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 Federal  Communications  Commission  FCC  06-  83 
 Before  the  Federal  Communications  Commission 
 Washington,  D.  C.  20554 


 In  the  Matter  of 
 Recommendations  of  the  Independent  Panel  Reviewing  the  Impact  of  Hurricane  Katrina  on 
 Communications  Networks 


 )  ) 
 )  ) 
 )  )  EB  Docket  No.  06-  119 


 NOTICE  OF  PROPOSED  RULEMAKING 
 Adopted:  June  16,  2006  Released:  June  19,  2006 
 Comment  Date:  [30  days  from  date  of  publication  in  Federal  Register]  Reply  Comment  Date:  [45  days  from  date  of  publication  in  Federal  Register] 


 By  the  Commission:  Chairman  Martin  and  Commissioners  Copps,  Adelstein,  Tate  and  McDowell  issuing  separate  statements. 
 I.  INTRODUCTION 
 1.  In  this  Notice  of  Proposed  Rulemaking  (Notice),  we  initiate  a  comprehensive  rulemaking  to  address  and  implement  the  recommendations  presented  by  the  Independent  Panel  Reviewing  the 


 Impact  of  Hurricane  Katrina  on  Communications  Networks  (Independent  Panel).  Congress  has  charged  the  Commission  with  promoting  the  safety  of  life  and  property  through  the  use  of  wire  and  radio 
 communications.  1  In  this  regard,  the  Commission  has  already  taken  a  number  of  steps  to  fulfill  this  mandate  and  we  will  continue  to  do  so.  The  Independent  Panels  report  described  the  impact  of  the  worst 
 natural  disaster  in  the  Nations  history,  as  well  as  the  overall  public  and  private  response  and  recovery  efforts.  Our  goal  in  this  proceeding  is  to  take  the  lessons  learned  from  this  disaster  and  build  upon  them 
 to  promote  more  effective,  efficient  response  and  recovery  efforts,  as  well  as  heightened  readiness  and  preparedness,  in  the  future.  To  accomplish  this  goal,  we  invite  comment  on  what  actions  the  Commission 
 can  take  to  address  the  Independent  Panels  recommendations. 
 II.  BACKGROUND 
 2.  On  Monday,  August  29,  2005,  Hurricane  Katrina  struck  the  Gulf  Coast  of  the  United  States,  causing  significant  damage  in  Alabama,  Louisiana,  and  Mississippi.  The  destruction  to 


 communications  companies  facilities  in  the  region,  and  therefore  to  the  services  upon  which  citizens  rely,  was  extraordinary.  Hurricane  Katrina  knocked  out  more  than  three  million  customer  phone  lines  in 
 Alabama,  Louisiana,  and  Mississippi.  The  wireline  telecommunications  network  sustained  enormous  damage    dozens  of  central  offices  and  countless  miles  of  outside  plant  were  damaged  or  destroyed  as  a 
 result  of  the  hurricane  or  the  subsequent  flooding.  Local  wireless  networks  also  sustained  considerable  damage    more  than  a  thousand  cell  sites  were  knocked  out  of  service  by  the  hurricane.  At  the 
 hurricanes  height,  more  than  thirty-  five  Public  Safety  Answering  Points  (PSAPs)  were  out  of  service, 


 1  See  47  U.  S.  C.    151. 
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 and  some  parishes  in  Louisiana  remained  without  911  or  enhanced  911  (E911)  service  for  weeks.  2 
 3.  In  January  2006,  Chairman  Kevin  J.  Martin  established  the  Independent  Panel  pursuant  to  the  Federal  Advisory  Committee  Act,  Public  Law  92-  463,  as  amended.  3  The  mission  of  the  Independent 


 Panel  was  to  review  the  impact  of  Hurricane  Katrina  on  the  telecommunications  and  media  infrastructure  in  the  areas  affected  by  the  hurricane.  Specifically,  the  Independent  Panel  was  to  study  the  impact  of 
 Hurricane  Katrina  on  all  sectors  of  the  telecommunications  and  media  industries,  including  public  safety  communications.  In  addition,  the  Independent  Panel  was  to  review  the  sufficiency  and  effectiveness  of 
 the  recovery  effort  with  respect  to  the  communications  infrastructure.  The  Independent  Panel  was  tasked  with  making  recommendations  to  the  Commission,  by  June  15,  2006,  regarding  ways  to  improve  disaster 
 preparedness,  network  reliability,  and  communications  among  first  responders  such  as  police,  fire  fighters,  and  emergency  medical  personnel.  4 


 4.  The  Independent  Panel  met  directly  on  five  occasions.  Four  of  these  meetings  were  used  to  examine  the  facts  surrounding  the  impact  of  Hurricane  Katrina  and  to  obtain  evidence  concerning  the 
 extent  of  the  damage  and  the  sufficiency  and  effectiveness  of  the  recovery  efforts.  5  On  one  occasion,  the  Independent  Panel  met  in  the  area  struck  by  Hurricane  Katrina  to  hear  first-  hand  from  victims  of  the 
 disaster.  In  addition  to  the  in-  person  meetings,  the  Independent  Panel  also  received  written  comments  from  interested  members  of  the  public.  Finally,  the  Independent  Panels  informal  working  groups  met  on 
 numerous  occasions  via  conference  call  and  in  person  to  discuss  their  progress. 
 5.  On  June  9,  2006,  the  Independent  Panel  held  its  final  meeting  in  Washington,  DC  to  conclude  its  analysis  and  deliberations.  The  Independent  Panel  finalized  its  findings  and 


 recommendations  and  submitted  its  report  on  June  12,  2006.  A  copy  of  the  report  is  attached  to  this  Notice  at  Appendix  B. 


 III.  DISCUSSION 
 6.  We  seek  comment  on  the  recommendations  presented  by  the  Independent  Panel  in  its  final  report.  The  Independent  Panels  recommendations  are  organized  into  four  areas:  (1)  pre-  positioning 


 2  See  generally  Independent  Panel  Reviewing  the  Impact  of  Hurricane  Katrina  on  Communications  Networks, 
 Report  and  Recommendations  to  the  Federal  Communications  Commission,  5-  31  (Independent  Panel  Report);  see  also  Federal-  State  Joint  Board  on  Universal  Service,  Order,  20  FCC  Rcd  16883,  para.  2  (2005)  (Katrina  USF 


 Order).  3 
 5  U.  S.  C.  App.  2  (1988).  4 
 See  the  Independent  Panel  Charter  available  at  http://  www.  fcc.  gov/  eb/  hkip/  HKIPCharter.  pdf  (last  visited  June  15,  2006);  see  also  the  Notice  of  Establishment  of  the  Commissions  Independent  Panel  Reviewing  the  Impact  of 


 Hurricane  Katrina  on  Communications  Networks,  71  Fed.  Reg.  933  (2006).  5 
 See  Public  Notice,  FCCs  Independent  Panel  Reviewing  the  Impact  of  Hurricane  Katrina  on  Communications  Networks  Announces  Final  Meeting  Scheduled  for  June  9,  2006  at  FCC  Headquarters,  DA  06-  1085  (May  24,  2006); 


 Public  Notice,  FCCs  Independent  Panel  Reviewing  the  Impact  of  Hurricane  Katrina  on  Communications  Networks  Announces  Next  Meeting  Scheduled  for  May  12,  2006  at  FCC  Headquarters,  DA  06-  925  (Apr.  26,  2006);  Public 
 Notice,  FCCs  Independent  Panel  Reviewing  the  Impact  of  Hurricane  Katrina  on  Communications  Networks  Announces  Next  Meeting  Scheduled  for  Tuesday,  April  18,  2006  at  FCC  Headquarters,  DA  06-  781  (Apr.  3,  2006); 
 Public  Notice,  FCCs  Independent  Panel  Reviewing  the  Impact  of  Hurricane  Katrina  on  Communications  Networks  Announces  Next  Meeting  Scheduled  for  Monday,  March  6,  2006  at  the  Mississippi  e-  Center  at  Jackson  State 
 University  in  Jackson,  Mississippi,  DA  06-  371  (Feb.  17,  2006);  Public  Notice,  Notice  of  Appointment  of  Members  to  Serve  on  Federal  Communications  Commissions  Independent  Panel  Reviewing  the  Impact  of  Hurricane  Katrina 
 on  Communications  Networks;  and  Independent  Panels  First  Meeting  Scheduled  for  January  30,  2006,  DA  06-  57  (Jan.  12,  2006). 
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 the  communications  industry  and  the  government  for  disasters  in  order  to  achieve  greater  network  reliability  and  resiliency;  (2)  improving  recovery  coordination  to  address  existing  shortcomings  and  to 
 maximize  the  use  of  existing  resources;  (3)  improving  the  operability  and  interoperability  of  public  safety  and  911  communications  in  times  of  crisis;  and  (4)  improving  communication  of  emergency  information 
 to  the  public.  6  In  some  cases,  the  Independent  Panel  recommends  actions  that  require  the  Commission  to  modify  its  rules  pursuant  to  notice-  and-  comment  rulemaking.  In  other  cases,  the  Independent  Panel 
 recommends  that  the  Commission  take  actions  that  are  not  dependent  upon  rulemakings,  such  as  increased  outreach  and  education  campaigns,  or  recommends  measures  that  may  not  fall  within  the 
 Commissions  statutory  authority  and  jurisdiction.  In  advocating  implementation  of  the  Independent  Panels  recommendations,  commenters  should  note  what  actions  would  fall  within  the  Commissions 
 statutory  authority  and  jurisdiction,  and  what  the  Commission  could  do  to  encourage  the  appropriate  entities  (e.  g.,  state  and  local  authorities)  to  take  action.  In  evaluating  the  Independent  Panels 
 recommendations,  our  goal  is  to  determine  what  actions  the  Commission  should  take  to  promote  greater  resiliency  and  reliability  of  communications  infrastructure,  as  well  as  the  actions  the  Commission  should 
 take  to  strengthen  and  improve  response  and  recovery  efforts.  We  therefore  invite  broad  comment  on  the  Independent  Panels  recommendations  and  on  the  measures  the  Commission  should  take  to  address  the 
 problems  identified.  We  also  generally  seek  comment  on  whether,  in  adopting  any  of  the  Independent  Panels  recommendations,  any  additional  safeguards  should  be  implemented  to  limit  disclosure  of 
 sensitive  infrastructure  information  or  commercial  information  to  prevent  exposing  potential  targets  to  wrongdoers  and  subjecting  regulated  entities  to  competitive  harm. 


 7.  In  addition  to  presenting  recommendations,  the  Independent  Panels  final  report  describes  the  Independent  Panels  observations  regarding  the  hurricanes  impact  and  the  sufficiency  of  the  recovery 
 efforts.  7  We  also  seek  comment  on  whether  the  Independent  Panels  observations  warrant  additional  measures  or  steps  beyond  the  reports  specific  recommendations.  Thus,  to  the  extent  parties  believe 
 additional  measures  beyond  the  Independent  Panels  recommendations  or  different  actions  are  warranted,  we  welcome  these  suggestions  and  recommendations.  We  also  seek  comment  whether  we  should  rely  on 
 voluntary  consensus  recommendations,  as  advocated  by  the  Independent  Panel,  or  whether  we  should  rely  on  other  measures  for  enhancing  readiness  and  promoting  more  effective  response  efforts. 


 A.  Pre-  Positioning  for  Disasters 
 8.  The  Independent  Panel  recommendation  notes  that  the  sheer  force  of  Hurricane  Katrina  and  the  extensive  flooding  that  occurred  severely  tested  the  reliability  and  resiliency  of  communications 


 networks  in  the  Gulf  Coast  region.  To  help  speed  response  efforts,  the  Independent  Panel  recommends  the  adoption  of  a  proactive  (rather  than  reactive)  program  for  network  reliability  and  resiliency.  At  the 
 heart  of  the  Independent  Panels  recommendations  are  steps  the  Independent  Panel  believes  the  communications  industry,  public  safety  organizations,  and  the  Commission  should  take  for  a  faster,  more 
 effective  response  to  disasters  and  emergencies.  8  In  particular,  the  Independent  Panel  recommends  that  the  Commission  work  with  industry  sectors,  associations,  and  other  organizations  to  establish  a 
 Readiness  Checklist  for  the  communications  industry  that  would  include  developing  formal  business  continuity  plans,  conducting  training  exercises,  developing  suitable  plans  and  procedures,  and 
 maintaining  pre-  positioned  supplies  and  equipment  to  help  in  disaster  response.  We  seek  comment  on  these  recommendations.  The  Independent  Panel  recommends  that  we  rely  on  checklists  developed  by 


 6  Independent  Panel  Report  at  31-  42. 
 7  The  Independent  Panels  observations  address  the  areas  of  network  reliability  and  resiliency,  recovery  coordination 
 and  procedures,  first  responder  communications,  and  emergency  communications  to  the  public.  Independent  Panel  Final  Report  at  5-  30. 


 8  Id.  at  31-  34. 
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 industry  consensus  groups,  such  as  the  Network  Reliability  and  Interoperability  Council  (NRIC)  and  the  Media  Security  and  Reliability  Council  (MSRC).  We  seek  comment  on  this  recommendation,  including 
 whether  we  should  rely  on  the  results  of  voluntary  consensus  recommendations  or  instead  rely  on  other  measures.  We  invite  parties  to  comment  on  the  appropriate  breadth  of  business  continuity  plans.  Are  the 
 suggested  elements  presented  by  the  Independent  Panel  adequate,  or  are  other  elements  useful  or  necessary?  We  seek  comment  on  whether  we  should  adopt  guidance  or  criteria  for  developing  business 
 continuity  plans,  conducting  exercises,  developing  and  practicing  communications  plans,  or  routinely  archiving  critical  system  back-  ups  for  secure  off-  site  facilities. 


 9.  The  Independent  Panel  also  recommends  enhancing  the  awareness  of  the  public  safety  community  in  non-  traditional  emergency  alternatives  through  community  education  campaigns.  We  seek 
 comment  on  this  recommendation  and  on  other  steps  we  can  take  within  our  jurisdiction  and  statutory  authority  to  assist  the  public  safety  community  response  to  disasters  and  other  emergencies.  The 
 Independent  Panel  recommends  that  the  Commission  establish  a  prioritized  system  of  automatically  waiving  regulatory  requirements,  or  of  granting  automatic  Special  Temporary  Authority  (STA)  in  certain 
 instances,  and  provides  a  list  of  specific  Commission  requirements.  We  invite  comment  on  this  suggestion.  Are  there  other  areas  where  regulatory  relief  would  be  appropriate?  Should  we  establish 
 specific  thresholds  or  requirements  in  the  Commissions  rules  pertaining  to  demonstrations  that  should  be  made?  The  Independent  Panel  also  recommends  that  the  Commission  coordinate  all  federal  outage  and 
 infrastructure  reporting  requirements  in  times  of  crisis.  9  We  seek  comment  on  this  recommendation  and  on  the  measures  the  Commission  can  take  within  its  statutory  authority  and  jurisdiction.  Parties  should 
 address  the  appropriate  content  of  emergency  outage  reports,  format,  frequency,  distribution,  and  related  issues.  We  seek  comment  on  whether  additional  safeguards  should  be  implemented  to  address  issues 
 concerning  potential  disclosure  of  sensitive  infrastructure  information  or  commercial  information  to  avoid  potential  harm  to  communications  providers  or  others.  Finally,  we  invite  comment  on  other  steps  beyond 
 those  recommended  by  the  panel  that  we  could  take  within  our  statutory  authority  and  jurisdiction  to  improve  or  strengthen  network  resiliency  and  reliability. 


 10.  We  seek  comment  on  whether  and  how  the  Commission  can  assist  organizations  whose  primary  business  is  not  communications  (e.  g.,  hospitals,  nursing  homes,  day  care  facilities,  and  so  forth) 
 with  developing  communications  plans  for  an  emergency.  We  also  seek  comment  on  whether  the  Commission  should  develop  a  hotline  and/  or  Website  to  assist  these  entities. 


 B.  Recovery  Coordination 
 11.  The  Independent  Panel  observed  significant  challenges  to  maintenance  and  restoration  of  communications  services  after  Hurricane  Katrina  due  in  part  to  problems  with  access  to  the  affected  area 


 and  key  resources  such  as  power  and/  or  generator  fuel.  The  Independent  Panel  generally  supports  the  National  Security  Telecommunications  Advisory  Committees  (NSTACs)  recommendation  for  a  national 
 standard  for  credentialing  telecommunications  repair  workers.  10  The  Independent  Panel  advocates,  however,  expanding  the  NSTACs  credentialing  recommendations  to  include  repair  workers  of  all 
 communications  infrastructure  (e.  g.,  wireline,  wireless,  WISP,  cable,  broadcasting,  satellite).  11  The  Independent  Panel  recommends  that  the  Commission  work  with  other  appropriate  Federal  departments 
 and  agencies  to  promptly  develop  national  credentialing  requirements  and  guidelines  to  enable  communications  infrastructure  providers  and  their  contracted  workers  to  access  affected  areas  post- 


 9  Id.  at  33-  34. 
 10  Id.  at  34. 
 11  Id. 
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 13.  In  addition  to  recommending  the  Commission  encourage  other  governmental  bodies  to  engage  in  these  activities,  the  Independent  Panel  notes  its  support  for  communications  infrastructure 
 providers  forming  an  industry-  only  group  for  disaster  planning,  coordinating  recovery  efforts,  and  other  purposes.  18  The  Independent  Panel  also  recommends  that  the  Commission  work  with  the  National 
 Communications  System,  an  organization  within  the  Department  of  Homeland  Security  (DHS),  to  broaden  the  membership  of  the  National  Coordinating  Center  for  Telecommunications  (NCC)  to  include 
 representation  of  all  types  of  communications  systems,  including  broadcast,  cable,  satellite,  and  other  new  technologies.  We  seek  comment  on  these  recommendations,  including  how  the  Commission  can  work 
 within  its  statutory  authority  and  jurisdiction  to  promote  greater  membership  in  the  DHSs  National  Communications  System  coordination  body.  We  seek  comment  on  how  the  Commission  could  best  work 
 within  its  own  jurisdiction  and  statutory  authority  to  assist  in  promoting  extensive,  cross-  jurisdictional  coordination.  We  also  seek  comment  generally  on  how  we  can  better  facilitate  coordination  during  times 
 of  crisis. 
 14.  The  Independent  Panel  also  recommended  that  the  Commission  work  with  the  DHSs  National  Communications  System  to  promote  the  use  of  existing  priority  communications  services,  such 


 as  Government  Emergency  Telecommunications  Service  (GETS),  Wireless  Priority  Service  (WPS),  and  Telecommunications  Service  Priority  (TSP).  In  particular,  the  Independent  Panel  recommends  that  the 
 Commission  work  with  the  DHSs  National  Communications  System  to  promote  WPS,  GETS  and  TSP  to  all  eligible  government,  public  safety,  and  critical  industry  groups.  19  We  seek  comment  on  how  the 
 Commission  can  address  these  recommendations  within  its  statutory  authority  and  jurisdiction.  Finally,  the  Independent  Panel  recommends  that  the  Commission  create  two  websites  identifying:  (1)  the  key 
 state  emergency  management  contacts  and  post-  disaster  staging  areas  for  communications  providers;  and  (2)  contact  information  for  the  Commissions  Task  Force  that  coordinates  disaster  response  efforts  and 
 procedures  for  facilitating  disaster  response  and  outage  recovery.  We  seek  comment  on  these  recommendations. 


 C.  First  Responder  Communications 
 15.  The  Independent  Panel  made  several  recommendations  intended  to  facilitate  the  restoration  of  public  safety  communications  capabilities.  As  with  other  recommendations,  the 


 Independent  Panel  recommends  that  the  Commission  encourage  state  and  local  authorities  to  take  actions,  and  to  assist  in  supporting  these  efforts  consistent  with  our  statutory  authority  and  jurisdiction.  For 
 example,  the  Independent  Panel  recommended  that  the  Commission  encourage  state  and  local  jurisdictions  to  retain  and  maintain  a  cache  of  equipment  components  that  would  be  needed  to 
 immediately  restore  existing  public  safety  communications  within  hours  of  a  disaster.  20  Such  a  cache  of  pre-  positioned  equipment  would  include  Radiofrequency  (RF)  gear  (e.  g.,  Internet  Protocol  (IP)  gateways, 
 dispatch  consoles,  etc),  trailers,  tower  system  components  (e.  g.,  antenna  systems  and  hydraulic  masts),  back-  up  power  equipment,  and  fuel.  We  seek  comment  on  these  recommendations.  We  invite  parties  to 
 comment  on  the  capabilities  and  content  of  pre-  positioned  equipment,  as  well  as  the  functionalities  most  critical  to  support  in  the  early  stages  of  a  crisis.  The  Independent  Panel  Report  also  includes 
 recommendations  intended  to  facilitate  interoperability  among  first  responder  communications,  including  a  recommendation  that  the  Commission  encourage  the  expeditious  development  of  regional  plans  for  the 
 use  of  700  MHz  systems  and  move  promptly  to  review  and  approve  such  plans.  21  The  Commission  seeks 


 18  Id.  at  36. 
 19  Id.  at  36  for  a  full  list  of  the  recommendations  addressing  these  priority  services. 
 20  For  a  complete  list  of  these  recommendations,  see  Independent  Panel  Report  at  37-  38. 
 21  Id.  at  38-  39. 
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 comment  on  these  recommendations,  including  how  they  should  be  implemented  within  our  statutory  authority  and  jurisdiction. 
 16.  The  Independent  Panel  also  made  recommendations  intended  to  ensure  a  more  robust  911  and  E911  service.  For  example,  the  panel  recommends  that  the  Commission  encourage  the 
 implementation  of  certain  NRIC  best  practices  intended  to  promote  the  reliability  and  resiliency  of  the  911  and  E911  architecture.  22  In  particular,  the  Independent  Panel  recommends  that  service  providers  and 
 network  operators  should  consider  placing  and  maintaining  911  circuits  over  diverse  interoffice  transport  facilities  and  should  ensure  availability  of  emergency  back-  up  power  capabilities  (located  on-  site,  when 
 appropriate).  The  Independent  Panel  further  recommends  that  network  operators  should  consider  deploying  dual  active  911  selective  router  architectures  as  a  means  for  eliminating  single  points  of  failure. 
 The  Independent  Panel  also  recommends  that  network  operators,  service  providers,  equipment  suppliers,  and  public  safety  authorities  should  establish  alternative  methods  of  communication  for  critical  personnel. 
 We  seek  comment  on  how  the  Commission  can  best  encourage  implementation  of  these  recommendations  consistent  with  our  statutory  authority  and  jurisdiction,  and  we  welcome  further  suggestions  on  measures 
 that  could  be  taken  to  strengthen  911  and  E911  infrastructure  and  architecture. 
 17.  With  respect  to  Public  Safety  Answering  Points  (PSAPs),  the  Independent  Panel  recommends  the  designation  of  a  secondary  back-  up  PSAP  that  is  more  than  200  miles  away  to  answer 


 calls  when  the  primary  and  secondary  PSAPs  are  disabled.  23  The  Independent  Panel  also  recommends  that  the  Commission  work  with  other  federal  agencies  to  enhance  funding  for  911  enhancement  and 
 interoperability.  The  Independent  Panel  recommends  that  the  Commission  work  to  assist  the  emergency  medical  community  to  facilitate  the  resiliency  and  effectiveness  of  their  emergency  communications 
 system.  The  Independent  Panel  report  includes  four  recommendations  regarding  the  emergency  medical  community,  stating  that  the  Commission  should,  inter  alia,  educate  the  emergency  medical  community 
 about  emergency  communications  and  the  various  priority  communications  services  and  help  to  coordinate  this  sectors  emergency  communications  efforts.  24  We  seek  comment  on  how  to  address  these 
 recommendations  consistent  with  our  statutory  authority  and  jurisdiction.  We  also  invite  comment  on  what  additional  steps  the  Commission  can  take  within  its  statutory  authority  to  assist  the  emergency 
 medical  community  enhance  its  disaster  response  capabilities. 
 D.  Emergency  Communications  to  the  Public 
 18.  The  Independent  Panel  report  also  includes  recommendations  intended  to  facilitate  and  complement  use  of  the  Emergency  Alert  System  (EAS),  including  recommendations  that  the  Commission 


 educate  state  and  local  officials  about  the  existing  EAS,  its  benefits,  and  how  it  can  be  utilized.  Further,  the  report  recommends  that  the  Commission  develop  a  program  for  educating  the  public  about  EAS  and 
 promote  community  awareness  of  potential  mechanisms  for  accessing  those  alerts  sent  during  power  outages  or  broadcast  transmission  failures.  25  In  order  to  ensure  that  all  Americans,  including  persons  with 
 disabilities  and  persons  who  do  not  speak  English,  are  able  to  receive  emergency  communications,  the  Independent  Panel  recommends  that  the  Commission:  (1)  promptly  find  a  mechanism  to  resolve  any 
 technical  hurdles  in  the  current  EAS  to  ensure  that  persons  with  hearing  or  vision  disabilities  and  persons  who  do  not  speak  English  have  equal  access  to  public  warnings;  (2)  work  with  the  various  industry  trade 
 associations  to  create  and  publicize  best  practices  for  serving  persons  with  disabilities  and  persons  who  do  not  speak  English;  and  (3)  encourage  state  and  local  government  agencies  who  provide  emergency 


 22  Id.  at  39. 
 23  Id. 
 24  Id.  at  40. 
 25  See  Independent  Panel  Report  at  40-  41. 
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 collected;  and  (d)  ways  to  minimize  the  burden  of  the  collection  of  information  on  the  respondents,  including  the  use  of  automated  collection  techniques  or  other  forms  of  information  technology.  In 
 addition,  pursuant  to  the  Small  Business  Paperwork  Relief  Act  of  2002,  Public  Law  107-  198,  see  44  U.  S.  C.  3506(  c)(  4),  we  seek  specific  comment  on  how  we  might  further  reduce  the  information  collection 
 burden  for  small  business  concerns  with  fewer  than  25  employees. 


 V.  ORDERING  CLAUSE 
 25.  IT  IS  ORDERED,  that  pursuant  to  sections  1,  4(  i)  and  (o),  201,  303(  r),  403,  and  706  of  the  Communications  Act  of  1934,  as  amended,  47  U.  S.  C.    151,  154(  i)  and  (o),  201,  303(  r),  403,  and 


 606,  this  Notice  of  Proposed  Rulemaking  IS  hereby  ADOPTED. 
 26.  IT  IS  FURTHER  ORDERED  that  the  Commissions  Consumer  and  Government  Affairs  Bureau,  Reference  Information  Center,  SHALL  SEND  a  copy  of  this  Notice  of  Proposed  Rulemaking, 


 including  the  Initial  Regulatory  Flexibility  Analysis,  to  the  Chief  Council  for  Advocacy  of  the  Small  Business  Administration. 


 FEDERAL  COMMUNICATIONS  COMMISSION 


 Marlene  H.  Dortch  Secretary 
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 APPENDIX  A  INITIAL  REGULATORY  FLEXIBILITY  ANALYSIS 
 1.  As  required  by  the  Regulatory  Flexibility  Act  of  1980,  as  amended  (RFA),  33  the  Commission  has  prepared  this  present  Initial  Regulatory  Flexibility  Analysis  (IRFA)  of  the  possible  significant 
 economic  impact  on  a  substantial  number  of  small  entities  by  the  policies  and  rules  proposed  in  this  Notice  of  Proposed  Rulemaking  (  Notice).  Written  public  comments  are  requested  on  this  IRFA. 
 Comments  must  be  identified  as  responses  to  the  IRFA  and  must  be  filed  by  the  deadlines  for  comments  on  the  Notice  provided  in  Section  IV  of  the  item.  The  Commission  will  send  a  copy  of  the  Notice, 
 including  this  IRFA,  to  the  Chief  Counsel  for  Advocacy  of  the  Small  Business  Administration  (SBA).  34  In  addition,  the  Notice  and  IRFA  (or  summaries  thereof)  will  be  published  in  the  Federal  Register.  35 


 A.  Need  for,  and  Objectives  of,  the  Proposed  Rules 
 2.  On  Monday,  August  29,  2005,  Hurricane  Katrina  struck  the  Gulf  Coast  of  the  United  States,  causing  significant  damage  in  Alabama,  Louisiana,  and  Mississippi.  The  destruction  to  communications 
 companies  facilities  in  the  region,  and  therefore  to  the  services  upon  which  citizens  rely,  was  extraordinary.  Hurricane  Katrina  knocked  out  more  than  three  million  customer  phone  lines  in  Alabama, 
 Louisiana,  and  Mississippi.  The  wireline  telecommunications  network  sustained  enormous  damage    dozens  of  central  offices  and  countless  miles  of  outside  plant  were  damaged  or  destroyed  as  a  result  of  the 
 hurricane  or  the  subsequent  flooding.  Local  wireless  networks  also  sustained  considerable  damage    more  than  a  thousand  cell  sites  were  knocked  out  of  service  by  the  hurricane.  At  the  hurricanes  height, 
 more  than  thirty-  five  Public  Safety  Answering  Points  (PSAPs)  were  out  of  service,  and  some  parishes  in  Louisiana  remained  without  911  or  enhanced  911  (E911)  service  for  weeks.  36 


 3.  In  January  2006,  Chairman  Kevin  J.  Martin  established  the  Independent  Panel  pursuant  to  the  Federal  Advisory  Committee  Act,  Public  Law  92-  463,  as  amended.  37  The  mission  of  the  Independent 
 Panel  was  to  review  the  impact  of  Hurricane  Katrina  on  the  telecommunications  and  media  infrastructure  in  the  areas  affected  by  the  hurricane.  Specifically,  the  Independent  Panel  was  to  study  the  impact  of 
 Hurricane  Katrina  on  all  sectors  of  the  telecommunications  and  media  industries,  including  public  safety  communications.  In  addition,  the  Independent  Panel  was  to  review  the  sufficiency  and  effectiveness  of 
 the  recovery  effort  with  respect  to  the  communications  infrastructure.  The  Independent  Panel  was  tasked  with  making  recommendations  to  the  Commission,  by  June  15,  2006,  regarding  ways  to  improve  disaster 
 preparedness,  network  reliability,  and  communications  among  first  responders  such  as  police,  fire  fighters,  and  emergency  medical  personnel.  38 


 33  See  5  U.  S.  C.    603.  The  RFA,  see  5  U.  S.  C.    601-  612,  has  been  amended  by  the  Small  Business  Regulatory 
 Enforcement  Fairness  Act  of  1996  (SBREFA),  Pub.  L.  No.  104-  121,  Title  II,  110  Stat.  857  (1996).  34 
 See  5  U.  S.  C.    603(  a).  35 
 Id.  36 
 See  generally  Independent  Panel  Reviewing  the  Impact  of  Hurricane  Katrina  on  Communications  Networks,  Report  and  Recommendations  to  the  Federal  Communications  Commission,  5-  31  (Independent  Panel  Report);  see 


 also  Federal-  State  Joint  Board  on  Universal  Service,  Order,  20  FCC  Rcd  16883,  para.  2  (2005)  (Katrina  USF  Order). 
 37  5  U.  S.  C.  App.  2  (1988). 
 38  See  the  Independent  Panel  Charter  available  at  http://  www.  fcc.  gov/  eb/  hkip/  HKIPCharter.  pdf  (last  visited  June  15, 
 2006);  see  also  the  Notice  of  Establishment  of  the  Commissions  Independent  Panel  Reviewing  the  Impact  of  Hurricane  Katrina  on  Communications  Networks,  71  Fed.  Reg.  933  (2006). 
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 4.  On  June  12,  2006,  the  Independent  Panel  submitted  its  Report  and  Recommendations.  As  explained  in  the  Notice,  Congress  has  charged  the  Commission  with  promoting  the  safety  of  life  and 
 property  through  the  use  of  wire  and  radio  communications.  In  this  regard,  we  have  already  taken  a  number  of  steps  to  fulfill  this  mandate  and  we  will  continue  to  do  so.  The  Independent  Panels  report 
 described  the  impact  of  the  worst  natural  disaster  in  the  Nations  history  as  well  as  the  overall  public  and  private  response  and  recovery  efforts.  Our  goal  in  this  proceeding  is  to  take  the  lessons  learned  from  this 
 disaster  and  build  upon  them  to  promote  more  effective,  efficient  response  and  recovery  efforts,  as  well  as  heightened  readiness  and  preparedness,  in  the  future.  To  accomplish  this  goal,  we  invite  comment  on 
 what  actions  the  Commission  can  take  to  address  the  Independent  Panels  recommendations. 
 5.  As  we  note  in  the  Notice,  in  some  cases,  the  Independent  Panel  recommends  action  that  require  the  Commission  to  modify  its  rules  pursuant  to  notice-  and-  comment  rulemaking.  In  other  cases, 


 the  Independent  Panel  recommends  that  the  Commission  take  actions  that  are  not  dependent  upon  rulemakings,  such  as  increased  outreach  and  education  campaigns,  or  recommends  measures  that  may  not 
 fall  within  the  Commissions  statutory  authority  and  jurisdiction.  In  advocating  implementation  of  the  Independent  Panels  recommendations,  commenters  should  note  what  actions  would  fall  within  the 
 Commissions  statutory  authority  and  jurisdiction  and  what  the  Commission  could  do  to  encourage  the  appropriate  entities  (e.  g.,  states  and  local  authorities)  to  take  action. 


 6.  To  speed  response  efforts,  the  Independent  Panel  recommends  that  adoption  of  a  proactive  (rather  than  reactive)  program  for  network  reliability  and  resiliency.  Specifically,  the  Independent  Panel 
 recommends  working  with  industry  sectors,  associations  and  other  organizations  to  establish  a  Readiness  Checklist  for  the  communications  industry  that  would  include  developing  formal  business  continuity 
 plans,  conducting  training  exercises,  developing  suitable  plans  and  procedures,  and  maintaining  pre-positioned  supplies  and  equipment  to  help  in  disaster  response.  The  Notice  seeks  comment  on  these 
 recommendations.  The  Independent  Panel  also  recommends  that  we  rely  on  checklists  developed  by  industry  consensus  groups,  such  as  the  Network  Reliability  and  Interoperability  Council  (NRIC)  and  the 
 Media  Security  and  Reliability  Council  (MSRC).  The  Notice  seeks  comment  on  this  recommendation,  including  whether  we  should  rely  on  the  results  of  voluntary  consensus  recommendations  or  instead  rely 
 on  other  measures.  The  Notice  also  seeks  comment  on  whether  we  should  adopt  guidance  or  criteria  for  developing  business  continuity  plans,  conducting  exercises,  developing  and  practicing  communications 
 plans,  or  routinely  archiving  critical  system  back-  ups  for  secure  off-  site  facilities. 
 7.  The  Independent  Panel  also  recommends  enhancing  the  public  safety  communitys  awareness  of  non-  traditional  emergency  alternatives  through  community  education  campaigns.  The  Notice  seeks 


 comment  on  this  recommendation  and  other  steps  we  can  take  within  our  jurisdiction  and  statutory  authority  to  assist  the  public  safety  community  in  responding  to  disasters  and  other  emergencies.  The 
 Independent  Panel  recommends  that  the  Commission  establish  a  prioritized  system  of  automatically  waiving  regulatory  requirements,  or  of  granting  automatic  Special  Temporary  Authority  (STA)  in  certain 
 instances,  and  provides  a  list  of  specific  Commission  requirements.  The  Notice  seeks  comment  on  this  suggestion.  The  Notice  also  seeks  comment  on  the  Independent  Panels  recommendation  that  the 
 Commission  coordinate  all  federal  outage  and  infrastructure  reporting  requirements  in  times  of  crisis.  In  addition,  the  Notice  seeks  comment  on  other  steps  beyond  those  recommended  by  the  Panel  that  the 
 Commission  could  take  within  our  statutory  authority  and  jurisdiction  to  improve  or  strengthen  network  resiliency  and  reliability. 


 8.  As  discussed  in  the  Notice,  the  Independent  Panel  generally  supports  the  National  Security  Telecommunications  Advisory  Committees  (NSTACs)  recommendation  for  a  national  standard  for 
 credentialing  telecommunications  repair  workers.  The  Independent  Panel,  however,  advocates  expanding  the  NSTAC  recommendations  to  include  repair  workers  of  all  communications  infrastructure.  The 
 Independent  Panel  recommends  that  the  Commission  work  with  other  appropriate  Federal  departments  and  government  agencies  to  promptly  develop  national  credentialing  requirements  and  guidelines  to 
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 enable  communications  infrastructure  providers  and  their  contracted  workers  to  access  affected  areas  post-  disaster.  The  Independent  Panel  also  recommends  that  the  Commission  encourage  states  to  develop 
 and  implement  a  credentialing  program  consistent  with  the  NSTAC  guidelines.  The  Notice  seeks  comment  on  these  recommendations  as  well  as  measures  the  Commission  can  take  within  its  statutory 
 authority  and  jurisdiction. 
 9.  The  Notice  seeks  comment  on  the  Independent  Panels  recommendation  that  the  Commission  work  with  Congress  and  appropriate  federal  departments  and  agencies  to  implement  the  NSTACs 


 recommendation  that  telecommunications  infrastructure  providers  should  be  afforded  emergency  responder  status  under  the  Stafford  Act  and  that  this  designation  should  be  incorporated  into  the  National 
 Response  Plan  and  state  and  local  emergency  response  plans.  With  respect  to  this  proposal,  the  Independent  Panel  also  recommends  that  the  emergency  responder  designation  include  all  types  of 
 communications  services. 
 10.  In  order  to  enable  the  communications  industry  and  state  and  local  emergency  officials  to  better  coordinate  their  preparation  for  and  response  to  disasters  affecting  communications  infrastructure, 


 the  Independent  Panel  recommends  that  the  Commission  work  with  state  and  local  emergency  officials  and  the  communications  industry  to  encourage  the  formation  of  coordinating  and  planning  bodies  at  the 
 state  or  regional  level.  As  set  forth  in  the  Notice,  the  Panels  recommendation  also  lists  activities  that  the  Commission  should  encourage  each  state  or  regional  coordinating  body  to  engage  in.  The  Notice  seeks 
 comment  on  this  recommendation  and  on  the  measures  the  Commission  could  take  within  its  statutory  authority  and  jurisdiction  to  encourage  other  Federal  agencies,  state  and  local  authorities  and  the  private 
 sector  to  address  the  Independent  Panels  recommendations  in  this  regard. 
 11.  The  Independent  Panel  recommends  that  the  Commission  work  with  the  National  Communications  System  (NCS)  to  broaden  the  membership  of  the  National  Coordinating  Center  for 


 Telecommunications  to  include  representation  from  all  types  of  communications  systems,  including  broadcast,  cable,  satellite,  and  other  new  technologies.  The  Notice  seeks  comment  on  this 
 recommendation,  including  how  the  Commission  can  work  within  its  statutory  authority  and  jurisdiction  to  promote  greater  membership  in  the  DHSs  National  Communications  System  coordination  body. 


 12.  The  Notice  seeks  comment  on  several  recommendations  designed  to  facilitate  the  use  of  existing  priority  communications  services,  such  as  Government  Emergency  Telecommunications  Service 
 (GETS),  Wireless  Priority  Service  (WPS)  and  Telecommunications  Service  Priority  (TSP),  all  of  which  are  administered  by  DHSs  National  Communications  System.  In  addition,  the  Notice  seeks  comment  on 
 the  Independent  Panels  recommendation  that  the  Commission  create  two  websites  identifying:  (1)  the  key  state  emergency  management  contacts  and  post-  disaster  staging  areas  for  communications  providers; 
 and  (2)  contact  information  for  the  Commissions  Task  Force  that  coordinates  disaster  response  efforts  and  procedures  for  facilitating  disaster  response  and  outage  recovery. 


 13.  In  the  Notice,  the  Commission  seeks  comment  on  several  recommendations  intended  to  facilitate  the  restoration  of  public  safety  communications  capabilities.  For  example,  it  seeks  comment  on 
 the  Panels  recommendation  that  the  Commission  encourage  state  and  local  jurisdictions  to  retain  and  maintain  a  cache  of  equipment  components  that  would  be  needed  to  immediately  restore  existing  public 
 safety  communications  within  hours  of  a  disaster.  The  Notice  also  seeks  comment  on  a  number  of  recommendations  intended  to  facilitate  interoperability  among  first  responder  communications,  including 
 a  recommendation  that  the  Commission  encourage  the  expeditious  development  of  regional  plans  for  the  use  of  700  MHz  systems  and  move  promptly  to  review  and  approve  such  plans. 


 14.  Regarding  911  and  E911  service,  the  Independent  Panel  recommends  that  the  Commission  encourage  the  implementation  of  certain  NRIC  best  practices  intended  to  promote  the  reliability  and 
 resiliency  of  the  911  and  E911  architecture.  The  Panel  recommends  that:  (1)  service  providers  and 
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 network  operators  consider  placing  and  maintaining  911  circuits  over  diverse  interoffice  transport  facilities  and  should  ensure  availability  of  emergency  back-  up  power  capabilities  (located  on-  site,  when 
 appropriate);  (2)  network  operators  consider  deploying  dual  service  911  selective  router  architectures  as  a  means  for  eliminating  single  points  of  failure;  and  (3)  network  operators,  service  providers,  equipment 
 suppliers,  and  public  safety  authorities  establish  alternative  methods  of  communication  for  critical  personnel.  The  Notice  seeks  comment  on  these  recommendations. 


 15.  With  respect  to  Public  Safety  Answering  Points  (PSAPs),  the  Independent  Panel  recommends  (1)  the  designation  of  a  secondary  back-  up  PSAP  that  is  more  than  200  miles  away  to  answer  calls  when 
 the  primary  and  secondary  PSAPs  are  disabled;  (2)  that  the  Commission  work  with  other  federal  agencies  to  enhance  funding  for  911  enhancement  and  interoperability;  and  (3)  that  the  Commission  work  to  assist 
 the  emergency  medical  community  to  facilitate  the  resiliency  and  effectiveness  of  their  emergency  communications  system.  The  Notice  seeks  comment  on  these  recommendations.  In  addition,  the 
 Independent  Panels  Report  and  Recommendations  includes  four  recommendations  regarding  the  emergency  medical  community,  stating  that  the  Commission  should,  inter  alia,  educate  the  emergency 
 medical  community  about  emergency  communications  and  the  various  priority  communications  services  and  help  to  coordinate  this  sectors  emergency  communications  efforts.  The  Notice  seeks  comment  on 
 these  recommendations. 
 16.  Finally,  the  Notice  seeks  comment  on  the  Independent  Panels  recommendations  that  the  Commission:  (1)  work  with  various  industry  trade  associations  to  create  and  publicize  best  practices  for 


 serving  persons  with  disabilities  and  persons  who  do  not  speak  English;  and  (2)  encourage  state  and  local  government  agencies  to  provide  emergency  information  to  take  steps  to  make  critical  emergency 
 information  accessible  to  persons  with  disabilities  and  persons  who  do  not  speak  English.  39 
 B.  Legal  Basis 


 17.  Authority  for  the  actions  proposed  in  this  Notice  may  be  found  in  sections  1,  4(  i),  4(  o),  303(  r),  403,  and  706  of  the  Communications  Act  of  1934,  as  amended,  (Act)  47  U.  S.  C.    151,  154(  i) 
 154(  o),  303(  r),  403  and  606. 
 C.  Description  and  Estimate  of  the  Number  of  Small  Entities  to  Which  Rules  Will  Apply 


 18.  The  RFA  directs  agencies  to  provide  a  description  of,  and,  where  feasible,  an  estimate  of,  the  number  of  small  entities  that  may  be  affected  by  the  rules  adopted  herein.  40  The  RFA  generally 
 defines  the  term  small  entity  as  having  the  same  meaning  as  the  terms  small  business,  small  organization,  and  small  governmental  jurisdiction.  41  In  addition,  the  term  small  business  has  the 
 same  meaning  as  the  term  small  business  concern  under  the  Small  Business  Act.  42  A  small  business 
 39  The  Independent  Panel  also  submitted  recommendations  regarding  the  Emergency  Alert  System.  We  note  that 
 this  issue  is  the  subject  of  the  Commissions  ongoing  EAS  rulemaking  proceeding  and  we  expect  to  address  those  and  related  issues  in  that  proceeding. 


 40  5  U.  S.  C.    604(  a)(  3). 
 41  5  U.  S.  C.    601(  6). 
 42  5  U.  S.  C.    601(  3)  (incorporating  by  reference  the  definition  of  small-  business  concern  in  the  Small  Business 
 Act,  15  U.  S.  C.    632).  Pursuant  to  5  U.  S.  C.    601(  3),  the  statutory  definition  of  a  small  business  applies  unless  an  agency,  after  consultation  with  the  Office  of  Advocacy  of  the  Small  Business  Administration  and  after  opportunity 


 for  public  comment,  establishes  one  or  more  definitions  of  such  term  which  are  appropriate  to  the  activities  of  the  agency  and  publishes  such  definition(  s)  in  the  Federal  Register.  5  U.  S.  C.    601(  3). 
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 concern  is  one  which:  (1)  is  independently  owned  and  operated;  (2)  is  not  dominant  in  its  field  of  operation;  and  (3)  satisfies  any  additional  criteria  established  by  the  Small  Business  Administration 
 (SBA).  43 
 19.  Nationwide,  there  are  a  total  of  approximately  22.4  million  small  businesses,  according  to  SBA  data.  44  A  small  organization  is  generally  any  not-  for-  profit  enterprise  which  is  independently 


 owned  and  operated  and  is  not  dominant  in  its  field.  45  Nationwide,  as  of  2002,  there  were  approximately  1.6  million  small  organizations.  46  The  term  small  governmental  jurisdiction  is  defined  generally  as 
 governments  of  cities,  towns,  townships,  villages,  school  districts,  or  special  districts,  with  a  population  of  less  than  fifty  thousand.  47  Census  Bureau  data  for  2002  indicate  that  there  were  87,525  local 
 governmental  jurisdictions  in  the  United  States.  48  We  estimate  that,  of  this  total,  84,377  entities  were  small  governmental  jurisdictions.  49  Thus,  we  estimate  that  most  governmental  jurisdictions  are  small. 


 20.  Television  Broadcasting.  The  SBA  has  developed  a  small  business  sized  standard  for  television  broadcasting,  which  consists  of  all  such  firms  having  $13  million  or  less  in  annual  receipts.  50 
 Business  concerns  included  in  this  industry  are  those  primarily  engaged  in  broadcasting  images  together  with  sound.  51  According  to  Commission  staff  review  of  the  BIA  Publications,  Inc.  Master  Access 
 Television  Analyzer  Database  (BIA)  on  October  18,  2005,  about  873  of  the  1,307  commercial  television  stations  52  (or  about  67  percent)  have  revenues  of  $12  million  or  less  and  thus  quality  as  small  entities 
 under  the  SBA  definition.  We  note,  however,  that,  in  assessing  whether  a  business  concern  qualifies  as  small  under  the  above  definition,  business  (control)  affiliations  53  must  be  included.  54  Our  estimate, 


 43  15  U.  S.  C.    632. 
 44  See  SBA,  Programs  and  Services,  SBA  Pamphlet  No.  CO-  0028,  at  page  40  (July  2002). 
 45  5  U.  S.  C.    601(  4). 
 46  Independent  Sector,  The  New  Nonprofit  Almanac  &  Desk  Reference  (2002). 
 47  5  U.  S.  C.    601(  5). 
 48  U.  S.  Census  Bureau,  Statistical  Abstract  of  the  United  States:  2006,  Section  8,  page  272,  Table  415. 
 49  We  assume  that  the  villages,  school  districts,  and  special  districts  are  small,  and  total  48,  558.  See  U.  S.  Census 
 Bureau,  Statistical  Abstract  of  the  United  States:  2006,  section  8,  page  273,  Table  417.  For  2002,  Census  Bureau  data  indicate  that  the  total  number  of  county,  municipal,  and  township  governments  nationwide  was  38,967,  of 


 which  35,  819  were  small.  Id.  50 
 13  C.  F.  R.    121.  201,  North  American  Industry  Classification  System  (NAICS)  code  515120.  51 
 Office  of  Management  and  Budget,  North  American  Industry  Classification  System:  United  States,  at  509  (1997).  This  category  description  continues,  These  establishments  operate  television  broadcasting  studios  and  facilities  for 


 the  programming  and  transmission  of  programs  to  the  public.  These  establishments  also  produce  or  transmit  visual  programming  to  affiliated  broadcast  television  stations,  which  in  turn  broadcast  the  programs  to  the  public  on  a 
 predetermined  schedule.  Programming  may  originate  in  their  own  studios,  from  an  affiliated  network,  or  from  external  sources.  Separate  census  categories  pertain  to  businesses  primarily  engaged  in  producing  programming. 
 Id.  at  502-  05,  NAICS  code  512120,  Motion  Picture  and  Video  Production;  NAICS  code  512120,  Motion  Picture  and  Video  Distribution;  NAICS  code  512191,  Teleproduction  and  Other  Post-  Production  Services;  and  NAICS  code 
 512199,  Other  Motion  Picture  and  Video  Industries.  52 
 Although  we  are  using  BIAs  estimate  for  purposes  of  this  revenue  comparison,  the  Commission  has  estimated  the  number  of  licensed  commercial  television  stations  to  be  1,368.  See  News  Release,  Broadcast  Station  Totals  as  of 


 June  30,  2005  (dated  Aug.  29,  2005);  see  http;://  www.  fcc.  gov/  mb/  audio/  totals/  bt050630.  html.  53 
 Concerns  are  affiliates  of  each  other  when  one  concern  controls  or  has  the  power  to  control  the  other  or  a  third  party  or  parties  controls  or  has  to  power  to  control  both.  13  C.  F.  R.    121.  103(  a)(  1). 
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 therefore,  likely  overstates  the  number  of  small  entities  that  might  be  affected  by  our  action,  because  the  revenue  figure  on  which  it  is  based  does  not  include  or  aggregate  revenues  from  affiliated  companies. 
 There  are  also  2,127  low  power  television  stations  (LPTV).  55  Given  the  nature  of  this  service,  we  will  presume  that  all  LPTV  licensees  qualify  as  small  entities  under  the  SBA  size  standard. 


 21.  Radio  Stations.  The  proposed  rules  and  policies  potentially  will  apply  to  all  AM  and  commercial  FM  radio  broadcasting  licensees  and  potential  licensees.  The  SBA  defines  a  radio 
 broadcasting  station  that  has  $6.5  million  or  less  in  annual  receipts  as  a  small  business.  56  A  radio  broadcasting  station  is  an  establishment  primarily  engaged  in  broadcasting  aural  programs  by  radio  to  the 
 public.  57  Included  in  this  industry  are  commercial,  religious,  educational,  and  other  radio  stations.  58  Radio  broadcasting  stations  which  primarily  are  engaged  in  radio  broadcasting  and  which  produce  radio 
 program  materials  are  similarly  included.  59  However,  radio  stations  that  are  separate  establishments  and  are  primarily  engaged  in  producing  radio  program  material  are  classified  under  another  NAICS  number.  60 
 According  to  Commission  staff  review  of  BIA  Publications,  Inc.  Master  Access  Radio  Analyzer  Database  on  March  31,  2005,  about  10,840  (95%)  of  11,410  commercial  radio  stations  have  revenue  of  $6  million 
 or  less.  We  note,  however,  that  many  radio  stations  are  affiliated  with  much  larger  corporations  having  much  higher  revenue.  Our  estimate,  therefore,  likely  overstates  the  number  of  small  entities  that  might  be 
 affected  by  our  action. 
 22.  Cable  and  Other  Program  Distribution.  The  Census  Bureau  defines  this  category  as  follows:  This  industry  comprises  establishments  primarily  engaged  as  third-  party  distribution  systems 


 for  broadcast  programming.  The  establishments  of  this  industry  deliver  visual,  aural,  or  textual  programming  received  from  cable  networks,  local  television  stations,  or  radio  networks  to  consumers  via 
 cable  or  direct-  to-  home  satellite  systems  on  a  subscription  or  fee  basis.  These  establishments  do  not  generally  originate  programming  material.  61  The  SBA  has  developed  a  small  business  size  standard  for 
 Cable  and  Other  Program  Distribution,  which  is:  all  such  firms  having  $13.5  million  or  less  in  annual  receipts.  62  According  to  Census  Bureau  data  for  2002,  there  were  a  total  of  1,191  firms  in  this  category 
 that  operated  for  the  entire  year.  63  Of  this  total,  1,087  firms  had  annual  receipts  of  under  $10  million,  and  43  firms  had  receipts  of  $10  million  or  more  but  less  than  $25  million.  64  Thus,  under  this  size  standard, 
 the  majority  of  firms  can  be  considered  small. 


 (...  continued  from  previous  page)  54  SBA  counts  the  receipts  or  employees  of  the  concern  whose  size  is  at  issue  and  those  of  all  its  domestic 
 concerns  size.  13  C.  F.  R.    121.103(  a)(  4).  55 
 Broadcast  Station  Totals  as  of  September  30,  2002,  FCC  News  Release  (rel.  Nov.  6,  2002).  56 
 See  13  C.  F.  R.    121.201,  NAICS  code  515112  (changed  from  513112  in  Oct.  2002).  57 
 Id.  58 
 Id.  59 
 Id.  60 
 Id.  61 
 U.  S.  Census  Bureau,  2002  NAICS  Definitions,  517510  Cable  and  Other  Program  Distribution;  http://  www.  census.  gov/  epcd/  naics02/  def/  NDEF517.  HTM. 


 62  13  C.  F.  R.    121.201,  NAICS  code  517510. 
 63  U.  S.  Census  Bureau,  2002  Economic  Census,  Subject  Series:  Information,  Table  4,  Receipts  Size  of  Firms  for  the 
 United  States:  2002,  NAICS  code  517510  (issued  November  2005).  64 
 Id.  An  additional  61  firms  had  annual  receipts  of  $25  million  or  more. 
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 23.  Cable  Companies  and  Systems.  The  Commission  has  also  developed  its  own  small  business  size  standards,  for  the  purpose  of  cable  rate  regulation.  Under  the  Commissions  rules,  a  small  cable 
 company  is  one  serving  400,000  or  fewer  subscribers,  nationwide.  65  Industry  data  indicate  that,  of  1,076  cable  operators  nationwide,  all  but  eleven  are  small  under  this  size  standard.  66  In  addition,  under  the 
 Commissions  rules,  a  small  system  is  a  cable  system  serving  15,000  or  fewer  subscribers.  67  Industry  data  indicate  that,  of  7,208  systems  nationwide,  6,139  systems  have  under  10,  000  subscribers,  and  an 
 additional  379  systems  have  10,000-  19,  999  subscribers.  68  Thus,  under  this  second  size  standard,  most  cable  systems  are  small. 


 24.  Cable  System  Operators.  The  Communications  Act  of  1934,  as  amended,  also  contains  a  size  standard  for  small  cable  system  operators,  which  is  a  cable  operator  that,  directly  or  through  an  affiliate, 
 serves  in  the  aggregate  fewer  than  1  percent  of  all  subscribers  in  the  United  States  and  is  not  affiliated  with  any  entity  or  entities  whose  gross  annual  revenues  in  the  aggregate  exceed  $250,000,000.  69  The 
 Commission  has  determined  that  an  operator  serving  fewer  than  677,000  subscribers  shall  be  deemed  a  small  operator,  if  its  annual  revenues,  when  combined  with  the  total  annual  revenues  of  all  its  affiliates, 
 do  not  exceed  $250  million  in  the  aggregate.  70  Industry  data  indicate  that,  of  1,076  cable  operators  nationwide,  all  but  ten  are  small  under  this  size  standard.  71  We  note  that  the  Commission  neither  requests 
 nor  collects  information  on  whether  cable  system  operators  are  affiliated  with  entities  whose  gross  annual  revenues  exceed  $250  million,  72  and  therefore  we  are  unable  to  estimate  more  accurately  the  number  of 
 cable  system  operators  that  would  qualify  as  small  under  this  size  standard. 
 25.  Multipoint  Distribution  Systems.  The  established  rules  apply  to  Multipoint  Distribution  Systems  (MDS)  operated  as  part  of  a  wireless  cable  system.  The  Commission  has  defined  small  entity 
 for  purposes  of  the  auction  of  MDS  frequencies  as  an  entity  that,  together  with  its  affiliates,  has  average  gross  annual  revenues  that  are  not  more  than  $40  million  for  the  preceding  three  calendar  years.  73  This 


 65  47  C.  F.  R.    76.  901(  e).  The  Commission  determined  that  this  size  standard  equates  approximately  to  a  size 
 standard  of  $100  million  or  less  in  annual  revenues.  Implementation  of  Sections  of  the  1992  Cable  Act:  Rate  Regulation,  Sixth  Report  and  Order  and  Eleventh  Order  on  Reconsideration,  10  FCC  Rcd  7393,  7408  (1995). 


 66  These  data  are  derived  from:  R.  R.  Bowker,  Broadcasting  &  Cable  Yearbook  2006,  Top  25  Cable/  Satellite 
 Operators,  pages  A-  8  &  C-  2  (data  current  as  of  June  30,  2005);  Warren  Communications  News,  Television  &  Cable  Factbook  2006,  Ownership  of  Cable  Systems  in  the  United  States,  pages  D-  1805  to  D-  1857. 


 67  47  C.  F.  R.    76.  901(  c). 
 68  Warren  Communications  News,  Television  &  Cable  Factbook  2006,  U.  S.  Cable  Systems  by  Subscriber  Size, 
 page  F-  2  (data  current  as  of  Oct.  2005).  The  data  do  not  include  718  systems  for  which  classifying  data  were  not  available. 


 69  47  U.  S.  C.    543(  m)(  2);  see  47  C.  F.  R.    76.  901(  f)  &  nn.  1-  3. 
 70  47  C.  F.  R.    76.  901(  f);  see  Public  Notice,  FCC  Announces  New  Subscriber  Count  for  the  Definition  of  Small 
 Cable  Operator,  DA  01-  158  (Cable  Services  Bureau,  Jan.  24,  2001)..  71 
 These  data  are  derived  from:  R.  R.  Bowker,  Broadcasting  &  Cable  Yearbook  2006,  Top  25  Cable/  Satellite  Operators,  pages  A-  8  &  C-  2  (data  current  as  of  June  30,  2005);  Warren  Communications  News,  Television  & 


 Cable  Factbook  2006,  Ownership  of  Cable  Systems  in  the  United  States,  pages  D-  1805  to  D-  1857.  72 
 The  Commission  does  receive  such  information  on  a  case-  by-  case  basis  if  a  cable  operator  appeals  a  local  franchise  authoritys  finding  that  the  operator  does  not  qualify  as  a  small  cable  operator  pursuant  to    76.  901(  f)  of 


 the  Commissions  rules.  See  47  C.  F.  R.    76.  909(  b).  73 
 47  C.  F.  R.    21.961(  b)(  1). 
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 definition  of  small  entity  in  the  context  of  MDS  auctions  has  been  approved  by  the  SBA.  74  The  Commission  completed  its  MDS  auction  in  March  1996  for  authorizations  in  493  basic  trading  areas.  Of 
 67  winning  bidders,  61  qualified  as  small  entities.  At  this  time,  we  estimate  that  of  the  61  small  business  MDS  auction  winners,  48  remain  small  business  licensees. 


 26.  MDS  also  includes  licensees  of  stations  authorized  prior  to  the  auction.  As  noted  above,  the  SBA  has  developed  a  definition  of  small  entities  for  pay  television  services,  cable  and  other 
 subscription  programming,  which  includes  all  such  companies  generating  $13.5  million  or  less  in  annual  receipts.  75  This  definition  includes  MDS  and  thus  applies  to  MDS  licensees  that  did  not  participate  in  the 
 MDS  auction.  Information  available  to  us  indicates  that  there  are  approximately  392  incumbent  MDS  licensees  that  do  not  generate  revenue  in  excess  of  $11  million  annually.  Therefore,  we  estimate  that 
 there  are  at  least  440  (392  pre-  auction  plus  48  auction  licensees)  small  MDS  providers  as  defined  by  the  SBA  and  the  Commissions  auction  rules  which  may  be  affected  by  the  rules  adopted  herein. 


 27.  Instructional  Television  Fixed  Service.  The  established  rules  would  also  apply  to  Instructional  Television  Fixed  Service  (ITFS)  facilities  operated  as  part  of  a  wireless  cable  system.  The 
 SBA  definition  of  small  entities  for  pay  television  services  also  appears  to  apply  to  ITFS.  76  There  are  presently  2,032  ITFS  licensees.  All  but  100  of  these  licenses  are  held  by  educational  institutions. 
 Educational  institutions  are  included  in  the  definition  of  a  small  business.  77  However,  we  do  not  collect  annual  revenue  data  for  ITFS  licensees,  and  are  not  able  to  ascertain  how  many  of  the  100  non-educational 
 licensees  would  be  categorized  as  small  under  the  SBA  definition.  Thus,  we  tentatively  conclude  that  at  least  1,932  are  small  businesses  and  may  be  affected  by  the  established  rules. 


 28.  Wireless  Service  Providers.  The  SBA  has  developed  a  small  business  size  standard  for  wireless  small  businesses  within  the  two  separate  categories  of  Paging  78  and  Cellular  and  Other  Wireless 
 Telecommunications.  79  Under  both  SBA  categories,  a  wireless  business  is  small  if  it  has  1,500  or  fewer  employees.  According  to  Commission  data,  80  1,012  companies  reported  that  they  were  engaged  in  the 
 provision  of  wireless  service.  Of  these  1,012  companies,  an  estimated  829  have  1,500  or  fewer  employees  and  183  have  more  than  1,500  employees.  This  SBA  size  standard  also  applies  to  wireless 
 telephony.  Wireless  telephony  includes  cellular,  personal  communications  services,  and  specialized  mobile  radio  telephony  carriers.  According  to  the  data,  437  carriers  reported  that  they  were  engaged  in 
 the  provision  of  wireless  telephony.  81  We  have  estimated  that  260  of  these  are  small  businesses  under  the  SBA  small  business  size  standard. 


 29.  Broadband  Personal  Communications  Service.  The  broadband  personal  communications 
 74  See  Amendment  of  Parts  21  and  74  of  the  Commissions  Rules  With  Regard  to  Filing  Procedures  in  the  Multipoint 
 Distribution  Service  and  in  the  Instructional  Television  Fixed  Service  and  Implementation  of  Section  309(  j)  of  the  Communications  Act    Competitive  Bidding,  MM  Docket  No.  94-  131  and  PP  Docket  No.  93-  253,  Report  and  Order, 


 10  FCC  Rcd  9589  (1995).  75 
 13  C.  F.  R.    121.  201,  NAICS  code  515210.  76 
 13  C.  F.  R.    121.  201,  NAICS  code  515210.  77 
 5  U.  S.  C.    601(  3).  78 
 13  C.  F.  R.    121.  201,  NAICS  code  517211.  79 
 13  C.  F.  R.    121.  201,  NAICS  code  517212.  80 
 FCC,  Wireline  Competition  Bureau,  Industry  Analysis  and  Technology  Division,  Trends  in  Telephone  Service  at  Table  5.  3  (June  2005)  (Trends  in  Telephone  Service).  This  source  uses  data  that  are  current  as  of  October  1,  2004. 


 81  Id.  Table  5.3,  page  5-  5. 
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 services  (PCS)  spectrum  is  divided  into  six  frequency  blocks  designated  A  through  F,  and  the  Commission  has  held  auctions  for  each  block.  The  Commission  has  created  a  small  business  size 
 standard  for  Blocks  C  and  F  as  an  entity  that  has  average  gross  revenues  of  less  than  $40  million  in  the  three  previous  calendar  years.  82  For  Block  F,  an  additional  small  business  size  standard  for  very  small 
 business  was  added  and  is  defined  as  an  entity  that,  together  with  its  affiliates,  has  average  gross  revenues  of  not  more  than  $15  million  for  the  preceding  three  calendar  years.  83  These  small  business  size 
 standards,  in  the  context  of  broadband  PCS  auctions,  have  been  approved  by  the  SBA.  84  No  small  businesses  within  the  SBA-  approved  small  business  size  standards  bid  successfully  for  licenses  in  Blocks 
 A  and  B.  There  were  90  winning  bidders  that  qualified  as  small  entities  in  the  Block  C  auctions.  A  total  of  93  small  and  very  small  business  bidders  won  approximately  40  percent  of  the  1,479  licenses  for 
 Blocks  D,  E,  and  F.  85  On  March  23,  1999,  the  Commission  reauctioned  155  C,  D,  E,  and  F  Block  licenses;  there  were  113  small  business  winning  bidders.  86  On  January  26,  2001,  the  Commission 
 completed  the  auction  of  422  C  and  F  Broadband  PCS  licenses  in  Auction  No.  35.  Of  the  35  winning  bidders  in  this  auction,  29  qualified  as  small  or  very  small  businesses.  87  Subsequent  events, 
 concerning  Auction  35,  including  judicial  and  agency  determinations,  resulted  in  a  total  of  163  C  and  F  Block  licenses  being  available  for  grant.  88 


 30.  Incumbent  Local  Exchange  Carriers  (Incumbent  LECs).  We  have  included  small  incumbent  local  exchange  carriers  in  this  present  IRFA  analysis.  As  noted  above,  a  small  business 
 under  the  RFA  is  one  that,  inter  alia,  meets  the  pertinent  small  business  size  standard  (e.  g.,  a  telephone  communications  business  having  1,500  or  fewer  employees),  and  is  not  dominant  in  its  field  of 
 operation.  89  The  SBAs  Office  of  Advocacy  contends  that,  for  RFA  purposes,  small  incumbent  LECs  are  not  dominant  in  their  field  of  operation  because  any  such  dominance  is  not  national  in  scope.  90  We 
 have  therefore  included  small  incumbent  local  exchange  carriers  in  this  RFA  analysis,  although  we  emphasize  that  this  RFA  action  has  no  effect  on  Commission  analyses  and  determinations  in  other,  non-RFA 
 contexts.  Neither  the  Commission  nor  the  SBA  has  developed  a  small  business  size  standard 


 82  See  Amendment  of  Parts  20  and  24  of  the  Commissions  Rules    Broadband  PCS  Competitive  Bidding  and  the 
 Commercial  Mobile  Radio  Service  Spectrum  Cap,  Report  and  Order,  11  FCC  Rcd  7824,  7850-  52,  paras.  57-  60  (1996)  (Broadband  PCS  Report  and  Order);  see  also  47  C.  F.  R.    24.  720(  b). 


 83  See  Broadband  PCS  Report  and  Order,  11  FCC  Rcd  at  7852,  para.  60. 
 84  See  Letter  to  Amy  Zoslov,  Chief,  Auctions  and  Industry  Analysis  Division,  Wireless  Telecommunications 
 Bureau,  Federal  Communications  Commission,  from  Aida  Alvarez,  Administrator,  Small  Business  Administration,  dated  December  2,  1998. 


 85  FCC  News,  Broadband  PCS,  D,  E  and  F  Block  Auction  Closes,  No.  71744  (rel.  Jan.  14,  1997). 
 86  See  C,  D,  E,  and  F  Block  Broadband  PCS  Auction  Closes,  Public  Notice,  14  FCC  Rcd  6688  (WTB  1999). 
 87  See  C  and  F  Block  Broadband  PCS  Auction  Closes;  Winning  Bidders  Announced,  Public  Notice,  16  FCC  Rcd 
 2339  (2001).  88 
 In  addition,  we  note  that,  as  a  general  matter,  the  number  of  winning  bidders  that  qualify  as  small  businesses  at  the  close  of  an  auction  does  not  necessarily  represent  the  number  of  small  businesses  currently  in  service.  Also,  the 


 Commission  does  not  generally  track  subsequent  business  size  unless,  in  the  context  of  assignments  or  transfers,  unjust  enrichment  issues  are  implicated. 
 89  15  U.  S.  C.    632. 
 90  Letter  from  Jere  W.  Glover,  Chief  Counsel  for  Advocacy,  SBA,  to  William  E.  Kennard,  Chairman,  FCC  (May  27, 
 1999).  The  Small  Business  Act  contains  a  definition  of  small-  business  concern,  which  the  RFA  incorporates  into  its  own  definition  of  small  business.  See  15  U.  S.  C.    632(  a)  (Small  Business  Act);  5  U.  S.  C.    601(  3)  (RFA). 


 SBA  regulations  interpret  small  business  concern  to  include  the  concept  of  dominance  on  a  national  basis.  See  13  C.  F.  R.    121.102(  b). 
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 specifically  for  incumbent  local  exchange  services.  The  appropriate  size  standard  under  SBA  rules  is  for  the  category  Wired  Telecommunications  Carriers.  Under  that  size  standard,  such  a  business  is  small  if  it 
 has  1,500  or  fewer  employees.  91  According  to  Commission  data,  92  1,303  carriers  have  reported  that  they  are  engaged  in  the  provision  of  incumbent  local  exchange  services.  Of  these  1,303  carriers,  an  estimated 
 1,020  have  1,500  or  fewer  employees  and  283  have  more  than  1,500  employees.  Consequently,  the  Commission  estimates  that  most  providers  of  incumbent  local  exchange  service  are  small  businesses  that 
 may  be  affected  by  our  proposed  rules. 
 31.  Competitive  Local  Exchange  Carriers  (Competitive  LECs),  Competitive  Access  Providers  (CAPs),  Shared-  Tenant  Service  Providers,  and  Other  Local  Service  Providers.  Neither  the 


 Commission  nor  the  SBA  has  developed  a  small  business  size  standard  specifically  for  these  service  providers.  The  appropriate  size  standard  under  SBA  rules  is  for  the  category  Wired  Telecommunications 
 Carriers.  Under  that  size  standard,  such  a  business  is  small  if  it  has  1,500  or  fewer  employees.  93  According  to  Commission  data,  94  769  carriers  have  reported  that  they  are  engaged  in  the  provision  of 
 either  competitive  access  provider  services  or  competitive  local  exchange  carrier  services.  Of  these  769  carriers,  an  estimated  676  have  1,500  or  fewer  employees  and  93  have  more  than  1,500  employees.  In 
 addition,  12  carriers  have  reported  that  they  are  Shared-  Tenant  Service  Providers,  and  all  12  are  estimated  to  have  1.500  or  fewer  employees.  In  addition,  39  carriers  have  reported  that  they  are  Other 
 Local  Service  Providers.  Of  the  39,  an  estimated  38  have  1,500  or  fewer  employees  and  one  has  more  than  1,500  employees.  Consequently,  the  Commission  estimates  that  most  providers  of  competitive  local 
 exchange  service,  competitive  access  providers,  Shared-  Tenant  Service  Providers,  and  Other  Local  Service  Providers  are  small  entities  that  may  be  affected  by  our  proposed  rules. 


 32.  Satellite  Telecommunications  and  Other  Telecommunications.  There  is  no  small  business  size  standard  developed  specifically  for  providers  of  satellite  service.  The  appropriate  size  standards 
 under  SBA  rules  are  for  the  two  broad  census  categories  of  Satellite  Telecommunications  and  Other  Telecommunications.  Under  both  categories,  such  a  business  is  small  if  it  has  $13.5  million  or  less  in 
 average  annual  receipts.  95 
 33.  The  first  category  of  Satellite  Telecommunications  comprises  establishments  primarily  engaged  in  providing  point-  to-  point  telecommunications  services  to  other  establishments  in  the 
 telecommunications  and  broadcasting  industries  by  forwarding  and  receiving  communications  signals  via  a  system  of  satellites  or  reselling  satellite  telecommunications.  96  For  this  category,  Census  Bureau  data 
 for  2002  show  that  there  were  a  total  of  371  firms  that  operated  for  the  entire  year.  97  Of  this  total,  307  firms  had  annual  receipts  of  under  $10  million,  and  26  firms  had  receipts  of  $10  million  to  $24,999,999.  98 
 Consequently,  we  estimate  that  the  majority  of  Satellite  Telecommunications  firms  are  small  entities  that  might  be  affected  by  our  action. 


 91  13  C.  F.  R.    121.  201,  NAICS  code  517110. 
 92  Trends  in  Telephone  Service,  Table  5.3. 
 93  13  C.  F.  R.    121.  201,  NAICS  code  517110. 
 94  Trends  in  Telephone  Service,  Table  5.3. 
 95  13  C.  F.  R.    121.201  ,  NAICS  codes  517410  and  517910. 
 96  U.  S.  Census  Bureau,  2002  NAICS  Definitions,  517410  Satellite  Telecommunications; 
 http://  www.  census.  gov/  epcd/  naics02/  def/  NDEF517.  HTM.  97 
 U.  S.  Census  Bureau,  2002  Economic  Census,  Subject  Series:  Information,  Establishment  and  Firm  Size  (Including  Legal  Form  of  Organization),  Table  4,  NAICS  code  517410  (issued  Nov.  2005). 


 98  Id.  An  additional  38  firms  had  annual  receipts  of  $25  million  or  more. 
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 Federal  Communications  Commission  FCC  06-  83 
 21 
 D.  Description  of  Projected  Reporting,  Recordkeeping,  and  Other  Compliance  Requirements  for  Small  Entities 
 34.  This  Notice  contains  proposals  that  may  result  in  specific  reporting  or  recordkeeping  requirements.  The  Notice  seeks  comment  on  the  Independent  Panels  recommendation  that  the 
 Commission  coordinate  all  federal  outage  and  infrastructure  reporting  requirements  in  times  of  crisis.  Specifically,  the  Notice  seeks  comment  on  the  appropriate  content  of  emergency  outage  reports,  format, 
 frequency,  distribution  and  related  issues.  The  Notice  requests  suggestions  on  the  appropriate  content  of  emergency  outage  reports,  format,  frequency,  distribution  and  related  issues.  The  Notice  also  seeks 
 comment  on  the  Independent  Panels  recommendation  that  the  Commission  establish  a  Readiness  Checklist  for  the  communications  industry  that  would  include,  inter  alia,  developing  formal  business 
 continuity  plans.  The  Notice  requests  comment  on  the  appropriate  breadth  of  business  continuity  plans  as  well  as  whether  the  Commission  should  adopt  guidance  or  criteria  for  the  elements  that  would  comprise 
 the  Readiness  Checklist. 
 E.  Steps  Taken  to  Minimize  the  Significant  Economic  Impact  on  Small  Entities,  and  Significant  Alternatives  Considered 


 35.  The  RFA  requires  an  agency  to  describe  any  significant  alternatives  that  it  has  considered  in  developing  its  approach,  which  may  include  the  following  four  alternatives  (among  others):  (  1)  the 
 establishment  of  differing  compliance  or  reporting  requirements  or  timetables  that  take  into  account  the  resources  available  to  small  entities;  (2)  the  clarification,  consolidation,  or  simplification  of  compliance 
 and  reporting  requirements  under  the  rule  for  such  small  entities;  (3)  the  use  of  performance  rather  than  design  standards;  and  (4)  an  exemption  from  coverage  of  the  rule,  or  any  part  thereof,  for  such  small 
 entities.  99  We  invite  comment  on  whether  small  entities  should  be  subject  to  different  requirements  if  we  adopt  rules  to  promote  more  effective,  efficient  response  and  recovery  efforts,  and  whether  differentiating 
 such  requirements  based  on  the  size  of  the  entities  is  warranted.  For  example,  should  there  be  timing  differences  for  requirements  imposed  on  small  entities?  Should  small  entities  be  subject  to  different 
 continuity  of  operations  requirements?  . 
 F.  Federal  Rules  that  May  Duplicate,  Overlap,  or  Conflict  with  the  Proposed  Rules 
 36.  None. 


 99  5  U.  S.  C.    603(  c)(  1)    (c)(  4). 
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 APPENDIX  B 
 INDEPENDENT  PANEL  REVIEWING  THE  IMPACT  OF  HURRICANE  KATRINA  ON  COMMUNICATIONS  NETWORK 
 REPORT  AND  RECOMMENDATIONS  TO  THE  FEDERAL  COMMUNCIATIONS  COMMISSION 
22
 Independent  Panel  Reviewing  the  Impact  of  Hurricane  Katrina  on 
 Communications  Networks 


 Report  and  Recommendations  to  the  Federal  Communications  Commission 


 June  12,  2006 
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 Independent  Panel  Reviewing  the  Impact  of  Hurricane  Katrina  on  Communications  Networks  Report  and  Recommendations  to  the  Federal  Communications  Commission 
 TABLE  OF  CONTENTS  Page 
 EXECUTIVE  SUMMARY  .............................................................................................................  i 
 INTRODUCTION  ...........................................................................................................................  1 
 I.  Panel  Formation  and  Charge................................................................................................  1 
 II.  Process  and  Activities  of  the  Panel......................................................................................  2 


 PANEL  OBSERVATIONS  REGARDING  THE  IMPACT  OF  HURRICANE  KATRINA  ON  THE  COMMUNICATIONS  SECTOR  AND  THE  SUFFICIENCY  AND  EFFECTIVENESS  OF 
 THE  RECOVERY  EFFORT  ...........................................................................................................  5 
 I.  Network  Reliability  and  Resiliency  .....................................................................................  5 
 A.  Effect  of  Hurricane  Katrina  on  Various  Types  of  Communications  Networks.......  6 
 B.  Major  Problems  Identified  Following  Katrina.......................................................  13 
 II.  Recovery  Coordination  and  Procedures.............................................................................  15 
 A.  Access  to  the  Affected  Area  and  Key  Resources...................................................  15 
 B.  Coordination  Between  Industry  and  Government  .................................................  19 
 C.  Emergency  Communications  Services  and  Programs  ...........................................  21 
 III.  First  Responder  Communications......................................................................................  22 
 A.  Lack  of  Advanced  Planning  for  Massive  System  Failures  ....................................  23 
 B.  Lack  of  Interoperability  .........................................................................................  25 
 C.  PSAP  Rerouting.....................................................................................................  27 
 D.  Emergency  Medical  Communications...................................................................  27 
 IV.  Emergency  Communications  to  the  Public........................................................................  27 
 A.  Lack  of  Activation  .................................................................................................  28 
 B.  Limitations  on  Coverage........................................................................................  28 
 C.  Reaching  Persons  with  Disabilities  and  Non-  English  Speaking  Americans  .........  29 
 D.  Inconsistent  or  Incorrect  Emergency  Information  .................................................  30 


 RECOMMENDATIONS...............................................................................................................  31 
 CONCLUSION..............................................................................................................................  43 
 APPENDIX  A:  Members  of  the  Independent  Panel 
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 Independent  Panel  Reviewing  the  Impact  of  Hurricane  Katrina  on  Communications  Networks  Report  and  Recommendations  to  the  Federal  Communications  Commission 
 ii 
 the  recovery  effort.  However,  additional  coordination  of  personnel  and  assets  within  industry  and  among  government  agencies  could  have  substantially  facilitated  restoration  of 
 communications  networks. 
 With  respect  to  emergency  communications,  Hurricane  Katrina  significantly  hampered  the  functionality  of  these  typically  resilient  systems.  The  areas  in  and  around  New  Orleans  were 


 seriously  impacted,  due  to  heavier  storm  impact  and  the  levee  flooding.  As  a  result,  more  than  2,000  police,  fire  and  emergency  medical  service  personnel  were  forced  to  communicate  in 
 single  channel  mode,  radio-  to-  radio,  utilizing  only  three  mutual  aid  frequencies.  This  level  of  destruction  did  not  extend  to  inland  areas,  which  generally  did  not  lose  their  communications 
 capabilities  and  were  soon  operating  at  pre-  Katrina  capabilities.  In  the  hardest  hit  areas,  however,  the  disruption  of  public  safety  communications  operability,  as  well  as  a  lack  of 
 interoperability,  frustrated  the  response  effort  and  caused  tremendous  confusion  among  official  personnel  and  the  general  public. 


 The  Panel  observed  that  lack  of  effective  first  responder  communications  after  the  storm  revealed  inadequate  planning,  coordination  and  training  on  the  use  of  technologies  that  can  help 
 to  restore  emergency  communications.  Very  few  public  safety  agencies  had  stockpiles  of  key  equipment  on  hand  to  implement  rapid  repairs  or  alternative,  redundant  systems  to  turn  to  when 
 their  primary  systems  failed.  To  the  extent  alternative  systems  were  available,  lack  of  training  and  familiarity  with  the  equipment  limited  functionality  and  impeded  the  recovery  effort. 
 Communications  assets  that  could  have  been  used  to  fill  gaps  were  apparently  not  requested  or  deployed  in  sufficient  quantities  to  have  a  significant  impact.  Hurricane  Katrina  also  highlighted 
 the  long-  standing  problem  of  interoperability  among  public  safety  communications  systems  operating  in  different  frequency  bands  and  with  different  technical  standards.  Additionally,  911 
 emergency  call  handling  suffered  from  a  lack  of  preprogrammed  routing  of  calls  to  PSAPs  not  incapacitated  by  the  hurricane.  Finally,  the  emergency  medical  community  seemed  lacking  in 
 contingency  communications  planning  and  information  about  technologies  and  services  that  might  address  their  critical  communications  needs. 


 The  use  of  communications  networks  to  disseminate  reliable  emergency  information  to  the  public  is  critical    before,  during  and  after  such  events.  While  the  Panel  understands  that  the 
 National  Weather  Service  used  the  Emergency  Alert  System  (  EAS)  to  provide  severe  weather  warnings  to  citizens  in  the  Gulf  States  in  advance  of  Katrina  making  landfall,  the  system  was 
 apparently  not  utilized  by  state  and  local  officials  to  provide  localized  emergency  evacuation  and  other  important  information.  In  the  absence  of  EAS  activation,  inconsistent  or  erroneous 
 information  was  sometimes  provided  within  the  affected  area.  Further,  the  Panel  heard  about  notification  technologies  that  may  permit  emergency  messages  to  be  sent  to  wireline  and 
 wireless  telephones  as  well  as  personal  digital  assistants  and  other  mobile  devices,  thus  complementing  the  traditional  broadcast-  based  EAS.  Ensuring  emergency  communications 
 reach  Americans  with  hearing  or  visual  disabilities  or  who  do  not  speak  English  was  a  major  challenge.  Although  the  broadcast  industry  has  taken  significant  steps  to  provide  on-  screen  sign 
 language  interpreters,  closed  captioning,  and  critical  information  in  a  second  language,  these  steps  were  reported  to  be  insufficient  in  certain  instances.  Shelters  also  generally  did  not  have 
 communications  capabilities  for  those  with  hearing  or  speech  disabilities. 
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 Independent  Panel  Reviewing  the  Impact  of  Hurricane  Katrina  on  Communications  Networks  Report  and  Recommendations  to  the  Federal  Communications  Commission 
 INTRODUCTION 
 The  Independent  Panel  Reviewing  the  Impact  of  Hurricane  Katrina  on  Communications  Networks  (  Katrina  Panel  or  Panel)  hereby  submits  its  report  to  the  Federal  Communications 
 Commission  (  Commission  or  FCC).  The  Panel  is  charged  with  studying  the  impact  of  Hurricane  Katrina  on  the  telecommunications  and  media  infrastructure  1  in  the  areas  affected  by 
 the  hurricane.  As  directed  by  the  Commission,  this  report  presents  the  Panels  findings  as  well  as  recommendations  for  improving  disaster  preparedness,  network  reliability  and 
 communications  among  first  responders. 


 I.  Panel  Formation  and  Charge 
 On  September  15,  2005,  FCC  Chairman  Kevin  J.  Martin  announced  that  he  would  establish  an  independent  expert  panel  to  review  the  impact  of  Hurricane  Katrina  on  the  communications 


 infrastructure.  2  Chairman  Martin  made  the  announcement  at  the  FCCs  Open  Meeting  focusing  on  the  effects  of  Hurricane  Katrina,  which  was  held  in  Atlanta,  Georgia.  He  stated  that  the  Panel 
 would  be  composed  of  public  safety  and  communications  industry  representatives.  3  The  twenty-seven  members  of  the  Panel,  reflecting  that  diverse  composition,  are  identified  in  Appendix  A. 
 Chairman  Martin  appointed  Nancy  J.  Victory  of  Wiley  Rein  &  Fielding  LLP,  the  former  Assistant  Secretary  of  Commerce  for  Communications  and  Information  and  Administrator  of  the 
 National  Telecommunications  and  Information  Administration,  to  chair  the  Panel.  4 
 In  accordance  with  the  requirements  of  the  Federal  Advisory  Committee  Act,  the  FCC  published  a  notice  announcing  the  establishment  of  the  Katrina  Panel  in  the  Federal  Register  on  January  6, 


 2006.  5  The  Panels  charter  details  the  Katrina  Panels  objectives  and  the  scope  of  its  activity.  6  Specifically,  the  Charter  directs  the  Panel: 


 1  Throughout  this  report,  the  terms  communications  infrastructure  and  communications  networks  are 
 intended  to  refer  to  both  telecommunications  (e.  g.,  telephony,  wireless,  satellite,  WISP)  and  media  (e.  g.,  radio,  television,  cable)  infrastructure.  Communications  providers  is  intended  to  refer  to  the  operators  of  these  networks. 


 2  Statement  of  Kevin  J.  Martin,  Chairman,  Federal  Communications  Commission,  Open  Meeting  on  the 
 Effects  of  Hurricane  Katrina,  Atlanta,  GA,  at  3  (Sept.  15,  2005),  available  at  http://  hraunfoss.  fcc.  gov/  edocs_  public/  attachmatch/  DOC-  261095A1.  pdf  [hereinafter  Martin  Sept.  15  Statement]; 


 see  also  FCC  Takes  Steps  to  Assist  in  Hurricane  Katrina  Disaster  Relief,  2005  FCC  LEXIS  5109  (rel.  Sept.  15,  2005)  (Commission  news  release). 
 3  Martin  Sept.  15  Statement  at  3. 
 4  Chairman  Kevin  J.  Martin  Names  Nancy  J.  Victory  as  Chair  of  the  Federal  Communication  Commission's 
 Independent  Panel  Reviewing  the  Impact  of  Hurricane  Katrina  on  Communications  Networks,  2005  FCC  LEXIS  6514  (rel.  Nov.  28,  2005)  (Commission  news  release). 


 5  See  Federal  Communications  Commission,  Federal  Advisory  Committee  Act,  Notice,  71  Fed.  Reg.  933 
 (Jan.  6,  2006),  available  at  http://  www.  fcc.  gov/  eb/  hkip/  hkipnoe.  pdf.  Access  to  the  public  comments  filed  with  and  notices  generated  by  the  Katrina  Panel  (unless  otherwise  noted  with  a  URL  designation  in  the  citations  which 


 follow)  is  through  the  Panels  website,  available  at  http://  www.  fcc.  gov/  eb/  hkip/. 
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 4 
 systems;  (4)  reviewing  the  impact  of  the  hurricane  on  PSAPs  and  the  procedures  used  to  re-  route  emergency  calls;  (5)  examining  whether  and  how  the  communications  networks 
 could  have  provided  greater  911  connectivity  for  private  citizens;  and  (6)  reviewing  the  adequacy  of  emergency  communications  to  the  public  before,  during  and  after  the 
 hurricane,  and  the  best  ways  to  alert  and  inform  the  public  about  emergencies  in  the  future.  Steve  Delahousey,  Vice  President  -  Operations,  American  Medical  Response, 
 served  as  the  Chair  of  this  working  group  and  Jim  Jacot,  Vice  President,  Cingular  Network  Group,  served  as  Vice-  Chair. 


 Typically,  discussion  about  various  findings  and  recommendations  occurred  first  within  the  working  groups.  The  working  groups  then  presented  draft  findings  and  recommendations  to  the 
 full  Panel  for  further  discussion.  Certain  issues  were  referred  back  to  the  working  groups  for  additional  discussion  and  revision. 


 The  Panel  held  its  final  meeting  on  June  9,  2006.  During  this  meeting,  the  Panel  discussed  the  final  draft  report,  including  recommendations  to  the  Commission.  The  Panel  then  unanimously 
 approved  this  report  for  submission  to  the  Commission.  11 


 11  The  Panel  would  like  to  recognize  and  express  appreciation  to  Lisa  Fowlkes  and  Jean  Ann  Collins,  the 
 Designated  and  Alternate  Designated  FACA  Officers  for  the  Panel,  for  their  important  contributions  in  enabling  the  Panel  to  carry  out  its  mission  under  the  Charter.  In  addition,  the  Panel  would  like  to  thank  Michael  A.  Lewis, 


 Thomas  Dombrowsky,  and  Brendan  T.  Carr  of  Wiley  Rein  &  Fielding  LLP  for  their  considerable  assistance  in  preparing  this  report. 
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 5 
 PANEL  OBSERVATIONS  REGARDING  THE  IMPACT  OF  HURRICANE  KATRINA  ON  THE  COMMUNICATIONS  SECTOR  AND  THE  SUFFICIENCY 
 AND  EFFECTIVENESS  OF  THE  RECOVERY  EFFORT 
 The  Katrina  Panel  has  been  charged  with  studying  the  impact  of  Hurricane  Katrina  on  all  sectors  of  the  telecommunications  and  media  industries,  including  public  safety  communications.  The 
 Panel  has  also  been  directed  to  review  the  effectiveness  of  the  recovery  effort  with  respect  to  this  infrastructure.  To  inform  its  views  on  these  issues,  the  Panel  heard  oral  presentations  and 
 reviewed  written  comments  from  numerous  government  and  industry  representatives,  as  well  as  other  interested  members  of  the  public.  The  Panel  members  also  brought  to  bear  their  own 
 experiences  with  Hurricane  Katrina  and  its  aftermath.  As  a  result  of  digesting  and  discussing  all  of  this  information,  the  Panel  members  identified  a  number  of  areas  where  problems  were 
 observed  or  communications  recovery  and  restoration  efforts  could  have  been  more  effective.  The  Panel  also  identified  areas  where  successes  were  achieved    successes  that  should  be 
 repeated.  These  observed  problems  and  successes,  which  are  detailed  below,  generally  formed  the  basis  for  the  Panels  recommendations  to  the  Commission. 


 The  Panels  observations  below  are  divided  into  four  sections.  Section  I,  Network  Reliability  and  Resiliency,  discusses  the  successes  and  failures  in  the  resiliency  and  reliability  of  various 
 types  of  communications  networks  from  an  operational  perspective.  This  section  looks  at  the  effects  of  both  the  hurricane  itself  and  the  subsequent  levee  breaches  on  communications 
 infrastructure.  Section  II,  Recovery  Coordination  and  Procedures,  reviews  the  challenges  communications  infrastructure  providers  encountered  in  restoring  and  maintaining 
 communications  service,  particularly  with  regard  to  access  and  credentialing  issues,  restoration  of  power,  and  security.  Section  III,  First  Responder  Communications,  examines  the  challenges 
 posed  to  public  safety  and  emergency  first  responders  in  the  days  following  Hurricane  Katrina.  And  finally  Section  IV,  Emergency  Communication  to  the  Public,  focuses  on  the  adequacy  and 
 effectiveness  of  emergency  communications  to  the  public  before,  during  and  after  Hurricane  Katrina. 


 I.  Network  Reliability  and  Resiliency 
 The  sheer  force  of  Hurricane  Katrina  and  the  extensive  flooding  resulting  from  the  breached  levees  severely  tested  the  reliability  and  resiliency  of  communications  networks  in  the  Gulf 


 Coast  region.  Katrina  also  affected  areas  of  the  Gulf  Coast  in  varied  fashions.  In  the  high  impact  zones  near  Gulfport,  MS  and  New  Orleans,  LA,  the  hurricane  created  much  heavier 
 damage  to  the  infrastructure  due  to  strong  winds  and,  in  New  Orleans,  extensive  flooding  in  the  days  after  the  storm.  In  less  impacted  areas,  damage  was  less  severe  and  recovery  efforts  were 
 more  easily  accomplished.  Katrina  taxed  each  type  of  communications  infrastructure  in  a  variety  of  ways:  (1)  strong  winds  and  rain  made  it  difficult  for  technical  staff  to  support  and  maintain 
 the  networks  and  blew  antennas  out  of  alignment;  (2)  heavy  flooding  following  Katrina  overwhelmed  a  large  portion  of  the  communications  infrastructure,  damaging  equipment  and 
 impeding  recovery;  (3)  single  points  of  failure  in  vital  communications  links  led  to  widespread  communications  outages  across  a  variety  of  networks;  and  (4)  the  duration  of  power  outages  far 
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 6 
 outlasted  most  generator  fuel  reserves,  leading  to  the  failure  of  otherwise  functional  infrastructure.  However,  there  were  resiliency  successes  in  the  aftermath:  (1)  a  large  portion  of 
 the  communications  infrastructure  withstood  the  storms  wind  and  rain  with  only  minor  damage  (as  distinguished  from  post-  storm  flooding  from  levee  breaches  and  power  outages,  which  had  a 
 more  devastating  impact);  (2)  satellite  networks,  although  taxed  by  extensive  numbers  of  additional  users,  remained  available  and  usable  throughout  the  affected  region;  and  (3)  the 
 communications  networks  operated  by  utilities  appeared  to  have  a  very  high  rate  of  survivability.  By  examining  the  failures  in  network  resiliency  and  reliability,  along  with  the  successes,  we  can 
 better  prepare  communications  infrastructure  to  withstand  or  quickly  recover  from  future  catastrophic  events. 


 A.  Effect  of  Hurricane  Katrina  on  Various  Types  of  Communications  Networks. 
 Hurricane  Katrina  and  its  aftermath  had  a  devastating  impact  on  communications  networks  in  the  Gulf  Coast  region.  In  the  affected  areas  of  Louisiana,  Mississippi  and  Alabama,  more  than  three 


 million  customer  telephone  lines  were  knocked  out  of  service.  Both  switching  centers  and  customer  lines  sustained  damage.  Thirty-  eight  911  call  centers  went  down.  Approximately  100 
 broadcast  stations  were  unable  to  transmit  and  hundreds  of  thousands  of  cable  customers  lost  service.  12  Even  generally  resilient  public  safety  networks  experienced  massive  outages.  In  short, 
 Katrina  had  a  catastrophic  impact  over  a  huge  geographic  area.  Further,  due  to  the  unique  circumstances  associated  with  this  disaster,  repair  and  activation  of  the  communications 
 infrastructure  in  the  region  was  not  a  matter  of  days,  but  rather  a  long  and  slow  process. 
 To  understand  the  precise  impact  that  Hurricane  Katrina  had  on  communications  networks,  it  is  useful  to  distinguish  between  the  impact  of  the  storm  itself  (i.  e.,  hurricane  force  winds  and  rain) 


 and  the  effect  of  what  came  later    extensive  flooding  from  breached  levees  and  widespread,  long  term  power  outages.  As  detailed  below,  it  appears  that  most  communications  infrastructure 
 in  the  areas  impacted  by  Katrina  fared  fairly  well  through  the  storms  wind  and  rain,  in  most  cases  sustaining  only  minor  damage  or  damage  that  should  have  been  promptly  repairable. 
 Indeed,  the  tower  industry  reported  that  of  all  the  towers  in  the  path  of  the  2005  hurricanes  in  the  Southeastern  and  Gulf  Coast  areas  of  the  United  States,  less  than  1  percent  suffered  any 
 structural  damage.  13  The  coastal  areas  that  bore  the  brunt  of  the  storm  suffered  the  worst  infrastructure  damage  from  the  hurricane.  Not  to  diminish  the  significant  impact  of  the  hurricane 
 itself,  what  made  Katrina  unique  and  particularly  catastrophic  were  the  unique  conditions  after  the  winds  subsided    substantial  flooding  and  widespread,  extended  power  outages.  These 
 developments  impacted  communications  networks  greatly,  causing  irreparable  damage  to  submerged  electronics  and  prolonged  outages  in  many  cases.  The  Panels  observations  on  how 
 each  type  of  communications  infrastructure  withstood  Katrina  and  its  challenging  aftermath  is  presented  below. 


 12  See  Written  Statement  of  Kevin  J.  Martin,  Chairman,  Federal  Communications  Commission,  Hearing  on 
 Public  Safety  Communications  from  9/  11  to  Katrina:  Critical  Public  Policy  Lessons,  Before  the  Subcommittee  on  Telecommunications  and  the  Internet,  Committee  on  Energy  and  Commerce,  United  States  House  of 


 Representatives,  at  2  (Sept.  29,  2005),  available  at  http://  hraunfoss.  fcc.  gov/  edocs_  public/  attachmatch/  DOC-261417A1.  pdf  [hereinafter  Martin  Sept.  29  Written  Statement]. 
 13  See  Comments  of  PCIA    The  Wireless  Infrastructure  Association,  at  1  (May  15,  2006). 
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 1.  Public  Safety  Communications  Networks.  Public  safety  communications  networks  are  generally  built  to  be  reliable  in  extreme  conditions.  14  To  ensure  this,  the  systems 
 are  planned  to  accommodate  everyday  peak  service  times  as  well  as  large  incidents.  They  are  also  designed  to  account  for  radio  system  disruptions,  such  as  power  outages,  transmission 
 failures,  system  interconnect  failures,  and  personal  radio  equipment  failures.  However,  these  systems  are  generally  not  designed  for  widespread  catastrophes  of  long  duration    the  situation 
 resulting  from  Katrina.  15  As  a  result  of  the  storm  and  its  aftermath,  public  safety  networks  in  the  Gulf  states  experienced  a  large  number  of  transmission  outages  that  impacted  the  functionality  of 
 both  primary  and  back-  up  systems.  The  loss  of  power  and  the  failure  of  switches  in  the  wireline  telephone  network  also  had  a  huge  impact  on  the  ability  of  public  safety  systems  to  function.  16 
 Public  safety  personnels  apparent  lack  of  familiarity  with  the  operation  of  back-  up  or  alternate  systems  (such  as  satellite  systems)  also  limited  functionality. 


 a.  Tower  Failures.  In  general,  public  safetys  antenna  towers  remained  standing  after  the  storm.  The  winds  did  blow  antennas  out  of  alignment,  requiring 
 readjustment.  However,  the  main  cause  of  transmission  failures  was  loss  of  power  (as  discussed  below).  Most  public  safety  radio  systems  by  design  are  able  to  handle  and  manage  a  single  or 
 isolated  subsystem  failure  or  loss.  17  However,  Katrina  affected  parts  of  four  states,  causing  transmission  losses  at  a  much  greater  number  and  over  a  larger  area  than  public  safety  planning 
 had  envisioned. 
 b.  Power  Failures.  Power  for  radio  base  stations  and  battery/  chargers  for  portable  radio  devices  are  carefully  planned  for  public  safety  systems.  However,  generators 


 are  typically  designed  to  keep  base  stations  operating  for  24  to  48  hours.  The  long  duration  of  power  outages  in  the  wake  of  Katrina  substantially  exceeded  the  capabilities  of  most  of  public 
 safetys  back-  up  generators  and  fuel  reserves.  18  Similarly,  portable  radios  and  back-  up  batteries  generally  have  an  8  to  10  hour  duty  cycle.  19  Without  access  to  power  to  recharge  the  devices  and 
 backup  batteries,  portable  devices  quickly  ran  out  of  power. 
 c.  Wireline  and  Network  Infrastructure  Failures.  Katrina  and  the  subsequent  levee  breaches  caused  significant  failures  of  the  Public  Switched  Telephone  Network 


 (  PSTN),  particularly  in  the  New  Orleans  area.  20  Public  safety  radio  networks  rely  on  interconnection  with  the  PSTN  or  by  fixed  microwave  links  to  get  communications  through  to 


 14  See,  e.  g.,  Written  Statement  of  Chief  Harlin  R.  McEwen,  Chairman,  Communications  and  Technology 
 Committee,  International  Association  of  Chiefs  of  Police,  at  2  (Mar.  6,  2006)  [hereinafter  McEwen  Mar.  6  Written  Statement]. 


 15  Id.  at  4. 
 16  See  id.  at  6. 
 17  See  id.  at  5. 
 18  See  id. 
 19  Id.  at  6. 
 20  Id. 
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 public  safety  responders.  Given  PSTN  failures,  as  well  as  damage  to  fixed  microwave  links,  public  safety  communications  were  significantly  affected. 
 d.  Training  Issues.  Because  of  failures  of  the  primary  public  safety  networks,  public  safety  personnel  had  to  utilize  back-  up  or  alternative  communications 
 technologies  with  which  they  may  not  have  had  substantial  experience.  Confusion  or  unfamiliarity  with  the  capabilities  or  operational  requirements  of  the  alternative  technology 
 seemed  to  result  in  limitations  in  functionality.  21  For  example,  some  public  safety  personnel  handed  satellite  phones  were  not  familiar  with  their  special  dialing  requirements  and,  as  a  result, 
 thought  the  phones  did  not  work.  22  Public  safety  personnel  did  not  seem  to  have  adequate  training  on  alternative  communications  technologies,  such  as  paging,  satellite,  license-  exempt 
 WISP  systems,  and  thus  were  not  able  to  transition  seamlessly  to  these  alternatives  when  existing  public  safety  communications  networks  failed.  Additionally,  because  alternative  technologies 
 were  used  so  infrequently,  there  were  reported  problems  with  upkeep  and  maintenance  of  the  equipment.  23 


 2.  Public  Safety  Answering  Points  (PSAPs).  Handling  of  911  calls  was  identified  as  a  problem  during  Katrina.  As  a  result  of  the  storm  and  subsequent  flooding,  thirty-eight 
 911  call  centers  ceased  to  function.  24  Limited  training  and  advanced  planning  on  how  to  handle  rerouting  of  emergency  calls  under  this  situation  created  serious  problems.  25  As  an 
 example,  the  City  of  Biloxi  was  able  to  relocate  their  911  call  center  prior  to  landfall;  however,  representatives  relocated  to  the  facility  did  not  have  full  911  capabilities.  This  severely 
 hampered  their  ability  to  effectively  route  911  calls  to  the  appropriate  agencies.  The  Katrina  experience  identified  that  there  appeared  to  be  a  lack  of  911  PSAP  failovers  and  some  deficits  in 
 training  on  routing  and  handling  of  calls  when  a  crisis  and  rerouting  occurs.  Nevertheless,  the  vast  majority  of  911  call  centers,  especially  in  the  less  impacted  portions  of  the  region,  were  up 
 and  running  by  September  9.  26 
 3.  Wireline.  According  to  FCC  data,  more  than  3  million  customer  phone  lines  were  knocked  out  in  the  Louisiana,  Mississippi  and  Alabama  area  following  Hurricane 


 Katrina.  27  The  wireline  telephone  network  sustained  significant  damage  both  to  the  switching 


 21  See,  e.  g.,  Oral  Testimony  of  Dr.  Sandy  Bogucki,  U.  S.  Department  of  Health  and  Human  Services,  Tr.  at  54-55 
 (Mar.  6,  2006)  [hereinafter  Bogucki  Mar.  6  Oral  Testimony].  22 
 Written  Testimony  of  David  Cavossa,  Executive  Director,  Satellite  Industry  Association,  Before  the  FCCs  Independent  Panel  Reviewing  the  Impact  of  Hurricane  Katrina,  at  4-  5  (Mar.  3,  2006)  [hereinafter  Cavossa-  SIA 


 Written  Testimony];  Bogucki  Mar.  6  Oral  Testimony,  Tr.  at  55.  23 
 See  Bogucki  Mar.  6  Oral  Testimony,  Tr.  at  55.  24 
 See  Martin  Sept.  29  Written  Statement  at  2.  25 
 See,  e.  g.,  Comments  of  Comcare  at  2  (May  11,  2006)  (there  was  no  plan  to  bring  in  additional  telecommunicators  to  the  region  to  keep  up  with  the  influx  of  911calls  from  victims  and  rescue  response  teams). 


 26  See  Martin  Sept.  29  Written  Statement  at  27. 
 27  See  Written  Statement  of  Kenneth  P.  Moran,  Director,  Office  of  Homeland  Security,  Enforcement  Bureau, 
 FCC,  on  Hurricane  Katrina,  Before  the  Committee  on  Energy  and  Commerce,  United  States  House  of 
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 centers  that  route  calls  and  to  the  lines  used  to  connect  buildings  and  customers  to  the  network.  28  Katrina  highlighted  the  dependence  on  tandems  and  tandem  access  to  SS7  switches.  29  The  high 
 volume  routes  from  tandem  switches,  especially  in  and  around  New  Orleans  were  especially  critical  and  vulnerable.  Katrina  highlighted  the  need  for  diversity  of  call  routing  and  avoiding 
 strict  reliance  upon  a  single  routing  solution.  One  tandem  switch,  which  was  critical  for  911  call  routing,  was  lost  from  September  4  to  September  21.  This  switch  went  down  due  to  flooding 
 that  did  not  allow  for  fuel  to  be  replenished.  Due  to  the  high  winds  and  severe  flooding,  there  were  multiple  breaks  in  the  fiber  network  supporting  the  PSTN.  Katrina  demonstrated  that  in 
 many  areas  there  may  be  a  lack  of  multiple  fiber  routes  throughout  the  wireline  network  and  that  aerial  fiber  was  more  at  risk  than  underground  fiber.  As  with  other  private  sector 
 communications  providers,  lack  of  access  to  facilities  (due  to  both  flooding  and  inadequate  credentialing),  lack  of  commercial  power,  and  lack  of  security  greatly  hampered  recovery  efforts. 
 Nevertheless,  ten  days  after  Katrina,  nearly  90  percent  of  wireline  customers  in  the  Gulf  region  who  had  lost  service  had  their  service  restored.  30  However,  the  vast  majority  of  these  customers 
 were  in  the  less  impacted  regions  of  the  Gulf;  regions  that  were  harder  hit  sustained  more  infrastructure  damage  and  continued  to  have  difficulty  in  restoring  service. 


 4.  Cellular/  PCS.  Local  cellular  and  personal  communications  service  (  PCS)  networks  received  considerable  damage  with  more  than  1000  base  station  sites 
 impacted.  31  In  general,  cellular/  PCS  base  stations  were  not  destroyed  by  Katrina,  although  some  antennas  required  adjustment  after  the  storm.  Rather,  the  majority  of  the  adverse  effects  and 
 outages  encountered  by  wireless  providers  were  due  to  a  lack  of  commercial  power  or  a  lack  of  transport  connectivity  to  the  wireless  switch  (wireline  T1  line  lost  or  fixed  microwave  backhaul 
 offline).  The  transport  connectivity  is  generally  provided  by  the  local  exchange  carrier.  With  either  failure,  wireless  providers  would  be  required  to  make  a  site  visit  to  return  the  base  station 
 to  operational  status.  Wireless  providers  cited  security  for  their  personnel,  access  and  fuel  as  the  most  pressing  needs  and  problems  affecting  restoration  of  wireless  service.  However,  within  one 
 week  after  Katrina,  approximately  80  percent  of  wireless  cell  sites  were  up  and  running.  32  Consistent  with  other  systems,  the  20  percent  of  base  stations  still  affected  were  in  the  areas  most 
 impacted  by  Katrina.  Cellular  base  stations  on  wheels  (  COWs)  were  successfully  used  as  needed  to  restore  service  throughout  the  affected  region.  Over  100  COWs  were  delivered  to  the 
 Gulf  Coast  region.  33  In  addition  to  voice  services,  text  messaging  was  used  successfully  during 


 Representatives,  at  2  (Sept.  7,  2005),  available  at  http://  hraunfoss.  fcc.  gov/  edocs_  public/  attachmatch/  DOC-260895A1.  pdf  [hereinafter  Moran  Sept.  7  Written  Statement]. 
 28  Id.  at  2-  3. 
 29  See,  e.  g.,  Oral  Testimony  of  Woody  Glover,  Director,  St.  Tammany  Parish  Communications  District,  Tr.  at 
 64-  67  (Mar.  6,  2006)  [hereinafter  Woody  Glover  Mar.  6  Oral  Testimony].  30 
 Martin  Sept.  29  Written  Statement  at  43.  31 
 Moran  Sept.  7  Written  Statement  at  3.  32 
 Martin  Sept.  29  Written  Statement  at  44. 
 33  S.  Comm.  on  Homeland  Security  and  Govt  Affairs,  109th  Cong.,  Hurricane  Katrina:  A  Nation  Still 


 Unprepared  at  18-  4,  May  2006,  available  at  http://  hsgac.  senate.  gov/_  file  s/  Katrina/  FullReport.  pdf  [hereinafter  Senate  Report  on  Katrina]. 
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 the  crisis  and  appeared  to  offer  communications  when  the  voice  networks  became  overloaded  with  traffic.  Additionally,  wireless  providers  push-  to-  talk  services  appeared  to  be  more  resilient 
 than  interconnected  voice  service  inasmuch  as  they  do  not  necessarily  rely  upon  connectivity  to  the  PSTN.  34 


 5.  Paging.  Paging  systems  seemed  more  reliable  in  some  instances  than  voice/  cellular  systems  because  paging  systems  utilize  satellite  networks,  rather  than  terrestrial 
 systems,  for  backbone  infrastructure.  35  Paging  technology  is  also  inherently  redundant,  which  means  that  messages  may  still  be  relayed  if  a  single  transmitter  or  group  of  transmitters  in  a 
 network  fails.  36  Paging  signals  penetrate  buildings  very  well,  thus  providing  an  added  level  of  reliability.  37  Additionally,  pagers  benefited  from  having  a  long  battery  life  and  thus  remained 
 operating  longer  during  the  power  outages.  38  Other  positive  observations  concerning  paging  systems  included  that  they  were  effective  at  text  messaging  and  were  equipped  to  provide 
 broadcast  messaging.  39  Finally,  although  it  is  unclear  whether  this  function  was  utilized,  group  pages  can  be  sent  out  during  times  of  emergencies  to  alert  thousands  of  pager  units  all  at  the 
 same  time.  40 
 6.  Satellite.  Satellite  networks  appeared  to  be  the  communications  service  least  disrupted  by  Hurricane  Katrina.  41  As  these  networks  do  not  heavily  depend  upon 


 terrestrial-  based  infrastructure,  they  are  typically  not  affected  by  wind,  rain,  flooding  or  power  outages.  42  As  a  result,  both  fixed  and  mobile  satellite  systems  provided  a  functional,  alternative 


 34  See  Written  Testimony  of  Dave  Flessas,  VP,  Network  Operations,  Sprint  Nextel  Corp,  Before  the  FCCs 
 Independent  Panel  Reviewing  the  Impact  of  Hurricane  Katrina,  at  3  (Jan.  30,  2006)  [hereinafter  Sprint  Nextel  Jan.  30  Written  Testimony]. 


 35  See,  e.  g.,  Written  Testimony  of  Vincent  D.  Kelly,  President  and  Chief  Executive  Officer,  USA  Mobility, 
 Before  the  FCCs  Independent  Panel  Reviewing  the  Impact  of  Hurricane  Katrina  at  7  (Mar.  6,  2006)  [hereinafter  Vincent  Kelly-  USA  Mobility  Mar.  6  Written  Testimony];  Oral  Testimony  of  Bruce  Deer,  President,  American 


 Association  of  Paging  Carriers,  Tr.  at  122-  123  (Mar.  6,  2006)  [hereinafter  Deer  Mar.  6  Oral  Testimony].  36 
 See,  e.  g.,  Vincent  Kelly-  USA  Mobility  Mar.  6  Written  Testimony  at  7-  8.  37 
 Deer  Mar.  6  Oral  Testimony,  Tr.  at  123.  38 
 Id.  39 
 See,  e.  g.,  Vincent  Kelly-  USA  Mobility  Mar.  6  Written  Testimony  at  3.  40 
 See,  e.  g.,  Comments  of  Interstate  Wireless,  Inc.,  at  1  (May  10,  2006).  41 
 See,  e.  g.,  Comments  of  Globalstar  LLC,  at  1  (Jan.  27,  2006)  [hereinafter  Globalstar  Comments].  42 
 See,  e.  g.,  Senate  Report  on  Katrina  at  18-  9  (  satellite  phones  do  not  rely  on  terrestrial  .  .  .  infrastructure  that  is  necessary  for  land  mobile  radio,  land-  line,  and  cellular  communications);  Written  Statement  of  Tony  Trujillo, 


 Chairman,  Satellite  Industry  Association,  Hearing  on  Public  Safety  Communications  From  9/  11  to  Katrina:  Critical  Public  Policy  Lessons,  Before  the  Subcommittee  on  Telecommunications  and  the  Internet,  Committee  on  Energy 
 and  Commerce,  United  States  House  of  Representatives,  at  3  (Sept.  29,  2005),  available  at  http://  energycommerce.  house.  gov/  108/  09292005Hearing1648/  Trujillo.  pdf  [hereinafter  Trujillo  Sept.  29  Written 
 Statement]. 
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 communications  path  for  those  in  the  storm-  ravaged  region.  43  Mobile  satellite  operators  reported  large  increases  in  satellite  traffic  without  any  particular  network/  infrastructure  issues.  44  More 
 than  20,000  satellite  phones  were  deployed  to  the  Gulf  Coast  region  in  the  days  following  Katrina.  45  Broadband  capacity  was  provided  by  fixed  satellite  operators  for  voice,  video  and 
 data  network  applications.  Nevertheless,  there  were  functionality  issues  with  satellite  communications    largely  due  to  lack  of  user  training  and  equipment  preparation.  46  Some 
 satellite  phones  require  specialized  dialing  in  order  to  place  a  call.  They  also  require  line  of  sight  with  the  satellite  and  thus  do  not  generally  work  indoors.  47  Users  who  had  not  been  trained  or 
 used  a  satellite  phone  prior  to  Katrina  reported  frustration  and  difficulty  in  rapid  and  effective  use  of  these  devices.  48  Satellite  phones  also  require  charged  batteries.  Handsets  that  were  not 
 charged  and  ready  to  go  were  of  no  use  as  there  was  often  no  power  to  recharge  handsets.  Additionally,  most  of  Louisianas  parishes  (all  but  three)  did  not  have  satellite  phones  on  hand 
 because  they  had  previously  chosen  to  discontinue  their  service  as  a  cost-  saving  measure.  49  Finally,  users  expressed  the  observation  that  satellite  data  networks  (replacing  wireline  T1 
 service)  were  more  robust  and  had  fewer  difficulties  in  obtaining  and  maintaining  communications  with  the  satellite  network  than  voice  services. 


 7.  Broadcasting.  The  television  and  radio  broadcasting  industry  was  also  hard  hit  by  Katrina.  Approximately  28  percent  of  television  stations  experienced  downtime  in 
 the  storm  zone;  approximately  35  percent  of  radio  stations  failed  in  one  fashion  or  another.  50  In 


 43  See,  e.  g.,  Written  Statement  of  Colonel  Jeff  Smith,  Deputy  Director,  Louisiana  Office  of  Homeland 
 Security  and  Emergency  Preparedness,  Hurricane  Katrina:  Preparedness  and  Response  by  the  State  of  Louisiana,  Before  the  Select  Bipartisan  Committee  to  Investigate  the  Preparation  for  and  Response  to  Hurricane  Katrina, 


 United  States  House  of  Representatives,  at  12  (Dec.  14,  2005),  available  at  http://  katrina.  house.  gov/  hearing/  12-  14-05/  smith_  121405.  doc  [hereinafter  Jeff  Smith  Written  Statement];  Written  Statement  of  Bruce  Baughman, 
 Director,  Alabama  State  Emergency  Management  Agency,  Hurricane  Katrina:  Preparedness  and  Response  by  the  State  of  Alabama,  Before  the  Select  Bipartisan  Committee  to  Investigate  the  Preparation  for  and  Response  to 
 Hurricane  Katrina,  United  States  House  of  Representatives,  at  4  (Nov.  9,  2005),  available  at  http://  katrina.  house.  gov/  hearings/  11_  09_  05/  baughman_  110905.  doc  ;  Written  Statement  of  Robert  Latham,  Director, 
 Mississippi  Emergency  Management  Agency,  Hurricane  Katrina:  Preparedness  and  Response  by  the  State  of  Mississippi,  Before  the  Select  Bipartisan  Committee  to  Investigate  the  Preparation  for  and  Response  to  Hurricane 
 Katrina,  United  States  House  of  Representatives,  at  4  (Dec.  7,  2005),  available  at  http://  katrina.  house.  gov/  hearings/  12_  07_  05/  latham_  120705.  pdf  . 
 44  Globalstar  Comments  at  2. 
 45  Trujillo  Sept.  29  Written  Statement  at  4. 
 46  See,  e.  g.,  Senate  Report  on  Katrina  at  18-  9  (problems  with  satellite  phones  do  not  appear  to  have  been 
 caused  by  the  phones  themselves  or  the  satellite  networks;  a  combination  of  user  error  and  obstruction  of  satellite  signals  were  most  likely  the  problems);  Cavossa-  SIA  Testimony  at  4-  5;  Bogucki  Mar.  6  Public  Testimony,  Tr.  at  55. 


 47  Cavossa-  SIA  Written  Testimony  at  5. 
 48  Id.  at  4. 
 49  See  Final  Report  of  the  Select  Bipartisan  Committee  to  Investigate  the  Preparation  for  and  Response  to 
 Hurricane  Katrina,  H.  R.  Rep.  No.  109-  377,  at  172-  73  (2006),  available  at  http://  www.  gpo.  access.  gov/  serialset/  creports/  Katrina.  html,  [hereinafter  House  Report]. 


 50  See,  e.  g.,  Martin  Sept.  29  Written  Statement  at  45;  Written  Statement  of  Kevin  J.  Martin,  Chairman, 
 Federal  Communications  Commission,  Hearing  on  Communications  in  a  Disaster,  Before  the  Senate  Comm.  on 
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 addition,  in  New  Orleans  and  the  surrounding  area,  only  4  of  the  41  broadcast  radio  stations  remained  on  the  air  in  the  wake  of  the  hurricane.  51  Some  broadcasters  continued  broadcasting 
 only  by  partnering  with  other  broadcasters  whose  signals  were  not  interrupted.  52  Broadcasters  reported  very  few  tower  losses  as  a  result  of  Katrina.  Instead,  the  wind  displacing  and  causing 
 misaligning  antennas  was  the  biggest  cause  of  broadcast  outages.  Although  this  type  of  damage  could  be  readily  repaired,  the  lengthy  power  outages    which  substantially  exceeded  back-  up 
 generator  capabilities    prevented  many  broadcast  stations  from  coming  back  on  the  air.  Power  outages  at  the  viewer/  listener  end  were  also  an  issue  as  they  prevented  broadcast  transmissions 
 from  being  successfully  received.  Additionally,  the  lack  of  security  for  broadcast  facilities  and  repair  personnel  impeded  recovery  efforts.  Nevertheless,  within  three  weeks  after  Katrina,  more 
 than  90  percent  of  broadcasters  were  up  and  running  in  the  affected  region.  53  However,  in  the  areas  most  impacted  by  the  storm,  the  vast  majority  of  stations  remained  down  much  longer. 


 8.  Cable.  As  with  the  broadcasting  industry,  cable  companies  in  the  region  reported  limited  infrastructure  damage  to  their  head  ends  following  Katrina.  In  the  areas  hardest 
 hit  by  the  storm  itself,  aerial  cable  infrastructure  was  heavily  damaged.  Some  cable  facilities  are  underground;  the  storms  wind  and  rain  had  only  minimal  effects  on  them.  However,  the 
 opposite  was  true  in  areas  where  the  levees  breach  caused  heavy  flooding.  There,  underground  facilities  were  heavily  damaged  and  the  electronics  in  those  facilities  were  generally  completely 
 lost.  The  cable  industry  indicated  that  new  cable  plants  generally  allowed  for  multiple  points  of  failure  and  system  workarounds  that  permitted  the  network  to  operate  in  spite  of  some 
 widespread  faults  in  the  infrastructure.  However,  lack  of  power  to  cable  facilities  and  security  proved  to  be  key  problems.  The  cable  operator  serving  New  Orleans  indicated  that,  even  where 
 its  network  was  intact,  lack  of  power/  fuel  prevented  it  from  restoring  operations  in  those  areas.  54  Also,  similar  to  broadcasting,  power  outages  at  the  viewer  end  prevented  cable  programming 
 from  being  successfully  received. 
 9.  Utilities.  Electric  utility  networks  (including  utility-  owned  commercial  wireless  networks)  appeared  to  have  a  high  rate  of  survivability  following  Katrina.  55  These 


 communications  systems  did  not  have  a  significant  rate  of  failure  because:  (1)  the  systems  were  designed  to  remain  intact  to  aid  restoration  of  electric  service  following  a  significant  storm  event; 
 (2)  they  were  built  with  significant  onsite  back-  up  power  supplies  (batteries  and  generators);  (3)  last  mile  connections  to  tower  sites  and  the  backbone  transport  are  typically  owned  by  the  utility 


 Commerce,  Science,  and  Transportation  at  2  (Sept.  22,  2005)  (an  estimated  100  broadcast  stations  were  knocked  off  the  air). 
 51  Moran  Sept.  7  Written  Statement  at  3. 
 52  Oral  Testimony  of  Dave  Vincent,  Station  Manager,  WLOX  -TV,  Before  the  FCCs  Independent  Panel 
 Reviewing  the  Impact  of  Hurricane  Katrina  on  Communications  Networks,  Tr.  at  309  (Mar.  6,  2006)  [hereinafter  Vincent-  WLOX  -TV  Mar.  6  Oral  Testimony]  (WLOX  in  Biloxi  partnered  with  WXX  V  in  Gulfport,  Mississippi, 


 which  carried  WLOX  s  signal  until  they  could  get  back  on  the  air).  53 
 Martin  Sept.  29  Written  Statement  at  45.  54 
 See,  e.  g.,  Comments  of  Greg  Bicket,  Cox  Communications,  at  1  (Jan.  27,  2006).  55 
 See,  e.  g.,  UTC  Comments,  Hurricanes  of  2005:  Performance  of  Gulf  Coast  Critical  Infrastructure  Communications  Networks,  at  2  (Jan.  27,  2006). 
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 and  have  redundant  paths  (both  T1  and  fixed  microwave);  and  (4)  the  staff  responsible  for  the  communications  network  have  a  focus  on  continuing  maintenance  of  network  elements  (for 
 example,  exercising  standby  generators  on  a  routine  basis). 
 10.  License  Exempt  Wireless  (WISPs).  The  License  Exempt  Wireless  or  wireless  internet  service  provider  (  WISP)  infrastructure,  in  general,  was  not  heavily  damaged 


 by  Katrina  or  the  subsequent  flooding,  although  some  antennas  required  adjustment  because  of  high  winds.  Rather,  the  majority  of  the  adverse  effects  and  outages  encountered  by  WISP 
 providers  were  due  to  a  lack  of  commercial  power  and  difficulty  with  fuel  resupply.  WISP  providers  cited  access  difficulties  as  their  most  pressing  problem  in  restoring  their  networks. 


 11.  Amateur  Radio  Service.  As  with  other  communications  services,  amateur  radio  stations  were  also  adversely  affected  by  Katrina.  Equipment  was  damaged  or  lost  due  to 
 the  storm  and  trained  amateurs  were  difficult  to  find  in  the  immediate  aftermath.  However,  once  called  into  help,  amateur  radio  operators  volunteered  to  support  many  agencies,  such  as  FEMA, 
 the  National  Weather  Service,  Hurricane  Watch  and  the  American  Red  Cross.  56  Amateurs  provided  wireless  communications  in  many  locations  where  there  was  no  other  means  of 
 communicating  and  also  provided  other  technical  aid  to  the  communities  affected  by  Katrina.  57 
 B.  Major  Problems  Identified  Following  Katrina. 
 In  reviewing  the  detailed  reports  from  each  communications  sector,  there  were  three  main  problems  that  caused  the  majority  of  communications  network  interruptions:  (1)  flooding;  (2) 


 lack  of  power  and/  or  fuel;  and  (3)  failure  of  redundant  pathways  for  communications  traffic.  In  addition,  a  fourth  item    inadvertent  line  cuts  during  restoration    resulted  in  additional  network 
 damage,  causing  new  outages  or  delaying  service  restoration.  Each  of  these  areas  of  concern  is  detailed  below. 


 1.  Flooding.  Hurricanes  typically  have  flooding  associated  with  them  due  to  the  torrential  rainfall  and  storm  surge  associated  with  the  storms.  However,  in  addition  to  these 
 sources  of  flooding,  the  levee  breaks  in  New  Orleans  caused  catastrophic  flooding  that  was  extremely  detrimental  to  the  communications  networks.  58  While  communications  infrastructure 
 had  been  hardened  to  prepare  against  strong  winds  from  a  hurricane,  the  widespread  flooding  of  long  duration  associated  with  Katrina  destroyed  or  disabled  substantial  portions  of  the 
 communications  networks  and  impeded  trained  personnel  from  reaching  and  operating  the  facilities.  59  In  addition,  as  detailed  below,  the  massive  flooding  caused  widespread  power 
 outages  that  were  not  readily  remedied  (electric  substations  could  not  be  reached  nor  were  there 


 56  See  Hurricane  Katrina  Amateur  Radio  Emergency  Communications  Relief  Effort  Operations  Review 
 Summary,  Written  Statement  submitted  by  Gregory  Sarratt,  W4OZK,  at  2  (Mar.  7,  2006).  57 
 Id.  at  4.  58 
 See,  e.  g.,  House  Report  at  164  (reporting  that  flooding  knocked  out  two  telephone  company  switches  and  hindered  the  communications  abilities  of  six  out  of  eight  police  districts  in  New  Orleans,  as  well  as  the  police 


 department  headquarters).  59 
 See,  e.  g.,  Oral  Testimony  of  Dr.  Juliette  M.  Saussy,  Director,  Emergency  Medical  Services  of  the  City  of  New  Orleans,  Louisiana,  Tr.  at  43-  44  (Mar.  6,  2006)  [hereinafter  Saussy  Mar.  6  Oral  Testimony]. 
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 personnel  available  to  remedy  the  outages).  The  flooding  also  wiped  out  transportation  options,  preventing  fuel  for  generators  from  getting  where  it  needed  to  be. 
 2.  Power  and  Fuel.  Katrina  caused  extensive  damage  to  the  power  grid.  Significant  portions  of  electrical  facilities  in  Mississippi,  Alabama  and  Louisiana    including 
 both  power  lines  and  electric  plants    were  severely  impaired  due  to  wind  and  flooding.  As  a  result,  power  to  support  the  communications  networks  was  generally  unavailable  throughout  the 
 region.  60  This  meant  that,  for  communications  systems  to  continue  to  operate,  backup  batteries  and  generators  were  required.  While  the  communications  industry  has  generally  been  diligent  in 
 deploying  backup  batteries  and  generators  and  ensuring  that  these  systems  have  one  to  two  days  of  fuel  or  charge,  not  all  locations  had  them  installed.  Furthermore,  not  all  locations  were  able  to 
 exercise  and  test  the  backup  equipment  in  any  systemic  fashion.  Thus,  some  generators  and  batteries  did  not  function  during  the  crisis.  Where  generators  were  installed  and  operational,  the 
 fuel  was  generally  exhausted  prior  to  restoration  of  power.  Finally,  flooding,  shortages  of  fuel  and  restrictions  on  access  to  the  affected  area  made  refueling  extraordinarily  difficult.  61  In  some 
 instances,  fuel  was  confiscated  by  federal  or  local  authorities  when  it  was  brought  into  the  Katrina  region.  62 


 3.  Redundant  pathways.  The  switches  that  failed,  especially  tandems,  had  widespread  effects  on  a  broad  variety  of  communications  in  and  out  of  the  Katrina  region.  In 
 addition,  T1  and  other  leased  lines  were  heavily  used  by  the  communications  networks  throughout  the  region,  with  those  failures  leading  to  loss  of  service.  As  an  example,  a  major 
 tandem  switch  in  New  Orleans  was  isolated,  which  meant  that  no  communications  from  parts  of  New  Orleans  to  outside  the  region  could  occur.  This  switch,  an  access  tandem  that  carried  long 
 distance  traffic  through  New  Orleans  and  out  to  other  offices,  had  two  major  routes  out  of  the  city  (one  to  the  east  and  one  to  the  west).  The  eastern  route  was  severed  by  a  barge  that  came 
 ashore  during  the  hurricane  and  cut  the  aerial  fiber  associated  with  the  route.  If  only  this  route  had  been  lost,  the  access  tandem  traffic  could  have  continued.  However,  the  western  route  was 
 also  severed    initially  by  large  trees  falling  across  aerial  cables,  then  subsequently  by  construction  crews  removing  debris  from  highway  rights-  of-  way.  While  there  were  provisions 
 for  rerouting  traffic  out  of  the  city,  the  simultaneous  loss  of  both  of  these  major  paths  significantly  limited  communications  service  in  parts  of  New  Orleans. 


 4.  Line  cuts.  During  the  restoration  process  following  Katrina,  there  were  numerous  instances  of  fiber  lines  cut  accidentally  by  parties  seeking  to  restore  power,  phone,  and 
 cable,  remove  trees  and  other  debris,  and  engage  in  similar  restoration  activities.  63  BellSouth  indicated  in  its  comments  to  the  Katrina  Panel  that  several  of  its  major  routes  were  cut  multiple 


 60  House  Report.  at  166. 
 61  Id.  at  164. 
 62  See,  e.  g.,  Senate  Report  on  Katrina  at  18-  4  (citing  Committee  staff  interview  of  William  Smith,  Chief 
 Technology  Officer,  BellSouth,  conducted  on  Jan.  25,  2006)  (FEMA  commandeered  communications  fuel  reserves  in  order  to  refuel  helicopters). 


 63  See,  e.  g.,  Woody  Glover  Mar.  6  Oral  Testimony,  Tr.  at  66  (Mar.  6,  2006). 
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 times.  64  For  example,  on  Monday,  September  12th,  a  major  fiber  route  from  Hammond,  Louisiana  to  Covington,  Louisiana  was  cut  by  a  tree  trimming  company.  65  Cox  Communications 
 reported  that,  by  the  eleventh  day  after  the  storm,  more  outages  of  its  network  in  the  region  were  caused  by  human  damage  than  storm  damage.  Public  safety  entities  also  noted  similar  cuts  in 
 service  during  the  restoration  process.  66 
 In  addition  to  these  major  causes  of  network  interruptions,  security  and  access  to  facilities  were  consistently  mentioned  as  significant  issues  affecting  restoration  of  communications  services. 


 These  problems  are  discussed  in  detail  in  the  following  section. 


 II.  Recovery  Coordination  and  Procedures 
 After  Katrinas  wind  and  rain  subsided,  challenges  to  communications  service  maintenance  and  restoration  continued.  Flooding,  which  submerged  and  damaged  equipment  and  blocked  access 


 for  restoration,  was  a  major  problem.  The  Panel  also  observed  significant  challenges  to  the  recovery  effort  resulting  from  (1)  inconsistent  and  unclear  requirements  for  communications 
 infrastructure  repair  crews  and  their  subcontractors  to  gain  access  to  the  affected  area;  (2)  limited  access  to  power  and/  or  generator  fuel;  (3)  limited  security  for  communications  infrastructure  and 
 personnel  and  lack  of  pre-  positioned  back-  up  equipment;  (4)  lack  of  established  coordination  between  the  communications  industry  and  state  and  local  officials  as  well  as  among  federal,  state 
 and  local  government  officials  with  respect  to  communications  matters;  and  (5)  limited  use  of  available  priority  communications  services.  On  the  other  hand,  lines  of  communication  between 
 the  communications  industry  and  the  federal  government  were  established  and  seemed  generally  effective  in  facilitating  coordination,  promptly  granting  needed  regulatory  relief,  and  gathering 
 outage  information.  In  addition,  ad  hoc,  informal  sharing  of  fuel  and  equipment  among  communications  industry  participants  helped  to  maximize  the  assets  available  and  bolster  the 
 recovery  effort.  However,  additional  industry  coordination  of  personnel  and  assets  internally  and  among  governments  could  have  substantially  facilitated  restoration  of  communications  networks. 


 A.  Access  to  the  Affected  Area  and  Key  Resources. 
 1.  Perimeter  Access  and  Credentialing.  Communications  restoration  efforts  were  hampered  significantly  by  the  inability  of  communications  infrastructure  repair  crews  and 


 their  contracted  workers  to  access  the  impacted  area  post-  disaster.  67  For  important  safety  and 


 64  See  Comments  by  William  L.  Smith,  BellSouth,  Before  the  FCCs  Independent  Panel  Reviewing  the 
 Impact  of  Hurricane  Katrina  on  Communications  Networks,  at  7  (Jan.  30,  2006)  [hereinafter  Smith-  BellSouth  Jan.  30  Written  Statement). 


 65  Id. 
 66  See,  e.  g.,  Comments  of  Robert  G.  Bailey,  National  Emergency  Number  Association,  Harris  County 
 Emergency  Communications,  at  1  (Jan.  30,  2006)  [hereinafter  Bailey  Jan.  30  Written  Testimony].  67 
 See,  e.  g.,  Oral  Testimony  of  William  L.  Smith,  Chief  Technology  Officer,  BellSouth  Corp.,  Before  the  FCCs  Independent  Panel  Reviewing  the  Impact  of  Hurricane  Katrina,  Tr.  at  188  (Jan.  30,  2006)  [hereinafter 


 Smith-  BellSouth  Jan.  30  Oral  Testimony];  see  also  Statement  of  Jim  Jacot,  Vice  President,  Cingular  Network  Group,  Before  the  FCCs  Independent  Panel  Reviewing  the  Impact  of  Hurricane  Katrina,  Tr.  at  125  (Jan.  30,  2006) 
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 security  reasons,  law  enforcement  personnel  set  up  a  perimeter  around  much  of  the  impacted  region  and  imposed  restrictions  on  who  could  access  the  area.  Communications  infrastructure 
 repair  crews  from  all  sectors  of  the  industry  had  great  difficulty  crossing  the  perimeter  to  access  their  facilities  in  need  of  repair.  68  This  seemed  to  be  a  particular  problem  for  smaller  or  non-traditional 
 communications  companies,  69  who  tended  to  have  lower  levels  of  name  recognition  with  law  enforcement  personnel  guarding  the  perimeter. 


 Although  some  jurisdictions  provided  credentials  to  communications  infrastructure  repair  crews  to  permit  them  to  access  the  affected  area,  the  process  appeared  to  be  unique  for  each  local 
 jurisdiction.  Communications  providers  reported  that  credentials  that  permitted  access  through  one  checkpoint  would  not  be  honored  at  another.  70  In  many  cases,  different  checkpoints  required 
 different  documentation  and  credentialing  before  permitting  access.  71  As  a  result,  repair  crews  needed  to  carry  multiple  credentials  and  letters  from  various  federal,  state  and  local  officials.  72 
 There  was  no  uniform  credentialing  method  in  place  whereby  one  type  of  credential  would  permit  access  at  any  checkpoint.  73  Communications  providers  were  also  not  clear  about  which 
 agency  had  authority  to  issue  the  necessary  credentials.  74  And  there  did  not  appear  to  be  any  mechanism  in  place  for  issuing  credentials  to  those  who  needed  them  prior  to  Katrina  making 
 landfall. 
 Once  communications  infrastructure  repair  crews  gained  access  to  the  impacted  area,  they  had  no  guarantee  they  would  be  allowed  to  remain  there.  The  enforcement  of  curfews  and  other  security 


 procedures  at  times  interrupted  repair  work  and  required  communications  restoration  crews  to  exit  the  area.  In  at  least  one  instance,  law  enforcement  personnel  insisted  that  communications 


 [hereinafter  Jacot-  Cingular  Jan.  30  Oral  Testimony];  Trujillo  Sept.  29  Written  Statement  at  9;  Comments  of  M/  A-Com  at  7  (Jan.  30,  2006). 
 68  See,  e.  g.,  Senate  Report  on  Katrina  at  18-  4  (repair  workers  sometimes  had  difficulty  gaining  access  to  their 
 equipment  and  facilities  because  the  police  and  National  Guard  refused  to  let  crews  enter  the  affected  area);  Federal  Support  to  Telecommunications  Infrastructure  Providers  in  National  Emergencies:  Designation  as  Emergency 


 Responders  (Private  Sector),  The  Presidents  National  Security  Telecommunications  Advisory  Committee,  Legislative  and  Regulatory  Task  Force,  at  7  (Jan.  31,  2006)  [hereinafter  Jan.  31  NSTAC  Report]. 
 69  See,  e.  g.,  Comments  of  the  Satellite  Industry  Association  at  6  (January  27,  2006)  (describing  how  satellite 
 system  repair  crews  had  difficulty  obtaining  access  to  the  impacted  area);  Comments  of  Xspedius  Communications,  LLC,  at  2,  6  (Mar.  6,  2006)  [hereinafter  Comments  of  X  spedius]. 


 70  See,  e.  g.,  Senate  Report  on  Katrina  at  18-  4  (citing  Committee  staff  interview  of  Christopher  Guttman-McCabe, 
 Vice  President,  Regulatory  Affairs,  CTIA,  conducted  on  Jan.  24,  2006)  (industry  representatives  said  that  their  technicians  would  benefit  from  having  uniform  credentialing  that  is  recognized  by  the  multiple  law 


 enforcement  agencies  operating  in  a  disaster  area).  71 
 See,  e.  g.,  Vincent-  WLOX-  TV  Mar.  6  Written  Testimony  at  5  (stating  that  a  credential  that  permitted  access  in  one  county  was  sometimes  not  honored  in  a  different  county). 


 72  See,  e.  g.,  Comments  of  Xspedius  at  2-  3. 
 73  See,  e.  g.,  Senate  Report  on  Katrina  at  Findings  at  8  (efforts  by  private  sector  to  restore  communications 
 efforts  were  hampered  by  the  fact  that  the  government  did  not  provide  uniform  credentials  to  gain  access  to  affected  areas). 


 74  See,  e.  g.,  Comments  of  Xspedius  at  3. 
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 technicians  cease  their  work  splicing  a  key  telecommunications  cable  and  exit  the  area  in  order  to  enforce  a  curfew.  75  Although  such  practices  may  have  been  necessary  from  a  security 
 standpoint,  they  did  interrupt  and  hamper  the  recovery  process. 
 The  problems  with  access  were  not  all  one-  sided.  Law  enforcement  personnel  also  expressed  frustration  with  the  access  situation,  particularly  with  respect  to  the  different  credentials  issued 


 and  not  knowing  what  to  ask  for  or  what  to  honor.  It  was  also  reported  that  credentialed  communications  infrastructure  repair  personnel  sometimes  allowed  non-  credentialed  individuals 
 to  ride  in  their  vehicles  through  checkpoints,  which  compromised  the  security  of  the  area.  It  also  caused  law  enforcement  personnel  at  the  perimeter  to  be  wary  of  persons  seeking  to  access  the 
 affected  area  and  the  credentials  they  presented,  potentially  further  slowing  the  access  process. 
 2.  Fuel.  Problems  with  maintaining  and  restoring  power  for  communications  infrastructure  significantly  affected  the  recovery  process.  As  described  in 


 Section  I.  B.  2  above,  many  facilities  could  have  been  up  and  operating  much  more  quickly  if  communications  providers  had  access  to  sufficient  fuel.  The  commercial  power  upon  which  the 
 vast  majority  of  communications  networks  depended  for  day-  to-  day  operations  was  knocked  out  over  a  huge  geographic  area.  Back-  up  generators  and  batteries  were  not  present  at  all  facilities. 
 Where  they  were  deployed,  most  provided  only  enough  power  to  operate  particular  communications  facilities  for  24-  48  hours    generally  a  sufficient  period  of  time  to  permit  the 
 restoration  of  commercial  power  in  most  situations,  but  not  enough  for  a  catastrophe  like  Hurricane  Katrina. 


 Access  to  fuel  reserves  or  priority  power  restoration  appeared  extremely  limited  for  the  communications  industry.  76  Only  a  few  communications  providers  had  stockpiles  of  fuel  or 
 special  supplier  arrangements.  However,  if  the  fuel  was  not  located  fairly  near  to  the  perimeter,  it  was  difficult  and  expensive  to  get  it  where  it  was  needed  in  a  timely  fashion.  Perimeter  access 
 issues  also  impeded  the  ability  to  bring  reserve  fuel  into  the  region.  Moreover,  many  roads  and  traditional  means  of  accessing  certain  facilities  could  not  be  used  due  to  the  extensive  flooding 
 that  followed  Hurricane  Katrina.  And  many  communications  providers  did  not  anticipate  the  need  for  alternative  means  of  reaching  their  facilities.  In  addition,  some  providers  reported 
 having  their  limited  fuel  reserves  confiscated  by  law  enforcement  personnel  for  other  pressing  needs.  77  Although  electric  and  other  utilities  maintain  priority  lists  for  commercial  power 
 restoration,  it  does  not  appear  that  commercial  communications  providers  were  on  or  eligible  for  such  lists.  Indeed,  one  wireless  provider  speaking  at  the  Katrina  Panels  January  2006  meeting   
 more  than  4  months  after  Katrinas  landfall    reported  that  it  had  23  cell  sites  in  the  impacted 


 75  Smith-  BellSouth  Jan.  30  Oral  Testimony,  Tr.  at  191;  see  also  Jacot-  Cingular  Jan.  30  Oral  Testimony,  Tr.  at 
 125.  76 
 See,  e.  g.,  Comments  of  Mississippi  Assn.  of  Broadcasters  at  1  2  (Jan.  27,  2006).  77 
 See,  e.  g.,  id.;  House  Report  at  167  ([  O]  ne  of  Nextels  fuel  trucks  was  stopped  at  gunpoint  and  its  fuel  taken  for  other  purposes  while  en  route  to  refuel  cell  tower  generators,  and  the  Mississippi  State  Police  redirected  a 


 fuel  truck  carrying  fuel  designated  for  a  cell  tower  generator  to  fuel  generators  at  Gulfport  Memorial  Hospital.). 
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 area  still  running  on  backup  generators.  78  Most  communications  providers  also  did  not  appear  to  be  able  to  access  any  government  fuel  reserves. 
 On  a  positive  note,  several  companies  apparently  shared  their  reserve  fuel  with  other  communications  providers  who  needed  it,  even  their  competitors.  79  This  sharing  occurred  on  a 
 purely  ad  hoc  basis.  80  There  did  not  appear  to  be  any  forum  or  coordination  area  for  fostering  industry  sharing  of  fuel  or  other  equipment. 


 3.  Security.  Limited  security  for  key  communications  facilities  and  communications  infrastructure  repair  crews  also  hampered  the  recovery  effort.  81  Security 
 concerns,  both  actual  and  perceived,  led  to  delays  in  the  restoration  of  communications  networks.  82  Communications  providers  reported  generators  being  stolen  from  key  facilities, 
 even  if  they  were  bolted  down.  Lack  of  security  for  communications  infrastructure  repair  workers  at  times  delayed  their  access  to  certain  facilities  to  make  repairs.  83  Some  providers 
 employed  their  own  security  crews.  84  However,  obtaining  credentials  to  allow  these  individuals  to  access  the  affected  area  was  sometimes  a  problem.  Further,  communications  infrastructure 
 repair  crews  generally  did  not  receive  security  details  from  law  enforcement.  Clearly,  law  enforcement  had  other  very  significant  responsibilities  in  the  wake  of  Katrina.  In  addition, 
 communications  providers  are  apparently  not  considered  emergency  responders  under  the  Robert  T.  Stafford  Disaster  Relief  and  Emergency  Assistance  Act  85  and  the  National  Response 
 Plan  and  thus  are  not  eligible  to  receive  non-  monetary  Federal  assistance,  like  security  protection  for  critical  facilities  and  repair  personnel.  86  In  one  instance,  however,  a  major  communications 
 provider  successfully  sought  governmental  security  for  its  Poydras  St.  office  in  New  Orleans,  which  serves  as  a  regional  hub  for  multiple  telecommunications  carriers.  Both  the  Louisiana 


 78  See  Jacot-  Cingular  Jan.  30  Oral  Testimony,  Tr.  at  123. 
 79  See,  e.  g.,  Vincent-  WLOX  -TV  Mar.  6  Oral  Testimony,  Tr.  at  312  (describing  how  the  radio  station  shared 
 fuel  with  a  nearby  news  organization).  80 
 See,  e.  g.,  Oral  Testimony  of  Steve  Davis,  Senior  Vice  President  of  Engineering,  Clear  Channel  Radio,  Before  the  FCCs  Independent  Panel  Reviewing  the  Impact  of  Hurricane  Katrina,  Tr.  at  81-  82  (Jan.  30,  2006) 


 [hereinafter  Steve  Davis-  Clear  Channel  Jan.  30  Oral  Testimony].  81 
 See,  e.  g.,  Senate  Report  on  Katrina  at  18-  4.  82 
 The  Federal  Response  To  Hurricane  Katrina  Lessons  Learned,  February  2006,  at  40,  available  at  http://  www.  whitehouse.  gov/  reports/  katrina-  lessons-  learned/. 


 83  Jan.  31  NSTAC  Report  at  5. 
 84  See,  e.  g.,  Senate  Report  on  Katrina  at  18-  4  (when  government  security  proved  unavailable,  many 
 telecommunications  providers  hired  private  security  to  protect  their  workers  and  supplies);  Written  Statement  of  Dave  Flessas,  Vice  President  for  Network  Operations,  Sprint  Nextel  Corp.,  Before  the  FCCs  Independent  Panel 


 Reviewing  the  Impact  of  Hurricane  Katrina,  at  2  (Jan.  30,  2006)  (security  issues  forced  Sprint  to  hire  armored  guards  to  protect  its  employees  and  contractors);  Jan.  31  NSTAC  Report  at  5. 
 85  Pub.  L.  No.  93-  288,  as  amended  [hereinafter  Stafford  Act]. 
 86  See,  e.  g.,  Smith-  BellSouth  Jan.  30  Written  Statement  at  9;  Jacot-  Cingular  Jan.  30  Oral  Testimony,  Tr.  at 
 125;  see  also  Oral  Testimony  of  Captain  Thomas  Wetherald,  Deputy  Operations  Director,  National  Communications  System,  Before  the  FCCs  Independent  Panel  Reviewing  the  Impact  of  Hurricane  Katrina,  Tr.  at  24  (Apr.  18,  2006) 


 [hereinafter  Capt.  Wetherald  Apr.  18  Oral  Testimony]. 
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 State  Police  and  the  FBI  provided  security  so  that  BellSouth  workers  could  return  to  the  office  and  keep  it  in  service.  87 
 Apparently,  several  companies  that  had  their  own  security  forces  shared  them  with  other  communications  providers  by  forming  a  convoy  to  go  to  a  particular  area.  88  Such  arrangements 
 seemed  to  occur  on  a  purely  informal  basis.  There  did  not  appear  to  be  any  forum  or  staging  area  for  fostering  industry  sharing  of  security  forces  or  other  resources. 


 4.  Pre-  positioning  of  Equipment.  Limited  pre-  positioning  of  communications  equipment  may  have  slowed  the  recovery  process.  While  some  individual 
 companies  and  organizations  had  some  backup  communications  technologies  on-  hand  for  use  after  a  disaster,  most  did  not  appear  to  locate  strategic  stockpiles  of  communications  equipment 
 that  could  be  rapidly  deployed  and  immediately  used  by  persons  in  the  impacted  area. 
 B.  Coordination  Between  Industry  and  Government. 
 1.  Industry    Federal  Government  Coordination.  Despite  problems  related  above  at  the  scene  of  the  disaster,  at  the  federal  level,  industry  and  government  recovery 


 coordination  for  the  communications  sector  appeared  to  function  as  intended.  Under  the  National  Response  Plan,  the  lead  federal  agency  for  emergency  support  functions  regarding 
 communications  is  the  National  Communications  System  (  NCS).  NCS  manages  the  National  Coordination  Center  for  Telecommunications  (  NCC)  in  Washington,  DC,  which  is  a  joint 
 industry-  federal  government  endeavor  with  36  member  companies.  89  The  NCC  meets  on  a  regular  basis  during  non-  emergency  situations;  during  and  immediately  after  Katrina,  it  met  daily 
 and  conducted  analysis  and  situational  monitoring  of  ongoing  events  and  response  capabilities.  90  The  Katrina  Panel  heard  that  this  group  played  an  important  and  effective  role  in  coordinating 
 communications  network  recovery  and  allowing  for  information  sharing  among  affected  industry  members.  91  Yet,  NCC  membership  is  limited  to  only  certain  providers  and  does  not  represent  a 
 broad  cross-  section  of  the  communications  industry  (for  example,  no  broadcasters,  WISPs,  or  cable  providers  are  members).  92  Accordingly,  certain  industry  sectors  or  companies  that  might 
 have  been  helpful  were  not  a  part  of  this  coordination  effort.  State  and  local  government  are  also  not  a  part  of  this  coordination  effort. 


 87  Smith-  BellSouth  Jan.  30  Written  Statement  at  8-  9. 
 88  See,  e.  g.,  Comments  of  Xspedius  at  3. 
 89  The  NSTAC  Report  on  the  National  Coordinating  Center  (4/  27/  06  Draft),  The  Presidents  National 
 Security  Telecommunications  Advisory  Committee,  May  10,  2006,  at  9-  10  [hereinafter  May  10  NSTAC  Report].  90 
 See  Written  Statement  of  Dr.  Peter  M.  Fonash,  Director,  National  Communications  System,  U.  S.  Department  of  Homeland  Security,  Ensuring  Operability  During  Catastrophic  Events,  Before  the  Subcommittee  on 


 Emergency  Preparedness,  Committee  on  Homeland  Security,  United  States  House  of  Representatives,  at  2,  6  (Oct.  26,  2005),  available  at  http://  hsc.  house.  gov/  files/  TestimonyFonash.  pdf. 
 91  See,  e.  g.,  Capt.  Wetherald  Apr.  18  Oral  Testimony,  Tr.  at  17  -18. 
 92  See  May  10  NSTAC  Report  at  4. 
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 The  FCC  was  widely  praised  as  playing  a  critical  role  in  helping  to  restore  communications  connectivity  in  the  wake  of  Hurricane  Katrina.  93  During  and  immediately  after  Katrina,  the 
 Commission  stayed  open  24  hours  a  day,  seven  days  a  week  to  respond  to  the  disaster.  94  Within  hours  of  Katrinas  landfall  in  the  Gulf  Coast  region,  the  Commission  established  an  internal  Task 
 Force  to  coordinate  its  response  efforts,  95  focusing  on  providing  regulatory  relief  where  necessary,  coordinating  efforts  with  other  federal  agencies,  and  providing  information  and 
 assistance  to  evacuees.  To  assist  communications  providers  in  their  recovery,  the  Commission  established  emergency  procedures  to  streamline  various  waiver  and  special  temporary  authority 
 processes  to  speed  needed  relief,  96  reached  out  to  various  providers  to  determine  their  needs,  and  assisted  communications  providers  in  obtaining  access  to  necessary  resources.  97 


 These  actions  by  the  Commission  appeared  substantially  to  assist  the  industry  in  the  recovery  effort.  The  emergency,  24/  7  contacts  the  Commission  made  available  and  the  new  streamlined 
 processes  clearly  accelerated  the  time  frame  for  receiving  necessary  regulatory  approvals.  However,  the  extensive  communications  outages  made  accessing  this  new  information  about 
 who  to  contact  and  how  to  comply  with  the  new  processes  difficult.  Similarly,  repair  crews  often  did  not  know  what  repairs  they  needed  to  make  until  they  reached  the  site. 


 In  addition,  while  it  was  generally  clear  to  communications  providers  that  the  Commission  was  the  right  agency  to  contact  for  regulatory  relief  after  the  disaster,  the  roles  of  other  federal 
 agencies  in  the  recovery  effort  were  not  as  clear  to  a  large  portion  of  the  industry.  98  Communications  providers  who  needed  federal  assistance  (such  as  obtaining  fuel  authorizations 
 or  access  to  the  impacted  area),  often  did  not  know  whom  to  contact.  Industry  participants  also  appeared  generally  unclear  about  which  federal  agency  was  responsible  for  implementing 
 important  recovery  programs  or  distributing  resources  to  communications  companies  operating  in  the  impacted  area.  Competing  requests  for  outage  information  from  government  entities  at  the 
 federal,  state  and  local  level  added  to  the  confusion  about  agency  roles.  And  responding  to  duplicative,  repeated  inquiries  in  the  aftermath  of  Hurricane  Katrina  was  cited  by  some  as  a 
 distraction  to  communications  providers  restoration  efforts. 


 93  See,  e.  g.,  The  Federal  Response  to  Hurricane  Katrina:  Lessons  Learned  at  142-  43  (February  2006). 
 94  See,  e.  g.,  Martin  Sept.  29  Written  Statement  at  3. 
 95  Moran  Sept.  7  Written  Statement  at  4. 
 96  See,  e.  g.,  International  Bureau  Announces  Procedures  to  Provide  Emergency  Communications  in  Areas 
 Impacted  by  Hurricane  Katrina,  FCC  Public  Notice  (rel.  Sept.  1,  2005),  available  at  http://  hraunfoss.  fcc.  gov/  edocs_  public/  attachmatch/  DOC-  260835A1.  pdf  . 


 97  See  Steve  Davis-  Clear  Channel  Jan.  30  Oral  Testimony,  Tr.  at  83  (describing  how  the  Audio  Division  of 
 the  FCCs  Media  Bureau  helped  radio  licensees  secure  access  to  fuel).  98 
 See,  e.  g.,  Written  Statement  of  C.  Patrick  Roberts,  President  of  the  Florida  Association  of  Broadcasters,  Before  the  FCCs  Independent  Panel  Reviewing  the  Impact  of  Hurricane  Katrina,  at  3  (Mar.  7,  2006)  (observing  that 


 American  must  have  a  more  cohesive  and  comprehensive  program  among  federal,  state,  and  local  governments  to  prepare  for  disasters);  see  also  Sprint-  Nextel  Jan.  30  Written  Testimony  at  4-  5  (recognizing  that  there  is  a  need  to 
 clarify  the  roles  and  responsibilities  of  the  government  agencies  that  are  involved  telecommunications  restoration). 
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 2.  Industry    State  and  Local  Government  Coordination.  In  general,  coordination  between  communications  providers  and  state  and  local  government  officials  in  the 
 affected  region  for  communications  network  recovery  purposes  did  not  appear  to  exist  except  on  an  ad  hoc  basis.  For  the  most  part,  there  did  not  appear  to  be  in  existence  any  organized 
 mechanism  for  communications  providers  to  share  information  with  local  officials  or  to  seek  their  assistance  with  respect  to  specific  recovery  issues,  like  access  and  fuel.  Following  Katrina, 
 the  Panel  heard  that  state  and  local  government  representatives  were  exchanging  business  cards  with  communications  providers  in  their  area  for  the  first  time.  Local  government  officials  noted 
 that  they  sometimes  did  not  know  where  to  turn  to  figure  out  why  communications  to  and  from  key  government  locations  did  not  work  and  how  to  express  their  priorities  for  communications 
 service  restoration.  In  addition,  coordinating  credentialing,  access,  fuel  sharing,  security  and  other  key  recovery  efforts  was  difficult  because  there  were  no  identified  staging  areas  or 
 coordination  points  for  the  communications  industry. 
 3.  Federal  Government    State  and  Local  Government  Coordination.  The  Panel  is  not  aware  of  pre-  established  mechanisms  through  which  the  federal  government 


 coordinated  with  state  and  local  governments  concerning  communications  network  restoration  issues  in  the  wake  of  Katrina.  For  example,  the  Panel  heard  that  civilian  public  safety  officials 
 were  often  unable  to  communicate  with  military  officials  brought  in  to  assist  local  law  enforcement.  In  addition,  state  and  local  governments  are  not  a  part  of  the  NCC  99  and,  therefore, 
 were  not  able  to  directly  coordinate  with  that  industry-  federal  government  group.  As  noted  above,  and  due  in  part  to  a  lack  of  pre-  arranged  recovery  procedures,  state  and  local  government 
 officials  did  not  seem  to  be  part  of  communications  network  recovery  efforts.  This  meant  that  their  restoration  priorities  may  not  have  been  effectively  conveyed  to  communications  providers 
 and  that  communications  providers  did  not  have  an  identified  place  to  turn  for  assistance  with  access  and  other  recovery  issues. 


 C.  Emergency  Communications  Services  and  Programs. 
 The  federal  government,  through  the  NCS,  has  established  several  programs  for  priority  communications  services  during  and  following  an  emergency.  100  These  are  the  Government 


 Emergency  Telecommunications  Service  (  GETS),  which  enables  an  eligible  user  to  get  priority  call  completion  for  wireline  telephone  calls;  the  Wireless  Priority  Service  (  WPS), 
 which  enables  an  eligible  user  to  get  access  to  the  next  free  channel  when  making  a  wireless  call;  and  Telecommunications  Service  Priority  (  TSP),  which  enables  a  qualifying  user  to  get 
 priority  restoration  and  provisioning  of  telecommunications  services.  101  During  and  after  Katrina,  these  priority  services  seemed  to  work  well  for  those  who  subscribed  to  them. 
 However,  only  a  small  percentage  of  those  eligible  for  the  services  appeared  to  do  so.  This  is  particularly  true  of  public  safety  users    many  eligible  public  safety  entities  have  not  signed  up 
 for  these  services.  It  also  appears  to  be  true  for  some  communications  providers,  including 
 99  See  May  10  NSTAC  Report  at  3. 
 100  See,  e.  g.,  Capt.  Wetherald  Apr.  18  Oral  Testimony,  Tr.  at  18. 
 101  See,  e.  g.,  Written  Statement  of  Dr.  Peter  Fonash,  Deputy  Manager,  National  Communications  System,  S. 
 Comm.  on  Homeland  Security  and  Govt  Affairs,  Hearing  on  Managing  Law  Enforcement  and  Communications  in  a  Catastrophe  at  3-  4  (Feb.  6,  2006),  available  at  http://  hsgac.  senate.  gov/_  files/  020606Fonash.  pdf  . 
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 broadcast,  WISP,  and  cable  companies.  These  priority  services  could  be  an  extremely  useful  tool  in  network  restoration  efforts.  Yet,  they  are  tools  that  appear  not  fully  utilized.  Like  other 
 emergency  tools,  they  require  training  and  practice.  In  some  cases,  users  who  had  access  to  these  services  did  not  fully  understand  how  to  use  them  (e.  g.,  that  a  WPS  call  requires  inputting  a 
 GETS  code  so  the  call  would  get  priority  treatment  when  it  reached  the  landline  network). 


 III.  First  Responder  Communications 
 In  the  days  following  Hurricane  Katrina,  the  ability  of  public  safety  and  emergency  first  responders  to  communicate  varied  greatly  across  the  affected  region.  The  areas  in  and  around 


 New  Orleans  were  seriously  impacted.  102  New  Orleans  EMS  was  forced  to  cease  911  operations  in  anticipation  of  Katrinas  landfall  and,  after  the  levees  were  breached,  a  total  loss  of  EMS  and 
 fire  communications  ensued.  103  The  communications  infrastructure  in  coastal  areas  was  heavily  damaged  due  to  winds  or  flooding.  104  As  a  result,  more  than  2000  police,  fire  and  EMS 
 personnel  were  forced  to  communicate  in  single  channel  mode,  radio-  to-  radio,  utilizing  only  three  mutual  aid  frequencies.  105  Some  mutual-  aid  channels  required  each  speaker  to  wait  his  or 
 her  turn  before  speaking,  sometimes  up  to  twenty  minutes.  106  This  level  of  destruction  did  not  extend  to  inland  areas  affected  by  the  hurricane  so,  in  contrast  to  New  Orleans,  neither  Baton 
 Rouge  nor  Jackson  County,  Mississippi,  completely  lost  their  communications  capabilities  and  were  soon  operating  at  pre-  Katrina  capabilities.  107  In  the  hardest  hit  areas,  however,  the 
 disruption  of  public  safety  communications  operability,  as  well  as  a  lack  of  interoperability,  frustrated  the  response  effort  and  caused  tremendous  confusion  among  official  personnel  108  and 
 the  general  public. 
 State  and  local  first  responders  are  required  to  act  and  communicate  within  minutes  after  disasters  have  occurred  and  not  hours  or  days  later  when  Federal  or  other  resources  from  outside 


 the  affected  area  become  available.  As  further  described  below,  the  lack  of  effective  emergency  communications  after  the  storm  revealed  inadequate  planning,  coordination  and  training  on  the 
 use  of  technologies  that  can  help  to  restore  emergency  communications.  Hurricane  Katrina  also  highlighted  the  long-  standing  problem  of  interoperability  among  public  safety  communications 


 102  See,  e.  g.,  Saussy  Mar.  6  Oral  Testimony,  Tr.  at  43. 
 103  Id. 
 104  Jeff  Smith  Written  Statement  at  12. 
 105  Presentation  of  Major  Mike  Sauter,  Office  of  Technology  and  Communications,  New  Orleans  Police 
 Department,  Before  the  FCCs  Independent  Panel  Reviewing  the  Impact  of  Hurricane  Katrina,  at  1  (Feb.  1,  2006)  [hereinafter  Sauter  Written  Statement]. 


 106  See,  e.  g.,  Senate  Report  on  Katrina  at  21-  6  (NOFD  and  NOPD  were  forced  to  use  a  mutual  aid  channel, 
 rather  than  the  800  MHz  trunk  system  they  were  supposed  to  operate  on;  transmission  over  the  mutual  aid  channel  was  limited  and  could  not  reach  certain  parts  of  the  city). 


 107  See  Oral  Testimony  of  George  W.  Sholl,  Director,  Jackson  County  Emergency  Communications  District, 
 Before  the  FCCs  Independent  Panel  Reviewing  the  Impact  of  Hurricane  Katrina,  at  Tr.  at  58-  59  (Mar.  6,  2006)  [hereinafter  Scholl  Mar.  6  Oral  Testimony]. 


 108  Saussy  Mar.  6  Oral  Testimony,  Tr.  at  43-  44. 
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 systems  operating  in  different  frequency  bands  and  with  different  technical  standards.  109  One  advantage  that  New  Orleans  had  was  the  fact  that  no  broadcasters  were  using  the  700  MHz 
 spectrum  set  aside  for  public  safety,  thus  freeing  it  up  immediately  for  first  responder  use.  110  As  a  result  of  this  availability,  communications  providers  were  able  to  provide  emergency  trucks 
 and  hundreds  of  radios  that  operated  on  this  spectrum  as  soon  as  first  responders  needed  them.  111  Finally,  911  emergency  call  handling  suffered  from  a  lack  of  preprogrammed  routing  of  calls  to 
 PSAPs  not  incapacitated  by  the  hurricane. 
 A.  Lack  of  Advanced  Planning  for  Massive  System  Failures. 
 It  was  described  to  the  Panel  that  public  safety  officials  plan  for  disasters  but  that  Hurricane  Katrina  was  a  catastrophe.  112  This  left  many  state  and  local  agencies    those  who  are  required  to 


 respond  first  to  such  emergencies    ill-  prepared  to  restore  communications  essential  to  their  ability  to  do  their  jobs.  113  Very  few  public  safety  agencies  had  stockpiles  of  key  equipment  on 
 hand  to  implement  rapid  repairs  or  patches  to  their  systems.  Had  they  been  available,  spare  radios,  batteries  and  chargers  as  well  as  portable  repeaters  or  self-  sufficient  communications 
 vehicles  (also  known  as  communications  on  wheels)  would  have  enabled  greater  local  communications  capabilities.  114  Further,  when  the  primary  communications  system  failed,  many 
 public  safety  entities  did  not  have  plans  for  an  alternative,  redundant  system  to  take  its  place.  115  Similarly,  public  safety  entities,  including  state  and  local  government  offices,  did  not  appear  to 
 have  plans  in  place  for  call  forwarding  or  number  portability  to  route  their  calls  to  alternative  locations  when  they  relocated.  The  apparent  absence  of  contingency  plans  to  address  massive 
 system  failures,  including  widespread  power  outages,  116  was  a  major  impediment  to  the  rapid  restoration  of  first  responder  communications. 


 Public  safety  agencies  rely  heavily  on  their  equipment  vendors  to  support  them  during  such  disasters  by  providing  replacement  parts  and  spare  radios.  Motorola  stated  that  72  hours  prior  to 
 Katrinas  landfall,  it  had  mobilized  more  than  100,000  pieces  of  equipment  and  more  than  300 
 109  See,  e.  g.,  Written  Statement  of  Colonel  (ret.)  Terry  J.  Ebbert,  Director,  Homeland  Security  for  New  Orleans, 
 Hurricane  Katrina:  Preparedness  and  Response  by  the  State  of  Louisiana,  Before  the  Select  Bipartisan  Committee  to  Investigate  the  Preparation  for  and  Response  to  Hurricane  Katrina,  United  States  House  of  Representatives,  at  3-  4 


 (Dec.  14,  2005),  available  a  http://  katrina.  house.  gov/  hearings/  12_  14_  05/  ebbert_  121405.  doc  .  110 
 See  Written  Statement  of  Kelly  Kirwin,  Vice  President,  Motorola  Comm.  &  Electronics,  Before  the  FCCs  Independent  Panel  Reviewing  the  Impact  of  Hurricane  Katrina,  at  5  (Jan.  30,  2006)  [hereinafter  Kirwin  Jan.  30 


 Written  Statement]  (in  some  major  cities  (e.  g.,  New  York,  Los  Angeles,  San  Francisco),  the  700  MHz  spectrum  would  not  be  available  to  first  responders). 
 111  See  id. 
 112  Written  Statement  of  Sheriff  Kevin  Beary,  Major  County  Sheriffs  Assn.  at  1  (Jan.  30,  2006)  [hereinafter 
 Beary  Jan.  30  Written  Statement].  113 
 Saussy  Mar.  6  Oral  Testimony,  Tr.  at  43-  44.  114 
 Beary  Jan.  30  Written  Statement  at  1.  115 
 Presentation  of  Sheriff  Ted  Sexton,  Sr.  National  Sheriffs  Assn  at  5  (Jan.  30,  2006);  McEwen  Mar.  6  Oral  Testimony,  Tr.  at  35-  36. 


 116  McEwen  Mar.  6  Written  Statement  at  5-  6. 
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 employees  to  support  their  customers.  117  Similarly,  M/  A-  Com  supported  the  restoration  and  maintenance  of  the  New  Orleans  800  MHz  system  as  well  as  the  systems  for  Mobile,  Biloxi, 
 Gulfport,  and  St.  Tammany  Parish.  118  Reports  indicate  that  these  efforts  with  established  vendors  were  generally  well-  executed,  except  for  problems  with  access  into  New  Orleans. 


 However,  the  Panel  was  made  aware  of  a  variety  of  non-  traditional,  alternative  technologies  that  could  have  served  as  effective,  back-  up  communications  for  public  safety  until  their  primary 
 systems  were  repaired.  As  noted  in  Section  I,  satellite  infrastructure  was  generally  unaffected  by  the  storm  and  could  have  provided  a  viable  back-  up  system.  Two-  way  paging  operations 
 remained  generally  operational  during  the  storm  and  did  provide  communications  capabilities  for  some  police,  fire  emergency  medical  personnel,  but  could  have  been  more  widely  utilized.  119 
 Other  types  of  non-  traditional  technology  that  can  be  deployed  quickly,  such  as  WiFi  and  WiMax,  or  self-  contained  communications  vehicles,  could  also  have  been  effectively  utilized. 
 These  all  appear  deserving  of  exploration  as  back-  up  communications  options  to  primary  public  safety  systems. 


 First  responders  lack  of  training  on  alternative,  back-  up  communications  equipment  was  also  an  impediment  in  the  recovery  effort.  120  This  lack  of  training  may  have  accounted  for  a  sizeable 
 number  of  communications  failures  during  the  first  48  hours  after  Katrina.  121  Public  safety  officials  noted  that  that  there  was  little  time  after  Katrina  to  investigate  the  capabilities  of  new 
 technologies  for  which  none  of  their  personnel  had  been  adequately  trained.  This  highlights  the  need  for  public  safety  entities  to  have  contingency  communications  plans  with  training  as  a  key 
 component.  The  lack  of  training  issue  evidenced  itself  in  particular  with  the  distribution  of  satellite  phones.  These  phones  proved  to  be  a  beneficial  resource  to  some,  while  others 
 described  the  service  as  spotty  and  capacity  strained.  In  many  cases,  it  appears  that  complaints  about  spotty  coverage  really  resulted  from  the  users  lack  of  understanding  about  how  to  use  the 
 phone  (e.  g.,  some  satellite  phones  have  a  unique  dialing  pattern  and  they  generally  do  not  work  indoors).  122  However,  the  uncontrolled  distribution  of  satellite  phones  could  also  have  triggered 
 capacity  issues  in  certain  areas.  123  Additionally,  public  safety  officials  reminded  the  Panel  that  users  must  be  properly  trained  before  they  can  be  expected  to  competently  use  technologies 
 during  high  stress  events.  124 


 117  Kirwin  Jan.  30  Written  Statement  at  2. 
 118  Comments  of  M/  A-  Com  at  7  (Jan.  30,  2006). 
 119  Vincent  Kelly-  USA  Mobility  Mar.  6  Written  Testimony  at  7-  9;  Deer  Mar.  6  Oral  Testimony,  Tr.  at  122-  23. 
 120  See,  e.  g.,  Written  Statement  of  James  Monroe  III,  Chief  Executive  Officer,  Globalstar  LLC,  Before  the 
 FCCs  Independent  Panel  Reviewing  the  Impact  of  Hurricane  Katrina  at  4  (Mar.  6,  2006)  [hereinafter  Monroe-Globalstar  Written  Statement]  (some  first  responders  failed  to  keep  handset  batteries  charged,  others  did  not  realize 


 that  satellite  phones  require  a  clear  line  of  sight  between  the  handset  and  the  satellite).  121 
 Id.  122 
 Cavossa-  SIA  Written  Testimony  at  4-  5.  123 
 See  Report  of  Ed  Smith,  Chief,  Baton  Rouge  Fire  Department,  Hurricane  Katrina  Independent  Panel  Meeting,  at  1  (Jan.  30,  2006)  [hereinafter  Written  Report  of  Ed  Smith]. 


 124  See,  e.  g.,  Scholl  Oral  Testimony,  Tr.  at  57-  58,  61-  62. 
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 Finally,  it  seems  that  communications  assets  that  were  available  and  could  have  been  used  by  first  responders  were  not  requested  or  deployed.  There  have  been  reports  that  federal 
 government  communications  assets  operated  and  maintained  by  FEMA  and  USDA  were  available,  but  not  utilized,  for  state  and  local  public  safety  operations.  125  This  underutilization 
 may  have  been  due  to  the  fact  that  FEMAs  pre-  staged  communications  vehicles  apparently  were  located  250-  350  miles  away  from  the  devastated  areas,  126  and  that  FEMA  did  not  request 
 deployment  of  these  vehicles  until  twenty-  four  hours  after  landfall.  127  Further,  first  responders  were  not  made  aware  of  these  assets  and/  or  did  not  know  how  to  request  them.  128  As  noted 
 above,  many  public  safety  officials  failed  to  subscribe  to  the  GETS,  TSP  and  WPS  priority  programs,  despite  their  eligibility.  129  Communications  assets  made  available  by  the  private 
 sector  also  appear  to  have  been  underutilized  by  first  responders.  The  Panel  heard  that  manufacturers  of  alternative  public  safety  communications  systems  were  unable  to  gain  the 
 attention  of  key  public  safety  officials  to  effectuate  their  proposed  donation  of  equipment  and  services.  Some  offered  equipment  or  access  to  their  network  in  Katrinas  aftermath  but  found 
 no  takers.  130  These  and  other  outlets  could  have  provided  some  measure  of  communications  capabilities,  while  repairs  to  primary  systems  were  completed. 


 B.  Lack  of  Interoperability. 
 Because  of  its  scope  and  severity,  Hurricane  Katrina  demanded  a  coordinated  response  from  federal  and  affected  state  and  local  agencies,  as  well  as  volunteers  from  states  both  neighboring 


 and  distant.  The  Panel  heard  evidence  that,  in  many  cases,  responders  in  different  agencies  were  unable  to  communicate  due  to  incompatible  frequency  assignments.  131  When  the  existing 
 infrastructure  for  the  New  Orleans  system  was  incapacitated  by  flooding,  communications  were  almost  completely  thwarted  as  too  many  users  attempted  to  use  the  three  mutual  aid  channels  in 
 the  800  MHz  band.  132  In  addition,  communications  between  the  military  and  first  responders 
 125  The  Federal  Response  To  Hurricane  Katrina  Lessons  Learned,  February  2006,  at  55. 
 126  Senate  Report  on  Katrina  at  12-  19  (citing  Committee  staff  interview  of  James  Attaway, 
 Telecommunications  Specialist,  Region  VI,  FEMA,  conducted  on  Jan.  13,  2006).  127 
 Senate  Report  on  Katrina  at  12-  19  (citing  Committee  staff  interview  of  William  Milani,  Chief  Mobile  Operations  Section,  FEMA,  conducted  on  Jan.  13,  2006). 


 128  See,  e.  g.,  Monroe-  Globalstar  Written  Statement  at  5  (first  responders  generally  did  not  have  pre-  emergency 
 deployment  plans  that  they  could  invoke  in  advance  of  the  actual  emergency).  129 
 During  and  after  Katrina,  the  NCS  issued  1,000  new  GETS  access  code  numbers  to  first  responders,  and  the  GETS  system  was  used  to  make  more  than  35,  000  calls  between  August  28  and  September  9.  House  Report  at 


 176.  During  Katrina,  the  NCS  enabled  and  distributed  more  than  4,  000  new  WPS  phones.  Id.  The  NCS  also  completed  more  than  1,500  TSP  assignments  following  Hurricane  Katrina.  Id.  at  177.  It  would  have  been  helpful  if 
 these  assets  had  been  in  place  before  the  disaster  and  first  responders  were  fully  trained  in  how  to  use  them.  130 
 Statement  of  Jerry  Knoblach,  Chairman  &  CEO,  Space  Data  Corporation,  Before  the  Federal  Communications  Commissions  Independent  Panel  Reviewing  the  Impact  of  Hurricane  Katrina  on  Communications 


 Networks,  at  6  (Mar.  7,  2006).  131 
 A  Failure  to  Communicate:  A  Stocktake  of  Government  Inaction  to  Address  Communications  Interoperability  Failures  Following  Hurricane  Katrina,  First  Response  Coalition,  December  2005. 


 132  Sauter  Written  Statement  at  1;  Written  Report  of  Ed  Smith  at  1. 
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 also  appeared  to  suffer  from  lack  of  interoperability.  133  In  some  cases,  the  military  was  reduced  to  using  human  runners  to  physically  carry  messages  between  deployed  units  and  first 
 responders.  134  In  another  case,  a  military  helicopter  had  to  drop  a  message  in  a  bottle  to  warn  first  responders  about  a  dangerous  gas  leak.  135 


 While  most  observers  characterized  operability  as  the  primary  communications  failure  following  Katrina,  136  increased  ability  to  interoperate  with  other  agencies  would  have  provided 
 greater  redundant  communications  paths  and  a  more  coordinated  response.  While  technological  solutions,  such  as  IP  gateways  to  integrate  frequencies  across  multiple  bands,  137  are  a  critical  tool 
 for  improving  interoperability,  the  Panel  was  reminded  that  technology  is  not  the  sole  driver  of  an  optimal  solution.  138  Training,  agreement  on  standard  operating  procedures,  governance  or 
 leadership  and  proper  usage  are  all  critical  elements  of  the  interoperability  continuum.  139  However,  the  Panel  heard  testimony  that  Project  SAFECOM,  which  is  intended  to  provide  a 
 solution  for  interoperability  among  Federal,  state  and  local  officials,  will  take  years  to  achieve  its  objectives.  140  However,  the  Panel  is  also  aware  of  more  expedient  proposals,  such  as  the  M/  A-COM, 
 Inc.  proposal  to  mandate  construction  of  all  Federal  and  non-  Federal  mutual  aid  channels  to  provide  baseline  interoperability  to  all  emergency  responders  that  operate  across  multiple 
 frequency  bands  using  disparate  technologies.  141 


 133  See  Written  Statement  of  Dr.  William  W.  Pinsky  on  behalf  of  the  American  Hospital  Association,  The  State 
 of  Interoperable  Communications:  Perspectives  from  the  Field,  Before  the  Subcommittee  on  Emergency  Preparedness,  Science,  and  Technology,  Committee  on  Homeland  Security,  United  States  House  of  Representatives, 


 at  5  (Feb.  15,  2006),  available  at  http://  hsc.  house.  gov/  files/  TestimonyPinsky.  pdf.  134 
 See,  e.  g.,  Written  Statement  of  The  Honorable  Timothy  J.  Roemer,  Director,  Center  for  National  Policy,  Public  Safety  Communications  From  9/  11  to  Katrina:  Critical  Public  Policy  Lessons,  Before  the  Subcommittee  on 


 Telecommunications  and  the  Internet,  Committee  on  Energy  and  Commerce,  United  States  House  of  Representatives,  at  5  (Sept.  29,  2005),  available  at 
 http://  energycommerce.  house.  gov/  108/  hearings/  09292005Hearing1648/  Roemer.  pdf  (describing  the  use  of  human  couriers  by  the  National  Guard). 
 135  Heather  Greenfield,  Katrina  Revealed  Gaps  In  Emergency  Response  System,  THE  WASH.  TIMES,  Dec.  28, 
 2005,  at  B1,  available  at  http://  washingtontimes.  com/  metro/  20051227-  095134-  3753r.  htm.  136 
 The  Federal  Response  To  Hurricane  Katrina  Lessons  Learned,  February  2006,  at  55;  Saussy  Mar.  6  Oral  Testimony,  Tr.  at  44. 


 137  See,  e.  g.,  Presentation  to  the  Meeting  of  the  Independent  Panel  Reviewing  the  Impact  of  Hurricane  Katrina 
 on  Communications  Networks,  Dr.  John  Vaughan,  Vice  President  TYCO  Electronics:  M/  A-  COM,  March  6,  2006;  see  also  Presentation  to  the  FCC's  Independent  Panel  Reviewing  the  Impact  of  Hurricane  Katrina  on 


 Communications  Networks,  Wesley  D.  Smith,  Technical  Director,  ARINC  (Mar.  7,  2006).  138 
 See  Interoperability  Continuum  Brochure,  Project  Safecom,  Dept.  of  Homeland  Security  (April  5,  2005),  available  at  http://  www.  safecomprogram.  gov/  NR/  rdonlyres/  5C103F66-  A36E-  4DD1-  A00A-54C477B47AFC/ 


 0/  ContinuumBrochure40505.  pdf.  139 
 Id.  at  4.  140 
 Oral  Testimony  of  Dr.  David  G.  Boyd,  Director  of  SAFECOM,  Dept.  of  Homeland  Security,  Tr.  at  29-  30  (Apr.  18,  2006);  see  also  Stephen  Losey,  Defense  re-  examines  homeland  role,  tactics,  Federal  Times.  com  (Oct.  18, 


 2005),  available  at  http://  www.  federaltimes.  com/  index.  php?  S=  1174164  .  141 
 See  Further  Comments  of  M/  A-  Com,  Inc.  (May  30,  2006). 
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 C.  PSAP  Rerouting. 
 When  a  PSAP  becomes  disabled,  911  emergency  calls  from  the  public  are  typically  diverted  to  a  secondary  neighboring  PSAP  using  preconfigured  traffic  routes.  In  many  cases,  Katrina  disabled 


 both  the  primary  and  secondary  PSAPs,  which  resulted  in  many  unanswered  emergency  calls.  Additionally,  many  PSAPs  in  Louisiana  did  not  have  protocols  in  place  to  identify  where  911 
 calls  should  go  and  had  not  arranged  for  any  rerouting,  resulting  in  dropped  emergency  calls.  142  The  Panel  heard  testimony  that  Katrina  has  highlighted  a  need  to  identify  additional  back-  up 
 PSAPs  at  remote  locations.  However,  FCC  regulations  may  currently  restrict  the  ability  of  local  phone  companies  to  establish  pre-  configured  routes  across  LATA  boundaries.  143  In  addition,  the 
 routing  of  calls  to  more  distant  PSAPs  would  require  specific  planning  to  ensure  appropriate  and  timely  response  to  emergency  calls. 


 D.  Emergency  Medical  Communications. 
 There  are  indications  that  the  emergency  medical  community  was  lacking  in  contingency  communications  planning  and  information  about  technologies  and  services  that  might  address 


 their  critical  communications  needs.  144  In  particular,  this  group  of  first  responders  did  not  seem  to  avail  itself  of  existing  priority  communications  services,  such  as  GETS,  WPS  and  TSP.  It  also 
 appeared  that  emergency  medical  personnel  were  not  always  integrated  into  a  localitys  public  safety  communications  planning. 


 IV.  Emergency  Communications  to  the  Public. 
 The  communications  infrastructure,  in  all  of  its  forms,  is  a  key  asset  in  delivering  information  to  the  American  public.  In  emergencies  and  disaster  situations,  ensuring  public  safety  is  the  first 


 priority.  The  use  of  communications  networks  to  disseminate  reliable  and  relevant  information  to  the  public  is  critical    before,  during  and  after  such  events.  Moreover,  to  the  extent  a  more 
 well-  informed  citizenry  is  better  able  to  prepare  for  and  respond  to  disasters,  there  should  be  less  strain  on  already  taxed  resources,  thereby  benefiting  recovery  efforts. 


 The  Emergency  Alert  System  (  EAS)  and  its  predecessor  systems  have  long  made  use  of  broadcast  radio  and  television  stations  as  the  principal  tools  for  communicating  with  the  public 
 about  emergencies  and  disaster  situations.  The  Panel  heard  stories  of  heroic  efforts  by  broadcasters  and  cable  operators  to  provide  members  of  the  public  impacted  by  Katrina  with 
 important  storm-  related  information.  However,  there  were  also  reports  of  missed  opportunities  to  utilize  the  EAS  and  limitations  in  existing  efforts  to  deliver  emergency  information  to  all 
 members  of  the  public.  New  technologies  may  address  some  of  these  limitations  by  facilitating  the  provision  of  both  macro-  and  micro-  level  information  about  impending  disasters  and 
 recovery  efforts. 


 142  House  Report  at  173. 
 143  Bailey  Jan.  30  Written  Testimony  at  3. 
 144  See  House  Report  at  269. 
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 A.  Lack  of  Activation. 
 The  EAS  can  be  activated  by  the  federal  government  as  well  as  by  state  and  local  officials  to  disseminate  official  news  and  information  to  the  public  in  the  event  of  an  emergency.  The  Panel 


 understands  that  the  National  Weather  Service  used  the  EAS  to  provide  severe  weather  warnings  to  citizens  in  the  Gulf  States  in  advance  of  Katrina  making  landfall.  145  However,  the  Panel  also 
 heard  that  the  EAS  was  not  utilized  by  state  and  local  officials  to  provide  localized  emergency  evacuation  and  other  important  information.  146  That  means  that  an  existing  and  effective  means 
 of  distributing  timely  information  to  our  citizens  was  not  fully  utilized. 
 B.  Limitations  in  Coverage. 
 The  primary  source  of  emergency  information  about  Katrina  came  through  broadcast  (including  satellite  broadcast)  and  cable  infrastructure,  whether  through  the  EAS  or  local  or  national  news 


 programming.  Citizens  who  were  not  watching  TV  or  listening  to  the  radio  at  the  time  of  the  broadcast  missed  this  emergency  information.  Damage  to  communications  infrastructure  made  it 
 difficult  for  news  and  emergency  information  to  reach  the  public,  as  did  power  outages.  147  As  a  result,  a  fairly  large  percentage  of  the  public  likely  were  uninformed.  The  Panel  heard  about 
 notification  technologies  that  may  permit  emergency  messages  to  be  sent  to  wireline  and  wireless  telephones  as  well  as  personal  digital  assistants  and  other  mobile  devices.  148  For 
 example,  the  Association  of  Public  Television  Stations  has  developed  a  means  for  utilizing  the  digital  transmissions  of  public  television  stations  to  datacast  emergency  information  to 
 computers  or  wireless  devices.  149  In  addition,  the  St.  Charles  Parish  Public  School  District  used  a  telephone-  based,  time-  sensitive  notification  technology  to  send  out  recorded  evacuation 
 messages  to  over  21,000  phone  numbers  in  advance  of  Katrinas  landfall.  150  The  District  continued  to  utilize  this  technology  to  provide  members  of  the  public  with  specific  information 
 regarding  conditions  in  the  community  in  the  storms  aftermath.  While  the  use  of  phone-  based  technologies  for  post-  disaster  communications  is  necessarily  dependent  on  the  state  of  the 
 telephone  network,  such  technologies    which  are  less  subject  to  disruption  from  power  outages    offer  the  potential  for  complementing  the  traditional  broadcast-  based  EAS. 


 The  Panel  also  understands  that  the  FCC  is  considering  extending  the  reach  of  the  existing  emergency  alert  system  to  other  technologies,  such  as  wireless  and  the  Internet.  151  The  Panel 
 145  The  Federal  Response  To  Hurricane  Katrina  Lessons  Learned,  February  2006,  at  28. 
 146  Comments  of  Hilary  Styron  of  the  National  Organization  on  Disability  Emergency  Preparedness  Initiative 
 at  2  (Mar.  6,  2006)  [hereinafter  Styron  Mar.  6  Written  Testimony].  147 
 Martin  Sept.  29  Written  Statement  at  2.  148 
 Comments  of  Notification  Technologies,  Inc.,  EB  Docket  No.  04-  296  (Jan.  24,  2006).  149 
 Written  Testimony  of  John  M.  Lawson,  President  and  CEO,  Association  of  Public  Television  Stations,  Before  the  FCCs  Independent  Panel  Reviewing  the  Impact  of  Hurricane  Katrina  on  Communications  Networks 


 (April  18,  2006). 
 150  Id.  at  12. 
 151  Review  of  the  Emergency  Alert  System,  First  Report  and  Order  and  Further  Notice  of  Proposed 
 Rulemaking,  20  FCC  Rcd  18,  625,  18,  653  (  69)  (2005). 
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 understands  that  there  are  ongoing  collaborative  industry-  government  efforts  to  overcome  the  hurdles  to  extending  alerts  to  other  technologies. 
 C.  Reaching  Persons  with  Disabilities  and  Non-  English-  Speaking  Americans. 
 Ensuring  emergency  communications  reach  all  Americans,  even  those  with  hearing  and  visual  disabilities  or  who  do  not  speak  English,  remains  a  major  challenge.  Unfortunately,  accessibility 


 to  suitable  communications  devices  for  the  deaf  and  hard  of  hearing  was  difficult  during  and  after  Hurricane  Katrina.  152  This  problem  was  intensified  by  the  fact  that  Katrina  brought 
 humidity,  rain,  flooding,  and  high  temperatures  (which  translate  into  perspiration),  all  of  which  reduce  the  effectiveness  of  hearing  aids  and  cochlear  implants.  153  For  persons  with  visual 
 impairments,  telephone  and  broadcast  outages  made  information  very  hard  to  obtain,  and  many  people  with  vision  loss  were  unable  to  evacuate.  154 


 The  broadcast  industry  has  taken  significant  steps  to  provide  on-  screen  sign  language  interpreters  and  close  captioning.  Broadcasters  also  sometimes  broadcast  critical  information  in  a  second 
 language  where  there  are  a  significant  number  of  non-  English  speaking  residents  in  the  community.  For  example,  a  Spanish-  language  radio  station  in  the  New  Orleans  area  provided 
 warnings,  and  information  about  family  members  and  disaster  relief  assistance.  155 
 However,  the  Panel  also  heard  that  written  or  captioned  information  was  at  times  inadequate  and  that  station  logos  or  captions  sometimes  covered  up  the  sign-  language  interpreter  or  close-captioning. 
 156  Additionally,  personnel  who  provided  these  critical  services  often  evacuated, 
 leaving  the  station  with  no  ability  to  deliver  these  services.  Further,  specialized  radios  relied  upon  by  the  hearing-  impaired,  because  they  can  display  text  messages,  are  not  currently  designed 


 to  be  battery-  operated  and  thus  became  useless  when  power  goes  out.  157  The  distribution  of  emergency  weather  information  in  languages  other  than  English  appeared  limited,  based 
 primarily  on  the  willingness  and  ability  of  local  weather  forecasting  offices  and  the  availability 


 152  See,  e.  g.,  Styron  Mar.  6  Written  Testimony  at  2  (over  80%  of  shelters  did  not  have  access  to 
 communications  devices  for  the  deaf;  over  60%  of  shelters  did  not  have  captioning  capabilities  utilized  on  the  televisions  screens  and  several  broadcasters  did  not  caption  their  emergency  information,  even  though  it  is  required 


 by  the  FCC);  Oral  Testimony  of  Cheryl  Heppner,  Vice  Chair,  Deaf  and  Hard  of  Hearing  Consumer  Advocacy  Network,  FCC  Independent  Panel  Reviewing  the  Impact  of  Hurricane  Katrina  on  Communications  Networks,  Tr.  at 
 283  (Mar.  6,  2006)  [hereinafter  Heppner  Mar.  6  Oral  Testimony]  (many  television  stations  did  not  provide  visual  information). 
 153  Heppner  Mar.  6  Oral  Testimony,  Tr.  at  282. 
 154  Comment  of  the  American  Council  of  the  Blind  and  American  Foundation  for  the  Blind,  at  2  (May  3, 
 2006).  155 
 See,  e.  g.,  Comments  by  the  National  Council  of  La  Raza,  In  the  Eye  of  the  Storm:  How  the  Govt  and  Private  Response  to  Hurricane  Katrina  Failed  Latinos  at  5  (Apr.  24,  2006)  [hereinafter  La  Raza  Comments]. 


 156  Heppner  Mar.  6  Oral  Testimony,  Tr.  at  283-  84;  Remarks  by  Cheryl  Heppner,  Deaf  and  Hard  of  Hearing 
 Consumer  Advocacy  Network,  at  2  (Mar.  6,  2006).  157 
 Heppner  Mar.  6.  Oral  Testimony  at  283-  85. 
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 of  ethnic  media  outlets.  158  Innovative  notification  technologies,  such  as  those  described  above,  may  provide  a  partial  answer  to  the  emergency  communications  needs  of  persons  with 
 disabilities  and  non-  English-  speaking  members  of  the  public  as  such  technologies  can  be  used  to  deliver  targeted  messages  in  a  specified  format. 


 Relatedly,  individuals  with  disabilities  often  had  a  difficult  time  using  communications  capabilities  at  shelters  or  other  recovery  areas.  159  Phone  and  computer  banks  provided  at  these 
 locations  generally  did  not  have  capabilities  to  assist  the  hearing  or  speech-  impaired.  160 
 D.  Inconsistent  or  Incorrect  Emergency  Information. 
 One  of  the  benefits  of  the  EAS  is  that  it  facilitates  the  communication  of  a  uniform  message  to  the  public  by  an  authoritative  or  credible  spokesperson,  thereby  minimizing  confusion  and 


 contributing  to  an  orderly  public  response.  However,  as  noted  above,  the  EAS  was  not  activated  in  several  jurisdictions.  Moreover,  while  broadcasters,  cable  operators  and  satellite  providers 
 went  to  considerable  lengths  to  provide  the  public  with  information  regarding  Katrina  and  its  impact,  the  Panel  understands  that  inconsistent  or  erroneous  information  about  critical 
 emergency  issues  was  sometimes  provided  within  the  affected  region.  For  example,  information  regarding  conditions  in  one  portion  of  New  Orleans  did  not  necessarily  accurately  depict 
 conditions  in  other  areas  of  the  city.  The  dissemination  of  targeted  information  from  an  authoritative  source  through  the  EAS  or  other  notification  technologies  might  have  assisted  with 
 this  problem. 


 158  See,  e.  g.,  La  Raza  Comments  at  5  (citing  Interview  with  official  at  the  National  Weather  Service,  Jan.  6, 
 2006).  159 
 Id.;  Styron  Mar.  6  Written  Testimony  at  2.  160 
 See,  e.  g.,  id.;  Comments  of  the  Consortium  for  Citizens  With  Disabilities  at  1-  2  (April  13,  2006);  Styron  Mar.  6  Oral  Testimony,  Tr.  at  291. 
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 RECOMMENDATIONS 
 Based  upon  its  observations  regarding  the  impact  of  Hurricane  Katrina  on  communications  networks  and  the  sufficiency  and  effectiveness  of  the  recovery  effort,  the  Panel  has  developed  a 
 number  of  recommendations  to  the  FCC  for  improving  disaster  preparedness,  network  reliability  and  communications  among  first  responders.  As  with  its  observations,  these  recommendations 
 are  grouped  into  four  sections.  The  first  contains  recommendations  for  steps  to  better  pre-position  the  communications  industry  and  the  government  for  disasters  in  order  to  achieve 
 greater  network  reliability  and  resiliency.  The  second  section  presents  suggestions  for  improving  recovery  coordination  to  address  existing  shortcomings  and  to  maximize  the  use  of  existing 
 resources.  The  third  section  focuses  on  first  responder  communications  issues,  recommending  essential  steps  for  improving  the  operability  and  interoperability  of  public  safety  and  911 
 communications  in  times  of  crisis.  And  finally,  the  last  group  of  recommendations  presents  the  Panels  suggestions  for  improving  emergency  communications  to  the  public.  All  of  our  citizens 
 deserve  to  be  sufficiently  informed  should  a  major  disaster  strike  in  the  future. 


 Pre-  positioning  for  Disasters    A  Proactive,  Rather  than  Reactive  Program  for  Network  Reliability  and  Resiliency 
 1.  Pre-  positioning  for  the  Communications  Industry    A  Readiness  Checklist    The  FCC  should  work  with  and  encourage  each  industry  sector,  through  their  organizations  or 
 associations,  to  develop  and  publicize  sector-  specific  readiness  recommendations.  Such  a  checklist  should  be  based  upon  relevant  industry  best  practices  as  set  forth  by  groups 
 such  as  the  Media  Security  and  Reliability  Council  (  MSRC)  and  the  Network  Reliability  and  Interoperability  Council  (  NRIC).  Any  such  checklist  should  include  the 
 following  elements: 
 a.  Developing  and  implementing  business  continuity  plans,  which  would  at  a  minimum  address: 


 i.  power  reserves,  ii.  cache  of  essential  replacement  equipment, 
 iii.  adequate  sparing  levels,  iv.  credentialing, 
 v.  Emergency  Operations  Center  (  EOC)  coordination,  vi.  training/  disaster  drills,  and 
 vii.  appropriate  disaster  preparedness  checklists; 
 b.  conducting  exercises  to  evaluate  these  plans  and  train  personnel; 
 c.  developing  and  practicing  a  communications  plan  to  identify  key  players  and  multiple  means  of  contacting  them  (including  alternate  communications  channels, 


 such  as  alpha  pagers,  Internet,  satellite  phones,  VOIP,  private  lines,  BlackBerry-type  devices,  etc.); 


 d.  routinely  archiving  critical  system  backups  and  providing  for  their  storage  in  a  secure  off-  site  facilities. 
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 2.  Pre-  positioning  for  Public  Safety    An  Awareness  Program  for  Non-  Traditional  Emergency  Alternatives    The  FCC  should  take  steps  to  educate  the  public  safety 
 community  about  the  availability  and  capabilities  of  non-  traditional  technologies  that  might  provide  effective  back-  up  solutions  for  existing  public  safety  communications 
 systems.  Examples  of  these  technologies  would  be  pagers,  satellite  technology  and  phones,  portable  towers  and  repeaters,  point-  to-  point  microwave  links,  license-  exempt 
 WISP  systems,  other  systems  less  reliant  on  the  PSTN,  and  bridging  technologies/  gateways  that  would  facilitate  interoperability.  One  means  for  the  FCC  to 
 do  this  would  be  to  organize  an  exhibit  area  or  demonstration  of  these  technologies  in  conjunction  with  one  or  more  large  public  safety  conferences,  such  as: 


 a.  APCO  International  Annual  Conference  and  Exposition  August  6-  10,  2006;  Orlando,  FL 
 b.  IAFC  Fire  Rescue  International  September  14-  16,  2006;  Dallas,  TX 
 c.  International  Association  of  Chiefs  of  Police  Conference  October  14-  18,  2006;  Boston,  MA 
 d.  NENA  Annual  Conference  and  Trade  Show  June  9-  14,  2007;  Fort  Worth,  TX 
 e.  National  Sheriffs  Association  Annual  Conference  June  23-  27,  2007;  Salt  Lake  City,  UT 
 f.  National  Fraternal  Order  of  Police  August  13-  16,  2007;  Louisville,  KY 
 The  FCC  should  also  consider  organizing  a  similar  exhibit/  demonstration  for  other  industry  sectors  that  might  benefit  from  this  information 


 3.  Pre-  positioning  for  FCC  Regulatory  Requirements    An  A  Priori  Program  for  Disaster  Areas    The  FCC  should  explore  amending  its  rules  to  permit  automatic  grants  of  certain 
 types  of  waivers  or  special  temporary  authority  (STA)  in  a  particular  geographic  area  if  the  President  declares  that  area  to  be  a  "disaster  area".  As  a  condition  of  the  waiver  or 
 STA,  the  FCC  could  require  verbal  or  written  notification  to  the  Commission  staff  contemporaneously  with  activation  or  promptly  after  the  fact.  Further,  the  FCC  should 
 examine  expanding  the  on-  line  filing  opportunities  for  STA  requests,  including  STA  requests  for  AM  broadcast  stations.  Examples  of  possible  rule  waivers  and  STAs  to 
 study  for  this  treatment  include: 
 a.  Wireline. 
 i.  Waiver  of  certain  carrier  change  requirements  to  allow  customers  whose  long  distance  service  was  disrupted  to  be  connected  to  an  operational  long 


 distance  provider.  ii.  Waiver  of  aging  residential  numbers  rules  for  customers  in  the  affected 
 area.  This  allows  carriers  to  disconnect  temporarily  customers  telephone  service,  upon  request,  and  reinstate  the  same  number  when  the  service  is 
 reconnected. 
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 iii.  Waiver  of  number  portability  requirements  to  allow  rerouting  of  traffic  to  switches  unaffected  by  the  crisis. 
 iv.  Waiver  of  reporting  filings,  such  as  Form  477  on  local  competition  and  broadband  data,  during  the  crisis. 


 b.  Wireless. 
 i.  Waiver  of  amateur  radio  and  license  exempt  rules  permitting  transmissions  necessary  to  meet  essential  communications  needs. 


 ii.  Waiver  of  application  filing  deadlines  (e.  g.,  renewals,  construction  notifications,  discontinuance  notices,  etc.),  construction  requirements,  and 
 discontinuance  of  service  requirements.  iii.  Streamlined  STA  process,  such  that  parties  in  the  affected  area  may 
 simply  notify  the  FCC  in  writing  or  verbally  of  a  need  to  operate  in  order  to  restore  service. 


 c.  Broadcast  and  Cable. 
 i.  Waiver  of  non-  commercial  educational  (  NCE)  rules  to  permit  NCE  television  and  radio  stations  in  the  affected  area  to  simulcast  and 


 rebroadcast  commercial  station  programming  during  a  crisis.  ii.  Waiver  of  requirements  for  notifying  the  FCC  of  use  of  emergency 
 antennas  within  24  hours.  iii.  Waiver  of  limits  on  AM  nighttime  operations,  so  long  as  operation  is 
 conducted  on  a  noncommercial  basis.  iv.  Waiver  of  rules  on  limited  and  discontinued  operations. 
 v.  Tolling  of  broadcast  station  construction  deadlines.  vi.  Automatic  STAs,  or  STAs  granted  through  written  or  oral  notification,  for 
 broadcast  stations  to  go  silent.  vii.  Waiver  of  restrictions  on  simulcast  programming  of  commonly  owned 
 stations  within  the  same  band.  viii.  Waiver  of  location  and  staffing  requirements  of  a  main  studio  within  the 
 community.  ix.  Waiver  of  activation  and  post-  event  Section  73.1250  reporting 
 requirements  related  to  transmission  of  point-  to-  point  communications  during  a  declared  emergency. 


 d.  Satellite. 
 i.  Waiver  of  requirements  for  notifying  the  FCC  of  use  of  emergency  antenna  equipment  within  24  hours. 


 ii.  Streamlined  STA  process  for  satellite  operators  responding  to  a  declared  emergency. 


 4.  Pre-  positioning  for  Government  Outage  Monitoring    A  Single  Repository  and  Contact  with  Consistent  Data  Collection    The  FCC  should  coordinate  with  other  federal  and 
 state  agencies  to  identify  a  single  repository/  point  of  contact  for  communications  outage  information  in  the  wake  of  an  emergency.  The  Panel  suggests  that  the  FCC  is  the  federal 
 agency  best  situated  to  perform  this  function.  The  FCC  should  work  with  affected 
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 industry  members  and  their  trade  associations  to  establish  a  consolidated  data  set  and  geographic  area  for  data  collection.  Once  broad  agreement  is  reached  on  the  appropriate 
 outage  information  to  be  collected,  it  should  be  consistently  applied  and  not  subject  to  routine  changes.  To  the  extent  practical,  the  frequency  of  voluntary  reporting  and 
 duration  of  reporting  requirements  should  be  specified  as  part  of  any  emergency  outage  reporting  plan.  The  Panel  suggests  that  reporting  no  more  than  once  a  day  would  strike 
 the  right  balance  between  supplying  important  outage  information  and  not  distracting  resources  from  critical  recovery  efforts.  Additionally,  any  proprietary  information  that  is 
 gathered  through  voluntary  outage  reporting  must  be  kept  confidential,  with  only  aggregated  information  provided  to  appropriate  government  entities,  such  as  the  local 
 EOC,  during  a  crisis  situation.  Any  carrier-  specific  data  should  be  disclosed  to  other  agencies  only  with  appropriate  confidentiality  safeguards  (such  as  non-  disclosure 
 agreements)  in  place. 


 Recovery  Coordination    Critical  Steps  for  Addressing  Existing  Shortcomings  and  Maximizing  Use  of  Existing  Resources 
 1.  Remedying  Existing  Shortcomings    National  Credentialing  Guidelines  for  Communications  Infrastructure  Providers    The  Panel  generally  supports  the  National 
 Security  Telecommunications  Advisory  Committees  (  NSTACs)  recommendation  for  a  national  standard  for  credentialing  telecommunications  repair  workers,  but  believes  this 
 should  be  broadened  to  include  repair  workers  of  all  communications  infrastructure  providers  (including  wireline,  wireless,  WISP,  satellite,  cable  and  broadcasting 
 infrastructure  providers).  Specifically,  the  Panel  recommends  that  the  FCC  work  with  other  appropriate  federal  departments  and  agencies  and  the  communications  industry  to 
 promptly  develop  national  credentialing  requirements  and  process  guidelines  for  enabling  communications  infrastructure  providers  and  their  contracted  workers  access  to  the 
 affected  area  post-  disaster.  The  FCC  should  encourage  states  to  develop  and  implement  a  credentialing  program  consistent  with  these  guidelines  as  promptly  as  possible  and 
 encourage  appropriate  communications  industry  members  to  secure  any  necessary  credentialing.  Under  this  program,  credentials  should  be  available  to  be  issued  to 
 communications  infrastructure  providers  at  any  time  during  the  year,  including  before,  during  and  after  a  disaster  situation.  The  credentials  should  be  issued  directly  to 
 communications  infrastructure  providers,  which  will  then  be  responsible  for  distributing  these  credentials  to  their  employees  and  contracted  workers.  These  credentials,  together 
 with  company-  issued  employee  or  contractor  identification  should  be  sufficient  to  permit  access.  As  a  condition  of  credentialing,  the  program  should  require  that  communications 
 infrastructure  providers  receiving  credentials  ensure  that  their  employees  and  contracted  workers  receiving  credentials  complete  basic  National  Incident  Management  System 
 (  NIMS)  training  (i.  e.,  Introduction  to  NIMS).  The  FCC  should  work  with  the  communications  industry  to  develop  an  appropriate  basic  NIMS  training  course  (no  more 
 than  one  hour)  for  communications  repair  workers  that  can  be  completed  online.  Once  developed,  this  communications-  specific  training  course  should  replace  Introduction  to 
 NIMS  as  the  requirement  for  credentialing.  The  FCC  should  also  encourage  states  to  recognize  and  accept  credentials  issued  by  other  states. 
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 2.  Remedying  Existing  Shortcomings    Emergency  Responder  Status  for  Communications  Infrastructure  Providers    The  Panel  supports  the  NSTACs 
 recommendation  that  telecommunications  infrastructure  providers  and  their  contracted  workers  be  afforded  emergency  responder  status  under  the  Stafford  Act  and  that  this 
 designation  be  incorporated  into  the  National  Response  Plan,  as  well  as  state  and  local  emergency  response  plans.  However,  the  Panel  suggests  that  this  recommendation  be 
 broadened  to  include  all  communications  infrastructure  providers  (including  wireline,  wireless,  WISP,  satellite,  cable  and  broadcasting  infrastructure  providers)  and  their 
 contracted  workers.  The  FCC  should  work  with  Congress  and  the  other  appropriate  federal  departments  and  agencies  to  implement  this  broadened  recommendation. 


 3.  Remedying  Existing  Shortcomings    Utilization  of  State/  Regional  Coordination  Bodies    The  FCC  should  work  with  state  and  local  government  and  the  communications 
 industry  (including  wireline,  wireless,  WISP,  satellite,  cable  and  broadcasting)  to  better  utilize  the  coordinating  capabilities  at  regional,  state  and  local  EOCs,  as  well  as  the  Joint 
 Field  Office  (  JFO).  The  FCC  should  encourage,  but  not  require,  each  regional,  state  and  local  EOC  and  the  JFO  to  engage  in  the  following  activities: 


 a.  Facilitate  coordination  between  communications  infrastructure  providers  (including  wireline,  wireless,  WISP,  satellite,  cable  and  broadcasting  providers, 
 where  appropriate)  and  state  and  local  emergency  preparedness  officials  (such  as  the  state  emergency  operations  center)  in  the  state  or  region  at  the  EOC  or  JFO. 
 The  parties  should  meet  on  a  periodic  basis  to  develop  channels  of  communications  (both  pre-  and  post-  disaster),  to  construct  joint  preparedness  and 
 response  plans,  and  to  conduct  joint  exercises. 
 b.  Develop  credentialing  requirements  and  procedures  for  purposes  of  allowing  communications  infrastructure  providers,  their  contracted  workers  and  private 


 security  teams,  if  any,  access  to  the  affected  area  post-  disaster.  These  requirements  and  procedures  should  be  consistent  with  any  nationally-  developed 
 credentialing  guidelines.  Where  possible,  web-  based  applications  should  be  created  to  pre-  clear  or  expedite  movement  of  communications  infrastructure 
 providers  into  a  disaster  area. 
 c.  Develop  and  facilitate  inclusion  in  the  states  Emergency  Preparedness  Plan,  where  appropriate,  one  or  more  clearly  identified  post-  disaster  coordination  areas 


 for  communications  infrastructure  providers,  their  contracted  workers,  and  private  security  teams,  if  any,  to  gather  post-  disaster  where  credentialing,  security,  escorts 
 and  further  coordination  can  be  achieved.  The  states  Emergency  Preparedness  Plan  should  describe  the  process  for  informing  communications  infrastructure 
 providers  where  these  coordination  area(  s)  will  be  located. 
 d.  Post-  disaster,  share  information  and  coordinate  resources  to  facilitate  repair  of  key  communications  infrastructure.  Specifically,  this  would  include  identifying 


 key  damaged  infrastructure;  if  necessary,  assigning  priorities  for  access  and  scarce  resources  (fuel,  security,  etc.)  to  repair  this  infrastructure.  Additionally, 
 the  coordination  body  and  staging  area  can  provide  a  means  for  industry  to  share 
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 and  maximize  scarce  resources  (share  surplus  equipment,  double  and  triple  up  on  security  escorts  to  a  particular  area,  etc.). 
 e.  Facilitate  electric  and  other  utilities  maintenance  of  priority  lists  for  commercial  power  restoration.  Include  commercial  communications  providers  on  this  priority 
 list  and  coordinate  power  restoration  activities  with  communications  restoration. 
 The  Panel  would  also  support  communications  infrastructure  providers  in  a  state  or  region  forming  an  industry-  only  group  for  disaster  planning,  coordinating  recovery 


 efforts  and  other  purposes.  Nevertheless,  the  Panel  believes  that  coordinating  capabilities  and  staffing  of  regional,  state  and  local  EOCs,  as  well  as  the  JFO,  need  to  be  better 
 utilized  for  the  purposes  described  above. 
 4.  Maximizing  Existing  Resources    Expanding  and  Publicizing  Emergency  Communications  Programs  (GETS,  WPS  and  TSP)    To  facilitate  the  use  of  existing 
 emergency  communications  services  and  programs,  the  FCC  should: 
 a.  Work  with  the  National  Communications  System  (  NCS)  to  actively  and  aggressively  promote  GETS,  WPS  and  TSP  to  all  eligible  government,  public 


 safety,  and  critical  industry  groups.  As  part  of  this  outreach  effort,  the  Commission  should  target  groups  that  have  relatively  low  levels  of  participation. 
 For  example,  the  Panel  recommends  that  the  Commission  reach  out  to  the  emergency  medical  community  and  major  trauma  centers  to  make  them  aware  of 
 the  availability  of  these  services. 
 b.  Work  with  the  NCS  to  clarify  whether  broadcast,  WISP,  satellite,  and  cable  company  repair  crews  are  eligible  for  GETS  and  WPS  under  the  Commissions 


 existing  rules.  If  so,  the  Commission  should  promote  the  availability  of  these  programs  to  those  entities  and  urge  their  subscribership.  If  the  Commission 
 determines  that  these  entities  are  not  eligible,  the  Panel  recommends  that  the  Commission  revise  its  rules  so  that  these  entities  can  subscribe  to  WPS  and 
 GETS. 
 c.  Work  with  the  NCS  to  explore  whether  it  is  technically  and  financially  feasible  for  WPS  calls  to  automatically  receive  GETS  treatment  when  they  reach  landline 


 facilities  (thus  avoiding  the  need  for  a  WPS  caller  to  also  enter  GETS  information).  The  Commission  may  desire  to  set  up  an  industry  task  force  to 
 explore  this  issue. 
 d.  Work  with  the  NCS  and  the  communications  sector  to  establish  and  promote  best  practices  to  ensure  that  all  WPS,  GETS,  and  TSP  subscribers  are  properly  trained 


 in  how  to  use  these  services. 
 5.  Maximizing  Existing  Resources    Broadening  NCC  to  Include  All  Communications  Infrastructure  Sectors    The  FCC  should  work  with  the  NCS  to  broaden  the  membership 
 of  the  National  Coordination  Center  for  Telecommunications  (  NCC)  to  include  adequate  representation  of  all  types  of  communications  systems,  including  broadcast, 
 cable,  satellite  and  other  new  technologies,  as  appropriate. 
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 6.  Maximizing  Existing  Resources    FCC  Website  for  Emergency  Coordination  Information    The  FCC  should  create  a  password-  protected  website,  accessible  by 
 credentialed  entities  (under  recovery  coordination  recommendation  #1  ),  listing  the  key  state  emergency  management  contacts  (especially  the  contacts  for  communications 
 coordinating  bodies),  as  well  as  post-  disaster  coordination  areas  for  communications  providers.  During  an  emergency,  this  website  should  be  updated  on  a  24/  7  basis. 


 7.  Maximizing  Existing  Resources    FCC  Website  for  Emergency  Response  Team  Information    The  FCC  should  create  a  website  to  publicize  the  agencys  emergency 
 response  teams  contact  information  and  procedures  for  facilitating  disaster  response  and  outage  recovery. 


 First  Responder  Communications    Essential  Steps  for  Addressing  Lessons  Learned  from  Hurricane  Katrina 
 1.  Essential  Steps  in  Pre-  positioning  Equipment,  Supplies  and  Personnel    An  Emergency  Restoration  Supply  Cache  and  Alternatives  Inventory    To  facilitate  the 
 restoration  of  public  safety  communications  capabilities,  the  FCC  should: 
 a.  Encourage  state  and  local  jurisdictions  to  retain  and  maintain,  including  through  arrangements  with  the  private  sector,  a  cache  of  equipment  components  that 


 would  be  needed  to  immediately  restore  existing  public  safety  communications  within  hours  of  a  disaster.  At  a  minimum,  the  cache  should  include  the  necessary 
 equipment  to  quickly  restore  communications  capabilities  on  all  relevant  mutual  aid  channels.  Such  a  cache  would  consist  of: 


 i.  RF  gear,  such  as  800  MHz,  UHF,  VHF,  Mutual  Aid,  IP  Gateway,  and  dispatch  consoles; 
 ii.  trailer  and  equipment  housing;  iii.  tower  system  components  (antenna  system,  hydraulic  mast); 
 iv.  power  system  components  (generator,  UPS,  batteries,  distribution  panel);  and 
 v.  fuel. 
 The  cache  should  be  maintained  as  a  regional  or  state-  wide  resource  and  located  in  areas  protected  from  disaster  impacts.  The  cache  should  be  included  as  an 


 element  of  the  National  Response  Plan. 
 b.  Encourage  state  and  local  jurisdictions  to  utilize  the  cache  through  training  exercises  on  a  regular  basis. 


 c.  Support  the  ongoing  efforts  of  the  NCC  to  develop  and  maintain  a  database  of  state  and  local  public  safety  system  information,  including  frequency  usage,  to 
 allow  for  more  efficient  spectrum  sharing,  rapid  on-  site  frequency  coordination,  and  emergency  provision  of  supplemental  equipment  in  the  event  of  system 
 failures. 
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 d.  Urge  public  safety  licensees  to  familiarize  themselves  with  alternative  communications  technologies  to  provide  communications  when  normal  public 
 safety  networks  are  down.  Such  technologies  include  satellite  telephones,  two-way  paging  devices,  and  other  technologies  less  reliant  on  the  PSTN.  Most 
 importantly,  public  safety  agencies  should  be  reminded/  encouraged  to  train  and  use  such  devices  prior  to  emergencies. 


 e.  Support  the  efforts  of  the  NCC  to  develop  an  inventory  of  available  communications  assets  (including  local,  state,  federal  civilian  and  military)  that 
 can  be  rapidly  deployed  in  the  event  of  a  catastrophic  event.  The  list  should  include  land  mobile  radios,  portable  infrastructure  equipment,  bridging 
 technologies/  gateways,  and  backup  power  system  components.  This  information  should  include  the  steps  necessary  for  requesting  the  deployment  of  these  assets. 
 The  FCC  should  work  with  the  NCC  and  the  appropriate  agencies  to  educate  key  state  and  local  emergency  response  personnel  on  the  availability  of  these  assets 
 and  how  to  request  them. 
 f.  Coordinate  with  the  NCS/  NCC  to  assure  that,  immediately  following  any  large  disaster,  there  is  an  efficient  means  by  which  federal,  state  and  local  officials  can 


 identify  and  locate  private  sector  communications  assets  that  can  be  made  rapidly  available  to  first  responders  and  relief  organizations.  One  such  means  to  be 
 considered  would  be  a  website  maintained  by  either  the  FCC  or  NCC  through  which  the  private  sector  could  register  available  assets  along  with  product 
 information.  The  website  should  be  designed  with  a  special  area  for  registering  available  equipment  to  assist  persons  with  disabilities  in  their  communications 
 needs. 
 2.  Essential  Steps  in  Enabling  Emergency  Communications  Capabilities    Facilitating  First  Responder  Interoperability    To  facilitate  interoperability  among  first  responder 
 communications,  the  FCC  should: 
 a.  Consistent  with  recent  legislation,  maintain  the  schedule  for  commencing  commercial  spectrum  auctions  before  January  28,  2008  to  fully  fund  the  $1  billion 


 public  safety  interoperability  program. 
 b.  Work  with  National  Telecommunications  and  Information  Administration  (  NTIA)  and  the  Department  of  Homeland  Security  (  DHS)  to  establish 


 appropriate  criteria  for  the  distribution  of  the  $1  billion  in  a  manner  that  best  promotes  interoperability  with  the  700  MHz  band.  Among  other  things,  such 
 criteria  should  mandate  that  any  radios  purchased  with  grant  monies  must  be  capable  of  operating  on  700  MHz  and  800  MHz  channels  established  for  mutual 
 aid  and  interoperability  voice  communications. 
 c.  Encourage  the  expeditious  development  of  regional  plans  for  the  use  of  700  MHz  systems  and  move  promptly  to  review  and  approve  such  plans. 


 d.  Expeditiously  approve  any  requests  by  broadcasters  to  terminate  analog  service  in  the  700  MHz  band  before  the  end  of  the  digital  television  transition  in  2009  in 
 order  to  allow  public  safety  users  immediate  access  to  this  spectrum. 
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 e.  Work  with  the  NTIA  and  DHS  to  develop  strategies  and  policies  to  expedite  allowing  Federal  (including  the  military),  state  and  local  agencies  to  share 
 spectrum  for  emergency  response  purposes,  particularly  the  Federal  incident  response  channels  and  channels  established  for  mutual  aid  and  interoperability. 


 f.  Publicize  interoperability  successes  and/  or  best  practices  by  public  safety  entities  to  serve  as  models  to  further  interoperability. 


 3.  Essential  Steps  in  Addressing  E-  911  Lessons  Learned    A  Plan  for  Resiliency  and  Restoration  of  E-  911  Infrastructure  and  PSAPs    In  order  to  ensure  a  more  robust  E-911 
 service,  the  FCC  should  encourage  the  implementation  of  these  best  practice  recommendations  issued  by  Focus  Group  1C  of  the  FCC-  chartered  NRIC  VII: 


 a.  Service  providers  and  network  operators  should  consider  placing  and  maintaining  911  circuits  over  diverse  interoffice  transport  facilities  (e.  g.,  geographically 
 diverse  facility  routes,  automatically  invoked  standby  routing,  diverse  digital  cross-  connect  system  services,  self-  healing  fiber  ring  topologies,  or  any 
 combination  thereof).  See  NRIC  VII  Recommendation  7-  7-  0566. 
 b.  Service  providers,  network  operators  and  property  managers  should  ensure  availability  of  emergency/  backup  power  (e.  g.,  batteries,  generators,  fuel  cells)  to 


 maintain  critical  communications  services  during  times  of  commercial  power  failures,  including  natural  and  manmade  occurrences  (e.  g.,  earthquakes,  floods, 
 fires,  power  brown/  blackouts,  terrorism).  The  emergency/  backup  power  generators  should  be  located  onsite,  when  appropriate.  See  NRIC  VII 
 Recommendation  7-  7-  5204. 
 c.  Network  operators  should  consider  deploying  dual  active  911  selective  router  architectures  to  enable  circuits  from  the  caller's  serving  end  office  to  be  split 


 between  two  selective  routers  in  order  to  eliminate  single  points  of  failure.  Diversity  should  also  be  considered  on  interoffice  transport  facilities  connecting 
 each  911  selective  router  to  the  PSAP  serving  end  office.  See  NRIC  VII  Recommendations  7-  7-  0571. 


 d.  Network  operators,  service  providers,  equipment  suppliers  and  public  safety  authorities  should  establish  alternative  methods  of  communication  for  critical 
 personnel.  See  NRIC  VII  Recommendation  7-  7-  1011. 
 In  addition,  the  FCC  should: 
 a.  Recommend  the  designation  of  a  secondary  back-  up  PSAP  that  is  more  than  200  miles  away  to  answer  calls  when  the  primary  and  secondary  PSAPs  are  disabled. 


 This  requires  the  FCC  to  eliminate  any  regulatory  prohibition  against  the  transport  of  911  across  LATA  boundaries.  The  Panel  recommends  that  the  FCC 
 expeditiously  initiate  such  a  rulemaking.  This  rulemaking  should  also  consider  permitting  a  backup  E-  911  tandem  across  a  LATA  boundary. 


 b.  Recommend  that  the  FCC  urge  the  DHS,  Fire  Grant  Act,  and  other  applicable  federal  programs  to  permit  state  or  local  911  commissions  or  emergency 
 communications  districts,  which  provide  911  or  public  safety  communications 
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 services,  to  be  eligible  to  apply  for  911  enhancement  and  communications  enhancement/  interoperability  grants. 
 4.  Essential  Steps  in  Addressing  Lessons  Learned  Concerning  Emergency  Medical  and  Hospital  Communications  Needs    An  Outreach  Program  to  Educate  and  Include  the 
 Emergency  Medical  Community  in  Emergency  Communications  Preparedness    The  FCC  should  work  to  assist  the  emergency  medical  community  to  facilitate  the  resiliency 
 and  effectiveness  of  their  emergency  communications  systems.  Among  other  things,  the  FCC  should: 


 a.  Educate  the  emergency  medical  community  about  emergency  communications  and  help  to  coordinate  this  sectors  emergency  communications  efforts; 
 b.  Educate  the  emergency  medical  community  about  the  various  priority  communications  services  (i.  e.,  GETS,  WPS  and  TSP)  and  urge  them  to  subscribe; 
 c.  Work  with  Congress  and  the  other  appropriate  federal  departments  and  agencies  to  ensure  emergency  medical  personnel  are  treated  as  public  safety  personnel 
 under  the  Stafford  Act;  and 
 d.  Support  DHS  efforts  to  make  emergency  medical  providers  eligible  for  funding  for  emergency  communications  equipment  under  the  State  Homeland  Security 


 Grant  Program. 


 Emergency  Communications  to  the  Public    Actions  to  Alert  and  Inform 
 1.  Actions  to  Alert  and  Inform    Revitalize  and  Publicize  the  Underutilized  Emergency  Alert  System    To  facilitate  and  complement  the  use  of  the  existing  Emergency  Alert 


 System  (  EAS),  the  FCC  should: 
 a.  Educate  state  and  local  officials  about  the  existing  EAS,  its  benefits,  and  how  it  can  be  best  utilized. 


 b.  Develop  a  program  for  educating  the  public  about  the  EAS  and  promote  community  awareness  of  potential  mechanisms  for  accessing  those  alerts  sent 
 during  power  outages  or  broadcast  transmission  failures. 
 c.  Move  expeditiously  to  complete  its  proceeding  to  explore  the  technical  and  financial  viability  of  expanding  the  EAS  to  other  technologies,  such  as  wireless 


 services  and  the  Internet,  recognizing  that  changes  to  communications  networks  and  equipment  take  time  to  implement. 


 d.  Consistent  with  proposed  legislation,  work  with  Congress  and  other  appropriate  federal  departments  and  agencies  to  explore  the  technical  and  financial  viability 
 of  establishing  a  comprehensive  national  warning  system  that  complements  existing  systems  and  allows  local  officials  to  increase  the  penetration  of  warnings 
 to  the  public  as  well  as  target,  when  necessary,  alerts  to  a  particular  area. 
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 e.  Work  with  the  DHS  and  other  appropriate  federal  agencies  on  pilot  programs  that  would  allow  more  immediate  evaluation  and  testing  of  new  notification 
 technologies. 
 f.  Work  with  the  Department  of  Commerce  to  expand  the  distribution  of  certain  critical  non-  weather  emergency  warnings  over  NOAA  weather  radios  to 


 supplement  the  EAS. 
 2.  Actions  to  Alert  and  Inform    Commence  Efforts  to  Ensure  that  Persons  with  Disabilities  and  Non-  English-  Speaking  Americans  Receive  Meaningful  Alerts    To 
 help  to  ensure  that  all  Americans,  including  those  with  hearing  or  visual  disabilities  or  who  do  not  speak  English,  can  receive  emergency  communications,  the  FCC  should: 


 a.  Promptly  find  a  mechanism  to  resolve  any  technical  and  financial  hurdles  in  the  current  EAS  to  ensure  that  non-  English  speaking  people  or  persons  with 
 disabilities  have  access  to  public  warnings,  if  readily  achievable. 
 b.  Work  with  the  various  industry  trade  associations  and  the  disabled  community  to  create  and  publicize  best  practices  for  serving  persons  with  disabilities  and  non-English- 


 speaking  Americans. 
 c.  Encourage  state  and  local  government  agencies  who  provide  emergency  information  (through  video  or  audio  broadcasts  or  websites)  to  take  steps  to  make 


 critical  emergency  information  accessible  to  persons  with  disabilities  and  non-English-  speaking  Americans. 


 3.  Actions  to  Alert  and  Inform    Ensure  Consistent  and  Reliable  Emergency  Information  Through  a  Consolidated  and  Coordinated  Public  Information  Program    Public 
 information  functions  should  be  coordinated  and  integrated  across  jurisdictions  and  across  functional  agencies,  among  federal,  state,  local  and  tribal  partners,  and  with 
 private  sector  and  non-  governmental  organizations.  The  FCC  should  work  with  all  involved  parties  to  help  facilitate  the  following: 


 a.  Integration  of  media  representatives  into  the  development  of  disaster  communications  plans  (ESF  #2).  These  plans  should  establish  systems  and 
 protocols  for  communicating  timely  and  accurate  information  to  the  public  during  crisis  or  emergency  situations. 


 b.  Designation  of  a  public  information  officer  at  each  EOC.  This  individual  should  be  accessible  to  the  media  to  handle  media  and  public  inquiries,  emergency  public 
 information  and  warnings,  rumor  monitoring  and  response,  and  other  functions  required  to  coordinate,  clear  with  appropriate  authorities,  and  disseminate 
 accurate  and  timely  information  related  to  the  incident,  particularly  regarding  information  on  public  health,  safety  and  protection. 


 c.  During  large  scale  disasters,  the  formation  of  a  Joint  Information  Center  (  JIC)  for  the  collocation  of  representatives  from  federal,  regional,  state,  local  and/  or 
 tribal  EOCs  tasked  with  primary  incident  coordination  responsibilities.  The  JIC  would  provide  the  mechanism  for  integrating  public  information  activities  across 
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 jurisdictions  and  with  private  sector  and  non-  governmental  organizations.  Media  operations  should  be  an  integral  part  of  the  JIC. 
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 CONCLUSION 
 The  Katrina  Panel  commends  Chairman  Martin  and  the  Commission  for  their  actions  to  assist  industry  and  first  responders  before,  during  and  after  Hurricane  Katrina  and  for  forming  this 
 Panel  to  identify  steps  to  be  taken  to  enhance  readiness  and  recovery  in  the  future.  The  Panel  thanks  the  Commission  for  the  opportunity  to  address  the  important  issues  associated  with  this 
 devastating  hurricanes  effect  on  our  nations  communications  networks.  In  this  effort,  the  Panel  members  have  brought  to  bear  a  broad  background  of  public  safety  and  industry  experiences, 
 including  (for  many)  first-  hand  knowledge  of  the  devastation  wrought  by  Katrina.  The  Panel  has  also  benefited  from  information  provided  in  the  many  comments  and  expert  presentations.  The 
 Panel  hopes  that  its  resulting  observations  and  recommendations  prove  useful  to  the  Commission  in  helping  to  ensure  that  the  communications  industry,  first  responders,  and  government  at  all 
 levels  are  better  prepared  for  future  hurricanes  and  any  other  disasters  that  might  lie  ahead  for  us. 
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 APPENDIX  A 
 Members  of  the  Independent  Panel  Reviewing  the  Impact  of  Hurricane  Katrina  on  Communications  Networks 


 Chair:  Nancy  J.  Victory,  Partner,  Wiley  Rein  &  Fielding  LLP 
 Carson  Agnew,  Executive  Vice  President,  Mobile  Satellite  Ventures,  LP  Michael  R.  Anderson,  Chairman,  PART-  15.  ORG 
 Robert  G.  (Gil)  Bailey,  ENP,  Telecommunications  Manager,  Harrison  County,  MS  Emergency  Communications  Commission 
 Kevin  Beary,  Sheriff,  Orange  County,  FL  Greg  Bicket,  Vice  President/  Regional  Manager,  Cox  Communications 
 Lt.  Colonel  Joseph  Booth,  Deputy  Superintendent,  Louisiana  State  Police  Steve  Davis,  Senior  Vice  President  -  Engineering,  Clear  Channel  Radio 
 Robert  G.  Dawson,  President  &  CEO,  SouthernLINC  Wireless  Stephen  A.  Dean,  Fire  Chief,  City  of  Mobile,  AL 
 Steve  Delahousey,  Vice  President  -  Operations,  American  Medical  Response  Dave  Flessas,  Vice  President  -  Network  Operations,  Sprint  Nextel  Corp. 
 Martin  D.  Hadfield,  Vice  President  -  Engineering,  Entercom  Communications  Corp.  Jim  O.  Jacot,  Vice  President,  Cingular  Network  Group 
 Tony  Kent,  Vice  President  -  Engineering  &  Network  Operations,  Cellular  South  Kelly  Kirwan,  Vice  President  -  State  and  Local  Government  and  Commercial  Markets  Division, 
 The  Americas  Group,  Government,  Enterprise,  and  Mobility  Solutions,  Motorola  Communications  and  Electronics,  Inc 
 Jonathan  D.  Linkous,  Executive  Director,  American  Telemedicine  Association  Adora  Obi  Nweze,  Director,  Hurricane  Relief  Efforts,  NAACP;  President,  Florida  State 
 Conference,  NAACP;  Member,  National  Board  of  Directors,  NAACP  Eduardo  Pea,  Board  Member,  League  of  United  Latin  American  Citizens 
 Billy  Pitts,  President  of  Government  Affairs,  The  NTI  Group  Major  Michael  Sauter,  Commander,  Office  of  Technology  and  Communications,  New  Orleans 
 Police  Department  Marion  Scott,  Vice  President  -  Operations,  CenturyTel 
 Kay  Sears,  Senior  Vice  President  of  Sales  and  Marketing,  G2  Satellite  Solutions,  PanAmSat  Corporation 
 Edmund  M.  Ted  Sexton,  Sr.,  President,  National  Sheriffs  Association  Edwin  D.  Smith,  Chief,  Baton  Rouge  Fire  Department 
 William  L.  Smith,  Chief  Technology  Officer,  BellSouth  Corporation  Patrick  Yoes,  President,  Louisiana  Fraternal  Order  of  Police,  National  Secretary,  Fraternal  Order 
 of  Police 
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 Federal  Communications  Commission  FCC  06-  83 
 STATEMENT  OF  CHAIRMAN  KEVIN  J.  MARTIN 


 Re:  Recommendations  of  the  Independent  Panel  Reviewing  the  Impact  of  Hurricane  Katrina  on  Communications  Networks,  EB  Docket  No.  06-  119 
 I  would  like  to  thank  the  members  of  the  Independent  Panel  for  taking  the  time  to  study  the  impact  of  Hurricane  Katrina  on  communications  networks.  I  would  also  like  to  thank 
 Nancy  Victory  for  agreeing  to  Chair  the  Independent  Panel.  We  all  appreciate  the  hard  work  that  went  into  studying  the  lessons  of  this  terrible  disaster  and  developing 
 recommendations  for  improving  our  response  in  the  future. 
 The  devastation  of  Hurricane  Katrina  highlighted  the  importance  of  telecommunications  and  media  to  our  daily  lives,  and  our  dependency  on  our  national  communications 
 infrastructure.  For  the  past  six  months,  experts  from  public  safety  organizations,  the  communications  industry,  and  public  interest  groups  have  worked  together  to  study  the 
 impact  of  Hurricane  Katrina  on  the  telecommunications  and  media  infrastructure  and  to  review  the  sufficiency  of  the  recovery  effort  with  respect  to  this  infrastructure. 


 In  its  final  report,  the  Independent  Panel  has  presented  recommendations  for  increasing  the  readiness  of  the  communications  industry,  improving  response  and  recovery  after 
 major  disasters,  enhancing  the  operability  and  interoperability  of  public  safety  and  911  communications,  and  strengthening  our  emergency  alert  communications.  I  am 
 particularly  pleased  to  see  the  Independent  Panels  recommendations  to  provide  a  Readiness  Checklist  for  the  communications  industry,  to  inform  the  public  safety 
 community  about  technologies  to  improve  the  operability  and  interoperability  of  their  communications,  to  strengthen  the  resiliency  of  Public  Safety  Answering  Points  (PSAPs) 
 and  other  911  infrastructure,  and  to  take  actions  to  ensure  the  public  gets  timely  information  in  times  of  emergency. 


 With  this  Notice  of  Proposed  Rulemaking,  we  are  asking  for  comments  and  suggestions  from  the  public  on  how  to  best  address  and  implement  the  Independent  Panels 
 recommendations.  I  look  forward  to  studying  the  Independent  Panels  report  and  to  reviewing  the  publics  responses  for  additional  follow-  up  action  so  that  we  can  improve 
 our  response  and  recovery  efforts  for  the  future. 
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 Federal  Communications  Commission  FCC  06-  83 
 2 
 STATEMENT  OF  COMMISSIONER  MICHAEL  J.  COPPS 
 Re:  Report  and  Recommendations  to  the  Federal  Communications  Commission,  from  the  Independent  Panel  Reviewing  the  Impact  of  Hurricane  Katrina  on  the 
 Communications  Networks. 
 Ten  months  ago,  the  nation  viewed  with  horror  the  images  of  destruction  coming  out  of  the  Gulf  Coast.  Many  of  us  found  it  nearly  impossible  to  believe  that  such 
 dislocation  and  suffering  could  occur  in  our  country,  the  wealthiest  and  most  technologically-  advanced  in  the  world.  I  visited  the  Coast  with  Chairman  Martin  and 
 other  telecommunications  leaders  in  the  days  after  Katrina,  and  I  can  tell  you  that  none  of  us  will  ever  forget  the  images  of  devastation  we  witnessed. 


 It  is  now  clear  that  the  causes  of  our  national  failure  were  multiple,  including  serious  breakdowns  in  leadership,  planning,  engineering,  policing,  and  emergency 
 management.  But  it  is  also  common  knowledge    on  both  sides  of  the  political  aisle    that  the  failure  of  our  national  communications  system  played  a  terrible  role  in 
 exacerbating  all  of  these  problems.  1  As  historian  Douglas  Brinkley  puts  it:  That  was  the  consensus,  the  one  fiasco  everyone  agreed  on    whatever  else  Katrina  did  to  New 
 Orleans,  it  had  clearly  broken  down  all  standard  modes  of  communications.  2 
 Todays  report  does  an  admirable  job  documenting  how  our  public  and  private  communications  networks  failed  during  the  storm  and  were  not  repaired  nearly  quickly 
 enough  in  its  wake.  The  country  owes  an  enormous  debt  of  gratitude  to  those  who  served  on  the  Panel,  to  Nancy  Victory  who  chaired  it,  and  to  the  many  individuals  who  testified 
 before  it  or  participated  in  compiling  this  report.  They  did  so  without  compensation,  while  holding  down  full-  time  jobs,  and  solely  out  of  a  spirit  of  public  service.  I  cannot 
 thank  them  enough  for  their  hard  work  and  dedication. 
 The  Panels  report  describes  our  countrys  communications  shortfalls  in  the  dispassionate,  objective  language  of  the  professional  engineer.  This  is  entirely  fitting  and 
 proper.  For  now  that  the  Gulf  Coast  has  begun  the  arduous  process  of  rebuilding,  our  task    indeed  our  solemn  duty    here  in  Washington  is  to  learn  all  that  we  can  from  this 
 tragedy.  We  must  ensure  that  we  are  better  prepared  as  a  nation  for  the  next  disaster,  whether  it  be  another  hurricane  (possibly  even  stronger  than  Katrina),  an  earthquake,  or  a 


 1  See  also  Final  Report  of  the  Select  Bipartisan  Committee  to  Investigate  the  Preparation  for  and  Response 
 to  Hurricane  Katrina,  H.  R.  Rep.  No.  109-  377,  at  165  (2006),  available  at  http://  katrina.  house.  gov/  full_  katrina_  report.  htm  (  The  near  total  failure  of  regional  communications 


 degraded  situational  awareness  and  exacerbated  problems  with  agency  coordination,  command  and  control,  logistics,  and  search  and  rescue  operations.);  Ivor  Van  Heerden  and  Mike  Bryan,  The  Storm  (Viking 
 2006),  at  95  (  Simply  put,  along  with  everything  else  during  Hurricane  Katrina,  we  had  a  ridiculous,  tragic  failure  to  communicate.) 
 2  Douglas  Brinkley,  The  Great  Deluge  (HarperCollins  2006),  at  215. 
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 terrorist  attack.  Sadly,  if  we  can  be  sure  of  anything,  it  is  that  there  will  be  a  next  disaster  and  that  we  are  not  prepared  for  it. 
 Each  failure  of  communications  documented  in  this  report  is  also  a  story  of  human  suffering  and  often  even  loss  of  life.  Consider  the  story  of  Lafon  Nursing  Home 
 of  the  Holy  Family  in  New  Orleans,  where  100  elderly  patients  found  themselves  left  behind  to  weather  the  storm.  On  the  third  harrowing  day,  They  finally  caught  a  break. 
 Someones  cell  phone  chirped  to  life,  offering  communication  with  the  outside  world.  3  This  momentary  lifeline  allowed  a  social  worker  to  contact  her  brother  in  Atlanta  who 
 eventually  managed  to  charter  a  private  bus  to  bring  the  patients  to  safety.  But  not  all  of  them    rescue  workers  eventually  recovered  22  bodies.  4 


 The  fact  that  within  one  week  after  Katrina,  approximately  80  percent  of  wireless  cell  sites  were  up  and  running  is  therefore  cold  comfort  indeed.  5  If  these  sites 
 had  been  up  and  running  sooner,  would  we  have  had  fewer  stories  like  Lafon?  6 
 Measured  in  these  terms,  this  report  is  a  shocking  indictment  of  the  disaster  readiness  of  our  existing  communications  networks.  Put  simply,  it  concludes  that  both 
 our  public  safety  and  commercial  networks:  (1)  are  not  capable  of  operating  without  power  for  more  than  a  day  or  two,  (2)  are  not  designed  with  sufficient  redundancy,  and 
 (3)  can  withstand  wind  and  rain  but  not  flooding.  This  is  true  of  the  wireless  and  wireline  networks  that  all  of  us  rely  upon  to  call  911  and  our  families  during  a  crisis.  It  is  also 
 true  of  the  multiple  networks  that  police  officers,  firefighters,  and  other  first  responders  rely  upon  to  protect  us  in  cases  of  emergency.  7  Because  power  outages,  multiple  sources 
 of  disruption,  and  flooding  are  all  entirely  predictable  outcomes  in  New  Orleans  and  elsewhere,  it  seems  clear  that  we  need  to  take  immediate  and  serious  corrective  action. 


 By  way  of  contrast,  it  appears  that  our  electric  utility  companies  have  developed  networks  that  both  survived  the  storm  and  managed  to  operate  during  the  aftermath,  even 
 with  the  power  outages.  8  These  are  the  private  networks  that  the  companies  use  to  communicate  with  their  employees  and  monitor  the  status  of  their  facilities.  The  utility 
 companies  networks  worked  better  during  the  storm  and  its  aftermath,  the  report  explains,  because  these  companies  designed  their  systems:  (1)  to  remain  intact  .  .  . 
 following  a  significant  storm  event,  (2)  with  significant  onsite  back-  up  power  supplies  (batteries  and  generators),  (3)  with  redundant  fixed  and  wireless  backhaul,  and  (4)  with 


 3  Anne  Hull  and  Doug  Struck,  A  Citys  Most  Helpless  Left  To  Fend  for  Themselves,  Washington  Post 
 (Sept.  23,  2005).  4 
 Id.  5 
 Report  at  9.  6 
 See  e.  g.,  The  Storm  at  62  (  The  nursing  home  trade  group  for  Louisiana  concluded  after  the  flood  that  at  least  two  thirds  of  the  citys  fifty-  three  nursing  homes  were  not  evacuated,  with  tragic  results.) 


 7  Nor  were  the  militarys  systems  anything  close  to  adequate  for  the  task.  As  todays  report  discusses,  in 
 order  to  communicate  with  civilian  first  responders,  the  military  was  reduced  to  using  human  runners  to  carry  messages  and,  in  one  case,  to  dropping  a  message  in  a  bottle  from  a  helicopter.  Report  at  26. 


 8  Id.  at  12-  13. 
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 staff  focus[  sed]  on  continuing  maintenance  of  network  elements  (for  example,  exercising  standby  generators  on  a  routine  basis).  9  For  heavens  sakes    shouldnt  our 
 public  safety  and  commercial  networks  be  built  with  the  same  concerns  in  mind?  10 
 In  light  of  these  sobering  conclusions,  I  think  that  the  central  question  raised  by  the  report  is  how    and  not  whether    the  communications  industry  should  begin  to 
 incorporate  more  rigorous  standards  into  how  it  constructs  and  maintains  networks.  To  be  fair,  I  recognize  that  there  are  important  concerns  about  cost  and  scalability  in 
 incorporating  innovations  developed  by  utility  companies  into  public  safety  and  commercial  networks.  But,  at  a  minimum,  lets  begin  by  confronting  the  issue. 


 For  these  reasons,  I  appreciate  my  colleagues  willingness  to  open  a  comprehensive  rulemaking  addressing  how  we  can  improve  the  reliability  and  disaster 
 readiness  of  our  nations  communications  networks.  I  am  especially  pleased  that  we  seek  comment  on  whether  voluntary  implementation  is  enough  or  whether  we  need  to  consider 
 other  measures.  The  most  important  thing,  of  course,  is  that  we  be  certain  the  job  is  getting  done.  By  the  first  anniversary  of  Katrina,  I  hope  and  expect  we  can  have  new 
 rules  in  place  that  will  improve  our  nations  communications  and  protect  the  public  safety. 


 Even  before  we  complete  our  new  rulemaking,  the  Commission  can  and  should  move  forward  with  a  number  of  the  Panels  recommendations.  Of  particular  importance, 
 we  need  to  complete  our  pending  proceeding  to  overhaul  the  antiquated  Emergency  Alert  System  (EAS).  The  report  tells  us  that  a  fairly  large  percentage  of  the  public  likely  were 
 uninformed  about  the  progress  of  the  storm.  11  We  need  to  do  better,  especially  for  our  disabled  and  non-  English-  speaking  citizens  who  are  poorly  served  by  our  current 
 broadcast-  based  systems.  I  believe  the  Panel  is  on  the  right  track  in  saying  the  Commission  needs  to  be  thinking  about  extending  EAS  to  newer  wireless  and  IP-  based 
 devices. 
 I  am  also  glad  that  we  seek  comment  on  whether,  and  how,  the  Commission  should  position  itself  as  a  clearinghouse  of  ideas  for  better  preparing  organizations  of 
 every  size  for  the  next  disaster.  I  have  advocated  this  approach  for  a  long  time.  Why  should  every  hospital,  day  care  center,  nursing  home,  charitable  organization,  and  small 
 business  have  to  start  at  square  one,  devising  its  own  plan,  developing  its  options,  figuring  out  how  to  respond  to  a  crisis,  as  if  no  one  else  has  been  down  this  road  before? 
 How  much  better  it  would  be  if  they  could  call  someone    say  the  FCC    and  talk  to  experts  who  could  tell  them  what  has  been  tried  and  works  and  what  has  been  tried  and 
 doesnt  work,  and  give  them  a  hand  along  the  way. 
 9  Id. 
 10  See  also  Mike  Scott,  H  arrison  County,  MS:  Radio  System  Weathers  the  Storm  in  Mississippi  ,  9-  1-  1 
 MAGAZINE,  Jan/  Feb  2006,  at  33  (  The  normal  construction  standard  looks  at  100-  year  flood  plans.    In  public  safety,  we  have  to  look  at  500-  year  flood  plans.). 


 11  Report  at  28. 
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 Finally,  I  want  to  emphasize  again  my  conviction  that  the  FCC  must  be  front  and  center  when  it  comes  to  safeguarding  the  nations  communications  security.  This  agency 
 has  the  best  people  and  the  best  expertise  in  government  on  communications.  As  Title  I  of  our  enabling  statute  makes  clear,  we  also  have  a  statutory  duty  to  ensure  the  safety  of 
 our  people  through  secure  communications  networks.  We  therefore  must  continually  ask  ourselves:  Are  we  doing  absolutely  everything  within  our  power  to  make  sure  that  our 
 institutional  knowledge  and  competence  are  being  fully  and  properly  used?  To  the  extent  they  arent,  we  fail  our  charge.  I  am  not  now,  and  never  have  been,  in  favor  of 
 waiting  for  others  to  do  our  job. 
 At  the  end  of  the  day,  the  Commissions  goal  should  be  do  such  a  good  job  that  communications  is  not  a  focus  in  the  aftermath  of  a  disaster.  It  should  be  an  afterthought 
 or  not  a  thought  at  all.  Police  and  other  first  responders,  hospital  workers,  nursing  home  staff,  and  concerned  family  members  should  be  free  to  focus  on  their  primary  missions. 
 They  should  not  have  to  worry,  in  the  middle  of  a  crisis,  about  whether  their  communications  equipment  will  work.  Unfortunately,  the  Katrina  experience  shows  us 
 that  we  as  a  nation  have  not  met  our  responsibilities.  The  only  question  now  is  whether    as  a  new  hurricane  season  is  upon  us    we  will  accept  our  challenge  and  develop 
 solutions  to  the  problems  this  report  so  carefully  identifies.  History  will  not  and  should  not  forgive  us  if  we  fail  to  do  so. 
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 STATEMENT  OF  COMMISSIONER  JONATHAN  S.  ADELSTEIN 
 Re:  Independent  Panel  Reviewing  the  Impact  of  Hurricane  Katrina  on  Communications  Networks;  Notice  of  Proposed  Rulemaking;  EB  Docket  No.  06- 
 119 
 I  want  to  extend  my  deepest  thanks  to  the  members  of  the  Independent  Panel  Reviewing  the  Impact  of  Hurricane  Katrina  for  investing  so  much  of  their  time  and  effort 
 to  draw  out  lessons  from  this  disaster  and  to  better  prepare  our  communities  for  the  future.  The  release  of  their  Report  brings  back  memories  of  the  devastation  wrought  by 
 the  storm  and  its  aftermath,  and  of  the  heroic  and  continuing  efforts  of  those  communities  to  regroup  and  rebuild. 


 Shortly  after  the  storm,  I  had  an  opportunity  to  witness  first  hand  some  of  the  widespread  destruction  and  personal  loss  in  the  Gulf  Coast,  which  was  far  worse  than  I 
 could  have  ever  imagined.  More  importantly,  I  also  was  able  to  meet  and  talk  with  communications  workers,  who  labored  around  the  clock  to  restore  connectivity  to  the 
 Gulf  Coast,  often  at  great  personal  sacrifice.  It  was  humbling  to  see  Americans  act  so  selflessly  when  others  are  in  need,  particularly  when  so  many  were  themselves  suffering 
 the  loss  of  homes,  communities,  or  loved  ones.  To  all  of  these  citizens,  we  owe  an  honest  assessment  of  our  strengths,  weaknesses,  and  our  commitment  to  preparedness. 


 Our  experience  with  Hurricane  Katrina  demonstrates  that  the  role  of  communications  is  essential  during  emergencies,  whether  citizens  are  trying  to  find  out 
 what  is  happening  with  their  families,  or  emergency  personnel  are  responding  to  an  urgent  situation.  This  Report  confirms  that  our  nations  communications  systems  were 
 put  to  the  test,  with  unfortunately  mixed  results.  I  welcome  the  coming  public  dialogue  on  the  Independent  Panels  recommendations,  and  look  forward  to  working  with  my 
 colleagues  and  the  broader  community  to  improve  our  preparedness  and  response. 
 This  Report  also  highlights  how  critical  it  is  that  the  Commission  provides  the  best  leadership  possible  to  ensure  that  communications  are  fully  operational  during  the 
 most  serious  events.  It  can  play  a  key  role  in  improving  our  nations  disaster  preparedness,  network  reliability,  and  communications  among  first  responders.  As  the 
 Report  suggests,  the  Commission  must  also  take  the  lead  in  coordinating  with  state  and  local  governments  in  advance  of  future  disasters  and  in  working  with  other  federal 
 agencies  to  ensure  that  credentialing  procedures  and  other  requirements  are  developed  in  advance  to  ensure  access  by  communications  workers  to  affected  areas  post-  disaster. 


 At  the  same  time,  this  Report  highlights  the  importance  of  advance  planning  and  provides  important  recommendations  on  how  we  can  ready  ourselves  before  disaster 
 strikes.  In  the  aftermath  of  Hurricane  Katrina,  the  Commission  received  high  marks  for  ensuring  that  it  was  responsive  in  the  wake  of  these  tragedies.  But  with  the  first  tropical 
 storm  of  2006  already  hitting  the  Gulf  Coast,  we  must  move  more  quickly  to  better  position  ourselves  for  the  inevitable  next  challenges.  So  I  wholeheartedly  support  the 
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 simultaneous  release  of  our  NPRM  to  better  allow  us  to  move  promptly  forward  on  the  important  Panel  recommendations. 
 Finally,  I  want  to  thank  Chairman  Martin  for  convening  this  group  and  Nancy  Victory  for  stepping  forward  in  leading  the  panel.  A  disaster  like  this  demonstrates  how 
 important  it  is  that  we  all  work  together  in  times  of  crisis.  Efforts  like  this  are  essential  to  achieve  the  continual  improvement  necessary  to  protect  ourselves  in  the  event  of  future 
 disasters,  be  they  natural  or  man-  made.  Thank  you  again  for  all  of  your  effort  and  for  your  commitment  to  the  hard  work  ahead. 
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 STATEMENT  OF  COMMISSIONER  DEBORAH  TAYLOR  TATE 
 Re:  Recommendation  of  the  Independent  Panel  Reviewing  the  Impact  of  Hurricane  Katrina  on  Communications  Networks,  EB  Docket  No.  06-  119 
 When  disaster  strikes,  our  first  reaction  is  to  reach  out  to  those  we  love.  We  call  for  help,  we  call  loved  ones  to  tell  them  we  are  okay,  and  we  call  to  offer  assistance  to 
 those  in  need.  The  Commission  plays  a  critical  role  in  ensuring  the  continuity  of  essential  communications  systems  that  are  relied  on  for  public  safety,  for  public  officials, 
 for  relief  efforts,  and  for  every  single  citizen  touched  by  a  disaster.  The  FCC  is  filled  with  engineers,  economists,  and  attorneys  with  an  intimate  knowledge  of  the 
 communications  industry.  These  people  are  also  parents  and  caring  human  beings  who  want  to  help  in  times  of  great  need.  This  collective  experience  is  a  valuable  resource  for 
 everyone  involved  in  a  disaster  response,  including  first  responders,  state  and  local  government,  other  federal  agencies,  and  of  course,  the  public.  That  is  why  I  am  pleased 
 to  support  todays  Notice  of  Proposed  Rulemaking  (Notice)  because  the  comments  we  receive  will  be  invaluable  to  the  Commission,  to  the  industries  we  regulate,  and  to  the 
 American  people. 
 Certainly,  we  all  owe  Nancy  Victory  a  sincere  debt  of  gratitude  for  her  leadership  of  the  independent  panel  reviewing  the  impact  of  Hurricane  Katrina.  To  those  members 
 of  the  panel  who  suffered  great  personal  loss,  we  particularly  thank  you  for  your  efforts  and  continue  our  prayers  for  recovery  and  renewal. 


 I  encourage  the  industry  to  continue  to  develop  and  share  their  own  thoughts,  strategies,  and  ideas  on  disaster  preparedness  and  emergency  system  interoperability  in 
 response  to  this  Notice.  The  industry  has  already  developed  some  extraordinary  disaster  recovery  plans,  and  I  have  been  able  to  see  emergency  response  equipment  set  up  by 
 several  companies,  including  AT&  Ts  Disaster  Recovery  equipment.  In  addition,  I  hope  that  we  can  learn  lessons  from  all  types  of  businesses    from  Home  Depot  to  Wal-  Mart 
 and  beyond    about  how  to  better  prepare  and  react  to  a  crisis. 
 I  would  also  hope  we  recognize  that  not  all  disasters  come  in  the  form  of  hurricanes.  The  threat  of  bioterrorism  or  a  pandemic  flu  will  strain  our  resources  in  ways 
 entirely  different  from  wind  and  rain.  We  must  not  simply  react  to  past  disasters,  but  look  ahead  to  future  threats  and  be  prepared  to  do  our  part  to  ensure  the  safety  and 
 security  of  all  Americans. 
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 STATEMENT  OF  COMMISSIONER  ROBERT  M.  MCDOWELL 
 Re:  Recommendations  of  the  Independent  Panel  Reviewing  the  Impact  of  Hurricane  Katrina  on  Communications  Networks  (EB  Docket  No.  06-  119) 
 In  the  aftermath  of  Hurricane  Katrina,  the  FCC  worked  around  the  clock  to  bring  much  needed  help  and  to  make  available  funds  to  help  restore  communications  and 
 provide  a  lifeline  for  thousands  of  Americans.  Under  the  leadership  of  Chairman  Martin,  the  FCC  was  a  model  of  swift  governmental  response  and  support  in  time  of  need. 


 The  job  of  the  Independent  Panel  was  to  study  the  effect  of  Hurricane  Katrina  on  all  sectors  of  the  telecommunications  and  media  industries,  to  review  and  critique  the 
 recovery  effort  with  respect  to  the  communications  infrastructure,  and  to  present  their  findings  and  recommendations  on  improving  disaster  preparedness,  network  reliability, 
 and  communications  among  first  responders.  I  applaud  the  Chairman  for  his  leadership  in  the  FCCs  response  to  Hurricane  Katrina  and  in  establishing  this  panel,  and  I  thank 
 Nancy  Victory  and  the  members  of  the  panel  for  their  hard  work. 
 The  lessons  learned  from  the  Katrina  experience  will  allow  us  to  be  better  prepared,  not  just  in  the  Gulf  Coast  region  or  in  the  event  of  a  hurricane,  but  in  the  face  of 
 any  impending  disaster  to  provide  the  critical  infrastructure  and  interoperability  of  communications  systems  so  vital  to  protecting  lives  and  property.  As  we  seek  comment 
 on  how  best  to  act  on  the  recommendations  of  the  Independent  Panel  and  put  these  measures  in  place,  I  urge  everyone  to  weigh  in  on  this  important  issue.  The  power  of 
 every  American  to  serve  the  public  good  has  never  been  stronger,  the  need  to  act  as  one  community  to  defend  against  the  threat  of  harm  has  never  been  more  urgent,  and  the 
 opportunity  to  come  together  to  make  a  difference  has  never  been  greater  than  now. 
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