 
Some guidelines to use in planning: 

 1 toilet per 40 persons (6 for 200, 14 for 500) 
 40 to 60 square feet of sleeping space per person 
 1 quart of drinking water (minimum) per person per day 
 5 gallons of water per person per day (all uses) 
 2,500 calories per person per day (approximately 3-1/2 pounds of unprepared food) 
Staff Needed 

 Shelter manager 
 Assistant Manager 
 Nurse 
 Registration 
 Food preparation 
 Building maintenance and sanitation 
Interim REP Program Manual III-218 August 2002 


Section III.E  American Red Cross 

TABLE 1 Staffing Requirements, Mass Care Facility 

The following are suggested requirements for shelters operating on a 24-hour basis. 
Circumstances will dictate actual needs. 

Title 200 Victims 500 Victims 1,000 Victims 
Manager and assistants 3 3 3 
Clerks and recorders* 1 1 2 
Messengers and communicators 2 2 5 
Security and safety* 2 2 4 
Transportation coordinator* 1 1 1 
Nurses (Red Cross) 3 4 5 
Doctor (on call) 1 1 2 
Ancillary (first aid)* 4 8 15 
Clerical (nursing assistance)* 1 2 4 
Cook 1 3 4 
Cook assistants* 3 4 8 
Kitchen helpers 4 12 24 
Servers* 3 3 6 
Building maintenance supervisor 1 1 1 
Janitor* 2 2 2 
Reception/registrar* 3 4 6 
Dormitory supervisor 1 2 3 
Interviewers (assistance) 5 11 21 
Records and report* 1 2 4 
Supply/storekeeper 1 1 2 
Recreation (babysitters)* 3 4 9 
Total 46 73 131 

*In most instances, 85 percent of the work should be done by shelter residents. 

Interim REP Program Manual III-219 August 2002 


Section III.E  American Red Cross 

Interim REP Program Manual III-220 August 2002 


Section III.F  Exercise Evaluators 

F. 
USE OF STATE, TRIBAL AND LOCAL PERSONNEL AS REP EXERCISE 
EVALUATORS 
REP Program Strategic Review Initiative 3.0 

Use of State, Tribal and Local Personnel as REP Exercise Evaluators 

Administrative Process 

1. 
TRAINING REQUIREMENT: State, Tribal, and local personnel must successfully 
complete the training/experience required of all FEMA evaluators. 
2. 
APPLICATION PACKET: Applicants complete and submit to the Regional 
Assistance Committee (RAC) Chair their qualification packets, which must include: 
 
A resume describing actual related experience and/or equivalent experience, 
 
Biography describing REP experience, 
 
Evidence of completion of mentoring assignment, 
 
Evidence of completion of the REP Evaluators Course, 
 
Two reference letters addressing evaluators ability to be impartial, suitability, 
and qualifications (applicants must be high school graduates, or equivalent 
[college is recommended]), and 
 
A commitment signed by the applicants employer. 
3. 
APPLICATION REVIEW: The RAC Chair conducts the initial review and 
determines whether to submit the application to the RAC Advisory Council (RAC AC), 
which reviews applications twice a year. Selected candidates are assigned to their 
respective Home of Record FEMA Region for incorporation into that Regions roster. 
State, county, or local personnel may not evaluate within their State (Home of Record); 
county personnel may not evaluate their State (Home of Record) or within the 
emergency planning zone for their site. The accepting RAC Chair is responsible for 
communications with the assigned evaluator, and will send to each applicant a 
selection/nonselection letter that references the RAC AC as the decision-making body. 
4. 
NATIONAL REGISTRY: The RAC AC maintains a national registry of available 
qualified State, Tribal, and local evaluators. 
5. 
HOST REGION RESPONSIBILITIES: The FEMA Host Region will: 
 
Request evaluator(s) for upcoming exercise; 
 
Match training/educational skills to the assignment; 
 
Complete an informal proximity and travel cost/cost benefit analysis; 
 
Budget and pay for invitation travel expenses, including transportation and per 
diem; 
 
Select, assign, and approve or disapprove evaluator candidates; and 
 
Send invitational travel letter to prospective evaluators. 
Interim REP Program Manual III-221 
August 2002 


Section III.F  Exercise Evaluators 

6. 
EVALUATOR RESPONSIBILITIES: The evaluator will: 
 
Evaluate at least one exercise per year, to remain active, 
 
Review all exercise material, 
 
Participate in all required exercise meetings, 
 
Prepare all written exercise evaluator documentation, and 
 
Ensure time flexibility in participating as an evaluator (may require weekend 
duty). 
7. 
EVALUATOR EMPLOYER COMMITMENT: The evaluators employer will 
facilitate employee attendance at all required evaluator training, meetings, etc. and 
agree, in writing, to the conditions stated in Item #8 below. 
8. 
CONDITIONS: State, Tribal, and local REP exercise evaluators are not eligible to 
receive any compensation, workmens or other; health insurance; life insurance; annual 
or sick leave; Federal monetary awards; nor any other benefits from FEMA. Evaluator 
performance does not count toward career tenure, nor time in service to the Federal 
government. 
9. 
IMPLEMENTATION: FEMA Headquarters announced this policy during the 2002 
National REP Conference and will post the information on the REP Home Page. The 
application process will then begin. 
Interim REP Program Manual III-222 
August 2002 


Section III.G  Exercise Credit 

G. EXERCISE CREDIT 
BILLING CODE 6718-02-P 

FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY 
Radiological Emergency Preparedness: Exercise Credit 

AGENCY: Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). 

ACTION: Notice with request for comments. 

SUMMARY: Pursuant to the Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) Program Strategic 
Review initiative 1.6, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is proposing to 
implement a policy for granting REP exercise credit to offsite response organizations (ORO) for 
participation in an actual incident or in a non-REP exercise. The subject notice contains the 
activities eligible for consideration for credit, guidelines for submitting a request, and 
documentation required. 

DATES: FEMA must receive comments on or before [Insert date 60 days after date of 
publication in the Federal Register]. 

ADDRESSES: You may submit your comments to the Rules Docket Clerk, Office of the 
General Counsel, Federal Emergency Management Agency, 500 C Street, SW, Room 840, 
Washington DC 20472, or send them by e-mail to rules@fema.gov. Please reference REP 
Exercise Credit in the subject line of your e-mail or comment letter. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Vanessa E. Quinn, Chief, Radiological 
Emergency Preparedness Branch, Technological Services Division, Federal Emergency 
Management Agency, 500 C Street, SW, Washington DC 20472; (202) 646-3664; 
vanessa.quinn@fema.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Pursuant to the REP Program Strategic Review 
Initiative 1.6, FEMA is proposing to implement a policy for granting REP exercise credit to 
offsite response organizations for participation in an actual incident or in a non-REP exercise. 
The subject notice contains the activities eligible for consideration for credit, guidelines for 
submitting a request, and documentation required. 

Background 

A radiological emergency response plan is developed and exercised in order to have reasonable 
assurance that adequate protective measures can be taken in the event of a radiological 
emergency. FEMA evaluates the exercises to ensure that the OROs have the capability to 
respond to a radiological emergency. An OROs response to man-made or natural events or 
participation in a non-REP exercise may also test all or part of the plan. For those areas that 
were tested, it may be appropriate to give credit in place of certain aspects of an evaluated REP 
exercise. 

Interim REP Program Manual III-223 August 2002 


Section III.G  Exercise Credit 

Credit for Responding to an Actual Emergency 

When an ORO responds to an actual incident involving radioactive materials, FEMA can 
consider granting exercise credit for such response activities as environmental monitoring; 
monitoring for contamination of persons and equipment and/or other activities, if these activities 
were successfully performed according to the applicable plan and procedures. FEMA may also 
consider granting credit for generic response activities, such as mobilization of personnel and 
facilities,4 for those OROs affected by an actual radiological incident. 

When an ORO responds to an actual incident that does not involve radioactive materials, the 
ORO may qualify for credit for generic response functions and activities, such as mobilization, 
facilities, communications equipment, and congregate care. 

The Credit columns in Table 7, entitled Detailed Federal Evaluation Process Matrix, indicate 
which functions and activities may be considered for the granting of exercise credit for response 
to a radiological or a non-radiological emergency. 

When requesting exercise credit for a response to an actual emergency, an ORO should ensure 
that the response included the following four elements: 

 
A prompt and timely mobilization of key State and local government staff and providers 
responsible for REP emergency functions; 
 
An actual reporting of the key REP staff who, in accordance with the plans, would report 
to the facility; 
 
Activation of the facility(ies) of the responding jurisdiction(s); and 
 
Establishment of communication links among responding organizations 
The ORO should then provide the following documentation to FEMA: 

1. 
Type and nature of the emergency; 
2. 
Timeline, to include time of response and time State and local REP staff arrived at the 
facility; 
3. 
Sign in-out sheet with name, function, date, and time; 
4. 
List of involved REP personnel and organizations and their connection to a REP 
response; 
5. 
Communications log showing the establishment of communication links with other 
organizations; 
6. 
List of involved jurisdictions; 
7. 
Emergency decisions made and implemented; 
8. 
Resources (facilities, equipment, etc.) used; and 
9. 
List of corrective actions or improvement items identified in the after-action report. 
FEMA will evaluate all facilities, as a baseline, during the first exercise under the new Evaluation Criteria. 
Therefore, FEMA will not grant exercise credit for facilities for the first exercise using the new Evaluation 
Criteria. 


Interim REP Program Manual III-224 
August 2002 


Section III.G  Exercise Credit 

Credit for Participating in Preparedness Exercises Other than REP 

ORO(s) may request REP exercise credit for demonstrating preparedness capabilities in FEMA 
exercises other than REP. These capabilities could include congregate care, facilities,1 and/or 
other activities performed in the exercise. The Credit columns in the attached Table 1 indicate 
which functions and activities may be considered for the granting of exercise credit for 
participation in an exercise other than REP when the exercise has a radiological component or 
when the exercise does not have a radiological component. 

ORO credit requests for participating in non-REP exercises must specify the exercise and 
document the OROs participation, including the activities it performed and a list of corrective 
actions or improvement items identified in the exercise after-action report. If credit is granted, 
the ORO must also include its exercise participation in the Annual Letter of Certification. 

Process 

An ORO submits its application for credit to the appropriate FEMA Region. The application 
must specify the basis for the credit (response to a radiological emergency, response to a non-
radiological emergency, participation in a radiological exercise other than REP or participation 
in a non-radiological exercise other than REP) and the REP evaluation area criterion(a) for which 
credit is requested. The application must also contain the appropriate documentation, as 
specified above. The FEMA Region will submit the request for credit, along with the Regions 
review and recommendations, to FEMA Headquarters. FEMA Headquarters will determine 
whether the credit requested will be granted, and if so, will issue an exemption to an ORO from 
FEMA evaluation of this criterion(a) in the next REP exercise. However, even if FEMA 
exempts a criterion from exercise evaluation, certain fundamental radiological emergency 
response functions and activities that are integral to the REP exercise must still be demonstrated 
in order to conduct the exercise. FEMA will specify any exempted activities that the ORO must 
still demonstrate. FEMA will not evaluate these activities unless their demonstration had a 
potential or actual adverse effect on the REP exercise. 

Timeline 

The ORO requesting credit for responding to an actual radiological or non-radiological 
emergency should submit the request to the appropriate FEMA Regional Office within 90 days 
following the event. The ORO requesting credit for participation in a non-REP exercise should 
submit the initial information 60 days in advance of the non-REP exercise and follow-up 
documentation within 90 days after the non-REP exercise. Any credit that is granted must be 
completed in time to allow inclusion in the extent-of-play discussions 90 days prior to the REP 
exercise for which credit is granted. FEMA will grant exemption from evaluation of a specific 
exercise criterion only once during the six year cycle for the applicable REP exercise. In 
addition, FEMA will not consider exemption from evaluation if the emergency response activity 
for which credit would be sought occurred more than two years prior to the date of the next 
scheduled REP exercise. 

Interim REP Program Manual III-225 August 2002 


Section III.G  Exercise Credit 

Dated: 

Michael D. Brown, 

General Counsel. 

Interim REP Program Manual III-226 August 2002 


Section III.G  Exercise Credit 

TABLE 7 Detailed Federal Evaluation Process Matrixa 

Out-of-
Consolidates 
Sequence 
of 
Credit 
Non-
Evaluation Area and REP-14 Minimum Exercise Radio-Radio-Staff 
Sub-Elements Objective(s) Frequencyb Scenario logical logical Asst Visit 
1. Emergency Operations 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 
Management 14, 17, 30 
a. Mobilization Every Exercise NO YES YES NO 
b. Facilities Every Exercise NO YES YES YES 
c. Direction and Control Every Exercise NO NO NO NO 
d. Communications 
Equipment 
Every Exercise NO NO NO NO 
e. Equipment and Every Exercise YES YES NO YES 
Supplies to Support 
Operations2. Protective Action 5, 7, 9, 14, 15, 
Decision-making 16, 17, 26, 28 
a. Emergency Worker 
Exposure Control 
Every Exercise YES YES NO YES 
b. Radiological Every Exercise NO YES NO NO 
Assessment & 
Protective Action 
Recommendations & 
Decisions for the 
Plume Phase of the 
Emergencyc. Protective Action Every Exercise NO YES YES NO 
Decisions for the 
Protection of Special 
Populationsd. Radiological Once in 6 yrs. NO YES NO NO 
Assessment and 
Decision-making for 
the Ingestion Exposure 
Pathwayc 
e. Radiological Once in 6 yrs. NO YES NO NO 
Assessment & 
Decision-making 
Concerning Relocation, 
Reentry, and Returnc 
3. Protective Action 5, 14, 15, 16, 
Implementation 17, 27, 29 
a. Implementation of Every Exercise YES YES NO NO 
Emergency Worker 
Exposure Controlb. Implementation of KI 
Decision 
Once in 6 yrs.d YES YES NO NO 
c. Implementation of Once in 6 yrs.e YES YES YES YES 
Protective Actions for 
Special Populations 
d. Implementation of Every Exercise YES YES YES YES 
Traffic and Access 
Controlf

Interim REP Program Manual III-227 August 2002 


Section III.G  Exercise Credit 

TABLE 7 Detailed Federal Evaluation Process Matrix (Cont.) 

Out-of-
Consolidates 
Sequence 
of 
Credit 
Non-
Evaluation Area and REP-14 Minimum Exercise Radio-Radio-Staff 
Sub-Elements Objective(s) Frequencyb Scenario logical logical Asst Visit 
e. Implementation of Once in 6 yrs. NO YES NO NO 
Ingestion Pathway 
Decisions 
f. Implementation of Once in 6 yrs. NO YES NO NO 
Relocation, Reentry, 
and Return Decisions 
4. Field Measurement and 6, 8, 24, 25 
Analysis 
a. Plume Phase Field 
Measurements and 
Analysis 
Every Full 
Participation 
Exerciseb 
YES YES NO NO 
b. Post Plume Phase Field Once in 6 yrs. YES YES NO NO 
Measurements and 
Sampling 
c. Laboratory Operations Once in 6 yrs. YES YES NO NO 
5. Emergency Notification 10, 11, 12, 13 
and Public Information 
a.1 Activation of the Every exercise NO NO NO NO 
Prompt Alert and 
Notification Systema.2 Activation of the 10 
Prompt Alert and 
Notification System 
(Fast Breaking) 
a.3 Notification of Every exercise  NO NO NO NO 
Exception Areas as needed 
and/or Backup Alert 
and Notification 
System within 
45 Minutes 
b. Emergency Every exercise NO NO NO NO 
Information and 
Instructions for the 
Public and the Media 
6. Support 18, 19, 20, 21, 
Operations/Facilities 22 
a. Monitoring and Once in 6 yrs.e YES YES NO NO 
Decontamination of 
Evacuees and 
Emergency Workers 
and Registration of 
Evacuees 
b. Monitoring and Once in 6 yrs.e YES YES NO NO 
Decontamination of 
Emergency Worker 
Equipment 

Interim REP Program Manual III-228 August 2002 


Section III.G  Exercise Credit 

TABLE 7 Detailed Federal Evaluation Process Matrix (Cont.) 

Out-of-
Consolidates 
Sequence 
of 
Credit 
Non-
Evaluation Area and REP-14 Minimum Exercise Radio-Radio-Staff 
Sub-Elements Objective(s) Frequencyb Scenario logical logical Asst Visit 
c. Temporary Care of 
Evacuees 
Once in 6 yrs.g YES YES YES YES 
d. Transportation and Every exercise YES YES NO NO 
Treatment of 
Contaminated 
Individuals

a 
See Evaluation Criteria for specific requirements. 

b 
Each State within the 10-mile EPZ of a commercial nuclear power site shall fully participate in an exercise jointly with the 
licensee and appropriate local governments at least every two years. Each State with multiple sites within its boundaries shall 
fully participate in a joint exercise at some site on a rotational basis at least every two years. When not fully participating in an 
exercise at a site, the State shall partially participate at that site to support the full participation of the local governments. 
The plume phase and the post-plume phase (ingestion, relocation, reentry and return) can be demonstrated separately. 

d 
Should be demonstrated in every biennial exercise by some organizations and should be demonstrated at least once every six 
years by every ORO with responsibility for implementation of KI decision. 

e 
All facilities must be evaluated once during the six-year exercise cycle. 

f 
Physical deployment of resources is not necessary. 

g 
Facilities managed by the American Red Cross (ARC), under the ARC/FEMA Memorandum of Understanding, will be 
evaluated once when designated or when substantial changes occur; all other facilities not managed by the ARC must be 
evaluated once in the six-year exercise cycle. 

Interim REP Program Manual III-229 
August 2002 


Section III.G  Exercise Credit 

Interim REP Program Manual III-230 August 2002 


Section III.H  Scenario Options 

H. 
SCENARIO OPTIONS 
Development of the scenario and negotiations for determining the extent of exercise play are 
crucial for ensuring a well-integrated exercise. These two elements are also essential in driving 
the simulated emergency response. Whatever variations or options are used, the concept of an 
integrated exercise must be maintained. 

Prior to an exercise, the utility and site-specialist (and in some regions the state) will have a 
meeting to discuss the exercise scenario. Over the years the scenarios have become stagnant, 
with participants often being very predictable. Therefore, it became apparent that variations of 
possible scenario options are greatly needed. 

Five recommendations that would provide for variation of scenarios for exercises and drills have 
been identified that would enhance the REP exercise process without affecting the basis for the 
technical design. Varying scenarios will provide the opportunity to enhance training and provide 
for more realistic emergency responses. 

1. 
States may demonstrate their post-plume phase capabilities more frequently than once 
every six years. Demonstration criteria for this option would be developed during the 
extent-of-play meeting. 
 
The OROs may conduct post-plume phase exercise activities (i.e., ingestion, relocation, 
recovery and return activities) more than once every six years. Many OROs have 
indicated a desire to have more post-plume exercises. 
 
Demonstration criteria for this option would be the same for any post-plume phase 
exercise, with the extent-of-play negotiated during the six-year agreement, if there is a 
six-year agreement. Otherwise, it would be negotiated during the extent-of-play meeting. 
 
Post-plume phase activities may be performed in connection with a plume exercise or 
they may be separated. If separated, the plume phase technical data may be extended into 
post-plume activities. However, the basis for performing the post-plume phase activities 
may be derived from other technical data that is discrete from what was used in the 
previous plume exercise. 
NOTE: Regardless of whether the activity is from the previous plume exercise or a new 

scenario, a Pre-Exercise Briefing is necessary to ensure that all response organizations 

(Federal, State, Tribal, and local) are familiar with the data and assumptions. 

 
When the post-plume phase is an extension of the previous plume phase exercise, the 
briefing should include the PADs made during that exercise. 
 
If a new scenario is used, the briefing should include discussion of the data, information, 
and controller injects necessary for the development of PADs as a point of departure for 
the post-plume phase exercise. 
Interim REP Program Manual III-231 
August 2002 


Section III.H  Scenario Options 

2. 
Mini-scenarios may be developed to support the increased participation of local 
responders. 
 
Mini-scenarios, sometimes referred to as controller injects, can provide increased 
participation by local, Tribal, and sometimes State response organizations during lulls in 
the primary radiological response activities. For example, a HAZMAT mini-scenario 
incident would require an immediate response. 
 
Mini-scenarios may be useful in enhancing exercise play for offsite emergency response 
OROs. However, developers of the mini-scenarios should ensure that they do not detract 
from the primary goals, technical analysis, and timeline of the primary scenario. 
NOTE: It should be clearly understood that prior to any mini-scenarios being injected into 
the exercise that the controller confer with the evaluation Team Leader. 

3. 
Exercises may begin at any of the four ECLs (NOUE, Alert, SAE, GE), and/or an ECL 
may be skipped to reflect a fast-breaking event. 
 
Events triggering an offsite response may be designed to initiate exercise play at any ECL 
and/or provide for skipping an ECL(s). To drive offsite response, an event most generally 
reaches the GE classification. However, the scenario writer and site specialist should 
review the plans, as some actions do occur at the Site Area Emergency. 
 
Controller injects must be provided to allow evaluation of field monitoring activities, if 
- 
There is no simulated release of radioactivity, and 
- 
There is more than one state involved, and the plume does not enter the second state. 
 
Skipping ECLs can provide more interesting and less predictable scenarios. 
NOTE: The advantages gained by not declaring the four ECLs in their usual order can be 
lost if the dress rehearsal drill that is held at many sites employs the same use of ECLs out 
of their usual order. It is strongly recommended that the scenario for the dress rehearsal not 
be the same scenario that is used during the evaluated exercise. 

4. 
The plume and post-plume phases of the exercise may be separated by days or months. 
 
Plume and post-plume activities may be separated to provide OROs with additional time 
to perform these activities more comprehensively. Separation can be by days or months 
and should be negotiated either in the six-year agreement or the extent-of-play meeting. 
Interim REP Program Manual III-232 
August 2002 


Section III.H  Scenario Options 

5. 
State, Tribal, and local governments may provide a representative who is involved in 
exercise planning on a confidential basis and is not a member of the response team. 
This confidential representative (or trusted agent) may provide input to enhance 
development of the scenario and extent-of-play agreement, and, therefore, enhance 
exercise play. 
 
A confidential representative (or trusted agent) is a member of a response organization 
who may participate substantially in the exercise design but must agree not to divulge 
exercise details to potential players or others involved with the exercise. 
 
If a trusted agent is used in the exercise, he or she should not be in roles that would be 
compromised by being privy to confidential information and must agree to not use 
confidential exercise information until it is released. 
- 
For example, a primary decision maker would not serve as a trusted agent, but a dose 
assessment staff member, reception center monitor, dispatcher, etc., could be a trusted 
agent. 
 
A trusted agent can be used except when a personnel shortage could affect full EOC 
participation or other response activities. In these situations, the assigned trusted agent 
cannot be a member of the response team. 
 
Participation by trusted agents in exercise planning and development of the scenario and 
extent-of-play is beneficial not only to State, Tribal, and local governments, but also to 
exercise play because they can provide a different perspective. 
 
Trusted agents would provide information on post-plume information such as agricultural 
crops, status and location of roads and bridges, and other information that would assist 
the scenario writer with the basic scenario and any mini-scenarios. 
Billable Hours: Yes 

Interim REP Program Manual III-233 
August 2002 


Section III.H  Scenario Options 

Interim REP Program Manual III-234 August 2002 


Section III.I  Correct Issues Immediately 

I. CORRECT ISSUES IMMEDIATELY 
During tabletop exercises, drills and other demonstrations conducted out-of-sequence from an 
integrated exercise, if FEMA and the offsite response organizations (ORO) agree, the FEMA 
Evaluator may have the participants re-demonstrate an activity that is determined to be not 
satisfactorily demonstrated. Immediate correction of issues in an integrated exercise is authorized 
only if it would not be disruptive and interrupt the flow of the exercise and affect other Evaluation 
Areas. The determination for which REP functions and activities could be candidates for 
re-demonstration should be agreed upon during the extent-of-play negotiations. 

Immediate correction of issues requires Evaluators with expertise in the activity being corrected. 
Thus, it is imperative that such FEMA Evaluators have the requisite professional knowledge or have 
been trained in the activity they are observing and evaluating in order to provide the necessary 
training to the participants. 

During the demonstration, the participant performs the activity. If it is performed 
unsatisfactorily, the FEMA Evaluator informs the participant of this. The Evaluator provides 
another opportunity for the participant to re-demonstrate the activity. The appropriate ORO 
responsible for training may give the participant some training prior to the re-demonstration. If 
the demonstration is performed correctly, the issue would later be classified and documented, 
with a statement in the exercise report that it was corrected during the exercise. If the 
demonstration is still performed unsuccessfully, the issue is documented and referred to the RAC 
Chair to determine the appropriate classification of the issue. 

The RAC Chair will make the final determination on the correction of issues from the 
Evaluators narrative description of activities and the appropriate documentation. 

This is effective March 31, 2000. 

Interim REP Program Manual III-235 August 2002 


Section III.I  Correct Issues Immediately 

Interim REP Program Manual III-236 August 2002 


Section III.J Emergency Medical Services 

J. EVALUATION OF EMERGENCY MEDICAL SERVICES DRILLS 
During the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board hearing involving offsite emergency response 
planning and preparedness for the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, and in subsequent 
litigation in the United States Court of Appeals, the court ruled that the existing interpretation of 
the required pre-accident medical arrangements for contaminated injured individuals was not 
sufficient. As a result of this litigation, FEMA, in consultation with the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, developed Guidance Memorandum MS-1, Medical Services, concerning the 
planning guidance for offsite emergency medical facilities, transportation and personnel. 

NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1, requires that State and local offsite response organizations 
demonstrate their capabilities regarding emergency medical services for contaminated injured 
members of the general public in annual drills. As a result of the court decision, the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission requested that FEMA evaluate each annual emergency medical services 
drill until State and local offsite response organizations demonstrated that their capabilities had 
been substantially enhanced. When FEMA determined that these capabilities were substantially 
enhanced and were consistently adequate to protect the public health and safety in the event of a 
radiological emergency at a commercial nuclear power plant, the evaluation frequency could be 
reduced to biennial. 

Using applicable FEMA Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program guidance and 
evaluation methodology, FEMA has determined that these capabilities have been enhanced and 
consistently demonstrated as adequate; therefore, offsite emergency medical services drills need 
to be evaluated only biennially. FEMA will, at the request of the State or involved local 
government, continue to evaluate the drills on an annual basis. 

If more than two medical facilities and transportation providers are designated as primary or 
backup, they also must be evaluated biennially. Other medical facilities and transportation 
providers included in the plan and supplemental to those listed as primary and backup should be 
evaluated at least once every six years. This policy is a clarification of Strategic Review 
Initiative 1.2. 

A medical drill must demonstrate the ability of the transportation services as well as medical 
facilities to handle an injured and contaminated individual without spreading contamination. The 
term contaminated injured was defined in Guidance Memorandum MS-1 as (1) contaminated 
and otherwise physically injured, (2) contaminated and exposed to dangerous levels of radiation, 
or (3) exposed to dangerous levels of radiation. 

Each location should have at a minimum one primary local hospital and one backup hospital for 
the evaluation and emergency treatment of contaminated injured members of the general 
public. In addition, there should be one primary and one backup ambulance service. It is 
preferred that the primary and backup medical facilities (hospital and ambulance) be located 
outside the EPZ. However, that is not always possible. Therefore, MS-1 recommends that at least 
one medical facility (either primary or backup medical facility) be located at least 15 to 20 miles 
from the nuclear power plant. 

Interim REP Program Manual III-237 August 2002 


Section III.J Emergency Medical Services 

During a MS-1 drill, both the transporting service and the hospital will be evaluated. Medical 
facilities should have at least one trained doctor and one trained nurse to perform and supervise 
the treatment of contaminated injured members of the general public. Contaminated injured 
individuals transported to medical facilities should be monitored as soon as possible to assure 
that everyone (ambulance and hospital) is aware of the medical and radiological status of the 
individual. However, if an ambulance defers monitoring to the hospital, then the ambulance crew 
must presume that the patient is contaminated and demonstrate appropriate contamination 
controls until the patient is monitored. It is allowable for an ambulance to demonstrate up to the 
point of departure for the hospital and then have a nonspecialized vehicle transport the victim 
to the medical facility. This option is used in areas where removing an ambulance from service 
to drive a great distance (over an hour) for a drill would not be in the best interests of the 
community. For further details on medical drills, see Section III.B.6, sub-element 6.d, 
Criterion 6.d.1. 

Billable Hours: Yes 

Interim REP Program Manual III-238 August 2002 


Section III.K  Post-Exercise Activities 

K. Post-Exercise Activities and Documentation5 
The Standard Exercise Report Format (SERF) is intended for use by Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA) staff, members of the Regional Assistance Committees (RACs) 
and all others who participate in the preparation of Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) 
Program Exercise Reports. This guidance has been issued to promote expediency in the 
preparation of REP Program exercise reports and greater uniformity in the content and 
organization of those reports. This section contains a revised version of the SERF Guidance 
Document originally issued in October 1995. Evaluation Areas have been included in this 
revision. 

This section (pages III-239 through III-270) reproduces portions of the FEMA document Standard Exercise 
Report Format. Page numbers have been revised to correspond to this manual. 

Interim REP Program Manual III-239 August 2002 


Section III.K  Post-Exercise Activities 

Interim REP Program Manual III-240 August 2002 


Section III.K  Post-Exercise Activities 

FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY 


Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program 


Standard Exercise Report Format 

Prepared by: 


Office of National Preparedness 
Technological Services Division 
Radiological Emergency Preparedness Branch 


Interim REP Program Manual III-241 August 2002 


Section III.K  Post-Exercise Activities 

Interim REP Program Manual III-242 August 2002 


Section III.K  Post-Exercise Activities 

Table of Contents 


A. OVERVIEW.................................................................................................................. III-245 


1. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................. III-245 


2. PURPOSE OF THE SERF ..................................................................................... III-245 


3. CONCEPTS OF THE SERF .................................................................................. III-246 


B. 
GENERAL GUIDANCE ............................................................................................. III-247 


1. SUMMARY ............................................................................................................ III-247 


2. 
TIME FRAME AND MILESTONES FOR PREPARATION 
OF EXERCISE REPORTS .................................................................................... III-248 

3. 
CLASSIFICATION OF EXERCISE ISSUES ....................................................... III-253 


a. 
Deficiencies and Areas Requiring Corrective Action ...................................... III-254 


b. 
Reclassification of Areas Requiring Corrective Action as Deficiencies........... III-255 


c. Plan Issues ........................................................................................................ III-256 


d. 
Areas Recommended For Improvement .......................................................... III-256 


4. STANDARDIZED EXERCISE ISSUE NUMBERING ........................................ III-257 


a. 
Elements of the Standard Exercise Issue Number ........................................... III-257 


b. 
Assigning Exercise Issue Numbers .................................................................. III-258 


c. 
Method of Issue Number Assignment and Tracking ....................................... III-258 


d. 
Re-numbering Prior Exercise Issues ................................................................ III-259 


5. DEFINITION OF EVALUATION AREA CRITERION STATUS ...................... III-259 


6. EXERCISE REPORT PREPARATION ................................................................ III-261 


a. 
Before the Exercise .......................................................................................... III-261 


b. 
At the Exercise Site .......................................................................................... III-262 


c. 
After the Exercise ............................................................................................. III-263 


d. 
General Considerations on Appearance of Exercise Reports ........................... III-264 


7. EXERCISE REPORT REVIEW ............................................................................ III-267 


8. FEMA HEADQUARTERS ASSISTANCE ......................................................... III-269 


Interim REP Program Manual III-243 
August 2002 


Section III.K  Post-Exercise Activities 

List of Tables 


Table 1: 
Milestones in REP Exercise Report Preparation............................................... III-249 


Table 2: 
NUREG-0654 Planning Elements under Which Exercise 
Deficiencies Might Be Assessed....................................................................... III-255 

List of Figures 

Figure 1: Illustration of the Standard Exercise Issue Number.......................................... III-258 
Figure 2: Exercise Issue Number Assignment Form........................................................ III-259 
Figure 3: Illustration of Outline Layout  Indentations.................................................. III-266 


Interim REP Program Manual III-244 
August 2002 


Section III.K  Post-Exercise Activities 

A. OVERVIEW 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The Standard Exercise Report Format (SERF) is intended for use by Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA) staff, members of the Regional Assistance Committees (RAC) 
and all others who participate in the preparation of Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) 
Program Exercise Reports. It is a companion to the FEMA REP Program Manual, April, 2002, 
which facilitates the planning and conduct of REP exercises, and the Evaluation Area criteria, 
September 2001, which are used by FEMA and other Federal agencies to evaluate and document 
the performance of off-site response organizations (ORO) participating in REP Program 
exercises. This guidance is issued to promote expediency in the preparation of REP Program 
exercise reports and greater uniformity in the content and organization of those reports. 

This guidance supersedes report preparation guidance contained in the FEMA REP Standard 
Exercise Report Format (SERF) document, dated October, 1995. 

2. PURPOSE OF THE SERF 
The purpose of the SERF is three-fold: 

 
To achieve completeness, uniformity and consistency among FEMA Regions, in 
the content and format of exercise reports as well as consistency in the 
interpretation of program guidance; 
 
To ensure that the reports are transmitted to the NRC and OROs in a timely 
manner by simplifying the report preparation and review process; and 
 
To provide report preparation guidelines relative to report content and format. 
The SERF is a structured format for use in preparing the biennial REP Program exercise 
evaluation report. The SERF defines the scope of the information contained in the report, 
including tables, timelines, definitions, etc., the format and style in which the information is 
presented, and the standards used in preparing and reviewing these reports. 

This document provides the minimum-level presentation for reporting the results and findings of 
the evaluation of biennial REP Program exercises. If the FEMA Region so desires, additional 
material, such as narrative descriptions of exercise play or emergency planning zone (EPZ) 
maps, may be included. However, the 90-calendar-day time frame will not be extended to 
accommodate the inclusion of such additional material. 

Interim REP Program Manual III-245 
August 2002 


Section III.K  Post-Exercise Activities 

3. CONCEPTS OF THE SERF 
The SERF was developed on the following basic concepts: 

 
Information in the exercise report should be complete enough to preclude 
misinterpretation and present an accurate, if somewhat abbreviated, 
representation of the REP Program and the full scope of exercise considerations; 
 
The format and style of all REP Program exercise reports should be consistent to 
facilitate comparison among FEMA Regions of the full scope of exercise 
considerations; and 
 
The exercise report preparation and review process should allow for completion 
of the final exercise report in a time frame conducive to utilization of the contents 
of the report for planning, training, and correction of exercise issues by the 
emergency preparedness community. 
Interim REP Program Manual III-246 
August 2002 


Section III.K  Post-Exercise Activities 

B. GENERAL GUIDANCE 
1. SUMMARY 
This section of the SERF contains guidance of a general nature, which is important to achieving 
and maintaining uniformity and consistency of exercise reports. 

 Milestones For Exercise Report Preparation 
The milestones for report preparation were revised to provide for completion of 
the final exercise report no later than 90 calendar days after the exercise. 
Section B.2 details the milestones and provides suggestions on how they can be 
met. 

 Classification of Exercise Issues 
Review and analysis of numerous exercise reports over the past decade indicates 
that there has been a lack of consistency and uniformity in the interpretation and 
application of REP policies and procedures used during exercise evaluation and 
report preparation relative to issue identification and classification. Section B.3 
discusses FEMA Headquarters interpretation of REP policies and considerations 
used in the classification of exercise issues. 

 Standardized Exercise Issue Numbering 
Significant variations in the method of numbering exercise issues have been noted 
among Regions, among sites in a Region, and among exercises at a site. FEMA 
Headquarters has developed a standardized system for numbering exercise issues: 
Deficiencies and Areas Requiring Corrective Action (ARCA). This system is 
designed to achieve consistency in numbering exercise issues within and among 
the FEMA Regions and expedite the tracking of exercise issues on a nationwide 
basis. Section B.4 presents the standardized method of issue numbering 
developed by FEMA Headquarters. 

 Definition of Evaluation Area Criterion Status 
The terms used to describe the status of exercise issues have also been subject to 
variations in their interpretation. Section B.5 defines and clarifies the terms that 
are used in the Exercise Evaluation and Results section of the exercise reports. 

 Exercise Report Preparation 
FEMA Headquarters has provided the FEMA Regions with two computer disks 
containing boilerplate narrative and tabular/matrix formats which the Regions can 
use in the preparation of exercise reports. Regional staff should prepare site-

Interim REP Program Manual III-247 August 2002 


Section III.K  Post-Exercise Activities 

specific boilerplate narrative, which will not change significantly between 
exercises (e.g., EPZ description, etc.). Section B.6 contains guidance and 
suggestions on modifying and/or creating boilerplate sections and various aspects 
of the physical appearance of the final exercise report. 

 
Exercise Report Reviews 
Section B.7 provides guidance for the review of the draft and final exercise 
reports prior to issuance. 

 
FEMA Headquarters Assistance 
Section B.8 discusses the role of FEMA Headquarters personnel, if present, at 
the exercise site. 

2. 
TIME FRAME AND MILESTONES FOR PREPARATION 
OF EXERCISE REPORTS 
The following are some of the key elements of the milestones and exercise report preparation 
process: 

 
The time frame for the preparation of the final exercise reports is 90 calendar 
days; 
 
The draft exercise report will be available for review by the State(s) and RAC 
members 30 days after the exercise; and 
 
The FEMA Regional Director will transmit the final exercise report directly to the 
appropriate NRC Regional Office with copies to the NRCs Office of Nuclear 
Reactor Regulation in Washington, DC; FEMA Headquarters, Office of National 
Preparedness, Technical Services Division, REP Branch; State(s); and RAC 
members no later than 90 calendar days after the exercise. 
The FEMA Interim REP Program Manual identifies 22 separate tasks to be accomplished before, 
during, and after the exercise. These tasks comprise the overall REP Program exercise process. 
Tasks 11-19 are of particular importance in the preparation of REP Program exercise reports. 

Interim REP Program Manual III-248 
August 2002 


Section III.K  Post-Exercise Activities 

TABLE 1: Milestones in REP Exercise Report Preparation 

Time (No later 
than X days after 
exercise) Task Task Description 
Exercise Day (ED) 11 Post-exercise evaluator/participant interviews conducted. 
ED + 1 12 Post-exercise evaluator debriefing conducted 
ED + 2 13 RAC Chairperson initiates consultation process for Deficiencies. 
RAC Chairperson will provide FEMA Headquarters with pertinent 
facts relative to each Deficiency, in writing, prior to any 
discussion among FEMA Headquarters and Regional 
personnel. 
ED + 2 14 Evaluation Area forms, exercise issues, and narratives completed 
and submitted to RAC Chairperson. 
ED + 2 15 Post-exercise participants briefing conducted. 
ED + 2 16 Public meeting conducted 
ED + 10 17 Official notification of identified Deficiency(ies) through letter 
from FEMA Regional Director (consistent with consultation with 
FEMA and NRC Headquarters and RAC members) to State(s) and 
RAC members with information copy to licensee. 
ED + 20 18 State(s) acknowledges receipt of Deficiency letter and proposes a 
Schedule of Corrective Actions for the identified Deficiency(ies). 
ED + 30 19 Draft exercise report provided to State(s) and RAC members by 
FEMA Region for review and comment. 
ED + 60 19 Comments and Schedule of Corrective Actions for the identified 
ARCAs provided by the State(s) and comments provided by RAC 
members on draft exercise report. 
ED + 90 19 Final exercise report distributed by FEMA Regional Director to 
the NRCs cognizant Regional Office with copies to the NRCs 
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation in Washington, DC; FEMA 
Headquarters, Office of National Preparedness, Technical Services 
Division, REP Branch; State(s); and RAC members. 

It is important to understand what is required at, and between, each of the milestones, in order to 
successfully prepare the final exercise report within the time allotted. Each milestone is 
discussed below in greater detail. 

 
Exercise Day (ED), Task 11  Conduct Post-Exercise Evaluator/Participant 
Interview 
These interviews, conducted immediately after the end of the exercise, have the 
two-fold purpose of (1) gathering additional data needed to document exercise 
performance and (2) allow the evaluators to summarize their observations of 
exercise play and offer suggestions for improvement for the participants. The 
evaluators summary and suggestions should include both positive and negative 

Interim REP Program Manual III-249 
August 2002 


Section III.K  Post-Exercise Activities 

observations and should not draw any conclusions about the classification of any 
identified issues. 

 ED + 1, Task 12  Debrief Exercise Evaluators 
As soon as possible after the exercise, the RAC Chairperson debriefs the exercise 

evaluators to secure accurate and complete information to serve as the basis for 

the preliminary information that will be presented at the participants briefing 

(Task 15). Evaluators meet with team leaders and FEMA staff to summarize 

exercise observations and documentation and identify exercise issues. A specific 

chronology of exercise events or timeline is compiled to provide a frame of 

reference for evaluating exercise performance and time-sensitive activities such 

as alert and notification. The timeline data is included in the exercise report. 

 ED + 2, Task 13  Initiate Deficiency Consultation Process 
During the evaluators debriefing, the RAC Chairperson will give careful 

consideration to any identified issues that might be assessed as Deficiencies. To 

facilitate the timely identification and assessment of Deficiencies, the RAC 

Chairperson must discuss potential Deficiencies with the State(s) and provide 

FEMA Headquarters with pertinent facts relative to each potential Deficiency in 

writing, prior to any discussion among FEMA Headquarters and Regional 

personnel. Once this is done, a consultation process involving the RAC 

Chairperson, OROs, RAC members, and FEMA and NRC Headquarters is 

initiated to discuss potential Deficiencies and determine appropriate corrective 

actions. 

 ED + 2, Task 14  Prepare Written Evaluation 
Evaluators can begin preparing Evaluation Area forms and narratives even before 
their debriefing on ED + 1 and should submit all completed forms and narratives, 
including new exercise issues and the status of prior ARCAs, to the RAC 
Chairpersons staff for review, no later than two days after the exercise. 

During the first two days after the exercise, the Regional staff should begin 
reviewing the completed EA forms, narratives, pertinent exercise documents, 
exercise issues, proposed corrective actions, and status of prior ARCAs. At this 
time, the Regional staff can begin preparing the exercise results and findings for 
incorporation into the draft exercise report. 

 ED + 2, Task 15  Conduct Post-Exercise Participants Briefing 
Within 48 hours after the completion of the exercise, the RAC Chairperson meets 
with the exercise participants to discuss the preliminary results of the exercise. 
The participants can also present a critique of their own performance as well. This 
briefing provides a means for summarizing and clarifying the results of the 

Interim REP Program Manual III-250 August 2002 


Section III.K  Post-Exercise Activities 

exercise and is conducted in accordance with 44 CFR Part 350.9(a) and (d). Other 
FEMA and RAC personnel may attend and participate in this briefing, as 
determined by the RAC Chairperson. 

 ED + 2, Task 16  Conduct Public Meeting 
Also within 48 hours after the completion of the exercise, the RAC Chairperson 
conducts a public meeting attended by representatives of FEMA, NRC, other 
appropriate RAC member agencies, exercise participants, and interested members 
of the public and media. This meeting provides the first formal notification to the 
public of the overall results of the exercise. Guidance on the format and conduct 
of the public meeting is contained in FEMA Interim REP Program Manual, 
section III.A, Milestones and Tasks. 

 ED + 10, Task 17  Notify State(s) of Deficiency(ies) 
Once the activities of the first two days after the exercise are completed, the RAC 
Chairperson continues the consultation process on the assessment of Deficiencies. 
No later than 10 days after completion of the exercise, the consultation process 
and assessment of any Deficiency(ies) should be completed. By this date, the 
Regional Director officially notifies the State(s) by letter of any identified 
Deficiency(ies). This letter must be consistent with and reflect the discussion and 
coordination among FEMA, the State(s), NRC, and RAC members. Specifically, 
the letter should contain the following basic information: (1) jurisdictions 
affected, (2) REP Evaluation Area Criteria under which the Deficiency(ies) were 
assessed, (3) description of the Deficiency(ies) identified, and (4) time frame for 
completion of the required remedial actions. An information copy of this letter 
should be sent to the licensee as a courtesy. 

While it is FEMAs intent to provide this formal documentation to the State(s) 
within 10 calendar days, there may be circumstances where the 10-day time frame 
may not be met. However, through the consultation and coordination process, all 
involved exercise participants will be made aware of significant exercise issues 
and problems immediately following the exercise. 

 ED + 20, Task 18  State(s) Acknowledges Receipt of Deficiency Letter 
No later than 20 days after the exercise or 10 days after the date of the Deficiency 
letter(s), the State(s) should formally acknowledge receipt of the Deficiency letter 
from the Regional Director. The State(s) acknowledgment should also identify 
the specific remedial actions which will be accomplished to correct the 
Deficiency(ies) and the proposed schedule for completing those remedial actions, 
i.e., the Schedule of Corrective Actions. 

The Schedule of Corrective Actions will indicate to the RAC Chairperson 
whether or not the results of the evaluation of those remedial actions will be 

Interim REP Program Manual III-251 August 2002 


Section III.K  Post-Exercise Activities 

available in time for inclusion in the final exercise report. If the remedial actions 
correcting the Deficiency(ies) have been completed no later than day 75 after the 
biennial exercise, the results and findings of those remedial actions will be 
included in the biennial exercise report. If not, the biennial exercise report will be 
issued within 90 calendar days after the exercise, and a separate report on the 
remedial actions will be prepared and issued within 30 calendar days after they 
have been completed. 

 ED + 30, Task 19  Prepare Draft Exercise Report 
Of course, the preparation of the draft exercise report should have begun at the 

exercise site, or even before the exercise, with quality assurance procedures to 

keep the report preparation on schedule and in line with the SERF guidance. 

No later than 30 days after the exercise, the FEMA Region will transmit the draft 
exercise report to the State(s) and RAC members for review and comment. The 
State(s) comments must include a Schedule of Corrective Actions for all ARCAs 
identified in the report. All comments must be returned to the Region no later 
than 60 days after the exercise. 

All comments should be aimed at ensuring (1) the accuracy and overall quality of 
the final exercise report, (2) consistent application of established REP policies 
and guidance in evaluating the performance of all exercise participants, and 

(3) identification and proper classification of Deficiencies and ARCAs. 
 ED + 60, Task 19  Prepare Final Exercise Report 
No later than 60 days after the exercise, all report comments must be received by 
the FEMA Region. The RAC Chairperson should review the States Schedule of 
Corrective Actions for the identified ARCAs and all comments as they are 
received, and discuss these comments, by telephone, with the commenters, if 
necessary, for clarification. 

Following this review, the RAC Chairperson should supervise revisions to the 

draft report and produce the final exercise report. No new or additional 

information, which was not available for review and comment in the draft report, 

should be added to the report at this stage without full coordination with the 

pertinent exercise participants. An example of this would be the addition of the 

results and findings of corrective actions taken to correct any identified 

Deficiency(ies). 

 ED + 90, Task 19  Distribute Final Exercise Report 
No later than 90 days after the exercise the FEMA Regional Director will send 
the final exercise report to the appropriate NRC Regional Office with copies to 
the NRCs Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation in Washington, DC; FEMA 

Interim REP Program Manual III-252 August 2002 


Section III.K  Post-Exercise Activities 

Headquarters, Office of National Preparedness, Technical Services Division, REP 
Branch; State(s); and RAC members. 

3. CLASSIFICATION OF EXERCISE ISSUES 
There are three classifications of issues which are identified in a REP Program biennial exercise: 

 
Deficiency  ...an observed or identified inadequacy of organizational 
performance in an exercise that could cause a finding that off-site emergency 
preparedness is not adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate 
protective measures can be taken in the event of a radiological emergency to 
protect the health and safety of the public living in the vicinity of a nuclear power 
plant. 
 
Area Requiring Corrective Action (ARCA)  ...an observed or identified 
inadequacy of organizational performance in an exercise that is not considered, 
by itself, to adversely impact public health and safety. 
 
Plan Issue  ...an observed or identified inadequacy in the OROs emergency 
plan or implementing procedures, rather than in the OROs performance. Plan 
Issues are not considered to be exercise issues. 
Only Deficiencies and ARCAs must be included in the exercise report. Any Plan Issues that are 
identified may be provided to the State(s) and local jurisdictions via letter by the Regional 
Director no later than 60 days after the exercise. 

It is the responsibility of the RAC Chairperson to assign one of these three classifications to each 
issue that is identified during an exercise. The RAC Chairperson must coordinate with FEMA 
Headquarters the assessment of Deficiencies, before formal issuance to the affected State(s). In 
classifying each issue, the RAC Chairperson must consider the overall exercise performance of 
the ORO which is being assessed the issue. While some subjective judgement must be used, 
classification must be based on the definitions listed above, the facts surrounding the OROs 
participation in the exercise and the demonstration of individual REP Evaluation Area Criteria. 

Just as each classification of issue has its own definition, it has its own requirements for 
correction: 

 
Because of the potential impact of Deficiencies on the public health and safety, 
they should be corrected within 120 days after the exercise date through 
appropriate remedial actions, including remedial exercises, drills, or other actions, 
including plan revisions. 
 
Correction of ARCAs should be verified before or during the next biennial 
exercise. 
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August 2002 


Section III.K  Post-Exercise Activities 

 
Plan Issues should be corrected through the revision of the appropriate State and 
local governments plans or procedures during the next annual plan review and 
update, submitted for FEMA review and reported in the States Annual Letter of 
Certification. 
a. Deficiencies and Areas Requiring Corrective Action 
Deficiencies and ARCAs have both similarities and significant differences that are discussed 
below. 

Similarities: 

 
Both classifications center on an incomplete, inadequate or incorrect 
demonstration of one or more points of review under the REP exercise 
Evaluation Area Criteria; 
 
Both classifications require correction by the jurisdiction to which they 
were assessed; and 
 
The resolution of both classifications must be tracked by the RAC 
Chairperson or FEMA Region. 
Differences: 

 
Deficiencies imply that there is a potential for compromising the 
protection of the public health and safety because the ORO lacks the 
appropriate response capability. ARCAs do not, by themselves, present 
that potential. 
 
Because of their potential impact on the public health and safety, 
Deficiencies should be corrected within 120 days after the exercise 
through demonstration of the necessary REP Evaluation Area Criteria 
under which the Deficiency(ies) was assessed, in a remedial exercise, drill, 
or other remedial actions, including plan revisions. All remedial actions 
undertaken to correct the Deficiency(ies) must be evaluated by FEMA. 
The correction of ARCAs should be verified before or during the next 
biennial exercise. 
FEMA has determined that significant problems identified with the planning elements and 
corresponding planning standards and Evaluation Area Criteria are likely to result in 
Deficiencies. Nine planning elements from NUREG-0654, their associated planning standards 
and the Evaluation Area Criteria under which a Deficiency might be assessed are listed in 
Table 2 below. 

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August 2002 


Section III.K  Post-Exercise Activities 

TABLE 2: NUREG-0654 Planning Elements under Which 
Exercise Deficiencies Might Be Assessed 

PLANNING ELEMENTS 
PLANNING 
STANDARDS 
EVALUATION 
AREA(S) 
Assignment of Responsibility 
(Including ORO Control) 
A,D 1 
Emergency Response Support & Resources C,H 1 
Alert & Notification Methods & Procedures E 1,5 
Emergency Communications F 1,6 
Public Education & Information 
(Including Areas Related to 
Emergency Public Information) 
G 5 
Accident Assessment 
(Including Field Monitoring & Radiological 
Assessment) 
I 2,4 
Protective Response 
(Including Evacuation & Other Protection Responses & 
Decision-making) 
J 1,2,3,6 
Radiological Exposure Control K 1,2,3,6 
Medical & Public Health Support & Services L,J 6 

In making a determination of whether an individual issue should be classified as a Deficiency or 
an ARCA, the RAC Chairperson must consider the potential impact of the identified issue on the 
public health and safety. 

 
If the identified issue could, by itself, have an adverse impact on the public health 
and safety, the issue should be classified as a Deficiency. 
 
If the identified issue could NOT. by itself, have an adverse impact on public 
health and safety, but simply reflects that the demonstration criteria were not met, 
the issue should be classified as an ARCA. 
b. Reclassification of Areas Requiring Corrective Action as Deficiencies 
There are two conditions under which an ARCA may be reclassified as a Deficiency: 

 
When the collective impact of two or more ARCAs on an organizations 
emergency functioning precludes adequate protection of the public health and 
safety. 
 
For recidivism, when an organization repeatedly demonstrates the inability to 
correct one or more previously identified ARCAs over a period of two or more 
biennial exercises. 
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Section III.K  Post-Exercise Activities 

Multiple exercise issues may be an indication of a more severe problem. If the combined effect 
of the exercise issues is a determination that ...off-site emergency preparedness is not adequate 
to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate protective measures can be taken in the event of 
a radiological emergency to protect the health and safety of the public living in the vicinity of a 
nuclear power plant, then a single Deficiency should be assessed, rather than multiple ARCAs. 

In reviewing the policy on reclassification of an ARCA as a Deficiency for recidivism, FEMA 
has determined that this condition is generally inappropriate. If the ARCA had no adverse effect 
on public health and safety the first time it was assessed, it would have no adverse effect the next 
time. If it did have an adverse effect on public health and safety, it should have been classified as 
a Deficiency the first time it was assessed. 

c. Plan Issues 
A Plan Issue is defined as an observed or identified inadequacy in the OROs emergency plan or 
implementing procedures, rather than in the OROs performance. Plan Issues may be identified 
by the evaluator or reviewer, but are classified as such by the RAC Chairperson. However, Plan 
Issues are not considered to be exercise issues and will not necessarily be included in the 
exercise report. Plan Issues may be provided to the State(s) for correction via letter from the 
Regional Director within 90 days of the exercise. 

Plan Issues should be corrected through the revision of the appropriate plans or procedures 
during the next annual plan review and update, submitted for FEMA review and reported in the 
States Annual Letter of Certification. 

Although Plan Issues are not, in and of themselves, exercise issues, the following should be 
considered by the RAC Chairperson: 

 
Any inadequacy in an OROs performance should be assessed as a Deficiency or 
ARCA, even if it resulted from following an inadequate plan. 
 
A Deficiency or ARCA cannot be assessed solely because of an inadequacy in a 
plan. However, the corrective actions to Deficiencies or ARCAs may involve plan 
corrections. 
 
If some section of a plan is inadequate, a Plan Issue will be reported to the State 
for correction, regardless of whether or not the OROs performance was adequate. 
d. Areas Recommended For Improvement 
Under the SERF, Areas Recommended For Improvement (ARFI) may be included in REP 
Program biennial exercise reports, if the OROs wish, or reported to the ORO(s) in writing. They 
should be discussed by the RAC Chairperson with the exercise participants during the postexercise 
briefing. 

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August 2002 


Section III.K  Post-Exercise Activities 

4. STANDARDIZED EXERCISE ISSUE NUMBERING 
FEMA has developed a standardized system for numbering exercise issues (Deficiencies and 
ARCAs). This system is used to achieve consistency in numbering exercise issues among FEMA 
Regions and site-specific exercise reports within each Region. It also expedites tracking of 
exercise issues on a nationwide basis. 

a. Elements of the Standard Exercise Issue Number 
The identifying number for Deficiencies and ARCAs includes the following elements, 
with each element separated by a hyphen (-). 

(1) Plant Site Identifier 
 
A two-digit number, corresponding to the Utility Billable P/ant Site 
Codes. (See Appendix C) 
(2) Exercise Year 
 Last two digits of the year the exercise was conducted 
(3) Evaluation Area Criterion 
 
The letters and numbers corresponding to the Evaluation Area 
Criterion in the FEMA REP Program Manual. 
(4) Issue Classification Identifier (D = Deficiency, A-ARCA) 
 
Deficiencies and ARCAs are included in exercise reports. Plan Issues 
may be reported to the State(s) via letter from the Regional Director; 
standardized exercise issue numbers are not assigned to Plan Issues. 
(5) Exercise Issue Identification Number 
 
A separate two (or three) digit indexing number assigned to each issue 
identified in the exercise. 
The elements of the Standard Exercise Issue Number are illustrated in Figure 1 below. 

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August 2002 


Section III.K  Post-Exercise Activities 

EXAMPLE: 
(1) 
76 
76-94-000-A-0l 
(2) (3) (4) 
94 000 D/A 
(5) 
01

 
SITE YEAR EA CRITERION DEFICIENCY/ARCA ISSUE NUMBER 


FIGURE 1: Illustration of the Standard Exercise Issue Number 

b. Assigning Exercise Issue Numbers 
The RAC Chairperson has the responsibility for assigning exercise issue identification numbers 
to issues to be included in the exercise report. After all issues have been identified and classified, 
they should be sorted as follows prior to the assignment of issue numbers. 

 
First, by jurisdiction/functional entity, in the same order as in the matrix 
contained in Section IV of the exercise report. 
 
Second, in numerical order of the Evaluation Area Criterion number under which 
they were assessed under each jurisdiction/functional entity. 
Every exercise issue should then be assigned an individual exercise issue identification number 
in the sequence in which they appear in Section IV of the exercise report. However, Deficiencies 
should be numbered separately from ARCAs, with issue numbers beginning with 01 in each 
category. 

Each exercise issue should be assigned a unique identification number. While there may be a 
need to add or delete issues during the post-exercise review process, only the last two digits of 
the identification numbers will need to be changed when the report is finalized. 

c. Method of Issue Number Assignment and Tracking 
One suggested way of numbering and tracking exercise issues is the use of the form illustrated in 
Figure 2 below. This form contains all elements of the standardized exercise issue number, 
except for the REP Evaluation Area Criterion and issue classification numbers, along with spaces 
for the jurisdiction/functional entity and a brief issue title. As issues are identified, the pertinent 
information can be filled in, by hand or electronically, to create a master list of all exercise 
issues identified during the exercise. 

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Section III.K  Post-Exercise Activities 

EXAMPLE: 
ISSUE NUMBER JURISDICTION/
FUNCTIONAL ENTITY 
BRIEF ISSUE TITLE 
76-94-__-__--01 ______________ ______________ 
76-94-__-__--02 ______________ ______________ 
76-94-__-__--03 ______________ ______________ 
(etc.) 

FIGURE 2: Exercise Issue Number Assignment Form 

d. Re-numbering Prior Exercise Issues 
It is not necessary to renumber issues assessed in previous exercises regardless of whether or not the 
issues were resolved during or remain unresolved after the current exercise. Only new issues need to 
be assigned Standard Exercise Issue Numbers. 

5. DEFINITION OF EVALUATION AREA CRITERION STATUS 
Once all exercise issues are classified, the RAC Chairperson is responsible for describing the 
status of each Evaluation Area Criterion demonstrated by individual jurisdictions and/or 
functional entities. There are four terms which are to be used in Section IV, Exercise Evaluation 
and Results, of the exercise report to describe the status of exercise Evaluation Area Criteria at 
each jurisdiction and/or functional entity following the current exercise. 

 
MET (M)  The jurisdiction or functional entity demonstrated all criteria for the 
Evaluation Area Criterion to the level required in the extent-of-play agreement, 
with NO Deficiencies or ARCAs assessed in the current exercise and NO 
Unresolved Prior ARCAs. 
 
DEFICIENCY (D)  The jurisdiction or functional entity demonstrated the 
Evaluation Area Criterion, BUT had one or more DEFICIENCIES assessed 
under the Evaluation Area Criterion. 
 
ARCA (A)  The jurisdiction or functional entity demonstrated the Evaluation 
Area Criterion, BUT had one or more ARCAs assessed under the Evaluation 
Area Criterion in the current exercise and/or one or more ARCAs assessed during 
a previous exercise which were not resolved in the current exercise. 
Interim REP Program Manual III-259 
August 2002 


Section III.K  Post-Exercise Activities 

 
NOT DEMONSTRATED (N)  The jurisdiction or functional entity did not, 
for a justifiable reason, demonstrate the Evaluation Area Criterion, as required in 
the extent-of-play agreement or at the two-year or six-year interval required in 
FEMA-REP Program Manual. 
A one-time exemption from demonstration of one or more Evaluation Area Criteria within a 
biennial exercise cycle may be granted by FEMA for an OROs response to an actual emergency 
or participation in an exercise, such as a chemical stockpile emergency preparedness exercise, 
requiring the demonstration of the same basic demonstration criteria, i.e., emergency response 
capabilities, as is required under the REP Evaluation Area Criteria. Such an exemption must be 
applied for by the State and approved by FEMAs Regional Office and Headquarters prior to the 
exercise. 

When a one-time exemption is granted for one or more REP exercise Evaluation Area Criteria, 
those Evaluation Area Criteria should be listed as MET in the exercise report and documentation 
of the reason the exemption was granted should be included in the extent-of-play agreement. 

If the RAC Chairperson determines that the reason for not demonstrating the Evaluation Area 
Criterion was valid, the status of the Evaluation Area Criterion should be defined as NOT 
DEMONSTRATED. In general, a jurisdiction or functional entity may justify not 
demonstrating an Evaluation Area Criterion because: 

 
Exercise participation had to be suspended so the ORO, or some members of its 
staff, could respond to an actual emergency during the time the exercise was 
being conducted or 
 
Some extenuating circumstance, such as a fire or flood at the facility to be 
demonstrated, prevented its use during the exercise. 
In all cases where an Evaluation Area Criterion is defined as NOT DEMONSTRATED, the 
Evaluation Area Criterion will be expected to be demonstrated during the next biennial exercise 
for the site. 

If an Evaluation Area Criterion is not demonstrated by the local jurisdiction or functional entity 
for such reasons as insufficient personnel or facilities or the outright refusal of the jurisdiction or 
functional entity to participate in the exercise, with no previously-arranged substitute response 
capability demonstrated by the State, the RAC Chairperson should carefully review and consider 
the facts surrounding the jurisdiction or functional entitys failure to demonstrate the Evaluation 
Area Criterion to see if either of the foregoing justifications for not demonstrating an exercise 
Evaluation Area Criterion applies. If the RAC Chairperson determines that a failure to 
demonstrate the exercise Evaluation Area Criterion was not justified, i.e., the ORO or functional 
entity was not responding to an actual, real life emergency or its facilities were not unavailable 
due to a fire, flooding, etc., then a Deficiency should be assessed under that Evaluation Area 
Criterion against the appropriate jurisdiction or functional entity and the Evaluation Area 
Criterion status should be defined as a DEFICIENCY. 

Interim REP Program Manual III-260 
August 2002 


Section III.K  Post-Exercise Activities 

6. EXERCISE REPORT PREPARATION 
The milestones for preparing the exercise report call for the draft exercise report to be ready for 
review 30 calendar days after the exercise and the final report to be completed within 90 calendar 
days after the exercise. 

With the implementation of the SERF, much of the planning for preparing and processing the 
report has already been done. 

 
The outline of the report, the contents of each section and subsection of the 
report, and the format in which the report is to be prepared have already been 
determined. 
 
FEMA Headquarters has provided the Regions with a computer disk that contains 
the basic report outline, boilerplate narrative and tabular formats. 
Preparation of the exercise report can, and should, begin before the exercise date. The 
advantages of working ahead include: 

 
The report preparers are, in effect, extending the amount of time available for 
report preparation without extending the deadline for completion of the draft and 
final reports; 
 
Once much of the site-specific boilerplate is prepared, it will require little or no 
modification for the next exercise report prepared for that site; and 
 
Preliminary preparation of some report sections (Evaluation Area Criteria matrix, 
evaluator/team leader list, etc.) will produce materials that can be included in the 
evaluators exercise packets for distribution prior to the exercise. 
a. Before the Exercise 
Boilerplate material can, and should, be prepared, to the extent possible, for incorporation into 
the draft exercise report before the exercise. For example, this could include the following report 
sections. 

 
Table of Contents 
 
Introduction 
 
Table 2 -Summary Results of Exercise Evaluation* 
* A preliminary version of the Summary Results of Exercise Evaluation matrix 
(Table 2, page E.J-3) showing an X in the matrix square for each Evaluation 
Area Criterion scheduled to be demonstrated by the participating jurisdictions/ 
Interim REP Program Manual III-261 
August 2002 


Section III.K  Post-Exercise Activities 

functional entities. This version of the matrix should be included in the 
evaluators pre-exercise packets. Later, after all exercise issues have been 
identified and classified and the RAC Chairperson has defined the status of each 
Evaluation Area Criterion for each jurisdiction and functional entity, the matrix 
can be revised and updated to reflect the demonstration status -Met (M), 
Deficiency (D), ARCA (A), and Not Demonstrated (N) -for each Evaluation Area 
Criterion demonstrated during the exercise by the participating jurisdictions and 
functional entities. 

Also, before the exercise, the Regional staff can, and should, prepare site-specific boilerplate 
narrative that will not change significantly between exercises (e.g., EPZ description, etc.). 

Some non-boilerplate information, such as the exercise Evaluation Area Criteria, extent-of-play 
agreement and scenario, can be prepared as soon as they are approved by the Region before the 
exercise. A preliminary listing of exercise evaluators and team leaders can be prepared and 
revised after the exercise if there are any changes in evaluation assignments. 

Preliminary work can be done on some report sections before the exercise and the sections 
completed after the exercise. For instance, preparation can begin on the report tables, with the 
addition of appropriate ORO names in column headings and cells. 

The data relating to actual exercise performance, exercise issues and recommended corrective 
actions will have to be added to the report after the exercise. However, there will be more time 
available for these tasks if the generic portions of the report have already been prepared. 

ALL data and narrative in the report must be checked after the first rough draft has been 
completed, to ensure that all report sections and matrix squares have been filled with the correct 
information, that all spelling and punctuation is correct and that the document follows the SERF. 
This type of review should be an on-going part of the report preparation process conducted by 
the FEMA Region whenever a section of the report is completed, prior to the draft exercise 
report being transmitted to the State(s) and RAC members for review and comment. 

b. At the Exercise Site 
The RAC Chairperson and the Regional staff are responsible for gathering all the information 
and data needed for the exercise report. By the date the exercise is conducted, it should be clear 
to the Regional staff exactly what information and data are needed to complete the exercise 
report. It should also be clear, even before the first pre-exercise evaluator briefing, how that 
information and data will be collected at the exercise site. 

At the pre-exercise briefing, the specific schedule and process for gathering exercise information 
and data should be carefully explained to the evaluators. 

Interim REP Program Manual III-262 August 2002 


Section III.K  Post-Exercise Activities 

Summary information, such as the exercise timeline and preliminary identification of exercise 
issues, can be collected from the evaluators, even before the Evaluation Area forms and 
narratives are prepared. For example: 

 
The post-exercise evaluators debriefing session, held the day after the exercise, 
provides a forum for discussing and collecting this information. 
 
A consolidated timeline can aid in identifying significant differences between 
OROs or jurisdictions in the time specific exercise actions occurred. Some 
exercise issues may be identified through the use of this consolidated timeline. 
Specific information regarding the demonstration of each Evaluation Area Criterion by each 
jurisdiction or functional entity will be contained in the Evaluation Area forms and narratives 
prepared by the evaluators and reviewed by the Regional staff. 

 
If within the constraints of budget and availability of personnel, the report 
preparation or clerical staff at the exercise site could type the narratives into pre-
formatted computer files. 
 
Each evaluators narrative summary should contain a complete description of all 
issues identified along with the recommended corrective actions. 
 
All issue descriptions should be accurate, clearly stated and concise. However, 
they must provide sufficient information regarding the who, what, when, where, 
how, and why of the issue. Report preparers should not be overly concerned 
about issue descriptions which are lengthy, if more detailed information is needed 
to thoroughly and accurately describe the exercise issue. Some details from the 
evaluators narrative summary may need to be added to the issue description to 
provide the OROs with enough information to facilitate an appropriate and timely 
correction of the issue. This is particularly important in an issues only format, 
since lengthy narrative descriptions of exercise play are not included. 
 
Pertinent exercise documents, such as sign-in sheets, logs, message forms, 
Emergency Alert System (EAS) or Emergency Broadcast System (EBS) message 
scripts, etc., should be attached to the appropriate set of Evaluation Area forms 
and narratives. 
c. After the Exercise 
The RAC Chairperson has the responsibility for classifying Deficiencies, ARCAs, and Plan 
Issues. Once this has been accomplished, the draft exercise report containing the Deficiencies 
and ARCAs can be finalized. 

 
Standardized exercise issue numbers should be assigned to the Deficiencies and 
ARCAs, in accordance with the system outlined in section B.4. 
Interim REP Program Manual III-263 
August 2002 


Section III.K  Post-Exercise Activities 

 
Based on the identified exercise issues, the RAC Chairperson should prepare the 
Summary Results of Exercise Evaluation matrix for Section IV of the report, 
which defines the status of each Evaluation Area Criterion demonstrated under 
the headings of Met, Deficiency, ARCA, or Not Demonstrated, as 
outlined in section B.5. 
 
Plan Issues will be provided to the State(s), via a letter from the Regional 
Director no later than 90 days after the exercise. A copy of this letter should be 
provided to FEMA Headquarters. 
While the issues identified in the exercise are being classified and numbered, the report 
preparation staff should be completing and checking the first three sections of the report. 

Once the exercise issues have been classified and the Section IV matrix has been prepared, the 
rest of Section IV, Exercise Evaluation and Results, can be drafted with information inserted into 
the report in accordance with guidance contained in the SERF. 

d. General Considerations on Appearance of Exercise Reports 
The overall goal of the REP Program is to provide assurance that the OROs can protect the 
health and safety of the general public in the vicinity of a nuclear power plant and the exercise 
report provides tangible evidence that this goal has been achieved. The exercise report document 
may have implications well beyond the scope of the stated purpose of the report since it may be 
read by anyone, inside or outside of government, in the United States or any country in the 
world. 

Each exercise report should not only present the facts surrounding the particular exercise, but 
present an accurate, abbreviated representation of the REP Program and the full scope of 
exercise considerations. 

This subsection contains guidance on the general appearance of the exercise report. 

1) General Appearance 

Because the word processing and printing capabilities may vary among Regions, the report 
preparation staff should adopt the following guidelines as a minimum. 

 
Top, right and bottom page margins should be between 0.75 and 1 .00 with the 
left margin between 1.00 and 1.50 to allow for binding. 
 
Generally, a serif font such as the Times New Roman font used in the boilerplate 
material provided by FEMA Headquarters should be used throughout the exercise 
report, with text printed at 12 characters per inch, fixed spacing, or at 12-point 
proportional spacing. Use of a sans-serif font may be necessary for ease of 
readability in tables, figures, etc., especially when the font size must be reduced. 
Interim REP Program Manual III-264 
August 2002 


Section III.K  Post-Exercise Activities 

 
Section and subsection headings should be in a larger-size font than the body of 
the text and should be printed in boldface type. 
 
To enhance readability, the report text should be justified to the left margin of the 
page, with appropriate indentations, rather than fully justified between the left 
and right margins. 
 
All pages of the report, including appendices, should be numbered sequentially, 
front to back, starting immediately after the table of contents of the report 
(centered, at bottom of page). 
 
Pages of the table of contents of the report should be numbered in small roman 
numerals. 
 
Page numbers should be added manually on report appendix pages that are 
produced by photocopying. 
2) Grammar, Spelling, Capitalization, and Punctuation 

Narrative text in the reports should be written in complete sentences. Most standard English 
spelling, grammar, capitalization and punctuation rules apply. (Federal used as an adjective 
and State used as either a noun or adjective are capitalized.) 

Sentence length should be no longer than necessary to convey the writers meaning. Avoid 
complex sentence structure to reduce the possibility of misunderstanding of the meaning and 
improve report readability. 

A physical check of spelling, grammar, capitalization and punctuation should be made, in 
addition to any spell-checking or grammar-checking computer programs, to ensure accuracy and 
consistency among all sections of the report. 

3) Outline Layout  Indentations 

All text in the first three sections of the exercise report should be presented in the same manner 
as the conventional English outline form, with subordinate sections indented and subdivisions 
labeled alternately with letters and numbers, as illustrated in Figure 3 below. 

It is not necessary to indent the first line of each paragraph, as would be done in standard English 
writing. 

A uniform system is used to number the names of jurisdictions and functional entities. This 
numbering system should be reflected accurately in the table of contents of the report. 

Interim REP Program Manual III-265 
August 2002 


Section III.K  Post-Exercise Activities 

I. 
SECTION TITLE 
A. 
Subsection Title 
*TEXT* ********************************************* 

1. 
*********************************************** 
a. 
********************************************* 
1) ***************************************** 
a) 
************************************** 

FIGURE 3: Illustration of Outline Layout  Indentations 

4) 
Use of Acronyms and Abbreviations 

As in almost any government or private sector technical program, acronyms and abbreviations 
are an integral part of the REP Program. Most government documents, including the final 
exercise report, include a list of acronyms and abbreviations, either at the beginning of or as 
an appendix to the document, to spell out myriad representations for programs, organizations, 
etc. 

Only those acronyms and abbreviations that are actually used in the exercise report should be 
included in the list of acronyms and abbreviations, which will be located in the first appendix 
to the report. The following rules should be observed regarding the use of acronyms and 
abbreviations: 

 
The first mention in the report of organizations, agencies or terms should be 
spelled out, with the acronym or abbreviation in parentheses after the spelled 
name. Thereafter, the acronym or abbreviation should be used. 
 
Acronyms should not be shown and used for organizational terms that are used 
only once or just a few times in the report. Such organizational titles and terms 
should be spelled out in full if they are used infrequently. 
The report writer should be sensitive to the uninitiated reader who may not be familiar with 
the many acronyms that those on the inside of the REP Program take for granted as a part of 
everyday language. Thus, the foregoing rules should be adhered to consistently. 

Interim REP Program Manual III-266 
August 2002 


Section III.K  Post-Exercise Activities 

5) Use and Numbering of Tables and Figures 

There are two tables which are necessary in exercise reports prepared under the SERF: 

(1) Exercise Timeline, and (2) Summary Results of Exercise Evaluation. If the Region 
determines that figures or additional tables are necessary in a specific report, the following 
guidance will be followed: 
 
Figures and tables will be numbered sequentially from the beginning to the end 
of the report; 
 
A separate list of figures and list of tables will be included at the end of the 
exercise reports table of contents; and 
 
Care will be taken to ensure that all figures and tables are numbered correctly, 
that the numbers are properly referenced in narrative text, and that the actual 
numbers match those in the lists at the end of the table of contents. 
7. EXERCISE REPORT REVIEW 
From the moment the exercise is terminated to the day that the final exercise report is issued, 
some portion of the data or the report preparation process will be under review. Comments will 
be made on revisions for content, accuracy, clarity, and/or style. Discussions between the RAC 
Chairperson and individual commenters will undoubtedly be necessary to clarify some of those 
comments. 

All reviews and comments or suggestions, at whatever level, should be aimed at ensuring 

(1) the accuracy and overall quality of the final exercise report, (2) consistent application of 
established REP policies and guidance in evaluating the performance of all exercise participants, 
and (3) identification and proper classification of Deficiencies and ARCAs. 
In order to produce a professional quality exercise report, which is both accurate and on time, the 
report writers and reviewers must both understand what is expected of them. 

The review process actually begins at the exercise site. 

 
As evaluators complete their Evaluation Area Criterion forms, narratives, and 
identify issues, FEMA reviewers should check them carefully to ensure that the 
documents are complete and accurate, that all exercise issues and recommended 
corrective actions are correctly identified and classified, prior ARCAs are 
properly addressed, and that all pertinent exercise documents are attached. 
 
When the Evaluation Area Criterion forms, narratives, and exercise issues are 
typed, they should be checked for accuracy. These evaluator-produced materials 
will be retained in the Regional files as a permanent record of exercise play. 
Interim REP Program Manual III-267 
August 2002 


Section III.K  Post-Exercise Activities 

As elements of the draft exercise report are being prepared, the Regional staff should 
continuously perform quality control reviews of their own work and correct errors in grammar, 
spelling, punctuation, capitalization and report layout, as well as to ensure accuracy and 
consistency of information among all sections of the report. With constant attention to the 
assurance of professional quality, the draft report will be completed within the deadline. 

The FEMA Region will send the draft exercise report to the State(s) and RAC members for 
review and comment 30 calendar days after the exercise. 

 
All reviewers and commenters should concentrate their review on the accuracy of 
the data and information contained in the draft report, identification and proper 
classification of exercise issues and overall report quality. 
 
Reviewers at all levels should not hesitate to contact the RAC Chairperson or 
report preparation staff to clarify any items that are not clear or considered 
correct. 
It is important that the Region receive of all comments on the draft exercise report no later than 
60 calendar days after the exercise. To facilitate the Regions (1) consideration and 
incorporation, as appropriate, of the comments and Schedule of Corrective Actions received and 

(2) retention of the comments in the Regional files, all comments will be provided to the RAC 
Chairperson in writing via letter and/or markup of the draft exercise report. Because of the 
pressure of the milestone deadlines, it will be difficult to incorporate comments not received 
within that time frame into the final report. All comments received will be considered and the 
RAC Chairperson will contact any reviewer necessary to discuss comments, if there is any 
question about incorporating those comments. 
At this point, the report preparation staff incorporates those comments and suggestions approved 
by the RAC Chairperson into the draft report to produce the final report. Again, the Regional 
staff should perform quality control reviews of their own work and correct errors in grammar, 
spelling, punctuation, capitalization and report layout, as well as to ensure the accuracy and 
consistency of information among all sections of the report. 

Once the final report is prepared, the Regional staff should perform a final review of the entire 
document to identify any detail that is not correct in content or form. 

The FEMA Regional Director will transmit the final exercise report directly to the NRCs 
cognizant Regional Office with copies to the NRCs Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation in 
Washington, DC; FEMA Headquarters, Office of National Preparedness, Technical Services 
Division, REP Branch; State(s); and RAC members no later than 90 calendar days after the 
exercise. 

Interim REP Program Manual III-268 
August 2002 


Section III.K  Post-Exercise Activities 

8. FEMA HEADQUARTERS ASSISTANCE 
Whenever possible, within the constraints of budget and availability of personnel, a 
representative of FEMA Headquarters will be present at the exercise site. 

This individual, if present, will be available for consultation to the RAC Chairperson and other 
exercise support personnel on matters pertaining to data gathering, issues classification, and 
report preparation. 

This individual can also serve as a liaison between the FEMA Region and FEMA Headquarters, 
Office of National Preparedness, Technical Services Division, REP Branch, on any matter 
involving the exercise or the preparation of the exercise report. 

Interim REP Program Manual III-269 August 2002 


Section III.K  Post-Exercise Activities 

Interim REP Program Manual III-270 August 2002 


Appendix A 

APPENDIX A: 

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS USED IN REP 

A Atomic Mass/Ampere/Activity of Isotope 
AC Alternating Current 
ACP Access Control Point 
AEC Atomic Energy Commission 
AECB Atomic Energy and Control Board 
AEOD Analysis and Evaluation of Operation Data 
AGL Above Ground level 
ALARA As Low As Reasonably Achievable 
ALC Annual Letter of Certification 
AMA American Medical Association 
AMS Aerial Measuring System 
AMTOR Amateur Telegraphy Over Radio 
A/N Alert/Notification 
ANI American Nuclear Insurers 
ANL Argonne National Laboratory 
ANSI American National Standards Institute 
ANSI American National Standards Institute 
Anti-Cs Anti-contamination Clothing 
APR Air-purifying Respirator 
ARAC Atmospheric Release Advisory Capability 
ARC American Red Cross 
ARCA Area Requiring Corrective Action 
ARES Amateur Radio Emergency Services 
ARFI Area Recommended for Improvement 
ARM Aerial Radiological Monitor 
ASLB Atomic Safety and Licensing Board 
a Alpha Particle 

 Beta Particle Radiation 
+ + particle (positron) 



. 


Ba Barium 
BEIR Biological Effects of Ionizing Radiation 
Btu British Thermal Unit 
BWR Boiling Water Reactor 

CAP Civil Air Patrol 
C degrees Celsius 
cc cubic centimeter 
CC Congregate Care 
CCA Comprehensive Cooperative Agreement 
CCC Congregate Care Center 


Interim REP Program Manual A-1 August 2002 


Appendix A 

CD Civil Defense 
CDV Civil Defense Victoreen 
CDC Centers for Disease Control 
CDE Committed Dose Equivalent 
CDRG Catastrophic Disaster Response Group 
CEDE Committed Effective Dose Equivalent 
CEM Certified Emergency Manager 
CEMP Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan 
CFA Cognizant Federal Agency 
CFAO Cognizant Federal Agency Official 
cfm cubic feet per minute 
CFR Code of Federal Regulations 
CHEMTREC Chemical Transportation Emergency Center 
Ci Curie 
CNSNS Commission for Nuclear Safety and Safeguards 
COE Corps of Engineers 
CPG Civil Preparedness Guide 
cpm counts per minute 
CRCPD Conference of Radiation Control Program Directors 
CSEPP Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program 
Cs Cesium 
Cu Cubic 

DAC Disaster Application Center 
DBA Design Basis Accident 
DECONN Decontamination 
DFO Disaster Field Office 
DHHS Department of Health and Human Services 
DIL Derived Intervention Level 
DNA Defense Nuclear Agency 
DOC Department of Commerce 
DOD Department of Defense 
DOE Department of Energy 
DOI Department of the Interior 
DOH Department of Health 
DOL Department of Labor 
DOS Department of State 
DOT Department of Transportation 
DPM Disintegrations Per Minute 
DRD Direct-Reading Dosimeter 
DRL Derived Response Levels 
DRP Division of Radiation Protection (DOH Division) 
DRSS Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards 
DSO NRC Director of Site Operations 

Interim REP Program Manual A-2 August 2002 


Appendix A 

E 911 Enhanced 9-1-1 
EAB Exclusion Area Boundary 
EACT Emergency Action and Coordination Team 
EAL Emergency Action Level 
EAS Emergency Alert System [formerly Emergency Broadcast System (EBS)] 
ECC Emergency Communications Center 
ECCS Emergency Core Cooling System 
ECL Emergency Classification Level 
EDE Effective Dose Equivalent 
EEM Exercise Evaluation Methodology 
EENET Emergency Educational Network 
EICC Emergency Information Coordination Center (FEMA) 
EIS Emergency Information System 
EM Emergency Management 
EMI Emergency Management Institute (Maryland) 
EMPO Emergency Medical Preparedness Office 
EMS Emergency Medical Services 
EMT Emergency Medical Technician 
EO Emergency Office 

E.O. Executive Order of the President 
EOC Emergency Operations Center (State) 
EOF Emergency Operations Facility (Utility) 
EOP Emergency Operations/Operating Plan or Procedure OR Extent of Play 
EOV Emergency Operations Vehicle 
EPA Environmental Protection Agency 
EPD Electronic Personnel Dosimeter 
EPG Exercise Preparation Guide 
EPO Environmental Protection Officer 
EPZ Emergency Planning Zone 
ER Emergency Room 
ERC Emergency Response Coordinator 
ERDA Energy Research and Development Administration 
ERPA Emergency Response Planning Area 
ERPG Emergency Response Guidelines 
ERPS Effluents Radiation Protection Section 
ERT Emergency Response Team 
ERT-A Emergency Response Team  Advance 
ESF Emergency Support Functions 
EST Emergency Support Team (FEMA) 
ETA Estimated Time of Arrival 
ETE Evacuation Time Estimate 
ETS Evacuation Time Study 
EW Emergency Worker 
EWAC Emergency Worker and Assistance Center 
EWC Emergency Worker Center 
EWMDS Emergency Worker Monitoring and Decontamination Station 
Interim REP Program Manual A-3 August 2002 


Appendix A 

F degrees Fahrenheit 
FAA Federal Aviation Administration 
FCC Federal Communications Commission 
FCO Federal Coordinating Officer 
FCP Field/Forward Command Post 
FDA Food and Drug Administration 
FECC Federal Emergency Communications Coordinator 
FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency 
FFE Federal Field Exercise 
FMT Field Monitoring Team 
FNF Fixed Nuclear Facility(ies) 
FOC Forward Operations Center 
FR Federal Register 
FRC Federal Regional Center/Federal Response Center 
FRERP Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan 
FRMAC Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center 
FRMAP Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assistance Plan [replaces the Interagency 

Radiological Assistance Plan (IRAP)] 
FRMT Field Radiological Monitoring Team 
FRP Federal Response Plan 
FRPCC Federal Radiological Preparedness Coordinating Committee 
FRSSB Facilities Radiological Safety and Safeguards Branch 
FSA Forward Staging Area 
ft foot/feet 
ft/min feet per minute 
ft3/min cubic feet per minute 
FTC Field Team Coordinator 
FTS Federal Telecommunications System 
FSAR Final Safety Analysis Report 

. Gamma Ray (Photon) Radiation 
g gram 
GE General Emergency 
gal Gallon 
GCF Ground Concentration Factor 
Ge (Li) Lithium Drifted Germanium 
GIS Geographic Information System 
GM Guidance Memorandum 
G-M Geiger-Mueller (radiation detector) 
GMT Greenwich Mean Time 
GPS Global Positioning System 
GSA General Services Administration 

h hour 
HAZMAT Hazardous Materials 
HEAR Hospital Emergency Administrative Radio 

Interim REP Program Manual A-4 August 2002 


Appendix A 

HEPA High-efficiency Particulate Air (as in filters) 
HF High Frequency 
HHS Department of Health and Human Services 
HOO NRC Headquarters Operations Officer 
H2 Hydrogen (molecular) 
H2O Water 
HF Hydrogen fluoride 
HP Health Physicist 
HPSI High Pressure Safety Injection 
HPT Health Physics Technician 
HUD Department of Housing and Urban Development 
HQ Headquarters 

I Iodine/Exposure Intensity 
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency 
ICPAE Interagency Committee for Public Affairs in Emergencies 
ICS Incident Command System 
IDLH Immediately Dangerous to Life or Health 
IEP Ingestion Exposure Pathway 
INEEL Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory 
INPO Institute for Nuclear Power Operations 
IP Implementing Procedure 
IPZ Ingestion Pathway Zone 
IRAC Interagency Radiological Assistance Committee 
IRAP Interagency Radiological Assistance Plan (replaced with FRMAP) 
IRZ Immediate Response Zone 

JCAH Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals 
JIC Joint Information Center 
JIS Joint Information System 
JNC Joint News Center 
JOC Joint Operations Center 
JPIC Joint Public Information Center 

k kilo (SI prefix 103) 
kg kilogram 
KI Potassium Iodide 
kV kilovolt 
kW kilowatt 
kWh kilowatt hour 

lb pound 
lbf pound force 
LANL Los Alamos National Laboratory 
LAO Lead Agency Official 
Ld Lethal Dose 

Interim REP Program Manual A-5 August 2002 


Appendix A 

LEPC Local Emergency Planning Committee 
LERN Law Enforcement Radio Net 
LFA Lead Federal Agency 
LLNL Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory 
LOA Letter of Agreement 
LOCA Loss of Coolant Accident 
LPN Licensed Practical Nurse 
LPZ Low Population Zone 
LWR Light Water Reactor 

MAC Monitoring and Analysis Coordinator 
MAELU Mutual Atomic Energy Liability Underwriters 
MERRT Medical Emergency Radiological Response Team 
MERS Mobile Emergency Response Support 
MET Meteorological 
mg milligram 
MHz megahertz 
MIC Media Information Center 
MOA Memorandum of Agreement 
MOU Memorandum of Understanding 
MPC Maximum Permissible Concentration 
mph miles per hour 
mR milliroentgen/millirem 
mR/h milliroentgen per hour 
mRem millirem 
MRV Mobile Response Vehicle 
MS-1 Medical Service  1 (Hospital) 
MSHA Mine Safety and Health Administration 
MT metric ton 
MW megawatt 
MWH megawatt hour 
MUDAC Meteorological and Unified Dose Assessment Center 
 micro (SI prefix 10-6) 
Ci microcuries 

NAAQS National Ambient Air Quality Standards 
NAERG North American Emergency Response Guidebook 
NaI(Tl) Sodium Iodide Doped with Thallium (scintillator) 
NARP Nuclear Weapon Accident Response Procedures 
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
NAWAS National Warning System 
NCC National Coordinating Center for Telecommunications 
NCP National Contingency Plan 
NCRP National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements 
NCS National Communications System 
NDA National Defense Area 

Interim REP Program Manual A-6 August 2002 


Appendix A 

NEI Nuclear Energy Institute 
NEMA National Emergency Management Association (State Directors) 
NEPA National Fire Protection Association 
NESP National Environmental Studies Project (NUMARC) 
NETC National Emergency Training Center (Maryland) 
NIFC National Interagency Fire Center 
NIOSH National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health 
NIST National Institute of Standards & Technology [formerly National Bureau of 
Standards (NBS)] 
NMMS Nuclear Materials Safeguards and Security 
NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
NOUE Notification of Unusual Event 
NPP Nuclear Power Plant 
NPS National Park Service 
NRC U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
NRT National Response Team 
NSA National Security Area 
NTS Nevada Test Site 
NTSB National Transportation Safety Board 
NUMARC Nuclear Management and Resources Council 
NUREG Nuclear Regulation/NRC Documents Reference 

NUREG-0654 NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1, Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of 
Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear 
Power Plants, November 1980 

NVLAP National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program 
NWS National Weather Service 

OAR Office of Air and Radiation 
OCRWM Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management 
OFA Other Federal Agencies 
OEM Office of Emergency Management 
OMB Office of Management and Budget 
ORIA Office of Radiation and Indoor Air 
ORNL Oak Ridge National Laboratory 
ORO Offsite Response Organization 
OSC Operational Support Center/On-Scene Coordinator 
OSHA Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
OST Operation Support Team 

PA Public Address/Public Affairs 
PAs Protective Actions 
PAD Protective Action Decision 
PAG Protective Action Guide 
PAO Public Affairs Officer 
PAR Protective Action Recommendation 
PAZ Protective Action Zone 

Interim REP Program Manual A-7 August 2002 


Appendix A 
PEL Permissible Exposure Limit 
PHS Public Health Service 
PIC Pressurized Ion Chamber 
PIO Public Information Officer 
PL Public Law 
POR Point(s) of Review 
PPE Personal Protective Equipment 
ppm parts per million 
psi pounds per square inch 
psia pounds per square inch absolute 
psig pounds per square inch gage 
Pu Plutonium 
PWR Pressurized Water Reactor 
PZ Precautionary Zone 
 Part 
Q Release Rate of Activity 
Qi Iotopic Release Rate 
QT Total Activity Released 
QUF6 Uranium Hexafluoride Inventory 
R roentgen 
R/h roentgen per hour 
Ra Radium 
RAC Regional Assistance Committee 
RAC AC Regional Assistance Committee Advisory Council 
RACES Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Service 
rad radiation absorbed dose 
RADLAB Radiological Laboratory 
RAM Radioactive Material 
RAP Radiological Assistance Program (DOE) 
RASCAL Radiological Assessment System for Consequence Analysis 
RC Reception Center 
RCC Reception and Congregate Care 
RCF Release Conversion Factor 
RCS Reactor Coolant System 
RCT Response Coordination Team 
RD Regional Director 
RDO Radiological Defense Officer/Regional Duty Officer 
REA Radioactive Emergency Area 
REDAM Radiological Emergency Dose Assessment Model 
REL Recommended Exposure Limit 
rem Roentgen equivalent man/mammal 
REP Radiological Emergency Preparedness 
RERO Radiological Emergency Response Operations 
RERP Radiological Emergency Response Plan 

Interim REP Program Manual A-8 August 2002 


Appendix A 

RERT Radiological Emergency Response Team 
RF Radio Frequency 
RG Review Guide 
R/h roentgens per hour 
RM Radiological Monitor 
RMT Radiological Monitoring Team 
RN Registered Nurse 
RO Radiological Officer 
ROC Regional Operations Center (FEMA) 
ROST Regional Office Support Team 
rpm revolutions per minute 
RPT Radiation Protection Technician 
RRAC Regional Radiological Assistance Committee 
RRF Regional Response Force 
RRT Radiological Response Team/Regional Response Team 
RX Reactor 

SAE Site Area Emergency 
SAR Search and Rescue/Safety Analysis Report 
SARA Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 
SAV Staff Assistance Visit 
SBA Small Business Administration 
SBGTS Standard Gas Treatment System 
SCBA Self-contained Underwater Breathing Apparatus 
SCO State Coordinating Officer 
SEOC State Emergency Operations Center 
SERF Standard Exercise Report Format 
SFO Senior Federal Offical/Senior FEMA Official 
SGTR Steam Generator Tube Rupture 
SLO State Liaison Officer 
SLPD State and Local Preparedness Division 
SME Subject Matter Expert 
SOP Standard Operating Procedure 
Sr Strontium 
SRD Self-Reading Dosimeter 
SRF Service of Agency Response Force 
SRSC Strategic Review Steering Committee 
SRV Safety Relief Value 
SSE Safe Shutdown Earthquake 
ST-DOSE Source Term to Dose 

TBA Thyroid Blocking Agent (see KI) 
TCP Traffic Control Point 
TDD Telecommunications Device for the Deaf 
TEDE Total Effective Dose Equivalent 
TH Technological Hazards 

Interim REP Program Manual A-9 August 2002 


Appendix A 
TL Team Leader 
TLD Thermoluminescent Dosimeter 
TMI Three Mile Island (Nuclear Power Plant) 
TSC Technical Support Center 
TSP Total Suspended Particulates 
TTC Technical Training Center 
U Uranium 
UCi microcurie 
UF6 Uranium Hexafluroide 
UHF Ultra High Frequency 
UO2F2 Uranyl Fluoride 
USC United States Code 
USCG U.S. Coast Guard 
USDA U.S. Department of Agriculture 
UTC Universal Time Coordinated 
V volt 
VA Veterans Administration 
VFD Volunteer Fire Department 
VFR Visual Flight Rules 
VHF Very High Frequency 
W watt 
WB Whole Body 
WP Warning Point 
Wt Weight 
yd yard 
yr year 
Z Atomic number 
Z Zulu (UTC) 
Zr Zirconium 

Interim REP Program Manual A-10 August 2002 


Appendix B 

APPENDIX B: 
GLOSSARY OF REP TERMS 


Absorbed dose: when ionizing radiation passes through living tissue, some of its energy is imparted 
to the tissue. The amount of ionizing radiation absorbed per unit mass of the irradiated tissue is 
called the absorbed dose, and is measured in rads and rems. 

Access control: all activities accomplished for the purpose of controlling entry or re-entry into an 
area that has either been evacuated or is under a sheltering protective action decision, because of 
radiological contamination to minimize the radiation exposure of individuals. This function is 
needed to prevent the general public from entering restricted areas (sheltered and/or evacuated) and 
permitting only emergency workers with essential missions and limited members of the general 
public to enter. 

Accident assessment: the evaluation of the actual and potential consequences of a radiological 
incident. 

Accident Response Group (ARG): the Department of Energy response group. A team of 
scientists, engineers, and technicians that is trained, organized, and equipped to respond to a nuclear 
weapons accident/incident. 

Action levels: thresholds for contamination levels that trigger the need for decontamination 
established in the plans. 

Activated: an Emergency Operations Center is considered Activated as soon as notification of an 
incident is received and the Director/Commissioner/EOC Representative makes the determination 
to activate the facility. The facility is not considered Operational until it is ready to carry out full 
emergency operations with key decision makers in place. 

Activation of Personnel: the process by which emergency response personnel are notified of an 
emergency situation, and requested to report for duty. 

Acute exposure: an exposure to radiation, which occurs over a short period of time, usually in less 
than an hour. 

Adequate: as used in reviews of radiological emergency response plans and procedures, adequate 
means that the plan contents are consistent and in full compliance with the plan requirements 
delineated in the NUREG-0654 evaluation criteria or alternative approaches approved by FEMA. 

Aerial Measuring System (AMS): DOE asset consisting of an integrated remote-sensing capability 
for rapidly determining radiological and ecological conditions of large areas of the environment. In 
conjunction with modern laboratory and assessment techniques, state-of-the-art airborne equipment 
is used for extremely low-level gamma radiation detection, high-altitude photography, airborne gas 
and particulate sampling, and multi-spectral photography and scanning. 

Interim REP Program Manual B-1 August 2002 


Appendix B 

Agreement State: a State that has entered into an agreement under the atomic Energy Act of 1954, 
as amended, in which NRC has relinquished to such States the majority of its regulatory authority 
over source, by-product, and special nuclear material in quantities not sufficient to form a critical 
mass. 

Airborne radioactivity: any radioactive material dispersed in the air in the form of dusts, fumes, 
mists, vapors, or gases. 

Air sampler: a device used to collect a sample of radioactive particulates suspended in the air. 

ALARA: acronym meaning as low as reasonably achievable. 

Alerting of personnel: transmission of a signal or message that places personnel on notice that a 
situation has developed that may require that they report for emergency duty. 

Alerting the public: activating an attention-getting warning signal through such means as sirens, 
tone alert radios, route alerting, and speakers on cars, helicopters, and boats. 

Alert system: the hardware system(s) used to get the attention of the public within the plume EPZ. 
Examples of an Alert system are: sirens; tone activated radios; and vehicles (including boats and 
airplanes) that utilize loud speakers/sirens, etc., to perform public alerting. 

Alpha particle: a positively charged particle ejected spontaneously from the nuclei of some 
radioactive elements. It is identical to a helium nucleus that has a mass number of 4 and an 
electrostatic charge of plus 2. It has low-penetrating power and short range. The most energetic 
alpha particle will generally fail to penetrate the skin. Alpha is hazardous when an alpha-emitting 
isotope is introduced into the body. Alpha particles are the least penetrating of the three common 
types of radiation (alpha, beta, gamma) and can be stopped by a piece of paper (cannot penetrate 
skin). 

Alternate EOC: an EOC outside the EPZ to which an emergency response organization may 
relocate if their home EOC is in the radioactive plume. 

Area Recommended For Improvement (ARFI): an aspect of emergency preparedness that could 
be improved to enhance preparedness but is not required to be corrected (and may be included in an 
appendix to the exercise report if requested by the State). 

Area Requiring Corrective Action (ARCA): an observed or identified inadequacy of 
organizational performance in an exercise that is not considered, by itself, to adversely impact 
public health and safety. The correction of an ARCA is required by the next scheduled biennial 
exercise. An ARCA may be reclassified as a Deficiency under two conditions: First, when the 
collective impact of two or more ARCAs on the functioning of an emergency organization 
precludes the adequate protection of the public health and safety; and second, when an organization 
repeatedly demonstrates the inability to correct one or more previously identified ARCA over a 
period of two or more biennial exercises. 

Interim REP Program Manual B-2 August 2002 


Appendix B 

Assessment: the evaluation and interpretation of radiological measurements and other information 
to provide a basis for decision-making. Assessments can include projections of offsite radiological 
impact. 

Atmospheric Release Advisory Capability (ARAC): DOE asset capable of providing a computer-
generated model of the most probable path of the radioactive contamination released at a 
radiological accident site. 

Atom: the smallest particle of an element that cannot be divided or broken up by chemical means. It 
consists of a central core called the nucleus, which contains protons and neutrons. Electrons revolve 
in orbits in the region surrounding the nucleus. 

Atomic energy: energy released in nuclear reactions. Of particular interest is the energy released 
when a neutron initiates the breaking up or fissioning of an atoms nucleus into smaller pieces 
(fission), or when two nuclei are joined together under millions of degrees of heat (fusion). It is 
more correctly called nuclear energy. 

Background radiation: the level of naturally occurring radiation in the environment. Sources 
include air, water, soil, potassium-40 in the body and cosmic radiation from the sun. The usually 
quoted individual background radiation exposure in mans natural environment is an average of 
125 millirem per year. 

Beta particle: A charged particle emitted from a nucleus during radioactive decay, with a mass 
equal to 1/1827 that of a proton. A negatively charged beta particle is identical to an electron. A 
positively charged beta particle is called a positron. Large amounts of beta radiation may cause skin 
burns, and beta emitters are harmful if they enter the body. Most beta particles can be stopped by 
aluminum foil. 

Body burden: the amount of radioactive material present in the body of a human or an animal. 

Boiling water reactor (BWR): a nuclear reactor in which water, used both as coolant and 
moderator, is allowed to boil in the reactor vessel. The resulting steam is used directly to drive a 
turbine. 

Breeder reactor: a nuclear reactor that produces or breeds more fissionable material than it 
consumes. The reactor is built with a core of fissionable plutonium-239, surrounded by a blanket of 
uranium-238. As the plutonium fissions, neutrons bombard the uranium converting the uranium 
blanket to more plutonium-239. 

Btu: a British thermal unit. The amount of heat required to change the temperature of one pound of 
water one degree Fahrenheit at sea level. 

Buffer zone: an area adjacent to a restricted zone, to which residents may return, but for which 
protective measures are recommended to minimize exposure to radiation. 

Interim REP Program Manual B-3 August 2002 


Appendix B 

Buffer zone (medical facilities): an area (within a hospital or other medical facility) adjacent to the 
radiological emergency area (restricted zone) for which protective measures are recommended to 
minimize both exposure to radiation and the spread of radiological contamination to radiological 
clean areas of the facility. 

Calibration: the check or correction of the accuracy of a measuring instrument to ensure proper 
operational characteristics. 

Cask: a heavily shielded container used to store and/or ship radioactive materials. Lead and steel are 
common materials used in the manufacture of casks. 

Chain-of-custody form: the documentation of the transfer of samples from one organization and 
individual to another with respect to the name of the organization and individual and dates of 
acceptance and/or transfer of samples. 

Chain reaction: a fission chain reaction occurs when a fissionable nucleus absorbs a neutron and 
fissions, relating additional neutrons. These in turn can be absorbed by other fissionable nuclei, 
releasing more neutrons. A chain reaction is achieved when this process becomes self-sustaining. 

Check source: a radioisotope with a known, relatively fixed activity level used to determine the 
responsiveness of survey instruments. 

Chronic exposure: exposure to small doses of radiation over an extended period of time. 

Cladding: the outer jacket of nuclear fuel elements. It prevents corrosion of the fuel and the release 
of fission products into the coolant. Aluminum or its alloys, stainless steel and zirconium are 
common cladding materials. 

Cobalt-60: a radioactive isotope formed from natural cobalt-59 by neutron activation in reactors. It 
is used for medical and industrial applications. 

Cognizant Federal Agency (CFA): the Federal agency that owns, authorizes, regulates, or is 
otherwise deemed responsible for the radiological activity causing the emergency and that has the 
authority to take action on site. 

Cognizant Federal Agency Official (CFAO): lead official designated by the CFA to manage its 
response at the site of a radiological emergency. 

Committed dose: the dose that will be received over a period of 50 years from the ingestion or 
inhalation of a particular quantity of a radionuclide or a specific mix of radionuclides. 

Committed dose equivalent (CDE): the dose equivalent to organs or tissues of reference that will 
be received from an intake of radioactive material by an individual during the 50-year period 
following ingestion. 

Interim REP Program Manual B-4 August 2002 


Appendix B 

Committed Effective Dose Equivalent (CEDE): the sum of the 50-year committed doses to 
individual organs from inhalation (or ingestion) of radionuclides, where the individual organ doses 
have been weighted so that the associated risk of fatal cancer can be added to the risk of fatal cancer 
from whole-body dose. 

Congregate care: the provision of temporary housing and basic necessities for evacuees. 

Congregate Care Center (CCC): a facility for temporary housing, care, and feeding of evacuees. 

Containment: the provision of a gas-tight shell or other enclosure around a reactor that confines 
fission products and prevents their release to the environment in an accident. 

Contaminated: the adhesion of radioactive particulates on the surface of structures, areas, objects, 
or personnel. 

Contaminated, injured, or exposed individuals: individuals who are: (1) contaminated with 
radioactive material that cannot be removed by the simple methods described in NUREG-0654, 
Criteria J.12. and K.5.b., (2) contaminated and otherwise physically injured, or (3) exposed to high 
levels of radiation. 

Contamination: a frequently misunderstood term, contamination refers to radioactive materials not 
in their intended containers. Fixed or loose contamination depends on the degree of effort 
required to unfix or remove the contamination from a surface. 

Control cell: exercise personnel who facilitate interfaces with nonparticipating groups, such as 
State, Tribal, and local government officials and special needs populations. 

Control rod: a rod containing a material that readily absorbs neutrons (such as boron). It is used to 
control the power of a nuclear reactor. By absorbing neutrons, a control rod slows the fission chain 
reaction by preventing neutrons from causing further fission. 

Control room: The area in a nuclear power plant from which most of the plant power production 
and emergency safety equipment can be operated by remote control. 

Controlled area: a defined area in which the occupational exposure of personnel to radiation or 
radioactive material is under the supervision of an individual in charge of radiation protection. 

Controller: the individual directing the flow of scenario events in order to ensure that the conduct 
of an exercise is conducted in accordance with the agreed-upon exercise objectives and the extent of 
play. 

Controller injects: the introduction of events, data, and information into exercises to drive the 
demonstration of objectives. 

Coolant: a substance, usually water, circulated through a nuclear reactor to remove or transfer heat. 

Interim REP Program Manual B-5 August 2002 


Appendix B 

Cool down: The gradual decrease in reactor fuel rod temperature caused by the removal of heat 
from the reactor coolant system. 

Cooling tower: a heat exchanger designed to aid in the cooling of water that was used to cool 
exhaust steam exiting the turbines of a power plant. Cooling towers transfer exhaust heat into the air 
instead of into a body of water. 

Coordinate: to bring into common action so as not to unnecessarily duplicate or omit important 
actions (does not involve direction of one agency by another). 

Core: the central portion of a nuclear reactor containing the fuel elements, moderator, neutron 
poisons, and support structures. 

Core melt accident: is a reactor accident in which the fuel core melts because of overheating. 

Counting: using an instrument to detect individual particles or gamma rays which interact with the 
detector on the instrument. For example, ambient radiation can be counted, or, alternatively, the 
radiation emitted by specific samples can be counted in units of cpm or cps. 

Critical: able to sustain a nuclear reaction at a constant level. 

Critical mass: the mass of fissionable material needed to support a self-sustaining chain reaction. 

Criticality: a term used in reactor physics to describe the state when the number of neutrons 
released by fission is exactly balanced by the neutrons being absorbed (by the fuel and poisons) and 
escaping the reactor core. A reactor is said to be critical when it achieves a self-sustaining nuclear 
chain reaction. 

Cumulative dose (radiation): the total dose resulting from repeated exposure to radiation of the 
same region, or of the whole body. 

Curie (Ci): the basic unit to describe the intensity of radioactivity in a sample of material. One curie 
is equal to 37 billion disintegrations (nuclear transformations) per second. So, in one curie, 
37 billion atoms decay in one second. Several commonly used fractions of the curie include: 

 Millicurie: 1/1,000th of a curie, (one-thousandth of a curie, abbreviated mCi) 

Microcurie: 1/1,000,000 of a curie, (one-millionth of a curie, abbreviated uCi) 

Nanocurie: 1/1,000,000,000 of a curie, (one billionth of a curie) 

Picocurie: 1/1,000,000,000,000 of a curie (one-trillionth of a curie, abbreviated pCi) 

Decay (radioactive): the decrease in the radiation intensity of any radioactive material with respect 
to time. 

Decontamination: the process of making any person, object, or area safe by absorbing, destroying, 
neutralizing, making harmless, or removing chemical or biological agents, or by removing 
radioactive material clinging to or around it. 

Interim REP Program Manual B-6 August 2002 


Appendix B 

Decontamination station: a building or location suitably equipped and organized where personnel 
and material are cleansed of chemical, biological, or radiological contaminants. 

Deficiency: an observed or identified inadequacy of organizational performance in an exercise that 
could cause a finding that offsite emergency preparedness is not adequate to provide reasonable 
assurance that appropriate protective measures can be taken in the event of a radiological 
emergency to protect the health and safety of the public living in the vicinity of a nuclear power 
plant. 

Depleted uranium: uranium having a percentage of uranium-235 smaller than the 0.7% found in 
natural uranium. It is obtained from spent (used) fuel elements or as byproduct tails, or residues 
from uranium isotope separation. 

Derived Response Level (DRL): calculated concentration of a particular radionuclide in a 
particular medium (e.g., food) that will produce a dose equal to a protective action guide. 

Direction and control: the management of emergency functions within a particular context 
(e.g., emergency operations center) through leadership and use of authority. 

Disabled individuals: individuals who are hearing-impaired, vision-impaired, non-ambulatory and 
require support (e.g., crutches), frail, dependent upon life-support systems, or mentally or 
emotionally impaired. 

Dose: the quantity of energy absorbed from ionization per unit mass of tissue. The rad is the unit of 
absorbed dose. 

Dose equivalent: a term used to express the amount of effective radiation when modifying factors 
have been considered. The product of absorbed dose multiplied by a quality factor multiplied by a 
distribution factor. It is expressed numerically in rem. The product of the absorbed dose in rad, a 
quality factor related to the biological effectiveness of the radiation involved and any other 
modifying factors. 

Dose rate: the radiation dose delivered per unit time and measured, for instance rems per hour (as 
rads per second or rads per hour). 

Dose equivalent: the absorbed radiation dose to human beings delivered. 

Dose limits for emergency workers: the allowable accumulated dose during the entire period of 
the emergency. Action to avoid exceeding the limit is taken based on actual measurements of 
integrated gamma exposure. In contrast, protective action guides are trigger levels of projected dose 
at which actions are taken to protect the public. These actions are taken prior to the dose being 
received. 

Interim REP Program Manual B-7 August 2002 


Appendix B 

Dosimeter: a portable device such as a thermoluminescent dosimeter (TLD) film badge or 
direst-reading ionization chamber for measuring and registering the total accumulated exposure 
to ionizing radiation: Dosimeter Information: 

Training dosimeter 

(requires quarterly leakage tests) 

CD V 138 0200 mR 

CD V 725 05 R 

CD V 730 020 R 

CD V 740 0100 R 

CD V 742 0200 R 

DCA 622 020 R 

DCA 862 0200 mR 

Dosimetry: the measurement of radiation doses. It applies to both the devices used (dosimeters) and 
to the techniques. 

Drill: an event involving organizational responses to a simulated accident to develop, test, and 
monitor specialized emergency skills that constitute one or more component of an emergency plan 
and procedure. 

Effective Dose Equivalent (EDE): the sum of the products of the dose equivalent to each organ on 
a weighting factor, where the weighting factor is the ratio of the risk of mortality from delayed 
health effects arising from irradiation of a particular organ or tissue to the total risk of mortality 
from delayed health effects when the whole body is irradiated uniformly to the same dose. 

Electron: a stable, negatively charged elementary particle of matter. Electrons orbit the positively 
charged nucleus of the atom. 

Element: one of the 103 known chemical substances that cannot be broken down further without 
changing its chemical properties. Some examples include hydrogen, nitrogen, gold, lead, and 
uranium. 

Emergency: an unexpected event during the operation of a nuclear facility that has a significant 
effect on the safety of the facility, personnel or the public. 

Emergency Action and Coordination Team (EACT): DOE senior management team at 
Headquarters that coordinates the initial FRMAP response to a radiological emergency. 

Emergency Alert System (EAS): a system of radio and television stations responsible for 
providing official government instructions to the public (formerly the Emergency Broadcast System 
[EBS]). 

Interim REP Program Manual B-8 August 2002 


Appendix B 

Emergency Classification Level(s) (ECL): applies to commercial nuclear power plants only: 

1. 
Notification of Unusual Event (NOUE): indicates that unusual events are in process or 
have occurred that indicate a potential degradation in the level of plant safety. No 
releases of radioactive material requiring offsite response or monitoring are expected, 
unless further degradation of safety systems occurs. 
2. 
Alert (ALERT): indicates that events are in process or have occurred that involve an 
actual or potential substantial degradation in the level of plant safety. Releases are 
expected to be limited to small fractions of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
protective action guides (PAG) exposure levels. 
3. 
Site Area Emergency (SAE): indicates that events are in process or have occurred that 
involves actual or likely major failures in the plant functions needed for protecting the 
public. Releases are not expected to exceed EPA PAG exposure levels, except near the 
site boundary. 
4. 
General Emergency (GE): indicates that events are in process or have occurred that 
involve actual or imminent substantial core degradation or melting, with potential for 
loss of containment integrity. Releases can reasonably be expected to exceed EPA PAG 
exposure levels offsite, beyond the immediate site area. 
Emergency Information and Coordination Center (EICC): FEMA 24-hour national emergency 
center from which the EST operates. EICC communications link the SFO, FEMA Regional and 
Headquarters staff, and other Federal departments and agencies at the national level with one 
another. 

Emergency information: material designed to improve public knowledge or understanding of an 
emergency. 

Emergency instructions: information provided to the general public during an emergency 
pertaining to protective action recommendations for actions such as evacuation and sheltering. 

Emergency Operations Facility (EOF): a facility that is the primary base of emergency operations 
for the Licensee in a radiological incident. An onsite operations facility provided by the NRC 
Licensee to facilitate the management of an overall emergency response. Utility and State officials, 
and a very limited number of Federal personnel may be accommodated. 

Emergency Operations Center (EOC): a facility that is the primary base of emergency operations 
for an ORO in a radiological emergency. 

Emergency phase: the initial phase of response actions, during which actions are taken in response 
to a threat of release or a release in progress. 

Interim REP Program Manual B-9 
August 2002 


Appendix B 

Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ): areas surrounding a nuclear power reactor site extending out to 
about 50 miles in which response activities and protective actions would be required to protect the 
public from the hazards of a nuclear accident. The EPZ for the plume extends out about 10 miles, 
the radius for the ingestion pathway out to about 50 miles. EPZs for accidents at other types of 
radiological facilities have not been defined but, for technical reasons, are significantly different 
from those defined for a nuclear power plant. 

Emergency protective actions: protective actions to isolate food to prevent its introduction into 
commerce and to determine whether condemnation or other disposition is appropriate. 

Emergency response planning area: see Planning area. 

Emergency Response Team (ERT): FEMA team deployed to a radiological emergency scene by 
the FEMA Director to make an initial assessment of the situation and then provide FEMAs primary 
response capability. 

Emergency Support Team (EST): FEMA Headquarters team that carries out notification, 
activation, and coordination procedures from the FEMA EICC. The EST is responsible for Federal 
agency headquarters coordination, staff support of the FEMA Director, and support of the SFO. 

Emergency Worker (EW): individual who has an essential mission within the plume exposure 
pathway emergency planning zone to protect the health and safety of the public who could be 
exposed to ionizing radiation from the plume or from its deposition. Some examples of emergency 
workers are: radiation monitoring personnel; traffic control personnel; evacuation vehicle drivers; 
fire and rescue personnel, including ambulance crews; medical facilities personnel; emergency 
operations center personnel; personnel carrying out backup alerting procedures; and essential 
services or utility personnel. 

Essential emergency functions: these include communications, direction and control of operations, 
alert and notification of the public, accident assessment, information for the public and media, 
radiological monitoring, protective response, and medical and public health support. 

Evacuation: a population protection strategy involving orderly movement of people away from an 
actual or potential hazard, and providing reception centers for those without their own resources for 
temporary relocation. 

Evacuation Time Estimate (ETE): an estimate, contained in emergency plans, of the time that 
would be required to evacuate general and special populations within the plume pathway emergency 
planning zone under emergency conditions. 

Evaluation module: the tool for evaluators to document exercise performance. 

Exception area: an area located approximately 5 to 10 miles from a nuclear power plant and 
specifically designated in an organizations plan, for which the 15-minute alerting and notification 
provision does not apply. For these areas, off-site authorities have approximately 45 minutes to 
complete alert and notification of the public. 

Interim REP Program Manual B-10 August 2002 


Appendix B 

Exclusion Area: the area surrounding a nuclear reactor in which the facility operator has the 
authority to determine all activities, including exclusion or removal of personnel and property from 
the area. A specific area off-limits (miles) from a nuclear plant. 

Exercise: an event involving organizational responses to a simulated commercial nuclear power 
plant accident with radiological and other offsite consequences. The purpose of an exercise is to test 
the integrated capabilities of involved offsite response organizations to implement emergency 
functions set forth in State, Tribal, and local radiological emergency response plans and procedures. 

Exercise issue: a problem in organizational exercise performance that is linked with specific 
NUREG-0654 standards and applicable evaluation criteria. There are two categories of exercise 
issues: Deficiencies and Areas Requiring Corrective Actions. 

Exposure: the absorption of radiation or ingestion of a radionuclide. The exposure at a given point 
is a measurement of radiation in relation to its ability to produce ionization. The unit of 
measurement of the exposure is the roentgen. A measure of radiation dose received by a person, 
usually broken down and used to refer to whole-body exposure compared with exposure to the 
hands only. 

Exposure rate: the amount of gamma radiation that an individual would receive in one hour as 
measured in air (typically expressed in units of microrem per hour, millirem per hour or rem per 
hour). 

Extent of Play: the document that describes the agreed-upon level of play vs. simulation at an 
emergency response exercise. May describe evaluation criteria to be demonstrated, equipment, 
including vehicles, to be used ,personnel to be deployed, facilities to be activated, etc. 

Extremities: the hands and forearms and, with restrictions, the head, feet, and ankles. (Permissible 
radiation exposures in these regions are generally greater than in the whole body because they 
contain less blood-forming material and have smaller volumes for energy absorption.) 

Facility: any building, center, room(s), or mobile unit(s) designed and equipped to support 
emergency operations. 

Fast-Breaking Incident: situation exists, severe core damage, requiring urgent action. 

Federal or other support organizations: Federal agencies such as FEMA, the U.S. Department of 
Energy, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, or any other governmental, quasi-governmental, 
or private organizations (e.g., American Red Cross, Civil Air Patrol, Radio Amateur Civil 
Emergency Services, cooperating state compact radiological monitoring or sampling personnel, and 
national or university laboratories) that may provide assistance in radiological emergencies. 

Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO): the Federal official appointed by the President upon 
declaration of a major disaster or emergency under Public Law 93-288 to coordinate the overall 
Federal response. 

Interim REP Program Manual B-11 August 2002 


Appendix B 

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA): this agency establishes Federal policies for 
and coordinates all civil defense and civil emergency planning, management, mitigation, and 
assistance functions of executive agencies. FEMA assists local and State agencies in their 
emergency planning. Its primary role is one of coordinating Federal, State, local, and volunteer 
response actions. 

Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan (FRERP): a plan for coordinating Federal 
response to any type of peacetime radiological emergency requiring significant Federal response. 

Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center (FRMAC): center usually located at 
an airport near the scene of a radiological emergency from with the DOE Offsite Technical Director 
conducts the FRMAP response. This center need not be located near the onsite or Federal-State 
operations centers as long as its operations can be coordinated with them. 

Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Plan (FRMAP): a plan to provide coordinated 
radiological monitoring and assessment assistance to the State and local governments in response to 
radiological emergencies. 

Federal Radiological Preparedness Coordinating Committee (FRPCC): established by 44 CFR 
Part 35l, and is the coordination mechanism, at the National Level, to provide technical assistance to 
State and Local Governments. 

Federal Response Center (FRC): the on-scene focal point established by the Senior FEMA 
Official, as required, for coordinating the Federal response to an incident. Representatives of other 
Federal, State, local, and volunteer agencies will be located in the center. 

Feed water: water supplied to the reactor pressure vessel (in a BWR) or the steam generator (in a 
PWR) that removes heat from the reactor fuel rods by boiling and becoming steam. The steam 
becomes the driving force for the plant turbine generator. 

Field Command Post (FCP): a center, either mobile or fixed, set up in a location convenient to the 
accident site, to facilitate emergency response, especially, for example, accident assessment 
activities such as direction of the field monitoring teams. 

Field Team Coordinator (FTC): the individual who manages the functions of field teams and 
coordinates data with the dose assessment group located in emergency operation centers and 
facilities. 

Fission: the splitting of an atomic nucleus into two approximately equal parts accompanied by the 
release of large amounts of energy and one or more neutrons. 

Fission gases: those fission products that exist in the gaseous state. Primarily the noble gases 
(krypton, xenon, radon, etc.). 

Film badge: a photographic film packet to be carried by personnel, usually in the form of a badge, 
used for measuring and permanently recording gamma ray dosage. 

Interim REP Program Manual B-12 August 2002 


Appendix B 

Fixed Nuclear Facilities (FNF): stationary nuclear installations that use or produce radioactive 
materials in their normal operations. These facilities include commercial nuclear power plants and 
other fixed facilities. 

Fixed contamination: contamination that remains after loose contamination has been removed by 
decontamination. 

Fixed (reproducible) geometry: a method of measuring levels of radioactivity in samples by using 
a standard size or volume of samples held at a fixed distance from the measuring instrument. 

Food chain: the pathway of any material through the environment to edible plants, animals and 
ultimately to man. 

Forward EOC: if the State EOC is a significant distance from the plant site, the plans may indicate 
that a near-site or forward EOC will be established at the time of an accident. 

Forward Command Post (FCP): in a location near the affected area used to direct the activities of 
State field personnel performing emergency tasks in support of local government response. At times 
this location can also be the location for field team coordination. 

Forward Operations Post: located in or near the affected area to coordinate the monitoring and 
sampling activities of the Radiological Emergency Response Teams. 

Forward Staging Area (FSA): location near accident site for location of resources for deployment. 

Fuel cycle: the series of steps involved in supplying fuel for nuclear power reactors. It includes 
mining, fabrication of fuel elements and assemblies, their use in a reactor, reprocessing spent fuel 
and refabrication into new fuel elements. 

Fuel element: a rod or other form into which nuclear fuel is fabricated for use in a nuclear reactor. 

Full Scale Exercise: a joint exercise in which: (1) State, Tribal, and local government and Licensee 
emergency personnel and other resources are mobilized in sufficient numbers to adequately 
demonstrate and test their planning and preparedness capabilities to respond to a simulated 
radiological emergency; (2) the integrated capabilities of organizations to adequately assess and 
respond to a radiological accident are demonstrated; and (3) the implementation of the observable 
elements of State and/or local and Licensee plans and preparedness is tested. 

Fusion: the formation of a heavier nucleus from two lighter ones, with the release of energy. 

Gamma rays: the most penetrating of the three types of ionizing radiation, gamma rays are 
electromagnetic radiationlike light, radio waves and microwaves. Similar to, but usually more 
powerful than X-rays, they have no mass; they are only energy. Gamma rays are best stopped or 
shielded against by dense material such as concrete or lead. 

Interim REP Program Manual B-13 August 2002 


Appendix B 

Geiger-Mueller (G-M) detector: a type of radiation detector that can be used to measure the 
gamma, or beta plus gamma radiation depending on whether the detector is covered by a beta 
shield. 

Groundshine: is gamma and/or beta radiation from radioactive material deposited on the ground. 

Half-life: the time required for the activity of a given radioactive species to decrease to half of its 
initial value due to radioactive decay. The half-life is a characteristic property of each radioactive 
species and is independent of its amount or condition. The effective half-life of a given isotope on 
the body is the time in which the quantity in the body will decrease to half as a result of both 
radioactive decay and biological elimination. Half-lives vary from millionths of a second to billions 
of years. 

Health physics: the science of recognizing, evaluating and controlling health hazards from ionizing 
radiation. 

Health Physics Technician (HPT): an individual trained in radiation protection. 

High exposure rate: rates greater than 2.5 milliroentgens per hour. 

High levels of radiation exposure: doses of 100 rem or greater. 

High-level waste: no longer useful materials from nuclear operations, which have radioactivity 
concentrations of hundreds to thousands of curies per gallon or cubic foot. 

Host area: a geographical area that is at least 5 miles, and preferably 10 miles, beyond the 
boundaries of the 10-mile plume pathway EPZ where functions such as congregate care, 
radiological monitoring, decontamination, and registration are conducted. 

Host regional office: the FEMA Regional Office that has program jurisdiction for a site because of 
the location of a commercial nuclear power plant within its regional borders. 

Hot spot: the region in a contaminated area in which the level of radioactive contamination is 
considerably greater than in neighboring regions. 

Implementing procedures (IPs): operating procedures used by personnel that provide a detailed 
description, including checklists, of the operations that are to be conducted by either a specific 
group of individuals or by a designated position. (Note: used synonymously with Standard 
Operating Procedures [SOPs].) 

Inadequate: as used in reviews of radiological emergency response plans or procedures, inadequate 
means the plan contents do not meet the NUREG-0654 evaluation criteria. 

Ingestion Exposure Pathway (IEP): NUREG-0396 estimates that the area in which human and 
animal ingestion of radioactive contamination is most likely is contained within approximately a 
50-mile radius around a nuclear reactor site following a significant accident release. Food, 

Interim REP Program Manual B-14 August 2002 


Appendix B 

potable water, or milk products in this pathway may become contaminated as a result of a release 
of radioactive gas or particulates to the atmosphere or waterways. The duration of such exposures 
could range in length from hours to months. 

Institutionalized individuals: individuals who reside in institutions, such as nursing homes or 
prisons, who may need to depend on others for assistance with protective actions. Institutionalized 
individuals may or may not have special needs. 

Ingestion Exercise: an exercise involving ingestion exposure pathway protective action decision-
making and implementation. A State should fully participate in the ingestion pathway portion of 
exercises at least once every six years. In States with more than one site, the State should rotate this 
participation from site to site. 

Interagency Radiological Assistance Plan (IRAP): 1965, revised 1975. (See FRMAP) 

Internal radiation: the nuclear radiation resulting from radioactive substances in the body. Some 
examples are iodine-131 found in the thyroid gland, and strontium-90 and plutonium-239 found in 
bone. 

Iodine: only one stable isotope exists, the rest are radioactive and artificially created. The most 
common, iodine-131 and iodine-125, are used for medical treatment of the thyroid gland and in 
research. 

Ion: an atom or molecule with a negative or positive electrical charge. 

Ionization: the process of adding or removing electrons from atoms or molecules, thereby creating 
ions. High temperatures, electrical discharges or nuclear radiation can cause ionization. 

Ionizing radiation: any radiation that displaces electrons from atoms or molecules, thereby 
producing icons. Alpha, beta and gamma radiation are examples. Ionizing radiation may damage 
skin and tissue. 

Irradiation: exposure to radiation. 

Isotope: nuclides having the same number of protons in their nuclei and the same atomic number, 
but differing in the number of neutrons and atomic mass number. Some isotopes of a particular 
element may be radioactive while the others are not. 

Joint Information Center (JIC): a central point of contact for all news media at the scene of the 
incident. News media representatives are kept informed of activities and events via public 
information officials from all participating Federal, State, and local agencies, which, ideally, are 
collocated at the JIC. 

Key staff: those emergency personnel, sufficient in numbers and functions, necessary to carry out 
emergency operations as required by scenario events and as set forth in the plans. 

Interim REP Program Manual B-15 August 2002 


Appendix B 

KI (potassium iodide): a prophylactic drug (stable form of iodine) that can be used effectively to 
block the uptake of radioiodine by the thyroid gland. 

Kilo: a prefix that multiplies a basic unit by 1,000. Example: 1 kilometer = 1,000 meters (103). 

Kilovolt (kv): the unit of electrical potential equal to 1000 volts. 

Lead Agency Official (LAO): designated official on scne from each participating Federal agency 
authorized to direct that agencys response. 

Licensed material: source material, special nuclear material, or by-product material received, 
possessed, used, or transferred under a general or special license issued by the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission or a State. 

Licensee: the utility or organization that has applied for or has received from the NRC (1) a license 
to construct or operate a commercial nuclear power plant, (2) a possession-only license for a 
commercial nuclear power plant, with the exception of licensees that have received an NRC-
approved exemption to 10 CFR 50.54(q) requirements, (3) an early site permit for a commercial 
nuclear power plant, (4) a combined construction permit and operating license for a commercial 
nuclear power plant, or (5) any other NRC license that is now or may become subject to 
requirements for offsite radiological emergency planning and preparedness activities. 

Licensee offsite response organization: the Licensees offsite emergency response organization 
comprised of Licensee, State, Tribal, and local government, volunteer and other support personnel 
required to implement the Licensees radiological emergency response plan. Such an organization 
entity is typically employed for situations where State, Tribal, and local governments do not 
participate in radiological emergency planning and preparedness. 

Limited response: response to a request for radiological assistance that involves limited DOE or 
other agency resources and does not require the formal field management structure. 

Low-level waste: wastes containing types and concentrations of radioactivity that require little or no 
shielding for personnel exposure. 

Maximally exposed individual: a hypothetical individual who receives the greatest possible 
projected dose in the area of highest radiation levels over a specified period of time. 

Measuring: refers to counting to detect radiation levels or determining other parameters, such as the 
energy of radiation or physical characteristics of samples, such as the volume of an air sample. 

Media center: a facility staffed by public information officers from multiple emergency response 
organizations for the purpose of providing a single designated point of contact with the news media 
and to facilitate exchange and coordination of information among public information officers from 
different organizations. This type of facility is also referred to as a Public Information Center, a 
Joint Information Center, a Public Affairs Center, or an Emergency News Center. 

Interim REP Program Manual B-16 August 2002 


Appendix B 

Meteorological Unified Dose Assessment Center (MUDAC): an area within or near the facility 
which houses the personnel responsible for the coordination of radiological monitoring teams, 
collection of radiological monitoring data, calculation of dose projections and the recommendation 
of protective actions for the EPZs. 

Microcurie : a one-millionth part of a curie. 
milli: A prefix that divides a basic unit by one thousand. 
Millicurie: see Curie. 
Millirem: a one-thousandth part of a roentgen. 
Milliroentgen: see Roentgen. 
mR: milliRoentgen (mR) one thousandth of a Roentgen. 
mRem/yr: amount of radiation received in l year. 
Mobile Emergency Response Support (MERS): FEMAs communications capability. 
Mobility impaired: those without transportation, including those without their own cars, those who 


are unable to drive and those who need assistance, any of whom will need transportation assistance 


to evacuate. 
Mobilized organization: an organization that has completed the activation process and is able to 
carry out the essential emergency functions, as required by scenario events and as set forth in 
emergency response plans. 


Monitoring: the act of detecting the presence of radiation and the measurement of radiation levels, 


usually with a portable survey instrument. 
Monitoring and decontamination facility: a temporary facility established outside the plume 
emergency planning zone for the purpose of monitoring and decontaminating emergency workers, 
and their vehicles and equipment used in the plume and/or areas contaminated by the plume. 


MS-1 Hospital: hospitals trained and capable of treating members of the general public who may 
be injured and/or considered to have substantial radiation related injuries, or who may have been 
exposed to and contaminated by radioactive materials. 

Nano: a prefix that divides a basic unit by one billion (109). 
Nanocurie: one-billionth part of a curie. 
Neutron: an uncharged particle found in the nucleus of every atom heavier than hydrogen. 


Neutrons sustain the fission chain reaction in a reactor. 

Interim REP Program Manual B-17 August 2002 


Appendix B 

Noble gases: the chemically inert radioactive gases that are released during an accident at a nuclear 
power plant. 

Non-participating organizations: State, Tribal, and local governments that are not participating in 
emergency planning and preparedness for accidents at a commercial nuclear power plant. 

Notification and mobilization of personnel: the transmission of messages to emergency personnel 
informing them of an emergency situation and directing them to report for emergency duty at their 
assigned duty stations. 

Notifying the public: distributing an instructional message, either through the Emergency 
Broadcast System or some other system. 

Nuclear Weapon Accident Response Procedures (NARP) Manual: Department of Defense and 
Defense Nuclear Agency Manual. 

Nuclear radiation: the particulate and electromagnetic radiation emitted from atomic nuclei in 
various nuclear processes. The important nuclear radiation (from the weapons standpoint) is alpha 
and beta particles, gamma rays and neutrons. All nuclear radiations are ionizing radiations, but the 
reverse is not true. 

Nucleus: the dense, central, positively charged core of an atom. All nuclei contain protons and 
neutrons except the nucleus of hydrogen, which has a single proton. 

Nuclide: a general term referring to all known isotopes, both stable (279) and unstable (about 
5,000), of the chemical elements. 

Objective: one of the 33 areas of offsite response organization capability which are evaluated 
during a REP exercise and which are defined in FEMA-REP-14 and FEMA-REP-15. 

Off-hours: the hours between 6:00 p.m. and 4:00 a.m. or any weekend hours. 

Offsite: that area beyond the boundaries of a nuclear plant. 

Offsite Response Organization (ORO): any State, Tribal, and local government, supporting 
private industry and voluntary organizations and Licensee offsite response organizations that are 
responsible for carrying out emergency functions during a radiological emergency. 

On-scene: the area surrounding a site that is, or potentially could be, impacted by an incident. This 
area includes both onsite and offsite areas. 

Onsite: the area/location of the commercial nuclear plant. 

Onsite personnel: Licensee or contract personnel working at commercial nuclear power plants. 

Interim REP Program Manual B-18 August 2002 


Appendix B 

Operational: the EOC/EOF/Media Center/Assistance Center/Emergency Worker Center/ 
Laboratories, etc., are considered Operational when all key decision makers are at their duty 
stations and capable of performing all emergency functions assigned to that facility. (See respective 
plans and procedures for list of key decision makers.) 

Operationally mobilized organization: an organization that has completed the activation process 
required by scenario events and their emergency response plan and procedures. Operational 
mobilization is achieved when all key personnel are at their duty stations. 

Partial exercise: the engagement of State, Tribal, and local government personnel in an exercise 
sufficient to adequately test facility-based direction and control functions for protective action 
decision making related to the appropriate establishment of emergency classification levels and 
communication capabilities among affected State, Tribal, and local governments and the Licensee. 
During partial participation exercises, it is not necessary to demonstrate field-based function. Partial 
participation, as defined, typically refers to the limited participation of State governments in an 
exercise; however, in some cases, this concept can be used to refer to an exercise in which local 
governments have limited participation. Limited participation of State, Tribal, and local 
organizations is permitted to provide relief to organizations that have responsibilities for two or 
more sites. 

Particulate radiation: radiation in the form of particles (e.g., neutrons, electrons, alpha and beta 
particles) as opposed to electromagnetic radiation. 

Pico: a prefix that divides a basic unit by one trillion (10-12). 

Picocurie: one-trillionth part of a curie. 

Plan: an organizations documented concept of operations and implementing procedures for 
managing its internal response and coordinating its external response with other organizations to 
radiological emergencies. 

Planning area: a predesignated geographic subdivision of the plume pathway emergency-planning 
zone. In some plans, it may be referred to as an Emergency Response Planning Area or an 
equivalent term. 

Plume: generally a gaseous atmospheric release from a nuclear power plant, in an accident or 
emergency, which may contain radioactive noble gases and volatile solids. While emergency plans 
must recognize the very low probability that particulates could be released in a serious accident, 
primary emphasis is given to the development of protective actions against the release of noble 
gases and volatiles such as radioiodines. This cloud is not visible to the eye, but can be measured, or 
seen with radiation measurement equipment. 

Plume dose projections: estimates of dosage to the public from exposure to the plume, over a 
period of time, in the absence of initiating protective actions. 

Interim REP Program Manual B-19 August 2002 


Appendix B 

Plume Exposure Pathway: for planning purposes, the area within approximately a 10-mile radius 
of a nuclear plant site. A term describing the means by which whole body radiation exposures occur 
as a result of immersion in a plume release. The area in which plume exposures are likely is 
described in NUREG-0396 as an area extending out approximately 10 miles from the reactor site 
and forming roughly a keyhole shape, with the keyhole oriented downwind. In the EPZ-plume, 
actions may be required to protect the public from the effects of whole-body external exposure to 
gamma radiation from the plume and from deposited materials and inhalation exposure from the 
passing radioactive plumes released materials. The duration of exposure in this mode could range 
from hours to days in the case of particulate deposition. 

Plutonium (Pu): an artificially produced fissile material. The Pu-239 isotope is used primarily in 
nuclear weapons. 

Pocket dosimeter: a small ionization detection instrument that indicates radiation exposure directly. 
An auxiliary charging device is usually necessary. 

Population dose projection: projection made by a Federal agency under FRMAP pertaining to the 
levels of radiation to which the population within the EPZ will be exposed. 

Portal monitor: a radiation monitor consisting of several radiation detectors arranged in a fixed 
position within a frame that forms a passageway for individuals being monitored. 

Post plume: activities (ingestion, relocation, re-entry, and return) that occur after a plume has been 
released. These activities can be demonstrated with the plume phase or separately. 

Potassium-40: a naturally occurring radioactive isotope of potassium. It is a beta and gamma 
emitter and has an exceedingly long half-life. The average person receives about 20 millirems a 
year from the potassium-40 in his/her body. 

Potassium iodide (KI): a prophylactic compound commonly referred to as a radioprotective drug, 
used to block the uptake of radioactive iodine by the thyroid in a human being. 

Potential dose: the radiation dose that could result from a particular set of plant conditions that are 
not based on estimated or measured releases or environmental levels. 

Precautionary protective actions: any preventive or emergency protective actions implemented 
without the verification of radionuclide measurements by field monitoring or laboratory analysis. 

Pre-operational exercise: an exercise conducted prior to the issuance of a full-power license of a 
commercial nuclear power plant by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

Pressure vessel: a strong-walled container housing the core of most types of power reactors. 

Pressurized water reactor: a power reactor in which heat is transferred from the core to the heat 
exchanger by water kept under high pressure. The primary system is pressurized to allow the water 
to reach high temperatures without boiling. Steam is generated in a secondary circuit. 

Interim REP Program Manual B-20 August 2002 


Appendix B 

Preventive protective actions: protective actions to prevent or reduce contamination of milk, food, 
and drinking water. Other preventive protective actions are washing, brushing, scrubbing, or peeling 
fruits and vegetables to remove surface contamination. 

Primary coolant: water used to cool and carry heat away from the core of a pressurized water 
reactor. Heat is transferred from the primary coolant to a secondary loop using a heat exchanger, 
producing steam to drive the turbine. 

Projected dose: the estimated or calculated amount of radiation dose to an individual from 
exposure to the plume and/or deposited materials, over a period of time, in the absence of protective 
action. 

Protective Action Decision (PAD): measures taken in anticipation of, or in response to, a release of 
radioactive material to the environment. The purpose of PAs is to provide dose savings by avoiding 
or minimizing the radiation exposure received by individuals, thereby minimizing the health risks 
resulting from radiation exposure. Sheltering and evacuation are the two PAs that are relied upon 
for limiting the direct exposure of the general public within the plume exposure EPZ. Preventive 
and emergency PAs are two categories of PAs that will be relied upon for limiting exposure from 
contaminated food and water in the ingestion exposure EPZ. 

Protective Action Guide (PAG): projected dose to an individual in the general population that 
warrants the implementation of protective action. Specific PAGs (FDA and EPA) have been 
recommended in terms of the level of projected dose that warrants the implementation of evacuation 
and sheltering, relocation, and limiting the use of contaminated food, water, or animal feed. 

Protective Action Recommendation (PAR): advice to the State on emergency measures it should 
consider in determining action for the public to take to avoid or reduce their exposure to radiation. 

Protective response: implementation of a protective action. 

Proton: positively charged particles that, along with neutrons, are the prime components of atomic 
nuclei. The atomic number of an atom is equal to the number of protons in its nucleus. 

Public instruction: instructions (warning messages) that are PARs for the public. Instructions 
should be given by a public official and delivered directly to the public via the notifications system 
(i.e., EAS radio). Message content and timeliness are very important. Messages should be repeated 
by Notification system at least every 15 minutes until updated by public authorities. If applicable, 
public instructions should be coordinated with other authorities. 

Public information: information delivered to the media via press conferences, interviews, technical 
briefings, printed media releases, and telephonic distribution of printed releases. Information should 
be current, accurate, and timely. All printed releases should be coordinated with other authorities 
before distribution to the media. Ideally, information released in news conferences, briefings, and 
interviews should be coordinated before release. If pre-coordination does not occur, then post-
notification of other authorities of critical points discussed in interviews, conferences, etc., should 
occur. 

Interim REP Program Manual B-21 August 2002 


Appendix B 

RAC AC: is the Regional Assistance Committee Advisory Council. Chairpersons from each of the 
10 FEMA Regional Radiological Assistance Committees work with FEMA Headquarters staff to 
ensure continuity throughout the Regions in the administration of the REP program. When the 
council was chartered in 1997 it was per the Kay C. Goss, Associate Director for Preparedness, 
Training and Exercises, memorandum dated February 25, 1997, addressed to FEMA Regional 
Directors. That memorandum stated the following: As you know, the RAC Chairperson Advisory 
Committee was established as an outgrowth of the first National Radiological Emergency 
Preparedness (REP) Conference held in Gettysburg, PA, July 29August 2, 1996. The committee is 
a standing Regional committee to discuss mutual program issues of substantive concern and provide 
consensus recommendation(s) to the PT&E Directorate. As a corollary responsibility, the 
Committee will provide technical expertise to the Federal Radiological Preparedness Coordinating 
Committee (FRPCC), as appropriate. 

Rad: acronym for radiation absorbed dose. The basic unit of absorbed dose radiation. One rad 
represents the absorption of 100 ergs of nuclear (or ionizing) radiation per gram of the absorbing 
material or tissue. 

Radiation Safety Officer: a health physicist or other individual experienced in radiation protection 
who advises medical facility staff regarding the hazards associated with high levels of radiation. 

Radiation sickness: the complex of symptoms characterizing the disease known as radiation injury, 
resulting from excessive exposure of the whole body (or large part) to ionizing radiation. The 
earliest of these symptoms are nausea, fatigue, vomiting, and diarrhea, which may be followed by 
loss of hair (epilation) hemorrhage, inflammation of the mouth and throat, and general loss of 
energy. In severe cases, where the radiation exposure has been relatively large, death may occur 
within 2 to 4 weeks. Those who survive 6 weeks after the receipt of a single large dose of radiation 
may generally be expected to recover. 

Probable Early Effects of Acute Radiation 

Whole Body Doses 

Acute Doses Probable Effect 
0 to 25 R (Roentgen) No obvious injury 
25 to 50 R Possible blood changes, but no serious injury 
50 to 100 R Blood-cell changes, some injury, no disability 
100 to 200 R Injury, possible disability 
200 to 400 R Injury and disability certain, death possible 
400 R Fatal to 50% 
600 R or more Fatal 

Radioactivity: the spontaneous decay or disintegration of an unstable atomic nucleus, usually 
accompanied by the emission of ionizing radiation, generally alpha or beta particles, often 
accompanied by gamma rays from the nuclei of an unstable isotope. 

Interim REP Program Manual B-22 August 2002 


Appendix B 

Radioisotope: an unstable isotope of an element that decays or disintegrates spontaneously, 
emitting radiation. Approximately 5000 natural and artificial radioisotopes have been identified. 

Radiological Assistance Program (RAP): a team dispatched to the site of a radiological incident 
by the DOE Regional Office responding to the incident. 

Radiological emergency: a type of radiological incident that poses an actual or potential hazard to 
public health or safety or loss of property. 

Radiological emergency area: an area established either on an ad hoc basis or pre-identified in a 
medical facility for monitoring, decontamination, and treatment of contaminated injured individuals, 
and for contamination control. 

Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) Program: the FEMA program that administers 
emergency preparedness for all commercial nuclear sites. 

Radiological Emergency Response Plan: a detailed plan which coordinates and describes the 
emergency response organizations, responsibilities, and capabilities of utilities, local or State 
governments, and private organizations to ensure public health and safety during an emergency 
situation in which there is a potential for radiological release. 

Radiological Emergency Response Team: a team located near the affected area that coordinates 
all field teams and sampling activities. 

Radiological survey: the directed effort to determine the distribution of radiological material and 
dose rates in an area. 

Radiology: that branch of medicine dealing with the diagnostic and therapeutic applications of 
radiant energy, including x-rays and radioisotopes. 

Radionuclide: a radioactive isotope of a particular element. 

Reception Center (RC): a pre-designated facility outside the Plume Exposure EPZ (minimum is 
15 miles from utility) at which the evacuated public can register; receive radiation monitoring and 
decontamination; receive assistance in contacting others; receive directions to Congregate Care 
Centers; reunite with others; and receive general information. It generally refers to a facility where 
monitoring, decontamination, and registration of evacuees are conducted. (Note: also called a 
relocation center, registration center.) 

Reclassification of Areas Requiring Corrective Action as Deficiencies: an ARCA may be 
reclassified as a Deficiency under two conditions. First, when the collective impact of two or more 
ARCAs on the functioning of an emergency organization precludes the adequate protection of the 
public health and safety; and second, when an organization repeatedly demonstrates the inability to 
correct one or more previously identified ARCAs over a period of two or more biennial exercises. 

Interim REP Program Manual B-23 August 2002 


Appendix B 

Recovery: the process of reducing radiation exposure rates and concentrations of radioactive 
material in the environment to acceptable levels for return by the general public for unconditional 
occupancy or use after the emergency phase of a radiological emergency. 

Recovery plan: a plan developed by the State to restore the affected area with Federal assistance if 
needed. 

Recovery worker: an individual who is permitted to enter the restricted zone under controlled 
conditions to perform work or to retrieve valuable property. 

Reentry: the provisions for the return of the public after evacuation, when the radiation risk has 
been reduced to acceptable levels. 

Reentry recommendation: advice provided to the State by the CFA in conjunction with the SFO 
and appropriate Federal departments and agencies concerning State and local government guidance 
or recommendations that may be issued to the public for returning to an area affected by a 
radiological emergency. 

Regional Office Support Team (ROST): FEMA regional team that supports the ERT. The ROST 
facilitates deployment of the ERT; interfaces with the EST at FEMA headquarters, with other 
regional departments or agencies, and with State and local agencies and organizations during 
deployment; provides regional support during deployment; and assists with recall of the ERT. 

Regional (Radiological) Assistance Committee (RAC): a committee of representatives from a 
number of Federal agencies which have agreed to assist the FEMA Region in providing technical 
assistance to State, Tribal, and local governments and to evaluate radiological emergency response 
plans and exercises on the basis of their special authorities, missions, and expertise. 

Regional Response Force (RRF): force identified in the Nuclear Accident Response Capabilities 
Listing (NARCL) (at JNACC) belonging to DOD or DOE installation, facilities, or activities within 
the US and its territories. The RRF may be tasked with taking emergency response actions 
necessary to maintain command and control onsite pending arrival of the Service or Agency 
Response Force (SRF). Function which the RRF may be tasked with, within their capabilities, are: 

(1) rescue operations; (2) accident site security; (3) firefighting; (4) initial weapon emergency 
safing; (5) radiation monitoring; (6) establishing command, control and communications; and 
(7) public affairs activities. 
Release: escape of radioactive materials into the environment. 

Relocation: the removal or continued exclusion of people (households) from contaminated areas to 
avoid chronic radiation exposure. 

Relocation center: generally refers to a facility where monitoring, decontamination, registration, 
and congregate care of evacuees are conducted. (Note: also known as Registration Center or 
Reception Center.) 

Interim REP Program Manual B-24 August 2002 


Appendix B 

Rem: acronym for Roentgen equivalent man. The unit of dose of any ionizing radiation that 
produces the same biological effect as a unit of absorbed dose of ordinary x-rays. A unit of dose for 
measuring the amount of ionizing radiation energy absorbed in biological tissue. 

Millirem: one-thousandth (1/1000) part of a roentgen. 

Residual contamination: contamination that remains after steps have been taken to remove it. 
These steps may consist of nothing more than allowing the contamination to decay naturally. 

Responsible offsite response organization (responsible ORO): an organization designated in an 
emergency response plan as that organization responsible for a specific emergency function. 

Responsible school official(s): the school official(s) participating in an exercise or drill, who are 
responsible for implementing school emergency procedures, according to the plan. 

Restricted zone: an area of controlled access from which the population has been evacuated, 
relocated or sheltered-in-place. 

Return: reoccupation of areas cleared for unrestricted residence or use by previously evacuated or 
relocated populations. 

Roentgen (r): a unit of exposure of gamma (or X-ray) radiation in field dosimetry. One roentgen is 
essentially equal to one rad. A unit for measuring the amount of radiation energy imparted to a 
volume of air. The roentgen can be used only to measure X-rays or gamma rays. 

Roentgen equivalent man/mammal (rem): one rem is the quantity of ionizing radiation of any 
type which, when absorbed by man or other mammals, produces a physiological effect equivalent to 
that produced by the absorption of 1 roentgen of X-ray or gamma radiation. 

Rumors: information circulated by individuals and organizations during an emergency that may or 
may not be true. (Usually, rumors originate and are spread on an ad hoc, not official basis.) 

Sampling: collecting specimens of materials (e.g., particles or radioiodine in the air, animal feed, 
vegetation, water, soil, milk, etc.) at field locations. 

Scenarios: time-based simulations of emergency events postulated to allow the demonstration of 
response capabilities. 

Schools: include public and private schools, kindergartens, and all licensed day care centers and 
homes with more than 10 children. 

Scram: (Safety Control Rod Axe Man): the sudden shutdown of a nuclear reactor, usually by rapid 
insertion of the control rods. Emergencies or deviations from normal reactor operation cause the 
reactor to automatically scram. 

Interim REP Program Manual B-25 August 2002 


Appendix B 

Senior FEMA Official (SFO): official appointed by the director of FEMA, or his representative, to 
direct the FEMA response at the scene of a radiological emergency. 

Shelter in place: a protective action which includes going indoors listening to an EAS radio or 
television station, closing all windows and doors, closing exterior vents, and turning off heating and 
air conditioning equipment using outside air. 

Shield: material used to reduce or stop radiation. 

Special facility: includes schools, day care centers, hospitals, nursing homes, certain types of 
industrial plants that may require a lengthy shutdown period, etc., within the plume EPZ that need to 
be considered separately from the general population when planning for an incident or accident at a 
nuclear power plant. 

Special nuclear material: by law, includes plutonium, uranium-233, and uranium containing more 
than the natural concentration of uranium-235. 

Special populations: groups and/or individuals with physical or mental handicaps that need 
assistance when protective actions are implemented. 

Spent fuel: nuclear reactor fuel that has been irradiated to the extent that it can no longer effectively 
sustain a chain reaction. 

Standard Operating Procedures (SOP): see Implementing procedures. 

State Coordinating Officer (SCO): an official designated by the governor of an affected State to 
work with the Cognizant Federal Agency Official and Senior FEMA Official in coordinating the 
response efforts of Federal, State, local, volunteer, and private agencies. 

Strontium: four naturally stable and 12 unstable isotopes exist. The most common unstable isotope 
is strontium-90, a product of nuclear fallout with a half-life of 28 years. It is a high-energy beta 
source and can be used as an energy source for satellites, remote weather stations and navigation 
buoys. 

Substantial: that the final decision as to whether or not a change is substantially negative and 
agreed upon by the ORO and FEMA Region. 

Survey meter: a portable instrument used in radiological monitoring to detect and measure ionizing 
radiation. 

Thermoluminescent dosimeter (TLD): a dosimetry badge used to measure an individuals level of 
exposure to ionizing radiation. It is characteristic of thermoluminescent material that radiation 
produces internal changes that cause the material, when subsequently heated, to give off a 
measurable amount of light directly proportional to the radiation dose. 

Interim REP Program Manual B-26 August 2002 


Appendix B 

Thyroid exposure: exposure of the thyroid gland to radiation from radioactive isotopes of iodine 
that have been either inhaled or ingested. 

Timely: the responsible ORO personnel/representatives demonstrate actions to disseminate the 
appropriate information/instructions with a sense of urgency and without undue delay. 

Total Effective Dose Equivalent (TEDE): the sum of the deep dose equivalent (for external 
exposures) and for committed effective dose equivalent (for internal exposures). 

Traffic control: all activities accomplished for the purpose of facilitating the evacuation of the 
general public in vehicles along specific routes. 

Transient persons: non-residents. Persons who do not permanently reside in the Plume Exposure 
EPZ, but may be present during an emergency. 

Transuranic elements: all elements above uranium on the periodic table  those with an 
atomic number greater than 92. All transuranics are produced artificially and are radioactive. 

Tritium: the one radioactive isotope of hydrogen. A small percentage of natural hydrogen in 
tritium, but the primary source of tritium is nuclear reactors. It has a half-life of 12 years, but will 
remain in the body only a few days if taken internally. It is not considered a major health hazard 
since it is a very weak beta emitter and not harmful unless consumed in very large quantities. 

Uranium: there are two primary isotopes: uranium-238, which accounts for 99 percent of all 
uranium; and uranium-235, the fissionable isotope that sustains the fission reaction in a nuclear 
reactor. 

Vapor: the gaseous form of substances that are normally in liquid or solid form. 

Whole-body exposure: an exposure of the body to radiation, in which the entire body rather 
than an isolated part is irradiated. Where a radioisotope is uniformly distributed throughout the 
body tissues, rather than being concentrated in certain parts, the irradiation can be considered as 
a whole-body exposure. 

X-ray: a penetrating form of electromagnetic radiation that is used in medical and industrial 
applications. 

Interim REP Program Manual B-27 August 2002 


Appendix B 

Interim REP Program Manual B-28 August 2002 


Appendix C 

APPENDIX C: 


RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS (REP) PROGRAM 
POLICY AND GUIDANCE 


While some of the material in the documents cited is out of date, the citations are provided for 
historical and tracking purposes. There also may be some redundancy in this list, as one 
document may provide more detail than another on a particular subject and, thus, is listed. This 
list will be updated in future revisions to the REP Program Manual. 

I. FEMA Documents 
A. REP SERIES 
1. 
Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and 
Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
and Federal Emergency Management Agency, NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1, 
Washington D.C., November 1980. 
2. 
Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and 
Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants - Criteria for Utility Offsite Planning and 
Preparedness, Final Report, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and Federal 
Emergency Management Agency, NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1, Supp. 1, 
Washington D.C., September 1988. 
3. 
Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and 
Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants, Criteria for Emergency Planning in an 
Early Site Permit Application, Draft Report for Comment, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission and Federal Emergency Management Agency, NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, 
Rev. 1, Supp. 2, Washington D.C., Draft, April 1996. 
4. 
Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and 
Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants - Criteria for Protective Action 
Recommended Initiatives for Severe Accidents, Draft Report for Interim Use and 
Comment, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and Federal Emergency Management 
Agency, NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1, Supp. 3, Washington D.C., Draft, July 
1996. 
5. 
Guidance on Offsite Emergency Radiation Measurement Systems, Phase 1 - Airborne 
Release, FEMA-REP-2, Rev. 2, June 1990. 
6. 
Guidance for Developing State, Tribal, and Local Radiological Emergency Response 
Planning and Preparedness for Transportation Accidents, FEMA REP-5, Rev. 2, 
November 2000. 
Interim REP Program Manual C-1 
August 2002 


Appendix C 

7. 
Exercise Evaluation and Simulation Facility Evacuation Events Models: Part 1 - 
PREDYN Users Guide, FEMA-REP-6, April 1984. 
8. 
Exercise Evaluation and Simulation Facility Evacuation Events Model: Part II - Users 
Manual, FEMA-REP-7, April 1984. 
9. 
Application of the I-DYNEV System (To Compute Estimates of Evacuation Travel Time 
at Nuclear Power Stations), FEMA-REP-8, December 1984. 
10. 
Guide for the Evaluation of Alert and Notification Systems for Nuclear Power Plants, 
FEMA-REP-10, November 1985. 
11. 
A Guide to Preparing Public Information Materials and Emergency Alert System 
Instructions for Radiological Emergencies, FEMA-REP-11, Draft, March 1995. 
(Incorporated in and superseded by the REP Program Manual.) 
12. 
Guidance on Offsite Emergency Radiation Measurement Systems, Phase 2 - The Milk 
Pathway, FEMA-REP-12, September 1987. 
13. 
Guidance on Offsite Emergency Radiation Measurement Systems, Phase 3 - Water and 
Non-Dairy Food Pathway, FEMA-REP-13, May 1990. 
14. 
Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise Manual, FEMA-REP-14, 
September 1991. (Superseded in part by the REP Program Manual.) 
15. 
Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise Evaluation Methodology, FEMAREP-
15, September 1991. (Superseded by the REP Program Manual.) 
16. 
Statements of Consideration for FEMA-REP-14 and FEMA-REP-15, FEMA-REP-18, 
January 1992. (Superseded in part by the REP Program Manual.) 
B. ADDITIONAL FEMA REP GUIDANCE 
1. 
Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program, Standard Exercise Report Format, 
FEMA, October 1995. (Superseded in part by the REP Program Manual.) 
2. 
Guide for All-Hazard Emergency Operations Planning, Federal Emergency Management 
Agency, State and Local Guide (SLG) 101, September 1996. 
3. 
Federal Policy on Distribution of Potassium Iodide Around Nuclear Power Sites for Use 
as a Thyroidal Blocking Agent, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Federal 
Register, Volume 50, p. 30,258, July 24, 1985. 
4. 
Federal Response Plan (FRP), Federal Emergency Management Agency, FEMA 229, 
April 1999. 
Interim REP Program Manual C-2 
August 2002 


Appendix C 

5. 
Memorandum of Understanding between Federal Emergency Management Agency and 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 58 Fed. Reg. 47, 996, Sept. 14, 1993. Note: This MOU, 
which was entered into June 17, 1993, supercedes all previous FEMA/NRC MOUs. 
6. 
Contamination Monitoring Standard for a Portal Monitor Used for Radiological 
Emergency Response, Federal Emergency Management Agency, March 1995. 
7. 
Background Information for the Contamination Monitoring Standard for a Portal Monitor 
Used for Radiological Emergency Response, Federal Emergency Management Agency, 
March 1995. 
8. 
Statements of Consideration for the Contamination Monitoring Standard for a Portal 
Monitor Used for Radiological Emergency Response, Federal Emergency Management 
Agency, March 1995. 
9. 
Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan (FRERP), Federal Emergency 
Management Agency, May 8, 1996 (61 FR 20944). 
10. 
Evacuation: An Assessment of Planning and Research, RR-9, Federal Emergency 
Management Agency, November 1987. 
11. 
Emergency Alert System, CPG 1-40, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Interim 
Use, June 1996. 
12. 
Emergency Alert System: A Program Guide for State and Local Governments, 
CPG 1-41, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Interim Use, June 1996. 
13. 
RG REP 01, Rev. 4, REP Emergency Information Materials/Brochures Review Guide, 
Federal Emergency Management Agency, January 1998. 
14. 
RG REP 02, Rev. 9, REP Annual Letter of Certification Review Guide (Checklist), 
Federal Emergency Management Agency, December 2000. 
15. 
RG REP 03, REP State and Local Plan Review Guide, Federal Emergency Management 
Agency, August 1994. 
16. 
RG REP 04, REP Reception and Care/Host Jurisdiction Plans (Includes Emergency 
Worker Decontamination) Review Guide, Federal Emergency Management Agency, 
September 1994. 
17. 
RG REP 05, Rev. 1, REP Evacuation Time Study Review Guide (Checklist), Federal 
Emergency Management Agency, April 1993. 
18. 
Check List for Review and Evaluation of Emergency Public Information Brochures for 
Ingestion Pathway Measures, Federal Emergency Management Agency, July 1990. 
Interim REP Program Manual C-3 
August 2002 


Appendix C 

19. 
Radiological Emergency Preparedness: Alert and Notification, Notice, Federal Register, 
Wednesday, September 12, 2001, pp. 47546-47548. 
20. 
Radiological Emergency Preparedness: Exercise Evaluation Methodology; Notice. 
Federal Register, Thursday, April 25, 2002, pp.20580-20602. 
II. 44 CFR Regulations 
1. 
44 CFR 350: Review and Approval of State and Local Radiological Emergency Plans and 
Preparedness, Code of Federal Regulations, Title 44, revised as of October 1, 2000. 
2. 
44 CFR 351: Radiological Emergency Planning and Preparedness, Code of Federal 
Regulations, Title 44, revised as of October 1, 2000. (To be revised after all Strategic 
Review Initiatives are finalized.) 
3. 
44 CFR 352: Commercial Nuclear Power Plants: Emergency Preparedness Planning,, 
Code of Federal Regulations, Title 44, revised as of October 1, 2000. 
4. 
44 CFR 353: Fee for Services in Support, Review and Approval of State and Local 
Government or Licensee Radiological Emergency Plans and Preparedness, Code of 
Federal Regulations, Title 44, revised as of October 1, 2000. 
5. 
44 CFR 354: Fee for Services to Support FEMAs Offsite Radiological Emergency 
Preparedness Program, , Code of Federal Regulations, Title 44, revised as of October 1, 
2000. 
III. 
Other Agency/Guidance Documents 
A. NRC 
1. 
Consideration of Potassium Iodide in Emergency Plans, Final Rule, U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission, Federal Register, Volume 66, No. 13, p. 5427, January 19, 2001. 
2. 
Emergency Planning and Preparedness for Nuclear Power Reactors, NRC Regulatory 
Guide 1.101 Rev.3, August 1992. 
3. 
Planning Basis for the Development of State and Local Government Radiological 
Emergency Response Plans in Support of Light Water Nuclear Power Plants, NUREG0396, 
EPA 520/1-78-016, Nuclear Regulatory Commission and Environment Protection 
Agency, December 1978. 
4. 
Criteria for Protective Action Recommendations for General Emergencies, NRC 
Information Notice 83-28, May 4, 1983. 
5. 
Response Technical Manual (RTM-91), NUREG/BR-0150, Vol. 1, Rev. 1, U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission, April 1991. 
Interim REP Program Manual C-4 
August 2002 


Appendix C 

6. 
Response Coordination Manual  1996, (RCM-96), NUREG/BR-0230, U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission, September, 1996. 
7. 
State of the Art in Evacuation Time Studies for Nuclear Power Plants, NUREG/CR4831, 
NNL-776, March 1992. 
8. 
Resources Available for Nuclear Power Plant Emergencies Under the Price-Anderson Act 
and Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, NUREG-1457, 
July 1992. 
9. 
Functional Criteria for Emergency Response Facilities, NUREG-0737, Supplement 1, 
January 1993. 
B. EPA 
1. 
Manual of Protective Action Guides and Protective Actions for Nuclear Incidents, 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), EPA 400-R-02-001, May 1992. 
C. USDA 
D. DHHS/FDA 
1. 
Accidental Radioactive Contamination of Human Food and Animal Feeds: 
Recommendations for State and Local Agencies, U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services, Food and Drug Administration, Center for Devices and Radiological Health, 
August 13, 1998 (63 FR 43402). 
2. 
Guidance  Potassium Iodide as a Thyroid Blocking Agent in Radiation Emergencies, 
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Food and Drug Administration, Center 
for Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER), December 11, 2001 (66 FR 238:64046). 
E. DOE 
F. DOL 
1. 
Respiratory Protection, Occupational Safety and Health Administration, 29 CFR 
1910.134. 
G. ARC 
1. 
Mass Care - Preparedness and Operations, Disaster Services Regulations and 
Procedures, ARC 3031, American Red Cross (ARC), Washington, DC, April 1987. 
2. 
Statement of Understanding Between The Federal Emergency Management Agency and 
The American National Red Cross, October 1, 1997. 
Interim REP Program Manual C-5 
August 2002 


Appendix C 

H. OTHER 
1. 
Respiratory Protection - A Manual and Guideline, 2nd edition, Publication #63PC91, 
American Industrial Hygiene Association (AIHA), Fairfax, VA. 
2. 
Personal Dosimetry Performance Criteria for Testing, American National Standards 
Institute, Standard N13.11-1983. 
3. 
Management of Persons Accidentally Contaminated with Radionuclides, National 
Council of Radiation Protection, Report No. 65, 1979. 
4. 
American National Standard for Respiratory Protection, ANSI 288.2-1992, American 
National Standards Institute, New York, NY. 
IV. 
FEMA Guidance Memoranda 
1. 
GM IT-1. A Guide to Documents Related to the REP Program, October 1, 1985. 
2. 
GM 4. Radio Transmission Frequencies and Coverage, April 1, 1980. 
3. 
GM 5. Agreements Among Governmental Agencies and Private Parties, Rev. 1, 
October 19, 1983. 
4. 
GM 8. Regional Advisory Committee Coordination with Utilities, Rev. 1, October 19, 
1983. 
5. 
GM 16. Standard Regional Reviewing and Reporting Procedures for State and Local 
Radiological Emergency Response Plans, August 7, 1980. 
6. 
GM 20. Foreign Language Translation of Public Education Brochures and Safety 
Messages, Joint FEMA/NRC Issuance. 
7. 
GM 21. Acceptance Criteria for Evacuation Plans, February 27, 1984. 
8. 
GM 22. Recordkeeping Requirements for Public Meetings, October 19, 1983. 
9. 
GM 24. Radiological Emergency Preparedness for Handicapped Persons, April 5, 1984. 
10. 
GM PI-1. FEMA Action to Pilot Test Guidance on Public Information Materials and 
Provide Technical Assistance On Its Use, October 2, 1985. 
11. 
GM FR-1. Federal Response Center Site Selection Criteria for Peacetime Radiological 
Emergencies, December 3, 1985. 
12. 
GM AN-1. FEMA Action to Qualify Alert and Notification Systems Against NUREG0654/
FEMA-REP-1 and FEMA-REP-10, April 21, 1987. 
Interim REP Program Manual C-6 
August 2002 


Appendix C 

13. 
GM EV-2. Protective Actions for School Children, November 13, 1986. Note: Guidance 
in FEMA-REP-14 superseded pages 6-13 concerning the following: (1) clarification of 
guidance related to the demonstration of protective action capabilities for schools in 
exercises, and (2) modifications to the set of questions as reflected in the Points of Review 
and Demonstration Criteria in Objective 16 of FEMA-REP-15. 
14. 
GM IN-1. The Ingestion Exposure Pathway, February 26, 1988. Note: Guidance in 
FEMA-REP-14 and FEMA-REP-15 superseded pages 12-17. 
15. 
GM PR-1. Policy on NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1 and 44 CFR Periodic Requirements, 
October 1, 1985. Note: Guidance in FEMA-REP-14 superseded two parts of the guidance 
contained in GM PR-1. These two changes were: (1) The provision set forth on page 3 
(Section 3) for partial participation in ingestion exercises for States with multiple sites 
located within their borders has been terminated. Per guidance provided in the Manual, 
such States would only need to partially participate in ingestion exercises when full 
participation exercises are conducted in bordering States. (2) During the year in which the 
full-participation exercise is held at one of the sites, the responsible State and local 
governments should review their plans and procedures for the other sites within the State to 
verify their accuracy and completeness. This review should validate the identification of 
farms, food processors and distributors. This review and any resultant revisions should be 
made and reported in the Annual Letter of Certification, as described in GM PR-1, as part 
of their annual review and plan update. 
16. 
GM MS-1. Medical Services, November 13, 1986. Note: Portions of GM MS-1 have 
been superseded in the following areas: (1) minimum staffing for medical facilities, 
(2) deferral of radiological monitoring by transportation providers to medical facility staff, 
and (3) the role of Licensee personnel in supporting State and local government medical 
services functions. 
17. 
GM RG-2. Guidance for FEMA Regional Implementation of the FEMA Rule, 44 CFR 
Part 352, February 8, 1993. 
V. FEMA Policy Statements 
1. 
PS-1 Policy Statement on Respiratory Protection, Federal Emergency Management 
Agency, November 22, 1985. 
2. 
PS-2 Policy Statement on Disposal of Waste Water and Contaminated Products from 
Decontamination Activities, Federal Emergency Management Agency, January 1989. 
3. 
PS-3 Policy Statement on the Use of NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1 and Guidance 
Memoranda, Federal Emergency Management Agency, February 28, 1989. 
4. 
Presidential Executive Order 13084, Consultation and Coordination with Tribal 
Governments, May 14, 1998. 
Interim REP Program Manual C-7 
August 2002 


Appendix C 

5. 
Presidential Executive Order 13007, Indian Sacred Sites, May 24, 1996. 
6. 
FEMA, Final Agency Policy for Government to Government Relations with American 
Indian and Alaska Native Tribal Governments, Federal Register, September 28, 1998. 
7. 
Memo from James Witt, FEMA Director, to all FEMA Associate Directors, 
Administrators, Executive Associate Directors, Regional Directors, and Office 
Directors, Strategic Plan for the Implementation of FEMAs Tribal Policy, December 4, 
2000. 
VI. 
Policy and Guidance Clarifications: Memoranda and Letters 
1. 
Memorandum from Richard Krimm to Frank Finch dated 5/17/85 on Congregate Care 
Facilities. 
2. 
Memorandum from Richard Krimm to NTH Division Chiefs, FEMA Regional Offices 
dated 12/24/85 on Guidance on NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1 Evaluation 
Criterion J.12. 
3. 
Memorandum from Richard Krimm to Glenn Woodard dated 4/22/86 on Clarification 
of the 15-Minute Design Objective for Alert and Notification Systems. 
4. 
Memorandum from Richard Krimm to Frank Begley dated 2/2/87 on 24-hour Staffing 
Capability. 
5. 
Memo from Richard Krimm to Regional Directors dated 2/5/87 on Annual Letter of 
Certification (ALC). 
6. 
Memorandum from Richard Krimm to Frank Begley dated 9/23/87 on Alternate 
Emergency Operations Center (EOC). 
7. 
Memorandum from Richard Krimm to Frank Begley dated 12/9/87 on Quad Cities 
Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) Boundary Determination (Split Jurisdiction). 
8. 
Memorandum from Richard Krimm to Frank Begley dated 1/5/88 on Radiological 
Monitoring. 
9. 
Memorandum from Richard Krimm to NTH Division Chiefs dated 2/9/88 on 
Clarification of Selected Provisions of Guidance Memorandum (GM) MS-1, Medical 
Services. 
10. 
Memorandum from Richard Krimm to Frank Begley dated 2/26/88 on Annual Letter of 
Certification. 
Interim REP Program Manual C-8 
August 2002 


Appendix C 

11. 
Memorandum from Grant Peterson to Regional Directors dated 3/7/88 on Guidelines 
for Regions to Use in Implementing NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1, 
Supplement 1, with Qualifying Exercises. 
12. 
Memorandum from Richard Krimm to Frank Begley dated 5/25/88 on Relocation 
Centers. 
13. 
Memo from Krimm to Edward Thomas dated 6/20/88 on Annual Letter of 
Certification (includes criteria and references a checklist). 
14. 
Memorandum from Richard Krimm to Frank Begley dated 9/19/88 on Medical 
Services and Radiological Monitoring Guidance. 
15. 
Memorandum from Craig Wingo to William Fucik dated 9/20/88 on FEMA Policy 
Concerning Receiving Schools Around the Perry Island NPS. 
16. 
Memorandum from Richard Krimm to Frank Begley dated 9/22/88 on Interpretation of 
Shall and Should as Used in NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1 and Off-Hours 
Unannounced Drills/Exercises. 
17. 
Memorandum from Richard Krimm to Glenn Woodard dated 9/30/88 on Clarification 
of Annual Medical Emergency Drill Provisions for States with Separate Sets of Primary 
and Backup Medical Facilities. 
18. 
Memorandum from Richard Krimm to Frank Begley dated 12/7/88 on Landmark 
Descriptions. 
19. 
Letter from Grant Peterson to Victor Stello, Jr. dated 3/28/89 on Use of 20 Percent of 
the EPZ Population for Planning Purposes for Radiological Monitoring. 
20. 
Memorandum from Grant Peterson to Paul Giordano dated 12/7/89 on Guidance on 
Ingestion Pathway Exercises. 
21. 
Memorandum from Grant Peterson to Regional Directors dated 1/12/90 on Distribution 
and Use of the Generic Ingestion Pathway Brochure, entitled Radiological Emergency 
Information. 
22. 
Memorandum from Frank Begley to Kenneth V. Miller (Missouri Department of 
Health) dated 3/23/90 on Exercise Demonstration of Two Radiological Monitoring 
Field Teams. 
23. 
Memorandum from Dennis Kwiatkowski to William Tidball dated 11/2/90 on Request 
from the State of New York for Waiver of Self-Reading Dosimetry Requirements for 
Emergency Workers. 
Interim REP Program Manual C-9 
August 2002 


Appendix C 

24. 
Memo from Richard Krimm to Warren, undated, on Granting Credit for Objectives 32 
and 33. 
25. 
Memorandum from Dennis Kwiatkowski to Stephen Harrell dated 1/16/92 on 
Response to Request From Region VII for Resolution of Radiological Emergency 
Preparedness (REP) Program Issues, including Radiological Monitoring for 20 Percent 
of the Population; Ingestion Pathway Exercises; Dosimetry and Protective Clothing; 
Medical Care of Nursing Home and Medically Dependent Hospital Evacuees; Portal 
Monitors. 
26. 
Memorandum from Dennis Kwiatkowski to Walter Pierson dated 3/26/92 on Response 
to Region IIIs Request for Guidance on Ingestion Pathway Exercise Demonstration. 
27 
Memorandum from Dennis Kwiatkowski to Walter Pierson dated 5/15/92 on 
Objective 13: Alert, Notification, and Emergency Information - Public Instructions. 

28. 
Memorandum from Dennis Kwiatkowski to Robert J. Adamcik dated 1/13/93 on 
Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency Request for Clarification of FEMAREP-
14 Dosimetry Requirements Under Objective 5, Emergency Worker Exposure 
Control. 
29. 
Memorandum from Craig Wingo to Stephen Harrell dated 3/5/93 on Response to 
Request for Policy Clarification on Radiological Emergency Planning for Day Care 
Centers. 
30. 
Memorandum from H. Joseph Flynn, (FEMA) Associate General Counsel for Program 
Law, to Richard W. Krimm dated 4/30/93 on Legal Opinion on Letters of Agreement. 
31. 
Memorandum from Margaret Lawless to RAC Chairs dated 6/25/93 on Guidance on 
Planning Requirements Whenever Changes are Made to Existing 10-Mile EPZs. 
(contains memorandum from Craig Wingo to Stephen Harrell dated 6/24/93 on 
Request for Guidance on Areas Beyond the 10 mile EPZ Ring.) 
32. 
Memo from Richard Krimm to Regional Directors dated 9/14/93 on Technical Review 
of REP Exercise Scenarios with attachments: Radiological Emergency Preparedness 
Exercise Scenario Technical Review Process; and Radiological Emergency 
Preparedness Exercise Scenario Review Checklist. 
33. 
Memorandum from Richard Krimm to Regional Directors dated 10/13/93 on Adequate 
Demonstration of Objective 16 at Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercises. 
34. 
Memo from Dennis Kwiatowski to Regional Directors dated 3/24/94 on Guidance 
Memo RG-2. 
Interim REP Program Manual C-10 
August 2002 


Appendix C 

35. 
Memorandum from Delbert Kohl to Charles Biggs dated 3/28/94 on Clarification of 
Communication Equipment Needed by Field Monitoring Teams for Radiological 
Emergency Preparedness. 
36. 
Memorandum from Joe Flynn to Dennis Kwiatkowski dated 4/6/94 on Impact of 
OSHAs HAZMAT Standard on REP Program. 
37. 
Memorandum from Dennis Kwiatkowski to Regional Directors, Regions I-X dated 
7/25/94, on Environmental Protection Agencys (EPA) Manual of Protective Action 
Guides (PAGs) and Protective Actions for Nuclear Incidents (EPA 400-R-92-001). 
38. 
Memorandum from Robert Fletcher to Stuart Rifkind dated 11/9/94 on Clarification on 
Alert and Notification System-the Order of Sirens and EBS Messages. 
39. 
Memorandum from Robert Fletcher to Charles Biggs dated 2/23/95 on Request for 
Exemption on Back-up Medical Facilities. 
40. 
Memorandum from Robert Fletcher to Charles Biggs dated 3/9/95 on EPA Manual of 
Protective Action Guides and Retrospective Determinations of Total Dose. 
41. 
Memorandum from Bill Wark to Larry Bailey dated 6/6/95 on Evaluation of Activities 
at Designated Radio/Television Stations That Broadcast Emergency Messages. 
42. 
Memorandum from William Wark to Joseph Dominguez dated 2/21/96 on Annual 
Distribution of Emergency Information to the Public. 
43. 
Memorandum from William Wark to Joseph Dominguez dated 4/12/96 on 
Precautionary Evacuation for the Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) of the Diablo 
Canyon Site. 
44. 
Memo from Vern Wingert to Larry Robertson dated 8/21/96 on Dosimeter Guidance 
for Emergency Workers. 
45. 
Memo from Kay C. Goss to FEMA Regional Directors dated 12/23/96 on Policy on 
Use of Dosimeters by Bus Drivers. 
46. 
Letter from Woodie Curtis to Paul Schmidt (Wisconsin Department of Health and 
Social Services) dated 3/7/97 on Several Technical Issues. 
47. 
Memorandum from Kay C. Goss to All Regional Directors dated 6/23/97 on 
Monitoring of Radiation Exposure by States. 
48. 
Memorandum from Vanessa Quinn to Woodie Curtis dated 9/29/98 on Alternative 
Approach by State of Michigan for Dose Assessment. 
Interim REP Program Manual C-11 
August 2002 


Appendix C 

49. 
Memorandum from Kay C. Goss to Regional Directors, I-X, dated 2/2/99, on Guidance 
for Providing Emergency Information and Instructions to the Public for Radiological 
Emergencies Using the New Emergency Alert System (EAS). 
50. 
Memorandum from Vanessa Quinn to Woodie J. Curtis dated 7/21/2000 on State of 
Illinois Determination on KI Inventory Potency. 
51. 
Memorandum from Vanessa Quinn to All RAC Chairs dated 11/20/2000 on Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA) Guidance on Extending the Shelf-life of Potassium Iodide 
(KI). 
Interim REP Program Manual C-12 
August 2002