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entitled 'Foot and Mouth Disease: To Protect U.S. Livestock, USDA Must 
Remain Vigilant and Resolve Outstanding Issues' which was released on 
August 26, 2002.



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Report to the Honorable Tom Daschle, U.S. Senate:



July 2002:



Foot and Mouth Disease:



To Protect U.S. Livestock, USDA Must Remain Vigilant and Resolve 

Outstanding Issues:



GAO-02-808:



Letter:



Executive Summary:



Purpose:



Background:



Results in Brief:



Principal Findings:



Recommendations for Executive Action:



Agency Comments:



Chapter 1:



FMD Is a Highly Contagious Animal Disease:



Incidence of FMD Worldwide Is Extensive:



International Community Has Guidelines to Control and Eradicate FMD:



An FMD Outbreak Can Cost Billions of Dollars:



Social Impacts of an Outbreak Can Be Significant:



USDA Is Responsible for Protecting U.S. Livestock From FMD and Other 

Animal Diseases:



U.S. Customs Service Supports USDAs Efforts at Ports of Entry:



Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:



Chapter 2:



USDA Obtains Information on Foreign FMD Outbreaks from Multiple 

Sources:



USDA Lacks a Formal Process to Ensure Dissemination of FMD Information 

to Customs:



Conclusions:



Recommendations for Executive Action:



Chapter 3:



USDAs Efforts to Control and Eradicate FMD in Other Countries Help 

Reduce the Risk to U.S. Livestock:



Despite U.S. Preventive Measures at Ports of Entry, Vulnerability to 

FMD Remains:



U.S. Preventive Measures Are Comparable to Those Used by Other 

Countries:



Conclusions:



Recommendation for Executive Action:



Agency Comments:



Chapter 4:



The Federal Government and Many States Have Developed and Tested 

Emergency Response Plans:



Serious Challenges to an Effective U.S. Response Are Yet to Be 

Resolved:



Conclusions:



Recommendation for Executive Action:



Appendixes:



Appendix I: Countries Considered FMD-Free by the United States



Appendix II: Measures for Preventing the Introduction of FMD into 
Canada



Appendix III: Measures for Preventing the Introduction of FMD into 
Mexico



Appendix IV: Measures for Preventing the Introduction of FMD into the 

United Kingdom



Appendix V: Comments from the U.S. Department of Agriculture



Appendix VI: Comments from the U.S. Customs Service



Appendix VII: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgements



Tables:



Table 1: Survival Time of the FMD Virus in Selected Products and By-
Products:



Table 2: Key USDA Information Dissemination Actions Taken After the 
2001 

Outbreak of FMD in the United Kingdom:



Table 3: Volume/Numbers of Passengers, Vehicles, and Cargo Entering the 

United States, Inspected by APHIS and Resulting in Seized Products, 

Fiscal Year 2001:



Table 4: Agriculture-Related Questions on the Prior and Revised U.S. 

Declaration Forms:



Figures:



Figure 1: Worldwide Incidence of FMD, 1992 through 2002:



Figure 2: Worldwide Incidence of Four Types of FMD, 1990 through 2002:



Figure 3: U.S. FMD Signs Posted at Ports of Entry:



Figure 4: Canadian and Mexican FMD Signs Posted at Ports of Entry:



Figure 5: Disposal of Animal Carcasses by Burial in the United Kingdom:



Figure 6: Disposal of Animal Carcasses by Incineration in the United 

Kingdom:



Abbreviations:



APHIS: Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service:



BSE: bovine spongiform encephalopathy:



CCRA: Canada Customs and Revenue Agency:



CFIA: Canadian Food Inspection Agency:



DEFRA: Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs:



FAS: Foreign Agricultural Service:



FEMA: Federal Emergency Management Agency:



FMD: foot and mouth disease:



FSIS : Food Safety and Inspection Service:



GAO: General Accounting Office:



NAHEMS: National Animal Health Emergency Management System:



OIE: Office International des Epizooties:



pH: potential of hydrogen:



SAGARPA: Secretaria de Agricultura, Ganaderia, Desarrollo Rural, Pesca 

y Alimentaction:



USDA: U.S. Department of Agriculture:



WTO: World Trade Organization:



Letter July 26, 2002:



The Honorable Tom Daschle

United States Senate:



Dear Senator Daschle:



As requested, we are reporting on the United States ability to prevent 

the introduction of foot and mouth disease. This report contains 

recommendations to the U.S. Department of Agriculture on the need to 

develop a process to expeditiously communicate information on foreign 

disease outbreaks to the Customs Service, improve some of the 

preventive measures used in the United States, and develop plans and 

timetables to address any outstanding issues that could impede a U.S. 

response.



As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents 

earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days 

from the date of this letter. We will then send copies to other 

appropriate congressional committees; the Secretary of Agriculture; the 

Commissioner of Customs; and the Director, Office of Management and 

Budget. We will also make copies available to others upon request. In 

addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site 

at http://www.gao.gov.



If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please 

call me at (202) 512-3841. Key contributors to this report are listed 

in appendix VII.



Sincerely yours,



Lawrence J. Dyckman

Director, Natural Resources

and Environment:



Signed by Lawrence J. Dyckman



[End of section]



Executive Summary:



Purpose:



The 2001 outbreak of foot and mouth disease (FMD) in the United Kingdom 

decisively illustrated the devastation that this highly contagious 

animal disease can cause to a nations livestock industry and other 

sectors of the economy. By the time the disease was eradicated, about 8 

months later, the United Kingdom had slaughtered over 4 million animals 

to control the disease, and sustained losses of over $5 billion in the 

food and agricultural sectors, as well as comparable losses to its 

tourism industry. Before 2001, the United Kingdom had been FMD-free for 

almost 34 years; following the outbreak, the country was, until 

recently, generally restricted from participating in the international 

trade of live animals, and animal and other products that could 

transmit the FMD virus.



The United States is an FMD-free nation and has not had an outbreak of 

the disease since 1929. In 2001, the U.S. livestock and poultry sector 

was valued at $100 billion. Because of the importance of the livestock 

industry to the U.S. agricultural sector and economy, protecting U.S. 

livestock from FMD and other animal diseases not present in the United 

States (foreign animal diseases) is an important responsibility for the 

U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). Senator Tom Daschle asked GAO to 

determine whether (1) U.S. processes to obtain and disseminate 

information on foreign FMD outbreaks are adequate, (2) U.S. measures 

for preventing FMD from entering the United States are effective and 

comparable with those of other selected countries, and (3) the United 

States could respond quickly and effectively to an outbreak of FMD, if 

it were to occur.



To respond to this request, GAO, among other things, visited seaports, 

airports, and international mail-processing facilities in New Jersey, 

Maryland, Texas, and Virginia. GAO also visited federal inspection 

stations on the U.S.-Canadian and U.S.-Mexican borders to observe 

inspection procedures for livestock imports and met with government 

officials in these countries who are responsible for protecting their 

nations livestock from FMD. GAO also interviewed state veterinarians 

in six states that are major producers of U.S. livestock, and 

international passengers and U.S. veterinarians who were in the United 

Kingdom during the outbreak. In addition, GAO reviewed and summarized 

legislation, regulations, and publicly available documents on the 

measures used by the European Union and the United Kingdom to prevent 

the introduction of FMD. (See chapter 1 for a detailed description of 

GAOs scope and methodology.)::



Background:



FMD is a highly contagious viral disease of cloven-hoofed animals such 

as cattle, swine, and sheep. Infected animals develop a fever and 

blisters on their tongue, lips, and between their hooves. Many animals 

recover from an FMD infection, but the disease leaves them debilitated 

and causes severe losses in meat and milk production. FMD does not have 

human health implications.



Animals, people, or any materials that bring the virus into contact 

with susceptible animals can spread FMD. FMD is a hardy virus, and in 

the right environmental conditions can persist in contaminated items, 

such as soil and manure, for weeks or months. Only about 40 percent of 

countries worldwide are considered FMD-free, but all three North 

American countries are FMD-free.



USDAs Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) is 

responsible for protecting U.S. livestock from the introduction of 

foreign animal diseases such as FMD. In fulfilling its 

responsibilities, APHIS conducts activities to exclude animal disease, 

detect and eradicate it, and educate the public about it. APHIS 

inspectors are present at 144 U.S. ports of entry, as well as in some 

foreign countries, to help ensure the safety of international cargo, 

passengers, and mail. According to USDA, this includes all major U.S. 

ports.



In an effort to keep U.S. animals free of foreign animal diseases, the 

U.S. Customs Service (Customs) is an important federal partner, 

supporting USDAs activities at each of the 301 ports of entry into the 

United States. Customs is the first line of defense at U.S. ports 

against the entry of prohibited and illegal items, particularly when 

the port does not have APHIS personnel. 																		

Results in Brief:



The United States has adequate processes for obtaining information on 

foreign FMD outbreaks and providing USDA agencies and others with this 

information, but it does not have adequate processes for sharing this 

information with Customs. The United States receives information on FMD 

outbreaks from USDA officials stationed in foreign countries, 

international agricultural and animal health organizations, and foreign 

governments directly. In particular, USDA has animal health experts 

stationed in 27 countries and agriculture trade officials stationed in 

129 countries. These officials collect a wide array of agricultural and 

animal health information about the countries and regions in which they 

are stationed, which allows the United States to have access to 

information on foreign FMD outbreaks in a timely manner. However, 

USDAs processes for disseminating information on foreign FMD outbreaks 

are uneven. For example, after receiving official notification from the 

United Kingdom on February 21, 2001, about the presence of FMD in that 

country, USDA immediately alerted its relevant agencies in Washington, 

D.C., and their field locations, and during the month of March provided 

the public, industry, state and local governments, and private 

veterinarians with information and guidance about FMD prevention. But 

USDA has no formal process for providing Customs with information. As a 

result, Customs inspectors at U.S. ports of entry did not receive 

uniform information or guidance on FMD prevention activities after the 

U.K. outbreak. Customs received this information only after formally 

requesting it from the Administrator of APHIS--over a month after the 

United Kingdoms notification. During this interval, many Customs 

inspectors said they felt ill equipped to adequately process 

international cargo and passengers at U.S. ports of entry. While USDA 

has taken an interim step to improve notification to Customs about 

foreign FMD outbreaks, GAO is recommending further improvements to 

establish a more permanent solution and ensure that Customs has clear 

procedures for handling passengers and cargo from countries affected by 

FMD.



U.S. measures to prevent the introduction of FMD are comparable to 

those used by other countries and have kept the United States free of 

the disease for almost 75 years. Nevertheless, because of the nature of 

the disease and the risk inherent in the ever-increasing volume of 

international travel and trade, U.S. livestock remains vulnerable to 

the disease. USDA has a two-pronged approach to prevent FMD from 

reaching U.S. livestock.



* USDA tries to keep FMD as far as possible from U.S. borders by 

helping other countries control and eradicate the disease. For example, 

USDA supports programs in Colombia and Panama to create an FMD-free 

buffer zone between North and Central America, which are FMD-free, and 

South America, which is not.



* USDA has developed and implemented specific preventive measures at 

ports of entry to ensure that international cargo, animals, passengers, 

and mail do not bring the disease into the United States. For example, 

in response to the outbreak in the United Kingdom, USDA immediately 

prohibited imports of susceptible animal products from the United 

Kingdom, including those shipped 3 weeks prior to the date of official 

notification of the outbreak. This prohibition remained in effect until 

USDA reassessed the United Kingdoms animal disease status and 

determined the products for which trade could safely resume. Similarly, 

at airports, USDA uses signs and inspectors, among other things, to 

ensure that international passengers do not inadvertently bring items 

into the country that could carry the FMD virus.



However, these and other efforts cannot completely eliminate the 

vulnerability of U.S. livestock because (1) some level of risk is 

inherent in international travel and trade, (2) FMD is a hardy virus 

that may remain viable for days or even weeks on shoes and in hay or 

certain meat and dairy products, and (3) the volume of legal and 

illegal international trade and passengers entering the United States 

makes it impossible for U.S. inspectors to inspect and ensure the 

safety of every shipment, baggage, or person entering the country. 

Furthermore, although the preventive measures the United States, 

Canada, and Mexico have implemented are similar, these other countries 

implementation measures suggest opportunities for USDA to improve its 

preventive measures. For example, all three countries use signs at 

airports to alert passengers about FMD and the need to keep it out of 

the country. However, the Canadian and Mexican signs are much more 

noticeable because they are larger, bolder, and more colorful. GAO is 

recommending that USDA revise its signs to improve their effectiveness.



In the event of an FMD outbreak, the United States will face a number 

of challenges in mounting an effective and quick response, even though 

USDA and many states have developed and tested emergency animal disease 

response plans. For example, a high level of cooperation, coordination, 

and communication between state and federal agencies and between 

federal agencies is critical to an effective response. While USDA is 

making improvements in these areas, there is a wide variance between 

the states. Similarly, an effective response will require an adequate 

infrastructure, including a massive commitment of manpower and 

laboratory resources. USDA has developed agreements with other federal 

agencies, such as the Department of Defense and the Federal Emergency 

Management Agency, to leverage additional resources. However, gaps 

remain. For example, it is unclear how USDA will obtain the 1,200 

additional veterinarians trained in responding to foreign animal 

diseases that it estimates the nation will need to respond to an FMD 

outbreak. Furthermore, several issues relating to animal 

identification, disposal, and indemnification have not yet been 

addressed. For example, the United States does not have a system to 

identify and track animal movements in the event of an outbreak, and it 

is unclear how this information would be gathered in a timely manner. 

USDA currently has several efforts under way to resolve these issues. 

However, the effectiveness and speed of a U.S. response may be 

compromised if these issues are not fully addressed and resolved before 

an FMD outbreak occurs. GAO is recommending that USDA develop plans 

with interim and final milestones to ensure that these issues are 

addressed in a timely fashion.



Principal Findings:



USDA Has Adequate Processes to Obtain Information on Foreign FMD 

Outbreaks but Can Improve Dissemination to Customs:



USDA receives information about the incidence of foreign animal 

diseases, including FMD, from a variety of sources. These include 

USDAs network of staff stationed in foreign countries, international 

animal health and trade organizations, and the governments of affected 

nations. However, the usefulness of the information on foreign FMD 

outbreaks depends on a foreign countrys willingness to provide 

accurate information in a timely fashion. For example, in 2001, 

Argentine officials did not acknowledge that some regions of their 

country had been affected with FMD, although unconfirmed reports 

indicated that the disease had been present for several months, 

according to USDA officials. USDA was unable to take official action to 

prohibit FMD-susceptible products from Argentina until it received an 

official notification of the outbreak or obtained verifiable scientific 

evidence that FMD was present in Argentina.



APHIS has primary responsibility for sharing information obtained about 

foreign FMD outbreaks with other agencies within USDA, Customs, state 

governments, affected industries, and the public. These entities all 

need current information about potential FMD outbreaks because they all 

play an important role in preventing or responding to an outbreak. 

While APHIS immediately alerts USDA agencies and others, it has no 

formal process or defined procedures to distribute information on 

foreign FMD outbreaks to Customs. For example, after the U.K. outbreak, 

APHIS did not inform Customs about its decisions to prohibit or 

restrict certain products or more vigilantly screen passengers arriving 

at U.S. ports of entry from the United Kingdom. Until the Acting 

Commissioner of Customs formally requested this information in writing 

from the Administrator of APHIS, Customs did not receive any official 

guidance on general inspection measures for passengers and products. 

According to a Customs memorandum and officials we spoke to, many 

Customs field inspectors felt ill equipped to adequately process 

international cargo and passengers at ports of entry during the initial 

stages of the U.K. outbreak. Moreover, according to Customs officials, 

these inspectors are not animal disease specialists, and therefore need 

clear, nontechnical procedures to help them process international 

passengers and their luggage, especially at those ports where there is 

no APHIS presence. According to an APHIS official, although Customs had 

not been included on the FMD alert distribution list in the past, a 

Customs official has now been added to the list and will receive future 

alerts about foreign FMD outbreaks. This is a good interim step, 

however, GAO does not believe that it completely addresses the need for 

formal and well-defined communication procedures and protocols between 

APHIS and Customs.



U.S. Preventive Measures Are Comparable to Those of Other Countries, 

but Providing Complete Protection May Be Infeasible:



The United States seeks to prevent an FMD outbreak by supporting 

various programs to control and eradicate the disease overseas and by 

screening livestock, animal and other products, and passengers at the 

nations ports of entry. By helping other nations eradicate or control 

FMD outbreaks, USDA reduces the potential for the disease to reach U.S. 

borders. For example, in North America, U.S. efforts to eradicate and 

control FMD have largely focused on Mexico because of the shared border 

and the possible threat that the FMD virus could move overland from 

South America, where the disease is endemic in several countries. USDA 

helped Mexico eradicate FMD in 1954 and continues to help ensure that 

Mexico remains disease free. Similarly, USDA programs have helped 

create FMD-free zones in Colombia and Panama. These zones will help 

alert countries in both Central and North America about the potential 

incursion of FMD from the south. Also, when other countries have an 

outbreak, USDA may provide support by sending U.S. veterinarians to 

help control and eradicate the disease. For example, a total of about 

327 U.S. animal health professionals, including over 300 veterinarians, 

helped eradicate the 2001 outbreak in the United Kingdom.



USDA has also identified key pathways by which the FMD virus could 

enter the United States and has implemented measures to prevent 

potentially infected animals or products from entering the country. For 

example, USDA allows imported livestock only from countries that are 

free of FMD and other diseases of concern, when they are accompanied by 

appropriate import permits and health certificates and may subject 

these animals to quarantine. Furthermore, if a country has an FMD 

outbreak, USDA prohibits the importation of all susceptible products 

shipped 3 weeks prior to the date of official notification of the 

outbreak. This prohibition remains in effect until USDA has reassessed 

the disease status of the affected country and determined the level of 

trade that can resume. Moreover, USDA restricts imports of animal 

products from FMD-affected countries to those that have been processed 

in such a manner that they inactivate the virus and do not present a 

risk to U.S. livestock. In contrast, other products, such as hay used 

for feed or bedding, fresh meat, and some dairy products, are 

completely prohibited. Similarly, USDA has preventive measures for 

international passengers and their luggage, garbage from international 

ships and airplanes, and military personnel and equipment returning 

from overseas to ensure that they are not carrying the virus into the 

country.



USDA officials and some animal health experts believe that the United 

States almost 75-year disease-free status is a measure of the success 

of the departments efforts to keep FMD out of the country. At the same 

time, these officials are also concerned that, because of the level of 

risk inherent in international trade and travel, no set of measures can 

ever completely eliminate the possibility that FMD will enter the 

United States. Moreover, these experts believe that U.S. vulnerability 

to an outbreak remains because (1) FMD is a hardy virus that can enter 

the country on a variety of animate and inanimate products and (2) the 

magnitude and volume of international passengers, mail, and products 

entering the United States creates an enormous inspection challenge for 

USDA and other federal agencies. According to USDA, it would take only 

one contaminated product coming into contact with one susceptible U.S. 

animal to start a nationwide outbreak.



Other countries face similar challenges in protecting their livestock 

from FMD. Canada, Mexico, and the United Kingdom generally use measures 

that are comparable to U.S. measures to ensure that imports of 

livestock and animal products, international mail, and garbage from 

international carriers do not present an FMD risk. However, the 

countries have implemented measures differently for international 

passengers. For example, while Canada and Mexico use disinfectant mats 

at ports of entry, the United States does not. According to USDA 

officials, the United States does not use disinfectant mats because 

research indicates that their use may cause the virus to spread. Also, 

while all three countries use signs at international airports to alert 

and inform passengers about the risks of FMD, the U.S. signs are not as 

noticeable as the signs used in Canada and Mexico. While GAO recognizes 

that there is a cost to developing new signs, more effective signs may 

help improve U.S. preventive measures for international passengers.



Despite Preparation Efforts, Serious Challenges to an Effective U.S. 

Response Are Yet to Be Resolved:



If FMD enters the United States despite USDAs preventive measures, the 

nations ability to identify, control, contain, and eradicate the 

disease quickly and effectively becomes paramount. Recognizing the 

importance of an effective response, USDA and many states have 

developed emergency response plans that establish a framework for the 

key elements necessary for a rapid and successful U.S. response and 

eradication program. These plans have been tested, to some extent, by 

federal and state agencies to determine their effectiveness. Planning 

and testing exercises have also identified the following challenges, 

which could ultimately impede an effective and timely U.S. response if 

they are not resolved before an FMD outbreak occurs:



* Ensuring the rapid identification and reporting of an FMD incident. A 

timely response depends on having livestock producers and private 

veterinarians quickly identify and report suspicious symptoms to state 

and federal officials. If they do not, FMD could become out of control 

before the federal and state governments initiate any action. Several 

federal and state animal health officials expressed concern about how 

quickly disease identification and reporting would actually occur in 

the United States. According to USDA officials, the U.K. outbreak 

helped raise general awareness among state officials, private 

veterinarians, and livestock producers about the risks and potential of 

an FMD outbreak in the United States. Consequently, in 2001, USDA and 

the states increased their efforts to inform the livestock industry 

about the risks and symptoms of FMD. The challenge to USDA will be to 

maintain this heightened awareness about FMD, now that the immediate 

risk from the United Kingdom has subsided.



* Enhancing cooperation, coordination, and communication between 

federal, state, and local agencies, private veterinarians, and the 

industry. Recent planning efforts and testing exercises have started 

the process of establishing greater coordination and improving the 

level of cooperation and communication between all levels. However, 

these efforts have also identified gaps in these areas, and according 

to state officials, the level of cooperation, coordination, and 

communication between state officials and their federal counterparts 

vary across states. To help address these gaps, USDA is working with 

other organizations, such as the National Emergency Management 

Association, and is providing funds to help states improve their 

planning for animal emergencies.



* Developing an adequate response infrastructure to outbreaks of animal 

disease. An effective response to an FMD outbreak depends on an 

adequate infrastructure, which should include a national emergency 

management control and command center, technical and other personnel, 

transportation and disposal equipment, and laboratory facilities and 

testing capacity. While details for some of these components have been 

developed, others are not yet fully resolved. For example, USDA, in 

partnership with the Federal Emergency Management Agency, has set up a 

mechanism that will enable it to leverage resources for many of the 

general logistical support activities needed to respond to an outbreak. 

Similarly, USDAs memorandum of understanding with the Department of 

Defense will help provide needed military personnel and equipment to 

support a response effort. However, it is not yet clear how the United 

States will fill the shortage of at least 1,200 specially trained 

veterinarians or the laboratory testing and diagnostic capacity that 

USDA estimates is needed to respond to an animal health emergency.



* Establishing methods to identify and dispose of animals, and 

indemnify livestock producers. The effectiveness of a U.S. response to 

an FMD outbreak will require an animal identification and tracking 

system that will allow responders to quickly identify, control, and 

slaughter infected and exposed animals, as well as clear animal 

disposal and indemnification policies. Recognizing the importance of an 

animal identification and tracking system, USDA began planning for it 

in 1999. However, until recently, the livestock industry has resisted 

the concept because of the costs involved and the potential for the 

unauthorized disclosure of proprietary information, according to USDA 

officials. Similarly, USDA has determined that burial, incineration, 

and rendering are the preferred methods for disposing of animal 

carcasses. However, according to federal and state officials, each of 

these disposal methods presents significant implementation challenges 

that have not yet been fully considered, such as the potential to 

spread the disease if on-farm disposal is not feasible, the potential 

to cause groundwater contamination or air pollution, high cost, and 

concerns about public perception. Finally, delays could occur during an 

FMD eradication effort, because producers--fearing that they might not 

be adequately compensated for the fair market value of destroyed 

animals, products, and materials as well as cleaning and disinfecting 

costs--may not cooperate with responders. To address this concern, USDA 

published a proposed rule on May 1, 2002, amending its FMD-related 

regulations that clarify how indemnity and compensation issues will be 

handled during an outbreak.



Recommendations for Executive Action:



GAO recommends that USDA collaborate with Customs to develop (1) a 

formal process to disseminate updated information on foreign FMD 

outbreaks to Customs inspectors at ports of entry and (2) nontechnical 

procedures that these inspectors can use to screen cargo and passengers 

from FMD-affected countries. GAO also recommends that USDA consider 

better signs for ports of entry to help ensure that international 

passengers do not inadvertently bring FMD into the United States. 

Finally, GAO recommends that USDA develop a plan and related milestones 

to address the outstanding issues that could compromise an effective 

and rapid U.S. response.



Agency Comments:



We provided Customs and USDA with a draft of this report for review and 

comment. Customs had no comments on the report. USDA stated that the 

report was generally accurate and insightful, and provided a number of 

meritorious recommendations. USDA also noted that the report provided 

an accurate portrayal of the challenges that face the continuum of 

federal, state, and industry resources dedicated to safeguarding the 

health of U.S. agriculture. USDA agreed with the reports conclusion 

that because of the enormous volume of international travel and trade, 

there is no way to ensure zero risk of disease introduction. However, 

USDA also believes that the short-and long-term measures that it is 

taking to enhance prevention, surveillance, emergency preparedness, and 

coordination with other federal, state, and industry organizations is 

providing a much-needed boost to the United States overall 

safeguarding infrastructure. At the same time, USDA agreed that it 

would continue to look critically at the effectiveness of its efforts 

and make whatever changes are warranted.



USDAs and Customs written comments are presented in appendix V and 

VI, respectively. USDAs comments include additional information on the 

departments recent and other ongoing efforts to enhance the United 

States ability to prevent and respond to an FMD outbreak in the areas 

of (1) resources and infrastructure, (2) prevention and control 

measures, and (3) communications and outreach. We have included this 

information and the additional technical comments that USDA provided us 

with throughout the report as appropriate.



[End of section]



Chapter 1: Introduction:



Foot and mouth disease (FMD) is one of the most devastating viral 

animal diseases affecting cloven-hoofed animals such as cattle and 

swine, and has occurred in most countries of the world at some point 

during the last century. Although the disease has no human-health 

implications, it can have enormous economic and social consequences, as 

recent outbreaks in the United Kingdom and Taiwan have demonstrated. 

These consequences occur because the international community values 

products from countries that are FMD-free and generally restricts 

international trade in FMD-susceptible products from countries affected 

by an outbreak. Most FMD-affected countries, therefore, take whatever 

measures necessary to regain their FMD-free status as quickly as 

possible. In the United States, the U.S. Department of Agriculture 

(USDA) has primary responsibility for protecting domestic livestock 

from animal diseases such as FMD. The U.S. Customs Service supports 

USDA in these efforts.



FMD Is a Highly Contagious Animal Disease:



FMD--a highly contagious viral disease affecting primarily cloven-

hoofed animals, such as cattle, sheep, swine, and goats--has 7 types 

and over 80 subtypes. Immunity to, or vaccination for, one type of the 

virus does not protect animals against infection from the other types. 

FMD-infected animals usually develop blister-like lesions in the mouth, 

on the tongue and lips, on the teats, or between the hooves, which 

causes them to salivate excessively or become lame. Other symptoms 

include fever, reduced feed consumption, and abortions. Cattle and pigs 

are very sensitive to the virus and show symptoms of the disease after 

a short incubation period of 3 to 5 days. The incubation period in 

sheep is considerably longer, about 10 to 14 days, and the clinical 

signs of the disease are usually mild and may be masked by other 

conventional conditions, thereby allowing the disease to go unnoticed. 

The mortality rate for nonadult animals infected with FMD varies and 

depends on the species and strain of the virus; in contrast, adult 

animals usually recover once the disease has run its course. However, 

because the disease leaves them severely debilitated, meat-producing 

animals do not normally regain their lost weight for many months, and 

dairy cows seldom produce milk at their former rate. The disease 

therefore can cause severe losses in the production of meat and milk.



The FMD virus is easily transmitted and spreads rapidly. Prior to and 

during the appearance of clinical signs, infected animals release the 

virus into the environment through respiration, milk, semen, blood, 

saliva, and feces. The virus may become airborne and spread quickly if 

pigs become infected because pigs prolifically produce and excrete 

large amounts of the virus into the air. Animals, people, or materials 

that are exposed to the virus can also spread FMD by bringing it into 

contact with susceptible animals. For example, the virus can spread 

when susceptible animals come in contact with contaminated:



* animals;



* animal products, such as meat, milk, hides, skins, and manure;



* transport vehicles and equipment;



* clothes or shoes worn by people; and:



* hay, feedstuffs, or veterinary biologics.[Footnote 1]



The FMD virus has a remarkable capability for remaining viable for long 

periods of time in a variety of animate and inanimate objects. For 

example, the virus can persist in the human nasal passages for up to 36 

hours, manure for 1 to 24 weeks, fodder for 1 month, and on shoes for 9 

to 14 weeks. The ability of the virus to persist in the environment and 

other products depends on the temperature and potential of hydrogen 

(pH) conditions.[Footnote 2] Generally, the virus can survive freezing 

but cannot survive at temperatures above 50 Celsius (122 Farenheit) 

and at pH levels of less than 6, or greater than 9. Table 1 shows the 

various lengths of time that the FMD virus can survive in some selected 

products.



Table 1: Survival Time of the FMD Virus in Selected Products and By-

Products:



Product or by-product: Bacon; Processing or storage conditions: Salted; 

Virus survival time: 183 days.



Product or by-product: Bedding (straw and wood shavings); Processing or 

storage conditions: N/A; Virus survival time: 4 weeks.



Product or by-product: Buttermilk; Processing or storage conditions: N/

A; Virus survival time: 14 days.



Product or by-product: Ham; Processing or storage conditions: N/A; 

Virus survival time: 16 weeks.



Product or by-product: Hay; Processing or storage conditions: Ambient 

temperature; Virus survival time: Greater than 200 days.



Product or by-product: Hides or skins; Processing or storage 

conditions: Air dried at 20 C; Virus survival time: 6 weeks.



Product or by-product: Manure; Processing or storage conditions: 

Summer/winter; Virus survival time: 1 week/24 weeks.



Product or by-product: Shoes; Processing or storage conditions: Summer/

winter; Virus survival time: 9 weeks/14 weeks.



Product or by-product: Soil; Processing or storage conditions: Summer/

winter; Virus survival time: 3-7 days/21 weeks.



Product or by-product: Water; Processing or storage conditions: Ambient 

temperature; Virus survival time: 14 weeks.



Product or by-product: Wool; Processing or storage conditions: Ambient 

temperature; Virus survival time: 20 days.



Legend: N/A=not applicable:



Source: Adapted by GAO from USDA information.



[End of table]



FMD can be confused with several similar but less harmful animal 

diseases that also produce blisters and cause animals to salivate, such 

as vesicular stomatitis, bovine viral diarrhea, and foot rot. Two 

foreign swine diseases are also clinically identical to FMD--swine 

vesicular disease and vesicular exanthema of swine. The only way to 

distinguish between FMD and these other diseases is through laboratory 

analyses of fluid or tissue samples. FMD is also sometimes confused 

with mad cow disease or bovine spongiform encephalopathy 

(BSE).[Footnote 3] BSE is a fatal, neuro-degenerative disease found in 

cattle in 23 countries around the world. Cattle contract the disease 

through animal feed that contains protein derived from the remains of 

diseased animals. Scientists generally believe that an equally fatal 

disease in humans--known as variant Creutzfeldt-Jacob Disease--is 

linked to eating beef from cattle with BSE. However, unlike mad cow 

disease, FMD has no known human health implications.



Incidence of FMD Worldwide Is Extensive:



FMD is present in about 60 percent of the countries in the world and 

endemic in many countries in Africa, the Middle East, Asia, and South 

America. The relatively few areas that are considered free of FMD 

include North and Central America, Australia, New Zealand, and the 

Caribbean. Figure 1 shows the presence of FMD worldwide for the period 

1992 through 2002.



Figure 1: Worldwide Incidence of FMD, 1992 through 2002:



[See PDF for image]



Source: GAOs adaptation of information from the Institute for Animal 

Health (Pirbright Laboratory), which is designated the World Reference 

Laboratory for Foot and Mouth Disease by the Food and Agriculture 

Organization of the United Nations, and the Office International des 

Epizooties.



[End of figure]



In 2000 and 2001, over 40 countries reported outbreaks of FMD, and 

during the first 5 months of 2002, five countries reported outbreaks. 

The spread of certain strains of the virus also demonstrates how 

quickly it is spreading throughout the world. For example, the FMD 

virus serotype O, known as the Pan-Asia strain, was first identified in 

northern India in 1990 and was subsequently found in Nepal in 1993. It 

then spread westward into Saudi Arabia during 1994 and, subsequently, 

throughout the Near East and into Europe (Thrace region of Turkey, 

Bulgaria, and Greece) in 1996. The Pan-Asia strain was also found in 

Bangladesh in 1996 and in Bhutan in 1998. In 1999 it was reported in 

mainland China and then detected in Taiwan. By late 1999 and in 2000, 

it had reached most of Southeast Asia. Most recently, the Pan-Asia 

strain was found in the Republic of Korea, Japan, the Primorsky 

Territory of the Russian Federation, and Mongolia (areas free from FMD 

since 1934, 1908, 1964, and 1973, respectively). The Pan-Asia strain is 

also responsible for the 2001 outbreak of FMD in the United Kingdom 

that subsequently spread to France, Ireland, and the Netherlands. 

Figure 2 shows the incidence of four types of FMD virus worldwide, 

including the type O Pan-Asia strain.



Figure 2: Worldwide Incidence of Four Types of FMD, 1990 through 2002:



[See PDF for image]



Source: GAOs adaptation of information from the Institute for Animal 

Health (Pirbright Laboratory), which is designated the World Reference 

Laboratory for Foot and Mouth Disease by the Food and Agriculture 

Organization of the United Nations, and the Office International des 

Epizooties.



[End of figure]



In North America, the last outbreaks of FMD for the United States, 

Canada, and Mexico occurred in 1929, 1952, and 1953, respectively. The 

United States has worked closely with both Canada and Mexico to 

eradicate FMD from North America.



International Community Has Guidelines to Control and Eradicate FMD:



The Office International des Epizooties (OIE)--an intergovernmental 

organization created in January 1924 by an international agreement 

signed by 28 countries--was established to guarantee the transparency 

of information on the animal disease status of member countries. In 

addition, OIE collects and analyzes veterinary scientific information 

and disseminates it to member countries, provides expertise and 

promotes international solidarity for the control of animal diseases, 

and guarantees the sanitary safety of world trade by developing rules 

for international trade in animals and animal products. In May 2001, 

OIE had 158 member countries.



OIE classifies member countries (or certain zones within these 

countries) as being FMD-free with or without vaccination if they meet 

certain criteria detailed in the OIE International Animal Health Code. 

For example, to obtain FMD-free status without vaccination, a member 

country should

(1) have a record of prompt animal disease reporting; (2) send a 

declaration that it has been FMD-free and has not used vaccination for 

1 year; (3) present evidence that it has an effective system of 

surveillance; 

(4) implement regulatory measures for the prevention and control of 

FMD; and (5) provide evidence that no vaccinated animals have been 

imported into the country, since such animals can become the source of 

future infections. Similarly, to obtain FMD-free-with-vaccination 

status, a country should (1) have a record for prompt animal disease 

reporting, (2) send a declaration that there have been no outbreaks of 

FMD for 2 years, 

(3) provide evidence that the country has effective surveillance 

systems and has implemented necessary regulatory measures to prevent 

and control FMD, (4) provide proof that routine vaccinations are 

carried out and that the vaccines comply with OIE standards, and (5) 

have an intensive and frequent system to detect any viral activity.



When FMD occurs in an FMD-free country or zone where vaccination is not 

practiced, the affected country must reapply after the outbreak to 

regain its FMD-free-without-vaccination status from OIE. OIE standards 

require a country to wait until 3 months after the last reported case 

of FMD when a stamping out approach (immediate slaughter of diseased 

and exposed animals with no vaccination) is used to eradicate the 

disease before the country can apply for reinstatement of its FMD-free 

status. As part of this process, surveillance results of laboratory-

screening tests (serological surveillance results) must be provided to 

OIE to prove that the disease has been eradicated. If vaccination was 

used to control the outbreak, then the country must wait until 3 months 

after the last vaccinated animal is slaughtered and serological 

surveillance results prove that the disease has been eradicated before 

reapplying for FMD-free status.



The international community generally places a high value on products 

from countries that are FMD-free without vaccination. Such countries 

can export both live animals and animal products easily to other FMD-

free countries. In contrast, countries that have an FMD-free-with-

vaccination status are restricted to trading animal products that can 

be treated to ensure that the virus is inactivated. As a result, most 

countries that are FMD-free without vaccination resort to a stamping 

out process to eradicate the disease if an outbreak occurs. The United 

Kingdom and Taiwan followed this process in 2001 and 1997, 

respectively. Similarly, if an outbreak were to occur in the United 

States, the current U.S. policy requires all infected and exposed 

animals to be immediately slaughtered and disposed of by incineration, 

burial, or rendering.[Footnote 4]



In recent years, the international community has been encouraging the 

acceptance of regionalization policies for international trade. 

Regionalization involves declaring one or more areas of a country FMD-

free while other areas are responding to an outbreak. Under a 

regionalization policy, in the event of an FMD outbreak in the United 

States, even if one state or area was infected, the nation as a whole 

might not lose its FMD-free status, and trade restrictions might not be 

enforced on all of our FMD-susceptible products.



An FMD Outbreak Can Cost Billions of Dollars:



An FMD outbreak could cost the U.S. economy billions of dollars in both 

direct and indirect costs. Direct costs to the government would include 

the costs of disease control and eradication, such as the maintenance 

of animal movement controls, control areas, and intensified border 

inspections; the destruction and disposal of infected animals; 

vaccines; and compensation to producers for the costs of disease 

containment. However, government compensation programs may not cover 

100 percent of producers costs. As a result, direct costs would also 

occur for disinfection and for the value of any slaughtered animals not 

subject to government compensation. According to recent U.K. government 

estimates, the direct costs for control and eradication of the 2001 

outbreak was about $4 billion. According to several estimates, the 

direct costs of controlling and eradicating a U.S. outbreak of FMD 

could range up to $24 billion in current dollars, depending, among 

other things, on the extent of the outbreak and the control strategy 

employed.[Footnote 5]



The value of lost export sales in the event of an FMD outbreak would 

represent a significant portion of the total direct costs to the U.S. 

economy. According to USDA officials, a single case of FMD in the 

United States would cause our trading partners to prohibit U.S. exports 

of live animals and animal products. This ban could result in losses of 

between $6 billion and $10 billion a year while the United States 

eradicated the disease and until it regained disease-free status. These 

losses may be mitigated to some extent by increased domestic sales of 

meat from disease-free portions of the United States that may otherwise 

have been exported. However, USDA officials believe that many people in 

the United States would refuse to eat meat during an FMD outbreak, thus 

the offset probably would be minimal.



Indirect costs of an FMD outbreak would include those costs affecting 

consumers, ancillary agricultural industries, and other sectors of the 

economy. For example, if large numbers of animals are destroyed as part 

of a control and eradication effort, then ancillary industries such as 

meat-processing facilities and feed suppliers are likely to lose 

revenue. Furthermore, an FMD outbreak would result in adverse effects 

such as unemployment, loss of income (to the extent that government 

compensation does not fully reimburse producers), and decreased 

economic activity, which could ripple through other sectors of the 

economy as well. For example, the loss of agricultural income could 

result in reduced sales of consumer goods. In the United Kingdom, 

according to government estimates, the 2001 outbreak resulted in losses 

to the tourism industry of over $5 billion that were comparable to the 

losses sustained by the food and agriculture sector.



In addition, not only may consumers have to pay higher prices for the 

remaining supply of animal products affected by an FMD outbreak, but 

the price of substitutes is likely to rise, as well. For example, as 

the price of FMD-free meat increases, some consumers are likely to buy 

poultry or other meat substitutes, thus causing the prices of these 

substitute products to rise. However, the higher prices that consumers 

pay for substitutes do not result in a net cost to the economy because 

these higher prices result in increased revenues for poultry producers 

and others.



Social Impacts of an Outbreak Can Be Significant:



An FMD outbreak can have significant social impacts, such as enormous 

psychological damage, especially on families and localities directly 

affected by the outbreak, as the U.K. experience in 2001 illustrates. 

For example, in May 2001, the Welsh Institute of Rural Health found 

that individuals affected by the FMD outbreak experienced a range of 

symptoms, including tearfulness, lack of sleep, loss of appetite, 

increased anger, irritability, and general depression. An increase in 

marital discord was also noted. One general practioner reported that 50 

percent of his patients affected by the FMD outbreak required 

antidepressant drugs. Some farming families even sent their children 

away from home during the outbreak rather than have them witness the 

slaughter and disposal of the familys livestock.



Consumer confidence in the safety of the U.K. food supply was also 

adversely affected by the outbreak. A survey by the United Kingdoms 

Institute of Grocery Distribution determined that because of the FMD 

and mad cow disease outbreaks, many consumers in the United Kingdom now 

consider meat and dairy products to be unsafe. As a result, these 

consumers have changed their grocery-buying habits.



An outbreak also significantly disrupts daily life. Normally busy 

livestock producers suddenly had almost nothing to do because their 

animals had been destroyed and their properties were quarantined. 

According to one study of the effects of FMD on farm life in the 

Cumbria area of the United Kingdom, most farming households had to curb 

their usual daily activities, and only the most essential movements on 

and off the farms were permitted. Lost income caused stress to families 

because they had to cut back on their household expenditures and some 

had to renegotiate loans. The study notes that the enforced isolation 

caused by the quarantines added to the tensions and stresses already 

being experienced by both adults and children.



USDA Is Responsible for Protecting U.S. Livestock From FMD and Other 

Animal Diseases:



Within USDA, the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) has 

the lead responsibility for protecting the nations livestock from 

foreign animal diseases, which are diseases not native to the United 

States as well as those thought to have been eradicated. Assisting 

APHIS in this endeavor are USDAs Foreign Agricultural Service, the 

Food Safety and Inspection Service, and the Homeland Security Council.



Within APHIS, several groups share responsibility for protecting U.S. 

livestock from the incursion of foreign animal diseases such as FMD:



* International Services. Working with its counterpart organizations in 

foreign countries, this group seeks to reduce the international spread 

of animal and poultry diseases. Its goal is to protect U.S. livestock 

and poultry by reducing risk abroad through disease-management 

strategies provided to exporting countries before they send their 

animals and products to the United States.



* Veterinary Services. To protect and improve the health, quality, and 

marketability of our nations animals, animal products, and veterinary 

biologics, this group seeks to prevent, control, and/or eliminate 

animal diseases, and monitor and promote animal health and 

productivity. This group administers laws and regulations on importing 

animals and animal products, including embryos and semen, to ensure 

that imports are free from certain disease agents. In addition, 

Veterinary Services provides training for state and private 

veterinarians on foreign animal diseases of concern and provides animal 

disease diagnostic and surveillance testing. Veterinary Services has 

primary responsibility for inspecting and ensuring the safety of live 

animal and animal product imports to the United States. Within 

Veterinary Services, the Emergency Programs unit coordinates efforts to 

prepare for and respond to animal disease outbreaks, including FMD, and 

in the fall of 2001, published a draft plan for responding to an FMD 

outbreak. It employs veterinarians trained to detect and respond to an 

FMD outbreak. Emergency Programs also provides federal and state 

veterinarians and others with training on foreign animal diseases.



* Plant Protection and Quarantine. Inspectors in this group are USDAs 

primary presence at 144 of the 301 ports of entry in the United States, 

as well as 8 foreign ports. According to USDA, inspectors are present 

at all major ports of entry, and staffing is based on risk assessments 

and supplemented with tools such as detector dogs, X-rays, and hand-

held remote-sensing equipment. USDA inspectors screen and physically 

inspect animal products and other cargo arriving by air, sea, or land, 

as well as international passengers and their luggage arriving via air, 

sea, or land border crossings. Most notably, the beagles in Plant 

Protection and Quarantines Beagle Brigade sniff travelers luggage for 

prohibited fruits, plants, and meat that could harbor harmful plant and 

animal pests and diseases. According to USDA, by the end of this year, 

it will have increased the number of dog teams to 123, which is double 

the level available 2 years ago.



In commenting on a draft of this report, USDA stated that by the end of 

this year, APHIS will also have increased the number of its 

safeguarding personnel to approximately 3,870--an increase of 50 

percent over its fiscal year 2000 staffing levels. Moreover, USDA told 

us that it has hired 18 additional veterinarians who are conducting 

port-of-entry reviews, working with state counterparts, and providing 

technical guidance and training on working with and handling animal 

products and byproducts and international garbage that could pose a 

threat of foreign animal diseases.



In addition, USDAs Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS) operates 

programs designed to build new markets and improve the competitive 

position of U.S. agriculture in the global marketplace. FAS is 

responsible for USDAs overseas activities, such as market development, 

international trade agreements and negotiations, and the collection and 

analysis of statistics and market information. FAS supports U.S. 

agricultural interests through its network of agricultural counselors, 

attachs, and trade officers stationed in many foreign countries. FAS 

officials primarily deal with agricultural trade issues and meet with 

host government and industry officials to discuss and facilitate 

agricultural trade.



USDAs Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) has primary 

responsibility for ensuring the safety of imported and domestic meat 

and meat products meant for human consumption. FSIS stations inspectors 

at ports of entry to conduct sampling and inspection functions on 

imported meat products. FSIS also has responsibility for approving 

countries that are eligible to export meat products to the United 

States. In fulfilling this responsibility, FSIS conducts periodic 

reviews of eligible countries. According to USDA, FSISs inspection of 

livestock before slaughter is an important surveillance tool for 

detecting the presence of FMD in the United States.



Finally, USDAs Homeland Security Council is responsible for leading 

and coordinating USDAs activities to plan for and manage agriculture-

related crises as well as emergency programs. This council serves as 

USDAs primary contact with the Federal Emergency Management Agency and 

facilitates coordination with other federal agencies, state and local 

governments, and private-sector organizations.



U.S. Customs Service Supports USDAs Efforts at Ports of Entry:



The U.S. Customs Service (Customs) is the nations primary enforcement 

agency for preventing the entry of a number of potentially harmful 

products into the United States, including FMD-contaminated products. 

In addition to their Customs responsibilities to ensure that proper 

duties or tariffs are paid on imported products, Customs inspectors 

work to enforce the regulations of about 40 federal agencies, such as 

those of USDA. Customs inspectors review paperwork, such as manifests 

and bills of lading, and physically inspect cargo and international 

passengers and their luggage. Customs has inspectors stationed at all 

301 ports of entry throughout the United States, including 

international airports and seaports and land border crossings along the 

Canadian and Mexican borders. Customs also has inspectors at some 

foreign locations, such as the international airport in Toronto, 

Canada, where they perform preclearance inspections of passengers and 

their luggage prior to entry into the United States. Customs inspectors 

also examine international mail and packages arriving in the United 

States at the 14 facilities handling mail of foreign origin.



Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:



Senator Tom Daschle asked us to determine whether (1) U.S. processes to 

obtain and disseminate information on foreign FMD outbreaks are 

adequate and timely, (2) U.S. measures for preventing FMD from entering 

the country are effective and comparable with those of other selected 

countries, and (3) the United States could respond quickly and 

effectively to an outbreak of FMD if it were to occur.



To address the first question, we obtained and reviewed relevant 

documents, and we interviewed USDA and Customs officials. In 

particular, we reviewed the adequacy and timeliness of the information 

obtained and disseminated by USDA after the 2001 FMD outbreak in the 

United Kingdom.



For the second question, we reviewed relevant legislation, regulations, 

and other USDA documents. We also interviewed USDA, Customs, and state 

officials. To observe the preventive measures for international cargo, 

we visited three large seaports in Elizabeth, New Jersey; Baltimore, 

Maryland; and Houston, Texas. To observe the preventive measures for 

international mail, we visited international mail-processing 

facilities in New Jersey and Virginia and one international express 

package carrier in Kentucky. To observe the preventive measures for 

live animals imported through 

U.S.-Canadian and U.S.-Mexican land ports of entry, we visited the 

Sarnia, Ontario, and Nuevo Laredo, Mexico, border crossings. To observe 

the preventive measures for international passengers, we visited Dulles 

International Airport, and obtained information on the preclearance 

procedures used to process international passengers entering the United 

States via Canada at the international airport in Toronto, Canada. We 

also gathered information on how garbage from international carriers is 

handled at airports and seaports. In addition, we visited two nearby 

county and two state fairs in Maryland and Virginia to observe how 

USDAs guidance for biosecurity measures to prevent the spread of 

disease at U.S. livestock and agricultural shows was implemented.



As a result of the heightened level of security at airports after 

September 11, 2001, and because our review was largely conducted after 

the U.K. outbreak had ended, we were unable to implement a portion of 

the review as originally planned. In particular, we were unable to 

survey passengers who were returning to the United States from the 

United Kingdom, during the outbreak, at the airport after they left the 

passenger-processing area. Instead, we surveyed by telephone 60 

passengers who visited the United Kingdom during the time of the 

outbreak (Mar. through Sept. 2001). We asked them to recall various 

aspects of their return trip and the processing they underwent at U.S. 

airports. These results cannot be generalized and represent only the 

experiences of the people whom we surveyed. In addition, because we 

asked people to recall events after the passage of 

4 to 6 months, their recollections of certain events and processes 

might not have been as clear as they would have been immediately upon 

arrival.



Furthermore, to respond to our second question, we compared the 

preventive measures used by Canada, Mexico, and the United Kingdom with 

those used by the United States. We selected Canada and Mexico for our 

review because the ability of the United States to protect its 

livestock from FMD also depends on the ability of our neighbors to 

prevent the disease; according to USDA officials, if any of the three 

countries has an FMD outbreak, the other two are also likely to have an 

outbreak. We included the United Kingdom in our analysis because it is 

a major U.S. trading partner and because of its recent experience with 

FMD. To obtain information on the preventive measures used by Canada 

and Mexico, we visited these two countries, met with federal officials, 

and obtained and reviewed relevant documents. While in Canada and 

Mexico, we visited airports, seaports, international mail-processing 

facilities, and border crossings to observe the preventive measures 

used by these countries. To obtain information on the United Kingdoms 

preventive measures, we reviewed and summarized legislation and 

regulations for the European Union and the United Kingdom, as well as 

other publicly available documents. To ensure the accuracy and 

completeness of our information, we shared the summaries that we 

prepared on the preventive measures used by the three countries with 

officials in these countries and asked for their review and comments. 

The information on these foreign countries preventive measures does 

not reflect our independent legal analysis.



Finally, for our third question, we reviewed federal and state 

emergency response plans as well as other key documents and federal 

legislation and regulations. We interviewed USDA officials, industry 

representatives, and state officials. We also interviewed a group of 

selected veterinarians and animal health technicians who were part of 

the U.S. contingent that supported the United Kingdoms response 

efforts in 2001 to obtain their perspectives on U.S. preparedness and 

observations on lessons learned from the U.K. outbreak. We interviewed 

the state veterinarian in six states that are major U.S. livestock 

producers to obtain their perspective on their states preparedness 

efforts as well as the overall U.S. ability to respond to an outbreak 

if it were to occur. We also attended a USDA training session and a 

conference organized by the Western States Livestock Health Association 

that included information on U.S. preparedness and response to an FMD 

outbreak.



We provided USDA and Customs with a draft of this report for review and 

comment. The written comments we received from USDA are presented in 

appendix V, and those we received from Customs, in appendix VI. In 

addition, we received technical comments from USDA that we have 

incorporated throughout the report as appropriate.



We conducted our work from August 2001 through May 2002 in accordance 

with generally accepted government auditing standards.



[End of section]



Chapter 2: USDA Has Adequate Processes to Obtain Information on Foreign 

FMD Outbreaks, but Dissemination to Customs Can Be Improved:



USDA relies on a wide variety of sources to obtain information on 

outbreaks of FMD overseas. Its sources include APHIS and FAS staff 

stationed abroad, official notifications from international trade or 

animal health organizations, and notifications from affected countries. 

But USDAs dissemination of this information is more problematic 

because it has no formal process--detailed procedures and protocols--

for sharing information on foreign FMD outbreaks with Customs, which 

provides the first line of defense against potentially contaminated 

products entering U.S. ports. USDA does, however, share the information 

it develops with agencies within the department, states, public and 

private veterinarians, industry groups, and the public through various 

methods, including E-mails, postings to USDAs Internet site, telephone 

calls, and media alerts.



USDA Obtains Information on Foreign FMD Outbreaks from Multiple 

Sources:



USDA receives information about the incidence of foreign animal 

diseases, including FMD, from a variety of sources. These include USDA 

staff stationed in foreign countries; international organizations, such 

as OIE and the World Trade Organization (WTO); and the governments of 

affected nations.



USDA officials stationed in countries around the world provide a range 

of information on agricultural issues, including the disease status of 

foreign countries. For example, APHISs International Services group 

employs over 300 foreign service officers and host country nationals in 

27 countries around the world. According to APHIS officials, these 

foreign service staff collect agricultural information for the 

countries they are stationed in as well as other countries in the 

region. Their primary sources of information include (1) official 

notifications from foreign governments about changes in their countrys 

animal or crop disease status; (2) meetings with host government, local 

industry, and private-sector officials; (3) local radio and television 

reports, as well as newspapers and magazines, which may provide early 

information about potential animal or crop disease problems; and (4) 

informal discussions at receptions or other social events hosted by the 

foreign government or private citizens, from which they may gather 

references of potential animal or crop disease problems. According to 

APHIS officials, any information gathered from unofficial or informal 

sources needs to be confirmed through other official sources before the 

United States can initiate any formal action, such as restricting 

imports.



Similarly, FAS maintains an international field structure: 63 

agricultural counselor, attach, and affiliate foreign national 

offices; 17 agricultural trade offices; and a number of agricultural 

advisers covering 129 countries around the world. According to the FAS 

officials we spoke with, staff stationed overseas have no functional 

responsibility for tracking foreign animal diseases, such as FMD. 

However, during their routine activities, they may become aware of a 

possible outbreak, in which case they would likely relay this 

information to FAS headquarters, in Washington, D.C. FAS staff obtain 

agricultural information from several of the same sources accessed by 

APHIS staff, such as the local media, trade and industry reports, 

meetings with host government officials, and official government 

notifications and documents.



In addition, FSIS provides APHIS with information on the disease 

conditions present in foreign countries that it obtains as part of its 

evaluation of a countrys eligibility to export meat and meat products 

to the United States. FSISs technical staff review the documents 

provided by the foreign country as well as conduct in-country visits 

before deeming a country eligible to export meat and meat products to 

the United States for human consumption. FSIS also conducts audits in 

each eligible exporting country, at least annually, and shares any 

information obtained on diseases of concern with APHIS, according to 

USDA.



USDA also receives information from international organizations, such 

as OIE and WTO, which have reporting guidelines for member nations to 

follow during outbreaks of certain animal diseases. For example, both 

OIE and WTO require member countries affected with FMD to make an 

official notification as soon as the disease has been confirmed. These 

organizations then provide other member nations with official 

notification of the outbreak.



In addition to reporting to international organizations, countries 

affected by FMD may report the outbreak directly to their major trading 

partners. For example, major U.S. trading partners often notify USDA 

officials directly when an FMD outbreak occurs, as the United Kingdom 

did in early 2001. According to APHIS officials, the United Kingdom 

notified USDA on the same day that it confirmed the presence of FMD--

February 21, 2001. In North America, Canada, Mexico, and the United 

States have an informal understanding that in the event of an FMD 

outbreak, the affected country will immediately report to the other two 

countries.



The usefulness of information on foreign FMD outbreaks depends on a 

foreign countrys willingness to provide accurate information in a 

timely fashion. There are instances, however, when a country may fail 

to notify OIE, WTO, or its major trading partners of a disease outbreak 

in a timely manner.[Footnote 6] For example, Argentine officials did 

not acknowledge that some regions of their country had been affected 

with FMD, although unconfirmed reports indicated that the disease had 

been present for several months, according to USDA officials. Argentina 

officially notified OIE on March 13, 2001, and USDA then took action to 

prohibit imports of affected Argentine products. In commenting on a 

draft of this report, USDA stated that if it had verifiable scientific 

evidence that FMD existed in Argentina, it could have prohibited 

imports before the country notified OIE.



USDA Lacks a Formal Process to Ensure Dissemination of FMD Information 

to Customs:



APHIS has primary responsibility for sharing information obtained about 

foreign FMD outbreaks with other agencies within USDA, Customs, state 

governments, affected industries, and the public. These entities all 

need information about potential FMD outbreaks because they all play an 

important role in preventing or responding to an outbreak. While APHIS 

immediately alerts USDA agencies and others, it has no formal process, 

including defined procedures and protocols, to distribute information 

on foreign FMD outbreaks to Customs. Consequently, there is no 

assurance that Customs inspectors at U.S. ports of entry, and in 

particular at the ports where APHIS does not have a presence, are 

adequately informed of the need to implement controls for potentially 

contaminated cargo, and international passengers and their luggage 

entering the United States.



APHIS Uses Multiple Mechanisms to Inform USDA Agencies and Others in 

the United States About Foreign FMD Outbreaks:



APHIS uses various methods to inform its own field staff located in the 

United States and abroad, other USDA agencies, state governments, 

industry groups, the public, and the media about foreign FMD outbreaks. 

These methods include:



* E-mails and electronic alerts,



* memos and letters,



* telephone calls,



* meetings,



* press releases,



* printed media (brochures, pamphlets, and posters),



* public education and outreach,



* toll free information hotline, and:



* postings to the Internet (USDAs Web page).



After the 2001 outbreak of FMD in the United Kingdom, we observed that 

APHIS used each of these methods to distribute information about (1) 

the disease, (2) the outbreak in the United Kingdom, and (3) preventing 

the introduction and spread of the disease in the United States. For 

example, APHIS field locations began receiving electronic alerts and E-

mails from APHIS headquarters, on February 21, 2001, which was the same 

day that the United Kingdom notified APHIS about the outbreak. 

Similarly, by the second week of March 2001, USDA had issued several 

press releases, placed information on its Web site about FMD 

precautions, initiated an international travelers education campaign, 

and established a toll-free number for public inquiries about the 

disease. Also, shortly after the U.K. outbreak began, APHIS distributed 

several types of printed media to its field offices nationwide. 

According to the Veterinary Services staff in the field offices we 

contacted, they distributed these materials to state governments, 

industry associations, and private veterinarians, and placed posters in 

public transportation terminals, such as train stations. Table 2 shows 

selected key actions APHIS took upon learning of the FMD outbreak in 

the United Kingdom.



Table 2: Key USDA Information Dissemination Actions Taken After the 

2001 Outbreak of FMD in the United Kingdom:



Date: Feb. 21, 2001; Action taken/information disseminated: APHIS Alert 

to all its Plant Protection and Quarantine Port Offices prohibiting the 

importation of all meat products from the United Kingdom (including 

England, Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland, and the Isle of Man)..



Date: Feb. 26, 2001; Action taken/information disseminated: APHIS 

Electronic Alert reminding Plant Protection and Quarantine inspectors 

to closely monitor international passengers, in particular those 

arriving from the United Kingdom, and screen for those who had been on 

a farm overseas and to check footwear and decontaminate if necessary..



Date: Mar. 1, 2001; Action taken/information disseminated: APHIS 

Electronic Alert to Plant Protection and Quarantine inspectors 

providing guidance on inspecting farm equipment and tractors as well as 

other vehicles imported from the United Kingdom or the Republic of 

Ireland..



Date: Mar. 6, 2001; Action taken/information disseminated: First team 

of U.S. veterinarians deployed to the United Kingdom to help respond to 

the outbreak..



Date: Mar. 12, 2001; Action taken/information disseminated: Beginning 

the week of March 12, 2001, a high-ranking APHIS official began a tour 

of major eastern U.S. ports, meeting with U.S. Customs and other 

federal inspection agencies to emphasize the need for aggressive 

exclusion activities..



Date: Mar. 13, 2001; Action taken/information disseminated: APHIS 

Electronic Alerts and USDA news release announcing the prohibition of 

imported live swine and ruminants, any fresh swine or ruminant meat 

(chilled or frozen), and other products of swine and ruminant from all 

European Union nations (does not include cooked pork products)..



Date: Mar. 13, 2001; Action taken/information disseminated: USDA Media 

Advisory announcing kick off of travelers education campaign starting 

March 14, 2001..



Date: Mar. 14, 2001; Action taken/information disseminated: USDA memo 

to its field veterinarians and Animal Import Centers regarding 

guidelines for importing pets from areas affected with FMD..



Date: Mar. 16, 2001; Action taken/information disseminated: USDA news 

release announcing the establishment of toll-free FMD call lines--

domestic and international..



Date: Mar. 20, 2001; Action taken/information disseminated: APHIS 

begins regularly scheduled conference calls with the National 

Association of State Departments of Agriculture to discuss APHISs FMD 

exclusion efforts..



Date: Mar. 22, 2001; Action taken/information disseminated: Specific 

guidance provided to the U.S. Customs Service on FMD-related inspection 

procedures for cargo and passengers at U.S. ports of entry..



Date: Mar. 23, 2001; Action taken/information disseminated: Industry 

Alert to livestock owners and private-practice veterinarians posted to 

the APHIS Web site, reminding them to report unusual animal health 

symptoms..



Date: Mar. 2001; Action taken/information disseminated: Other 

information issued during the month of March includes; * meetings about 

FMD with industry, state, and local governments;; * FMD-prevention 

information developed for airlines;; * warning signs posted at 

airports;; * public service announcements on radio and television; and; 

* FMD information for USDA extension agents..



Date: Apr. 9, 2001; Action taken/information disseminated: Secretary of 

Agriculture authorizes an additional $32 million to increase inspection 

personnel..



Date: Apr. 26, 2001; Action taken/information disseminated: Secretary 

of Agriculture assures the Congress that compensation would be 

available to producers in the event of an FMD outbreak in the United 

States. USDA begins hiring 400 new inspectors and doubling the size of 

the canine inspection teams, and reassigns 200 current inspectors to 

critical ports of entry..



Date: May 11, 2001; Action taken/information disseminated: USDA and the 

Department of Defense coordinate restrictions on military exercises to 

ensure that FMD is kept out of the United States..



Date: May 2001; Action taken/information disseminated: USDA issues FMD-

prevention guidelines for livestock shows agricultural fairs, and other 

agricultural events..



[End of table]



However, the effectiveness of USDAs efforts is uncertain. For example, 

in March 2001, APHIS issued an industry alert to airlines, suggesting 

that they could assist USDAs preventive activities by making in-flight 

announcements on international flights to raise passengers awareness 

about the dangers of FMD. APHIS also provided a brief text for the 

airlines to use when making these announcements. However, the 

passengers returning from the United Kingdom during the outbreak whom 

we contacted told us that not all the airlines made such announcements.



Similarly in May 2001, APHIS issued disease prevention guidelines for 

livestock shows and agricultural fairs, such as state and county fairs. 

According to APHIS officials, these guidelines are suggestions for 

fair organizers and directors, and their actual use and implementation 

are left to the discretion of state and local authorities. We observed 

that the implementation of APHISs guidelines varied dramatically at 

the two county fairs and two state fairs that we visited. For example, 

USDAs guidelines indicate that food should not be allowed in areas 

where show animals are housed; however, at all four fairs, we observed 

that no restrictions of this kind were in effect. Moreover, some of the 

livestock owners and show officials that we interviewed at the fairs 

generally did not know about the risks associated with FMD or the need 

to take precautionary measures to prevent its introduction or spread. 

For example, one livestock producer told us that FMD was a European 

problem and that the United States did not have to worry about it.



APHIS Does Not Have a Formal Process to Provide Customs with 

Information on Foreign FMD Outbreaks:



While APHIS uses a number of mechanisms for informing interested 

parties about foreign FMD outbreaks, it has no formal process to inform 

Customs--the first deterrent to the importation of potentially FMD-

affected products--about these outbreaks. As Table 2 shows, after the 

U.K. outbreak, APHIS did not immediately inform Customs about its 

decisions to prohibit or restrict certain products or more vigilantly 

screen passengers arriving at U.S. ports of entry from the United 

Kingdom. Customs did not receive any consistent national guidance from 

APHIS until the Acting Commissioner of Customs formally requested this 

information in writing from the Administrator of APHIS, on March 16, 

2001. As a result, Customs field staff did not receive uniform 

official guidance on general inspection measures for passengers and 

products until March 27, 2001, and specific information on at-risk 

products to be detained at the ports until April 4, 2001--37 and 45 

days, respectively, after APHIS received the United Kingdoms official 

notification of the outbreak. According to a Customs memorandum and 

officials we spoke to, field inspectors felt ill equipped to adequately 

process international cargo and passengers at ports of entry during the 

initial stages of the U.K. outbreak. For example, one Customs 

supervisor told us that there was no APHIS inspector present at her 

port of entry and that she had no information on how to clean 

passengers shoes and what kind of disinfectant to use. According to 

this Customs supervisor, the lack of official guidance forced her staff 

to rely on informal and inadequate guidance obtained from APHIS 

officials located at another port of entry. She added that because 

Customs inspectors are not animal disease specialists, they need 

nontechnical, clear procedures to help them process international 

cargo, passengers and their luggage, especially at those ports where 

there is no APHIS presence. The Customs Assistant Director for Field 

Operations agreed that such uniform and clear guidance is needed for 

all Customs field inspectors.



APHIS officials acknowledged that they did not notify Customs of the 

U.K. outbreak. According to these officials, because Customs had not 

sought specific guidance from APHIS about prior FMD outbreaks in other 

countries, they believed that Customs knew how to handle cargo, 

passengers, and luggage arriving from the United Kingdom during the 

outbreak without specific notification and further guidance from them. 

As a result of the concerns raised by Customs during the U.K. outbreak, 

the APHIS Assistant Director for Technical Trade Services told us that 

in May 2002, she added an official from the Customs Office of Field 

Operations to the list of people to whom she sends E-mail notifications 

of foreign FMD outbreaks. The Customs Assistant Director for Field 

Operations told us that this action will help his office better inform 

Customs field inspectors about future foreign FMD outbreaks.



Conclusions:



Although APHIS is primarily responsible for protecting U.S. livestock 

from FMD, it needs Customs to help it fulfill this responsibility. 

Customs is especially critical to keeping FMD-contaminated products out 

of the United States at those ports of entry where APHIS is not 

present. However, Customs inspectors can help provide a concerted, 

coordinated, and comprehensive defense against FMD at the nations 

border only if they receive current information on the countries that 

are affected by FMD and have clear nontechnical guidelines on how to 

process at-risk products and passengers. APHIS has taken the first 

interim step to notify Customs of future foreign FMD outbreaks, by 

including a Customs official on one of its electronic mailing lists. 

However, we believe that this does not provide a permanent solution to 

the lack of clear communication protocols and procedures between APHIS 

and Customs.



Recommendations for Executive Action:



To help ensure that Customs inspectors at all U.S. ports of entry are 

fully informed about current foreign FMD outbreaks, we recommend that 

the Secretary of Agriculture direct the Administrator of APHIS to 

develop (1) a formal written agreement with the Commissioner of the 

Customs Service that will clearly delineate the process by which future 

information on foreign FMD outbreaks will be communicated with Customs 

and (2) uniform, nontechnical procedures that Customs inspectors can 

use to process international passengers and cargo arriving from FMD-

affected countries.



[End of section]



Chapter 3: U.S. Measures to Prevent FMD Are Generally Comparable to 

Other Countries, but Complete Protection May Be Infeasible:



U.S. measures to prevent an FMD outbreak--control and eradication 

overseas and the port of entry screening of livestock, animal products, 

and passengers--have been successful since 1929. Nevertheless, the 

United States remains vulnerable to an FMD outbreak because of the 

nature of the virus, the many pathways by which it can come into the 

country, and the growing magnitude and volume of both legal and illegal 

passengers and cargo entering the country. Other countries face similar 

challenges in protecting their livestock from FMD and use preventive 

measures that are comparable to those the United States uses. However, 

the United States could also build on the experiences of other 

countries to improve its preventive measures.



USDAs Efforts to Control and Eradicate FMD in Other Countries Help 

Reduce the Risk to U.S. Livestock:



As a first line of defense to safeguarding U.S. animal resources 

against the introduction of pests and diseases, USDA helps prevent, 

control, and eradicate agricultural health threats where they originate 

outside the United States. By helping other nations eradicate or 

control these outbreaks, USDA reduces the risk of agricultural pests 

and diseases reaching U.S. borders.



In North America, U.S. efforts to eradicate and control FMD have 

largely focused on Mexico, because of our shared border and the 

possible threat of the FMD viruss moving overland from South America, 

where the disease is endemic in some countries. USDA has staff located 

in Mexico working with the Mexico-United States Commission for the 

Prevention of Foot and Mouth Disease and Other Exotic Animal Diseases. 

The commission, formed in 1947 as a combined U.S.-Mexican effort to 

eradicate FMD from Mexico,[Footnote 7] built Mexicos animal health 

infrastructure and successfully eradicated FMD from Mexico in 1954. 

Today, USDA and Mexican veterinarians work together, through the 

activities of the commission, to provide disease surveillance, 

diagnostic testing, and training for Mexico to ensure that the country 

remains FMD-free. According to USDA officials in Mexico, the United 

States initially covered about 80 percent of the costs for the joint 

program; however, as the Mexican government assumed greater 

responsibility for the program, the U.S. share has decreased to about 

20 percent. In fiscal year 2001, USDA provided about $160,000 in 

funding for the commissions activities. According to USDA officials, 

this funding supports the commissions high-security laboratory in 

Mexico City by providing training, supplies, and equipment.



In addition, for over 30 years, the United States has held regular 

meetings on animal health issues with the governments of Canada and 

Mexico to harmonize North Americas import requirements and, more 

recently, to coordinate preventive actions and emergency response 

activities in the event of an FMD outbreak. For example, in 2000, the 

three countries held joint exercises--known as the Tripartite Exercise 

2000--to test their FMD communication and response plans, and to assess 

their response systems. As a result of this exercise, the three 

governments signed a memorandum of understanding to formally establish 

the North American Animal Health Committee. This committee represents 

animal health issues for the North American Free Trade Agreement and 

seeks to harmonize live animal and animal product import requirements 

for North America. The committee will also plan emergency response 

activities and perform joint test exercises to ensure that all three 

countries remain prepared to respond to an FMD outbreak.



The United States also supports efforts to establish FMD-control zones 

in Central and South America. For example, to help alert countries in 

Central and North America about the potential incursion of FMD from 

South America, USDA has established cooperative programs with Panama 

and Colombia. In Panama, USDA supports the U.S.-Panama Cooperative 

Program for the Prevention of Foot and Mouth Disease, which maintains 

the Darien Gap area of Panama free from FMD and other foreign animal 

diseases. This program conducts field surveillance at high-risk border 

points and annual training, analyzes technical data, and improves the 

infrastructure. The program also provides support for the Investigative 

Laboratory for Vesicular Disease, which provides bio-containment, 

diagnostic, and detection capabilities for vesicular and other foreign 

animal diseases in Central America.



Through the Colombian program, USDA helps maintain an FMD-free barrier 

along the Colombia-Panama border.[Footnote 8] This barrier serves as 

the first line of defense for preventing the spread of FMD northward 

into Central America, Mexico, and the United States, which are all FMD-

free. Until FMD is eradicated from South America, USDA believes that 

maintaining this barrier will prevent the diseases northward spread. 

USDA provides technical assistance and half of the funding for the 

program.



As part of its disease exclusion activities for the region, USDA also 

has cooperative agreements with all the other Central American 

countries to support joint monitoring and surveillance activities, 

including field investigations and the collection of laboratory samples 

for FMD and other foreign animal diseases. Through these agreements, 

USDA helps transfer surveillance and detection technologies to these 

countries.



When FMD strikes other nations--as it did recently, for example, in 

Argentina and the United Kingdom--the United States may assist in 

controlling and eradicating the disease. For example, a total of 327 

U.S. animal health professionals, including over 300 veterinarians, 

helped eradicate the 2001 outbreak in the United Kingdom. The Americans 

came from USDA, other federal agencies, and state governments. 

Beginning in March 2001, they traveled to the United Kingdom, generally 

in groups that averaged about 10 per week, and assisted with the 

response for about a month. At the peak of the outbreak during March 

and April, about 100 U.S. animal health professionals were assisting in 

the U.K. response. The U.S. responders with whom we spoke participated 

in surveillance activities, such as collecting blood samples, and 

epidemiology tasks, such as tracking and predicting the path of new 

disease outbreaks. They also issued permits and licenses to move 

animals and products such as silage. By providing such assistance, the 

United States not only helps ensure that the disease is eradicated 

quickly, but also helps reduce the potential for FMD-infected products 

to arrive at U.S. ports of entry.[Footnote 9]



Despite U.S. Preventive Measures at Ports of Entry, Vulnerability to 

FMD Remains:



Preventive measures at U.S. borders provide the second line of defense 

against the incursion of FMD into the United States. USDA has 

identified several key pathways by which the FMD-virus could enter the 

United States. To respond to the risk posed by these pathways, USDA 

implemented measures designed to ensure that animals, products, 

passengers, and equipment arriving at U.S. borders are free of the 

virus and do not pose a risk to U.S. livestock. However, some level of 

risk is inherent in international trade and travel, and no set of 

measures can ever completely eliminate the possibility that FMD will 

enter the country. Moreover, because FMD is a hardy virus and the level 

of inspection resources cannot keep pace with the increasing volume and 

magnitude of cargo and passengers, both legal and illegal, that 

continue to enter the country, the United States remains vulnerable to 

an outbreak.



The United States Has Implemented Preventive Measures for Key Pathways:



The FMD virus could enter the United States through a number of key 

pathways: live animal imports, imports of animal and other products, 

international passengers and their luggage, garbage from international 

carriers, international mail, and military personnel and equipment 

returning from overseas. For each of these pathways, USDA has developed 

and implemented specific preventive measures described below.



Live animal imports. The United States allows imported livestock, such 

as swine, cattle, and sheep, only from preapproved countries that USDA 

judges to be free of FMD and other diseases of concern.[Footnote 10] 

For example, in April 2002, USDA recognized 49 countries or 

geographical regions as free of FMD. (See app. I.) Generally, live 

animals can be imported only through designated ports of entry, the 

majority of which are located along U.S. borders shared with Canada and 

Mexico, and three others located on the east and west coasts.[Footnote 

11] Most live cattle imports into the United States originate from 

Canada and Mexico; live hog imports, from Canada; and live lamb 

imports, from Australia and New Zealand. Livestock exported to the 

United States must be accompanied by a U.S. import permit and a health 

certificate from an official government veterinarian in the country of 

origin. The health certificate states that the animals have been in the 

exporting country for at least 60 days prior to shipment and are free 

of other diseases of concern.[Footnote 12] Generally, animals arriving 

from countries other than Canada and Mexico may be 

quarantined.[Footnote 13] Zoological ruminants and swine from FMD-

affected countries are permitted into the United States but must be 

processed through USDAs New York Animal Import Center.



Animal and other product imports. Thousands of animal and other 

products that could be contaminated with the FMD virus could 

potentially enter the United States during the course of normal 

international trade. These products include animal products meant for 

human consumption, such as meat and dairy products; nonfood animal 

products, such as hides, skins, casings, and animal extracts; as well 

as nonanimal products, such as farm equipment, hay, and straw. USDA 

regulates the importation of this diverse range of products to help 

minimize the risk of introducing FMD into the United States.



USDA implements different import rules for FMD-free and FMD-affected 

countries. Generally, for countries free of FMD and other diseases of 

concern,[Footnote 14] USDA imposes few restrictions on animal product 

imports. For FMD-affected countries, USDA prohibits the importation of 

all susceptible products shipped 3 weeks prior to the date of official 

notification of the outbreak. This prohibition remains in effect until 

USDA reassesses the disease status of the affected country and 

determines the level of trade that can resume. USDA allows imports of 

animal and other products from FMD-affected countries only if they meet 

certain requirements. These requirements vary for different kinds of 

products, as follows:



* Animal products meant for human consumption. Generally fresh, 

chilled, or frozen meat from cattle, sheep, and pigs, and fresh milk 

are prohibited from FMD-affected countries. However, processed meat and 

dairy products are allowed from FMD-affected countries if they meet 

certain requirements. For example, meat products can be imported from 

FMD-affected countries only if (1) the country and meat processing 

plants have been deemed eligible to export meat products to the United 

States by FSIS and (2) the processing plants also meet APHISs meat-

processing standards. The APHIS standards ensure that meat products 

from these countries are not contaminated with the FMD virus, and 

require that the products be processed in a manner that will inactivate 

the virus. For example, they must be fully cooked, dry cured, or canned 

and shelf-stable, with all bones removed. Moreover, a U.S. import 

permit and an official veterinary health certificate from the country 

of origin must accompany certain meat shipments. Similarly, most dairy 

products from FMD-affected countries must meet APHISs requirements to 

ensure that they do not pose a risk of FMDs introduction. For example, 

milk products that are in a concentrated liquid form and are shelf-

stable without refrigeration are allowed from FMD-affected countries. 

Some dairy products, such as condensed milk require a U.S. import 

permit, while others, such as yogurt and butter are unrestricted and do 

not require a permit.[Footnote 15]



* Nonfood animal products. A variety of nonfood animal products are 

allowed from FMD-affected countries if they have been properly treated 

to inactivate the virus; however, a U.S. import permit may be required. 

For example, tanned hides, leather, and fully finished mounted animal 

trophies can be imported into the United States from FMD-affected 

countries.



* Other products. USDA does not allow imports of grass, hay, or straw 

used for feeding, bedding, or other purposes from FMD-affected 

countries. However, used farm equipment is allowed with a certificate 

from the exporting country stating that the equipment has been steam 

cleaned. APHIS officials inspect farm equipment at U.S. ports of entry 

to ensure that it is free from dirt and soil. If dirt and soil are 

found, then inspectors will determine whether they can be adequately 

washed with detergent and disinfected at an appropriate location before 

granting approval for entry into the United States.



All animal and other products arriving at U.S. ports of entry, whether 

from FMD-free or FMD-affected countries, are subject to inspection by 

U.S. federal inspectors. Customs officials, who review the documents 

accompanying the shipments, either electronically or on paper, provide 

the first level of inspection for these shipments. On the basis of this 

review, Customs is authorized to either release the shipments into 

commerce or hold them for USDA inspection. USDA provides Customs with a 

list of products to be flagged for inspection by APHIS. APHIS 

inspectors ensure that all the necessary documents accompanying the 

shipment, such as import permits and official health certificates, are 

complete and ensure that the shipments match their manifest. In some 

instances, APHIS inspectors will inspect the shipping containers to 

check their contents. After APHIS completes its inspection, the 

shipment may proceed to FSIS and/or the Food and Drug Administration 

for further inspection, depending on which agency regulates the safety 

of these products for human health issues, or may proceed to Customs 

for release into commerce.[Footnote 16] According to USDA, FSIS 

inspectors at ports of entry visually examine all shipments of products 

under FSISs jurisdiction and randomly select some for more in-depth 

examination.



In commenting on a draft of this report, USDA noted that it has primary 

inspection responsibility for agricultural cargo and manifests at those 

ports staffed with USDA inspectors. To ensure that these shipments 

continue to be referred to USDA for inspection, the department said 

that it is working with Customs and other federal agencies to develop 

an automated targeting system, which will serve as an electronic 

interface among federal agencies to identify and automatically 

segregate high-risk plant cargo and track imported animals and animal 

products.



International passengers. International passengers who may have been in 

contact with the FMD virus, either through contact with infected 

animals or materials such as soil and manure, or who bring potentially 

contaminated products into the country may also transmit the virus to 

the United States. USDA provides the following FMD-prevention 

information and types of scrutiny for international passengers in an 

effort to reduce the risk associated with this pathway:



* USDA requests airlines to make in-flight announcements on 

international flights; at ports of entry, it places warning signs and 

it plays prerecorded announcements about how international passengers 

can assist in keeping FMD out of the United States.



* International passengers must fill out a U.S. Customs declaration 

form that asks if they are bringing any animal or plant products into 

the country and if, while traveling abroad, they visited a farm or were 

in contact with animals. Passengers responding affirmatively to these 

questions are sent by Customs officials to a USDA inspection area at 

the port of entry for further processing. USDA officials may x-ray and 

inspect the contents of the passengers baggage; ask them additional 

questions; confiscate any prohibited items, such as meat and dairy 

products; and clean and disinfect their shoes.



* USDAs Beagle Brigade and inspectors generally rove the baggage claim 

areas at major ports of entry to help identify passengers and their 

luggage that may be carrying prohibited food items. USDA inspectors 

look not only for suspicious packages, such as bulky, misshapen, and 

leaking containers, but also question passengers about their travels to 

determine whether they present a greater risk of disease transmission. 

If the dogs or the inspectors identify such passengers, these 

passengers are referred to the USDA inspection area for further 

processing.



After the 2001 FMD outbreak in the United Kingdom, according to the 

international passengers we surveyed, some of these measures were not 

consistently implemented. For example, some passengers told us that the 

airlines they traveled on did not make any in-flight announcements 

about FMD. Other passengers told us that even though their Customs 

declaration form indicated that they had been in contact with animals 

or visited a farm while in the United Kingdom, they were not referred 

by officials to the USDA inspection area at the airport for further 

processing or they had to request USDA personnel at the airports to 

examine and disinfect the shoes that they wore while they were in FMD-

affected areas in the United Kingdom.



Garbage from international carriers. Garbage from international 

carriers, such as airplanes and ships, can also transmit the FMD virus 

into the United States if the garbage contains food items contaminated 

with the virus. Therefore, USDA has developed guidelines to ensure that 

garbage from international carriers is properly handled and disposed of 

so that it does not present a risk to U.S. livestock. For example, USDA 

inspectors supervise the removal of all international garbage from 

airplanes and ships. This garbage must be transported in leak-proof 

containers and must be disposed of properly, such as by incineration or 

sterilization, and subsequent burial at a landfill. USDA has compliance 

agreements with catering firms and cleaners that outline the proper 

handling and approved disposal methods for international garbage. 

Before a compliance agreement is signed, APHIS officials will, among 

other things, review the application; visit the handling, processing, 

or disposal facilities; observe the operation of any equipment to 

determine its adequacy for handling garbage; and certify and approve 

the garbage cookers and sterilizers to be used to process international 

garbage. USDA also monitors firms operating under these compliance 

agreements to ensure that they abide by the conditions stated in the 

agreement.



International mail. Prohibited animal products that could transmit the 

FMD virus may also be sent through international mail and courier 

services to U.S. residents. As a result, international mail packages 

entering the United States are subject to inspection by Customs and 

USDA officials. Customs generally reviews the declaration form on the 

packages and either visually inspects or x-rays them as part of its 

responsibility to screen international mail for illegal and prohibited 

items, such as contraband and drugs. At USDAs request, Customs can 

also screen international packages for prohibited animal products, such 

as meat and dairy products from FMD-affected countries. Customs sets 

aside packages that appear to contain such items for USDAs inspection. 

USDA officials will review the declaration forms and may x-ray or open 

these packages for physical inspection. If the item in the package is a 

permissible product, the officials will reseal the package and release 

it for delivery; otherwise it will be confiscated and 

destroyed.[Footnote 17] In commenting on a draft of this report, USDA 

noted that mail from high-risk countries is more thoroughly scrutinized 

on the basis of pathway analysis.



Military personnel and equipment. Because U.S. military forces are 

deployed throughout the world, troops and military equipment returning 

to the United States could introduce FMD and other diseases into the 

country. As a result, USDA provides support for the military and helps 

oversee the reentry of military cargo, personnel, equipment, and 

personal property to reduce the risk of introducing diseases into the 

United States. For example, military personnel must declare all 

agricultural items they are bringing back to the United States and 

identify whether they have been on farms or in contact with animals 

while abroad. Their clothing and gear should also be cleaned and washed 

before reentering the country. Similarly, all military rolling stock, 

such as humvees, trucks, weapons systems, and tanks, as well as other 

used military gear, such as canvas tents, must be thoroughly cleaned 

before reentry. Pallets, wooden crates, and other military equipment 

must be free of soil, manure, and debris. Military equipment used to 

eradicate animal diseases overseas, such as FMD, is not allowed 

reentry. For small-scale operations, the military must notify USDA at 

least 7 days in advance of arrival at a U.S. port of entry. USDA will 

determine if appropriate cleaning facilities are available at the first 

port of entry, and all items will be held at this port for inspection. 

If approved cleaning facilities are not available or if the equipment 

is contaminated to an extent that prevents cleaning, USDA will refuse 

to allow reentry. Large-scale operations require a 30-day notification.



United States Remains Vulnerable to FMD:



The United States has not had an outbreak of FMD since 1929, and some 

USDA officials and animal health experts believe that this healthy 

condition of U.S. livestock is directly related to the effectiveness of 

U.S. measures to prevent the incursion of the disease. However, these 

and other experts agree that the nation remains vulnerable to an FMD 

outbreak for the following reasons:



* FMD is a highly contagious and hardy virus that remains viable for 

long periods of time.



* FMD can be carried and transmitted by a variety of animate and 

inanimate items. Although the key pathways described earlier pose 

varying levels of risk to U.S. livestock, according to USDA, it could 

take only one contaminated product to come into contact with one 

susceptible U.S. animal to start a nationwide outbreak.



* The magnitude and volume of international passengers, mail, and 

products entering the United States creates an enormous challenge for 

USDA and other federal inspection agencies. As a result, most 

inspections at ports of entry are restricted to paper reviews of 

manifests supported by a limited number of judgmentally selected 

samples for physical inspection. For example, in fiscal year 2001, over 

470 million international passengers and pedestrians arrived at U.S. 

ports of entry; of these, USDA inspected about 102 million. According 

to APHIS officials, about 30 percent of the items seized from 

passengers at airports were prohibited animal products or by-products. 

Table 3 provides information on the volume/numbers of passengers, 

vehicles, and cargo entering the United States and the level of APHISs 

inspections for fiscal year 2001. Similarly, the volume of 

international mail entering the United States makes it difficult for 

APHIS and Customs to adequately screen incoming parcels for FMD-

susceptible products. For example, APHIS inspectors at the 

international mail facility in Elizabeth, New Jersey, told us that 

about 30,000 international parcels pass through their check point every 

day. This volume of mail provides the inspectors approximately 3 

seconds per parcel to judge whether the package might contain FMD-

susceptible products. Moreover, mail is processed at the facility 

during the day and night to keep up with the volume of international 

mail arriving daily. However, APHIS inspectors are present only during 

the day shifts and detector dogs are available for only 1 to 2 days per 

week. Although Customs inspectors screen packages for FMD-susceptible 

products during the time when APHIS inspectors are not available, both 

APHIS and Customs inspectors told us that the process is less effective 

than having an APHIS inspector on site. Nonetheless, according to 

APHISs Assistant Director for Port Operations, even doubling or 

tripling the agencys inspection resources would not significantly 

reduce the FMD risk from overseas entries because the percentage of 

passengers, vehicles, and cargo receiving a physical inspection is 

likely to continue to be relatively low.



Table 3: Volume/Numbers of Passengers, Vehicles, and Cargo Entering the 

United States, Inspected by APHIS and Resulting in Seized Products, 

Fiscal Year 2001:



Commodity/mode: Passengers; (all modes of transport); Volume/

number[A]: 472,000,000; Inspected by APHIS[B]: 101,513,792; Percentage 

inspected: 21.5.



Commodity/mode: Ships; Volume/number[A]: 215,328; Inspected by 

APHIS[B]: 52,016; Percentage inspected: 24.2.



Commodity/mode: Aircraft; Volume/number[A]: 1,064,923; Inspected by 

APHIS[B]: 541,109; Percentage inspected: 49.0.



Commodity/mode: Cargo; * Rail; * Trucks; * Ship; Volume/number[A]: 

14,538,271[C]; 1,534,566; 7,878,000

5,125,705; Inspected by APHIS[B]: 2,181,904[D]; Percentage inspected: 

N/A[E].



Commodity/mode: Mail packages; Volume/number[A]: N/A[ F]; Inspected by 

APHIS[B]: 434,216; Percentage inspected: N/A.



Legend: N/A=not applicable:



[A] Source: U.S. Customs Service.



[B] Source: USDA.



[C] The number of full containers. :



[D] The number of bills of lading inspected. A single bill of lading 

may include multiple containers. :



[E] The percentage cannot be calculated because APHIS and Customs 

report their data in differing units of measure.



[F] The total amount of international mail that entered the United 

States during fiscal year 2001was not available; however, APHIS 

officials at the Port Elizabeth, New Jersey, facility told us that 

approximately 30,000 parcels go past their check point every day.



[End of table]



* Moreover, most U.S. preventive measures are not designed to intercept 

illegal entries of products or passengers that may harbor the FMD 

virus. According to USDA, the volume of illegal agricultural products 

entering the United States is growing, and contraband meat products 

entering the country is the single most important risk for the 

introduction of FMD. In addition, illegal shipments of products from 

countries other than the stated point of origin and illegal immigrants 

also pose significant risks. USDA and Customs annually confiscate 

thousands of contraband and prohibited products at U.S. ports of entry. 

For example, in fiscal year 2001, USDA seized 313,231 shipments of 

prohibited meat/poultry and animal by-products. According to USDA 

officials, these seizures are only a small portion of the contraband 

entering the United States. To respond to the growing threat from 

illegal entries, USDA recently created the Smuggling Interdiction and 

Trade Compliance program. Program officials collaborate with several 

federal, state, and private organizations to ensure compliance with 

U.S. agriculture import laws at ports of entry.



U.S. Preventive Measures Are Comparable to Those Used by Other 

Countries:



U.S. preventive measures for FMD are comparable to the measures used by 

Canada, Mexico, and the United Kingdom for four key pathways included 

in this review: livestock imports, animal product imports, 

international mail, and garbage from international carriers. The 

pathway that presented the most significant area of difference 

concerned the measures used to process international passengers 

entering these countries. (Detailed information on the preventive 

measures used by Canada, Mexico, and the United Kingdom are provided in 

appendixes II through IV of this report.):



Generally, U.S. preventive measures were similar to those used by the 

other three countries for the following four pathways:



* Imported livestock. The three countries allow imports of livestock 

only from approved countries that are FMD-free. Generally, these live 

animals must be imported through predetermined inspection ports that 

have adequate facilities available to quarantine the animals, if 

necessary. In addition, the countries require import permits and health 

certificates to accompany the livestock shipments unless the animals 

are imported directly for slaughter. Of the three countries, Mexico 

requires an official government veterinarian to (1) preinspect animals 

imported from countries other than the United States in their country 

of origin before they are loaded for transport to Mexico and (2) 

accompany the shipment and monitor the health status of the animals 

while they are in transit.



* Imported animal products. The countries generally allow animal 

product imports only from countries that they consider FMD-free and 

that meet their specific animal health and food safety standards. The 

countries also allow certain animal product imports from FMD-affected 

countries if they originate from a preapproved establishment and are 

processed in a manner that would inactivate the virus. For example, 

meat products that are fully cooked and canned and are shelf-stable can 

be imported from FMD-affected countries, but unprocessed products, such 

as fresh, chilled, or frozen meat, and untreated milk, are not allowed. 

In addition, all imported animal product shipments are subject to 

review and may be selected for physical inspection when they arrive at 

the port of entry in each of the countries.[Footnote 18]



* International mail. The countries handle international mail in a 

similar manner, which includes a review of the documentation detailing 

the sender, country of origin, and contents of the package. Only 

packages considered suspect, for example, because they do not include 

required information, are from high-risk countries, or have been sent 

by repeat offenders, are selected and opened for further inspection. 

Canada uses x-ray technology to help identify packages containing 

prohibited items, and Mexican officials told us that all international 

packages arriving from FMD-affected countries are opened and inspected 

for prohibited items.



* Garbage from international carriers. The countries federal agencies 

responsible for protecting animal health supervise the containment, 

transportation, and processing of garbage from international carriers. 

They generally dispose of international garbage by incineration or 

under certain conditions by burial at federally approved sites. For 

example, in Canada, international garbage can be buried at approved 

sites located at least half a kilometer from any premise with livestock 

and/or poultry and must be immediately covered by 1.8 meters (approx. 

5.5 feet) of local refuse and/or other standard covering material. At 

the time of our review, none of the countries allowed domestic animals 

to be fed international garbage from airlines or ships.



In commenting on a draft of this report, USDA noted that the United 

Kingdom faces greater risk than the United States because it is a 

member of the European Union, which includes, and provides for trade 

among, countries that are FMD-free as well as some that are not.



The United States differed from Canada and Mexico in the measures used 

to prevent FMD from entering the country via international passengers. 

Specifically, we noted the following three areas of difference:



* Use of signs at ports of entry. While Canada, Mexico, and the United 

States all posted special signs at ports of entry to alert 

international passengers to the dangers of FMD, the U.S. signs were 

smaller and less visible in comparison with the signs used by the other 

two countries. For example, the Canadian signs were over 6 feet tall 

and warned passengers in large, bold letters in both English and French 

about FMD. Similarly, in Mexico the signs were also over 6 feet tall, 

included pictures, and colored text in English or Spanish. In contrast, 

the first U.S. signs were 1-by-1 foot and included relatively small-

sized text on a white background that was difficult to read and did not 

easily convey the importance of the message. According to USDA 

officials, these signs were subsequently replaced with larger signs (3-

by-3 feet) that included a colored graphic and larger-sized text. While 

larger, we observed at one U.S. international airport that the new 

signs were placed at a considerable distance from arriving passengers. 

These signs were placed on easels on top of the baggage carousels and 

therefore were several feet above eye level. In contrast, we observed 

that the signs in Canada and Mexico were placed in more easily visible 

locations that were in greater proximity to the passengers. According 

to agriculture officials in all three countries, they are limited in 

their ability to place signs at ports of entry because they have to 

negotiate the size and placement with the port authorities. As a 

result, they are not always able to use the most effective signs or 

locations. Figures 3 and 4 show the signs that were used in the United 

States and Canada and Mexico.



Figure 3: U.S. FMD Signs Posted at Ports of Entry:



[See PDF for image]



[End of figure]



Figure 4: Canadian and Mexican FMD Signs Posted at Ports of Entry:



[See PDF for image]



[End of figure]



* Modified declaration forms. In 2001, both Canada and Mexico made 

changes to the declaration forms they use to process international 

passengers upon arrival. For example, after the U.K. outbreak in 2001, 

Canada reworded its declaration form to provide examples of food 

products of concern, such as dairy products. Similarly, Mexico 

developed a separate form that passengers coming from FMD-affected 

countries must complete, and it asks clear, detailed agriculture-

related questions. In contrast, the United States did not make any 

changes to its declaration form in 2001, and some of the international 

passengers we contacted considered the agriculture-related question on 

the form ineffective and unclear. A senior APHIS official told us that 

USDA was aware that the question on the form was confusing and 

ambiguous to travelers. This official said that most of the confusion 

arises because the question on the form consolidates three questions 

into one.



In commenting on a draft of this report, USDA stated that it has 

recently worked with Customs to revise the agricultural question on the 

Customs declaration form. The form now includes two agriculture-related 

questions that USDA believes will be more easily understood by 

travelers and will yield better information to the department to help 

focus its inspection efforts. The new form is currently being 

distributed throughout the country. Because USDAs actions address our 

concerns, we have deleted our recommendation on this issue from this 

report. (See table 4 for a comparison of the agriculture-related 

questions on the prior and revised U.S. declaration forms.):



Table 4: Agriculture-Related Questions on the Prior and Revised U.S. 

Declaration Forms:



Language on prior Customs declaration form[A]: Q.11 I am (We are) 

bringing fruits, plants, meats, food, soil, birds, snails, other live 

animals, wildlife products, farm products; or, have been on a farm or 

ranch outside the U.S.; [Empty]; Language on revised Customs 

declaration form[A]: Q.11 I am (We are) bringing; (a) fruits, plants, 

food, insects: 

(b) meats, animals, animal/wildlife products: 

(c) disease agents, cell cultures, snails:

(d) soil or have been on a farm/ranch/pasture:; Q.12 I have (We have) 

been in close proximity of

(such as touching or handling) livestock:



Note: ABoth forms require the questions to be answered with either a 

yes or no response.



[End of table]



* Use of disinfectant mats. As a precaution, both Canada and Mexico 

developed guidelines requiring all international passengers arriving at 

airports and seaports to walk over disinfectant mats when entering the 

country. However, according to USDA officials, the United States chose 

not to use disinfectant mats because USDA research found that the 

disinfectant in the mat would become ineffective after a certain number 

of uses and may begin to harbor the virus, thus contaminating shoes 

that were otherwise clean.



Conclusions:



The United States has had significant success in keeping the nations 

livestock FMD-free since 1929. To some extent, the success of this 

effort is directly related to the effectiveness of U.S. preventive 

measures both abroad and at the nations borders. However, because of 

the extensive presence of FMD worldwide and because the magnitude and 

volume of international cargo and travel continue to expand, the 

nations vulnerability to an introduction of FMD remains high. The 

steps that other nations have taken to reduce the risk of FMD--such as 

signs to alert international passengers--could help improve USDAs 

efforts to protect U.S. livestock. While we recognize that there is an 

additional cost to preparing new, larger, and more noticeable signs, we 

believe that, given the significant economic costs of an FMD outbreak 

to the nation, these costs are justified if they can help improve our 

preventive measures.



Recommendation for Executive Action:



To help improve the effectiveness of U.S. measures to prevent the 

introduction of FMD by international passengers, we recommend that the 

Secretary of Agriculture direct the Administrator, APHIS, to develop 

more effective signage about FMD for ports of entry.



Agency Comments:



In its comments on a draft of this report, USDA stated that it is in 

the process of developing new signage for ports of entry that will be 

larger and more mobile than the ones that we observed during the course 

of our work.



[End of section]



Chapter 4: Despite Preparation Efforts, the United States Will Face 

Challenges in Responding Quickly and Effectively to an FMD Outbreak:



If FMD enters the United States despite USDAs preventive measures, the 

nations ability to identify, control, contain, and eradicate the 

disease quickly and effectively becomes paramount. Recognizing the 

importance of an effective response and the necessity to prepare before 

an outbreak occurs, USDA and most states have developed emergency 

response plans that establish a framework for the key elements 

necessary for a rapid and successful U.S. response and eradication 

program. Many of these plans have, to some extent, been tested by 

federal and state agencies to determine their effectiveness. However, 

planning and testing exercises have also identified several challenges 

that could ultimately impede an effective and timely U.S. response if 

they are not resolved before an FMD outbreak occurs.



The Federal Government and Many States Have Developed and Tested 

Emergency Response Plans:



Planning for a coordinated response to emergencies, including outbreaks 

of animal disease, is occurring at both the federal and state levels. 

Furthermore, both the federal government and many states have tested 

and revised their plans in response to the results of these tests.



Federal and State Governments Have Developed Emergency Response Plans:



At the federal level, 26 federal agencies and the American Red Cross 

signed the federal response plan in April 1999, which is intended to 

guide the federal response to national emergencies and augment state 

response efforts. Under this plan, the Federal Emergency Management 

Agency (FEMA) is designated as the coordinating agency and is 

responsible for providing expertise in emergency communications, 

command and control, and public affairs. In the event of an FMD 

outbreak, FEMA would designate USDA as the lead agency and work closely 

with the department to coordinate the support of other federal agencies 

to respond to the outbreak. For example, under the plan, Customs would 

lock down ports of entry; the Department of Defense would provide 

personnel, equipment, and transport; the Environmental Protection 

Agency would provide technical support on the disposal of animal 

carcasses; the National Park Service would guide the response if 

wildlife become infected; and other agencies would provide additional 

support.



To supplement the federal response plan and provide specific guidelines 

for an animal disease emergency, such as implementing quarantines of 

infected premises and disposing of animal carcasses, APHIS, USDAs 

Homeland Security Council, and FEMA are taking the lead in developing a 

federal plan specifically for responding to an FMD or other highly 

contagious outbreak of an animal disease. The draft plan calls for the 

involvement of more than 20 agencies and describes the authorities, 

policies, situations, planning assumptions, concept of operations, and 

federal agency resources that will provide the framework for an 

integrated local, state, and federal response.



At the state level, many states have developed an animal disease 

component for their states emergency management plans. According to 

the National Animal Health Emergency Management System 

(NAHEMS),[Footnote 19] in January 2000, only about half the states and 

U.S. territories had developed animal health emergency response plans. 

At that time, NAHEMS recommended that each state develop a plan for 

responding to animal health emergencies that links to their states 

emergency management plan and includes information on the following key 

elements:



* Animal health surveillance and detection systems.



* Control and eradication procedures.



* Communication between key partners.



* Involvement of emergency management officials.



* Collaboration between state and federal emergency responders.



* Involvement of state and federal animal health officials in 

responding to natural disasters.



According to NAHEMS, in its 2001 annual report dated March 2002, the 

number of states and U.S. territories with animal disease emergency 

plans had increased to 46, of which 45 had included the plan as part of 

their states emergency management plan, and 30 indicated that their 

plan included all of the elements listed above.



Federal and State Agencies Have Tested Their Emergency Response Plans:



To ensure the efficacy and completeness of their plans, the federal 

government and many of the states have conducted tabletop and 

functional exercises. Tabletop exercises bring together key decision 

makers in a relatively stress-free setting to:



* discuss the contingencies and logistics of a hypothetical disease 

outbreak;



* evaluate plans, policies, and procedures; and:



* resolve questions of coordination and responsibility.



The setting is relatively stress-free because there is no time limit to 

resolve the hypothetical outbreak. In contrast, functional exercises 

simulate an emergency in the most realistic way possible, without 

moving people or equipment. It is a stressful, real-time exercise in 

which people apply emergency response functions to a hypothetical 

scenario. According to one APHIS official, functional exercises are 

best described as dress rehearsals for actual emergencies.



The federal government has held both tabletop and functional exercises, 

as described below:



* To ensure that the federal FMD emergency response plan is 

comprehensive and well coordinated, USDA conducted a tabletop exercise 

in 2001. In this exercise, USDA developed a scenario involving a 

modest, limited FMD outbreak in the United States and obtained the 

views of 21 federal agencies and the American Red Cross on how they 

could support the federal response to an FMD outbreak. USDA used this 

information to revise its draft national FMD response plan.



* The federal government held a functional exercise in 2000--the 

Tripartite Exercise 2000--to test the plans, policies, and procedures 

that would guide the emergency response to a multifocal FMD outbreak in 

North America. The test focused on communication between the various 

entities involved in an outbreak and the use of vaccines by Canada, 

Mexico, and the United States. The test resulted in many 

recommendations to improve the three countries abilities to

(1) communicate effectively, (2) provide program support, and (3) use 

vaccines. According to the final report, the recommendations, if 

implemented, will improve North Americas overall response capacity. 

The three countries have established working groups tasked with 

responding to these recommendations.



Similarly, as of 2001, about 26 states had periodically conducted 

various kinds of exercises to test state responses to an FMD or other 

animal disease outbreak, according to NAHEMS. For example, in June 

2001, the Texas Animal Health Commission, in conjunction with the Texas 

Division of Emergency Management within the Texas Department of Public 

Safety, conducted a 4-day modified functional exercise of the states 

draft FMD response plan and engaged 23 federal, state, academic, and 

private entities in the exercise. The exercise was designed to test 

participants abilities to control the simulated outbreak, find and 

deliver indemnity funds, and streamline the decision-making processes. 

Overall, the exercise determined that better communication and 

coordination could improve the speed and effectiveness of the states 

response. It also identified areas of ambiguity in the plan that left 

participants without clear directions at crucial times during the 

exercise. According to state officials, the plan was revised as a 

result of the exercise, and according to the Executive Director of the 

Texas Animal Health Commission, more exercises are necessary to 

continuously improve the plan. However, the state veterinarian also 

said that he does not believe that adequate resources are available 

either at the federal or state level for such activities.



Serious Challenges to an Effective U.S. Response Are Yet to Be 

Resolved:



As the U.K. experience has demonstrated, responding to an FMD outbreak 

can tax a nations fiscal, scientific, and human resources. If a 

similar outbreak were to occur in the United States, the nation would 

face a wide spectrum of challenges that can hamper an effective and 

rapid response: (1) the need for rapid disease identification and 

reporting; (2) effective communication, coordination, and cooperation 

between federal, state, and local responders; (3) an adequate response 

infrastructure, including equipment, personnel, and laboratory 

capacity; and (4) clear animal identification, indemnification, and 

disposal policies. While USDA has made some progress in addressing some 

of these issues, significant work remains.



Rapid Disease Identification and Reporting:



The rapid identification and reporting of an FMD incident is key to 

mounting a timely response. However, a timely response depends on 

livestock producers and private veterinarians quickly identifying and 

reporting suspicious symptoms to state and federal officials. If they 

do not do so, FMD could become out of control before the federal and 

state governments could initiate any action. For example, within the 

first few days of the outbreak in the United Kingdom, before the first 

reports of FMD reached British officials, infected animals were criss-

crossing the country in hundreds of separate movements, putting other 

livestock at risk. The main geographical spread of the disease occurred 

before any suspicion that the disease was present in the country. In 

contrast, in France, county officials quickly identified diseased 

animals from the United Kingdom, and were able to slaughter them 

quickly and avoid a large-scale outbreak. As a result, France sustained 

minimal animal losses and was declared FMD-free within months, while it 

took the United Kingdom almost a year to eradicate the disease and 

regain its FMD-free status.



Several federal and state animal health officials with whom we spoke 

were concerned about how quickly disease identification and reporting 

would actually occur in the United States. They told us that livestock 

producers or veterinarians may not readily identify FMD because (1) the 

disease presents symptoms that are similar to other less-serious 

diseases, (2) FMD and other foreign animal diseases are not usually 

included in veterinary school curricula, and (3) many veterinarians may 

never have seen FMD-infected animals. Furthermore, livestock producers 

and veterinarians may not report the disease because they are not aware 

of the reporting process or may not realize the criticality of prompt 

reporting.



According to USDA officials, the U.K. outbreak helped raise general 

awareness among state officials, private veterinarians, and livestock 

producers about the risks and potential of an FMD outbreak in the 

United States. An indication of this increased awareness is the 

doubling of foreign animal disease investigations from about 400 in 

2000 to more than 800 in 2001. In addition, federal and state officials 

told us that the U.K. outbreak led to greater awareness of the need to 

have trained diagnosticians for foreign animal diseases in the field. 

In recent years, more field veterinarians have attended foreign animal 

disease training at USDAs Plum Island facility.[Footnote 20]



Nevertheless, as described in chapter 2, USDA intensified its efforts 

to increase public and industry awareness about FMD after the U.K. 

outbreak in 2001. As part of these efforts, USDA also addressed 

industry and animal health associations, and sponsored workshops, 

conferences, and informational telecasts for federal, state, and local 

officials, and others. In addition, the state governments also 

supported and supplemented USDAs informational efforts. Despite USDA 

and state efforts to flood the livestock industry with information 

about the risks of FMD during 2001, the challenge to USDA will be to 

maintain this heightened awareness about FMD, now that the immediate 

risk from the U.K. outbreak has subsided.



Cooperation, Coordination, and Communication:



Cooperation, coordination, and communication between federal, state, 

and local agencies, private veterinarians, and livestock producers are 

essential for an effective FMD response. Recent planning efforts and 

test exercises have helped start the process of establishing greater 

coordination and improving the level of cooperation and communication 

between all levels. According to a USDA official, for example, USDAs 

recent planning efforts to develop a national FMD response plan brought 

together officials from a variety of federal agencies to consider the 

implications of an FMD outbreak to their areas of responsibility and 

helped them develop ways in which they could support a federal 

response.



Moreover, efforts to improve communication, cooperation, and 

coordination are beginning to transcend state boundaries. In 2001, 26 

U.S. states/territories reported to NAHEMS that they were part of a 

group of states that had agreed to support each other in preparing for 

and responding to animal health emergencies. For example, according to 

Midwestern state officials, they are now beginning to address regional 

coordination and cooperation issues. In May 2002, seven Midwestern 

states met in Iowa for a planning conference to discuss a coordinated 

response plan for the region.



While these planning and testing efforts have improved the level of 

communication, coordination, and cooperation, they have also identified 

areas that need considerable attention. For example, although the 

Tripartite Exercise of 2000 identified generally good communication and 

cooperation between government and industry participants, it also 

identified the need for the following actions:



* Improve the technology used to ensure an uninterrupted flow of 

information.



* Develop written agreements between national animal health and 

industry officials to ensure a continued high level of communication 

even when players change.



* Have federal and state counterparts work together to develop 

collaborative relationships that will improve communications during an 

actual outbreak.



We also found that cooperation and communication between federal and 

state officials varied by state. For example, while some state 

officials indicated that they had excellent working relationships with 

their federal counterpart located in the state, others told us that 

cooperation and communication were limited. According to one APHIS 

field veterinarian, the level of cooperation and communication depends 

to a large extent on the personalities of the people involved and 

therefore such variance is to be expected. While the development of 

written agreements as suggested by the Tripartite exercise report and 

NAHEMS could help alleviate this problem, as of 2001, only about 32 

U.S. states/territories had such agreements or other documents that 

detailed the respective roles of federal and state officials.



To help improve cooperation, coordination, and communication, USDA 

officials told us that they are working with organizations such as the 

National Emergency Management Association to help states with their 

animal-emergency-planning efforts. In addition, USDA awarded 38 grants 

totaling $1.8 million in 2001 to state agencies, tribal nations, and 

emergency management organizations. According to USDA, this funding was 

to be used for training, equipment, and emergency-preparedness 

exercises.



In commenting on a draft of this report, USDA stated that in late May 

2002, it announced that it would be making more than $43 million 

available as grants to the states for strengthening homeland security 

preparedness. Of this $43 million, $14 million is to help states meet 

the national standards of emergency preparedness established by NAHEMS. 

Moreover, USDA stated that it is working with FEMA to develop a 

framework for a comprehensive communications plan to address a foreign 

animal disease outbreak. The plan will help better ensure the timely 

dissemination of information to critical audiences, including federal 

agencies, states, and industries.



Adequate Response Infrastructure:



An effective response to an FMD outbreak requires an effective 

infrastructure, including a national emergency management control and 

command center, technical and other personnel, transportation and 

disposal equipment, and laboratory facilities and testing capacity.



To ensure that a U.S. response to an FMD outbreak is properly 

coordinated and adequately controlled, USDA has established an 

Emergency Management Operations Center at its Riverdale, Maryland, 

location. In the event of an outbreak, USDA will activate this center 

to coordinate day-to-day activities during an FMD response and notify 

U.S. trading partners of the status of the outbreak. According to 

USDAs draft FMD response plan, APHIS will set up the Joint Information 

Center--collocated with the Emergency Management Operations Center--to 

serve as the primary source of public information about the response 

and will coordinate with other federal and state information centers.



In addition, as the U.K. outbreak illustrated, responding to an FMD 

outbreak requires extensive personnel resources. These include persons 

who can provide (1) specialized animal disease support for testing and 

diagnosis, epidemiology, vaccination, slaughter, and carcass disposal; 

(2) biohazard response support for controlling animals movement and 

decontaminating infected and exposed premises, equipment, and 

personnel; and (3) general logistics support for sheltering and feeding 

responders; the transportation, movement, and positioning of equipment 

and supplies; and general law enforcement. During the 2001 outbreak, 

the U.K. government had to request specialized animal disease support 

from several countries, including the United States, Canada, Australia, 

and New Zealand; hire thousands of private contractors to provide 

slaughter and decontamination support; and use military personnel to 

provide general logistical support. According to a U.K. government 

working paper issued in March 2002, during the peak of the outbreak, 

more than 7,000 civil servants, 2,000 veterinarians, and 2,000 armed 

forces personnel were involved in the response--making it a bigger and 

more complex logistical exercise than the United Kingdoms involvement 

in the Gulf War.



A recent test exercise in Iowa indicates that the personnel 

requirements to respond to an FMD outbreak in the United States would 

also be enormous--approaching 50,000 people to support a response. More 

specifically, according to APHIS estimates, the United States would be 

at least 1,200 veterinarians short of the required 2,000 to 3,000 

specially trained veterinarians needed to respond to an animal health 

emergency. APHIS officials told us that while state and private 

veterinarians could help make up some of this difference, without 

appropriate training, their help would be of limited use.



To address the personnel challenges posed by an FMD outbreak, USDA has 

undertaken several efforts. By partnering with FEMA and other emergency 

management organizations, USDA will be able to leverage these agencies 

resources to help provide many of the general logistical support 

activities. Similarly, USDA has established a memorandum of 

understanding with the Department of Defense to provide military 

personnel and equipment to support a response effort. In addition, 

APHIS has implemented an Emergency Veterinarian Officer Program to 

increase the number of veterinarians available to assist in an animal 

health emergency. The program trains federal, state, and private 

veterinarians to handle emergency situations. As of December 2001, 

APHIS had trained 276 emergency veterinarian officers, 145 of whom 

participated in responding to the U.K. outbreak. Moreover, USDA has 

trained 520 veterinarians across the country as foreign animal disease 

diagnosticians, and they may be called upon to provide specialized 

animal health support in the event of an outbreak. Finally, according 

to APHIS officials, USDA has informal arrangements with the United 

Kingdom and other countries to provide the United States with 

veterinary support. More formally, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the 

United States, and the United Kingdom are currently drafting a 

memorandum of understanding that would allow the five countries to 

share veterinary resources in the event of an animal health emergency.



In commenting on a draft of this report, USDA also indicated that it 

has created a National Animal Health Reserve Corps, composed of private 

veterinarians from around the country who would be willing to assist 

APHIS veterinarians in field and laboratory operations during a foreign 

animal disease situation. According to USDA, to date, more than 275 

private veterinarians have signed on to this corps and the department 

is continuing its efforts to recruit more members. This corps will 

supplement the personnel drawn from states, and other federal agencies 

and organizations.



A response infrastructure also requires a diagnostic laboratory system 

that is capable of handling the volume of testing and analysis 

necessary in the event of an outbreak. For example, from February 

through December 2001, the United Kingdoms Pirbright Laboratory, that 

countrys primary reference laboratory, tested 15,000 samples for the 

presence of the FMD virus and performed 1 million monitoring tests to 

ensure that the disease had been eradicated. Nationwide, a total of 

2.75 million samples were tested as part of the response to the 

outbreak. Despite this level of testing, according to U.S. 

veterinarians returning from the United Kingdom, the United Kingdom had 

unmet needs for laboratory assistance.



In the United States, USDAs Plum Island facility--the primary 

laboratory in the United States that is authorized to test suspected 

FMD samples--would be quickly overwhelmed in the event of an FMD 

outbreak, according to many federal and state officials with whom we 

spoke. Recognizing this potential problem, the National Association of 

State Departments of Agriculture recently recommended that the United 

States develop a national strategy for animal health diagnostic 

laboratory services that would include USDAs Plum Island facility and 

its National Veterinary Services Laboratories at Ames, Iowa, as well as 

state and university laboratories. Currently, state diagnostic 

laboratories have no formal role in a foreign animal disease response. 

In addition, the Director of the Plum Island facility stated that the 

nation needs to look beyond Plum Island for laboratory support in the 

event of a large-scale FMD outbreak. He suggested that off-site 

noncentralized testing, using noninfectious material (tests that do not 

use the live virus), should be considered with backup testing support 

provided by Plum Island. APHIS officials told us that while the idea of 

a regional laboratory structure has merit, several issues would have to 

be addressed before such a structure could be implemented. For example, 

laboratory personnel would have to undergo continuous training and 

certification, and facilities would have to be renovated and maintained 

to provide state of the art capabilities. This would require a 

significant commitment of resources.



In commenting on a draft of this report, USDA stated that as part of 

its efforts to strengthen homeland security preparedness, it is 

providing state and university cooperators with $20.6 million to 

establish a network of diagnostic laboratories dispersed strategically 

throughout the country. This network will permit the rapid and accurate 

diagnosis of animal disease threats. Moreover, USDA stated that earlier 

this year it allocated $177 million to make improvements at key 

locations, including its diagnostic and research facilities in Ames, 

Iowa, and Plum Island, and that $15.3 million was allocated to USDAs 

Agricultural Research Service to improve rapid detection technology for 

FMD as well as other animal diseases.



Animal Identification, Disposal, and Indemnification Policies:



The effectiveness of a U.S. response to an FMD outbreak will require an 

animal identification and tracking system to allow responders to 

identify, control, and slaughter infected and exposed animals as well 

as clear animal disposal and indemnification policies. The 2002 farm 

bill,[Footnote 21] addresses animal disposal and indemnification issues 

by providing the Secretary of Agriculture with broad authority to hold, 

seize, treat, or destroy any animal, as well as to limit interstate 

livestock movement as part of USDAs efforts to prevent the spread of 

any livestock disease or pest. The Secretary may also take measures to 

detect, control, or eradicate any pest or disease of livestock, as 

needed. In addition, the farm bill requires the Secretary to compensate 

owners on the basis of the fair market value of destroyed animals and 

related materials. USDA is currently trying to develop specific 

guidance on how these authorities will be implemented.



Many epidemiologists believe that in the event of an FMD outbreak, 

successfully tracing affected animal movements within 24 hours is 

essential if the response is to be effective. However, the United 

States generally does not require animal identification, nor does it 

have a system for tracking animal movements. As a result, according to 

a USDA official, in the event of an FMD outbreak, USDA would likely 

have to rely on sales records to track animal movements, which could 

take days, or weeks, depending on the accuracy of record-keeping and 

producer/seller cooperation.



The longer it takes to identify animals and track their movements from 

premise to premise, the more difficult it becomes to contain the 

outbreak. USDA officials told us that, depending on where the outbreak 

is first identified, it may be relatively easy or extremely difficult 

to trace. For example, if only one farm were infected and animals had 

not recently been moved on or off the premises, no tracing of live 

animals would be necessary. However, if the outbreak first appeared in 

a major market or feedlot where hundreds of animals move in and out on 

almost a daily basis, tracing would be very difficult and time-

consuming.



Recognizing the importance of an animal identification and tracking 

system, USDA began planning such a system 3 years ago, according to the 

Director of the National Animal Identification initiative. However, the 

industry resisted the concept because of the costs involved and the 

potential for the unauthorized disclosure of proprietary information. 

The Director noted that the events of September 11, 2001, as well as 

technological advances appear to be reducing the level of industry 

opposition to a national animal identification system. For example, 

this official told us that the National Cattlemens Beef Association 

recently indicated some support for such a system. However, the 

following issues will need to be resolved before a national system can 

be developed and implemented:



* The responsibility for funding the system.



* The type of technology that should be employed--strictly visual, 

electronic, or some combination.



* The amount of information that should be included on each animals 

identification tag or electronic-tracking device.



* The persons able to access this information.



* The information that should be shared with other federal departments 

and agencies.



* At what point on the farm-to-table continuum should identification 

end?



In addition, during an FMD outbreak in the United States, the disposal 

of carcasses could become a significant challenge because of the 

potential number of animals that may have to be slaughtered. For 

example, during the U.K. outbreak, over 4 million animals, primarily 

sheep, were slaughtered for controlling the disease. According to USDA 

estimates, if the United States had an outbreak of comparable magnitude 

(affecting about 8 percent of the livestock population), over 13 

million animals would be affected, and most of them would be cattle and 

hogs. Generally, disposal can occur by burial, incineration, or 

rendering. In the United States, according to USDAs draft FMD response 

plan, burial would be the preferred method of disposal when conditions 

make it practical. The plan states that burial is the fastest, easiest, 

and most economical method of disposal. When burial is not feasible, 

the plan recommends incineration as the alternative means of disposal 

even though USDA recognizes that incineration is both difficult and 

expensive. According to a USDA veterinarian who helped during the U.K. 

outbreak, a 200-meter funeral pyre was used to incinerate 400 cows or 

1,200 sheep or 1,600 pigs. Such a pyre required 1,000 railway ties, 8 

tons of kindling, 400 wooden pallets, 4 tons of straw, 200 tons of 

coal, and 1,000 liters of diesel fuel. In addition, heavy equipment, 

such as bulldozers and a team of about 18 to 20 people, was needed to 

construct the pyre. Figures 5 and 6 show burial pits and incineration 

pyres used in the United Kingdom to dispose of slaughtered animals.



Figure 5: Disposal of Animal Carcasses by Burial in the United Kingdom:



[See PDF for image]



Source: USDA.



[End of figure]



Figure 6: Disposal of Animal Carcasses by Incineration in the United 

Kingdom:



[See PDF for image]



Source: USDA.



[End of figure]



According to the federal and state officials we spoke with, each of 

these disposal methods presents significant implementation challenges 

that have not yet been fully considered. For example, burial poses such 

challenges as the potential to contaminate groundwater, the need to 

identify burial sites and obtain appropriate federal and state permits 

and clearances in advance, and the potential to spread the disease if 

animals have to be transported to an off-farm burial site. For 

incineration, the incineration site has to be accessible to large 

equipment, and yet has to be sufficiently away from public view to 

minimize negative public reaction to the sight of large burning pyres. 

In addition, incineration could not only affect air quality but also 

may be ineffective because if not constructed properly, the pyres may 

not generate sufficient temperatures to completely incinerate the 

carcasses. According to a USDA veterinarian, in the United Kingdom the 

pyres generally burned for about 9 to 10 days before all of the 

carcasses were incinerated. Similarly, rendering poses challenges 

because transporting carcasses to rendering plants increases the risk 

of spreading the disease, and additional cleaning and disinfecting 

procedures would be needed at the rendering facility. Some U.S. 

veterinarians returning from the United Kingdom told us that during the 

outbreak, the United Kingdom faced many of these disposal challenges 

and they were concerned that the United States might not have devoted 

enough attention to deciding how it would address these or similar 

disposal issues. According to APHIS officials, USDA is currently 

creating digital maps of the whole country to help identify appropriate 

burial and incineration locations. In addition, USDA is trying to 

determine alternative uses of carcasses, such as safely converting the 

meat into food, and using vaccinations to limit the number of animals 

slaughtered and thus requiring disposal.



Finally, clear indemnification and compensation criteria are needed to 

ensure producer cooperation to slaughter and dispose of infected and 

exposed livestock during an outbreak. During the U.K. outbreak, the 

government agency responsible for responding to the outbreak 

experienced delays in slaughtering animals because of farmers 

resistance and legal challenges. According to state and livestock 

association officials, indemnification would be a significant issue--

one that could hamper a rapid response in the United States.



USDA published a proposed rule on May 1, 2002, amending the indemnity 

provisions for its FMD-related regulations. This proposed rule 

clarifies how USDA will determine the value of animals and materials 

affected by an FMD outbreak and how indemnity payments will be made to 

claimants. USDA developed this proposed rule because it was concerned 

that potential delays to an FMD eradication program in the United 

States might occur because of producers perceptions that they might 

not be adequately compensated for the fair market value of destroyed 

animals, products, and materials as well as cleaning and disinfecting 

costs. Under the proposed rule, the federal government would pay 100 

percent of the costs for the purchase, destruction, and disposition of 

animals if they become infected with FMD, as well as for materials 

contaminated with FMD and the cleaning and disinfection of affected 

premises, according to USDA.



In commenting on a draft of this report, USDA agreed that animal 

identification, carcass disposal, and indemnity are all absolutely 

vital areas that have to be addressed before any major outbreak of 

disease. In this regard, USDA stated that it is working closely with 

the agricultural industries to provide forums for a national dialogue 

on the issue of a national identification plan for American livestock. 

The ultimate objective is to establish a national identification plan 

that provides the essential elements to improve emergency response and 

meet future needs. USDA further stated that it is investing in other 

options for disposing of carcasses on a large scale. Finally, USDA 

stated that it has extended the comment period from July 1 to July 31, 

2002, for its proposed regulations that address how decisions regarding 

indemnity payments will be made in the event of an FMD outbreak.



Conclusions:



If an outbreak of FMD in the United States rages out of control, it 

could ultimately cost tens of billions of dollars and the destruction 

of millions of animals. To avoid such catastrophic consequences, the 

disease must be stamped out quickly. Although the federal government 

and state governments have made significant progress in developing and 

testing emergency response plans for an animal disease outbreak, such 

as FMD, significant issues remain unresolved. These unresolved issues 

could present major impediments to an effective and timely response if 

not addressed before an outbreak occurs. While USDA currently has 

several ongoing efforts to resolve many of these issues, the department 

has not established specific time frames for the completion of these 

efforts. We believe it is critical that adequate management attention 

and resources be made available to ensure that these issues are 

resolved expeditiously.



Recommendation for Executive Action:



To ensure that the United States is well positioned to respond 

effectively to an animal disease outbreak such as FMD, we recommend 

that the Secretary of Agriculture direct the Administrator of APHIS to 

develop a plan, which should include interim milestones and completion 

dates, for addressing the various unresolved issues that could 

challenge an effective U.S. response.



[End of section]



Appendixes:



Appendix I: Countries Considered FMD-Free by the United States:



As of April 29, 2002, USDA considered the following countries/areas 

free of foot and mouth disease (FMD) and rinderpest (cattle plague):



Australia

Austria [Footnote 22]

Bahama Islands [Footnote 22]

Barbados

Belgium [Footnote 22]

Belize (British Honduras)

Bermuda

Canada

Channel Islands [Footnote 22]

Chile [Footnote 22]

Costa Rica

Czech Republic [Footnote 22]

Denmark [Footnote 22]

Dominican Republic

El Salvador

Fiji

Finland [Footnote 22]

France [Footnote 22]

Germany [Footnote 22]

Greenland

Guatemala

Haiti

Honduras

Hungary [Footnote 22]

Iceland

Italy [Footnote 22]

Jamaica

Japan [Footnote 22]

Luxemborg [Footnote 22]

Mexico

Netherlands [Footnote 22]

New Caledonia [Footnote 22]

New Zealand

Nicaragua

Northern Ireland [Footnote 22]

Norway [Footnote 22]

Panama

Panama Canal Zone

Papua New Guinea [Footnote 22]

Poland [Footnote 22]

Portugal [Footnote 22]

Republic of Ireland [Footnote 22]

Spain [Footnote 22]

Sweden [Footnote 22]

Switzerland[Footnote  [Footnote 22]]

Territory of St. Pierre and Miquelon

Tobago

Trinidad

Trust Territories of the Pacific Islands:



[End of section]



Appendix II Measures for Preventing the Introduction of FMD into 

Canada:



This appendix provides summary information on Canadas preventive 

measures to ensure that FMD does not enter the country via five key 

pathways included in our review: (1) the importation of live animals; 

(2) the importation of animal products; (3) the handling and disposal 

of garbage from international carriers, such as airplanes and ships; 

(4) international passengers; and (5) packages sent through 

international mail.



Background:



The creation of the Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA), in April 

1997, consolidated the delivery of all federal food, animal, and plant 

health inspection programs, which were previously provided by four 

federal agencies, into a single food safety agency for Canada. CFIA 

delivers food, plant, and animal inspection programs in 18 regions 

across Canada. CFIA has 180 field offices, including border ports of 

entry, and 408 offices in nongovernment establishments, such as 

processing facilities. CFIA also has 13 biosecurity level-III 

laboratories, including 1 that handles FMD and large animals.[Footnote 

23] These laboratories provide scientific advice, develop new 

technologies, provide testing services, and conduct research.



The Health of Animals Act authorizes CFIA to prevent the introduction 

of diseases that may harm animals or humans. CFIA controls the 

importation of animals and animal products from foreign countries to 

reduce the risk of introducing serious animal diseases, such as FMD. 

The last outbreak of FMD in Canada was in 1952. CFIA has 14 inspection 

programs for animals, food, and plants produced in Canada and 

commodities and live animals imported into Canada. One of these 

programs is the Animal Health and Production program, which is applied 

at Canadian ports of entry. This program covers the issuing of import 

permits, quarantining of live animal imports, negotiating export health 

requirements with other nations government, and establishing and 

ensuring compliance with Canadian import health standards. In addition, 

the program is responsible for implementing domestic disease control 

programs, foreign animal disease preparedness, and emergency response.



Controls for Live Animal Imports:



Canada allows live animal imports only from countries that are FMD-free 

and have been preapproved by CFIA. Generally, live animals imported 

into Canada must be admitted through approved inspection ports of 

entry. For example, live animals imported into Canada by air from 

countries other than the United States are required to enter at 

airports, such as Vancouver, Halifax, Montreal, Toronto, and Calgary. 

CFIA generally requires that an import permit application be filed in 

advance of the importation of live animals from countries other than 

the United States. The import permit contains information on the (1) 

importer, who must be a Canadian resident; (2) exporter; (3) 

destination of the animal(s); (4) producer; (5) port of entry; (6) 

preapproved quarantine site, if the animal is to be quarantined; and 

(7) description of animals to be imported including the number, 

species, breed, age, color, name, individual identification, and 

registration numbers or numbers from the official seal on the 

transporting vehicle. If quarantine periods are required for the 

animals, CFIA preapproves the quarantine premises.



The inspection of shipments of live animals at Canadian ports of entry 

includes a document review and verification by Canadian Customs and 

CFIA, and in some cases, CFIA inspectors may off-load the animals for 

inspection, depending on their proposed use. As part of the physical 

inspection, inspectors may verify the animal identification numbers. 

CFIA usually requires the importer to have a license to move the 

imported animals to their final destination. Additionally, once animals 

have entered Canada, CFIA can impose post-import requirements, which 

may include the possible quarantine and testing or additional treatment 

of the animals.



All live animals, regardless of their country of origin, must meet 

these general import requirements. However, once these requirements are 

met, Canada has separate procedures for live animal imports from the 

United States and those from other countries.



Live Animals Imported from the United States:



Generally, live animals entering Canada from the United States must 

conform to entry requirements that are less stringent than those for 

animals from other countries. Depending on an animals state of origin 

and the intended use of the animal, tests for some foreign animal 

diseases that Canada does not have or has already eradicated, such as 

brucellosis, tuberculosis, anaplasmosis, and blue tongue, may be 

required. Some states have been preapproved by CFIA to export certain 

kinds of animals on the basis of the states disease status. For 

example, as of April 2002, the following seven U.S. states were 

qualified to export restricted feeder cattle to Canada: Hawaii, Idaho, 

Montana, New York, North Dakota, South Dakota, and Washington.



CFIA generally does not require an import permit for most animals 

imported from the United States. For example, an import permit is not 

required for U.S. imports of breeding cattle and bob calves for 

fattening. These animals are required only to have an Official 

Zoosanitary Export Certificate signed by an official USDA veterinarian. 

The certificate contains information on the (1) name and address of the 

consignor; (2) consignee; (3) individual identification of the animals 

to be exported; (4) animals origin; (5) results of the veterinary 

examination of the animals; and (6) animals residency in the United 

States, which must be for a minimum of 60 days. Additionally, while 

some animals, such as bob calves and restricted feeder cattle, are not 

required to be tested for diseases that Canada does not have such as, 

tuberculosis, brucellosis, blue tongue, and anaplasmosis, others, such 

as breeding cattle, must be tested.



Similarly, a CFIA import permit and individual identification are not 

required for animals imported from the United States for direct 

slaughter. U.S. livestock to be exported to Canada for direct slaughter 

are placed in sealed trucks or containers and transported directly to 

the Canadian slaughter facility. CFIA requires all live animals 

imported for direct slaughter from the United States to be slaughtered 

within 4 days of importation.



CFIA encourages U.S. exporters to fax inspection certificates ahead of 

time to ease the border review process.[Footnote 24] Once a truckload 

of U.S. livestock arrives at the border, Canadian Customs performs a 

preclearance document review for CFIA and then sends the vehicle to the 

CFIA inspection area, where inspectors review the documentation to 

ensure that the information provided is correct. When required, CFIA 

unloads cattle for individual inspection. CFIA can perform inspections 

on the trailers if the load is small and it is safe to do so. U.S. 

livestock imported for direct slaughter requires only a visual 

inspection; however, imported breeding cattle are checked for health 

status, and their ear tags and tattoos are verified against the 

documentation provided. Every transporter is required to clean and 

disinfect the trucks, railway cars, aircraft, or shipping vessels that 

have been used to transport livestock immediately after they have been 

unloaded.



A U.S. origin health certificate issued by a USDA-authorized 

veterinarian must accompany swine imports from the United States. The 

certificate contains the name and address of both the consignor and 

consignee and complete identification of the animals to be exported, 

including certification that the (1) United States is free of hog 

cholera; (2) herd of origin has been free of brucellosis and pseudo 

rabies for the past 12 months, and that the animals exported have been 

tested for these two diseases; (3) animals have been isolated from 

other animals for at least 30 days prior to export; (4) animals have 

been transported in cleaned and disinfected vehicles; and (5) animals 

have not been fed any garbage at any time. Additionally, all swine 

imported from the United States must be quarantined in Canada for at 

least 30 days in a CFIA-approved quarantine station. Swine shipments 

imported directly for slaughter are required to have an import permit.



CFIA requires shipments of bovine embryos or semen from the United 

States to be accompanied by a U.S. origin health certificate and an 

import permit. The certificate contains information such as the (1) 

registered name and identification number of the parents, (2) species 

and breed, 

(3) name and address of the consignor, (4) address of the collection 

premises, (5) numbers from the official seal on the transporting 

vehicle, and (6) name and address of the consignee.



Live Animals Imported from Other Countries:



To prevent the introduction of disease and control the importation of 

animals into Canada, the Minister of Agriculture designates countries 

or parts of countries free from specific diseases. Canada designates 

countries to be FMD-free after reviewing the (1) prevalence of disease 

in the country or part of a country, (2) time since the last outbreak 

of the disease, 

(3) surveillance programs in effect, (4) measures taken to prevent the 

introduction and spread of the disease, (5) natural barriers to the 

spread of the disease, and (6) the zoo-sanitary infrastructure. 

Importing countries must also be free of other Office of International 

des Epizooties (OIE) List A diseases in addition to FMD, such as 

rinderpest and classical swine fever. Importing countries that have OIE 

List B diseases, such as bovine spongiform encephalopathy, also known 

as mad cow disease; tuberculosis; and brucellosis must provide 

additional documentation proving that the herds being exported to 

Canada are free of these diseases. At the time of our review, in 

addition to the United States, CFIA accepted live cattle imports only 

from Australia and New Zealand, and goats were permitted only from the 

United States.



If CFIA recognizes a country as free of FMD and other diseases of 

concern, the importer must apply for an import permit for live animals. 

CFIA generally requires that all live animals imported into the country 

have a unique individual identification. However, there are exceptions 

for animals imported for direct slaughter. Additionally, all cattle 

must be tested for tuberculosis, brucellosis, blue tongue, and 

anaplasmosis, unless the exporting country is considered free of these 

diseases and certifies that it is free of other diseases of concern.



CFIA has established additional requirements for importing horses into 

Canada from FMD-affected countries. Under CFIA supervision, horses from 

FMD-affected countries must be quarantined and washed with a 

disinfectant. In addition, their hooves and all equipment, such as 

saddles and tack, and all transportation vehicles must be cleaned and 

disinfected. Bedding and manure must be placed in bags and incinerated.



Controls for Imported Animal Products:



Canada allows only imports of FMD-susceptible animal products, such as 

fresh meat, from countries that have been preapproved by CFIA. Some 

animal products may be imported from FMD-affected countries if they 

meet certain requirements. CFIA and the Canada Customs and Revenue 

Agency (CCRA) combine investigation services at ports of entry to 

ensure that all Canadian import requirements are met prior to releasing 

the products into commerce. Animal product imports from the United 

States are generally required only to present proof of the country of 

origin at the port of entry.



Countries or parts of countries officially considered FMD-free by CFIA 

can generally export many types of animal products to Canada. As with 

live animal imports, to designate a country as FMD-free, CFIA reviews 

information about the (1) prevalence of the disease in a country; (2) 

time since the last FMD outbreak; (3) surveillance programs in effect; 

(4) measures taken to prevent the introduction and spread of the 

disease; (5) natural barriers to the spread of the disease; and (6) 

zoo-sanitary infrastructure.



For all countries, Canada also has a country-by-country meat inspection 

and approval system, which includes a review of the following (1) the 

countrys overall system of meat inspection, (2) the establishments 

operating within that system, and (3) the approval of individual meat 

products prepared in these establishments. Moreover, CFIA reviews 

relevant legislation and related technical information, including the 

countrys residue-monitoring program. If the requesting country has 

legislation equivalent to Canadas, a visit is made to the country to 

study the actual implementation of the legislation in establishments. 

On the basis of satisfactory findings during the visit, establishments 

wishing to export meat products to Canada are approved. CFIA maintains 

a list of the countries and establishments that have been approved to 

export certain types of meat products into Canada. For those countries 

where the meat inspection system as a whole has not been approved, 

importation may be limited to specific meat products.



Importations from countries that are not considered free from FMD are 

normally limited, to include the following: (1) commercially sterile 

canned cooked meat products; (2) pasteurized, canned, cured, and 

boneless meat products; and (3) cooked, frozen, tubed and boneless beef 

from specified establishments in certain countries. Milk products are 

allowed entry if they have been treated properly and are certified 

accordingly. Establishments approved for meat and meat product exports 

to Canada are periodically reviewed.



All commercial shipments of imported meat products are subject to 

monitoring and inspection at the Canadian port of entry. Once a 

shipment is identified as containing meat products, it must be held 

until the CFIA inspector reviews the information, such as the Official 

Meat Inspection Certificate signed by the official veterinarian of the 

exporting country. The Official Meat Inspection Certificate contains 

information on the (1) name and address of the exporter and importer; 

(2) certificate number, country code, and exporting establishment 

number; (3) establishment number and name, and country where the 

animals were slaughtered; (4) name of the carrier; (5) port of loading 

and landing; (6) departure date; (7) number and description of the meat 

products; and (8) numbers from the official seal on the container and 

the container numbers. Depending on the exporting country, additional 

certifications may be required. Some animal product shipments are 

exempt from CFIA review because they are in transit through Canada to 

another country. CFIA does not review these shipments, provided they 

remain under a Customs bond and originate in a country and are of a 

type that would otherwise be eligible for entry into Canada. Animal 

product imports from the United States are generally required only to 

present proof of country of origin. However, some U.S. products, such 

as meat and bone meal are also required to have an import permit.



CFIAs sampling and inspection procedures for all meat packed in boxes 

require the shipment to be totally unloaded and staged so that all 

containers are visible. Inspectors visually scan the shipment to 

identify any evidence of damaged or stained cartons and to verify outer 

labels. For shipments that include suspected or unsatisfactory 

containers, a full inspection of affected containers is conducted. For 

canned meat products, random inspections are carried out by the 

inspector on a minimum of 40 cases, which are to be representative of 

the inspection lot and not include more than 5 containers from each of 

the cases. When there are fewer than 40 cases in an inspection lot, 

inspectors select the appropriate number of containers out of each case 

to make up the required sample. For inspection lots having fewer than 

200 containers, the entire inspection lot must be examined, and the 

total number of containers must be recorded on the report form.



When a shipment is refused entry into Canada, the inspector must 

immediately hold the animal products and notify the area office by 

telephone. The inspector or an officer from the area office must 

officially notify the importer that the imported shipment is totally or 

partially refused and that the importer has 90 days to destroy it or 

remove it from Canada or it will be destroyed under direct supervision 

of a CFIA inspector.



Controls for International Garbage:



Garbage from international airlines and ships must be disposed of and 

treated under the supervision of a CFIA inspector. Garbage from 

carriers of U.S. origin, however, is disposed of in landfills, similar 

to those for Canadian garbage. CFIA requires international garbage to 

be disposed of by incineration, heat treatment at 100 Celsius for 30 

minutes, or burial at a CFIA-approved site. In addition, the 

transportation routes for international garbage are approved in advance 

along with alternative routes in case of an emergency. Transporters are 

responsible for maintaining their trucks in good condition and checking 

to ensure that there are no possible leaks.



Regarding foreign ships, CFIA monitors and inspects them to ensure that 

garbage on board the vehicle is stored and contained properly. Garbage 

can be removed only from ships at approved ports that have adequate 

incineration or burial sites. The ships destinations are also recorded 

at the first Canadian port of entry, and CFIA inspectors may seal 

galleys to ensure that foreign foodstuffs do not find their way onto 

Canadian land. At subsequent Canadian ports, CFIA inspectors check the 

galley seals. Seals may be broken under CFIA presence but must be 

resealed prior to departure if the ship is going to additional Canadian 

ports. All foodstuffs and pet animals are to remain on the ship and are 

allowed off only with the written permission of CFIA. If ships do not 

comply with these requirements, CFIA can fine and bar the vessel from 

entering Canadian waters.



Controls for International Passengers:



CFIA inspectors work with CCRA officers and with specially trained 

detector dogs in all major airports to prevent the entry of prohibited 

plants and animal products. International passengers are required to 

declare all animals and animal products; the failure to declare certain 

animal products can result in fines. International passengers, except 

those arriving from the United States, are not allowed to bring meat 

and meat products into Canada but may bring up to 20 kilograms of 

cheese. Passengers not declaring prohibited items are subject to 

monetary penalties of up to Can. $400. At the main Canadian 

international airports, CFIA has approximately nine dogs trained to 

sniff baggage accompanying international passengers before they proceed 

through the federal inspection areas. The detector dog program is part 

of CFIAs front line of defense against pests and diseases. The dogs 

are trained to detect items such as prohibited fruits, plants, and 

meat. When the dogs are not available, CFIA inspectors walk through the 

baggage claim area looking for anything that might be considered 

suspicious.



CFIA made a number of changes to the international passenger controls 

as a result of the FMD outbreak in the United Kingdom and other parts 

of Europe. CFIA expanded its efforts to (1) use detector dogs at the 

airports, (2) x-ray passengers baggage, and (3) mount a public 

awareness campaign. As a part of the public awareness campaign, large 

signs were placed around the airport terminals informing the public 

about FMD and precautions that should be taken to prevent its 

introduction into Canada. Brochures were also printed conveying similar 

information and handed to international passengers arriving from FMD-

infected countries. In addition, CCRA officials asked specific 

questions about whether the passengers had been around farm animals or 

visited farms or if they planned to visit a farm in Canada--even if the 

relevant question was not marked on the declaration card. This 

additional questioning ceased after the United Kingdom was declared 

FMD-free. Moreover, all international passengers entering Canada were 

required to step on a disinfectant mat. Passengers who indicated that 

they might present an FMD risk were asked additional questions about 

their activities and--as deemed necessary--their shoes were sent out 

for cleaning. For example, when soccer teams came to Canada from 

countries that had FMD, their shoes were sent for cleaning at the 

teams expense. CFIA officials told us that even though the European 

outbreak is over, FMD still exists in many parts of the world, and they 

are planning to revamp their public awareness campaign and broaden the 

messages to cover all foreign pests and diseases.



Controls for International Mail:



CCRA officers inspect all international packages arriving into Canada 

by mail. Although CCRA officers are the only officials authorized to 

open mail, when inspectors find packages that need further inspection 

by agencies, such as CFIA or drug enforcement, they open it and affix a 

seal with a code indicating which agency should perform a further 

inspection. Generally, each package is then x-rayed. Problem importers/

exporters are identified through a computer system, and these packages 

are given additional scrutiny.



Recently, Canada passed new legislation making the recipient 

responsible for items sent through the mail, rather than the sender. As 

a result, recipients in Canada may be held responsible if they receive 

inappropriate items through the mail. For example, if personal 

shipments of prohibited agricultural products are sent through the 

mail, the recipient can be subject to monetary penalties of up to Can. 

$400. For commercial shipments, however, penalties for prohibited 

agricultural products can currently be as much as Can. $6,000. In 

addition, criminal penalties can also be imposed, depending on the 

nature of the offense.



[End of section]



Appendix III: Measures for Preventing the Introduction of FMD into 

Mexico:



This appendix provides summary information on the preventive measures 

that Mexico uses to ensure that FMD does not enter the country via five 

key pathways included in our review: (1) the importation of live 

animals; 

(2) the importation of animal products; (3) the handling and disposal 

of garbage from international carriers, such as airplanes and ships; 

(4) international passengers; and (5) packages sent through 

international mail.



Background:



The Mexican American Commission for the Eradication of Foot and Mouth 

Disease, formed in 1947, combined U.S. and Mexican efforts to eradicate 

FMD from Mexico.[Footnote 25] The commission built Mexicos animal 

health infrastructure and successfully eradicated FMD from Mexico in 

1954. Currently, the commission is responsible for performing a number 

of activities, including (1) foreign animal disease surveillance, (2) 

responding to reports of suspicious cases, (3) developing training on 

emergency plans and programs, (4) promoting public information 

programs, and 

(5) preparing and updating Mexicos emergency foreign animal disease 

response plans.



Mexicos Secretaria de Agricultura, Ganaderia, Desarrollo Rural, Pesca 

y Alimentacion (SAGARPA) covers agriculture, rural development, fish, 

and food issues. SAGARPA is responsible for implementing, among other 

things, (1) the animal health laws and regulations, (2) the zoo-

sanitary rules used by inspectors at border inspections at the port of 

entry, and (3) the animal health measures used in response to a foreign 

animal disease emergency. SAGARPA has 509 inspection offices, 105 of 

which are at international ports of entry, such as border crossings, 

airports, and seaports. For 2001, SAGARPAs budget for borders, ports, 

and airports was about Mex. $11 million (approximately U.S. $1.1 

million). All imports of live animals and agricultural products must be 

processed through one of SAGARPAs offices. In addition, SAGARPA 

officials enforce compliance with Mexicos official zoo-sanitary rules 

(1) at Customs offices, (2) at quarantine stations, (3) at inspection 

points, and (4) in other countries where treaties and accords have been 

approved.



SAGARPA divides Mexico into eight regions and assigns a veterinarian 

coordinator to each region for animal disease surveillance and for 

activating emergency operations in the event of a foreign animal 

disease outbreak. Additionally, to support the coordinators, Mexico 

established 29 animal health emergency state groups. Active throughout 

Mexico, these groups include over 900 government and private 

veterinarians trained in identifying and responding to foreign animal 

diseases, including FMD. Mexico also has a diagnostic biosecurity 

level-III laboratory capable of testing for foreign animal 

diseases.[Footnote 26] In 2001, Mexico reported performing 220 

investigations into suspicious cases that might have been FMD. All 

investigations resulted in negative results for the FMD virus.



Controls for Live Animal Imports:



SAGARPA allows live animal imports only from preapproved countries. 

Live animal imports into Mexico are prohibited from countries that have 

the FMD virus. SAGARPAs general requirements for all live animal 

imports include advance notification to SAGARPAs official 

veterinarians at the ports of entry. The amount of time required for 

official advance notification depends on the animals country of 

origin. Before live animals can be sent to Mexico, SAGARPA sends 

official veterinarians to the exporting country to ensure that the live 

animals to be exported are free of disease.



Once a live animal shipment arrives at the Mexican port of entry, 

official veterinarians review all the documents and physically inspect 

the animals. Importers are required to supply (1) a Mexican sanitary 

import permit; (2) a country of origin health certificate; (3) a dip 

certificate, if applicable; (4) a registration certificate, if 

applicable; and (5) a commercial license. The sanitary import permit 

certifies that the exporting country has met Mexican importation 

requirements. The health certificate contains information on the:



* name and address of the importer,



* place of origin and destination of the animals,



* animal health production standards of the exporting country,



* place where the certificate was issued, and:



* time period for which the certificate is effective.



All animals imported into Mexico must have individual identification 

marks or numbers unless they are imported for immediate slaughter. If 

animals are imported for direct slaughter, the only information that 

needs to be recorded is the number of animals and their origin. 

Additionally, all live animals must walk over a disinfectant mat, and 

depending on how tame the animals are, the hooves are scraped of dirt, 

and the entire animal is hosed down with disinfectant. Additionally, 

the trucks and containers that transported the animals are disinfected, 

and any bedding or waste from the animals is incinerated at the port of 

entry.



Generally, all live animals, regardless of their country of origin, 

must meet these import requirements. However once these requirements 

are met, Mexico has separate procedures for live animals imported from 

the United States and those imported from other countries.



Live Animal Imports from the United States:



Generally, all live animals entering Mexico from the United States are 

allowed to conform to less-stringent entry requirements than animals 

imported from other countries. For example, animals from the United 

States frequently pass through Mexican land border ports on the basis 

of a U.S. veterinary inspection. U.S. animals that arrive in Mexico via 

air or sea are also allowed to enter with just a sanitary import permit 

when facilities for inspection are available at the port of entry 

within Mexico.



Before crossing the border, U.S. animals must remain on the U.S. side 

of the border at an authorized facility for a minimum of 24 hours. When 

Mexican veterinarians perform entry inspections in lieu of their U.S. 

counterparts, they may (1) require additional quarantine for the 

animals, (2) perform clinical observations and inspect the animals, (3) 

require animals to be disinfected and/or immunized, or (4) apply other 

animal health safety measures.



Live Animal Imports from Other Countries:



In addition to the general requirements listed above, all live animals 

entering Mexico from preapproved countries must meet other import 

requirements. Importers of live animals from countries other than the 

United States are required to notify SAGARPA in advance of a shipment. 

As a part of the live animal importation process, SAGARPA sends two 

official veterinarians to the exporting country to inspect the animals 

before they are sent to Mexico. These Mexican veterinarians are 

responsible for developing an animal health report for the animals 

being exported, which will document information on the health of the 

animals from the time the veterinarians arrive in the exporting country 

until the shipment of animals arrives in Mexico. As a result, before 

the animals are loaded onto the ship for transport to Mexico, the 

Mexican veterinarians will examine the paperwork and inspect each 

animal. One of the veterinarians will then accompany the shipment and 

monitor the animals for clinical signs of disease while in transit to 

Mexico. According to Mexican officials, because the majority of live 

animal imports into Mexico come from Australia, Guatemala, New Zealand, 

Nicaragua, and Panama, the time in transit is usually considered an 

adequate quarantine period for the animals. For example, the voyage 

from New Zealand or Australia typically lasts 28 days and serves as an 

adequate quarantine period for live animals. Because live animal 

imports from countries such as Panama or Guatemala are also transported 

to Mexico via ship and enter the country at maritime ports, they too 

are subject to the same procedures. If the veterinarian on board the 

ship notices any suspicious animal disease signs during the trip to 

Mexico, the veterinarian will notify officials in Mexico, and the 

shipment can be rejected en route and returned to the exporting 

country.



Controls for Imported Animal Products:



SAGARPA and the Mexican Customs Service combine inspection services at 

Mexican ports of entry to ensure that all imported products comply with 

all Mexican import requirements before they are released into commerce. 

Animal products can be imported into Mexico only from countries that 

SAGAPRA has preapproved, using OIE criteria for determining which 

countries are FMD-free. SAGARPA may add additional requirements or 

restrictions to the OIE criteria if it deems them necessary. Mexico 

does allow some animal product imports from countries that have FMD, as 

long as SAGARPA has approved the animal-product-processing plants and 

the products are shipped with the required health and sanitary 

certificates. Some products, such as milk and dairy products, are 

allowed into Mexico only if they have been properly heat-treated or 

subjected to maturation processes that destroy the FMD virus. Other 

products, such as machinery, vehicles, and bullfighting equipment, must 

undergo disinfection procedures, determined by SAGARPA, before being 

allowed into the country. Products denied entry into Mexico must be 

immediately reexported or destroyed.



All agricultural cargo must be processed through one of SAGARPAs 

inspection offices located at various borders, airports, and seaports. 

Some imported animal products are allowed entry only at certain ports 

of entry that have the proper facilities to warehouse them. SAGARPA 

officials review the manifest of all international carriers arriving in 

Mexico to ensure that no food items inadvertently enter the country 

without inspection.



The broker initiates the importation and inspection process for animal 

products at the port of entry by presenting the required paperwork, 

including the sanitary import permit, and requesting inspection 

services from SAGARPA officials. The SAGARPA port veterinarian will 

review the paperwork as well as the health certificate accompanying the 

shipment. The health certificate contains information on the (1) name 

and address of the importer or proprietor, (2) place of origin and the 

specific destination of the animal products, (3) animal health 

production standards used by the exporting country, (4) place where the 

certificate was issued, and (5) time period for which the certificate 

is effective. If the import documents are in order and the products are 

from permissible countries, the container is unloaded from the vessel 

and transported to the official warehouse for further inspection.



SAGARPA officials inspect all containers used to ship animal products 

or farm machinery and equipment. Containers from countries that Mexico 

has deemed as high-risk for FMD must be sprayed with disinfectant on 

the outside. In addition to the containers they arrive in, farm 

machinery and other equipment from high-risk countries must be 

completely disinfected. Fresh, chilled, and frozen meat products are 

physically inspected by SAGARPA inspectors while they are stored in the 

refrigerated section of the Customs warehouse. The inspection consists 

of (1) a paperwork review, including a review of the Mexican sanitary 

import permit and health certificate signed by an official veterinarian 

of the exporting country, and (2) a visual inspection of the meat 

packages for the meat-processing plants seal, lot number, and factory 

number to ensure that the product came from an approved plant in the 

country of origin. In addition, SAGARPA officials may collect product 

samples for laboratory analysis.[Footnote 27] Once all the reviews and 

inspections are completed, SAGARPA inspectors complete the inspection 

report and make a final recommendation on whether the shipment should 

be released. Cargo cannot leave the warehouse at the port of entry 

without forms from SAGARPA stating that the cargo has been inspected 

and deemed safe to enter the country. After the main SAGARPA office 

issues the final certificate of importation and releases the shipment, 

the broker can proceed to the Mexican Customs inspection. Mexican 

Customs helps SAGARPA ensure that prohibited or restricted products are 

not entering the country.



Controls for International Garbage:



SAGARPA officials supervise the off-loading and disposal of organic 

waste and garbage from airplanes and ships arriving from FMD-affected 

countries. Generally, this garbage must be incinerated. Incinerators in 

two locations accept international garbage--one in Mexico City and one 

in Cancun. Consequently, cruise ships arriving in Mexico are allowed to 

dispose of garbage only in Cancun. Ships arriving at other Mexican 

ports must take their garbage with them.



Controls for International Passengers:



In addition to the regular immigration and customs forms that all 

international passengers have to complete upon entry into Mexico, all 

passengers from FMD-affected countries must fill out a special, 

detailed questionnaire. This questionnaire asks passengers to help 

prevent the introduction of FMD by (1) declaring any animal products 

that they may be carrying and (2) providing information about their 

contact with animals in the country from which they are arriving. In 

addition, the form asks passengers to avoid visiting places in Mexico 

where they could come into contact with live animals.



At airports and marine ports of entry, international passengers from 

high-risk countries must walk over special mats soaked with 

disinfectant to disinfect their shoes. According to Mexican officials, 

the disinfectant mats are changed every month, and before the arrival 

of a high-risk flight at the airport, SAGARPA officials apply fresh 

disinfectant to the mat. In addition, until January 2002, the outside 

surface of baggage arriving from high-risk countries was sprayed with 

disinfectant as it was loaded onto the conveyor belt and before it 

entered the baggage claim area of the airport. Baggage from high-risk 

flights is also x-rayed and inspected for illegal products by official 

inspectors at the airports. All confiscated products are incinerated.



Announcements are made on the public information system at the airport 

in English, Spanish, and French requesting passengers to help prevent 

the introduction of FMD into Mexico by complying with the Mexican 

requirements described above. Signs in English and Spanish warning 

travelers about the dangers of FMD are posted throughout the airports.



Mexico also has inspection requirements for international cargo ships 

arriving at Mexican seaports that specifically relate to the disposal 

and use of food in the ships galley that is intended for the crew. As 

part of this inspection process, Mexican officials (1) review the list 

of all the seaports that the ship has stopped at before arriving in 

Mexico to determine whether it docked in ports that pose a risk for 

FMD, (2) review the list of all food products on board the ship, (3) 

visually inspect the food in the galley, 

(4) seal the food containers in the galleys of those ships that are 

from high-risk countries, and (5) disinfect the stairs and main 

entrances of the ship. Crewmembers of ships docked at a Mexican port 

for more than 3 or 4 days are allowed to consume some of the products 

in the galley while they are docked. Crewmembers leaving the ship to go 

ashore must go through the same procedures as other international 

passengers arriving at any port of entry--complete immigration and 

customs forms, declare any products of animal or plant origin that they 

may be carrying, and walk over disinfectant mats.



Controls for International Mail:



SAGARPA officials receive advance notification of all international 

mail deliveries to Mexican post offices that handle such mail. 

According to Mexican officials, SAGARPA inspectors open and inspect 100 

percent of all the international packages arriving from FMD-affected 

countries but only randomly sample packages arriving from the United 

States and Canada. According to these officials, the post office 

facility in Mexico City receives about 500 packages per international 

mail delivery. Inspectors do not leave the postal facility until all of 

the packages that arrived on a particular day have been inspected, 

according to officials. Any prohibited products sent through 

international mail that are confiscated are incinerated.



[End of section]



Appendix IV: Measures for Preventing the Introduction of FMD into the 

United Kingdom:



This appendix provides summary information on the preventive measures 

used by the United Kingdom to ensure that FMD does not enter the 

country via five key pathways included in our review: (1) the 

importation of live animals; (2) the importation of animal products; 

(3) the handling and disposal of garbage from international carriers, 

such as airplanes and ships; (4) international passengers; and (5) 

packages sent through international mail. Because the United Kingdom is 

subject to the directives of the European Union Economic Community, for 

each pathway, this appendix summarizes (1) the preventive measures 

established by the European Union for trade between member states and 

nonmember countries and 

(2) any additional measures established by the United Kingdom.



Background:



The United Kingdom is a member state of the European Union Economic 

Community[Footnote 28] and is subject to the European Unions 

directives. One E.U. goal was to develop a common market without 

borders among the member states. The European Union established 

directives that approximated member states laws and developed rules 

applicable to all member states. These directives harmonized the 

European Unions laws so that member states could consistently follow 

and apply the same rules uniformly in a common market. For example, 

each member state must follow guidelines governing the import of live 

animals and animal products to prevent the introduction of foreign 

animal diseases, such as FMD, into the European Union. In addition, 

each member state is allowed to have national provisions as needed. As 

a result, the United Kingdom has its own legislation governing the 

imports of live animals and animal products that implements the 

European Unions directives and covers areas that are not harmonized by 

these directives.



When the European Union becomes aware of an outbreak of disease in 

another member state or in a nonmember country that may constitute a 

serious threat to animal or public health, it has the power to issue a 

declaration making it an offense for any member state to import 

specific animals or animal products from the affected country or 

region. In the event of such an outbreak, the European Union can take 

emergency safeguard measures, including prohibiting the (1) export of 

particular species of animals or animal products from affected member 

states to other member states and (2) import of live animals or animal 

products from affected nonmember countries by member states. In certain 

circumstances, member states may invoke additional safeguarding 

procedures and take interim safeguard and protective measures. Member 

states invoking such measures and procedures must inform all members of 

the European Union of the actions taken and the reasons for them.



The Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) is the 

federal agency responsible for environmental, rural, food, and related 

issues. DEFRA is responsible for ensuring the health of livestock in 

the United Kingdom.



E.U. and U.K. Controls for Live Animal Imports:



The European Union has established separate preventive measures for 

imports of live animals from member states and those from nonmember 

states. In addition, the United Kingdom has additional controls to 

ensure that live animal imports are disease free.



E.U. Measures for Imports of Live Animals from Member States:



Live animal trade between member states requires an official 

veterinarian from the state of origin to inspect the animals prior to 

their movement and certify them as disease-free. This certification 

ensures that the (1) animals have originated from an FMD-free country 

or have been tested for diseases of concern, (2) animals have been 

isolated for a specified period of time, (3) country has an official 

disease surveillance program, and (4) animal production standards have 

been met. Member states must also ensure that the animals to be 

exported (1) come from approved holdings that undergo routine 

veterinary checks, (2) have official tags and identification as 

required by E.U. rules, and (3) are registered in such a way that the 

original transit holding can be traced. Although the inspections of 

live animals traded between member states are generally performed in 

the country of origin, nondiscriminatory, random spot checks in the 

destination member state are permitted. Official veterinarians in the 

destination member state are responsible for performing these checks.



E.U. Measures for Imports of Live Animals from Nonmember Countries:



Member states can import live animals only from nonmember countries (or 

areas of nonmember countries) if the European Union has approved the 

country as being FMD-free. This approval is granted on a country-by-

country basis after the following factors have been considered for the 

nonmember country:



* The general health of the livestock, wildlife, and other domestic 

animals, with particular attention to any exotic animal diseases and 

environmental health situations that may exist.



* The regularity and rapidity with which information on outbreaks of 

infectious or contagious animal diseases is supplied to trading 

partners.



* The rules for and implementation of measures to prevent and control 

infectious or contagious animal diseases, including those that apply to 

imports.



* The structure and authority of veterinary services, including 

laboratory services.



* Legislation covering the use of animal production substances, such as 

hormones.



In addition, live animals are prohibited entry into the European Union 

when (1) importation rules were not followed, (2) the animals appear or 

are found to be diseased, and (3) the animals are unfit to continue to 

travel. Animals denied importation must be quarantined and reexported 

out of the country or slaughtered.



Live animal shipments from nonmember countries must enter the European 

Union through approved member states border inspection posts. A health 

certificate signed by an official veterinarian from the exporting 

country must accompany all shipments. E.U. directives have harmonized 

the inspections conducted at the border inspection posts to ensure the 

quality and equality at all member states ports of entry. At border 

inspection posts, animal shipments undergo full documentary, identity, 

and physical checks by an official veterinarian before the shipment is 

allowed to enter into free circulation within the European Union. The 

border inspection post must ensure that only cattle and swine that show 

no clinical signs of specific diseases and no signs of FMD and 

brucellosis are allowed into the European Union. Border inspection 

posts are required to inform other member states border inspection 

posts of any live animal shipments denied entry and the reasons for the 

denial.



U.K. Measures for Imports of Live Animals from Member States:



Animals can be imported from member states to go directly to slaughter 

facilities, move through approved holding centers to slaughter 

facilities, or go directly to farms in the United Kingdom. An export 

health certificate and a license for animal movement must accompany 

animals arriving from member states. Veterinary inspectors have the 

authority to inspect animals imported into the United Kingdom from 

member states at their point of destination to ensure that E.U. 

requirements have been met. Inspectors can stop a shipment of animals 

while in transit if the transporter does not have the appropriate 

documentation. Animals imported for slaughter are required to be 

slaughtered immediately after they arrive at an approved facility. 

Breeding animals must have remained in the exporting member state for 6 

months prior to transport to the United Kingdom, and slaughter animals, 

3 months.



DEFRA maintains a list of registered haulers allowed to transport live 

animals within the United Kingdom. Haulers must maintain the following 

information for shipments of cattle and swine: the (1) place and date 

of pick-ups, including the name of the producer or business and the 

address of the animal-holding center; (2) species, origin, and number 

of animals transported; (3) the date and place of disinfection; and (4) 

individual animal identification numbers. Because of the recent FMD 

outbreak, as a temporary measure, transportation vehicles are required 

to have, at all times while in the United Kingdom, proof of 

disinfection.



In addition, operators or owners of holding centers must record and 

maintain information on the owners name, the registration number of 

the transporter, and the license number for all imported animals. For 

cattle, they must also record the country of origin, date of entry into 

the United Kingdom, identification numbers, and the date of exit and 

proposed destination if the cattle are at a holding center. For swine, 

operators are required to record only the registration number of the 

holding center or the herd of origin and the proposed destination. 

Owners and operators of slaughter facilities are generally not required 

to maintain this information.



U.K. Measures for Imports of Live Animals from Nonmember Countries:



The United Kingdom has adopted the European Unions directives for 

importing live animals and has spelled out the details for implementing 

these rules in legislation. Animals that have already passed through 

another member states border inspection post are required to have both 

a border certificate of examination and the original health certificate 

when they arrive at the U.K. destination. The United Kingdom also has 

procedures for post-import checks, which allow DEFRA veterinary 

inspectors to recheck any imported animals that were processed at a 

member states border inspection post. These post-import checks can 

occur at the imported animals destination or while they are in 

transit. As a result of these checks, if disease is suspected, animals 

may be quarantined, slaughtered, or reexported. The imports of live 

animals from nonmember countries are required to enter the United 

Kingdom through certain ports of entry such as, Heathrow, Luton, 

Stansted, and Prestwick.



E.U. and U.K. Controls for Imported Animal Products:



The European Union has established separate preventive measures for 

imports of animal products from member and nonmember states. The United 

Kingdom has additional controls to ensure that animal product imports 

are disease free.



E.U. Measures for Imported Animal Products from Member States:



Animal products imported by a member state from other member states 

must be shipped from approved and licensed facilities that meet the 

European Unions animal health requirements and are under the control 

of an official veterinarian. Each member state is responsible for 

ensuring that its animal products are safe and disease free. 

Intracommunity shipments of animal products must be accompanied by an 

official health certificate or commercial document that contains 

information on the origin and destination of the products. As a result 

of the European Unions common market rules, there are no routine 

public health checks at member states ports of entry for shipments 

originating in another member state. However, E.U. rules permit random 

spot checks of shipments at the place of destination.



E.U. Measures for Imported Animal Products from Nonmember Countries:



Member states can import animal products only from nonmember countries 

or parts of a nonmember country approved by the European Union. As with 

live animal imports, approval is considered on a country-by-country 

basis after the following factors have been considered:



* The general health of the livestock, wildlife, and other domestic 

animals, with particular attention to any exotic animal diseases and 

environmental health situations that may exist.



* The regularity and rapidity with which information on infectious or 

contagious animal disease outbreaks is supplied to trading partners.



* The rules for and implementation of measures to prevent and control 

infectious or contagious animal diseases, including those that apply to 

imports.



* The structure and authority of veterinary services, including 

laboratory services.



* Legislation covering the use of animal production substances, such as 

hormones.



Imported animal products from nonmember countries must enter member 

states through approved border inspection posts and be accompanied by a 

health certificate signed by an official veterinarian of the exporting 

country. Official veterinarians at the member states border inspection 

post are responsible for ensuring that the following three types of 

checks on shipments from nonmember countries are performed and that the 

information provided is verified:



* A documentary check to review the veterinary documentation 

accompanying the shipment, the importers advance written notice 

specifying the number and nature of the shipment, and the estimated 

time of arrival at the port of entry.



* An identity check to verify that the contents of the shipment are the 

same as described in the documentation. For shipments that do not 

arrive in containers, identity checks involve ensuring that the stamps, 

official marks, and health marks identifying the country and 

establishment of origin are present. In contrast, shipments arriving in 

officially sealed containers are not opened unless there is doubt about 

the authenticity of the seals or suspicions about tampering. In such 

cases, the containers will be opened and inspected to ensure that the 

stamps, health marks, and other marks identifying the country and 

establishment of origin are present on the shipment and conform to 

those on the certificate or document accompanying the shipment.



* A physical check of the shipment involves inspecting the contents to 

ensure that they do not present an animal or public health risk. During 

a physical check, the inspectors may take samples for laboratory 

analysis. Physical checks are conducted on a predetermined percentage 

of imported shipments of animal products from nonmember countries. The 

percentage varies according to the product and the country of origin. 

For example, veterinarians inspect 20 percent of fresh meat, fish 

products, eggs, animal fats, and animal casings shipments and 50 

percent of wild meat products, milk, egg products, and processed animal 

protein shipments.



In those cases where the checks indicate that the shipment does not 

meet requirements for entry into the European Union, the shipment is 

reexported if it does not pose any risk to public or animal health. For 

shipments where reexportation is not possible, the product is 

destroyed.



E.U. rules allow for the importation of some types of animal products, 

such as canned meat and some milk products, from nonmember countries 

that have FMD, as long as specific food-processing procedures are 

followed to inactivate the virus. For example, milk products imported 

from FMD countries must be properly heat-treated.



Imports of semen and embryos from nonmember countries are accepted by 

the European Union if the shipment (1) comes from an FMD-free country; 

(2) is accompanied by a signed health certificate attesting to the 

disease-free status of the animals from which the semen, ova, or 

embryos are derived; and (3) comes through an approved collection 

center. The information in the accompanying documents is checked at the 

member states border inspection post to determine if the shipment 

meets the European Unions requirements before it is released. The 

European Union has additional requirements for imported germplasm; 

however, these are currently being updated.



U.K. Measures for Imported Animal Products from Member States:



Animal products from other member states must be accompanied by all the 

documents required by E.U. rules and are deliverable only to the 

address in the United Kingdom that is identified on these documents. 

Official U.K. veterinarians perform nondiscriminatory veterinary 

checks for products imported from other member states, which may 

include the sampling of the product at the U.K. destination.



U.K. Measures for Imports of Animal Products from Nonmember Countries:



In order to ensure that animal diseases are not imported into the 

United Kingdom via animal products from nonmember countries, DEFRA 

enforces a system of controls that relies primarily on the health 

certification accompanying the shipment and post-import official 

veterinary inspections of the shipment. Imports from nonmember 

countries are permitted only through about 26 approved border 

inspection posts in the United Kingdom.



E.U. and U.K. Controls for International Garbage:



E.U. rules require that garbage from international carriers, such as 

airplanes and ships, be removed under official control for destruction. 

In the United Kingdom, international garbage is known as catering 

waste and, according to U.K. regulations, represents the most likely 

route by which a major foreign animal disease such as FMD could enter 

the country. As a result, DEFRA regulates the handling and disposal of 

all catering waste from international carriers that arrive in the 

United Kingdom. To ensure proper handling and disposal, DEFRA issues 

licenses, which delineate how the catering waste is to be transported, 

including the transportation route for the waste from the port of entry 

to the disposal site and how it is to be disposed of, which could 

either be at an approved landfill or incinerator. Livestock in the 

United Kingdom cannot be fed any imported catering waste.



E.U. and U.K. Controls for International Passengers:



E.U. rules set limits on what products international passengers can 

bring from nonmember countries into member states. For example, 

personal imports of raw meat from any nonmember country are illegal. 

However, passengers are allowed to bring some animal products from 

nonmember countries if (1) the products are meant for human 

consumption, (2) the products come from an E.U.-approved country, and 

(3) the quantity imported does not exceed 1 kilogram (2.2 pounds) per 

person. Passengers traveling within the European Union are allowed to 

import meat, animal, and milk products up to 10 kilograms per person as 

long as the product originates from another member state.



The United Kingdom follows the E.U. rules for personal imports of 

animal products by international passengers. The United Kingdom can 

impose penalties of up to 2 years of imprisonment and fines for 

passengers found smuggling prohibited goods, such as milk and raw meat. 

Additional restrictions on personal imports of international travelers 

may be imposed as needed, owing to outbreaks of animal disease in 

various parts of the world.



As part of a new publicity campaign to help stop illegal products, such 

as meat, from entering the United Kingdom, posters were placed at 

various ports of entry and airports to inform travelers about 

prohibited items and warn them about potential penalties for illegal 

imports.



U.K. Controls for International Mail:



We are not aware of any specific E.U. requirements for international 

mail. However, U.K. Customs inspectors examine all international mail 

packages for prohibited and restricted items. For example, packages 

containing meat products may be subject to inspection and may be opened 

and closed by a post office official. Packages from approved nonmember 

countries will be allowed as long as the quantity of the product does 

not exceed 1 kilogram (2.2 pounds), the product is fully cooked in 

hermetically sealed containers, and it is intended for personal 

consumption only. Packages found in contravention of these regulations 

are liable to be seized without compensation. Meat or meat products 

sent to the United Kingdom via international mail from other member 

states are allowed if they are for personal consumption and do not 

exceed 10 kilograms. Additional evidence may be required to support 

claims that imports in excess of 

10 kilograms are for personal use. Further restrictions on imported 

items sent through international mail may be imposed as needed, owing 

to outbreaks of animal disease in other countries.



[End of section]



Appendix V Comments from the U.S. Department of Agriculture:



USDA:



United States Department of Agriculture:



Office of the Secretary Washington, D.C. 20250:



JUL 2 2002:



Dr. Lawrence J. Dyckman Director:



Natural Resources and Environment United States General Accounting 

Office Washington, D.C. 20548:



Dear Dr. Dyckman:



The Department of Agriculture (USDA) has reviewed the General 

Accounting Offices (GAO) Draft Report, To Protect U.S. Livestock, 

USDA Must Remain Vigilant and Resolve Outstanding Issues (GAO-02-808). 

We found the report to be generally accurate and insightful, providing 

a number of meritorious recommendations. We appreciate this opportunity 

to comment on your findings.



Resources and Infrastructure:



Since last years foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) outbreak in the United 

Kingdom and the events of September 11, USDA has significantly 

heightened efforts to prevent foreign agricultural pests and diseases 

from entering the United States either intentionally or accidentally. 

In late May, USDA announced that more than $43 million would be made 

available in grants to States from the $328 million approved by 

President Bush and the Congress earlier this year to strengthen USDAs 

homeland security preparedness. These grants are an important component 

of the Administrations continued efforts to strengthen the Federal-

State-industry infrastructure available to quickly detect and 

effectively respond to a potentially devastating introduction of FMD or 

another foreign animal disease.



Of the $43 million announced in May, $20.6 million is being provided to 

State and university cooperators to be used to establish a network of 

diagnostic laboratories dispersed strategically throughout the Nation 

to permit rapid and accurate diagnosis of animal disease threats;

$4.5 million will be used to strengthen State-level surveillance for 

animal disease; and $4.3 million will be used to assist States to 
improve 

their capability to detect plant pests and diseases. In addition, $14 

million is being used to help States meet the national standards of 

emergency preparedness established by the National Animal Health 
Emergency 

Management System (NAHEMS). [Last year USDA provided the States $2 

million to work toward meeting NAHEMS standards; these funds were drawn 

from fiscal year (FY) 2001 supplemental appropriations bill, which 

provided USDA with $5 million out of a requested $35 million; 

the balance of the $5 million was used for other emergency preparedness 

needs.]



We are also working in closely with the Federal Emergency Management 

Agency (FEMA) to develop a comprehensive operational plan under which 

FEMA would coordinate Federal assets and resources to assist USDA in 

the event of an outbreak. Additionally, we are working within the 

Department to ensure that the Forest Service and other agencies could 

provide logistical and operational support in the event of an outbreak.



This latest infusion of resources follows other allocations announced 

earlier this year, including $177 million to make improvements at key 

USDA locations, including diagnostic and research facilities in Ames, 

Iowa, and Plum Island, New York. We also devoted an additional $35 

million to strengthen the Agricultural Quarantine Inspection program by 

expediting work with the U.S. Customs Service on an automated 

inspection targeting system, purchasing 100 rapid pathogen 

identification devices, and hiring additional inspection personnel. 

USDA also provided $16.5 million for the Food Safety and Inspection 

Service to increase monitoring, provide training to inspectors, expand 

technical capabilities, and hire additional inspectors for imported 

meat and poultry. Finally, $15.3 million was provided for the 

Agricultural Research Service to improve rapid detection technologies 

for FMD as well as other animal diseases.



This year, the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) has 

established two new Senior Executive Service positions to head 

Emergency Programs (animal health) and Port Operations, and both of 

these positions will be filled by the end of the year. In addition, by 

the end of the year, APHIS will have increased its safeguarding 

personnel to approximately 3,870, a 50 percent increase over FY 2000 

staffing levels, and we will have doubled the number of dog teams to 

123 from the level of 2 years ago. We have also hired 18 additional 

veterinarians who are conducting port reviews, working closely with 

State counterparts, and providing technical guidance and training on 

working with and handling animal products, animal by-products, and 

international garbage that could pose a threat of foreign animal 

diseases. The Presidents FY 2003 budget requests about $150 million in 

additional funding for USDA for additional homeland security 

protections. If this request is granted by Congress, it would bring the 

resources dedicated to protecting agricultural health to the highest 

levels ever.



With regard to concerns about the availability of sufficient personnel 

to work on a massive eradication effort if one were required, we wish 

to point out that we have created a National Animal Health Reserve 

Corps, composed of private veterinarians from around the United States 

who would be willing to assist APHIS veterinarians in field and 

laboratory operations during a foreign animal disease situation. To 

date, more than 275 private veterinarians have signed on to this Corps, 

and we are continuing to recruit more members. This Corps supplements 

the force of personnel drawn from the States, the Department of 
Defense, 

FEMA, and other organizations in the event of an animal disease 

catastrophe. We are also working with Canada, New Zealand, Australia, 

and the United Kingdom on the creation of an international veterinary 

reserve, which could supplement resources available domestically in the 

event of a major emergency.



Prevention and Control Measures:



We wish to note that, although the report seems to characterize the 

United States regulatory processes as similar to those of the United 

Kingdom, belonging to European Union (EU) presents the United Kingdom 

with greater risk than that faced by the United States, because the EU 

includes, and provides for trade among, countries that are FMD-free and 

some that are not.



APHIS is continually assessing emerging animal health conditions around 

the world and ensuring that our requirements effectively address the 

risks associated not only with FMD but also bovine spongiform 

encephalopathy and a host of other diseases of concern.



We wish to note that the report understated the number of ports at 

which USDA has a presence. In fact, USDA has a presence at all major 

U.S. ports, with staffing based on risk assessments and supplemented 

with tools ranging from detector dogs to x-rays to hand-held remote 

sensing/diagnostic equipment. In those ports staffed by USDA, we have 

the primary inspection responsibility for agricultural cargo and 

manifests. To ensure that these shipments continue to be referred to 

USDA for inspection, we are working with Customs and other Federal 

agencies:



on the aforementioned automated targeting system, which will serve as 

an electronic interface among several Federal agencies to identify and 

automatically segregate high-risk plant cargo and track imported 

animals and animal products.



In addition, Customs and APHIS inspectors work together at 

international mail facilities, examining package declaration forms, 

visually inspecting or x-raying package contents to determine those 

items requiring closer inspection, which may include opening such mail. 

Mail from high-risk countries is more thoroughly scrutinized, and this 

is based upon pathway analyses, which can help determine the potential 

for the introduction of a foreign animal disease.



With regard to the concerns cited about work needed in the areas of 

animal identification, carcass disposal, and indemnity, we would agree 

that these are all absolutely vital areas to have addressed prior to 

any major outbreak of disease. In this regard, we are working closely 

with the agricultural industries to provide forums for national 

dialogue on the issue of a national identification plan for American 

livestock. The ultimate objective is to establish a national 

identification plan that provides the essential elements to improve 

emergency response and meet future needs. We are also investing other 

options available for disposing of carcasses on a large scale. Further, 

on May l, 2002, we published in the Federal Register proposed 

regulations to address the payment of indemnity in the event of an FMD 

outbreak. Under this rule, the Federal Government would pay 100 percent 

of the costs for purchase, destruction, and disposition of animals 

should they become infected with FMD as well as for materials 

contaminated with FMD and cleaning and disinfection of affected 

premises. We recently extended the comment period on this proposal to 

July 31, 2002.



Communications and Outreach:



Immediately upon the detection of FMD in the United Kingdom, USDA 

implemented an aggressive educational campaign to increase awareness of 

FMD on the part of international travelers, farmers, and the general 

public. Among other things, additional advisory signs were posted in 

airports, public service announcements were broadcast, an information 

hotline and comprehensive Web site were established, and a suggested 

in-flight announcement was provided to international carriers. Our 

outreach effort continues, and APHIS is in the process of developing 

new signage at ports of entry that will be larger and more mobile than 

the ones observed by the GAO auditors. In addition, we are very pleased 

to note that we have worked with Customs to modify the Customs 

declaration form so that its questions will be understood more easily 

by travelers and yield better information to help us focus our efforts. 

The new forms are now being distributed around the country.



We are also working in conjunction with FEMA to develop a framework for 

a comprehensive communications plan to address a foreign animal disease 

outbreak. The plan will help better ensure timely dissemination of 

accurate information to critical audiences, including Customs and other 

Federal agencies, States, and industry.



Conclusion:



In short, we appreciate the opportunity to review GAOs report and 

believe the final product is overall an accurate portrayal of the 

challenges facing the continuum of Federal, State, and industry 

resources dedicated to safeguarding U.S. agricultural health. As the 

report acknowledges, with the enormous volume of international travel 

and trade, there is no way to ensure zero risk of disease introduction. 

However, we believe that the short-and long-term measures we are taking 

to enhance prevention, surveillance, emergency preparedness, and 

coordination with other Federal, State, and industry organizations are 

providing a much-needed boost to our overall safeguarding 

infrastructure. We will continue to look critically at the 

effectiveness of our efforts and to make whatever changes are warranted 

to ensure that the American food supply continues to be the safest, 

most abundant, and most affordable food supply in the world.



Sincerely,



Ann M. Veneman Secretary:



Signed by Ann M. Veneman:



[End of figure]



Appendix VI: Comments from the U.S. Customs Service:



U.S. Customs Service Memorandum:



DATE: July 2, 2002:



FILE: AUD-1-OP CN:



MEMORANDUM FOR LAWRENCE J. DYCKMAN GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE:



FROM: Director, Office of Planning:



SUBJECT:Comments on Draft Audit Report Entitled Foot and Mouth Disease: 

To Protect U.S. Agriculture, USDA Must Remain Vigilant and Resolve 

Outstanding Issues:



Thank you for providing us with a copy of your draft report entitled 

Foot and Mouth Disease: To Protect U.S. Agriculture, USDA Must Remain 

Vigilant and Resolve Outstanding Issues and the chance to discuss the 

issues in this report.



We have reviewed this report and have no comments to make at this time 

on the substance of the report.



We did not identify any information that would warrant protection under 

the Freedom of Information Act.



Thank you for the opportunity to review the draft report. If you have 

any questions regarding this report, please contact Ms. Cecelia Neglia 

at (202) 927-9369.



Signed by Willam F. Riley:



[End of figure]



Appendix VII: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:



GAO Contacts:



Lawrence Dyckman (202) 512-3841

Anu Mittal (202) 512-9846:



Acknowledgments:



In addition to the persons named above, Erin Barlow, Clifford Diehl, 

and Eugene Wisnoski made key contributions to this report. Important 

contributions were also made by William Chatlos, Oliver Easterwood, 

Judy Pagano, and Carol Hernstadt Shulman.



FOOTNOTES



[1] A veterinary biologic is a product used for diagnosing, preventing, 

and treating an animal disease. These products include vaccines and 

kits for diagnosing specific animal diseases.



[2] The pH condition of a product is the measure of its degree of 

acidity or alkalinity; a value of 7 is considered neutral while values 

greater than 7 are considered alkaline and values below 7 are 

considered acidic. A high or low pH of a product may inactivate certain 

viruses, such as FMD.



[3] In January 2002, we issued a report on BSE entitled Mad Cow 

Disease: Improvements in the Animal Feed Ban and Other Regulatory Areas 

Would Strengthen U.S. Prevention Efforts, GAO-02-183 (Washington, D.C.: 

Jan. 25, 2002).



[4] Rendering is a process that subjects animal tissue to heat or 

chemicals to separate the fat from the protein and mineral components.



[5] Over 4 million animals were slaughtered during the U.K. outbreak to 

control the disease. According to a USDA preliminary estimate, a 

comparable outbreak in the United States could require the destruction 

of about 13 million animals.



[6] While OIE cannot sanction countries that do not comply with its 

reporting requirements, WTO can.



[7] The commission was originally called the Mexican American 

Commission for the Eradication of Foot and Mouth Disease.



[8] This barrier is one of two in the world; the other, in Turkey, is 

maintained by the European Union to protect Western Europe from FMD.



[9] According to USDA officials who helped respond to the U.K. outbreak 

in 2001, another benefit of sending U.S. personnel to assist with 

foreign disease outbreaks is the valuable training they receive by 

handling diseased animals and responding to various aspects of a real 

life response.



[10] USDA performs a risk assessment to determine a countrys FMD-free 

status using the OIE criteria described in chapter 1, and independently 

validates the countrys disease status reports sent to the OIE. In 

addition, USDA reviews additional information provided by the country 

and conducts verification visits to the country.



[11] Twenty-six other U.S. ports of entry accept live animals on a 

limited basis.



[12] Because the incubation period for FMD is significantly less than 

60 days, the 60-day requirement helps ensure that if animals have been 

exposed to the FMD virus or other serious animal health diseases, they 

would become symptomatic within this period of time.



[13] The length of the quarantine depends on the type of animals 

imported and the kinds of diseases present in the country of origin.



[14] Unrestricted trade is generally dependent on a countrys being 

free of other diseases of concern, such as cattle plague (rinderpest), 

and others. FMD is only one of the diseases of concern.



[15] The import permit allows USDA to evaluate the processing 

conditions for the product and determine whether the stated process 

will inactivate the FMD virus.



[16] Certain imported animal products, such as meat, are regulated by 

FSIS, while others, such as milk and cheese, are regulated by the Food 

and Drug Administration to ensure that they are safe for human 

consumption before they are released into U.S. commerce.



[17] Senders of packages that are confiscated and destroyed are 

routinely notified.



[18] All imported animal product shipments receive a documentary 

review, which usually involves a review of the accompanying paperwork, 

such as import permits and health certifications. A percentage of 

animal product shipments is judgmentally selected for physical 

inspection to ensure that the products do not present any animal or 

public health risk. Samples may be taken for laboratory analyses as 

part of this inspection.



[19] NAHEMS is a joint federal-state-industry group whose objectives 

include improving the U.S. ability to respond to animal health 

emergencies.



[20] Plum Island is USDAs high-security laboratory (with a biosafety 

level-III status) located on an island off of Long Island, New York, 

and is the only U.S. laboratory authorized to conduct diagnostic 

testing of FMD-suspected samples using live FMD virus.



[21] The President signed the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 

2002 (the 2002 farm bill) on May 13, 2002.



[22] These countries are included in special categories for FMD and 

rinderpest because even though they have been determined to be free of 

these diseases, one or more of the following conditions exist: (1) they 

supplement their national meat supply through the importation of fresh, 

chilled, or frozen meat of ruminants or swine from countries/areas that 

are not designated as free of rinderpest or FMD; (2) they have a common 

land border with countries/areas that are not designated as free of 

rinderpest or FMD; or (3) they import ruminants or swine from 

countries/areas that are not designated as free of rinderpest or FMD 

under conditions less restrictive than would be acceptable for 

importation into the United States.



[23] Canadas biosecurity level-IV laboratory conducts tests on animals 

infected with dangerous zoonotic agents.



[24] Live animals in transit by air are off-loaded only to change 

planes and, if destined for the United States, are placed in sealed 

trucks before leaving Canada. CFIA does not allow animals to transit 

Canada that would normally not be allowed into the country.



[25] The commission is currently called the Mexico-United States 

Commission for the Prevention of Foot-and-Mouth and other Exotic Animal 

Diseases.



[26] A biosecurity level-III laboratory is one that maintains a high 

security level and employs extreme control measures in the handling of 

samples. Such laboratories install special control measures to reduce 

the risk of pathogens escaping into the surrounding environment by 

using air filters and requiring all personnel to take disinfectant 

showers prior to leaving the facility.



[27] Mexico has a meat-product-sampling scheme, which is detailed in 

the countrys meat inspection regulations. Normally, 15 samples are 

taken from a shipment of 25 tons of meat. The system is based on a 

judgmental sampling process; however, importers who have had problems 

in the past are sampled more often.



[28] Member states include Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, 

Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Republic of 

Ireland, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.



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