An Evaluation of Compliance with the
National Flood Insurance Program Part A:
Achieving Community Compliance


Jacquelyn Monday, Kristen Y. Grill, 
Paul Esformes, and Matthew Eng 
with Tina Kinney and Marc Shapiro 

American Institutes for Research 

October 2006


Prepared as part of the 20012006 Evaluation of the National Flood Insurance Program



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An Evaluation of Compliance with the National Flood 
Insurance Program Part A: 


Achieving Community Compliance 


Prepared as part of the 2001-2006 Evaluation of the National Flood Insurance Program 

Jacquelyn L. Monday, Kristen Y. Grill, 
Paul Esformes, and Matthew Eng 
with Tina Kinney and Marc Shapiro 


American Institutes for Research 
1000 Thomas Jefferson St., NW 
Washington, D.C. 20007 

November 2006 

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An Evaluation of Compliance with the National Flood Insurance Program Part A: Achieving Community Compliance 


iv 

EVALUATION OF THE NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM 

This Evaluation comprises a series of reports prepared by the American Institutes for 
Research (AIR) and selected subcontractors under a contract managed by AIR. These reports 
assess questions identified and prioritized by a steering committee about the National Flood 
Insurance Program. Individual reports will be posted on the FEMA website as they are finalized. 
The website URL is http://www.fema.gov/business/nfip/nfipeval.shtm. The reports in the 
Evaluation are 

The Evaluation of the National Flood Insurance Program  Final Report 

American Institutes for Research and NFIP Evaluation Working Group 

Assessing the Adequacy of the National Flood 
Insurance Program's 1 Percent Flood Standard. 

Galloway, Baecher, Plasencia, Coulton, 
Louthain, and Bagha, Water Policy 
Collaborative, University of Maryland. 

Assessing the National Flood Insurance 
Programs Actuarial Soundness. Bingham, 
Charron, Kirschner, Messick, and Sabade, 
Deloitte Consulting. 

Costs and Consequences of Flooding and 
the Impact of the National Flood Insurance 
Program. Sarmiento and Miller, Pacific 
Institute of Research and Evaluation. 


Developmental and Environmental Impacts of 
the National Flood Insurance Program: A 
Review of Literature. Rosenbaum, American 
Institutes for Research. 


The Developmental and Environmental Impact 
of the National Flood Insurance Program: A 
Summary Research Report. Rosenbaum and 
Bouleware, American Institutes for Research. 


An Evaluation of Compliance with the National 
Flood Insurance Program Part A: Achieving 
Community Compliance. Monday, Grill, 
Esformes, Eng, Kinney, and Shapiro, American 
Institutes for Research. 


An Evaluation of Compliance with the National 
Flood Insurance Program Part B: 
Are Minimum Building Requirements Being 
Met? Mathis and Nicholson, Dewberry.


Evaluation of the National Flood Insurance 
Programs Building Standards. Jones, 
Coulbourne, Marshall, and Rogers, Christopher 
Jones and Associates. 

Managing Future Development Conditions in 
the National Flood Insurance Program. 

Blais, Nguyen, Tate, Dogan and Petrow, ABSG 
Consulting; and Mifflin and Jones. 

The National Flood Insurance Programs 
Environmental Reviews: An Assessment of 
FEMAs Implementation of NEPA and Executive 
Order 11988. Rosenbaum, American Institutes 
for Research. 

The National Flood Insurance Programs 
Mandatory Purchase Requirement: Policies, 
Processes and Stakeholders. Tobin and Calfee, 
American Institutes for Research. 

The National Flood Insurance Programs 
Market Penetration Rate: Estimates and Policy 
Implications. Dixon, Clancy, Seabury, and 
Overton, RAND Corporation. 

Performance Assessment and Evaluation 
Measures for Periodic Use by the National 
Flood Insurance Program. Miller, Langston, 
and Nelkin, Pacific Institute of Research and 
Evaluation. 

State Roles and Responsibilities in the National 
Flood Insurance Program. Mittler, Morgan, 
Shapiro, and Grill, American Institutes for 
Research. 

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The research described in this report was funded with Federal funds from the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency under contract # 282-98-0029 and under subcontract to the 
American Institutes for Research. The content of this publication does not necessarily reflect the 
views or policies of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, nor does mention of trade 
names, commercial products, or organizations imply endorsement by the U.S. Government. 

Established in 1946, with headquarters in Washington, D.C., the American Institutes for 
Research (AIR) is an independent, nonpartisan, not-for-profit organization that conducts 
behavioral and social science research on important social issues and delivers technical 
assistance both domestically and internationally in the areas of health, education, and workforce 
productivity. 

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Authors 

Jacquelyn Monday is President of JLM Associates, Inc., a consulting firm specializing since 
1990 in floodplain management research, policy analysis, and writing. Until 1991 she served as Chief of 
Research Publications for the Louisiana Geological Survey, and before that was on the staff of the 
National Flood Insurance Program at the Federal Emergency Management Agency in Washington, D.C. 
Before joining FEMA, Monday was a Research Associate with the Natural Hazards Research and 
Applications Information Center. She is the recipient of the Goddard-White Award for Achievement in 
Floodplain Management, and the author of numerous articles and reports on floodplain management, 
hazards policy, and sustainability. Monday holds a B.A. and an M.A., both in geography, from the 
University of Colorado. 

Kristen Yarber Grill is a graduate student at the University of Wisconsins La Follette School of 
Public Affairs. She has a B.A. in Public Policy from the University of Chicago. Before joining AIR she 
worked at the U.S. Department of Energys Argonne National Laboratory, where she coauthored several 
reports analyzing the sources of pollution in Asia. 

Paul Esformes is completing a J.D. and masters in Public Policy at Duke University. He 
received his A.B. at the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton 
University where he concentrated in urban and land use planning policy. Esformes worked at the 
American Institutes for Research evaluating community compliance with the National Flood Insurance 
Program. Before attending graduate school, he was an analyst for Charles River Associates, an economic 
litigation consulting firm specializing in antitrust, merger and acquisition, and international trade cases. 

Matthew Eng is a planning and development specialist with the City of Seattles Office of Policy 
and Management. He coordinates the Citys efforts in performance measurement. Eng worked as a 
research assistant/associate on the evaluation of the National Flood Insurance Program from 2002 to 
2004. He holds a bachelors degree in public policy from Hamilton College and a masters degree in 
public administration from Syracuse University. 

Tina M. Kinney currently owns her own real estate business. Before this, she spent nine years in 
the public sector and held several high-ranking positions, including Policy Analyst at the U.S. 
Government Accountability Office, Research Scientist at the American Institutes for Research, and 
Business Process Analyst at Fairfax County Public Schools. While at AIR, Kinney served as Deputy 
Director of the NFIP Evaluation. At Fairfax County, she reported directly to the Chief Financial Officer 
on projects such as compliance with federal grant time keeping and preparing departmental moves to a 
new headquarters building. Kinney received her Masters in Public Administration from SUNY Albany in 
1997. 

Marc Shapiro is a Senior Research Scientist at the American Institutes for Research, where he is 
project director for the evaluation of the National Flood Insurance Program. He also has been project 
manager for an educational reform project for the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) 
in Macedonia as well as supervisor of an evaluation of all USAID-sponsored secondary education 
projects in Macedonia. His previous work for ICF Consulting involved evaluation and research on a 
variety of environmental and natural resources subjects and their intersection with energy and 
transportation/planning issues. He served as the coordinator of surveys and policy research for the 
countrys largest Hispanic voter research institute, the Southwest Voter Research Institute. Shapiro 
consults regarding monitoring and evaluation issues and serves as Vice-Chair and formerly as Chair of 
the board of the Foundation for Sustainable Development. He has taught policy classes at The George 
Washington University. Shapiro received his B.A. in political science from Washington University in St. 
Louis and his M.A. and Ph.D. in political science from the University of Rochester. 

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TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Executive Summary.................................................................................................................... vii 


1. THE EVALUATION OF THE NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM ........ 1


1.1 Background on the NFIP ............................................................................................. 3 


1.2 Evaluating Compliance with the National Flood Insurance Program ......................... 6 


1.2.1 The Community Compliance Process and Model .............................................. 7 


1.2.2 Previous Research on Compliance and Enforcement Models .......................... 14 


1.2.3 Applicability of Previous Research to the NFIP............................................... 20 


1.2.4 Scope and Method for Assessing Community Compliance ............................. 21 


1.3 Organization of the Report......................................................................................... 23 


2. THE LEVEL OF COMMUNITY COMPLIANCE NATIONWIDE............................... 24


2.1 Defining Compliance................................................................................................. 24 


2.2 The Optimal Level of Compliance ............................................................................ 25 


2.3 Independent Evaluation of Compliance..................................................................... 27 


2.3.1. Compliant Buildings as a Measure .................................................................. 27 


2.3.2. Compliant Communities as a Measure ............................................................ 27 


2.4 Existing Data to Measure Community Compliance .................................................. 28 


2.4.1. Alternatives Considered................................................................................... 28 


2.4.2. Analysis of Communities with Persistent Compliance Problems.................... 30 


2.5 Level of Nationwide Compliance .............................................................................. 32 


3. THE ROLE OF COMMUNITIES, THE STATES, AND FEMA IN COMMUNITY 
COMPLIANCE..................................................................................................................... 33 

3.1 The Communitys Role.............................................................................................. 33 


3.2 The Role of the States................................................................................................ 34 


3.2.1 States as Participating Communities ............................................................. 35 


3.2.2 State Capability for Compliance Activities ...................................................... 36 


3.2.3 State Programs and FEMAs Community Assistance Program ....................... 36 


3.3 The Role of FEMA .................................................................................................... 39 


3.3.1 Allocation of NFIP Staff in Regional Offices................................................... 41 


3.3.2 Workload and Priorities of NFIP Staff ............................................................. 42 


3.4 Recommendations...................................................................................................... 43 


4. PROMOTING COMMUNITY COMPLIANCE............................................................... 44


4.1 Technical Assistance to Communities....................................................................... 45 


4.1.1 Community Assistance Contacts and Community Assistance Visits............... 45 


4.1.2 Other Technical Assistance............................................................................... 49 


4.2 Training...................................................................................................................... 50 


4.2.1 FEMAs Training Offerings ............................................................................. 50 


4.2.2 Training for Regional Office and State Staff.................................................... 51 


4.2.3 Training for Community Staff .......................................................................... 53 


4.2.4 Training as a Tool for Promoting Compliance ................................................. 55 


4.3 Professional Certification in Floodplain Management .............................................. 56 


4.4. Incentives and Disincentives to Promote Compliance.............................................. 57 


4.4.1 Insurance Availability and the Insurance Rating Structure ............................... 57 


4.4.2 Premium Discounts for CRS Communities ...................................................... 58 


4.4.3 Increased Cost of Compliance (ICC) Coverage................................................ 58 


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4.4.4 Denial of Insurance Coverage........................................................................... 59 


4.5 Recommendations for Promoting Compliance.......................................................... 59 


5. MONITORING COMMUNITY COMPLIANCE WITH THE NFIP............................. 61


5.1 Contact with Communities ........................................................................................ 61 


5.1.1 Dual Purpose of CACs and CAVs.................................................................... 64 


5.1.2 CAVs as Determinants of Compliance or Noncompliance .............................. 65 


5.1.3 Findings on Community Contacts as Monitoring............................................. 67 


5.2 The Community Information System ........................................................................ 68 


5.2.1 The Role of CIS in Monitoring Community Compliance ................................ 68 


5.2.3 Effectiveness of CIS as a Monitoring Tool....................................................... 77 


5.3 The Submit-for-Rate Procedure................................................................................. 79 


5.3.1 The Submit-for-Rate Process............................................................................ 79 


5.3.2 Use of Submit-for-Rate Applications as Monitoring........................................ 80 


5.4 Letters of Map Revision based on Fill....................................................................... 82 


5.4.1 LOMR-Fs and Community Compliance............................................................ 83 


5.5 Community Rating System Procedures ..................................................................... 84 


5.6 Other (Insurance Claims, Complaints, Requests for Assistance) .............................. 85 


5.7 Findings and Recommendations for Monitoring Compliance................................... 85 


5.7.1 Recommendations............................................................................................. 86 


6. ENFORCEMENT OF COMMUNITY COMPLIANCE .................................................. 89


6.1 Determining Noncompliance..................................................................................... 91 


6.1.1 CAVs Remaining Open .................................................................................... 92 


6.1 Correcting Program Deficiencies............................................................................... 93 


6.2 Remedying Violations ............................................................................................... 95 


6.2.1 Maximum Extent Possible ................................................................................ 97 


6.2.2 Full Extent of Legal Authority.......................................................................... 98 


6.2.3 Options for Remedying Violations ................................................................... 98 


6.3 Flexibility in Correcting Program Deficiencies and Remedying Violations........... 102 


6.3.1 Variable Duration of Enforcement Actions .................................................... 104 


6.4 Probation.................................................................................................................. 104 


6.4.1. Effectiveness of Probation ............................................................................. 106 


6.4.2 Effectiveness of the Probation Surcharge....................................................... 108 


6.4.3 Indefinite Probationary Periods ...................................................................... 109 


6.5 Suspension from the NFIP....................................................................................... 110 


6.5.1 Effectiveness of Suspension ........................................................................... 112 


7.6 Obstacles to Enforcement of Community Compliance ........................................... 112 


6.6.1 Uncertainty about Documentation .................................................................. 112 


6.6.2 Duplication of Effort....................................................................................... 113 


6.6.3 Political Pressure............................................................................................. 114 


6.6.4 Perception of Weakness in Enforcement ........................................................ 114 


6.7 Discretion and Trade-offs in Enforcement .............................................................. 115 


6.8 Findings and Recommendations on Enforcement of Community Compliance....... 116 


7. SPECIAL ISSUES IN COMMUNITY COMPLIANCE................................................. 120


7.1 The Substantial Damage Requirement..................................................................... 120 


7.1.1 Compliance with the Substantial Damage/Substantial Improvement ............ 121 


7.1.2 Longstanding Problems in Implementing Substantial Damage Rules............ 128 


7.1.3 Recommendations on Substantial Damage/Improvement.............................. 130 


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7.2 Variances.................................................................................................................. 131 


7.2.1 Number of Variances Granted ........................................................................ 132 


7.2.2. Compliance of Variances Granted................................................................. 133 


7.2.3 Reasons for Noncompliant Variances............................................................. 134 


7.2.3 Monitoring Variances ..................................................................................... 136 


7.2.4 Recommendations on Variances..................................................................... 136 


7.3. Compliance in CRS Communities........................................................................... 136 


7.3.1 Background on the CRS.................................................................................. 137 


7.3.2 Monitoring NFIP Compliance in CRS Communities ..................................... 138 


8.3.4 Noncompliance in CRS Communities............................................................ 143 


7.3.5. Findings and Conclusions.............................................................................. 144 


7.3.6 Recommendations on the CRS ....................................................................... 148 


8. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS ................................................................................. 150


8.1 The Framework for NFIP Community Compliance ................................................ 150 


8.2 Promotion................................................................................................................. 151 


8.3 Monitoring ............................................................................................................... 151 


8.4 Enforcement............................................................................................................. 152 


8.5 Level of Community Compliance............................................................................ 153 


8.6 Questions of Balance ............................................................................................... 154 


9. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVING COMMUNITY COMPLIANCE......... 156


9.1 Major Recommendations......................................................................................... 156 


9.1.1 Increase Community Assistance Visits........................................................... 156 


9.1.2 Revitalize the CIS ........................................................................................... 156 


9.1.3 Impose Probation more Readily...................................................................... 157 


9.1.4 Miscellaneous ................................................................................................. 157 


9.2 Specific Recommendations...................................................................................... 157 


9.2.1 Recommendations on FEMA and State Responsibilities ............................... 158 


9.2.2 Recommendations for Promoting Compliance............................................... 158 


9.2.3 Recommendations for Monitoring.................................................................. 158 


9.2.4 Recommendations for Enforcement ............................................................... 159 


9.2.5 Recommendations on Special Compliance Issues.......................................... 159 


10. APPENDICES..................................................................................................................... 161
APPENDIX A: A Method for Measuring the Effect of Training on Compliance............... 161 
APPENDIX B: Data Available through the CIS ................................................................. 167 
APPENDIX C: Active 1316 Declarations by Community.................................................. 169 
APPENDIX D: Suspension and Probation Records as of October 31, 2003....................... 171 
APPENDIX E: Communities Currently Suspended or on Probation .................................. 174 
APPENDIX F: Sequence of Events in an NFIP Enforcement Action................................. 175 
APPENDIX G: An Explanation of CRS Activities ............................................................. 177 
APPENDIX H: A Method for Evaluating Compliance in CRS Communities.................... 179 
APPENDIX I: CRS Communities that have not received a CAV....................................... 180 


11. ACRONYMS AND GLOSSARY ...................................................................................... 182


12. REFERENCES.................................................................................................................... 187


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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

Background 

Floods are the most common natural disaster in the United States, the most costly on 
average, and the most dangerous. Between 1955 and 1999 floods caused an annual average of 
about $2 billion in direct damage to property, crops, and infrastructure, and 100 deaths. Because 
flooding is fairly predictable, however, a large proportion of these losses and deaths could have 
been avoided. The National Flood Insurance Act of 1968 (Public Law 90-448) was enacted by 
Congress as a comprehensive effort to minimize both flood damage and the financial impacts of 
floods on individuals and federal, state, and local governments. 

A major component of the 1968 Act was the establishment of the National Flood 
Insurance Program (NFIP), through which federally backed flood insurance is made available to 
property owners and residents in communities that choose to participate in the Program. In return 
for the availability of such insurance, communities adopt and enforce minimum floodplain 
management requirements within the Special Flood Hazard Area of the community (as depicted 
on a map issued by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)). These requirements 
are designed to prevent new development from increasing the flood threat and to protect new and 
existing buildings from anticipated flooding. 

In general, communities participating in the NFIP must require permits for all new 
development in the SFHA; elevate the lowest floor of all residential development in the SFHA to 
or above the base flood elevation and elevate or floodproof the lowest floor of nonresidential 
buildings to that elevation; restrict development in the regulatory floodway; ensure that 
construction materials and methods used will minimize future flood damage; and treat 
substantially improved structures as new buildings that must meet the minimum NFIP standards. 

The success of the NFIP depends on communities ensuring that buildings and other 
development within their jurisdictions are constructed and maintained according to these 
standards so that flood losses will be minimized. If communities do not elect to participate in the 
program or if they do so but fail to adequately enforce the standards, then lives and property are 
placed in harms way; buildings will suffer unnecessary flood damage; sound land use planning 
in floodplains will be discouraged; the NFIPs actuarial soundness will be jeopardized; changes 
in public policies and regulations may be based on unreliable data; and the costs to society from 
future floods will be increased unnecessarily. 

There has never been a comprehensive assessment of nationwide compliance with NFIP 
standards. Although participating communities are monitored individually on a regular, though 
fairly infrequent, basis, the question of how well the NFIP is being administered across the 
United States has been unanswered. In 2000, the Department of Homeland Securitys Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) contracted with the American Institutes for Research 
(AIR) to perform a comprehensive evaluation of the NFIP. As one part of the evaluation, FEMA 
charged AIR with conducting a nationwide assessment of community compliance with the NFIP 
minimum floodplain management regulations as set forth in Title 44, Section 60.3, of the Code 
of Federal Regulations (44 CFR 60.3). 

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This summary describes the research methods used in this evaluation of community 
compliance, presents selected findings, and lists the most salient recommendations growing out 
of the study. 

Method 

A range of evaluative methods was considered in designing this study. The approach 
chosen focused on lengthy, open-ended interviews with purposively selected regional, state, and 
community floodplain management and insurance staff as well as specialists from the private and 
non-profit sectors. The sample was selected to be as representative as possible of the issues and 
problems faced nationwide, focusing in particular on the areas where current and future flood risk 
is greatest and thus where success in achieving compliance is most important. The FEMA regional 
offices included in the interviews covered more than 90 percent of the flood insurance policies and 
80 percent of the communities participating in the NFIP. The study team shadowed staff on 
assistance visits conducted in four participating communities. In addition, the study team collected 
community files, policy guidance, and letter and communication templates and had access to the 
Community Information System (CIS) and Bureaunet databases and reporting tools to gather 
information on a number of subjects. 

Findings 

The Framework for Community Compliance with the NFIP 

This evaluation found that the NFIP uses a cooperative enforcement model for its 
compliance program, combining numerous voluntary approaches (most notably financial 
incentives offered through the insurance side of the NFIP) with sanctions that can be used as 
needed. Under this cooperative enforcement scheme, it is assumed that most communities and 
individuals are willing to abide by technical standards set for the program, public servants want to 
protect people and their property, incentives are more efficient tools for compliance than 
sanctions, and personnel and other resources are highly constrained. These assumptions lead the 
NFIP compliance program to emphasize the ongoing provision of education about the program 
standards and how to reach them, rather than extensive monitoring, inspections, and penalties. 

The NFIP compliance model used by FEMA has three main components: (1) promotion of 
compliance (technical assistance, education, training, incentives); (2) monitoring of community 
compliance (contact with communities and evaluation of their programs, use of institutionalized 
indicators, and recordkeeping); and (3) enforcement (use of sanctions including probation and 
suspension). These three components generally are viewed as essential to the process of achieving 
compliance and are found in varying forms in most regulatory programs. 

This study and previous research have shown that, among the 20,000 participating 
communities nationwide, there is, in fact, a high level of willingness to comply with the NFIP 
standards; many exemplary local programs; and real progress being made by many communities 
in coping with flood risk. The fact that most of those communities are operating competent 
programs supports the underlying assumption and confirms that a predominantly cooperative 
enforcement model is an appropriate match for the NFIP. This is underscored by the research 
literature on cooperative enforcement strategies, which documents the effective use of this type 
of model by programs with characteristics resembling those of the NFIP. 

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The NFIP compliance program based on this model makes good use of the 
institutionalized aspects of the NFIP and is well-integrated with the NFIP insurance mechanisms. 
The study team encountered no major gaps in the framework of the compliance program. 

Tradeoffs in the NFIP Compliance Program 

The NFIP compliance program operates under certain constraints and must continually 
make tradeoffs to achieve an appropriate balance among competing objectives, approaches, and 
perspectives. Two constraints are paramount: statutory limits and finite resources. A number of 
additional conflicting factors must continually be balanced by the NFIP headquarters and 
regional staff and the state personnel, described below, and this affects the compliance program. 

Number of communities vs. number of policiesOf the 20,000 communities participating 
in the NFIP nationwide, about half have fewer than 10 flood insurance policies each. A balance 
must continually be struck between the equitability of giving equal attention to all communities 
and the cost-effectiveness of devoting more resources to the communities with the greatest 
number of policies (thus protecting the financial stability of the National Flood Insurance Fund). 

Number of communities vs. amount and growth of flood riskMany communities have 
little development at risk and are experiencing no or very slow growth, while others face 
enormous risk to millions and even billions of dollars of property, increasing yearly. Cost-
effectiveness in distributing scarce resources dictates that more attention be given to the 
communities with higher flood risk and the potential for additional development at risk in the 
future. 

Present vs. futureAlthough the focus of community compliance operations tends to fall 
on existing violations, in the long run, focusing on yesterdays mistakes may not be as important 
or cost effective as preventing tomorrows. This is particularly true because one of the NFIPs 
ultimate goals is to minimize the amount of property and people at risk over time. 

Cooperative approach vs. penaltiesThe cooperative approach used by the NFIP 
compliance program is cost-effective and successful in achieving compliance from most 
communities. However, for certain communities and in certain circumstances it does not work 
well and a stricter stance, utilizing penalties, is needed. Incorporating both optionscooperative 
approaches and penaltiesin a single program using the same personnel is a daily challenge. 

Costs to a few communities vs. benefits for allOne of the main purposes of the NFIP is 
to shift the costs of flooding away from the federal taxpayers and onto those who choose to bear 
the risks of flooding. This goal is sound in theory but in implementation poses dilemmas. 
Imposing the ultimate sanction available under the NFIP compliance programsuspending a 
community from the NFIP and thus depriving its residents of flood insurance, federally backed 
mortgages, disaster relief, and other benefitsis a good example of this tradeoff. The difficulty 
inherent in imposing costs on the few to benefit the many is an ongoing conflict. 

The Nationwide Level of Compliance 

This study on community compliance and the companion study on building compliance 
(Mathis and Nicholson 2006) have made some progress in quantify the extent to which 
communities and buildings have been meeting the NFIPs flood loss reduction standardsa 

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measurement that has never been made in the 35 years of the NFIPs existence. Producing 
comprehensive and fully reliable statistics on community-level compliance has proven 
problematic, however. 

In lieu of a costly and time-consuming independent assessment of a random selection of 
communities nationwide, the study team attempted to use existing compliance data to generate 
an estimate of nationwide levels of community compliance. A number of ways of analyzing 
existing information, using proxies, or combining existing data with new information were 
considered for this study and ultimately rejected, primarily because existing data (which is 
predominantly housed in the CIS) had been demonstrated to be insufficiently reliable for this 
purpose. 

However, by making a series of assumptions about the representation of visited 
communities, the length of time that is reasonable for a community to take to remedy 
noncompliance, and the accuracy of community visit data entered into the CIS over a five-year 
period, the study team derived an estimated nationwide rate of community compliance of 70 to 
85 percent. In this determination a community was considered to be compliant it if had no 
program deficiencies or violations or if it addressed them satisfactorily within two years. As 
another way of gauging overall community compliance, FEMA and state personnel were asked 
in interviews to give estimates of the proportion of compliant communities in their territories. 
Their responses ranged from 0 percent compliant for some areas to 100 percent for others, but 
averaged to 78 percent compliant, the median of the range calculated from existing records. 

The other part of the overall picture of nationwide compliance with the NFIP is the extent 
to which individual structures in flood-prone areas meet the NFIP building standards. Mathis and 
Nicholson (2006) found that 63 percent of buildings are fully compliant with the NFIP and that 
89 percent of the buildings are properly elevated, the most important factor in preventing flood 
damage. 

What these figures convey is uncertain. It is unrealistic to aspire to 100 percent 
compliance in every community 100 percent of the time, and the funding provided for NFIP 
compliance falls far short of providing any level of effort that could even attempt such an 
achievement. Yet there has been no indication from Congress or FEMA of what level of 
nationwide community compliance is optimal or acceptable. Further, noncompliance at the 
community level may or may not result in noncompliant buildings and thus increased flood risk 
and costs to the NFIP, depending on other factors, so this correlation could not be quantified. 
Nor was this studys method able to connect directly the level of community compliance during 
a given period with claims data or loss model results to provide an estimate of the effect of 
noncompliance on the actuarial soundness of the NFIP. Thus it is not at all clear whether these 
figures on both community-wide compliance and the compliance of individual structures imply 
the need for drastic improvement or cause for satisfaction. 

Promotion of Compliance 

Of the three components of the NFIP compliance model, FEMA and its state partners put 
the vast majority of their resources and effort into promoting community compliance, largely 
through training and technical assistance to community staff and officials. This emphasis is 
appropriate for a model based on a cooperative enforcement approach and has been effective in 

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helping most communities achieve and maintain compliant programs. These promotional tools 
are not as effective as they could be if there were more resources for both FEMA and the states 
to increase staff levels and travel support, and to produce and deliver more workshop and 
training materials. It bears remembering that promoting compliance through these educational 
efforts must be continual, because of local and state staff turnover and because of increases in 
development pressure and other on-the-ground changes in communities and in their flood risk. 

Monitoring 

Information about and documentation of what is happening on the ground are essential to 
achieving community compliance, and are obtained through the monitoring phase of the NFIP 
compliance program. This study has shown that the NFIPs monitoring approach functions fairly 
effectively for purposes of detecting individual community needs for additional promotion of 
compliance (technical assistance and education) but not for detecting all the compliance 
problems that need to be addressed through additional technical assistance or possibly 
enforcement action. On average, each year no more than 10 percent of NFIP communities 
receive a monitoring contactand that proportion is achieved only by using all available 
resources in both the FEMA regional offices and the states. Only about half of those contacts are 
comprehensive evaluations (including a site visit) of a local program. This frequency is not 
enough to detect noncompliance and address it before the potential flood damage is increased, 
and falls far short of the goals FEMA has stated in its manual for conducting community visits, 
of contacting every community at least once every five years. 

The study found two weaknesses in FEMAs Community Information System (CIS) 
databasethe agencys system for documenting and cataloging both the information that it 
generates from its own monitoring activities and that which it obtains from other sources for 
purposes of monitoring. First, the CIS records on community contacts and visits are incomplete 
because there is a backlog of data that has not been entered into the system by some states and 
FEMA regional offices. Second, the software that enables the data to be searched and compiled 
is inflexible and of limited usefulness for many types of analyses that could otherwise be based 
on the CIS data. The study found that many FEMA and state personnel were not using the CIS 
for monitoring purposes. 

While this study was being conducted, the CIS was being transferred to a web-based 
system, which was expected to remedy the prior difficulty in remotely accessing the system, 
which had been a key contributor to the deficiencies in data and perceived usefulness of the 
system that were reported during interviews conducted by the study team. Because this important 
transition occurred while the study was in progress, conclusive findings about the effectiveness 
of the CIS for monitoring compliance were not possible. The CIS database has the potential to be 
a strong monitoring and evaluation tool, however, if the two above deficiencies are addressed 
and the access problem has been remedied. Hard and accurate documentation of the number of 
community contacts, visits, technical assistance responses, staff in training sessions, 
correspondence, and other activities will help answer questions about the level of overall 
compliance and the effectiveness of the methods being used to achieve it that could not be 
answered during this study. 

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Enforcement 

The strongest community-wide enforcement sanctions available under the NFIP 
(probation and suspension) have been applied relatively few times. Formal threats of probation in 
the form of probation letters have been issued 104 times in the history of the NFIP; probation has 
been imposed 49 times; and 10 communities have been suspended for failure to enforce their 
ordinances. It is notable that, for the times that FEMA has formally threatened and/or imposed 
probation, compliance has been achieved in 85 percent of the cases. 

There are few, if any, programs sufficiently similar to the NFIP from which to draw a 
norm of frequency with which enforcement sanctions or penalties should be applied to be most 
effective. However, research on compliance and enforcement has demonstrated that the presence 
of a credible threat of a penalty is useful and perhaps even necessary to achieve the highest 
possible levels of compliance, even in cooperative enforcement models. This is borne out by the 
compliance history of the NFIP, which shows that some communities are recalcitrant and appear 
to respond only to a serious threat or the imposition of a penalty but also that, as noted above, 
when the threat and/or penalty is imposed, compliance does result. However, there is a 
widespread perception among FEMA and state staff (and perhaps among communities) that 
FEMA is highly unlikely to apply sanctions in most cases. In addition, interviews revealed 
considerable dissatisfaction among floodplain management professionals with FEMAs 
relatively infrequent use of its two strongest enforcement tools. 

In exploring why the sanctions are not applied more frequently, this study found that 
there are numerous real and perceived internal obstacles to the imposition of probation (the first 
sanction). Under the NFIP model (as implemented), the bulk of resources and effort are devoted 
to providing a range of technical assistance services to communities and their staffs. This has 
created a climate in which services and guidance are readily offered and accepted but a stricter, 
enforcement-oriented approach layered on top can be an awkward fit. This is particularly true 
because the same personnel are expected to carry out both technical assistance and enforcement 
functions, and was borne out in interviews with FEMA and state personnel. This results in a 
protracted movement from one phase (providing technical assistance) to the next (imposing the 
probation penalty) whereas the research suggests that a short, swift movement into a sanctions 
phase is needed to induce compliance. Other obstacles to the imposition of probation include 
confusion about the amount and nature of documentation required, possible political pressure,1 
turnover in personnel, and shortage of staff time to give proper attention to the problem. 

The Roles of FEMA and the States 

The roles of FEMA regional offices and state offices overlap in all three approaches to 
community compliance in the NFIP, although certain tools are used more by the states and others 
more by FEMA. 

The study team concluded that, in its complex staffing allocations, FEMA has 
appropriately balanced the need to have a presence (at least seven full-time-equivalent positions) 
in every region with its limited resources and with the variability among regions in the amount of 
current and expected compliance work. Nevertheless, officials in most of the regional offices 

1 The highest official in each regional office, the Regional Director, is a political appointee. 

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reported that both staff and resources are insufficient to address the needs of the communities 
and policyholders and to address compliance activities in particular. 

The study team encountered comments from regional office staff about being temporarily 
transferred to non-NFIP related activities, primarily for pre- and post-disaster activities. Disaster 
response is not an activity envisaged by the National Flood Insurance Act as a use of the flood 
insurance premiums, which are designated to pay for the NFIPs administrative expenses 
(including staff salaries). While some of these pre- and post-disaster activities are directly related 
to NFIP and NFIP staff have an obligation to help where they can during the response to an 
emergency, use of NFIP staff for other disaster-related activities can detract from their NFIP 
responsibilities (including compliance). FEMA was unable to answer inquiries about the precise 
amount of time NFIP staff spend on non-NFIP matters, or the net effect of these reassignments, 
if any, on the National Flood Insurance Fund. 

States play a vital, but varied, role in the management and administration of the NFIP. 
Besides the statutory requirement that states designate a coordinating office for the NFIP, and the 
supportive role defined in the NFIP regulations, there is little other formal policy on the states 
contribution to the NFIP. The role played by the states today has been created administratively 
out of the federal governments need for much more on-the-ground assistance than it can provide 
by itself and also out of the significant capacity states have to interface with the local 
communities whose implementation is the backbone of the NFIP. 

To support state conduct of NFIP compliance activities, funding is provided to the states 
on a cost-sharing basis (75 percent federal and 25 percent state) through the Community 
Assistance Program-State Support Services Element. In 2002, funding ranged between $25,000 
and $250,000 per state, and averaged $96,000. (Funding levels were increased since then, so that 
the Fiscal Year 2006 figure is about 40 percent above the 2002 allocation.) Currently all 50 states 
participate in CAP-SSSE. Many state floodplain management programs rely heavily on this 
federal funding, so the CAP-SSSE is critical to the promotion, monitoring, and enforcement of 
community compliance with the NFIP. 

However, two deficiencies in the current CAP program prevent it from funding state and 
local NFIP compliance activities as effectively as it could. First, despite recent increases, CAPSSSE 
funding has not kept pace with the state responsibilities and overall demand for flood 
services, nor does the distribution of funds among states fully account for the need or capabilities 
within each state. Second, state floodplain management programs are not fully accountable for 
the completion of compliance activities once they do receive money. There is insufficient 
emphasis either in the five-year planning or the CAP agreements on the precise activities to be 
carried out, how those activities are expected to improve compliance, and whether (at the end of 
the years funding cycle) they have resulted in improved compliance. Because states conduct so 
many of the NFIP-related compliance activities with CAP funds, the absence of measurable 
compliance goals is a significant gap in tracking or evaluating compliance. 

Variances 

There was no indication that noncompliant variances are issued on a widespread basis, 
nor that variances are typically granted to allow a building to be constructed below the required 
elevation. Biennial report data for two selected years indicated that less than 3 percent of all 
NFIP communities granted variances for development in the floodplain, although 267 

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communities did grant variances for 100 percent of the permits that they issued in those two 
years. A large number of variances in a community does not necessarily indicate noncompliance, 
but data indicating whether the granted variances met the NFIP criteria were not readily 
available. 

Community Rating System 

Monitoring and enforcement in communities that participate in the CRSa selective subprogram 
in which communities with exemplary flood hazard reduction programs earn insurance 
premium reductions for their residentswas found to have some shortcomings. Although 
admission to the CRS requires demonstration of full compliance with the NFIP and a clean 
community assistance visit (CAV) is now required, 10 percent of CRS communities have not 
received a CAV (either within the two years before joining the CRS or since joining). Of the 
CRS communities that have received a CAV, 12 percent (105 communities) had one or more 
serious program deficiencies identified during the CAV. At the time these data were analyzed 38 
CRS communities had compliance problems that had remained officially unresolved for at least 
15 months, and some for many years. In addition, some CRS communities have been upgraded 
in CRS class while officially noncompliant. 

These shortcomings are the result of inadequate recordkeeping, confusion within ISO and 
the FEMA regional offices about their roles and responsibilities, unclear policy on the conduct of 
routine CAVs for CRS communities, and communication gaps between ISO and FEMA about 
CRS upgrades. 

Substantial Damage/Substantial Improvement 

Outside evaluators, several studies, and FEMA are in agreement that the substantial 
damage and substantial improvement provisions of the NFIP are not being implemented to the 
degree that FEMA had intended. However, this evaluation was not able to quantify the extent of 
noncompliance with this rule. Noncompliance by local officials that was documented was found 
to result from misunderstanding of the rules, fear of political pressure, and belief that the rules 
impose a financial hardship on property owners. The timing of the substantial damage 
determination (immediately after a disaster), a lack of information about damaged structures, and 
the variety of ways substantial damage and substantial improvement can be calculated further 
impede compliance with this requirement. 

Recommendations 

This evaluation has concluded that there are three main actions through which FEMA is 
most likely to improve community compliance processes. 

 Increase the number and frequency of CAVs. It is critical that means be found to 
increase the number and frequency of community visits. FEMAs records show that 
each NFIP community receives some sort of one-on-one contact with state or FEMA 
floodplain management staff about once in 10 years; only half of those contacts 
include an onsite visit to the community. This is an insufficient level of FEMA or 
state presence to maintain the level of monitoring necessary to avert compliance 
problems. 
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 Revitalize the CIS. One effective step toward improving the community compliance 
program would be to revitalize the Community Information System. If fully 
functional, CIS would be a powerful tool both for monitoring NFIP compliance 
nationwide and for making quantitative assessments of compliance-related issues. 
The absence of such an information base hampered this evaluation. FEMA must bring 
the CISs community assistance records up to date, upgrade the systems 
reporting/query function, and add certain items to the list of data routinely entered 
into it. It is also essential to simultaneously rehabilitate the CISs image among 
regional office and state floodplain management staff (now that technological 
obstacles have been overcome) so that they will be motivated to enter records 
conscientiously and trust the data now accessible through the CIS. 
 Impose probation more readily. The NFIP community compliance model uses the 
enforcement sanctions of probation and suspension sparingly. Although this is 
appropriate given the characteristics and constraints of the NFIP and is successful a 
large proportion of the time, it has also been demonstrated that a minority of 
communities are not likely to respond to this approach. For those communities, a 
credible threat of penalty is needed. The NFIP has a sanction available for this 
purpose in the form of probation, but it is used so infrequently that there has 
developed a widespread perception among FEMA regional office and state staff that 
it is unlikely to be imposed in any given situation. This perception deprives the threat 
of its credibility and thus keeps recalcitrant communities unresponsive. Further, 
FEMA regional office and state staff themselves have grown to believe that they will 
never be able to succeed in having probation imposed on a noncompliant community, 
and their frustration is detrimental to an effective community compliance initiative. 
FEMA should make an effort to act with deliberation on existing or future 
recommendations for probation action, with an eye toward re-establishing the 
credibility of this sanction. 
Two additional actions, presumably by Congress, would help improve community 
compliance with the NFIP. 

 Provide more funding and personnel for both federal and state activities. If 
higher rates of compliance and quantifiable measures of compliance are desired, 
additional resources must be provided for those purposes. At present there are simply 
not enough experienced staff persons (at the federal or state levels) assigned to 
monitoring and enforcement functions to guarantee that communities are sufficiently 
monitored, that follow-up actions are taken when compliance problems are 
discovered, and that data on the whole process are maintained. 
 Clarify the use of flood insurance premium funds. A related issue is whetheror 
to what degreeit is appropriate routinely to assign federal NFIP personnel, whose 
salaries are paid out of the National Flood Insurance Fund, to non-NFIP duties. This 
can be a drain on already-scarce NFIP resources. 
More specific actions that would enhance the operations of the community compliance 
program are addressed in the body of the report. 

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1. THE EVALUATION OF THE 
NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM 
Floods are the most common natural disaster in the United States. Between 1955 and 
2003 floods were estimated to have caused $98 billion in direct damage to property, crops, and 
infrastructure, or an average of about $2 billion each year. In 1972, flood damage exceeded $4.5 
billion; another $16 billion in damage occurred in 19932 (Pielke et al. 2002). The costs in human 
lives are just as dramatic: each year floods result in about 100 deaths. 

Despite the havoc floods cause, they are among the most preventable natural disasters. 
The majority of floods occur at predictable intervals in defined geographic areas, along 
coastlines, near riverbanks, and in low-lying areas, most of which have been identified as prone 
to flooding. Mapping technology; hydrologic and hydrostatic measurement and analysis; 
building elevation and location; improvements in construction techniques and materials; flood 
warning systems; structural mitigation projects, such as dams and levees; and temporary flood 
protections, such as sandbagging, can and have significantly reduced the risk of and damage 
from flooding. 

The National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) plays a major role in efforts to reduce 
flood losses. Congress established the NFIP with the passage of the National Flood Insurance 
Act of 1968 (Public Law 90-448) and subsequently amended it in 1973, 1994, and 2004. One of 
the Acts primary purposes is to encourage state and local governments to adopt and enforce 
appropriate land use provisions to restrict future development of land which is exposed to flood 
hazard. The NFIPs creation was based on the federal governments consideration of several 
factors. First, floods are costly to property owners and federal, state, and local governments. 
Second, despite the federal governments significant investment in structural mitigation, flood 
losses had continued to increase. Finally, the private insurance industry had found the provision 
of flood insurance to be uneconomical and did not supply an alternative. 

Responsibility for administering the NFIP initially fell to the Department of Housing and 
Urban Development, but this authority was transferred to the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA), an independent agency created in 1979. FEMA became part of the Department 
of Homeland Security in March 2003. FEMAs Mitigation Division now manages the NFIP.3 

The NFIPs goals can be stated as decreasing the risk of flood losses, reducing the costs 
and adverse consequences of flooding, reducing the demands and expectations for disaster 
assistance after floods, and restoring and preserving the natural and beneficial values of 
floodplains. 4 To address these goals, FEMA identifies and maps flood-prone communities, 
promotes floodplain management, and provides flood insurance. 

2 Figures are in 1995 dollars. 

3 The division also manages the National Dam Safety Program, the National Earthquake Hazards Reduction 

Program, the National Hurricane Program, the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program, the Flood Mitigation Assistance 

Program, and Pre-Disaster Mitigation authorized by the Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000. 
4 These outcome goals were reached by a consensus of FEMA and the NFIP Evaluation team in the 2002 Design for 

the Evaluation of the National Flood Insurance Program. The fourth goal is not included in the statute, however. 

The primary purposes stated in the 1968 Act that created the NFIP were to Through insurance, better indemnify 

individuals for flood losses that created personal hardships and economic distress; reduce future flood damages 

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With the passage of the 1968 Act, Congress authorized the federal government to 
identify and publish information with respect to all flood plain areas, including coastal areas 
located in the United States that have such areas and then to establish or update flood-risk zone 
data in all such areas, and make estimates with respect to the rates of probable flood caused loss 
for the various flood risk zones for each of these areas. 

The 1968 Act further authorized the federal government to establish and implement a 
national flood insurance program which will enable interested persons to purchase insurance 
against loss resulting from physical damage to or loss of real property or personal property 
related thereto arising from any flood occurring in the United States. Flood insurance provides 
the mechanism by which victims of flooding can be compensated for flood damage. No less 
important, flood insurance also provides a way for some of the financial burden of flood losses to 
be removed from taxpayers, such as for federal disaster assistance and casualty loss deductions 
under federal income taxes. Property owners can purchase flood insurance directly from the 
NFIP or, more typically, from private insurance companies (referred to as Write Your Own or 
WYO companies). These companies collect premiums, retain a portion of these premiums, for 
expenses and claims payments, and then submit the remaining premiums to the National Flood 
Insurance Fund. 

The National Flood Insurance Fund was established within the U.S. Treasury by the 1968 
Act as the funding mechanism of the NFIP. Premium income and policy fees are deposited into 
the fund and program expenses including claims payments, operating and administrative costs, 
and, since 1986, federal salaries and program expenses such as mapping and engineering. In 
addition, the NFIP has the authority to borrow up to $1.5 billion from the Treasury, which must 
be repaid along with interest. The borrowing authority limit can be (and typically is ) increased 
by the President in years with catastrophic flood losses. 

One purpose of the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968 is to study flood hazardsin 
order to provide for a constant reappraisal of the flood insurance program and its effect on land-
use requirements. This clear call for evaluation and the fact that the NFIP has never been the 
subject of a comprehensive evaluation led FEMA to assemble a panel of experts to analyze a 
series of key issues about the programs operations and effectiveness. 

FEMA, which administers the NFIP and is part of the U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security, decided to conduct a major evaluation of the programs performance and goals. In 
2000, FEMA contracted with the American Institutes for Research (AIR) an independent, not-
for-profit corporation to lead and manage the comprehensive evaluation of the NFIP. The 
evaluation is this first comprehensive review since the programs inception. The purpose of the 
overall evaluation is to develop data and information needed to formulate better policies for 
floodplain management, risk assessment, and insurance, and to support long-term planning and 
policymaking for the NFIP. 

The evaluation examines many issues related to the NFIP, such as the programs actuarial 
soundness, its developmental and environmental impacts, and compliance among participating 
communities with the NFIPs requirements. The ultimate goal of the evaluation is to contribute 

through State and community floodplain management regulations; and reduce Federal expenditures for disaster 
assistance and flood control (42 USC 4001). 

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to improvements in the effectiveness of the NFIP. This substudy within the Evaluation was 
conducted by the AIR. 

1.1 Background on the NFIP 
Once a community with flood-prone areas is mapped with a Flood Insurance Rate Map 
(FIRM) issued by FEMA, it may choose to participate in the NFIPs regular program. 
Participation in the NFIP makes property owners in the community eligible to purchase federal 
flood insurance and receive other benefits not available in nonparticipating communities. A 
participating community can be any political entity that has the authority to adopt and enforce 
floodplain ordinances for the area under its jurisdiction. Examples include a city, a town, a tribe, 
and a county or parish. Participation in the NFIP is voluntary, although some states require 
participation. In states that do not require participation, communities can decide whether to enter 
the NFIP and can choose to withdraw from the NFIP at any time. However, once a community is 
mapped, it has one year to decide whether to participate in the NFIP before it is designated a 
nonparticipating (sanctioned) community. A community that decides to participate must adopt 
and agree to enforce a flood hazard reduction ordinance that meets the minimum criteria set out 
in the NFIP regulations at 44 CFR 60.3. 

Property owners in nonparticipating communities are not eligible for flood insurance 
under the NFIP (although they may be able to secure flood insurance from private companies) 
and, if they are sanctioned, are ineligible for federal financial assistance for the acquisition or 
construction of structures in their identified flood-prone areas. This includes many loans or 
grants from the Small Business Association, the Veterans Administration, and the U.S. 
Department of Housing and Urban Development, among others. Finally, nonparticipating 
communities are not eligible for federal financial assistance for the permanent repair or 
reconstruction of insurable buildings in an SFHA after a presidentially declared flood disaster. 

The identification and management of flood-prone areas under the NFIP is founded on 
the base floodthat flood that has a 1 percent chance of being equaled or exceeded in any year. 
This is also commonly referred to as the 100-year flood, or the flood that has a statistical 
probability of occurring once every 100 years. The 1 percent annual chance standard and the 
100-year flood are synonymous.5 The base flood elevation (BFE) is the level of the waters 
surface during the 1 percent annual chance flood. If a base flood occurs, water would reach the 
BFE (assuming that the BFE had been determined correctly and that no subsequent changes had 
occurred in the areas topography or natural conditions). The BFE varies among communities 
and within them and also can changethe base flood will reach a higher level if development 
gradually encroaches on the drainage area. BFEs are established and depicted on the FIRM for 
the flood-prone area. The NFIP requires that new (and substantially improved) construction be 
built so that the lowest floor is at the BFE (nonresidential buildings have the option of being 
floodproofed to that elevation). Participating communities incorporate this and other NFIP 
standards into their local ordinances, but may adopt stricter standards than those required by the 
NFIP if they wish. 

5 For more on the base flood and associated policies and practices, see the companion substudy, Assessing the 
Adequacy of the National Flood Insurance Program's 1 Percent Flood Standard. 

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Substantial improvement is the term applied to any reconstruction, rehabilitation, 
addition, or other improvement to a building, the cost of which equals or exceeds 50 percent of 
the market value of the building before the improvement.6 A related term, substantial damage, 
refers to damage to a building of any origin whereby the cost of restoring the building to its pre-
damaged condition is equal to or exceeds 50 percent of the buildings market value before the 
damage occurred. Substantially damaged or substantially improved structures must be brought 
into compliance with the same requirements that apply to post-FIRM structures. 

The Flood Insurance Rate Map (FIRM), which participating communities must 
officially adopt as part of their floodplain management ordinance, identifies the Special Flood 
Hazard Areas (SFHAs) in the community. The boundaries of the SFHA correspond to the 
limits of the 1 percent annual chance flood. Floods can be larger or smaller than the 1 percent 
flood. Smaller floods, which have a greater probability of occurrence, in theory should never 
exceed the boundaries of an SFHA. In contrast, a lower probability flood larger than the 1 
percent flood will always rise above the BFE and extend beyond the SFHA, unless human 
intervention prevents this from happening. 

There are three key elements in the determination of flood insurance rates in a 
participating community. First, the FIRMs identify different flood zones depending on the flood 
risk, which is calculated through engineering analyses. Areas within SFHAs include A and V 
zones, which would be inundated by the 1 percent annual chance flood. All states have A zones. 
Only coastal states have V zones, which are vulnerable to high velocity water from waves. X 
zones are outside of SFHAs (but may still be vulnerable to floods that exceed the BFE). All else 
being equal, insurance rates in V zones will always be higher than rates in A zones. About 68 
percent of federal flood insurance policies are for properties in A zones, and another 2 percent 
are for properties in V zones. The remaining policies are for properties outside SFHAs. 

A second element in the determination of insurance rates is the date a building is 
constructed. The NFIP makes a distinction between what it labels pre-FIRM and post-FIRM 
construction. The former includes all construction or substantial improvement that started on or 
before December 31, 1974, or before the effective date of a communitys FIRM, whichever is 
later. All other construction and substantial improvements are post-FIRM. A participating 
communitys ordinance must require (and the community must enforce) that such construction 
within SFHAs meet or exceed the NFIPs minimum building requirements in effect at the time 
construction begins. What constitutes pre- and post-FIRM construction varies among 
communities, depending on the date of a communitys FIRM. As an example, Alexandria, 
Virginia, has a FIRM dated May 8, 1970, so all construction in the citys SFHA after that date is 
considered post-FIRM. In contrast, all construction in Live Oak County, Texas, before 
November 19, 2003 is pre-FIRM because its FIRM did not become effective until that date. 

6 Substantial improvement does not include work to correct existing violations of local or state health, safety, or 
sanitary codes or alterations to an historic structure as long as the alterations do not preclude the structures 
continued designation as historic. 

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A Statistical Portrait of the NFIP 

Slightly more than 20,000 communities in the 50 states, American Samoa, the 
District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands participated in the National 
Flood Insurance Program as of September 30, 2004. A community can be a state, any of its 
political subdivisions, and Indian tribe, or Alaska Native village that has the authority to 
adopt and enforce floodplain management regulations within its jurisdiction. 

Given the variety of governmental structures among the states, the distribution of 
communities is not evenly spread among the states or even dependent on the population of 
these states. Three states, Pennsylvania (with over 2,450 communities), New York (1,464), 
and Texas (1,110) account for about 25 percent of all participating communities. In contrast, 
California, the state with the largest population, has 518 participating communities. Hawaii 
(4), Alaska (30), and Nevada (31) have the fewest participating communities. 

Most flood-prone communities participate in the NFIP, and their residents had about 

4.5 million policies in force as of September 30, 2004, with total coverage exceeding $722.7 
billion. The total premium paid to obtain this coverage was $1.95 billion. 
Five coastal states, Florida, Texas, Louisiana, California, and New Jersey, account 
for nearly 70 percent of all policies. These five states plus five other coastal states account 
for 81 percent of all policies. Floridians have about 41 percent of all policies  but more than 
half of these policies are in 20 of the states 437 participating communities. Outside of 
Florida, the median policy count per community is eight, but this number disguises the fact 
that many communities have no policies. Among participating communities, for example, 
3,452 had no policies in August 2004. Almost two-thirds of the 20,000 communities in the 
NFIP have 20 or fewer policyholders. 

At the opposite extreme, the unincorporated areas of Dade County, Florida have the 
most policies, more than 209,200, followed by Houston, Texas (99,200 policies), Jefferson 
Parish (88,000 policies) and, New Orleans, Louisiana (85,200 policies), Lee County, Florida 
(81,000 policies), and Harris County, Texas (72,100 policies). One percent of participating 
communities have almost 65 percent of all policies. Miami Dade County alone has more 
policies than the combined total of policies in more than 16,760 other participating 
communities. 

Communities also vary by the type of flood hazards that they contain and relative 
flood risk. As of September 30, 2004, slightly less than 2 percent of NFIP policies in force 
were in V Zones, about 68 percent were in A Zones, and the remaining 30 percent were in 
other zones, primarily those outside of SFHAs. 

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In general, pre-FIRM insurance rates are subsidized because theoretically at the time of 
construction the community and property owner had no way of knowing what the flood risk 
would be at that site and thus how to protect the building by elevating it or other means. In 
contrast, the post-FIRM policy rates are based on actuarial determinations of the flood risk. Even 
though pre-FIRM policies are not charged an actuarial premium, the premium is still generally 
more expensive than those charged post-FIRM properties. 

The third element of insurance rating (for post-FIRM construction) is the elevation of the 
building in relation to the BFE. Buildings that are situated at or above the level of the BFE are at 
less risk than buildings below BFE and therefore have insurance rates commensurate with that 
risk. The farther below BFE a building lies, the higher its flood insurance rate will be. 

Under the ordinance adopted by the community pursuant to NFIP standards, when 
buildings are constructed within the SFHA, professional surveyors must sign, seal, and certify 
elevation certificates, which specify the elevation of the lowest floor of a buildings lowest 
enclosed area.7 

1.2 Evaluating Compliance with the National Flood Insurance Program 
The NFIPs success is based on two contingencies. The first is that communities will 
choose to participate in the program and therefore will adopt and agree to enforce floodplain 
management ordinances established under authority of the National Flood Insurance Act, as 
amended. The incentive for such participation, and all that it entails, is the availability of flood 
insurance for the community and its property ownersinsurance that is not readily available 
through the commercial insurance market but is crucial to protecting property from loss. 

Second, once a community begins participating in the NFIP, it is assumed that it 
administers and enforces its ordinance in such a way that development in its flood-prone areas 
actually does meet the local (and NFIP) standards and thus is protected from future flood 
damage. There are numerous requirements for protecting buildings and infrastructure (addressed 
in detail later in this report), but those related to elevation are the most easily recognized and 
useful for illustration. For construction in A Zones, for example, residences must be built so that 
their lowest floor (including basement) elevated to or above the BFE. Nonresidential structures 
in SFHAs can be either elevated or dry-floodproofed. In V Zones (coastal floodplains that have 
the additional hazard of storm waves), buildings must be elevated on piles and columns so the 
lowest horizontal structure member is at or above the BFE. 

If either condition is not metif communities do not elect to participate in the program 
or if they do so but fail to adequately enforce those building standards and others, then lives and 
property are placed in harms way; buildings will suffer unnecessary flood damage; sound land 
use planning in floodplains is discouraged; the NFIPs actuarial soundness can be jeopardized; 
changes in public policies and regulations may be based on unreliable data; and the costs to 
society from future floods will be increased unnecessarily. In short, a high level of continuous 
compliance with the NFIP standards is crucial to the programs success. Thus, the question of the 

7 An area used solely for parking of vehicles, building access, or storage in an area other than a basement is not 
considered a buildings lowest floor. 

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extent and nature of compliance and noncompliance is an important element of any assessment 
of the NFIP. 

An Evaluation of Compliance with the National Flood Insurance Program was 
performed in two parts, one by AIR and one by Dewberry. Part A: Achieving Community 
Compliance, addressed in this report, assesses the processes for ensuring community compliance 
with NFIP regulations and pertinent legislation. The areas of inquiry include the NFIPs 
approach to training and technical assistance, the effectiveness of tools for monitoring 
community compliance and defining and remedying violations, the roles of FEMAs 
headquarters and regional offices, and state floodplain management offices in supporting the 
NFIP, the capabilities of communities to identify and address violations and the application, 
appropriateness, and effectiveness of sanctions for noncompliance. 

Part B: Are Minimum Building Standards Being Met? was prepared by Dewberry under 
subcontract to AIR, and quantitatively assessed the compliance of post-FIRM buildingsboth 
insured and uninsured in SFHAswith the NFIPs floodplain management regulations, 
especially those related to construction standards. That study estimates, within the areas selected, 
which floodplain management regulations have the highest and lowest rates of compliance and 
characterizes levels of compliance by type and size of community, geographical area, foundation 
type, occupancy, building type, and similar factors. 

By dividing the topic of compliance into two interrelated parts, AIR distinguishes 
between the processes and organizations that support and enforce compliance with NFIP 
standards and the actual compliance or noncompliance of the millions of buildings across the 
United States that are required to meet NFIP construction standards. The disparate forms of 
analysis for the two components of NFIP compliance necessitated two studies, but they are 
interrelated and findings from both are incorporated and cross-referenced in both reports when 
appropriate. 

Despite FEMAs efforts to monitor communities compliance, the level of compliance 
had been unknown for many years. In Sharing the Challenge, the Interagency Floodplain 
Management Review Committee (1994) observed that many communities are not enforcing 
their [floodplain management] ordinances adequately, often because they do not understand the 
program requirements or the long-term benefits of reducing flood damage. Pasterick (1998) 
noted that the NFIP compliance process has identified a number of violations of program 
standards at the local level He also observed there has never been a comprehensive 
assessment of the level of compliance nationwide. 

This evaluation is intended to fill that gap, at least in part, with the dual studies focusing 
on both the extent to which local floodplain management programs meet the NFIP standards 
(Part A, described in this report) and the compliance with those standards of the buildings that 
are constructed within those jurisdictions (Part B, described in Mathis and Nicholson 2006). 

1.2.1 The Community Compliance Process and Model 
Although the NFIP is a national program, its implementation takes place at the 
community level. The process begins when FEMA conducts an engineering study of the flood 
hazard in a community and produces a flood map for the community based on that study. To 
participate in the NFIP, the community must adopt and agree to enforce a floodplain 

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management ordinance to manage the flood hazards depicted on the map according to standards 
set out in the NFIP regulations (or higher standards). In exchange for a communitys 
commitment to regulate its floodplain, FEMA declares its property owners eligible to purchase 
flood insurance through the NFIP. 

Some states require communities to meet requirements more stringent than the NFIPs 
minimum requirements and, in these cases, the state requirements take precedence. Communities 
also may choose to have more stringent standards for themselves. To remain in good standing 
with the NFIP and thereby maintain the availability of flood insurance for its residents, a 
community must remain compliant with the NFIP standards. 

To be compliant with the NFIP, a community must fulfill responsibilities in two major 
categories: its program must operate in accord with NFIP requirements, and the structures built 
and development carried out within its jurisdiction must individually meet NFIP requirements. 
The NFIP regulations at 44 CFR 60 list and provide details on the program, construction, and 
other standards, but for purposes of discussing community compliance, the requirements are 
generalized in the list in figure 1. 

There are numerous additional details associated with these requirements and their 
applicability, which are not discussed here. For example, the construction rules apply only to 
structures built after the community received an official FIRM (called post-FIRM structures). 
Structures built before the map was adopted (pre-FIRM structures) are not subject to the rules. 
However, pre-FIRM structures must be brought to post-FIRM standards when they suffer 
damage equal to or greater than half the value or replacement cost of the structure (called 
substantial damage), or when they are improved at a cost equaling or exceeding 50 percent of the 
buildings value or replacement cost (called substantial improvement). 

When a community joins the NFIP, its ordinance is reviewed to be sure it meets the NFIP 
standards. After that, participating communities are contacted and visited periodically by staff of 
the FEMA regional offices or the state floodplain management office, to provide the local staff 
and officials with any technical information and guidance they may need to administer their local 
ordinance effectively and run a program that meets NFIP requirements and results in buildings 
and development that also meet those requirements and thus are protected from flood damage. 

If and when FEMA or state staff discover that a communitys program is not meeting 
NFIP standards and/or that there are buildings or other development in the community that are in 
violation of the communitys ordinance, the community is required to take corrective measures, 
with assistance and guidance from FEMA and the state. Communities that do not correct 
deficiencies in their programs and remedy the violations after a suitable amount of time and 
assistance can be placed on probation and ultimately suspended from the NFIP, resulting in the 
loss of flood insurance for their residents. Suspended communities can be reinstated after 
addressing their compliance problems. 

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FIGURE 1: Basic Components of Community Compliance 
with NFIP Requirements 

 Floodplain management ordinance, regulations meet NFIP criteria 
 Administration, inspection, and enforcement procedures effective 
 Engineering review and support adequate 
 Other community measures (land use plan, building code, zoning, etc.) 
consistent with NFIP standards 
 Buildings in flood hazard area elevated to proper level 
 Enclosures below base flood elevation restricted 
 Openings for entry of flood waters adequate 
 Manufactured homes properly elevated and anchored 
 Building components (HVAC, utilities) elevated 
 Floodway not encroached upon 
 Buildings in V Zones anchored on pile/column foundations 
 Buildings in V Zone landward of mean high tide 
The NFIP Compliance Model 

Successful implementation of the NFIPand the accompanying minimization of flood 
risk and flood damagedepends heavily on how well local governments administer their 
ordinances. To help ensure that community programs nationwide are compliant and that 
violations are minimal, FEMA and the states employ a multi-faceted compliance program 
incorporating numerous techniques, all with an eye toward building local capability that will 
alleviate flood damage today and prevent losses in the future as well. 

Compliance at the local level can be lacking for many reasons. Noncompliance may be 
due to staff turnover, local officials lack of technical expertise, misunderstanding about what 
they are required to do, or failure to appreciate the reasons for the requirements and the possible 
consequences of noncompliance (FEMA 1986, 2002). Similarly, local officials may bend to 
political pressure because they do not fully understand the purpose of a particular regulation or 
the possible consequences of not meeting it. On the other hand, noncompliance may be 
intentionalthe result of willful disregard of the NFIP standards and the communitys own 
ordinance and regulations. 

Because FEMA has no written description of the model that underlies its compliance 
program, the study team characterized the implicit model for purposes of this evaluation, based 
on the agencys preferred approach and comparisons to other governmental models of 
compliance. In the study teams depiction, the NFIP program for community compliance has 
three broad components: (1) promotion, (2) monitoring, and (3) enforcement. These are the three 
main approaches FEMA and the states use to try to achieve full compliance with the NFIP 
standards, nationwide. The word promotion is used here to encompass all the activities that are 
geared toward informing and educating appropriate people, in appropriate detail, about the NFIP, 
its standards, and the reasons for and benefits of it. The activities FEMA calls technical 

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assistance8 make up a large part of the promotion component of the compliance program. The 
second approach is here termed monitoring, and means the process of collecting information; 
documenting activities; archiving both the information and documentation; keeping track of 
activities at local, state, and regional levels; and in general being alert to indicators of possible 
problems communities may be having in implementation of their ordinances to meet the NFIP 
standards. The study team uses the term enforcement to mean the third component of the 
modelthe process through which FEMA (sometimes in conjunction with the states and the 
community) takes action to compel compliance through program-authorized sanctions or legal 
procedures. 

Because of the technical nature of the program and the likelihood of its criteria and 
procedures being misunderstoodparticularly in the case of small communities with minimal inhouse 
expertise and in instances of staff turnoverrather than viewing enforcement as the first 
and only remedy to problems with compliance, FEMA prefers to provide information and 
education (technical assistance) to address the shortcomings in communities efforts before 
initiating formal enforcement action. FEMA has stated that no community should be suspended 
from the program unless efforts have first been made to correct the communitys noncompliance 
through additional training and technical assistance (FEMA 1986). Thus, enforcement sanctions 
such as probation and suspension are not applied as initial tools in the model FEMA uses. That 
is, the assumption is that communities are noncompliant due to their lack of understanding of 
program requirements unless shown otherwise, through continued patterns of problems. 

Three basic assumptions are implicit in the NFIP compliance model: 

 Most property owners, community officials, and developers will follow the rules and 
standards once they understand them and the reasons behind them. 
 Incentives are more effective than sanctions, although both are necessary. 
 Similarly situated communities should receive consistent treatment. 
As will be seen, these assumptions have helped to shape the focus and emphasis of the 
NFIP compliance program as administered by FEMA. They are in keeping with similar 
assumptions underlying some other governmental enforcement models. 

Each of the three components of the NFIP community compliance program (promotion, 
monitoring, and enforcement) is supported by several techniques or tools that are used to 
achieve success at that approach (figure 2). Some tools support more than one approach to 
achieving compliance, and the distinction among approaches is not necessarily a sharp one. It 
should also be noted that the approaches can be applied simultaneously and are mutually 
supportive. In this evaluation, each of the tools is examined separately in order to assess its 
effectiveness. This framework uses terminology and techniques similar to those used by the 
compliance and enforcement systems found in other governmental programs. 

8 Technical assistance takes many forms, including phone and other contacts with NFIP communities, visits to 
communities, the issuance of procedural guidance, development of technical publications, and responding to 
inquiries. 

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One way of visualizing the compliance process is to begin at the left and move to the 
right along the top of figure 2. If one assumes, as FEMA does, that the central problem faced 
regarding compliance is of awareness an understanding of complicated rules and that most 
communities and property owners will meet the standards voluntarily when they become aware 
of them, putting the bulk of program effort and resources into promoting compliance may be a 
proper program design. In this model, the second component, monitoring, is simply a vehicle for 
determining whether and where the promotional work was successful and for injecting additional 
promotion (in the form of technical assistance or training, for instance) for communities in need 
or on issues that appear to be problematic. The third component, enforcement, covers the 
situations in which promotion was found (through monitoring techniques) to be unsuccessful 
(resulting in continued compliance problems) and additional promotional effort by FEMA and/or 
the state did not result in resolution of the problems. Besides addressing the recalcitrant 
communities, the enforcement component, when employed properly, is presumed to serve as a 
deterrent to noncompliance among other communities. 

FIGURE 2: The Program for Achieving Community Compliance with the NFIP 

Approaches/Components 
Promoting 
Community 
Compliance 
Monitoring 
Community 
Compliance 
Enforcing 
Community 
Compliance 
Tools 
Training 
Technical Assistance 
(community 
assistance contacts, 
community assistance 
visits, procedural 
guidance, technical 
publications, response 
to inquiries, other) 
Professional 
Certification 
Incentives (insurance 
availability, insurance 
rating structure, CRS 
discount, ICC 
coverage) 
Disincentives 
(loss of insurance 
availability, insurance 
rating structure, denial 
of insurance coverage 
(1316), denial of 
flood disaster 
assistance) 
Community assistance 
contacts and 
Community assistance 
visits, meetings 
Community Rating 
System procedures 
Community 
Information System 
(and data contained 
therein) 
Submit-for-Rate 
Procedure 
Letters of Map 
Revision based on Fill 
(LOMR-Fs) 
Complaints from 
citizens and others 
Correction of Program Deficiencies 
(performed by community) 
Remediation of Violations 
(performed by community) 
Section 1316 Declaration for 
individual structure violations 
(declaration by community; 
insurance denied by FEMA) 
Legal action against owner of 
individual structure (pursued by 
community, state) 
Subrogation against community 
and/or individual (pursued by 
FEMA) 
Probation 
(imposed by FEMA) 
Suspension 
(imposed by FEMA) 

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These three components generally are viewed as essential to the process of achieving 
compliance and are found in varying forms in most regulatory programs. The extent to which 
one should be used over another depends upon the assumptions underlying the compliance 
efforts, the goals in terms of compliance, and the current compliance situation. If one of the 
components or tools is found to be extremely weak, it is possible that the whole program may be 
undermined. On the other hand, it may be that other tools compensate for the weakness, resulting 
in minimal impact from one flawed area. Further, the right mix across these components may 
change over time. 

Constraints and Trade-offs in NFIP Compliance 

The NFIP compliance program operates, as any government program does, under certain 
constraints and must continually make tradeoffs to achieve an appropriate balance among 
competing objectives, approaches, and perspectives. Two constraints are paramount: statutory 
limits and finite resources. 

In passing the National Flood Insurance Act, Congress set out a scheme for the NFIP that 
entailed preserving local authority by assigning the bulk of implementation of the program to the 
local level, with minimal administrative oversight from the federal government. Sensitive to the 
specter of unfunded federal mandates and mindful of the federal scheme of government, both 
the Congress and FEMA have shaped the program to emphasize the benefits to local 
governments and their residents and to provide technical support for locally based 
implementation. For the compliance program of the NFIP, this has meant that there has been no 
development of a large contingent of inspection personnel armed with a variety of penalties to 
buttress a heavy-handed enforcement role for FEMA. Instead, the program relies on various 
forms of support to local governments (funding, training, specialized assistance), along with 
incorporation into the program of financial and other incentives, and a preference for allowing 
autonomous localities to develop over time a capacity for proper implementation. This is an 
understandable approach in a federal system where the federal government has no land use 
authority. 

As with most governmental programs, funds for NFIP compliance are limited. The 
number of FEMA personnel dedicated to the NFIP nationwide is small (less than 150 in 2003) 
given the more than 20,000 communities whose compliance with the NFIP criteria must be 
assured. Since 1986, administrative and operating expenses for the NFIP, including staff salaries, 
have come out of the funds generated by insurance policy premiums and fees. Although this 
protects NFIP staff to some extent from government-wide budget cuts, it also provides a ceiling 
for resources. 

A number of conflicting factors that affect the NFIP compliance program must 
continually be balanced by the NFIP headquarters and regional staff: 

Number of communities vs. number of policiesThere are about 20,000 communities 
participating in the NFIP nationwide, but about half of them have very few flood insurance 
policies (fewer than 10 per community). While FEMAs stated policy regarding compliance is 
that no NFIP community [should be] overlooked (FEMA 1989, p. 1-4), cost-effectiveness in 
distributing scarce resources and protecting the Flood Insurance Fund would dictate that more 
attention be given to the communities with more policies. 

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Number of communities vs. amount and growth of flood riskMany communities 
have little development at risk and are experiencing no or very slow growth, while other 
communities have enormous risk to millions and even billions of dollars of property, increasing 
yearly. Again, cost-effectiveness in distributing scarce resources would dictate that more 
attention be given to the communities with higher flood risk and the potential for additional 
development at risk. 

Present vs. futureWhen assessing community performance of its duties under the 
NFIP compliance program, the focus tends to fall on existing violations. The NFIPs ultimate 
goals are long-term, however: to minimize the amount of property and people at risk over time. 
Because the nation is growing and development is constantly shifting from one area to another 
(towards the coasts in the last few decades, for example), local capacity to cope with increasing 
flood risk must be cultivated. Further, the cost of preventing future problems in terms of 
development should be lower than the cost of mitigating past mistakes. Thus, in the long run, 
focusing on yesterdays mistakes may not be as important or cost effective as preventing 
tomorrows. This suggests that the benefits of pursuing an approach in which supplying a 
community with further education and guidance to avoid future missteps may be more cost 
effective than penalizing it for past errors, again assuming most problems were caused by error 
rather than willful misconduct. 

Cooperative approach vs. penaltiesAn assumption underlying the NFIP compliance 
program, as noted above, is that most people and local governments will meet the required 
standards once they are aware of them. As has been revealed in prior research on enforcement 
schemes (discussed below), this assumption holds true in some circumstances and not in others. 
For the majority of communities, as will be seen throughout the discussion in this report, the 
cooperative approach used by the NFIP compliance program is effective in achieving compliance 
and at comparatively low cost to the federal government. However, for certain communities and 
in certain circumstances, it does not appear to work well and in those instances a stricter stance, 
utilizing penalties, appears necessary. In some instances, optimal ways to reach compliance are 
less clear cut. The difficulty lies in attempting to incorporate both optionscooperative 
approaches and penaltiesin a single program and in establishing thresholds and processes to 
clarify when individuals in charge of enforcement should use one rather than the other. 

Costs to a few communities vs. benefits for allOne of the main purposes of the NFIP 
is to shift the costs of flooding away from the federal taxpayers and onto those who choose to 
bear the risks of flooding. This goal is sound in theory but in implementation poses dilemmas. 
Imposing the ultimate sanction available under the NFIP compliance programsuspending a 
community from the NFIP and thus depriving its residents of flood insurance, federally backed 
mortgages, disaster relief, and other benefitsis a good example of this tradeoff. Given the 
prolonged and painstaking process FEMA follows to try to avoid suspending a community, any 
community that is suspended for failure meet the NFIP standards is likely to have earned its 
penalty. Further, were a disaster to strike that suspended community, the political and public 
pressure to provide federal relief and support despite the communitys status as a non-player 
might be irresistible. This would undermine one of the stated goals of and motives underlying the 
program. Further, whether the intangible deterrence effect of imposing suspension (or other 
sanctions) is worth the negative publicity and political pressure that would accrue to FEMA is a 
constant consideration. 

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1.2.2 Previous Research on Compliance and Enforcement Models 
The study team examined both the literature on compliance and other government 
agencies and programs in search of compliance models that could be used as a basis for 
comparisons to the NFIP compliance program model. The structure of the NFIP is complicated, 
however, making comparisons difficult. The NFIP involves a combination of underlying 
characteristics and assumptions that was not duplicated in any other program encountered by the 
study team.9 These factors include 

 A widely supported public-interest goal (reduction of flood disasters); 
 Shared implementation (federal, state, and local governments all have roles); 
 A combination of governmental and individual or corporate (builders, developers, 
insurers) behavior involved in and affecting compliance; 
 Signals of risk (flood risk) that are infrequent, sometimes ambiguous, and difficult to 
interpret; 
 Considerable diversity in local-level conditions and thus in the ordinances and 
programs to be monitored; 
 Changes (sometimes frequent) in personnel responsible for the entities being 
regulated (communities), along with repeated interactions over time between those 
being monitored and those doing the monitoring; and 
 Political pressure that inhibits the ability to impose strict community-wide penalties. 
The social science literature does provide insights that aid in an examination of certain 
aspects of the NFIPs model. The literature cannot provide definitive answers, however, about 
the efficacy of the NFIP model compared to other programmatic models overall, nor to the value 
of switching to a different approach. 

The academic literature on compliance is tied to that on deterrence, and generally can be 
grouped by the level of subject, including compliance of individuals with government rules, 
compliance of corporate entities with government rules, and compliance of governmental entities 
with the standards of other governmental institutions. The NFIP exhibits a complicated federal 
model of delegated monitoring in which compliance is required both between the property 
owners or individual developers and local governments as well as between communities and 
either state or federal agencies. Most theory and research do not consider federal models 
explicitly but, again, considering one level of the NFIP model at a time (e.g., government-togovernment) 
makes it possible to glean lessons from the research. 

There has been a sizeable amount of research on governmental monitoring of individuals, 
focused primarily on criminal behavior with regard to the tax code. This research demonstrates, 

9 Note that some of these factors are shared by other government programs (the National Pollution Discharge 

Elimination System, administered by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, for one), but no program the 

study team found had all of these characteristics. 

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for example, that tax crimes are reduced when penalties and the probabilities of delivering 
penalties to violators are increased (Zimring and Hawkins 1973; Gibbs 1975; Tittle 1980). The 
research on inter-governmental institutions is more pertinent, however, because that is the basis 
of the NFIP model. 

Research on inter-governmental monitoring and compliance in the United States is 
dominated by research on Congressional monitoring of the executive branch of the federal 
government rather than on national governments monitoring state or local governments. That is, 
much of the literature focuses on organizations and individuals operating as direct agents of the 
principal; fewer studies examine the difference in compliance that results when agents are 
independent entities (as communities are) that do not exist solely to achieve the principals 
(NFIPs) mission. Most theoretical work has considered simplified models whose components 
can be delineated clearly, and most empirical research focuses on governmental entities that lack 
the complexity of the NFIP. This review focuses on only that theory and research most relevant 
to the NFIPs model and on the possible applicability of alternate models. 

The early research on the principal agent theory focused on deterrence models of 
enforcement that are characterized by frequent, inflexible penalties backed up by the threat of 
additional legal action. The deterrence model has been used in governmental issues such as tax 
enforcement and some environmental regulations where the primary underlying assumption is 
that compliance cannot be structured in a way that is either (1) incentive compatible to reduce 
noncompliance, or (2) does not include incentives for free riders to benefit from everyone 
elses compliance threatening the system to unravel. Scholz (1997) notes that early theoretical 
work that supported the effectiveness of deterrence models (Becker 1968, Stigler 1970, and 
Posner 1986) relied on four simplifying assumptions to define the enforcement problem: (1) 
monitored entities are fully informed utility maximizers; (2) legal statutes unambiguously define 
misbehavior; (3) legal punishment provides the primary incentive for compliance; and (4) 
enforcement agencies optimally detect and punish misbehavior, given available resources. None 
of these assumptions is closely applicable to the NFIP. 

One problem with attempting to apply a simplified general deterrence model of 
compliance to the NFIP is that the underlying assumptions do not accommodate for entities that 
behave with bounded rationality because of their complicated internal structures (government at 
any level, for example). The underlying assumptions of such a general model also do not 
accommodate situations in which rules and behavior are often inherently ambiguous, as they are 
under the NFIP, or for the potential of imperfect enforcement by agencies. Most of these 
assumptions are violated for the NFIP at some level, as they are for some other governmental 
programs. Many of the approaches for enforcement used in the NFIP such as emphasizing use of 
positive incentives to promote compliance and providing considerable discretion and flexibility 
to the regulators (regional offices and states) in order to address widely varying situations across 
the country do not fit the traditional model. There is considerable evidence as well that 
traditional sanctions can be inefficient deterrents under certain circumstances, including some of 
those faced by the NFIP (Adler 1983; Ansari 1990; Bachman, Bowers, and Marcus 1968; Rahim 
and Buntzman 1989; Kanter 1977). 

Broadening to other compliance and enforcement regimes, there are three notable areas 
of research that are potentially relevant to this analysis of the NFIP: error-correction models, 
cooperative enforcement strategies, and voluntary mechanisms. 

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Error-Correction Models 

When the primary concerns of an enforcement program are unintentional errors that 
everyone wants to avoid, the error-correction model may be an appropriate general model of 
compliance to consider. Unintentional errors are most likely to occur when the signs of risk are 
infrequent and difficult to interpret, as is often the case with flooding, and which involve 
problematic externalities that are not reflected clearly in economic costs at the time when 
decisions about risk-coping strategies are made. To reduce these mistakes, the research on this 
model suggests policy solutions that bolster the self-monitoring and error-correction mechanisms 

(1) within organizations, (2) by third-parties (insurers, underwriters, etc.), or (3) using public 
monitors. This research also suggests the creation of redundant error-detection systems 
(Heimann 1997; Landau 1969; Scholz 1984). 
In theory, the frequency of inspections and extent of redundancy should be related to the 
magnitude of risk to life but, in reality, the costs of the detection systems also plays a role, 
especially when that cost is considered in light of the magnitude of fears resulting from errors. 
For example, society tends to prefer higher intensity and redundancy in error-detection systems 
for high-salience risks, such as airplanes and nuclear plants, than for risks like automobile 
accidents or non-catastrophic floods, which seem mundane. These social preferences change 
over time as relative and absolute perceived risks change. In accord with this theory, the NFIP 
maintains a low level of intensity of error-detection systems and redundancy compared to other 
threats, even though more people die from floods and more property losses occur from them. 
This situation is due, in part, to biases toward the high-visibility but low-probability risks (Slovic 
et al. 1977)10 and the optimistic bias that floods will not happen to oneself (Mileti and 
Darlington 1995; Mileti, Fitzpatrick, and Farhar 1992).11 

The research on error-correction models also indicates that penalties have an effect on 
compliance, although compliance does not necessarily increase with the size of the penalty. For 
instance, one study of workplace safety and the regulations of the Occupational Safety and 
Health Administration indicates that, although penalties do improve safety, the size of the 
penalty has little effect on the level of improvement (Scholz and Gray 1990). The literature also 
suggests the importance of cooperation among different agencies or levels of government: for 
instance, if the agreed-upon technique for achieving compliance in error-correction systems is a 
threat from a single deterrence-oriented agency at any level may result in lessened cooperation 
from the organization under scrutiny. Although this work focuses on corporate behavior rather 
than inter-governmental relations, its findings have direct relevance to the NFIP, in which at least 
50 state agencies, FEMA headquarters, 10 FEMA regional offices, and 20,000 communities all 
share responsibility for community compliance and clearly benefit from mutual cooperation. 

10 As early as 1977, a series of laboratory experiments by Slovic and his colleagues showed that people are willing 

to accept low probability and high cost risks but protect themselves against more certain risks, even if the cost of 

such losses would be low. 
11 Research indicates that, in general, the public does not perceive the risk of suffering damage or loss from a flood 

to be high and that most people do not believe that their homes will ever be flooded (Bozell, KRC, and Westhill no 

date; KRC 1995, 1996, 1999) 

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Cooperative Enforcement Strategies 

One type of compliance program emphasizing an approach that potentially is of greater 
relevance to the NFIP is cooperative enforcement strategies. These emphasize the ability to scale 
penalties according to the behavior patterns of the monitored entities, the ability of monitoring 
entities to use discretion and flexibility in enforcement mechanisms, and a sufficiently 
empowered enforcement agency to maintain a credible threat of enforcement (Ayres and 
Braithwaite 1992; Scholz 1991).12 The assumptions that underlie cooperative approaches are that 
activity can be monitored or self-monitored successfully and transparently, the organizations 
being monitored would not gain a significant economic comparative advantage over their 
competition if they fail to comply, and interactions are repeated over time. The latter assumption 
is a finding suggested by the prisoners dilemma problem13, in which cooperative solutions can 
be reached as long as each side expects frequent, long-term interactions. If interactions continue 
over time, then all parties realize that long-term payoffs based on good-faith effort will outweigh 
short-term incentives to shirk. 

An example of cooperative enforcement from the NFIP compliance process is that staff 
members from FEMA regional offices and states have considerable flexibility in working with a 
community that is having compliance problems. Good faith and hard work on the part of the 
local staff are routinely taken into consideration when evaluating the communitys progress 
toward remedying its violations. Under the NFIP, the focus during community contacts and visits 
is on using technical assistance to help the community achieve compliant status rather than 
threatening to penalize the community if it does not meet the standards. This is based on the 
assumption that lack of knowledge is the main barrier to compliance and the realization that 
FEMA, the states, and the communities will be interacting more or less continuously as long as 
the NFIP endures. The cooperative enforcement model is perhaps the closest fit to the overall 
NFIP compliance process of all the models the study team examined. 

The benefit of cooperative strategies in regulatory enforcement, when the underlying 
assumptions are met, is that there is a lower administrative and legal burden on the regulating 
agencies and potentially higher levels of cooperation than with other approaches. This is 
important to the NFIP, not only because high levels of local compliance are desired but also 
because of the limited resources available at the federal level to ensure compliance. One 
empirical research project indicates that deterrence-oriented strategies that use punishments 
frequently are less effective in reducing workplace injuries than cooperative enforcement 
strategies that use punishments less frequently in response to cooperation on the part of the 
regulated community (Scholz 1991). 

The cooperative enforcement literature does underscore, however, that compliance 
initiatives are most effective if they are supported by a credible threat of enforcement action 
(Cohen 1998; Compliance Information Project 1999; Crow et al. 2000). Furthermore, a study by 
the Canadian group Pollution Probe (1999), which reviewed voluntary initiatives in 

12 Error correction regimes may or may not be cooperative in their approach, so these categories are not mutually 

exclusive. Regulations and standards that are developed cooperatively between the regulator and the regulated 

community are a related approach. 
13 See, for example, Axelrod (1984) for a discussion of the application of the prisoners dilemma to governance and 

other applications. 

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environmental protection and resource conservation, concluded, in part, that these initiatives 
should have clear targets and timelines with progress measured at regular intervals.14 

One drawback to cooperative enforcement strategies noted in the literature is that 
enforcement agencies and those regulated have a temptation to take advantage of each other. 
Inspectors can insist on expensive measures that fulfill all requirements even when overall harm 
is reduced more by other measures. Those regulated have the advantage of knowing far more 
than the inspectors about what is actually happening and can disguise their actual level of 
compliance. They may also discount the cost of being caught if they do not expect continued 
interaction with the other entities. This concern arises consistently in the environmental policy 
and some other regulatory arenas. The study team did not uncover the first issue as a central 
concern for the NFIP, and disguising behavior is not generally cited as a problem for the NFIP 
either, but the issue of informational asymmetries and complications in effective monitoring is a 
prominent theme in this study. 

The concern for the NFIP suggested in the research on cooperative enforcement strategies 
is whether the program has the political strength to suspend any given community from the 
program, its strongest penalty. Some evidence from interviews with state-level NFIP 
coordinators and other state agencies conducted for this study as well as a related one (Mittler et 
al. 2006) suggests that the perception among state-level representatives that reluctance of some 
FEMA regional offices to use the probation sanction (which precedes suspension) undermines 
efforts to achieve compliance when following up community violations. The compliance 
literature suggests that the trade-off in allowing flexibility across inspectors (in the case of the 
NFIP, the regional offices and states) is that rates of compliance for recalcitrant communities 
may be lower in regions that do not readily put communities on probation, all else held equal. 

This hypothesis is extremely difficult to test quantitatively in the NFIP and in most other 
cooperative enforcement regimes. First, the test there would have to include a control for the 
dissimilarities across regions. Second, measuring strategic preemptive behavior and non-events 
is highly problematic due to the threat of enforcement. That is, it is often hard to discern through 
data (even if perfectly gathered) the difference between a community that prevents or corrects 
violations because of the threat of probation and one that does so without such a threat.15 Brehm 
(1996) notes that these selection bias issues are endemic in researching cooperative 
compliance where the situation that is observed is generally one of sanctions having been applied 
after unsuccessful negotiations. Anecdotal evidence from these research efforts provides some 
support for this contention. In the environmental literature, such as air pollution enforcement, it 
often is claimed that communications that involve threats to begin enforcement proceedings are 
easier signals for Congressional overseers (and researchers) to count as effort toward enforcing 
compliance, but they may be less successful in moving toward compliance than informal threats 
and discussions with non-compliant companies. The problem of selection bias is ameliorated 

14 Another example comes from an ad hoc group composed of both environmental advocacy and industry 

representatives calling itself the New Directions Group (NDG), which developed both principles and criteria that 

should underlie both the design and practice of these approaches. Their work stresses that cooperative agreements 

should be participatory, transparent, and performance based. 
15For example, formal theoretical approaches to studying Congressional oversight observe that an oversight 

committees apparent inactivity with respect to an agency does not mean the agency exercises complete discretion 

(McCubbins and Schwartz 1984, McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast 1987, 1989, 1990). 

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somewhat with the NFIP in that some information is retained about community contacts and 
visits even when the result of the visit is that no violations or problems are found. Unfortunately, 
considerable improvements could be made in the recording and cataloging of this information, as 
discussed in Section 5.2 of this report as well as in Mittler et al., (2006). 

Despite this concern, the primary assumptions underlying cooperative enforcement 
models are supported in the NFIP compliance process, suggesting that the choice of using this 
strategy within the NFIP may be appropriate and more productive than the less cooperative 
approach of threatening and using stricter penalties in a majority of the compliance cases. 

Voluntary Mechanisms 

Another set of research relevant to this NFIP study involves the use of voluntary codes 
and agreements. The general set of assumptions underlying the set of choice of a system of 
compliance characterized by voluntary measures is whether expected harm from the behavior is 
not large and the process of creating mandatory rules is highly burdensome, inefficient, 
inflexible (especially when technological change is rapid), or politically infeasible (Baggott 
1986; Harrison 1999). 

Voluntary compliance approaches vary widely. They can include agreements between 
private organizations, where government merely supports agreements to prevent free riding; 
voluntary agreements directly between an industry and the government to proscribe action 
(sometimes to avoid direct regulation); or just governmental exhortations or challenges. 
Voluntary approaches are used throughout the NFIP but are not central to compliance. States 
may voluntarily require communities to go above and beyond NFIP minimum standards and 
communities may do so on their own. Many individual property owners voluntarily insure 
themselves (some are required to purchase insurance as a condition of receiving a mortgage). 
Communities voluntarily enter the Community Rating System (CRS), a sub-program for 
exemplary local floodplain management programs. The NFIP has buttressed some of its 
voluntary activities by incorporating financial incentives to induce the desired action. 

There is little solid quantitative research on the efficacy of voluntary approaches. 
Because experience with voluntary approaches has been gained only comparatively recently, few 
evaluations have been done. In any case, there are considerable obstacles to evaluation of 
voluntary programs (Harrison 1999). The available research suggests that voluntary approaches 
can be productive when government can provide incentives such as positive social rewards (e.g., 
good publicity, as used by the Environmental Protection Agency in its Clean Air Excellence 
Awards Program) or discounted costs. The NFIP does provide discounts to policyholders in CRS 
communities. However, political theory suggests that it is most effective to match incentives to 
the relevant actor, which in this case is the community. In terms of community-level incentives 
through the NFIPs CRS, policyholders discounts provide little beyond good publicity for 
relevant local government officials and programs in exchange for the sometimes high up-front 
costs to the community for making changes. Thus, the reasons the communities join the CRS are 
more likely to be related to other factors such as the direct reward to community officials of 
reducing future risk after previous flooding experiences, and pride in being singled out as having 
one of the better community-level programs in the country. The literature would suggest that the 
CRS consider providing the communities themselves a direct incentivea reduced cost-share in 

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a flood mitigation project, or funding for community floodplain management programs, for 
example. 

Other Research 

The available research on other aspects of compliance has additional limitations that 
hinder both its application to this study of the NFIP and the study teams ability to consider 
alternative models. Current research provides few quantitative comparisons of actual rates of 
compliance in response to different enforcement regimes. The results that are available are in 
conflict, a result, in part, of the large difference in the types of compliance issues measured 
(Burby, May, and Paterson 1993: Harrison 1999; Scholz 1991). Nor is there much research on 
proper responses to declining ratios of the number of those involved in monitoring and enforcing 
to the number of entities being monitored, as is found with the NFIP over time (federal and state 
staff levels remain fairly steady while the number of communities and amount of floodplain 
development grows). Further, the complexity inherent in the many layers of interactions within 
the NFIP generally is not addressed in formal (mathematical) theoretical models due, in part, to 
the expected indeterminacy of results with so many players and variables (see McKelvey 1979). 

Moe (1985) provided an example of a complicated multi-layer empirical analysis of 
regulatory agency performance that is perhaps the most relevant to the NFIP. He considered the 
web of interactions surrounding the performance of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) 
relative to the wishes of its principals. His structural model includes Congress, the President, the 
courts, various constituencies, and the NLRB staff and its field agents, and is constrained by 
processes established by the principals and economic conditions. The model is sufficiently 
different from the NFIP in terms of a compliance system, that the specifics are not directly 
comparable. Moe found that organizations performance is endogenous to the preferences of all 
parties, not just to the top-most principals (Congress and the President), and the behavior of each 
principal or actor adjusts to that of the others to create an equilibrium outcome. The outcomes 
were not simple to predict based on stated goals of just Congress or the executive branch. In 
addition, the equilibrium tended to be protected by everyone involved, at least in the absence of 
an external shock to the system. 

It also should be noted from the literature that, in regulatory regimes with competing 
constituencies and interests, often designed with conflicting (or even unstated) goals, less than 
optimal performance towards any one of those goals can be expected. Further, the process can be 
changed quickly only with considerable difficulty. The NFIP fits this description to a large extent 
with its multiple constituencies and the fact that some goals (such as actuarial soundness) can be 
in conflict with that of proper floodplain management and prevention of flood losses, as 
discussed in another sub-study of the NFIP Evaluation (Bingham et al. 2006). This body of 
research draws attention to the fact that the NFIP not only exists to serve multiple principals and 
multiple constituencies, but that its outcomes are difficult to predict based on generic approaches 
to compliance that are not specific to the NFIPs structure and unique characteristics. 

1.2.3 Applicability of Previous Research to the NFIP 
In sum, the research does not provide clear answers to the question of what compliance 
and enforcement models would be most comparable to the NFIP. Indeed, it seems evident that no 
single standard model can reasonably be applied to the NFIP and, moreover, the research 

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suggests that there are trade-offs inherent in all approaches. As this discussion reveals, the NFIP 
in fact uses more than one of the structural elements of compliance models discussed in this 
sectioncooperative enforcement, voluntary measures, incentives, and sanctions. In addition, 
the NFIP tends to adopt each element when the assumptions appropriate to that element are met 
and when the tradeoffs suggested in the literature favor the compliance approach taken. The 
evaluation of NFIP compliance discussed in this report therefore focuses how well the multiple-
layered model functions, and how effective it is in helping the NFIP achieve its goals. 

1.2.4 Scope and Method for Assessing Community Compliance 
This evaluation of community compliance with the NFIP considers the role of each level 
of government in the NFIP community compliance program, the operation of each of the 
programs three components (promotion, monitoring, and enforcement), the effectiveness of the 
overall program model (a combination of cooperative, voluntary, self-monitoring, and deterrence 
approaches), the impact of several special issues on community compliance, and the nationwide 
level of community compliance. The study team addresses issues, processes, and procedures that 
are widely recognized as indicators of compliance and discusses both the NFIPs many strengths 
and its seeming weaknesses. In identifying both, the goal is to recognize the programs 
considerable accomplishments with regard to compliance as well as to improve its overall 
effectiveness. 

To gain familiarity with the NFIP and build background knowledge, the study team 
reviewed hundreds of academic and evaluative reports from both FEMA and FEMAs Inspector 
General and outside organizations such as the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) 
and the Association of State Floodplain Managers (ASFPM). The study team conducted many 
interviews with officials at FEMA headquarters and in most of the regional offices to obtain 
information on federal policy, guidance, and organizational history. 

The study design included consideration of the collection of aggregate data, case studies, 
and interviews. The research design chosen focuses on lengthy, open-ended interviews with 
regional, state, and community staff. Budget restrictions precluded a sufficiently large randomly 
drawn sample of communities to be statistically representative of the whole country. Instead, the 
study team purposively selected communities to interview that would make the sample as 
representative as possible of the issues and problems faced nationwide, focusing in particular on 
the areas where current and future flood risk is greatest and thus where success in compliance is 
most important. These interviews were concentrated primarily, but not exclusively, in many of the 
nations most vulnerable communities (e.g., several in the New Orleans area) as well as in 
communities with high concentrations of policyholders across the country, such as coastal Florida 
and Texas. 

This approach of over-sampling communities most at risk is warranted not only 
because it concentrates attention where the issue is most important but also because there are so 
many communities in the nation with very few flood insurance policies. More than half of the 
20,000 NFIP communities have 10 or fewer flood insurance policiesabout 3,000 of those have 
no policies at all. Given a growing list of 20,000 communities and a shrinking or static 
operational budget for compliance for the implementing agency (FEMA), the evaluation model 
should mirror the strategy of placing emphasis where risk from lack of compliance is greatest. 
These concerns are greatest in the areas in which the study team over-sampled in its interview 

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approach, and so successful compliance among these areas perhaps should be weighted more 
heavily in the evaluation of compliance. 

It should also be noted that this was a multi-year investigation so a cut-off date had to be 
established to enable the study team to concentrate on analysis instead of continually accumulating 
more updated information. Thus, certain single years (say, 2002) or cut-off dates were chosen for 
analysis of given topics, even though by now more up-to-date information exists. Issues for which 
significant changes took place after the data-gathering ceased are noted. Every effort was made to 
obtain the most current and accurate data when possible. 

The selection of FEMA regional offices and their staff, states, and communities was 
based on a combination of factors: FEMAs recommendations of respondent entities that likely 
would yield meaningful insights; AIRs judgment of the entities most likely to shed light on the 
questions developed in light of the background material and preliminary interviews; a weighted 
sample of communities and FEMA regions that represented most of the flood insurance policies 
and major flood risk areas; and the time, cost, and personnel limitations imposed by the scope of 
the overall study. A clustering sample selection approach was used to reduce time, effort, and 
travel expenditures. That is, if interviews and research were scheduled for a particular FEMA 
regional office, the study team took advantage of the proximity of its field personnel to conduct 
interviews and research with states and/or communities nearby. This purposive approach also 
attempted to choose respondents broadly representative of the universe of NFIP communities, 
states, or FEMA regional offices and thus provide different perspectives on compliance. 

The study members also met with lenders, members of the National Flood Determination 
Association, and representatives of companies that sell flood insurance, and also had access to 
correspondence between FEMA regional offices and states and communities. Many of these 
communities were contacted by telephone. Correspondence also included reports on visits to 
communities. 

This purposive sampling had both advantages and disadvantages. On the positive side, 
the study team was able to gather a large amount of information about many of the issues 
believed to be central to the question of the success of community compliance with the NFIP, 
including the opinions of many professionals with expertise accumulated over decades. A 
principal drawback of the sampling method was that for most issues the data obtained cannot be 
judged to be perfectly representative of the universe of NFIP communities, states, or (perhaps to 
a lesser extent) FEMA regional offices. Nor is it possible with data obtained through this method 
to make direct comparisons of compliance between groups of communities with different 
characteristics (such as coastal vs. inland communities; Community Rating System participants 
vs. non-participants; communities with recent flood experience vs. those with none; etc.). 

Although consideration was given to performing one or more case studies of compliance 
in a particular state or community (or both), the study team concluded that this approach was not 
the most effective use of study time or funds. The complexity of the compliance process within a 
community, combined with the wide array of individual characteristics that are specific to a 
given community, and the fact that NFIP compliance or noncompliance unfolds over time 
sometimes a long period of timesuggested that case studies of individual communities could 
provide incomplete pictures even for the type of community they were intended to represent. 
Although a series of case studies would yield some useful information, the information would be 

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far from generalizable, so the decision was made in consultation with FEMA to focus the scope 
of work on national-level patterns. 

FEMAs 10 regional offices hold primary responsibility for implementing, managing, and 
monitoring community compliance with the NFIP and retain considerable autonomy and 
discretion to address compliance issues. Recognizing this, the study team conducted lengthy, 
open-ended interviews in eight of the 10 regional offices with 70 staff membersincluding 16 
senior NFIP staff. The study team conducted additional interviews with representatives of 10 
NFIP state coordinating agencies, 21 participating communities; four regional, nongovernmental 
organizations involved in the NFIP; the Association of State Floodplain Managers (ASFPM); 
and several specialists in specific areas of the NFIP, such as insurance and training. The regional 
offices included in the interviews covered more than 90 percent of the flood insurance policies 
and 80% of the communities in the NFIP. 

During each field investigation, the study team collected community files, policy 
guidance, and letter and communication templates. All of the interviews conducted were open-
ended to allow respondents to fully expand on their experiences and observations regarding 
compliance. Several of the same questions were asked of most respondents to assure some 
consistency across interviews and to allow comparisons. The responses gathered from these 
interviews often guided further research by identifying the compliance processes that are difficult 
or problematic to implement. For example, it was through these interviews and review of 
additional literature that the study team identified the need to pay particular attention to 
community compliance with the NFIPs substantial damage regulations and to variances. 
Confidentiality was promised and provided to each respondent. 

The study team had access to the Community Information System (CIS) and Bureaunet 
databases and reporting tools (described in subsequent sections of this report) to gather 
information on a number of subjects. Much of the observation and analysis focused on contacts 
and visits with communities conducted by FEMA regional office or state personnel. To gain a 
better understanding of the tools for monitoring compliance and providing training, the study 
team shadowed staff on assistance visits conducted in four participating communities. These 
visits ranged from one to five days. 

1.3 Organization of the Report 
Chapter 2 of this report discusses the level of community compliance nationwide. The 
chapter after that begins the presentation of data about and analysis of the roles played by the 
different levels of government in the compliance program of the NFIP. After that, each of the 
components of the program is evaluated in a separate chapter (promotion, monitoring, and 
enforcement). Chapter 7 then explores three potentially problematic issues in community 
compliance (the substantial damage/improvement requirement, variances, and the Community 
Rating System). That is followed by Chapter 8, a summary of the evaluation. In Chapter 9 the 
study team presents recommendations for improving the effectiveness of the community 
compliance program. A series of appendixes supplies backup information as referenced in the 
body of the report. 

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2. THE LEVEL OF COMMUNITY COMPLIANCE NATIONWIDE 
In 1998, it was observed that there has never been a comprehensive assessment of the 
level of compliance nationwide (Pasterick 1998). In the 35 years of the existence of the NFIP, 
the extent to which communities and buildings have been meeting the standards set forth to 
minimize flood damage had never been measured. At the outset of this evaluation of the NFIP, it 
was hoped that this investigation could at last shed light on those elusive figures. This study on 
community compliance and the companion study on building compliance (Mathis and Nicholson 
2006) have made progress in answering that question, but producing comprehensive and fully 
reliable statistics has proven problematic. 

This chapter describes the methods of measuring compliance that were considered by the 
study team, lists the advantages and drawbacks of each, and explains why each was rejected for 
this study. That is followed by a discussion of a means by which the study team was able to 
generate a rough estimate of the level of community compliance nationwide, along with a 
description of that methods assumptions and shortcomings. 

2.1 Defining Compliance 
In general, under the compliance model used by FEMA, a community is either compliant 
or noncompliant. For compliance purposes, FEMA does not assign ratings to communities, nor 
does it establish performance rankings or grade levels. The main reason for this is that the NFIP 
standards set forth in the regulations are minima that must be met for a community to participate 
in the NFIP. The only communities that are formally and publicly considered noncompliant in 
the NFIP are those that are on probation or have been suspended from the program. 

Nevertheless, there are some gray areas, notably the situations in which a community 
has been found to have some enforcement problems (program deficiencies and/or violations) and 
is working to address them. As discussed elsewhere in this report, the process of correcting 
program deficiencies and remedying violations can take a long timea year or moreso that 
condition of indefinite status can last at least that long. Another gray area is the situation in 
which a community is found to have program deficiencies or violations, but they are minor as 
defined by the NFIP community compliance program. It is very common to find a community 
with at least one enforcement problem, so in attempting to develop an aggregate measure of 
compliance, consideration must be given to whether communities in these situations are to be 
considered compliant or noncompliant. 

This difficulty is also encountered in other compliance and enforcement programs. For 
example, it has been noted that for the pollution control programs of the Environmental 
Protection Agency there are a series of definitional and usage problems that frustrate those who 
would like to use the term compliance (Brown and Green 2001, p. 40). These include the 
question of whether a facility (a community, in the NFIP model) is assumed to be compliant if it 
has not been inspected lately, or whether it is therefore assumed to have the same status as it did 
at its last inspection, even if that was noncompliance. Another example is whether one day of 
emitting pollutants renders a facility noncompliant for the whole quarter or other reporting 
period. 

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2.2 The Optimal Level of Compliance 
The study team did not uncover any statement by FEMA or Congress about what level of 
compliance with the NFIP should be sought nationwide, nor is there a clearly relevant alternative 
governmental compliance program model with well-defined, publicly-stated goals for 
compliance levels. It seems obvious that anticipating 100 percent community compliance is 
unrealistic, but a desired level has neither been defined nor illuminated in the research literature 
on other compliance schemes. 

Some examples of levels of compliance calculated for other programs are presented 
below. The difference between the NFIP and the other programs in these examples in terms of 
purpose, operational framework, entities monitored and regulated, and enforcement options 
available is readily apparent and makes all of these unsuitable for direct comparison. 
Nevertheless, they do give a flavor of the range of compliance levels experienced in nationwide 
programs as well as the variation in means by which these figures are obtained and calculated. In 
the research literature and public documents describing environmental and other compliance 
there was a pervasive lament about the relative lack of effective monitoring and the shortage of 
solid evidence of compliance (Portney 1990). 

 The compliance with the provisions of the Highly Erodible Land Conservation and 
Wetland Conservation programs of the U.S. Department of Agriculture was found to 
be about 97 percent. This was based on a review of the records for 17,723 tracts of 
land that are receiving payments under those programs (covering about 4.9 million 
acres), of which about two-thirds were selected randomly and the other third 
purposively because of the potential for noncompliance (Claassen et al. 2005, p. 13). 
The U.S. General Accounting Office criticized the method used to reach this figure as 
including some tracts that were not required to comply with the provisions (U.S. 
General Accounting Office 2003). When these were omitted from the totals, the 
compliance rate came down to 93 percent. 
 Based on a survey of managers of underground storage tank programs in all 50 states, 
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency found that 89 percent of the 700,000 tanks 
subject to the rules of the Underground Storage Tank program were initially 
compliant, that is, the tanks had the required protective equipment in place that 
prevents hazardous substances from leaking into soil or groundwater. However, 30 
percent of all the tanks were not compliant with the operations and maintenance 
standards (U.S. General Accounting Office 2002, p. 2). 
 The compliance of the manufacturing sector during 2001 and 2002 with the air 
quality program administered by the state of New Jersey was calculated at 64% 
(Shewmake 2004, p. 20). This figure was based on over 7,200 inspections of 1,709 
facilities; those with any emissions violations were considered noncompliant. 
 Based on 35,600 federal and state inspections conducted in 1998 and 1999 of major 
sources of air pollution (as defined under Title V of the Clear Air Act), 88 to 89 
percent of facilities were calculated to have complied with their emissions permits. 
However, knowing that these routine inspections often do not detect all problems, 
EPA further investigated and found that 76 percent of wood production facilities (to 
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cite one example) had made operational changes without obtaining revisions to their 
permits and that, further, in the refinery industry there was widespread under-
reporting of emissions from leaking valves and other equipment (U.S. General 
Accounting Office 2001, p. 2). 

 The proportion of drinking water systems in significant non-compliance with Clean 
Water Act standards was calculated at about 15 percent nationwide (Davies and 
Probst 2001, p. 15). This figure was based on facilities that did not have any 
violations during at least one quarter of Fiscal Year 1998. 
 Based on five years of continuous data on about one million facilities subject to 
federal air, water, waste, and drinking water laws administered and enforced by the 
states under authority delegated from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 97 
percent of all sites were found to be not in significant non-compliance (Brown and 
Green 2001, p. 33). This figure was based on the number of sites for which no 
significant violations were found after inspections (297,000 conducted in 1999 
alone) and/or other compliance evaluations (178,558 conducted in 1999). 
It can be seen from this range of examples that there is wide variation in the way 
compliance is defined and determined, along with variation in the actual aggregated level that is 
calculated. Further, no optimal level of compliance was discussed in relation to any of these 
programs, although all the data were presented in terms of searching for ways to improve the 
compliance rate. In theory, FEMA should be able to develop an optimal level of community 
compliance for the NFIP based on premium income, cost of administering the program, 
anticipated claims, and other factors. But the proper threshold may be more a matter of public 
policy than finance. If communities make a commitment to enforce their ordinances in exchange 
for federal benefits in the form of flood insurance and flood disaster assistance, it seems apparent 
that they should be kept cognizant of the NFIPs requirements, and as best as they can, meet that 
agreement in full at all times. These are issues for Congress and/or FEMA to decide. 

Related to the issue of setting an optimal level of compliance is the question of assessing 
the performance of FEMAs compliance program in relation to overall compliance. For many 
years, there have been complaints from floodplain management staff and officials that FEMA 
does not impose its probation and suspension sanctions often enough. In the absence of 
reliable figures on the overall level of complianceand whether it is rising or falling over 
timeit has been impossible to say whether the sanctions are used in an appropriate number of 
instances or to determine what effect their use may have on levels of compliance. 

Another consideration in determining an optimal level of compliance is that of change 
over time. Any assessment of the level of nationwide compliance would need to be repeated 
periodically because of (1) turnover in local personnel; (2) changes on the ground as 
development occurs and alters watersheds; and (3) changes in the NFIP maps, regulations, 
policies, and guidelines. If an ideal level of compliance is to be used as a goal, the amount and 
types of anticipated change must be taken into account. 

A final factor is whether to give added weight to communities with large numbers of 
flood insurance policies. To protect the Flood Insurance Fund, the level of compliance in those 
communities arguably should be higher, or guarded more rigorously, than in other communities 

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and doing so should be more cost-effective in terms of time and resources available for 
compliance activities. On the other hand, flood damage is just as harmful and disruptive to 
communities with few insurance policies and all flood-prone communities should be ready to 
handle future development in their floodplains. Concerns about equity might dictate that 
communities be treated similarly. Again, this sort of difficulty arises in environmental regulatory 
programs. How does one account, one investigator poses, for the situation in which one small 
facility is compliant with air and water quality laws but another, large facility is not? (Brown and 
Green 2001, p. 40). Depending on how compliance is defined and how the data are aggregated, 
the two entities could have equal impacts on the nationwide compliance rate but they definitely 
have disparate impacts on the overall level of undesirable outcomes (more pollution in the case 
of environmental regulatory programs and, by analogy, more flood losses and costs in the case of 
the NFIP). 

2.3 Independent Evaluation of Compliance 
2.3.1. Compliant Buildings as a Measure 
One of the most illuminating pieces of information that would result from any evaluation 
of NFIP compliance is the extent to which the floodplain areas throughout the United States are 
either free of development or are developed only with buildings that are constructed to resist 
damage. From this perspective, the number of floodplain buildings that are in violation, and how 
serious those violations are, is an important measure of overall compliance with the NFIP. Part B 
of this evaluation, Are Minimum Building Standards Being Met? examined this issue. Of the 
buildings inspected for that study, 63 percent were found to be fully compliant with NFIP 
standards and 89 percent were elevated properly (probably the most effective way to minimize 
future flood damage) although some other aspect of the building may have been noncompliant 
(Mathis and Nicholson 2006). 

2.3.2. Compliant Communities as a Measure 
Measuring the number of building violations is only part of the answer to the question of 
overall compliance. Violations, by definition, have already occurred. Because a principal focus 
of the NFIP is to prevent and minimize future flood damage, the overall administrative strength 
and compliance of each communitys programand the aggregated strength and compliance of 
all the nations community-level programsis important, because that is how future violations 
(and increased flood risk) are prevented. Thus, the number of communities in the United States 
that are compliant at any given point, or over time, is a companion to the level of flood-
resistance of buildings as indicators of overall compliance with the NFIP standards nationwide. 

The study team believes that the most accurate, impartial, and comprehensive way of 
measuring nationwide compliance would be to conduct on-site visits with a representative 
sample of communities nationwide. Floodplain management professionals agree that the only 
way to be certain whether a community is compliant is to conduct an on-site visit and evaluate 
the program. The visit would be similar to a Community Assistance Visit (CAV) (see Section 
4.1) in that it would include checks of community ordinances, records, and procedures, and an 
inspection tour of the floodplain. This would establish a snapshot judgment of the compliance 
or noncompliance of the community at a given point in time. The results of these evaluations 
would be accumulated to determine what percentage of communities is compliant, what kinds of 

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noncompliance are most common, how the level of compliance varies across community types, 
and other information. 

Such an assessment would be a massive undertaking. Experienced personnel would be 
needed to conduct the evaluation visits. The number of communities studied would have to be 
large enough to ensure that a random sample would include representatives from every 
significant category of community: coastal, riverine, rural, urban, slow-growth, fast-growth, and 
others. Reaching agreement on how to define the categories would be necessary as well. Each 
visit would take at least one day and probably several. The travel expenses would be 
considerable. This approach far exceeded the resources available for this study. 

2.4 Existing Data to Measure Community Compliance 
In the absence of the ability to gather extensive and objective indicators on compliance 
independently, the study team looked for data that have already been collected that could be used 
to establish nationwide levels of community compliance with the NFIP. 

Obtaining and cataloging information for all 20,000 communities in the NFIP is 
formidable task. FEMA has been pursuing the collection of aggregate-level compliance data for 
many years, through various means (such as the mandatory biennial reports submitted by 
communities). Most of these data are housed in the Community Information System (CIS) and 
are fairly comprehensive for some categories of information, notably flood insurance, but as 
discussed in detail in Section 5.2, they contain gaps, particularly with regard to data pertaining to 
compliance issues, and are difficult to analyze through the software currently integrated into the 
CIS. Further, although the study team attempted to verify independently some of the crucial 
information, this effort was extremely time-consuming and not wholly successful. Nevertheless, 
the data are useful for certain purposes. 

2.4.1. Alternatives Considered 
Using CRS Communities as a Proxy for Nationwide Compliance 

The study team considered using the Community Rating System (CRS) (see Section 7.3) 
communities as an indicator of overall compliance. This option is attractive for several reasons. 
First, the number of CRS communities is manageable (about 1,000). Second, there exist more 
comprehensive and more accurate data about them than about the rest of the participating communities. 
Third, CRS communities account for about two-thirds of the NFIP policy base, so their 
importance to the NFIP and the Flood Insurance Fund is disproportionately great. 

However, although the level of compliance among CRS communities is a useful 
benchmark, it cannot be said to reflect the entire universe of NFIP communities. Most obviously, 
CRS communities are by definition already supposed to be compliant at meeting the minimum 
standards of the NFIP (although, as shown in Section 7.3.4, they are not 100 percent compliant), 
so their rate of compliance is almost certainly better than that of the rest of the NFIP 
communities. All CRS communities are actively engaged in flood damage reduction beyond the 
minimum requirements, which cannot be said for all the other NFIP communities. Using CRS 
compliance rates would result in an overestimation of nationwide compliance. 

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Communities on Probation or Suspension 

At any point in time, there is only a handful of communities on probation or suspended 
from the NFIP. Although this figure is easy to obtain and verify and does reflect the level of 
formally declared noncompliance (from which a level of compliance can be derived), it is 
meaningless as a measure of on-the-ground adherence to program standards nationwide. Much of 
this report has demonstrated the lengths to which FEMA and the states must go to help 
communities reach a level of compliance that is acceptable, and the difficulties encountered in 
attempting to impose a sanction on a noncompliant community so that it can be considered 
formally noncompliant. Using the number of communities on probation or suspended would 
clearly over-represent the level of nationwide compliance. 

Communities Threatened with Probation 

As with communities on probation or suspension, the number of communities with 
noncompliance severe enough to warrant being threatened with probation via a probation letter is 
easy to obtain (104 in the history of the NFIP), but cannot be considered a measure of overall 
noncompliance. 

Professional Judgment 

Floodplain management staff members from both FEMA regional office and state offices 
were asked during interviews to estimate the percentage of communities in their region or state 
that were compliant with the NFIP standards. Most respondents gave estimated performance 
levels of between 75 and 80 percent compliance. Their estimates ranged from zero to 100 percent 
and applied to both small portions of their territories to entire states. They also noted, however, 
the variability in perceptions of compliance: some staff consider a community with even one 
small violation noncompliant (albeit temporarily) while others believe that, if the community has 
a valid ordinance, is making good faith efforts to implement it, and has avoided numerous 
serious problems then it can be considered substantially compliant. 

Communities with Program Deficiencies or Violations 

The main reason for finding out how compliant communities are nationwide is to obtain 
an idea of how well the NFIP is operating to minimize flood damage. With that in mind, it seems 
clear that for this purpose noncompliance should be defined as all communities with any 
program deficiencies or violations, because those defects represent increased potential flood 
damage. Obtaining the number of communities in this category (or a representative sample of 
this category) would enable the calculation of a nationwide level of compliance. Because FEMA 
and state staff already conduct on-site evaluations of community compliance, in theory their data 
on program deficiencies and violations could be used for such an accounting. 

Section 5.2 describes the procedure by which reports of the onsite visits (CAVs) 
conducted by FEMA and state staff, which list program deficiencies and violations, are 
catalogued in the CIS. In theory it is possible to review all of the CAV reports for a given period 
of time and note the number of communities in which program deficiencies and violations were 
found. From that, an overall level of noncompliance could be extrapolated. The accuracy of this 
technique would depend on the validity of several assumptions: (1) all CAVs that were done 
have been entered in the CIS; (2) the CAV reports as entered in the CIS are accurate; (3) enough 

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CAVs are reviewed to be representative of communities nationwide; and (4) the CAV reports 
have accurately assessed the program deficiencies and violations in each community. Because of 
time constraints and the fact that it was not clear that the assumptions could be met, the study 
team did not review the CIS records to calculate the number of communities with program 
deficiencies or violations noted in the report as filed in the CIS. Therefore, the percentage of 
CAVs that have detected compliance problems is not available as a basis for calculating 
compliance nationwide. 

Communities with Persistent Program Deficiencies or Violations 

Program deficiencies or violations only manifest themselves as additional costs to the 
NFIP if and when development results that is itself noncompliant and thus increases the potential 
for flood damage and then floods do in fact occur. Because of these location- and time-specific 
complications, it is not possible through the method used in this study to calculate additional 
costs to the NFIP, or increased insurance premiums, due to given levels of community 
noncompliance. 

Because floods do not occur frequently in any one community and addressing 
deficiencies and violations can take a long time, for purposes of assessing nationwide compliance, 
therefore, it is reasonable to make an allowance for minimal or short-term noncompliance. 
Taking into consideration FEMAs own guidance on community compliance, which anticipates 
that a year or so may pass before a communitys compliance problems are fully addressed, and 
that historically sanctions usually have been imposed only after several years have passed, the 
study team decided, for purposes of making nationwide estimates, to count as noncompliant 
those communities whose program deficiencies and violations are not addressed within two years 
of being identified. An advantage to this approach was that these data were more readily 
available to the study team. 

2.4.2. Analysis of Communities with Persistent Compliance Problems 
As described in Section 6.1, CAV reports are labeled closed when all outstanding 
compliance issues resulting from the visit have been resolved. From CIS the study team was able 
to obtain data on the number of CAVs conducted and the number that were closed at different 
points in time over a five-year period. (Some of this information is displayed in figure 9.) These 
data showed that, two years after CAVs are conducted, about 30 percent of the communities that 
had received those CAVs still have outstanding compliance problems. 

The accuracy of this technique depends on all four of the assumptions listed above and 
also on four additional assumptions. The study team also assumed that (5) the five-year period 
for which data were analyzed is fairly representative of any other five-year period; (6) CAVs 
were open only because enforcement problems had not been addressed and not because of 
recordkeeping errors or other reasons; (7) CAVs were closed only for communities whose 
enforcement problems, if any, had been resolved, and not because of recordkeeping errors or 
other reasons; (8) to the extent that assumptions 6 and 7 were violated, such recordkeeping errors 
roughly offset each other (false negatives and false positives are roughly balanced); and (9) about 
half of the communities that received CAVs were representative of all NFIP communities and 
the other half were selected because of reported or suspected compliance problems. These 
assumptions were made based on the best judgment of the study team after discussions with 

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numerous FEMA, state, and community representatives, as discussed in other sections of this 
report. 

Most of these assumptions admittedly are violated to some degree. As noted elsewhere, 
the study team found the CIS data to be incomplete and of questionable accuracy. Recordkeeping 
errors have been made, some CAV reports have been closed even though compliance problems 
still existed, and some CAVs may still be shown as open even though all compliance issues have 
been addressed. The CAVs conducted and recorded in CIS probably over-represent communities 
with compliance problems or with a potential for them, since CAVs often are conducted in 
communities where there is a known potential for noncompliance (for instance, after contact with 
the community or after a complaint has raised suspicions of compliance problems), but it is not 
known what proportion of communities are selected on this basis. 

However, the study team believes that the data are accurate enough, at this aggregate 
level, to yield an estimate of nationwide community compliance. If half of CAVs are conducted 
where compliance concerns are most likely to be found (the ninth assumption, above), then most, 
but not all, of the other communities visited would be expected to be compliant. To generate an 
upper bound of community noncompliance, the team first assumed that the percentage of 
persistent noncompliance is three times higher in communities for which CAVs are conducted 
purposively because many are already suspected of having compliance problems.16 This means 
that the compliance rate for the half of communities sampled randomly would be 15 percent.17 If 
the half of CAVs conducted randomly is assumed to reflect best the majority of communities in 
the NFIP and thus taken as a lower bound of persistent noncompliance, this leads to a calculation 
of no less than 15 percent noncompliance, as defined earlier, among communities.18 An upper 
bound of noncompliance would assume that the rate of persistent noncompliance among those 
communities selected purposively and those selected randomly are roughly the same. 

This leads to a calculation that between 15 and 30 percent of NFIP communities 
nationwide may be persistently noncompliant, defined, as noted above, as not addressing 
program deficiencies and/or violations within two years of having those problems identified by 
FEMA or the state. Again, as discussed in the previous section, this level of program deficiency 
or violation represents a potential for additional flood damage and costs to the NFIP, although it 
was not possible to calculate additional costs or increased premiums that would result from given 
levels of community noncompliance. 

The problematic nature of making this sort of compliance level determination is not 
unique to the NFIP. Other government programs, especially environmental ones, face similar 
difficulties in assigning meaningful numbers to data collected, aggregated, and interpreted in 
different ways by different responsible parties. For example, as described above in the case of 

16 Many selected purposively are simply large communities that are felt to deserve additional attention due to the 

amount of development or number of structures in the floodplain. 
17 For instance, if 1,000 communities are given CAVs, half randomly with one-third the rate of noncompliance 

found as those selected purposively, the number of noncompliant communities found would be 75 among those 

500 selected randomly and 225 among those selected purposively, or rates of 15 percent and 45 percent, 

respectively.
18 The phrase no less than 15 percent was chosen as a lower bound because the set of communities not selected 

randomly exists, even if in smaller numbers, and so the actual lower bound must be larger than that number, given 

the assumptions discussed. 

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federal programs for preventing air and water pollution that are administered by the states on 
behalf of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, a nationwide compliance rate of 97 percent 
was calculated by identifying violators and subtracting the number of violations from the number 
of entities regulated. However, for the same regulatory programs for the same period, the states 
were asked to report a compliance rate based on their usual methods of determining such levels, 
which included both calculations based on data and estimates based on other factors. Their 
responses, aggregated to a nationwide level, can be stated as 74 percent of the states reporting 
environmental compliance rates of 80 percent or greater19 (Brown and Green 2001, p. 40). This 
is a fairly substantial difference in the two methods of determination, and points out the 
difficulties inherent in compliance measurement. 

2.5 Level of Nationwide Compliance 
Based on the above analysis of persistently noncompliant NFIP communities, it can be 
extrapolated that between 70 and 85 percent of NFIP communities nationwide are probably fully 
compliant or can be expected to remedy identified noncompliance within two years. This is in 
keeping with the professional judgment of federal and state floodplain management staff, also 
noted above, that between 75 and 80 percent of communities are compliant. 

What these figures convey is uncertain. It is unrealistic to aspire to 100 percent 
compliance in every community 100 percent of the time, particularly when the NFIP is 
fundamentally a non-regulatory program and hence has limited resources allocated to it for 
monitoring and enforcement. Few other governmental programs that have small compliance 
budgets expect perfect compliance. In the absence of comparable compliance levels from other 
programs to serve as models and without establishment of goals for an acceptable NFIP 
compliance rate on the part of Congress or FEMA it is difficult to know what is reasonable. Nor 
are there reliable outcome measures to gage the acceptability of this levelthis study was not 
able to connect directly the level of community compliance during a given period with claims 
data or loss model results to provide an estimate of the effect of noncompliance on the actuarial 
soundness of the NFIP. For all of these reasons it is not clear whether the 75 to 80 percent 
compliance rate implies the need for drastic improvement or cause for satisfaction. However, this 
report indicates ways in which FEMA can improve its compliance program and, it is hoped, the 
nationwide compliance rate. 

19 Half the states report compliance at 90 percent or greater and another quarter of the states report it at between the 
80 and 90 percent levels (Brown and Green 2001, p. 40). 

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3. THE ROLE OF COMMUNITIES, THE STATES, AND FEMA 
IN COMMUNITY COMPLIANCE 
Although the NFIP is a federal program, its successful implementation and management 
depend on the participation of a variety of partners, including local communities, state floodplain 
management offices, and FEMA headquarters and regional offices 

Participating communities agree to adopt and enforce compliant floodplain management 
regulations as a condition of making federal flood insurance available. FEMA regional offices 
and state floodplain management programs support local communities by providing technical 
assistance and monitoring and enforcing compliance with the requirements of the NFIP. 

3.1 The Communitys Role 
Communities must enforce the ordinances that they adopt. This means, first, that all 
development, defined as any man-made change toreal estate, including but not limited to 
buildings or other structures, mining, dredging, filling, grading, paving, excavation or drilling 
operations or storage of equipment or materials, in a communitys Special Flood Hazard Area 
(SFHA, as mapped by FEMA, discussed in the previous chapter) must be reviewed and 
permitted. The communitys permitting process allows it to ensure that all construction and 
development is adequately designed, located, constructed, and anchored to minimize flood 
damage and be fully compliant with its floodplain management ordinance. Communities can 
grant exceptions, called variances, to the NFIP requirements under limited circumstances. FEMA 
recommends communities conduct inspections throughout the building process to detect 
violations and remedy them before the structure is completed. Once a structure is built, the 
community must obtain an as-built elevation certificate (or floodproofing certificate if 
floodproofing is allowed). The elevation certificate compares a surveyors or engineers record 
of the elevation of the structures lowest floor to the BFE at the site. These and other documents 
must be retained by the community and become public records. 

Communities must designate a floodplain manager who is responsible for ensuring the 
community complies with its ordinance. The floodplain manager serves as FEMAs and the 
states contact within the community. In general, he or she is responsible for understanding NFIP 
regulations, reviewing permit applications, conducting inspections (or designating a staff 
member to conduct inspections), taking enforcement actions against noncompliant development, 
monitoring and participating in the variance process (although he or she is not usually 
responsible for issuing variances), and keeping the communitys floodplain records. Ideally, a 
community ensures that its floodplain manager is properly trained and professionally certified. 

FEMA believes that local officials have the knowledge, capabilities, and resources to best 
address floodplain management problems. FEMA guidance notes that there is no effective 
substitute for developing and maintaining high quality community capability in floodplain 
management than through one-on-one contact with local floodplain management administrators. 
Both FEMA and the statesseparately and cooperativelywork to help communities develop 
and maintain the expertise necessary to properly administer NFIP-compliant floodplain 
management programs. 

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3.2 The Role of the States 
States play a vital, but vaguely defined role in the management and administration of the 
NFIP. Besides the requirement that states designate a coordinating office for the NFIP, the 
National Flood Insurance Act is largely silent about the state role. The NFIP regulations at 59 
CFR 60.25 define the state role loosely as a supportive one (Mittler et al. 2006). The role played 
by the states today has been created administratively out of the federal governments need for 
much more on-the-ground assistance than it can provide by itself and also out of the significant 
capacity states have to interface with the local communities whose implementation is the 
backbone of the NFIP. States are in a position to define the needs of their communities better 
than FEMA and can be more effective than regional officials in delivering services (technical 
assistance; monitoring, and pursuing corrective actions in communities) to communities because 
of their knowledge of and familiarity with state governing authorities and how these interrelate 
with local floodplain management ordinance as well as their knowledge of related state 
programs. 

Federal regulations emphasize the states responsibility to assist communities in the 
management of their floodplains. States are required to designate an agency of state government 
to be responsible for coordinating program aspects of floodplain management in the state.20 State 
floodplain management programs are administered by a single state office, whose location in a 
particular agency varies from state to state. A state-designated NFIP Coordinator in that office 
has responsibility for coordinating all NFIP-related activities undertaken by agencies within the 
state. The office of the state floodplain coordinator serves as a state partner with the staff at the 
FEMA regional office who do NFIP work in the state. 

If communities within their jurisdictions are to participate in the NFIP, states must have 
enacted legislation that enables communities to regulate development within flood-prone areas, 
assist communities to qualify for participation in the NFIP, and provide local governments and 
the general public with program information on the coordination of local activities with federal 
and state requirements for managing flood-prone areas. In addition, state floodplain management 
programs may include mapping and hazard mitigation programs. 

Within the state floodplain management officeoften housed in an emergency 
management agency or natural resources departmentone or several individuals serve as 
floodplain management staff. Due to differences in state priorities and capabilities, the role of the 
state coordinating office varies widely among states. In some states the NFIP coordination 
functions have been integrated into the states own floodplain management programs; in others, 
meeting federal requirements and helping communities meet them is the only floodplain 
management activity undertaken at the state level. In both cases, however, the state role 
generally includes a range of promotion, monitoring, and enforcement activities, such as 
encouraging communities to participate in the NFIP; providing floodplain management and 
NFIP training and technical assistance to communities and other state agencies; and 
communicating to and coordinating with FEMA on community needs and compliance problems. 
Some states plan and implement their own projects for managing floodplains, operate mapping 
programs, and have their own state-level floodplain management regulations to implement and 
enforce. 

20 All 50 states, the District of Columbia, and three territories participate in the NFIP. 

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The roles of FEMA regional offices and state offices overlap in all three approaches to 
community compliance in the NFIP, although certain tools within each are used more by the 
states and others more by FEMA. Regions and states both provide training and workshops and 
assist localities in designing, implementing, and enforcing their ordinances. Thus, regions and 
states cooperate on a number of NFIP issues. For instance, 1) states and regions negotiate 
compliance activities to be conducted for upcoming years using the Community Assistance 
Program-State Support Service Element (CAP-SSSE); 2) if states find serious violations to local 
ordinances, they are brought to the attention of the regional office, and 3) regions agree to 
support local compliance with any state regulations that exceed the standards of the NFIP. 

In March 2003, FEMA conducted a telephone survey of 26 state floodplain managers in 
all 10 regions asking them what they thought their roles were in the NFIP. The states said their 
role in assuring compliance was 1) assisting, working with, and educating participating 
communities; 2) notifying or referring the violations to FEMA; and 3) notifying or meeting with 
local officials. The study team found that nearly all states offer workshops, provide technical 
assistance, visit communities, and review ordinances. One regional office staff member stated 
that he relies on states to monitor compliance problems as well as bring problems to the attention 
of the region, saying that they are the eyes and ears of the region. 

3.2.1 States as Participating Communities 
State agencies also participate in the NFIP in much the same way that communities do, 
since states meet the definition of a community set forth by the NFIP. Thus, state construction 
projects in mapped flood hazard areas are required to comply with the minimum floodplain 
management criteria set forth in 44CFR60.3. Like other communities, states cannot obtain 
federal flood insurance on state buildings if they are not fulfilling their responsibilities pursuant 
to NFIP participation. 

Little definitive information is available about state agency compliance with NFIP 
regulations. There are preliminary indications that some state permitting processes may be 
noncompliant. For instance, a recent survey of state programs by the Association of State 
Floodplain Managers (ASFPM)21 asked states to assess their own compliance, staff from 27 
states revealed that they knew of occasions when agencies in their states did not comply with 
NFIP regulations (ASFPM 2004). The subject is discussed in greater detail in the NFIP 
evaluation sub-study, State Roles and Responsibilities in the National Flood Insurance Program 
(Mittler et al. 2006). 

Although this evaluation did not address state performance in meeting NFIP standards, 
the study team encountered comments from both FEMA regional offices and states on the need 
for an assessment of state compliance with the NFIP. Such an assessment would provide an 
opportunity for state staff (especially non-floodplain management staff) to receive technical 
assistance if needed as well as be a way to verify compliance with NFIP regulations. A state 
assessment would include a review of state facilities and site visits to hospitals, campgrounds, 
maintenance facilities, prisons, etc. Several regional and state officials stated that they did not 

21 The survey was sent to 50 states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico. Responses were obtained from 49 
states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico. Not all respondents answered all questions. 

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know whether the development activities of state agencies were in compliance with NFIP 
regulations. 

3.2.2 State Capability for Compliance Activities 
Like communities, states capabilities to promote, monitor, and enforce community 
compliance are affected by the state legislation governing them. States can pass legislation that 
requires communities to meet or exceed the NFIPs floodplain management regulations. 
According to the ASFPMs survey, 60 percent of states have legislation exercising state authority 
over some aspects of floodplain management (ASFPM 2004). Additionally, many states have 
building codes or natural resource laws that support or exceed NFIP standards. The strength, or 
extent to which these regulations exceed NFIP minimum requirements, varies by state. 

State regulations affect the level of participation of communities as well. Community 
participation in the NFIP is voluntary, although some states require NFIP participation as part of 
their floodplain management program. In 2002, 26 states required their communities to conduct 
land use planning as part of their land development review process. Communities in those states, 
for example, likely would have an easier time implementing their flood hazard ordinance as 
required for NFIP participation because state requirements for analogous land use management 
are already in place. 

3.2.3 State Programs and FEMAs Community Assistance Program 
The Community Assistance ProgramState Support Services Element (CAP-SSSE), 
introduced in 1985, provides funding from FEMA to state floodplain management programs in 
order to identify, prevent, and resolve floodplain management issues in accordance with the 
compliance objectives of the NFIP. According to FEMA officials at headquarters, the purpose 
of state CAP funding is to buy services for FEMA and build state capability in flood mitigation. 
State activities funded through the CAP include ordinance assistance; community assistance and 
monitoring through telephone, email, or onsite visit and appropriate follow-up; workshops and 
other training; entering floodplain management information into CIS; and general technical 
assistanceall of which help build local compliance with the NFIP. 

CAP-SSSE funding is provided to states on a cost-sharing basis, with FEMA supplying 
up to 75 percent of total funding and the state providing at least 25 percent. In 2002, funding 
ranged between $25,000 and $250,000 per state, averaging $96,000. With increases in overall 
CAP funding, by 2006 the average per state had reached $140,000. Currently all 50 states 
participate in CAP-SSSE. 

FEMA guidance maintains that states are expected to continue to perform other duties 
and responsibilities of the state NFIP Coordinating Agency and support state floodplain 
management programs and initiatives using their own resources and funding, regardless of 
CAP-SSSE funding. However, only 12 states surveyed by FEMA in 2002 had a state-funded 
floodplain management program aside from the CAP-SSSE. Because many state floodplain 
management programs rely heavily on this federal funding, the CAP-SSSE is critical to the 
promotion, monitoring, and enforcement of community compliance with the NFIP. 

However, two deficiencies in the current CAP program prevent it from funding state and 
local NFIP compliance activities as effectively as it could. First, even with recent increases, 

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CAP-SSSE funding has not kept pace with the state responsibilities and overall demand for flood 
services. A related drawback is that the criteria for distributing CAP-SSSE funds are vaguely 
understood and are viewed as not always accounting for the need or capabilities within each 
state, as discussed below. Second, state floodplain management programs sometimes are not held 
fully accountable for the non-completion of compliance activities once they do receive money, 
although funding has been pulled from states in some cases (Mittler et al. 2006). In essence, 
CAP-SSSE purchases floodplain management services for FEMA from state floodplain 
management programs, but the monitoring of those services is not as thorough as it could be. 

Level and Allocation of CAP Funds 

For most of the 1990s, CAP-SSSE funding nationwide was roughly $3 million annually, 
spread over all the states. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, annual CAP funding gradually 
increased to $5 million and then was substantially increased to reach $7 million in both 2004 and 
2005. During this period, NFIP policies in force grew by 84 percent (from 2.48 million in 1990 
to 4.57 million in 2003). Flood-prone states and communities experienced substantial population 
growth, especially in coastal areas. Over 85 percent of states surveyed by ASFPM in 2003 
reported that state-level floodplain management activities have either increased or stayed the 
same since 1995. In other words, the need for floodplain management work has increased 
substantially in most states, but until very recently CAP funding for state work stayed roughly 
the same, not even increasing enough to cover inflation. The meager funding is complicated by 
the fact that state budget deficits can limit the amount that a state can contribute as a match for 
the federal CAP funds, thus reducing the states overall funding. 

CAP-SSSE allocations are officially based on several factors, but FEMA headquarters 
officials retain considerable discretion in distributing funds, according to interviews with 
headquarters and regional officials. The primary factors are personnel, flood risk, and capacity. 
First, a base amount is designated to support at least one full-time floodplain management 
employee for one yearroughly between $40,000 and $50,000. Second, FEMA considers the 
risk of flooding in the state, based on the number of participating communities, insurance 
policies in force, and rate of development. States with communities having high rates of 
development along coastal areas may receive additional consideration based on their higher risk 
of flood damage. FEMA headquarters then makes lump sum allocations to each region. The 
regions in turn divide their allocations among their states. 

Finally, the FEMA regional offices take into account the states capacity to implement 
compliance activities effectively, based on personnel and the state governments resources for 
floodplain management. According to a FEMA official, regions generally provide more funding 
to better performing states. It is unclear based on the interviews and information provided by 
FEMA on what basis a state agency is judged to be better performing. In interviews, regional 
officials agreed in their judgment of which states are below-average performers, but offered 
mainly anecdotal evidence to justify their assessments. Although the above criteria shaped 
funding levels at the programs inception, FEMA stated that, in years when overall funding did 
not increase, funding usually has been based primarily on the previous years support. In a year 
in which funding levels are higher, there is more opportunity to allocate the increased funding to 
states that are in need. 

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In the course of interviews, the study team frequently encountered frustration with the 
amount of funding provided by CAP-SSSE and a widespread belief that funding was simply 
handed out based on past amounts. The majority of FEMA and state officials with whom the 
study team spoke were uncertain or unaware of the criteria used to distribute money to the states. 
In interviews with state officials, none cited the same distribution criteria explained by FEMA 
headquarters. 

This suggests that funding amounts are not set in a collaborative process between state 
and regional officials, with an eye toward the needs of the state for that year (including 
compliance activities). Because funding amounts are dictated to state floodplain management 
programs, and only later divided up for compliance activities, it is not possible for states to know 
how to make themselves more competitive for funds that would be used for compliance 
purposes. The lack of transparency also has contributed to negative perceptions among regional 
and state officials of the programs ability to properly fund state activities. 

Accountability for CAP Funds 

Accountability for the use of funds is built into the implementation process for CAPSSSE 
funds in several ways. Headquarters allocates money to the regional offices, which make 
allocations to the states. The states NFIP coordinating agencies apply for CAP-SSSE annually 
by submitting an application and workplan. Based on this, the region negotiates a CAP 
agreement with the state, detailing the type and number of activities to be completed during the 
upcoming year. The CAP agreement and the accompanying workplan are a formal, annual 
contract between FEMA and the state. 

A typical workplan contains a description of the approach to promoting and monitoring 
compliance through a proposed number of activities such as visits to and other contact with 
communities, ordinance assistance, and workshops to be completed during the year. However, 
completion of floodplain management activities often is not systematically monitored or assessed 
in relation to goals or funding amounts at a regional or national level. Although accountability 
mechanisms currently exist for financial and activity reporting in CAP-SSSE, there have been no 
reporting mechanisms to measure the achievements or outcomes of activities undertaken using 
CAP-SSSE funds, according to a FEMA memorandum issued in 2002. 

In Fiscal Year 2004, as part of FEMAs shift to performance-based management, CAPSSSE 
guidance directed states to complete five-year strategic plans covering activities and goals 
for Fiscal Years 2005 through 2009. Each state is to negotiate work plans and performance 
measures with regional offices to establish clear expectations for performance. 

A performance-based model of CAP-SSSE should increase accountability. It should be 
noted, however, that the model Five-Year Floodplain Management Work Plans and guidance in 
use during the period this study was conducted did not show a clear connection to flood loss 
reduction or compliance goals, focusing instead on administrative issues. For example, the 
guidance provided 20 suggested outcomes/outputs for states to use in their work plans. One 
suggested goal was simply Increase the number of technical assistance contacts [visits to and 
other contacts with communities] to communities in your state that result in increased 
compliance. The number of activities conducted is not necessarily a significant indicator of 
overall outcomes and it is hoped that, as experience with the five-year CAP planning process 

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grows, the regional offices and states will develop more meaningful compliance goals, and ways 
of measuring progress towards them. 

In summary, significant funding is provided to the states through the CAP-SSSE to 
conduct compliance activities, and the states clearly use those funds in a wide range of compliance 
activities. So far there often has been insufficient emphasis in the new five-year planning or the 
CAP agreements on the precise activities to be carried out, how those activities are expected to 
improve compliance, and whether (at the end of the years funding cycle) they have resulted in 
improved compliance. Because most floodplain management activity is funded through the CAP 
in most states, measurable goals that contribute in specific ways to improved community 
compliance will be crucial to attempts to track and evaluate compliance and the states role in it. 
The lack of such information for past years, given that states conduct so many of the NFIP-related 
compliance activities, has hampered attempts to evaluate progress in compliance. 

3.3 The Role of FEMA 
FEMA administers the NFIP on behalf of the federal government and, as such, is 
responsible for establishing and implementing measures to ensure community compliance with 
the program in accordance with 59 CFR 59.24. 

Organizationally, FEMA consists of a headquarters office in Washington, D.C., and 10 
regional offices, each of which serves several states (see figure 3). The headquarters personnels 
compliance responsibilities focus on developing criteria, standards, policy, and guidance for the 
regional offices to assist them in community compliance. The Federal Insurance Administrator at 
headquarters has authority to suspend communities from the NFIP for noncompliance or 
reinstate them when appropriate (FEMA 1986, p. 1-3, 4). 

The regional office personnel, unlike headquarters staff, have ongoing contact with NFIP 
communities and the states and are responsible for the implementation of the community 
compliance program. Their tasks include 

 PromotionRegional office staff help NFIP-participating communities administer 
their local ordinances in accord with NFIP requirements; provide technical assistance 
on all aspects of the NFIP, including flood insurance; maintain contact with 
communities through telephone, email, on-site visits, and other meetings; conduct 
training and other education; and other activities. 
 MonitoringRegional office staff monitor communities through community 
contacts, visits, and other means; review and follow up on community-specific 
information that may indicate compliance problems (such as insurance rating forms); 
and document compliance problems and their resolution. 
 EnforcementRegional office staff specify program deficiencies and ordinance 
violations that are discovered through community contact; support and consult with 
the community as it corrects and remedies compliance problems; document 
community contact and followup actions; impose or remove community probation 
(Regional Directors authority); and recommend to headquarters that a community be 
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FIGURE 3: FEMA Regional Offices 

SOURCE: FEMA website http://www.fema.gov/ehp/contacts.shtm 
suspended or reinstated. Regional office staffs also consult and coordinate with the state 

floodplain manager on NFIP enforcement matters, and support the state in state 

enforcement actions as needed. 

Although FEMA regional offices are subordinate to headquarters, they also have 
considerable autonomy. Regional staff (including those responsible for compliance) report to the 
Regional Director, who reports to the Directors office at headquarters, not to a specific program 
office (like compliance) at headquarters. For the most part regional offices follow the processes 
and policies set out by the headquarters program staff, but some go their own way and have their 
own cultures. This means that headquarters program staff cannot always ensure that program 
policies are implemented as intended. This has been especially true of the compliance program at 
headquarters, which has operated for most of the last 20 years with an average of three or four 
staff people, who are responsible for both community eligibility and compliance. Not only is this 
level of staffing a hindrance to implementation of the compliance program, but also it leaves 
little opportunity for program development or enhancement. 

On the positive side, this arrangement means that regions retain a great deal of flexibility 
to address compliance problems independently and adapt solutions to state and local needs. 
Regional staff use their judgment to decide what communities must do to address enforcement 
problems, and determine when program deficiencies have been corrected and violations 
remedied to the maximum extent possible. The judgment of the regional office staff is also relied 
upon in deciding whether a community should be placed on or removed from probation. 

The NFIP compliance program guidance does not specify a relationship between the 
regional office and the states for promotion or monitoring NFIP community compliance. In 
practice, however, as discussed below, many regional offices also coordinate with and support 
the states in the conduct of activities under those two approaches (e.g., training and conferences). 

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3.3.1 Allocation of NFIP Staff in Regional Offices 
As of October 2003, there was a total of 136 staff positions (full time equivalents or 
FTEs) devoted to NFIP-related activities in the regional offices of FEMA.22 This figure includes 
engineers, administrative support staff, FEMA management, and program specialists, the latter 
of whom conduct most of the promotion, monitoring, and enforcement for NFIP community 
compliance. 

The number of FTEs in each region varies. Each region has a minimum of six to seven 
FTEs, the minimum necessary to carry out the program in a region (a branch chief, secretary, one 
to two engineers, and two to three planners). Beyond that minimum number, regional staff have 
been allocated according to a calculation of nationwide activity occurring in each region. A 
comprehensive analysis and allocation was done in 1986 and some adjustments have been made 
since then, based on increased workload resulting from the National Flood Insurance Reform Act 
of 1994 and similar criteria. 

Table 1 displays each regions NFIP staff level, along with that regions percentage of 
nationwide activity (as determined by FEMA in the 1986 staff allocation), regional office staff, 
participating communities, and flood insurance policies. Assuming that these realities, coupled 
with the amount of building activity, development, and other factors are reasonably accurate 
predictors of the level of compliance work that will need to be done in a region, the distribution 
of staff among the regional offices is a reasonable one. The greatest shares of nationwide activity 
and policies are in Regions IV and VI, and their current FTE levels of 21 and 20 are the highest 
of all the regions. Those two regions do not have the most communities of all the regions, but 
they do rank third and fourth. At the other end of the spectrum, the smallest regional offices are 
Regions I, VII, VIII, and X, and they all have comparatively low numbers of communities, 
policies, and activity. 

The levels of personnel are important to the effectiveness of the NFIP because if staff 
levels are insufficient, oversight and compliance can suffer. However, the study team did not 
discover any ratio or other accepted method by which to determine when the size of compliance 
staff is adequate. There is no direct correlation between numbers of communities and staff size, 
for example, because one community with intense development pressure could take as much 
staff time as 100 small, rural communities. By the same token, a community with several 
thousand flood insurance policies might not require as much staff time as expected if a large 
proportion of the policies are for condominium units in high-rise buildings that already have 
been built to NFIP standards. 

The study team concluded that, in its complex staffing allocations, FEMA has 
appropriately balanced the need to have a presence (at least 7 FTEs) in every region with its 
limited resources and with the variability among regions in the amount of current and expected 
compliance work. 

Nevertheless, officials in eight regional offices said both staff and resources are 
insufficient to address the needs of the communities and policyholders. Nearly half a dozen 

22 An official at FEMA headquarters indicated that regions use various definitions of what constitutes NFIP-related 
activities. Some personnel are used for pre-disaster mitigation and grant programs that relate to floods. 

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TABLE 1: Distribution of NFIP Personnel and Activity among FEMA Regional Offices 

Region 
(# of NFIP staff) 
Share of All 
Nationwide 
Activity* 
Share of All 
Regional Office 
NFIP personnel** 
Share of All 
NFIP 
Communities** 
Share of All 
NFIP 
Policies** 
I (11) 6% 8% 10% 2% 
II (13) 7% 10% 10% 7% 
III (15) 9% 11% 16% 5% 
IV (21) 26% 15% 14% 50% 
V (14) 10% 10% 19% 3% 
VI (20) 22% 15% 11% 20% 
VII (10) 4% 7% 8% 1% 
VIII (10) 3% 7% 6% <1% 
IX (13) 10% 10% 3% 8% 
X (9) 2% 7% 4% 1% 
*As calculated by FEMA for its 1986 allocation of staff, with a formula based on policies in force, claims 
paid, property at risk, growth in property at risk, level of flood study activity, number of participating 
communities, number of building permits, and number of variances. 
**Totals do not equal 100 because of rounding. 

regional officials acknowledged that the regional offices lacked enough staff to conduct 
compliance activities. This issue is discussed again in Chapter 6 on monitoring. 

3.3.2 Workload and Priorities of NFIP Staff 
Over the past decade, the headquarters staff responsible for the community compliance 
program have numbered from two to five FTEs with the usual staffing level being three or four 
people. At this level of support, according to officials interviewed, oversight of program 
implementation takes up most staff time. There is little opportunity to address deficiencies in the 
program framework or develop additional or newer guidance, training, database systems, or 
other long-term resources, even though those needs are recognized. 

Under normal conditions, regional office floodplain management staff have 
responsibilities under the NFIP besides community compliance, including grant administration 
and technical assistance for insurance matters. When the study team asked program specialists in 
four regional offices to estimate the time they spent on compliance activities, they replied that 
those activities took slightly more than half of their time. 

Several FEMA regional and state officials expressed the sentiment that enforcing 
community compliance with the NFIP is not a priority within FEMA and that this negatively 
affects the effectiveness of the program. Some officials stated that FEMAs goalsdisaster 
coordination and managementdo not fit well with the compliance and enforcement activities of 
the NFIP. 

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The study team also encountered comments from regional office staff about being 
temporarily transferred to non-NFIP related activities, primarily for pre- and post-disaster 
activities. One program specialist stated that fully half of his time is devoted to non-NFIP work. 
Some staff reported that when a disaster occurs, all personnel can be pulled off compliance work 
for months at a time. In some instances the disasters to which NFIP staff are assigned are not 
even related to flooding. 

Some disaster-related activities are directly related to the NFIP, such as assisting with 
substantial damage assessments or investigating the need for re-mapping after a flood. Further, 
NFIP staff have an obligation and willingness to help where they can during the response to an 
emergency. However, disaster response is not an activity envisaged by the National Flood 
Insurance Act as a use of the flood insurance premiums, which are designated to pay for the 
NFIPs administrative expenses (including staff salaries). When NFIP staff are routinely 
assigned other duties, not only do they have less time for their NFIP responsibilities (including 
compliance) but also flood insurance premiums thus are being used for non-NFIP work. 

FEMA was unable to estimate the precise amount of time NFIP staff spend on non-NFIP 
matters, or the net effect of these reassignments, if any, on the National Flood Insurance Fund. 
The study team sent an inquiry about this issue to FEMAs Inspector General, but had received 
no explanation by the time the study concluded. 

3.4 Recommendations 
Community compliance with NFIP standards is achieved through the combined efforts of 
local, state, and federal governments. The study team identified several ways in which the 
effectiveness of the states and FEMA could be strengthened. 

Increase the number of FEMA headquarters and regional office staff assigned to compliance 
work. Additional staff would improve implementation of the compliance program and 
allow for the development of program enhancements. 

Reexamine assignment of NFIP staff to non-NFIP work. FEMA should consider whether NFIP 
staff are being used appropriately when they are assigned to non-NFIP duties, such as 
grants administration and disaster response and recovery. 

Increase CAP-SSSE funding for compliance work by the states and clarify criteria for funding 
allocations. State participation is critical to community compliance, but most states rely 
on federal funds to support their work. Additional staff would improve the operation of 
the compliance program. Indeed, there is evidence that the addition of a second staff 
person (in states where there has been only one) results in a considerable increase in state 
capability (Mittler et al. 2006). FEMA needs to make explicit the criteria by which CAP 
funds are allocated to reinforce to states that CAP-SSSE directly funds compliance 
activities and encourage the types of activities that are needed. 

Hold states accountable for non-completion of compliance work funded under the CAP-SSSE. If 
state work plans for the CAP are to improve compliance, they need actionable, 
measurable steps that contribute toward larger goals, and states must complete the work 
as specified. 

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4. PROMOTING COMMUNITY COMPLIANCE 
The bulk of NFIP compliance resources, both within FEMA and the states, is devoted to 
the promotion component of the NFIP compliance model. The term promotion is used here 
to encompass any aspect of the NFIP that fosters an understanding of flood risks and how the 
various activities of the NFIP contribute to avoiding damage from floods and recovering from 
themat both individual and community levels. Some of the tools used to promote compliance 
with the NFIP are institutionalized through statutes or regulations; some are the product of 
activities carried out by FEMA and the states, and some are a combination of both. Most of these 
tools are based on the assumptions implicit in the NFIP compliance model that people, 
businesses, and local governments (1) will try to meet the requirements of the NFIP once they 
are educated about the reasons for the standards; (2) will try to obtain financial benefits that are 
available under the program (such as lower flood insurance rates); and (3) will try to avoid 
negative consequences of failure to meet the standards (higher insurance rates, for example, or 
suspension from the program). 

Those fundamental assumptions are the foundation of FEMAs compliance approach, 
which emphasizes promoting compliance with the NFIP on its merits. In its guidance materials 
and subsequent statements, FEMA has stressed its belief that the majority of violations stem 
from communities ignorance of NFIP requirements, failure to understand the rationales behind 
program requirements, or a lack of technical skills on the part of the floodplain officials in the 
community (FEMA 1986). Thus FEMA relies heavily on tools that promote both full 
understanding of the program at the community level and voluntary compliance at the individual 
level. 

The range of tools used by FEMA and the states to promote compliance with the NFIP 
appears in figure 4. Each of these is discussed in the sections that follow, and an assessment is 
made of their effectiveness in promoting compliance. Recommendations for improving the tools 
are made in Section 4.5. 

FIGURE 4: Tools that Promote Community Compliance 

Technical assistance to communities 

community assistance contact (CAC) 
community assistance visit (CAV) 
procedural guidance and technical publications, response to inquiries 


Training 

for community staff 
for state and FEMA staff 


Professional certification of federal, state, and local floodplain managers 
Incentives for compliance 

insurance availability 
insurance rating structure (noncompliant structures pay higher rates) 
CRS participation gets community-wide discount 
ICC coverage pays for mitigation for individual structures 

Disincentives for noncompliance 

loss of insurance availability in community 
re-rating structure for higher rates 
denial of insurance coverage (1316) for individual structure 

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4.1 Technical Assistance to Communities 
In keeping with the assumption that most noncompliance is the result of ignorance about 
the program, FEMAs primary tool for promoting compliance is the provision of floodplain 
management assistance services (commonly known as technical assistance) to the local 
officials and staff of participating communities, both before noncompliance occurs and in the 
course of addressing it. 

FEMAs goal as stated in the community assistance manual (FEMA 1989) is that every 
NFIP-participating community be provided with technical assistance and/or contacted to 
determine if assistance is needed at least once every five years (FEMA 1989). FEMA says this 
contact can be in the form of a CAC, a community assistance visit (CAV), or another form of 
direct, one-on-one contact with the community (responding to requests for information, 
participating in meetings with the community, coordinating with the community on mapping or 
other issues). By establishing a definite cycle, FEMAs aim was to ensure that no NFIP 
community is overlooked in the provision of floodplain management assistance services 
(FEMA 1989, p. 1-4). Within this five-year cycle, FEMA expected regional office staff to use 
their judgment in setting priorities for which communities should receive what level or form of 
attention and when, depending on factors described below. 

To ensure that this technical assistance is offered and/or provided, the FEMA regional 
offices either assign regional office staff to conduct or offer the assistance services or they assign 
the duty to states through their contracts with FEMA under the CAP (described above in Section 
3.2.3). 

4.1.1 Community Assistance Contacts and Community Assistance Visits 
The staff of FEMAs regional offices and the state floodplain management offices have 
direct one-on-one contact with individual communities through three means: CACs; CAVs; and 
meetings for mapping, ordinance review, or other purposes. CACs and CAVs are the primary 
means by which communities receive technical assistance tailored to their needs. 

A CAC is a telephone call or brief visit to a community that is used to establish or reestablish 
contact with a community and determine if any problems or issues exist and to offer 
community assistance if needed. 

A CAV is a scheduled visit to the community that may take anywhere from a few hours 
for a small community with little building activity to three days or more for a large one with 
extensive floodplain areas and development pressure. CAVs are the most intensive form of 
technical assistance provided by FEMA and the states. A CAV includes a tour of the floodplain, 
meetings with local floodplain management officials, and a thorough examination of a 
communitys ordinance, its files on permits and variances, and other documents. The staff 
conducting the CAV can then answer the community floodplain managers questions, explain 
specific NFIP regulations as needed, and/or provide the community with additional written 
guidance. The staff conducting the CAV can also recommend (but not require) additional formal 
training for the local floodplain manager(s). 

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State Conduct of CACs and CAVs 

Although both state and regional office staff conduct CACs and CAVs, states conduct the 
majority of them in most regions, based on data between 1997 and 2002. Most states and 
regional offices negotiate the number of CAVs and CACs that will be conducted by each group 
in their annual CAP-SSSE agreement, based on considerations of their capabilities and needs. In 
a few instances, states hire contractors to conduct CACs and CAVs. For example, Texas 
contracts its community assistance education (and monitoring) to an outside engineering firm. 
Since 1998, Pennsylvania has contracted with County Conservation Districts to conduct 
approximately 90 percent of its CAVs. Figure 5 shows that states conducted more than 70 
percent of the CACs and CAVs that were done during the six-year period. The distribution of 
CAVs and CACs between regions and states varied by region but favored states overall, with the 
exception of CACs in Regions VIII and IX. It should be noted that there is no single optimal 
division of community assistance work between FEMA and the states. Tasks are apportioned 
annually based on staff levels and other factors specific to the regional offices and the states. 

FIGURE 5: Percentage of CAVs and CACs conducted by the States and FEMA Regional Offices, 
January 1, 1997 to December 31, 2002. Source: CIS and Regional Offices 

CAV 
CAC 
CAV 
CAC 
CAV 
CAC 
CAV 
CAC 
CAV 
CAC 
CAV 
CAC 
CAV 
CAC 
CAV 
CAC 
CAV 
CAC 
CAV 
CAC 
RegionX 
RegionIX 
RegionVIII 
RegionVII 
RegionV 
RegionVI 
RegionIV 
RegionIII 
RegionII 
RegionI 

0 20 40 60 80 100 
Percent 
State FEMA 

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Frequency of CACs and CAVs 

FEMAs goal as stated in the community assistance manual is that every participating 
community be contacted, visited, and/or provided with technical assistance every five years 
(FEMA 1989). However, as FEMA guidance admits, generally, there will not be sufficient staff 
at the region and state to [conduct a] CAV [in] all communities in the state on a regular basis. 
Therefore, for both technical assistance (promotion) and monitoring purposes, FEMA 
recommends that CAVs be prioritized for communities with the most development or those most 
likely to need technical assistance. Some indicators of this are growth rates, development activity 
in SFHAs, previous compliance issues, and citizen complaints. 

The frequency with which community contact is done is analyzed further below, because 
it is critical to how well the monitoring phase of the NFIP compliance program functions (see 
Chapter 5). Data gathered by the study team show that, nationwide, communities are contacted 
via a CAC or CAV an average of one time every 10 years. This is fairly infrequent contact for a 
program in which regulations, policies, procedures, and technology are all prone to change, and 
whose compliance model relies heavily on the communities understanding of and good faith 
adherence to its standards. 

CACs and CAVs as Technical Assistance 

How well CACs and CAVs work to provide technical assistance to communities is 
difficult to assess. FEMA has provided extensive guidance on what must be covered during the 
contacts, but the extent to which those procedures are carried out and how effectively varies. The 
staff person doing the work has a large impact on the quality of the interaction with the 
community, how thorough the contact or visit is, and the value and accuracy of the information 
communicated. This is true for at least two reasons. First, the regional office staff members (and 
states, perhaps to a lesser extent) have disparate backgrounds, from Ph.D.s in engineering to 
people who started in FEMA as secretaries and were promoted. Second, no standard training is 
required to ensure that common approaches are used to deliver community assistance. 

The study team encountered no criticism from regional office or state staff of the CAV 
process itself, although there were some suggestions for slight modifications to the list of items 
covered during a CAV.23 Both FEMA and state staff appear to be generally satisfied with the 
approach of making an onsite visit to a community, meeting with staff, inspecting records, 
touring the floodplain, and other steps as appropriate. 

Among the community officials interviewed by the study team the overall attitude toward 
CAVs could be characterized as one of acceptance of the procedure. One community objected to 
a CAVs being scheduled for an inconvenient timeafter a flood when local staff were already 
overburdened. One community thought it had been treated harshly during a CAV over its one 
and only variance. These comments are representative of the differing opinions about CAVs 
expressed by community officials: 

 CAVs help the city . . . find problems. 
23 Comprehensive instructions for conducting a CAV are included in FEMA Manual 7810.4, Guidance for 
Conducting Community Assistance Contacts and Community Assistance Visits (FEMA 1989). 

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 CAVs are a pain. The community doesnt like to be told what to do. 
 CAVs can be an inconvenience because of the work involved. 
 CAVs are a very thorough review of a community flood management program. 
With regard to the provision of technical assistance, most of the community officials 
interviewed told the study team that the regional office and state staff were helpful and answered 
their questions accurately and thoroughly in both CACs and CAVs. Some communities 
mentioned that they had more contact with the state than the regional office, and some said the 
opposite. There were a few comments from community staff about personality and relationships 
with the state or regional office person assigned to that community. 

CACs and CAVs serve a dual purpose within the NFIP. As is discussed in Chapter 5, 
besides being tools for providing technical assistance, they are also intended to be used to 
monitor communities for compliance with NFIP requirements. In a 2003 survey of state NFIP 
coordinators (ASFPM 2004), half of the states that responded viewed the primary purpose of 
CACs and CAVs as being the provision of technical assistance, 28 percent responded that the 
purpose of CAVs was both monitoring and technical assistance, and 20 percent of the states used 
these visits primarily for monitoring. The FEMA regional office staff interviewed by the study 
team had a more uniform understanding that the CAVs and CACs they perform serve multiple 
purposes simultaneously. 

Although it is true that the majority of state staff view their role in CAVs and other 
venues as providing assistance and that some state personnel purposely avoid giving the 
appearance of monitoring or evaluating the communitys compliance, it appears that the 
opposite may be true sometimes as well. That is, some of the responses from communities 
indicate that some staff people may be viewing their interaction with the community as an 
authoritative, from the top down action, seeing themselves as using CAVs primarily to find 
problems with the communitys program and tell the community to fix them, and how. This may 
work well for monitoring and enforcement purposes, but the community comments show that it 
is not the most effective technique for providing technical assistance. In its training needs report, 
FEMA also found that local floodplain managers want on-site training that is non-regulatory in 
nature. Technical assistance is best provided in an environment where the recipients feel free to 
admit their ignorance of a subject and ask questions without fear of negative repercussions, but 
because any violations or program deficiencies discovered during a CAV may lead FEMA to 
sanction the community, local staff may be afraid to ask questions or may try to conceal their 
ignorance of some topics instead of admitting a need for assistance. This may lessen the quality 
of technical assistance that can be provided during the CAV. 

One significant drawback of CAVs as they are conducted currently is the fact that more 
of them cannot be done given the staff and resources available to the FEMA regional offices and 
the states. This complaint was registered by regional and state staff and even by communities. 

As technical assistance, CACs and CAVs when they occur appear to be effective at 
conveying complex and changing program information to communities. A few of the 
communities interviewed indicated that they receive conflicting information at times (sometimes 
within a regional office, sometimes between the regional office and the state, sometimes between 

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the regional office and FEMA headquarters). But judging by the opinion of most of the local 
respondents, CACs and CAVs conducted both by regional office staff and by state staff are 
fulfilling the purpose of providing technical assistance. The drawbacks of CAVs and CACs 
include variability in quality that results from the personality and preferences of the staff person 
doing the work, the fact that monitoring and enforcement functions are combined within a single 
community visit, and the inability of FEMA and the states to provide more frequent CAVs to 
communities. 

4.1.2 Other Technical Assistance 
Procedural Guidance and Technical Publications 

FEMA has issued an abundance of guidance for regional offices, states, and participating 
communities to ensure the consistent interpretation of NFIP policy. Written guidance includes 
various policy memos and technical bulletins as well as two guidance manuals, described below. 
FEMA regional office staff repeatedly told the study team that these two books, combined with 
the Code of Federal Regulations, were their primary sources for guidance. Additional guidance 
related to policy interpretation has been issued through various memos and technical bulletins. 

NFIP Guidance for Conducting CACs and CAVs (FEMA 1989) is a guide for conducting 
CACs and CAVs and a training document for staff who are not familiar with those procedures. 
However, the document does not discuss major relevant issues that have arisen since its 
production in 1989. Foremost among these is the responsibility of regional office and state 
floodplain management staff to enter CAC and CAV data into CIS or how staff can use CIS as a 
tool for promoting or monitoring compliance. Nor does the guidance manual discuss the CRS 
although FEMA has stated that that it wants CAVs conducted in CRS communities on a five-
year cycle (FEMA Inspector General 2002). 

The NFIP Community Compliance Program Guidance (FEMA 1986) sets out policies 
and procedures for taking enforcement action against noncompliant communities and structures. 
Because the document was created in 1986, it did not include discussion of CRS retrograde (a 
reduction in the communitys CRS rating, which can include its removal from the CRS) as an 
enforcement option, nor did it reference use of the CIS. An August 8, 2002 memorandum to the 
FEMA regional offices established a Compliance Policy for CRS that included a CAV policy 
and a procedure for retrograding non-compliant CRS communities. 

Other Community Contact 

Other means by which regional office and state staff interact with communities include 
meetings about mapping, assistance in updating floodplain management ordinances, short or 
informal visits to a community, and small workshops that allow for detailed discussion of the 
specific floodplain management situations of the communities in attendance. According to 
FEMAs guidance, such interactions with a community are sufficient to count as a contact 
needed to meet the goal of reaching every NFIP community every five years. 

Data are not available to determine to extent to which communities are being contacted 
through other types of technical assistance. As an example, although the data show that only 42 
percent of communities in Region V are contacted via formal CAC or CAV in an average five-
year time period, staff at Region V told the study team that they spend a large percentage of 

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every day on the phone with communities answering questions and providing technical 
assistance. They said that they do not record these contacts since they do not consider them 
formal CACs. Likewise, the study team found paper records (such as letters to communities) of 
regional office staff and state floodplain management staffs having visited communities and 
providing technical assistance, but the regions often did not record these visits in any systematic 
way (as they would CACs and CAVs). 

Finally, FEMA does not compile records of the contacts made with communities during 
local workshops. Although some states record the number of communities that attend state-
delivered training, these records are not compiled by FEMA or recorded with other community 
information in CIS. A lack of formal recordkeeping about some types of contact with regulated 
entities is not unusual in regulatory programs. It has the advantage in the case of the NFIP of 
allowing the flexibility to provide technical assistance without regulatory pressure. This is a 
common feature in environmental regulatory compliance, but it makes evaluation of the impact 
of such informal contacts more difficult. 

4.2 Training 
Training is a tool for promoting community compliance because it furthers and deepens 
the understanding of the requirements and goals of the NFIP. If responsible parties understand 
the reasons for the program and how the requirements help achieve its goals, the thinking goes, 
they will be more likely to comply with them. Training on the NFIP is useful for two distinct 
audiences: (1) the community floodplain managers who must administer the NFIP-based local 
ordinance, and (2) the FEMA regional office and state floodplain management staff who are 
responsible for educating and monitoring the communities. This section addresses the question 
of whether available training options meet the needs of those two audiences. 

4.2.1 FEMAs Training Offerings 
Training for all floodplain management staff is available from multiple sources. FEMAs 
national training center, the Emergency Management Institute (EMI) in Emmitsburg, Maryland, 
and home study courses produced by EMI offer training to regional, state, and local floodplain 
officials. Additional training for community staff, funded by FEMA, is provided at local training 
events by FEMA regional office or state staff. Training and workshops on the NFIP and related 
issues also are offered at the conferences of the ASFPM and state floodplain management 
associations. The main sources for training are listed below: 

 Resident Courses at EMI: EMI has consistently offered two courses that teach 
audiences how to comply with NFIP regulations: Managing Floodplain 
Development through the NFIP and The Community Rating System. The courses 
are four days each, and are available several times per year to anyone involved in 
floodplain management. They are free of charge and travel stipends are available. 
Managing Floodplain Development through the NFIP is aimed at community 
floodplain managers, although anyone available in floodplain management can enroll. 
Topics addressed include an explanation of NFIP requirements, the strategies and 
tools available for floodplain managers, the use of data in the implementation of 
floodplain management regulations, floodplain permit review and enforcement 
procedures, and the relationship between flood insurance and floodplain management. 
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The Community Rating System course describes how communities can receive 
credit in the CRS for activities that go beyond the NFIPs minimum requirements. 

 Field-Deployed EMI Courses: Managing Floodplain Development through the 
NFIP is sometimes field-deployed outside of the national training center. It is up to 
individual instructors to initiate delivery of this course in their regions. Instructors are 
usually FEMA regional office or state floodplain management staff that have taken 
and possibly taught the course at EMI. State floodplain management staff in about 10 
states in Regions III, IV, and VI field deploy this basic course. 
 Training Provided by ASFPM: The ASFPM provides on-line training in floodplain 
management. ASFPM also sponsors an annual conference at which floodplain 
management training is provided. 
 Courses Developed by FEMA Regional Office and the States: FEMA regional 
office and state floodplain management staff in almost all states and regional offices 
have developed and delivered training about NFIP requirements and how to achieve 
compliance. Sometimes these courses are based on Managing Floodplain 
Development through the NFIP. Sometimes they are short (one-day or less) courses 
on specific floodplain management subjects. Examples of courses that have been 
offered in various regions are Floodplain Management 101, State-Specific 
Floodplain Management 101, Mitigation Tools, Floodplain Regulations 101, 
Compliance and Enforcement Strategies, Post-Flood Disaster Assistance, and 
Substantial Damage/Improvement. 
 EMI Home Study Series: EMI developed a home-study version of Managing 
Floodplain Development through the NFIP, covering the same material as the EMI 
resident course of the same name. Upon request, the course was delivered to students 
to study at their leisure. Students could then take a test and send the results to EMI to 
receive course credit. According to EMI records, close to 2,000 people requested the 
course from EMI and about 30 percent completed it and passed the test. Although 
EMI no longer offers the course, FEMA and other floodplain management groups 
such as ASFPM and the State of Illinois have made versions of the course available 
on-line. FEMA has reconfigured the course materials into a desk reference and study 
guide that can be used for independent study. 
4.2.2 Training for Regional Office and State Staff 
There is no standard training program from the NFIP staff responsible for monitoring or 
enforcing compliance. In addition, as noted above, the prior experience of those responsible for 
compliance varies widelyfrom clerical workers with secondary education who have been 
promoted within FEMA to engineers and planners with graduate degrees. FEMA thus appears 
not to have any formal or minimum requirements for its compliance staff. 

Many, but not all, FEMA regional office staff have attended courses at EMI. About half 
of the regional office staff who told the study team that they attended training at EMI said that 
they attended more than one course, including Managing Floodplain Development Through the 
NFIP, The Community Rating System, and courses for engineers such as those on retrofitting 

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or coastal construction. Regional office staff also stressed their reliance on on-the-job training or 
mentoring. Some regional offices told the study team that they train new FEMA program 
specialists by matching them with a senior FEMA program specialist mentor. Many mentioned 
this one-on-one assistance in addition to formal training they took at EMI, but some staff had 
only on-the-job training. 

State floodplain coordinators also attend training at EMI and/or at state agency or 
ASFPM conferences and workshops. In many states, some of the costs for state personnel 
participation in training and workshops is supported by FEMAs Community Assistance 
Program. Although the number of state staff who attended NFIP-related training is not available, 
in response to a survey by the ASFPM, 47 state NFIP Coordinators indicated that their agency 
encouraged them to attend FEMA-sponsored classes and workshops and 43 indicated that 
participation in state- and/or ASFPM-sponsored training, conferences, and workshops was 
encouraged (ASFPM 2004). In addition, 30 state floodplain management offices have staff who 
are certified in floodplain management by the ASFPM or a state association accredited by 
ASFPM. An examination is required for certification, and the study materials recommended and 
made available by the ASFPM as preparation for the exam include the materials from the home-
study version of Managing Floodplain Development through the NFIP. 

An important deficiency in training to date has been that courses offered at EMI have 
taught local floodplain managers how to be compliant with the NFIP, but have not trained 
regional office and state floodplain management staff how to monitor and enforce community 
compliance. Noting this gap in training, several regional office staff expressed a need for training 
that is focused on procedures, such as how to conduct a visit to a community, how to coordinate 
NFIP activities in the states, and how to use CIS. Likewise, staff at FEMA headquarters 
expressed a wish that regional office staff receive more training on the proper way to document 
community violations so that enforcement actions can proceed without delay and/or repetition of 
effort. 

FEMA introduced a new course aimed specifically at FEMA program specialists and 
state floodplain coordinators called Floodplain Management and Community Compliance for 
State and FEMA Staff at a 2003 workshop and delivered the course to regional and state staff at 
the 2004 and 2005 ASFPM conferences. The course has been distributed on CD to its regional 
offices for their use in training and to deliver to state floodplain coordinators. 

FEMA is developing four advanced floodplain management courses (1) Floodplain 
Management Implications associated with Letters of Map Change, NFIP Regulations 
Advanced; The Roles and Responsibilities of the Local Floodplain Administrator, and Postdisaster 
Floodplain Management. The four courses will be pilot tested at EMI during the 
summer of 2006. FEMAs plan is to deliver the courses in the field rather than at EMI. In 
addition, EMI is now offering a train-the-trainer course specifically for NFIP classes. The goal 
is to develop a cadre of instructors who would field deploy both the basic and advanced courses, 
expanding the number of state and local personnel that can be reached with training. 

Both FEMAs study of training needs (FEMA 2003) and the study teams interviews 
found that many state and regional staff want to participate in regular meetings to share 
experiences, training, and best practices for achieving community compliance. FEMA (2003) 
recommended that it sponsor opportunities for regional office and state floodplain management 

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staff to meet, perhaps at an annual conference at EMI. In the past, FEMA sponsored conferences 
of this type, and regional office staff told the study team that these meetings promoted 
consistency in NFIP compliance work among the regions. Several regional offices told the study 
team that they have regular meetings of NFIP staff within the regions where staff can discuss 
their compliance work and share best practices. Regional staff mentioned other possibilities for 
sharing experiences, such as regular conference calls to complement or even replace regular 
workshops at EMI. 

In an enforcement/compliance model heavily weighted toward promoting compliance 
through the provision of technical assistanceas the NFIP model isit is essential that the 
personnel responsible for providing that assistance have as much expertise as possible. However, 
the study team found some deficiencies in FEMAs provision of training for FEMA and state 
floodplain management staff. Even basic training in the NFIP is not required of state or regional 
staff, and advanced training in monitoring and compliance procedures has up until now been 
offered only sporadically. Further, state and FEMA floodplain management staff lack 
opportunities to communicate and share best practices among themselves through national 
conference calls, workshops, or retreats. These conditions are detrimental to training and 
educating FEMA and state officials in floodplain management and NFIP policy. 

4.2.3 Training for Community Staff 
Communities cannot be compliant with the NFIP if their officials and staff do not 
understand its requirements. Formal training can provide community floodplain managers with a 
comprehensive and consistent message about what FEMA expects of communities to be 
compliant with the NFIPs requirements. Training of this type can be delivered without the 
pressure of monitoring and enforcement (unlike technical assistance provided during community 
visits or other formats), and therefore provides a venue for community floodplain management 
staff to admit ignorance and ask questions about floodplain management in their communities. 
Such training sessions also offer an opportunity to acquaint staff from various communities with 
each other and with the FEMA or state staff leading the training. These introductions open 
avenues for the community staff to get additional advice later. 

Due to frequent staff turnover in many communities there is a continuous need for basic 
training, which far outweighs any need for more advanced training. In interviews with AIR, 
FEMA regional office staff likewise identified a need for basic training in many communities. 
Some FEMA regional office staff commented that many local floodplain managers did not have 
the skills or knowledge to be compliant. 

The majority of communities do not attend training at EMI. Of the people who attended 
Managing Floodplain Development through the NFIP at EMI in 2002, 86 were from a local 
(town or county) government. An additional 130 local staff members attended the course when it 
was delivered off-site. Those attendees represented fewer than 1 percent of communities 
nationwide. Although communities do not have to pay tuition at EMI, only communities that 
have the resources available to cover the absent floodplain managers duties for a week send 
representatives to classes there. According to FEMA (2003), those who are able to attend 
training at EMI are usually full-time, professional employees of large metropolitan areasthose 
least likely to need training. It cannot reasonably be expected that small communities with fewer 

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than 20 flood insurance policies (about two-thirds of all NFIP communities) would expend time 
and resources to send their staff to EMI. 

Because EMI is not a practical option for most communities, those that do receive formal 
training usually do so through locally delivered classes and workshops. In its 2003 survey of 
state floodplain managers, ASFPM asked the states to report on the training that they provide to 
communities. Thirty-nine states reported that, in 2002, the collectively trained 8,881 people 
representing 3,051 communities (16 percent of all participating communities nationwide in 
2002). Table 2 presents responses to the ASFPM survey from states that delivered training at 
local events in 2002. 

Only 10 states reported to the ASFPM that they did not train any communities in 2002. 
Four states reported training more than 50 percent of their communities in that single year and 16 
states trained 20 percent of their communities. If those states continue to conduct training at a 
similar rate, they would train every participating community in their states within five yearsfar 
more than can be reached through EMI-based courses. The need for training would continue due 
to the frequent turnover of floodplain management staff in many communities. 

According to FEMAs report on training needs (FEMA 2003) the states said the biggest 
challenge in trying to provide training to NFIP communities is that NFIP training is not required. 
It is difficult to convince communities to attend training and the states saw a need to mandate 
training for local building officials in participating communities. The communities themselves 
expressed support for the recommendation. Nearly all of the communities interviewed for the 
study agreed that a minimum level of training in the NFIP and floodplain management should 
be required/mandated by the NFIP regulations. 

Many of the states and communities interviewed assumed that a requirement for training 
in the NFIP would come from FEMA, but there is no such requirement in the NFIP regulations. 
Further, it is not clear that FEMA has legal authority to mandate training. A FEMA staff member 
told the study team that FEMA could not require all communities to attend training because such 
a requirement would create an unfair burden on communities with few (or no) policies or little 
development, especially considering the limited availability of local training opportunities in 
many states. FEMA further told the study team that training requirements should be enacted only 
at the state level, not the federal level. Three states, Arkansas, New Mexico, and Oklahoma, have 
moved on their own to legislate requirements for training or floodplain management certification 
for community staff. These states may serve as models for other states to enact similar 
requirements. 

The Community Rating System (CRS) provides incentives to encourage and reward 
training by providing credits that can earn policyholders discounts on their flood insurance 
premiums. Communities that participate in the CRS can receive up to 75 points of CRS credit for 
training (including state training of insurance agents). Because a community needs 500 points to 
receive discounts on policyholders premiums, 75 points can be a significant contribution. About 
nine percent of CRS communities (85 communities) received credit in May 2003 for attending 
training at EMI or having certified floodplain managers (CFMs) on staff. A full discussion of the 
CRS is provided in Section 7.3. 

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TABLE 2: Percentage of States Communities Represented at State-provided Training, 2002 

Percentage of Percentage of 
State Communities at State-
provided Training in State Communities at State-
provided Training in 
2002 2002 
AK 52 MS 25 
AL 4 MT 10 
AR 41 NE 5 
CA 49 NH 16 
CO 22 NJ 9 
CT 28 NM 23 
DE 47 NV 7 
GA 9 NY 7 
ID 25 OH 2 
IL 38 OK 17 
IN 11 OR 12 
KS 39 PA 4 
KY 10 RI 100 
LA 14 SD 1 
MA 60 TN 34 
MD 21 TX 7 
ME 21 WA 17 
MI 26 WI 2 
MN 28 WV 10 
MO 53 

NOTE: No data on training were available for VI, IA, and WY
SOURCE: ASFPM (2004); Bureaunet State Fact Sheet (Participating communities, December 2002) 


4.2.4 Training as a Tool for Promoting Compliance 
Although FEMA places a high importance on training, it does not require NFIP training 
for its staff, state floodplain coordinators, or community floodplain managers. Nor does FEMA 
monitor or standardize training and technical assistance developed and delivered by the FEMA 
program specialists, the states, or other entities independent of EMI. FEMAs basic floodplain 
management course, originally delivered at EMI has now been adapted for field deployment and 
independent study. This may be a useful model through which training can be expanded in the 
future: curriculum materials are developed and tested by FEMA and EMI and then made 
available in a variety of formats for states, regional offices, communities, and individuals to use 
in a more convenient forum. There is no longer a regular vehicle through which FEMA 
headquarters and regional office staff and state staff who are responsible for providing technical 
assistance (and monitoring) to communities can meet and share experiences among themselves, 
but interviews indicated widespread support for such an opportunity. 

A full analysis of the effects of training on community compliance with the NFIP was not 
possible for this report because FEMA does not systematically collect the data necessary for such 
an analysis. In Appendix A, recommendations are made of ways to measure the effects of 
training and technical assistance on compliance. More research must be done to determine the 
effect that training and certification have on compliance in communities. 

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4.3 Professional Certification in Floodplain Management 
One of the biggest steps taken to spread and standardize training for practicing floodplain 
managers at all levels is the Certified Floodplain Management (CFM) program developed and 
administered by the ASFPM. This formalized procedure, begun in 1999, allows individuals to 
demonstrate that they have a standardized level of knowledge and skills and a commitment to 
continual education in floodplain management. The program encourages floodplain managers 
and other interested parties to attend training or study independently. 

Staff members from FEMA headquarters and from EMI participated in the development 
of the training materials and examination for the CFM program. As of June 2006 were 3,305 
CFMs nationwide, including federal agency staff, state agency personnel, local floodplain 
managers, and experts from academia, the private sector, and other organizations. Six states have 
developed their own exams, incorporating state and national (NFIP) standards, and received 
ASFPM accreditation. About half of the nations CFMs have received their accreditation through 
a state program. FEMA and several other federal agencies have provided financial support in 
establishing and operating this certification program. 

Certification has three requirements. To become certified, an individual must pass an 
exam that tests his or her knowledge of floodplain management. To maintain certification, the 
individual must attend floodplain management training (that can include web-based or home-
study courses) and compile a specified number of continuing education credits every two years. 
Finally, the individual must pay a fee for initial certification and biennial renewal. 

New Mexico Requires Localities to hire CFMs to Administer Community Floodplain Ordinances 

In 2001, New Mexico passed a law requiring that every NFIP-participating community designate a floodplain 
manager certified by the state to administer its ordinance. The community must either have a certified floodplain manager 
on staff or designate a floodplain manager from a neighboring community to administer its ordinance. The state 
established a deadline of December 31, 2002 for all communities to meet this requirement but did not establish a penalty 
for failure to do so. The law has led to the certification of a large number of local floodplain managers. As of September 
2004, about 78 percent of participating communities in New Mexico had met the requirement to certify their floodplain 
managers. A state floodplain management staff member in New Mexico expressed hope that, through continued 
discussions with communities and by continuing to offer local opportunities to receive training and certification, the state 
could convince the remaining communities to receive certification for their floodplain managers. 

The certification program furthers the professionalism of floodplain managers nationwide 
by enhancing the level of expertise not only of those who are administering local ordinances but 
also those who are providing training, guidance, and technical assistance to those local 
personnel. Professional certification thus helps spread full understanding and appreciation of the 
NFIP, and promote compliance with its requirements. 

Because certification was only begun in 1999, it is too soon to determine what impact 
professional certification has on compliance with the NFIP. However, there is anecdotal 
evidence that it raises awareness of flood hazards and the importance of managing them at the 
local level. For example, the New Mexico legislature was sufficiently convinced that better local 
performance in floodplain management would accrue from certification that it made certification 
mandatory for its local administrators (see box). 

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A related contributor to training for floodplain managers are the state and regional 
professional associations of floodplain managers, sometimes combined with associations for 
hazards managers and/or stormwater managers. According to the ASFPM, in 2006 there were 41 
states with associations, including several states in regional associations. As noted by Mittler et 
al. (2006), these groups play a critical role in supplementing the resources of states and 
communities, providing training, and offering a non- governmental, peer-to-peer information 
source. The ASFPM has been instrumental in the development of these associations, and FEMA 
has been supportive of these efforts. Continued support, in the form of providing speakers, 
hosting workshops, and recognizing contributions and feedback from association leaders will 
contribute to the level of training and professionalism of floodplain managers at all levels. 

4.4. Incentives and Disincentives to Promote Compliance 
Besides the training and technical assistance tools FEMA and the states use to promote 
compliance, there are several incentives and disincentives built into the NFIP that operate 
indirectly to promote community compliance. These insurance-based mechanisms are 
specifically referenced in the NFIP Community Compliance Program Guidance, which states 
that one goal of the compliance program is to maximize the use of the existing NFIP program 
structure, noting that the floodplain management and flood insurance components of the 
program were intended to be mutually supportive (FEMA 1986, p. 1-1). 

The insurance tools were examined in other substudies under the NFIP Evaluation, so 
they are not evaluated in this report. However, they are described briefly below because they are 
an integral part of the framework of the NFIP. Because they influence individual and 
community-level behavior (such as purchasing flood insurance or investing time and effort to 
obtain lower rates), they contributealbeit in an unquantified wayto community compliance. 
It should also be noted that insurance incentives and disincentives only operate if the community 
is eligible for flood insurance, that is, if its floodplain management program is operating in 
compliance with the NFIP. 

4.4.1 Insurance Availability and the Insurance Rating Structure 
The first incentive is the availability of flood insurance to residents of communities that 
participate in the program. Without the NFIP, people would not be able to purchase insurance 
an important financial protection to the owner of any home or business. The assumption is that 
communities are pressured by their constituents to join the NFIP and, by extension, to remain in 
good standing with it, so that flood insurance will remain available. 

A second, related incentive is that the flood insurance rates are established in part on a 
buildings compliance with the NFIP standards. Buildings that are not built to proper standards 
are at greater risk of being flooded and therefore cost more to insure than those that are 
constructed properly. Theoretically, individuals who are building a new structure (or improving 
an old one) have an incentive to obtain the lowest possible rate by insisting that their structure 
comply with or exceed NFIP standards (as incorporated into the local ordinance). Individuals 
who find themselves in the position of having expensive flood insurance premiums because of 
the communitys failure to adequately administer appropriate regulations, the thinking goes, will 
express their displeasure to their local officials resulting, over time, in a community that pays 
proper attention to its compliance with the NFIP. 

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Conversely, once a community joins the NFIP and makes flood insurance available to its 
residents, the prospect of losing that ability to purchase insurance operates as a disincentive to 
ignoring the communitys responsibilities under the NFIP. Similarly, the fact that the flood 
insurance rates for a noncompliant structure will be based on its higher flood risk discourages 
individuals and developers from circumventing building standards. 

4.4.2 Premium Discounts for CRS Communities 
An additional incentive beyond the availability of flood insurance is the discount in 
premiums that is provided to policyholders in communities participating in the Community 
Rating System. Communities in the CRS are those whose floodplain management programs 
exceed NFIP minimum standards in certain specified ways. In exchange for this advanced 
floodplain management approach, the NFIP reduces the annual flood insurance premiums in that 
community by 5 to 45%, depending on the extent of the CRS communitys flood reduction 
activities. 

In addition to the discount received by policyholders, the recognition that communities 
receive when they participate in the CRS, and improve their classification within it (resulting in 
an incremental increase in the discount) promotes compliance by furthering the understanding 
and acceptance of sound floodplain management. 

Compliance in CRS communities is examined in Section 7.3. 

4.4.3 Increased Cost of Compliance (ICC) Coverage 
Increased Cost of Compliance (ICC) insurance coverage provides property owners with 
up to $30,00024 to bring their substantially damaged structures into compliance, if needed, after 
the community has declared the structure substantially damaged. 25 Such damage does not have 
to be the result of a presidentially declared disaster. Compliance activities eligible for an ICC 
claim payment include floodproofing, elevating, relocating, or demolishing (or a combination of 
these activities) an insured structure. 

All Standard Flood Insurance Policies issued or renewed since June 1, 1997 contain ICC 
coverage. The study team found that the funding was not widely used during its first 6 years of 
existence, possibly for reasons explained in the discussion on substantial damage in Section 7.1. 
In recent years, ICC claims (and their accompanying use for mitigation) have increased. 
According to data from FEMA, although only about 1,000 ICC claims had been paid from 1997 

24 The amount paid by the NFIP under ICC coverage is in addition to the amount of coverage selected by 
the policyholder under the Standard Flood Insurance Policy. However, the total amount of the claim payment (i.e., 
property coverage plus ICC coverage) cannot exceed the maximum amount allowed under the program (currently 
$250,000 for a residential structure). 

25 Policyholders owning repetitive loss properties, not declared substantially damaged, can make an ICC 
claim only if their homes are located in a state or participating community that has adopted and currently enforces a 
repetitive loss provision or a cumulative substantial damage provision in its floodplain management ordinance or 
regulations. A repetitive loss structure is a building covered by a contract for flood insurance that has incurred 
flood-related damage on 2 occasions during a 10-year period ending on the date of the event for which a second 
claim is made, in which the cost of repairing the flood damage, on the average, equaled or exceeded 25% of the 
market value of the building at the time of each such flood event. 

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to 2003, that number tripled in the next two years. As of the end of Fiscal Year 2005, the NFIP 
had paid 3,209 claims under the ICC coverage to substantially damaged or non-substantially 
damaged repetitive loss structures, for a total of more than $59 million. 

4.4.4 Denial of Insurance Coverage 
When a structure is in violation of the local ordinance, the community has the option of 
making a declaration under Section 1316 of the National Flood Insurance Act that the structure is 
not eligible for flood insurance. A structure that cannot be insured cannot secure a mortgage 
from a federally regulated lender and is ineligible for other grants, loans, or guarantees made by 
federal agencies for acquisition or construction related to the structure. If the uninsured building 
is damaged in a flood, no federal disaster assistance is available to rebuild or repair. The 
disadvantages that would be brought about by a Section 1316 declaration act as disincentives to 
actions (or inaction) that might otherwise be chosen to avoid compliance with the NFIP. 

The way in which Section 1316 declarations are used in NFIP enforcement is discussed 
in Section 6.2.3. 

4.5 Recommendations for Promoting Compliance 
FEMA should update its two general guidance documents. These two manuals, NFIP Community 
Compliance Program Guidance (1986) and NFIP Guidance for Conducting CACs and 
CAVs (1989) do not reflect the many changes that have been made to the NFIP since the 
1980s. Although FEMA has explained these changes in other materials (e.g., policy 
memos, technical bulletins, EMI course materials), a single comprehensive guide for 
compliance work would help eliminate confusion and errors. 

FEMA and the states should continue to use the CAP-SSSE funding to deliver training to 
community staff and make sure some CAP-SSSE funds are dedicated for such a purpose 
in contracts. In each annual CAP/SSSE, contracts between the states and FEMA, a task 
should be included that calls for training communities. FEMA should encourage those 
states that do not provide any training for their communities to include it in their CAP 
workplans. 

FEMA should continue its support of training for local staff, state training requirements, 
certification of local floodplain managers, and the formation of state and regional 
professional associations. Mandatory training and/or certification of community 
floodplain managers through national or, more likely, state-by-state legislative changes 
would promote local awareness of NFIP requirements and knowledge of tools available 
to achieve compliance. FEMA can provide incentives for communities to attend training 
by supporting state training or certification requirements and by encouraging 
communities to enter the CRS, which offers incentives for communities to attend 
training. Associations can be supported through the provision of speakers, hosting 
workshops, and offering feedback to association representatives. 

FEMA should require that all regional compliance staff attend standardized NFIP training. 

Training should be delivered at centralized locations (such as EMI or the annual ASFPM 
conference) so that different states and regional offices will be represented and learn from 
each other. 

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States should consider requiring professional certification of their local floodplain management 
officials. Such legislation would foster local knowledge of NFIP requirements and thus 
promote community compliance. 

FEMA should develop training courses and materials on compliance for state and regional 
compliance officials (and also for interested communities) . There is need and desire for 
better, more standardized understanding of monitoring techniques, how to document 
violations, and process enforcement actions. 

State and FEMA regional staff should be encouraged to meet and share best practices. FEMA 
should continue to support opportunities for state and regional staff to meet and learn 
from each other, either in formal workshops at EMI or in regularly scheduled informal 
meetings or conference calls. 

The effect of training and technical assistance on community compliance should be measured. 
FEMA records do not currently contain the data necessary to measure the effect of 
training and technical assistance on community compliance. The study team has outlined 
a method for improving data collection and determining the effects of training, and 
included that information in Appendix A. 

FEMA should issue additional guidance on and further publicize the ICC coverage. A concerted 
effort is needed to provide information to community members after a flood detailing 
who is eligible to make a claim on their ICC coverage, how to make a claim, and the 
purposes for which ICC money can be used. This incentive to compliance will only 
operate when communities and property owners are aware of it. 

The indicators of the need for technical assistance should be tracked more closely. Including 
language on the biennial report form asking communities to note whether they have had a 
change in floodplain management staff is one way to track turnover in local personnel, 
which may indicate the need for contact with the community. This would be particularly 
effective if the information were then entered into the CIS so that FEMA and state staff 
can quickly access it. Another option would be for each regional office and state to 
develop its own mandatory periodic email reporting or communicating tool, which could 
be used no less than annually to more quickly gather information on staff turnover or 
other factors that the regional office or state considers significant for their communities. 

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5. MONITORING COMMUNITY COMPLIANCE WITH THE NFIP 
Central to any compliance program are means by which the people or entities responsible 
for ensuring compliance maintain an awareness of the extent to which program standards are 
being met. In this report the term monitoring is used to describe collectively all the activities 
under the NFIP that help keep FEMA headquarters, FEMA regional offices, and the states 
apprised of floodplain management in the communities. These activities include both remote 
means of monitoring (such as using computer systems to track relevant NFIP data), sharing 
information, and integrating procedures among components of the NFIP, as well as encounters 
with local officials and visits to communities that are intended to seek out more detailed 
information about a communitys compliance. 

The tools employed by FEMA and the states in this component of the compliance 
program include on-site and remote measures and screening mechanisms through which 
potential problems are singled out (figure 6). Each of these tools is discussed and analyzed in this 
chapter and its effectiveness in monitoring assessed. The chapter concludes with 
recommendations for improving the monitoring component of the NFIP compliance model. 

FIGURE 6: Tools for Monitoring Community Compliance 

 Contacts with communities 
Community assistance contact (CAC) 
Community assistance visit (CAV) 
Other meetings 

Community Information System 
Submit for rate procedure 
Letters of Map Revision based on Fill (LOMR-Fs) 
Community Rating System procedures 

Complaints, requests for technical assistance 

5.1 Contact with Communities 
Direct one-on-one contact with community floodplain management officials is the most 
thorough and effective way of monitoring a single community to determine its compliance with 
NFIP criteria, and is a legally required precursor to any enforcement action that may be 
necessary (discussed in Chapter 6). 

As noted in the discussion on technical assistance (Section 4.1, above), the staff of 
FEMAs regional offices and the state floodplain management offices have direct one-on-one 
contact with individual communities through three means: CACs; CAVs; and meetings for 
mapping, ordinance review, or other purposes. CAVs are the only types of contact in which it is 
standard practice to visit the community and conduct a thorough investigation of all aspects of 
the communitys floodplain management program (including conducting a field visit in which 
buildings are inspected for compliance). CAVs are, therefore, incomparable tools for monitoring 
community compliance. A CAC is used to establish or re-establish contact with a community as 
a screening tool for the purpose of determining if any problems or issues may exist sufficient to 

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prioritize for a CAV and to offer a community assistance if necessary. CACs can be conducted 
by means of a telephone call or brief visit. Their role in monitoring is usually as a screening tool. 
That is, it may be possible from a CAC for a regional office or state staff to determine that there 
may well be compliance problems in a community and thus a CAV or other onsite visit should 
be scheduled. However, it is not possible from a CAC to conclude that a community has no 
compliance problems or violations. 

Because limited resources dictate that not all communities can be visited frequently, for 
monitoring purposes (as for technical assistance), FEMA recommends that CAVs and CACs be 
prioritized for communities with the most development or the most likelihood of compliance 
problems. States and regions are urged to consider factors such as high growth rates, 
development activity in SFHAs, potential compliance issues identified through remote means 
(such as submit-to-rate insurance applications, the LOMR process, or repetitive loss lists), and 
citizen complaints. 

To be effective as a monitoring tool, contact with communitieswhatever form it 
takesmust be regular and frequent enough to assure that noncompliant activities are detected, 
and it should be kept in mind that as communities change, compliance problems can crop up 
where none existed before. FEMAs guidance for conducting CACs and CAVs states that 
ideally, each fiscal year some type of contact should be made with all NFIP communities 
during which programs are assessed and assistance provided. However, it acknowledges that 
such a task is virtually impossible given limited resources (FEMA 1989, p. 1-3). The guidance 
goes on to establish a goal that every participating community be contacted or visited every five 
years. This should be attainable, according to FEMA headquarters staff, through a combination 
of CACs, CAVs, and all the other community assessment and assistance activities conducted 
(meetings and consultation on mapping, ordinance meetings, training, workshops, etc.). 

It was not clear to the study team how FEMA arrived at the five-year time frame as a 
goal, given that allocations of regional office personnel are fairly steady and the amount of state 
assistance obtained through the CAP-SSSE is predictable. It may be preferable for FEMA to set 
an attainable goal by working backwards from the rate of coverage of communities that is 
feasible, given available staff, and calculate the number of years it would take to reach each 
community. That number of years might be different for each region or for different categories of 
community. Otherwise, the goal is not as useful as it could be. 

There is some basis for considering a five-year cycle reasonable, although it did not exist 
when FEMA issued its guidance. In a survey of state floodplain managers, the ASFPM asked 
how frequently communities should be monitored. The average of the states responses was 
this: every 2.8 years under ideal circumstances (no constraints in funding or staff); every two 
years if the community had a history of compliance problems or was experiencing rapid growth; 
and every 4.5 years if the community had no development pressure. This suggests that FEMAs 
five-year goal may be just barely reasonable when it is coupled with the agencys guidance that 
certain communities be given priority in scheduling CAVs, thus putting them ahead of the 
routine five-year schedule (those with rapid growth or development in floodplains, past 
compliance problems, or citizen complaints). 

To determine whether communities are actually contacted at this rate in accord with 
FEMAs written policy (a CAC, CAV, or other contact every five years), the study team asked 

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each FEMA regional office to supply the number of CACs and CAVs conducted by regional 
office staff, state staff, or others from January 1997 to December 2002 (data are not available on 
the number of other types of contacts). Table 2 shows the average number of CACs and CAVs 
conducted per year from 1997 through 2002. To cover all communities within a five-year period, 
each region would have to have contact with an average of 20 percent of its communities each 
year. Assuming each community was contacted only once from 1997 to 2002 (an assumption 
that probably overestimates the percentage of communities contacted), it can be seen that almost 
all regions fell short of full coverage of their communities in this five-year period. 

The best situation is that of Region VIII. At the rates shown in the table, it would take the 
Region VIII office and states no more than five years to contact every community in their region 
via a CAC or CAV. At the other extreme, no fewer than 20 years would pass before every 
community in Region III or in Region VII were contacted. The nationwide average for the length 
of the cycle for community contact is about 10 years. This confirms the sentiment expressed by 
many regional office staff to the study team that the five-year goal for everyone was unattainable 
and therefore served to frustrate rather than motivate them to contact as many communities as 
possible. 

TABLE 2: Community Assistance Contacts and Community Assistance Visits Conducted in 
NFIP communities by All Sources, by Region, 19972002 

Region 
Number of 
Participating 
Communities, 
19991 
Average Number 
of CACs 
Conducted per 
Year2 
Average Number 
of CAVs 
Conducted per 
Year2 
Average Percentage 
of Regions 
Communities 
Contacted per Year 
I 1,896 65 105 9% 
II 2,013 81 43 6% 
III 3,135 37 75 4% 
IV 2,609 276 92 14% 
V 3,646 126 180 8% 
VI 2,058 155 107 13% 
VII 1,627 53 6 4% 
VIII 1,093 130 81 19% 
IX 644 8 81 14% 
X 720 19 59 10% 
Nationwide 19,441 950 827 9% 
1 December 31, 1999 is the midpoint between January 1997 and December 2002. 
2 The total may over-represent the number of communities assessed because single communities 
may have been contacted multiple times through various means. 

The piece of information missing from this analysis is the number of other contacts that 
communities receive. FEMA told the study team that systematic records are not kept of all these 
interactions with communities, although individual staff members may keep their own notes or 
memos of such contacts. Thus it is not possible to tell exactly how frequently communities 

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receive some other sort of contact with the state or a regional office representative. However, 
contacts that are not recorded are of minimal value in monitoring because they leave no basis for 
conducting follow-up actions that may be necessary nor do they provide documentation that a 
certain community has been contacted and thus may be removed from the schedule for future 
contacts. That means that those other contacts should not be counted in the monitoring scheme 
until and unless they are systematically recorded. So the figures calculated by the study team 
above probably constitute a fairly accurate record of the monitoring that can be counted toward 
the five-year goal. In any case, other contacts that are made with communities, although 
useful, cannot be considered as effective as a CAV or CAC in assessing compliance because they 
have different objectives. 

Even if each community could be reached once in five years, it is not clear that that is 
frequent enough to avert compliance problems or to address them before they become severe. 
The judgment of the states as expressed above is that the optimal rate of community contact 
ranges from two to three years and only communities with little or no development pressure 
should be allowed to wait almost five years between contacts. 

The study team encountered confusion on the part of the regional office staff about their 
responsibility for meeting FEMAs five-year goal. Many regional office staff misinterpret the 
goal to mean that every community must be assessed by a CAV (the more intensive, time-
consuming, and comprehensive contact) every five years. FEMA headquarters contributed to this 
confusion by indicating in its response to a 2002 report by FEMAs Inspector General that 
FEMAs current policy requires that every community be assessed by a CAV every five years 
(Inspector General 2002)26 Although there may be value in doing so, this expectation is 
inconsistent with the actual goal as described in FEMAs guidance (FEMA 1989). 

5.1.1 Dual Purpose of CACs and CAVs 
Under the NFIP compliance model, CACs and CAVs are tools for both promotion 
(discussed in Section 4.1.1) and monitoring For this reason, staff conducting the CAC or CAV 
may be reluctant to discuss the prospect of sanctions with a community and instead will only 
provide technical assistance. In its survey of state NFIP coordinators (ASFPM 2004), half the 
states reported that they view technical assistance, not monitoring, as the primary purpose of 
CACs and CAVs. One state floodplain coordinator told the study team that, although he conducts 
many CAVs each year, the CAVs never include discussion of sanctions through the NFIP. He 
said that enforcing NFIP policies would mean that he could not work as closely with 
communities, advising them in the same capacity he does now. FEMA emphasizes technical 
assistance over monitoring and enforcement. This is consistent with FEMAs implicit model and 
assumption that all or most do not need enforcement. By combining technical assistance with 
monitoring and enforcement, FEMA may put too much emphasis on the former as a tool for 
achieving community compliance and create an environment in which FEMA regional and state 
staff are unwilling to enforce compliance through sanctions. 

26 FEMA said in that response that it would instruct its staff to schedule CAVs in Community Rating System (CRS) 
communities with the same regularity as other communities and that in doing so CAVs would be conducted in 
every CRS community within a 3- to 5-year timeframe. This is discussed further in Section 7.3. 

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On the other hand, monitoring is necessary and the technical assistance aspect of the 
inevitable community visit can help to soften the reality that monitoring is being done 
simultaneously. Another implication of that state coordinators comment and the other states 
responses to the ASFPM survey is that monitoring for enforcement purposes may not be 
occurring as often as the CAV data suggest. If many states or even regional staff who conduct 
CAVs are confining themselves to providing education and assistance rather than touring the 
floodplain and inspecting community records with an eye toward detecting noncompliance, then 
violations and program deficiencies may be going unnoticed or if noticed, unrecorded for 
enforcement purposes. 

One solution to this dilemma might be establishing a system in which monitoring and 
technical assistance are separated. Perhaps the state staff become responsible for providing 
technical assistance while the FEMA staff cover monitoring and enforcement. This would free 
the technical assistance staff from monitoring and enforcement responsibilities (and vice versa) 
and over the long run may enable personnel to specialize and thus operate more effectively. 
However, this approach easily could double the number of community visits that need to be 
conducted, since it is agreed that community visits are needed both for technical assistance and 
for monitoring. In a situation in which resources are limited, this might be an inefficient use of 
staff time and travel funds. Using both state and FEMA staff for both technical assistance and 
monitoring, and performing them simultaneously, is a tradeoff made by FEMA in the design of 
the compliance program that is probably unavoidable. 

5.1.2 CAVs as Determinants of Compliance or Noncompliance 
Although other community contact and other monitoring tools can help detect possible 
program deficiencies and violations, only by visiting the community (through a CAV) can the 
existence of compliance problems be confirmed and documented. To be effective in this way, 
CAVs must verify the presence (or absence) of program deficiencies or violations; provide 
documentation for future reference; serve as a determination of whether a community is 
compliant; and set the stage for possible enforcement action. 

Detection of Violations and Program Deficiencies 

The study team did not attempt to assess how well regional office and state staff perform 
in detecting violations and program deficiencies; presumably they are all minimally qualified to 
conduct this task. There was no indication in interviews with regional office, state, or community 
staff that the conduct of CAVs is inadequate (although, as noted in Section 4.1.1, above, some 
personality conflicts were described). However, there were several comments from those 
interviewed that mentioned old violations. It was not clear whether these were discovered only 
recently or whether they had remained unresolved from an earlier CAV. This suggests that there 
may be some gaps in the CAV procedure (perhaps more time needs to be spent to be sure all of a 
communitys flood-prone areas are monitored) or in the ability of some of the officials who 
conduct CAVs (as discussed above, formal training is not required for all state personnel or for 
all FEMA regional office staff). 

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Documentation 

There are standard procedures for documenting CAVs, set out in FEMAs guidance 
(FEMA 1989). Documentation consists, at a minimum, of (1) the community visit report (usually 
called a CAV report) (FEMA Form 81-68), which must be completed after each community 
visit; and (2) a letter to the communitys CEO informing him or her or the findings of the visit 
(usually called the follow-up letter). FEMAs guidance emphasizes repeatedly the importance 
of thorough and accurate documentation: Because it is impossible to tell whether an 
enforcement action will ever be necessary, it is important to document carefully [all] relevant 
community activities (FEMA 1989, p. 7-4). The CAV report and any accompanying notes are 
required to be on file in the regional office within 30 days of the visit (FEMA 1989, p. I-1) and 
are supposed to be entered into the CIS for future reference. Reports for CAVs that found no 
compliance problems in a community are filed with the regional office as closed; for CAVs 
that detected compliance problems, the CAV report is completed and filed as usual but the CAV 
is considered open. Documentation of ongoing technical assistance and other followup 
activities is added to the file as needed until all needed action (by FEMA, the states, or the 
community) is completed and then CAV is closed. According to information the study team 
obtained through CIS for the years 1997 to 2002, CAVs are typically closed between 277 and 
306 days after they are conducted. Roughly 10 percent are reported closed the same day they are 
conducted. 27 

The CAV report has four categories in which no,  minor, or serious program 
deficiencies are to be noted by the official conducting the CAV: (1) floodplain management 
regulations, (2) administration and enforcement process and procedures, (3) engineering, and 

(4) other community land use policies and procedures that are inconsistent with the local 
floodplain management regulations. Detailed descriptions of any problems are required in the 
report. Suspected violations of the ordinance must be documented in detail according to a 
checklist provided in the guidance manual. It includes such details as property address, type of 
development, photo or sketch, estimated elevation of lowest floor of building and adjacent 
ground level, location on the FIRM, permit number; date of construction, elevation certificate 
date, variance information, and other data. 
The letter to the CEO describes the findings of the CAV, and FEMA guidance specifies 
that it be sent within 15 working days after the community visit. Any program deficiencies or 
violations that were discovered are described in detail in the letter. Actions the community must 
take to address the compliance problems are listed in the letter, along with a time frame for their 
completion. Follow-up action that FEMA or the state has agreed to (such as the provision of 
additional technical assistance, providing on-site training, etc.) is also specified. 

The timetable set out in the letter to the CEO as part of the CAV documentation gives 
concrete deadlines for the community, FEMA, and the state to follow. FEMAs guidance states 
that any technical assistance that is promised to the community should be provided with 90 days 
if possible (FEMA 1989, p. 7-1). The deadlines set for community action are to be reasonable 

27 It should be noted that the date corresponding to a CAV or CAC does not necessarily represent the actual date the 

action was taken. For instance, two months after a CAV, a regional office staff member may enter data stating that 

the CAV was closed one week after the CAV. In other words, dates in CIS are those entered by regional and state 

officials, not necessarily the date when an action was taken. 

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considering the complexity of the actions that are required of the community and in general 
should be no shorter than 30 days and in many cases 90 day or longer would be appropriate 
(FEMA 1986 p. 3-13). 

Determination of Compliance 

When all the follow-up activities to the CAV have been completed, the CAV is closed. 
There is a place at the end of the CAV report form to indicate the date on which the CAV was 
officially closed by the regional office or state. On that date, the community is considered to be 
compliant with the NFIP. In most cases, no problems or only minor ones are discovered in a 
community, so the CAV can be closed within days or weeks. If follow-up action was needed by 
the community or other entity, the CAV is not closed until all activities are completed. This 
includes any actions FEMA or the state promised to take as well as all the corrective and 
remedial action that was required of the community to address its program deficiencies and 
violations (FEMA 1989, p. 7-1). 

It can take months or even a year or more to address numerous or problematic program 
deficiencies or violations, so CAV reports stay open that whole time. The community is not 
fully compliant, but no sanctions have been applied because it is working on corrective and 
remedial measures. 

If the compliance problems are not remedied within a certain time, then an enforcement 
action begins (described in Section 6). 

CAVs as Precursors to Enforcement 

FEMA policy states that a community may be placed on probation on the strength of a 
CAV done by a state, but that a CAV must have been done by FEMA staff before the community 
can be suspended (FEMA 1986, p 7-1). This suggests that the FEMA regional office should 
become involved as soon as possible after a state CAV reveals serious compliance problems, 
because escalation of the enforcement action may eventually require a FEMA CAV. FEMAs 
guidance anticipates this situation by saying, Agencies conducting CAVs on behalf of FEMA 
should contact the FEMA regional office at the earliest stage possible if issues or problems may 
require some type of enforcement action or other follow-up assistance on the part of FEMA . . 
.Ensuring [that] communities comply with NFIP floodplain management criteria through the 
conduct of enforcement actions is a FEMA responsibility and can not be delegated to States or 
other Federal agencies (FEMA 1989, p. 7-2). 

By the same token, FEMA guidance warns that headquarters should be advised as soon 
as possible after a CAV if headquarters involvement in follow-up actions is anticipated (FEMA 
1989, p. 7-3). 

5.1.3 Findings on Community Contacts as Monitoring 
In chapter four, the study team concluded that FEMAs goal of contacting every NFIP 
community once every five years is not necessarily optimal for monitoring or for technical 
assistance purposes. Some of FEMAs regional office staff were not aware of the goal, and some 
misunderstood it. Even if it were widely acknowledged and understood, there do not appear to be 

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enough resources to achieve it. Even if there were enough resources to meet the goal, all contacts 
are not documented so there is no way to prove that the goal has been met. 

The implications of this insufficiency in monitoring are that first, compliance problems 
may go undetected, and second, the rate of community compliance cannot be documented fully 
and accurately. Further, monitoring may not be occurring even as often as calculated by the 
study team, because at least some states confine their community contact to providing assistance 
rather than monitoring. 

5.2 The Community Information System 
FEMA maintains floodplain management information about communities nationwide in a 
database called the Community Information System (CIS). CIS includes community-specific 
demographic, engineering, and insurance information; communities past and present NFIP 
status and floodplain management activities; status of flood maps and floodplain studies; CRS 
grade, if appropriate; and other information for all jurisdictions in the United States that have 
been identified as flood-prone. The CIS also includes information gathered through the 
mandatory biennial report submitted by communities and reports of CACs and CAVs conducted 
by regional office or state staff (see Appendix B). 

FEMA maintains several other databases of information, such as Bureaunet, which 
contains information on the status of individual properties in the NFIP, including claims and loss 
statistics, submit-for-rate properties, and policy growth and retention. Unlike Bureaunet, 
however, CIS provides statistics aggregated by community rather than statistics on individual 
properties (although some of the information contained in CIS does pertain to individual 
structures, such as Letters of Map Change and CAV notes). CIS is also meant to be a source of 
information for outside organizations, such as the U.S. Government Accountability Office and 
FEMAs Inspector General, to develop statistics on the NFIP and participating communities. 

Federal, regional, and state floodplain management officials can enter, modify, and view 
information contained in the CIS database28. They can also request reports on selected 
information through the CISs Reporting Tool. 

FEMA introduced CIS in 1989. Before 1986, NFIP data were maintained on a mainframe 
computer called the Management Information System (MIS), which was not accessible by the 
regional offices or states. In 2004, FEMA launched a web-based version of CIS, intended to 
allow state users access to the database CIS through the internet. 

5.2.1 The Role of CIS in Monitoring Community Compliance 
An authoritative, official source of community-related informationas the CIS is 
intended to beis vital to monitoring compliance with NFIP standards. CIS, or a similar vehicle, 
needs to archive and make available documentation of a communitys history and status in the 
NFIP. This would allow federal, regional, and state officials to identify, assess, and track 
communities floodplain management activities. Such a database should aid planning for 

28 Limited access is offered to state floodplain management staff, who may enter, modify, and view specified 

information on communities in their states, while other information is available for viewing only. National-level 

users have greater ability to view and modify data. 

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compliance activities such as training and technical assistance; provide input for making 
decisions about enforcement actions; and facilitate communication about compliance among 
headquarters, regional office, and state personnel. Information related directly to community 
compliance available in CIS includes probation, suspension, withdrawal, and reinstatement; CRS 
class, effective dates, activity points, and contacts; ordinance adoption and approval; and CAV 
and CAC dates and findings (see Appendix B). 

Ideally, in order to help determine whether another CAV or CAC is warranted, for 
example, a regional office or state should be able to check in CIS to find out the number of 
CAVs that a given community has received, what the outcomes were, and how the community 
has responded to any deficiencies or violations uncovered. Or data from CIS could demonstrate 
that the community has a history of making progress in addressing floodplain management 
issues. This type of information could be used in assigning suitable guidance for remedying 
violations. In addition, all this information can provide a statistical base for analyzing and 
documenting compliance trends nationwide and over time.29 

CISs Reporting Tool allows users to analyze certain types of data related to compliance, 
mapping, variances, and community participation. In theory, this reporting capability would be 
used by FEMA headquarters and regional staff and the states to establish program priorities and 
improve decision-making. A complete table of the reports contained in CIS can be found in 
Appendix B. Additional, custom reports may be obtained by contacting FEMA officials directly. 

Interviews with federal and regional officials revealed that much communication between 
headquarters and the region about compliance issues is based on anecdotal information. A lack 
of consistency in approach, documentation, record-keeping, and evaluation of such issues among 
FEMA regional offices was a frequently cited problem. In recent years, FEMA has done away 
with compliance meetings for all regional staff, making it more difficult for regional officials to 
understand the context of their actions, or coordinate their approaches to shared problems. An 
effective and reliable statistical tool would enhance the ability of FEMA headquarters to 
accurately assess compliance activities at the regional level. CIS has the capability to improve 
consistency among regional offices as well. 

To be an effective tool for monitoring community compliance, the CIS must 

 be an authoritative source of community information pertaining to NFIP compliance, 
 be useable by all relevant parties (FEMA headquarters and regional staff, state staff, 
and outside entities), and 
 be used by NFIP staff and FEMA headquarters and regional offices and by the states. 
29 These monitoring functions coordinate well with FEMAs vision of the use of the CIS. According to FEMA 
guidance, the objectives of CIS are to (1) be the authoritative information source and official record of NFIP data; 

(2) provide the means of managing the NFIP by providing capability to address day-to-day issues, problems, and 
program activities, conduct evaluations, track community status, and conduct overall statistical analysis; (3) 
improve the decision-making process; and (4) offer an effective means to exchange information between the 
Federal Insurance Administration (FIA) headquarters [now the Mitigation Division] and FEMA regional offices. 
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Accordingly, the study teams analysis of the CIS covered the extent to which CIS 
records are complete and accurate, whether relevant parties have access to CIS, whether FEMA 
provides sufficient guidance on the use of CIS, and whether relevant parties possess database 
systems as alternatives to CIS. 

The CIS as an Authoritative Information Source 

To be authoritative, CIS must contain comprehensive and accurate data needed for 
compliance purposes and also be viewed with confidence by its users. 

Incomplete CIS Data on Compliance Activities 

Previous estimates of the completeness of CIS records were anecdotal, based on instances 
in which states had failed to enter information into CIS because of lack of access to the database, 
insufficient funding and resources to perform the data entry, management miscues, or inadequate 
guidance. FEMA officials stated that some regional staff members had consistently failed to 
enter data in the system. They also estimated that only about 60 percent of CAVs and CACs had 
been recorded in CIS. Interviews with regional officials produced similar answers. Preliminary 
evidence of CISs incompleteness can also be found in a survey FEMA conducted in 2002 of 
regional directors regarding the effectiveness of CAP-SSSE and proposed changes. Regional 
directors were asked whether the states within their regions were using CIS and entering the 
results of CAVs, CACs, and ordinance information into the system. Four regions reported that 
there were some problems with CIS and that use was sporadic, or varied by state.30 Four regions 
reported that their states were using CIS. One region reported that its states were not. These and 
other similar responses indicated deficiencies in CISs completeness. 

Because FEMA currently has no systematic way to determine the completeness of CIS 
records, the study team sought to establish a reliable means of estimating the extent of the 
compliance-related data present in CIS. Because CAVs and CACs are important tools for both 
promoting and monitoring community compliance and reports on them are invaluable, an 
evaluation of the entry of reports on CAVs and CACs into CIS is an efficient way to estimate 
CIS completeness, even though these data represent only a portion of the information housed in 
CIS (see Appendix B). The number of CACs and CAVs conducted and closed in a given year 
can be an important statistic for determining state and regional efforts to measure and remedy 
local compliance problems. Further, CAC and CAV data require periodic entry and update, and 
are more frequently used than other information in CIS. 

To establish an independent benchmark of actual CAC and CAV activities against which 
to compare CIS records, the study team contacted state and regional officials and imposed a 
significant data request upon them and their staffs, which took weeks and often months to 
complete. As the study team found, evaluating the completeness of CIS records is burdensome 
under the current system. The implication for FEMA is that officials are unable to readily assess 
the completeness of records contained in CIS without significant effort. 

The analysis was limited to CAVs and CACs conducted between January 1, 1997, and 
December 31, 2002, to assure that more accurate results were obtained from regional and state 

30 One region did not answer this question. 

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officials, to lessen the effects of staff turnover among NFIP officials, and to focus the analysis on 
a time period during which the majority of states had access to CIS. 

The study team began by collecting records available in CIS for the period in question 
(current as of September 2003) and then contacted regional offices directly to confirm the 
available figures and solicit additional records that may not have been entered in CIS. The 
responses to AIRs requests varied depending on region and state. 

CISs completeness with respect to compliance information was analyzed in two ways. 
First, the team drew records from CIS of the number of CAVs and CACs conducted between 
January 1, 1997 and December 31, 2002. State and regional offices were contacted and their 
records compared to CIS records to determine the percentage of CAVs and CACs entered into 
CIS. The study team assessed the overall level of incompleteness as well as that of individual 
states and regions. CAC and CAV records were broken down by whether a state or region had 
entered them. (The entity that conducts the CAV or CAC is responsible for entering the 
information in CIS.) 

The analysis showed that, nationwide, between 1997 and 2002, 81 percent of CAVs 
conducted period were entered in CIS, while 81 percent of CACs were entered. Overall, CIS 
records entered by FEMAs regional offices were slightly less complete than those entered by 
state officials for the time period. Regional offices entered 77 percent of CAVs they conducted 
and 78 percent of their CACs. State offices entered 82 percent of CAVs they conducted and 83 
percent of CACs. This is a better completion rate than the 60 percent that was estimated by 
FEMA in interviews and in response to the Inspector Generals evaluation. 

A relatively small number of states and regions accounted for most of the incompleteness 
in CIS during the five-year period studied. In Regions III, V, and VIII there were CIS entry rates 
of 6 percent, 72 percent, and 25 percent, respectively. In Region III, Maryland entered fewer than 
two percent of the CAVs and CACs conducted and closed by the state office between 1997 and 
2002. In Region V, the regional office entered 20 percent of the CAVs it conducted and closed in 
Indiana, but none of the CAVs it conducted and closed in Minnesota. There were deficiencies in 
CIS entry in Region VIII as well. 

Data were deficient for several states.31. Fewer than 10 percent of the CAVs and CACs 
conducted in Wisconsin, Maryland, Montana, Utah, and North Dakota, were entered into CIS. 
Confirming the findings for regional offices, three of these six states are in Region VIII. Regions 
III, V, and VIII had consistently low entry of CAVs and CACs, both by the regional offices and 
by the state floodplain management office. Table 3 shows the level of entry of data into CIS by 
those states that have incomplete records. 

Incomplete CIS records also mean that some monitoring activities go unrecorded. For 
example, between 1997 and 2002, regional officials reported that Iowa conducted 81 CACs in 
participating communities but CIS only records 34. During interviews, officials in Virginias 
Department of Conservation and Recreation pointed out that CAV records for their state were 
incomplete. The officials stated that CIS shows that Virginia had conducted three CAVs 

31 Data for a state represent CAVs or CACs conducted and entered by either the state or the regional office. In other 

words, some CAVs conducted in Kentucky were entered (or not entered) by the state floodplain management 

office in Kentucky, while others were entered (or not entered) by FEMA Region IV. 

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TABLE 3: States with Incomplete entry of CACs and CAVs 

State 
Portion of CAC and CAV Activities 
entered in CIS, 1997 to 2002 
1 Wisconsin 0% 
2 Maryland 1% 
3 Montana 2% 
3 Utah 2% 
5 North Dakota 3% 
6 Ohio 26% 
7 Pennsylvania 28% 
8 Delaware 29% 
9 Wyoming 37% 
10 West Virginia 50% 
11 Colorado 54% 
12 South Dakota 61% 
12 Michigan 61% 
12 Iowa 61% 
15 Minnesota 66% 
16 Indiana 91% 
Source: Bureaunet, AIR analysis, FEMA region and state records. 

since 1997. In reality, the state has conducted 34 since 2001 alone. Although the study team went 
to considerable lengths to contact regions and states to obtain more accurate figures than are 
available in CIS, organizations independent of FEMA, such as the U.S. Government 
Accountability Office, may not have the time, resources, or knowledge to confirm the CIS 
statistics in this way. This means that the actual compliance activities of states and communities 
can be significantly misrepresented. 

Interviews with federal, regional, and state officials confirmed these patterns and explain, 
in part, the deficiencies found in data entry. FEMA officials in Region III stated that inputting 
data into CIS is low on the regions priority list. Some regional and state officials expressed the 
view that data-entry is too time-consuming, costly, and unproductive, given available resources. 
In a survey conducted by FEMA in 2002, nearly 25 percent of the regional officials who 
answered a question about data-collection efforts stated that their states or region did not have 
the time or resources to enter compliance-related data into CIS. 

Based on AIRs interviews with officials and analysis, possible reasons for the failure of 
the states and regional offices to complete their CIS data entry include 

 Lack of resources and/or personnel, 
 Negative perceptions among regional or state staff about the usefulness of CIS and 
about data entry, 
 No perceived consequence for failure to enter information into CIS, and 
 Lack of access to CIS (before 2004, when the system was transferred to the web). 
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From information gathered by ASFPM for its survey of state floodplain management 
programs, the study team concluded that past CAP-SSSE agreements (which determine most 
state activities with regard to the NFIP) typically placed a low priority on entering information 
into CIS: the activities least often conducted using CAP funds are maintaining and updating 
CIS, according to ASFPMs survey. 

Repeated guidance from FEMA to all regions and states emphasizing the importance of 
entering data in CIS has not succeeded in eliminating incompleteness. Targeting the small 
number of states with significantly incomplete records may be a more effective way to address 
the problem than simply reissuing general guidance. 

Inaccuracy of CIS Data on Compliance Activities 

The study team did not conduct a statistical analysis of the accuracy of information 
already entered in CIS, because it was not able to obtain reliable information against which to 
check CIS data. FEMA headquarters could not provide accurate CAV and CAC data and 
recommended that the study team contact regions directly. Requests from regional offices for the 
total number of CAVs and CACs conducted in the time period took between one and six months 
to assemble and required repeated followup by the study team. Comprehensive analysis of the 
content of CAV and CAC recordif a method could be found to conduct itcould yield 
valuable information about CIS usage and data entry. 

However, it can be said that since CIS records are demonstrably incomplete, any 
aggregated data drawn from the system necessarily will be inaccurate. The same is true of any 
trends that may be drawn from a review of CIS data. The incompleteness of the records in CIS 
and the accuracy of the system are inseparable. 

An example of the effect of problems with making inferences based on inadequate data 
collection systems can be found in FEMAs official response to a 2002 report by the Office of 
the Inspector General, Community Rating System: Effectiveness and Other Issues The purpose of 
the Inspector Generals review was to determine the effectiveness of the CRS as a tool to 
improve local floodplain management and recommend improvements. The Inspector General 
analyzed the number of CRS communities that had received a CAV and recommended that 
FEMA emphasize in its CAP-SSSE guidance the importance of completing CAVs for all CRS 
communities. FEMA replied that because the number used by the Inspector General in its 
analysis was derived from CIS, and a large number of FEMA regions and states have not entered 
all of their CAVs into CIS, the agency did not accept the Inspector Generals estimate and 
suspected that more communities had received CAVs than was shown. 

There is anecdotal evidence of other ways in which inaccuracies have been introduced to 
CIS. For example, one regional official stated that he had started closing all files open before 
2000 regardless of current status in an effort to clean up records. Because of his action, an 
unknown number of CACs and CAVs were never properly resolved and/or recorded. One branch 
chief stated that insurance data are the only accurate information in CIS but are not useful to the 
regional office for compliance purposes. 

FEMA headquarters officials told the study team they expected the web-based version of 
CIS (introduced in 2004, at the end of the data-gathering phase of this study) would encourage 
uniformity across regions by requiring regional staff to enter all CAC and CAV and compliance 

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data. However, it is unclear whether the web-based version would address the quarter of 
respondents who feel they lack the time or resources to record compliance data in CIS. 

Lack of Confidence in CIS 

Based on interviews with federal, regional, and state officials, the study team found that 
numerous officials perceive CIS as unreliable and inaccurate, regardless of the actual level of 
accuracy of the data housed in the system. Attitudes toward the usefulness of CIS were almost 
universally negative. Federal, regional, and state officials have been unwilling to use CIS as a 
reliable statistical, informational, or planning source. This perception is potentially more 
damaging to the success of the CIS as a monitoring tool than any actual deficiencies in the 
database. 

One of the stated functions of CIS is to allow groups such as the U.S. Government 
Accountability Office and Congress to develop statistics on flood prone communities, including 
compliance information. However, after the review by the Inspector General of the effectiveness 
of the CRS described above, FEMA rejected the figures drawn by the Inspector General from 
CIS, saying that for various reasons, we [FEMA] know that not all CAVs have been entered 
into CIS by the FEMA regions and states. FEMA could not offer a more reliable figure or even 
an estimate of CISs inaccuracy, but the agencys misgivings about its usefulness were clear. 
Without the data supposedly cataloged in CIS, a constructive appraisal of compliance 
deficiencies is prevented. This hampered AIRs own evaluation. 

CIS as a Useable Tool 

To be a useable monitoring tool, the CIS must be accessible to all appropriate users, must 
house and present information in a useful format, and allow it to be retrieved in ways that are 
convenient for users. 

Access to CIS 

All parties involved in community compliancestates and regionsmust have ready 
access to CIS if it is to be an effective monitoring tool. Universal access to the CIS has been a 
problem since its inception, largely because of technological obstacles: the database is large and 
must by used by numerous people with differing computing platforms, and constant advances in 
the various computer systems induced a continual catch-up cycle for the CIS. Several state 
offices had not been able to access the system because of firewalls or other security measures 
that were attached to their computer systems. In recent years, FEMA has focused attention on 
making CIS accessible and in 2004 introduced a web-based version that reportedly has greatly 
minimized and possibly eliminated access problems. As of 2006, there were nearly 1,000 
registered CIS users, and training had been conducted on using the web-based version.32 

Even though access problems appear to have been resolved, the past inaccessibility of 
CIS necessarily has resulted in an inaccurate historical record, that unless remedied, will 
continue to yield information that is unsuitable as a basis for some types of compliance 
monitoring and evaluation.. 

32 The majority of the study teams interviews and analysis were done in 2003 and early 2004, before the web-based 
CIS was operational. This updated information was obtained from FEMA headquarters. 

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CIS as a Workable Tool 

Because CIS can only access information related to a single community at a time, the CIS 
Reporting Tool is the only means for retrieving data in a form than enables statewide, regional, 
or national comparisons. As the CISs main evaluative and planning method, the reporting tool 
has several deficiencies. It is limited to 51 different reports with fixed data fields, and it can 
present data on only a small portion of the large number of fields available in CIS (see Appendix 
B). For most reports, the user is allowed to modify the time period and scope of the data 
(national, regional, state, or community). 

Errors or formatting problems can make data obtained through the reporting tool 
unreliable or unusable. Also, the reporting tool generates reports in .pdf format, readable with 
Adobe Acrobat software, which prevents the user from manipulating data or running operations 
as basic as summing items in a column. This format also makes it difficult to import or transfer 
information into or from a database format (such as Microsoft Excel or Microsoft Access). 
Although the .pdf format ensures that reports generated by CIS are not modified incorrectly, it 
precludes planning or statistical evaluation functions for larger, more complex reports. Flexible, 
user-generated queries would greatly increase the capabilities of CIS and serve regional and state 
needs. 

Customized reports are available by directly contacting FEMA headquarters officials 
charged with maintaining CIS. However, these requests for data can take weeks or months to be 
completed, depending on their complexity and the availability of FEMA staff. 

Extent to which CIS is Used by Relevant Parties 

To be an effective monitoring tool, CIS must actually be used by the people who need its 
informationFEMA headquarters and regional office staff and state personnel, as well as the 
occasional external agency or group. AIRs investigation found that CIS is not universally used 
by those people, and uncovered some reasons why that may be so. 

Several FEMA officials stated that CIS is seen primarily as a data-entry tool, maintained 
to satisfy FEMAs regional or headquarters offices, of little use in day-to-day operations. 
According to one branch chief, CIS is an example of a headquarters-designated responsibility 
that hinders, rather than helps, regional offices fulfill their responsibilities. 

One program specialist in Region V told the study team that she uses CIS to review, 
approve, and close CACs and CAVs conducted by Michigan state officials. But another person 
in the same region stated, neither the states nor the regions use CIS. 

It was clear from interviews that CIS is not used routinely to help make decisions about 
compliance. Instead, compliance problems and issues are brought to the attention of regional 
officials through other means, often anecdotal and descriptive, rather than quantitative (propertyowner 
complaints, local officials requests for technical assistance, or biennial reports). Regional 
and state officials emphasized that they utilize frequent personal contact with community 
officials to keep apprised of communities NFIP status, compliance issues and problems, and 
community program activities. 

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Guidance on CIS 

One possible explanation for the lack of use of CIS is that the systems role and 
capabilities are not understood. Two main avenues through which FEMA can provide guidance 
on compliance-related CIS topics and record-keeping are the guidance for CAVs and CACs and 
the instructions for implementation of activities under the CAP-SSSE. The study team found that 
CIS guidance through both of these avenues has been lacking. 

CIS was launched in 1989, the same year in which the primary compliance document, 
Guidance for Conducting Community Assistance Contacts and Community Assistance Visits, was 
issued. The CAV guide makes no mention of record-keeping using CIS or its role in the NFIP. 
The guide refers to the Floodplain Management System, one of several precursors to CIS that is 
no longer in use. Because the guide has not been re-issued since its initial debut, it still does not 
contain information on the CIS. 

FEMA also issues annual guidance that directs states and regional offices on the use and 
implementation of funds provided under CAP-SSSE. CAP-SSSE funds a variety of state 
activities, including CIS data entry. The CAP-SSSE agreements made between the region and 
the state may also include directives to input information into CIS. For example, Louisianas 
CAP-SSSE agreement for Fiscal Year 2003 contains as one of its 13 tasks update and maintain 
CIS program, noting that the updated information will be shared with FEMA Region VI 
personnel on a regular basis. Of states surveyed by the ASFPM, 98 percent and 92 percent 
indicated that CAVs and CACs, respectively, were accomplished under the CAP-SSSE 
agreement, indicating ample opportunity for FEMA to mandate, guide, and fund state entry of 
those key compliance activities into CIS. 

Instead, the CAP-SSSE guidance issued by FEMA headquarters has placed varying 
degrees of importance on CIS use and data-entry. Although guidance for earlier years did not 
mention entry of floodplain management activities into CIS, guidance for Fiscal Years 2003 and 
2004 state that entry of data into CIS is expected. Guidance for Fiscal Years 2004 and 2005 used 
stronger language: Regional Offices are to ensure that all information is entered into CIS. . . 
Regions should require states to update and enter information . . . [emphasis added]. 

However, none of the annual CAP-SSSE guidance documents from 1999 to 2005 
stipulates consequences for failure to complete CIS data entry. Presumably regional offices track 
the states entry of CIS data if it is a specified task under the states CAP-SSSE agreement, and 
would have the same recourse for requiring that the task be completed as it would for any other 
task. However, the study team did not uncover any instances in which this option for requiring 
entry of CIS data had been pursued. 

The effect of deficiencies in guidance can be seen in the priority regions and states place 
on CIS data-entry. According to the ASFPM, 29 states, or 58 percent of those that responded, 
stated that maintaining and updating CIS was covered under the CAP-SSSE Agreement. 
However, the survey also found that maintaining and updating CIS was among the activities 
least often conducted using CAP-SSSE funds. Apparently, states and regions recognize that CIS 
is available and encouraged by FEMA headquarters, but place little importance on entering data 
into the system. 

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Alternative Database Systems 

One illustration of the consequences of the problems with CIS is that states have 
developed alternative data collection and database systems of their own. The extent to which 
they depend on those systems probably lessens their use of CIS. According to the 2003 ASFPM 
survey, over 75 percent of the states reported that they maintain some sort of floodplain 
management-oriented website and/or state database. These systems may have features and 
objectives similar to those of CIS and, to the extent that they come to be relied upon instead of 
CIS, the usefulness of CIS will be further undermined. 

Based on the survey responses, state database systems are not standardized and their 
content varies considerably. Nearly all of the information reported by state floodplain 
management officials as contained in their databases, however, overlaps with that maintained in 
CIS. For example, Kansas officials reported that their own database contains community name, 
address, floodplain manager, CEO, CRS status, repetitive loss structures, last community visit, 
ordinance status, flooding source, and type of map, all of which are covered in CIS. Still, no state 
appears to possess a database as comprehensive as CIS. Also, some data is maintained in 
informal systems, accessible only to regional or state officials. For instance, one regional official 
stated that most state compliance data are kept in handwritten notes. 

Although state databases may fulfill compliance planning needs within that state, they do 
not facilitate the exchange of information between states, regional offices, and FEMA 
headquarters. Duplicative data systems may mean expending unnecessary time and resources 
replicating data entry work. Although it is unknown whether identical information is being 
entered in both databases by the states, the prospect of multiple, possibly contradictory, sources 
of compliance information is a bleak one. Nor is it clear to what extent state databases exist in 
lieu of CIS. If states and others are habitually using state databases instead of CIS, that would 
help explain both why CIS is not used more and also the incompleteness found in CIS records. 
An official at ASFPM stated that over half of the states are keeping their own comprehensive 
databases, which are not compatible with CIS. Also, an official stated in 2003 that Wisconsin 
has its own data collection efforts and databases that are not compatible with CIS and that neither 
the state nor the region uses CIS. 

5.2.3 Effectiveness of CIS as a Monitoring Tool 
CIS has the potential to be a significant aid to monitoring community compliance with 
the NFIP, but it is not being used effectively. The deficiencies in CIS are not due primarily to 
problems with accessibility, which is being addressed through the new web-based system. 
Rather, time and financial constraints, lack of guidance, lack of consequences, a cumbersome 
reporting software program, and negative perceptions prevent the CIS from being a complete and 
accurate source of information about the compliance activities that take place. This also prevents 
FEMA officials and the states from using data that already exist to assist in the monitoring 
functions of the NFIP, and undermines the credibility of the CIS as a source of information for 
compliance use. 

The study team concluded that CIS is not yet the authoritative source of statistical 
information on floodplain management that is needed for effective nationwide monitoring of 
community compliance with the NFIP. 

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 The CIS records are only about 85 percent complete, with some states and regions 
having a very small proportion of their floodplain management data in the system. 
 Of the records that are stored in the system, it is impossible to gage their accuracy 
because of the absence of an independent, readily available source of alternative 
information. Further, the very lack of comprehensiveness automatically renders 
inaccurate any aggregated information that may be pulled from CIS. 
 CIS is not viewed with confidence by its users. Perceptions of CISs inaccuracy 
undermine its authority as a source of monitoring information 
CIS has the potential for being a useable tool, but has some significant drawbacks: 

 The CIS reporting tool, the only means by which information can be pulled from the 
system other than a display of a single communitys record, is limited, inflexible, and 
not susceptible to customized inquiries. 
 Customized reports can be obtained from CIS only through FEMA headquarters staff, 
and can take several weeks to produce. 
 Reports generated from CIS are available only in .pdf format, which cannot be 
manipulated. They would be more useful if they could be downloaded into a 
spreadsheet or database format. 
CIS is not actually used as a monitoring tool by most relevant parties: 

 Officials seldom rely on the monitoring capabilities of CIS to help them assess, 
evaluate, or make decisions about current compliance issues. Instead, they rely on 
anecdotal and descriptive information such as that obtained through personal 
contacts. 
 CISs usefulness for monitoring compliance is undermined by the widespread belief 
among personnel at FEMA headquarters, regional offices, and the states that it is 
unreliableinaccurate and untested in terms of generating useful reports. This 
impression is potentially more damaging to the long-term usefulness of CIS than 
actual inaccuracies because of entrenched individual and institutional attitudes. 
 The guidance issued by FEMA with regard to the purpose and potential uses of CIS, 
its role in compliance, the importance of data entry, and other issues has been 
inconsistent and inadequate. 
 Many states have developed and are using their own database systems. 
The study team concluded that, without some changes, the CISs value as a monitoring 
tool is not likely to improve. 

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 There is no systematic or statistical means of evaluating the deficiencies in CIS or 
attempting to remedy them. FEMA reports that this is largely a result of having 
minimal staff resources at headquarters to work on improvements to the CIS. 
 CISs incompleteness is largely attributable to selected regions and states, but 
repeated instructions to regional offices and states to finish the data entry have not 
resulted in that tasks being completed. 
 States and regions consider the entry of data into CIS to be a low priority, based in 
part on their own perception of the systems uselessness (see above). 
The CIS is vital to successful monitoring of community compliance with the NFIP. 
FEMAs stated objectives for the CIS are completely supportive of this function. The measure of 
the CISs success as a monitoring tool is that states and regions should be able to accurately 
assess past and current compliance and related floodplain management activities through the 
CIS. The CIS also could play a critical role in planning for future activities and as a statistical 
source for FEMA participants, as well as outside evaluators. However, these goals can be 
achieved only with a database system that is authoritative and useable, a status that had not been 
fully reached at the time the data for this evaluation were collected. As noted above, FEMA has 
taken steps recently to remedy key shortcomings in the CIS. The study team has several 
recommendations to further improve the CIS as a monitoring tool, listed in Section 5.7. For 
FEMA to improve CIS, and indeed to implement these recommendations, it will have to 
overcome negative attitudes on the part of regional office and state officials that CIS records are 
unreliable. 

5.3 The Submit-for-Rate Procedure 
For the majority of types of structures built after a communitys FIRM becomes effective, 
flood insurance rates are specified by insurance agents who use tables published in the NFIP 
Flood Insurance Manual to determine the appropriate rates. However, the Manual does not 
provide rates for structures built more than 1 foot below the BFE, those that are located in an 
unnumbered V Zone, and others with special characteristics. In those cases, the agent must 
submit the flood insurance application to company headquarters for individualized rating. This 
process is called a submit-for-rate.33 Some of these submit-for-rates applications are for 
compliant buildings that are difficult to rate and therefore need to be handled individually by an 
underwriter, but many indicate buildings that may be in violation of local floodplain 
management regulations. The study team examined submit-for-rates to determine the extent to 
which they can identify noncompliance and thereby serve as a monitoring tool. 

5.3.1 The Submit-for-Rate Process 
The study team examined the lowest floor elevations of all residential structures on file 
with FEMA that were submitted for rating in June 2003. Although the specific reason a given 

33 FEMA told the study team that many coastal communities will have some compliant structures rated through the 

submit-for-rate process because of the complicated nature of coastal construction. However, the study team found 

that only a small percentage of all submit-for-rates come from coastal zones and less than one percent from 

unnumbered V zones. 

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structure was submitted for rate is not known, the study team found that 88 percent of residential 
structures submitted for rate were built more than one foot below BFE (Table 4), indicating 
possible noncompliance with the local ordinance. 

Submit-for-rates are considered by FEMA to be a red flag that alerts floodplain 
management staff to possible noncompliance (FEMA 1989). Because of this, FEMA keeps data 
on all structures submitted for rate and passes information on those structures to its regional 
offices for their attention and also instructs its Bureau and Statistical Agent (BSA) to forward 
submit-for-rate applications to the appropriate regional offices in monthly packets. The packet 
identifies the structure (by address, community, FIRM and panel number, zone, post-FIRM vs. 
pre-FIRM, etc.), its height relative to the BFE, whether the structure has enclosures below BFE, 
the type of walls used for the enclosure, whether the structure has vents, whether the structure is 
floodproofed, and whether a variance was granted. 

TABLE 4: Height of Residential Structures Submitted for Rate Relative to BFE, June 2003 

Height Relative to BFE 
Number of Residential Structures 
Submitted for Rate 
Percentage of Total Residential 
Structures Submitted for Rate 
Built 1 foot below BFE or higher 33 13 
1.1 to 1.9 feet below BFE 49 19 
2 to 2.9 feet below BFE 43 16 
3 to 3.9 feet below BFE 21 8 
4 to 4.9 feet below BFE 21 8 
5 or more feet below BFE 96 37 
SOURCE: FEMAs Bureau and Statistical Agent (BSA) 

Although these data cannot be used to determine with certainty whether the structure is 
compliant, they can give FEMA and the states a reason to suspect noncompliance and follow up 
with the community. The data can indicate program deficiencies, such as a community that is 
granting a large number of variances. Because of the information described above and the fact 
that is routed to the regional offices, submit-for-rate data should be useful to regional office and 
state staff in targeting possible noncompliance. 

5.3.2 Use of Submit-for-Rate Applications as Monitoring 
The majority of the FEMA regional office staff interviewed by the study team said that 
they take some action to address submit-for-rates when they receive referrals from BSA. About 
half of FEMA program specialists told the study team that they contact the community to 
investigate the submit-for-rate when they receive a referral. The other half of FEMA program 
specialists told the study team that they do not address submit-for-rates with the communities, 
but rather pass the referrals on to the states to investigate. Several FEMA program specialists 
told the study team that a large number of submit-for-rates in any community would prompt the 
region or state to conduct a CAV in the community. States confirm this, as 15 states report that 
they use the data on submit-for-rate reports to help them set priorities for community monitoring 
visits (ASFPM 2004). 

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TABLE 5: Average Number of Submit-for-Rates, 1998-2002 
Submit-for-Rates by Region 
Region Average per Year 
I 122 
I 350 
III 288 
IV 2,488 
V 260 
VI 749 
VII 71 
VIII 53 
IX 85 
X 71 
Top 10 States by Average Number of Submit-for-Rates 
State Average per Year 
FL 1,483 
TX 530 
NC 318 
SC 262 
NJ 241 
LA 186 
MS 138 
GA 136 
VA 116 
NY 94 

SOURCE: FEMA BSA 


However, several FEMA regional office and state floodplain management staff told the 
study team that they find the format of the submit-for-rate referrals they receive from BSA to be 
confusing. They report that it takes a long time to figure out why the structure was submitted for 
rate. This can deter them from following up on the information for compliance purposes. This is 
especially true in the regions and states that receive a large number of submit-for-rates. As table 
5 shows, Region IV averages more than 200 submit-for-rates each month. Florida alone accounts 
for one third of all submit-for-rates in an average year. Other regions average between four and 
60 submit-for-rates each month. One state with a large number of submit-for-rates said that it 
takes staff a long time to go through the submit-for-rate applications passed on to them in boxes 
from the region because the boxes are normally not accompanied by a cover letter or any 
description of the contents. The state floodplain manager said that the state does not have the 
staff to devote to reviewing the documents or using them for compliance work. 

Many staff members at the regional offices told the study team that they perceive error by 
insurance agents to be a common reason structures are submitted for rate. It is the perception of 
one FEMA program specialist that 70 percent of the submit-for- rates he investigates are 
incorrect. A common statement was that regional office staff found structures submitted for 
rate had been issued a Letter of Map Revision that removed them from the floodplain. Such a 
structure would not be required to be elevated and thus should not have been submitted for rate. 

Some regional office and state floodplain management staff told the study team they did 
not understand what to do with submit-for-rates. When asked how submit-for-rates affected 
compliance, the state floodplain manager and another staff member for a state with high numbers 
of submit for rates from 1998 to 2002 responded only that they were unfamiliar with the submit-
for-rate process. The state floodplain manager for another state with a high number of submit-

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for-rates told the study team that the region thought privacy issues prevented them from 
sharing submit-for-rate applications with him. 

The perceptions that submit-for-rate data are confusing or incorrect, and ignorance of the 
ways submit-for-rate data could be used discourage regional office and state staff from using the 
data as a tool for identifying possible noncompliance. It is clear from interviews that many 
regional office and state staff want to use the information, but it was not possible to quantify the 
extent to which it is actually used. 

5.4 Letters of Map Revision based on Fill 
Raising the ground elevation of a portion of a floodplain property with earthen fill and 
then constructing the building on top of that fill is often the best strategy for protecting that 
building and its residents. Sometimes when earthen fill has been used to elevate the ground level 
of a parcel, the result is that the floodplain is essentially changed because an area of land 
previously lying below the mapped 100-year flood level now lies above it. In those instances, a 
request can be made by a property-owner, developer, or participating community that the 
communitys FIRM be officially modified by the issuance of a Letter of Map Revision Based on 
Fill (LOMR-F). This revision reflects a change in flood risk to that property (resulting from its 
having been raised above the floodplain level). The result is that property with the LOMR-F is 
officially removed from the SFHA and is exempted from the local ordinance (and thus the NFIP 
standards) and from mandatory purchase of flood insurance. A LOMR-F does not reflect an 
inaccuracy in the initial FIRM, but rather is a voluntary procedure requiring the review and/or 
approval of community officials, independent mapping contractors, and FEMA. 

Under the NFIP standards, LOMR-Fs may not be granted in floodways, V-Zones, coastal 
areas, or SFHAs subject to alluvial fan flooding. The NFIP requirements prohibit the placement 
of fill and other obstructions in the floodway unless in can be shown that there will be no 
increase in flood stage, but there are no limitations on placement of fill outside of the floodway. 
It has long been debated whether allowing fill at all is desirable and also whether removing such 
filled properties from the floodplain via LOMR-Fs is good floodplain management. The 
placement of fill can cause localized drainage problems and increased flood levels and also have 
negative effects on the floodplain itself, by removing natural storage, altering natural floodplain 
processes such as channel migration, and degrading riparian habitat. On the other hand, fill can 
be a safer method of protecting buildings from flood damage since floodwaters do not come in 
contact with or enter a building elevated on fill. 

A number of officials interviewed stated that LOMR-Fs do not support the objectives of 
the NFIP. A mapping contractor noted that this sentiment has been in existence since the mid1970s. 
Many NFIP officials and state floodplain managers believe that mapped elevations should 
be not be changed based on fill and that such incremental revisions are disruptive to floodplain 
management efforts. One FEMA official stated a system that requires buildings to be elevated 
in the floodplain and removes buildings elevated by fill from the floodplain is fundamentally at 
odds with itself. Officials have speculated that the use of fill might have residual impacts on 
surrounding properties, the floodplain environment, and encroach on the floodway as well. 

A central dynamic in the debate is whether fill should be treated as a means of elevation, 
and protection from a flood hazard, or whether it should be evaluated solely as a change in the 

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map. Although there is considerable disagreement among experts regarding the consequences of 
fill, FEMAs issuance of LOMR-Fs seems to favor the placement of fill over other means of 
elevation. Unfortunately, this argument runs, issuance of a LOMR-F then removes the 
requirements of the mandatory purchase requirement, one of the main inducements for flood 
insurance purchase and building elevation. 

However, the study team found a lack of formal, nationwide studies certifying the safety 
of properties that receive LOMR-Fs. A few case studies were found that peripherally addressed 
the issue of fill. Interviews with federal, regional, state, and community officials showed the 
study team that relatively little is known about the consequences of granting LOMR-Fs on 
compliance or the use of fill as a means of elevation. This issue is examined more thoroughly in 
another study in the NFIP Evaluation (Rosenbaum 2006). Conversations with FEMA officials 
and experts revealed that the lack of data on LOMRs resulted from the gradual process within 
NFIP implementation of separating LOMR-Fs from other forms of map revisions and shifting 
from the treatment of fill as an elevation technique to treating it as a map change. 

5.4.1 LOMR-Fs and Community Compliance 
LOMR-Fs are used as monitoring tools to target potential compliance problems in two 
main ways: through the LOMR-F application process, and through routine NFIP monitoring. 

The LOMR-F Process as Monitoring 

During the course of the LOMR-F application process, a handful of cases are identified 
as potential violations to NFIP regulations. In Fiscal Year 2002 15,057 properties applied for 
LOMR-Fs, a slight decrease from Fiscal Year 2001, but in keeping with the average number of 
requests processed per year. From this number, 12,653 properties were removed from the SFHA 
by LOMR-Fs and 600 were denied.34 

Denials may be indicators of a deficiency in the communitys floodplain management 
program. Because a community must certify that a property is reasonably safe from flooding 
before FEMA issues a LOMR-F, a denial means that FEMA disagrees with a communitys 
determination. Nationwide, for Fiscal Year 2002, 4 percent of all determinations were denied, 
consistent with the two preceding years. Over the past three fiscal years, denials accounted for 3 
percent of determinations nationwide, ranging from 0.98 percent in Region 9 to 10 percent in 
Region 3. 

Between Fiscal Years 2001 through 2003, 105 properties were targeted as potential 
violations. The most common issues with these properties are the improper placement of fill 
such as in the floodway or a V zoneor lowest floor elevations that are well below the BFE. 
The distinction between denied requests for LOMR-Fs and the list of potential violations is that 
denials result from reasons other than violations of the NFIP. FEMA suspends judgment on the 
applications that contain potential violations and forwards the case to the FEMA regional office 
and the community to be resolved. The requestor can reapply for a LOMR-F. 

34 It should be noted that because LOMR-F applications are often for multiple properties, the figures displayed do 
not reflect the number of cases processed, but rather the number of properties affected by FEMAs determination. 

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LOMR-Fs as Indicators in Community Assistance Visits 

The number of LOMR-F applications each year that obtain the approval of community 
officials, but are denied by FEMA, can be an indication of compliance problems. The 
communities, states, or regions that have the most denials may have fill-related violations or they 
may have program deficiencies (lack of technical expertise to perform the necessary analysis to 
properly certify the safety of the property with fill). For this reason, FEMAs guidance states that 

(1) issuance of a LOMR-F should be recorded in the CIS and be made available for review by 
the FEMA official who conducts the CAV; (2) the number of LOMR-Fs in a community is one 
an indicator of floodplain development activity and could be a reason to target a community for a 
CAV; (3) officials conducting a CAV should assess the processes by which LOMR-Fs and other 
forms of development are approved and to check the communitys documentation that floodplain 
development (including fill) does not result in increased flood elevations more than allowed by 
the NFIP standards. 
Summary 

FEMAs current procedure for identifying potential violations through the LOMR-F 
application process is useful but limited as a compliance tool. Although it does serve to identify 
potential floodway and lowest-floor violations, it cannot identify all potential violations 
involving fill. The study team was not able to determine the extent to which LOMR-F records 
are entered into CIS as intended, or how frequently they are used by regional or state staff. 

5.5 Community Rating System Procedures 
Another method through which monitoring of community compliance can be done is 
through the routine procedures of the Community Rating System (CRS). The CRS is a voluntary 
program within the NFIP that encourages communities to perform floodplain management 
activities that exceed the NFIPs minimum requirements. Communities that do so are rewarded 
with discounted flood insurance premiums for their residents. About 1,000 communities 
participate in the CRS, representing about 66% of the NFIPs policy base. One prerequisite for 
joining the CRS is that the community be in full compliance with the NFIPs minimum 
requirements. The CRS is managed jointly by FEMA and by Insurance Services Office, Inc. 
(ISO). 

Communities participating in the CRS are subject to routine NFIP monitoring, but the 
CRS application and participation procedures provide an additional level of monitoring. There 
are three additional means by which CRS communities are monitored and their compliance with 
the NFIP thus could be verified: (1) upon initial application to the CRS; (2) when an upgrade of 
CRS status is requested; and (3) during periodic visits by ISO/CRS personnel. Through these 
additional contacts between CRS communities and NFIP-related personnel, indicators of 
potential compliance problems can be spotted. If information about CRS communities is 
regularly shared among FEMA, the states, and ISO/CRS personnel, there should be ample 
opportunity to avert compliance problems in CRS communities. The monitoring steps are 
discussed individually and in more detail in Section 6.3. 

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5.6 Other (Insurance Claims, Complaints, Requests for Assistance) 
There are a variety of other means by which FEMA and the states monitor local 
floodplain management activity in order to identify potential compliance problems. Both state 
and regional offices routinely receive letters and telephone calls questioning the propriety of 
observed floodplain development activity or otherwise notifying them of potential violations. 
Through the process of providing technical assistance to local officials, developers, and others 
who request it, floodplain management staff members sometimes become aware of potential 
compliance problems. Flood insurance claims that are atypical are another trigger for further 
investigation. 

As noted in the discussion on technical assistance above, data are not available to 
determine how many communities receive some sort of contact through these other means, or 
what followup action is taken, if any, because regional and state staff usually do not record such 
interactions. The study team did see copies of letters to communities and other documents such 
as staff notes, but they are not routinely catalogued. Thus the extent to which such work 
contributes to overall monitoring cannot be quantified. Although its quantitative value to 
monitoring is unknown and the technique is a largely passive onesimply waiting for requests 
or complaints to be received and then reacting to themthese signs of potential compliance 
problems are part of the information constantly being sifted by regional and state floodplain 
managers whose professional judgment is often the most reliable indicator of trouble. 

5.7 Findings and Recommendations for Monitoring Compliance 
All the tools available to FEMA and the states for monitoring community compliance 
with the NFIP are necessary and useful, both alone and in combination. Two of them are the 
most significant, however. First, CAVs are absolutely essential to the success of the overall 
compliance program. Second, a fully functional CIS is critical for effective monitoring and for 
demonstrating the extent of compliance nationwide. FEMA has done well with the former while 
the condition of the latter can use further improvement. 

CAVs (and to a lesser extent, CACs) produce the closely targeted and in-depth 
information that is essential to a determination that a community is compliant or noncompliant 
with the NFIP. That and the documentation that is made of the visit and its aftermath are the 
foundations of potential enforcement actions. However, because they can only be conducted 
relatively infrequently, CAVs cannot suffice as the sole monitoring technique. Just under 1,800 
community contacts and visits are conducted in an average year, roughly 10% of the 
participating communities, using all available resources at regional and state levels. Even 
assuming that no community is visited or contacted twice (an untrue assumption), in any given 
five-year period only half the communities participating in the NFIP could have an encounter 
with a regional office or state official could qualify as a monitoring contact. 

The CIS contains information about every community participating in the NFIPno 
other monitoring tool compares with this potential. A good portion of that information is useful 
in targeting potential violations and determining which communities may be need further 
monitoring. Just as important, the CAV and CAC reports and notes that are supposed to be stored 
in CIS are the main mechanism for maintaining historical perspectives on compliance, tracking 
past problems, and determining trends and levels of compliance. 

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At the time of this investigation, the CIS was populated with about 85% of the CAV and 
CAC records that are required to be housed there, and the status of the other data was unknown. 
Nor did it appear that most FEMA regional office or states staff were using CIS effectively for 
monitoring. As explained above, this is due to the perceived (and possibly actual) inaccuracy of 
the data and the cumbersome nature of its reporting feature. Thus, to a large extent, the potential 
of this powerful monitoring (and evaluation) tool has been unrealized. Although FEMA has 
addressed one of the main deficiencies in the CIS (inability of all users to access it), the agency 
also needs to remedy two other shortcomings (the backlog of unentered information and the 
clumsiness of the reporting software) and also re-establish theCISs credibility among regional 
office and state staff as a depository of accurate information on compliance and other NFIP 
activities. 

The most effective way to use these two strong tools (CAVs and the CIS) would be to 
draw upon the CISs broad coverage of statistical information to spot and track indicators of 
potential compliance difficulty and then to schedule contact or visits with the communities 
involved to investigate the situation. FEMAs guidance for CIS and compliance both indicate 
that the tools should be coordinated in this way, but the study team found that in practice this 
correlation has not been taking place. Regional office staff have tended to disregard the CIS and 
rely more on indicators they develop on their own (information from states, etc.) to determine 
which communities to contact or visit. States rely on FEMA and the CAP negotiations and their 
own indicators to set their priorities for community contacts or visits. Both of these techniques 
are reasonable approaches, but the effective use of CIS and its data would sharpen these efforts 
and provide the additional advantage of statistical documentation of existing and past situations. 

The study team found that the other monitoring vehicles (CRS procedures, the submit-
for-rate process, LOMR-F applications, and other sources of information such as complaints or 
requests for assistance), are primarily of use as incidental indicators of potential noncompliance. 
As such, each piece of information obtained through these avenues must receive individual 
follow-up if the levels of NFIP compliance are to benefit from it. Typically the follow-up takes 
the form either of investigation by regional or state staff as input of the information into the pool 
of factors that will be considered when the next round of community visits is scheduled. 
However, data on these indicators are not all assembled or archived or shared systematically, so 
they are not as useful as they could be. 

5.7.1 Recommendations 
More resources (funding and staff) should be found to increase the number of CAVs (and CACs) 

conducted by the states and by FEMA regional staff. The CAVs and CACs are not done 

frequently enough to ensure community compliance. 

FEMA should clarify its goal for the frequency of contacting every community and specify its 

applicability to CRS communities. The 1989 guidance is clear that community contact 

may be quite short and simpleall that is needed for the majority of communitiesbut 

subsequent word from FEMA headquarters and regional and state interpretations have 

indicated otherwise. Reiteration or modification of the original guidance is needed. If 

FEMA wants to ensure that certain types of communities (e.g., CRS communities) are 

contacted specifically via CAV (rather than a CAC), it should issue an explicit 

clarification to this effect. 

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FEMA should bring the CIS closer to realizing its potential as a monitoring tool by: 

 Eliminating the backlog of incomplete records within CIS. To be an authoritative and 
statistically valid source of information, CIS needs data that approaches being 100% 
complete. If targeted efforts to get complete data entry from the regional offices and 
states (as recommended below) do not prove sufficient, FEMA should contract with 
an outside organization to enter data from past CAVs and CACs into CIS to complete 
the database of past records. A dedicated organization could enter data more 
efficiently than FEMA regional staff, who have other responsibilities. 
 Focusing resources and attention on the regions and states with the most deficient CIS 
records. The majority of discrepancies in CAV and CAC records (and presumably the 
remainder of CIS records) is due to a few regions and states. Rather than simply reissuing 
guidance to the nation as a whole, requiring the entry of information into CIS, 
FEMA should specifically target these regions and states and address the reasons for 
their incomplete data entry. Because of the likelihood that there are varied reasons for 
unfinished CIS data entry, a single solution is unlikely to remedy inadequacies in all 
regions and states. 
 Updating and clarifying guidance on entering information in CIS. The guidance for 
conducting CAVs and CACs, which was issued in 1989, needs to be updated to 
include the entry of CACs and CAVs into CIS during follow-up or documentation. 
Adding this info is critical for two reasons. Not only would an update provide an 
opportunity for FEMA to distribute instructions and describe its expectations for CIS 
data entry, but also it would allow FEMA to update the guidance on a number of 
other issues that have changed since the documents publication, such as the rules 
regarding LOMR-Fs. 
 Making entry of CAV report data into the CIS a prescribed and funded task for states 
under the CAP-SSSE. FEMA should direct the regional offices to ensure that entry of 
information into CIS s done by states as a funded activity under the CAP-SSSE. This 
would link funding for CACs and CAVs directly to recording the results of those 
contacts in CIS. CIS entry then could be monitored by regional officials in charge of 
managing the CAP. This is consistent with FEMAs goal of using CAP-SSSE as a 
means of moving states toward a performance-based management model. 
 Adding to the list of data routinely entered into the CIS. Information on turnover of 
community staff could be obtained by adding an item on the biennial report form or 
through a separate regular canvassing effort, perhaps conducted by the states. These 
data would help set priorities for community contacts and visits. FEMA also should 
add a component to the CIS that tracks submit-for-rates in communities. This would 
enhance monitoring by incorporating into the computerized recordkeeping system 
another indicator of potential noncompliance and make it easier for regions and states 
to access and share the information. 
 Improving the flexibility of the CIS reporting tool. A user-generated query system 
would improve the flexibility of CIS and make full use of the information it contains. 
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The study team recommends that FEMA investigate the potential for implementing a 

reporting interface that offers customized reports in a more accessible format. 

 Rehabilitating the image and reputation of the CIS among users and potential users. 
FEMA regional office and state floodplain management staff should be encouraged to 
make better use of the CIS for monitoring, enter records conscientiously, and begin to 
trust the data they can access through CIS. 
 Periodically checking the accuracy and completeness of CIS records. CISs 
completeness should be checked regularly and compared to FEMAs goals. 
Regardless of the method used, regular assessments of state and regional data entry 
efforts are essential to maintaining and improving the usefulness of the system as a 
compliance monitoring tool and for its other functions. The study team recommends 
that FEMA complete further studies to gage the accuracy of existing information and 
determine sources of inaccuracy. 
Clarify the submit-for-rate reporting form. FEMA should add a place at the top of the submit-
for-rate application in which the insurance agent can write a general statement of the 
reason he or she is submitting the structure for rate. Regional office staff and their 
partners in the states can refer to that statement to quickly determine which submit-forrates 
warrant further investigation. 

Provide updated guidance on how submit-for-rate data should be used for monitoring. 
Confusion among the regional office and state staff about how to use submit-for-rate data 
is hampering the use of the information as a screening tool for noncompliance. 

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6. ENFORCEMENT OF COMMUNITY COMPLIANCE 
An effective community floodplain management program is continually identifying 
potential and actual violations of its NFIP-based ordinance and taking steps to avert them or 
enforce compliance on its own, for example, through its building inspection procedures. These 
sorts of compliance issues need never come to the attention of FEMA or the states. 

Even in situations where FEMA or state personnel have knowledge of a deficiency or 
violation and communicate it to the community, NFIP or state enforcement action is not 
necessarily required. Often a program deficiency or a violation is the result of misunderstanding, 
and the community is able to correct the deficiency or remedy the violation in short order after 
becoming aware of it. Many of the instances in which informal technical assistance is provided 
to the community by regional office or state personnel (perhaps via telephone) as discussed in 
Section 4.1.1 no doubt fall into this category. State and regional office staff told the study team 
that they spend considerable time answering questions from communities, some of which are 
questions about specific compliance problems that the communities have or see developing. 
However, as noted in Section 5.2, these are not systematically documented so it is impossible to 
know how much potential and actual noncompliance is being addressed in this way. Sometimes a 
letter or email is sent to the community as confirmation of the guidance provided, and a copy is 
filed, but such records are not universally kept. In most of these cases presumably the 
community addresses the problem and enforcement steps on the part of FEMA or the state are 
unnecessary. 

This mode of operations is in keeping with the NFIP compliance models emphasis on 
voluntary and cooperative compliance and enforcement and is in accord with guidance issued by 
FEMA, that an objective of its community compliance program is to emphasize resolving 
problems through technical assistance rather than through an enforcement action (FEMA 1986). 

For purposes of this discussion, then, enforcement is considered to begin when FEMA 
or the state notifies a community in writing that one or more substantive program deficiencies 
and/or violations have been identified and requests that the community correct and/or remedy 
them. The deficiencies and violations are described in writing, ways to address them are 
suggested, and deadlines are given for completion of the needed actions. This notification is 
almost always made in a follow-up letter to the Chief Executive Officer of the community 
after a visit to the community, because of the difficulty of precisely detecting specific 
compliance problems off-site. The community visit could have been prompted by information 
about potential violations that reached FEMA or the state through one of the indirect monitoring 
tools described in the previous section (submit-for-rates, CRS verification visit, community 
contact, etc.) or they may have been identified through a regularly scheduled CAV. The 
procedure for and content of such follow-up letters are described in FEMA guidance (FEMA 
1989, p. 6-5). 

In most cases, receiving written notification of the compliance problems and what must 
be done to address them is sufficient to prompt the community officials to take action to regain 
full compliance with the NFIP. FEMA and/or state staff provide technical assistance and work 
with the community as needed and also conduct follow up monitoring to confirm that the 
necessary actions have been taken. The community, state, and FEMA have a range of tools for 
addressing compliance problems (figure 7). 

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FIGURE 7: Tools for Enforcing Community Compliance 

Correcting program deficienciesFEMA or state mandates, community corrects 

Remedying violationsFEMA or state mandates, community remedies 

Rescission of permit so proposed structure or development is not carried out 

Modification of structure or development 

Legal action against property owner or other responsible partybrought by state or 

locality 
Section 1316 denial of insurance 
Subrogation actions by FEMA against community and/or individual


Probation 
Suspension 

In other cases, however, the community is not responsive to a simple notification of 
compliance problems. If the community is unable or unwilling to remedy violations in an allotted 
amount of time, if program deficiencies are too pervasive or serious, or if the community does 
not or will not correct them, FEMA can impose sanctions. The two strongest community-wide 
sanctions are first, probation and, if the community still remains noncompliant, suspension from 
the NFIP. In addition, there are sanctions that can be applied to individual structures in order to 
induce or compel compliance or at least shift the noncompliant structures flood risk away from 
taxpayers or other policyholders and back to the property owner. 

From the point at which the communitys CEO is notified in the follow-up letter that 
certain compliance issues must be addressed to the time that such issues are fully resolved (or are 
not resolved, resulting in sanctions), many different scenarios can develop. The resolution of 
compliance problems is a complex process that can involve action by and consultation among 
many players at the local, state, and federal levels and in the private sector. It may require the use 
of a combination of techniques and take several months, a year, or even more to resolve all 
problems (see box on LaFourche Parish). 

This chapter describes the steps used by FEMA and the states in the enforcement process 
and examines the effectiveness of each of the tools to achieve compliance with the NFIP. That 
discussion is followed by an analysis of the strength of the enforcement component of the NFIP 
compliance program and recommendations for improvement. 

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LaFourche Parish, Louisiana, addresses Noncompliance 

This example of a fairly simply compliance problem shows how LaFourche Parishs noncompliance was addressed 
over time, in a series of steps, and through a combination of techniques. 

According to LaFourche Parish, in 2003 FEMA reviewed almost 175 variances issued by the community between 
the 1990s to 2003 and found that a quarter of them had been granted inappropriately. Not only were inappropriate variances 
granted by the community Board of Appeals, but the permit issuing office also granted waivers along with many permits, 
recognized by the community but not by FEMA, which excused structures from meeting NFIP building requirements without 
grant of formal variances. 

FEMA gave the community six months to remedy the violations or risk sanctioning, including removal from the 
CRS and possibly probation. 

The community did not meet the deadline and was consequently retrograded to a CRS class 10 (nonparticipation in 
the CRS). 

After that, the Parish managed to convince many of the variance recipients to bring their structures into compliance 
at their own expense. To achieve this, the Parish publicized the community-wide loss of the discount on flood insurance that 
the CRS had provided; threatened to sue the noncompliant variance recipients; and warned of the residents of FEMAs threat 
to place the community on probation, which would result in a surcharge on policies. Extensive local media coverage of the 
situation brought all these considerations to light. 

As of June 2004, a representative of the FEMA regional office said that the Parish had remedied all but six of the 
noncompliant variances. The community and FEMA then agreed to pursue the possibility of declaring the remaining 
noncompliant structures ineligible for flood insurance under Section 1316. 

6.1 Determining Noncompliance 
As noted in Section 5.1 on monitoring, community visits (CAVs) conducted by either the 
states or FEMA personnel form the basis for a determination of a communitys compliance or 
noncompliance. The community is considered noncompliant if it has one or more deficiencies in 
its floodplain management program, and/or there is one or more structures or other development 
within its jurisdiction that are in violation of the local floodplain management ordinance. 
However, rather than making a formal, public declaration that a community is noncompliant as 
soon as deficiencies or violations are documented, FEMAs practice is to provide the community 
with opportunities to achieve compliance on its own. These opportunities come in the form of 
first, additional technical assistance and consultation with state and/or regional staff and other 
federal agencies as needed, and second, time to work out and implement the best combination of 
solutions. 

Therefore, to prepare for possible eventual enforcement action but still allow for the 
likely resolution of the problems by the community, FEMA and the states use a procedure that 
documents the noncompliance and the steps that are taken to address it but still maintains the 
communitys good standing with the NFIP. Under this procedure, the program deficiencies or 
violations identified during a CAV are recorded in the CAV report in the state or FEMA files 
and the CAVs status is left open, meaning that compliance problems exist in the community. 
Follow-up consultation, technical assistance, and progress reports continue and are all added to 
the CAV report documentation. When the compliance problems are all resolved, the CAV is 
considered closed in the FEMA and state records, indicating that the community is fully 
compliant with the NFIP. There is a space on the CAV report form (and entered into the CIS) in 
which the responsible regional office staff member indicates that the CAV is officially closed. 

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This period during which the CAV is open because compliance problems in the 
community are being worked on is an essential part of the compliance process under the model 
used by FEMA for the NFIP. It allows a period during which FEMA, the state, and the 
community can work cooperatively to resolve the compliance problems after the community has 
been formally notified of the nature of the problems and of what must be done to address them. 
Although interim deadlines are usually imposed in the follow-up letter for achieving interim 
steps towards the goal of full compliance, FEMAs regional staff and the states have the 
flexibility of extending these deadlines as needed, if the community continues to make progress. 

One result of this procedure is that communities learn how to address their compliance 
problems and become more proficient at interpreting and implementing the flood damage 
reduction provisions of their ordinances. Another result, however, is that some communities 
remain essentially noncompliant for a long period of time. Federal, regional, and state officials 
interviewed by the study team agreed that serious building violations and program deficiencies 
are allowed to persist in a large number of communities. 

6.1.1 CAVs Remaining Open 
As noted, a CAV (or a CAC) remains open until all program deficiencies have been 
corrected and violations remedied and any assistance promised to the community has been 
provided. At that point FEMA or the state officially closes the CAV. If no violations are 
discovered and the community does not need technical assistance, the CAC or CAV may be 
closed on the same day it is initiated. Therefore, the length of time a CAV remains open should 
indicate how long communities are noncompliant and how long it takes to resolve program 
deficiencies or violations. FEMA (1989) states that remedial actions should be pursued on a 
timely basis. Nevertheless it acknowledges that some program deficiencies and violations may 
take a year or more to remedy. The study team analyzed the CIS data on CACs and CAVs from 
January 1997 through December 2002. Figure 8 shows the average length of time CAVs 
remained open during that period. 

The study team found that 61 percent of CAVs were closed within one year of being 
initiated, meaning either that no compliance problems were found or that they were addressed 
within one year. Within 2 years, 71 percent of the CAVs were closed. The average length of time 
a CAV was open was 277 days. Almost a quarter of CAVs were open for five or more years and 
21 percent of CAVs conducted from 1997 to 2002 remained open as of May 2004.35 Assuming 
two years is sufficient to address most compliance problems if a good-faith effort is being made, 
these figures suggest that roughly one-quarter to one-third of communities with known 
compliance problems are not responsive to additional technical assistance and consultation from 
FEMA and/or the states. It must be assumed that during these years, violations and program 
deficiencies are persisting and that, consequently, buildings and thus the Flood Insurance Fund 
remained at risk. 

35 The average length of time a CAC was open was 118 days. As of May 2004, 5 percent of CACs conducted from 

1997 to 2002 remained open. CACs are not included in the above analysis because most do not involve a 

community visit, which would be necessary before enforcement action. CACs that did reveal a potential 

compliance problem presumably led to CAVs. 

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FIGURE 8: Length of Time CAV Remained Open, CAVs initiated 1997 to 2002 


Source: CIS, May 2004 

In theory, CAVs are closed only when compliance problems have been resolved. In 
practice, however, the study team identified multiple instances in which senior regional officials 
in FEMA closed CAVs even though violations had not been addressed (for instance, in an effort 
to clear the backlog of data not entered in the CIS, as discussed in Section 5.2. Sometimes CAVs 
were closed by the regional office managers in the face of opposition from the staff who had 
conducted the CAV. This detracts from the reliability of the length of time a CAV is open as an 
indicator of progress in obtaining compliance. By the same token, it was not possible to 
determine whether CAVs remained open after the problems were addressed simply because of 
insufficient recordkeeping or confusion due to staff turnoverthat is, the CAV closure was 
not recorded in CIS even though the community had resolved its compliance problems. 

6.1 Correcting Program Deficiencies 
The first type of compliance problem that may be found in a community is a program 
deficiency. A program deficiency is a defect in a communitys floodplain management 
regulations or administrative procedures that impairs effective implementation of floodplain 
management regulations or building regulations (FEMA 1986). The NFIP compliance program 
differentiates between minor program deficiencies and substantive ones (Table 6). 

Although minor program deficiencies must be corrected, they are the sort of problems 
that do not impede a communitys ability to enforce, or are not critical to effective 
implementation of, its floodplain regulations. Examples include permit or variance records that 
are not easily accessible, or administrative procedures or practices that are easily corrected and 
do not result in multiple violations or increase exposure to flood losses. 

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TABLE 6: Some Typical Program Deficiencies and Ordinance Violations 

Program Deficiencies 
Program deficiencies may be minor or substantive. 
Examples listed below are substantive. 
(All program deficiencies must be corrected.) 
Ordinance Violations 
Violations may be minor or substantive. 
Examples listed below are substantive. 
(All violations must be remedied to maximum extent possible.) 
 Local floodplain management ordinance and/or 
regulations inconsistent with NFIP regulations 
 Building not elevated to proper level 
 Local administration and enforcement process and 
procedures inadequate to prevent violations 
 Improper use of enclosed area below lowest floor 
 Changes in the community boundary that affect the 
flood hazard area 
 Manufactured homes not anchored 
 Failure to use best available data as basis for setting 
local elevation and floodproofing requirements 
 Building components (HVAC, utilities) not elevated to 
proper level 
 Variance procedures inconsistent with NFIP criteria  Encroachment in floodway 
 Failure to operate and maintain flood protection 
projects credited by FEMA as providing 100-year 
protection (such as levees) 
 Building in V Zone not anchored 
 Building in V Zone placed seaward of mean high tide 

Substantive (sometimes called serious) program deficiencies are those that have 
resulted or could result in increased potential flood damage or flood stages, such as failure to 
require permits for proposed construction or other development within flood-prone areas, 
ordinances that are not compliant with the NFIPs floodplain management criteria or that do not 
contain adequate enforcement provisions, or variance procedures that are not consistent with 
NFIP variance criteria. 

Any deficiencies in the communitys program that are discovered must be corrected. 
Little or no leeway is allowed the community in meeting this standard, because it is fully within 
the communitys control to take the steps needed to correct these procedural and administrative 
shortcomings. A flawed ordinance can (and must) be amended. A relaxed local permitting 
procedure must be revamped. Enforcement procedures for the ordinance must be formalized if 
they have been ineffective in preventing violations. These are program deficiencies and render 
the community noncompliant even if there is no building activity taking place and no buildings 
are in violation. The community is expected to take corrective steps once the problems have been 
identified. 

Some of the examples of ways to correct program deficiencies given in the Community 
Compliance Program Guidance include 

 amend ordinances to close loopholes; 
 amend ordinances to add penalty provisions; 
 revise permit, certification, or inspection forms to make them more usable; and 
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 locate or produce missing elevation or floodproofing certificates. 
There are many other ways to correct deficiencies, depending on the nature of the 
problem. 

6.2 Remedying Violations 
The second type of compliance problem that a community may have is a violation of its 
floodplain management ordinance. A violation is the failure of a structure or other development 
to be fully compliant with the communitys floodplain management regulations (FEMA 1986). 
A typical violation is a building whose lowest floor has been built below the BFE or whatever 
elevation is required by the communitys ordinance, or a structure in a V Zone that is not 
properly anchored to a pile or column foundation. FEMA guidance differentiates between minor 
violations and substantive ones (table 6). 

A minor violation is one that does not normally result in increased flood risk in the 
community, although it still must be remedied. A substantive violation is one that has resulted in 
or could result in increased potential flood damage or flood stages. Substantive (sometimes 
called serious) violations include, but are not limited to, obstructions in floodways or stream 
channels that increase flood stages, post-FIRM structures built with their lowest floor below the 
BFE, or structures located seaward of mean high tide. 

Because of the limitless variety of circumstances, ordinance violations can be more 
complicated to handle than program deficiencies. The violations are most often buildings that are 
improperly built or elevated, but there can be ordinance violations that involve bridges or other 
structures, improper use of fill, damage to dunes, etc. FEMAs compliance guidance states that 
violations must be remedied to the maximum extent possible. 

There are two main reasons that violations are subject to a different standard than 
program deficiencies (which, as noted above, must be fully corrected). First, in some cases there 
are limits to the communitys authority and ability to eliminate the violation completely. For 
example, the communitys ordinances may lack provisions for penalties to be imposed against 
errant property owners. In this case, the ordinance may be amended (correcting the program 
deficiency), but it could not be made to apply retroactively to violations that had already 
occurred. Second, violations can vary in severity. Some violations result in buildings that are at 
greatly increased risk of flood damage (being constructed several feet below the BFE, for 
example). Other buildings, even though they are in violation of the local ordinance, may not be 
subject to much additional damage. A common example of this kind of violation is a building 
whose lowest floor has been built to the proper elevation but its utilities (furnace, air 
conditioning system, etc.) have been placed below the flood elevation. To further complicate the 
situation, in some cases it may be almost impossible (or prohibitively expensive) to bring a 
building into full compliance. 

One major goal of the NFIP standards is to lessen or eliminate the flood damage that 
buildings will suffer. Thus FEMA does not always require buildings in violation to be brought 
back into full compliance before the community itself can be termed compliant. Instead, if there 
is no legal or practical way to make a building fully compliant, a community may be allowed to 
bring the building into partial compliance or, if this is not possible, find a way to reduce the 

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impacts of the fact that it is non compliant, or to reduce federal liabilities with regard to the 
structure, and/or to protect the structure or other affected development from flood damage 
(FEMA 1986). 

Communities have several options available to them to remedy violations to the 
maximum extent possible. Remedies depend in large part on the type of violation and its cause. 
Some of the examples of ways to remedy violations to bring the structure into full compliance, as 
given in the Community Compliance Program Guidance include: 

 Demonstrate that the structure is not in violation by providing missing elevation, V 
Zone, or floodproofing certificates; 
 Rescind permits for structures not yet built or in the early stages of construction; 
 Tear down or modify the noncompliant structure or 
 Temove offending fill in the floodway; and 
 Implement a master drainage plan or flood control work to protect noncompliant 
structures (FEMA 1986, p. 3-6). 
It is important to note that it is not always possible for a community to fully eliminate the 
harm (or potential harm) done by a violation. FEMAs guidance therefore provides for remedies 
that can at least lessen the impact of the violation, decrease the likelihood that a similar one will 
occur in the future, or provide for ways to shift the costs of the harm done by the violation. If 
implemented to the maximum extent possible, these remedies can return the community to 
compliant status even though there may be nothing more that can be done about the 
noncompliant building or development itself. Ways to remedy violations that do not result in a 
fully compliant structure but do lessen or shift risk or serve as deterrents include 

 Seek civil or criminal penalties as provided for in the local ordinance; 
 Initiate licensing actions against architects, engineers, builders, or developers 
responsible for the violations; 
 Issue declarations that the structures are noncompliant for purposes of denial of 
insurance under Section 1316 of the National Flood Insurance Act; and 
 Submit evidence that the structure cannot be cited (due to legal constraints in state or 
local legislation, for example) (FEMA 1986, p. 3-7). 
The community is expected to pursue one or a combination of available options to 
remedy building violations to the maximum extent possible. Often FEMA or the state will 
specify what they consider to be appropriate remedies, or such decisions may be made in 
consultation with the community officials. It is not unusual for communities to welcome the 
strong hand of a state or federal office when they are dealing with developers or others who do 
not wish to abide by the local requirements. 

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It should be noted that, in the NFIP model of compliance, violations and program 
deficiencies (described in the previous section) are interrelated. Presumably a community with a 
compliant program has measures in place to detect potential violations and prevent them from 
occurring, but mistakes and oversights can occur. By the same token, a community with 
structures or development in violation cannot be considered compliant, even if its administrative 
procedures seem exemplary and there are explanations for how the violations occurred. 

6.2.1 Maximum Extent Possible 
NFIP regulations state that communities are required to remedy violations to the 
maximum extent possible. The compliance program guidance defines the standard as the 
most effective level of flood loss reduction given practical and legal constraints. 

When asked to define maximum extent possible, officials from FEMA headquarters 
provided a similar definition: addressing violations to the degree possible given the legal, 
economic, and practical constraints. An official from FEMA headquarters provided the following 
example: a house built on a crawlspace whose lowest floor is found to be six inches below BFE, 
with no flood vents or ventilation openings. He said that, rather than requiring the property-
owner to elevate the entire house at tremendous cost, the community may seek more practicable 
solutions that reduce the flood risk, such as creating openings to allow water to enter during 
flood stages and thus equalize the water pressure on the foundation, and/or applying minor 
floodproofing measures. 

The staff interviewed by the study team at the regional, state, and local levels offered 
differing views of what specific remedies would qualify for maximum extent possible. This 

What is the Maximum Extent Possible? 

An example of confusion over the definition of maximum extent possible and full extent of legal authority can 
be seen in the case of Lafourche Parish, Louisiana. 

In September 2003, Lafourche Parish was found to have granted 44 improper variances. The community was 
warned by FEMA that its continued participation in the NFIP was contingent on correction of its variance procedures (a 
program deficiency) and remedying existing violations (most of which were the absence of flood vents in lower areas of 
buildings). By December, the Parish had corrected all but 17 of the original violations, many of which required the addition 
of vents on storage sheds. 

Community officials examined the options of prosecuting property-owners of noncompliant properties or making 
Section 1316 declarations in order to avoid having to pursue legal action against the owners of the structures. FEMA 
representatives indicated that Section 1316 should only be enacted after all other methods of bringing properties into 
compliance had been attempted. It was unclear to community officials whether this meant first prosecuting property owners. 
In a letter to the parish president, a FEMA official stated that where appropriate, legal action is expected as part of 
comprehensive efforts to bring the parish in line with NFIP regulations. This did little to clarify whether legal action was 
obligatory. 

An article in the Daily Comet, the Lafourche Parish newspaper stated, Semantics leaves room for speculation, as 
parish officials are left to determine exactly what FEMA officials mean by the maximum extent possible. 

Charges were eventually filed against some property-owners, although statements by the district attorney indicated 
that the filing of charges may not have been a serious indication of an intention to prosecute property owners, but rather the 
fulfillment of a minimum requirement imposed by FEMA. The parishs experience is indicative of the confusion over both 
remedying violations to the maximum extent possible and the need for court action against property owners. 

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demonstrates that communities, states, and regions have varying concepts of the threshold for 
addressing violations and require remedies to meet different standards. In the words of a FEMA 
official, all communities enforce differently and have varying tolerance levels for 
noncompliance. For example, one community may require a home built three feet below BFE to 
be demolished, while another community may decide that requiring the elevation of just the 
utilities is a practicable strategy. 

Although flexibility in applying such standards is a hallmark of the NFIP compliance 
program, it is not clear to what extent this inconsistency is detrimental to compliance overall. 
This is the type of difficulty that would be minimized by more systematic and readily accessible 
documentation of monitoring activity or by facilitating the sharing of best practices among 
regional office and state personnel in a regular forum such as that discontinued by FEMA some 
years ago, as discussed in Section 4.2.2. A staff person faced with a compliance problem without 
an obvious solution could access the CIS to see how a similar situation was handled in the past or 
in another region. Or, if regular meetings had been held, he or she might already have an idea of 
how to handle it, or would know someone in another regional office or state who had dealt with a 
similar situation. 

6.2.2 Full Extent of Legal Authority 
FEMA headquarters officials stated that a community is remedying violations to the 
maximum extent possible when it exercises the full extent of its legal authority to remedy them. 
The legal remedies available to communities vary according to the provisions of their local 
ordinances and sometimes state law. Typically there will be a provision authorizing the 
community to impose fines, issue injunctions, demand specific performance, etc. There is 
disagreement, however, on whether violators must be prosecuted by the community in order to 
regain compliance with the NFIP. A FEMA headquarters official said that a community did not 
have to take violators to court before declaring a Section 1316 denial of insurance coverage, 
which is discussed below. But two communities said they were told the opposite: that they were 
required to utilize the court system before declaring a property ineligible for flood insurance 
under Section 1316. 

6.2.3 Options for Remedying Violations 
States, communities, and property owners (and sometimes FEMA) have a number of 
options available to remedy individual building or development violations to the maximum 
extent possible to bring the structure back into compliance and reduce its flood risk. Most of 
these options are pursued by the community independently in the course of its normal inspection 
and enforcement procedures, and some are pursued after consultation with state and/or FEMA 
staff after a community has been notified that it is not in compliance with the NFIP. Thus these 
measures are some of the steps communities must take to avoid sanctions (probation and 
suspension) from FEMA. Addressing structural violations individually reduces flood risk, 
eliminates negative insurance effects, and does not penalize compliant property-owners in the 
community. 

The following sections discuss enforcement actions that can be taken against structures in 
violation after the failure of other, simpler options (such as simply notifying the property owner 

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that the structure or violation must be corrected). Often the options listed below are the last 
avenues available to a community before FEMA must impose community-wide sanctions. 

Legal Action against Owner of Noncompliant Structure 

One of the ways in which communities (or states) can remedy violations is by taking 
legal action against the owner of the noncompliant structure, according to the recourse available 
in the local ordinance. It is the implicit threat of such action that causes most property owners to 
fix whatever is wrong with the structure when simply notified by the local government that it is 
in violation. In a community that has been found to be noncompliant, FEMA or the state may 
mandate legal action as part of the communitys remedies if requesting the property owners to 
comply is not effective. Some examples follow. 

 The community could take corrective action or do work on the noncompliant 
structure itself, and bill the owner for the work. If the owner refuses to pay, a lien 
may be able to be placed against the property. 
 The community could record a notice of violation on the property deed or title in the 
recorders office. The notice remains until the violation is remedied and informs 
current and future owners of the violation and the need to correct it, and projects the 
higher flood insurance premiums associated with non-compliant construction. 
 The community could bring civil or criminal charges against the property owner. 
FEMA officials interviewed by the study team disagreed about the effectiveness of 
prosecuting violations in court. Such proceedings are costly and time-consuming, with no 
guarantee of the outcome. One FEMA program specialist said FEMA wanted to avoid a situation 
in which a community goes to court and loses, for fear of setting a precedent that the community 
did not have an enforceable basis for its regulations. In contrast, an ASFPM official stated that 
legal action by the community would be helpful because, even if the community lost the case, it 
would establish a precedent that the local floodplain manager would enforce regulations through 
the courts if necessary. 

Denial of Flood Insurance under Section 1316 

In some cases, even after all options for remedial action have been explored, a 
community cannot cause a structure in violation to be brought into compliance with the local 
ordinance. This could occur when a property owner refuses to have the necessary work done 
even after the community has applied all the penalties available under its ordinances or when the 
building is constructed or situated in such a way that the violation is uncorrectable. In such 
instances, a community or state can remedy the situation to some extent by declaring the 
structure ineligible for flood insurance under Section 1316 of the National Flood Insurance Act. 
Although the structure will remain at risk, the risk then will be borne by the property owner 
rather than by the other policyholders or taxpayers. 

Regulations implementing Section 1316 were first issued in 1986. A declaration under 
Section 1316 denies flood insurance for a property in violation of state or local floodplain 
management regulations. Section 1316 can only be implemented in instances when an appropriate 

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authority in the state or community submits a declaration to FEMA specifically stating that the 
structure is a violation. When FEMA determines that the violation is valid, flood insurance 
becomes unavailable. No new policy can be written to cover the building, nor can an existing 
policy be renewed. A structure ineligible for flood insurance also would be ineligible to a 
mortgage from a federally regulated lender. In addition, grants, loans, or guarantees made by 
federal agencies may not be obtained for acquisition or construction related to the structure. If 
there were a flood, no federal disaster assistance would be available to rebuild or repair that 
structure. Flood insurance coverage can be regained when a declaration of violation has been 
rescinded. 

The prospect of having a Section 1316 declaration made on a property provides both an 
economic incentive for the property owner to correct the violation (an uninsurable structure may 
be less valuable in the real estate market), and a method by which communities can take action 
against uncorrectable violations. It also is meant to deter future violations. Section 1316 is not 
a preferred method of remedying a violation, because it is better that the structure be modified to 
be made compliant and less prone to risk. Instead, Section 1316 was intended primarily as a 
backup for local enforcement actions (i.e., if a community could not force compliance through 
the enforcement mechanisms in its regulations, it could use Section 1316 as additional leverage) 
and not merely as a mechanism to remove bad risks from the policy base (FEMA 1986, p. 4-2). 

Data obtained by the study team showed that 755 Section 1316 declarations were made 
between December 1968 and January 2004. As of January 2004, there were 603 properties on the 
register of active declarations (some declarations were rescinded after the property owner took 
the needed action to eliminate the violation). Section 1316 declarations are highly localized by 
community and state. Declarations have been made in only 106 participating communities (0.5 
percent of all participating communities) in 32 states. Table 7 lists the top 10 communities with 
historical and active 1316 declarations. 

TABLE 7: Historic and Active Section 1316 Declarations, Top Ten Communities 

Community Active 1316 
Declarations 
Percentage of 
Active 1316 
Declarations 
All 1316 
Declarations 
Percentage of All 
1316 Declarations 
Galveston County, TX 131 21.7 151 20.0 
Montgomery County, 
TX 120 19.9 122 16.2 
Harris County, TX 68 11.3 102 13.5 
Cameron Parish, LA 30 5.0 32 4.2 
City of Tybee Island, 
GA 22 3.6 32 4.2 
City of Valley Park, MO 18 3.0 19 2.5 
Yavapai County, AZ 15 2.5 23 3.0 
Platte County, MO 15 2.5 17 2.3 
Buchanan County, MO 14 2.3 15 2.0 
City of Tarpon Springs, 
FL 10 1.7 51 6.8 
443 564 
SOURCE: CIS and 
FEMA 

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Ten communities accounted for 73 percent of all active Section 1316 declarations and 75 
percent of all declarations. Even for those communities, Section 1316 declarations were a rare 
occurrence. Seventy percent of communities that have issued 1316 declarations have only done 
so once or twice. Appendix C lists all communities with active Section 1316 declarations. 

The study team considered that the infrequent use of Section 1316 declarations as a 
remedial measure may indicate one or more of the following conditions: high levels of 
compliance (i.e., Section 1316 declarations are not needed very often), lack of knowledge about 
the Section 1316 option, or reluctance on the part of local officials to preclude a property owner 
from obtaining insurance. It also may indicate that other, more preferred means of remedying 
violations are successful in most instances. The study teams work on this question was 
inconclusive. 

It is unclear whether most participating communities know that Section 1316 is an option 
for remedying a violation, given its infrequent use. The NFIP Community Compliance Guidance 
gives only general guidance, stating that a Section 1316 declaration should be made when the 
violation cannot be remedied by modifying the structure. The community should pursue the most 
effective level of flood loss reduction attainable given practical and legal constraints before 
making a Section 1316 declaration. Section 1316 is listed as an example of a means of 
remedying violations, but there is little additional direction about whether it should only be used 
as a last resort, or after attempts have been made to bring the property-owner to court. 

The study team did encounter some apparent contradiction in the use of Section- 1316 in 
relation to the full extent of legal authority standard, which implies that communities must 
exhaust the legal options available to them under their ordinances before making a Section 1316 
declaration. In some cases, this would mean utilizing the court system to prosecute violators. A 
FEMA headquarters official said that a community did not have to take violators to court before 
declaring a Section 1316 denial of insurance and that the Section 1316 declaration was meant to 
provide an additional recourse for a building official when his or her request to bring legal action 
against noncompliant structures is denied by the communitys attorney. The study team 
identified several communities that had declared Section 1316 on properties without taking the 
owners to court. But two of the communities interviewed said they were told the opposite: that 
they were required to utilize the court system before declaring a property ineligible for flood 
insurance under Section 1316. 

Without an in-depth investigation of the various circumstances surrounding all the 
Section 1316 declarations, which falls outside the scope of this study, it is not possible to 
determine whether the remedy is being applied appropriately. It may well be that the flexibility 
necessary within the NFIP compliance program results in legal action being required from some 
communities before a Section 1316 declaration is determined to be the maximum extent 
possible of remediation for a given structure while in other communities the pursuit of further 
legal recourse is not necessary before the Section 1316 option is followed. 

Subrogation Actions against Community and/or Property Owner 

A subrogation action is a legal procedure that FEMA can follow to recover the costs of 
insurance claims paid for flood damage that occurred as a result of acts or omissions of a 
community or an individual property owner. Subrogation actions are not pursued frequently, and 

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were not explored in this study. They are a very staff-intensive option and require the dedication 
of considerable resources. However, the authority and ability of the NFIP to protect its financial 
outlays in this way is another tool in the enforcement process and can act as a deterrent to 
noncompliance. 

6.3 Flexibility in Correcting Program Deficiencies and Remedying Violations 
Participating communities vary widely by population, level of development, type of flood 
hazard, and number of policyholders. Some communities fund their floodplain management 
programs generously and are staffed with world-class expertise. They administer superior 
programs that in many ways exceed the NFIPs minimum requirements. In contrast, other 
participating communities, often strapped for resources and unconcerned about floods (until they 
happen), find themselves dependent on inexperienced and part-time officials who know little 
about floodplain management. 

This diversity in expertise has obvious implications for basic levels of compliance 
nationwide: some communities find compliance with NFIP standards simple and automatic while 
to others compliance is a confusing struggle. This diversity also complicates FEMAs and the 
states response to communities when noncompliance is discovered. Regardless of what the 
programs regulations may require, reality occasionally requires FEMA and the states to temper 
their expectations about compliance. Although all program deficiencies must be corrected, 
FEMA guidance allows its staff to work with communities to remedy violations to the 
maximum extent possible, which is sometimes to a lesser degree than originally required by 
the NFIP. This may involve, for example, allowing a noncompliant structure built below BFE to 
elevate only its utilities to BFE (rather than the whole building) or it may involve dry 
floodproofing a non-elevated residential structure (which normally is not allowed), among other 
options. Further, FEMA guidance states that communities are to use their discretion in 
addressing compliance problems, and that they should be given a reasonable degree of latitude 
in determining how to correct a program deficiency or remedy a violation (FEMA 1986, p.3-4). 

The variety of circumstances and community capabilities also dictates that FEMA allows 
its staff leeway to use its judgment to determine when a community has done all that it can to 
correct deficiencies and remedy existing violations, at which point FEMA considers the 
community to have regained compliance. Likewise, FEMAs staff is expected to use its 
judgment to determine when a community is no longer responsive to FEMAs efforts to help it 
remedy violations or correct program deficiencies, at which point the staff should recommend 
that sanction procedures be initiated. 

The Community Compliance Program Guidance describes mitigating and 
aggravating factors that regional office (and state) staff should take into account both when 
determining what corrective actions and remedial measures must be taken by a noncompliant 
community and also when deciding whether the community has addressed the problems 
sufficiently or movement toward sanctions is warranted. Some examples of mitigating 
circumstances listed in the guidance are 

 The community has demonstrated willingness to take positive action to resolve past 
problems; 
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 Newly elected officials or recently hired staff have demonstrated a new attitude 
toward NFIP compliance on the part of the community; 
 There are only isolated instances of violations or a single program deficiencies (rather 
than a pattern of widespread problems); 
 The community has had no prior contact with FEMA; 
 A particular remedial measure would undermine the credibility of local officials or 
their efforts to achieve compliance; the present owner of a property in violation was 
not the owner at the time the structure become noncompliant; and 
 Due to lack of local resources, the community has had to rely on the availability of 
technical assistance from outside sources (FEMA, the state, or other entities). 
Some examples of aggravating factors listed in the guidance are: 

 The community has not demonstrated willingness to resolve past problems; 
 There is a history of prior violations or program deficiencies identified and brought to 
the communitys attention; 
 There is a pattern of widespread program deficiencies or violations; 
 Deficiencies in the local program have resulted in increased exposure to flood losses; 
 The community has receive prior technical assistance; and 
 The violations occurred recently. 
The variations among FEMA staff and states in how they interpret maximum extent 
possible, the uncertainty about the standard full extent of legal authority, the natural 
differences in approaches to technical assistance and enforcement around the country, the range 
of mitigating and aggravating factors that may be present, and the considerable discretion 
allowed to FEMA staff by both the official guidance documents and the situation, result in a 
range of different possible outcomes for any given compliance problem. Further, FEMA officials 
acknowledge that the success of strategies to remedy violations may be affected by a lack of 
community resources or the discretion of the judicial system. 

This variability may be of concern if FEMA wishes to meets its goal for consistent and 
similar treatment of like-situated communities (FEMA 1989). Even though there is wide 
variability among the community characteristics and the problems that arise, some degree of 
consistency is needed for reasons of equity, to make any action FEMA takes defensible, and to 
ensure as much similarity in flood risk to similarly-situated buildings as possible so that actuarial 
insurance rating is on a sound footing. 

However, the flexibility is sound from at least three standpoints. First, it is more efficient 
to allow decisions to be made in the field by the staff persons closest to the decision than to have 
centralized review of each decision, which would be time-consuming in a process that is already 

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over-long (see discussion below). Second, the ordinances that are being violated are local matters 
and in the end the local government has responsibility to resolve problems that arise from them 
and to find ways to make the enforcement of the ordinance provisions workable and effective 
now and for future situations. There needs to be some flexibility in state and federal approaches 
to allow the local government to make its own decisions about this. Third, research has shown 
that the deterrence effect of clear-cut sanctions diminishes greatly for violations that are rare or 
idiosyncratic. For all three of these reasons, allowing discretion to the inspectors is considered 
a wise policy and is followed in other government compliance programs. It might also be added 
that there is no way to know what implementation problems might arise if a strict, by-the-book 
system with no flexibility were used. 

6.3.1 Variable Duration of Enforcement Actions 
The length of time between the beginning of enforcement through the successive steps of 
an enforcement action varies widely. FEMA headquarters was unable to provide the study team 
with an average of the length of time between the identification of substantive violations and/or 
program deficiencies and the placement of the community on probation. Cases vary by the types 
of violations, the options for mitigation, turnover of community officials, occurrence of a 
disaster, and the cooperativeness of the community officials. They estimated a range of between 
one and several years. This is borne out by the data on open CAVs, discussed above in Section 

5.1.2. The implication of this is that known program deficiencies and violations are allowed to 
persist in those communities. In interviews with the study team, federal, regional, and state 
officials agreed that this is happening. 
FEMA and most states have a preference for working cooperatively with the community, 
providing consultation and technical assistance, to resolve compliance problems without 
resorting to sanctions. This is one main reason that there can be a considerable period of time 
between the point at which program deficiencies and violations are identified and the point at 
which they are all resolved or, at the other extreme, FEMA acts to impose sanctions on the 
community. The question of how long is too long may well be unanswerable, given the wide 
range of local circumstances that FEMA and the states face in enforcing compliance and 
considering the trade-offs in staff time, political capital, documentation, and other factors that 
would have to be made to hasten the process. 

6.4 Probation 
If efforts fail to correct program deficiencies and/or remedy violations in a community 
after FEMA or the state has requested it, the community faces sanctions from FEMA, the first of 
which is probation. Probation is the formal and public notification to the community that it is 
noncompliant and may face suspension from the program. When a community is placed on 
probation, NFIP flood insurance remains available but all policyholders in the community are 
assessed an additional fee (or surcharge) of $50 per year. Probation was introduced in the early 
1980s as a tool for obtaining compliance and as a formal precursor to suspension. The probation 
process was established by regulation in 1986. Before that, there was no provision for placing 
communities on probation for failure to enforce. Several regions had been using some form of 
informal probation, but it was not outlined in the regulations or guidance. As FEMA began to 
focus more on promotion, monitoring, and enforcement, the need for formal procedures became 
apparent. The full sequence of events in an enforcement action is displayed in Appendix F. 

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Probation can be imposed only if (1) the regional office or state has identified one or 
more substantive program deficiencies or violations; (2) FEMA or the state has conducted a 
CAV; (3) previous actions to resolve problems through community assistance and consultation 
have failed; and (4) the community failed to take necessary corrective actions and remedial 
measures, as specified by the regional office or state. 

To commence the placement of a community on probation, the regional director sends a 
90-day probation letter to the community (the letter is sent at least 31 days before the 90-day 
period begins). The letter provides a formal opportunity, with a clear deadline, for the 
community to demonstrate that it has corrected program deficiencies and remedied violations, 
and thus avoid probation. The probation letter communicates the following information: 

 The community will be put on probation unless it takes steps to bring its program into 
compliance with NFIP criteria; 
 A list of program deficiencies and violations; 
 Required corrective actions and remedial measures; 
 Notification that insurance remains available during probation; and 
 Notification that a $50 surcharge will be applied to all policies during probation. 
Once the 90-day period begins, the regional office issues a press release describing the 
impending probation. FEMA also notifies the communitys Congressional members of the 
impending probation. 

If, after the 90-day period has ended, the community still has not satisfactorily corrected 
the specified programs deficiencies and remedied the specified violations, probation becomes 
effective and the surcharge is imposed. 

These steps were crafted at the creation of the NFIP compliance program to allow 
communities due process in addressing the impending sanctions. With this procedure, 
community officials have little basis for complaining that they were taken by surprise or were 
not given time to explain or remedy the situation. 

While a community is on probation, the regional office and/or state staff continue to work 
with the local staff and officials to resolve the compliance problems. The probationary period 
lasts until the compliance problems have been addressed satisfactorily, according to a timetable 
set by the regional office or state. If the community is making progress when the deadline 
arrives, the probationary period can be extended. After the compliance problems are addressed, 
the probationary period can still be extended for a fixed period of up to another year, if the 
program deficiencies and violations were multiple and substantive and future compliance by the 
community is in question. In cases of such extensions, FEMA guidance recommends that another 
CAV be conducted to determine if probation can be lifted. 

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6.4.1. Effectiveness of Probation 
Throughout the NFIPs history, 104 communities have been threatened with probation for 
failure to enforce through probation letters from the regional office, according to FEMA. About 
half of these communities remedied their violations in the allotted time period and avoided 
probation. The remaining 49 were placed on probation. Forty of those have had probation lifted 
and have been returned to compliant status (see the complete list in Appendix D). All of the 
FEMA regional offices have issued at least one probation letter, and all regions have had at least 
one community placed on probation. Communities on probation as of October 31, 2003 are listed 
in Appendix E. 

Based on these numbers, the threat of probation (in the form of the probation letter) 
results in compliance about half of the time. Probation itself has yielded compliance in about 72 
percent of the cases in which it has been used. The combination of the probation letter and the 
actual imposition of probation has been successful in bringing to compliance 85 percent of the 
communities on which it has been used. This suggests that formally threatening and using 
probation has been quite effective in bringing about community compliance. 

What is not (and cannot be) known is the number of communities that were induced to 
remedy violations and correct program deficiencies simply by the prospect of receiving the 
probation letter, realizing that once the letter is received probation is the next step. In this sense, 
the mere fact that the NFIP has a stated probation procedure serves to deter noncompliance. 

However, there is a strong sentiment among the officials interviewed by the study team 
that the number of communities that have been formally threatened with the prospect of 
probation is relatively small when compared to the number of communities in which serious 
violations were found and documented. 

Number of Candidates for Probation 

Because the NFIP compliance model anticipates that addressing a given communitys 
compliance problems could take up to a year or more, and because both FEMA and the states 
prefer to use a cooperative approach and apply sanctions only after that fails, for purposes of this 
analysis the study team considered two years to be a reasonable cutoff point between 
communities that are making progress and those who should be candidates for stronger 
measures, namely a probation letter as a precursor to probation. 

The study team used the number of CAVs left open for longer than two years as the best 
available indicator of the number of communities with serious compliance problems that have 
not been subjected to enforcement action. As was shown in figure 8, that number is about 30 
percent of all CAVs conducted during the five-year period for which records were analyzed. 36 
This is in line with an estimate posited by FEMA officials in one region, who said that about 25 
percent of participating communities in two states in their region had serious compliance 
problems. Based on the assumption that the five-year period studied is typical, this means that, 
nationwide, something like 250 communities every year are potential candidates for probation 

36 It should be noted again that the CIS data are not wholly reliable, because of potential inaccuracies and because 
they do not contain 100% of the CAV records. 

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letters. Even acknowledging a large number of extenuating circumstances, there is little 
explanation either in the traditional compliance and enforcement literature or within FEMAs 
own technical-assistance-based model to explain why, in 20 years, only 104 probation letters 
were issued. The compliance and enforcement literature indicates that, even within a model 
emphasizing that many or even most compliance problems arise through mistakes, some 
penalties and enforcement threats are required as a deterrent to bad apples to keep the threat of 
enforcement credible and keep current and future development out of harms way (Scholz 1997). 

These numbers suggest that the enforcement component of the compliance process is not 
working well at some point between the discovery of violations and the issuance of the probation 
letter. Further, if the formal threat of probation (probation letter) and the imposition of probation 
are effective 85% of the time, and there are many communities with records of extended time 
periods without correction of compliant problems, then FEMA should be using this technique 
more often. 

Obstacles to Issuing Probation Letters 

The interviews the study team conducted with state, regional office, and FEMA 
headquarters officials revealed a range of real and perceived obstacles to issuing probation 
letters. Some FEMA regional offices appear to be reluctant to issue probation letters that are 
based on state findings and documentation. Some regional directors apparently are reluctant to 
issue probation letters at all. FEMA and state staff opinions may vary about how hard the 
community is trying and how long it should be allowed to keep working on its problems and 
this can lead to disagreement over how much more needs to be done before a recommendation is 
sent to the regional director that a probation letter be issued. Similarly, there can be conflicts 
among FEMA personnel (particularly between the field staff who have actually met with the 
community and the senior management, who probably have not) over how much documentation 
is enough to substantiate the recommendation for a probation letter, and between FEMA and 
state personnel on the same topic. Shifts in personnel within state and regional offices cause 
enforcement actions and paperwork to be delayed, duplicated, and in some instances, simply 
started over. 

Another reason for reluctance may be that probation is necessarily seen as a precursor to 
suspension. Although there is no time limit for a probationary period, and suspension is not 
automatic, regional directors and regional staff realize that, once a community is on probation, 
suspension becomes a real possibility. But because suspension of a community can only be done 
by headquarters (the Federal Insurance Administrator has the authority), if the regional office 
personnel perceive a lack of support from headquarters, or if it is not clear how much or what 
documentation headquarters will require from the regional office before it imposes suspension, 
the regional office staff and/or the regional director may hesitate to take the first step in the 
process (sending the probation letter). 

It also should be noted that regional office staff and regional directors change over time, 
while compliance problems develop slowly and can take a long time to resolve, even under the 
best of circumstances. Thus a compliance problem in a community can outlast the personnel who 
first discovered and documented it, and also worked with the community, providing technical 
assistance at the onset of the enforcement action. The study teams interviews indicated that 
there have been instances in which a staff person responsible for a community with enforcement 

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problems failed to resolve a communitys compliance problems after several months or longer, 
and then moved on to another position, leaving the unresolved situation to a new person. 

The study team also encountered in interviews the contention that some enforcement 
personnel game the compliance timeline by delaying more severe actions (such as 
enforcement) knowing that they may leave their current position before having to take the 
unpopular step of recommending a community for probation. As a political appointee, a 
Regional Director also realizes that his or her tenure is limited and may wish simply to avoid an 
enforcement action that may be politically unpopular and still be unresolved when he or she 
leaves the regional office. 

Still another possible reason for the seeming lag in action on recommendations to issue 
probation letters is that senior regional office staff (including the appointed regional director) 
have responsibilities beyond the NFIP. The occurrence of one or more major disasters within the 
region, for example, could overwhelm their capability to address complex and sensitive NFIP 
enforcement matters while the disaster response and recovery activities are underway (which can 
be a year or more). 

Some caution on the part of FEMA senior personnel is certainly warranted. The probation 
letter (the last step before probation) is a big step because it is a formal communication from one 
government to another and has a specific deadline. Senior FEMA regional officials rightly want 
to avoid having to back down from this position and also realize that, once the communitys 
deadline has been reached, action must be taken. To issue a probation letter, the FEMA regional 
office must be prepared to follow through and place the community on probation if needed. 

Despite these explanations for a regional offices not proceeding to the step of issuing a 
probation letter, it should be possible for FEMA to take a more aggressive stance towards 
limiting the length of time a community can languish in noncompliant status. It may be feasible, 
for example, to set an outer limit of, say, two years for a community to address its problems 
after a CAV, after which the probation letter becomes automatic. An automatic deadline such as 
this would move the enforcement process along more quickly to the probation letter step, which 
has been proven effective. 

6.4.2 Effectiveness of the Probation Surcharge 
When FEMA first proposed a probation surcharge, it selected an amount of $50, which 
equaled about 25 percent of the average premium being charged at the time (April 1985). 
According to FEMA, [t]his additional premium in communities that do not adequately regulate 
development reflects the added liability to the program that results from increases in potential 
flood damage (Federal Register, 4/15/85, p. 14904). In its proposed rule, FEMA solicited 
public comment on the appropriate method of implementing a probation surcharge: the proposed 
flat charge per policy or a percentage increase applied to the premium of each policy. This 
second alternative would generate approximately the same amount of revenue as the proposed 
flat charge of $50. According to FEMA By establishing this probation procedure and charging 
this additional premium, FEMA expects to be able to obtain community compliance with 
Program requirements prior to reaching the point where there is no alternative but to suspend a 
community (FR, 4/15/85, p. 14904). Overall, the comments received by FEMA supported the 
probation surcharge but they varied as to the type of surcharge favored and the mechanics of 

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imposing probation on a community (FR, 9/4/85, p. 36016). FEMA agreed with those 
comments that said the proposed amount of $50 would be too high for some policyholders. As a 
result, FEMA reduced the surcharge to $25, believing this amount would still be effective in 
drawing the attention of the policyholders to a communitys noncompliance and obtaining their 
support for actions to avoid suspension (Federal Register, 9/4/85, 36016-7). The $25 surcharge 
was in place for several years and in October 1992 was increased to $50. 

The amount of the surcharge for communities on probation has not changed since 1992, 
even though the average flood insurance premium has. In 1985, the average flood insurance 
premium was $224. In 2003, the average premium had risen to $446. The average premium is 
expected to increase further in the wake of recent years of major hurricane damage. The average 
claim payment over the five years between 1983 and 1987 was $8,917. This increased to $20,163 
for the five years between 1999 and 2003. If the added liability to the program resulting from a 
communitys noncompliance amounts to about 25 percent of the average premium, and the 
surcharge is meant in part to account for that additional liability, then the amount of the 
surcharge now should be at least $100. Based on FEMA statistics, the surcharge for probationary 
communities has not kept pace with increases in flood insurance premiums, or flood damage. 

In its interviews with state and regional office personnel, the study team encountered 
some sentiment that the surcharge was too small to be effective in inducing community 
compliance. However, FEMA headquarters officials stated that the amount of the surcharge is 
not important, as long as it is enough to draw the policyholders attention to the communitys 
noncompliance. In the estimation several floodplain management officials, the surcharge alerts 
policy-holders to deficiencies in the communitys compliance with its floodplain ordinance and 
creates a motivation for citizens to pressure community officials and support the remediation of 
violations. One FEMA official stated that the agency was concerned that if it set the surcharge 
too high, policyholders would let their policies lapse. 

Little is known about the impact of increasing or decreasing surcharge amounts on 
compliance with violations. Indeed, as discussed in the review of the research literature, large 
penalties are not always necessary to elicit a response from those monitored if conditions are 
otherwise conducive to compliance. It is possible that the threat of a higher surcharge would 
motivate communities both to prevent and remedy violations before, rather than after, probation 
procedures are enacted. Some officials acknowledged that it may be time to consider an increase 
in the surcharge, especially if there had been some concerns that an increase in rates of one-
quarter of the average would motivate further compliance. Concerns about equity may suggest a 
need to scale penalties slightly, (e.g., step-ladder) based on individuals premiums. 

6.4.3 Indefinite Probationary Periods 
The rule of thumb for the NFIP compliance program is that communities are put on 
probation for one to three years. This is a typical length of time for communities to reach a 
point of accomplishment in their programs and to correct all program deficiencies and remedy 
violations to the maximum extent possible. Probation is sometimes extended for another year 
after that point, with monitoring by the regional office or state to ensure that the community in 
fact is able to administer its ordinance properly. 

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In determining whether to lift probation, some officials told the study team that they also 
consider the communitys willingness to work with regional officials and the level of 
cooperation and effort expended by the community. FEMA officials stated that there is no upper 
limit to how long a community can remain on probation as long as it is working on its 
compliance problems. 

The study team analyzed the probation records obtained from FEMA and determined 
that, of the 41 communities that have been placed on probation and subsequently returned to 
compliant status, the average duration of the probationary period was 27 months. Only two 
communities were on probation for more than 4 yearsone had a five-year probationary period 
and one had 10 years of probation. 

Of the seven communities currently on probation,37 four have been on for less than 2 
years and one for slightly over 2 years. However, one Indiana community has been on probation 
for over five years, and Guam has been on probation for more than 11 years, the longest 
probation period in NFIP history (see box). 

For communities that have been on probation for many years, the question arises why 
suspension procedures have not been instigated. FEMA officials stated that those communities 
that have been suspended to date were only those that did not cooperate, stonewalled the 
program, and were unresponsive to remedying their compliance problems. This indicates that 
FEMA reserves the suspension option for situations for the most egregious cases. FEMA 
headquarters and regional office staff use their judgment in determining when that point is 
reached, and do not necessarily agree. The case of Guam, although perhaps a unique situation, 
shows clearly how steps in the right direction can be followed by backsliding and how large 
numbers of factors enter into the decision about whether to move from probation to suspension. 

6.5 Suspension from the NFIP 
If a community on probation fails to remedy its violations and/or program deficiencies 
during its probationary period, the Federal Insurance Administrator (at FEMA headquarters) can 
suspend the community from the NFIP. A community may only be suspended when its identified 
violations and program deficiencies are both multiple and substantive. FEMA staff must verify 
through a CAV the violations and program deficiencies that result in suspension. FEMA does not 
specify the maximum time that communities can remain on probation before facing suspension. 
Instead, decisions about whether to extend the communitys probationary period or proceed with 
suspension are made on a community-by-community basis. Before the 1980s there was a 
suspension process for failure to enforce, but it was difficult to use since there was no probation 
process or other precursor to the suspension show cause letter. The 30-day show cause letter and 
the 30-day suspension letter were instituted in the 1976 revisions to the NFIP regulations. 

Suspended communities lose all of the benefits of participation on the NFIP. Property 
owners in such communities lose their eligibility to purchase or renew flood insurance. Flood 
insurance is neither sold nor renewed in those communities during the suspension period. 

37 Figures are as of October 2003. Two other communities are on probationary status after being reinstated from 
suspension. Those two are not included in this analysis. 

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Property owners in the flood hazard areas of suspended communities are not eligible for certain 
grants or loans from federal agencies or certain funds after presidentially declared disasters. 

A community remains suspended until it corrects all program deficiencies and remedies 
all violations to the maximum extent possible. At that point, FEMA can reinstate the community 
into the NFIP and also may impose certain additional conditions. For example, for up to one year 
after being reinstated, suspended communities could be required to report to the regional office 
all activities on the floodplain and each variance they grant. The regional office could visit after 
a specified amount of time to ensure that the community is enforcing its floodplain management 
regulations. Once reinstated, property owners in the community again can obtain flood insurance 
coverage. 

Throughout the NFIPs history, 10 communities have been suspended for failure to 
enforce. Of those, six have been reinstated (two on probationary status, four on full status). Four 
of those communities remained suspended as of October 2003 (two had been on suspension for 
12 years, one for five years, and one for 3 years). Of the six that have been reinstated, the length 

Guams History of Probation 

Guams history with the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) illustrates some of the difficulties faced in 
determining whether a community should be suspended from the program and also in implementing that suspension. 

Located to the south of the Mariana Islands in the western Pacific, Guam is highly vulnerable to natural disasters, 
including typhoons, earthquakes, and flooding. Guam elected to join the NFIP in 1985, making flood insurance and 
disaster assistance funds available to its over 166,000 residents. In 2006, there were 233 flood insurance policies active in 
Guam, for $35 million in coverage. 

Compliance problems in Guam were first discovered in 1985 and noted during subsequent CAVs. FEMA 
identified more than 30 construction violations, many on the banks of the Agana River, and Guam was placed on probation 
in 1992. Several years later, Region IX requested that Guam be suspended from the program. FEMA headquarters did not 
support the recommendation for suspension, and Guam remained on probation. In 1997, the Region again recommended 
that Guam be suspended. This time headquarters agreed and began suspension procedures. However, several days before 
implementation, Typhoon Paka struck Guam and FEMA headquarters decided to halt suspension. According to FEMA 
headquarters, suspending Guam while it struggled to recover from a major natural disaster would have exacerbated the 
effects of the damage and suggested that FEMA and the U.S. government were unsympathetic. 

Between 1998 and 1999, Region IX and the government of Guam developed a three-year retrofit plan for 
mitigating noncompliant structures, educating floodplain management participants, and obtaining buy-in from FEMA 
headquarters and the government of Guam. NFIP training sessions were provided to Guam government officials, local 
building contractors, developers, architects, engineers, lenders, and insurance agents. Hazard Mitigation Grant Program 
(HMGP) funds were allocated to retrofit construction violations in exchange for the government of Guams building a 
flood control channel. However, the government of Guam did not fully implement the retrofit plan or construct the flood 
control channel. Region IX issued a third recommendation to FEMA headquarters for suspension from the NFIP in April 
2003. As of September 2004, headquarters was still considering the recommendation. The Region has continued to renew 
Guams probationary status. Guam remains a participant in the NFIP, although its policy holders pay a $50 surcharge on 
their flood insurance policies. 

Guams failure to comply with NFIP regulations has implications for the NFIP, as well as the residents of Guam. 
First, it is notable that, although probation has been 85% effective in producing compliance among the rest of the NFIP, 12 
years of probation apparently have not improved the government of Guams ability to implement and enforce its own 
floodplain ordinance. The reasons for this are not entirely clear, although it is known that pro-development political 
pressures and budgetary problems have played a role. Guam has been the subject of five major disaster declarations since 
1997, including Typhoon Paka, which caused over $200 million in damage. This recurring disruption doubtless affects the 
ability of Guams government to make steady progress. 

All these factors, among others, come into play as compliance is pursued and enforcement sanctions considered. 
Any judgment about the propriety of probation vs. suspension must weigh among other factorsthe communitys 
unusual situation, the time-consuming and expensive process of making onsite visits; the small number of flood insurance 
policies in place; and the detrimental effect of Guams long probationary period serving as a suggestion that FEMA is 
unwilling to suspend a noncompliant community. 

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of suspension varied from less than one year to 12 years. The ten suspended communities are 
distributed among five of the FEMA regions (III, IV, V, VII, and VIII). Communities on 
suspension as of October 31, 2003 are listed in Appendix E. 

6.5.1 Effectiveness of Suspension 
Based on this admittedly small number of instances, suspension appears to have been 
slightly less successful at bringing about compliance than has probation: only 60 percent of 
suspended communities historically have returned to the NFIP. However, considerable caution 
should accompany any direct comparison because communities that remain suspended tend to be 
at once the most recalcitrant and those with almost no development pressure and few or no 
insurance policies. Thus they have little to lose. In contrast, because of prohibitions on federal 
assistance that accompany non-participation, no community with floodplain development can 
afford to remain outside the program. 

Because there is no flood insurance in force in those communities, the Flood Insurance 
Fund is not at risk (as it is in probationary communities). Although nonparticipating communities 
are not eligible for many types of disaster assistance after a flood disaster, because no suspended 
community has experienced a presidentially declared disaster, it is not clear whether public 
opinion and political pressure in the aftermath of such an event would prevent taxpayer funds 
from being used to alleviate the losses suffered by the uninsured residents of these 
nonparticipating communities. 

7.6 Obstacles to Enforcement of Community Compliance 
The study team identified two problematic steps in the enforcement process used under 
the NFIP compliance program. First, probation letters, which are the first step in putting a 
community on probation, are not issued frequently enough or only after a long period of time. 
Second, a few communities spend too much time on probation before being suspended. Both of 
these logjams can be attributed in part to a number of factors discussed above, including internal 
matters such as turnover in agency staff, competing demands of disasters and other work, and 
honest professional disagreement about whether stronger enforcement measures are warranted in 
a given situation. There are three additional factors, discussed below, that contribute to making 
enforcement difficult: confusion about documentation; duplication of effort, and political 
pressure. In addition, overall compliance efforts are undermined by a perception among 
communities and states, and sometimes regions, that FEMA is unwilling to implement sanctions. 

6.6.1 Uncertainty about Documentation 
Staff from FEMA headquarters stated that the implementation of sanctions is hindered by 
insufficient documentation of violations at the regional and state level. They said that proper 
documentation of violations is essential because it protects communities against false accusations 
and insulates FEMA from legal action and political pressure over unfair decisions: A well-
prepared argument will result in a successful sanction and little political intervention. The 
documentation, written communications with the community, procedures required for remedial 
action, and the schedule of steps to take to avoid probation must be definitive so that the 
community is offered the protection of due process contemplated in the NFIP regulations on the 

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probation process. Headquarters staff cited several instances in which requests for 
implementation of sanctions were simply unsupported by the accompanying information. 

For their part, the regions realize that headquarters wants thorough documentation, but do 
not know how much. There is a perception that, out of fear of repercussions and/or political 
pressure, headquarters insists on extreme amounts of documentation and exhaustive visits to 
community to provide additional training and technical assistance. This results in a long, 
sometimes indefinite, period during which ever-more assistance is provided and additional 
amounts of documentation are accumulated. 

6.6.2 Duplication of Effort 
The insistence by some regional offices that FEMA staff confirm compliance problems 
identified by states creates the potential for duplication of effort. Several state floodplain 
coordinators interviewed by the study team contended that FEMA duplicates work already done 
by the states, slowing the enforcement process, frustrating state and regional officials, and 
delaying probation/suspension procedures. 

One states procedure for sanctioning communities is to send up to three letters 
requesting that the community remedy compliance problems within a given deadline. The state 
first allows for communities to respond within 90 days, then 60 days, and finally 30 days (a total 
of six months). If the community does not remedy the violations within the time period, the state 
requests that the region impose probation. However, the regional office insists on duplicating the 
process of sending warnings to the community before passing a recommendation to 
headquarters. Further delaying the process, headquarters sends its own set of warnings to the 
community. This triplication of enforcement procedures delays sanctions for long periods of time 
and creates the impression that FEMA is reluctant to implement sanctions. A state official 
offered the example of a community that was found to have over 100 violations in 1993, but was 
suspended from the program only in 2003, due to the lengthy process of documentation. 

It should be noted that FEMAs guidance on state documentation of compliance problems 
states that a community may be placed on probation based on hard documentation developed 
and provided by States (FEMA 1986, p. 7-1). However, the standard for suspension differs: a 
regional office may not recommend to headquarters that a community be suspended solely on the 
basis of documentation provided by the state. For suspension, the FEMA regional staff must visit 
the community and make their own determination about the deficiencies, violations, and local 
progress in addressing them. 

FEMAs guidance further states that the conduct of enforcement actions (placing a 
community on probation or suspension) is a Federal responsibility and will not be delegated to 
the States (FEMA 1986, p. 7-1). 

It seems clear that a state cannot reasonably expect to place a community on NFIP 
probation on its own authority (since it does not have that authority), but equally clear that it is 
within a FEMA regional directors discretion to rely solely on state documentation and 
recommendations regarding probation as a trusted partnership. However, based on the confusion 
evidenced by the study teams interviews, this guidance may need clarification. 

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6.6.3 Political Pressure 
Political pressures from members of Congress on behalf of constituent communities can 
affect the implementation of the NFIP and community compliance. Political considerations were 
among the reasons for the establishment of the probation process to begin with. Before 1976, the 
NFIP did not have a formal probation process or the due process provided by a 90-day probation 
letter and a 30-day show-cause letter before suspension. Noncompliant communities were simply 
suspended without much prior notification. As a result, suspensions resulted in harsh immediate 
reactions from congressional members. The formal probation process instituted in the mid 1980s 
laid the groundwork for suspension and gave FEMA documentation of noncompliance and 
refusal or inability to remedy violations. Generally, [FEMA] found that communities that had 
been through the [formal] probation process and still not complied got little sympathy from their 
Senators and congressmen, said one FEMA official. 

However, the study teams interviews with regional and state officials revealed that both 
probation and suspension are typically highly politically charged actions. A number of states 
noted that FEMA was reluctant to initiate enforcement sanctions against communities in 
situations in which they encountered political pressure. Several states identified participating 
communities within their states that they believed had not been sanctioned because of pressure 
from within FEMA headquarters or from members of Congress. For example, FEMA put the 
Borough of Shickshinny in Luzerne County, Pennsylvania, on probation for 10 years but never 
suspended it because of Congressional pressure, according to a Pennsylvania state floodplain 
management official. FEMA eventually ended Shickshinnys probation in April 2002 when the 
borough approached the owners of six homes violating NFIP regulations about options to 
retrofit. However, as of 2005, the six non-compliant structures had not been retrofitted. 

It should also be noted that FEMAs regional directors are political appointees. As such, 
they may be more sensitive to pressures from Congressional members or other officials not to 
sanction communities for noncompliance. This can result in a similar bottle-neck in the probation 
process, if the regional director is unwilling or hesitant to pursue the procedures for applying 
sanctions. 

6.6.4 Perception of Weakness in Enforcement 
Several state officials reported in interviews their belief that FEMA headquarters is non-
supportive of enforcement actions. When the ASFPM asked whether the regional offices support 
enforcement actions in a state, almost half of the states said they received adequate support and 
58 percent said they sometimes did or did not at all (Note: percentages to not add up to 100 
percent because some states chose more than one answer). One state official opined that, within 
FEMA, enforcement is an unpopular solution. 

Additional support for follow-up enforcement activities was the request most commonly 
made by states, including adherence to a schedule and commitment to enforcement action. One 
state floodplain management official told the study team that when he has recommended a 
community for suspension, he has felt pressure from FEMA to delay or withdraw sanctions. 

Regional office staff, in turn, perceive an unwillingness to enforce from headquarters. 
Four regional officials described, in the words of one official, a climate of a lack of 

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enforcement. For example, a regional official described a community that the regional office 
wanted to place on probation but headquarters insisted that the region work with the community. 
A division director said he wanted clearer guidance from headquarters on how the regional office 
should use sanctions. 

FEMA headquarters personnel, however, profess willingness to go through with 
enforcement; they claim, rather, that the regions are not asking them to put communities on 
probation. FEMA headquarters officials indicated they encouraged regional directors to 
overcome their reluctance to make politically difficult decisions. 

In short, each group perceived the other to be too limited in its efforts to push for the 
remediation of violations and to implement sanctions. But federal, regional, and state officials 
were united in their belief that probation and suspension are imposed too infrequently on 
noncompliant communities. 

There is a perception among FEMA regional office and state staff that communities 
believe (or could believe) that FEMA has no teeth for enforcement and consequently the threat 
of probation and suspension is a weak tool. However, it is not known if communities across the 
country do have that perception; subsequent proactive behavior by communities before they are 
put on probation is difficult to explore and parse from actions that might occur anyway, as 
discussed in the section on research literature. About 50 communities have been placed on 
probation and 10 suspended. It is not clear how many enforcement actions across the nation that 
result in probation or suspension would be enough to constitute a viable threat, although it is 
obvious that the number of actions that have been carried out so far has operated as an effective 
threat to some extent. The literature suggests that, if qualitative research indicates that the threat 
is considered credible and consistent by all involved, the anticipated outcome will be little need 
for placing communities on probation or suspension. The communities simply would learn not to 
take that risk. The research literature reviewed by the study team did not provide an answer to 
the question of the size of threat needed to induce certain behavior, nor were there other 
governmental programs similar enough to the NFIP to serve as a baseline. 

Even if some of the weaknesses noted are the perceptions of only a few staff from the 
regional offices and states, such a perception still can harm compliance levels. If FEMA is 
believed to be reluctant to enforce compliance through sanctions, this will affect the efforts by 
both the states and the participating communities to ensure compliance. For example, a state 
could document violations by a community and send this information to FEMA, only to find that 
such documentation is not enough to permit FEMA to impose a sanction. States and 
participating communities will feel their efforts are pointless and may not apply themselves as 
vigorously as before. 

6.7 Discretion and Trade-offs in Enforcement 
FEMA believes that compliance and flood safety problems can be remedied more easily 
if the community is participating in the NFIP than if it is not. Therefore, FEMA has an interest in 
working with communities even when they are on probation to help them remedy violations, 
rather than rushing to impose suspension. In other words, FEMA believes in allowing 
communities to remain in good standing with the NFIP as long as they are working to remedy 
their compliance problems. This policy means that some enforcement actions in fact may last a 

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long time, but result in compliance in the end, as evidenced by the communities that have faced 
probation, some of it lengthy, but have eventually come to implement their flood hazard 
reduction measures adequately. and that regional offices and states retain discretion in 
determining whether the community is working in good faith to address the situation. 

Unlike some issue areas in which compliance with governmental programs is clear cut, 
each of the steps in the enforcement process for the NFIP involves professional judgment, and 
the use of discretion on the part of floodplain management personnel in FEMA and the states. 
Those decisions often involve making implicit and sometimes explicit trade-offs. For example, 

 The usefulness of consistent and precisely stipulated enforcement procedures 
(desirable from a nationwide standpoint) must be weighed against the flexibility that 
is needed by regional office and state staff to handle idiosyncratic individual 
compliance situations effectively. 
 The negative effects of probation or suspension for an individual community 
(increased cost or loss of insurance coverage for residents and political 
embarrassment for the community) must be weighed against the possible future 
deterrence effect for other unspecified communities in the region of imposing 
sanctions more readily. 
 The potential cost to federal taxpayers and other policyholders of allowing a 
noncompliant community to remain in the NFIP for a long period must be weighed 
against the value of eventually bringing that community to full compliance so that it 
bears responsibility for its flood risk in the future. 
 The much more tangible political costs of imposing probation on or suspending a 
specific community must be weighed against the value of visible enforcement as a 
deterrent to noncompliance by other unspecified communities in the future. 
It can be seen that the best balance among these factors can vary from situation to 
situation. In fact, these tradeoffs interact together in a larger system where there may not be one 
unique overall solution and where a given actor may only see their small part. This is an 
important and inescapable characteristic of enforcement in the NFIP. 

6.8 Findings and Recommendations on Enforcement of Community 
Compliance 
It is important to note that this study cannot verify whether FEMAs enforcement 
methods have been detrimental to nationwide compliance nor can it solve the complex cost-
benefit equation that would lead FEMA to an optimal solution that combines cooperative 
approaches and sanctioning in appropriate measures. It may be that the NFIP compliance 
program functions relatively well along the lines of certain other voluntary compliance models, 
meaning that the motivation of most community leaders to do the right thing, the incentives built 
into the program, and other factors generally are stronger determinants of community 
compliance than the threat of enforcement. The research literature supports the idea that, for 
regulated entities with a culture that is more supportive of compliance or for which compliant 

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norms are supported,38 a model focused on support and technical assistance over swift penalties 
and deterrence such as that used for the NFIP is sufficient. In those cases, a strong penalty for 
violators may not be necessary as a deterrent. 

However, the more difficult issue involves the compliance of communities that do not 
have supportive attitudes toward making the necessary changes. The interviews conducted by the 
study team and the statistics on the length of time needed to bring some communities to 
compliance and/or out of probation, coupled with the handful of communities that have been 
suspended and/or withdrawn from the program in the face of FEMA and state insistence that 
they adhere to the program requirements, indicates that there are a certain number of 
communities whose attitude toward the NFIP can be characterized as recalcitrant. Although the 
research linking compliance levels to the credibility of a sanction is limited, intractable to clarify 
through theory alone, and difficult to apply across programs, it generally does support the beliefs 
of the regional office and state officials quoted above who think that a well-known reluctance to 
sanction can harm compliance levels, particularly among the more unwilling communities. As 
noted in Section 1.2.4, the literature underscores the general understanding that compliance 
initiatives are most effective if they are supported by some credible threat of enforcement 
action.39 Without that threat, regulatory programs become more like cooperative or voluntary 
approaches (which, as noted above are effective mostly for communities that are already 
cooperative). Researchers note that in many cases, Absent the plausible threat of enforcement, 
cooperative approaches to achieving compliance seem to have only limited effect on regulated 
entities (Crow et al. 2000). The evidence and research suggests that, in addition to using its 
cooperation-based approach, FEMA also should take steps to increase the belief among 
communities that the agency is willing to use its probation and suspension sanctions more readily 
than it has to date. Some movement in this direction appears to be warranted. 

Even if the NFIPs enforcement mechanism remains mostly reliant on cooperative 
approaches rather than sanctions, changes may be required to meet the assumptions and 
conditions under which those cooperative approaches will be most effective. A study by the 
Canadian group Pollution Probe (1999) reviewed voluntary initiatives in environmental 
protection and resource conservation and provided an appropriate framework for cooperative 
enforcement strategies. They concluded, in part, that 

The ideal voluntary initiative has clearly stated and publicly supported goals, targets, and 

timelines. Progress is measured and reported at regular intervals, with problems addressed 

openly and expeditiously. The initiative is evaluated and adjusted, as necessary, with the 

full participation of stakeholders (Pollution Probe 1999). 

Although the mostly-cooperative approach toward enforcement in the NFIP is not identical to the 
types of initiatives considered by Pollution Probe, the criteria for effectiveness they set are 
largely relevant, and as this section indicates, the NFIP compliance program is not meeting all of 

38 See, for instance, Compliance Information Project (2000) regarding the views of environmental compliance 

inspectors. 
39 See, for instance, Cohen (1998) and the U.S. EPAs Compliance Information Project (1999), which summarizes 

the literature on incentive-based initiatives and enforcement as well as other enforcement literature. 

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the conditions.40 Deadlines set for compliance are not always clearly stated or adhered to, 
progress is not measured and reported consistently or publicly, state and especially local 
stakeholders are not full participants in NFIP decision making, and the guidance that is provided 
is sometimes unclear, contradictory, or too general to be useful in all cases. These shortcomings 
in having a fully cooperative approach point out a tension within the NFIP compliance program: 
personnel representing the NFIP are expected to be helpful and elicit the cooperation of local 
staff and officials in a joint endeavor (minimizing flood losses and costs by participating in the 
NFIP), but when compliance problems arise, those same personnel are expected to take on the 
role of enforcers. This is a problematic transition not just for the staff involved, but for the 
program as well. 

Although the evidence discussed in this section supports the contention that FEMA may 
be using its strongest sanctions insufficiently to achieve maximum or even better compliance, a 
bigger issue facing the NFIP is not necessarily how to get closer to achieving full compliance. 
Instead, FEMA must deal continuously with a more complete cost-benefit analysis of the tradeoffs 
involved between a willingness to use sanctions more regularly and a reliance mostly on 
cooperative approaches. These factors include trade-offs between, on the one hand, safety and 
financial benefits that result from stronger deterrence as well as potentially quicker resolution of 
violations and deficiencies and, on the other hand, the impact on community policyholders if a 
flood occurs, the political capital lost with local governmental officials, and other political costs. 

The intangible costs and benefits and the wide variability in the circumstances of 
compliance problems make it impossible for this study to provide FEMA with the best 
approach to enforcement of community compliance. The study team does, however, recommend 
ways to improve the procedures used in obtaining compliance. These changes should enable the 
NFIP compliance model to better meet the conditions necessary for cooperative approaches to be 
successful, according to the research literature. There are also steps that could be taken to reduce 
the political pressures and other factors that undermine the effectiveness of the NFIP compliance 
approach. 

FEMA should issue clear guidance on what documentation is required for probation and 

suspension. Confusion about the documentation needed was widespread. The need for 

clearer guidance is especially keen because states conduct the majority of CAVs, which 

are the foundation of enforcement action. 

The process of providing technical assistance to noncompliant communities should be finite and 

well documented. FEMA must know what training and technical assistance each 

community receives to know when noncompliance ceases to stem from ignorance of 

NFIP regulations. FEMA regional office and state floodplain management staff should 

make training available to noncompliant communities and document, continuously and in 

a standard format, the training and technical assistance that they provide. This 

documentation should be housed in the CIS. 

40 It is interesting to note that these conditions of a successful cooperative enforcement strategy are more nearly met 
by the NFIP Community Rating System, which appears to have a better community compliance performance than 
the NFIP overall. 

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Consideration should be given to imposing a fixed time limit for correcting program deficiencies 
and remedying violations. Although some flexibility is necessary, the study team found 
that the technical assistance and documentation phase that follows a CAV can stretch on 
indefinitely. 

FEMA should clarify its guidance on full extent of legal authority. The study team found some 
confusion about what was meant by the requirement that a community remedy violations 
to the full extent of its legal authority. This was of concern particularly in deciding when 
a Section 1316 declaration is acceptable remedial action. 

Consideration should be given to raising the probation surcharge. The study team recommends 
that FEMA explore the potential effects of increasing the probation surcharge. The 
investigation should identify whether a higher surcharge would encourage communities 
to remedy violations to avoid probation, or decrease the length of time a community 
remains on probation, and thus, the length of time that structures and residents are at risk. 

Consideration should be given to using informational and automated methods to increase 
pressure on communities. The literature indicates that, in voluntary or cooperative 
enforcement programs, information can be used to cajole supervised entities into making 
changes. This perhaps could take the form of a requirement that the community notify all 
policyholders and/or the media that a surcharge may be imposed and that policyholders 
may become ineligible for flood insurance if the remedial measures are not taken. 
Another variation would be to impose smaller, interim penalties such as the required 
mailing an automatic, involuntary penalty. That is, perhaps two years after a CAV is 
opened but not closed, an automatic mailing is done to policyholders and the media. 
Then, in another year, probation is automatic. The advantage of this approach is that there 
is no villainthe requirement and the penalty are in the statute or regulations. 

FEMA should take steps to increase the belief among communities, FEMA staff, and state staff 
that the agency is willing to use its probation and suspension sanctions more readily than 
it has to date. This sentiment, whether true or not, prevails among both FEMA and state 
staff and needs to be changed, perhaps by implementing and publicizing more 
enforcement actions than in the past. FEMA or Congress should consider a procedure of 
automatically suspending a community after it spends a set period of time on probation, 
with exceptions allowed by regional officials contingent on clear indicators of progress. 
The differencethat active (rather than passive) steps must be taken to avoid 
suspensioncould make a real difference in outcomes. 

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7. SPECIAL ISSUES IN COMMUNITY COMPLIANCE 
Throughout the background reading, literature review, and interviews done for this 
evaluation, three issues recurred as problematic in NFIP compliance, each for different reasons. 
These topics were given special attention by the study team. The first, the substantial 
damage/substantial improvement requirement, raises compliance problems because it is 
complicated and potentially unpopular at the local level. The second, issuance of variances, has 
the potential to be misunderstood and misused by communities. The third topic, compliance 
among Community Rating System communities, poses concerns because of the high 
expectations held for those communities and the lower flood insurance premiums paid by their 
residents in return for lowered risk. Each of these is discussed in detail in this section. 

7.1 The Substantial Damage Requirement 
When a building in a communitys SFHA is substantially damaged or when a property 
owner makes a substantial improvement to a structure, the community must require that the 
property owner bring the entire structure to post-FIRM standards and comply with all of the 
building regulations in the communitys floodplain ordinance. FEMA defines substantial 
improvement as any reconstruction, rehabilitation, addition, or other improvement of a structure, 
the cost of which equals or exceeds 50 percent of the market value of the structure before the 
start of construction of the improvement41 Substantial damage occurs when a structure suffers 
damage (from any cause) equal to or greater than 50 percent of the market value of the structure 
before the damage occurred, regardless of whether the property owner chooses to repair the 
damage. 

These substantial damage and substantial improvement requirements are the main 
mechanisms for bringing pre-FIRM structures to post-FIRM standards.42 They ensure that 
increased investments in flood hazard areas throughout the country receive needed protection 
from flood risk and do not compel additional federal outlays after a flood disaster. Since most 
pre-FIRM structures were built without the knowledge or identification of flood risks, both 
requirements work towards reducing the stock of these more flood-prone structures. The 
substantial damage and substantial improvement rules also affect insurance rates because when 
FEMA reclassifies pre-FIRM substantially damaged or substantially improved structures as post-
FIRM, the structures are re-rated to actuarial rates and are no longer eligible for subsidized flood 
insurance. Thus, compliance with the substantial damage and substantial improvement rules 
ensures structural protection and the financial stability of the NFIP. 

When a community participates in the NFIP, it agrees to adopt and enforce the substantial 
damage and substantial improvement rules as part of its floodplain management ordinance. It is 

41 FEMAs definition substantial improvement excludes (1) any project for improvement of a structure to correct 

existing violations of state or local health, sanitary, or safety code specifications . . . and (2) any alteration of a 

designated historic structure, provided that the alteration will not preclude the structures continued designation. 

According to an official at FEMA, a participating community has the option of exempting a historic structure from 

NFIP regulations either through the definition of substantial improvement or through the variance procedure. 
42 The substantial damage and substantial improvement rules also apply to post-FIRM structures in communities that 

have undergone map revisions resulting in more stringent regulations, change in zone designations, or higher 

BFEs. Once substantially damaged or substantially improved, structures in remapped communities must be 

brought into compliance with the regulations applicable for the most recent map in effect. 

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the communitys responsibility to monitor damage and improvements to properties and declare 
that substantial damage or substantial improvement has taken place. Communities must then 
require the property owner(s) to bring the structures to post-FIRM standards. Failure of a 
community to enforce the substantial damage and substantial improvement rules is a program 
deficiency and the substantially improved (or repaired) buildings are violations, making the 
community noncompliant with the NFIPs minimum requirements. Because of the complexity of 
this requirement, the difficulty communities can have in implementing it, and the consequences 
of its non-enforcement, FEMAs guidance on conducting CAVs and CACs lists any substantial 
improvements to existing structures and the number of substantially damaged structures as one 
factor in determining whether there is likely to be noncompliance in a community and thus that 
that community warrants a visit from state or regional office staff. Further, FEMAs guidance on 
community compliance lists a substantially improved structure with its lowest floor below BFE 
as an example of a substantive violation. 

The study team examined community compliance with the substantial damage and 
substantial improvement requirements. Previous studies have suggested that communities often 
fail to identify and declare substantial damage or improvement and/or fail to enforce compliance 
with post-FIRM building standards after a declaration of substantial damage or improvement is 
made. Through a review of previous studies of the effectiveness of the rule; interviews with 
FEMA, state, and local floodplain management staff; and analysis of flood insurance claims data, 
the study team identified both the reasons that the process sometimes breaks down and the 
actions that FEMA can take to improve implementation of the rules. 

7.1.1 Compliance with the Substantial Damage/Substantial Improvement Requirement 
Lack of community compliance with substantial damage and substantial improvement 
rules has been identified in several studies from 1980 through the 2000s (Federal Insurance 
Administration 1980; Insurance Services Office, Inc. and French & Associates 1992; National 
Wildlife Federation 1998; Federal Emergency Management Agency Inspector General 1999; 
Association of State Floodplain Managers 2000). These reports found that noncompliance with 
the substantial damage rule occurs when communities (1) fail to properly declare structures 
substantially damaged, and/or (2) fail to monitor reconstruction of substantially damaged 
structures to ensure that they are brought to post-FIRM standards. 

In a report issued by the National Wildlife Federation (1998), researchers found that 
failure to bring structures to post-FIRM standards after the structures were declared substantially 
damaged caused the structures to be damaged in later floods. Nearly 15 percent of the repetitive 
loss properties studied (4,736 structures) had insurance claims that indicated that the property 
may have incurred substantial damage at least once in their loss histories. Further analysis 
showed that these properties experienced approximately the same number of losses  and 
accumulated even greater flood insurance payments  after being substantially damaged as they 
experienced before being substantially damaged, indicating that the structures had not been 
brought to post-FIRM standards as required. 

In 1999, FEMAs Inspector General (FEMA Inspector General 1999) used NFIP claims 
data to identify 603 structures as being substantially damaged, while the communities identified 
only 106 of those structures as being substantially damaged (a difference of 82 percent). It is 
important to note that, although NFIP claims data can help identify potentially substantially 

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damaged buildings, they use slightly different calculation methods than communities are 
instructed to use and therefore may inaccurately identify some structures as being substantially 
damaged. This is addressed in greater detail later in the report. To determine whether obvious 
mitigation occurred, the Inspector General took pictures of 87 of the 603 structures. When 
compared to pictures taken by claims adjusters, the Inspector Generals pictures revealed that 87 
percent of the structures sampled were not elevated when they were rebuilt. They also found that 
of a sample of 43 structures that were declared substantially damaged by communities, only 11 
were reclassified as post-FIRM and re-rated with actuarial rates. 

FEMA has recognized that its substantial damage and substantial improvement 
requirements are not always thoroughly implemented. In 1991 FEMA convened a workshop to 
review the extent and causes of why substantially damaged buildings were not being brought up 
to post-FIRM standards (ISO and French & Associates 1992). One major conclusion was that 
the NFIP is faced with a large percentage of substantially damaged buildings that are not rebuilt 
to post-FIRM standards nor are they re-rated as post-FIRM buildings. Furthermore, in 
interviews with the study team, FEMA regional officials and state floodplain management staff 
identified failure to declare structures substantially damaged or substantially improved and 
failure to bring declared structures to post-FIRM standards as common forms of noncompliance 
in communities. Some described substantial damage and improvement as the biggest challenge 
for the NFIP and the region, the number one compliance problem, or the biggest failure of 
the compliance process. One FEMA program specialist said substantial damage and 
improvement is an issue that drives the region crazy. 

In summary, FEMA and outside evaluators are in agreement that the substantial damage 
and substantial improvement provisions are not being implemented to the degree that FEMA had 
intended. Even so, the substantial damage/improvement requirement remains the main driver for 
post-flood mitigation, and FEMA has devoted considerable resources to efforts to improve its 
implementation. It is therefore important to identify ways to remedy the situation. 

The study team found that shortcomings in implementation of the substantial damage and 
improvement rule are usually the result of one or more of the following factors: reluctance to 
make proper declarations, confusion about or ignorance of the rule, problematic timing, varying 
methods of calculating substantial, and lack of information about damaged structures. These 
factors often combine to make implementation of the rules especially problematic. 

Reluctance to make Proper Declarations 

Floodplain management staff at FEMA, the states, and various regional floodplain 
management organizations frequently pointed to the reluctance of community officials to declare 
substantial damage and substantial improvement. Local floodplain managers may avoid 
declaring structures substantially damaged or improved out of consideration for the perceived 
hardships of community members. A declaration of substantial damage or improvement will 
often add significant expense to the repair or improvement of the structure. Participants in the 
1991 Substantial Damage Workshop found the most important reason why heavily damaged 
buildings are not rebuilt protected from flood damage is because most owners do not have the 
funds needed to meet the regulatory requirement (ISO and French & Associates 1992). Thus, 
many participating communities are hesitant to declare a property substantially damaged until 
funding from some source is secured to enable the property owner to make necessary 

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modifications. As one FEMA program specialist said, local officials are themselves local and it 
is difficult to make a neighbor comply with NFIP regulations like the costly improvements to the 
structure that will be required if it is declared substantially damaged. 

The problem of economic hardship is compounded when the property owners are already 
economically disadvantaged. In response to the report Audit of the Effectiveness of the 
Substantial Damage Rule (FEMA Inspector General 1999), a regional director wrote, A 
community cannot be expected to condemn low value structures [in this case by declaring the 
structure substantially damaged] without providing alternative housing for the families 
affected.43 It is politically and emotionally difficult for officials to require community members 
who have already suffered because of the extensive damage to their structures to take on the 
added cost of bringing their homes to post-FIRM building standards. 

Floodplain managers sometimes face political pressure not to declare structures 
substantially damaged or improved. Several FEMA program specialists told the study team that 
sometimes a local floodplain manager fails to declare or enforce the rules because the mayor 
overrides his authority or more generally because of political ramifications. Such political 
pressure can lead to a reluctance to make declarations or enforce compliance during 
reconstruction out of fear of negative repercussions. It can also affect the resources provided to 
local staff to make the declarations and monitor reconstruction. 

The result of these types of reluctance is that the local official tends to give the property 
owner the benefit of the doubt when making a determination of whether the damage has been 
substantial. When the percentage is close to the 50 percent threshold, the local governments 
tendency is to lean toward the lower number, freeing the property owner of the costly mitigation 
requirement. 

Timing Problematic 

Communities are often faced with the challenge of declaring structures substantially 
damaged after a flooda confusing time during which emotions run high. Problems that already 
affect implementation of the rules, such as confusion and politics, are more acute in this 
environment. For example, in response to a report that noted inadequate implementation of the 
substantial damage rule (FEMA Inspector General 1999), a representative of a FEMA regional 
office described a post-flood situation in which three communities building inspectors were 
responsible for making substantial damage declarations for their communities. The regional 
office staff member described the staff as overwhelmed by the workload in the post-disaster 
environment. Despite this difficulty, declarations must be made quickly so that permits can be 
issued and property owners begin reconstruction. Delays or perceived delays in receiving the go-
ahead to begin rebuilding contribute to property owners dissatisfaction, confusion, and 
resistance to further requirements. Many floodplain management staff at the regional and state 
level said that the speed with which FEMA provides relief and recovery funds after a disaster 
sometimes makes enforcement of the substantial damage rule more difficult. One state floodplain 
coordinator told the study team that communities receive contradictory signals when FEMA 

43 He was referring to a situation that followed a massive flood in which families in substantially damaged, low-

value structures were allowed to repair their homes without bringing them to post-FIRM building standards. In this 

particular case, FEMA planned to buy out the affected structures in the future and took that into consideration in 

its decision to excuse the families from the substantial damage requirements. 

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provides funding to repair damaged structures before the community identifies which structures 
must be brought to post-FIRM standards during that repair process. 

It is even more difficult to enforce the substantial damage rule when the disaster is 
something other than flooding (e.g., wildfires). In these situations, all of the problems of the 
post-disaster environment apply, but floodplain management staff must make a special effort to 
remind community members of the continued importance of compliance with floodplain 
management regulations. 

Although only the community has the authority to make declarations of substantial 
damage and substantial improvement, outside experts (such as building officials from other 
communities, civil engineers, and consultants) can provide support and help make calculations. 

Regional office staff agree that the presence of outside support is a key element in 
ensuring compliance with the substantial damage rule. One FEMA program specialist said Our 
experience has been that it would be difficult to expect a jurisdiction to completely take over the 
operation [after a large flood] and expect quick, accurate determinations to result. Another 
FEMA program specialist remarked that the only way to ensure that communities enforce the 
rule is to have outside floodplain management staff coordinating the declaration process. 

The study team was told by FEMA regional office and state floodplain management staff 
that they often make a point of being present to help communities after a disaster if they expect 
the communities to have a large number of substantially damaged structures. One state official 
said he has taken photographs and written down details of specific properties after floods for 
follow-up work with local officials. Many staff said that, when possible, they arrange for outside 
contractors, such as the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, to either assist communities in making 
declarations, or to do other work that frees up local staff to make declarations. 

FEMA has also recommended that communities establish a mutual aid agreement with 
building permit officials and similar professionals from other participating communities. When a 
disaster occurs in one community in the group, all of the communities in the group respond. 
Communities that enter into cooperative agreements have the opportunity to practice making 
substantial damage declarations in other communities and thus are more experienced when a 
disaster hits their own community. Also, the community suffering the disaster benefits from the 
presence of additional help to lessen the workload on their own staff. It is critical that 
communities involved in such agreements understand how to properly declare substantial 
damage since any incorrect assumptions made by one community may be communicated to the 
others in the group. 

Misunderstanding of the Substantial Damage/Substantial Improvement Rules 

In National Flood Programs in Review 2000 (ASFPM 2000), the ASFPM indicated that 
one reason communities fail to declare structures substantially damaged or improved is 
confusion about how to perform the calculation. In interviews, FEMA and state floodplain 
management staff sometimes described the rules as confusing or difficult for the communities to 
understand and stated that communities do not understand what they must do to comply with 
them. Substantial damage and substantial improvement occur only infrequently in most 
communities, so floodplain management staff are often inexperienced at making such 
declarations. 

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FEMA program specialists said that although communities are usually aware of the rules 
they do not understand how to make the calculations to declare substantial damage or substantial 
improvement. Communities can usually identify structures that are less than 40 percent or more 
than 60 percent damaged or improved, but structures with damage or improvement ratios at or 
around 50 percent cause considerable problems. 

A survey of federal, state, and local floodplain management officials on training found 
that all three groups desired additional training on enforcing the substantial 
damage/improvement provisions. In particular, many local officials indicated that they lack the 
training to estimate substantial damage and to understand the substantial improvement provision. 
FEMAs course on floodplain management (Managing Floodplain Development through the 
NFIP) provides guidance on the substantial damage and substantial improvement provisions. In 
addition to definitions, regulations, and illustrations, the course allows students to practice 
calculating repair and improvement costs and market value. Many states and regional office staff 
in every region deliver training to communities on calculating and declaring substantial damage, 
when possible, usually after a disaster. 44 Federal and state officials suggested that FEMAs 
Emergency Management Institute (EMI) develop more advanced courses on topics like 
substantial damage and substantial improvement. 

In 1998, FEMA released the first version of the Residential Substantial Damage 
Estimator (RSDE), a software package designed to help state and local officials estimate a 
structures value and damage costs. FEMA recommends that state and local officials use the 
software in conjunction with an industry-accepted guide on estimating residential costs. Some of 
FEMAs training materials on the provisions now include an explanation of RSDE and its 
advantages when used by participating communities. For example, the study team obtained a 
copy of a presentation developed by FEMA Region V, which explains how to use RSDE after a 
flood. The presentation provides samples of worksheets used by participating communities to 
collect data on substantially damaged structures for later input into RSDE. Federal and state 
officials identified a need to provide participating communities training on RSDE. 

Differing Methods for Calculating Substantial Damage 

FEMA guidelines give communities multiple options for calculating the costs of both the 
original market value45 of the structure and the cost of the damage or repair. Methods for 
determining a structures market value include independent appraisals by a professional 
appraiser; detailed estimates of a structures actual cash value; and qualified estimates based 
on sound professional judgment by staff of local building department or local or state tax 
assessors office. FEMA allows communities two additional less-precise options to use for those 
structures with damage or improvements that are clearly above or below 50 percent: property 
appraisals used for tax assessments (adjusted assessed value); and the value of a structure 
reported in NFIP claims data. Methods for estimating the cost of damage or repair include 

44 Although representatives of all of the FEMA regional offices and several states told AIR that they provide some 

sort of training in substantial damage and substantial improvement, the level and amount of training available vary 

considerably by state and region. Several regions provide training in substantial damage calculations either only in 

the post-disaster environment or at workshops independent of a disaster. Other states and regions provide training 

only in one-on-one meetings with communities that have experienced a recent disaster. 
45 Although insurance adjusters use replacement cost in their post-disaster calculations, FEMA does not consider 

replacement cost to be an acceptable substitute for market value. 

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itemized estimates made by licensed contractors or other professional estimators in the 
construction industry; monetary damage estimated by an NFIP claims adjuster (for insured 
structures only); qualified estimates from local building permit department using professional 
judgment and knowledge of regional and local construction costs; valuation tables published by 
the major building code groups; and assessments conducted during field surveys of post-flood 
damage by state or local officials.)46 

By choosing certain calculation methods over others, owners of structures that are 
damaged (or improved) in the range of 40 to 60 percent can manipulate calculations to show that 
their structures were not substantially damaged or improved. FEMAs report on the 1991 
substantial damage workshop said: 

Both building damage and building value figures can be manipulated 
depending on the needs and desires of the actor. [Building damage is 
sometimes measured as total damage sustained or as only the cost of 
the repairs that are actually made or reported to the permit official. 
Often repairs do not replace everything with like quality, use free 
labor, etcDifferent estimators, adjusters and appraisers can produce 
and defend different numbers](ISO and French & Associates 1992, p. 
7). 

FEMA program specialists and state floodplain management staff said that property 
owners or floodplain management staff often avoid declaring substantial damage or 
improvement by calculating damage or improvement to be only 48 to 49 percent of the value of 
the structure. One community certified that all of its structures damaged by Hurricane Floyd 
were no more than 49 percent damaged. 

The study team concluded that the wide range of calculation methods currently available 
has contributed to inadequate implementation of the rules by confusing communities and 
facilitating abuse. This has led to a high number of calculations of damage and improvement in 
the high 40 percent range. 

Some states and communities have adopted a cumulative method of calculating 
substantial damage or improvement. With a cumulative qualifier provision, the community 
agrees to track damage or improvements to properties over a given period of time (sometimes 
five or 10 years) or the life of the property. When the total cumulative value of all improvements 
or damage within that time period exceeds 50 percent of a structures market value, the structure 
is then required to meet the NFIPs minimum requirements. To use a lower threshold, a 
community may require a structure to be brought to post-FIRM standards when it suffers damage 
or is improved to a point greater than or equal to 25 percent (for example) of pre-damage market 
value. Both the cumulative qualifier and the lower threshold provisions have the effect of 
requiring more structures to comply with the NFIPs minimum requirements as a result of 
improvements or repairs made following a disaster. 

46 A further complication is that some property owners use donated labor or materials to make improvements or 
repairs and fail to include these costs in their calculations. Compliance with FEMA requirements demands that the 
community estimate the value of all donated labor or materials and include the estimated value in calculations of 
improvement. 

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FEMA has typically rejected recommendations to redefine substantial improvement to 
include the cumulative tracking of building permits because of the burden it would place on 
communities who do not have the sophisticated recordkeeping capacity or expertise required to 
track a cumulative requirement. FEMA has encouraged, but not required, participating 
communities to adopt more stringent standards and has recognized the precedence of such 
standards over the NFIPs minimum requirements. 

For example, encouragement is provided to communities participating in the Community 
Rating System, who can earn credit points for adopting a cumulative qualifier provision for 
substantial damage or substantial improvement or for adopting a threshold for substantial 
damage or substantial improvement that is lower than the 50 percent threshold mandated by the 
NFIP. As of May 1, 2003, 260 CRS communities (27 percent) were earning points for 
cumulatively counting improvements or repairs made to a structure and 32 CRS communities (3 
percent) were earning points for enforcing a lower substantial-improvement threshold. 

Claims Data not Used 

When claims adjusters survey a post-disaster situation and suspect that a structure may 
have incurred substantial damage, FEMA requests that they complete an Adjuster Preliminary 
Damage Assessment form. The form identifies potentially substantially damaged structures by 
recording a structures probable repair cost, replacement cost, and actual cash value.47 Both 
WYO companies and the NFIP Servicing Agent (National Con-Serv, Inc.) use the forms. A 
completed form is sent to the NFIPs Bureau and Statistical Agent (the Bureau) which then 
makes the data collected on the form available to FEMAs regional offices on its website, 
FIANet (also known as BureauNet). Finally, the regional offices distribute the information to the 
appropriate local officials for their use in determining substantially damaged structures. 

Although insurance claims data submitted in Preliminary Damage Assessment Forms 
cannot be used as a substitute for calculations made by the community, such data can help the 
community to identify the structures that suffered damage in the range of 50 percent. As ISO 
reported after the 1991 Substantial Damage Workshop (ISO and French & Associates 1992), 
While damage totals can be misleading, the details of what was damaged and their total repair 
or replacement costs are dependable. There is a wealth of data in the claims files that can be very 
helpful for FEMAs floodplain management purposes. 

Although FEMA agrees that the data are useful tools for communities, the process of 
communicating the data to the communities is not streamlined and often breaks down in 
implementation. Evidence suggests that a lack of communication between the actors (claims 
adjusters, the Bureau, FEMA, the states, and the communities) prevents local staff from using 
these data to help them make substantial damage declarations. In response to the Inspector 
Generals report, a representative of one regional office described the lack of communication of 
claims data after a 1996 flood: Throughout the disaster, the affected communities requested 
FEMA to provide notice of properties for which substantial damage claims were filed or 
rewarded. However, DFO [Disaster Field Office] staff did not receive more than a handful of 
Substantial Damage Claim Forms either from the NFIP or WYO [Write Your Own insurance] 

47 Although calculating substantial damage or substantial improvement requires a structures market value, the form 
asks for a structures replacement cost because calculating market value can vary by location. 

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companies. He added that the other forms had been sent to the Flood Response Office for the 
disaster, but that a lack of communication prevented staff in the communities from ever 
receiving that data. The regional office representative added that the region believes that the 
process has greatly improved since 1996. 

Since 1996, the process of communicating claims data to the regions has been improved 
by providing the information on the Bureaus website, FIANet, rather than relying on sharing 
paper records of claims data. However, interviews conducted in 2003 and 2004 suggest that 
many floodplain management staff at FEMA and the states remain frustrated by the 
implementation of the process. The study team asked FEMA program specialists at eight 
regional offices how they received information on potentially substantially damaged structures in 
participating communities. Although some FEMA program specialists mentioned using FIANet 
to access data from the preliminary damage assessment forms, several indicated that they do not 
know how to get such claims data or do not know how to use the data. One FEMA program 
specialist did not know it was his responsibility to check FIANet for data, but expected to receive 
hard copies of claims data. However, FEMA told the study team that the Bureau no longer 
provides hard copies. Other FEMA program specialists told the study team that there is no 
adequate way to provide local officials with damage estimates or that the region cannot share 
claims data with communities because of privacy concerns. Several state floodplain management 
staff in multiple regions told the study team that they and/or the communities in their states do 
not receive claims data to aid in substantial damage declarations after a disaster, although such 
information would be useful. 

Regional offices are the link between the Bureau and participating communities with 
regard to communicating information on potentially substantially damaged structures. If regional 
offices do not understand their role in the process, then participating communities lack a tool that 
would prove useful in their enforcement of the substantial damage provision. 

The agency that brings the claims data to the community, whether it be FEMA or the 
state, should make sure that the community understands the limitations of the data. Managing 
Floodplain Development through the NFIP notes that insurance claims data should only be used 
as a screening tool for identifying potentially substantially damaged buildings. Although this 
information is readily available to communities, it may be overlooked or not understood, and 
staff in many communities have not received the training. Since FEMA, or another floodplain 
management agency, must deliver the data to the community, they have the opportunity to 
discuss the limitations of the data with community staff at that time. FEMA should stress this 
responsibility when it discusses the issue with the regional offices. 

7.1.2 Longstanding Problems in Implementing Substantial Damage Rules 
Participants in FEMAs 1991 substantial damage workshop (ISO and French & 
Associates 1992) recommended that FEMA 

 Change the definition so that all actors go by the same rules; 
 Provide financial assistance to policyholders for mitigation projects; 
 Provide more guidance documents and training to local officials and monitor their 
work; 
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 Provide intensive assistance and additional staff to permit officials after a flood; and 
 Support this effort through the process of adjusting claims and by re-rating 
substantially damaged structures after a review by a local official. 
The National Wildlife Federation (National Wildlife Federation 1998) recommended 
more vigorous enforcement of the substantial damage provision. In addition, the National 
Wildlife Federation recommended that FEMA and Congress include a cumulative threshold for 
substantial damage and allow FEMA to determine substantial damage, when necessary. 

In 1999, FEMAs Inspector General recommended that FEMA 

 Establish processes to ensure communities, FEMA officials, and policyholders 
promptly receive data on insurance claims that will help them in identifying 
potentially substantially damaged structures; 
 Require communities to use the most objective sources to estimate costs when 
calculating substantial damage; and 
 Consistently manage and monitor local enforcement of the substantial damage 
provision. 
 The Inspector General further commented on FEMAs delay in making the decisions 
to improve the provisions effectiveness despite the agencys long-standing 
knowledge of enforcement problems. 
In 1998, FEMA solicited opinions from the NFIPs partners and customers on all facets 
of the program. Respondents raised several issues related to substantial damage and substantial 
improvement including, but not limited to, using a structures replacement cost (instead of 
market value) when determining substantial damage, implementing a cumulative qualifier 
provision to the definition of substantial improvement, improving the time in which state and 
local officials receive information on insurance claims, and providing more training on 
evaluating and calculating substantial improvements and substantial damage. 

Finally, in a review of national flood programs, the ASFPM recommended strengthening 
the substantial damage and substantial improvement provisions in two ways: (1) by redefining 
substantial improvement to include a provision that treats improvements on a cumulative basis, 
and (2) by developing a clear position on whether to use replacement cost or market value when 
making determinations of substantial damage or substantial improvement. In general, the 
ASFPM has found that replacement cost is a better standard in coastal areas, while market value 
works better in riverine locales (ASFPM 2000). 

Either through anecdotes or through formal channels, such as the reports and studies 
previously described, FEMA has known for several years of the problems hindering enforcement 
of the substantial damage and substantial improvement rules. FEMA has made several changes 
to improve implementation, including creating a definition for substantial damage in 1989, 
issuing written guidance such as Answers to Questions About Substantially Damaged Buildings, 
instituting Increased Cost of Compliance (ICC) coverage as part of the National Flood Insurance 

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Reform Act of 1994, developing the Residential Substantial Damage Estimator (RSDE) 
software, and including activities such as adoption of a cumulative qualifier and lower threshold 
for substantial damage and substantial improvement in the CRS. Ways to resolve other issues, 
like using replacement cost rather than market value when determining a structures value, are 
being examined by FEMA. 

Despite these and other changes, there are still shortcomings in the implementation of the 
substantial damage and substantial improvement rules. Lack of understanding of the rules 
persists because training and guidance have not reached all communities. Many communities are 
reluctant to enforce the rules because they face political pressure or feel that enforcement of the 
rules is a hardship on property owners. Such pressures can be lessened by the provision of 
mitigation funding or payments under the Increased Cost of Compliance provisions of flood 
insurance policies, which have been used more frequently in the last several years (see the 
discussion in Section 4.4.3). Issues such as timing and the variety of ways substantial damage 
and substantial improvement can be calculated often further impede declaration and mitigation. 

7.1.3 Recommendations on Substantial Damage/Improvement 
Enforcement of the substantial damage/improvement provision of the local floodplain 
management ordinance is the communitys responsibility but it does not always take place 
effectively. Even though they are unevenly implemented, the substantial damage/improvement 
requirements are the main driver for mitigation after a flood. FEMA can improve compliance 
with substantial damage and substantial improvement by providing more support and data to 
communities and promoting funding for mitigation. 

Promote awareness of the ICC coverage. Knowing that these funds will be available to insured 
property owners to help alleviate the cost of bringing their building up to NFIP standards 
should help relieve the hesitation of local officials to declare such structures substantially 
damaged. Floodplain management staff should increase their efforts to provide 
information to community members after a flood detailing who is eligible to make a 
claim on their ICC coverage, how to make a claim, and the purposes for which money 
received from an ICC claim payment can be used. 

Provide more training and guidance on substantial damage/improvement to local staff. This 
training can be delivered through EMI, the regional offices, or the states. 

Provide communities with the Residential Substantial Damage Estimator software and train 
them to use it. Wider use of this software can improve compliant implementation of the 
substantial damage rule. Federal and state officials have identified the benefits of RSDE 
training and technical assistance. 

After a flood, provide and/or encourage support for local determinations of substantial damage 
with staff from FEMA, states, outside experts, and cooperative agreements. This can 
compensate for lack of knowledge on the part of local floodplain management staff and 
can make declarations politically easier for them. 

Continue to encourage communities to adopt a cumulative qualifier provision or a lower 
threshold for substantial damage. Although it can be difficult to track and calculate, in 
communities that do choose to administer a cumulative threshold for substantial damage 

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do more to minimize future flood damage. Lower and/or cumulative thresholds can 
hasten the conversion of pre-FIRM construction into flood-resistant status nationwide. 

Clarify the procedures for sharing lists of potentially substantially damaged structures. FEMA 
regional offices can help communities make substantial damage declarations by more 
readily sharing insurance claims data after a flood. FEMA should send the regional 
offices a memo clarifying their role in collecting and distributing this data. Regional 
office and state personnel working with community officials should be sure that the local 
staff understands the limitations of the claims data. 

Visit communities during non-flood disaster recovery to ensure compliance. The importance of 
compliance with floodplain management requirements as rebuilding takes place is often 
not evident to a community after a tornado, earthquake, or fire. It is therefore imperative 
that FEMA, the state, or another floodplain management organization be present and just 
as visible in the community after non-flood disasters as they are after floods. 

Address problems caused by the variety in methods for calculating substantial 
damage/improvement. FEMA already is working with experts and interested parties to 
revise and clarify what methods communities should use to calculate substantial damage 
and substantial improvement. They should choose a limited number of methods to narrow 
the breadth of damage figure calculations. 

7.2 Variances 
The effectiveness of the NFIP in protecting property from flood damage can be 
undermined if too many exceptions to the building and development criteria are allowed. For that 
reason, the extent to which communities grant variances was investigated for this evaluation. 

Communities may grant variances at their own discretion, but the NFIP regulations 
provide guidelines for the specific circumstances in which a community is allowed to issue a 
variance from the floodplain requirements (for example, to allow a structure to be built below 
BFE). These exceptions are granted as a result of formal application by the property owner and a 
communitys formal review of the application. In brief, they require that the applicant 
demonstrate that exceptional hardship would result if the variance was not granted and that no 
increased flood heights or safety threats would result. Further, any variance granted must allow 
only the minimum deviation from the local ordinance possible to afford relief (see 44 CFR 60.6). 
Such variances are for floodplain management purposes only; insurance premiums are not 
modified by the issuance of a variance and remain commensurate with the height of the structure 
in relation to BFE. Communities are required to retain record of all floodplain-related variances 
issued. 

Communities are required to report all variances issued on their NFIP biennial reports, 
and FEMA can review the justification for the variances a community grants. A pattern of 
granting variances that are inconsistent with NFIP requirements is a deficiency in a communitys 
program and makes it subject to sanctions. 

FEMA policy documents state that flood-related variances should be rare because, except 
for historic structures, there are few cases in which all of the variance criteria are met. The 
variance criteria developed by FEMA are intentionally stringent to limit variances to only those 

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unique cases where physical constraints of the property itself make compliance with NFIP 
building standards extremely difficult, if not impossible. However, if a large number of 
communities were issuing a large number of varianceseven variances that meet the NFIP 
criteriathat could indicate potential noncompliance with the intent of the NFIP regulations, if 
not the letter. 

The study team reviewed the number of variances reported in biennial reports throughout 
the 1990s and early 2000s, as well as community records such as variance hearings and variance 
records to determine the extent to which communities grant variances to their floodplain 
management regulations and whether FEMAs variance criteria are met in those cases. The study 
team also assessed FEMA regional office staffs understanding of FEMAs variance criteria and 
the degree to which FEMA and the states monitor communities for compliance with NFIP 
regulations regarding variances. 

7.2.1 Number of Variances Granted 
Biennial report data for two years (1995 and 1997) showed that less than 3 percent of all 
participating communities reported granting variances for development in the floodplain during 
the previous year. When these figures are adjusted to reflect the response rate for communities 
submitting biennial reports, the percentage of communities that granted variances is still less than 
4 percent. 

The data did indicate, however, that a few communities may be overusing variances. 
According to biennial report data for 1997 and 2001/2002, communities that granted variances 
issued an average of three per community. Of the communities that reported granting variances, 
5 percent granted 10 or more variances per community (and among those 5 percent, the average 
was 20 variances per community). The study team also found that some communities that grant 
variances grant variances for the majority of, if not all, structures built or improved. Data for 
1997 and for 2003 show that 267 communities granted variances for 100 percent of the permits 
that they issued48 (FEMA 1997; Mathis and Nicholson 2006). 

A large number of variances does not necessarily indicate noncompliance in a 
community, and it is not possible to determine from biennial report data whether the variances 
were granted in accordance with NFIP guidelines. However, several FEMA program specialists 
told the study team that such an indication would warrant further investigation and possibly a 
community visit, especially if variances accounted for a large percentage of the permitted 
structures. Table 8 identifies the 20 participating communities whose biennial reports between 
1991 and 2003 showed the largest number of variances. In a little over half of these 
communities, the variances were not only large in absolute numbers, but also constituted a large 
percentage of the permits issued that year. 

TABLE 8: Communities That Granted the Most Variances, 1991 to 2003 
Community Year 
Number of 
Variances 
Granted 
Variances as a 
Percentage of 
Permits Granted 
48 These figures may underrepresent the number of communities granting variances, because all the 2003 
biennial reports had not been collected from communities at the time data were gathered. 

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Tampa, FL 1995 120 39 
Puerto Rico 1997 68 72 
Miami Dade County, FL 1993 65 1 
Poquoson, VA 1993 55 8 
Dearborn Heights, MI 1995 50 2 
Puerto Rico 2003 50 56 
Lafourche Parish, LA 1997 43 4 
Marietta, OH 1995 42 48 
St. Charles Parish, LA 1995 41 9 
Winthrop, MA 2003 40 13 
Floyd County, KY 1995 39 93 
Marietta, OH 1997 38 44 
Stoughton, MA 1995 37 86 
Charleston, SC 1997 36 5 
Fairhaven, MA 1995 36 100 
Kittitas County, WA 1997 35 100 
St. Petersburg, FL 1993 35 15 
Fremont County, CO 1993 34 100 
Delcambre, LA 1997 32 40 
St. Charles Parish, LA 1993 30 5 

Note: Communities may appear more than once for different years 

7.2.2. Compliance of Variances Granted 
Data indicating whether the variances granted by communities meet the NFIP criteria are 
not readily available. Through interviews with FEMA staff and state and local floodplain 
management officials and review of FEMA correspondence and local variance records, the study 
team found that some communities grant variances that are not compliant with NFIP variance 
criteria. Likewise FEMA and state floodplain management staff gave examples of communities 
that had granted inappropriate variances, sometimes over the objections of FEMA or the state. 
However, no evidence was found that such noncompliance was widespread. Rather, it seems to 
be concentrated in a relatively small group of communities. 

Post-Construction Variances 

Post-construction (retroactive) variances are not discussed in FEMA guidance or NFIP 
regulations. This has led to an inconsistent interpretation of communities use of post-
construction variances to remedy violations, as required under the compliance guidelines. 

A representative of FEMA headquarters said that FEMA strongly discourages 
communities from issuing post-construction variances when communities discover violations 
because once the variance is granted, the communities lose their ability to initiate legal action 
against the property owner. Furthermore, it would be highly unlikely that such post-construction 
variances would meet the criteria for a variance because the hardship would most likely be 
financial (the expense of elevating an already-built structure). 

However, several FEMA program specialists and state floodplain coordinators (and one 
community) said that communities can issue variances to address noncompliant structures 
retroactively, i.e., a building that is found to be in violation can simply be issued a variance to 
exempt it from the applicable regulation. The example was given of granting a post-construction 
variance if a built structure were discovered to be one-quarter inch or several inches below BFE 
(in other words, a minor violation likely the result of measurement error). One state floodplain 

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coordinator said that a post-construction variance should be granted if the noncompliant structure 
were the result of an honest mistake. A FEMA program specialist in one region recommends 
during community training that noncompliant communities use variances to bring about partial 
compliance in noncompliant (improperly elevated) structures, but attaching conditions (for 
example, the property owner receives a variance for the improperly elevated structure, but must 
elevate the utilities). 

Clarification of the official position on post-construction variances is needed. 

7.2.3 Reasons for Noncompliant Variances 
There are three main reasons for communities granting noncompliant variances: 
unfamiliarity with the NFIP and its purpose; confusion about or ignorance of NFIP variance 
criteria; and deliberate disregard for the NFIP variance criteria. 

Unfamiliarity with the NFIP 

Compliant application of NFIP variance criteria is typically not in the hands of the local 
floodplain manager, but instead is dependent on the actions of an elected or appointed board, 
often called a Board of Appeals, which is responsible for hearing applications for variances from 
all types of zoning requirements, not just those related to floodplain management. Not only are 
these boards often unfamiliar with the NFIP, but also they are accustomed to applying the 
community zoning criteria to other types of zoning variances and may be inclined to apply those 
same standards to floodplain management variances. A lack of understanding of the reasons for 
floodplain management regulations can lead board members to underestimate the importance of 
complying with those regulations, sometimes leading to a deliberate disregard for NFIP variance 
criteria. Finally, board members are typically elected or appointed members of the community 
and may be affected by politics when they make decisions on variances. Therefore, when the 
interests of the NFIP compete with the perceived interests of the variance applicant, boards may 
sometimes disregard NFIP variance criteria in their deliberations. 

It is the responsibility of a community floodplain manager to represent the interests of the 
NFIP before the board at variance hearings. The floodplain manager can recommend that the 
board approve variances that are consistent with NFIP criteria and deny variances that are not, 
but the final decision whether to grant the variance lies with the board. Indeed, the study team 
found several examples of boards granting variances over the objections of the local floodplain 
manager. FEMA and state floodplain management staff can choose to provide written opinions 
to the board or testify in support of or in opposition to grant of variance. As an authority outside 
of the community, FEMA or state floodplain management staff may have more influence than 
would a community floodplain manager and may be able to explain NFIP regulations and the 
reasons for them better than a local floodplain manager. Also, the presence of FEMA or the state 
can lessen the political pressure that a local floodplain manager or a board faces by making it 
clear that the community is required to comply with NFIP regulations or else risk sanctioning by 
FEMA. 

One community told the study team that it separated floodplain variances from other 
types of variances. While the communitys Board of Appeals hears requests for variances not 
related to floodplain management, only the city construction department has the authority to 

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grant floodplain variances. This separation of variance authority may be useful in other 
communities. 

Misunderstanding about Variance Criteria 

Although the majority of floodplain management staff at the community, state, and 
FEMA regional office level generally understand NFIP variance criteria, interviews showed that 
some staff are confused about certain issues. 

The most prevalent source of confusion regarding NFIP variance criteria is what 
constitutes hardship sufficient to warrant a grant of a variance. Although FEMA does not 
strictly define hardship in regulations or guidance, it does give many examples of what are not 
considered hardships. FEMA variance criteria, as written in the Code of Federal Regulations and 
translated into compliant community ordinances, makes clear that variances should not be 
granted for economic reasons. Also, FEMA guidance documents specifically reiterate that the 
physical disability of an applicant is not a justifiable reason to grant a NFIP variance. 

A review of the minutes from several variance hearings, however, shows that 
communities often accept economic hardship (i.e., the expense of complying with the ordinance) 
as an acceptable reason for granting variance. This confusion was present in some of the 
communities interviewed for this study. For example, one community told the study team that a 
property owner could prove hardship by showing that elevating the structure would be 
expensive. 

One FEMA program specialist told the study team that although it is not appropriate for 
communities to grant variances because of a physical disability of an applicant, such situations 
always get the variance anyway because they are tearjerkers. Sometimes even the FEMA 
and state staff responsible for monitoring and training communities were unaware of certain 
NFIP variance requirements. For example, several FEMA program specialists and one state 
floodplain coordinator said that variances granted because of physical disability are acceptable to 
FEMA. The state floodplain coordinator told the study team that the only legitimate reasons for 
communities to grant variances are for historical structures and physically disabled owners. One 
FEMA program specialist told the study team that his predecessor had told communities that 
physical disability was an acceptable justification for granting variance. The current FEMA 
program specialist has been working with communities to resolve the confusion that resulted. 

Deliberate Disregard for NFIP Variance Standards 

Some communities allow structures to be built without meeting NFIP standards without 
granting a variance at all. The study team found examples of building permits on file in 
communities showing structures built below BFE or without the vents required by the NFIP. The 
community floodplain managers approved these permits despite the fact that the structures built 
to the permits specifications would be noncompliant. In a similar vein, one community avoided 
the variance process by granting waivers approving noncompliant construction in place of 
official variances. Because they avoided the variance process entirely, the communities did not 
have to report these noncompliant structures in their biennial reports to FEMA, making the 
violations more difficult for FEMA to detect. 

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7.2.3 Monitoring Variances 
Because communities report variances in biennial reports, it is easy for FEMA to identify 
communities that grant a large number of variances (provided that the community properly 
reports the variances). Monitoring of biennial reports allows FEMA to ensure that communities 
do not make a practice of granting inappropriate variances. In interviews, some FEMA program 
specialists said they did not check variances in the biennial reports. One senior staff at a regional 
office mentioned never having found a community in the region with a large number of 
variances compared to the number of structures. However, a review of recent biennial report data 
by the study team indicated that there are several such communities in the region. 

If biennial reports are checked (through the CIS or otherwise) to see what communities 
are issuing a large number of variances, then FEMA can investigate those communities to 
determine whether they were issued according to NFIP guidelines. Steps can then be taken to 
provide additional technical assistance or, if needed, apply an additional layer of review (by the 
state or FEMA) of the variances applications the community receives. With FEMAs or the 
states recommendation that the variance would not meet NFIP criteria on record, documentation 
will be in place that the community knew the variance would be noncompliant. There then would 
be grounds for sanctioning if a pattern of granting such variances develops. 

7.2.4 Recommendations on Variances 
Issue additional guidance on variances to regional offices and communities. The regulations 

provided in the CFR are clear overall, but are not detailed enough to function as 

guidance. Current guidance is piecemeal and there is no guidance for staff regarding post-

construction (retroactive) variances. 

FEMA drafted variance guidance in 1991, but never finalized or distributed it. Little 

work would be needed to update and issue the 1991 draft. This guidance document could 

be geared to the Boards of Appeal by containing background on the importance of the 

NFIP in addition to an explanation of NFIP variance criteria. 

The guidance should emphasize the importance of monitoring variance report in the 

biennial reports, so that followup can be done if needed. 

7.3. Compliance in CRS Communities 
The Community Rating System (CRS), initiated in 1990, is a program within the NFIP 
that encourages communities to perform floodplain management activities that exceed the 
NFIPs minimum requirements by rewarding their residents with discounted flood insurance. 
Any community participating in the NFIP may join the CRS, provided that community is in full 
compliance with the NFIPs minimum requirements and that it performs a minimum number of 
additional floodplain management activities. 

All CRS communities are required to maintain programs that are compliant with the 
NFIP standards. Beyond this prerequisite, however, the compliance of CRS communities is 
arguably even more important to the success of the NFIP than that of other communities, for two 
reasons. 

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First, CRS communities are being recognized and rewarded for having better 
floodplain management programs. Equity dictates that they be held to that standard and thus 
there ought to be no question about the NFIP minimum requirements being met. Confidence in 
both the NFIP and the integrity of the CRS can be undermined by a perception that standards of 
compliance are not uniformly applied. 

Second, noncompliance in CRS communities increases the overall costs of the NFIP and 
affects the vitality of the flood insurance fund, just as noncompliance in other communities does. 
However, it could be argued that CRS community noncompliance is marginally even more 
costly, because the policyholders in those communities are contributing less to the National 
Flood Insurance Fund because they pay lower premiums. 

Finally, as of October 1, 2004, there were 1006 communities in the CRS. Although the 
1006 CRS communities represent only 5 percent of all NFIP communities, they account for over 
66 percent of all flood insurance policyholders (FEMA 2004). Thus their performance can have a 
significant impact on the actuarial soundness of the NFIP and the Flood Insurance Fund. 

For these reasons, the study team paid particular attention to an analysis of compliance in 
CRS communities. 

7.3.1 Background on the CRS 
FEMA joined with the Insurance Services Office, Inc. (ISO) to develop and manage the 
CRS.49 Together, FEMA and the ISO developed a catalog of specific activities that communities 
in the CRS can undertake to improve floodplain management. There are 18 activities in four 
main categories: Public Information, Mapping and Regulations, Flood Damage Reduction, and 
Flood Preparedness. Each activity is assigned a point value (or a range of available points) that 
communities receive if they implement the activity on a continuous basis (see Appendix G for a 
list of creditable activities). The number of points a community earns determines the 
communitys class and accompanying flood insurance discount. Classes range from 9 (lowest) 
to 1 (highest). For example, a community that earns 1000 points is a Class 8 community, and its 
residents receive a 10 percent discount on their flood insurance premiums;1500 points entitles 
the community to Class 7, etc.. The highest level, Class 1, receives a 45 percent discount.50) 
Over half of all CRS communities are Class 8 or better. By rewarding communities for 
undertaking specific activities that FEMA has determined improve floodplain management, 
FEMA promotes compliance by providing an incentive for communities to exceed the NFIPs 
minimum requirements and further reduce risk. 

After a community joins the CRS, it can move up in class (called an upgrade) with 
increased floodplain management efforts, or it can be downgraded in class if it stops 
implementing some activities. Periodic cycle verification visits by ISO verify whether the 
community is meeting the requirements for an activity for which it receives CRS credit. If it is 
not, ISO will take those points away. This sometimes leads to a communitys being retrograded 

49 ISO has experience developing rating systems to classify insurance risk and developed similar rating systems for 

fire insurance (ISOs Public Protect Classification Program) and building code effectiveness (ISOs Building Code 

Effectiveness Grading Schedule). 
50 The policyholders within the SFHAs always receive the full discount. Policyholders outside of SFHAs also 

receive a discount, although it is sometimes less than the full percentage discount. 

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(assigned to a lower class). For example, a community may lose enough points that it must be 
retrograded from a Class 7 to a Class 8. 

FEMA will retrograde a community to Class 10 (non-participation in the CRS and no 
discount on flood insurance) if it finds that a community does not meet the minimum 
requirements of the NFIP (i.e., has program deficiencies or violations). FEMA also will 
retrograde a community to Class 10 if it is not meeting the other prerequisites of participation in 
the CRS (for example, the community does not keep elevation certificates on file or does not 
conduct enough activities to receive 500 points). A retrograde to Class 10 removes a community 
from the CRS. The community loses all of the points that it had earned, and policyholders cease 
to receive policy premium discounts. A community that has been retrograded to Class 10 may 
reapply to the CRS when it can prove that it meets the minimum CRS requirements. A 
community that has been retrograded to Class 10 and still does not correct its program 
deficiencies or remedy its violations is subject to standard NFIP sanctionsprobation and 
suspension. 

7.3.2 Monitoring NFIP Compliance in CRS Communities 
In theory, it should be easier to ensure the compliance of CRS communities with the 
minimum NFIP criteria than that of other communities because CRS communities are the subject 
of additional monitoring procedures. Further, the CRS monitoring is not the responsibility of 
overburdened FEMA and state staff but is assigned to ISO personnel. There are 16 field 
personnel (called ISO/CRS Specialists) to cover the 1,000 ISO communities. It is not their 
responsibility to assess the communitys compliance with the NFIP standards but rather to 
provide assistance on and verification of the activities for which the community is receiving CRS 
credit. Nevertheless, the additional contact with the community, the checks of records that are 
conducted pursuant to CRS participation, and other assistance is doubtless of assistance in 
ensuring NFIP compliance as well. 

There are four means by which CRS communities can be monitored and their 
compliance with the NFIP thus verified: (1) upon initial application to the CRS; (2) when an 
upgrade of CRS status is requested; (3) during periodic visits by ISO/CRS personnel; and (4) 
through customary NFIP monitoring. At each of these points different factors come into play 
along with opportunities for identifying and addressing any noncompliance. These monitoring 
opportunities vary in effectiveness, for varying reasons. The four steps for monitoring CRS 
communities, and their effectiveness, are discussed below. 

Entry into the CRS 

Before it may be considered for the CRS, a community must show that it is compliant 
with the NFIPs minimum requirements by obtaining a letter from its FEMA regional office 
verifying compliance and submitting it with its other CRS application materials. Before 1996, 
staff at the regional offices were allowed to choose whether a CAV was needed before the 
certification letter could be written. In 1996, FEMA began requiring that a CAV have been 
conducted no more than a year before the date of the letter verifying compliance, and the 
compliance letter be no more than 6 months old when the community applied to the CRS. 
According to FEMA, applicant communities cannot be considered in full compliance if they 
have not had a recent CAV (within the past year) (FEMA Inspector General 2002). 

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FEMA told the study team that it expects ISO to reject any applications that do not 
include a letter from the regional office indicating that a clean CAV has been conducted If 
properly implemented, this policy should assure that communities are not allowed to enter the 
CRS without being compliant with the NFIPs minimum requirements. 

An official at FEMA headquarters said that, due to the length of the application process, 
it might have taken up to two years from the 1996 policy change to fully implement the 
requirement for a letter certifying a clean CAV. The study team therefore examined communities 
in two groups: (1) those that entered the CRS in 1996 and 1997 and (2) those that joined from 
1998 through May 2004. The study team analyzed CAV records for CRS communities that 
entered the CRS between May 1996 and May 2004 to determine whether the regional offices and 
ISO were complying with this CAV requirement. 

The study team found that the proportion of CRS communities that have a recent, clean 
CAV has risen since the 1996 requirement, but implementation of the requirement is not yet 
complete. Of the communities that entered the CRS from 1996 through 1998, 75 percent 
received a CAV. More recently, 98 percent of communities that joined the CRS between 1999 
and May 2004 had received a CAV. This improvement shows that regions are focusing their 
efforts on ensuring compliance in communities that want to enter the CRS. However, at least six 
communities entered the CRS between 1999 and 2004 without a clean, recent CAV (table 9). 
Two of those communities have received a CAV since program entry. The other four had yet to 
receive a CAV as of October 2004. ISO approved these communities applications to enter the 
CRS despite the fact that the letters they supplied from their regional offices did not include 
reference to a recent CAV. 

TABLE 9: Communities that Entered the CRS without a CAV, 1999-2004 

Community Date of CRS Entry 
Marco Island, FL October 2000 
Rockville, SC October 1998 
Pawtucket, RI October 2002 
Upper St. Clair, PA October 1998 
West Carrollton, OH May 2002 
Yellowstone County, MT May 2003 
SOURCE: CIS and personal communications with FEMA regional officials (various 
dates) 

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After examining many of the letters sent by the FEMA regional offices to certify 
compliance in communities applying to the CRS since the 1996 CAV requirement, the study 
team found that ISO accepted many types of letters to certify compliance. It was clear that some 
letters had been written by FEMA for the specific purpose of informing ISO of an applicant 
communitys compliance. Such letters clearly stated that FEMA had determined the community 
was compliant by conducting a CAV on a given date and closing the CAV on a given date. 
However, other letters were clearly not written with the ISO in mind. It was difficult to tell from 
many of those letters whether a CAV had taken place, what the date of the CAV was, whether all 
compliance problems had been resolved, and whether the CAV had been closed. 

Upgrade in CRS Status 

When a CRS community thinks it conducts enough additional activities to warrant an 
upgrade in its classification in the CRS, it can ask ISO to conduct a verification visit. ISO 
notifies FEMA that the community is being considered for an upgrade and requests that FEMA 
notify ISO if the community is noncompliant. This is the second point at which noncompliance 
in CRS communities could be detected. It is FEMA policy that communities in the process of 
correcting violations should not benefit from an improvement in class, but that any pending 
upgrade be held in abeyance until the compliance issues are resolved. However, the 
community is not required to submit a letter from the FEMA regional office certifying 
compliance and FEMA is not required to conduct a CAV to confirm that the community is 
compliant. If ISO is able to verify the points necessary for a CRS upgrade and does not hear 
from FEMA that the community is noncompliant, the community is approved for upgrade 
effective within six months. 

Eleven CRS communities have been upgraded despite an open CAV in which a serious 
program deficiency was discovered. ISO upgraded eight of those communities before the CAV 
was closed. In one other community it is unclear whether the CAV was closed before upgrade. 
For example, Huntsville, Alabama, was upgraded to Class 7 in May 2003, months after a CAV in 
which the state found serious program deficiencies (failure to require no-rise certificates for 
development in the floodway and granting inappropriate variances). The CAV was closed five 
months after the community was upgraded to Class 7. 

Some of the 11 communities never resolved their program deficiencies, although they 
continue to participate in the CRS at the upgraded class. Gulfport and Hernando County, Florida; 
Greenville, North Carolina; and Fairfield, California, have all been upgraded since FEMA or the 
state found serious program deficiencies during a CAV. Although the communities continue to 
participate in the CRS at an improved class (Hernando County, Greenville, and Fairfield are 
currently Class 8 and Gulfport is Class 7), these program deficiencies have yet to be resolved and 
the CAVs still remain open.51 

One community, Huntington Beach, California, entered CRS as a Class 9 in October 
1995, less than one year after a CAV in which serious problems were noted in both floodplain 
regulations and administration and enforcement procedures. A more recent CAV, in August 
2003, noted serious problems in the other category. The notes for this CAV cite numerous 
possible violations from construction during the 1980s and the early 1990s. The study team 

51 FEMA headquarters and the regional offices confirmed the open status of these CAVs. 

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followed up with the region and confirmed that the community was allowed to remain in the 
CRS and receive premium discounts even though FEMA knew that numerous structures were in 
danger of sustaining flood damage if a base flood were to occur. The region said that 
enforcement action (such as CRS retrograde) against the community was not pursued because 
the community was working to correct those violations through a water diversion project. The 
project was recently completed, and the region believed that some structures remained noncompliant. 
Meanwhile, the community has been upgraded to a Class 7. 

The regions decision not to recommend a CRS retrograde while the community worked 
on its water diversion project is consistent with FEMAs policy of not pursuing sanctions (i.e., 
probation and suspension) as long as a community is actively working to remedy its problems. 
Although it may be appropriate not to sanction a community while it is working to remedy its 
problems, it is debatable whether it is appropriate for a community to continue to remain in the 
CRS and receive discounted premiums for policyholders for almost 10 years and also have its 
rating upgraded, when it is known to be noncompliant. 

Periodic Visits by ISO staff 

If the communitys initial application to the CRS is in order and it appears that its 
activities will earn enough points to qualify it, ISO will schedule a verification visit to the 
communitya third means by which NFIP noncompliance could be detected. A verification visit 
is essentially a field inspection during which a representative of ISO checks that the community 
meets the specific requirements for the CRS activities for which the community requested credit. 

Thereafter, ISO conducts periodic visits to CRS communities to verify that they continue 
to meet the specific requirements of the CRS. During these cycle visits, which take place every 
five years for communities in Classes 69 and every three years for communities in Class 5 or 
above, a representative of ISO conducts a field inspection to verify that the community meets the 
specific CRS requirements of the activities for which it receives credit. 

This cycle verification visit does not include an inspection for compliance with the 
NFIPs minimum requirements. The assumption of the ISO is that a community applying to join 
the CRS or to be upgraded in class has already been checked by FEMA for compliance with the 
NFIP. However, during the cycle verification visits, ISO might happen to discover possible 
noncompliance. For example, an ISO representative might notice structures not elevated to BFE 
during his or her review of elevation certificates. ISO guidelines state that the ISO representative 
should contact the FEMA regional office and the state if it is suspected that a community may 
not be compliant with the NFIPs minimum requirements. ISO guidelines do not give a 
standardized procedure for this notification. A senior staff member at ISO told the study team 
that it may notify FEMA or the state in writing, by phone call, or send a picture of the structure 
in question. 

Routine NFIP Monitoring for CRS Communities 

CRS communities are subject to routine monitoring for compliance with the NFIPs 
minimum requirements by FEMA and its partners in the states, just as other NFIP communities 
are, through CACs, CAVs, and other tools. If any program deficiencies or violations are 
discovered, and the community does not remedy them within an acceptable time frame (within 
six months, according to FEMA guidance for CRS communities), FEMA is supposed to notify 

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ISO that the community is noncompliant with the NFIPs minimum requirements and should be 
retrograded directly to Class 10, that is, removed from the CRS. 

In 2002, FEMAs Inspector General found that CAVs had been conducted in 66 percent 
of CRS communities nationwide. FEMA agreed that conducting CAVsfor all CRS 
communities is necessary and appropriate, and said it would require that all CRS communities 
be covered by a CAV in the following three to five years. However, FEMA disagreed with the 
accuracy of the Inspector Generals findings that CAV rates nationwide were as low as 66 
percent. Since the Inspector General used only CIS data for its analysis, FEMA said the report 
possibly did not include a large number of CAV reports that may not have been entered into the 
CIS. The NFIP Evaluation study team therefore conducted additional research to determine the 
percentage of CRS communities that have received a CAV.52 

FEMAs CRS coordinator at headquarters agreed that the CRS application process could 
take up to two years from the time a community informs the regional office that it wishes to 
apply until the community is admitted into the CRS. Therefore, all CAVs that a community 
received up to two years before it entered the CRS until August 2004 were included in the 
analysis. Hence, a statement in this report that a CRS community has not received a CAV means 
that the community did not receive a CAV during the period beginning two years before the 
community entered the CRS until August 2004, when the data were analyzed. 

The study team collected records from the CIS and calculated a CAV rate similar to that 
found by the Inspector General. Next, the study team contacted representatives of the FEMA 
regional offices and requested that they check their paper files for CAVs conducted in CRS 
communities that were not entered into the CIS. FEMA also contacted ISO and the regions and 
was able to supply additional CAV records. All regional offices confirmed that the records 
available in CIS were incomplete and supplied the study team with additional information on 
CAVs. Ultimately, eight of the 10 regional offices confirmed that there were CRS communities 
that had not received a CAV. All CRS communities in the other two regional offices (Regions 
VII and X) had received a CAV within the time period considered. The study team completed its 
data collection by reviewing the records entered into the CIS since data collection began and 
incorporating updates. 

The study team found that 90 percent of current CRS communities have received a 
CAVa much better rate than that reported by the Inspector General (2002).53 The 10 percent of 
CRS communities that have not received a CAV represent about 79,000 flood insurance policies 
with about $10.5 billion insurance in force and over $27 million in premiums collected annually. 
These premiums reflect a premium discount applied to reward reduced risk and exemplary 
floodplain management. 

CAV rates for CRS communities vary by region. Region III had the lowest CAV rate; it 
conducted CAVs in 72 percent of CRS communities. The staff in that region indicated that they 
prefer to devote scarce resources to conducting CAVs in communities with suspected 
compliance problems, not model communities, which CRS communities are assumed to be. 

52 A model for conducting that research is presented in Appendix G. 
53 A list of all current CRS communities that have not received a CAV, along with the communities classes and 


dates of entry, can be found in Appendix H. 

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As table 10 shows, CAVs have been conducted in all CRS communities that are Class 4 
or better. However, five Class 5 CRS communities have not received a CAV. In all, 55 percent 
of CRS communities that have not received a CAV are Class 8 or better (53 of 96 communities). 

TABLE 10: Distribution by Current Class of CRS Communities without a recent CAV, as of August 2004. 

Class Total CRS Communities 
Number Without a 
CAV 
Cumulative Percentage of 
Communities Without a CAV 
1 0 0 0 
2 1 0 0 
3 0 0 0 
4 2 0 0 
5 23 4 4 
6 52 2 6 
7 191 9 16 
8 396 38 55 
9 336 43 100 
Total 1001 96 100 
NOTE: Recent means within 2 years of the communitys entry into the CRS. 
SOURCE: CIS and personal communications with FEMA regional officials (various dates) 

8.3.4 Noncompliance in CRS Communities 
FEMA policy states that a CRS community is not in compliance if there are outstanding 
program deficiencies or violations from a CAV. If program deficiencies or violations are 
identified during a CAV, guidance states that the regional office may allow up to six months 
after the date of the CAV follow-up letter for a community to correct program deficiencies or 
remedy all violations to the maximum extent possible. CRS communities are expected to show 
immediate actions (not intentions) to remedy the problems. 

The study team examined the findings of CAVs conducted since communities entered the 
CRS to analyze the extent and nature of noncompliance in CRS communities and whether 
problems were addressed (as evidenced by a closed CAV). Of the 905 CRS communities in 
which a CAV has been conducted, 105 (12 percent) have had serious program deficiencies 
identified since they joined the CRS.54 The most common category of deficiency was in 
ordinance administration and enforcement (62 communities or 46 percent of the deficiencies 
noted) and engineering was the next-most-common deficiency (26 percent). Of all these 105 
communities, 38 had CAVs that were still open (compliance problems officially unresolved) as 
of September 2004. All of these CAVs have been officially unresolved for at least 15 months and 
most for several (up to 10) years (table 11). 

It is clear that many communities have CRS classifications (and accompanying premium 
discounts) that they likely do not deserve. Even though FEMAs guidance allows regional office 
staff to grant extensions of the six-month time period for addressing compliance problems to 
communities if remedial measures are underway, but not completed, it is difficult to imagine 
that that circumstance applies to all 38 of these communities and that extensions amounting to 
many years could properly be granted. On the other hand, CRS communities are generally large 

54 This finding may under-represent the actual percentage of CRS communities in which program deficiencies have 
been identified because CAV findings were not available for all 905 communities. 

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communities with significant floodplain development. Some of them grant thousands of permits 
a year and some problems are inevitable. 

CRS communities at higher classes are less likely to be noncompliant with the NFIPs 
minimum requirements. Seventy-two percent of CAVs in which serious deficiencies were found 
occurred in Class 9 communities, and 28 percent were found in Class 8 or better (table 12), with 
12 percent of serious program deficiencies found in communities in Classes 7, 6, and 5. 

The study team found that the criteria use for imposing retrogrades are inconsistent 
across the regional offices. Seventeen communities have been retrograded to Class 10 (removed 
from the CRS) for noncompliance with minimum NFIP requirements (table 13). According to 
FEMA, several other communities have chosen to leave the CRS after compliance problems 
were discovered, rather than face an involuntary retrograde. 

Letters to the communities usually cited an unresolved CAV as the reason for the 
retrograde. Reports for eight of those CAVs were available in CIS. Of those, CAV notes for 
three listed serious program deficiencies, and those three communities were retrograded to Class 
10 one to two years after that CAV. In the remaining five, only minor deficiencies were noted, 
but the communities nevertheless were retrograded, usually one to two years after the CAV. 

Although flexibility in addressing compliance problems and in the length of time allowed 
to do so are reasonable approaches in the NFIP compliance program, for communities in the 
CRS too much flexibility is unwarranted. It is difficult to justify why communities that have been 
admitted to the CRS based on the premise that they have been and continue to meet minimum 
NFIP standards should continue to participate indefinitely while they remedy their problems. 

7.3.5. Findings and Conclusions 
The study teams analysis found monitoring and enforcement in CRS communities to be 
deficient. Because compliance must be certified before entry into the CRS is approved and 
because CRS participation brings additional opportunities for communities to have contact with 
technical experts in the FEMA regional office, the state, and ISO, all CRS communities should 
be compliant with the minimum requirements of the NFIP. The team found that 

 Communities have entered the CRS without having NFIP compliance verified; 
 Communities have been upgraded in CRS class while officially noncompliant; 
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TABLE 11: Open CAVs in which Serious Program Deficiencies Were Noted in Current CRS Communities1,4 

Community 
Category of Reported 
Serious Deficiency CAV Date 
Current 
Class2 
Class at 
CAV 
Policies in 
Force3 
Total Insurance 
Coverage3 
Region I 
Harwich, MA ORD 8/12/1997 9 9 460 $89,792,400 
Region III 
Bloomsburg, PA ORD 3/28/1996 8 9 315 $31,340,000 
Arlington County, VA ENG 11/1/1993 9 9 189 $34,676,100 
Region IV 
Gulfport, FL ENF 2/10/1994 7 9 2,418 $267,408,600 
Hernando County, FL ENF 8/22/1994 8 9 3,399 $468,324,900 
Jacksonville Beach, FL ENF 9/30/1994 8 8 4,756 $887,340,300 
Manatee County , FL ENF 3/16/2000 7 7 16,249 $2,481,401,400 
North Miami, FL ORD, ENF 8/26/2002 5 5 7,212 $935,240,000 
St. Petersburg, FL ORD, ENF 6/2/2003 
7 
7 
33,290 $4,459,415,100 ENF 3/22/1994 8 
Greenville, NC ORD 8/29/2002 8 9 895 $128,420,000 
Kinston, NC ENF, ENG 9/25/2002 9 9 431 $63,360,600 
Lenoir County, NC ENF, ENG 8/7/2002 9 9 224 $33,119,800 
North Topsail Beach, NC ENF 4/12/2000 8 8 1,108 $142,627,000 
Topsail Beach, NC ENF 9/27/2001 6 9 1,150 $203,721,800 
Aiken County, SC ENG 8/23/2002 9 9 62 $9,082,500 
Lexington County, NC ENF 8/8/2001 9 9 727 $103,517,000 
Region V 
Noblesville, IN ORD 12/18/1996 8 8 201 $29,878,400 
Delta, OH ORD, ENF 2/22/1996 9 9 17 $1,195,500 
Ozaukee County, WI ENG 8/17/1994 9 9 66 $11,193,700 
Region VI 
League City, TX ENF 12/15/1998 9 9 9,380 $1,822,241,500 
Region VIII 
Aurora, CO ORD 12/7/1993 8 9 278 $42,099,300 
Fremont County, CO ENF, ENG 2/12/1998 
9 
9 
97 $12,483,900ENG 2/24/1995 9 
Gunnison County, CO ENF 9/27/1999 9 9 116 $18,764,500 
Littleton, CO ENF 1/25/1999 7 7 98 $17,195,200 
Louisville, CO ENF 2/25/2000 
9 
9 
18 $4,117,300ORD, ENF 12/8/1992 9 
Parker, CO ENF 2/10/1999 7 7 21 $4,603,700 
Pitkin County, CO ENF 2/16/1994 8 9 116 $19,247,900 
Steamboat Springs, CO ENF 6/23/2000 
9 
9 
178 $28,903,000ORD, ENF 11/18/1997 9 
Flathead County, MT ENF 4/11/1996 9 9 217 $36,800,900 
Lewis And Clark County, 
MT 
ENG 
9/29/1994 8 9 102 $10,990,700 
Region IX 
Fairfield, CA ORD, ENF 2/6/2002 8 9 475 $81,825,600 
Richmond, CA ENF 8/3/1999 9 9 72 $18,292,000 
Santa Clara, CA ENF 9/13/2002 8 8 1,586 $257,709,200 
Solano County, CA ENF 3/25/2002 8 8 333 $64,325,500 
Yorba Linda, CA ORD, ENF, ENG 4/26/2000 8 8 59 $13,021,400 
Storey County, NV ENF 8/14/2002 8 8 172 $21,869,700 
Region X 
Eugene, OR ENG 6/25/1999 7 8 808 $157,692,100 
Medford, OR ENF 3/26/1998 9 9 222 $32,240,100 
TOTAL: 38 Communities 87,517 $13,045,478,600 
1Status of CAVs was confirmed by FEMA in personal communication to AIR, September 2004. 
.2Class as of May 2004 3As of October 2003 4Regions II and VII had no CRS communities with open CAVs 

ORD= Floodplain management regulations ENF= Administration and enforcement process and procedures 
ENG= Engineering OTH= Other community land use policies and procedures such as the local zoning or building code 
requirements inconsistent with local floodplain management regulations 
SOURCE: CIS (CAV date, findings); FEMA BSA (PIF, Total Coverage, Class at Time of CAV); May 2004 Insurance Manual 
(Current Class) 

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TABLE 12: CRS Communities in which Serious Program Deficiencies were Found, by 
Class at Time of CAV 

Class of Community at Time of CAV Number of CAVs during which serious Program 
Deficiencies were found in Current CRS 
Communities 
9 81 
8 20 
7 10 
6 1 
5 1 
4 0 
3 0 
2 0 
Total 113* 

*Total does not equal total of communities in which serious problems were found because some
communities had more than one CAV in which a serious deficiency was noted. 
SOURCE: CIS, May 2003; personal communications with FEMA regional officials (various dates) 


TABLE 13: CRS Communities Retrograded to Class 10 for Compliance 
Issues, 1990-2004 


Atlantic City, NJ* 
Babylon, NY 
Bayville Village, NY* 
Cedar City, UT 
Coralville, IA 
Farmington Hills, MI 
Highland Heights, OH 
Lafourche Parish, LA 
Martin County, FL* 
Mesa, AZ 
Mobile, AL 
Monroe County, FL 
Naperville, IL 
Ponce Inlet, FL* 
Savannah, GA* 
Sea Isle City, NJ 
South Pasadena, FL* 
*Community was allowed to reapply after addressing all violations/ 
deficiencies, and after minimum of one year review period. 
SOURCE: FEMA Personal Communication, January 2005. 
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 CRS communities are not receiving CAVs or CACs with the frequency required by 
FEMA guidance; and 
 Some CRS communities receive prompt retrogrades for NFIP compliance problems 
while other noncompliant communities continue to participate in the CRS for long 
periods. 
These shortcomings are the result of inadequate recordkeeping, confusion within ISO and 
the FEMA regional offices about their roles and responsibilities, unclear policy on CAVs, and 
communication gaps between ISO and FEMA about CRS upgrades. 

Recordkeeping Deficiencies 

Because the CIS does not contain complete CAV records, FEMA is not always aware of 
whether CRS communities are being monitored for compliance on a routine basis, like other 
NFIP communities. Even more remarkable, some FEMA regional offices were unaware of CAVs 
that had occurred in CRS communities. Several regions told the study team that they either could 
not produce a complete list of CRS communities that had not received a CAV or could not 
produce one without getting additional data from the states. Additionally, many regional offices 
told the study team that some CRS communities had not received a CAV, but FEMA 
headquarters and ISO had documentation of CAVs that had been done in those communities. It is 
not clear that FEMA regional staff receive or are even aware of the result of ISOs visits to 
communities or, conversely, that ISO staff are informed of the results of CAVs. The study team 
identified multiple instances of both problems. 

The study teams findings indicate that ISO accepts letters from the FEMA regional 
offices certifying compliance even when the letters do not provide the date of a recent CAV and 
other essential information. Because a recent clean CAV is required for acceptance into the 
CRS, it is imperative that ISO be able to readily determine whether a community has met the 
requirement. An inability to do so has resulted in communities entering the CRS without 
demonstrating compliance. A standardized process by which FEMA certifies compliance would 
remedy this situation. 

CAVs for CRS Communities 

Current guidance does not clearly explain how frequently FEMA and the states should 
conduct CAVs in CRS communities. FEMA wrote in its response to the Inspector General 
(2002) that it would require that all CRS communities be covered by a CAV over the next 3-5 
years. It wrote that the goal would be accomplished through thepolicy of including existing 
CRS communities on normal CAV schedules, (Inspector General 2002) thereby indicating that 
communities are normally visited for a CAV on a regular cycle of no greater than five years. 
FEMA followed this response with a 2002 memo to the FEMA regional offices, in which it said 
CRS participating communities should be scheduled for a CAV or CAC as any other NFIP 
community based on selection criteria developed by the FEMA regional office and in accordance 
with guidance provided in the Guidance for Conducting Community Assistance Contacts and 
Community Assistance Visits. However, the study team has illustrated earlier in this report that 
regions do not conduct CAVs with that degree of regularity. It is therefore unclear to the study 

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team and to the FEMA regional offices and states how frequently headquarters intends CAVs to 
be conducted in CRS communities. 

Roles and Responsibilities 

A clear distinction between the roles of ISO and FEMA is key to ensuring that CRS 
communities are monitored adequately and compliance problems addressed immediately. 
However, some regional staff told the study team that they believe that conducting CAVs in CRS 
communities is not a good use of resources because they assume that all CRS communities are 
compliant or because they mistakenly believe that ISO monitors CRS communities for 
compliance. ISO is neither qualified nor instructed to inspect CRS communities for compliance 
with the NFIP. ISO inspections are in-depth analyses of community satisfaction of the specific 
requirements of the CRS, not of the NFIP. 

When this confusion exists, the importance of FEMAs monitoring of CRS communities 
is underestimated. Regional staff who believe that ISO monitors communities for compliance 
may be less likely to conduct CAVs in CRS communities. When this occurs, there is danger that 
some CRS communities may be participating in the CRS without being compliant with the 
NFIPs minimum requirements. 

Communication about CRS Upgrades 

FEMA currently relies on informal communication between its staff and the ISO to 
ensure that temporarily noncompliant communities are not upgraded and persistently 
noncompliant communities are retrograded. Likewise, ISO is expected to notify the FEMA 
regional offices of communities eligible for upgrade twice annually so that there is an 
opportunity for FEMA to comment on the communitys level of compliance and recommend 
against an upgrade, if necessary. However, FEMA neither requires the regional office to certify 
that the community is compliant nor requires that the community have a clean CAV to be 
upgraded. 

Although FEMA has occasionally delayed a communitys upgrade until compliance work 
could be completed, the study teams findings indicate that this system is not sufficient to ensure 
that noncompliant communities do not benefit from class improvements. Communities should 
not be upgraded until a CAV is conducted and closed. The FEMA regional office should certify 
this fact and the communitys compliance. 

7.3.6 Recommendations on the CRS 
Improve recordkeeping and communication about CRS communities among FEMA 

headquarters, regional offices, the states, and ISO. Improved recordkeeping in the CIS 

(FEMAs computerized recordkeeping system) would allow FEMA to better track which 

CRS communities have received CAVs and whether compliance problems identified in 

those CAVs have been resolved. A system should be established to automatically convey 

to the other parties any contact with or visit to a CRS community. 

Clarify the roles and responsibilities of ISO and regional office staff. Guidance from FEMA 

should address the misconceptions about the role played by ISO personnel when they 

visit communities. 

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Standardize the procedure for certifying NFIP compliance upon application to the CRS. The 
regional offices letter certifying compliance should give the date the most recent CAV 
was initiated and the date it was closed. ISO should accept only letters that include that 
information. 

Require that NFIP compliance be certified by the FEMA regional office before a CRS community 
is upgraded. This certification letter could follow the format of the letter used upon 
application to the CRS. 

Clarify the schedule for routine monitoring of CRS communities. If FEMA intends that some 
contact or specifically a CAV be completed for CRS communities on a set schedule, that 
fact should be communicated to regional offices and states. 

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8. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
There is considerable challenge in drawing conclusions and making generalizations about 
compliance in a program that involves more than 20,000 communities whose characteristics vary 
widely. Based on its interviews, field work, and data analysis for this evaluation, the study team 
offers here some observations about the nationwide status of community compliance and the 
effectiveness of the NFIP model for ensuring that communities achieve compliance. 

Perfect community compliance, nationwide, is an ideal but not one that is likely to be 
achieved unless fundamental changes are made to increase the level of funding for the NFIP at 
both the national and state levels and to provide added insulation from normal political 
influences. Given the fact that a primary NFIP goalminimizing flood lossesrelies on land 
use authority that resides in state and local governments rather than at the federal level, 
implementation of a large proportion of the programs requirements naturally depends on 
community staff and officials who operate at a large remove from the federal personnel who 
oversee the program and also have multiple priorities that often compete with floodplain 
management. Reliance on local implementation is a very inexpensive avenue for federal program 
implementation, but it will inevitably be accompanied by wide variation in effectiveness. Many 
communitiesbecause of lack of resources or expertise, or bothstruggle to implement any 
type of regulations and floodplain management regulations tend to be more complex and 
technical than most. Thus noncompliance at some level must be expected. 

It is, therefore, a real challenge for the NFIP to achieve a high level of community 
compliance nationwide. Limited resources, primarily in terms of numbers of experienced federal 
and state professionals available to conduct community visits and to develop and maintain an 
efficient and accurate national database, have been identified throughout this report as factors 
that inhibit better operation of the compliance program and hence better compliance. Of nearly 
equal importance in hindering compliance activities are the political considerations: not only 
direct pressure that is brought to bear when communities complain to their Congressional 
delegations about possible sanctions but also the potential political fallout that some players at all 
levels perceive may accrue if they take strong action to enforce program requirements. These 
political considerations have important consequences for NFIP compliance even if the potential 
for political fall-out is more perceived than real. 

The public policy question becomes, then, whether a higher level of compliance can be 
achieved, and whether the trade-offs necessary to do so are acceptable, given available funding 
and political will. This is a complex calculation that cannot be fully resolved by the study team 
and that also will change over time. Nor are there comparable governmental programs or 
compliance efforts to serve as a overall useful guide or baseline. However, with the trade-offs 
and constraints in mind, it is possible to speak in general terms about current status and future 
possibilities. 

8.1 The Framework for NFIP Community Compliance 
FEMA uses an enforcement/compliance program model that can best be characterized as 
cooperative enforcement, combined with numerous voluntary approaches (most notably financial 
incentives offered through the insurance side of the NFIP). Under this cooperative enforcement 
scheme, it is assumed that most communities and individuals are willing to abide by technical 

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standards set for the program, and that public servants are interested in protecting people and 
their property. Based on this assumption, a compliance programs primary goal would be to 
supply ongoing education about the program standards and how to reach them. This study and 
previous research have shown that, among the 20,000 participating communities nationwide, 
there is a healthy level of willingness to comply with the NFIP standards; many exemplary local 
programs; and impressive progress being made in coping with flood risk. This success and the 
fact that most of those communities are in fact operating competent programs supports the 
underlying assumption and confirms that a predominantly cooperative enforcement model is an 
appropriate match for the NFIP. This is underscored by the research literature on cooperative 
enforcement strategies, which describes effective use of this type of model by programs with 
characteristics resembling those of the NFIP. 

The NFIP compliance model used by FEMA has three main components: promotion of 
compliance (technical assistance, education, training, incentives); monitoring of community 
compliance (contact with communities, use of institutionalized indicators, and recordkeeping); 
and enforcement (use of sanctions including probation and suspension). The compliance program 
based on this model makes good use of the institutionalized aspects of the NFIP and is well-
integrated with the NFIP insurance mechanisms. Even though the compliance program was 
formalized 20 years ago, the study team encountered no major gaps in the framework of the 
compliance program itself, except that its guidance documents have not been updated to include 
such program enhancements as the CRS and the CIS. There are some shortcomings in the 
implementation of the program 

8.2 Promotion 
Of the three enforcement program components, FEMA and its state partners put the vast 
majority of their resources and effort into promotion of community compliance. This is 
appropriate for a model based on a cooperative enforcement approach. Training and technical 
assistance are the two promotion efforts most emphasized by FEMA and are certainly robust 
tools for promoting compliance. They are not as effective as they could be if there were more 
resources for both FEMA and the states to increase staff levels and travel support, and to produce 
and deliver more workshop and training materials. 

8.3 Monitoring 
Although the emphasis on promotion/technical assistance emphasis is effective for the 
NFIP, the monitoring component cannot be shirked, because the information about and 
documentation of what is happening on the ground is essential both to the provision of technical 
assistance and to the investigation and sanctioning of noncompliance. 

This study has shown that the NFIPs monitoring approach functions fairly effectively for 
purposes of detecting the need for additional promotion of compliance (technical assistance and 
education) but not as well for detecting compliance problems that need to be addressed through 
additional technical assistance or possibly enforcement. On average, each year no more than 10 
percent of NFIP communities receive a monitoring contactand that occurs only by using all 
available resources at both the FEMA regional offices and the states. Only about half of those 
contacts are comprehensive evaluations (including a site visit) of a local program. This frequency 
is not enough to detect noncompliance and address it before the potential flood damage is 

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increased, and falls short of FEMAs previously stated goal of contacting every community at 
least once every five years. 

It is difficult to see how this situation can be remedied except with additional funding for 
floodplain management personnel at the FEMA regional offices or in the states. Thorough 
reviews of local programs must be done, and they take time. There are far too few personnel 
available to do what needs to be done. 

The study also found some weaknesses in FEMAs system for documenting and 
cataloging both the information that it generates from it own monitoring activities and that which 
it obtains from other sources for purposes of monitoring. FEMAs CIS database has the potential 
to be a strong monitoring tool, but its records on community contacts and visits and other 
activities are incomplete and their accuracy could not be verified. Some additional pieces of 
information that would be useful for monitoring purposes, such as records of training and 
technical assistance provided to individual communities, should be added to the CIS. Finally, the 
CISs software for compiling and reporting information from the database is not flexible enough 
for the type of analyses that would be most helpful for monitoring and evaluating compliance. 
These shortcomings have made it difficult for users to employ the CIS and have contributed to a 
reluctance on the part of federal regional and state personnel to use the system as much as it 
could be. Further, because of the problems with CIS, FEMA has not been able to supply the kind 
of evidence (hard and accurate documentation of the number of community contacts, visits, 
technical assistance responses, staff in training sessions, correspondence, etc.) sought by outside 
evaluators, Congress, and taxpayers. 

FEMA has worked continuously since the launching of the CIS to overcome 
technological difficulties inherent in a large database that must be used by federal and state staff 
at hundreds of remote locations. The accomplishmentreached near the end of this studyof 
having the CIS universally accessible through the web should remedy many of the past 
difficulties. Action upon the recommendations in the next chapter would help strengthen the 
other weaknesses in the CIS. 

8.4 Enforcement 
As noted in the literature review, the study team was unable to find situations sufficiently 
similar to the NFIP from which to draw a norm of frequency with which enforcement 
sanctions or penalties should be applied to be most effective. However, research on compliance 
and enforcement has demonstrated that the presence of a credible threat of a penalty is useful and 
perhaps even necessary to achieve the highest possible levels of compliance, even in cooperative 
enforcement models. This is borne out by the compliance history of the NFIP, which shows that 
some communities are recalcitrant and appear to respond only to a serious threat or the 
imposition of a penalty. 

If the enforcement mechanism in a governmental compliance program is widely 
understood to be applied consistently and with certainty, the literature suggests that it may not 
need to be applied often. An infrequently applied penalty can be explained, however, by either an 
effective system or an ineffective one in which those in charge of enforcement are being overly 
selective in their use of the mechanism. In such a case, a more solid understanding of how the 

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enforcement mechanism is applied must rely on qualitative research on peoples understanding 
of where the system lies along the effectiveness continuum to augment quantitative indicators. 

In the case of the NFIP, the strongest community-wide enforcement tools (probation and 
suspension) indeed have been applied relatively few times. Formal threats of probation in the form 
of probation letters have been issued 104 times in the history of the NFIP; probation has been 
imposed 49 times; 10 communities have been suspended. It is notable that, when FEMA has 
formally threatened and/or imposed probation, compliance has been achieved in 85 percent of the 
cases. However, there is a widespread perception among FEMA and state staff (and perhaps 
among communities) that FEMA is highly unlikely to apply sanctions in most cases. Most 
importantly, interviews revealed considerable dissatisfaction among floodplain management 
professionals with FEMAs relatively infrequent use of its two strongest enforcement tools. 

This study found, further, that there are numerous real and perceived internal obstacles to 
the imposition of the first sanction, probation. Under the NFIP model (as implemented), the bulk 
of resources and effort are devoted to providing a range of technical assistance services to 
communities and their staffs. This has created a climate in which services and guidance are 
readily offered and accepted but a stricter, enforcement-oriented approach layered on top can be 
an awkward fit. This is particularly true because the same personnel are expected to carry out 
both functions, and this difficulty was borne out in interviews with FEMA and state personnel. 
The result is that it can be a very long, slow step from one phase (providing technical assistance) 
to the next (imposing the probation penalty) whereas research suggests that there ought to be a 
short, swift movement into sanctions if they are to be effective in inducing compliance. Other 
obstacles include confusion about the documentation required, possible political pressure, 
turnover in personnel, and shortage of staff time to give proper attention to the problem. 

The level of community compliance with the NFIP, and the credibility of the compliance 
program itself, likely would benefit if the internal obstacles could be minimized and if the 
perception could be strengthened that probation and suspension (or other sanctions as mentioned 
below) will be imposed swiftly when necessary. A few selected probation actions over time, well 
publicized, may well suffice. 

Another option would be the introduction of one or more intermediate-level sanctions, 
such as an automatic mailing to policyholders when noncompliance persists for more than, say, 
one year, or some other public, but not drastic, measure warning of more stringent future action. 
Research has shown that the possible penalty does not have to be heavy to result in improved 
compliance. A penalty that is automatic has the advantage of shielding staff from having to take 
personal responsibility for the shift from friendly provision of service to the stronger, 
enforcement-oriented approach. 

8.5 Level of Community Compliance 
The NFIP has faced a vague but long-standing perception among floodplain management 
professionals and observers that compliance with the program standards is a problem. Through 
the course of this investigation, the study team encountered a strong sentiment that enforcement 
is weak, as discussed above, but when asked for estimates of the percentage of communities in 
their region or state that were compliant, most FEMA and state staff gave estimated performance 
levels of between 75 and 80 percent compliance. Further, using FEMA data from the CIS, which 

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may not be wholly reliable, as well as a set of nine assumptions discussed in Sections 2.4.1 and 
2.4.2, the study team derived an estimate of nationwide community compliance of between 70 
and 85 percent. The community noncompliance that exists represents a potential for flood 
damage that only manifests itself as additional costs to the NFIP if noncompliant development 
results from it and flood damage subsequently occurs. Because of these location- and time-
specific complications, it is not possible to calculate additional costs to the NFIP or increased 
insurance premiums due to given levels of community noncompliance. 

Both of these estimated sets of bounds for community compliance must be considered 
rough approximations. However, they are fairly consistent with each other and, interestingly, 
within the range of building compliance found in the companion study (63% of buildings fully 
compliant and 89% properly elevated) (Mathis and Nicholson 2006).55 If the perception of 
compliance among some floodplain management professionals is lower than the reality, it may 
be due to the numerous small and a few egregious examples of noncompliance that garner 
attention and serve to frustrate people who believe in and work toward the goals of the NFIP. It 
may also be due to higher rates of noncompliance within certain states or regions, and the study 
was not designed to estimate with reliability such higher localized noncompliance rates. 

This is not to say that there are no compliance problems, because it is clear that there are 
daunting ones and that, with increased growth and development especially in coastal areas, the 
situation is more likely to worsen than to improve without continued and, if possible, improved 
vigilance. In addition, the risk represented by the percentage of noncompliant communities and 
construction that may be occurring during the period of noncompliance (some of which may be 
at an increased risk of flooding), may be considerable, and program integrity and public policy 
demand that it be minimized as much as possible. An unanswered and probably unanswerable 
question, as discussed in Section 2.2, is what an optimal level should be, given the constraints, 
costs, and tradeoffs inherent in the NFIP as in all governmental programs. 

8.6 Questions of Balance 
It is evident that the implementation of a program to achieve community compliance with 
the NFIP is beset by the constant necessity of making trade-offs between varying approaches, 
balancing opposing needs, and weighing the costs and benefits of any action. For the most part, 
FEMA and the states appear to have effectively and appropriately navigated these tightropes. 

The potential for higher levels of community compliance among recalcitrant communities 
by using strong enforcement techniques has been given up (or postponed) to allow flexibility to 
the regional offices and states in handling each compliance problem according to the needs of the 
situation. The option of devoting most of the available resources to strong enforcement and 
heavy penalties for violators has been traded for the cost-effective and future-oriented technique 
of educating and guiding community staff who will therefore be able to prevent future flood 
damage. When necessary, more attention is devoted to the communities with greater flood risk 
and/or larger policy bases, rather than always treating each community exactly the same. 

These and many other trade-offs have been made, along with constant attention to 
political and budgetary constraints. Although there are many improvements that could 

55 Although note that, while related over the long-run, these are different measures and should not be equated. 

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conceivably be made to improve community compliance, given more generous funding, the 
reality is that actions always must be taken selectively and with an eye toward intangible costs 
that may be too high at any given moment. 

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9. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVING COMMUNITY 
COMPLIANCE 
Recommendations for improving the various components of the community compliance 
program, as implemented by FEMA and the states, have been identified and explained in the 
pertinent sections throughout this report. They are repeated in list format at the end of this 
chapter. First, the most important, overarching suggestions for improving community 
compliance are discussed. 

9.1 Major Recommendations 
This evaluation has concluded that there are three main actions through which FEMA is 
most likely to improve community compliance. 

9.1.1 Increase Community Assistance Visits 
FEMA should continue community assistance work to promote, monitor, and enforce 
compliance, particularly the conduct of CAVs. However, it is critical that some means be found 
to increase the number and frequency of community visits. At present, FEMAs goal as stated in 
the CAV/CAC manual is that each NFIP community receive some sort of one-on-one contact 
with the state or FEMA every five years. Data indicate, however, that the rate of such contact is 
only about once in 10 years, and only half of those contacts include a community visit. This is 
not a sufficient level of FEMA or state presence to maintain the level of monitoring necessary to 
avert compliance problems. 

9.1.2 Revitalize the CIS 
FEMA has in the Community Information System a potentially powerful tool for 
monitoring compliance nationwide. The database also can enable FEMA and other entities to 
obtain a comprehensive picture of nationwide compliance. Although it cannot answer every 
question, the data stored there, if accurate and up-to-date, would enable quantitative assessments 
to be made of numbers of communities monitored in a given year; how many are noncompliant 
(have open CAVs with serious violations), how long the CAVs remain open; which communities 
have had staff turnover, and similar questions. That is an essential starting point for more in-
depth analysis of both the optimal level of compliance and the level being achieved. This solid 
core of data is essential to knowing whether progress is being made in compliance, whatever the 
reason. 

Overcoming technological obstacles to widespread access and use of the CIS occupied 
FEMA for several years and inhibited the ability to make and disseminate improvements in the 
systems use for monitoring compliance (and other purposes). With the full implementation of 
the web-based system in 2004 and subsequent enhancements accomplished, FEMA should move 
forward to remedy the remaining deficiencies by designing a more usable query function and 
filling the backlog of unentered community assistance data. It is also essential to simultaneously 
rehabilitate the CISs image among regional office and state floodplain management staff in 
order to assure that they enter records conscientiously and begin to trust the data they can access 
through CIS. 

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9.1.3 Impose Probation more Readily 
The NFIP community compliance model is weighted toward using a cooperative 
approach that entails large amounts of technical assistance services, and uses enforcement 
mechanisms, such as the sanctions of probation and suspension, only sparingly. As noted in this 
study, this is an appropriate approach for a governmental program with the characteristics and 
constraints of the NFIP. However, it has also been demonstrated that a minority of communities 
are not likely to respond to this approach and for those a credible threat of penalty is needed. The 
NFIP has a sanction available for this purpose in the form of probation, but it is used so 
infrequently that there has developed a widespread perception that it is unlikely to be imposed in 
any given situation. This perception deprives the threat of its credibility and thus keeps 
recalcitrant communities unresponsive. Further, FEMA regional office and state staff themselves 
have grown to believe that they will never be able to succeed in having probation imposed on a 
noncompliant community, and their frustration is detrimental to an effective community 
compliance initiative. 

FEMA should make an effort to act with deliberation on existing or future 
recommendations for probation action, with an eye toward re-establishing the credibility of this 
sanction. 

9.1.4 Miscellaneous 
If FEMA maintains its present position that technical assistance and training are the best 
ways to achieve compliance, it should be able to document why that is so, or at least document 
that positive impacts are being realized from the resources devoted to technical assistance. This 
will require enhancing use of the CIS, as noted above, and also the addition of a system for 
tracking the provision of training to floodplain management staff at all levels and incorporating 
that into the CIS. FEMA should develop a comprehensive method of measuring the effect of 
training and technical assistance on community compliance. 

It is not clear whether the level of noncompliance among Community Rating System 
communities is higher or lower than that of the rest of the NFIP participants (since rates for the 
whole NFIP cannot be determined) but noncompliant CRS communities do draw a 
disproportionate amount of attention from the profession, the public, and Congress. FEMA 
should devote attention to remedying the both the noncompliance and the perception of 
noncompliance among the CRS communities. 

Consideration should be given to conducting an investigation of state compliance with 
the NFIP criteria. Several regional and state officials stated that they did not know whether the 
development activities of state agencies were in compliance with NFIP regulations. 

9.2 Specific Recommendations 
Listed below are specific recommendations that were presented and discussed more 
thoroughly in the body of the report. They are grouped by subject matter. 

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9.2.1 Recommendations on FEMA and State Responsibilities 
Additional funding should be provided to FEMA to increase the number of FEMA headquarters 
and regional office staff assigned to compliance work. 

The practice of assigning NFIP staff to non-NFIP work should be re-examined. 

FEMA should increase the CAP-SSSE funding for compliance work by the states and clarify the 
criteria being used for funding allocations. 

FEMA should hold states accountable for non-completion of compliance work funded under the 
CAP-SSSE. 

9.2.2 Recommendations for Promoting Compliance 
FEMA should update its two general guidance documents for community assistance and 
community compliance. 
The indicators of communities needs for technical assistance should be tracked more closely. 
FEMA and the states should continue to use the CAP-SSSE funding to deliver training to 
community staff. 

FEMA should continue its support of training for local staff, state training requirements, 
certification of local floodplain managers, and the formation of state and local 
professional associations. 

FEMA should require all regional compliance staff to attend standardized NFIP training and 
develop training for them in monitoring and enforcement procedures. 
State and FEMA regional staff should meet routinely to share best practices. 
States should consider requiring professional certification of their local floodplain management 
officials. 
The effect of training and technical assistance on community compliance should be measured. 
FEMA should issue additional guidance on and publicize the availability of ICC coverage. 

9.2.3 Recommendations for Monitoring 
FEMA should clarify its goal for the frequency of contact with every community and specify its 
applicability to CRS communities. 

More resources (funding and staff) should be found to increase the number of CAVs (and CACs) 
conducted by the states and by FEMA regional staff. 

FEMA should bring the CIS closer to realizing its potential as a monitoring tool by: 

 Eliminating the backlog of incomplete records within CIS; 
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 Periodically checking the accuracy and completeness of CIS record; 
 Updating and clarifying guidance on entering information in CIS; 
 Making entry of CAV report data into the CIS a prescribed and funded task for states 
under the CAP-SSSE; 
 Adding to the list of data routinely entered into the CIS (1) information on turnover of 
local staff; (2) tracking information for submit-for-rate applications; 
 Improving the flexibility of the CIS reporting tool; and 
 Rehabilitating the image and reputation of the CIS among users and potential users. 
FEMA should clarify the submit-for-rate reporting form. 
FEMA should establish a tracking system for submit-for-rates and issue updated guidance on 
how submit-for-rate data should be used for monitoring. 

9.2.4 Recommendations for Enforcement 
FEMA should issue and/or clarify some of its guidance on enforcement: 

 the types and quantity of documentation required for probation and suspension of 
communities for failure to enforce their ordinances; and 
 the meaning and implications of full extent of legal authority. 
The process of providing technical assistance to noncompliant communities should be finite and 
well documented. 
Consideration should be given to imposing a time limit for correcting program deficiencies and 
remedying violations. 
Consideration should be given to raising the probation surcharge. 
Consideration should be given to using informational and automated methods to increase 

pressure on communities that are not making sufficient progress toward compliance. 
FEMA should apply probation more frequently and publicize its use among floodplain 
management professionals. 

9.2.5 Recommendations on Special Compliance Issues 
FEMA could improve implementation of the substantial damage/improvement requirement 
through the following means: 

 Provide more training and guidance on substantial damage/improvement to local 
staff. 
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 Provide communities with the Residential Substantial Damage Estimator software 
and train them to use it. 
 Promote awareness of the ICC coverage, to help diminish the financial impact of 
required mitigation measures. 
 After a flood, provide and encourage support for local determinations of substantial 
damage with staff from FEMA, states, outside experts, and cooperative agreements 
among communities. 
 Clarify the procedures for sharing lists of potentially substantially damaged structures 
after a flood. 
 Visit communities during recovery from any type of disaster to ensure that the 
substantial damage/improvement requirement is implemented. 
 Continue to encourage communities to adopt a lower threshold for substantial damage 
or a cumulative qualifier provision. 
 Continue efforts to narrow the range of methods acceptable for calculating substantial 
damage/improvement. 
FEMA should issue additional guidance to regional offices and communities, to correct 
misperceptions and misunderstanding about the acceptable use of variances. 

The following actions by FEMA would help confirm and document that CRS communities are 
compliant with the minimum NFIP standards: 

 Improve recordkeeping and communication about CRS communities among FEMA 
headquarters, regional offices, the states, and ISO. 
 Clarify the roles and responsibilities of ISO and regional office staff for monitoring 
compliance with NFIP standards. 
 Standardize the procedure for certifying NFIP compliance upon application to the 
CRS, and require that NFIP compliance be certified by the FEMA regional office 
before a CRS community is upgraded. 
 Clarify the schedule for routine monitoring of CRS communities. 
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10. APPENDICES 
APPENDIX A: A Method for Measuring the Effect of Training on 
Compliance 

To measure the effect of training and technical assistance on compliance, FEMA must 
first collect data on what training and technical assistance is being offered to each subject group. 
Measures of training output include the amount and type of training offered at EMI and in the 
field, and the attendees of that training. Technical assistance outputs include the number of 
CACs, CAVs, and other technical assistance contacts made and the types of written guidance 
distributed. Secondly, FEMA must collect data to measure the outcomes of training and technical 
assistance, i.e., the effect that the training and technical assistance has on compliance. Currently, 
FEMA does not collect the data necessary to measure either training outputs or outcomes. 
However, only small steps are necessary to begin collecting the data FEMA needs. Examples of 
output and outcome measures for training and technical assistance training and technical 
assistance are given in figure A-1. 

FIGURE A-1: Training Outputs and Outcomes 

Training and Technical Assistance 

Training and Technical Assistance 
OUTPUTS 

OUTCOMES 

Measure: 

Measure: 

 Provision of training/technical assistance 
 Changes in understanding, behavior, and 
community compliance as a result of training 
and technical assistance 

Assesses: 

 Number of training and technical assistance 
Assesses: 

opportunities provided 

 Understanding before and after training or 
technical assistance 
 Types of training and technical assistance 
provided 
 Compliance before and after training or 
technical assistance 
 People/communities reached through training 
and technical assistance 
Examples: 
Examples: 

 Tests of knowledge before and after training or 
technical assistance 
 Number of CACs/CAVs conducted 
 Analysis of compliance before and after training 
and technical assistance 
 Number of workshops/ courses delivered 
 Comprehensive list of communities that attend 
training 
MORE DIFFICULT TO MEASURE 

EASIEST TO MEASURE 

A.1 Evaluating Training Outputs 
FEMA currently collects some information to describe the amount and type of training 
and technical assistance provided. Regional office and state staff are instructed to enter into CIS 

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what communities they contact or visit for CACs and CAVs. However, it is not clear from these 
records what types of technical assistance were provided in the contact. Furthermore, the study 
team has found that not all CACs and CAVs are entered into CIS, and other types of technical 
assistance contacts are never recorded in CIS. 

EMI currently takes only limited steps to measure training output. Data are readily 
available that detail the number and types of NFIP classes given per year and the number of 
people who attend those classes. However, EMI does not collect data to describe which 
communities attendees represent. States and FEMA regional office staff also provide training to 
communities. States sometimes record this training as part of their CAP SSSE report, but FEMA 
does not currently systematically keep records of the number or types of courses or workshops 
offered outside of EMI. 

A.1.2 Identifying Attendees at Training 
EMI already collects data to quantify training output provided on-site and in field-
deployed courses. Data are available on the number of courses offered, subjects of courses, and 
number of participants. Furthermore, EMI uses surveys of attendees to describe many 
characteristics of the participants. However, EMI does not ask participants to identify their role 
in floodplain management or the community that they represent.56 This failure to identify 
communities attending training precludes any further analysis on the effects of training on the 
participants communities. The study team recommends that EMI ask students to identify 
specifically what organization, office, or community they represent. It is only by collecting this 
level of detailed information that FEMA can accurately measure who receives training from EMI 
and how that training affects participants compliance work. 

A.1.3 Documenting non-EMI Training 
In its 2003 survey of state floodplain management staff, ASFPM asked many questions 
about the training that the states provide to communities. The study team was able to use this 
data to determine the amount of training that was provided outside of EMI in 2002. However, 
this ASFPM survey data provided information for only a single year and did not name the 
communities that attended training. Without the data from this survey, FEMA would not know 
how much training is conducted locally because FEMA does not collect its own data quantifying 
training. Currently, states may provide some information on training that their staffs intend to 
conduct as part of their CAP SSSE agreement. States also have quarterly and annual reporting 
requirements that require them to describe activities conducted using CAP-SSSE funds, 
including training and technical assistance. However, there is no standardization of what data on 
training the states must provide in that report. The study team recommends that FEMA ask all 
states to report the number and subjects of training courses and workshops that they conduct and 
the number and names of communities that attended training in the previous year. 

A.1.4 Additions to Recordkeeping 
56 EMI asks participants whether they are from federal, state, or local government, or if they come from the private 
sector or a voluntary organization. Further admission statistics identify the state that each participant comes from 
and the address of their office. However, this data cannot be accurately used to identify what communities attend 
training. 

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Currently, FEMA does not collect complete records of what communities receive 
technical assistance through CACs and CAVs. Although FEMA regional office staff members 
and many states are expected to enter into CIS what communities they visit for CACs and CAVs, 
the study team has found that staff report only a portion of CACs and CAVs. FEMA should take 
the steps already identified by the study team to ensure 100 percent of CACs and CAVs are 
recorded in CIS. Furthermore, the current format of CIS focuses on the regulatory and not the 
technical assistance nature of CAVs. Staff entering data in the CAV report compliance findings 
and then have the opportunity to enter additional notes. Staff members can use the notes section 
to describe technical assistance offered to the communities, but seldom do. The study team 
recommends that FEMA take steps to better record the technical assistance supplied in CACs 
and CAVs by including a section of the CIS CAV report that specifically asks staff what types of 
technical assistance were provided during the CAC or CAV. 

Staff members in many regional offices told the study team that counting CACs and 
CAVs alone does not provide a complete measurement of the number of technical assistance 
contacts that FEMA and the states have with communities. For example, FEMA regional office 
staff members often visit communities or provide technical assistance via phone but do not 
record these contacts as CACs or CAVs. These visits are not entered into CIS because there is no 
category for other types of technical assistance visits. Often the only records of these visits are 
travel logs or letters to communities in community files in the regional offices. FEMA should 
instruct regional office and state staff to keep records of this additional technical assistance. This 
could be as simple as asking regional offices or states to keep a single phone log of telephone 
contacts with communities and travel log of technical assistance visits to communities. If this 
data were entered into CIS as other technical assistance, it could be available to FEMA 
headquarters or outside evaluators who want to measure technical assistance output. It could also 
be a resource to FEMA regional office staff and state floodplain management staff to use in 
prioritizing communities for future CACs and CAVs. 

A.2 Evaluating Training Outcomes 
Identifying training and technical assistance output is only the first step in measuring 
their effects on community compliance. FEMA must also measure the outcomes of training and 
technical assistance. The study team recommends that FEMA evaluate training on four levels: 
evaluation of reaction (level 1), evaluation of learning (level 2), evaluation of behavior (level 3), 
and evaluation of results (level 4) (see table A-1). It is not necessary to evaluate training on all of 
these levels to begin to understand the effect of training on compliance; however, the value of 
the analysis increases as the levels of evaluation increase. The study team provides 
recommendations for measuring outputs on each of the four levels. FEMA should decide which 
recommendations to implement based on the resources it has available. 

A.2.1 Using Course Evaluations and Periodic Surveys 
EMI currently administers a course evaluation form to participants in EMI resident 
courses and field-deployed training. The course evaluation form is administered immediately 
following training while students are still at the training site. The course evaluation form asks 
participants to rate statements about the course on a 6-point range, one being strongly 

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TABLE A-1: Four Steps for Evaluating Training Outcomes 

Level 1: Reaction 

Did the participants like the training/technical assistance? Did it meet their expectations? How do 
participants plan to use what they learned in future NFIP work? 

Measurement tools: Course evaluations and periodic surveys 

Level 2: Learning 

Did the participants skills, knowledge, or attitudes change as a result of the training/technical assistance? 
Measurement tools: Tests before and after training (administered at training site), surveys of participants 

Level 3: Behavior 

Did the participants change their behavior as a result of the training/technical assistance? 

Measurement tools: Survey three months to a year following training/technical assistance, CAV before 
and after training/technical assistance 

Level 4: Results 

Did the change in behavior have an effect on community compliance? 

Measurement tools: CAV before and after training/technical assistance; noted improvement in compliance 
following training (as evidenced by entry into CRS, certification in floodplain management, fewer flood 
insurance claims following a disaster, implementation of a compliant ordinance, etc) 

SOURCE: Four Steps for Evaluating Training Identified by Kirkpatrick (1959) 

disagree, five being strongly agree, and six being not applicable. Examples of statements 
that participants are asked to rate include, [the instruction] subject was thoroughly covered, 
course expectations, requirements, and objectives were made clear, [the course] contributed 
to my knowledge and skills, my knowledge of the subject is extensive after completing this 
course, and my knowledge of the subject was already extensive before I took this course. 
Additional questions in the course evaluation ask students to rate the quality of course content 
and quality of instruction separately for each unit of the course taught. Participants rate each unit 
on a scale of one to five, one being the lowest, and five the highest. Finally, participants are 
given to opportunity to add open-ended remarks at the end of the course evaluations. Course 
evaluations are posted on EMIs website and can be accessed by those with FEMA permission. 
Evaluations are anonymous. EMI staff and outside evaluators can use these course evaluations to 
rate participants initial reaction to training. EMI uses course evaluations to give teachers 
feedback on their training and to periodically change course content or offerings. 

FEMA regional office and state floodplain management staff who deliver training outside 
of EMI may choose to collect similar information from their students. However, they are not 
required to do so. Nor does FEMA collect such data from courses outside of EMI. The study 
team recommends that FEMA ask trainers to do so, perhaps using the course evaluation format 
already developed by EMI. For such data to be beneficial to FEMAs overall training efforts, the 
study team recommends that FEMA provide the mechanism for data to be collected in a central 
location, perhaps a website. Data could be stored for analysis by FEMA or outside evaluators. 

Similar surveying techniques could be used to rate participants reaction to technical 
assistance. Collection of data detailing output of technical assistance would give FEMA a 
database of recipients of technical assistance. FEMA could periodically survey a sample from 

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that database to rate their reactions to the assistance. The results of these surveys would allow 
FEMA to measure the reactions to and perceptions of various forms of technical assistance. 

A.2.2 Pre- and Post-Testing 
In the course evaluation forms distributed at EMI following training, participants are 
given the following statements and asked to rate them from strongly disagree to strongly 
agree: My knowledge of the subject is extensive after completing this course, and My 
knowledge of the subject was already extensive before I took this course. Participants ratings 
of these questions allow evaluators to estimate the increase of participants perceptions of their 
knowledge of the subject as a result of the training. This measurement of perception can be 
useful and should be continued. 

Tests administered to participants before and after training are even more useful for 
measuring increased knowledge resulting from training. Pre-training tests establish participants 
baseline knowledge of a subject. Improved scores on post-training exams can be used to show 
how effective the training was at increasing participants knowledge. By looking at the specific 
areas of weakness shown in incorrect answers on post-training tests, trainers and evaluators can 
determine what areas of training were more or less effective than others. Trainers at EMI 
currently administer a pre-test before training and an exam following training. Tests are intended 
to inform participants of their weak areas so they will seek outside help in those areas when they 

return to their jobs. EMI collects final exams, but not pre-tests. Although EMI would not make 
any exam results available to the study team for this report, EMI could collect and use those data 
to determine changes in knowledge about the NFIPs requirements following training. 

FEMA regional office and state floodplain management staff who deliver training may 
choose to collect similar information from their students. However, they are not required to do 
so. Nor does FEMA collect such data from courses outside of EMI. The study team recommends 
that FEMA encourage outside trainers to conduct tests before and after training. Trainers could 
use the results to evaluate their own courses. For such data to be beneficial to FEMAs overall 
training strategy, the study team recommends that FEMA provide the mechanism for aggregate 
results to be collected in a central location, perhaps a website. Data could be stored for analysis 
by FEMA or outside evaluators. 

A.2.3 Comparing CAVs 
The final levels of evaluation, measure of behavior changes and results of training and 
technical assistance, are traditionally the most difficult to measure. However, these 
measurements are ultimately the most important measurements in the evaluation. In interviews 
with AIR, FEMA regional office staff mentioned a variety of ways that they anecdotally note the 
effect of training and technical assistance on community compliance. Those staff members said 
that they would think training had a positive effect on compliance if they saw the following 
changes in a community following training or technical assistance: 

 Increased sophistication of questions they receive from communities after training (7) 
 CAVs that find fewer violations after training (2) 
 Communities entering the CRS following training (2) 
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 More CFMs or participating communities in an area after training (1) 
 Decline flood insurance claims in a community following training (1) 
FEMA must have a complete understanding of compliance in communities before they 
attend training as well as after training to determine improvement in compliance. For this to 
occur, it is necessary that a sample of communities have a CAV before training and then after 
training. If funding allows, the study team recommends that FEMA measure changes of behavior 
and results of training by conducting CAVs in a sample of communities before and after those 
communities attend training. 

A.2.4 Isolating Training Effects 
Once FEMA identifies changes in behavior and compliance following training or 
technical assistance, it is important to determine what portion of the change can be attributed to 
training, in other words, to isolate the effect of the training on compliance. Although FEMA may 
see marked improvement in a community following training, the improvements could have been 
influenced by other factors. For example, a community may have had serious compliance 
problems, gone to training, and then remedied all of its violations. However, the remedied 
violations may have been caused by the same factor that influenced the community to attend 
training in the first place. This outside factor may have been a change in government in the 
community to a government more supportive of the NFIP, the threat of probation, or the 
realization that policyholders in the community could earn lower premium rates if the 
community became compliant and joined the CRS. On the other hand, compliance by a 
community may not progress because of changes in personnel. 

Comparisons should be made across groups with similar circumstances such as whether a 
CAV had occurred recently and the CAV findings, staff turnover, etc. With sufficient 
information, statistical analyses can be run as multivariate analyses of the whole dataset 
controlling for each factor. 

The study team recommends that FEMA also ask recipients of training and technical 
assistance what portion of changes in floodplain management in the community they would 
attribute to the training and technical assistance that they received and what other factors 
recipients think contributed to the improvements. Questions of this sort could be included in a 
survey administered to samples of recipients of training and technical assistance who joined the 
CRS or who had some other marked improvement following training or technical assistance. 

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APPENDIX B: Data Available through the CIS 

FEMAs CIS database is currently accessible via the internet website at 
https://portal.fema.gov. Users are required to log in with a user name and password, obtained 
from FEMA. To access information in CIS, users must first designate a community. The user 
may search for a community by one or more of the following criteria: 

 State 
 Community 
 FIRM Status 
 Community Status 
 Community ID 
 County 
 FHBM Status. 
Once a community has been selected, the user has access to a variety of information 
about floodplain management, NFIP status, and compliance. At the time of this review, the main 
CIS interface contained four main sections from which to choose: Community, CRS, CAC/CAV, 
Maps, SOS (Scope of Studies), and Insurance. In addition, there were links to CISs Reporting 
Tool and the mapping needs assessment process. Each section took the user to a new web page 
displaying information or further links for more information. 

Information directly related to compliance is contained in several different subcategories. 
CIS features information on compliance monitoring (CAVs and CACs), incentives for exceeding 
minimum compliance requirements (CRS, CRS credited-activities), sanctioning for 
noncompliance (probation and suspension status), plus overall community data such as number 
of policies, permits, and variances. Some of the types of data most relevant to community 
compliance are shown in table B-1. 

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Table B-1: Some Compliance-Related Reports 
Currently Available Through the CIS Reporting Tool 
Report Available Scope of Report Time Period 
Nation Region State Community 

Biennial Ranking of Communities by X X X Calendar Year Number of Flood Insurance Policies 

Biennial Ranking of Communities by X X X Calendar Year 

Number of Permits 
Biennial Ranking of Communities by X X X Calendar Year Number of Variances 

Biennial Summary Report by X X X Calendar Year 

Community 
Biennial Summary Report by Region X X X Calendar Year and State 

CAC Follow-up X Start/ End Dates 
CAV Follow-up X Start/ End Dates 
Community Listing With Point Of X

Contact 

Community NFIP Probation Report X X X 

Community Status Book X X X X 
Community Status Report 

Community Status Validation Report X X X 

Community Suspension and 
Withdrawn Report X X X 
Future CACs/CAVs Report X X X X Calendar Year 
Historical CACs/CAVs Report X X X Start/ End Dates 
Insurance Policy/Claims Data X X X X/CID 

Regional Summary of CAC Contacts X X X Start/ End Dates 

Regional Summary of CAV Contacts X X X Start/ End Dates 

Summary Of Community Assistance X X X Start/ End Dates

Contacts Report 
Summary Of Community Assistance X X X Start/ End DatesVisits Report 

Summary of CAC Findings X X X Start/ End Dates 
Summary of Open CACs X X X Start/ End Dates 

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APPENDIX C: Active 1316 Declarations by Community 

Community State Community 
ID 
5470 TX GALVESTON COUNTY 
0483 TX MONTGOMERY COUNTY 
0287 TX HARRIS COUNTY 
5194 LA CAMERON PARISH 
5164 GA TYBEE ISLAND, CITY OF 
0391 MO VALLEY PARK, CITY OF 
0093 AZ YAVAPAI COUNTY 
0475 MO PLATTE COUNTY 
0040 MO BUCHANAN COUNTY 
0259 FL TARPON SPRINGS, CITY OF 
0231 GA TOCCOA, CITY OF 
0022 KY AUGUSTA, CITY OF 
0077 NM SOCORRO, CITY OF 
0839 NY OWEGO, TOWN OF 
0356 TX HOOD COUNTY 
0019 LA AVOYELLES PARISH 
0266 TX GUADALUPE COUNTY 
0622 TX TOM GREEN COUNTY 
0160 LA ST. CHARLES PARISH 
5345 NY WESTHAMPTON BEACH, VILLAGE OF 
0296 TX HOUSTON, CITY OF 
0021 AK MATANUSKA-SUSITNA 
FAIRBANKS-NORTH STAR BOROUGH 
5009 AK 
0037 AZ MARICOPA COUNTY 
0273 MN STEPHEN, CITY OF 
0043 MO ST. JOSEPH, CITY OF 
0035 TX BEXAR COUNTY 
0297 TX HUMBLE, CITY OF 
0623 TX SAN ANGELO, CITY OF 
0131 AZ CAMP VERDE, TOWN OF 
0211 AR CLINTON, CITY OF 
5139 FL PINELLAS COUNTY 
0009 KS ATCHISON COUNTY 
0040 LA LAKE CHARLES, CITY OF 
5199 LA JEFFERSON PARISH 
0173 MO KANSAS CITY, CITY OF 
0729 NY SCHUYLERVILLE, VILLAGE OF 
0029 SC BERKELEY COUNTY 
5416 SC ISLE OF PALMS, CITY OF 
0520 TX PARKER COUNTY 
0418 AL DAUPHIN ISLAND, TOWN OF 
0038 AZ AVONDALE, CITY OF 
0055 AZ TOLLESON, CITY OF 
0073 AZ PIMA COUNTY 
0181 AR LITTLE ROCK, CITY OF 
0025 CA CONTRA COSTA COUNTY 

Structures Percentage of Total 
Active 1316 Declarations 
131 21.7 
120 19.9 
68 11.3 
30 5.0 
22 3.6 
18 3.0 
15 2.5 
15 2.5 
14 2.3 
10 1.7 
6 1.0 
6 1.0 
6 1.0 
6 1.0 
6 1.0 
5 0.8 
5 0.8 
5 0.8 
4 0.7 
4 0.7 
4 0.7 
3 0.5 
3 0.5 
3 0.5 
3 0.5 
3 0.5 
3 0.5 
3 0.5 
3 0.5 
2 0.3 
2 0.3 
2 0.3 
2 0.3 
2 0.3 
2 0.3 
2 0.3 
2 0.3 
2 0.3 
2 0.3 
2 0.3 
1 0.2 
1 0.2 
1 0.2 
1 0.2 
1 0.2 
1 0.2 

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0207 CA NAPA, CITY OF 
0153 FL MANATEE COUNTY 
0230 FL PASCO COUNTY 
5163 GA SAVANNAH, CITY OF 
0314 IL GRAFTON, CITY OF 
0687 IL WHITESIDE COUNTY 
0828 IL TOPEKA, TOWN OF 
0475 KS CANTON, CITY OF 
0135 LA OUACHITA PARISH 
0123 ME ANSON, TOWN OF 
0278 MI PORT SHELDON, TOWNSHIP OF 
0281 MI SPRING LAKE, TOWNSHIP OF 
0738 MI ALGOMA, TOWNSHIP OF 
0322 MN NORMAN COUNTY 
0108 MS COLUMBUS, CITY OF 
0204 MO CANTON, CITY OF 
0294 MO PARKVILLE, CITY OF 
0077 MT BUTTE-SILVER BOW COUNTY 
0239 NE NORTH BEND, CITY OF 
0265 NJ OLD BRIDGE, TOWNSHIP OF 
0416 NJ LOWER ALLOWAYS CREEK, TOWNSHIP 
0493 NJ PHILLIPSBURG, TOWN OF 
0034 NY SCIO, TOWN OF 
0417 NY GREECE, TOWN OF 
0060 OH URBANA, CITY OF 
0691 OH LOCKBOURNE, VILLAGE OF 
0220 OK BARTLESVILLE, CITY OF 
0483 OK GRADY COUNTY 
0205 PA TINICUM, TOWNSHIP OF 
0650 PA MUNCY CREEK, TOWNSHIP 
0129 SC LEXINGTON COUNTY 
0177 TN MEMPHIS, CITY OF 
0097 TX CALHOUN COUNTY 
0101 TX CAMERON COUNTY 
0204 TX EASTLAND, CITY OF 
0321 TX HAYS COUNTY 
0417 TX KENDALL COUNTY 
0484 TX CONROE, CITY OF 
0602 TX KELLER, CITY OF 
0704 TX AUSTIN COUNTY 
0706 TX BELL COUNTY 
1195 TX BRAZOS COUNTY 
1266 TX SURFSIDE BEACH, VILLAGE OF 
1585 TX TIKIT ISLAND, VILLAGE OF 
5456 TX BAYTOWN, CITY OF 
5463 TX COMAL COUNTY 
5495 TX PALACIOS, CITY OF 
0155 WA HAMILTON, TOWN OF 
5534 WA SNOHOMISH COUNTY 
0070 WV KANAWHA COUNTY 
0224 WI ARGYLE, VILLAGE OF 
Total Active 1316 Declarations 

1 0.2 
1 0.2 
1 0.2 
1 0.2 
1 0.2 
1 0.2 
1 0.2 
1 0.2 
1 0.2 
1 0.2 
1 0.2 
1 0.2 
1 0.2 
1 0.2 
1 0.2 
1 0.2 
1 0.2 
1 0.2 
1 0.2 
1 0.2 
1 0.2 
1 0.2 
1 0.2 
1 0.2 
1 0.2 
1 0.2 
1 0.2 
1 0.2 
1 0.2 
1 0.2 
1 0.2 
1 0.2 
1 0.2 
1 0.2 
1 0.2 
1 0.2 
1 0.2 
1 0.2 
1 0.2 
1 0.2 
1 0.2 
1 0.2 
1 0.2 
1 0.2 
1 0.2 
1 0.2 
1 0.2 
1 0.2 
1 0.2 
1 0.2 
1 0.2 
603 

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APPENDIX D: Suspension and Probation Records as of October 31, 2003 

Region Community State Projected Status Date of Date of Probation Suspension Date 
Effective Compliance 
Date 
Suspended from NFIP For Failure To Enforce 
IV Campton KY 6/15/1990 Suspended Suspended on 
2/6/1991. 
V Grand Tower IL 4/30/1990 Suspended Suspended on 
6/17/1991. 
V Hamilton County IL 12/5/1998 Suspended Suspended on 
1/17/2000. 
V Washington Park IL 7/26/1996 Suspended Suspended on 
8/3/1998. 
Reinstated into NFIP 
IV Clayton GA 4/12/1993 Reinstated 1/31/1995 Suspended on 
1/19/1994. 
V Milan IL 7/26/1996 Reinstated 4/22/1999 Suspended on 
8/3/1998. 
VII Humboldt IA 10/29/1990 Reinstated 1/25/1996 Suspended on 
11/6/1991. 
VIII Glendive MT 3/11/1998 Reinstated 3/11/1999 
Reinstated and Currently On Probation 
III Oceana WV 10/25/2001 Reinstated/ Extended on Suspended on 
On probation 10/25/2002 10/16/1979. Reinstated 
on probation on 
10/25/2001. 
III Smithers WV 10/29/1990 Reinstated/ 9/6/2001 Suspended on 
On probation 6/17/1991. Reinstated 
on 9/6/2001. 
Currently On Probation 
III Slaughter Beach DE 8/1/2002 On probation 
III Winchester VA 2/7/2003 On probation 
IV Winchester TN 5/1/1989 On probation Withdrew on 
6/5/1989. 
V Jersey County IL 7/16/2001 On probation Extended on 
7/16/2002. 
V Patriot IN 6/30/1999 On probation Extended on 
6/30/2003. 
VI Catahoula Parish LA 6/9/2003 On probation 
IX Territory of Guam GU 4/6/1992 On probation Extended on 
4/6/2003. 
X Dayton WA 12/15/2001 On probation Extended on 
12/15/2002. 
Probation Lifted 
I Farmington ME 6/15/1989 Probation lifted 4/19/1991 
II Plattsburgh NY 2/11/2000 Probation lifted 2/11/2002 
III Colwyn PA 11/15/1995 Probation lifted 11/15/1998 
III Dover PA 12/6/1991 Probation lifted 12/6/1995 
III Shickshinny PA 4/9/1992 Probation lifted 4/1/2002 8 days before 
III Rivesville WV 6/17/1991 Probation lifted 6/17/1992 
III Summers WV 7/28/1993 Probation lifted 7/12/1998 
IV Dallas County AL 4/14/1995 Probation lifted 4/14/1996 
IV Muscle Shoals AL 11/8/1991 Probation lifted 11/8/1992 

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IV Camden County GA 4/1/1988 Probation lifted 3/31/1989 
IV Gilmer GA 8/19/1994 Probation lifted 8/19/1999 
IV Bell County KY 1/1/1989 Probation lifted 10/22/1990 
IV Leslie County KY 12/17/1992 Probation lifted 12/17/1994 
IV Colleton County SC 7/2/1990 Probation lifted 7/2/1992 
IV Folley Beach SC 1/6/1992 Probation lifted 1/9/1992 
IV Georgetown County SC 5/15/1992 Probation lifted 5/15/1993 
IV McCormick County SC 9/1/1991 Probation lifted 9/1/1992 
IV McClellanville SC 6/1/1991 Probation lifted 6/16/1994 
IV Jackson TN 8/5/1994 Probation lifted 8/5/1995 
V Marengo IL 9/14/1993 Probation lifted 9/14/1996 
V Martinsville IN 3/1/1995 Probation lifted 3/1/1998 
V Seymour IN 10/22/1993 Probation lifted 9/19/1994 
V Medora IN 11/20/1998 Probation lifted 11/20/2002 11/20/2002 
V Estral Beach MI 9/10/1993 Probation lifted 9/10/1995 
V Ashtabula OH 4/12/1993 Probation lifted 4/12/1997 
V Lawrence County OH 10/3/1996 Probation lifted 10/4/1999 
V Reynoldsburg OH 11/3/1989 Probation lifted 11/3/1990 
VI Hunt County TX 6/6/1994 Probation lifted 6/6/1997 
VI Port Isabel TX 1/14/1994 Probation lifted 6/1/1996 
VI Tiki Island TX 9/9/1992 Probation lifted 1/22/1993 
VII Carteville MO 11/18/1991 Probation lifted 3/18/1992 
VII Lincoln County MO 3/4/1996 Probation lifted 3/4/1999 
VII Marion County MO 6/14/1996 Probation lifted 6/14/1998 
VII Newburg MO 9/8/1990 Probation lifted 11/13/1991 
VII Ste. Genevieve MO 4/22/1995 Probation lifted 9/17/1996 
County 
VII Waynesville MO 7/22/1996 Probation lifted 7/22/1998 
VII Scribner NE 10/7/1991 Probation lifted 9/15/1993 
IX Cotati CA 4/1/1998 Probation lifted 4/1/2000 
Benewah County ID 3/4/1996 Probation lifted 8/16/1998 
X Benewah County ID 1/15/1998 Probation lifted 9/21/2000 
X Boundary County ID 3/4/1996 Probation lifted 3/4/1998 
Remedied Violations without Probation Time before probation that 
compliance was achieved. 
I Wareham MA 11/22/1993 Complied 11/10/1993 
I Stratford CT 8/28/1995 Complied 8/25/1995 3 days before 
I East Haven CT 2/9/1998 Complied 2/5/1998 4 days before 
II Long Beach NJ 5/17/1989 Complied 5/11/1989 6 days before 
II Monmouth NJ 11/1/2003 Complied 
Beach 
II Cicero NY 9/15/1994 Complied 9/15/1994 Same day 
II Sea Isle City NJ 12/1/1996 Complied 10/29/1996 30 days before 
III Elsmere DE 11/20/1991 Complied 11/18/1991 2 days before 
III Bethany Beach DE 11/15/1995 Complied 10/17/1995 28 days before 
III Plymouth PA 7/28/1993 Complied 7/28/1993 Same day 
III Logan County WV 9/28/1990 Complied 9/20/1990 8 days before 
III Mullens WV 7/28/1993 Complied 7/28/1993 Same day 
IV Key West FL 6/6/1989 Complied 6/16/1989 
IV Manatee County FL 5/25/1989 Complied 5/29/1989 
IV Cave Spring GA 10/25/1995 Complied 9/29/1995 26 days before 

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IV Eatonton GA 4/12/1993 Complied 2/2/1993 69 days before 
IV Glenn County GA 8/15/1996 Complied 8/15/1996 Same day 
IV Augusta KY 12/4/2000 Complied 7/9/2001 
IV Biloxi MS 10/16/1990 Complied 8/28/1990 49 days before 
IV Columbia MS 11/20/1992 Complied 11/20/1992 Same day 
IV Ashe County NC 10/16/1989 Complied 10/17/1989 
IV Charleston SC 10/1/1991 Complied 9/25/1991 6 days before 
County 
IV Mt. Pleasant SC 6/1/1992 Complied 5/21/1992 11 days before 
IV Rutherford TN 5/6/1992 Complied 4/27/1992 9 days before 
County 
V Indianapolis IN 6/15/1995 Complied 6/15/1995 Same day 
V Lancaster OH 4/22/1987 Complied 4/14/1987 8 days before 
V Niles OH 11/29/1991 Complied 12/4/1991 
VI Cameron Parish LA 7/13/1990 Complied 7/5/1990 8 days ahead 
VI Salpulpa OK 12/1/1986 Complied 11/25/1986 6 days before 
VI San Patricio TX 3/27/1992 Complied 3/18/1992 9 days before 
County 
VI Surfside Beach TX 6/1/1995 Complied 6/1/1995 Same day 
VII Fremont County IA 3/1/1996 Complied 2/26/1996 3 days before 
VII Hamberg IA 3/1/1996 Complied 2/26/1996 3 days before 
VII Thurman IA 3/1/1996 Complied 2/26/1996 3 days before 
VII Jefferson County MO 3/5/1990 Complied 3/8/1990 
VII Parkville MO 11/15/1989 Complied 9/7/1989 69 days before 
VII Pemiscot County MO 7/27/1992 Complied 5/13/1992 52 days before 
VII Perry County MO 4/1/1996 Complied 3/29/1996 3 days before 
VII Platte City MO 3/5/1990 Complied 1/26/1990 38 days before 
VII Scott County MO 11/2/1986 Complied 10/23/1986 10 days before 
VII Valley Park MO 11/21/1989 Complied 11/8/1989 13 days before 
VII Cedar Creek NE 3/30/1995 Complied 3/22/1995 8 days before 
VIII Box Elder SD 4/15/1987 Complied 4/14/1987 1 day before 
VIII Cedar City UT 11/12/1996 Complied 11/12/1996 Same day 
IX Sonoma County CA 12/5/1989 Complied 12/13/1989 
X Island County WA 1/25/1999 Complied 1/25/1999 Same day 
X Ocean Shores WA 8/1/1995 Complied 7/31/1995 1 day before 
X Rathdrum ID 5/21/1996 Complied 5/20/1996 1 day before 
IV Monroe County FL 3/1/1988 Complied 2/24/1988 5 days before 23 
5/31/2002 Complied 5/8/2002 days before 

SOURCE: FEMA Headquarters 11/1/03 

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APPENDIX E: Communities Currently Suspended or on Probation 
(as of October 31, 2003) 

Table SP: Communities Currently Suspended or On Probation: As of October 31, 2003 

Region Community State ProjectedEffective 
Date 
Probation 
Status 
Date of 
Compliance 
Date of 
Probation 
Date of 
Suspension 
IV Campton KY 6/15/1990 Suspended Suspended on 
2/6/1991. 
V Grand 
Tower 
IL 4/30/1990 Suspended Suspended on 
6/17/1991. 
V Hamilton 
County 
IL 12/5/1998 Suspended Suspended on 
1/17/2000. 
V Washington 
Park 
IL 7/26/1996 Suspended Suspended on 
8/3/1998. 
III Oceana WV 10/25/2001 Reinstated/On 
probation 
Extended on 
10/25/2002 
Suspended on 
10/16/1979. 
Reinstated on 
probation on 
10/25/2001. 
III Smithers WV 10/29/1990 Reinstated/On 
probation 
9/6/2001 Suspended on 
6/17/1991. 
Reinstated on 
9/6/2001. 
III Slaughter 
Beach 
DE 8/1/2002 On probation 
III 
IV 
Winchester 
Winchester 
VA 
TN 
2/7/2003 
5/1/1989 
On probation 
On probation Withdrew on 
6/5/1989. 
V Jersey 
County 
IL 7/16/2001 On probation Extended on 
7/16/2002. 
V Patriot IN 6/30/1999 On probation Extended on 
6/30/2003. 
VI Catahoula 
Parish 
LA 6/9/2003 On probation 
IX Territory of 
Guam 
GU 4/6/1992 On probation Extended on 
4/6/2003. 
X Dayton WA 12/15/2001 On probation Extended on 
12/15/2002. 
SOURCE: FEMA Personal Communication. 

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APPENDIX F: Sequence of Events in an NFIP Enforcement Action 

Region or state identifies program deficiencies and apparent violations, documents them, and provides assistance and 
consultation to community57. 

Region or state requests that program deficiencies 
be corrected and violations remedied, suggests 
appropriate remedial measures, and sets deadline for 
compliance58. 

Community corrects the program deficiencies and remedies the 
violations. No enforcement action required. 
Step 3. Unsatisfactory community response. Region notifies headquarters that 90-day probation letter will be issued in 10 
days. Headquarters prepares for notification of impending probation and of surcharge. 

Regional director notifies community by certified mail that probation begins at conclusion of 90-day notice period unless 
remedial measures are taken. Community notification takes place at least 31 days before 90-day notice begins. Letter 
outlines all substantive deficiencies and violations as well as suggested remedial measures. Region or headquarters notifies 
appropriate congressional delegations. 
No later than 30 days after 90-day notice period 
begins, Region issues media release. 
Satisfactory community response. Community corrects program 
deficiencies and remedies violations. No enforcement action 
required. 
Unsatisfactory community response. Probation goes into effect at conclusion of 90-day notice period. Surcharge imposed. 
Region sends letter to community setting new 
compliance deadlines and revising required 
remedial measures if necessary. 
Community response unsatisfactory. Regional director recommends suspension to headquarters and submits documentation 
and chronology of events. 
Headquarters agrees and sends 30-day show cause letter. 
Satisfactory community response. Community corrects program 
deficiencies and remedies violations. Probation is either lifted or 
probation extended for up to one year with CAV or other follow-up 
visit scheduled. Surcharge continues for one-year period or until end 
of year, respectively. 
Headquarters reviews Regions recommendation for 
suspension. 
Headquarters does not concur with recommendation. Community is 
referred back to Region for more documentation or community 
assistance. Probation and surcharge continues. 
Community submits response to 30-day show cause letter to Region along with evidence of compliance. Region reviews 
submission and makes recommendation to headquarters on whether community has shown cause. 

Headquarters reviews Regions recommendation. Headquarters determines community should not be suspended. 
Probation is either lifted or extended for no more than one year. 
57 This timeline applies to enforcement sanctions imposed by FEMA (though usually with state assistance and 
input). Some states with more restrictive floodplain management regulations impose their own enforcement 
sanctions independently of FEMA and the NFIP. 

58 If the state conducted the initial visit or contact that detected violations, it can refer the issue to the regional office 
before the request for violations to be remedied. The region can then conduct a compliance visit to verify 
violations. The approach taken by the state and region depends on the characteristics of the situation and the 
regional and state capabilities. On any enforcement sanction, the region and state coordinate to decide the proper 
course of action. 

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Headquarters determines that community has not shown cause and should be suspended. Sends 30-day suspension letter. 
Headquarters publishes notice in Federal Register. 

Region reviews any further submission by community and makes recommendation to headquarters to suspend or not 
suspend. 
Headquarters reviews Regions recommendation. Headquarters decides to withdraw suspension. Probation is either 
lifted or extended for no more than one year. 
Community suspended from NFIP. Suspension lasts until compliance is achieved or may extend for up to one year beyond 
that. Headquarters issues media release. 
Community applies to Region for reinstatement and submits evidence of remedial actions taken and resolution of intent to 
comply. 

Region reviews submission, obtains more data, conducts visit if necessary. Regional director makes recommendation to 
headquarters. 

Headquarters reviews Regions recommendation. 

Headquarters reinstates community either on full program status or 
on a probationary status with CAV or other follow-up visit 
scheduled. Surcharge begins and continues for at least one full year. 
Community remains suspended until receipt of satisfactory reinstatement submission or remains suspended for up to one 
year after a satisfactory reinstatement submission. 

SOURCE: FEMA 1986, p. 3-173-21 

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APPENDIX G: An Explanation of CRS Activities 

Public Information Activities 

This series credits programs that advise people about the flood hazard, flood insurance, 
and ways to reduce flood damage. These activities also provide data needed by insurance agents 
for accurate flood insurance rating: 

 Elevation Certificates (Activity 310): Maintain FEMA elevation certificates for new 
construction in the floodplain. Keeping certificates after the date of CRS application 
is required of all CRS communities. 
 Map Information (Activity 320): Respond to inquiries about what FIRM zone a 
property is in and publicize this service. 
 Outreach Projects (Activity 330): Send information about the flood hazard, flood 
insurance, and flood protection measures to residents. 
 Hazard Disclosure (Activity 340): Advise potential purchasers of flood-prone 
property about the flood hazard or require a notice of the flood hazard. 
 Flood Protection Library (Activity 350): The public library maintains references on 
flood insurance and flood protection. 
 Flood Protection Assistance (Activity 360): Give inquiring property owners technical 
advice on how to protect their buildings from flooding and publicize this service. 
Mapping and Regulation Activities 

This series credits programs that provide increased protection to new development. The 
credit points for the activities in this series are increased for growing communities: 

 Additional Flood Data (Activity 410): Develop new flood elevations, floodway 
delineations, wave heights or other regulatory flood hazard data for an area that was 
not mapped in detail by the flood insurance study; or have the flood insurance study 
based on a higher state or local standard. 
 Open Space Preservation (Activity 420): Guarantee that currently vacant floodplain 
lands will be kept free from development; additional credit is given for areas still in, 
or restored to, their natural state.. 
 Higher Regulatory Standards (Activity 430): Require freeboard; require engineered 
foundations; require compensatory storage; zone the floodplain for minimum lot sizes 
of one acre or larger; have regulations to protect critical facilities, or have other 
standards for new construction that exceed the minimum NFIP requirements. 
 Flood Data Maintenance (Activity 440): Keep flood and property data on computer 
records; use better base maps; or maintain elevation reference marks. 
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 Stormwater Management (Activity 450): Regulate new development throughout the 
watershed to ensure that post-development runoff is no worse than predevelopment 
runoff and/or protects or improves water quality. 
Flood Damage Reduction Activities 

This series credits programs for areas in which existing development is at risk. There is 
no CRS credit for new structural flood control measures because greater reductions in flood 
insurance rates are provided through the FIRM revision process. 

 Floodplain Management Planning Activity 510): Prepare, adopt and implement a 
comprehensive plan that addresses the communitys flood problem, and evaluate and 
revise the plan annually. 
 Acquisition and Relocation (Activity 520): Acquire and/or relocate flood-prone 
buildings so that they are out of the floodplain. 
 Retrofitting (Activity 530) Protect flood-prone buildings through elevation, on-site 
barriers, or floodproofing. 
 Drainage System Maintenance (Activity 540): Conduct periodic inspections of all 
channels and retention basins, and remove debris as needed. 
Flood Preparedness Activities 

This series is oriented toward preparing for and responding to a flood due to natural 
causes, a levee failure or a dam breach. They are usually coordinated by the communitys 
emergency manager: 

 Flood Warning Program (Activity 610) Provide early flood warnings to the public 
and have a detailed flood response plan keyed to flood crest predictions. 
 Levee Safety (Activity 620): Maintain levees that are not reflected on the FIRM as 
providing base flood protection. 
 Dam Safety (Activity 630): All communities in a state with an approved dam safety 
program receive credit. 
SOURCE: Managing Floodplain Development Through the NFIP, Home study version (IS9) 
retrieved from ASFPM website http://www.floods.org/Certification/is9/unit9.pdf January 2005. 

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APPENDIX H: A Method for Evaluating Compliance in CRS Communities 

The study team estimated that the CRS application process could take up to two years 
from the time a community applies until a community is admitted into the CRS; the CRS 
coordinator at headquarters agreed. In our analysis, we included all CAVs that each community 
received in the time since it entered the CRS (until April 2004) as well as any CAV each 
community received up to two years prior to the year it entered the CRS. Hence, when we state 
that a CRS community has not received a CAV, it means that the community did not receive a 
CAV in the time period beginning two years before the community entered the CRS up until 
August 2004. 

The study team began its examination of CAVs in CRS communities by collecting 
records from the CIS. The study team then contacted representatives of the ten FEMA regional 
offices and requested that they check their paper files and notify the study team of CAVs 
conducted in CRS communities that were not entered into the CIS. The regional office staff often 
contacted the states in their regions for additional CAV records. Updates were made in response 
to data supplied by the regions (note: additional CAV data was acquired from all regions). 
Finally, FEMA headquarters contacted both ISO and the regions regarding two sets of AIR 
findings: (1) current CRS communities that had entered the CRS since 1998 and had not received 
a CAV and (2) current CRS communities with open CAVs in which serious program deficiencies 
had been noted. In response, ISO supplied FEMA, who in turn supplied the study team and the 
regions, with the CAV documentation that had been submitted regarding the list of communities 
that entered the CRS since 1998. The regions submitted updated data in response to both sets of 
AIR findings. The study team adjusted its findings accordingly. The study team completed its 
data collection by reviewing the records entered into the CIS and incorporating updates made 
since our data collection began. 

The study team accepted a generous range of documents as proof of a CAV having 
occurred including (1) record of the CAV in the CIS; (2) a physical copy of a CAV report; (3) 
record of a letter sent FEMA to a community referencing a CAV that had occurred (note: the 
must have already been conducted by the date of the letter; the study team did not accept letters 
referencing CAVs that had been scheduled but not conducted by the date of the letter); or (4) a 
communication from the regional office or state to the study team giving the date of a CAV that 
had been conducted. 59 

In conclusion, the study team made every attempt to ensure that all CAVs were included 
whether or not those CAVs had been recorded in the CIS. A few regions commented to the study 
team that they felt they knew of CAVs that were conducted in CRS communities; however, there 
was no physical record of the CAV having occurred and the region could not supply the date of 
the CAV. In those cases, the study team could not accept that a CAV had been conducted. 

59 The study team did not require additional documentation of a CAV if the regional office or state supplied a CAV 

date. This assumption of honest self-reporting may have the ultimate effect of underreporting the number of 

communities that have not received a CAV. 

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APPENDIX I: CRS Communities that have not received a CAV 
within Two Years before Program Entry 

CID Community PIF1 
Total Insurance 
Coverage1 Class2 
CRS Entry 
Date2 
Region I 
230191 Alfred, ME 6 $569,400 8 10/1991 
230208 Arrowsic, ME 2 $180,000 9 10/1993 
230057 Farmington, ME 22 $1,190,500 9 10/1994 
230069 Hallowell, ME 40 $4,313,200 9 10/1996 
230178 Norridgewock, ME 25 $2,642,600 9 10/1997 
230293 Southwest Harbor, ME 21 $3,635,000 9 10/1996 
445401 Middletown, RI 89 $18,849,600 8 10/1991 
440022 Pawtucket, RI 96 $8,705,500 8 10/2002 
Region II 
340289 Bradley Beach, NJ 136 $22,665,800 7 10/1995 
Hackensack Meadowlands 
340570 Commission, NJ 1,097 $172,253,900 8 10/1992 
340246 Hamilton Township, NJ 634 $82,116,500 8 10/1992 
340467 Linden, NJ 195 $32,636,800 8 10/1991 
345307 North Plainfield, NJ 401 $67,021,900 9 10/1992 
340329 Spring Lake, NJ 448 $106,402,300 8 10/1994 
360772 Corning, NY 114 $17,775,700 9 10/1991 
360150 Elmira City, NY 283 $27,089,900 8 10/1991 
360151 Elmira Town, NY 77 $8,772,200 9 10/1991 
360153 Horseheads Town, NY 69 $5,653,300 9 10/1991 
360154 Horseheads Village, NY 26 $2,382,600 9 10/1991 
360932 Scarsdale, NY 115 $27,149,500 8 10/1993 
360156 Southport, NY 50 $5,683,700 9 10/1991 
360595 Syracuse, NY 187 $12,102,800 9 10/1993 
Region III 
421062 Etna, PA 161 $14,034,100 8 10/1996 
421134 Granville, PA 46 $4,341,100 9 10/1993 
420642 Jersey Shore, PA 471 $29,211,800 9 10/1993 
420612 Kingston, PA 62 $9,737,700 9 10/1992 
420687 Lewistown, PA 220 $19,673,200 9 10/1993 
425384 Milton, PA 409 $42,414,100 8 10/1992 
420754 Newport, PA 122 $7,765,100 9 10/1994 
421101 Shaler, PA 120 $12,642,500 9 10/1994 
421119 Upper St. Clair, PA 48 $11,057,200 8 10/1998 
510130 Roanoke, VA 614 $99,942,200 9 10/1996 
510053 Vienna, VA 46 $9,250,500 9 10/1996 
510005 Wachapreague, VA 106 $13,413,200 9 10/1996 
Region IV 
120636 Bal Harbour Village, FL 1,923 $409,298,200 8 10/1996 
120198 Cloud Lake, FL 14 $2,109,700 8 10/1994 
120643 Hialeah, FL 23,227 $2,461,369,700 8 10/1993 
120162 Jupiter Island, FL 432 $133,933,000 8 10/1995 
120190 Kissimmee, FL 768 $108,881,200 8 10/1996 
120211 Lake Clarke Shores, FL 213 $44,903,000 9 10/1994 
120213 Lake Worth, FL 1,863 $302,103,700 9 10/1996 
120214 Lantana, FL 993 $144,421,600 9 10/1994 
120292 Longwood, FL 296 $54,664,100 9 10/1996 
120656 North Miami Beach, FL 7,921 $867,022,000 8 10/1993 
120261 Polk County, FL 4,548 $569,549,700 7 10/1992 
120164 Sewalls Point, FL 394 $112,359,800 8 10/1996 
120658 South Miami, FL 1,544 $254,398,400 8 10/1993 
120659 Surfside, FL 2,463 $419,389,100 8 10/1993 
120300 Suwannee County, FL 273 $26,250,900 8 10/1996 
120302 Taylor County, FL 498 $51,287,000 9 10/1996 
130306 Douglas County , GA 48 $9,799,600 8 10/1995 
280096 Meridian, MS 433 $40,490,600 8 10/1992 

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370268 Washington Park, NC 127 $17,525,000 9 10/1992 
470211 Athens, TN 24 $1,947,200 9 10/1993 
470176 Carthage, TN 93 $8,771,300 8 10/1992 
475425 Elizabethton, TN 162 $16,065,700 9 10/1993 

Region V 

170204 Downers Grove, IL 55 $10,044,600 7 10/1991 
170378 Lincolnshire, IL 118 $28,884,400 5 10/1993 
170132 Northbrook, IL 96 $21,522,300 7 10/1994 
170214 Oak Brook, IL 66 $17,503,800 7 10/1992 
170172 Orland Hills, IL 23 $2,571,000 5 10/1996 
180001 Decatur, IN 92 $4,540,200 9 10/1993 
275228 Austin, MN 115 $10,622,300 5 10/1991 
275240 Lake St. Croix beach, MN 32 $4,143,800 8 10/1995 
390328 Licking County, OH 140 $17,732,400 8 10/1993 
390176 Obetz, OH 26 $3,775,900 9 10/1996 
390419 West Carrollton, OH 424 $34,400,700 9 5/2002 
550612 Allouez, WI 131 $16,257,200 7 10/1992 
550128 Eau Claire, WI 93 $7,910,200 8 10/1991 
550085 Mazomanie, WI 23 $2,288,300 9 10/1991 
550537 Winnebago County , WI 341 $38,417,600 8 10/1991 

Region VI 

050140 Blytheville, AR 105 $11,169,800 9 10/1995 
220220 Houma, LA 2,929 $370,464,000 9 10/1992 
220036 Shreveport, LA 3,879 $465,857,700 8 10/1991 
350045 Alamogordo, NM 1,113 $81,484,300 9 10/1991 
350002 Albuquerque, NM 1,407 $172,488,200 8 10/1993 
350001 Bernalillo County, NM 426 $57,171,700 9 10/1993 
350010 Clovis, NM 447 $35,961,000 9 10/1991 
350067 Farmington, NM 92 $22,577,100 9 10/1991 
350029 Hobbs, NM 712 $53,448,600 8 10/1992 
350006 Roswell, NM 862 $55,631,800 9 10/1992 
480289 Bellaire, TX 3,094 $729,698,500 9 10/1993 
480484 Conroe, TX 557 $98,018,000 7 10/1992 
480173 Duncanville, TX 168 $23,402,900 8 10/1991 
485472 Grand Prairie, TX 196 $36,074,300 8 10/1991 
480601 Hurst, TX 199 $28,397,100 8 10/1992 
480195 Lewisville, TX 80 $15,521,400 7 10/1991 
480607 North Richland Hills, TX 185 $26,111,000 7 10/1991 
480140 Plano, TX 378 $84,275,400 6 10/1992 
480184 Richardson, TX 215 $40,125,900 8 10/1991 
480502 Sweetwater, TX 13 $1,631,700 9 10/1991 
485513 Taylor Lake Village, TX 942 $213,905,200 8 10/1996 
480662 Wichita Falls, TX 1,073 $138,164,400 9 10/1991 
Region VII 
No Communities 
Region VIII 
300142 Yellowstone County, MT 80 $11,128,500 8 5/2003 
Region IX 

040037 Maricopa County, AZ 1,441 $262,604,400 5 10/1991 
040073 Pima County, AZ 2,099 $328,547,800 6 10/1991 

Region X 

No Communities 
1 As of December 2003 
2 Current as of May 2004 
SOURCE: FEMA BSA (PIF, Total Insurance Coverage); May 2004 Insurance Manual (Current Class, Date of 
CRS Entry) 

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11. ACRONYMS AND GLOSSARY 
ASFPMAssociation of State Floodplain Managers 

Base floodThe flood having a 1 percent chance of being equaled or exceeded in any year. 

Base flood elevation (BFE)The elevation shown on the Flood Insurance Rate Map that 
indicates the water surface elevation resulting from a flood that has a one percent chance of 
equaling or exceeding that level in any given year. 

CACcommunity assistance contact 

CAPCommunity Assistance Program 

CAVcommunity assistance visit 

Community--A political entity that has the authority to adopt and enforce floodplain ordinances 
for the area under its jurisdiction. 

Community Rating System (CRS)A program developed by FEMA to provide incentives for 
those communities that have gone beyond the minimum floodplain management requirements to 
develop extra measures to provide protection from flooding. 

DHSDepartment of Homeland Security 

Date of constructionThe date that the building permit was issued provided the actual start of 
construction, repair, reconstruction, or improvement was within 180 days of the permit date. 

Elevated buildingA building that has no basement and has its lowest elevated floor raised 
above the ground level by foundation walls, shear walls, posts, piers, pilings, or columns. Solid 
foundation perimeter walls are not acceptable for elevating buildings in V and VE zones. 

EnclosureThat portion of an elevated building below the lowest elevated floor that is either 
partially or fully shut-in by rigid walls. 

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)The federal agency under which the 
National Flood Insurance Program is administered. 

Federal Insurance Administration (FIA)The federal entity within FEMA that directly 
administers the National Flood Insurance Program (now FIMA, the Federal Insurance and 
Mitigation Administration) 

FloodA general and temporary condition of partial or complete inundation of two or more 
acres of normally dry land area or of two or more properties from overflow of inland or tidal 
waters; or unusual and rapid accumulation or runoff of surface waters from any source; or 
mudflow; or collapse or subsidence of land along the shore of a lake or similar body of water as 
a result of erosion or undermining caused by waves or currents of water exceeding anticipated 
cyclical levels that result in a flood as defined above. 

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Flood Hazard Boundary Map (FHBM)Official map of a community issued by the 
Administrator, where the boundaries of the flood, mudflow, and related erosion areas having 
special hazards have been designated. 

Flood Insurance Rate Map (FIRM)Official map of a community on which the FIA 
Administrator has delineated both the special hazard areas and the risk premium zones applicable 
to the community. 

FloodplainAny land area susceptible to being inundated by flood waters from any source. 

Floodplain managementThe operation of an overall program of corrective and preventive 
measures for reducing flood damage, including but not limited to, emergency preparedness 
plans, flood control works, and floodplain management regulations. 

FloodproofingAny combination of structural and nonstructural additions, changes, or 
adjustments to structures, which reduce or eliminate risk of flood damage to real estate or 
improved real property, water and sanitation facilities, or structures with their contents. 

FreeboardAn additional amount of height (e.g., 2 feet) above the base flood elevation used as 
a factor of safety in determining the level at which a structures lowest floor must be elevated or 
floodproofed to be in accordance with State or community floodplain management regulations. 

FTEFull Time Employee 

FYFiscal Year 

GAOU.S. Government Accountability Office 

GISGeographic information system 

HMGPHazard Mitigation Grant Program 

Historic buildingAny building that is listed in the National Register of Historic places maintained 
by the Department of the Interior or on approved state or local registers, or preliminarily 
determined by the Secretary of the Interior as meeting the requirements for such listing on the 
National Register; or is contributing to the historical significance of a historic district 

ImprovementsFixtures, alterations, installations, or additions comprising a part of the insured 
building, including the units within the insured condominium building. 

Increased Cost of ComplianceCoverage for expenses a property owner must incur, above 
and beyond the cost to repair the physical damage the structure actually sustained from a 
flooding event, to comply with mitigation requirements of State or local floodplain management 
ordinances or laws. Acceptable mitigation measures are elevation, floodproofing, relocation, 
demolition, or any combination thereof. 

Letter of Map Revision (LOMR)An official amendment to the currently effective FEMA 
map. It is issued by FEMA and changes flood zones, delineations, and elevations. 

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Lowest floorThe lowest floor of the lowest enclosed area (including a basement). An 
unfinished or flood-resistant enclosure, usable solely for parking of vehicles, building access, or 
storage in an area other than a basement area, is not considered a buildings lowest floor 
provided that such enclosure is not built so as to render the structure in violation of requirements. 

Mandatory purchaseUnder the provisions of the Flood Disaster Protection Act of 1973, 
individuals, businesses, and others buying, building, or improving property located in identified 
areas of special flood hazards within participating communities are required to purchase flood 
insurance as a prerequisite for receiving any type of direct or indirect federal financial assistance 
(e.g., any loan, grant, guaranty, insurance, payment, subsidy, or disaster assistance) when the 
building or personal property is the subject of or security for such assistance. 

Manufactured (mobile) homeA structure built on a permanent chassis, transported to its site 
in one or more sections, and affixed to a permanent foundation. Manufactured (mobile) home 
does not include recreational vehicles. 

Map revisionA change in the FHBM or FIRM for a community which reflects revised zone, 
base flood, or other information. 

National Flood Insurance FundEstablished in the U.S. Treasury by the National Flood 
Insurance Act of 1968 as the funding mechanism of the NFIP. Premiums collected are deposited 
into the fund, and losses, operating, and administrative costs and, since 1986, federal salaries and 
mapping costs are all paid out of the NFIF. 

National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP)The program of flood insurance coverage and 
floodplain management administered under the Act and applicable Federal regulations 
promulgated in Title 44 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Subchapter B. 

New constructionBuildings for which the start of construction commenced on or after the 
effective date of an initial FIRM or after December 31, 1974, whichever is later, including any 
subsequent improvements. 

NFIP Bureau and Statistical AgentA corporation, partnership, association, or any other 
organized entity that contracts with the Federal Insurance Administration to be the focal point of 
support operations for the NFIP. 

NonresidentialIncludes, but is not limited to: small business concerns, churches, schools, 
farm buildings (including grain bins and silos), poolhouses, clubhouses, recreational buildings, 
mercantile structures, agricultural and industrial structures, warehouses, hotels, and motels with 
normal room rentals for less than 6 months duration, and nursing homes. 

OMBOffice of Management and Budget 

Participating communityA community for which the FIA Administrator has authorized the 
sale of flood insurance under the NFIP. 

PolicyThe entire written contract between the insured and the insurer. 

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Post-FIRM buildinga building for which construction or substantial improvement occurred 
after December 31, 1974, or on or after the effective date of an initial Flood Insurance Rate Map 
(FIRM), whichever is later. 

Pre-FIRM buildinga building for which construction or substantial improvement occurred on 
or before December 31, 1974, or before the effective date of an initial Flood Insurance Rate Map 
(FIRM). 

ProbationA means of formally notifying participating communities of violations and 
deficiencies in the administration and enforcement of the local floodplain management 
regulations. 

Regular ProgramThe final phase of a communitys participation in the National Flood 
Insurance Program. In this phase, a Flood Insurance Rate Map is in effect and full limits of 
coverage are available under the Act. 

Repetitive loss structureA structure, covered by a contract of flood insurance issued under 
the NFIP, that has suffered flood damage on two occasions during a 10-year period that ends on 
the date of the second loss, in which the cost to repair the flood damage, on average, equaled or 
exceeded 25% of the market value of the structure at the time of each flood loss. 

Section 1316-Section of the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968, as amended, which states 
that no new flood insurance coverage shall be provided for any property that the Federal 
Insurance Administrator finds has been declared by a duly constituted state or local zoning 
authority or other authorized public body to be in violation of state or local laws, regulations, or 
ordinances that are intended to discourage or otherwise restrict land development or occupancy 
in flood-prone areas. 

Special Flood Hazard Area (SFHA)An area having special flood, mudflow, or flood-related 
erosion hazards, and shown on a Flood Hazard Boundary Map or a Flood Insurance Rate Map as 
Zone A, AO, A1-A30, AE, A99, AH, AR, AR/A, AR/AE, AR/AH, AR/AO, AR/A1-A30, V1V30, 
VE, or V. For the purpose of determining Community Rating System premium discounts, 
all AR and A99 zones are treated as non-SFHAs. 

Submit-for-RateAn application for flood insurance on a building for which no risk rate is 
published in the Flood Insurance Manual. Insurance coverage can be obtained only after the 
NFIP has approved the application and has established the risk premium rate. 

Substantial damageDamage of any origin sustained by a building whereby the cost of 
restoring the building to its before-damaged condition would equal or exceed 50 percent of the 
market value of the building before the damage occurred. 

Substantial improvementAny reconstruction, rehabilitation, addition, or other improvement 
of a building, the cost of which equals or exceeds 50 percent of the market value of the building 
before the start of construction of the improvement. Substantial improvement includes 
buildings that have incurred substantial damage, regardless of the actual repair performed. 

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SuspensionRemoval of a participating community from the NFIP because the community has 
not enacted and/or enforced the proper floodplain management regulations required for 
participation in the NFIP. 

VarianceA grant of relief by a participating community from the terms of its floodplain 
management regulations. 

Vents(sometimes called proper openings or flood vents) All enclosures below the lowest 
elevated floor of a building in A Zones must be designed to automatically equalize hydrostatic 
flood forces on exterior walls by allowing for the entry and exit of floodwaters. The bottom of all 
openings must be no higher than 1 foot above grade. 

Write Your Own (WYO) ProgramA cooperative undertaking of the insurance industry and 
the Federal Insurance Administration begun in October 1983. The WYO Program operates 
within the context of the NFIP and involves private insurance carriers who issue and service 
National Flood Insurance Program policies. 

ZoneA geographical area shown on a Flood Hazard Boundary Map or a Flood Insurance Rate 
Map that reflects the severity or type of flooding in the area. 

Source: http://www.fema.gov 

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