UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD
WASHINGTON, D.C.

**********************************************************
IN THE MATTER OF THE INVESTIGATION OF      *
AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC., FLIGHT 1420,      *	Docket Number
McDONNELL DOUGLAS MD-82, N215AA            *	SA-519
LITTLE ROCK, ARKANSAS, JUNE 1, 1999        *
***********************************************************

Arkansas Excelsior Hotel
Bill Clinton Ballroom
Three Statehouse Plaza
Little Rock, Arkansas  72201

Thursday, January 27, 2000
8:30 a.m.

Board of Inquiry

		HONORABLE JIM HALL, Chairman
		Board of Inquiry

		THOMAS HAUETER, Deputy Director
		Office of Aviation Safety

		JOHN CLARK, Deputy Director
		Office of Research and Engineering

		BARRY SWEEDLER, Director
		Office of Safety Recommendations and
		Accomplishments

		BEN BERMAN, Hearing Officer
		Office of Aviation Safety


Technical Panel

		GREGORY SALOTTOLO
		GREGORY FEITH
		EVAN BYRNE
		MARK GEORGE
		CHARLES PEREIRA
		LAWRENCE ROMAN
		DAVID TEW
		DONALD EICK


Public Information Officer

		PAUL SCHLAMM
		Office of Public Affairs
		Washington, D.C.

Parties to the Hearing

		LYLE STREETER, Air Safety Investigator
		Accident Investigation Division, AAI-100
		Federal Aviation Administration

		RONALD J. HINDERBERGER, Director
		Airplane Safety
		Boeing Commercial Airplane Group

		ROBERT W. BAKER, Vice Chairman
		American Airlines, Inc.

		CAPTAIN CHRIS D. ZWINGLE
		Special Assistant to Chairman
		National Safety and Training Committee
		Allied Pilots Association

		KATHY LORD-JONES
		National Safety Coordinator
		Association of Professional Flight Attendants

		ROBERT KUESSNER
		National Weather Service

		DEBORAH H. SCHWARTZ, A.A.E.
		Airport Manager
		Little Rock National Airport

		J.T. CANTRELL, Training Chief
		Little Rock Fire Department


I N D E X

WITNESS:								PAGE:

Operations

David C. Gilliom, Manager						 374
Flight Standards Division - Western Pacific Region
	Interview by David Tew

Robert Baker, Vice Chairman					 443
American Airlines
	Interview by Evan Byrne/Gregory Feith

Meteorology

George Wilken, Science and Operations Officer		 542
National Weather Service
North Little Rock Forecast Office
	Interview by Donald Eick

Dr. Wes Wilson							 516
MIT Lincoln Labs
	Interview by Donald Eick

Dale A. Rhoda							 677
	MIT Lincoln Labs
	Interview by Donald Eick

Rainer Dombrowsky, Chief						 729
Surface Observation Branch
National Weather Service, Headquarters






P R O C E E D I N G S
									8:30 a.m.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  We will reconvene this public hearing 
of the National Transportation Safety Board.  This hearing is being 
held in connection with the Accident Investigation involving American 
Airlines Flight 1420, a McDonnell Douglas MD-82, Registration 
N215AA, that had an accident here in Little Rock on June 1, 1999.
		I would ask our hearing officer, Mr. Berman, if he would 
call the next witness.
		MR. BERMAN:  I call Mr. David C. Gilliom.
Whereupon,
DAVID C. GILLIOM
having been first duly affirmed, was called as a witness herein and 
was examined and testified as follows:
INTERVIEW BY BOARD OF INQUIRY
		BY MR. BERMAN:
	Q	Good morning, sir.  Would you please state your full 
name and business address for the record?
I'm sorry.  Flip the switch on your mike.
		MR. BERMAN:  Stand by one second.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  We've got assistance coming here.
		MR. BERMAN:  Go ahead.
		THE WITNESS:  Thanks.  I'm David C. Gilliom.  I work for 
the Federal Aviation Administration, and my business address is the 
Western Pacific Regional Office in Los Angeles, California.
		MR. BERMAN:  Thank you.
		BY MR. BERMAN:
	Q	And what is your -- your present position at the Federal 
Aviation Administration?
	A	I'm the Manager of the Flight Standards Division for the 
Western Pacific Region.
	Q	How long have you held that position?
	A	For eight years.
	Q	Would you please describe your duties and 
responsibilities as Manager of Flight Standards Division?
	A	Yes.  I would first distinguish -- excuse me -- that the 
field divisions are responsible for the operational aspects of our 
programs, and I bring that out because it's obviously distinct from 
what's done in Washington, which is the policy and rulemaking piece 
of it.
		So, as an implementing body, I oversee the functions of 
17 field offices, and I ensure that those offices comply with internal 
guidance, and that the resources that are distributed in my region 
are used in accordance with agency priorities.
		I'd also point out that I chair a national committee.  So, 
this is slightly different from the implementing role, and that 
committee has provided sponsorship of the ATOS System.
	Q	Thank you.  And could you please summarize your 
education, training and experience that you used to qualify for your 
position?
	A	I've been in aviation for 32 years, with the FAA for 22 
years.  I have a military background, a concurrent career, with the 
Air Force, 25 years on active duty and as a reservist, hold an airline 
transport pilot certificate with 727-737 ratings, although I haven't 
been an active pilot for eight years.
		I also have a Master's degree in Business 
Administration.
	Q	Thank you very much.
		MR. BERMAN:  Go ahead, Captain Tew.
INTERVIEW BY TECHNICAL PANEL
		BY MR. TEW:
	Q	Good morning, Mr. Gilliom.
	A	Good morning.
	Q	Could you tell us what your role was in the development 
of ATOS?
	A	Yes.  I have participated in the development of ATOS 
since its inception, primarily in the oversight of the activities that 
occurred to develop the nuts and bolts of the system.
		I was involved with the 90-day safety review in 1996.  
Some of the recommendations that came from that review led to our 
internal look that eventually led to the decision that we needed to 
move forward from where we were in relation to our regulatory 
oversight systems.
		MR. TEW:  Okay.  For the audience's benefit, I should 
point out, we did yesterday, we'll do it again today, ATOS is the FAA's 
Air Transportation Oversight System.  It's the new oversight system 
that is in place, and that's what we're discussing when we say ATOS.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  And it might help the audience if we 
had an explanation of what precipitated the 90-day review in 1996, 
you know, and your look at the system.
		THE WITNESS:  The 90-day safety review was directed 
by at that time Administrator Hensen following the ValuJet accident, 
in which Flight Standards was under certainly some scrutiny 
regarding its current oversight system, and as a result of that review, 
there -- which was quite brief.  It was advertised as a 90-day review.  
Actually, the primary work took place in about 45 days.  So, it was 
very compressed and obviously not enough time to do a thorough 
system development.
		But as a result of that review, there were several 
recommendations that involved changes to the oversight of Flight 
Standards, and also changes within our own internal systems.  It was 
an opportunity to look inward, to make sure that our own safety 
culture was an adequate one to support the activities that we're 
responsible for.
		Many of those recommendations were further developed 
as we worked with Sandia National Laboratory subsequent to the 
review to develop the Air Transportation Oversight System.
		We chose Sandia as a consultant because of their 
eminent expertise in the systems safety arena.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Not because of the weather?
		THE WITNESS:  Well, obviously not because of the 
weather.  That's correct.
		BY MR. TEW:
	Q	Could you tell us how much ATOS has cost to develop?
	A	How much it has cost?
	Q	Yes.
	A	Oh, I don't have precise figures in terms of developing a 
system of its magnitude.  The actual nuts and bolts of it have not 
been that expensive in terms of -- of buying outside consultancy help 
and facilitation help and documentation help, the kinds of things that 
the agency's not prepared to do internally.
		Much of the manpower to develop it came from our own 
resources.  In fact, the subject matter experts that we used were, for 
the most part, line inspectors.  We wanted to use their expertise in 
developing the new system.
		So, I can give you a rough estimate.  I would guess from 
1996 to '98, which is the initial development period, we spent 
roughly $2 million on development costs outside of our own internal 
investment, and again I'm talking about the costs of salaries for the 
people who were involved with the development and travel.  
		But money that was spent on contractors, in the 
neighborhood of $2 million, and we still have expenditures on-going 
because there's extensive development continuing with ATOS as -- as 
we further develop the sophistication of the system.
	Q	Was the ATOS System intended to replace the old PTRS 
System?
	A	It definitely is intended to replace that system for Part 
121 air transportation air carriers.  It's not implemented to that 
extent.  I'm not sure if it's been made clear that the system has only 
been implemented for 10 existing carriers.
		There's still a 140 121 air carriers that are operating 
under the National Program Guidelines and PTRS.
	Q	At these 10 carriers, did the PTRS System stop when 
ATOS was implemented or is still being run in parallel?
	A	It stopped to the extent that we use PTRS to record 
surveillance activities.  There are still certificate management 
functions that occur that are reported through the PTRS activity, and 
I would say that there has been some transitional problems in terms 
of inspectors getting used to the new system.
		So, some functions that are borderline between 
certificate management and surveillance, and I would mention 
specifically initial operating experience, in some cases, that's still 
been entered in the PTRS Recordkeeping System.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  We might again observe for the 
individuals that are observing and keep them informed, this system 
was evaluated initially by the Board as a result of our accident that 
occurred in Miami with FineAir.  
		It was the Board's recommendation at that time that the 
system be extended from the major carriers to all the Part 121 fleet.
		THE WITNESS:  Yes, sir, and we have developed a plan 
to do that.  At this point, we're somewhat reluctant to move forward 
until we've finished complete development of some of the process 
modules in the system and also have the resources available to move 
forward.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Might finish staffing the ATOS for 
American first, and then we'll move forward.
		THE WITNESS:  Well, that's certainly an important issue, 
and staffing is -- is one of the things that this system, once it's 
developed fully, will help us be very clear about what the needs are, 
and in fact, I think much of that is in place for American today.
		There's a new Comprehensive Surveillance Plan, as was 
mentioned yesterday, that was developed just last week for 
American.  That plan is very quantifiable and should identify resource 
shortages, particularly in the geographic inspector arena, and there 
are policies and procedures to identify those needs.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Dave, I don't want to be interrupting, 
but I would ask, what was wrong with the old system?  Why do we 
need a new system?  Just simply put, what were the deficiencies that 
you found, and what are the things you're trying to give attention to 
with this new system?
		THE WITNESS:  Well, quite simply, the old system, 
which was very good and certainly established an excellent record of 
safety for the industry and FAA, had reached a plateau.  There was 
really no way to make further safety gains with it.  It was a system 
that was based on professional expertise of individual inspectors.  It 
really wasn't a system so much.  It was designed to inspect in safety.
		So, we attempted to do that by observing as many 
activities and surveillances we had resources to do.  Actually, the 
data that was produced in terms of taking actions on that data, the 
predominant actions we took were enforcements, and I believe it was 
mentioned yesterday that that approach has limited effectiveness.
		The change to the ATOS model is an effort to move away 
from a system that's totally reliant on numbers of inspectors to again 
attempt to inspect in quality to a system that is focused on data and 
risk management and uses system safety principles not only to 
develop the FAA's system but to look at the air carriers' operating 
systems to ensure that those systems also are built around good 
system safety concepts.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Wasn't it correct, David, that as a 
result of ValuJet, maybe there was a feeling that there weren't 
enough resources for -- that the major carriers basically had their 
safety act together, and that there weren't enough resources being 
expended on some of the new entrants and some of the other 
carriers?
		THE WITNESS:  That -- that is a fact.  I believe the FAA's 
situation is not different from other agencies.  We probably will never 
have all the resources that we would certainly like to have and -- and 
could use.
		Our challenge is to build systems that leverage those 
resources and allow us to do our job with --
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  What has actually happened to the 
number of inspectors over the last 10 years, to your knowledge?
		THE WITNESS:  Following the 90-day safety review in the 
ValuJet incident, we had an opportunity to substantially increase 
inspector resources.  Due to budget contingencies last year, we were 
not able to do that, and this year, I believe we will be, at least at 
present, able to replace inspectors that we lose.  But we're not in a 
growth mode, certainly.
		BY MR. TEW:
	Q	You just mentioned that you just developed -- not that 
you developed, that a Comprehensive Surveillance Plan was 
developed for American, I believe?
	A	Yes.  Actually for all 10 of the carriers under ATOS.
	Q	Okay.  During testimony yesterday, I believe that it came 
out that there was not an analyst working at American, I believe.
	A	That's correct.
	Q	And therefore the data was not being analyzed, so it 
couldn't be used in a development of this.  How -- the POI of the 
American unit said that he developed this comprehensive plan based 
on his experience, I believe.
		How can you develop an effective comprehensive plan 
for ATOS without the aid of an analyst?
	A	The experience, I believe, that was referenced yesterday 
would be in the context of experience that came from ATOS data.  
The fact is that these comprehensive surveillance plans are 
developed using very detailed tools.
		There's a system safety analysis tool and an air carrier 
analysis tool that involve extensive processes to analyze the 
conditions that -- and the environment that face a particular carrier, 
in this case American, and from that, the plan is developed.
		So, it's not done on the basis of subjective expert 
opinion as somewhat the old plan is under the National Program 
Guidelines.  This is completely different.  It's very systematic.  It's 
very detailed.
		It doesn't have to do with the analyst function.  I do have 
one illustration that actually might be helpful in pointing out how the 
system works and where analysis comes into play.  
		It might help understand while it's important to have 
analysts in these offices, we can still do what we're doing, which is an 
improved surveillance process, without the use of the analysts.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Well, now you realize if you tell 
Congress that, they'll cut all your analysts?
		THE WITNESS:  Well, I wouldn't attempt to say that this 
system is valid as a system without analysts.  We do need the 
analysts.  What is important to -- to point out is --
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  I mean I just -- I'm just asking 
because I mean either they're part of the system or they aren't part 
of the system.  As a taxpayer, I'm not interested in funding 
accessories.
		THE WITNESS:  They're a hundred percent part of the 
system, and what was said yesterday about the ability to analyze the 
data that comes from this system is limited without them.
		I would also point out, though, that -- that among the 
activities that is on-going to -- to enhance the system is further 
development in the process module that deal with the analysts.  So, 
we're working on the procedures that the analysts will use right now.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Have you got a diagram you want to 
put up?
		THE WITNESS:  Yes, I think it would be helpful.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Victor?  
		THE WITNESS:  This diagram shows the system that 
Sandia Labs helped us design, and again we used our own line 
inspectors basically to help develop this model.
		It has eight processes, and they're represented by the 
boxes, thank you, and if -- if you 
--
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Can people in the back see the 
writing?  Make it out?
		THE WITNESS:  Well, --
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  So, you might read it.
		THE WITNESS:  -- I'll read it.  You know, just beginning 
with this first box, it says, "System Configuration".  That, we would 
call a process module.  There are eight of them around the circle, 
obviously linked in a closed loop system.
		So, the first one, System Configuration, deals with the 
initial certification of operators.  It's our certification activity, and it 
also deals with how our office or how the FAA's internal structure is 
prepared to deal with a new operator.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  For the benefit of the audience, and I 
think people have grasped this, but basically -- and put the chart 
back up, Victor.  Basically, what you're talking about is how we spend 
our tax dollars through our Government to oversee the aviation safety 
system, is that correct?
		THE WITNESS:  That's correct.  When --
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  And this is a -- you know, the latest of 
how you all have put together an effective way to do that.
		THE WITNESS:  That's correct.  In fact, I would advocate 
it as such a major step forward, that it truly is the leading edge of a 
regulatory system.  So, I believe it puts us in a posture again to be 
making a world standard or setting a world standard.
		But going quickly around the system as it's designed 
and represented by this model, after initial certification, the next 
process is certificate management.  It's this process that develops 
the Comprehensive Surveillance Plan.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  And every major carrier, every Part 
121, has a certificate, right?  Is that --
		THE WITNESS:  That's correct.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  That gives them the right to --
		THE WITNESS:  That's correct.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  -- use the skyways that belong to all 
of us?
		THE WITNESS:  I believe it will be clear once I have 
described briefly this entire model, that its application to new entrant 
carriers, and again when -- when you think about how this came 
about after ValuJet, that's one of the major things we wanted to deal 
with, improved quality of our certification services, that it will be 
clear this model really is -- can be very effective, will be very effective 
for new entrants and the remaining carriers that are not under it 
today.
		In the second module, as I said, the Comprehensive 
Surveillance Plan is -- is developed.
		The third module deals with the resources required to 
carry out that surveillance.  So, this is where we're ensuring we have 
enough people, that they're properly trained, that there's enough 
money to go out and do the actual work.
		The fourth module is surveillance implementation, self-
explanatory.  It's where we carry out the Comprehensive Surveillance 
Plan.
		The fifth module deals with reporting.  This is the 
module where we have moved away from PTRS, which is basically a 
work program tracking system.  That's the old model.  This one is -- 
is in truth much improved from a PTRS activity.  It allows us to enter 
much richer data fields.
		I should point out that in surveillance implementation, 
one of the criticisms of the Board and others with which we agreed 
was that our old system did not require the extensive use of 
checklists and job aids to complete an activity.  We could call an 
activity complete no matter how rudimentary our surveillance work 
had been for that activity.
		Under the current system, there are extensive job aids 
which must be completed before either an element performance 
inspection or a safety attribute inspection can be called complete.
		The data is reported and entered in the fifth module.
		In the sixth module, evaluation.  We do something with 
the data we've never done before, and that is we evaluate it to make 
sure that it is complete and accurate, and that it meets the 
standards that we're looking for with this type of data.
		The seventh module, after the data's been validated, it's 
then analyzed to determine what it's showing us.  From the analysis, 
we are looking for root causes, trends, other things that would be of 
use to bring about changes or to confirm that in fact the carrier's 
continuing to operate in accordance with its design systems, and 
that those systems are well-designed.
		And from the analysis, then clearly there could and will 
be actions that -- that come forth, even if that action is -- is simply to 
document that we have confirmed the carrier's doing what it said it 
would do and doing it well.
		It is a closed loop system.  So, from what we've learned 
from our data collection and analysis, if there are changes that are 
required, we go right back into Module 1 to change operations 
specifications or whatever else might be required to bring about the 
necessary changes.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  And as it pertains to just American 
Airlines, the loop right now has problems that Number 3, Number 4 
and Number 7?
		THE WITNESS:  Number 3 and -- Number 3 is certainly a 
problem in that that deals with staffing issues.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Hm-hmm.
		THE WITNESS:  However, there are clearly-developed 
policies and procedures to identify those staffing needs, and I would 
expect, now that there is the first -- actually the second surveillance 
plan in place, that as resource needs are identified, that they will be 
elevated.
		Last year, I can say in my own region, Western Pacific 
Region, when the American Certificate Management Unit requested 
new inspector resources, we were able to provide those in Western 
Pacific.  I can't speak for other regions.
		So, there is a process in place to deal with the needs, 
and again if that were to happen this year, I have no doubt that I 
would be able to meet the requirements of any ATOS carrier in terms 
of surveillance needs.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  I'm just asking as an observation 
today, do we still have -- we still have some challenges --
		THE WITNESS:  Yes, sir.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  -- in 3 and 4 and 7?
		THE WITNESS:  I would say there are challenges in 
those modules.  I would also point out --
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  I'm in the position, too.  I sometimes 
don't have enough resources at the Board, and I don't like to ever 
admit I don't have enough resources in terms of being able to do the 
job.  I want to be able to say yes, we're able to do the job.
		But the truth of the matter on that situation is you got 3, 
4 and 7 for you to really have your loop closed like you want it 
closed, and you've designed it, need -- need attention.
		THE WITNESS:  That's correct.  I would also point out 
that the predominant work that has been done on this system to date 
deals with surveillance.  We are working currently on the certification 
activity.  I'm sure the Board is aware that we have a new Certification 
Standardization Evaluation Team, CSET.
		CSET is part of this model.  Its function is primarily in 
that first system configuration module.  They are using procedures in 
a much more standardized way than we have used them in the past, 
but they still predominantly are our old procedures.  
		So, we have extensive activity.  It will take time to finish 
on-going in that module now to convert or re-engineer our 
certification activity to comply with the system safety concepts.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Good.
		BY MR. TEW:
	Q	Just for clarification, the Chairman mentioned that there 
were deficiencies in three of the modules.  There's eight modules 
here in this closed loop.
		Could you tell us how many have been fully developed of 
the eight?
	A	The modules that have had the most work are all of 
those dealing with surveillance.  So, it would be 2, 3, 4 and 5.
		Now, again, the problem that we're having with Module 
3 is not so much that there aren't processes that have been 
developed; it's the ability to have full resources to carry that work 
out.
		Again, it gives us tools, I think, to better use the 
resources that we do have, but as the Chairman pointed out, and as I 
said earlier, government agencies will always be more in need of 
resources than are generally available.  
	Q	So, we really haven't achieved this closed loop yet then, 
I believe?
	A	We have not.  I think it was a valid point, for example, 
that there's not an analyst in every office.  I mentioned that that's one 
of the modules that we've done rudimentary work on.  We need to do 
much more in that module.
		When that work is completed, there will be -- the 
analysts would be better used, not to say that they couldn't function 
in the system as it's designed today, but that's clearly an area where 
there's still need.
	Q	How do you develop an analysis module in this work?  
How do you develop this without the help of the analysts?  Wouldn't 
they be an aid?
	A	We -- well, there are two ways to provide that expertise.  
We do have a function in the Headquarters organization that is 
staffed with operations research analysts.  I believe there are three or 
four analysts on board in that Headquarters staff.
		We have the one analyst hired in Southwest that gives us 
a core group of analysts as subject matter experts to use internally.  
Also, we are using contractors to help with this activity.  We're 
continuing to use Sandia to help with this activity.  All of those 
outside sources can provide expertise and in some cases an external 
input which is very important to have.  So, that's where the expertise 
would come from.
	Q	So, you're using staff analysts and then outside help?
	A	That's correct.
	Q	Is -- is -- is this effective in analyzing this data then?  
Because this is --
	A	Well, when -- when you asked me the question about 
developing the analyst module, we're -- when it comes to analyzing 
the data, which is an operational concern, we're still somewhat 
deficient in that area in that again we only have the one analyst on 
site at Southwest.
		This group in Washington has a limited capability to 
help with analysis in CMTs.  However, I think as -- as Corky Valentine 
testified yesterday, although there isn't an analyst present at 
American Airlines, clearly the data which he said was much improved 
from the PTRS data is being looked at by Corky and others.
		It is being analyzed, certainly to the extent that we 
analyze PTRS data in the old system.  So, there is a rudimentary 
activity going on in that process module.  There are actions coming 
out of that analysis.  There are changes to comprehensive 
surveillance plans in terms of targeting that are occurring.
		So, again it's a rudimentary function.  We need to take it 
much further, but -- but it is occurring, and -- and there is a 
difference between the development activity and the operational 
activity.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Well, David, as you know, they said -- 
they had told us in correspondence that this thing would be up and 
running.  Has the budget cuts -- if you hadn't had the budget cuts, 
and you'd had the staffing, would this thing be ready to take off the 
shelf now?
		THE WITNESS:  Yes, but I don't want to under-play the 
fact that -- two facts, actually.  That there's extensive work to be done 
with initial certification.  We need to develop better analytic 
procedures.  We need to develop better implementation procedures, 
and this model is designed for continuous improvement.
		One of our past mistakes is to fix --
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  That's life, though, right?
		THE WITNESS:  It is life, but -- but we, unfortunately, 
didn't learn the lesson as well as we might have in that we have 
always tried to fix it once, once fixed, keep it in place.  That's not the 
intent here.  We realize that we need to continuously revise this 
system through a continuous improvement process, and that will be 
on-going throughout the life of the system.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Good.
		THE WITNESS:  And I think we're in a much better 
posture to do that than we were with the old system, which was quite 
linear.  It was not a closed loop system.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  But the reality of the old loop system 
was that we used to have days that we -- we tried to -- we had enough 
inspectors, and the Government -- the way the Government 
approached inspecting has changed, and a lot of that's changed 
because of the realities of Government being cut as well as all the 
modern philosophy about things, in my personal -- now, that's my 
personal opinion.
		As we sit here trying to do the job of regulating an 
industry that has grown in about 10 years with essentially the same 
resources, you're put in the situation of trying to look at different 
ways of accomplishing the same goal with the same manpower.
		THE WITNESS:  That's largely true, but I would point out 
that the value of this system as it matures is that it does allow us to 
leverage resources through better targeting, and --
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  I mean the Board's on record.  We -- 
we think it's a good system.  We just want to try and get it -- the loop 
closed.
		BY MR. TEW:
	Q	You said this system was -- it was put in place.  It wasn't 
finished, and it was designed that -- to be improved as it goes along.  
But, you know, four of the eight modules, I believe, were not 
developed to start with, and none of the analysts were in place.
		Do you feel possibly that it might have been put into 
place just a little bit premature as a replacement for the PTRS 
System?
	A	Well, again, all the modules were developed to an 
extent.  Four of them were worked on more extensively than others, 
and the remaining four had rudimentary improvements.
		Even the initial certification module, which -- which we're 
re-engineering now, was substantially improved when we put the 
CSET team in place over what we had before.  So, all the modules 
were developed to an extent.  We did have a complete system.
		We did make a conscious decision to implement that 
system, knowing that there was further work needed in some of the 
modules, simply for the reason that after working on it for two years, 
and government things tend to become either another study that 
gets put on a shelf and never implemented or you move forward, we 
were very convinced that what we had done in the surveillance arena 
was a substantial improvement over what we had before, and I think 
again that came out in testimony yesterday, that the data coming 
from the system is much richer than the data that we were getting 
from the old system.
	Q	How were the airlines and industry representatives 
involved in the development of ATOS?
	A	The airlines and industry were -- were not involved to 
any great extent in the initial development of the system.  We realize 
that industry input is important.  We have sought it.  Certainly once 
the system was initially implemented, we've had meetings with ATA 
to discuss the system, to make sure it's understood, to get some 
feedback about its shortcomings from that perspective.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  You might explain, David, who ATA is.
		THE WITNESS:  The Air Transport Association, which 
represents most of the major carriers in the 121 arena.
		So, we are getting that input now, and we certainly will 
get the input as we develop the initial certification activity.
		BY MR. TEW:
	Q	You just mentioned a minute ago that you -- this is -- this 
program is the leading edge of the -- of a regulatory system -- new 
regulatory system.
		I understand that a significant number of the questions 
in the inspection reports are not based on the FARs or any regulatory 
basis.  How can you collect data and analyze data that is 
questionable or -- and non-regulatory and expect to achieve 
compliance?
	A	I don't believe the data is questionable.  I believe the 
data are legitimate areas for FAA to -- to be concerned.  The Board 
and others have pointed out that simply looking at the regulatory 
requirements for compliance falls short of what's needed to take the 
next step in safety in terms of looking at corporate cultures, safety 
attributes, a number of concepts that are standard in the safety 
business, whether it's nuclear safety or safety in airlines.  These are 
all legitimate areas for the FAA to collect data in order to target its 
resources.
		When it comes to insisting that certain changes be 
made, clearly we're limited to what we can enforce to what is written 
in our regulations.  However, that doesn't limit what we can look at 
and what we can bring to the carrier's attention as a concern.
		One of the things that's very important about this 
system, and I believe it came out to some extent yesterday, is that 
one of the action items that can occur is a system analysis team or a 
SAT that did occur with the American unit, and it would correct some 
perception that I believe existed yesterday in that regard.
		A system analysis team is not an audit team.  In fact, it 
is a team that undertakes a problem-solving activity.  It's not 
something that can be done unilaterally by FAA.  It necessarily 
involves -- requires the involvement of -- of other parties to do it 
properly.
		We can't problem-solve for American, for example, and 
in that regard, I believe that the other two activities which were 
mentioned probably were legitimate audits, as I understand, done by 
outside auditors hired by APA and by American to -- to do an audit of 
a certain function for which it wouldn't have been appropriate to 
include FAA's team members, although I do understand it's not my -- 
the certificate clearly isn't in my region.
		I do understand that there were extensive briefings from 
those audit efforts to the CMU or CMO as it occurred, but I think it is 
important certainly to distinguish again that this SAT or system 
analysis team is a problem-solving activity that looks at specific 
trend data or any set of data that may indicate a problem or a 
concern, and the attempt then is to identify that -- that risk or 
hazard, to mitigate it, eliminate it or in some way manage it, which is 
what occurred here.
		The recommendations that came out of that SAT team, I 
believe 17 of them have been implemented already by American, 
which is -- obviously without some follow-up implementation, it's not 
an effective process.  I believe that does prove that as a tool which is 
part of ATOS, there are clearly good things happening that -- that are 
making real changes.
	Q	Thank you.  Under the old system, you could put an 
airman's name into the system and check/see how many inspections 
he's had, what areas he was inspected on, and you could do the 
same thing with an N number of an airplane.  You could put it in and 
check on a particular airplane and see what oversight had been done 
on that.
		Why does the ATOS System not allow this?
	A	Well, to -- to say that it doesn't allow this, I'm not sure 
it's quite accurate, and I -- I believe that we -- we still are capable of 
deriving from the system inspection work that we have done involving 
a particular aircraft or a particular airman.
		But I would point out again that we're trying to move 
away from this technology that won't take us any further in terms of 
looking at individual pieces of the system for a quality control-type 
activity, that -- for example, it was mentioned perhaps nobody's 
looking at every piece of American's system wherever they operate.
		Well, that -- that well might be true, and we do that with 
some confidence.  If we're sure that American's system was properly 
designed, and by what we have looked at, that American is 
complying or continuing to -- to operate with what was designed 
initially as it was designed.  In other words, they're keeping integrity 
in their systems.
		So, we may not have to look at every airman or every 
check airman or every facility in order to have confidence that the 
system that American designed and is -- is practicing is in fact being 
carried out the way it was designed.
	Q	Thank you.  I understand that inspectors are having 
difficulty in interpreting the safety attribute inspections and the 
element performance inspection questions, and in fact, inspectors 
are responding differently to the same questions.
		If this is so, how do you achieve quality data, and how 
do you achieve standardization?
	A	Through lessons learned, and again this is a continuing 
improvement process.  We did implement ATOS, and since 
implementing it, we've -- we've learned several things about 
shortcomings in the initial training and the design of the initial 
questionnaires and checklists that we're using.
		We have revamped and redesigned both the training 
program and the checklist for EPIs, and we intend -- and -- and the 
procedures as well.  We intend to conduct seminars in the near 
future with all of the CMTs, the complete units, all the inspectors 
involved, in other words, to ensure that there's an understanding of 
how to use those new tools.  So, we're moving forward in all the 
areas you mentioned.
	Q	Okay.  Under the -- the General Accounting Office did an 
audit, and they mentioned in there that the training was ineffective.  
Is this what you're saying?  
	A	That's correct.  In fact, the training that was offered was 
developed and provided in a fairly special environment in order to 
quickly train the inspectors that would be involved with these 10 
carriers or the initial cadre.
		Since that time, the training has been moved to our 
Academy in Oklahoma City, where it's now resident, and there's been 
several -- there have been several changes made to the curriculum.
		My understanding from talking to our people who have 
come through that new program is that it's a very good course.
	Q	Also according to the same GAO report, the guidance for 
planning and performing inspections was not very effective.  Has this 
guidance been reviewed and improved?
	A	The -- yes is the answer.  The -- the job aids that are 
being used to do element performance inspections have been 
revamped, field tested, and they are ready now for implementation.  
That should occur within the next month or so.
		There was a decision made that the guidance used on 
the safety attribute inspection is adequate, but there's further 
explanation needed in terms of how to apply it, and that will be 
accomplished through the seminars that I mentioned previously.
	Q	Under the ATOS Program, since the inspections are kind 
of specifically targeted, what method is there for identifying and 
reporting problems or areas of concern?
	A	The -- there are two methods actually.  Because these 
inspections are very detailed, they take time, and our reporting 
process is -- is one that allows entry of data as the inspection is on-
going.
		Initially, CMUs, certificate management inspectors, 
could not access that data easily.  That's another correction that 
we've made.  So that as an inspection activity is on-going, the -- the 
information is now available to our principal inspectors.
		At the same time, we believe that with this concept, 
there is the capability for much improved communications between 
the geographic inspectors and principal inspectors.  The good old 
phone still is -- is a -- is a very usable system.
		Now that we don't have a 190 geographic inspectors 
doing generic work on American Airlines but rather have a much 
smaller team, working almost full time on American, it's easier for 
that team to communicate to the principals when they find 
immediate problems that need attention.
	Q	Once again referring to the GAO report, could you 
explain why an airline's screening, boarding and cabin briefing 
procedures are given more weight than cockpit procedures in 
determining the number of inspections that an ATOS team is to 
conduct?
	A	I'm not sure that I would agree that they're given more 
weight than those other factors at all.  In fact, I believe the CMT has 
a great deal of latitude on where to place its emphasis.
		It could be for any given carrier, if the data show that 
the training and cockpit procedures are being adequately executed 
as designed, but cabin safety procedures are not, that we would 
focus our resources in those areas, but there is flexibility 
intentionally built into the system, and targeting is to occur based on 
the data that we're deriving from the system.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  How does the system deal with that 
manual situation, where the manufacturer makes the change and half 
of your major carriers implement it and the other half don't?  Do you 
all communicate on that and try to -- is there any policy or --
		THE WITNESS:  There are -- there are things that the 
system can do to deal with that issue.  I would point out, outside of 
ATOS, that the agency recently has made available through a web 
site all changes of that nature, changes to AFMs and bulletins from 
manufacturers, and we've sent instructions not just to ATOS 
principals but to all of our principals telling them to check that web 
site in order to determine whether there are applicable changes that 
are recent, and, if so, to take those changes to the operator to ensure 
that the operator's aware of them.
		We still have some work to do in that area.  Again, 
because this is a closed loop system, when we find those kinds of 
problems with one carrier -- one of the modules that I didn't point 
out, it's a ninth module on the schematic that I displayed, is the 
policy module.  That's really the headquarters work function.
		But the system allows us to -- to insist actually that we 
provide feedback to that policy group when there are problems that 
need dissemination to a broader audience or that need the attention 
that only the policy group can deal with.
		So, again, I think that the system is in place.  It's a 
matter of refining it and making it work to our advantage.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  And under ATOS, how are you going 
to evaluate training and oversee training?
		THE WITNESS:  Carrier training?
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Carrier training, yeah.
		THE WITNESS:  The -- the system is -- is designed to do 
inspections in 88 different elements of air carrier systems.  The 
system has defined some generic air carrier systems as part of the 
model.  There's seven air carrier systems that we're looking at, 14 
subsystems, 88 system elements.
		We do element performance inspections in each of those 
areas.  In fact, one of the major air carrier systems is training.  So, 
all the subsystems and elements under that activity have specific 
protocols that we use to -- to examine how the training's been put 
together and how well it's being executed.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  And you have -- we heard yesterday 
that your inspectors have average of 38 years of -- 36-38 years with 
the service, with the FAA.  So, I guess the majority of that 38 years, 
they've been using the old system.
		So, how are you going to train these gentlemen or ladies 
with all this experience to do this new job without having gaps and -- 
and problems?  Life's full of problems, though.
		THE WITNESS:  Well, --
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Disregard the problems, the gaps.
		THE WITNESS:  When -- when you're speaking of gaps, 
I'm assuming that it's in reference to bringing on new people or these 
--
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Bringing on your new system.  I mean 
it -- obviously this event occurred during the transition of these two 
systems.  Was that an impact or not an impact?  Whether this was an 
audit or a problem-solving thing, ATOS is designed, I believe, to 
prevent incidents such as this occurring.
		THE WITNESS:  Absolutely.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Not evaluate them after they occur, 
and what we have here is we've had -- whether it was an audit or 
problem-solving, is it 13 or 17 different items that -- that were noted 
by the carrier, the union and -- and everyone, that were of an urgent -
- we were told of an urgent situation.  That's my -- my concern -- 
observation last night was if I was in the situation of government 
oversight, that's -- that's a reflection and a concern to me.  How did 
that occur?
		THE WITNESS:  Well, I think it's a very good point, and 
clearly the FAA's very reliant on the expertise that our inspectors 
bring to the agency, and we have focused in the past on enhancing 
that type of traditional expertise.
		Clearly we have a need with this new model to focus also 
on training that develops skills, such as auditing skills, system safety 
skills, and risk management skills.  These are not skills that are 
particularly common to mechanics, pilots and other people that 
operate in this industry.
		So, we have a clear requirement ahead of us to identify 
those needs and to develop appropriate training courses that can 
provide for those needs.  That's --
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  And attract people to Oklahoma City 
to take the courses.
		THE WITNESS:  That's true, also.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Go ahead, then.
		BY MR. TEW:
	Q	All the data that's been collected so far, has it been 
entered into the system?
	A	Yes.  I say yes in that one of the things that -- that has 
always been a problem, and I believe we have the ability to -- to work 
on quite effectively with this system, is that inspectors take 
corrective action on site without entering data into the system, and 
therefore valuable information is lost to us.
		Again, this system demands that inspectors use 
protocols that require documentation before an inspection can be 
called complete.  That forces the issue of data entry much more 
effectively.  It's not to say that we're still not losing some valuable 
data, and I think that as we move forward with some of these safety 
programs that have recently been approved, particularly the 
partnership programs, gives us the ability to collect data in a much 
more extensive and valuable way.
	Q	Well, following up on the Chairman's question, I 
understand that a number of inspectors are having a good bit of 
trouble working with the system, entering the data, that it's not really 
user-friendly.
	A	Well, two things about that.  First of all, the system uses 
a web-based technology, and we are -- our data entry was dependent 
upon accessing the database through the Internet, through modems, 
when we initially implemented the system.  So, the speed and user-
friendliness was not so much system design as -- as how well the 
Internet service provider provided that service.
		We now have moved to the database inside the FAA's fire 
wall.  It's on the FAA Intranet.  It's accessible through our wide area 
network.  The speed of the system has substantially improved from 
the people I've talked to.  Those types of problems have -- have been 
virtually eliminated.
		In terms of the ease of entering data and the ease of 
what we're doing, I would be the last to say that ATOS was designed 
or that it will make the inspector's job easier.  In fact, it's tougher.  
It's tough work.  It requires a great deal of expertise.  It's -- it's not 
easy to -- to do what we're asking, and yet the only way to improve 
the data quality is to ask people to do this work and do it well.
		That's one reason, also, that it's not so well accepted.  
Change is very difficult to bring about in any organization, such as 
ours, or anyone else that has an organization of comparable size or 
complexity.  But this -- this is tough work.
	Q	Okay.  Thank you.  The FAA spent $95 million on the 
Safety Performance Analysis System or SPAS, as it's called, so that it 
would analyze key aviation data, identify trends and potential safety 
concerns, and target inspection resources accordingly.
		Why isn't the ATOS System linked up with this existing 
Flight Standards Aviation Risk Analysis System?
	A	SPAS is -- is an excellent system, still being used with a 
140 carriers that are not under ATOS and will be the primary analytic 
engine for the analytic module process once that process is 
developed and once SPAS has been re-engineered, so to speak, to 
use ATOS data.
		That work is currently on-going.  The initial interfaces 
should be done this fiscal year, and within two to three fiscal years, 
SPAS, as I said, will become the primary analytic engine for ATOS.
	Q	Since it doesn't currently link with SPAS, how do you 
ensure that the information gathered by the ATOS is sufficient to 
allow the agency to perform critical trend and safety analysis, also 
since the analysis module is not developed?
	A	Well, again what -- what is lacking for principal 
inspectors, such as Corky testified yesterday, is an analytic tool, 
either through an analyst or through a tool such as SPAS.  So, the 
analysis that's being done has to be done based on what he and his 
staff are able to do simply by reviewing the data and identifying 
trends using manual techniques.
		Excuse me.  So, there -- there clearly is work to be done 
in that area yet.  We do have plans to do it.  It's on-going now.
	Q	ATOS was originally designed that all new entrant 
airlines would come under ATOS.  Is this being done?
	A	It's not being done.  Again, as I mentioned, we're 
reluctant to move forward in expanding the application of ATOS until 
we've done two things.
		One, finished the work that is on-going now to make the 
remaining four process modules more sophisticated in their 
activities, and, two, till we have a fair comfort level with the 
resources that are needed to move forward with the system.
	Q	You touched briefly on this.  Has FAA upper 
management received any complaints from inspectors in the field 
and the principal operating inspectors?  What are the complaints, 
and what is being done to respond to them?
	A	Well, I believe we have touched on this extensively 
actually.  We have certainly received many complaints.  As I said, 
some of those complaints are based simply on not wanting to do 
something different that's harder work.
		The other complaints that -- that truly are valid have all 
been, I think, dealt with quite effectively, either through the 
improvements that we have made in terms of job aids, automation, 
changes to procedures, some of the educational changes that I've 
talked about, or they have been duly noted as changes that need to 
be made as we re-engineer our initial certification activities and 
continue to develop the analysis, evaluation and implementation 
processes.
	Q	Have you uncovered any major safety defects as a result 
of the ATOS Program?
	A	By that, do you mean have we discovered safety defects 
in air carrier operations?
	Q	Yes.  Have you uncovered any major safety defects in the 
operations of the airlines themselves?
	A	Yes.  I mean in -- in the regard that the data and the 
surveillance that we have done have identified problems that need to 
be fixed, yes.  Again, I believe that you can go to any of the 10 initial 
cadre carriers, the Certificate Management Units, and find examples 
where there have been problems that led to system analysis teams 
and eventually actions that were taken to correct problems.
	Q	Thank you, Inspector Gilliom.
		MR. TEW:  Mr. Chairman, I have no more questions.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Well, I guess I see Mr. Feith turning 
his microphone on.  Do you have questions, Mr. Feith?
		MR. FEITH:  Yes, sir.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Please proceed.
		BY MR. FEITH:
	Q	Mr. Gilliom, you were talking about the fact that there 
are no analysts in all of the offices, and that that function has now 
fallen on to basically the POIs and their staff.
		Given the level of detail now that you're receiving 
through this program as far as the information that's being gathered, 
how much time in your view do you see the POIs and their staff 
having to take to analyze this data, and doesn't that compromise 
their ability to be out in the field doing the surveillance work and 
doing the inspections rather than being in the office trying to analyze 
that data?
	A	I think there are two -- two important things in this 
regard.  First, the time that's spent is no more than the time that was 
spent under the old system.  So, again, while we don't have 
everything we need for this new system, we -- we -- we certainly have 
no less than what we had before.
		Secondly, the inspection work or the surveillance work 
that -- that you're referencing really shouldn't be done by the 
principal inspectors.  They're there to manage the certificate 
activities.  When they need inspection work done, they should rely on 
the geographic inspectors who are there to do that work, and in fact, 
when we finally have the training in place, as I mentioned, the audits, 
system safety, risk management training in place that's needed, that 
area of expertise of doing that surveillance will be highly specialized.  
It's not something the principals should be focused on doing.
	Q	Okay.  Now, two things.  First off, you've got more -- 
more information.  So, how can you be taking the same amount of 
time as in the old system, evaluating new data that has more detail 
to it and still be able to do it in the same period of time?
	A	Well, --
	Q	And, second, -- and then, second, you were talking about 
that the POI relies on the geographic inspectors, and as we heard 
yesterday from Mr. Valentine, he's got a geographic inspector sitting 
in Las Vegas where he really needs the inspector in New York 
because that's a hub, that's a big operation, and he can't rely on 
anybody there because he doesn't have anybody there.
	A	Right.  They're both important points.  First of all, the 
data may be more in quantity.  I couldn't verify that.  What was 
testified to yesterday is that it's much improved in quality.  That 
quality improvement could in fact make it easier to analyze now.
		I'm not here to say that that's ideal in terms of that we 
do need analysts for this system.  So, that's a clear need that is 
ahead of us.  But the -- the enhanced data should be easier to work 
with in the long run.
		Secondly, the -- the workforce that is in place today to 
do the surveillance work may not be in a most efficient place to do 
that work.  That's for a reason.  We had to use the people that we 
were using before.
		The person, for example, doing operations work in Las 
Vegas for American Airlines is the same person who is there doing 
that work predominantly under the NPG and PTRS activity.
		We couldn't just eliminate that person from the system.  
We had to keep using that person, even though he's not in the most 
efficient place to do the work.
		When he moves on, the position will not exist in Las 
Vegas any longer.  It will go to in fact wherever American Airlines 
Certificate Management Unit tells us they want it.  If that is in New 
York, we'll do our best to fill the position in New York.
		In my region again, this is my personal experience, we 
have moved many of our geographic inspector positions from where 
they began to where they are now most needed.
		Second point in this arena is that that person in Las 
Vegas is not limited to Las Vegas as he used to be under the old 
system.  It used to be a very confined geographic area in which that 
person operated.  That person now has the authority to travel 
wherever he needs to travel to do the work under the Comprehensive 
Surveillance Plan, including offshore, because there's a fair amount 
of international work that needs to be done.
	Q	Okay.  Following up on that, we heard yesterday in 
previous testimony that there are travel restrictions because of 
budgeting.
	A	Yes.
	Q	So, now you've just told me two different things.
	A	I -- I don't believe -- I didn't intend to do that.  There -- 
there are always travel restrictions in relation to budget.  However, 
we this year have funded the Certificate Management Units, each of 
them, with twice as much travel funding as they had last year.  It's 
roughly a $100,000 per unit.
		We have the capability now of costing this activity much 
more accurately than we've had in the past.  We're going to continue 
to try to use the existing resources to serve the priorities that are 
specified by the agency, and clearly surveillance of Part 121 
operators, whether they're under ATOS or not, is a high priority for 
us.
	Q	Do you have funds in Western Pacific Region to do all of 
the things you need to do with your people?
	A	Well, you asked a very sweeping question, and my 
answer will be more specific.  I believe we have the funds to do 
what's needed under this ATOS model with the United America West 
certificates which my region's responsible for.  I think that will be 
true across the board for the 10 certificates we're dealing with.
		Notwithstanding that, again I don't believe government 
agencies will ever have all the resources that they think they need to 
do the work that's there.  So, we're prioritizing in Western Pacific 
Region to make sure that we do the first things first.
	Q	Okay.  And I'm not going to belabor this, but I just want 
to get clarification.  Let's say towards the latter part of the year, you 
see a projection that you're going to run short of funds to fulfill the 
mission.  How hard is it to get additional funds to complete the work 
necessary for that particular year or is that going to be sacrificed?
	A	My experience with the agency is that when a true need 
is identified, such as you're talking about, it gets met one way or 
another.  Usually it means by creating pain in another part of the 
agency.
		Within the things that I have control over in my own 
region, if I see that situation arising, I'll be moving resources from 
General Aviation activities to serve this priority, and, similarly, the 
agency will attempt to cope with that.
		Again, we're dealing with some tough situations in the 
long run, and as I pointed out at the beginning of this, there's a limit 
to -- to what I can provide valid testimony to in regards to resources 
and probably have reached that point.
	Q	Let's see.  In this -- in this transition period from old to 
new, and the fact that the training had been identified by a GAO 
report, and you've acknowledged that the training was basically 
insufficient for the inspectors that are using this system.
	A	It was -- I -- I can understand why you would use that 
word, and certainly others have.  It's not how I would characterize it, 
but it needed improvement which has occurred.
	Q	Well, it's our understanding, we've -- I mean prior to 
coming to this hearing, we -- we have talked to a variety of people, 
and they told us that it was ineffective, that it didn't give them the 
level of knowledge necessary to start this new system.  They had a 
lot of problems with it.  
		It was very time-consuming in entering this information 
into the system and basically bogged them down, and it was their 
opinion that they weren't able to do the job that they were being paid 
to do because of this time-consuming transition, and I know that 
there's been changes that have been evaluated throughout this past 
year that the system's been in place, but have those changes been 
filtered down?
		Have the inspectors received additional training or 
recurrent training on these changes that are continually being --
	A	Well, again, I believe the answer is yes, and if you look at 
the testimony from yesterday, I think there was a clear distinction 
drawn between the first activity to develop the initial Comprehensive 
Surveillance Plan a year ago versus what occurred last week, which 
was an enhanced process.
		I think it went much more smoothly in all of the CMOs, 
and, frankly, I think we got much better plans out of it.  So, yes is the 
answer.  We have made improvements that have been effective that 
are in place.
	Q	Okay.  Thank you, Mr. Gilliom.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Okay.  We'll move to the tables now.  
The National Weather Service?
		MR. KUESSNER:  No questions, sir.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Little Rock National Airport?
		MS. SCHWARTZ:  No questions.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Little Rock Fire Department?
		MR. CANTRELL:  No questions, sir.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  The Federal -- excuse me.  I'll hold 
the Federal -- Boeing Commercial Airplane Group?
		MR. HINDERBERGER:  No questions.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  American Airlines?
		MR. BAKER:  We have no questions, Mr. Chairman.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Allied Pilots Association?
		MR. ZWINGLE:  No questions, sir.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  The Association of Professional Flight 
Attendants?
		MS. LORD-JONES:  No questions, sir.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  And the Federal Aviation 
Administration?
		MR. STREETER:  A couple, sir.
INTERVIEW BY PARTIES TO THE HEARING
		BY MR. STREETER:
	Q	The -- I will, first of all, start off with the ATOS data.  Is 
that the only data that is planned to feed into the analysis process?
	A	No, it isn't.  We in that process want to look at frankly 
the entire world of data that's available.  So, not only FAA data, such 
as accident and incident data, enforcement data, other things that 
come from FAA databases, but in the long run, the system is really 
designed to use the wealth of data that the carrier's generating, and I 
believe through our new partnership programs, there will be a variety 
of data inputs from that activity.
		Any data is valuable data, and as we develop the 
analysis module, we will be, first of all, determining exactly what 
questions we need to answer in order to effectively manage the 
certificate, and any data that helps us answer those questions, we 
would hope would be available and used in the process.
	Q	I believe you mentioned that the Comprehensive 
Surveillance Plans were finished for most of the ATOS carriers within 
the last week or so.
		Do you view that as a static document then for the 
remainder of the year?
	A	No.  The system and those documents are intended to 
be flexible.  It's quite different from the old system, and for that 
reason, it's unlikely that any of these surveillance plans would be in a 
strict sense 100 percent completed in any given year because the 
intent is, as we learn from the surveillance we're doing, to shift or 
retarget our resources from areas where there are not problems to 
areas where there are more likely to be problems.
	Q	Okay.  So, then, if you saw a surveillance plan that had 
been retargeted one or more times during the year, would you 
consider that a normal --
	A	That's excessive.
	Q	Okay.  Thank you.  I have no further questions, sir.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Mr. Sweedler?
		MR. SWEEDLER:  Yes, Mr. Chairman.  I just have one 
question.

INTERVIEW BY BOARD OF INQUIRY
		BY MR. SWEEDLER:
	Q	I think the testimony has been that only one of the ATOS 
carriers has an analyst.  Could you give us some idea of what the 
planning is to add the other nine analysts, and how long it might take 
to get them on board?
	A	Planning to date was to hire at least four more analysts 
this year, and that's on hold due to a hiring freeze that is currently in 
place.
		Analysts are new to us.  So, these are not internal hires.  
These have to be outside hires, and the population that's available to 
fill those positions is still somewhat of an unknown, and until we 
know exactly who we're dealing with, it will be hard to determine 
what training may be necessary, and again this is one area where 
we're still doing extensive work, and we know that's ahead of us.
		But our plan at least would be to move forward to that 
extent this year.
	Q	So, not only do you have the problem of trying to fill the 
positions that you're not usually familiar with, but you have the hiring 
freeze to deal with?
	A	That's true.
	Q	Thank you, sir.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Mr. Berman?
		MR. BERMAN:  No questions, Mr. Chairman.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Mr. Haueter?
		MR. HAUETER:  I have a couple.
		BY MR. HAUETER:
	Q	As I mentioned yesterday, under the NASIP Program, 
which no longer exists, there was an internal audit function where 
FAA inspectors in different regions came in and looked at another 
region.  How is that being handled now under ATOS?
	A	Well, first of all, I would correct something that -- that I 
think was -- was said yesterday about NASIPs.
		They have not been eliminated.  They've always been 
available on request to -- to be accomplished, and, so, the program 
is -- is still there.
		What has been decided and what is on-going is that the 
NASIP Program, like our old surveillance program, is not adequate to 
do the work that needs to be done in the future in order to make the 
advances that we'd like to make.
		So, it also has been redesigned in terms of -- of along 
the same system safety lines, so that when we do a NASIP, it's not 
simply a compliance inspection but it will look at the very things that 
the Board, I think, has rightly pointed out need to be looked at in 
terms of safety cultures and management structures and the 
systems of the carrier.
		Also, the program will be turned internally to look at 
FAA's own capabilities and how well we're doing our job in terms of 
our own culture and structure and compliance with our own 
procedures.
		So, it's -- it'll be a two-pronged approach in the future 
once it's redesigned, but it still is there.  We don't intend to eliminate 
it.
		I also would point out that Certificate Management 
Teams have two components, the Certificate Management Unit are 
the principal inspectors who are there to manage certificate 
activities, and the geographic arm of the team which is doing 
surveillance.  		By design, those geographic inspectors, 
while they are team members, do not report to the same supervisors 
or managers.  Those people do come from other regions.  They are 
independent.  We designed it that way as a control, so that those 
people shouldn't feel pressure to not enter honest data as a result of 
their surveillance.
		So, in fact, we have a full-time look now by those people 
from inspectors who are outside of the region, and hopefully we will 
keep some level of discomfort between those two elements of the 
team in order to maintain that objectivity.
	Q	I guess a follow-up there.  Do you have any idea when 
the NASIP Program will be redesigned and available again?
	A	I -- I -- I know that it's an activity that is on-going.  I don't 
think it's so extensive that it won't be done this fiscal year, but it's 
not a program I'm working directly with.  So, I don't -- I don't know 
the dates.
	Q	Okay.  If a geographic, you know, inspector were to note 
problems in how a principal operations inspector was running the 
shop or something else, how would he get that information up higher 
in the FAA?
	A	Beyond the Certificate Management Team?
	Q	Right.
	A	Well, first of all, because of this separation of powers, so 
to speak, there's nothing in the system that can override whatever 
data the geographic inspector wants to enter.  So, even with the 
evaluation function that is there to validate the data, there's -- there's 
no way that whatever that person has put down into the system, that 
it can be eliminated.
		In fact, to some extent, that person, if he makes an 
error, it's fairly difficult to correct that error.  It can be corrected, but 
there will be a record of the change.  So, there's -- there's that type of 
integrity built in.
		There's always -- there are processes in place to elevate 
concerns outside of the CMT.  Part of those are covered by our 
collective bargaining agreement, and again we're looking at our own 
safety culture to make sure that there's no impediment to raising 
safety issues to whatever level's necessary to address them.
	Q	Will ATOS be customized for each carrier?
	A	It is customized for each carrier.  I mean that really is 
part and parcel of the whole concept.  Before, our geographic 
inspectors were very generic.  Some of them were -- were trying to 
look -- do inspections on 20 or more carriers, couldn't be experts in 
the systems of that carrier.
		Now, they're working on a single carrier, and the design 
is to make them experts on that carrier's systems.
	Q	Okay.  We had, you know, mention yesterday that the 
inspector had no choice over where the geographic inspectors would 
be.  Who makes those decisions?
	A	Well, that's a misperception that was generated again by 
the way we put the system in place initially.  We needed to use the 
inspectors that had been doing the work before where they were.  We 
acknowledged from the beginning that that was not the most efficient 
choice, but it was necessary at the time.
		We acknowledged from the beginning that it would 
change over time.  So, when these people leave their jobs for 
whatever reason, they're not replaced where they were.  Instead, the 
Certificate Management Unit and that unit alone has the authority to 
request where the new position will be, not who the person will be 
but where it will be, and the design is to get it in the most efficient 
place to do the work.
	Q	It seems like it could take quite some time if you're 
waiting for a period to resign or retire for that to happen.
	A	In some cases, that may be.  One of the unfortunate 
problems we're dealing with is that with the geographic inspectors, 
there's a high rate of turnover, too high a rate of turnover.  So, some 
-- the -- as I said, when we make an investment in the inspector, and 
it's a new system, it will be quite an investment.  So, we need 
actually to focus on reducing the rate of turnover.
		What we obviously haven't done a good job on is 
communicating that CMUs do have control over where those 
positions are, and perhaps this hearing will help correct that to some 
extent.
	Q	But I guess, you know, how much control do you have 
when you're waiting for somebody to retire before you can make the 
switch?  That seems --
	A	To some extent, it's a problem that can and will be 
addressed.  We have some union concerns there that are legitimate 
in terms of fairness to employees, and those are problems, I think, 
that we have to work.
		But, once again, where a person is doesn't limit where 
that person can do the work.
	Q	Okay.  And I guess also from the testimony yesterday, it 
indicated that he believed he's about 40 percent under-staffed, and 
that's a huge number in my opinion.
	A	It is, and I'm sure quite valid from -- from where Corky 
sits, and maybe -- maybe quite valid period.  Every -- every inspector 
you ask will have, including myself, a different opinion about what 
the staffing needs are.
		What the ATOS model does is help us become much 
more explicit about these needs, much more -- make the numbers 
much more quantifiable, and I'm looking forward actually to -- as the 
system is applied, how -- how that piece of it works well for us.
	Q	Okay.  Thank you.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Mr. Clark?
		BY MR. CLARK:
	Q	There were three studies, one on SAT and one by Allied 
Pilots and American, that came up with 89 recommendations.  How 
is that type of information or recommendations or resolutions of 
those recommendations transferred to other airlines or to other 
CMTs or CMUs?
	A	It's -- it's an area of challenge, I think.  Excuse me.  It's 
an area of challenge not only for FAA but for industry and everyone 
else, how to share best practices and problems.  It's one that we're 
working on.
		I frankly believe this model is -- is a good model for 
sharing the data.  As we've talked about it for the most part 
throughout this hearing, we've talked about ATOS as it applies to 
American Airlines or to another individual carrier, but if you look at 
again that schematic, it is a model that -- that -- that integrates all 
those activities and permits data to flow into again that policy 
module in a systematic way.
		So, I think ultimately, we have now a structure and an 
infrastructure in place that can better utilize data, such as you're 
talking about, and spread it than we've had in the past.
		But there are a lot of problems involved from proprietary 
issues to litigation issues to other things that impinge on the 
industry and the FAA and all of us involved in dealing with this issue 
and how well we can do it.  So, we need to keep working on it.
	Q	Okay.  Is -- is there something -- we hear about ATOS 
under development, and is there something functionally in place now 
that can distribute the lessons learned or at least those 17 
recommendations that have been adopted by an agreement with 
American and the FAA?  Have those been distributed or is there -- the 
model is a little nebulous.  Is there -- what is the -- what shows up on 
somebody's desk that says this information has been transferred?  
How does that get done?
	A	The -- well, again, of those recommendations -- and I'm 
not familiar with each of them individually, some of them may be 
proprietary, and ceratinly that would be a concern in terms of 
sharing them.
		Otherwise the ATOS activity at this point only would 
provide an opportunity for those recommendations to be surfaced 
through the ATOS CMO which is the Headquarters group that 
provides support to this activity, and -- and through that group 
disseminated to other ATOS carriers.
		Part of the -- the analysis function and the 
implementation function is to identify best practices so that they can 
be shared.  Again, I think we have rudimentary elements in place at 
this time that need further development.
	Q	Okay.  Thank you.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Well, David, I have had the honor and 
privilege of being the chairman of this agency since 1994 and being 
on this Board since the Fall of '93.  So, most of your testimony I have 
seen this process take place, and, of course, I have my own 
observations as to why this -- this took place, but clearly after 
ValuJet, there was an attention on some of the new entrant carriers, 
feeling that the major airlines basically had their act together, and 
we needed to do a better job, and this system was designed.
		Hopefully it's going to do a better job on all carriers, but 
I think what we've seen in the discussion today is that, you know, you 
have a very experienced workforce that's been working with the 
system that by and large has done very well historically, as you 
pointed out in your opening comments, and that now you're putting a 
new system in, and I'm still concerned about the gap that's taking 
place and the resistance that we obviously are seeing, and I'm sure 
you're aware of, which is just human nature.
		All of us don't like change.  It's difficult, and if you've 
been doing something, particularly if it's something you think is 
effective, somebody comes along and wants you to do it differently, 
you -- you resist, and there, we've got to have some training and the 
system.
		The only thing that's been sort of discussed, and I think 
you're aware as well as I am or much, much  better than I am, are 
the problems and the challenges.  You know, I observed two things 
that I want to be sure of.
		One, I see all these people in Washington go up to 
Congress and say, you know, less is more, and many times, less is 
less, and when it comes to safety, less means -- can mean the loss of 
lives and serious injuries to individuals that are lying on the Federal 
Government to provide safety oversight of the aviation system.
		But the main concern I have is -- gets to what Mr. Clark 
said.  I guess we got a free audit here out of the airline union, which 
we appreciate, and American Airlines, looking at the system with 
some recommendations after an accident, and, you know, we live in 
a great country.
		We have very -- these fatal accidents, such as this, are 
rare in the system.  We killed over 400,000 people on our highways 
last year, and a lot of the -- a lot of the good -- last year -- last 
decade.  I apologize.  40,000 a year over the last 10 years.  It's the 
Number 1 killer of kids.  
		One of my interests has been to try to get a lot of the 
technology and practices in aviation on our highways.  But one of the 
reasons aviation is so safe is because of the detail we go into safety 
and the culture we have as demonstrated by this hearing and 
everyone's participation.
		But you need to see if you can't figure out how these 88 
items get transferred within the system.  Just to say it's not -- I 
understand your answer, short answer is there's no way to do it right 
now, but I would suggest if you -- if you can go back and do that, and 
I'll try to get -- I'd like to ask Mr. Haueter -- I'd like to send a letter to 
Ms. Garvey on the basis of this hearing and ask her to -- to see if you 
all can't make that a priority because there are -- it's important 
information.
		There are a number of factors that we're going to be 
looking at, have looked at and will look at in this hearing that are 
important to the safety of each and every flight that takes off every 
flight, and -- and -- and obviously an oversight, a close look at the 
safety system of American, we went through.
		There was another major carrier that had five accidents 
in the earlier part of my service on the Board, and they had to do a 
very serious internal look at themselves and learned a great deal and 
improved greatly, and that information needs to be transferred 
through the -- through the system.
		Now, you have been an excellent witness, and I 
compliment on your service to the Government and the military.  You 
don't have quite as much as what, 57 years as one of our previous 
witnesses has, but it's obviously excellent service, and I think service 
to our nation should be acknowledged and recognized, and I 
appreciate that.
		I'd like to present you an opportunity as I have with all 
the witnesses, and I think Mr. Tew now is not going to be stepping on 
the Chairman's question here, and I appreciate that.
		Do you have any additional suggestions or thoughts for 
the Board in light of this accident or your experience that might be 
helpful to aviation safety to prevent an event such as this from 
recurring?
		THE WITNESS:  Thank you, Mr. Chairman.  The only 
thing that I would like to leave, I guess, as a thought is that in my 
opinion, this move to a new air transportation oversight system from 
a regulator's point of view is very important, and it's very easy to 
derail a process like this.
		One of the things that Sandia did for us when we were 
initially designing this system and considering designing it was a 
study of why we had been so unsuccessful at making changes with 
the old system, and they looked at our entire environment, the whole 
environment that includes not only the regulator but the industry and 
various oversight groups, and determined that -- that from their 
observation of that phenomena, that that environment's immutable.
		It really is very change-resistant because the overall 
interplay of all the players is that the static status is nice, and clearly 
I think we're dealing with that internally in making these changes.
		It's very difficult.  We admittedly have some rough 
edges.  We're working to smooth those out, but it's going to take a 
great deal of fortitude, I think, to -- to see this through, and I -- I hope 
that we have the opportunity and support to do that because in my 
personal opinion, this is the one thing that as a regulator, if we don't 
do, we will never progress, and while I would not say that the system 
we have in place is -- is everything that it should be because it is one 
that is designed for future generations and improvement, over time, I 
think it will be again the leading edge worldclass system, and I'd like 
to continue participating in that development.
		So, thank you for that opportunity.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Okay.  Well, thank you very much, 
and we -- as I said, the Board's on record in favor of ATOS, on record 
in the favor of expansion of ATOS, and I will individually try, and the 
Board will, to get you the necessary resources to implement the 
program.
		I understand you have to -- but it's clear to me when you 
have a closed loop, and you don't have the resources for three boxes 
in the loop, your system is not going to perform as -- as designed.
		Well, we've had -- I appreciate this first witness.  We're 
going to take a break now before our next witness.  
		I would like to make a very important announcement.  
The City of Little Rock and its Mayor, Jim Daley, have provided coffee 
outside the ballroom compliments of the citizens of this great city.  
The Mayor properly observed yesterday that the Federal Government 
with all its wonderful rules and regulations is unable to provide 
funding for coffee for you all, and, so, the City of Little Rock has 
rushed in to the 
-- to the gap, and there's coffee outside the door compliments of the 
City of Little Rock.  I hope that will in no way bias anyone in their 
opinions or later proceedings in this hearing, but the coffee is there.
		So, we'll stand in recess --
		MR. STREETER:  Mr. Chairman?
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  -- until --
		MR. STREETER:  Mr. Chairman?
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  For 15 minutes.
		MR. STREETER:  Mr. Chairman?
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Yes?
		MR. STREETER:  Over here, sir.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Yes, sir?
		MR. STREETER:  I would ask that Mr. Gilliom be 
released as a witness so he can return to his duties in Western 
Pacific Region before our weather arrives.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Oh, I forgot.  The National Weather 
Service is also providing five to 10 inches of snow later today, we are 
told.  We're told.  
		Now, you are excused to return, Mr. Gilliom.
		THE WITNESS:  Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
		(Whereupon, the witness was excused.)
		(Whereupon, a recess was taken.)
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  We will reconvene this public hearing 
of the National Transportation Safety Board, and I'll ask Mr. Berman 
if he'll call our next witness.
		MR. BERMAN:  I call Mr. Robert Baker.
Whereupon,
ROBERT BAKER
having been first duly affirmed, was called as a witness herein and 
was examined and testified as follows:
INTERVIEW BY BOARD OF INQUIRY
		BY MR. BERMAN:
	Q	Good morning.
	A	Good morning.
	Q	Would you please state your full name and business 
address for the record?
	A	My name is Robert W. Baker.  I office at American 
Airlines Headquarters, Dallas-Fort Worth, Texas.
	Q	And by whom are you employed?
	A	American Airlines.
	Q	What's your present position, and then, please, your 
position at the time of the accident?
	A	I am currently Vice Chairman of AMR Corporation, the 
owner of American Airlines and American.  At the time of the 
accident, I was Executive Vice President of Operations.
	Q	Of American Airlines?
	A	Of American Airlines.
	Q	Not AMR.  Okay.  And how long have you held these two 
positions?
	A	I've been in the Vice Chairman's role as a part of the 
Office of the Chairman for approximately three weeks.  I was in 
charge of American's Airline Operations under various titles since 
1985.
	Q	Thinking back to the Executive Vice President and 
similar positions at the airline, could you please summarize your 
duties and responsibilities in those positions?
	A	I'd be glad to, and in a few moments, I'll show you an 
organizational chart that will give you more detail.
		Operations within American Airlines encompasses all of 
those functions and responsibilities having to do with the actual 
operation of the aircraft and our airport functions.  That would 
include the Flight Department, the hiring, training and day-to-day 
operation of the flying part of the company, Maintenance and 
Engineering for our fleet of aircraft, some planning functions in the 
crew area, dependability monitoring, the Operations Center, 
including the dispatch function, crew schedule, and then other 
support roles, such as security, corporate real estate, safety, and our 
cargo operations.
	Q	And also please describe your responsibilities as Vice 
Chairman of AMR.
	A	That is a relatively new concept at American Airlines.  It 
is an attempt to -- to create a little different structure as we go 
forward.  The chairman of the corporation, Mr. Don Carty, and I will 
co-manage the airline.  I will be principally responsible for continued 
oversight of the operating side of the company.  He will be more 
involved in the finance, marketing and external affairs.
	Q	Thank you.  And could you summarize your education 
and training that qualified you for these positions?
	A	I received a Bachelor's in Economics from Trinity College 
in Hartford, Connecticut, in 1966, and an MBA from the Wharton 
School of the University of Pennsylvania in 1968.
	Q	And do you hold FAA airman certificates?
	A	I do not.
	Q	Thank you very much, sir.
	A	Thank you.
INTERVIEW BY TECHNICAL PANEL
		BY DR. BYRNE:
	Q	Good morning, Mr. Baker.
	A	Good morning.  Just one follow-up question as far as 
your background and current duties and responsibilities.
		Do you have the opportunity to ever observe flight 
operations from the flight deck during your daily activities?
	A	Yes, I do.  I travel two to three days a week to carry out 
various assignments.  In that context, I have a personal policy of 
spending approximately 50 percent of those travel days on the 
jumpseat in our aircraft.
	Q	Thank you.  Before -- what we'd like to talk about today 
are your internal oversight programs in terms of flight safety, and 
also your response to recent accidents and incidents at the company.
		But before we do so, I know you have a presentation 
prepared, and would you please start that presentation by going 
through the management structure and hierarchy as it relates to 
flight operations and flight safety at American Airlines?
	A	Thank you very much.  I very much appreciate the 
opportunity to participate in this process.
		Let me -- before showing you some organizational 
charts, which I think is the most efficient way to describe the way we 
are organized and some changes that we have recently made and are 
evolving toward.
		I think it's appropriate that I begin by trying to describe 
the culture within the company and the way in which the 
management team at the senior level attempts to run the company.
		First of all, I think it is fair to say, and our reputation is 
widely known, as a company that is highly analytical and highly data 
rich.  We -- we very much like to deal with problems in an analytical 
and a data-driven sense.  We have lots of feeds of data that we 
believe tell us where our successes and failures lie.
		Secondly, we cherish very much the notion of 
innovation, whether it be in the marketing area or the operating area.  
We are prepared to spend the resources and human capital to create 
constant innovation in an attempt to find better ways to do business 
and to serve our customers.
		The third point that is important is that we have the 
corporation under constant evaluation.  Throughout the staff groups 
and as a group of senior managers, we sit once a week and evaluate 
the operation of the airline from almost every conceivable direction.
		We are not the least bit reluctant to identify our failures 
and to then use that same analytical approach to designing the 
solutions and fixes.
		We are very hard on ourselves on a routine basis.  We 
believe very much in constant and continuous change as a means of 
keeping up with the business that is operating in an environment that 
changes rapidly throughout our network.
		One item that I hope to demonstrate to you this morning 
is something a bit new for us, and that is we are moving very quickly 
toward more of a third party evaluation.  We think we're pretty tough 
on ourselves.  We do a lot of self-evaluation.  We think it appropriate, 
particularly as the company gets larger, that we bring to bear the 
resources of third parties to help us evaluate our performance.
		One thing in the safety area that -- that guides us 
throughout the operating departments is that we never feel we 
achieve perfect safety.  That is our goal, but we never get there, and 
if we ever believe that we've gotten there, we probably have a very 
serious problem, and that's what keeps us moving and bringing 
change to -- to the corporation.
		Let me now show you -- and I apologize if -- if these are 
hard to read in this large room.  I'll show you a series of 
organizational charts that represents American Airlines in the past 
and at the point of the accident, and then I will highlight some 
changes that we have and are in the process of implementing at the 
corporation.
		Let me say at the beginning that this appears to be a 
stacked chart, but in reality, all of the people on this chart report 
directly to the chairman, president and CEO, Mr. Don Carty.
		If you were to draw this on a piece of paper, it would be 
a single horizontal string of positions reporting to -- to the chairman's 
office.  These are all of the typical functions of -- of an airline and a 
big company.  
		Marketing, Government Affairs, General Counsel, and 
then some of our subsidiary efforts and in the computer business, 
American Eagle, our regional airline subsidiary, and here is -- is the 
Operations side of the company, showing myself as -- as being in that 
role.  This basic organization has been in place at American for many 
years.  
		Dropping now to -- to the Operations organization, 
specifically it is, as I indicated, all-encompassing to the -- to the 
airline operations, but more specifically, starting at the left, we have 
Maintenance and Engineering responsible for the maintenance of -- of 
our aircraft.  That is done both in line maintenance stations and in 
our two major maintenance bases, one at Tulsa, Oklahoma, and one 
at Alliance Airport in Fort Worth, Texas.  We employ approximately 
10,000 people in this Maintenance and Engineering function.
		The second function are those Planning and 
Performance Evaluation functions that deal primarily with our crew 
resources and also manages our dispatch and crew schedule 
function.  
		The Vice President of Flight and Chief Pilot is 
responsible for the hiring, training and day-to-day operation of our -- 
of our flying.
		The President of Cargo is a self-contained separate 
company in charge of all aspects of the cargo business, which, to put 
it in perspective, is roughly a $1 billion business for American 
Airlines.
		We have on the far right shown a VP of the Reno Air 
Integration.  In 1999, we purchased the assets of Reno Air and 
integrated them into American.  This function was principally the 
place in which we -- we focused that integration, coordinated it 
across all the company's departments.
		Then Corporate Real Estate on the bottom left, 
responsible for the real estate and building of our facilities, 
purchasing, responsible for everything that we buy, including aircraft 
parts.
		Managing Director of Security, both internal and external 
security, and, finally and importantly, in the far right, the Managing 
Director of Safety.  This function includes the safety processes and 
the environmental oversight at American Airlines and the subsidiary 
companies.
	Q	Mr. Baker, just a quick question.
	A	Yes.
	Q	Pardon me.  With those nine operational units 
underneath you, would you describe for us your relative amount of 
time in oversight or your -- where you allocate your responsibilities?  
Is it equally across those nine operational units or bias towards one 
versus another?
	A	Well, I -- first of all, it is a plate full.  I can assure you 
every one, I think, in the airline business works extraordinarily long 
hours.  It is to some degree a reactive environment.
		Clearly, the -- the areas that get the majority of my 
attention are maintenance and flight.  Those are the two functions 
that probably between them get 60 percent of my attention.
	Q	Thank you.
	A	This chart now reflects the changes that we have most 
recently made.  The important pieces are that I have been elevated 
to the Office of the Chairman.  Mr. Carty and I will share the 
management of the company, and as you -- as you will see in a 
minute, the important operations functions report directly to the 
Office of the Chairman, and I will retain primary operational 
responsibility.
		Again, these are -- the stacking of these boxes are not 
intended to imply that the upper row is more important functionally 
than the bottom.  They would all be horizontally.
		I have been replaced in the Executive VP of Operations 
role, and a new function at American at the very senior level of the 
corporation.  We have now taken safety, security and our 
environmental assets and put them together in one department 
reporting directly to the Office of the Chairman.
		We think that is an important step that we have been 
considering for -- for a number of months, and we have now 
implemented that organization, and let me show you what that 
organization looks like.
		This is the top line, if you will, of this new organization.  
On the far left, the safety functions, then security, environmental, 
and those are the three functions that existed but not under a single 
leadership prior to this.
		The two new areas are on the right side of the chart, 
labeled Operational Audits and Compliance.  In these areas, we 
intend to substantially pick up, if you will, our auditing processes by 
third parties who are not responsible for the operation of particular 
operational functions throughout the company.
		All in all, I expect as we -- we populate this organization, 
we will be adding on the order of 20 to 25 additional people to these 
functions.
		In going now one step below that, this shows you that 
far left box, the safety function.  Here, we have taken each of the 
areas that are in the operation.  We have assigned safety 
responsibility to a member of the safety staff, also focusing on those 
interfaces to the FAA in terms of airworthiness on the far right, and 
the flying operation on -- on the far left.  So, this is a highly-
integrated but extensive attempt to provide more safety emphasis at 
the company.
		One additional change that I believe is important for this 
context is in our Flight Department itself.  These are the basic 
functions of the Vice President and Chief Pilot in Flight.  
		The change we have made is an important one on the 
left side of the chart, in which we have separated very distinctly from 
an organizational point of view the function of doing the training 
through the ground school and -- and simulator to the Flight 
Standards Group or the Checking Group to ensure that the training 
has been done according to the syllabus and done in a standardized 
way.
		In the past, those functions have been combined within 
the training organization.  We think separating them will give us an 
improved level of objectivity and enable us to -- to enhance our level 
of standardization.  That, I believe, is an important change for our 
company, and that about does it for the organizational changes.
	Q	Thank you, Mr. Baker.  A couple follow-up questions.  
What was the fundamental reason for these organizational changes 
at the high level?
	A	Well, at the very highest level, the creation of the Office 
of the Chairman was aimed at a number of -- of the objectives.  The 
first objective is to provide some additional focus in some areas, one 
of those being the combined safety, security and environmental.  
Clearly, it was time to -- to provide more resources there and to focus 
them at the top of the corporation.
		Secondly, we have an obligation to our shareholders to 
prepare for successorship, and if you could understand all of the 
details of -- of the people we put into the various jobs, what we are 
essentially doing is preparing for the successorship to Mr. Carty and 
I when we retire down the road.
		So, this was an opportunity to do some training while 
we're still here and to bring the younger men and women forward in 
the organization.
So, with those two thoughts in mind, that's how the organization 
evolved.
	Q	Were these changes proposed or considered before the 
Little Rock accident?
	A	Yes, they were.  Particularly in the safety area, they were 
under consideration and evaluation, but we had not acted on them.
	Q	And why hadn't you acted on them?
	A	Well, we had not reached a consensus that any 
particular change was -- was appropriate or meaningful.  We've spent 
a good deal more time on that and reached that conclusion and have 
now made those changes.
	Q	And when you say "we", could you give me a picture of 
who you're talking about?  Who are making these decisions?
	A	Well, the decisions are made essentially by Mr. Carty 
and I with the concurrence of our Board of Directors, since our board 
is required to approve all officerships in the corporation.
	Q	Let me turn to the Flight Safety aspect of the 
management structure, and this touches more -- gets away from box 
diagrams and into philosophy.
		Does American Airlines have a formal written statement 
outlining corporate safety policies?
	A	Well, I'm not sure we have a statement that -- that 
outlines them for the entire corporation, other than safety being the 
Number 1 priority of all of our responsibilities, and I believe that is 
continuously stated in public documents for both our shareholders 
and our employees.
		As you get down into individual departments and 
through our internal audit function, we do have statements of that 
philosophy.
	Q	And as far as the Department of Flight Safety is 
concerned, at the time of the accident, what was its scope or reach?  
What was its mandate?
	A	Let me go back and -- and also indicate that at the time 
of the accident, the Flight Safety responsibility was in the Flight 
Department itself.  Under this organizational change I've just 
reviewed, the direct reporting relationship will be to the Vice 
President of Safety, Security and Environmental with a dotted line to 
the VP of Flight and Chief Pilot.  So, we are making that -- that 
change as well.
		The mandate of -- of the Flight Safety Department was 
(1) to investigate all events and incidents for what we could learn.  
That is a very important ingredient of our management style, to learn 
from our shortcomings and hopefully translate them into changes.
		Secondly, to make suggestions and input to flight 
management and -- and to myself as to things that they observed 
needed to be changed or -- or looked at.
	Q	Why does the dotted -- why does the straight line 
reporting stop at the Vice President level and not continue on to the -
- or bypass the Vice President and go directly to the Chairman level?
	A	Well, we -- we felt, and -- and with the help of some 
outside folks who came in and looked with us at the way we were 
organized, which I'll review in a few minutes, that a third party 
relationship of -- of the safety -- the Flight Safety function reporting to 
the VP of Safety was a better approach than to the Vice President 
responsible for producing the product, if you will.
		So, again it is an attempt to separate functions and 
responsibilities of providing the product from assessing its -- its 
quality and its compliance, and, so, we thought separating those 
would be an appropriate step to take.
	Q	What criteria do you use to evaluate the effectiveness of 
the Flight Safety Department?
	A	Well, we have a number of management tools that we 
use for all of our senior people in evaluating their performance and in 
running a particular function.  So, we will utilize those tools.  We use 
such things as 360 reviews.
		Obviously we -- we will look at the output, if you will, of -- 
of that function.  Are they probing deeply enough?  Are they coming 
up with issues that we need to deal with?
		We want to get to an aggressive approach of problem 
finding and solving, less reactive types of things.  So, those are the -- 
the -- the -- the points that we will be looking for as this organization 
matures and develops over the next year or so.
	Q	And who is doing this review or oversight of the Flight 
Safety Program?
	A	Well, the Vice President of Safety, Environmental and 
Security and myself will be personally involved in -- in that 
organization's maturing and its performance.
	Q	Who had direct oversight of that program at the time of 
the accident?
	A	At the time of the accident, our Safety and 
Environmental functions were a department in my organization.  That 
department was managed by Mr. Tommy McFall, who reported 
directly to me.
	Q	And does the Flight Safety Department or did the Flight 
Safety Department at the time of the accident have a formal means 
to communicate safety-related information to pilots and other 
operational personnel at the company?
	A	Oh, yes.  I -- we -- we have a premium, if you will, on 
communications.  We -- we emphasize continuously the importance 
of -- of communication, horizontally and vertically.
		I think we have a culture that -- that cherishes the flow 
of information.  As I said, we are data-driven.  So, I don't think we -- 
we have a problem of communicating issues, findings and problems.
	Q	Mr. Baker, before we proceed in your presentation, I'd 
like to, with the Chairman's concurrence, pass the microphone to Mr. 
Feith for further questions.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Okay.
		MR. FEITH:  We'll keep going.
		BY DR. BYRNE:  
	Q	I guess no further questions.  So, if we could at this 
point transition from the management structure and hierarchy to 
specific oversight programs and responsibilities that the company 
has, and continue your presentation at that point.	
	A	Thank you very much.  As I indicated in my introductory 
remarks, we are a company and a group of -- of managers that 
believe in getting all of the data we can possibly get.
		In fact, there is no such thing as too much data.  We 
value input from all sources, and we want to use that data to identify 
problems and hopefully help us articulate solutions that pinpoint the 
problems very carefully.
		We do like to learn from events.  There is no point in 
having things happen unless you learn from those events and use 
that knowledge to try to -- to prevent their reoccurrence.
		I will attempt in this to not use jargon.  So, I'll define 
some of these acronyms as we go forward.  We have a number of 
programs that help us provide this data and this input to our 
management process.
		The first is a program called AASAP, which stands for 
the American Airlines Safety Action Program.  This is a program 
conceived at American Airlines in 1992 by one of our captains.  We 
worked with it internally in a small group, and in 1994, the program 
was actually put into place in the Flight Department at American 
Airlines, and I will go into more detail on this program in just a 
moment.
		A companion program is FOQA, which stands for Flight 
Operations Quality Assessment, and that is another form of data-
gathering, again looking for problems, looking for trends, that point 
us at difficulties that we can then correct and deal with.
		Next is a system that we call FlightNet Reporting.  This 
is a more traditional feedback system from our line pilots.  In 
essence, it's often called a debrief in aviation terms.  We get 
approximately 18 to 21,000 debriefs a year from our cockpit 
crewmen.
		There are certain mandatory debriefs for some 21 
events that happen on the airline.  We want to know about these 
events, so that we can go understand them, see what drove these 
events to happen.  A couple of examples.  We want to know about 
diversions.  We want to know about engine shutdowns.  We want to 
know about bird strikes, and there's some 21 of those mandatory 
things that happen in the airline every day that must be debriefed 
through this FlightNet reporting system.
Again, though, this is an opportunity for our line crews to tell us of 
problems and things that bother them as they fly the airline.  
		We have, and I spoke briefly about our internal and 
external audit program.  We have had an industry-leading internal 
audit program for some 10 years.  Every six months, we look at the 
output of that internal audit process.
		It is a true compliance to the FARs' approach, and we 
have this internal audit process operating in all of the operating 
departments of the company, and, of course, in the maintenance 
area, we have a very extensive inspection and quality assurance 
organization of several hundred people constantly looking and back-
checking our maintenance organization.
		I will review with you some of our external audit 
processes in just a minute.
		Another important data generator, if you will, is the Air 
Carrier Voluntary Disclosure Program.  This is an opportunity under 
the FARs for an air carrier or its personnel to step forward and 
disclose to the FAA a discrepancy or an operation that -- that may in 
fact be a violation, so that we can get all of the facts on the table and 
review exactly what happened.
		Next is the American Airlines and the Allied Pilots 
Association safety review process, and I will talk further about that in 
a minute, but this is an organized interface between the pilot union 
and the company again to -- to pull up to a level of action any input 
that we can get from our line pilots.
		Finally, the ATOS Program.  We spent a lot of time on 
that this morning, and I won't go into that any further.  We are very, 
very hopeful that ATOS will mature very quickly.  We look forward to 
mining that data.  We think it's very important, and we're very 
anxious to get on with that.
	Q	Mr. Baker, were all six of those programs in place at the 
time of the accident?
	A	Yes, with one exception, and I'll touch on that.  The 
safety review process.
	Q	Thank you.
	A	Now, specifically to -- to AASAP.  As I indicated, this is a 
program that was developed at American.  It started in the Flight 
Department.  It now involves not only our pilots but our mechanics 
and dispatchers as well.
		It is a true accident prevention program.  It operates on 
the basis of the following principle, and that is that the best safety 
information is the information that we don't know, and, so, any way 
that we can create to bring information that otherwise would not be 
known to those who can effect change, to bring that information to 
the surface is very, very valuable, and that's what AASAP's principle 
concept is all about.
		Since the inception of the program, we have had over 
20,000 reports submitted to AASAP.  These are all in a database 
which is continuously updated.  This database provides us trending 
information on particular subjects.  It feeds, if you will, our training 
syllabus and our other functions of managing our pilots.
		Every six weeks, we take the data from the reports that 
have come in, and we circulate those reports and descriptors of 
incidents to all of our line pilots because we believe that line pilots, 
too, can learn from the other -- from the incidents and -- and events 
that others have been involved in.
		It is a self-reporting program.  It is intended, as I said, 
to identify and correct safety concerns.
		Once a report is submitted and accepted into the 
program, and not every report that is offered is accepted -- if a pilot -
- I'll use a pilot example.  If a pilot has intentionally violated the rules 
and the Federal Air Regulations, that report is not acceptable for 
consideration under the AASAP Program.
		Secondly, if the FAA is aware of the event and the 
incident from other known and public sources, an AASAP report is -- 
is -- is not appropriate and is not accepted.
		We have found in the five or so years of this program 
that we have been able to -- to get a handle on improvements in all 
operational areas.  We have characterized the -- the database and 
tried to create the top 10 event categories for our own focus in our 
training and in our surveillance of the airline.
		Operational distractions are Number 1.  Rushing to 
comply, Number 1.  Automation dependency, Number 3, and 
situational awareness, Number 4, just to give you a flavor of the 
types of things that have come out of our database work and our 
trending.
		Let me now give you some specific examples of some 
improvements that have come directly out of the input of the AASAP 
Program.  First, we've been able to make operating manual changes 
across all of our fleets.  One of the problems we dealt with early on in 
AASAP was to try to understand why our pilots, particularly flying the 
Super 80 aircraft, were having difficulty maintaining the assigned 
altitude given to them by Air Traffic Control.
		We found two -- we made two changes.  First, we found a 
mechanical problem with the altitude knob on the -- on the glare 
shield that moves the assigned altitude into a window, if you will, for 
the crew to -- to observe, and, secondly, we adopted a -- a new 
approach that we call point and shoot, and that is when the crew is 
given a new altitude assignment, the pilot not flying will put it in the 
box.  The pilot flying will physically point at it and affirm that he 
understands that there has been a change in the assigned altitude.  
We have put that across all of our -- all of our fleets.
		We have likewise adopted that point and shoot approach 
to changes in our FMC computers on board the airplane, which is 
crucial that both crew members understand the changes have been 
made in the FMC input.
		The second example is a change in our policy on 
position hold.  We had an event in which one of our aircraft was 
cleared into position hold, and another carrier's aircraft flew very 
closely over the top of the airplane.  
		We believe after looking at this in some detail, because 
of the report that we got in AASAP, that we were being held too long 
in a position hold and not given clearance.  So, we now forbid our 
aircraft to take a lengthy assignment in the position hold at our 
airports.  We think that's a prudent thing to do.
		The third example is the situation in which we have an 
engine failure.  At slow speed, the rudder will be confined.  There is a 
technique to kick the opposite rudder to free that rudder.  This is a 
manual change that has come directly out of AASAP.
		We've made policy changes for both pilots, dispatchers 
and mechanics, including some additional work and guidance on 
thunderstorm avoidance, decision-making and crosswind 
approaches.
		In the area of training procedures, we've done a lot more 
work because we now understand more clearly the issues of 
distractions and so forth, human factors and safety.  We've used the 
AASAP incidents as feed to our loft design, so that we actually fly 
things that our pilots experience, and we use the items that we learn 
through AASAP as -- as briefing items.
		In the air traffic area, we feed these -- these topics to -- 
to ATC by way of the FAA member of the evaluation committee.  We 
were able to deal with a runway incursion problem in El Paso that 
was observed by several of our crews.  That brought about some 
additional painting and identification and the threshold of two 
convergent runways.
		We have identified problems at particular airports on the 
arrivals in which our enhanced GPWS suggests that we are being 
brought in too low for the approach, giving an alarm.  This was the 
case in an airport at Middletown.
		Finally, we identified a very dangerous situation that we 
worked with Air Traffic Service to modify the air space in an area that 
was being used by parachute jumpers, which is a very incompatible 
use of air space.
		But we would only know about those almost-kinds of 
situations by having the ability of our crew members to step forward, 
and, finally, we do on occasion determine and detect that additional 
proficiency for individual crew members is an appropriate strategy, 
and we take action on that basis.
		I indicated that I would talk more about the flight safety 
review process.  This is the interface of American Airlines and the 
Allied Pilots Association.  There are two committees that are very 
important to -- to providing data and helping us manage our 
operation; that is, the Training Committee and the Safety Committee.
		These have been very -- historically very strong 
relationships with the company, with open doors.  I don't think it's 
any secret that we have had some economic differences with our 
pilots union.
		Unfortunately, this drove, if you will, a closing of some of 
those doors.  The relationship deteriorated.  The flow of information 
was reduced.  We were not getting the benefit of -- of the APA Safety 
Committee and Training Committee's input to our process.
		We believe that that is an essential part going forward.  
As the senior leader in the Operating side of the airline, I am 
committed to restoring that relationship to a very positive role.  I 
believe that the union's leadership and board are as well.  They have 
assured me they are.
		We are rebuilding that consensus, and I expect that as 
we go forward, this is going to be a tremendously-important and 
positive process for American Airlines and for our crew members.  
So, I think we are -- we're going to put the past behind us and go 
forward and mine that data very -- very well.
		That is all that I have to offer on our systems, Mr. Byrne.
	Q	I'd like to follow up on two general areas. One is on the 
reporting systems, the AASAP Program, and the second area is the 
internal audits.
		As far as the AASAP Program is concerned, how many 
personnel from American specifically are assigned to the AASAP 
Program?
	A	One part of my description probably didn't -- didn't 
explain very well how it works.  When a -- when an AASAP report is -- 
is put forward, there -- there is a three-party meeting that takes place 
every week.  It involves the FAA, our CMO office, the Allied Pilots 
Association, and American Airlines, and the three parties look at the 
submitted report.
		They decide who are the appropriate people at APA or 
FAA or the company to go and investigate the details or to take 
action to -- to change or correct things.  So, that meeting takes 
place, and those are three individuals that probably spend on the 
order of half a day a week.
		In addition, within the company, we have about two and 
a half people that are full time kind of running the program 
continuously.
	Q	In terms of the volume of reports that come in, Captain 
Griffith testified in July that approximately 3,500 reports come in 
specific to the AASAP program on an annual basis, is that correct?
	A	That's correct.
	Q	And for the FlightNet System, which encompasses, I 
guess, both AASAP and the OF25 Program, he testified between 
about 18,000 and 21,000 reports come in annually?
	A	That's correct.
	Q	And could you just back up and describe the OF25 
Program?
	A	The OF25 Program is what I described as the FlightNet 
Reporting System.  It is a more traditional debrief system for our 
flight crews to use.  As you indicated, 18 to 20,000 per year.  
		It encompasses or solicits general comments about the 
operation, but it also is a routine reporting mechanism to report to 
the company some 21 specific events that may or may not occur out 
in the day-to-day operation.
	Q	Are flight diversions part of those OF25 criteria?
	A	Yes, they are.
	Q	What happens to OF25 reports that are in that category 
of flight diversions?
	A	We look at those reports for the purpose of 
understanding why the diversion took place.  Was it handled 
correctly?  It is much more an informational thing than an action 
item, but we want to know what the frequency of our diversions are.
		For instance, if we were to see a large number of 
diversions to one small city, we'd worry a lot about that because of 
the overload on that small city and their ability to do a good job, 
both for the crew and -- and our passengers.  So, it's really kind of a 
visibility kind of a reporting system, so that we know what's going on 
in the system, and we trend it.
	Q	And my understanding is the AASAP Program's 
synonymous with the OF25 Program when a captain submits a report 
of diversion.  Is that -- how is that information held?
	A	That's held in the OF25 system, I believe under the 
cockpit crew member's name.
	Q	How long is it held in the OF25 system?
	A	I do not know.
	Q	Are captains tracked for diversions?
	A	Absolutely not.
	Q	Moving on -- moving back to the staffing and how the 
AASAP reports are evaluated, with 3,500 reports coming in, and 
recently I read in a newspaper article, approximately a 150 reports 
are evaluated each week by the ERT, Event Review Team, how do you 
ensure that specific nuggets of information or safety-critical items 
are not being missed?
	A	I -- I think the number of unduplicated reports suggests 
a somewhat lower number.  It's not unusual, and I'll just use one 
example of, let's say, an altitude excedance, that we will get an 
AASAP report from both the captain and the co-pilot.  So, within the 
3,500, we really have two about the same incident.
		A lot of the reports fall into known categories of altitude 
excedances, misreads back leading to -- to difficulties, and we can 
categorize those fairly quickly.
		The unique and -- and different ones come out of that 
reporting flow pretty -- pretty quickly and are dealt with by the staffs 
that are assigned those reports to come back to the ERT with 
feedback on what happened and what we're going to do about it.
		So, while we have just the three kind of clearinghousing 
all of those reports, there's a large staff that gets the reports all over 
the company, including our Airport Managers, who have an obligation 
to come back and -- and tell us of the investigation and the results.
	Q	And you mentioned the top 10 issues that are coming 
out of the AASAP Program.  Would you elaborate on what is meant 
by "rushing to comply"?
	A	Rushing to comply, as I understand the concept since 
I'm not a pilot, I'm a little less able to articulate that -- that concept 
very well perhaps, but it is the -- the concept that -- that a crew 
member or a crew is asked to do something, and without thinking it 
all the way through will just simply execute the request.  It's termed 
"rushing to comply".
	Q	And who's asking the crews to do something?
	A	Well, my understanding is it's typically a combination of 
Air Traffic Control perhaps giving them instructions or (2) just the 
normal course of operating the flight gets into this rush to comply 
process.
	Q	And you mentioned one of the products of the AASAP 
Program was new thunderstorm guidance procedures or new 
thunderstorm guidance.  When did that come into place?
	A	That is in -- in work at the present time.
	Q	So, it was not in place at the time of the accident?
	A	I don't believe so.  That -- that isn't to say we didn't have 
any guidance, but we're redoing that guidance.
	Q	I'd like to turn now to the Internal Audit Program.  In 
general terms, not specifically related to any accidents or incidents, 
how frequently are these -- is this an on-going evaluation program?  
Are they time based or event driven?
	A	This is a continuous internal audit process.  It is a true 
audit in the sense that what we are looking at is -- is compliance to 
the FARs and our operating specification as approved by the FAA.
		We are looking very narrowly at are we doing what we 
said we were going to do in our ops spec, and are we within 
compliance of all the FARs as -- as we know them?
		That process cycles through every operating department 
every six months.  We then pull the results of that together.  We sit 
down at my level and review each department's performance.  We 
then go to our Certificate Management Office at the FAA, and we 
share our findings with them as to what we have found and what 
we're going to do about it.  So,  it's continuous in six-month 
increments.
	Q	And that's each department, each operational unit, 
Flight Operations?  Training and Standards is conducting their own 
audits?
	A	Dispatch, Weather, Flight Training. Maintenance has a 
huge part of that process.  Our Flight Service people that manage our 
flight attendants.  We've tried to get that into as many of the areas of 
the company that have an operating and safety impact.
	Q	Who is the point person within each department that's 
conducting these audits or responsible --
	A	We have a coordinator assigned in each department to 
make sure that the -- the analysis and the audit is -- is conducted, 
conducted properly, and then assembled into a -- into a report.
	Q	At what level is that coordinator?
	A	Usually a manager or managing director, one step below 
the vice president level.
	Q	The scope of these audits, how often does it go beyond 
regulatory compliance?
	A	These particular audits are not intended, and I don't 
believe they -- they go beyond regulatory compliance or compliance 
to our operations spec.  We use other processes to get at some of 
those issues.
	Q	And the other processes are?
	A	External audits, general management reviews and 
performance reviews.
	Q	Who conducts the external audits, other than the FAA?
	A	Various folks, and in a minute, I -- I will kind of give you 
some detail on that, if I might.
	Q	Okay.  
		DR. BYRNE:  I guess at this point, I'd like to pass the 
microphone to Mr. Feith.
		BY MR. FEITH:
	Q	Well, it looks like it's still morning.  Good morning, Mr. 
Baker.
	A	Good morning.
	Q	You had talked about several things, and let me just 
back up to one point that you had just made regarding the -- I believe 
it was the guidance about weather that you had just spoke of, and 
that it was being revamped, and you said that that had come from 
the OF25 and AASAP input?
	A	Yes.
	Q	Okay.  Can you be specific as to what kind of reports 
came from the AASAP Program or the OF25 Program that 
necessitated that guidance change?
	A	I don't think I'm qualified at this point to give you a 
detailed understanding of specifically what drove it, but a collection 
of -- of those input prompted the ERT to suggest to our Flight 
Management that -- that some modification was appropriate.
	Q	As far as that same program, the OF25 and the AASAP 
Program, do you have any understanding about any other anomalies 
or deficiencies in the organization with regard to crew pairing?
		We had looked at the crew pairing issue with having the 
chief pilot with a new first officer.  Have you seen any kind of crew 
pairing issues come through the AASAP Program?
	A	No, I have not.
	Q	How about with any other training issues, such as FMC 
training, or any particular training with the MD-80 aircraft?
	A	Not with the MD-80, but as I indicated, one of our top 
10 items that have come out of the trended data in AASAP is what 
we call "automation dependence".  That relates more to the FMC-
driven aircraft, 757 and above.  But I have -- I'm not aware personally 
of any direct input relative to the Super 80.
	Q	And then using the OF25 and the AASAP Program, 
you're using that system to monitor trends and that kind of thing, to 
identify deficiencies or anomalies that you can take corrective action 
with.
		Given the fact that the Chairman had made a statement 
earlier regarding American Airlines, and during his tenure, American 
has had several accidents and some serious incidents, have you seen 
anything that -- that would lead to a systemic problem from your 
perspective through that program to identify the specific target areas 
that needed to be corrected?
	A	Well, I think the -- I think it's fair to say that the top 10 
trended issues coming out of AASAP in particular represent the most 
rewarding areas for us to concentrate on to avoid a systemic 
problem.
		That's where our resource ought to be -- be focused and 
changes made as we understand that there are better ways to do 
things.  I think it's very, very helpful to us to be able to get out of that 
data those kinds of trended areas, and we work those very hard, and 
we'll continue to.
	Q	As far as -- can you give me a characterization of your 
relationship with the FAA?  We -- we heard the FAA's perspective 
yesterday, and the fact that they had some manpower issues and 
that kind of thing.
		But could you just briefly describe your relationship with 
the FAA?
	A	Well, the FAA is a critical part of -- of our Aviation Safety 
Program.  We take the view that the FAA has the resources and, most 
importantly, the expertise to bring to American Airlines additional 
input on things we do well and things we don't do so well.
		So, we have a very open door with the FAA.  We -- we -- 
we listen attentively to what they say.  We are absolutely committed 
to -- to ATOS as a process that can help us provide more input and 
more data to identify problems.
		So, the -- the FAA is really a member of the Safety Team 
at American Airlines in every respect, and they're very important to 
us.
	Q	During the course of the investigation of not only this 
accident but previous accidents, typically we're made aware via 
different sources about concerns that on-line pilots have within the 
organization.
		We've talked about fatigue in this hearing and in this 
accident, and I just wanted to know if you're aware of any AASAP or 
OF25 Program issues regarding to crew fatigue, and, if so, what 
measures were taken to accommodate those or -- or fix those?
	A	I don't think I can -- I can comment as to the presence of 
fatigue within AASAP or the OF25.  Fatigue is -- is something that any 
one who runs big machinery in challenging areas needs to pay 
attention to in our view.
		We have recently reaffirmed our fatigue policy that 
permits any one of our crew members to take him or herself off duty 
because of fatigue with no consequences adverse to that employee, 
and we think that is a sound policy, and -- and it has been used, and 
that crew member will never hear from us.
	Q	As far as taking this one step further in a different vein, 
we know that the Department of Transportation does track on-time 
performance of the carriers, and given the fact that this is a very 
competitive market, do you see, especially now in your new position 
as Vice Chairman, the fact that if we have a late-arriving airplane, 
and the consequences and the publication of that on-time 
performance, do you see that driving any of these flights to be 
completed?
	A	No, and if you look at the -- the incident particulars at 
American Airlines since 1995, in almost every case, these operations 
were woefully late before they ever got in the air, and -- and, so, that 
the dependent -- the arrival dependability was -- was certainly not a 
factor.
		I don't believe that American's professional pilots are 
ever going to make a trade-off of being on time versus the safety of 
the operation, and we certainly would not condone that trade-off or 
that approach either.
	Q	Given the facts of what we know thus far about this 
particular flight and some of the things that had been said early on in 
this investigation by, I guess, some American -- well, one particular 
American Airlines person who is no longer at the airline, can you just 
characterize for me and for the rest of us what -- what your 
assessment may have been as to the captain flying into Little Rock 
that particular night under the conditions that -- that we're talking 
about here?
		We had a two-hour late flight, and going into an area 
where weather is a -- is a very big consideration in the decision-
making process, and this captain's continuation into an area of 
weather that, based on some testimony and witness interviews, was 
very questionable at the time.
	A	Mr. Feith, I -- I am not a pilot.  I have not been trained 
on the Super 80 or nor American's procedures.  It would be grossly 
inappropriate for me to register any kind of opinion on Captain 
Bushman's decision-making that evening.
		I remain very optimistic that through this process that 
we're involved in here today, that we, too, will get a better 
understanding of all the factors involved in this tragic event.
		But I'm -- I'm not qualified to make that kind of a 
judgment.  I'm sorry.
	Q	Let me clarify then.  Given the fact that in the position 
that you held prior to now being Vice Chairman but being the Vice 
President of the Operations side of the house, and given that this 
falls under your control, the purview of your control, as far as the 
feedback that you've received since the accident, don't you have 
enough information to make a judgment or at least an opinion about 
the captain's decision to fly into Little Rock that night?
	A	I -- I certainly have gained a clearer understanding of 
some areas in which American Airlines will -- will address and 
improve.  The human decision-making, I -- I have no opinion at this 
point in time.
	Q	Okay.  Thank you, Mr. Baker.
		BY MR. EICK:
	Q	Mr. Baker, I have a few questions for you.  Have any of 
your managers in the Systems Operations Center brought to you any 
reports or requests for additional support equipment regarding 
weather or reported any other deficiencies that they believe would 
affect their operation role of safety and efficiency?
	A	No.  We are -- we have been very aggressive in 
innovating, if you will, in the -- particularly in the weather area.  We 
have stepped forward on several occasions with our own funding for 
a joint program with the University of Oklahoma and close-in weather 
forecasting, called HUBCAPS, which has been very successful.
		We have cooperated with the FAA on a program called 
ITWIS.  As I think you heard yesterday, the airlines, including 
American, has a standing and very strong request that we get 
Doppler in our Operations Center.
		I'm not aware of any request for technology or -- or data 
that -- that we haven't fulfilled.
	Q	And that request for Doppler data specifically is the 
Terminal Doppler Weather Radar?
	A	That's correct.
	Q	Does the American Systems Operations Control Center 
have access to the Internet at their work stations?
	A	I can't be absolutely sure.  I believe so, but I'm -- I'm not 
absolutely sure.
	Q	One of the follow-up questions related to that is, there 
are some weather support pages on the Internet, and one of the 
questions related to that is, has American Airlines gotten FAA 
approval for the use of that data?
	A	I don't know the answer to that.  I'd be glad to furnish it, 
though.
	Q	I think that's all the questions I have.  Thank you, Mr. 
Baker.
	A	Thank you.
		MR. EICK:  Mr. Chairman?
		DR. BYRNE:  Mr. Chairman, I still have one or two more 
questions in this area, then we'd like to let Mr. Baker continue with 
his presentation, with your concurrence.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Well, that's fine.  We're an hour and 
five minutes, and -- but I want to be sure we take as much time as -- 
as we need with Mr. Baker, but let's -- let's move.
		DR. BYRNE:  We'll expedite.
		BY DR. BYRNE:
	Q	Mr. Baker, how do you evaluate individual bases?  I'm 
sorry.  Individual bases?
	A	Yes.
	Q	Crew bases?
	A	I am not directly involved in the -- in the management of 
the bases.  Our Flight Department structure deals with that.  So, I'm 
not qualified to answer that.
	Q	And in terms of the internal audit program, would you 
characterize or describe for us its relationship to voluntary 
disclosure?
	A	There's a relationship, although of a minor nature, that 
goes like this.  If, in the process of conducting the audit, we were to 
find something that was clearly a violation, in addition to reviewing 
that with our Certificate Management Office, we may voluntarily 
disclose it under the FAA's program.
	Q	That's all I have in this area.  If you could continue with 
your presentation now, addressing American's actions following 
incidents and accidents?
	A	Thank you, and I'll try to expedite this, Mr. Chairman.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Oh, no, no.  This is what we've been 
waiting on.
		THE WITNESS:  I'm feeling ill.  American obviously takes 
its performance and particularly the fatal accidents quite seriously.  
As I've -- as I've tried to describe this morning, we are constantly 
trying to improve that margin of safety at American Airlines and 
throughout our operation.
		The safety performance of American and the airline 
industry in this country is at an extraordinarily high level, but -- but 
we can never assume that we have reached a satisfactory level until 
we never ever have a fatal accident again.
		We were very proud of our performance for the period 
from 1979 to 1995, in which we operated the largest fleet of jet 
aircraft in the world without ever having a fatal accident, and then 
our corporation literally was rocked by two accidents, first in '95 and 
then in 1999, here in Little Rock.
		We have tried to work very hard to understand those 
events and to garner from that as much as we can to avoid a 
recurrence, and I'd like to review the specific approaches --
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Mr. Baker, the only -- and I -- first of 
all, let me applaud you all on your record, but is there some reason 
the Roselawn accident is not listed on there?
		THE WITNESS:  No.  That is -- that was an American 
Eagle event.  Simply a bookkeeping issue of American Eagle versus 
American Airlines, but -- but it had --
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  It had your paint on the skin of the 
plane?
		THE WITNESS:  Absolutely, and we bear full 
responsibility, and we worked that -- that event.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  And you all have done, you know, a 
lot of things that were -- that the Board had concerns about, the FAA 
had concerns about.  American's been very aggressive in following up 
on those, and I compliment you, but I just had noted that was not on 
the list.
		THE WITNESS:  Thank you.  Following the Cali, 
Colombia, 757 accident, we thought it would be appropriate to -- to 
do an intraspective assessment of our entire operation.  We set out 
to do a comprehensive flight safety review.  It involved the Allied 
Pilots Association and a lot of their folks as resources, the FAA.
		We undertook an 18-month review of every single part of 
American's operation that we could look at, looking for suggestions 
and opportunities to improve our operations and be safer.
		We even went to each of our crew bases and held 
meetings with our line pilots.  We got some 3 or 400 suggestions 
from those line pilots of things to look at.
		Over the next several months, we boiled all this down 
into some areas in which we were going to focus, and those are in 
the human factors area.  Division-specific operations, which is a little 
bit technical, but our pilots are qualified to operate in certain parts of 
our route system which represent different challenges that need 
special training.
		For instance, those that operate into Central and South 
American need some training in addition to what a pilot flying in the 
domestic United States would receive.
		We examined advance technologies that would be 
available to help us improve our safety margin.  We looked at our 
structure and our procedures, and we examined the concept of FOQA 
as a -- as an additional process.
		Let me give you now some direct examples of things that 
came out of that lengthy and comprehensive process.  The first thing 
we stumbled into was a piece of technology that had been developed 
by the Allied Signal Corporation, which is name-enhanced, Ground 
Proximity Warning System.  
		This is an on-board device available for our large 
commercial aircraft that couple the location of the aircraft relative to 
the ground and presents to the crew a real-time database of the 
terrain in and around the aircraft.
		This had been a conceptual idea that had been 
developed by Allied Signal, but they could never frankly get anyone 
very interested in it.  We got interested in a big way.  We helped 
them certify that technology, and American Airlines led the industry 
in committing to equip every one of our aircraft, and we're getting to 
the end of that installation process now.
		The second important thing we discovered in examining 
the accident in Cali, Colombia, was that perhaps our crew members 
needed some additional work in how to recover an aircraft that got 
itself into an unusual attitude, very nose high, very nose low.
		There are specific techniques of flying an aircraft out of 
those precarious positions.  While lots of our pilots come out of the 
military where that is standard training, to an increasing degree, we 
have regional airline and corporate jet pilots joining us.
		So, we committed to a one-day course for every pilot at 
American and an on-going program on a recurrent training basis of 
these technologies and approaches to maneuvering aircraft out of 
unusual positions.
		Coupling an approach event at Hartford and Cali, we put 
together a non-precision approach working group to try to see if we 
couldn't come up with a standard approach to non-precision 
landings.  There were some runways and airports that -- that we 
frankly evaluated and excluded as acceptable to American, and we 
have been working with the industry to bring this approach across 
the entire industry.
		Finally, we have asked Jepsen, who is the primary 
supplier of the reference materials that our pilots use, the so-called 
plates or charts, to put the terrain in and around airports on those 
charts.  That's not completely done, but we've made very good 
progress there.
		Following the tragic accident here in -- in Little Rock, 
Arkansas, we took a little different approach to again see if we 
couldn't organize an approach to -- to learning from -- from what had 
happened.
		We had used basically internal resources with the help 
of the FAA in 1995 and '96.  We thought it was appropriate to bring 
some outside third parties into the process, and, so, we embarked on 
a -- on a three-phase, if you will, approach or concurrent evaluations 
during the period August through November.
		The first of those was an evaluation of our flight training, 
our flight organization, and fundamentally the way we were running 
the Flight Department.  What we were seeking here was the input of 
other professional pilots who had managed airline operations at 
other places.
		If the safety business were simply a case of plugging in 
10 specific things that we all agreed on, we would have done that 
long ago, but in actuality, airline safety is a process of improvement 
continuously of the margin of safety, and we wanted the benefit of 
outside eyes looking at how we did business.  So, we -- we started 
with -- with that evaluation.
		Almost concurrent with that, the Allied Pilots 
Association leadership came forward, indicated that they would very 
much like to participate with the company in a similar approach.  We 
agreed with that.  We need -- we saw no problem with another set of 
eyes, and, so, we launched a second vendor, again experienced 
airline command pilots, looking at the operation, almost the same 
subjects that the first group had looked at, but a second set of eyes 
were certainly welcome.
		Finally, we started the third leg of this concurrent 
evaluation process with the FAA and the APA in what is known as the 
"systems analysis team".  That was a process involving all three 
parties.  They took a 120 days.  
		The basic process is to look at what had happened 
during the last several years at American Airlines in various events, 
why did those things happen, and then, finally, what are the 
intervention approaches that the airline and the FAA and APA could 
embark on to try to prevent a reoccurrence?
		Out of that process, and I -- and I -- and I need to stop 
here to -- to make sure that the record is absolutely clear.  These 
were not compliance audits.  These were evaluations, and these were 
really management consulting assignments to American and to the 
APA as to how we might do business differently in a positive way.
		We have taken all three of those efforts and 
unduplicated the recommendations which were in many cases very 
similar, and we've ended up with some 85 unduplicated 
recommendations. 	
		Interestingly, over half of those 85 recommendations 
came out of the joint FAA/APA and American SAT Program, a very 
productive part of the -- of the three evaluations.
		American and -- and the APA have sat and taken those 
85.  We have put them in -- in a priority as to both time line and the 
importance or safety impact, and we produced from that effort, 
which no one can probably read, but from left to right, across the 
bottom, are time lines.
		The first group is the first quarter of this year.  The 
middle group, June of this year, and then, finally, a group of --
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Victor, can you put the slide back up 
while he's talking about it?  Thank you.
		THE WITNESS:  Finally, on the far right, a group that will 
extend from July of this year to January of the year 02.  The most 
important are on the top.  The lesser impacts are on the bottom, 
and, so, now we have an agreed-upon priority of -- of how to proceed.
		We have submitted that list to the CMO.  They have 
reviewed it.  They are comfortable with our implementation plan, and 
in fact, we have taken this work and gone to Washington with our 
CMO individuals and presented this to the Flight Standards Group in 
Washington, and certainly following this hearing, Mr. Chairman, it is 
our plan to -- to share the detail of this with your staff as well as we 
did back in '95 and '96.
		So, we have -- we have learned some more things.  I 
think it's fair to say we've got some work to do.  We will be a better 
airline for it, and we think we've done this in a very straightforward 
participative way, and I'm now prepared for questions.
		BY DR. BYRNE:
	Q	Mr. Baker, a couple of follow-up questions.  The audit 
following -- in 1996, following the Cali and the Hartford accident, the 
Special Assessment Team -- seven areas that were evaluated.
		One of them you had up on one of your slides listing 
Operation Structures and Procedures.  Did that -- did the team that 
was responsible for looking at that area also evaluate corporate 
culture or organizational influences on flight operations?
	A	You're going back a little further than my memory can 
take me.  I don't believe that it -- its emphasis was in the cultural 
area.  There were some structural issues, but I -- I would frankly have 
to refresh myself to give you an accurate answer.
	Q	And concerning the audit after Little Rock, Mr. Valentine 
yesterday expressed some concerns about the rapid expansion and 
the large volume of training on-going at the airline.
		Were you aware of those concerns from the POI before 
yesterday, and how are you addressing those concerns?  Were they 
part of the audit?
	A	Yes.  I personally and the rest of the Flight staff has had 
an on-going dialogue with Mr. Valentine on that subject.  He has 
raised some very specific issues that we are reacting to.
		We think it is -- it is clearly manageable.  We -- we have 
put on the necessary resources to ensure that the training is -- is 
done properly and -- and completely.  I think the FAA has -- has done 
some of the same but perhaps needs additional help in that area.
		I would point out that while we added two fleet types, 
new fleet types, to American's fleet in 1999, we are also in the 
process of retiring two fleets that will decomplicate the airline 
considerably.  These are first-generation jet aircraft, the 7-2 and the 
DC-10.
		Secondly, back in the '80s, American grew at an even 
greater rate in terms of the number of new aircraft and pilots we took 
in.  This is not a new phenomena in the industry, and, finally, the 
growth on a relative basis in the industry is often much higher than it 
is at American.
	Q	Thank you.
		BY MR. FEITH:
	Q	Mr. Baker, in looking at this one slide that you had 
highlights by category, one of the -- 
		MR. FEITH:  And I don't know, Victor, if you could put 
that last slide back up?
		BY MR. FEITH:
	Q	In the lower left-hand corner, there is -- one of these 
objectives is to improve chief pilot communication skills.  Can you 
tell us what that is, and what prompted that?
	A	I'm not sure I recall what prompted it, but what we have 
planned there is to send our chief pilots who run our bases to formal 
leadership education school on communications, so that they are 
good at communicating to their line pilots, standing on their feet to 
express themselves.
		They asked, I believe, for this kind of training.  We have 
started that training already and have several graduates.
	Q	Was there a problem?  Apparently -- apparently there 
was or they wouldn't have asked for this, but do you have any kind of 
specifics you could give us?
	A	I do not.  I believe it came out of the -- the notion that 
some of them felt less competent than they wanted to be on their 
feet, and if we're -- if they're going to lead people, they need to be 
confident.
	Q	Is this a requisite now for new chief pilots being selected 
in the position then?
	A	I think it will become part of -- of the training that -- 
some of which or most of it will be given after they're selected, but 
we think this is important training.
	Q	The term "corporate culture" has been brought up.  Can 
you just briefly describe for me what your belief is about corporate 
culture?
	A	Corporate culture to me is -- is an articulation of the 
environment in which a company or a department or any kind of an 
organization operates on a day-to-day basis.
		It is really the atmosphere that the leadership of -- of 
that organization sets by example.  It has various characteristics as 
to whether people feel good working there, whether they feel 
comfortable bringing problems forward, whether they feel they're 
being compensated fairly for -- for their effort and within the 
competitive marketplace.
		So, it's all of those factors that lead up to the basic 
question to an individual, and that is, is this a good place to work, 
and do you want to be here tomorrow?
		I think it's many, many factors, but -- but those are just 
a few.
	Q	Do you feel that you in your position and in your 
previous position were plugged in enough into the system to get a 
good flavor for the corporate culture that existed at American Airlines 
not only this past year but over the last five-six years?
	A	Yes, I do.
	Q	Have you seen any kind of change?  Has it basically 
stagnated?  Is everybody happy?
	A	Well, --
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Well, now, Mr. Feith, hell, everybody 
isn't happy at the NTSB.
		MR. FEITH:  Yeah.  Well, you didn't ask about the 
corporate culture at the NTSB.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Well, --
		MR. FEITH:  I'm just seeing if there's a better place to 
work.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Well, now, if you're going to do that, 
you need to do that on your own time.
		THE WITNESS:  You and I will talk later, Mr. Feith.
		MR. FEITH:  Okay.
		THE WITNESS:  I -- I think the answer to that must be 
taken in its proper context.  The airline business is a tough business.  
We don't make any money.  This is very cyclical.  If you look at the 
industry over the last 50 years, we basically have been a break-even.  
Many years, we make a lot of money, and a lot of years, we lose a lot 
of money.
		We uniquely combine large numbers of capital assets 
called airplanes that cost lots and lots of money with a very high 
labor concentration.  That's a very unusual mix in corporate America.  
That means basically that we must run that business carefully and 
diligently, and we're working on one percent kind of margins.
		That makes it a -- a challenging business for all of us to 
be in, and we have to keep, of course, the priorities straight of safety, 
customer convenience and the other earmarks of our product.
		That -- that, I think, causes the employees of an airline 
to be -- to have to be aggressive, to be intelligent, to work hard, and 
in our -- in our environment in which we're constantly re-evaluating 
and making changes, it -- it's a fairly turbulent environment.
		I don't think there's anything peculiar about American 
Airlines in that regard, but I think that's a fair assessment of the 
industry.
		BY MR. FEITH:
	Q	Well, I wanted to get -- get that -- that flavor only 
because I know that Mr. Carty had made a statement in a speech 
regarding corporate culture at American Airlines, and he had said 
that one of the strategic objectives of American Airlines was to create 
the industry's best corporate culture.
		My question then is, what tools or what strategies are 
going to be used to improve a corporate culture that we know is 
volatile in any organization, NTSB, American Airlines or anywhere 
else, but how is that objective going to be attained, especially -- and 
the second part is what tools are you going to use to effectively 
evaluate management in attaining that goal?
	A	Unfortunately, there are no quick, easy answers to those 
issues.  The things we are paying attention to in hopes that they will 
deliver a -- a positive culture for our employees which then quickly 
reflects to our customers, and if our customers are happy, our 
shareholders are happy.
		Some of those issues start with the leadership.  Who are 
we selecting to lead the company all the way through the 
management structure?  Do they embark upon their jobs with the 
right attitudes and expectations of their people?  Are we giving them 
the proper leadership training or are we simply giving them a badge 
and throwing them out there, saying you're now the boss?
		I think the -- the discussion we had about our chief pilot 
communication skill is an example of the recognition that we've got 
to have the right skills in the hands of our -- of our managers.
		We've got to deal with the policy issues of compensation 
and the way we treat people aggressively but clearly with equity.  
People are very sensitive to whether they think they are being treated 
equitably, one to another group.
		So, it's a constant process of evaluation, hiring the right 
people, giving them the training, deciding on policies that affect 
people in a humanitarian and equitable fashion, and then continuing 
when things go wrong to deal with those objectively and -- and 
forcefully and aggressively, and I think if we do some of those types 
of things and insist upon it all the way up and down the line, we're 
going to have a very positive culture at American Airlines.
	Q	Thank you.  Switching gears back to the specific area of 
flight training and personnel performance, with regard to trend 
monitoring for deficiencies in individual crew members' performance, 
does American Airlines have a system in place to do that?
	A	Well, it comes in a number of flavors, I think.  AASAP is 
clearly an opportunity for -- for that kind of input, and we -- and we 
do get that input.  The evaluation during recurrent and upgrade 
training is -- is another process that is in place along with our check 
rides.
		So, I -- I think we have all of the traditional tools, plus 
AASAP in place, to deal with that.
	Q	And in keeping that type of record, the training records 
and things like that, do you record negative as well as positive or just 
positive as far as check ride passing and things like that?
	A	I'm going to have to defer that.  I don't know the detail of 
the recordkeeping system.
	Q	Okay.  The reason I bring that up is looking at getting 
meaningful qualitative data to make assessments as -- as 
management, looking for trends, given that you have a very complex 
AASAP Program and OF25 Program, is American -- do they have the 
proper tools in place to be able to make those evaluations?
	A	I think so.  I think we do as much or more than -- than 
we are required to do under -- under the FARs, and we do as much or 
more than -- than our -- than the other big airlines.
		We are always open to suggestions in that area and 
opportunity to learn.
	Q	And this may be a difficult question to answer, but you 
had said that you -- you believed you were fairly plugged into the 
culture that exists at American Airlines.
		What types of feedback do you receive in making sure 
that the pilots that don't have the feeling of subtle pressures that 
they have to complete flights, that they -- you know, that they have to 
fly on the edge of fatigue and things like that?
		We've received, as the NTSB, excuse me, numerous 
people calling us or providing us letters that while we understand 
your position, and -- and yours is the company, I mean we continue 
to get this feedback that people are flying tired, that American 
Airlines pilots are still flying on the edge of fatigue, and that 
management isn't listening to these pilots who say, you know, 
management's saying one thing for the cameras, but in fact, this is 
the reality.
		How plugged in are you, and what kind of feedback, I 
mean, are you getting that -- that's different than what we're getting 
because we're basically at opposite ends of this table and trying to 
address this problem?
		You said that you are revising the fatigue issues at -- at 
American.  Can you just -- I don't know if we've described that or not, 
but if you could just briefly describe what you're doing to correct 
that?
	A	Let me go back over that, if I might.
	Q	I -- I -- pardon my ignorance if I've -- if you've already 
done it.  I -- I just don't recall.
	A	Well, very simply, we -- we revised and re-emphasized 
our fatigue policies.  As you know, the reserve rest issue in the 
domestic operation has been one of controversy over the last eight 
months.  The industry is now working toward compliance with -- with 
the FAR.  
		Substantial impacts on the airlines, and while we 
transition to that, which requires us to -- to add considerable number 
of personnel, we put into place a fatigue -- a no-fault, if you will, 
fatigue policy, and we have said to our pilots in no uncertain terms, 
you feel you are unable to perform because of fatigue, then you're off 
the trip by your -- by your own request with -- with no recourse from 
the company, and -- and you'll never from us again.
		The proof of the fact that I believe that the notion that 
American Airlines pilots are routinely operating in a fatigued fashion 
is simply that the number of people availing themselves of that 
process has not increased.
	Q	Okay.  Let me just take a word that you said, and that is 
no-fault policy.  Was there a fault policy?
	A	No, but -- but, clearly, people that -- that would -- would 
fly part of a sequence and then decide that they were too fatigued 
were -- were asked by their -- by their base management what the 
issue was and what the problem was and how did it happen and so 
forth.
		We -- we've abandoned all that inquiry, and if they go 
fatigued, they go fatigued, and that's the end of the story.
	Q	Does this carry on to the other side of the cockpit door, 
to the cabin crew as well?
	A	I'm not familiar with what fatigue policies the flight 
attendants operate under.
	Q	Well, if I butcher this question, then Don will bail me 
out, but you had made mention about -- and in one of your -- in this 
last slide you had talking about the revised thunderstorm avoidance 
policy, and Captain Lewis talked about this yesterday, and that was 
an increase, one day check -- for the check airman of one-day 
training on airborne weather radar and the interpretation of the 
results.
		Was that based on this accident at Little Rock that that 
increased training occurred, and who does that apply to?  Captain 
Lewis had talked about check airmen.  Shouldn't that training be 
filtered throughout the entire flight organization?
	A	Absolutely, and that is clearly our plan.  As I think you 
heard Captain Lewis or -- or one of the other witnesses say, our 
principal radar training has to be done in the aircraft to get the true 
techniques of operating airborne radar down properly.
		So, we started with our check airmen who are our 
principal teachers, if you will, in flight as they do line checks and 
upgrade training and so forth.
		It is clearly our intent to move on to all of our captains 
and first officers with this radar training.  It is something that we 
have talked about for a couple of years.  I think the situation here in 
Little Rock clearly made us simply make the decision and 
commitment to go forward immediately.
	Q	Switching gears again, originally it was brought up 
during the early stages of this investigation about crew pairing with 
the management pilot flying with a new first officer.  Do you have any 
opinions on that?
	A	No, I don't.
	Q	Okay.  That is all of my questions.  I know that Dr. Byrne 
has one last question.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Well, let's move on, Dr. Byrne.  What 
is your question?
		DR. BYRNE:  I'll make it quick.
		BY DR. BYRNE:
	Q	Yesterday, we spoke about procedures and techniques 
and the differences between the two.  The Safety Board raised the 
issue of the differences between procedures and techniques in its 
1993 -- or its report on the 1993 DC-10 landing accident at Dallas.
		How can American ensure that techniques used by 
individual pilots are equally safe and equally tolerant of error?
	A	Well, that's a very far-reaching question, and I'm not 
sure I'm -- I'm the one that ought to answer that.  It's much more in 
line with someone more familiar with the specifics of flight training 
than I.
		But I -- I think from my -- my perspective and my focus 
in the corporation, that's got to be an item that we insist that our 
flight management pay attention to, but I'm not qualified to -- to 
deliver any information on the specifics of how you would do that.
	Q	Thank you, Mr. Baker.
		DR. BYRNE:  Mr. Chairman, this completes my 
questioning.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  We'll move to the tables.  Little Rock 
National Airport?
		MS. SCHWARTZ:  No questions, Mr. Chairman.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  The Little Rock Fire Department?
		MR. CANTRELL:  No questions, sir.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Federal Aviation Administration?
		MR. STREETER:  No questions, Mr. Chairman.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  The Boeing Commercial Airplane 
Group?
		MR. HINDERBERGER:  No questions, Mr. Chairman.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  The Allied Pilots Association?
		MR. ZWINGLE:  We have no questions, Mr. Chairman.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  The Association of Professional Flight 
Attendants?
		MS. LORD-JONES:  Actually, I have one.
INTERVIEW BY PARTIES TO THE HEARING
		BY MS. LORD-JONES:
	Q	Mr. Baker, throughout your testimony today, you have 
mentioned the AASAP Program.  Lately, there has been references to 
the AASAP Program as an immunity program or a whistle-blower 
program. 
		Would you mind commenting on that for us, please?
	A	Just two short weeks ago, President Clinton held a news 
briefing in the White House in which he endorsed and -- and the FAA 
announced their intent to execute an advisory circular that will 
permit the AASAP concept to be implemented at the rest of the U.S. 
industry's airlines.
		It has taken us five years to get to that point, and we are 
extremely pleased that he took that action.
		Unfortunately, the media in reporting that activity 
suggested that perhaps this was an immunity or -- or a whistle-
blower program which -- which I find a very disturbing and -- and 
inaccurate characterization.
		This program is intended to get information out in the 
open that otherwise we would know very little about.  The ultimate 
immunity in the safety business and aviation is silence, and without 
AASAP and its companion programs, FOQA, that we will be 
developing, we will have to live under silence, and that's the ultimate 
immunity, not this program.
		MS. LORD-JONES:  I have no further questions.  Thank 
you.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Very well.  The Allied -- let's see.  No.  
I'm -- I'm -- back to American Airlines.  No.  The National Weather 
Service?  I apologize.  I lost track.
		MR. KUESSNER:  No questions, sir.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Okay.  American Airlines?
		MR. McFALL:  No questions, sir.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Very well.  Mr. Sweedler?
		MR. SWEEDLER:  Yes, Mr. Chairman.
INTERVIEW BY BOARD OF INQUIRY
		BY MR. SWEEDLER:
	Q	Mr. Baker, I have one question I'd like to pose to you.  
There was some discussion yesterday about the possible use of 
additional data to look at potential problems before they become 
accidents.
		I was very impressed with your AASAP Program and the 
use of this program by -- now by the rest of the industry, hopefully, 
but as you -- as you're, I'm sure, aware, there are some airlines, 
primarily in Europe, that use recorded data as part of this program 
to sort of augment what you -- what you have in AASAP, and, for 
example -- I'll just take one airline as an example.
		KLM has a program that they've devised between -- with 
-- with the cooperation of -- of their pilots obviously, where every time 
a large aircraft returns to Amsterdam, the data that's recorded is 
downloaded and is run against a program just to see if there are 
omissions or -- or deviations from standard procedures, and anything 
they learn from -- from -- from that program is obviously 
disseminated to the pilots for -- so they can learn from this, and 
they've come up with some good examples similar to what you have, 
and what I'm -- what I'm asking you is, have you considered using 
this to augment your AASAP Program or if you -- if you haven't, can I 
sort of ask you to take a look at this and see if it's something that you 
could be utilizing?
	A	Thank you very much.  We -- we consider AASAP really 
to be a Phase 1 of a FOQA program as they're commonly called.  We, 
too, share your enthusiasm for the benefits that can come from on-
board recorders that are occasionally dumped and so forth.
		We and the Allied Pilots Association have committed to 
each other to work in that direction as rapidly as we can get there.  It 
is not as easy a subject in our environment as it is in Europe to get 
into place, but we share the enthusiasm and the importance of it, 
and I have no doubt that American Airlines and the Allied Pilots 
Association are going to get that done.
	Q	Thank you, sir.
		MR. SWEEDLER:  I have no further questions, Mr. 
Chairman.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Mr. Berman?
		MR. BERMAN:  Thank you.
		BY MR. BERMAN:
	Q	Mr. Baker, we are looking forward to meeting the new 
Vice President of Safety, Mr. Hern.  We'd like to know him, and then 
hopefully we'll never have to speak to him on an urgent basis.
		Could you please also fill in for us the names that were 
on those boxes going down through the Flight and Operations and 
Maintenance Safety people working for Mr. Hern?
	A	We'd be glad to -- to fill those boxes in as we go along.  
That organization, as you can imagine, because, as I indicated, it 
represents a large expansion of resource, is yet to be populated, but 
we'll give you those names, and as that organization evolves, just 
how it lines up.  Be glad to.
	Q	Okay.  Are any of them populated right now or is it --
	A	Yes.  On the -- on the Safety side of that organization, I 
believe that Captain Scott Griffith will be the principal leadership 
player there.
	Q	For Flight Safety?
	A	Yes.  On the Operational Audits, Mr. McFall will lead that 
group.  The Security Group is currently managed by Mr. Larry 
Wonsley, and he will continue to do that.  We have not selected an 
Environmental or Compliance leader at this point.
	Q	And Maintenance also is open?
	A	Maintenance?
	Q	I think you had a Maintenance Safety Branch somewhere 
there.
	A	Airworthiness managing director will be on the Tulsa 
staff principally.  I do not have that name.
	Q	Okay.  Thank you.  Does American Airlines track flights 
that are close to the 15-minute DOT limit for timeliness, the ones 
that are kind of in danger of falling across and being classified late, 
and does American inform the pilots when flights are in that status?
	A	Not on a real-time basis.  As we go through the month, 
which is the DOT recordkeeping window, and we have flights that are 
performing woefully below the performance expectation, we try to 
work with the stations to get the airplanes out on time.
		We let the crew member know that this is a DOT trip 
that hasn't performed very well, but on a real-time basis, as an 
aircraft flies this afternoon, we do not.
	Q	So, you do let the flight crew know, say, on their release 
for the day that -- that a certain flight is a DOT-critical flight?
	A	That -- that it is a trip that has not performed.  We -- we 
-- we call it the "shame list", --
	Q	Hm-hmm.
	A	-- and trips that are on the shame list, which is an 
evolving list every day, we will let the crew know that the trip is on 
that list and -- and for their information.
	Q	And what do you expect them to do as pilots when --
	A	I think --
	Q	-- they see that?
	A	-- it's just part of the situational awareness.  We don't 
ask or expect them to do anything in particular but just be aware 
that it's -- it's a trip that hasn't performed well.
	Q	Okay.  Let me switch gears a little bit and talk about the 
decision you've made to separate training from flight standards.
		Prior to the Little Rock accident, had you taken a look at 
how other airlines organized themselves in this regard, identified any 
different practices or best practices in the industry?
	A	It -- it is very complicated to try as hard as we try to -- to 
examine how other airlines do their business.  We -- we -- we spend a 
lot of time doing exactly that.
		The problem we run into is we don't -- we see a box that 
is labeled similar to one we have, but the actual functions of those 
are very different carrier-to-carrier.
		So, yes, we have looked at the other carriers.  We see a 
mix of approaches to how the Flight Department is organized and 
what apparent authority they have.  We try to learn from that, but it 
is a very difficult process, in spite of our efforts to -- to know exactly 
how our principal competitors are -- are organized and doing 
business.
	Q	Hm-hmm.
	A	But we have seen different approaches to -- to training 
from executing the training syllabus to -- to checking and 
standardization.  We were once organized as we are now with the 
separation.  So, this is really a return to that approach of many, 
many years ago, long before I came along.
	Q	Had this change been discussed after the accidents 
preceding Little Rock and before the Little Rock accident?
	A	I believe so.
	Q	And why wasn't the action taken before Little Rock?
	A	Whenever you make those kinds of -- of large changes, it 
has lots of impact on -- on people and the way things happen.  So, we 
-- we -- we are careful and prudent, and we try to build a consensus 
before we make that big a change.
		We were -- we simply weren't able to -- to get to the point 
of actioning that concept, but we are now of the view that that's a 
good thing to do, and we're going to do it.
	Q	In the audits that you conducted and that the other 
parties conducted with you after this accident, did you get any 
specific data to feed into your organization's decision-making 
apparatus that would indicate to you that there was a specific reason 
to separate these functions?
		In other words, was there a problem identified?
	A	Well, let me recall to you that -- that the 
-- two of the three evaluation approaches were -- were a process of 
garnering the views of very accomplished and senior aviation 
consultants.
		In both cases, they made recommendations in the 
direction that we have taken, but they didn't necessarily, as most 
consultants do, they don't justify their views.  They just give them to 
us.  But we took those views.  We thought about them.  We had 
thought about them in the past and became convinced that this was 
the right time to make such a change, and we've done it.
	Q	Okay.  Sir, you mentioned that distraction and rushing 
to comply were the top two kind of high-volume mass findings 
coming out of the mass of incidents reported in AASAP.
	A	Correct.
	Q	Certainly without prejudging anything, those are -- those 
are issues that need to be considered in this accident as well.
		What is American Airlines doing about these 
-- these high-volume issues that churn up -- I'm sure pop up across 
the AASAP Committee's desk many, many times on each meeting?
	A	Well, they become briefing items.  Let's take distractions 
as a good example.  We -- we brief our captains.  We have a 
magazine that -- that we put out approximately quarterly called 
"Flight Deck" in which we try to communicate with our captains and 
first officers about important subjects.  That is an avenue for us to 
deal with that subject on our check rides, in our recurrent training, 
and -- and then, quite honestly, whatever we can do to eliminate the 
sources of those distractions.
		Frankly, and this is not a secret to anyone, the conflict 
that occasionally occurs in a large company between a union and 
management is -- is a generator of -- of distraction. 
		So, to the degree that we can, along with APA, control 
that and keep it out of the cockpit, that's good.
	Q	Hm-hmm.
	A	So, it's a constant process, I think, through a lot of 
different avenues.
	Q	I hear what you're saying, and I guess while the mass 
volume of reports that involve these factors may make it appear like 
those are the ones to treat quickly in AASAP process, maybe the 
message is actually the opposite, and these -- these things that keep 
repeating again and again and aren't -- aren't the rare unique finds 
are -- are perhaps a place to focus.
		Also, you're raising the -- the communication issue 
between pilots and management raises the next issue I was going to 
bring up.  Was that specifically or particularly an acute problem at 
the time of the Little Rock accident?
	A	I don't believe so.  I frankly don't recall the source of 
that particular recommendation, but I don't believe so.
	Q	Hm-hmm.  Okay.  Thinking back to the question I asked 
you a few minutes ago about the DOT time and informing the pilots 
when their flights are chronically a late on, I'm having trouble trying 
to identify exactly what you would expect a pilot to do or -- or what a 
pilot could do that -- that might not, you know, be subliminally or 
inadvertently giving them the message that they ought to rush to 
comply during that flight.  What -- what's your thought about that?
	A	Well, I think it is -- it is simply an element of situational 
awareness of many factors that we inform our crew members of.  If -- 
if you look at the paperwork we give to a crew member, it is a lot of 
information about a whole plethora of subjects across a wide range 
that we think as a command pilot they ought to have the benefit of.
		This is just simply one of those -- those factors.  We have 
never trained nor told our crew members or captains to do anything 
in particular but be aware of the fact that this airplane has -- or this 
particular flight has -- has not performed very well, and if you had a 
choice of -- of being able to help the dependability or not, we want 
them to know that.
	Q	Has American given any thought as a corporate 
philosophy to -- to insulating its pilots from certain information that 
might have only potentially negative safety implications and no 
positive ones?
	A	I'm not opposed to that concept.  I -- as I sit here, I'm 
not quite sure how you do that, but --
	Q	Well, --
	A	-- conceptually, --
	Q	-- for example, not telling them which flights are 
chronically late?
	A	Well, you first have to agree that that's a negative, but I 
take --
	Q	I said potentially negative, but I won't say it's a complete 
negative one, yeah.
		Was this flight, the accident flight, a DOT-flagged flight?
	A	I don't -- I don't know.
	Q	Okay.
	A	That -- certainly that evening, it was over two hours late 
before it ever left DFW.
	Q	Yes.  It certainly was not going to cross the boundary to 
be on time --
	A	No.
	Q	-- no matter what the crew did.  Just in the global sense, 
based on the findings of all the post-accident audits, do you feel 
there is possibly a level of complacency in the Operations 
Departments at your airline that somehow managed to survive the -- 
the previous accidents and get up to the one we're talking about 
here?
	A	I don't believe there -- there is a complacency issue at 
American Airlines.  However, that is -- that is an issue that requires 
constant attention and focus at every airline.
		These -- these aircraft that we fly today are -- are so 
sophisticated and reliable, 99 percent of the time, the operation 
works very smoothly.  So, complacency is a risk that we need to 
focus on every day, but I don't believe I've ever seen anything to 
suggest that complacency is a bigger problem at American versus 
anywhere else.
	Q	Hm-hmm.  We certainly applaud all the findings, all the 
hard work in these audits and the actions that the company's taking 
to -- to resolve the problems that were found, but the question still 
does remain, why wasn't the organization fired up in the same way 
before the accident and able to prevent it?
	A	Well, I wish I -- I wish I knew what we could have done 
precisely to have avoided each of the events that -- that we've had.  I 
can -- I can only tell you with some conviction that every one of them 
is unacceptable, and that we are committed as -- as a leadership 
team and every employee at American Airlines who pay a big price 
when these events happen, that we're going to work as hard as we 
know how with -- with the best of help that we can garner to not have 
another one.
		I don't want to do another one of these hearings, sir.
	Q	Do you think you'll have the same number, volume and -- 
and level of activity of auditing every year on into the future as you 
did after this accident?
	A	I think we're going to do more.  As I tried to -- to show -- 
to show you, we are moving toward less internal auditing and more 
third party auditing for the purpose of creating an on-going process 
of -- of objective assessment of our performance against our -- our 
own rules and our own standards and those that are expected of us.
	Q	That certainly gives the FAA and ATOS and anyone else 
looking at your company from outside a thing to monitor and watch 
on into the future, and it will be --
	A	And I think ATOS is -- is potentially going to make a 
dramatic contribution to aviation safety.
	Q	Let me ask you just a very specific final question that 
was just passed to me.  Point of clarification.
		Is there a new thunderstorm avoidance policy or are we 
talking about the training that is being given to check airmen?
	A	Well, the policy is the same, and that is we do not enter 
areas of -- of thunderstorms.  The training is in evolution, but I don't 
believe that it has actually been put into place.
		I'm probably not the right one to be precise on that, but 
that's my understanding.
	Q	Okay.  Thank you.  No more questions.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Go ahead, Tom.
		BY MR. HAUETER:
	Q	I just have a couple.  To follow up Mr. Sweedler's 
question about the FOQA Program, does American now routinely 
download quick access recorder information and review it?
	A	We download the recorders in response to either an 
AASAP event in which it would be appropriate to understand the 
movement of the aircraft and so forth and any -- any events, such as 
a tail strike, turbulence.
		So, we have half a dozen or so event characteristics that 
drive us to pull the data.  We do not in -- in a programmatic sense, as 
Mr. Sweedler indicated the Europeans do, pull recorders looking for 
excedances.  We have -- we have not reached the point yet with the 
Allied Pilots Association where that -- that approach is -- is underway.
	Q	Okay.  And you made mention that you fly in the 
jumpseat a fair amount.  Do you find the pilots to be very forthright 
and talking to you about their problems concerning the line or are 
they intimidated by your position in their cockpit?
	A	Well, I don't think I'm a very intimidating guy, and they 
seem to tell me an awful lot of things that -- that they'd like me to 
hear.  
		I -- I am very fortunate in that over the many years I've 
been with the company, I think I have developed the confidence of a 
lot of those folks, and they don't hesitate to write, call me at home, 
call me in the office, send me e-mails, and they talk freely on the 
jumpseat.
		So, I -- I usually walk -- my wife always complains that I 
litter the top of my dresser with little pieces of paper of all the things 
people tell me as I journey around the company, things that need 
attention, things that need changing, things that are problems, and 
our cockpit crewmen are professionals who -- who believe very 
strongly in what they're doing, and they want it to be right, and they 
want it to be safe, and they -- they tell me a lot.
	Q	Thank you, sir.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Mr. Clark?
		MR. CLARK:  No questions.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Mr. Baker, first, let me just observe 
and thank you for your presence.  The audience may all know or may 
not know, but you are certainly respected as a leader in the aviation 
industry, an effective spokesman for your airline and someone who is 
called upon and very knowledgeable in the safety area, and the 
Board has long felt that the safety culture of an organization depends 
on leadership from the top.
		You need to have the culture, safety culture up and 
down the organization, but clearly the individuals in charge of the 
resources of the organization are the ones that can have the most 
impact in setting the tone for the organization, and I think it speaks 
in my personal opinion very favorably of American Airlines that you, 
as the Vice Chairman of the whole operation, have taken this time to 
come and -- and participate in these hearings, and I hope they will be 
of -- that what you learn here and see here will be of continued 
benefit to you in your responsibilities.
		I also applaud you on trying to develop new leadership 
at American.  That's one of the situations in the Federal Government 
we're constantly challenged with, is trying to bring on new and able 
public servants to fulfill those responsibilities.
		Tell us a little about -- you put up a slide and talked 
about the growth of the system from 1979 to 1995.  Can you tell us -
- can you characterize that in terms of the number of either flights or 
the number of pilots, mechanics?  How much growth was there 
through that period?
		THE WITNESS:  Let me take you back to approximately 
1982 when the first substantial growth at American Airlines and for 
that matter the industry took place.
		In the early '80s, American Airlines was fundamentally a 
domestic airline, an airline that employed approximately 34,000 
employees, an airline that operated 240 or 50 jet aircraft.
		We saw as deregulation had occurred in the late '70s 
that the only way that we were going to survive the almost perfectly 
competitive business that the airline industry is, that we were going 
to have to grow, both domestically and internationally, and we set 
about that through the middle and late '80s and arrived at the Desert 
Storm period of 1990-91 having grown to an airline of something 
over 600 aircraft and probably 70 or 80,000 employees.
		We did not grow during those Desert Storm years when 
the economy was lacking.  Our competitors did start to grow before 
we did, and, so, we again started to grow in 1998, and, today, we sit 
at approximately a 100,000 employees and 750 jet aircraft.
		We operate internationally to Europe, South and Central 
America, the Orient and North America.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  And how many pilots and how many 
mechanics do -- do you have that information on the top of your 
head?  If not, I --
		THE WITNESS:  We've grown from approximately 7,000 
pilots.  I believe we're just over 10,000 pilots today.  We are hiring 
pilots at the rate of 80 per month.  That is the maximum that we can 
train effectively with our resources, and, frankly, that's -- that's as 
many as I want to bring on at one time.
		Mechanics have likewise grown commensurate with the 
fleet.  They don't grow quite in the same relationship because the 
new aircraft requires fewer man hours in its initial years than an 
older one, but as a rule of thumb, Mr. Chairman, we apply 
approximately 14 man hours of mechanic time for every hour that an 
aircraft flies.  Now, that's a blended number of the very oldest 
airplanes in the fleet and the brand-new 737 we took last week.
		As those airplanes mature and get more hours, the 
maintenance work goes up, and that, of course, is one of the reasons 
we're anxious to retire our older fleets, the 727 and DC-10.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Now, does that -- do those numbers 
include the American Eagle system?
		THE WITNESS:  They do not.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  And could you give us an idea of how 
big American Eagle is, and I believe it's under the umbrella there?  
It's under you and Mr. Carty?
		THE WITNESS:  It is, indeed.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Are those subsidiaries wholly owned 
by AMR?
		THE WITNESS:  Yes.  There's a fairly long history there 
that I won't take a lot of time on, but American Eagle is a large 
regional airline that operates basically in Puerto Rico, Florida, New 
England, the Chicago/Upper Midwest, the DFW area and the West 
Coast.
		It is the by-product of several years of merger, 
acquisition and consolidation of smaller regional airlines, but, today, 
with the exception of the operation in Puerto Rico, it operates as a 
single certificate, operating two aircraft, three aircraft types, the 
regional jet, the Saab and the ATR.
		It is about 220 aircraft in total.  I do not know the 
employee numbers.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  The reason I ask that is that we have 
a growth in this country of the feeder system, of which American 
Eagle is an important part of that community, similar to the one we 
are meeting in today, and you had put up the slide that got my 
attention in regard to the major accidents, and I accept the fact that 
you all view Cali and this particular accident as sort of maybe major 
accidents that prompted you to action.
		During my tenure at the Board, as Chairman, the Board 
has, in February of '94, dealt, as you know, with the Saab 340 
incident at New Rhodes, Louisiana.  I was the member on scene in 
Marsville, North Carolina, which was an American Eagle Jetstream, 
3379, with 15 fatal that occurred in December of '94.
		The Board has looked at in Grandby, Connecticut, a 
collision you're very familiar with with the major -- with American 
Airlines, the MD-83, that occurred in November of 1995.
		As I mentioned, of course, I was the member on scene at 
the American Eagle accident in Roselawn that we are familiar with 
with -- with a number of fatalities.
		In addition, the Board has investigated incidents that 
met the category for our investigations in American 1340 in Chicago, 
American 903 in Palm Springs, and just recently have finished an 
investigation on a DC-10 in Antiqua.
		So, the -- when we talk about the number of events, 
those are in addition to Cali and to the incident here in Little Rock, 
and -- and without getting into the details of the -- of the accident, I 
think and I feel that that has probably helped prompt the corporate 
leadership to take the action that you all have taken in these areas, 
and -- and I -- and I applaud that.
		I just have a couple of questions in regard to this 
organization and this information.  How does this apply to American 
Eagle?
		THE WITNESS:  American Eagle operates on its own 
certificate.  It is what I would characterize as a sister company.  We 
are increasingly sharing both resources and -- and human capital 
back and forth.  Everything that we do at American, we will share 
with American Eagle and likely implement in an appropriately-similar 
way.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  And I mentioned that because I fly, 
you know.  I'm one of your frequent fliers, and I have your miles, and 
when I buy a ticket on your airline, I don't usually pay any attention, 
and I may go out, and it's an American Eagle flight or it may be, you 
know, an American flight, but I really don't know usually till I get to 
the gate, and the colors are the same.  The uniforms are the same, 
and I'm just wondering whether the safety system that's in place is 
the same.
		THE WITNESS:  I think we share the responsibility for 
both certificate operations.  We are committed equally on both sides 
and understand the public's perception, and, frankly, they deserve to 
have the best that we can provide on -- on both airlines.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  But as Vice Chairman, both of them 
are under your direction? 
		THE WITNESS:  They are, indeed.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  And do you jumpseat on American 
Eagle as well?
		THE WITNESS:  Yes, I do.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  That's good.  The issue of the chief 
pilot, would you kind of explain very briefly again for me, and I don't 
want to try to cover any of the ground that's already been covered, 
what is the role of the chief pilot?
		THE WITNESS:  Are you referring to the corporate chief 
pilot or a base chief pilot?
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Well, the gentleman that was in this 
particular accident flight in Chicago, I guess we were referring to him 
as the chief pilot.  What -- what distinguished him from the rest of 
the pilot community?
		THE WITNESS:  Of the almost 10,000 pilots, they are 
assigned to nine crew bases across our domestic system.  All of our 
crew bases are within the United States.
		Our two largest crew bases are at Dallas-Fort Worth 
Airport and Chicago, which are our two large domestic hubs.
		In Chicago, I'm going to guess that we probably have on 
the order of 2,500 pilots who are assigned to that base.  In addition 
to those pilots, we have a management structure assigned to that 
base for the purpose of supervising and providing those interfaces to 
the corporation that every employee deserves in the way of personnel 
issues and paycheck issues and communications conduits and so 
forth.
		Captain Bushman was one of the team of pilots who had 
been hired to serve as a supervisory pilot at the Chicago base.  He 
and his other colleagues in that role worked for a base manager and 
chief pilot who's the boss in Chicago.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Okay.  But he was -- in other words, 
you have 10,000 in American Airlines, the pilots you're responsible 
for.  How many at American Eagle?
		THE WITNESS:  Probably on the order of 3,000 pilots.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  So, an additional 3,000, but here, 
obviously the chief pilot is somebody who's picked out for above-
average ability, leadership skills, communications skills?
		THE WITNESS:  Yes, sir, exactly.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  You talk about a -- the organization 
being data-rich, and I -- and I think that's -- and I applaud that, and I 
think that's excellent.
		I do wonder, how does that -- we saw some specific 
questions, I think, that have been raised by this accident in regard to 
training, and how does that data -- how is that data richness used to 
evaluate the effectiveness of the -- of the training program?
		I'm thinking specifically of, you know, here we have the 
issues of reading radar data, understanding weather, understanding 
undefined terms, such as bowling alley and blanketed.
		How do you use that data to -- to get inside that system 
to evaluate the training since we've seen that we've had some -- I 
think the FAA is in the process of trying to go from one system of 
oversight to another, and the gap that's left, we're looking really to 
the carrier.
		THE WITNESS:  If -- if we collect and mine the data 
properly, we should -- what should pop out of that data are the non-
standard and the aberrational factors in our operation that we can 
then attempt to deal with by either changing the procedure, changing 
the training or getting a higher level of compliance to those.  You can 
-- you can fail for any one of those three problems.
		I'm not sure that we have as -- as robust a data richness 
in the -- in the training area as we need.  We do an awful lot of data 
collection on the pilot's view of the training process, and, of course, 
we do the line checking and so forth.
		Are there better ways beyond AASAP to do it?  I think we 
have to continuously look for those opportunities, but the data isn't 
worth an awful lot unless you can mine it up into action to change 
the training, change the compliance, and so forth.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Well, just -- and this is just a 
suggestion on my part.  That may be an area that you look at in 
terms of -- of your data -- data program.
		Now, I have -- first, let me applaud you on your no-fault 
fatigue program.  But also I have been told, and I guess learned from 
personal experience, that usually the last person that would know 
that they are fatigued is the person that is fatigued, and there is sort 
of a system among many of us that that's a sign of weakness, and 
therefore we don't -- if somebody says you look tired, well, no, I don't 
look tired.  I'm fine.
		There are times in your system that, you know, there's 
weather problems, there are other things that -- obviously delays 
increase the work in the cockpit, work on the crew, and is there 
anything being done in addition to the no-fault fatigue policy, which I 
-- you know, again we applaud, to try to either train the individual or 
provide some oversight in -- in key and difficult situations that you 
aren't over-stressing particular individuals in -- in the process?
		THE WITNESS:  Well, I think our fatigue 
countermeasures program is a good start.  Whether it's exactly 
targeted, I think, deserves a review.  It is intended to give our cockpit 
crew members some advice on -- on how to manage themselves as 
they cross time zones and attempt to sleep and eat and -- and get 
exercise and so forth.
		I'm not sure as I sit here because I'm not intimately 
familiar with the content of the program, that it stresses enough the 
self-evaluation, and it's okay to say I'm fatigued.  Maybe there's an 
opportunity to do some more there.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Okay.  Well, let me just say again, 
and this is my final comment, how much I appreciate you being here, 
how much I appreciate American Airlines providing all of the 
witnesses that you have in a very cooperative fashion, and I know 
that you share with me the -- the wish that we won't have any future 
hearings in regard to your all's operations, and I -- and I'm -- feel very 
comfortable with your commitment, and -- and I think again you are 
in a position, you and Mr. Carty, being responsible for the resources 
over both American Airlines and American Eagle, to be sure that the 
safety needs are -- are funded and given the priority, and I 
compliment you on the new structure and attempts to do that.
		As I have done with all the other witnesses, is there 
anything else that you additionally would like to add in this forum, in 
this setting, at this time for the benefit of this hearing, which, of 
course, is to focus on this accident, to try to come up with 
recommendations to prevent a similar occurrence?
		THE WITNESS:  Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.  
Let me just roll through a couple of subjects that have occurred to 
me over the last couple of days.
		I believe if you look at the record, that the problem of 
runway overruns is -- is getting worse.  The data I have looked at 
suggests that it has gotten worse in 1999 versus '98.  Much like 
runway incursions, I think we ought to look to see if there's some 
systemic runway-airplane combination problem that deserves our 
collective attention.
		Second, I believe that we can never do enough to 
improve weather analysis and reporting, both to the dispatcher and 
to the flight crew in a tactical sense.
		Third, programs like AASAP, which have the opportunity 
of allowing dedicated airline people to surface the issues to all of us 
to action, need to be encouraged, need to be fostered, and need to 
be implemented as quickly as we know how.
		The airline industry, the FAA, the government, is too 
slow in terms of time to market.  There is technology available to 
help us.  There are changes that we all have identified through this 
process and others, but we take too darn long to go from let's do it to 
getting it in place, and we've got to learn how to do that a lot better 
on the operating side of -- of aviation.
		We talked a lot yesterday about money.  This is a 
business that takes a lot of money, and for anyone to believe that the 
FAA or an airline is going to be able to do the safety job for the 
American public without adequate funding for equipment and people, 
that's just not going to make it.  So, we've got to have adequate 
money.  We've got to have a healthy industry to be able to afford to 
do the things that need to be done.
		And, finally, Mr. Chairman, a pet peeve of my own is that 
we, in my opinion, are on the brink of taking one of this country's 
greatest attributes, and that is commercial aviation, and putting it in 
jeopardy for the simple reason that we are not attracting the young 
men and women to this business, both on the government side and 
on the airline side, and with the down-sizing of the military, that's 
going to get worse.
		We've got to figure out how to make this an attractive 
place for men and women to work.  We can only make this business 
work if we have the very best people that this country can offer, and I 
think we -- we've got to go forward and figure that out as a national 
priority, not only for aviation but the other -- the other businesses 
that operate in challenging environments.
		This is a business that needs commitment and 
professionalism, and we need the young men and women to get 
started now.
		Mr. Chairman, I'm getting old, and I'm not going to be 
here much longer.  The young folks have got to come along, and 
we've got to do everything we can to encourage them.
		Thank you.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Well, thank you, Mr. Baker, and thank 
you for all your comments, and we've spent a long time with this 
witness, and I appreciate the time you've given us.
		We are going to take our lunch break.  I have a note here 
from the Mayor.  Now, don't -- he's not buying lunch.  But he does 
say we have an hour.  If the hotel restaurants are crowded, the River 
Market area is two blocks east on Markum, and the large market hall 
has many food vendors that provide delicious food from Arkansas.
		So, we would -- who do we need to meet with?  If we 
could -- Mr. Clark would like to meet with each one of the 
coordinators.  
		We'll stand in recess until 2:00.
		(Whereupon, at 1:00 p.m., the hearing was recessed, to 
reconvene this same day, Thursday, January 27th, 2000, at 2:00 
p.m.)



A F T E R N O O N    S E S S I O N
									2:00 p.m.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  We will reconvene the hearing of the 
National Transportation Safety Board.  This is being held in 
connection with the accident of American Airlines Flight 1420 that 
occurred June 1st, 1999, at Little Rock, Arkansas.
		I'll ask our hearing officer, Mr. Berman, if he'll call the 
next witness.
		MR. BERMAN:  Thank you, Mr. Chairman.  I call Mr. 
George Wilken.
Whereupon,
GEORGE WILKEN
having been first duly affirmed, was called as a witness herein and 
was examined and testified as follows:
INTERVIEW BY BOARD OF INQUIRY
		BY MR. BERMAN:
	Q	Good afternoon, sir.  Could you please state your name, 
your full name, and your business address for the record?
	A	My name is George Wilken.  I work for the National 
Weather Service in North Little Rock, Arkansas.
	Q	And what's the business address of that office?
	A	It's 8400 Remount Road.
	Q	In Little Rock.  What's your present position there?
	A	I'm a science and operations officer at the station.
	Q	Did you hold that position at the time of the accident?
	A	Yes, I did.
	Q	Thank you, sir.  How long have you been in that job?
	A	I've been seven years as a science and operations 
officer.
	Q	Would you please give me a brief description of your 
duties and responsibilities in that job?
	A	Briefly put, I work in Training and Technology Transfer.  
Just to embellish that a little bit, I'm responsible for when our people 
come back from schools on technical matters, such as Doppler 
Weather Radar.  I additionally train them, and there is on-going 
training at the station for that as well as the other systems on the 
station.
	Q	Thanks.  Could you please give me a summary of your 
education and training and experience for this position?
	A	I hold a Bachelor of Science in Meteorology from 
Northern Illinois University.  I've also done extensive work for a 
Master's in Computer Data Analysis.  I've worked on virtually every 
weather radar that ever has been since the 1960s, was in the Air 
Force and spent two years as a weather instructor.
	Q	Okay.  Thanks.  Do you have any FAA airman 
certificates?
	A	No, I do not.
	Q	Do you hold any National Weather Service certifications 
that we should know about?
	A	The several certifications in various things, including 
radar.
	Q	Okay.  Thank you very much.
		MR. BERMAN:  Mr. Eick?
INTERVIEW BY THE TECHNICAL PANEL
		BY MR. EICK:
	Q	Good afternoon, Mr. Wilken, and thank you very much 
for being here to help us answer the questions regarding the weather 
radar products.
		First question I have for you, though, are you not also 
one of the local presidents of the American Meteorological Society?
	A	I am the president of the local American Meteorological 
Society.
	Q	All right.  Well, I also understand that you have a 
presentation for us involving the weather radar products, regarding 
the evening of June 1st, but before we go into that, I would like to 
ask you some background information regarding the weather 
situation and your role at the Weather Service.
		Can you first tell us something about how you got 
involved in recreating some of these radar products we're going to be 
seeing today?
	A	Yes.  As a science and operations officer, part of my 
duties are to critique and sort of do quality assurance on our both 
service and products.  		When we have a significant event 
such as this aircraft accident occur, I immediately sit down the next 
day or the closest day to that and review all the imagery to see if 
we've done our best on that particular event.
		So, the morning after this event occurred, I did just that.  
I sat down and reviewed all the imagery, including some of the 
products I had been working on insofar as critiquing them for use as 
radar products, and we'll see those later, and that's primarily a 
combined shear.
	Q	What was the staffing on the evening of June 1st?  This 
happened late at night.  Was the National Weather Service Forecast 
Office up to full staffing?
	A	Yes.  Normally, if we have a severe weather event, our 
staffing normally would be two forecasters and one public service 
person, that's a hydro-meteorological technician on duty.  That's at 
all times of the day.
		If we do have severe weather, we would staff according 
to how extreme or how busy that event might be.  On that particular 
night, we additionally had a meteorologist watching the radar 
particularly, and we had another person, an HMT, hydro-
meteorological technician, who was doing weather radio and some of 
the warnings.
	Q	What type of products does the National Weather 
Service Forecast Office in Little Rock issue aimed at aviation?
	A	We issue primarily two products.  Those are the TAFs or 
the terminal area forecasts, and the TWFs, which are the transcribed 
weather forecasts.		
		Q	Now, I also understand that a weather warning 
was issued from your office that evening or several --
	A	Yes.
	Q	-- weather warnings?
	A	Actually two for Pulaski County, which, of course, this 
was located in the accident, that is.
	Q	Could I bring your attention to Exhibit 5-A and on Page 
24?  Are these the weather warnings that were issued?
	A	Yes.
	Q	Can you describe for us why they were issued, and what 
criteria the National Weather Service was using?
	A	I think as we'll see on the imagery that will be presented 
in a little while, the weather warnings are issued primarily based on 
some criteria that we've established, both at our office and in the 
Weather Service at large, and those would be reflectivity 
characteristics, physical characteristics of the imagery that we see 
on the radar.
		So, on this particular night, we were looking at a very 
strong line of thunderstorms moving towards Central Arkansas from 
the northwest, and we saw some very strong to severe cells located 
within that line.
		We had some indications and some reports of some 
wind damage being created as the line passed a particular area.  So, 
that, in combination with the radar echoes and how strong they were, 
we put out warnings based on those factors.
	Q	How are those warnings distributed?
	A	The warnings are distributed in a couple different ways.  
We do distribute them to the Air Traffic Control Tower at the Little 
Rock Airport by a direct line.  
		We also distribute them by our NOAA Weather Wire, 
which is essentially a computer-driven system that provides that to 
the press.  We also distribute it by NOAA Weather Radio, which, of 
course, is a voice-type distribution.
	Q	Was the severe thunderstorm warning and amended 
terminal forecast provided to the Air Traffic Control through that 
direct link?
	A	Yes.
	Q	Does the National Weather Service provide any other 
advisories, such as high wind alerts, potential thunderstorm impacts, 
snow advisories, for the Little Rock Airport on a regular basis?
	A	Not for the Little Rock Airport on a regular basis, but in 
some extreme events, like tornadic events in particular, we have 
placed a phone call over to them in 1997 to let them know that there 
was a tornado headed their way, and the Control Tower people 
probably should consider evacuating the control tower.
		But on a thunderstorm situation, as we saw with this 
line, that did not really prompt us to do anything special.
	Q	Did your role at the Weather Service Office deal anything 
with the Memphis Center Weather Service Unit?
	A	Yes, we do.  We interact with them quite often.  At -- the 
Center Weather Service Unit was closed.  So, we couldn't interact 
with them at that particular time.
	Q	But normally you would contact them to advise that a 
severe thunderstorm warning or a major event was occurring in your 
region of responsibility?
	A	We would talk to them not on a case-by-case basis 
necessarily, but if something was very, very unusual, we would 
certainly talk to them.
	Q	Is there a direct link also to the Center Weather Service 
Unit or just a dial telephone?
	A	It would be a dial telephone.  We have them on our 
speed dial at the office.
	Q	All right.  These radar products you're about to show us, 
are these products unique to the National Weather Service, North 
Little Rock Office, or are these also available to other National 
Weather Service and FAA Aviation Centers?
	A	The WSR-88D, which is the Doppler Weather Radar, has 
a suite of products indicated which is available to all offices and all 
the users.
	Q	All right.  Did you have availability to lightening data?
	A	Yes.
	Q	Was it useful in tracking and identifying any severe 
signatures with the thunderstorms?
	A	Very much so.  We just recently acquired a new 
computer system called AWIPS, Advanced Weather Interactive 
Processing System, and was placed in our station roughly about two 
months before the event occurred, and that has live lightening data 
on it that we can access.
		So, our forecasters had become accustomed to looking 
at that lightening data in conjunction with severe weather that was 
occurring.
	Q	Now, the radar data you're going to show us is a 
different type of system than airborne radar, is that correct?
	A	Yes, it is.
	Q	The airborne radar, such as what, 1420 was using was 
an XBand Radar with three centimeters and about a three-degree 
beam width.  What is the characteristics with the radar you're going 
to be using?
	A	Well, our -- our radar is much more powerful, has a very 
narrow beam and a very much longer wave length on it.  It's a 10-
centimeter radar, commonly called an S Band Radar.  It has 750,000 
watt output, and it has one degree -- approximately one degree -- it's 
a little less than one degree beam coverage.
		So, what it essentially does is it puts out a stronger 
amount of power in a much narrower or smaller cross-section.
	Q	Now, the WSR-88D or the NEXRAD Doppler Radar, it 
also performs what is called a volume scan strategy.  Can you explain 
that to us, please?
	A	Yes.  In fact, I think we could probably look at one of the 
-- I think it's Page 9, I believe, is the revised Page 9 that shows the 
diagram which is toward the -- roughly about the middle or bottom of 
the page.
		It talks about the volume scan strategy.  There was a 
revised single page put out for this.  Basically, the volume scan 
strategy is when the radar will gradually elevate on a kilt-by-kilt 
basis.
		In this particular case, we were in Volume Coverage 
Pattern 21, which dictates we would see nine elevation cuts in six 
minutes of time.  So, the radar will make a 360 at the first elevation 
cut, then jump to the next one, make a 360 and so forth, all the way 
up to the top.
		It will start at about a half-degree elevation at the 
bottom level and up at about 19 and a half degrees at the top.
	Q	Can you describe what the scale of intensity or 
reflectivity is?
	A	The reflectivity -- you're talking about the decibels?  Is 
that what you're talking about?
	Q	Yes, Mr. Wilken.
	A	The decibel intensity that we see on radar and will see 
that again on the pictures when we look at them a little bit is a 
reflectivity value, that the higher the value basically the stronger the 
storm or actually the stronger the rainfall.
		The radar does not really see storms.  It sees rain, but 
we can also interpret some of the reflectivity returns as being those 
of hail or just having a strong thunderstorm in progress.
	Q	In Exhibit 5A on Page 10, are -- is this a correct 
representation of the reflectivity scales with the appropriate rainfall 
rates?
	A	Appears to be, yes.
	Q	All right.  And if we can go with your presentation, and 
can you show us something on the composite reflectivity images that 
you've brought?
	A	Yeah.  
	Q	Can you also show snow?
	A	Well, I should put in a little commercial right now 
because I talked to some people earlier saying that snow would start 
after 12 and before 2 p.m., but I won't go into that.
		What you're looking at on the right-hand side of the 
picture here, this is a reflectivity, up through this area, is the 
reflectivity scale.  As you look at the top, the five units of reflectivity 
or five dbzs, as they're called, extend up to 75 dbzs at the upper 
limit.
		Now, we can look at the picture here.  It's going to be a 
little hard to see.  Maybe it's a little muddy.  Little Rock is located 
right about here.  The airport symbol, if you can see it, it's not real 
visible, is located almost immediately east of the Little Rock 
indicator.
		So, what we're looking at is a thunderstorm complex line 
as it was approaching Little Rock area. You'll notice some blowing up 
to the northern end of this line.  Also notice some fairly high 
reflectivity values that are located in two different areas.
		This was a thunderstorm that initially had passed over 
Little Rock Airport which is where my little red dot is, and the second 
one is the thunderstorm that was approaching the airport about the 
time the aircraft was approaching.
		You'll also see that, as mentioned, we have some high 
reflectivity returns, 60 to 65 dbzs, which is considered in our office, 
especially in the 65 dbz range, to be indicative of large hail.
		In addition, when we look at some of the other 
photographs or pictures of the base reflectivity a little different than 
this, you'll notice also that we can see some reflectivity aloft.
		Now, what we're looking at here, I might clarify a little 
bit, is composite reflectivity.  It is a composite of all the elevation 
angles of the radar, constructing the highest reflectivity at all the 
elevation angles and putting them on one picture.
		So, what the radar operator normally does is to look at 
this picture and sort of get an idea of where the worst or highest 
reflectivities are, here and here, and then start to look aloft to see 
which of those reflectivities are suspended aloft perhaps to produce 
a microburst or some other wind event down at the surface.
		So, this is sort of a first look product, I guess you would 
say, just to get a general idea of what was going on.
		MR. EICK:  All right.  If I can interject just a point of 
information, I should explain to Mr. Chairman and everyone in the 
audience, this exhibit that Mr. Wilken is presenting is in Docket 5D, 
and you've been provided those. 
		Docket Attachment 5D will include the radar products 
that Mr. Wilken is presenting.
		MR. CLARK:  Mr. Wilken, can you tell us the time of that 
particular view?  The accident occurred about 11:50 to 11:51.
		THE WITNESS:  Right.  This first one is the composite 
reflectivity at 0445 or 11:45 local time.
		MR. CLARK:  That would be five minutes before the 
accident?
		THE WITNESS:  Yes.
		MR. CLARK:  Okay.  And how much did that composite -- 
did that cover a six-minute period?
		THE WITNESS:  That covers a six-minute period, yes.  
Now, I might add, also, that the base products, as they're called, that 
is the base reflectivity, velocity and what we call spectrum width, 
products are available immediately.
		The post-process products, like the composite 
reflectivity, usually do not arrive immediately after the volume scan 
of six minutes, but you have to require some processing by the radar 
computer.  So, this would be available probably another six minutes 
down the line.
		MR. CLARK:  That 11:45 time, is that when the scan 
ended?
		THE WITNESS:  That's when it began.
		MR. CLARK:  So, that piece of data was scanning 
weather from 11:45 till 11:51, and you would have had that 
approximately six minutes later?
		THE WITNESS:  Right.
		MR. CLARK:  Okay.
		THE WITNESS:  Looking at the next picture here, which 
would be the composite at 0451 Greenwich or Universal Time or 
11:51, about the time the aircraft touched down, this is a little more 
difficult to see here.  It's even a little muddier than the other one.
		I was hoping -- the reason we chose to show these or at 
least I wanted them shown is that I felt they were a little bit clearer 
than what we had looked at earlier on some of the other imagery.
		I believe LIT is right in this area here.  The airport is 
located right about where my dot is.  You can see an airport symbol.  
The airport symbol does not necessarily show exactly where the 
runways are.  It just indicates like any type of icon that that is 
located in that general vicinity.
		I have put the rivers -- you can barely see the river going 
north, the Arkansas River -- here we go.  That's good.  The airport 
symbol is right here.  The river north of there.  The aircraft ended up 
right about in this area.  You can see a very large again strong echo, 
60 dbzs.  The one to the east has broken up a little bit, but 
essentially what we had working at the airport about aircraft touch 
down time was this very large, very strong thunderstorm.
		BY DR. BYRNE:
	Q	Can you estimate what reflectivity is over the airport at 
that time?
	A	It looks like right at this point, you do have some 60 dbz 
right over the airport.  So, that would be in the upper limit or the old 
-- what we used to call a VIP-6 category at that time.
	Q	Okay.  Now, airborne weather radar usually has three 
contours or three levels of reflectivity.  With Level 3 activity, the 
strongest that they're going to show, at 40 dbz, on your scale there, 
can you show us in your color scale where 40 dbz would be painting 
red or the maximum intensity on the airborne radar?
	A	Well, we have -- we'd have to go back up a little bit to -- 
you look back again at that -- I think the best thing to do would be to 
look back at the scale that we had in there.  I forget which page that 
was on.  20 something.
	Q	Page 10 on 5A?
	A	Probably 10.  Okay.  Okay.  If we look at the scale, the 
VIP scales we're talking about, what is -- is what the National 
Weather Service used to use on the predecessor to the 88D, and they 
go from a 0 to a 6, basically a 1 through 6, but the zeroes are pretty 
much non-existent for any real significance.
		The 88D levels, of course, have much more or many 
gates to go through, and if you look at the third column from the left, 
if you look at 40 to 44, the Level 3, this is what we're looking at right 
here, up in the green and blue.
		So, a lot of these surrounding echoes, surrounding 
much stronger echoes, all through this area are about the 40 to 44 
dbz rating, while toward the airport at that particular time, as I said, 
we had a 60 and a 55 to 60 dbz.  So, that would put us, of course, 
across the line into the extreme category.
		MR. BAKER:  Mr. Wilken, while you're pointing at things, 
could you repoint to the river and the airport?  We're a little 
confused.
		THE WITNESS:  Okay.  The river runs right up through 
here, across over this, and we can see the northern bank real good 
here in the east and west.  The airport symbol is right where my dot 
is.
		MR. BAKER:  What is that straight line between the 
airport and the river?
		THE WITNESS:  This line right here?
		MR. BAKER:  Yeah.
		THE WITNESS:  That's the movement of the storm itself.  
The radar will put a movement of the storm, estimate where it's 
going, and how fast it's going to get there.  So, where you see a little 
X in a little circle, that's where the storm is now, where the storm 
centroid is at the present time, and it will subsequently plot points 
along the line.
		You can see this storm supposedly had moved from a 
different direction, but the radar sometimes will combine two storms 
and give an erroneous direction, but this particular direction 
appeared to be the same as the environmental winds at that 
particular time, northwest to southeast movement.
		MR. BAKER:  Thank you.
		THE WITNESS:  We can probably pan in a little bit on 
that one as well.
		BY DR. BYRNE:
	Q	What is the time on this image, too?
	A	This is the six minutes after the last one.  So, it's 0457 
Greenwich or 11:57, some -- six minutes after roughly, after the 
aircraft touched down.  The river again is located right about in 
through here.  The airport symbol right about there.
		You can see that there's still some 60 dbz located over 
the airport, over the area we're talking about.  Characteristically, we 
would expect to see very heavy rain, hail, at least half inch or larger, 
and probably some gusty winds from those photographs.
		Again, we see tracks of the storms, the lines coming 
through here, and you can see there's another track here of this 
storm.  The track here that's pointing down to the southeast.
	Q	Okay.  Go on to base reflectivity.
	A	Now, the difference here between the composite and the 
base is the fact that the base are basically one elevation cut of 
reflectivity.  This one, it's hard to see up here in the corner, but it's 
0.5.  So, it's a half degree elevation cut.  You can see it there.  You 
can see the time 0445 Greenwich or 11:45 local time.
		The radar also will tell you the max dbz rating on the 
radar.  It won't exactly tell you where, but it will at least tell you that 
you've got that to look at, and, of course, you can look at the scale 
and see that 61 would be somewhere in this gape between the 60 
and 65.
		We can look at the center of the picture now.  Just pull it 
up just a little bit.  Okay.  You can pan in just a little bit.  Okay.  
That's good.
		Here again, the river curling up.  Little Rock is down 
here at this time.  The airport symbol is sort of masked by some of 
the imagery right in this area.
	Q	Now, this image is at what time, did you say?
	A	0451, 11:51 local time.
	Q	Okay.
	A	And basically it was painting the thunderstorms again at 
-- it had passed over the airport, at that time was only about a 40 to 
45 dbzs, but you can see 55 dbzs are pretty widespread to the 
northwest as this next storm moved in.
		MR. FEITH:  Mr. Wilken, just a question.  With that 60 
dbz rating, would you expect wind shear in any of that?
		THE WITNESS:  Not necessarily.  It would have to -- we 
would have to look up in the thunderstorm, and we'll do that in a few 
minutes, to see if we had any suspended reflectivities.  If we do have 
some suspended reflectivities, we could very possibly get a 
microburst which would produce wind shear.
		BY DR. BYRNE:
	Q	Now, at this time, 04 -- is this 0445 or 51 there, George?
	A	This is 445.  I think the first one, I think, we looked at.
	Q	Okay.  So, at this time, the aircraft is still out to the 
south of the airport.  
	A	I am looking at 0451.  You can see it up here.  Okay.  We 
can look toward the center of the image, please.  Little Rock again 
right about in this area.  The airport again masked a little bit by 
some of the imagery.
		You'll notice that although the 55 dbz has somewhat 
diminished at this time, we do see the start of the 60 dbz right in the 
middle of the 55, which is usually the way the operator would want 
to see it.  He would want to see a high reflectivity surrounded by 
somewhat lesser and not just have what we call an outlier, where you 
have a high reflectivity with no supporting high reflectivities around 
it.
		So, this is showing some development or strengthening 
of the storm as it's moving toward the airport.
		I'm going to go up at the same time, 0451 Z, on base 
reflectivity on the next picture, and this will be at 1.5 degrees.  Okay.  
We can go toward the center of the picture.
		You'll see that we elevate a little bit.  We start to see 
more white.  It's going to be -- okay.  Little Rock is right in this area.  
Can't quite see the airport symbol.  It should be right about in this 
area here, I believe.  Should be just about due east.  I don't really see 
it.  Should be right about in here, I believe.
		But as we're going up, you can see that there is more in 
the way of 60 dbz reflectivity that's suspended a little bit higher in 
the thunderstorm at this particular time.
		We can go on to the next one.  Going up approximately 
one more degree, to 2.4, at the same time frame but toward the 
center.  Okay.  The airport symbol is right here.  Little Rock, of 
course, downtown area is here.  You can see very large area, and 
that's significant when you see a very large area, even more so at this 
higher altitude than the lower one we just saw.
		So, this is what we call suspended reflectivity -- high 
reflectivities, which are something that the radar operator would look 
for to sort of contemplate maybe a microburst possibility.
		And the last one will be about another degree up at 3.3 
or 4.  Sorry.  Once again, it's very highly reflectivities with suspended 
up inside the thunderstorm at about the time the aircraft touched 
down.  Here is the airport symbol.  Little Rock is over here.
		So, basically, at 0451, we saw some very strong 
suspended high reflectivities in the thunderstorm as it was moving 
toward the airport.
		MR. ZWINGLE:  Mr. Chairman?  May I ask Mr. Wilken -- 
Allied Pilots Association.  Mr. Chairman?
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Yes.  I'm sorry.
		MR. ZWINGLE:  That's all right.  May I ask Mr. Wilken to 
clarify the -- the elevation of those -- the 2.5 and -- and 3.4 degree --
		THE WITNESS:  You mean above ground level?
		MR. ZWINGLE:  Yes, sir.
		THE WITNESS:  You can look back -- again a follow-
along.  You can -- there is a chart on Page 9 at the top of the page of 
your hand-out.
		MR. ZWINGLE:  5A?
		THE WITNESS:  5A.  I'm sorry.  Yes.  At a half degree 
elevation, you're looking at the center of the beam about a little 
under a thousand feet at 1.5, center of the beam about 1,700-1,800 
feet.  At 2.4, you're looking at about 2,500 feet.  3.3 at about 3,100.  
That's the center of the beam, and that's what the radar will show 
you.
		The beam width is such of one degree or thereabouts 
would show you that the lower level is somewhat lower than the 
center.  For instance, at .4, .5, you're looking at about 624 feet for 
the bottom of the beam, and for 3.3, the bottom is about 2,800 feet.
		So, you can match those with what we see up on the 
screen.
		We're going to look at a four-panel base reflectivity once 
again at 0451 Z, and basically this is a four panel of the four panels 
we just saw, but you can take a quick look at the comparatives 
between one panel to the next.
		The next one.  It's not going to be real easy to see, I 
know, but basically we went from about a 55 dbz echo.  This is the 
first time at 0451 -- excuse me -- these are bottom.  They're half 
degree echo at 0451.
		As we start to go up, within the thunderstorm, we start 
to see more and more 60 dbz in the third quadrant.  See more and 
more 60 dbz echoes showing up as we go further aloft, and that is 
significant.  That is very significant to look for the possibility of a 
microburst because you have basically a high water load very high in 
the cloud, maybe some hail contained with that, and it's forming a 
very dense pocket which can very rapidly rush toward the ground 
and produce a microburst, and that would be something 
-- a very strong concern for the radar operator.
		We also have -- the next group is a time series which 
basically shows the movement in toward the airport on a one-by-one 
basis.  Let's see.  Can you pan out to see what we have here?  I think 
we might have got off track here a little bit.  Let's see what we're at.
		Okay.  This is 0457 Z.  I think I'm one ahead of myself, 
and this is the correct one.  At 0457 Z, this is just at the half degree 
level.  Once again, what we saw earlier was about a 55 dbz at that 
level, and now we're seeing definitely some embedded 60 dbz 
echoes.  The airport -- I think it's right over the airport at that time.  
Little Rock is over here, and this is the airport symbol right in this 
area.
		Okay.  We can go to the next group.  This will be two full 
hard copies, one partial hard copy, showing the general movement.  
This is going to be hard to see on the screen because they're a little 
smaller, but basically the airport or LIT is right about in this area.  
Oops.  Getting up on me there.  Let's see.  Lost it now.  I had it.
		Okay.  I think this is LIT right here.  The airport symbol 
right about in this area, I believe.  I can't quite make it out myself.  
But basically at this time, if you can show me the time up here in the 
left corner -- oop.  Go down a little bit more.  Over to the right a little 
bit more.  A little more.  Okay.
		Quad 1, which we're looking at here, a max of 63 dbz 
somewhere around the particular picture, but this is -- let's see.  I 
lost the time on this one.  Okay.  Go back to the picture, if you would 
and go toward the bottom of the picture a little bit.  Oop.  Nope.  
Just to that particular quadrant.  There you go.
		This is at 0410.  So, this is well before the time when 
the aircraft was approaching the field, but if you'll pull it up back to 
the middle again, once again Little Rock is right about here.  The 
airport would be right about in this area.
		I think I see the symbol vaguely right about in there, but 
you can see off to the west that that particular time, we did have 
some echoes.  They weren't real strong, but they did have some 
configuration.  You have a little bit of what was referred to earlier as 
a loop, a line echo wave pattern, which is showing right in this area.
		Characteristically, you would see some wind damage or 
some problems develop right to the east-northeast of that center of 
that line echo wave pattern, but at this time, we had just generally a 
line of thunderstorms that is gradually moving itself toward the Little 
Rock area.
		You go to the right, Number 2 Quadrant there.  Basically 
let's run through these fairly quickly because it just shows basically 
the line movement.  We start to see some red marks.  It's hard to see 
from where you're at, I'm sure, but there's some 55 dbz start to show 
up within the areas of thunderstorms.
		Okay.  If you go to the bottom left quadrant, you start to 
see a little bit of blowing occurring which is indicative of some strong 
winds moving across, and indeed when the first thunderstorm moved 
across the airport, there was some wind at that time, not as 
significant as it became later, but certainly enough to be concerned 
about.
		Go to the bottom right quadrant.  It's a little harder to 
see, but basically there was some blowing in this area again.  Little 
Rock is right here.  You can see just the outer edge of this enhanced 
area of echoes.  You still see some 55 dbz.
		If we go to the next --
		BY DR. BYRNE:
	Q	Mr. Wilken, could I just interject?  On Exhibit 5B, on 
Page 18 through 20, are these not approximately the same type of --
	A	Yeah.  They are, and I think probably it would be easier 
to see them in the hand-out than they would be on the screen.  So, I -
- I would opt to maybe let the audience look at those and maybe we'll 
go on to the next series.
	Q	All right.  Well, if you'd put your last slide back up, let 
me just ask you a question.  For everyone, Exhibit 5B, Pages 18 
through 21, show the same presentation.
		Can I ask you to characterize how are those 
thunderstorms organized?  Is that a scattered area? Multi-cellular 
storm?  Is it a line activity?
	A	We would probably call this a solid line because there 
are very few breaks in the line.  There's at least nine-tenths coverage 
of the stronger echoes.
		As we look -- I'm looking at the 0410, Figure 24A, right 
now, and looking through this, pretty much all through the first page, 
I don't have my page number real handy, but it goes from Figure 24A 
through C, pretty much a solid line indicated on that.
		You're looking at 24D through 24F.  We see a few breaks 
starting to develop toward the middle or at least to the southwest of 
Little Rock in the line, especially as we get toward 24F.  You see a 
few breaks developing down to the southwest, but essentially it's still 
pretty much a solid line of coverage.
	Q	And this is before the accident time?
	A	Yes, it is.  And you can look at the times coincident with 
those images and see the times that were incurred there, and as we 
get on to Figure 24H would be about the time of the aircraft touching 
down.
		You can see that there is pretty strong coverage right 
over the Little Rock and just immediately east of Little Rock which 
would encompass the airport.
	Q	All right.  
	A	Okay.  We'll go on to the next series.  Okay.  	Q
	We can go right on to the exhibit on Page 14, Mr. Wilken.
	A	Thank you.
	Q	The radio velocity?
	A	Okay.  That's where we're going to, yes.  What we're 
going to look at now is a little more abstract, and it's going to require 
a little more concentration when I'm trying to interpret this.
		This is the velocity picture from the Doppler, and this is 
why the Doppler is the Doppler, because it can do velocity and look 
at velocity at various elevation angles as we saw in reflectivity.
		This particular shot is a half a degree elevation angle up 
from the ground at 445 Greenwich.  Now, the difference here in the 
scale is that this scale is broken essentially in two.  We have the zero 
velocity which we call the zero isotope.
		As we go to the negative numbers, we're looking at wind 
velocities or the cool colors, as we call them, moving toward the 
radar.  We're looking at the warm colors, the reds and yellows.  We 
have wind moving away from the radar.
		So, if we could sort of center this again?  Oop.  Yep.  
There you go.  Okay.  Little Rock is right here.  The airport symbol is 
hard to see, but it's right in this area.
		What this is depicting is that you have some warm 
colors showing here.  So, you have some wind blowing away from the 
radar.  The radar is up in this area.  So, the wind is actually coming 
from the northwest to southeast, and we know that that first 
thunderstorm passed.  It probably put out a gust front with it, and 
actually what we're seeing down here where the red and the greens 
come together is an indication of the gust front.
		We actually have winds toward the radar down here in 
the greens, winds away from the radar in this area.  So, you have 
sort of a convergence line which would be very indicative of a gust 
front.
		So, we did have a frontal passage of some sort, that is, 
at least the gust front, move through the airport before the aircraft 
was approaching the airport.  This is at 445 again, I believe.  Yes.
		Go on to the next one.  The next picture here, 0451 Z 
again, about six minutes down the line, after the elevation again.  
We're looking at the same type of situation.  Warm colors away, the 
cool colors toward the radar.  If you could center the picture again?
		Little Rock is located right here.  Airport symbol right 
about here, and, once again, you can see there were some fairly 
strong winds.  These would be up in the roughly 40 knot to 45 knot 
range on the color scale.
		We see something ominous developing up to the 
northwest with this new thunderstorm because we're starting to see 
some colors that are indicative of perhaps a microburst 
development, and, of course, about this time in reflectivity, we're 
looking at 60 dbzs located about the same area.
	Q	So, at this time period, the microburst is located where 
in respect to the --
	A	It's not fully developed yet, but it's located northwest of 
the airport, the airport being here, and you can see the wind flow 
right now is moving -- this is moving toward the radar at this 
particular time, actually moving this way, where this is moving away 
from the radar.
		So, the environmental winds are the winds generally 
over the airport at this particular time would be essentially from the 
northwest where you're starting to see some movement in toward 
this particular cell now, coupling up with some other winds, again 
moving in an opposite direction.
		So, this was located right about on the river, just to the 
northwest of the airport, which was located right about here.
		If we can go to the next one?  This is 0457.  This is six 
minutes after the aircraft touched down. Once again, half degree 
elevation.  We can look toward the center of the picture once again.  
What we're seeing here now is a -- looks like a microburst right just 
about over the airport.
		The center of the microburst would be right in this area.  
You have winds moving to the southeast, to the southeast, winds 
moving to the northwest here.  So, I can compare this to like a drop 
of water in a puddle where the microburst would come down, hit the 
ground, and it would generally spread out in all directions.
		So, you're seeing a very strong footprint here of a 
microburst that occurred and did produce that very strong wind gust 
at about that time.  So, this and the instrumentation at the ground 
level were very well correlated as far as what was happening.
	Q	One question I have for you real quick, Mr. Wilken.
	A	Sure.
	Q	How much meteorology training did it take you to 
interpret all these radar products?
	A	The base education for one of our operators is four 
weeks of concentrated study at our Radar School in Norman, 
Oklahoma.  Once you do that, you've started, but you've only started.
		After that, it's a matter of sitting on the radar, and I'm 
sort of the, you might say, the check pilot for our people on the radar 
where I sit and look over their shoulder and make sure that they're 
doing what we think they should be doing as far as quality assurance 
goes.
		So, training is on-going.  It's never stopped in terms of 
looking at different imagery.  Our people review imagery which is 
kept on archive disks.  We have various drills that we make up for 
them.  We have seminars at least twice yearly for them in terms of 
radar, and, of course, Arkansas is a very strong state in terms of 
severe weather.
		So, it's really our duty to keep very vigilant on this, and 
I'm happy to say we've been awarded two Department of Commerce 
Silver Medals for our work here in Little Rock, one in 1977 and one in 
1999.  Okay. 
		This is basically another four panel which will show the 
same radio velocities we just looked at for the various time frames 
with the 0440 Z added in as the first frame.  You can go to your 
Exhibit 28 in your hand-out and look at this.  I think you'll probably 
get more or better resolution by looking at your hand-out perhaps 
than looking at this.
		But you can see what happens.  If you'd just pan back 
once, we can just do a very quick look at this, and our operators -- 
one thing bad about a hard copy is that you don't see movement.  
The radar has the capability to produce time lapse, and we usually 
have or always have, I should say, one screen running in time lapse 
to see the progression of events because it's a very strong indicator 
as to what we need to do in terms of putting out warnings.
		So, if we had this in time lapse, you would see basically 
one picture, but you would see the progression of events.  For 
instance, the velocities in the area of the airport there which were 
produced by the gust front going through which is this feature right 
here, and you can see the gust front moving along with time.
		As we get to the third picture here, we start to see 
something very ominous south of the radar, northwest of the airport, 
in terms of a developing microburst, and then once we get to the 
0457 time or the 11:57 time, the microburst indeed does drop down 
to the surface and produces 70-80 knot gusts at the airport at that 
particular time.
		We're going to jump over the Exhibit or Attachment 49, 
which is actually the bad wind display, on the last couple time 
periods of the bad wind display.  We did not really have much 
occurring or being detected at the low levels.
		The bad wind display is a product that is sort of an 
averaged wind around the radar.  So, any extremes that do occur will 
be averaged out to some degree, and in this particular time, we did 
some northwest winds at about a thousand or 2,000 feet at about 30 
knots, but I don't feel they were representative of what was going on 
because of the averaging.
		So, we've chosen to bypass that one for now and show 
you the combined shear product.
		MR. BAKER:  Mr. Wilken, before you go to the -- too far 
into the winds, --
		THE WITNESS:  Yes?
		MR. BAKER:  -- does that time lapse technology also 
have a delay process in it?  Earlier, you were saying that your 
imagery was approximately six minutes ago, plus delivery time.
		THE WITNESS:  Now, the base reflectivity is delivered 
immediately when that particular elevation cut is completed.  So, as 
soon as --
		MR. BAKER:  But that takes about six minutes, I think 
you said?
		THE WITNESS:  No.		
		MR. BAKER:  Okay.
		THE WITNESS:  As soon as that cut is completed, all 
nine cuts take six minutes.  So, the first cut would take a portion of 
that, one-ninth of whatever it is, and then you go to the next cut and 
so forth.  So, a half degree elevation, the base reflectivity would be 
available pretty quickly after the elevation scan or the volume scan 
started.
		So, the cuts we are looking at on base reflectivity would 
be available immediately after that one elevation cut was completed.  
At that time, the radar would inject that into the time lapse, and 
you'd have it immediately available.  It's just a matter of tenths of a 
second because the radar will automatically add those to the time 
lapse as they accrue.
		So, you keep seeing an extension of each time lapse by 
one picture every time it's completed down the line.  Is that clear?  
Okay.
		Okay.  I'll go back to combined shear.  This is a little bit 
more of an abstract product.  It looks more like modern art perhaps 
than it does radar, but I found it to be a very useful product, and I'm 
perhaps the only one in the whole country that's doing any work on 
this product.
		We do have some products on the radar which are not 
used very much, and people have chosen not to really look at them 
for whatever reason.
		I found that the combined shear product, although it 
does take a very intense computer operation, is very much a 
resource hog on the computer to some degree, and you can only 
measure it at one elevation angle selectable, we chose 1.5 degrees 
because over time, we have seen that this is the most representative 
elevation angle to use.
		So, in this particular one at quarter till the hour, 11:45, 
once again, -- now, here we're looking at units of shear, and shear 
has no units.  So, it's sort of a contradiction, I know, but basically I 
call them units of shear.
		So, the further up the scale we get, in a paper I wrote, 
basically shows that about 70 to 80 units of shear is very indicative 
of something, strong shear, at that particular location.
		So, at this point in time, we're looking at the airport here 
as it's moving along, Little Rock here, and we're looking at some -- 
just some low-level units of shear right over Little Rock and 
somewhat higher shear value over the airport at that time, not 
seeming to be very indicative of anything serious at this particular 
time.
		Up to the northwest, we see again the cell developing up 
in that area, and as I mentioned earlier, and we saw in both 
reflectivity and velocity, it was developing into a microburst.
		So, this was showing some shear at this particular time.  
I think that's what Mr. Feith was talking about earlier.  This was 
showing some indications that it was becoming the area to watch 
insofar as bad thunderstorms go.
		Do you want to go to the next one?  You can see that the 
thunderstorm obviously is approaching the airport again.  The airport 
symbol is very clear at this particular time, 0451, about the time the 
aircraft touched down.  
		It did not look like there was any real strong shear over 
the airport, but certainly immediately to the northwest, the shear 
was really starting to develop as this downburst started to develop, 
and I think you'll see something very dramatic in the next picture.
		We see our 70 units of shear have come into play.  The 
airport is right here, indicative of the downburst, the splaying out of 
the winds from the center of the storm, showing the shear that it 
produced as it moved out, the very strong shear over the airport 
itself.
		So, this product, you can see, is a very good product, 
not in real time, again this is a product that is post-process, but 
certainly in some kind of a forensic-type case like this one is, this is a 
very good product to look at.
		MR. BAKER:  What time is that one?
		THE WITNESS:  This is 0457.  Again, these are all at 1.5 
degrees.
		BY DR. BYRNE:
	Q	Are there any other severe weather products on the 
WSR-88D that proved useful in forecasting thunderstorms during this 
evening of June 1st?
	A	Well, there are several that our people normally look at.  
We look at the echo tops product quite a bit.  Of course, we use the 
velocity products quite a bit because we're always concerned about 
rotation in the storms because we find that a large part of 
thunderstorms, that is, a large percentage of thunderstorms, have 
rotation in them.
		What the public hears in terms of tornado warnings are 
just a very small subset of the storms that we see that have rotation.
		There's a series of four products called a "severe 
weather product series" which will provide a percent chance of severe 
weather at a location.  Those are used to some extent, but we have 
not really found a good threshold to use on those yet.  So, they're in 
less use.
		There are some products that we use called "VIL", 
vertically integrated liquid.  VIL is a product we look at both for 
microbursts and hail, and I designed a chart that our people use 
during the day.  It's called the VIL of the Day.  It's correlated with a 
500 millibar temperature to give you a number that you need to look 
for for dime-sized hail or larger.  That's in use at our office every day.
		So, there are several more things that we look at.  Of 
course, we look at all elevation cuts.  It's very important that we look 
at every elevation angle to see what is suspended aloft.  If we look at 
the top of the storm, we can look at the storm top divergence which 
would produce an idea of whether or not we have strong winds or 
large hail developing.
	Q	How did the radar products with respect to where the 
activity was located, the timing, match up with the severe weather 
reports reported across the area?
	A	Matched up quite well.  The gusts reported at the airport 
was very coincidental with the time of the microburst recorded by 
the 88D.
	Q	Mr. Wilken, my last question I have for you is I'm going 
to draw your attention to the poster in front of you, which is in 
Exhibit 5B on Page 12, which is the base reflectivity image at the 0.4 
to 0.5 degree elevation scan at 0451 Z.
	A	Okay.
	Q	Or at the approximate time of the accident or 
specifically within the minute after the accident.  Do you recognize 
this product?
	A	Well, the color scheme's a little different, but it looks like 
it would be equal to our reflectivity product, I would say.
	Q	Well, this is an eight -- magnification of eight times, and 
the color scale has been changed to more approximate the -- the 
airborne radar with about 40 dbz showing up on this as dark orange 
going to red. So, we're looking at -- would you agree that these are 
the same products that you have presented --
	A	Yes.
	Q	-- previously?
	A	The imagery is the same, the color scheme is different.
	Q	Now, in -- on this image, we also have the aircraft track.  
If you can look at that track, and the Little Rock Airport, the 
geographic center of the airport, is at the crosshair with Little Rock, 
and you'll see the track going in.
		Is there any -- what approximate reflectivity would you 
say was along the track at that period of time?
	A	Well, at that time, it looks like you were probably 
running in the 50 dbz or higher at that time. There's some pink 
indicated just to the west or over the airport, I should say, at that 
time.  So, you're looking at somewhere between 50 to 60 dbzs.
	Q	And that would relate to what on the Scale 1 through 6 
with the Weather Service?
	A	You'd be a 5 to a 6 on your VIP scales.
	Q	Mr. Wilken, I thank you very much.
		DR. BYRNE:  Mr. Chairman, any questions for Mr. 
Wilken?
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Do the parties -- we'll move to the 
party tables.  The Little Rock Fire Department?
		MR. CANTRELL:  Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
INTERVIEW BY PARTIES TO THE HEARING
		BY MR. CANTRELL:
	Q	Sir, in your opinion, approximately how much rain fell 
between 2345 and 15 minutes after midnight or could you estimate?
	A	I can't really estimate.  I don't have those pictures with 
me, but the radar does do an estimation on it.  I know it was a very 
heavy amount at that particular time.  I think at one time, if memory 
recalls, it was about a third of an inch a minute, about three-tenths 
of an inch a minute.
	Q	What impact on visibility would rain of that magnitude 
have, sir?
	A	Well, it would draw down.  Of course, you wouldn't have 
fog coincidental with the rain.  So, your visibilities would drop 
dramatically at that time.
	Q	On field visibility at the time, could you estimate that, 
sir?
	A	I don't have any way to do that right here, no.
	Q	All right, sir.  Are you familiar with the properties of 
FLIRR, forward-looking infrared radar?
	A	Not really, no.
	Q	All right, sir.  A radar question in general.  Does infrared 
radar have an effect where it is masked or blinded by heavy rain, in 
particular cold rain, or would you know, sir?
	A	Infrared radar, you said?
	Q	Yes, sir.
	A	I really don't have any knowledge about infrared radar.  
So, I couldn't answer that question.
	Q	All right, sir.  No more questions.  Thank you very much, 
sir.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  The Federal Aviation Administration?
		MR. STREETER:  Yes, sir.
		BY MR. STREETER:
	Q	If you could help explain a little bit more on the product 
you're using here.  I'm not familiar with your radar.  I am familiar 
with the air traffic radar and with in-flight radar systems.
		Are you -- are the -- are the graphics you're presenting 
here, is this an example of what your radar operator sees when he's 
sitting at the -- at the display?
	A	Yes, sir.  It's a one-to-one relationship, right.
	Q	Okay.  And I guess the part I don't understand then is 
you talk about the -- I believe it was 9 -- 9 build-ups in a six-minute 
period.  How -- how is the picture evolving over that six-minute 
period?  Is he just getting a different -- a different elevation on each 
sweep?
	A	Yes.  You're getting an elevation cut as it's completed in 
the base reflectivity.  The composite is one that has to include all the 
angles.  So, it would have to be made up after the entire volume scan 
completed.
	Q	Okay, sir.
	A	So, we're talking about base and composite as two 
different things.
		Q	Understood.  So, the base would be what he would 
actually see then on a single sweep sitting at the -- at the display?
	A	That's correct.
	Q	Okay.  And then this product is the composite made up 
after the entire volume has been swept for a particular period?
	A	That's correct.
	Q	Okay.  I understand.  Thank you, sir.  You did also 
mention that your operators undergo four weeks of intensive training 
on -- on the basic equipment and so on before they start working 
this. 
		Is it safe to assume that they have a scientific education 
prior to doing that?
	A	All our people are graduate meteorologists, yes.
	Q	Okay.  Are you -- are you familiar with the air traffic 
control radar similar to what they have over here at Little Rock 
Tower?
	A	Minimally.
	Q	Okay.  Are you familiar enough to -- to say what kind of 
picture it would have presented in this type of weather situation that 
night?
	A	Well, from past experience with the FAA-type radars, it 
would depict precipitation, but it probably would not be a very strong 
presentation.
	Q	So, the controller would not have seen anything at all 
like this type of return?
	A	Well, certainly not like we have --
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  I don't think Mr. Wilken is going to be 
able to answer that question.
		MR. STREETER:  Okay.  I'm sorry.  I see what you mean.  
I didn't mean to word it that way, sir, and it's a good point.  Thank 
you.  I'll disregard that.
		BY MR. STREETER:
	Q	Are there any other weather radars in the Little Rock 
area besides --
	A	We have three -- three television stations.  Each have 
their own radar, --
	Q	Hm-hmm.
	A	-- which are a shorter wave length and a much less 
powered radar than we have.
	Q	How would the -- how would their displays compare to 
what you're seeing here?
	A	They have a different processing system; that is, theirs 
is processed a little differently than our Doppler is.  Their 
presentations are made more for the tv audience rather than for the 
professional.
	Q	Okay.  Understood.  And then the last question is, are 
you familiar with on-board weather radar systems at all?
	A	Not at all, no.
	Q	Okay.  That's all I have, sir.  Thank you.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  The Boeing Commercial Airplane 
Group?
		MR. HINDERBERGER:  Mr. Chairman, we have no 
questions.  Thank you.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  American Airlines, Incorporated?
		MR. BAKER:  Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
		BY MR. BAKER:
	Q	Mr. Wilken, do you have a responsibility to communicate 
severe weather warnings to special groups, such as air traffic control 
towers or en route centers or the airlines?
	A	Well, would you define responsibility?
	Q	If you were to see with all of your equipment a 
significant weather phenomena, are you expected to tell the air traffic 
controllers at Little Rock Airport or the en route center or airlines 
through any mechanism of that weather?
	A	We do have a direct line to the air traffic control tower, 
and that provides them instantaneous bulletins of severe weather, 
severe thunderstorms, tornado warnings, the watches, all aviation-
type things like SIGMECs and AIRMECs.  So, we do have that facility 
to them.
	Q	And do your -- do your personnel on duty routinely notify 
the airport?
	A	Not by telephone, not routinely, no.  In the case of 1997, 
when we had a tornado approaching the airport, that was over and 
above what we would suspect or -- or call on.  So, we called on that 
particular occasion.
		In the case of thunderstorms, we'd be making an awful 
lot of calls because Arkansas is very ripe with thunderstorms all 
through the year.
	Q	And in your view and experience, having seen this type 
of weather, would you have expected the -- the person on duty to call 
the tower at the airport?
	A	Not as a matter of routine, no.
	Q	On your equipment, are there audible or visual alerts 
that are generated to notify you that particular threshold values may 
have been reached that would result in a warning of any type?
	A	Yes, sir.  
	Q	Were they sounding that evening?
	A	Yes, they were.  But I might add that we expect our 
operators to beat the radar; that is, not have the audible alert sound 
before the particular signature has been identified.  That is one of 
our prime training tools that we deal with.  That is, we expect them 
to have that knowledge and foresight to be able to see that event 
taking place before the radar does.
	Q	Within the National Weather Service Severe Weather 
Warnings, do the terms "microburst" or "wind shear" -- are they used 
routinely?
	A	Yes.
	Q	Okay.  Do other groups have access to the same WSR-
88D information as is received in your office?
	A	They do, but they are provided that through vendors for 
the most part.  There are three, what we call, NIDS vendors at the 
present time, which produce radar information that is given to 
whoever wants to subscribe to the service.  That is taken off of our 
radar and provided through the vendor to a tv station that may not 
have their own radar or wants to have the extra-added attraction of 
having ours on to look at as well.
		There are several of those vendors on the Internet.  Very 
few of them offer radar in real time, however.
	Q	Do they routinely issue warnings?
	A	The Weather Service is solely responsible and charged 
with issuing warnings.
	Q	Going back to -- the evening -- given -- given the lead 
times and so forth of your equipment, at what point would the 
individual on duty have been able to determine that a gust front was 
in fact going to impact the Little Rock Airport?
	A	Well, a gust front is a feature that usually moves along in 
advance of a line of thunderstorms.  So, the lead time should be 
relatively long on that.  You could probably look upstream, that is, to 
the northwest in this case, see that the gust front had developed and 
was moving in a particular direction, and almost with unerring 
accuracy predict when it would arrive at a particular point.  So, the 
lead time could be anywhere from, you know, depending on how long 
you wanted to make it.  You could do it 30-40 minutes out in time 
without a problem.
	Q	Do I understand from your previous question -- answers 
that you probably would not have as a matter of routine warned the 
control tower of an approaching gust front?
	A	No, we normally do not.  That's a standard feature with 
a lot of thunderstorms.  So, we'd be calling the control tower a lot of 
times, and I'm afraid they might get a little tired of hearing us call 
them really.
	Q	Okay.  Now, -- now, going to this -- this picture, this 
large display with the reflectivity, as I understand it, this was taken 
at a snapshot point in time of 51 after the hour.
	A	Well, snapshot.  Of course, you would have to qualify 
that by saying the complete rotation of the radar 360 degrees.  So, 
that would involve probably about a little less than a minute of time, 
something like that.
	Q	Okay.  And --
	A	Starting time at 0451.
	Q	And -- and the aircraft track has then been imposed on 
it.
	A	Yes.
	Q	But the -- would you agree that when the aircraft was, 
for instance, flying the arc to the northeast of the airport, it would 
have been a different time than this picture was taken?
	A	I can't really determine it because I didn't make up 
those pictures, really.
	Q	I see.  Did -- did you -- just for clarification, did you tell 
us that the center weather service would have gotten this information 
if they had not been closed?
	A	They are on a circuit connected to us by computer, just 
as all the weather service facilities are.  So, they would have seen 
everything we issued, yes.
	Q	What -- what would you say is the -- the relative 
frequency of Level 6 thunderstorms in the Little Rock area in a year's 
time?
	A	The frequency?
	Q	Is it frequent, infrequent, once a year, twice a year?
	A	I'd probably have to put it on more of a percentage 
basis.  I would say probably about maybe 20 percent of the time.
	Q	That you have thunderstorms that rise to the Level 6?
	A	Yes.
	Q	Thank you very much.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Allied Pilots Association?
		MR. ZWINGLE:  Yes, sir.
		BY MR. ZWINGLE:	
	Q	Mr. Wilken, with regards to the composite image that 
has been displayed to the public for the duration of your presentation 
and to which Mr. Baker referenced, is there not -- I can't see it from 
here, but is there not a time stamp on the aircraft track or a series of 
time stamps on the aircraft track that would indicate that -- that the 
track of the aircraft, the time element involved in the track of the 
aircraft is not equivalent to that of the radar display?
	A	I would think it was.  Like I said, I -- we didn't make up 
these pictures.  Mr. Eick, I think, and his group made them up.  So, I 
can't really directly relate to that, but that would seem logical, yes.
	Q	Okay.  Is it possible, given the elevation of your scan, of 
your radar scans, that the aircraft flew this track underneath the 
weather depicted and clear of clouds?
	A	It's hard to tell on a plan or map-type picture which 
you're looking at.  You would have to look at a vertical cross-section 
with the aircraft track superimposed on that to see that feature.
	Q	But is it possible?
	A	It's possible.
	Q	Thank you.  Would you define the meteorological term 
"microburst"?
	A	A microburst is just a sudden down rush caused by the 
suspended -- usually a large area of rain, suspended about 10,000 
feet or higher in the thunderstorm, and when that load exceeds the 
up drafts in the thunderstorm, it will immediately drop through the 
thunderstorm and splay out at the surface.  Wind gusts have been 
clocked at well over a hundred miles an hour in some of them.
	Q	And are you familiar with the operational definition of 
the term "microburst"?  Operational meaning that which is relevant to 
the operation of aircraft.
	A	No, I'm not.
	Q	Okay.  In your presentation, you made reference, and 
correct me if I'm wrong, I may have misunderstood this, I believe you 
said with reference to the VIP intensity chart or conversion chart, 
that it used to be called Level 6?
	A	Yes.
	Q	Has that changed?
	A	Well, we use the smaller range gates of the 88D, which 
provide a lot of levels, and one of what we used to call the VIP levels.  
So, in one VIP level, you may see several gates or intensity levels in 
dbzs for this radar.
		So, we don't look at -- for our purposes, we don't use VIP 
levels any more.  That was a WSR-57 technology that was replaced in 
our office in 1993.  We've now gone to the smaller range gates which 
provide a little bit more definitive intensity values for our people to 
look at.
	Q	Is this chart then for an Exhibit 5A, Page 10, still 
relevant for our use, given what you just said, for the purpose of the 
investigation?
	A	5A, Page 10.  
	Q	It's the end of the SVIP DBZ Conversion Chart.
	A	Yeah.  It's relevant because in the first column, you have 
the VIP levels which the weather service used to use.  You can 
convert the third column over, the precip mode, in dbzs, which is 
now -- you can see several range gates -- excuse me -- several 
intensity gates in each of these or at least quite a few of these that 
are gathered into one of these VIP levels.
		So, you can equate, for instance, if you're looking at a 
26 dbz echo, you can equate that out to the left as being a very light 
or VIP Level 1.
	Q	But this chart is still valid, still current?
	A	Still valid, yes.
	Q	Still relevant?  Okay.
		MR. BERMAN:  Sir, can I interrupt you for just a second?  
I think we'd like to let Mr. Eick give an explanation of this chart 
because it is an NTSB-produced product.  He can tell about how it's 
produced, what the markings are about the flight track of the 
airplane and describe it in general for the people in the back who 
can't see it.
		MR. EICK:  The chart that you're seeing right there as 
well as a lot of the exhibits in Exhibit 5B from Page 11 on were 
obtained by getting the Level 2 archive tape from the National 
Weather Service and putting it on an HP work station back at NTSB 
Headquarters and using Motif Interactive Radar Analysis Software to 
reapply the radar data to the image.
		In our software, we are able to manipulate the data, 
such as centering it on the accident site, which we did here.  We 
were also able to put the range rings in nautical miles, centered on 
the center of the airport, and we were able to change this color scale 
to whatever range we felt necessary to highlight the activity.
		The track information was obtained from our ATC group, 
from the National Track Analysis Program or NTAP.  So, it is the 
history of the flight track, and that is corrected.  It is not 
instantaneous.  It is the track history with the end of the track being 
the final resting location.
		The radar data that you are seeing here is the volume 
scan that started at 0451 or 51 and going through.  The exact image 
was taken.  This volume scan was completed at 0451:59 and is the -- 
that's when that volume scan was available, and that is the 
presentation with track.  That is the lowest reflectivity, 0.4 degrees, 
closest to the time of the accident.
		MR. BERMAN:  So, Mr. Eick, the airplane's position at 
the time this radar picture was taken is basically the end of that 
track at the accident location or close to it?
		MR. EICK:  That is correct.
		MR. BERMAN:  And how many minutes are elapsed 
between the time the airplane's in that tear-drop maneuver out to the 
east of the airport and the accident time?
		MR. EICK:  At the top of the tear drop is at 0441:04.  
So, if you go back in the other images that are already in the docket, 
you will see, if you wanted to match the track to the time, there are 
specific images to match the time period.  That's why you'll see the 
same track on different images, just so you can find the position of 
the aircraft.
		At 0451 is the closest to the time of the accident, and it 
shows for our purposes the closest time to the accident here.
		MR. ZWINGLE:  Thank you, Mr. Eick, Mr. Berman, for 
that clarification.  I think that's very important.
		BY MR. ZWINGLE:
	Q	Mr. Wilken, the -- I'm sorry this is not included in any 
exhibits.  So, I certainly understand if Mr. Wilken does not want to 
comment on this.  However, in the Airman's Information Manual and 
in the Air Traffic Controller Handbook is contained a glossary which 
is known as a Pilot Controller Glossary and is the only tool that I have 
as a pilot to interpret NWS VIP Doppler Weather Radar Information.
		Six levels are identified.  Level 1 being weak, Level 2 
being moderate, Level 3 being strong, Level 4 being very strong, 
Level 5 being intense, and Level 6 being extreme.
		In consideration of the terminology of the identification 
of your weather warning product being the severe weather warning, 
where does the term "severe" integrate?
	A	Actually, you can have severe anywhere from a Level 3 
on up.
	Q	Okay.  Thank you.  Does the WSR-88D Doppler Radar 
provide precipitation totals over a specific geographic area?
	A	Yes, it does.
	Q	And how small is that area or how small can that area 
be?
	A	Well, the area can be as big as the state of Arkansas.
	Q	And how small?
	A	Well, you can narrow it down to just, you know, do an 8X 
magnification like we did, and you can see right in the local area of 
Little Rock or North Little Rock or whatever.
	Q	Can you tell me how many pixels cover the Little Rock 
Airport?
	A	Pixel is usually about a half a nautical mile on the side.  
I'm not quite sure how big the airport is, but I would guess two to 
three across and maybe three up and down, north-south, something 
like that.
	Q	Okay.  Thank you.  Are you able to compare the product 
of the WSR-88D with the product of the Terminal Doppler Weather 
Radar?
	A	No, I can't.
	Q	The precipitation intensity expected or experienced from 
a Level 6 thunderstorm, could that cause flooding, serious flooding in 
a community?
	A	Of course, it depends on the time that rain was 
occurring, how long it occurred.  A very quick, what I would call a, 
burst of precipitation might produce, you know, quarter of an inch of 
rain, which wouldn't be a big problem.  
		You have other things to consider, like antecedent 
conditions, like if the soil was saturated and other things like that.  If 
the soil was saturated, it would flood, of course, much more rapidly, 
depending on the time scale of the rain itself.
		So, there are a couple other things to consider which we 
do consider in the course of looking at flash flooding.
	Q	But in the general community, it is possible?
	A	It is possible, yes.
	Q	Thank you.  My last question.  In consideration of the 
intensity of the weather, the intensity of this thunderstorm in terms 
of precipitation and wind velocities, would it have been reasonable 
for someone with knowledge of this, the existence of this weather, to 
have warned these pilots, the crew of 1420?
	A	Well, it goes back again to what we normally do, and 
normally that would not --
	Q	I'm not asking for you.  I'm saying someone.
	A	Someone?
	Q	Someone with the knowledge of this information.
	A	Well, I -- I think the answer -- it sort of answers its own 
question.  I think it's sort of yes, really.
	Q	Sort of yes?
	A	Well, I mean it's yes.
	Q	Thank you very much.  No further questions.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  The Association of Professional Flight 
Attendants?
		MS. LORD-JONES:  We have no questions.  Thank you.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  The Little Rock National Airport?
		MS. SCHWARTZ:  No questions, Mr. Chairman.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  The National Weather Service?
		MR. KUESSNER:  I have no questions.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  No questions.  Now, Mr. Wilken, I just 
want to clarify one thing before we go to the Board of Inquiry.
		Do you think you do a better job in accurately 
forecasting than the three tv stations here locally?
		THE WITNESS:  Considering they have our forecast to 
look at, and we don't have theirs, yes.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Mr. Sweedler?
		MR. SWEEDLER:  I have no questions, Mr. Chairman.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Mr. Berman?
INTERVIEW BY BOARD OF INQUIRY
		BY MR. BERMAN:
	Q	Sir, was the -- was the gust front that was shown on your 
radar, was that generated locally by the thunderstorm that was to 
the northwest of the airport at the time of the accident or was that 
part of a general frontal cold front passage or larger weather scale 
feature?
	A	I don't recall exactly.  You can look back toward the front 
of the weather and look at the synoptic conditions at that time, but 
just looking at the radar alone, it appears that that was generated 
locally because it fits pretty much the model of what it would look 
like flowing out from a thunderstorm.
	Q	Okay.  And to what degree is your -- your Doppler Radar 
a real-time product?  I heard you say that it takes one minute to 
make a single scan, nine minutes to make a compilation.  
		Is there any other processing or -- or work required 
before that picture could be shifted to -- to a pilot if the 
communication means were available?
	A	The base reflectivities are available -- all the base 
products are available instantaneously.  The reason I showed, and we 
used what's called storm relative motion, is that if you look at a base 
velocity product, you'd be looking at all the velocities, including the 
environmental velocities that would somewhat mask some of these 
features.
		The SRM, the storm relative motion, subtracts the 
environmental velocity and gives you basically a snapshot of the 
velocities at that point in time.  So, I think it's well worth the time for 
the processing to take place to have that product available because 
that's what we very often use for putting out warnings, especially 
tornado warnings.
		Of course, when we look at tornado warnings, although 
we didn't have that problem here, we would look at a couplet 
developing; that is, what we call just a tornadic couplet where the 
wind is in-bound/out-bound in very close proximity to one another, 
and that is something that storm relative velocity shows very easily.
		Base velocity has trouble showing that.  But all the base 
products in short are available as soon as that elevation cut is 
completed.
	Q	And about how much delay would be required for that 
summary product that you mentioned?
	A	The SRM would be about a six-minute delay on that.
	Q	Okay.
	A	That's the length of the volume scan, basically.
	Q	Okay.  Thank you.  No more questions.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Mr. Haueter?
		MR. HAUETER:  I have no questions.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Mr. Clark?
		BY MR. CLARK:
	Q	Earlier, you were looking at several elevation slices of 
the radar data, and you pointed out an area that you interpreted to 
be a developing microburst.
		Do you have -- is your operator on duty looking for those 
specific events as they occur on the slice-by-slice basis?
	A	Yes.  Our people are basically -- it's the old story of 
having a property of an aircraft and a jet.  In the old technology, the 
57th Radar, we had the prop-driven.  It was a three rpm radar.  It 
required strictly manual technology to recognize features which were 
few and far between.
		This radar produces a full suite of products every six 
minutes.  So, the radar operator has to keep well ahead of that 
power curve and keep with the radar in examining each volume scan, 
each sweep of the volume scan, as it occurs, and once again, we 
expect our people to recognize features before the radar does.
		I set up all the thresholds in the radar for various things, 
like precipitation, wind speed, reflectivity values and whatever, but 
before the alarm goes off on the radar, we would fully expect the 
operator to have that well in hand by that time, even two volume 
scans before, and part of that is because we're using time lapse to 
watch trends as well, and the trends are very important in radar to 
get an idea of what's going on.
	Q	Okay.  That particular area where you identified the -- 
the potential emergence of a microburst, if we're looking at two scans 
previous, is that -- do you mean that's 12 minutes earlier?
	A	Yes.
	Q	And that particular event should have started -- the 
signature should have started appearing about that time, the 12 
minutes earlier?
	A	Well, when we start to see a color change -- and we 
developed the color scale, and that's one of the other reasons why I 
wanted to use our pictures from our radar.  The color scale we have 
developed has better and quicker recognition to it.
		We have light colors within dark colors and so forth, so 
that you can really pick out the features as they're developing, and 
that's another thing that our radar operators have the advantage of, 
is that specific color scale, which is not in use by every office.  Every 
office can choose to use the one they want.  We find this color scale 
is very good for that and will allow us very quick recognition of a 
particular feature developing.
	Q	When your operator starts recognizing that a -- a 
potential microburst is developing, how long does it take him to get 
that information to the tower?
	A	If he puts out a warning, that information will go 
instantaneously.  A warning could be put out in less than two 
minutes.
	Q	I'm not familiar.  Was a warning put out for that 
particular event?
	A	There was a warning put out for something before then, 
about 18 past the hour, about 11:18, 0418.  0418, there was a 
warning issued for the approach of the line because we had had 
some reports of wind damage with the line as it was moving across.  
		So, Pulaski County, including the atmosphere, was 
included in that warning.
	Q	Okay.  And that particular warning was 18 minutes 
earlier.  What about the specific event that you pointed out that -- 
that the time line you were showing was radar data from about the 
time the airplane touched down.  Was there a warning put out 
associated with that?
	A	We already had a warning in progress.  So, there was 
really no need to put out another one because that would tend to 
confuse everybody that, you know, got the product.
		The warning that we had put out earlier at 18 past was 
in effect for one hour.  So, that would encompass the time the 
aircraft touched down.
	Q	So, even though you see a specific -- a specific event 
developing directly over the airport or in direct proximity to the 
airport, you don't put out an additional warning for that specific 
event to the tower?
	A	Not necessarily an additional warning, but we would put 
out something.  We have severe weather statements that we put out 
to track particular events as they're occurring, and they're issued 
between the warning times.
		So, this warning was issued about 18 past the hour.  We 
probably would have issued two or three severe weather statements 
by the time the aircraft touched down.
	Q	Was there any severe weather statement put out that -- 
one particular event that you pointed out to us, the developing 
microburst or the potential, was there a statement put out 
associated with that event?
	A	Not particularly for that event, just generally for the wind 
speeds that were producing downed trees and other things as the 
line moved through.
	Q	Is that -- it appears, though -- you heard earlier -- I 
assume you were here yesterday.  The -- you heard about the tactical 
and strategic weather dissemination or tactical operations, for 
example.  It sounds to me that you don't consider your weather 
product to be directly involved in a tactical operation.
	A	Well, our weather product is -- is put out for aviation and 
public, but our focus is more on public really on that particular 
product, although watches that are put out earlier, preparatory to 
having warnings issued by the local office, do include aviation 
weather.  Ours again is worded more for the public rather than the 
aviation community.
	Q	Are there -- your weather products go to other places.  
Are they more in tune to supplying more direct weather information 
for the aviation community or is it your office that does that?
	A	I don't quite understand what you're getting at.
	Q	Well, it seems like the -- from what you described, you 
have very pertinent information that could be used almost 
immediately at the Little Rock Tower, and it doesn't appear that that 
very specific information is being relayed directly to the Little Rock 
Tower.
		Is there -- are there other people that use your product 
to provide that information or is that solely your --
	A	I'm not aware of anyone else providing aviation 
information to the tower, if that's what you mean.
	Q	Right.  Okay.  All right.  Thank you.
		MR. KUESSNER:  Excuse me.  Chairman Hall?
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Yes?
		MR. KUESSNER:  Weather Service here.  I know this is 
unusual, but I -- I'd like to ask some follow-up questions based on 
some of the questioning from John Clark and the representative from 
APA.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Sure.  Do any of the parties have 
objection to the National Weather Service following up?
		(No response)
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  No objection.  Proceed.
INTERVIEW BY PARTIES TO THE HEARING
		BY MR. KUESSNER:
	Q	Now, you said that your warning, the severe weather 
warning was essentially geared toward the public sector, is that 
correct?
	A	That's correct.
	Q	Are there other products that -- that you put out that are 
geared specifically for aviation?
	A	Well, yes.  We have the Terminal Forecast or TAF as it's 
called, and then the Transcribed Weather Broadcast, the TWB.
	Q	Now, you were here when we heard the testimony of the 
first officer on Wednesday.  It seems like an eon ago.
	A	Yes.
	Q	And you heard him acknowledge that he received a 
Terminal Forecast for Little Rock, --
	A	Yes.
	Q	-- which included a forecast of thunderstorms and wind 
gusts of 40 knots for the time that they had intended to land at the 
airport, is that correct?
	A	That's correct.
	Q	Also, you heard that the first officer acknowledged 
receiving a convective SIGMEC which included the airport?
	A	Yes.
	Q	And that convective SIGMEC included advice of a severe 
thunderstorm with wind gusts of 70 knots possible and hail to two 
inches possible, is that correct?
	A	That is correct, as I remember that specifically.
	Q	Is that an advisory that is geared and aimed at the 
aviation community?
	A	Yes.
	Q	Also, did you hear testimony that the crew in this case 
received an observation of gusts of winds of 45 knots, gusting to 45 
knots, at the field?
	A	Yes.
	Q	And also receiving information that it was raining heavily 
at the airport, and the visibility had dropped down to one mile?
	A	Yes.
	Q	Thank you.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Very well.  Well, since we're covering 
what you heard yesterday, did you hear the terminology "bowling 
alley" and "blanketed"?
		THE WITNESS:  Yes.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Are you familiar with those or --
		THE WITNESS:  I can't say I am, no.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  -- are those commonly used?
		THE WITNESS:  No.  That's the first time I'd heard either 
term.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  And, so, you wouldn't have any 
definition as to what either one of those mean in weather terms?
		THE WITNESS:  Neither are in my glossary of 
meteorological terms, no.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Well, okay.  Very well.  Mr. Wilken, 
you've been an excellent witness, and we would like to give you the 
opportunity if there's anything else in addition you would like to add 
for the benefit of the Board or that you think might be something the 
Board should look at in terms of preventing an accident similar to 
this one recurring.
		THE WITNESS:  Well, I think we at our office and in the 
Weather Service at large always try to do things better than we did 
them before, and that's part of my job, to do that quality assurance, 
and I think we are very open to suggestions as to how we can do 
things better.
		So, I feel that if -- when the Board puts forward their 
decision on how things worked on this particular accident, we would 
be very interested in seeing that report and seeing any 
recommendations from the Board.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Well, you have an important public 
position, and I certainly appreciate that attitude.  That's excellent.  
You're excused, sir.
		(Whereupon, the witness was excused.)
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Mr. Berman, would you call the next 
witness?
		MR. BERMAN:  I call Dr. Wes Wilson.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  We'll get our next witness started and 
go 15-20 minutes, and then we'll take a break.  We'll take a break at 
the top of the hour.  So, wherever we are when we get there.
Whereupon,
DR. WES WILSON
having been first duly affirmed, was called as a witness herein and 
was examined and testified as follows:
INTERVIEW BY BOARD OF INQUIRY
		BY MR. BERMAN:
	Q	Good afternoon.  Would you please state your full name 
and business address for the record?
	A	Wesley Wilson.  I work for MIT Lincoln Laboratory in 
Lexington, Massachusetts, 244 Wood Street.
	Q	And what's your present position at the Lincoln 
Laboratories?
	A	I'm a member of the Technical staff.
	Q	How long have you held that position?
	A	I've been at Lincoln since 1990.
	Q	Please describe for us your duties and responsibilities 
as a member of the Technical staff.
	A	Well, I've been -- I have a fairly long history of working in 
aviation weather.  I was part of the original -- before I came to 
Lincoln, I was a member of the original group of scientists who did 
research in wind shear and helped develop the FAA Wind Shear 
Detection Systems, and I have worked on a variety of aviation 
weather products while at Lincoln.
		I am currently the lead of the FAA Ceiling and Visibility 
Product Development Team.
	Q	So, just to also clarify, you're mostly involved in aviation 
research for most of your job or all of it?
	A	Right now, I do a little bit of operational weather 
research for the Navy, but mostly it's FAA aviation weather research.  
That's correct.
	Q	Thanks.  And also please summarize for us your 
experience and training that brought you to your position.
	A	Well, I have a Ph.D. in Mathematics from the University 
of Maryland a long time ago, 1964.  I was a professor for about 23 
years, then I worked at NCAR for almost 10 years on aviation 
weather, and now I've been at Lincoln for 10 years on aviation 
weather.
	Q	Okay.  Thank you.  Do you have any FAA airman 
certificates, pilot experience and the like?
	A	No, I do not.
	Q	Okay.
	A	I guess one other thing I should say, I am the source 
scientist on the LWAS Algorithms and on parts of the TWR Wind 
Shear Algorithms.
	Q	Thank you.  Do you have any National Weather Service 
certifications as an observer or --
	A	No, I do not.
	Q	-- anything like that?  Okay.  Great.  Thank you very 
much.
		MR. BERMAN:  Mr. Eick?
INTERVIEW BY THE TECHNICAL PANEL
		BY MR. EICK:
	Q	Dr. Wilson, good afternoon.  I understand that you have 
a presentation based on our exhibits on the LWAS data or the Low-
Level Wind Shear Alert System at Little Rock?
	A	Yes, I do.
	Q	Would you like to proceed with your presentation?
	A	Sure.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  How long's that take, the 
presentation take, Doctor?
		THE WITNESS:  It's about a 30-minute presentation.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Why don't we do this, so everybody 
will be focused on it?  Let's take our break now, and we'll come back 
so you can start your presentation with a fresh crowd.
		THE WITNESS:  Sure.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  We'll break for 15 minutes.
		(Whereupon, a recess was taken.)
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Could I ask everyone now to, you 
know, to please take a seat, and if you have a private conversation, 
please take it outside the room.
We'll reconvene the hearing.
		Please proceed, Mr. Eick.
		BY MR. EICK:
	Q	Yes, Dr. Wilson.  Will you please present your 
presentation for us, please?
	A	Sure.  Okay.  I've been asked to give a little background, 
theoretical and historical, on the LWAS System, just so we can have 
a conceptual understanding of what the system did on the evening of 
June 1st.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  You might explain just briefly for 
everybody what LWAS means.
		THE WITNESS:  Okay.  LWAS is Low-Level Wind Shear 
Alert System.  It is a -- it is a system of anemometers at an airport, a 
network of anemometers in an airport, and we'll see some planned 
views in a little bit, which is one of the FAA systems for the detection 
of wind shear.
		I think as we go through the talk, you'll see there's quite 
a history.  This has been around for awhile.
		I'm going to start by talking about the characteristics of 
wind shear, then a description and history of the LWAS System, and 
there are really three or actually historically four different LWAS 
Systems.
		I'll talk about its general capabilities that have been 
established through field experiments and then finally the -- discuss 
what happened on June 1st.
		Wind shear -- well, there are a lot of things that could be 
called wind shear, but there are two dominant types of wind shear 
that are considered to be the prominent hazards to aviation.
		They are the gust front wind shear and the microburst 
wind shear, and we've, of course, already heard both of them 
discussed a little bit today.
		I've drawn some cartoons here.  In the gust front wind 
shear, we have a pool of dense air which comes from some far-away 
event, which is spreading outwards because of just buoyancy.  At the 
leading edge, there would be a strong -- usually a strong surge, and 
then as that pushes into the still air, we have an area where there is 
a masking or a -- what's in fluid dynamics called convergence.
		The microburst wind shear is a falling column of air, hits 
the ground and splashes, and as it flows outwards, we have in the 
horizontal wind field a loss of mass or a divergence.
		The -- if we're thinking of detecting this kind of wind 
shear with anemometers or a series of anemometers, we have to 
think about what are the signatures we might expect to see.  
		If we have two anemometers, then the convergence 
signature would be wind flowing into this area to create a mass gain 
or a very strong inflow and a weak outflow would give the same 
resulting convergence.
		If we had three anemometers forming a triangle, we 
either could have inflow everywhere on the triangle or we could have 
very strong inflow coupled with weak outflow.
		In this situation, we get the convergence signature.  
What that's trying to do is identify that we are right here ahead of the 
gust front.
		Sometimes we either have only one anemometer or the 
anemometers are so far apart, that only one of the anemometers can 
see the event.  In that case, -- oops.  Oh, I'm sorry.  Back to my face.
		In that case, we'd be concentrating on trying to see 
when the surge goes across the anemometer, and we would look for 
what's called an anomalous wind.  What this would be is a wind that 
is suddenly very unusual compared with the expected wind in that 
region.  		So, we have to have some other reference which 
has given us what the expected wind would be, and then we suddenly 
see a departure, and that would be the anomalous wind signature.	
	
		For the microburst detection, we do essentially the same 
thing, but now we look at two anemometers and the line segment 
between them and look for an outflow or a mass loss, could be shown 
by a weak inflow and a very strong outflow.  On a triangle, we look for 
the mass loss in the same general scenario of a net resulting mass 
loss.
		Again, if we only had one anemometer or our 
anemometers are very widely spaced, we might look for just a surge 
at the anemometer.  So, the anomalous wind is again an indicator -- 
in the case where we don't have a dense network, the anomalous 
wind is another indicator.  That should be a warning to us that when 
you see the anomalous wind, you don't know what is causing it.  You 
just know you have wind shear, and, unfortunately, an anomalous 
wind could also be caused by a wind shear that is not an aviation 
hazard, such as a dust devil.
		So, when we use this particular detection technology, we 
have to be very careful or we will be giving false alerts or what the 
pilot will operationally perceive to be a false alert.
		Let's press forward.  I want to now talk about how this -- 
general ideas about wind shear can be and have been applied to the 
building of -- design and building of the LWAS System.
		The LWAS design and indeed at sort of the same time, 
the TDWR design came out of a series of meetings that were 
conducted by the FAA, known as the Wind Shear Users Group.  That 
group was composed, of course, of people from the FAA, scientists 
from several research laboratories.  Some of the pilots organizations 
that are seated here today were members of that.  The airlines were 
represented.  ATA was there.  NASA was there.  
		It was pretty much everybody that had a stake in 
aviation safety and wind shear were brought together in one room, 
and together, we designed the system that FAA eventually made -- 
imposed the requirements for.
		The basic precepts that came out of that were, first of 
all, we had to minimize false alerts.  The alerts that were given by the 
system had to be believable.  Of course, the purpose of it was to 
detect hazardous wind shear, hazardous to aviation.
		From the research and the scientific community brought 
in the fact that the scale of the phenomena was a couple of 
kilometers, and therefore if we wanted to detect it best, our sensing 
system should reflect or respect that scale.
		When we took that knowledge to the LWAS, the -- what 
came out of that group was a requirement that the station spacing 
should be two to two and a half kilometers.  The reason for that was 
that the research had shown that if you had that kind of a station 
spacing, then the divergence and convergence became very reliable 
indicators.  
		Reliable means two things.  First of all, it's able to detect 
the event, and, secondly, if it makes a detection that the -- that the 
event really is a hazardous wind shear.
		Unfortunately, we also looked at situations where the 
station spacing was larger, and in that case, we knew we could 
detect wind shear with -- with the anomalous winds, but that the 
detections would be less reliable.  So, false alerts became a problem.
		At that point, a notion of persistence was introduced 
which said that the shear had to be detected for several repetitions 
before the alert would be given to pilots.  In the LWAS System, those 
repetitions are every 10 seconds.  So, this delays alerts 40 to 50 
seconds.
		Okay.  Quickly through the history.  The first LWAS was 
not designed at this time.  Indeed, it was designed 10 years earlier 
and was already operational at the airports.  It used only the 
anomalous winds alerts scheme.  It had wind shear alert by sector in 
the northwest, east, whatever, of the airport, and it used six sensors.
		A centerfield sector sensor and boundary sensors 
around.  This system was designed to detect gust fronts encroaching 
on the airport.
		Coming out of that work with the user group, an 
algorithm -- we designed an algorithm which was based on the 
divergence/convergence technology.  This is the algorithm that the 
FAA selected to go into the LWAS System.  NE is for Network 
Expansion.  This is in some sense the Cadillac of LWAS Systems.
		Unfortunately, they turn out to be difficult to install 
because to get full coverage of where the airplane is in hazard, it has 
to be put on off-airport property which has caused a lot of 
complications with getting real estate rights on the land that the 
airport doesn't own and control.
		The system was designed and specified in the late '80s, 
and yet the first system wasn't deployed until 1996.  This was 
because of the requirement or need to procure a lot of hardware and 
to do these complicated installations.
		The savvy folks at the FAA figured out back in the mid-
'80s that it was going to be a long time before they saw these.  They 
recognized that wind shear was happening.  Airplanes would be 
flying, and, so, they asked could -- was it possible to take some of 
this technology for the NE and to apply it to the existing hardware of 
the old LWAS to get some microburst detection and to reduce false 
alerts to hazardous wind shears, and that became the LWAS-2 
System with what's called the Wind Shear Algorithm, and because we 
had to fit the old hardware, we have the sparse station spacing, and 
we can only get wind shear alerts.
		This system never says the word "microburst" even 
though internally to the algorithm, it detects microbursts.  The 
reason for that is the display has no way to issue the microburst 
message.  So, this is a hardware constraint.
		The reason this is very important to us today, this is the 
LWAS that is in operation at Little Rock today and was in operation 
on June 1st.
		Again, just very quickly, what would the ultimate LWAS 
look like?  It would have the close station spacing.  It would be able 
to say wind shear alert or microburst alert based on what the 
algorithm detected.  It would use the divergence or convergence as 
the signatures.
		A microburst is what is -- what the message is given 
when there is a very strong divergence.  Otherwise, it would be a 
wind shear alert.  However, again at the guidance of the user group, 
the FAA accepted the ruling that the weaker alert, the wind shear 
alert, is given only if we actually measure a head wind loss or gain 
along the runway, and the reason for that is that means that if a pilot 
ignores the alert and lands, he will likely encounter and feel a loss or 
gain as he flies into that approach, and it was felt that pilots didn't 
want to hear alerts about events that weren't going to actually affect 
the performance of the aircraft. 
		So, this was part of the guidance of the user group, part 
of the direction from the FAA.  So, the LWAS NE is designed to -- with 
that extra caveat in the alert.
		LWAS-2 -- and I've decided to show you a map now.  
This is the Little Rock Airport.  These are -- the red numbers are the 
six locations of the LWAS stations.  The blue letters are the sectors 
where the wind shear alerts are given.  So, a pilot would be given 
wind shear alerts centerfield, wind shear alert north, wind shear alert 
northeast, depending on the circumstance, and those alerts are 
based on a new analysis which involves both a divergence estimate, 
and I'm showing here some typical edges or a triangle formed by 
these stations.
		Because of the fact these stations are so far apart, these 
are fairly long edges and triangles, and it's possible that a small 
microburst could just fit in between and not be detected at all.
		Because of that problem and the gust fronts, we also do 
an analysis for anomalous station winds, and the -- if an anomalous 
wind is detected, and it is persistent for five scans, then an alert is 
issued.  So, this is the basic philosophy of the system that is in 
operation at Little Rock today.
		Just to give you a comparison, the FAA is already 
procuring an improved system which would be just on airport.  It 
would not go out far beyond the runways to give the full extension 
capability of the NE.  This is the restricted system, and what it will be 
is on airport sensors but using the advanced algorithm techniques, 
and that is the coming technology.
		I think the first article should be delivered this year, and 
they will be installed this year and next.
		At Little Rock, that means sensors will be added in these 
four locations indicated by the red dots, and you can see how that 
will reduce the size of the triangle, and I'm going to ask you to flip 
backwards and forwards just once or twice.  Backwards, we see the 
sparse geometry.  Forwards, we see how much denser it gets by 
adding these few extra stations on the airport.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  How many LWAS-2s will get that?  All 
of them?
		THE WITNESS:  All of the LWAS-2s will be upgraded.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  And how many are there?
		THE WITNESS:  This is -- or they'll be decommissioned 
and replaced by ASR-9 WSP.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Okay.
		THE WITNESS:  So, some will get the radar, some 
airports will get this.  When -- but there will be no LWAS-2s left after 
this procurement is complete.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Okay.
		THE WITNESS:  Okay.  Let's pop forward.  I want to talk 
a little bit about the performance statistics.  Now, this is not what 
happened at Little Rock.  This is just how well the systems work in 
general, which was the basis for the FAA's decision to deploy these 
systems.
		This is based on meteorological field experiments where 
other sensors, like radar -- extra radars were brought in, so that we 
could accurately estimate what the true wind shear circumstance 
was.
		Okay.  I've got the three LWAS systems here, the NE, the 
RS, which is the restricted system, and the LWAS-2, the one we have 
today.  My measures of scale are the probability of detection, the 
probability that wind shear alert exists -- is issued when there is wind 
shear at the airport.
		We have either generic wind shear or what is the 
probability that the alert will be issued when there's a microburst at 
the airport, and then we also have to worry about the false alerts.
		I'm using here the probability of a false -- that an issued 
alert is false.  So, this is the percentage of issued alerts which are 
not appropriate. For the notion of wind shear, I have two notions.  
One is wind shear along a runway, and the other is just wind shear in 
some direction at the airport.  So, the "all" indicates wind shear in 
some direction.  This requires that there be a head wind loss or gain 
on one of the runways.
		The LWAS NE, the so-called -- I call it the Cadillac LWAS, 
detects three quarters of the wind shear, virtually all of the 
microbursts, and has a very low chance of issuing a false alert.
		The LWAS RS is just as good, but it only covers 60 
percent of the area because it doesn't have the runway extensions.  
So, these numbers are simply 60 percent of these numbers, and the 
reduction there is because of the lack of coverage, not because of 
lack of algorithm skill.
		The LWAS-2 has the same coverage as the RS but has 
the much sparser stations and the older algorithm.  So, it drops in 
prediction -- yeah.  The detection capability rather substantially.  It 
does successfully reduce the false alerts, if we use the criteria of 
false alerts in all directions.  Since it has no test for along runway 
alerts, it must issue alerts for shears that are not along the runway.  
If you score it against the requirement of a shear along the runway, it 
has more false alerts.
		This is a training problem because the pilots who ignore 
LWAS alerts today will not see the head wind loss or gain and will 
perceive that the system is giving false alerts even though there is a 
wind shear at the airport.
		We would hope, of course, that pilots don't test the 
system, especially when they have guys in the backseat, but if they 
should inadvertently go through when a wind shear alert is being 
offered, they may perceive a false alert when the system is in fact 
correctly detecting wind shear.
		MR. CLARK:  Excuse me.  How would these numbers 
change if we're dealing with events on the runway?
		THE WITNESS:  Well, this --
		MR. CLARK:  Part of the numbers are biased for --
		THE WITNESS:  These numbers are for the winds along 
the runway.
		MR. CLARK:  I meant on the runway, around the runway.  
Part of the -- the far-right numbers, I understand, --
		THE WITNESS:  Okay.
		MR. CLARK:  -- were extended off of the runway, and our 
event was --
		THE WITNESS:  Okay.  All of the -- the LWAS NE and 
LWAS RS alerts are runway-specific.  They are only issued to the -- 
the alert is issued only to the runway where the shear is present.  
		The LWAS-2 alerts are issued by sector, and the sector 
in some sense is associated with the runway, but the -- because of 
the sparsity of the situation, there's less precision in the LWAS-2 
alerts.
		Okay.  I think what we came for was to find out what 
happened on June 1st.  Was the system credible?  First of all, what 
was the meteorological situation?  How did the system measure it, 
and was that a credible interpretation of the meteorology?
		So, let's pop on.  I think I'm going to talk to this one 
backwards.  The first issue is did the system measure the wind 
correctly.  The second issue is after it measured the wind correctly, 
did it make a correct interpretation of the wind shear circumstance?
		In this course of upgrading a system to RS, the FAA has 
sent out teams to do surveys of every airport and, where necessary, 
either move existing sensors or raise the height of the pole of the 
sensor so that the sensors will measure the true winds.
		This had already been done at Little Rock.  So, because 
we knew that they had just improved the system siting, we expected 
to see good performance.  		The FAA Program Support 
Facility in Oklahoma City took the data recorded for the month before 
the accident and analyzed it statistically to see if there was any 
evidence of sheltering in the winds from that recorded data set.
		They're using statistical software that I helped design, 
and I trained them in the use of.  They concluded that there were no 
problems.  The system was performing properly and well.  I reviewed 
their work, and I concurred.  So, I think we don't have to worry in this 
case with the sensors not being properly located for the use 
intended.
		The sensor data, the LWAS wind data, are archived.  I 
have access to those, and I've analyzed them in ways that I will 
describe, and I also have access to the archived LWAS data, display 
data, what appeared on the tower displays for the controllers, both 
the winds and the alerts that they saw, and they are in this exhibit.
		DR. BYRNE:  They're in Exhibit 5B, beginning on Page 
27, and up to the accident time on Page 30.
		THE WITNESS:  Okay.  I am going to show you why this 
is not a perfect or complete data set from a scientific viewpoint, and, 
so, we have to either admit that there are gaps in knowledge or make 
some guesses, and I think it's not appropriate to guess.  
		So, I will simply tell you what I can determine with some 
credibility from the data I see, and in that sense, what I'm going to 
be doing -- conducting is what I call a subjective analysis.  A 
subjective analysis is when human experts sit down and ponder the 
data and try to figure out what was going on.
		In this subjective analysis, I was assisted with -- by 
several of the scientists at Lincoln Laboratory, a couple of whom sit 
down at Memphis, Eric Proteus and Mark Eisenbinger, and review 
microbursts and wind shear events performance day after day, all 
summer long.  They've been doing this for several years.  So, I've had 
some help from some really good experts in this.  But that's what 
this line and this line amount to.  Best estimations of what went on 
by human experts.
		I also have access to a simulation of the LWAS-2 
algorithm.  Now, by this, I mean I have a software program that 
executes the LWAS-2 algorithm, and it's accurate to the best of my 
ability to determine that I have good software.
		I must be very careful and point out this is not the 
official FAA software, and therefore there are some differences in how 
it performs, some of which I can sort of explain, some of which I 
cannot explain.
		The FAA software has gone through acceptance tests 
and a lot of scrutiny that my software has not gone through.  So, 
when in doubt, I tend to believe that software a little better.
		Unfortunately, the LWAS-1 and LWAS-2 do not have with 
them what's called event reconstruction, which is the ability to run 
the actual software and put hooks into it to see what it did and why it 
did it.  LWAS NE and LWAS RS will have event reconstruction 
capability delivered with the system.  But we are handicapped here.  
That's just not a capability that comes with this system.
		I've tried to describe what was going on here in sort of a 
pseudo-time line.  Across here, we have the time.  This is 
approximately the last few minutes of flight, and the time when the 
aircraft was on the runway.  From what I've heard here, I gather I 
have this slid about a half a minute early.
		The 88D took a scan at about 4650, six minutes later, 
would be 52 and 58.  That would be the velocity fields.  The 
reflectivity fields are a minute earlier.  There is a six-minute step 
between here.  
		The LWAS is 10-second data.  So, it's very fine time 
sliced through the event.  It is unfortunately on a very restricted 
patch of real estate, and with these sensors that are a little bit too 
widely spaced to be appropriate for fine details about what happened 
to wind shear.
		So, our data set is a little bit inadequate on two ways.  
The radar is very precise but porous in time.  The LWAS is very fine 
in time but doesn't have the spacial resolution that we would like to 
have.  So, we'll do the best we can.
		The LWAS System.  I've put across here the gust front 
that we -- that was discussed earlier, went through.  LWAS issued 
wind shear alerts on that gust front up till about, I think it is, 11:36 
or 37.  Those alerts started in the north, and as the event moved 
across the airport, moved to centerfield and then to the south.
		There was a secondary front around 11:40 which lasted 
-- this caused alerts which lasted for a few minutes, and with wind 
shear alerts here primarily in the north and northwest.  It went quiet 
for a little while.
		Around 11:47, there was a wind shear alert issued for 
just a little over a minute, and this was issued the alerts at 
centerfield north and northeast.  Then those alerts stopped.  There 
was a wind surge that I've been asked about.  So, I'm going to 
specifically talk about this wind surge at the northwest sector.
		I put question marks here.  The operational LWAS did 
not issue alerts on this wind surge or at least the archived data set 
does not indicate that the alerts were issued.
		My running of the software does indicate for several 
scans that there was an alert level.  So, we have a discrepancy here 
that I cannot explain easily.  I won't even try.  They're just different.
		And then, finally, at about 11:52 -- now, everything sort 
of had stopped with the plane by 11:51.  By 11:52, a microburst 
impacted the airport in the northwest, and then LWAS in a fairly 
timely way issued a wind shear alert for that.  Remember that's all 
LWAS can say is wind shear alert, and that wind shear alert went on 
for 13 minutes.
		So, we're going to look at the data.  I'm going to take 
you through the data step-by-step.  This is what's happening event-
wise.  After we've gone through the data, I'm going to put this back 
up again, so that we can look again at what we just saw.  So, I'm 
going to tell you what -- I've told you what I'm going to tell you.  I'm 
going to tell you, and then I'm going to tell you what I told you.
		Let's move forward now.  We got the base data from the 
NEXRAD.  Eric Proteus from Lincoln ran this analysis for me.  This 
has somewhat finer scale of data resolution than we were looking at 
before, and also I've zoomed in so we're looking fairly closely in a 
fairly tight region around the airport.
		What we -- this is the reflectivity over on the right.  Reds 
are my top level.  So, this is more like VIP levels.  We see this squall 
line down here, a little shower down through this region, and then 
this intense rainfall up here indicated by the red.
		On the other side, the right side here, I have the velocity 
field.  The blue colors, the cool colors, are the winds towards the 
radar.  The warm colors are the winds away from the radar.  Here's 
that old gust front that went by, oh, 10 or 15 minutes before.  The 
time here is 11:46, and the -- I have put on here the LWAS winds, 
rough indications of the LWAS winds around the airport, and the 
radar says -- the -- yeah.  The radar indicates the winds blowing away 
from the radar.  The LWAS winds indicate the wind's going away from 
the radar.
		So, everything's in agreement here.  I would point out 
that the action line, the storm and the other stuff, is still separated 
from the airport by some amount here.
		I also want to point out something else, that with the 
data delays that were discussed in the previous discussion, that the -
- at least six minutes would pass before the National Weather Service 
meteorologists could see this.  Even if you had -- and this capability 
doesn't exist today, except among scientists.
		Even if you had really good data communication and 
other things, a delay of 12 to 15 minutes, especially if you went 
through a vendor, it will certainly be 15 minutes, is what you would 
expect.  This is the picture that would be available to the user 
community six minutes after the crash, even if we had all this stuff 
hooked together, and we were delivering stuff to the pilot just 
because of the delays that are inherent in the system, and as we go 
forward, you're going to see a lot happens in this next 12 minutes.
		This is the reason why the FAA has built their own wind 
shear systems, the TDWR, etc., because these delays from this kind 
of sensing system are just intolerable.
		So, let's step forward.  This is six minutes later, and this 
-- we did see this.  The rain has mostly abated, except for this very 
sharp shaft right of the northwest part of the airport.  So, this is the 
rain shaft that people have been talking about.
		This is the wind field.  The wind field here shows a very 
weak divergence.  The divergence here is across the beam of the 
radar.  The LWAS winds show a fairly strong divergence.  The radar 
can't see it, but the microburst is in fact starting at this time, 11:52.  
The radar is not picking it up, and as we move to the next time now, 
this -- the -- this is the time that was gone through with some 
scrutiny.
		The precipitation pattern has broadened, and the 
microburst is now clearly visible.  The aviation definition of a 
microburst is at least 30 knots over no more than four kilometers.  
This one shows 50 knots over the four kilometers.  This is clearly a 
microburst.  LWAS also gets that 50 knot number.
		As we go -- I'm going to go into the LWAS winds now, 
and it's worse than it looks.  What we're going to see is an awful lot 
happened as is revealed by the LWAS wind field that's even subscale 
to these radar pictures, and remember the -- the end user who's 
buying this product is still looking at that first picture.  All this stuff 
has happened, and now a lot more -- I'm going to show you a lot 
more has happened, that LWAS correctly analyzes and was not even 
available to the radar meteorologists.
		So, we're back to 11:46, the beginning of the event.  
What we see here are nominal 20 to 30 knot winds, gusty winds, 
around the airport.  As we step forward, same sort of story.  I want to 
bring your eye to the fact that in these three stations, I suddenly 
have a fairly strong outflow and a weak inflow.  This is at the 
vergence signature we're looking for, and indeed LWAS started 
making the detection, but because of persistence hasn't issued an 
alert yet.
		Let's see.  Can we pop forward?  There we go.  The 
winds are now getting strong, and actually the detection's started in 
between these two time scans, and at this point, LWAS is making 
that wind shear alert that we saw the system issued.  So, it issued 
this alert because of this divergence, and the alert is located at 
centerfield northeast and north.  That's the alert that was given to 
the pilot.
		That situation persists.  That starts to weaken now.  The 
system has a linger of the alert which holds the alert for awhile after 
the event.  It doesn't jump to an all clear until it's pretty sure it really 
is all clear.  So, the alert persisted, and this is the last pole in fact 
when that alert is issued.
		I want to stop here and point out that while this is going 
away, right at -- the next 10 seconds, this alert is gone.  This sensor 
starts showing winds.  Now, this is the alert that wasn't issued.  
That's a station anomaly.  We step forward.  That gets to be a pretty 
good gust over there.  It now weakens and goes away.
		Now, this is -- in some sense -- I'm sure this is not a dust 
devil, but this would be the kind of a signature you would see from a 
localized feature that was not a hazard to aviation.
		I can't tell you what this is because whatever it was was 
happening outside.  It influenced that one sensor and then stopped.  
Now, one issue about something like that, oh, wait a minute, there's 
a lot of real estate in here.  Is that really something dangerous that's 
crawling across the airport that's going to cause a problem, and we 
just can't see it because of the sparse station spacing?  That's a real 
concern.
		I've looked at the data, and sometimes that's what's 
going on, but then you see it later.  This time, I don't believe that was 
what's going on.  I really believe this was a local event out in that 
sector that didn't go forward.
		Let's look at the situation.  We're down to our 20 and 30 
knot winds, still down with our 20 and 30 knot winds, and now, oops, 
what's that?  Well, we've certainly got a surge down here by the 
runway now.
		However, it's coupled with an almost stopping of the 
wind up here.  What's happening, I believe, and my colleagues who've 
examined this case with me believe, is that a microburst has come 
down right here. It's sending an outflow in this direction, an outflow 
in this direction, which is enhancing this wind, causing this large 
number and canceling out the wind that was coming in with that 
northwest flow.
		It was actually -- LWAS -- actually 40 seconds later, not 
30 seconds later, which is the time I've got here.  LWAS issued a first 
alert on this because it did correctly detect this divergence over 
several poles, and I've drawn now a picture of my best guess of 
where this microburst was.
		Remember, we saw the bright spot in the reflectivity 
field at 11:52, that red dot right on the end of the runway, and this is 
what the LWAS winds are at exactly the same time that we're looking 
at that red dot.
		Stepping forward by 30 second steps -- and I will assure 
you I have looked at the 10 second data.  There aren't any surprises 
that I'm not telling you about.  I just didn't want to keep you all 
afternoon looking at pictures of wind arrows.  So, I've stepped it up 
to 30 seconds, and we see that this thing is there.  It stays there.  It's 
not moving.  It's pretty well planted right there on the northwest part.
		It does begin to expand, and now, boy, we have a really 
classic picture of a microburst as seen by anemometers here.  It has 
now expanded to enclose the whole airport and keeps doing this.  
This -- I jumped forward two minutes.
		This matches that last radar scan where the radar 
showed us the same picture with the microburst.  So, what I've done 
with a few sensors is taken you through what I saw in the wind data 
that I had available to examine, and, so, now I'll wrap up and tell you 
what I conclude from all this.
		First of all, let's go back to the time line.  What we've 
done is we've looked at this 12 minutes here sort of carefully.  We 
found out why this wind shear was offered.  We have an explanation 
for that wind surge that didn't issue a wind shear alert, and then we 
found the microburst and saw the microburst outflow.
		What I'm -- my stated conclusions about this are, and I'll 
emphasize the word "issued" here, I have looked at all of the alerts 
LWAS issued and all of the data, and I don't think there's any false 
alerts in there.
		The issued alerts, I believe, were correct on this day.  
That's not always true with LWAS, but this particular day, I think the 
issued alerts were very credible and gave a good interpretation of 
what was going on.
		This wind shear alert at 11:47, this is the alert that was 
given to the pilot, I believe, this alert was a proper wind shear alert, 
and it was properly located for the -- where it was located in the alert 
messages.
		The simulation indicates an additional wind shear alert.  
It was fairly brief, but it was an alert that my running of the software 
indicates would have passed the persistence test, and that alert was 
not issued.
		Then there was a microburst alert.  The -- we saw that 
situation.  The alert was very timely.  It started in the northwest 
sector.  It moved slowly to the southeast, which is mostly the 
enlarging of the system, and I will repeat, I don't think that northwest 
surge was associated with this microburst.  So, this was not -- that 
was not some early warning about the microburst.  That was 
something else, then this microburst came down, and the main 
reason I believe that is because once the microburst came down, it 
didn't move.  It stayed planted, almost rooted where it was.
		It's hard to believe that something would come 
screaming into the airport from the northwest, stop on the end of the 
runway and sit there for five or 13 minutes.  So, that's the basis for 
my conclusion that these were two different meteorological events 
that were just going on.
		Remember, this is a very chaotic wind field.  There was 
a lot of stuff going on that day, and, finally, of course, we saw that 
the LWAS system this time actually nailed the detection of that 
microburst.  It's not always that good, but we'll take credit for it.  I 
guess I'm done.
		BY DR. BYRNE:
	Q	Dr. Wilson, can you tell us something about the 
comparison of the simulation software that you mentioned in the 
operational alerts?
	A	Okay.  The simulation -- okay.  The operational system is 
doing a bunch of stuff.  It is poling the stations.  It is bringing the 
data in.  It is running the algorithm.  It is driving the displays.  It is 
archiving the data.  A lot of things going on.
		My software is simply software which executes the wind 
shear algorithms from a data file.  So, my computer is not loaded 
with other tasks.  The -- there is also an issue that part of the -- what 
we do to minimize false alerts is we do a lot of data filtering and 
stuff.
		The data filtering is something that is an on-going thing 
which lasts, well, for as long as the system has been running, 
although the actual filters that are being used pretty well cleanse 
themselves certainly within an hour or so.
		I don't have a very long data set here.  My data set 
starts just about 20 minutes before the first gust front comes across.  
So, my filters aren't spun up to the same level that the filters are 
spun up in the operational software.  So, there are minor differences.
		What I found when I went through this thing very 
carefully was that my software seems to be a little bit more 
aggressive about issuing alerts than the operational system was. 
		By aggressive, I mean that at each of the sectors, I had 
somewhere between -- over an hour and a half period, I had 
something like 15 extra alerts.  Those are 10 second alerts per 
sector.
		It was always the case that my software issued alerts 
that the other software didn't.  So, for some reason, my software was 
a little bit more sensitive, and since I don't have access to the 
operational software, I can't make a comparison to tell you why.  I 
can just tell you it's always a little bit more aggressive.  
		Usually this shows up as my software issues an alert one 
or two poles earlier than the operational system, and my software 
holds the alert one or two poles towards the end of where the 
operational system stops, and over these several different wind 
events, that adds up.
		When we have a short event like that surge at the north 
end, if you knock two poles off the front and two poles off the back, 
and you require a five pole persistence, the operational software 
might very well have seen that thing for three or four poles, not quite 
gotten to the persistence, and then turned it off because of this 
difference in the software -- in the sensitivity of the two 
performances.
		But I'm speculating.  I don't know.  The only way I could 
know would be if I could get inside of the operational software to look 
at it.  But there are differences, and my software is more aggressive.  
That I can say.
	Q	Can you comment on the crosswind shear that the 
aircraft might have encountered on 4 Right?
	A	We see -- we definitely see from when that microburst 
came down at about the time when the aircraft was rolling down the 
runway, the LWAS sensor at centerfield surged to 41 knots.  That 
certainly was more crosswind -- now, he -- he expected some 
crosswind there.  He'd been getting reports on crosswind, but he -- 
that is more crosswind than was being shown in the system for the 
several minutes before and which certainly he had received 
information about in any message.
		I don't know if he was already rolled past there because I 
don't know the detailed time line of that aircraft.
		The other problem we have is because of those sparse 
sensors, there could have been other surges, even stronger surges, 
down that runway that were between the sensors, and we just don't 
have information.
		So, I'm speculating.  If that's an important issue, I would 
presume that someone has analyzed the flight data recorder, and 
they can tell you much more about what happened to that plane than 
I can from the data that I have.
	Q	Later this year, the Little Rock Airport is scheduled for 
their upgrade to the LWAS RS or relocation and software --
	A	Yes.
	Q	-- upgrade with nine sensors.
	A	Yes.  It's going to be 10, it turns out.
	Q	We have some improvements.  Would there have been 
any major differences in the advisory with the RS versus the 
performance in the LWAS-2 system that occurred on June 1st?
	A	I don't think so, and the reason I don't is because this -- 
this microburst was -- well, I can't -- well, you said any differences.  I 
was thinking of the microburst.
		This microburst started with a fairly large footprint and 
happened to fall conveniently between the sensors in such a way that 
the alert seems to be extremely timely from the LWAS-2.
		The LWAS RS would get a lot of alerts that the LWAS-2 
wouldn't get, but on this particular microburst, I think they'd have 
both shown the same thing.
		There is a possibility, in fact even a probability, that the 
LWAS RS, unless it got the full strength of that microburst, might 
initially have thought it was a wind shear and detected it better but 
canceled the alert because it didn't have a measure of headwind loss 
and gain along the runway.  
		That microburst is far enough off, it probably was not 
causing a headwind problem on that -- or a loss -- a headwind loss 
down that runway.  So, LWAS RS might have in fact done a little 
worse.
	Q	All right.  If there was a Terminal Doppler Weather Radar 
installed at Little Rock, would we have seen any major differences in 
our air traffic control support or any advisories?
	A	It depends on where it was located.  If it was located 
where the NEXRAD is, because of the non-alignment with the radar 
beam, it probably would have been later than LWAS on this 
particular alert.
		If it had been located looking down the runway or up 
from the south, sort of the southeast, it probably would have given a 
wonderful picture of that microburst, but that's sort of a crapshoot.
	Q	All right.  Well, Dr. Wilson, I would like to thank you.  
With your presentation, you've answered all my questions, and I'll 
turn it over to Mr. Hall for your handling.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Okay.  Well, we'll go to the tables for 
questions.  I would ask -- Dr. Wilson, you probably don't know what 
an LWAS costs, do you?
		THE WITNESS:  Well, I know some old numbers, but 
they're fussy, but I think part of the problem is that the system is 
procured, and then the FAA independently does the real estate work, 
and I'm -- you'd probably have to actually do some snooping around 
to get the whole bundle together.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Well, that's just -- my only point is 
obviously the purpose of the system is to provide safety protection --
		THE WITNESS:  Right.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  -- at the airport, and it's paid for by 
the taxpayers.  It's not a cheap affair, I would assume.
		THE WITNESS:  Oh, it's not cheap.  It's well over a 
million dollars a system.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Right.  And, so, federal aviation -- so, 
the performance of it is something I wanted to put it in context.  
We're very interested in the performance of it.  It's there for safety, 
for the safety of flight, and it is an expensive item.
		Federal Aviation Administration.
INTERVIEW BY PARTIES TO THE HEARING
		BY MR. STREETER:
	Q	Doctor, if you could clarify one item for me, and I believe 
this was -- the wind event.  You were talking about where the wind 
shear alert was not issued, and you were --
	A	Yes.
	Q	-- discussing the differences between the software, and I 
think that was one that was at 11:49:10.
	A	Yes.
	Q	When you say the wind shear alert was not issued, for 
clarification, you mean the LWAS system did not issue --
	A	The LWAS system did not put -- put an alert on the 
display --
	Q	Okay.
	A	-- or at least -- let me be very careful.  What I have 
access to is the archive of the displays, which I think is the official 
record.  It may not be the correct record.
		However, I also -- I guess what I know about this, other 
than LWAS, is what I read in the papers.  The archive does not show 
an alert, and I read in this morning's paper the cockpit voice recorder 
transcript, and there was no -- I looked very carefully at what alerts 
did the pilot receive, and he got the alert for the one at 47.  He did 
not get a subsequent wind shear alert.
		So, my belief is that the controllers did not see an alert, 
and my archive is correct.
	Q	Okay.  So, based on what you saw in the CVR transcript 
and your archive data, it does not appear that the LWAS system alert 
--
	A	It's the newspaper version.  I always mistrust papers.
	Q	Oh, okay.
	A	But, yes, I believe -- I believe that the issue -- sorry 
about that, folks.  
	Q	Okay.
	A	It was certainly not in the official transcript.
	Q	Okay.  Thank you very much, sir.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Boeing Commercial Airplane Group?
		MR. HINDERBERGER:  Mr. Chairman, Boeing has no 
questions.  Thank you.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Okay.  American Airlines, 
Incorporated?
		MR. BAKER:  Mr. Eick, is Dr. Wilson's presentation in the 
exhibits?
		MR. EICK:  No, it is not.  It was just prepared on Monday 
and finalized.  So, once I do get it, I will include it and forward it out 
to the groups.  It is not in the attachment right now.  Just the tower 
display of the low-level wind shear alerts are in an exhibit to be. 
		THE WITNESS:  Yes.  I have it here.  I will hand it to him 
today.
		MR. BAKER:  We would like to request -- and Dr. Wilson 
identified the subject -- that the Weather Group and the Performance 
Group correlate Dr. Wilson's data on wind direction and velocities 
with the DFDR, so we really nail down once and for all where the 
airplane was and what it was subjected to, so we don't speculate as 
to what really happened.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  I think that's reasonable.  That will be 
done.
		MR. BAKER:  Thank you.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Allied Pilots Association?
		MR. ZWINGLE:  Mr. Chairman, I'd like to comment first 
that I think Dr. Wilson's testimony was critical and an excellent 
presentation.
		BY MR. ZWINGLE:
	Q	Dr. Wilson, you began to clarify, and I'd just like you to 
complete, if you would, the notion of alerts, that just because the 
wind shear -- I'm sorry -- the LWAS system alerts and displays in the 
tower cab, that does not necessarily mean the alert was forwarded to 
the pilot, is that correct?
	A	What I said was -- that's all a matter of -- of somebody's 
record because everything's recorded.  I said I have not reviewed 
that.  So, I don't know.
	Q	Okay.  But your -- your references to alert meant that the 
LWAS system alerted in the tower cab?
	A	Well, if we're going to pick straw -- pick hairs here, my 
reference is that the archive of what the computer says it sent to the 
tower cab is my alert.  I wasn't in the cab.
	Q	That's fine.
	A	I didn't see what the controllers saw.
	Q	I understand.  That's fine.  That's accurate.  Would you 
describe the two-minute averaging function of the centerfield wind, 
and how this wind value compares to reality?
	A	Okay.  I certainly will, but I want to point out that that 
number, while it is of -- it's an ICAO requirement, and it's a very 
important number, it has nothing to do with the functioning of these 
algorithms.
		The two-minute average wind at centerfield is simply the 
running average, and, so, in two minutes at 10 seconds poles, there 
are 12 samples of the wind taken each 10 seconds, and they are 
simply averaged.
		Every time you step forward 10 seconds, the oldest 
value is dropped off, the new value is put on, and the window slides 
forward, and you compute what's known as a running average value.
		That -- the reasons -- well, if you put one anemometer 
out, what it measures is representative of exactly what happens at it.  
It may not have anything to do or it certainly decorrelates with what 
happens as far away as you are or as far away as the end of the 
runway is.
		The reason -- there was research conducted by ICAO 
back in the early '70s, excellent research paper, which I have read, in 
which it was established that the most representative wind for the 
entire airport is a 10-minute running average, but, of course, the 10-
minute running average has a very slow time response when there is 
a shift, and, so, ICAO settled on the two-minute average as being a 
compromise between representative of the whole airport and having 
a fairly rapid time response when there's a wind shift.
		That is the reason why the original LWAS was designed 
with boundary sensors, so you could pick out those perhaps non-
representative areas.
	Q	In consideration of the fact that there are variations in 
the LWAS equipment, LWAS-2, LWAS NE, etc., what sort of variations 
and warnings do we get from these equipment?
	A	The LWAS-2 says wind shear alert.  It's just like LWAS-1.  
Wind shear alert by sector.  The LWAS NE, the LWAS RS and the 
TDWR all have identical messages which will either say microburst 
alert on a runway, expect a certain amount of loss, or wind shear 
alert on a runway, expect either a gain or a loss, depending on what 
the system has detected.
		Those -- that was the main or one of the really important 
things that that wind shear working group did, was it brought all of 
these systems into a standard message.
	Q	Okay.  Depending upon the size of the airport and, of 
course, the geographical size of the airport and the type of system 
installed, should wind values, in your opinion, should wind values 
sensed at a location closest to the landing runway or operational 
runway for take-off or landing be reported to the pilot advice 
centerfield winds?
	A	I guess I could be a little snide and say I was brought 
here because I have expertise, not because I have opinions.
	Q	In your expertise then.
	A	That's really not for me to say.  I believe that the 
centerfield wind is sort of an ICAO standard, and, so, there's --
	Q	Okay.
	A	-- some hills to climb to change that.  But, yes, certainly 
we could have opinions about what might be more useful to pilots.
	Q	Would -- would perimeter winds be of value to me, --
	A	They --
	Q	-- absent -- absent alert?
	A	Well, certainly they -- they -- oh, yes, and -- and a lot of 
pilots, if they have any concern, pilots are always free to ask for 
them.  Controllers have them on their displays, and pilots can ask for 
them.
	Q	In your expertise, do you think that aeronautical charts 
provided to pilots should identify the vintage of the system, the type 
of system, LWAS-2 versus LWAS NE, etc.?
	A	I don't have expertise in that.  I thought something 
about that was on the Jepsen charts, but I don't know all the detail.
	Q	Okay.  And are you familiar with -- with the description 
of the LWAS system in the Aeronautical Information Manual?
	A	No, I'm not.
	Q	Okay.  Thank you very much.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Association of Professional Flight 
Attendants?
		MS. LORD-JONES:  We have no questions.  Thank you.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  National Weather Service?
		MR. KUESSNER:  No questions, sir.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  I see your prediction outside is 
continuing to provide accuracy.  I think it looks like about three to 
four inches now on that shelf.
		The Little Rock National Airport?
		MS. SCHWARTZ:  No questions, sir.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Do you know how much the LWAS 
system cost for your airport?
		MS. SCHWARTZ:  Not exactly, sir.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  If you have that, if you could provide 
that for the record, we would appreciate it.
		The Little Rock Fire Department?
		MR. CANTRELL:  No questions, sir.  Thank you.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Mr. Sweedler?
		MR. SWEEDLER:  I have no questions, Mr. Chairman.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Mr. Berman?
INTERVIEW BY THE BOARD OF INQUIRY
		BY MR. BERMAN:
	Q	Sir, I was interested in your statement that a side gust 
or a crosswind gust coming over a runway that -- that might affect 
the performance of -- of an airplane that's landing on a slippery 
runway wouldn't necessarily be flagged with an alert on the -- on the 
newest LWAS systems, and that was an explicit choice made by -- by 
a committee.
	A	Yes.
	Q	Were you a member of that committee?
	A	I was.
	Q	Okay.  Could you give us a brief summary of the -- the 
thoughts behind that, and were there any counter arguments?  Was 
there unanimous agreement reached on that?  Give us a little flavor 
of that.
	A	That committee had met for three days or about 60 to 
80 people.  I don't remember exactly which one.  The committee sort 
of grew with time.  It got to be popular, and more people wanted to 
be part of it.  It was a big group.  It's hard to call a committee.
		Almost every decision that that -- and this committee 
met several times.  It was a lot of the same people.  Almost every -- 
by the way, the NTSB was represented on that -- at that.  I think Greg 
was -- Greg, weren't you part of that or was that -- blame it on Bud.  
Greg and Bud were there.  That's right.  I got this now.
		Almost every decision that was made by this committee 
was unanimous.  This was at the end -- this issue was the last issue 
considered.  It was the end of the third day.  There was a lot of 
fatigue, and this one cut almost right down the middle.
		I can remember a member from the FAA who was -- 
literally had tears coming down his face screaming "you're going to 
kill people", and there were people in the other side saying "we just 
can't have this system sitting out there giving all these false alerts.  
Nobody will believe it, and then we'll kill people", and I think it was 
more out of fatigue than good sense that the committee stopped at 
that point, and the 53 percent side won, and that became the rule.
		People commented that we ought to revisit it, but it 
never was.  The group never met again, and it stopped there.
	Q	And what year was this?
	A	'88.
	Q	Or millennium, if you don't remember the exact year.
	A	Approximately late '80s.
	Q	Okay.
	A	There are still people -- I was just called last -- oh, six 
months ago by somebody from NCAR saying we really ought to 
revisit that.
	Q	We -- we won't -- we won't ask how the NTSB voted 
because we don't traditionally vote.  Well, seriously, we don't -- we 
don't -- we -- we function usually as observers at meetings like this 
and don't vote.
		But can you -- and you've said that an FAA -- at least one 
FAA representative was opposed to this decision.
	A	Paul O'Brien from the Tech Center.  He's retired now.
	Q	Can you -- can you characterize the positions of yourself 
and other people at that time or -- and tell me how you feel now 
about it.
	A	You know, it's hard to tell what's conservative in this 
circumstance because of the issue that if you -- if a system alerts a 
lot, users may start to ignore it, and yet it's clear that we can design 
situations where it might be really critical information, and maybe 
the reason we couldn't figure it out was because at that time, we 
didn't have the right people in the room to make the decision.
		Certainly nobody could explain to that group of people 
why they should become -- come to consensus.  Maybe they need 
some aeronautical engineers or somebody.
	Q	And how do you feel about it now?
	A	Still bothers me.
	Q	You -- you believe it should be revisited in a committee?
	A	Revisited, I think -- okay.  You're getting opinions now, 
not expertise, but, yeah, the -- it bothers me because I think of a 
scenario, and, you know, I look at the data here.  I wonder if I maybe 
saw it.
	Q	Okay.  Thanks very much.  No more questions.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Mr. Haueter?
		MR. HAUETER:  No questions.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Mr. Clark?
		BY MR. CLARK:
	Q	Regarding the crosswind warnings that weren't 
programmed into the system, does your computer program analyze 
that and/or for the data we have, would we have generated some 
type of crosswind warning?
	A	No.  Well, let's be -- this only comes up for systems that 
are able to estimate a runway header -- headwind gain or loss.  That 
would be the NE or the RS system.
		The unique -- in order to make a reliable estimation of 
the headwind change on a runway, you need a lot of sensors.  The 
LWAS-2 doesn't have enough sensors to reliably make that 
estimation.  Since it can't estimate the headwind change, it doesn't 
even try and just issues all the alerts.
	Q	Okay.  The other thing.  You made several comments 
somewhat apart.  One is that the sensors were too far apart in one 
sense, but then the whole airport had recently undergone a survey.
		Does that -- would the survey have identified that --
	A	No.
	Q	-- the sensors were too far apart?
	A	Okay.  No.  The sensors in the LWAS-1 were specified to 
be one at centerfield and others at sort of the end -- the far ends of 
the airport property in all directions.  A little bit beyond the runway 
ends, but certainly not everywhere where the airplanes were low.
		The LWAS-2 was required to be a software upgrade.  
There was no money in that procurement to pay for new poles or 
more poles or anything.  So, LWAS-2 got what was there.  The 
system had already been in operation for about 10 years at that 
point, and, so, what we were forced to do was come up with an 
algorithm that would do the best possible job, given that we had that 
geometry to deal with.
	Q	Okay.
	A	This was intended to be an interim system, just a 
bridge, until the NE could be procured, and then we got into money 
problems because the NE turned out to be expensive, and, so, the 
bridge has lasted a lot more years than were intended.  
		I think we started with that in the first presentation this 
morning.  We've been revisiting the fact that we're in transition more 
than we're ever getting anything done.
	Q	Okay.  What -- what is in the program for Little Rock 
now?  Do we --
	A	The RS system -- as I said, they've already installed the 
new poles.  They are waiting for the software to be completed and 
tested.  The factory test will happen some time in the next few 
months, and then they will install the new software there.
	Q	Okay.  All right.  Thank you.
	A	I'm optimistic when I say few months.  That probably 
means 18 months, but in the next year or two, the -- I mean I could -- 
there's also a schedule of what airport gets what.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Well, I'm -- let me try to put this in 
sort of bites that I can understand.  You have a system at Little Rock.  
It's your LWAS-2 system.
		THE WITNESS:  Yes.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  It has five poles, five sensors?
		THE WITNESS:  Six.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Six, but I saw -- I think -- didn't I -- I 
thought you said there were five.
		THE WITNESS:  There's the centerfield --
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  You said at the airport, that there 
were five operational now.  Are there six or five?
		THE WITNESS:  There's six.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Six?
		THE WITNESS:  I have the data from six.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  So, there's six?
		THE WITNESS:  There's five sectors.  Five alert sectors.
		MS. SCHWARTZ:  Mr. Chairman, I would defer to the 
FAA as it is their equipment and installation.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Okay.  But you all thought there was 
five, but you -- there are six?  They're saying there's six.  Okay.  So, 
there's six of them.  We can only find five poles.  We went -- I went to 
look.
		THE WITNESS:  There was two in the south.  There's one 
in the north, one in the northeast, and one on the northwest, and one 
in the centerfield.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  On that hill over across the river, 
right?
		THE WITNESS:  I have not -- I got in after dark last night.  
I would have done a survey, but --
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Well, go out there and count and 
make me feel better.
		THE WITNESS:  Well, they gave me data from six poles.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Well, that's -- that's what I want to 
find out about.  So, you got the data from those poles, and that 
system, that present system is scheduled to be upgraded, right?
		THE WITNESS:  Yes.  I showed you the map of where the 
new poles -- those --
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Right.
		THE WITNESS:  -- poles will be kept, and the new poles 
will be stuck in.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  And -- but the new system -- tell me 
why the new system is better than the old system.  Essentially, as I 
understand it, it gives greater coverage and doesn't have these holes 
--
		THE WITNESS:  Okay.  It will not give greater coverage.  
It will fill the holes, fill the coverage --
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Fill the holes.
		THE WITNESS:  -- area, so that smaller events can't slip 
through the cracks.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  And does that mean more warnings?
		THE WITNESS:  Yes, it should.  It should mean -- well, I 
showed you the performance statistics.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Right.
		THE WITNESS:  It will probably increase the number of 
microburst warnings by about 50 percent correctly.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Okay.  And I guess, is that 
-- that gets into something I guess we'll get into with the FAA or 
should have or maybe you have some experience -- is anybody 
training the pilots so they know we have -- as the gentleman with 
Allied Pilots said, here's a new system.  It's going to be more 
sensitive.  You're going to see -- experience more warnings.  So, we 
don't have it desensitized -- the pilots being desensitized --
		THE WITNESS:  Actually, the pilots have already in a 
sense been trained because when the new system is in, the alerts will 
look just like TDWR alerts.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Good.  Okay.  Now, --
		THE WITNESS:  So, it will be transparent to them what 
system is giving them the wind shear alert.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  But the new alerts will not have the 
crosswind alerts, right?
		THE WITNESS:  That's correct.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  But the old system does have some 
crosswind --
		THE WITNESS:  That's correct.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  -- alerts?  And --
		THE WITNESS:  Well, the old system doesn't know 
enough to know.  It just gives the alerts.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  But there was then another 
crosswind, I guess, approximately 40 miles an hour.
		THE WITNESS:  It alerted -- that's the one -- it did alert 
on that.  It delayed the required persistence count of 50 seconds.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Okay.
		THE WITNESS:  But it did alert on that, yes.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  And, now was that consistent 
because the forecast was gusts up to 40 miles an hour?
		THE WITNESS:  Yeah.  The LWAS system certainly 
measured gusts that supported the Weather Service forecast.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  And you've developed this software, 
and is it -- do you think that the system itself -- and I'm looking not 
just at Little Rock, but -- but nationally is being maintained properly 
and kept current, so it's -- it's a useful tool it's designed for because 
it's -- it's a big investment?
		THE WITNESS:  Well, the FAA has a steady program for 
making improvements.  The procurement of the RS and the resiting 
of the poles was part of that.  I see steady progress.  I do work sort of 
closely with the people.  They -- they turned the technology or the 
care of the system from the Tech Center over to Oklahoma City.  
When they did that, I made several trips out there to train them in 
the technology and in the -- how -- methods for using -- maintaining 
the technology.  The FAA funded that, of course.
		I think -- I am not -- would not be critical of how the FAA 
maintains this system.  Obviously every door knob could be polished 
more, but I've seen good conscientious work in the maintaining of 
this system, and the system did check out well.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  And here it was good performance?
		THE WITNESS:  Yes.  A lot of that has to do with the 
people at the airport, the facilities people at the airport.  If they don't 
stay on top of it -- so, I think you have to give a lot of credit to the -- 
to the people at the airport to keep it running.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Well, very good.  Very good.  Well, Dr. 
Wilson, you've given a very -- a most interesting presentation on a 
very important safety system that we've got a big investment in.  So, 
-- and I guess the bottom line is, here it performed pretty much as 
designed.
		THE WITNESS:  That's my conclusion, yes.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  That, I understand then.  I would like 
to give you an opportunity.  Is there anything else the Board should 
be looking at?  You've raised one issue here on the crosswind 
component.  Is there anything else that you think -- and I'm not 
putting words in your mouth about whether there's something we 
should or shouldn't look at, but are there any things you -- you've 
studied this particular event, and any information the Board should 
consider in trying to make recommendations to prevent another 
occurrence similar to this?
		THE WITNESS:  You know, I almost -- I can just say you 
can pull my transcript from Charlotte and reread it because I think 
you asked the same question there.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Well, we -- maybe I ought to do that.
		THE WITNESS:  My --
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  If staff had been sharp, they would 
have that for me to have already read and be prepared on.  I 
remember now.
		THE WITNESS:  My focus is -- is --
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Please cover those points again then, 
because, I mean --
		THE WITNESS:  This is just a point of --
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Charlotte was a windy -- you know, 
for the audience, you might tell them a little bit about the Charlotte 
accident.
		THE WITNESS:  That was an accident which clearly was 
a microburst.  The pilot flew into a microburst, and the issue there 
was -- or one issue -- there were many issues, of course.  
		One issue there was that he made a decision to go 
around, and the LWAS issue -- system issued its first alert on that 
microburst 10 seconds after he changed frequency, and they weren't 
able to get the word to him, and he flew the plane believing he was 
flying to avoid a heavy rain shaft and never knew that he was fighting 
with the wind shear, and he did not use the -- I believe he did not use 
wind shear escape maneuver in that circumstance.  Clearly, the 
information could have meant something different to him.
		I guess what I said at the last meeting, and I can make it 
a little more colorful now because I heard a cute quote last summer, 
and I'll prefix this by saying my focus for the last 20 years has been 
aviation weather and a lot of time hazardous weather.
		I think there's a lot of good stuff out there, and I know 
that there are other safety issues and other priorities, and you guys 
have to balance them all.
		I also want to make it very clear that I am not in any way 
trying to prejudge this case or say what did or didn't happen with 
respect to this airplane and this pilot.
		My optimism is that I see a lot of good stuff happening.  
The FAA has a good weather research program going on.  It's an on-
going thing.  They have built the ITWS System.  They have efforts 
going to improve it.  That's now in procurement.  A lot of good stuff.
		AWIN.  NASA is working on the AWIN Program, trying to 
figure out how to get information to pilots.  I maliciously took the 
time to show you, even if you had a 10-minute delay between when 
the radar saw something and when you got it to the pilot, how out-of-
date things might be, and I think communication systems is not 
rocket science.  There's no risk in developing a communication 
system.  There's some bucks involved.  		Some of them are 
probably federal bucks to turn on the pipeline of information, some 
of them are going to have to come from the carriers to turn on the 
bucket to receive the data.  So, there's bucks involved both ways, 
and there's a lot of things that are competing for those bucks.  I 
understand that.
		I'll close with a quote from Patton.  I guess my charge is 
stay the course, don't give up on funding safety stuff.  Less is less to 
quote our esteemed chairman.  Patton's comment was weather's not 
important until it's important, and then it's too late.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Well, thank you very much, Dr. 
Wilson, for your testimony, and, Mr. Berman, if you'll call us the next 
witness.
		(Whereupon, the witness was excused.)
		MR. BERMAN:  I call Dale A. Rhoda.
Whereupon,
DALE A. RHODA
having been first duly affirmed, was called as a witness herein and 
was examined and testified as follows:
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Mr. Rhoda, welcome.  Dr. Wilson 
does not follow the MIT football team.  Do you follow the MIT football 
team?
		THE WITNESS:  I'm not sure we have a football team.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Oh, you do, definitely do, definitely 
do.
		Please proceed.
		MR. EICK:  Good afternoon, Mr. Rhoda.  
		MR. BERMAN:  Excuse me.  Mr. Eick, let me ask him the 
basic questions.
		MR. EICK:  Oh, I'm sorry.
		MR. BERMAN:  Sorry about that.
INTERVIEW BY BOARD OF INQUIRY
		BY MR. BERMAN:
	Q	Please state your full name and business address for the 
record.
	A	My name is Dale Rhoda.  I'm an employee of MIT Lincoln 
Laboratory at 244 Wood Street in Lexington, Massachusetts.
	Q	Okay.  Thank you.  And your present position at Lincoln 
Laboratory?
	A	I'm also a member of the Research staff there.
	Q	How long have you held that position?
	A	I started working at Lincoln Laboratory in the Fall of 
1989.
	Q	Could you please tell us your duties and responsibilities 
in that position?
	A	Hm-hmm.  In those 10 years, I've contributed in 
different ways to the development of and testing of the Terminal 
Doppler Weather Radar and then the Integrated Terminal Weather 
System, which has been referenced several times today, the ITWS, 
looking at various -- doing various tasks.
		I was the field site manager for the Dallas-Fort Worth 
Prototype of the ITWS System for a couple of years.  I've wrote some 
software in the TDWR System, and since about 1994, I guess, one of 
my areas of expertise has been combining flight track data along with 
weather information from these FAA weather acquisition systems.
	Q	Okay.  Thanks.  And can you please give us a summary 
of your education and training and prior experience to qualify you for 
the current position you have?
	A	Hm-hmm.  I have a Bachelor's Degree in Mathematics.  I 
have a Master's Degree in Public Policy.  Before my time at Lincoln 
Laboratory, I was employed in another atmospheric research lab at 
MIT, also, writing software to analyze Doppler Weather Radar data.
	Q	Okay.  Thank you.  Do you have any FAA airman 
certificates?
	A	I do not.
	Q	Okay.  Very good.
		MR. BERMAN:  Go ahead, Mr. Eick.
INTERVIEW BY TECHNICAL PANEL
		BY MR. EICK:
	Q	Mr. Rhoda, you -- we have added Exhibit Number 5C, 
based on your research in thunderstorm penetrations in the terminal 
area.
		Can you tell us something about your research?  I 
understand you have a presentation to show to us.
	A	I do have a presentation which describes that research 
and summarizes what's in that report which is in the deposition.
	Q	Please continue.
	A	Thank you.  The work that I'll describe this afternoon 
was performed by myself and my colleague Margo Povlok in the 
Weather Sensing Group at Lincoln Lab.
		We've heard several things about airline policies about 
flying around when there are thunderstorms in the terminal area, and 
one of the results of our study was that we were able to look at the 
practice as well as the policy, and that's what I'm going to talk about 
today.
		I have a brief introduction where I will review the roles 
and responsibilities of the players in the decision to -- whether to 
penetrate or deviate storms in the terminal area.  I'll go over briefly 
what we refer to as the Level 3 rule of thumb that we keep hearing 
about at various FAA facilities and that we hear about from pilots and 
read about in pilot publications as well, and then I'll clarify which of 
the several precipitation scales that we've talked about today, I'll be 
using for the rest of my presentation.
		Then I'll go over the NASA-funded study that we 
performed that's described in that report that we just mentioned.  
Why did NASA ask us to do the work, what did we do, how did we do 
it, and what did we find essentially?
		First, I'd like to just, as part of the introduction, briefly 
review who the players are that helped make decisions about 
penetrating or deviating around storms in the terminal area.  What 
are their sources of weather information, and what are their 
responsibilities, and it's a lot of information on the slide, but I'll just 
go through it quickly.
		First, of course, the pilots -- the decision whether to 
penetrate or deviate around a thunderstorm ultimately lies with 
them.  They have several sources of weather information.
		Two sources that are available to them are the ATIS, 
which I believe stands for Automated Terminal Information System, 
but I could be wrong, but that's a voice recording that's updated at 
least hourly that describes the current conditions at the air field, the 
current runways that are active, any significant weather information, 
and it's updated if the weather changes within the hour, that is 
updated as well.  That's available to them on a particular radio 
frequency at each terminal.
		TWIP stands for Terminal Weather Information for 
Pilots.  That's only available currently at the airports that have 
terminal doppler weather radars, and that's a simplified message 
that describes -- it's a text message which pilots can request over 
their ACARs, describes the storms within 15 miles of the airport, 
their direction from the airport, and their overall direction of motion.  
So, that's available at the TDWR airports.  It's not available at Little 
Rock.
		Commercial aircraft, of course, have airborne radar on 
board.  Pilots observe visual cues when the visibility is such that they 
can.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  There is no terminal doppler weather 
radar here at Little Rock.  Is there any planned or scheduled that 
we're aware of?
		THE WITNESS:  Not that I'm aware of.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Are you all --
		THE WITNESS:  That's an FAA question, really.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  -- in line for the terminal doppler 
weather radar system here?
		MR. STREETER:  As soon as you asked that question, my 
resource is not at the table.  I can find that out for you and let you 
know.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  When your resource returns, let me 
know.
		MR. STREETER:  We'll do that.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Okay.
		MR. STREETER:  Sure.
		THE WITNESS:  Pilots can observe the visual cues 
outside the cockpit window, and then those methods -- those first 
three methods or particularly the first two methods, I like to think of 
those as being active information acquisition, where they make some 
sort of request, and they get some sort of reply.  So, they tune in to 
the ATIS frequency.  They request a TWIP message or they 
manipulate the controls on their airborne radar.
		The other sources of information are a little more 
passive.  You can look out the window.  You don't have to change 
what you're doing.  Simply the information comes in to your eyes, if 
you look for it, as well as monitoring the radio frequency for either 
wind shear alerts from the various wind shear detection systems or 
from PIREPs or pilot reports.  Sometimes the preceding pilots will 
give a ride report or describe the conditions along the route of flight.
		Another way of acquiring information is the pilots can 
ask the controller to solicit information from the preceding pilot, if 
they are not already giving that information or if the pilot recently 
changed to the current frequency.
		Moving along to the airline dispatchers, as we discussed 
before, those dispatchers have weather data from various vendors 
and others.  Typically, the dispatchers rarely initiate contact with the 
pilot once the pilot has entered the TRACON, but in some cases, 
particularly when the pilots call and ask the dispatchers for their 
opinion, they will use the weather products that are at their disposal 
to give advice about whether or not a diversion is going to be 
necessary, but not about individual deviations and penetrations 
around individual storms.
		The air traffic controller in the tower has the 
responsibility of reading the centerfield wind and has the 
responsibility of reading wind shear alerts when they are available 
from LWAS or TDWR.
		At the airports where the controllers have access to a 
six-level precipitation product, the controllers in the tower have 
limited access to that product.  They see it on a monochrome screen.  
So, they see one of the six levels in a light green and another of the 
six levels in a bright green, and those controllers do not have the 
responsibility to relay PIREPs, but they do do so on a time-available 
basis, but they're not required to do that.
		And then, finally, the TRACON controllers that are 
talking to the -- to the planes when they're a little further out, they -- 
at those airports where they have a six-level weather product, where 
they have an ASR-9, they can see again the six-level precip on a 
monochrome display in light and bright green.  
		They do not have any access ever to the wind shear 
information that the controllers in the tower have, and, so, the 
controllers that are directing the planes to the airport, if the tower 
controllers are reading wind shear alerts, the TRACON controllers do 
not hear those wind shear alerts, and they don't have any display 
that shows those alerts to them.
		And, finally, at the bottom of the slide that we were just 
looking at, TRACON controllers also may relay PIREPs from the 
preceding planes.
		Before we did the study that I'm going to describe in just 
a minute, we did a literature search and really, to the best of our 
knowledge, there hadn't been any other studies where people 
collected weather data and flight track data to see what sorts of 
decisions the pilots make in the terminal area, but there are some 
things written in the literature.
		This is a quote from a magazine.  This quote was written 
by a pilot to other pilots describing the weather products that are 
available to air traffic controllers, and this is very typical of the things 
that we would hear from pilots, and that we've heard in the various 
places around the country where we have been testing and 
developing, for instance, the TDWR and ITWS.
		When we visit and spend many hours in TRACONs and 
towers developing these products, we generally hear this sort of 
Level 3 rule of thumb, where the controllers have access to the sixth 
level VIP weather product.  They say that generally speaking, since 
that's the only presentation they have, generally speaking, the pilots 
avoid storms that are Level 3 and higher.  
		Here's another quote along those lines, and that was 
really -- we weren't able to find an instance where anyone had taken a 
look to validate that rule of thumb, but that's a very widely-quoted 
rule of thumb at FAA facilities across the country.
		So, just to review, we've talked about a couple of 
different precipitation scales today, and the remainder of my talk, I'm 
going to use this sixth level precip scale which the National Weather 
Service gentleman said is the old way of doing things at the NWS, 
but I assure you it's the current way of doing things at the FAA and 
probably will be for some time.
		Rather than breaking precipitation up into 16 levels, 16 
or more levels, the FAA systems detect precipitation on the six level 
scale.  You'll see some adjectives over there to the left from the AIM 
that was mentioned earlier. 
		To put those -- these precip levels in layman's terms, I've 
listed what they would correspond to roughly in terms of rainfall in 
inches per hour, if you want to think about this in terms of watering 
your lawn.
		There will be -- I'm going to show a couple of movies in a 
minute of planes flying around weather in the Dallas-Fort Worth 
TRACON area, and the colors that I'm going to use for these six level 
weather product are the same colors that are used on the TDWR 
depiction and will be used on the ITWS depictions as well, and 
they're listed here, where the greens are Level 1 and 2, and anything 
yellow or orange or red is Level 3 and higher.
		And then on the far right, I've listed what a typical 
airborne radar display would look like with three colors.  Level 1 
generally shows up as green, Level 2 is yellow, and everything higher 
as red.  Now, there are some four-color airborne displays. 
		My understanding is that with the four-color displays, 
Level 5 and Level 6 would show up in a magenta as well.  There may 
be some variation, but that's sort of the general color scheme.
		With that background out of the way, I'd like to describe 
the study that we did that was written up this past June.  NASA AIMs 
is developing some air traffic control decision support tools for use in 
the terminal area.  The one that I'm specifically going to talk about is 
called "the final approach spacing tool", sometimes abbreviated as 
FAST.
		That tool knows about all the traffic that's arriving into 
the airport area and aids the controllers by suggesting for each plane 
which runway the controller should land that plane on and what 
sequence the plane should be landed in in order to achieve a very 
efficient throughput in busy traffic periods.
		The way that it does that is by relying on a set of routes 
that it assumes each plane will fly from a particular arrival fix to a 
particular runway.  As long as the plane does fly the route that the 
system knows about, then the system has some very sophisticated 
aerodynamic information, information about the performance of each 
different type of aircraft and can estimate the time it will take the 
plane to fly from its current point to the runway touchdown point.  
Therefore, it can set up a list -- a sequence list, and it can distribute 
the aircraft evenly among the runways and achieve a very efficient 
throughput.
		But all of those calculations rely on those, quote 
unquote, time-to-fly estimates which rely on knowing the route that 
the plane will fly in the terminal area.
		On days when there are thunderstorms in the terminal 
area, those form effective roadblocks.  The routes change and 
meander as we will see in a minute, and the computer no longer 
knows what routes the planes will fly, and it's not able to make time-
to-fly estimates, and with the current version of FAST, it's simply 
turned off on storm days because it doesn't know how to deal with 
weather.
		So, we were asked by NASA to think about some future 
generation of FAST that might be able to, first of all, predict the 
location of the weather in the future, but, more specifically, the piece 
of the puzzle we were working on is saying if you knew -- if you know 
what the weather is, how do you know which of those storms are 
going to be more or less likely to cause requests for deviations, and, 
so, we wanted to measure all the available weather variables at a 
particular airport in this study, which I'll describe in a minute, and 
we wanted to do an initial investigation to see whether or not we 
could combine those variables into a measure of the probability that 
a plane would deviate around a particular storm.  
		That was the goal of the study, and in looking at that, 
basically efficiency-based study, it's also -- our conclusions or our 
findings are also applicable to terminal area safety, and also in the 
days of the future when controllers are not looking at monochrome 
displays but color displays, what weather products should the 
controllers be looking at?  Is the six level VIP scale the right one to 
help them anticipate pilot deviations or is there some other product 
that would be more helpful?
		Our approach was to collect 60 hours of weather data 
and flight track data in the DFW terminal area.  Because FAST is only 
concerned with aircraft that are arriving into the terminal area space, 
for this study, we restricted our attention to arrivals only.  So, we did 
not look at pilot encounters with thunderstorms for aircraft that were 
departing, only arrivals.
		In that 60 hours of stormy data, we identified every 
encounter where an aircraft, arriving aircraft had a thunderstorm in 
its nominal flight path.  We split those into penetrations and 
deviations, and I'll describe how we did that in a minute, and for 
each of those, we extracted the weather and the flight variables for 
each of those encounters.  
		So, we had then a large database of the types of weather 
that the planes did fly through, and the types of weather that the 
planes specifically avoided, and we analyzed that statistically, and I 
just want to point out that the data we looked at were nine stormy 
days in the late Spring and Summer of 1997, and while there were 
some fairly dramatic penetrations of thunderstorms, these were not 
days that anyone read about in the newspaper in terms of there 
being any accidents or, as far as we know, any -- any injuries.  
They were nine Dallas thunderstorm days.
		The way we were able to collect the weather data and 
the reason -- one of the reasons that we did the study in Dallas is 
that our group at Lincoln Laboratory was testing our prototype of the 
integrated terminal weather system which is shown in a block 
diagram here.
		I've included this slide for two reasons.  First, to show 
you the weather sensors that we used to collect the weather data I'll 
describe in a minute, and, second, to make the point that on these 
days, this was not a pristine environment for an experiment about 
behavior in the presence of thunderstorms because we were 
providing real-time weather information via this prototype system to 
the traffic managers in the towers, the TRACON, the en route center 
at Fort Worth, and as well as the major airlines operating in and out 
of Dallas-Fort Worth at their dispatch offices, either via web sites or 
dedicated phone lines.
		So, the people thinking about traffic management on 
these nine days that I'll describe had the best available weather 
information.  They had false echoes removed from their displays.  
They had excellent weather information with which to make their 
decisions.
		The sensors that we used to collect the weather 
information were the three radars shown across the top, the National 
Weather Service's NEXRAD located in Fort Worth, two Terminal 
Doppler Weather Radars, one that looks for wind shear over Love 
Field and the other that looks for wind shear over DFW, three airport 
surveillance radars that cover the DFW TRACON air space.
		In our study, we did not look at AWAS data or LWAS 
data, but we did look at data from the National Lightening Detection 
Network, and that's a network of sensors all across the country that 
detects every cloud-to-ground lightening strike in the country, and we 
didn't look at any weather data from aircraft, but we did in fact have 
flight track data in the terminal area.
		Here's a list of the sensors again, and I listed the 
variables that we looked at in our study.  So, the airport surveillance 
radar gives you a six level precipitation product.  
		We computed another variable which we call weather 
coverage with that product.  We -- it's simply what percentage of the 
air space is covered in rain.  What percentage of the air space has 
light rain over it, and what percentage of the air space has heavy rain 
over it?
		From the doppler radars, the Terminal Doppler Weather 
Radar and the NEXRAD, these radars, as we've heard several times 
today, take several minutes to do an entire volume scan, but one 
benefit of waiting all those minutes is that you get a three-
dimensional picture of the storm structure, whereas the airport 
surveillance radar updates every 30 seconds.  It's a very current 
picture of what's going on, but it's only a two-dimensional picture.
		So, with the three-dimensional reflectivity information 
from these doppler radars, we use that three-dimensional storm 
structure to determine whether the planes were flying above or below 
the storms.
		If you only did a study like this using ASR information, 
the data would be very current, but you wouldn't know if the planes 
were above or below the storms.  Using the three doppler radars 
together, they each update on average every five or six minutes, but 
you have three of them.  So, really the update rate is more like every 
two or three minutes, and the TDWRs update over the airports every 
one minute.  So, it's  very current three-dimensional information 
about what's going on.
		We computed a number of two-dimensional projections 
of that three-dimensional storm structure, some variables that have 
already been described today, vertically-integrated liquid, maximum 
reflectivity in a vertical column.  What was the echo tops or how -- 
how high were the clouds?  What was the echo bottom?  Was the rain 
reaching the ground or not?  What was the thickness of the clouds?  
What was the probability that there's severe hail in that location, and 
then from the Terminal Doppler Weather Radars, were there 
microbursts or gust fronts?
		We looked at the cloud-to-ground flash rate from the 
Lightening Detection Network, and then from the flight track data, we 
computed several interesting variables.  We had the flight ID.  So, we 
knew -- on most of the days, we had flight IDs.  So, we knew which 
airlines the planes were flying from, what kind of aircraft it was, what 
fix they came in over, what runway they landed on.  Where were they 
when they encountered the storm?  How far from the airport were 
they?  What was the total path link it took them from the time they 
entered the terminal air space to fly to the runways?
		Were they a leader or a follower, where that's something 
that's a variable that we made up, and the definition was that if 
another plane had flown the same route in the preceding 10 minutes, 
then you are a follower.  If you are the first plane to fly this particular 
route within a 10-minute time span, which we arbitrarily made up, 
then we called them a leader.
		What was the altitude?  What time did they arrive, and 
we also had the delay information.  We knew what time -- we knew 
how long their flight had been.  We knew what time they were 
supposed to take off, what time they did take off, etc.
		So, let's look at a couple of examples of -- I'm going to 
show you movies now of two of these stormy days.  Is there any way 
we can focus that just a little bit better or is that as good as it gets?  
Okay.  That's what we have.
		This is the Dallas-Fort Worth Terminal Area seen from 
above.  The DFW runways are right in the center, and to give you an 
idea of scale, each of these little whisker lines right here is one 
nautical mile long.  So, the runways are very small in here.  It's about 
40 nautical miles or 45 out to the edge of the TRACON.
		Arriving traffic typically enters the DFW air space over 
these four corner posts.  Each of the blue numbers that you see here 
is the current location of an aircraft, and then I have 10-minute long 
contrails, if you will, in red.  So, we can see when the flow is in a very 
steady state, all those red lines line up over each other, and you have 
a simple flow.
		We'll start the animation in just a minute, and you can 
see that when planes start deviating, the red lines diverge and go 
around the storms.  The colors are a little hard to see in the 
projector, but greens again are Level 1 and 2, anything yellow or 
orange or red are Level 3 and above.
		Would you start the animation, please?  Thank you.  
Here it goes.  Every time the screen updates, that's 30 seconds of 
real time.  So, this is much, much faster, you'll be happy to know, 
than the planes fly in real time.
		But here we have four arrival streams coming in, five 
arrival streams actually because there are two from the southwest.  
These are planes landing at DFW and at Love Field.
		Some storms are starting to build.  Some near the 
nominal flight path.  So, we'll start to see -- you can see the red line 
bowing.  Now you see planes going on both sides.  There's some 
deviation starting there.  Now they're coming in.  They're diverting 
around the weather.
		This storm also is moving through the nominal flight 
path.  So, the arrivals have stopped for a moment, and you can see 
the planes flying to the north around the weather and to the south.
		These storms will continue up to the north and disrupt 
this flight path which at the moment is fairly nominal, though you see 
it's going to start to be affected.  The planes are holding outside the 
TRACON here.  Some are finding a path through the storms. Normal 
arrivals from the southwest, deviations coming in from the southeast.
		On this day, we'll see in a chart -- I believe on this day, 
there were an equal number of penetrations and deviations.  You can 
see some -- a little bit of holding here in the terminal air space.
		This storm that just came up across DFW dropped a 
microburst on the air field, and the planes scattered and held, but 
the storm was fast-moving.  It moved off the air field, and the planes 
came right back in.  They didn't have to leave the TRACON.  The ATC 
held the planes at the corner post for a few minutes.  It was really 
beautifully choreographed compared to some instances where the 
wind shear sits on the air field, and everyone has to find somewhere 
else to go.
		Now we have planes here penetrating yellows and reds.  
It's hard to see with the way the projector's focused, but penetrating 
storms on final approach and near the airport, and I'll quantify that 
for you in a minute.
		Let's go to the next slide, which shows another, and this 
is -- I'm just going to show you two days from the study, and start the 
animation, please.  The same air space, same parameters.  Every 
time the screen updates, it's 30 seconds.
		Here we have a long line of storms across North Texas.  
There is a fortuitous gap at the moment in this line of storms over 
the air field.  That gap is going to fill in, but in this movie, we're going 
to see pilots penetrating the storms Level 3 and higher for more than 
an hour on final approach, starting now.  It's hard to see.  There's 
yellow there, but we'll see it.
		No arrivals from the northwest because of that long line 
of storms that was there for awhile.  Now, they're going to realize 
that there are some holes here that they can fly through, and we'll 
start to see arrivals coming in from the northwest.
		You can see the planes penetrating, and I'm sorry it's so 
hard to see on the projector that the storms there are yellow and 
brown, Level 3 and higher.  They're going to continue to penetrate for 
a few more minutes.  You see a little holding here at the corner 
posts, and now they're going to start penetrating again, and then, for 
some reason, I can't tell you why, they're going to stop penetrating, 
and it's going to be very chaotic for just a minute, and two planes 
that are just about to land are going to take very long pathways 
through very heavy precipitation, and they are going to leave the air 
space.
		You see some pilots here choosing to divert instead of 
penetrating, but mostly they're penetrating this Level 3 and 4 and 5.  
This chaos is about to begin, and the two planes that get the long 
pathways through this storm right here, there they are right there, 
you can see what they thought about the ride.  They're leaving.  
Everyone else is landing safely, going around the ends of the storms 
and landing on the diagonal runway.
		If we have time at the end, we can show this again.  You 
can watch it for quite a long time and always see something new.  
But we'll go on to the next slide.  Thank you.
		As I mentioned, we looked at -- in the data set, we 
identified every penetration and every deviation.  The penetrations 
were easy to find.  The computer could do that and knows where the 
planes are, knows where the weather is, and, so, the surveillance 
radar that we use saw the plane every five seconds.
		For every aircraft location, we went in to each of those 
weather variable -- weather fields and pulled out the weather value 
for the location of the plane every five seconds.
		For deviations, we used human analysts who were 
familiar with the nominal routes in the TRACON from the corner 
posts to the runways to identify when aircraft were deviating around 
weather.  They would use a mouse, draw a box around the storm that 
caused the deviation, and then the computer would take over again 
and go into each little grid point inside the box that the human drew.  
So, the human drew the large box here, and then we're illustrating 
each of the grid points that are inside that box, and the computer 
would pull out the value of every variable inside every grid point.
		This gave us a large database of penetrations and 
deviations, and here is the total data set.  Nine days, again from late 
April of '97 through July 5th.  The cases ranged from four hours up 
to -- we had the longest one was 12 hours.
		There were a total of 1,952 encounters with 
thunderstorms in this time period.  These are arriving aircraft only.  
2,000 times, the planes had a thunderstorm in their nominal flight 
path.  One-third of the time, 642 times, they deviated around the 
storm and didn't penetrate.  Two-thirds of the time, they penetrated 
the storms.
		Given that long list of variables from the earlier slide, we 
were able to break the planes -- we looked at the subset of planes 
that had encounters with Level 3 and higher weather, and we broke 
them into various subsets and did some statistical hypothesis tests 
to see if one group was more likely than the other to penetrate.
		So, the first test indicated on this chart is planes that 
were delayed somewhere upstream on the current leg of flight before 
they reached the Dallas air space.  So, aircraft that had been delayed 
for 15 minutes or more somewhere upstream on this current leg of 
flight, after -- after leaving their departure airport.  So, if they held on 
the ground, say, for two hours and were two hours late leaving, that 
doesn't count.  
		It's a 15-minute delay in the air or longer versus the 
aircraft that had flown to the Dallas air space in their nominal flying 
time, and we found that to a very statistically significant extent, the 
aircraft that had been delayed upstream before they reached the 
Dallas air space were more likely to penetrate Level 3 and higher 
weather than the aircraft that arrived in the air space in the nominal 
flying time or less.
		This -- these hypothesis tests are usually characterized 
by a confidence level.  The confidence level on this conclusion is that 
the one percent level.  The chance that these numbers were so 
different by chance rather than by some sort of structure is less than 
one percent.
		The next set of subgroups that we split the data into 
were the leaders and the followers.  Again, a follower is anyone who 
had another aircraft in front of him some time in the preceding 10 
minutes, and as you could see in those movies, most of the folks 
were followers, but every time they break off and start a new path, 
that person is a leader.
		Again, the aircraft that had a plane flying the same route 
in the preceding 10 minutes, those aircraft that encountered Level 3 
and higher were much more likely to go through than the aircraft 
that were the first one to drive up, pardon the term, to a Level 3 or 
higher storm.  They were much more likely to deviate.
		Next, we split the encounters with the heavy weather, 
between those that occurred during daylight hours and those that 
occurred more than one hour after twilight.  So, when it was clear 
that the sun was no longer illuminating the cloud and visual cues out 
the cockpit window would be -- the normal visual cues would be 
difficult, though, of course, even in the day time, it's difficult to see 
lightening strikes, and at night, it's -- you can detect the presence of 
lightening, if not its location perhaps, which found that storms that 
encountered these electrified -- pilots that encountered these 
electrified storms at night were more likely to penetrate the heavy 
weather than those that encountered them during the day time.	
		So, we can't say conclusively that the visual cues play an 
important role, but that -- that result -- that's one possible conclusion 
you could draw from that result.
		The final test we did using the flight variables was to 
look -- to compare the performance of pilots or the behavior, I should 
say, of pilots at the different airlines.  The five airlines with the most 
aircraft flying around in the Dallas air space in our data set are listed 
here, and there were small differences in the percentage of the pilots 
that penetrated both heavy weather and weak weather, but none of 
those differences were large enough to be statistically significant.
		So, the behavior of the aircraft -- of the -- of the pilots, 
there were no differences that we could discern across the airlines.  
None of those, however, were what NASA asked us to look at.
		They asked us to look at whether or not deviations could 
be predictable and particularly using weather variables, and what we 
found through our statistical analysis is that far from the airport, the 
answer is yes.  More than kilometers from the airport, the plane -- 
the pilots' behavior was very well correlated with three types of 
variables:  the intensity of the storm measured by almost any 
variable and almost any radar, the better with the 3-D pencil beam 
radars than the 2-D radars; the weather coverage, how much weather 
is in the area.
		When the pilots were encountering the only storm in the 
sky, they tended to go around it, but when there's widespread 
precipitation, and one would need to fly through some precipitation 
to get where one was going, they tended to penetrate, but then it 
curved again at the upper end of the scale.  When there was 
widespread heavy precipitation, they tended to avoid the region.
		So, weather coverage was -- was correlated with their 
behavior, and, finally, the range from the airport, and we found that 
far from the airport, based on this data set of 2,000 encounters, if 
we -- if we trained the statistical classifier on some of those 
encounters and then showed -- tested it on the other encounters, 
where we were able to correctly predict what the pilots would do 
between 70 and 85 percent of the time.
		Now, NASA didn't ask us nor are we presumptuous 
enough to think that we would ever predict what a specific pilot is 
going to do, but the question is could you come up with a product 
that indicated the statistical likelihood that a storm would cause 
deviations.
		So, I don't want to imply that we were -- that we're 
predicting individual pilot behavior, but -- but we were able to predict 
the penetrations and deviations roughly three-quarters of the time far 
from the airport.
		Near the airport, however, it's much more complicated 
because the pilots almost never deviated.  They almost always 
penetrated.  This plot is showing as a function of range from the 
airport in kilometers.  This is the entire data set.  These are the 
deviations and the penetrations.  The deviations are the dark bars, 
and the penetrations are the light bars, and I apologize if the people 
in the back can't see.  I hope you can see the light bars.
		Far from the airport, we have a pretty homogenous mix 
of deviations and penetrations, but within 30 or within 25 or 20 
kilometers of the airport, most of the encounters are taking place 
there, and as you can see, they're almost all penetrations.  Very, very 
few deviations near the airport.
		We'll see on the next slide that those penetrations were 
of Level 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 near the airport, and try as we might with 
our powerful statistical software, the behavior -- the ones that chose 
to deviate, it was not because there was anything different about the 
storms measured by the weather variables that we measure.
		Now, there may be some -- some variables that we didn't 
measure, but their behavior was not correlated with any of those 
storms -- those variables that we measured.
		This chart shows only the -- excuse me -- only the 
penetrations.  Again, as a function of range from the airport, color-
coded by the intensity level or the VIP level of the weather that they 
penetrated, and the yellow is showing up as sort of a sickly green 
here, but we've got Level 1s in the dark green.  We mostly didn't pay 
much attention to Level 1.
		We've got Level 2s in the brighter green, and then this 
should be a yellow, and the yellow and magenta and red are Level 3, 
4 and 5, and you can see that there are some penetrations of Level 3 
and higher at all ranges, but within 25 kilometers of the airport, we 
have in this data set, if you count over to the left, more than 200 
penetrations of Level 3 and higher, and you need to keep in mind 
that we had not only the two-dimensional weather information, but 
we had a 3-D picture of the storm.
		So, if I say it was a penetration, and I don't mean flying 
underneath it, the plane was flying through weather of that intensity 
level as measured by one of those radars.
		Some of the things that could be a factor near the 
airport that we've heard when presenting this work to various groups, 
and it just sort of makes sense, common sense, is that there is less 
lateral leeway as you get nearer the runway.  You can deviate when 
you're far from the runway, maintain your place in line and stay on 
the nominal -- and -- and make your approach, but as you get nearer 
and nearer the runway, a deviation means necessarily that you're 
going to do a missed approach or an aborted approach.  You're going 
to lose your place in line and fly back out into that storm field that 
you've just made your way through.
		There's a higher workload, higher pilot workload in the 
cockpit as you get closer and closer to the airport, and this is 
conjecture on my part, but it may be true that the pilots go from 
acquiring information more actively, where they have to devote some 
of their time to manipulating the radar and requesting -- requesting, 
for instance, a TWIP message, entering the request and waiting for it 
to come back, to a system of letting their eyes and ears give them 
the most information, to looking out the cockpit window, listening for 
wind shear alerts from the controllers and from PIREPs, from other 
pilots.
		This is the last slide before the summary.  This shows -- 
it tries to answer the question of whether or not there's a, quote 
unquote, penalty for deviating at any particular range, and the lower 
line, the brighter purple line, shows as a function of range from the 
airport for the aircraft that penetrated storms at those ranges, what 
was their total path link, that it took some -- took them to fly from the 
edge of the TRACON to the runway, and you can see that the 
distance from the edge of the terminal air space to the runways is 
generally between 80 and 100 kilometers, depending on which 
runway you're landing on and which fix you're flying over, and that if 
you penetrate the storms and don't deviate, then the total path link is 
between 80 and 100 kilometers.
		For aircraft that deviate far from the airport, their total 
path link to get to the runways was very comparable to the planes 
that penetrate.  So, there's very little cost in terms of an extra path 
link to get around the storms at those ranges, but as you get nearer 
and nearer the runway, in particular within 25 kilometers, then -- now 
if you deviate, this is just again validating the common sense.
		Now, if you deviate, you're committing to doing a missed 
approach, and you have to go out and -- and rejoin the que at some 
point, and, so, the total path link that those -- the average total path 
link that those planes flew was well over 50 percent more which just 
makes sense.
		So, we just wanted to check and make sure that it made 
sense, but it was interesting to see.  We did not know what we would 
find out here far from the airport.  Far from the airport, you can see 
really there's very little penalty in terms of a deviation.  Your total -- 
the total path link it takes to get to the runway is comparable to if 
you had penetrated.
		So, in summary, far from the airport, we were able to 
fulfill NASA's requests quite well.  The penetration and deviation 
behavior seems to be quite predictable if you have some 
measurement of the storm intensity and the coverage of the 
precipitation region, and there's some reason to hope that in the 
future, if automation systems or decision support systems like FAST 
are going to run on days when there are storms around as well, that 
we might be able to help them understand which pathways are likely 
to be closed and which pathways are likely to -- to not result in 
nominal flying times.
		Near the airport, however, we found that there were a 
great many penetrations of precipitation of all intensities, all of the 
levels, except for 6, no penetrations of Level 6, and that sometimes 
those streams of penetrations until something objectionable happen 
would then lead to the planes behind the one that had the objection 
having missed approaches and aborted approaches as well.
		We found that pilots were more likely to penetrate 
intense precipitation when they were following another aircraft, if 
they had been delayed upstream somewhere in this current leg of 
flight, and if they were flying after dark, and we did not find any 
discernible differences in the behavior of pilots from different 
airlines, and the full report, which has been entered in the record, is 
also available at our web site.
		That concludes my presentation.
INTERVIEW BY TECHNICAL PANEL
		BY DR. BYRNE:
	Q	Mr. Rhoda, just to re-emphasize or clarify one of your 
last statements here, was there any biases or trends in air carriers of 
which were more likely to penetrate than any other air carriers?
	A	There were differences, but there were -- but those 
differences were not statistically significant.  So, we had, you know, 
different numbers of encounters by different airlines just because no 
matter where you drew the line, if you take a larger data set, you 
would have different numbers of encounters, and there were 
differences in the percentages of pilots from the different airlines that 
-- that penetrated or deviated precipitation, but those differences, 
when you applied the statistical hypothesis test to see if those 
differences are statistically significant or not, none of the differences 
were significant.
		So, the numbers were different in the sense that the 
numerator and the denominator came up with a different ratio, but in 
the statistical sense, that we could say that this airline is more likely 
to penetrate or deviate, there were no differences.
	Q	You also conducted similar research in Orlando, Florida.  
Did you find similar findings?
	A	That study in Orlando was a preliminary study to this 
one, back in the Summer of 1993, and it wasn't as carefully 
controlled as this one in that the computer wasn't going in and 
pulling data out for every penetration.
		We did that small study to see what sort of software we 
would need to write to do a larger study.  Generally speaking, what 
we found, broadly speaking, was similar.  We saw penetrations of 
more intense precipitation near the airport, and farther from the 
airport, they tended to avoid things that were Level 3 and higher.
		But the encounters which we chose to examine were all 
subjectively selected.  Myself and a couple of other analysts chose 
the encounters, quite frankly, that looked interesting, and then we -- 
rather than having the computer do the analysis, we sliced the radar 
data vertically by hand and went in and did a lot with pencil and 
paper.
		So, that small study paved the way for this one.  This 
one, I would say, is more objective, but there were no -- broadly 
speaking, the results were the same.  There were surprisingly high -- 
there were penetrations of surprisingly intense storms near the 
airport, even when viewed with the three-dimensional radar.  So, the 
results were very similar.
	Q	The research was also done at one of the world's busiest 
airports and home to a hub for two large major airlines.  Would you 
expect to find anything different going to a little smaller airport, like 
Little Rock, with less traffic flow?
	A	It's hard to say.  Orlando's certainly smaller than Dallas, 
and the results were largely the same, and, so, I can only comment 
from that.  I'm not sure how -- how the behavior would vary at the 
ends of the spokes, if you will, rather than at the hub.  I'm not sure 
what you'd find.  We'd be happy to take a look at some of that, but I 
don't know.
	Q	What role do you think compliance and airborne weather 
radar systems and wind shear systems and the training that we've 
done in the past with wind shear recovery, what type of complacency 
do you think is a factor in this study?
	A	We saw interesting behavior when there were 
microbursts at the airport, and in hindsight, we probably should have 
included not just was there a microburst there but was there a 
warning read to the pilot?  Was there -- did the pilot receive a 
warning?
		As Wes indicated earlier, that's -- that's harder to 
measure.  It would involve recording the voice transmissions between 
the towers and the pilots, but we did not see any penetrations of 
microbursts that were on the runways, and, so, it's possible that 
those deviations that we saw near the airport, which were not 
explained by any other -- any of the weather variables that we did 
include in our study, would be explained if you included the 
variables, saying pilot received a wind shear alert.
		So, perhaps that's when they decided to deviate, is when 
they received a wind shear alert.  We did not see penetrations of 
microbursts in the regions where the TDWR system warns for 
microbursts.  We did see one fairly disturbing incidence where pilots 
were penetrating Level 3, Level 4 and Level 5.  All of a sudden, they 
stopped penetrating, presumably for some reason, possibly for some 
reason you'd hear about on the voice recording, but we didn't have it.
		Two planes broke out to the right, one plane broke off 
the approach to the left turning -- avoiding whatever was in front that 
presumably someone had objected to but turning into the rain shaft 
that was producing at the surface, this 60-knot microburst, a very 
strong microburst, but the microburst was beside the runway, not 
along the runway.  It was far enough away from the runway that it 
was in a region where no warnings would be read to anyone.
		So, if the planes fly the nominal flight path, they have 
the benefit of those pilot reports.  They have the benefit, particularly 
at a busy airport, of there's a high likelihood that someone has 
recently flown along there.
		Now, we know that the weather can change in those 
intervening minutes, but you have the benefit of the PIREPs, but as 
soon as you break off from the nominal approach route and fly to the 
left or to the right, presumably because of some hazard that's been 
identified in front of you, now you're flying in a region where there are 
no PIREPs because no one has flown there in the last few minutes, 
and the wind shear detection systems, even the most sophisticated 
ones, do not provide information to the controllers to read about any 
air space except the nominal flight path.
		So, the only really significant penetration of wind shear 
we saw was outside the warning area, but it was a very strong 
microburst.  It was an ATR plane, didn't have any problem with that 
altitude and was not intending to land.  So, it was not flying near the 
stall speed.
		In terms of complacency, because we did not record 
whether or not the pilots were receiving wind shear alerts in this 
study, I really can't comment about whether they complied with their 
rules, and also the rules vary slightly from airline to airline.  It would 
be possible to do such a study, but it wasn't the focus of the study 
that we were doing.
	Q	Your study indicates or demonstrates some very 
significant safety impacts.  I'm sure you presented this to the FAA?
	A	It's been presented, yes, at high levels at the FAA and at 
NASA, the folks at NASA who are doing the AWIN work.
	Q	Has there been any request for further -- further 
research or further action regarding this matter?
	A	To date, there have not.  So, the study has been in 
circulation since June, and -- and we have put together a couple of 
proposals for some follow-on work, but nothing has come together 
yet.  We're also testing the ITWS system.
		We -- we have the infrastructure in place to collect this 
type of data easily at several places around the country, and it 
wouldn't be hard for us to do this study, to extend it or to repeat it, 
to make sure the results hold either at other places or in more days 
at Dallas-Fort Worth, but we haven't yet been asked to do so.
	Q	Mr. Rhoda, we'd like to thank you from the Tech Panel, 
and Mr. Feith has a question.
		MR. FEITH:  Thank you.  I'm going to jump in.
		BY MR. FEITH:
	Q	This was a very interesting presentation.  A couple of 
things.  You didn't discern between airlines, but how about types of 
aircraft, jet versus turboprop?
	A	We looked at that and didn't find a difference.
	Q	Okay.	
	A	I should have -- I should have listed that.
Turned out that there wasn't a difference.
	Q	And you said that the report's been in circulation since 
June or thereabouts.  Disseminated to airlines and -- and other facets 
of the aviation industry.
		Have you gotten any feedback from any of the air 
carriers that may have gotten your report, and what was -- what was 
their response to it?
	A	We briefed the report at American a couple of times to 
different audiences.  Once to one of the management pilot -- actually 
to a room full of several management pilots, and then later to the 
Allied Pilots Association and had very -- conversations that were very 
helpful to us in understanding some of the factors that come in to 
play.
		One of those viewgraphs reflected some of those 
conversations in terms of the restrictions in the lateral leeway.  So, 
we gained some insight into what some of the factors are as the 
plane gets closer and closer to the runways.  
		No one has expressed any particular surprise at what 
we've found.  So, the reactions have been more along the lines of 
helping us understand the factors.  You know, we are experts in 
weather sensing and the radar information and the interpretation of 
that information, and we've been testing our systems at FAA facilities 
for more than a decade now.  
		So, we understand a little more perhaps from the FAA 
side or from the operational side inside the tower and the TRACON, 
and, so, those conversations have been illuminating to me in terms 
of what information is available to the pilots.
		No surprise particularly expressed when we have briefed 
this, but really comments to help us understand what's going on, and 
what factors are -- are being taken into account.
	Q	Thank you very much.
	A	Hm-hmm.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Okay.  We'll go to the tables.  Boeing 
Commercial Airplane Group?
		MR. HINDERBERGER:  Mr. Chairman, we have no 
questions.  Thank you.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  American Airlines, Inc.?
		MR. BAKER:  Thank you.  We have no questions.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  The Allied Pilots Association?
		MR. ZWINGLE:  Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
INTERVIEW BY PARTIES TO THE HEARING
		BY MR. ZWINGLE:
	Q	Mr. Rhoda, am I correct, did I hear you correctly, did 
you state that your work is not drawing any correlation between the 
behavior observed, the traffic at DFW Airport versus Little Rock?
	A	No, we haven't examined any data from Little Rock.  So, 
I wouldn't have any way to comment on what the behavioral --
	Q	So, this presentation does not draw a correlation 
between the two operations?
	A	Nope.  This -- this presentation is strictly behavior in the 
DFW air space.
	Q	Okay.
	A	The only other air space we've looked at is Orlando, and 
again that was a small exploratory study and not really large enough 
to draw statistically significant conclusions.
	Q	Okay.  You referenced a Level 3 rule of thumb.
	A	Hm-hmm.
	Q	Is this a -- you say this is a pilot rule of thumb or a 
controller rule of thumb?
	A	Well, I don't know that we'll find it written -- well, we do 
find it written down in that IFR Magazine.  It's something that we've 
heard first, something that personally I have heard first at FAA 
facilities.
		So, I've spent a great many hours in TRACONs and 
towers, sitting with controllers and traffic managers since they have 
helped us develop prototype weather systems.  The Terminal Doppler 
Weather Radar and ITWS, and with their feedback, and, so, in talking 
to them about pilot behavior in the presence of thunderstorms, that's 
where I first heard what I'm referring to as this Level 3 rule of thumb, 
where they've said -- the only variable that those personnel have ever 
had to measure the intensity of storms is this VIP level, this six level 
scale that we've been talking about today, and, so, they don't have 
access to VIL or to anything that has any three-dimensional storm 
structure or to the echo top information or anything like that.
		So, they only have one variable.  They only have one 
yardstick, and the rule of thumb that they have then on that one sort 
of dimensional scale is that Level 3 and higher, when the weather 
reaches Level 3 and higher, that -- that's when the pilots start to 
request deviations.
		Not a hard and fast rule that they always deviate, but 
that when the -- from a controller's viewpoint, as I understand it from 
these conversations, when the weather is reaching Level 3 intensity, 
you better start thinking about your routing options because they're 
going to start requesting deviations, and then, after having heard 
that in FAA facilities where we've been testing our products, so in 
Orlando and Memphis and Dallas, both in the en route centers and in 
the TRACONs and the towers, then I came across this reference in 
the print in a -- from the slide that I showed earlier in a magazine for 
pilots and to pilots about the weather information the controllers 
have and what to do in that area.
	Q	Okay.  So, in consideration of the fact that in my own 
informal survey here at the table with six pilots and probably 50 to 
60,000 hours of experience who have never heard the rule of thumb, 
am I correct to assume this is not necessarily an air carrier --
	A	Certainly never anything I've ever seen in writing, except 
informally in this general interest magazine article in a pilot 
magazine.  But something which is widely quoted in FAA facilities as 
their characterization of how pilots behave, if they have to express it 
as a function of the only variable they ever have to measure storm 
intensity.
	Q	I understand.  Thank you.  Does your study indicate in 
consideration of the location at the Dallas-Fort Worth Airport and in 
consideration of the fact that this airport has -- is blessed with 
multiple sensors, as you referenced, how much of this information 
that was gathered from -- from those sensors was transmitted to the 
air crews during your study?
	A	The air crews would not have received any graphical -- 
any color graphical depiction of the storms.  The TWIP product has 
an alpha numeric --
	Q	Yes.
	A	-- depiction that flight crews that have, if I understand 
correctly, a printer in the cockpit which would be a limited -- I'm not 
sure which air crews.  There's some of the Delta planes, but I'm not 
sure which aircraft types that have a printer as well as an alpha 
numeric display for their ACARS.  They can requested a map which 
would have little numbers, 1s and 2s and 3s and Ms for microbursts 
and lines of Gs for gust fronts.
		Those would have been the only air crews that could 
have -- would have received a graphical depiction from this plethora 
of sensors.
	Q	So, -- go ahead.  Continue.  I'm sorry.
	A	In terms of verbal description from a dispatcher or from 
a controller looking at these displays, it would be hard for me to say.  
No controller has one of these color displays in front of them.  The 
supervisors in the towers and the TRACONs do.  Some controllers, by 
virtue of where they're sitting, can see them, and sometimes on the 
frequency, we hear them giving descriptions to air crews that could 
only have come from our prototype systems and not from their PVD.
		But no air crews routinely receive graphic information, 
certainly color graphic information, from these modern ground-based 
sensors.
	Q	I understand that.  Thank you.  Are you aware that not 
all air carrier aircraft are ACARS-equipped, not capable of receiving 
the TWIP?
	A	I am aware of that.
	Q	Okay.  Do you know -- do you have data in your study to 
suggest that any aircraft were warned of -- of -- of hazardous 
weather?
	A	I -- I know from having listened to the scanners, the ATC 
frequencies, on those days.  During this time, I was the office 
manager of our Dallas -- it was a prototype system, and I worked on 
many of those days, and from listening to the scanners, I heard the 
wind shear alerts and the microburst alerts being read as the 
controllers are required to do.
		In terms of warnings about precipitation intensity, the 
controllers, as I hope we all know, are certainly not required to read -
- to relay any information based on their weather radar information.  
They are very loathe to do so.  
		They're often heard to say, as they are, I believe, in the 
cockpit voice recording in this incident, you have better information 
than I do because they are suspicious of the quality of the 
information that they have, as they should be, because of some data 
quality issues with the airport surveillance radar until it is cleaned up 
by systems like ITWS.
		So, I don't know.  We didn't record the voice information.  
I don't know.  Controllers do sometimes say I'm showing a Level 4, 
you know, what do you see or I'm showing this or what, what do you 
see?  But they're not required to do so, and it's rare because they are 
concerned about liability issues.
	Q	Charming.  Does your data -- is your data broken down 
to reflect the percentage of flight time an aircraft is on a published 
route versus a radar vector?
	A	No.  No.  That would be a useful thing to do, but it's not.
	Q	Okay.  Two more.  Did you conduct any debriefs, flight 
crew debriefs after the penetrations were observed after the arrivals 
were completed?
	A	I did not.
	Q	Okay.  And did you have any personal observation time 
on the flight decks of the air carrier aircraft?  In other words, 
jumpseat observations?
	A	In the study?
	Q	Yes.
	A	No.  I have flown jumpseat, but not on any of these nine 
days.
	Q	Thanks very much.
	A	Hm-hmm.
	Q	No further questions, sir.
	A	All right.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Association of Professional Flight 
Attendants?
		MS. LORD-JONES:  We have no questions.  Thank you.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  National Weather Service?
		MR. KUESSNER:  National Weather Service has no 
questions.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Little Rock National Airport?
		MS. SCHWARTZ:  No questions, sir.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Little Rock Fire Department?
		MR. CANTRELL:  No questions, sir.  Thank you.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  And the Federal Aviation 
Administration?
		MR. STREETER:  No questions, Chairman.  I do have 
your answer on the Little Rock Airport.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  All right.
		MR. STREETER:  They are not scheduled to get TDWRS.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  So, -- and someone gave me a list.  I 
guess there are 39 airports that presently have the Terminal Doppler 
Weather Radar.
		MR. STREETER:  I don't know the exact numbers, but --
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  And four that are under construction, 
and then the one we got worked out up at JFK, I think.
		MR. STREETER:  That's correct.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  So, as usual, you're getting about the 
top 40 airports in the country.  What about the rest of them?  Is there 
any other advance system planned at this point?
		MR. STREETER:  Yeah.  I have been advised there is 
another system planned.  I also understand there are no more plans 
for additional TDWRs.  So, it will go to the later system.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Okay.  Very well.  Very well.
		THE WITNESS:  That additional system was also 
developed in the Weather Sensing Group at Lincoln Laboratory.  It's 
the ASR Weather Systems Processor, and I believe it's currently 
slated to go to 34 additional airports, 34 airports in addition to the 
ones that have received TDWR.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Well, good.  Okay.  Well, thank you.  I 
guess that's the tables.  Mr. Sweedler?
		MR. SWEEDLER:  No questions, Mr. Chairman.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Mr. Berman?
		MR. BERMAN:  No questions, sir.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Mr. Haueter?
		MR. HAUETER:  No questions.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Mr. Clark?
		MR. CLARK:  I have no questions.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  And the Chairman has no questions.  
Mr. Rhoda, we appreciate your presentation.  It was certainly 
informative.
		Do you have any comments that -- additional comments 
you'd like to make?
		THE WITNESS:  I don't, sir.  Thank you very much for 
your time.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Well, we appreciate you coming here, 
and I doubt if you're going to be leaving soon.  But -- so, we hope 
you'll enjoy and follow the rest of the testimony.
		THE WITNESS:  Thank you.
		(Whereupon, the witness was excused.)
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  We are sitting at what, 5 after 6, and 
I'd like to get one more witness in tonight.  I'm very aware that the 
President's giving the State of the Union here, and some may want to 
observe that, but let's take a short break, try to get back in about 10 
minutes.
		The last witness is going to talk on the subject of the 
Automated Surface Observation System, the ASOS, which is yet 
another piece of equipment that is funded to -- to provide weather 
assistance.
		We'll be in recess for 10 minutes.
		(Whereupon, a recess was taken.)
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  We will reconvene -- I guess i'm 
waiting.  We will reconvene this hearing of the National 
Transportation Safety Board, and I ask Mr. Berman if he'll call our 
next witness.
		MR. BERMAN:  Thank you.  I call Mr. Rainer 
Dombrowsky.
Whereupon,
RAINER DOMBROWSKY
having been first duly affirmed, was called as a witness herein and 
was examined and testified as follows:
INTERVIEW BY BOARD OF INQUIRY
		BY MR. BERMAN:
	Q	Sir, please state your full name and business address for 
the record.  You need to flip the switch, sir.
	A	For the record, my name is Rainer M. Dombrowsky.
	Q	And by whom are you presently employed?
	A	I am employed by the National Weather Service, located 
in Silver Spring, Maryland.
	Q	What's your present position at the Weather Service?
	A	At the present time, I am the Chief of the Surface 
Observations Branch of the National Weather Service.
	Q	How long have you held that position, sir?
	A	I've been in this position for one year.   Prior to that, I 
held other Headquarters positions in the Office of Meteorology.
	Q	Would you please briefly describe your duties and 
responsibilities in your current position?
	A	In my current position, I oversee the policy, the 
implementation and the replacement of surface-observing systems 
which follow the range of our Cooperative Weather Observer Program 
and also the ASOS Program.
	Q	And could you please describe your education and 
training and experience that brought you to your current 
qualifications?
	A	I have a Bachelor's Degree from the University of 
Minnesota in Geography with a Meteorology Certification from the 
National Weather Service.  I have been with the Air Weather Service 
of the Air Force, was with them for seven years and completed an 
additional 17 years with the Air National Guard, also operating a 
weather flight, and I've been with the National Weather Service since 
1977, and I've worked just about every position in the Weather 
Service, from meteorological technician taking manual observations 
to my current position supervising the National Network.
	Q	Okay.  Thank you.  And do you hold any current FAA 
airman certificates or current National Weather Service 
certifications?
	A	None with the FAA.  I do have an observer certificate 
with the National Weather Service which is still valid, both in 
observations and radar.
	Q	Okay.  Thank you very much.
		MR. BERMAN:  Mr. Eick?
INTERVIEW BY THE TECHNICAL PANEL
		BY MR. EICK:
	Q	Good evening, Mr. Dombrowsky.
	A	Good afternoon.
	Q	I'd like to start our presentation this morning with giving 
you an eyewitness of the weather conditions at Little Rock on the 
evening of the accident.
		MR. EICK:  The -- what is it?  Six minutes?  The clip is 
only 30 seconds, and it actually covers six minutes, but we'd like to 
give you a feeling of what was going on the evening of the accident.
		Will you please roll the video, please?
		MR. CLARK:  Just a second.  Do you want to describe 
where this video came from?
		MR. EICK:  The video came from a security camera on 
the field at Little Rock and was -- well, four cameras, and provides us 
different viewpoints of the -- the airport area from the security 
cameras.
		The video runs from 0449 to 0454.  So, I take that back 
on the time period.  It's a little bit shorter, but again it's a short 30 
seconds.
		(Video shown)
		MR. FEITH:  What we are looking at is a ramp.  The 
camera's showing the ramp, and it progressively gets worse as these 
clips play through.  You're looking at four camera views per minute, 
five-second clips each, and as -- as we move into other camera views, 
and if you're watching the time, you see that it is raining.  
		You can see objects on the ramp, but as the 
thunderstorm that has been talked about by various witnesses makes 
it progress towards the airport, the airplane is already down by our 
accounts as far as the landing time, but what this is showing is more 
or less a validation of the movement of the thunderstorm and the 
fact that the heavy rain does progress across the field as it's 
correlated to -- to all the time calculations from the witnesses talking 
about the wind shear and the LWAS system and the ASOS that we'll 
be talking about.
		What you're seeing is the rotating beacon on top of the 
tower.
		MR. EICK:  That flash was a lightening strike nearby the 
airport.  That's the end of the video.
		BY MR. EICK:
	Q	Mr. Dombrowsky, can you provide us a quick summary 
of some of the advantages and limitations of the Automated Surface 
Observation System?
	A	The latest generation of automated systems, the ASOS, 
was developed jointly with the FAA and the National Weather Service 
with some support from the Department of Defense in order to 
maximize the amount of observations that could be taken across the 
country.
		One of the limitations as has been heard earlier by the 
other federal agencies is that we're all operating under varying 
budgets, and as the budgets become tighter, we needed to look for 
other avenues because manual observations for one are expensive, 
and, secondly, the manual observations typically in the last decade 
or two have been taken in the basic weather watch mode rather than 
the continuous weather watch mode because of the need for the 
observers to be doing other duties while they were in the observation 
arena.
		So, the ASOS has allowed us to produce more timely 
observations, more frequent observations.  Although the ASOS does 
not have the capability of detecting certain parameters, such as hail, 
currently most ASOSs do not have the thunderstorm capability but 
that will be coming, freezing precipitation was another issue, and we 
have freezing sensors on the systems now.
		But phenomena, such as hail, tornados, volcanic ash, 
things of that nature, are still limits to the system.
	Q	Can you tell us, what is the official source of weather 
data or observations for the Little Rock Airport?
	A	The official observation for Little Rock is the ASOS 
System, and the ASOS System is complemented by a contract 
observer augmentation under a contract with the FAA.
	Q	Is the ASOS monitor available in the control tower for 
ATC use and reporting the most current conditions?
	A	Not the monitor itself.  The operator interface device is 
located one -- right across the hall and downstairs from the control 
tower, but there is an interface that allows the observation to be 
retransmitted to the tower.
		So, once the ASOS and the observer are in agreement, 
the observation is retransmitted to the control tower at the various 
positions within the tower.
	Q	How often are observations made, and are there any 
special criteria used?
	A	Observations are mandated to be taken once per hour 
with the stipulation that if certain special criteria are met during that 
hour, an observation will be taken to accommodate that particular 
special criteria.
		Now, those criteria range from cloud height to cloud 
visibility, beginning and ending of precipitation, and a number of 
other parameters, such as wind shifts and so on.
	Q	I'd like to find out some more about some of the specific 
sensors.  Can you tell us how the ASOS System gets its time stamps 
to verify the accuracy of the time of the observations?
	A	Well, the ASOS -- the first part of your question, the 
ASOS has a number of various sensors attached to it.  It's a full 
complete system which has a cloud height indicator, temperature 
and dew point sensor, and the standard make-up for observations 
that you would see at any manual site.
		The time stamping capability is done in a number of 
ways.  The ASOS has three internal clocks.  Those three clocks are 
compared against one another routinely during the day.
		If there's a clock drift of more than seven seconds, the 
system will automatically call our ASOS Operations Monitoring 
Center in Washington, actually in our Headquarters in Silver Spring, 
and if there is a problem, the folks at the AOMC, as we call it, will 
reset the system, but it has the intelligence to be able to compare 
itself, and if two of the three clocks are within time, the system's 
considered accurate.
	Q	The next reporting element on the observation would be 
the wind.  Can you tell us something about the wind anemometer, 
and how high is it located, and is this an international standard?
	A	Well, the anemometer is located with the system.  It's 
set at the standard 10 meters, which is the WMO or World 
Meteorological Organization standard.  The National Weather Service 
and weather services throughout the world use the WMO guidelines.
		If they deviate from those, they ask for special 
permission to do so, and we have done that in a number of cases in 
our Federal Meteorological Handbook Number 1, but that does not 
apply to the wind.
	Q	We just saw a presentation on LWAS.  The LWAS sensors 
at the Little Rock Airport are located anywhere from 70 to a 150 feet 
above the ground.  How would wind impact the height elevation 
differences between our 10 meter ASOS?
	A	You -- you could definitely see differences, but again 
that's going to be dependent on the type of phenomena going 
through the area.  But I would typically expect to see slightly higher 
winds the further up you would go.
	Q	How does the ASOS wind algorithm work, and how is it 
with regards to its accuracy?
	A	Well, in the simplest context, the algorithm has already 
been pretty much described by the gentleman from MIT in his 
description of the two-minute wind.
		As he mentioned there, it's a continuous averaging, and 
what the ASOS does is sample the wind data.  It also has a quality 
data check internal to the algorithm, and if there are deviations from 
what the system is programmed to look for, then it will throw out 
those characters and again provide the folks out at our AOMC with 
data quality errors.
		So, if there is a major problem, then we can go back by 
way of notification to the local office having support responsibilities 
for it, but it has an internal quality control capability, and again the 
system will average out those 10-second readings that are taken over 
the minutes as they were described earlier.
	Q	Would a wind report drive a special report in any cases?
	A	In some instances, a wind report will drive a special.  
One of those is a wind shift.  Any time the wind is 10 knots or 
greater, as detected by the instrument, and the wind direction 
changes by 45 degrees or greater, the system cues to begin 
sampling, and that sampling is predicated on the fact that that shift 
holds for approximately 15 minutes, and then it is verified as an 
official wind shift.
		Some of the other wind parameters that the ASOS looks 
for as far as specials include squalls, where there is a sudden 
doubling of the wind speed in excess of 22 knots, and that would 
also precipitate the issuance of a special.
	Q	In reviewing some of the ASOS data, in Exhibit 5A on 
Page 19, we have some of the one-minute ASOS data.  Looking at 
that, could you tell us where a wind shift report would be initially 
flagged?
	A	Looking at the one-minute data that is presented here, I 
would say that the flagging of a special would occur some time 
around the minute 31 -- 0431.  That would be the time that the 
system has begun to sense the 45-degree shift, and then once that 
shift has been initiated, it times out for 15 minutes just as it does 
with some of the lightening sensor systems that we do have at a few 
of our sites.
		It times as well.  So, it has to have that 15 minutes 
before it initiates that special, and the reason that is done, and we 
use those parameters, is to ensure that we don't issue numerous 
specials because in a variable wind situation, the winds may be 
vacillating back and forth, and, you know, we would be inundating 
the tower and the folks who use the various products by generating 
specials more frequently.
		So, that's why we have that 15-minute time limit, and 
that 15-minute time limit is the official convention being used by the 
National Weather Service in its Federal Meteorological Handbook 
Number 1, and the FAA uses it also in their 7900 Series regulation, 
which also deals with the observations program.
	Q	What was the National Weather Service official wind 
report at the time of the accident around 0450?
	A	At 0450, if you were to use these observations here, at 
0450, we had -- again depending on what you're looking for, the two-
minute wind was reading at 285 degrees at 16 knots, and then the 
five-second gust was reading 302 degrees at 22 knots, and that was 
one minute prior to the accident time.  As the hand-out shows, the 
accident was documented to have occurred on approximately 0451, 
and the winds were very similar to that previous minute.
	Q	Moving on to the other sensors, how does the ASOS 
report its prevailing visibility?
	A	The ASOS reports its prevailing visibility by examining a 
small segment of the atmosphere.  The actual distance between the 
two sensors is only approximately two to three feet, but what it is 
sampling is the clarity of the atmosphere and applying that to a 
prevailing condition, and again it does a similar sampling process 
there as well.
	Q	How does the ASOS System detect thunderstorms?
	A	At the present time, the ASOS System does not detect 
thunderstorms.  We are in the process of a joint venture with the 
FAA.  We are -- currently, we have just completed the deployment or 
in the process of completing the deployment of the ASOS Software 
Version 2.60.  That particular ASOS software supports the FAA's 
LDRS software, which relies on the National Lightening Detection 
Network.
		The data from those ground strokes go into the LDRS.  
The LDRS goes into -- feeds into the ASOS, and from that, the 
appropriate remarks are generated with respect to the 
thunderstorms' beginning and ending times, the location and 
whether it is on site or whether it's in the vicinity of the airport 
complex.
	Q	In regards to the thunderstorm location, how many 
miles does the lightening strike have to be classify as a thunderstorm 
at the airport?
	A	At the airport, it has to be within five statute miles.  If 
it's outside that five-mile band, excuse me, it's considered in the 
vicinity, and then if it's beyond the 10-mile statute mile marker, it is 
considered at a distance, and there are appropriate remarks that 
account for that.
	Q	How does the ASOS determine the weather type and 
intensity?
	A	The weather type and intensity is done almost in the 
same fashion that the manual observer does.  We have a sensor on 
the field which can detect only certain types of phenomena, such as 
fog and precipitation.
		When it comes to types of weather phenomena, such as 
hail, our system cannot detect that, and again what it does is it looks 
in reductions in clarity of the atmosphere based on the water droplet 
size and so on.
		In addition, we also use the rate-of-fall technique, which 
is also found in the Federal Meteorological Handbook Number 1, and 
using rate-of-fall techniques, we can calculate the intensity through 
the ranges of light to heavy.
	Q	One of the critical factors in this accident is going to be 
precipitation amount.  How does the ASOS measure rainfall?
	A	The ASOS has a tipping bucket device.  That device is an 
eight-inch diameter rain catch which has a pendulum with two 
1/100th catch buckets on a pendulum, and as the rain drops into 
the bucket, it fills the first cup, gravity takes over, and it dumps that 
cup out, and the next cup fills.
		Each time a cup fills and empties, an electrical charge is 
sent through the system, and it sends a message to the system that 
1/100th of rain has fallen, and it begins to count cumulatively during 
that hour.
		We can also generate data that give you one minute and 
15 minute read-outs on the precipitation.
	Q	How accurate is that in the high-wind situation of 20-30 
knots?
	A	In high-wind situations, you have a problem with 
overshooting the rain because of the angle at which the rain is 
coming down.  You also have problems with heavy droplets causing a 
lot of splash.  So that when you get into torrential rains, the tipping 
bucket is not one of the most accurate, but then again all of our 
systems suffer some degree in catch loss because of high winds and 
also because of the splashing effect.
		So, I would estimate in general we could lose as much 
as 10 percent, depending on the intensity of the rain and the 
direction of the rain that's coming.
	Q	Are you familiar where the ASOS is located at the Little 
Rock Field?
	A	Yes, I am.  We visited that on our first day here.
	Q	Can you describe where it is in relationship to Runway 4 
Left and 4 Right?
	A	It is at mid-field on 04 Left and approximately one-half 
to three-quarters of a mile further away from the 04 Right.
	Q	Is it possible with the location of where the ASOS is that 
the rainfall rate would be different at the departure end of 4 Right?
	A	It's definitely possible.  If you're familiar with convective 
precipitation, it can have a very sharp demarcation line, and I've seen 
instances that I personally experienced where I might be standing on 
one side of the street, and it's pouring across the street, and the rain 
never gets to my side of the street.
		So, there -- there is a very fine demarcation that can 
occur.  So, it is conceivable that the precipitation could have been 
heavier over the ASOS.
	Q	Looking at the data in Exhibit 5A on Page 19, can you 
give us an idea of the intensity of the precipitation with the one-
minute averages of .01, .02, .03?  Give us an idea of the intensity of 
the rainfall at this time.
	A	Actually, using these one-minute values, I would say that 
we are at a moderate to heavy rainfall rate, even with what looks like 
small numbers, at .01 and .02.  	
		See, by definition, in rainfall rates, any time that you 
have 6/100ths of an inch or greater during a six-minute interval, that 
constitutes heavy rain by the definition used in the FMH-1.
	Q	In rainfall rates of .07 inch a minute?
	A	.07, yeah.  You're definitely in the heavy category.  
You're -- actually, you're on the verge of heavy even with some of 
those smaller amounts at 0436.
	Q	In the course of the investigation, it was also discovered 
that the observer use was used to augment the system, could not 
issue a special report between 0 -- 47 and 20 seconds after the hour 
to 53 and 20 seconds after the hour because of what he referred to 
as a "lock-out".
		Can you describe what this lock-out is?
	A	The lock-out was put into place to account for 
accomplishing the mandatory hourly observation during the hour.  It 
was felt that the specials, unless they were of urgent specials, such 
as a tornado or a funnel cloud, something of that nature, would not 
warrant any override of that -- of that lock-out period, and again that 
was a decision jointly made by the FAA and the National Weather 
Service again with the -- some participation by the DoD through the 
ASOS Program Management Council, which meet quarterly.
		We -- since then, we have looked at that lock-out period 
more closely and feel that we -- we should be looking at allowing 
observers to put significant specials into that period of time, though 
the one limitation we discovered in our review was that the writing of 
the software was going to take much more time than we originally 
thought, and one of the other issues was that the program office for 
ASOS was being closed since the system was becoming operational, 
and our contract with our software folks expired, and during that 
period, we were in the transition of giving our Software Network 
Group within the National Weather Service working on this particular 
software fixes.
		We expect to have the lock-out period issue resolved 
some time later this year.  We're estimating in the August-September 
time frame with the deployment of ASOS Version 2.80 which will give 
greater flexibility to the system.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Mr. Eick, can I just interject and ask, 
sir, who is responsible for the maintenance of the system?
		THE WITNESS:  At the present time, the National 
Weather Service is responsible for all maintenance, logistics and 
acquisition.  There have been recent overtures by the FAA to consider 
taking the maintenance over, but the two agencies are still 
discussing that issue.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  So, is this -- is this piece of 
equipment co-located with the RVR out there?  Is that where that is?  
That little box of equipment that's --
		THE WITNESS:  I think it's in the proximity, but the -- the 
system itself resides again at mid-field on 04 Left, and it also is 
maintained by the National Weather Service, although it is 
technically owned by the Federal Aviation Administration.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Do your people actually maintain it or 
contract individuals?
		THE WITNESS:  No.  We -- we maintain it, sir.  What we 
have is an agreement with the Federal Aviation Administration.  They 
own about 75 percent of all of the ASOSs.  We own the remainder.  
Ours are focused not only on aviation, but we also have ASOSs that 
are focused on climatological programs, and -- but the majority of 
the -- actually all of the FAA-owned ASOSs are in support of airport 
locations and the aviation program.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  And you all check -- do you all check 
to see how often they're working properly or --
		THE WITNESS:  Yes, we do.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  -- calibrated?
		THE WITNESS:  Yes, sir.  We have a system in place at 
our ASOS Operating Center in Washington that can monitor these 
systems, and whenever we get data quality errors, the system will 
alert us to those, and then we would then dispatch the responsible 
office to go out and deal with it.
		Now, depending on the type of sensor that's in question, 
that had -- they have different response times.  The more critical 
sensors, such as visibility and wind, have a 12-hour response time.  
Some of the less critical ones, such as the precipitation, they might 
have as much as a 48-hour response time.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  And in the meantime, do the people 
in the tower know that it's out or --
		THE WITNESS:  Yes, they do.  In most cases, the -- we 
can go as far as issuing a NOTAM for a particular sensor if it is out, 
but again in most instances like Little Rock, when we do have 
augmentation in place, if the automated system goes down, then the 
observer begins taking manual observations, and they have the 
equipment to do so.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Okay.
		BY MR. EICK:
	Q	Mr. Dombrowsky, you had a chance to review the ASOS 
observations during the period.  In Exhibit 5B on Pages 1 through 7, 
we have the ASOS information.
		On Page 1 specifically, at Little Rock, we have an 
observation at 0423 Z, winds from the south at nine knots, seven 
miles, with thunderstorms, few clouds at 7,500 feet with 
cumulonimbus clouds, ceiling broken at 10,000 with remarks of 
frequent lightening in cloud, cloud-to-cloud, and the position of 
thunderstorms.
		Based on this observation, it appears that the 
observation, the ASOS was augmented by the observer.  Looking 
beyond this point, do you see any time in between that the ASOS 
would have issued a special report without human involvement?
	A	The ASOS would have been obligated or programmed to 
issue a special shortly before the onset of the hourly because of the 
wind shift that had occurred at 31 minutes past the hour.
	Q	So, that would have been around 0446, prior to the lock-
out period?
	A	Yes, right.  Just prior to the lock-out period.
	Q	What about the reduction in visibility?  We went from 
seven -- seven miles, and then at the special time at 0453 Z, we were 
at one mile and thunderstorm and heavy rain, mist.
		Would there have been any specials due to reductions in 
visibilities during this time period?
	A	There could have been.  Again, it depends on how -- how 
quickly you slip down through the criteria.  In some instances, the 
observer had override control of the -- of the system, and the 
observer does have that capability because there are times when the 
ASOS may be showing a reduction in visibility which might be more 
in line with a sector visibility rather than a prevailing visibility, and in 
those situations, the augmenting observer has the option to go into 
the manual mode and keep the system there.
		The ASOS will continue to update itself because on what 
it is seeing, and it will continue to tell the observer, but when they're 
in that override mode or that edit mode, the observer has control.
		Now, there is a good chance that that particular 
observation that slipped down to a mile could have been generated 
by the ASOS or by the observer.  It's hard to tell from the data sets 
that you have here.  We'd have to go back and take a look at the one-
minute archive data to confirm whether it was manually generated or 
whether it was generated by the -- by the system itself.
	Q	So, it is possible the thunderstorm and rain would have 
been -- could have continued with the precipitation, but it did not hit 
a magic value of visibility of three miles and would not have provided 
a special?
	A	Well, that's correct.  See, what -- from what I see in the 
trend here, you went from a six mile down to a one mile.  All right.  
That meets the criteria for a special because you have gone below 
that three-mile threshold.
		You would be obligated -- the system would be obligated 
to give you another special if you came back up through that special 
criteria.  So, as the visibility -- as any of these parameters diminish, 
you have to go through that threshold.
		When you are on an improving trend, it's coming equal 
to or through that threshold that the system will generate 
observation -- generate specials.  		The system at Little Rock 
is programmed to follow the standard special criteria for -- as issued 
in the Federal Meteorological Handbook, and that would give you a 
special criteria requirement at three miles, at one mile, at one-half a 
mile, and special consideration given to a quarter mile, and in the 
situation of cloud heights, it would be less than 3,000, 2,000, 1,000, 
500 and then every 100 feet below that.
	Q	Based on these observations, what was the first time 
hail was reported at the airport?
	A	That would be indicated by the augmentation remark 
issued in 05 -- excuse me -- 0509 observation, at least that's how it's 
listed here, where you have the remark -- well, let's see here.  Where 
you have the GSB, that's where the hail began at 0458.  That would 
be the first carry-on of when the hail began.
	Q	And in closing, I guess, in your review of the data, you 
found the ASOS properly working during the period of the accident?
	A	Following notification of the accident, I asked the AOMC 
to capture all of the data, and we have a staff in our Plan Product 
Improvement Group that reviewed this data for several days prior to 
talking to the folks here at Little Rock, and based on our analysis, the 
ASOS was operating as designed.
	Q	Thank you.  Mr. Dombrowsky, I appreciate you coming 
out in this nice snowy day, and that's all the questions I have.
		MR. EICK:  Mr. Feith?
		MR. FEITH:  I just got two questions real quick.

		BY MR. FEITH:
	Q	The first one.  You were talking about the configuration 
of where the system is in the current tower.  Little Rock's building a 
new tower.  Is this going to be the same configuration in the new 
tower?
	A	Yes, it is, because the ASOSs per FAA agreement are to 
be placed at the mid-field touch down.
	Q	Okay.
	A	So, they're all placed that way across the country.
	Q	Okay.  And then --
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  How many fields get ASOSs?
		THE WITNESS:  We have -- I couldn't tell you how many 
we are using purely for climatology, but we have roughly a thousand 
ASOSs around the country.  
		One of the benefits of the ASOS system has been that 
we've been able to in some cases at what we call Level D sites -- I'm 
not sure if you're familiar with the airport level ratings of the FAA and 
the Airline Pilots Association have agreed to.
		But depending on the level designated to that particular 
airport, the office can -- the ASOS can either be a stand-alone at 
Level D where all you get is the automated observation.  At those 
particular sites, we have adapted those systems to be able to detect 
lightening.  We have 19 sites around there that have single site 
lightening detection capability.
		They also have a freezing rain sensor capability, and 
they have a precipitation catch capability.  These were requirements 
placed on the National Weather Service by the Modernization 
Transition Committee, and until we met those requirements, we did 
not have stand-alone D level sites.
		If those sites do not have those capabilities, then those 
sites are required, both by the National Weather Service and the FAA, 
to retain contract augmentation, and at D level sites, we do have 
that.
		The service level also will dictate what additional 
parameters need to be reported, such as RVR and other 
enhancements that the control tower personnel can't handle, and 
under those situations, Level C, Level B and Level A-type support is 
provided through the augmentation process.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Okay.
		BY MR. FEITH:
	Q	How does the augmenter get the observation up to the 
tower?
	A	The augmenter allows the ASOS to do what the ASOS is 
programmed to do.  Once the observer concurs and does the 
transmission, and it becomes official, the augmenter then types the 
observation manually once again on the asynchronis system that 
links the augmenter to the tower and to the National Weather Service 
office because that system also provides a number of other 
meteorological products to the control tower.
	Q	Okay.  And last question.  As far as the visibility and the 
documentation of the visibility, I believe that the sensors are at 
around six feet.
	A	Yes, sir, hm-hmm.
	Q	That -- that visibility at six feet, how was that number 
chosen versus 10 feet versus two feet versus a hundred feet?
	A	The -- the convention that was used was adopted when 
flight was first really getting going.  The average height of a pilot's 
cockpit was at approximately six feet, and that was the choice of 
height for both the temperature sensor and also for the -- for the 
visibility sensor as well initially, and we're looking at maybe 
modifying some of those as well.
But that was the initial rationale behind the choice.
	Q	So, the attempt to modify it is based on newer aircraft, 
being that we have cockpit heights higher than six feet?
	A	Yes, sir, and, then again, what we're trying to replicate is 
the -- again, the prevailing visibility at what we deem to be a ground 
level height for the air crew when they're coming in, and then that's 
the rationale behind it.
	Q	Will that take into consideration 747, MD-11s, type 
aircraft that are coming in at a high deck angle, where --
	A	Actually, it doesn't take that into consideration, plus you 
also have to deal with other issues that might impact air traffic 
coming in, is slant range visibility.
		We are trying to portray what the visibility is at surface, 
and that's what we're trying to do with that particular system, and, 
you know, it doesn't deal well or do slant range visibilities, and I 
know those can be critical because I've worked in support of CDSUs 
where slant range visibility of four miles was critical to incoming 
traffic, and it reduced the amount of traffic flow into a particular 
airport that I monitored.
	Q	Very good.  Thank you very much.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  You have a thousand of these items 
out there?
		THE WITNESS:  Yes, sir.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Do you monitor all thousand in 
Washington?
		THE WITNESS:  Yes, sir.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Hmm?
		THE WITNESS:  National Weather Service monitors all of 
them through our system in Silver Spring, Maryland, and it's a 
continuous monitoring process, and if a system shows any flaw, 
giving us data quality errors, it automatically alerts us.  
		We built that self-interrogation capability into the system 
so that when a system felt it was -- something was incorrect, it would 
flag us in Washington.  We can do diagnostics from there, and, you 
know, again, if it is a major problem that requires replacement of a 
sensor, we can then go ahead and contact the maintenance support 
staff out here in the Little Rock area.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Do you do the ones that are in 
Alaska, too, in these passes?
		THE WITNESS:  Yes, sir.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Okay.  Let me see.  American 
Airlines?
		MR. BAKER:  Thank you.

INTERVIEW BY THE PARTIES TO THE HEARING
		BY MR. BAKER:
	Q	You mentioned that the -- the augmenter or observer 
takes the output from ASOS, checks it essentially, that it -- that it 
seems reasonable and makes sense, and then gets it to the tower.  
How long does that process typically take?
	A	We have a five-minute edit window for all observations.  
So, -- and again, it takes approximately -- it would take a person 
approximately five minutes to do an accurate good manual 
observation, and that's the rationale behind using a five-minute edit 
window.
	Q	On some other rain-measuring gear around the industry, 
units are outfitted with a wind shield to essentially help deal with 
that issue of very strong winds and angular water and inaccuracies.  
Has this ever been considered for ASOS?
	A	We've not considered it for this particular system on 
ASOS.  The wind shields typically give you the best results when 
you're dealing with frozen precipitation and not with liquid.  So, the -- 
the adding of a wind shield wouldn't add any significant increase in 
the catch.  So, we've opted to delay putting any type of equipment on 
the next generation system that we've got coming in.
		We are expecting to go to a next generation all purpose 
or all weather precipitation gauge, and we're in the process of 
reviewing the candidate systems right now, and I'm sure those 
candidate systems will have some additional skirting placed around 
them to -- to minimize that, but it becomes more of an issue with 
solid precipitation, days like today, rather than liquid precipitation, 
although there is some loss of catch, depending on the strength of 
the wind.
	Q	I recall that when ASOS was being developed and 
initially rolled out, there was quite a debate between the air carriers, 
airports and the FAA, and presumably you folks were involved as 
well, on -- on the issue of RVR, and as I remember the -- the 
disagreement, the initial units did not have RVR measuring 
capability, and in essence, the -- the FAA's plan was to abandon the 
alternate or common RVR gear, leaving the airlines and the airports 
to essentially find some other way to -- to measure RVR.
		Has that debate been settled, and what's the status of 
RVR and ASOS?
	A	The debate has not been settled.  We are -- we have our 
software ready to report RVR once the FAA makes the determination 
as to what level of RVR capability they would like to have.
		The issue is scheduled for further debate, I believe next 
month, at the next ATA meeting in Washington, and because I know 
that the airlines are very interested in restoring the RVR capability 
that the National Weather Service had at one time.
		Once we eliminated the transmisometers, which are the 
systems that provide you the read-outs, once those were removed, 
there was no move to replace them with anything else, and that was 
the one -- that was one of the limitations that the ASOS had, and that 
was one of the reasons why we continue to maintain augmentation at 
the Level As and Bs and possibly some select Cs that require the 
RVR read-outs.
	Q	You indicated that the majority of the ASOS units out 
there do not have currently the capability to detect thunderstorms.  
What equipment does the observer have to supplement ASOS or 
make up for -- for ASOS in regard to thunderstorm and lightening 
activity?
	A	Here -- well, I'll just cite Little Rock because I just got to 
see their operation this week.  What Little Rock has is basically just 
the -- the use of the human observer.  The observer's ability to listen 
for thunder, which was a requirement or a cue,  if you will, for the 
beginning of thunderstorms.
		They visually track.  They receive the radar observations 
on their asynchronis system, so they can get a better feel for 
movement rather than trying to rely on their own eye contact, but 
that's about as much as the augmenter can do.
		Basically what the old manual observing system used to 
do, and that is use the radar, use whatever complementary sensing 
devices you have.  If you've got a satellite image, that might help you 
a little bit, at least give you a first hint that's something coming or 
something's, you know, going to be developing.
		You can use the terminal forecast to judge the timing on 
when a storm might be coming in and to be more cognizant of the 
fact that that potential is there, but really it boils down to just the 
human approach to observing the weather, and that's really all they 
have right now.
	Q	Was there a qualified observer on duty the evening of 
this accident?
	A	Yes, there was.  You happened -- actually, there were 
two on that evening because you were -- the event occurred right in 
the middle of a shift change.  So, both observers were there for the 
better part of the hour.
	Q	Are you aware of a discrepancy that apparently exists 
between the ASOS/observer data that suggest that the thunderstorm 
activity was moving to the northeast and the radar depictions that 
indicated it was moving to the southeast and east?
	A	I was not aware that anyone thought that was a 
discrepancy.  I've seen that phenomena happen.  Individual cells 
might be moving in a northeasterly component while the main line is 
sliding southeast.
		So, depending on what the observer was trying to 
articulate, it's hard to say without being there.
	Q	Is the tower controller ever designated as the observer?
	A	The tower controllers are all certified under the limited 
observation or LORS Program because they -- they can provide tower 
visibility.  As you know, there -- it can be critical at times for the air 
crews, when you have a shallow layer of fog, which might be above 
the head of the ground observer, but yet not above the control tower, 
and the prevailing visibility in the control tower might be unlimited, 
and you might have zero visibility on the surface.  That is another 
additional bit of information that can be valuable to the pilot.
	Q	Was the control tower -- were the tower controllers 
assigned that duty this -- on the evening of the accident?
	A	They -- they had that ability at all times.  The official 
observation will come from the observer, the augmenter that is under 
contract to the FAA, but the tower personnel can take observations.  
Typically, they will communicate any questions with the augmenter 
because we -- we asked the folks about that, and they do have a very 
good working relationship with the tower.
	Q	Are there any special duties of the observer during this 
lock-out period that was referred to?
	A	Well, during the lock-out period, all the -- what the 
observer is doing is taking his or her look at what is happening in the 
environment and then comparing what they are seeing visually to 
what the ASOS is reporting, and it's -- it's just that period of time 
where they begin to settle in on the most recent and accurate winds, 
the most recent pressure because, as you know in a convective 
situation, the winds can vary, and you don't want to jump out on the 
wind direction or speed too quickly.
		The pressure may vary, and it may require additional 
remarks, especially if you're in a situation where pressure might be 
on the verge of rising rapidly, and that requires a mandatory remark 
to be affixed to the observation.
	Q	When ASOS was designed and planned and conceived, if 
you will, was it always in the plan to have an augmenter process 
along with the technology that is ASOS?
	A	No, it was not.  The plan was to eventually get to a level 
where we would have what we have now on a limited basis in the 
National Weather Service as Level D systems.  Unfortunately, the 
state of the art in technology with regard to a number of capabilities 
involving present weather, the inability of the system to be able to 
accurately ascertain the intensity of drizzle from the perspective of 
rate-of-fall rather than from visibility.
		The problem there is the system can't differentiate 
between a mix of phenomena, such as fog and drizzle.  So, we're 
trying to readapt our -- our sensor for present weather to account for 
drizzle situations and their intensity based on the rate-of-fall.  That's 
just one example of one of the things that the system doesn't do well 
right now, and we do have a full-fledged funded program dealing with 
plan product improvement.
		We will be moving forward with a replacement dew point 
sensor this year.  The first deployments will begin the latter part of 
this year.  We've also completed our initial work on the ice-free wind 
sensor.  Many parts of the country have problems with the wind 
anemometers freezing up.  So, we are in the process of again trying 
to resolve what is most important to both the National Weather 
Service and the FAA.
		We periodically sit down and compare the priorities of 
what needs to be done in the ASOS arena to make it a true stand-
alone system some time in the future.
	Q	Thank you.  That's very helpful.  No further questions.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Thank you.  The Allied Pilots 
Association?
		MR. ZWINGLE:  Yes, I do have some questions.
		BY MR. ZWINGLE:
	Q	In consideration of the observer augmentation of the 
ASOS, is it true that there are at least four levels of service?
	A	Yes, there are.  Those four levels of service were agreed 
to in, I believe, 1996.  It was put in the public record for review, and 
the four levels were agreed to by the various airline associations, the 
FAA and the National Weather Service.
	Q	Okay.  That noted, how -- how are the users of your 
product made aware of the real-time capability of the sensor or 
system?
	A	You want -- are you talking about the -- how do the users 
know whether I'm on Level A, B or C?
	Q	Yes, sir.
	A	Okay.  As of right now, that is still for me a point of 
contention with the FAA.  I have asked the FAA to look at possibly 
putting that in the approach plates, so that folks would know exactly 
what level of service they are getting.  That again has yet to be 
resolved between the two agencies.  It's just a matter of notification.
		The -- at the present time, there is no way for anyone to 
know what level of service they're getting, other than the fact that if 
you do have a control tower, you are at least at a Level C.  Level Ds 
do not have control towers.  Level Cs, Bs and As have control towers, 
and depending on the complexity of the approach into the airport, 
the amount of traffic and the terrain, those are some of the 
parameters that were used to apply the various levels along with the 
types of weather phenomena that occur as well.
		So, if there was a high need for RVR, you would more -- 
you're going to more than likely see the majority of the RVR reporting 
capability go to the A and B level sites.
	Q	Okay.  Does the thunderstorm sensor on the ASOS 
System use cloud-to-ground or cloud-to-cloud lightening?
	A	The -- there's a difference right now.  There are 19 sites 
in the National Weather Service that are called single site lightening 
detection sensors.  They have a maximum range of approximately 35 
to 40 miles.  They -- they can detect both cloud-to-ground and cloud-
to-cloud.  The problem is that the software cannot differentiate the 
direction of which the cloud-to-cloud is occurring.
		So, from the standpoint of having a complete system, it 
does not fully meet what we would like it to do.  We are working with 
a number of vendors to try and resolve that particular issue.
		As far as the LDRS capability, which is the system of 
choice that will be deployed or actually is being deployed because it 
is part of the ASOS Version 2.60 currently in deployment, that 
capability is simply a turn-on-the-switch, and you'll be able to get the 
lightening detection information.  The -- in that particular system, all 
it does detect is the cloud-to-ground lightening strikes.
	Q	Thank you.  Do you have Exhibit 5A available to you?
	A	Yes, I do.
	Q	Page 19, entitled ASOS Wind Information/Precipitation 
Amounts.
	A	Yes, sir.
	Q	Am I correct in observing that the total accumulated 
rainfall from the time precipitation began at, I believe, 0436 Z, until 
the annotated time of the accident is 41/100ths of an inch?
	A	No.  What you see -- actually, it's -- oh, let me -- let me 
double check here to make sure I've got this correct.  If you look out 
in the -- in the -- in the table itself, there's one mistake in the table, I 
can tell you right now.  The ASOS does not in its log annotate traces.  
Those were put in just so people knew that precipitation did occur, 
but it did not register 1/100th of an inch.
		What you see in that column that's marked one minute 
precip, those are the amounts that occurred each of those minutes.
	Q	Hm-hmm.
	A	Now, the total through the hour is the 1.09 you see in 
the bottom right.  The 14/100ths is the 15-minute precipitation total 
from 4:30 to 4:45.
	Q	I see.  Okay.  
	A	As I mentioned, the system does monitor precipitation 
on a one-minute, a 15-minute and an hourly basis.  
	Q	Okay.  How does the precipitation rate as recorded by 
the ASOS System compare or do you know how it compares to the 
precipitation intensity indicated by the WSR-88D?
	A	We use the ASOS.  We use eight-inch gauges as the 
ground truth for the 88D, and they are used to assist in the 
calibration of the 88D itself.  So, we use the ASOS as a calibration 
tool for the 88D.
	Q	Okay.  Last question.  There seems to be some -- several 
issues of reliability with the ASOS System.  Did you have the same 
type of reliability with human observers?
	A	I would say that based on the three studies that were 
done -- because that question comes up constantly, you know.  How 
does the -- how can a system with limited optics do the same -- 
perform the same way as a human being?
		Well, you've got to remember the -- the human beings 
that you've been dealing with for the last 20 years have not been 
taking continuous observations, and we attempted in a number of 
studies, one done by the National Weather Service, one done by the 
FAA, and the most recent one done at the request of Senator Snowe 
in Maine, we went to the Air Force's Technological Labs and asked 
the Air Force to conduct a study on visibility and cloud height and 
compared the ability of the ASOS to the observer who was supplied 
by the Air Force and an augmenter that was working at that 
particular site, and from the five or six sites that we did in that study, 
it was proven that the ASOS is equivalent, if not slightly better, than 
what the human does with respect to clouds and visibility.
		Now, when it comes to other parameters that the 
system isn't designed for right now, like hail stones and things of that 
nature, yeah, that's where the human has the edge.
	Q	Thank you very much.  No further questions.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  The Association of Professional Flight 
Attendants?
		MS. LORD-JONES:  We have no questions, sir.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  The National Weather Service?
		MR. KUESSNER:  Am I the last one?
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Oh, no.  Oh, no.  You should be.  Yes.  
I'm sorry.  I apologize.  It is late.
		The Little Rock National Airport?
		MS. SCHWARTZ:  We have no questions, sir.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  The Little Rock Fire Department?
		MR. CANTRELL:  No questions, sir.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Federal Aviation Administration?
		MR. STREETER:  No questions.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  The Boeing Commercial Airplane 
Group?
		MR. HINDERBERGER:  No questions, sir.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  The National Weather Service?
		MR. KUESSNER:  Thank you, sir.
		BY MR. KUESSNER:
		Q	Just one thing, Mr. Dombrowsky.  On Page 6 of -- I guess 
it's Exhibit 5B.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  I'm just glad to see there's not a 
machine there to answer the question -- ask the questions.
		MR. KUESSNER:  Thank you.
		THE WITNESS:  Page 6?
		MR. KUESSNER:  Yeah.
		THE WITNESS:  Okay.
		BY MR. KUESSNER:
	Q	About one-third of the way down, where it says, "CMD 
Sys Log"?
	A	Hm-hmm.
	Q	Now, in -- in that area below that, is that where you 
expect any errors or problems that would have occurred during the 
times indicated would be logged there?
	A	Right.  What the system has done in that particular 
situation is has identified a loss of power, and in the system's log 
entry, it indicates that the uninterruptable power source did kick in 
appropriately, and then it also acknowledges the return to the 
standard power.  So, you can see it does have an internal check 
capability, and in some instances, such as this, because the UPS is 
something that -- well, we just brought on board here in the last year 
or so.
		We're trying to resolve some of the issues that we might 
have with regard to local power sources.
	Q	Now, this -- this part about the battery power on and 
restored, this occurred a bit before the accident in question, correct?
	A	That's correct.
	Q	Because this is in Greenwich Meridian Time?
	A	Hm-hmm.
	Q	Now, is there anything -- anything else on this page 
which would indicate there were any problems, I mean subsequent to 
that time?  At least through the accident time, to make it easy.
		(Pause)
		THE WITNESS:  About the only thing that I could say 
would be the -- let's see here the timing of that.  I'll have to do 
something about getting these in proper time because they keep 
switching back and forth from the various times.
		Log-off, log-on entries, and then there is -- should be a -- 
if I remember correctly, there was a situation with a special --
		BY MR. KUESSNER:
	Q	I was referring under the -- under the Sys Log piece.
	A	Under the Sys Log piece?
	Q	Yeah.  On Page 6.
	A	Okay.  
	Q	I see at 0215, there was an AC power restored, and then 
the next --
	A	Right.
	Q	-- entry is 0718.  So, there's no indication that there 
were any problems?
	A	My biggest problem right now is I can't focus on where 
you're looking at.
	Q	Sorry.  Do you have Page 6?
	A	I've got Page 6.
	Q	Exhibit 5B?
	A	I've got the Sys Log entries, DCP UPS, power on, power 
restored.
	Q	Okay.  And then about -- a little bit further down and 
halfway down where it says, "6/2/99, 0214"?
	A	6/2/99.  Other than the technician logging on.
	Q	So, it was reliable?  There was no problem?
	A	Yeah.  I -- I wasn't sure where you were going because, 
you know, the technicians always will, you know, -- if they do get a 
call to the AOMC in Washington, the technicians will call in and do a 
cursory review of what is happening internal to the system.
		Again, I don't even look at that as -- as a problem.  Like I 
say, once the power is restored, I just ignore the rest of it because 
that's all routine.  But, no, our technicians in Washington will call in 
to the system, and if they do see a problem, that's when they do their 
diagnostics, and they will make the appropriate calls.  It was so 
obvious, I didn't see it.
	Q	No further questions.  Thanks.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Mr. Sweedler?
		MR. SWEEDLER:  No questions, Mr. Chairman.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Mr. Berman?


INTERVIEW BY THE BOARD OF INQUIRY
		BY MR. BERMAN:
	Q	Sir, can you explain why the ASOS didn't show the 41-
knot gust that was found on the LWAS?
	A	It's -- as was explained earlier, the location can make a 
difference.  You wouldn't necessarily see the 41-knot gust on the 
ASOS.  You also -- I'm not sure what -- at what height that particular 
LWAS was.  It could be -- could have been at 75 feet or whatever.  
So, there -- there are a number of reasons why 41 knots wouldn't 
show up, an LWAS wind would not show up on the ASOS.
	Q	Thank you.
	A	Hm-hmm.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Mr. Haueter?
		MR. HAUETER:  No questions.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Mr. Clark?
		BY MR. CLARK:
	Q	I've become confused on the lock-out, and I guess if 
we've covered this, I apologize.  The -- during the period of the lock-
out, were there any specials that -- let me rephrase that.
		If there were no lock-out present, would ASOS have sent 
any specials during that time period?
	A	Yes, it would have, because the --
	Q	What sort of --
	A	-- visibilities dropped below three miles during that 
period.  That would have constituted the system to have generated a 
special and sent it out.  Because of the lock-out, the way it's set up, 
the observer cannot go in and make any changes in the system.
		Although it does document the actual visibility during 
that five-minute period, it makes that information available to the 
observer, so that the observer can annotate it.  If we were not -- if we 
were using the old surface airways code, it would have probably 
generated what we call a record special, but in this particular 
instance, we're using the METAR code, and -- and there is no 
accommodation for that particular capability.  That's one of the other 
reasons you don't see that generation of specials during an hourly 
period.
	Q	Okay.  Is the -- you mentioned the three-mile visibility.
	A	Hm-hmm.
	Q	Are there any others that would go with the gusting 
winds, the thunderstorm being present or nearby, or whatever 
rainfall was going on at that time?
	A	Yeah.  The -- from the standpoint of any additional 
specials, I -- I -- I didn't -- again, without going back and looking, I 
would say the visibility was probably the only one.
		Winds did not reach a level that could have done that.  I 
know that the wind direction special did not engage for whatever 
reason, but that particular special -- that particular remark was 
carried forward into the -- into the hourly.  So, that wind shift that 
would have occurred at 31 did get carried forward as part of the 
information in the hourly observation.
	Q	Okay.  You mentioned that there were archive data.  
Would any of that shed more light on my question to go back and 
look at that archive data rather than what's in the docket or what you 
have available today?
	A	Well, we did look at all the archive data in Washington 
and -- and felt confident that the system was performing as designed.  
I think about the only -- well, as far as the lock-out goes, there's not 
much we can do about the lock-out.  You can't override anything in 
that observation period time because the edit will not open up for the 
generation of specials.
		What it can do, though, is if there are certain code 
indicators that will allow you to do that, there are certain data fields 
that the observer can go in and edit, and the only ones that would 
supersede that and preempt the hourly from going out are 
observations that contain remarks pertinent to severe weather, such 
as tornados and things of that nature.
		Thunderstorms and -- and severe thunderstorms do not 
qualify under that particular lock-out.
	Q	I guess that's the -- I understand that it worked the way 
it was designed.  I guess my question goes more to if there are -- 
should we go back and reconsider that if there are thunderstorms or 
significant wind shifts, that we should be able to preempt that lock-
out and get that information out in a timely manner?
	A	We've already started that process, sir.  In our Software 
Version Load 2.80, which is scheduled for release in the August-
September time frame of this year, the lock-out issue has been 
resolved.  We are testing that software load right now under a 
Demonstration Version of Load 2.75, and, you know, we're going to 
be testing that in the lab for the next several weeks.  We began that 
testing process about a week or so ago, and once we prove that it 
works on our local sites -- as you know, everything always works well 
within a lab, but when you take it out in the field, it just, you know, -- 
that's the true test, and we'll be deploying the 2.75 Software Load to 
a number of sites around the country to validate and get, you know, 
a systems acceptance test completed, and then, once we have that, 
we'll be positioned to deploy the software load in that hopefully 
August-September time frame, barring any difficulties.
	Q	Okay.  But going back, the -- your review of the data, 
there were -- other than the three-mile visibility, going below three 
miles, there were no indicators that would have been a factor during 
this lock-out period based on your observations?
	A	Based on what I've seen here, no.  The only thing that 
could have been carried forward, and it was carried forward into the 
record hourly because that's the way the system is programmed, 
that if a phenomena occurs during the -- a special phenomena occurs 
during the lock-out period, it is still documented.  It is still put into 
the observation.
		The only thing you don't see is a separate independent 
observation called a specia to acknowledge that, yes, I've had a 
reduction in visibility.  It requires that special observation.  What it 
does, it holds that observation, that special criteria that was met, 
into the -- into the hourly and then deploys the hourly with all of 
those elements updated to what is currently going on at the site.
	Q	Okay.  And I assume we have that data available?
	A	Yes.
	Q	All right.  Thank you.
	A	Yes, sir.
		BY MR. EICK:
	Q	Mr. Dombrowsky, can you tell us what the peak wind 
observed on the evening of June 1st at Little Rock?
	A	Based on my recollection, I believe it was 76 knots was 
the peak wind that was observed.  I believe that was on the -- in one 
of the --
	Q	I think on Page 1 on the obs.
	A	Either Page 1 of the obs or it was also, I think, in one of 
the tables that was showing the one-minute data.  But 76 knots is 
what I -- what I recollect.
	Q	And on the observations on the specias, too, or in the 
normal hourly obs, the observer could also -- the system could 
automatically also put in peak winds?
	A	Yes.  It generates peak wind remarks.  It generates wind 
shift remarks.  It generates squall remarks, if that happens to be the 
-- the criteria that is met during the observation time.
	Q	And the definition of the -- of a gust is -- can you give us 
a definition of the gust, of this gust of 76 knots, versus why it wasn't 
reported as a squall?
	A	Well, the -- the requirement of a squall is that you have 
to be at a -- a speed of 22 knots.  That's the low end threshold.  This 
is at -- and again it's -- by definition, a squall is a sudden doubling of 
the wind, and the wind has to be at least 22 knots or greater, and 
that criteria wasn't met.
	Q	And the definition of a gust?
	A	The definition of a gust is a difference between the 
prevailing wind speed, and the gust has to be greater than nine 
knots.  Once that difference is greater than nine knots, it constitutes 
a -- a gust.
	Q	Thank you very much.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  All right.  Any other questions?
		(No response)
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Mr. Dombrowsky, the only inquiry I 
have is that this new system, you said there are some thought of 
turning the maintenance of this system over to the FAA?
		THE WITNESS:  It's not our thought, sir.  It's the thought 
of the FAA.  There's a desire there to streamline the overall 
maintenance program, and the FAA has come to the National 
Weather Service on several occasions during the past year-year and a 
half in an effort to analyze and determine what is best for the Federal 
Government, and we each have our position.
		We would prefer to keep it, but the FAA would prefer to 
take it over, but again it would cost the FAA a significant amount of 
money up front to be able to do that, and right now, the budget the 
way it is, I -- I expect the FAA to probably back down on that.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Is it your system?
		THE WITNESS:  Actually it's a joint-owned system.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  I mean whose software and whose --
		THE WITNESS:  Oh, we -- we've done all of the --
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Who's got the smarts that 
understands whether it's operating correctly?
		THE WITNESS:  As of right now, we do, sir.  We do all 
the plan product improvement.  We do all the maintenance.  The FAA 
has been our partner in this process, but most of the partnering 
that's been done by the FAA has been getting agreements on the 
various requirements and also getting additional funding to the 
National Weather Service to maintain the systems that the FAA has 
ownership over.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  And does it work now?
		THE WITNESS:  It's working right now.  Our position at 
the National Weather Service is, you know, why change?  It's working, 
and it's the most efficient program right now.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  If I was the ATA, I'd be concerned 
about that.  That's not my business, but I -- you know, if you all have 
the system, and I want to be sure the FAA's got all the things that it's 
responsible for working first.
		But, Mr. Streeter, are you part of that grab?
		MR. STREETER:  No.  That will continue --
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Is that at your level?
		MR. STREETER:  That will continue under discussion, 
sir.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Okay.  Well, I hope there's some -- 
some good reason for it.  If there is, I'd like to -- like to know.
		Well, Mr. Dombrowsky, we would certainly welcome any 
closing thoughts that you would have.
		THE WITNESS:  Well, from the standpoint of this 
accident, I really don't have any -- any more to add than what the 
preceding individuals have presented.  		Safety is 
paramount, and we will do everything we can in the National Weather 
Service to provide the best possible services and ensure that we do 
meet the requirements for flight safety.  We're very, very much in 
favor of ensuring that we do that.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  Well, thank you very much.  Now, 
that's going to conclude today.  I want -- before the parties get antsy 
and move now, we've got six witnesses left.  
		We have one gentleman, Dr. Dinges, who is going to 
come and talk to us about fatigue, but he is snowed in, and he's not 
going to be able to get here.
		Mr. Roman, our individual, is snowed in in St. Louis, but 
we can get his questions faxed here right, Mr. Feith, and ask those 
for him if he can't -- can't get here.
		I would just as soon start at 8:30 in the morning and 
attempt to finish tomorrow, unless there's a wave of desire to stay 
Saturday.  Do I see a wave?
		(No response)
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  I see -- I don't even see a wave in the 
audience.  So, we will start at 8:30 in the morning.  We will attempt 
to complete this hearing tomorrow, and I again thank the parties for 
their attention.  I thank the audience and observers for your 
attendance, and if there's a Mr. Robert Gilford in the audience, I'd 
like to see him, if he'd come up to the podium.
		I'm sorry.  Mr. Baker, yes, sir?
		MR. BAKER:  Mr. Chairman, thank you.  I have one final 
request on this snowy day.  You know, as we've gone through the last 
two days, we've identified several programs and clocks that are 
tracking various things, the cockpit voice recorder, the FDR, the 
LWAS, and now ASOS, the WSR-88.
		I'm getting quite concerned and would ask that the staff, 
following these hearings, attempt to do a verification and 
synchronization of all the times in these systems, so that we don't 
make a mistake of when things happened.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  I -- I agree with you, and that's a 
good -- excellent thought.
		MR. BAKER:  I have no further comments.  Thank you.
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  We're all challenged and continue to 
be challenged by technology.
		Any other comments from any of the other parties?
		(No response)
		CHAIRMAN HALL:  We'd like to thank the National 
Weather Service for today's snow.  Little Rock for the coffee.  Is the 
Mayor here?  The Mayor's left.  So, there's no free dinner, I guess.
		So, we will all -- we will stand adjourned until 8:30 in the 
morning.
		(Whereupon, at 7:45 p.m., the hearing was adjourned, 
to reconvene tomorrow morning, Friday, January 28th, 2000, at 8:30 
a.m.)



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