Boot Camps for Juvenile Offenders: an Implementation Evaluation of Three Demonstration.
Programs
Series: NIJ Research Report
Published: January 1996
122 pages
265,840 bytes

Boot Camps for Juvenile Offenders:
An Implementation Evaluation of 
Three Demonstration Programs

A Final Summary Report Presented to
The National Institute of Justice

By: Blair B. Bourque, Roberta C. Cronin,
Frank R. Pearson, Daniel B. Felker,
Mei Han, and Sarah M. Hill

Supported under Award #92-DD-CX-K043 from the
National Institute of Justice, Office of Justice
Programs, U.S. Department of Justice. Points of
view in this document are those of the authors and
do not necessarily represent the official position
of the U.S. Department of Justice.
-----------------------------------
Table of Contents

Chapter 1
Introduction
  The Boot Camp Movement
  Why Boot Camps for Juveniles?
  The OJJDP Demonstration Program
  The Boot Camp Evaluation
  The Evaluation Report

Chapter 2
The Design and Initial Implementation 
of the Boot Camps
  The Boot Camp Program Design
  The Three Prototype Juvenile Boot Camps
  Organizational Structure and Management
  Program Design

Chapter 3
Boot Camp Selection Phase
  OJJDP's Guidelines for Selection
  Selection Criteria at the Program Sites
  Selection Process

Chapter 4
Boot Camp: The Intensive Training Phase
  Boot Camp Philosophy and Design
  Program Capacity and Utilization
  Facilities
  Management and Staffing
  Program Content During Boot Camp
  Participant Misconduct and Discipline 
  Boot Camp Graduation and Termination Rates
  Attitudes of Youths Toward the Boot Camp
    Regimens
  Implementation Issues

Chapter 5
Aftercare Programs
  Parameters Set by OJJDP
  Local Aftercare Program Designs
  The Aftercare Programs in Operation
  Mechanisms for Monitoring and Disciplining
    Youths
  Implementation Issues

Chapter 6
Changes During the Boot Camp Phase
  Evidence of Change During the Boot Camp Phase
  Evidence of Change During the Aftercare Phase
  Program Costs

Chapter 7
Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendations
  Key Implementation Findings
  Conclusions
  Recommendations

Bibliography
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Chapter 1

Introduction

One of the most closely watched developments in
corrections over the last few years has been the
proliferation of boot camp programs. Characterized
by a strong emphasis on military structure, drill,
and discipline, these programs offer a new twist
on the use of residential programs for convicted
criminals. A movement that began with a single 50-
bed program in Georgia in 1983 (Parent, 1989),
boot camps now operate in more than half the
States. 

In the fall of 1990, the Office of Juvenile
Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) in the
U.S. Department of Justice launched a
demonstration program to examine the feasibility,
appropriateness, and promise of the boot camp
model for juvenile offenders. In 1991, three sites
were chosen to participate in the demonstration.
At the same time, the American Institutes for
Research (AIR) and the Institute for
Criminological Research (ICR) at Rutgers
University were selected by the National Institute
of Justice (NIJ) to conduct an evaluation of these
demonstration programs.

This final report on the AIR/ICR evaluation
presents observations of the first 18 months of
the demonstration period. Detailed descriptions of
the programs at each site, including the
assumptions, rationales, and contexts that
determined how each site went about developing a
program are presented. Comparing the major
components of the camps, the report discusses how
well the programs succeeded in the short term--
during the boot camp as well as the subsequent
aftercare program. The report ends with an
analysis of the promise of boot camps as an
effective and appropriate intermediate sanction
for juveniles and general considerations for
improving their structure and processes.

The Boot Camp Movement

The correctional system is often characterized as
a system in crisis (Byrne, Lurigio, and
Petersilia, 1992). In a little over a decade the
adult prisoner population has grown a remarkable
150 percent (U.S. General Accounting Office,
1993). Both the rate of prison incarceration and
the absolute number of inmates reached their
highest levels ever in 1992 (American Correctional
Association, 1993). The surge in inmate
populations in part reflects a widespread
disillusionment with the potential for
rehabilitating offenders in the community, a
disillusionment that began to take hold in the
1970's (Martinson, 1974; Palmer, 1992). Throughout
much of the 1980's, public concern with safety and
with giving offenders their "just deserts," not
rehabilitation, dominated sentencing policy. To
many, incarceration seemed the most natural way to
punish offenders and protect society.

By 1990, however, the effects of this policy were
becoming apparent. Prisons were straining at the
seams and correctional costs were spiraling
higher, yet crime was not diminishing. Meanwhile,
new studies were causing some policymakers and
practitioners to reappraise the potential of
rehabilitative approaches (Palmer, 1992). 

In this climate there emerged a vigorous interest
in "intermediate sanctions" that could satisfy the
public's demand for protection and punishment
without further taxing correctional facilities and
budgets. Intermediate sanctions are generally
defined as sentencing alternatives that fall
between the poles of simple probation and
incarceration (Morris and Tonry, 1990; Toby, 1982,
1984). The term embraces a wide variety of
correctional approaches, including intensive
supervision, fines, restitution, and community
service, often used in combination. Most
intermediate sanctions claim multiple goals:
saving money, deterring crime, protecting the
public, and rehabilitating offenders (Byrne et
al., 1992). 

Boot camps are a relatively new addition to the
intermediate sanctions menu. Billed as "one of the
most recent and exciting forms of intermediate
sanctions being adopted by the States" (Office of
Justice Programs, 1990), they consist of a
relatively short period of incarceration in a
quasi-military environment, followed by a period
of supervision in the community. The first camp,
the "Special Alternative Incarceration" program,
opened in Georgia in 1983, an outgrowth of
discussions between the Commissioner of the
Georgia Department of Corrections and a local
judge; both were dissatisfied with sentencing
options then available (Parent, 1989). Oklahoma
and Mississippi soon followed suit, opening
paramilitary camps for adult offenders. By 1993,
there were at least 59 State and 10 local boot
camps for adults operating in 29 States (Cronin,
1994).

In addition to their considerable popularity
within the correctional system, boot camps have
demonstrated extraordinary appeal to the general
public. Experts on boot camp programming
nationwide note that boot camps are a "natural"
for media coverage, which tends to focus on the
programs' disciplinary aspects and appeals to "get
tough" sentiments. In a culture where many people
view military service as a formative experience,
the public also seems to intuitively grasp the
rehabilitative rationale for the programs (Parent,
1989; MacKenzie and Parent, 1992).

Why Boot Camps for Juveniles?

The notion of developing boot camps for juvenile
offenders evolved logically as the juvenile system
increasingly faced pressures similar to those
forcing change in the adult system. Although the
juvenile justice system nationwide is not as
severely burdened as the adult system, it exhibits
the same general trends. Juveniles in custody for
delinquent offenses increased 35 percent from 1978
to 1989, a period when the youth population of the
United States declined by 11 percent (OJJDP,
1992). Thus, satisfactory alternatives to long-
term institutionalization are as welcome in the
juvenile system as they are in the adult system.

Furthermore, age groups served by the juvenile and
adult systems overlap. The age of criminal
adulthood is 16 or less in some States, and in
most States certain categories of juvenile
offenders can be tried and sentenced in the adult
system. Moreover, a significant proportion of the
adult criminal justice system's clientele consists
of persons in their teens and early 20's. This is
especially true of adult boot camps, which
disproportionately recruit offenders who are young
and fit enough to tolerate their programs'
physical regimen. Thus, if boot camps hold promise
as effective interventions for young adults, it is
plausible to think that they might be appropriate
interventions for older juveniles as well.

In some respects, the harsh image of a boot camp
regimen appears at odds with a juvenile justice
system that, at least in theory, tends to
emphasize "rehabilitation" over punishment or
public safety. Since the Illinois statute
establishing the first juvenile court in 1899, the
juvenile justice system in the United States has
been influenced strongly by a rehabilitative
philosophy (Schlossman, 1983). Delinquents were
considered to have lacked proper parental
guidance, which the juvenile court judge, acting
in loco parentis, would attempt to supply. The
juvenile system, including probation officers
attached to the juvenile court and what were
initially called "training schools," was intended
to remedy parental deficiencies in upbringing, the
presumed reason for bad behavior in adolescence. 

Notwithstanding this ideological focus on
rehabilitation, the juvenile justice system also
has traditionally included discipline. The
original training schools were often run in a
military style. Custodial institutions for
juveniles were often constructed with bars and
cells that seemed punitive to the casual observer.
The closest approximation to current U.S. boot
camp programs--British detention centers--were
developed to deal with adolescents rather than
with adult offenders. Faced with an upsurge of
adolescent crime following World War II, quasi-
military "detention centers" were set up in
England and Wales under the hypothesis that "a
short, sharp shock" to adolescents early in their
criminal careers might nip their anti-social
tendencies in the bud. When evaluative research
produced disappointing recidivism rates for the
detention center youths, plans were announced in
1979 to establish two even tougher detention
centers:

. . . life will be conducted at a brisk tempo.
Much greater emphasis will be put on hard and
constructive activities, on discipline and
tidiness, on self-respect and respect for those in
authority. We will introduce on a regular basis
drill, parades and inspections. Offenders will
have to earn their limited privileges by good
behavior . . . (Thornton, et al., 1984).

Delinquents were not the only groups singled out
for these quasi-military approaches. Military
schools have served for many years as an
acceptable solution to schooling middle-class
adolescents, particularly those seemingly on a
troubled path.

In any case, the U.S. juvenile justice system has
come under increasing attack for its perceived
laxity in treating youth and its tendency to
emphasize rehabilitation over other correctional
goals. Boot camps, in contrast to many other
alternatives, offer a particularly attractive
package--the chance to pursue rehabilitative goals
in an environment that does not appear to coddle
delinquents. 

The OJJDP Demonstration Program

In this context, OJJDP initiated a demonstration
program to explore whether boot camp programs for
adult offenders could be adapted for male juvenile
offenders. The demonstration would provide a means
to "develop, test, and disseminate information on
a prototypical juvenile boot camp as an
intermediate sanction program" (OJJDP, 1990). In
particular, these programs would identify
adaptations to the adult boot camp model to allow
boot camps to operate within State or local
juvenile justice systems and to make their
programming age-appropriate. Despite the growing
popularity of boot camp programs in the adult
correctional system, the concept had not taken
hold in the juvenile system until OJJDP's
demonstration program was under way (Toby and
Pearson, 1992). 

In September 1991, OJJDP awarded grants to three
groups to develop boot camp programs. Applicants
from Cleveland, Ohio; Mobile, Alabama; and Denver,
Colorado, were selected through a competitive
process. They each received an initial award for
18 months with the potential for a continuance
award for an additional 18 months. Grantees spent
the first 6 months of the demonstration designing
the intervention and then opened their boot camps
in March or April 1992. The AIR/ICR evaluation
focuses on the demonstration experience during
this 18-month period.

The Boot Camp Evaluation

The OJJDP boot camp demonstration program included
a plan for a 2-year evaluation to be sponsored by
the National Institute of Justice (NIJ). The
evaluation was awarded at about the same time as
demonstration sites were selected, in October
1991. During the first year of the evaluation, the
Institute for Criminological Research at Rutgers
University was the prime grantee, with the
American Institutes for Research as its
subcontractor. In the second year, the
relationship was reversed. 

The scope of the evaluation of the juvenile boot
camps narrowed over the course of the study.
Initially, the plan was to conduct both a process
and an impact evaluation. However, by the second
year it became apparent that sufficient resources
would not be available to conduct the impact
evaluation, nor to include all of the process
measurements envisioned in the evaluation's
original design. As a result, the design was
scaled back to focus only on process issues.

The core of the assessment was a management
information system that captured administrative
data as offenders progressed through the
demonstration program.

o  At intake, grantees were asked to collect
information on participants' demographic
characteristics, delinquent history, details of
instant (current) offense, disposition of current
case, educational history, employment status,
living arrangements, and criminality of family
members and friends. 

o  At the beginning and end of the 90-day term,
boot camp staff were asked to rate participants'
performance on a number of dimensions. 

o  At the end of the 90-day term, boot camp staff
were asked to report participants' date of
graduation or reasons for leaving the program
prematurely, any serious infractions of the rules,
any honors or awards, and any special services
received. 

o  Five months after boot camp graduation,
grantees were asked to provide an update on
participants' status, including whether they were
still participating in boot camp aftercare and, if
not, the reason for nonparticipation; their
residence and educational placement during
aftercare; and any serious disciplinary
infractions. At this point, boot camp participants
who were still active in the program were asked to
rate their experiences, as well as changes in
their attitudes, values, behavior, and
expectations. 

o  Finally, at the end of the demonstration
program in 1993, grantees were asked to provide a
status report on all first-year platoons,
indicating which youths had completed both boot
camp and aftercare, as well as reasons for
noncompletion. 

The grantees designated various staff to assist in
obtaining this information and researchers worked
with them to fill in gaps and resolve any
inconsistencies among data sources. In addition,
some sites were able to supplement the basic
management information with data they had
collected on physical fitness, educational
performance, and participants' attitudes. Data
collection covered all participants admitted to
boot camp in the first year of the program--119 in
Cleveland, 76 in Denver, and 122 in Mobile.

To supplement these data sources, researchers made
an average of five site visits to each program,
spoke with participants, and interviewed program
staff and representatives of the agencies that
constituted each program. Researchers also kept in
frequent contact with key program staff by
telephone throughout the demonstration.

The Evaluation Report

The remainder of this report presents the results
of the process evaluation of the three boot camp
demonstration programs. Chapter 2 describes the
basic program design in more detail and provides
an overview of the individual programs. Chapter 3
presents each site's selection process (the
procedures each program used to choose candidates
for participation in the program), the
characteristics of program participants, and the
characteristics of those who failed to complete
the program successfully. Detailed descriptions of
the programs' boot camp phase are presented in
chapter 4. A discussion of the aftercare programs
in each site appears in chapter 5. Chapter 6
offers an analysis of observable changes in boot
camp participants during the program period and
the program completion and attrition rates.
Chapter 7 presents conclusions and considerations
for the design of boot camps for juveniles and
provides suggestions for further research.


Chapter 2.  The Design and Initial Implementation
of the Boot Camps

Chapter 2 describes the overall design of the
OJJDP boot camp demonstration program for juvenile
offenders and provides a brief overview of the
three programs developed within that framework.
Chapter 2 also discusses issues that arose during
the early stages, as the sites planned their
programs and served the first few cohorts of
youths. 

The Boot Camp Program Design

The general framework for demonstration programs
was set forth in OJJDP's program announcement,
which appeared in the Federal Register on July 12,
1990. The purpose of the initiative was to develop
and evaluate a juvenile boot camp program. Similar
to a typical boot camp program for adults, it
would serve adjudicated, nonviolent offenders and
emphasize discipline and work. It would also
emphasize "treatment," a core concern of virtually
all correctional programming for juvenile
offenders and a key element in some adult boot
camps. 

OJJDP's agenda for the demonstration programs was
ambitious. The programs would:

o  Serve as a cost-effective sanction.

o  Promote basic, traditional, moral values and
instill a work ethic.

o  Provide discipline to youths through physical
conditioning and teamwork.

o  Promote literacy and increase academic
achievement.

o  Include activities and resources to reduce drug
and alcohol abuse. 

o  Encourage participants to become productive,
law-abiding citizens.

o  Ensure that juvenile offenders are punished and
held accountable.

OJJDP emphasized that the demonstration programs
were to constitute an intermediate sanction (i.e.,
punishment less severe than long-term
institutionalization, but more severe than
immediate supervised release). Although the
programs were to ensure public safety, they were
not to be used for violent or serious repeat
offenders deserving long-term institutionalization
(Federal Register, 1990).

Any public or private organization was eligible to
submit a bid for funding, but preference was given
to proposals that involved collaborative efforts
between public and private agencies and to
consortia involving service agencies and local
juvenile justice systems. Funds were to be awarded
in two 18-month periods. The first award would
cover a 6-month planning effort and a 12-month
implementation period. The second award would
support program operations and allow programs to
develop a training manual and a package of
technical assistance materials that would explain
the methods and approaches used to implement the
programs.

The program announcement called for applicants to
design programs with four phases: selection,
intensive training, preparedness, and
accountability. Applicants were free to set their
own standards for the duration of the program,
except that the intensive training or boot camp
phase was expected to last at least 90 days.

Selection

During the first phase, selection, grantees would
identify a sufficient number of prospective
program participants and establish their
eligibility. According to OJJDP, to participate in
the demonstration program a youth must:

o  Be adjudicated by the juvenile court and be
awaiting implementation of the court disposition.

o  Be categorized as at high risk of continuing
delinquency or of abusing drugs or alcohol.

o  Be under the age of 18.

o  Have no history of mental illness.

o  Not be considered violent or have a history of
involvement in violent crimes.

o  Not be an escape risk.

o  Demonstrate motivation to participate in the
program.

OJJDP offered no specific definition or
methodology for determining which prospective
participants were violent or an escape risk or for
measuring their motivation to participate. Grant
applicants were to apply their own criteria for
selecting program participants.

As part of selection, each grantee would be
required to randomly assign eligible youth to
either the demonstration program or to a control
group, making it possible to conduct a rigorous
impact evaluation. 

Intensive Training

This phase of the program, what is usually
referred to by the term "boot camp," was to
involve rigorous physical conditioning,
discipline, activities to instill confidence,
self-esteem, teamwork and leadership, and it was
to last no less than 90 days. Programs were
expected to adapt some portion of a military-style
system of dress, drills, courtesy, discipline, and
physical training. They were also expected to
conduct comprehensive diagnostic assessments,
provide participants academic training, teach
employment skills, provide participants drug and
alcohol assessments and counseling, and provide
them other kinds of counseling during the
intensive training phase of the program.

Programs were given considerable flexibility in
the implementation of intensive training. Indeed,
as will be discussed in chapter 4, each program
also varied in the degree to which it adopted
military procedures. The programs also varied the
proportion of time devoted to physical training,
work, drill and ceremony, education, and other
support services.

Preparedness

During the third phase, preparedness, OJJDP
specified that the programs return the
participants to a community setting with intensive
supervision and aftercare. Each participant was to
have an individualized plan and be accountable for
accomplishing it. The program staff, with the help
of agencies and volunteers in the community, were
to provide the various support services that the
young offenders need to resist negative influences
in their communities, find work, and complete
academic programs. The program and agency staff
were directed to conduct drug testing,
prevention/treatment counseling, and physical
conditioning and provide support to participants'
families. Participants failing to pursue academic
and vocational training or employment, and those
not participating in community services and
treatment, would be terminated from the program
pending a review by the presiding court.

Accountability

OJJDP envisioned a final phase of aftercare in
which youths were to be held accountable for their
behavior through a systematic restitution and
community service plan. During this stage the
services and activities of the preparedness phase
would be continued. However, youths would be
subject to less intensive monitoring and
supervision, including reduced aftercare time
commitments.

The Underlying Rationale 

Although each grantee was expected to develop a
specific program within the context of local
policy, preferences, and resource constraints, the
OJJDP program announcement delineated general
requirements for development of the programs. The
expectation was that the programs would marshal
resources--people, physical facilities, counseling
and educational materials, agreements with social
and community agencies--to systematically
implement programming that would positively affect
participants' short- and long-term attitudes and
behavior. A distinguishing characteristic was the
expectation that the intensive training phase of
activities would reflect and be conducted in a
distinctively military-like setting.

Embedded in boot camp theory are the twin themes
of discipline and development. The implicit
hypothesis is that external discipline fosters the
self-discipline needed to engage in, and benefit
from, program treatment and development
components. 

The hypothesized logic chain begins with uniformed
drill instructors carefully selected and trained
to give offenders strict military-like discipline
and supervision. Drill instructors who brook no
nonsense from program participants and
consistently enforce prescribed manners of
behavior are instrumental in establishing the boot
camp's structured environment. Program
participants exposed to this environment will
learn self-discipline, resistance to peer
pressure, and commitment to traditional values.
Over time, these personal changes will enhance
feelings of self-worth and reinforce socially
desirable behaviors such as seeking and holding
jobs, continuing education, and resisting criminal
activities.

Within the program's disciplined structure,
participants are better able to focus on and
actively engage in educational (remedial or
otherwise) courses, life skills training, and
counseling. These, too, enhance feelings of worth
and accomplishment, instill an appreciation and
propensity for positive behavior, and improve
chances for resisting damaging peer pressure and
criminal behavior.

The Three Prototype Juvenile Boot Camps

OJJDP awarded grants to three teams of public and
private agencies to develop prototype
demonstration programs for juvenile offenders.
These teams were:

o  The Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas,
Cleveland, Ohio, in association with the North
American Family Institute.

o  The Boys and Girls Clubs of Greater Mobile,
Alabama, in association with the Strickland Youth
Center of Mobile County Juvenile Court and the
University of South Alabama.

o  The Colorado Division of Youth Services,
Denver, Colorado, in association with New Pride,
Inc.

All three teams cited similar systemic problems
driving their decisions to bid. These problems--
rapidly rising numbers of juvenile arrests,
increased involvement of youth with drugs,
overcrowded juvenile facilities, and the expense
of institutionalizing youth--mirrored problems
found in most of the country's juvenile justice
systems. The demonstration programs were viewed as
a possible means to alleviate overcrowding and
still provide innovative services.

The primary goal of Cleveland's demonstration
program was to alleviate severe overcrowding in
juvenile correctional facilities while providing
adequate supervision and treatment. Although
Ohio's Juvenile Code encourages supervision and
rehabilitation in a family environment, separating
the child from his parents only when necessary for
his welfare or in the interests of public safety
(Kurtz and Giannelli, 1989), in 1991, the State
had the second largest number of children in
public custody in the Nation (Bureau of Justice
Statistics, 1994). Reducing this population was a
major concern in Ohio. By decreasing time in
custody, boot camps would lower institutional care
costs. Newspaper exposs on overcrowding and the
resulting diminished ability to provide
rehabilitation or recruit enough qualified 
trained staff increased the State's interest in
boot camps and other intermediate sanctions. The
Cuyahoga County Juvenile Court was also eager to
have correctional alternatives for the increasing
numbers of offenders they confronted, particularly
alternatives that showed promise in reducing
recidivism.

Similarly, the Denver program was developed during
a period when Colorado's juvenile correctional
facilities were under extreme pressure and facing
critical public scrutiny. At the time the program
developed its proposal to OJJDP, the State's
juvenile training schools were estimated to be
operating at 120 percent of capacity. Officials
were concerned that the practice of diverting
juvenile delinquents from secure residential
correctional facilities was undermining local
officials' efforts to sanction delinquent
behavior. They were also concerned that the public
believed that youths were being returned to the
community without any punishment for their crimes.

Interest in the Mobile program stemmed from the
increasing number of juveniles arrested in Alabama
each year for engaging in some form of criminal
behavior. Juvenile court and law enforcement
officials in Mobile believed that these youths
would have a chance of changing their lives for
the better if they could be temporarily removed
from their home environment and exposed to a more
positive lifestyle. Moreover, elected officials
and civic leaders in the area believed that
community services and juvenile justice resources
could be meshed to meet the needs of troubled
youth. The demonstration program seemed a
plausible way of accomplishing this goal.
Additionally, the Strickland Youth Center had
experimented with a 2-week "mini" boot camp in
1991 to explore the feasibility of the model.

Organizational Structure and Management

As was suggested in the OJJDP program
announcement, all three programs included both
public and private sector agencies. Public sector
involvement was critical in resolving issues that
involved the court or probation and correctional
agencies. Private sector involvement added skills,
resources, and, in some cases, facilities to the
program. Together, the partners offered each other
a sounding board on policies and procedures and a
synergy that proved quite useful to a high-
visibility program.

In Cleveland, the Cuyahoga County Juvenile Court
contracted with Massachusetts-based North American
Family Institute (NAFI) to run its program's boot
camp and aftercare phases. The juvenile court
coordinated all program activities, conducted
planning, research and evaluation, and selected
participants. The court paid one manager out of
grant funds to oversee the selection process. NAFI
was responsible for operating both the boot camp
and aftercare demonstration program, training
staff, and providing technical assistance.
 
Similarly, a public agency, the Colorado Division
of Youth Services (DYS), was the prime contractor
in Denver. DYS contracted with New Pride, Inc., a
private, nonprofit corporation with a long history
of providing community-based services to high-risk
delinquents, to operate the program. DYS provided
two client managers and a project coordinator to
oversee program operations, handle selection, and
administer case management for boot camp
participants throughout their sojourn in the
program. New Pride operated both the program's
boot camp and aftercare phases.

In Mobile, the demonstration program was a
partnership of the Strickland Youth Center of the
Mobile County Court, the Boys and Girls Club of
Greater Mobile (B&GC), and the University of South
Alabama. Unlike in Cleveland and Denver, in Mobile
the private partner (B&GC) was the prime
contractor. However, Mobile County's chief
probation officer and the executive director of
B&GC served as co-project directors. They jointly
supervised the director of the program, who in
turn managed both the boot camp and aftercare
phases. Strickland Youth Center managed the intake
and selection process and dedicated three full-
time probation officers to the program. These
officers provided case management supervision for
youths in boot camp and aftercare.

Program Design

In designing their programs, the three sites
adhered to the broad program parameters set forth
in the program announcement. Each of the programs
considered selection to be the first stage of the
process, screening youths against a set of
preordained criteria. Each program implemented a
90-day boot camp on the premises of an existing
youth correctional facility. The central feature
of their camps was the use of quasi-military
structure, discipline, customs, and activities.
Each program also developed an aftercare program,
although none chose to split the program into the
specific preparedness and accountability phases
that OJJDP had envisioned. Both Cleveland and
Denver did, however, divide aftercare into phases
that differed in intensity of surveillance and
services.

Overall, the sites bought into a general
philosophy regarding boot camps that would
permeate both their boot camp and aftercare
programs:

o  The Cuyahoga County Juvenile Court's partner,
NAFI, employed the "normative model," which
attempts to move youths who have gravitated toward
antisocial normative systems back toward healthy
functioning. NAFI incorporated only those aspects
of military boot camps that were compatible with a
safe, structured environment--physical exercise,
military customs and courtesies, and group
punishment. The program's cornerstone was
techniques, such as guided group interaction, that
NAFI had employed in other institutions. The
military veneer provided the program with
straightforward rules, standards, and
expectations. NAFI's philosophy permeated both the
boot camp and aftercare programs; the military
aspects were limited for the most part to the
residential boot camp.

o  The Colorado Division of Youth Services and New
Pride saw the boot camp program as an opportunity
to diverge dramatically from their existing
treatment modalities. By applying a military model
that deliberately made boot camp a high-stress
experience, they would set high standards for
behavior and hold youths accountable to those
standards. Unlike counselors in other programs,
strict drill instructors would intentionally play
a tough role. The Denver program rested on a
theory that youths ultimately would perceive the
DI's as positive role models and internalize their
standards of conduct. Once youths were released
from the boot camp, however, the strict military
environment would be replaced by a "prep school"
that required youths to wear coats and ties and
that employed an entirely educational emphasis.

o  In Mobile, the Strickland Youth Center
supported the discipline, regimentation, and
emphasis on traditional values inherent in the
boot camp model. Mobile planned to employ military
components to gain the attention of youths and to
increase their focus on activities and goals.
Disciplined behavior and exposure to DI role
models would ultimately improve the self-
discipline and concentration of youths, who would
then be more receptive to individualized education
and other rehabilitative components. Youths would
continue to draw upon their improved self-
discipline once they were released to the tutoring
and recreational programs of the Boys and Girls
Club. 

In short, all three programs saw the military
model as an avenue for creating a secure,
structured environment that would permit youths to
make other changes. All three programs also viewed
drill instructors as positive role models for
youths to emulate. Denver and Mobile depended on
the external discipline of the military to produce
internal controls. Cleveland aimed to improve
internal controls via a peer culture that
established a positive normative system in each
platoon. This system would continue to be
nourished during the aftercare period.

The next three chapters describe in detail the
program implemented at each site. Chapter 3
discusses the selection process and criteria
employed by the sites, as well as the types of
youths selected for participation. Chapter 4
discusses the three boot camp programs and
variations in the degree of militarism they
employed, and chapter 5 explores the three starkly
different aftercare models implemented by the
programs. 

Chapter 3.  Boot Camp Selection Phase

According to the framework outlined in the
previous chapter, the first phase of the program
was participant selection. This chapter describes
the screening criteria developed by the programs,
the selection processes they employed, and the
characteristics of the youths these criteria and
processes identified during the first year of
operation (April 1992 through March 1993). 

Because the demonstration programs were conceived
to be intermediate sanctions, they were designed
to serve midlevel offenders--youths whose criminal
behavior warranted some intervention more
restrictive than probation but not serious enough
to prompt long-term institutionalization. Defining
these offenders was a critical question for the
programs, in terms of both public support and
ability to work successfully with youths. Drawing
the line too close to the probation end of the
spectrum would raise questions about fairness in
sentencing for youths whose criminal records were
normally minor enough to warrant a lesser
sentence. Net-widening--selecting youths who would
otherwise have been placed in less expensive,
nonresidential placements--also would reduce the
program's potential for lowering costs. 

On the other hand, if the programs were used
simply as an alternative to longer term
institutional placements, it would be more
difficult to make the case that the programs
punished youths and held them accountable for
their behaviors. Questions might be raised about
whether the programs were shrinking the net by
reducing the amount of time youths were
incarcerated. A perception that boot camps were
diversion programs, providing a less restrictive
alternative for youths, might well erode some of
the public support enjoyed by the programs. 

In fact, the three demonstration programs came to
different decisions about which youths to define
as midlevel offenders. That decisionmaking is
reflected in the type of youths who participated
in the boot camps.  

OJJDP's Guidelines for Selection 

In its program announcement, OJJDP described the
appropriate boot camp target population as
"adjudicated, nonviolent, juvenile offenders who
are under 18 years of age" (Federal Register,
1990). Violence was to be determined on the basis
of offense-based criteria, including homicide,
rape, armed robbery, aggravated assault, and arson
(Summary of Solicitation Workshop Proceedings,
1990). In addition, the programs were to exclude
"serious, habitual offenders who ordinarily would
be assigned to a correctional institution"
(Summary of Solicitation Workshop Proceedings,
1990). However, the target population was to "have
a history of offending with prior attempts at
intervention that appear to have failed" (Federal
Register, 1990), placing them at high risk of
further involvement in the juvenile or criminal
justice systems. The program announcement and
backup application materials did not set objective
criteria for "serious, habitual offenders," nor
did they clarify whether the programs were to
exclude all offenders normally sentenced to
correctional facilities, or only violent and
habitual offenders who would be so sentenced. In
the absence of precise definitions, the programs
were able to interpret the guidelines to fit a
broad range of offenders. 

Except for the dictate that candidates have an
adjudication and have failed to benefit from
previous interventions, the criteria served to
exclude offenders who were too serious or violent
rather than to define youths who had committed
offenses serious enough to warrant inclusion in
the target population. Public safety was cited as
a reason for excluding violent youths, because the
boot camps were designed as minimum security
institutions. The ambiguity in threshold criteria
indicated that there was less concern about
whether boot camps would result in more youths in
residential placement than about whether serious
and violent offenders would be released
prematurely into the community. 

 In addition to exclusion on the basis of youths'
criminal records (i.e., serious and violent
offenses), programs were to screen out candidates
who had histories of mental illness and who were
considered escape risks. Programs could elect to
serve all juveniles, or they could focus on one of
two groups: youths 15 years old and younger or
youths 15 to 17 years old. All candidates were to
"demonstrate motivation to participate in the
program" (Federal Register, 1990).

Because they were funded under OJJDP's program
development process, the demonstration programs
also had research requirements for testing their
effects. The guidelines required that youths be
randomly assigned to experimental or control
conditions. This requirement meant that the
programs had to screen and select twice the number
of youths they needed to fill their available
slots.

Selection Criteria at the Program Sites

Within the broad screening parameters outlined by
OJJDP, the three programs defined their own
criteria and procedures for identifying
candidates.

Only males were eligible for participation. All
three programs chose to serve the broadest age
range stipulated by OJJDP, rather than focusing
only on those above or below age 15. Both
Cleveland and Denver set 14 as their minimum age
limit, while Mobile selected from among 13-year-
olds. As its maximum age limit, Mobile employed
the statutory age of juvenile court jurisdiction,
17. In Denver and Cleveland, 18-year-olds could be
admitted if they were 17 at the time of referral.

Both Cleveland and Mobile met the nonviolent
criterion by excluding offenders with offenses on
a proscribed list. In Cleveland, this list
included murder, manslaughter, rape and other sex
offenses, arson, kidnapping, and corruption of a
minor. Mobile excluded these same offenders and
also those whose offenses were less serious, i.e.,
assaults 1 and 2, burglary 1, robbery, and
shooting into an occupied building or vehicle.
Although Denver did not have a set list of
exclusionary violent or sex offenses, in practice
their offense criteria were similar to
Cleveland's. In Mobile and Denver, the exclusions
applied to all offenses on a youth's record; in
Cleveland they applied only to current offenses.
Cleveland did, however, eliminate youths from
consideration if they were considered serious,
habitual offenders.

None of the three sites set lower boundary offense
criteria. In all three sites, however, the
expectation was that the programs would not serve
youths who were before the court for the first
time. In fact, Cleveland's criteria implied that
only misdemeanor and felony offenses would be
eligible. Mobile targeted youths who had failed on
probation and whose probation officer recommended
them for the program. Denver targeted youths who
were committed to the State Department of Youth
Services and were awaiting placement at its
classification center. Denver also targeted youths
under probation supervision by the local juvenile
court. Only Cleveland selected participants
entirely from youths who would otherwise have had
a residential placement either at a Ohio Division
of Youth Services (ODYS) facility or at the
county-run Youth Development Center (YDC), neither
of which accepts status offenders. 

Thus, on the selection discussed previously,
Mobile's criteria fell closest to the net-widening
end, admitting youths who might otherwise receive
a probation sentence. Denver's criteria defined a
midpoint and included both probationers and youths
committed to State custody. Cleveland fell closest
to the other end of the spectrum, selecting from
among the institution-bound only.

The special demands of boot camp dictated
stringent medical and psychological screening. All
three programs required thorough medical
screenings to ensure that youths would be able to
participate in rigorous physical conditioning.
They also attempted to screen out youths with
psychological problems that might reduce their
tolerance level for a highly structured military-
style setting. Youths with serious drug and
alcohol addictions (Cleveland specified only those
serious enough to require detoxification) were
excluded for similar reasons. Because the boot
camps would not be located in high-security
facilities, youths who were considered escape
risks were ruled out as candidates. Finally,
Mobile added an intelligence criterion requiring
candidates to have a minimum IQ of 60.

Although voluntary participation is typical of
many adult boot camps, Cleveland was the only site
requiring voluntary agreement. Initially, there
was concern in Cleveland that too few youths would
volunteer for the program because the alternative
at ODYS or YDC would only be a few months longer
than the "tough" boot camp. Whereas offenders
volunteer for boot camp in the adult system
because their prison sentence could be reduced by
several years, the attraction is less obvious in
the juvenile system, where sentence reduction
amounts to no more than a few months. Despite
these fears, Cleveland remained committed to
voluntary participation, believing it to be a
powerful motivational tool. Indeed, the concerns
proved fruitless, as almost all of the youths
offered an opportunity to enter the candidate pool
did, in fact, volunteer. 

Cleveland's voluntary participation requirement
went further than OJJDP's stipulation that youths
"show a motivation to participate." Denver took a
youth's feelings about boot camp into
consideration in selection decisions, but it did
not necessarily exclude an unwilling youth from
eligibility on that basis. In Mobile, there was no
voluntary aspect to the assignment process. In
part, this policy stemmed from the fact that
judges perceived a voluntary requirement as a
limit to their judicial discretion. It also
stemmed from concerns--similar to those in
Cleveland--that the program would not be able to
attract enough volunteers.  

Selection Process

The selection process was tailored to the
processes already in place in the three juvenile
justice systems. Some features, however, were
shared across programs. Each camp entered youths
in "platoons" or "flights" of 7 to 13. The
capacity at both Cleveland and Mobile allowed 10
to 12 youths to enter the program each month.
Denver's capacity was smaller, permitting 12
youths to enter the camp every 6 weeks. Each
program followed random assignment procedures,
requiring the identification of double the number
of youths required for an experimental
intervention. In addition, the programs first
employed less expensive screening strategies, such
as reviews of official records, reserving the more
expensive medical exams until the pool of
candidates had been winnowed to a more manageable
level. 

Following are summaries of the selection processes
used in Cleveland, Denver, and Mobile. 

Cleveland

After a juvenile court judge had committed a youth
to ODYS or to YDC, a special boot camp program
manager conducted a preliminary screening for age
and medical history and obtained a release of
information. All youths with ODYS or YDC
commitments entered the detention center,
regardless of whether they were in secure
detention during the pretrial stage. At this
juncture the judge could override a youth's entry
into the candidate pool and send him directly to
ODYS or YDC, or a youth could fall out of the pool
because he qualified for community corrections.
Next, the program manager reviewed the criminal,
social, and medical history of youths remaining in
the pool and met with each candidate to explain
the boot camp program and to obtain a written
voluntary participation statement. The program
manager also administered mental health and
substance abuse screens. Finally, the physician at
the detention center conducted a physical exam.
All youths who survived this process were then
submitted in pairs to the research team for random
assignment. The entire screening process took no
more than 2 days. 

Youths who were assigned to the control conditions
were generally transported to one of the nine ODYS
institutions or to YDC within a few hours. Boot
camp youths were held in the detention center or,
in a few cases, released to a shelter care
facility to await the assembly of the next platoon
of youths at the first of the month. During this
time the program manager conducted both a parent
and a youth orientation to boot camp. 

Denver

In Denver, there were two tracks for entry into
boot camp: the Department of Youth Services (DYS)
track, accounting for about 56 percent of the
candidate pool, and the probation track,
accounting for the remainder. The latter involved
a less systematic process. 

The DYS candidate pool consisted of all youths
housed at the DYS selection and classification
center at that time. Two DYS case managers
assigned to the program screened suitable
candidates with the assistance of center staff and
DYS field officers. The screeners focused on
youths with risk scores that qualified them for a
medium security facility or community placement.
The routine classification process, which involves
medical, clinical, educational, and drug and
alcohol evaluations at the center, produced most
of the information needed to determine whether a
youth qualified for the candidate pool. The
manager also met with a parent to obtain
additional medical information. Finally, case
managers met with youths to orient them to the
program and to determine their interest in the
program. The case managers made the final decision
as to whether the youths entered the boot camp
pool, and they presented pairs of youths to the
research team for random assignment. 

The other pool of candidates came from individual
probation officers in Denver, who could make
referrals to the DYS case managers. Youths could
be referred before or after sentencing or when
they had violated conditions of their probation.
Because youths who entered the pool via probation
avenues were not part of the DYS system, the DYS
case managers did not have easy access to them or
to their records, except for court actions
recorded in Colorado's statewide computer system.
Case managers collected background data from the
probation officers and interviewed most youths
over the telephone. Youths were required to have
medical screenings. Case managers then 
made final admission decisions on the basis of
this information and relayed pairs of youths for
random assignment. For youths who had already been
sentenced, the judge generally had paved the way
for random assignment by specifying boot camp and
an alternative placement. Youths already sentenced
or who faced a violation of probation at the time
of random assignment had to appear before a judge
to finalize the disposition. 

The distinction between youths who entered the
program via probation and those who entered via
DYS was maintained in the aftercare period, when
DYS youths were supervised by DYS case managers
and probation youths were assigned to probation
officers. 

Mobile

After adjudication, probation officers screened
youths to determine if they met the age and
offense criteria specified by the program. They
also made recommendations to the court regarding
which youths should be considered for admission.
After this initial screening, the judge ordered
youths into the candidate pool or made an
alternative disposition. Youths who entered the
pool underwent a series of tests: a suicide risk
assessment, an escape risk assessment, a drug and
alcohol assessment, a psychological examination,
and, if the youths did not have an intelligence
score on record, an IQ test. Candidates were
required to arrange for a medical exam by their
own doctor or were provided a medical examination
by a local clinic. Finally, the EYC director
reviewed the candidate pool and could override
assignment decisions. This final review was
subject to an appeal by the probation officer to a
committee consisting of the boot camp director,
the probation officer, the Strickland Youth Center
psychometrist, the boot camp drug and alcohol
assessor, a boot camp life skills coordinator, and
a probation supervisor. Youths selected for the
final pool were submitted in pairs for random
assignment.

Pretransfer

Holding youths in detention or at a central
classification center simplified the screening
process because youths were more accessible and
because information is routinely collected at
those detention sites. Of the youths who entered
the three boot camps during the first year, at
least 74 percent in Denver, and slightly fewer
than half in the other two sites, had been placed
in secure detention prior to their adjudication.
Once selected, however, detention was mandatory in
Cleveland. All of the youths were held in secure
detention during the period from disposition to
transfer, approximately 98 percent of them for the
entire time. In both Denver and Mobile the
percentages of youths in secure detention during
all or part of the selection period were 66
percent and 44 percent, respectively.

Although it simplifies the selection process,
detaining youths adds to the cost of a program and
must be factored into cost-effectiveness
equations. Because the programs formed platoons on
a monthly basis in both Cleveland and Mobile, and
every 6 weeks in Denver, it was expected that at
least 1 or 2 weeks would elapse between random
assignment and intake into the boot camp. Mobile
had the shortest time period between assignment
and transfer, with 64 percent of youths waiting no
more than 9 days. The abbreviated wait, in
conjunction with the low detention rate, meant
that the

*  In Mobile, judges do not sentence youths until
after selections have been made for boot camp; it
is therefore not known to what option a judge
would have sentenced youths admitted to boot camp.

**  In Denver, probation may refer youths to the
program prior to disposition. Youths then appear
for disposition. Those youths assigned to the
experimental group would have "boot camp" entered
on the record, in essence approving the random
assignment.

Mobile program involved fewer postcommitment
detention days, and, therefore, presumably
experienced lower costs than the other two
programs. As would be expected with the longer
period between formation of platoons, Denver had
the longest time periods between disposition and
transfer, with almost half of the youths waiting
20 or more days. Cleveland fell in the middle with
a median wait of about 2 weeks. 

In Cleveland, the added time in detention was a
problem because of overcrowding in the detention
center. Once a youth is committed to ODYS or YDC,
he generally is transported immediately, rarely
waiting longer than 1 or 2 days. Therefore, a
median postcommitment time of 13 days for up to 10
youths each month was an added burden on the
detention center. 

The demonstration program had the opposite effect
on Denver's detention situation. According to DYS
staff, detained boot camp youths, though spending
more days on average in detention than youths at
either of the other boot camp programs, were
likely still detained a shorter period of time
than other committed youths in Denver. In fact,
Colorado's youth service system is so crowded, and
committed youths there wait so long for
residential placements, that the shorter preboot
camp detention periods may have been an incentive
for youths to seek the boot camp alternative.

Characteristics of Youths Screened into Boot Camp

The programs began selecting youths to participate
in boot camp in March 1992, and the first cohort
entered facilities in April. During the first year
of operation, Cleveland accepted 119 youths,
Denver accepted 76, and Mobile accepted 122. The
social, educational, and delinquent
characteristics of these youths are presented
below. 

The programs' screening criteria yielded an all-
male population of predominantly older youths.
Over three-quarters of the youths in both
Cleveland and Denver were at least 16 years old.
Mobile drew a slightly younger recruit class, with
an average age of 15.6, compared to 16.5 in both
Cleveland and Denver. Mobile was the only program
to accept 13-year-olds, and it selected 7 percent
of its recruits from this group. Denver set a
screening minimum of age 14, but in practice
screened out most 14-year-olds because staff
believed that programming was not appropriate for
such a broad age range (14- to 18-year-olds). 

About 80 percent of recruits in Cleveland and 64
percent of recruits in Mobile were African
American. Except for a few Hispanic youths in
Cleveland, the remainder of recruits in both
programs were white. Denver's boot camp population
was more varied, with 35 percent African American,
35 percent white, 22 percent Hispanic, and 8
percent Native American and other. 

Criminal Records. Consistent with the program's
target criteria, most boot camp youths were not
violent or serious, habitual offenders. However,
screening rules did vary across sites. Cleveland
selected the most serious group of offenders,
Mobile selected the least serious group, and
Denver fell in the middle. 

Felony referrals predominate at all three sites,
with 72.3 percent of youth in Cleveland, 50.7 in
Denver, and 49.2 percent in Mobile entering boot
camp on felony charges. These typically were
property offenses in Denver and Mobile and, to a
lesser extent, in Cleveland. Cleveland differed
from the other two sites in that a number of
youths entered the program on drug felonies and on
felonies against persons. All three programs took
in a substantial proportion of probation
violators, with no additional offense adjudicated
concurrently. About 23 percent of youths in
Cleveland, 29 percent in Denver, and 38 percent in
Mobile were selected for boot camp on the basis of
probation violations. 

Although the majority of the offenses in all three
programs were property crimes, the type of crime
differed across the three sites. More than a
quarter of instant offenses in Mobile were thefts,
but in the other sites thefts represented much
smaller proportions. On the other hand, Mobile had
fewer auto thefts than Denver or Cleveland. (It is
not known how many auto thefts were reported in
Cleveland because this offense is charged there as
"receiving stolen property" and categorized as
"other property.") Cleveland had the highest
percentage of youths brought in on robberies (13
percent) and also had a substantial number of drug
offenses, the bulk of which were drug trafficking
rather than possession or use. The vast majority
of instant offenses in Cleveland and Mobile were
felonies, accounting for 93.5 percent and 78.9
percent, respectively, of cases reported at those
sites. Denver had a much higher percentage of
youths brought in on misdemeanor charges (37.7
percent).

Three additional indicators of the seriousness of
boot camp participants' instant offenses are the
degree of injury to the victim, the amount of loss
associated with the offense, and whether a gun was
involved. As would be expected from the program
criteria, most instant offenses did not involve
physical injury to the victim. Victims in a few
cases required treatment by a doctor or
hospitalization, but for the most part injuries
were minor.

About 15 percent of cases in Cleveland involved
use of a gun, however, compared with 7 percent in
Denver and Mobile. Property damage or loss was
prevalent in Mobile and Denver, where over half of
the offenses involved some losses. A relatively
small proportion of cases (26.3 percent in Denver,
19.7 percent in Mobile, and 9.9 percent in
Cleveland) involved losses of $600 or more.

Prior to their instant offense, most boot camp
youths had accumulated a delinquency record and
were under supervision by the juvenile court.
Because Mobile intentionally selected youths who
had violated probation, it is not surprising that
73.8 percent of the program's recruits were on
probation or parole upon arrest for the boot camp
offense. A similar proportion of youths in
Cleveland and a slightly lower percentage of
youths in Denver were on probation or parole.
Youths in the "other" status category had escaped
from an institution or otherwise were under some
form of court supervision. Only 16.9 percent of
the boot camp youths in Cleveland, 9.3 percent in
Denver, and 10.7 percent in Mobile were not
involved in the juvenile system when they were
arrested for their current offense. 

With respect to prior findings, Cleveland's youths
had accumulated the most extensive delinquency
records by the time they committed their instant
offenses. About 19 percent of the Cleveland youths
had three or more felony findings excluding the
instant offense and 41 percent of them had two or
more felony findings. In Denver and Mobile only
about 20 percent of the youths had two or more
prior felony findings. Only 24 percent of the
Cleveland youths had no prior felony finding
before the offense which stimulated program entry,
in contrast to 49 percent of the Denver youths and
43 percent of the Mobile youths. 

Looking at their entire criminal histories at the
point of boot camp entry, the differences between
youths in Cleveland and those in the other two
programs are even more apparent. Ninety-seven
percent of Cleveland youths had at least one
felony charge on their records. The mean number of
felony charges on their records was 3.0, dropping
only slightly, to 2.8, for mean felony findings.
Denver and Mobile's youths had on average at least
one fewer felony finding and fewer felony charges.
About 24 percent of youths in Denver and 21
percent in Mobile did not have any felony charges
but all youths in Cleveland and all but one in
Denver had at least one felony or misdemeanor
charge upon entry to boot camp. In Mobile,
however, 10 youths whose only delinquent offense
was a violation of a court order for a status
offense entered the program. 

On average, youths in Denver initiated their
criminal careers at later ages than youths in
Mobile and Cleveland. The mean age of first
criminal referral ranged from 13.7 years in Mobile
to 14.9 years in Denver. These differences may be
more apparent than real, however. In Denver, many
youths had prior run-ins with Colorado's municipal
courts, which handle violations and some
misdemeanors. The official State delinquency
records for these youths commenced when they
contacted a county-level court. The researchers
did not have systematic access to municipal court
information.

Not only had youths in Cleveland accumulated more
serious criminal records than youths in Mobile and
Denver, but 27 percent had a prior commitment to
either the State or county correctional system.
Fewer than 5 percent of youths in either Mobile or
Denver had State commitments, but both programs
had youths who had been confined for less
restrictive sentences. In Denver, 45 percent had
received a "probation plus detention" sentence
prior to boot camp, and in Mobile, 16 percent had
served time in Camp Basic, a 2-week precursor to
the boot camp program. Only about 16 percent of
youths in Mobile and Cleveland and 26 percent in
Denver had not received at least a formal
probation sentence prior to boot camp.

In summary, most youths selected for boot camp had
a prior sentence at least as serious as probation,
and they were either on probation/parole or had
some other system involvement prior to their entry
into boot camp. The instant offense was typically
a property, drug, or "other" felony involving no
injury and relatively small monetary loss. Some
youths entered boot camp on a violation of a court
order or probation with no other new offense; all
of the youths entering on violations had prior
criminal offenses, except for 10 youths in Mobile
who had been placed on probation for status
offenses. According to any of the criteria
discussed, recruits in Cleveland had considerably
more serious criminal records than youths in
either Mobile or Denver.

Family and Social Characteristics. The
characteristics of the boot camp youths' families
reveal a disturbing picture of youths living in
broken families that in many cases were already
known to the court system. At the time of referral
to boot camp, no more than 30 percent of youths in
the three programs lived with both parents or a
parent and a stepparent. In the two sites where
data was available--Cleveland and Mobile--58
percent and 46 percent, respectively, of
participants' families were on some form of public
assistance. About one-third or more of youths in
all three programs had one or more siblings with
official delinquency records, and sizeable
proportions of the youths' parents were known to
have either criminal records or to have been
referred for child neglect and abuse. The numbers
are slightly lower in Denver, and lower still in
Mobile, but Cleveland made a point of collecting
this information for use in assessing their
candidates' risk, while the other sites did not.
The main point is that many of these youths came
from families already ensconced in the criminal
justice system.

Reviews of youths' social background records show
that most boot camp youths hang out with peers who
also are delinquent. Almost all youths in
Cleveland and Mobile and about 78 percent in
Denver reported having delinquent friends.
Discipline problems at home or at school also were
prevalent among these youths, particularly in
Cleveland and Denver. Almost half of the youths in
Denver had "major" drug or alcohol use problems.
Major drug problems were reported less frequently
for youths in Cleveland and Mobile, possibly
because more youths with such problems were
screened out. Gang problems surfaced most
frequently among youths in Denver, with 42 percent
suspected of major gang involvement. About 30
percent of youths in Cleveland and 26 percent in
Mobile had strong gang links. At the point of boot
camp entry, the vast majority of youths in
Cleveland and Denver were either not enrolled in
school or were enrolled but attending very
sporadically. Proportionately fewer of the youths
in Mobile exhibited school dropout or severe
attendance patterns, perhaps because they were
somewhat younger.

In addition to data from social records, in
Cleveland self-report data were available from a
youth survey administered at the detention center
before selection for the program. Because these
surveys were administered by a boot camp staff
member at a time when the youths may have been
trying to cast themselves in the best light
possible to gain entry into the boot camp program,
limited significance can be given to the results.
However, the surveys do provide some insight into
how the youths perceived themselves, or how they
may have wanted to portray themselves. 

Many survey items asked youths to indicate their
agreement or disagreement with statements on a 5-
point Likert scale. More than 50 percent of the
youths reported a "positive attitude" toward
themselves on four of the five statements.
However, fewer than half were satisfied with
themselves. 

A number of youths reported difficulty controlling
their tempers and saying things without stopping
to think. On the other hand, 92 percent responded
in the direction indicating internal locus of
control by agreeing that a person can pretty well
make whatever he wants out of his life. Most
youths perceived that they had some control over
their destiny.

Responses to the statements concerning peer
relationships were generally positive. Youths
generally felt close to their friends and believed
they fit in well with them. They also agreed that
it is easy to have friends if you try to be
friendly. 

Boot camp youths also perceived that their peers
generally disapprove of criminal behavior,
particularly if it involves breaking into a
building or using force. However, fewer than half
reported that their friends would disapprove of
their hitting or threatening someone or of their
selling hard drugs. 

A percentage of youths reported that they had
engaged in various delinquent and other negative
behaviors in the 3 months prior to boot camp
admission. Generally, the more serious the crime,
the fewer the number of youth admitting having
committed it. More than half the youths reported
that they had been rowdy in a public place, hit or
threatened to hit other students in the last 3
months, or taken part in a fight where a group of
their friends were pitted against another group.
On the other hand, none reported that he had raped
someone, and few reported using force to rob
students or adults. An interesting finding from
the survey was the frequency of reported sexual
activity. All but 5 percent of the youths reported
having had sex in the 3 months prior to admittance
to the camps, and 45 percent reported having had
sex on 10 or more occasions. The majority reported
using alcohol, and about 38 percent reported using
marijuana. None of the youths reported using drugs
such as crack, cocaine, or heroin.

Taken at face value, the surveys described a pool
of youths with fairly good self-esteem and strong
peer relationships, most of whom did not admit to
criminal activity of a serious nature during the 3
months prior to detention. However, a number of
the youths did admit to minor criminal behavior
and fighting among peers, as well as alcohol use.
The vast majority also claimed frequent sexual
activity. 

Problems In the Selection Process

Three types of selection problems emerged as the
programs implemented their designs: screening
procedures inadequate to detect all medical,
behavioral, and psychological problems;
uncertainty about the appropriateness of the
screening criteria, particularly with regard to
age and criminal history; and problems attaining
adequate cohort sizes. (A fourth problem,
deviations from random assignment, is described in
Appendix A.) 

Inability of Screening Procedures To Detect
Problems

Soon after program implementation, some flaws in
the screening process became apparent. Almost
immediately, program staff found that some medical
problems had eluded detection in the screening
stage. This problem caused concern not only
because physical training was an integral part of
the program, but also because the program could
potentially be held liable in the case of injury.
In Cleveland, the program supplemented the
detention physical with a more thorough physical
by the physician at the Youth Development Center.
In Denver, case managers attempted to supplement
medical information on participants' health
problems with medical histories obtained from
parents. 

Behavioral problems that did not respond to the
boot camp environment also became apparent fairly
early in the program. In response, the programs
tightened screening by reviewing the
characteristics of some of the early program
failures and alerting the screeners to those
problems. Mobile took a second look at its screen
for psychosis after some particularly bizarre
animalistic behavior on the part of one youth. 

Uncertainty About the Appropriateness of the
Screening Criteria

Both Cleveland and Denver expressed some
dissatisfaction with the blanket exclusion of
youths who had committed "violent" crimes, and no
site adhered to this requirement 100 percent. In
Denver, staff observed that most youths in the
juvenile system had some history of violence, in
part because gang involvement was so prevalent,
even though this violent experience might not
appear on their official records. In any case,
staff felt that youths presumed to have a violent
history did no worse than others in boot camp, and
some performed extremely well. Denver did not
relax the criterion until the end of the second
year, and then only occasionally. In actuality,
however, the programs included offenders with
violent instant offenses, including youths who had
committed aggravated assaults or robberies.
Fifteen percent of the instant offenses in
Cleveland included use of a gun. Cleveland took
youths who had committed violent offenses as long
as those offenses were not their instant offense. 

Another area of uncertainty was deciding what ages
were appropriate for the programs. As noted above,
none of the programs elected to serve a more
narrow age population as suggested by OJJDP, but
chose instead to serve all juveniles ages 13 to 17
(in Mobile) or 14 to 17 (in Cleveland and Denver).
Denver, after a couple of months of experience,
avoided 14-year-olds and instead sought older
youths believed to be more socially mature. On the
other hand, older youths were a problem because
many of them were inappropriate for regular school
placements, and because aftercare programs had
been designed with the assumption that youths
would be supervised at school during the day. All
three programs had a number of 18-year-old youths
in boot camp who turned 18 after the offense was
filed (date age calculated for screening
purposes), but before transport to 
boot camp.

Problems Attaining Adequate Caseload Sizes

Except for some initial tinkering with the timing
of selection for a new cohort, neither Cleveland
nor Mobile had any major difficulties obtaining
enough cases, even though the research design
required them to identify two youths for every
program slot. It is notable that in Cleveland
participation was adequate despite the fact that
the youths had to volunteer for the program. In
Denver, however, the program was plagued by a lack
of participants, and it never reached capacity.
Certainly the random assignment procedures
exacerbated this problem. 

Overall, except for the random assignment
requirements, the programs appeared satisfied with
the selection criteria and process. Although
Denver and Cleveland believed they could handle
youthful violent offenders in their programs,
staff admitted that it was difficult to predict
which types of youth would succeed or fail in the
boot camp environment. Chapter 5 attempts to
answer that question empirically. 

Chapter 4.  Boot Camp: The Intensive Training
Phase

A 90-day period of residence in a boot camp, known
as the "intensive training phase," was the heart
of the demonstration program. In this chapter, the
key features of the boot camp phase are described.
Unless otherwise noted, descriptions are based on
the first year of boot camp operations, from April
1992 through March 1993. 

Boot Camp Philosophy and Design

According to OJJDP's program announcement, the
intensive training phase was expected to offer a
crime- and drug-free environment in which to
change the behavior and attitudes of participants.
To achieve these changes, the program would expose
youths to military-like routine, drills and
discipline, and rigorous physical conditioning.
The program would also include rehabilitative
components such as education, counseling,
development of work- and life-coping skills, drug
and alcohol abuse programming, and family
involvement. Upon graduation from boot camp, each
youth would return to the community with an
individualized plan for continuing and reinforcing
the progress he had made (Federal Register, 1990).

Although OJJDP dictated the framework for the boot
camp phase, it was up to the demonstration sites
to flesh out a program that incorporated the
required elements, was philosophically coherent,
and was appropriate for juveniles. Much of the
initial framework was completed during the
proposal development stage. Because none of the
grantees had previous experience with boot camp
programs for juveniles or adults, all looked
closely at the available literature and visited at
least one boot camp for adults. The grantees also
struggled to translate the broad vision of a
"character-building" program into a plan for day-
to-day operations. 

As a result, each boot camp developed a rationale
and perspective that was distinctive. 

o  Cleveland's program designers at juvenile court
steered away from what they perceived to be the
negative, degrading, and excessively punitive
aspects of some boot camps. Instead, they elected
the treatment approach, augmented by an atmosphere
of military discipline, that the North American
Family Institute (NAFI) had implemented in other
locations. NAFI's approach, based on the
"normative model," assumes that individuals
assimilate group norms in order to belong. Because
delinquents have gravitated toward antisocial
normative systems, treatment must move them back
toward healthy, prosocial values and functioning.
NAFI aims to create a safe, comfortable
environment in which staff can set clear
expectations, establish a positive peer culture,
and persuade youths to accept different values and
behaviors. A counseling technique called guided
group interaction is a crucial part of the NAFI
approach. For Cleveland's program, NAFI would
incorporate only those aspects of military boot
camps compatible with the normative model. In
general, this meant regimentation and structure,
physical exercise, and military customs and
courtesies--elements that would create a safe,
secure environment for participants. 

o  The Denver grantees, the Colorado Division of
Youth Services and New Pride, Inc., had lengthy
experience in providing a wide variety of programs
for delinquent juveniles in residential and
nonresidential settings. They saw the boot camp
phase as a chance to depart radically from
previous treatment models--that is, to commit
fully to the military model. Although their boot
camp would include some traditional rehabilitative
programming, that would not be its primary
emphasis. Thus, the staff would deliberately try
to make boot camp a high-stress experience in
which profound life changes could take root. Drill
instructors (DI's) would be expected to play the
"tough" role, unlike counselors that youths might
encounter in other types of programs. Strict
military-style discipline would teach socially
acceptable behavior and the consequences of
deviance. Meanwhile, DI's would provide the
positive role models of leadership and integrity
that many youths were lacking. Ultimately, as in
Cleveland, the hope was that youths would come to
identify and internalize these positive standards
of conduct. Program staff also felt that the
toughness of the program would provide another
benefit: Unlike the usual DYS parolee, a youth who
graduated from boot camp would have an
accomplishment to be proud of. In short, Denver's
boot camp would equip its graduates with the self-
esteem, self-discipline, and positive values to
profit from the educational and treatment programs
available during aftercare.

o  In Mobile, the military model was familiar and
readily acceptable to program planners and the
wider community. As home to a number of military
bases and to many military careerists, veterans,
and retirees, Alabama is generally sympathetic to
program models that stress discipline and
regimentation and uphold traditional values.
Mobile, in addition, had experimented with a 2-
week boot camp prior to receiving the OJJDP
demonstration grant. The driving concept behind
Mobile's demonstration program was that unfocused
and inattentive youths cannot benefit from
rehabilitative and treatment regimens. The
military model was viewed as an effective means to
gain the attention of participants and get them to
focus on specific activities and aims. In time,
disciplined behavior and exposure to DI role
models would improve self-discipline and the
ability to concentrate. Youths then would be ready
to respond to individualized education,
challenging activities requiring teamwork, and
counseling. Moreover, part of the boot camp
experience would include an opportunity to learn
respect for the environment and take part in
outdoor activities to help maintain it--an
emphasis giving rise to the program's name, the
Environmental Youth Corps. 

In all three programs, these basic orientations
remained constant throughout the demonstration and
accounted for some differences in program
emphasis. As discussed below, despite differences
in emphasis, the boot camps shared many features.
In chapter 5, the authors illustrate how there was
much more cross-site variation in aftercare. 

Program Capacity and Utilization

Program capacity, which ranged from 24
participants in Denver to 30 in Cleveland and 52
in Mobile, was dictated mainly by the amount of
the OJJDP award and the size of the building(s)
available to the boot camps. 

The boot camps were designed to admit "platoons"--
groups of youths who would enter boot camp
together and graduate together. To fully use its
facility capacity, Cleveland intended to start a
new platoon of 10 youths every month. Similarly,
Denver planned on a platoon of 12 every 6 weeks,
and Mobile planned on a platoon of 13 every 3
weeks. Although Cleveland was generally able to
meet its targets, platoons in Denver and Mobile
were smaller than expected, averaging 10
participants each. Also, the period between
platoons in Denver and Mobile was, on average, 7
to 10 days longer than expected. In any case, the
Mobile facility would have been extremely cramped
if it had admitted platoons according to the
original plan. In fact, during the second year of
Mobile's program, official capacity was limited to
32 by order of the fire marshal.

All three programs accepted their initial cohort
in early to mid-April 1992, about 6 months after
the OJJDP award. Cleveland and Mobile admitted 12
platoons during the first full year, and Denver
took in eight. 

Facilities

All three programs modified existing facilities to
serve as boot camps. The Cleveland program, called
Camp Roulston, used two cottages at a county-
operated residential center for delinquents,
situated about 30 miles outside the city. Denver's
Camp Foxfire occupied a building on the grounds of
a DYS youth services center on the outskirts of
Denver. The Mobile program used a separate
building and two trailers at the county court's
Strickland Youth Center. 

Although each program had its own building or
buildings, the location enabled the demonstration
programs to share some facilities and services
with other programs, such as classrooms in
Cleveland and medical services, cafeteria
services, and recreational areas at all three
sites. Through constant supervision and careful
scheduling, the programs avoided commingling boot
camp participants with youths in other programs.
At times, however, boot camp participants were
within sight and sound of others. Staff reported
that participants occasionally were taunted by
youths from other programs, but generally this
kind of harassment was minor. In fact, in
Cleveland, youths from other programs looked
favorably upon boot camp and even requested that
some of its procedures be adapted for them.
Similarly, in Denver, after adjacent youths had
complained that the boot camp's early morning
exercise drills were waking them up, the camp
director noticed that some of these youths had
begun running in the morning.

The boot camps depended on staff supervision,
rather than fences, for security. There were no
fences in Cleveland, and in Denver and Mobile,
portions of the boot camp grounds were fenced but
program activities were conducted beyond those
boundaries.

Management and Staffing

At each site, the boot camp was operated by the
private nongovernmental partner in the
demonstration. This was the North American Family
Institute (NAFI) in Cleveland, New Pride, Inc., in
Denver, and the Boys and Girls Clubs of Greater
Mobile in Mobile. The Cleveland boot camp was
staffed entirely by NAFI employees. Although
private employees predominated at both the Denver
and Mobile boot camps, these camps also included
staff employed by their public agency partners,
the Colorado Division of Youth Services (DYS) and
the County Court, respectively. The staffing level
at each site included not only personnel who were
stationed at the boot camp and had day-to-day
responsibility for the program there; each boot
camp received additional administrative and
management support, as well as assistance with
diagnostic assessments, from the agencies
participating in the demonstration. 

Cleveland had the most generous staffing support,
with 22 staff members for the intensive training
phase, including three teachers who were provided
under subcontract. This level of staffing amounted
to one staff person for every 1.4 beds. Denver had
12 staff and Mobile had 21, translating into one
staff member for every two beds in Denver and one
for every 2.4 beds in Mobile. 

In all three boot camps, drill instructors (DI's)
made up the majority of the staff, and it was in
this position that differences in staffing across
sites were most apparent. Cleveland had more DI's
than Mobile and Denver put together. The latter
sites used security guards to supplement or
replace the DI force after lights out, while
Cleveland used part-time DI's to relieve full-
timers when necessary. As a result, Denver
normally assigned only one DI to each of the day
shifts. At night, one DI slept in the facility
while a security guard kept watch. Mobile averaged
three DI's per day shift and two DI's or security
guards at night. Cleveland normally had five DI's
on the day shifts and four at night. 

In contrast to Cleveland, both Denver and Mobile
struggled to cover all shifts while allowing
sufficient sick leave and vacation time for DI's.
The need to take pressure off the DI staff was one
reason why these two sites sometimes stretched out
the interval between new platoons. (Inability to
find sufficient qualified applicants was another
reason, especially in Denver.) As a result of the
slower than intended pace of intake in Denver and
Mobile, as well as early terminations from all
three programs, facilities were never filled to
capacity. As a result, ratios of participants to
total staff were variable and consistently lower
than ratios of beds to staff. 

Staffing levels for positions other than drill
instructors were more consistent across sites.
Mobile had two to three client managers and
Denver had two, compared to Cleveland's one.
However, the functions of Cleveland's client
manager were narrower. Called a human resources
manager, he was primarily responsible for youths
currently in the camp and was employed by NAFI. In
contrast, client managers in both Denver and
Mobile had broader functions and were government
employees. In Denver, the client managers worked
for DYS and had responsibility for screening boot
camp candidates and managing boot camp graduates,
as well as working with current boot camp
residents. Mobile's client managers, who were
county probation officers, had similar
responsibilities for youths in and out of the
camp. At all three sites, the client managers were
assigned exclusively to the demonstration
programs. 

Consistent with a strong emphasis on educational
progress during boot camp, Mobile employed four
educational staff to deliver academic and life
skills curriculums, in contrast to Denver's two.
Cleveland contracted with an alternative school,
obtaining three teachers for its education
program. This circumvented the need to hire
teachers directly, an action which had threatened
to antagonize the local teacher's union. 

Overall supervision of each boot camp was provided
by an onsite director, employed by the private
partner in the demonstration. In Denver and
Mobile, the director did not supervise the client
managers at boot camp because they were government
employees and under the supervision of their
respective agencies. 

The Denver director's duties were limited to the
boot camp, but directors in Mobile and Cleveland
had broader responsibilities. Mobile's director
was also responsible for supervising the
demonstration's aftercare coordinator. In
Cleveland, responsibility for directing boot camp
and aftercare was combined in a single position,
with the director maintaining offices at both the
boot camp and aftercare locations. Cleveland had
begun operations with separate directors for boot
camp and aftercare but combined these functions
within a few months under a central director to
provide more continuity of programming. 

DI Qualifications and Training

At all three sites, the positions of drill
instructor and camp director were new to the
juvenile correctional system. Each site wanted
DI's who were able to relate to youths, but in
other respects they took differing approaches.
Cleveland deliberately chose a mix of staff
representing both military and counseling
backgrounds "to provide checks and balances."
Whatever their backgrounds, staff had to be
flexible enough to adapt to the broader program
demands. 

Denver and Mobile, on the other hand, specifically
chose people with military experience. (Only one
DI in Denver did not have a military or ROTC
background.) They wanted people who could "play
the role" of a DI, offering a model of good
physical condition and consistent, fair
leadership. In fact, Denver specifically avoided
hiring DI's with counseling or therapeutic
backgrounds for fear that they would have
difficulty adhering to the military model. 

The camp commander in Denver was ex-military and
also had law enforcement experience. In Cleveland,
neither of the first two directors had military
experience. One had a background in child care and
the other had a background in corrections. The
third director had served in the military, but his
primary work experience was in corrections. In
Mobile, the initial director was retired military
with experience in adult correctional boot camps.
The second director was a social scientist and
evaluation specialist, and the third director was
retired military with expertise in basic skills
education. 

Each site took a distinctive approach to training
its boot camp team. In Cleveland, the original
staff received several days of training from NAFI
before the boot camp opened. NAFI also offered 8
hours per month of inservice training, and senior
staff received additional training at NAFI
headquarters in Massachusetts. Replacement staff
received a 3-day orientation at another NAFI
facility, as well as onsite orientation and one-
on-one monitoring and support.

Denver sent its commander and initial DI team for
a 3-week stint at Quantico, Virginia, where they
attended Marine DI training specially designed for
correctional officers. This session was
supplemented by some local training on the
juvenile justice system. One DI was trained on the
job, having come on board after the initial
training. Mobile's initial team underwent 3 weeks
of intensive, onsite training designed by the camp
director. Subsequent hires were trained on the
job.

Staff Turnover

Staff turnover at the three boot camps varied
dramatically. During the first full year of boot
camp operations, the period in which systematic
data were collected for participating youths, both
Cleveland and Mobile changed boot camp directors.
In Cleveland, the change resulted from
philosophical differences between NAFI and the
original director. In Mobile, local policymakers
were unhappy with what they saw as an overly
militaristic approach by the first director. He
was replaced by a social scientist from the
University of South Alabama who had been involved
in designing the original program. 

Cleveland and Mobile also experienced relatively
high turnover in other positions. Some staff were
dismissed for disobeying program rules. Others
quit, often for better pay. In Mobile, some DI's
also left because they were unhappy with the
change of directors, and two other staff were laid
off because of downsizing necessitated by a pared-
down continuation award from OJJDP. One of
Mobile's DI's was let go after a child molestation
charge came to light; although the charge had
nothing to do with his boot camp performance, it
would have disqualified him for hiring if known at
the time of his job application. By the end of the
first year at Mobile's boot camp, only three of
the nine original DI's and one of the five
original teachers remained. 

In contrast, Denver's turnover was low in both the
first and second years of operations. The original
camp director remained with the boot camp for the
first 18 months, with the senior drill instructor
stepping in for the final 6 months. Otherwise, the
program lost just two staff. In the first year a
DI was fired for not adhering to the program's
disciplinary guidelines, and in the second year
one teacher was terminated as a result of cuts in
OJJDP funding. Denver staff attribute the low
turnover among DI's in part to competitive
salaries and a tight job market resulting from the
closing of a local military base. 

Program Content During Boot Camp

All three boot camps provided recruits a mixture
of regimentation and discipline plus
rehabilitative programming in a spartan
environment. 

Physical Environment

Mobile housed its recruits in barracks with bunk
beds, and Denver assigned its junior, or newest,
platoon to beds in the day room. All youths in
Cleveland's camp had individual rooms, as did
members of Denver's senior platoon. Despite the
differences in sleeping arrangements, boot camp
settings were spartan at all locations. Facilities
contained limited, extremely functional furniture,
and sleeping rooms were devoid of personal
touches. Youths stored uniforms and their few
belongings in foot lockers or a single bureau.
Televisions and radios were generally off limits,
unless granted as a special privilege. Visiting
privileges were strictly limited, and home visits
were not allowed. Telephone access also was
severely restricted. Even at the site with the
most generous telephone policy, youths could call
home only once a week. 

Military Regimentation and Discipline

Following through on the military theme, all
programs accorded a central role to the drill
instructor. Drill instructors were the primary
supervisors of boot camp participants and were
responsible for keeping them on a demanding,
tightly controlled schedule that provided little
or no personal time. Drill instructors used
military titles (e.g., sergeant, lieutenant), and
DI's and youths wore military-style uniforms.
Platoons earned hats or special insignia to
differentiate their rank in the program. DI's also
trained youths to use military customs and
courtesies ("Yes, Sir," "Recruit Jones requests
permission to...," etc.), accustomed them to
standing at attention, and taught them to march in
drill formation. There were routine inspections of
living quarters and personal hygiene, and mail was
monitored. In addition to enforcing discipline,
these techniques served to prevent contraband from
getting into the facilities and to discourage gang
insignia, such as self-administered tattoos. 

All programs were harshest or most restrictive in
the first days and weeks while military rules and
protocol were being learned. Programs were split
into three 30-day periods, with attainment of the
next phase signified by a change in shirt color or
hat, as well as increased privileges. Participants
could earn the right to visitation or phone calls,
for example. Senior recruits were expected to be
models for newer recruits. 

Like their military counterparts, these boot camps
ended with a public graduation ceremony attended
by parents and friends of the participants as well
as local dignitaries, including judges, the local
chief of police, and others. Typically, the
ceremonies featured marching drills and accorded
some special recognition to superior performers. A
youth might serve as platoon leader or flag-
bearer, for example, or make a brief speech. 

Despite these similarities, there were variations
in the way the military model was implemented at
the three sites. Verbal intimidation and yelling
were a standard part of the DI style in Denver and
Mobile. In fact, both Denver and Mobile used a
high-confrontation intake ritual, complete with
military haircuts, to establish control initially.
Cleveland's intake was briefer and involved less
verbal intimidation, and staff there did not yell
or use "in-your-face" techniques. In contrast to
Denver and Mobile, Cleveland also lacked a "brig"
or isolation room for miscreants and placed less
emphasis on drilling. Although none of the
programs reproduced the rigors and regimentation
of a real military boot camp, the Denver camp came
closest. Cleveland fell at the other extreme, with
Mobile in the middle. In effect, Cleveland, the
site that selected the youths with the most
serious records, also had the least rigorous boot
camp. Mobile and Denver, on the other hand,
selected less serious youths and employed more
military emphasis. 

Emulating military models, all three boot camps
required youths to routinely maintain their living
areas. This requirement included cleaning and
polishing private rooms and common spaces and yard
work. In Mobile, some cleaning tasks, such as
cleaning the administration or classroom
buildings, were treated as a privilege because
they involved little supervision. Generally, the
boot camp staff saw these work activities as one
method of teaching good work habits and daily
living skills. Extra work also was used as a
punishment at all sites. In any event, the result
was that the camps looked extremely clean and
orderly.

Physical Training

Physical fitness and conditioning activities were
a daily part of the program at all sites. Youths
participated in early morning runs and
calisthenics, as well as team sports such as
football or basketball. Over time, Mobile shifted
from individual conditioning toward more group
sports. Both Cleveland and Denver made it a
practice to test the fitness levels of new
platoons in order to establish benchmarks and to
protect against injuries from too intense
conditioning. Because of concern about the wide
variations in fitness levels, Cleveland did not
perform this test until the 1-month mark, and
Denver limited the running test to one mile. 

Challenge or Adventure Programming

"Challenge" or "adventure" programs typically
involve a series of stressful, physically
demanding tasks that require group cooperation and
problem solving. The tasks are of graduated
difficulty and are carried out under the
supervision of specially trained staff. All three
sites originally proposed to make this type of
programming an integral part of the boot camp
experience. 

The reality was somewhat different. Cleveland and
Mobile purchased ROPES courses, which included a
standard curriculum, one or more obstacle courses,
and instructor training. In Cleveland,
construction of the courses was delayed as staff
attempted to resolve issues of location with the
host facility and to obtain construction funds. An
indoor course was ready by the second quarter, but
an outdoor course was not available until the
second year. Challenge activities mainly took
place on weekends. 

In Mobile, challenge and adventure programming,
including outings like overnight camping and
canoeing, were intended to be a weekly part of the
program. Although the program did purchase the
ROPES course and some mountain bikes for use on
trails at a Boys and Girls Clubs' campground,
these activities were not regularly scheduled. A
serious problem, not encountered in Cleveland, was
staff turnover among the DI's who had been
certified as ROPES trainers. With only one ROPES-
certified instructor left, use of Mobile's course
eventually dwindled to just 10 days out of the
boot camp's 90-day period. 

Denver never implemented a formal challenge
program, but the boot camp did construct and use a
military-style obstacle course as part of its
physical conditioning activities. 

Education

Each boot camp provided several hours of
educational programming on weekdays in compliance
with State regulations as well as OJJDP
guidelines. The typical youth entered boot camp
with a record of school failure; many were far
behind grade level and some had already dropped
out of school. Thus, all the programs emphasized
basic skills and remedial education in reading,
writing, and mathematics. 

The specific arrangements for providing the
education program varied. After a few months of
using teachers hired part time from the host
institution, Cleveland subcontracted with an
alternative school to run the educational portion
of its program. This arrangement was intended to
provide a certified program, while freeing the
boot camp of the union strictures that would arise
from hiring teachers directly. 

The Denver and Mobile programs hired their own
instructors. Mobile's instructors used a packaged
curriculum known as the PACE Learning System,
which tests a youth's educational level upon
intake and then provides an individualized self-
paced program of instruction geared to that level.
Teachers worked with students individually as they
progressed through the curriculum. Although
Cleveland's and Denver's programs did not use
self-paced instruction, their instructors gave a
good deal of individual attention to students
because of the great variation in academic skills.

Life Skills

In addition to basic education, each boot camp
offered a "life skills" curriculum, which might be
best described as a hybrid of education and group
counseling. Life skills curriculum modules varied
somewhat but typically incorporated such topics as
drugs and alcohol, AIDS, sexual behavior, risk
taking, conflict resolution, values clarification,
responsible decisionmaking, and goal setting. The
curriculums combined techniques like classroom
discussion, self-assessments, group exercises, and
written assignments. 

Cleveland's life skills curriculum, designed by
the program director, was delivered by the drill
instructors. In Denver and Mobile, instructors
were hired to deliver the life skills curriculum.
The Denver instructor was one of the boot camp's
two certified teachers; because of budget cuts,
however, she was laid off at the end of the first
year, leaving the remaining teacher to cover both
academic and life skills instruction. In Mobile,
the life skills teacher (there were several over
the course of the program) typically brought some
experience in counseling and criminal justice.
Mobile had originally planned to integrate the
life skills and ROPES curriculums under a single
instructor. This arrangement never worked out,
however, in part because of personnel problems
related to finding and retaining a person with the
right combination of skills, and in part because
of scheduling difficulties.

At a more fundamental level, each camp's entire
regimen was designed to improve basic life skills
such as grooming and personal hygiene, maintenance
of surroundings, comportment, and time management
through daily instruction and practice. 

Substance Abuse Education and Counseling

All programs tried to avoid admitting youths in
need of drug treatment, although many youths were
assumed to be drug-involved at some level. As
reported in chapter 3, background records of the
youths admitted to boot camp often indicated a
problem with drugs or alcohol, especially in
Cleveland and Denver. As a result, although none
of the boot camps provided a separate and distinct
substance abuse education or counseling program,
all incorporated relevant materials in their life
skills curriculum. In Cleveland, some drug
counseling also occurred in the context of its
guided group interaction program, described below.

Other Counseling or Therapy

To some extent, staff in all three camps
considered every component of their programs to be
a form of counseling. However, only Cleveland
offered a formal counseling program beyond what
was embedded in the life skills or ROPES
curriculums. A major focus of Cleveland's program
was guided group interaction, a counseling
approach designed to foster a positive peer
culture. One-hour sessions led by trained drill
instructors were held daily. Following explicit
written rules of interaction, youths discussed
feelings and problem behaviors and attempted to
develop acceptable responses. 

In addition, DI's, probation officers, client
managers, or other staff at each site counseled
participants informally from time to time on
specific behavior problems or a particular issue
that was troubling a youth. 

Family Involvement

In contrast to standard practices at many juvenile
institutions, family participation and visitation
was not encouraged during the program's boot camp
phase. The camps generally permitted family visits
only in the latter half of the program, and even
then visits were severely limited. In Denver, for
instance, parents typically visited just once
before graduation. However, parents could call
case managers for information about their sons,
and case managers consulted them during planning
for their sons' release from boot camp. Cleveland
also held a formal orientation session for each
family as youths entered the camp to establish a
relationship with the parents and to inform them
about the program. 

Mobile was unique in that it offered an 8-week
parenting class at the boot camp, conducted by the
program's senior probation officer. Participation
was not required, but a major incentive for
parents to attend the class was the opportunity to
see, but not speak to, their children. DI's
marched the platoons through the classroom at some
point during each session.

Community Service

OJJDP did not require that the intensive training
phase include community service, but both Mobile
and Cleveland did so anyway. In keeping with the
program's name, the Environmental Youth Corps,
Mobile's youths participated in park, schoolyard,
and beach cleanups. Some of Mobile's work
activities, such as helping to build the bike
trail at the Boys and Girls Clubs of Greater
Mobile's camp, also had a community service
element that served the broader community.
Cleveland incorporated at least two community
service activities during boot camp, including
landscaping work and helping to bag food for the
homeless. Denver did not include community service
among its boot camp activities.

Case Management

Each boot camp had client managers--a NAFI social
worker in Cleveland, two DYS client managers in
Denver, and two to three county probation officers
in Mobile. In each case, the client manager was
responsible for assessing each youth's needs,
preparing a workplan for each youth at intake,
updating the plan according to his progress and
experiences during the boot camp phase, and
arranging for his transition to the community. The
workplans were designed to be relatively uniform
for all participants, but they needed to be much
more individualized for the postrelease phase.
Some youths might not be able to return to their
own homes, for example, and others might require
continuing drug counseling. Also, educational
goals might vary at this point.

Whether the boot camp case manager's
responsibility ended at graduation depended on the
site. In Mobile, it did not; the probation
officers continued as case managers during
aftercare. In Cleveland, responsibility shifted to
an aftercare case manager. In Denver, the
situation depended on the youth's legal status.
Case managers retained responsibility for youths
who had been committed to DYS but relinquished it
to probation officers for youths referred to the
program by the juvenile court.

Program Duration

All three boot camps were designed to last about
90 days. During the first year, the average
graduate in Cleveland spent 92 days in boot camp,
and in Denver the average stay was 91 days. Time
to graduation in Mobile was longer--108 days on
average--primarily because the program often held
youths back for disciplinary infractions or
unsatisfactory progress. However, youths whose
performance was exemplary would finish the program
in around 90 days.

Denver did not use "setbacks"; instead, in rare
instances expelled youths were permitted to repeat
the entire boot camp program. In exceptional
cases, youths also might remain over 90 days in
boot camp because case managers needed extra time
to find them a place to live in the community. In
Denver, this process never involved more than a
few days, but in Mobile, at least one youth
remained in boot camp for months beyond his
scheduled release date because a community
placement could not be found.

Programming Mix

Time was allocated among the main activities at
the three camps. Official schedules, which were
not always strictly followed and tended to differ
at different stages in the programs. Also, program
schedules from the three sites did not always use
the same terminology or method of breaking down
activities. All three programs had 15- to 16-hour
days, beginning with reveille no later than 5 to 6
a.m. and ending with lights out by 9 to 10 p.m.
Daytime activities, however, differed somewhat at
each site. 

Looking first at the activities normally
associated with military boot camps--military
training and drill, work, and physical
conditioning--Cleveland devoted 3 hours to them
each day, compared with 5 hours in Mobile and 8
hours in Denver. Conversely, Denver devoted the
least time each day to education and life skills
programs, 4 hours, while Mobile devoted 7 hours
and Cleveland scheduled 5 hours. Cleveland also
regularly scheduled an hour of counseling beyond
what was offered in its life skills curriculum. 

The camps' program schedules confirmed the
researchers' opinion, acquired through observation
and interviews, that Denver provided the most
militaristic setting and Cleveland the least, and
that Mobile placed the heaviest emphasis on
educational achievement.

Participant Misconduct and Discipline

Sanctions

All three boot camps had a written policy
governing sanctions for participant misconduct.
Overall, there were two broad levels of sanctions:

o  Summary punishment, or sanctions that could be
imposed on the spot, at the discretion of the
drill instructor.

o  Sanctions that could be imposed only with the
review or approval of some higher authority.

Summary punishment or on-the-spot sanctions for
misconduct were reserved primarily for less
serious breaches of rules. In Denver and Mobile,
this form of misconduct might result in a stern
reprimand, extra exercise, such as pushups, or
extra work detail. In Denver, DI's could place a
youth in the brig for up to 24 hours without
review, although it is not known how often summary
"sentences" as long as 24 hours actually occurred.
(In practice, the distinction between summary
punishment and reviewed sanctions was blurred in
Denver. If the camp commandant was present when
brig time was imposed, he could review the
punishment and modify it if he saw fit.) Staff
concluded that some youths preferred brig time to
the rigors of the boot camp regimen.

More serious breaches of discipline were referred
up the chain of command--to the camp commander in
Denver or to the head drill instructor or the camp
director in Mobile--for imposition of a sanction.
In Mobile, the most serious infractions were heard
by a disciplinary board composed of the camp
director, the head DI, the academic and the life
skills coordinators, and the probation supervisor.
In these instances, the disciplinary board heard
testimony from witnesses and dismissed the charges
or imposed punishment accordingly. Punishments in
Denver and Mobile could involve several days in
the brig (or isolation room), although most
punishments were lighter. In general, this
sanctioning system was patterned after military
procedures. However, Mobile's disciplinary system,
under its first director, was distinctive in that
it often used meaningless work as a form of
punishment. 

Cleveland's system of sanctions, adapted from
procedures in other nonmilitary programs run by
NAFI, was more elaborate than either Denver's or
Mobile's. It involved an explicit progression of
punishments. At the low end of the spectrum,
sanctions ranged from "suggestions" to
"directives" (orders) to "confrontation." At the
upper end, sanctions included client contracts and
physical control or restraint, the latter used
when a youth was out of control and perceived to
be a danger to himself or others. Intermediate
sanctions included separation for counseling,
"incentive exercise" (e.g., pushups), and work
detail. 

As in the other two sites, Cleveland's DI's could
handle less serious misconduct or misconduct
requiring immediate intervention on their own,
while a board was convened for the most serious
infractions. Minor infractions were often dealt
with during the daily guided group interaction
session. Youths were rarely observed doing
incentive exercise in Cleveland, although
elsewhere it was common for DI's to impose extra
exercise as punishment. 

The disciplinary systems all borrowed one
important element from the military model. DI's
could punish an individual or the entire platoon,
even for the misconduct of just one member. One
improperly made bed might mean that everyone had
to remake their beds, or one youth's misconduct
might cost the whole group some privilege. Group
rewards and punishments were expected to help
produce peer pressure for compliance and instill a
sense of individual responsibility to the group.
In Mobile, the whole platoon could be put before
the disciplinary board. 

In addition to specifying how and when different
levels of sanctions might be applied, all sites
had rules setting limits on DI behavior. For
example, DI's were forbidden to use vulgar,
profane, or humiliating language, including ethnic
epithets, and physical contact with recruits was
limited to certain prescribed situations.
Departures from the approved standards were not
observed at any of the camps during onsite visits.
However, staff reported that there were lapses,
and all three sites dismissed at least one staff
person for failing to follow approved disciplinary
procedures. In Mobile, for instance, a staff
member was disciplined for breaking the rules
regarding use of the barrack's TV monitor, which
taped the barrack's activities 24 hours a day. In
Denver a DI was dismissed for violating personal
contact rules after he taped a youth's mouth shut.

Setbacks

In addition to their regular policies for
sanctioning misbehavior, Cleveland and Mobile had
a provision for delaying a youth's graduation from
boot camp. In both sites, youths earned points
daily and platoons earned points weekly that
determined their privileges and attainment of
levels. In Cleveland, a negative review (or a
serious infraction) could cause a youth to be held
back an extra 30 days, in effect demoting him to
the platoon that entered after his own. This
demotion could occur just once, however. 

Mobile's system was more elaborate, and setbacks
were used more frequently. Although the system
allowed setbacks up to 30 days, the usual setback
was for a week, and a recruit could win back days
for good behavior and rejoin his original
platoon. 

Denver had no setback system, although DI's rated
each youth weekly, and there was a formal
evaluation of behavior every 45 days. The youth,
his case manager, the camp commander, and the
youth's lead DI all participated in the evaluation
meeting. Although Denver did not allow setbacks,
three youths (3.9 percent of the camp's first-year
participants) repeated the program after having
been expelled. 

Termination

The most serious sanction a youth could receive
was termination from the program. Termination
could occur as a result of a single act, such as
escape from the facility or assault on a staff
member, or it could occur as a result of a
continuing pattern of misconduct. Programs
initially did not have explicit policies governing
termination, and to a large extent, this remained
at the discretion of staff. However, after its
first escapes, Cleveland adopted a firm policy
that youths who were absent from the camp for over
48 hours would not be permitted to return. Youths
absent for over 24 hours would not be readmitted
unless they had voluntarily returned to camp. 

The single infraction most likely to lead to
termination in Denver and Mobile was escape. In
Cleveland, it was assault against staff, with
escape ranking second. At every site, however,
some escapees and assaulters were returned to the
program. Mobile was the most likely to retain
escapees. However, attempted escape in Mobile
resulted in an automatic sentence of 72 hours in
isolation. 

Youths might leave boot camp prematurely for other
than disciplinary reasons, most notably because of
a physical or psychological problem. In theory,
youths at all three sites could also quit the
programs, although entry to boot camp had been
voluntary only in Cleveland. All sites discouraged
quitting. For instance, Cleveland youths had to
complete a long series of steps in order to quit.
In any case, staff reported that in practice,
youths typically "quit" by running away or by
becoming so uncooperative and disruptive that the
boot camp expelled them. In Denver, staff believed
that at least three youths faked suicide attempts
to prompt their removal from the program.

Consequences of Termination

Presumably, if the consequences of termination
were predictable and adverse, youths would be more
likely to comply with the boot camps' regimens.
And, indeed, in Cleveland the consequences of
termination were predictable and adverse. Youths
who were expelled from boot camp were returned to
either DYS or the county's residential program to
serve their backup sentence, which was always
longer than the 90-day boot camp regimen. 

In Denver and Mobile, the situation was not so
clear cut. In Denver, youths who had been
committed to DYS were returned to an assessment
center for reassessment and reassignment. This
process likely involved a waiting period in a
detention facility and eventual transfer to
another secure residential placement. But youths
referred by the Denver probation department and
all youths in Mobile were returned to court for
imposition of a new penalty. This policy could
result in a more severe punishment, but the
outcome depended on the probation officer's
recommendation and, ultimately, the judge's
discretion. 

Infractions and Sanctions: Experience of the
First-Year Platoons

As part of the evaluation, systematic information
was collected about the infractions committed by
youths in boot camp and the sanctions applied. The
scope of this research was limited to serious rule
infractions, however, because all sites required
staff to document them. 

It should be noted that sites may have differed in
the completeness of their documentation and the
way they defined a "serious" infraction. There are
some indications, for instance, that Denver kept
less complete records of disciplinary actions,
potentially deflating its overall infraction rate.
As a result, only the most serious of the
infractions across sites--escape, attempted
escape, assaults against staff, and other assaults
or fighting--are discussed and compared. These
infractions were more consistently documented at
every site than infractions such as disobedience.
The number of serious infractions per youth in
Mobile averaged 3.4, versus 2.6 in Cleveland and
1.9 in Denver. Whereas all sites experienced
escapes, Mobile had by far the largest number, 34,
versus 6 in Cleveland and 8 in Denver. Mobile also
had more attempted escapes, although here the
number was much closer to that experienced by the
other sites. 

Escape and attempted escape rates in Mobile
appeared to be well above the norm in juvenile
facilities nationwide, according to data reported
in Conditions of Confinement, a nationwide survey
of juvenile detention and corrections facilities
conducted in 1991 (Parent, Lieter, Kennedy,
Livens, Wentworth, and Wilcox, 1994). That study
reported an overall escape and attempted escape
rate of 2.46 per 100 juveniles in facilities of
all types, a rate of 2.72 for training schools,
and a rate of 4.77 for ranches. Mobile's escape
and attempted escape rate were estimated to be
about 8 per 100. Denver's rate, at 4.6, also
appeared somewhat above average, unless ranches
are used as the standard. Cleveland's rate, 1.8,
was below average. The methods used to calculate
rates differ somewhat from those used in the
Conditions of Confinement study, however, so it
would be unwise to attach too much significance to
precise numbers.

As for assaults against staff, 20 were reported
for the first-year platoons. Seventeen of them
occurred in Cleveland and three in Mobile. No
assaults against staff were reported in Denver.
Infractions involving assaults or fighting among
the youths were considerably more common than
assaults against staff. Again, this behavior was
least frequent in Denver. 

Overall, the most common serious infractions at
the three camps were assaults or fighting among
participants, disobedience or insubordination, and
"loss of bearing," a term that covers a variety of
behaviors deemed inappropriate for a boot camp
participant, such as swearing, inappropriate
dress, or roughhousing. 

Another way to look at serious infractions is to
consider what proportion of participants committed
each type of infraction. First, the proportion of
youths who escaped from boot camp varied widely--
from almost 1 in 4 in Mobile to 1 in 9 in Denver
to about 1 in 15 in Cleveland. These differences
cannot be explained by the relatively minor
differences in the physical security of the three
facilities. Instead, there may have been
differences across sites in the nature of
supervision or in the propensities of youths to
run away. The distance from one's home turf may
have discouraged some potential escapees, for
instance. Mobile's program is located near the
center of the city. In contrast, Cleveland's boot
camp is 30 miles away, and Denver's program,
although not in quite as remote a location as
Cleveland's, is still several miles from downtown
Denver. Differences in escapes may also reflect
the relative onerousness of the boot camp regimen
or the punishments imposed for attempting to
escape. Unfortunately, these factors are difficult
to disentangle. For example, Cleveland, with the
lowest escape rates, combined the least
militaristic program with potentially the most
adverse consequences for escape.

Youths in Denver were relatively unlikely to have
been charged with assaultive infractions, whereas
nearly two-thirds of youths in Mobile had an
assault or fight on their boot camp records. In
Cleveland, over 40 percent had been involved in
such an incident. As noted before, no assaults
against staff were recorded in Denver. In Mobile,
2.5 percent of the youths assaulted staff, and in
Cleveland, 13.8 percent did so. 

Each site had distinctive preferences for certain
types of sanctions. Over half of Mobile's
participants served time in the camp's isolation
room or were assigned extra duty as a punishment
for a serious rule infraction. Loss of privileges
and letters of apology were the only other
sanctions meted out with any regularity in Mobile.
In Denver, too, the majority of youths in first-
year platoons served time in the brig, with extra
duty the only other sanction meted out to more
than 10 percent of the participants. 

Cleveland's pattern was quite different. The only
sanction experienced by a majority of participants
was counseling or "redirection," a program-
specific term that describes other kinds of verbal
responses to misbehavior. Restraint, which refers
to the practice of physically holding or
constraining the movements of a youth who is out
of control, and loss of privileges were the next
most common responses to misbehavior. Few youths
in Cleveland spent time in isolation because
Cleveland had no "brig." 

It is tempting to speculate about the
relationships between styles of discipline and the
incidence of serious infractions, such as assaults
and fighting reported above. However, no
persuasive hypotheses can be offered. Although
Cleveland, for instance, relied less than the
other sites on traditional forms of military
discipline and had the highest rate of assaults
against staff, other factors may have been more
significant. As reported in chapter 3, youths in
Cleveland had more extensive criminal records than
did participants in Mobile or Denver. Also, while
commenting on the low rates of assault in Denver,
the Denver camp commander noted that his staff
tended to be older than those at the other boot
camps and, therefore, may have had an easier time
establishing and maintaining authority. 

Of the youths in first-year platoons set back for
poor performance or specific misconduct, about 8
percent of youths were set back in Cleveland,
whereas 31 percent were set back in Mobile. All of
those set back in Cleveland eventually graduated.
In contrast, 7 (18.4 percent) of the 38 setbacks
in Mobile failed to graduate. As noted earlier,
Denver did not use setbacks as a sanction.

Boot Camp Graduation and Termination Rates

The programs' most serious sanction is removal
from boot camp. Of the youths who successfully
completed boot camp and entered an aftercare
program, the Cleveland program achieved the
highest graduation rate, with 94.1 percent of its
first-year participants completing boot camp.
Completion rates in Denver and Mobile were lower,
at 80.3 percent and 82 percent, respectively. 

The majority of terminations in Cleveland and
Mobile occurred because of attempted escape. The
next most common reason for termination was
noncompliance with the program. Mobile also lost
three participants because of physical or
psychological problems. Reasons for termination
from the Denver program were more varied. Of the
15 youths who failed to graduate, 6 were
disruptive or otherwise noncompliant, 3 escaped, 5
were removed for medical reasons, and 1 was
removed for a combination of medical problems and
poor performance. Three of the five youths removed
from that program for medical reasons were
involved in suicide attempts, as was the youth
removed for both medical problems and poor
performance.

The timing of removals from boot camp was also
examined to determine if there were any trends. In
particular, it was important to know if there were
more program removals during the 
first 4 months of program operation. In contrast,
Denver's termination rate was relatively constant
throughout most of the first year, declining only
slightly toward the end.

To determine if there were any periods during
which youths were at particular risk of dropping
out, dropout was examined as a function of time in
the boot camp. In both Cleveland and Denver, the
majority of youths who were going to drop out did
so within the camp's first 2 weeks. These early
dropouts could be considered to be a type of
participant selection error that was identified
soon after transfer. In Mobile, however, the first
2 weeks of the program accounted for just 27
percent of boot camp losses, and a relatively
large number of Mobile youths dropped out after
the 10-week mark. Some of these late dropouts were
youths who had been recycled.

Attitudes of Youths Toward the Boot Camp Regimens

In light of the preceding description of the boot
camps' structure and discipline, it would be
useful to know how the participants assessed the
programs. Two measures of the attitudes of
participants toward the regimens are available: 

o  Informal interviews with youths belonging to
the first or second platoon at each site conducted
by evaluation staff during site visits.

o  Rating form responses from a number of youths
who had reached the eighth month in the
demonstration program and were participating in
aftercare at that time.

In both surveys, unfortunately, the respondents
were a small and nonrepresentative sample of all
youths who participated in the camps. The
reactions of these youths are included, however,
because they may be of interest to some readers.
Results were difficult to interpret given the
limited samples involved. Many of those
participants most unhappy or most unsuited to boot
camp were no longer available to express their
opinions when these data were collected. In the
interviews, several themes were common across
sites:

o  Youths had anticipated that boot camp would be
tough, and most found it to be a challenging
experience. In Cleveland, however, several youths
were disappointed that the program was not more
intense ("like a Marine [Corps] boot camp"),
although in Denver some youths described the first
few days as the worst of their lives. 

o  Most youths found it hard to adjust to boot
camp rules and discipline at first, but they
viewed boot camp as a challenge and were proud to
be making it through.

o  Youths varied in their attitudes toward the
drill instructors but reported that most were fair
and consistent. Some youths specifically mentioned
liking the level of personal attention from drill
instructors. 

o  Youths at every site particularly liked the
programs' physical conditioning and drilling
activities. In Cleveland, they also liked the
guided group interaction program. However, youths
also complained that they were sometimes treated
inconsistently because staff were still developing
some of the rules and procedures. Other unpopular
aspects of the regimen, especially in Denver and
Mobile, were cleaning up the barracks and "getting
yelled at."

In a survey asking participants to rate their
agreement or disagreement with five dimensions of
the camps, the majority of respondents rated camp
rules as clear and saw drill instructors as fair,
consistent, and helpful. Youths in Cleveland were
somewhat more likely than youths at the other two
sites to feel that DI's cared about them
personally. On the other hand, proportionally more
youths in Denver felt that their boot camp was
like a real military boot camp; about 87 percent
felt this way, compared with 58 percent in
Cleveland and Mobile, confirming the evaluation
team's impression that Denver was the most
"military" of the three camps. 

Implementation Issues 

Each site gave considerable thought to the
purposes and design of its boot camp program
during the proposal development stage and the 6-
month planning phase that followed the grant
award. As a result, all programs opened on
schedule in 1992 with a full complement of staff
and a formal set of operating procedures. Two
years later, programs in Cleveland and Mobile
continued to operate, while Denver's program was
about to be replaced by a larger boot camp
program, authorized by the State legislature and
operated under State auspices. In general, program
staff and other juvenile justice personnel were
pleased with the accomplishments of the intensive
training phase, and the programs were well
received by the public. Boot camp implementation
was not trouble-free, however. Several problem
areas emerged during the demonstration experience.

Staffing

Although the sites varied in their vision of what
the boot camp phase should entail, all attempted
to strike a delicate balance between the military
model and the more traditional supportive and
rehabilitative services model. At the level of
program or camp director, it was especially
important to have someone who could understand
both the military and rehabilitative dimensions.
The staff, too, had to strike the right balance.
Moreover, the staff in Cleveland had to understand
and integrate the therapeutic model that NAFI
adapted to the boot camp setting.

In practice, achieving this balance was not easy.
Personnel with military backgrounds sometimes
found it hard to adjust to working with youths who
were younger, more defiant, and less accustomed to
structure than the average military recruit. Those
without military experience, on the other hand,
lacked knowledge of military procedures and skills
like marching, or a military orientation toward
leadership and esprit de corps. At a more
fundamental level, some staff probably mistrusted
the military model and favored more traditional
rehabilitative approaches. 

As a result, all three sites had to replace one or
more staff who did not perform to expectations or
was not philosophically in tune with the site's
vision of how a boot camp should operate. In
addition, both Cleveland and Mobile changed boot
camp directors in the first year. 

Staff Turnover

Two of the three sites, Cleveland and Mobile, saw
substantial staff turnover as a result of
resignations and dismissals. One reason may have
been the camps' workload, which was intense and
demanding, especially for drill instructors. In
Mobile, the program was sometimes short-staffed,
and DI's had to work overtime. In Cleveland, DI's
were trained and expected to perform as counselors
as well as DI's, and administrators noted that a
certain amount of staff burnout was inevitable.
Pay levels may also have been a factor in both
Cleveland and Mobile, as staff often left for
higher paying opportunities. 

Personnel turnover was costly in many ways. It
sometimes left programs short-staffed,
necessitated more on-the-job training, and when
boot camp leadership changed, it required staff to
adjust to new philosophies and procedures.
Sometimes the impact of staff turnover was more
specific. In Mobile, when turnover depleted most
of the staff who had attended special training in
the ROPES curriculum, on-the-job training was not
deemed a satisfactory substitute. The boot camp
responded by reducing use of the ROPES course even
though it had been a core component in the
original program design. Unfortunately, the
researchers can only speculate about how these
changes were experienced by boot camp recruits. On
a personal level, it is likely that they welcomed
some staff departures and regretted others. (In
one instance, youths wrote letters of support for
a dismissed staff member.) But more generally,
turnover presumably exposed youths to staff with
less experience and, on occasion, to new
procedures and philosophies.

Discipline

Programs also struggled to find appropriate and
effective disciplinary procedures that were
consistent with a military model. 

o  In Denver, the camp initially made heavy use of
time in the brig, or isolation cell, as a
punishment for serious infractions. The original
brig was closet-sized, but the program began using
a larger room when visitors from OJJDP objected.
Denver staff gradually realized, however, that
some youths actually sought brig time as a way to
escape participating in the daily boot camp
regimen. As a result, they made less use of the
brig as time went on and substituted more extra-
duty assignments. Staff also tried to make the
brig less hospitable by piping in loud music or
periodically waking up "prisoners." Mobile
prevented youths from sleeping in the isolation
room during the day. 

o  In Mobile, the first boot camp director often
ordered misbehaving youths to perform meaningless
work such as digging big holes and filling them
up. Under the next director, youths were more
often ordered to perform constructive work such as
planting shrubs around the perimeter fence. 

Termination

Termination policy was a particularly difficult
area for the camps. Staff recognized that they had
to be realistic about their expectations for
performance, especially during a youth's first few
weeks in boot camp. Otherwise, there would be an
unacceptably high level of program terminations;
if standards were too exacting at first, youths
would find it easy to "quit" the program simply by
being noncompliant. The sites grappled with this
problem in a variety of ways.

o  In Denver, late in the first year, four youths
appeared to attempt suicide. No injuries resulted
and Denver staff believed that at least three or
four of the youths faked the incidents in order to
be removed from the program. However, even staged
incidents can sometimes result in accidental
injury or death. Rather than risk another attempt,
staff consulted with mental health experts and
immediately terminated all but one of the youths
involved. The fourth youth was eventually removed
as well. Cleveland also experienced two or three
suicide attempts. However, both attempts were
treated as not serious and the youths were allowed
to stay. There is no evidence that the sites
viewed the suicide attempts as grounds for
altering either their selection criteria and
screening or the boot camp regimen itself.
 
o  Cleveland and Mobile developed a "setback"
system that provided an alternative to expulsion
for some youths who performed poorly. As noted
earlier, however, Mobile used the option much more
frequently than Cleveland. Mobile also used
setbacks as a punishment for escape, but Cleveland
did not. In both sites, expulsions declined over
the life of the program.

o  After the first escape attempt, Cleveland took
a hard line to deter further episodes. Absent
youths who did not return within 48 hours were
expelled from boot camp and transferred to the
State Division of Youth Services for placement in
a State juvenile facility. 

With the exception of the Cleveland policy on
escapes, none of the programs had hard and fast
ground rules for expulsion. They preferred to make
decisions on a case-by-case basis. It is not known
whether participating youths viewed these
decisions as fair and consistent. In Denver,
however, a youth who had been expelled from boot
camp was allowed to restart the program after
filing a grievance questioning the grounds for his
expulsion. 

Other Issues

Aside from these problems, a number of other
issues surfaced at one or more sites:

o  Budget cuts. All of the programs suffered from
unexpected cutbacks in OJJDP funds going into the
continuation phase, which coincided with the
beginning of the second full year of boot camp
operations. Cleveland succeeded in filling the
gaps from other funding sources, but both Denver
and Mobile had to scale back their programming.
Denver dropped one of the camp's two teachers, a
specialist in the program's life skills
curriculum, thereby weakening what was already an
area of lesser emphasis at this site. Mobile laid
off two drill instructors.

o  Training new staff. All of the programs trained
their initial staff as a group before opening
camp. But high turnover among staff in Cleveland
and Mobile forced those programs to train
replacements as they came on board. In Mobile,
this training method was a particular problem
because the boot camp was frequently understaffed
and there was no formal one-on-one training
regimen in place. Cleveland's boot camp operator,
NAFI, had an advantage in that it had a more
generous staffing pattern and operated a network
of other programs where new personnel could be
sent for offsite training. 

o  Changing expectations on the part of new
entrants. At every site, the first platoons
entered boot camp relatively ignorant of the
regimen they would face. As word spread to new
recruits through the grapevine, however, this
situation changed quite quickly and had, according
to staff, mostly negative consequences. Youths
were less likely to be thrown off balance by the
camps' intake rituals and were sometimes less
responsive to disciplinary methods. 

o  Gang rivalries. All three sites accepted a
substantial proportion of gang-involved youths,
and inevitably, there were times when youths from
rival gangs entered camps at the same time and
were placed in the same platoon. Camp uniforms and
rules that forbid personalization of clothing and
tattooing kept gang-identified insignia to a
minimum, and, in general, staff felt the situation
was manageable under the close supervision and
control afforded by the boot camp setting. None of
the programs attempted to put rival gang members
in separate platoons.

o  Educational programming. For a brief period,
Cleveland ran its educational program using
teachers from the host institution, a county-run
residential facility. Because the two facilities
had such diverse philosophies and behavioral
expectations for participating youths, it was
difficult to integrate their teachers. The program
eventually hired a subcontractor to provide
schooling. 

o  Coexisting with the host institution. Each site
had to cooperate with its host institution,
particularly in scheduling the use of the indoor
facilities and the grounds, which led to some
tension in the startup phase, especially in
Cleveland. Other adjustments were needed, too.
Because Cleveland and Denver relied on the medical
services of the host institution, they had to
sensitize medical personnel to the possibility
that youths would fabricate illnesses to avoid
program participation. In Cleveland, the portion
sizes at the host institution's cafeteria were
skimpy for boot camp youths and had to be
increased. 

o  Planning for release. All three sites had
occasional problems locating suitable placements
in the community for boot camp graduates. To avoid
this problem, the Cleveland program stopped
accepting youths who did not have a postrelease
placement lined up at intake. 

Chapter 5. Aftercare Programs

When youths graduate from boot camp, they are
released into a community aftercare program.
During this crucial reentry phase, aftercare
programs are to provide the supervision and
support required to successfully reintegrate them
into the community.
 
This chapter describes the parameters the Office
of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention
(OJJDP) set for the aftercare designs and the
aftercare programs developed by each demonstration
site over the first 2 years of operation. The
description begins with an overview of the three
aftercare program models. The models are then
discussed in terms of their underlying philosophy,
their management and staffing structure, their
content, and their mechanisms for monitoring and
disciplining youths. The chapter concludes with
discussions of implementation issues and the
evolution of aftercare programs.

Parameters Set by OJJDP

One of the distinguishing features of the OJJDP
program was the requirement that aftercare be an
integral part of grantees' program designs. This
requirement reflected the increasing body of
research and opinion focusing on the central role
that aftercare programming plays in the successful
rehabilitation of youths.

According to OJJDP's program announcement,
aftercare was to be case-management driven, with
individualized performance workplans developed and
updated to guide delivery of services. The program
was to draw upon existing employment, education,
drug testing, and treatment resources in the
community to assist in delivering services.
Aftercare also was to build on the discipline and
character-building processes initiated during the
intensive training stage at boot camp.

The program announcement described two separate
aftercare phases--preparedness and accountability-
-distinguished primarily by the amount of
responsibility youths were to be asked to assume.
The transition from preparedness to accountability
was also to be marked by a movement away from
external controls on a youth's behavior to
internal, self-imposed controls. The goals for the
preparedness phase sound remarkably similar to
those for the intensive training phase: "To
provide discipline, treatment and work experience,
educational services, and character development"
(Federal Register, 1990). Youths were to continue
their participation in "rigorous physical
conditioning pursuant to their performance
workplan" and to "gain experience in highly
structured settings" (Federal Register, 1990).

In the final phase--accountability--the program
was to provide youths support for self-discipline,
work experience, educational services, and drug
resistance skills. Participants would be required
to continue in a physical conditioning program and
to make restitution to victims. Youths who did not
pursue academic and vocational opportunities, or
who did not participate in treatment and community
service activities, would be terminated from the
program.

Local Aftercare Program Designs

How did the programs read these Federal
requirements? Initially, aftercare did not receive
the same attention from program developers as did
boot camp, in part because they had the benefit of
3 months to plan aftercare services before the
first youth graduated. The original proposals had
sketched broad outlines for the aftercare
component of the program; designs were finalized
in April to June 1992. The programs also benefited
from the fact that the aftercare approach outlined
by OJJDP was not so different from the approach
probation and parole agencies were already
employing in the three jurisdictions. Emphasizing
case management and referral to community
resources were not new ideas. All that was
required was to package these strategies and apply
them to the population of youths who were
graduating from boot camp.
 
The programs departed from Federal guidelines in
that they did not divide aftercare into
preparedness and accountability phases, the latter
of which was to emphasize restitution. Because
none of the programs had restitution components,
it did not make sense to maintain a distinction on
this basis. The programs did, however, decrease
supervision levels over the course of the
aftercare program. Cleveland had three phases--
intensive, stepdown 1, and stepdown 2--and each
level permitted greater independence. In Denver
there were two stages of supervision, Wyatt
Academy and probation. In Mobile there were no
formal phases, and decisions about when to relax
monitoring requirements were made on an individual
basis.

The Aftercare Programs in Operation

Each jurisdiction configured its aftercare program
differently. Because the programs were so
different, a brief overview of each is given
before their organizational and programmatic
dimensions are compared.
 
Cleveland

The North American Family Institute (NAFI)
operated a centralized aftercare program for boot
camp graduates at City Center, a downtown location
that served as the hub of operations for its staff
of 15 case managers, coordinators, counselors, and
teachers. NAFI operated Cleveland's aftercare
program, giving the company commander
responsibility for oversight of both boot camp and
aftercare components. As did the boot camp, the
program employed group counseling techniques such
as guided group interaction to encourage the
development of a positive peer culture. A full
array of services was offered, including
assistance in preparing for and obtaining jobs,
substance abuse counseling, family counseling,
tutoring, challenge activities, recreational and
social events, and referrals to local self-help
and professional agencies. The program added a
transitional academy during its second year of
operation so that youths could build on the
educational progress made at boot camp and have
more flexibility about when they would reenter the
regular school system. Youths moved through three
progressively decreasing levels of supervision,
starting with mandatory daily attendance at City
Center from 8:15 a.m. to 5 p.m. By the fourth
month after release from boot camp, most youths
had earned the privilege of attending City Center
only three evenings a week. The program also
employed a vocational placement coordinator who
trained youths in how to participate in an
employment interview and arranged for their local
employment. 

Denver

In Denver, an alternative school run by New Pride,
Inc., Wyatt Academy, was the core of the aftercare
program. For the first 6 months after release,
boot camp graduates were assigned to the school,
which was located on the top floor of a downtown
office building. Three teachers taught a
curriculum that included math, language arts, and
social studies. An aftercare coordinator, who
acted as assistant principal of Wyatt, taught
physical education and leadership courses adapted
from an Army curriculum. The aftercare coordinator
also served as a liaison with the different agency
staff involved with each youth. After school,
youths had access to other services such as drug
and alcohol counseling at New Pride, Inc., as
indicated by their individualized plans. Case
management and supervision of youths committed to
the Division of Youth Services (DYS) were the
responsibility of the DYS case managers assigned
to Denver's boot camp; for probation youths, those
same functions were the responsibility of the
probation officers who originally referred the
youths to the program. When a youth completed
Wyatt Academy, the probation officer or case
manager continued to supervise him until his
court-ordered sentence was complete. At this
stage, requirements for boot camp youths were the
same as those for any other youths on probation.

Mobile

Seven Boys and Girls Clubs in the Mobile, Alabama,
area had primary responsibility for aftercare
programming for Mobile's graduates. Each youth was
assigned to a club close to his residence and was
expected to participate in that club's activities.
The clubs provided youths with afterschool and
weekend educational and recreational services such
as tutoring, life skills courses, social skills
classes, basketball and other sports, and
community service opportunities. Overall
management of boot camp graduates was assigned to
a single aftercare coordinator who was responsible
for ensuring compliance with a performance
workplan specifying each youth's aftercare
activities. All boot camp graduates were placed on
probation status with the Mobile Juvenile Court
and were required to report twice a month to a
probation officer. In addition, youths required to
make restitution were supervised by a restitution
coordinator from the Strickland Youth Center. 

The directors of each club monitored attendance
and participation in required activities and
reported absences and other violations to the
aftercare coordinator and to the participants'
probation officers. However, with services to
youths dispersed across a number of locations and
fragmented among different agencies, it proved to
be extremely difficult to deliver all required
services at all seven Boys and Girls Clubs sites
and, at the same time, monitor each youth's
attendance or progress. Therefore, in September
1993, the aftercare program was revamped to
provide more focus and control. The revised
approach included a weekly core aftercare session
located at a single Boys and Girls Club site,
school and home visits by probation officers,
weekday offsite aftercare events, and weekend
aftercare events.

The structural characteristics, locations,
philosophies, content, and monitoring systems of
these three aftercare programs are compared below.

Structure of the Aftercare Programs

As was the case in the boot camp phase, the
private nongovernmental partners--New Pride, Inc.,
NAFI, and Boys and Girls Clubs of Greater Mobile--
operated the aftercare programs.

Cleveland had a simple, centralized management
structure. A few months into the program, the
program assigned responsibility for the boot camp
and aftercare components to a company commander
who had offices at both the aftercare and boot
camp locations. With central control of both boot
camp and aftercare, it was relatively easy to
implement common policies and procedures, to train
staff jointly, and to develop joint programs and
curriculums. Of the three programs, Cleveland also
had the largest staff, all of whom were NAFI
employees. Staff consisted of an aftercare
coordinator, a family services coordinator, a
vocational services coordinator, a substance abuse
coordinator, four case managers, and two
driver/counselors. In addition, when the program
opened the transitional academy as an alternative
to regular schools, it added a principal and three
teachers. The staffing pattern allowed the
Cleveland aftercare program to assume
responsibility for the case management functions
as well as the educational, recreational, and
counseling activities. 

In contrast, Denver had the most complex
management structure and the fewest staff.
Although New Pride, Inc., operated both the boot
camp and aftercare components, there was no
central coordinator to manage both programs.
Staffing at the aftercare program, Wyatt Academy,
consisted solely of an aftercare coordinator, a
principal, and three teachers. Their primary
responsibility was to provide youths alternative
schooling for the first 6 months after graduation
from boot camp. Responsibility for case management
was dispersed among a number of individuals and
agencies. The aftercare coordinator was
responsible for supervising youths each day at
school and for following up on absentees. However,
legal responsibility for youths who had been
sentenced to DYS rested with the DYS case
managers. These managers in turn sometimes
delegated responsibility for youths in out-of-home
placements, known as "proctor care," to the
proctor care providers. Responsibility for
probation youths ultimately rested with the
individual probation officers who had referred the
youths to the program. This structure was awkward
and in some instances made it difficult to take
prompt, effective action on problems such as
truancy.

Mobile's structure was almost the reverse of
Denver's. Mobile had no central location for
aftercare, and youths were dispersed among seven
Boys and Girls Clubs in greater Mobile. In effect,
the youths were mainstreamed into the educational
and recreational programs already available to
other youths in the community. There were no staff
at those clubs who were exclusively dedicated to
boot camp graduates, nor were there activities
exclusively designed for them. The only staff
person dedicated to aftercare was an aftercare
coordinator, whose primary responsibility was to
act as a liaison between the Boys and Girls Clubs
and the boot camp. The probation officers assigned
at boot camp retained responsibility for case
management throughout the aftercare period. 

This decentralized management structure made
adequate supervision of Mobile's graduates
extremely difficult during the first year, a
problem exacerbated by a coordinator who did not
aggressively monitor attendance. The distribution
of youths across seven different locations
contributed to a deterioration of the camaraderie
and esprit de corps that the program had been
trying to build during the intensive training boot
camp phase. Not only was there no integration of
boot camp activities and policies into the
aftercare phase, but the boot camp peer group was
also 
broken up.

During the second year of operation, the Boys and
Girls Clubs of Greater Mobile attempted to rectify
these problems by restructuring the aftercare
program around a core curriculum. Boot camp
graduates were required to attend a weekly
aftercare session held at one designated club.
This session was conducted by staff, probation
officers, a team of Boys and Girls Clubs of
Greater Mobile staff specifically assigned to the
boot camp aftercare program, community
organizations, and volunteers. In addition, youths
were required to participate in monthly community
service projects.

Location

Denver and Cleveland located their aftercare
programs in downtown central locations. In Mobile,
youths were dispersed geographically according to
the Boys and Girls Clubs to which they were
assigned. Youths in Mobile also had access to the
resources of the County Court's Strickland Youth
Center and to a Boys and Girls Clubs beach
property for recreational and community service
activities. 

In Cleveland, staff had difficulty finding a
location that met the program's needs for space
and access to recreational facilities. The program
had to make two temporary moves before the City
Center facility, located in a deserted industrial
complex, became available. Cleveland's staff
considered this sparsely populated area an ideal
location because their facility was beyond the
city's gang turfs. Moreover, the offices were near
public transportation and quite spacious. The only
drawback was that the complex had no outdoor space
for physical training or recreational sports and
activities. 

Denver's Wyatt Academy is located on one floor of
an office building in downtown Denver about two
blocks away from New Pride, Inc.'s main center.
The academy's offices were intended to be
temporary quarters while New Pride, Inc., sought
funding for a much larger version of the school
that would serve trouble-prone youths from a
variety of referral sources and operate in a
renovated school building. The program never moved
from its original location. Consequently, it
lacked recreational facilities, and meals had to
be brought in because the space had no kitchen. On
the positive side, however, the academy was close
to New Pride, Inc., and to public transportation
routes. 

Aftercare Philosophy

Each of the programs applied a different
theoretical framework to the activities and
structure of aftercare. The rationale underlying
the programs in Cleveland and Denver called for a
segregated, intense program to ease the transition
from boot camp to the community. In Mobile,
however, the theory was that boot camp graduates
could be mainstreamed into the supportive
environment of the Boys and Girls Clubs of Greater
Mobile. None of the programs formally documented
the "aftercare" philosophy versus the "boot camp"
philosophy. The philosophical descriptions below
were gleaned from interviews with project staff
and observations of the programs.

The underpinning of both the boot camp and the
aftercare approach in Cleveland was the normative
model. Essentially, program efforts were directed
toward using the peer group to develop a positive
normative system that would replace a negative,
antisocial normative system. The normative model
could be applied in residential or nonresidential
settings, using techniques such as guided group
interaction. Guided group interaction sessions
were an important aspect of Cleveland's aftercare
program, although they were not held on a daily
basis as they had been during boot camp. 

Whether or not their aftercare program had
military overtones was irrelevant to Cleveland's
approach. The aftercare services there were
initially designed with few military elements and
were not well integrated with the program's
intensive training boot camp phase. Over time,
however, an attempt was made to make the
transition between boot camp and aftercare less
abrupt by incorporating additional military
elements into aftercare services and by developing
joint programs.

In contrast, the Denver program intentionally
applied a rationale for its aftercare program that
was different from the rationale applied to its
boot camp. Wyatt Academy was to provide
participants a protected, supportive, educational
environment in which youths could practice new
behaviors and reinforce the values they had
learned in boot camp. The transition from the
military boot camp to a serious school was
symbolized by a change from the military-style
uniform to a "prep school" uniform consisting of
blazer and tie. Boot camp graduation ceremonies,
where youths wore these new uniforms, also served
to emphasize that expectations for the youths had
changed. The primary focus was now to be on
education. Youths would, however, continue to use
courtesies such as "Yes, Sir" and "No, Sir" and
attend physical education and leadership training
courses based on military models.

Aftercare in Mobile represented a total shift in
focus from the external controls on behavior
employed at boot camp to a youth development
model. The assumption was that the programs and
philosophy of the Boys and Girls Clubs of Greater
Mobile would help to sustain the positive
attitudes and behavior that youths had acquired
during the intensive training boot camp phase. An
individually tailored program would be developed
for each youth, emphasizing education, social
skills, or work, depending on the specific needs
and objectives identified in a detailed
"Administrative Transfer Plan" developed at boot
camp. 

Aftercare Content

Upon graduation from boot camp, youths in
Cleveland and Denver were subject to strict
surveillance and supervision requirements,
including daily attendance at a day treatment
center. In Cleveland, supervision was gradually
reduced as youths exhibited responsibility for
controlling their behavior. Youths were released
after a minimum aftercare period of 6 months. In
Denver, however, the same attendance requirements
were maintained for 6 months, at which time youths
were released to regular probation supervision for
the duration of their sentences. Mobile's
requirements were less stringent, with youths
attending Boys and Girls Clubs programs for 9
months.

Cleveland defined different levels of supervision
and the approximate length of time youths were
expected to stay at each level. Cleveland's
supervision was most intense at the beginning,
requiring daily attendance at City Center from
8:15 a.m. to 5 p.m. for 1 month and attendance at
the transitional academy. Next, youths progressed
to Stepdown 1, which gave them weekends off and
permitted attendance at their regular school.
Finally, in Stepdown 2, the program was
individualized, but it typically included a
requirement that youths attend City Center
functions 3 nights a week. Denver's aftercare
requirements were less stringent; youths there
were expected to attend Wyatt Academy from 9 a.m.
to 3:15 p.m., Monday through Friday, and to attend
afterschool drug counseling or other programs as
required by their case manager. After 120 school
days, youths were released from the demonstration
program to the sole supervision of their regular
probation officer or DYS case manager. 

Mobile did not define specific categories of
supervision. However, the case managers
responsible for monitoring boot camp graduates'
progress and attendance gradually reduced the
number of contacts over the course of the
aftercare period.

The sites not only varied in the amount and length
of supervision provided, but they also differed in
their emphasis on types of services. Denver's
primary focus was educational intervention through
programs at Wyatt, supplemented as needed with
substance abuse education and treatment at New
Pride, Inc. Cleveland also emphasized education,
adding a transitional academy in the second year
of operation, but the centerpiece of the program
was counseling, borrowing extensively from the
guided group interaction approach. Cleveland also
had the broadest array of direct services,
offering substance abuse education and groups,
family counseling, and vocational training. The
emphasis was less clear in Mobile, possibly
because staff stressed the importance of tailoring
the program to the specific needs of youths. In
Mobile, youths focused on education, social
skills, or work, depending on their particular
circumstances. Services emphasized there were
those available at Boys and Girls Clubs--tutoring,
case management, life skills training, recreation,
and community service.

Although youths at all three sites were expected
to leave boot camp with individualized treatment
plans and to take advantage of appropriate
agencies in the community, few were actually
referred to outside agencies, at least in the
first months after graduation. 

A determination of appropriate custody
arrangements was usually made in conjunction with
development of the treatment plan. Researchers
learned of the living arrangements for the small
sample of youths for whom staff filled out
aftercare ratings forms. Almost one-third of the
sample in Denver was in foster care, with most of
the remaining youths residing with at least one
parent. Cleveland did not have any aftercare
youths in foster care, but one-quarter of the
youths resided with either a grandparent or a
friend. In Mobile, however, all but 10 percent of
its graduates resided with at least one parent.

Described below is each component of the aftercare
programs: education; physical fitness; military
drill and discipline; counseling; drug and alcohol
counseling, education, treatment, and testing;
family counseling; vocational training and job
preparation; and community service and
restitution. 

Education

Upon graduation from boot camp, youths in Denver
entered Wyatt Academy. Graduates in Cleveland and
Mobile initially were mainstreamed into the
regular public school system. Because Cleveland's
aftercare program encountered problems locating
appropriate school placements for a number of
youths and because youths had adjustment
difficulties from entering school programs
midstream, the program initiated a transitional
academy in the summer of 1993. Thereafter,
following the procedure in Denver, youths in
Cleveland entered the transitional academy
directly from boot camp. However, although Denver
youths remained in the academy for a full 6
months, after about 3 months Cleveland made a
decision to either mainstream the youths into a
regular educational setting or continue their
studies at the academy. GED candidates generally
remained in the academy until they obtained their
diploma.

Cleveland's transitional academy was run by the
Phoenix School, the same organization that
operated the boot camp's educational program. The
Phoenix School operates other alternative
education programs in the State, serving similar
populations of youths. Staff included two
academic instructors, a half-time GED coordinator,
and a half-time academic counselor. Courses
focused on both academic achievement and behavior
and included English, mathematics, history or
citizenship, literature, science, youth
leadership, and physical education.

Unlike Cleveland's academy, Denver's Wyatt Academy
was deliberately segregated from other New Pride
aftercare services. The separate location, the
requirement that youths wear blazers and ties, and
the academy's heavy emphasis on basic subjects
were intended to impart the message that school
was the youths' primary focus for the next half-
year or more.

Wyatt was accredited by the State Education
Department, permitting the program to obtain State
educational funds for the students it taught.
Staff included a principal and three teachers who 
specialized in math, social studies, and language
arts. In addition, the aftercare coordinator
taught physical education and a leadership
training class. 

Wyatt's traditional daily curriculum included two
periods of English, two periods of mathematics,
and two periods of social studies. Classes were
small and the instruction highly individualized,
particularly in mathematics, a subject in which
students' proficiencies varied considerably.
School began at 9 a.m. and ended at 3:15 p.m.,
with the last period of the day designated for
physical training and a leadership course. Youths
were usually assigned daily homework assignments.

Wyatt attempted to control attendance through both
a positive incentive system and a disciplinary
system. Youths who had perfect attendance all week
or whose behavior was designated as exemplary
earned the right to leave an hour and a half early
on Friday, skipping the physical and leadership
training. Absenteeism was punished by requiring a
youth to make up each day of unexcused absence
with 2 days of additional time in school. 

Denver's main objectives for youths were improving
their educational performance and developing
longer term educational goals, leaving Wyatt for
another alternative school, or in the case of
those who had completed their GED's, entering a
community college or vocational training.
Returning to a public school was also a
possibility, but staff viewed this as an
unrealistic plan for most youths. Youths could
also stay at Wyatt beyond their required term, as
did one youth.

Mobile did not operate a transitional school, and
the program confronted many of the same
difficulties finding appropriate school placements
initially experienced in Cleveland. Often, the
schools that youths in Mobile had attended prior
to boot camp were deemed inappropriate. Boot camp
staff believed that officials at these schools
often viewed boot camp youths negatively.
Aftercare staff also were concerned about the
effects of peer pressure and expectations,
including gang membership. Staff helped youths
finalize educational plans and accompanied them on
a visit to their assigned school prior to
graduation. The program described the youth's
educational progress while at boot camp to school
officials, and attempted to alleviate any concerns
the school might have had about the youth's
conduct. Most boot camp graduates were enrolled in
regular schools, but truancy was a serious
problem. As a result, the program attempted to
increase the frequency with which staff checked on
how youths were progressing in school.

Physical Fitness

Denver was the only program to continue daily
physical training activities during the aftercare
phase. Weather permitting, the last period of each
school day was devoted to calisthenics and runs.
Both Mobile and Cleveland incorporated sports into
their aftercare programs, but did not offer
intensive physical training. For instance,
Cleveland's weekly schedule usually included 2 or
3 evenings of basketball or other games at nearby
recreational facilities. In Mobile sports and
games were offered at the Boys and Girls Clubs of
Greater Mobile. Weekend activities at both
locations included challenge activities.

Military Drill and Discipline

The aftercare programs incorporated very little
that was military in nature except for military-
style courtesies and manners and some military
titles. In Denver, for example, youths were
required to refer to each other as "Cadet" or
"Mister," and faculty were addressed as "Sir" or
"Ma'am." In Cleveland, some staff bore civilian
titles, but the aftercare counselor/drivers wore
uniforms and were referred to as "drill sergeants"
by the youths. In fact, the counselor/drivers
rotated assignments as drill sergeants in the boot
camp. In response to youths' requests, additional
military components, such as marching and
drilling, were gradually added to the aftercare
programs in Cleveland and Mobile. 

The aftercare programs in Denver and Cleveland
incorporated more aspects of military leadership
training into their curriculums. The last period
at Wyatt was a combination of physical training
and leadership training adapted by the aftercare
coordinator, a retired Command Sergeant Major,
from courses in the Sergeants Major Leadership
Academy. These courses included effective
listening, communication skills, character
building, courtesy, and discipline. Cleveland's
"Youth Leadership Curriculum" was developed by the
third director of the program, a member of the
Marine Corps reserves.

Counseling

The Cleveland and Mobile programs conducted values
clarification exercises as part of their aftercare
leadership or life skills courses, and all three
programs referred youths exhibiting serious
emotional problems for professional counseling.
However, only Cleveland made counseling the
linchpin of its aftercare program. During the
first intensive phase of aftercare, youths in that
program continued the daily guided group
interaction or confrontational group sessions
initiated in boot camp. Essentially, the program
used the peer group to discuss issues confronted
by youths and developed concrete, socially
acceptable means of dealing with them. 

Drug and Alcohol Counseling, Education, Treatment,
and Testing

Some substance abuse education and counseling were
incorporated into the leadership training and life
skills curriculum at all three sites. In
addition, both Denver and Cleveland had separate
substance abuse program components.

Cleveland's substance abuse program was under the
direction of a substance abuse coordinator. City
Center activities in this domain included:

o  The AMER-I-CAN program, a group counseling,
self-help program designed to increase self-
confidence and achievement among youths. It
included an emphasis on prevention as well as
cessation of substance abuse. All aftercare youths
attended, regardless of their involvement in
substance abuse. 

o  The RAAM (Resocialization of African American
Males) program, an education and group counseling
program directed primarily at drug traffickers,
although other youths also attended. The RAAM
sessions were held weekly at City Center.

o  Referral to other community agencies, including
Alcoholics Anonymous and Narcotics Anonymous.

Denver referred boot camp youths with substance
abuse problems to Out-patient Abuse Therapy
(OPAT), a treatment program operated by New Pride,
Inc. Among the therapeutic techniques OPAT
employed were rational emotive therapy, relapse
prevention therapy, and positive peer pressure.

Drug testing was conducted infrequently at all
three sites. In Cleveland, urine tests were
occasionally administered when a case manager
suspected that a youth had used drugs. In Denver,
youths were tested infrequently at Wyatt Academy,
but the New Pride, Inc., OPAT program routinely
tested youths referred there for treatment. In
Mobile, few youths were tested during the first
year. However, under the new aftercare design, a
few participants were selected randomly each week
to undergo urine tests. 

Family Counseling

Although all three of the demonstration programs
recognized that dysfunctional families were a
serious problem for many participating youths, the
programmatic emphasis was on the individual and
resolving his problems, rather than on the family.
Only in Cleveland was a staff person specifically
designated for family issues. This coordinator
visited youths and their families at home and
incorporated family goals into each youth's
performance workplan. She also attempted to link
families requiring assistance to community
services. For example, the aftercare program
linked several clients' families to the Home
Energy Assistance Program, which helped heat those
families' homes. She also referred them to support
groups that focused on improving parenting skills.
In Denver, youths who had been placed in proctor
care were eligible for family counseling through
the proctor care agency.

Vocational Training and Job Preparation

In the long run, the boot camps hoped to increase
the work ethic among youths as well as their
employability. By design, Denver focused on
improving youths' long-term employability by
concentrating on academic achievement. Wyatt
Academy staff discouraged youths from holding jobs
during aftercare, arguing that work would
interfere with their attention to school.
Cleveland, on the other hand, had a full-time
vocational service coordinator responsible for
locating employment for graduates, preparing them
to obtain and hold a job (e.g., filling out
applications and role-playing interviews), and
monitoring their performance. However, the program
fell short of its goal of having 25 percent of the
youths employed during the first year. Mobile
incorporated some job skills training into the
life skills curriculum, but made no concerted
effort in this area. In Mobile, youths showed a
great deal of interest in an automobile mechanics
training program that was in the planning stage
when this study was conducted.

Community Service and Restitution

Although OJJDP's program announcement stipulated
that the programs require restitution to victims
and the grant applications had claimed restitution
as a program objective, in practice none of the
programs had a restitution component. In
Cleveland, the juvenile court generally does not
order restitution in conjunction with an
institutional sentence. In fact, during the first
year none of the youths at each camp had
restitution orders. Among the small aftercare
sample for which information was available, 5 of
the 43 youths in Denver and 5 of the 27 youths in
Mobile participated in court-ordered restitution.
The boot camp program did not become involved in
providing assistance with or monitoring
restitution payments in those cases. Instead,
restitution was handled through existing court
routines.

All three programs had some community service
activity, although only in Mobile was there a
routine, coordinated effort. There, service
activities were scheduled almost every weekend.
These activities ranged from working in nursing
homes to helping out at community events such as
"fun runs." Over 86 percent of the youths in the
aftercare sample in Mobile participated in
community service activities. The percentage of
youths participating in community service was
considerably lower in the other two sites: 17
percent in Cleveland, and 5 percent in Denver.
Cleveland required just one community service
activity for youths in aftercare, and in Denver
the aftercare coordinator sometimes "persuaded"
cadets who had misbehaved during the school week
to "volunteer" to work on a community service
project over the weekend. 

Summary

In summary, the programs' aftercare components
varied considerably more in their activities and
structures than did their boot camps. They shared
an individualized, case management approach to
aftercare that included substance abuse prevention
activities and life skills training. Mobile
implemented a decentralized aftercare program,
dispersing the boot camp youths among seven Boys
and Girls Clubs of Greater Mobile and immediately
mainstreaming them into "normal" environments.
Both Denver and Cleveland centralized their
efforts, focusing activities during the first few
months around transitional schools serving only
boot camp graduates. The transition to regular
systems and activities was, therefore, more
gradual at both of these sites. Finally, Cleveland
offered the broadest array of services and
employed the largest staff, more than twice the
number employed in Denver. Mobile assigned only
one staff person exclusively to aftercare
activities.

Mechanisms for Monitoring and Disciplining Youths

Discipline during aftercare was a far more complex
and difficult issue than discipline during boot
camp. While youths were under the tight
supervision and control of boot camp, their
misbehavior was obvious and the discipline
straightforward. Moreover, once the program
spelled out the rules, youths who were unable to
comply with them were simply expelled, in many
cases to serve a sentence in a less desirable
environment. In contrast, during aftercare a great
deal of a youth's time was spent without the
direct supervision of the aftercare staff, making
it difficult to monitor behavior problems. Once a
problem was brought to the attention of aftercare
staff, what should be done? How much latitude
should a youth be given before being expelled from
the program? What should be tolerated as "normal"
backsliding that is expected from youths who had
already shown themselves capable of getting
through boot camp? These considerations aside,
programs were aware that a high expulsion rate
would cast serious doubts on the viability of the
boot camp model.

The most pervasive disciplinary problem in
aftercare for all three programs was absenteeism.
In both Denver and Cleveland, the fact that youths
were required to attend the program center each
day meant that absenteeism was discovered fairly
quickly. In Mobile, knowledge of a youth's
absenteeism depended on the frequency of checks
made by the aftercare coordinator. During the
first several months, these checks were not very
systematic. Once a problem was noted, however, the
programs had different policies for handling
youths:

o  In Cleveland, youths who were absent for a few
days were brought before an attendance review
board consisting of the youth's case manager, a
teacher, a student, the family services
coordinator, the aftercare coordinator, and the
commander of the program. This board reviewed the
problem, formulated a plan to improve attendance,
and imposed a punishment, usually extra weekend
hours at City Center. Youths who continued to miss
activities could be brought in for a second or
third review but were eventually subjected to a
more serious review by the commander's board. At
this juncture, a youth could be placed on "SPIN"
status, meaning the program was attempting to
engage him, but he was in danger of being
classified as absent from the program and subject
to a violation of a court order on that basis. 

o  In Denver, the aftercare coordinator attempted
to contact youths (and their families) who were
absent for more than 1 or 2 days. If this contact
did not prompt absent youths to show up at Wyatt,
the coordinator would notify their probation
officers or DYS case managers. There was some
disincentive for youths to return to Wyatt if
their absences were unexcused because their time
in the academy would be extended by double the
number of days they had missed. Ultimately,
continued absenteeism resulted in expulsion from
the program. Any additional consequences, such as
return to court as a probation violator or
transfer to another placement, were the province
of DYS case managers or probation officers.

o  In Mobile, youths who failed to attend the Boys
and Girls Clubs or school were first counseled by
probation officers. Then, if attendance problems
continued, youths were either sent back to boot
camp for "recharging" for 1 or 2 months or were
charged with a probation violation and brought
back before the court.

Strategies for handling other behavior problems
were decided on a case-by-case basis, and some
policies changed over time. In Cleveland, for
instance, early adjustment problems prompted the
program to try sending youths back to boot camp
for a weekend refresher course. Threatening of
staff and disruptive behavior resulted in some
expulsions, but more commonly, youths simply did
not show up for aftercare activities.

Committing a new crime generally was another basis
for expulsion from the program. As a practical
matter, it often meant that youths were held in
detention pending disposition of new charges and,
as a result, could not participate in the
aftercare program. Eventually, most youths brought
before the court were committed to State
institutions. However, for misdemeanors and local
infractions, aftercare staff might attempt to
retain the youths and sometimes even acted as
advocates on their behalf in court. 

Aftercare completion, enrollment, and dropout
rates for youths in the three aftercare programs
were calculated on the basis of the status of
youths in February 1994, about 10 months after the
last of the cohorts in the sample had entered the
program. Because the program was designed to last
12 months, all of the sites still had some youths
enrolled, ranging from 2 youths in Denver to 6 in
Cleveland and 23 in Mobile. At this juncture,
Mobile had graduated almost half of the
demonstration youths and Cleveland had graduated
about 45 percent. In Denver, a smaller proportion,
26 percent, had graduated. 

Termination rates from the program ranged from
70.5 percent in Denver to 50 percent in Cleveland
and 28.3 percent in Mobile. The reasons for
termination varied somewhat by site. By far the
most common reason for termination in Cleveland
and Mobile was arrest for a new offense, whereas
slightly fewer youths in Denver were terminated
for new offenses than for simply going "AWOL"--the
acronym that indicates a youth had simply ceased
attending the program and was considered to have
dropped out but was not known to have committed a
new crime. AWOL terminations were less common in
Cleveland and rare in Mobile. All sites also
terminated some youths for failure to comply with
other program requirements. Cleveland was the only
site where participants died while in aftercare;
the two fatalities there were reportedly caused by
gang-related incidents.

It is difficult to interpret these attrition
patterns. However, it is interesting that
Cleveland and Denver lost similar proportions to
new offenses--33 percent and 29.5 percent,
respectively--compared to 20.2 percent in Mobile.
This order was expected, given the prior
delinquent histories of youths at the three sites.
As discussed in chapter 3, Cleveland youths had
the most serious criminal histories and Mobile
youths the least serious, with Denver youths
falling between the two but closer to Cleveland.
The remaining differences in attrition were
largely attributable to differences in the AWOL
percentages, as well as to the fact that Mobile
had many youths classified as still active in the
program. The AWOL differences may partly reflect
differing responses to absenteeism or differing
monitoring procedures. In Mobile, for instance,
where youths reported to seven different Boys and
Girls Clubs, attendance requirements were variable
and only loosely monitored during some portions of
the demonstration. As long as a youth continued to
report regularly to his probation officer, he may
well have escaped sanctions for poor attendance at
his club site.

In Denver, part of the explanation for the high
proportion of AWOL terminations may lie in the
unique structure of that program, which split
aftercare responsibilities between Wyatt Academy
staff and various case managers, including two DYS
staff based at the boot camp and local probation
officers who had referred probationers to the
program. Program staff at Wyatt Academy were able
to flag absenteeism but were ultimately dependent
on these case managers and probation officers to
sanction persistent truants. However, Wyatt staff
felt that they did not always get aggressive
backup from case managers and probation officers,
in part because the structure was cumbersome and
in part because some case managers were less
enthusiastic about the aftercare program than the
boot camp itself. In any case, if a youth did not
reappear, Wyatt staff eventually listed him as
withdrawn from the program.

Unlike the boot camp attrition, which peaked in
the first 2 weeks, the majority of aftercare
attrition occurred after 3 months. It is not known
if this pattern says more about the point at which
youths stopped participating in the program or the
point at which sites classified them as dropouts.
However, the pattern does indicate that the
programs cannot relax if youths make it through
the first few months after release from boot camp
because attrition occurs throughout the aftercare
period.

Implementation Issues

The programs' aftercare components grappled with a
number of implementation problems over their first
2 years of operation. Because these programs were
the first demonstrations of juvenile boot camps,
no aftercare models existed to emulate. Adult boot
camp programs provided little guidance because
little was known about boot camp aftercare for
adults, and many of the issues and requirements
confronting juveniles, such as custody
arrangements or compulsory education, are
irrelevant to adult programs. In the absence of
models, the programs confronted a number of key
issues.

Tailoring Juvenile Aftercare to Boot Camp
Graduates

All three programs combined elements of
traditional juvenile aftercare--case management,
individualized treatment plans, and regular
reporting--with service delivery in new,
nontraditional settings. In Cleveland and Denver,
day centers were created, and in Mobile, boot camp
graduates were distributed to seven existing Boys
and Girls Clubs.

Aside from delivering services in innovative
settings, it was an open question as to whether or
how much programs needed to tailor aftercare
programming to the boot camp population. There
were several dimensions to the question:

o  After the strict regimentation and close
supervision of boot camp, what degree of external
control and supervision is appropriate during
aftercare? The Cleveland and Mobile programs moved
from less supervision to tighter controls over the
course of this evaluation. Both required refresher
courses at boot camp for youths showing signs of
regressing. Cleveland also developed a separate,
midcourse educational program to eliminate some of
the problems youths had in adjusting to normal
school environments. Many staff felt that the
transition to aftercare needed to be more gradual,
with more external controls extended into
aftercare.

o  How important is it to maintain the platoon as
a group and to build aftercare activities around
that group? Cleveland was the only program that
attempted to continue building group cohesion
during the aftercare period. Cleveland's aftercare
approach relied on group interaction techniques to
foster the development of a positive peer culture.
Although Denver kept platoons intact simply by
having a central location, there was no concerted
effort during aftercare to build on the sense of
responsibility to the group that youths had
developed in boot camp. In Mobile, original
platoons did not even congregate in aftercare.
However, late in the program, Mobile did implement
a requirement that all youths attend one session
per week at the same Boys and Girls Clubs.

o  To what extent should military policies,
procedures, and customs be integrated into the
aftercare program? Except for titles and customs,
the program incorporated very little that was
military in nature. In that sense, they were
virtually indistinguishable from non-boot camp
aftercare programs. Except in Denver, even the
physical training conducted during boot camp was
discontinued. Some youths expressed interest in
continuing some of the military drills, and youths
in Cleveland conducted sporadic drill practices.

Sanctions

A second set of implementation issues concerned
how and where to draw the line on behavior
problems in aftercare. If it was difficult to
develop consistent sanctions in boot camp, an
environment that limited the set of problems to be
addressed, it was even harder during aftercare,
where staff sometimes did not even have a
consensus about what behavior should be considered
a problem.

o  What constitutes a behavior problem in
aftercare, and at what point does a problem
warrant intervention? A new arrest was an obvious
problem, but more commonly the programs faced
behaviors like absenteeism that fell in a gray
area between acceptable teenage limit testing and
a real problem. After how many absences does the
program shift from attempting to lure a youth back
into the program to taking an action that probably
ends his tenure in the program? What messages does
it impart to other youths when a youth has been
absent for 10 days and then shows up again with no
obvious consequences? For the most part, responses
to these issues developed on an ad hoc basis as
individual cases occurred. Only at Denver's Wyatt
Academy were the consequences of absenteeism
predictable.

o  What sanctions should be applied to problem
behaviors? Does early punishment result in
additional absenteeism? Conversely, do youths
learn that they can get away with skipping school
or aftercare programs as long as they show up
every now and then? Some of the programs used
incentives to reward attendance and other positive
behavior. But for serious behavior problems, the
only sanction that sent a strong message without
pushing the youths out of the program was to send
them back to boot camp to be refreshed or
recycled. Both Cleveland and Mobile made limited
use of this strategy.

Part of the programs' reluctance to develop
concrete policy in these areas may lie in the fact
that they had invested considerable effort in each
youth by the time he entered aftercare and did not
want to give up on him so late in the process.

Organization and Management Structure

Lack of clarity in case management
responsibilities and procedures and in lines of
authority were issues in Mobile and Denver. In
both sites, case management involved transfer of
information and responsibility from one agency to
another. Lines of authority and responsibility
were much clearer in Cleveland, which employed a
management structure in which one organization
controlled both program and case management
functions.

o  Who monitors day-to-day supervision of youths?
Who has the responsibility to locate absent youths
and attempt to re-engage them in the program? When
these responsibilities are divided among different
staff in agencies or locations, it is difficult to
monitor the activities of youths and to intervene
early when problems first arise. In Mobile, boot
camp case managers, who were county probation
officers, continued to be responsible for youths
in aftercare. However, the aftercare coordinator
employed by the Boys and Girls Clubs of Greater
Mobile was responsible for monitoring youths at
the seven club locations. There were no clear-cut
policies delineating how or when information would
be shared among these parties and who had
responsibility to take definitive action if
problems arose. In Denver, the situation was even
more complex with case management responsibility
assigned to DYS case managers, probation officers,
or proctor care providers, depending on the
youth's initial sentence and aftercare residence.
As a result, Wyatt Academy's aftercare coordinator
might have to contact multiple individuals at
those agencies to discuss a youth's behavior
problems in school.

At a deeper level, these structures involved a
fragmentation of responsibility for decisions
about a youth's status in the program and, in some
cases, ambiguity about his aftercare goals. If a
serious behavior problem is observed, who or which
agency should impose sanctions? More generally,
who should judge whether the program was meeting
the youth's needs? In both Denver and Mobile, not
all of the staff shared the same notions of their
own and others' responsibilities. And, if there
was a problem with a policy or implementation of
that policy in another agency, it was unclear what
avenues they could use to address the problem. In
Denver, for instance, there was some evidence that
Wyatt staff and case managers sent youths mixed
messages about the importance of complying with
the Wyatt Academy program and disagreed about
whether youths should get jobs. There was no
formal mechanism for resolving these differences.

Resources

A final issue for Denver and Mobile was that the
resources available to those programs were
inadequate to implement the full scope of planned
activities. When grant allocations were cut during
the second award period, the still-evolving
aftercare programs were particularly hard hit.
Many improvements that the sites had been
considering were set aside. Denver, for instance,
had originally proposed to establish a systematic
community service component. Early on, program
staff also spoke of making a more concerted effort
to work with families while youths were in
aftercare. Neither of these plans was ever carried
out. In contrast, Cleveland incorporated different
assumptions about funding levels into their
original proposal and had backup plans that
enabled the site to more adequately fund its
program.

By the close of the evaluation period, the boot
camps had worked through many of their problems
and settled into a routine. In contrast, the
aftercare programs were still struggling, although
they already were quite different from those in
place when the first youths graduated from boot
camp. Disappointed by first-year attrition rates,
program staff were virtually unanimous in singling
out aftercare as the demonstration element most in
need of further improvement.

Chapter 6.  Changes During the Boot Camp Phase

The rationale underlying the demonstration
programs discussed in this report is that the
intensive training experiences during boot camp
produce changes in participants' knowledge and
skills, attitudes and values, and behavior. As
indicated by the rationale presented in chapter 2,
these changes in turn result in increased self-
sufficiency in the community and decreased crime
and delinquency, all of which would ultimately
reduce the costs of delinquency to society in
general. At the same time, youths are held
accountable to victims and the community through
restitution and participation in community service
activities. In Cleveland, an additional objective
was sought: to divert youths from longer term
institutional placements and, in so doing, achieve
cost savings.

In theory, many of the changes expected for
participants were to have occurred by the time
they graduated from boot camp. There was an
assumption that military structure and discipline,
in conjunction with the boot camps' other
elements, would alter the youths' skills,
attitudes, and behavior. Support during the
aftercare period would then enable youths to
consolidate what they had learned in boot camp and
to gradually test their new skills in their own
environment. 

This chapter discusses the very limited data
available from the implementation evaluation.
These data evaluate the progress of youths in
three areas: improvement in knowledge and skills,
improvement in attitudes and values, and
improvement in behavior. Measures of improvement
included physical fitness tests, educational
tests, and staff ratings of individuals on seven
categories of performance, supplemented by
anecdotal evidence on the effectiveness of the
boot camp obtained during interviews with youths
and onsite staff. While evidence of positive
changes in skill, attitude, and behavior at the
conclusion of the 3-month camps does not
necessarily ensure that the program will produce
the long-term impacts it desires, the absence of
any positive changes would certainly raise
concerns about the validity of the concept or its
implementation. The focus of this chapter,
therefore, is on any changes that occurred in the
short term. In the absence of appropriate
comparison data and lacking adequate followup
periods, the longer term changes that the programs
hope to stimulate are not addressed.

This chapter also reports program completion rates
during the evaluation period, describing the
reasons for program attrition at selected
attrition points. It then compares the
characteristics of youths who graduated to those
who did not.

Finally, although cost-effectiveness analyses are
beyond the scope of this evaluation, the operating
costs of the three boot camp and aftercare models
are described, and operating costs per bed are
estimated.

Evidence of Change During the Boot Camp Phase

Some data were available to describe changes
observed in youths who participated in the
intensive training or boot camp phase of the
demonstration programs. The following areas were
assessed: literacy and educational performance,
physical fitness, attitudes and values, and
behavior while at boot camp.

Test scores in Cleveland. When the Phoenix School
took over the educational program at Cleveland's
boot camp in September 1992, all youths were
routinely given the Wide Range Achievement Test-
Revised (WRAT-R) on entry into boot camp and just
before graduation. The WRAT-R is a standardized,
nontimed exam testing reading, spelling, and math
skills. It is used to determine academic
achievement levels from age 5 to adulthood. Data
were available for youths entering boot camp from
cohorts 5 through 12. 

On entry to boot camp, testing of 76 Cleveland
youths in reading revealed that roughly one-third
tested at elementary school level (grade 5 or
below), about one-third tested at middle school
level (grades 6 to 9), and about one-third tested
at high school level (grades 10 to 12). Spelling
and math scores were lower, with over half of the
youths testing at elementary level in spelling,
and three-quarters testing at grade 7 or below in
math. The appropriateness of grade levels
according to individual ages was not considered
because of the wide range of acceptable ages for
any given grade. Recalling that the mean age of
entry into the boot camp program is 16.5 years in
Cleveland, however, an average grade level of 7 in
reading and 6 in spelling and math means that, by
any standard, a considerable number of youths were
below grade level.

Posttest administration of the WRAT-R permitted an
assessment of changes in grade level at the end of
boot camp. There were statistically significant
increases in reading, spelling, and math as
measured by the WRAT-R. Over half of the youths
increased by at least one grade level in reading
and math, and 46 percent increased by that amount
in spelling. A sizeable proportion of youths
increased their standing by at least two grade
levels--36.8 percent in reading, 25 percent in
spelling, and 28.9 percent in math. For a 3-month
educational program, these changes are very
encouraging, particularly for youths with a
history of academic failure. There also was a
group, however, who did not exhibit grade-level
changes during the boot camp period. Thirty-three
percent of youths in the camps did not improve in
reading, 39.5 percent did not improve in spelling,
and 32.9 percent did not improve in math. Overall,
the odds that these changes could be explained by
chance alone are less than one in a thousand.

Test scores in Mobile. Mobile's educational
program was based on the PACE Learning System, an
individually prescribed instructional curriculum
that encompasses grade levels 2 through 12. The
goal of the program was to return recruits to the
public school system with both improved abilities
and increased confidence or to prepare youths for
the high school equivalency examination (GED). 
After entering boot camp, each youth took the Test
of Adult Basic Education (TABE) to determine
reading, math, language, and spelling achievement
levels. Pretest TABE scores were converted to
grade equivalents using norms for juvenile
offenders. Teachers used scores on the TABE to
design the appropriate self-paced instructional
package. For youths who scored high on the TABE,
PACE instructional materials were supplemented
with grade-appropriate curriculum materials from
the Mobile County School system. Youths took the
TABE again on completion of the educational plan
or at the conclusion of the intensive boot camp
training period.

Of the grade levels, as determined by TABE
results, of boot camp youths at the time they
entered the demonstration program, over one-half
were at grade level 6 or below, and one-quarter
were at grade levels 7 or 8. The mean pretest
grade level was 5.9--considerably lower than that
expected for youths whose average age was 15.5.

During their time in boot camp, two-thirds of the
youths were able to improve their total TABE
grade-level equivalents by at least one grade
level. Twenty-nine percent of the youths increased
their total scores by two grades or more. Youths
were more likely to improve their reading and
language scores than their math and spelling
scores. The mean grade-level changes on the four
subtests--reading, math, language, and spelling--
were all 1 year or more. As with the WRAT-R,
changes for each of the subtests and for the total
score were statistically significant. As was the
case in Cleveland, youths who had initially scored
at the low end of the distribution did not make
gains as great as those who had initially scored
higher.

These mean grade-level increases of about 1 year
in Cleveland and more than 1 year in Mobile are
consistent with other assessments of correctional
educational programs that report pre-to-post
increases in achievement scores (Cohen and
Filipczak, 1971; Mayer and Hoffman, 1982; Ball,
Parker, and Saunders, 1982; McAfee, 1984). What is
striking about the grade-level increases in 
Cleveland and Mobile is that they occurred over
only a 3-month educational program, a shorter pre-
to-postinterval than is typically employed.

Youths' assessment of educational programs. In
addition to examining the test scores discussed
above, a small sample of youths in aftercare were
asked whether the boot camps' educational programs
had improved their reading, writing, and math
skills. This sample was limited to youths who were
still active in the fifth month of aftercare. Of
the 19 respondents in Cleveland, 73.6 percent
agreed or strongly agreed that the educational
program there had stimulated improvements.
Similarly, 78.8 percent of the 33 respondents in
Mobile agreed with the statement. However, in
Denver only 33.4 percent of respondents perceived
that the educational program had improved their
reading, writing, and math skills. These results
are not particularly surprising in light of the
observation made in chapter 4 that Mobile placed
the most emphasis on education and spent the most
time per day on educational activities during boot
camp, whereas Denver placed the least emphasis
during boot camp on this aspect of the program.

Physical Fitness

Only the Cleveland program provided enough scores
on physical fitness tests to report on this aspect
of the camps' regimens. The Cleveland program
tested muscular strength, endurance, and
cardiorespiratory endurance at three 30-day
intervals. Because there were concerns about the
fitness levels of youths on entry to boot camp and
fears that injuries would result if the fitness
program were too aggressive, no testing was
conducted until the youths had about 1 month of
preconditioning. The test consisted of repetitions
of pushups in 1 minute, repetitions of situps in 2
minutes, and a timed 1-mile run. The physical
fitness test was similar to the Army Physical
Fitness Test, but with requirements scaled back
for a younger age group.

When the pretest and posttest mean number of
pushups and situps, the mean times for the 1-mile
run, and changes in these scores are considered,
the pretest scores are quite high. For instance,
the mean score for situps at the pretest point
would earn a youth a high score (78) on the Army
Physical Fitness Test, based on standards for the
17- to 21-year-old range. This suggests that
either the average youth had very quickly improved
his conditioning since point of entry, or staff
concerns about the effects of a sedentary
lifestyle proved to be unwarranted for most
youths. By the 90-day mark, youths' conditioning
had improved still further. They performed an
average of 12.1 more pushups in 1 minute, 9.9 more
situps in 2 minutes, and ran the 1 miles in 37
fewer seconds than at the 30-day mark. Paired t-
tests indicated that these differences were
statistically significant at the .05 level or
higher.

There was anecdotal evidence from all three sites
to bolster these test data on improvements in
physical conditioning. For instance, several
youths in Cleveland and Mobile reportedly shed a
perceptible amount of weight as they progressed
through the fitness program. In Denver, some
youths were so proud of their physical shape that
they attempted to send photographs home for
relatives and girlfriends. Whether because of the
physical conditioning, a drug-free environment, or
improved nutrition, a number of youths reported in
interviews that they felt better while at boot
camp. 

Attitudes and Values

Staff at all three sites rated youths on eight
attitudinal and behavioral dimensions: respect for
authority, self-discipline and control,
responsibility, integrity, teamwork, personal
appearance and bearing, social behavior, and work
ethic. Instructions called for the ratings to be
completed by the drill instructor working most
closely with each participant and for ratings to
be made at the end of week 2 and week 12, when
youths completed the boot camp phase of the
program. The ratings were made on a 7-point
scale, with a rating of 1 indicating little
respect for authority, and a rating of 7
indicating great respect for authority.

Because staff did not routinely rate youths until
the first few cohorts had gone through,
particularly in Denver and Mobile, ratings were
not available for all youths. A total of 134
complete sets of pre- and postratings were
collected, the bulk of which were from Cleveland.
Because there were different raters at each site,
it is not appropriate to conclude that youths at
one site exhibited more positive or negative
behaviors and attitudes than youths at another
site. What these figures do reveal, however, is
that just before graduation from boot camp, staff
on average rated youths above the midpoint in
every category of behavior and that the ratings
were fairly consistent across the eight
categories. Staff perceived that the youths
generally followed orders and acted respectfully;
exerted control over their behavior and stayed out
of trouble; kept commitments and maintained
property, clothing, and equipment; told the truth
about personal matters and admitted mistakes;
contributed to team efforts; kept themselves
properly and neatly groomed and maintained
military bearing; were polite and considerate and
used appropriate manners; and persevered in
completing assignments as well as volunteering for
extra tasks. On average, staff rated youths
slightly higher in terms of their personal
appearance and bearing and their work ethic than
on their respect for authority and self-
discipline.

When the average change in staff ratings of boot
camp participants by site during the 10 weeks
between the initial and final ratings are
presented, because of differences in rating
styles, one cannot conclude that one program had
more impact on these behaviors than did another
program. In fact, in Cleveland there may have been
a ceiling effect in the ratings. 

The average initial rating on the eight behavioral
dimensions was 4.8 in Cleveland, whereas it was
only 3.1 in Denver and 2.6 in Mobile. On a 7-point
scale, the initial scores recorded by Cleveland
staff left less room to indicate any gains
exhibited by the participants in that boot camp.
In fact, Cleveland staff ratings did not show much
improvement over the course of boot camp, with all
gains being less than 1 point on the 5-point
scale. However, all but three of those changes
were significant at the .05 level. 

The Denver and Mobile ratings showed substantial
improvements during 10 weeks of boot camp, and all
of these changes were statistically significant.
On average, these improvements were uniform across
the eight dimensions rated. From the perspective
of drill instructors who were working most closely
with the youths, there had been considerable
positive changes in participants' attitudes and
behaviors by the week of graduation. 

The patterns of change were somewhat different in
the two sites. In Denver, staff indicated that
youths changed most in their work ethic and
personal appearance and least in terms of their
teamwork. Youths' respect for authority changed
most in the opinion of Mobile staff, and least in
integrity and social behavior.

Frequency of Behavior Requiring Disciplinary
Action

Another indicator of whether or not the youths'
behavior improved during the boot camp period is
the frequency of disciplinary infractions. The
percentage of disciplinary infractions that
occurred in the first, second, and third months of
boot camp show that Cleveland's infractions show a
pattern that would be expected if behavior were
improving with time in the program: close to half
of the infractions occurred in the first month and
less than 22 percent in the third month. The
relationship was nonmonotonic in Mobile and
Denver, although at both sites there were fewer
infractions in the last month than in the first
month. With the possible exception of Cleveland,
these differences are too small to draw any
conclusions about improvements in behavior.

Evidence of Change During the Aftercare Phase

During this evaluation only two types of data were
available to assess the progress of youths once
they left boot camp: ratings of changes at
approximately the eighth month (typically the
fifth month in aftercare) and logs describing each
youth's status in the program or attrition from it
through the 12-month period of expected program
participation.

Youths' Ratings of Changes

Nineteen youths from Cleveland, 15 from Denver,
and 33 from Mobile rated changes on 14 dimensions
of their behavior. They considered changes that
had occurred from before boot camp to 4 months
into the aftercare phase. Simple 3-point scales
were used that asked whether a youth was engaging
in a behavior more, the same, or less, or whether
an area was better, the same, or worse. 

Considering the percentage of youths at each site
rating, each dimension in a positive or negative
direction. The most striking aspect of the youths'
assessment of their progress in almost every area
is that the majority reported doing better in
aftercare than they had before boot camp. The vast
majority claimed to have reduced their criminal
activities and drug and alcohol use since entering
boot camp. Although youths were promised that
their responses were confidential, the respondents
may, of course, have had a tendency to select
socially desirable responses. Nonetheless, the
pattern of responses is interesting and there is
no evidence that the average youth consistently
selected the "correct" answer to every item. There
were some areas, however, where less than half of
the youths claimed improvements. A smaller
percentage of Denver youths reported that they
were getting along better with other people (27
percent) and working better with others (40
percent). And at all three sites slightly less
than half of the respondents indicated that they
were trying to do school assignments and getting
along better in school since entering the boot
camp program. This response is somewhat surprising
given that youths in Cleveland and Mobile appeared
to have achieved educational gains at the
conclusion of the boot camp phase. Also of
interest was that relatively small percentages of
youths at each site reported having changed their
peer group since boot camp. Youths reported that
they still were socializing with the same friends
they had spent time with before boot camp.
Although not much weight can be attached to these
results because of the small sample sizes and
possible response biases, it appears that the
average youth perceived the program as having
changed his behavior for the better.

Program Attrition

Chapters 4 and 5 described attrition patterns
during the programs' boot camp and aftercare
phases. About 10 months after the last of the
cohorts in this study's sample had entered the
program, 42 percent of the youths in Cleveland, 21
percent in Denver, and 40 percent in Mobile had
graduated from the aftercare program. Another 19
percent of the youths in Mobile were still
enrolled in the aftercare program, as were smaller
percentages of youths in Cleveland and Denver.
Over three-quarters of the youths in Denver did
not complete the program; the bulk of these losses
occurred during the aftercare period. The
attrition rate was considerably lower in Cleveland
at 53 percent, with nearly all losses occurring
during the aftercare period. Mobile had the lowest
overall attrition rate, losing slightly more in
the aftercare period than during boot camp.

To determine if program startup difficulties were
a factor in program attrition, the attrition rates
for the first few cohorts of youths to enter the
program (four in Cleveland and Mobile and three in
Denver) were compared with those for the last few
cohorts. In both Cleveland and Mobile, the first
four cohorts accounted for a higher proportion of
program losses than did the last four cohorts. The
changes both of these programs made in their
aftercare programs--Cleveland implemented a
transitional school and Mobile restructured
aftercare to include more activities exclusively
for boot camp youths--may have begun to reap some
benefits. In Denver, however, there were just as
many dropouts among the last few cohorts as among
the first three.

The primary reasons for program attrition varied
across sites. Program terminations for medical
reasons or for "failure to comply" accounted for
over half of Mobile's losses and about one-quarter
of Denver's losses. In Cleveland, these categories
accounted for only 15.9 percent of the program's
losses (i.e., 53 percent of Cleveland's youths did
not graduate, and 15.9 percent of this group were
terminated for "failure to comply.") Rather, 61.9
percent of the nongraduating group were terminated
due to arrests for new charges and 18.9 percent
due to what the program referred to as "AWOL"--
escape from boot camp or nonattendance in
aftercare. Denver lost a smaller proportion to new
crimes, but it had a considerably larger
proportion of youths classified as "AWOL" with no
known new offenses.

Cleveland's pattern of attrition reflects the fact
that very few program losses occurred during the
boot camp phase when most terminations due to
failure to comply or medical reasons took place.
Cleveland did not terminate any youths for medical
reasons and only 8.4 percent for failure to comply
with the program. Close to one-third of Cleveland
youths were terminated from the program because of
arrests for new offenses, and another 10.1 percent
were classified as "AWOL," with no known new 
offenses. Two youths were removed from the 
rolls when they were killed in incidents reportedly 
related to gang activity.

In contrast, about one-fifth of participants in
Denver were terminated because of medical or
psychological problems or failure to comply with
the program. Denver also lost a sizeable
proportion of youths to new arrests during the
program period. In addition, a significant
proportion of youths, 31.6 percent, were
classified as "AWOL."

Similarly, Mobile terminated 22 percent of its
entrants for failure to comply. The program
reported few terminations for medical and
psychological problems, however. About 11 percent
of youths in Mobile were terminated because of
arrests for new crimes during the program period,
and 6.6 percent were designated as "AWOL."

Overall, 11 youths were charged with violent
crimes, 2 of which were murder. Receiving stolen
property (which in Cleveland includes auto theft)
and selling or possessing drugs accounted for most
of the other new charges. In Denver, 13 youths
were charged with property offenses, and 3 were
charged with violent crimes, 2 of which were
robberies. Of the 14 youths in Mobile arrested for
new offenses, all but 2 were charged with property
offenses. One youth was charged with rape and one
with robbery. 

The relationship between program attrition and the
criminal and social characteristics of the youths
at intake was also examined. In Cleveland, there
was a statistically significant relationship
between the seriousness of a youth's prior
sentence and completion of boot camp (x2 = 14.3,
df = 3, p < .01). Of the 32 youths who had a prior
institutional sentence to either ODYS or YDC, only
about 22 percent graduated from boot camp or were
still in the program. Of the youths who had been
placed on intensive probation, slightly more than
half dropped out of the program. On the other
hand, the majority of youths whose most serious
prior sentence was probation completed the program
successfully. Boot camp staff in Cleveland
suspected that youths with prior incarcerations
did not perform as well in boot camp. Some
surmised that they were less afraid of the boot
camp alternative, in this case ODYS, because they
had already spent time there. Other staff believed
that a prior incarceration was just another
indication that a youth had penetrated too far
into the criminal justice system to easily reverse
course. The fact that none of the indicators of
the seriousness of the youths' instant or prior
offenses was related to dropout tends to support
the former interpretation--that it was the
previous experience of incarceration rather than
the seriousness of the criminal career that was
associated with program losses. The other factor
related to dropout in Cleveland was gang
involvement, with youths exhibiting strong gang
affiliation more likely to drop out than those
with minor or no gang affiliation (x2 = 6.7, df =
2, p < = .05). 

In Denver, the same relationship between program
dropout and prior incarceration emerged, although
the cell sizes were too small to test for
statistical significance. Of the Denver youths who
had been incarcerated (as part of a probation plus
detention sentence or Department of Institutions
commitment), only 10.8 percent completed or were
still enrolled in the program, compared to 30.8
percent of youths with no prior commitments. 

As in Denver, the association between program
dropout and previous incarceration emerged in
Mobile, although there were too few youths with
previous incarcerations to make statistical
significance levels meaningful. Of the six youths
who had been incarcerated, five did not complete
the program. Other variables related to dropout in
Mobile were discipline problems at home or school
and a history of fighting. Also, youths who were
involved in drug sales were more likely to drop
out. As was the case for Cleveland, however, the
variables characterizing the seriousness or length
of the criminal history were unrelated to program
completion. 

Program Costs

Over the course of the demonstration, Cleveland
received approximately $1.4 million in OJJDP
funds, and Denver and Mobile each received about
$1.5 million. All sites were awarded two separate
grants, each covering 18 months. Because of budget
limitations at OJJDP, the second award was smaller
than expected, which forced the programs to cut
costs or find money from other sources. In
contrast to the other sites, Cleveland heavily
subsidized its demonstration with nonfederal
funds. In part, this was possible because
Cleveland's program qualified for a State subsidy
designed to encourage localities to use more
correctional options in the community.

It was difficult to examine program costs in
detail due to different budget procedures and time
frames across sites and limited information on
nonfederal and inkind contributions to the
demonstration programs. Caution should be taken in
the following areas when interpreting these
figures:

o  It was necessary to allocate some budget line
items (including administrative costs, training
costs, and a number of other expenses) between the
boot camp and aftercare phases. A 60 percent boot
camp/40 percent aftercare split was used.

o  Denver's aftercare costs did not include the
cost of teachers, an expense underwritten by the
school system.

o  Budgets included travel to meetings, data
collection, and some other administrative costs
that probably would not have been incurred if the
sites had not been part of a demonstration
program.

o  Costs excluded some inkind contributions if the
sites did not attach a specific dollar value to
them. Denver, for example, did not estimate the
value of their boot camp space.

Personnel costs accounted for the largest share of
the program budgets, both in boot camp and
aftercare. Allowing for the crudity of these
estimates, it is still interesting that the costs
of boot camp were quite similar across sites,
ranging from a high of $75 per day in Cleveland to
a low of $66 in Mobile. Costs of aftercare were
more diverse for several reasons, including the
intrinsic differences in the three programs. 

Mobile's aftercare, which did not include an
educational component or a special program center
for boot camp graduates, was by far the cheapest.
In contrast, Cleveland's aftercare program was the
most comprehensive and therefore the most costly.
Differences between the cost of aftercare in
Denver and Cleveland are overstated, however,
because the cost of teachers' salaries in Denver
are not included.

Note that the various costs estimates (per slot,
per day, per participant) are affected by
assumptions about program capacity, occupancy
rates, and length of stay. The estimates shown
assume full occupancy of the programs. Other
jurisdictions would need to consider these
assumptions carefully in forecasting their own
cost estimates.

Using full occupancy as the cost standard,
however, all programs believed that their boot
camp residential programs operated at a lower
daily cost than alternative facilities. Ohio
estimated the average daily cost of placement in
its State facilities at $99, whereas Denver's
higher security facilities averaged $138 per day,
and its community residential facilities averaged
$92.

This chapter has presented some preliminary
evidence that youths who entered the demonstration
programs during the first year achieved physical
fitness, educational, and attitudinal gains during
the 3-month boot camp phase. Most youths completed
the boot camp phase, but attrition during
aftercare was a problem for the programs. There
was a strong, statistically significant
relationship between an incarceration prior to
boot camp and program attrition. In the next
chapter, the implications of these findings are
discussed.

Chapter 7.  Findings, Conclusions, and
Recommendations

The Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency
Prevention initiated the boot camp demonstration
program to develop boot camp models for the
juvenile system and to test the feasibility and
appropriateness of their implementation. In
September 1991, three groups received awards to
develop and implement boot camp programs as
intermediate sanctions:

o  Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas,
Cleveland, Ohio, working in association with the
North American Family Institute.

o  Colorado Division of Youth Services, Denver,
Colorado, in association with New Pride, Inc.

o  Boys and Girls Clubs of Greater Mobile,
Alabama, in association with the Strickland Youth
Center of the Mobile County Juvenile Court and the
University of South Alabama.

 Simultaneously, the National Institute of Justice
sponsored this evaluation of the demonstration
programs. The evaluation covered program
implementation, focusing on the experiences of
youths who entered the programs during the first
year of operation from April 1992 through March
1993. The goal of the evaluation was to provide
systematic information about program design and
implementation to the three demonstration sites,
to OJJDP, and to jurisdictions considering the
development of juvenile boot camps. Impact
analyses were beyond the scope of this evaluation.

Key Implementation Findings

The key findings from this implementation
evaluation are highlighted below.

Program Design

Despite their limited experience with boot camps
and a dearth of juvenile programs to model, all
three sites met the challenge of implementing the
boot camp demonstration. They put together working
public-private partnerships, developed and refined
a coherent program rationale, and opened their
program doors on schedule 6 months after the grant
award.

Each program incorporated a structured selection
process, a 90-day residential boot camp phase, and
an aftercare phase of 6 to 9 months. All programs
shared the assumption that the boot camp
environment would give youths a unique opportunity
to make positive changes in their attitudes,
values, skills, and behaviors. These improvements
would in turn provide them with a solid foundation
for educational, work, and treatment activities
when youths returned to the community.

Each of the sites adopted a slightly different
philosophy for its program. Cleveland applied the
"normative model," attempting to develop prosocial
normative systems during the boot camp and
aftercare phases. Military customs and procedures
were adapted to the underlying treatment
philosophy of Cleveland's private partner, the
North American Family Institute. Both Denver and
Mobile operated with the philosophy that highly
structured and stressful military experience, in
concert with positive role models, would promote
internal changes in youths. As a result, they
would be more receptive to education and treatment
in the community.
 
Participants

All programs targeted male delinquents, ages 13
and up in Mobile, and 14 and up in Cleveland and
Denver. In keeping with OJJDP guidelines, all
sites excluded some types of violent offenders. In
this respect, Mobile was the most exclusionary and
Cleveland the least, allowing entry to some youths
whose previous offense was violent but ruling out
offenders whose current offense was violent. All
programs screened candidates for medical and
psychological suitability. Only Cleveland's
program was voluntary, and only Cleveland
exclusively targeted youths who would otherwise be
confined in a State or county facility. 

During the first year, 119 youths entered
Cleveland's boot camp, 76 entered the Denver
program, and 122 entered Mobile's camp. 

Judging from their official records, youths who
entered the Cleveland program had previously been
more involved with the juvenile justice system and
had committed more serious offenses than youths
entering the Denver and Mobile programs. In
addition, over one-fourth of Cleveland's youths
had a prior commitment to State or county
facilities. In Denver and Mobile, less than 5
percent of participants had prior State
commitments, although many Denver youths had
served short sentences in detention facilities,
and one out of six Mobile youths had attended a 2-
week mini-boot camp. 

Many participants had background characteristics
associated with youths at risk, such as single-
parent families, low income, poor school
attendance, delinquent siblings or peers, gang
involvement, drug or alcohol use, and a record of
disciplinary problems at home or school.
Participants in Cleveland and Denver, on average,
tended to be older than those in Mobile (16.5
years versus 15.6 years). 

Boot Camp

All three sites developed 90-day residential
programs that exposed youths to military-like
routine, discipline, and physical conditioning, as
well as to more traditional rehabilitative
components such as remedial education, life skills
education and counseling, and substance abuse
education. Cleveland and Mobile also offered
physical challenge programming. Other key features
of the programs included:

o  A platoon structure in which groups of 10 to 13
youths entered together and were expected to
graduate together. 

o  Spartan facilities located on the grounds of an
existing institution, but with separate
programming.

o  Onsite drill instructors (DI's), teachers, and
case managers.

o  Intentional selection of some staff with
military backgrounds.

o  An initial staff training program.

o  Military-style uniforms for youths and DI's and
use of military jargon, customs, and courtesies.

o  A tightly programmed day, starting at 5:30 or 6
a.m. and ending with lights out by 9 or 10 p.m.

o  Summary (on-the-spot) punishment for some
breaches of rules, for example, 25 pushups for
inappropriate language.

o  A progression of sanctions, culminating in a
board or commander's authority to remove youths
from the program.

o  A public graduation ceremony.

Although they had many common characteristics, the
boot camps differed in a number of ways that
reflected their distinctive philosophies and
rationales. Cleveland's program, modeled after
other residential programs operated by the same
organization but with a "military overlay," placed
the least emphasis on military structure,
regimentation, and physical exercise. It also was
the only site to make therapeutic counseling a
central part of its program. Denver, in contrast,
deliberately avoided traditional treatment
modalities and created the most military-like
setting. Compared with the other sites, Denver
spent the most time on military drill, fitness,
and work and devoted the least time to remedial
education and life skills curriculum. Mobile
placed moderate emphasis on military aspects, and,
of the three sites, allocated the most programming
time to education. 

Most participants committed at least one
infraction serious enough to be recorded for the
evaluation team. These infractions typically
involved disobedience or disrespect, improper
language or conduct, or a fight with another
youth. The most serious infractions, escape and
assaults on staff, were less common. There were 34
escapes attempted in Mobile, 6 in Cleveland, and 8
in Denver. Cleveland reported 17 assaults on staff
and Mobile 3; none were reported in Denver.

In keeping with their greater emphasis on military
aspects, Denver and Mobile often ordered brig or
isolation time for misconduct, while Cleveland did
not. The sanction most commonly applied in
Cleveland was counseling. 

Boot camp completion rates for youths admitted
during the first program year were high, ranging
from 94 percent in Cleveland to 82 percent in
Mobile and 80 percent in Denver. The majority of
youths who left the camps were terminated for
noncompliance or escape. In Denver, however, a
third of its dropouts left for medical reasons. In
Cleveland and Denver, the majority of the boot
camp dropouts occurred within the first 2 weeks.

Interviews with a small sample of youths from
early platoons suggested that they liked the
physical conditioning and drill elements of boot
camp, but they found it hard to adjust to boot
camp rules and discipline, especially during the
first month of the program.

Implementation of the boot camps proceeded
relatively smoothly at all three sites. However,
two sites, Cleveland and Mobile, experienced high
staff turnover. Staff attributed the turnover to
staff burnout from the intensity of the program
and to low salaries. In general, program staff
felt that it was difficult to achieve the right
balance between military orientation and
sensitivity to the special characteristics of
juvenile delinquents. They also found it difficult
to train replacement staff adequately without
disrupting program operations. In addition, boot
camps struggled to find appropriate and effective
disciplinary measures and a clear-cut termination
policy. Both Cleveland and Mobile developed a
"setback" system, which usually forced youths
being disciplined to graduate later than expected.
Mobile used this sanction for almost a third of
first-year participants, while Cleveland used it
for only 8 percent of its youths.

Aftercare

The aftercare components of the three
demonstration programs were more diverse than the
boot camps. Denver's 6-month program was the
shortest, and Mobile's 9-month program was the
longest. Cleveland's youths could be released at 6
months or kept in the program for up to 8 months.
Youths lived at home or in other approved
placements and were required to attend the
aftercare programs. Cleveland and Denver created
aftercare centers specifically for boot camp
graduates, whereas Mobile "mainstreamed" boot camp
graduates to seven local Boys and Girls Clubs.
Denver's center was an academy-style school, with
nonacademic services such as drug counseling
obtained by referral to other programs. In
contrast, Cleveland's center was the hub of most
counseling and supportive services other than
school. Mobile's youths were expected to
participate in existing afterschool and evening
programs at their assigned Boys and Girls Clubs. 

For the most part, aftercare represented an abrupt
break from the military discipline and
regimentation of the boot camp phase. Most of the
military elements were abandoned, with the
exception of a few military-style courtesies and
titles, the inclusion of some military leadership
training materials in the curriculum used in
Cleveland and Denver, and continuation of regular
physical training in Denver. 

In general, Cleveland provided the most
comprehensive aftercare services. As in boot camp,
counseling was a core element of the program.
Unlike the other two programs, Cleveland employed
a staff member to work with families and a full-
time vocational services counselor. 

All three programs organized community service
activities but none had a specific restitution
component. Case managers monitored restitution
payments for youths who had restitution orders in
Denver and Mobile. Restitution was generally not
ordered for youths committed in Cleveland. 

During the aftercare phase, arrangements for day-
to-day supervision and case management varied in
complexity. In Cleveland, both functions were
handled by the aftercare center staff. In Denver
and Mobile, youths were supervised daily by the
staff at Wyatt Academy and the Boys and Girls
Clubs of Greater Mobile, respectively, but case
management usually remained the responsibility of
a youth's probation officer or Department of Youth
Services case manager. This split in
responsibility made it more difficult to identify
youths who were not complying with program
requirements and to take remedial action. 

The most persistent disciplinary problem during
aftercare was absenteeism. Programs struggled to
find appropriate incentives for good attendance,
but solutions were not readily available to
address absenteeism. Programs also developed
policies and procedures for handling other problem
behaviors. Threatening staff, extremely disruptive
behavior, and committing a serious new crime
generally were considered grounds for expulsion.

Despite high completion rates during the
residential boot camp phase, many youths did not
complete aftercare. Of the 112 youths entering the
aftercare program in Cleveland, 33 percent were
arrested for a new offense before completing the
program and 17 percent were terminated for other
reasons, including 2 deaths. In Denver, 70 percent
failed to complete the program; about half of
these youths dropped out, and about half were
terminated because they were arrested for a new
offense. Mobile reported fewer losses during
aftercare; 28 of the youths who entered aftercare
there were terminated. However, Mobile's
statistics may not be directly comparable. Because
its aftercare program was so decentralized, Mobile
did not identify persistent absentees as reliably
as did the other sites. Most of the youths who did
leave Mobile's aftercare were arrested for new
offenses. 

All programs experimented with their aftercare
programs and made constant adjustments. Both
Cleveland and Mobile significantly modified
aftercare in the second year. Because many first-
year youths had trouble rejoining regular school
programs in midstream, Cleveland added an
alternative school to its center to serve as a
transitional point for youths who wanted to return
to a regular school. Because there was no other
opportunity to keep the boot camp peer group
together after graduation, Mobile added a weekly
session and one monthly activity that brought boot
camp graduates together in aftercare. 

Short-term Effects

Consistent with the program rationales, there were
indications that youths improved their educational
performance, physical fitness, and behavior during
boot camp. In Cleveland and Mobile, where boot
camp staff tested educational achievement of
participants upon entry and at graduation, the
average youth gained one grade level or more
during the 90-day residential phase. In Cleveland,
the only site reporting sufficient data on changes
in physical fitness, youths also made significant
gains on fitness tests. Anecdotal data and
observations suggest that physical gains also
occurred at the other sites. Drill instructor
ratings of participant performance in several
areas, including respect for authority, self-
discipline, team work, and personal appearance,
also improved substantially over the course of
Denver and Mobile's boot camps. Ratings improved
less in Cleveland, although they moved in the
desired direction.

Youths who remained in the program for at least 8
months (3 months of boot camp phase and 5 months
of aftercare) reported positive changes in their
attitudes and behaviors. These findings were based
on a small sample, however, and despite promises
of confidentiality, responses may have been biased
toward socially desirable answers.

Costs

Only crude estimates of program operating costs
were possible. However, these estimates showed
that daily costs for the residential phase of the
program, assuming full occupancy, ranged from $66
in Mobile to $75 in Cleveland. The sites indicated
that these costs are lower than the daily costs of
confinement in State or local facilities.
Aftercare costs differed much more, reflecting
greater diversity in the aftercare programs. 

In short, the three grantees developed viable boot
camp programs that fell within the broad
parameters laid out by OJJDP. There was variation
across sites in terms of the characteristics of
participating youths, the type of military
environment, the service emphasis, and the
aftercare program structure and services. At the
conclusion of the boot camp phase, empirical and
anecdotal evidence of positive changes in the
skills, behaviors, and attitudes of participants
was found. During aftercare, program completion
became a problem, prompting considerable revisions
to programming and structure in Cleveland and
Mobile. Mostly because of heavy attrition in
aftercare, overall program attrition amounted to
53 percent in Cleveland, 76 percent in Denver, and
41 percent in Mobile.

Conclusions

Can the boot camp model be adapted to the juvenile
justice system? The experiences of the three
demonstration programs indicate that residential
boot camps can be implemented in the juvenile
justice system. Adult boot camp models require
adaptations to fit the requirements of the
juvenile system, including additional educational
programming and some altering of disciplinary
procedures. The programs did not always foresee
the corrections required, but by the conclusion of
the evaluation period, each had adjusted adult
boot camp designs to fit its juvenile
environments. 
 
The programs were developed with the assumption
that boot camp should stimulate changes in youths'
attitudes, skills, and behavior, and that those
changes would, in turn, increase self-sufficiency
in the community and decrease crime and
delinquency. As part of the implementation
evaluation, it is important to note several
important observations about the front end of this
logic chain. The first criterion for measuring the
success of the programs is whether youths stayed
in the program long enough to accrue any personal
benefits. At all three sites, the majority of
youths successfully graduated from boot camp.
Cleveland graduated 95 percent of its entrants,
and both Denver and Mobile graduated 80 percent or
more. 

A second indicator of successful program
implementation is whether the boot camp stimulated
changes in attitudes and behaviors. Both empirical
and anecdotal evidence exists that first-year boot
camp youths made gains in physical fitness,
education, and attitude over the 3-month period,
at least at some sites. In the absence of a
control or comparison group, these changes cannot
be attributed to the boot camps. Nor can judgments
be made about the significance of the observed
changes. The fact that youths in both Cleveland
and Mobile on average increased their educational
grade level by over one year may, indeed, reflect
the experience of youths in other institutions. In
fact, other studies have documented educational
achievements of this magnitude, although perhaps
over a longer period of institutionalization. What
can be said is that youths who participated in
boot camp did not appear to be worse off in any
measure of educational or behavioral performance
at the conclusion of their training. As they were
poised to leave boot camps, the youths whom we
interviewed expressed confidence that they had
made considerable changes in their lives and that
their behavioral trajectory would be different
from what it had been prior to boot camp.

What appeared to be a promising prognosis at the
conclusion of boot camp disintegrated during
aftercare. All three programs were plagued by high
attrition rates for noncompliance, absenteeism,
and new arrests during the aftercare period. No
other indicators of progress were observed during
this phase that would help pinpoint where the
problems lay. In all fairness to the programs,
aftercare was particularly affected by unexpected
cuts in Federal support, especially in Denver and
Mobile, where reductions resulted in programs far
less comprehensive than originally planned. The
programs expressed considerable concern about
making aftercare services more effective and were
still seeking expert advice and adjusting this
component when the evaluation came to a close.
However, at this juncture it does not appear that
the demonstration programs solved the problem that
typically plagues residential correctional
programs: inmates who appear to thrive in the
institutional environment but falter when they
return home. 

This evaluation cannot draw conclusions about the
long-term impact of the program. The study did not
track postprogram recidivism, and it collected
data on inprogram recidivism only to the extent
that a new arrest prompted termination from the
program. Of youths entering the boot camps during
the first year, 32.8 percent in Cleveland, 25
percent in Denver, and 11.5 percent in Mobile were
removed for new arrests. Without knowing what the
arrest rates would have been for a control group
of comparable youths, it is difficult to interpret
what these attrition rates mean. However, it is
possible that more information on these issues may
be forthcoming in 1996, under the auspices of
research funded by OJJDP.

Neither can the programs' impact on correctional
crowding or cost savings be assessed without more
information about recidivism and the costs of
alternative placements. Juvenile programs cannot
be expected to have the same potential to reduce
costs as adult boot camps. Adult boot camps
generally serve as a 4- to 6-month alternative to
a much longer sentence, measured in years rather
than months. Juvenile sentences are much shorter,
thereby reducing the savings in days and costs
that juvenile camps can produce. In fact,
Cleveland was the only program that set reductions
in institutional crowding as a goal. But because
the Cleveland program was so small in relation to
the size of Ohio's juvenile correctional
population, the effects are likely to be marginal.
 
Did the boot camp programs select appropriate
youths? As conceived by OJJDP, the boot camp
program was to have been an intermediate sanction,
designed for intermediate offenders who did not
merit long-term institutionalization but were
considered too serious for diversion or a
probation sentence. During the first year of
implementation, Mobile probably erred on the side
of including too many youths for whom the less
restrictive and costly probation sanctions would
have been appropriate, including some youths whose
most serious offense was a violation of probation
for a status offense. Cleveland and Denver, on the
other hand, may have erred too far on the side of
including serious offenders. Cleveland's youths
averaged 2.8 felony convictions, and 27 percent
had been sentenced to an institution before boot
camp. Denver's program also had a number of youths
who had previously been incarcerated.

The selection criteria and procedures generated a
sufficient number of eligible youths, and the
programs made few changes to the criteria. A few
medical problems that surfaced in the first few
cohorts, however, led to greater attention to the
camps' medical and psychological screenings.
Judging by boot camp completion rates, these
criteria successfully screened youths who could
withstand the boot camp regimen. 

It is not so clear whether the criteria
successfully identified youths who would benefit
most from the program. In particular, the finding
that youths with prior incarceration experience
were less likely to complete the boot camp and
aftercare components raises questions about the
appropriateness of this group for boot camps.
Staff in Cleveland recognized this pattern and
expressed concern about the ability of the program
to deal with those with prior incarcerations.
Given the brevity of the observation period and
the shortcomings of aftercare programs during
their early implementation months, not enough
information is available at this juncture to
translate this finding into a recommendation.
However, it deserves additional research and
experimentation on the part of the programs,
particularly in light of staff uneasiness about
their ability to work with youths with longer
criminal histories.

Did the programs' military overlay contribute to
their effectiveness? The differential effects of
the military aspects of the program cannot be
disentangled from other components. However, it is
known that most program staff perceived the
military aspects as important, if not essential. 

An analogy to the military boot camp is helpful in
assessing the viability and limits of the military
model for corrections. In the military, boot camp
is the initiation process that attempts to mold a
group of individuals into a cohesive team that
will respond without question to authority.
Ultimately, the conformity and respect established
during boot camp may come into play in life-
threatening situations. When a young person leaves
a military boot camp, he remains in the service
for a minimum of 2 years. During this time, the
same structure and rules of behavior that guided
his behavior in boot camp are in place. In
addition, that person has a job, clothing, and a
place to live. For many individuals, the military
becomes a family of sorts, and a source of
structure and support.

Contrast this model with a correctional boot camp.
In a correctional camp, the focus is less on
building a team and more on changing an
individual's behavior and teaching cooperation.
Unlike the military, when a youth leaves a
correctional boot camp, he leaves its structure
and support and way of life and returns to an
environment that has already failed him. Because
of these differences, there are clearly limits to
what a correctional boot camp can be expected to
accomplish.

The demonstration programs employed a military
framework in tandem with strong educational and
skill-building components. Rather than serving as
a good in and of itself, this structure
establishes the discipline and control that enable
youths to focus on constructive changes and
accomplishments. The appropriate analogy may be a
military school rather than a military boot camp,
where the military context serves as a setting in
which to offer educational services. This is not
to say that the military aspects of the program
are unimportant. The fact that these "boot camps"
evoked images of a tough, macho environment may
have been essential for acceptance, because some
youths may be more accepting of "treatment" when
it is delivered from within a military structure.

Recommendations

Boot camp programs need to clarify the cause and
effect rationales they are using to explain
expectations for changing participant behavior.
Imparting a clear understanding of the
underpinnings of a program is critical to its
smooth operation, particularly when the idea is
novel, as is the concept of a boot camp for
juveniles. The Cleveland program carefully
delineated a rationale describing how different
program activities would affect youths and what
they hoped to accomplish. Having a well-developed
rationale was an enormous advantage for both
Cleveland's program directors and staff. In making
day-to-day decisions about how to react to the
multitude of behaviors and questions encountered
in a new program for juvenile offenders, it is
very useful to be able to step back and ask, "What
are we trying to do?" In addition, the process of
describing how the program will work may identify
inconsistencies in the chain of logic. 

Boot camp programs should carefully define and
select target populations in light of their goals
for rehabilitation, recidivism, cost containment,
punishment, and other important areas. OJJDP
intended the demonstration to target intermediate
offenders. Given the costs of these programs, it
would make sense that they be reserved for youths
who have already failed in less costly placements
such as probation. Whether boot camps should
exclude high-end or violent offenders is an open
question, and an issue for which these programs
can give little guidance. However, preliminary
indications are that offenders with previous
incarceration experience do not perform well in
demonstration settings. High-end offenders would
undoubtedly impose additional burdens that these
programs did not face, including the need for
additional security and political opposition from
those who see boot camp placement as
insufficiently punitive.

Because aftercare was the period during which most
attrition occurred, this part of the demonstration
program clearly needs to be improved and perhaps
restructured. During the evaluation, a number of
changes were made to the programs' aftercare
phases, and their effects are as yet unknown.
Presented below are recommendations for improving
the programs' aftercare services, based primarily
on reports from boot camp staff and assessments
made by correctional and court officials. 

o    Programs need to identify strategies for
smoothing the transition from boot camp to
aftercare. Aftercare designs should expressly
build on the structure, discipline, and learning
experiences of the programs' boot camps. 

o  The transition from a closely monitored boot
camp to aftercare should be less abrupt,
permitting youths to adjust more slowly to the
community. There was general consensus among
program staff that the requirements for
participation in aftercare should be stiffer and
that youths should be more closely monitored,
particularly in the period immediately following
release. The development of the transitional
academy in Cleveland, the revisions to Mobile's
aftercare program, and the decision to recycle
youths to boot camp from aftercare were, in part,
an expression of that consensus. Closer
supervision not only reduces the time youths have
to get into trouble, it also provides more program
exposure and more treatment. A number of staff
mentioned that a halfway house might help in this
respect. 

o  It is imperative that programs develop clear
sets of disciplinary rules, expectations for
behavior, and graduated sanctions for both boot
camp and aftercare. Although the programs had
tightened and refined their rules and procedures
for boot camp, they still had not developed hard
and fast rules about acceptable behavior in
aftercare. What to do about nonattendance was a
particularly thorny issue. Aftercare staff wanted
youths to follow the rules and believed that some
sanctions should be applied for misconduct and
absences, but they feared that harsher sanctions
might drive youths into further nonattendance.
These issues were never satisfactorily resolved. 

In programs where multiple agencies may be
involved in monitoring youths, the
responsibilities of each agency need to be spelled
out in detail. If youths are to be held
accountable and if positive changes begun in boot
camp are to be reinforced, there must be a clear
understanding of who is responsible for the youths
and when sanctions should be applied to keep them
focused on the program. Delineating
responsibilities is particularly important if the
aftercare program is drawing on the capabilities
of a variety of agencies, a situation in which
staff are especially susceptible to a "pass-the-
buck" mentality.

In light of the high staff turnover rates
experienced by two of the programs, there is a
continuous need for staff training. Intensive,
offsite training is frequently too expensive and
may not be available exactly when needed.
Particularly for very specific training, such as
certification as a challenge course instructor,
turnover can become a problem if the staff capable
of conducting that training leave the program. New
programs must anticipate high staff turnover rates
and build into workplans training at frequent
intervals.

The boot camp concept warrants additional
attention and research. A comparison of boot camp
and control youths would yield important insights
into how boot camps perform relative to other
sanctions. Moreover, not enough is known about
boot camps and their effectiveness to support the
endorsement of a single model for wide
implementation. A series of studies that
systematically looks at the effects of variations
in boot camp and aftercare design would be highly
desirable. The demonstration programs evaluated in
this study demonstrated that boot camps can be
implemented in the juvenile justice system.
Whether those boot camps work is still unknown.
That question merits further research.
----------------------------------

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