Unit X: Building Design Guidance 

Unit X 

COURSE TITLE Building Design for Homeland Security TIME 150 minutes 

UNIT TITLE Building Design Guidance 

OBJECTIVES 1. Explain architectural considerations to mitigate impacts from blast 
effects and transmission of chemical, biological, and radiological 
agents from exterior and interior incidents 

2. 
Identify key elements of building structural and nonstructural 
systems for mitigation of blast effects 
3. 
Compare and contrast the benefit of building envelope, mechanical 
system, electrical system, fire protection system, and 
communications system mitigation measures, including synergies 
and conflicts 
4. 
Apply these concepts to an existing building or building conceptual 
design and identify mitigation measures needed to reduce 
vulnerabilities 


SCOPE The following topics will be covered in this unit: 

1. 
Architectural considerations, including building configuration, space 
design, and special situations 
2. 
Building structural and nonstructural considerations with emphasis 
on progressive collapse, loads and stresses, and good engineering 
practices 
3. 
Design issues for the building envelope, including wall design, 
window design, door design, and roof system design with 
approaches to define levels of protection 
4. 
Mechanical system design issues, including interfacing with 
operational procedures, emergency plans, and training 
5. 
Other building systems design consideration for electrical, fire 
protection, communications, electronic security, entry control, and 
physical security that mitigate the effects of a threat or hazard 
6. 
Activity: Select mitigation measures that reduce vulnerability and 
associated risk from the building perspective for the highest risk 
pairs (asset - threat/hazard) identified in Unit V-B. 



Unit X 

REFERENCES 1. FEMA 426, Reference Manual to Mitigate Potential Terrorist 
Attacks Against Buildings, pages 3-1 to 3-46 and 3-48 to 3-52; 
Checklist at end of Chapter 1 

2. 
FEMA 427, Primer for Design of Commercial Buildings to Mitigate 
Terrorist Attacks 
3. 
FEMA 430, Primer for Incorporating Building Security Components 
in Architectural Design (when available) 
4. 
FEMA 452, Risk Assessment: A How-To Guide to Mitigate Potential 
Terrorist Attacks Against Buildings, pages 5-1 to 5-16 
5. 
Student Manual, Unit X-A or Unit X-B as selected 
6. 
Case Study  Appendix A: Suburban, Hazardville Information 
Company or Appendix B: Suburban, HazardCorp Building as 
selected 
7. 
Unit X visuals 


REQUIREMENTS 1. FEMA 426, Reference Manual to Mitigate Potential Terrorist 
Attacks Against Buildings (one per student) 

2. 
FEMA 452, Risk Assessment: A How-To Guide to Mitigate Potential 
Terrorist Attacks Against Buildings (one per student) 
3. 
Instructor Guides, Unit X 
4. 
Student Manual(one per student) for selected case study 
5. 
Overhead projector or computer display unit 
6. 
Unit X visuals 
7. 
Threat Matrices and dry-erase markers 
8. 
Chart paper, easel, and markers 


UNIT X OUTLINE Time Page 

X. Building Design Guidance 150 minutes 
[65 slides at about 1.5 minutes per slide over 90 minutes] 

1. 
Introduction and Unit Overview 13.5 minutes IG X-5 
Third Layer of Defense 
2. 
Architecture 15 minutes IG X-11 
3. 
Structural Systems 9 minutes IG X-18 
4. 
Building Envelope 24 minutes IG X-24 
5. 
Utility Systems 4.5 minutes IG X-39 



Unit X 

6. 
Mechanical and Electrical Systems 10.5 minutes IG X-41 
7. 
Plumbing and Gas Systems 1.5 minutes IG-X-48 
8. 
Fire Alarm Systems 1.5 minutes IG-X-49 
9. 
Communications  Information Technology Systems 3 minutes IG-X-50 
10. 
Equipment Operations and Maintenance 3 minutes IG-X-52 
11. 
Security Systems 4.5 minutes IG-X-54 
12. 
Practical Applications 1.5 minutes IG-X-58 
13. 
Building Materials: General Guidance 1.5 minutes IG-X-58 
14. 
Desired Building Protection Level 1.5 minutes IG-X-59 
15. 
Summary 1.5 minutes IG-X-60 
16. 
Student Activity Instructions 1.5 minutes IG-X-61 
17. 
Student Activity: Building Design Guidance 60 minutes IG X-A-62 
(Version A Suburban) 
[45 minutes for students, 15 minutes for instructor review] 
18. 
Student Activity: Building Design Guidance 60 minutes IG X-B-83 
(Version B Urban) 
[45 minutes for students, 15 minutes for instructor review] 


PREPARING TO TEACH THIS UNIT 

Tailoring Content to the Local Area: Review the Instructor Guides to identify topics that 
should focus on the local area. Plan how you will use the generic content, and prepare for a 
locally oriented discussion. The locally oriented discussion should be in conjunction with the 
version of the case study selected as the student activity used during the course offering. 

Optional Activity: There are three versions of the student activity available for use during this 
course -- Suburban, Urban, or Continuity of Operations Planning (COOP). 

Activity: The students will continue the familiarization with the Case Study materials. The Case 
Study is a complete risk assessment and analysis of mitigation options and strategies for a 
typical commercial office building located in a mixed urban-suburban environment business 
park (suburban), a 50-story high-rise office building located in a downtown urban 
environment (urban), or an alternate facility to be assessed for potential COOP use (based 


Unit X 

upon the suburban building). The assessment will use the DoD Antiterrorism Standards and 
the GSA Interagency Security Criteria to determine Levels of Protection and identify specific 
vulnerabilities. Mitigation options and strategies will use the concepts provided in FEMA 
426 and other FEMA publications related to emergency planning and disaster recovery. 

Refer students to their Student Manuals for worksheets and activities. 

 
Direct students to the appropriate page in the Student Manual. 
 
Read the activity instructions found in the Student Manual. 
 
Describe how the selected case study appendix in the Student Manual is used to obtain the 
data needed for the building assessment. 
 
Walk through the pages of the activity with the students, describing the steps followed to 
obtain the answers in the completed examples, and what is expected of the groups for this 
activity. 
 
If applicable to this activity, explain what information is to be transferred to the Risk Matrix 
poster. For this activity, the assessment of the building in greater depth may result in the 
groups adjusting the Risk Matrix scores for vulnerability rating, with resultant changes to risk 
rating. 
 
Tell students how long they have to work on the requirements. 
 
While students are working, all instructors should closely observe the groups process and 
progress. If any groups are struggling, immediately assist them by clarifying the assignment 
and providing as much help as is necessary for the groups to complete the requirement in the 
allotted time. Also, monitor each group for full participation of all members. For example, 
ask any student who is not fully engaged a question that requires his/her viewpoint to be 
presented to the group. 
 
At the end of the working period, reconvene the class. 
 
Ask a representative from one group to provide the answer to the first requirement. Then 
simply ask if anyone disagrees. If the answer is correct and no one disagrees, state that the 
answer is correct and move on to the next requirement. If there is disagreement, provide the 
school solution and move on. 
 
If time is short, simply provide the school solution and ask for questions. Do not end the 
activity without ensuring that students know if their answers are correct or at least on the 
right track. Note, there are no right or wrong answers, but all answers must be justified with 
rationale. 
 
Ask for and answer questions. 



Unit X: Building Design Guidance 

INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 

VISUAL X-1 

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY 

Unit X
Building Design Guidance



Introduction and Unit Overview 

This is Unit X Building Design Guidance. 
Continuing with our understanding of 
vulnerability and mitigation measures, we 
have looked at site and layout concerns and 
now turn our attention to what considerations 
are needed in building design to mitigate 
tactics involving explosive blast or CBR 
agents. 

We will examine design considerations that 

achieve a balanced building envelope that 

provides a defensive layer against the 

given terrorist tactic and avoids creating 

ripple effects where one incident may 

affect more than one building system. 

Catastrophic collapse of any building is a 
primary concern. Historically, the majority of 
fatalities that occur in terrorist attacks directed 
against buildings are due to building collapse. 
This was true for the Oklahoma City bombing 
in 1995 when 87 percent of the building 
occupants who were killed were in the 
collapsed portion of the Murrah Federal 
Building. But glass causes over 80 percent of 
injuries during bomb blast and there are some 
low cost techniques to keep CBR agents 
outside of buildings or to limit their spread 
inside. 


Unit X: Building Design Guidance 

INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 

VISUAL X-2 


BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit X-2 
Unit Objectives 
Explain architectural 
considerations to mitigateimpacts from blast effects andtransmission of chemical, 
biological, and radiological 
agents from exterior and interior 
incidents. 
Identify key elements ofbuilding structural and non-
structural systems for mitigationof blast effects. 
References 
FEMA Building 
Vulnerability Assessment 
Checklist, Chapter 1, 
page 1-46, FEMA 426 
Building Design 
Guidance, Chapter 3, 
FEMA 426 
FEMA 430, Primer for 
Incorporating Building 
Security Components in 
Architectural Design 
VISUAL X-3 


Unit Objectives (cont.) 

Compare and contrast the benefit of building 
envelope, mechanical system, electrical 
system, fire protection system, and 
communication system mitigation measures, 
including synergies and conflicts. 

Apply these concepts to an existing building 
or building conceptual design and identifymitigation measures needed to reduce 
vulnerabilities. 


BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit X-3 

Unit Objectives 

At the end of this unit, the students should be 
able to: 

Explain architectural considerations due to 
impact from blast effects and transmission 
of chemical, biological, and radiological 
agents from exterior and interior incidents. 

Identify key elements of a buildings 
structural and non-structural systems for 
mitigation of blast effects. 

In addition to FEMA 426, also consult FEMA 
430 (future) for additional design concepts. 

Unit Objectives (continued) 

Compare and contrast the benefit of building 
envelope, mechanical system, electrical 
system, fire protection system, and 
communication system mitigation 
measures, including synergies and 
conflicts. 

Apply these concepts to an existing building 
or building conceptual design and identify 
mitigation measures needed to reduce 
vulnerabilities. 


INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 

VISUAL X-4 


BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit X-4 
Layers of Defense 
FEMA 452, Figure 2-2: Layers of Defense, p. 2-3 
From FEMA 452 
The layers of defense is a traditional 
approach in security engineering and use 
concentric circles extending out from an area 
or site to the building or asset that requires 
protection. They can be seen as demarcation 
points for different security strategies. 
Identifying the layers of defense early in the 
assessment process will help you to 
understand better the assets that require 
protection and determine your mitigation 
options. Figure 2-2 shows the layers of 
defense described above. 

Layers of Defense 

The first and second layers were discussed in 
the previous instruction unit. The Third Layer 
of Defense is applicable to Building Design  
starting at the building drip line, taking into 
account the complete building envelope, and 
including any additional considerations found 
anywhere in the building. 

FEMA 452 -- Third Layer of Defense. This 
deals with the protection of the asset itself. It 
proposes to harden the structures and systems, 
incorporate effective HVAC systems and 
surveillance equipment, and wisely design and 
locate utilities and mechanical systems. Note 
that, of all blast mitigation measures, distance 
is the most effective measure because other 
measures vary in effectiveness and can be 
more costly. However, often it is not possible 
to provide adequate stand-off distance. For 
example, sidewalks in many urban areas may 
be less than 10 meters (33 feet), while 
appropriate stand-off may require a minimum 
of 25 meters (82 feet). The building owner 
has control of this layer and its main 
mitigation measures are hardening against 
blast and security sensors/CCTV as final 
access control. 


Unit X: Building Design Guidance 

INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 

VISUAL X-5 


BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit X-5 
Third Layer of Defense 
Stand-off Distance  primary impact on design and 
construction of building envelope and structure 
against design basis threat (explosives) 
To protect against unauthorized vehicles 
approaching target buildings 
FEMA 426, Figure 2-8: Concept of stand-off distance, p. 2-22 (left) 
FEMA 426, Figure 4-5: Explosive blast range to effects, p. 4-11 (right) 
VISUAL X-6 

Third Layer of Defense 

Stand-off
versus
Given
Hardening


 
Red  Very severe damage, 
possible collapse
 
Yellow  Very unrepairable
structural damage
 Green  Moderate repairable 
Detonation at 
400 feet structural damage


Detonation at 80 feet 
Detonation at 
171 feet 
FEMA 426, Figure 4-9: Stand-off distance versus blast impact 

 Khobar Towers, p. 4-15 

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit X-6 

Third Layer of Defense 

Stand-off Distance versus Hardening of 
Structures 

Of all blast mitigation measures, distance is the 
most effective measure because other measures 
vary in effectiveness and can be more costly. 
However, many times it is not possible to 
provide adequate stand-off distance. 

Desired minimum stand-off in the DoD 
Unified Facility Criteria (UFC) and used as 
the initial screening distance in FEMA 426 is 
82 feet. However, this may only protect 
against column collapse for a 250 pound car 
bomb at 82 feet. 

The design basis threat weapon yield and the 
level of protection desired drive the hardening 
required for the stand-off distance available. 

Third Layer of Defense 

Stand-off versus Given Hardening 

This representation of the estimated damage at 
Khobar Towers uses the blast modeling 
software available circa 1997. It shows the 
front faade of the target building receiving 
very severe damage when the estimated bomb 
is at 80 feet. Increasing the stand-off using the 
same building construction and bomb size 
shows that the stand-off required to limit 
damage is 400 feet. 


INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 

VISUAL X-7 


BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit X-7 
Third Layer of Defense 
Less stand-off requires 
. More mass 
. More steel 
. Thicker and 
stronger glass 
. Better door and 
window frame 
connection to 
building/wall 
Hardening 
U.S. Embassy: Kampala, Uganda designed to 
resist explosive blast [upper left  DOS and 
Hinman]. Other three photos are from New 
York City indicating glass and overhang 
(poor) [lower left], similar glass and 
overhang (poor) but with wall (better) [upper 
right], and window curtain wall (usually 
poor) [lower right]. 
VISUAL X-8 

Third Layer of Defense 


BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit X-8 
Third Layer 
Second Layer 
First Layer 
Layers of 
Defense 
ArchitectureStructural SystemsBuilding EnvelopeUtility SystemsMechanical & Electrical SysPlumbing & Gas SystemsFire Alarm SystemsComm -Info Technology SysEquipment Ops & MaintSecurity Systems 
Note that one mitigation measure may reduce 
the risk of more than one asset-threat/hazard 
pair of interest as illustrated by Table 2-1, 
page 2-54, of FEMA 426, where a mitigation 
measure may apply to multiple tactics. On 

Third Layer of Defense 
Hardening 

Less stand-off requires more mass and more 
steel for hardening, thicker and stronger glass, 
and better window frame connection to the 
building/wall. However, this should be done 
in concert with good architecture design and 
aesthetics principles. As you can see, the 
other photos show architectural treatments that 
increase blast damage  overhangs and much 
glass. 

Note that 82 feet of stand-off allows use of 
conventional construction with minimal 
upgrades when used in conjunction with a 
controlled perimeter that detects larger bombs 
prior to getting anywhere near the building. 

Third Layer of Defense 

The third layer of defense deals with the 
protection of the asset itself. The column 
headings include key elements of protection 
and the row headings includes the three layers 
of defense. The matrix allows designers to 
consider different methods of protection and 
when they could be used. For the third layer 
of defense, designers should go through each 
system to take appropriate mitigation 
measures for an existing building or provide 
increased hardening when designing a 
building. 

The rest of this instruction unit will follow 
along the column headings in the order shown. 
This is the same order as found in the Building 
Vulnerability Checklist at the end of Chapter 1 
of FEMA 426. 


Unit X: Building Design Guidance 

INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 

the other hand, a mitigation measure against 
one tactic may increase the vulnerability to 
other tactics. 

VISUAL X-9 

Third Layer of Defense 

When hardening a building, the following should be 
considered: 

. 
Progressive collapse 
. 
Appropriate security systems 
. 
Hardening the building envelope 
. 
Appropriate HVAC systems to mitigate CBR 
. 
Hardening the remaining structure 
. 
Hardening and location of utilities 



BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit X-9 

Third Layer of Defense 

Hardening Considerations: 

 
Progressive collapse 
This should be the first consideration as 
most deaths result from building collapse 
and life safety seeks to ensure safe 
evacuation of a building during or after any 
incident. Structural framing and load-
bearing components are the concern here. 
 
Appropriate security systems 
For an existing building the addition of 
security systems to deter, detect, and deny 
the building needs to be done whether or 
not building hardening can be done. 
 
Hardening the building envelope 
After progressive collapse, hardening the 
building envelope provides the most 
protection against injury during blast events 
and aligns with building tightness 
considerations for exterior CBR releases. 
 
Appropriate HVAC systems to mitigate 
against CBR 
Next the control of HVAC operation for 
exterior and interior CBR releases should 
be considered based upon the complexity of 
the existing or designed system. 
 
Hardening the structure 
After progressive collapse and hardening 
the building envelope, hardening the rest of 
the structural/nonstructural components to 
reduce injury should be considered. 
 
Hardening and location of utilities 
This might be the most expensive to do with 
an existing building, but should be fully 
implemented in a new building design. 
Accessible, aboveground utilities should 
receive first consideration for hardening. 



Unit X: Building Design Guidance 

INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 

VISUAL X-10 


BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit X-10 
Architecture  Building Configuration 
Low, Large Footprint 
Tall, Small Footprint 
Architecture  Building Configuration 

Designers should balance a number of relevant 
considerations to the extent that site, 
economic, and other factors allow. 

Some of the relevant considerations include 
the following: 

 
The shape of the building 
 
Low, large footprint buildings 
 
Tall, small footprint buildings 


General benefits of the two basic approaches: 

Low, Large Footprint: 

 
Reduced effect of explosive blast (catches 
less of the blast wave)  Dispersed and 
blast wave rolls over the top. 
 
Reduced effect of progressive collapse 
(less of the building can fall)  Due to less 
structural members impacted. 
 
Reduced surveillance or easier mitigation 
(lower height allows terrain and 
landscaping options) 
 
Better energy conservation (green roof 
potential and earth-sheltered design  earth 
berm reduces energy loss and directs blast 
wave over the building if the berm is as 
high as the building) 
Tall, Small Footprint: 


 
Reduced blast effects on upper floors 
 
Air intakes better protected against CBR 
events 
 
Site runoff reduced, reducing culvert size 
as a covert entry point 
 
More parking space that meets local 
planning commission/building code 



Unit X: Building Design Guidance 

INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 

VISUAL X-11 


BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit X-11 
Shapes That 
Accentuate Blast 
Architecture  Building Configuration 
Rectangular versus 
U, L or E 
Avoid re-entrant corners 
Flush face versus eaves 
and overhangs 
FEMA 426, Figure 3-2: Re-entrant corners in a floor plan, p. 3-6 
FEMA 427, Figure 6-3: Effects of building shape vs. air blast, p. 6-9 
VISUAL X-12 


Architecture  Building Configuration

Hardening  Story height vs Stand-off 

. 
Hardening of first three floors is
critical as these take brunt of blast 
. 
At third through sixth floor, hardening 
can be reduced due to reflection 
angle 
. 
Above the sixth floor, conventional
construction may be sufficient
depending upon design threat and
reflections off adjacent buildings



1 
7 
6 
5 
4 
3 
2 
BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit X-12 

Architecture  Building Configuration 

A lot can be done architecturally to mitigate 
the effects of a terrorist bombing on a facility. 
These measures often cost nothing or very 
little if implemented early in the design 
process. FEMA 430 (future) will contain an 
expanded discussion of incorporating security 
components in architectural design. 

 Further looking at building shapes, certain 
configurations trap the blast wave, 
increasing overall damage to the structure. 
For example, U or L shaped buildings, 
overhangs, and re-entrant corners in 
general should be avoided. Either the 
reflected pressure increases as it cannot 
vent around the building or the building 
gets hit with reflected blast waves at points 
already hit by the initial blast wave. 

Architecture  Building Configuration 

GSA has stated the hardening for the urban 
situation will be fully evaluated for the first 
three floors of the building because these 
floors are most vulnerable. At the third 
through sixth floor, the hardening can be 
reduced, but some hardening is still necessary. 
Above the sixth floor may need only 
conventional construction with minimal 
hardening -- because the reflection angle is 
going to result in a lower coefficient of 
reflection and the increased stand-off distance 
to these floors also results in less reflected 
pressure. 

However, as the bomb gets bigger, the upper 
floors will see severe damage even with the 
increased reflection angles just due to the 
higher incident pressure generated by larger 
bombs. 

The GSA approach would hold very well for a 


Unit X: Building Design Guidance 

INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 

VISUAL X-13 


BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit X-13 
Architecture  Building Configuration 
Ground floor elevation 4 feet above grade 
Orient glazing perpendicular to principal threat direction 
Avoid exposed structural 
elements 
Pitched roofs and pitched 
window sills 
FEMA 426, Figure 3-1: Glazed areas perpendicularly oriented away 
from streets, p. 3-5 
high-rise building surrounded by low-rise 
buildings (3 floors and less), but is probably 
less applicable for the high-rise building 
surrounded by other high-rise buildings. Blast 
wave reflections off adjacent buildings, will 
affect all floors of the building of interest to 
varying degrees. The reflections will follow 
much longer paths resulting in larger effective 
stand-off distances and the various reflection 
angles will result in lower incident and 
reflected pressures compared to the initial 
blast wave. Unfortunately, the reflections my 
hit a very weak point in the response motion 
of the building or building component at any 
floor level resulting in more damage than 
would have been originally expected. 

Architecture  Building Configuration 

 
Elevating the ground floor makes moving 
vehicle attack more difficult 
 
If the glazing looks perpendicular to the 
direction of travel for the blast wave, the 
glass sees less reflected pressure. 
 
Do not have structural elements, like 
columns, easily exposed on the outside of 
the building. This goes for any 
architectural feature that can become 
damaged or disconnected by a blast wave. 
 
If armed attack includes Molotov cocktails 
or home-made grenades, pitched roofs and 
pitched window sills tend to cause the 
thrown item to roll off and away from the 
building. Air intakes have similar 
considerations. 



Unit X: Building Design Guidance 

INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit X-14 
Architecture  Building Configuration 
. Avoid trucks parking in or 
underneath buildings 
. Design to prevent progressive 
collapse 
. Ensure separation from critical 
systems, functions, and utility 
service entrances 
. Separate loading docks from 
building critical functions 
. Provide sufficient area for 
screening vehicles and 
packages 
. Keep dumpsters away from 
buildings 
Loading Docks 
VISUAL X-14 


VISUAL X-15 


Architecture  Building Configuration 

Loading Docks 

 
Loading docks are higher risk locations as 
larger vehicles with potentially larger 
bombs are allowed minimal stand-off from 
the building. 
 
Building design calls for the basics of 
preventing progressive collapse, and 
separating critical equipment, systems, 
components and functions away from the 
loading dock. 
 
Do not provide a hiding location by 
placing dumpsters adjacent to the building 
 
Screen packages and vehicles coming to 
the loading dock at other locations or in an 
area of sufficient size to allow searches 
and sufficient distance from the building to 
reduce the impact of any incident. 


Architecture  Building Configuration 

Parking Considerations 

 
As with loading docks, parking underneath 
a building is a higher risk situation as 
larger bombs than can be hand-carried 
approach the building with minimal 
stand-off. 
 
As with loading docks, progressive 
collapse is a primary concern 
 
Restrict parking to vetted vehicles, but 
also provide access control and security 
systems 
 
Access from underground parking 
(stairwells and elevators) to the building 
should be only to unsecured spaces where 
access control then occurs, such as outside 
the footprint of the building 


BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit X-15 
Architecture  Building Configuration 
Parking Considerations 
. Restrict parking underneath buildings 
. Well-lit, security presence, emergency 
communications, and/or CCTV 
. Apply progressive collapse hardening 
to columns when parking garage is in 
building 
. Garage elevators service garage 
only to unsecured zone of lobby 

Unit X: Building Design Guidance 

INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 

VISUAL X-16 

Architecture  Space Design 


BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit X-16 

VISUAL X-17 

The loading dock and warehouse 
provide single point of entry to the 
interior. 
The mailroom is located within the 
interior and not on exterior wall or 
separate HVAC system. 
The telecom switch and computer 
data center are adjacent to the 
warehouse. 
The trash dumpster and 
emergency generator are located 
adjacent to the loading dock. 
FEMA 426, Figure 1-10: Non-redundant critical functions collocated 
near loading dock, p. 1-41 
BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit X-17 
Architecture  Space Design 
Place unsecured or high risk 
areas outside building 
footprint 
Do not mix high risk and low 
risk tenants in same building 
Locate critical assets into 
interior of building 
Separate areas of high visitor 
activity (unsecured) from 
critical assets 
FEMA 427, Figure 6-4: Improving layout of adjacent unsecured and 
secured areas, p. 6-10 
Architecture  Space Design 

Functional Layout 

Public areas such as the lobby, loading dock, 
mail room, garage, and retail areas need to be 
separated from the more secured areas of the 
facility. This can be done by creating internal 
hard lines or buffer zones, using secondary 
stairwells, elevator shafts, corridors, and 
storage areas between public and secured 
areas. 

In lobby areas, the architect would be wise to 
consider the queuing requirements in front of 
the inspection stations so that visitors are not 
forced to stand outside during bad weather 
conditions or in a congested line inside a small 
lobby while waiting to enter the secured areas. 
Consider allowing enough lobby space for 
future inspection equipment. 

Architecture  Space Design 

Structural Layout 

Unsecured areas should be physically 
separated from the main building to the extent 
possible. 

For example, a separate lobby pavilion or 
loading dock outside the main footprint 
provides enhanced protection against damage 
and potential building collapse in the event of 
an explosion. Similarly, placing parking areas 
outside the main footprint of the building can 
be highly effective in reducing the 
vulnerability to catastrophic collapse. 

Mixed occupancies. High-risk tenants should 
not be housed with low-risk tenants. Terrorists 
may identify some targets based on their 
symbology, visibility, ideology, political 
views, potential for publicity, or simply the 


Unit X: Building Design Guidance 

INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 

VISUAL X-18 

Architecture  Space Design 

Eliminate hiding places Building Exterior 

Interior barriers 

Offset doorways 

Minimize glazing,
particularly interior glazing 
near high-risk areas


Lobby with security
procedures configured to
contain incidents (blast, 
CBR, armed attack)


FEMA 426, Figure 3-3: Offset doors through foyer, p. 3-7 
BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit X-18 

consequences of their loss. Low-risk tenants 
are then placed at higher risk due to proximity. 

 
However, if there are very few high-risk 
tenants among many low-risk tenants, then 
dispersal and devalue can be mitigation 
techniques. 
 
After Oklahoma City, day care centers 
(low-risk) are separated from the main 
building functions (high-risk) to reduce the 
risk to the day care centers. This has been 
done at the Pentagon, with a relatively 
minor decrease in convenience. 


Architecture  Space Design 

Design Measures 

 
Eliminate hiding places 
Generally a good security idea, especially 
in any areas where few people may 
frequent, like stairwells or underground 
parking 
 
Interior barriers 
Channel building staff and visitors to their 
respective areas and use interior barriers to 
provide separation between unsecure and 
secure areas 
 
Offset doorways 
If an explosive blast breaches the first door 
in a foyer, the offset will provide additional 
protection to the next door -- less incident 
pressure striking the interior door due to 
swirling of the blast wave. 
 
Minimize glazing 
Glass, unless hardened, adds to injuries 
during incidents. Reducing glazing is one 
approach, hardening is another, and proper 
placement is a third. 
 
Lobby design 
While it is a given that security and access 
control should be in the lobby, but design 
should accommodate the occurrence of an 
incident within lobby  reversal of standard 
design pressures, containment of the event 



Unit X: Building Design Guidance 

INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 

VISUAL X-19 


Architecture  Other Location Concerns 

 
Safe havens / shelters 
 
Office locations 
 
Public toilets and service areas 
 
Retail spaces 
 
Stairwells 
 
Mailroom 



BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit X-19 

For additional information on safe havens, 
see FEMA 453 (future) -Multihazard 
Shelter (Safe Havens) Design 

inside the lobby without affecting the rest 

of the building, control of agents and toxic 

gases, and hardening against armed attack. 

Architecture  Other Location Concerns 

When designing high-risk buildings, engineers 
and architects should consider the following: 

The innermost layer of protection within a 
physical security system is the safe haven. 
Safe havens are not intended to withstand a 
disciplined, paramilitary attack featuring 
explosives and heavy weapons. They are 
locations where sheltering-in-place for CBR, 
protection from natural hazards or bomb blast 
can occur. 

Offices considered to be high risk (more likely 
to be targeted by terrorists) should be placed 
or glazed so that the occupants cannot be seen 
from an uncontrolled public area such as a 
street. Whenever possible, these spaces should 
face courtyards, internal sites, or controlled 
areas. 

Public toilets and service areas, or access to 
vertical circulation systems (stairwells and 
elevators) should not be located in any non-
secure areas, including the queuing area 
before visitor screening at the public entrance. 

Retail and other mixed uses, which have 
been encouraged in public buildings by the 
Public Buildings Cooperative Use Act of 
1976, create spaces that are open and inviting. 
Although important to the public nature of the 
buildings, the presence of retail and other 
mixed uses may present a risk to buildings and 
their occupants and should be carefully 
considered on a project-specific basis during 
project design. Consider allowing access to 
retail space only from the outside of the 
building and not between any interior spaces 


Unit X: Building Design Guidance 

INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 

or consider access configuration so that 
movement from retail spaces must go past 
security to get to the rest of the building. 

Stairwells required for emergency egress 
should be located as remotely as possible from 
areas where blast events might occur and, 
wherever possible, should not discharge into 
lobbies, parking, or loading areas. When 
possible, emergency egress stairwells should 
be separate from the main building ingress 
stairwells, and secured to prevent individuals 
from accessing the secured floors of the 
building. Also do What-If as what would be 
done if a stairwell is lost as an egress during 
an incident. 

Mailrooms should be located away from 
facility main entrances, areas containing 
critical services, utilities, distribution systems, 
and important assets. Avoid locating a 
mailroom in the same building as a child care 
center. In fact, the processing and inspection 
of mail and packages is best done in a separate 
building if possible. If an incident requires 
evacuation of the building, a separate building 
would limit the impact, vice a high-occupancy 
office building. Ditto, do What-If and plan 
alternatives. 

Structural Systems 

Progressive Collapse Design 

Progressive collapse is a situation where local 
failure of a primary structural component 
leads to the collapse of adjoining members, 
which, in turn, leads to additional collapse. 
Hence, the total damage is disproportionate to 
the original cause. Progressive collapse is a 
chain reaction of structural failures that 
follows from damage to a relatively small 
portion of a structure. More information on 
progressive collapse can also be found in 

VISUAL X-20 


Structural Systems 

Progressive Collapse Design 

GSA Progressive Collapse Analysis and Design Guidance 
for New Federal Office Buildings and Major Modernization 
Projects 

DoD Unified Facilities Criteria -Minimum Antiterrorism 
Standards for Buildings 


BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit X-20 


INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 

To minimize the potential for progressive 
collapse, designers should understand the 
following: 

 
The use of redundant lateral and vertical 
load paths is highly encouraged. 
 
Ductile materials are needed for both 
primary and secondary structural elements 
to be capable of deforming well beyond 
the elastic limit. 
 
Both the primary and secondary structural 
elements should be designed to resist load 
reversals. 
 
Primary structural elements should be able 
to resist shear failures by having flexural 
capacity greater than shear capacity. 
 
Fire protection should be applied to 
structural members to survive a worst-case 
fire duration allows fire fighters to control 
damage prior to initiation of structural 
collapse. Suggest reviewing the National 
Institute of Standards and Technology 
(NIST) report dealing with World Trade 
Center 7 (WTC 7) which collapsed due to 
fire. 


FEMA 427, Primer for Design of 
Commercial Buildings to Mitigate Terrorist 
Attacks. 

Buildings should be designed with the intent 
of reducing the potential for progressive 
collapse as a result of an abnormal loading 
event, regardless of the required level of 
protection. 

 
Primary structural elements are columns 
girders and roof beams that are the first 
items for design to prevent progressive 
collapse. 
 
Secondary structural elements, such as 
floor beams and slabs, also may contribute 
to progressive collapse. Of particular 
weakness to progressive collapse is flat 
slab construction where the floor is 
thickened in areas to substitute for beams 
in the interest of cost savings. Floor 
connections to columns are the concern in 
this type of construction. This has been a 
standard office building design for many 
years, but should not be used if progressive 
collapse is a concern. 
 
Primary nonstructural elements, such as 
ceilings and heavy suspended mechanical 
equipment, contribute to casualties but not 
progressive collapse. 
 
Secondary nonstructural elements, such as 
partitions, furniture, and light fixtures, like 
primary nonstructural elements, also 
contribute to casualties, but not progressive 
collapse. 



Unit X: Building Design Guidance 

INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 

VISUAL X-21 


BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit X-21 
Loss of column 
Loss of interior column only if 
uncontrolled access occurs 
below. 
(Hardening may be an 
acceptable alternative) 
Loss of column Loss of column 
BUILDING PLAN 
Structural SystemsProgressive Collapse Concept 
Bay Size 
NOTE: The BAY SIZE is the distance 
between columns in the vertical and 
horizontal directions. The Bay Size can be 
identical or different in any part of the 
building and change between different parts 
of the building. 

Structural Systems 

Progressive Collapse Concept 

The GSA and DoD require that the structural 
response of a building be analyzed in a 
methodology that removes a key structural 
element (e.g., vertical load carrying column, 
section of bearing wall, beam, etc.) to 
simulate local damage from any incident. If 
effective alternative load paths are available 
for redistributing the loads that was originally 
supported by the removed structural element, 
the building has a low potential for 
progressive collapse. 

 
If a column is lost, will the rest of the 
building still stand? 
 
If an exterior beam is lost, will the rest of 
the building still stand? 
 
If connections between column and floors 
are lost will the slenderized column still be 
able to carry the load or if the column fails, 
will the rest of the building still stand? 
DoD criteria states that columns of high-
occupancy buildings will remain standing 
if all the floor connections on a given floor 
connecting to that column are lost. 


If the threat can get to an interior column or 
beam, the same questions apply, such as 
underground parking or a mailroom. 

Note that the more complex the structure 
layout (differing from square or rectangle) the 
more components (columns and beams) that 
must be analyzed. 


Unit X: Building Design Guidance 

INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 

VISUAL X-22 


Structural Systems --Collapse 

GSA and DoD criteria do not provide specific guidance for 
an engineering structural response model 

These organizations are working toward Interagency 
Security Committee consolidated guidance 

Owner and design team should decide how much 
progressive collapse analysis and mitigation to 
incorporate into design. 


BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit X-22 

Structural Systems -- Collapse 

 
Although these criteria provide specific 
guidance on which structural elements 
must be analyzed for removal from the 
structural design configuration, they do not 
provide specific guidance for choosing an 
engineering structural response model for 
verifying the effectiveness of alternate load 
paths. 
 
Unless a building is being designed to meet 
the GSA or DOD criteria, it is up to the 
owner and the design team to decide how 
much progressive collapse analysis and 
mitigation to incorporate into their design. 
 
Priority should be given to the critical 
elements that are essential to mitigating the 
extent of collapse. Designs for secondary 
structural elements should minimize injury 
and damage. 
 
Consideration should be given to reducing 
damage and injury from primary as well as 
secondary nonstructural elements. 


Both GSA and DoD take a threat-independent 
approach to progressive collapse  it does not 
matter how the column or beam is damaged 
or removed, the intent is that the building will 
remain standing. However, the concept is a 
single structural member being removed  if 
the Design Basis Threat is large enough to 
damage two components simultaneously, then 
additional analysis would be needed. 


Unit X: Building Design Guidance 

INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 

VISUAL X-23 


BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit X-23 
Structural Systems --Loads and Stresses 
Ronan Point, 
London 
Murrah Federal 
Building, 
Oklahoma City 
Khobar Towers, 
Dhahran 
Ronan Point: On the morning of 16 May 
1968, Mrs. Ivy Hodge, a tenant on the 18th 
floor of the 22 (24 in other reports) -story 
Ronan Point apartment tower in Newham, 
east London, struck a match in her kitchen. 
The match set off a gas explosion that 
knocked out load-bearing precast concrete 
panels near the corner of the building. The 
loss of support at the 18th floor caused the 
floors above to collapse all the way to the 
roof. 

The impact of these collapsing floors set off a 
chain reaction of collapses almost all the way 
to the ground. The ultimate result can be seen 
in Figure 1: the corner bay of the building has 
collapsed from top to bottom. Mrs. Hodge 
survived but four others died. 

Construction of Ronan Point primarily 
consisted of precast concrete panels. While 
this type of construction can be designed to 
avoid progressive collapse from abnormal 
loading conditions, Ronan Point lacked the 
connection details necessary to effectively 
redistribute load. The essential missing detail 
was reinforcement continuity between panels. 
Because of this, there was no mechanism in 
place for achieving effective alternate load 

Structural Systems -- Loads and Stresses 

The DoD designates the level of blast 
protection a building must meet based on how 
many occupants it contains and its function. 
The demands on the structure will be equal to 
the combined effects of dead, live, and blast 
loads. Blast loads or dynamic rebound may 
occur in directions opposed to typical gravity 
loads. 

Ronan Point had a whole section of the 
building collapse due to load-bearing precast 
concrete panels in one apartment being lost. 
That incident changed the British Code to 
prevent similar occurrences. 

Khobar Towers was designed to the British 
Code, and only the faade was lost. 

The Murrah Federal Building was not 
designed to the British Code and the loss of 
one column then affected a transfer girder. 
There were discontinuities in columns across 
the lobby causing multiple columns to fail 
when the transfer girder became unsupported, 
resulting in load transfers that the building 
could not handle. 

The minimum goal is to have continuous 
columns from foundation to roof. When 
assessing a building any discontinuity of 
columns is a flag indicated the need for 
further analysis. 


Unit X: Building Design Guidance 

INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 

paths once failure began to propagate. 

Khobar Towers was built to the British 
Standard that was a result of Ronan Point. 

The Murrah Building owner wanted no 
columns in the lobby, thus designer used 
transfer beams to carry the load of the upper 
columns. 

VISUAL X-24 

Structural Systems  Best Practices 

Consider incorporating active or passive internal 
damping into structural system (sway reduction in 
high-rise) 

Use symmetric reinforcement, recognizing 
components might act in directions opposite to 
original or standard design  flooring especially 

Column spacing should be minimized (<=30 feet) 


BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit X-24 

Structural Systems  Best Practices 

The following guidelines are commonly used 
to mitigate the effects of blast on structures 
and to mitigate the potential for progressive 
collapse. These guidelines are not meant to be 
complete, but are provided to assist the 
designer in the initial evaluation and selection 
of design approaches. For example: 

 
Consider incorporating internal damping 
into the structural system to absorb the 
blast impact. Although mass has been the 
blast design approach in the past, using 
more ductile materials with damping is 
being investigated. Damping systems will 
most likely be found in high-rise 
buildings. 
 
The use of symmetric reinforcement can 
increase the ultimate load capacity of the 
structure. This is especially true for load 
reversals on floor slabs. 
 
A practical upper level for column 
spacing is 30 feet, but 20 feet is better. If 
the column is lost, the remaining beam 
must span 40 to 60 feet. Above 60 feet, 
the beam becomes unreasonably large and 
expensive. Note that the Murrah Building 
had 40-foot column spacing in the lobby. 



Unit X: Building Design Guidance 

INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 

VISUAL X-25 


Structural Systems  Best Practices (cont.) 

Stagger lap splices and other discontinuities and 
ensure full development of reinforcement capacity or 
replace with more flexible connections  floors to 
columns especially 

Protect primary load carrying members with 
architectural features that provide 6 inches minimum 
of stand-off 

Use ductile detailing requirements for seismic 
design when possible 

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit X-25 

VISUAL X-26 


Building Envelope 

During actual blast or CBR event, building envelope 
provides some level of protection for people inside: 

. 
Walls 
. 
Windows 
. 
Doors 
. 
Roofs 


Soil can be highly effective in reducing damage during anexplosive event 

Minimize ornamentation that may become flying debrisin an explosion. 


BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit X-26 

Structural Systems  Best Practices (cont.) 

 
Lap splices must be upgraded from those 
found in conventional construction to 
handle the forces during a blast event. 
Consider interlocking J splices. 
 
By keeping a 6-inch stand-off from 
vertical load carrying members, a small 
weapons charge is less likely to shear the 
member. 
 
In many cases, the ductile detailing 
requirements for seismic design and the 
alternate load paths provided by 
progressive collapse design assist in the 
protection from blast. 
 
Ductility can be imbedded in the material, 
like steel reinforcing of concrete, or added 
to an existing component, like fragment-
retention film on windows or spray-on 
truck bed liner on walls to strengthen 
weaker structures and catch 
fragmentation. 


Building Envelope 

General principles: 

 
The exterior envelope of the building is 
the most vulnerable to an exterior 
explosive threat because it is closest to the 
blast. 
 
The exterior envelope also impacts the 
infiltration of CBR agents into the 
structure, but tight building construction 
must be done in conjunction with other 
actions to ensure some level of protection 
 
Soil can be highly effective in reducing 
the impact of a major explosion by 
reducing fragmentation off walls and 
street furniture or directing a blast wave 
over a building. 
 
Minimize ornamentation that may 
become flying debris in an explosion. 



Unit X: Building Design Guidance 

INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 

VISUAL X-27 


Building Envelope  Walls 

Design should ensure a flexible failure mode 

Resist actual pressures and impulses acting on exterior wall 
surfaces from design basis threats 

Withstand dynamic reactions from windows and windows 
stay connected to walls 

Use multiple barrier materials and construction techniques  
composites can add ductility and strength at savings 

As desired Level of Protection increases, additional mass 
and reinforcement may be required 


BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit X-27 

This includes street furniture, overhangs, 

sculptures, etc. 

Building Envelope  Walls 

Ideally, the exterior walls need to be able to 
resist the loads transmitted by the windows 
and doors. It is not uncommon for bullet-
resistant windows to have a higher ultimate 
capacity than the walls to which they are 
attached. 

Beyond ensuring a flexible failure mode, 
design the exterior wall to resist the pressure 
levels of the design basis threat. Special 
reinforcing and anchors should be provided 
around blast-resistant window and door 
frames. 

Deflections around certain members, such as 
windows, should be controlled to prevent 
premature failure. Additional reinforcement is 
generally required. Window frame deflection 
must not cause premature window glazing 
failure and window frame deflection must not 
differ greatly from the wall deflections. 
Seismic pinning of window frames may be 
required. 

Poured-in-place reinforced concrete will 
provide the highest level of protection, but 
solutions like pre-cast concrete, reinforced 
CMU block, metal studs, and a combination 
of these may also be used to achieve lower 
levels of protection. Connections are the key, 
especially for pre-cast concrete curtain walls. 

Retrofitting existing unreinforced masonry 
walls may consider steel plates, metal studs, 
reinforced concrete backing wall, high-
strength fibers glued to the wall, or spray-on 
truck bed liner. If the wall is double-wythe 
(two wall system)  usually a brick exterior, 
air gap, and interior CMU block, consider 


Unit X: Building Design Guidance 

INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 

VISUAL X-28 


Building Envelope  Best Wall Practices 

Use symmetric reinforcement, recognizing that 
components might act in directions opposite to 
original or standard design 

. Lobbies and mailrooms 
Use wire mesh in plaster  reduces spalling / 
fragmentation 

Floor to floor heights should be minimized (<=16 
feet) 


BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit X-28 

spraying vermiculite into the air gap to add 
mass and ductility. 

When the design basis threat increases or the 
level of protection desired increases, the 
solution is more mass and more reinforcement 
to add ductility. Increasing the ductility of 
exterior walls along with mass are suitable 
ways to ensure blast pressure and 
fragmentation do not readily enter the 
building. 

Building Envelope  Best Wall Practices 

The following best practices are commonly 
used to mitigate the effects of blast on 
structures and to mitigate the potential for 
progressive collapse. These guidelines are not 
meant to be complete, but are provided to 
assist the designer in the initial evaluation and 
selection of design approaches. For example: 

Just as mentioned with structural framing, 
symmetrical reinforcement adds strength to 
masonry and concrete walls, especially on the 
side away from the bomb where the 
reinforcement increases the tensile strength of 
the concrete. Thus, for lobbies and 
mailrooms the bombs can be exterior (where 
standard design places wind loading, rain, 
snow, and flying debris) or interior, so the 
symmetric reinforcement adds strength to the 
wall in either direction. 

Wire mesh keeps plaster together, adds tensile 
strength, reduces spalling of the plaster, and 
assists in keeping fragmentation from entering 
the room (plaster or otherwise). 

In general, floor to floor heights should be 
minimized. Unless there is an overriding 
architectural requirement, a practical limit is 
generally less than or equal to 16 feet. 
Consider bond beams (which connect 


Unit X: Building Design Guidance 

INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 

VISUAL X-29 


Building Envelope  Best Wall Practices 
(cont.) 

Connect faade from floor slab to floor slab to avoid 
attachments to columns (one-way wall elements) 

. Limits forces transferred to vertical structural 
elements 

No unreinforced CMU  use fully grouted and 
reinforced construction 


BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit X-29 

columns at about the mid-point between floor 
or run across the top of doors and windows), 
as used in seismic zones, to reduce the 
effective height of the wall. Since the walls 
are connected to the floor above and below, 
the shorter the wall height the stronger the 
wall all other things being equal. 

Building Envelope  Best Wall Practices 
(cont.) 

Additional best practices include: 

The reason why the walls are connected to the 
floor above and the floor below is to ensure 
there is no direct loading on the columns. 
Since the walls are only pinned at the top and 
the bottom this is called one-way. If they 
were also pinned to the columns on each side 
they would be two-way wall elements. Good 
blast design seeks to keep the structural 
framing as the absolute last component of the 
building to fail, thus the use of one-way wall 
elements. 

Avoid the use of unreinforced masonry when 
blast is a threat. Masonry walls break up 
readily and become secondary fragments 
during blasts. Grout (mass) and reinforcement 
(ductility) are definitely required for blast 
resistance. The Ufundi building next to the 
Kenya embassy was all unreinforced brick 
and the bomb blast toppled the whole 
building. 


Unit X: Building Design Guidance 

INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 

VISUAL X-30 


Building Envelope  Windows 

Balanced Window Design 
Glass strength 
Glass connection to window frame (bite) 
Frame strength 
Frame anchoring to building 
Frame and building interaction 


BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit X-30 

VISUAL X-31 


BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit X-31 
Balanced 
Design 
Building Envelope  Windows 
Glass (weakest to strongest) 
. Annealed (shards) 
. Heat Strengthened (shards) 
. Fully Thermally Tempered(pellets) 
. Laminated (large pieces) 
. Polycarbonate 
(bullet-resistant) 
Building Envelope  Windows 

Window systems on the exterior faade of a 
building should be designed to mitigate the 
hazardous effects of flying glass during an 
explosion event. Designs should integrate the 
features of the glass, connection of the glass 
to the frame (bite), and anchoring of the frame 
to the building structure to achieve a 
balanced design. This means all the 
components should have compatible 
capacities and theoretically would all fail at 
the same pressure-pulse levels. In this way, 
the damage sequence and extent of damage 
are controlled. 

Ultimately, in a balanced design, the order 
of failure should be: 

 
Glass 
 
Window frame and frame anchoring 
 
Wall 
 
Building structural framing 


The pressure differences should not be large 
and the Level of Protection for the Design 
Basis Threat should be met. 

Building Envelope  Windows 

Five types of glass are commonly used in 
window glazing systems: annealed glass, heat 
strengthened glass, fully thermally tempered, 
laminated glass, and polycarbonate. Other 
types of glass materials exist, but are not 
commonly used in typical commercial 
window systems. Of the five common types, 
annealed glass and fully thermally 
tempered glass are the type of windows for 
most office buildings. 

Annealed glass, also known as float, plate, or 
sheet glass, is the most common glass type 
used in commercial construction. Annealed 


INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 

glass is of relatively low strength and, upon 
failure, fractures into razor sharp, dagger-
shaped fragments (see slide -- the right photo 
is annealed glass failing during an actual 
explosive test and the left photo is a close-up 
of the shards). Annealed glass breaks at about 

0.2 psi (incident pressure). 

Heat strengthened glass (HS), also known as 
double strength glass, is used where wind 
loading starts becoming a problem. It breaks 
like annealed glass, but at about 0.4 psi 
(incident pressure). 

Fully thermally tempered glass (TTG) is 
typically four to five times stronger than 
annealed glass. Instead of shards, TTG breaks 
into pellets that can be stopped by a regular 
suit coat. It breaks at about 0.8 psi (incident 
pressure. 

Laminated glass is a pane with multiple glass 
layers and a pliable interlayer material 
(usually made from polyvinyl butyral (PVB)) 
between the glass layers. This interlayer 
should have a thickness of 30 mils [30 
thousandths of an inch] (minimum) or 60 mils 
(recommended). Do not use an interlayer of 
15 mils. 

Thermoplastic polycarbonates are very 
strong and suitable for blast- and forced entry-
resistant window design. They are usually 
laminated in 3 or more layers with glass on 
the outside to prevent environmental 
degradation of the plastic (yellowing) and to 
aid in cleaning (avoid scratches). 

Wire-reinforced glass is a common glazing 
material. It consists of annealed glass with an 
embedded layer of wire mesh. It is usually 
used for fire resistance and as a forced entry 
barrier. It is not recommended for blast 
design. 


Unit X: Building Design Guidance 

INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 

VISUAL X-32 Building Envelope  Windows 

GSA Glazing Performance Conditions 

Building Envelope  Windows 

Table 3-1, page 3-21, in FEMA 426 presents

GSA Glazing Performance Conditions 

six GSA glazing protection levels based on 
how far glass fragments would enter a space 
and potentially injure its occupants (known as 
a flight model). This slide depicts how far 
glass fragments could enter a structure for 
each GSA performance condition. The divide 
between performance conditions 3a and 3b 

FEMA 426, Figure 3-4: Side view of a test structure illustrating
performance conditions of Table 3-2, p. 3-22


can be equated to the threshold of injury.

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit X-32 

The divide between performance conditions 4 
and 5 can be equated to the threshold of 
lethality. A person standing in the room has 
a potential of being hit in the upper body/head 
area by glass fragments that are traveling fast 
enough to penetrate the body. 

The GSA glazing performance conditions 
shown will correlate with the DoD levels of 
protection presented in Table 3-2, page 3-22, 
in FEMA 426 as shown previously in Unit 
VII, Explosive Blast. 

VISUAL X-33 Building Envelope -- Window Frames 

Window frames need to retain the glass so 

Building Envelope -Window Frames that the entire pane does not pull out (glass 

flexes and can pull out of frame during the 

Goal: transfer load from glass to frame and retain glass in 

frame 

blast) and also should be designed to resist the 
breaking stress of the window glass. 

Wet Glaze (silicon) 

The window bite (i.e., the depth of window 
captured by the frame) needs to be at least  
inch. DoD criteria call for a minimum 3/8- 
inch bite if silicon sealant is applied, but call 
for a 1-inch bite if no silicone sealant is used. 
Butt-glazed strip windows can require even 
more bite with or without sealant, since there 
is bite only on the top and bottom of the 
window. 


BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit X-33 
Bite:  inch minimum 
Structural sealant: 
 inch bead or wet glaze 
Bite 
Glazing Tape Sealant 
Glass Frame 
Balanced Design 

Unit X: Building Design Guidance 

INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 

VISUAL X-34 


BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit X-34 
Balanced Design 
Building Envelope -Window Frames 
Goal: transfer load to building structure 
Balanced strength: 
glass, frame, 
and connection 
of frame to wall 
To retain the glass in the frame, a minimum 
of a -inch bead of structural sealant (i.e., 
silicone or polyvinyl butyral) should be used 
around the inner perimeter of the window. 
This should be done on all four sides of the 
window. Since strip windows with butt 
glazing can only apply sealant on the top and 
bottom, they are not good options for blast as 
the bite must be large, even with sealant. 

Window Frames 

The frame must not flex during the blast 
loading and cause the glass to pop out. 

The blast loading across the glass and frame 
now transfers to the frame connections to the 
building. These connections must handle the 
shear and tensile stresses and the bending 
moments of the connection design. 

The frame members connecting adjoining 
windows are referred to as mullions. These 
members may be designed using a static 
approach when the breaking strength of the 
window glass is applied to the mullion, or a 
dynamic load may be applied using the peak 
pressure and impulse values. Because 
mullions only connect at their top and bottom 
ends to the building structure, the mullion 
must handle the transferred blast loading from 
both adjacent windows. 

Other considerations for windows must 
balance the amount of light, energy 
conservation, noise transmission, venting of 
fumes, and emergency egress in addition to 
blast response and CBR protection. 


Unit X: Building Design Guidance 

INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 

VISUAL X-35 


BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit X-35 
Building Envelope -Fragment Retention Film 
Clear tough polyester film attached to inside of glass 
surface with strong pressure-sensitive adhesive 
Also known as shatter-resistant 
film, safety film, or protective film 
Relatively low installation costs 
Level of protection varies with 
thickness of film and method 
of installation 
Limited life for FRF 
When obscuration of rooms cannot be 
handled by site and layout design, one 
alternative is to install glazing with mirrored 
finishes or add fragment retention film that is 
mirrored. This works fairly well with single 
pane windows, but double pane windows 
may overheat with the mirrored fragment 
retention film  consult window 
manufacturer if there is a question. Realize, 
however that the mirrored finishes work best 
during daytime ambient light (room light less 
bright compared to ambient light). At night 
time or on overcast days, observation into the 
room is possible if interior lights are on. 
Shades or Venetian blinds can provide 
obscuration during low ambient light. 

Building Envelope  Fragment Retention 
Film (FRF) 

Another treatment used for mitigating the 
effects of an explosive attack is security 
window film. The polyester film used in 
commercial products is commonly referred to 
as fragment retention film (FRF), safety film, 
security film, protective film, or shatter-
resistant film. These films adhere to the 
interior surface of the window to provide 
fragment retention and reduce the overall 
velocity of the glass fragments at failure. The 
film greatly increases the tensile strength of 
thin annealed glass and limits the deflection 
of the glass under blast loading. 

Fragment retention film combines a strong 
pressure sensitive adhesive with a tough 
polyester layer. It should be limited to use in 
retrofit applications due to degradation of the 
film and adhesive by ultraviolet light. Do not 
use for new construction and it is of little to 
negative benefit on thicker, higher strength 
glass. For example, applying FRF to 3/8-inch 
thermally tempered glass will INCREASE the 
stand-off required for a given bomb size as 
the film will hold the glass together, acting 
like a sail and increasing the distance that the 
glass will fly into the test room. 

Note that fragment retention film can be 
justified for multiple reasons  blast 
protection, physical security (smash and 
grab), and energy conservation (mirrored or 
tinted). Thus, justification can be based upon 
the multiple benefits derived for little 
difference in cost. 


Unit X: Building Design Guidance 

INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 

VISUAL X-36 


BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit X-36 
Daylight Application 
Building Envelope -Fragment Retention Film 
Wet Glazing (edge to edge) 
Building Envelope  Fragment Retention 
Film 

Fragment retention film behaves similarly to 
relatively thin laminated and polycarbonate 
glazing in terms of fragmentation. It is 
available in common thicknesses of 2, 4, 7, 
and 10 mils. Also found up to 15 mils. The 
Navy recommends 10 mils. 

Fragment retention film improves the 
performance of the glass under blast loading 
to varying degrees, depending on the 
thickness, quality, and type of film 
installation. Note a daylight application will 
leave a 1/16 inch space around the edge of the 
FRF where water used to apply the FRF is 
squeegeed out. Daylight application of FRF to 
very thin glass can reduce the stand-off 
distance in half for a given level of protection. 
The best performance is achieved when the 
film is installed into the bite of the glazing or 
is connected to the frame (mechanically or 
with chemical sealants). 

Fragment retention film can also be purchased 
with tinted, mirrored, or solar versions that 
provide energy conservation benefits when 
using air conditioning. 


Unit X: Building Design Guidance 

INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit X-37 
Building Envelope -Blast Curtains 
Invented by British during 
WW II 
Kevlar curtains 
Allow venting of blast 
wave while catching 
fragments 
May be augmented with 
FRF 
VISUAL X-37 


VISUAL X- 38 


Building Envelope  Blast Curtains 

 
Can now see out of these curtains as 
opposed to the blackout curtains from 
WWII -- uses Kevlar or other high 
strength fibers. In fact it is easier to see 
out of sheer black curtains than sheer 
white curtains. 
 
They allow venting of the blast wave 
while catching glass fragments 
 
May be augmented with FRF (British only 
specify them with FRF) 
 
Connections of curtains or blast shields to 
building frame are critical. 


Building Envelope  Catch Bar 

Increased safety for fragment retention can be 
obtained in the event of catastrophic failure 
from an explosive blast by placing a 
decorative catch bar or grillwork on the 
interior of the glazing. Note, catch bars must 
be mounted across the center of mass of each 
window pane (vision area of glass) to be 
effective. A catch bar is ineffective with 4 
mil FRF as the FRF will just tear (shear) on 
the catch bar. This is also another reason why 
the Navy recommends 10 mil. 

Catch bars are usually considered with a 
retrofit of fragment retention film to not only 
catch the glass, but also catch the existing 
window frame that may not be adequately 
connected to the wall. They can also be 
considered for laminated glass. 

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit X-38 
Plan View 
Building Envelope -Catch Bar 
Must be centered on window and window panes 
FRF must be thick enough to hold the fragments (= 7 mil) 
Laminated glass should have 
60 mil interlayer 
FEMA 427, Figure 6-7: Safe laminated glass systems and failure modes, 
p. 6-29 

Unit X: Building Design Guidance 

INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 

VISUAL X-39 


Building Envelope  Best Window Practices 

No windows adjacent to doors 

Minimize number and size of windows -watch 
building code requirements 
Laminated glass for high-occupancy buildings 
Stationary, non-operating windows, but operable 

window may be needed by building code 
Steel versus aluminum window framing 


BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit X-39 

Building Envelope  Best Window Practice 

Windows adjacent to doors allow easy access 
to the locking mechanism on the door by just 
breaking the window and reaching in. 

Smaller windows are stronger against blast 
for a given window material and less 
expensive as well. Using fewer windows also 
reduces cost. However, building codes may 
specify the square footage of windows 
required based upon the total square footage 
of the floor level the windows are on. 

Laminated glass is required for high-
occupancy buildings by DoD. For life cycle 
costing and blast resistance, especially at the 
lower end of weapon yield, laminated glass is 
the best choice. 

Life safety/fire codes may require operable 
windows as an escape route in certain 
occupancies (dormitories, for example). 
Recommend sliding or swing-out windows 
for better blast performance. 

Heavy duty aluminum frames have performed 
well, although steel should be specified if 
design basis threat is large. 


Unit X: Building Design Guidance 

INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 

VISUAL X-40 


BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit X-40 
Building Envelope  Doors 
Balanced strength 
. Door 
. Frame 
. Anchorage to building 
Hollow steel doors or steel-clad doors 
Steel door frames 
Blast-resistant doors available 
. Generally heavy 
. Generally expensive 
Building Envelope  Doors 

A door system includes the door, frame, and 
anchorage to the building. As part of a 
balanced design approach, exterior doors in 
high risk buildings should be designed to 
withstand the maximum dynamic pressure 
and duration of the load from the design 
threat explosive blast. Other general door 
considerations are as follows: 

Provide hollow steel doors or steel-clad doors 
with steel frames. 

Provide blast-resistant doors for high threats 
and high levels of protection. 

Limit normal entry/egress through one door, 
if possible. 

Keep exterior doors to a minimum while 
accommodating emergency egress. 

Ensure that exterior doors open outward from 
inhabited areas. If inward opening the 
locking mechanism must handle the blast 
loading [A 3 foot by 7 foot door has 3 x 7 
x 144 = 3,024 square inches of surface 
area. A reflected blast pressure of 2 psi 
puts 3 tons of force on that locking 
mechanism.] If outward opening the 
whole door frame takes the blast loading. 

Replace externally mounted locks and hasps 
with internally locking devices because 
the weakest part of a door system is the 
latching component. 

Install doors, where practical, so that they 
present a blank, flush surface to the 
outside to reduce their vulnerability to 
attack. 

Locate hinges on the interior or provide 
concealed hinges to reduce their 
vulnerability to tampering. [Ask students 
if they see anything wrong with the door 
in the photo  exterior hinges. However, 
there is a balanced magnetic switch on the 
inside of the door connected to the 
security alarm which mitigates the 


Unit X: Building Design Guidance 

INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 

VISUAL X-41 


BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit X-41 
Sloped sacrificial 
roof over 
protected 
roof/ceiling 
Sandbags or dirt 
layer 
Restrict access to 
roof 
Building Envelope  Roofs 
Preferred  poured in place reinforced concrete 
Lower protection  steel framing with concrete and metal 
deck slab 
FEMA 426, Figure 3-7: Sacrificial roof, p. 3-33 
exterior hinges. 
Install emergency exit doors so that they 

facilitate only exiting movement. 
Equip any outward-opening double door with 

protective hinges and key-operated 

mortise-type locks. 
Provide solid doors or walls as a backup for 

glass doors in foyers. 

Building Envelope  Roofs 

For an explosive threat, especially for thrown 
explosives (e.g., satchels, hand grenades, and 
even mortars), the primary loading on the roof 
is downward over-pressure. The stand-off to 
the protected ceiling provides the protection. 
The sloped roof tends to cause the explosive 
to roll off and away from the building. For 
explosions at ground level, secondary loads 
include upward pressure on the protected 
ceiling and roof due to the blast penetrating 
through openings and upward suction during 
the negative loading phase. The upward 
pressures may have an increased duration due 
to multiple reflections of the air blast 
internally. It is conservative to consider the 
downward and upward loads separately. 

The preferred system is to use poured-inplace 
reinforced concrete with beams in two 
directions. If this system is used, beams 
should have stirrups along the entire span 
spaced not greater than one half the beam 
depths. Steel pan formwork provides 
additional protection as the formwork 
mitigates falling debris, but since load 
reversals may occur, the concrete in the steel 
pan formwork should have steel in both faces 
(symmetrical reinforcement). 

Less desirable systems include metal plate 
systems without concrete, and precast and 
pre/post tensioned systems. 


Unit X: Building Design Guidance 

INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 

Precast roof panels are problematic because 
of the tendency to fail at the connections, like 
pre-cast curtain walls. 

Pre/post tensioned systems tend to fail in a 
brittle manner if stressed beyond their elastic 
limit and they also are not able to accept 
upward loads without additional 
reinforcement. 

Standard construction found in the Middle 
East, for example, uses soil/dirt as insulation 
in the roof at a thickness of 18 inches or so. 
The soil is placed on a waterproofed concrete 
poured-in-place deck and covered with 1meter 
square concrete panels that are 
waterproofed and sloped to roof drains. With 
two layers of standard sand bags (about 8 
inches in total deep) on top, this roof, has a 
high level of protection. 

Many conventional roof designs will provide 
a suitable blast response for most buildings, 
considering minimum Design Basis Threats. 
The intent here is to point out what roofs may 
be a problem and why. For higher Design 
Basis Threats and tactics involving the roof, 
the protected ceiling and sacrificial roof 
concept applies. 


Unit X: Building Design Guidance 

INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 

VISUAL X-42 


Utility Systems 

Building Service 

. 
Electric  commercial and backup 
. 
Domestic water 
. 
Fire protection water 
. 
Fuel  coal, oil, natural gas, or other 
. 
Steam heat with or without condensate return 
. 
Hot water heat 



BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit X-42 

VISUAL X-43 


Utility Systems 

Building Service (cont) 

. 
Sewer  piping and sewage lift stations 
. 
Storm drainage 
. 
Information 
. 
Communications 
. 
Fire alarm 
. 
Security systems and alarms 



BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit X-43 

Utility Systems 

Building Service 

While Utility Systems are first and foremost 
considered under Site and Layout Design, 
they have a direct impact on the building 
envelope based upon where and how they 
enter the building to provide service to that 
structure. While most will think of what is 
brought into a building, it is equally important 
to note what needs to be taken out of the 
building to maintain function and operation. 

For example, steam heat may be provided by 
a central boiler plant on the site/campus that 
requires condensate to be returned for energy 
efficiency. But steam heat purchased from a 
commercial steam heat company in an urban 
environment is usually dumped to drain to 
prevent contaminants beyond the steam heat 
companys control from fouling their boilers. 

Utility Systems 

Building Service (cont.) 

Thus, anything feeding into and out of the 
building should be considered due to its 
impact on the building envelope and building 
operations if damaged. 

For example, water service into a building 
balances against sewer service to get it out of 
the building. A sewage lift pump or station 
that is not on backup power results in raw 
sewage backing up into the building. 


Unit X: Building Design Guidance 

INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 

VISUAL X-44 


Utility Systems 

Entrances 

. 
Proximity to each other 
. 
Aboveground or underground 


. 
Accessible or secure
Delivery capacity
. Separate 


. 
Aggregate
Storage capacity
. 
Outage duration 
. Planned or historical 






BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit X-44 

Utility Systems 

Service entrances of utilities into buildings 
take on the following concerns: 

 
Reduce the number of utility openings, 
manholes, tunnels, air conditioning ducts, 
filters, and access panels into the 
structure. Balance this with having two 
well separated service entrances for each 
utility. 
 
Proximity: How close are the service 
entrances to each other and can a single 
event affect more than one utility  for 
example all utilities entering along the 
loading dock ramp because the utility 
room is adjacent or underneath the 
loading dock. 
o Locate utility systems away from likely 
areas of potential attack, such as 
loading docks, lobbies, and parking 
areas. The alternative is hardening. 


 
Above or below ground: Below ground is 
preferred, but gas meters and pressure 
regulators, electric meters and 
transformers, and tankage may be 
aboveground. By building code gas lines 
must come above ground before entering 
a building to prevent gas leaks from 
following the piping into the building and 
reaching explosive concentrations in a 
basement. 
 
Can someone outside the building access 
the utility where it enters the building or 
use it as a way of getting into the 
building? 


o Use lockable systems for utility 
openings and manholes where 
appropriate. Infrequently used utility 
covers/manholes can be tack-welded as 
an inexpensive alternative to locking 
tamper-resistant covers. 

Delivery capacity is an operational 
consideration before and after an incident: 


Unit X: Building Design Guidance 

INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 

VISUAL X-45 


BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit X-45 
Mechanical & Electrical Systems 
Functional layout  physical 
separation or hardening 
Structural layout  systems 
installation 
Do not mount utility 
equipment or fixtures on 
exterior walls or mailrooms 
Avoid hanging utility 
equipment and fixtures from 
roof slab or ceiling 
 
Will each service entrance handle 50% of 
the total building needs or 100% (like 
hospitals require for electric service). 
Emergency operations plans should 
consider all contingencies for losing either 
or both service entrances for each given 
utility. 
Storage capacity is a concern during: 


 
Evacuation (i.e., How long will the 
emergency lighting system continue to 
operate?) 
 
Orderly shutdown of a computer system 
(battery backup for uninterruptible power 
supply) 
 
Continued operations (fuel stored for 
emergency generator use to last as long as 
historically longest commercial outage or 
until contingency contracts in place can 
refuel the generator on an acceptable 
schedule). 


Mechanical and Electrical Systems 

The major security functions of an electrical 
are to maintain power to essential building 
services, provide lighting and surveillance to 
deter criminal activity, and provide 
emergency communications. 

The primary goal of a mechanical and 
electrical system after a terrorist attack should 
be to continue to operate key life safety and 
evacuations systems. 

The following suggestions attempt to protect 
the mechanical and electric systems during an 
explosive blast event: 

 Do not mount plumbing, electrical 
fixtures, or utility lines on the inside of 
exterior walls, but, when this is 
unavoidable, mount fixtures on a separate 
wall at least 6 inches from the exterior 
wall face. 


Unit X: Building Design Guidance 

INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 

VISUAL X-46 


BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit X-46 
Mechanical & Electrical Systems 
Overhead components, architectural features, and other 
fixtures > 14 kilograms (31 pounds), especially in occupied 
spaces 
. Mount to resist forces 
0.5 x W in any direction 
and 1.5 x W in downward 
direction (DoD Unified 
Facilities Criteria) 
. Plus any seismic 
requirements 
 
Avoid suspending plumbing fixtures and 
piping from the ceiling or roof slab. 
Remember the upheaval if the blast wave 
gets inside the building. 
o The roof slab is part of the building 
envelope. 
o The ceiling is less sturdy than the floor 
above. 




 
When the above cannot be done, add 
ductility, additional supports, and 
hardening to achieve some level of 
protection. 


Mechanical and Electrical Systems 

Nonstructural Elements 

False ceilings, light fixtures, Venetian blinds, 
ductwork, air conditioning components, and 
other equipment may become flying debris in 
the event of an explosion once the building 
envelope is breached. Marques and other 
exterior nonstructural elements must also be 
considered since upward blast pressure will 
be much greater. 

Wherever possible, it is recommended that the 
design be simplified to limit these 
hazards. Placing heavy equipment such as 
air conditioners near the floor rather than 
the ceiling is one idea; using curtains 
rather than Venetian blinds, and using 
exposed duct work as an architectural 
device are others. 

When using seismic requirements added to 
the above will require about a Seismic 
Zone 4 (old system) [highest level] 
design. For example, 30 years ago 2-foot 
4-foot light fixtures in drop ceilings 
required additional support (other than the 
drop ceiling support) on two opposing 
corners using 9-gauge wire. Seismic Zone 
4 would consider threaded rod on all four 
corners to satisfy the requirement. 


Unit X: Building Design Guidance 

INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 

VISUAL X-47 


BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit X-47 
Mechanical & Electrical Systems 
Distribution within building 
. Looped or multiple radial versus single radial 
. Pipe chases  horizontal and vertical  cross 
impacts 
Normal and emergency equipment locations 
. Generators versus commercial switchboard or 
transfer switch 
. Electric fire pumps versus diesel fire pumps 
Mechanical and Electrical Systems 

Distribution  similar to comments about 
utility systems previously 

 
Multiple risers and looping on each floor 
with isolation valving or switches adds 
redundancy 
 
As high voltage and low voltage 
electricity is separated from 
communications circuits due to capacitive 
coupling and fault tolerance situations, 
other systems should not share the same 
pipe chases or provide vertical separation 
to overcome secondary effects of leakage. 
Locations of emergency equipment also 
figure into redundancy: 


 
Locate components in less vulnerable 
areas such as away from loading docks, 
entrances and parking. Seek 50-foot 
separation as a minimum. 
 
Placing emergency switchgear and 
commercial switchgear in the same room 
allows one event in either system to affect 
the other. 
 
Fuel tanks should be mounted near the 
emergency generator(s) and be given the 
same protection as the generator. 
Separating them puts the fuel distribution 
at greater risk due to the distance of the 
separation. 
 
If an emergency generator cannot be 
justified, consider running conduits with 
conductors through a manual transfer 
switch to a quick disconnect on the 
outside of the building. A rental generator 
/ company can be prearranged to provide 
rapid backup power as required without 
major rewiring. This would be equivalent 
to a Siamese water connection for fire 
fighting. 
 
Similarly, placing electric fire pumps and 
diesel fire pumps side-by-side allows one 
event to affect both primary and backup 



Unit X: Building Design Guidance 

INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 

VISUAL X-48 


Mechanical & Electrical Systems 

Restrict access -locks / alarms / surveillance 

. 
Utility floors / levels 
. 
Rooms 
. 
Closets 
. 
Roofs 
. 
Security locks/interlocks comply with building code 
. 
Building information 
. 
Also consider for other systems 



BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit X-48 

VISUAL X-49 


Mechanical & Electrical Systems 

Building lighting and CCTV compatibility 

. 
Intensity 
. 
Resolution 
. 
Angle 
. 
Color 
Exit lighting  consider floor level, like airplanes 
Emergency lighting  battery packs have their 


place 


BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit X-49 

systems. The event is not just loss of 
commercial power. 

Mechanical and Electrical Systems 

Restrict Access 

 
Physical security for utility rooms, closets, 
etc., should be implemented to prevent 
tampering with the systems and to prevent 
the direct introduction of hazardous 
materials into heating, ventilating, and air 
conditioning (HVAC) ducts that distribute 
air to portion(s) of the building. 
 
Public access to building roofs should be 
prevented. Access to the roof may allow 
entry to the building and access to air 
intakes and HVAC equipment (e.g., self-
contained HVAC units, laboratory or 
bathroom exhausts) located on the roof. 
 
Access to information on building 
operations (including mechanical, 
electrical, vertical transport, fire and life 
safety, security system plans and 
schematics, and emergency operations 
procedures) should be strictly controlled. 


Mechanical and Electrical Systems 

Closed circuit television/security cameras and 
building lighting must be worked as a system 
to ensure compatible operation: 

 
The intensity, angle, and color of the 
lighting affect camera resolution, 
including low-light and infra-red 
o Detection for response versus 
identification for police/legal action 


 
Exit lighting has traditionally been at top 
of door level shining downward to floor or 
along halls. After incidents smoke, heat, 
and toxic fumes are normally lighter than 
air so traditional exit lighting is obscured. 
Putting exit lighting at floor level works 
whether walking upright or crawling. 



Unit X: Building Design Guidance 

INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 

VISUAL X-50 


Mechanical & Electrical Systems 

Ventilation and Filtration  HVAC Control Options 

. 
Building specific 
. 
System shutdown  configuration and access 
. 
HVAC fans and dampers 
. 
Include 24/7 exhausts, i.e. restrooms 




. 
Zone pressurization 
. 
Doors and elevator use 
. 
Shelter-in-place 







BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit X-50 

 Emergency lighting from a distribution 
system with central batteries and backup 
generator is one design approach, but 
distributed emergency lighting with self-
contained battery packs along the egress 
route ensures operation during a wider 
range of potential incidents. Do not forget 
restrooms in the emergency lighting 
scheme. 

Mechanical and Electrical Systems 

Ventilation and Filtration  HVAC Control 
Options 

Available options are specific to the building 
as HVAC equipment and configuration, 
building functions, continuing operations, and 
other factors affect what can be done. 

 
HVAC control may not be appropriate in 
all emergency situations. Protection from 
CBR attacks depends upon the design and 
operation of the HVAC system and the 
nature of the CBR agent release. 
o Ducted returns (vice using hallways as 
returns) offer limited access points to 
introduce a CBR agent. The return 
vents can be placed in conspicuous 
locations, reducing the risk of an agent 
being secretly introduced into the 
return system. 
o Large buildings usually have multiple 
HVAC zones, with each zone served 
by its own air handling unit and duct 
system. 




 
Complete system shutdown of all HVAC 
systems is the simplest initial approach to 
handle either external or internal releases 
o Since speed is critical, a single 
shutdown point is desirable, but the 
larger the system(s) the difficult this 
becomes. 
o A rapid response may involve closing 
various dampers, especially those 







Unit X: Building Design Guidance 

INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 

controlling the flow of outdoor air (in 
the event of an exterior CBR release). 

. Consideration should be given to 
installing low leakage dampers to 
minimize this flow pathway. 

o Must include all air handling systems, 
such as restroom exhausts that run 
continuously. 

 If zone pressurization is designed into the 
system (for fire fighting as an example, 
where the fire floor is ventilated to remove 
heat and adjacent areas are overpressurized 
to keep smoke and gases contained), then 
realize that opening and closing doors or 
operating elevators will change the zone 
pressurization being attempted. 

o Even without zone pressurization, 
opening and closing doors and 
operating elevators will affect the flow 
of air and spread smoke, toxic fumes, 
and CBR agents within the building. 
o Consider shelter-in-place rooms or 
areas where people can congregate in 
the event of an outdoor release and, in 
some cases, indoor releases. 
. 
Without pressurization the goal is 
to create areas where outdoor air 
infiltration is very low. 
. 
With pressurization requires a 
filtered air supply from an installed 
or portable unit with filters suitable 
for the agent released. 







Unit X: Building Design Guidance 

INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 

VISUAL X-51 


Mechanical & Electrical Systems 

Ventilation and Filtration  HVAC Control Options 

. 
Specialized exhaust for some areas  i.e., lobbies 
and mailrooms 
. 
Air purge (e.g., 100 percent outside air if internal 
release) 
. 
CBR filters to trap and prevent spread elsewhere 




. 
Pressurized egress routes (may already exist) 


. Filtered air supply or shutdown if release external 


BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit X-51 

Mechanical and Electrical Systems 

Ventilation and Filtration  HVAC Control 
Options 

 
To prevent widespread dispersion of a 
contaminant released within lobbies, 
mailrooms, and loading docks, their 
HVAC systems should be isolated and the 
areas maintained at a negative pressure 
relative to the rest of the building, but at 
positive pressure relative to the outdoors. 
o Air purge is suitable for removal of 
smoke and toxic fumes from fire or 
explosive blast 
o If a CBR release, an air purge would 
not be suitable as it would just spread 
the agent vice controlling it unless 
CBR filters installed on exhaust to trap 
the agents and prevent spreading them. 
o Another consideration is glazing in 
these areas. 
. 
If not hardened, then windows will 
be blown out during an internal 
blast which lessens the need for air 
purge. This is a good design 
example for a frangible panel that 
vents pressure and reduces pressure 
on the walls shared by the rest of 
the building. 
. 
If hardened, then smoke and gases 
are trapped and air purge is 
beneficial. However, all walls will 
required additional hardening 
because of the increased internal 
blast pressures. 








 
Egress routes (stairwells) are normally 
pressurized to prevent smoke from internal 
fire from entering the stairwells. An 
external CBR release would be pulled into 
the stairwells by this system. Thus, either 
the pressurization system must be turned 
off during an external release or a filtering 



Unit X: Building Design Guidance 

INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 

VISUAL X-52 


Plumbing and Gas Systems 

Same considerations as electrical and mechanical 
systems 

Added concern is fuel distribution 

. 
Heating sources / open flames / fuel load 
Interaction with other systems during an incident 
. 
Fuel versus alarms / electric / fire protection 
water / structure 
. 
Water versus electronic / electric 



BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit X-52 

system must engage to provide clean air to 
the stairwells. 

Plumbing and Gas Systems 

All systems distributed throughout the 
building have similar consideration. There 
are other concerns based upon What-If 
scenarios, such as leaks occurring in 
plumbing or gas systems. 

 Look at the physical relationship between 
the systems (which also includes utilities 
as they enter the building) 

o Will a leak in a fuel system reach a 
heat source and will the fuel 
distribution system aid in spreading the 
fire throughout the building? 
o Will leaks from water or fuel systems 
fall upon electrical systems and 
equipment? 
. 
For example, standard underground 
construction always puts water 
systems above sewer systems so 
that a sewer leak will have less 
chance of contaminating the water 
system. 
. 
Additionally, are flammable 
systems like fuel/natural gas 
separated from mass 
notification/communication 
systems so that an initial fire 
incident does not disable the mass 
notification system? 







Unit X: Building Design Guidance 

INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 

VISUAL X-53 


Fire Alarm Systems 

Considerations similar to information and communications 
systems, but tighter building codes 

. 
Centralized or localized 
. 
Fire alarm panel access for responding fire fighters or 
fire control center 
. 
Interaction with other building systems 
. 
Telephone / IT 
. 
Energy management 
. 
HVAC controls 




. 
Off-premises reporting and when 



BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit X-53 

Fire Alarm Systems 

Similar concerns as with communications 
systems to be covered next, but building 
codes based upon National Fire Protection 
Association standards are more prescriptive 

 
First alarm to evacuate, then call the fire 
department 
o If localized, alarm bells sound to 
evacuate the building, then 
automatically calls fire department 
o If centralized (hotels for example), a 
response would verify fire before 
sounding evacuation and calling fire 
department from manned location 




 
Fire alarm panels are normally near main 
entrances of buildings so first responder 
fire fighters can determine which zone of 
the building alarmed if fire location is not 
obvious 
o Fire control centers are normally 
manned and fire department should 
know where they are located 


 
Interaction with other systems should 
confirm wiring of the fire alarm system, 
whether it is combined with any other 
system for information flow, and whether 
or not an alarm activation also initiates 
actions through other systems, like energy 
management, SCADA (Supervisory 
Control and Data Acquisition), or HVAC 
controls. 
 
Finally, as explained above, how is off-
premises reporting done  direct telephone 
line to fire department, reporting to a 
commercial central security/fire company 
who contacts the fire department, 
centralized system manned in building 
which then triggers a call to the fire 
department or calls 911, autodial to 
someone else, etc. 



Unit X: Building Design Guidance 

INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 

VISUAL X-54 


BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit X-54 
Communications -Information 
Technology Systems 
Looped versus radial distribution 
Redundancy 
. Landline, security, fire watch 
. Copper 
. Fiber optics 
. Cell phones (voice, walkietalkie, 
text) 
. Handheld radios / repeaters 
. Radio telemetry / microwave 
links 
. Satellite 
Mass notification 
. Loud speakers 
. Telephone hands-off 
speaker 
. Computer pop-up 
. Pager 
Communications  Information 
Technology Systems 

Distribution considerations are the same as 
for other systems, especially to ensure some 
communications capability if an incident 
affects communication lines 

 Redundancy is always a consideration and 
technology selected has pros and cons 

o Copper easier to tap through 
electromagnetic signals 
o Cell phones get tied up during major 
incidents, especially analog voice 
(which locks bandwidth), but walkietalkie 
and text features on phones or 
Blackberrys use packet transmission 
when bandwidth is available so there is 
more capability as found during 
Hurricane Katrina 
o Handheld radios have blind spots both 
in dispersed campuses and high-rise 
buildings, necessitating use of repeaters 
or distributed antennas to maintain 
coverage. Consider a base radio 
communication system with antenna(s) 
installed in stairwells, and portable sets 
distributed on floors. 
o Alarm and information systems. 


Should not be collected and mounted in 
a single conduit, or even collocated. 
Circuits to various parts of the building 
should be installed in at least two 
directions and/or risers 

o NOTE: The red phone shown is a 
telephone connected to the local 
telephone company and powered by the 
telephone company. It is the backup to 
VOIP phones throughout the campus. 

 Mass notification to building occupants 
can take many approaches, but must 
ensure system capability or redundancy 
for the range of potential incidents. 
Keeping occupants informed as response 
requirements change is vital to save lives. 


Unit X: Building Design Guidance 

INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 

VISUAL X-55 


BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit X-55 
Communications -Information 
Technology Systems (cont.) 
Empty conduits 
. Future growth 
. Speed repair 
Battery and backup power for IT 
. Hubs, switches, servers, 
switchboards, MW links, etc. 
. VOIP, building ops, alarms, 
etc. 
Fire stopping in conduits between 
floors 
Secure dedicated lines 
between critical securityfunctions 
Backup control centerwith same capability asprimary 
Communications  Information 
Technology Systems (cont.) 

The one thing about information is that it is 
ever expanding, thus future load growth 
should always be considered, especially extra 
conduits that assist repairs and allow 
additional capability as needed. 

 
These conduits are for future dedicated 
electrical circuits, updated information 
systems, and additional security systems. 
The last being the quickest way to provide 
reduction in risk. 
Note that battery backup and emergency 
power must be at or link to all distributed 
equipment in the IT system to keep system 
functional 


 
If other capabilities like VOIP (Voice Over 
Internet Protocol) telephones, building 
operations, or alarms on IT Systems 
increases need for the electric backup 


Historically, communications systems have 
been installed without consideration for other 
building codes  for example, conduits 
between floors must have fire stopping 
installed to prevent spread of fires, fuel leaks, 
gas leaks, defeat of zone pressurization, or 
spread of CBR agents and other toxic 
materials. 

Security information and flow of information 
to building occupants is critical before, 
during, and after an incident. Dedicated 
communication lines between security 
functions  such as central security control 
and entry control stations keeps information 
current, especially during deter and detect 
situations. Control centers for security, fire, 
and emergency operations may have backup 
locations depending upon the size of the 
organization or site. Communications 


Unit X: Building Design Guidance 

INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 

VISUAL X-56 


Equipment Operations and Maintenance 

Preventive Maintenance and Procedures 

. 
Drawings indicating locations and capacities are current? 
. 
Maintenance critical to keep systems operational 
. 
Critical systems air balanced and pressurization monitored 
regularly? 
. 
Periodic recommissioning of major systems? 




. 
Regularly test strategic equipment 
. 
Sensors, backup equipment and lighting, alarms, and 
procedures tested regularly to ensure operation when needed? 
. Backup systems periodically tested under worst case loadings? 






BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit X-56 

capability should be replicated at the backup 
site, or if alternative methods are used, staff 
must be trained for both primary and backup 
procedures and equipment. 

Equipment Operations and Maintenance 

 
Keeping drawings up to date and ensuring 
capacities meet current needs as functions 
and infrastructure changes occur are 
necessary for proper maintenance and 
operation 
 
An emergency system that will not 
function properly when called upon will 
result in increased damage and casualties 
o In the past, US military installations in a 
foreign country tested their Class B 
generator plant (sized to support the 
complete installation when commercial 
power lost) at 5:00 am on Sunday 
morning to avoid inconveniencing 
people. Class A plants are prime power 
and used where there is no reliable 
commercial power. Class C units are 
also backups but of smaller size and 
distributed at the critical loads and 
buildings. One engineer knew that this 
did not ensure operation when needed 
and convinced decision makers to run 
the test during the peak electrical load of 
the month (units were tested once a 
month for two hours). It took almost six 
months of incremental repair before the 
plant could run for the full 2 hours. Six 
moths later a country-wide power 
outage occurred. This installation was 
the only US installation that stayed fully 
operational for the whole commercial 
power outage. 


 
Bottom line: Preventive maintenance and 
testing that ensures the systems will work 
in all required modes, including emergency 
situations, must be done to ensure proper 
functioning when they are called upon. 



Unit X: Building Design Guidance 

INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 

VISUAL X-57 


Equipment Operations and Maintenance 

Maintenance Staff Training 

. 
System upgrades will require new training 
. 
Specific instructions for CBR event (internal vs external 
release) 
. 
Systems accessible for adjustment, maintenance, and 
testing 



BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit X-57 

Equipment Operations and Maintenance 

Maintenance Staff Training 

Since emergency systems, especially HVAC, 
are not standard building components, the 
staff must receive training in how the 
upgraded mechanical systems are designed to 
work, how they should be operated, and how 
they should be maintained and tested. 

 
A high-rise in Chicago was designed to 
have all lights burning 24 hours a day in 
the winter as part of the heating system 
design. A new manager demanded the 
lights be turned off and the staff could not 
explain why so they were turned off. A 
cold snap hit and the small supplemental 
boiler in the basement and the lights turned 
back on took 4 days to bring the building 
back to desired office temperatures. 
 
Maintenance and operational staff must 
have the training in the operational 
procedures for all potential situations in 
how the building will be reconfigured, 
especially for CBR events outside and 
inside the building. 
 
Another point based upon experience, is 
that maintenance staff will be more likely 
to perform maintenance, repairs, and 
testing if the equipment is accessible. The 
more difficult it is to perform these actions 
the less likely they will be done. 


o Example  steam boiler in penthouse of 
3-story building required weekly 
replenishment of water treatment 
chemicals. An elevator got the heavy 
chemicals to the third floor, but to get 
to the penthouse required winding 
through offices and then carrying them 
up a vertical ladder to a roof hatch. 
The building was originally designed 
for a location with water that did not 
need water treatment. 


Unit X: Building Design Guidance 

INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 

VISUAL X-58 


BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit X-58 
Security Systems 
Purpose is to improve the reliability and effectiveness of life 
safety systems, security systems, and building functions. 
. Detection 
. Access control 
. Duress alarms 
. Primary and backup control 
centers  same procedures 
Electronic Security Systems 
Chapter 3 of FEMA 426 is not a design 
guide for Electronic Security Systems (ESS). 
The following criteria are only intended to 
stress those concepts and practices that 
warrant special attention to enhance public 
safety. Consult design guides pertinent to the 
specific project for detailed information 
about electronic security. A description of 
Electronic Security Systems is provided in 

Appendix D of FEMA 426. 

Security Systems 

Electronic Security Systems 

The purpose of electronic security is to 
improve the reliability and effectiveness of 
life safety systems, security systems, and 
building functions. When possible, 
accommodations should be made for future 
developments in security systems. 

 
Basic intrusion detection devices should 
be provided: magnetic reed switches for 
interior doors and openings, glass break 
sensors for windows up to scalable 
heights, and balanced magnetic contact 
switch sets for all exterior doors, 
including overhead/roll-up doors. Roof 
intrusion detection should be reviewed. 
 
A color CCTV surveillance system with 
recording capability should be provided to 
view and record activity at the perimeter 
of the building, particularly at primary 
entrances and exits. 
 
Consider duress alarms at Entry Control 
Stations, where the general public has 
contact, and other locations as deemed 
necessary from threat or past history. 
Also call boxes in parking areas for 
similar function. 
 
The Operational Control Center (OCC), 
Fire Command Center (FCC), and 
Security Control Center (SCC) may be 
collocated. If collocated, the chain of 
command should be carefully pre-planned 
to ensure the most qualified leadership is 
in control for specific types of events. 
Secure information links should be 
provided between the OCC, FCC, and 
SCC. 
 
A Backup Control Center (BCC) should 
be provided in a different location, such as 
a manager's or engineer's office. If 



Unit X: Building Design Guidance 

INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 

VISUAL X-59 


Security Systems 

Entry Control Stations 

Channel visitors entering building to access control in lobby 
Signs should assist in controlling authorized entry 
Have sufficient lobby space for security measures (current or

future) 
Avoid extensive queuing, especially outside building 
Proper lighting, especially if manned 24 hours/ day 
Hardened against attack based upon security needs 


BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit X-59 

feasible, an off-site location should be 

considered. 

 
A fully redundant BCC should be 
installed (this is an alternative to the 
above). 
 
An on-site monitoring center should be 
used during normal business hours and be 
operational 24 hours. When not manned 
the monitoring center responsibility can 
be transferred to an off-site location 


These criteria primarily address access control 
design, including stair and lobby design, 
because access control must be considered 
when design concepts for a building are first 
conceived. Although fewer options are 
available for modernization projects, some 
designs can be altered to consider future 
access control objectives. 

Security Systems 

Entry Control Stations 

Entry control stations should be provided at 
main perimeter entrances of the building 
where security personnel are present (see 
Figure 3-12, page 3-48, of FEMA 426). In 
addition, entry control stations should be 
located close to the perimeter entrance to 
permit people inside the entry control station 
to maintain constant surveillance over the 
entrance and its approaches. Note that many 
of the considerations for entry control stations 
listed here are appropriate for Site and Layout 
Design as discussed in Chapter 2 of FEMA 

426. Additional considerations at entry 
control stations include: 

 
Channel visitors to access control with 
appropriate signage to differentiate 
between visitors and building occupants / 
tenants 
 
Additional space is needed for metal 



Unit X: Building Design Guidance 

INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 

VISUAL X-60 


Security Systems 

Emergency Plans 

All buildings should have current plans 

. 
Building evacuation with signage & emergency lighting 
. 
Accountability  rally points, call-in 
. 
Incorporate CBR scenarios into plans 
. General occupant actions 


. 
Response staff actions  HVAC and control centers 
Exercise the plans to ensure they work 
. 
Coordinate with local emergency response personnel 


. Test all aspects 
BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit X-60 

detectors and x-ray machines. If not 

installed initially, allow future space in 

case they may be installed later. 

 
Queuing should be limited, i.e. access 
control should have sufficient throughput 
to avoid having a high concentration of 
personnel at the entrance at any time. 
Queuing that takes the line outside the 
building should be avoided at all costs. 
 
Lighting, with CCTV should assist in 
identification and access control. 
 
Entry control stations should be hardened 
against attacks according to the type of 
threat. The methods of hardening may 
include: 
o Reinforced concrete or masonry 
o Steel plating 
o Bullet-resistant glass 
o Commercially fabricated, bullet-
resistant building components or 
assemblies 




 
Entry control stations adjacent to the 
building but not inside should have 
appropriate environmental support (heat / 
air conditioning), lighting, and sufficient 
glassed area to afford adequate 
observation for people inside. 


Security Systems 

Emergency Plans 

All buildings should have current emergency 
plans to address fire, weather, and other types 
of emergencies. 

In light of past U.S. experiences with anthrax 
and similar threats, these plans should be 
updated to consider CBR attack scenarios and 
the associated procedures. Emergency plans 
should have procedures for communicating 
instructions to building occupants, identifying 
suitable shelter-in-place areas (if they exist), 
identifying appropriate use and selection of 


INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 

personal protective equipment (i.e., clothing, 
gloves, respirators), and directing emergency 
evacuations. 

Building design should be able to ensure the 
optimal operation of the emergency plans. 
The emergency plans should not default to 
only what can be done after the building is 
constructed. In other words, like security and 
homeland defense, emergency planning 
should be an up-front design consideration 
that gets incorporated into the planning, 
budgeting, and design of the building. 

Note that bomb threats have been used in the 
past by terrorists to evaluate evacuation 
procedures and determine where the evacuees 
congregate after leaving the building. 
Consider multiple rally points (A, B, and C) 
and vary their use so that a pattern cannot be 
determined by terrorist surveillance. 

Then the plans must be tested to ensure they 
work in all situations, that what is written can 
actually be done, especially at the speed 
required, and that the plans and equipment 
operation work in agreement. 

Note that walking egress routes are not 
always down a single stairwell, especially in 
high-rise building as in the World Trade 
Center Complex. Recommend exercising an 
annual evacuation exercise to ensure most 
people know the egress routes (primary and 
alternate) and can negotiate them in a speedy 
manner. Signage and lighting along the 
whole route should also be evaluated at the 
same time. 

Additionally, all security locking 
arrangements on doors used for egress must 
comply with requirements of the National 
Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 101, Life 
Safety Code. 


Unit X: Building Design Guidance 

INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 

VISUAL X-61 


Practical Applications 

What can be done with a reasonable level of effort? 

End of Chapter 3, FEMA 426 listing of mitigation 
measures 

. 
Less protection, less cost, with less effort 
. 
Greater protection, greater cost, at greater effort 



BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit X-61 

Direct students to Table 2-1 in FEMA 426 
and arrow listing on pages 3-51 and 3-52 of 
FEMA 426. 

VISUAL X-62 

Building Materials: General Guidance 

All building materials and types acceptable under 
building codes are allowed. 

Special consideration should be given to materials 
having inherent flexibility and ability to respond to 
load reversals. 

Careful detailing is required for materials (such aspre-stressed concrete, pre-cast concrete, and 
masonry) to adequately respond to design loads. 

Construction type selected must meet allperformance criteria of specified protection level. 


BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit X-62 

Practical Applications 

What can be done with a reasonable level of 
effort? 

Consult Table 2-1, page 2-54, of FEMA 426 
to understand the benefit of various mitigation 
efforts against a range of terrorist tactics. 

There is a range of FEMA 426 mitigation 
efforts at a range of cost. Consult pages 3-51 
and 3-52 of FEMA 426 to see the range of 
relative costs for most situations. 

Building Materials: General Guidance 

 
All building materials and types 
acceptable under model building codes are 
allowed (except unreinforced masonry  
brick and/or CMU (concrete masonry 
unit)  concrete block. 
 
Special consideration should be given to 
materials that have inherent flexibility and 
that are better able to respond to load 
reversals (i.e., cast in place reinforced 
concrete and steel construction). 
 
Careful detailing is required for material 
such as pre-stressed concrete, pre-cast 
concrete, and masonry (brick and concrete 
masonry unit) to adequately respond to 
the design loads. Even calling out seismic 
connections may not be adequate as the 
workforce may not be familiar with the 
changes from their norm; thus detailing is 
very important. 


o For example, aluminum wiring is not 
used in homes in the US because 
copper trained electricians over-



Unit X: Building Design Guidance 

INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 

VISUAL X-63 


Desired Building Protection Level 

Component design based on: 

Design Basis Threat 
Threat Independent approach 
Level of Protection sought 
Leverage natural hazards design/retrofit 
Incorporate security design as part of normal capital or 

O&M program 
Use existing tools/techniques, but augment with new 
standards/guidelines/codes 


BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit X-63 

Establishing the design basis threat early in 
the design cycle reduces cost, has synergies 
with other requirements  seismic and wind, 
and should never be an afterthought of the 
design. Even for a low threat, there is value 
torqued the connections, causing cold 
flow, loose connections, and fires. 
Great Britain took path to put copper 
on the outside of aluminum, taking 
advantage of the less expensive 
aluminum without getting the cold flow 
problem. 

o Another example, plastic water pipe 
initially installed by copper-trained 
plumbers were not twisted 90 degrees 
to spread the glue as this was not 
needed when soldering copper. 
Imperfections in the plastic would 
scrape the glue away resulting in leaks. 
Plumbers now know this procedure and 
we still use plastic water piping. 

 
The construction type selected must meet 
all performance criteria of the specified 
level of protection. 
 
The designer must bear in mind that the 
design approaches are, at times, in 
conflict. These conflicts must be worked 
out on a case by case basis. 


Desired Building Protection Level 

The assessment process to this point should 
determine the level of protection sought for 
the building structure based upon the threat / 
hazard specific to the facility. Explosive blast 
threats usually govern building structural 
design for high risk buildings. 

Some design approaches are threat 
independent, such as progressive collapse. 
Other approaches depend upon an identified 
Design Basis Threat. The design basis threat 
is the terrorism hazard equivalent to the 
natural hazards design basis which is based 
upon recorded history, measurement methods 
to determine the magnitude of the hazard and 
have been established as building codes based 
on the weather and geological conditions of 
the locality. 


Unit X: Building Design Guidance 

INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 

in providing certain minimum features to the 
site and building design. This allows 
adjustment to the level of protection if the 
level of threat changes. This is the current 
philosophy of the Department of Defense. 

Even if no design changes result, the 
understanding in going through the 
assessment process, especially in the data 
collection and identifying Points of Contact, 
is beneficial if future man-made hazards 
threaten or occur. 

VISUAL X-64 

Summary 

Building Design Guidance and Mitigation Options 

Using the FEMA 426 Checklist will help identify 
vulnerabilities and provide recommended mitigation 
options. 

There are many methods to mitigate each vulnerability. 

Relatively low cost mitigations significantly reduce risk. 


BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit X-64 

Whenever there are projects to accomplish in 
a building, seek to leverage natural hazard 
upgrades, energy conservation upgrades, and 
other capital improvement or O&M 
(Operations and Maintenance) work to 
achieve synergies at less cost to achieve 
HVAC upgrades and building hardening. 

In every design situation, the intent is to seek 
a balance between all the different 
requirements to include in the design (e.g., 
antiterrorism, energy conservation, building 
code, seismic, wind, snow loading, handicap 
access, adjacent architecture, etc.). 

Summary 

To summarize: 

This unit provides a foundation for a 
systematic approach to assessing the 
vulnerabilities of a building to manmade 
hazards. 

The Building Vulnerability Assessment 
Checklist in FEMA 426 can provide an 
excellent framework for the identification of 
mitigation options that will, over time, 
significantly reduce the vulnerability of a 
building to manmade hazards. 

Note that there are many different techniques 
to mitigate each vulnerability. They have 
different costs and may increase, reduce, or 
have no effect on risk for other tactics. Thus, 
each mitigation measure needs to be 
compared to every threat / hazard tactic for 
the building particulars. 

Antiterrorism assessment teams that have 
been operating over 5 years indicate that 
historically about 80 percent of mitigation 
recommendations are low cost /no cost 


INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 

VISUAL X-65 


Unit X Case Study Activity 

Building Design Guidance and Mitigation Measures

Background

Emphasis: 

. 
Providing a balanced building envelope that is a defensive layeragainst the terrorist tactic of interest 
. 
Avoiding situations where one incident affects more than one 
building system 


FEMA 426, Building Vulnerability Assessment Checklist 

Requirements

Assign sections of the checklist to qualified group members 
Refer to Case Study, and answer worksheet questions 
Review results to identify vulnerabilities and possible

mitigation measures 

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit X-65 

Refer participants to FEMA 426, the Unit X 
Case Study activity in the Student Manual. 

Members of the instructor staff should be 
available to answer questions and assist 
groups as needed. 

At the end of 45 minutes, reconvene the class 
and facilitate group reporting. Take 15 
minutes to review group results. 

There are 48 questions to answer by the team 
and then confer. With an average of 7 team 
members this means each member answers 
about 7 questions or about 4 minutes per 
question during their 30 minutes of research. 

planning and procedural changes. 

Student Activity 

The Building Vulnerability Assessment 
Checklist in FEMA 426 can be used as a 
screening tool for vulnerability assessment of 
an existing building or a preliminary design. 

The checklist includes questions that 
determine if critical systems will continue to 
function to enhance deterrence, detection, 
denial, and damage limitation, and emergency 
systems function during a threat or hazard 
situation. 

Activity Requirements 

 
Continue working is small groups. 
 
Assign sections of the checklist to the 
group members who are most 
knowledgeable and qualified to perform 
an assessment of the assigned area. There 
are 49 questions so that with 7 students 
(working group size sought), each student 
would need to answer 7 questions in about 
30 minutes (4-5 minutes per question) 
leaving 15 minutes to discuss results as a 
group. 
 
Refer to the Case Study to determine 
answers to the worksheet questions. 
 
Then review results as a team to identify 
vulnerabilities and possible mitigation 
measures. 


Take 45 minutes to complete this activity. 
Solutions will be reviewed in plenary group. 

Transition 

Unit XI will cover Electronic Security 
Systems. 


UNIT X-A CASE STUDY ACTIVITY: 
BUILDING DESIGN GUIDANCE 
(Suburban Version) 

In this unit, the emphasis will be upon providing a balanced building envelope that is a defensive 
layer against the terrorist tactic of interest and avoiding situations where one incident affects 
more than one building system. The Building Vulnerability Assessment Checklist in FEMA 
426 can be used as a screening tool for preliminary building design vulnerability assessment. 

Requirements 

Assign sections of the checklist to the group members who are most knowledgeable and 
qualified to perform an assessment of the assigned area. Refer to the Case Study to determine 
answers to the questions. Then review results as a team to identify vulnerabilities and possible 
mitigation measures. 

1. 
Complete the following questions of the Building Vulnerability Assessment Checklist 
(FEMA 426, Table 1-22, pages 1-46 to 1-93) that address building design. Note: 
Vulnerability Questions that cannot be answered with the case study information provided 
have not been included in this student exercise. 
2. 
Upon completion of these portions of the checklist, refer back to the vulnerability ratings 
determined in the Unit IV Case Study Activity and, based on this more detailed analysis, 
decide if any vulnerability rating needs adjustment. Adjust the Threat Matrix chart 
accordingly. 
3. 
Select mitigation measures to reduce vulnerability and associated risk based upon the 
building design. 
4. 
Estimate the new risk ratings for high-risk asset-threat pairs (as adjusted in step 2 above) 
based on the recommended mitigation measures. 


Section Vulnerability Question Guidance Observations 
2 Architectural 
2.5 Do entrances avoid 
significant queuing? 
If queuing will occur within the 
building footprint, the area 
should be enclosed in blast-
resistant construction. If queuing 
is expected outside the building, 
a rain cover should be provided. 
For manpower and equipment 
requirements, collocate or 
combine staff and visitor 
entrances. 
Reference: GSA PBS-P100 
Because of the mixed time of 
employees coming to work, 
queuing at the entrance is 
minimal to non-existent. 
Visitors are also few in 
number so that they do not 
exceed the reception area 
capacity. 


Section Vulnerability Question Guidance Observations 
Is access control 
provided through main 
entrance points for 
employees and visitors? 
(lobby receptionist, sign-
in, staff escorts, issue of 
visitor badges, checking 
forms of personal 
identification, electronic 
access control systems) 
Reference: Physical 
Security Assessment for 
the Department of Veterans 
Affairs Facilities 
Visitor access control is 
handled in the lobby by 
the receptionist, who 
signs the visitors in and 
contacts staff to provide 
escort. Employees use 
electronic access control 
to enter the building. 

Access control at other 
companies within the 
complex is unknown. 

Is access to private and 
public space or restricted 
area space clearly 
defined through the 
design of the space, 
signage, use of electronic 
security devices, etc.? 

Finishes and signage 
should be designed for 
visual simplicity. 

Reference: Physical 
Security Assessment for 
the Department of Veterans 
Affairs Facilities 
The building is 
monitored by door and 
window alarms, which 
connect to ADT, the 
nationwide alarm 
company. Unauthorized 
opening of any door or 
window will 
immediately notify 
ADT via telephone. 
ADT will normally call 
the HIC Security Office 
prior to contacting the 
police and DPS. 
Employees have 
proximity cards to allow 
them to enter the front 
and loading dock doors 
without activating the 
alarm. 

The innermost layer of 
physical security 
involves the Computer 
Data Center and the 
Communications 
Center. Equipped with 
locked doors, these two 
rooms meet the 
governments 
requirements for 
handling classified 


Do public and employee 
entrances include space 
for possible future 
installation of access 
control and screening 
equipment? 

Section Vulnerability Question Guidance Observations 
material. Only 
authorized employees 
possess the necessary 
proximity cards and 
PINs to gain access. 
2.9 Is access to elevators Reference: Physical No elevators in 
distinguished as to those Security Assessment for building. 
that are designated only the Department of Veterans 
for employees and Affairs Facilities 
visitors? 

These include walkthrough 
metal detectors 
and x-ray devices, 
identification check, 
electronic access card, 
search stations, and 
turnstiles. 

Reference: GSA PBS-P100 
Yes, lobby / reception 
area within building 
could accommodate 
space-saving screening 
equipment. Interior 
office space also has 
adequate room for such 
equipment. 

Do foyers have 
reinforced concrete walls 
and offset interior and 
exterior doors from each 
other? 

Consider for exterior 
entrances to the building or 
to access critical areas 
within the building if 
explosive blast hazard must 
be mitigated. 

Reference: U.S. Army TM 
5-853 
The exterior walls are 
made of CMU with a 
brick veneer on the 
outside. Steel 
framework supports the 
structure, and exposed 
columns are enclosed in 
gypsum wallboard. The 
exterior wall of the 
foyer has extensive 
glass. 

The exterior and interior 
doors of the foyer are in 
a straight line 

The construction of 
interior walls is gypsum 
wallboard on metal 
studs. 


Section Vulnerability Question Guidance Observations 
Do circulation routes 
have unobstructed views 
of people approaching 
controlled access points? 

This applies to building 
entrances and to critical 
areas within the building. 

References: USAF 
Installation Force 
Protection Guide and DoD 
UFC 4-010-01 
Yes, circulation routes 
have unobstructed 
views of people 
approaching controlled 
access points. The front 
door is monitored both 
by the receptionist and 
CCTV. The rear 
entrance is monitored 
by CCTV. 

Are critical assets 
(people, activities, 
building systems and 
components) located 
close to any main 
entrance, vehicle 
circulation, parking, 
maintenance area, 
loading dock, or interior 
parking? 

Are the critical building 
systems and components 
hardened? 

Critical building 
components include: 
Emergency generator 
including fuel systems, day 
tank, fire sprinkler, and 
water supply; Normal fuel 
storage; Main switchgear; 
Telephone distribution and 
main switchgear; Fire 
pumps; Building control 
centers; Uninterruptible 
Power Supply (UPS) 
systems controlling critical 
functions; Main 
refrigeration and 
ventilation systems if 
critical to building 
operation; Elevator 
machinery and controls; 
Shafts for stairs, elevators, 
and utilities; Critical 
distribution feeders for 
emergency power. 
Evacuation and rescue 
require emergency systems 
to remain operational 
during a disaster and they 
should be located away 
from potential attack 
locations. Primary and 
backup systems should be 
separated to reduce the risk 
of both being impacted by 
a single incident if 
Electrical service is 
provided through two 
buried transmission 
lines from two separate 
pad-mounted 
transformers outside the 
building near the rear 
loading dock. 
Emergency power is 
provided by a single 
diesel generator, located 
in a shed in the rear 
parking lot, also near 
the loading dock. The 
generator has a 50gallon 
day tank, 
maintained at 80 percent 
capacity. The 2,000gallon 
main tank is 
buried under the parking 
lot, near the generator. 

The batteries to support 
the UPS are in a small 
room next to the UPS 
room. 

Natural gas enters the 
building through two 
meters under the 
loading dock staircase 
and goes overhead to 
the mechanical and 
electrical (M&E) room 


collocated. Utility systems 
should be located at least 
50 feet from loading docks, 
front entrances, and 
parking areas. 

Section Vulnerability Question Guidance Observations 
One way to harden critical 
building systems and 
components is to enclose 
them within hardened 
walls, floors, and ceilings. 
Do not place them near 
high-risk areas where they 
can receive collateral 
damage. 

Reference: GSA PBS-P100 
at the buildings 
southwest corner. 

Thus, most of the 
critical utilities are 
either in the rear 
parking area or near the 
loading dock or both. 

Are high-value or critical 
assets located as far into 
the interior of the 
building as possible and 
separated from the public 
areas of the building? 

Critical assets, such as 
people and activities, are 
more vulnerable to hazards 
when on an exterior 
building wall or adjacent to 
uncontrolled public areas 
inside the building. 

Reference: GSA PBS-P100 
People are located along 
the exterior wall at the 
front of the building. 
The secure space has 
the best interior space 
location  not on an 
exterior wall, as does 
the conference room. 
The office space acts as 
the buffer between the 
critical functions in the 
back and the public area 
of the building at the 
main entrance. 

M&E room is located 
on an exterior wall. 

There are no public use 
areas within the 
building. 

2.17 Is high visitor activity High-risk activities should All visitors enter 
away from critical also be separated from through a common front 
assets? low-risk activities. Also, entrance. Once admitted 
visitor activities should be to the site, visitor 
separated from daily activity is escorted and 


Section Vulnerability Question Guidance Observations 
activities. 

part of daily activities. 

Reference: USAF 
Installation Force 
Protection Guide 

Are loading docks and 
receiving and shipping 
areas separated in any 
direction from utility 
rooms, utility mains, and 
service entrances, 
including electrical, 
telephone/data, fire 
detection/alarm systems, 
fire suppression water 
mains, cooling and 
heating mains, etc.? 

Loading docks should be 
designed to keep vehicles 
from driving into or 
parking under the building. 
If loading docks are in 
close proximity to critical 
equipment, consider 
hardening the equipment 
and service against 
explosive blast. Consider a 
50-foot separation distance 
in all directions. 

Reference: GSA PBS-P100 
No, the loading dock 
connects directly into 
interior space, critical 
functions, and 
infrastructure. A 
commercial power 
transformer, the natural 
gas meters, and the 
M&E rooms are within 
50 feet of the loading 
dock. 

Are mailrooms located 
away from building main 
entrances, areas 
containing critical 
services, utilities, 
distribution systems, and 
important assets? 

Is the mailroom located 
near the loading dock? 

The mailroom should be 
located at the perimeter of 
the building with an 
outside wall or window 
designed for pressure 
relief. 

By separating the 
mailroom and the loading 
dock, the collateral damage 
of an incident at one has 
less impact upon the other. 
However, this may be the 
preferred mailroom 
location. 

Off-site screening stations 
or a separate delivery 
processing building on site 
may be cost-effective, 
particularly if several 
buildings may share one 
mailroom. A separate 
delivery processing 
HIC has no mail room. 
Incoming mail is 
normally processed by 
the receptionist inside 
the front door. Large 
packages are delivered 
to the loading dock. 

The foyer, where mail is 
delivered, is of standard 
office construction. 
Blast would affect 
exterior walls (glazing) 
and interior walls 
(gypsum board on metal 
studs) about equally. 


Section Vulnerability Question Guidance Observations 
Does the mailroom have 
adequate space available 
for equipment to examine 
incoming packages and 
for an explosive disposal 
container? 

building reduces risk and 
simplifies protection 
measures. 

Reference: GSA PBS-P100 

Screening of all deliveries 
to the building, including 

U.S. mail, commercial 
package delivery services, 
delivery of office supplies, 
etc. 

Reference: GSA PBS-P100 
HIC has no mail room. 
Mail is delivered to the 
receptionist in the foyer. 
Space is limited for mail 
screening equipment, 
especially if personnel 
screening equipment is 
installed. 

However, package 
screening could be done 
at or near the loading 
doc, where there would 
be sufficient room for 
the equipment. 
However, someone 
from Security would 
have to process the mail 
as the reception desk 
cannot be left 
unmanned. 

Are areas of refuge 
identified, with special 
consideration given to 
egress? 

Areas of refuge can be safe 
havens, shelters, or 
protected spaces for use 
during specified hazards. 

Reference: FEMA 386-7 
Yes, the Computer Data 
Center and the large 
conference room are 
identified as areas of 
refuge. 

Are stairwells required 
for emergency egress 
located as remotely as 
possible from high-risk 
areas where blast events 
might occur? 

Are stairways maintained 
with positive pressure or 
are there other smoke 
Consider designing stairs 
so that they discharge into 
other than lobbies, parking, 
or loading areas. 

Maintaining positive 
pressure from a clean 
source of air (may require 
special filtering) aids in 
egress by keeping smoke, 
Stairways are located in 
the interior of the 
building, away from the 
perimeter walls. They 
are part of the steel 
mezzanine design and 
are towards the front of 
the building. Multiple 
exits are located around 
the building and from 


Section Vulnerability Question Guidance Observations 
control systems? 

heat, toxic fumes, etc. out 
of the stairway. Pressurize 
exit stairways in 
accordance with the 
National Model Building 
Code. 

Reference: GSA PBSP100 
and CDC/NIOSH, 
Pub 2002-139 
both the front and rear. 

Stairways are open and 
not designed with any 
fire protection features, 
such as a positive 
pressure system. 

Do interior barriers 
differentiate level of 
security within a 
building? 

Reference: USAF 
Installation Force 
Protection Guide 
Electronic controls exist 
in the form of alarms, 
door locks, proximity 
cards, and use of PIN 
numbers for room/area 
access. 

Are emergency systems 
located away from high-
risk areas? 

The intent is to keep the 
emergency systems out of 
harms way, such that one 
incident takes out all capability  
both the regular systems and 
their backups. 

Reference: FEMA 386-7 
The high risk areas are the 
front entrance and the rear 
loading dock. 
Emergency/backup generator 
is located over 50 feet away 
from main power supply 
lines, loading dock, and 
M&E room. UPS is located 
inside the buildings high 
bay area, but probably within 
50 feet of the loading dock. 

3 Structural Systems 
3.1 

What type of 

construction? 
What type of concrete 
and reinforcing steel? 

What type of steel? 
What type of foundation? 

The type of construction 
provides an indication of the 
robustness to abnormal loading 
and load reversals. A reinforced 
concrete moment-resisting frame 
provides greater ductility and 
redundancy than a flat-slab or 
flat-plate construction. The 
ductility of steel frame with 
metal deck depends on the 
connection details and pre-
tensioned or post-tensioned 
construction provides little 
capacity for abnormal loading 
patterns and load reversals. The 
resistance of load-bearing wall 
structures varies to a great 
extent, depending on whether the 
Located in a suburban office 
complex, the HIC office 
building comprises a 
19,000- square foot main 
floor for offices and 
computers, and a 3,300square 
foot executive 
mezzanine (a second floor 
over part of the office). 

The building that houses the 
Hazardville Information 
Company (HIC) is an office 
building of standard 
construction. 

The walls are made of 
concrete blocks (CMU



walls are reinforced or 
unreinforced. A rapid screening 
process developed by FEMA for 
assessing structural hazards 
identifies the following types of 
construction with a structural 
score ranging from 1.0 to 8.5. A 
higher score indicates a greater 
capacity to sustain load 
reversals. 

Section Vulnerability Question Guidance Observations 
Wood buildings of all types - 4.5 
to 8.5 
Steel moment-resisting frames - 

3.5 to 4.5 
Braced steel frames - 2.5 to 3.0 
Light metal buildings - 5.5 to 6.5 
Steel frames with cast-in-place 
concrete shear walls - 3.5 to 4.5 
Steel frames with unreinforced 
masonry infill walls - 1.5 to 3.0 
Concrete moment-resisting 
frames - 2.0 to 4.0 
Concrete shear wall buildings - 

3.0 to 4.0 
Concrete frames with 
unreinforced masonry infill 
walls - 1.5 to 3.0 
Tilt-up buildings - 2.0 to 3.5 
Precast concrete frame buildings 

-1.5 to 2.5 
Reinforced masonry - 3.0 to 4.0 
Unreinforced masonry - 1.0 to 

2.5 

References: FEMA 154 and 
Physical Security Assessment for 
the Department of Veterans 
Affairs Facilities 

concrete masonry units) with 
a brick veneer on the outside. 
Steel framework supports the 
structure, and exposed 
columns are enclosed in 
gypsum wallboard. The roof 
is a metal deck with gravel 
on top and insulation 
underneath. It is slightly 
angled to allow water to 
drain. The roof overhangs 
the front entrance by 8 feet. 
This provides a covered area 
for employees to stay dry on 
rainy days. Cylindrical 
columns support the 
overhang. 

Will the structure suffer 
an unacceptable level of 
damage resulting from 
the postulated threat 
(blast loading or weapon 
impact)? 

The extent of damage to the 
structure and exterior wall 
systems from the bomb threat 
may be related to a protection 
level. The following is for new 
buildings: 

Level of Protection Below 
Antiterrorism 
Standards - Severe damage. 
Frame collapse/massive 
destruction. Little left standing. 
Doors and windows fail and 
result in lethal hazards. Majority 
The standard construction 
techniques used to build the 
site HIC occupies do not 
create buildings that 
withstand explosive blasts. 
Terrorist threat was not a 
part of design consideration. 


Section Vulnerability Question Guidance Observations 
of personnel suffer fatalities. 

Very Low Level Protection 

Heavy damage. Onset of 
structural collapse. Major 
deformation of primary and 
secondary structural members, 
but progressive collapse is 
unlikely. Collapse of non-
structural elements. Glazing will 
break and is likely to be 
propelled into the building, 
resulting in serious glazing 
fragment injuries, but fragments 
will be reduced. Doors may be 
propelled into rooms, presenting 
serious hazards. Majority of 
personnel suffer serious injuries. 
There are likely to be a limited 
number (10 percent to 25 
percent) of fatalities. 

Low Level of Protection 

Moderate damage, unrepairable. 
Major deformation of non-
structural elements and 
secondary structural members 
and minor deformation of 
primary structural members, but 
progressive collapse is unlikely. 
Glazing will break, but fall 
within 1 meter of the wall or 
otherwise not present a 
significant fragment hazard. 
Doors may fail, but they will 
rebound out of their frames, 
presenting minimal hazards. 
Majority of personnel suffer 
significant injuries. There may 
be a few (<10 percent) fatalities. 

Medium Level Protection -
Minor damage, repairable. 
Minor deformations of non-
structural elements and 
secondary structural members 
and no permanent deformation 
in primary structural members. 
Glazing will break, but will 
remain in the window frame. 
Doors will stay in frames, but 
will not be reusable. Some minor 
injuries, but fatalities are 
unlikely. 

High Level Protection -


Section Vulnerability Question Guidance Observations 
Minimal damage, repairable. No 
permanent deformation of 
primary and secondary structural 
members or non-structural 
elements. Glazing will not break. 
Doors will be reusable. Only 
superficial injuries are likely. 

Reference: DoD UFC 4-010-01 

Will the loading dock 
design limit damage to 
adjacent areas and vent 
explosive force to the 
exterior of the building? 

Design the floor of the loading 
dock for blast resistance if the 
area below is occupied or 
contains critical utilities. 

Reference: GSA PBS-P100 

The loading dock is the 
weakest part of the exterior 
rear wall. There are no 
hardened walls between the 
loading dock and the rest of 
the building as the plan 
shows only standard 
gypboard and metal stud 
walls. 

Thus the loading dock will 
not limit any damage into the 
building and anything 
occurring on the loading 
dock will directly affect the 
building interior. 

4 Building Envelope 
4.1 What is the designed or 
estimated protection level 
of the exterior walls 
against the postulated 
explosive threat? 

The performance of the faade 
varies to a great extent on the 
materials. Different construction 
includes brick or stone with 
block backup, steel stud walls, 
precast panels, curtain wall with 
glass, stone, or metal panel 
elements. 

Shear walls that are essential to 
the lateral and vertical load 
bearing system and that also 
function as exterior walls should 
be considered primary structures 
and should resist the actual blast 
loads predicted from the threats 
specified. Where exterior walls 
are not designed for the full 
design loads, special 
consideration should be given to 
construction types that reduce 
the potential for injury. 

Reference: GSA PBS-P100 

There was no postulated 
explosive threat in the 
original design of the 
building or site. Thus, it is 
estimated that the protection 
level will be very poor for 
the assessment design basis 
threat. 

The exterior walls are made 
of CMU with a brick veneer 
on the outside. Steel 
framework supports the 
structure 

Windows are double glazed, 
-inch thick annealed glass. 


Section Vulnerability Question Guidance Observations 
Is there less than 40 
percent fenestration per 
structural bay? 

Is the window system 
design on the exterior 
faade balanced to 
mitigate the hazardous 
effects of flying glazing 
following an explosive 
event? 
(glazing, frames, 
anchorage to supporting 
walls, etc.) 

Do the glazing systems 
with a -inch (-inch is 
better) bite contain an 
application of structural 
silicone? 

Is the glazing laminated 
or is it protected with an 
anti-shatter (fragment 
retention) film? 

If an anti-shatter film is 
used, is it a minimum of 
a 7-mil thick film, or 
specially manufactured 
4-mil thick film? 

The performance of the glass 
will similarly depend on the 
materials. Glazing may be single 
pane or double pane, monolithic 
or laminated, annealed, heat 
strengthened or fully tempered. 

The percent fenestration is a 
balance between protection 
level, cost, the architectural look 
of the building within its 
surroundings, and building 
codes. One goal is to keep 
fenestration to below 40 percent 
of the building envelope vertical 
surface area, but the process 
must balance differing 
requirements. A blast engineer 
may prefer no windows; an 
architect may favor window 
curtain walls; building codes 
require so much fenestration per 
square footage of floor area; fire 
codes require a prescribed 
window opening area if the 
window is a designated escape 
route; and the building owner 
has cost concerns. 

Ideally, an owner would want 
100 percent of the glazed area to 
provide the design protection 
level against the postulated 
explosive threat (design basis 
threat weapon size at the 
expected stand-off distance). 
However, economics and 
geometry may allow 80 percent 
to 90 percent due to the 
statistical differences in the 
manufacturing process for glass 
or the angle of incidence of the 
blast wave upon upper story 
windows (4th floor and higher). 

Reference: GSA PBS-P100 

All windows are in the office 
space area of the building 
(complete in the front and 
half of one side). In that area 
the fenestration is probably 
more than 40%. 

Fenster is German for 
window. 

The window system is 
standard commercial 
construction and thus, the 
glass, framing, and 
anchorage are expected to be 
insufficient for the design 
basis threat at the available 
stand-off. One benefit is that 
there are windows only on 
two sides of the building. 

6 
Mechanical Systems (HVAC and CBR) 
6.1 Where are the air intakes 
and exhaust louvers for 
the building? 
(low, high, or midpoint 
Air intakes should be located on 
the roof or as high as possible. 
Otherwise secure within 
CPTED-compliant fencing or 
enclosure. The fencing or 
Outside air is brought in 
through a vent in the wall. 
The vent is alarmed to 
prevent intruder access. 

Section Vulnerability Question Guidance Observations 
of the building structure) 

Are the intakes and 
exhausts accessible to the 
public? 

enclosure should have a sloped 
roof to prevent the throwing of 
anything into the enclosure near 
the intakes. 

Reference: GSA PBS-P100 states 
that air intakes should be on the 
fourth floor or higher and, on 
buildings with three floors or 
less, they should be on the roof 
or as high as practical. Locating 
intakes high on a wall is 
preferred over a roof location. 

Reference: DoD UFC 4-010-01 
states that, for all new inhabited 
buildings covered by FEMA 426, 
all air intakes should be located 
at least 3 meters (10 feet) above 
the ground. 

Reference: CDC/NIOSH, Pub 
2002-139 states: An extension 
height of 12 feet (3.7 m) will 
place the intake out of reach of 
individuals without some 
assistance. Also, the entrance to 
the intake should be covered 
with a sloped metal mesh to 
reduce the threat of objects being 
tossed into the intake. A 
minimum slope of 45 is 
generally adequate. Extension 
height should be increased 
where existing platforms or 
building features (i.e., loading 
docks, retaining walls) might 
provide access to the outdoor air 
intakes. 

Reference: LBNL Pub 51959: 
Exhausts are also a concern 
during an outdoor release, 
especially if exhaust fans are not 
in continuous operation, due to 
wind effects and chimney effects 
(air movement due to differential 
temperature). 

A screened exhaust duct is 
on the roof. 

Single air intakes may feed 

No, there is only one air 
several air handling units. 

Are there multiple air 

intake. 

intake locations? 

Indicate if the air intakes are 
localized or separated. Installing 
low-leakage dampers is one way 


Section Vulnerability Question Guidance Observations 
to provide the system separation 
when necessary. 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department 
of Veterans Affairs Facilities 
6.4 What are the types of air 
filtration? Include the 
efficiency and number of 
filter modules for each of 
the main air handling 
systems. 
Is there any collective 
protection for chemical, 
biological, and 
radiological 
contamination designed 
into the building? 
MERV  Minimum Efficiency 
Reporting Value 
HEPA  High Efficiency 
Particulate Air 
Activated charcoal for gases 
Ultraviolet C for biologicals 
Consider mix of approaches for 
optimum protection and cost-
effectiveness. 
Reference: CDC/NIOSH Pub 
2002-139 
The air used to heat or cool 
the building is filtered in the 
HVAC room using standard 
industrial grade MERV 8 
filters. 
There is no CBR protection 
designed into the building. 
6.8 How are the air handling 
systems zoned? 
What areas and functions 
do each of the primary 
air handling systems 
serve? 
Understanding the critical areas 
of the building that must 
continue functioning focuses 
security and hazard mitigation 
measures. 
Applying HVAC zones that 
Isolate lobbies, mailrooms, 
loading docks, and other entry 
and storage areas from the rest 
of the building HVAC zones and 
maintaining negative pressure 
within these areas will contain 
CBR releases. Identify common 
return systems that service more 
than one zone, effectively 
making a large single zone. 
Conversely, emergency egress 
routes should receive positive 
pressurization to ensure 
contamination does not hinder 
egress. Consider filtering of the 
pressurization air. 
Reference: CDC/NIOSH, Pub 
2002-139 and LBNL PUB 51959 
HVAC Supply is split into 
two zones, one for the 
Computer Data Center and 
one for the rest of the 
building. 
The Data Center maintains a 
slight net positive pressure 
compared to the main office 
areas. 
The ducts are divided in half 
to allow them to serve as 
supply and return headers. 
The divider is insulated to 
minimize heat transfer from 
one side to the other. 
Stairwells are not separately 
pressurized. 


Section Vulnerability Question Guidance Observations 
Are there large central air 
handling units or are 
there multiple units 
serving separate zones? 

Independent units can continue 
to operate if damage occurs to 
limited areas of the building. 

Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department 
of Veterans Affairs Facilities 

The Computer Center and 
the Communications Center 
use Digital Environmental 
Managers (DEMs). 

Cooling (or heat removal) is 
done by two chillers in the 
M&E room. Three Trane 
100-ton chillers are 
available; normally only two 
are needed to cover all heat 
loads. The chillers remove 
heat from the chilled water 
system, and use the 
condenser water system to 
send the waste heat to two 
rooftop cooling towers. The 
chilled water is then routed 
from the chillers to air 
handlers for the majority of 
the building; cooling for the 
Computer Center and the 
Communications Center is 
done by directing chilled 
water to the DEMs. 

What is the method of 
temperature and humidity 
control? 

Is it localized or 
centralized? 

Central systems can range from 
monitoring only to full control. 
Local control may be available 
to override central operation. 

Of greatest concern are systems 
needed before, during, and after 
an incident that may be 
unavailable due to temperature 
and humidity exceeding 
operational limits (e.g., main 
telephone switch room). 

Reference: DOC CIAO 
Vulnerability Assessment 
Framework 1.1 

The main system for the 
building has limited 
humidity control through 
heating and cooling coils 
contained air handlers. 

The Computer Center and 
the Communications Center 
use Digital Environmental 
Managers (DEM) to direct 
the warm air where it is 
needed, add or remove 
humidity from the air, or 
even cool some areas while 
warming others. 

Are there any smoke 
evacuation systems 
installed? 

Does it have purge 
capability? 

For an internal blast, a smoke 
removal system may be 
essential, particularly in large, 
open spaces. The equipment 
should be located away from 
high-risk areas, the system 
controls and wiring should be 
protected, and it should be 
connected to emergency power. 
This exhaust capability can be 
built into areas with significant 
No, the building has no 
specific smoke evacuation or 
purge capability. 


Section Vulnerability Question Guidance Observations 
risk on internal events, such as 
lobbies, loading docks, and 
mailrooms. Consider filtering of 
the exhaust to capture CBR 
contaminants. 

References: GSA PBS-P100, 
CDC/NIOSH Pub 2002-139, and 
LBNL Pub 51959 

Are fire dampers 
installed at all fire 
barriers? 

Are all dampers 
functional and seal well 
when closed? 

All dampers (fire, smoke, 
outdoor air, return air, bypass) 
must be functional for proper 
protection within the building 
during an incident. 

Reference: CDC/NIOSH Pub 
2002-139 

HVAC fire and smoke 
dampers in the M&E room 
air handling unit (AHU). 

Do elevators have recall 
capability and elevator 
emergency message 
capability? 

Although a life-safety code and 
fire response requirement, the 
control of elevators also has 
benefit during a CBR incident. 
The elevators generate a piston 
effect, causing pressure 
differentials in the elevator shaft 
and associated floors that can 
force contamination to flow up 
or down. 

Reference: LBNL Pub 51959 

No elevators in HIC. 

Is access to building 
information restricted? 

Information on building 
operations, schematics, 
procedures, plans, and 
specifications should be strictly 
controlled and available only to 
authorized personnel. 

References: CDC/NIOSH Pub 
2002-139 and LBNL Pub 51959 

No, there is no specific 
information that the office 
park management company 
restricts access to building 
information. 

8 
Electrical Systems 
Are there any 
transformers or 
switchgears located 
outside the building or 
accessible from the 
building exterior? 

Are they vulnerable to 

Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department 
of Veterans Affairs Facilities 

The two 12.47KV feeders 
lead to two separate 
transformers outside the 
building, one near the north 
side by the loading dock, and 
the other near the south side 
by the M&E room. 

These transformers are in the 
rear parking lot, accessible to 


Section Vulnerability Question Guidance Observations 
public access? 
Are they secured? 
the public and secured only 
by a heavy duty lock. 
8.4 Are critical electrical 
systems collocated with 
other building systems? 
Are critical electrical 
systems located in areas 
outside of secured 
electrical areas? 
Is security system wiring 
located separately from 
electrical and other 
service systems? 
Collocation concerns include 
rooms, ceilings, raceways, 
conduits, panels, and risers. 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department 
of Veterans Affairs Facilities 
Yes, the electrical system is 
located adjacent to the main 
telecommunication and 
server closet. The HVAC 
room is also located adjacent 
to the electrical distribution 
room. 
Commercial and backup 
switchgear are both in the 
M&E room. Wiring is run as 
inexpensively as possible to 
minimize rental costs, which 
means in same pipe chases or 
adjacent conduit. 
8.6 Does emergency backup 
power exist for all areas 
within the building or for 
critical areas only? 
How is the emergency 
power distributed? 
Is the emergency power 
system independent from 
the normal electrical 
service, particularly in 
critical areas? 
There should be no single 
critical node that allows both the 
normal electrical service and the 
emergency backup power to be 
affected by a single incident. 
Automatic transfer switches and 
interconnecting switchgear are 
the initial concerns. 
Emergency and normal electrical 
equipment should be installed 
separately, at different locations, 
and as far apart as possible. 
Reference: GSA PBS-P100 
Yes, emergency backup 
power exists and can be 
routed to all areas of the 
building. The automatic 
transfer switch in the M&E 
room is a single point 
vulnerability in the system. 
Critical computer systems 
are backed up by an UPS 
(uninterruptible power 
supply) that is maintained 
separately from the sites 
generator back-up power. 
All individual computers / 
monitors have small 
(~750va) UPSs. 
9 Fire Alarm Systems 
9.1 Is the building fire alarm 
system centralized or 
localized? 
How are alarms made 
known, both locally and 
centrally? 
Are critical documents 
and control systems 
located in a secure yet 
Fire alarm systems must first 
warn building occupants to 
evacuate for life safety. Then 
they must inform the responding 
agency to dispatch fire 
equipment and personnel. 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department 
of Veterans Affairs Facilities 
The building fire alarm 
system is centralized. The 
fire alarm is routed over the 
telephone lines directly to 
the fire department. No 
intermediate monitoring 
agency is required for 
notification. An 
intermediate monitoring 
system is only used for the 
security alarm. 


Section Vulnerability Question Guidance Observations 
accessible location? 

Where are the fire alarm 
panels located? 

Do they allow access to 
unauthorized personnel? 

Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department 
of Veterans Affairs Facilities 

The fire alarm panels are 
located in the building 
portion adjacent to HIC. The 
HIC security manager has a 
key to that part of the 
building for access to the fire 
alarm panels. However, the 
panels are accessible to the 
occupants / tenants of that 
building portion. 

Is the fire alarm system 
standalone or integrated 
with other functions such 
as security and 
environmental or 
building management 
systems? 

What is the interface? 

Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department 
of Veterans Affairs Facilities 

The fire alarm system is 
standalone and separate from 
the security system. The 
system uses the telephone 
circuits to place a call to the 
local fire department. 

9.5 Is there redundant off-
premises fire alarm 
reporting? 
Fire alarms can ring at a fire 
station, at an intermediary alarm 
monitoring center, or autodial 
someone else. See Items 5.21 
and 10.5 of the checklist. 
Yes, there is redundant off-
premises fire alarm reporting 
through the security alarm 
service. This will notify an 
intermediate alarm 
monitoring center. 
Communications and IT Systems
10 
10.1 Where is the main 
telephone distribution 
room and where is it in 
relation to higher-risk 
areas? 
Is the main telephone 
distribution room secure? 

One can expect to find voice, 
data, signal, and alarm systems 
to be routed through the main 
telephone distribution room. 

Reference: FEMA 386-7 
The main telephone 
distribution center is located 
next to the electrical and 
HVAC (mechanical). The 
alarm systems are routed 
through the telephone room 
(and circuits). The room is 
within the interior of the 
secured building and access 
is restricted to authorized 
personnel only. Outside 
repair contractors are 
escorted at all times. 

Critical areas should be supplied 

No, there are no redundant 

Are there redundant 

with multiple or redundant 

communication systems 

communications systems 

means of communications. 

available as part of any 

available? 

Power outage phones can 

building system. The only 

provide redundancy as they 

redundant communications 

connect directly to the local 

are cell phones which 


Section Vulnerability Question Guidance Observations 
commercial telephone switch off operate throughout the 
site and not through the building building. 
telephone switch in the main 
telephone distribution room. 
A base radio communication 
system with antenna can be 
installed in stairwells, and 
portable sets distributed to 
floors. 
References: GSA PBS-P100 and 
FEMA 386-7 

Where are the main 
distribution facility, data 
centers, routers, 
firewalls, and servers 
located and are they 
secure? 

Where are the secondary 
and/or intermediate 
distribution facilities and 
are they secure? 

Concern is collateral damage 
from manmade hazards and 
redundancy of critical functions. 

Reference: DOC CIAO 
Vulnerability Assessment 
Framework 1.1 

The Computer Data Center is 
interior to the building and is 
behind layers of security. 
The Communications Center 
is on an outside wall, but 
also behind security. 

What type, power rating, 
and location of the 
uninterruptible power 
supply (UPS)? (battery, 
on-line, filtered) 

Are the UPS also 
connected to emergency 
power? 

Consider that UPS should be 
found at all computerized points 
from the main distribution 
facility to individual data closets 
and at critical personal 
computers/terminals. 

Critical LAN sections should 
also be on backup power. 

Reference: DOC CIAO 
Vulnerability Assessment 
Framework 1.1 

The UPS system is based on 
a lead acid battery bank. 
Currently, there is no exhaust 
system for the battery bank. 
The UPS system can be fed 
from the emergency backup 
power (generator). 

10.12 Where is the disaster 
recovery/mirroring site? 

A site with suitable equipment 
that allows continuation of 
operations or that mirrors 
(operates in parallel to) the 
existing operation is beneficial if 
equipment is lost during a 
natural or manmade disaster. 
The need is based upon the 
criticality of the operation and 
how quickly replacement 
equipment can be put in place 
HIC is the recovery site for 
many clients. 

HIC maintains an off-site 
storage location for clients 
that require backup data to 
be stored at a separate site. 

Classified backup data for 
certain government clients 
are stored in a special 


and operated. 

Section Vulnerability Question Guidance Observations 
fireproof safe in the Secure 

Space. 
Reference: DOC CIAO 
Vulnerability Assessment 
Framework 1.1 

10.15 Is there a mass 
notification system that 
reaches all building 
occupants? 
(public address, pager, 
cell phone, computer 
override, etc.) 
Will one or more of these 
systems be operational 
under hazard conditions? 
(UPS, emergency power) 

Depending upon building size, a 
mass notification system will 
provide warning and alert 
information, along with actions 
to take before and after an 
incident if there is redundancy 
and power. 

Reference: DoD UFC 4-010-01 

The telephone system has a 
building-wide announcing 
feature that can be activated 
by pressing one button at any 
phone. It reaches all users 
within audible distance of a 
phone. 

This system will continue to 
operate on the UPS and/or 
backup generator power. 

10.16 Do control centers and 
their designated alternate 
locations have equivalent 
or reduced capability for 
voice, data, mass 
notification, etc.? 
(emergency operations, 
security, fire alarms, 
building automation) 
Do the alternate 

locations also have 

access to backup 

systems, including 

emergency power? 

Reference: GSA PBS-P100 

The emergency operations 
center is the large conference 
room. There is no designated 
alternate. 

The room is equipped with 
network and telephone 
connections and cell phones 
are able to receive a signal. 

11 Equipment Operations and Maintenance 
11.8 Is stairway and exit sign 
lighting operational? 

The maintenance program for 
stairway and exit sign lighting 
(all egress lighting) should 
ensure functioning under normal 
and emergency power 
conditions. 

Expect building codes to be 
updated as emergency egress 
lighting is moved from upper 
walls and over doorways to floor 
level as heat and smoke drive 
occupants to crawl along the 
Yes, standard door or ceiling 
mounted exit signs and 
emergency lighting (battery 
packs) are in place for all six 
exits from the building. 


Section Vulnerability Question Guidance Observations 
13 
floor to get out of the building. 
Signs and lights mounted high 
have limited or no benefit when 
obscured. 
Reference: FEMA 386-7 
Security Master Plan 
The development and 
implementation of a security 

13.1 Does a written security 

plan exist for this site or 

master plan provides a roadmap 

building? 

that outlines the strategic 
direction and vision, operational, 

When was the initial 

managerial, and technological 
security plan written and 

mission, goals, and objectives of 
the organizations security 

last revised? 

program. 

Who is responsible for 

Reference: DOC CIAO 
preparing and reviewing 

Vulnerability Assessment 

Framework 1.1 

the security plan? 

Building Design Mitigation Measures 
(Suburban Version) 

The Security Officer 
maintains the fire evacuation 
and response plan and has 
posted fire evacuation routes 
in key office hallways and 
break areas. 

HIC does not have a mass 
evacuation plan and rally 
point. 

Asset-Threat/Hazard 
Pair 
Current Risk 
Rating 
Suggested Mitigation 
Measure 
Revised Risk 
Rating 
1. Explosive 
Blast/Structural 
High FRF film on window Medium 
2. Explosive 
Blast/Structural 
High Enclose open entrance 
area 
Medium 
3. Chemical/Mechanical High Extend Air Intake Medium 
4. Biological/Mechanical High Extend Air Intake Medium 
5. Radiological/Site Medium Mass Evacuation Plan 
and Rally Point 
Low 


UNIT X-B CASE STUDY ACTIVITY: 
BUILDING DESIGN GUIDANCE 
(Urban Version) 

In this unit, the emphasis will be upon providing a balanced building envelope that is a defensive 
layer against the terrorist tactic of interest and avoiding situations where one incident affects 
more than one building system. The Building Vulnerability Assessment Checklist in FEMA 
426 (Table 1-22, pages 1-46 to 1-93) can be used as a screening tool for preliminary building 
design vulnerability assessment or for assessment of an existing building. The checklist includes 
questions that determine if critical and emergency systems will continue to function to enhance 
deterrence, detection, denial, and damage limitation during and after a threat or hazard situation. 

Requirements 

Assign sections of the checklist to the group member who is most knowledgeable and qualified 
to perform an assessment of the assigned area. Refer to the Appendix B Case Study to determine 
answers to the questions. Then review results as a team to identify vulnerabilities and possible 
mitigation measures. 

1. Complete the following questions of the Building Vulnerability Assessment Checklist 
(FEMA 426, Table 1-22, pages 1-46 to 1-93) which address building design. 

Note: There are 49 questions below (157 in Section 2, 7 in Section 3, 2 in Section 
4, 7 in Section 6, 3 in Section 7, 3 in Section 8, 4 in Section 9, 5 in Section 10, 2 
in Section 11, and 1 in Section 13), so it is recommended that the team split up the 
questions among themselves taking 7-9 questions each and review the Appendix 
B Case Study for answers. Apportion the available time for gathering the answers 
and then provide each other the answers while performing the two actions below. 

2. 
Upon completion of these portions of the checklist, refer back to the vulnerability ratings 
determined in the Unit IV Case Study Activity and, based on this more detailed analysis, 
decide if any vulnerability rating needs adjustment. Adjust the Threat Matrix chart 
accordingly for vulnerability rating and risk rating. 
3. 
Select mitigation measures to reduce vulnerability and associated risk based upon the building 
design. 
4. 
Estimate the new risk ratings for high risk asset-threat pairs (as adjusted in step 2 above) 
based on the recommended mitigation measures. 



Section Vulnerability Question Guidance Observations 
2 Architectural 
2.5 Do entrances avoid 
significant queuing? 
If queuing will occur within the 
building footprint, the area 
should be enclosed in blast-
resistant construction. If queuing 
is expected outside the building, 
a rain cover should be provided. 
For manpower and equipment 
requirements, collocate or 
combine staff and visitor 
entrances. 
Reference: GSA PBS-P100 
The HazardCorp Building has 
a spacious lobby that avoids 
queuing. 
2.6 Does security screening 
cover all public and 
private areas? 
Are public and private 
activities separated? 
Are public toilets, service 
spaces, or access to stairs 
or elevators located in 
any non-secure areas, 
including the queuing 
area before screening at 
the public entrance? 
Retail activities should be 
prohibited in non-secured areas. 
However the Public Building 
Cooperative Use Act of 1976 
encourages retail and mixed uses 
to create open and inviting 
buildings. Consider separating 
entryways, controlling access, 
hardening shared partitions, and 
special security operational 
countermeasures. 
Reference: GSA PBS-P100 and 
FEMA 386-7 
The Lobby has open access to 
retail, atrium, mailroom, and 
meeting room spaces. Thus, 
public and private activities 
are not completely separated. 
Visitors to controlled floors 
are instructed to go to the 
Lobby Reception Desks and 
call the office to be visited to 
get an escort. That escort will 
come to the desk and take the 
visitor to the office. However, 
not all floors are controlled, so 
visitors can get off at those 
floors to transact business. 
Security desk as required by 
tenants are at one or more 
elevator lobbies at the floors 
rented by those tenants. Some 
tenants have a security desk at 
only one floor, with access to 
other floors controlled. 
Designated elevators, 
including one service elevator, 
have card readers and PIN 
(Personal Identification 
Number) keypads for 
movement to and from access 
controlled floors. 
The building stairways 
extending into the 
underground parking have 
card readers and PIN keypads 
at each level of underground 
parking to gain entrance to the 


Section Vulnerability Question Guidance Observations 
stairways. 
2.7 Is access control 
provided through main 
entrance points for 
employees and visitors? 
(lobby receptionist, sign-
in, staff escorts, issue of 
visitor badges, checking 
forms of personal 
identification, electronic 
access control systems) 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department 
of Veterans Affairs Facilities 
Electronic access control is set 
up for building occupants / 
tenants. Visitor access control 
is handled at the Lobby 
Reception Desk for those 
requiring escort to controlled 
floors. There is no other 
control for visitors for retail, 
lobby, meeting rooms, or 
floors who do not have 
specific security needs. 
2.8 Is access to private and 
public space or restricted 
area space clearly 
defined through the 
design of the space, 
signage, use of electronic 
security devices, etc.? 
Finishes and signage should be 
designed for visual simplicity. 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department 
of Veterans Affairs Facilities 
Currently electronic security is 
the only indication 
differentiating private and 
public space. The only 
signage is the standard menu 
board that indicates what 
tenant is on what floor. 
2.9 Is access to elevators 
distinguished as to those 
that are designated only 
for employees and 
visitors? 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department 
of Veterans Affairs Facilities 
Twenty-eight passenger 
elevators and three service 
elevators serve the various 
levels of the building. Two 
building elevators provide 
service to the underground 
parking levels. The plaza 
underground parking has two 
elevators that are located just 
east of the plaza parking 
entrance and exit. 
Designated elevators, 
including one service elevator, 
have card readers and PIN 
(Personal Identification 
Number) keypads for 
movement to and from access 
controlled floors. To get the 
elevator to move to a specific 
floor you have to press the 
floor key, read your card, and 
enter your PIN. In addition, 
there is a Duress PIN that 
alerts building and floor 
security that an authorized 
person is moving to a 
controlled floor with a security 
problem. Two of the 


Section Vulnerability Question Guidance Observations 
designated building elevators 
with access controls serve the 
underground parking levels. 
Visitors are not capable of 
using the controlled access 
elevators. 
The elevators and stairwells 
serving the underground 
parking that is not under the 
building have no access 
control equipment installed. 
2.10 Do public and employee 
entrances include space 
for possible future 
installation of access 
control and screening 
equipment? 
These include walk-through 
metal detectors and x-ray 
devices, identification check, 
electronic access card, search 
stations, and turnstiles. 
Reference: GSA PBS-P100 
Yes, the Lobby has more than 
adequate space for 
reconfiguring to any security 
format desired for any security 
equipment needed. 
2.11 Do foyers have 
reinforced concrete walls 
and offset interior and 
exterior doors from each 
other? 
Consider for exterior entrances 
to the building or to access 
critical areas within the building 
if explosive blast hazard must be 
mitigated. 
Reference: U.S. Army TM 5-853 
The building has a window 
curtain wall on the exterior. 
The Lobby, albeit having 
stronger glass has fewer 
structural members to which to 
transfer blast loading, and will 
be affected the most by this 
blast location. 
There are no exterior doors in 
the Lobby that are aligned 
with interior doors. 
None of the Lobby is hardened 
and the Lobby atrium is open 
for the first 3 floors. 
2.13 Do circulation routes 
have unobstructed views 
of people approaching 
controlled access points? 
This applies to building 
entrances and to critical areas 
within the building. 
References: USAF Installation 
Force Protection Guide and 
DoD UFC 4-010-01 
CCTV is set up at most 
exterior entrances to the 
building. CCTV is also at 
elevator lobbies, especially if 
secure access is the policy on 
that floor. 
Security personnel at the 
Lobby Reception Desk have 
full view of the entrances and 
elevator circulation routes. 


Section Vulnerability Question Guidance Observations 
2.15 Are critical assets 
(people, activities, 
building systems and 
components) located 
close to any main 
entrance, vehicle 
circulation, parking, 
maintenance area, 
loading dock, or interior 
parking? 
Are the critical building 
systems and components 
hardened? 
Critical building components 
include: Emergency generator 
including fuel systems, day tank, 
fire sprinkler, and water supply; 
Normal fuel storage; Main 
switchgear; Telephone 
distribution and main 
switchgear; Fire pumps; 
Building control centers; 
Uninterruptible Power Supply 
(UPS) systems controlling 
critical functions; Main 
refrigeration and ventilation 
systems if critical to building 
operation; Elevator machinery 
and controls; Shafts for stairs, 
elevators, and utilities; Critical 
distribution feeders for 
emergency power. Evacuation 
and rescue require emergency 
systems to remain operational 
during a disaster and they should 
be located away from potential 
attack locations. Primary and 
backup systems should be 
separated to reduce the risk of 
both being impacted by a single 
incident if collocated. Utility 
systems should be located at 
least 50 feet from loading docks, 
front entrances, and parking 
areas. 
One way to harden critical 
building systems and 
components is to enclose them 
within hardened walls, floors, 
and ceilings. Do not place them 
near high-risk areas where they 
can receive collateral damage. 
Reference: GSA PBS-P100 
Utility entrances into the 
building are expected to be 
exposed in the underground 
parking levels. The loading 
dock has utility services under 
it as well as a fuel storage 
tank. Electrical utilities room 
is on an outside wall of the 
first floor with little stand-off 
and next to an underground 
vehicle parking ramp. 
Vertical utility distribution is 
in separated pipe chases or in 
elevator shafts. 
Egress stairwells do not 
discharge to the outside, but to 
the loading dock and to the 
area near the electrical utilities 
room. 
None of the critical building 
systems are hardened. 
2.16 Are high-value or critical 
assets located as far into 
the interior of the 
building as possible and 
separated from the public 
areas of the building? 
Critical assets, such as people 
and activities, are more 
vulnerable to hazards when on 
an exterior building wall or 
adjacent to uncontrolled public 
areas inside the building. 
Reference: GSA PBS-P100 
This high-rise building uses 
vertical separation to provide 
protection to high-value and 
critical assets. 
The assets are not well 
separated from public areas of 
the building in every case, 
especially in the underground 
parking levels under the 
building. Critical assets are 


Section Vulnerability Question Guidance Observations 
also contained on exterior 
walls: administration and 
electric utilities room, for 
example. 
2.17 Is high visitor activity 
away from critical 
assets? 
High-risk activities should also 
be separated from low-risk 
activities. Also, visitor activities 
should be separated from daily 
activities. 
Reference: USAF Installation 
Force Protection Guide 
Low-risk activities are limited 
to floors 1 to 3. All visitors 
enter through the first floor. 
At times, visitors may be one 
floor above or below critical 
assets. 
Otherwise the security 
protocols in place keep visitors 
away from the critical assets 
as much as can be expected. 
2.19 Are loading docks and 
receiving and shipping 
areas separated in any 
direction from utility 
rooms, utility mains, and 
service entrances, 
including electrical, 
telephone/data, fire 
detection/alarm systems, 
fire suppression water 
mains, cooling and 
heating mains, etc.? 
Loading docks should be 
designed to keep vehicles from 
driving into or parking under the 
building. If loading docks are in 
close proximity to critical 
equipment, consider hardening 
the equipment and service 
against explosive blast. Consider 
a 50-foot separation distance in 
all directions. 
Reference: GSA PBS-P100 
No, the loading dock connects 
directly into interior space, 
critical functions, and 
infrastructure, including an 
egress stairwell and the service 
elevators. 
50-foot separation is not 
present in most cases. 
2.20 Are mailrooms located 
away from building main 
entrances, areas 
containing critical 
services, utilities, 
distribution systems, and 
important assets? 
Is the mailroom located 
near the loading dock? 
The mailroom should be located 
at the perimeter of the building 
with an outside wall or window 
designed for pressure relief. 
By separating the mailroom and 
the loading dock, the collateral 
damage of an incident at one has 
less impact upon the other. 
However, this may be the 
preferred mailroom location. 
Off-site screening stations or a 
separate delivery processing 
building on site may be cost-
effective, particularly if several 
buildings may share one 
mailroom. A separate delivery 
processing building reduces risk 
and simplifies protection 
measures. 
HazardCorp receives mail, 
packages, and equipment at 
the loading dock where a 
recently renovated (per DoD 
criteria) mailroom/shipping 
office inspects the items using 
x-ray and other equipment 
before distributing to tenants 
within the building. By 
agreement, HazardCorp 
Building accepts deliveries for 
specific tenants in other 
buildings in the immediate 
vicinity (within 2 city blocks) 
due to this mailroom 
capability. 
Mailroom is adjacent to the 
loading dock and far from 
other entrances. 


Section Vulnerability Question Guidance Observations 
Reference: GSA PBS-P100 
2.22 Are areas of refuge 
identified, with special 
consideration given to 
egress? 
Areas of refuge can be safe 
havens, shelters, or protected 
spaces for use during specified 
hazards. 
Reference: FEMA 386-7 
There are no specific safe 
havens provided by 
HazardCorp in this building 
and no information that any of 
the tenants have a shelter. 
The Office of Emergency 
Management (25th floor) may 
have shelter capability built-in 
due to the Emergency 
Operations Center on this floor 
supported by extensive backup 
electric generation. 
2.23 Are stairwells required 
for emergency egress 
located as remotely as 
possible from high-risk 
areas where blast events 
might occur? 
Are stairways maintained 
with positive pressure or 
are there other smoke 
control systems? 
Consider designing stairs so that 
they discharge into other than 
lobbies, parking, or loading 
areas. 
Maintaining positive pressure 
from a clean source of air (may 
require special filtering) aids in 
egress by keeping smoke, heat, 
toxic fumes, etc. out of the 
stairway. Pressurize exit 
stairways in accordance with the 
National Model Building Code. 
Reference: GSA PBS-P100 and 
CDC/NIOSH, Pub 2002-139 
Stairwell #1 is located on the 
southwest side (exits near 
loading dock) and Stairwell #2 
is located on the northwest 
side within the central core 
(exits near the electrical 
utilities room and vehicle 
ramp to underground parking). 
Both exit stairwells discharge 
to the building interior at 
ground level or to the parking 
levels underneath the building. 
Per local building code the 
stairwells are pressurized to 
keep smoke out during fires. 
2.25 Do interior barriers 
differentiate level of 
security within a 
building? 
Reference: USAF Installation 
Force Protection Guide 
Electronic controls exist in the 
form of alarms, door locks, 
proximity cards, and use of 
PIN numbers for stairwell and 
elevator access. 
2.26 Are emergency systems 
located away from high-
risk areas? 
The intent is to keep the 
emergency systems out of 
harms way, such that one 
incident takes out all capability  
both the regular systems and 
their backups. 
Reference: FEMA 386-7 
Emergency power generators 
are on the 4th floor or higher. 
However, four fuel tanks are 
under the loading dock area. 
Communications have 
redundancy located away from 
high-risk areas. 
3 Structural Systems 
3.1 What type of 
construction? 
The type of construction 
provides an indication of the 
robustness to abnormal loading 
and load reversals. A reinforced 
Steel moment-resisting-frame 
construction uses steel columns 
and beams. 


Section Vulnerability Question Guidance Observations 
What type of concrete 
and reinforcing steel? 
What type of steel? 
What type of foundation? 
concrete moment-resisting frame 
provides greater ductility and 
redundancy than a flat-slab or 
flat-plate construction. The 
ductility of steel frame with 
metal deck depends on the 
connection details and pre-
tensioned or post-tensioned 
construction provides little 
capacity for abnormal loading 
patterns and load reversals. The 
resistance of load-bearing wall 
structures varies to a great 
extent, depending on whether the 
walls are reinforced or 
unreinforced. A rapid screening 
process developed by FEMA for 
assessing structural hazards 
identifies the following types of 
construction with a structural 
score ranging from 1.0 to 8.5. A 
higher score indicates a greater 
capacity to sustain load 
reversals. 
Wood buildings of all types - 4.5 
to 8.5 
Steel moment-resisting frames - 
3.5 to 4.5 
Braced steel frames - 2.5 to 3.0 
Light metal buildings - 5.5 to 6.5 
Steel frames with cast-in-place 
concrete shear walls - 3.5 to 4.5 
Steel frames with unreinforced 
masonry infill walls - 1.5 to 3.0 
Concrete moment-resisting 
frames - 2.0 to 4.0 
Concrete shear wall buildings - 
3.0 to 4.0 
Concrete frames with 
unreinforced masonry infill 
walls - 1.5 to 3.0 
Tilt-up buildings - 2.0 to 3.5 
Precast concrete frame buildings 
- 1.5 to 2.5 
Reinforced masonry - 3.0 to 4.0 
Unreinforced masonry - 1.0 to 
2.5 
References: FEMA 154 and 
Physical Security Assessment for 
the Department of Veterans 
Affairs Facilities 
The office floor slab is an 
electrified composite 3-inch 
metal deck with 2-1/2- inch 
normal-weight concrete fill 
spanning between the steel 
beams. 
The underground parking floor 
slabs are substantial cast-inplace 
reinforced concrete with 
reinforced concrete columns 
that align with steel columns on 
the first floor and have 
additional columns to handle 
the vehicle loading. 
The lateral load resisting 
system (for wind loads only) 
consists of four perimeter 
moment frames, with a column 
spacing of approximately 15 
feet , one at each exterior wall, 
augmented by two-story belt 
trusses between the 4th and 
6th floors and the 22nd and 
24th floors. There are 
additional trusses at the north 
and south elevations below the 
4th floor. An interior cross 
braced core extends from the 
foundations to the 6th floor. 
The horizontal shear is 
transferred into the core at the 
4th and 6th floors. The 4th 
floor diaphragm consists of a 
14-inch thick reinforced 
concrete slab with embedded 
T-sections. The 6th floor is an 
8-inch thick reinforced 
concrete slab. 
The building foundations are 
reinforced concrete caissons. 
The caissons are needed due to 
the proximity to the water. 


Section Vulnerability Question Guidance Observations 
3.3 Are the steel frame 
connections moment 
connections? 
Is the column spacing 
minimized so that 
reasonably sized 
members will resist the 
design loads and increase 
the redundancy of the 
system? 
What are the floor-tofloor 
heights? 
A practical upper level for 
column spacing is generally 30 
feet. Unless there is an 
overriding architectural 
requirement, a practical limit for 
floor-to-floor heights is 
generally less than or equal to 16 
feet. 
Reference: GSA PBS-P100 
The connections for this steel 
structure are moment 
connections. 
The first to third floors is an 
open atrium and 60 foot 
transfer trusses at the fourth 
floor span between the core 
and girders towards the front 
of the atrium to provide clear 
space 
The lateral load resisting 
system (for wind loads only) 
consists of four perimeter 
moment frames, with a 
column spacing of 
approximately 15 feet , one at 
each exterior wall, augmented 
by two-story belt trusses 
between the 4th and 6th floors 
and the 22nd and 24th floors. 
Along the four exterior 
elevations, center-to-center 
column spacing is 
approximately 15 feet. 
Column trees are used at these 
locations. A column tree is a 
shop-fabricated column 
assembly with beam stubs 
shop-welded to the column 
flanges. 
Along the exterior elevations, 
and within the core up to the 
6th floor, the spans are 
approximately 30 feet. 
Interior column spacing is 
approximately 30 feet. At 
these locations, traditional 
moment frame construction is 
used. 
Some columns below the 6th 
floor are special large sections 
or built-up box shapes with 
plates up to 10 inches thick 
welded from flange to flange, 
parallel to the web, to provide 
the necessary section 
properties. 
The floor-to-floor story height 


Section Vulnerability Question Guidance Observations 
for office and parking garage 
floors is 12 feet. The first 
three floors are 14 feet and the 
mechanical floors are 16 feet 
in height. 
3.4 Are critical elements 
vulnerable to failure? 
The priority for upgrades should 
be based on the relative 
importance of structural or non-
structural elements that are 
essential to mitigating the extent 
of collapse and minimizing 
injury and damage. 
Primary Structural Elements 
provide the essential parts of the 
buildings resistance to 
catastrophic blast loads and 
progressive collapse. These 
include columns, girders, roof 
beams, and the main lateral 
resistance system. 
Secondary Structural Elements 
consist of all other load bearing 
members, such as floor beams, 
slabs, that are essential for life 
safety systems or elements 
which can cause substantial 
injury if failure occurs, including 
ceilings or heavy suspended 
mechanical units. 
Secondary Non-Structural 
Elements consist of all elements 
not covered in primary non-
structural elements, such as 
partitions, furniture, and light 
fixtures. 
Reference: GSA PBS-P100 
The four most prominent 
elements vulnerable to failure 
are the canopy at the plaza 
main entrance, the atrium 
vertical columns that support 
transfer girders, the loading 
dock area, and the columns of 
the underground parking 
levels. 
The canopy must be able to 
take load reversals, thus 
hardening is in order. 
Even though the atrium 
columns are substantially 
strengthened, a progressive 
collapse analysis is needed or 
these columns must receive 
additional hardening so that 
they do not fail under Design 
Basis Threat blast loads or 
smaller hand carried weapons. 
Hardening of the loading dock 
walls to direct the blast away 
from the building is also a 
consideration due to the 
proximity of the loading dock 
to egress and critical 
equipment. 
The columns and column to 
floor connections of the 
underground parking levels 
are also of concern, especially 
for that parking below the 
building. 
Other Secondary Non-
Structural Elements of 
particular concern due to no 
consideration in original 
design are the components of 
the atrium that would be 
affected by blast entering at 
the level of the first three 
floors. 


Section Vulnerability Question Guidance Observations 
3.5 Will the structure suffer 
an unacceptable level of 
damage resulting from 
the postulated threat 
(blast loading or weapon 
impact)? 
The extent of damage to the 
structure and exterior wall 
systems from the bomb threat 
may be related to a protection 
level. The following is for new 
buildings: 
Level of Protection Below 
Antiterrorism Standards -
Severe damage. Frame 
collapse/massive destruction. 
Little left standing. Doors and 
windows fail and result in lethal 
hazards. Majority of personnel 
suffer fatalities. 
Very Low Level Protection 
Heavy damage. Onset of 
structural collapse. Major 
deformation of primary and 
secondary structural members, 
but progressive collapse is 
unlikely. Collapse of non-
structural elements. Glazing will 
break and is likely to be 
propelled into the building, 
resulting in serious glazing 
fragment injuries, but fragments 
will be reduced. Doors may be 
propelled into rooms, presenting 
serious hazards. Majority of 
personnel suffer serious injuries. 
There are likely to be a limited 
number (10 percent to 25 
percent) of fatalities. 
Low Level of Protection 
Moderate damage, unrepairable. 
Major deformation of non-
structural elements and 
secondary structural members 
and minor deformation of 
primary structural members, but 
progressive collapse is unlikely. 
Glazing will break, but fall 
within 1 meter of the wall or 
otherwise not present a 
significant fragment hazard. 
Doors may fail, but they will 
rebound out of their frames, 
presenting minimal hazards. 
Majority of personnel suffer 
significant injuries. There may 
be a few (<10 percent) fatalities. 
Medium Level Protection -
Progressive collapse is a 
concern because the first to 
third floors is an open atrium 
and 60 foot transfer trusses at 
the fourth floor span between 
the core and girders towards 
the front of the atrium to 
provide clear space. 
The building exterior is clad 
with an aluminum/glass 
curtain wall attached to the 
face of the building structure. 
Typical glazing is  inch or 
3/8 inch annealed single pane 
double strength glass. The 
first three floors are 3/8 inch 
thermally tempered single-
pane glass. 
In the urban environment 
without significant stand-off 
and the design used for this 
building, the estimated 
damage level will be very 
high. 


Section Vulnerability Question Guidance Observations 
Minor damage, repairable. 
Minor deformations of non-
structural elements and 
secondary structural members 
and no permanent deformation 
in primary structural members. 
Glazing will break, but will 
remain in the window frame. 
Doors will stay in frames, but 
will not be reusable. Some minor 
injuries, but fatalities are 
unlikely. 
High Level Protection -
Minimal damage, repairable. No 
permanent deformation of 
primary and secondary structural 
members or non-structural 
elements. Glazing will not break. 
Doors will be reusable. Only 
superficial injuries are likely. 
Reference: DoD UFC 4-010-01 
3.8 Are there transfer girders 
supported by columns 
within unscreened public 
spaces or at the exterior 
of the building? 
Transfer girders allow 
discontinuities in columns 
between roof and foundation. 
This design has inherent 
difficulty in transferring load to 
redundant paths upon loss of a 
column or the girder. Transfer 
beams and girders that, if lost, 
may cause progressive collapse 
are therefore highly discouraged. 
Reference: GSA PBS-P100 
The open 3-story atrium has 
transfer girders on the fourth 
floor to handle the columns in 
the 47 stories above. These 
columns are in the unscreened 
public area of the building and 
are on the first layer of 
columns inside the building on 
the plaza main entrance side. 
3.10 Will the loading dock 
design limit damage to 
adjacent areas and vent 
explosive force to the 
exterior of the building? 
Design the floor of the loading 
dock for blast resistance if the 
area below is occupied or 
contains critical utilities. 
Reference: GSA PBS-P100 
The loading dock area has 
hardening only in those areas 
affected by the renovation of 
the mailroom for upgraded 
security. 
There is significant critical 
infrastructure underneath the 
loading dock area that requires 
hardening and the remaining 
standard construction walls 
need hardening to direct blast 
away from the building 
without any other impact. 
This includes adjacent column 
hardening. 


Section Vulnerability Question Guidance Observations 
3.11 Are mailrooms, where 
packages are received 
and opened for 
inspection, and 
unscreened retail spaces 
designed to mitigate the 
effects of a blast on 
primary vertical or lateral 
bracing members? 
Where mailrooms and 
unscreened retail spaces are 
located in occupied areas or 
adjacent to critical utilities, 
walls, ceilings, and floors, they 
should be blast-and fragment- 
resistant. 
Methods to facilitate the venting 
of explosive forces and gases 
from the interior spaces to the 
outside of the structure may 
include blow-out panels and 
window system designs that 
provide protection from blast 
pressure applied to the outside, 
but that readily fail and vent if 
exposed to blast pressure on the 
inside. 
Reference: GSA PBS-P100 
HazardCorp receives mail, 
packages, and equipment at 
the loading dock where a 
recently renovated (per DoD 
criteria) mailroom/shipping 
office inspects the items using 
x-ray and other equipment 
before distributing to tenants 
within the building. By 
agreement, HazardCorp 
Building accepts deliveries for 
specific tenants in other 
buildings in the immediate 
vicinity (within 2 city blocks) 
due to this mailroom 
capability. 
Retail space is another matter 
as it is unscreened and has 
access to the Lobby. The 
retail space has no hardening 
of shared walls. As a 
minimum the doors entering 
the Lobby should be used as 
emergency exits only with 
crash bars and alarms. 
4 Building Envelope 
4.1 What is the designed or 
estimated protection level 
of the exterior walls 
against the postulated 
explosive threat? 
The performance of the faade 
varies to a great extent on the 
materials. Different construction 
includes brick or stone with 
block backup, steel stud walls, 
precast panels, curtain wall with 
glass, stone, or metal panel 
elements. 
Shear walls that are essential to 
the lateral and vertical load 
bearing system and that also 
function as exterior walls should 
be considered primary structures 
and should resist the actual blast 
loads predicted from the threats 
specified. Where exterior walls 
are not designed for the full 
design loads, special 
consideration should be given to 
construction types that reduce 
the potential for injury. 
Reference: GSA PBS-P100 
A window curtain wall of 
aluminum and glass, even 
slightly thicker thermally 
tempered glass will not 
provide the desired level of 
protection without additional 
hardening. Hardening the 
glass is one concern, but 
hardening the framing of the 
curtain wall is of greater 
concern as blast resistant 
curtain wall design was not 
available when this building 
was originally built. 
A blast analysis would be in 
order to specify the type and 
level of hardening required. 


Section Vulnerability Question Guidance Observations 
4.2 Is there less than 40 
percent fenestration per 
structural bay? 
Is the window system 
design on the exterior 
faade balanced to 
mitigate the hazardous 
effects of flying glazing 
following an explosive 
event? 
(glazing, frames, 
anchorage to supporting 
walls, etc.) 
Do the glazing systems 
with a -inch (-inch is 
better) bite contain an 
application of structural 
silicone? 
Is the glazing laminated 
or is it protected with an 
anti-shatter (fragment 
retention) film? 
If an anti-shatter film is 
used, is it a minimum of 
a 7-mil thick film, or 
specially manufactured 
4-mil thick film? 
The performance of the glass 
will similarly depend on the 
materials. Glazing may be single 
pane or double pane, monolithic 
or laminated, annealed, heat 
strengthened or fully tempered. 
The percent fenestration is a 
balance between protection 
level, cost, the architectural look 
of the building within its 
surroundings, and building 
codes. One goal is to keep 
fenestration to below 40 percent 
of the building envelope vertical 
surface area, but the process 
must balance differing 
requirements. A blast engineer 
may prefer no windows; an 
architect may favor window 
curtain walls; building codes 
require so much fenestration per 
square footage of floor area; fire 
codes require a prescribed 
window opening area if the 
window is a designated escape 
route; and the building owner 
has cost concerns. 
Ideally, an owner would want 
100 percent of the glazed area to 
provide the design protection 
level against the postulated 
explosive threat (design basis 
threat weapon size at the 
expected stand-off distance). 
However, economics and 
geometry may allow 80 percent 
to 90 percent due to the 
statistical differences in the 
manufacturing process for glass 
or the angle of incidence of the 
blast wave upon upper story 
windows (4th floor and higher). 
Reference: GSA PBS-P100 
Window curtain walls have 
almost 100 percent glazing or 
windows per structural bay 
(the distance between two 
exterior columns). Most of 
the glazing is optical, but the 
glazing that covers the 
structural components above 
the lower drop ceiling to the 
floor above is called spandrel 
glass. 
Fenster is German for 
window. 
The framing of window 
curtain walls is weaker that 
can be designed for windows 
connected to more substantial 
wall material. Recent testing 
shows that window curtain 
walls can be hardened and, 
with their inherent flexibility, 
can survive higher blast 
loadings. 
The strongest glass in the 
building is 3/8-inch thermally 
tempered on the first three 
floors. The remaining glass is 
-inch or 3/8-inch annealed 
double strength. All glass is 
single pane without any other 
hardening. 
6 Mechanical Systems (HVAC and CBR) 
6.1 Where are the air intakes 
and exhaust louvers for 
the building? 
(low, high, or midpoint 
Air intakes should be located on 
the roof or as high as possible. 
Otherwise secure within 
CPTED-compliant fencing or 
enclosure. The fencing or 
The air used to heat and cool 
the HazardCorp Building is 
filtered in the various 
mechanical rooms using 
standard industrial grade 


Section Vulnerability Question Guidance Observations 
of the building structure) 
Are the intakes and 
exhausts accessible to the 
public? 
enclosure should have a sloped 
roof to prevent the throwing of 
anything into the enclosure near 
the intakes. 
Reference: GSA PBS-P100 states 
that air intakes should be on the 
fourth floor or higher and, on 
buildings with three floors or 
less, they should be on the roof 
or as high as practical. Locating 
intakes high on a wall is 
preferred over a roof location. 
Reference: DoD UFC 4-010-01 
states that, for all new inhabited 
buildings covered by FEMA 426, 
all air intakes should be located 
at least 3 meters (10 feet) above 
the ground. 
Reference: CDC/NIOSH, Pub 
2002-139 states: An extension 
height of 12 feet (3.7 m) will 
place the intake out of reach of 
individuals without some 
assistance. Also, the entrance to 
the intake should be covered 
with a sloped metal mesh to 
reduce the threat of objects being 
tossed into the intake. A 
minimum slope of 45 is 
generally adequate. Extension 
height should be increased 
where existing platforms or 
building features (i.e., loading 
docks, retaining walls) might 
provide access to the outdoor air 
intakes. 
Reference: LBNL Pub 51959: 
Exhausts are also a concern 
during an outdoor release, 
especially if exhaust fans are not 
in continuous operation, due to 
wind effects and chimney effects 
(air movement due to differential 
temperature). 
MERV 8 filters. Outside 
make-up air is brought in 
through vents in the wall 
located at the associated 
mechanical room floor, with 
the lowest vent being on the 4th 
floor. The main mechanical 
rooms are located on the 26th, 
49th, and 50th floors. 
Screened exhaust ducts are 
located at the mechanical floor 
level or are extended to the 
roof. 
Thus, the intakes and exhausts 
are not accessible to the public. 
6.3 Are there multiple air 
intake locations? 
Single air intakes may feed 
several air handling units. 
Indicate if the air intakes are 
localized or separated. Installing 
low-leakage dampers is one way 
There are multiple air intake 
locations  one or more on 
every mechanical floor and 
other additional smaller units 
on other floors. 


Section Vulnerability Question Guidance Observations 
to provide the system separation 
when necessary. 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department 
of Veterans Affairs Facilities 
6.4 What are the types of air 
filtration? Include the 
efficiency and number of 
filter modules for each of 
the main air handling 
systems. 
Is there any collective 
protection for chemical, 
biological, and 
radiological 
contamination designed 
into the building? 
MERV  Minimum Efficiency 
Reporting Value 
HEPA  High Efficiency 
Particulate Air 
Activated charcoal for gases 
Ultraviolet C for biologicals 
Consider mix of approaches for 
optimum protection and cost-
effectiveness. 
Reference: CDC/NIOSH Pub 
2002-139 
The air used to heat and cool 
the HazardCorp Building is 
filtered in the various 
mechanical rooms using 
standard industrial grade 
MERV 8 filters. 
There is no CBR protection 
designed into the building. 
6.5 Is there space for larger 
filter assemblies on 
critical air handling 
systems? 
Air handling units serving 
critical functions during 
continued operation may be 
retrofitted to provide enhanced 
protection during emergencies. 
However, upgraded filtration 
may have negative effects upon 
the overall air handling system 
operation, such as increased 
pressure drop. 
Reference: CDC/NIOSH, Pub 
2002-139 
The ductwork for return air 
from conditioned spaces has 
sufficient room inside the 
ductwork and mechanical 
room area for equipment under 
control of Building 
Management to incorporate 
additional filters and 
equipment. HVAC systems 
within tenant spaces usually 
have much less space for 
making changes 
6.8 How are the air handling 
systems zoned? 
What areas and functions 
do each of the primary 
air handling systems 
serve? 
Understanding the critical areas 
of the building that must 
continue functioning focuses 
security and hazard mitigation 
measures. 
Applying HVAC zones that 
Isolate lobbies, mailrooms, 
loading docks, and other entry 
and storage areas from the rest 
of the building HVAC zones and 
maintaining negative pressure 
within these areas will contain 
CBR releases. Identify common 
return systems that service more 
than one zone, effectively 
making a large single zone. 
A zoned, smoke control system 
is provided in the building. 
This system is designed to 
pressurize the floors above and 
below the floor of alarm and 
exhaust the floor of alarm to 
limit smoke and heat spread. 
Thus, the building is separated 
into many zones that can be 
controlled independently. 
The mailroom is the only part 
of the building designed as a 
separate zone during its 
renovation. 
The egress stairwells were built 


Section Vulnerability Question Guidance Observations 
Conversely, emergency egress 
routes should receive positive 
pressurization to ensure 
contamination does not hinder 
egress. Consider filtering of the 
pressurization air. 
Reference: CDC/NIOSH, Pub 
2002-139 and LBNL PUB 51959 
of fire-rated construction using 
gypsum wall board and are 
pressurized to keep smoke out 
of the stairwells during a fire 
per local building code. 
6.14 Where are the building 
automation control 
centers and cabinets 
located? 
Are they in secure areas? 
How is the control wiring 
routed? 
Access to any component of the 
building automation and control 
system could compromise the 
functioning of the system, 
increasing vulnerability to a 
hazard or precluding their proper 
operation during a hazard 
incident. 
The HVAC and exhaust system 
controls should be in a secure 
area that allows rapid shutdown 
or other activation based upon 
location and type of attack. 
Reference: FEMA 386-7, DOC 
CIAO Vulnerability Assessment 
Framework 1.1, and LBNL PUB 
51959 
Building Management has 
SCADA (Supervisory Control 
and Data Acquisition), EMCS 
(Energy Management and 
Control System), and Building 
Security systems coordinated 
with the tenants needs and the 
building overall. Note that the 
Building Management Systems 
are connected to the internet 
for alarms / monitoring / 
adjustment by 
engineering/security personnel 
from home. Building 
Management is collocated with 
the Building Security Center / 
Fire Control Center. 
Administration, electrical, and 
utilities, along with the utility 
risers have controlled access, 
either key lock, electronic lock 
using proximity card, and/or 
balanced magnetic switch with 
fixed Black and White CCTV 
(Closed Circuit Television) 
coverage. 
More that one vertical 
riser/pipe chase is used to run 
any system. 
7 Plumbing and Gas Systems 
7.1 What is the method of 
water distribution? 
Central shaft locations for piping 
are more vulnerable than 
multiple riser locations. 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities 
The primary water supply is 
provided by a dedicated fire 
yard main looped around the 
complex. This main is 
supplied directly from the 
municipal water supply. 
There are water tanks on each 
mechanical floor (4th, 26th, and 


Section Vulnerability Question Guidance Observations 
50th). The tanks are 2,000 
gallons for potable water and 
3,000 gallons for sprinkler 
systems. There are two water 
service lines, one coming into 
the building from the west side 
and one coming from the south 
(under the loading dock). 
Electric pumps at various 
levels pump water from the 
street level to the tanks for 
distribution throughout the 
building. 
The white blocks in the core of 
Figure 9 contain the toilets, air 
conditioning ducts, and risers 
for electrical, telecom, 
computer, fire protection, and 
plumbing unless indicated 
elsewhere. 
7.3 Is there redundancy to 
the main piping 
distribution? 
Looping of piping and use of 
section valves provide 
redundancies in the event 
sections of the system are 
damaged. 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities 
7.4 What is the method of 
heating domestic water? 
What fuel(s) is used? 
Single source of hot water with 
one fuel source is more 
vulnerable than multiple sources 
and multiple fuel types. 
Domestic hot water availability 
is an operational concern for 
many building occupancies. 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities 
8 Electrical Systems 
8.1 Are there any 
transformers or 
switchgears located 
outside the building or 
accessible from the 
building exterior? 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department 
of Veterans Affairs Facilities 
Only electrical service 
entrances are accessible in the 
underground parking levels, 
vulnerable to public access, 
and not secured. 
Once inside the building, all 
transformers and equipment 


Section Vulnerability Question Guidance Observations 
Are they vulnerable to 
public access? 
Are they secured? 
are not accessible, have limited 
vulnerability, and are secure. 
8.3 How are the electrical 
rooms secured and where 
are they located relative 
to other higher risk areas, 
starting with the main 
electrical distribution 
room at the service 
entrance? 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities 
Administration, electrical, and 
utilities, along with the utility 
risers have controlled access, 
either key lock, electronic lock 
using proximity card, and/or 
balanced magnetic switch with 
fixed Black and White CCTV 
(Closed Circuit Television) 
coverage. 
There are two service 
entrances to transformers on 
the 4th floor. The electrical 
utility room on the first floor 
is the most vulnerable 
component as it is on an 
exterior wall with little standoff. 
8.4 Are critical electrical 
systems collocated with 
other building systems? 
Are critical electrical 
systems located in areas 
outside of secured 
electrical areas? 
Is security system wiring 
located separately from 
electrical and other 
service systems? 
Collocation concerns include 
rooms, ceilings, raceways, 
conduits, panels, and risers. 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department 
of Veterans Affairs Facilities 
While there is some 
collocation of critical 
electrical systems, such as 
backup generators and 
automatic transfer switches, 
there has been an effort to 
provide multiple paths in 
separate risers to provide some 
level of redundancy. 
The same can be said for 
security system wiring which 
may also run in risers with 
other utility systems. 
8.6 Does emergency backup 
power exist for all areas 
within the building or for 
critical areas only? 
How is the emergency 
power distributed? 
Is the emergency power 
system independent from 
There should be no single 
critical node that allows both the 
normal electrical service and the 
emergency backup power to be 
affected by a single incident. 
Automatic transfer switches and 
interconnecting switchgear are 
the initial concerns. 
Emergency and normal electrical 
equipment should be installed 
separately, at different locations, 
Building Management 
provides backup generator and 
systems for life-safety code 
requirements. Tenants provide 
their own backup generator for 
their critical needs. Thus, 
critical loads are only 
supplied, not the whole 
building. 
Emergency power has 
generators distributed 


Section Vulnerability Question Guidance Observations 
the normal electrical 
service, particularly in 
critical areas? 
and as far apart as possible. 
Reference: GSA PBS-P100 
throughout the building on 
various floors to support those 
tenants that need backup 
power. A fairly good job has 
been done to make the 
emergency power system 
independent of the normal 
electrical service wherever 
possible. 
The weakest link in the 
emergency power system is 
the fuel distribution system 
based upon the location of 
tanks relative to generation 
and how the fuel is supplied or 
replenished. 
9 Fire Alarm Systems 
9.1 Is the building fire alarm 
system centralized or 
localized? 
How are alarms made 
known, both locally and 
centrally? 
Are critical documents 
and control systems 
located in a secure yet 
accessible location? 
Fire alarm systems must first 
warn building occupants to 
evacuate for life safety. Then 
they must inform the responding 
agency to dispatch fire 
equipment and personnel. 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department 
of Veterans Affairs Facilities 
The building fire alarm system 
is centralized with a Fire 
Control Center collocated with 
Building Security. 
Monitoring of the fire-alarm 
control panel for the building 
is provided independently at a 
central station. 
There is also a Fire Watch 
phone in each stairwell on 
each floor that provides 
communications with the 
Building Security Office/Fire 
Control Center. It is a copper 
wire system powered from the 
Fire Control Center that 
provides a backup to other 
communications for the trained 
Fire Watch personnel on each 
floor. 
As with other systems, the fire 
alarm systems are accessible 
where needed or secure where 
necessary. 
Critical documents are the 
responsibility of respective 
tenants or Building 
Management as appropriate. 


Section Vulnerability Question Guidance Observations 
9.2 Where are the fire alarm 
panels located? 
Do they allow access to 
unauthorized personnel? 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department 
of Veterans Affairs Facilities 
The Fire Control Center in the 
Administration area of the first 
floor is where the fire alarm 
panels are located. 
The Administration area is 
under access control. 
9.3 Is the fire alarm system 
standalone or integrated 
with other functions such 
as security and 
environmental or building 
management systems? 
What is the interface? 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department 
of Veterans Affairs Facilities 
The fire alarm system is 
standalone and separate from 
other systems. Note that most 
other building management 
systems have internet 
connections for convenience. 
9.5 Is there redundant off-
premises fire alarm 
reporting? 
Fire alarms can ring at a fire 
station, at an intermediary alarm 
monitoring center, or autodial 
someone else. See Items 5.21 
and 10.5 of the checklist. 
Yes, monitoring of the fire-
alarm control panel for the 
building is provided 
independently at a central 
station. 
10 Communications and IT Systems 
10.1 Where is the main 
telephone distribution 
room and where is it in 
relation to higher-risk 
areas? 
Is the main telephone 
distribution room secure? 
One can expect to find voice, 
data, signal, and alarm systems 
to be routed through the main 
telephone distribution room. 
Reference: FEMA 386-7 
Each tenant and Building 
Management have different 
voice telecommunication 
providers. Some tenants use 
VOIP (Voice Over Internet 
Protocol) voice providers and 
others use separate copper or 
fiber service to analog or 
digital telephone service 
providers. One tenant has a 
satellite communications dish 
that has two voice circuits built 
in for trouble shooting satellite 
connectivity. 
There are multiple telephone 
service entrances (3 total) and 
each tenant has a separate 
telephone distribution room. 
Telecommunications has same 
security and access control 
throughout building as other 
utilities. 


Section Vulnerability Question Guidance Observations 
10.2 Does the telephone 
system have an UPS 
(uninterruptible power 
supply)? -- What is its 
type, power rating, 
operational duration 
under load, and location? 
(battery, on-line, filtered) 
Many telephone systems are 
now computerized and need an 
UPS to ensure reliability during 
power fluctuations. The UPS is 
also needed to await any 
emergency power coming on 
line or allow orderly shutdown. 
Reference: DOC CIAO 
Vulnerability Assessment 
Framework 1.1 
Building Management uses 
VOIP as their main voice 
telecom service and ensures 
there are Uninterruptible 
Power Supplies (UPS) on all 
powered connection points 
and that these points are also 
on backup generator power. 
The tenants have their own 
systems that may or may not 
have UPS installed. 
10.5 Are there redundant 
communications systems 
available? 
Critical areas should be supplied 
with multiple or redundant 
means of communications. 
Power outage phones can 
provide redundancy as they 
connect directly to the local 
commercial telephone switch off 
site and not through the building 
telephone switch in the main 
telephone distribution room. 
A base radio communication 
system with antenna can be 
installed in stairwells, and 
portable sets distributed to 
floors. 
References: GSA PBS-P100 and 
FEMA 386-7 
Each tenant and Building 
Management has different 
voice telecommunication 
providers. Some tenants use 
VOIP (Voice Over Internet 
Protocol) voice providers and 
others use separate copper or 
fiber service to analog or 
digital telephone service 
providers. One tenant has a 
satellite communications dish 
that has two voice circuits 
built in for trouble shooting 
satellite connectivity. 
Building Management uses 
VOIP as their main voice 
telecom service and ensures 
there are Uninterruptible 
Power Supplies (UPS) on all 
powered connection points 
and that these points are also 
on backup generator power. 
The Building Security 
Office/Fire Control Center on 
the first floor has a red 
phone copper landline 
connection to a telephone 
central office as backup 
communications to the VOIP. 
Certain tenants also use this 
system as backup. 
Cell phones work in various 
portions of the building. 
There are repeaters for 
Building Securitys handheld 
radios positioned throughout 
the building to ensure coverage 
in any location for use by 


Section Vulnerability Question Guidance Observations 
security and maintenance 
personnel. The Building 
Security Office has spare 
radios to issue as necessary. 
The repeaters are on UPS and 
connected to backup generator 
power. The repeaters also 
support the fire department and 
police department hand held 
frequencies for both 
transmission and reception. 
These frequencies are tested by 
respective department 
personnel once a quarter. 
10.15 Is there a mass 
notification system that 
reaches all building 
occupants? 
(public address, pager, 
cell phone, computer 
override, etc.) 
Will one or more of these 
systems be operational 
under hazard conditions? 
(UPS, emergency power) 
Depending upon building size, a 
mass notification system will 
provide warning and alert 
information, along with actions 
to take before and after an 
incident if there is redundancy 
and power. 
Reference: DoD UFC 4-010-01 
Speakers for voice evacuation 
announcements are located 
throughout the building and 
are activated manually at the 
Fire Control Center (FCC). 
10.16 Do control centers and 
their designated alternate 
locations have equivalent 
or reduced capability for 
voice, data, mass 
notification, etc.? 
(emergency operations, 
security, fire alarms, 
building automation) 
Do the alternate locations 
also have access to 
backup systems, 
including emergency 
power? 
Reference: GSA PBS-P100 The Building Security Center, 
Fire Control Center, and 
Building Management Control 
Center are all collocated in the 
Administration area on the first 
floor. There is no backup 
location. 


Section Vulnerability Question Guidance Observations 
11 Equipment Operations and Maintenance 
11.7 Are backup power 
systems periodically 
tested under load? 
Loading should be at or above 
maximum connected load to 
ensure available capacity and 
automatic sensors should be 
tested at least once per year. -- 
Periodically (once a year as a 
minimum) check the duration of 
capacity of backup systems by 
running them for the expected 
emergency duration or 
estimating operational duration 
through fuel consumption, water 
consumption, or voltage loss. 
Reference: FEMA 386-7 
Testing of generators is done 
by each respective tenant for 
their systems. The Building 
Management generators are 
run once every three months 
for 2 hours, exercising all 
components of the system 
under near maximum load 
conditions. If the 2 hour test 
fails, then repairs are made 
and another test is coordinated 
within 2 weeks and so on until 
the system runs successfully 
for 2 hours. 
Uninterruptible Power 
Supplies for tenant data 
computer systems are varied 
based upon the needs of the 
tenants and the available space 
in their rented area. Capacity 
varies from 10 minutes to 2 
hours. Actual testing to 
confirm these capacities is 
unknown. 
In addition to the emergency 
generators, the existing 
uninterruptible power supply 
(UPS) provides 4 hours of full 
operation for the fire alarm 
system and 212 hours of 
standby operation. 
Again, testing to confirm these 
durations is unknown. 
11.8 Is stairway and exit sign 
lighting operational? 
The maintenance program for 
stairway and exit sign lighting 
(all egress lighting) should 
ensure functioning under normal 
and emergency power 
conditions. 
Expect building codes to be 
updated as emergency egress 
lighting is moved from upper 
walls and over doorways to floor 
level as heat and smoke drive 
occupants to crawl along the 
floor to get out of the building. 
Emergency power generators 
are located on various levels 
and provide back-up power for 
emergency lighting in 
corridors and stairwells. 
Emergency lighting units in 
the exit stairwells, elevator 
lobbies and elevator cabs are 
equipped with individual 
backup batteries. 
Battery operated emergency 
lighting is provided in the 
stairwells and photo-


Section Vulnerability Question Guidance Observations 
Signs and lights mounted high 
have limited or no benefit when 
obscured. 
Reference: FEMA 386-7 
luminescent paint is placed on 
the edge of the stair treads to 
facilitate emergency exits. In 
addition to the battery-
powered lighting, the stairs 
also have emergency system 
lighting powered by the 
generators. 
While installed, there is no 
indication that these systems 
are on a maintenance program 
or that they are tested 
periodically. 
13 Security Master Plan 
13.1 Does a written security 
plan exist for this site or 
building? 
When was the initial 
security plan written and 
last revised? 
Who is responsible for 
preparing and reviewing 
the security plan? 
The development and 
implementation of a security 
master plan provides a roadmap 
that outlines the strategic 
direction and vision, operational, 
managerial, and technological 
mission, goals, and objectives of 
the organizations security 
program. 
Reference: DOC CIAO 
Vulnerability Assessment 
Framework 1.1 
The HazardCorp Building has 
a Building Security 
Committee made up of 
security representatives from 
each tenant. Building 
Management heads this 
committee with the Building 
Security Chief as the 
chairman. The committee 
coordinates the specific and 
general security needs of the 
tenants with each other and for 
the building as a whole. 
The Building Security 
Committee maintains the fire 
evacuation and response plan 
for the building, coordinated 
with the fire evacuation and 
response plan for each tenant. 


Building Design Mitigation Measures 
(Urban Version) 

Asset-Threat/Hazard 
Pair 
Current Risk 
Rating 
Suggested Mitigation 
Measure 
Revised Risk 
Rating 
1. Envelope Systems / 
Vehicle Bomb 
High Harden windows and 
window curtain wall framing 
after blast analysis 
Medium 
2. Structural Systems / 
Vehicle Bomb 
High Harden atrium columns and 
use architectural stand-off to 
add protection. Harden 
underground parking 
columns and control access 
to underground parking 
under the building to tenants 
only. 
Medium 
3. Mechanical Systems / 
CBR Attack 
(Chemical) 
High Upgrade filters to MERV 11 
or 2 stage filters with HEPA 
as second filter. Add sensors 
to switch in activated 
charcoal filters. Consider on 
critical floors. 
Medium 
4. Mechanical Systems / 
CBR Attack 
(Mechanical) 
High Add UVGI to HVAC system 
on critical floors 
Medium 
5. Mechanical Systems / 
CBR Attack 
(Radiological) 
Medium Upgrade filters to MERV 11 
or 2 stage filters with HEPA 
as second filter 
Low