Seismic Analysis for Preclosure Safety Rev 00B, ICN 00

000-00C-MGR0-00700-000-00B

December 2004



1. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this seismic preclosure safety analysis is to identify the potential seismicallyinitiated 
event sequences associated with preclosure operations of the repository at Yucca 
Mountain and assign appropriate design bases to provide assurance of achieving the performance 
objectives specified in the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 10 CFR Part 63 for radiological 
consequences. This seismic preclosure safety analysis is performed in support of the License 
Application for the Yucca Mountain Project. 
In more detail, this analysis identifies the systems, structures, and components (SSCs) that are 
subject to seismic design bases. This analysis assigns one of two design basis ground motion 
(DBGM) levels, DBGM-1 or DBGM-2, to SSCs important to safety (ITS) that are credited in the 
prevention or mitigation of seismically-initiated event sequences. An application of seismic 
margins approach is also demonstrated for SSCs assigned to DBGM-2 by showing a high 
confidence of a low probability of failure at a higher ground acceleration value, termed a 
beyond-design basis ground motion (BDBGM) level. 
The objective of this analysis is to meet the performance requirements of 10 CFR 63.111(a) and 
10 CFR 63.111(b) for offsite and worker doses. The results of this calculation are used as inputs 
to the following: 
A classification analysis of SSCs ITS by identifying potential seismically-initiated 
failures (loss of safety function) that could lead to undesired consequences 
An assignment of either DBGM-1 or DBGM-2 to each SSC ITS credited in the 
prevention or mitigation of a seismically-initiated event sequence 
A nuclear safety design basis report that will state the seismic design requirements that 
are credited in this analysis. 
The present analysis reflects the design information available as of October 2004 and is 
considered preliminary. The evolving design of the repository will be re-evaluated periodically 
to ensure that seismic hazards are properly evaluated and identified. This document supersedes 
the seismic classifications, assignments, and computations in Seismic Analysis for Preclosure 
Safety (BSC 2004a). 
2. QUALITY ASSURANCE 
The Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management, Quality Assurance Program, applies to 
this design analysis because it relates to items important to public radiological safety. The 
analysis was prepared in accordance with AP-3.12Q, Design Calculations and Analyses, and AP- 
3.15Q, Managing Technical Product Inputs. 

3. USE OF SOFTWARE 
3.1 SOFTWARE TRACKED BY CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT 
None used. 
3.2 COMMERCIAL OFF-THE-SHELF SOFTWARE USED 
Commercial off-the-shelf software is used in this calculation. Microsoft Word (version: 
Word 97) is used for standard word processing and Microsoft Excel (version: Excel 97) is 
used to tabulate information and perform simple calculations involving products and sums. 
Microsoft Visio (version: Professional 2002) was used to produce fault trees and logic 
diagrams. The computations and software do not require qualification under LP-SI.11Q-BSC, 
Software Management. 
4. INPUTS AND ANALYSIS BASIS 
4.1 DIRECT INPUTS 
4.1.1 Waste Forms 
Spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and high-level radioactive waste (HLW) will arrive at the repository in 
solid form in a variety of types and sizes. These waste forms will include (BSC 2004b, pp. 4-1 
to 4-14; BSC 2004c, pp. 4-1 to 4-7; and DOE 2002a, pp. 10 to 17): 
Commercial spent nuclear fuel (CSNF) assemblies 
Dual-purpose canisters (DPC) containing CSNF 
DOE-owned spent nuclear fuel (DSNF) canisters 
Naval spent nuclear fuel (NSNF) canisters 
DOE HLW canisters. 
CSNF is further divided between waste from boiling-water reactors (BWR) and pressurized 
water reactors (PWR). 
4.1.2 Reference Design for Surface Facilities 
Facility names will follow the sketch of the surface facilities, as shown in Attachment I, 
modified from BSC (2004d). 
The reference design for the repository includes several systems and facilities handling HLW: 
Railcar Staging Area and Truck Staging Area, defined together in this analysis as the 
Transportation Facility (part of the Balance of Plant [BSC 2004e]) 
Receipt Systems, including Transportation Cask Receipt/Return Facility (TCRRF) and 
Transportation Cask Buffer Area (BSC 2004f) 

Canister Handling Facility (CHF) (BSC 2004g) 
Dry Transfer Facility (DTF) (BSC 2004h) (two units, each containing a Remediation 
System [BSC 2004i]) 
Fuel Handling Facility (FHF) (BSC 2004j) 
SNF Aging Facility (BSC 2004k) 
Subsurface Facility (BSC 2004l). 
Information is also taken from facility and system description documents and other references 
(including BSC 2004m; BSC 2004n; BSC 2004o) together with descriptions in BSC (2004p, 
Section 6.6). A Shielded Canister Transfer System (SCT) Facility (Arthur 2003) is not included 
as this facility has not been sufficiently defined. 
Significant details include: 
The emplacement drifts are loaded with approximately 11,200 waste packages (WPs) 
(Williams 2003a, Table 3). 
DTF staging racks accommodate 120 CSNF assemblies (72 BWR and 48 PWR) and 10 
canisters (BSC 2004h, Section 4.1.4.1, Staging). 
The staging racks in the wet remediation area accommodate, at a minimum, 48 PWR 
CSNF assemblies, 72 BWR CSNF assemblies, and 10 DOE waste canisters (BSC 
2003a, Asset WBS 1.5.04.01.02; BSC 2004i, Section 3.1.2.2.3). 
The initial SNF Aging Facility will contain 1,000 MTHM (BSC 2004k, Section 
4.1.1.1), which represents about 2,500 CSNF assemblies (CSNFAs). Four additional 
pads (5,000 MTHM each), located to the northwest of the process buildings, may be 
added to accommodate an additional 20,000 MTHM. There is also provision on the 
site layout plan to accommodate an additional 19,000 MTHM as a contingency (BSC 
2004k, Section 4.1.1.1). 
The initial SNF Aging Facility will have 80 vertical storage positions and 20 horizontal 
positions as part of a single module (slab unit); subsequent facilities will contain five 
such modules (BSC 2004k, Section 4.1.1.1 and Figure B-4). 
The CHF will have a shielded staging pit for 10 DSNF/HLW canisters (BSC 2004g, 
Section 4.1.1). 
The FHF will have one closure cell (BSC 2004j, Section B.2.1.3) and will not receive 
DSNF multi-canister overpacks, horizontal dual-purpose canisters, and non-standard 
fuel (BSC 2004j, Section 1.1). 

4.1.3 Applicable Seismic Events 
Monitored Geologic Repository External Events Hazards Screening Analysis (BSC 2004q, 
Section 7 and Table 2) concludes that seismic events are applicable to the repository. Design for 
vibratory ground motion is based on the potential occurrence of natural seismic activity or maninduced 
events, such as weapons testing on the Nevada Test Site (Section 4.1.11). 
4.1.4 Design and Operation of Repository 
The design and operation of the repository and potential internal events are described and 
identified in Internal Hazards Analysis for License Application (BSC 2004p), based on existing 
designs together with cited supplemental information and assumptions in Section 5. Most details 
of the repository waste handling operation in this analysis are taken from BSC (2004p, Section 
6.6). 
4.1.5 SSCs Important to Safety 
The list of SSCs that are classified as ITS are identified in Q-List (BSC 2004r, Appendix A). 
Event sequences are categorized and descriptions of design features that are credited with 
prevention or credited for mitigation of the radiological consequences of such event sequences 
are identified in Categorization of Event Sequences for License Application (BSC 2004s). 
4.1.6 Offsite Dose Information for Unmitigated Release of Radioactivity 
Preclosure Consequence Analyses for License Application (BSC 2004t, Table 23) provides 
offsite dose information for unmitigated release of radioactivity from CSNFAs. Unfiltered 
offsite doses from NSNF and vitrified HLW canisters are provided in BSC (2004t, Table 24). 
4.1.7 Definitions and Mean Annual Probability of Exceedance for DBGM Levels 
The definition and mean annual probability of exceedance (MAPE) of the reference design 
earthquakes are obtained from Preclosure Seismic Design Methodology for a Geologic 
Repository at Yucca Mountain (BSC 2004u, Section 3.1.1). Two DBGM levels for design are 
defined and used in these analyses: DBGM-1 at 1  10-3 MAPE and DBGM-2 at 5  10-4 MAPE. 
4.1.8 Definition of Beyond Design Basis Ground Motion Level for Demonstration of 
Capacity for DBGM-2 Structures, Systems, and Components 
For SSCs designed to a DBGM-2 level, structural analyses will be conducted at a beyond design 
basis ground motion (BDBGM) level to demonstrate the capacity of the SSCs to perform their 
intended safety functions at ground motion levels that are greater than the design basis. SSCs 
designed to DBGM-2 level will be evaluated for a BDBGM at the 1  10-4 MAPE (BSC 2004u, 
Section 3.3.1). 

4.1.9 Estimates of Peak Ground Acceleration and Spectral Acceleration for Reference 
Earthquakes 
The horizontal peak ground acceleration (PGA) is commonly used as the primary parameter in 
seismic analyses and design, as well as to describe structural fragilities (e.g., Budnitz et al. 1985; 
McGuire et al. 2002; Chen et al. 1991, Section 3.1.1.2). PGA will be utilized for the present 
seismic margins analysis (SMA) approach as the hazard parameter, and is defined in this context 
as the maximum horizontal spectral acceleration at 100 Hz. 
In addition, for many cases of interest, spectral accelerations in the range of 1 to 2.5 Hz and 5 to 
10 Hz can be of primary importance in structural response and either can be used as a design 
parameter (e.g., Regulatory Guide 1.165, Appendix C). Thus, seismic ground motion parameters 
of the average horizontal spectral accelerations at 1 to 2.5 Hz [SA(1-2.5)] and 5 to 10 Hz [SA(5-10)] 
are included here for reference. 
The parameter values and source data sets are presented in Table 1. Estimates of the PGA and 
average spectral accelerations for the reference earthquakes are based on information from 
seismic data sets (indicated by document tracking numbers [DTNs]). 
4.1.10 Preclosure Radiation Dose Limits 
Relevant preclosure dose limits for Category 1 and Category 2 event sequences are presented in 
Table 2, based on applicable regulations. The dose values shown are for total effective dose 
equivalent (TEDE), a measure of body dose. Other higher limits for other parts of the body are 
specified per 10 CFR 63.111(b)(2), 10 CFR 20.1201 to 1204, 10 CFR 20.1207 to 1208, and 10 
CFR 20.1301 to 1302. Dose limits for Category 1 event sequences for the present analysis are 
taken as the maximum annual dose. 
4.1.11 Probability of Category 1 and Category 2 Sequences 
Category 1 sequences are defined as those event sequences that are expected to occur one or 
more times before permanent closure of the geologic repository operations area (10 CFR 63.2). 
For a 100-year preclosure duration (Assumption 5.12) and a chance of occurrence of once, this 
can be stated as at least 1 chance over 100 years, or an annual probability of occurrence of 10-2. 
Category 2 sequences are defined as event sequences that have at least one chance in 10,000 of 
occurring before permanent closure (10 CFR 63.2). Again, for a 100-year preclosure duration 
(Assumption 5.12), this can be stated as at least 1 chance in 1,000,000 per year, or an annual 
probability of occurrence of 10-6. 

Table 1. Ground Motions Associated with Reference Earthquakes 
Part A: Peak Ground Accelerations 
Horizontal Peak Ground Acceleration 
(PGA) (g) 
Ground Motion 
Category 
Mean Annual 
Probability of 
Exceedance 
(MAPE) 
Surface a,b 
Subsurface DTN DTN 
DBGM-1 
1.0  10-3 
0.37 
0.13 
MO0411SDSDE103.003, 
MO0405SDSTPNTB.001 
DBGM-2 
5.0  10-4 
0.58 
0.19 
MO0411SDSTMHIS.006, 
MO0407SDARS104.001 
BDBGM 
1.0  10-4 
1.19 
0.43 
MO0411WHBDE104.003, 
MO0306SDSAVDTH.000 
Part B: Spectral Accelerations 
Average Horizontal 
Spectral Accelerations c(g) 
Ground 
Motion 
Category 
Mean Annual 
Probability of 
Exceedance 
(MAPE) 
Range 
Surface a,b 
Subsurface DTN DTN 
SA(1-2.5) 
0.43 
0.17 
DBGM-1 
1.0  10-3 
SA(5-10) 
0.80 
0.25 
MO0411SDSDE103.003, 
MO0405SDSTPNTB.001 
MO0411SDSDE103.003, 
MO0405SDSTPNTB.001 
SA(1-2.5) 
0.67 
0.24 
DBGM-2 
5.0  10-4 
SA(5-10) 
1.22 
0.37 
MO0411SDSTMHIS.006, 
MO0407SDARS104.001 
MO0411SDSTMHIS.006, 
MO0407SDARS104.001 
SA(1-2.5) 
1.58 
0.55 
BDBGM 
1.0  10-4 
SA(5-10) 
2.52 
0.83 
MO0411WHBDE104.003, 
MO0306SDSAVDTH.000 
MO0411WHBDE104.003, 
MO0306SDSAVDTH.000 
NOTES: a Surface values were defined for the Waste Handling Building Area (BSC 2002, Figure 1) based on 
profiles for 35 ft (11 m) and 110 ft (34 m) of alluvium (soil). 
b PGA values for surface facilities are computed at Point D/E at 5% damping. Location of computation 
points for surface facilities and emplacement level is shown in BSC (2004v, Figure 1). PGA values 
are calculated at a frequency of 100 Hz (period = 0.01 second). 
c SA(1-2.5) = [(SA1 +SA2.5) / 2] and SA(5-10) = [(SA5 +SA10) / 2], where SA1, SA2.5, SA5, and SA10 are the 
maximum horizontal spectral accelerations at 1 Hz, 2.5 Hz, 5 Hz, and 10 Hz, respectively, for 5% 
damping. 
Source data and file names for above values are shown in Attachment VII. 
BDBGM = beyond design basis ground motion; DBGM = design basis ground motion; DTN = document 
tracking number; g = acceleration due to gravity; SA = spectral acceleration; SA(X-Y) = average spectral 
acceleration for a range, computed as the average of spectral accelerations at frequency X and 
frequency Y. 

Table 2. Bases for Assigning Design Basis Ground Motions to SSCs ITS 
Performance 
Objectives Applied to 
Seismic Preclosure 
Safety 
Dose Receptor 
Consequences of Loss of 
SSC Safety Function 
Single Sequence Dose 
Limit (TEDE) a 
DBGM Assigned to SSCs 
ITS c 
Radiation Worker 
>5 rem (0.05 Sv) 
DBGM-1 
Controlled Area Worker 
Beyond Geologic Repository 
Operations Area 
Or 
Member of Public on Site 
and Beyond Geologic 
Repository Operations Area 
Or 
NTS/Nellis Workers in 
Unrestricted Area 
>100 mrem (1.0 mSv) d or 
>2 mrem (0.02 mSv) per 
hour d 
or 
>10 mrem (0.1 mSv) from 
air emissions d 
DBGM-1 
Category 1 Event 
Sequences 
[10 CFR 63.111(b)(1), 
10 CFR 20.1201-1204, 
10 CFR 20.1207-1208, 
10 CFR 20.1301-1302] 
Member of Public Beyond 
Site Boundary, in General 
Environment 
>15 mrem (0.15 mSv) 
DBGM-1 
Category 2 Event 
Sequences 
[10 CFR 63.111(b)(2)] 
Individual at or Beyond the 
Site Boundary b 
>5 rem (0.05 Sv) 
DBGM-2 
Criticality Condition 
[10 CFR 63.112(e)(6)] 
N/A 
N/A 
DBGM-2 
NOTES: a Values are for TEDE (a measure of body dose). Higher dose equivalents for the lens of the eye, skin, 
and extremities are not included in the table, but are subject to separate limits per 10 CFR 63.111(b)(2), 
10 CFR 20.1101, 10 CFR 20.1201 to 1204, 10 CFR 20.1207 to 1208, and 10 CFR 20.1301 to 1302. 
b At any point on the site boundary. 
c Any seismic event sequence that results in a breach of a DSNF canister is assumed to exceed 5 rem 
TEDE at the site boundary for the purposes of assigning DBGM-2. Doses from such canister breaches 
will not be explicitly calculated. 
d Limit doses do not include occupational dose or doses received from background radiation, from any 
medical administration the individual has received, from exposure to individuals administered radioactive 
material and released under 10 CFR 35.75, or from voluntary participation in medical research programs. 
DBGM = design basis ground motion; ITS = important to safety; NTS = Nevada Test Site; SSCs = 
structures, systems, and components; TEDE = total effective dose equivalent. 

4.2 DESIGN BASES FOR CASK/WASTE PACKAGE/CANISTER DROPS 
4.2.1 Drop Characteristics of Transportation Casks 
Requirements for transportation casks are defined in 10 CFR Part 71. Transportation casks with 
impact limiters are required to withstand (without breach) a 30 ft (9 m) drop onto a flat, 
essentially unyielding, horizontal surface, striking the surface in a position for which maximum 
damage is expected (10 CFR 71.73). The cask is also to withstand (without breach) a drop from 
40 in (1 m) onto a vertical steel bar 6 in (0.15 m) in diameter, and normal vibrations incident to 
transport (10 CFR 71.71). 
In addition, material within transportation casks must be subcritical even with the most reactive 
credible configuration of the fissile material and moderation to the most reactive credible extent 
(10 CFR 71.55). 
4.2.2 Drop Characteristics of U.S. Department of Energy Canisters 
There are several kinds of DOE canisters. For spent nuclear fuel, there are standardized canisters 
and multi-canister overpacks (MCOs). The term, DSNF canister, includes standardized and 
MCO canisters. The following criteria are used for guidance: 
DSNF standardized canisters can withstand, without breaching, a drop in any 
orientation from a height of 23 ft (7.0 m) onto an essentially unyielding surface (BSC 
2004w, Section 6; DOE 2002b, Section 4.3.7). 
MCO canisters can withstand, without breaching, a flat bottom drop (3 degrees or less 
from vertical) from a height of 23 ft (7.0 m) and a drop in any orientation from a height 
of 2 ft (0.6 m) (individually - not both in sequence) onto an essentially unyielding 
surface (BSC 2004w, Section 6). 
The probability that a DSNF canister is defective such that it may breach if dropped 
from within the height limits stated above is 2.3  10-4 (BSC 2004w, Section 6). 
The DOE HLW canisters can withstand, without breaching, a drop to less than 23 ft 
(7.0 m) above the bottom of cask, waste package, staging rack, or staging pit (based on 
analysis and testing) (BSC 2001, Section 6.1). 
4.2.3 Drop Characteristics of Waste Package 
Design requirements will ensure that the waste package will withstand without breaching the 
following drop and tipover events (BSC 2004s, Assumption 5.1.3.12). The following criteria are 
used for guidance: 
Free drop (with trunnion collars installed) on a flat unyielding surface, starting from a 
horizontal position located 7.9 ft (2.4 m) above an essentially unyielding surface 

Free drop (with trunnion collars installed) on a flat unyielding surface, starting from a 
vertical position located 6.6 ft (2.0 m) above an essentially unyielding surface 
Free drop with emplacement pallet (without trunnion collars) from a position located 
6.6 ft (2.0 m) above an essentially unyielding surface 
Tipover and slap down (with trunnion collars installed) from a vertical position onto an 
essentially unyielding horizontal surface. 
4.2.4 Drop of Naval Spent Nuclear Fuel Canisters 
NSNF canisters are to be designed to preclude a dose greater than that prescribed for the limit of 
a Category 2 sequence [i.e., the more limiting of a TEDE of 0.05 Sv (5 rem), or the sum of the 
deep dose equivalent to any individual organ or tissue (other than the lens of the eye) of 0.5 Sv 
(50 rem). The lens dose equivalent may not exceed 0.15 Sv (15 rem), and the shallow dose 
equivalent to skin may not exceed 0.5 Sv (50 rem)] after sustaining a flat bottom drop or a drop 
in any orientation (DOE 2002b, Section 4.4.8). 
4.3 DEFINITION OF SAFETY FUNCTIONS 
4.3.1 General 
Each SSC ITS that is credited in the prevention or mitigation of a seismically-initiated event 
sequence will be assigned a safety function (or functions) with regard to performance goals for 
the specific SSC during and after the initiating seismic event. This section defines the safety 
functions employed for this analysis; the functions are defined based on prior analyses and 
engineering judgement. 
4.3.2 Safety Function: No Structural Collapse 
The safety function, no structural collapse, is assigned to facilities and structures assigned to 
either a DBGM-1 or DBGM-2 level. For seismic margin calculations, the function corresponds 
approximately to the state of large permanent distortion, short of collapse of a structure or 
facility, termed Limit State A by BSC (2004u, Table A-1). [Note that for design, structural 
analyses will be performed to demonstrate compliance with a more-restrictive Limit State C, or 
limited permanent distortion, essentially requiring minimal damage to the structure.] 
The no structural collapse safety function has the following performance goals during and after a 
seismic event: 
No structural collapse occurs (i.e., column and support members remain upright, beams 
remain functional, and walls remain standing), and failure of contents is not serious 
enough to cause severe injury or death, prevent evacuation, or induce a breach of a 
waste container. 
Confinement of internal airflow is not required and may not be maintained. Concrete 
walls will remain standing, but may be extensively cracked; they may not maintain 

pressure differential with normal heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC). 
Cracks will still provide a tortuous path for material release. The largest cracks are 
expected to be no greater than  in (12 mm). 
Distortion of the structure will be limited, but expected to be visible to the naked eye. 
Components will remain anchored, but with no assurance that they will remain 
functional or easily repairable. 
These goals are modified from various facility requirements for seismic design (DOE-STD- 
1020-2002, Natural Phenomena Hazards Design and Evaluation Criteria for Department of 
Energy Facilities, Appendix C). However, no direct correlation is adopted between this safety 
function and any defined performance category in DOE-STD-1020. 
An additional requirement of this safety function is that the failure of adjacent structures and 
other SSCs (whether safety-related or not) shall be considered in seismic analyses, as 
appropriate, and shall not induce collapse of the designated structure. 
4.3.3 Safety Function: No Drop 
The safety function, no drop, is assigned to cranes assigned to a DBGM-2 level. The no-drop 
safety function has the following performance goals during and after a seismic event: 
The crane shall not release (or drop) a waste container or waste form either due to 
failure of crane components or controls due to a designated seismic event. 
The crane, as a system, shall not collapse or fall down. The crane shall remain on its 
track or guide system (regardless if crane is holding a waste container or waste form at 
the time of the event). 
Horizontal movement (swinging) of the waste cask or waste package shall be restrained 
(if necessary) to preclude impacts with nearby walls and barriers. 
The crane track or guide system shall remain intact and attached to the structure. It 
may be distorted and bent, however. 
The crane shall not move in an uncontrolled manner or exceed its design speed limit. 
4.3.4 Safety Function: No Breach 
The safety function, no breach, is assigned to various waste containers assigned to either a 
DBGM-1 or DBGM-2 level. 
The no breach (leak tight) safety function has the following performance goal during and after a 
seismic event: 

Containment of the waste form is maintained and no release or dispersement of 
radionuclides (either as gas or particulates) to the environment occurs. 
Distortion and damage of the container will be limited. 
4.3.5 Safety Function: No Tipover 
The safety function, no tipover, is assigned to various SSCs handling casks and canisters (e.g., 
turntables and pedestals) assigned to either a DBGM-1 or DBGM-2 level. The no tipover safety 
function has the following performance goal during and after a seismic event: 
The SSC shall not allow a tipover of a cask or canister (i.e., an overturn from an upright 
or normal position and impact the floor, ground, or other object), or tilting of the cask 
or canister resulting in an impact with an adjacent SCC ITS causing a domino effect. 
4.3.6 Safety Function: No Slap Down 
The safety function, no slap down, is assigned to various SSCs handling casks and canisters 
(trolleys, waste package transporters, transport locomotives, HAMs, MSC transporters) assigned 
to either a DBGM-1 or DBGM-2 level. The no slap down safety function has the following 
performance goals during and after a seismic event: 
The SSC shall not allow a slap down or rapid drop of a waste cask or waste package in 
transit (i.e., the fall of a package or canister, a vertical distance and subsequent impact 
onto the floor, ground, or onto another object). 
Any impacts to the waste cask / package shall be within design specifications and, 
thereby, not induce a breach of the waste cask/package in transit. 
The SSC itself may sustain substantial damage and may no longer be operable. 
4.3.7 Safety Function: No Release 
The safety function, no release, is assigned to staging and storage racks assigned to either a 
DBGM-1 or DBGM-2 level. 
The no release safety function has the following performance goals during and after a seismic 
event: 
No release or dispersement of radionuclides (either as gas and/or as particulates) to the 
environment due to shaking or deformation of the waste form or storage rack occurs. 
Distortion and damage of the waste form and rack(s) will be limited and will not 
preclude additional operations to retrieve the waste forms. 

4.3.8 Safety Function: No Failure 
The safety function, no failure, is assigned to various SSCs (e.g., limiters, collars, dampers) 
assigned to either a DBGM-1 or DBGM-2 level. The no failure safety function has the following 
performance goal during and after a seismic event: 
The SSC will continue its designated safety function after a seismic event without 
significant degradation in the performance or requirement for repair. For structural 
elements, the load response shall be essentially elastic due to the seismic event. 
4.3.9 Safety Function: No Significant Cracking / Displacement 
The safety function, no significant cracking / displacement, is assigned to aging pads at the 
DBGM-2 level. The no significant cracking / displacement safety function has the following 
performance goals during and after a seismic event: 
Aging pad is essentially intact. The concrete will remain structurally sound, but may 
contain several small cracks. The largest cracks are expected to be no greater than 
1/8 in (3 mm), and lengths shorter than 2 ft (0.6 m). 
Distortion of the pad will be very limited and not expected to be immediately apparent 
to the naked eye. 
Differential displacement across the pad shall be minimal, with differential 
displacements insufficient to cause a tipover of individual storage casks. 
4.3.10 Safety Function: Controlled Failure 
The safety function, controlled failure, is assigned in special instances to SSCs (e.g., 
ventilation stacks) to precluded potential interactions with SSCs ITS. The controlled failure 
safety function has the following performance goals for ventilation stacks during and after a 
seismic event: 
Failure of a SSC due to a seismic event shall not obstruct an open flow path to the 
environment of the corresponding ventilation system. 
Failure of a SSC shall not impede the safety function of another SSC ITS. 

4.3.11 Safety Function: Shielding Integrity Remains Intact 
The safety function, shielding integrity remains intact, is assigned to shielding SSCs (e.g., 
shield view ports, shield windows, shield doors) at the DBGM-1 and DBGM-2 levels. The 
shielding integrity remains intact safety function has the following performance goals during and 
after a seismic event: 
SSC remains essentially intact and in-place, and provides sufficient (direct shine) 
shielding to permit workers to egress the area without receiving a significant dose 
(significant is defined as less than 10 percent of the worker dose limit). 
Cracking of glass will be limited, and drainage of fluids (used in ports and windows for 
shielding) will be slow. 
4.3.12 Safety Function: Maintain Waste Form 
The safety function, maintain waste form, is assigned to fuel handling machines at either the 
DBGM-1 or DBGM-2 level. The maintain waste form safety function has the following 
performance goals during and after a seismic event: 
The SSC continues to maintain (retain) the waste form. 
The waste form remains intact and in-place. 
Damage to the waste form is minimal. 
Significant release or dispersement of radionuclides (either as gas and/or as 
particulates) to the environment due to shaking or deformation of the waste form is 
precluded. 
4.3.13 Safety Function: No Criticality 
The safety function, no criticality, is assigned to various waste containers (e.g., casks, 
canisters, WPs) and staging and storage racks assigned to DBGM-2 level. 
For various waste containers, the no criticality safety function has the following performance 
goal during and after a seismic event: 
The waste in the container shall remain nuclear subcritical as a result of a drop or 
impact within design limits with the most reactive credible configuration of the fissile 
material and moderation to the most reactive credible extent. 
The container internal geometry shall retain the design waste configuration with only 
minor damage/distortion. 

For staging and storage racks, the no criticality safety function has the following performance 
goal during and after a seismic event: 
The rack shall remain structurally intact (with minimal distortion of the rack) and 
prevent bare fuel assemblies (or other exposed waste forms) to become nuclear critical 
as a result considering the most reactive credible configuration of the fissile material 
and moderation to the most reactive credible extent. 
4.3.14 Safety Function: No Runaway 
The safety function, no runaway (uncontrolled descent), is assigned to transporters and 
locomotives assigned to the DBGM-1 and DBGM-2 levels. The no runaway safety function has 
the following performance goal during and after a seismic event: 
The SSC shall stop the transport train (the trailer/car containing a waste form) after a 
seismic event (however, a tipover is not precluded). 
The SSC shall not allow the speed of the transport train to exceed its maximum 
allowable limits. 
The coupler shall remain connected between the locomotive and transport train. 
4.3.15 Safety Function: No Discharge 
The safety function, no discharge, is assigned to SSCs such as vent ducts, as well as highefficiency 
particulate air (HEPA) filters and filter housings, which can contain a significant 
particulate dose and are assigned to either a DBGM-1 or DBGM-2 level. 
For filters, the no discharge safety function has the following performance goals during and after 
a seismic event: 
No significant release or dispersement of radionuclides (particulates) to the immediate 
environment (to the structure interior or exterior) due to shaking of the filter and/or 
deformation of the filter (housing) system occurs. (A significant release is defined as a 
release that results in less than a small fraction of the applicable dose limit over a 
period of 24 hours). 
No significant release or dispersement of radionuclides (particulates) back into the 
interior ventilation system (i.e., no back flow) shall be precluded by valves/dampers or 
other appropriate devices. 
External components of the system (e.g., housings, fans, etc.) shall be rigidly anchored 
to major building elements (walls, floors, partitions). 
The system shall maintain its structural integrity, and distortion/damage of the housing 
and hangers (if applicable) will be limited. 

For vent ducts, the no discharge safety function has the following performance goals during and 
after a seismic event: 
No significant release or dispersement of radionuclides (particulates) to the immediate 
environment. (A significant release is defined as a release that results in less than a 
small fraction of the applicable dose limit over a period of 24 hours, and analyses shall 
consider potential accumulations within the duct re-entering the air stream). 
The duct shall maintain effective confinement of internal airflow with minimal outflow 
through joints. 
The duct shall maintain its structural integrity, and distortion/damage of the duct and 
hangers will be limited. 
4.3.16 Safety Function: No Derailment 
The safety function, no derailment, is assigned to trolley rails and rail tracks, which are 
assigned to either a DBGM-1 or DBGM-2 level. 
The no derailment safety function has the following performance goals during and after a seismic 
event: 
No significant structural deformation of the rail occurs (i.e., the rails will not shear, 
heave, or warp), that is serious enough to cause derailment or tipover of any waste 
transporter on the rail (e.g., WP trolley). 
No significant failure of the rail occurs (e.g., shearing, separation) that could induce a 
derailment if a transporter would pass over the damaged section. 
Distortion of the rail will be limited and not expected to be immediately apparent to the 
naked eye. 
Rail will remain for the most part anchored and functional (or easily repairable). 
The rail system shall not impede the braking of any waste transporter on the rail. 
4.3.17 Safety Function: No Fall Down 
The safety function, no fall down, is assigned to large equipment (spent fuel handling 
machines, welders) that could impact SSCs if the specific equipment losses its anchorage and 
falls due to a seismic event. These SSCs can be assigned to either a DBGM-1 or DBGM-2 level. 

The no fall down safety function has the following performance goals during and after a seismic 
event: 
The equipment as a system shall not collapse or fall down. The equipment shall remain 
on its track / guide system (if present). 
Anchorage for the equipment shall maintain the equipment in-place. 
4.3.18 Safety Function: No Loss of Confinement 
The safety function, no loss of confinement, is assigned to facilities and structures assigned to 
either a DBGM-1 or DBGM-2 level where structural integrity and confinement after the seismic 
event must be credited for compliance or added for defense in depth. For seismic margin 
calculations, the function corresponds to the state of limited permanent distortion of a structure 
or facility, termed Limit State C by BSC (2004u, Table A-1). 
In the present analysis, no credit is taken for confinement for limiting offsite dose to the public 
and, thereby, this safety function is not used. This definition was added for completeness. 
The no loss of confinement safety function has the following performance goals during and after 
a seismic event: 
No structural collapse occurs (i.e., column and support members remain upright, beams 
remain functional, and walls remain standing), and failure of contents is not serious 
enough to cause severe injury or death, prevent evacuation, or induce a breach of a 
waste container. 
Confinement of internal airflow is required and will be maintained. Concrete walls will 
remain standing, but may be cracked. This cracking however, is small enough to 
maintain the pressure differential with normal HVAC. The largest cracks are expected 
to be no greater than approximately 1/8 in (3 mm). 
Distortion of the structure will be very limited and not expected to be immediately 
apparent to the naked eye. 
Components will remain anchored and functional or easily repairable. 
These goals are modified from various facility requirements for seismic design (DOE-STD- 
1020-2002, Natural Phenomena Hazards Design and Evaluation Criteria for Department of 
Energy Facilities, Appendix C). However, no direct correlation is adopted between this safety 
function and any defined performance category in DOE-STD-1020. 
An additional requirement of this safety function is that the failure of adjacent structures and 
other SSCs (whether safety-related or not) shall be considered in seismic analyses as appropriate 
and shall not induce collapse of the designated structure. 

4.4 OTHER CONDERATIONS 
4.4.1 High Confidence of Low Probability of Failure Capacity 
The SMA in this calculation uses a high confidence of low probability of failure (HCLPF) 
capacity as a conservative description of a SSC capacity to withstand vibratory motion. For the 
present analysis, the HCLPF capacity of a given SSC is defined as the ground acceleration at 
which there is approximately 1 percent probability of failure on the mean (single) fragility curve 
(e.g., Kennedy 2001, p. 40). Failure in this context is loss of the defined safety function. 
Ground acceleration is defined in terms of PGA and expressed in units of g, the acceleration due 
to gravity at sea level. 
An alternative, earlier, definition of HCLPF capacity is the ground acceleration at 5 percent 
probability of failure on the 95 percent confidence fragility curve (e.g., Budnitz et al. 1985, 
Section 2.3; ASCE 4-98, Seismic Analysis of Safety-Related Nuclear Structures and 
Commentary, p. 46). However, the current definition is essentially equivalent to this alternative 
when utilizing a single fragility curve (i.e., when the median curve is not subdivided between 
random and modeling uncertainty) and is recognized by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (NRC) (Chen et al. 1991, p. 7). 
4.4.2 Vibratory Ground Motion Due to Underground Nuclear Explosions 
In addition to earthquakes, underground nuclear explosions (and other explosive detonations) can 
produce vibratory ground motions. Although such explosions can range to several hundred 
kilotons, it is concluded that due to the distance of the site to the test areas and the natural 
attenuation of these motions, that naturally-occurring motions from earthquakes will control 
seismic design criteria for both surface and subsurface facilities at Yucca Mountain (BSC 2003b, 
Section 6.2.1.1). 
Underground nuclear explosion testing has not been conducted at the Nevada Test Site since 
October 1992, and there are no current plans to resume such testing. In the unlikely event that 
underground nuclear explosion testing is again started, these vibratory motions (due to 
underground nuclear explosion testing) will be evaluated and, if necessary, included in seismic 
analyses, when the distribution in space, time, and magnitude (or yield) can be specified for these 
new tests (YMP 1997b, Section A5). However, in the absence of any planned testing, inclusion 
of explosive sources for ground motion is beyond the scope of the present analysis. 
4.4.3 Multi-Purpose Canisters 
The specific processes that would be involved in processing commercial multi-purpose canisters, 
which could theoretically be received at the repository and transferred intact into waste packages, 
are beyond the scope of this analysis at this time (Assumption 5.17). 

5. ASSUMPTIONS 
The assumptions presented in this section are used throughout the analysis in Section 6. 
Rationale for these assumptions is based on the best available information pertaining to the 
repository design as of October 2004. These assumptions are suitable for use in this analysis and 
will be updated or verified in revisions of this analysis. 
5.1 Sealed WPs, or monitored geologic repository site-specific casks (MSCs), cannot be 
breached by direct action of seismic forces up to and including ground motions 
associated with the 1.0  10-4 MAPE reference level earthquake. That is, seismic 
vibratory forces cannot shake apart or cause bolted or welded closures to open. 
Rationale: Such containers are robust and subject to stringent nuclear codes and 
standards. This assumption is used to screen out seismic event sequences involving such 
containers. The favorable performance of the waste packages for a 1.0  10-4 MAPE 
reference level earthquake has been demonstrated for the waste packages emplaced in the 
drifts during the preclosure period (BSC 2004y, Section 7.1.2.2.1). 
5.2 Sealed WPs or MSCs cannot be breached by a seismically-induced tipover, slap down, or 
impact when it can be assured by design or it is physically impossible that the WPs or 
MSCs can not exceed the design basis for the respective container. 
Rationale: Design bases are established for internal events and earthquakes to prevent the 
initiation of a release for such postulated impacts. This assumption is used to screen out 
seismic event sequences involving such containers. 
5.3 Seismically-induced failures of mechanical, electrical, or control systems of cranes, fuel 
handling machines, and other lifting devices may result in drops that exceed the design 
basis drop height of the waste form being processed. Such seismic failures are assumed 
to occur only when the earthquake exceeds the design bases assigned to a particular SSC 
(i.e., if the earthquake exceeds DBGM-1 or DBGM-2 assigned to a given SSC). 
Rationale: There is insufficient information on equipment design to preclude such events, 
and one purpose of this analysis is to determine to what extent such seismic failures are 
potential vulnerabilities and then assign the appropriate DBGM to each SSC. This 
assumption is used as a basis for including in the analysis seismic event sequences 
involving such containers. This assumption is considered conservative. 
5.4 Seismically-induced failures of mechanical, electrical, or control systems of the WP 
transporter system, designed to withstand the DBGM-2 reference earthquake, cannot 
cause an uncontrolled descent into the subsurface unless an earthquake exceeds the 
design bases. 
Rationale: The transporter SSCs will be designed to prevent such occurrence and will be 
seismically qualified. Furthermore, the effect of an earthquake on such SSCs is likely to 
be transitory (e.g., relay chatter) and under the control of human operators (either onboard 
or in the Communications Control Center) so that even if an anomalous signal were 

initiated and not self-correcting, the human operator would intervene. In addition, the 
transporter shall be designed to stop on the loss of electrical power (BSC 2004o, Section 
3.3.4.2.1). One purpose of this analysis is to determine to what extent such seismic 
failures are potential vulnerabilities and then assign appropriate DBGM to each SSC. 
This assumption is used as a basis for including in the analysis seismic event sequences 
involving the WP transporter. This assumption is considered conservative. 
5.5 Seismically-induced failures of mechanical, electrical, or control systems of the WP 
emplacement gantry cannot result in a drop (or impact on a WP) that exceeds the design 
drop-height basis of the WP. 
Rationale: Even if a seismically-induced failure or spurious signal could cause a drop, 
there is insufficient space in an emplacement drift and a limited range of motion for the 
WP emplacement gantry lifting mechanisms, such that drops beyond the WP design 
drop-height basis are precluded. Furthermore, the speed of motion of the gantry is 
limited so even a seismically-induced spurious signal to move is unlikely to result in a 
collision that is beyond the WP design basis. This assumption in used as a basis for 
screening out seismic event sequences involving the WP emplacement gantry. 
5.6 Seismically-induced failures of mechanical, electrical, or control systems of the WP 
welding system cannot directly result in a release of radioactivity from a WP. 
Rationale: Potentially, a seismically-induced failure or spurious signal can cause a 
problem during the welding process, as noted in BSC (2004s, Section 6.3.11), including 
potential burn-through during welding (noted in Table III-2, Items #18 and #29, under the 
heading, Fires). However, while a burn-through of the inner lid can occur, the required 
high temperatures and duration of heating to damage the waste cladding and waste form 
allow for sufficient time to shutdown the system and prevent any release after a seismic 
event. Also, the expected loss of power due to a seismic event will cause the welder to 
stop shortly after the event occurrence. It is also noted that the potential damage area due 
to the welder (and thereby the potential release) is relatively small. 
In addition, design and operational requirements will ensure under normal operations that 
the welding equipment cannot initiate an event sequence by burning through the inner lid 
of the WP during the welding process or by overheating the fuel such that safe 
temperatures are exceeded (BSC 2004s, Section 5.1.1.53). 
This assumption is used as a basis for screening out seismic event sequences involving 
the WP welding process, exclusive of tipover and dropped equipment sequences 
(Assumption 5.7). 
5.7 Seismically-induced failures (tipover and dropped equipment sequences) of transport 
lorries, trolleys, and fixtures for supporting an unsealed WP during the welding process 
may result in a release of radioactivity. Furthermore, dropping lids or the falling of 
heavy equipment onto an unwelded WP may result in the release of radioactivity. 
Rationale: This assumption is used as a basis for considering (screening-in) seismic event 

sequences involving SSCs associated with the WP welding functional area. It is 
recognized that the tipover and slap down of an unsealed waste package can result in 
dropping CSNFAs and thereby releasing radioactivity, whereas the tipover of (or drop of 
equipment or a lid onto) a sealed WP containing a DSNF canister may or may not result 
in a release. In addition, dropping lids or falling of heavy equipment onto an unwelded 
WP may result in the release of radioactivity depending on the mass of the dropped 
objects. 
5.8 There are two identical DTFs, identified as DTF-1 and DTF-2, and seismic failures in the 
respective DTFs are conservatively taken to be completely correlated with each other. 
This means that if a seismic failure of a given SSC occurs in DTF-1, the counterpart SSC 
in DTF-2 fails with a conditional probability of 1.0. The probability of the SSC failure in 
DTF-1 depends on its DBGM assignment and intensity of the ground motion of the 
initiating earthquake. 
Rationale: Assuming two identical and seismically correlated DTFs are performing the 
same operation at the time when an earthquake occurs, while conservative, simplifies the 
analysis so that details of throughput capacities and geometries do not have to be 
considered in this preliminary analysis. The assumption includes complete correlation 
and concurrent failure of all SSCs in the two structures. This assumption is used to 
assign DBGM categories to SSCs in the DTFs and in developing a SMA model. 
5.9 Seismic-initiated failures of SSCs associated with functional areas other than the DTF are 
not correlated with seismic failures within the DTF, but can fail concurrently with 
failures of SSCs within the DTF. 
Rationale: An earthquake is a common-cause initiating event that can induce event 
sequences in all facilities at the same time. This is a conservative assumption, as SSCs 
that are not housed in the DTF have essentially no seismic failure mechanisms that could 
be strongly correlated to failures of SSCs in the DTF. This assumption is used in 
developing a SMA model. 
5.10 For this preliminary analysis, HCLPF capacities are developed from generic factors for 
SSCs based on available literature and assumed to be representative of SSCs ITS 
modeled in the SMA. Further, it is assumed that capacities can be based on PGA values 
in Table 1, Part A. 
Rationale: For final design, the HCLPF capacities must be based on specific designs of 
buildings, location of equipment, support and anchors of equipment, and various load and 
damping factors that are included in the actual design. Such design-specific HCLPF 
capacities are not available as direct input to this analysis, so it is necessary to calculate 
representative values (see Section 6.6 for values). 
5.11 The HCLPF capacity for loss of offsite power is assumed as 0.10 g. 
Rationale: Loss of offsite power (LOSP) is typically attributed to the failure of ceramic 
insulators. Typical seismic capacity evaluations indicate that such insulators have a 

median seismic capacity of about 0.2 g (Kennedy et al. 1980, Table 7), that represents the 
median (50 percent) conditional failure probability. The HCLPF capacity represents the 
0.01 of the mean failure probability, which is less than the median capacity. A value 
of 0.10 g is arbitrarily used in this analysis. Alternatively, the conditional probability of 
LOSP could be assumed as 1.0 and screened out of the SMA logic models (Prassinos et 
al. 1986, Table 2-3a, p. 24). A specific HCLPF capacity is assumed in this analysis to 
illustrate the application of the methods for determining the HCLPF capacity of a given 
functional area and facility. The offsite power grid is not designed to withstand the 
intense ground motions required for the design of SSCs ITS. 
5.12 The preclosure period is nominally to extend 100 years for this analysis. If computations 
are limited to the emplacement period alone, a 50-year emplacement period can be 
adopted. 
Rationale: The overall preclosure period of 100 years is adopted for this analysis based 
on stated guidance (Williams 2003b). For surface facilities, a 50-year emplacement 
period can be assumed, which will accommodate a nominal receipt period of 24 years 
(DOE 2002a, Table 1), together with an allowance for system testing, conservatism, and 
delays (BSC 2004s, Section 5.2.1.12). 
5.13 The postulated breach of one or multiple canisters containing DSNF (excluding NSNF) is 
assumed to result in a public dose that exceeds 5 rem total effective dose equivalent 
(TEDE) at a distance of 11 km for an unmitigated release (i.e., the dose exceeds the limits 
shown in Table 2 for a Category 2 event sequence). The resulting dose is tabulated as 
unknown throughout Section 6, but is treated in the analysis as being equal to or greater 
than 5 rem TEDE. 
Rationale: Dose consequences for DSNF have not been evaluated in Preclosure 
Consequence Analyses for License Application (BSC 2004t) and are regarded as 
unknown in this analysis. 
5.14 Assemblies placed in staging vaults or storage racks within a DTF are assumed to be able 
to withstand the assigned DBGM level ground motions without significant release or 
becoming critical. 
Rationale: Assemblies placed in staging vaults or storage racks in the DTF-1 and DTF-2 
are to be intact and in good condition since the assemblies are inspected and tested on 
receipt. Impact loads on the assemblies from a DBGM level earthquake sustained while 
within storage are expected to be less than other design loads such as those required for 
transportation of the assemblies. Individual assembly spaces are to be sealed storage 
tubes (BSC 2004h, Section B.1.1.2, Room 1050) preventing the release of particulates, 
and vaults and racks will be designed to withstand an assigned DBGM level ground 
motion and remain intact. It is expected that the sealed tubes would be destroyed when 
the structure collapses. 

5.15 Assemblies placed in storage pools within the DTF are assumed to be able to withstand 
the assigned DBGM level ground motions without significant release or becoming 
critical. 
Rationale: Release of particulates and volatile radionuclides from any failed assembly is 
contained within the pool, so only gaseous radionuclides contribute to dose. The motion 
of assemblies placed in the wet remediation storage pool will be dampened by the 
presence of water, and transfer of any particulates from the assemblies to the air will be 
prevented by the overlying water. Storage racks and restraints in the pool and pool frame 
will be designed to withstand an assigned DBGM level ground motion to maintain noncritical 
geometry. 
5.16 It is assumed that any potential seismically-initiated hazards occurring within the 
Transportation Facility are bounded by the design requirements of 10 CFR Part 71 and, 
therefore, cannot be breached by the direct action of seismic forces up to and including 
ground motions associated with the 1.0  10-4 MAPE reference level earthquake. That is, 
seismic vibratory forces cannot shake apart or cause bolted or welded closures to open, 
similar to Assumption 5.1 for WPs and MSCs. 
Rationale: In the truck parking lot, railcar staging area, and on the roads and rails leading 
to the Cask and Waste Package Receipt Building (C&WPRB), the transportation casks 
are configured according to the regulations that govern offsite transportation 
(specifically, 10 CFR Part 71). The transportation cask is designed to be robust under the 
requirements of 10 CFR 71, and is to be able to survive the significant internal forces of a 
drop onto an unyielding surface and transport vibrations (Section 4.2.1). Until the cask 
impact limiters are removed and the cask lifted, drop conditions due to a seismic event 
are identical to potential drops during transport. Therefore, it is expected that any 
potential initiating event or internal/external hazard occurring in the receipt areas (that 
involve transportation casks with impact limiters installed) is bounded by the design and 
drop requirements of 10 CFR 71. 
5.17 The activities that would be involved in handling commercial MPCs, which could 
potentially be received at the repository and transferred intact into waste packages, are 
not explicitly considered in this analysis. 
Rationale: Currently, no MPCs have been licensed by the NRC (BSC 2004k, Appendix 
A). If they are to be accepted for disposal, it is assumed that they will be handled in a 
similar manner as vertical DPCs except that they will be placed directly into an 
appropriately-sized WP. 
5.18 The potential maximum dose from low-level waste (LLW) handling is below the 
allowable Category 1 dose limits for workers. 
Rationale: The potential maximum dose for SSCs from LLW handling is presently 
unspecified. The waste is under design and operational controls and it is expected that 
this requirement can readily be achieved. 

5.19 Lifts by cranes and other handling devices shall be designed to operate and be used 
within maximum design basis drop heights (such as defined in Section 4.2). 
Rationale: This is identified as a design requirement to provide a margin for potential 
drop sequences. This can readily be achieved by design for normal operations. Note that 
seismically-induced event sequences may result in drops that exceed these design basis 
drop heights (Assumption 5.3). 
5.20 Cranes that handle NSNF canisters must withstand DBGM-2 seismic event. 
Rationale: Due to the potential for seismic interactions if a large navy crane failed (e.g., 
fell from the overhead rail) together with the undefined dose due to the complete rupture 
of a NSNF canister due to a seismic event, this requirement is assumed for the present 
analysis. This is considered to provide additional defense-in-depth as part of a riskinformed 
basis. 
5.21 The potential maximum dose from a HEPA filter system is above the allowable 
Category 1 dose limits for workers, but below the Category 2 offsite public dose limits. 
Rationale: The potential maximum dose for SSCs of the HEPA filter system is presently 
unspecified. The retained particulate dose on the filter could potentially exceed 
allowable dose limits of workers. It is expected however, that the maximum dose 
contained on the filter is well below the Category 2 dose limits. As the retention of 
particulates on the filter is under design and operational controls and it is expected that 
this requirement can readily be achieved. 
5.22 The potential maximum dose retained in the exhaust ventilation system is above the 
allowable Category 1 dose limits for workers, but below the Category 2 offsite public 
dose limits. 
Rationale: The potential maximum dose of the ventilation system is presently 
unspecified. The amount of particulates in the ducts is expected to very small and that 
accumulation in the maximum unsupported duct run to be below allowable dose limits of 
workers. However, considering potential risk, it is assumed that the allowable Category 1 
dose limits for workers can be exceeded. It is noted that the accumulation of particulates 
within the vent ducting is under design and operational controls and it is expected that 
this requirement can readily be achieved. 
5.23 SSCs assigned to DBGM-1 can be re-assigned to DBGM-2 to reduce the aggregated dose 
DBGM-1 dose to provide additional defense-in-depth. 
Rationale: The dose resulting from the aggregated DBGM-1 calculation may be 
compliant with regulatory limits, but may be deemed too high. In this case, SSCs 
assigned to DBGM-1 may be re-assigned to the higher DBGM-2 level to further reduce 
the aggregated DBGM-1 dose. This premise is considered appropriate to provide 
additional defense-in-depth as part of a risk-informed basis, and is employed in Table 4. 

6. ANALYSIS 
6.1 ANALYSIS PROCESS 
6.1.1 Summary of Approach 
The seismic design strategy for preclosure safety is based on establishing the appropriate 
combination of design basis ground motion levels, termed DBGM-1 and DBGM-2, and design 
procedures/requirements, together with a demonstration of sufficient seismic margin that meets 
the intent of 10 CFR Part 63. 
An essential point of the analysis process is to identify SSCs ITS that are credited in the 
prevention or mitigation of seismically-initiated event sequences. These SSCs ITS are identified 
by postulating the seismically induced failure (i.e., the loss of the safety function) of a SSC, in 
combination with the seismically induced failures of other SSCs, and evaluating the dose 
consequences of the postulated failures. If the postulated failures and event sequences lead to 
calculated radiation exposures in excess of the limits identified at 10 CFR 63.111(a) for 
Category 1 event sequences, then DBGM-1 is assigned to the SSCs required to prevent the 
initiation of the sequence. If the postulated failures lead to calculated doses in excess of the 
limits at 63.111(b)(2) for Category 2 event sequences, then DBGM-2 is assigned to the SSCs. 
Consistent with a risk-informed approach, the defined probabilities for DBGM-1 and DBGM-2 
and design criteria and procedures are considered reasonable and appropriate relative to other 
facilities having comparable or greater levels of risk, and are in accordance with the provisions 
of 10 CFR 63.102(f) (BSC 2004u, Section 3.4). 
The analysis will also demonstrate the margin of the SSC to vibratory ground motion. In 
utilizing the DBGM-1 and DBGM-2 design values, it is understood that a substantial amount of 
conservatism is incorporated into the design process. SSCs, therefore, can have a substantial 
capacity to sustain higher ground motions than the design value and still maintain the required 
safety function. 
The margin to failure for each SSC is established by the SMA analysis, depending on the DBGM 
level: 
For SSCs designated and designed to a DBGM-1 level, there is sufficient margin 
inherent in the DBGM-1 design requirement with respect to Category 1 event 
sequences. To clarify, the frequency of the initiating seismic event alone of a DBGM-1 
event (i.e., at 1 x 10-3 MAPE) is beyond the requirements of Category 1 event 
sequences (i.e., at 1 x 10-2 annual probability of occurrence; see Section 4.1.11), and 
subsequent seismically-induced failure events in each sequence will further reduce the 
probability of occurrence of failure in the overall sequence. Therefore, all 
seismically-initiated event sequences that have been mitigated or prevented by the use 
of a DBGM-1 assignment to a SSC are less probable than the Category 1 occurrence 
criterion. 

For SSCs designated as DBGM-2, explicit SMA calculations are performed to 
demonstrate that the defined safety function of each such SSC is maintained at a higher 
acceleration level, termed BDBGM. The BDBGM level of 1 x 10-4 MAPE is defined 
from precedent with NNPs (BSC 2004u, Section 3.3.2). The SMA will determine the 
ground motions at which the mean probability of not maintaining the safety function of 
the SSC will be less than 1 percent, which is termed the high confidence low 
probability of failure (or HCLPF) capacity value. Simply, the HCLPF capacity of each 
SSC will be demonstrated to significantly exceed the BDBGM acceleration. 
This SMA approach is consistent with precedents adopted for nuclear facilities with comparable 
or higher risks to workers and the public, and it meets the regulatory intent of the concepts 
described in 10 CFR 63.102 and the preclosure performance objectives established in 10 CFR 
63.111 (BSC 2004u, Section 3.3.2). 
6.1.2 Analysis Methods and Steps 
The overall seismic analysis process (implemented in subsequent sections) can be divided into of 
the following steps, which can be grouped into four separate stages: 
Stage 1. Identification and Evaluation 
Identify and evaluate potential seismically-initiated internal event sequences for 
facilities that are part of the waste handling process. These event sequences are 
identified by (1) postulating a seismically-initiated event for internal hazards (BSC 
2004p, Section 6.6) and (2) from a review of operations to identify seismically-unique 
sequences. [Note: seismic event trees can be developed to assist the identification of 
event sequences and in the development of generalized event sequences, as in Section 
6.3.1.2.] 
Stage 2. Evaluate Dose and Assign Seismic Levels 
Identify the maximum potential dose to the public or workers for each potential 
seismically-initiated event sequence by postulating seismic failure (loss of safety 
function) of each SSC and assessing the maximum potential dose of the failure. 
Assign a DBGM level to each SSC ITS that can be credited in the prevention or 
mitigation of a seismically-initiated event sequence, based on the maximum potential 
dose to the public and workers of the related seismically-initiated event sequence. 
Also, assess these assignments for an aggregated dose from DBGM-1 event sequences 
that in aggregate could potentially exceed the Category 2 dose limit to the public; 
reassign SSCs from DBGM-1 to DBGM-2, as required, to reduce the aggregated dose 
to below the Category 2 limit. 
Define the safety function for each SSC ITS as credited in seismic sequences (e.g., no 
structural collapse onto waste form). 
Identify and evaluate possible seismic interactions (i.e., if the potential failures initiated 
by seismic events of SSCs not important to safety could initiate failures of SSCs ITS). 
These SSCs are to be further evaluated during design (see Stage 3, step c). 

Identify any SSC that should be included on the Q-List as evaluated from the foregoing 
seismic analyses. 
Stage 3. Design 
Design each SSC ITS per applicable design code(s) at the specified DBGM level. 
For SSCs assigned to DBGM-2, perform engineering design computations at the 
BDBGM level (to demonstrate that the safety function is maintained within limited 
inelastic deformation of the structure). 
Identify all SSCs that can affect the safety function of a SSC ITS. Any SSC whose 
failure can cause a SSC classified as ITS to not perform its safety function when 
required shall be classified as a Safety Category ITS and designed to prevent the 
unacceptable interaction. 
Determine the HCLPF capacity of each identified SSC ITS assigned to DBGM-2. 
Simplified methods may be used for the initial HCLPF calculations. [Where it can be 
demonstrated by simplified bounding analyses that the ratio of the HCLPF capacity to 
the BDBGM acceleration for an SSC exceeds 1.50, no HCLPF capacity will be 
computed and it will be reported that the HCLPF seismic margin exceeds 1.50 as 
opposed to reporting a specific value (BSC 2004u, Section B-1).] 
Stage 4. Margin Demonstration 
For each SSC assigned to DBGM-2, compare the HCLPF capacity to the BDBGM 
level to ensure that sufficient additional margin is present (i.e., that the HCLPF capacity 
exceeds the BDBGM by at least 10 percent). 
Applying seismic event trees and fault tree analyses, develop Boolean expressions for 
the minimal cutsets of each seismic event sequence, which may include independent 
failure events as well as seismic failure events for various SSCs ITS. [Note: the term, 
cutset, is defined in Attachment II). 
Screen out cutsets that include independent SSC or human failure events having a 
probability of less than 1  10-3. [Note: With a minimum 10-3 MAPE for a seismic 
event, and a probability less than 10-3 for any subsequent independent event, the entire 
sequence has a joint annual probability of less than 10-6, which is less than Category 2 
criterion (i.e., the sequence is beyond Category 2).] 
Develop a repository-wide Boolean expression by combining the Boolean expressions 
of individual credible sequences, and reduce it to its simplest form using Boolean 
algebra. 
Determine the repository-wide HCLPF capacity by inserting HCLPF capacities of 
seismic failure modes of SSCs ITS that appear in the repository-wide Boolean 
expression and applying the min-max process. 
Stages 1, 2, and 4 are performed as part of the present analysis. The design of the SSCs and the 
determination of individual HCLPF capacities (Stage 3) are to be conducted by others when 
sufficient design detail is available. However, Stage 3 results are not available at this time, and 
representative generic HCLPF capacities are used for the present calculation. 

It is noted that the stages can be iterative with other preclosure safety analyses (e.g., internal 
hazard identification, fire hazard analysis and categorization) and the above stages are not always 
performed sequentially. The specific computational methods utilized in this analysis are 
discussed in more detail in Attachment II. 
6.1.3 Analysis Limitations 
A general framework for the seismic analysis for preclosure safety is established by this analysis, 
but some aspects of the defined process are not implemented fully, including: 
As noted, individual HCLPF capacities for SSCs are not available at this time (i.e., 
Stage 3 results), and representative generic HCLPF are used for the present calculation. 
Seismically-initiated fire sequences are not included due to the lack of definition of 
fire-related systems and components. However, potential seismic-fire sequences are 
identified in seismically-initiated internal event sequences (Attachment III) and in 
evaluating seismic interactions (Section 6.5). Fires will be included in updates to this 
analysis when sufficient detail is available. 
Recognition of potential seismic interactions is included in the analysis, but further 
design detail is required to determine the credibility of these event sequences; this 
discussion will be included in updates to this analysis. 
The probability of failure of seismically-initiated event sequences subsequent to the 
initiating seismic event are not computed for this analysis due to lack of definition of 
specific systems and SSCs. (Such analyses would require computation of the seismic 
fragility function for each affected SSC. The seismic fragility represents the 
conditional probability of the loss of the safety function given the seismic ground 
motions of a specified magnitude.) 
The topic of vibratory-induced control failures such as relay chatter is not explicitly 
discussed in the analysis due to the current level of design detail. In older systems, 
seismic-induced relay chatter is the opening and/or closing of relay contacts due to the 
influence of seismic accelerations, either directly or indirectly, and includes 
components such as electrical relays, contactors, and switches. This chatter due to 
ground motions can cause unacceptable performance of various controls, instruments, 
equipment, and valves. In modern solid-state control systems, relay contacts are 
generally not present, but other spurious signal effects may be produced by circuit 
board vibrations, and these effects should be considered in seismic analyses. The topic 
of chatter will be evaluated in more depth when sufficient information is available. 
The implemented SMA method does not explicitly include the evaluation of design and 
construction errors, evaluations of wear and aging, and possible adverse human 
response caused by earthquake-induced stress. 

6.2 IDENTIFICATION AND EVALUATION 
6.2.1 Identification of Possible Event Sequences 
Possible seismically-initiated event sequences and the waste form and material at risk for each 
event sequence were identified and are included in Attachment III, based on the description of 
the facility and an evaluation of identified internal hazards. The current description of facilities 
and operations is provided in Section 4.2.1 and BSC (2004p). The internal hazards analysis 
(BSC 2004p, Section 6.6) provides an extensive description of potential hazards having potential 
radiological consequences or criticality conditions for each of the functional areas. However, the 
potential initiating events are not explicitly described in the hazard analysis and thus, each 
hazard was evaluated as to a possible initiation by a seismic event. 
Attachment III also identifies potential seismically-unique event sequences not included in 
internal hazards analysis. These are based on potential hazards that are unique to seismic events, 
such as structural collapse and movement. 
Though not explicitly stated in Attachment III, the loss of offsite electrical power (LOSP) can be 
expected to occur regularly with a seismically initiated event sequence. As observed in 
NUREG/CR-4334 (Budnitz et al. 1985, Summary), Loss of offsite electrical power is found to 
occur at earthquake levels much lower than the levels at which most other equipment and 
structures are believed to fail. Therefore, most earthquake-induced accidents leading to serious 
consequences essentially begin with offsite power loss. For the present analysis, the HCLPF 
capacity for LOSP is taken as 0.1 g (Assumption 5.11), thereby having a very high probability of 
occurrence after either DBGM-1 or DBGM-2 seismic events. 
It should be also noted that event sequences due to other, non-seismic, initiating events are not 
considered in the present analyses. In addition, no seismically-induced/influenced human failure 
event was identified in this analysis or as an initiator of an event sequence. 
6.2.2. Evaluation of Event Sequences 
6.2.2.1 General 
In evaluating event sequences, those event sequences that could possibly follow an earthquake 
affecting the site are labeled as potential seismically-initiated sequences. Based on an evaluation 
of the range of these potential seismically-initiated sequences, event sequences that are excluded 
by physical limitations or by a very low probability of occurrence can be screened out from 
further consideration. The resultant event sequences that are not screened out by an evaluation 
process and are within defined ranges of annual probability of occurrence for Category 1 and 
Category 2 event sequences (Section 4.1.11) are termed credible. 
In this analysis, event sequences that have been screened out in internal event analyses because 
of design features are, however, screened in for the seismic event sequences analysis until 
screened out for other reasons. The design features credited in the internal events analyses are a 
candidate for assignment of the DBGM level. 

Potential event sequences are identified in Attachment III; credible sequences are evaluated in 
Sections 6.3 and 6.4 and are based on the screening criteria in the following sections. 
6.2.2.2 Screening of Seismically-Initiated Event Sequences 
In reviewing potential seismically-initiated event sequences, it is possible to identify and screenout 
sequences that include a single independent failure event (or events) after the seismic 
initiation having a low probability of occurrence (less than 1  10-3). In considering the 
probability of occurrence for a specific seismic event sequence, a small occupancy or exposure 
factor that reduces the probability of a specific event (in conjunction with an earthquake) can 
also be used in the screening process and is discussed further in Sections 6.3 and 6.4. 
The following are considered in screening event sequences: 
Breach of WPs, MSCs, and Transportation Casks - Direct Action: Sealed WPs, MSCs and 
transportation casks shall be designed so that they cannot be breached by direct action of seismic 
forces up to and including ground motions associated with the BDBGM (Assumptions 5.1 and 
5.16). 
Breach of WPs and MSCs - Tipover, Slap Down, or Impact: Sealed WPs or MSCs shall be 
designed so that cannot be breached by a seismically-induced tipover, slap down, or impact when 
it can be assured by design or it is physically impossible that the WPs or MSCs can not exceed 
the design basis for the respective container (Assumption 5.2). 
WP Emplacement Gantry - Drop or Impact: Seismically-induced failures of mechanical, 
electrical, or control systems of the WP emplacement gantry cannot result in a drop or impact on 
a WP that exceeds the design basis of the WP (Assumption 5.5). 
WP Breach Due to Welding System: Seismically-induced failures of mechanical, electrical, or 
control systems of the WP welding system cannot result in a release of radioactivity from a WP 
(Assumption 5.6). 
Staging Racks/Staging Vaults/Staging Pool Release: Storage pools, staging racks, or staging 
vaults within the DTF containing CSNF assemblies shall be designed to withstand the DBGM-2 
level ground motions without significant release (Assumptions 5.14 and 5.15). 
WP Transporter Uncontrolled Descent (Runaway): The mechanical, electrical, or control 
systems of the WP transporter system shall be designed to withstand the DBGM-2 reference 
earthquake, to prevent an uncontrolled descent into the subsurface (Assumption 5.4). 
Rockfall on WP: Shielded compartment and waste package handling equipment of the 
transporter shall be designed such that a waste package remains inside of the shielded 
compartment during credible events. The waste package transporter shall be designed to 
withstand the bounding rockfalls in access drifts, thereby precluding a seismically-initiated 
rockfall onto the WP and, thereby, these events are not considered in this analysis. Furthermore, 
the WP is designed to withstand the bounding rockfall in an emplacement drift thereby 
precluding a breach of the WP for a 10-4 MAPE seismic event (BSC 2004y, Section 7.1.2.2.1) 

Trolley - Shield Door Collisions: The design and operation of trolleys holding loaded, sealed 
WPs shall constrain travel speeds to levels such that a collision with shield doors would not 
overturn the trolley or cause it to drop its load (Section 6.2.2.3). 
Criticality in Receipt Area: Criticality of casks in the Transportation Cask Receipt/Return 
Facility, or the Transportation Cask Buffer Area is screened-out (considered not credible) 
because the casks must be subcritical even with most reactive credible configuration of the fissile 
material and moderation to the most reactive credible extent (BSC 2004s, Section 6.3.2.6.1) and 
thereby, this event is not considered in this analysis. 
Loss of Confinement: Structural confinement of radionuclides during or after a seismic event 
has not been identified as a requirement for safety for any waste handling facility and thereby is 
not considered in this analysis. 
6.3 ANALYSIS OF DOSE TO OFFSITE PUBLIC 
6.3.1 Identification of Seismic Fault and Event Trees 
6.3.1.1 Master Logic Diagram 
A single earthquake of sufficient intensity can result in the concurrent initiation of event 
sequences in multiple facilities and operational areas. As noted in Attachment II, a master logic 
diagram (MLD) is an application of fault tree logic that aids in performing the thorough and 
structured identification of potential seismic concerns. A MLD for the repository is depicted in 
Figure 1. 
The top event in Figure 1, Release of Radioactivity Due to Earthquake, is developed as an ORgate 
to include each of the facilities or operations that contain radioactive material. The seismic 
event sequences for each of the facilities or functional area (e.g., DTF-1) is developed further 
using tables, event trees, and fault trees, as appropriate, to systematically identify the potential 
event sequences and the seismic and independent failure modes that come into play in offsite 
dose. 
6.3.1.2 Seismic Event Tree Analysis 
Following the approach described in Attachment II (Section II.4.3), several generalized SETs 
were created to describe the series of events that must occur in order to result in a release of 
radiation to the public. These generalized SETs are displayed in Figure II-3 and Figures V-1 
through V-7. Although Figure V-4 presents a SET for seismically-induced fire scenarios, the 
present analysis does not apply the fire SET because sufficient design information is not 
available. The definitions of the event headings are provided in Table V-1. The generalized 
SETs are simplified in a series of steps described below to apply in the present analysis. The 
definitions of the event headings are provided in Table V-1. 

Figure 1. Master Logic Diagram for Seismic Preclosure Safety Analysis for Dose 

Using established event-tree conventions (NRC 1983, Section 3.4.3.1, pp. 3-24 to 3-25), the 
event heading description defines a success state for a function of an SSC or, in some cases, a 
conditioning event that defines a potential branching node in an event sequence. However, the 
event tree convention assigns an event name for the failure state (loss of the function) or less 
favorable conditioning event. Thus, the event heading, Waste Form Does Not Breach After 
Drop, is associated with the failure event BR_DROP. Through fault tree analysis, a HCLPF 
capacity will be determined for the failure event BR_DROP. The complement event is labeled 
/BR_DROP and means the heading event is successful. (The symbol / before an event name 
indicates the complement or NOT function.) 
The first step in simplifying the generalized sets is to eliminate the event headings OF_TRAN, 
OTF_CELL, OTF_STAG, and OTF_TROL. These four event headings are conditioning events 
that are used in the SETs to emphasize that the potential event sequences cannot occur if waste 
form is not present in a particular operation, or if there is a chance that waste form will not be 
impacted when an earthquake strikes. 
For the present analysis, there is insufficient design and operational information to quantify the 
OF_TRAN, OTF_CELL, OTF_STAG, and OTF_TROL factors, so the probabilities are set equal 
to 1.0, and the event headings are eliminated from the SETs. However, such factors may be 
applied qualitatively when evaluating seismic event sequences. 
The generalized trees are further simplified before solving event sequences. For example, 
Figure II-3 describes a SET for the drop of a waste form that includes several other event 
headings that can be eliminated to simplify the SET. 
For this analysis, the preclosure safety strategy and design basis take no credit for confinement or 
filtration of any radioactivity released in an event sequence for offsite doses in meeting 10 CFR 
63.111 for Category 2 event sequences (e.g., BSC 2004s). This means that the event headings 
CONF_CELL and HEPA_CELL can be eliminated from Figure II-3. Furthermore, for purposes 
of evaluating consequences of seismic event sequences to assign DBGMs to SSCs, it is assumed 
conservatively that a dropped waste form will breach with probability 1.0, so that the event 
heading BR_DROP can be eliminated from the SET. Although the design basis for operations 
involving DSNF canister is no breach, one purpose of this analysis is to assign the DBGM-2 
requirement to SSCs ITS that are credited in preventing a canister breach in the event of an 
earthquake. 
The simplified SET for the seismically-induced drop of a suspended waste form is shown in 
Figure 2. Two event sequences (Numbers. 2 and 3) result in an unmitigated release to the site 
boundary. Sequence 2 includes the earthquake (EQ) AND the success event /EQPT_SUP event 
AND the failure event DR_LOAD. The consequences of Sequence 2 include the release from 
the drop of the suspended waste and any other waste form it might strike. This simplified SET is 
named DSL for reference in the analysis. 
Sequence 3 includes the earthquake (EQ) AND the failure event EQPT_SUP. In this event 
sequence, the event DR_LOAD is shown as a guaranteed failure to indicate that the suspended 
waste will surely fall if the entire machine falls after its support fails in the earthquake. The 

consequences of Sequence 3 include the release from the suspended waste and any other waste 
form it might strike and from any other waste form that the machine or supports might strike. 
Figure 2 is a generic SET that can be used to represent all lifting and transfer operations in any of 
the facilities. The structure of the DSL tree is customized to a given facility or operation by 
using specific event labels that will be defined in Section 6.6. For example, the simplified SET 
in Figure 2 is used to represent seismic event sequences for the DTF Fuel Handling Machine by 
changing the name of the event headings to EQPT_SUP_FTM and DR_LOAD_FTM, 
respectively. Similarly, Figure 2 is used to represent seismic event sequences for the DTF 
canister transfer crane by changing the name of the event headings to EQPT_SUP_DTC and 
DR_LOAD_DTC, respectively. Using similar considerations, other generalized SETs from 
Attachment V were simplified as presented in Figures 6 through 9. 
Figure 2. Simplified Seismic Event Tree for a Drop of Suspended Load 
Figure 3 represents the fall of handling equipment onto a waste form. The event heading 
EQPT_SUP is the same as in Figure 2. It was simplified from Figure V-6. This simplified SET 
is named FHE for reference in the analysis. 
Figure 4 represents the seismically-induced failure, derailment, or other effect that results in 
tipover, slap down, or impact of a waste form that is being transferred or being acted upon. It 
was simplified from Figure V-7. The failure event is labeled TROL_TO. This simplified SET is 
named TOS for reference in the analysis. 

Figure 3. Simplified Seismic Event Tree for a Fall of Heavy Equipment onto Waste Form 
Figure 4. Simplified Seismic Event Tree for a Tipover or Slap Down in a Handling Operation 
Figure 5 represents the collapse of a structural element onto a waste form. It is a simple event 
tree and is the same as Figure V-1, but is reproduced here with the other simplified tree SETs. 

The failure event is labeled CELL_COLL. This simplified SET is named COL for reference in 
the analysis. 
Figure 6 represents a seismically-induced LOSP and is simplified from Figure V-5. Three 
failure events are used: LOSP, EQT_FS, and DR_LOSP. In Sequence 3, the event DR_LOSP 
represents the seismic failure of mechanical or control systems that result in a load drop, 
regardless if the fail-safe features do not fail. 
Figure 5. Simplified Seismic Event Tree for a Collapse of Structure of Transfer Cell 
Figure 6. Simplified Seismic Event Tree for a Seismically-Induced Loss of Offsite Power 

In Sequence 4, however, the event EQT_FS represents the seismic failure of the fail-safe features 
and the event DR_LOSP in this sequence is represented as a guaranteed failure. This simplified 
SET is named LOSP for reference in the analysis. 
As described for the DSL tree, the simplified SETs are used to represent different functional 
areas by replacing the generic event name with an operation-specific name. The generic event 
name EQPT_SUP is replaced with EQPT_SUP_FTM to represent a seismic failure of the DTF 
Fuel Handling Machine. 
6.3.1.3 Fault Tree Analysis 
This section presents fault tree analysis for some event headings that appear in the simplified 
SETs. Figure 7 is a fault tree for the top event DR_LOAD_FHM, which is the event, Fuel 
Handling Machine Fails to Maintain Suspended Load. The top event is developed as an OR-gate 
into two fault events that represent, respectively, mechanical failures and control system failures. 
The mechanical failure fault event is developed as an OR-gate with inputs being basic events 
FHM_LH_EQ (seismically-induced failure) and FHM_LH_IN (independent failures of the 
mechanisms). The control system fault event is also developed as an OR-gate with inputs being 
basic events FHM_CONLH_EQ (seismically-induced failure such as relay chatter or vibratory 
contact between circuit boards), FHM_CONLH_IN (independent failures), and FHM_LH_HFE 
(i.e., a seismically-induced or influenced human-failure event that results in dropping the 
suspended load during or closely following an earthquake). Depending on the design of the 
operating controls, use of interlocks, or other design features, the event FHM_LH_HFE may not 
belong in the fault tree. 
The structure of Figure 7 serves to emphasize that seismic event sequences may progress due to 
concurrent independent (random) failure events as well as seismically-induced failures. 
However, unless independent failures or human failure events are highly probable events, they 
can usually be screened out as being too unlikely to occur at the same time an earthquake strikes. 
For example, it is estimated that the probability of dropping a lifted waste form is about 10-5 per 
lift (BSC 2004s, Assumption 5.1.8). This probability includes all independent causes including 
failures in the mechanical system and the control system, and may also include human failure 
events. This implies that the sum of probabilities of events FHM_LH_IN and 
FHM_CONLH_IN are on the order of 10-5 and can be screened out. Even if the failure rate of 
10-5 per lift does not include human failure events, the event FHM_LH_HFE can be screened out 
on its own merit, as described in the next paragraph. 
Event FHM_LH_HFE represents a human-induced or influenced initiation of a drop. If such a 
human failure event is applicable to the design, a typical value for human error probability is on 
the order of 10-3 for well-arranged manual controls (Swain and Guttmann 1983, Table 20-12). 
As noted in Section II.4.4, low-probability, independent failure events (including human failure 
events) having a probability of less than approximately 1  10-3, are screened out in the SMA 
method. Therefore, for this analysis, FHM_LH_HFE is screened out. 
. 

Figure 7. Fault Tree: Fuel Handling Machine Fails to Maintain Suspended Load 

As a result of the screening, the cutsets for the top event are two single cutsets, {FHM_LH_EQ} 
and {FHM_CONLH_EQ}, both seismically-induced failures. 
Fault tree logic and screening, similar to Figure 7, can be applied to the analysis of the top event 
DR_LOAD_DTC, Dry Transfer Crane Fails to Maintain Suspended Load. The fault tree is 
Figure VI-4 and entails changing the names of the top and basic events in Figure 7 to replace 
FHM with DTC. After screening, the cutsets for the top event are the two single cutsets, 
{DTC_LH_EQ} and {DTC_CONLH_EQ}, both seismically-induced failures. Figure 8 displays 
a fault tree for the top event EQT_FS_FHM, Fuel Handling Machine Fails to Stop in Fail-Safe 
Mode Following Earthquake. 
The top event is developed as an OR-gate, having the input events FHM_FS_EQ (fail-safe fails 
due to earthquake) and FHM_FS_IN (fail-safe fails due to independent failures). Because the 
fail-safe design features are expected to be highly reliable, it is judged that FHM_FS_IN may be 
screened out. Therefore, the cutset for top event EQT_FS_FHM is one single cutset, 
{FHM_FS_EQ}. 
Figure VI-2 presents a fault tree, similar to Figure 8, for the top event Dry Transfer Crane Fails 
to Stop in Fail-Safe Mode Following Earthquake, which results in one single cutset, 
{DTC_FS_EQ}. 
6.3.2 Dose Consequences of Seismic Event Sequences 
This analysis does not take credit for the confinement or filtration of radioactivity that may be 
released from a breached waste form. Therefore, any seismic event sequence that results in a 
release is assumed to produce an offsite dose to the public. The doses are proportional to the 
numbers and types of waste forms that are breached in a seismic event sequence. Such doses are 
scaled from unit doses that represent the offsite doses that result from the breach of an individual 
waste form. 
Offsite dose information for the unmitigated release of radioactivity from CSNFAs was obtained 
from Preclosure Consequence Analyses for License Application (BSC 2004t, Tables 23 and 24). 
Offsite doses are evaluated at 11 km using a 95th percentile atmospheric dispersion factor. 
These dose values, while bounding and unfiltered, include a leak path factor (BSC 2004t, 
Assumption 4.11). The leak path factor represents the assumption that an event, while it results 
in a loss of the confinement barrier, such as a seal, does not result in a gross rupture of the 
container and, thereby, a tortuous path is maintained for the release of gaseous radionuclides. 
The factor accounts for the fraction of airborne released material that discharges into the 
atmosphere from the heating, ventilation, and air-conditioning exhaust systems. To obtain the 
offsite doses for unmitigated release (without assuming any barrier to release), it is necessary to 
remove the credit for the leak path factor. Therefore, the dose values of BSC (2004t, Tables 23 
and 24) have been scaled by a factor of 10 for SNF in a transportation cask and by a factor of 
100 for DHLW in a canister. 

Figure 8. Fault Tree: Fuel Handling Machine Fails to Stop in Fail-Safe Mode Following an Earthquake 

The values from BSC (2004t) are shown in the Basic Dose Inputs section of Table 3. Basic 
Dose Inputs presents the offsite dose values that are scaled to calculate the doses for other waste 
forms. These values are scaled linearly to calculate the dose from a single CSNFA or from WPs, 
staging racks, and dual-purpose canisters in proportion to the number of CSNFAs present. The 
Derived Doses portion of Table 3 presents the calculated values. 
The basic dose inputs represent airborne releases that result from any breach of the containment 
barrier of a given waste form, such as the cladding of spent fuel rods in a commercial fuel 
assembly or the shell or closure of a transportation cask or waste package. Such airborne 
releases and their resulting doses are representative of waste form breaches that are assumed for 
impacts on the waste form due to drops, slap downs, collisions and falling objects that can break 
or penetrate the waste form. Although conservative source terms, damage fraction (i.e., 100% of 
the fuel rods breached), release fractions, respirable fraction, and atmospheric dispersion factors 
are used in the basic dose inputs, such airborne releases may not be representative of releases 
that may result when a waste form is significantly damaged during a seismic event. For 
example, if a CSNF assembly were essentially flattened against the floor after being hit by a 
collapsing wall or support beam, the airborne release fraction or respirable fraction may be 
judged to be higher than that associated with breach of 100% of the fuel rods in the assembly. 
However, with the basic dose inputs as given, along with the assumption that offsite doses from 
breach of DSNF exceeds the performance goals for Category 2 event sequences, it is determined 
that such structural failures must be prevented as the DBGM-2 levels are assigned. Therefore, it 
is not necessary in this analysis to investigate doses that may result from structural collapse 
scenarios. 
The unit doses for canisters containing DSNF are not explicitly calculated for Category 1 or 
Category 2 event sequences in this analysis. For this analysis, such doses are considered 
unknown and assumed to exceed 5 rem (Assumption 5.13) for purposes of demonstrating 
compliance with 10 CFR 63.111 and for assigning DBGMs to SSCs ITS that are credited in the 
prevention or mitigation of a seismically-initiated event sequence. Therefore, Table 3 lists 
unknown for the unit dose of an individual DSNF canister, and similarly, unit doses of larger 
waste forms containing one or more DSNF canisters are also unknown. 
In addition, bounding doses were estimated based on engineering judgement for a limited 
number of systems where specific dose values were not available: 
The potential maximum dose from LLW handling is below the allowable Category 1 
dose limits for workers (Assumption 5.18). 
The potential maximum dose from a HEPA filter system is above the allowable 
Category 1 dose limits for workers, but below the Category 2 offsite public dose limits 
(Assumption 5.21). 
The potential maximum dose retained in the exhaust ventilation system is above the 
allowable Category 1 dose limits for workers, but below the Category 2 offsite public 
dose limits. 

Table 3. Offsite Unit Dose Consequences for Various Waste Forms 
Type of Waste Form or Functional Area 
Number of CSNFAs 
Present 
Offsite Dose at 11 km 
(mrem) a 
Offsite Dose at 11 km for 
Analysis (rem) a 
Basic Dose Inputs 
Transportation Cask - 36 PWR CSNFAs (Maximum PWR Source Term) a,b 
36 
476 
0.48 
Transportation Cask - 74 BWR CSNFAs (Maximum BWR Source Term) a,b 
74 
371 
0.37 
DSNF Canister c 
N/A 
Unknown c 
> 5 Rem 
DOE HLW Canister - Maximum d 
N/A 
77 
0.08 
NSNF Canister e 
1 
11 
0.01 
Derived Doses (Scaled from Basic Dose Inputs) 
CSNFA - Maximum PWR Source Term 
1 
13.22 
0.013 
CSNFA - Maximum BWR Source Term 
1 
5.01 
0.005 
DPC - PWR CSNFAs 
36 
476 
0.48 
DPC - BWR CSNFAs 
74 
371 
0.37 
WP - DOE HLW Canisters and 1 DSNF Canister 
N/A 
Unknown c 
> 5 Rem 
WP - DOE HLW Canisters and 2 DSNF Canisters 
N/A 
Unknown c 
> 5 Rem 
WP - PWR CSNFAs (Maximum PWR Source Term) 
21 
278 
0.28 
WP - BWR CSNFAs (Maximum PWR Source Term) 
44 
220 
0.22 
Transportation Cask - PWR CSNFAs 
24 
317 
0.32 
Transportation Cask - BWR CSNFAs 
68 
341 
0.34 
Transportation Cask - DSNF Canister c 
N/A 
Unknown c 
> 5 Rem 
MSC - PWR CSNFAs 
24 
317 
0.32 
MSC - BWR CSNFAs 
68 
341 
0.34 
Dry Transfer Cell Staging Rack -PWR CSNFAs 
48 
635 
0.63 
Dry Transfer Cell Staging Rack - BWR CSNFAs 
72 
361 
0.36 
Dry Transfer Cell Staging Rack -Total (Sum of BWR + PWR) 
120 
996 
1.00 
Dry Transfer Cell Staging Rack - DSNF Canisters 
10 
Unknown c 
> 5 Rem 

Table 3. Offsite Unit Dose Consequences for Various Waste Forms (Continued) 
Type of Waste Form or Functional Area 
Number of CSNFAs 
Present 
Offsite Dose at 11 km 
(mrem) a 
Offsite Dose at 11 km for 
Analysis (rem) a 
Wet Cask Remediation Staging Rack - PWR CSNFAs 
48 
635 g 
0.63 
Wet Cask Remediation Staging Rack - BWR CSNFAs 
72 
341 g 
0.34 
Wet Cask Remediation Staging Rack - DOE Canisters 
10 
Unknown c 
> 5 
WP Handling and Staging Cell (PWR CSNFA) 
105 
1390 
1.39 
WP Staging (10 WPs)+Loadout (1 WP) = (11 PWR WPs) 
231 
3054 
3.05 
WP Staging (10 WPs)+Loadout (1 WP) = (11 DOE Canister WPs) 
N/A 
Unknown c 
> 5 
WP Transporter (1 PWR WP) 
36 
476 
0.48 
WP Transporter (1 DOE Canister WP) 
N/A 
Unknown c 
> 5 
Doses Not Analyzed 
WPs in Emplacement Drifts 
-- 
Not available 
> 5 f 
SNF Aging Facility - Casks on Pads 
-- 
Not available 
> 5 f 
NOTES: a TEDE at 11 km using 95 percentile atmospheric dispersion factor 
b Based on unfiltered TEDE for 36 PWR and 74 BWR in Table 23 of BSC (2004t, scaled by a factor of 10 to remove assumption of leak path factor. 
c Any unmitigated release from a DSNF canister will result in an unacceptable dose, i.e. greater than 5 rem TEDE (Assumption 5.13). 
d Scaled 1:5 for maximum unfiltered TEDE for one DOE canister from Table 24 of BSC (2004t (i.e., Savannah River Site HLW canister), scaled by a factor of 100 to 
remove assumption of leak path factor. 
e Based on drop and breach of one NSNF canister without HEPA filters, Table 24 of BSC (2004t, scaled by a factor of 10 to remove assumption of leak-path factor. 
f Given the potential unmitigated release from a DSNF canister (see above), any release will result in an unacceptable dose, i.e. greater than 5 rem. 
g Doses do not include particulates. 
BWR = boiling water reactor; DOE = U.S. Department of Energy; DPC = dual-purpose canister; DSNF = DOE-owned spent nuclear fuel; HEPA = high-efficiency 
particulate air; HLW = high-level radioactive waste; MSC = monitored geologic repository site-specific cask; NSNF = naval spent nuclear fuel; PWR = pressurized 
water reactor; TEDE = total effective dose equivalent; WP = waste package. 

The bottom portion of Table 3 indicates two functional areas for which doses are not analyzed. 
The emplacement drifts will be loaded with approximately 11,200 WPs (per Section 4.1.2) and 
contain both CSNFAs and canistered waste. The dose from the breach of a single WP containing 
DSNF is assumed to exceed 5 rem. Therefore, SSCs ITS in the WP emplacement area 
(subsurface storage) are assigned DBGM-2. The only SSC ITS affected is the WP, which has a 
design requirement to not breach from any drops within the WP design basis, impacts between 
the WP and the support pallet, or from the impact of rockfall and falling ground support 
components, including those initiated by a DBGM-2 earthquake. In addition, the WP 
confinement structure must withstand stress that is induced by a subsurface DBGM-2 
earthquake. 
No explicit doses are provided for the surface aging facility. The initial aging facility is planned 
for 1,000 MTHM, which represents about 2,500 CSNFAs (Section 4.1.2). The concurrent 
breach of this many CSNFAs would result in an offsite dose exceeding 5 rem. Additional aging 
pads may be added, each containing approximately 5,000 MTHM (BSC 2004k, Section 4.1.1.1). 
Furthermore, operational flexibility may require the temporary staging of DSNF canisters. As 
noted throughout, any seismically-induced event sequence that results in an impact on one or 
more DSNF canisters is assumed to result in an offsite dose that is greater than 5 rem 
(Assumption 5.13). Therefore, as shown in Section 6.3.3, the entire aging facility is assigned 
DBGM-2. 
6.3.3 Assigning Design Basis Ground Motions to Structures, Systems, and Components 
Important to Safety 
Table IV-1 lists the SSCs that have been identified as being ITS in previous analyses (BSC 
2004r, Appendix A). Per the seismic methodology (BSC 2004u, Section 3.1.1), all SSCs ITS 
that are credited in the prevention or mitigation of a seismically-initiated event sequence must be 
assigned one of the two DBGM categories, as appropriate, to the dose that would result from 
their seismic failure. 
As defined in Section 4.1.7, the two DBGM levels employed in these analyses are DBGM-1 at 
1  10-3 MAPE and DBGM-2 at 5  10-4 MAPE. As appropriate, SSCs that have been identified 
as contributors to a potential seismic-unique event sequence from the seismic safety analysis 
reported herein must be added to the list of SSCs ITS. 
The assignment of DBGMs to SSCs ITS proceeds in stages as shown in Table 4: 
1. Calculate the consequences associated with each individual seismic event sequence, as 
shown in the Offsite Dose column of Table 4. This stage is a deterministic analysis. 
Based on the doses in this column, DBGM-1 or DBGM-2 is initially assigned to the 
SSCs whose individual seismic failure results in the calculated dose. Doses for 
sequences involving DSNF canisters are given as unknown and the SSCs ITS that 
prevent these doses are assigned DBGM-2. Consequences for the DTF transfer of 
CSNF that uses a fuel-handling machine are treated separately from those of the DTF 
transfer of DSNF canisters that uses an overhead crane. The consequences for only 
one DTF are included in the Offsite Dose column. 

Table 4. Offsite Dose Assignment of DBGMs to Functional Areas/Systems 
Functional Area/System 
Waste Form 
Condition 
Number 
of 
Waste 
Units 
Offsite 
Dose a 
(rem) 
DBGM by 
Operations 
Area 
Offsite Dose 
for 2 DTFs 
(rem) 
DBGM by 
Operations 
Area for 2 
DTFs 
Dose from 
DBGM-1 
SSCs (rem) 
Reassigned 
to DBGM-2 b 
Transportation Facility 
Railcar Staging Area 
Transportation Cask (All 
Waste Forms Including 
DSNF) c 
Sealed 
Variable 
> 5 
DBGM-2 
N/A 
-- 
-- 
-- 
Truck Staging Area 
Transportation Cask (All 
Waste Forms Including 
DSNF) c 
Sealed 
Variable 
> 5 
DBGM-2 
N/A 
-- 
-- 
-- 
Receipt Systems 
Cask and Waste Package 
Receipt Building 
- Warehouse & Non- 
Nuclear Receipt Facility 
None 
-- 
0 
0 
CD d 
N/A d 
-- 
-- 
-- 
Cask and Waste Package 
Receipt Building 
- Transportation Cask 
Receipt/Return Facility 
Transportation Cask (All 
Waste Forms Including 
DSNF) c 
Sealed 
6 
> 5 
DBGM-2 
N/A 
-- 
-- 
-- 
Transportation Cask Buffer 
Area 
Transportation Cask (All 
Waste Forms Including 
DSNF) c 
Sealed 
36 
> 5 
DBGM-2 
N/A 
-- 
-- 
-- 
WP Receipt Facility 
None 
-- 
0 
0 
CD d 
N/A d 
-- 
-- 
-- 
Heavy Equipment 
Maintenance Facility (HEMF) 
None 
-- 
0 
0 
CD d 
N/A d 
-- 
-- 
-- 

Table 4. Offsite Dose Assignment of DBGMs to Functional Areas/Systems (Continued) 
Functional Area/System 
Waste Form 
Condition 
Number 
of 
Waste 
Units 
Offsite 
Dose a 
(rem) 
DBGM by 
Operations 
Area 
Offsite Dose 
for 2 DTFs 
(rem) 
DBGM by 
Operations 
Area for 2 
DTFs 
Dose from 
DBGM-1 
SSCs (rem) 
Reassigned 
to DBGM-2 b 
Canister Handling Facility 
Entrance Vestibule 
Transportation Cask 
(Canister Forms NSNF, 
HLW and DSNF) c 
Sealed 
1 
> 5 
DBGM-2 
N/A 
-- 
-- 
-- 
Transfer Area 
- Handling 
Transportation Cask 
(Including DSNF) 
Unsealed 
1 
> 5 
DBGM-2 
N/A 
-- 
-- 
-- 
MSC (Canister Including 
DSNF) 
Unsealed 
2 
> 5 
DBGM-2 
N/A 
-- 
-- 
-- 
Transfer Area 
- Pits 
WP (Canister Including 
DSNF) 
Unsealed 
1 
> 5 
DBGM-2 
N/A 
-- 
-- 
-- 
Transfer Area 
- Staging Pits 
Canister (DSNF) 
Sealed 
10 
> 5 
DBGM-2 
N/A 
-- 
-- 
-- 
WP Closure 
WP (Canister Including 
DSNF) 
Unsealed 
2 
> 5 
DBGM-2 
N/A 
-- 
-- 
-- 
WP Transporter Load 
WP (Canister Including 
DSNF) 
Sealed 
1 
> 5 
DBGM-2 
N/A 
-- 
-- 
-- 
Dry Transfer Facility (2) 
Empty WP Processing 
None 
-- 
0 
0 
CD 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
Entrance Vestibule 
- 200 ton Cask Handling 
Crane 
Transportation Cask 
(Including DSNF) 
Sealed 
1 
> 5 
DBGM-2 
N/A 
-- 
-- 
-- 
Entrance Vestibule 
- Site rail transfer cart 
(SRTC) e 
MSC 
Sealed 
1 
0.34 
DBGM-1 
0.68 
DBGM-1 
0.68 
X 
Turntable & Preparation 
Rooms 
Transportation Cask 
(Including DSNF) 
Partially Sealed 
1 
> 5 
DBGM-2 
N/A 
-- 
-- 
-- 

Table 4. Offsite Dose Assignment of DBGMs to Functional Areas/Systems (Continued) 
Functional Area/System 
Waste Form 
Condition 
Number 
of 
Waste 
Units 
Offsite 
Dose a 
(rem) 
DBGM by 
Operations 
Area 
Offsite Dose 
for 2 DTFs 
(rem) 
DBGM by 
Operations 
Area for 2 
DTFs 
Dose from 
DBGM-1 
SSCs (rem) 
Reassigned 
to DBGM-2 b 
Cask and MSC Docking 
Room 
Transportation Cask 
(Including DSNF) 
Unsealed 
1 
> 5 
DBGM-2 
N/A 
-- 
-- 
-- 
NSNF Receipt 
- 200 ton Navy Cask 
Handling Crane 
NSNF Assembly or 
Canister 
Sealed 
1 
0.01 
DBGM-1 
0.01 
DBGM-1 
0.01 
X e 
NSNF Processing 
- 70 ton Navy Cask 
Handling Crane 
NSNF Assembly 
Partially Sealed 
1 
0.01 
DBGM-1 
0.01 
DBGM-1 
0.01 
X e 
WP (CSNFA - 21 PWR) 
(2 ports) 
Unsealed 
42 
0.56 
Bounded by 
DSNF 
Requirements 
(see below) 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
Waste Transfer 
- WP Docking 
or WP (Canister) 
(2 ports) (Including DSNF) 
Unsealed 
2 
> 5 
DBGM-2 
N/A 
-- 
-- 
-- 
Waste Transfer 
- Spent Fuel Transfer 
Machine 
CSNF Assembly 
N/A 
1 
0.013 
DBGM-1 
0.03 
DBGM-1 
0.03 
Transportation Cask (2) 
(Including DSNF) 
Unsealed 
2 
> 5 
DBGM-2 
N/A 
-- 
-- 
-- 
Waste Transfer 
- Cask & MSC Docking 
- Canister/HLW 
Handling Crane 
or MSC (2) 
Unsealed 
2 
0.68 
Bounded by 
DSNF 
Requirements 
(see above) 
-- 
-- 
-- 
CSNF in CSNF Staging 
Rack 
N/A 
120 
1.00 
DBGM-1 
2.00 
DBGM-1 
2.00 
X 
Waste Transfer 
- Staging 
Canisters in Canister 
Staging Rack (Including 
DSNF) 
N/A 
10 
> 5 
DBGM-2 
N/A 
-- 
-- 
-- 
Empty Transportation 
Cask/MSC/DPC Removal 
Offsite 
None 
-- 
0 
0 
CD 
N/A 
-- 
-- 
-- 

Table 4. Offsite Dose Assignment of DBGMs to Functional Areas/Systems (Continued) 
Functional Area/System 
Waste Form 
Condition 
Number 
of 
Waste 
Units 
Offsite 
Dose a 
(rem) 
DBGM by 
Operations 
Area 
Offsite Dose 
for 2 DTFs 
(rem) 
DBGM by 
Operations 
Area for 2 
DTFs 
Dose from 
DBGM-1 
SSCs (rem) 
Reassigned 
to DBGM-2 b 
Cask Restoration Room / 
Loaded MSC Removal 
MSC 
Partially Sealed 
1 
0.34 
DBGM-1 
0.68 
DBGM-1 
0.68 
X 
WP (CSNFA) 
Sealed / 
Unsealed 
5 
1.39 
Bounded by 
DSNF 
Requirements 
(see below) 
N/A 
-- 
-- 
WP Handling and Staging 
Cell 
- Staging 
WP (Canister Including 
DSNF) 
Unsealed 
1 
> 5 
DBGM-2 
N/A 
-- 
-- 
-- 
WP Handling and Staging 
Cell 
- Bridge Crane 
WP (Canister Including 
DSNF) 
Unsealed 
1 
> 5 
DBGM-2 
N/A 
-- 
-- 
-- 
WP Handling and Staging 
Cell 
- WP Closure Cells 
WP (Canister Including 
DSNF) 
Unsealed 
4 
> 5 
DBGM-2 
N/A 
-- 
-- 
-- 
WP (CSNFA) 
Sealed 
1 
0.28 
Bounded by 
DSNF 
Requirements 
(see below) 
N/A 
-- 
-- 
-- 
WP Loadout (WP Loadout 
Cell, WP Transporter 
Vestibule, Exit Vestibule) 
or WP (Canister Including 
DSNF) 
Sealed 
1 
> 5 
DBGM-2 
N/A 
-- 
-- 
-- 
WP (CSNFA) 
Sealed/ 
Unsealed 
1 
0.28 
Bounded by 
DSNF 
Requirements 
(see below) 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
WP Remediation 
or WP (Canister Including 
DSNF) 
Sealed/ 
Unsealed 
1 
> 5 
DBGM-2 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 

Table 4. Offsite Dose Assignment of DBGMs to Functional Areas/Systems (Continued) 
Functional Area/System 
Waste Form 
Condition 
Number 
of 
Waste 
Units 
Offsite 
Dose a 
(rem) 
DBGM by 
Operations 
Area 
Offsite Dose 
for 2 DTFs 
(rem) 
DBGM by 
Operations 
Area for 2 
DTFs 
Dose from 
DBGM-1 
SSCs (rem) 
Reassigned 
to DBGM-2 b 
MSC 
Unsealed 
1 
0.34 
Bounded by 
DSNF 
Requirements 
(see below) 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
or Transportation Cask 
(Canister Including DSNF) 
Unsealed 
1 
> 5 
DBGM-2 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
Dry Remediation 
or SNF/HLW DPC 
Unsealed 
1 
0.48 f 
Bounded by 
DSNF 
Requirements 
(see above) 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
Transportation Cask 
(Canister including DSNF) 
Sealed/ 
Unsealed 
1 
> 5 
DBGM-2 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
MSC 
Sealed / 
Unsealed 
1 
0.34 
Bounded by 
DSNF 
Requirements 
(see above) 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
NSNF 
Sealed/ 
Unsealed 
1 
0.01 
Bounded by 
DSNF 
Requirements 
(see above) 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
DSNF / HLW Canisters 
Sealed/ 
Unsealed 
1 
> 5 
Bounded by 
DSNF 
Requirements 
(see above) 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
Wet Remediation 
- Laydown Area, Cask 
Wet Remediation 
Entrance Vestibule 
Special Canister 
(Damaged Waste including 
DSNF) g 
Sealed/ 
Unsealed 
1 
> 5 
Bounded by 
DSNF 
Requirements 
(see above) 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 

Table 4. Offsite Dose Assignment of DBGMs to Functional Areas/Systems (Continued) 
Functional Area/System 
Waste Form 
Condition 
Number 
of 
Waste 
Units 
Offsite 
Dose a 
(rem) 
DBGM by 
Operations 
Area 
Offsite Dose 
for 2 DTFs 
(rem) 
DBGM by 
Operations 
Area for 2 
DTFs 
Dose from 
DBGM-1 
SSCs (rem) 
Reassigned 
to DBGM-2 b 
PWR CSNFA 
N/A 
48 
0.36 
Bounded by 
DSNF 
Requirements 
(see below) 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
BWR CSNFA 
N/A 
72 
0.34 
Bounded by 
DSNF 
Requirements 
(see below) 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
Wet Remediation 
- Staging Racks 
DOE Canisters (Including 
DSNF) 
N/A 
10 
> 5 
DBGM-2 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
DPC Cutting 
DPC 
Sealed/ 
Unsealed 
1 
0.48 
DBGM-1 
0.96 
DBGM-1 
0.96 
X 
Fuel Handling Facility 
Entrance Vestibule 
Transportation Cask 
(CSNF; DSNF canisters 
except MCOs; NSNF; and 
DOE HLW) 
Sealed 
1 
> 5 
DBGM-2 
N/A 
-- 
-- 
-- 
Preparation / Restoration 
Area 
Transportation Cask 
(Including DSNF) 
Partially Sealed 
1 
> 5 
DBGM-2 
N/A 
-- 
-- 
-- 
Empty Waste Package 
Processing 
None 
-- 
0 
0 
CD 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
Waste Transfer 
- Spent Fuel Transfer 
Machine 
CSNF Assembly 
N/A 
1 
0.013 
DBGM-1 
N/A 
-- 
0.013 
-- 
MSC (Including DSNF) 
Unsealed 
1 
> 5 
DBGM-2 
N/A 
-- 
-- 
-- 
Transfer Cell 
- Pits 
WP (Including DSNF) 
Unsealed 
1 
> 5 
DBGM-2 
N/A 
-- 
-- 
-- 
Loaded MSC Receipt 
MSC (Including DSNF) 
Sealed 
1 
> 5 
DBGM-2 
N/A 
-- 
-- 
WP Closure Cell 
WP (Including DSNF) 
Sealed 
1 
> 5 
DBGM-2 
N/A 
-- 
-- 
-- 
WP Loadout Area 
WP (Including DSNF) 
Sealed 
1 
> 5 
DBGM-2 
N/A 
-- 
-- 
-- 

Table 4. Offsite Dose Assignment of DBGMs to Functional Areas/Systems (Continued) 
Functional Area/System 
Waste Form 
Condition 
Number 
of 
Waste 
Units 
Offsite 
Dose a 
(rem) 
DBGM by 
Operations 
Area 
Offsite Dose 
for 2 DTFs 
(rem) 
DBGM by 
Operations 
Area for 2 
DTFs 
Dose from 
DBGM-1 
SSCs (rem) 
Reassigned 
to DBGM-2 b 
Subsurface Operations: WP 
Subsurface Transport and 
Emplacement 
0 
WP(CSNFA) 
Sealed 
1 
0.48 
Bounded by 
DSNF 
Requirements 
(see below) 
N/A d 
-- 
-- 
-- 
WP Transporter 
WP (Canister, Including 
DSNF) 
Sealed 
1 
> 5 
DBGM-2 
N/A 
-- 
-- 
-- 
WP in Emplacement Drifts 
Not Analyzed h 
-- 
-- 
Not 
Analyzed i 
DBGM-2 
N/A 
-- 
-- 
-- 
SNF Aging Facility 
MSC per trip j 
Sealed 
1 
0.34 
Bounded by 
DSNF 
Requirements 
(see below) j 
N/A 
-- 
-- 
-- 
DPC per trip j 
Sealed 
1 
0.48 
Bounded by 
DSNF 
Requirements 
(see below) j 
N/A 
-- 
-- 
-- 
Transporters i 
Containing DSNF (per 
trip) 
Sealed 
1 
> 5 
DBGM-2 
N/A 
-- 
-- 
-- 
Aging Module - Horizontal 
Sealed 
20 
9.6 
DBGM-2 
N/A 
-- 
-- 
-- 
Initial Aging Pad 
Aging Module - Vertical 
(Including DSNF) 
Sealed 
80 
> 5 
DBGM-2 
N/A 
-- 
-- 
-- 

Table 4. Offsite Dose Assignment of DBGMs to Functional Areas/Systems (Continued) 
Functional Area/System 
Waste Form 
Condition 
Number 
of 
Waste 
Units 
Offsite 
Dose a 
(rem) 
DBGM by 
Operations 
Area 
Offsite Dose 
for 2 DTFs 
(rem) 
DBGM by 
Operations 
Area for 2 
DTFs 
Dose from 
DBGM-1 
SSCs (rem) 
Reassigned 
to DBGM-2 b 
Aging Module - 
Horizontal (Including 
DPC) 
Sealed 
120 
57.6 
DBGM-2 
N/A 
-- 
-- 
-- 
Aging Pad #2 (+ Others) 
Aging Module - Vertical 
(Including MSC With 
DSNF) 
Sealed 
400 
> 5 
DBGM-2 
N/A 
-- 
-- 
-- 
Sum of DBGM-1 Doses (From Seismic Failures of DBGM-1 SSCs above)- 
4.38 
Adjusted DBGM-1 Doses (Doses flagged with "X" that are re-assigned to DBGM-2) 
<4.34> 
Net Adjusted DBGM-1 Dose 
0.04 
NOTES: a Offsite doses are taken from Table 3. 
b Items marked with X subtracted from total DBGM-1 dose, and re-assigned to DBGM-2. The re-assignment is to ensure compliance and provide addition 
defense in-depth. 
c Unit doses for canisters containing DSNF not explicitly calculated (per Section 5, Assumption 5.13). For this analysis, all such doses are assumed to exceed 
5 rem. 
d CD = conventional design (i.e. no DBGM-1 or -2 assignment); N/A = not applicable. 
e In accordance with Section 5, Assumption 5.20. 
f Assumed DPC with 36 PWR CSNFAs. 
g Contents of special canister (damaged waste) is unspecified; for conservatism, dose is assumed to exceed 5 rem. 
h Not analyzed, see Table 3. 
i Transport may employ different SSCs for handling the respective MSC, DPC, and DSNF waste forms, so a DBGM is assigned to each. If the same SSCs are 
used for all waste forms, then the limiting case of DSNF applies, and DBGM-2 is assigned to SSCs. 
j Operational considerations may limit or prohibit the transport of DSNF to the Aging Pad, but for the conservatism, it is included in this analysis. 
CSNF = commercial spent nuclear fuel; DBGM = design basis ground motion; DPC = dual-purpose canister; DSNF = U.S. Department of Energy-owned spent 
nuclear fuel; DTF = Dry Transfer Facility; MCO = multi-canister overpack; MSC = monitored geologic repository site-specific cask; N/A = not applicable; NSNF = 
naval spent nuclear fuel; SRTC = site rail transfer cart; SSCs = structures, systems, and components; WP = waste package. 

2. Consider the effects of correlation between seismic failures in various facilities. 
Correlations between the two DTFs need to be considered (Section 5, 
Assumption 5.8). Column 7 of Table 4 (Offsite Dose for 2 DTFs), multiplies all doses 
related to one DTF by a factor of two. The entries in this column indicate the dose 
associated with seismic event sequences involving both DTFs. 
3. Consider aggregated offsite dose from the postulated failure of all DBGM-1 SSCs. If 
the aggregated dose is less than 5 rem TEDE, then the initial DBGM assignments are 
maintained. However, if the initial analysis were to indicate that the aggregated dose 
is equal to or greater than 5 rem TEDE (i.e., noncompliance of aggregated DBGM-1 
SSCs doses with 10 CFR 63.111(b)(2)), then re-assign one or more DBGM-1 SSCs to 
DBGM-2 to achieve compliance. If compliance is still not achieved, it will be 
necessary to consider changes in the design and/or to take credit for the occupancy or 
target factors described in Section II.4.3. (Re-assignment of DBGM-1 SSCs may also 
be performed based on risk-informed decisions, e.g., Assumption 5.20.) 
Column 9 of Table 4 (Dose from DBGM-1 SSC) lists the offsite dose that would result when 
assumed seismic failures of DBGM-1 assigned SSCs occur in an individual functional area. The 
unadjusted sum of these doses is shown to be 4.38 rem. This dose may result after the 
occurrence of any earthquake that exceeds the ground motions of DBGM-1. This condition 
while it complies with 10 CFR 63.111(a) or (b), is considered large for the analysis and is 
adjusted. 
As part of this adjustment, utilizing a risk-informed approach, the cranes handling the NSNF 
canisters are assigned to DBGM-2 (Assumption 5.20) and are flagged with an X in column 10 
of Table 4 (Reassigned to DBGM-2). Similarly, the SRTC, the DPC cutting system, the CSNF 
staging rack, and loaded MSC removal system are also assigned to DBGM-2 and are flagged 
with an X to reduce the total aggregated DBGM-1 dose (Assumption 5.23). The sum of these 
re-assigned dose values is 4.34 rem. Subtracting these items, the total resultant dose of items 
assigned to DBGM-1 is reduced to 0.04 rem (4.38- 4.34). 
The results of these assignments in Table 4 are used as the basis for assignment of DBGM levels 
to SSC ITS in Table IV-1. 
6.4 ANALYSIS OF RADITION WORKER AND OTHERS ONSITE DOSE 
6.4.1 Identification of Seismic Fault and Event Trees 
6.4.1.1 Master Logic Diagram 
As noted in Attachment II, a master logic diagram (MLD) is an application of fault tree logic that 
aids in performing the thorough and structured identification of potential seismic concerns. A 
MLD for the repository is depicted in Figure 1 and is used as a reference to ensure that 
potentially seismically-initiated event sequences in all facilities are considered for dose to 
radiation workers and other onsite workers and public. 

6.4.1.2 Seismic Event Tree Analysis 
As in Section 6.3.1.2, simplified trees can be constructed to describe the series of events that 
must occur to result in a seismically-induced sequence that will result in a dose to the radiation 
worker. Figure 9 represents a seismically-induced loss of confinement resulting in an airborne 
dose to radiation workers in the operations area. Obviously, the extent of exposure is dependent 
on the type of waste form present and shielding present (OF_DSE), and if the worker can egress 
the area in sufficient time (OF_EGR) to mitigate the amount of exposure. This simplified SET is 
named AIR for reference in this analysis. 
In a similar fashion, Figure 10 provides a simplified tree to describe the series of events that must 
occur to result in a radiation dose to radiation workers in the operations area due to a seismicallyinduced 
loss of shielding function. The shielding can be in the form of doors or view ports, 
which fail as well as the fracturing of the confinement walls, which can allow radiation exposure. 
This simplified SET is named RAD for reference in this analysis. 
6.4.1.3 Fault Tree Analysis 
For the present analyses, fault tree analyses are not developed for dose to radiation worker and 
others. 
6.4.2 Dose Consequences of Seismic Event Sequences 
At present, doses to radiation workers and others from possible event sequences described earlier 
are not available. However, since the shielding and other SSCs are installed to ensure that doses 
received during normal operations are acceptable, it is assumed that loss of the credited function 
in a seismically-initiated event sequence will exceed the allowable Category 1 dose limits for 
workers. 
6.4.3 Assigning Design Basis Ground Motions to Structures, Systems, and Components 
Imporatnt to Safety 
All SSCs ITS related to radiation worker dose and onsite public are to be assigned a DBGM-1 
category. 10 CFR 63.111 does not specify worker dose for Category 2 event sequences. 
Therefore, if any SSC must be designated ITS to ensure meeting worker dose following an 
earthquake, the SSC is assigned to DBGM-1. However, some SSCs related to worker dose may 
be classified as DBGM-2 for other reasons. For example, a wall preventing worker dose may be 
classified as DBGM-2 for a safety function of no-collapse to comply with offsite dose 
requirements for offsite dose. 
DBGM-1 level is defined at a 1  10-3 MAPE (Section 4.1.7). As the design matures and other 
SSCs are identified as ITS because of worker dose, such SSCs will be assigned a DBGM-1, as a 
minimum, according to the defined procedures in this analysis, as performed in Section 6.3. 

Preclosure Safety Analysis Calculation 
Title: Seismic Analysis for Preclosure Safety 
Document Identifier: 000-00C-MGR0-00700-000-00B Page 64 of 110 
Figure 9. Simplified Seismic Event Tree for Loss of Confinement with Airborne Contaminants 
Figure 10. Simplified Seismic Event Tree for Loss of Shielding 

6.5 SEISMIC INTERACTIONS AND SECONDARY FAILURES 
6.5.1 Overview of Seismic Interactions 
During the occurrence of an earthquake, it is possible for the seismic response of one SSC to 
affect the performance of another SSC. This sequence of events is called a seismic interaction, 
and often termed two-over-one interactions in nuclear power plant (NPP) seismic analyses. 
With regard to the current analysis, the potential for a secondary system to compromise the 
safety function of a SSC designated as DBGM-1 or DBGM-2 is evaluated. 
Cases of seismic interaction include (e.g. DOE-STD-1020-2002, Appendix C): 
Structural failure and fall 
Proximity 
Flexibility of attached lines and cables 
Flooding or exposure to fluids from ruptured vessels and piping systems 
Effects of seismically-induced fires. 
6.5.2 Structural Failure and Fall Interactions 
Structural failure and fall can occur where a DBGM-1 or DBGM-2 designated SSC can 
potentially be damaged by an overhead or adjacent SSC with a lesser seismic designation. For 
example, the ducting or fan motors of a transfer cell ventilation system may fail as a result of an 
earthquake and strike a DOE canister. In another possible case, equipment supports might fail, 
allowing sampling devices or decontamination equipment to strike a CSNFA in a staging area. 
To prevent such occurrences, SSCs that can cause this type of damage (the source SSCs) need to 
be identified. If a source SCC cannot be relocated or isolated using a barrier, additional seismic 
requirements need to be assigned to the source SSC to prevent the loss of safety function to the 
other (target) SSC. Therefore, depending on the dose consequences attributed to such an event 
sequence, a DBGM-1 level or a DBGM-2 level can be assigned to a SSC that is not ITS, if the 
response of the source SSC will affect the safety function of the target SSC. 
At the present stage of design, there is insufficient detail to thoroughly address such event 
sequences, but an initial list is presented in Table 5. SSCs that are not ITS will be re-examined 
in updates to this analysis for possible seismically-initiated failure sequences. In addition, a 
proposed design requirement is identified to consider such interaction : 
System interaction that includes the adverse effects of failure of a lower seismic design 
category SSC on the safety function of a higher seismic design category SSC will be 
considered in the design. 

Table 5. Potential Failure/Fall Seismic Interactions for Further Evaluation 
System/Facility 
Source SSC 
Potential Interaction and Target SSC 
DTF Wet Cask 
Remediation 
20 ton overhead maintenance crane 
Failure of crane into pool or onto other 
equipment including 200 ton handling 
crane 
DTF Wet Cask 
Remediation 
External walkway within area 
Failure of walkway onto other SSCs or 
waste forms in pool 
Transportation Cask 
Receipt/Return Facility 
Walls of Warehouse and Non-Nuclear 
Receipt Facility (WNNRF) 
Collapse on transportation casks of 
adjacent TCRRF Cask Receipt and 
Return Area 
All 
Anchorages above staging areas 
Fall of SSC onto other SSCs 
NOTE: DTF = Dry Transfer Facility; SSC = structure, system, or component; SSCs = structures, systems, and 
components; TCRRF = Transportation Cask Receipt/Return Facility. 
6.5.3 Proximity Interactions 
Impact between SSCs in close proximity to each other due to relative motion during earthquake 
response is another form of interaction, which must be considered in seismic interaction 
evaluations. If such an impact could cause damage or failure, a combined design approach of 
sufficient separation distance to prevent impact, and adequate anchorage, bracing, or other means 
to prevent large deflections, is typical. Of particular concern is the proximity of a waste handling 
facility directly adjacent to a non-waste handling facility such as a warehouse or administrative 
structure. 
It should be noted that even if there is impact between adjacent structures and equipment, there 
may not be potential for any significant damage such that seismic interaction would not result in 
design measures being implemented. An example of such a case is a 1 in (0.03 m) diameter 
pipe, which cannot damage an adjacent 12 in (0.30 m) diameter pipe regardless of the separation 
distance. 
An initial list of potential seismic interactions due to proximate SSCs is presented in Table 6. 
Similar to structural failure and fall interactions, SSCs that are not ITS will be re-examined in 
updates to this analysis for potential seismic interactions due to proximity. 

Table 6. Potential Proximity Seismic Interactions for Further Evaluation 
Source SSC 
Target SSC 
Potential Interaction 
Warehouse and Non-Nuclear 
Receipt Facility (WNNRF) 
Transportation Cask 
Receipt/Return Facility (TCRRF) 
Cask Receipt and Return Area 
Source and target share common wall and 
many infrastructure systems 
Firewater Facility (Central) 
Fuel Handling Facility 
Structural failure and water leakage/ water 
system failure 
Slope 
Initial Aging Facility 
Failure of slope could affect pad stability 
6.5.4 Flexibility Interactions 
Another form of seismic interaction occurs where distribution lines such as piping, tubing, 
conduit, and cables connected to an item important to safety or production have insufficient 
flexibility to accommodate relative movement between the important item and adjacent 
structures or equipment to which the distribution line is anchored. This interaction may also 
involve the cable trays holding the cables. 
To address this concern, the following proposed design requirement is identified: 
For SSCs identified as ITS and credited in the prevention or mitigation of seismicallyinitiated 
event sequences, sufficient flexibility of connected piping, tubing, conduit, and 
cables shall be provided from the important item to the first support on nearby structures or 
equipment. Failure of relevant cable trays shall also be considered in seismic design. 
6.5.5 Flooding and Fire Interactions 
Other forms of seismic interaction result if vessels or piping systems rupture due to earthquake 
excitation and cause fires or flooding that could affect performance of nearby important or 
critical SSCs. In this case, such vessels or piping systems must continue to perform their 
function of containing fluids or combustibles such that they shall be elevated in category to the 
level of the targets that would be endangered by their failure. 
Possible seismically-initiated flooding and fire sequences were evaluated earlier as part of 
seismic hazard analysis and are identified in Attachment III. Potential seismically-initiated 
flooding sequences are identified in Table 7. 

Table 7. Potential Flooding-Seismic Interactions for Further Evaluation 
Source SSC a 
Target SSC a 
Potential Interaction a 
DTF water lines of the high 
pressure water system used for 
decontamination activities in the 
WP/Trolley Decontamination 
Room 
DTF WP Handling, Welding and 
Decontamination SSCs 
Flooding of adjoining areas due to rupture 
of water line. 
DTF water lines of the cask 
decontamination system or cask 
preparation system (cask 
cooling) in the cask wet 
remediation / lay down area. 
DTF Wet Remediation SSCs 
Flooding due to rupture of water line. 
Water lines on the development 
side of the repository 
WP Subsurface Transport and 
Emplacement SSC including 
WP, WP Transporter, Transport 
Locomotive 
Flooding from a water pipe break. 
Water lines on the development 
side of the repository 
Subsurface Facilities SSCs 
Flooding from a water pipe break. 
Remediation Pool 
DTF Wet Remediation SSCs 
Sump Area, Pool Cooling 
System 
Flooding due to rupture or cracking of pool 
lining and rapid drawdown of pool. 
Pool sump system (including 
pump, sump lines, seals and 
valves, etc). 
DTF Wet Remediation SSCs 
Sump Area, Pool Cooling 
System 
Flooding due to rupture of drainage line. 
NOTE: a Source, target and potential interaction as identified in Attachment III. 
DTF = Dry Transfer Facility; SSC = structure, system, or component; SSCs = structures, systems, and 
components; WP = waste package. 
Regarding fires, seismically-induced fires can lead to the failure of cable systems, resulting in the 
loss of electrical circuits and power. These circuit failures in turn can lead to (a) the failure of 
remote and local control circuits; (b) the spurious actuation (chatter) of plant equipment; or (c) 
the actuation or shutdown of alarm and fire suppression systems (such as sprinklers). The 
actuation modes of circuit failures are typically assumed to be caused within a cable run by a 
hot short (i.e., an electrical fault between cable conductors without a loss of conductor 
integrity or a simultaneous short to ground), and have been shown to be an important and 
sometimes even dominant contributor to fire risk in a number of NPP studies (NEA 2000, 
Section 2.2.2.2). 
The potential for seismically-induced fires (and attendant control failures) together with flooding 
potential will be examined in updates to this analysis, as there is insufficient design information 
to evaluate these seismically-induced event sequences at this time. 

6.6 EVALUATION OF THE HCLPF CAPACITIES OF STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS, 
AND COMPONENTS 
A HCLPF capacity is tied to a specific seismic failure event or loss of a specific safety function 
for a given SSC. HCLPF capacities are developed by design engineering disciplines as input to 
the seismic systems analysis. When this analysis is performed, the HCLPF seismic margin for 
each SSC ITS will be computed and reported. The HCLPF seismic margin is the ratio of the 
HCLPF seismic capacity to the appropriate BDBGM ground motion acceleration. For 
conservatism, the HCLPF seismic margin will utilize a target minimum value of 1.10 (BSC 
2004u, Section 3.3.2). In addition, in updates to this analysis, HCLPF capacities specific to 
designs of repository SSCs ITS will be calculated using the CDFM method (EPRI 1991, Chapter 
2) or other accepted methods. 
In this calculation, generic capacity factors are used to estimate representative HCLPF capacities 
(Section 5, Assumption 5.10), and HCLPF seismic margins are not computed. The HCLPF 
capacity defines the ground motion (e.g., PGA value) at which there is no more than 0.01 
conditional probability of failure (loss of defined safety function). It is symbolized as C0.01. In 
the CDFM method, it is shown that: 
C0.01  CCDFM (Eq. 1) 
The CDFM capacity of any SSC can be estimated from: 
CCDFM = FS * F  * DBGM (Eq. 2) 
where DBGM is the design basis ground motion for which the SSC has been designed, FS is a 
computed strength margin factor, and F is an inelastic energy absorption factor (BSC 2004u, 
Appendix B). The DBGM is defined in terms of the PGA or spectral accelerations representative 
of design spectrum. For this analysis, it is assumed that the DBGM is specified by the PGA 
values presented in Table 1, Part A. 
The product of strength margin factor and the inelastic energy absorption factor can be defined, 
for present purposes, as the HCLPF multiplier: 
FHCLPF = FS * F  (Eq. 3) 
The value of F varies with the amount of structural deformation that is defined as representing 
failure for the loss of a given safety function. Table 8 presents definitions of Limits States A 
through D (BSC 2004u, Table A-1). 

Table 8. Structural Deformation Limits for Limit States 
Limit State 
Structural Deformation Limit 
Amount of Damage 
A 
Large permanent distortion, short of collapse 
Significant 
B 
Moderate permanent distortion 
Generally repairable 
C 
Limited permanent distortion 
Minimal 
D 
Essentially elastic behavior 
None 
The term, FS, may be determined as the ratio of the 98 percent exceedance capacity over the 
seismic demand. This strength margin factor, % 98 S F , can be written as (BSC 2004u, Appendix 
B, Eq. B-4): 
S 
NS C C 
D 
D C F 
F 
% S 
- 
= 
98 
(Eq. 4) 
where CC is the capacity computed using code and standard capacity acceptance criteria 
including strength-reduction factors permitted by code. DNS is the expected concurrent, nonseismic 
demand, DS is the conservatively estimated seismic demand computed for the DBGM 
input, and FC is a capacity increase factor. The seismic demand, DS, will be computed in 
accordance with applicable codes and standards. 
The capacity increase factor, FC, is given by: 
C 
C C 
C 
F % 98 = (Eq. 5) 
where C98% is the estimated 98 percent exceedance probability capacity (BSC 2004u, Appendix 
B, Eq. B-5). 
An approach for estimating C98% is described in A Methodology for Assessment of Nuclear 
Power Plant Seismic Margin (EPRI 1991). When data are inadequate to estimate C98% or for the 
sake of simplicity, FC may conservatively be taken as 1.0. 
As for typical values, median estimates of the various FS values (i.e., % 50 S F ) have been shown 
to range between 1.2 and 2.5 (Kennedy and Ravindra 1984, Table 2). To estimate the 
corresponding Fs for C98% values (i.e., % 98 S F ), a lognormal distribution is used relating 
% 98 S F and % 50 S F , expressed as: 
C e S S F F  054 . 2 
% 50 % 98 
- = (Eq. 6) 

where C is the composite strength variability (Kennedy and Ravindra 1984, Eq. 4), which 
ranges from about 0.12 to 0.20 (Kennedy and Ravindra 1984, Table 3). The factor, 2.054, is 
from standardized Normal distribution percentiles. Using the stated range of C values, the 
exponential portion of Eq. 6 has values ranging from 0.6 and 0.8. Multiplying these values with 
the bounding values of 1.2 and 2.5 for % 50 S F , a range for % 98 S F for typical structures is 
approximately: 
% 98 S F  1 to 2 (Eq. 7) 
The % 98 S F value for low rise shear wall structures will be at the upper portion of this range, and 
for present purposes, % 98 S F is assumed to be 2.0, as shown in Table 9 (Assumption 5.10). 
The inelastic energy absorption factor, F, is to be estimated at the 95 percent exceedance 
probability (BSC 2004u, Appendix B, Section B-4.2). DOE-STD-1020-2002, Table 2-3, 
provides conservative generic estimates of 95 percent exceedance probability of F for structures 
for Limit State C. 
For example, the F = 1.5 value is given for concrete shear wall structures (in-plane shear) as a 
conservative generic estimate that reasonably corresponds to an allowable story drift limit of 
0.4 percent, which is appropriate for Limit State C (BSC 2004u, Appendix B). The F values are 
appropriately increased for Limit States A and B. Higher allowable drift limits of 0.75 percent 
and 0.6 percent are used for Limit States A and B, respectively (BSC 2004u, Appendix B). For 
low-rise shear walls, conservative generic inelastic energy absorption factors, F, for Limit 
States A and B are estimated by increasing the Limit State C factor F by slightly less than the 
square root of the ratio of allowable drift limits. The resulting F values for low-rise shear walls 
are 2.0, 1.75, and 1.5 for Limit States A, B, and C, as shown in Table 9 (BSC 2004u, Appendix 
B). 
Limit State A is defined as large permanent distortion. The HCLPF capacity for a collapse state 
is expected to be higher than for Limit State A. However, for this analysis, it is conservatively 
assumed that it is the same as the HCLPF capacity for Limit State A. 
For this analysis, HCLPF capacities for mechanical and electrical equipment and anchorages 
specific to the repository are not available. For purposes of determining the overall HCLPF 
capacity for this analysis, HCLPF multiplier factors were estimated and are presented in Table 
10 (Section 5, Assumption 5.10). To provide a comparison for this value, the median total 
equipment factor for mechanical components ranges from 3.5 to 20 in Kennedy and 
Ravindra (1984, Table 2), together with average C values ranging from about 0.4 to 0.7 
(computed using Kennedy and Ravindra 1984, Eq. 4). 

Again, using the normalized exponential relationship between the 99 percent curve and the 
median (e.g., Kennedy 2001, Eq. 4), the HCLPF multiplier factor at 99 percent 99% HCLPF F , is : 
C e HCLPF HCLPF F F  326 . 2 
% 50 % 99 
- = (Eq. 8) 
Where 50% HCLPF F is the median value. For a C value of 0.5, the resultant range for capacity 
factor at 99 percent probability becomes 1 to 6. Using these values as a guide, an average value 
of 2.5 is assigned to active mechanical components, and 5.0 is assigned to passive mechanical 
components. A value of 3.0 for supports is roughly based on Kennedy and Ravindra (1984, 
Table 3) for Class 2 piping. 
The HCLPF multipliers in Tables 9 and 10 are used to estimate the HCLPF capacities for SSCs 
as shown in Table 11. As design matures, actual HCLPF capacities appropriate to the design 
will be used. 
Table 9. Capacity Calculations for Shear-Wall Structures 
Type of SSCs 
Loss of Safety 
Function 
(Failure Criterion) 
Structural Limit State a 
Non-Linear 
Margin 
Factor 
F 
b 
Computed 
Strength 
Margin 
Factor 
FS 
HCLPF 
Multiplier for 
DBGM 
FHCLPF = 
(F * FS) 
Collapse 
A - Large permanent 
distortion 
2.0 
2.0 
4.0 
Fail to support 
equipment 
B - Moderate 
permanent 
distortion 
1.75 
2.0 
3.5 
Concrete 
Shear Wall 
None, repairable 
C - Limited permanent 
distortion 
1.5 
2.0 
3.0 
NOTE: a From BSC 2004u, Table A-1. 
b F is based on BSC (2004u, Appendix B); FS is assumed (Assumption 5.10) and is comparable to data in Kennedy 
and Ravindra (1984, Table 2). 
DBGM = design basis ground motion; HCLPF = high confidence of low probability of failure; SSCs = structures, 
systems, and components. 

Table 10. Capacity Estimates for Mechanical Equipment 
Type of SSCs 
Loss of Safety Function 
(Failure Criterion) 
HCLPF 
Multiplier for 
DBGM, 
FHCLPF a 
Supports 
(e.g., crane, fuel handling 
machine) 
Fail to support equipment 
3.0 b 
Mechanical equipment 
(active component) 
Fail to perform safety function 
2.5 b 
Mechanical equipment 
(passive components) 
Fail to perform safety function 
5.0 b 
NOTES: a Multiplier is based on Limit State A, from Table 8. Specific values are 
estimates and will be replaced when values for actual equipment are 
available (Assumption 5.10). 
b Value is assumed (Assumption 5.10) and is comparable to median 
fragility factors from Kennedy and Ravindra (1984, Table 3), reduced by 
a factor of 0.60. 
c Value is assumed (Assumption 5.10) and is comparable to data in 
Kennedy and Ravindra (1984, Table 2). Note that the median values in 
cite need to be to converted to 99 percent percentile values to compare 
to assumption, i.e., the range of 3 to 20 is reduced to 1 to 6. 
DBGM = design basis ground motion; HCLPF = high confidence of low 
probability of failure; SSCs = structures, systems, and components 

Table 11. Representative High Confidence of Low Probability of Failure Capacities for Structure, 
Systems, and Components 
HCLPF Capacity (g) 
Type of SSCs 
Loss of Safety Function 
(Failure Criterion) 
HCLPF 
Multiplier 
for DBGM 
Designed to 
DBGM-1 
@ PGA = 0.37 g 
Designed to 
DBGM-2 
@ PGA = 0.58 g 
Collapse 
4.0 
1.48 
2.32 
Fail to support equipment 
3.5 
1.30 
2.03 
Concrete Shear Wall 
None, repairable 
3.0 
1.11 
1.74 
Supports (e.g., crane, fuel 
handling machine, or 
equipment) 
Fail to support equipment 
3.0 
1.11 
1.74 
Fail to perform safety 
function, minimum (Active) 
2.5 
0.93 
1.45 
Mechanical Equipment 
Fail to perform safety 
function, maximum 
(Passive) 
5.0 
1.85 
2.90 
NOTE: Shaded data not used in analysis. 
DBGM = design basis ground motion; HCLPF = high confidence of low probability of failure; PGA = peak ground 
acceleration; SSCs = structures, systems, and components. 
6.7 REPOSITORY-WIDE HCLPF CAPACITIES 
The analysis comprises the following activities: 
Develop Boolean expressions for the minimal cutsets of each credible seismic event 
sequence, which may include independent failure events as well as seismic failure 
events for various SSCs ITS. Cutsets that include independent failure events having a 
probability of less than 1  10-3 are screened out as described in Section II.4.4. 
Develop a repository-wide Boolean expression by combining the Boolean expression of 
individual credible sequences, and reduce it to its simplest form using Boolean algebra 
and screening criteria. 
Determine the repository-wide HCLPF capacity by inserting HCLPF capacities of 
seismic failure modes of SSCs ITS that appear in the repository-wide Boolean 
expression and then apply the min-max process. 
Figure 11 illustrates the logic for developing the repository-wide Boolean expression for offsite 
dose. 
The top event in Figure 11 is defined as "Seismic Failures Result in Dose = 5 rem (or 
unknown)" and is developed as an OR-gate. One input to the top event is the event DBGM-2 

SSCs Fail Resulting in Dose = 5 rem or Unknown. The phrase, = 5 rem (or unknown), refers 
to the dose resulting from breach of one or more DSNF canisters per Assumption 5.13. This 
event is developed as an OR-gate whose inputs are the failure events of DBGM-2 SSCs ITS in at 
least one of the functional areas listed in the box under the OR-gate. This part of the Boolean 
development is straightforward using the results of the event sequence consequence analysis and 
DBGM assignment. 
The other input to the top event is Multiple DBGM-1 SSC Fail Resulting in Dose = 5 rem. 
This event is developed as an AND-gate; its inputs are the failure events of DBGM-1 SSCs in 
those functional areas listed in the box under the AND-gate whose combined doses equal or 
exceed 5 rem. However, as a result of the deterministic analysis and assigning DBGM-2 to SSCs 
that were initially assigned DBGM-1, there should be no combinations of failures of DBGM-1 
SSCs that result in a dose = 5 rem. 
In the present analysis, therefore, the maximum dose from the concurrent failure of all DBGM-1 
SSCs sums to 0.04 rem, as shown in Table 4. As a result, the seismic failure of DBGM-1 SSCs 
do not have to be included in the development of the overall Boolean expression for exceeding 
5 rem. 
In developing the present Boolean expressions, generic SET and FT analyses are applied. 
Unique identifying names are not used for basic events that refer to individual SSCs and specific 
seismically-induced loss of safety function. However, unique basis event names are used for 
seismic events pertaining to an entire facility. If the analyses were performed by computer, 
using a program such as SAPHIRE, it would be necessary to assign unique event names for each 
basic event representing a given seismically-induced failure for a specific SSC to avoid problems 
with the Boolean logic. When additional design detail and the need to perform seismic capacity 
analyses for specific SSCs, or complexity dictates the use of computer analyses, unique basic 
event identifiers will be developed. While similar event names are applied to several operational 
areas in the same facility, the distinction between seismic failures of specific SSCs in different 
functional areas is maintained in the structure of the tables used for the analysis. Generic SET 
models and event headings that appear in the generic SETs are used for the various surface 
facilities as illustrated in Table 12. 
Table 12 lists the generic simplified SET models that apply to event sequences in each functional 
area. The names of the generic SETs are defined in Section 6.3.13. One column of Table 12 
lists the SET models for direct seismic failures that are specific to operations in each functional 
area. This column includes one to three SET names for each functional area. The generic 
simplified SETs are assigned by inspection of the lists of potential seismically-induced event 
sequences shown in Table III-2 for each functional area. 

Figure 11. Logic Diagram for Development of Facility-wide Boolean Expression for Dose to the Public 

For example, wherever Table III-2 lists collapse of structure, the generic SET COL is 
applied. Similarly, wherever Table III-2 list drop of cask or drop of fuel assembly, etc., the 
generic SET DSL is applied. Similarly, the SET for TOS is assigned to tipovers and slap 
downs associated with SSCs that support or transport waste forms near to the ground. The SET 
FHE is applied wherever Table III-2 lists a drop of something other than a waste form. As 
noted, the present analysis does not include seismically-induced fire sequences. 
Column five of Table 12 indicates which operations are susceptible to the seismic LOSP. This 
means that a LOSP SET is also applicable to that functional area. The Boolean expression for 
these functional areas must include both the direct and LOSP-related failure events. 
Upon further consideration, it is judged that some of the event sequences can be screened out, 
and the SET names for those event sequences are enclosed in parentheses in the Operation 
Specific column. The bases for screening out these event sequences are given in the Comments 
column. In most instances, it is judged that the occupancy factor is small for these event 
sequences relative to other event sequences. Furthermore, the waste aging facility and WP 
storage in the emplacement drifts are screened out for reasons noted in the Comments column. 
In lieu of generating numerous SETs, the generic simplified SETs are used by substituting 
unique names for operation-specific basic events. Table 13 lists the operation-specific event 
names, such as CHF_COLL_EQ in column 2, that are each used for several functional areas as 
listed in column 1. These operation-specific event names are categorized by the DBGM level 
and the generic HCLPF capacities are provided, based on the analyses described in Section 6.6. 
Table 13 provides the operation-specific failure event names that correlate to the generic failure 
event names used in the SETs. Table 13 collects the various functional areas that use each 
simplified SET. Column 5 of Table 13 assigns a unique numerical identification tag to each 
functional area, within the same facility, that uses the same SET. Column 6 of Table 13 assigns 
unique basic event identifiers and unique event tree headings for each of the functional areas 
listed in Column 5. The operation-specific unique basic event names in Column 6 are used in the 
Boolean expressions for seismic event sequences in the various functional areas of the 
repository. 
Table 14 presents the HCLPF capacities that are estimated for each of the basic events presented 
in Table 13. The HCLPF capacities in Table 14 are derived from the values presented in Table 
11 according to the DBGM assignment developed in Table 12 for SSCs in each functional area. 
The simplified generic event trees and fault trees associated with the event headings, along with 
operation-specific basic event names, are used to determine the minimal cutsets for the seismic 
event sequences for each functional area. Each minimal cutset contains one or more failure 
events that can result in the undesired event sequence. The union (OR logic) of all minimal 
cutsets for all undesired event sequence(s) of each functional area gives the Boolean expression 
for that functional area. 

Table 12. Seismic Event Trees and Events Associated with Seismic Event Sequences 
Generic SET Model 
Functional Area and SSCs a 
Waste Form a 
DBGM 
Group a 
Operation 
Specific b,c 
Subject to 
LOSP Comment Comment 
Transportation Facility 
Railcar Staging Area 
Transportation 
Cask 
DBGM-2 
[TOS] 
No 
Low occupancy factor as transportation casks retain 
impact limiters prior to move to other facilities. 
Truck Staging Area 
Transportation 
Cask 
DBGM-2 
[TOS] 
No 
Low occupancy factor as transportation casks retain 
impact limiters prior to move to other facilities. 
Receipt Systems 
Cask and Waste Package 
Receipt Building - 
Transportation Cask 
Receipt/Return Facility 
Transportation 
Cask 
DBGM-2 
[TOS] 
No 
Low occupancy factor as only small fraction of 
transportation casks have impact limiters removed prior to 
movement into other facility. 
Transportation Cask Buffer 
Area 
Transportation 
Cask 
DBGM-2 
[TOS] 
No 
Low occupancy factor as only small fraction of 
transportation casks have impact limiters removed prior to 
movement into other facility. 

Table 12. Seismic Event Trees and Events Associated with Seismic Event Sequences (Continued) 
Generic SET Model 
Functional Area a 
Waste Form a 
DBGM 
Group a 
Operation 
Specific b,c 
Subject to 
LOSP Comment Comment 
Canister Handling Facility 
Entrance Vestibule 
Transportation 
Cask 
DBGM-2 
TOS 
Yes 
Transfer Area - Handling 
Transportation 
Cask 
DBGM-2 
TOS 
[+ DSL + FHE] 
Yes 
Small occupancy factor for DSL, FHE, and LOSP. 
Transfer Area - Pits (MSC) 
MSC 
DBGM-2 
COL + DSL + 
FHE 
Yes 
Transfer Area - Pits 
(Canister) 
WP 
DBGM-2 
DSL + FHE 
Yes 
Transfer Area - Staging Pits 
Canister 
(DSNF) 
DBGM-2 
COL + RC 
No 
WP Closure 
WP 
DBGM-2 
TOS + FHE 
[+ DSL] 
Yes 
Small occupancy factor for DSL. 
WP Transporter Load 
WP 
DBGM-2 
COL + FHE 
Yes 
Dry Transfer Facility (2) 
Entrance Vestibule - 200 ton 
Cask Handling Crane 
Transportation 
Cask 
DBGM-2 
COL + DSL 
Yes 
Entrance Vestibule - SRTC 
MSC 
DBGM-2 
TOS 
Yes 
Turntable and Preparation 
Rooms 
Transportation 
Cask 
DBGM-2 
COL + TOS 
[+ FHE] 
Yes 
Small occupancy factor for FHE. 
Cask and MSC Docking Room 
Transportation 
Cask 
DBGM-2 
COL + TOS 
[+ FHE] 
Yes 
Small occupancy factor for FHE. 
NSNF Receipt - 200 ton Navy 
Cask Handling Crane 
NSNF 
DBGM-2 
COL + DSL 
Yes 

Table 12. Seismic Event Trees and Events Associated with Seismic Event Sequences (Continued) 
Generic SET Model 
Functional Area a 
Waste Form a 
DBGM 
Group a 
Operation 
Specific b,c 
Subject to 
LOSP Comment Comment 
NSNF Processing - 70 ton 
Navy Cask Handling Crane 
NSNF 
DBGM-2 
COL + DSL 
Yes 
Waste Transfer - WP Docking 
WP (CSNFA - 
21 PWR) (2) 
or WP 
(Canister) (2) 
DBGM-2 
COL + FHE 
[+ DSL] 
Yes 
Small occupancy factor for DSL. 
Waste Transfer - Spent Fuel 
Transfer Machine 
CSNF 
DBGM-1 
DSL 
Yes 
Waste Transfer - Cask and 
MSC Docking 
Transportation 
Cask (2) or 
MSC (2) 
DBGM-2 
COL + FHE 
[+ DSL] 
Yes 
Small occupancy factor for DSL. 
Waste Transfer - Staging 
(CSNF) 
CSNF 
DBGM-2 
COL + RC 
No 
(Note: Re-assigned to DBGM-2 in Table 4) 
Waste Transfer - Staging 
(Canisters) 
Canisters 
(Including 
DSNF) 
DBGM-2 
COL [+ RC] 
No 
Rack collapse does not exceed equivalent design lift 
height. 
Cask Restoration Room/ 
Loaded MSC Removal 
MSC 
DBGM-2 
COL + TOS 
Yes 
WP Handling and 
Staging Cell - Staging 
WP 
DBGM-2 
COL + TOS 
Yes 
WP Handling and 
Staging Cell - Bridge Crane 
WP 
DBGM-2 
DSL 
Yes 
WP Handling and 
Staging Cell - WP Closure 
Cells 
WP 
DBGM-2 
COL + TOS 
[+ FHE] 
Yes 
Small occupancy factor for FHE. 
WP Loadout 
WP 
DBGM-2 
COL + FHE 
Yes 

Table 12. Seismic Event Trees and Events Associated with Seismic Event Sequences (Continued) 
Generic SET Model 
Functional Area a 
Waste Form a 
DBGM 
Group a 
Operation 
Specific b,c 
Subject to 
LOSP Comment Comment 
WP Remediation 
WP 
DBGM-2 
COL 
[+ FHE + DSL] 
Yes 
Small occupancy factor for FHE, DSL, and LOSP due to 
infrequent use of Remediation Building. 
Dry Cask Remediation 
MSC or 
Transportation 
Cask or 
SNF/HLW 
DPC 
DBGM-2 
COL 
[+ FHE + DSL] 
Yes 
Small occupancy factor for FHE, DSL, and LOSP due to 
infrequent use of Remediation Building. 
Wet Cask Remediation 
Transportation 
Cask, MSC, 
DSNF/HLW 
Canisters, 
NSNF, Special 
Canister 
DBGM-2 
COL 
[+ FHE + DSL] 
Yes 
Small occupancy factor for FHE, DSL, and LOSP due to 
infrequent use of Remediation Building. 
Wet Cask Remediation - 
Staging Racks 
PWR CSNFA, 
BWR CSNFA, 
and DSNF 
DBGM-2 
COL + RC 
No 
DPC Cutting 
DPC 
DBGM-2 
TOS + FHE 
[+ DSL] 
Yes 
Small occupancy factor for DSL. (Note: Re-assigned to 
DBGM-2) 
Fuel Handling Facility 
Entrance Vestibule 
Transportation 
Cask 
DBGM-2 
COL + TOS 
Yes 
Preparation/Restoration Area 
Transportation 
Cask 
DBGM-2 
COL + TOS 
[+ DSL + FHE] 
Yes 
Small occupancy factor for DSL, FHE, and LOSP 
Transfer Cell 
Transportation 
Cask 
DBGM-2 
DSL + TOS 
Yes 
Transfer Cell - Pit 
MSC 
DBGM-2 
FHE 
No 
Transfer Cell - Pit 
WP 
DBGM-2 
FHE 
No 

Table 12. Seismic Event Trees and Events Associated with Seismic Event Sequences (Continued) 
Generic SET Model 
Functional Area a 
Waste Form a 
DBGM 
Group a 
Operation 
Specific b,c 
Subject to 
LOSP Comment Comment 
Waste Transfer - Spent Fuel 
Transfer Machine 
CSNF 
DBGM-1 
DSL 
Yes 
Loaded MSC Receipt 
WP 
DBGM-2 
DSL + FHE 
Yes 
WP Closure Cell 
WP 
DBGM-2 
TOS + FHE 
[+ DSL] 
Yes 
Small occupancy factor for DSL. 
WP Loadout Area 
WP 
DBGM-2 
COL + FHE 
Yes 
Subsurface WP Transport/Emplacement 
WP Transporter 
WP(CSNFA 
and Canister) 
DBGM-2 
[Not Analyzed] 
No 
Transporter is self-powered. Transporter drive stops on 
loss of power and operator can intervene, as necessary, to 
recover from seismically-induced spurious operations. 
Small occupancy factor for downgrade. Derailment due to 
invert or track distortions does not cause impacts beyond 
WP design bases. 
WP in Emplacement Drifts 
WP 
DBGM-2 
[Not Analyzed] 
No 
WP is designed not to breach for seismic motions or 
impact of falling rock and support due to DBGM-2. 
SNF Aging Facility 
MSC per trip 
DBGM-1 
TOS 
No 
Transporter is self-powered. 
DPC per trip 
DBGM-1 
TOS 
No 
Transporter is self-powered. 
Transporters 
DSNF (per trip) 
DBGM-2 
TOS 
No 
Transporter is self-powered. 
Initial Aging Pad 
Aging Module - 
Horizontal 
DBGM-2 
[TOS] 
No 
Design to sustain DBGM-2 event without tipover or slap 
down of canister. 
Initial Aging Pad 
Aging Module - 
Vertical 
DBGM-2 
[TOS] 
No 
Design to sustain DBGM-2 event without tipover or slap 
down of canister. 

Table 12. Seismic Event Trees and Events Associated with Seismic Event Sequences (Continued) 
Generic SET Model 
Functional Area a 
Waste Form a 
DBGM 
Group a 
Operation 
Specific b,c 
Subject to 
LOSP Comment Comment 
Aging Pad #2 (+ Others) 
Aging Module - 
Horizontal 
DBGM-2 
[TOS] 
No 
Design to sustain DBGM-2 event without tipover or slap 
down of canister. 
Aging Pad #2 (+ Others) 
Aging Module - 
Vertical 
DBGM-2 
[TOS] 
No 
Design to sustain DBGM-2 event without tipover or slap 
down of canister. 
NOTES: a. From Table 4. 
b. Section 6.3.1.2 provides definitions of simplified event trees. 
c. Items in parentheses are screened out from further consideration per rationale in the Comments column. 
CSNFA = commercial spent nuclear fuel assembly; DBGM = design basis ground motion; DPC = dual-purpose canister; MSC = monitored geologic 
repository site-specific cask; NSNF = naval spent nuclear fuel; PWR = pressurized water reactor; RC = Rack collapse; SRTC = site rail transfer cart; 
WP = waste package. 

Table 13. Operation-Specific Failure Event Name Used with Generic Seismic Event Tree 
Generic Set a 
Failure Event Name in 
Generic b 
Failure Event Definition 
Functional Area 
Operation-Specific Failure 
Event Name c 
CHF Transfer Area - Pits (MSC) 
CHF Transfer Area - Pits (Canister) 
CHF Transfer Area - Staging Pits 
CHF WP Transporter Load 
CHF_COLL_EQ 
DTF Entrance Vestibule - 200 ton Cask 
Handling Crane 
DTF NSNF Receipt - 200 ton Navy Cask 
Handling Crane 
DTF NSNF Processing - 70 ton Navy Cask 
Handling Crane 
DTF Turntable and Preparation Rooms 
DTF Cask and MSC Docking Room 
DTF NSNF Receipt 
DTF NSNF Processing 
DTF - Waste Transfer - WP Docking 
DTF Waste Transfer - Cask & MSC Docking 
DTF Waste Transfer - Staging (CSNF) 
DTF Waste Transfer - Staging (Canisters) 
DTF Cask Restoration Room/Loaded MSC 
Removal 
DTF WP Handling and Staging Cell - Staging 
DTF WP Handling and Staging Cell - WP 
Closure Cells 
DTF WP Loadout 
DTF WP Remediation 
DTF Dry Cask Remediation 
DTF Wet Cask Remediation 
DTF Wet Cask Remediation - Staging Racks 
DTF_COLL_EQ 
COL 
CELL_COLL 
Collapse of Transfer Cell or 
Other Structure 
FHF Entrance Vestibule 
FHF Preparation / Restoration Area 
FHF WP Loadout Area 
FHF_COLL_EQ 

Table 13. Operation-Specific Failure Event Name Used with Generic Seismic Event Tree (Continued) 
Generic SET a 
Failure Event Name in 
Generic b 
Failure Event Definition 
Functional Area 
Operation-Specific Failure 
Event Name c 
EQPT_SUP 
See FHE 
See FHE 
See FHE 
CHF Transfer Area - Handling (Crane) 
DR_LOAD_CHF 
[CHF_LH_EQ + 
CHF_CONLH_EQ] 
DTF Entrance Vestibule (200 ton Cask 
Handling Crane) 
DTF NSNF Receipt - 200 ton Navy Cask 
Handling Crane 
DTF NSNF Processing - 70 ton Navy Cask 
Handling Crane 
DTF WP Handling and Staging Cell - Bridge 
Crane 
DR_LOAD_DTC 
[DTC_LH_EQ + 
DTC_CONLH_EQ] DTF NSNF Processing - 70 ton Navy Cask 
Handling Crane 
DTF WP Handling and Staging Cell - Bridge 
Crane 
DR_LOAD_DTC 
[DTC_LH_EQ + 
DTC_CONLH_EQ] 
DTF WP Handling and Staging Cell - Bridge 
Crane 
DR_LOAD_DTC 
[DTC_LH_EQ + 
DTC_CONLH_EQ] 
DR_LOAD_DTC 
[DTC_LH_EQ + 
DTC_CONLH_EQ] 
DTF Waste Transfer - Spent Fuel Transfer 
Machine 
FHF Waste Transfer - Spent Fuel Transfer 
Machine 
DR_LOAD_FHM 
[FHM_LH_EQ + 
FHM_CONLH_EQ] 
DR_LOAD_FHM 
[FHM_LH_EQ + 
FHM_CONLH_EQ] 
FHF Transfer Cell (Crane) 
DSL 
DR_LOAD 
Failure of Crane or Fuel Handling 
Machine to Maintain Load 
FHF Loaded MSC Receipt 
DR_LOAD_FHF 
[FHF_LH_EQ + 
FHF_CONLH_EQ] 
DR_LOAD_FHF 
[FHF_LH_EQ + 
FHF_CONLH_EQ] 
CHF Transfer Area - Pits (MSC) 
CHF Transfer Area - Pits (Canister) 
CHF WP Closure 
CHF WP Transporter Load 
CHF_EQSUP_EQ 
CHF WP Closure 
CHF WP Transporter Load 
CHF_EQSUP_EQ 
CHF WP Transporter Load 
CHF_EQSUP_EQ CHF_EQSUP_EQ 
FHE 
EQPT_SUP 
Failure of Support Structure of 
Crane or Fuel Handling Machine 
(Spent Fuel Transfer Machine) 
DTF Waste Transfer - Spent Fuel Transfer 
Machine 
FHM_EQSUP_EQ 

Table 13. Operation-Specific Failure Event Name Used with Generic Seismic Event Tree (Continued) 
Generic SET a 
Failure Event Name in 
Generic b 
Failure Event Definition 
Functional Area 
Operation-Specific Failure 
Event Name c 
DTF Waste Transfer - WP Docking 
DTF Waste Transfer - Cask & MSC Docking 
DTF WP Loadout 
DTF_EQSUP_EQ 
DTF WP Loadout 
DTF_EQSUP_EQ DTF_EQSUP_EQ 
DTF DPC Cutting 
DPCC_EQSUP_EQ 
FHF Transfer Cell - Pit 
FHF Loaded MSC Receipt 
FHF WP Closure Cell 
FHE 
(Continued) 
FHF WP Loadout Area 
FHF_EQSUP_EQ 
FHF WP Closure Cell 
FHE 
(Continued) 
FHF WP Loadout Area 
FHF_EQSUP_EQ 
FHE 
(Continued) 
FHF WP Loadout Area 
FHF_EQSUP_EQ FHF_EQSUP_EQ 
LOSP 
Loss of Offsite Power 
All active SSCs except battery powered 
LOSP_EQ (for all) 
DTF Entrance Vestibule - 200 ton Cask 
Handling Crane 
DTF NSNF Receipt - 200 ton Navy Cask 
Handling Crane 
DTF NSNF Processing - 70 ton Navy Cask 
Handling Crane 
EQT_FS_DTC 
[DTC_FS_EQ] 
DTF NSNF Processing - 70 ton Navy Cask 
Handling Crane 
EQT_FS_DTC 
[DTC_FS_EQ] 
EQT_FS_DTC 
[DTC_FS_EQ] 
DTF Waste Transfer - Spent Fuel Transfer 
Machine 
EQT_FS_FHM 
[FHM_FS_EQ] 
DTF WP Handling and Staging Cell - Bridge 
Crane 
EQT_FS_DHC 
[DHC_FS_EQ] 
LOSP 
EQT_FS 
Failure of Handling Equipment to 
Stop in Fail-Safe Mode 
FHF Transfer Cell (Crane) 
EQT_FS_FHC 
[FHC_FS_EQ] 

Table 13. Operation-Specific Failure Event Name Used with Generic Seismic Event Tree (Continued) 
Generic SET a 
Failure Event Name in 
Generic b 
Failure Event Definition 
Functional Area 
Operation-Specific Failure 
Event Name c 
CHF Entrance Vestibule 
TRCSK_FIXT_EQ 
CHF Transfer Area - Handling 
CHF_FIXT_EQ 
CHF WP Closure 
CHF_FIXT_EQ 
DTF Entrance Vestibule - SRTC 
TRCSK_FIXT_EQ 
DTF Turntable & Preparation Rooms 
DTF_FIXT_EQ 
DTF Cask and MSC Docking Room 
DTF_FIXT_EQ 
DTF NSNF Processing 
DTN_FIXT_EQ 
DTF Cask Restoration Room/Loaded MSC 
Removal 
DTN_FIXT_EQ 
DTF WP Handling and Staging Cell - Staging 
DTS_FIXT_EQ 
DTF WP Handling and Staging Cell - WP 
Closure Cells 
DTS_FIXT_EQ 
DTF DPC Cutting 
DPC_FIXT_EQ 
FHF Entrance Vestibule 
FHE_FIXT_EQ 
FHF Preparation/Restoration Area 
FHP_FIXT_EQ 
FHF Transfer Cell 
TRCSK_FIXT_EQ 
FHF WP Closure Cell 
FHC_FIXT_EQ 
TOS 
TROL_TO 
Trolley, Lorry, or Fixture Tipover, 
Slap Down or Impact 
WP Subsurface Transport and Emplacement - 
WP Transporter 
SSC_TRAN_EQ 

Table 13. Operation-Specific Failure Event Name Used with Generic Seismic Event Tree (Continued) 
Generic SET a 
Failure Event Name in 
Generic b 
Failure Event Definition 
Functional Area 
Operation-Specific Failure 
Event Name c 
SNF Aging Facility Transporters 
SMSC_TRAN_EQ 
TOS 
(Continued) 
TROL_TO 
(Continued) 
(see prior page) 
MSC Transporter 
MSC_TRANS_EQ 
CHF Transfer Area - Staging Pits 
CHF_RCK_EQ 
DTF Waste Transfer - Staging (CSNF) 
DTF_RCK_EQ 
DTF Wet Cask Remediation - Staging Racks 
(PWR CSNFA) 
RBP_RCK_EQ 
RC 
Not illustrated 
CSNFA Staging Racks Collapse 
Due To Earthquake 
DTF Wet Cask Remediation - Staging Racks 
(BWR CSNFA) 
RBB_RCK_EQ 
NOTES: a Defined in Table 12. 
b Defined in Attachment V. 
c Developed from fault tree; SET failure event replaced by basic event names for top event of supporting fault tree. 
BWR = boiling water reactor; CHF = Canister Handling Facility; CSNFA = commercial spent nuclear fuel assembly; DPC = dual-purpose canister; 
DTF = Dry Transfer Facility; FHF = Fuel Handling Facility; MSC = monitored geologic repository site-specific cask; NSNF = naval spent nuclear fuel; 
PWR = pressurized water reactor; RC = rack collapse; SET = seismic event tree; SSCs = structures, systems, and components; SNF = spent nuclear 
fuel; SRTC = site rail transfer cart; WP = waste package. 

Table 15 lists the Boolean expressions for the event sequences associated with failures of 
DBGM-1 SSCs. Table 16 lists the Boolean expressions for the event sequences associated with 
failures of DBGM-2 SSCs. The Boolean expressions for many functional areas are reduced to 
one cutset containing one seismic failure event. The same basic event may appear in the 
Boolean expressions for two or more event sequences. If so, the rules of Boolean algebra are 
applied to absorb the multiple occurrences in the Boolean expression for the combination of 
event sequences. 
Tables 12 and 13 are used to generate the HCLPF capacity for the repository using the min-max 
process. First, HCLPF capacities for each SSC failure event are entered into the Event HCLPF 
Capacities columns of Tables 12 and 13. The min-max logic is applied, as appropriate, to the 
Boolean expression for each functional area to determine the limiting HCLPF capacity for failure 
events associated with each. 
Figure 11 indicates that event sequences involving DBGM-1 SSCs must be combined with AND 
logic to produce a dose that could exceed 5 rem TEDE. After re-assignment of some functional 
areas and their associated SSCs to DBGM-2, the sum of doses from the remaining DBGM-1 
SSCs is only 0.04 rem (recorded in Table 14). Therefore, the seismic events from the AND gate 
do not contribute to the evaluation of the overall Boolean expression for exceeding 5 rem. This 
does not preclude a large seismic event (i.e., larger then DBGM-1, but less than DBGM-2) that 
would fail all DBGM-1 SSCs, resulting in an offsite dose of 0.04 rem. 
Table 15 indicates that the minimum HCLPF capacity for DBGM-1 SSCs is 0.93 g. This 
represents the level of ground motion at which there is about a 1 percent chance that at least one 
SSC would fail and potentially result in an offsite dose greater than 15 mrem (but less than 5 
rem) at the site boundary (or exceed other DBGM-1 dose limits). 
However, the AND analysis of seismic failures of DBGM-1 SSCs provides a Boolean expression 
for evaluating the HCLPF capacity for contributing toward doses that exceed the 5 rem limit for 
Category 2 event sequences, when combined with the seismic failure of one or more DBGM-2 
SSCs. Therefore, the net HCLPF capacity for the combined event sequences in Table 15 is the 
maximum of the HCLPF capacities of the DBGM-1 SSCs for the event sequences of the 
individual functional areas. This HCLPF represents the peak ground motion at which there is a 
probability of 0.01 (or less) of having an offsite dose of 0.04 rem. This result is 0.93 g. 
Figure 11 also indicates that event sequences involving DBGM-2 SSCs must be combined with 
OR logic. Therefore, the HCLPF capacity for the combined event sequences in Table 16 is the 
minimum of the HCLPF capacities of the SSCs for the event sequences of the individual 
functional areas. This result shown is 1.45 g. 

Table 14. Basic Event Names and Estimated HCLPF Capacities 
Functional Area a 
Operation-Specific 
Failure Event Name 
Category Of SSCs For 
Representative HCLPF 
Capacity 
Loss Of 
Safety 
Function b 
HCLPF 
Capacity - 
DBGM-1 (g) b 
HCLPF 
Capacity- 
DBGM-2 (g) b 
CHF Transfer Area - Pits 
CHF Transfer Area - Staging Pits 
CHF WP Transporter Load 
CHF_COLL_EQ 
Concrete Shear Wall 
Collapse 
--- 
2.32 
DTF Entrance Vestibule - Crane 
DTF Turntable and Preparation Rooms 
DTF Cask and MSC Docking Room 
DTF - Waste Transfer - WP Docking 
DTF Waste Transfer - Cask and MSC 
Docking 
DTF Waste Transfer - Staging (CSNF) 
DTF Waste Transfer - Staging (Canisters) 
DTF WP Handling and Staging Cell - 
Staging 
DTF WP Handling and Staging Cell - WP 
Closure Cells 
DTF WP Loadout 
DTF_COLL_EQ 
Concrete Shear Wall 
Collapse 
--- 
2.32 
DTF NSNF Receipt - 70 ton Navy Cask 
Handling Crane 
DTF NSNF Processing - 200 ton Navy 
Cask Handling Crane 
DTF_COLL_EQ 
Concrete Shear Wall 
Collapse 
--- 
2.32 
DTF Cask Restoration Room/Loaded 
MSC Removal 
DTF_COLL_EQ 
Concrete Shear Wall 
Collapse 
1.48 
--- 
DTF Waste Transfer - Staging (CSNF) 
DTF_COLL_EQ 
Concrete Shear Wall 
Collapse 
--- 
2.32 
DTF WP Remediation 
DTF Dry Remediation 
DTF_COLL_EQ 
Concrete Shear Wall 
Collapse 
--- 
2.32 

Table 14. Basic Event Names and Estimated HCLPF Capacities (Continued) 
Functional Area a 
Operation-Specific 
Failure Event Name 
Category Of SSCs For 
Representative HCLPF 
Capacity 
Loss Of 
Safety 
Function b 
HCLPF 
Capacity - 
DBGM-1 (g) b 
HCLPF 
Capacity- 
DBGM-2 (g)b 
DTF Wet Remediation 
DTF Wet Remediation - Staging Racks 
DTF_COLL_EQ 
Concrete Shear Wall 
Collapse 
--- 
2.32 
FHF Entrance Vestibule 
FHF Preparation/Restoration Area 
FHF WP Loadout Area 
FHF_COLL_EQ 
Concrete Shear Wall 
Collapse 
--- 
2.32 
CHF Transfer Area - Handling (Crane) 
DR_LOAD_CHF 
[CHF_LH_EQ + 
CHF_CONLM_EQ] 
Mechanical Equipment 
Fail to perform 
safety function, 
minimum 
(Active) 
--- 
1.45 
DTF NSNF Receipt - 200 ton Navy Cask 
Handling Crane 
DTF NSNF Processing - 70 ton Navy 
Cask Handling Crane 
DR_LOAD_DTC b 
[DTF_LH_EQ + 
DTF_CONLM_EQ] 
Mechanical Equipment 
Fail to perform 
safety function, 
minimum 
(Active) 
--- 
1.45 
DTF Entrance Vestibule (200 ton Cask 
Handling Crane) 
DTF WP Handling and Staging Cell - 
Bridge Crane 
DR_LOAD_DTC b 
[DTF_LH_EQ + 
DTF_CONLM_EQ] 
Mechanical Equipment 
Fail to perform 
safety function, 
minimum 
(Active) 
--- 
1.45 
DTF Waste Transfer - Spent Fuel 
Transfer Machine 
DR_LOAD_FHM b 
[DTF_LH_EQ + 
DTF_CONLM_EQ] 
Mechanical Equipment 
Fail to perform 
safety function, 
minimum 
(Active) 
0.93 
--- 
FHF Waste Transfer - Spent Fuel 
Transfer Machine 
DR_LOAD_FHM b 
[DTF_LH_EQ + 
DTF_CONLM_EQ] 
Mechanical Equipment 
Fail to perform 
safety function, 
minimum 
(Active) 
0.93 
--- 
FHF Transfer Cell (Crane) 
FHF Loaded MSC Receipt 
DR_LOAD_FHF 
[FHF_LH_EQ + 
FHF_CONLM_EQ] 
Mechanical Equipment 
Fail to perform 
safety function, 
minimum 
(Active) 
--- 
1.45 

Table 14. Basic Event Names and Estimated HCLPF Capacities (Continued) 
Functional Area a 
Operation-Specific 
Failure Event Name 
Category Of SSCs For 
Representative HCLPF 
Capacity 
Loss Of 
Safety 
Function b 
HCLPF 
Capacity - 
DBGM-1 (g) b 
HCLPF 
Capacity- 
DBGM-2 (g)b 
CHF Transfer Area - Pits (Canister) 
CHF_EQSUP_EQ 
Supports 
Failure to 
support 
equipment 
--- 
1.74 
CHF Transfer Area - Pits (MSC) 
CHF_EQSUP_EQ 
Supports 
Failure to 
support 
equipment 
--- 
1.74 
CHF WP Closure 
CHF_EQSUP_EQ 
Supports 
Failure to 
support 
equipment 
--- 
1.74 
CHF WP Transporter Load 
CHF_EQSUP_EQ 
Supports 
Failure to 
support 
equipment 
--- 
1.74 
DTF Waste Transfer - Spent Fuel 
Transfer Machine 
FHM_EQSUP_EQ 
Supports 
Failure to 
support 
equipment 
--- 
1.74 
DTF Waste Transfer - WP Docking 
DTF_CRSUP_EQ 
Supports 
Failure to 
support 
equipment 
--- 
1.74 
DTF Waste Transfer - Cask and MSC 
Docking 
DTF_EQSUP_EQ 
Supports 
Failure to 
support 
equipment 
--- 
1.74 
DTF WP Loadout 
DTF_EQSUP_EQ 
Supports 
Failure to 
support 
equipment 
--- 
1.74 
DTF DPC Cutting 
DPCC_EQSUP_EQ 
Supports 
Failure to 
support 
equipment 
--- 
1.74 
FHF Transfer Cell - Pit 
FHF_EQSUP_EQ 
Supports 
Failure to 
support 
equipment 
--- 
1.74 

Table 14. Basic Event Names and Estimated HCLPF Capacities (Continued) 
Functional Area a 
Operation-Specific 
Failure Event Name 
Category Of SSCs For 
Representative HCLPF 
Capacity 
Loss Of 
Safety 
Function b 
HCLPF 
Capacity - 
DBGM-1 (g) b 
HCLPF 
Capacity- 
DBGM-2 (g)b 
FHF Loaded MSC Receipt 
FHF_EQSUP_EQ 
Supports 
Failure to 
support 
equipment 
--- 
1.74 
FHF WP Closure Cell 
FHF_EQSUP_EQ 
Supports 
Failure to 
support 
equipment 
--- 
1.74 
FHF WP Loadout Area 
FHF_EQSUP_EQ 
Supports 
Failure to 
support 
equipment 
--- 
1.74 
LOSP 
LOSP_EQ (for all) 
Ceramic Insulators 
Loss of power 
to cranes and 
handling 
equipment 
0.10 
0.10 
DTF Entrance Vestibule - 200 ton Cask 
Handling Crane 
EQT_FS_DTC 
[DTF_FS_EQ] 
Mechanical Equipment 
Fail to perform 
safety function, 
minimum 
(Active) 
--- 
1.45 
DTF NSNF Receipt - 200 ton Navy Cask 
Handling Crane - Receipt 
EQT_FS_DTC 
[DTF_FS_EQ] 
Mechanical Equipment 
Fail to perform 
safety function, 
minimum 
(Active) 
1.45 
DTF NSNF Processing - 70 ton Navy 
Cask Handling Crane - Processing 
EQT_FS_DTC 
[DTF_FS_EQ] 
Mechanical Equipment 
Fail to perform 
safety function, 
minimum 
(Active) 
1.45 
DTF Waste Transfer - Spent Fuel 
Transfer Machine 
EQT_FS_FHM 
[DTF_FS_EQ] 
Mechanical Equipment 
Fail to perform 
safety function, 
minimum 
(Active) 
0.93 
--- 

Table 14. Basic Event Names and Estimated HCLPF Capacities (Continued) 
Functional Area a 
Operation-Specific 
Failure Event Name 
Category Of SSCs For 
Representative HCLPF 
Capacity 
Loss Of 
Safety 
Function b 
HCLPF 
Capacity - 
DBGM-1 (g) b 
HCLPF 
Capacity- 
DBGM-2 (g)b 
DTF WP Handling and Staging Cell - 
Bridge Crane 
EQT_FS_DHC 
[FHF_FS_EQ] 
Mechanical Equipment 
Fail to perform 
safety function, 
minimum 
(Active) 
--- 
1.45 
FHF Transfer Cell (Crane) 
EQT_FS_FHC 
Mechanical Equipment 
Fail to perform 
safety function, 
minimum 
(Active) 
--- 
1.45 
CHF Entrance Vestibule 
TRCSK_FIXT_EQ 
Supports 
Fail to support 
equipment 
--- 
1.74 
CHF Transfer Area - Handling 
CHF_FIXT_EQ 
Supports 
Fail to support 
equipment 
--- 
1.74 
CHF WP Closure 
CHF_FIXT_EQ 
Supports 
Fail to support 
equipment 
--- 
1.74 
DTF Entrance Vestibule - SRTC 
TRCSK_FIXT_EQ 
Mechanical Equipment 
Fail to perform 
safety function, 
minimum 
(Active) 
--- 
1.45 
DTF Turntable & Preparation Rooms 
DTF_FIXT_EQ 
Supports 
Failure to 
support 
equipment 
--- 
1.74 
DTF Cask and MSC Docking Room 
DTF_FIXT_EQ 
Supports 
Failure to 
support 
equipment 
--- 
1.74 
DTF NSNF Processing 
DTN_FIXT_EQ 
Supports 
Failure to 
support 
equipment 
--- 
1.74 
DTF Cask Restoration Room/Loaded 
MSC Removal 
DTN_FIXT_EQ 
Supports 
Failure to 
support 
equipment 
--- 
1.74 

Table 14. Basic Event Names and Estimated HCLPF Capacities (Continued) 
Functional Area a 
Operation-Specific 
Failure Event Name 
Category Of SSCs For 
Representative HCLPF 
Capacity 
Loss Of 
Safety 
Function b 
HCLPF 
Capacity - 
DBGM-1 (g) b 
HCLPF 
Capacity- 
DBGM-2 (g)b 
DTF WP Handling and Staging Cell - 
Staging 
DTS_FIXT_EQ 
Supports 
Failure to 
support 
equipment 
--- 
1.74 
DTF WP Handling and Staging Cell - WP 
Closure Cells 
DTS_FIXT_EQ 
Supports 
Failure to 
support 
equipment 
--- 
1.74 
DTF DPC Cutting 
DPC_FIXT_EQ 
Supports 
Failure to 
support 
equipment 
--- 
1.74 
FHF Entrance Vestibule 
FHE_FIXT_EQ 
Supports 
Failure to 
support 
equipment 
--- 
1.74 
FHF Preparation/Restoration Area 
FHP_FIXT_EQ 
Supports 
Failure to 
support 
equipment 
--- 
1.74 
FHF Transfer Cell 
TRCSK_FIXT_EQ 
Supports 
Failure to 
support 
equipment 
--- 
1.74 
FHF WP Closure Cell 
FHC_FIXT_EQ 
Supports 
Failure to 
support 
equipment 
--- 
1.74 
WP Subsurface Transport and 
Emplacement - WP Transporter 
SSC_TRAN_EQ 
Mechanical Equipment 
(On-board 
electromechanical) 
Fail to perform 
safety function, 
minimum 
(Active) 
--- 
1.45 
MSC Transport (MSC/DPC/DSNF) 
MSC_TRAN_EQ 
Mechanical Equipment 
(On-board 
electromechanical) 
Fail to perform 
safety function, 
minimum 
(Active) 
--- 
1.45 

Table 14. Basic Event Names and Estimated HCLPF Capacities (Continued) 
Functional Area a 
Operation-Specific 
Failure Event Name 
Category Of SSCs For 
Representative HCLPF 
Capacity 
Loss Of 
Safety 
Function b 
HCLPF 
Capacity - 
DBGM-1 (g) b 
HCLPF 
Capacity- 
DBGM-2 (g)b 
SNF Aging Facility MSC Transport 
SMSC_TRAN_EQ 
Mechanical Equipment 
(On-board 
electromechanical) 
Fail to perform 
safety function, 
minimum 
(Active) 
--- 
1.45 
CHF Transfer Area - Staging Pits 
CHF_RCK_EQ 
Mechanical Equipment 
(Mid-range, passive) 
Fail to perform 
safety function, 
maximum 
(Passive) 
--- 
2.90 
DTF Waste Transfer - Staging (CSNF) 
DTF_RCK_EQ 
Mechanical Equipment 
(Mid-range, passive) 
Fail to perform 
safety function, 
maximum 
(Passive) 
--- 
2.90 
DTF Wet Cask Remediation - Staging 
Racks (PWR or BWR CSNFA) 
RBP_RCK_EQ 
Mechanical Equipment 
(Mid-range, passive) 
Fail to perform 
safety function, 
maximum 
(Passive) 
--- 
2.90 
NOTES: a From Table 4. 
b HCLPF capacities of SSCs and defined safety functions are based on Table 11. 
BWR = boiling water reactor; CHF = Canister Handling Facility; CSNF = commercial spent nuclear fuel; DBGM = design basis ground motion; 
DPC = dual-purpose canister; DSNF = U.S. Department of Energy-owned spent nuclear fuel; DTF = Dry Transfer Facility; FHF = Fuel Handling 
Facility; HCLPF = high confidence of low probability of failure; LOSP = loss of offsite power; MSC = monitored geologic repository site-specific 
cask; NSNF = naval spent nuclear fuel; PWR = pressurized water reactor; SNF = spent nuclear fuel; SNF = spent nuclear fuel; SRTC = site rail 
transfer cart; WP = waste package. 

Table 15. Boolean Expression and HCLPF Capacity Evaluation for Event Sequences 
Involving DBGM-1 Structures, Systems, and Components 
Functional Area 
Offsite Dose 
(rem) a 
SET Model 
Boolean Expression for Event Sequence 
HCLPF Capacity 
Calculation for 
Sequence 
Boolean (g) b 
HCLPF Capacity for 
Sequence (g) c 
DTF Waste Transfer - Spent Fuel Transfer 
Machine 
0.03 
DSL 
DR_LOAD_FHM 
0.93 
0.93 
FHF Waste Transfer - Spent Fuel Transfer 
Machine 
0.01 
DSL 
DR_LOAD_FHM 
0.93 
0.93 
Total Dose from the loss of Safety 
Function for DBGM-1 SSCs c 
0.04 
Net HCLPF for DBGM-1 event sequences: {max} c = 
{0.93} 
Minimum HCLPF for Any DBGM-1 event sequences: {min} c = 
{0.93} 
NOTES: a See Table 4 for source of dose values, and Table 14 for HCLPF capacities. 
b Boolean expressions for DBGM-1 use min{} or max{} logic as shown. 
c HCLPF capacity for the seismic failure of all DBGM-1 SSCs is the maximum HCLPF capacity of individual SSCs. The HCLPF capacity for seismic 
failure of any single DBGM-1 SSC is the minimum HCLPF capacity of individual SSCs. 
CSNF = commercial spent nuclear fuel; DBGM = design basis ground motion; DPC = dual-purpose canister; DTF = Dry Transfer Facility; HCLPF = high 
probability of low probability of failure; MSC = monitored geologic repository site-specific cask; NSNF = naval spent nuclear fuel; SRTC = site rail transfer 
cart; SSCs = structures, systems, and components. 

Table 16. Boolean Expression and HCLPF Capacity Evaluation for Event Sequences 
Involving DBGM-2 Structures, Systems, and Components 
Functional Area a 
Offsite Dose 
(rem) a 
SET 
Model b 
Boolean Expression for Event Sequence 
HCLPF Capacity 
Calculation for 
Sequence 
Boolean (g) a,d 
HCLPF Capacity for 
Sequence (g) c 
CHF Entrance Vestibule 
> 5 
TOS 
TRCSK_FIXT_EQ 
1.74 
1.74 
CHF Transfer Area - Handling 
> 5 
TOS 
CHF_FIXT_EQ 
1.74 
1.74 
CHF Transfer Area - Pits (MSC) 
> 5 
COL + FHE 
CHF_COLL_EQ + CHF_EQSUP_EQ 
min{2.32, 1.74} 
1.74 
CHF Transfer Area - Pits (Canister) 
> 5 
COL + FHE 
CHF_COLL_EQ + CHF_EQSUP_EQ 
min{2.32, 1.74 } 
1.74 
CHF Transfer Area - Staging Pits 
> 5 
COL + RC 
CHF_COLL_EQ + CHF_RCK_EQ 
min{2.32, 2.90} 
2.32 
CHF WP Closure 
> 5 
TOS + FHE 
CHF_FIXT_EQ + CHF_EQSUP_EQ 
min{1.74, 1.74} 
1.74 
CHF WP Transporter Load 
> 5 
COL + FHE 
CHF_COLL_EQ + CHF_EQSUP_EQ 
min{2.32, 1.74} 
1.74 
DTF Entrance Vestibule - SRTC 
0.68 
TOS 
TRCSK_FIXT_EQ 
1.45 
1.45 
DTF Entrance Vestibule - 200 ton Cask 
Handling Crane 
> 5 
COL + DSL 
+ LOSP 
DTF_COLL_EQ + DR_LOAD_DTC 
+ (LOS_EQ + EQT_FS_DTC) 
min{2.32, 1.45, 
max{0.1,1.45}} 
1.45 
DTF Turntable Preparation Rooms 
> 5 
COL + TOS 
DTF_COLL_EQ + DTF_FIXT_EQ 
min{2.32, 1.74} 
1.74 
DTF Cask and MSC Docking Room 
> 5 
COL + TOS 
DTF_COLL_EQ + DTF_FIXT_EQ 
min{2.32, 1.74 } 
1.74 

Table 16. Boolean Expression and HCLPF Capacity Evaluation for Event Sequences 
Involving DBGM-2 Structures, Systems, and Components (Continued) 
Functional Area a 
Offsite Dose 
(rem) a 
SET 
Model b 
Boolean Expression for Event Sequence 
HCLPF Capacity 
Calculation for 
Sequence 
Boolean (g) a,d 
HCLPF Capacity for 
Sequence (g) c 
DTF NSNF Receipt - 200 ton Navy Cask 
Handling Crane 
0.01 
(Reassigned 
from DBGM1) 
COL + DSL + 
LOSP 
DTF_COLL_EQ + DR_LOAD_DTC 
+ (EQT_FS_DTC + LOS_EQ) 
min{2.32, 1.45, 
max{0.1,1.45}} 
1.45 
DTF NSNF Processing - 70 ton Navy Cask 
Handling Crane 
0.01 
(Reassigned 
from DBGM1) 
COL + DSL + 
LOSP 
DTF_COLL_EQ + DR_LOAD_DTC 
+ (EQT_FS_DTC + LOD_EQ) 
min{2.32, 1.45, 
max{0.1,1.45}} 
1.45 
DTF Waste Transfer - WP Docking 
> 5 
COL + FHE 
DTF_COLL_EQ + DTF_EQSUP_EQ 
min{2.32, 1.74} 
1.74 
DTF Waste Transfer - Cask and MSC 
Docking 
> 5 
COL + FHE 
DTF_COLL_EQ + DTF_EQSUP_EQ 
min{2.32, 1.74} 
1.74 
DTF Waste Transfer - Staging (Canisters) 
> 5 
COL 
DTF_COLL_EQ 
2.32 
2.32 
DTF WP Handling and Staging Cell - 
Staging [WP (Canister)] 
> 5 
COL + TOS 
DTF_COLL_EQ + DTS_FIXT_EQ 
min{2.32, 1.74 } 
1.74 
DTF WP Handling and Staging Cell - 
Bridge Crane [WP (Canister)] 
> 5 
DSL 
DR_LOAD_DTC 
1.45 
1.45 
DTF WP Handling and Staging Cell - WP 
Closure Cells [WP (Canister)] 
> 5 
COL + TOS 
DTF_COLL_EQ + DTS_FIXT_EQ 
min{2.32, 1.74} 
1.74 
DTF WP Loadout [WP (Canister)] 
> 5 
COL + FHE 
DTF_COLL_EQ + DTF_EQSUP_EQ 
min{2.32, 1.74} 
1.74 
DTF WP Remediation WP 
> 5 
COL 
DTF_COLL_EQ 
2.32 
2.32 

Table 16. Boolean Expression and HCLPF Capacity Evaluation for Event Sequences 
Involving DBGM-2 Structures, Systems, and Components (Continued) 
Functional Area a 
Offsite Dose 
(rem) a 
SET 
Model b 
Boolean Expression for Event Sequence 
HCLPF Capacity 
Calculation for 
Sequence 
Boolean (g) a,d 
HCLPF Capacity for 
Sequence (g) c 
DTF Cask Restoration Room / Loaded 
MSC Removal 
0.68 
COL + TOS 
DTF_COLL_EQ + DTN_FIXT_EQ 
min{2.32, 1.74} 
1.74 
DTF Dry Remediation 
> 5 
COL 
DTF_COLL_EQ 
2.32 
2.32 
DTF Wet Remediation - Laydown Area, 
Cask Wet Remediation Entrance Vestibule 
> 5 
COL 
DTF_COLL_EQ 
2.32 
2.32 
DTF DPC Cutting 
0.96 
TOS + FHE 
DPC_FIXT_EQ + DPCC_EQSUP_EQ 
min{1.74, 1.74} 
1.74 
FHF Entrance Vestibule 
> 5 
COL + TOS 
FHF_COLL_EQ + FHE_FIXT_EQ 
min{2.32, 1.74} 
1.74 
FHF Preparation/Restoration Area 
> 5 
COL + TOS 
FHF_COLL_EQ + FHE_FIXT_EQ 
min{2.32, 1.74} 
1.74 
FHF Transfer Cell 
> 5 
DSL + TOS 
DR_LOAD_FHF + TRCSK_FIXT_EQ 
min{1.45, 1.74} 
1.45 
FHF Transfer Cell - Pits (MSC and WP) 
> 5 
FHE 
FHF_EQSUP_EQ 
1.74 
1.74 
FHF Loaded MSC Receipt 
> 5 
DSL + FHE 
DR_LOAD_FHF + FHF_EQSUP_EQ 
min{1.45, 1.74} 
1.45 
FHF WP Closure Cell 
> 5 
TOS + FHE 
FHC_FIXT_EQ + FHF_EQSUP_EQ 
min{1.74, 1.74} 
1.74 
FHF WP Loadout Area 
> 5 
COL + FHE 
FHF_COLL_EQ + FHF_EQSUP_EQ 
min{2.32, 1.74} 
1.74 
WP Subsurface Transport and 
Emplacement - WP Transporter 
> 5 
TOS 
SSC_TRAN_EQ 
1.45 
1.45 

Table 16. Boolean Expression and HCLPF Capacity Evaluation for Event Sequences 
Involving DBGM-2 Structures, Systems, and Components (Continued) 
Functional Area a 
Offsite Dose 
(rem) a 
SET 
Model b 
Boolean Expression for Event Sequence 
HCLPF Capacity 
Calculation for 
Sequence 
Boolean (g) a,d 
HCLPF Capacity for 
Sequence (g) c 
SNF Aging Facility MSC Transport 
(Canister) 
> 5 
TOS 
SMSC_TRAN_EQ 
1.45 
1.45 
DTF Waste Transfer - Staging (CSNF) 
2.26 
COL + RC 
DTF_COLL_EQ + DTF_RCK_EQ 
min{2.32, 2.90} 
2.32 
Total Dose from the loss of Safety 
Function for DBGM-2 SSCs c 
> 5 
Net HCLPF for DBGM-2 event sequences: {min} b = 
{1.45} 
NOTES: a See Table 4 for source of dose values, and Table 14 for HCLPF capacities. 
b Items without operation-specific SET Model are not shown; see Table 12. 
c HCLPF capacity for all DBGM-2 is minimum HCLPF capacity of SSCs. 
d Boolean expression for all DBGM-2 is UNION OR logic of the Boolean expressions of all the sequences. 
CSNF = commercial spent nuclear fuel; DBGM = design basis ground motion; DPC = dual-purpose canister; DTF = Dry Transfer Facility; HCLPF = 
high confidence of low probability of failure; MSC = monitored geologic repository site-specific cask; RB = Remediation Building; SRTC = site rail 
transfer cart; SSCs = structures, systems, and components; WP = waste package. 

Furthermore, Figure 11 applies OR logic to combine the Boolean expressions from Tables 12 
and 13 to obtain the facility-wide HCLPF capacity for the top event, Seismic Failures Result in 
Dose = 5 rem (or unknown). However, the seismic failures of the DBGM-1 SSCs do not 
contribute to the Boolean expression for exceeding 5 rem. Therefore, the HCLPF capacities 
derived in Table 16 result in 1.45 g for the repository-wide HCLPF capacity, based on the 
analysis presented. This HCLPF capacity is the ground acceleration at which there is a 
probability of 0.01 of exceeding the offsite dose limit of 5 rem TEDE. 
Because the PGA for the BDBGM at the surface is estimated as 1.19 g (Table 1) and the 
repository-wide HCLPF capacity of 1.45 g exceeds this value, the preliminary repository design 
is demonstrated to be sufficient based on the analysis presented herein. 
7. RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS 
This calculation provides a seismic preclosure safety analysis to support the DOE License 
Application design effort for a repository at Yucca Mountain and provides the assignment of 
DBGM-1 and DBGM-2 design bases to SSCs credited in the prevention of seismic event 
sequences. 
To establish a basis for the classification of SSCs ITS, which are credited in the prevention or 
mitigation of a seismically-initiated event sequence, an identification of potential seismic event 
sequences was performed. The results of this evaluation are included in Attachment III. Using 
the defined probability-based levels of design basis ground motions (i.e., DBGM-1 and 
DBGM-2) in Table 1, each functional area and major system was assigned a DBGM level based 
on the potential offsite dose (Table 4). A limited number of DBGM-1 facilities were reclassified 
to DBGM-2 to comply with 10 CFR 63.111 such that the failure of all DBGM-1 
facilities would not exceed 5 rem. Using this assessment, the classification of DBGM levels to 
identified SSCs ITS was performed and is presented in Tables IV-1 and IV-2. 
Assigning DBGM-1 to SSCs prevents seismically initiated event sequences that could expose 
workers, onsite public, or offsite public to doses that exceed the performance objectives for 
Category 1 event sequences, as defined in 10 CFR 63.111(a) and (b)(1). Assigning DBGM-2 to 
SSCs prevents seismically initiated event sequences that could 1) expose the offsite public to 
doses that exceed the performance objectives for Category 2 event sequences, as defined in 10 
CFR 63.111(b)(2), or 2) potentially lead to a criticality condition. 
For preclosure seismic analyses to address 10 CFR 63 requirements, a method for computing 
seismic margins has been described in this calculation and the methodology has been 
demonstrated. The seismic margins analysis demonstrates that SSCs designed for DBGM-2 will 
ensure a high-confidence of low probability of failure that the Category 2 performance objectives 
will be achieved even for the accelerations associated with the BDBGM levels. Section 6.1 
summarizes the methods for this calculation, Section 6.1.1 provides the stages and steps to be 
performed for the seismic calculation, Attachment II provides a description of methods, and 
Sections 6.3 and 6.4 provide the analysis of doses to the public and workers, respectively, 
together with an evaluation of interactions in Section 6.5. 

To provide an estimate of facility-wide HCLPF capacity, a logic network was established 
(composed of fault and event trees) to describe the earthquake-initiated sequences and identify 
simplified trees to be used in the HCLPF calculation for offsite dose. The result of the analyses 
for facility-wide HCLPF capacity for preventing an offsite dose that exceeds 5 rem (represented 
by Figure 11) is 1.45 g, which compares favorably with 1.19 g (i.e., BDBGM in Table 1 for 
surface). 
In addition, the minimum DBGM-2 HCLPF capacity (i.e. 1.45 g, from Table 16) exceeds the 
BDBGM margin value of 1.19 g for the surface facilities. Therefore, as all HCLPF capacities 
exceed margin values, sufficient margin has been demonstrated for the repository. 
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Nuclear Regulatory Commission. TIC: 246563. 
Williams, N.H. 2003a. "Thermal Inputs for Evaluations Supporting TSPA-LA, Supplement. 
Interoffice memorandum from N.H. Williams (BSC) to Distribution, April 4, 2003, 0205035938, 
with enclosures. ACC: |MOL.20030501.0081. 
Williams, N.H. 2003b. "Contract No. DE-AC28-01RW12101 - Licensing Position-034, 
Preclosure Period Duration. Letter from N.H. Williams (BSC) to J.D. Ziegler (DOE/ORD), 
December 15, 2003, 1209039726, with enclosure. ACC: MOL.20040107.0059. 
YMP (Yucca Mountain Site Characterization Project) 1997a. Preclosure Seismic Design 
Methodology for a Geologic Repository at Yucca Mountain. Topical Report YMP/TR-003-NP, 
Rev 02. Las Vegas, Nevada: Yucca Mountain Site Characterization Office. 
ACC: MOL.19971009.0412. 
YMP 1997b. Methodology to Assess Fault Displacement and Vibratory Ground Motion 
Hazards at Yucca Mountain. Topical Report YMP/TR-002-NP, Rev. 1. Las Vegas, Nevada: 
Yucca Mountain Site Characterization Office. ACC: MOL.19971016.0777. 
8.2 CODES, STANDARDS, REGULATIONS, AND PROCEDURES 
10 CFR 20. Energy: Standards for Protection Against Radiation. Readily Available. 
10 CFR 35. Energy: Medical Use of Byproduct Material. Readily Available. 
10 CFR 60. Energy: Disposal of High-Level Radioactive Wastes in Geologic Repositories. 
Readily available. 
10 CFR 63. Energy: Disposal of High-Level Radioactive Wastes in a Geologic Repository at 
Yucca Mountain, Nevada. Readily available. 
10 CFR 71. Energy: Packaging and Transportation of Radioactive Material. Readily available. 
ASCE 4-98. 2000. Seismic Analysis of Safety-Related Nuclear Structures and Commentary. 
Reston, Virginia: American Society of Civil Engineers. TIC: 253158. 
ASME RA-S-2002. Standard for Probabilistic Risk Assessment for Nuclear Power Plant 
Applications. New York, New York: American Society of Mechanical Engineers. TIC: 
255508. 
DOE-STD-1020-2002. 2002. Natural Phenomena Hazards Design and Evaluation Criteria for 
Department of Energy Facilities. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Energy. TIC: 253058. 
ICC (International Code Council) 2000. International Building Code 2000. Falls Church, 
Virginia: International Code Council. TIC: 251054. 

AP-3.12Q, Rev. 2, ICN 2. Design Calculations and Analyses. Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Department of Energy, Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management. ACC: 
DOC.20040318.0002. 
AP-3.15Q, Rev. 4, ICN 5. Managing Technical Product Inputs. Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Department of Energy, Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste 
Management. ACC: DOC.20040812.0004. 
LP-SI.11Q-BSC, Rev. 0, ICN 0. Software Management. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department 
of Energy, Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management. ACC: DOC.20040225.0007. 
8.3 DATA 
MO0306SDSAVDTH.000. Seismic Design Spectra and Acceleration, Velocity, and 
Displacement Time Histories for the Emplacement Level at 10-4 Annual Exceedance Frequency. 
Submittal date: 06/26/2003. 
MO0405SDSTPNTB.001. Seismic Design Spectra (5% Damped) and Time Histories for the 
Emplacement Level (Point B) at 10-3 Annual Exceedance Frequency. Submittal date: 
05/03/2004. 
MO0407SDARS104.001. Seismic Design Spectra (5% Damped) for the Emplacement Level 
(Point B) at 5X10-4 Annual Exceedance Frequency. Submittal date: 07/13/2004. 
MO0411SDSDE103.003. Seismic Design Spectra and Time Histories for the Surface Facilities 
Area (Point D/E) at 10-3 Annual Exceedance Frequency. Submittal date: 11/16/2004. 
MO0411SDSTMHIS.006. Seismic Design Spectra and Time Histories for the Surface Facilities 
Area (Point D/E) at 5E-4 Annual Exceedance Frequency. Submittal date: 11/16/2004. 
MO0411WHBDE104.003. Seismic Design Spectra and Time Histories for the Surface Facilities 
Area (Point D/E) at 10-4 Annual Exceedance Frequency. Submittal date: 11/16/2004. 

INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 

ATTACHMENT I 
SKETCH OF SURFACE LAYOUT 

INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 

ATTACHMENT I 
SKETCH OF SURFACE LAYOUT 
Attached is a sketch of the repository facilities as presently understood (Figure I-1). It depicts 
the location of surface waste handling facilities such as the CHF, DTF, FHF, and additional SNF 
aging facilities. A list identifying structures in this figure that handle HLW (or directly support 
HLW-handling operations) is presented in Table I-1. 


Table I-1. Identification of High-Level Waste Handling Related Structures at Surface 
Facility Description 
HLW 
Handling 
Related 
System / 
Facility 
Dry Transfer Facility #1 (DTF-1) 
v 
Dry Transfer Facility #2 (DTF-2) 
v 
Transportation Cask Receipt/Return Facility (TCRRF) - 
Cask Receipt and Return Area a,b 
v 
Transportation Cask Receipt/Return Facility (TCRRF) - 
Transportation Cask Buffer Area b 
v 
Waste Package Receipt Facility (WPRF) a 
. 
Low-Level Waste Handling (LLWH) 
. 
Aging Facility - Initial (1,000 MTHM) 
v 
Aging Facility - #1 (5,000 MTHM) 
v 
Aging Facility - #2 (5,000 MTHM) 
v 
Aging Facility - #3 (5,000 MTHM) 
v 
Aging Facility - #4 (5,000 MTHM) 
v 
Canister Handling Facility (CHF) 
v 
Fuel Handling Facility (FHF) 
v 
Heavy Equipment Maintenance Facility (HEMF) 
. 
Warehouse & Non-Nuclear Receipt Facility (WNNRF) a,b 
. 
Central Control Center / Primary Alarm System 
. 
Utility Facility (UF) 
. 
Cooling Tower 
. 
Evaporation Pond 
. 
Switchgear Facility 
. 
Standby Generator Facility 
. 
Emergency Generator Facility 
. 
Switchyard (230 kV AND 138 kV) 
. 
Switchgear Facility (12.1 kV) 
. 
Firewater Facility (Central) 
. 

Table I-1. Identification of High-Level Waste Handling Related Structures at Surface (Continued) 
Facility Description 
Waste 
Handling 
Related 
System / 
Facility 
Firewater Facility (North) 
. 
Firewater Facility (South) 
. 
Central Security Station 
. 
Cask Receipt Security Station 
. 
North Perimeter Security Station 
. 
Railcar Staging Area c 
v 
Truck Staging Area c 
v 
Septic Tank and Leach Field 
. 
Administration Facility 
. 
Fire, Rescue and Medical Facility 
. 
Administration Security Station 
. 
Warehouse/Central Receiving 
. 
Craft Shops 
. 
Equipment/Yard Storage 
. 
Storm Water Retention Pond 
. 
NOTES: a. The WNNRF contains the WPRF. The structure housing the WNNRF and Cask Receipt 
and Return Area of the TCRRF is termed the Cask and Waste Package Receipt Building 
(CWPRB). 
b. Grouped as Receipt Systems for present analysis. 
c. Grouped as Transportation Facility for present analysis 
HLW = high-level radioactive waste; MTHM = metric tons of heavy metal; kV = kilovolts. 

ATTACHMENT II 
DESCRIPTION OF ANALYSIS METHODS 

INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 

ATTACHMENT II 
DESCRIPTION OF ANALYSIS METHODS 
II.1 Background 
This attachment provides an overview of the methods that will be used in this calculation. The 
analysis is based on the preclosure design methodology developed for Yucca Mountain (BSC 
2004u). The methodology stipulates that an SSC ITS that is credited in the prevention or 
mitigation of a seismically-initiated event sequence be designed to withstand seismic design 
levels DBGM-1 or DBGM-2, depending on the resulting dose to repository workers or the public 
should the SSC lose its safety function due to an earthquake. The methodology defines the 
seismic hazard level associated with a respective DBGM and adopts a seismic margins 
methodology to address the requirements of 10 CFR Part 63. It should be noted that the 
methodology in BSC (2004u) supersedes earlier descriptions as in YMP (1997a), which was 
based on 10 CFR Part 60. 
Seismic design input parameters include PGA, the spectral accelerations at different frequencies 
and peak ground velocity that are predicted to occur for various MAPE levels for the Yucca 
Mountain site in accordance with a probabilistic seismic hazards analysis (YMP 1997b). The 
reference earthquakes (BSC 2004u, Section 3.1.1) to be used as the design bases for SSCs ITS 
are defined as follows: 
DBGM-1 is the ground motion having a MAPE of 1.0  10-3 (i.e., a return period of 
1,000 years). 
DBGM-2 is the ground motion having a MAPE of 5.0  10-4 (i.e., a return period of 
2,000 years). 
The two DBGM ground motion levels represent reasonable annual probability of exceedance 
levels relative to precedents adopted for nuclear facilities (e.g., BSC 2004u, Sections 3 and 3.4) 
in accordance with the discussion in 10 CFR 63.102(f), which states: 
Preclosure safety analysis. Section 63.111 includes performance objectives for 
the geologic repository operations area for the period before permanent closure 
and decontamination or permanent closure, decontamination, and dismantlement 
of surface facilities. The preclosure safety analysis is a systematic examination of 
the site; the design; and the potential hazards, initiating events and their resulting 
event sequences and potential radiological exposures to workers and the public. 
Initiating events are to be considered for inclusion in the preclosure safety 
analysis for determining event sequences only if they are reasonable (i.e., based 
on the characteristics of the geologic setting and the human environment, and 
consistent with precedents adopted for nuclear facilities with comparable or 
higher risks to workers and the public). The analysis identifies structures, 
systems, and components important to safety. [Italics added for emphasis] 

In addressing the requirements of 10 CFR Part 63, the analysis will invoke a more limiting, 
reference level earthquake for each SSC ITS assigned to DBGM-2, termed as the beyond-design 
basis ground motion event or BDBGM (BSC 2004u, Section 3.3.1). This level is also in 
accordance with precedent (BSC 2004u, Section 3). Structural analyses will be conducted for 
SSCs ITS at these BDBGM levels to demonstrate the capacity of the SSCs to perform their 
intended safety functions at ground motion levels that are greater than the design basis ground 
motions. 
II.2 Assignment of Design Basis Ground Motions to SSCs 
The assignment of the respective DBGM levels to SSCs ITS (that are credited in the prevention 
or mitigation of a seismically-initiated event sequence) is tied to the dose limits established in the 
performance requirements of 10 CFR 63.111 (with reference to 10 CFR 63.204 and 10 CFR 
20.1201) for Category 1 and Category 2 event sequences. Table 2 summarizes the bases for 
DBGM assignments to SSCs ITS for the present analyses. 
As a minimum, DBGM-1 is assigned to an SSC if the seismic failure of the SSC (i.e., loss of the 
SSC safety function) could result in a dose equal to or greater than 5 rem TEDE to a radiation 
worker, greater than 2 mrem to an on site public or non-radiation worker or 15 mrem TEDE to 
the public at the site in the General Environment (Table 2, Section 4.1.11). Similarly, DBGM-2 
is assigned to an SSC if the seismic failure of the SSC could result in a dose equal to or greater 
than 5 rem to the public at the boundary of the site or beyond. Should it be shown that 
concurrent seismic failures of multiple SSCs initially assigned to DBGM-1 could result in a 
public dose of 5 rem TEDE or more, one or more of those SSCs must be re-assigned to the 
DBGM-2 category. 
Some special conditions are noted in this approach. Whenever the potential consequences of a 
seismic sequence could result in the breach of a DSNF canister, no dose calculations are 
performed, and such SSCs are assigned to the DBGM-2 category (Assumption 5.13). In 
addition, whenever the potential consequences of a seismic sequence could result in a criticality 
condition, no dose calculations are performed, and such SSCs are assigned to the DBGM-2 
category. 
There are two pathways for identifying SSCs ITS credited in the prevention or mitigation of a 
seismically-initiated event sequence. The first pathway is the analysis of event sequences for 
internal hazards and identification of SSCs credited in the prevention or mitigation of internal 
event sequences (BSC 2004p; BSC 2004s). The initiating events and loss of safety functions of 
the credited SSCs are postulated to be vulnerable to seismic failures, and DBGMs are assigned in 
accordance with the dose or criticality that could result. Such seismic event sequences are 
postulated to cause initiating events that could otherwise occur from random failures (i.e., 
independent of an earthquake), such as drop of waste forms by handling equipment, LOSP, and 
fires. 
Depending on the design bases of various SSCs and intensity of the ground motion associated 
with a given earthquake, it is possible, although unlikely, for many or all of the internal event 
sequences to be triggered concurrently by the seismically-induced loss of safety function. 

The second pathway for identifying SSCs ITS is the analysis of seismically-initiated event 
sequences that were not identified in the internal event analysis. Such event sequences include 
seismic failures of passive SSCs, such as transfer cell walls and ceiling, support structures of 
cranes and handling equipment, or disassembly of spent fuel assembly staging racks. The 
seismic failure (loss of safety function) of each SSC is postulated, and the potential doses are 
assessed (except in the case of potential DSNF canister breach). DBGMs are assigned in 
accordance with the stated dose guidelines (Table 2). Again, depending on the design bases of 
various SSCs and the intensity of the ground motion associated with a given earthquake, it is 
possible, although unlikely, for the failure of passive components and the internal event 
sequences to be triggered concurrently. 
At the completion of the seismic PCSA, the SSCs that must be credited to prevent or mitigate 
seismic event sequences are assigned a DBGM category that will be reflected in the 10 CFR 63.2 
design bases and are input to the safety classification analysis. 
II.3 Regulatory Approach 
II.3.1 General 
There are two requirements that must be met to address the intent of 10 CFR Part 63, as 
described in the following: 
1. The first requirement stems from the principles cited in Preclosure Seismic Design 
Methodology for a Geological Repository at Yucca Mountain (BSC 2004u, Section 
3.1.1): 
- The repository design must meet the dose limits for Category 1 event 
sequences specified in 10 CFR 63.111(b)(1) when subjected to ground 
motions associated with DBGM-1. 
- The repository design must meet the dose limits for Category 2 event 
sequences specified in 10 CFR 63.111(b)(2) when subjected to ground 
motions associated with DBGM-2. 
These compliance requirements will be satisfied by assigning the respective DBGMs 
to SSCs ITS to prevent or mitigate doses that could exceed the respective limits for 
Category 1 and Category 2 event sequences. An examination of event sequences 
initiated by the seismic failure of an SSC non-ITS that might cause an SSC ITS to 
lose its safety function, needs to be performed. 
2. The second requirement is to demonstrate that any seismic event sequence whose 
consequences could exceed the dose limits specified in 10 CFR 63.111(b)(2) for 
Category 2 event sequences is less likely than the Category 2 probability threshold. 
This requirement stems from the 10 CFR 63.2 definition of a Category 2 event 
sequence, as follows: 

Event sequence means a series of actions and/or occurrences within the 
natural and engineered components of a geologic repository operations 
area that could potentially lead to the exposure of individuals to 
radiation. An event sequence includes one or more initiating events 
and associated combinations of repository system component failures, 
including those produced by the action or inaction of operating 
personnel. Event sequences that are expected to occur one or more 
times before permanent closure of the geologic repository operations 
area are referred to as Category 1 event sequences. Other event 
sequences that have at least one chance in 10,000 of occurring before 
permanent closure are referred to as Category 2 event sequences. 
Since the preclosure operational period is nominally 100 years (Assumption 5.12), the above 
definition is equivalent to saying that a Category 2 event sequence has an annual probability of 
occurrence, often termed frequency, of at least 1  10-6. The basis for demonstrating compliance 
with 10 CFR Part 63 for seismic event sequences is the requirement that the dose from no 
seismically-induced Category 2 event sequence exceed the dose limit specified in 
10 CFR 63.111(b)(2). 
Thus, to demonstrate compliance with 10 CFR Part 63 for seismic sequences, it must be shown 
that the annual probability of exceeding 5 rem TEDE to the public is sufficiently small. In this 
analysis, the method of seismic margins analysis is used to demonstrate that the repository 
systems are designed to exhibit a high confidence of a low probability of failure where failure 
(i.e., the loss of the credited safety function) results in a dose in excess of 5 rem TEDE. 
Although dose limits for specific organs are given in 10 CFR 63.111 and are considered in PCSA 
evaluations of compliance, the current analysis is based on compliance with the offsite dose limit 
of 5 rem TEDE. Should special circumstances in a seismically-initiated sequence result in an 
organ dose being more limiting in assigning DBGM levels, SSCs involved in the sequence will 
be assigned to the more limiting DBGM. 
II.3.2 Design Considerations 
The assignment of the DBGM-1 to various SSCs ITS stipulates that there are no seismicallyinitiated 
event sequences for ground motions corresponding to a MAPE of 1  10-3 or higher. 
The margins in the design ensure that the conditional probability of failure is essentially zero 
when subjected to design bases ground motion (or less severe vibratory ground motions). 
Consequently, there are no seismically-initiated Category 1 event sequences that result in doses 
to workers or the public. 
However, seismically-initiated event sequences can occur for ground motions greater than 
DBGM-1. As the MAPE of such ground motions decreases from 1  10-3 to say 5  10-4, the 
accelerations increase and the margin to failure decreases of DBGM-1 SSCs. Depending on the 
seismic design margins for various SSCs designed to DBGM-1, one or more SSCs could lose 
their safety functions following an earthquake that is more intense than the DBGM-1 ground 
motions and, thereby, result in one or more seismically-initiated event sequences. The total dose 

from such event sequences could exceed the 10 CFR 63.111(b)(1) limits for Category 1 event 
sequences. However, such event sequences would be considered Category 2 event sequences 
and unless the total dose exceeds 5 rem total effective dose equivalent to the public, the resulting 
doses are in compliance with 10 CFR 63.111(b)(2) limits for Category 2 event sequences. 
In the event that the analysis indicates that the total dose exceeds 5 rem to the public at the 
boundary of the site or beyond, were all of the SSCs assigned to DBGM-1 to fail, then one or 
more of the affected SSCs is reassigned to the DBGM-2 category and designed accordingly. The 
reassignment of SSCs to DBGM-2 continues until the total dose from postulated failure of the 
remaining DBGM-1 SSCs is less than 5 rem. This process is not performed for worker dose, as 
there is no worker dose limit associated with Category 2 event sequences. Therefore, it is not 
necessary for compliance evaluations to consider the total worker dose that might result if 
multiple DBGM-1 SSCs were to fail in an earthquake that is more intense than a level DBGM-1 
event. 
The assignment of the DBGM-2 to various SSCs ITS means that there are no event sequences 
initiated by the seismically-induced failures of SSCs assigned to DBGM-2 for ground motions 
corresponding to a MAPE of 5  10-4 or higher. Note that in the DBGM-2 assignment, the 
margin in the design ensures that the conditional probability of failure is negligible when 
subjected to design bases ground motions. For SSCs assigned to a DBGM-2 level, margin is also 
demonstrated to a BDBGM level or a MAPE of 1  10-4. This limiting probability level is 
considered to be reasonable, based on the characteristics of the geologic setting and the human 
environment, and consistent with precedents adopted for nuclear facilities with comparable or 
higher risks to workers and the public, in accordance with the provisions of 10 CFR 63.102(f), 
and, therefore, compliant with the total framework of the regulation. 
II.3.3 Seismic Margins Analysis 
As noted earlier, the SMA method is employed for this analysis. SMA is one of the methods 
accepted by the NRC for NPPs to demonstrate compliance with the purpose of an individual 
plant examination of external events, as stated in Procedural and Submittal Guidance for the 
Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE) for Severe Accident Vulnerabilities 
(Chen et al. 1991, Section 3.2.1). A seismic probabilistic risk assessment is the other acceptable 
method and several guidance documents are available (e.g., NRC 2002, ASME RA-S-2002, 
Standard for Probabilistic Risk Assessment for Nuclear Power Plant Applications). 
The objective of a SMA is to demonstrate that there is high confidence of low probability of 
failure to comply with a stated safety criterion (i.e., that the safety criterion is not exceeded). For 
NPPs, the safety criterion is preventing core damage (Prassinos et al. 1986, p. 3). The risk 
associated with NPPs is expressed in terms of achieving an acceptable core damage frequency or 
large early release [of radioactivity] frequency (LERF) that meets NRC guidelines (e.g. 
NRC 2002, Section 19.II, p. SRP 19-6). 
10 CFR Part 63 does not define an overall, or integral, risk goal for the repository. However, the 
risk goal adopted for this analysis is to demonstrate that the annual probability of exceeding a 

public dose of 5 rem TEDE is less than the MAPE of the BDBGM, in accordance with the 
provisions of 10 CFR 63.102(f). 
The term, seismic margin, was introduced in the nuclear power plant industry where studies by 
industry and the NRC have shown that NPPs are capable of withstanding earthquake motion 
substantially greater than the safe shutdown earthquake (SSE) acceleration (Prassinos 
et al. 1986, p. 1). Preclosure Seismic Design Methodology for a Geological Repository at Yucca 
Mountain (BSC 2004u, Section 3.2, p. 19) states that, with exceptions as noted, the DOE 
considers that the approach to seismic design for the SSE given in applicable subsections of the 
Standard Review Plan for NPPs (i.e., Section 3.7.1 [NRC 1989a], Section 3.7.2 [NRC 1989b], 
Section 3.7.3 [NRC 1989c], and Section 3.10 [NRC 1981]), provides appropriate acceptance 
criteria for the seismic design of repository surface facilities that are important to safety. 
Application of Standard Review Plan design procedures and acceptance criteria, in large 
measure, means replacing the term SSE with the terms DBGM-1 or DBGM-2. Therefore, the 
repository SSCs ITS have margin to loss of safety function that is substantially greater than the 
ground motion to which the SSCs are designed. 
For NPPs, the design basis earthquake is specified as the SSE. Typically, the SSE has a PGA on 
the order of 0.22 g (where g is the acceleration of gravity) for NPPs in the eastern U.S. (Kennedy 
et al. 1980, p. 320) and as high as 0.75 g for NPPs on the west coast (YMP 1997a, p. C-1). 
Through structural analysis of SSCs to quantify their strength margins to withstand forces 
imposed by earthquakes, it is determined at what PGA the conditional probability of failure (loss 
of safety function) is 0.01 or less. The ground motion associated with the 0.01 probability of loss 
of safety function is termed the HCLPF capacity of the SSC. 
The PGA of the HCLPF capacity is significantly greater than the PGA associated with the SSE. 
In NPP SMAs, it is customary to define a review level earthquake or BDBGM that has twice the 
intensity of the SSE. The NRC has binned NPPs into 0.3 g and 0.5 g for SMA considerations 
(Chen et al. 1991, Section 3.2.2). Compliance with the individual plant examination of external 
events guidance for NPP is demonstrated when the plant level HCLPF capacity equals or 
exceeds the ground motion of the BDBGM that has a PGA of about twice that of the review level 
earthquake (i.e., either 0.3 g or 0.5 g). Section 4.2 of Prassinos et al. (1986) notes that selecting a 
review earthquake greater than 0.5 g will preclude the screening out of components based on 
generic capacities. 
In SMA for NPPs, a HCLPF capacity is determined for each SSC that appears in safe-shutdown 
event sequences, and a plant-level HCLPF capacity is determined from systems analysis as that 
minimum PGA for which no safe-shutdown path exists, thereby, leading to core damage. 
For the repository, the DBGM-1 and DBGM-2 ground motions are adopted as the design basis 
earthquakes (counterparts of the SSE for NPPs) and considered reasonable with respect to 
nuclear precedent per 10 CFR 63.102(f) (BSC 2004u, Section 3.3.2). A systems analysis is 
performed to model seismic event sequences and identify the SSCs that contribute to credible 
seismically-initiated event sequences (e.g., those resulting in a dose greater than 5 rem TEDE). 
HCLPF capacities are determined for the SSCs and used in the systems model to determine the 
plant-level HCLPF capacity for the repository. 

For margin computations, the BDBGM level selected for the repository is the ground motion 
associated with a MAPE of 1  10-4 for BDBGM. For the present approach, the minimum 
HCLPF capacities for the surface functional areas designated as DBGM-2 equal or exceed the 
BDBGM level. 
SMA incorporates three distinct analyses: 
Systems analysis to define the event sequences that could result from a 
seismic-initiating event and identify the SSCs ITS that are credited in preventing or 
mitigating seismically-initiated event sequences 
Seismic capacity analysis of those SSCs ITS to determine the HCLPF capacity of each 
SSC ITS 
Combination of the system model and HCLPF capacities to determine the repositorywide 
level HCLPF capacity (e.g., Kennedy 2001). 
When design detail permits, the analysis of HCLPF capacities is performed by design engineers 
and provides input to the seismic safety analysis. For the present analysis, HCLPF capacities are 
based on generic factors (Assumption 5.10). 
The development of the system model and determination of the repository-wide level HCLPF 
capacity is the primary activity reported in this analysis. 
II.4 Seismic Systems Analysis 
II.4.1 Rationale 
The intent of the seismic systems analysis is to conduct a systematic identification of potential 
seismically-initiated event sequences and their preclosure safety consequences. The seismic 
systems analysis provides the bases for assigning DBGMs to SSCs ITS and a framework for 
addressing the requirements of 10 CFR Part 63. 
To the extent appropriate to the complexity of the analysis, the seismic systems analysis employs 
event tree and fault tree analysis methods. The event tree and fault tree analyses are used to 
develop logic models for individual SSCs and the overall repository that define the various ways 
that an undesired consequence could result from seismically-initiated event sequences. As 
appropriate to the amount of design detail available, the analysis includes the effects of random 
failures (independent of the seismic ground motions) and human failure events (HFEs) that may 
be exacerbated in the aftermath of an earthquake. The results of event tree and fault tree 
analyses identify how seismically-induced failures of an individual SSC, combinations of 
seismically-induced failures of multiple SSCs, or combinations of seismically-induced and 
random failures of multiple SSCs or HFEs, or both, lead to undesired consequences. 
The following sections describe the applications of event and fault tree methods to the seismic 
systems analysis. 

II.4.2 Master Logic Diagram 
A master logic diagram (MLD) is an application of fault tree logic that aids in performing a 
thorough, structured identification of potential seismic concerns in the repository. A MLD is not 
necessary, but its graphic display has the advantages over a tabular listing of ensuring 
completeness and identifying potential correlation between seismic event sequences. 
Figure II-1 shows a MLD for the seismic analysis of the repository in a fault tree format. The 
top event in Figure II-1, Release of Radioactivity Due to Earthquake, is developed as an ORgate 
that includes each of the facilities or operations that contain radioactive material. 
A MLD identifies that releases could occur simultaneously from surface and subsurface handling 
and processing operations as well as from transport operations and an aging facility. A MLD 
must be based on a specific repository design. For example, Figure II-1 is based on the latest 
design information (Section 4.1.2). 
The structure of the MLD guides the development to lower levels of assembly to identify 
specific buildings, functional areas, or operations where radioactive waste is being processed or 
stored and, thereby, potentially vulnerable to a seismically-induced release of, or exposure to, 
radiation. Such detailed development may employ event tree and/or fault tree analysis. 
The annotations in Figure II-1 identify locations where an earthquake could potentially initiate 
releases and exposures at the same time, given an earthquake of sufficient intensity. Each of the 
events under the OR-gate in Figure II-1 could be described more completely as Release of 
Radioactivity from DTF-1 Due to Earthquake, as illustrated in Figure II-2. 
Figure II-2 illustrates how the MLD logic can be continued to lower levels of assembly to 
identify potential release scenarios. This figure addresses either of the two DTFs. The OR-gate 
logic emphasizes the fact that any one of the scenarios listed could result in the undesired top 
event Release of Radioactivity from DTF Due to Earthquake. However, it is more convenient 
to list potential initiating events for each functional area in a table. The detailed development of 
seismic event sequences uses tables, event trees, and fault trees, as appropriate, to systematically 
identify the potential event sequences and failure modes that come into play. 
In general, seismic failures in diverse facilities and operations are uncorrelated with respect to 
their conditional probability of failure in the presence of an earthquake of given intensity. 
However, duplicate structures may be correlated such that given a seismic failure in one DTF 
(with a specific seismic capacity of the structure and earthquake intensity) is assumed to occur 
with conditional probability of 1.0 in the other DTF. The MLD in Figure II-1 is annotated to 
indicate where DTFs of the same design may be highly correlated. The figure also indicates that 
minor or no correlation is expected among the other facilities and operations with DTF. 

Figure II-1. Master Logic Diagram for Seismic Preclosure Safety Analysis for Dose to the Public or Workers 

Figure II-2. Master Logic Diagram for Seismic Preclosure Safety Analysis for Dry Transfer Facility 
II.4.3 Seismic Event Trees 
Seismic event trees (SETs) are developed to display the various seismic event sequences that 
could be initiated in a particular operation or facility. A SET for a given facility or operation is 
created for each initiating event that is identified as being a potential start of an undesired event 
sequence. One basis for SET creation considers event sequences and consequence analyses that 
have been developed for independent (random) initiating events. Such initiating events include 
drops of waste forms, LOSP, and fires inside the waste handling facility. Each initiating event 
that could be initiated by an earthquake is incorporated into a SET. 
Another basis for SET creation is identification of initiating events and event sequences that are 
unique to seismic scenarios. Such initiating events include failure of staging racks full of 
spent-fuel assemblies, collapses of roofs or walls of surface structures onto fuel assemblies or 
canisters, fall of heavy cranes or equipment onto fuel assemblies or canisters, or loosening and 
fall of large rock blocks onto WPs in emplacement drifts. 
Attachment V describes several generalized SETs for seismically-induced initiating events. 
These SETs are termed generalized because they include one or more event headings that may be 

screened out or deleted as a result of assumptions used and the amount of detail available for 
modeling in the SET. The trees that result from this screening are termed, simplified SETs. 
Figure II-3 illustrates a generalized SET for a drop of a waste form. In this example, the 
initiating event is the earthquake. Two heading events are noted whose failures could result in 
the drop of a suspended waste form. One heading, event Crane or Fuel Handling Machine 
Structure Intact (labeled EQPT_SUP), would result from a passive failure in a non-seismic 
analysis (and, thereby, would be screened-out as a low-probability event). However, a failure of 
a passive SSC can be a seismically-initiated. 
The second heading event is Crane or Fuel Handling Machine Maintains Load (labeled 
DR_LOAD), whose failure could be caused by either seismic effects or random failures in the 
mechanisms or control system. The frequency of the event DR_LOAD (random event) would be 
used in a SET for an internal event analysis. In this SET, however, the event DR_LOAD 
represents the conditional probability of dropping the waste form or failure of the support 
structure, conditioned on the intensity of the earthquake. 
The event heading Waste Form Present in Operation (Occupancy Factor) (labeled 
OF_TRAN) is included in the SET to emphasize the fact that potential seismic event 
sequences cannot occur if no waste form is present in a particular operation. The value of the 
yes fraction representing OF_TRAN is estimated from the number of operations per year and 
the time per operation when the waste form is at risk. For dry transfer operations of commercial 
SNF, the yes fraction of OF_TRAN may be expected to be close to 1.0. However, the yes 
fraction representing OF_TRAN for dry transfer of DSNF canisters is expected to be less than 
1.0. 
The SETs in Attachment V include similar events labeled OTF_CELL, OTF_STAG, and 
OTF_TROL. The events represent both occupancy factors and target factors. A target factor 
considers the fraction of time that a machine subject to seismic failure is above a vulnerable 
waste form, or the probability that a portion of collapsing structure strikes a vulnerable waste 
form. There must be sufficient design and operational information to quantify the yes 
fractions for OF_TRAN, OTF_CELL, OTF_STAG, and OTF_TROL; otherwise, the value 
should be set equal to 1.0 and the event heading is eliminated from the SETs to simplify the 
analysis. Nevertheless, where appropriate, qualitative arguments can be used regarding 
occupancy or target factors in screening out some seismic event sequences. 
The three right hand columns of Figure II-3 and other SETs display, respectively, the Sequence 
Number (used for identification), the Damage State that results from the sequence of events (e.g., 
OK means no radiological consequences and Release means a source term is generated), and 
the Offsite Dose Type (i.e., Mitigated, or Unmitigated). 

Figure II-3. Seismic Event Tree: Drop of Suspended Waste Form 

A SET provides the framework for quantifying the conditional probability of occurrence of 
undesired event sequences. The conditional probability of an event sequence that releases 
radioactivity following an earthquake will account for dependent and independent failures of 
SSCs and any human actions that come into play. This may require development of a fault tree 
model to support the SET event heading, as described in Section II.4.4. However, lowprobability, 
independent and dependent failure events that do not contribute significantly to the 
seismic event sequences are screened out of event tree and fault tree models to simplify analysis. 
In describing these models and results, the term cutset is used. A cutset is composed of one or 
more basic failure events, combined in AND logic that results in the top event of a fault tree 
model or the occurrence of a given event sequence. The term single is used to describe a 
cutset composed of one basic event. The occurrence of that single basic event results in the top 
event. The term double is used to describe a cutset composed of two basic events. Both of the 
basic events must occur to result in the top event. The term, triple, and so on are used to 
describe higher order cutsets. 
A cutset may include one or more independent failures, a seismic failure event and one or more 
independent events, or multiple seismic failure events. The SET logic models (linked to system 
fault tree models, as appropriate) are solved to determine the minimal cutsets that result in a 
given event sequence. Minimal cutsets define the individual failure events or combinations of 
failure events that could each result in the occurrence of the event sequence. Through the rules 
of Boolean algebra, the least number of unique cutsets that result in the event sequence is 
determined, and these are termed the minimal cutsets. 
The probability that a fault tree top event or a given event sequence will occur is the union (i.e., 
OR logic, or arithmetic sum) of the probabilities of the minimal cutsets. The minimal cutsets are 
applied in developing the Boolean expression in the SMA analysis, as described in Section II.5. 
A SET logic diagram may be constructed with any convenient graphics software. The SETs 
used in this analysis, for example, were drawn in Microsoft Visio. However, for more complex 
SET development and solution, a specialized program like SAPHIRE (Smith et al. 2000) could 
be used. 
II.4.4 System Fault Trees 
The fault tree logic models for active systems that appear in SET headings are modified to 
include potential seismically-induced failures. The top event in a system fault tree represents the 
conditional probability of the loss of a given safety function, conditioned on the occurrence of an 
earthquake. The top event probability has to be multiplied by the annual probability of 
exceedance of an earthquake to quantify the annual probability of a seismic event sequence. The 
basic events in the fault tree include potential independent failures, dependencies on electric 
power or cooling water, common-cause failures among like components/subsystems, and humaninduced 
failures in addition to seismic failure events. All basic events in the fault tree represent 
probabilities of failure events that occur either as a result of ground motions associated with an 
earthquake, or failure events that occur concurrently with the earthquake but are independent of 
the ground motions. 

Figure II-4 illustrates a fault tree for an active system that illustrates how seismically-induced 
faults, random failures, and human failure events could result in one of the event headings in a 
SET. The top event of the fault tree, Crane or Fuel Handling Machine Fails to Maintain 
Suspended Load, is the failure event for an event heading in Figure II-3. The top event is 
developed as an OR-gate having two events: (1) a fault due to mechanical failures of the holding 
or lifting mechanism, and (2) a fault due to failures or spurious signals in the control system. 
These two faults are each developed to a third level as OR-gates. The inputs to these two ORgates 
are modeled as undeveloped events (indicated by the diamond symbols under each input 
event box). 
Each input event is named and identified by type of fault, e.g., TRAN_LH_EQ to represent 
seismically-induced failures of the mechanisms, TRAN_LH_IN to represent independent (or 
random) failures, and TRAN_LH_HFE to represent a human influenced or induced failure event. 
Event TRAN_LH_HFE is treated as a random failure that could occur independently of the 
ground motions but whose probability may be higher in the aftermath of an earthquake than 
under normal operating conditions. The input events in Figure II-4 are generic. Whether or not 
all of the inputs apply to a particular waste handling system depends on the design. Thus, the 
fault trees used in this analysis will be limited in detail but complete in identification of potential 
failure modes. 
For seismic system analysis, it is efficient to screen out low-probability, independent failure 
events from the fault tree. For example, knowing that the DBGM-1 and DBGM-2 earthquakes 
have a MAPE of 1  10-3 and 5  10-4, respectively, the occurrence of any random event having a 
probability of less than approximately 1  10-3 concurrent with an earthquake having an annual 
probability of 1  10-3 or less would result in a sequence annual probability of 1  10-6 or less 
(below the Category 2 threshold). 
In addition to direct seismic failures, some SSCs in the system FT could be vulnerable to failure 
by secondary system interaction effects (this type of failure is commonly termed two-over-one 
interactions in NPP seismic analyses). Such dependencies should be included in the fault tree 
model unless they are screened out as low probability events. If appropriate, unlikely seismic 
failure events may be screened out of the system fault trees. 
For example, the SMAs of commercial NPPs apply guidelines for screening based on generic 
HCLPF capacities (given in terms of PGA) for various categories of components (Prassinos et 
al. 1986, pp. 18 to 21). However, for a BDBGM greater than 0.5 g, virtually no SSC can be 
screened out for the generic commercial NPPs (EPRI 1991, pp. 2-37 to 2-41). 
The fault tree models are solved to determine the minimal cutsets that result in the top event. 
Minimal cutsets define the individual failure events or combinations of failure events that could 
each result in the occurrence of the top event. A cutset may include one or more independent 
failures, a seismic failure event and one or more independent events, or multiple seismic failure 
events. 

Figure II-4. Fault Tree: Crane or Fuel Handling Machine Fails to Maintain Suspended Load 

Simple fault trees like those in the present analysis can be solved by hand using the rules of 
Boolean algebra. More complex fault trees may require a specialized program such as the 
SAPHIRE program (Smith et al. 2000). 
II.5 Development of an Overall Boolean Expression 
The cutsets for individual sequences having the same consequences are combined into a 
facility-wide Boolean expression. For the this evaluation, the minimal cutsets of all seismic 
event sequences that result in an offsite dose of 5 rem TEDE or greater are combined through the 
logic of the MLD. The laws of Boolean algebra are applied so that many cutsets containing the 
same failure event, either seismically-induced or independent failures, are absorbed into the 
lowest order cutset containing that failure event. 
The result is the final Boolean expression for the top event that is being considered (e.g., a single 
sequence or the sum of several sequences that give an offsite dose of 5 rem or more). The final 
Boolean expression is used to calculate the HCLPF capacity for the repository as a whole, using 
HCLPF capacities of individual SSCs as inputs, as described in Section II.6. 
II.6 Evaluation of HCLPF Capacities of SSCs 
A HCLPF capacity is tied to a specific seismic failure event, or loss of a specific safety function, 
for a given SSC. Thus, the structure of a transfer cell may have two safety functions that could 
be credited in the prevention or mitigation of seismic event sequences. One safety function 
might be no collapse (onto staged CSNF assemblies or DOE canisters) to prevent a release. 
Another safety function of the structure might be maintain confinement if the structure is 
necessary to ensure mitigation succeeds. Because of strength margins ensured by designing 
SSCs ITS in accordance with nuclear precedents, the HCLPF capacity for maintain confinement 
will be significantly greater than the DBGM level for which the structure is designed. 
Furthermore, the HCLPF capacity for no collapse will be even higher and, therefore, will be 
significantly greater than the DBGM level 
The HCLPF capacity of mechanical equipment is also defined for the loss of safety function. 
For transport vehicles, the loss of safety function includes an uncontrolled speed, a tipover or a 
failure of the waste form restraints that results in an impact to a waste form that exceeds its 
design basis. For cranes and fuel handling machines, one loss of safety function is dropping a 
waste form beyond its design basis, and another is failure of the equipment supports that results 
in a fall of heavy equipment onto a waste form. 
When design detail permits, HCLPF capacities are provided by design and structural engineering 
as input to the seismic systems analysis. For such analyses, HCLPF capacities specific to 
designs of repository SSCs ITS will be calculated using the CDFM method (EPRI 1991, pp. 2-45 
to 2-55). For this preliminary calculation, however, generic capacity factors are used to estimate 
representative HCLPF capacities in a CDFM framework. 

II.7 Seismic Margins Evaluation 
II.7.1 Objective 
The objective of the SMA is to demonstrate that there is a suitably low conditional probability of 
an unacceptable dose, given an earthquake of the magnitude of the BDBGM level. 
II.7.2 Determination of HCLPF Capacity for Repository 
The HCLPF for the repository is calculated through a max-min treatment of the combinations of 
HCLPFs of the individual SSC according to how the SSC appears in the AND and OR logic or 
the facility-wide Boolean expression. The facility-wide Boolean expression is derived from the 
event tree and fault tree analyses. When two or more SSC seismic failure events appear in an 
AND expression (i.e., the intersection of two or more events), the HCLPF acceleration for the 
expression is the maximum HCLPF capacity of one SSC appearing in the Boolean expression. 
When two or more SSC seismic failure events appear in an OR expression (i.e., the union of two 
or more events), the HCLPF acceleration for the expression is the minimum HCLPF capacity of 
one SSC appearing in the expression. This method is in accordance with Recommendations to 
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission on Trial Guidelines for Seismic Margins Reviews of 
Nuclear Power Plants (Prassinos et al. 1986, Section 4.8.2). 
If the expression is simple enough, the evaluation of the facility-wide HCLPF using the min-max 
process may be performed by hand. Otherwise, a event tree/fault tree computer program, e.g., 
SAPHIRE (Smith et al. 2000), may be used to develop the SET, fault trees, the minimal cutsets 
for individual sequences, and the facility-wide Boolean expression for the top event (i.e., a 
release that exceeds the 10 CFR 63.111 offsite dose limit). 
The facility-wide HCLPF capacity is the smallest ground motion acceleration that could result in 
a dose that exceeds the regulatory limits. If all of the SSCs appearing in the repository-wide 
Boolean expression have a HCLPF acceleration that is higher than PGA BDBGM, the smallest 
acceleration that could result in a non-compliant dose would also be higher than PGA BDBGM. 
The repository would be deemed to have achieved HCLPF, i.e., a high confidence of low 
probability of failure to comply with 10 CFR Part 63. 
For example, suppose a facility is subject to four seismic failure events labeled A, B, C, and D, 
and that a dose of 5 rem could occur from the following minimal cutsets: {A}, {B}, or {C, D}. 
Events A through D represent various losses of safety functions of one or more SSCs. The 
mathematical set {C, D} (the term, set, in this context should not to be confused with a SET) 
means that both seismic failure C and seismic failure D must occur to produce the release of 
radiation. The sets {A} and {B} each contain a single element, meaning that if either event A or 
event B is true, there would be a release. The Boolean expression for the event T, seismic 
failures result in dose of 5 rem is given as the logical union (summation) of all minimal cutsets 
that produce the same outcome. 

In the current example, the Boolean expression becomes: 
T = A + B + (C*D) 
For illustration, suppose that the HCLPF capacities of the events A, B, C and D (represented as 
HA, HB, HC, and HD, respectively) have been determined to be HA = 0.8 g, HB = 1.0 g, HC = 0.5 g 
and HD = 0.7 g. These values are applied in the Boolean expression using the min-max approach 
to determine the HCLPF capacity for the facility HT, as follows: 
HT = min{HA, HB, max[HC ,HD]}, 
HT = min{0.8 g, 1.0 g, max[0.5 g, 0.7 g]}, 
HT = min{0.8 g, 1.0 g, 0.7 g}, 
HT = 0.7 g. 
This example illustrates how the failure mode with the lowest HCLPF capacity determines the 
overall HCLPF capacity for the facility. 

ATTACHMENT III 
IDENTIFICATION OF SEISMICALLY-INITIATED POTENTIAL EVENTS 

INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 

ATTACHMENT III 
IDENTIFICATION OF SEISMICALLY INITIATED POTENTIAL EVENTS 
The identification of operations and waste form(s) at risk together with potential events that can 
be seismically initiated are presented in Tables III-1 and III-2, based on the results of the internal 
hazards analysis (BSC 2004p) and the identification and review of other potential seismic 
hazards. Facilities discussed in the section are identified in Attachment I. 
In Table III-1, columns 1 through 4 are summary materials, as follows: 
Column 1 lists the functional areas. 
Column 2 summarizes the operations performed on radioactive waste forms in each 
area. An area such as the equipment maintenance warehouse is noted as N/A for not 
applicable since no waste forms will be handled there. 
Column 3 lists the SSCs (other than structures) that are used in the various operations. 
The SSCs listed are not necessarily ITS unless they are credited with prevention or 
mitigation of an event sequence. 
Column 4 characterizes the waste form and quantity of material at risk that could be 
involved in an event sequence initiated by a seismic event. 
In Table III-2, columns 2 through 3 identify seismic sequences: 
Column 1 lists the functional areas. 
Column 2 lists the potential initiators of seismic event sequences that were considered 
in the internal event hazards as a potential initiator of internal event sequences for each 
functional area of the repository. The initiating events in this column are primarily 
derived from the internal hazards analysis (BSC 2004p). However, hazards for the 
SNF Aging System are based on guidance from Cogema (2004), as cited in BSC 
(2004p). The results of these two analyses were screened to identify hazard categories 
that involve collisions or crushing of waste forms or fire initiation in waste handling or 
staging area. Column 2 provides a starting place for the seismic safety analysis by 
building on previous analyses. 
Column 3 is created as part of this seismic analysis to identify initiating events that 
could be initiated only by an earthquake, such as the collapse of the structures housing 
the operations. 
In review of the internal hazards list in BSC (2004p), some internal hazards were excluded as not 
credible as regard to seismically-initiated event sequence. These hazards were screened-out due 
to an expected small occupancy or exposure factor that reduces the probability of a specific event 
(in conjunction with an earthquake) to a very low probability of occurrence (i.e., less than 

1  10-3). Therefore, these hazards are not included in Table III-2, based on the present level of 
design information. 
These screened-out hazards include: 
Non-intact SNF oxidation or oxidation of damaged SNF and degradation due to 
exposure to a non-inerted environment at normal operating temperatures under topic, 
Chemical Contamination/Flooding. 
The three hazards under the topic, Explosion/Implosion, including, hydrogen 
explosions, explosion hazard associated with the cask sampling and purging system, 
and pneumatic or pressurized system missile due to a fractured nozzle/valve 
stem/pneumatic device. 
Cask overheating due to solar insolation. 
Updates to this analysis will re-evaluate the screening of these hazards as design information 
evolves. 

Table III-1. Identification of Operations and Waste Form(s) at Risk 
Functional Areas a 
Synopsis of Waste-Related Operations a,c 
Identified Relevant SSCs b 
Expected Waste Form and 
Material at Risk 
1. Transportation 
Facility: 
1. Railcar Staging Area 
2. Truck Staging Area 
Move casks on commercial transporters 
Commercial transporter 
(Locomotives, railcars, trucks, 
and transfer trailers) 
Transport casks - With Impact 
Limiters - Quantity Varying With 
Time. 
2. Receipt Systems: 
1. Cask and Waste 
Package Receipt 
Building (CWPRB), 
containing: 
Cask Receipt / 
Return Area of the 
Transportation 
Cask Receipt 
Return Facility 
(TCRRF) and 
Warehouse & Non- 
Nuclear Receipt 
Facility (WNNRF), 
2. Transportation Cask 
Buffer Area (TCBA) of 
the TCRRF 
Receive, inspect, move, park, and queue transporters with 
casks 
Lift, rotate and transfer casks 
Transport casks with DPC to SNF Aging 
Site prime mover 
Site-rail transfer cart (SRTC) 
SRTC positioner 
SRTC tractor 
Rail lines for the SRTC 
Commercial transporter 
(Locomotives, railcars, trucks, 
and transfer trailers) 
250 ton overhead crane 
Mobile elevating platforms 
Forklifts 
Turntable (located between the 
CWPRB and the TCBA) 
25 ton Maintenance crane 
Grapples and support stands 
Cask/skid lifting yokes 
Impact limiters 
Horizontal cask transfer trailer 
Locking device - SRTC 
Transport casks - with impact 
limiters (impact limiters and 
personnel barriers may be 
temporarily removed) 
Up to 30 casks in TCRRF 
Transportation Cask Buffer 
Area 
Maximum of 4 Casks in 
TCRRF Cask Receipt / 
Return Area 

Table III-1. Identification of Operations and Waste Form(s) at Risk (Continued) 
Functional Areas a 
Synopsis of Waste-Related Operations a,c 
Identified Relevant SSCs b 
Expected Waste Form and 
Material at Risk 
3. CHF: Cask Receipt 
Entrance Vestibule, 
Tools/Parts Storage 
Room 
Open roll-up entry doors 
Move cask into entrance vestibule 
Close roll-up entry doors 
Remove impact limiters and personnel barrier using crane 
Inspect/survey for contamination, radiation, and for damage 
Open doors, move into tools/parts storage area 
Close doors 
Open canister transfer cell shield doors 
SRTC 
Airlock doors 
Commercial transporter 
(Locomotives, railcars, trucks, 
and transfer trailers) 
20 ton vestibule bridge crane 
Forklifts 
Scissor jack 
Shield wall and door 
Personnel barrier 
Mobile elevating platforms 
Transport cask - With Impact 
Limiters; 
Transport cask (DPC) - Without 
Impact Limiters 
4. CHF: Canister 
Transfer 
Canister Transfer Cell 
Move cask into the shielded canister transfer cell. 
Remove cask tie-downs and upend cask on the SRTC, LWT 
trailer, or OWT trailer using the 200 ton capacity bridge 
crane. 
Lift cask and position into the cask preparation pit utilizing 
the 200 ton overhead bridge crane. 
Position a moveable platform for cask and MSC preparation 
over the pit to provide worker access for lid bolt removal and 
gas sampling operations. 
Sample cask interior cavity gas contents, and if normal, 
equalize the internal pressure, and remove the cask lid 
bolts. In the unlikely event a gas sample indicates that the 
cask contains a breached canister, the cask is removed to 
the Remediation Facility, if available, or other holding area. 
Transfer the moveable platform for cask and MSC 
preparation to the staging area in the canister transfer cell. 
For DOE transportation casks, the lid is left in place until the 
transfer system is ready to commence transfer operations. 
Shield walls, and doors 
Shield view ports 
Manipulators 
Tie-downs (seismic restraints) 
Lifting Yokes 
WP transfer trolley 
Shield ring and lifting grapples 
SRTC 
MSC transporter 
Locomotives, railcars, trucks, 
and transfer trailers 
Remote-control lid bolt 
detorquers 
Handling equipment 
Trolley travel locks 
Transport cask - With Impact 
Limiters 
Transport cask (DPC) - Without 
Impact Limiters 
(2) Open WPs / MSCs 
(1) Transportation cask 
(unloading pit) 
(10) Canisters in staging pits 

Table III-1. Identification of Operations and Waste Form(s) at Risk (Continued) 
Functional Areas a 
Synopsis of Waste-Related Operations a,c 
Identified Relevant SSCs b 
Expected Waste Form and 
Material at Risk 
4. CHF: Canister 
Transfer 
Canister Transfer Cell 
(Continued) 
For naval transportation cask preparation, remove the cask 
lid and install a shield ring over the pit to provide shielding 
over the annulus area between the pit and cask wall. 
If SNF or HLW aging or staging is required, transfer a 
canister to an MSC for transfer to the SNF Aging System. 
When an empty MSC is scheduled for processing, Transport 
the MSC from either the WNNRF or an aging pad and move 
through the entrance vestibule to the canister transfer cell. 
Remove tie-downs, and lift the empty MSC and position into 
the MSC/WP loading pit, and prepare for canister transfer. 
Transport the WP from the WNNRF to the CHF using an 
SRTC. The WP middle and outer closure lids are delivered 
to the WP closure support area. Move the empty WP and 
inner lid with spread ring from the SRTC using the 100 ton 
capacity overhead bridge crane to the MSC/WP loading pit. 
When aging is required, move empty MSCs from the 
WNNRF on the SRTC. 
Lift and position the WP is into the MSC/WP loading pit 
where it is prepared to receive canisters. The cask 
preparation pit and the MSC/WP loading pits are equipped 
with impact limiters to absorb and dissipate impact energy 
from an accidental drop of a loaded WP, and to mitigate 
canister damage and prevent a breach of a DOE 
standardized canister or an MCO. 
Perform canister transfer operations in the canister transfer 
cell. 
Once the WP is prepared to accept canisters with the inner 
lid removed, personnel exit the canister transfer cell. 
Operators remotely remove the lids from the DOE 
transportation casks or MSCs, or they remove the shield 
ring from the naval transportation cask. 
Remote operations are performed from the canister transfer 
cell operating gallery. 
(Continued from prior page) 
Cask outer lid 
Pit moveable platform 
MSC inner and outer lids 
100 ton auxiliary hook and torque 
wrench 
Impact limiters 
200 ton cask handling (bridge) 
crane 
100 ton WP and canister 
handling crane 
Cask preparation pit 
(2) MSC/WP pits 
Canister staging pit 
WP turntable 
WP tilting machine 
WP collar removal machine 
MSC transporter 
Shield plugs 
See Prior Page 

Table III-1. Identification of Operations and Waste Form(s) at Risk (Continued) 
Functional Areas a 
Synopsis of Waste-Related Operations a,c 
Identified Relevant SSCs b 
Expected Waste Form and 
Material at Risk 
4. CHF: Canister 
Transfer 
Canister Transfer Cell 
(Continued) 
Position the 100 ton capacity WP and canister handling 
crane over the pit and use a canister lifting grapple to 
engage and lift each canister one at a time. 
Lift canisters out of the cask using the remotely operated 
overhead crane. The canister is lifted slightly above the 
floor and moved to a location over the prepositioned WP in 
the MSC/WP loading pit. 
Remotely disconnect the canister grapple, and return the 
crane to a staging position. 
For DOE SNF and DOE HLW canisters, several transfer 
operations from one or more transportation casks are 
required to fill the WP. In the case where DOE SNF and 
HLW canisters are not to be immediately loaded into a WP, 
transfer operations are performed to move a canister into 
the canister staging pit or an MSC. 
NSNF canisters require one transfer to load the canister into 
the naval WP. Prior to removing the naval transportation 
cask shield ring, a lift fixture with pintle is lowered over the 
NSNF canister. The lift fixture with six captive bolts is 
manually attached to the NSNF canister. 
Prior to canister transfer operations, personnel are 
evacuated from the canister transfer cell and the cask shield 
ring is removed. 
Lower the grapple of the 100 ton crane to remotely engage 
with the pintle on the lift fixture. Lift the canister and transfer 
to either a naval long WP or naval short WP, as appropriate 
to the NSNF canister being handled. 
Lower the 100 ton crane auxiliary hook, attached with a 
remotely operated torque wrench and disconnect the 
canister-lifting fixture. Remotely transfer (using the main 
hook with grapples) the lift fixture to a staging area in the 
canister transfer cell. Place the inner lid and spread ring in 
the WP to prevent canister ejection due to an accidental 
drop. The WP is then ready for transfer to the WP trolley 
and WP positioning cell for closure operations. 
See Prior Page 
See Prior Page 

Table III-1. Identification of Operations and Waste Form(s) at Risk (Continued) 
Functional Areas a 
Synopsis of Waste-Related Operations a,c 
Identified Relevant SSCs b 
Expected Waste Form and 
Material at Risk 
4. CHF: Canister 
Transfer 
Canister Transfer Cell 
(Continued) 
An MSC is capable of receiving a vertical DPC for aging. 
Place the empty MSC in an MSC/WP loading pit, loosen and 
remove lid bolts, and lift the he lid away. 
Place a transportation cask containing a DPC in the 
adjacent MSC/WP loading pit and remove the lid bolts and 
closure lid(s). Personnel will manually install a canisterlifting 
fixture with pintle and exit the transfer cell. 
The transfer of the DPC to the MSC is performed remotely. 
Personnel then reenter the canister transfer cell, reinstall the 
MSC lid, and load the MSC onto the SRTC for delivery 
outside to an MSC transporter for transfer to the SNF Aging 
System. Transfer the unloaded transportation cask to the 
cask receipt and return system. 
See Prior Page 
See Prior Page 
5. CHF: WP Transfer 
to WP Closure, MSC 
Closure and Removal, 
Canister Transfer Cell 
Remotely engage a loaded WP with the 100 ton capacity 
WP and canister handling crane, lifting yoke, and WP upper 
lifting collar; lift out of the pit, and place on a WP trolley. 
Move WP trolley a WP positioning cell and the WP trolley 
parking area located outside the WP positioning cell. 
Using remote controls, shield windows, closed-circuit 
television, manual and power manipulators, remotely 
controlled overhead bridge cranes, and other remote 
equipment, perform the SNF and HLW canister transfer 
operations. 
After loading an MSC, personnel then reenter the canister 
transfer cell, reinstall the MSC lid, and load the MSC onto 
the SRTC for delivery outside to an MSC transporter for 
transfer to the SNF Aging System. 
Move MSC outside on an SRTC where an MSC transporter 
can retrieve the cask for transfer to an aging pad. 
For an MSC containing a vertical DPC, remove the lift fixture 
with pintle prior to the MSC lid being installed. 
Loaded MSCs also go through additional processing steps, 
including filling the cask with an inert gas and performing 
seal leak tests, as necessary 
See CHF: Canister Transfer Area 
- Canister Transfer Cell 
+ 
Remote equipment including: 
remote controls, shield windows, 
closed-circuit television, manual 
and power manipulators 
Lift fixture with pintle 
See CHF: Canister Transfer Area 
- Canister Transfer Cell 

Table III-1. Identification of Operations and Waste Form(s) at Risk (Continued) 
Functional Areas a 
Synopsis of Waste-Related Operations a,c 
Identified Relevant SSCs b 
Expected Waste Form and 
Material at Risk 
6. CHF: WP Closure 
Install inner lid spread rings on WP 
Weld inner lid and spread ring 
Evacuate WP interior and fill with inert gas 
Weld middle and outer lids 
Examine welds and mitigate residual stress 
WP transfer trolley 
15 ton and 3 ton precision 
handling cranes 
Robotic arm 
Shield door(s) 
Electromechanical manipulators 
Glove box 
Shield view port 
Trolley pedestal 
Welding equipment 
WP inner, middle and outer lids 
WP spread ring 
Trolley rail tracks 
Handling equipment 
Two unsealed WPs 
7. CHF: WP Loadout 
Canister Transfer Cell, 
WP Tool Storage 
Room, Exit Vestibule 
Open shield doors and move WP transporter into WP 
loadout area from WP closure cell through WP tool storage 
room using transport locomotive 
Open WP transporter doors and extend bedplate 
Lift and position WP 
Survey for contamination and defects 
Lower onto emplacement pallet, which is on rotating table 
Reposition WP by using rotating table 
Remove lifting collars 
Lift, transfer and lower WP and emplacement pallet onto WP 
transporter bedplate 
Retract bedplate and close WP transporter doors 
Move WP transporter out of CHF through WP tool room and 
exist vestibule; close shield doors using transport locomotive 
Shield doors 
100 ton loadout cell bridge crane 
WP Lifting collar and yoke 
Emplacement pallet 
WP transporter 
Transport locomotive(s) 
Tilting fixture 
Rotating table 
Trolley pedestal 
Transporter rail tracks 
One full, sealed WP 

Table III-1. Identification of Operations and Waste Form(s) at Risk (Continued) 
Functional Areas a 
Synopsis of Waste-Related Operations a,c 
Identified Relevant SSCs b 
Expected Waste Form and 
Material at Risk 
8. CHF: Empty 
Transportation Cask 
and MSC Removal 
Canister Transfer Cell, 
WP Tool Storage 
Room, Exit Vestibule 
None 
(Tasks involve unloaded casks, and unloaded MSCs) 
N/A d 
N/A 
9. DTF: Cask & MSC 
Receipt 
Cask and MSC 
Entrance Vestibule, 
Cask and MSC SRTC 
Receipt Area, Cask and 
MSC to Trolley Transfer 
Room 
The SRTCs carrying loaded transportation casks with 
impact limiters installed are received in the cask and MSC 
SRTC receipt area of the DTF after passing through the 
cask and MSC entrance vestibule. 
Operations: 
Open shield doors and move casks into vestibule area 
Close shield doors 
Remove impact limiters and personnel barrier 
Perform inspection and radiological survey 
Open airlock doors 
Lift and upend the transportation cask using the cask 
handling crane. 
Vertically move cask from the cask and MSC SRTC receipt 
area through a shield door and into the cask and MSC to 
trolley transfer room. 
Place the cask on the pedestal on the trolley and secure in 
place with hold-down devices. 
The MSCs to be unloaded in the DTF are prepared for 
transfer operations in a manner similar to that used for 
CSNF transportation casks and in the same locations 
Loaded MSCs processed in the DTF are carried to the DTF 
by the MSC transporter from the SNF Aging System pad 
and lowered onto an SRTC (in a vertical orientation) outside 
of the DTF. 
The SRTC holding the MSC is then pushed by an SRTC 
tractor into the DTF for processing. 
200 ton cask handling crane 
25 ton impact limiter crane 
Seismic restraints 
SRTC 
10 ton forklifts 
Shield/entrance doors 
Handling tools 
Personnel barriers 
Impact limiters 
Mobile elevating platforms 
Transfer trolley 
MSC transporter 
SRTC rail tracks 
Transfer trolley tracks 
Yokes, yoke stands and 
restraints 
Trolley pedestal 
One sealed transport cask 
without impact limiters (one cask 
per DTF) 
Or sealed MSC 

Table III-1. Identification of Operations and Waste Form(s) at Risk (Continued) 
Functional Areas a 
Synopsis of Waste-Related Operations a,c 
Identified Relevant SSCs b 
Expected Waste Form and 
Material at Risk 
10. DTF: Preparation 
Cask/MSC Turntable 
Room, Cask 
Preparation Room 
Close airlock/shield doors to receipt room. 
Open airlock/shield doors to turntable room 
Cask and trolley moves into turntable room onto rotating 
table 
Close airlock/shield doors to transfer room. 
Cask is rotated to align with preparation room entrance 
Open airlock/shield doors from turntable to preparation room 
Cask and trolley moves into preparation room 
Close airlock/shield doors from turntable to preparation 
room 
Outer lid bolts removed 
Gas sampling and pressure checks performed 
Outer lid removed 
Inner lid bolts loosened and some removed 
Install docking rings 
Airlock/shield doors 
Turntable 
Transfer trolley 
Remote-control lid bolt 
detorquers 
Tools and equipment (including a 
lid-lifting fixture, lid bolts, etc.) 
Outer and inner lids 
Trolley tracks 
Trolley pedestal 
One sealed transport cask 
without impact limiters or MSC 
(one per DTF) 
[During last stages: One partially 
unsealed transport cask without 
impact limiters or partially 
unsealed MSC (one per DTF)] 
11. DTF: Cask and 
MSC Docking 
Cask and MSC Docking 
Room 
Open airlock/shield doors to turntable room 
Move cask and trolley into turntable room onto rotating table 
Close airlock/shield doors to preparation area 
Rotate cask to align with docking room entrance 
Open airlock/shield doors from turntable to docking room 
Move cask and trolley into docking room and unto turntable 
Rotate cask to align with docking position 
Move cask to position under docking port 
Close airlock doors from turntable room to docking room 
Airlock/shield doors 
Turntable 
Transfer trolley 
Trolley rail tracks 
Trolley positioning equipment 
Cask inner lid 
Trolley pedestal 
Docking rings 
Gantry crane 
Mobile slab and cell plug 
One partially unsealed transport 
cask without impact limiters (one 
cask per DTF) 

Table III-1. Identification of Operations and Waste Form(s) at Risk (Continued) 
Functional Areas a 
Synopsis of Waste-Related Operations a,c 
Identified Relevant SSCs b 
Expected Waste Form and 
Material at Risk 
12. DTF: Empty WP 
and MSC Processing 
Prior to Loading 
None 
(Tasks involve unloaded WPs) 
N/A d 
N/A 
13. DTF: NSNF Receipt 
WP and Navy Cask 
Entrance Vestibule, 
WP/Navy Cask SRTC 
Receipt Area, WP/Navy 
to Trolley Transfer 
Room, WP/Navy Cask 
Preparation Room 
NSNF casks enter the DTF on SRTCs in the WP and navy 
cask entrance vestibule and are unloaded in the WP/navy 
cask SRTC receipt area. 
Operations: 
Open shield doors 
Move casks into entrance vestibule area 
Close shield doors 
Remove impact limiters and personnel barrier using WP 
handling crane and place on special stands for radiological 
survey 
Perform inspection and radiological survey 
Open airlock doors 
Lift, tilt and vertically load cask through shield doors onto 
trolley using the 200 ton navy cask handling crane 
Place seismic restraints placed on cask 
Move trolley and cask to the WP/navy cask preparation 
room 
10 ton forklift 
200 ton naval-cask handling 
crane 
50 ton WP handling crane 
Transfer trolley 
Seismic restraints 
SRTC tractor 
Mobile elevating platforms 
Handling equipment 
SRTC rail tracks 
Trolley rail tracks 
Trolley positioning equipment 
Trolley pedestal 
Shield doors 
Lid bolts 
Sealed NSNF cask without 
impact limiters 

Table III-1. Identification of Operations and Waste Form(s) at Risk (Continued) 
Functional Areas a 
Synopsis of Waste-Related Operations a,c 
Identified Relevant SSCs b 
Expected Waste Form and 
Material at Risk 
14. DTF: NSNF 
Processing 
WP Docking Cell, WP 
Loading (Naval 
Canister)/Docking Ring 
Removal Cell, WP 
Loading/Docking Ring 
Removal Cell 
Open shield doors 
Move cask into preparation room 
Close shield doors 
Sample interior gases of cask 
Remove lid bolts 
Move trolley and cask to the naval cask transfer room 
Lift and position the naval cask through the WP docking cell 
to the WP loading (naval canister)/docking ring removal cell 
under the unloading station. 
Transfer the canisters using a special crane to an empty WP 
previously placed in the WP loading/docking ring removal 
cell. 
Thereafter, prepare WP for transfer to the WP handling and 
staging cell, including placing the inner lid on the WP. 
Airlock/shield doors 
Cask outer lid 
Transfer trolley 
70 ton Navy Cask handling crane 
Remote-control lid bolt 
detorquers 
Handling equipment (such as a 
canister grapple) 
Trolley rail tracks 
Trolley positioning equipment 
Trolley pedestal 
Lid bolts 
One unsealed NSNF cask 
without impact limiters (one cask 
per DTF) 

Table III-1. Identification of Operations and Waste Form(s) at Risk (Continued) 
Functional Areas a 
Synopsis of Waste-Related Operations a,c 
Identified Relevant SSCs b 
Expected Waste Form and 
Material at Risk 
15. DTF: Transfer 
Cask and MSC Docking 
Room, Waste Transfer 
Cell, WP Docking Cell, 
WP Loading/Docking 
Ring Removal Cell 
Remove cask inner lid and/or docking port plugs 
Select grapples and index cask/MSC/ to be unloaded 
Initiate auto transfer by spent fuel transfer machine 
Check cask/MSC after transfer 
Undock unloaded cask/MSC, open docking room doors, and 
then transfer cask/MSC to restoration area 
Check WP and install inner lid 
Undock WP, open docking room doors, and move WP by 
trolley to WP closure preparation cell 
Spent fuel transfer machine 
Various grapples 
Transfer trolley 
Airlock/shield doors 
Staging racks 
Inner WP lid 
70 ton Navy Cask handling crane 
WP loading/docking ring 
Mobile slab 
Handling equipment (such as a 
canister grapple) 
Trolley rail tracks 
Trolley positioning equipment 
Trolley pedestal 
Lid bolts 
Shield view ports/windows 
Manipulators 
Open WPs or MSCs (2 stations) 
Two open transport cask s or two 
open MSCs or one of each 
SNF assembly or canister 
Staging racks 
120 CSNF assemblies 
10 canisters 
16. DTF: Empty 
Transportation Cask/ 
MSC/DPC Removal 
Cask and MSC Docking 
Room, Cask/MSC 
Turntable Room, Cask 
Restoration Room, 
Cask and MSC to 
Trolley Transfer Room, 
Cask and MSC SRTC 
Receipt Area, Cask and 
MSC Entrance 
Vestibule 
Once SNF/HLW transfer operations are completed, retrieve 
the transportation cask inner lid from storage in the waste 
transfer cell and lower into the unloaded cask. Place the 
docking port plug into the docking port and disengage the 
cask port docking device. 
Return unloaded transportation casks (except naval 
transportation casks) and loaded or unloaded MSCs to the 
Cask/MSC/WP Preparation System from the SNF/HLW 
Transfer System following waste transfer operations. 
Undock unloaded transportation casks and loaded or 
unloaded MSCs room the cask and MSC docking room or 
the DPC Docking room. 
Move the cask trolley to the cask restoration room. 
Cask inner lid 
Docking port plug 
Cask trolley 
Docking ring, 
200 ton cask handling crane 
Cask tie downs 
Impact limiters and personnel 
barrier 
SRTC 
WP trolley 
200 ton navy cask handling 
crane 
Accumulated materials 

Table III-1. Identification of Operations and Waste Form(s) at Risk (Continued) 
Functional Areas a 
Synopsis of Waste-Related Operations a,c 
Identified Relevant SSCs b 
Expected Waste Form and 
Material at Risk 
16. DTF: Empty 
Transportation Cask/ 
MSC/DPC Removal 
Cask and MSC Docking 
Room, Cask/MSC 
Turntable Room, Cask 
Restoration Room, 
Cask and MSC to 
Trolley Transfer Room, 
Cask and MSC SRTC 
Receipt Area, Cask and 
MSC Entrance 
Vestibule 
(Continued) 
Remove and decontaminate docking ring, and send it back 
to the cask preparation subsystem. 
Fasten and check the inner lid for tightness. Install outer lid 
(depending on cask design). Conduct an external 
radiological survey on the cask, trolley, and pedestal. Move 
the cask trolley to the cask and MSC to trolley transfer room. 
From here, lift the unloaded transportation cask with the 
cask handling crane, place on the SRTC in the cask and 
MSC SRTC receipt area, and down-end back to a horizontal 
position. Install cask tie down, as necessary, and impact 
limiters and personnel barrier are installed, if necessary. 
Move the unloaded transportation cask through the cask 
and MSC entrance vestibule to the Cask Receipt and Return 
System on the SRTC. 
Return unloaded naval casks to the Cask/MSC/WP 
Preparation System by the SNF/HLW Transfer System. Set 
the cask lid in place and move the WP trolley from the WP 
loading (navy canister)/docking ring removal cell to the 
WP/navy cask preparation room. Install cask lid bolts and 
perform a radiological survey. 
Then move the naval cask to the WP/navy trolley transfer 
room, lift using the navy cask handling crane, place on the 
SRTC and down-ended to the horizontal position in the 
WP/navy cask SRTC receipt area. Install the naval cask tie 
downs are installed, as necessary, and perform a 
radiological survey. Install the impact limiters and personnel 
barrier, if necessary. Perform a second radiological survey 
and final inspection. Move the unloaded naval cask on the 
SRTC through the WP and navy cask entrance vestibule to 
the cask receipt and return system. 
Move unloaded DPC casks from the DPC docking room to 
the cask restoration room and are handled in a similar 
manner as that of other transportation casks during cask 
restoration operations. 
See prior page 
See prior page 

Table III-1. Identification of Operations and Waste Form(s) at Risk (Continued) 
Functional Areas a 
Synopsis of Waste-Related Operations a,c 
Identified Relevant SSCs b 
Expected Waste Form and 
Material at Risk 
16. DTF: Empty 
Transportation Cask/ 
MSC/DPC Removal 
(Continued) 
Move unloaded MSCs from the cask and MSC docking 
room to the cask restoration room and handle in a similar 
manner as that of other transportation casks. 
See prior page 
See prior page 
17. DTF: Loaded MSC 
Removal 
Cask and MSC Docking 
Room, Cask/MSC 
Turntable Room, Cask 
Preparation Room, 
Cask and MSC to 
Trolley Transfer Room, 
Cask and MSC SRTC 
Receipt Area, Cask and 
MSC Entrance 
Vestibule 
Move loaded MSC and trolley onto docking turntable 
Rotate MSC to align with cask turntable room entrance 
Open airlock/shield doors to cask turntable room 
Move loaded MSC and trolley into turntable room onto 
rotating table 
Close airlock/shield doors to docking room. 
Rotate MSC to align with restoration room entrance 
Open airlock/shield doors from turntable to restoration room 
MSC and trolley moves into restoration room 
Close airlock/shield doors from turntable to restoration room 
Remove docking ring, and replace cask inner lid 
Restore MSC: vacuum dry, seal, fill with inert gas, test seals 
Open airlock/shield doors from turntable to restoration room 
Move loaded MSC and trolley into turntable room onto 
rotating table 
Rotate MSC to align with restoration room entrance 
Open airlock/shield doors from turntable to transfer room 
Move MSC into transfer room 
Transfer MSC to a MSC transporter and move MSC to 
Aging Facility 
(Specific activities are reverse of MSC load-in) 
Transfer trolley 
200 ton cask handling crane 
SRTC 
Airlock/shield doors 
Shield view ports 
Docking ring 
MSC outer lid 
MSC inner lid 
Turntables 
MSC transporter 
Mobile elevating platforms 
One partially-sealed MSC 

Table III-1. Identification of Operations and Waste Form(s) at Risk (Continued) 
Functional Areas a 
Synopsis of Waste-Related Operations a,c 
Identified Relevant SSCs b 
Expected Waste Form and 
Material at Risk 
18. DTF: WP Handling, 
Welding and 
Decontamination 
WP Handling and 
Staging Cell, WP 
Positioning Cells, WP 
Closure Cells, and the 
WP/Trolley 
Decontamination Room 
Conduct contamination survey 
Transfer WP from trolley to lateral transfer system trolley 
using crane 
Install inner lid 
Trolley moves WP laterally into WP closure cell 
Install inner lid spread rings 
Tack weld inner lid 
Purge WP interior/backfill with inert gas 
Weld middle and outer lids 
Inspect welds and postclosure check 
WP is transferred out of cell to storage area or remediation 
(if necessary) 
100 ton staging cell overhead 
bridge crane 
WP Transfer Trolley 
Lateral Transfer Trolley 
Closure cell pedestal 
Welding equipment 
Inner, middle and outer WP lids 
Spread ring 
Shield doors 
Manipulators 
Glove box facilities 
Shield view port(s) / windows 
Handling equipment 
Grapples and yokes 
Trolley rail tracks 
One full unsealed WP prior to 
transfer into closure cell (4 
stations per DTF); sealed 
thereafter 

Table III-1. Identification of Operations and Waste Form(s) at Risk (Continued) 
Functional Areas a 
Synopsis of Waste-Related Operations a,c 
Identified Relevant SSCs b 
Expected Waste Form and 
Material at Risk 
19. DTF: WP Loadout 
WP Loadout Cell, WP 
Transporter Vestibule, 
Exit Vestibule 
Configured tilting machine for WP Type 
Lift/move WP with crane onto trolley and mount 
Move trolley into loadout tilt and transporter area 
Rotate WP to horizontal using titling machine 
Lower WP onto emplacement pallet with loadout handling 
crane 
Remove trunnion collars 
Move and dock the subsurface transporter into DTF, and 
extend bedplate 
Lifts, transfer and lower WP and emplacement pallet with 
crane onto WP transporter bedplate 
100 ton WP loadout cell 
overhead crane 
Tilting machine 
WP loadout trolley 
Four-point lifting fixture (for 
engaging pallet) 
Emplacement pallet 
WP transporter 
WP Trunnion collars 
Rotating table 
Shield doors 
Manipulators 
Transport locomotive(s) 
Trolley rail tracks 
WP transporter rail tracks 
One full, sealed WP in process 
(one per DTF) 
20. DTF: WP 
Remediation 
DPC Cutting/WP Dry 
Remediation Cell 
Open shield doors 
Transfer loaded, sealed WP from WP closure area to cutting 
WP dry remediation cell on WP trolley 
Close shield doors 
Lift WP into opening station inside WP dry remediation cell 
If necessary, open WP by cutting machine, and place 
docking interface on WP (including lid cover) 
Place WP on trolley and move to DPC/WP unload port 
Remove inner lid and open WP 
Transfer contents to staging area or to new WP or to MSC 
using spent fuel transfer machine 
WP trolley 
Handling tools 
Chip-less Cutting machine 
100 ton WP remediation (bridge) 
crane 
Docking interface 
WP lids 
Shield doors 
Spent fuel transfer machine 
Shield view port(s) 
Shield doors 
Trolley rail tracks 
Manipulators 
One full, sealed or open WP in 
process (one per DTF) 
During transfer: one of the 
following: 
Fuel assemblies 
DSNF / HLW Canisters 
NSNF canisters 
During transfer: one of the 
following: 
Open WP 
Open MSC 
CSNFA staging racks 

Table III-1. Identification of Operations and Waste Form(s) at Risk (Continued) 
Functional Areas a 
Synopsis of Waste-Related Operations a,c 
Identified Relevant SSCs b 
Expected Waste Form and 
Material at Risk 
21. DTF: Dry 
Remediation 
Cask Docking/Dry 
Remediation Room, 
Tool Spare Transfer 
Room, DPC Cutting/WP 
Dry Remediation Cell 
Open/close shield doors for DPC Preparation Room, DPC 
Docking Room, and Tool Spare Transfer Room as required 
for movement. 
Off-Normal condition detected in the Cask/MSC/WP 
Preparation System: 
Move transportation cask or MSC (or containing the waste 
necessitating remediation) from the Cask Preparation Room 
through the DPC Preparation/Cask Dry Remediation Room 
to the turntable in the DPC Docking Room. 
From the turntable, move the cask to the Tool / Spare 
Storage Room 
When applicable, repair the transportation cask or MSC, and 
return it to the Cask Preparation Room to finish cask 
preparation. 
If necessary, move the cask back into the Cask Dry 
Remediation Docking Room and docked for waste 
remediation. 
Transfer the SNF/HLW from the cask to a basket located on 
a WP/DPC trolley in the DPC cutting/WP dry remediation 
cell using the WP remediation crane. 
Move the basket on the WP/DPC trolley to the DPC/WP 
unload port. 
Open sliding door and transfer to a WP by the SNF/HLW 
Transfer System. 
Undock cask in the Cask Dry Remediation Docking Room 
Move cask to the Tool/Spare Storage Room for restoration. 
After restoration, return cask on its trolley to the 
Cask/MSC/WP Preparation System for transfer to an SRTC. 
When the off-normal condition affects SNF/HLW and the 
condition is detected during the SNF/HLW transfer process: 
Undock and close the cask and closed, as appropriate, in 
the Cask and MSC Docking Room. 
15 ton tool spare transfer room 
crane 
100 ton WP remediation (bridge) 
crane 
Port plug gantry crane 
Handling tools 
Docking port (mobile slab) 
Docking port plug 
Shield doors 
Transfer trolley 
SRTC 
Docking ring 
Cask lid 
MSC outer and inner lids 
Turntable 
Basket on trolley 
Shield view port(s) 
Trolley rail tracks 
Manipulators 
Tools and equipment 
Handling equipment and 
grapples 
Mobile elevating platforms 
During transfer: one of the 
following: 
MSC or Transportation cask 
SNF/HLW 

Table III-1. Identification of Operations and Waste Form(s) at Risk (Continued) 
Functional Areas a 
Synopsis of Waste-Related Operations a,c 
Identified Relevant SSCs b 
Expected Waste Form and 
Material at Risk 
21. DTF: Dry 
Remediation 
Cask Docking/Dry 
Remediation Room, 
Tool Spare Transfer 
Room, DPC Cutting/WP 
Dry Remediation Cell 
(Continued) 
(Continued from prior page) 
Move the cask on its trolley through the Cask/MSC 
Turntable Room, the Cask Preparation Room, DPC 
Preparation/Cask Dry Remediation, the turntable in the DPC 
Docking Room, and into the Cask Dry Remediation Docking 
Room and/or the Tool/Spare Storage Room. 
If necessary, remove the cask contents as previously 
described. 
Naval casks will not be transferred to DPC cutting / WP 
Remediation cell by this system. 
See prior page 
See prior page 
22. DTF: Wet 
Remediation 
Cask Wet Remediation / 
Laydown Area, Cask 
Wet Remediation 
Entrance Vestibule 
Transfer casks vertically on transfer trolley from DTF 
process area or horizontally on SRTC through entrance area 
From DTF: Open/close shield doors for DPC Preparation 
Room, DPC Docking Room, and Cask Wet Remediation / 
Laydown Area as required for movement. 
From Outside: Open/close roll-up and shield doors as 
required for movement. 
Move cask into wet remediation room 
Fuel transfer takes place under water. 
For horizontal cask, crane lifts and upends cask to vertical 
and then onto turntable inside cask pit 
Otherwise, crane transfers vertical cask to cask pit 
Prepare cask, including sampling and unbolting lids 
Lift and lower cask into pool by crane and grapple 
Open lid 
Fuel handling machine removes SNF and transfers SNF to 
staging rack, to MSC or to special canister 
Replace lid on empty cask, and lift cask from pool into cask 
pit and drain; place on trolley and move empty cask to 
Receipt Area 
Transfer trolley 
200 ton cask handling crane 
20 ton overhead maintenance 
crane 
Cask handling equipment 
including lifting yoke 
SRTC 
Airlock doors 
Roll-up door 
Wet remediation fuel handling 
machine 
Pool structure (including fuel 
baskets and racks; (2) cask 
stands; crush pads; stainless 
steel liner) 
Pool water supply system 
(treatment and cooling; waterlevel 
control; ion exchange bed 
and filters; pumps; piping) 
Mobile elevating platforms 
Loaded cask or MSC upon entry 
(one per facility) 
Staging racks / baskets 
(minimum total capacity): 
48 PWR CSNF assemblies 
72 BWR CSNF assemblies, 
10 DOE waste canisters 
After opening cask: 
During transfer: one of the 
following is present: 
Fuel assemblies 
DSNF / HLW canisters 
NSNF canisters 
During transfer: one of the 
following is be present: 
Open, full MSC 
Open, special canister 

Table III-1. Identification of Operations and Waste Form(s) at Risk (Continued) 
Functional Areas a 
Synopsis of Waste-Related Operations a,c 
Identified Relevant SSCs b 
Expected Waste Form and 
Material at Risk 
22. DTF: Wet 
Remediation 
Cask Wet Remediation / 
Laydown Area, Cask 
Wet Remediation 
Entrance Vestibule 
(Continued) 
(Continued from prior page) 
Move empty MSC to remediation area on trolley; lift/lower 
and place MSC onto turntable in cask pit and then to pool 
floor 
Transfer SNF from staging rack into empty MSC 
Install MSC lid and lift out of pool onto cask pit turntable 
Transfer MSC onto trolley and move loaded MSC to receipt 
area 
(Continued from prior page) 
Remote-control bolt detorque 
machine 
Trolley rail tracks 
Shield view port / window 
Manipulators 
Handling tools and equipment 
External stairs/walkway in area 
Fuel assembly / cask drying 
equipment 
Lid storage racks 
Cask pit turntable 
SNF drying and inerting system 
Cask draining equipment 
Cask cooling equipment 
Cask equipment pits (2) 
Cask preparation and 
decontamination pit 
Cask lid(s) 
Cask skirt 
Turntable (inside the cask 
decontamination pit with electric 
motor) 
See Prior Page 

Table III-1. Identification of Operations and Waste Form(s) at Risk (Continued) 
Functional Areas a 
Synopsis of Waste-Related Operations a,c 
Identified Relevant SSCs b 
Expected Waste Form and 
Material at Risk 
23. DTF: DPC Cutting 
DPC Preparation/Cask 
Dry Remediation Room, 
DPC Docking Room, 
DPC Cutting/WP Dry 
Remediation Cell 
Remove cask bolts 
Open shield doors to DPC preparation/cask dry remediation 
room 
Place DPC on trolley in cask receipt area, and move DPC 
cask by trolley to DPC preparation/cask dry remediation 
room 
Prepare cask by removing the cask lid, attaching a DPC 
handling device and installing the cask docking ring 
Following preparation, open shield doors and move cask 
and trolley into the DPC docking room. 
Position trolley under the DPC docking station to facilitates 
the transfer of the DPC from the cask to the DPC cutting/WP 
dry remediation cell 
Transfer the DPC from the DPC cask to the DPC cutting/WP 
dry remediation cell, using the WP remediation crane. 
Move the DPC into the DPC cutting station and sample 
internal gases and vent 
Remove DPC lid using the chipless cutting machine. 
Raise the severed lid high enough for a power shear to 
reach in and cut off the long drainpipe that was used during 
the loading of the DPC 
Remove DPC lid and transfer the DPC onto the WP/DPC 
trolley by the WP remediation crane 
Transfer the opened DPC on the trolley to the DPC/WP 
unload area of the DPC cutting/WP dry remediation cell for 
the transfer of the CSNF. 
Transfer CSNF to staging area or to WP or to MSC using 
spent fuel transfer machine 
After unloading is complete, return the WP/DPC trolley with 
the empty DPC to its initial position. 
Transfer trolley 
Handling equipment 
Airlock doors 
Turntable (in DPC docking room) 
Cask docking ring 
Docking port plug 
100 ton WP remediation crane 
Chip-less cutting machine 
Detorquing device 
Grapples 
Spent fuel transfer machine 
Cask lid and bolts 
DPC lid 
Trolley rail tracks 
Shield view ports and windows 
Manipulators 
Mobile slab 
Sealed/unsealed, loaded DPC 
CSNF assembly (during transfer 
by spent fuel transfer machine) 

Table III-1. Identification of Operations and Waste Form(s) at Risk (Continued) 
Functional Areas a 
Synopsis of Waste-Related Operations a,c 
Identified Relevant SSCs b 
Expected Waste Form and 
Material at Risk 
24. FHF: Cask and 
MSC Receipt 
Entrance Vestibule 
Open entry doors 
Cask: Move cask into area using diesel-powered site prime 
mover 
Close entry doors 
Off-load cask 
Remove impact limiters and personnel barrier using crane 
Inspect/survey for contamination, radiation, and for damage 
Up end, lift and transfer cask to import/export trolley 
MSC: Transport loaded MSC into entrance vestibule by 
MSC transporter. Inspect and then lift and transfer to 
import/export trolley 
Site prime mover 
SRTC 
Locomotives, railcars, trucks, 
and transfer trailers 
200 ton gantry crane 
30 ton auxiliary hook 
Grapples, spreaders, bales, 
yokes and accessories 
Forklift 
Impact limiters 
Tilting frame 
Mobile elevating platforms 
Import/export trolley 
Entry doors (bypass leaf door) 
Rail tracks 
Cask preparation stand and tools 
Transport cask - With Impact 
Limiters 
or Transport cask - Without 
Impact Limiters 
or MSC 
or Site-specific cask 

Table III-1. Identification of Operations and Waste Form(s) at Risk (Continued) 
Functional Areas a 
Synopsis of Waste-Related Operations a,c 
Identified Relevant SSCs b 
Expected Waste Form and 
Material at Risk 
25. FHF: Preparation 
Preparation Room 
Open shield door 
Move casks (or MSC) into preparation area 
Close shield door 
Outer lid bolts removed 
Gas sampling and pressure checks performed 
Outer lid removed 
Inner lid bolts loosened and some removed 
Install docking rings 
Open shield doors to main transfer room, and move 
cask/MSC. 
Failed fuel is removed back through entrance vestibule o 
storage or Remediation Facility) 
Open shield doors to main transfer room, and move 
cask/MSC. 
Failed fuel is removed back through entrance vestibule o 
storage or Remediation Facility) 
Site prime mover 
SRTC 
Import/export trolley 
Mobile elevating platforms 
Shield doors 
Rail tracks 
Transport cask - Without Impact 
Limiters 
or MSC 
or Site-specific cask 
26. FHF: Empty WP / 
Empty MSC 
Processing 
Entrance Vestibule, 
Preparation Room, 
Main Transfer Room, 
and Fuel Transfer Bay 
None Identified 
(Tasks involve unloaded WPs and MSCs) 
N/A d 
N/A 

Table III-1. Identification of Operations and Waste Form(s) at Risk (Continued) 
Functional Areas a 
Synopsis of Waste-Related Operations a,c 
Identified Relevant SSCs b 
Expected Waste Form and 
Material at Risk 
27. FHF: CSNF 
Assembly Transfer 
Main Transfer Room, 
Fuel Transfer Bay, Fuel 
Transfer Room 
Transfer the cask or MSC from the import/export trolleys 
pedestal to a pedestal on one of the three transfer bay 
trolleys using the main transfer room overhead bridge crane. 
Move the transfer bay trolley into the fuel transfer bay and 
beneath the fuel transfer room. 
Transfer CSNF using a fuel handling machine with a mastmounted 
manipulator from a transportation cask or MSC into 
a designated WP or MSC via a dry handling process. 
After the fuel transfer activities are completed to an MSC, 
the shield lid is replaced. 
If a WP is loaded, place the inner lid on the loaded WP, and 
then reinstall the transfer port seal plugs. 
The loaded MSC, loaded WP, and empty cask or MSC are 
available for removal from the respective fuel transfer bays. 
200 ton bridge crane 
30 ton auxiliary hook 
Mobile elevating platforms, 
mobile slab 
Import/export trolley 
Transfer bay trolleys w. pedestal 
Shield doors and windows 
Rail and trolley racks 
Docking ring 
Spent fuel transfer machine 
30 ton fuel transfer maintenance 
crane 
Manipulators 
Shield lid 
Wall penetrations (for swipes) 
Handling equipment 
Transport cask - Without Impact 
Limiters 
or MSC 
or Site-specific cask 
Open WP (one) 
CSNF assembly (one) 
28. FHF: Canister 
Transfer 
Main Transfer Room 
Transfer the cask or MSC containing a canister or canisters 
to be unloaded into a WP or MSC into the main transfer 
room on the import/export trolley 
Remove the cask or MSC lid or lids, as appropriate, lift the 
canister or canisters from the cask or MSC and lower the 
canister(s) into the empty WP or empty MSC using the main 
transfer room overhead crane to the dedicated canister 
transfer station 
Once the transfer of the canister or canisters to the WP or 
MSC is complete, the respective lids are replaced on the 
cask, WP, or MSC prior to the dispositioning of the various 
filled and empty containers 
200 ton bridge crane 
30 ton auxiliary hook 
Mobile elevating platform 
Import/export trolley 
Closure trolley with pedestal 
Shield doors 
Rail and trolley tracks 
Docking ring 
Shield view port / windows 
Handling equipment 
Lids 
Transport cask - Without Impact 
Limiters 
or MSC 
or Site-specific cask 
Canister (one) 
Open WP (one) 

Table III-1. Identification of Operations and Waste Form(s) at Risk (Continued) 
Functional Areas a 
Synopsis of Waste-Related Operations a,c 
Identified Relevant SSCs b 
Expected Waste Form and 
Material at Risk 
29. FHF: WP Closure 
Main Transfer Room, 
WP Positioning Cell, 
WP Closure Cell 
Closure operations include welding, nondestructive 
examination, and stress mitigation 
Place the inner lid on a WP loaded with CSNF assemblies in 
fuel transfer bay 
Open the shield doors of the fuel transfer bay and move the 
trolley holding the WP into the main transfer room 
Remove the docking ring and transfer the filled, unsealed 
WP to the trolley that serves the WP closure cell using the 
main transfer room overhead crane 
Once the loaded WP is received in the closure cell, sealweld 
the inner lid and spread ring in place, 
Evacuate the WP inner vessel and fill with inert gas 
Weld the middle and outer lids in place, and 
nondestructively examine the welds. Mitigate the residual 
stresses on the outer lid weld 
Shield doors of fuel of transfer 
bay 
Welding equipment 
Inner middle and outer WP lids 
Spread ring 
Transfer trolley 
WP closure trolley 
200 ton crane (main transfer 
room overhead crane) 
Docking ring 
Handling equipment 
Electromechanical manipulators 
Shield view port / windows 
Trolley tracks 
Glove box 
15 ton closure cell crane 
3 ton remote handling crane 
WP closure robotic arm 
Weld-stress mitigation equipment 
Inerting equipment 
Examination equipment 
One full WP with no or partial 
seal 

Table III-1. Identification of Operations and Waste Form(s) at Risk (Continued) 
Functional Areas a 
Synopsis of Waste-Related Operations a,c 
Identified Relevant SSCs b 
Expected Waste Form and 
Material at Risk 
30. FHF: WP Loadout 
Main Transfer Room, 
Preparation Room, 
Entrance Vestibule 
Once the WP is sealed, transfer the WP and trolley to the 
WP loadout area inside the main transfer room 
Lift the WP using the overhead bridge crane from the 
pedestal on the trolley and move to the WP survey area 
Remotely survey the loaded WPs for surface contamination 
and perform minor wipe downs of contaminated WPs 
utilizing remote manipulators 
Transfer the WP to the WP tilting machine using main 
transfer room overhead bridge crane 
Down-end the WP to a horizontal orientation using the WP 
upper and lower lifting collar trunnions and the tilting 
machine and over head crane 
Lower the WP onto the previously delivered emplacement 
pallet that is supported by the rotating table 
The rotating table is used to position the WP for remote 
removal of the WP upper and lower lifting collars using the 
lifting collar removal machine 
Move The WP transporter through the entrance vestibule 
and the preparation room to the transfer room WP loadout 
area 
Open the shield door(s) on the WP transporter and activate 
and the transporter bedplate remotely and extend it from the 
transporter 
Position the overhead crane and a lifting fixture with yokes 
over the WP and emplacement pallet. Engage the 
emplacement pallet and the WP using the lifting fixture 
Lift, transfer and lower the WP and emplacement pallet onto 
the extended WP transporter bedplate 
Retract the WP, pallet, and bedplate are into the WP 
transporter and close the transporter shield doors 
Move the WP transporter from the main transfer room, 
through the preparation room, and then through the 
entrance vestibule to the subsurface repository for 
emplacement 
WP transfer trolley 
200 ton crane (main transfer 
room overhead crane) 
Lifting collar 
Emplacement pallet 
WP transporter 
Shield doors 
Shield windows 
Manipulators 
WP upper and lower lifting collar 
trunnions 
WP tilting machine 
WP rotating table 
WP upper and lower lifting 
collars 
WP transporter rail tracks 
Trolley rail tracks 
Transport locomotive(s) 
One full, sealed WP 

Table III-1. Identification of Operations and Waste Form(s) at Risk (Continued) 
Functional Areas a 
Synopsis of Waste-Related Operations a,c 
Identified Relevant SSCs b 
Expected Waste Form and 
Material at Risk 
31. FHF: Loaded MSC 
Removal 
Main Transfer Room, 
Preparation Room, 
Entrance Vestibule 
After the MSC is filled, reinstall the MSC lid(s) and transfer 
the MSC to the import/export trolley, using the main transfer 
room overhead crane 
Perform a radiological survey, remove the docking rings and 
conduct other preparation activities 
Move the MSC on the import/export trolley to the 
preparation room where the MSC is prepared for exit 
Tighten MSC lid bolts fill with inert gas, and perform a leak 
test. Transfer the trolley and MSC to the entrance vestibule 
Open shield doors, move the MSC through the facility, and 
close shield doors 
After the MSC and trolley arrive in the entrance vestibule, lift 
the MSC from the pedestal on the import/export trolley using 
the gantry crane. 
Move the MSC in a vertical orientation to the pad outside of 
the FHF using the crane 
Lower the MSC using the gantry crane to the pad in a 
vertical orientation 
Lift the loaded MSC using the MSC transporter off the pad 
and transport it from the FTF to the SNF Aging System pad 
MSC lid(s) 
Import/export trolley 
200 ton bridge crane (main 
transfer room overhead crane) 
Shield doors 
200 ton gantry crane (entrance 
vestibule gantry crane) 
Docking ring 
Lid bolts 
Trolley rail tracks 
Rail tracks 
MSC transporter 
Forklift 
Mobile elevating platform 
Closed, loaded MSC 
32. FHF: Empty 
Transportation Cask, 
MSC Removal 
Main Transfer Room, 
Preparation Room, 
Entrance Vestibule 
Tasks involve unloaded casks and MSCs: 
For an unloaded cask/MSC in a transfer bay, retrieve the 
cask or MSC docking port plug with the attached inner lid 
from its storage area in the fuel transfer room and return it to 
the port 
Release the inner lid and return it to the cask or MSC cask. 
Disengage the port docking device and move the transfer 
trolley with the unloaded cask or MSC to the main transfer 
room 
Remove the docking ring, survey, decontaminate as 
necessary, and place onto a docking ring stand (or bag it for 
later decontamination) 
Docking port plugs 
Inner and outer lids 
Transfer trolley 
Import/export trolley 
Docking ring 
Truck or rail conveyance 
Cask tie downs 
Gantry crane 
SNF Aging System transporter 
200 ton gantry crane 
None 

Table III-1. Identification of Operations and Waste Form(s) at Risk (Continued) 
Functional Areas a 
Synopsis of Waste-Related Operations a,c 
Identified Relevant SSCs b 
Expected Waste Form and 
Material at Risk 
32. FHF: Empty 
Transportation Cask, 
MSC Removal 
Main Transfer Room, 
Preparation Room, 
Entrance Vestibule 
(Continued) 
For a cask or MSC unloaded at the canister transfer station, 
remove the protective collar. Lift the cask or MSC from the 
transfer bay trolley, or the floor of the main transfer room, 
and move to the import/export trolley. Move the 
import/export trolley to the preparation room. Bolt the inner 
and outer lids in place 
Inspect the unloaded cask or MSC for external damage, 
inspect sealing surfaces and swipe, survey and 
decontaminate (as necessary) external surfaces and move 
to the entrance vestibule (room 1001) 
For an unloaded cask, move an unloaded truck or rail 
conveyance from the appropriate staging area near the site 
security gate into the entrance vestibule. Move the 
unloaded cask from the cask transfer trolley to the 
conveyance and down ended in place. Secure cask tie 
downs in place, and install cask impact limiters, tamper 
indicating devices and personnel barrier 
Remove the unloaded transportation cask from the FHF for 
return to the National Transportation System. Move an 
unloaded MSC just outside the entrance vestibule using the 
gantry crane. The SNF Aging System transporter picks up 
the unloaded MSC and returns it to the SNF Aging System 
aging pad 
See prior page 
See prior page 

Table III-1. Identification of Operations and Waste Form(s) at Risk (Continued) 
Functional Areas a 
Synopsis of Waste-Related Operations a,c 
Identified Relevant SSCs b 
Expected Waste Form and 
Material at Risk 
33. Subsurface: 
Subsurface WP 
Transport and 
Emplacement 
Receive WP on emplacement pallet onto bedplate, and 
retract bedplate into shield; close shield doors 
Transport WP to North Portal (surface), then down ramp, 
through mains to designated turnout 
Open ventilation isolation doors 
WP transporter car and locomotive positions shield at 
emplacement dock 
Close ventilation isolation doors 
WP transporter moves into transfer dock and WP 
transporter car opens shield doors 
Transfer WP to bedplate by chain mechanism 
WP emplacement gantry moves over bedplate and lifts and 
emplacement pallet 
Gantry moves WP and emplacement pallet in emplacement 
drift and sets them down in drift 
WP transporter 
Transport locomotive 
WP emplacement gantry 
Ground support system 
Ventilation isolation doors 
Rail system and catenary system 
Emplacement pallet 
One full, sealed WP in process 
(one per DTF and one per 
transporter) 
Other emplaced WPs 
34. SNF Aging System; 
Aging Pads 
Vertical Bolted-Closure Cask Operations: 
Engage and lift MSC using MSC transporter 
Move the MSC to the Aging Pad using the MSC 
transporter over the transfer route 
Move the vertical cask to the designated storage system 
on the pad, using the MSC transporter 
Set the vertical cask down on the pad 
Install/connect seal leakage monitoring system, as 
necessary 
Conduct periodic inspections 
Horizontal Aging System Operations: 
Attach the site tractor to the transfer trailer containing the 
HTC 
Aging pad for vertical casks 
Horizontal aging modules 
(HAMs) 
MSC transporter 
Prime mover and transfer trailer 
Shield doors 
Mobile crane 
Horizontal storage module cart 
Horizontal cask transfer trailer 
Hydraulic rams 
Hydraulic power units 
closure plate 
HTC closure lid 
One DPC per trip to horizontal 
aging module 
One MSC per trip to aging pad 
Multiple DPCs in aging module 
Multiple MSCs in vertical 
orientation on aging pad 

Table III-1. Identification of Operations and Waste Form(s) at Risk (Continued) 
Functional Areas a 
Synopsis of Waste-Related Operations a,c 
Identified Relevant SSCs b 
Expected Waste Form and 
Material at Risk 
34. SNF Aging System; 
Aging Pads 
Horizontal Aging System Operations (Continued): 
Move the HTC to the Aging Pad 
Position the HTC and transfer trailer in front of the 
module face 
Remove the cask ram closure plate 
Install the ram trunnion support assembly 
Remove the HAM shield door 
Use trailer skid positioning system / optical surveying 
transits to align cask with HAM 
Remove the HTC top closure lid 
Dock the HTC with the HAM and install the cask/module 
restraints 
Install and align the hydraulic ram cylinder in the ram 
trunnion support assembly 
Extend the ram hydraulic cylinder until the grapple 
contacts the DPC bottom 
Engage the DPC grapple ring with the ram grapple 
Extend the ram hydraulic cylinder until the DPC is fully 
inserted in the HAM 
Disengage the grapple from the DPC 
Remove the hydraulic ram from the HTC 
Remove the HTC from the HAM 
Install the DPC seismic restraint and HAM shield door 
See prior page 
See prior page 

Table III-1. Identification of Operations and Waste Form(s) at Risk (Continued) 
Functional Areas a 
Synopsis of Waste-Related Operations a,c 
Identified Relevant SSCs b 
Expected Waste Form and 
Material at Risk 
35. Subsurface 
Facilities: Construction 
Hazards 
None 
Subsurface bulkheads 
Isolation airlocks/barriers 
Shafts 
Exhaust tunnels 
WP(s) 
36. Surface Facilities: 
Construction Hazards 
None 
Commercial transporter 
(Locomotives, railcars, trucks, 
and transfer trailers) 
WP (shielded) transporter car 
MSC transporter 
Loaded transportation cask 
or loaded MSC 
or WP 
37. Subsurface 
Facilities: Drip Shield 
Installation 
Emplace drip shields with drip shield emplacement gantry 
similar to the WP emplacement operation 
Transport the drip shield emplacement gantry with a 
locomotive and gantry carrier to the emplacement drift 
turnout 
Drive the drip shield emplacement gantry into the drift using 
remote control operators and put the gantry on standby 
Transport drip shield to emplacement drift. After a drip 
shield carrier car docks at the emplacement drift, move the 
drip shield emplacement gantry over a drip shield by 
straddling the railcar. The gantry lifts the drip shield off the 
railcar then carries the shield through the emplacement drift 
and over the WPs to emplace the shield 
Locomotive(s) 
Gantry carrier 
Drip shield emplacement gantry 
Drip shield 
Rail system and catenary system 
WP(s) 

Table III-1. Identification of Operations and Waste Form(s) at Risk (Continued) 
Functional Areas a 
Synopsis of Waste-Related Operations a,c 
Identified Relevant SSCs b 
Expected Waste Form and 
Material at Risk 
38. Retrieval 
Included in emplacement evaluations 
Included in emplacement 
evaluations 
Included in emplacement 
evaluations 
39. Site-Generated 
Radiological Waste 
Disposal 
None 
N/A 
Unspecified 
NOTES: a Modified from BSC (2004p). 
b Terms specified in BSC (2004p), Cogema (2004) and cites in Section 4.1.2. 
c SNF Aging System modified from Cogema (2004). 
d N/A = Not applicable, as no waste forms are handled in this operations area. 
BWR = boiling water reactor; CHF = Canister Handling Facility; CSNF = commercial spent nuclear fuel; DPC = dual-purpose canister; 
DSNF = U.S. Department of Energy-owned spent nuclear fuel; DTF = Dry Transfer Facility; FHF = Fuel Handling Facility; HAMs = horizontal 
aging modules; HLW = high-level radioactive waste; MCO = multi-canister overpack; MSC = monitored geologic repository site-specific cask; 
PWR = pressurized water reactor; SNF = spent nuclear fuel; SRTC = site rail transfer cart; WP = waste package. 

Table III-2. Identification of Seismically Initiated Potential Events 
Functional Areas a 
Internal Events That Could Be Initiated by Seismic Event a,b,c 
Potential Seismically-Unique Events 
1. Transportation 
Facility: 
1. Railcar Staging Area 
2. Truck Staging Area 
Drops, Slap Downs, Collisions: 
Overturning of commercial transporter. 
Collisions between transport vehicles. 
Cask roll off from transport vehicles. 
None identified 
2. Receipt Systems: 
1. Cask and Waste 
Package Receipt 
Building, containing: 
Cask Receipt / 
Return Area of the 
Transportation 
Cask Receipt 
Return Facility 
(TCRRF) and 
Warehouse & Non- 
Nuclear Receipt 
Facility (WNNRF), 
2. Transportation Cask 
Buffer Area of the 
TCRRF 
Drops, Slap Downs, Collisions: 
1. Overturning or collision of a site prime mover moving a legal-weight or overweight 
truck trailer holding a transportation cask (with impact limiters and personnel barrier 
installed). 
2. Derailment, overturning, or collision involving a site prime mover moving an offsite 
railcar holding a transportation cask (with impact limiters and personnel barrier 
installed) followed by a load tipover or fall. 
3. Collision involving a forklift and a cask on a railcar or a legal-weight or an 
overweight truck trailer (with or without impact limiters and personnel barrier 
installed). 
4. Collision involving a mobile elevating platform and a cask on a railcar or a legalweight 
or an overweight truck trailer (with or without impact limiters and personnel 
barrier installed). 
5. Drop of a transportation cask and its support skid (with impact limiters and 
personnel barrier installed) from the cask receipt and return area overhead crane 
during transfer to an SRTC. 
6. Drop or collision of a transportation cask and a support skid (with impact limiters 
and personnel barrier installed) from cask receipt and return area overhead crane 
onto or against a sharp object during transfer to an SRTC. 
7. Drop of a transportation cask with impact limiters and personnel barrier removed 
(including the NSNF cask or a transportation cask carrying a horizontal DPC not 
going to the SNF Aging System) from the cask receipt and return area overhead 
crane during transfer to an SRTC. 
8. Drop or collision of a transportation cask with impact limiters and personnel barrier 
removed (including the NSNF cask or a transportation cask carrying a horizontal 
DPC not going to the SNF Aging System) from the cask receipt and return area 
overhead crane onto or against a sharp object during transfer to an SRTC. 
Seismically-Unique: 
Collapse of structure. 
Failure/collapse of crane. 

Table III-2. Identification of Seismically Initiated Potential Events (Continued) 
Functional Areas a 
Internal Events That Could Be Initiated by Seismic Event a,b,c 
Potential Seismically-Unique Events 
2. Receipt Systems: 
(Continued) 
Drops, Slap Downs, Collisions: 
9. Drop of a horizontal transportation cask containing a horizontal DPC (with impact 
limiters and personnel barrier removed) from the cask receipt and return area 
overhead crane during transfer to a horizontal cask transfer trailer (for subsequent 
emplacement in a HAM). 
10. Drop or collision of a transportation cask containing a horizontal DPC (with impact 
limiters and personnel barrier removed) from the cask receipt and return area 
overhead crane onto or against a sharp object during transfer to a horizontal cask 
transfer trailer (for subsequent emplacement in a HAM). 
11. Slap down of a naval transportation cask or a transportation cask carrying a 
horizontal DPC (or other cask requiring removal of impact limiters prior to transfer) 
from the cask receipt and return area overhead crane back onto the railcar (forward 
slap down) or the ground or site prime mover (backward slap down) during the 
upending of the cask to a vertical orientation from a horizontal orientation during 
cask removal from the offsite railcar or other transport. 
12. Slap down of a naval transportation cask (or other cask requiring removal of impact 
limiters prior to transfer) from the cask receipt and return area overhead crane onto 
the SRTC (forward slap down) or the ground or SRTC tractor (backward slap down) 
during the down ending of the cask from a vertical to a horizontal orientation after 
cask removal from the offsite railcar or other transport. 
13. Slap down of a horizontal transportation cask holding a horizontal DPC (with impact 
limiters removed) from the cask receipt and return area overhead crane onto the 
horizontal cask transfer trailer or the site prime mover (forward slap down) or the 
ground (backward slap down) during the down ending of the cask from a vertical to 
a horizontal orientation after cask removal from the offsite railcar or other transport. 
14. Overturning or collision involving the site prime mover pulling a horizontal cask 
transfer trailer holding a transportation cask (without impact limiters) containing a 
horizontal DPC at the TCRRF or departing the TCRRF for a HAM. 
15. Runaway of a site prime mover pulling a horizontal cask transfer trailer holding a 
transportation cask (with no impact limiters) containing a horizontal DPC. 
16. Drop or collision of handling equipment onto or against a transportation cask (with 
impact limiters and personnel barrier installed). 
17. Drop or collision of handling equipment onto or against a transportation cask 
(without impact limiters or personnel barrier installed). 
See prior page. 

Table III-2. Identification of Seismically Initiated Potential Events (Continued) 
Functional Areas a 
Internal Events That Could Be Initiated by Seismic Event a,b,c 
Potential Seismically-Unique Events 
2. Receipt Systems: 
(Continued) 
Drops, Slap Downs, Collisions: 
18. Drop or collision of heavy loads from the maintenance crane onto or against a 
transportation cask (with or without impact limiters or personnel barrier installed). 
19. Derailment of the SRTC positioner moving an SRTC holding a transportation cask 
(with impact limiters and personnel barrier installed) resulting in an SRTC collision 
or derailment followed by a load tipover or fall. 
20. Derailment of the SRTC positioner moving an SRTC holding a transportation cask 
(with impact limiters and personnel barrier installed) due to a malfunction of the 
turntable in the TCBA, resulting in an SRTC collision or derailment followed by a 
load tipover or fall. 
21. Roll-off and/or derailment of an SRTC holding a transportation cask (with impact 
limiters and personnel barrier installed) from the SRTC positioner followed by a load 
tipover or fall. 
22. Collision of a SRTC tractor and an SRTC holding a transportation cask (with impact 
limiters and personnel barrier installed). 
23. Derailment or collision involving an SRTC holding a transportation cask (with impact 
limiters and personnel barrier installed) being pushed or pulled by an SRTC tractor 
followed by a load tipover or fall. 
24. SRTC carrying a transportation cask (with impact limiters installed) from the 
C&WPRB to the TCBA, the DTF, or the CHF is pushed by the SRTC tractor into the 
SRTC positioner trench. 
25. Drop of a transfer cask containing a horizontal DPC (with impact limiters removed) 
from the cask receipt and return area overhead crane during transfer from a 
horizontal cask transfer trailer (after retrieval from a HAM) to an SRTC for 
processing in the DTF. 
26. Drop or collision of a transfer cask containing a horizontal DPC (with impact limiters 
removed) from the cask receipt and return area overhead crane onto or against a 
sharp object during transfer from a horizontal cask transfer trailer (after retrieval 
from a HAM) to an SRTC for processing in the DTF. 
27. Slap down of a transfer cask holding a horizontal DPC (without impact limiters) from 
the cask receipt and return area overhead crane back onto the horizontal cask 
transfer trailer or the site prime mover (forward slap down) or the ground (backward 
slap down) during the upending of the cask to a vertical orientation from a horizontal 
orientation during the transfer of the cask from the horizontal cask transfer trailer to 
an SRTC. 
See prior page. 

Table III-2. Identification of Seismically Initiated Potential Events (Continued) 
Functional Areas a 
Internal Events That Could Be Initiated by Seismic Event a,b,c 
Potential Seismically-Unique Events 
2. Receipt Systems: 
(Continued) 
Drops, Slap Downs, Collisions: 
28. Slap down of a transfer cask holding a horizontal DPC (without impact limiters) from 
the cask receipt and return area overhead crane onto an SRTC or SRTC Tractor 
(forward slap down) or the ground (backward slap down) during the down ending of 
the cask to a vertical orientation from a horizontal orientation after removal from the 
horizontal cask transfer trailer. 
29. Overturning or collision involving the site prime mover pulling a horizontal cask 
transfer trailer holding a transfer cask (without impact limiters) containing a 
horizontal DPC in transit to, or at, the TCRRF. 
30. Runaway of a site prime mover pulling a horizontal cask transfer trailer holding a 
transfer cask (with no impact limiters) containing a horizontal DPC. 
Fires: 
1. Fire/explosion (battery/electrical fire) involving a site prime mover moving an LWT 
or OWT trailer holding a transportation cask. 
2. Fire/explosion (battery/electrical fire) involving a site prime mover moving a railroad 
car holding a rail transportation cask. 
3. Fire/explosion (battery/electrical fire) involving a site prime mover pulling or pushing 
a horizontal cask transfer trailer holding a horizontal transport cask containing a 
horizontal DPC (at the TCRRF or in transit to a HAM). 
4. Fire/explosion (battery/electrical fire) involving a site prime mover pulling or pushing 
a horizontal cask transfer trailer holding a transfer cask containing a horizontal DPC 
(at the TCRRF or in transit from a HAM). 
5. Diesel fuel fire/explosion involving an SRTC tractor pushing or pulling an SRTC 
holding a transportation cask. 
Electrical fire associated with a mobile elevating platform (electrical/battery). 
7. Electrical fire involving the cask receipt and return area overhead crane, handling 
equipment, or other electrical equipment. 
8. Electrical fire involving the turntable carrying the SRTC positioner holding an SRTC 
loaded with a transportation cask. 
9. Electrical fire associated with a forklift (electrical/battery). 
10. Electrical fire associated with a mobile elevating platform (electrical/battery). 
11. Transient combustible fire in C&WPRB or the TCBA. 
See prior page. 

Table III-2. Identification of Seismically Initiated Potential Events (Continued) 
Functional Areas a 
Internal Events That Could Be Initiated by Seismic Event a,b,c 
Potential Seismically-Unique Events 
2. Receipt Systems: 
(Continued) 
Fires: 
12. N/S d 
Radiation: 
1. Radiation exposure of a facility worker and/or the offsite public. 
2. N/S 
Criticality: 
1. Criticality associated with a transportation cask collision, drop, or slap down 
(involving a crane) and a rearrangement of the cask internals. 
2. Criticality associated with an offsite railcar collision or derailment (holding a 
transportation cask) followed by a load tipover or fall and a rearrangement of the 
cask internals. 
3. Criticality associated with a collision or overturning of an LWT or OWT trailer 
(holding a transportation cask) and a rearrangement of the cask internals. 
4. Criticality associated with an SRTC collision or derailment (holding a transportation 
cask) followed by a load tipover or fall and a rearrangement of the cask internals. 
5. Criticality associated with an SRTC positioner collision or derailment (carrying an 
SRTC holding a transportation cask) followed by a load tipover or fall and 
rearrangement of the cask internals. 
6. Criticality associated with a horizontal transport cask (holding a horizontal DPC) 
collision or derailment (involving a horizontal cask transfer trailer or railcar) followed 
by a load tipover or fall and a rearrangement of the cask internals. 
7. Criticality associated with a horizontal transport cask (holding a horizontal DPC) 
drop or slap down from the cask receipt and return area overhead crane and a 
rearrangement of the cask internals. 
8. Criticality associated with a transfer cask (holding a horizontal DPC) collision or 
derailment (involving a horizontal cask transfer trailer or an SRTC) followed by a 
load tipover or fall and a rearrangement of the cask internals. 
9. Criticality associated with a transfer cask (holding a horizontal DPC) drop or slap 
down from the cask receipt and return area overhead crane and a rearrangement of 
the cask internals. 
See prior page. 

Table III-2. Identification of Seismically Initiated Potential Events (Continued) 
Functional Areas a 
Internal Events That Could Be Initiated by Seismic Event a,b,c 
Potential Seismically-Unique Events 
3. CHF: Cask Receipt 
Entrance Vestibule, 
Tools/Parts Storage 
Room 
Drops, Slap Downs, Collisions: 
1. SRTC derailment, overturning, or collision involving a loaded cask followed by a 
load tipover or fall. 
2. Overturning or collision involving a legal-weight truck trailer or overweight truck 
trailer holding a cask. 
3. SRTC derailment, overturning, or collision involving a loaded MSC followed by a 
load tipover or fall. 
4. Collision of an SRTC, a legal-weight truck trailer, or overweight truck trailer carrying 
a loaded cask with the entrance vestibule doors, tool/parts storage room doors, or 
the canister transfer cell shield doors. 
5. The entrance vestibule doors, tool/parts storage room doors, or the canister transfer 
cell shield doors close on an SRTC, a legal-weight truck trailer, or an overweight 
truck trailer carrying a loaded cask. 
6. Collision of an SRTC carrying a loaded MSC with the entrance vestibule doors, 
tool/parts storage room doors, or the canister transfer cell shield doors. 
7. The entrance vestibule doors, tool/parts storage room doors, or the canister transfer 
cell shield doors close on an SRTC carrying a loaded MSC. 
8. Collision of a mobile elevating platform with a cask during removal of personnel 
barriers and impact limiters or during survey activities. 
9. Drop or collision of personnel barriers or impact limiters from the entrance vestibule 
overhead crane onto or against a cask. 
10. Collision between a forklift and a cask on an SRTC, a legal-weight truck trailer or 
overweight truck trailer or the conveyance holding the cask. 
11. Collision between a mobile elevating platform and a cask on an SRTC, a legalweight 
truck trailer or overweight truck trailer or the conveyance holding the cask. 
12. Collision between a forklift and an MSC on an SRTC or the SRTC holding the cask. 
13. Collision between a mobile elevating platform and an MSC on an SRTC or the 
SRTC holding the MSC. 
14. Drop or collision of equipment from the entrance vestibule overhead bridge crane 
(including handling equipment for personnel barrier, impact limiters, etc.) onto or 
against a cask or MSC. 
Seismically-Unique: 
Collapse of structures. 
Failure/collapse of crane. 

Table III-2. Identification of Seismically Initiated Potential Events (Continued) 
Functional Areas a 
Internal Events That Could Be Initiated by Seismic Event a,b,c 
Potential Seismically-Unique Events 
3. CHF: Cask Receipt 
Entrance Vestibule, 
Tools/Parts Storage 
Room 
(Continued) 
Fires: 
1. Electrical fire associated with the entrance vestibule overhead crane. 
2. Electrical fire associated with handling equipment or other entrance vestibule 
electrical equipment. 
3. Diesel fuel fire/explosion involving a diesel-powered SRTC tractor pulling or pushing 
an SRTC holding a loaded cask or MSC. 
4. Fire/explosion (battery/electrical fire) involving a site prime mover pulling or pushing 
a legal-weight or overweight truck trailer holding a loaded cask. 
5. Electrical fire associated with a forklift (electrical/battery). 
6. Electrical fire associated with a mobile elevating platform (electrical/battery). 
7. Transient combustible fire in the entrance vestibule or the tools/parts storage room. 
Radiation: 
1. Radiation exposure of a facility worker and/or the offsite public. 
2. Loss of confinement zone due to ventilation system malfunction or other breach of a 
confinement barrier leading to a release of airborne radiation. 
3. N/S 
Criticality: 
1. Criticality associated with an SRTC (holding a cask) derailment or collision followed 
by a load tipover or fall and rearrangement of the cask internals. 
2. Criticality associated with overturning or collision involving an LWT or an OWT 
trailer holding a cask and rearrangement of cask internals. 
3. Criticality associated with an SRTC (holding a loaded MSC) derailment or collision 
followed by a load tipover or fall and rearrangement of the cask internals. 
See prior page. 

Table III-2. Identification of Seismically Initiated Potential Events (Continued) 
Functional Areas a 
Internal Events That Could Be Initiated by Seismic Event a,b,c 
Potential Seismically-Unique Events 
4. CHF: Canister 
Transfer 
Canister Transfer Cell 
Drops, Slap Downs, Collisions: 
1. Slap down of a cask onto an SRTC, a truck trailer, or the floor during upending of 
the cask to the vertical orientation. 
2. Drop of a cask from a canister transfer cell overhead crane onto the floor during the 
transfer from an SRTC or truck trailer to the cask preparation pit. 
3. Drop or collision of a cask from a canister transfer cell overhead crane onto or 
against a sharp object during the transfer from an SRTC or truck trailer to the cask 
preparation pit. 
4. Drop of a loaded MSC from a canister transfer cell overhead crane onto the floor 
during the transfer from an SRTC to the cask preparation pit. 
5. Drop or collision of a loaded MSC from a canister transfer cell overhead crane onto 
or against a sharp object during the transfer from an SRTC to the cask preparation 
pit. 
6. Drop or collision of a cask from a canister transfer cell overhead crane into or 
against the cask preparation pit or an MSC/WP loading pit during the transfer from 
an SRTC or truck trailer to the cask preparation pit. 
7. Drop or collision of a loaded MSC from a canister transfer cell overhead crane into 
or against the cask preparation pit or an MSC/WP loading pit during the transfer 
from the SRTC to the cask preparation pit. 
8. Slap down of a cask or MSC in the pit area due to off-center cask or MSC lowering 
into the cask preparation pit and followed by a cask or MSC corner drop onto the 
edge of the pit and slap down. 
9. Drop or collision involving the pit moveable platform onto or against a cask or MSC 
in the cask preparation pit. 
10. Handling equipment drop onto or against a cask or MSC. 
11. Drop of a cask or MSC outer lid from a canister transfer cell overhead crane onto a 
cask or MSC inner lid, as applicable. 
12. Drop of a cask or MSC inner lid from a canister transfer cell overhead crane onto a 
canister inside the cask or MSC, as applicable. 
13. Drop or collision of tools or handling equipment (including the outer lid-lifting fixture, 
inner lid-lifting fixture, etc.) onto or against a cask or MSC outer lid or a cask or 
MSC inner lid, as applicable. 
Seismically-Unique: 
Collapse of structure; 
Failure of equipment supports; 
Failure of shield walls, shield doors or 
view ports to protect against radiation; 
Failure of airlock doors view ports for 
airborne confinement; 
Failure/collapse of crane. 

Table III-2. Identification of Seismically Initiated Potential Events (Continued) 
Functional Areas a 
Internal Events That Could Be Initiated by Seismic Event a,b,c 
Potential Seismically-Unique Events 
4. CHF: Canister 
Transfer 
Canister Transfer Cell 
(Continued) 
Drops, Slap Downs, Collisions: 
14. Drop or collision of tools or handling equipment, including a lift fixture with pintle or a 
shield ring, onto or against a canister inside an open cask or MSC. 
15. Drop of a canister from a canister transfer cell overhead crane back into the cask or 
MSC being unloaded (including a NSNF canister, an MCO, a DPC, a DOE HLW 
canister, or a DOE SNF canister). 
16. Drop or collision of a DOE HLW canister or a DOE SNF canister from a canister 
transfer cell overhead crane onto or against another DOE SNF canister, or DOE 
HLW canister in the cask being unloaded, as applicable. 
17. Impact due to horizontal of a canister before it is fully vertically lifted out of a cask or 
MSC. 
18. Drop of a canister from a canister transfer cell overhead crane onto the cell floor or 
other flat object during transfer from the cask or MSC to a WP or an MSC, as 
applicable, or during transfer to a canister staging pit. 
19. Drop or collision of a canister from a canister transfer cell overhead crane onto or 
against a sharp object during transfer from the cask or MSC to a WP or an MSC, as 
applicable, or during transfer to a canister staging pit. 
20. Slap down of a canister in an MSC/WP loading pit or the pit areas due to off-center 
canister lowering into the WP or MSC, followed by a canister corner drop onto the 
edge of the pit and slap down. 
21. Drop or collision of a DPC, DOE HLW canister, or DOE SNF canister from a 
canister transfer cell overhead crane into or against the empty MSC being loaded. 
22. Drop or collision of a NSNF canister, a DOE HLW canister, an MCO, or a DOE SNF 
canister from a canister transfer cell overhead crane into or against the WP being 
loaded. 
23. Drop or collision of a DOE HLW canister from a canister transfer cell overhead 
crane onto or another DOE HLW canister, an MCO, or a DOE SNF canister in a 
WP. 
24. Drop or collision of a DOE HLW canister from a canister transfer cell overhead 
crane onto or another DOE HLW canister or a DOE SNF canister in an MSC. 
25. Drop or collision of a DOE SNF canister from a canister transfer cell overhead crane 
onto or against a DOE HLW canister in a WP or MSC. 
26. Drop or collision of an MCO from a canister transfer cell overhead crane onto or 
against another MCO or onto a DOE HLW canister in a WP. 
See prior page. 

Table III-2. Identification of Seismically Initiated Potential Events (Continued) 
Functional Areas a 
Internal Events That Could Be Initiated by Seismic Event a,b,c 
Potential Seismically-Unique Events 
4. CHF: Canister 
Transfer 
Canister Transfer Cell 
(Continued) 
Drops, Slap Downs, Collisions: 
27. Drop or collision of an MCO from a canister transfer cell overhead crane onto or 
against a DOE SNF canister or a drop of a DOE SNF canister onto or against 
another DOE SNF canister in a WP due to a misload. 
28. Drop or collision of an MCO from a canister transfer cell overhead crane onto or 
against a DOE SNF canister or onto or against a DOE HLW canister in an MSC due 
to a misload. 
29. Drop or collision of a DOE HLW canister or a DOE SNF canister from a canister 
transfer cell overhead crane into or against a canister staging pit. 
30. Slap down of a DOE HLW canister or a DOE SNF canister in the staging pit area 
due to off-center canister lowering into the pit and followed by a canister corner drop 
onto the edge of the staging pit and a slap down. 
31. Drop or collision of a DOE HLW canister or a DOE SNF canister from a canister 
transfer cell overhead crane onto or against the top of another DOE HLW canister 
or DOE SNF canister in a canister staging pit. 
32. Impact due to horizontal movement of a canister before it is fully vertically lifted out 
of a canister staging pit. 
33. Drop of or collision of handling equipment onto or against a DOE HLW canister or a 
DOE SNF canister in a canister staging pit. 
34. Drop of or collision of a canister staging pit shield plug onto or against a canister in 
the canister staging pit. 
35. Drop or collision involving the pit moveable platform onto or against a loaded MSC 
in an MSC/WP loading pit. 
36. Drop of a WP inner lid into an open, loaded WP. 
37. Drop of the MSC lid into an open, loaded MSC. 
38. Drop or collision of tools or handling equipment into or against an open, loaded or 
partially loaded WP. 
39. Drop or collision of tools or handling equipment into or against an open, loaded or 
partially loaded MSC. 
40. Drop or collision of tools or equipment (including a lid-lifting fixture) onto or against a 
loaded WP inner lid. 
41. Drop or collision of tools or equipment (including a lid-lifting fixture) onto or against 
the lid of a loaded, unsealed or sealed MSC. 
See prior page. 

Table III-2. Identification of Seismically Initiated Potential Events (Continued) 
Functional Areas a 
Internal Events That Could Be Initiated by Seismic Event a,b,c 
Potential Seismically-Unique Events 
4. CHF: Canister 
Transfer 
Canister Transfer Cell 
(Continued) 
Fires: 
1. Electrical fire associated with the canister transfer cell overhead cranes. 
2. Electrical fire associated with handling equipment or other canister transfer cell 
electrical equipment. 
3. Diesel fuel fire/explosion on an SRTC tractor pushing an SRTC holding a loaded 
cask into the transfer area. 
4. Fire/explosion (battery/electrical fire) involving a site prime mover pulling or pushing 
a legal-weight or overweight truck trailer holding a loaded cask. 
5. Diesel fuel fire/explosion associated with the SRTC tractor pushing an SRTC 
holding an MSC. 
6. Electrical fire associated with a forklift (electrical/battery). 
7. High-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filter fire due to excessive radioactive decay 
within the filter bed. 
8. Canister overheating in the canister staging pit due to a loss of cooling resulting in 
excessive temperature and possible damage to canister contents and/or 
confinement. 
9. Transient combustible fire in the canister transfer cell. 
10. Overheating of a loaded cask, WP, or MSC while staged in a pit due to a loss of 
cooling resulting in excessive temperature and possible damage to canister 
contents. 
Radiation: 
1. Radiation exposure of a facility worker and/or the offsite public. 
2. Loss of confinement zone due to ventilation system malfunction or other breach of a 
confinement barrier leading to a release of airborne radiation. 
3. Damage or rupture of cask sampling and purging system, leading to a release of 
cask internal gasses and radioactive material. 
4. N/S 
5. Inadvertent opening of a canister transfer cell shield door, leading to a worker 
exposure. 
6. N/S 
See prior page. 

Table III-2. Identification of Seismically Initiated Potential Events (Continued) 
Functional Areas a 
Internal Events That Could Be Initiated by Seismic Event a,b,c 
Potential Seismically-Unique Events 
4. CHF: Canister 
Transfer 
Canister Transfer Cell 
(Continued) 
Criticality: 
1. Criticality associated with a drop or slap down of a loaded cask from a canister 
transfer cell overhead crane and a rearrangement of cask internals. 
2. Criticality associated with a drop or slap down of a loaded MSC from a canister 
transfer cell overhead crane and a rearrangement of cask internals. 
3. Criticality associated with a drop or slap down of a loaded WP (unsealed) from a 
canister transfer cell overhead crane and a rearrangement of WP internals. 
4. Criticality associated with a drop or slap down of a DOE SNF canister, a NSNF 
canister, an MCO, a DPC, or a DOE HLW canister and a rearrangement of canister 
internals. 
5. N/S 
6. N/S 
7. Criticality associated with a drop of heavy equipment onto an unsealed, loaded 
cask, WP, or MSC and a rearrangement of the container internals. 
See prior page. 
5. CHF: WP Transfer 
to WP Closure, MSC 
Closure and Removal, 
Canister Transfer Cell 
Drops, Slap Downs, Collisions: 
1. Drop or collision of handling equipment or a lifting fixture onto or against a loaded 
WP inner lid. 
2. Drop or collision of handling equipment or a lifting fixture onto or against a loaded 
MSC lid. 
3. Impact due to horizontal movement of a loaded WP by a canister transfer cell 
overhead crane before it is fully lifted vertically out of the MSC/WP loading pit. 
4. Drop or collision of an unsealed, loaded WP from a canister transfer cell overhead 
crane back into or against the MSC/WP loading pit. 
5. Drop of an unsealed, loaded WP from a canister transfer cell overhead crane onto 
the cell floor or a pit cover during the lift and transfer to the WP positioning cell 
pedestal and trolley. 
6. Drop or collision of an unsealed, loaded WP from a canister transfer cell overhead 
crane onto or against a sharp object during the lift and transfer to the WP 
positioning cell pedestal and trolley. 
7. Slap down of a loaded, unsealed WP onto the cell floor, into a wall, or onto a pit 
cover following a drop from a canister transfer cell overhead crane onto the edge of 
the trolley, a pit edge, or pit cover during the lift and transfer to the WP positioning 
cell pedestal and trolley. 
Seismically-Unique: 
Collapse of structure. 
Failure of equipment supports. 
Failure of shield walls, shield doors or 
view ports to protect against radiation. 
Failure of airlock doors view ports for 
airborne confinement. 
Failure/collapse of crane. 

Table III-2. Identification of Seismically Initiated Potential Events (Continued) 
Functional Areas a 
Internal Events That Could Be Initiated by Seismic Event a,b,c 
Potential Seismically-Unique Events 
5. CHF: WP Transfer 
to WP Closure, MSC 
Closure and Removal, 
Canister Transfer Cell 
(Continued) 
8. Drop or collision of an unsealed, loaded WP from a canister transfer cell overhead 
crane onto or against a loaded or partially loaded MSC or WP (with no lid in place) 
in an MSC/WP loading pit (with no pit cover in place) during the lift and transfer to 
the WP positioning cell pedestal and trolley. 
9. Drop or collision of a unsealed, loaded WP from a canister transfer cell overhead 
crane onto or against a loaded MSC or WP (with lid in place) in an MSC/WP loading 
pit (with no pit cover in place) during the lift and transfer to the WP positioning cell 
pedestal and trolley. 
10.Drop or collision of an unsealed, loaded WP from a canister transfer cell overhead 
crane or against a loaded, unsealed WP on the opposite WP positioning cell 
pedestal and trolley during the lift and transfer to a WP positioning cell pedestal and 
trolley. 
11. Drop or collision of an unsealed, loaded WP from a canister transfer cell overhead 
crane onto or against a loaded, sealed WP on the opposite WP positioning cell 
pedestal and trolley during the lift and transfer to a WP positioning cell pedestal and 
trolley. 
12. Slap down of a loaded, unsealed WP onto the floor and then across or into an 
empty MSC/WP loading pit (with no pit cover in place) following a drop from a 
canister transfer cell overhead crane onto the edge of the trolley or pit edge during 
the lift and transfer to the WP positioning cell pedestal and trolley. 
13. Slap down of a loaded, unsealed WP onto the floor and then across or into an 
MSC/WP loading pit (with no pit cover in place and a loaded or partially loaded, 
sealed or unsealed MSC or WP in place) following a drop from a canister transfer 
cell overhead crane onto the edge of the trolley or pit edge during the lift and 
transfer to the WP positioning cell pedestal and trolley. 
14. Slap down of a loaded, unsealed WP that subsequently impacts a loaded, unsealed 
WP on the opposite WP positioning cell trolley following a drop from a canister 
transfer cell overhead crane onto the edge of the opposite WP positioning cell 
trolley, a pit edge, or other object during the lift and transfer to the WP positioning 
cell pedestal and trolley. 
15. Slap down of a loaded, unsealed WP that subsequently impacts a loaded, sealed 
WP on the opposite WP positioning cell trolley following a drop from a canister 
transfer cell overhead crane onto the edge of the WP positioning cell trolley, a pit 
edge, or other object during the lift and transfer to the WP positioning cell pedestal 
and trolley. 
See prior page. 

Table III-2. Identification of Seismically Initiated Potential Events (Continued) 
Functional Areas a 
Internal Events That Could Be Initiated by Seismic Event a,b,c 
Potential Seismically-Unique Events 
5. CHF: WP Transfer 
to WP Closure, MSC 
Closure and Removal, 
Canister Transfer Cell 
(Continued) 
Drops, Slap Downs, Collisions: 
16. Impact due to horizontal movement of an MSC by a canister transfer cell overhead 
crane before it is fully vertically lifted out of the MSC/WP loading pit. 
17. Drop or collision of a loaded, sealed MSC from a canister transfer cell overhead 
crane back into or against the MSC/WP loading pit during MSC removal and 
transfer to the SRTC. 
18. Slap down of a loaded, sealed MSC onto the cell floor, into a wall, or onto a pit 
cover following a drop from a canister transfer cell overhead crane onto the edge of 
the MSC/WP loading pit or the SRTC during MSC removal from the pit and transfer 
to the SRTC. 
19. Drop or collision of a loaded, sealed MSC from a canister transfer cell overhead 
crane onto or against the SRTC following removal of the MSC from the MSC/WP 
loading pit during transfer to the SRTC for removal from the building. 
20. Drop of a loaded, sealed MSC from a canister transfer cell overhead crane onto the 
canister transfer cell floor or a pit cover following removal of the MSC from the 
MSC/WP loading pit. 
21. Drop or collision of a loaded, sealed MSC from a canister transfer cell overhead 
crane onto or against a sharp object following removal of the MSC from the 
MSC/WP loading pit. 
22. Collision of the SRTC (holding a loaded, sealed MSC) with the entrance vestibule 
doors, the tool/parts storage room doors, or the canister transfer cell shield doors. 
23. The entrance vestibule doors, the tool/parts storage room doors, or the canister 
transfer cell shield doors close on the SRTC holding a loaded, sealed MSC. 
Fire: 
1. Electrical fire associated with the canister transfer cell overhead cranes. 
2. Electrical fire associated with handling equipment or other canister transfer cell 
electrical equipment. 
3. Diesel fuel fire/explosion associated with the SRTC tractor pulling an SRTC holding 
an MSC. 
4. N/S d 
5. Transient combustible fire in the canister transfer cell. 
6. N/S 
See prior page. 

Table III-2. Identification of Seismically Initiated Potential Events (Continued) 
Functional Areas a 
Internal Events That Could Be Initiated by Seismic Event a,b,c 
Potential Seismically-Unique Events 
5. CHF: WP Transfer 
to WP Closure, MSC 
Closure and Removal, 
Canister Transfer Cell 
(Continued) 
Fire: 
7. Overheating of a loaded, unsealed (and uninerted) WP or MSC due to a loss of 
cooling resulting in excessive temperature and possible damage to canister 
contents. 
Radiation: 
1. Radiation exposure of a facility worker and/or the offsite public. 
2. Loss of confinement zone due to ventilation system malfunction or other breach of a 
confinement barrier leading to a release of airborne radiation. 
3. Inadvertent opening of a canister transfer cell shield door or a WP positioning cell 
shield door, leading to a worker exposure. 
4. N/S 
Criticality: 
1. Criticality associated with a drop or slap down of a loaded MSC from a canister 
transfer cell overhead crane and a rearrangement of cask internals. 
2. Criticality associated with an SRTC (holding a loaded MSC) derailment or collision 
followed by a load tipover or fall and rearrangement of the cask internals. 
3. Criticality associated with a drop or slap down of a loaded, unsealed WP from a 
canister transfer cell overhead crane and a rearrangement of WP internals. 
4. Criticality associated with a drop of heavy equipment onto an unsealed, loaded WP 
or MSC and a rearrangement of the container internals. 
See prior page. 

Table III-2. Identification of Seismically Initiated Potential Events (Continued) 
Functional Areas a 
Internal Events That Could Be Initiated by Seismic Event a,b,c 
Potential Seismically-Unique Events 
6. CHF: WP Closure 
Drops, Slap Downs, Collision: 
1. Derailment of a trolley holding a loaded, unsealed WP followed by a load tipover or 
fall. 
2. Drop or collision of equipment from a canister transfer cell overhead crane onto or 
against a loaded, unsealed WP positioned on a pedestal on a trolley. 
3. Collision involving the trolley holding the loaded, unsealed WP and the shield doors 
between the canister transfer cell and the WP positioning cell. 
4. Shield doors between the canister transfer cell and the WP positioning cell close on 
the trolley holding the loaded, unsealed WP. 
5. Lid drop onto a WP from the lid placement fixture equipment during the welding 
process. 
6. Equipment drop onto a WP during the welding process. 
7. Drop or collision of equipment from a canister transfer cell overhead crane onto or 
against a loaded, sealed WP positioned on a pedestal on a trolley. 
8. Collision involving the trolley holding the loaded, sealed WP and the shield doors 
between the WP positioning cell and the canister transfer cell. 
9. Shield doors between the WP positioning cell and the canister transfer cell close on 
the trolley holding the loaded, sealed WP. 
Fire: 
1. Electrical fire associated with HLW handling equipment and other electrically 
powered equipment in the WP closure cell or the WP positioning cell, including the 
overhead cranes and the welders in the WP closure cells. 
2. Electrical fire associated with a motor on a WP trolley. 
3. N/S 
4. N/S 
5. Overheating of a loaded WP due to a loss of cooling resulting in excessive 
temperature and possible damage to the canister contents. 
6. Transient combustible fire in the WP closure cell or the WP positioning cell. 
Radiation: 
1. Radiation exposure of a facility worker and/or the offsite public. 
Seismically-Unique: 
Collapse of structure. 
Failure of equipment supports. 
Failure of shield walls, shield doors, 
glove box or view ports to protect 
against radiation. 
Failure of airlock doors for airborne 
confinement. 
Failure/collapse of crane. 

Table III-2. Identification of Seismically Initiated Potential Events (Continued) 
Functional Areas a 
Internal Events That Could Be Initiated by Seismic Event a,b,c 
Potential Seismically-Unique Events 
6. CHF: WP Closure 
(Continued) 
Radiation: 
2. Glovebox leak leads to a radiological release. 
3. Loss of confinement zone due to ventilation system malfunction or other breach of a 
confinement barrier leading to a release of airborne radiation. 
4. Inadvertent opening of a canister transfer cell shield door or a WP positioning cell 
shield door, leading to a worker exposure. 
5. N/S 
Criticality: 
1. Criticality associated with a trolley holding a sealed or unsealed WP derailment 
followed by a load tipover or fall and rearrangement of the container internals. 
2 Criticality associated with a drop of heavy equipment onto an unsealed, loaded WP 
and a rearrangement of the container internals. 
See prior page. 
7. CHF: WP Loadout 
Canister Transfer Cell, 
WP Tool Storage 
Room, Exit Vestibule 
Drops, Slap Downs, Collision: 
1. Derailment of a trolley holding a loaded, sealed WP followed by a load tipover or 
fall. 
2. Drop of a loaded, sealed WP from a canister transfer cell overhead crane onto the 
floor during transfer from the trolley to the survey area. 
3. Drop or collision of a loaded, sealed WP from a canister transfer cell overhead 
crane onto or against a sharp object during transfer from the trolley to the survey 
area. 
4. Slap down of a loaded, sealed WP that subsequently impacts a loaded, unsealed 
WP on the opposite WP positioning cell trolley following a drop from a canister 
transfer cell overhead crane onto the edge of the opposite WP positioning cell 
trolley, a pit edge, or other object during the lift and transfer to the survey area. 
5. Slap down of a loaded, sealed WP that subsequently impacts a loaded, sealed WP 
on the opposite WP positioning cell trolley following a drop from a canister transfer 
cell overhead crane onto the edge of the WP positioning cell trolley, a pit edge, or 
other object during the lift and transfer to the survey area. 
6. Drop or collision of a sealed, loaded WP from a canister transfer cell overhead 
crane onto or against a loaded, unsealed WP on the opposite WP positioning cell 
pedestal and trolley during the lift and transfer to the survey area. 
Seismically-Unique: 
Collapse of structure. 
Failure of equipment supports. 
Failure of shield walls, or shield doors 
to protect against radiation. 
Failure/collapse of crane. 

Table III-2. Identification of Seismically Initiated Potential Events (Continued) 
Functional Areas a 
Internal Events That Could Be Initiated by Seismic Event a,b,c 
Potential Seismically-Unique Events 
7. CHF: WP Loadout 
Canister Transfer Cell, 
WP Tool Storage 
Room, Exit Vestibule 
(Continued) 
Drops, Slap Downs, Collision: 
7. Drop or collision of a sealed, loaded WP from a canister transfer cell overhead 
crane onto or against a loaded, sealed WP on the opposite WP positioning cell 
pedestal and trolley during the lift and transfer to the survey area. 
8. Drop of a loaded, sealed WP from a canister transfer cell overhead crane onto the 
floor during the transfer from the survey area to the tilting machine. 
9. Drop of a loaded, sealed WP from a canister transfer cell overhead crane back onto 
the pedestal on the trolley during the transfer from the survey area to the tilting 
machine. 
10. Drop or collision of a loaded, sealed WP from a canister transfer cell overhead 
crane onto or against a sharp object (including the tilting machine) during transfer 
from the survey area to the tilting machine. 
11. Slap down (either forward into the WP turntable or backward onto the floor) of a 
loaded, sealed WP in the tilting machine from a canister transfer cell overhead 
crane during the lowering of the WP to the horizontal position on the emplacement 
pallet previously placed on the WP turntable. 
12. Collision of the tilting machine against a loaded, sealed WP on an emplacement 
pallet on the WP turntable. 
13. Drop or collision of a lifting collar from a canister transfer cell overhead crane onto 
or against a WP after removal of the collar from the WP collar removal machine. 
14. Collision or impact of the trunion collar removal machine and a loaded, sealed WP 
positioned on an emplacement pallet positioned on the WP turntable. 
15. Drop of a loaded, sealed WP positioned on a emplacement pallet (from a horizontal 
position) from a canister transfer cell overhead crane onto the floor or the bedplate 
during transfer of the WP and emplacement pallet from the WP turntable to the WP 
transporter bedplate. 
16. Drop or collision of a loaded, sealed WP positioned on a emplacement pallet (from 
a horizontal position) from a canister transfer cell overhead crane onto or against a 
sharp object during transfer of the WP and emplacement pallet from the WP 
turntable to the WP transporter bedplate. 
17. Equipment drop or collision (including lifting yokes) onto or against a loaded, sealed 
WP when the WP is on the emplacement pallet on the WP turntable or when the 
WP is on the emplacement pallet on the WP transporter bedplate. 
See prior page. 

Table III-2. Identification of Seismically Initiated Potential Events (Continued) 
Functional Areas a 
Internal Events That Could Be Initiated by Seismic Event a,b,c 
Potential Seismically-Unique Events 
7. CHF: WP Loadout 
Canister Transfer Cell, 
WP Tool Storage 
Room, Exit Vestibule 
(Continued) 
Drops, Slap Downs, Collisions: 
18. Collision involving a WP transporter (holding the sealed WP on an emplacement 
pallet) and the shield doors between the canister transfer cell and the WP tool 
storage room. 
19. The shield doors between the canister transfer cell and the WP tool storage room 
close on the WP transporter (holding the sealed WP on an emplacement pallet). 
20. Collision involving WP transporter (holding the sealed WP on an emplacement 
pallet) and the doors between the WP tool storage room and the exit vestibule. 
21. The doors between the WP tool storage room and the exit vestibule close on the 
WP transporter (holding the sealed WP on an emplacement pallet). 
22. Collision involving WP transporter (holding the sealed WP on an emplacement 
pallet) and the doors between the exit vestibule and the ambient air (outside). 
23. Doors between the exit vestibule and the ambient air (outside) close on the WP 
transporter (holding the sealed WP on an emplacement pallet). 
24. Derailment of a WP transporter in the exit vestibule, WP tool storage room, or WP 
loadout area of the canister transfer cell followed by a load tipover or fall. 
Fire: 
1. Electrical fire associated with the WP transporter loadout area housing the 
equipment for WP tilt and WP transporter loading, as well as the WP tool storage 
room and the exit vestibule (including the WP collar removal machine, the tilting 
machine, and the WP rotating turntable). 
2. Electrical fire associated with the WP transporter loadout area overhead bridge 
cranes. 
3. Electrical fire associated with equipment on the WP transporter, including motors to 
extend the WP transporter bedplate. 
4. Electrical fire associated with the WP transporter locomotive. 
5. Electrical fire associated with a motor on a WP trolley. 
6. Overheating of a loaded, sealed WP due to a loss of cooling resulting in excessive 
temperature and possible damage to the canister contents. 
7. Transient combustible fire in the WP transporter load area, canister transfer area, 
the WP transporter vestibule tool storage room, or the exit vestibule. 
See prior page. 

Table III-2. Identification of Seismically Initiated Potential Events (Continued) 
Functional Areas a 
Internal Events That Could Be Initiated by Seismic Event a,b,c 
Potential Seismically-Unique Events 
7. CHF: WP Loadout 
Canister Transfer Cell, 
WP Tool Storage 
Room, Exit Vestibule 
(Continued) 
Radiation: 
1. Radiation exposure of a facility worker and/or the offsite public. 
2. Loss of confinement zone due to ventilation system malfunction or other breach of a 
confinement barrier leading to a release of airborne radiation. 
3. Inadvertent opening of a canister transfer cell shield door, leading to a worker 
exposure. 
4. Inadvertent opening of the WP transporter shielded enclosure doors, leading to a 
worker exposure. 
Criticality: 
1. Criticality associated with a trolley holding a WP derailment followed by a load 
tipover or fall and rearrangement of the WP internals. 
2. Criticality associated with a drop, slap down, or collision of a WP and a 
rearrangement of the container internals. 
3. Criticality associated with a slap down of a WP and a rearrangement of the 
container internals. 
See prior page. 
8. CHF: Empty 
Transportation Cask 
and MSC Removal 
Canister Transfer Cell, 
WP Tool Storage 
Room, Exit Vestibule 
None identified. 
Seismically-Unique: 
None identified. 

Table III-2. Identification of Seismically Initiated Potential Events (Continued) 
Functional Areas a 
Internal Events That Could Be Initiated by Seismic Event a,b,c 
Potential Seismically-Unique Events 
9. DTF: Cask & MSC 
Receipt 
Cask and MSC 
Entrance Vestibule, 
Cask and MSC SRTC 
Receipt Area, Cask and 
MSC to Trolley Transfer 
Room 
Drops, Slap Downs, Collisions: 
1. SRTC derailment involving a loaded cask (with impact limiters installed) followed by 
a load tipover or fall. 
2. Collision of an SRTC carrying a loaded cask (with impact limiters installed) with the 
cask and MSC entrance vestibule doors or the cask and MSC SRTC receipt area 
doors. 
3. The cask and MSC entrance vestibule doors or the cask and MSC SRTC receipt 
area doors close on an SRTC carrying a loaded cask (with impact limiters installed). 
4. MSC transporter collision or overturning involving a loaded MSC followed by a load 
tipover or fall. 
5. Collision of an MSC transporter carrying a loaded MSC with the cask and MSC 
entrance vestibule doors or the cask and MSC SRTC receipt area shield doors. 
6. The cask and MSC entrance vestibule doors or the cask and MSC SRTC receipt 
area shield doors close on an MSC transporter carrying a loaded MSC. 
7. Collision of a mobile elevating platform with a loaded cask during removal of the 
personnel barriers and impact limiters or during survey activities. 
8. Forklift collision with a cask on an SRTC (with or without impact limiters installed on 
the cask) or the SRTC holding the cask. 
9. Collision between a forklift and an MSC positioned on the floor, an MSC on a 
pedestal on a trolley, or the MSC transporter holding the MSC. 
10. Collision between a mobile elevating platform and an MSC positioned on the floor, 
an MSC on a pedestal on a trolley, or the MSC transporter holding the MSC. 
11. Drop or collision of personnel barriers or impact limiters from the receipt area crane 
onto or against a loaded cask. 
12. Slap down of a loaded cask onto an SRTC during the upending of the loaded cask 
to the vertical orientation. 
13. Drop of a loaded cask from an overhead crane onto the floor during the transfer 
from an SRTC to a pedestal already staged on a trolley. 
14. Drop of a loaded cask from an overhead crane onto the pedestal on a trolley during 
the transfer from an SRTC to a pedestal already staged on a trolley. 
15. Drop or collision of a loaded cask from an overhead crane onto or against a sharp 
object during the transfer from an SRTC to a pedestal previously positioned on a 
trolley. 
Seismically-Unique: 
Collapse of structure. 
Failure of equipment supports. 
Failure of shield walls, or shield doors 
to protect against radiation. 
Failure/collapse of crane. 

Table III-2. Identification of Seismically Initiated Potential Events (Continued) 
Functional Areas a 
Internal Events That Could Be Initiated by Seismic Event a,b,c 
Potential Seismically-Unique Events 
9. DTF: Cask & MSC 
Receipt 
Cask and MSC 
Entrance Vestibule, 
Cask and MSC SRTC 
Receipt Area, Cask and 
MSC to Trolley Transfer 
Room 
(Continued) 
Drops, Slap Downs, Collisions: 
16. Slap down of a loaded cask following a drop from an overhead crane onto the edge 
of the trolley or pedestal during transfer of the cask from the SRTC to the pedestal. 
17. Collision of a loaded cask suspended from an overhead crane with the shield doors 
separating the cask and MSC SRTC receipt area and the cask and MSC to trolley 
transfer room during the transfer of the cask from the SRTC to the trolley. 
18. Closing of the shield doors separating the cask and MSC SRTC receipt area and 
the cask and MSC to trolley transfer room (striking a loaded cask while it is 
suspended from the overhead crane) during the transfer of the cask from the SRTC 
to the pedestal on a trolley. 
19. Drop of a loaded MSC from an overhead crane onto the floor during the transfer 
from an SRTC to a pedestal previously positioned on a trolley. 
20. Drop of a loaded MSC from an overhead crane onto the pedestal on a trolley during 
the transfer from an SRTC to a pedestal previously positioned on a trolley. 
21. Drop or collision of a loaded MSC from an overhead crane onto or against a sharp 
object during the transfer from the floor (after delivery by the MSC transporter) to a 
pedestal already staged on trolley. 
22. Collision of a loaded MSC suspended from an overhead crane with the shield doors 
separating the cask and MSC SRTC receipt area and the cask and MSC to trolley 
transfer room during transfer of the MSC from the floor (after delivery by the MSC 
transporter) to the pedestal on a trolley. 
23. Closing of the shield doors separating the cask and MSC SRTC receipt area and 
the cask and MSC to trolley transfer room (striking a loaded MSC while it is 
suspended from the overhead crane) during the transfer of the MSC from the floor 
(after delivery by the MSC transporter) to the pedestal on a trolley. 
24. Slap down of a loaded MSC following a drop from an overhead crane onto the edge 
of the trolley or pedestal during transfer of the MSC from the floor (after delivery by 
the MSC transporter) to the pedestal on a trolley. 
25. Drop or collision of handling equipment from an overhead bridge crane onto or 
against a loaded cask or MSC. 
26. Drop or collision of equipment from the maintenance crane onto or against a loaded 
cask or MSC. 
See prior page. 

Table III-2. Identification of Seismically Initiated Potential Events (Continued) 
Functional Areas a 
Internal Events That Could Be Initiated by Seismic Event a,b,c 
Potential Seismically-Unique Events 
9. DTF: Cask & MSC 
Receipt 
Cask and MSC 
Entrance Vestibule, 
Cask and MSC SRTC 
Receipt Area, Cask and 
MSC to Trolley Transfer 
Room 
(Continued) 
Drops, Slap Downs, Collisions: 
27. Collision of a trolley holding a cask or MSC on a pedestal with the shield doors 
separating the cask and MSC to trolley transfer room and the cask and MSC 
turntable room. 
28. The shield doors separating the cask and MSC to trolley transfer room and the cask 
and MSC turntable room close on a trolley holding a loaded cask or MSC on a 
pedestal. 
29. Derailment of a trolley holding a cask or MSC on a pedestal followed by a load 
tipover or fall. 
Fires: 
1. Electrical fire associated with the cask and MSC SRTC receipt area overhead 
cranes. 
2. Electrical fire associated with handling equipment or other electrical equipment in 
the cask and MSC entrance vestibule, cask and MSC SRTC receipt area, or the 
cask and MSC to trolley transfer room. 
3. Diesel fuel fire/explosion involving an SRTC tractor pulling or pushing an SRTC 
holding a loaded cask. 
4. Diesel fuel fire/explosion involving an MSC transporter holding a loaded MSC. 
5. Fire/explosion (battery/electrical fire) associated with the cask trolley. 
6. Fire/explosion (battery/electrical fire) associated with a forklift. 
7. Fire/explosion (battery/electrical fire) associated with a mobile elevating platform. 
8. Transient combustible fire in the cask and MSC SRTC receipt area, the cask and 
MSC entrance vestibule, or the cask and MSC to trolley transfer room. 
9. N/S 
Radiation: 
1. Radiation exposure of a facility worker and/or the offsite public. 
2. Loss of confinement zone due to ventilation system malfunction or other breach of a 
confinement barrier leading to a release of airborne radiation. 
Criticality: 
1. Criticality associated with an SRTC derailment or collision followed by a load tipover 
or fall and a rearrangement of cask internals. 
See prior page. 

Table III-2. Identification of Seismically Initiated Potential Events (Continued) 
Functional Areas a 
Internal Events That Could Be Initiated by Seismic Event a,b,c 
Potential Seismically-Unique Events 
9. DTF: Cask & MSC 
Receipt 
(Continued) 
Criticality: 
2. Criticality associated with cask drop or collision and rearrangement of cask 
internals. 
3. Criticality associated with an MSC drop or collision and rearrangement of cask 
internals. 
4. Criticality associated with an SRTC (holding a loaded MSC) derailment or collision 
followed by a load tipover or fall and rearrangement of the cask internals 
See prior page. 
10. DTF: Preparation 
Cask/MSC Turntable 
Room, Cask 
Preparation Room 
Drops, Slap Downs, Collisions: 
1. Derailment of a trolley holding a cask or MSC on a pedestal (with outer and/or inner 
lid bolted in place, if applicable) followed by a load tipover or fall. 
2. Derailment of a trolley holding a cask or MSC on a pedestal (with outer and/or inner 
lid bolted in place, if applicable) due to a turntable malfunction followed by a load 
tipover or fall. 
3. Collision of a trolley holding a cask or MSC on a pedestal (with outer and/or inner lid 
bolted in place, if applicable) with shield doors separating the Cask/MSC turntable 
room and the cask preparation room. 
4. Closure of the shield doors separating the cask/MSC turntable room and the cask 
preparation room onto the trolley holding a cask or MSC on a pedestal (with outer 
and/or inner lid bolted in place, if applicable). 
5. Collision involving two trolleys with at least one holding a cask or MSC on a 
pedestal (with outer and/or inner lid bolted in place, if applicable). 
6. Drop or collision of tools or equipment (including a lid-lifting fixture, lid bolts, etc.) 
onto or against a cask or MSC outer lid (if applicable) or a cask or MSC inner lid in 
the cask preparation room. 
7. Drop of a cask or MSC outer lid from the overhead crane onto the cask or MSC (if 
applicable) in the cask preparation room. 
8. Drop or collision of a docking ring onto or against a cask or MSC in the cask 
preparation room. 
Fires: 
1. Electrical fire associated with the cask preparation area 20 ton overhead crane 
2. Electrical fire associated with handling equipment or other cask preparation area 
equipment, including the turntable. 
Seismically-Unique: 
Collapse of structure. 
Failure of equipment supports. 
Failure of shield walls or shield doors 
to protect against radiation. 
Failure of airlock doors for airborne 
confinement. 

Table III-2. Identification of Seismically Initiated Potential Events (Continued) 
Functional Areas a 
Internal Events That Could Be Initiated by Seismic Event a,b,c 
Potential Seismically-Unique Events 
10. DTF: Preparation 
Cask/MSC Turntable 
Room, Cask 
Preparation Room 
Fires: 
3. Fire/explosion (battery/electrical fire) associated with the trolley. 
4. Transient combustible fire in the cask preparation room or the cask/MSC turntable 
room. 
5. N/S 
6. Intact or non-intact SNF overheating or damage to canister contents due to a loss of 
cooling resulting in excessive temperature and possible zircaloy cladding (or other 
cladding) unzipping or cladding failure due to excessive hoop stresses. 
Radiation: 
1. Radiation exposure of a facility worker and/or the offsite public. 
2. Damage or rupture of cask sampling and purging system, leading to a release of 
cask internal gases and radioactive material. 
3. Thermal expansion of gases or other loss of confinement in an unsealed cask or 
MSC, leading to radiological release. 
4. Loss of confinement zone due to ventilation system malfunction or other breach of a 
confinement barrier leading to a release of airborne radiation. 
5. N/S 
Criticality: 
1. Criticality associated with a cask or MSC collision followed by a load tipover or fall 
and a rearrangement of the cask internals. 
2. Criticality associated with a cask or MSC trolley derailment followed by a load 
tipover or fall and a rearrangement of the cask internals. 
See prior page. 
11. DTF: Cask/MSC 
Docking 
Cask and MSC Docking 
Room 
Drops, Slap Downs, Collisions: 
1. Derailment of a trolley holding a cask or MSC on a pedestal (with outer lid removed 
[if applicable] and inner lid unbolted but in place) followed by a load tipover or fall. 
2. Derailment of a trolley holding a cask or MSC on a pedestal (with outer lid removed 
[if applicable] and inner lid unbolted but in place) due to a turntable malfunction 
followed by a load tipover or fall. 
3. Collision of a trolley holding a cask or MSC on a pedestal (with outer lid removed [if 
applicable] and inner lid unbolted but in place) with shield doors separating the cask 
preparation room and the cask/MSC turntable room or the shield doors separating 
the cask/MSC turntable room and the cask and MSC docking room. 
Seismically-Unique: 
Collapse of structure. 
Failure of equipment supports. 
Failure of shield walls or shield doors 
to protect against radiation. 
Failure of airlock doors for airborne 
confinement. 

Table III-2. Identification of Seismically Initiated Potential Events (Continued) 
Functional Areas a 
Internal Events That Could Be Initiated by Seismic Event a,b,c 
Potential Seismically-Unique Events 
11. DTF: Cask and 
MSC Docking 
Cask and MSC Docking 
Room 
(Continued) 
Drops, Slap Downs, Collisions: 
4. Closure of the shield doors separating the cask preparation room and the cask/MSC 
turntable room or the shield doors separating the cask/MSC turntable room and the 
cask and MSC docking room onto the trolley holding a cask or MSC on a pedestal 
(with outer lid removed [if applicable] and inner lid unbolted but in place). 
5. Collision involving two trolleys with at least one holding a cask or MSC on a 
pedestal (with outer lid removed [if applicable] and inner lid unbolted but in place). 
6. Drop or collision of a docking port (mobile slab) onto or against a cask or MSC. 
7. Drop or collision of a docking port plug onto or against a cask lid or MSC lid (with 
outer lid removed [if applicable] and inner lid unbolted but in place). 
8. Drop of an inner lid into a cask or MSC (with outer lid removed [if applicable]). 
Fire: 
1. Electrical fire associated with handling equipment or other cask and MSC docking 
room equipment (including the turntable). 
2. Fire/explosion (battery/electrical fire) associated with the cask trolley. 
3. Transient combustible fire in the cask preparation area, cask/MSC turntable room, 
and cask and MSC docking room. 
4. N/S 
5. Intact or non-intact SNF overheating or damage to canister contents due to a loss of 
cooling resulting in excessive temperature and possible zircaloy cladding (or other 
cladding) unzipping or cladding failure due to excessive hoop stresses. 
See prior page. 

Table III-2. Identification of Seismically Initiated Potential Events (Continued) 
Functional Areas a 
Internal Events That Could Be Initiated by Seismic Event a,b,c 
Potential Seismically-Unique Events 
11. DTF: Cask and 
MSC Docking 
Cask and MSC Docking 
Room 
(Continued) 
Radiation: 
1. Radiation exposure of a facility worker and/or the offsite public. 
2. Docking ring failure leads to a radiological release. 
3. N/S 
4. Thermal expansion of gases or other loss of confinement in an unsealed cask or 
MSC, leading to radiological release. 
5. Loss of confinement zone due to ventilation system malfunction or other breach of a 
confinement barrier leading to a release of airborne radiation. 
6. N/S 
Criticality: 
1. Criticality associated with cask or MSC collisions or a trolley derailment followed by 
a load tipover or fall and a rearrangement of cask or MSC internals. 
See prior page. 
12. DTF: Empty WP 
and MSC Processing 
Prior to Loading 
None identified. 
Seismically-Unique: 
None identified. 

Table III-2. Identification of Seismically Initiated Potential Events (Continued) 
Functional Areas a 
Internal Events That Could Be Initiated by Seismic Event a,b,c 
Potential Seismically-Unique Events 
13. DTF: NSNF Receipt 
WP and Navy Cask 
Entrance Vestibule, 
WP/Navy Cask SRTC 
Receipt Area, WP/Navy 
to Trolley Transfer 
Room, WP/Navy Cask 
Preparation Room 
Drops, Slap Downs, Collisions: 
1. SRTC derailment involving a loaded NSNF cask followed by a load tipover or fall. 
2. Collision of an SRTC carrying a loaded NSNF cask with the WP and navy cask 
entrance vestibule doors or the WP/navy cask SRTC receipt area shield doors. 
3. The WP and navy cask entrance vestibule doors or the WP/navy cask SRTC receipt 
area shield doors close on an SRTC carrying a loaded cask. 
4. Collision of mobile elevating platforms with a loaded NSNF cask during removal of 
personnel barriers and impact limiters or during survey activities. 
5. Forklift collision with a NSNF cask on an SRTC (with or without impact limiters 
installed on the cask) or the SRTC holding the cask. 
6. Drop or collision of personnel barriers or impact limiters from the receipt area crane 
onto or against a loaded NSNF cask. 
7. Slap down of a loaded NSNF cask onto an SRTC during upending of the loaded 
cask to the vertical orientation. 
8. Drop of a loaded NSNF cask from the overhead crane onto the floor during the 
transfer from an SRTC to a pedestal previously positioned on a trolley. 
9. Drop of a loaded NSNF cask from the overhead crane onto a pedestal on a trolley 
during the transfer from an SRTC to a pedestal previously positioned on a trolley. 
10. Drop or collision of a loaded cask from the overhead crane onto or against a sharp 
object during the transfer from an SRTC to a pedestal previously positioned on 
trolley. 
11. Collision of a loaded NSNF cask suspended from the overhead crane with the 
shield doors separating the WP/navy cask SRTC receipt area and the WP/navy to 
trolley transfer room during transfer of the NSNF cask from the SRTC to the trolley. 
12. Closing of the shield doors separating the WP/navy cask SRTC receipt area and the 
WP/navy to trolley transfer room (striking the cask while the loaded cask is 
suspended from the overhead crane) during the transfer of the cask from the SRTC 
to the trolley. 

Table III-2. Identification of Seismically Initiated Potential Events (Continued) 
Functional Areas a 
Internal Events That Could Be Initiated by Seismic Event a,b,c 
Potential Seismically-Unique Events 
13. DTF: NSNF Receipt 
WP and Navy Cask 
Entrance Vestibule, 
WP/Navy Cask SRTC 
Receipt Area, WP/Navy 
to Trolley Transfer 
Room, WP/Navy Cask 
Preparation Room 
Drops, Slap Downs, Collisions: 
13. Slap down of a loaded NSNF cask following a drop from the overhead crane onto 
the edge of the trolley or pedestal during transfer of the cask from the SRTC to the 
trolley. 
14. Drop or collision of handling equipment from the overhead bridge crane onto or 
against a loaded NSNF cask. 
15. Drop or collision of equipment from the overhead bridge crane onto or against a 
loaded NSNF cask. 
16. Collision of a trolley holding a NSNF cask on a pedestal with shield doors 
separating the WP/navy to trolley transfer room and the WP/navy cask preparation 
room. 
17. Closing of the shield doors separating the WP/navy to trolley transfer room and the 
WP/navy cask preparation room on a trolley holding a NSNF cask on a pedestal. 
18. Derailment of a trolley holding a NSNF cask on a pedestal followed by a load 
tipover or fall. 
Fires: 
1. Electrical fire associated with the WP/navy cask SRTC receipt area overhead 
cranes. 
2. Electrical fire associated with handling equipment or other electrical equipment in 
the WP/navy cask SRTC receipt area, WP and navy cask entrance vestibule, the 
WP/navy to trolley transfer room, or the WP/navy cask preparation room. 
3. Diesel fuel fire/explosion involving an SRTC tractor pulling or pushing an SRTC 
holding a loaded cask or canister. 
4. Electrical fire associated with a trolley holding a NSNF cask containing a NSNF 
canister. 
5. Fire/explosion (battery/electrical fire) associated with a forklift. 
6. Fire/explosion (battery/electrical fire) associated with a mobile elevating platform. 
7. Transient combustible fire in the WP and navy cask entrance vestibule, the 
WP/navy cask SRTC receipt area, the WP/navy cask to trolley transfer room , or the 
WP/navy cask preparation room. 
8. N/S 
Seismically-Unique: 
Collapse of structure. 
Failure of equipment supports. 
Failure/collapse of crane. 

Table III-2. Identification of Seismically Initiated Potential Events (Continued) 
Functional Areas a 
Internal Events That Could Be Initiated by Seismic Event a,b,c 
Potential Seismically-Unique Events 
13. DTF: NSNF Receipt 
WP and Navy Cask 
Entrance Vestibule, 
WP/Navy Cask SRTC 
Receipt Area, WP/Navy 
to Trolley Transfer 
Room, WP/Navy Cask 
Preparation Room 
Radiation: 
1. Radiation exposure of a facility worker and/or the offsite public. 
2. Loss of confinement zone due to ventilation system malfunction or other breach of a 
confinement barrier leading to a release of airborne radiation. 
3. N/S. 
Criticality: 
1. Criticality associated with an SRTC derailment or collision followed by a load tipover 
or fall and a rearrangement of the NSNF cask internals. 
2. Criticality associated with a NSNF cask drop, slap down, or collision and 
rearrangement of cask internals. 
3. Criticality associated with NSNF cask trolley derailment followed by a load tipover or 
fall and a rearrangement of the cask internals. 
See prior page. 

Table III-2. Identification of Seismically Initiated Potential Events (Continued) 
Functional Areas a 
Internal Events That Could Be Initiated by Seismic Event a,b,c 
Potential Seismically-Unique Events 
14. DTF: NSNF 
Processing 
WP Docking Cell, WP 
Loading (Naval 
Canister)/Docking Ring 
Removal Cell, WP 
Loading/Docking Ring 
Removal Cell 
Drops, Slap Downs, Collisions: 
1. Derailment of a trolley holding a loaded NSNF cask on a pedestal followed by a 
load tipover or fall. 
2. Drop or collision of handling equipment (such as the lid grapple) onto or against a 
NSNF cask outer lid (if applicable) or inner lid. 
3. Drop of a NSNF cask inner lid (if applicable) from the WP docking cell crane onto a 
NSNF canister. 
4. Drop or collision of handling equipment (such as a canister grapple) into or against 
an open NSNF cask loaded with a NSNF canister. 
5. Drop or collision of a NSNF canister from the WP docking cell crane back into or 
against the NSNF cask being unloaded. 
6. Fall of a NSNF canister from the WP docking crane onto the edge of the cask, the 
edge of the WP, or the edge of the transfer floor, followed by a slap down of the 
canister. 
7. Drop or collision of a NSNF canister from the WP docking cell crane onto or against 
a sharp object. 
8. Collision involving a NSNF canister suspended from the WP docking cell crane with 
equipment located in the WP docking cell or the WP loading (navy canister)/docking 
ring removal cell, such as lid lifting equipment. 
9. Drop of a NSNF canister from the WP docking room crane onto the transfer cell 
floor. 
10. Impact due to horizontal movement of the NSNF canister before it is completely 
removed from the naval transportation cask. 
11. Drop or collision of a NSNF canister from the 70 ton navy canister handling crane 
into or against the WP. 
12. Drop or collision of handling equipment into or against an open WP loaded with a 
NSNF canister. 
13. Drop of a WP inner lid from the WP docking cell crane into a loaded naval WP. 
Fires: 
1. Electrical fire associated with SNF handling equipment in the WP docking cell, and 
the WP loading (NSNF canister)/docking ring removal cell (including the overhead 
cranes, etc.). 
Seismically-Unique: 
Collapse of structure. 
Failure of equipment supports. 
Failure of shield walls or shield doors 
to protect against radiation. 
Failure of airlock doors for airborne 
confinement. 
Failure/collapse of crane. 

Table III-2. Identification of Seismically Initiated Potential Events (Continued) 
Functional Areas a 
Internal Events That Could Be Initiated by Seismic Event a,b,c 
Potential Seismically-Unique Events 
14. DTF: NSNF 
Processing 
WP/Navy Cask 
Preparation Room, WP 
Docking Cell, WP 
Loading (Naval 
Canister)/Docking Ring 
Removal Cell 
(Continued) 
Fires: 
2. Electrical fire associated with the trolley holding either a loaded, unsealed WP or a 
loaded NSNF cask holding a NSNF canister. 
3. N/S 
4. Overheating of a loaded, unsealed (and uninerted) cask or WP due to a loss of 
cooling resulting in excessive temperature and possible damage to canister 
contents. 
5. Transient combustible fire in the WP docking cell, or the WP loading (naval 
canister)/docking ring removal cell. 
Radiation: 
1. Radiation exposure of a facility worker and/or the offsite public. 
2. Loss of confinement zone due to ventilation system malfunction or other breach of a 
confinement barrier leading to a release of airborne radiation. 
3. Inadvertent opening of a shield door, leading to a worker exposure. 
4. N/S 
Criticality: 
1. Criticality associated with a NSNF cask drop or collision and rearrangement of cask 
internals. 
See prior page. 

Table III-2. Identification of Seismically Initiated Potential Events (Continued) 
Functional Areas a 
Internal Events That Could Be Initiated by Seismic Event a,b,c 
Potential Seismically-Unique Events 
15. DTF: Transfer 
Cask and MSC Docking 
Room, Waste Transfer 
Cell, WP Docking Cell, 
WP Loading/Docking 
Ring Removal Cell 
Drops, Slap Downs, Collisions: 
1. Drop or collision of handling equipment into or against an open cask or open MSC 
loaded with CSNF assemblies, a DOE HLW canister, a DOE SNF MCO, or a DOE 
SNF canister. 
2. Drop or collision of an SNF assembly from the spent fuel transfer machine back into 
or against a cask or MSC being unloaded. 
3. Drop or collision of an SNF assembly from the spent fuel transfer machine back 
onto or against one or more SNF assembly(ies) in a cask or MSC. 
4. Impact due to horizontal movement of an SNF assembly by the spent fuel transfer 
machine before the assembly is completely removed from the cask or MSC. 
5. Drop of an SNF assembly from the spent fuel transfer machine onto the waste 
transfer cell floor. 
6. Collision involving an SNF assembly suspended from the spent fuel transfer 
machine with equipment located in the waste transfer cell or on the cell floor (such 
as lid lifting equipment). 
7. Drop or collision of an SNF assembly from the spent fuel transfer machine onto or 
against a sharp object. 
8. Drop or collision of an SNF assembly from the spent fuel transfer machine into or 
against an empty WP or MSC being loaded. 
9. Drop and slap down of an SNF assembly from the spent fuel transfer machine (due 
to impact with an edge of the cask, MSC, WP, floor edge, WP internal baffle, 
staging rack, etc.) during the transfer from the cask or MSC to a WP or staging rack. 
10. Drop or collision of an SNF assembly from the spent fuel transfer machine onto or 
against another SNF assembly in a WP or MSC. 
11. Drop or collision of a SNF assembly from the spent fuel transfer machine into or 
against an empty staging rack in the waste transfer cell. 
12. Drop or collision of a SNF assembly from the spent fuel transfer machine onto or 
against one or more SNF assemblies in a staging rack. 
13. Drop or collision of a SNF assembly from the spent fuel transfer machine onto or 
against a DOE HLW canister or DOE SNF canister in a staging rack. 
14. Drop or collision of a DOE HLW canister or a DOE SNF canister from the waste 
transfer cell overhead crane back into or against the cask or MSC being unloaded. 
Seismically-Unique: 
Collapse of structure. 
Failure of equipment supports. 
Failure of shield walls, view ports or 
shield doors to protect against 
radiation. 
Failure of airlock doors , or view ports 
to provide airborne confinement 
Failure/collapse of spent fuel transfer 
machine. 

Table III-2. Identification of Seismically Initiated Potential Events (Continued) 
Functional Areas a 
Internal Events That Could Be Initiated by Seismic Event a,b,c 
Potential Seismically-Unique Events 
15. DTF: Transfer 
Waste Transfer Cell, 
WP Docking Cell, WP 
Loading/Docking Ring 
Removal Cell 
Drops, Slap Downs, Collisions: 
15. Drop or collision of a DOE SNF MCO from the waste transfer cell overhead crane 
back into or against the cask being unloaded. 
16. Impact due to horizontal of a DOE HLW canister or a DOE SNF canister with the 
waste transfer cell overhead crane before the canister is completely removed from 
the cask or MSC. 
17. Impact due to horizontal of a DOE SNF MCO with the waste transfer cell overhead 
crane before the canister is completely removed from the cask. 
18. Drop and slap down of a DOE HLW canister or a DOE SNF canister from the waste 
transfer cell overhead crane (due to impact with an edge of the cask, MSC, WP, 
floor edge, WP internal baffle, staging rack, etc.) during the transfer from the cask or 
MSC to a WP, or staging rack. 
19. Drop and slap down of a DOE SNF MCO from the waste transfer cell overhead 
crane (due to impact with an edge of the cask, WP, floor edge, WP internal baffle, 
etc.) during the transfer from the cask to a WP. 
20. Drop or collision of a DOE HLW canister, a DOE SNF canister, or a DOE SNF MCO 
from the waste transfer cell overhead crane onto or against a sharp object. 
21. Collision involving a DOE HLW canister, a DOE SNF canister, or a DOE SNF MCO 
suspended from the waste transfer cell overhead crane with equipment located in 
the waste transfer cell or on the cell floor, such as lid lifting equipment. 
22. Drop of a DOE HLW canister, a DOE SNF canister, or a DOE SNF MCO from the 
waste transfer cell overhead crane onto the waste transfer cell floor. 
23. Drop or collision of a DOE HLW canister or a DOE SNF canister from the waste 
transfer cell crane into or against an empty canister staging rack. 
24. Drop or collision of a DOE HLW canister or a DOE SNF canister from the waste 
transfer cell crane into or against an SNF assembly staging rack loaded with SNF 
assemblies. 
25. Drop or collision of a DOE HLW canister or a DOE SNF canister from the waste 
transfer cell crane onto or against another DOE HLW canister or DOE SNF canister 
in a staging rack. 
26. Drop or collision of a DOE HLW canister or a DOE SNF canister from the waste 
transfer cell crane into or against an empty WP or into or against an empty MSC 
being loaded. 
See prior page. 

Table III-2. Identification of Seismically Initiated Potential Events (Continued) 
Functional Areas a 
Internal Events That Could Be Initiated by Seismic Event a,b,c 
Potential Seismically-Unique Events 
15. DTF: Transfer 
Waste Transfer Cell, 
WP Docking Cell, WP 
Loading/Docking Ring 
Removal Cell 
(Continued) 
Drops, Slap Downs, Collisions: 
27. Drop or collision of a DOE SNF MCO from the waste transfer cell crane into or 
against an empty WP being loaded. 
28. Drop or collision of a DOE HLW canister from the waste transfer cell crane onto or 
against another DOE HLW canister in a WP or in an MSC being loaded. 
29. Drop or collision of a DOE HLW canister from the waste transfer cell crane onto or 
against another DOE HLW canister, a DOE SNF canister, or a DOE SNF MCO in a 
WP being loaded. 
30. Drop or collision of a DOE SNF canister from the waste transfer cell crane onto or 
against a DOE HLW canister in a WP or in an MSC. 
31. Drop or collision of a DOE SNF MCO from the waste transfer cell crane onto or 
against another DOE SNF MCO or a DOE HLW canister in a WP being loaded. 
32. Drop or collision of a DOE SNF canister from the waste transfer cell crane onto or 
against another DOE SNF canister in a WP or in an MSC in a misload situation. 
33. Drop or collision of a DOE SNF MCO from the waste transfer cell crane onto or 
against a DOE SNF canister in a WP in a misload situation. 
34. Drop or collision of a DOE HLW canister, a DOE SNF canister, or a DOE SNF MCO 
from the waste transfer cell crane onto or against SNF assemblies in a WP or in an 
MSC in a misload situation. 
35. Drop or collision of a SNF assembly from the spent fuel transfer machine onto or 
against a DOE HLW canister or a DOE SNF canister in a WP or in an MSC in a 
misload situation. 
36. Drop or collision of a SNF assembly from the spent fuel transfer machine onto or 
against a DOE HLW canister, a DOE SNF canister, or a DOE SNF MCO in a WP in 
a misload situation. 
37. Drop or collision of handling equipment onto or against SNF in the SNF staging 
rack. 
38. Drop or collision of handling equipment onto or against a DOE HLW canister or a 
DOE SNF canister in a canister staging rack. 
39. Drop or collision of handling equipment into or against an open MSC or an open WP 
filled with SNF assemblies. 
See prior page. 

Table III-2. Identification of Seismically Initiated Potential Events (Continued) 
Functional Areas a 
Internal Events That Could Be Initiated by Seismic Event a,b,c 
Potential Seismically-Unique Events 
15. DTF: Transfer 
Waste Transfer Cell, 
WP Docking Cell, WP 
Loading/Docking Ring 
Removal Cell 
(Continued) 
Drops, Slap Downs, Collisions: 
40. Drop or collision of handling equipment into or against an open WP loaded with 
DOE HLW canisters, and/or a DOE SNF canister, and/or DOE SNF MCOs. 
41. Drop or collision of a WP inner lid or MSC cask inner lid from the docking station 
crane onto or against a loaded WP or loaded MSC. 
42. Drop or collision of a WP docking port plug from the waste transfer cell crane onto 
or against the inner lid of a loaded WP or loaded MSC (with lid in place but not 
sealed). 
43. Drop or collision of a WP docking ring onto or against a loaded WP (with lid in place 
but not sealed) during docking ring removal in the WP loading/docking ring removal 
cell. 
44. Drop or collision of a handling or other miscellaneous equipment onto or against a 
loaded WP (with lid in place but not sealed) during docking ring removal in the WP 
looking/docking ring removal cell. 
45. Derailment of a trolley holding a loaded, unsealed WP (with lid in place but not 
sealed) followed by a load tipover or fall. 
Fires: 
1. N/S 
2. Electrical fire associated with SNF and HLW handling equipment or other 
electrically powered equipment in the waste transfer cell, the WP docking cell, or 
the WP loading/docking ring removal cell (including the overhead cranes and the 
spent fuel transfer machine). 
3. Fire/explosion (battery/electrical fire) associated with a cask trolley holding an 
unsealed, partially-filled or filled cask or MSC. 
4. Electrical fire associated with a WP trolley holding an unsealed, partially-filled or 
filled WP 
5. Intact or non-intact SNF overheating or damage to canister contents due to a loss of 
cooling resulting in excessive temperature and possible zircaloy cladding (or other 
cladding) unzipping or cladding failure due to excessive hoop stresses. 
6. Transient combustible fire in the cask and MSC docking room, in the waste transfer 
cell, the WP docking cell, or the WP loading/docking ring removal cell. 
See prior page. 

Table III-2. Identification of Seismically Initiated Potential Events (Continued) 
Functional Areas a 
Internal Events That Could Be Initiated by Seismic Event a,b,c 
Potential Seismically-Unique Events 
15. DTF: Transfer 
Waste Transfer Cell, 
WP Docking Cell, WP 
Loading/Docking Ring 
Removal Cell 
(Continued) 
Radiation: 
1. Radiation exposure of a facility worker and/or the offsite public. 
2. Docking ring failure leads to a radiological release. 
3. N/S 
4. Loss of confinement zone due to ventilation system malfunction or other breach of a 
confinement barrier leading to a release of airborne contamination. 
5. N/S 
6. Inadvertent opening of a shield door, leading to a worker exposure. 
7. N/S 
Criticality: 
1. Criticality associated with a drop of an SNF assembly from the spent fuel transfer 
machine into a cask, MSC, or WP and a rearrangement of the cask, MSC, or WP 
internals. 
2. Criticality associated with a drop of an SNF assembly from the spent fuel transfer 
machine and a rearrangement of the fuel rods that comprise the assembly due to 
impact. 
3. Criticality associated with a drop of an SNF assembly from the spent fuel transfer 
machine onto the storage racks and a rearrangement of the orientation of the SNF 
assemblies in the storage racks. 
4. Criticality associated with a drop or slap down of a DOE SNF canister, a DOE SNF 
MCO, or a DOE HLW canister. 
5. Criticality associated with the drop of heavy equipment onto a loaded, unsealed 
cask, MSC, or WP and a rearrangement of the container internals. 
6. N/S 
7. N/S 
8. N/S 
See prior page. 

Table III-2. Identification of Seismically Initiated Potential Events (Continued) 
Functional Areas a 
Internal Events That Could Be Initiated by Seismic Event a,b,c 
Potential Seismically-Unique Events 
16. DTF: Empty 
Transportation Cask/ 
MSC/DPC Removal 
Cask and MSC Docking 
Room, Cask/MSC 
Turntable Room, Cask 
Restoration Room, 
Cask and MSC to 
Trolley Transfer Room, 
Cask and MSC SRTC 
Receipt Area, Cask and 
MSC Entrance 
Vestibule 
Drops, Slap Downs, Collisions: 
None identified. 
Fires 
None identified. 
Radiation: 
1. Radiation exposure of a facility worker. 
2. Loss of confinement zone due to ventilation system malfunction or other breach of a 
confinement barrier leading to a release of airborne radiation. 
Criticality: 
1. N/S 
Seismically-Unique: 
Collapse of structure. 
17. DTF: Loaded MSC 
Removal 
Cask and MSC Docking 
Room, Cask/MSC 
Turntable Room, Cask 
Preparation Room, 
Cask and MSC to 
Trolley Transfer Room, 
Cask and MSC SRTC 
Receipt Area, Cask and 
MSC Entrance 
Vestibule 
Drops, Slap Downs, Collisions: 
1. Derailment of a trolley holding a loaded MSC on a pedestal followed by a load 
tipover or fall (before or after the outer lid [as applicable] is fastened). 
2. Derailment of a trolley holding a loaded MSC on a pedestal due to a turntable 
malfunction followed by a load tipover or fall (before or after the outer lid [as 
applicable] is fastened). 
3. Collision of a trolley holding a loaded MSC on a pedestal with the shield doors 
separating the cask and MSC docking room and the cask/MSC turntable room or 
the cask/MSC turntable room and the cask preparation room (before or after the 
outer lid [as applicable] is fastened). 
4. Closure of the shield doors separating the cask and MSC docking room and the 
cask/MSC turntable room or the cask/MSC turntable room and the cask preparation 
room onto the trolley holding a loaded MSC on a pedestal (before or after the outer 
lid [as applicable] is fastened). 
5. Collision involving two trolleys holding casks on pedestals (including a loaded MSC) 
(before or after the outer lid [as applicable] is fastened). 
6. Drop or collision of tools or equipment (including the outer lid-lifting fixture, inner lidlifting 
fixture, lid bolts, etc.) onto or against an MSC inner lid or outer lid, as 
applicable, during the MSC lid fastening process. 
7. Drop of an MSC outer lid from the overhead crane onto the loaded 
MSC inner lid, as applicable. 
Seismically-Unique: 
Collapse of structure. 
Failure of equipment supports. 
Failure of shield walls, view ports or 
shield doors to protect against 
radiation. 
Failure of airlock doors to provide 
airborne confinement. 
Failure/collapse of crane. 

Table III-2. Identification of Seismically Initiated Potential Events (Continued) 
Functional Areas a 
Internal Events That Could Be Initiated by Seismic Event a,b,c 
Potential Seismically-Unique Events 
17. DTF: Loaded MSC 
Removal 
Cask and MSC Docking 
Room, Cask/MSC 
Turntable Room, Cask 
Preparation Room, 
Cask and MSC to 
Trolley Transfer Room, 
Cask and MSC SRTC 
Receipt Area, Cask and 
MSC Entrance 
Vestibule 
(Continued) 
Drops, Slap Downs, Collisions: 
8. Drop or collision of a docking ring onto or against a loaded MSC. 
9. Collision of a trolley holding a loaded, sealed MSC on a pedestal with shield doors 
separating cask/MSC turntable room and the cask and MSC to trolley transfer room. 
10. Closure of the shield doors separating cask/MSC turntable room and the cask and 
MSC to trolley transfer room onto the trolley holding a loaded, sealed MSC on a 
pedestal. 
11. Drop of a loaded, sealed MSC from the overhead crane onto the floor during the 
transfer of the MSC from a pedestal staged on a trolley to the floor in the lay-down 
area in the cask and MSC SRTC receipt area. 
12. Drop or collision of a loaded MSC from the overhead crane onto or against a sharp 
object during the transfer of the MSC from a pedestal staged on a trolley to the floor 
in the lay-down area in the cask and MSC SRTC receipt area. 
13. Slap down of a loaded, sealed MSC following a drop onto the edge of the pedestal, 
trolley, railcar or other object during the transfer of the MSC from a pedestal staged 
on a trolley to the floor in the lay-down area in the cask and MSC SRTC receipt 
area. 
14. Drop or collision of handling equipment from the overhead bridge crane onto or 
against a loaded MSC. 
15. Drop or collision of equipment from the 25 ton material handling onto or against a 
loaded, sealed MSC. 
16. Forklift collision with a loaded, sealed MSC on a pedestal on a trolley, an MSC 
positioned on the floor in the lay-down area in the cask and MSC SRTC receipt 
area, or with the MSC transporter holding the MSC. 
17. Mobile elevating platform collision with a loaded, sealed MSC on a pedestal on a 
trolley, an MSC positioned on the floor in the lay-down area in the cask and MSC 
SRTC receipt area, or with the MSC transporter holding the MSC. 
18. Drop of a loaded MSC from the MSC transporter onto the floor inside the DTF while 
in-transit to the SNF Aging System. 
19. Drop or collision of a loaded MSC from the MSC transporter onto or against a sharp 
object inside the DTF while in-transit to the SNF Aging System. 
20. MSC transporter collision while carrying a loaded, sealed MSC followed by an MSC 
tipover or fall. 
See prior page. 

Table III-2. Identification of Seismically Initiated Potential Events (Continued) 
Functional Areas a 
Internal Events That Could Be Initiated by Seismic Event a,b,c 
Potential Seismically-Unique Events 
17. DTF: Loaded MSC 
Removal 
Cask and MSC Docking 
Room, Cask/MSC 
Turntable Room, Cask 
Preparation Room, 
Cask and MSC to 
Trolley Transfer Room, 
Cask and MSC SRTC 
Receipt Area, Cask and 
MSC Entrance 
Vestibule 
(Continued) 
Drops, Slap Downs, Collisions: 
21. MSC transporter collision into a loaded, sealed MSC followed by an MSC tipover or 
fall. 
22. Collision of the MSC transporter (holding a loaded, sealed MSC) with the cask and 
MSC SRTC receipt area shield doors or the cask and MSC entrance vestibule 
doors. 
23. The cask and MSC SRTC receipt area shield doors or the cask and MSC entrance 
vestibule doors close on the MSC transporter holding a loaded, sealed MSC. 
Fires: 
1. Electrical fire associated with the overhead cranes, including those located in the 
cask and MSC docking room, and the cask and MSC SRTC receipt area. 
2. Electrical fire associated with handling equipment or other equipment located in the 
cask and MSC docking room, cask/MSC turntable room, cask and MSC to trolley 
transfer room, cask preparation room, cask and MSC SRTC receipt area, or the 
cask and MSC entrance vestibule (including the turntables). 
3. Transient combustible fire in the cask and MSC docking room, cask/MSC turntable 
room, cask preparation room, cask and MSC to trolley transfer room, cask and 
MSC SRTC receipt area, or the cask and MSC entrance vestibule. 
4. Fire/explosion (battery/electrical fire) associated with the cask trolley. 
5. Fire/explosion (battery/electrical fire) associated with a forklift. 
6. Fire/explosion (battery/electrical fire) associated with a mobile elevating platform. 
7. Diesel fuel fire/explosion involving an MSC transporter holding a loaded MSC. 
Radiation: 
1. Radiation exposure of a facility worker and/or the offsite public. 
2. Damage or rupture of cask inerting system leading to a release of MSC internal 
gases. 
3. Expansion of gases in the loaded, unsealed MSC, leading to radiological release. 
4. Loss of confinement zone due to ventilation system malfunction or other breach of a 
confinement barrier leading to a release of airborne radiation. 
See prior page. 

Table III-2. Identification of Seismically Initiated Potential Events (Continued) 
Functional Areas a 
Internal Events That Could Be Initiated by Seismic Event a,b,c 
Potential Seismically-Unique Events 
17. DTF: Loaded MSC 
Removal 
Cask and MSC Docking 
Room, Cask/MSC 
Turntable Room, Cask 
Preparation Room, 
Cask and MSC to 
Trolley Transfer Room, 
Cask and MSC SRTC 
Receipt Area, Cask and 
MSC Entrance 
Vestibule 
(Continued) 
Criticality: 
1. Criticality associated with an MSC collision or trolley derailment followed by a load 
tipover or fall and a rearrangement of the MSC internals (before or after the outer lid 
[as applicable] is fastened). 
2. Criticality associated with a drop or slap down of a loaded, sealed MSC from an 
overhead crane and a rearrangement of cask internals. 
3. Criticality associated with an MSC transporter collision while holding a loaded, 
sealed MSC followed by a load tipover or fall and rearrangement of the cask 
internals. 
See prior page. 
18. DTF: WP Handling, 
Welding and 
Decontamination 
WP Handling and 
Staging Cell, WP 
Positioning Cells, WP 
Closure Cells, and the 
WP/Trolley 
Decontamination Room 
Drops, Slap Downs, Collisions: 
1. Collision involving the trolley holding the loaded, unsealed WP and the shield doors 
between the WP loading/docking ring removal cell and the WP handling and staging 
cell. 
2. Shield doors between the WP loading/docking ring removal cell and the WP 
handling and staging cell close on the trolley holding the loaded, unsealed WP. 
3. Derailment of a trolley holding a loaded, unsealed WP followed by a load tipover or 
fall. 
4. Drop of a loaded, unsealed WP from the WP handling and staging cell overhead 
crane onto the floor during the transfer from the waste transfer area pedestal and 
trolley to a WP positioning cell pedestal and trolley. 
5. Drop of a loaded, unsealed WP from the WP handling and staging cell overhead 
crane onto a pedestal on a trolley during the transfer from the waste transfer area 
pedestal and trolley to a WP positioning cell pedestal and trolley. 
6. Drop or collision of a loaded, unsealed WP from the WP handling and staging cell 
overhead crane onto or against a sharp object during the transfer from the waste 
transfer area pedestal and trolley to a WP positioning cell pedestal and trolley. 
7. Slap down of a loaded, unsealed WP from the WP handling and staging cell 
overhead crane (due to impact with a curb/berm/impact limiter used to maintain 
drop height limits) or pedestal edge during the transfer from the waste transfer area 
pedestal and trolley to a WP positioning cell pedestal and trolley. 
Seismically-Unique: 
Collapse of structure. 
Failure of equipment supports. 
Failure of shield walls, view ports or 
shield doors to protect against 
radiation. 
Failure of airlock doors or view ports to 
provide airborne confinement. 
Failure/collapse of crane. 

Table III-2. Identification of Seismically Initiated Potential Events (Continued) 
Functional Areas a 
Internal Events That Could Be Initiated by Seismic Event a,b,c 
Potential Seismically-Unique Events 
18. DTF: WP Handling, 
Welding and 
Decontamination 
WP Handling and 
Staging Cell, WP 
Positioning Cells, WP 
Closure Cells, and the 
WP/Trolley 
Decontamination Room 
(Continued) 
Drops, Slap Downs, Collisions: 
8. Drop or collision of equipment (handling equipment, etc.) from the WP handling and 
staging cell overhead crane onto or against a loaded, unsealed WP positioned on a 
pedestal on a trolley. 
9. Collision involving the trolley holding the loaded, unsealed WP and the shield doors 
between WP handling and staging cell and the WP positioning cell. 
10. Shield doors between the WP handling and staging cell and the WP positioning cell 
close on the trolley holding the loaded, unsealed WP. 
11. Lid drop onto a WP from the lid placement fixture equipment during the welding 
process. 
12. Equipment drop onto a WP during the welding process. 
13. Drop or collision of equipment (handling equipment, etc.) from the WP handling and 
staging cell overhead crane onto or against a loaded, sealed WP positioned on a 
pedestal on a trolley. 
14. Collision involving the trolley holding the loaded, sealed WP and the shield doors 
between the WP positioning cell and the WP handling and staging cell. 
15. Shield doors between the WP positioning cell and the WP handling and staging cell 
close on the trolley holding the loaded, sealed WP. 
16. Derailment of a trolley holding a loaded, sealed WP on the rails leading from the 
WP positioning cell, followed by a load tipover or fall. 
17. Drop of a loaded, sealed WP from the WP handling and staging cell overhead crane 
onto the floor during transfer from the WP positioning cell pedestal and trolley to the 
WP survey station. 
18. Drop or collision of a loaded, sealed WP from the WP handling and staging cell 
overhead crane onto or against a sharp object during transfer from the WP 
positioning cell pedestal and trolley to the WP survey station. 
19. Drop of a loaded, sealed WP from the WP handling and staging cell overhead crane 
onto the floor during the transfer from the WP survey station to a trolley for transfer 
to the WP loadout cell or during transfer to a position in a vertical orientation in a 
storage location in the WP handling and staging cell. 
20. Drop of a loaded, sealed WP from the WP handling and staging cell overhead crane 
onto a trolley during the transfer from the WP survey station to a trolley for transfer 
to the WP loadout cell. 
See prior page. 

Table III-2. Identification of Seismically Initiated Potential Events (Continued) 
Functional Areas a 
Internal Events That Could Be Initiated by Seismic Event a,b,c 
Potential Seismically-Unique Events 
18. DTF: WP Handling, 
Welding and 
Decontamination 
WP Handling and 
Staging Cell, WP 
Positioning Cells, WP 
Closure Cells, and the 
WP/Trolley 
Decontamination Room 
(Continued) 
Drops, Slap Downs, Collisions: 
21. Drop or collision of a loaded, sealed WP from the WP handling and staging cell 
overhead crane onto or against a sharp object during transfer from the WP survey 
station to a trolley for transfer to the WP loadout cell or during transfer to a position 
in a vertical orientation in a storage location in the WP handling and staging cell. 
22. Slap down of a loaded, sealed WP from the WP handling and staging cell overhead 
crane (due to impact with a curb/berm/impact limiter used to maintain drop height 
limits) or trolley edge during transfer from the WP survey station to a trolley for 
transfer to the WP loadout cell or during transfer to a position in a vertical 
orientation in a storage location in the WP handling and staging cell. 
23. Drop or collision of equipment (handling equipment, etc.) from the WP handling and 
staging cell overhead crane onto or against a loaded, sealed WP positioned in a 
vertical position in a storage position in the WP handling and staging cell. 
24. Drop of a loaded, partially sealed WP (WP with a known weld defect) from the WP 
handling and staging cell overhead crane onto the floor during the transfer from the 
WP positioning cell pedestal and trolley to a trolley for transfer to the DPC 
cutting/WP dry remediation cell. 
25. Drop of a loaded, partially sealed WP (WP with a known weld defect) from the WP 
handling and staging cell overhead crane onto a trolley during the transfer from the 
WP positioning cell pedestal and trolley to a trolley for transfer to the DPC 
cutting/WP dry remediation cell. 
26. Drop or collision of a loaded, partially sealed WP (WP with a known weld defect) 
from the WP handling and staging cell overhead crane onto or against a sharp 
object during transfer from the WP positioning cell pedestal and trolley to a trolley 
for transfer to the DPC cutting/WP dry remediation cell. 
27. Slap down of a loaded, partially sealed WP (WP with a known weld defect) from the 
WP handling and staging cell overhead crane (due to impact with a 
curb/berm/impact limiter used to maintain drop height limits) or trolley edge during 
the transfer from the WP positioning cell pedestal and trolley to a trolley for transfer 
to the DPC cutting/WP dry remediation cell. 
28. Drop of a loaded, sealed WP (WP needing decontamination) from the WP handling 
and staging cell overhead crane onto the floor during transfer from the WP survey 
station to a trolley for transfer to the WP/trolley decontamination room. 
See prior page. 

Table III-2. Identification of Seismically Initiated Potential Events (Continued) 
Functional Areas a 
Internal Events That Could Be Initiated by Seismic Event a,b,c 
Potential Seismically-Unique Events 
18. DTF: WP Handling, 
Welding and 
Decontamination 
WP Handling and 
Staging Cell, WP 
Positioning Cells, WP 
Closure Cells, and the 
WP/Trolley 
Decontamination Room 
(Continued) 
Drops, Slap Downs, Collisions: 
29. Drop of a loaded, sealed WP (WP needing decontamination) from the WP handling 
and staging cell overhead crane onto a trolley during transfer from the WP survey 
station to a trolley for transfer to the WP/trolley decontamination room. 
30. Drop or collision of a loaded, sealed WP (WP needing decontamination) from the 
WP handling and staging cell overhead crane onto or against a sharp object during 
transfer from the WP survey station to a trolley for transfer to the WP/trolley 
decontamination room. 
31. Slap down of a loaded, sealed WP (WP needing decontamination) from the WP 
handling and staging cell overhead crane (due to impact with a curb/berm/impact 
limiter used to maintain drop height limits) or trolley edge during the transfer from 
the WP survey station to a trolley for transfer to the WP/trolley decontamination 
room. 
32. Collision involving the trolley holding the loaded, sealed, contaminated or 
decontaminated WP and the shield doors between the WP handling and staging cell 
and the WP/trolley decontamination room. 
33. Shield doors between the WP handling and staging cell and the WP/trolley 
decontamination room close on the trolley holding the loaded, sealed, contaminated 
or decontaminated WP. 
34. Derailment of a trolley holding the loaded, sealed, contaminated or decontaminated 
WP in the WP/trolley decontamination room (or on the rails leading to/from this 
room) followed by a load tipover or fall. 
35. Drop or collision of equipment (handling equipment, decontamination equipment 
etc.) onto or against a loaded, sealed contaminated or decontaminated WP 
positioned on a trolley in the WP/trolley decontamination room. 
36. Drop of a loaded, sealed, decontaminated WP from the WP handling and staging 
cell overhead crane onto the floor during transfer from the trolley serving the 
WP/trolley decontamination room to the trolley to the WP loadout cell. 
37. Drop of a loaded, sealed, decontaminated WP from the WP handling and staging 
cell overhead crane onto a trolley during transfer from the trolley serving the 
WP/trolley decontamination room to the trolley to the WP loadout cell. 
38. Drop or collision of a loaded, sealed, decontaminated WP from the WP handling 
and staging cell overhead crane onto or against a sharp object during transfer from 
the trolley serving the WP/trolley decontamination room to the trolley to the WP 
loadout cell. 
See prior page. 

Table III-2. Identification of Seismically Initiated Potential Events (Continued) 
Functional Areas a 
Internal Events That Could Be Initiated by Seismic Event a,b,c 
Potential Seismically-Unique Events 
18. DTF: WP Handling, 
Welding and 
Decontamination 
WP Handling and 
Staging Cell, WP 
Positioning Cells, WP 
Closure Cells, and the 
WP/Trolley 
Decontamination Room 
(Continued) 
Drops, Slap Downs, Collisions: 
39. Slap down (tip-over from an elevated surface) of a loaded, sealed, decontaminated 
WP from the WP handling and staging cell overhead crane (due to impact with a 
curb/berm/impact limiter used to maintain drop height limits) or trolley edge during 
the transfer from the trolley serving the WP/trolley decontamination room to the 
trolley to the WP loadout cell. 
40. Drop or collision of equipment (handling equipment, etc.) from the WP handling and 
staging cell overhead crane onto or against a loaded, sealed or partially sealed 
(with a known weld defect), contaminated or decontaminated WP positioned on a 
pedestal on a trolley, on a trolley without a pedestal, or the WP survey station. 
41. Derailment of a trolley holding a loaded, sealed WP on the rails leading from the 
WP handling and staging cell to the WP loadout cell, followed by a load tipover or 
fall. 
Fires: 
1. Electrical fire associated with SNF or HLW handling and other electrically powered 
equipment in the WP handling and staging cell, the WP positioning cells, and the 
WP closure cells, including the cranes and the welders in the WP closure cells. 
2. Electrical fire associated with a trolley holding a loaded WP (unsealed or sealed) 
3. Fuel damage by burn-through during welding process/heat damage. 
4. Thermal hazard/SNF overheating in a WP during the welding process resulting in 
excessive cladding temperature and possible zircaloy cladding (or other cladding) 
unzipping. 
5. N/S 
6. Intact or non-intact SNF overheating or damage to canister contents due to a loss of 
cooling resulting in excessive temperature and possible zircaloy cladding (or other 
cladding) unzipping or cladding failure due to excessive hoop stresses. 
7. Transient combustible fire in the WP handling and staging cells, WP positioning 
cells, WP closure cells, and the WP/trolley decontamination room. 
Radiation: 
1. Radiation exposure of a facility worker and/or the offsite public. 
2. Glove box leak leads radiological release of airborne contamination. 
3. N/S 
See prior page. 

Table III-2. Identification of Seismically Initiated Potential Events (Continued) 
Functional Areas a 
Internal Events That Could Be Initiated by Seismic Event a,b,c 
Potential Seismically-Unique Events 
18. DTF: WP Handling, 
Welding and 
Decontamination 
WP Handling and 
Staging Cell, WP 
Positioning Cells, WP 
Closure Cells, and the 
WP/Trolley 
Decontamination Room 
(Continued) 
Radiation: 
4. Loss of confinement zone due to ventilation system malfunction or other breach of a 
confinement barrier leading to a release of airborne radiation. 
5. Inadvertent opening of a shield door, leading to a worker exposure 
6. N/S 
Contamination/Flooding: 
1. N/S 
2. Flooding due to rupture of water line or clogging of drain associated with the high 
pressure water system used for decontamination activities in the WP/Trolley 
Decontamination Room. 
Criticality: 
1. Criticality associated with a trolley holding a loaded, sealed or unsealed WP 
derailment followed by a load tipover or fall and a rearrangement of the container 
internals. 
2. Criticality associated with a drop or slap down of a loaded, unsealed WP and a 
rearrangement of the container contents (including SNF assemblies that may move 
out of the WP). 
3. Criticality associated with the drop of heavy equipment onto a loaded, unsealed WP 
and a rearrangement of the container internals. 
4. Criticality associated with a drop or slap down of a loaded, sealed WP and a 
rearrangement of the container internals. 
See prior page. 

Table III-2. Identification of Seismically Initiated Potential Events (Continued) 
Functional Areas a 
Internal Events That Could Be Initiated by Seismic Event a,b,c 
Potential Seismically-Unique Events 
19. DTF: WP Loadout 
WP Loadout Cell, WP 
Transporter Vestibule, 
Exit Vestibule 
Drops, Slap Downs, Collisions: 
1. Collision involving the trolley holding the loaded, sealed WP and the shield doors 
between the WP handling and staging cell and the WP loadout cell. 
2. Shield doors between the WP handling and staging cell and the WP loadout cell 
close on the trolley holding the loaded, sealed WP. 
3. Derailment of a trolley in the WP loadout cell holding a loaded, sealed WP followed 
by a load tipover or fall. 
4. Drop of a loaded, sealed WP from the WP loadout cell overhead crane onto the 
floor during the transfer from the trolley to the tilting machine. 
5. Drop of a loaded, sealed WP from the WP loadout cell overhead crane back onto 
the trolley during the transfer from the trolley to the tilting machine. 
6. Drop or collision of a loaded, sealed WP from the WP loadout cell overhead crane 
onto or against a sharp object (including the tilting machine) during transfer from the 
trolley to the tilting machine. 
7. Slap down (either forward into the WP turntable or backward onto the floor) of a 
loaded, sealed WP engaged in the tilting machine from the WP loadout cell 
overhead crane during the lowering of the WP to the horizontal position on the 
emplacement pallet previously placed on the WP turntable. 
8. Collision of the tilting machine against a loaded, sealed WP on an emplacement 
pallet on the WP Turntable. 
9. Equipment drop or collision (including lifting yokes) onto or against a loaded, sealed 
WP during the process to move the WP from the trolley to the tilting machine. 
10. Collision of the WP trunnion collar removal machine and the WP during trunnion 
collar removal. 
11. Drop of trunnion collar from the 100 ton overhead bridge crane in the WP loadout 
cell onto a WP during trunnion collar removal. 
12. Movement of the WP Turntable holding the loaded, sealed WP (positioned on the 
emplacement pallet) prior to disengagement/removal of the WP trunnion collar 
removal machine. 
13. Collision of the WP transporter or transporter bedplate with the loaded, sealed WP 
positioned on a emplacement pallet on the WP turntable during movement of the 
bedplate under the WP turntable. 
Seismically-Unique: 
Collapse of structure. 
Failure of equipment supports. 
Failure of shield walls or shield doors 
to protect against radiation. 
Failure of airlock doors to provide 
airborne confinement. 
Failure/collapse of crane. 

Table III-2. Identification of Seismically Initiated Potential Events (Continued) 
Functional Areas a 
Internal Events That Could Be Initiated by Seismic Event a,b,c 
Potential Seismically-Unique Events 
19. DTF: WP Loadout 
WP Loadout Cell, WP 
Transporter Vestibule, 
Exit Vestibule 
(Continued) 
Drops, Slap Downs, Collisions: 
14. Drop of the loaded, sealed WP (positioned on an emplacement pallet) onto the 
transporter bedplate during the lowering of the WP and emplacement pallet from the 
WP turntable to the transporter bedplate positioned under the turntable. 
15. Collision involving a WP transporter (holding the sealed WP on an emplacement 
pallet) and the shield doors between the WP loadout cell and the WP transporter 
vestibule. 
16. Shield doors between the WP loadout cell and the WP transporter vestibule close 
on the WP transporter (holding the loaded, sealed WP on an emplacement pallet). 
17. Collision involving WP transporter (holding the loaded, sealed WP on an 
emplacement pallet) and the shield doors between the WP transporter vestibule and 
the exit vestibule. 
18. Shield doors between the WP transporter vestibule and the exit vestibule close on 
the WP transporter (holding the loaded, sealed WP on an emplacement pallet). 
19. Collision involving the WP transporter (holding the loaded, sealed WP on an 
emplacement pallet) and the doors between the exit vestibule and the ambient air 
(outside). 
20. Doors between the exit vestibule and the ambient air (outside) close on the WP 
transporter (holding the loaded, sealed WP on a pallet). 
21. Derailment of a WP transporter in the exit vestibule, WP transporter vestibule, or 
WP loadout cell followed by a load tipover or fall. 
22. Drop of a heavy load from the maintenance crane in the WP loadout crane park cell 
onto a loaded, sealed WP. 
Fires: 
1. Electrical fire associated with the WP loadout cell, the WP transporter vestibule, or 
the exit vestibule (including the WP collar removal machine, the tilting machine, and 
the WP turntable). 
2. Electrical fire associated with a trolley holding a sealed WP. 
3. Electrical fire associated with the WP loadout cell overhead bridge crane. 
See prior page. 

Table III-2. Identification of Seismically Initiated Potential Events (Continued) 
Functional Areas a 
Internal Events That Could Be Initiated by Seismic Event a,b,c 
Potential Seismically-Unique Events 
19. DTF: WP Loadout 
WP Loadout Cell, WP 
Transporter Vestibule, 
Exit Vestibule 
(Continued) 
Fires: 
4. Electrical fire associated with equipment on the WP transporter, including motors to 
extend the WP transporter bedplate. 
5. Electrical fire associated with the WP transporter locomotive. 
6. Intact or non-intact SNF overheating or damage to canister contents due to a loss of 
cooling resulting in excessive temperature and possible zircaloy cladding (or other 
cladding) unzipping or cladding failure due to excessive hoop stresses. 
7. Transient combustible fire in the WP loadout cell, the WP transporter vestibule, or 
the exit vestibule. 
Radiation: 
1. Radiation exposure of a facility worker and/or the offsite public. 
2. Loss of confinement zone due to ventilation system malfunction or other breach of a 
confinement barrier leading to a release of airborne radiation. 
3. Inadvertent opening of a shield door, leading to a worker exposure. 
4. Inadvertent opening of the WP transporter shielded enclosure doors, leading to a 
worker exposure. 
5. N/S 
Criticality: 
1. Criticality associated with a trolley holding a loaded, sealed WP derailment followed 
by a load tipover or fall and a rearrangement of the container internals. 
2. Criticality associated with a drop, slap down, or collision of a loaded, sealed WP and 
a rearrangement of the container internals. 
3. Criticality associated with a WP transporter derailment followed by a load tipover or 
fall and rearrangement of the WP internals. 
See prior page. 

Table III-2. Identification of Seismically Initiated Potential Events (Continued) 
Functional Areas a 
Internal Events That Could Be Initiated by Seismic Event a,b,c 
Potential Seismically-Unique Events 
20. DTF: WP 
Remediation 
DPC Cutting/WP Dry 
Remediation Cell 
Drops, Slap Downs, Collisions: 
1. Collision involving the trolley holding a loaded, partially sealed WP (WP with a 
known weld defect) and the shield doors between the WP handling and staging cell 
and the WP/trolley decontamination room or the doors between the WP/trolley 
decontamination room and the DPC cutting/WP dry remediation cell. 
2. Shield doors between the WP handling and staging cell and the WP/trolley 
decontamination room or the doors between the WP/trolley decontamination room 
and the DPC cutting/WP dry remediation cell close on the trolley holding a loaded, 
partially sealed WP (WP with a known weld defect). 
3. Derailment of a trolley holding a loaded, partially sealed WP (WP with a known weld 
defect) followed by a load tipover or fall in the DPC cutting/WP dry remediation cell. 
4. Drop of a loaded, partially sealed WP (WP with a known weld defect) from the DPC 
cutting/WP dry remediation cell overhead crane onto the floor during the transfer 
from the trolley to the cutting machine base. 
5. Drop of a loaded, partially sealed WP (WP with a known weld defect) from the DPC 
cutting/WP dry remediation cell overhead crane onto the cutting machine base 
during the transfer from the trolley to the cutting machine base. 
6. Drop or collision of a loaded, partially sealed WP (WP with a known weld defect) 
from the DPC cutting/WP dry remediation cell overhead crane onto or against a 
sharp object during transfer from the trolley to the cutting machine base. 
7. Drop or collision of equipment (including a lifting yoke) from the DPC cutting/WP dry 
remediation cell overhead crane onto or against a loaded, partially sealed WP (WP 
with a known weld defect). 
8. Drop or collision of the WP/canister cutting machine onto or against the defective 
WP during the lowering of the machine for the lid-cutting operation. 
9. Damage to the WP contents (fuel assembly[ies], canisters, etc.) during lid-cutting 
operations. 
10. Drop or collision of the WP/canister cutting machine onto or against the defective 
WP during the removal of the machine after the lid-cutting operation. 
11. Drop of a severed lid (outer, middle, or inner) back onto the WP from an overhead 
crane during, or after, the completion of the WP cutting. 
12. Drop or collision of handling equipment (lid grapple) onto or against the unsealed 
(open), loaded WP. 
Seismically-Unique: 
Collapse of structure. 
Failure of equipment supports. 
Failure of shield walls, view ports or 
shield doors to protect against 
radiation. 
Failure of airlock doors, or view ports 
to provide airborne confinement. 
Failure/collapse of crane. 

Table III-2. Identification of Seismically Initiated Potential Events (Continued) 
Functional Areas a 
Internal Events That Could Be Initiated by Seismic Event a,b,c 
Potential Seismically-Unique Events 
20. DTF: WP 
Remediation 
DPC Cutting/WP Dry 
Remediation Cell 
(Continued) 
Drops, Slap Downs, Collisions: 
13. Drop of an unsealed (open), loaded WP from the overhead crane in the DPC 
cutting/WP dry remediation cell onto the floor during the transfer of the WP from the 
cutting machine base to the trolley that travels to the unloading port to the waste 
transfer cell. 
14. Drop of an unsealed (open), loaded WP from the overhead crane in the DPC 
cutting/WP dry remediation cell onto the trolley during the transfer of the WP from 
the cutting machine base to the trolley that travels to the unloading port to the waste 
transfer cell. 
15. Drop or collision of an unsealed (open), loaded WP from the overhead crane in the 
DPC cutting/WP dry remediation cell onto or against a sharp object during transfer 
of the WP from the cutting machine base to the trolley that travels to the unloading 
port to the waste transfer cell. 
16. Slap down of an unsealed (open), loaded WP following a drop from the overhead 
crane in the DPC cutting/WP dry remediation cell onto the edge of a pedestal or 
impact limiter on/near the trolley that travels to the unloading port to the waste 
transfer cell during the lift and transfer to the trolley. 
17. Derailment of a trolley (that travels to the unloading port to the waste transfer cell) 
holding a loaded WP (in an opened state) in the DPC cutting/WP dry remediation 
cell followed by a load tipover or fall. 
18. Drop or collision of an SNF assembly from the spent fuel transfer machine into or 
against the WP. 
19. Drop or collision of an SNF assembly from the spent fuel transfer machine onto or 
against another SNF assembly or assemblies in the WP. 
20. Impact due to horizontal movement of an SNF assembly by the spent fuel transfer 
machine before the assembly is fully lifted out of the WP. 
21. Drop and slap down of an SNF assembly from the spent fuel transfer machine (due 
to impact with an edge of the WP, floor edge, WP internal baffle, etc.) during the 
transfer of the SNF assemblies to a WP or staging rack. 
22. Drop or collision of a NSNF canister, a DOE HLW canister, a DOE SNF canister, or 
a DOE SNF MCO from the waste transfer cell overhead crane back into or against 
the WP being unloaded. 
See prior page. 

Table III-2. Identification of Seismically Initiated Potential Events (Continued) 
Functional Areas a 
Internal Events That Could Be Initiated by Seismic Event a,b,c 
Potential Seismically-Unique Events 
20. DTF: WP 
Remediation 
DPC Cutting/WP Dry 
Remediation Cell 
(Continued) 
Drops, Slap Downs, Collisions: 
23. Impact due to horizontal of a NSNF canister, a DOE HLW canister, a DOE SNF 
canister, or a DOE SNF MCO with the waste transfer cell overhead crane before the 
canister is completely removed from the WP. 
24. Drop or collision of a DOE HLW canister from the waste transfer cell crane back 
onto or against, another DOE HLW canister, a DOE SNF canister, or a DOE SNF 
MCO in a WP 
25. Drop or collision of a DOE SNF canister from the waste transfer cell crane onto or 
against, a DOE HLW canister in the WP. 
26. Drop or collision of a DOE SNF MCO from the waste transfer cell crane onto or 
against, another DOE SNF MCO or a DOE HLW canister in the WP. 
27. Drop and slap down of a DOE HLW canister, a DOE SNF MCO, a DOE SNF 
canister, or a NSNF canister from the waste transfer cell overhead crane (due to 
impact with an edge of the WP, floor edge, WP internal baffle, etc.) during the 
transfer from the WP to a new WP, MSC, or staging rack (if applicable). 
28. Drop or collision of handling equipment into or against an opened WP filled with 
SNF assemblies. 
29. Drop or collision of handling equipment into or against an opened WP loaded with a 
NSNF canister, DOE HLW canisters, and/or DOE SNF canisters, and/or DOE SNF 
MCOs 
Fires: 
1. Electrical fire associated with SNF and HLW handling equipment in the DPC 
cutting/WP dry remediation cell (including the overhead cranes, overhead 
manipulators, the chipless cutting equipment, etc.). 
2. Electrical fire associated with the trolley. 
3. Intact or non-intact SNF overheating or damage to canister contents due to a loss of 
cooling resulting in excessive temperature and possible zircaloy cladding (or other 
cladding) unzipping or cladding failure due to excessive hoop stresses. 
4. N/S 
5. Transient combustible fire in the DPC cutting/WP dry remediation cell. 
See prior page. 

Table III-2. Identification of Seismically Initiated Potential Events (Continued) 
Functional Areas a 
Internal Events That Could Be Initiated by Seismic Event a,b,c 
Potential Seismically-Unique Events 
20. DTF: WP 
Remediation 
DPC Cutting/WP Dry 
Remediation Cell 
(Continued) 
Radiation: 
1. Radiation exposure of a facility worker and/or the offsite public. 
2. Damage or rupture of the WP sampling and purging system, leading to a release of 
WP internal gases and radioactive material. 
3. Loss of confinement zone due to ventilation system malfunction or other breach of a 
confinement barrier leading to a release of airborne radiation. 
4. Thermal expansion of gases or other loss of confinement in an unsealed cask, 
leading to radiological release. 
5. N/S 
Criticality: 
1. Criticality associated with a trolley (holding a partially sealed WP being unloaded 
requiring remediation) derailment followed by a load tipover or fall and a 
rearrangement of the container internals. 
2. Criticality associated with a drop of an SNF assembly from the waste transfer cell 
spent fuel transfer machine back into the WP being unloaded and a rearrangement 
of the WP internals. 
3. Criticality associated with a drop of an SNF assembly from the spent fuel transfer 
machine back into a WP being unloaded and a rearrangement of the fuel rods that 
comprise the assembly due to impact. 
4. Criticality associated with a drop or slap down of a WP from the DPC cutting/WP dry 
remediation cell overhead crane and a rearrangement of the container internals. 
5. Criticality associated with a drop or slap down of a NSNF canister, a DOE SNF 
canister, a DOE SNF MCO, or a DOE HLW canister from the waste transfer cell 
overhead crane during WP unloading. 
6. Criticality associated with a trolley (holding an unsealed, open WP) derailment 
followed by a load tipover or fall and a rearrangement of the container internals. 
7. Criticality associated with the drop of heavy equipment onto an unsealed, open WP 
and a rearrangement of the container internals. 
See prior page. 

Table III-2. Identification of Seismically Initiated Potential Events (Continued) 
Functional Areas a 
Internal Events That Could Be Initiated by Seismic Event a,b,c 
Potential Seismically-Unique Events 
21. DTF: Dry 
Remediation 
Cask Docking/Dry 
Remediation Room, 
Tool Spare Transfer 
Room, DPC Cutting/WP 
Dry Remediation Cell 
Drops, Slap Downs, Collisions: 
1. Collision involving the trolley holding the cask or MSC requiring remediation and the 
shield doors between the cask and MSC docking room and the cask/MSC turntable 
room, the cask/MSC turntable room and the cask preparation room, the cask 
preparation room and the DPC preparation/cask dry remediation room, the DPC 
preparation/dry remediation room and the cask docking/dry remediation room, or 
the cask docking/dry remediation room and the tool spare transfer room. 
2. Shield doors between the cask and MSC docking room and the cask/MSC turntable 
room, the cask/MSC turntable room and the cask preparation room, the cask 
preparation room and the DPC preparation/cask dry remediation room, the DPC 
preparation/dry remediation room and the cask docking/dry remediation room, or 
the cask docking/dry remediation room and the tool spare transfer room close on 
the trolley holding the cask or MSC requiring remediation. 
3. Derailment of a trolley in the cask and MSC docking room, the cask/MSC turntable 
room, the cask preparation room, the DPC preparation/cask dry remediation room, 
the cask docking/dry remediation room, or the tool spare transfer room while 
holding a cask or MSC, followed by a load tipover or fall. 
4. Drop or collision of tools or equipment onto or against a cask or MSC requiring 
remediation. 
5. Collision involving an access platform or a mobile elevating platform (if required) 
and a cask or MSC requiring remediation. 
6. Collision of a trolley holding the cask or MSC requiring remediation with another 
trolley holding a cask or MSC on the turntable in the DPC docking room or on the 
tracks leading to the cask docking/dry remediation room or tool spare transfer room. 
7. Drop or collision of a docking port (mobile slab) onto or against a cask or MSC. 
8. Drop or collision of a docking port plug onto or against a cask lid or MSC lid (with 
outer lid removed [if applicable] and inner lid unbolted but in place). 
9. Drop of an inner lid on a cask or MSC (with outer lid removed [if applicable]). 
10. Drop or collision of a grapple or other handling equipment into or against an open 
cask or MSC loaded with SNF assemblies, a DPC, a DOE HLW canister, a DOE 
SNF MCO, or a DOE SNF canister. 
11. Drop or collision of an SNF assembly from the DPC cutting/WP dry remediation cell 
crane back into or against a cask or MSC being unloaded 
Seismically-Unique: 
Collapse of structure. 
Failure of equipment supports. 
Failure of shield walls, view ports or 
shield doors to protect against 
radiation. 
Failure of airlock doors, or view ports 
to provide airborne confinement. 
Failure/collapse of crane. 

Table III-2. Identification of Seismically Initiated Potential Events (Continued) 
Functional Areas a 
Internal Events That Could Be Initiated by Seismic Event a,b,c 
Potential Seismically-Unique Events 
21. DTF: Dry 
Remediation 
Cask Docking/Dry 
Remediation Room, 
Tool Spare Transfer 
Room, DPC Cutting/WP 
Dry Remediation Cell 
(Continued) 
Drops, Slap Downs, Collisions: 
12. Drop or collision of an SNF assembly from the DPC cutting/WP dry remediation cell 
crane onto or against another SNF assembly in a cask or MSC. 
13. Impact due to horizontal movement of an SNF assembly by the DPC cutting/WP dry 
remediation cell crane before the assembly is completely removed from the cask or 
MSC. 
14. Drop of an SNF assembly from the DPC cutting/WP dry remediation cell crane onto 
the DPC cutting/WP dry remediation cell floor. 
15. Collision involving an SNF assembly suspended from the DPC cutting/WP dry 
remediation cell crane with equipment located in the DPC cutting/WP dry 
remediation cell or on the cell floor (such as lid lifting equipment). 
16. Drop or collision of an SNF assembly from the DPC cutting/WP dry remediation cell 
crane onto or against a sharp object. 
17. Drop or collision of an SNF assembly from the DPC cutting/WP dry remediation cell 
crane into or against an empty basket located on a trolley in the DPC cutting/WP 
dry remediation cell. 
18. Drop and slap down of an SNF assembly from the DPC cutting/WP dry remediation 
cell crane (due to impact with an edge of the cask, MSC, basket, floor edge, basket 
internal baffle, etc.) during the transfer from the cask or MSC to a basket on a trolley 
in the DPC cutting/WP dry remediation cell. 
19. Drop or collision of a SNF assembly from the DPC cutting/WP dry remediation cell 
crane onto or against one or more SNF assemblies in a basket on a trolley in the 
DPC cutting/WP dry remediation cell. 
20. Drop or collision of a DPC, a DOE HLW canister, a DOE SNF canister, or a DOE 
SNF MCO from the DPC cutting/WP dry remediation cell crane back into or against 
the cask or MSC being unloaded, as applicable. 
21. Drop or collision of a DPC, a DOE HLW canister, a DOE SNF canister, or a DOE 
SNF MCO from the DPC cutting/WP dry remediation cell crane back onto or against 
a DPC, a DOE HLW canister, a DOE SNF canister, or a DOE SNF MCO in the cask 
or MSC, as applicable. 
22. Impact due to horizontal of a DPC, a DOE HLW canister, a DOE SNF canister, or a 
DOE SNF MCO with the DPC cutting/WP dry remediation cell crane before the 
canister is completely removed from the cask or MSC, as applicable. 
See prior page. 

Table III-2. Identification of Seismically Initiated Potential Events (Continued) 
Functional Areas a 
Internal Events That Could Be Initiated by Seismic Event a,b,c 
Potential Seismically-Unique Events 
21. DTF: Dry 
Remediation 
Cask Docking/Dry 
Remediation Room, 
Tool Spare Transfer 
Room, DPC Cutting/WP 
Dry Remediation Cell 
(Continued) 
Drops, Slap Downs, Collisions: 
23 Drop and slap down of a DPC, a DOE HLW canister, a DOE SNF MCO, or a DOE 
SNF canister from the DPC cutting/WP dry remediation cell crane (due to impact 
with an edge of the cask, MSC, floor edge, basket internal baffle, etc.) during the 
transfer from the cask or MSC (as applicable) to a basket on a trolley in the DPC 
cutting/WP dry remediation cell. 
24 Drop or collision of a DPC, a DOE HLW canister, a DOE SNF canister, or a DOE 
SNF MCO from the DPC cutting/WP dry remediation cell crane onto or against a 
sharp object. 
25. Collision involving a DPC, a DOE HLW canister, a DOE SNF canister, or a DOE 
SNF MCO suspended from the DPC cutting/WP dry remediation cell crane with 
equipment located in the DPC cutting/WP dry remediation cell or on the cell floor. 
26. Drop of a DPC, a DOE HLW canister, a DOE SNF canister, or a DOE SNF MCO 
from the DPC cutting/WP dry remediation cell crane onto the DPC cutting/WP dry 
remediation cell floor. 
27. Drop or collision of a DPC, a DOE HLW canister, a DOE SNF canister, or a DOE 
SNF MCO from the DPC cutting/WP dry remediation cell crane into or against an 
empty basket on a trolley in the DPC cutting/WP dry remediation cell. 
28. Drop or collision of a DOE HLW canister from the DPC cutting/WP dry remediation 
cell crane onto or against another DOE HLW canister, a DOE SNF canister or a 
DOE SNF MCO in a basket on a trolley in the DPC cutting/WP dry remediation cell. 
29. Drop or collision of a DOE SNF canister from the DPC cutting/WP dry remediation 
cell crane onto or against a DOE HLW canister in a basket on a trolley in the DPC 
cutting/WP dry remediation cell. 
30. Drop or collision of a DOE SNF MCO from the DPC cutting/WP dry remediation cell 
crane onto or against another DOE SNF MCO or a DOE HLW canister in a basket 
on a trolley in the DPC cutting/WP dry remediation cell. 
31. Drop or collision of handling equipment from the DPC cutting/WP dry remediation 
cell crane into or against a basket on a trolley in the DPC cutting/WP dry 
remediation cell filled with SNF assemblies. 
32. Drop or collision of handling equipment from the DPC cutting/WP dry remediation 
cell crane into or against a basket on a trolley in the DPC cutting/WP dry 
remediation cell loaded with DOE HLW canisters, and/or a DOE SNF canister, 
and/or DOE SNF MCOs, as applicable. 
See prior page. 

Table III-2. Identification of Seismically Initiated Potential Events (Continued) 
Functional Areas a 
Internal Events That Could Be Initiated by Seismic Event a,b,c 
Potential Seismically-Unique Events 
21. DTF: Dry 
Remediation 
Cask Docking/Dry 
Remediation Room, 
Tool Spare Transfer 
Room, DPC Cutting/WP 
Dry Remediation Cell 
(Continued) 
Drops, Slap Downs, Collisions: 
33. Drop or collision of handling equipment from the DPC cutting/WP dry remediation 
cell crane into or against a basket on a trolley in the DPC cutting/WP dry 
remediation cell loaded with a DPC (if not emptied). 
34. Derailment of a trolley (that travels to the unloading port to the waste transfer cell) 
holding a loaded basket containing SNF assemblies in the DPC cutting/WP dry 
remediation cell, followed by a load tipover or fall. 
35. Derailment of a trolley (that travels to the unloading port to the waste transfer cell) 
holding a loaded basket containing a DPC (if not emptied), or a combination of DOE 
HLW canisters, DOE SNF canisters, or DOE SNF MCOs in the DPC cutting/WP dry 
remediation cell, followed by a load tipover or fall. 
36. Drop or collision of a load port cover from the waste transfer cell crane onto or 
against a loaded basket on a trolley that is being unloaded. 
37. Drop or collision of a SNF assembly from the spent fuel transfer machine back into 
or against the basket on a trolley. 
38. Impact due to a horizontal movement of a SNF assembly by the spent fuel transfer 
machine before the assembly is fully lifted out of the basket on a trolley. 
39. Drop and slap down of an SNF assembly from the spent fuel transfer machine (due 
to impact with an edge of the basket, the floor edge, a basket internal baffle, etc.) 
during the SNF transfer from the basket on the trolley to a WP or staging rack. 
40. Drop or collision of a DPC (if not emptied), a DOE HLW canister, a DOE SNF 
canister, or a DOE SNF MCO from the waste transfer cell overhead crane back into 
or against the basket on a trolley being unloaded. 
41. Impact due to a horizontal movement of a DPC (if not emptied), a DOE HLW 
canister, a DOE SNF canister, or DOE SNF MCO with the waste transfer cell 
overhead crane before the canister is completely removed from the basket on a 
trolley. 
42. Drop or collision of a DOE HLW canister from the waste transfer cell crane back 
onto or against another DOE HLW canister, a DOE SNF canister, or a DOE SNF 
MCO in the basket on a trolley. 
43. Drop or collision of a DOE SNF canister from the waste transfer cell crane onto or 
against a DOE HLW canister in the basket on a trolley. 
44. Drop or collision of a DOE SNF MCO from the waste transfer cell crane onto or 
against another DOE SNF MCO or a DOE HLW canister in the basket on a trolley. 
See prior page. 

Table III-2. Identification of Seismically Initiated Potential Events (Continued) 
Functional Areas a 
Internal Events That Could Be Initiated by Seismic Event a,b,c 
Potential Seismically-Unique Events 
21. DTF: Dry 
Remediation 
Cask Docking/Dry 
Remediation Room, 
Tool Spare Transfer 
Room, DPC Cutting/WP 
Dry Remediation Cell 
(Continued) 
Drops, Slap Downs, Collisions: 
45. Drop and slap down of a DOE HLW canister, a DOE SNF MCO, or a DOE SNF 
canister from the waste transfer cell overhead crane (due to impact with an edge of 
the basket, floor edge, basket internal baffle, etc.) during the transfer from the 
basket on a trolley to a new WP or staging rack (if applicable). 
46. Drop or collision of handling equipment from the spent fuel transfer machine into or 
against a basket on a trolley filled with SNF assemblies. 
47. Drop or collision of handling equipment from the waste transfer cell overhead crane 
into or against a basket on a trolley loaded with DOE HLW canisters, and/or DOE 
SNF canisters, and/or DOE SNF MCOs, as applicable. 
Fires: 
1. Electrical fire associated with tools or SNF and HLW handling equipment in the cask 
docking/dry remediation room, the tool spare transfer room, or the DPC cutting/WP 
dry remediation cell (including the overhead cranes, overhead manipulators, etc.). 
2. Intact or non-intact SNF overheating or damage to canister contents due to a loss of 
cooling resulting in excessive temperature and possible zircaloy cladding (or other 
cladding) unzipping or cladding failure due to excessive hoop stresses. 
3. N/S 
4. Transient combustible fire in the cask and MSC docking room, the cask/MSC 
turntable room, the cask preparation room, the DPC preparation/cask dry 
remediation room, the cask docking/dry remediation room, the tool spare transfer 
room, or the DPC cutting/WP dry remediation cell. 
5. Electrical fire associated with the trolley. 
6. Fire/explosion (battery/electrical fire) associated with a mobile elevating platform. 
Radiation: 
1. Radiation exposure of a facility worker and/or the offsite public. 
2. Damage or rupture of the cask and MSC sampling and purging system, leading to a 
release of canister internal gases and radioactive material. 
3. Loss of confinement zone due to ventilation system malfunction or other breach of a 
confinement barrier leading to a release of airborne radiation. 
4. Thermal expansion of gases or other loss of confinement in an unsealed cask or 
MSC, leading to radiological release. 
See prior page. 

Table III-2. Identification of Seismically Initiated Potential Events (Continued) 
Functional Areas a 
Internal Events That Could Be Initiated by Seismic Event a,b,c 
Potential Seismically-Unique Events 
21. DTF: Dry 
Remediation 
Cask Docking/Dry 
Remediation Room, 
Tool Spare Transfer 
Room, DPC Cutting/WP 
Dry Remediation Cell 
(Continued) 
Radiation: 
5. N/S 
Criticality: 
1. Criticality associated with a trolley derailment (holding a cask or MSC requiring 
remediation) followed by a load tipover or fall and a rearrangement of the container 
internals. 
2. Criticality associated with a drop of an SNF assembly from the DPC cutting/WP dry 
remediation cell crane back into the cask or MSC being unloaded or drop into a 
basket on a trolley being unloaded and a rearrangement of the cask, MSC, or 
basket internals. 
3. Criticality associated with a drop or slap down of a NSNF canister, a DOE SNF 
canister, a DOE SNF MCO, or a DOE HLW canister from DPC cutting/WP dry 
remediation cell crane during cask or MSC unloading or basket on a trolley loading 
(as applicable). 
4. Criticality associated with a trolley (holding a basket containing SNF assemblies, a 
NSNF canister, or various combinations of DOE SNF canisters, DOE SNF MCOs, 
or DOE HLW canisters) derailment followed by a load tipover or fall and a 
rearrangement of the basket contents. 
5. Criticality associated with a drop of an SNF assembly from the spent fuel transfer 
machine back into the basket on a trolley being unloaded and a rearrangement of 
the basket contents. 
6. Criticality associated with a drop of an SNF assembly from the DPC cutting/WP dry 
remediation cell crane back into the cask or MSC being unloaded or onto the DPC 
cutting/WP dry remediation cell floor and a rearrangement of the fuel rods that 
comprise the assembly due to impact. 
7. Criticality associated with a drop or slap down of a NSNF canister, a DOE SNF 
canister, a DOE SNF MCO, or a DOE HLW canister from waste transfer cell crane 
during the unloading of the basket on a trolley (as applicable). 
8. Criticality associated with the drop of heavy equipment (lifting fixture, etc.) onto a 
basket on a trolley and a rearrangement of the basket contents. 
See prior page. 

Table III-2. Identification of Seismically Initiated Potential Events (Continued) 
Functional Areas a 
Internal Events That Could Be Initiated by Seismic Event a,b,c 
Potential Seismically-Unique Events 
22. DTF: Wet 
Remediation 
Cask Wet Remediation / 
Laydown Area, Cask 
Wet Remediation 
Entrance Vestibule 
Drops, Slap Downs, Collisions: 
1. Collision involving the trolley (holding the cask or MSC to be remediated) and the 
doors to the cask wet remediation entrance vestibule, the shield doors between the 
cask wet remediation entrance vestibule and the cask wet remediation/laydown 
area, or the shield doors between the DPC docking room and the cask wet 
remediation/laydown area. 
2. Doors to the cask wet remediation entrance vestibule, the shield doors between the 
cask wet remediation entrance vestibule and the cask wet remediation/laydown 
area, or the shield doors between the DPC docking room and the cask wet 
remediation/laydown area close on the trolley (holding the cask or MSC to be 
remediated). 
3. Derailment of a trolley in the wet remediation entrance vestibule or the cask wet 
remediation/laydown area while holding a cask or MSC to be remediated, followed 
by a load tipover or fall. 
4. SRTC derailment involving a loaded cask (with or without impact limiters installed) 
or MSC. 
5. Collision of an SRTC carrying a loaded cask (with or without impact limiters 
installed) or MSC with the cask wet remediation entrance vestibule doors or the 
cask wet remediation/laydown area shield doors. 
6. Cask wet remediation entrance vestibule doors or the cask wet 
remediation/laydown area shield doors close on an SRTC carrying a loaded cask 
(with or without impact limiters installed) or MSC. 
7. Collision of a mobile elevating platform with a loaded cask or MSC during removal 
of personnel barriers and impact limiters (if applicable) or during survey activities. 
8. Drop or collision of personnel barriers or impact limiters from the cask wet 
remediation/laydown area crane onto or against a loaded cask (if applicable). 
9. Slap-down of a loaded cask onto an SRTC during upending of the loaded cask to 
the vertical orientation. 
10. Drop and slap-down of a loaded MSC onto an SRTC or the floor during the lift of the 
loaded MSC off of the SRTC. 
11. Drop of a loaded cask or MSC from the overhead bridge crane onto the floor during 
transfer from the trolley or SRTC to the cask decontamination pit/cask preparation 
pit. 
Seismically-Unique: 
Collapse of structure. 
Collapse/fracture of pool wall(s) / liner. 
Failure of equipment supports. 
Failure of shield walls, or shield doors 
to protect against radiation. 
Failure of airlock doors, or view ports 
to provide airborne confinement. 
Failure/collapse of wet remediation 
fuel handling machine into pool. 
Failure/collapse of crane(s). 
(Rapid) failure of pool water supply 
system. 
Possible 2 over 1: 
Failure of 20 ton crane onto other 
equipment (including 200 ton crane). 
Failure of walkway onto other SSCs] 

Table III-2. Identification of Seismically Initiated Potential Events (Continued) 
Functional Areas a 
Internal Events That Could Be Initiated by Seismic Event a,b,c 
Potential Seismically-Unique Events 
22. DTF: Wet 
Remediation 
Cask Wet Remediation / 
Laydown Area, Cask 
Wet Remediation 
Entrance Vestibule 
(Continued) 
Drops, Slap Downs, Collisions: 
12. Drop or collision of a loaded cask or MSC from the overhead bridge crane onto or 
against a sharp object during transfer from the trolley or SRTC to the cask 
decontamination pit/cask prep pit. 
13. Drop or collision of a loaded cask or MSC from the overhead bridge crane into or 
against the cask decontamination pit/cask prep pit during transfer from the trolley or 
SRTC to the cask decontamination pit/cask prep pit. 
14. Tipover or slap down of a loaded cask or MSC from the overhead bridge crane into 
the cask decontamination pit/cask prep pit or onto the floor due to contact with the 
pit ledge or access platform during transfer from the trolley or SRTC to the cask 
decontamination pit/cask prep pit. 
15. Drop or collision of handling equipment (including the cask lifting yoke, cask skirt, 
cask skirt lifting beam, and cask immersion rod) onto or against the cask or MSC 
before or after transfer of the cask to the cask decontamination pit/cask prep pit. 
16. Collision involving an access platform and a cask or MSC in the cask 
decontamination pit/cask prep pit. 
17. Drop or collision of the cask lid bolt detorque machine or other cask prep equipment 
with or against a loaded cask or MSC or cask or MSC inner lid (including a lid-lifting 
fixture, cask gas sample/purge system equipment, cask cool-down equipment, etc.). 
18. Drop of a cask or MSC outer lid from the overhead crane onto the cask or MSC. 
19. Drop or collision of a loaded cask or MSC from the overhead bridge crane back into 
or against a pit during transfer from the cask decontamination pit/cask prep pit into 
the pool. 
20. Drop of a loaded cask or MSC from the overhead bridge crane onto the cell floor 
during transfer from the cask decontamination pit/cask prep pit into the pool. 
21. Drop of a loaded cask or MSC from the overhead bridge crane onto or against a 
sharp object during transfer from the cask decontamination pit/cask prep pit into the 
pool. 
22. Drop of a loaded cask or MSC from the overhead bridge crane onto the pool floor 
during transfer from the cask decontamination pit/cask prep pit into the pool. 
23. Drop or collision of a loaded cask or MSC from the overhead bridge crane onto or 
against an empty cask or MSC already in the pool during transfer from the cask 
decontamination pit/cask prep pit into the pool. 
See prior page. 

Table III-2. Identification of Seismically Initiated Potential Events (Continued) 
Functional Areas a 
Internal Events That Could Be Initiated by Seismic Event a,b,c 
Potential Seismically-Unique Events 
22. DTF: Wet 
Remediation 
Cask Wet Remediation / 
Laydown Area, Cask 
Wet Remediation 
Entrance Vestibule 
(Continued) 
Drops, Slap Downs, Collisions: 
24. Tipover or slap down of a loaded cask or MSC from the overhead bridge crane (due 
to impact with the pool edge or ledge/wall in the pool) into the pool during transfer 
from the cask decontamination pit/cask prep pit into the pool. 
25. Drop or collision of handling equipment (or other equipment, including an immersion 
rod) onto or against the lid of a loaded cask or MSC positioned in the pool prior to, 
or after, the cask or MSC lid removal or installation process, respectively. 
26. Collision involving a lid suspended in the pool from the fuel transfer machine 
removing (or installing) the cask or MSC lid during the lid removal (or installation) 
process in the pool. 
27. Drop of a cask or MSC inner lid onto or into a loaded cask or MSC from the fuel 
transfer machine during the lid removal (or installation) process in the pool. 
28. Drop or collision of an empty cask or MSC from the overhead bridge crane onto or 
against the cask or MSC already in the pool (to be unloaded) during the lowering of 
the empty cask or MSC into the pool. 
29. Drop or collision of the cask or MSC lid from the empty cask or MSC onto or against 
the unsealed (open) cask to be unloaded. 
30. Drop or collision of an empty SNF basket onto or against the cask to be unloaded. 
31. Drop or collision of an empty or full canister for damaged SNF onto or against the 
cask being unloaded. 
32. Drop or collision of an empty or full canister for damaged onto or against the empty 
or full SNF basket being loaded). 
33. Drop of an SNF assembly onto the pool floor while suspended from the fuel transfer 
machine during transfer from the cask to the SNF basket or to the empty cask or 
MSC in the pool. 
34. Drop or collision of an SNF assembly onto or against a sharp object while 
suspended from the fuel transfer machine during transfer from the cask to the SNF 
basket or to the empty cask or MSC in the pool. 
35. Drop or collision of an SNF assembly back into or against the cask or MSC being 
unloaded while suspended from the fuel transfer machine during transfer from the 
cask to the SNF basket or to the empty cask or MSC in the pool. 
36. Drop or collision of an SNF assembly onto or against another assembly or 
assemblies in the cask while suspended from the fuel transfer machine during 
transfer from the cask to the SNF basket or to the empty cask or MSC (n the pool. 
See prior page. 

Table III-2. Identification of Seismically Initiated Potential Events (Continued) 
Functional Areas a 
Internal Events That Could Be Initiated by Seismic Event a,b,c 
Potential Seismically-Unique Events 
22. DTF: Wet 
Remediation 
Cask Wet Remediation / 
Laydown Area, Cask 
Wet Remediation 
Entrance Vestibule 
(Continued) 
Drops, Slap Downs, Collisions: 
37. Impact due to Impact due to horizontal of an SNF assembly by the fuel transfer 
machine before the assembly is fully lifted out of the cask or MSC. 
38. Drop or collision of an SNF assembly into or against the empty SNF basket in the 
pool while suspended from the fuel transfer machine during transfer from the cask 
to an empty location in the SNF basket. 
39. Drop or collision of an SNF assembly onto or against another fuel assembly or 
assemblies in the SNF basket in the pool while suspended from the fuel transfer 
machine during transfer from the cask to an empty location in the SNF basket. 
40. Collision of the fuel transfer machine basket grapple with a filled SNF basket during 
the closing (or opening) of the SNF basket. 
41. Drop of a filled SNF basket from the fuel transfer machine onto the pool floor during 
transfer of the filled SNF basket to (or from) the pool area basket storage rack. 
42. Drop or collision of a filled SNF basket from the fuel transfer machine onto or 
against a sharp object during transfer of the filled SNF basket to (or from) the pool 
area basket storage rack. 
43. Drop or collision of a filled SNF basket from the fuel transfer machine onto, into, or 
against the cask or MSC being unloaded or loaded (containing SNF) during transfer 
of the filled SNF basket to or from the pool area basket storage rack. 
44. Drop or collision of a filled SNF basket from the fuel transfer machine onto or 
against an empty basket storage rack location during transfer of the filled SNF 
basket to (or from) the pool area basket storage rack. 
45. Drop or collision of a filled SNF basket from the fuel transfer machine onto or 
against a filled basket storage rack location (onto another filled SNF basket) during 
transfer of the filled SNF basket to (or from) the pool area basket storage rack. 
46. Drop or collision of handling equipment from the fuel transfer machine onto or 
against an SNF assembly or assemblies in the SNF basket (before or after transfer 
to pool area basket storage rack). 
47. Drop of an SNF assembly onto the pool floor while suspended from the fuel transfer 
machine during transfer to an empty cask or MSC from the SNF basket. 
48. Drop of an SNF assembly onto or against a sharp object while suspended from the 
fuel transfer machine during transfer to an empty cask or MSC from the SNF 
basket. 
49. Impact due to horizontal movement of an SNF assembly by the fuel transfer 
machine before the assembly is fully lifted out of the SNF basket. 
See prior page. 

Table III-2. Identification of Seismically Initiated Potential Events (Continued) 
Functional Areas a 
Internal Events That Could Be Initiated by Seismic Event a,b,c 
Potential Seismically-Unique Events 
22. DTF: Wet 
Remediation 
Cask Wet Remediation / 
Laydown Area, Cask 
Wet Remediation 
Entrance Vestibule 
(Continued) 
Drops, Slap Downs, Collisions: 
50. Drop or collision of an SNF assembly back into or against the SNF basket being 
unloaded in the pool while suspended from the fuel transfer machine during transfer 
to an empty cask or MSC. 
51. Drop or collision of an SNF assembly onto or against another assembly or 
assemblies in the SNF basket in the pool while suspended from the fuel transfer 
machine during transfer to an empty cask or MSC. 
52. Drop or collision of a SNF assembly into or against an empty MSC in the pool while 
suspended from the fuel transfer machine during transfer to an empty location in a 
cask or MSC from the SNF basket. 
53. Drop or collision of a SNF assembly onto or against another fuel assembly or 
assemblies inside the MSC in the pool while suspended from the fuel transfer 
machine during transfer to an empty location in a cask or MSC from the SNF 
basket. 
54. Drop or collision of an empty SNF basket onto or against a filled cask or MSC 
during movement of the empty SNF basket (after closure of the basket) back to the 
pool area basket storage rack. 
55. Drop or collision of handling equipment or a lid (or other equipment), either from the 
overhead bridge crane, maintenance crane, or from the fuel transfer machine, onto 
or against an SNF assembly or assemblies in an open unsealed cask or MSC 
positioned at the bottom of the pool. 
56. Drop or collision of handling equipment (or other equipment) from the overhead 
bridge crane onto or against a loaded cask or MSC positioned at the bottom of the 
pool after the lid has been installed, prior to removal from the pool. 
57. Drop of a loaded cask or MSC from the overhead bridge crane onto the pool floor 
during transfer from the pool to the cask decontamination pit/cask prep pit. 
58. Drop or collision of a loaded cask or MSC from the overhead bridge crane onto or 
against a sharp object in the pool during transfer out of the pool to the cask 
decontamination pit/cask prep pit. 
59. Tipover or slap down of a loaded cask or MSC into the cask decon. pit/cask prep pit 
from the overhead bridge crane due to impact with the pit edge or access platform 
in the pit during transfer from the pool to the cask decon. pit/cask prep pit. 
60. Tipover or slap down of a loaded cask or MSC into the from the overhead bridge 
crane due to impact with the pool edge or ledge/wall in the pool during transfer from 
the pool to the cask decon. pit/cask prep pit. 
See prior page. 

Table III-2. Identification of Seismically Initiated Potential Events (Continued) 
Functional Areas a 
Internal Events That Could Be Initiated by Seismic Event a,b,c 
Potential Seismically-Unique Events 
22. DTF: Wet 
Remediation 
Cask Wet Remediation / 
Laydown Area, Cask 
Wet Remediation 
Entrance Vestibule 
(Continued) 
Drops, Slap Downs, Collisions: 
61. Drop or collision of a loaded cask or MSC from the overhead bridge crane into or 
against the cask decontamination pit/cask prep pit during transfer from the pool to 
the cask decontamination pit/cask prep pit. 
62. Drop of a loaded cask or MSC from the overhead bridge crane onto the wet 
remediation area floor during transfer from the pool to the cask decon. pit/cask prep 
pit or from the cask decontamination pit/cask prep pit to a trolley. 
63. Drop of a loaded cask or MSC from the overhead bridge crane onto the trolley 
during the transfer from the cask decontamination pit/cask prep pit to a trolley. 
64. Drop or collision of a loaded cask or MSC from the overhead bridge crane onto or 
against a sharp object in the cask wet remediation/laydown area during transfer 
from the pool to the cask decontamination pit/cask prep pit or from the cask 
decontamination pit/cask prep pit to a trolley. 
65. Slap down of a loaded cask or MSC following a drop from the overhead bridge 
crane (due to contact with the edge of a trolley or trolley pedestal) during the lift 
from the cask decontamination pit/cask prep pit to the trolley. 
66. Drop or collision of an unloaded cask from the overhead bridge crane onto or 
against a loaded cask or MSC in the pool during transfer of the empty cask from the 
pool. 
67. Collision involving an access platform and a loaded cask or MSC in the cask 
decontamination pit/cask prep pit. 
68. Drop of a cask or MSC outer lid from the overhead crane onto the loaded cask or 
MSC. 
69. Drop or collision of the cask or MSC handling equipment (including the lifting yoke, 
cask skirt, cask skirt lifting beam, etc.), the lid bolt torque machine, dry vacuum 
equipment, leak test equipment, flushing equipment, etc., or other cask preparation 
or decontamination equipment, onto or against a loaded cask or MSC or cask or 
MSC inner lid. 
70. Drop or collision of handling equipment (including the cask lifting yoke) onto or 
against a cask or MSC before or after transfer of the loaded, sealed cask or MSC to 
the trolley. 
71. Derailment of a trolley holding a loaded, sealed cask or MSC followed by a load 
tipover or fall. 
See prior page. 

Table III-2. Identification of Seismically Initiated Potential Events (Continued) 
Functional Areas a 
Internal Events That Could Be Initiated by Seismic Event a,b,c 
Potential Seismically-Unique Events 
22. DTF: Wet 
Remediation 
Cask Wet Remediation / 
Laydown Area, Cask 
Wet Remediation 
Entrance Vestibule 
(Continued) 
Drops, Slap Downs, Collisions: 
72. Collision of a trolley holding a loaded, sealed, remediated cask or MSC with the 
shield doors separating the cask wet remediation/laydown area and the DPC 
docking room. 
73. Shield doors separating the cask wet remediation/laydown area and the DPC 
docking room close on a trolley holding a loaded, sealed, remediated cask or MSC. 
Fires: 
1. Electrical fires associated with the vacuum drier, pool water makeup equipment, or 
other pool-related equipment. 
2. Electrical fire associated with SNF and HLW handling equipment or other 
associated equipment in the cask wet remediation/laydown area and cask wet 
remediation entrance vestibule (including the cask lid bolt detorque device, the 
turntable, overhead manipulators, overhead bridge cranes, the fuel transfer 
machine, etc.). 
3. Fire/explosion (battery/electrical fire) associated with the trolley. 
4. Fire/explosion (battery/electrical fire) associated with the mobile elevating platform. 
5. Diesel fuel fire/explosion involving an SRTC tractor pushing an SRTC holding a 
transportation cask or MSC into the cask wet remediation entrance vestibule. 
6. Overheating of SNF due to loss of pool water, including events that could lead to 
such a loss, including the breakdown of the pool water cooling system, resulting in 
excessive cladding temperature and possible zircaloy cladding (or other cladding) 
unzipping. 
7. N/S 
8. N/S 
9. Intact or non-intact SNF overheating due to a loss of cooling resulting in excessive 
temperature and possible zircaloy cladding (or other cladding) unzipping or cladding 
failure due to excessive hoop stresses. 
10. N/S. 
11. Transient combustible fire in the cask wet remediation/laydown area or the cask wet 
remediation entrance vestibule. 
See prior page. 

Table III-2. Identification of Seismically Initiated Potential Events (Continued) 
Functional Areas a 
Internal Events That Could Be Initiated by Seismic Event a,b,c 
Potential Seismically-Unique Events 
22. DTF: Wet 
Remediation 
Cask Wet Remediation / 
Laydown Area, Cask 
Wet Remediation 
Entrance Vestibule 
(Continued) 
Radiation: 
1. Damage or rupture of the cask sampling and purging system, leading to a release of 
internal gases and radioactive material. 
2. Uncontrolled pool water drain down / fill or leak of pool cooling or water treatment 
system resulting in flooding and radioactive contamination of adjoining areas. 
3. N/S 
4. Radiation exposure of a facility worker and/or the offsite public. 
5. Loss of confinement zone due to a ventilation system malfunction or other breach of 
a confinement barrier leading to a release of radiation. 
6. N/S 
7. Thermal expansion of gases or other loss of confinement in an unsealed cask or 
MSC, leading to radiological release. 
8. N/S 
Criticality: 
1 Criticality associated with a derailment of a trolley moving a loaded cask followed by 
a load tipover or fall and a rearrangement of the container internals. 
2. Criticality associated with a derailment of an SRTC holding a loaded cask or MSC 
followed by a load tipover or fall and a rearrangement of the container internals. 
3. Criticality associated with a drop, slap down, or collision of a cask or an MSC (when 
handled with an over head crane) and a rearrangement of the container internals. 
4. Criticality associated with a drop of an SNF assembly while unloading a 
transportation cask, loading cask or MSC, or filling or emptying an SNF basket in 
the pool, and a rearrangement of SNF in the cask, MSC, or basket. 
5. Criticality associated with a drop of an SNF assembly from the fuel transfer machine 
(in the pool) and a rearrangement of the fuel rods that comprise the assembly due 
to impact. 
6. N/S. 
7. N/S 
8. Criticality associated with the drop of a spent fuel assembly basket holding several 
SNF assemblies in the pool (including a drop onto another basket) and a 
rearrangement of the contents of the basket or baskets. 
See prior page. 

Table III-2. Identification of Seismically Initiated Potential Events (Continued) 
Functional Areas a 
Internal Events That Could Be Initiated by Seismic Event a,b,c 
Potential Seismically-Unique Events 
22. DTF: Wet 
Remediation 
Cask Wet Remediation / 
Laydown Area, Cask 
Wet Remediation 
Entrance Vestibule 
(Continued) 
Criticality: 
9. Criticality associated with the drop of heavy equipment onto a loaded fuel basket 
(either a single basket or several baskets in a basket storage rack) and a 
rearrangement of the contents of the basket or baskets. 
10. Criticality associated with the drop of heavy equipment onto a loaded cask or MSC 
and a rearrangement of the container internals (either in or out of the pool). 
Contamination/Flooding: 
1. Uncontrolled pool water down resulting in flooding (including a down resulting from 
a puncture of the pool liner due to a cask drop). 
2. N/S 
3. Cask decontamination pit/cask prep pit flooding due to pool overfill, flooding, pool 
equipment malfunction, cask preparation system (cask cooling) equipment 
malfunction, etc. 
4. Uncontrolled water spill from the cask decontamination system or the cask 
preparation system (cask cooling) in the cask wet remediation/laydown area. 
5. N/S 
See prior page. 

Table III-2. Identification of Seismically Initiated Potential Events (Continued) 
Functional Areas a 
Internal Events That Could Be Initiated by Seismic Event a,b,c 
Potential Seismically-Unique Events 
23. DTF: DPC Cutting 
DPC Preparation/Cask 
Dry Remediation Room, 
DPC Docking Room, 
DPC Cutting/WP Dry 
Remediation Cell 
Drops, Slap Downs, Collisions: 
1. Collision involving the trolley holding the cask containing the loaded DPC and the 
shield doors between the cask preparation room and the DPC preparation/cask dry 
remediation room. 
2. Shield doors between the cask preparation room and the DPC preparation/cask dry 
remediation room close on the trolley holding the cask containing the loaded DPC. 
3. Derailment of a trolley in the DPC preparation/cask dry remediation room or DPC 
docking room while holding a cask containing a loaded DPC followed by a load 
tipover or fall. 
4. Drop or collision of a docking ring (or tools, or equipment) onto or against the cask 
containing the DPC. 
5. Collision involving the docking ring station or other access platforms and a cask 
containing a loaded DPC in the DPC preparation/cask dry remediation room. 
6. Collision involving a trolley holding the cask containing the loaded DPC and the 
shield doors between DPC preparation/cask dry remediation room and the DPC 
docking room. 
7. Shield doors between the DPC preparation/cask dry remediation room and the DPC 
docking room close on a trolley holding the cask containing the loaded DPC. 
8. Derailment of a trolley holding the cask containing the loaded DPC on the turntable 
in the DPC docking room followed by a load tipover or fall. 
9. Collision of a trolley holding the cask containing the loaded DPC with another trolley 
holding a cask on the turntable in the DPC docking room. 
10. Drop or collision of a docking port (mobile slab) onto or against a cask containing 
the loaded DPC. 
11. Drop or collision of a docking port plug onto or against the lid of a cask containing 
the loaded DPC (with outer lid removed [if applicable] and inner lid unbolted but in 
place). 
12. Drop of an inner lid on a cask containing the loaded DPC (with outer lid removed [if 
applicable]). 
13. Drop or collision of DPC handling device or tools or equipment onto or against the 
DPC during the drilling/installation of the DPC handling device. 
Seismically-Unique: 
Collapse of structure. 
Failure of equipment supports. 
Failure of shield walls, or shield doors 
to protect against radiation. 
Failure of airlock doors, or view ports 
to provide airborne confinement 
Failure/collapse of crane. 

Table III-2. Identification of Seismically Initiated Potential Events (Continued) 
Functional Areas a 
Internal Events That Could Be Initiated by Seismic Event a,b,c 
Potential Seismically-Unique Events 
23. DTF: DPC Cutting 
DPC Preparation / Cask 
Dry Remediation Room, 
DPC Docking Room, 
DPC Cutting / WP Dry 
Remediation Cell 
(Continued) 
Drops, Slap Downs, Collisions: 
14. Drop or collision of a loaded DPC from the DPC Cutting/WP Dry Remediation Cell 
overhead crane through the unload port back into or against the transportation cask 
being unloaded during the DPC transfer from the transportation cask to the DPC 
cutting/WP dry remediation cell cutting machine base. 
15. Drop of a loaded DPC from the DPC Cutting/WP Dry Remediation Cell overhead 
crane onto the floor during DPC transfer from the transportation cask to the DPC 
cutting/WP dry remediation cell cutting machine base. 
16. Drop of a loaded DPC from the DPC Cutting/WP Dry Remediation Cell overhead 
crane onto the cutting machine base during DPC transfer from the transportation 
cask to the DPC cutting/WP dry remediation cell cutting machine base. 
17. Drop or collision of a loaded DPC from the DPC Cutting/WP Dry Remediation Cell 
overhead crane onto or against a sharp object during DPC transfer from the 
transportation cask to the DPC cutting/WP dry remediation cell cutting machine 
base. 
18. Drop or collision of the lid-cutting machine onto or against the DPC during the 
lowering of the machine for the lid-cutting operation. 
19. Damage to one or more fuel assembly(ies) during lid-cutting operations or the DPC 
drainpipe cutting operation. 
20. Drop or collision of the DPC cutting machine onto or against the open (lidless) DPC 
during the removal of the machine after the lid-cutting operation. 
21. Drop or collision of the severed lid back onto or against the open DPC from the 
ceiling-mounted manipulator or overhead crane after the completion of the DPC lidcutting. 
22. Drop or collision of handling equipment (lid grapple, etc.) onto or against the 
unsealed (open) loaded DPC. 
23. Drop of an unsealed (open), loaded DPC from the overhead crane in the DPC 
cutting/WP dry remediation cell onto the floor during the transfer of the DPC from 
the DPC cutting machine base to the trolley that travels to the unloading port to the 
waste transfer cell. 
24. Drop of an unsealed (open), loaded DPC from the overhead crane in the DPC 
cutting/WP dry remediation cell onto the trolley during the transfer of the DPC from 
the DPC cutting machine base to the trolley that travels to the unloading port to the 
waste transfer cell. 
See prior page. 

Table III-2. Identification of Seismically Initiated Potential Events (Continued) 
Functional Areas a 
Internal Events That Could Be Initiated by Seismic Event a,b,c 
Potential Seismically-Unique Events 
23. DTF: DPC Cutting 
DPC Preparation / Cask 
Dry Remediation Room, 
DPC Docking Room, 
DPC Cutting / WP Dry 
Remediation Cell 
(Continued) 
Drops, Slap Downs, Collisions: 
25. Drop or collision of an unsealed (open), loaded DPC from the overhead crane in the 
DPC cutting/WP dry remediation cell onto or against a sharp object during the 
transfer of the DPC from the DPC cutting machine base to the trolley that travels to 
the unloading port to the waste transfer cell. 
26. Slap down of an unsealed (open), loaded DPC following a drop from the overhead 
crane in the DPC cutting/WP dry remediation cell onto the edge of a trolley that 
travels to the unloading port to the waste transfer cell during the lift and transfer to 
the trolley. 
27. Derailment of a trolley (that travels to the unloading port to the waste transfer cell) 
holding a loaded DPC (in an unsealed, opened state) in the DPC cutting/WP dry 
remediation cell, followed by a load tipover or fall. 
28. Drop or collision of a load port cover from the waste transfer cell crane onto or 
against the DPC being unloaded. 
29. Drop or collision of a SNF assembly from the spent fuel transfer machine onto or 
against another SNF assembly or assemblies in the DPC being unloaded. 
30. Impact due to horizontal movement of a SNF assembly by the spent fuel transfer 
machine before the assembly is fully lifted out of the DPC. 
31. Drop or collision of a SNF assembly from the spent fuel transfer machine onto or 
against a sharp object (other than another SNF assembly). 
32. Drop and slap down of an SNF assembly from the spent fuel transfer machine (due 
to impact with an edge of the DPC, the floor edge, a DPC internal baffle, etc.) during 
the SNF transfer from the DPC to a WP or staging rack. 
Fires: 
1. Electrical fire associated with SNF handling equipment in the DPC preparation/dry 
remediation room, DPC docking room, the waste transfer cell, or the DPC 
cutting/WP dry remediation cell (including the overhead cranes, overhead 
manipulators, the chipless cutting equipment, etc.). 
2. Fire/explosion (battery/electrical fire) associated with the cask-handling trolley. 
3. Electrical fire associated with the trolley in the DPC cutting/WP dry remediation cell. 
4. Intact or non-intact SNF overheating due to a loss of cooling resulting in excessive 
temperature and possible zircaloy cladding (or other cladding) unzipping or cladding 
failure due to excessive hoop stresses. 
See prior page. 

Table III-2. Identification of Seismically Initiated Potential Events (Continued) 
Functional Areas a 
Internal Events That Could Be Initiated by Seismic Event a,b,c 
Potential Seismically-Unique Events 
23. DTF: DPC Cutting 
DPC Preparation / Cask 
Dry Remediation Room, 
DPC Docking Room, 
DPC Cutting / WP Dry 
Remediation Cell 
(Continued) 
Fires: 
5. N/S 
6. Transient combustible fire in the DPC preparation/dry remediation room, DPC 
docking room, the waste transfer cell, or the DPC cutting/WP dry remediation cell. 
Radiation: 
1. N/S 
2. Damage or rupture of the DPC sampling and purging system, leading to a release 
of canister internal gases and radioactive material. 
3. Loss of confinement zone due to ventilation system malfunction or other breach of a 
confinement barrier leading to a release of airborne radiation. 
4. Thermal expansion of gases or other loss of confinement in an unsealed cask, 
leading to radiological release. 
5. N/S 
Criticality: 
1. Criticality associated with a derailment of a trolley moving a transportation cask 
holding a sealed, loaded DPC and a rearrangement of the DPC contents followed 
by a load tipover or fall. 
2. Criticality associated with a drop or slap down of a sealed, loaded DPC from the 
DPC Cutting/WP Dry Remediation Cell overhead crane and a rearrangement of the 
DPC contents. 
3. Criticality associated with a drop or slap down of an unsealed (open) loaded, or 
sealed (unopened) loaded DPC from DPC cutting area overhead crane and a 
rearrangement of the DPC contents. 
4. Criticality associated with a derailment of a trolley moving an unsealed (open) 
loaded DPC followed by a load tipover or fall and a rearrangement of the DPC 
contents. 
5. Criticality associated with a drop of an SNF assembly from the spent fuel transfer 
machine back into the DPC being unloaded and a rearrangement of the canister 
internals. 
6. Criticality associated with a drop of an SNF assembly from the spent fuel transfer 
machine and a rearrangement of the fuel rods that comprise the assembly due to 
impact. 
See prior page. 

Table III-2. Identification of Seismically Initiated Potential Events (Continued) 
Functional Areas a 
Internal Events That Could Be Initiated by Seismic Event a,b,c 
Potential Seismically-Unique Events 
23. DTF: DPC Cutting 
DPC Preparation / Cask 
Dry Remediation Room, 
DPC Docking Room, 
DPC Cutting / WP Dry 
Remediation Cell 
(Continued) 
Criticality: 
7. Criticality associated with the drop of heavy equipment onto an unsealed (open) 
loaded, or sealed (unopened) loaded DPC and a rearrangement of the container 
internals. 
See prior page. 
24. FHF: Cask and 
MSC Receipt 
Entrance Vestibule 
Drops, Slap Downs, Collision: 
1. Railcar derailment, overturning, or collision involving a loaded cask followed by a 
load tipover or fall. 
2. Overturning or collision involving an LWT or OWT holding a loaded cask (with 
impact limiters and personnel barrier installed). 
3. Collision of a railcar, an LWT, or OWT carrying a loaded cask (with impact limiters 
and personnel barrier installed)with the entrance vestibule doors. 
4. The entrance vestibule doors close on a railcar, an LWT, or an OWT carrying a 
loaded cask (with impact limiters and personnel barrier installed). 
5. Collision of the gantry crane carrying a loaded MSC with the entrance vestibule 
doors. 
6. The entrance vestibule doors close on the entrance vestibule gantry crane carrying 
a loaded MSC. 
7. Collision of a mobile elevating platform with a loaded cask or the conveyance 
holding the cask during removal of personnel barriers and impact limiters or during 
survey activities. 
8. Drop or collision of personnel barriers or impact limiters from the entrance vestibule 
gantry crane onto or against the loaded cask. 
9. Collision between a forklift and a loaded cask on a railcar, an LWT, an OWT, or the 
conveyance holding the cask, prior to or after the removal of impact limiters and 
personnel barrier. 
10. Collision between a mobile elevating platform and a loaded cask on a railcar, an 
LWT, an OWT, or the conveyance holding the cask. 
11. Collision between the entrance vestibule gantry crane carrying a loaded MSC and a 
forklift. 
Seismically-Unique: 
Collapse of structure. 
Failure of equipment supports. 
Failure/collapse of crane. 

Table III-2. Identification of Seismically Initiated Potential Events (Continued) 
Functional Areas a 
Internal Events That Could Be Initiated by Seismic Event a,b,c 
Potential Seismically-Unique Events 
24. FHF: Cask and 
MSC Receipt 
Entrance Vestibule 
(Continued) 
Drops, Slap Downs, Collision: 
12. Collision between the entrance vestibule gantry crane carrying the loaded MSC and 
a mobile elevating platform. 
13. Drop or collision of equipment from the entrance vestibule gantry crane (including 
handling equipment for personnel barriers, impact limiters, etc.) onto or against a 
loaded cask or loaded MSC. 
14. Slap down of a loaded cask onto a railcar, a truck trailer, or the floor during 
upending of the cask to the vertical orientation (after removal of the impact limiters 
and personnel barrier). 
15. Drop of a loaded cask in a horizontal position (such as the Hi Star) from the 
entrance vestibule gantry crane onto the floor or back onto the railcar or truck trailer 
during the transfer from a railcar or truck trailer to the tilting frame. 
16. Drop or collision of a loaded cask in a horizontal position (such as the Hi Star) from 
the entrance vestibule gantry crane onto or against a sharp object or the tilting 
frame during the transfer from a railcar or truck trailer to the tilting frame. 
17. Drop of a loaded cask from the entrance vestibule gantry crane onto the floor during 
the transfer from a railcar, truck trailer, or tilting frame to the pedestal on an 
import/export trolley. 
18. Drop of a loaded cask from the entrance vestibule gantry crane onto the pedestal 
on an import/export trolley during the transfer from a railcar, truck trailer, or tilting 
frame to the pedestal on an import/export trolley. 
19. Drop or collision of a loaded cask from the entrance vestibule gantry crane onto or 
against a sharp object during the transfer from a railcar, truck trailer, or tilting frame 
to the pedestal on an import/export trolley. 
20. Drop of a loaded MSC from the entrance vestibule gantry crane onto the floor 
during the transfer from the FHF pad to the pedestal on an import/export trolley. 
21. Drop of a loaded MSC from the entrance vestibule gantry crane onto the pedestal 
on an import/export trolley during the transfer from the FHF pad to the pedestal on 
an import/export trolley. 
22. Drop or collision of a loaded MSC from the entrance vestibule gantry crane onto or 
against a sharp object during the transfer from the FHF pad to the pedestal on an 
import/export trolley. 
23. Slap down of a loaded cask in the entrance vestibule due to off-center cask 
lowering or drop onto the pedestal on an import/export. 
See prior page. 

Table III-2. Identification of Seismically Initiated Potential Events (Continued) 
Functional Areas a 
Internal Events That Could Be Initiated by Seismic Event a,b,c 
Potential Seismically-Unique Events 
24. FHF: Cask and 
MSC Receipt 
Entrance Vestibule 
(Continued) 
Drops, Slap Downs, Collision: 
24. Slap down of a loaded MSC in the entrance vestibule due to off-center MSC 
lowering or drop onto the pedestal or edge of the pedestal on an import/export 
trolley. 
25. Handling equipment drop onto a loaded cask or loaded MSC. 
Fire: 
1. Electrical fire associated with the entrance vestibule gantry crane. 
2. Electrical fire associated with handling equipment or other entrance vestibule 
electrical equipment. 
3. Fire/explosion (battery/electrical fire) involving a site prime mover pulling or pushing 
a conveyance holding a loaded cask. 
4. Fire/explosion (battery/electrical fire) associated with the import/export trolley. 
5. Fire/explosion (battery/electrical fire) associated with a forklift. 
6. Fire/explosion (battery/electrical fire) associated with the mobile elevating platform. 
7. N/S 
8. Transient combustible fire in the entrance vestibule. 
Radiation: 
1. Radiation exposure of a facility worker and/or the offsite public. 
2. Loss of confinement zone due to ventilation system malfunction or other breach of a 
confinement barrier leading to a release of airborne radiation. 
3. N/S 
Criticality: 
1. Criticality associated with a railcar (holding a loaded cask ) derailment or collision 
followed by a load tipover or fall and rearrangement of the cask internals. 
2. Criticality associated with an overturning or collision involving an LWT or an OWT 
holding a loaded cask and rearrangement of cask internals. 
3. Criticality associated with a drop or slap down of a cask and a rearrangement of the 
container internals. 
4. Criticality associated with a drop or slap down of an MSC and a rearrangement of 
the container internals. 
See prior page. 

Table III-2. Identification of Seismically Initiated Potential Events (Continued) 
Functional Areas a 
Internal Events That Could Be Initiated by Seismic Event a,b,c 
Potential Seismically-Unique Events 
24. FHF: Cask and 
MSC Receipt 
Entrance Vestibule 
(Continued) 
Criticality: 
5. Criticality associated with collision of the entrance vestibule gantry crane holding an 
MSC followed by a load drop or tipover and a rearrangement of the MSC internals. 
See prior page. 
25. FHF: Preparation 
Preparation Room 
Drops, Slap Downs, Collision: 
1. Collision of a loaded cask or loaded MSC on a pedestal on the import/export trolley 
with the preparation room shield doors separating the FHF entrance vestibule from 
the preparation room. 
2. The preparation room shield doors separating the FHF entrance vestibule from the 
preparation room close on a loaded cask or loaded MSC on a pedestal on the 
import/export trolley. 
3. Derailment of an import/export trolley holding a loaded cask or loaded MSC on a 
pedestal (with outer and/or inner lid bolted in place, if applicable) followed by a load 
tipover or fall. 
4. Drop or collision of tools or equipment (including a lid-lifting fixture, lid bolts, etc.) 
onto or against a loaded cask or loaded MSC outer lid (if applicable) or a cask or 
MSC inner lid in the preparation room. 
5. Collision of a mobile elevating platform with a loaded cask or loaded MSC during 
preparation activities on top of the cask or MSC. 
6. Drop of a cask or MSC outer lid onto the loaded cask or loaded MSC (if applicable) 
in the preparation room. 
7. Derailment of an import/export trolley holding a loaded cask or loaded MSC on a 
pedestal (with outer lid removed [if applicable] and inner lid unbolted but in place) 
followed by a load tipover or fall. 
8. Collision of an import/export trolley holding a loaded cask or loaded MSC on a 
pedestal (with outer lid removed [if applicable] and inner lid unbolted but in place) 
with shield doors separating the preparation room and the main transfer room 
9. Closure of the shield doors separating the preparation room and the main transfer 
room onto the import/export trolley holding a loaded cask or loaded MSC on a 
pedestal (with outer lid removed [if applicable] and inner lid unbolted but in place). 
Seismically-Unique: 
Collapse of structure. 
Failure of equipment supports. 
Failure of shield walls or shield doors 
to protect against radiation. 

Table III-2. Identification of Seismically Initiated Potential Events (Continued) 
Functional Areas a 
Internal Events That Could Be Initiated by Seismic Event a,b,c 
Potential Seismically-Unique Events 
25. FHF: Preparation 
Preparation Room 
(Continued) 
Fire: 
1. Electrical fire associated with handling equipment or other preparation room 
equipment. 
2. Fire/explosion (battery/electrical fire) associated with the trolley. 
3. Fire/explosion (battery/electrical fire) associated with the mobile elevating platform. 
4. Transient combustible fire in the preparation area. 
5. N/S 
6. Intact or non-intact SNF overheating or damage to canister contents due to a loss of 
cooling resulting in excessive temperature and possible zircaloy cladding (or other 
cladding) unzipping or cladding failure due to excessive hoop stresses. 
Radiation: 
1. Radiation exposure of a facility worker and/or the offsite public. 
2. Damage or rupture of cask sampling and purging system, leading to a release of 
cask internal gases and radioactive material. 
3. N/S 
4. Loss of confinement zone due to ventilation system malfunction or other breach of a 
confinement barrier leading to a release of airborne radiation. 
Criticality: 
1. Criticality associated with a loaded cask or loaded MSC collision or trolley 
derailment followed by a load tipover or fall and a rearrangement of the cask 
internals. 
See prior page. 
26. FHF: Empty WP / 
Empty MSC 
Processing 
Entrance Vestibule, 
Preparation Room, 
Main Transfer Room, 
and Fuel Transfer Bay 
None Identified 
None Identified 

Table III-2. Identification of Seismically Initiated Potential Events (Continued) 
Functional Areas a 
Internal Events That Could Be Initiated by Seismic Event a,b,c 
Potential Seismically-Unique Events 
27. FHF: CSNF 
Assembly Transfer 
Main Transfer Room, 
Fuel Transfer Bay, Fuel 
Transfer Room 
Drops, Slap Downs, Collision: 
1. Derailment of the import/export trolley holding a loaded cask or loaded MSC on a 
pedestal (with inner lid in place, unbolted) followed by a load tipover or fall. 
2. Drop of a loaded cask or MSC (with inner lid in place, unbolted) onto the floor during 
the lift using the overhead bridge crane from the import/export trolley to the cask 
transfer trolley or MSC trolley, respectively. 
3. Drop of a loaded cask or MSC (with inner lid in place, unbolted) onto the trolley 
during the lift using the overhead bridge crane from the import/export trolley to the 
cask transfer trolley or MSC trolley, respectively. 
4. Drop or collision of a loaded cask or MSC (with inner lid in place, unbolted) onto or 
against a sharp object during the lift using the overhead bridge crane from the 
import/export trolley to the cask transfer trolley or MSC trolley, respectively. 
5. Slap down of a loaded cask or MSC (with inner lid in place, unbolted) following a 
drop from the overhead bridge crane onto the edge of the pedestal, trolley, or other 
object during the transfer from the import/export trolley to the cask transfer trolley or 
MSC trolley, respectively. 
6. Drop or collision of a docking ring onto or against a loaded cask or loaded MSC 
prior to entering the fuel transfer bay for unloading. 
7. Collision of a mobile elevating platform with a loaded cask or loaded MSC during 
docking ring or installation activities associated with the cask or MSC prior to 
entering the fuel transfer bay for unloading. 
8. Drop or collision of a manipulator, handling equipment, or other miscellaneous 
equipment onto or against a loaded cask or loaded MSC prior to entering the fuel 
transfer bay for unloading. 
9. Derailment of the cask transfer trolley or MSC trolley holding a loaded cask or 
loaded MSC, respectively, on a pedestal (with inner lid in place, unbolted) followed 
by a load tipover or fall. 
10. Collision of a trolley holding a loaded cask or loaded MSC on a pedestal (with outer 
lid removed [if applicable] and inner lid unbolted but in place) with the shield doors 
separating the main transfer room and the fuel transfer bay 
11. Closure of the shield doors separating the main transfer room and the fuel transfer 
bay onto the trolley holding a loaded cask or loaded MSC on a pedestal (with outer 
lid removed [if applicable] and inner lid unbolted but in place). 
Seismically-Unique: 
Collapse of structure. 
Failure of equipment supports. 
Failure of shield walls, shield windows 
or shield doors to protect against 
radiation. 
Failure/collapse of crane. 

Table III-2. Identification of Seismically Initiated Potential Events (Continued) 
Functional Areas a 
Internal Events That Could Be Initiated by Seismic Event a,b,c 
Potential Seismically-Unique Events 
27. FHF: CSNF 
Assembly Transfer 
Main Transfer Room, 
Fuel Transfer Bay, Fuel 
Transfer Room 
(Continued) 
Drops, Slap Downs, Collision: 
12. Drop or collision of a docking port with or against a cask or MSC. 
13. Drop or collision of a docking port plug onto or against a cask lid or MSC lid (with 
outer lid removed [if applicable] and inner lid unbolted but in place). 
14. Drop of an inner lid onto a cask or MSC (with outer lid removed [if applicable]). 
15. Drop or collision of an SNF assembly from the spent fuel transfer machine back into 
or against a cask or MSC being unloaded. 
16. Drop or collision of an SNF assembly from the spent fuel transfer machine onto or 
against one or more SNF assembly(ies) in the cask or MSC being unloaded or onto 
one or more SNF assembly(ies) in the WP or MSC being loaded. 
17. Impact due to horizontal movement of an SNF assembly by the spent fuel transfer 
machine before the assembly is completely removed from the cask or MSC. 
18. Drop of an SNF assembly from the spent fuel transfer machine onto the fuel transfer 
room floor. 
19. Collision involving an SNF assembly suspended from the spent fuel transfer 
machine with wall-mounted equipment located in the fuel transfer room. 
20. Drop or collision of an SNF assembly from the spent fuel transfer machine onto or 
against a sharp object. 
21. Drop or collision of an SNF assembly from the spent fuel transfer machine into or 
against an empty WP or MSC being loaded. 
22. Drop and slap down of an SNF assembly from the spent fuel transfer machine (due 
to impact with an edge of the cask, MSC, WP, floor edge, WP internal baffle, etc.) 
during the transfer from the cask or MSC to a WP or MSC. 
23. Drop or collision of handling equipment into or against an open MSC or an open WP 
filled with SNF assemblies. 
24. Drop of a WP inner lid or MSC cask inner lid (as appropriate) from the fuel transfer 
room crane onto a loaded WP or loaded MSC. 
25. Drop or collision of a transfer port seal plug from the fuel transfer room crane onto 
or against the inner lid of a loaded WP or a loaded MSC. 
Fire: 
1. Electrical fire associated with SNF handling equipment or other electrically powered 
equipment in the main transfer room, the fuel transfer bays, or the fuel transfer room 
(including the overhead cranes and the spent fuel transfer machine). 
See prior page. 

Table III-2. Identification of Seismically Initiated Potential Events (Continued) 
Functional Areas a 
Internal Events That Could Be Initiated by Seismic Event a,b,c 
Potential Seismically-Unique Events 
27. FHF: CSNF 
Assembly Transfer 
Main Transfer Room, 
Fuel Transfer Bay, Fuel 
Transfer Room 
(Continued) 
Fire: 
2. Fire/explosion (battery/electrical fire) associated with a cask transfer trolley or an 
MSC trolley holding a filled or partially filled cask or MSC, respectively, with or 
without inner lid in place (but not sealed). 
3. Electrical fire associated with a WP trolley holding a partially filled or filled WP, with 
or without inner lid in place (but not sealed). 
4. Fire/explosion (battery/electrical fire) associated with the mobile elevating platform. 
5. N/S 
6. Intact or non-intact SNF overheating due to a loss of cooling resulting in excessive 
temperature and possible zircaloy cladding (or other cladding) unzipping or cladding 
failure due to excessive hoop stresses. 
7. N/S 
8. Transient combustible fire in the main transfer room, the fuel transfer bays, or the 
fuel transfer room. 
Radiation: 
1. Radiation exposure of a facility worker and/or the offsite public. 
2. Docking ring failure leads to a radiological release. 
3. N/S 
4. Thermal expansion of gases or other loss of confinement in an unsealed cask or 
MSC, leading to radiological release. 
5. Loss of confinement zone due to ventilation system malfunction or other breach of a 
confinement barrier leading to a release of airborne contamination. 
6. Inadvertent opening of a fuel transfer bay door, leading to a worker exposure. 
7. N/S 
Criticality: 
1. Criticality associated with a drop or slap down of a loaded, unsealed cask or MSC 
from the main transfer room overhead crane and a rearrangement of the container 
internals. 
2. Criticality associated with an import/export trolley, a cask transfer trolley, or an MSC 
trolley holding a loaded, unsealed cask or MSC (as applicable) derailment followed 
by a load tipover or fall and a rearrangement of the container internals. 
See prior page. 

Table III-2. Identification of Seismically Initiated Potential Events (Continued) 
Functional Areas a 
Internal Events That Could Be Initiated by Seismic Event a,b,c 
Potential Seismically-Unique Events 
27. FHF: CSNF 
Assembly Transfer 
Main Transfer Room, 
Fuel Transfer Bay, Fuel 
Transfer Room 
(Continued) 
Criticality: 
3. Criticality associated with a drop of an SNF assembly from the spent fuel transfer 
machine into a cask, MSC, or WP and a rearrangement of the cask, MSC, or WP 
internals. 
4. Criticality associated with a drop of an SNF assembly from the spent fuel transfer 
machine and a rearrangement of the fuel rods that comprise the assembly due to 
impact. 
5. Criticality associated with the drop of heavy equipment onto a loaded, open cask, 
MSC, or WP and a rearrangement of the container internals. 
6. N/S 
See prior page. 
28. FHF: Canister 
Transfer 
Main Transfer Room 
Drops, Slap Downs, Collision: 
1. Drop or collision of a loaded cask (with inner lid in place, unbolted) from the main 
transfer room overhead crane onto the floor during the transfer from a pedestal on 
the import/export trolley to the cask transfer station. 
2. Drop of a loaded cask (with inner lid in place, unbolted) from the main transfer room 
overhead crane onto or against a sharp object during the transfer from a pedestal 
on the import/export trolley to the cask transfer station. 
3. Drop or collision of a loaded cask (with inner lid in place, unbolted) from the main 
transfer room overhead crane into or against the canister transfer station. 
4. Slap down of a loaded cask (with inner lid in place, unbolted) in the main transfer 
room due to a cask corner drop from the main transfer room over head crane onto 
the edge of the pedestal or import/export trolley followed by a slap down. 
5. Drop or collision of a loaded cask (with inner lid in place, unbolted) from the main 
transfer room overhead crane into or against the canister transfer station. 
6. Slap down of a loaded cask (with inner lid in place, unbolted) onto the floor, out of 
the canister transfer station, or into a wall due to off-center cask lowering into the 
canister transfer station. 
Seismically-Unique: 
Collapse of structure. 
Failure of equipment supports. 
Failure of shield walls, shield windows 
or shield doors to protect against 
radiation. 
Failure of airlock doors or view ports 
for airborne confinement. 
Failure/collapse of crane. 

Table III-2. Identification of Seismically Initiated Potential Events (Continued) 
Functional Areas a 
Internal Events That Could Be Initiated by Seismic Event a,b,c 
Potential Seismically-Unique Events 
28. FHF: Canister 
Transfer 
Main Transfer Room 
(Continued) 
Drops, Slap Downs, Collision: 
7. Drop or collision of a manipulator, handling equipment, or other miscellaneous 
equipment onto or against a loaded cask (with inner lid in place, unbolted) prior to 
entering the canister transfer station for unloading. 
8. Drop of a cask inner lid, as appropriate, from the main transfer room overhead 
crane into a loaded cask to be unloaded. 
9. Drop or collision of handling equipment into or against an open cask loaded with a 
DPC, a DOE HLW canister, a NSNF canister, or a DOE SNF canister. 
10. Drop or collision of a DPC, a DOE HLW canister, a DOE SNF canister, or a NSNF 
canister from the main transfer room overhead crane back into or against the cask 
being unloaded. 
11. Impact due to horizontal movement of a NSNF canister, a DPC, a DOE HLW 
canister, or a DOE SNF canister with the main transfer room overhead crane before 
the canister is completely removed from the cask. 
12. Drop and slap down of a NSNF canister, a DOE HLW canister or a DOE SNF 
canister from the main transfer room overhead crane into the side of the canister 
transfer station (due to impact with an edge of the cask, MSC, WP, floor edge, WP 
or MSC internal baffle, etc.) during the transfer from the cask to a WP or MSC (as 
appropriate). 
13. Drop and slap down of a DPC from the main transfer room overhead crane into the 
side of the canister transfer station (due to impact with an edge of the cask, MSC, 
floor edge, MSC internal baffle, etc.) during the transfer from the cask to an MSC. 
14. Drop or collision of a DPC, a DOE HLW canister, a DOE SNF canister, or a NSNF 
canister from the main transfer room overhead crane onto or against a sharp object 
or edge in the canister transfer station. 
15. Drop of a DPC, a DOE HLW canister, a DOE SNF canister, or a NSNF canister 
from the main transfer room overhead crane onto the canister transfer station floor. 
16. Drop or collision of a DOE HLW canister, a DOE SNF canister, or a NSNF canister 
from the main transfer room crane into or against an empty WP or empty MSC. 
17. Drop or collision of a NSNF canister from the main transfer room crane into or 
against an empty WP. 
18. Drop or collision of a DPC from the main transfer room crane into or against an 
empty MSC. 
See prior page. 

Table III-2. Identification of Seismically Initiated Potential Events (Continued) 
Functional Areas a 
Internal Events That Could Be Initiated by Seismic Event a,b,c 
Potential Seismically-Unique Events 
28. FHF: Canister 
Transfer 
Main Transfer Room 
(Continued) 
Drops, Slap Downs, Collision: 
19. Collision involving a DPC, a DOE HLW canister, a DOE SNF canister, or a NSNF 
canister and the canister transfer station. 
20. Drop or collision of a DOE HLW canister from the main transfer room overhead 
crane onto or against another DOE HLW canister or a DOE SNF canister in a WP 
or in an MSC. 
21. Drop or collision of a DOE SNF canister from the main transfer room overhead 
crane onto or against a DOE HLW canister in a WP or in an MSC. 
22. Drop or collision of handling equipment into or against an open WP or MSC loaded 
with a DPC, DOE HLW canisters, and/or DOE SNF canisters, and/or a NSNF 
canister, as appropriate. 
23. Drop of a WP inner lid or MSC cask inner lid, as appropriate, from the main transfer 
room overhead crane onto a filled (loaded) WP or loaded MSC. 
Fire: 
1. N/S 
2. Electrical fire associated with SNF and HLW handling equipment in the main 
transfer room (including the overhead crane, manipulators, the movable 
platform/sleeve assembly, etc.). 
3. Fire/explosion (battery/electrical fire) associated with the import/export trolley. 
4. Fire/explosion (battery/electrical fire) associated with the mobile elevating platform. 
5. N/S 
6. Overheating of a loaded cask, WP, or MSC due to a loss of cooling resulting in 
excessive temperature and possible damage to canister contents. 
7. Transient combustible fire in the main transfer room. 
Radiation: 
1. Radiation exposure of a facility worker and/or the offsite public. 
2. Loss of confinement zone due to ventilation system malfunction or other breach of a 
confinement barrier leading to a release of airborne contamination. 
3. Thermal expansion of gases or other loss of confinement in an unsealed cask, 
leading to radiological release. 
4. Inadvertent opening of the main transfer room shield door, leading to a worker 
exposure. 
See prior page. 

Table III-2. Identification of Seismically Initiated Potential Events (Continued) 
Functional Areas a 
Internal Events That Could Be Initiated by Seismic Event a,b,c 
Potential Seismically-Unique Events 
28. FHF: Canister 
Transfer 
Main Transfer Room 
(Continued) 
Radiation: 
5. N/S 
Criticality: 
1. Criticality associated with a drop or slap down of a loaded cask or MSC from the 
main transfer room overhead crane and a rearrangement of the cask or MSC 
internals. 
2. Criticality associated with a drop or slap down of a DPC, a DOE SNF canister, a 
NSNF canister, or a DOE HLW canister and a rearrangement of canister internals. 
3. Criticality associated with the drop of heavy equipment onto a loaded, open cask, 
MSC, or WP and a rearrangement of the container internals. 
4. N/S 
See prior page. 
29. FHF: WP Closure 
Main Transfer Room, 
WP Positioning Cell, 
WP Closure Cell 
Drops, Slap Downs, Collision: 
1. Collision involving the trolley holding the loaded, unsealed WP and the shield doors 
between the main transfer room and the WP positioning cell. 
2. Shield doors between the main transfer room and the WP positioning cell close on 
the trolley holding the loaded, unsealed WP. 
3. Derailment of a trolley holding a loaded, unsealed WP followed by a load tipover or 
fall. 
4. Drop or collision of equipment from a main transfer room overhead crane, including 
a docking ring, lifting equipment, or a lifting fixture, onto or against a loaded, 
unsealed WP or WP inner lid. 
5. Drop or collision of an unsealed, loaded WP from the main transfer room overhead 
crane back into or against the canister transfer station. 
6. Drop of an unsealed, loaded WP from the main transfer room overhead crane onto 
the main transfer room floor during the lift and transfer to the WP positioning cell 
pedestal and trolley. 
7. Drop of an unsealed, loaded WP from the main transfer room overhead crane onto 
the pedestal on the WP positioning cell trolley during the lift and transfer to the WP 
positioning cell pedestal and trolley. 
8. Drop or collision of an unsealed, loaded WP from the main transfer room overhead 
crane onto or against a sharp object during the lift and transfer to the WP 
positioning cell pedestal and trolley. 
Seismically-Unique: 
Collapse of structure. 
Failure of equipment supports. 
Failure of shield walls, shield doors, or 
view ports to protect against radiation. 
Failure of airlock doors or view ports 
for airborne confinement. 
Failure/collapse of crane(s) or robotic 
arm. 

Table III-2. Identification of Seismically Initiated Potential Events (Continued) 
Functional Areas a 
Internal Events That Could Be Initiated by Seismic Event a,b,c 
Potential Seismically-Unique Events 
29. FHF: WP Closure 
Main Transfer Room, 
WP Positioning Cell, 
WP Closure Cell 
(Continued) 
Drops, Slap Downs, Collision: 
9. Slap down of a loaded, unsealed WP onto the floor, into a wall, or into nearby 
equipment following a drop from the main transfer room overhead crane onto the 
edge of the trolley, pedestal, or other equipment during the lift and transfer to the 
WP positioning cell pedestal and trolley. 
10. Lid drop onto a WP from the lid placement fixture equipment during the welding 
process. 
11. Equipment drop onto a WP during the welding process. 
12. Drop or collision of equipment from a main transfer room overhead crane onto or 
against a loaded, sealed WP positioned on a pedestal on a trolley. 
13. Collision involving the trolley holding the loaded, sealed WP and the shield doors 
between the WP positioning cell and the main transfer room. 
14. Shield doors between the WP positioning cell and the main transfer room close on 
the trolley holding the loaded, sealed WP. 
Fire: 
1. Electrical fire associated with handling equipment or other electrically powered 
equipment in the WP closure cell and the WP positioning cell, including the 
overhead cranes and the welders in the WP closure cell. 
2. Electrical fire associated with the WP transfer trolley holding a loaded, unsealed WP 
or a WP closure transfer trolley holding a loaded, unsealed or sealed WP. 
3. Intact or non-intact SNF overheating or damage to canister contents due to a loss of 
cooling resulting in excessive temperature and possible zircaloy cladding (or other 
cladding) unzipping or cladding failure due to excessive hoop stresses. 
4. Canister/fuel damage by burn-through during welding process/heat damage. 
5. Thermal hazard/canister/SNF overheating in a WP during the welding process 
resulting in excessive cladding temperature and possible zircaloy cladding (or other 
cladding) unzipping. 
6. Transient combustible fire in the WP closure cell and the WP positioning cell. 
Radiation: 
1. Radiation exposure of a facility worker and/or the offsite public. 
2. Glove box leak leads to a radiological release. 
See prior page. 

Table III-2. Identification of Seismically Initiated Potential Events (Continued) 
Functional Areas a 
Internal Events That Could Be Initiated by Seismic Event a,b,c 
Potential Seismically-Unique Events 
29. FHF: WP Closure 
Main Transfer Room, 
WP Positioning Cell, 
WP Closure Cell 
(Continued) 
Radiation: 
3. Loss of confinement zone due to ventilation system malfunction or other breach of a 
confinement barrier leading to a release of airborne radiation. 
Criticality: 
1. Criticality associated with a trolley holding a sealed or unsealed WP derailment 
followed by a load tipover or fall and rearrangement of the container internals. 
2. Criticality associated with a drop or slap down of a loaded, unsealed WP from the 
main transfer room overhead crane and a rearrangement of the container internals. 
3. Criticality associated with the drop of heavy equipment onto a loaded, unsealed WP 
and a rearrangement of the container internals. 
4. Inadvertent opening of a transfer bay shield door or the WP positioning cell shield 
door, leading to a worker exposure. 
5. N/S 
See prior page. 
30. FHF: WP Loadout 
Main Transfer Room, 
Preparation Room, 
Entrance Vestibule 
Drops, Slap Downs, Collision: 
1. Derailment of a trolley holding a loaded, sealed WP followed by a load tipover or 
fall. 
2. Drop of a loaded, sealed WP from a main transfer room overhead crane onto the 
floor during transfer from the trolley to the survey area or from the survey area to 
the tilting machine. 
3. Drop or collision of a loaded, sealed WP from a main transfer room overhead crane 
onto or against a sharp object (including the tilting machine) during transfer from the 
trolley to the survey area or from the survey area to the tilting machine. 
4. Slap down of a loaded, sealed WP from a main transfer room overhead crane to the 
cell floor during transfer from the trolley to the survey area due to drop from the 
overhead crane onto the edge of the pedestal on the trolley, the edge of the trolley, 
or another object on the floor. 
5. Slap down (either forward into the WP turntable or backward onto the floor) of a 
loaded, sealed WP in the tilting machine from a main transfer room overhead crane 
during the lowering of the WP to the horizontal position on the emplacement pallet 
previously placed on the WP turntable. 
Seismically-Unique: 
Collapse of structure. 
Failure of equipment supports. 
Failure of shield walls, or shield doors 
to protect against radiation. 

Table III-2. Identification of Seismically Initiated Potential Events (Continued) 
Functional Areas a 
Internal Events That Could Be Initiated by Seismic Event a,b,c 
Potential Seismically-Unique Events 
30. FHF: WP Loadout 
Main Transfer Room, 
Preparation Room, 
Entrance Vestibule 
(Continued) 
Drops, Slap Downs, Collisions: 
6. Collision of the tilting machine against a loaded, sealed WP on an emplacement 
pallet on the WP turntable. 
7. Drop or collision of a lifting collar from a main transfer room overhead crane onto or 
against a loaded, sealed WP after removal of the collar from the WP collar removal 
machine. 
8. Collision or impact of the lifting collar removal machine and a loaded, sealed WP 
placed on an emplacement pallet positioned on the WP turntable. 
9. Drop of a loaded, sealed WP and emplacement pallet from a main transfer room 
overhead crane onto the floor during transfer of the WP and emplacement pallet 
from the WP turntable to the WP transporter bedplate. 
10. Drop of a loaded, sealed WP and emplacement pallet from a main transfer room 
overhead crane onto the WP transporter bedplate during transfer of the WP and 
emplacement pallet from the WP turntable to the WP transporter bedplate. 
11. Drop or collision of a loaded, sealed WP on a emplacement pallet from a main 
transfer room overhead crane onto or against a sharp object during transfer of the 
WP and emplacement pallet from the WP turntable to the WP transporter bedplate. 
12. Equipment drop or collision (including lifting yokes) onto or against a loaded, sealed 
WP in the WP transporter load area (including the process to move the WP from the 
trolley to the WP transporter). 
13. Collision involving a WP transporter (holding the sealed WP on an emplacement 
pallet) and the doors between the main transfer room and the preparation room. 
14. The doors between the main transfer room and the preparation room close on the 
WP transporter (holding the sealed WP on an emplacement pallet). 
15. Collision involving WP transporter (holding the sealed WP on an emplacement 
pallet) and the shield doors between the preparation room and the entrance 
vestibule. 
16. Shield doors between the preparation room and the entrance vestibule close on the 
WP transporter (holding the sealed WP on an emplacement pallet). 
17. Collision involving WP transporter (holding the sealed WP on an emplacement 
pallet) and the doors between the entrance vestibule and the ambient air (outside). 
18. Doors between the entrance vestibule and the ambient air (outside) close on the 
WP transporter (holding the sealed WP on an emplacement pallet). 
See prior page. 

Table III-2. Identification of Seismically Initiated Potential Events (Continued) 
Functional Areas a 
Internal Events That Could Be Initiated by Seismic Event a,b,c 
Potential Seismically-Unique Events 
30. FHF: WP Loadout 
Main Transfer Room, 
Preparation Room, 
Entrance Vestibule 
(Continued) 
Drops, Slap Downs, Collisions: 
19. Derailment or collision of a WP transporter(holding the sealed WP on a 
emplacement pallet) in the main transfer room, preparation room, or entrance 
vestibule followed by a load tipover or fall 
.Fires: 
1. Electrical fire associated with the equipment in the WP transporter load area of the 
main transfer room, including the WP collar removal machine, the tilting machine, 
and the WP turntable. 
2. Electrical fire associated with the main transfer room overhead cranes. 
3. Electrical fire associated with equipment on the WP transporter, including motors to 
extend the WP transporter bedplate. 
4. Electrical fire associated with the WP transport locomotive. 
5. Fire/explosion (battery/electrical fire) associated with the WP closure transfer trolley. 
6. Intact or non-intact SNF overheating or damage to canister contents due to a loss of 
cooling resulting in excessive temperature and possible zircaloy cladding (or other 
cladding) unzipping or cladding failure due to excessive hoop stresses. 
7. Transient combustible fire in the main transfer room, preparation room, or the 
entrance vestibule. 
Radiation: 
1. Radiation exposure of a facility worker and/or the offsite public. 
2. Loss of confinement zone due to ventilation system malfunction or other breach of a 
confinement barrier leading to a release of airborne radiation. 
3. Inadvertent opening of the main transfer room shield door, leading to a worker 
exposure. 
4. Inadvertent opening of the WP transporter shielded enclosure doors, leading to a 
worker exposure. 
5. N/S 
Criticality: 
1. Criticality associated with a trolley holding a sealed WP derailment followed by a 
load tipover or fall and rearrangement of the WP internals. 
See prior page. 

Table III-2. Identification of Seismically Initiated Potential Events (Continued) 
Functional Areas a 
Internal Events That Could Be Initiated by Seismic Event a,b,c 
Potential Seismically-Unique Events 
30. FHF: WP Loadout 
Main Transfer Room, 
Preparation Room, 
Entrance Vestibule 
(Continued) 
Criticality: 
2. Criticality associated with a drop, slap down, or collision of a sealed WP and a 
rearrangement of the container internals. 
3. Criticality associated with a WP transporter derailment followed by a load tipover or 
fall and rearrangement of the WP internals. 
See prior page. 
31. FHF: Loaded MSC 
Removal 
Main Transfer Room, 
Preparation Room, 
Entrance Vestibule 
Drops, Slap Downs, Collisions: 
1. Impact due to horizontal movement of a loaded MSC by the main transfer room 
overhead crane before it is fully removed from the canister transfer station. 
2. Collision of a loaded MSC from the main transfer room overhead crane with the 
canister transfer station. 
3. Drop of an MSC inner or outer lid (as applicable) from the fuel transfer room 
overhead crane onto the loaded MSC in the fuel transfer bay. 
4. Drop or collision of the transfer port plug from the fuel transfer room overhead 
crane onto or against the inner lid or outer lid of a loaded MSC (as applicable) in the 
fuel transfer bay or main transfer room (as applicable). 
5. Drop of an MSC inner or outer lid (as applicable) from the main transfer room 
overhead crane onto the loaded MSC in the canister transfer station. 
6. Collision of a mobile elevating platform with a loaded MSC during docking ring 
removal activities associated with the MSC. 
7. Collision of a trolley holding a loaded MSC on a pedestal with the shield doors 
separating the fuel transfer bay and the main transfer room. 
8. Closure of the shield doors separating the fuel transfer bay and the main transfer 
room onto the trolley holding a loaded MSC on a pedestal. 
9. Drop or collision of tools or equipment (including the outer lid-lifting fixture, inner lidlifting 
fixture [as applicable], lid bolts, etc.) onto or against an MSC inner lid or outer 
lid (as applicable) during the MSC sealing process. 
10. Derailment of a trolley serving a fuel transfer bay or the import/export trolley holding 
a loaded MSC on a pedestal followed by a load tipover or fall. 
Seismically-Unique: 
Collapse of structure. 
Failure of equipment supports. 
Failure of shield walls, or shield doors 
to protect against radiation. 
Failure/collapse of crane. 

Table III-2. Identification of Seismically Initiated Potential Events (Continued) 
Functional Areas a 
Internal Events That Could Be Initiated by Seismic Event a,b,c 
Potential Seismically-Unique Events 
31. FH:F Loaded MSC 
Removal 
Main Transfer Room, 
Preparation Room, 
Entrance Vestibule 
(Continued) 
Drops, Slap Downs, Collisions: 
11. Drop of a loaded MSC from the main transfer room overhead crane onto the floor 
during the MSC transfer from a pedestal staged on a trolley serving the fuel transfer 
bay or from the canister transfer station to the import/export trolley and pedestal. 
12. Drop of a loaded MSC from the main transfer room overhead crane onto the 
pedestal on a trolley during the MSC transfer from a pedestal staged on a transfer 
trolley serving the fuel transfer bay or from the canister transfer station to the 
import/export trolley and pedestal. 
13. Drop or collision of a loaded MSC from the main transfer room overhead crane onto 
or against a sharp object during the transfer from a pedestal staged on a transfer 
trolley serving the fuel transfer bay or from the canister transfer station to the 
import/export trolley and pedestal. 
14. Slap down of a loaded MSC following a drop from onto the edge of the pedestal or 
trolley or other object during the transfer from a pedestal staged on a transfer trolley 
serving the fuel transfer bay or from the canister transfer station to the import/export 
trolley and pedestal. 
15. Slap down of a loaded MSC onto the floor, into a wall, or into nearby equipment 
following a drop from the main transfer room overhead crane onto the edge of the 
import/export trolley, pedestal, or other equipment during the lift and transfer of the 
MSC from the canister transfer station to the import/export trolley. 
16. Collision of the import/export trolley holding a loaded MSC on a pedestal with the 
shield doors separating the main transfer room and the preparation room or the 
preparation room and the entrance vestibule. 
17. Closure of the shield doors separating main transfer room and the preparation room 
or the preparation room and the entrance vestibule onto the import/export trolley 
holding a loaded MSC on a pedestal. 
18. Drop or collision of equipment in the preparation room onto or against a loaded 
MSC on a pedestal on an import/export trolley. 
19. Drop of a loaded MSC from the entrance vestibule gantry crane onto the floor 
during the lifting of the loaded MSC off of the pedestal on the import/export trolley. 
20. Drop or collision of a loaded MSC from the entrance vestibule gantry crane onto or 
against a sharp object during the lifting of the loaded MSC off of the pedestal on the 
import/export trolley. 
See prior page. 

Table III-2. Identification of Seismically Initiated Potential Events (Continued) 
Functional Areas a 
Internal Events That Could Be Initiated by Seismic Event a,b,c 
Potential Seismically-Unique Events 
31. FHF: Loaded MSC 
Removal 
Main Transfer Room, 
Preparation Room, 
Entrance Vestibule 
(Continued) 
Drops, Slap Downs, Collisions: 
21. Slap down of a loaded, sealed MSC following a drop from the entrance vestibule 
gantry crane onto the edge of the pedestal, edge of the import/export trolley, or 
other equipment during the lifting of the loaded MSC off of the pedestal on the 
import/export trolley. 
22. Collision of the entrance vestibule gantry crane holding a loaded MSC with a forklift, 
mobile elevating platform, or other object in the entrance vestibule. 
23. Collision of the entrance vestibule gantry crane holding a loaded MSC with the 
entrance vestibule doors. 
24. The entrance vestibule doors close on the entrance vestibule gantry crane holding a 
loaded MSC. 
Fires: 
1. Electrical fire associated with the main transfer room overhead crane , and the 
entrance vestibule gantry crane. 
2. Electrical fire associated with handling equipment or other equipment located in the 
main transfer room, the preparation room, or the entrance vestibule. 
3. Transient combustible fire in the main transfer room, preparation room, or the 
entrance vestibule. 
4. N/S 
5. Fire/explosion (battery/electrical fire) associated with the trolley. 
6. Fire/explosion (battery/electrical fire) associated with a mobile elevating platform. 
Radiation: 
1. Radiation exposure of a facility worker and/or the offsite public. 
2. Damage or rupture of cask inerting system leading to a release of cask internal 
gases. 
3. N/S 
4. Loss of confinement zone due to ventilation system malfunction or other breach of a 
confinement barrier leading to a release of airborne radiation. 
5. N/S 
See prior page. 

Table III-2. Identification of Seismically Initiated Potential Events (Continued) 
Functional Areas a 
Internal Events That Could Be Initiated by Seismic Event a,b,c 
Potential Seismically-Unique Events 
31. FHF: Loaded MSC 
Removal 
Main Transfer Room, 
Preparation Room, 
Entrance Vestibule 
(Continued) 
Criticality: 
1. Criticality associated with an MSC trolley collision or trolley derailment followed by a 
load tipover or fall and a rearrangement of the MSC internals. 
2. Criticality associated with a drop or slap down of a loaded MSC from an overhead 
crane and a rearrangement of cask internals. 
3. Criticality associated with the drop of heavy equipment onto an unsealed MSC and 
a rearrangement of the container internals. 
See prior page. 
32. FHF: Empty 
Transportation Cask, 
MSC Removal 
Main Transfer Room, 
Preparation Room, 
Entrance Vestibule 
Drops, Slap Downs, Collisions: 
None identified. 
Fires: 
None identified. 
Radiation: 
1. Radiation exposure of a facility worker and/or the offsite public. 
2. Loss of confinement zone due to ventilation system malfunction or other breach of a 
confinement barrier leading to a release of airborne radiation. 
Criticality: 
None identified. 
Seismically-Unique: 
None identified. 

Table III-2. Identification of Seismically Initiated Potential Events (Continued) 
Functional Areas a 
Internal Events That Could Be Initiated by Seismic Event a,b,c 
Potential Seismically-Unique Events 
33. Subsurface: WP 
Subsurface Transport 
and Emplacement 
Drops, Slap Downs, Collisions: 
1. Collision involving the transport locomotive and the WP transporter (holding the 
sealed WP on an emplacement pallet) during coupling, prior to entering the North 
Portal. 
2. Derailment of a WP transporter outdoors, prior to entering the north ramp, followed 
by a load tipover or fall. 
3. Derailment of a WP transporter while on the north ramp, in a main drift, or in an 
emplacement drift turnout, after passing through the North Portal, followed by a load 
tipover or fall. 
4. Runaway of a loaded WP transporter while proceeding down the north ramp. 
5. Collision involving a WP transporter (holding a sealed WP on an emplacement 
pallet) and other stationary or moving equipment. 
6. Derailment of a WP transporter at the turnout drift switch, followed by a load tipover 
or fall. 
7. Collision involving a WP transporter (holding the sealed WP on an emplacement 
pallet) and the emplacement access doors. 
8. Emplacement access doors close on the WP transporter (holding the sealed WP on 
an emplacement pallet). 
9. Rockfall onto a WP transporter while in the subsurface. 
10. Collision involving a WP transporter (holding the sealed WP on an emplacement 
pallet) and the emplacement transfer dock (while backing into the dock). 
11.WP transporter doors close on the WP on an emplacement pallet. 
12.WP rolls or slides out of a WP transporter on the surface (outdoors), in a ramp, in a 
main drift, or at the entrance of the emplacement drift. 
13.WP and emplacement pallet drop from a WP emplacement gantry. 
14. Derailment of a WP emplacement gantry holding a WP on an emplacement pallet, 
followed by a load drop (drop of the WP and emplacement pallet). 
15.WP emplacement gantry carrying a WP collides with another WP in the drift. 
16.WP emplacement gantry carrying a WP travels to the end of the drift and drops off 
the end of the rails, falling to the ground below. 
Seismically-Unique: 
Tunnel invert and track distortions. 
Failure of supports for electrical supply 
or control system. 
Portal collapse. 
Failure of shield walls or doors to 
protect against radiation. 
Structural failure of WP transporter, 
WP emplacement gantry, 
emplacement pallet 

Table III-2. Identification of Seismically Initiated Potential Events (Continued) 
Functional Areas a 
Internal Events That Could Be Initiated by Seismic Event a,b,c 
Potential Seismically-Unique Events 
33. Subsurface: 
Subsurface WP 
Transport and 
Emplacement 
(Continued) 
Drops, Slap Downs, Collisions: 
17.WP emplacement gantry holding a WP on a emplacement pallet rolls off the 
emplacement transfer dock and either falls onto the drift rails (or surrounding 
ground) or impacts the WP transporter (if the transporter has not been moved). 
18. Empty WP emplacement gantry rolls off the emplacement transfer dock and falls 
onto the WP transporter, impacting the WP on the emplacement pallet on the 
extended bedplate. 
19. Collision of a WP emplacement gantry holding a WP on an emplacement pallet with 
a fallen rock, fallen ground support, or other object, followed by a load drop (drop of 
the WP and emplacement pallet). 
20. Rockfall onto a WP. 
21. Rockfall onto a WP emplacement gantry holding a WP on an emplacement pallet. 
22. Ground control drop onto a WP. 
23. Ground control drop onto a WP emplacement gantry holding a WP on an 
emplacement pallet. 
24. Runaway WP transporter in an emplacement main drift and a collision with the 
barrier isolating the development side of the repository from the emplacement side 
of the repository. 
Fires: 
1. Electrical fire associated with the transport locomotive. 
2. Fire/explosion (battery/electrical fire) associated with the transport locomotive. 
3. Fire/explosion (battery/electrical fire) associated with the WP emplacement gantry. 
4. Electrical fire associated with equipment on the WP transporter, including motors to 
extend the WP transporter bedplate. 
5. Electrical fire associated with the WP emplacement gantry or other subsurface 
equipment. 
6. N/S 
7. N/S 
Radiation: 
1. Radiation exposure of a facility worker and/or the offsite public. 
See prior page. 

Table III-2. Identification of Seismically Initiated Potential Events (Continued) 
Functional Areas a 
Internal Events That Could Be Initiated by Seismic Event a,b,c 
Potential Seismically-Unique Events 
33. Subsurface: 
Subsurface WP 
Transport and 
Emplacement 
(Continued) 
Radiation: 
2. N/S 
3. Release of activated air and dust to the environment. 
4. Inadvertent opening of the WP transporter shielded enclosure doors, leading to a 
worker exposure. 
5. N/S 
6. Inadvertent opening of the emplacement access doors, leading to a worker 
exposure. 
Criticality: 
1. Criticality associated with a drop or collision of a WP and a rearrangement of the 
container internals. 
Contamination/Flooding: 
1. Flooding from a water pipe break originating on the development side of the 
repository (there are no sources of water present in the emplacement side of the 
repository. 
2. N/S 
See prior page. 
34. SNF Aging System; 
Aging Pads d 
VERTICAL AGING SYSTEM 
MSC Transporter Mechanical/Structural Failure: 
1. The MSC transporter fails and the vertical cask drops, resulting in damage to the 
aging system. 
2. The MSC transporter fails and tips over, resulting in damage to the aging system. 
Roadway Surface Failure: 
1. Hole, defect, or weak subsurface or shoulder condition in transfer roadway results in 
tipover of MSC transporter during transfer of a vertical cask. 
MSC Transporter Control Error: 
1. The MSC transporter rolls off edge of roadway and is damaged in a tipover event. 
2. The MSC transporter collides with vehicles or equipment staged or moving along 
transfer route causing direct damage, a cask drop, or tipover event. 
3. The MSC transporter collides with aging cask or module staged on Aging Pad 
causing direct damage, a cask drop, or tipover event. 
External Hazard - Induced by Seismic 
Activity [Designated as Beyond 
Category 2] d: 
SNF Aging System suffers structural 
damage when subjected to maximum 
acceleration loadings/interaction 
impacts 
SNF Aging System tipovers and 
suffers structural damage 
Aging cask or transfer cask is dropped 
from transporter and damaged during 
transfer operations. 
During transfer ram operation resulting 
in DPC mechanical interaction with 
HTC and/or HAM rail system and 
damage to the DPC. 

Table III-2. Identification of Seismically Initiated Potential Events (Continued) 
Functional Areas a 
Internal Events That Could Be Initiated by Seismic Event a,b,c 
Potential Seismically-Unique Events 
34. SNF Aging System; 
Aging Pads c 
(Continued) 
MSC Transporter Control Error: 
4. The MSC transporter rolls down inclined roadway and collides with fixed object or 
tips over. 
5. The MSC transporter collides with an aging cask or module causing a volatile fuel of 
hydraulic fuel spill, or hydrogen release (i.e., batteries). An explosion and/or fire 
results that damages the aging system. 
6. The MSC transporter collides with other vehicles causing a volatile fuel of hydraulic 
fuel spill, or hydrogen release (i.e., batteries). An explosion and/or fire results that 
damages the aging system. 
7. The MSC transporter collides with an aging cask or module causing an acid spill 
(i.e., batteries). Acid or other chloride containing chemical comes in contact with 
aging system surface and results in damage to the aging system. 
8. The MSC transporter collides with other vehicles causing an acid spill (i.e., 
batteries). Acid or other chloride-containing chemical comes in contact with aging 
system surface and results in damage to the aging system. 
9. The MSC transporter is moved in the wrong direction off the Aging Pad resulting in 
a tipover and damage to the Aging Cask. 
10. The MSC transporter is moved in the wrong direction off the Aging Pad resulting in 
a tipover and damage to the Aging Cask. 
Incorrect Vent Screen Installation: 
1. N/S 
Incorrect Temperature Monitoring System Installation Error: 
1. N/S 
Confinement Barrier Monitoring System Error: 
1. Malfunctioning confinement barrier monitoring system component results in loss of 
indication or inaccurate monitoring data being observed and interpreted by 
surveillance personnel. Inaccurate monitoring data results in a defective aging 
system seal not being detected and unmonitored radiological releases to occur. 
Vent Temperature Monitoring System Malfunction: 
1. Malfunctioning vent temperature monitoring system component results in loss of 
indication or inaccurate monitoring data being observed and interpreted by 
surveillance personnel. Inaccurate monitoring data results in a defective aging 
system seal not being detected and unmonitored radiological releases to occur. 
Other Seismically-Unique events: 
Sliding of vertical cask. 
Collapse of horizontal module 
structure. 
Failure of horizontal module shield 
door radiation. 

Table III-2. Identification of Seismically Initiated Potential Events (Continued) 
Functional Areas a 
Internal Events That Could Be Initiated by Seismic Event a,b,c 
Potential Seismically-Unique Events 
34. SNF Aging System; 
Aging Pads c 
(Continued) 
Confinement Barrier Monitoring System Failure: 
1. Malfunctioning confinement barrier monitoring system component results in loss of 
indication or inaccurate monitoring data being observed and interpreted by 
surveillance personnel. Inaccurate monitoring data results in a defective aging 
system seal not being detected and unmonitored radiological releases to occur. 
Seal Welded Confinement Barrier System Failure: 
1. The failure of seal welds caused by mechanical loads on the system. Radiological 
release as a result of this event. 
Bolted Closure Confinement System Failure: 
1. The failure of o-ring seals associated with one of the primary confinement barriers 
caused by mechanical damage to the closure system ( from cask drop or some 
other hazard). Radiological release as a result of this event. 
Surveillance/Maintenance Vehicle Control Failure: 
1. An Aging Pad or maintenance/surveillance vehicle collides with an aging cask or 
module staged on the Aging Pad during maintenance/surveillance activity on Aging 
Pad causing direct damage to an aging cask or tipover event. 
2. An Aging Pad or maintenance/surveillance vehicle collides with an aging cask or 
module causing a volatile fuel of hydraulic fuel spill, or hydrogen release (i.e., 
batteries). An explosion and/or fire results that damages the aging system. 
3. An Aging Pad or maintenance/surveillance vehicle collides with an aging cask or 
module causing an acid spill (i.e., batteries). Acid or other liquid chemical comes in 
contact with aging system surface and results in damage to the aging system. 
Welding/Cutting Activities: 
1. N/S 
2. A gas cylinder is dropped, crushed, or tipped over, resulting in an explosion and/or 
fire that damages an aging system 
Fire: 
1. Flammable liquids or combustible materials stages or near the Aging Pad ignite. 
The fire results in damage to the aging system 
See prior page 

Table III-2. Identification of Seismically Initiated Potential Events (Continued) 
Functional Areas a 
Internal Events That Could Be Initiated by Seismic Event a,b,c 
Potential Seismically-Unique Events 
34. SNF Aging System; 
Aging Pads c 
(Continued) 
HORIZONTAL AGING SYSTEM 
HTC Cask Tractor Control Failure 
1. The HTC Cask Tractor collides with aging cask during attachment procedure 
causing direct damage or tipover event that damages the DPC. 
HTC Transfer Trailer/Tractor Mechanical/Structural Failure 
1. The HTC transfer trailer/tractor fails and the HTC drops, resulting in damage to the 
aging system. 
2. The HTC transfer trailer/tractor fails and tips over, resulting in damage to the aging 
system. 
Roadway Surface Failure: 
1. Hole, defect, or weak subsurface or shoulder condition in transfer roadway results in 
tipover of HTC transfer trailer/tractor during transfer of a vertical cask. 
HTC Transfer Trailer/Tractor Control Error: 
1. The HTC transfer trailer/tractor rolls off edge of roadway and is damaged in a 
tipover event. 
2. The HTC transfer trailer/tractor collides with vehicles or equipment staged or 
moving along transfer route causing direct damage, a cask drop, or tipover event. 
3. The HTC transfer trailer/tractor collides with aging cask or module staged on Aging 
Pad causing direct damage, a cask drop, or tipover event. 
4. The HTC transfer trailer/tractor rolls down inclined roadway and collides with fixed 
object or tips over. 
5. The HTC transfer trailer/tractor and/or Cask Tractor collide with an aging cask or 
module causing a volatile fuel of hydraulic fuel spill, or hydrogen release (i.e., 
batteries). An explosion and/or fire results that damages the aging system. 
6. The HTC transfer trailer/tractor and/or Cask Tractor collide with other vehicles 
causing a volatile fuel of hydraulic fuel spill, or hydrogen release (i.e., batteries). An 
explosion and/or fire results that damages the aging system. 
7. The Cask Tractor collides with an aging cask or module causing an acid spill (i.e., 
batteries). Acid or other chloride containing chemical comes in contact with aging 
system surface and results in damage to the aging system. 
8. The HTC transfer trailer/tractor is moved in the wrong direction off the Aging Pad 
resulting in a tipover and damage to the Aging Cask. 
See prior page 

Table III-2. Identification of Seismically Initiated Potential Events (Continued) 
Functional Areas a 
Internal Events That Could Be Initiated by Seismic Event a,b,c 
Potential Seismically-Unique Events 
34. SNF Aging System; 
Aging Pads c 
(Continued) 
Load Drops: 
1. The HTC ram access plate cover is dropped from a mobile crane onto the HTC 
(without impact limiters) causing damage. 
2. The HAM shield door is dropped from a mobile crane onto the HTC (without impact 
limiters), HAM or directly onto a DPC during ram transfer operations, causing 
damage. 
Surface Contamination: 
1. N/S 
Hydraulic Ram Hydraulic System Failure: 
1. The Hydraulic ram hydraulic fluid is released and is ignited. An explosion and/or fire 
results that damages the aging system. 
DPC Misalignment: 
1. N/S 
Hydraulic Ram System Malfunction: 
1. N/S 
Incorrect Seismic Restraint Installation: 
1. Improper installation of seismic restraint results in damage to DPC following a 
seismic event. 
Vent Temperature Monitoring System Installation Error: 
1. N/S 
Vent Temperature Monitoring System Malfunction: 
1. Malfunctioning temperature monitoring system component results in loss of 
indication or inaccurate monitoring data being observed and interpreted by 
surveillance personnel. Inaccurate monitoring data results in a defective aging 
system seal not being detected and unmonitored damage to contained SNF clad or 
HLW packing barriers. 
Surveillance/Maintenance Vehicle Control Failure: 
1. An Aging Pad or maintenance/surveillance vehicle collides with an aging cask or 
module staged on the Aging Pad during maintenance/surveillance activity on Aging 
Pad causing direct damage to an aging cask or tipover event. 
See prior page 

Table III-2. Identification of Seismically Initiated Potential Events (Continued) 
Functional Areas a 
Internal Events That Could Be Initiated by Seismic Event a,b,c 
Potential Seismically-Unique Events 
34. SNF Aging System; 
Aging Pads c 
(Continued) 
Surveillance/Maintenance Vehicle Control Failure: 
2. An Aging Pad or maintenance/surveillance vehicle collides with an aging cask or 
module causing a volatile fuel or hydraulic fuel spill, or hydrogen release (i.e., 
batteries). An explosion and/or fire results that damages the aging system. 
3. An Aging Pad or maintenance/surveillance vehicle collides with an aging cask or 
module causing an acid spill (i.e., batteries). Acid or other liquid chemical comes in 
contact with aging system. 
Welding/Cutting Activities: 
1. N/S 
2. A gas cylinder is dropped, crushed, or tipped over, resulting in an explosion and/or 
fire that damages an aging system. 
Fire: 
1. Flammable liquids or combustible materials stages or near the Aging Pad ignite. 
The fire results in damage to the aging system. 
External: 
Loss of Power. 
See prior page 

Table III-2. Identification of Seismically Initiated Potential Events (Continued) 
Functional Areas a 
Internal Events That Could Be Initiated by Seismic Event a,b,c 
Potential Seismically-Unique Events 
35. Subsurface 
Facilities: Construction 
Hazards 
Drops, Slap Downs, Collision: 
None identified. 
Fire: 
1. Diesel fuel fire or explosion associated with development equipment resulting in 
damage to the subsurface isolation barriers. 
2. Electrical fire associated with subsurface development equipment or other 
equipment resulting in damage to the subsurface isolation barriers. 
3. Transient combustible fire in the development side of the subsurface facilities 
resulting in damage to the subsurface isolation barriers. 
4. Loss of cooling in the emplacement drifts. 
Criticality: 
None identified. 
Radiation: 
None identified. 
Contamination/Flooding: 
1. Flooding from a pipe break originating on the development side of the repository 
(there are no sources of process water present in the emplacement side of the 
repository). 
Seismically-Unique: 
Collapse / rockfall within exhaust 
shaft(s) or exhaust tunnels, reversing 
air flow, leading to a loss of 
confinement. 
Failure of isolation airlocks between 
emplacement and development areas, 
leading to a release of activated 
material present in the emplacement 
side of the repository into the 
development side of the repository. 
36. Surface Facilities: 
Construction Hazards 
Drops, Slap Downs, Collision: 
1. Impacts on a loaded transportation cask, a loaded MSC, or a loaded WP as a result 
of construction operations. 
Fire: 
1. Diesel fuel fire/explosion associated with construction equipment. 
2. Electrical fire associated with construction equipment or other equipment. 
3. Transient combustible fire. 
Radiation: 
1. Radiation exposure of a facility worker and/or the offsite public. 
Criticality: 
1. Criticality associated with an impact on a loaded transportation cask, a loaded MSC, 
or a loaded WP and a rearrangement of the container internals. 
Seismically-Unique: 
Collapse of construction cranes or 
other tall equipment onto surface 
facilities. 

Table III-2. Identification of Seismically Initiated Potential Events (Continued) 
Functional Areas a 
Internal Events That Could Be Initiated by Seismic Event a,b,c 
Potential Seismically-Unique Events 
37. Subsurface 
Facilities: Drip Shield 
Installation 
Drops, Slap Downs, Collisions: 
1. Derailment of a drip shield emplacement gantry carrying a drip shield, followed by a 
load drop (drop of the drip shield); the drip shield and/or the gantry impacts a WP or 
several WPs. 
2. Drip shield emplacement gantry carrying a drip shield collides with a WP or WPs 
due to gantry failure. 
3. Collision of a drip shield emplacement gantry holding a drip shield with a fallen rock, 
fallen ground support, or other object, followed by a load drop (drop of the drip 
shield) onto a WP or WPs. 
4. Rockfall onto a drip shield emplacement gantry carrying a drip shield, leading to 
gantry damage or failure and impact of the rock or drip shield with a WP. 
5. Rockfall onto a WP. 
6. Ground control drop onto a WP. 
7. Ground control drop onto a drip shield emplacement gantry carrying a drip shield, 
leading to gantry damage or failure and impact of the ground control or drip shield 
with a WP. 
Fires: 
1. Electrical fire associated with the drip shield emplacement gantry or other 
subsurface equipment. 
2. N/S 
Radiation: 
1. Early WP failure while in the subsurface during the preclosure period and a 
resultant release of radioactive material. 
2. Release of activated air and dust to the environment. 
Criticality: 
1. Criticality associated with an impact or collision with a WP and a rearrangement of 
the container internals. 
Seismically-Unique: 
None identified. 
38. Retrieval 
Included in emplacement evaluations. 
Included in emplacement evaluations. 

Table III-2. Identification of Seismically Initiated Potential Events (Continued) 
Functional Areas a 
Internal Events That Could Be Initiated by Seismic Event a,b,c 
Potential Seismically-Unique Events 
39. Site-Generated 
Radiological Waste 
Disposal 
Drops, Slap Downs, Collisions: 
1. Drop of a heavy load onto a tank, piping, or a container containing liquid radioactive 
waste. 
2. Drop of a container or drum containing solid LLW. 
Fires: 
1. Transient combustible fire in areas where dry, flammable LLW is stored. 
Radiation: 
1. Radiation exposure of a facility worker. 
Criticality: 
None identified. 
Seismically-Unique: 
Collapse of disposal structures onto 
other SSCs ITS. 
NOTES: a Modified from BSC (2004p). 
b Numbering of potential internal events is as shown in BSC (2004p). Events, which are not applicable to seismic event initiation, are labeled N/S 
for not applicable. 
c SNF Aging System listings modified from Cogema (2004). 
d N/S = Not seismic: excluded as not credible as a seismically-initiated event. 
BWR = boiling water reactor; CHF = Canister Handling Facility; CSNF = commercial spent nuclear fuel; DPC = dual-purpose canister; 
DSNF = U.S. Department of Energy-owned spent nuclear fuel; DTF = Dry Transfer Facility; FHF = Fuel Handling Facility; HAMs = horizontal 
aging modules; HLW = high-level radioactive waste; ITS = important to safety; MCO = multi-canister overpack; MSC = monitored geologic repository 
site-specific cask; PWR = pressurized water reactor; SNF = spent nuclear fuel; SRTC = site rail transfer cart; SSCs = structures, systems, and 
components; WP = waste package. 

INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 

ATTACHMENT IV 
STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS, AND COMPONENTS IMPORTANT TO SAFETY 
WITH DBGM ASSIGNMENTS 

INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 

ATTACHMENT IV 
STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS, AND COMPONENTS IMPORTANT TO SAFETY 
WITH DBGM ASSIGNMENT 
Attached is a table of assignments of DBGM levels to structures, systems, subsystems and 
components that are classified as important to safety (ITS) that are credited in the prevention or 
mitigation of a seismically-initiated event sequences. ITS is one division of the SSCs classified 
as Safety Category (BSC 2004z , Section 4.2.2). The other division of SSCs is termed important 
to waste isolation. SSCs important to waste isolation are considered in postclosure performance 
assessment but are not applicable to preclosure safety and therefore are not addressed in this 
analysis. 
The potential doses in Table 3 and the results of the assignments in Table 4 are used as the basis 
for assignment of DBGM levels to SSC ITS in Table IV-1. In the implementation of these 
DBGM assignments, not all SSCs that are ITS are assigned a DBGM level. If the specific SSC 
is not credited in the prevention or mitigation of a credible seismically-initiated event sequence, 
it is not assigned a DBGM level. Rather, the SSC will be assigned a conventional design 
designation for the seismic design criterion. Therefore, the list contains several SSC ITS that 
have a conventional design assignment. 
On another aspect of assigning DBGM levels, certain SSCs may be upgraded from DBGM-1 to 
DBGM-2 based on considerations of the aggregated DBGM-1 dose. In the event when analysis 
indicate the aggregated dose due to the failure of all BDGM-1 is equal to or greater than 5 rem 
TEDE [i.e., non-compliance of aggregated DBGM-1 SSCs doses with 10 CFR 63.111(b)(2)], 
then one or more DBGM-1 SSCs may be upgraded to a DBGM-2 level to achieve compliance. 
Further, re-assignment from a DBGM-1 to a DBGM-2 level may also be based on risk informed 
management or review decisions. 
In addition, the table identifies potential seismic interactions. These interactions can cause an 
SSC to be designated as ITS when examined in detailed design. Any SSC whose failure can 
cause a SSC classified as ITS to not perform its safety function when required shall be classified 
as a Safety Category ITS and designed to prevent the unacceptable interaction. Items that 
potentially can cause such a two-over-one interaction are identified in the Table IV-1, based on 
the current level of design. However, for this analysis, the specific SSC is not re-assigned to 
ITS, but rather identified for further investigation. In this regard, a small design change, such as 
changing the SSC location, or by introducing of a barrier or restraint, could remove or change the 
interaction. For example, if a piping system could fail and strike a SSC ITS, pipe 
restraints/hangers could be introduced to prevent the displacement. In this case, the restraints 
would then be designated as SSC-ITS and designed to a DBGM level, and not the piping system. 
In summary, while seismic interactions are noted, no re-assignment of SSCs is performed as part 
of seismic interaction in the present analysis. 

Table IV-1. Seismic Classification of Systems, Components and Functions 
System/ 
Subsystem a 
Subsystem/ 
Component/ 
Function a,c 
Safety 
Category a 
ITS/ITWI a 
Seismic 
Category b 
Safety Function 
(for DBGM 
Assignment) d 
Basis for Seismic Classification/Comments 
Balance of Plant Facilities 
Administration 
Facility 
Structure 
Non-SC 
N/A 
CD 
N/A 
No function of this facility is credited for the 
prevention or mitigation of a seismically-initiated 
event sequence. 
Security Facility 
Structure 
Non-SC 
N/A 
CD 
N/A 
No function of this facility is credited for the 
prevention or mitigation of a seismically-initiated 
event sequence. 
Utility Facility 
Structure 
Non-SC 
N/A 
CD 
N/A 
No function of this facility is credited for the 
prevention or mitigation of a seismically-initiated 
event sequence. 
Emergency 
Response Facility 
Structure 
Non-SC 
N/A 
CD 
N/A 
No function of this facility is credited for the 
prevention or mitigation of a seismically-initiated 
event sequence. 
Offsite Facilities 
Structure 
Non-SC 
N/A 
CD 
N/A 
No function of this facility is credited for the 
prevention or mitigation of a seismically-initiated 
event sequence. 
Materials and 
Consumables 
Facility 
Structure 
Non-SC 
N/A 
CD 
N/A 
No function of this facility is credited for the 
prevention or mitigation of a seismically-initiated 
event sequence. 
Fire Water Facility 
Structure 
Non-SC 
N/A 
CD 
N/A 
No function of this facility is credited for the 
prevention or mitigation of a seismically-initiated 
event sequence. 
Maintenance and 
Repair Facility 
Structure 
Non-SC 
N/A 
CD 
N/A 
No function of this facility is credited for the 
prevention or mitigation of a seismically-initiated 
event sequence. 

Table IV-1. Seismic Classification of Systems, Components and Functions (Continued) 
System/ 
Subsystem a 
Subsystem/ 
Component/ 
Function a,c 
Safety 
Category a 
ITS/ITWI a 
Seismic 
Category b 
Safety Function 
(for DBGM 
Assignment) d 
Basis for Seismic Classification/Comments 
Generator Facility 
Structure 
Non-SC 
N/A 
CD 
N/A 
No function of this facility is credited for the 
prevention or mitigation of a seismically-initiated 
event sequence. 
Switchgear Facility 
Structure 
Non-SC 
N/A 
CD 
N/A 
[Potential for 
Seismic Interaction] 
No function of this facility is credited for the 
prevention or mitigation of a seismically-initiated 
event sequence. 
Potential Interaction: SSC houses 4.16 kV 
switchgear, which controls power for fans supplying 
air to waste transfer cells requiring continual 
cooling. 
Construction 
Support Facility 
Structure 
Non-SC 
N/A 
CD 
N/A 
No function of this facility is credited for the 
prevention or mitigation of a seismically-initiated 
event sequence. 
Central Control 
Center Facility 
Structure 
Non-SC 
N/A 
CD 
N/A 
[Potential for 
Seismic Interaction] 
Collapse of structure due to a seismic event shall 
not impact waste handling operations or adjacent 
structures. 
No function of this facility is credited for the 
prevention or mitigation of a seismically-initiated 
event sequence. 
Seismically-initiated control function failure could 
potentially impact a SSC ITS. 
Transportation 
Facility 
Truck and 
Railcar 
Staging Areas 
Non-SC 
N/A 
CD 
N/A 
Design loads in compliance with 10 CFR Part 71 
bound expected seismic loads for seismicallyinitiated 
sequences with transporters with impact 
limiters. 

Table IV-1. Seismic Classification of Systems, Components and Functions (Continued) 
System/ 
Subsystem a 
Subsystem/ 
Component/ 
Function a,c 
Safety 
Category a 
ITS/ITWI a 
Seismic 
Category b 
Safety Function 
(for DBGM 
Assignment) d 
Basis for Seismic Classification/Comments 
Canister Handling Facility 
CHF 
Structure 
SC 
ITS 
DBGM-2 
No Structural 
Collapse 
Collapse of structure due to a seismic event could 
initiate an event sequence exceeding the 
performance objectives of 10 CFR 63.111(b)(2) by 
breach of DSNF canister or other waste containers. 
CHF 
Rails for 
Trolleys, WP 
Transporter, 
and SRTCs 
SC 
ITS 
DBGM-2 
No Derailment 
Damage to rails and subsequent tipover or slap 
down of a waste transport due to a seismic event 
could initiate an event sequence exceeding the 
performance objectives of 10 CFR 63.111(b)(2) by 
breach of DSNF canister or other waste containers. 
CHF 
Permanent 
Shielding 
(including 
Shield Doors 
and Walls, 
Airlock Doors, 
Shield View 
Ports, and 
Viewing 
Windows) 
SC 
ITS 
DBGM-1 
Shielding Integrity 
Remains Intact 
Loss of shielding due to a seismic event could 
initiate an event sequence exceeding the 
performance objectives of 10 CFR 63.111(b)(1). 
Cask/ Monitored Geologic Repository Site-Specific Cask/Waste Package Preparation System 
Cask Preparation 
200 ton Cask 
Handling 
Crane and 
Rigging (DTF 
and CHF) 
SC 
ITS 
DBGM-2 
No Drop 
Drop of cask without impact limiters containing 
DSNF due to a seismic event could initiate an event 
sequence exceeding the performance objectives of 
10 CFR 63.111(b)(2) by breach of a DSNF canister. 

Table IV-1. Seismic Classification of Systems, Components and Functions (Continued) 
System/ 
Subsystem a 
Subsystem/ 
Component/ 
Function a,c 
Safety 
Category a 
ITS/ITWI a 
Seismic 
Category b 
Safety Function 
(for DBGM 
Assignment) d 
Basis for Seismic Classification/Comments 
Cask Preparation 
200 ton Navy 
Cask 
Handling 
Crane and 
Rigging 
(DTF) 
SC 
ITS 
DBGM-2 
No Drop 
Assigned to DBGM-2 as part of risk-informed basis 
(Assumption 5.20) 
Cask Preparation 
Crane Lifting 
Yokes 
SC 
ITS 
DBGM-2 
No Drop 
As part of the crane assembly, the yokes are relied 
on to minimize the probability of a load drop. 
Drop of cask without impact limiters containing 
DSNF due to a seismic event could initiate an event 
sequence exceeding the performance objectives of 
10 CFR 63.111(b)(2) by breach of a DSNF canister. 
Cask Preparation 
Turntables 
SC 
ITS 
DBGM-2 
No Tipover 
Tipover due to a seismic event could initiate an 
event sequence exceeding the performance 
objectives of 10 CFR 63.111(b)(2) by breach of a 
DSNF canister. 
Cask Preparation 
Cask Docking 
Ring 
Non-SC 
N/A 
CD 
N/A 
No function of this SSC is credited for the 
prevention or mitigation of a seismically-initiated 
event sequence. 
Cask Preparation 
Cask Pit 
Pedestal 
Non-SC 
N/A 
CD 
N/A 
No function of this SSC is credited for the 
prevention or mitigation of a seismically-initiated 
event sequence. 
Cask Preparation 
Cask Pit 
Protective 
Covers 
SC 
ITS 
DBGM-1 
Shielding Integrity 
Remains Intact 
Removal or damage of covers due to a seismic 
event could initiate an event sequence exceeding 
the performance objectives of 10 CFR 63.111(b)(1). 
Cask Preparation 
Pit Crush Pad 
SC 
ITS 
CD 
N/A 
No function of this SSC is credited for the 
prevention or mitigation of a seismically-initiated 
event sequence. 

Table IV-1. Seismic Classification of Systems, Components and Functions (Continued) 
System/ 
Subsystem a 
Subsystem/ 
Component/ 
Function a,c 
Safety 
Category a 
ITS/ITWI a 
Seismic 
Category b 
Safety Function 
(for DBGM 
Assignment) d 
Basis for Seismic Classification/Comments 
Cask Preparation 
200 ton 
Vestibule 
Gantry Crane 
(FHF) 
SC 
ITS 
DBGM-2 
No Drop 
Drop of cask due to a seismic event could initiate an 
event sequence exceeding the performance 
objectives of 10 CFR 63.111(b)(2) by release from a 
DSNF canister. 
Cask Preparation 
200 ton Main 
Transfer 
Room Crane 
(FHF) 
SC 
ITS 
DBGM-2 
No Drop 
Drop of cask due to a seismic event could initiate an 
event sequence exceeding the performance 
objectives of 10 CFR 63.111(b)(2) by release from a 
DSNF canister. 
Sharp objects that could result in a breach to a 
waste form or its container shall not be located 
under the load path of any crane that handles waste 
forms or waste containers without appropriate lift 
height restrictions on the crane. 
Cask Preparation 
Mobile 
Elevating 
Platform 
Non-SC 
N/A 
CD 
N/A 
[Potential for 
Seismic Interaction] 
No function of this SSC is credited for the 
prevention or mitigation of a seismically-initiated 
event sequence. 
Possible platform for interaction with waste 
container to be examined. 
Cask Preparation 
Cask Pit 
Movable 
Platform 
Non-SC 
N/A 
CD 
N/A 
[Potential for 
Seismic Interaction] 
No function of this SSC is credited for the 
prevention or mitigation of a seismically-initiated 
event sequence. 
Possible platform for interaction with waste 
container to be examined. 
Cask Preparation 
Trolleys 
SC 
ITS 
DBGM-2 
No Slap Down 
A slap down due to a seismic event could initiate an 
event sequence exceeding the performance 
objectives of 10 CFR 63.111(b)(2) by breach of a 
DSNF canister. 

Table IV-1. Seismic Classification of Systems, Components and Functions (Continued) 
System/ 
Subsystem a 
Subsystem/ 
Component/ 
Function a,c 
Safety 
Category a 
ITS/ITWI a 
Seismic 
Category b 
Safety Function 
(for DBGM 
Assignment) d 
Basis for Seismic Classification/Comments 
Cask Preparation 
Pedestals, 
and Hold- 
Down 
Devices 
(DTF, CHF, 
and FHF) 
SC 
ITS 
DBGM-2 
No Tipover 
A tipover due to a seismic event could initiate an 
event sequence exceeding the performance 
objectives of 10 CFR 63.111(b)(2) by breach of a 
DSNF canister. 
WP Preparation 
WP Trolleys 
(DTF) 
SC 
ITS 
DBGM-2 
No Tipover 
A tipover due to a seismic event could initiate an 
event sequence exceeding the performance 
objectives of 10 CFR 63.111(b)(2) by breach of a 
DSNF canister. 
WP Preparation 
Pedestals, 
and Hold- 
Down 
Devices 
(DTF) 
SC 
ITS 
DBGM-2 
No Slap Down 
A slap down due to a seismic event could initiate an 
event sequence exceeding the performance 
objectives of 10 CFR 63.111(b)(2) by breach of a 
DSNF canister. 
WP Preparation 
WP Docking 
Ring 
Non-SC 
N/A 
CD 
N/A 
No function of this SSC is credited for the 
prevention or mitigation of a seismically-initiated 
event sequence. 
WP Preparation 
100 ton WP 
and Canister 
Handling 
Crane (CHF) 
SC 
ITS 
DBGM-2 
No Drop 
Drop of WP due to a seismic event could initiate an 
event sequence exceeding the performance 
objectives of 10 CFR 63.111(b)(2) by release from a 
DSNF canister. 
Sharp objects that could result in a breach to a 
waste form or its container shall not be located 
under the load path of any crane that handles waste 
forms or waste containers without appropriate lift 
height restrictions on the crane. 

Table IV-1. Seismic Classification of Systems, Components and Functions (Continued) 
System/ 
Subsystem a 
Subsystem/ 
Component/ 
Function a,c 
Safety 
Category a 
ITS/ITWI a 
Seismic 
Category b 
Safety Function 
(for DBGM 
Assignment) d 
Basis for Seismic Classification/Comments 
WP Preparation 
Crane Lifting 
Yokes 
SC 
ITS 
DBGM-2 
No Drop 
As part of the crane assembly, the yokes are relied 
on to minimize the probability of a load drop. 
Drop of WP due to a seismic event could initiate an 
event sequence exceeding the performance 
objectives of 10 CFR 63.111(b)(2) by release from a 
DSNF canister. 
WP Preparation 
Crush Pad 
SC 
ITS 
CD 
N/A 
No function of this SSC is credited for the 
prevention or mitigation of a seismically-initiated 
event sequence. 
WP Preparation 
WP Pit 
Pedestal 
Non-SC 
N/A 
CD 
N/A 
No function of this SSC is credited for the 
prevention or mitigation of a seismically-initiated 
event sequence. 
WP Preparation 
WP Pit 
Protective 
Cover 
SC 
ITS 
DBGM-1 
No Failure 
Removal or damage of cover due to a seismic event 
could initiate an event sequence exceeding the 
performance objectives of 10 CFR 63.111(b)(1). 
WP Preparation 
MSC Pit 
Pedestal 
Non-SC 
N/A 
CD 
N/A 
No function of this SSC is credited for the 
prevention or mitigation of a seismically-initiated 
event sequence. 
WP Preparation 
MSC Pit 
Protective 
Cover 
SC 
ITS 
DBGM-1 
No Failure 
Removal or damage of cover due to a seismic event 
could initiate an event sequence exceeding the 
performance objectives of 10 CFR 63.111(b)(1). 
Cask Restoration 
Entire 
(Same 
Components 
as Cask 
Preparation 
Subsystem) 
Non-SC 
N/A 
CD 
N/A 
No function of this SSC is credited for the 
prevention or mitigation of a seismically-initiated 
event sequence. 

Table IV-1. Seismic Classification of Systems, Components and Functions (Continued) 
System/ 
Subsystem a 
Subsystem/ 
Component/ 
Function a,c 
Safety 
Category a 
ITS/ITWI a 
Seismic 
Category b 
Safety Function 
(for DBGM 
Assignment) d 
Basis for Seismic Classification/Comments 
Cask Receipt and Return System 
SRTC Buffer 
SRTC 
ITS 
N/A 
DBGM-2 
No Slap Down 
In receipt areas, impact limiters are removed from 
transportation casks while on SRTCs. In this 
situation, failure of the SSC would involve waste 
forms without impact limiters, and therefore the 
potential exists for a seismic event to initiate an 
event sequence exceeding the performance 
objectives of 10 CFR 63.111(b)(2). 
In most cases, the SRTC will carry transportation 
casks with impact limiters. Transportation casks 
with impact limiters are designed to 10 CFR Part 71 
requirements, which are assumed to exceed 
DBGM-2 design loads (Assumption 5.16). 
SRTC Buffer 
SRTC Rails 
(and 
Supports) 
Non-SC 
N/A 
CD 
N/A 
No function of these SSCs is credited for the 
prevention or mitigation of a seismically-initiated 
event sequence. 
SRTC rails and supports are used to transport 
waste forms in transportation casks with impact 
limiters within the Transportation Cask Buffer Area. 
Transportation casks with impact limiters are 
designed to 10 CFR Part 71 requirements, which 
exceed 1DBGM-2 design loads (Assumption 5.16). 
SRTC Buffer 
SRTC 
Positioner 
Non-SC 
N/A 
CD 
N/A 
No function of this SSC is credited for the 
prevention or mitigation of a seismically-initiated 
event sequence. 
Failure of SSC would involve waste forms within 
transportation casks with impact limiters. 
Transportation casks with impact limiters are 
designed to 10 CFR Part 71 requirements, which 
exceed DBGM-2 design loads (Assumption 5.16). 

Table IV-1. Seismic Classification of Systems, Components and Functions (Continued) 
System/ 
Subsystem a 
Subsystem/ 
Component/ 
Function a,c 
Safety 
Category a 
ITS/ITWI a 
Seismic 
Category b 
Safety Function 
(for DBGM 
Assignment) d 
Basis for Seismic Classification/Comments 
SRTC Buffer 
SRTC 
Positioner 
Turntable 
Non-SC 
N/A 
CD 
N/A 
No function of this SSC is credited for the 
prevention or mitigation of a seismically-initiated 
event sequence. 
Failure of SSC would involve waste forms within 
transportation casks with impact limiters. 
Transportation casks with impact limiters are 
designed to 10 CFR Part 71 requirements, which 
exceed DBGM-2 design loads (Assumption 5.16). 
SRTC Buffer 
SRTC Tractor 
Non-SC 
N/A 
DBGM-2* 
No Slap Down* 
No Runaway* 
Within structures, the tractor may collide with the 
STRC or mis-direct the SRTC (runaway) and induce 
slap down of cask without impact limiters due to a 
seismic event that could initiate an event sequence 
exceeding the performance objectives of 
10 CFR 63.111(b)(2). 
However, movement of the SRTC (containing casks 
without impact limiters) by the SRTC tractor is 
limited to very short distances within structures 
(DTF, CHF, FHF), and requires reevaluation to 
determine if a slapdown or runaway is a credible 
event. 
*Designation of SSC requires review. 
Cask Receipt and 
Return 
250 ton Cask 
Handling 
Crane 
(TCRRF) 
SC 
ITS 
DBGM-2 
No Drop 
Drop of WP due to a seismic event could initiate an 
event sequence exceeding the performance 
objectives of 10 CFR 63.111(b)(2) by release from a 
DSNF canister. 
Sharp objects that could result in a breach to a 
waste form or its container shall not be located 
under the load path of any crane that handles waste 
forms or waste containers without appropriate lift 
height restrictions on the crane. 

Table IV-1. Seismic Classification of Systems, Components and Functions (Continued) 
System/ 
Subsystem a 
Subsystem/ 
Component/ 
Function a,c 
Safety 
Category a 
ITS/ITWI a 
Seismic 
Category b 
Safety Function 
(for DBGM 
Assignment) d 
Basis for Seismic Classification/Comments 
Cask Receipt and 
Return 
Cask Lifting 
Yokes 
SC 
ITS 
DBGM-2 
No Drop 
Drop of WP due to a seismic event could initiate an 
event sequence exceeding the performance 
objectives of 10 CFR 63.111(b)(2) by release from a 
DSNF canister. 
Cask Receipt and 
Return 
Crush Pad 
SC 
ITS 
CD 
N/A 
No function of this SSC is credited for the 
prevention or mitigation of a seismically-initiated 
event sequence. 
Communications System 
Communications 
Subsystems 
include: 
Voice such as 
Radio, Wired 
and Mobile 
Telephone, 
Public 
Address; 
Video; Data; 
Network; and 
Transport 
Non-SC 
N/A 
CD 
N/A 
No function of these SSCs is credited for the 
prevention or mitigation of a seismically-initiated 
event sequence. 
Digital Control and Management Information System 
Digital Control and 
Management 
Information 
Entire 
Non-SC 
N/A 
CD 
N/A 
[Potential Seismic 
Interaction] 
No function of this SSC is credited for the 
prevention or mitigation of a seismically-initiated 
event sequence. 
Potential loss of control function due to Chatter 
induced by seismic event; see Section 6.1.3. 

Table IV-1. Seismic Classification of Systems, Components and Functions (Continued) 
System/ 
Subsystem a 
Subsystem/ 
Component/ 
Function a,c 
Safety 
Category a 
ITS/ITWI a 
Seismic 
Category b 
Safety Function 
(for DBGM 
Assignment) d 
Basis for Seismic Classification/Comments 
DOE and Commercial Waste Package System 
DOE and 
Commercial WP 
System 
WP 
(See also 
Engineered 
Barrier 
System) 
SC 
ITS / IWTI 
DBGM-2 
No Breach 
No Criticality 
Breach of WP due to a seismic event could initiate 
an event sequence exceeding the performance 
objectives of 10 CFR 63.111(b)(2) by release from a 
DSNF canister. 
The system shall ensure that as a result of a 
seismic event, a nuclear criticality cannot occur. 
DOE and 
Commercial WP 
System 
Trunnion 
Collar 
SC 
ITS 
DBGM-2 
No Drop 
Breach of WP due to a seismic event could initiate 
an event sequence exceeding the performance 
objectives of 10 CFR 63.111(b)(2) by release from a 
DSNF canister. 
DOE Spent Nuclear Fuel Disposable Canister 
DSNF Disposable 
Canister 
Standardized 
DSNF 
Canister 
SC 
ITS 
DBGM-2 
No Breach 
Breach of DSNF Canister due to a seismic event 
could initiate an event sequence exceeding the 
performance objectives of 10 CFR 63.111(b)(2). 
DSNF Disposable 
Canister 
DOE Multicanister 
Overpack 
SC 
ITS 
DBGM-2 
No Breach 
Breach of DSNF Canister due to a seismic event 
could initiate an event sequence exceeding the 
performance objectives of 10 CFR 63.111(b)(2). 
DSNF Disposable 
Canister 
DOE HLW 
Canister 
SC 
ITS 
DBGM-1 
No Breach 
Breach of HLW canister due to a seismic event is 
taken (conservatively) to exceed the performance 
objectives of 10 CFR 63.111(b)(1). 
DSNF Disposable 
Canister 
Internal 
Geometry 
Control 
(For DSNF 
Standardized 
and Multicanisters, 
and 
HLW) 
SC 
ITS 
DBGM-2 
No Criticality 
The SSC shall ensure that as a result of a seismic 
event, a nuclear criticality cannot occur. 

Table IV-1. Seismic Classification of Systems, Components and Functions (Continued) 
System/ 
Subsystem a 
Subsystem/ 
Component/ 
Function a,c 
Safety 
Category a 
ITS/ITWI a 
Seismic 
Category b 
Safety Function 
(for DBGM 
Assignment) d 
Basis for Seismic Classification/Comments 
DSNF Disposable 
Canister 
Internal 
Neutron 
Absorbers 
SC 
ITWI 
CD 
N/A 
No function of these SSCs is credited for the 
prevention or mitigation of a seismically-initiated 
event sequence. 
Dry Transfer Facility (Includes Remediation System) 
DTF 
Structure 
SC 
ITS 
DBGM-2 
No Structural 
Collapse 
Collapse of structure due to a seismic event could 
initiate an event sequence exceeding the 
performance objectives of 10 CFR 63.111(b)(2) by 
breach of DSNF canister or other waste containers. 
DTF 
Remediation 
Pool 
SC 
ITS 
DBGM-2 
No Failure 
Failure of pool resulting loss of water due to a 
seismic event could initiate an event sequence 
exceeding the performance objectives of 10 CFR 
63.111(b)(2). 
DTF 
Rails for 
Trolleys, WP 
Transporter, 
and SRTCs 
SC 
ITS 
DBGM-2 
No Derailment 
Damage to rails and subsequent tipover or slap 
down of a waste transport due to a seismic event 
could initiate an event sequence exceeding the 
performance objectives of 10 CFR 63.111(b)(2) by 
breach of DSNF canister or other waste containers. 
DTF 
Permanent 
Shielding 
(including 
Shield Doors 
and Walls, 
Airlock Doors, 
Shield View 
Ports, and 
Viewing 
Windows) 
SC 
ITS 
DBGM-1 
Shielding Integrity 
Remains Intact 
Loss of shielding due to a seismic event could 
initiate an event sequence exceeding the 
performance objectives of 10 CFR 63.111(b)(1). 

Table IV-1. Seismic Classification of Systems, Components and Functions (Continued) 
System/ 
Subsystem a 
Subsystem/ 
Component/ 
Function a,c 
Safety 
Category a 
ITS/ITWI a 
Seismic 
Category b 
Safety Function 
(for DBGM 
Assignment) d 
Basis for Seismic Classification/Comments 
DTF 
Electromechanical 
manipulators 
(Not 
Assigned)* 
(Not 
Assigned)* 
DBGM-2 
No Drop 
Manipulators will latch/unlatch grapples, 
connect/disconnect crane attachments, and sort 
and pack waste into container. 
Drop of SSCs held by manipulators onto a waste 
form due to a seismic event could initiate an event 
sequence exceeding the performance objectives of 
10 CFR 63.111(b)(2) by breach of a DSNF canister. 
*Classification of SSC requires review. 
Electrical Power System 
Normal Power, 
Switchyard and 
Standby Power, and 
Emergency Diesel 
Generators 
Entire 
Non-SC 
N/A 
CD 
N/A 
[Potential for 
Seismic Interaction] 
No function of these SSCs is credited for the 
prevention or mitigation of a seismically-initiated 
event sequence. 
Offsite power failure can be expected due to 
significant seismic event. 
Emergency Power 
4.16 kV 
Emergency 
Bus, 480 V 
Emergency 
Bus, 125 V 
DC, and 120 
V AC UPS 
SC 
ITS 
CD 
N/A 
[Potential for Seismic 
Interaction] 
No function of this SSC is credited for the 
prevention or mitigation of a seismically-initiated 
event sequence. 
Emergency power failure can be expected due to 
significant seismic event. 
Electrical Support System 
Lighting 
Entire 
Non-SC 
N/A 
CD 
N/A 
No function of this SSC is credited for the 
prevention or mitigation of a seismically-initiated 
event sequence. 
Grounding 
Entire 
Non-SC 
N/A 
CD 
N/A 
No function of this SSC is credited for the 
prevention or mitigation of a seismically-initiated 
event sequence. 

Table IV-1. Seismic Classification of Systems, Components and Functions (Continued) 
System/ 
Subsystem a 
Subsystem/ 
Component/ 
Function a,c 
Safety 
Category a 
ITS/ITWI a 
Seismic 
Category b 
Safety Function 
(for DBGM 
Assignment) d 
Basis for Seismic Classification/Comments 
Lightning Protection 
Entire 
Non-SC 
N/A 
CD 
N/A 
No function of this SSC is credited for the 
prevention or mitigation of a seismically-initiated 
event sequence. 
Cathodic Protection 
Entire 
Non-SC 
N/A 
CD 
N/A 
No function of this SSC is credited for the 
prevention or mitigation of a seismically-initiated 
event sequence. 
Heat Tracing 
Entire 
Non-SC 
N/A 
CD 
N/A 
No function of this SSC is credited for the 
prevention or mitigation of a seismically-initiated 
event sequence. 
Cable Raceway 
Portion that 
Supports ITS 
Function of 
the DTF and 
FHF Surface 
Nuclear 
HVAC 
Primary 
Subsystem 
Components 
from the Fan 
Motor to the 
4160 V Bus 
Emergency 
Power 
Subsystem 
SC 
ITS 
CD 
N/A 
[Potential for 
Seismic Interaction] 
No function of this SSC is credited for the 
prevention or mitigation of a seismically-initiated 
event sequence. 

Table IV-1. Seismic Classification of Systems, Components and Functions (Continued) 
System/ 
Subsystem a 
Subsystem/ 
Component/ 
Function a,c 
Safety 
Category a 
ITS/ITWI a 
Seismic 
Category b 
Safety Function 
(for DBGM 
Assignment) d 
Basis for Seismic Classification/Comments 
Cable Raceway 
Portion of the 
Cable 
Raceway 
Subsystem 
that Supports 
Normal 
Power, 
Switchyard 
and Standby 
Power, and 
Emergency 
Diesel 
Generators 
(including 
support 
systems) 
Non-SC 
N/A 
CD 
N/A 
No function of these SSCs is credited for the 
prevention or mitigation of a seismically-initiated 
event sequence. 
Emplacement and Retrieval System 
WP Transportation 
WP 
Transporter 
SC 
ITS 
DBGM-2 
No Runaway 
(Together with 
Locomotive and 
Coupler) 
A runaway locomotive due to a seismic event could 
initiate an event sequence exceeding the 
performance objectives of 10 CFR 63.111(b)(2) by 
breach of a DSNF canister. 
The restraints used to immobilize the bedplate 
inside the shielding compartment of the transporter 
and the mechanism for locking the doors of the 
shielding compartment shall withstand a credible 
collision or derailment of the transporter without 
failure. 
WP Transportation 
WP 
Transporter 
SC 
ITS 
DBGM-1 
Shielding Integrity 
Remains Intact 
Loss of shielding due to a seismic event could 
initiate an event sequence exceeding the 
performance objectives of 10 CFR 63.111(b)(1). 

Table IV-1. Seismic Classification of Systems, Components and Functions (Continued) 
System/ 
Subsystem a 
Subsystem/ 
Component/ 
Function a,c 
Safety 
Category a 
ITS/ITWI a 
Seismic 
Category b 
Safety Function 
(for DBGM 
Assignment) d 
Basis for Seismic Classification/Comments 
WP Emplacement 
WP 
Emplacement 
Gantry 
SC 
ITS 
CD 
N/A 
The slow speed and controls of the gantry shall 
prevent the waste package emplacement gantry 
carrying a waste package from impacting another 
emplaced WP or impacting the end of the 
emplacement drift (Assumption 5.5). 
With current emplacement drift dimensions, the 
design drop height(s) of the WP can not be 
physically exceeded. Therefore, no slapdown or 
drop criterion is applied as the sealed WPs cannot 
exceed height limits and be breached by a 
seismically-induced event (Assumptions 5.2 and 
5.5). 
WP Retrieval 
Components 
of this System 
are the Same 
as WP 
Transport and 
WP 
Emplacement 
Systems 
Same as 
Designated 
in WP 
Transport 
and WP 
Emplacement 
Systems 
Same as 
Designated 
in WP 
Transport 
and WP 
Emplacement 
Systems 
Same as 
Designated in 
WP Transport 
and WP 
Emplacement 
Systems 
Same as 
Designated in WP 
Transport and WP 
Emplacement 
Systems 
Support Equipment 
Transport 
Locomotive 
(and Coupler) 
SC 
ITS 
DBGM-2 
No Runaway 
(Together with WP 
Transporter) 
A runaway locomotive (which could initiate a slap 
down of WP) due to a seismic event could initiate 
an event sequence exceeding the performance 
objectives of 10 CFR 63.111(b)(2) by breach of a 
DSNF canister. 
Support Equipment 
Gantry 
Carrier 
Non-SC 
N/A 
CD 
N/A 
No function of this SSC is credited for the 
prevention or mitigation of a seismically-initiated 
event sequence. 

Table IV-1. Seismic Classification of Systems, Components and Functions (Continued) 
System/ 
Subsystem a 
Subsystem/ 
Component/ 
Function a,c 
Safety 
Category a 
ITS/ITWI a 
Seismic 
Category b 
Safety Function 
(for DBGM 
Assignment) d 
Basis for Seismic Classification/Comments 
Emplacement Drift Subsystem 
Emplacement Drift 
Emplacement 
Drift Excavated 
Opening 
SC 
ITS/ITWI 
CD 
N/A 
No function of this SSC is credited for the 
prevention or mitigation of a seismically-initiated 
event sequence. 
The opening dimensions will influence the size of a 
possible rockfall. The WP is designed to withstand 
the rockfall without breach. 
Emplacement Drift 
Emplacement 
Drift Ground 
Support 
Non-SC 
N/A 
CD 
N/A 
No function of this SSC is credited for the 
prevention or mitigation of a seismically-initiated 
event sequence. 
Emplacement Drift 
Drift Invert 
(Steel) 
(See 
Engineered 
Barrier) 
Non-SC 
N/A 
CD 
N/A 
No function of this SSC is credited for the 
prevention or mitigation of a seismically-initiated 
event sequence. 
Emplacement Drift 
Drift Invert 
(Ballast) 
(See 
Engineered 
Barrier) 
SC 
ITWI 
CD 
N/A 
No function of this SSC is credited for the 
prevention or mitigation of a seismically-initiated 
event sequence. 
Emplacement Drift 
WP 
Emplacement 
Pallet 
SC 
ITWI / ITS 
DBGM-2 
No Failure 
The WP and pallet are lifted as a unit and placed 
onto the bedplate of the transporter as part of 
transport to the subsurface. As such, the pallet 
transfers loads to the WP. Failure of the pallet 
during a lift could cause a drop of WP due to a 
seismic event that could initiate an event sequence 
exceeding the performance objectives of 
10 CFR 63.111(b)(2) by release from a DSNF 
canister. 

Table IV-1. Seismic Classification of Systems, Components and Functions (Continued) 
System/ 
Subsystem a 
Subsystem/ 
Component/ 
Function a,c 
Safety 
Category a 
ITS/ITWI a 
Seismic 
Category b 
Safety Function 
(for DBGM 
Assignment) d 
Basis for Seismic Classification/Comments 
Emplacement Drift 
Drip Shield 
SC 
ITWI 
CD 
N/A 
No function of this SSC is credited for the 
prevention or mitigation of a seismically-initiated 
event sequence. 
See also: Engineered Barrier System. 
Emplacement Drift 
Drip Shield 
Emplacement 
Gantry 
Non-SC 
N/A 
CD 
N/A 
No function of this SSC is credited for the 
prevention or mitigation of a seismically-initiated 
event sequence. 
Engineered Barrier System 
Engineered Barrier 
Drip Shield 
SC 
ITWI 
CD 
N/A 
No function of this SSC is credited for the 
prevention or mitigation of a seismically-initiated 
event sequence. 
See also: Emplacement Drift Subsystem. 
Engineered Barrier 
WP 
SC 
ITWI / ITS 
DBGM-2 
No Breach 
Release from a DSNF canister due to a seismic 
event could initiate an event sequence exceeding 
the performance objectives of 10 CFR 63.111(b)(2). 
See also the DOE, Commercial, and Naval WP 
System for requirements on entire package. 
Engineered Barrier 
WP Internals 
(Internal 
Geometry 
Controls) 
SC 
ITWI / ITS 
DBGM-2 
No Criticality 
The SSC shall ensure that as a result of a seismic 
event, a nuclear criticality cannot occur. 
Internal geometry controls prevent in-package 
criticality for preclosure period. 
Engineered Barrier 
Waste Form 
SC 
ITWI 
N/A 
N/A 
No function of this SSC is credited for the 
prevention or mitigation of a seismically-initiated 
event sequence. 
No seismic design criteria identified. 

Table IV-1. Seismic Classification of Systems, Components and Functions (Continued) 
System/ 
Subsystem a 
Subsystem/ 
Component/ 
Function a,c 
Safety 
Category a 
ITS/ITWI a 
Seismic 
Category b 
Safety Function 
(for DBGM 
Assignment) d 
Basis for Seismic Classification/Comments 
Engineered Barrier 
Cladding 
SC 
ITWI 
N/A 
N/A 
No function of this SSC is credited for the 
prevention or mitigation of a seismically-initiated 
event sequence. 
See the Emplacement Drift System for the Drift 
Invert ITS preclosure functions. 
Engineered Barrier 
Drift Invert 
(Ballast) 
SC 
ITWI 
CD 
N/A 
No function of this SSC is credited for the 
prevention or mitigation of a seismically-initiated 
event sequence. 
See also: Emplacement Drift System. 
Environmental / Meteorological Monitoring System 
Environmental / 
Meteorological 
Monitoring 
Entire 
Non-SC 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
No function of this SSC is credited for the 
prevention or mitigation of a seismically-initiated 
event sequence. 
No seismic design criteria identified. 
Fire Protection System 
Fire Protection 
Entire 
Subsystems 
include: Fire 
Water; Fire 
Barrier; 
Explosion 
Protection; 
Fire 
Suppression; 
Fire 
Detection; 
and Fire 
Alarm 
Non-SC 
N/A 
CD 
N/A 
No function of these SSCs is credited for the 
prevention or mitigation of a seismically-initiated 
event sequence. 

Table IV-1. Seismic Classification of Systems, Components and Functions (Continued) 
System/ 
Subsystem a 
Subsystem/ 
Component/ 
Function a,c 
Safety 
Category a 
ITS/ITWI a 
Seismic 
Category b 
Safety Function 
(for DBGM 
Assignment) d 
Basis for Seismic Classification/Comments 
Fuel Handling Facility 
FHF 
Structure 
SC 
ITS 
DBGM-2 
No Structural 
Collapse 
Collapse of structure due to a seismic event could 
initiate an event sequence exceeding the 
performance objectives of 10 CFR 63.111(b)(2) by 
breach of DSNF canister or other waste containers. 
FHF 
Rails for 
Trolleys and 
WP 
Transporter 
SC 
ITS 
DBGM-2 
No Derailment 
Damage to rails and subsequent tipover or slap 
down of a waste transport due to a seismic event 
could initiate an event sequence exceeding the 
performance objectives of 10 CFR 63.111(b)(2) by 
breach of DSNF canister or other waste containers. 
FHF 
Permanent 
Shielding 
(including 
Shield Doors 
and Walls, 
Airlock Doors, 
Shield View 
Ports, and 
Viewing 
Windows) 
SC 
ITS 
DBGM-1 
Shielding Integrity 
Remains Intact 
Loss of shielding due to a seismic event could 
initiate an event sequence exceeding the 
performance objectives of 10 CFR 63.111(b)(1). 
Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning Plant Heating and Cooling System 
HVAC Plant Heating 
and Cooling 
Entire 
Subsystems 
include: Hot 
Water 
Heating and 
Chilled Water 
Cooling 
Non-SC 
N/A 
CD 
N/A 
No function of these SSCs is credited for the 
prevention or mitigation of a seismically-initiated 
event sequence. 

Table IV-1. Seismic Classification of Systems, Components and Functions (Continued) 
System/ 
Subsystem a 
Subsystem/ 
Component/ 
Function a,c 
Safety 
Category a 
ITS/ITWI a 
Seismic 
Category b 
Safety Function 
(for DBGM 
Assignment) d 
Basis for Seismic Classification/Comments 
Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management System 
LLW Management 
System 
Entire 
Subsystems 
include: 
Liquid LLW; 
Solid LLW; 
Gaseous 
LLW; and 
Mixed LLW 
Non-SC 
N/A 
CD 
N/A 
No HLW waste forms are handled by this system. 
No function of these SSCs is credited for the 
prevention or mitigation of a seismically-initiated 
event sequence. 
Low-Level Radioactive Waste Generating System 
LLW Generating 
System 
Entire 
Non-SC 
N/A 
CD 
N/A 
No HLW waste forms are handled by this system. 
No function of these SSCs is credited for the 
prevention or mitigation of a seismically-initiated 
event sequence. 
Lower Natural Barrier System 
Unsaturated Zone 
Below the 
Repository Horizon 
and Saturated Zone 
Below and Downgradient 
from the 
Repository 
Entire 
SC 
ITWI 
N/A 
N/A 
Natural system is not seismically designed. 

Table IV-1. Seismic Classification of Systems, Components and Functions (Continued) 
System/ 
Subsystem a 
Subsystem/ 
Component/ 
Function a,c 
Safety 
Category a 
ITS/ITWI a 
Seismic 
Category b 
Safety Function 
(for DBGM 
Assignment) d 
Basis for Seismic Classification/Comments 
Naval Spent Nuclear Fuel Canister 
NSNF Canister 
Internals 
Internal 
Geometry 
Control 
NSNF 
Canister 
Baskets, 
Loading 
Sleeves and 
Cans. 
SC 
ITWI* 
DBGM-2 
No Criticality 
The SSC shall ensure that as a result of a seismic 
event, a nuclear criticality cannot occur. 
Internal geometry controls prevent in-package 
criticality for preclosure period. 
*Classification of SSC requires review. 
NSNF Canister 
Internals 
Control Rods 
or Neutron 
Absorbing 
Material and 
Their 
Attachment 
Hardware and 
SNF Cladding 
SC 
ITWI 
CD 
N/A 
No function of these SSCs is credited for the 
prevention or mitigation of a seismically-initiated 
event sequence. 
NSNF Canister 
NSNF 
Canister 
SC 
ITS/ITWI 
DBGM-2 
No Breach 
Breach of canister due to a seismic event could 
initiate an event sequence exceeding the 
performance objectives of 10 CFR 63.111(b)(2). 

Table IV-1. Seismic Classification of Systems, Components and Functions (Continued) 
System/ 
Subsystem a 
Subsystem/ 
Component/ 
Function a,c 
Safety 
Category a 
ITS/ITWI a 
Seismic 
Category b 
Safety Function 
(for DBGM 
Assignment) d 
Basis for Seismic Classification/Comments 
Naval Spent Nuclear Fuel Waste Package System 
NSNF WP 
WP 
SC 
ITS/ ITWI 
DBGM-2 
No Breach 
No Criticality 
Breach of canister due to a seismic event could 
initiate an event sequence exceeding the 
performance objectives of 10 CFR 63.111(b)(2). 
The SSC shall ensure that as a result of a seismic 
event, a nuclear criticality cannot occur. 
NSNF WP 
Trunnion 
Collar 
SC 
ITS 
DBGM-2 
No Drop 
Breach of WP due to a seismic event could initiate 
an event sequence exceeding the performance 
objectives of 10 CFR 63.111(b)(2) by release from a 
DSNF canister. 
Non-Nuclear Handling System 
Non-Nuclear 
Handling 
Entire 
Non-SC 
N/A 
CD 
N/A 
No function of these SSCs is credited for the 
prevention or mitigation of a seismically-initiated 
event sequence. 
Non-Radiological Waste Management System 
Non-Radiological 
Waste Management 
Entire 
Non-SC 
N/A 
CD 
N/A 
No function of these SSCs is credited for the 
prevention or mitigation of a seismically-initiated 
event sequence. 
Plant Services System 
Water Distribution 
Entire 
Non-SC 
N/A 
CD 
N/A 
No function of these SSCs is credited for the 
prevention or mitigation of a seismically-initiated 
event sequence. 
Fuel Oil Distribution 
Entire 
Non-SC 
N/A 
CD 
N/A 
No function of these SSCs is credited for the 
prevention or mitigation of a seismically-initiated 
event sequence. 

Table IV-1. Seismic Classification of Systems, Components and Functions (Continued) 
System/ 
Subsystem a 
Subsystem/ 
Component/ 
Function a,c 
Safety 
Category a 
ITS/ITWI a 
Seismic 
Category b 
Safety Function 
(for DBGM 
Assignment) d 
Basis for Seismic Classification/Comments 
Compressed Air 
Distribution 
Entire 
Non-SC 
N/A 
CD 
N/A 
No function of these SSCs is credited for the 
prevention or mitigation of a seismically-initiated 
event sequence. 
Service Gases 
Distribution 
Entire 
Non-SC 
N/A 
CD 
N/A 
No function of these SSCs is credited for the 
prevention or mitigation of a seismically-initiated 
event sequence. 
Post-Emplacement Subsystem 
Post-emplacement 
Thermal 
Management 
Non-SC 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
System is not seismically designed. 
Post-emplacement 
Decommissioning 
and 
Decontamination 
Non-SC 
N/A 
CD 
N/A 
No function of these SSCs is credited for the 
prevention or mitigation of a seismically-initiated 
event sequence. 
Post-emplacement 
Closure 
(includes 
Keyways and 
Backfill in 
Access Mains 
and Exhaust 
Mains; 
Ventilation 
Shafts and 
Raises, and 
Borehole 
Seals) 
SC 
ITWI 
CD 
N/A 
No function of these SSCs is credited for the 
prevention or mitigation of a seismically-initiated 
event sequence. 
Post-emplacement 
Performance 
Confirmation 
Non-SC 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
System is not seismically designed. 

Table IV-1. Seismic Classification of Systems, Components and Functions (Continued) 
System/ 
Subsystem a 
Subsystem/ 
Component/ 
Function a,c 
Safety 
Category a 
ITS/ITWI a 
Seismic 
Category b 
Safety Function 
(for DBGM 
Assignment) d 
Basis for Seismic Classification/Comments 
Radiation/Radiological Monitoring System 
Radiation / 
Radiological 
Monitoring 
Entire 
Non-SC 
N/A 
CD 
N/A 
No function of these SSCs is credited for the 
prevention or mitigation of a seismically-initiated 
event sequence. 
Remediation System 
Dry Remediation 
Trolleys 
SC 
ITS 
DBGM-2 
No Slap Down 
Slap down of WP due to a seismic event could 
initiate an event sequence exceeding the 
performance objectives of 10 CFR 63.111(b)(2) by 
release from a DSNF canister. 
Dry Remediation 
Pedestal, and 
Hold-Down 
Devices 
SC 
ITS 
DBGM-2 
No Tipover 
Tipover of WP due to a seismic event could initiate 
an event sequence exceeding the performance 
objectives of 10 CFR 63.111(b)(2) by release from a 
DSNF canister. 
Dry Remediation 
Turntable 
SC 
ITS 
DBGM-2 
No Tipover 
Tipover of WP due to a seismic event could initiate 
an event sequence exceeding the performance 
objectives of 10 CFR 63.111(b)(2) by release from a 
DSNF canister. 
Dry Remediation 
Docking 
Station 
Non-SC 
N/A 
CD 
N/A 
No function of this SSC is credited for the 
prevention or mitigation of a seismically-initiated 
event sequence. 
Wet Remediation 
200 ton Cask 
Handling 
Crane 
SC 
ITS 
DBGM-2 
No Drop 
Drop of WP due to a seismic event could initiate an 
event sequence exceeding the performance 
objectives of 10 CFR 63.111(b)(2) by release from a 
DSNF canister. 
Wet Remediation 
Pit Crush Pad 
SC 
ITS 
CD 
N/A 
No function of this SSC is credited for the 
prevention or mitigation of a seismically-initiated 
event sequence. 

Table IV-1. Seismic Classification of Systems, Components and Functions (Continued) 
System/ 
Subsystem a 
Subsystem/ 
Component/ 
Function a,c 
Safety 
Category a 
ITS/ITWI a 
Seismic 
Category b 
Safety Function 
(for DBGM 
Assignment) d 
Basis for Seismic Classification/Comments 
Wet Remediation 
Pool Crush 
Pad 
SC 
ITS 
CD 
N/A 
No function of this SSC is credited for the 
prevention or mitigation of a seismically-initiated 
event sequence. 
Wet Remediation 
Turntable 
Non-SC 
N/A 
CD 
N/A 
This turntable has no rails and does not hold a 
trolley. No function of this SSC is credited for the 
prevention or mitigation of a seismically-initiated 
event sequence. 
Wet Remediation 
Fuel Handling 
Machine and 
Grapples 
SC 
ITS 
DBGM-1 
Maintain Waste 
Form 
Drop of waste form could initiate an event sequence 
exceeding the performance objectives of 
10 CFR 63.111(b)(1). 
Wet Remediation 
Fuel Handling 
Machine and 
Grapples 
SC 
ITS 
DBGM-2 
No Fall Down 
Fall of this SSC onto WP containing canisters could 
initiate an event sequence exceeding the 
performance objectives of 10 CFR 63.111(b)(2). 
Wet Remediation 
Crane Lifting 
Yokes 
SC 
ITS 
DBGM-2 
No Drop 
Drop due to a seismic event could initiate an event 
sequence exceeding the performance objectives of 
10 CFR 63.111(b)(2) by release from a DSNF 
canister. 
Wet Remediation 
Staging 
Racks in 
Remediation 
Pool 
SC 
ITS 
DBGM-2 
No Release 
No Criticality 
Collapse/failure of these SSCs containing canisters 
could initiate an event sequence exceeding the 
performance objectives of 10 CFR 63.111(b)(2) by 
breach of a DSNF canister. 
WP Remediation 
100 ton WP 
Remediation 
Crane (DTF) 
SC 
ITS 
DBGM-2 
No Drop 
Drop of WP due to a seismic event could initiate an 
event sequence exceeding the performance 
objectives of 10 CFR 63.111(b)(2) by release from a 
DSNF canister. 
WP Remediation 
Crane Lifting 
Yokes 
SC 
ITS 
DBGM-2 
No Drop 
Drop due to a seismic event could initiate an event 
sequence exceeding the performance objectives of 
10 CFR 63.111(b)(2) by release from a DSNF 
canister. 

Table IV-1. Seismic Classification of Systems, Components and Functions (Continued) 
System/ 
Subsystem a 
Subsystem/ 
Component/ 
Function a,c 
Safety 
Category a 
ITS/ITWI a 
Seismic 
Category b 
Safety Function 
(for DBGM 
Assignment) d 
Basis for Seismic Classification/Comments 
WP Remediation 
WP/DPC 
Trolleys 
SC 
ITS 
DBGM-2 
No Slap Down 
Slap down of WP due to a seismic event could 
initiate an event sequence exceeding the 
performance objectives of 10 CFR 63.111(b)(2) by 
release from a DSNF canister. 
WP Remediation 
Pedestals, 
and Hold- 
Down 
Devices 
SC 
ITS 
DBGM-2 
No Tipover 
Tipover of WP due to a seismic event could initiate 
an event sequence exceeding the performance 
objectives of 10 CFR 63.111(b)(2) by release from a 
DSNF canister. 
Safeguards and Security System 
Safeguards and 
Security 
Entire 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
System is not seismically designed. 
Spent Nuclear Fuel Aging System 
Cask Transfer 
Cask Tractor 
SC 
ITS 
DBGM-2 
No Runaway 
Slap down of cask without impact limiters due to a 
seismic event could initiate an event sequence 
exceeding the performance objectives of 
10 CFR 63.111(b)(2). 
Cask Transfer 
Horizontal 
Storage 
Module Cart 
SC 
ITS 
DBGM-2 
No Slap Down 
No Runaway 
Slap down of cask due to a seismic event could 
initiate an event sequence exceeding the 
performance objectives of 10 CFR 63.111(b)(2). e 
Cask Transfer 
MSC 
Transporter 
SC 
ITS 
DBGM-2 
No Slap Down 
No Runaway 
Slap down of cask due to a seismic event could 
initiate an event sequence exceeding the 
performance objectives of 10 CFR 63.111(b)(2). e 
Aging Pad 
Surface Aging 
Pad 
SC 
ITS 
DBGM-2 
No Significant 
Cracking / 
Displacement 
Tipover of cask by uneven base pad due to a 
seismic event could initiate an event sequence 
exceeding the performance objectives of 10 CFR 
63.111(b)(2). 

Table IV-1. Seismic Classification of Systems, Components and Functions (Continued) 
System/ 
Subsystem a 
Subsystem/ 
Component/ 
Function a,c 
Safety 
Category a 
ITS/ITWI a 
Seismic 
Category b 
Safety Function 
(for DBGM 
Assignment) d 
Basis for Seismic Classification/Comments 
Aging Pad 
Support 
Structures 
(Including 
Utility 
Buildings and 
Personnel 
Barriers) 
Non-SC 
N/A 
CD 
N/A 
No function of these SSCs is credited for the 
prevention or mitigation of a seismically-initiated 
event sequence. 
Aging Pad 
Aircraft 
Protection 
Barrier that 
Surrounds the 
Aging Pads 
SC 
ITS 
CD 
N/A 
Barrier also provides shielding to workers outside 
GROA along adjacent road to North Construction 
Portal. As workers can readily exit this area, dose 
from failure of SSC is not identified to exceed the 
performance objectives of 10 CFR 63.111(b)(1) due 
to a seismic event. 
Aging Cask / MSC 
MSCs and 
Other Vertical 
Aging / 
Staging 
Systems* 
SC 
ITS 
DBGM-2 
No Tipover 
No Breach 
Tipover of, or release from the MSC due to a 
seismic event could initiate an event sequence 
exceeding the performance objectives of 10 CFR 
63.111(b)(2) by release from a DSNF canister. 
*Further breakout of BSC (2004r, Appendix A). 
Aging Cask / MSC 
Horizontal 
Aging 
Modules 
(HAMs)]* 
SC 
ITS 
DBGM-2 
No Collapse 
[Potential for 
Seismic Interaction] 
Collapse of the HAM on a cask due to a seismic 
event could initiate an event sequence exceeding 
the performance objectives of 10 CFR 63.111(b)(2) 
by release from a DSNF canister. 
Potential for displacement of HAM and impacting 
contained cask shall be examined during design as 
potential for seismic interaction. 
*Further breakout of BSC (2004r, Appendix A). 
Spent Nuclear Fuel / High Level Waste Transfer System 
WP Loadout 
100 ton WP 
Handling 
Crane (DTF) 
SC 
ITS 
DBGM-2 
No Drop 
Drop of WP due to a seismic event could initiate an 
event sequence exceeding the performance 
objectives of 10 CFR 63.111(b)(2) by release from a 
DSNF canister. 

Table IV-1. Seismic Classification of Systems, Components and Functions (Continued) 
System/ 
Subsystem a 
Subsystem/ 
Component/ 
Function a,c 
Safety 
Category a 
ITS/ITWI a 
Seismic 
Category b 
Safety Function 
(for DBGM 
Assignment) d 
Basis for Seismic Classification/Comments 
WP Loadout 
100 ton WP 
Loadout 
Handling 
Crane (DTF) 
SC 
ITS 
DBGM-2 
No Drop 
Drop of WP due to a seismic event could initiate an 
event sequence exceeding the performance 
objectives of 10 CFR 63.111(b)(2) by release from a 
DSNF canister. 
WP Loadout 
Crane Lifting 
Yokes 
SC 
ITS 
DBGM-2 
No Drop 
Drop due to a seismic event could initiate an event 
sequence exceeding the performance objectives of 
10 CFR 63.111(b)(2) by release from a DSNF 
canister. 
WP Loadout 
Trolleys 
SC 
ITS 
DBGM-2 
No Slap Down 
Slap down of cask due to a seismic event could 
initiate an event sequence exceeding the 
performance objectives of 10 CFR 63.111(b)(2) by 
release from a DSNF canister. 
WP Loadout 
Pedestal, and 
Hold-Down 
Devices 
SC 
ITS 
DBGM-2 
No Tipover 
Slap down of cask due to a seismic event could 
initiate an event sequence exceeding the 
performance objectives of 10 CFR 63.111(b)(2) by 
release from a DSNF canister. 
WP Loadout 
WP Tilting 
Machine 
SC 
ITS 
DBGM-2 
No Drop 
No Slap Down 
Slap down or drop of WP due to a seismic event 
could initiate an event sequence exceeding the 
performance objectives of 10 CFR 63.111(b)(2) by 
release from a DSNF canister. 
WP Loadout 
WP Turntable 
SC 
ITS 
DBGM-2 
No Tipover 
Tipover of WP due to a seismic event could initiate 
an event sequence exceeding the performance 
objectives of 10 CFR 63.111(b)(2) by release from a 
DSNF canister. 
WP Loadout 
Trunnion 
Collar 
Removal 
Machine 
SC 
ITS 
DBGM-2 
No Slap Down 
No Breach 
Trunnion collar removal machine can potentially 
cause slap down of WP after impact, or breach WP 
during removal process. 
SSC could initiate an event sequence exceeding 
the performance objectives of 10 CFR 63.111(b)(2) 
by breach of a DSNF canister. 

Table IV-1. Seismic Classification of Systems, Components and Functions (Continued) 
System/ 
Subsystem a 
Subsystem/ 
Component/ 
Function a,c 
Safety 
Category a 
ITS/ITWI a 
Seismic 
Category b 
Safety Function 
(for DBGM 
Assignment) d 
Basis for Seismic Classification/Comments 
DPC Cutting 
Cutting 
Machine 
(DTF) 
SC 
ITS 
DBGM-2 
No Failure 
No Fall Down 
[Potential for 
Seismic Interaction] 
Potential interaction from miscut of dual-purpose 
canister due to a seismic event. 
Machine could potentially fall into open WP. 
DPC Cutting 
DPC Docking 
Station 
Non-SC 
N/A 
CD 
N/A 
No function of this SSC is credited for the 
prevention or mitigation of a seismically-initiated 
event sequence. 
Dry Transfer 
Spent Fuel 
Transfer 
Machine and 
Grapples 
(DTF and 
FHF) 
SC 
ITS 
DBGM-1 
Maintain Waste 
Form 
Mishandling of fuel due to a seismic event could 
initiate an event sequence exceeding the 
performance objectives of 10 CFR 63.111(b)(1) . 
Dry Transfer 
Spent Fuel 
Transfer 
Machine and 
Grapples 
(DTF and 
FHF) 
SC 
ITS 
DBGM-2 
No Fall Down 
Collapse/failure of this SSC onto a open WP could 
initiate an event sequence exceeding the 
performance objectives of 10 CFR 63.111(b)(2). 
Dry Transfer 
70 ton 
Canister 
Handling 
Crane (DTF) 
SC 
ITS 
DBGM-2 
No Drop 
Drop of WP due to a seismic event could initiate an 
event sequence exceeding the performance 
objectives of 10 CFR 63.111(b)(2) by release from a 
DSNF canister. 
Dry Transfer 
70 ton Navy 
Canister 
Handling 
Crane (DTF) 
SC 
ITS 
DBGM-2 
No Drop 
Assignment to DBGM-2 per Assumption 5.20. 
Dry Transfer 
Crane Lifting 
Yokes 
SC 
ITS 
DBGM-2 
No Drop 
Drop due to a seismic event could initiate an event 
sequence exceeding the performance objectives of 
10 CFR 63.111(b)(2) by release from a DSNF 
canister. 

Table IV-1. Seismic Classification of Systems, Components and Functions (Continued) 
System/ 
Subsystem a 
Subsystem/ 
Component/ 
Function a,c 
Safety 
Category a 
ITS/ITWI a 
Seismic 
Category b 
Safety Function 
(for DBGM 
Assignment) d 
Basis for Seismic Classification/Comments 
Dry Transfer 
Cask/WP 
Docking 
Station 
Non-SC 
N/A 
CD 
N/A 
No function of this SSC is credited for the 
prevention or mitigation of a seismically-initiated 
event sequence. 
Dry Transfer 
Canister and 
SNF Staging 
Racks (DTF) 
SC 
N/A 
DBGM-2 
No Release 
Collapse/failure of this SSC containing canisters 
could initiate an event sequence exceeding the 
performance objectives of 10 CFR 63.111(b)(2). 
Dry Transfer 
Canister and 
SNF Staging 
Racks (DTF) 
SC 
N/A 
DBGM-2 
No Criticality 
Collapse/failure of this SSC containing canisters 
could initiate an event sequence exceeding the 
performance objectives of 10 CFR 63.111(b)(2). 
Dry Transfer 
Staging Pits 
(CHF) 
SC 
ITS 
DBGM-2 
No Release 
Collapse/failure of these SSCs containing canisters 
could initiate an event sequence exceeding the 
performance objectives of 10 CFR 63.111(b)(2) by 
breach of a DSNF canister. 
Dry Transfer 
Staging Pits 
(CHF) 
SC 
ITS 
DBGM-2 
No Criticality 
Collapse/failure of these SSCs containing canisters 
could initiate an event sequence exceeding the 
performance objectives of 10 CFR 63.111(b)(2) by 
breach of a DSNF canister. 
Subsurface Development 
Subsurface 
Development 
Excavation 
Non-SC 
N/A 
CD 
N/A 
No function of this SSC is credited for the 
prevention or mitigation of a seismically-initiated 
event sequence. 
Subsurface Facility 
Subsurface Facility 
Rails 
Non-SC 
N/A 
CD 
N/A 
No function of this facility is credited for the 
prevention or mitigation of a seismically-initiated 
event sequence. 

Table IV-1. Seismic Classification of Systems, Components and Functions (Continued) 
System/ 
Subsystem a 
Subsystem/ 
Component/ 
Function a,c 
Safety 
Category a 
ITS/ITWI a 
Seismic 
Category b 
Safety Function 
(for DBGM 
Assignment) d 
Basis for Seismic Classification/Comments 
Subsurface Facility 
Size and 
Layout of 
Drifts 
SC 
ITS / ITWI 
CD 
N/A 
No function of this facility is credited for the 
prevention or mitigation of a seismically-initiated 
event sequence. 
Low extraction ratio of underground facility 
precludes total collapse of tunnel system under 
DBGM-2 loading. 
Subsurface Facility 
Nonemplacement 
Openings 
SC 
ITS 
CD 
N/A 
No function of this SSC is credited for the 
prevention or mitigation of a seismically-initiated 
event sequence. 
Subsurface Facility 
Ground 
Support for 
Nonemplacement 
Openings 
Non-SC 
N/A 
CD 
N/A 
No function of this SSC is credited for the 
prevention or mitigation of a seismically-initiated 
event sequence. 
Subsurface Ventilation System 
Subsurface 
Ventilation 
Entire 
(Emplacement 
Ventilation, 
including 
Access Main) 
Non-SC 
N/A 
CD 
N/A 
No function of this SSC is credited for the 
prevention or mitigation of a seismically-initiated 
event sequence. 
Surface Industrial Heating Ventilation Air Conditioning 
Surface Industrial 
HVAC 
Inlet and 
Outlet 
Dampers and 
Ventilation 
Ducting for 
Fuel Element 
Staging Areas 
(DTF Only) 
SC 
ITS 
DBGM-1 
No Failure 
Failure of dampers and ducting required for passive 
airflow due to a seismic event could initiate an event 
sequence exceeding the performance objectives of 
10 CFR 63.111(b)(1). 

Table IV-1. Seismic Classification of Systems, Components and Functions (Continued) 
System/ 
Subsystem a 
Subsystem/ 
Component/ 
Function a,c 
Safety 
Category a 
ITS/ITWI a 
Seismic 
Category b 
Safety Function 
(for DBGM 
Assignment) d 
Basis for Seismic Classification/Comments 
Surface Industrial 
HVAC 
Stack for Fuel 
Element 
Staging Areas 
(DTF Only) 
SC 
ITS 
DBGM-1 
Controlled Failure 
[Potential for 
Seismic Interaction] 
The failure of the stack due to a seismic event shall 
not obstruct an open flow path to the environment 
for all Category 1 seismically-initiated event 
sequences. 
Failure of passive airflow due to a seismic event 
could initiate an event sequence exceeding the 
performance objectives of 10 CFR 63.111(b)(1). 
Surface Industrial 
HVAC 
SSCs Other 
Than Inlet 
and Outlet 
Dampers and 
Ventilation 
Ducting 
(including 
stack) for 
Fuel Element 
Staging Areas 
(DTF Only) 
Non-SC 
N/A 
CD 
N/A 
No function of these SSCs is credited for the 
prevention or mitigation of a seismically-initiated 
event sequence. 

Table IV-1. Seismic Classification of Systems, Components and Functions (Continued) 
System/ 
Subsystem a 
Subsystem/ 
Component/ 
Function a,c 
Safety 
Category a 
ITS/ITWI a 
Seismic 
Category b 
Safety Function 
(for DBGM 
Assignment) d 
Basis for Seismic Classification/Comments 
Surface Nuclear Heating Ventilation Air Conditioning 
Primary 
Exhaust 
Fans, High- 
Efficiency 
Particulate Air 
(HEPA) 
Filters, Inlet 
Isolation 
Dampers, 
Exhaust 
Isolation 
Dampers, 
Inlet and 
Exhaust 
Ducting for 
Waste 
Transfer Cells 
(DTF and 
FHF Only) 
SC 
ITS 
CD 
(Except As 
Specifically 
Identified) 
N/A 
No function of these SSCs is credited for the 
prevention or mitigation of a seismically-initiated 
event sequence. 
Primary 
HEPA Filters 
SC* 
ITS* 
DBGM-1 
No Discharge 
Filters will (with time) accumulate radioactive 
particulates, which may be released to workers after 
a seismic event and failure of a HEPA unit. Dose is 
unspecified at this time, but potentially could exceed 
15 mrem. Therefore, release of contents due to a 
seismic event could initiate an event sequence 
exceeding the performance objectives of 
10 CFR 63.111(b)(1). 
*Based on classification of Primary subsystem. 

Table IV-1. Seismic Classification of Systems, Components and Functions (Continued) 
System/ 
Subsystem a 
Subsystem/ 
Component/ 
Function a,c 
Safety 
Category a 
ITS/ITWI a 
Seismic 
Category b 
Safety Function 
(for DBGM 
Assignment) d 
Basis for Seismic Classification/Comments 
Primary 
Vent Ducts 
(Exhaust 
Ducting and 
Dampers) 
SC* 
ITS* 
DBGM-1 
No Discharge 
Ducts will (with time) accumulate radioactive 
particulates, which may be released to workers after 
seismic event and failure of vent ducts. Dose is 
unspecified at this time, but potentially could exceed 
15 mrem. Therefore, release of contents due to a 
seismic event could initiate an event sequence 
exceeding the performance objectives of 10 CFR 
63.111(b)(1). 
*Based on classification of Primary subsystem. 
Secondary 
Entire 
Non-SC 
N/A 
CD 
N/A 
No function of these SSCs is credited for the 
prevention or mitigation of a seismically-initiated 
event sequence. 
Tertiary 
Entire 
Non-SC 
N/A 
CD 
N/A 
No function of these SSCs is credited for the 
prevention or mitigation of a seismically-initiated 
event sequence. 
Transportation Cask 
Transportation Cask 
Entire 
SC 
ITS 
DBGM-2 
No Breach 
No Criticality 
Transportation casks received at the geologic 
repository operations area operations area shall be 
designed and licensed in accordance with 10 CFR 
Part 71. 
Design loads in compliance with 10 CFR Part 71 
bound the expected seismic loads for seismicallyinitiated 
sequences with transporters with impact 
limiters. 
The SSC shall ensure that as a result of a seismic 
event, a nuclear criticality cannot occur. 

Table IV-1. Seismic Classification of Systems, Components and Functions (Continued) 
System/ 
Subsystem a 
Subsystem/ 
Component/ 
Function a,c 
Safety 
Category a 
ITS/ITWI a 
Seismic 
Category b 
Safety Function 
(for DBGM 
Assignment) d 
Basis for Seismic Classification/Comments 
Transportation Cask Receipt/Return Facility 
Cask Receipt and 
Return Area 
Structure 
SC 
ITS 
DBGM-2 
No Structural 
Collapse 
Collapse of structure due to a seismic event could 
initiate an event sequence exceeding the 
performance objectives of 10 CFR 63.111(b)(2) by 
breach of DSNF canister or other waste containers. 
Seismic evaluations shall consider potential 
collapse of adjacent Warehouse and Non-Nuclear 
Receipt Facility. 
Transportation Cask 
Buffer Area 
Structure 
Non-SC 
N/A 
CD 
N/A 
Facility is unenclosed and no overhead structural 
component is identified for structure. 
Transportation casks stored in buffer area shall 
have impact limiters attached. 
Design loads in compliance with 10 CFR Part 71 
bound the expected seismic loads for seismicallyinitiated 
sequences with transporters with impact 
limiters in this area. Therefore, no function of this 
SSC is credited for the prevention or mitigation of a 
credible seismically-initiated event sequence. 
Upper Natural Barrier System 
Topography and 
Surficial Soils and 
Unsaturated Zone 
to the Repository 
Horizon 
--- 
SC 
ITWI 
N/A 
N/A 
Natural system is not seismically designed. 

Table IV-1. Seismic Classification of Systems, Components and Functions (Continued) 
System/ 
Subsystem a 
Subsystem/ 
Component/ 
Function a,c 
Safety 
Category a 
ITS/ITWI a 
Seismic 
Category b 
Safety Function 
(for DBGM 
Assignment) d 
Basis for Seismic Classification/Comments 
Warehouse and Non-Nuclear Receipt Facility 
Warehouse and 
Non-Nuclear 
Receipt Facility 
Structure 
Non-SC 
N/A 
CD 
N/A 
[Potential Seismic 
interaction] 
Structure shares a wall and subsystems with the 
Transportation Cask Receipt/Return Facility, and 
may interact with this ITS Facility. Design review 
required to demonstrate no seismic interaction, or 
SSCs that will prevent this interaction. 
Waste Package Closure System 
Welding 
(Equipment) 
Entire 
Non-SC* 
N/A 
DBGM-2 
No Fall Down 
[Potential Seismic 
interaction] 
Fall (loss of anchorage) of this SSC into a waste 
package due to a seismic event could initiate an 
event sequence exceeding the performance 
objectives of 10 CFR 63.111(b)(2) by breach of 
DSNF canister or other waste containers. 
Potential for burn-through identified in Attachment 
III, but seismically-initiated sequence is considered 
to be not credible (Assumption 5.6). 
*Classification of SSC requires review. 
Inerting (Equipment) 
Entire 
Non-SC 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
No seismic design required for SSC. 
No function of these SSCs is credited for the 
prevention or mitigation of a seismically-initiated 
event sequence. 
Nondestructive 
Testing (Equipment) 
Entire 
Non-SC 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
No seismic design required for SSC. 
No function of these SSCs is credited for the 
prevention or mitigation of a seismically-initiated 
event sequence. 

Table IV-1. Seismic Classification of Systems, Components and Functions (Continued) 
System/ 
Subsystem a 
Subsystem/ 
Component/ 
Function a,c 
Safety 
Category a 
ITS/ITWI a 
Seismic 
Category b 
Safety Function 
(for DBGM 
Assignment) d 
Basis for Seismic Classification/Comments 
Stress Mitigation 
(Equipment) 
Entire 
Non-SC 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
No seismic design required for SSC. 
No function of these SSCs is credited for the 
prevention or mitigation of a seismically-initiated 
event sequence. 
WP Identification 
Entire 
Non-SC 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
No seismic design required for SSC. 
No function of these SSCs is credited for the 
prevention or mitigation of a seismically-initiated 
event sequence. 
Spread Ring 
Installation 
Entire 
Non-SC 
N/A 
CD 
N/A 
No function of these SSCs is credited for the 
prevention or mitigation of a seismically-initiated 
event sequence. 
Material Handling 
Entire 
Non-SC 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
No seismic design required for SSC. 
No function of these SSCs is credited for the 
prevention or mitigation of a seismically-initiated 
event sequence. 
Remote Equipment 
Maintenance 
Entire 
Non-SC 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
No seismic design required for SSC. 
No function of these SSCs is credited for the 
prevention or mitigation of a seismically-initiated 
event sequence. 

Table IV-1. Seismic Classification of Systems, Components and Functions (Continued) 
System/ 
Subsystem a 
Subsystem/ 
Component/ 
Function a,c 
Safety 
Category a 
ITS/ITWI a 
Seismic 
Category b 
Safety Function 
(for DBGM 
Assignment) d 
Basis for Seismic Classification/Comments 
Operations Control 
Entire 
Non-SC 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
No seismic design required for SSC. 
No function of this SSC is credited for the 
prevention or mitigation of a seismically-initiated 
event sequence. 
NOTES: a System/Facility list, Safety Category and ITS/ITWI assignments are modified from BSC (2004r, Appendix A); the System/Facility list was further 
expanded for clarification, as required. 
b SSCs designated, conventional design (CD), shall be designed in accordance with the methodology of Section 1615 of the International 
Building Code (ICC 2000), and incorporating all relevant Project seismic criteria and standards, as appropriate (BSC, 2004aa, Section 6.1.3.2; 
BSC 2004x, Section 6.4). 
c The term cask refers to both the transportation cask and the site-specific cask, unless specified otherwise. 
d Safety Functions are defined in Section 4.3. 
e Operational considerations may limit or prohibit the transport of DSNF to the Aging Pad, but for the conservatism, it is included for this analysis. 
AC = alternating current; CD = conventional design; CHF = Canister Handling Facility; DBGM = design basis ground motion; DC = direct current; 
DOE = U.S. Department of Energy; DSNF = U.S. Department of Energy-owned spent nuclear fuel; DTF = Dry Transfer Facility; DPC = dual 
purpose canister; FHF = Fuel Handling Facility; HLW = high-level radioactive waste; HVAC = heating, ventilation, and air-conditioning; 
HEPA = high-efficiency particulate air (filter); ITS = important to safety; ITWI = important to waste isolation; LLW = low-level waste; 
MSC = monitored geologic repository site-specific cask; N/A = Not Applicable; Non-SC = non-safety category; SC = safety category; SNF = spent 
nuclear fuel; SRTC = site rail transfer cart; SSC = structure, system, or component; SSCs = structures, systems, and components; TCRRF = 
Transportation Cask Receipt/Return Facility; UPS = uninterruptible power supply; V = volts; WP = waste package. 

ATTACHMENT V 
GENERALIZED SEISMIC EVENT TREES 

INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 

Table V-1. Seismic Event Tree Event Definitions 
Event Name 
(Failure State) 
Event Definition 
BR_DROP 
Waste Form Breaches After Drop 
BR_FALL 
Waste Form Breaches After Fall 
BR_SLAP 
Waste Form Breaches After Slap-down 
CELL_COLL 
Transfer Cell Structure Collapses 
CONF_CELL 
Confinement Structure Fails 
CONF_CELL_F 
Confinement Structure Fails 
DR_LOAD 
Crane or Fuel Handling Machine Drops Load 
DR_LOSP 
Waste Form Drops or Collides With Object (Due To Seismic/LOSP Effect On Control 
System) 
EQPT_SUP 
Crane or Fuel Handling Machine Structure Fails 
EQ 
Earthquake Occurs 
EQT_FS 
Handling Equipment Does Not Stop In Fail-Safe Mode 
F_DR_COL 
Fire Causes Waste Form To Drop or Collide With Object 
FIRE_CELL 
Fire Initiated In Cell (Electrical or Other) 
GEOM_COOL 
Geometry/Ducting Fails 
HEPA_CELL 
HVAC/HEPA Filtration Fails 
HEPA_CELL_F 
HVAC/HEPA Filtration in Cell Fails 
HEPA_LOSP 
HVAC/HEPA Filtration Power Fails 
HVAC_COOL 
HVAC Cooling System Fails to Function 
LOSP 
Loss of Offsite Power 
OF_TRAN 
Waste Form Suspended From Handling Equipment (Occupancy Factor) 
OTF_CELL 
Falling Structure Impacts Staging Rack or Waste In Process (Target/Occupancy Factor) 
OTF_STAG 
Waste Present (Occupancy Factor) or Equipment Over Waste (Target Factor) 
OTF_TROL 
Waste Form Present In Operation (Occupancy Factor) 
POOL_LIN 
Pool Structure/ Liner Fails 
POOL_SUPP 
Water Supply and Cooling Fails 
RES_COOL_C 
Restoration Of Cooling or Remedial Action Fails 
RES_COOL_P 
Restoration Of Level/ Cooling Fails 
SUPP_CELL 
Fire-Suppression System Fails 
TROL_TO 
Trolley, Railcar, Fixture Causes Tipover, Slap Down or Impact 
NOTE: HEPA = high-efficiency particulate air; and HVAC = heating, ventilation, and air-conditioning. 

Figure V-1. Seismic Event Tree: Collapse of Structure of Transfer Cell 
Figure V-2. Seismic Event Tree: Remediation Building Pool Level and Cooling 

Figure V-3. Seismic Event Tree: Active Cooling of Dry Transfer Facility Staging Commercial Spent 
Nuclear Fuel 

Figure V-4. Seismic Event Tree: Seismically-Induced Fire in Dry Transfer Facility Transfer Cell 

Figure V-5. Seismic Event Tree: Seismically-Induced Loss of Offsite Power 

Figure V-6. Seismic Event Tree: Fall of Handling Equipment onto Waste Form 

Figure V-7. Seismic Event Tree: Tipover/Slap Down in Handling Operations 

INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 

ATTACHMENT VI 
FAULT TREES 

INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 

Table VI-1. Fault Tree Top Events 
Top Event Name 
Description 
EQT_FS_FHM 
Fuel Handling Machine Fails to Stop in Fail-Safe Mode Following Earthquake 
EQT_FS_DTC 
DTF Crane Fails to Stop in Fail-Safe Mode Following Earthquake 
DR_LOAD_FHM 
Fuel Handling Machine Fails to Maintain Suspended Load 
DR_LOAD_DTC 
DTF Crane Fails to Maintain Suspended Load 
NOTE: DTF = Dry Transfer Facility. 
Table VI-2. Basic Event List 
Event Name 
Description 
CONT_LH_EQ 
Seismically-induced Failures of Control System 
CONT_LH_IN 
Independent Failures of Control System 
DTC_CONLH_EQ 
Seismically-induced Failures of Control System 
DTC_CONLH_IN 
Independent Failures of Control System 
DTC_LH_HFE 
Seismically-induced or Influenced Human Failure in using Control System 
DTC_FS_EQ 
Fail-Safe Mode Fails Due to Seismically-induced Failures 
DTC_FS_IN 
Fail-Safe Mode Fails Due to Independent Failures (Mechanical, Electronic, or Human) 
FHM_FS_EQ 
Fail-Safe Mode Fails Due to Seismically-induced Failures 
FHM_FS_IN 
Fail-Safe Mode Fails Due to Independent Failures (Mechanical, Electronic, or Human) 
FHM_LH_EQ 
Seismically-induced Failures of Lifting/Holding Mechanisms 
FHM_LH_IN 
Independent Failures of Lifting/Holding Mechanisms 
FHM_CONLH_EQ 
Seismically-induced Failures of Control System 
FHM_CONLH_IN 
Independent Failures of Control System 
FHM_LH_HFE 
Seismically-induced or Influenced Human Failure in using Control System 
TRAN_LH_EQ 
Seismically-induced Failures of Lifting/Holding Mechanisms 
TRAN_LH_HFE 
Seismically-induced or Influenced Human Failure in using Control System 
TRAN_LH_IND 
Independent Failures of Lifting/Holding Mechanisms 

Figure VI-1. Fault Tree: Fuel Handling Machine Fails to Stop in Fail-Safe Mode Following an 
Earthquake 

Figure VI-2. Fault Tree: Dry Transfer Facility Crane Fails to Stop in Fail-Safe Mode Following an 
Earthquake 

Figure VI-3. Fault Tree: Fuel Handling Machine Fails to Maintain Suspended Load 

Figure VI-4. Fault Tree: Dry Transfer Facility Crane Fails to Maintain Suspended Load 

INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 

ATTACHMENT VII 
SOURCE DATA FOR GROUND MOTIONS ASSOCIATED WITH REFERENCE 
EARTHQUAKES 

NTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 

Table VII-1. Source Data for Ground Motions Associated with Reference Earthquakes 
Average Spectral 
Accelerations for 
Rage of Frequencies 
Mean 
Annual 
Probability 
of 
Exceedance 
Location 
Frequency 
(Hz) 
Period 
(Seconds) 
Horizontal 
Spectral 
Acceleration 
@ 5% 
Damping 
(g) 
Peak Ground 
Acceleration 
(Horizontal) a 
(g) 
SA(1-2.5) b 
(g) 
SA(5-10) b 
(g) DTN/ File Name DTN/ File Name 
1.00 
1.000 
0.2506 
2.01 
0.498 
0.5493 
2.50 0.400 (0.6158) d 
2.99 0.335 0.6599 
4.98 0.201 0.7758 
5.00 0.200 (0.7764) e 
5.99 0.167 0.7957 
10.00 0.100 0.8180 
1.0 x 10-3 Surface c 
100.00 0.010 0.3709 0.3709 f 
2.50 
0.400 
(0.6158) d 
2.99 0.335 0.6599 
4.98 0.201 0.7758 
5.00 0.200 (0.7764) e 
5.99 0.167 0.7957 
10.00 0.100 0.8180 
1.0 x 10-3 Surface c 
100.00 0.010 0.3709 0.3709 f 
2.99 
0.335 
0.6599 
4.98 0.201 0.7758 
5.00 0.200 (0.7764) e 
5.99 0.167 0.7957 
10.00 0.100 0.8180 
1.0 x 10-3 Surface c 
100.00 0.010 0.3709 0.3709 f 
4.98 
0.201 
0.7758 
5.00 0.200 (0.7764) e 
5.99 0.167 0.7957 
10.00 0.100 0.8180 
1.0 x 10-3 Surface c 
100.00 0.010 0.3709 0.3709 f 
5.00 
0.200 
(0.7764) e 
5.99 0.167 0.7957 
10.00 0.100 0.8180 
1.0 x 10-3 Surface c 
100.00 0.010 0.3709 0.3709 f 
5.99 
0.167 
0.7957 
10.00 0.100 0.8180 
1.0 x 10-3 Surface c 
100.00 0.010 0.3709 0.3709 f 
10.00 
0.100 
0.8180 
1.0 x 10-3 Surface c 
100.00 0.010 0.3709 0.3709 f 
1.0 x 10-3 
Surface c 
100.00 
0.010 
0.3709 0.3709 f 0.3709 f 
0.4332 
0.7972 
DTN: MO0411SDSDE103.003 
File: SPCDAMP10-3_tdms.xls 
1.00 
1.000 
0.1330 
2.00 
0.500 
0.2007 
2.50 0.400 (0.2096) g 
5.00 0.200 0.2541 
10.00 0.100 0.2553 
1.0 x 10-3 
Emplacement 
Level 
100.00 0.010 0.1316 0.1316 
2.50 
0.400 
(0.2096) g 
5.00 0.200 0.2541 
10.00 0.100 0.2553 
1.0 x 10-3 
Emplacement 
Level 
100.00 0.010 0.1316 0.1316 
5.00 
0.200 
0.2541 
10.00 0.100 0.2553 
1.0 x 10-3 
Emplacement 
Level 
100.00 0.010 0.1316 0.1316 
10.00 
0.100 
0.2553 
1.0 x 10-3 
Emplacement 
Level 
100.00 0.010 0.1316 0.1316 
1.0 x 10-3 
Emplacement 
Level 
100.00 
0.010 
0.1316 0.1316 0.1316 
0.1713 
0.2547 
DTN: MO0405SDSTPNTB.001 
File:10-3HB1.dat 

Table VII-1. Source Data for Ground Motions Associated with Reference Earthquakes (Continued) 
Average Spectral 
Accelerations for 
Range of Frequencies 
Mean 
Annual 
Probability 
of 
Exceedance 
Location 
Frequency 
(Hz) 
Period 
(Seconds) 
Horizontal 
Spectral 
Acceleration 
@ 5% 
Damping 
(g) 
Peak Ground 
Acceleration 
(Horizontal) a 
(g) 
SA(1-2.5) b 
(g) 
SA(5-10) b 
(g) DTN/ File Name DTN/ File Name 
1.00 
1.000 
0.3918 
2.01 
0.498 
0.8309 
2.50 0.400 (0.9531) d 
2.99 0.335 1.0341 
4.98 0.201 1.1779 
5.00 0.200 (1.1789) e 
5.99 0.167 1.2106 
10.00 0.100 1.2512 
5.0 x 10-4 Surface d 
100.00 0.010 0.5802 0.5802 f 
2.50 
0.400 
(0.9531) d 
2.99 0.335 1.0341 
4.98 0.201 1.1779 
5.00 0.200 (1.1789) e 
5.99 0.167 1.2106 
10.00 0.100 1.2512 
5.0 x 10-4 Surface d 
100.00 0.010 0.5802 0.5802 f 
2.99 
0.335 
1.0341 
4.98 0.201 1.1779 
5.00 0.200 (1.1789) e 
5.99 0.167 1.2106 
10.00 0.100 1.2512 
5.0 x 10-4 Surface d 
100.00 0.010 0.5802 0.5802 f 
4.98 
0.201 
1.1779 
5.00 0.200 (1.1789) e 
5.99 0.167 1.2106 
10.00 0.100 1.2512 
5.0 x 10-4 Surface d 
100.00 0.010 0.5802 0.5802 f 
5.00 
0.200 
(1.1789) e 
5.99 0.167 1.2106 
10.00 0.100 1.2512 
5.0 x 10-4 Surface d 
100.00 0.010 0.5802 0.5802 f 
5.99 
0.167 
1.2106 
10.00 0.100 1.2512 
5.0 x 10-4 Surface d 
100.00 0.010 0.5802 0.5802 f 
10.00 
0.100 
1.2512 
5.0 x 10-4 Surface d 
100.00 0.010 0.5802 0.5802 f 
5.0 x 10-4 
Surface d 
100.00 
0.010 
0.5802 0.5802 f 0.5802 f 
0.6724 
1.2150 
DTN: MO0411SDSTMHIS.006 
File: spcdamp5E-4_TDMS.xls 
1.00 
1.000 
0.1880 
2.00 
0.500 
0.2749 
2.50 0.400 (0.2885) g 
5.00 0.200 0.3567 
10.00 0.100 0.3789 
5.0 x 10-4 
Emplacement 
Level 
100.00 0.010 0.1911 0.1911 
2.50 
0.400 
(0.2885) g 
5.00 0.200 0.3567 
10.00 0.100 0.3789 
5.0 x 10-4 
Emplacement 
Level 
100.00 0.010 0.1911 0.1911 
5.00 
0.200 
0.3567 
10.00 0.100 0.3789 
5.0 x 10-4 
Emplacement 
Level 
100.00 0.010 0.1911 0.1911 
10.00 
0.100 
0.3789 
5.0 x 10-4 
Emplacement 
Level 
100.00 0.010 0.1911 0.1911 
5.0 x 10-4 
Emplacement 
Level 
100.00 
0.010 
0.1911 0.1911 0.1911 
0.2383 
0.3678 
DTN: MO0407SDARS104.001 
File:5e-4Horizontal Spectrum.dat 

Table VII-1. Source Data for Ground Motions Associated with Reference Earthquakes (Continued) 
Average Spectral 
Accelerations for 
Range of Frequencies 
Mean 
Annual 
Probability 
of 
Exceedance 
Location 
Frequency 
(Hz) 
Period 
(Seconds) 
Horizontal 
Spectral 
Acceleration 
@ 5% 
Damping 
(g) 
Peak Ground 
Acceleration 
(Horizontal) a 
(g) 
SA(1-2.5) b 
(g) 
SA(5-10) b 
(g) DTN/ File Name DTN/ File Name 
1.00 
1.000 
1.0704 
2.01 
0.498 
1.9482 
2.50 0.400 (2.0950) d 
2.99 0.335 2.1924 
4.98 0.201 2.4746 
5.00 0.200 (2.4753) e 
5.99 0.167 2.4490 
10.00 0.10 2.5548 
1.0 x 10-4 Surface d 
100.00 0.01 1.1926 1.1926 f 
2.50 
0.400 
(2.0950) d 
2.99 0.335 2.1924 
4.98 0.201 2.4746 
5.00 0.200 (2.4753) e 
5.99 0.167 2.4490 
10.00 0.10 2.5548 
1.0 x 10-4 Surface d 
100.00 0.01 1.1926 1.1926 f 
2.99 
0.335 
2.1924 
4.98 0.201 2.4746 
5.00 0.200 (2.4753) e 
5.99 0.167 2.4490 
10.00 0.10 2.5548 
1.0 x 10-4 Surface d 
100.00 0.01 1.1926 1.1926 f 
4.98 
0.201 
2.4746 
5.00 0.200 (2.4753) e 
5.99 0.167 2.4490 
10.00 0.10 2.5548 
1.0 x 10-4 Surface d 
100.00 0.01 1.1926 1.1926 f 
5.00 
0.200 
(2.4753) e 
5.99 0.167 2.4490 
10.00 0.10 2.5548 
1.0 x 10-4 Surface d 
100.00 0.01 1.1926 1.1926 f 
5.99 
0.167 
2.4490 
10.00 0.10 2.5548 
1.0 x 10-4 Surface d 
100.00 0.01 1.1926 1.1926 f 
10.00 
0.10 
2.5548 
1.0 x 10-4 Surface d 
100.00 0.01 1.1926 1.1926 f 
1.0 x 10-4 
Surface d 
100.00 
0.01 
1.1926 1.1926 f 1.1926 f 
1.5827 
2.5151 
DTN: MO0411WHBDE104.003 
File: Spcdamp10-4_TDMS.xls 
1.00 
1.000 
0.4197 
2.01 
0.498 
0.6139 
2.48 0.404 0.6726 
2.50 0.400 (0.6753) h 
2.54 0.394 0.6794 
4.98 0.201 0.8187 
5.00 0.200 (0.8192) i 
5.09 0.196 0.8211 
10.00 0.100 0.8355 
1.0 x 10-4 
Emplacement 
Level 
100.00 0.010 0.4257 0.4257 
2.48 
0.404 
0.6726 
2.50 0.400 (0.6753) h 
2.54 0.394 0.6794 
4.98 0.201 0.8187 
5.00 0.200 (0.8192) i 
5.09 0.196 0.8211 
10.00 0.100 0.8355 
1.0 x 10-4 
Emplacement 
Level 
100.00 0.010 0.4257 0.4257 
2.50 
0.400 
(0.6753) h 
2.54 0.394 0.6794 
4.98 0.201 0.8187 
5.00 0.200 (0.8192) i 
5.09 0.196 0.8211 
10.00 0.100 0.8355 
1.0 x 10-4 
Emplacement 
Level 
100.00 0.010 0.4257 0.4257 
2.54 
0.394 
0.6794 
4.98 0.201 0.8187 
5.00 0.200 (0.8192) i 
5.09 0.196 0.8211 
10.00 0.100 0.8355 
1.0 x 10-4 
Emplacement 
Level 
100.00 0.010 0.4257 0.4257 
4.98 
0.201 
0.8187 
5.00 0.200 (0.8192) i 
5.09 0.196 0.8211 
10.00 0.100 0.8355 
1.0 x 10-4 
Emplacement 
Level 
100.00 0.010 0.4257 0.4257 
5.00 
0.200 
(0.8192) i 
5.09 0.196 0.8211 
10.00 0.100 0.8355 
1.0 x 10-4 
Emplacement 
Level 
100.00 0.010 0.4257 0.4257 
5.09 
0.196 
0.8211 
10.00 0.100 0.8355 
1.0 x 10-4 
Emplacement 
Level 
100.00 0.010 0.4257 0.4257 
10.00 
0.100 
0.8355 
1.0 x 10-4 
Emplacement 
Level 
100.00 0.010 0.4257 0.4257 
1.0 x 10-4 
Emplacement 
Level 
100.00 
0.010 
0.4257 0.4257 0.4257 
0.5475 
0.8273 
DTN: MO0306SDSAVDTH.000 
File:10-4BH.dat 

NOTES: a PGA values are calculated at a frequency of 100 Hz (period = 0.01 second) at 5% damping. 
b SA(1-2.5) = [(SA1 +SA2.5) / 2] and SA(5-10) = [(SA5 +SA10) / 2], where SA1, SA2.5, SA5, and SA10 are the maximum horizontal spectral accelerations 
at 1 Hz, 2.5 Hz, 5 Hz, and 10 Hz, respectively, for 5% damping. 
c Surface values were defined for the Waste Handling Building Area (BSC 2002, Figure 1) based on profiles for 35 ft (11 m) and 110 ft (34 m) of 
alluvium (soil). 
d The value for a frequency of 2.5 Hz for subsurface facilities is not explicitly shown in the data source. The value was computed using a simple 
linear scaling of the values at 2.01 Hz and 2.99 Hz. 
e The value for a frequency of 5.0 Hz for subsurface facilities is not explicitly shown in the data source. The value was computed using a simple 
linear scaling of the values at 4.98 Hz and 5.99 Hz. 
f PGA values for surface facilities are computed at Point D/E. Location of computation points for surface facilities and emplacement level is 
shown in BSC (2004v, Figure 1). 
g The value for a frequency of 2.5 Hz for subsurface facilities is not explicitly shown in the data source. The value was computed using a simple 
linear scaling of the values at 2.0 Hz and 5.0 Hz. 
h The value for a frequency of 2.5 Hz for subsurface facilities is not explicitly shown in the data source. The value was computed using a simple 
linear scaling of the values at 2.48 Hz and 2.54 Hz. 
i The value for a frequency of 5.0 Hz for subsurface facilities is not explicitly shown in the data source. The value was computed using a simple 
linear scaling of the values at 4.98 Hz and 5.09 Hz. 
BDBGM = beyond design basis ground motion; DBGM = design basis ground motion; DTN = document tracking number; g = acceleration due to 
gravity; SA = spectral acceleration; SA(X-Y) = average spectral acceleration for a range, computed as the average of spectral accelerations at 
frequency X and frequency Y.