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Report to Congressional Requesters:

United States General Accounting Office:

GAO:

February 2003:

Food-Processing Security:

Voluntary Efforts Are Under Way, but Federal Agencies Cannot Fully 

Assess Their Implementation:

GAO-03-342:

GAO Highlights:

Highlights of GAO-03-342, a report to Senators Richard J. Durbin and

Tom Harkin:

Why GAO Did This Study:

The events of September 11, 2001, have placed added emphasis on

ensuring the security of the nations food supply. GAO

examined (1) whether FDA and USDA have sufficient authority

under current statutes to require that food processors adopt security

measures, (2) what security guidelines FDA and USDA have

provided to industry, and (3) what security measures food processors

have adopted.

What GAO Found:

Federal food safety statutes give the Food and Drug Administration 

(FDA) and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) broad authority to 

regulate the safety of the U.S. food supply but do not specifically 

authorize them to impose security requirements at food-processing 

facilities. However, these agencies food safety statutes can be 

interpreted to provide authority to impose certain security measures. 

FDA believes that its statutes authorize it to regulate food security 

to the extent that food security and safety overlap but observes that 

there is little overlap between security and safety. USDA believes 

that it could require food processors to adopt certain security 

measures that are closely related to sanitary conditions inside the 

facility. USDA also believes that the statutes, however, cannot be 

interpreted to authorize the regulation of security measures tha are 

not associated with the immediate food-processing environment, such 

as requiring fences, alarms, and outside lighting. Neither agency 

believes that it has the authority to regulate all aspects of 

security at food-processing facilities.

Both FDA and USDA issued voluntary security guidelines to help food

processors identify measures to prevent or mitigate the risk of 

deliberate contamination. Because these guidelines are voluntary, 

neither agency enforces, monitors, or documents their implementation. 

Both FDA and USDA have asked their inspectors to be vigilant and to 

discuss security with managers at food-processing facilities, but the 

agencies have stressed that inspectors should not enforce the 

implementation of security measures or document any observations 

because of the possible release of this information under the Freedom 

of Information Act and the potential for the misuse of this 

information.

Since FDA and USDA do not monitor and document food processors

implementation of security guidelines, the extent of the industrys 

adoption of security measures is unknown. According to officials of 

trade associations and the five facilities we visited, however, food 

processors are implementing a range of security measures. In addition, 

the FDA and USDA field inspectors we surveyed indicated that most 

facilities have implemented some security measures, such as installing 

fences. However, the inspectors were less able to comment on security 

measures that were not as obvious, such as accounting for missing stock 

and implementing proper mail-handling practices. The inspectors also 

noted that while USDA has provided some of its field supervisory 

personnel with security training on the voluntary security guidelines 

it issued, it has not provided most of its inspectors with such 

training. FDA has not provided its staff with any training on the

security guidelines. Without training on the security guidelines, 

inspectors are limited in their ability to conduct informed discussions 

regarding security with managers at food-processing facilities.

What GAO Recommends:

This report recommends that the Secretaries of the Departments of

Health and Human Services and Agriculture study their agencies

existing statutes to identify what additional authorities they may

need relating to security measures at food-processing facilities to

reduce the risk of deliberate contamination of the food supply.

On the basis of these studies results, the agencies should seek

additional authority from the Congress, as needed.

GAO also recommends that the agencies provide training for all

food inspection personnel to enhance their awareness and

ability to discuss security measures with plant personnel.

USDA agreed with this reports recommendations. FDA agreed

with the recommendation to provide training for all food

inspection personnel but took no position on GAOs other

recommendation.

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-342.

To view the full report, including the scope and methodology, click 

on the link above. For more information, contact Lawrence J.

Dyckman at (202) 512-3841 or dyckmanl@gao.gov.

Contents:

Letter:

Results in Brief:

Background:

Existing Food Safety Statutes Do Not Provide Sufficient Authority to 

Regulate All Aspects of Security at Food-Processing Facilities:

FDA and FSIS Issued Voluntary Security Guidelines to Food Processors 

but Do Not Track or Document the Extent to Which They Are Being 

Implemented:

Food Processors Are Implementing a Range of Security Measures, but 

Extent of Implementation Is Largely Unknown to FDA and FSIS:

Conclusions:

Recommendations for Executive Action:

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:

Appendix II; FDA Survey Results:

Appendix III: FSIS Survey Results:

Appendix IV: Comments from the U.S. Department of Agriculture:

Appendix V: Comments from the Food and Drug Administration:

Appendix VI: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:

Table:

Table 1: State Officials Satisfaction with Federal, State, and 

Industry Efforts to Safeguard Food Products from Deliberate 

Contamination:

Figures:

Figure 1: Examples of Security Measures Contained in FDA and FSIS 

Guidelines:

Figure 2: Percentage of Survey Responses Indicating Observation or 

Knowledge of More Visible Security Measures:

Figure 3: Percentage of Survey Responses Indicating Observation or 

Knowledge of Less Visible Security Measures:

Abbreviations:

CDC: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention:

EPA: Environmental Protection Agency:

FBI: Federal Bureau of Investigation:

FDA: Food and Drug Administration:

FSIS: Food Safety and Inspection Service:

GAO: General Accounting Office:

HACCP: Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point:

ISAC: Information Sharing and Analysis Center:

USDA: U.S. Department of Agriculture:

This is a work of the U.S. Government and is not subject to copyright 

protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed 

in its entirety without further permission from GAO. It may contain 

copyrighted graphics, images or other materials. Permission from the 

copyright holder may be necessary should you wish to reproduce 

copyrighted materials separately from GAOs product.

February 14, 2003:

The Honorable Richard J. Durbin

Ranking Democratic Member

Subcommittee on Oversight of

 Government Management,

 the Federal Workforce,

 and the District of Columbia

Committee on Governmental Affairs

United States Senate:

The Honorable Tom Harkin

Ranking Democratic Member

Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition

 and Forestry

United States Senate:

Ensuring the safety of the nations food supply--protecting the food 

supply from unintentional contamination--is a key objective of the 

Department of Health and Human Services Food and Drug Administration 

(FDA) and the Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) of the U.S. 

Department of Agriculture (USDA). Since the terrorist attacks of 

September 11, 2001, however, ensuring food security--that is, 

protecting the food supply from deliberate contamination--has also 

become a heightened concern of these agencies. Bioterrorism experts, 

government officials, and scientists at the Centers for Disease Control 

and Prevention (CDC) and the National Academies warn that U.S. food-

processing facilities are vulnerable to terrorist attack and that the 

deliberate introduction of biological and chemical agents into food 

supplies could sicken large numbers of people and possibly cause many 

deaths. Some experts note that terrorist groups could introduce 

infectious disease agents and chemicals into the food supply to confuse 

public health officials into believing that outbreaks were naturally 

occurring, thus delaying detection and action. Recognizing this risk, 

on October 8, 2001, the President added the agriculture and food 

industries to the list of critical infrastructure sectors needing 

protection from terrorist attack.

Although the U.S. food supply has been mostly secure from deliberate 

contamination, a few such incidents have occurred. In 1984, for 

example, a cult group poisoned salad bars in some Oregon restaurants 

with Salmonella bacteria, and about 750 people became ill. Some large 

naturally occurring outbreaks of foodborne illness that result from 

accidental contamination illustrate how widespread and costly the 

effects of deliberate contamination could be. In 1994, for example, 

224,000 people nationwide were infected with Salmonella enteritidis 

after eating a national brand of ice cream. This outbreak was estimated 

to have cost about $18.1 million, including $6.9 million for medical 

care and $11.2 million in time lost from work.

The intentional contamination of the food supply could have severe 

consequences for the economy and the health of the American public. 

Security measures that could minimize the risk of such an event at 

food-processing facilities range from restricting visitor access, 

securing hazardous chemicals, and restricting access to in-plant 

laboratories to conducting employee background checks, building fences 

around facilities, and designating a food security management 

coordinator.

In this context, you asked us to determine (1) the extent to which 

federal statutes can be effectively used to regulate food security at 

food-processing facilities; (2) what actions FDA and USDA have taken to 

help food processors prevent or reduce the risk of deliberate food 

contamination and how these agencies determine the extent to which 

food-processing facilities are implementing security measures; and 

(3) the extent to which industry is implementing security measures to 

better protect food products against deliberate contamination. While 

experts acknowledge that a terrorist attack could be aimed also at 

livestock and crops on farms or at foods at retail stores, this review 

focused on the food-processing segment of the farm-to-table food 

continuum--that is, from the farm gate to the retail level. Also, we 

confined our review to domestic food processors, although we recognize 

that both FDA and USDA have intensified their efforts to enhance the 

oversight of imported foods at U.S. ports of entry.

In conducting our work, we sought the cooperation of industry 

associations to survey a representative number of food-processing 

facilities. We also sought permission to visit some food-processing 

facilities to discuss the extent to which they are implementing 

security measures, although we acknowledge that industry is not 

obligated to respond to our inquiries. We were unsuccessful in our 

attempts to survey a representative number of food-processing 

facilities because companies were concerned about sharing information 

on security measures; however, we were able to secure visits to five 

companies. To obtain a broader overview of the security measures being 

adopted, we also surveyed FDA and USDA food inspectors to obtain their 

views on the extent of security they have observed at food-processing 

facilities they inspect across the country. We also asked state audit 

offices in all 50 states to interview a selected number of state food 

safety regulatory officials concerning their food security activities, 

if any. Eleven agreed to participate. Appendix I contains the details 

of our scope and methodology. We conducted our review from February 

through December 2002 in accordance with generally accepted government 

auditing standards.

Results in Brief:

Federal food safety statutes provide FDA and USDA with broad authority 

to regulate the safety of the U.S. food supply but do not specifically 

authorize them to impose security requirements at food-processing 

facilities. However, while these agencies food safety statutes can be 

interpreted to provide authority to impose certain security 

requirements, as opposed to food safety requirements, neither agency 

believes it has the authority to regulate all aspects of security. FDA 

believes that its authorities under the Federal Food, Drug, and 

Cosmetic Act and the Public Health Service Act would extend to the 

regulation of facility security measures to prevent the intentional 

contamination of food products to the extent that they overlap with 

food safety. However, FDA observes that there is little overlap between 

safety and security. USDA believes that the Federal Meat, Poultry 

Products, and Egg Products Inspection Acts can be construed to 

authorize it to require food processors to adopt certain security 

measures that are closely related to sanitary conditions inside food-

processing plants. In addition, USDA believes that the statutes cannot 

be interpreted to authorize the regulation of security measures that 

are not associated with the immediate food-processing environment. As a 

result, USDA does not believe it has the authority to require that food 

processors adopt measures to ensure security outside the premises, such 

as installing fences, or to require that food processors conduct 

employee background checks.

Both FDA and USDA have issued voluntary guidelines to help food 

processors identify measures they can implement to prevent or mitigate 

the risk of deliberate contamination. Because these guidelines are 

voluntary, neither agency monitors or documents their implementation. 

Also, FDA and FSIS have instructed their food safety inspectors to be 

familiar with the agencies guidelines as they conduct regular food 

safety inspections and to discuss, but not interpret, the security 

guidelines with facility personnel. The agencies have told inspectors 

not to document the existence or lack of security measures because of 

the possible release of this information under the Freedom of 

Information Act and the potential for the misuse of this information. 

As a result, FDA and FSIS do not have information on the extent of 

security at food-processing facilities or whether gaps in security may 

exist in specific industry sectors.

FDA and USDA lack comprehensive information on the extent to which 

food-processing companies are adopting security measures. However, 

officials from the food trade associations that we contacted believe 

that food processors are voluntarily implementing a range of security 

measures, including those in the federal guidelines--from limiting 

access to facilities to evaluating plant security. Although we found 

this to be the case at the five food-processing facilities we visited, 

we could not verify the extent to which industry has adopted security 

measures nationwide--in part, because food-processing facilities 

prefer not to share information about their security measures with 

federal agencies. They are concerned that this sensitive information 

could be released to the public under the Freedom of Information Act. 

In particular, the industry is worried that if security gaps at food-

processing facilities were made public they could provide a road map 

for terrorist groups. FDA and FSIS officials also cited this concern as 

a factor that limits the amount of information they believe they can 

collect. In addition, according to FDA and FSIS food inspectors we 

surveyed, the food-processing facilities they regularly inspect are 

voluntarily implementing a range of security measures and most 

facilities have implemented measures to enhance perimeter fencing and 

lighting. On the other hand, these inspectors were less able to comment 

on less-visible security measures, such as accounting for missing stock 

and implementing proper mail-handling practices. The inspectors also 

indicated that larger food-processing facilities are implementing more 

security measures than smaller ones. Finally, the FDA inspectors that 

we surveyed stated that they had not received training on food security 

even though the agency encourages them to discuss security matters with 

plant personnel. FSIS has provided training to its supervisory field 

inspection personnel, who reported that it would be beneficial if the 

field inspectors--who are most directly involved with daily processing 

activities at each plant--were also trained on security measures.

This report recommends that the Secretary of the Department of Health 

and Human Services and the Secretary of Agriculture study what 

additional authorities their agencies may need relating to security 

measures at food-processing facilities to reduce the risk of deliberate 

contamination of the food supply. On the basis of the results of these 

studies, the agencies should seek additional authority from the 

Congress, as needed. The report also recommends executive action aimed 

at ensuring that the agencies field personnel are provided with 

training on food security measures.

We provided FDA and USDA with a draft of this report for their review 

and comment and received written and oral comments from both agencies 

on the reports contents and its recommendations. The agencies also 

provided technical comments, which we incorporated into the report as 

appropriate. USDA agreed with the two recommendations made in this 

report. FDA agreed with our recommendation that it provide all food 

inspection personnel with training on security measures. FDA did not 

have an opinion on our recommendation that the agency study what 

additional authorities it may need relating to security measures at 

food-processing facilities. USDAs comments are contained in appendix 

IV, and FDAs comments are provided in appendix V.

Background:

Under the Federal Meat Inspection Act, the Poultry Products Inspection 

Act, and the Egg Products Inspection Act, USDA, through FSIS, is 

responsible for ensuring the safety of meat, poultry, and certain egg 

products. Under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act and the Public 

Health Service Act, FDA is responsible for all other foods, including 

fruits and vegetables; dairy products; seafood; and certain canned, 

frozen, and packaged foods. The food-processing sector is generally 

described as the middle segment of the farm-to-table continuum--it 

extends from the time livestock and crops leave the farm for slaughter 

and processing into food until it reaches retail establishments.

FDA and FSIS work to ensure the safety of food products processed in 

the United States through a regulatory system of preventive controls 

that identifies hazards early in the production process to minimize the 

risk of contamination. Known as the Hazard Analysis and Critical 

Control Point (HACCP) system, it makes food-processing facilities 

responsible for developing a plan that identifies harmful 

microbiological, chemical, and physical hazards that are reasonably 

likely to occur and establishes critical control points to prevent or 

reduce contamination.[Footnote 1] Through their inspection programs, 

FDA and FSIS verify that food processors are implementing their HACCP 

plans. FDA inspects over 57,000 food facilities every 5 years on 

average, and USDA inspects over 6,000 meat and poultry slaughter and 

processing facilities daily. Individual states also conduct yearly 

inspections of about 300,000 food-processing facilities, including 

small firms with fewer than 10 employees and large corporations with 

thousands of employees and multiple processing plants located in many 

states. Both FDA and FSIS have the authority to take enforcement 

actions as necessary to ensure that facilities meet the agencies 

safety and sanitation regulatory requirements. As we reported in 2001, 

in fiscal year 1999, the latest year for which such information was 

available, FDA, FSIS, and the states spent a total of about $1.3 

billion on food safety activities.[Footnote 2]

Following the events of September 11, 2001, the federal government 

intensified its efforts to address the potential for deliberate 

contamination of agriculture and food products. On October 8, 2001, the 

President issued an executive order establishing the Office of Homeland 

Security, which added the agriculture and food industries to the list 

of critical infrastructure systems needing protection from terrorist 

attack. In addition, the Congress provided FDA and USDA with emergency 

funding to prevent, prepare for, and respond to potential bioterrorist 

attacks through the Department of Defense Appropriation Act of 2002: 

$97 million for FDA and $15 million for FSIS. For the most part, FDA 

has used the emergency funds to enhance the security of imported food 

by hiring new inspectors and increasing inspections at U.S. ports of 

entry. FSIS has used its emergency funds to support its food security 

activities, which include, among other things, providing educational 

and specialized training. FDAs fiscal year 2003 budget builds upon 

funding received from the fiscal year 2002 appropriation plus the 

fiscal year 2002 emergency supplemental funding of $97 million to 

counter terrorism. FDA plans to seek additional funding in the future 

for food safety activities and security activities related to 

terrorism. FSIS is asking for an additional $28 million. The Congress 

also enacted the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness 

and Response Act of 2002, which contains numerous provisions designed 

to enhance the safety and security of the food, drug, and water 

industries.[Footnote 3]

In addition, both FDA and USDA have taken many actions to better 

protect the food supply against deliberate contamination. For example, 

FDA has hired 655 new food safety investigators and laboratory 

personnel in the field. In addition, it has participated in several 

exercises at the federal and state levels to enhance emergency response 

procedures. Furthermore, FDA is working with CDC to initiate and 

implement a nationwide Laboratory Response Network for foods to 

identify laboratory capacity for testing agents that could be used to 

deliberately contaminate food. It has also provided additional 

laboratory training for food safety personnel and sought stakeholders 

input to develop regulations that are required by the new bioterrorism 

legislation. Moreover, FDA worked with the Office of the Surgeon 

General, U.S. Air Force, to adapt a version of the Operational Risk 

Management approach to examine the relative risks of intentional 

contamination during various stages of food production and 

distribution.[Footnote 4] Within the Department of Health and Human 

Services, both FDA and CDC have worked closely with federal, state, and 

local agencies to enhance their surveillance of diseases caused by 

foodborne pathogens. FDAs efforts to reduce food security risks also 

include working with other federal agencies, trade associations, and 

the Alliance for Food Security.

USDA has formed a Homeland Security Council to develop a Department-

wide plan to coordinate efforts between all USDA agencies and offices. 

The Department has also established the FSIS Office of Food Security 

and Emergency Preparedness to centralize the Departments work on 

security matters. USDA has also coordinated with other government 

agencies, such as the Office of Homeland Security, the Federal Bureau 

of Investigation (FBI), and FDA, to develop prevention, detection, and 

response procedures to better protect the nations food 

supply.[Footnote 5] USDA will be increasing the number of import 

inspectors by 20. These inspectors will place special emphasis on food 

security in addition to their traditional food safety role. In 

addition, USDA has participated in several exercises at the federal and 

state levels to enhance response procedures and has conducted risk 

assessments for domestic and imported food. Since this review began, 

USDA has conducted three simulation exercises at the Department and 

agency level to test the Departments response to a terrorist attack 

and is planning three additional simulations for the spring of 2003. 

USDA has also conducted preparedness-training sessions for 

veterinarians and circuit supervisors. (Circuit supervisors supervise 

the work of in-plant inspection personnel and discuss the security 

guidelines with them.):

Experts from government and academia generally agree that terrorists 

could use food products as a vehicle for introducing harmful agents 

into the food supply. Just recently, the National Academies reported 

that terrorists could use toxic chemicals or infectious agents to 

contaminate food production facilities and that, although much 

attention has been paid to ensuring safety and purity throughout the 

various stages of processing and distribution, protecting the food 

supply from intentional contamination has not been a major focus of 

federal agencies.[Footnote 6] Among other things, the report says that 

FDA should act promptly to extend its HACCP methodology so that it 

could be used to deal effectively with the deliberate contamination of 

the food supply. In February 2002, CDC reported that although the food 

and water systems in the United States are among the safest in the 

world, the nationwide outbreaks due to unintentional food or water 

contamination demonstrate the ongoing need for vigilance in protecting 

food and water supplies.[Footnote 7] All of the bioterrorism experts 

whom we consulted from academia agreed that the food supply is at risk.

Existing Food Safety Statutes Do Not Provide Sufficient Authority to 

Regulate All Aspects of Security at Food-Processing Facilities:

The food safety statutes do not specifically authorize FDA or USDA to 

require food processors to implement any type of security measures 

designed to prevent the intentional contamination of the foods they 

produce.[Footnote 8] While these agencies food safety statutes can be 

interpreted to provide authority to impose certain security 

requirements, as opposed to food safety requirements, neither agency 

believes it has the authority to regulate all aspects of security.

Counsel in the Department of Health and Human Services Office of the 

Assistant Secretary for Legislation advised that FDAs authorities 

under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act and the Public Health 

Service Act provide FDA with tools to adopt measures to control 

insanitary preparation, packing, and holding conditions that could lead 

to unsafe food; detect contamination of food; and control contaminated 

food. However, Counsel also advised that FDAs food safety authorities 

do not extend to the regulation of physical facility security measures. 

FDAs counsel provided a similar assessment, telling us that, to the 

extent that food safety and security overlap, FDA might be able to 

require the industry to take precautionary steps to improve security 

but observed that there is little overlap between safety and security. 

One area where safety and security do overlap is in the handling of 

hazardous materials. FDAs existing safety regulations specify that 

hazardous chemicals should be stored so that they cannot contaminate 

food products. This requirement overlaps with FDAs food security 

guidelines advising that hazardous chemicals be stored in a secure area 

and that access to them be limited.

USDA, on the other hand, has a somewhat more expansive view of the 

extent to which its statutory authority allows it to require food 

processors to adopt certain security measures. USDAs general counsel 

concluded that to the extent that security precautions pertain to 

activities closely related to sanitary conditions in the food 

preparation process, FSIS has the authority to require food processors 

to implement certain security measures.[Footnote 9] The general counsel 

concluded that FSIS could require facilities to develop and maintain a 

food security management plan concerning their response to an actual 

threat involving product tampering, since this is directly related to 

food adulteration. Such a plan could be added to a current HACCP plan 

or it could be entirely separate. USDA also believes that FSIS has 

authority to mandate its inside security guidelines, such as 

controlling or restricting access to certain areas, monitoring the 

operation of equipment to prevent tampering, and keeping accurate 

inventories of restricted ingredients and hazardous chemicals. 

Similarly, USDA believes that many of its security measures that 

address shipping and receiving food products or protecting water and 

ice used in processing products also could be made mandatory. These 

measures include putting tamper-proof seals on incoming and outgoing 

shipments and controlling access to water lines and ice storage.

On the other hand, USDA believes that the outside security measures 

included in its guidelines, such as securing plant boundaries and 

providing guards, alarms, and outside lighting, have little to do with 

sanitation in the facility or the immediate food-processing environment 

and, therefore, could not be made mandatory under existing authorities. 

With respect to the guidelines personnel security measures, USDA noted 

that FSIS has limited authority over personnel matters at food-

processing facilities and could not require facilities to perform 

personnel background checks before hiring.

FDA and FSIS Issued Voluntary Security Guidelines to Food Processors 

but Do Not Track or Document the Extent to Which They Are Being 

Implemented:

In response to the nations growing concerns regarding the potential 

for deliberate contamination of the food supply, FDA and USDA issued 

guidelines to the food-processing industry suggesting measures to 

enhance security at their facilities. Among other things, the 

guidelines suggests conducting a risk assessment, developing a plan to 

address security risks at plants, and adopting a wide range of security 

measures inside and outside the premises. Food-processing facilities 

are not required to adopt any of the security measures but are 

encouraged to adopt those that they feel are best suited for their 

operations. Although both agencies have alerted their field inspection 

personnel to be vigilant about security issues, they have also told the 

inspectors that they are not authorized to enforce these measures and 

have instructed them not to document their observations regarding 

security because of the possible release of this information under the 

Freedom of Information Act and the potential for the misuse of this 

information. As a result, FDA and USDA currently do not know the extent 

to which food security measures are being implemented at food-

processing facilities. In contrast, the Congress directed medium-size 

and large-size community water systems, which are privately or publicly 

owned, to assess their vulnerability to terrorist attacks and to 

develop an emergency response plan to prepare for such an event. The 

act also authorized funding to be used for basic security enhancements, 

such as the installation of fencing, gating, lighting, or security 

cameras. This approach enables the Environmental Protection Agency 

(EPA) to monitor the water industrys security efforts and could be a 

possible model for the food safety agencies.

Industrys Compliance with Security Guidelines Is Voluntary:

In 2002, FDA and FSIS each issued voluntary security guidelines to the 

food-processing industry to help federal-and state-inspected plants 

identify ways to enhance their security.[Footnote 10] The agencies 

encouraged food processors, among others, to review their current 

operations and adopt those security measures suggested in the 

guidelines that they believed would be best suited for their 

facilities. Officials from both FDA and FSIS told us that there was 

little or no coordination between the two agencies in developing these 

guidelines. The FDA guidance contains over 100 recommended security 

measures covering seven areas of plant operation, such as managing food 

security, physical (outside) security, and computer security. FSISs 

guidelines contain 68 security measures and cover seven areas of plant 

operation. Figure 1 summarizes key aspects of both agencies voluntary 

security guidelines for industry. FDA and FSIS have made the guidelines 

available on the Internet.[Footnote 11] These guidelines are very 

similar--one difference is that FSISs contain security measures for 

slaughter facilities.

Figure 1: Examples of Security Measures Contained in FDA and FSIS 

Guidelines:

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Some state governments have also acted to protect food products from 

deliberate contamination. We learned from 11 state auditing offices 

that food safety regulatory officials from most of these states are 

providing industry or state inspectors with guidelines, either in the 

form of the FDA and FSIS guidelines or guidelines developed by the 

state officials themselves.[Footnote 12] In addition, three states have 

enacted new legislation or regulations addressing the security of food 

products.

FDA and FSIS Instruct Their Inspectors to Be Observant:

Although FDA and FSIS do not assess the extent to which food processors 

are implementing security measures, the agencies have asked their field 

inspection personnel to be on heightened alert and to discuss, but not 

interpret, the security guidance with facility officials during their 

routine food safety inspections.[Footnote 13] However, both FDA and 

USDA have instructed their field inspection personnel to refrain from 

enforcing any aspects of the security guidelines because the agencies 

generally believe that they lack such authority. They have also 

instructed their field personnel not to document plants security 

measures because they are concerned that such information would be 

subject to Freedom of Information Act requests.

More specifically, FDAs instructions to its field personnel specify 

that they should neither perform a comprehensive food security audit of 

the establishment nor conduct extensive interviews to determine the 

extent to which preventive measures suggested in the guidelines have 

been adopted. The goals, according to FDA, are to heighten industrys 

awareness of food security practices, facilitate an exchange of 

information between FDA and industry on the subject of food security, 

and encourage plant management to voluntarily implement those 

preventive measures that they believe are most appropriate for their 

operation. In short, FDA inspectors are encouraged to discuss food 

security concerns with plant management and to provide them with copies 

of the guidelines. Although the exact details of such discussions are 

not to be recorded, inspectors are required to document in their 

inspection reports that such discussions took place and that they gave 

a copy of the guidelines to facility management.

Similarly, FSIS has informed its field inspectors that they have no 

regulatory duties regarding the enforcement of the guidelines. 

Initially, the agency instructed its inspectors to refer any questions 

from facility managers to USDAs Technical Service Center in Omaha, 

Nebraska.[Footnote 14] Recently the agency modified its position 

regarding direct discussions of food security and now allows inspectors 

to discuss, but not interpret, security with facility management. 

Inspectors are still instructed not to document these conversations or 

enforce the adoption of any security measure.

Officials from both agencies expressed concerns about gathering 

security information from facilities because it could be subject to 

public disclosure through Freedom of Information Act requests. If 

terrorists gained access to this information, it could give them a road 

map to target the most vulnerable areas in a food-processing plant.

Water Security Provisions in the 2002 Bioterrorism Act Are a Possible 

Model for the Food Safety Agencies:

Recent congressional efforts to better protect the nations drinking 

water from terrorist acts may offer a model for FDA and USDA to help 

monitor security measures adopted at food-processing facilities as well 

as to identify any security gaps that may exist at these facilities. 

Although there are differences in how the government regulates drinking 

water and food, food and water are essential daily consumption 

elements, and both are regulated to ensure their safety.

In June 2002, the Congress enacted the Public Health Security and 

Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, which, among other 

things, amended the Safe Drinking Water Act. The Bioterrorism Act 

requires medium-size and large-size community water systems (those 

serving over 3,300 people), which are privately and publicly owned, to 

certify to EPA that they have assessed their vulnerability to a 

terrorist attack and developed emergency plans to prepare for and 

respond to such an attack. These water systems serve 91 percent of the 

United States population. Each communitys water system is required to 

conduct a vulnerability assessment and submit a copy of the assessment 

to EPA.[Footnote 15] The act specifies that the vulnerability 

assessment is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information 

Act, except for the identity of the community water system and the date 

on which it certifies compliance. Community water systems are also 

required to prepare an emergency response plan that incorporates the 

results of their vulnerability assessments. In addition, the act 

authorizes funding for financial assistance to community water systems 

to support the purchasing of security equipment, such as fencing, 

gating, lighting, or security cameras.

Food Processors Are Implementing a Range of Security Measures, but 

Extent of Implementation Is Largely Unknown to FDA and FSIS:

FDA and FSIS lack comprehensive information on the extent to which 

food-processing companies are adopting security measures. However, 

officials from the majority of the food trade associations that we 

contacted believe that their members are implementing a range of 

measures to enhance security at their facilities. We found that the 

five food-processing facilities we visited in various geographic 

regions around the country are also implementing an array of security 

measures that range from developing risk assessment plans to hiring 

security contractors.[Footnote 16] Furthermore, our survey of FDA and 

FSIS inspectors indicates that, generally, food-processing facilities 

are implementing a range of security measures. The survey responses 

indicate, however, that the inspectors were more aware of those 

security measures that were the most visible to them during the course 

of their regular food safety inspections.[Footnote 17]

Trade Association Officials Indicate That Industry Is Implementing 

Various Security Measures:

According to trade association officials, food processors are 

voluntarily taking steps to prevent the deliberate contamination of 

their products, including adopting many of the measures suggested by 

FDA and FSIS, such as installing fences, requiring that employees wear 

identification, and restricting access to certain plant areas. 

Association officials told us that most large food-processing 

facilities already have ample security plans that include many of the 

recommendations made by FDA and FSIS. One trade association recently 

conducted a survey of its members and asked for their opinions about 

FSISs Guidelines. Most of the respondents indicated that they were 

aware of the guidelines; they believed the guidelines were for the most 

part practical and workable; and they used them in their security 

plans. However, these officials were unable to provide data on the 

extent to which the food-processing industry is implementing security 

measures to prevent or mitigate the potential deliberate contamination 

of food products.[Footnote 18]

Trade association officials also said that they provided FDA and FSIS 

with comments on the voluntary guidelines and, in some cases, have also 

issued their own food security guidelines to their members. Although 

the officials generally believe that the agencies guidelines are 

reasonable, they do not want the government to regulate food security. 

They also feel that some companies, especially small facilities with 

limited resources, are unable to implement all the measures in the 

guidelines. Therefore, these officials believe it is important for the 

guidelines to remain voluntary.

The industry is involved in improving food security in other ways as 

well. For example, the food industry associations formed the Alliance 

for Food Security to facilitate the exchange of information about food 

security issues. The Alliance is composed of trade associations 

representing the food chain, from commodity production through 

processing, packaging, distribution, and retail sale, as well as 

government agencies responsible for food and water safety, public 

health, and law enforcement. Similarly, led by the Food Marketing 

Institute, the food industry and FBI established the Information 

Sharing and Analysis Center (ISAC), which serves as a contact point for 

gathering, analyzing, and disseminating information among companies and 

the multiagency National Infrastructure Protection Center based at FBI 

headquarters. Through ISAC, FBI officials have notified food 

manufacturers of warnings and threats that the Center deems to be 

credible. ISAC also provides a voluntary mechanism for reporting 

suspicious activity in a confidential manner and for developing 

solutions.

Five Processing Facilities Provide Some Indication about Industrys 

Efforts:

We visited five food-processing facilities, including a slaughter plant 

and facilities that produce beverages and ready-to-eat products. 

Although these facilities are not in any way representative of all 

food-processing plants nationwide, they provide some information about 

the types of security measures that some facilities are implementing. 

All five facilities had conducted risk analyses and, on the basis of 

the results, had implemented a number of security measures similar to 

those suggested in the FDA and FSIS guidelines. For example, all five 

facilities limited access to the facility through such means as 

requiring visitors to enter through a guard shack and to provide 

identification. In addition, employees at three of the facilities could 

enter the facility only by using magnetic cards.

However, managers at the five facilities offered differing opinions 

about personnel security. Although all of the facilities we visited 

performed background checks on their employees that included 

verification of social security numbers, only some verified prior work 

experience, criminal history, and level of education. One company also 

required that its contractors, such as construction companies working 

in the facility, perform employment, education, and criminal checks of 

their own employees. The facilities also used different protocols for 

employee access to different areas within the plant. For example, at 

four of the facilities, employees were limited to those areas of the 

plant in which they worked.

While the managers at these facilities generally complimented FDAs and 

USDAs security guidelines, they said that they do not want the 

agencies to regulate security. Rather, they believe that the agencies 

should develop a nonprescriptive framework or strategy for industry and 

then leave them to decide how to meet their individual requirements. 

One manager believes that food security responsibilities should be 

moved to the Department of Homeland Security.

Finally, our discussions with trade association officials and food-

processing industry officials revealed that the industry is very 

concerned about sharing security information with federal agencies 

because of the possibility that it could provide a road map for 

terrorist groups if it were released under the Freedom of Information 

Act. Although the act exempts from public release certain national 

security, trade secret, and commercial or financial information, 

industry officials are generally skeptical about the governments 

ability to prevent the release of sensitive security information at 

food-processing facilities. FBI officials told us that they have cited 

these exemptions when assuring ISAC members that security information 

shared with them will be protected from public release. These officials 

explained that the courts have generally ruled that the commercial 

information exemption protects those who voluntarily provide the 

government with information if the information is of a kind that the 

provider would not ordinarily release to the public.[Footnote 19] 

However, the FBI officials we interviewed believe that the government 

should find some way of assuring industry that sensitive security 

information is protected from public release.

FDA and FSIS Survey Respondents Indicate That Processing Facilities Are 

Implementing a Range of Security Measures:

FDA and FSIS survey respondents observed a range of security measures 

being implemented at food-processing facilities, although both FDA and 

FSIS respondents were able to provide more information about those 

security measures that were most visible during the course of their 

normal inspection duties. Figure 2 shows selected categories of 

security measures recommended in the FDA and FSIS security guidelines 

that were most visible to inspectors.[Footnote 20] The majority of the 

FDA survey respondents said they were able to observe security 

measures, such as fencing around the plants perimeter, limiting access 

to restricted areas, securing hazardous materials, and providing 

adequate interior and exterior lighting. Likewise, most of FSISs 

circuit supervisors were able to observe outside security measures 

including alarmed emergency exits, plant perimeter protection, positive 

employee identification, and the inspection of incoming and outgoing 

vehicles.

Figure 2: Percentage of Survey Responses Indicating Observation or 

Knowledge of More Visible Security Measures:

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Note: GAO survey of FDA and FSIS inspectors.

Survey respondents provided fewer observations regarding other types of 

security measures included in the FDA and FSIS guidelines--in some 

instances because these measures were less visible to them. For 

example, FDA respondents were less able to comment on whether they 

noticed or knew of the presence of security measures designed to 

account for missing stock or for other finished product irregularities. 

(See fig. 3.) Similarly, FSIS respondents were less unable to comment 

on the extent to which facilities were performing background checks on 

new employees or implementing proper mail-handling practices.

Figure 3: Percentage of Survey Responses Indicating Observation or 

Knowledge of Less Visible Security Measures:

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Figure 4: Note: GAO survey of FDA and FSIS inspectors.

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

More than half of FSISs survey respondents stated that large plants--

those with at least 500 employees--had implemented a range of security 

measures, including the areas of outside security, storage, slaughter 

and processing, and personnel security. Fewer of these respondents 

observed these security measures at smaller plants. Some FDA and FSIS 

respondents provided additional comments that the very small firms 

typically lack the financial resources to implement many of the 

security measures suggested in the government guidelines. Similarly, 

some respondents commented that many of the security measures might not 

be necessary at smaller establishments.

Additionally, most of the FDA respondents reported that they had not 

received training on food security; while nearly all of the FSIS 

respondents reported that they had recently received such training. 

Some of the FSIS respondents further stated that although they had 

received food security training, further training was greatly needed in 

the field. Such training would be beneficial because field personnel 

are encouraged to discuss security measures with managers at the 

facilities they inspect.

Finally, responses to our survey showed that FDA and FSIS respondents 

have different levels of satisfaction with or confidence in the 

efforts of the processing facilities they inspect to ensure the 

protection of food from acts of deliberate contamination.[Footnote 21] 

While nearly half of the FSIS respondents said they were somewhat or 

very confident of the efforts made by the food processors they inspect, 

slightly over one-fourth of the FDA respondents were satisfied or very 

satisfied with the efforts made by the food processors they inspect.

Regulatory Officials from 11 States Indicate Some Level of Satisfaction 

with Security Efforts:

Thirty-seven food regulatory officials interviewed by state auditors in 

11 states provided opinions on their overall level of satisfaction with 

federal, state, and industry efforts to protect food from intentional 

contamination. Table 1 shows that nearly half of the state regulatory 

officials interviewed expressed satisfaction with the efforts made by 

federal, state, and industry to safeguard food products--though these 

results cannot be generalized to all state regulatory officials.

Table 1: State Officials Satisfaction with Federal, State, and 

Industry Efforts to Safeguard Food Products from Deliberate 

Contamination:

Questions asked of 37 state food safety regulatory officials: (11 

states): How satisfied are you with the federal governments efforts?; 

Percentage of officials very satisfied or 

satisfied: 43.3; Percentage of officials neither satisfied nor 

dissatisfied: 32.4; Percentage of officials dissatisfied or very 

dissatisfied: 24.3.

Questions asked of 37 state food safety regulatory officials: (11 

states): How satisfied are you with the state governments efforts?; 

Percentage of officials very satisfied or 

satisfied: 56.8; Percentage of officials neither satisfied nor 

dissatisfied: 29.7; Percentage of officials dissatisfied or very 

dissatisfied: 13.5.

Questions asked of 37 state food safety regulatory officials: (11 

states): How satisfied are you with industrys efforts?; Percentage of 

officials very satisfied or 

satisfied: 43.2; Percentage of officials neither satisfied nor 

dissatisfied: 45.9; Percentage of officials dissatisfied or very 

dissatisfied: 10.8.

[End of table]

Source: State audit offices.

Notes: Combined state survey of 37 state regulatory officials.

Percentages may not total 100 because of rounding.

Finally, most of the state officials interviewed by state auditors 

believed it was either important or very important for states to 

monitor whether companies have adopted security measures to prevent 

acts of deliberate contamination; 3 of the 11 states are already 

requiring their inspectors to do so.

Conclusions:

The vulnerability of the food supply to potential acts of deliberate 

contamination is a national concern. The President addressed this 

concern in the October 8, 2001, executive order establishing the Office 

of Homeland Security and adding the agriculture and food industries to 

the list of critical infrastructure systems needing protection from 

terrorist attack. The National Academies have also concluded in a 

recently released report that infectious agents and toxic chemicals 

could be used by terrorists to contaminate food-processing facilities. 

Among other things, the report says that FDA should act promptly to 

extend its Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point methodology so it 

might be used to deal effectively with deliberate contamination of the 

food supply. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention also 

reported recently on the need to better protect our nations food and 

water supplies.

These assessments underscore the need to enhance security at food-

processing facilities. Although FDA and FSIS recognize that need and 

have taken action to encourage food processors to voluntarily adopt 

security measures, these actions may be insufficient. Because the 

agencies believe that they generally lack authority to mandate security 

measures and are concerned that such information would be subject to 

Freedom of Information Act requests, they do not collect information on 

industrys voluntary implementation of security measures. The agencies 

are, therefore, unable to determine the extent to which food processors 

have voluntarily implemented such measures. Both FDA and USDA have 

completed risk assessments. However, without the ability to require 

food-processing facilities to provide information on their security 

measures, these federal agencies cannot fully assess industrys efforts 

to prevent or reduce the vulnerability of the nations food supply to 

deliberate contamination. Similarly, they cannot advise processors on 

needed security enhancements. Furthermore, lacking baseline 

information on the facilities security condition, the agencies would 

be unprepared to advise food-processing facilities on any additional 

actions needed if the federal government were to go to a higher threat 

alert.

Finally, the lack of security training for FDA food inspectors on the 

voluntary security guidelines issued for food processors and the 

limited number of FSIS inspectors that have so far received training on 

the voluntary security guidelines hamper the inspectors ability to 

conduct informed discussions regarding security measures with facility 

personnel as they are currently instructed to do.

Recommendations for Executive Action:

In order to reduce the risk of deliberate contamination of food 

products, we are recommending that the Secretary of Health and Human 

Services and the Secretary of Agriculture study their agencies 

existing statutes and identify what additional authorities they may 

need relating to security measures at food-processing facilities. On 

the basis of the results of these studies, the agencies should seek 

additional authority from the Congress, as needed.

To increase field inspectors knowledge and understanding of food 

security issues and facilitate their discussions about the voluntary 

security guidelines with plant personnel, we are also recommending that 

the Secretary of Health and Human Services and the Secretary of 

Agriculture provide training for their agencies field staff on the 

security measures discussed in the voluntary guidelines.

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:

We provided FDA and USDA with a draft of this report for their review 

and comment. We received written and clarifying oral comments from each 

agency. The agencies also provided technical comments, which we 

incorporated into the report as appropriate. FDA agreed with our 

recommendation that it provide all food inspection personnel with 

training on security measures. Subsequently, FDA officials told us that 

the agency did not have an opinion on our recommendation that it study 

what additional authorities it may need relating to security measures 

at food-processing facilities. In its written comments, FDA stated that 

the report is factual and describes accurately the events and actions 

that FDA has taken on food security. FDA also commented that one of the 

goals of its voluntary guidance to industry is to heighten awareness of 

food security practices and that the role of its investigators is first 

and foremost food safety. FDA also said that it does not have 

sufficient security expertise to provide industry with consultation in 

this area. FDA further commented that although HACCP and other 

preventive controls are appropriate measures to enhance food safety, 

HACCP does not afford similar advantages for addressing deliberate 

contamination, tampering, and/or terrorist actions related to the food 

supply. Our report underscores that the role of FDAs investigators is 

primarily one of food safety. Nevertheless, we believe that it is also 

crucial for cognizant agencies to have information about industrys 

security efforts so that they can assess the extent to which the risk 

of deliberate contamination is being mitigated. We also believe that 

possessing such information is important if it becomes necessary to 

advise food processors on needed security enhancements. With regard to 

HACCP, our report does not take a position on the feasibility of using 

HACCP as a means to control deliberate contamination; instead, we 

report on the opinion of the National Academies. FDAs comments are 

presented in appendix V.

In its written comments, USDA agreed with the contents of our report. 

Subsequently, USDAs food safety officials confirmed that the agency 

also agrees with the reports recommendations. In its letter, USDA 

commented that it has already conducted a comprehensive risk assessment 

of the food supply without plant security information and that knowing 

whether a plant employed one or several security measures was not 

needed to assess the risk. Our report acknowledges that USDA has 

conducted a comprehensive risk assessment, but we believe that it is 

crucial for cognizant agencies to have information about industrys 

security efforts so that they can assess the extent to which the risk 

of deliberate contamination is being mitigated. USDAs comments are 

presented in appendix IV.

As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents 

of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days 

from the report date. At that time, we will send copies to the 

Secretaries of Agriculture and Health and Human Services; the Director 

of the Federal Bureau of Investigation; the Director, Office of 

Management and Budget; and other interested parties. We will also make 

copies available to others upon request. In addition, the report will 

be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.

If you have any questions about this report, please contact Maria 

Cristina Gobin or me at (202) 512-3841. Key contributors to this report 

are listed in appendix VI.

signed by Lawrence J. Dyckman:

Lawrence J. Dyckman

Director, Natural Resources 

  and Environment:

[End of section]

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:

To determine the extent to which the current federal food safety 

statutes can be effectively used to regulate security at food-

processing facilities, we analyzed the Food and Drug Administrations 

(FDA) and the U.S. Department of Agricultures (USDA) existing 

statutory authorities. We discussed these authorities with FDA and USDA 

counsel and requested a legal opinion to determine the extent to which 

each agency believes its existing authorities allow it to regulate food 

security. We then independently reviewed these authorities to draw our 

own conclusions.

To describe the actions that FDA and USDA have taken to help food 

processors prevent or reduce the risk of deliberate food contamination, 

we met with staff from FDA and FSIS to review the voluntary guidelines 

issued by each agency. To better understand the provisions of the 

guidelines, we met with agency program staff responsible for issuing 

the guidelines and for receiving industry comments on it. To learn how 

the guidelines would be implemented, we met with FDA and USDAs Food 

Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) officials responsible for field 

operations and with staff from field offices in Atlanta, Georgia, and 

Beltsville, Maryland. Finally, to gather additional information about 

the vulnerability of the food supply to acts of deliberate 

contamination, we contacted nine experts from academia, including 

experts in food safety and in bioterrorism.

To describe how the government is determining the extent to which food-

processing companies are implementing security procedures, we asked FDA 

and FSIS program officials about the nature of the information they are 

collecting about industry security measures. We also conducted surveys 

of agency field personnel to obtain their observations about and 

knowledge of food security measures taken at facilities they regularly 

inspect for food safety. Our FDA survey, which was Web-based, was 

administered to all 150 field investigators who recorded 465 or more 

hours for domestic food inspection from June 1, 2001 to May 31, 2002. 

Our survey of FSIS staff was a telephone survey of a randomly selected 

stratified sample of 50 circuit supervisors. Our response rate for 

these surveys was higher than 85 percent for FDA and 90 percent for 

FSIS, and respondents included participants from all the agencies 

geographic regions. Before administering the surveys, we discussed with 

and obtained input from FDA and FSIS program officials. We also 

pretested the surveys at field locations to ensure that our questions 

were valid, clear, and precise and that responding to the survey did 

not place an undue burden on the respondents. In addition, we contacted 

state audit offices in all 50 states to collect information about state 

government actions designed to prevent the deliberate contamination of 

food products. Of the 50 state audit offices we contacted, only 11 

agreed to help us collect this information: Arizona, Florida, Maryland, 

Michigan, New York, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, 

Tennessee, and Texas.

To determine the extent to which the food-processing industry is 

implementing security measures to better protect its products against 

deliberate contamination, we contacted officials from 13 trade 

associations representing, among others, the meat and poultry, dairy, 

egg, and fruits and vegetables industries and the food-processing 

industry. We discussed the guidelines that their organizations have 

issued, and they described what actions their constituents are taking 

to protect their products. We also visited five food-processing 

facilities in various geographic regions to ask corporate and plant 

officials about the actions they have taken to protect their products 

and facilities against intentional contamination. These facilities 

included a slaughter plant as well as facilities that produce beverages 

and ready-to-eat products. We recognize that the efforts of these five 

facilities are not necessarily representative of the whole food-

processing industry. To identify the concerns that the industry has 

about sharing sensitive information with federal agencies, we spoke 

with industry representatives as well as officials from the Federal 

Bureau of Investigations National Infrastructure Protection Center.

We conducted our review from February through December 2002 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

[End of section]

Appendix II: FDA Survey Results:

[End of section]

[See PDF for image]

[End of section]

Appendix III: FSIS Survey Results:

[End of section]

[See PDF for image]

[End of section]

Appendix IV: Comments from the U.S. Department of Agriculture:

Mr. Lawrence J. Dyckman:

Director, Natural Resources and Environment Team Food and Agriculture 

Issues:

United States General Accounting Office 441 G Street, NW, Room 2T23 

Washington, DC 20548:

Dear Mr. Dyckman:

Thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on the GAO Draft 

Report (GAO-03-342), FOOD SECURITY: Voluntary Efforts Are Underway, 

but Federal Agencies Cannot Fully Assess Their Implementation draft 

report. We generally agree with the contents of this report. However, 

please consider the following comment.

On page 22 GAO concluded that the ...federal agencies cannot fully 

assess the vulnerability of the nations food supply, or advise 

processors on needed security enhancements. Restate sentence to read: 

...federal agencies may have a difficult time assessing the 

vulnerability of the nations food supply...:

FSIS, as acknowledged on page 7 of the report, has completed a risk 

assessment of the food supply from farm to table. However, FSIS did not 

require information on the plant security measures to conduct its risk 

assessment. FSIS made the assumption that plant security measures could 

be overcome by a determined terrorist and that certain commodities or 

processes could be more at risk than others to an attack. Security 

measures could lessen the risk, but the risk would still exist. The 

risk assessment evaluated which agents could be used on the food 

supply, which agents are easy to obtain or produce, and assessed 

whether the food-processing product had any mitigation factors that 

would prevent or lessen an intentional attack. These assumptions were 

then used to develop a risk model. Knowing whether a plant employed one 

or several security measures was not needed to assess the risk.

We have enclosed a few editorial comments for your consideration.

Sincerely,

Signed by Garry L. McKee:

Garry L. McKee, Ph.D., M.P.H. Administrator:

[End of section]

Appendix V: Comments from the Food and Drug Administration:

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES:

Food and Drug Administration Rockville MD 20857:

January 22, 2003:

Mr. Lawrence J. Dyckman:

Director, Natural Resources and Environment United States General 

Accounting Office 441 G Street, NW:

Washington, DC 20548:

Dear Mr. Dyckman:

Please find the enclosed comments from the Food and Drug Administration 

on the GAO draft report entitled, FOOD SECURITY: Voluntary Efforts Are 

Underway, but Federal Agencies Cannot Fully Assess Their Implementation 

(GAO-03-342). The Agency provided extensive technical comments directly 

to your staff.

We appreciate the opportunity to review and comment on this draft 

report before its publication as well as the opportunity to work with 

your staff in developing this report.

Sincerely,

Signed by Mark B. McClellan:

Mark B. McClellan, M.D., Ph.D. Commissioner of Food and Drugs:

Enclosure:

General Comments by the Department of Health and Human Services Food 

and Drug Administration (FDA) on General Accounting Offices (GAO) 

Draft Report FOOD SECURITY: Voluntary Efforts Are Underway, but Federal 

Agencies Cannot Fully Assess Their Implementation GAO-03-342):

FDA appreciates the opportunity to comment on GAOs draft report. The 

report is factual and describes accurately the events and actions taken 

by FDA related to food security as well as the sensitive nature of the 

information related to security measures taken by the food-processing 

industry.

GAO also accurately acknowledges efforts taken by FDA and other 

government agencies to enhance safety and security of regulated 

products. These efforts, in conjunction with the Public Health Security 

and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, are primarily 

directed toward imported products.

The draft report discusses the different views between USDA and FDA on 

its authorities to address security concerns. In point of fact, our 

positions are very similar and any slight difference is more an issue 

of semantics rather than of substance.

FDA would like to stress that the goal of its voluntary guidance to 

industry on security is not only to facilitate an exchange of 

information between FDA and industry on the subject of food security 

but also to heighten awareness of their food security practices. FDA 

does not possess sufficient resources in security expertise per se to 

provide consultation to the industry in this area. However, if we 

heighten awareness of security issues, the industry can consult with 

security experts to review their facility and adopt appropriate 

procedures. The role of the FDA investigator is first and foremost food 

safety and, as an ancillary role, to observe food security measures as 

they relate to the food safety investigation. FDA is only obliged to 

observe and comment when certain measures are not easily visible and do 

not link up and when they coincide with the primary purpose of the 

investigation.

In addition, FDA agrees with GAO that Hazards Analysis Critical Control 

Points (HACCP) and other preventive controls are appropriate measures 

to reduce and or eliminate food safety contamination but do not believe 

HACCP affords similar advantages to deliberate contamination, tampering 

and or terrorist actions to the food supply. Accordingly, and in 

cooperation with the U.S. Air Force, FDA employed the Operational Risk 

Management approach to identify and minimize food security risks.

GAOs Recommendations for Executive Action:

1. In order to reduce the risk of deliberate contamination of food 

products, we are recommending that the Secretary of Health and Human 

Services and the Secretary of the Agriculture study their existing 

statutes and identify what additional authorities they may need 

relating to security measures at food-processing facilities. Based on 

the results of the study, the agencies should seek additional authority 

from the Congress, as needed.

FDA response:

FDA believes that its authorities under the Federal Food, Drug, and 

Cosmetic Act and the Public Health Service Act would extend to the 

regulation of facility security measures to prevent the intentional 

contamination of food products to the extent they overlap with food 

safety.

As we have previously reported, the General Counsel in the Department 

of Health and Human Services Offic e of the Assistant Secretary for 

Legislation advised that FDAs authorities under the Federal Food, 

Drug, and Cosmetic Act and the Public Health Service Act provide FDA 

with tools to adopt measures to control insanitary preparation, 

packing, and holding conditions that may lead to unsafe food, detect 

contamination of food, and control contaminated food. However, HHS 

counsel also advised that FDAs food safety authorities do not extend 

to the regulation of physical facility security measures to prevent 

intentional contamination of food products. FDA counsel believes that 

to the extent that food safety and security overlap, FDA might be able 

to require industry to take steps to improve security depending on the 

particular measure at issue, but observed that there is likely to be 

little overlap between safety and security in various areas, e.g., 

background checks of employees.

2. To increase field inspectors knowledge and understanding of food 

security issues and facilitate their discussions about the voluntary 

security guidelines with plant personnel, we are also recommending that 

the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services and the 

Secretary of Agriculture provide training for the agencys field staff 

on the security measures discussed in the voluntary guidelines.

FDA response:

FDA plans to conduct formal training on the guidance to industry on 

food security in addition to the formal instructions previously 

provided to FDA field staff on the guidance. We agree that the training 

FDA delivers to field staff will:

*Discuss the content of the guidance and how food security activities 

are integrated into a food safety inspection;

*Address food security as it relates to the guidance to industry as an 

ancillary function of a food safety inspection and/or investigation;

*Encourage inspectors not to delve beyond those facility operations 

that are directly a part of a food safety investigation; and:

*Not be considered to confer expert credentials for security upon FDA 

investigators but simply improve their abilities to heighten awareness 

of facility management on food security at the time of the food safety 

investigation.

[End of section]

Appendix VI: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:

GAO Contacts:

Lawrence J. Dyckman, (202) 512-3841

Maria Cristina Gobin, (202) 512-8418:

Acknowledgments:

In addition to those named above, John Johnson, John Nicholson, Jr., 

Stuart Ryba, and Margaret Skiba made key contributions to this report. 

Nancy Crothers, Doreen S. Feldman, Oliver Easterwood, Evan Gilman, and 

Ronald La Due Lake also made important contributions.

FOOTNOTES

[1] FDAs HACCP program applies only to seafood and juice, not to all 

FDA-regulated food. 

[2] See U.S. General Accounting Office, Food Safety: Overview of 

Federal and State Expenditures, GAO-01-177 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 20, 

2001).

[3] This act contains provisions that provide FDA with new authority to 

detain products that are believed to present a serious health threat. 

It also authorizes FDA to debar importers who have been convicted of 

certain food import violations, which results in the denial of delivery 

of products to those importers.

[4] Operational Risk Management is an approach to risk assessment that 

increases operational effectiveness by anticipating hazards and 

reducing the potential for loss.

[5] On November 25, 2002, President Bush signed the Homeland Security 

Act of 2002, which created the Department of Homeland Security. The 

Department will replace the Office of Homeland Security.

[6] See National Research Council of the National Academies, Making the 

Nation Safer: The Role of Science and Technology in Countering 

Terrorism (Washington, D.C: June 2002).

[7] See Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Public Health 

Assessment of Potential Biological Terrorism Agents, Emerging 

Infectious Diseases (Atlanta, Ga.: February 2002).

[8] FDA, under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act and the Public 

Health Service Act, and USDA, under the Federal Meat Inspection Act, 

Poultry Products Inspection Act, and the Egg Products Inspection Act, 

have broad authority to regulate food safety. These laws require that 

food products be processed under sanitary conditions, be unadulterated, 

and be properly labeled.

[9] USDAs view on its authority to impose security requirements that 

are closely related to sanitary conditions is derived from the food 

safety laws prohibitions against adulteration. Adulterated food is 

virtually identically defined in the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic 

Act and the Federal Meat, Poultry Products, and Egg Products Inspection 

Acts as food that has been prepared, packed, [packaged in the egg 

inspection act] or held under insanitary conditions whereby it may have 

become contaminated with filth, or whereby it may have been rendered 

injurious to health. See 21 U.S.C. 342(a)(4), 21 U.S.C. 601(m)(4), 21 

U.S.C. 453(g)(4) and 21 U.S.C. 1033(a)(4).

[10] FDA was first to issue guidelines in January 2002; FSIS 

subsequently issued its guidelines in May 2002. 

[11] See www.cfsan.fda.gov/~dms/secguid.html for FDA and 

www.fsis.usda.gov/oa/topics/securityguide.htm for FSIS.

[12] Eleven of the 50 state audit offices we contacted for assistance 

in interviewing their food regulatory officials responded to our 

request. The participating state auditing offices were Arizona, 

Florida, Maryland, Michigan, New York, North Carolina, Oklahoma, 

Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and Texas. Because the state auditors 

collected information from only 11 states, these observations cannot be 

generalized. 

[13] According to an FSIS memorandum to its field personnel, 

heightened alert is defined as identifying and reporting any 

suspicious activities that could adversely affect our nations 

security.

[14] The Technical Service Center provides field inspection personnel 

with technical assistance, advice, and guidance regarding the 

implementation of national policies, programs, and procedures. The 

center also serves as a central point for reporting and responding to 

suspicious activities related to food security. 

[15] The vulnerability assessment must include, among other things, a 

review of pipes and constructed conveyances; physical barriers; and 

water collection, pretreatment, treatment, storage, and distribution 

facilities.

[16] The facilities vary in size from 100 to 800 employees.

[17] We surveyed 50 FSIS Circuit Supervisors (obtained responses from 

45) who oversee the activities of the agencys field inspectors and 150 

FDA investigators (obtained responses from 128) who perform the 

inspections of food-processing facilities to ask about the security 

measures they have observed at the plants they inspect. Our survey 

included questions about outside security, visitor access, employee 

screening, and shipping and handling, among others. The methods used 

and results from these surveys are contained in appendixes II and III.

[18] The National Food Processors Association is in the process of 

evaluating the results from its food security survey of its members, 

but not all of the results were ready in time to be included in this 

report.

[19] See, for example, Critical Mass Energy Project v. Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission, 975 F. 2d 871 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (en banc) cert. 

denied, 507 U.S. 984 (1993) (information in safety reports 

voluntarily provided to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission by nuclear 

safety groups was confidential and thus exempt from disclosure under 

the Freedom of Information Acts exemption for financial or commercial 

information).

[20] Security measures listed in FDAs and FSISs food security 

guidelines are somewhat different. The agencies developed their 

guidelines in January and May 2002, respectively, and did not 

coordinate their efforts. 

[21] FDA preferred that we ask about the level of satisfaction, while 

FSIS wanted us to ask about the level of confidence.

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