Board of Contract Appeals
                    General Services Administration
                         Washington, D.C. 20405
 
          ____________________________________________________
 
                         GSBCA 12710 GRANTED; 
            GSBCA 12294, 12523,12690, 12907 GRANTED IN PART;
          GSBCA 12841, 12842 DENIED IN PART:  October 23, 1998
          ____________________________________________________
 
 
                       GSBCA 12294, 12523, 12690,
                       12710, 12841, 12842, 12907
 
 
                   SAE/AMERICON - MID ATLANTIC, INC.,
 
                                                     Appellant,
 
                                   v.
 
                    GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION,
 
                                                     Respondent.
 
        Peter  M. D'Ambrosio, Mark E. Hanson,  Eun K. (Julie) Chung,
   and John Marshall Cook of Smith, Pachter, McWhorter & D'Ambrosio,
   Vienna, VA, counsel for Appellant.
 
        Robert C. Smith,  Martin A. Hom, Kevin S.  Anderson and Nora
   P.   Huey,   Office   of   General  Counsel,   General   Services
   Administration, Washington, DC, counsel for Respondent.
 
   Before Board Judges BORWICK, HYATT, and VERGILIO.
 
   HYATT, Board Judge.
 
        These  consolidated appeals arise  under a contract  for the
   construction of the Trenton Courthouse Annex for  the firm, fixed
   price of $22,519,000.  The appeals are from contracting officer's
   decisions  (a)   denying  claims  totaling     $10,375,448.81  in
   equitable  adjustments  and  (b)  terminating  the  contract  for
   default  for  failure   to  make  progress  adequate   to  ensure
   completion of the work in  a manner that would meet the  contract
   completion date.   Given the amount of excusable  and Government-
   caused delay demonstrated  by the contractor, SAE/Americon  - Mid
   Atlantic, Inc., we find that the Government improperly terminated
   the contract for  default and convert the termination  to one for
   the convenience of  the Government.  Resolution of  the amount of
   any quantum  to which  SAE may be  entitled based  on Government-
   caused delay, changed work,   and the termination of its contract
   is  deferred for consideration  in conjunction with  a settlement
   proposal       based      on       the      termination       for
   convenience.[foot #] 1
 
 
                            Findings of Fact
 
   Background
 
        1.   Contract    number    GS-03P-91-CDC-0006,    for    the
   construction   of  an  annex  to  the  existing  Trenton  Federal
   Courthouse in  Trenton, New Jersey,  was awarded  by the  General
   Services Administration (GSA)  to SAE   on April  26, 1991.   The
   annex was designed as a seven-story  building with a two and one-
   half level underground parking garage.  The contract drawings and
   specifications delineated  a  structural steel  frame, and  metal
   decks with concrete  slab floors, and fireproofing,  over drilled
   pier caissons.   The exterior wall was  designed as a  metal stud
   backup  covered with vapor barrier sheathing, building paper, and
   an exterior  veneer of limestone  or ground-faced block.   On the
   north  side of  the building,  the  contractor was  to install  a
   curtain wall, or  beacon, which is an architectural  feature made
                                                                    
                   ----------- FOOTNOTE BEGINS ---------
 
        [foot #] 1 During the hearing  of these appeals, discussions
   arose between  counsel and the Board concerning  the proper focus
   of testimony  in light of  Government objections to  exhibits and
   testimony from subcontractors  with respect  to monetary  claims.
   The principal basis for the  objections was surprise based on the
   fact  that quantum  claims and  supporting  information had  been
   updated, but not earlier provided, to counsel for respondent. The
   discussion  centered on  issues  of  efficiency  and  economy  in
   litigating the full  panoply of quantum issues  when a successful
   challenge to  the  default action  would result  in these  issues
   being subsumed  in a termination for convenience  recovery.  See,
                                                                ___
   e.g., Nolan Brothers,  Inc. v. United States, 405  F.2d 1250 (Ct.
   ____  ______________________________________
   Cl.  1969); PBI Electric  Corp. v. United States,  17 Cl. Ct. 128
               ____________________________________
   (1989);  Foremost Mechanical  Systems, Inc.  v. General  Services
                   ----------- FOOTNOTE BEGINS ---------
   Administration,   GSBCA 12335, et al.,  95-1 BCA   27,382 (1994).
   ______________
   Following  these  discussions,  the parties,  and  respondent  in
   particular,  focused  principally on the merits of the delay case
   presented by SAE to rebut the Government's case in support of its
   termination decision.   Although appellant has presented proposed
   findings  with respect  to quantum,  respondent,  in reliance  on
   these discussions, did not brief these issues.  Given the Board's
   determination that  the default termination  action was improper,
   quantum issues are deferred  for resolution in connection  with a
   termination for convenience  settlement proposal.  To  the extent
   further proceedings  are required,  the evidence  already in  the
   record concerning  quantum will  be considered  at that time,  as
   will be  any supplementary  evidence and  argument necessary  for
   resolution of  any monetary amounts  which SAE may claim  under a
   termination for convenience settlement.   
 
                   ----------- FOOTNOTE ENDS -----------
 
 
   of  an  aluminum frame  with  glass  that  hangs outside  of  the
   building  and  does  not structurally  support  any  part of  the
   building.      Transcript   at  64-65;      Appeal   File,  GSBCA
   12253[foot #] 2, Exhibit 1. 
 
 
        2.   In  February 1989,  GSA  awarded an  architect-engineer
   contract to  the  Vitetta Group  for design  services to  develop
   conceptual, tentative, 50% working and 100% construction drawings
   and  specifications  to  be  used  by GSA  to  solicit  bids  for
   construction of the annex.   GSA's contract with Vitetta required
   the architect to conduct  subsurface geotechnical investigations.
   Hearing   Exhibit   A-288.[foot #] 3      Under   its    contract
   with GSA, Vitetta  was also responsible for  reviewing submittals
   of shop drawings to ensure compliance with contract requirements.
   Appeal  File,  GSBCA  12253,  Exhibit  3,    01010,    1.02,  and
     01300; Transcript at 2929-40.  
 
        3.   GSA's construction quality manager for the project  was
   O'Brien-Kreitzberg & Associates (OKA).  Appeal File, GSBCA 12253,
   Exhibit 3,   01010,   1.02.  In 1989, GSA entered into a contract
   with OKA  for the  provision of  construction quality  management
   services.   That  contract called  for  extensive services  to be
   provided in the managing of the overall project, from development
   of  a   design  for  construction   to  the  completion   of  the
   construction process.   Under this contract, OKA  participated in
   design   reviews,   constructability  reviews   of   the  design,
   identification   of   defects,    conflicts,   ambiguities,   and
   irregularities  in contract documents, and was expected to review
   and monitor schedules  for both  design and  construction of  the
   building.    During   construction  OKA  was  charged   with  the
   responsibility  to  inspect  the general  contractor's  work  for
   conformity  with the  contract  and  to  advise  the  contracting
                                                                    
                   ----------- FOOTNOTE BEGINS ---------
 
        [foot #] 2 GSBCA 12253 was the first appeal filed by SAE  in
   connection   with  this  contract.    It  was  dismissed  without
   prejudice on December 12, 1994, by agreement of the parties.  The
   appeal file submitted  in connection with this  dispute contained
   the contract  and specifications  referred to  in this  decision.
   The dispute  raised  in GSBCA  12253  was incorporated  in  GSBCA
   12907, which combined  the consolidated claims arising  under the
   contract  for the contracting officer's consideration as a whole.
   GSA subsequently submitted a large multi-volume appeal file under
   GSBCA 12907,  which is the  principal appeal file referred  to in
   this decision.   The documents in the appeal file for GSBCA 12253
   were not resubmitted in the  omnibus appeal file for GSBCA 12907,
   however.   We thus continue  to refer  to that appeal  file, even
   though the underlying appeal was dismissed.
 
        [foot #] 3 At the hearing in these cases, both appellant and
   respondent introduced  numerous exhibits not  previously included
   in the appeal  files.  Hearing exhibits offered  by appellant are
   prefaced  with an  "A" before  the  exhibit number;  respondent's
   hearing exhibit numbers are prefaced with an "R."  
 
                   ----------- FOOTNOTE ENDS -----------
 
 
   officer  of  instances  where the  general  contractor  failed to
   correct  or replace work identified as nonconforming or rejected.
   In addition, OKA was responsible for scheduling and  tracking the
   submittal,  review, and approval  of shop drawings,  samples, and
   other submittals.  OKA was to assist the contracting officer with
   changes  to  the construction  contract,  including performing  a
   review  of the  merits  of  change  order  requests,  negotiating
   settlements, and determining  the impact of  changed work on  the
   contract completion date.  Hearing Exhibits A-71, A-72.
 
 
        4.   In performing under its contract, in response to issues
   arising in both the design and construction phases of the Trenton
   project,  OKA retained  the services  of  several consultants  to
   provide  expert  design   services  on  behalf  of  GSA.    These
   subcontractors included Seelye, Stevenson, Value & Knecht (SSVK),
   Wiss  Janney Elstner  (WJE), and  Dames &  Moore.   Transcript at
   4146-48; Hearing Exhibits A-72, A-902.
 
   SAE's Initial Strategy
 
        5.   The invitation for  bids (IFB) for the  construction of
   the  annex  was  issued  in  January  1991,    and  included  the
   construction  drawings  and specifications  prepared  by Vitetta.
   Bids were received  by GSA on March 19, 1991.  Hearing Exhibit A-
   423.
 
        6.   In  January or  February 1991,  SAE, one of  the larger
   construction  contractors   in  the  world,   first  contemplated
   submitting a bid  to construct the Trenton annex.   Transcript at
   49-53.   SAE  was  experienced  in building  courthouses  and  in
   working   on  projects   with  the   United  States   Government.
   Transcript   at  53-56.     SAE   also  had   personnel   in  the
   Philadelphia/Trenton area with experience in public  construction
   projects of a similar size and nature.  Transcript at 58.  
 
        7.   Under the  contract, the  project was  to be  completed
   within 760 calendar days after  receipt of the notice to proceed.
   The  notice  to proceed  was  received by  SAE  on May  16, 1991,
   establishing  June 13,  1993,  as the  completion date.   Hearing
   Exhibit R-94.   SAE  initially hoped to  complete the  project in
   eighteen  months and submitted a construction schedule reflecting
   this  goal.    Transcript  at  150.   For  various  reasons,  the
   eighteen-month  schedule  was  never  approved  by  GSA  or  OKA.
   Transcript at 152-54.   
 
        8.   A memorandum written by the initial SAE project manager
   during the early stages of performance referred to SAE's strategy
   to  win  both  the  Trenton  contract  and  another  construction
   contract for the federal courthouse in nearby Camden, New Jersey,
   and  negotiate  and  award  the  subcontracts  on  both  projects
   simultaneously.  SAE was not awarded the Camden project, however,
   and  thus was not  able to proceed  on this basis.   The internal
   memorandum speculated that as a result, the award of subcontracts
   on the  Trenton project  may have been  delayed.   The memorandum
   states  that as  of  September 1991,  six  subcontracts had  been
   awarded and executed, although many other subcontractors had been
   locked-in  in  principle.    The  memorandum's  author  expressed
   concern that this might  contribute to delays in the submittal of
   subcontractor  shop  drawings  because  subcontractors  were  not
   starting drawings  until their contracts  were in place.   Appeal
   File, Vol. IX, Book I, Exhibit 11.
 
 
        9.   The  initial SAE project manager also observed that, as
   of September 25, 1991, the  project was already forty days behind
   schedule.    Although  he  considered  a  good  portion  of  this
   attributable to Government-caused and excusable delays associated
   with the caisson  work, at the same  time, he noted that  SAE was
   also  considering how to cope  with performance problems with its
   sheeting and  shoring contractor,  Keystone Foundations.   Appeal
   File, Vol. IX, Book I, Exhibit 11.
 
        10.  As of September  25, the SAE project  manager expressed
   concern  that  SAE's  plan to  complete  contract  performance in
   eighteen months was overly aggressive and not realistic, although
   he also  noted that  liquidated damages should  not be  a concern
   because  the contract allowed  twenty-five months to  complete.  
   Appeal File, Vol. IX, Book I, Exhibit 11.
 
        11.  In his testimony  at the hearing, however,  the initial
   SAE project manager stated that prior to bidding the project, SAE
   consulted with trade contractors, including caisson, sheeting and
   shoring,  concrete,  structural  steel,  masonry, and  glass  and
   glazing subcontractors, to  obtain their  views on  how the  work
   could be expected to proceed.  The trades verified SAE's analysis
   of the contract documents and specifications.  Transcript at 139.
   Once SAE received the contract  award, it proceeded to enter into
   subcontracts with the  appropriate trades.  This was  done in the
   order in  which work would be performed.  More than two-thirds of
   the work was at least  informally subcontracted by July 1991; the
   bulk of  the subcontracts were locked  in by September 1991.   To
   the extent some subcontracts were not awarded by that time, these
   were for contract work that was not to be performed for some time
   to come,  and had  no impact  on SAE's  ability to  perform in  a
   timely fashion.  Transcript at 156-57. 
 
   Contract Administration and the Shop Drawing Submittal Process
 
        12.  The contract  contained the  usual Federal  Acquisition
   Regulation (FAR) clauses applicable to a fixed-price construction
   contract, including the Changes clause (FAR 52.243-4 (8-87)), the
   Differing  Site  Conditions  clause (FAR  52.236-2  (4-84)),  the
   Suspension of Work clause (FAR 52.212-12 (4-84)), and the Default
   Termination  clause  (FAR   52.249-10  (4-84)).     The   Default
   Termination clause provided, in pertinent part:
 
             If  the   contractor  refuses  or   fails  to
             prosecute  the  work or  any  separable part,
             with  the  diligence  that  will  insure  its
 
             completion within the  time specified in this
             contract including any extension, or fails to
             complete  the  work  within  this  time,  the
             Government  may,  by  written notice  to  the
             Contractor,  terminate the  right to  proceed
             with the work  (or the separable part  of the
             work) that has been delayed.
 
   Appeal File, GSBCA 12253, Exhibit 2.    In addition, with respect
   to specifications and drawings the contract provided that:
 
             Where   "as   shown"  "as   indicated,"   "as
             detailed,"  or words  of  similar import  are
             used,  it  shall   be  understood  that   the
             reference   is    made   to    the   drawings
             accompanying  this  contract   unless  stated
             otherwise.  
 
   Appeal File, GSBCA 12253, Exhibit 2.  
 
        13.  The  contract  vested authority  in  Vitetta  to review
   SAE's submittals and shop drawings.  Work was not to be  released
   for fabrication  or materials  procured for  installation on  the
   project  until submittals were approved by Vitetta. Vitetta could
   impact  fabrication or  procurement  by requiring  resubmittal of
   drawings incorporating  Vitetta's notations  or by  rejecting the
   submittals  outright, and  requiring resubmittals.   The contract
   specifications provided that:
 
             Architect will  indicate    findings  of  his
             review on  the Architect's  Stamp and  on the
             Submittals Transmittal, and if appropriate by
             notation on submittal, as follows:
 
             1.   Reviewed:    Work may  be  fabricated or
                  procured, and installed, as described in
                  submittal.
 
             2.   Reviewed with  Notations:   Work may  be
                  fabricated or  procured as  described in
                  the submittal as  modified by notations,
                  but  may not be delivered to the site or
                  installed.  A  transmittal is  required,
                  verifying    inclusion    of    notation
                  information.
 
             3.   Revise and  resubmit:   Work may  not be
                  fabricated or  procured.   A resubmittal
                  is  required  incorporating  information
                  found to be lacking or erroneous.
 
             4.   Rejected:  Work may not be fabricated or
                  procured:     Submittal  is   considered
                  inconsistent   with    requirements   in
 
                  Contract  Documents.     Resubmittal  is
                  required.
 
   The contract also  provided that "[i]f, in the  course of review,
   [the]  Architect/Engineer  determines  that  non-compliance  with
   requirements  of  this   section  or  other   Contract  Documents
   indicates  inadequate  review by  Contractor,  Architect/Engineer
   will reject and return submittal without further review."  Appeal
   File, GSBCA 12253, Exhibit 3,   01300,   1.09.
 
        14.  With  respect  to  the  drawing  submittal  process the
   contract further required:
 
             Where  action  and  return   is  required  or
             requested,  the   Contracting  Officer   will
             review each submittal,  mark with Action, and
             where  possible  return  within  2  weeks  of
             receipt.   Where submittal must  be held  for
             coordination, Contractor will be so advised.
 
             1.   Final  Unrestricted Release:   Work  may
                  proceed,  provided   it  complies   with
                  contract  documents,  when  submittal is
                  returned marked "Approved."
 
             2.   Final-But-Restricted Release:   Work may
                  proceed,  provided   it  complies   with
                  notations and  corrections on  submittal
                  and   with   contract   documents,  when
                  submittal is  returned marked  "Approved
                  as Noted."
 
             3.   Returned  for   Resubmittal:     Do  not
                  proceed with work.   Revise submittal in
                  accordance with  notations thereon,  and
                  resubmit  without  delay   to  obtain  a
                  different action marking.   Do not allow
                  submittals      marked     "Disapproved,
                  Resubmit" (or unmarked  submittals where
                  a  marking is  required) to  be used  in
                  connection with performance of the work.
 
             4.   Other  Action:     Where   submittal  is
                  returned  for  other reasons,  with  the
                  Contracting     Officer's    explanation
                  included, it will  be marked "Action Not
                  Required."
 
   Appeal File, GSBCA 12253, Exhibit 3,   01300,   1.11A.
 
        15.  The contract  also called  for the  development by  the
   contractor  of  a   critical  path  method  (CPM)   network  plan
   demonstrating complete fulfillment of  all contract requirements,
   with  this plan  to be  updated regularly  and used  in planning,
   performing, reporting, and  coordinating the work.   The contract
   required that the CPM plan be  developed through the activity-on-
   arrow  diagraming method (ADM).   Adjustments to  scheduled times
   for  completion of the  work were to  be made  only in accordance
   with the CPM clause.  Each request  for a time extension based on
   claimed  delays or changed work  was to be  accompanied by a time
   impact analysis (TIA), based upon  the date or dates when changes
   were issued or  delays began.  Appeal File,  GSBCA 12253, Exhibit
   3,    01311.    With  respect to  TIAs,  the contract  explicitly
   required:
 
 
             1.   The Time  Impact Analysis  shall be
                  based upon  the date or  dates when
                  the change or  changes were issued,
                  or the  date or dates  when alleged
                  delay or  delays began,  the status
                  of the Construction Project at that
                  time and  shall include  event time
                  computations   for   all   affected
                  activities. 
 
             2.   If  the  Contracting  Officer finds
                  after  review  of the  Time  Impact
                  Analysis  that  the  Contractor  is
                  entitled to  any extension  of time
                  for completing any of the milestone
                  times  for  completion,   the  time
                  adjustments will be approved by the
                  Contracting Officer, whether or not
                  the  time  for  completion  of  the
                  overall    project   is    extended
                  thereby,  and  the  Contractor will
                  then  be  directed  to  revise  the
                  Project Schedule accordingly.
 
             3.   If the Contractor does not submit a
                  Time Impact  Analysis for  a change
                  or alleged  delay, or  provide such
                  additional  supporting  information
                  as  the  Contracting   Officer  may
                  require within the specified period
                  of time, or  within such additional
                  time  as  may  be  allowed  by  the
                  Contracting  Officer.  [sic]    The
                  Contracting Officer  will determine
                  the  time impact,  if  any, of  the
                  change  alleged delay.   . . .   If
                  this  results  in  a  determination
                  that no adjustments should be made,
                  the Contracting Officer  will issue
                  said determination and  Time Impact
                  Analysis to  the Contractor  at the
                  time of  directing such  adjustment
                  of the time for completion.
   Appeal File, GSBCA 12253, Exhibit 3,   01311.  Following issuance
   of the  notice to  proceed, SAE submitted,  and GSA  approved, an
   initial  120-day  construction   schedule  (covering  preliminary
   activities to be performed under  the project) as required by the
   contract.  Transcript at 149-50.
 
 
        16.  The contract also defined certain  milestone events and
   maximum periods for completing these events from issuance of  the
   notice to proceed (NTP):
 
             Description                             Days from NTP
 
             1.   Caissons  completed, subbasement  walls.
                              70
 
             2.   Complete concrete through first floor slab
                  ready to start steel construction.           180 
 
             3.   Steel erected and plumb, metal deck and
                  all related work complete and ready for
                  concrete placement on initial three elevated
                  slabs above first floor.                250
 
             4.   Three levels of elevated concrete slab
                  Description                        Days from NTP
 
                  above first floor complete and ready
                  for exterior wall.  Mech/elec rough-in 
                  started.                           295
 
             5.   Start exterior masonry above limestone 
                  (scaffold erected and one floor of
                  sheathing complete).                    310
 
             6.   Four levels of mech/elec rough-in
                  complete.  Mech room, mech & elect
                  working.                           360
 
             7.   Building watertight, roofs, exterior
                  walls, glazing all complete.            400
 
             8.   Mech & elect complete on all floors,
                  equipment installed, start full system
                  testing except air balance.                  490
 
             9.   East or west half of one courtroom floor 
                  substantially complete except for painting,
                  carpet, drapes, and other appropriate finish
                  items as approved by CQM.               530
 
             10.  Interior finishes, millwork, doors &
                  hardware security systems all complete
                  (except touch-up painting, carpet, and 
                  drapes) ready for punch list.           730
 
                  Contract Completion                760
 
   Appeal File, GSBCA 12253, Exhibit 3,   01311.
 
        17.  Following   submission  of   the  preliminary   120-day
   schedule, SAE  submitted an eighteen-month  duration construction
   schedule  in  CPM  format.    The  schedule contained  about  250
   activities.   Transcript at  150.   SAE's  schedule was  prepared
   using the precedent diagram method (PDM); SAE contended that this
   method  was functionally equivalent  to the arrow  diagram method
   (ADM) required under  the contract.   Transcript at 150,  152-53,
   234-38.   Although  the  contract  did not  prohibit  a  schedule
   projecting early completion,  this particular schedule  was never
   approved.  Finding 7.  
 
        18.  At the time that SAE's initial  eighteen-month schedule
   was submitted,  the contracting  officer and  OKA believed  SAE's
   schedule was achievable and  not submitted with the intention  of
   creating claims  on the project.   Deposition of  James Concannon
   (Concannon Deposition), Vol.  2 at 256-57.   Other GSA  personnel
   were skeptical of  the compressed schedule, however,  and advised
   against  approval of an  eighteen-month schedule.   Deposition of
   Marc Mitchelson (Mitchelson  Deposition) at 24-25.   Vitetta also
   advised  against  approval  of  SAE's  eighteen-month   schedule.
   Concannon Deposition, Vol. 2 at 239-40. 
 
        19.  During  the  early days  of  contract performance,  SAE
   submitted  monthly updates of its eighteen-month schedule to OKA.
   In addition, SAE  prepared weekly  updates for  its own  internal
   planning purposes.   Transcript at 154-55.  SAE  also held weekly
   meetings with  subcontractors to  coordinate work  in the  field.
   Transcript at 159.
 
   Excavation and Foundation Work 
 
        Excavation and Installation of Caissons
 
        20.  The  contract  documents  included  specifications  and
   drawings that described the required work for construction of the
   caissons.  The solicitation  documents also provided geotechnical
   data  related to subsurface  conditions.  Hearing  Exhibit A-261;
   Transcript at  141-42.  The  geotechnical data made  available to
   prospective  bidders was produced in connection with a subsurface
   investigation  conducted by Earth  Engineering Services  (EES) at
   the    request    of    Vitetta.         Hearing    Exhibit    A-
   261.[foot #] 4
 
                                                                    
                   ----------- FOOTNOTE BEGINS ---------
 
        [foot #] 4 The Geotechnical  Report produced  by EES  stated
   that  the scope  of the  investigation "consisted  of a  site and
   subsurface  investigation, laboratory  testing of  representative
   soil samples and  an engineering analysis  of pertinent site  and
   subsurface data."  Hearing Exhibit A-261.
 
                   ----------- FOOTNOTE ENDS -----------
 
 
 
        21.  Section 02380  of the contract  specifications required
   the contractor to:
 
             Provide  concrete caissons  to the  extent of
             which  is  shown on  the  Drawings, including
             locations,  diameters  of  shafts,  estimated
             bottom elevations, top elevations and details
             of construction.
 
   Appeal File, GSBCA 12253, Exhibit  3; Hearing Exhibit A-260.  The
   specifications called for installation  of eighty-five reinforced
   concrete caissons.  The contract additionally required that SAE:
 
             Drill  caisson  shafts  down  to  sound  rock
             acceptable to  the soils engineer  as capable
             of  supporting   60  tons  per   square  foot
             [tsf]. . . .    When caissons  bear  on rock,
             socket  the bottom  . .  . at least  6 inches
             into rock with required bearing capacity.
 
   Appeal  File, GSBCA 12253, Exhibit 3,    02380,    3.02(D) & (E).
   The  locations  and elevations  of  the  caissons  were shown  on
   drawings 9-S-1  and 9-S-2.   The excavation  of caisson  work was
   defined  by the  contract  as "unclassified."    This meant  that
   appellant was responsible for the  removal of all materials  from
   the  ground  surface  down  to  the  completion  of  the caisson.
   Transcript at 2395.  
 
        22.  The contract specified that drilling equipment shall be
   "power driven auger type."   Appeal File, GSBCA 12253, Exhibit 3,
     02380,   2.01. 
 
        23.  Appendix A  to the solicitation  contained geotechnical
   data and  information  concerning  subsurface  conditions.    The
   Geotechnical Report stated that:
 
             The    objective    of    the    geotechnical
             investigations is to provide an assessment of
             foundation    conditions   and    recommended
             criteria pertaining to  foundation design and
             construction.  The scope of the investigation
             consisted   of   a    site   and   subsurface
             investigation,    laboratory    testing    of
             representative    soil    samples    and   an
             engineering  analysis of  pertinent site  and
             subsurface data.
 
   Hearing Exhibit A-261.  The contract stated that GSA's purpose in
   including   the  geotechnical   data  and   exploratory  drilling
   information  was  so that  the  "Contractor  may  have  the  same
   information as is available to the Government and the Architect."
   Hearing Exhibit A-260.  
        24.  With  respect to  the  geotechnical data  provided, the
   Government cautioned  however, that:
 
             (B)  the  data is  not guaranteed  as to
                  accuracy or completeness; and . . .
 
 
             (D)  the   submission    of   the    bid
                  constitutes  an  agreement  by  the
                  Bidder that he  shall make no claim
                  against the Government or Architect
                  because  the  subsurface  data made
                  available is not  representative of
                  the actual subsurface conditions.
 
   Hearing Exhibit A-261.
 
        25.  The Geotechnical Report presented the results of eleven
   test  borings.   The  report  set forth  the  eleven boring  logs
   detailing the  results of  the test  borings, including  standard
   penetration testing  and rock core  boring, at the  project site.
   One test  boring (TB), TB-108, was  a boring five feet  into rock
   underlying the site.  Hearing Exhibit A-261.
 
        26.  The  report  stated  that  for  purposes  of  preparing
   estimates, the  top  of  "sound" bedrock  should  be  assumed  as
   thirty-two   feet  below   existing   surface   for  the   entire
   investigation site.  Hearing Exhibit A-261.  
 
        27.  Nine  of  the  eleven  boring  logs  contained  in  the
   Geotechnical   Report  noted   "Auger   refusal  on   Precambrian
   'undifferentiated'  hard bedrock."   One boring log  noted "Auger
   refusal  on  Precambrian  'undifferentiated'  bedrock,"  and  the
   remaining boring  log stated  that the rock  was "hard  fractured
   Precambrian 'undifferentiated'  biotitel feldspar  Gneiss bedrock
   of fair quality."  Hearing Exhibit A-261.
 
        28.  The boring logs showed the depth of auger refusals  and
   bedrock  to  be between  23   and  33   feet below  the  existing
   surface, with  all but three  borings reflecting depths  of auger
   refusal between 28 and 33  feet.   The only rock core boring, TB-
   108,  showed the depth of  bedrock at 32  feet below the existing
   surface.  Hearing Exhibit A-261.  
 
        29.  Each of the  boring logs stated that  above the bedrock
   were  layers  of  "dense  to  very  dense gray-brown  silty  fine
   gravelly,  coarse  to   fine  sand/medium  to  fine   sand  (SM);
   occasionally  interbedded with dense  to very dense  gray poorly-
   graded coarse  to fine sandy  gravel with little fine  gravel and
   silt  (GP-GM)."       Three  boring  logs  showed   a  hard  soil
   classification,  with the auger  having penetrated the  hard soil
   material.   Eight boring  logs described  "very dense  decomposed
   rock" just above  the hard  bedrock.    None of  the boring  logs
   showed the  presence of any  weathered rock.  Hearing  Exhibit A-
   261; Transcript at 2464-65, 2470.
 
        30.  The specifications  required that after  the contractor
   drilled the caissons  to the indicated  depth of bedrock  surface
   and  socketed  six  inches  into  the  60  tsf  bearing  rock,  a
   professional  engineer was  to  check  and  certify  the  caisson
   bottom.    The contractor  would  then  install  rebar  and  pour
   concrete.  Appeal File, GSBCA 12253, Exhibit 2, contract drawings
   9-S-1, 9-S-2, 9-S-13; Transcript at 159, 170-71, 385.
 
        31.  SAE  construed the  contract drawings  to  show that  a
   contractor reasonably could  expect to encounter rock  capable of
   providing 60  tsf in bearing  capacity at the bedrock  surface at
   approximately  72  to  73  feet  elevation,  ten  feet below  the
   excavation.  Transcript  at 69-70.  Appellant's  expert testified
   consistently with this interpretation.  Transcript at 1295-96.
 
        32.  SAE  relied  on  the  information  in the  Geotechnical
   Report in preparing its  estimate of the caisson work.   Based on
   the report,  SAE believed  that drilling  for  caissons would  be
   through a gravelly soil, to a  firm, bedrock bottom about 32 feet
   below the existing  ground surface at elevation 103  feet.  SAE's
   estimator considered the  information in the Geotechnical  Report
   to  be  internally  consistent.   Transcript  at  141-43; Hearing
   Exhibit A-261.
 
        33.  SAE   conducted  visual   site  inspections   prior  to
   submitting  its  bid, but  was  unable to  derive  any additional
   information  as to  subsurface conditions  because  the site  was
   paved  and in use as  a parking lot  for the existing courthouse.
   Transcript at 143.
 
        34.  SAE's  caisson  subcontractor was  America's  Drilling,
   Inc. (ADI).  ADI was experienced in caisson work and had recently
   performed  jobs in the Philadelphia/Trenton area, although it was
   based  in  Buffalo,  New  York.   Transcript  at  160,  398.   In
   selecting ADI, SAE recognized some risk associated with using  an
   out-of-town  subcontractor,  but  concluded  that  the  risk  was
   outweighed by  the projected cost  savings since ADI's  price was
   low.    In addition  to  checking ADI's  local  references, SAE's
   initial  project manager  interviewed  ADI personnel  to evaluate
   their suitability for the project.   Transcript at 160-61.    SAE
   also noted that  ADI was "gun shy" about  the estimator's pricing
   on this project and that ADI  had already said it could not  meet
   the   schedule.[foot #] 5     As  to   the   latter  point,   SAE
   was   confident  it  could   "work  around"   the  inconvenience.
   Transcript at 161-62; Hearing Exhibit R-12.
 
        35.  The on-site  Dames &  Moore inspector  retained by  OKA
   testified   to  his   opinion  that   ADI's   initial  crew   was
                                                                    
                   ----------- FOOTNOTE BEGINS ---------
 
        [foot #] 5 This appeared to  be a difference based  on ADI's
   expectation  that it would  complete about four  caissons per day
   and SAE's desire to  achieve a productivity level of five  to six
   caissons per day.  Transcript at 162.
 
                   ----------- FOOTNOTE ENDS -----------
 
 
   inexperienced  and  apparently  unfamiliar  with  the  drill  rig
   operations.   The  inspector also testified that he talked to the
   ADI supervisor,  who told  the inspector that  ADI had  fielded a
   highway  paving crew  for the  excavation  work.   This inspector
   concluded that this contributed to delays and equipment failures.
   Transcript at 2408-14, 2418.
 
 
        36.  The solicitation required bidders to offer caisson unit
   prices and stated that:
 
             the  contract sum  is  to include  the lineal
             feet  of   caissons  of   each  diameter   as
             indicated  on the  contract  drawings.   Unit
             price  for  each diameter  of caissons  is to
             include excavation, pumping,  caisson shells,
             concrete, reinforcing steel and modifications
             to bell size, complete and in place. . . .
 
             The  unit price  for  caissons  will be  used
             solely  to  determine the  adjustment  of the
             contract sum for  variances in the length  of
             caissons  actually  installed.     The  total
             length of each  diameter of caisson  actually
             installed  will  be  compared  to  the  total
             length of each diameter shown on the contract
             drawings  and this  difference multiplied  by
             the unit price  will determine the  amount of
             adjustment to the contract sum.  
 
   Appeal File  GSBCA 12253, Exhibit  2.  ADI reviewed  the contract
   documents  and supplied unit prices for various caisson diameters
   to SAE,  which included these  prices in its  bid.   Appeal File,
   GSBCA 12253, Exhibit 2; Hearing Exhibits A-424, A-609; Transcript
   at 389-90, 397.
 
        37.  ADI's   prices  were  based   on  its  review   of  the
   Geotechnical Report  supplied with  the bidding  documents.   The
   contract  did not  call for,  and ADI  did not  provide, separate
   prices  for  drilling  into  bedrock.    Hearing  Exhibit  A-556;
   Transcript at 389-90, 402, 1364.[foot #] 6
 
        38.  Based on the  information in  the Geotechnical  Report,
   ADI  anticipated  drilling  through  overburden  to  rock.    ADI
                                                                    
                   ----------- FOOTNOTE BEGINS ---------
 
        [foot #] 6 The specifications called for drilling a six-inch
   socket  into rock, which  signified to the  knowledgeable caisson
   contractor  that the  requirement  was  to "toe  or  key in"  the
   caisson. Had the  specifications reflected  the possibility  that
   drilling some  three or more  feet into rock might  be necessary,
   ADI, and probably other caisson contractors, would have requested
   additional  geotechnical information to  be able to  estimate the
   added cost of  the additional rock drilling.   Transcript at 170,
   272, 392-93, 442-43. 
 
                   ----------- FOOTNOTE ENDS -----------
 
 
   understood the overburden to be soil-like and not rock, fractured
   rock,  or   weathered   rock.[foot #] 7     The   shop   drawings
   submitted  by  ADI  were  consistent  with  this  interpretation.
   Hearing Exhibit A-659.  Based on this information, ADI determined
   that its drill  rigs, which were  considerably stronger than  the
   auger used to perform the  analysis contained in the Geotechnical
   Report,  could readily penetrate the materials below the surface.
   Transcript at 165, 393-96.
 
 
        39.  Based  on the  anticipated  subsurface conditions,  SAE
   expected that ADI would  be able  to achieve a production rate of
   five  caissons per day,  resulting in seventeen  production days,
   with  a total of about twenty-one days including mobilization and
   demobilization.  Transcript at 276, 385; Hearing Exhibit A-676.
 
        40.  The   contract   required   appellant  to   provide   a
   professional  soils engineer to certify the rock bearing capacity
   at the bottom of the caissons.  Hearing Exhibit A-260; Transcript
   at  2603.   On July  2,  1991, OKA  notified SAE  that  a caisson
   testing laboratory had not been submitted for review and approval
   and that on-site  caisson work would not be  permitted to proceed
   until  an approved  caisson  testing  laboratory  was  in  place.
   Appeal File, Vol. I-A, Exhibits 19, 21.   
 
                                                                    
                   ----------- FOOTNOTE BEGINS ---------
 
        [foot #] 7 With  respect  to  subsurface  conditions,    the
   Geotechnical Report concluded as follows:
 
                  The  site  geology is  characterized  by
             Pleistocene   sands  and   gravels/Cretaceous
             silts  and   sands  over   "undifferentiated"
             gneiss  bedrock  similar to  the  Precambrian
             Wissahickon mica schist/gneiss bedrock.  
 
                  . . . .
 
             In  summary,   hard  bedrock   consisting  of
             fractured   gneiss   are   expected   to   be
             encountered below  depths on the order  of 24
             feet, whereas natural  ground water table  is
             anticipated to be perched on bedrock  surface
             at  depths  on  the order  of  20  feet below
             existing  surface.       The  overburden   is
             characterized  by 2 to 5 feet of granular and
             cinder fill  mantle over a  dense stratum  of
             Pleistocene/Cretaceous silty sand  and gravel
             above  the  water table  before  encountering
             hard bedrock; a deeper fill overburden should
             be  expected  in  the  immediate vicinity  of
             existing utility lines.  
 
   Hearing Exhibit A-261.
 
                   ----------- FOOTNOTE ENDS -----------
 
 
 
        41.  On  July 8,  1991, SAE  proposed  Underwood Engineering
   Testing Company as its caisson testing laboratory.  Underwood was
   rejected, however, because it had not been inspected and approved
   by the Materials  Reference Laboratory of the National  Bureau of
   Standards,  as required  by the  contract.   Transcript  at 2603;
   Appeal File, Vol. I-A, Exhibits 21, 25.
 
        42.  On July  11, 1991,  appellant submitted information  on
   Testwell-Craig Testing Laboratories.  Respondent informed  SAE by
   letter of July 16, 1991,  that the information submitted for this
   company was incomplete.  Appeal  File, Vol. I-A, Exhibits 32, 39.
   Testwell-Craig  was ultimately  approved as  the caisson  testing
   laboratory on July 24, 1991.  Transcript at 2606.
 
        43.  The contract also provided that:
 
             The Government   may also engage and  pay for
             the services  of  an  independent  agency  to
             perform  tests,   retests,  spot   checks  or
             inspections  specified  as  the  Contractor's
             responsibilities. . . . 
 
             If there is a discrepancy between the results
             of   tests   or   inspections   between   the
             Contractor's    independent  agency  and  the
             Government's    independent    agency,    the
             Government     agency's  results   will  take
             precedence.
 
   Appeal File, GSBCA 12253, Exhibit 2.  
 
        44.  Prior  to commencing  work  on the  caissons, personnel
   from ADI  and SAE met  with representatives of OKA,  Vitetta, and
   others to  discuss ADI's  plans for completing  this part  of the
   work.   At the  meeting, it was  understood that  SAE's inspector
   would inspect approximately  ten percent of the  caisson bottoms,
   about the  first four to nine caissons.   It was also agreed that
   probe hole drill testing would  be conducted on about ten percent
   of  the caisson  bottoms.   Appeal  File, Vol.  I-A, Exhibit  22;
   Transcript at 170-71, 278, 281, 318.
 
        45.  After removing pavement  over the  site, SAE  commenced
   the excavation and foundation work.  The planned sequence of work
   called for  excavating from an  original grade of 103  feet above
   sea  level down  10  feet to  93  feet above  sea  level.   After
   installing sheeting  and shoring, SAE  then planned to  drill and
   install caissons on a level working platform at ninety-three feet
   elevation.  Then SAE planned to excavate an additional 10 feet of
   earth  down  to  elevation  83  feet  above  sea  level,  install
   additional  sheeting and begin the  concrete work.  Transcript at
   164-65.  In conjunction with the requirement for certification of
   the rock  bearing  capacity of  the  caisson bottom,  a  specific
   inspection hold point was set for the bottom of each caisson just
   prior to  dropping the  rebar cage into  the hole  preparatory to
   pouring concrete.   Transcript  at 2603;  Appeal File,  Vol. I-A,
   Exhibit 22.
 
 
        46.  SAE used a  building plan that in essence  depicted the
   "footprint" of the project.   It showed column lines running east
   to west, labeled A  through H; the column lines  running north to
   south were labeled 1 through 24.  Transcript at 162-63.   SAE and
   ADI contemplated  a specific  sequence  of work  under which  ADI
   would begin  excavation in the  northeast, or A-D,  quadrant area
   depicted in  the schematic  building plan.   This meant  that ADI
   would  commence  drilling in  the  area closest  to  the existing
   courthouse building and work out  from there.  Hearing Exhibit A-
   101.  This plan was chosen so that ADI could complete drilling in
   the  deepest part  of  the  parking garage  ramp  to provide  the
   follow-on concrete subcontractor access  to work without  jumping
   around the site.  Transcript at 229, 273-75.
 
        47.  ADI mobilized  to the site  on July 9,  1991, following
   the completion of the first  phase of excavation and sheeting and
   shoring of excavation walls.  Transcript at  168-69.  On July 10,
   ADI drilled  a test caisson.   Initially, drilling  progressed as
   expected  through the  overburden  materials  above  the  bearing
   strata.  When ADI reached elevation 74.4, the actual rock present
   was not capable  of yielding a bearing  capacity of 60 tsf.   ADI
   drilled  deeper,  but  still  could not  locate  rock  capable of
   providing the required  bearing capacity.  Transcript  at 172-74,
   282-83, 399-400; Appeal File, Vol. I-B, Exhibit 21.
 
        48.  The  next  day, ADI  drilled a  second test  caisson at
   another location.   Again,  it could not  locate rock  capable of
   bearing 60 tsf.  Also that day, ADI drilled a test  probe hole at
   the  first test caisson location.   Transcript at 172-73, 282-83;
   Appeal File, Vol. I-B, Exhibit 21.
 
        49.  SAE informed GSA that the load bearing capacity of  the
   rock could not  be certified at 60 tsf.  ADI's test drilling gave
   rise to two requests for information (RFIs).   The first, RFI 11,
   submitted  to GSA  on July  10, 1991,  offered the  conclusion of
   SAE's  engineer that the bearing capacity  could not be certified
   at 60  tsf and  requested additional information.   Appeal  File,
   Vol. I-A, Exhibit 27; Transcript at  176.  GSA responded that "no
   additional information  is available."   Appeal  File, Vol.  I-A,
   Exhibit 27.   The second RFI, RFI 20,  dated July 12, 1991, again
   advised that  the subsurface at  the caisson bottom would  not be
   capable of providing 60 tsf  bearing capacity.  Appeal File, Vol.
   I-A, Exhibit  32.  In a letter dated  July 12, 1991, SAE formally
   notified  the   contracting  officer  that  it   had  encountered
   differing  site conditions.  Transcript at  175-76;  Appeal File,
   Vol. I-A, Exhibit 33.
 
        50.  After   the  second  RFI   was  issued,  GSA   and  SAE
   representatives  met  to  discuss the  situation.    No immediate
   solution was arrived at, however, so SAE's project manager,  with
   the  knowledge of  OKA, directed  ADI to  demobilize its  crew to
   minimize costs.   Transcript  at 174,  283-84; Appeal  File, Vol.
   I-A, Exhibit 34.
 
 
        51.  In  response   to  SAE's  notice   of  differing   site
   conditions,  GSA, through  Vitetta, retained  the  services of  a
   soils engineer, Mellick-Tully, to 
 
             (1) explore the subsurface bedrock conditions
             within  the   proposed  building   area;  (2)
             estimate    the   geotechnical    engineering
             properties of the  bedrock; (3) evaluate  the
             suitability   of   caisson   foundations  for
             support  of  the  structure  considering  the
             anticipated structural loads  and encountered
             bedrock   conditions;   and   (4)   recommend
             alternate  caisson   foundation  design   and
             installation criteria.
 
   Hearing Exhibit A-263.[foot #] 8
 
        52.  Mellick-Tully performed  eleven exploratory  borings of
   rock core extractions  and evaluated the cores.   Hearing Exhibit
   A-263.   While Mellick-Tully was  conducting this work, SAE could
   not perform at the site.  Transcript at 177, 1300-01.
 
        53.  Following  Mellick-Tully's exploration,  GSA, OKA,  and
   Dames & Moore met to discuss the results of that study, which had
   confirmed  that  60  tsf  rock  was not  present  at  the  design
   elevations.  Transcript at  2492; Appeal File, Vol.  I-A, Exhibit
   42.   GSA, based on  advice from Dames  & Moore and  OKA, decided
   that redesigning  the caisson  foundation to  "socketed" caissons
   was the best alternative.  Appeal File, Vol. I-A, Exhibits 41-42.
 
 
        54.  After GSA met with its consultants, SAE representatives
   joined the  meeting and received a preliminary report of Mellick-
   Tully's findings.  No direction on how to proceed was provided at
   that meeting, however.   Transcript at 178-79; Appeal  File, Vol.
   I-A, Exhibit 42.
 
        55.  On  July 23, 1991, SAE  received a request for proposal
   (RFP) seeking submission of various unit prices for rock drilling
   by  depth intervals  for the  caissons.   Appeal File,  Vol. I-A,
   Exhibit 62.   SAE forwarded the RFP  to ADI.  Hearing  Exhibit A-
   660.   ADI submitted unit prices as requested.  Appeal File, Vol.
   I-A, Exhibit 44.  
 
 
                                                                    
                   ----------- FOOTNOTE BEGINS ---------
 
        [foot #] 8 Mellick-Tully  was  retained   for  this  purpose
   because  of the  untimely death  of the   EES  scientist who  had
   performed the investigation  underlying the Geotechnical  Report.
   Appeal File, Vol. I-B, Exhibit 10.
 
                   ----------- FOOTNOTE ENDS -----------
 
 
 
        56.  A  second RFP,  dated July  22, 1991,  was issued  with
   contract  modification  AC05.    This  modification  reduced  the
   requirement for bearing capacity of bedrock from 60 to 25 tsf for
   all  85  caissons.    With  respect  to  thirteen  caissons,  the
   modification  added  a  requirement  for  side  friction,  to  be
   achieved   by  additional  rock  socketing.    GSA  directed  the
   installation of the 72 remaining caissons at  no additional cost.
   Appeal File, Vol. I-A, Exhibit 52.
 
        57.  On July 24, 1991, GSA  issued a third RFP setting forth
   new requirements of  two to two and one-half  feet rock socketing
   (drilling)  for the  thirteen  specified  caissons and  requested
   submission of a  proposal for the additional work.   Appeal File,
   Vol. I-A, Exhibit 54.  
 
        58.  A  revision  of  the  first RFP  (see  Finding  55) was
   received  by SAE  on July  27, 1991.   This revision  stated that
   "unit price per lineal  foot for drilling additional caissons  in
   rock is to include the  actual cost of drilling (including normal
   overhead and profit) plus the cost  of additional concrete only."
   The  contractor was directed not to  include additional costs for
   "demobilization/mobilization,"  for   project  delay   caused  by
   demobilization, or  for project  delay due  to time required  for
   rock  drilling  in the  unit prices  --  delay costs  were  to be
   addressed separately.  Appeal File, Vol. I-A, Exhibit 62.
 
        59.  SAE's project  manager testified  that  because of  the
   subsurface conditions encountered,  no progress with the  caisson
   work was possible  from July 10 through  July 24.   Transcript at
   184.   OKA recognized in  its report for  July 1991 that  it "was
   identified that an inappropriately high rock bearing capacity had
   been specified  for  the  caisson installation."    In  order  to
   minimize costs, SAE  suspended caisson operations while  the rock
   bearing  capacity  was  reevaluated  and  needed  design  changes
   developed.  Hearing  Exhibit A-561.
 
        60.  On July 24, 1991, GSA  directed work on the caissons to
   resume.  SAE promptly notified ADI.  ADI remobilized at  the site
   on July 29.  Transcript at 186-87, 286.
 
        61.   As  a  result of  the  redesign of  the  caissons, the
   controversy  concerning the  load bearing  capacity  of the  rock
   encountered   in  the   initial   drilling,   and   the   revised
   specification, which was  changed to require that  the contractor
   drill caisson shafts  down to sound rock acceptable  to the soils
   engineer as capable of supporting 25 tsf, the Government informed
   SAE that every  caisson was required  to be inspected,  verified,
   and  accepted by the  soils engineer.  This  inspection had to be
   performed  for  each  caisson before  concrete  could  be poured.
   Appeal File, Vol. I-A, Exhibit 71.
 
        62.  Although  Vitetta had  stated  that  the side  friction
   requirement  applied   only  to   the  thirteen   deeper-socketed
   caissons, OKA's soils engineer, Dames & Moore, in effect required
   that all the caissons meet  this criteria.   Transcript  at 2486-
   91, 2501; Appeal File, Vol. I-A, Exhibit 45.
 
 
        63.  Once  ADI recommenced  drilling, it  encountered jagged
   rock at  the bottom of  the caissons that damaged  its equipment,
   causing the  80,000 pound caisson  drilling machine to  bounce up
   and down.   The  drill teeth  caught on  the  hard, jagged  rock,
   causing damage  to the equipment.   As a result,  ADI experienced
   unanticipated  equipment failures, including  two instances  of a
   broken    Kelly   bar.[foot #] 9       ADI's    project   manager
   described this experience:
 
             [We]  started  to  hit  a  bottom  we  didn't
             anticipate,   that  was   just  tearing   the
             daylights out of the equipment and causing an
             80,000-pound  machine to  bounce up  and down
             and  breaking the  kelly bar  --  in fact,  I
             think we broke  the kelly bar twice,  which I
             have  never seen  happen, with  this, what  I
             call jagged  rock  on  the  bottom  of  these
             caissons.
 
             We would  anticipate  -- in  all other  jobs,
             when you get  down to rock . .  . unless it's
             sloped for  some reason, it  is usually  like
             maybe a  glacier went  through and  left dirt
             and  then  rock.     Sometimes  there   is  a
             decomposed layer which  isn't that difficult,
             and then you get  down to hard rock  and it's
             relatively  smooth  down   there,  it's  like
             drilling on this, to  where you wear yourself
             in a groove with the teeth, and then you just
             bear down  on the  auger, and  the more  down
             pressure you put on the auger, the harder you
             dig,  but  it's  smooth   going  around,  and
             there's .  . . the  bottom of the  drill bit,
             the  tip of  a drill  bit,  there are  edges.
             These have  teeth on  them sticking  out, and
             when these teeth on these flights would  come
             around and catch this very hard rock that was
             sticking  up, something  had to give  and the
             machine  was bouncing. In fact, as I said, we
             had never broken a kelly bar before this job.
                
 
   Transcript at 288-89.  SAE's project manager confirmed  that as a
   result  of  the unexpected  nature of  the rock  encountered (see
                                                                    
                   ----------- FOOTNOTE BEGINS ---------
 
        [foot #] 9 A Kelly  bar is a  hollow metal tube.   The drill
   bit operates within the Kelly bar which supports the walls of the
   drilled holes  while the earth  is being  excavated.  See  Sosa Y
                                                         ___  ______
   Barbero Constructores, S.A., ENG BCA PCC-57, 92-1 BCA   24,627 at
   ___________________________
   122,851.  
 
                   ----------- FOOTNOTE ENDS -----------
 
 
   Finding 73),  ADI's production rate  "just went out  the window."
   Transcript at 187-88.  Dames &  Moore similarly acknowledged that
   the  subsurface rock conditions caused ADI's equipment to bounce.
   Hearing Exhibit R-2. 
 
 
        64.  The effect  of  the  rock  conditions  encountered  was
   acknowledged by OKA in one of its monthly reports:
 
             The  subsurface rock strata  has proved to be
             steeply   tilted    and   folded    so   that
             considerable unanticipated  time, effort  and
             drill teeth are expended in reaching suitable
             caisson bottom conditions.   In some caissons
             75% of the  bottom will be hard rock, and the
             remaining  25%,  along  one  side,  will   be
             unsuitable.  The only solution is to continue
             drilling  through the  rock until  acceptable
             bottom conditions  are achieved.   Instead of
             three   or  four   caissons   per  day,   the
             production rate has  been one or two  per day
             and sometimes less.  
 
   Hearing Exhibit A-561;   Hearing Exhibits A-562, A-563.
 
        65.  When ADI began drilling again, numerous inspectors were
   at  the site,  including representatives from  GSA, OKA,  Dames &
   Moore, Mellick-Tully,  and SAE's soils  engineer, Testwell-Craig.
   There were  so many inspectors  that ADI instructed them  to stay
   away from  the caisson  holes while ADI  performed its  work, not
   only for safety but also  because they were impeding the drilling
   process.  Transcript at 289-90.
 
        66.  Although  the contract  placed  the responsibility  for
   certification of  caisson bearing  capacity  on the  contractor's
   approved soils engineer,  Testwell-Craig considered  that it  was
   hampered  in its  efforts  to  perform  its  duties  because  its
   authority and function  was limited by OKA's  consultant, Dames &
   Moore.   Dames  & Moore  would  inspect caisson  bottoms and,  at
   times,  reject ones  that had  been  accepted by  Testwell-Craig.
   Transcript at  289-302, 2514-15.   One  of OKA's  representatives
   would also  climb  into  the caissons  to  inspect  the  bottoms,
   although,  in  the  opinion  of  SAE, he  was  not  qualified  to
   determine   if  the  bearing  capacity  was  acceptable  or  not.
   Transcript at 2511, 3336-37, 3366-67.
 
        67.  Differences  of opinion  between SAE's  soils engineers
   and OKA's soils  engineer were resolved by OKA in  favor of OKA's
   engineer.  Transcript at 293, 2512-14.  When  these disagreements
   occurred, ADI  was directed by OKA to  drill deeper, even when it
   had  already proceeded to the next caisson and would be forced to
   return to the already-inspected caisson.   This not only affected
   ADI's  orderly completion of caisson drilling, but also disrupted
   the scheduling of foundation concrete.  Transcript at 293.  
 
        68.  With  some frequency, the Dames & Moore inspectors were
   not on  site when  ADI would  complete drilling  a hole and  when
   Testwell-Craig conducted  its inspection.   Thus,  Testwell-Craig
   would approve caissons one day, and the next morning, the Dames &
   Moore inspector would reject the caisson and require ADI to drill
   additional rock.  Hearing Exhibit A-673; Transcript at 303-04.   
 
        69.  Concrete  placement  in  the   caissons  was  adversely
   affected  by the disagreements  over the load-bearing  quality of
   rock in  the caissons.  Concrete had to  be ordered four hours in
   advance, and when Dames  & Moore would overrule  SAE's inspector,
   SAE was frequently forced to cancel or waste concrete ordered for
   placement in a hole  that had been approved by the SAE inspector.
   Hearing Exhibit A-673; Transcript at 304-05.  
 
        70.  As  a result of  this inspection activity,  ADI and SAE
   were  unable to  follow an  orderly sequence of  work or  to plan
   ahead  efficiently.    ADI's  productivity  was  reduced  from  a
   projected completion  of four to six  caissons per day to  one or
   two.  Transcript at 199-200, 295.  
 
        71.  SAE  and ADI sought  to clarify the  inspection process
   with GSA  and OKA  so as  to avoid  the delays  encountered.   In
   response to an inquiry  as to the standard  being applied by  OKA
   and  GSA inspectors  to certify  a particular  caisson as  25 tsf
   rock,  OKA and GSA  informed SAE and ADI  that the inspection and
   judgment  as  to the  bearing  capacity of  the  rock  had to  be
   rendered  individually and that  advance parameters would  not be
   established.  This  was because of the "variety  of bottom strata
   encountered."  Hearing Exhibit A-129.
 
        72.  In response to  an inquiry seeking clarification  as to
   final  authority  of  inspectors,  GSA  acknowledged  that  SAE's
   inspector was to  certify the bottom of the  caisson.  Consistent
   with the  contract (see Finding  43), GSA took the  position that
   inspections by OKA and Dames & Moore were the final authority and
   could overrule  the conclusions  of the  SAE inspector.   Hearing
   Exhibit A-129; Transcript at 189-90, 193-95, 310-11.
 
        73.   In  a meeting held  on September 9,  1991, attended by
   ADI, SAE, GSA,  OKA, Vitetta, Mellick-Tully,  and Dames &  Moore,
   sketches  of  the  subsurface  conditions  thus  far  encountered
   revealed  that the rock layers/seams were severely tilted (rather
   than  horizontal) and contained alternating hard and soft layers.
   There was no disagreement among the representatives in attendance
   that  these  were  the  conditions  encountered  and  that  these
   conditions had not been anticipated.  The Geotechnical Report had
   shown only a slightly tilted  bedrock surface and the boring logs
   had  not revealed  any weathered  rock.   Hearing  Exhibit A-129;
   Transcript at 189-91, 2464-65.
 
        74.  These  conditions  contributed  to  the  absence  of  a
   standard or  consistent manner  in  which the  caissons could  be
   drilled and  inspected.   ADI's efficiency  was  impaired by  the
   multiple inspections  of each  caisson and  frequent issuance  of
   directions  to   redrill  to   lower  depths.     ADI's   planned
   productivity  was  significantly  reduced  by  the  unanticipated
   condition  of the subsurface bedrock.  Transcript at 192-93, 200,
   296-97; Hearing Exhibit A-561. 
 
 
        75.  In an attempt  to mitigate the delays  described above,
   at the request of SAE, ADI mobilized  a second drill rig in early
   September.    This  effort  was  unsuccessful,  however,  largely
   because although the kelly bar did not break on this machine, the
   jagged subsurface  rock caused  the flight of  the auger  to snap
   off,  an  unusual  type  of  damage  encountered  only   on  rare
   occasions.  Transcript at 312-13.
 
        76.  The variable  and jagged rock conditions encountered at
   the site delayed ADI's completion  of the caisson work in several
   respects.  The unanticipated conditions gave rise to the need for
   numerous additional  inspections.  In  addition, ADI's  equipment
   was subjected to significant additional wear and tear, causing it
   to  break  down on  at least  one occasion.   The  extra drilling
   required,  however, was the  most significant contributor  to the
   delay in completing  this portion of the work.   ADI had expected
   the overburden, consisting  of soil and gravel, to  be drilled in
   one-half to one  hour for  each caisson, with  the drilling of  a
   six- inch socket to require another half hour.  Instead, for most
   caissons, ADI  was required to   drill into approximately  two to
   three  feet of rock,  consuming considerable additional  time and
   significantly delaying completion  of ADI's work.   Transcript at
   312, 408-09; Hearing  Exhibit A-553.
 
        77.  ADI's work  was not  completed until  October 8,  1991,
   nearly  two calendar months  after its intended  completion date.
   Transcript at 314-15, 410; Hearing Exhibit A-553.
 
        78.  SAE and ADI met with OKA and  GSA on October 9, 10, and
   11  to discuss  SAE's request  for additional compensation  and a
   time extension  of fifty days.   Appeal File, Vol.  I-C, Exhibits
   17-18,  20; Transcript  at 209,  410-11.   On  December 6,  1991,
   modification ACO9 was issued, unilaterally extending the contract
   completion date by fifteen days (to cover the period during which
   work was actually stopped)   and increasing the contract price in
   the amount of  $86,632.10 to cover, inter  alia, 1)  the  cost of
   the suspension  of work from  July 12  through 26,  1991; 2)  the
   costs  of drilling and  installing additional sockets  for twelve
   caissons; 3) the cost of varying the lengths and sizes of certain
   designated  caissons; 4) costs  for clean-out and  inspection for
   added socket lengths for fourteen caissons;  5) costs of removing
   additional  material from added socket lengths;  and 6) the added
   cost of  the  side friction  tests  for two  specified  caissons.
   Appeal File, Exhibit 12253, Exhibit 137.  
 
        79.  Subsequently,  SAE  submitted   another  claim  to  the
   contracting officer seeking $627,515 in added costs of performing
   the caisson work and a  forty-day extension of time to compensate
   for the alleged differing site conditions.  Appeal File, Exhibits
   138, 146.   The  contracting officer agreed  that based  upon the
   unit prices established in the contract,  SAE  was entitled to an
   additional $7,666 for caisson installation, but otherwise  denied
   this claim.  Appeal File, GSBCA 12253, Exhibit 155. 
 
 
        Expert Testimony Concerning Subsurface Conditions
 
        80.  In  support  of  its  claim  that  the  nature  of  the
   subsurface conditions encountered by  ADI represented a differing
   site condition, SAE presented  the testimony of George  Tamaro, a
   registered professional engineer in numerous states including New
   Jersey.   Mr. Tamaro  is a geotechnical  and structural  engineer
   with extensive experience  in foundation engineering and  design,
   including  caisson  design.    He  has  extensive  experience  in
   conducting  geotechnical  investigations,  preparing Geotechnical
   Reports, and inspecting foundation construction work.  Transcript
   at 1273-84; Hearing Exhibit A-538.
 
        81.  Mr.  Tamaro reviewed  the solicitation for  the Trenton
   project,  including contract  drawings,  specifications, and  the
   Geotechnical Report  provided to  prospective bidders.   He  also
   reviewed  construction  records  to  arrive  at   an  independent
   conclusion  as to  whether a  differing site  condition had  been
   encountered on this project.   Transcript at 1285-86; Exhibit  A-
   555. 
 
        82.   Based on  his review  of these  documents, Mr.  Tamaro
   formed  the opinion  that  a  reasonable  contractor  would  have
   concluded that  caissons were primarily  to be installed  on soil
   with a nominal six-inch embedment (socket) into rock.  Transcript
   at 1287-88.   The  contract documents,  in Mr. Tamaro's  opinion,
   informed  contractors  that  they would  drill  through  soil and
   encounter top  of rock at  "auger refusal."  Transcript  at 1289;
   Hearing Exhibits A-261, A-539.
 
        83.  In performing his expert analysis, Mr.  Tamaro combined
   the  information   in  the  contract  documents,   including  the
   Geotechnical   Report,   the   results   of   the   Mellick-Tully
   investigation,   and  the  as-built  caisson  data  in  a  single
   composite  drawing,  with a  contour  of the  bedrock  surface to
   determine where  this information  indicated top  of bedrock.  He
   concluded that the contract drawings showed top of rock elevation
   as depicted on the borings  as the start of the socket and that a
   six-inch socket could be achieved from the top of rock elevation.
   Transcript  at  1295-96;  Hearing Exhibit  A-554.    The contract
   drawings  showed estimated  bottom of  caisson  elevations to  be
   consistent with six inches from  top of rock as indicated in  the
   EES boring  logs.   Transcript at 1289;  Hearing Exhibits  A-261,
   A-539, A-554; Contract Drawings 9-S-1, 9-S-2.
 
        84.  Mr.  Tamaro  interpreted  the  Geotechnical  Report  to
   identify top of rock  as rock capable as supporting a  load of 60
   tsf.  He pointed out that the contract further described the rock
   as  "sound bedrock," "hard bedrock, fractured gneiss," and "deep,
   hard bedrock."  Transcript at 1289-90; Hearing Exhibits A-260, A-
   261,  A-539.  In  addition, contract specifications  and drawings
   identified the rock as "sound  rock capable of supporting 60 tons
   per   square  foot,"    and   "60-ton  bearing  strata."    These
   descriptions denoted that the rock  was very sound, hard material
   suitable  to carry very  substantial loads.   Transcript at 1290;
   Hearing Exhibits A-260, A-261, A-539.
 
 
        85.  All but one of the borings showed that "very  dense . .
   . decomposed rock"  was encountered  prior to  auger refusal  and
   that "auger  refusal" occurred  on "precambrian  undifferentiated
   hard bedrock."   Transcript  at 1317-18;  Hearing Exhibit  A-261.
   Nothing in the Geotechnical Report raised a "red flag" to alert a
   contractor to a potential problem.   The contract simply directed
   contractors to drill six inches once top of rock is reached.  Mr.
   Tamaro opined  that based on this information  a contractor could
   reasonably  expect the  subsurface  conditions in  the  immediate
   vicinity  of   the  borings  to  have   similar  characteristics.
   Transcript at 1317-18.  
 
        86.  Under      the     New      York     City      Building
   Code[foot #] 10    hard    sound     rock    is    capable     of
   supporting 60  tsf; medium  hard rock,  40 tsf;  and intermediate
   rock, 20  tsf.   Hearing  Exhibit A-551;  Transcript at  1291-93.
   Hard  sound  rock  includes  various  grades  of  gneiss.     The
   characteristics of hard sound rock are:
 
             [T]he rock rings when struck with a pick or a
             bar.  It does not disintegrate after exposure
             to air or water.  It breaks with sharp, fresh
             fracture.  Cracks  are un-weathered and  less
             than  one-eighth inch  wide.  .  .  .    [The
             fractures]  are  no  closer than  three  feet
             apart, and core recovery with  a double tube,
             diamond core  barrel is generally  85 percent
             or greater to each five-foot run.   
 
   Transcript  at   1292.    The   New  York   City  Building   Code
   distinguishes  between 20 tsf intermediate rock, which has a dull
   sound when struck with  a piece of steel, and 40  tsf medium hard
   rock, which has a ringing sound  when hit with a piece of  steel.
                                                                    
                   ----------- FOOTNOTE BEGINS ---------
 
        [foot #] 10 Mr.  Tamaro testified  that  the  New York  City
   Building Code is one of the most detailed and comprehensive codes
   that  addresses  caisson  work.    It  has  been  developed  from
   considerable  experience with  caissons in schistic  and gneissic
   rock.   Transcript at  1291; Hearing Exhibit  A-551.   Mr. Tamaro
   also explained  that it is  reasonable to refer  to the New  York
   City Building  Code in  this case because  the rock  described in
   this Code is  essentially the same rock formation as  the rock in
   New  Jersey:   gneissic rock  with  the same  materials and  same
   mineralogical features.  Transcript at 1294.
 
                   ----------- FOOTNOTE ENDS -----------
 
 
   Twenty-five ton rock  is closer in its  characteristics to twenty
   ton  rock than  to  forty  ton rock.  Transcript  at 1293,  1326;
   Hearing Exhibit A-551.
 
 
        87.  Boring log TB-108,  a rock core, showed a core recovery
   rate of  92 percent in  the Geotechnical Report.   This conformed
   with the requirement  for 85 percent recovery and  60 tsf bearing
   capacity for hard  sound rock classification  under the New  York
   City Building Code.   Using  the criteria  of the  New York  City
   Building  Code,  therefore,  the boring  log  reflected  that the
   material was  60 tsf rock  and was sufficiently solid  to support
   substantial loads.  Transcript at 1293-94.
 
        88.  In  Mr.  Tamaro's  opinion, a  projected  rate  of five
   caissons per day was not  overly ambitious given that the project
   caissons were  short,  running through  approximately fifteen  to
   twenty feet  of soil, and  should have been  easy to drill  until
   rock was encountered.  Transcript at 1376-77.  
 
        89.  Based  on  his  extensive  experience  with  foundation
   engineering and construction  work, Mr. Tamaro also  testified to
   his opinion on the reasonable level of inspection that would have
   been anticipated by a contractor  based on the information in the
   contract  documents   and  the  contract   provisions  concerning
   inspection   and   quality    assurance.[foot #] 11      In   Mr.
   Tamaro's  experience,  ordinarily a  quality  assurance inspector
   would  check  the  first several  caissons  to  confirm  that the
   contractor's  quality was being performed properly and would then
   relinquish  direct control to  the contractor's inspector.   This
   usually involves inspections of about ten percent of  the initial
   caisson bottoms.  Transcript at 1331-32.  
 
        90.  The industry standard for testing caissons is either to
   1)  perform boring at  exactly the caisson  location and evaluate
   the rock exposed  by the boring or  2) drill the socket  and then
   inspect the socket  and bottom of caisson for the  quality of the
   rock.   Transcript at  1322. The SAE  contract specified  a probe
   hole  drilling procedure.    Transcript  at 1329.    To test  the
   soundness  of the  rock  at caisson  bottom,  the contractor  was
   required to  probe drill  through sound rock  to investigate  the
   rock  beneath  the bearing  surface.   When  the  contractor then
   encountered a soft  seam, the inspector would  require redrilling
   the socket into sound rock beneath the seam.  Transcript at 1330.
   Nothing in  the contract forewarned the contractor  of the actual
   conditions that  would be encountered, i.e., the location of soft
   seams under hard, sound rock.  Hearing Exhibits A-260, A-261.
 
                                                                    
                   ----------- FOOTNOTE BEGINS ---------
 
        [foot #] 11 The contract  placed the  initial responsibility
   for quality control  and certification of the  suitability of the
   bearing surface  on  the contractor,  with the  proviso that  GSA
   could  perform quality  assurance  checks or  conduct independent
   tests and inspections.  Finding 43; Transcript at 1331-32.
 
                   ----------- FOOTNOTE ENDS -----------
 
 
 
        91.  In  Mr. Tamaro's opinion, the variations in the caisson
   bottoms could be acceptable if  the inspector could find that the
   capacity of one portion  of the caisson is 40 tsf or  60 tsf rock
   and  the other has  seams that are  of a lower  capacity, but the
   overall base  of the  caisson on  average provides the  requisite
   bearing capacity.  Transcript at 1330.  
 
        92.  In  preparing  his  report,  Mr.  Tamaro  reviewed  the
   inspection  reports of  Dames &  Moore,  GSA's quality  assurance
   inspectors.  Based on consistent statements in these reports, the
   Dames & Moore inspectors looked for, tested for, and required the
   characteristics of 40 to 60 tsf rock.  Mr. Tamaro also determined
   that Dames  & Moore relied on the New  York City Building Code in
   evaluating  caisson  sockets.  Transcript   at  1325-26;  Hearing
   Exhibits R-26, A-875.
 
        93.  Many of the caissons were not accepted by Dames & Moore
   until  ADI attained  ringing rock.   Often,  ADI was  required to
   drill through substantial amounts of rock to reach ringing rock. 
    Hearing  Exhibits R-26, A-875. The requirement for ringing rock,
   however, is applicable  only to 40 or 60 tsf rock,  not to 25 tsf
   rock.  Transcript at 1327-28.  
 
        94.  In  Mr. Tamaro's  opinion, some  of  the caissons  were
   "under-designed," prompting  Dames &  Moore to  develop de  facto
   criteria  in  the field  for  acceptance of  caisson  bottoms and
   sides, even  though these  requirements were  not  stated in  the
   contract or  in the modification  concerning caissons.   For some
   caissons, the contractor  was required to  drill to ringing  rock
   and embedment of six inches also  in ringing rock.  For at  least
   one caisson,  this required ADI  to drill four and  one-half feet
   below top of rock, and achieve a six-inch embedment  on one edge,
   requiring  removal of  three feet  of rock  from the  other edge.
   Hearing  Exhibits  R-26,  A-545, A-875;  Appeal  File,  Vol. I-A,
   Exhibit 59; Transcript at 1333-38. 
 
        95.  Mr.  Tamaro  also   opined  that  the  Dames   &  Moore
   inspectors attempted  to provide  the necessary  bearing capacity
   for the under-designed caissons by obtaining additional socketing
   in the  field.  Transcript at 1328.   He based this conclusion in
   part on   field reports acknowledging that caisson diameters were
   undersized in the  design absent the 7  tsf side friction in  the
   six-inch pocket.  The inspectors thus looked for 7 tsf around the
   caisson perimeter, as well  as a bearing  capacity of 25 tsf  for
   these  caissons,   in  order  to  ensure  the  caisson  would  be
   sufficient to bear the load of the building.  Transcript at 1310-
   11.
 
        96.  Contrary to the indications in the Geotechnical Report,
   the rock conditions at  the site were highly variable    The rock
   had seams  of decomposed  and deficient  material within  rock in
   both vertical and horizontal planes.  Rock would slope throughout
   the caisson, so that  ADI would hit rock at a  high elevation and
   then encounter a sloping surface. Sloping, combined with the hard
   surface,  required ADI  to proceed  very  cautiously in  drilling
   sockets  because  the  tools  tended  to drive  down  the  slope.
   Hearing Exhibits A-545, A-875, R-26; Transcript at 1340-42.  
 
 
        97.  To summarize, Mr.  Tamaro's expert testimony  supported
   SAE's claims that  the caisson work was  delayed by unanticipated
   subsurface  conditions.  The  presence of these  conditions could
   not have  been deduced from the contract  information provided to
   bidders.   Moreover, the effect  of the variable  rock conditions
   was  exacerbated by  the  field efforts  of  OKA's inspectors  to
   compensate  for   undersized  and   under-designed  caissons   by
   requiring additional  rock drilling to achieve  deeper socketing.
   Hearing  Exhibits  A-543, A-544,  A-545;  Transcript at  1323-24,
   1337-40, 1343-44.
 
        Sheeting and Shoring
 
        98.  The  contract  required  SAE  to  provide  sheeting and
   shoring  to  "protect   existing  buildings,  streets,  walkways,
   utilities,  and other improvements and excavation against loss of
   ground or caving embankments."  Appeal File, GSBCA 12253, Exhibit
   2,      02150,    1.02(A)(1).    Appellant  contracted  with  Key
   Foundations  to perform  sheeting and  shoring  for the  project.
   Hearing Exhibit R-84.
 
        99.  Key  was  to  install sheeting  and  shoring  along the
   northeast  corner   of  the  building  down  to  and  around  the
   subbasement level.  This was expected to take approximately three
   to four weeks, and as of June 1991, Key was scheduled to complete
   this task by July 16.   Transcript at 3663; Hearing Exhibit R-84.
 
 
        100. By August 13,  correspondence in the record  shows that
   SAE  was experiencing  significant performance  difficulties with
   Key.    On  that date,  SAE  informed  Key that  it  was delaying
   progress on  the project and  urged it  to mobilize promptly.   A
   week  later,  SAE  informed  Key  that  its  proposed  corrective
   measures for repairing  defective shoring and sheeting  work were
   unacceptable,  and instructed  Key  to provide  another  solution
   immediately and complete  all shoring and sheeting by  the end of
   August.   This letter warned  Key that  it would be  delaying the
   project's critical path.  Hearing Exhibit R-84.
 
        101. On August 29, 1991, SAE advised Key that a soldier beam
   had failed  and was  impacting the  safety of the  project.   SAE
   reiterated  its concerns  with Key's  delays to  the project  and
   stated   that  delay  costs   would  be  back-charged   to  Key's
   subcontract.   Hearing Exhibit R-84.
 
        102. On September  9, 1991,  Redi Concrete Company  informed
   SAE that  the instability  of the shoring  along the 24  line was
   delaying the start of the  concrete foundation walls along the 23
   line and the D line.  SAE  expressed additional concern to Key in
   further correspondence.   Hearing Exhibit R-84.  On September 29,
   1991, during the excavation of  the subbasement, a section of the
   sheeting and shoring  along the north  wall sustained a  blowout.
   Transcript at 3333; Hearing Exhibit R-63.
 
 
        103. The sheeting and shoring  work was eventually completed
   by  another contractor,  U.S.  Earthworks.   On  October 14,  SAE
   issued  a subcontract change  order taking deductions  from Key's
   subcontract for 1) repairs required to subpar work; 2)  deductive
   changes to the work for work  not performed by Key; 3) clean  up;
   and 4) twenty days of delay.  Hearing Exhibit R-84.
 
        104. Although  the   last  perimeter   caisson,  A-16,   was
   completed on September 9, 1991,  sheeting and shoring along the A
   and 24  lines was not completed  until October 1, 1991.   Hearing
   Exhibits A-553, R-12.  In OKA's view, the  delay in completion of
   sheeting  and shoring was  the critical controlling  delay to the
   start of critical  concrete.  OKA concluded that  Key delayed the
   start of  critical concrete by sixty-five days.  Hearing Exhibits
   R-12, R-84; Transcript at 3662, 3671. 
 
        Foundation Work
 
        105. The foundation work was subcontracted to  Redi Concrete
   Company.  Redi  was responsible for cast-in-place  concrete work,
   including construction of  concrete foundations, walls, slabs-on-
   grade,  slabs-on-deck,  slabs-on-metal  deck,  and  various  site
   improvements.  Transcript at 2011-13; Hearing Exhibit A-641.
 
        106. By  agreement with SAE,  Redi was prepared  to commence
   the foundation  work on July  10, 1991,  despite the fact  that a
   written subcontract  was not  formally executed  until August  1,
   1991.  Transcript at 2013-14,   2030, 2066-67; Hearing Exhibit A-
   641.    Initially,  Redi  prepared  shop  drawings  and  obtained
   bonding.   In  addition, Redi  fabricated  and delivered  caisson
   reinforcing steel cages prior to execution of the subcontract  in
   order to  support SAE's planned schedule.  Transcript at 2013-14;
   Appeal File,  Vol. I-A,  Exhibits 20, 24.   Redi's  caisson rebar
   cages were constructed  and available at the site,  but could not
   be  used in  July  because  of the  delays  to caisson  drilling.
   Transcript at 203; Appeal File, Vol. I-A, Exhibit 36.
 
        107. Redi is an experienced concrete construction firm which
   has been in business since  approximately 1956.  During that time
   Redi  has performed  concrete work on  a variety  of construction
   projects,  many of  them  comparable  in  scope  to  the  Trenton
   project.  Transcript at 2010-15.
 
        108. Based on its review of the bid documents, Redi expected
   that the concrete  work would be straightforward, as  most of the
   work  was  of  a  type   in  which  it  was  highly  experienced.
   Transcript at 2015-16.  
 
        109. Redi's  bid  was  based  on  following  SAE's   planned
   approach  of beginning  work  at the  northeast  quadrant of  the
   building,  then  moving  to  the  northwest  quadrant,  then  the
   southwest   quadrant,   and  finally   the   southeast  quadrant.
   Transcript at  204, 2017-18; Appeal  File, Vol. I-B,  Exhibit 17;
   Hearing Exhibit A-831 at 4 and Attachment 3A.
 
 
        110. Redi  planned to perform the concrete work by following
   caisson  installation  in the  northeast  quadrant  around column
   lines A-D, 24 to 16, with its wall crew, which would form, place,
   and strip the foundation  walls.  The slab crew would  than place
   slabs on grade  as the wall crew moved to the next quadrant, with
   the slab crew  again following the wall  crew.  Redi was  to move
   counter-clockwise and work westward from the deepest part  of the
   excavation.  Transcript  at 2017-19, 2037-38; Hearing  Exhibit A-
   831, at 6-8.
 
        111. Redi initially planned fourteen weeks for completion of
   the foundation work.  This  period included expected delays for a
   normal  level of weather, design issues, and excavation problems.
   Based on this  schedule, Redi expected to  complete concrete work
   by  the end  of October  1991.   Transcript  at 2019-20;  Hearing
   Exhibit A-831.
 
        112. To  form and place  foundation walls  efficiently, Redi
   needed  the multiple  caissons  underlying  each foundation  wall
   completed in the scheduled duration and sequence.   Transcript at
   2022,  2027;  Hearing  Exhibit A-831.    Although  Redi commenced
   foundation work  on August  21, 1991, it  could not  complete the
   foundation work  underlying steel until  March 2, 1992.   Hearing
   Exhibits A-101, A-831, A-838.  One of the significant reasons why
   Redi was  not able  to complete the  foundation concrete  work as
   originally  scheduled was that the caisson work was not completed
   as scheduled or  in the as-planned order.   Transcript at 201-02,
   2022; Appeal File, Vol. I-A, Exhibits 4, 36; Appeal File, Vol. I-
   B, Exhibit 17; Hearing Exhibits A-101, A-831.
 
        113. Because Redi had anticipated  that concrete work  would
   be completed  in October, it  had not accounted for  cold weather
   conditions as a factor in  its planned schedule.  Redi ultimately
   worked on  the foundations and  slabs during  the winter  months,
   which  reduced its  productivity.   Transcript  at 562,  2020-21;
   Hearing Exhibits A-831, A-838.
 
   Change in SAE Management Team
 
        114. In late October  1991, SAE changed its  project manager
   because SAE's upper level management considered that  personality
   conflicts  among GSA,  Vitetta, OKA,  and  SAE's initial  project
   manager  could be  hindering progress.    At the  same time,  SAE
   doubled the  size of  the day-to-day project  staff from  four to
   eight, to  address Vitetta's  rejections of  submittals and  shop
   drawings and  the  associated resubmissions  of these  documents.
   This  additional  staff  also handled  exterior  wall  issues and
   change orders.  Transcript at 68-70, 542-43.
 
        115. The new project manager, assigned to manage the Trenton
   project on a day-to-day basis,  had thirty years of experience in
   the  construction  industry  and had  significant  experience  in
   managing  and  scheduling  large, complex  building  construction
   projects.   Transcript at  530-35.  After  this project  team had
   been  in  place  for  about  two months,    OKA  recognized  that
   "[s]ignificantly  more  harmonious   relationships  [were]  being
   established" among the  SAE,  OKA, Vitetta, and GSA staff working
   on this project.  Hearing Exhibits A-563, A-904. 
 
        116. In September 1991,  the project was eight  weeks behind
   the schedule initially prepared by  SAE.  Hearing Exhibit R-12,  
   4; Transcript  at 115-16.   In November  1991, SAE and OKA agreed
   that  SAE's  new project  manager  would develop  a  revised, as-
   planned schedule in an attempt to resolve OKA's objections to the
   prior schedule. With input from the major subcontractors, the new
   project manager developed  a schedule with  a completion date  of
   February 18,  1993.  Hearing  Exhibits A-90, A-91;  Transcript at
   546-48, 1037.
 
        117. Although the new project manager prepared and forwarded
   a schedule to OKA during the course of the contract, no schedules
   were ever  officially approved by OKA or GSA.  The schedules were
   reviewed  and  returned  with   extensive  comments  on  numerous
   occasions,  and  OKA  recognized  that  the  schedules  would  be
   susceptible to being made  acceptable with certain modifications,
   but OKA was never fully  satisfied with the schedules proposed by
   SAE.    Consequently,  the  project never  had  an  approved  CPM
   schedule as contemplated by the contract.   Transcript at 552-53,
   1029, 1034, 1037, 1039; Hearing Exhibit A-107.
 
   Structural Steel
 
        118. The project's structural  steel was the  framework upon
   which  the  remainder of  the building  was  to be  erected.   It
   included  columns, beams,  spandrel  beams,  and  floor  purlins.
   Transcript at 458-59.
 
        119. In  May 1991, SAE contracted with Interstate Iron Works
   to  prepare  shop  drawings and  fabricate  and  erect structural
   steel,   a  metal  deck,  and   steel  stairs  for  the  project.
   Transcript at 458, 1835, 1844; Hearing Exhibit A-635.  Interstate
   subcontracted  with Entech to  detail and prepare  the structural
   steel shop drawings, and with Papp Ironworks to furnish the steel
   stairs.  Transcript at 501, 1836.
 
        120. Interstate planned to fabricate the steel and transport
   it directly to  the project site in the same sequence as it would
   be erected.  Transcript at 1844.  For purposes of  sequencing the
   work,  Interstate initially divided the building into five areas.
   Appeal File, Vol. II, Exhibit 1.  To erect steel, Interstate used
   a derricking system, under which  steel was loaded onto a flatbed
   truck and sent to the site in  a particular order to maintain the
   erection sequence.   Transcript at 494-95.   Interstate initially
   evaluated  several possible  erection sequences  but,  by October
   1991, had determined that the site was best suited to a two-phase
   east-west erection sequence.  Transcript at 495-97, 563-64.
 
 
        121. The  contract  called  for  galvanized steel  relieving
   angles to support  the exterior skin of the  building.  Relieving
   angles  are horizontal, L-shaped steel pieces of varying lengths,
   welded  to gusset  plates that  are attached  to the  spandrel or
   floor beams at  each floor. In essence, the  relieving angles are
   shelves that  support the  exterior veneer.   Transcript  at 801,
   807, 814.  The requirement for  galvanized steel relieving angles
   increased  the lead time  for fabrication because  each relieving
   angle   had  to  be  fabricated and  then  shipped elsewhere  for
   galvanizing.  Transcript at 459-60.
 
        122. Interstate intended to connect the relieving  angles to
   the perimeter  or horizontal  spandrel beams  at its  fabricating
   shop.  This  would allow Interstate to ship and erect both pieces
   at one  time and to minimize the number  of pieces required to be
   lifted by  a crane,  increasing the  efficiency of  construction.
   Although the angle would normally be attached to the column after
   the spandrel  is erected  and the angle  is adjusted,  Interstate
   interpreted  the  contract's  structural  steel  drawings,  which
   depicted the relieving  angle segments ending or  breaking at the
   vertical structural steel columns, to permit this approach.  This
   was because the drawings suggested that the relieving angle would
   be attached  only to  one  spandrel beam  and would  not cross  a
   column to be attached  to a second spandrel.   Transcript at 461,
   1850-51.
 
        123. Interstate's first  shop drawing submittal was  made in
   late  June 1991.  Interstate anticipated completing the submittal
   process by  mid-September 1991, with steel  fabrication beginning
   immediately  in June.  This would  have allowed  for five  to six
   weeks of steel fabrication, with completion in late October 1991.
   Transcript  at 462-63.     Interstate intended to  start erecting
   steel in mid-to-late October 1991, with completion occurring some
   eight weeks  later, near  the  end of  December.   This would  be
   followed by two  weeks of effort in completing  the bolting-up of
   the  steel and installation of miscellaneous items.  Appeal File,
   Vol. II, Exhibit 3; Transcript at 464, 1844.
 
        124. After surveying  the site, Interstate and SAE developed
   an east-west sequence  for erection of steel to  avoid moving the
   crane more than once.  Transcript  at 495-97, 563-64.
 
        125. Given the size of the job, Interstate expected two shop
   drawing  submissions,  with approval  of  the second  submission,
   permitting  fabrication  to   commence.     Transcript  at   467.
   Submissions were made  to SAE, which  forwarded drawings to  OKA.
   The drawing log reflects that SAE  generally did not hold any  of
   these drawings more than one or two days before transmitting them
   to OKA and  Vitetta and then back  to Interstate.  Transcript  at
   518-19; Hearing Exhibit A-788D.
 
        126. The  initial  relieving  angle  drawings,  numbers  one
   through seven, were submitted to SAE on Friday, July 5, 1991, and
   were transmitted by  SAE to OKA for Vitetta's  review on Tuesday,
   July 9,  1991.    These  drawings,  in  Interstate's  view,  were
   prepared  consistent   with  the  American  Institute   of  Steel
   Construction's   manual.[foot #] 12       In    preparing   these
   drawings, Interstate relied on the contract joint locations shown
   at   the  vertical  columns  in  the  structural  steel  contract
   drawings.   The  control joint  locations  "broke" the  relieving
   angles at the  columns.  Transcript at 465-66,  472, 511, 878-80;
   Appeal File, Vol. II, Exhibits 7, 9.  
        127. Instead  of showing the control joint  for each face of
   the building, the contract drawings showed only a typical line on
   each face or  elevation without any  dimensions.  These  drawings
   did not  permit Interstate  to determine  a precise  location for
   control joints.   Transcript at 520-21, 878-80;  Hearing Exhibits
   A-360D, E, F.
 
        128. The control  joints in the  exterior veneer are  at the
   same location as breaks in the relieving angle steel to allow for
   deflection, displacement, and  movement of the metal  stud backup
   wall and the veneer.  Transcript at 865-66, 879-81.
 
        129. In  response   to  Interstate's   first  submittal   of
   relieving angle drawings,  Vitetta provided additional dimensions
   necessary for the  location of some control joints.   Vitetta did
   not, however,  change many of the control joints which Interstate
   had placed at the column lines.  Transcript at 521-22.
 
        130. Interstate  was  not  able  to  complete  its  erection
   drawings  or  the  piece detail  without  completed  and approved
   relieving  angle drawings.  This  was because the locations where
   the relieving angles "broke," or  where one relieving angle ended
   and another began, were directly  related to the locations on the
   spandrel beams of each floor of the attachment points, the gusset
   plates, of  the relieving  angles.   Transcript  at 470,  881-82.
   Thus, pending approval of the location of relieving angle breaks,
   Interstate was not  able to determine  where the connections  for
   the relieving angles   would occur on the perimeter  beams.  This
   delayed  the detailing  and fabrication  of  perimeter beams  and
   gussets  for attaching the relieving  angels.  Transcript at 507;
   Appeal File, Vol. II, Exhibit 9.
 
        131. Interstate  met  with  representatives  of  Vitetta  in
   September 1991.  At that  time  Interstate maintains that  it was
   told that the relieving angles could not be broken at the columns
   and that all of the relieving  angle and erection drawings for an
   entire floor must be submitted  at one time.  Transcript at  470-
   71,  515-16, 1847-51.   This floor-by-floor approach  required by
   the  architect was  inconsistent with  the  approach intended  by
                                                                    
                   ----------- FOOTNOTE BEGINS ---------
 
        [foot #] 12 This manual was incorporated in the contract  by
   reference.  AppealFile, GSBCA 12253, Exhibit 3,   05120,   1.04. 
 
                   ----------- FOOTNOTE ENDS -----------
 
 
   Interstate and SAE, which was to erect the steel for the building
   in  two phases:  first the east  one-third of the building (Phase
   I) and then the west two-thirds of the building (Phase II).  This
   direction  conflicted with the  planned sequence of  work in that
   Interstate  had to prepare, submit, and obtain Vitetta's approval
   for Phase II steel on each  floor, even when it intended only  to
   erect Phase I steel.   Each time Vitetta had a problem with Phase
   II steel  drawings, Phase I construction was  delayed. The floor-
   by-floor  approach  to  submittals  required     that  Interstate
   complete submittals for  all seven floors before  it could embark
   upon fabrication and  erection of  Phase I  steel. Transcript  at
   470-71, 1847-48.
 
 
        132. GSA  maintains that  there was  no  requirement in  the
   contract that Interstate submit structural steel shop drawings on
   a floor-by-floor basis.   Interstate was free to  submit the shop
   drawings  in accordance with its planned erection sequence, which
   is what  Vitetta expected the  contractors to do.   Transcript at
   3939-40.  Moreover, minutes of the administrative meeting held on
   September 18, 1991,  specifically state that Vitetta  agreed that
   SAE  could  exercise  its  own  discretion  with  respect to  the
   sequence (by derrick or by  floor) of shop drawing submittals for
   structural steel.  Hearing Exhibit R-30.  
 
        133. By  letters dated  August 6  and  14, 1991,  Interstate
   informed  SAE  that the  relieving  angle drawings  had  not been
   returned.   In the  letter of August  14, Interstate  pointed out
   that the  delay could  result in  more expensive  winter erection
   costs.  Appeal File, Vol. II,  Exhibits 7, 9; Transcript at  472-
   74.   SAE in turn,  notified OKA and  GSA of the  alleged Vitetta
   delay in returning  the relieving angle drawings.   Transcript at
   560; Hearing Exhibit A-138.
 
        134. Interstate was unable to fabricate certain steel pieces
   and  could not  erect surrounding steel  absent responses  to its
   questions and  approval of  the relieving angle  drawings.   As a
   result, Interstate  was not  able to  commence steel  erection as
   planned.  Transcript at 474, 881-82.
 
        135. The initial  relieving angle drawings were  returned by
   Vitetta marked  "revise and  resubmit" on August  22, 1991.   The
   drawings contained modifications by Vitetta,  reflecting a change
   in the contract  drawing configuration of relieving  angle breaks
   at the center line of the column to breaks at the  corners of the
   building in  a north-south  orientation.   Transcript at  475-76,
   879-80; Hearing Exhibits A-345, A-360.
 
        136. Thereafter, SAE, Interstate,  and Vitetta agreed  to an
   exchange  of design information  by telephone so  that Interstate
   could  ask questions  directly of  Vitetta.   Vitetta  ended this
   approach  in about  two weeks,  however.   Transcript at  484-85.
   Interstate  also   offered  to  place  Interstate   personnel  in
   Vitetta's  office to work  through dimension issues,  but Vitetta
   declined this  offer.  Transcript  at 485-87; Hearing  Exhibit A-
   134.
 
 
        137. On   August   27,   1991,  Interstate,   through   SAE,
   resubmitted  the  first  two  relieving  angle  drawings  showing
   Vitetta's  changes to  the location  of  relieving angle  breaks.
   These were returned on September 17, marked  "approved as noted."
   Relieving angle  drawings three  through seven were  subsequently
   returned,   however,  marked  "revise   and  resubmit"  and  with
   notations  that  the  approval  of   drawings  one  and  two  was
   rescinded.   This  was based  on  another architectural  decision
   determining  that the  relieving  angles could  not break  at the
   columns.  This determination was related to a modification of the
   orientation of the control joints announced in a memorandum dated
   October 7, 1991.   Transcript at 478-79,  880-81; Hearing Exhibit
   A-778, A-887.
 
        138. Accordingly,  the  third  versions  of  the  first  two
   relieving  angle   drawings  were  submitted  October   9,  1991.
   Transcript at  480-81; Appeal File,  Vol. II, Exhibit 13.   These
   were returned  on October 18,  1991, marked  "approved as  noted"
   with a notation  that the corner control joints  of the relieving
   angles were  to be changed  from the north-south direction  to an
   east-west direction.  Transcript at 480-82.
 
        139. The changes in orientation of the corner control joints
   affected numerous  other steel  drawings   because the  perimeter
   steel details, the erection plan, and the relieving angles plans,
   on which the joints appear, all had to be changed.  Transcript at
   509.    Interstate  ultimately  submitted  the   relieving  angle
   drawings  for architectural  approval  four  times, with  several
   being submitted five  times.  A  similar pattern was  experienced
   with the erection plans.  Transcript at 467.
 
        140. Interstate began fabricating steel on October 29, 1991,
   shortly  before it received complete submittal approvals.  Appeal
   File, Vol.  II, Exhibit  20.   Approved relieving  angle drawings
   were  received on  October 31.     Until Interstate  received the
   approved relieving  angle drawings, it  was unable to  finish its
   erection drawings or the piece  details because it needed to know
   where  the  relieving angles  would  break in  order  to properly
   locate the spandrel beams of each floor.  Transcript at 482, 508-
   09.
 
        141.   According to  SAE and Interstate,  actual fabrication
   time was extended approximately three  months, in contrast to the
   five or six weeks that should  have been required.  The disrupted
   shop drawing  submittal process  caused  Interstate to  fabricate
   steel   in  an  irregular  sequence,  in  that  Interstate  would
   fabricate some steel  for the courthouse project and  then put it
   aside and move to other  jobs while the submittal process dragged
   on.  Then it would resume fabrication for the courthouse project.
    The process also  resulted in fabrication of pieces  of steel of
   different sizes  at the same  time, which is not  the economical,
   efficient approach of  fabricating each particular size  at once,
   as Interstate  had planned.   The  piecemeal fabrication  process
   forced Interstate to store steel at its plant until it was needed
   at the project site.  Transcript at 493-94, 497, 1848-50.
 
 
        142. Beginning February  19, 1992,  Interstate  was able  to
   erect  steel using the  east-west sequence.   Transcript  at 564.
   Once it had access to the site  and the approval of its drawings,
   Interstate  erected the steel  for the building  in approximately
   the same duration as originally planned.  Transcript at 495.
 
   Exterior Skin
 
        143. Vitetta's initial architectural drawings  called for an
   exterior  wall design based  on a  metal stud  backup wall.   OKA
   contracted  with an  engineering  consultant, Seelye,  Stevenson,
   Value  &  Knecht  (SSVK),  to  perform a  design  review  of  the
   architect's working drawings.  On September 19, 1990, SSVK issued
   a "Technical  Design Review  Report" which  stated the  following
   with respect to the exterior walls and masonry:
 
             The use of metal studs with gypsum board as a
             back-up  for an exterior  masonry finish is a
             very economical  system, but has  a potential
             for troublesome performance.
 
             The history  of such construction  shows that
             it is  notorious for leaking.   Imperfections
             in the  masonry work  are conducive to  leaks
             that  tend to severely  shorten the  life and
             reduce  the effectiveness  of wall  fastening
             systems, and greatly  increase the likelihood
             of such leaks penetrating through the back-up
             board, to the  interior of the space.   Also,
             if any weep  holes become  clogged, which  is
             not  uncommon,  water  could  build  up   and
             penetrate into the building. 
 
             The selection  of  materials  and  method  of
             construction for the exterior walls, as shown
             on  drawings No.  19 through A.21.c  does not
             constitute  in  our   opinion  an  acceptable
             quality  level  for  the design  of  a public
             building requiring  an extended  trouble-free
             service  life  that   suitably  reflects  the
             institution of a courthouse. 
 
             Metal stud construction  is in our  view more
             suitable  for  commercial   applications,  or
             where   special   considerations    (seismic)
             require a structure of least possible mass.
 
             We recommend reconsideration and reevaluation
             of this design, with the possibility of going
 
             to a typical masonry cavity wall construction
             with masonry backup.
 
   Hearing Exhibits A-29, A-180.
 
        144. The Government's expert, Ivan Becica, an architect with
   a master's  degree  in civil  engineering,  with an  emphasis  on
   structural design,  Transcript at 3184-85, explained the "debate"
   over metal stud construction as follows:
 
             It is essentially steel studs being used as a
             backup to  support masonry products,  and the
             concern is as designer, how do we look at the
             action, the  structural action  of these  two
             elements where they are assembled together.
 
             The debate has  to do with  how rigid is  the
             steel stud wall and what is the effect of the
             steel  stud wall's  rigidity on  the behavior
             performance  of  the brick  veneer.     Brick
             veneers,  concrete  masonry veneers  are  all
             brittle materials as compared to steel studs,
             which are manufactured  from a material  that
             has an  enormous  amount  of  ductility  and,
             therefore, can deflect  great amounts of wind
             within their  allowable stress  range without
             yielding  or without failure, as opposed to a
             brick,  stone,  or concrete  masonry  veneer,
             which is joined by mortar.
 
             These  systems  tend  to   be  very  weak  in
             tension, strong in compression, and when they
             bend as  a result  of the  action of  lateral
             loads such as  wind or earthquake,  they tend
             to crack.   And when they crack  they tend to
             leak more  than  they  would  normally  leak.
             Once  water gets behind  the wall in  a large
             quantity, it  tends to  degrade materials  on
             the  interior  of  the  building  as  well as
             degrade the attachments that are made between
             the  steel studs and the  brick.  And are all
             causes for concern.
 
   Transcript at 3200-01.  Mr. Becica noted that there is a split in
   the industry  concerning whether and  when steel studs  should be
   used and further stated:
 
             There is nothing inherently wrong with  steel
             stud  wall construction.  It is just a matter
             of  how you  assemble the  wall  and how  you
             design the  wall.   Care has  to be  taken to
             include --  to deal  with all  these problems
             that we know  can exist.   [The issue is  not
             whether  it is  negligent to  select a  steel
 
             stud wall.]  The issue  is once you do decide
             it is a steel stud wall,  you must be careful
             . . .  how you design it  and you must .  . .
             proceed in  a very cautious  manner and  make
             your decisions based on [a] rational analysis
             of the situation that you have.
 
   Transcript at 3201-02.
 
        145. After  forwarding SSVK's report to GSA, OKA followed up
   with its own report, observing, with respect to the status of the
   wall  sections as  designed by  Vitetta at  that point,  that the
   details  were incomplete  and not  fairly  representative of  the
   architect's  intent.    The  working  drawings,  in  OKA's  view,
   contained discrepancies and contradictions  such that the  design
   at  that point was  unsuitable for  fully understanding  the wall
   system  and how  it was  intended to  interact with  the masonry.
   Hearing Exhibits A-29, A-30.
 
        146. Other  than   directing   Vitetta   to   use   a   more
   "conservative approach to this type of wall construction [by] . .
   . using an allowable deflection  factor of H/1500 for stud backup
   to  CMU [concrete  masonry unit]  walls and  H/1000 for  stud and
   limestone  veneer  wall   areas,"    GSA  did   not  require  any
   modifications  of  the  design  put forth  by  Vitetta.   Hearing
   Exhibit A-35.   Vitetta performed calculations of  the metal stud
   backup  walls'  anticipated  deflection  based  on  the  proposed
   spacing  of metal studs at  16 inches and  reported that the wall
   system met GSA's deflection criteria.  Hearing Exhibit A-415.  
 
        147. Other than  changing the  specification to  state GSA's
   deflection criteria, Vitetta  does not appear to have changed the
   working drawings as reviewed by  SSVK to address the other issues
   raised with respect to this  exterior wall design. Transcript  at
   839-40,  4216-17.  SAE's expert, a structural engineer, testified
   that  based on  his  review  of the  documents,  Vitetta did  not
   address either the  inherent problems with the  metal stud backup
   wall system  or the  criticisms  raised by  OKA and  SSVK at  the
   design stage.  Transcript at 837-42.  
 
        148. At the time it approved the metal stud backup wall, GSA
   was aware of the  concerns voiced by OKA and SSVK  and understood
   that the exterior  wall design was not the  traditional method of
   supporting   a   monumental  building's   exterior.     Concannon
   Deposition, Vol.  II at 187-88, 192-94.  GSA nonetheless approved
   the design, based on Vitetta's word that the exterior wall system
   and metal  stud backup was  acceptable.  GSA expected  to realize
   approximately $1,000,000 in cost savings as a result of the metal
   stud backup system.  Concannon Deposition, Vol. I at 126, Vol. IV
   at 387.
 
        149. In a memorandum dated March 21, 1991,  OKA informed GSA
   and Vitetta that bidders were interpreting the metal stud  backup
   wall specification and drawings to require fewer metal studs than
   were actually intended to be  installed by the architect and GSA.
   OKA expressed the  view that this would lead  to underpricing the
   true  cost of satisfying GSA's true  intent and interpretation of
   these specifications.  No clarifications of the specification and
   drawings were issued to respond to this concern, however.  Appeal
   File, GSBCA 12294, Exhibit 6.
 
 
        150. Section  05400   of  the   specification  provided   in
             pertinent part:
 
             1.02 DESCRIPTION OF WORK
 
                  A.   The  extent  of  the  exterior
                       wall metal stud  work is shown
                       on the Drawings as specified.
 
                  B.   The work  includes the  design
                       and    engineering   of    the
                       exterior  wall     metal  stud
                       system  to  meet   the  design
                       criteria       and      design
                       arrangement   shown   on   the
                       Drawings as specified.
 
                  .  .  .  .
 
             1.08 DESIGN CRITERIA
 
                  2.   Stud size:
 
                       a.   8   inch  deep   section,
                            spaced not  more than  16
                            inches  on  center;  Stud
                            gauge:  12
 
                       b.   6   inch  deep   section,
                            spaced  no  more  than 12
                            inches  on  center;  Stud
                            gauge:  14
 
                       c.   as indicated on drawings.
 
                  3.   Deflection criteria:
    
                       a.   H/1500:    backup for CMU
                            veneer.
 
                       b.   H/1200:     backup    for
                            limestone veneer.
 
   Appeal File, GSBCA 12253, Exhibit 3.
 
        Limestone Design Issues
 
        151. SAE's  exterior  limestone  and  granite  and  interior
   marble subcontractor was  Dan Lepore & Sons, Inc.   Transcript at
   575,  1164-65.   In estimating  its bid  for the  project, Lepore
   quantified  and priced the  number of stone  pieces and elements,
   approximated and  priced installation  productivity based  on the
   building's  physical configuration,  and tendered  a  bid to  all
   bidding general contractors.  Transcript at 1170-72.
 
        152. The   specification  for   "Anchors  and   Attachments"
   provided the following:
 
             A.   Provide anchors and attachments of types
                  and sizes required  to support stonework
                  and as follows:
 
               1. Stainless Steel, AISI [American Iron and
                  Steel  Institute]   type  302/304   non-
                  magnetic  for  all   anchors  in  direct
                  contact with stone.
 
               2. Cast  or malleable  iron for  adjustable
                  inserts embedded in  concrete and not in
                  direct contact with stone.
 
               3. Hot-Dip Galvanized Steel:
 
                     a.     For  anchor  bolts,  nuts
                            and washers not in direct
                            contact    with    stone;
                            comply  with  ASTM  A307,
                            Grade A, for material and
                            ASTM C153, Class  C , for
                            galvanizing.
 
                      b.    For steel plates,  shapes
                            and  bars  not  in direct
                            contact    with    stone;
                            comply with ASTM  A36 for
                            materials and ASTM   A123
                            for galvanizing.
 
   Appeal File, GSBCA 12253, Exhibit 3,   04400, Stonework,   2.07.
 
        153. Lepore began  performing its  scope of  work under  the
   anticipated subcontract  in June  1991, although  its subcontract
   with SAE had not at that time been executed.  Transcript at 1173-
   74;  Hearing Exhibit A-636.   Lepore entered into a contract with
   Harding &  Cogswell to  prepare shop drawings  and to  supply and
   fabricate limestone needed  for the project.  Transcript  at 579-
   80, 1175.
 
        154.  Under specification section 04400 of the contract, SAE
   was required to  provide Indiana limestone to match  in grade and
   color  "Regal Buff"  by Rock  of  Ages, a  granite supplier  with
   quarries in  New England.  There is no Indiana limestone known as
   regal buff.  Since, in any event, Rock of  Ages is not a supplier
   of  limestone,  and  Lepore  could  not  identify  a supplier  of
   limestone  known as regal buff, Lepore submitted Indiana standard
   buff limestone samples to Vitetta  for its review in August 1991.
   Transcript at 1174-75; Hearing Exhibit  A-336.
 
 
        155. When Vitetta reviewed  the samples in January  1992, it
   rejected  them.   Transcript at  620-21;  Hearing Exhibit  A-336.
   Vitetta   then  changed  the  specification  from  buff  to  grey
   limestone.  Harding & Cogswell, through Lepore and SAE, submitted
   a  range of grey limestone samples.   Vitetta, however, attempted
   to direct  that all limestone  for the building match  the color,
   texture, and  markings of  only one piece  of the  submitted grey
   samples, which  is not possible  given inherent variation  in the
   natural stone specified.  Transcript at 1175-76; Hearing Exhibits
   A-336, A-870.
 
        156. At the  time it revised  the specification to  call for
   grey  limestone, Vitetta  also required additional  submittals of
   different color ground-face  block.  This extended  the submittal
   process  because SAE submitted some forty to fifty block samples,
   which Vitetta rejected.  Vitetta wanted filled block and insisted
   that  a particular  company, Anchor,  in  fact   made a  matching
   filled  block.  SAE  determined that  Anchor did  not manufacture
   such a block.  In May 1992,  GSA ended the stalemate and directed
   Vitetta to  accept the grey block originally submitted by Lepore.
   Transcript  at  620-64; Mitchelson  Deposition at  101-03; Appeal
   File, Vol. IV, Exhibits 35, 55; Hearing Exhibits A-269, A-726.
 
        157. In  a letter dated March 17, 1992, Vitetta approved the
   buff limestone samples  submitted in August 1991,  excluding only
   one stone of the  sample range.   Appeal File, Vol. IV,  Exhibits
   32, 37;  Transcript at 1177-78.
 
        158. In order to make progress, Harding & Cogswell commenced
   work before Vitetta approved the  shop drawings.  The preliminary
   work involved slabbing the stone, or cutting it into large blocks
   approximating  the sizes needed for the  building.  Transcript at
   1254.
 
        159. The  first full set  of limestone shop  drawings, which
   included  a limestone attachment system, was submitted to Vitetta
   on September  15, 1991.   The drawings were returned  on November
   15, 1991, with the following notation:  "Anchors detailed are not
   per spec.  See  VG [Vitetta Group] drawings for anchorage."  This
   was understood by SAE and its  subcontractor to be a direction to
   adhere to  the design set  forth on the contract  drawings, which
   depicted a dowel  connection at the relieving angles  and between
   stones in non-relieving  angle locations.  Transcript  at 581-83,
   1181-82; Hearing Exhibits A-325, A-336.
 
        160. The wall tie "anchor" referred  to in the drawings is a
   device for attaching limestone to the metal stud at all locations
   other than  the relieving angle.  The wall tie anchor connects to
   a receiver attached to the metal stud.  Transcript at 802, 807.
 
 
        161. Lepore  was concerned  about  the limestone  attachment
   design  in the  contract drawings  because the  dowel in  a fully
   mortared  system, as specified  in the contract  documents, could
   cause cracking  in the stones  as deflection and movement  of the
   stone could twist the dowel and cause  the stone to fail.  Lepore
   and  its  subcontractor  were   dubious  about  the  use  of   an
   interlocking, rigid system such as that used in the design in the
   contract documents.   Lepore also was  concerned that the  design
   allowed no tolerance and would be difficult to  construct because
   the design required the  dowel to line up  exactly with holes  in
   the stones.  Transcript at 582, 586-88, 1179-81, 1184-85; Hearing
   Exhibit A-856.
 
        162. In the  initial limestone  submittals, Lepore  tried to
   address  its concerns about  tolerance and lateral  adjustment by
   showing the  anchorage as a  split tail  strap using an  eight to
   ten-inch slot cut in the stone, rather than a single hole.  These
   concerns were stated  in a letter sent to SAE on January 8, 1992.
   SAE  forwarded this  letter to  Vitetta and  OKA.   Transcript at
   1178-81; Hearing  Exhibits A-359,  A-856.   Vitetta responded  by
   stating  that Lepore's  observations  were  "valid concerns  with
   cavity/veneer design, but nothing to  indicate a problem on  this
   Project."  Appeal File, Vol. V-A, Exhibit 6.
 
        163. The  design  details   in  the  contract  architectural
   drawings did not show complete details of the limestone anchorage
   system.   Drawing 5/A39 showed  a masonry tie  (DW-10) connection
   detail with  a note requiring the use of  "Tie Anchor Sim. to Tie
   #1Typ."  SAE  requested clarification of this note several times,
   specifically inquiring what Vitetta regarded as "similar" because
   of the existence  of several potentially  similar configurations.
   Lepore did not believe that the receiver for the DW-10 wire would
   be compatible with  the dowel and strap, and both  SAE and Lepore
   understood the DW-10 tie to be a brick wall tie, not suitable for
   anchoring limestone panels.  Transcript at 580, 583, 1183, 1189. 
 
        164. A meeting was convened on December 9, 1991, attended by
   representatives  of SAE,  Lepore, Vitetta,  and  OKA, to  discuss
   technical  issues with  respect to  the  connections between  the
   limestone panels and the building and from one limestone panel to
   another.    The  next day,  Lepore  communicated  the information
   obtained to Harding & Cogswell.   Transcript at 577; Appeal File,
   Vol. IV, Exhibits 13-14.  
 
        165. After the meeting on December 9, 1991, a  new submittal
   was prepared in a second  set of limestone drawings, forwarded on
   February 3,  1992.   These drawings attempted  to show  the exact
   anchorage  system in accordance  with the contract  drawings, but
   sought design information as to the length of the dowel and other
   details.  Hearing Exhibit A-336; Transcript at 577, 1185-87.
 
        166. This second set  of drawings was returned  on March 26,
   1992, with an  annotation stating  that SAE  was responsible  for
   designing the connections and should coordinate the details based
   on   the  Indiana  Limestone  Institute  (ILI)  Handbook.    This
   direction  conflicted  with  the interpretation  of  SAE  and its
   subcontractors,  who construed  the  contract specifications  and
   drawings to be prescriptive with respect to limestone connection.
   Transcript  at 578-79, 1185-89; Appeal File, GSBCA 12253, Exhibit
   3,   04400; Hearing Exhibit  A-336.
 
        167. A meeting was convened on March 3, 1992, to discuss the
   limestone  exterior veneer  system  and  its  connection  to  the
   building.   In  an effort  to move  the project,  SAE  and Lepore
   presented details for  anchoring the stone for  Vitetta's review.
   Transcript at 590-92, 1191-94; Appeal  File, Vol. V-A, Exhibit 9.
   The question of who was  responsible for designing the  anchoring
   system was not resolved at the meeting, although in a transmittal
   of March 4,  SAE attempted to obtain Vitetta's  approval of SAE's
   connection details.  Transcript at 592-93, 1191-92.
 
        168. SAE  also  sought the  intervention of  the contracting
   officer   with  respect  to  the  proper  interpretation  of  the
   limestone attachment specifications so as to permit progress with
   this  issue.   SAE  did not  obtain  direction from  GSA  on this
   matter, however.  Transcript at 594-95.   In a letter dated March
   27, 1992, SAE wrote to OKA asking that  Vitetta identify the stud
   receiver considered  to be similar to Tie  #1.  Appeal File, Vol.
   V-A, Exhibit 15; Transcript at 596.  
 
        169. On  April 4,  1992,  SAE submitted  RFI 213,  which set
   forth  each  of  its   specific  questions  concerning  limestone
   connection  details.  SAE  sought design details  identifying the
   length of  the typical dowel  pin, the depth  of the hole  in the
   limestone  to accommodate the  pins, and slotting  details in the
   stone at  the dowel locations.   Appeal File, Vol.  V-A, Exhibits
   19,  21; Hearing  Exhibit A-150.   Vitetta  replied on  April 22,
   1992,   again  stating  that  the  connection  details  were  the
   responsibility  of the  contractor.      Hearing  Exhibit  A-150;
   Transcript at 597-98.
 
        170. On April 6, 1992, Vitetta,  OKA, SAE, and Lepore met to
   discuss the  connection details.   As a  result of  this meeting,
   Lepore understood that  GSA would approve straps,  cramps, split-
   tails,  and slotting  the  stone  to  address the  tolerance  and
   constructability  issues  raised  by  the  architect's  anchorage
   system.  Appeal  File, Vol. V-A, Exhibit 21;  Transcript at 1195-
   97.  At this meeting, many, although not all, design details were
   determined.  For  example, it was agreed that for a 3/8" dowel, a
   3/4" hole would be drilled; for a 1/8" split-tail or cramp,  a  "
   slot would be cut;  slots would be used at locations  in front of
   metal studs,  but a  dowel hole  would be  cut  at the  relieving
   angle.  In addition, it  was determined that Lepore would provide
   a plate with a 1" dowel pin of 3/8" diameter atop it to be welded
   to  the relieving  angle; the  stone  would be  drilled for  3/4"
   diameter holes to a depth of 1-1/4".  The depth of the  " slot in
   the  stone  was  to  be  determined by  Vitetta.    Vitetta  also
   confirmed  that the DW-10 brick tie  depicted on contract drawing
   A36.2  was to be  used to  anchor the  limestone panels.   Appeal
   File, Vol. V-A, Exhibits 21, 23; Transcript at 1197.
 
 
         171.     After  the  April 6  meeting,  however,  SAE still
   could neither complete the shop drawings for approval nor release
   the   limestone  for  complete   fabrication  due   to  remaining
   unresolved  issues, which  included the  slot  dimensions in  the
   stone and the  method of bolting the  receiver to the stud.   SAE
   apprised  OKA and  GSA of this  problem.  Appeal  File, Vol. V-A,
   Exhibits 23-24; Transcript at 602-03.  
 
        172. On April  30, 1992,  representatives for SAE,  Vitetta,
   and Lepore traveled to Harding & Cogswell's Indiana facilities to
   try to resolve the limestone connection details. In the course of
   this meeting,  however, representatives  from Vitetta  reiterated
   their view that  SAE was responsible for  designing the limestone
   connections, which left the situation essentially unchanged since
   it had  first arisen in  September 1991.  Appeal  File, Vol. V-A,
   Exhibits 27, 29; Transcript at 606-08, 1199-1201; Hearing Exhibit
   A-330.
 
        173. During this period, SAE's schedule updates, which  were
   provided to  OKA, showed  later  and later  completion dates,  as
   delays to  limestone were on the critical  path.  OKA agreed that
   limestone issues  were on  the critical path  and that  delays in
   this  area  were  affecting  the  project  completion.    Hearing
   Exhibits A-331, A-908, A-909, A-910; Transcript at 608-09.
 
        174. GSA  directed OKA, Vitetta, SAE,  and Lepore to meet on
   May 6, 1992, at which time a GSA representative reviewed RFI  213
   and directed Vitetta  to provide design information  missing from
   the  contract  drawings' limestone  connection details.   Vitetta
   provided  this information approximately two weeks later.  Appeal
   File, Vol.  V-A, Exhibit  32; Transcript at  580, 612-14.   Using
   Vitetta's  response  to  GSA's  direction,  and  the  information
   provided with respect to earlier questions, SAE's project manager
   sketched the connection detail configurations and submitted these
   sketches on June 15, 1992.   Appeal File, Vol. V-B, Exhibits 5-6;
   Transcript at 618-19.   Thereafter, Vitetta still  only agreed to
   approve the  shop  drawings when  the  SAE project  manager  also
   initialed them.  This was not fully resolved until July 28, 1992.
   Transcript at 575-77; Hearing Exhibit A-336.  On August 20, 1992,
   SAE directed  Lepore to  fabricate the  limestone.   Appeal File,
   Vol. V-B, Exhibit 43.
 
        Metal Stud Backup Wall Issues
 
        175. One element of the overall  exterior wall system is the
   metal stud backup wall.  Transcript  at 808, 3132.  Section 05400
   of  the  contract specifications  stated  that:   "The  extent of
   exterior  wall  metal stud  work  is  shown  on the  Drawings  as
   specified" and "the  work includes the design  and engineering of
   the exterior wall  metal stud system to meet  the design criteria
   and  design  arrangement  shown on  the  drawings  as specified."
   Hearing Exhibit A-123.
 
 
        176. The contract  drawings showed  the  size, spacing,  and
   deflection ratio for the metal studs.  SAE and its subcontractors
   could not determine from these drawings that spacing of less than
   that  depicted on  the  drawings would  be  necessary to  achieve
   specified deflection ratios of H/1200  and H/1500.  SAE concluded
   that the spacing  set forth in the drawings  and the selection of
   metal stud size meant that  the architect had designed the backup
   wall to  meet  the  specified  deflection  ratios  and  that  the
   contract did not require the  contractor to design the metal stud
   component of the  exterior wall.  Transcript  at 139-40; Contract
   Drawings A31, Detail  1; A32, Detail  2; A34, Detail 1;  and A37,
   Detail 2.
 
        177. SAE could not  prepare the metal stud  backup wall shop
   drawings   until  the  limestone  anchorage  design  issues  were
   resolved.    Transcript  at  600-01.    Vitetta  interpreted  the
   specifications  and drawings  to require  SAE  to show  the metal
   studs on the limestone shop drawings and the anchors on the metal
   stud  shop drawings  to verify  that each  anchor connected  to a
   stud.   Hearing Exhibit A-862.   Contract Drawing A39,  Detail 5,
   showing  a wall  section-limestone veneer, allowed  the use  of a
   metal strap between  studs wherever anchors did not  align with a
   stud.   
 
        178. SAE's subcontractor  had  to locate  the  precise  stud
   locations  on the drawings to comply with GSA's interpretation of
   the deflection criteria.  Approximation of the stud locations was
   precluded, and there  was no flexibility to move a stud to meet a
   limestone  anchor because the  studs were to  be installed before
   the  limestone and  because movements of  this nature  could have
   caused  portions of  the walls  to fail  to meet  the architect's
   criteria for stiffness.  Transcript at 721-22.
 
        179. Vitetta returned the  metal stud shop drawings  on July
   31, 1992, marked "approved as noted."  Hearing Exhibit A-336.
 
        Continuing Issues With Respect to Exterior Wall Design
 
        180. In June  1992, GSA directed OKA to  review the exterior
   wall submittals as  to the adequacy of the  exterior wall design.
   OKA suggested that  an independent engineering expert  provide an
   opinion on whether any details  or attachments would be likely to
   fail  or cause  durability problems  in  the long  or short  run.
   Hearing Exhibit A-15.
 
        181. A meeting with representatives of GSA, OKA, and Vitetta
   was  held on  July 15,  1992, at  which   GSA expressed  concerns
   regarding the exterior wall system.  SAE was not present at  this
   meeting.  Hearing Exhibit A-300; Transcript at 3420, 3422-23.
 
        182. In  a  letter  dated  July  22,  1992,  GSA's  Regional
   Director of Design and Construction, Alfred S. DeLucia, confirmed
   the  agency's concerns about  the exterior wall  design, advising
   OKA and Vitetta as follows:
 
             I have doubts that a metal stud backing wall,
             covered with gypsum board, will function as a
             single  structural  system  in  a  manner  as
             forgiving  as  a conventional  CMU  [concrete
             masonry  unit] backing  wall, and  will leave
             less room for error during construction. .  .
             .  The  complexity  of  the  system  and  the
             flashing required  leaves much  potential for
             leaks.  . . . [I]t must be clearly understood
             that I hold you accountable and expect you to
             work together to ensure this system  does not
             fail in the immediate or distant future.  
 
   Hearing Exhibit A-300.  
 
        183. On August 17, 1992, OKA forwarded a formal  proposal to
   GSA  to obtain  an  independent architect/engineering  consultant
   review of  the exterior  wall system.   OKA recommended  that the
   independent engineers  review the  relevant design  documents and
   provide a written  report with an overall evaluation  of the wall
   system.  In  addition, OKA proposed  that the consultant  provide
   detailed  evaluations of specific  design conditions such  as the
   anchoring  methods, flashing  details, and  material installation
   coordination,   with   recommendations   for   enhancements   and
   modifications  to the  design.   Finally,  OKA proposed  that the
   consultant  evaluate  the  system  for  long-term  durability  as
   presently  designed  and  with  various  proposed  enhancements. 
   Hearing Exhibit A-155.
 
        184. GSA, through OKA, retained the engineering firm of Wiss
   Janney Elstner (WJE)   "to evaluate the long  term performance of
   the  limestone masonry veneer/metal  stud exterior  wall system."
   Hearing  Exhibits A-156,  A-157.    GSA's  principal  purpose  in
   retaining  WJE was to determine whether  the exterior wall design
   was  in fact  sound, as  represented by  Vitetta.   Transcript at
   3425-27.
 
        185. In September 1992,  Mr. DeLucia wrote to  OKA, Vitetta,
   and  SAE, stating  that GSA  would hold  all the  parties jointly
   responsible  for design and  performance of the  exterior facade.
   In  the letter  received by  SAE, Mr.  DeLucia characterized  the
   exterior wall system as a "less forgiving system."   Appeal File,
   Vol.  III-A, Exhibit  30; Transcript  at  637-39.   SAE took  the
   position in  response to this  letter that it had  no obligations
   other than those stated in the contract drawings, but agreed that
   it   would  perform  all   responsibilities  under  the  contract
   documents.  Transcript at 639-40; Hearing Exhibit A-453.  At that
   point,  SAE was adding  personnel to expedite the construction of
   the exterior facade.
 
        186. A similar  letter was dispatched  to OKA, in  which GSA
   took  the position  that  OKA  was  potentially  responsible  for
   "failures to  the [exterior wall]  system related  to design  and
   constructability review,  construction oversight  and enforcement
   of construction quality  control."  Hearing  Exhibit A-191.   OKA
   responded to GSA by pointing out that it had strongly recommended
   against the  metal stud backup  system and that GSA  had accepted
   this  design over  OKA's  objections.    Hearing  Exhibit  A-234.
   Because  of its  concerns  about  GSA's  position,  however,  OKA
   engaged an additional inspector who  would "focus strictly on the
   exterior wall" and who  would be a  stickler with respect to  the
   quality of the wall.  Hearing Exhibit A-911.
 
        187. GSA's  letter to  Vitetta, also  sent  on September  4,
   1992, observed that  the wall system design  was "unconventional"
   and stated that Vitetta would be "held accountable for any future
   failures   of  this   wall   system   related   to   design   and
   responsibilities ancillary to design in the construction  phase."
   Hearing  Exhibit A-232.    Vitetta  responded  by  disputing  Mr.
   DeLucia's    characterization    of    the    wall   system    as
   "unconventional."   Hearing Exhibit A-233.
 
        188. The WJE report was issued  in October 1992.  It  led to
   some twelve to fifteen changes to the design of the exterior wall
   throughout the fall of 1992.   Most of WJE's recommendations were
   implemented, despite  the fact  that,  by then,  the project  was
   significantly   behind  schedule  with  respect  to  the  planned
   completion  date.  Hearing  Exhibit A-156; Transcript  at 642-43;
   Mitchelson Deposition at 119-20.
 
        189. One of WJE's  recommendations was to either  change the
   veneer  material  to  prevent  cracking  and  water  infiltration
   associated with  the flexibility  of the  metal stud  backup wall
   system  or change  the joints  from  mortar to  sealant to  allow
   flexing  without  cracking in  the  joints.   In  particular, WJE
   recommended deleting  the mortar in the limestone joints to avoid
   cracking caused by deflection of  the metal stud backup systems. 
   Hearing Exhibits A-156, A-348; Transcript at  643-44, 864-67.  On
   October  26,  1992,  GSA  issued  field  instruction  number  62,
   directing   deletion  of  mortar  at  all  limestone  joints  and
   substituting a soft or caulked  joint.  Transcript at 644; Appeal
   File, Vol. V-C, Exhibit 10.
 
        190. WJE's  assessment  of  the  exterior  wall design  also
   resulted in changes to flashing, substitution of bolts for screws
   to fasten  the exterior wall,  and the requirement of  a drainage
   mat  in the  wall  cavity between  the metal  stud  wall and  the
   limestone and block veneer.  Hearing Exhibits A-156, A-291.
 
        Deflection of Relieving Angles
 
        191. Although not required by  the contract, SAE constructed
   two limestone mockups on the east side  of the building, one from
   the granite base  course up to the second  floor relieving angle,
   and the  other from the second floor relieving angle to the third
   floor.  Transcript at 652-53.  After building the mockup from the
   granite base to the second  floor, SAE installed the second floor
   relieving  angle and flashing  that went from  the concrete floor
   under the metal  stud track and draped over  the relieving angle.
   This construction was observed by representatives of OKA and GSA,
   who confirmed that the construction  was proper and did not raise
   any objections to the techniques used  by SAE.  Appeal File, Vol.
   V-D, Exhibit 6; Transcript at 654-55.
 
 
        192. During  the  process  of  erecting  limestone  from the
   second floor relieving  angle to the third floor,  SAE and Lepore
   noted stone  movement and varying  joint widths.  SAE  and Lepore
   both thought  that this would  be a  result of deflection  of the
   relieving angles from the loads  created by the limestone panels.
   SAE measured the movements of the limestone panels and determined
   that  some joints had closed  to one-eighth inch  in places.  SAE
   raised the occurrence of deflection  of the angles in its Quality
   Control (QC) daily  report dated December 23, 1992.   This report
   was provided to  OKA.  Hearing Exhibit A-326;  Transcript at 655-
   58.   In a letter  dated January 5,  1993, addressed to  OKA, SAE
   repeated its  concerns about  deflection.  Appeal File, Vol. V-C,
   Exhibit   51.    Shortly   thereafter,  SAE   stopped  installing
   limestone.  Transcript at 660-61.
 
        193. In a memorandum  addressed to OKA, issued  on September
   15,  1992, Vitetta  stated  that  it  had  never  calculated  the
   deflection of  the relieving angles.   This was confirmed  by the
   Vitetta architect who  headed this project.   Hearing Exhibit  A-
   158; Transcript at  3163.  GSA's contracting  officer's technical
   representative (COTR) testified  that this was a surprise  to the
   agency and stated  that he would have expected these calculations
   to  be performed  by  the  architect as  part  of the  structural
   engineer's responsibility.  Mitchelson Deposition at 122-24. 
 
        194. Following discovery of the deflection concerns, Vitetta
   issued sketches  directing alternate  shim locations.   GSA  then
   directed SAE  to furnish  a drawing showing  the location  of the
   shims.   Transcript  at 661.    Field instruction  number 73  was
   issued on January  11, 1993, directing SAE to  use multiple shims
   per stone.  Appeal File, Vol. V-D, Exhibit 7; Transcript at 664.
 
        195. The   standard  and   accepted   practice  in   masonry
   construction is  to install shims for stone  at approximately the
   one-quarter point  of each  stone.   Transcript  at 657,  928-29,
   1207.  Field  instruction number  73 called for  the use of  more
   than two shims per stone at the belt course immediately above the
   second floor relieving angle.  SAE and its  masonry subcontractor
   were concerned that  following the field instruction  could cause
   inappropriate loading and  failure of the stones.  These concerns
   were  stated in  a letter  dated January  18, 1993, in  which SAE
   requested  a formal directive from the contracting officer before
   it would proceed with  the placement of the shims.   Appeal File,
   Vol. V-D, Exhibits 5,7; Transcript at  665-66, 1207.
 
        196. Thereafter,  the  contracting  officer  withdrew  field
   instruction number 73, and  instead directed SAE to  produce shop
   drawings showing the placement of  shims for all limestone on the
   building.  Appeal  File, Vol. V-D, Exhibit 11.  GSA also directed
   SAE to  uncover the relieving  angle in the second  floor mock-up
   area.    Subsequently,  this directive  was  expanded  to include
   removal of all limestone on both the east and south elevations to
   the  second floor  relieving  angles.    Appeal File,  Vol.  V-D,
   Exhibits 13-14, 21.
 
        197. SAE  stripped the  limestone  from these  areas between
   January 25 and  28.  During the removal process it was noted that
   the welds in the relieving angle brackets did not comply with the
   shop drawings.   An independent engineer  who examined the  welds
   concluded, however,  that the  welds had not  failed and  had not
   caused the deflection of the relieving angles.  Appeal File, Vol.
   V-D, Exhibit 37; Transcript at 669-81, 827-28; Hearing Exhibit A-
   457.
 
        198. After  determining that it was impracticable to weld in
   conformance with the shop drawings because of the unusually tight
   spacing  of  the  exterior  wall  components,  SAE  submitted  an
   alternative detail for  welding at the relieving  angle brackets.
   The alternative detail was submitted on February 9, 1993.  Appeal
   File, Vol. V-D,  Exhibit 42, Vol. V-E, Exhibit  19; Transcript at
   671.
 
        199. Vitetta  approved   the  alternative  detail   in  late
   February.  SAE performed the additional welding on March 3, 1993.
   Appeal File, Vol. V-D, Exhibit 58, Vol. V-E, Exhibit 24.
 
        200. As a result of the direction to use multiple shims with
   each  stone, SAE  retained  a structural  designer.   The  expert
   retained  by SAE  had    been approved  by  Vitetta as  a  design
   professional for  the design of exterior stone  connections in an
   earlier project.  This expert  concluded that the use of multiple
   shims per  stone was inappropriate  and further advised  that the
   first  course  of  stone  should  be bedded  in  mortar.    These
   conclusions were forwarded by SAE to GSA by letter dated February
   9, 1993.  Appeal File, Vol.  V-D, Exhibit 44; Hearing Exhibit  A-
   371; Transcript at 668.
 
        201. Limestone  installation  was  stopped from  January  10
   until  March  28, 1993,  during  which  time  SAE was  unable  to
   construct  the exterior  facade of  the building.   Transcript at
   557-68.
 
        202. In  a letter  dated  March 2,  1993, OKA  distributed a
   letter  from  Vitetta  addressing limestone  setting  procedures.
   Appeal File,  Vol. V-E,  Exhibit 17.   These procedures  restored
   mortar  joints  to the  limestone  facade  and, in  cold  weather
   conditions, provided a fifteen-hour cure period, which was deemed
   necessary  at  the  relieving  angle  to  ensure  the  joint  was
   essentially non-compressible  prior to placing  subsequent levels
   above it.  SAE took  the position  that the  fifteen-hour waiting
   period resulted in construction inefficiencies at the forty-three
   continuous  relieving angles.    Transcript  at 666-68,  1221-24;
   Hearing Exhibits A-790, A-797.
 
 
        203. OKA,  in   a  letter   to   the  contracting   officer,
   acknowledged that the stone setting  procedure that SAE had  been
   directed  to  follow  would  require  changes  to  SAE's  planned
   sequence  and duration for installing limestone.  Hearing Exhibit
   A-109.    The  new  procedures  would  require  demobilizing  and
   remobilizing at another  area in an effort to  perform other work
   while waiting for bed joints to cure properly, or, alternatively,
   moving ahead and installing grip-stay anchors if no other setting
   location  was available.  Transcript at 1221-24; Hearing Exhibits
   A-790, A-797. 
 
        Flashing Design Details
 
        204. The  wall system set forth various requirements for the
   installation of flashing in  order to provide a  water protection
   system behind the exterior veneer.  The flashing was to lay under
   the metal stud track, down  over the relieving angle, and project
   through to the  exterior veneer for the purpose  of ensuring that
   water penetrating  the exterior veneer  was kept out of  the wall
   system  to  prevent  corrosion and  deterioration  of  the veneer
   anchors,  sheathing, studs, and  drywall.  Transcript  at 797-98,
   801, 907.
 
        205. Section  7600,  paragraph  2.02.c.1,  of  the  contract
   required seven-ounce copper flashing bonded with  asphalt between
   two layers of fiberglass cloth.  The flashing was to be  used for
   through-wall  applications.  Appeal File, GSBCA 12253, Exhibit 3.
   The specified copper flashing came in rolls, and almost all of it
   had to be field fabricated.  Transcript at 3058.
 
        206. The  contract  required  SAE  to  employ  persons  with
   expertise and experience in the installation of flashing.  Appeal
   File, GSBCA  12253, Exhibit 3,   01040;  Transcript at 3059.  GSA
   contends that Lepore,  the masonry subcontractor, which  was also
   responsible for flashing installation  under its subcontract with
   SAE,  was not appropriately experienced in flashing installation.
 
 
        207. The Trenton project posed unique design  conditions and
   construction problems in the  field with respect to the  flashing
   and  relieving angle  conditions,  especially as  they interfaced
   with the curtain  wall.  Mitchelson Deposition at  138-40.  Based
   on the contract drawings, SAE  could only determine the design of
   flashing for a straight wall or typical relieving angle condition
   as opposed to changes in elevation and  changes of the wall in or
   out.  Transcript at 674. 
 
        208. Al  Comly, Vitetta's  senior  project manager  for  the
   Trenton annex,  testified that Vitetta did not endeavor to detail
   every  flashing condition.    He pointed  out  that the  contract
   referred to a publication of the Sheet Metal and Air Conditioning
   Contractors National  Association.  This publication  contained a
   collection  of various  flashing details  and  proper methods  to
   install  flashing at  penetrations  and  around various  building
   elements.   Transcript  at 3059-60;  Hearing Exhibit  R-58.   Mr.
   Comly  also  testified   that  a  variety  of   widely  available
   publications  detail  flashing  installation.   He  mentioned, in
   particular,  a roofing manual  published by the  National Roofing
   Manufacturers  Association (NRMA)  that showed  how to  fabricate
   flashings   and  how  to  install  the  flashings  under  various
   conditions,  including inside and outside corners.  Transcript at
   3064.
 
 
        209. SAE recognized  that the  contract referenced  flashing
   manufacturers'   product  literature.     In  SAE's   view,  this
   literature  contained insufficient  information and  construction
   details  to enable  SAE to  install  the flashing  appropriately.
   Transcript at 739-40.  Mr. Comly  was unable to locate any detail
   in  the  NRMA  manual  that  would have  assisted  with  flashing
   installation.  Transcript at 3167.
 
        210. SAE  submitted  RFI  267,  dated  September  18,  1992,
   seeking details for flashing a  pipe penetration condition at the
   penthouse.   The response received  was not helpful; as a result,
   on October 7, SAE resubmitted  this RFI and informed OKA that  it
   was  in the  process  of  preparing  additional  RFIs  to  obtain
   flashing details needed for other areas of the building where the
   drawings  contained  similarly   insufficient  flashing  details.
   Transcript at  673-74;   Appeal File,  Vol. VI,  Exhibit 9.   The
   response received from OKA and  Vitetta was that no details could
   be provided  because SAE  had not provided  shop drawings  of the
   flashings.  Transcript at 674-75;  Appeal File, Vol. VI, Exhibits
   9, 11.
 
        211. SAE's  position  was  that  paragraph  1.04(c)  of  the
   flashing  specification of  the  contract  did  not  require  the
   contractor  to   prepare  flashing   shop  drawings   except  for
   prefabricated flashings.   Nearly all  copper laminated flashing,
   including  that  installed  at the  relieving  angles,  was field
   installed  by SAE's  subcontractor.  Under  then-current industry
   practice, SAE was  not required to submit  flashing shop drawings
   for field installed flashing.  Transcript at 3168-69.
 
        212.  By letter dated  November 11, 1992, addressed  to GSA,
   Vitetta acknowledged problems with the contract flashing  details
   and stated  that it "had begun  to develop an alternative  set of
   details."  Hearing  Exhibit  A-457.  This action was prompted  by
   WJE's  recommendation  that   the  architect  prepare  additional
   flashing details,  including those  at intersections with  walls.
   Hearing Exhibits A-156, A-347, A-348.
 
        213. By letter  dated November  11,  1992, OKA  sent to  SAE
   "Request  for   Proposal  099,"  enclosing  bulletin   number  71
   clarifying  "laminated  copper   sheet  flashing,  limestone  and
   sealant"  with a  number of  details  prepared by  Vitetta.   GSA
   subsequently  issued field instruction number 67, on November 13,
   1992, directing SAE to proceed in accordance with bulletin number
   71.     This   added  stainless   steel  flashing   modifications
   recommended by WJE in its report.  Appeal File, Vol. VI, Exhibits
   16, 18, 20.
 
 
        214. Thereafter, on December 14, 1992, SAE submitted RFI 318
   seeking additional details  for each of the  conditions for which
   the contract drawings still did not  contain sufficient detail to
   permit  proper installation of  flashing.  Transcript  at 677-78;
   Hearing Exhibit A-858.   
 
        215. Vitetta agreed that clarifications  were needed to  the
   flashing  design in  the contract  drawings,  but contended  that
   Vitetta's response to RFI 318  had addressed them.  Transcript at
   3066-67.   In  a letter  dated  January 15,  1993,  OKA sent  SAE
   additional  flashing  clarifications  to address  SAE's  flashing
   RFIs.  These  details differed from those provided  by Vitetta in
   its letter  of November 4,  1992.  Appeal File,  Vol. VI, Exhibit
   45.  
 
        216. At  GSA's request,  Vitetta  subsequently retained  the
   services  of  an  expert  in  flashing  design, John  Serke,  who
   prepared  a  report  containing  isometric  details  of  how  the
   flashing  should be installed.   These installation  details were
   received  by SAE on  or about March  2, 1993.   According to GSA,
   Serke's  diagrams showed  methods for  correcting  defective work
   done by  SAE's subcontractor.   SAE takes  the position  that the
   flashing diagrams developed  in the Serke report went  far beyond
   what SAE's subcontractor  had  attempted to do  in installing the
   flashing using existing  contract drawings and information.   Mr.
   Serke did not  testify concerning the findings or  purpose of his
   report.   After  receiving  the  details  provided in  the  Serke
   report, SAE was  able to proceed with proper  installation of the
   flashing.  Transcript at 678-79,  873, 959-63; Hearing Exhibit A-
   482.  
 
        217. After the  stone had  been installed  as instructed  by
   GSA,  SAE observed  from the  scaffold on  the  building exterior
   stones in very  close proximity to the stone or stones below as a
   result  of additional deflection  of the relieving  angles.  This
   forced the stainless  steel flashing down  into contact with  the
   stone below  the relieving angles and prevented SAE from caulking
   the space  between the  underside of the  flashing and  the stone
   below  as designed.    GSA  issued a  change  order deleting  the
   requirement for caulking at these joints.  Transcript  at 672-73,
   734-35.
 
        Deficiencies in Exterior Wall Design
 
        218. Considerable expert testimony was provided with respect
   to the  properties of the  architect's wall design.   Appellant's
   expert  was  Otto  Guedelhoefer,   a  structural  engineer   with
   considerable experience in  the design and construction  of metal
   stud backup  walls and curtain wall  systems.   His  specialty is
   the evaluation and  repair of distressed and  damaged structures,
   particularly difficult projects with critical construction loads.
   Transcript at 764-69.   Respondent offered the  testimony of Ivan
   Becica, a  professional engineer  who had  recently designed  the
   Camden  courthouse for  GSA.    The  Camden courthouse  was of  a
   conventional design.  Transcript at 3191, 3280, 3284-85.   
 
 
        219. The  experts agreed  that  metal stud  backed,  cavity-
   veneer  wall systems  must  be  designed  carefully  to  consider
   potential  problems and  to  incorporate appropriate  engineering
   solutions to these problems.  Transcript at 784-85, 3202; Hearing
   Exhibits A-156, A-365,  A-369, A-375, A-376.  This  project was a
   complex,  articulated building with  horizontally offset walls, a
   variety of construction  materials, numerous planes  intersecting
   in  different directions, parapet  walls returning to  other flat
   faces  and   numerous  significant  openings.     These  features
   presented a challenge for ensuring that water was kept out of the
   wall system with an adequate flashing design.  Transcript at 797-
   98, 819-20.
 
        220. All  components of the wall system, including the metal
   studs,  wall ties,  flashing,  relieving angles,  and  structural
   support,  must function together to produce a structurally sound,
   watertight  building  exterior.    Transcript  at  808-09.    Mr.
   Guedelhoefer expressed  the opinion  that it  is the  architect's
   responsibility to prescribe proper design details to achieve this
   result:
 
             [T]he critical aspect for the designer is  to
             make  sure he  minimizes  [deflection of  the
             steel stud].  He does that in  the metal stud
             system by taking due concern  about the metal
             stud stiffness.   He can control that  by the
             gauge of  the  thickness of  the  metal,  the
             dimensions of the  channel shaping system  of
             the  stud, the  spacing of  the  stud, and  a
             number of different ways.
 
                  Then,  at  the  same  time,  he  has  to
             anticipate  that he  is going  to  have water
             intrusion. . .  .  As  you add complexity  in
             geometry [of a building], you continue to add
             demands  to  the   design  to  overcome  that
             complexity.      In  my   opinion,   that  is
             specifically the purview of the designer.  He
             is the  first one.   He starts  with a  clean
             piece of paper.   He's the guy who is trained
             to  be  able  to  select  materials that  are
             compatible with  one another.   He's trained,
             and [in]  the position, .  . . to be  able to
             describe  the  details  that  he  thinks  are
 
             appropriate to  provide the assurance  that a
             system that's already  under certain fire  in
             the industry is not going to be a problem for
             a  building  that  is  supposed  to  have   a
             monumental long  life as is described  by the
             prospectus with the courthouse.  
 
   Transcript at 817-18.
 
        221. To avoid  the infiltration  of water  into and  through
   cracks in  the mortar  between stones on  the exterior  wall, the
   metal stud  backup design must  minimize the  flexibility of  the
   steel   studs  to  avoid   deflection  and  movement   of  stone.
   Transcript at 817-20; Hearing Exhibit A-859.
 
        222. Mr. Guedelhoefer  concluded, based upon  an examination
   of  the events  leading up  to  the problems  encountered in  the
   exterior wall  construction process, that  the criticisms leveled
   at Vitetta's exterior wall design  caused Vitetta to be extremely
   cautious  about approving the contractor's submittals of exterior
   wall drawings.  Transcript at  847-48.   Mr. Guedelhoefer further
   opined  that the  requirement for  a full  scale at  grade mockup
   demonstrated that the design of the exterior wall was incomplete,
   and was an attempt to complete the design during construction and
   to transfer  design responsibility and  coordination of  exterior
   wall components to  the contractor.   Transcript at 840-41,  848.
   Even  respondent's  expert,   Mr.  Becica,  testified   that  his
   engineering  and architectural firm  would not have  designed the
   project with a metal stud backup wall.  Transcript at 3314.
 
        223. The building was  intended to be designed for  a fifty-
   year  life.   Transcript at  3129;  Hearing Exhibit  A-892.   Mr.
   Guedelhoefer  concluded that the architect failed to complete the
   design  sufficiently to  ensure the  wall  system would  function
   consistently with long building life.  Transcript at 869.
 
        224. Contract  Drawing  A-24,  specifically  drawn  for  the
   purpose  of  showing  control joints  on  the  elevations of  the
   building, does  not  show  any  control joints  at  the  corners.
   Vitetta's  design drawings showed  control joints in  a detail on
   Drawing S-16 and in another detail  on Drawing S-14, on the north
   and  south  faces of  the  building.    Relying on  the  contract
   drawings,  Interstate  showed  the joints  consistent  with these
   details  given  that  this  was  the  only  information  it  had.
   Appellant's expert testified to his opinion that placement of the
   control joints is not  a responsibility of the contractor --  the
   contract documents should  have shown the  control joints at  all
   places  where  the design  professionals  deemed them  necessary.
   Transcript at 878-82; Hearing Exhibits A-345,  A-350.
 
        225. Vitetta ultimately directed that the control  joints be
   on  the  east side  of  the  building.   Hearing  Exhibit  A-887.
   Interstate incorporated this in its third shop drawing submittal,
   which  Vitetta approved  on  November 7,  1991.   This  piecemeal
   process  delayed   Interstate's  fabrication  of  steel  for  the
   perimeter of the building because the relieving angles are bolted
   and then welded  to gusset plates which are then  attached to the
   perimeter steel  beam.   Findings 102-03.   Fabrication of  steel
   could not proceed  until attachment points were determined.  This
   in   turn  depended  upon  final  placement  of  control  joints.
   Transcript at 880-81; Hearing Exhibit A-345.
 
 
        226. Appellant's  expert also testified to his view that the
   contract documents  contained design specifications  with respect
   to drawings and specifications  addressing limestone attachments.
   Transcript at  890, 895.  It  was not SAE's  obligation to design
   the anchorage  system,  but rather  to  reflect in  shop  drawing
   submittals  what the  architect  had  designed  in  the  contract
   drawings.    Transcript  at 895.    Lepore's  president similarly
   testified  that when, based on Lepore's substantial experience as
   a contractor in this field,  it undertook to suggest an alternate
   method of  performance, including suggested  modifications to the
   proposed  anchorage  system,  the architect  made  it  clear that
   Lepore  was to adhere  to Vitetta's drawings  and specifications.
   Transcript at 1193, 1199.
 
        227.    In the  opinion  of Mr.  Guedelhoefer,  the  Trenton
   project specifications did not  contain necessary design criteria
   with respect to the limestone attachment process.   Transcript at
   904; see Hearing  Exhibit A-370.   The contract documents  depict
   the  standard methods  used to  fasten  anchors to  studs --  Tek
   screws, which are  self-drilling fasteners not made  of stainless
   steel.[foot #] 13        Transcript     at    870-71;    Contract
   Drawings A-36, A-36.2, A-39.   The contract drawings did not show
   the limestone anchor  tie receiver or stainless steel  bolts that
   GSA  ultimately directed SAE to use.   Transcript at 891-92.  The
   final approved limestone attachment detail differs  substantially
   from   the  detail  shown  in  the  original  contract  drawings.
   Transcript at 902-03; Hearing Exhibit A-351.
 
        228. The limestone anchor design was not finalized until the
   July 23, 1992,  shop drawing  submittal.   Transcript at  900-02;
   Hearing Exhibits A-351, A-359.
 
        229. In  the  opinion of  appellant's  expert, the  contract
   drawings did not  require the contractor to  coordinate the metal
   studs with the limestone anchor tie location.   Mr. Guedelhoefer,
   in fact, suggested that contract drawing A-39, detail 5, provided
   a method by which the alignment of those two elements of the wall
   system  would be  unnecessary.   Transcript  at 910-11;  Contract
   Drawing A-39.  In Mr. Guedelhoefer's judgment, the requirement to
   coordinate  the separate metal stud and limestone anchor drawings
                                                                    
                   ----------- FOOTNOTE BEGINS ---------
 
        [foot #] 13 SAE suggests that the recommendation of WJE that
   bolts be used in lieu of  Tek screws supports the conclusion that
   the  contract  drawings did  call  for  the  use of  Tek  screws.
   Hearing Exhibit A-156.
 
                   ----------- FOOTNOTE ENDS -----------
 
 
   was  improper  because  it is  the  designer's  responsibility to
   coordinate  design components prior  to releasing the  design for
   bids.  Transcript at 911-12.
 
 
        230. In  November   1991, Lepore  raised  concerns with  the
   design of the limestone attachment at the relieving angle, in the
   proposed use of a dowel  penetrating the relieving angle, and the
   overall  constructability of  the limestone  attachment.   Lepore
   also  brought  up  the potential  for  cracking  inherent  in the
   design's requirement for the use  of mortar, a hard material that
   could crack with deflection of  the stone.  Transcript at 884-86.
   It is customary  in the industry and considered  to be obligatory
   for contractors to raise concerns  of this nature.  Transcript at
   3306-07.
 
        231. In the  first set  of limestone  shop drawings,  Lepore
   proposed an alternate that in SAE's view was more  constructable,
   did not have strict tolerance requirements, did not penetrate the
   flashing, and did not create a potential for fracturing the stone
   through rotation   or deflection.   Transcript  at 887,  1178-81;
   Hearing Exhibit A-359; Appeal File, Vol. V-A, Exhibit 9.   In the
   opinion of SAE's expert, the limestone relieving angle attachment
   proposed by  Lepore in  its first set  of shop  drawings complied
   with  the Indiana  Limestone  Institute  Handbook, the  reference
   incorporated in the contract.  Transcript at 889.
 
        232. SAE's expert also testified that if Vitetta intended to
   shift  to  the   contractor  the  responsibility  for   limestone
   attachment  design,  it should  have been  more receptive  to the
   recommendations   and   proposed   design   offered   by    SAE's
   subcontractor.  Transcript at 903.
 
        233. The Brick  Institute of  America (BIA)  has established
   standards for allowable deflection of relieving angles supporting
   masonry at 1/16th  of an  inch.  Transcript  at 918.   Reasonable
   design practice required that Vitetta calculate the deflection of
   the  relieving angles  under  the load  of  the limestone  panels
   because  the amount of deflection cannot be accurately determined
   and predicted without  such calculations.  Transcript  at 914-18,
   3301; Mitchelson Deposition at 123-24.
 
        234. To analyze the deflection issue,  Mr. Guedelhoefer used
   a computer modeling program, a finite element analysis, to depict
   the unloaded angle,  the angle under uniform  loading conditions,
   the angle under loading with  mortar bedding, and the angle under
   loading  with the stone supported on the  shims only, as would be
   the case  with sealant joints.    GSA's structural  expert agreed
   that the  finite  element  analysis  constituted  an  appropriate
   methodology for analyzing  relieving angle  behavior under  load.
   Under all conditions,  the relieving angle deflects at  a rate of
   approximately three times  the allowable deflection of  1/16th of
   an inch.  Transcript at  918-20, 3231; Hearing Exhibits A-349, A-
   384.
 
        235. Mr.  Guedelhoefer's  calculations  were  predicated  on
   information from the  structural steel  shop drawings  as to  the
   size of  the relieving angle  and associated  supports and  their
   location,  from  the  limestone  shop  drawings  identifying  the
   limestone  panels, and  from videotapes  recorded  by GSA  during
   SAE's removal of the limestone after discovery of  the deflection
   of the relieving  angles.      The deflection  at the  tip of the
   relieving angle predicted  under Mr. Guedelhoefer's  calculations
   is  very close  to the  measured 3/16th  of an  inch displacement
   shown on GSA's videotape.  Transcript at 924-25.
 
        236. Mr. Guedelhoefer  concluded that the deflection  of the
   relieving  angle  first  identified  in  SAE's  daily  report  of
   December  23, 1992, occurred because  of inadequate design of the
   relieving angle for support of the limestone.  Transcript at 918-
   19.  The lack of profile and other technical aspects of the welds
   SAE applied to the gusset plates supporting the relieving  angle,
   which were  uncovered by  removal of the  limestone, did  not and
   could  not have  caused  or contributed  to  the relieving  angle
   deflection. Transcript at 669-71, 927-28.
 
        Flashing Design Defects
 
        237. Mr. Guedelhoefer testified that water infiltration will
   occur  in any  masonry building  because  the masonry  materials,
   whether block, limestone, or brick, are not water resistant.  The
   possibility of water infiltration  must thus be addressed in  the
   design  of  a   flashing  system  that  protects   against  water
   penetration reaching the  veneer attachment devices or  the metal
   studs  themselves.  These details, in Mr. Guedelhoefer's opinion,
   are  the designer's, or  architect's, responsibility in  order to
   attain  the building life expectancy  promised to GSA by Vitetta.
   Transcript at 817-20; Hearing Exhibits A-859, A-892.
 
        238. Because  of the many  questions raised with  respect to
   the  metal stud  backup wall  in the  context of  this particular
   building design, in SAE's expert's opinion, flashing details were
   critical and required  to be more complete and  of higher quality
   than  in a garden- variety, geometrically  simple building with a
   concrete masonry  unit backup  wall as opposed  to the  project's
   metal stud backup wall.  Transcript at 820.
 
        239. In  Mr.   Guedelhoefer's  opinion,  it   was  Vitetta's
   responsibility  to  provide  adequate  details  of   flashing  in
   locations  such as interior corners, exterior corners, splices or
   laps,   parapet  walls  abutting  another  wall,  and  an  offset
   relieving angle at a different elevation than the adjacent angle.
   The contract  documents did not  contain any  design details  for
   such  conditions.   Transcript  at  812-23.    Instead, the  only
   flashing detail provided by Vitetta depicted typical locations on
   the  building.  The building's geometry, however, introduced many
   atypical  conditions not addressed  by the  details shown  in the
   contract drawings.  Transcript at 823-24.
 
        240. The flashing  specifications are  set forth in  section
   07600 of the contract drawings.  These specifications did not, in
   Mr.  Guedelhoefer's   view,  impose   upon  the   contractor  the
   obligation to design flashing.  Transcript at 825.
 
        Defects in Metal Stud Backup Wall Design
 
        241. The contract  drawings depicted  the metal stud  backup
   wall  system as completely  designed, despite the specification's
   language  that the  contractor was  responsible for  design.   In
   reality,  however,  the  corners  and  windows  of  the  building
   required far more metal studs than the contract  drawings showed.
   Transcript at 850-52.  
 
        242. In submitting shop drawings, SAE's subcontractor showed
   the  same standard spacing  depicted in the  contract drawings in
   the  corner areas.  Transcript at 856-57.  In responding to GSA's
   questions about  the stiffness  of the  metal  stud backup  wall,
   Vitetta  represented that  it had  calculated the  design of  the
   metal stud backup wall  to meet the deflection  criteria directed
   by GSA using  sixteen-inch spacing of studs.   In reviewing these
   calculations, Mr.  Guedelhoefer concluded that Vitetta intended a
   configuration and arrangement of studs consistent with that shown
   in  the  contract drawings,  rather  than  bunched studs  at  the
   corners of  the building  and was  unaware of  the impact  on the
   number of studs necessary for  the wall to withstand windloads at
   the  corners of  the  building.  Transcript  at  862-63;  Hearing
   Exhibit A-415.
 
        243. The first set of metal stud backup wall  shop drawings,
   submitted  on   April  9,   1992,  reflected   corner  conditions
   consistent with  the standard sixteen-inch  spacing reflected  in
   the  contract drawings.   These  were  returned on  May 6  marked
   revise  and resubmit.    In  reviewing  these  drawings,  Vitetta
   circled only  two corner conditions near the  beacon (see Finding
   244) and noted  that "fabricator/designer verify that  the studs,
   this  area, are  designed for  corner conditions."   There  were,
   however, many  similarly atypical  corners which  were not  noted
   until  the  second  shop  drawing  submittal on  June  2.    This
   submittal was returned  by Vitetta on June 30,  1992.  Transcript
   at 858-60; Hearing Exhibits A-336, A-361.
 
   Curtain Wall Issues
 
        244. The  curtain wall,  or  beacon,  provided  for  in  the
   contract  documents  was  a  multi-storied  glass  and   aluminum
   enclosure on  the north  elevation of the  new building.   Appeal
   File, GSBCA 12253, Exhibit 3.
 
        245. SAE  initially  intended to  subcontract  with National
   Glass and Metal Co., Inc. for the glass and glazing work required
   for the project.  On  September 30, 1991, National Glass informed
   SAE that  the subcontract agreement was unacceptable  and that it
   would not  proceed with the work.  Appeal  File, Vol. IX, Book 1,
   Exhibits 11, 12.
 
 
        246. SAE  then entered into an agreement with Atlantic Plate
   Glass (APG) for the glass  and glazing work. The subcontract with
   SAE  was not  signed until  March  5, 1992.  Transcript at  4039;
   Hearing Exhibit  R-12 at  3-24.  APG  in turn  subcontracted with
   Kawneer  Company, Inc.,  to  supply  the  curtain wall  and  shop
   drawings.  Transcript at 2249.  
 
        247. Under SAE's original construction schedule, the curtain
   wall subcontract  was required to be in place by October 1, 1991,
   in order to  meet SAE's  planned date of  December 24, 1991,  for
   beacon shop drawings submittal.  Because of the delay in entering
   into  a subcontract for  the curtain wall work,  the first set of
   shop  drawings for  the  beacon  was submitted  on  May 7,  1992.
   Hearing Exhibit  R-34.   OKA, in  its  analysis of  delay on  the
   project, concluded  that delays in  locking in a  subcontract for
   the  curtain wall  work caused  this string  of activities  to be
   extended by  some nineteen  weeks, from  the initially  scheduled
   completion   date  of  June  22,  1992,   to  November  2,  1992.
   Transcript at 4039; Hearing Exhibit R-12.
 
        248. The glass and glazing work was divided into two phases.
   Phase  I  included  the  punched  window  openings and  Phase  II
   included  the curtain wall/beacon and sloped glazing.  Transcript
   at 2784.   The Phase II shop  drawings initially submitted on May
   7, 1992, were returned  on June 11, 1992, with  the review action
   "rejected-resubmit as specified."  Hearing Exhibit R-34.
 
        249. In reviewing the Phase II shop drawings, Vitetta raised
   various issues regarding the ability of the proposed curtain wall
   system  to meet  contract specifications.    Transcript at  2790.
   These  issues were  as follows:   1) whether the  curtain wall as
   proposed  met  the  requirement  for  pressure  equalization;  2)
   whether  the  curtain  wall drawings  had  been  coordinated with
   structural steel shop drawings; 3) whether the profile and number
   depths  deviated from  drawings;  and  4)  whether  the  vertical
   members  were custom-designed and not tested.   Appeal File, Vol.
   VIII-A,  Exhibit  13;  Transcript at  2790-96.    Because Vitetta
   considered that there was no point in reviewing the shop drawings
   until  these issues had been addressed to Vitetta's satisfaction,
   Vitetta   held,  rather   than  rejected,   the   shop  drawings.
   Transcript at 2809-10.
 
        Pressure Equalization
 
        250. The contract  stated that  "[t]he  curtain wall  system
   must exhibit a pressure equalized design, no pressure bar systems
   will be accepted."  Appeal File, GSBCA 12253, Exhibit 3,   08920,
     1.06(H)(3).   In a pressure bar  system the glazing is  held in
   place by bars fastened into the backup extrusion from the outside
   of the curtain wall.   Transcript (Nov. 8) at 60.  A pressure bar
   system  can also  have  a  pressure  equalized  design,  however.
   Transcript at 4614.
 
 
        251. Pressure  equalization  is  intended to  prevent  water
   penetration through  a curtain wall.  It  is achieved by using an
   exterior and interior  seal, or barrier, which  creates a cavity.
   The  pressure  in  the  cavity  is  equalized  with  the  outside
   pressure,  allowing  any  water  that  infiltrates  the  exterior
   barrier  to drain  out.   Without the pressure  equalized cavity,
   negative pressure on the inside of the building can  work to draw
   water into the building.  Transcript at 2791-92; Transcript (Nov.
   8) at 7.
 
        252. APG's  subcontractor,  Kawneer,  proposed  supplying  a
   curtain wall system  based on its 1600 IG (inside glazing) model.
   Of the variety of commercial 1600 curtain wall systems offered by
   Kawneer, only the 1600 concealed vent and the 1600 sheerwall were
   specifically  advertised  as  containing  a  pressure   equalized
   design.   The  1600 IG  was  not anywhere  described as  pressure
   equalized  in  Kawneer's  literature.    Hearing  Exhibit  A-495.
   According to  Vitetta, if a  curtain wall is  pressure equalized,
   the literature will ordinarily so state.  How secondary seals are
   proposed  for the system also  provides an indication of pressure
   equalization.  Transcript at 2794-95.
 
        253. In a letter dated June 16, 1992, Kawneer described four
   basic principles of  pressure equalized design and  explained how
   the  proposed 1600  IG model  met  those engineering  principles.
   Appeal File, Vol. IX, Book 1, Exhibit 20.  
 
        254. In a meeting  held on June 17, 1992,  Vitetta requested
   that  Kawneer provide a certification by an engineer representing
   the manufacturer that the 1600  IG system was pressure equalized.
   Vitetta  also wanted  Kawneer  to  provide  details  showing  the
   measures required to ensure that a pressure equalized design  was
   accomplished, and  test or other supporting data to show pressure
   equalized  design.   Appeal File,  Vol. IX,  Book 1,  Exhibit 20.
   Vitetta responded to  Kawneer's June  16 letter  by letter  dated
   June 26 stating that it required the information described in the
   June 17 meeting.  Appeal File, Vol. IX, Book 1, Exhibit 20.
 
        255. On  June  29,  1992,  SAE forwarded  a  letter  it  had
   received from Curtain Wall Design & Consulting, Inc. (CDC), after
   reviewing the contract specifications and the Kawneer IG details,
   stated that:
    
             CDC agrees that the  glazing pocket around IG
             perimeter  provides   a  pressure   equalized
             chamber as long  as the removable glass  stop
             is wet sealed to the horizontal extrusion.  A
             continuous  fillet   bead  of   curtain  wall
             sealant along the upper corner of the glazing
             pocket is needed to complete the air  barrier
             seal around  the chamber.   This  fillet bead
 
             should also  follow along the  vertical edges
             of the glass stop where it terminates on each
             end at the mullion.  
 
   Appeal File, Vol. IX,  Book 1, Exhibit 23.  By  letter dated July
   7, 1992,  Vitetta took the  position that   CDC's letter was  not
   acceptable because  the representations  in the  letter were  not
   directly  made  by  Kawneer  and  shop  drawing  details  for the
   secondary seal were not included.  Appeal  File, Vol. IX, Book 1,
   Exhibits 22, 24; Transcript at 2824.
 
        256. On  July  15,  1992,  SAE  informed  APG  of  Vitetta's
   position  that supporting data  would be required  to demonstrate
   that the  proposed curtain  wall system  was pressure  equalized.
   Appeal File,  Vol.  VIII, Exhibit  33.   On  July 22,  1992,  SAE
   forwarded   a  letter  authored   by  a  Kawneer   field  product
   specialist, dated July  14, which described  the manner in  which
   the  pressure equalization  principle  was incorporated  into the
   1600 IG.     Appeal  File, Vol.  VIII, Exhibit 34.   This  letter
   included a  sketch which  showed the  continuous horizontal  seal
   between the interior glazing bead and the extrusion  described in
   CDC's July  7 letter.   Vitetta's concern, however, was  that the
   statements made  about the  1600 IG's  pressure equalized  design
   were  not   made  by   a  Kawneer  engineer   or  by   a  Kawneer
   representative authorized to make technical representations about
   the 1600 IG design.  Transcript at 2825-26.
 
        257. Vitetta  considered that  it was  important  to have  a
   Kawneer  engineer represent  that the  proposed  system would  be
   pressure equalized because of the  lack of a standardized test in
   the industry.  Although many  curtain wall systems can be adapted
   to have  pressure equalized performance,  proper installation  in
   accordance with  these adaptations  is critical.   Transcript  at
   2827.
 
        258. On July 29, 1992, SAE forwarded a letter dated July 27,
   1992, which was authored by  Kawneer's engineering manager.  This
   letter offered a detailed explanation of  how the 1600  IG system
   met  the requirements for a pressure  equalized design.  Included
   with the letter was Kawneer's sketch SK-1, a cross-section of the
   1600  IG's horizontal  member,  showing  the  installation  of  a
   continuous  horizontal seal  and  a  vertical  seal  between  the
   mullion and  the glazing bead  to seal the glazing  pocket.  This
   communication  was deemed by  Vitetta to provide  adequate backup
   data and information  as to how the 1600 IG would be installed to
   ensure that it would meet  the requirement for pressure equalized
   performance.  Appeal File, Vol. VIII-A, Exhibit 36; Transcript at
   2828.  The  details for the seals  shown on sketch SK-1  were not
   provided until the  submittal of the third set  of shop drawings.
   Transcript at 2874; Hearing Exhibit R-41.
 
        259. For curtain  wall systems,  the contract  required that
   the contractor:
 
             Provide the Manufacturer's stock curtain wall
             system, adapted to the application indicated,
             that complies  with performance  requirements
             specified  as  demonstrated   by  independent
             testing of  the Manufacturer's  corresponding
             stock  systems  according   to  test  methods
             indicated.     Acceptance  or   rejection  of
             standard tests shall be  determined solely by
             the Architect.
 
   Appeal  File, GSBCA  12253, Exhibit  4,    08920,    1.04A.   The
   specifications further required the contractor to:
 
             Provide   test  reports   from  a   qualified
             independent  testing  laboratory   that  show
             compliance of the manufacturer's stock glazed
             aluminum curtain wall system with performance
             requirements indicated based on comprehensive
             testing  of  the  system  by  the  laboratory
             within the last  10 years current  production
             of   the   system    by   the   manufacturer.
             Acceptance or rejection of test reports shall
             be  judged  solely  by  the  Architect.    If
             existing  test  reports   are  not  accepted,
             testing of the curtain wall shall be required
             as below.
 
   Appeal File, GSBCA 12253, Exhibit 4,   08920,   1.05E.  
 
        260. Taking  into consideration the  geometry of the beacon,
   SAE proposed  a two-piece  custom vertical mullion  in its  first
   beacon  shop   drawings  submittal.     Hearing  Exhibit   A-357;
   Transcript at 2797-99, 4541-42.   The test reports submitted with
   this  submittal, however,  were for  a  one-piece stock  vertical
   mullion.  Hearing Exhibit A-495;  Transcript at 2797-99.  On June
   11, 1992,  SAE was informed  that the curtain wall  submittal was
   being rejected in part because  of the discrepancy in the mullion
   proposed  versus  the  mullion  test  reports  submitted  to  the
   Government, which  the architect did  not deem  to be  acceptable
   verification that the two-piece system met contract requirements.
   Appeal File, Vol. VIII-A, Exhibit 14.
 
        261.  On November 12, 1992, SAE submitted shape sketches for
   the beacon frames.  Shape sketches are usually submitted prior to
   the ordering of  an extrusion to ascertain whether  there will be
   problems with the  proposed dimensions or profiles.   On November
   18, Vitetta returned the shape sketches,  which included the two-
   piece vertical  mullion but  did not show  that this  mullion met
   performance requirements, marked "revise and  resubmit."  Vitetta
   wanted to  know  whether  the two-piece  mullion  had  been  used
   previously and  whether  detailed test  reports  were  available.
   Hearing Exhibit R-38; Transcript at 2821.
 
        262.   In a meeting held on December  1, 1992, it was agreed
   that  if Kawneer would provide information demonstrating that the
   two-piece mullion was used and tested in a  previous application,
   then  GSA would reconsider  the need for  preconstruction tests. 
   One of the major concerns was how the fasteners for the two-piece
   mullions  would perform  under negative  pressures  and how  they
   would  respond to  seismic racking.   Transcript  at 2819.    The
   meeting gave rise to twelve  "action steps" that were agreed upon
   by  the  attendees.    Appeal  File,  Vol.  VIII-B,  Exhibit  11;
   Transcript at 2843-44.
 
        263.  On December 4,  1992, the contracting officer told SAE
   that  since information regarding the previous use and testing of
   the  two-piece  mullion had  not  been  received,  SAE  would  be
   required  to  conduct  preconstruction  tests  of  the  two-piece
   mullion to ensure it met performance requirements.   Appeal File,
   Vol. VIII-B,  Exhibit 13.   On December  10, 1992,  SAE forwarded
   details from  different Kawneer  systems to  demonstrate how  the
   proposed   two-piece  mullion   would   perform  under   negative
   pressures.    Appeal  File,  Vol.  VIII-B,  Exhibit  17.    After
   reviewing this  information, Vitetta  concluded that  two of  the
   details  were for a  different system, a  third detail was  for a
   pressure plate system,  and none of the information addressed its
   concern  about   the  fasteners'   ability  to   resist  negative
   pressures.   Based on this,  Vitetta recommended  preconstruction
   testing be performed.  Appeal File, Vol. VIII-B, Exhibit 20.
 
        264.  Thereafter,  SAE's project manager requested  that the
   testing  requirement  be  modified  to  accommodate  the  current
   schedule,  which would have been negatively  impacted by the time
   required for testing.  Appeal File, Vol. VIII-B, Exhibit 29.
 
        265. Another  meeting to address the curtain wall issues was
   convened on December 30, 1992.   SAE stated at that  meeting that
   it  was proceeding  with preconstruction  testing  and that  shop
   drawings  for  the  mockup would  be  submitted  on  December 31.
   Kawneer asked if the issue could be resolved by using a one-piece
   or monolithic mullion instead of the  custom two-piece mullion it
   was proposing.   It  was confirmed  that preconstruction  testing
   could be avoided if appellant provided information showing that a
   similar  two-piece system had been  previously used and tested on
   another project  or revised  the system  to a  one-piece mullion.
   Appeal File, Vol. VIII-B, Exhibit 33.
 
        266. On  January 12, 1993, SAE and its subcontractor elected
   to proceed  with a  monolithic mullion  instead of  the two-piece
   mullion.  Appeal  File, Vol.  VIII-B, Exhibit  45; Transcript  at
   2846.  Prior  to that time, the  second set of shop  drawings had
   been submitted on  October 29, 1992, and returned  on December 9,
   1992, with the review notation of "revise and resubmit."  Hearing
   Exhibits R-4, R-35; Transcript at  2822.  These drawings had been
   held, rather than rejected outright, because issues  needed to be
   addressed  before Vitetta could  proceed with a  detailed review.
   Transcript at 2835.  According to Vitetta, the fundamental issues
   raised in the first set of shop drawings were not resolved in the
   second set of shop  drawings submittals, either.   In particular,
   the shop  drawings still proposed  a two-piece  mullion to  which
   submitted  tests and calculations  did not apply.   Transcript at
   2823,  2836.  Further, coordination  with structural steel was an
   issue.  Kawneer was not working with the correct structural steel
   shop  drawings and failed  to address necessary  modifications to
   the  building structure  to  support  the  loads imposed  by  the
   beacon.  Transcript at 2836-37.
 
 
        267. The third set of  shop drawings was submitted  on March
   10, 1993,  and returned on  March 23, 1993.    About half  of the
   drawings  were  approved;  the  remaining  drawings  were  marked
   "revise and  resubmit."   Hearing Exhibits  R-4, R-36.   Although
   some  of the general  notes from the second  set of shop drawings
   had  still  not  been  fully   addressed  in  the  third  set  of
   submittals,  the fundamental issues identified in June 1992, were
   addressed and  resolved.  Appeal  File, Vol. VIII-C,  Exhibit 23;
   Transcript at 2867-69, 2872.
 
        268. By GSA's calculations, using SAE's scheduled  durations
   and taking into account the impact of the late award of a curtain
   wall  subcontract, the submittal and  approval of the beacon shop
   drawings should have been completed  over the period from March 5
   through June  20, 1992. Instead,  the process took from  March 5,
   1992, through  July 2, 1993,  before the beacon was  released for
   fabrication.    This shop drawing delay, which  GSA attributes to
   SAE, caused the string of  activities associated with the curtain
   wall  to  slip  by  fifty-seven  weeks.   Hearing  Exhibit  R-12;
   Transcript at 4040.  
 
        Fabrication Delays to the Curtain Wall System
 
        269. On  May  12,  1993,  APG  forwarded  to  appellant  the
   following request  for information from Kawneer:   "What would it
   take to have elevations shown  on our shop [drawings] verified in
   the field or if they don't exist, guaranteed?"  Appeal File, Vol.
   VIII-C,  Exhibit 32.   Subsequently, APG conducted  a preliminary
   field  site check of the as-built conditions.  In that visit, APG
   discovered discrepancies of 3/4 inch  and 1 inch between the shop
   drawings and  as-built  conditions  on the  third  floor.    This
   prompted APG's letter  of August 10, 1993, which  stated that the
   shop  drawings were prepared  in accordance with  approved beacon
   shop drawings, and  that it had been assured  many times that the
   steel shop drawings correctly reflected field conditions.  Appeal
   File, Vol. VIII-C, Exhibit  43.  On August 23, 1993, APG informed
   SAE that Kawneer was  on hold for the curtain wall  until the as-
   built  conditions for masonry and structural steel were verified.
   APG further  stated that  it was waiting  for marked-up  drawings
   before it would  have Kawneer commence fabrication of the beacon.
   Appeal File, Vol. VIII-C, Exhibit 44.  On September 13, 1993, SAE
   instructed  APG to fabricate  the beacon  in accordance  with the
   shop drawings that  were approved on June 21,  1993, and informed
   APG  that   any  variations  in   the  substrate  would   be  the
   responsibility of the appropriate  subcontractors.  Appeal  File,
   Vol. VIII-C, Exhibit 45.
 
 
        270. Upon being told  by APG that the delivery  schedule for
   the  beacon had slipped to  mid-January 1994, instead of November
   1, 1993,  SAE informed APG  that its hold  on fabrication of  the
   curtain wall was unjustified because  no stop work order had ever
   issued;   SAE  also told  APG to  proceed with  fabrication since
   there would be an  opportunity to make adjustments to  dimensions
   as  the  fabrication process  was  still  in the  die-making  and
   extrusion phase.  Appeal File, Vol. VIII-C, Exhibit 47.  
 
        271. The  delay in fabrication of the beacon was contributed
   to by APG's decision  to put a hold on fabrication  of the beacon
   because of  dimensional  discrepancies  in  as-built  conditions.
   GSA's schedule  witness testified  that this  delayed the  beacon
   string of activities by thirteen  weeks, from  December 17, 1993,
   to March 23, 1994.  Hearing Exhibit R-12.
 
        272. Although SAE argues  that the beacon activities  do not
   appear  on the  critical path  because it  was possible  to build
   temporary  partitions   to  allow   interior  work  to   proceed,
   Transcript at 4440-41,  GSA maintains that  while SAE could  have
   started to install  temporary partitions any time  after February
   22, 1993, it did not do so in an effective manner.  Transcript at
   4636-37; Hearing Exhibit R-96.  A progress photograph dated March
   1, 1993, shows  a piece of blue plastic covering  the beacon area
   on  the outside of the  building, but the  plastic was ripped and
   SAE was having problems with this enclosure.  Transcript at 4642-
   43;  Hearing Exhibit R-102.  Progress  photographs taken on April
   1,  1993, reflect that no temporary partitions had been installed
   for the fourth  through seventh floors. Hearing Exhibits R-98, R-
   99, R-100, R-101; Transcript at 4638-41.
 
        273. At the same time, installation of the main roof,  which
   was scheduled to start on April 29, 1993, and be completed on May
   19,  1993,  had not  been  completed  as  of September  1,  1993.
   Windows  were still  being installed  as of  that date,  as well.
   Hearing Exhibit R-112A-G; Transcript at 4647-55.
 
   Roofing Issues
 
        274. The contract specified two types of roofing -- modified
   bitumen  on the  flat  surfaces  and metal  on  peaked or  sloped
   surfaces.   Appeal  File, GSBCA  12523, Exhibit 2;  Transcript at
   2968-69.    Prior to  installing  the  roof, the  contractor  was
   required to complete  a roof deck and insulation.   Completion of
   the  structural portion of the parapet  walls was also necessary.
   Transcript at 2969.
 
        275. Respondent  attributes delays  in  installation of  the
   roof  to SAE.    The  initial shop  drawings  for  the roof  were
   transmitted to Vitetta on February 19, 1992, and were rejected as
   incomplete.  A  second submittal was not received  until July 23,
   1992.   This  submittal was  "approved  as noted"  on August  18.
   Hearing Exhibit R-4; Transcript at 2970-71.  
 
 
        276. Although  submittals for the  flat portion of  the roof
   were approved, this  roof system was not installed.   Rather, the
   contractor subsequently submitted a different roofing package and
   started  the roofing submittal process all over again. Transcript
   at 2972.  Final roofing submittals were not complete and approved
   until the summer of 1993.  Transcript at 2973-75.  
 
   Kickers
 
        277. A kicker is a steel angle support bracket which, on the
   seventh floor of  the building, runs from the  structural wall to
   the underside  of the roof  deck.  Field conditions  required the
   installation in some areas of steel channels in order to properly
   weld the kickers to  the roof structure.  Appeal  File, Vol. VII,
   Exhibits 1, 2, 5.   
 
        278. SAE's  subcontractor ran out  of ground face  block and
   failed to  complete  masonry  work  on schedule.    This  delayed
   installation of  the  kickers for  two  months and  thus  delayed
   enclosure of the building.  Appeal File, Vol. VII, Exhibit 12.
 
   Termination for Default
 
        279. In  the spring  of 1993,  SAE  prepared a  "work-around
   schedule" for the purpose of resequencing remaining work from the
   sequence used in the schedule  prepared in December 1992.  Appeal
   File, Vol.  X, Exhibit 77.   This schedule projected  a September
   1994  completion date.  Transcript at 76, 686-87; Hearing Exhibit
   A-301.   The work-around schedule  was used by SAE  to manage the
   project and  was regularly updated  by SAE.  It  included revised
   sequences  and  other  attempts  to  manage  the time  impact  of
   continuing delays.  Transcript at 1047-48.
 
        280. The contracting officer  accepted the schedule, subject
   to  comments provided,  as a  plan to  complete the  project, but
   specifically stated  that it was  not accepted  as a  work-around
   schedule     as    defined     by    the     contract.[foot #] 14
   Appeal File, Vol. X, Exhibit 82. 
 
 
        281. This schedule  was prepared with  the expectation  that
   most substantial issues had been  taken care of, that there would
   be no further substantial delays  given that the issues regarding
   limestone  connection details,  relieving  angle deflection,  and
   flashing  details were  resolved,  the  exterior  wall  work  was
   advancing satisfactorily, roofing work was underway,  and drywall
   and other interior work was about to begin.  Transcript at 688.
 
        282. In   order  to  move  the  curtain  wall  approval  and
   construction  activities  off  the critical  path,  and  with the
   knowledge  and  agreement of  GSA  and  OKA,  SAE  constructed  a
   temporary enclosure and  roof over the beacon area  in the summer
   of 1993.   This enclosure was intended to  allow for installation
   of drywall.   SAE  commenced  drywall installation  in late  July
   1993, and  until the  termination for  default  of the  contract,
   continued to  install drywall  throughout the  building with  the
   exception  of   areas  immediately   adjacent   to  the   beacon.
   Transcript at 685-86; Hearing Exhibits A-310, A-913.
 
        283. In the  fall of  1993, SAE  had increased manpower  and
   begun to build  momentum toward completing the project.   At that
   point,  SAE  had  no  expectation  that  the  contract  might  be
   terminated.   SAE's subcontractors  confirmed that  this was  the
   status  of  the project  at  this  point,  and that  the  default
   termination action  came as  a surprise.   Transcript  at 694-95,
   1449-50,  1728, 1782, 1817, 1998-99, 2063, 2152-53, 2289; Hearing
   Exhibit A-697.
 
 
                                                                    
                   ----------- FOOTNOTE BEGINS ---------
 
        [foot #] 14 Section 1310,    1.08 of the contract  addresses
   the use of a "work-around schedule":
 
             Purpose:  Work-around      schedules,      or
             "workarounds"  may  be  used  to  adjust  the
             sequence  of  construction  activities and/or
             the  approach to the construction in order to
             accomplish any or all of the following:
 
             1.   Recover lost time.
 
             2.   Get ahead on  the schedule progress
                  or accomplish  a specific  activity
                  earlier.
 
             3.   Overcome  a  specific  obstacle  or
                  obstacles that would otherwise hold
                  up work.
 
   Appeal File, GSBCA 12253, Exhibit 3.
 
                   ----------- FOOTNOTE ENDS -----------
 
 
 
        284. In the summer of 1993, SAE and GSA officials, including
   the Deputy Regional Administrator, had been  meeting to discuss a
   completion schedule for  the project and to  negotiate resolution
   of outstanding  claims  of both  parties.   These  meetings  were
   premised on the  understanding that the delays  were attributable
   to  some extent  to  both  parties, and  the  recognition of  the
   importance of getting back on  track promptly.  Transcript at 82-
   84, 691-95; Hearing Exhibit A-241.
 
        285. Appellant submitted monthly  updates to the work-around
   schedule  through  October  1993.   Hearing  Exhibit  R-85.   OKA
   concluded from  a review of the monthly updates that the work was
   continuing to slip through the date of the contract's termination
   for default.  Transcript at 4035.
 
        286. Despite  what appeared  to SAE  to  be progress  toward
   negotiating a resolution of differences with GSA and agreeing  to
   a reasonable  schedule for completion,  on October 22,  1993, the
   contracting officer  issued a  decision terminating  the contract
   for default.  That decision informed SAE:
 
             The Government  has carefully  considered the
             prosecution  of the work  by your  firm under
             th[is]  contract.   Under  the  terms of  the
             contract, completion of the work was expected
             by October  27, 1993.   However,  at minimum,
             30% of  the work  is still  not complete  and
             cannot  be  completed  by October  27,  1993.
             Insufficient  progress has  been made  toward
             enclosing the building.  Your firm has failed
             to   furnish  an   acceptable  revised   work
             schedule.  The  information provided by  your
             firm  alleging  Government   delay  has  been
             analyzed and found to be meritless. 
 
             In total, your firm  has failed to  prosecute
             the work with the diligence that  will insure
             its completion within  the time specified  by
             the contract.
 
             Accordingly, consistent with Clause 98 of the
             General   Clauses   of  the   Contract   (FAR
             CONSTRUCTION) (APR  1984), the  Government is
             terminating your  right to  proceed with  the
             work under this contract.
 
   Hearing Exhibit A-210.
 
   SAE's Schedule Analysis
 
        287. A schedule analysis was undertaken by SAE's expert, Mr.
   Douglas  Coppi,  and  presented  at  the  hearing  to  assist  in
   allocating responsibility for  the various delays associated with
   the  project.  Hearing Exhibit A-101.   What follows is a summary
   of  the  expert's  testimony and  views  concerning  the schedule
   impacts  of  various  events  occurring  in the  course  of  this
   project.
 
 
        288. Mr.  Coppi,  the  National   Director  of  Construction
   Litigation for Coopers & Lybrand, and the head of this accounting
   firm's Coppi  & Associates  division, testified  as SAE's  expert
   with respect  to construction scheduling and cost  analysis.  Mr.
   Coppi has a  degree in civil  engineering and  has many years  of
   experience  in  schedule,  cost,  and  overall  claims  analysis.
   Transcript at 1008-28; Hearing Exhibit A-558.
 
        289. SAE initially retained  Coppi & Associates in  the fall
   of 1992 to  assist with preparation of a schedule  that GSA would
   approve.  Prior to retaining  Mr. Coppi, SAE, in March 1992,  had
   submitted  a CPM  project schedule.   At the  time Mr.  Coppi was
   brought  on board,  SAE was  still awaiting  GSA's input  on that
   schedule.    GSA's   comments  were  received  on   November  24;
   substantive comments  and specific recommendations  were provided
   in a December  9, 1992, letter  authored by  OKA.  Transcript  at
   1038-39.   Mr.  Coppi and  his staff  reviewed and  revised SAE's
   then-existing schedule,  taking into account comments provided by
   OKA.   OKA's comments were  incorporated into a schedule referred
   to as   TSBL [Trenton schedule baseline], which  was submitted on
   December 24, 1992,  within the fourteen-day period  for revision.
   Coppi &  Associates also  reviewed the  then-pending caisson  and
   structural steel claims.  Transcript at 1028-29, 1034, 1039-40.
 
        290.   Upon  receipt of  additional  comments  from  OKA  in
   February 1993,  Coppi & Associates  further revised  the TSBL  to
   incorporate these comments.  The  new schedule was referred to as
   TRCL  (Trenton  claim).  Neither schedule  was  approved  by GSA,
   however, ostensibly upon  the advice of OKA that  approval of the
   schedule  would  establish  a baseline  for  pending  claims with
   respect  to  the  caisson, structural  steel,  and  exterior skin
   issues.  Transcript at 1042, 4159-66; Hearing Exhibit A-903.
 
        291. Eventually, GSA did provisionally  accept a work-around
   schedule in  the spring of  1993.  Finding  280.  Once  the work-
   around schedule was accepted, it  was updated monthly and used by
   SAE and its trades to perform everyday activities on the project.
   Transcript at 1045-48.
 
        292. At  that point, the completion of the building exterior
   and installation  of the beacon,  or glass curtain wall,  was the
   principal factor delaying the progress  of construction.  OKA, in
   an earlier report  dated January  5, 1993,  noted the  following,
   however:
 
             The  critical   path  was   through  building
             watertight (roof,  walls, windows  and Beacon
             curtain wall all completed), which restrained
             the  start  of all  interior  water sensitive
             finishes until  late April or mid  June 1993.
 
             .  .  .   [A]  means  of working  around  the
             requirement  to  enclose   all  the  building
             before  starting  interior  drywall  work  is
             needed. .  .  .   The  means and  methods  of
             achieving   the    needed   building    tight
             conditions are  not addressed in  this report
             as these are felt to  best be left up to SAE.
             In this  report OKA  expressed the view  that
             the  Beacon   curtain  wall  area   could  be
             temporarily  enclosed  for   both  water  and
             environment control in courtrooms.
 
   Hearing Exhibit A-106.   This opinion, that an  interim enclosure
   technique for achieving interior finish work would be viable, was
   repeated  in a letter  to GSA  dated January  28, 1993.   Hearing
   Exhibit A-303.
 
        293. SAE commenced erecting temporary partitions to  enclose
   the  beacon area  in  August  1993.   This  activity allowed  the
   project's critical path to run through  the interior work without
   completion  of the  beacon  curtain wall.    Transcript at  4248;
   Hearing Exhibits  A-303, A-913.   In a  report dated  October 22,
   1993, OKA projected a construction completion date of November 3,
   1994, based  on its  conclusion that the  critical path,  at that
   point, ran through interior finish work.   Hearing Exhibit A-310.
 
        294. Mr. Coppi presented a detailed schedule analysis at the
   hearing  of these  appeals.    His analysis  was  contained in  a
   lengthy   narrative  and  various  exhibits,  and  was    further
   summarized  in eight charts depicting the  schedule impact on the
   particular  activity delayed  and the  overall  extension of  the
   project.  Transcript at 1073-75; Hearing Exhibit A-101.
 
        295. In  working with SAE  to develop a  consolidated impact
   claim,  Coppi & Associates  strove to incorporate  the individual
   time impact analyses for such  issues as caisson delay, the metal
   stud backup system, exterior skin work, and the like, and present
   a coherent overview  of the impact  of the various events  on the
   overall progress of the project.  Transcript at 1051-52.  Coppi &
   Associates  undertook  to   develop  what  it  believed   was  an
   appropriate baseline schedule.  This was done by taking the TSBL,
   incorporating OKA's April 1993 comments and arriving at the TRCL.
   This became Mr. Coppi's baseline schedule, or the starting point,
   for the CPM analysis presented to the Board.  Transcript at 1053-
   54.   
        296. In preparing this schedule analysis, Coppi & Associates
   reviewed numerous documents,  including the contract,  applicable
   specifications,  the contract drawings, the shop  drawings, RFIs,
   change  orders, proposed  change  orders, project  correspondence
   between SAE and its subcontractors, SAE and GSA, SAE and OKA, GSA
   and OKA, GSA and Vitetta,  and OKA and Vitetta, schedule updates,
   minutes of  meetings, OKA's  monthly reports,  and daily  reports
   prepared by  various project  managers.   Transcript at  1054-55.
   Coppi &  Associates also met  with SAE and its  subcontractors to
   obtain firsthand information from the individuals who were on the
   scene  and  to   gauge  the  accuracy  of   their  recollections.
   Transcript at 1056.
 
 
        297. The methodology for the  schedule analysis was selected
   by  Mr. Coppi, who deemed this approach to be consistent with the
   specification.    The  methodology  used   "marches  through  the
   project,  [and] measures where  the project stood  during certain
   milestones."   Some of the milestones used included completion of
   the caissons, completion of critical concrete work, completion of
   structural   steel,   and   various   milestones  applicable   to
   installation  of exterior skin.  Coppi  & Associates undertook to
   determine  where the  project  was  both prior  to  and after  an
   alleged delay or change, and to measure the effect on the project
   completion date.  Transcript at 1059.   This was an adaptation of
   the schedule specification used in SAE's contract,  which, in Mr.
   Coppi's opinion, was  not intended for use in  the situation that
   occurred here,  where many overlapping  events affected  contract
   completion, in contrast to the more typical project experience of
   several stand alone delays.  Transcript at 1060.  Because many of
   the  delays,  such  as  those  impacting  critical  concrete  and
   structural  steel, occurred concurrently, it was necessary to net
   out the delays to derive  the proper impact on the  critical path
   and  determine the  time extensions  to which  the contractor  is
   entitled.  Transcript  at 1061.  Because of  the many overlapping
   project delays,  Mr. Coppi did not perform  a traditional adverse
   weather study.   To facilitate  accuracy and  completeness of the
   study,  however, the  CPM analysis  included weather  as a  delay
   factor.  Mr. Coppi explained  that weather delays included in his
   analysis represented  no more than  five percent  of the  overall
   delay  experienced on the  project and did  not materially affect
   the analysis.  Transcript at 4447-48; Finding 328. 
 
        298. Each chart prepared  by Coppi & Associates  presented a
   graphic depiction of  the overall project's critical  path before
   and  after each  critical delay  event.   The top  of each  chart
   showed the project schedule as  it stood prior to the impact  and
   the  bottom of  the chart  detailed how  the impact  affected the
   project  schedule.  The time impact analysis at the bottom of the
   chart is then carried forward  to become the schedule baseline of
   the following  chart, which  shows the  cumulative effect of  the
   various impacts.  Transcript at 1077; Hearing Exhibit A-101.
 
        299. Mr.   Coppi   testified   that   the  charts'   arrows,
   representing specific activities, differ in length depending upon
   how  long the particular activity was on  the critical path.  The
   data associated with  the end of each arrow  does not necessarily
   indicate  the activity  was  completed, but  for purposes  of the
   schedule analysis,  that  it was  completed  to the  point  where
   follow-on activity  could commence --  i.e., it was no  longer on
   the  critical path.   This  use of  the as-built  information was
   adopted  to be consistent  with Mr. Coppi's  understanding of the
   time impact analysis (TIA) approach provided for in the contract.
   Transcript at 4458.
 
        300. All  "days" referred  to in  the  charts are  "calendar
   days."  Transcript at 1076-77.
 
        Caisson Delays
 
        301. Impact I,  as shown  on chart  1, presents  Mr. Coppi's
   quantification  of    the  delay  caused  by the  differing  site
   condition  and  resulting  intensified  inspection process  which
   impacted progress  of the caisson  work.  Transcript  at 1079-80;
   Hearing Exhibit A-101.
 
        302. Under  Mr.   Coppi's  analysis,   the  differing   site
   condition is deemed  to have caused forty calendar  days of delay
   to  caisson installation for two  reasons.  First, the unexpected
   subsurface  conditions required a redesign of the caissons, which
   stopped  work from  July  10  to  July 31,  1991.    Second,  the
   redesigned caisson  work itself  required more  time to  complete
   because  the rock encountered  required more drilling  than could
   reasonably  have  been  anticipated   based  on  the  information
   supplied to  prospective bidders.   Transcript  at 1080;  Hearing
   Exhibit A-101.
 
        303.  Under Mr.  Coppi's  analysis, the  forty-day delay  to
   installation of caissons  delayed the start of  the next critical
   activity,  which Mr. Coppi  determined to be  concrete foundation
   walls, from the planned start date of July 31, 1991, to September
   9, 1991.  As of that date, sufficient caissons were  installed to
   allow the start of concrete work on the critical path in the A-D,
   12-24 line walls.   Transcript  at 1080-81,  1085, 4461;  Hearing
   Exhibit A-101.
 
        304. Mr. Coppi determined  that the redesign period  for the
   caissons accounted for fourteen of  the forty days of delay, from
   July 17 through July 31,  1991.  An additional   twenty-five days
   were required because of the differing site condition itself  and
   the extra inspection  attributable to concerns over  the adequacy
   of the  caissons' load-bearing abilities.   One remaining  day of
   delay was attributed to severe  weather.  SAE mitigated the total
   delay associated with caisson installation by performing  out-of-
   sequence work on the concrete foundation wall at column line G-24
   to G-17 from August 21 through  September 9.  Since this concrete
   work would have been critical  later in the project, this reduced
   the  impact of  the caisson  delay  by six  days, to  a  total of
   thirty-four.  Under this analysis,  based on the delay in caisson
   installation alone, the duration  of the project was extended  to
   July 19, 1993.   Transcript at 1081-83, 1085;  Hearing Exhibit A-
   101.  
 
        Structural Steel/Concrete Delay
 
        305. Impact  II(a), as  described in  Mr.  Coppi's chart  2,
   quantified the schedule extension justified by delays relating to
   structural  steel  shop  drawings and  concrete.    This analysis
   begins  with the  critical path  as adjusted  to account  for the
   preceding  delay in caisson installation.  Transcript at 1085-86;
   Hearing Exhibit A-101. 
 
 
        306. This  adjusted critical path showed that SAE planned to
   start  east structural steel work immediately upon the completion
   of  the critical  concrete  work on  November  28, 1991.    As of
   November  28, critical concrete  was not complete  and structural
   steel  was not  ready  to  start.   Transcript  at 1086;  Hearing
   Exhibit A-101.
 
        307. The  structural  steel  was not  ready  on  November 28
   because of delays in the  shop drawing approval process for which
   SAE assigns  responsibility  to GSA.    Delays in  modifying  the
   control  joints and approving  the relieving angle  shop drawings
   prevented  completion  of  detailing   and  fabrication  of   the
   perimeter  structural  steel  in  steel derricks  1  and  24, and
   others, until  February 3,  1992.   The  relieving angles  attach
   directly  to supports attached  to the structural  steel spandrel
   beams on the perimeter steel.  Transcript at 460, 884, 1085-86.
 
        308. The concrete was  not completed by this  time initially
   because the  concrete subcontractor  was hampered  by tight  site
   conditions  brought about by  ADI's second caisson  drilling rig,
   then by numerous RFIs, and finally by the caisson delay extending
   into cold weather conditions.  Transcript at  1086, 1088; Hearing
   Exhibit A-101.
 
        309. The  last  significant  changes to  the  design  of the
   relieving angles occurred on November 15, 1991.  Using this date,
   and computing  the scheduled  time for  preparation of  perimeter
   steel shop drawings  and then for fabrication of  that steel, Mr.
   Coppi  forecasted  that the  steel  should have  been  on-site on
   February 3, 1992.  Transcript at 1087.
 
        310. A substantial portion  of the east  side steel was  not
   approved by  Vitetta for fabrication  until January 15,  1992, or
   later.   This included portions of derricks 13,  16, 30,  and 32,
   all of which were located just above  derricks 1 and 24.  Hearing
   Exhibits R-26, R-85.  
        311. Completion  of concrete  work restrained  the start  of
   steel erection, but  steel erection was  already impacted by  the
   shop drawing approval process and fabrication delays to perimeter
   steel.  Transcript at 1086-88,  4465; Hearing Exhibit A-101.  The
   February  3, 1992,  adjusted  start  date  for  structural  steel
   erection is sixty-seven days  later than the expected start  date
   of November 28.  Mr. Coppi assigned responsibility for this delay
   as follows:  1) eight days attributable to weather; and 2) fifty-
   nine days  of concurrent  delay because GSA's  delay in  the shop
   drawing approval process  and resultant delay in  fabrication and
   delivery of steel to the site occurred  at the same time as SAE's
   delay in competing  the concrete work upon which the steel was to
   be erected.   Based on  the sixty-seven days of  delay identified
   here, the adjusted completion date would have been September  23,
   1993.  Transcript at 1085-88; Hearing Exhibit A-101.  
 
        312. Impact  II(b), as  described  on  Chart  3,  quantifies
   additional delay to the project based on SAE's late completion of
   the second level concrete deck work. Structural steel work  still
   could  not be  erected because  of  the failure  to complete  the
   second-level  concrete  work.   Structural  steel  work  actually
   commenced on February  19, 1992, some sixteen days  later than it
   could have in the absence of delay for which SAE concedes  it was
   responsible.   Absent any  further delays, this  additional delay
   period would have extended project completion to October 9, 1993.
   Transcript at 1089-91; Hearing Exhibit A-101.  
 
        East Concrete Slab on Deck Delay
 
        313. Impact  III,  as  summarized on  Mr.  Coppi's  chart 4,
   quantifies SAE's delay in performing the east-side concrete slab-
   on-deck at floors  2 through 7.   This work should  have occurred
   between March 2 and April 12, 1992, under the as-planned schedule
   adjustments made as  part of Mr. Coppi's  analysis.  SAE  did not
   complete this work until May 12, 1992, thirty days later than the
   adjusted,  as-planned  finish date,  which  extended the  project
   completion date by thirty days  -- twenty-seven from delay to the
   concrete work  and  three attributed  by  Mr. Coppi  to  weather.
   After impact  III, the  total critical path  delay was  147 days,
   extending  the  project  completion   date  from  the  originally
   scheduled date of June 14, 1993, to November 8, 1993.  Transcript
   at 1090-92, 1097; Hearing Exhibit A-101.  
 
       Exterior Facade Issues
 
            Limestone Selection and Attachment Systems
 
       314. Impact IV(a),  as described on  chart 5,  quantifies the
  schedule extension  caused by GSA delays  related to the  exterior
  facade  selection  and  attachment  system   design.    Based   on
  contemporaneous OKA reports  issued in May 1992, the project could
  have been  ready for  the installation  of limestone  as early  as
  June  2,  1992.   Hearing  Exhibit  A-566.   As  of that  time OKA
  conceded that  limestone fabrication  and delivery were  "squarely
  on the  schedule critical path and  every day of  delay in getting
  fabrication  started  is  probably  a  day  of  Project  delay and
  attendant costs."  Transcript at  1098-99; Hearing Exhibit  A-567.
  In  its May report,  summarizing the project status  as of the end
  of April,  OKA stated that SAE  and its subcontractors were  ready
  to  begin  installing  metal  studs  and  masonry  backup in  May.
  Hearing Exhibit A-567.
 
        315. In  a  subsequent  report  dated  July  13,  1992,  OKA
   acknowledged:
 
             Since   the    floor   slabs    are   poured,
             installation  of  the exterior  wall  systems
             (metal stud and/or  masonry backup limestone,
             ground face  block, cast  stone, etc.)  could
             have  started over two months ago on the east
 
             face  of  the  building, except  for  the ten
             unresolved   selection   problems   and  shop
             drawings difficulties.  As of the end of June
             1992, there are still unresolved problems and
             difficulties to overcome.   Thus, a claim for
             project  delay  has  to  be  considered  very
             probable.   These  allegations may  have some
             merit, and  SAE may  be able to  substantiate
             project delay associated  with these exterior
             wall system problems and difficulties.  
 
   Hearing Exhibit A-567.
 
        316. As of June  2, 1992, the project was not  ready for the
   commencement  of  limestone  installation  because  the  numerous
   delays  concerning limestone  issues made  it  apparent that  the
   limestone  would not be available on June 2, as planned.  Because
   of this,  the predecessor work  to the limestone  (staging, metal
   studs, vapor barrier  and sheathing) was not pressed  to meet the
   originally scheduled  June 2 date.   These tasks could  and would
   have  been completed  timely if  the delay  to limestone  had not
   existed but --  in Mr. Coppi's words  -- there was no  reason for
   these trades "to hurry up and wait."  Transcript at 1099-1101.
 
        317. Various  submittal  problems contributed  to  limestone
   delays, but the driving factor under Mr. Coppi's analysis was the
   late approval of the exterior limestone shop drawings.  Limestone
   shop drawings were not  approved until July 28, 1992.   Given the
   fifteen  week fabrication lead  time required, limestone  was not
   delivered to the  site until November 17,  1992.   This  caused a
   167-day delay  to the  project.  Transcript  at 1100-03;  Hearing
   Exhibit A-101.
 
        318. During  this 167-day delay period, Mr. Coppi determined
   that  SAE  was able  to  accomplish thirty-four  days  of out-of-
   sequence work, mitigating  the total delay to the  project to 133
   days.   Mr. Coppi  assigned the causes of  the delays as follows:
   1) eight days  were attributed to unusual weather;  2) three days
   were caused  by a  strike; and  3)  the remaining  122 days  were
   caused  by GSA  delays in  the  limestone shop  drawings approval
   process, extending the overall completion date to March 21, 1994,
   if the project had suffered  no additional delays.  Transcript at
   1100-04; Hearing Exhibit A-101.
 
             Attachment System and Flashing Delays (IV(b))
 
        319. Impact  IV(b), as  described  on  appellant's chart  6,
   quantified the schedule extension caused by GSA delays related to
   the  attachment system design and the problems experienced by SAE
   with the flashing  design.  The chart also  quantified SAE delays
   required  to fixing welding deficiencies in the relieving angles.
   Transcript at 1104; Hearing Exhibit A-101.  
 
        320. Even  after limestone  work began,  installation delays
   continued, basically as a  result of the more  difficult flashing
   procedures  required and  the  time-consuming setting  procedure.
   Winter conditions also impacted limestone installation.  The GSA-
   caused  delays extended the duration of limestone installation by
   forty days, with  an additional day for weather  conditions.  SAE
   accomplished six days of out-of sequence work,  to reduce overall
   delay  to thirty-five  days.    Transcript  at  1104-07;  Hearing
   Exhibit A-101.  
 
        321. Further delay was occurred as a  result of the redesign
   of the setting procedures (shim placement and mortar  compared to
   no mortar) and the flashing  procedures and details.  These items
   disrupted  the critical  work between  January 23  and  March 30,
   1993.  During the first portion of the setting and flashing delay
   period,  however, SAE was  concurrently delayed because  welds at
   the relieving  angles did not conform to  approved shop drawings.
   As  a result  of  deflection  in the  relieving  angles, SAE  was
   directed  to remove  the limestone    already erected  up to  the
   second floor relieving  angles; this activity caused  the welding
   deficiencies  to  be  revealed.   SAE's  as-planned  duration for
   erection  of  all floors  of  the  east  elevation limestone  was
   twenty-eight  calendar  days.    Removal  and  reinstallation  of
   limestone for two floors and  the rewelding activities could have
   been completed  by SAE in  twenty-three days, or by  February 15,
   1993.  Transcript at 1157-58.
 
        322. The  twenty-three-day concurrent  delay, combined  with
   thirty-five days of critical  path delay, resulted in  an overall
   delay to the critical path  of fifty-eight days, which, under the
   Coppi analysis, extended the project completion date, assuming no
   further critical  path delays,  to May 18,  1994.   Transcript at
   1107; Hearing Exhibit A-101.
 
             Attachment System & Flashing Delays (IV(c))
 
        323. Impact IV(c),  summarized  on chart  7, quantified  the
   schedule  extension after February 15, 1993, attributable to GSA-
   directed limestone  setting procedures and  GSA's preparation  of
   flashing  design  details  missing  from  the  original  contract
   specifications and drawings.  Hearing Exhibit A-101.
 
        324. In   addition  to   relieving   angle  deflection   and
   rewelding, the  progress  of limestone  installation was  further
   impeded by Vitetta's shimming direction, SAE's concerns about the
   shimming  procedures,  and  GSA's  eventual  rescission  of  that
   direction.  GSA's restoration of mortar  to the limestone joints,
   after  previously deleting it, and the  lack of flashing details,
   prevented work  from proceeding  until March 30,  1993, when  SAE
   restarted limestone  work on  the east facade.   Under  the Coppi
   analysis, the period from February  15 until March 30 represented
   a day-for-day delay  to the critical path of  forty-three days in
   duration, with one day caused  by weather and the other forty-two
   directly attributable to  GSA's actions.  Transcript  at 1108-09;
   Hearing Exhibit A-101.
 
 
        325. Chart  7  also  showed a  twenty-one-day  delay  to the
   critical path resulting from changes  ordered by GSA to the work-
   around   requirements  when  the  SAE  work-around  schedule  was
   accepted.   With these  changes, the  overall project  completion
   date was extended twenty-one days from June 30 to July 21, 1994. 
   Transcript at  1108-09.  The  overall delay to the  critical path
   during the period analyzed in chart 7 was sixty-four days, sixty-
   three of which  Mr. Coppi considered  to be GSA's  responsibility
   and  one of  which stemmed  from  weather.   Transcript at  1109;
   Hearing Exhibit A-101.
 
             Attachment System & Flashing Delays (IV(d))
 
        326. Chart 8 quantified impact IV(d), the schedule extension
   caused by delays relating  to extended duration for flashing  and
   setting  work, block  shortage,  kicker  redesign, and  disrupted
   interior work.   These  delays were evaluated  as of  October 19,
   1993, just three  days before the termination for  default of the
   contract.  Transcript at 1110.
 
        327. The  setting and  flashing  procedures finally  decided
   upon by GSA  resulted in extra work and more  difficult work than
   shown in the  original specifications.  Therefore,  the durations
   of those  activities were  extended by  twenty-seven days,  which
   likewise extended  the critical  path of  the project  by twenty-
   seven days.  Transcript at 1110-11; Hearing Exhibit A-101.
 
        328. The kickers that  support the ground-face block  at the
   roof  had to  be redesigned  because of  an  architectural design
   error.  The redesign took place during the twenty-four-day period
   between  August 20  and September  13,  1993.   Also during  that
   period,  SAE's progress  was  impacted  by  a  ground-face  block
   shortage  experienced   by  its  masonry   contractor,  Contarino
   Brothers.   These  events  caused  a  twenty-four-day  period  of
   concurrent delay to  the project.   Transcript  at 1111;  Hearing
   Exhibit A-101.
 
        329. After adding four  days of weather delay to the twenty-
   seven and twenty-four-day delay periods,  the building watertight
   date was  extended by fifty-five  days, from  August  25, 1993 to
   October 19, 1993.  The  project completion date slipped more than
   fifty-five days because the  schedule problems up to October  19,
   1993, led to anticipated inefficiencies in the interior finishes,
   which  increased the  their projected  duration  and the  overall
   project duration by thirty-two days.  Transcript at 1111-13.  The
   anticipated   project  completion  date  at  the  time  of  SAE's
   termination, including the eighty-seven  days of delay  reflected
   on Chart 8, was October 16, 1994.
 
        330. Mr. Coppi's analysis  of the impact  of weather on  the
   project  consisted of identification of days during an identified
   delay when  a weather  event  stopped the  day's  work.   When  a
   weather  delay was  determined, that  day  was not  charged to  a
   particular party.    Mr.  Coppi  did not  conduct  a  traditional
   adverse weather  study because preceding  and overlapping  delays
   made  assigning   responsibility  for   specific  weather   delay
   impracticable in that  SAE was forced to  perform many activities
   in different time periods than  anticipated when the project  was
   first commenced.   In  addition,  Mr. Coppi  determined that  the
   approximately  five percent  of total  delay  possibly caused  by
   weather   would  not   significantly   impact  his   conclusions.
   Transcript  at  4447-48.   Nothing in  this study  suggested that
   weather  conditions  were   other  than  what  would   have  been
   anticipated  by a knowledgeable contractor and, therefore, worked
   into the schedule. 
 
 
        331. Under Mr.  Coppi's CPM  analysis, the  total amount  of
   delay experienced  on the  project  was 489  days, extending  the
   completion date from June 14, 1993, to October 16, 1994.  All but
   fifty-three days  of this  delay was  experienced prior  to SAE's
   termination      for       default      on       October      22,
   1993.[foot #] 15        Mr.    Coppi    attributed    twenty-nine
   days of delay to  either severe weather  or strikes; 106 days  of
   delay to concurrent  delay; forty-three days  of delay to  causes
   attributable  solely to  SAE; and  311  days of  delay to  causes
   solely attributable  to GSA.   Transcript  at 1113-1114;  Hearing
   Exhibit A-101. 
 
   Respondent's Schedule Analysis
 
        332. Respondent did not perform an independent CPM analysis,
   but rather  provided  the  testimony  of  two  OKA  employees  to
   challenge the validity  of SAE's CPM  schedule.  These  witnesses
   were  accepted as  schedule experts  based on  experience in  the
   construction industry primarily  from the standpoint  of managing
   construction projects for owners.  Neither of these employees had
   day-to-day responsibilities  for managing  the project,  although
   one witness, John  D. Orr, was the project  executive assigned to
   the Trenton annex.  Transcript at 4127-34, 3624-31.  
 
        333.  One of Mr. Orr's principal criticisms of the Coppi CPM
   analysis  was the  lack of  an adverse  weather study.   Mr.  Orr
   concluded that SAE's  claim for twenty-six days  of weather delay
   was based solely on the fact that work had not been  performed on
   those days because of the weather.  At the same time,  it was Mr.
   Orr's  understanding that  SAE had  already included a  number of
                                                                    
                   ----------- FOOTNOTE BEGINS ---------
 
        [foot #] 15    The prospective delays (i.e., those that were
   projected to impact future work to be performed by SAE)  were the
   twenty-one  days of  delay based  on changes  to  the work-around
   schedule shown on chart 7, and the thirty-two-day delay projected
   based on  disrupted interior work, shown  on chart 8.   SAE never
   performed this work because of the termination.  Hearing  Exhibit
   A-101.
 
                   ----------- FOOTNOTE ENDS -----------
 
 
   days  in its  schedule for  weather conditions.     Transcript at
   1146-47,  3984.    Mr.  Orr  also testified  that  given  weather
   conditions  in  the  Trenton area,  a  contractor  would normally
   expect to lose about twenty  working days per year.  The  twenty-
   six days claimed  is less than  should have been factored  into a
   reasonable working schedule.  Transcript at 3987-88.  Finally, it
   appeared  to Mr.  Orr that  some  of the  claimed weather  delays
   occurred during  periods when the critical path  ran through such
   items as structural steel shop drawings approval, the ground-face
   block shortage and kicker redesign, activities which would not be
   impacted by weather.  Transcript at 3992.
 
 
        334. According to Mr. Orr, who compared Mr. Coppi's as-built
   charts against the  as-planned charts submitted by SAE during the
   course of the  project, thirty-one of the  dates represented were
   inaccurate.  He  testified   that  errors  in  these   dates  are
   significant because  if the as-built  data is not correct  in the
   schedule analysis, then the  projected dates will not be  correct
   either.  Transcript at 4009-23, 4658; Hearing Exhibit R-89. 
 
        335. Specifically,  with respect to Mr. Coppi's chart 2, Mr.
   Orr disagreed with  the designated date of February  3, 1992, for
   completion of fabrication  and delivery of structural steel.  Mr.
   Orr determined  that structural  steel was  not delivered  to the
   site until February 19, 1992.  Transcript at 4015.
 
        336. Mr. Orr  also took issue with dates designated on chart
   number 4.   This chart identified March  2, 1992, as the  date on
   which east  structural steel  derricks 1 and  24 and  shear studs
   were complete.   According to progress photographs taken on March
   2, 1992,  derrick 1,  on the southeast  corner, was  erected, but
   derrick 24,  on the  northeast corner, was  not erected.   Appeal
   File, Vol.  I-A, Exhibit 4.   Moreover, structural steel  was not
   erected in  the sequence shown on Mr. Coppi's chart.  Rather, the
   south side of  phase I, consisting of  derricks 1, 4, 7,  10, 13,
   and 16, was erected first, because  it was a better way to  erect
   steel   to  accommodate  the  small  footprint  of  the  project.
   Transcript at 4096-97.
 
        337. On chart 8,  Mr. Coppi depicted temporary  enclosure of
   the building at  the curtain wall as completed as  of October 19,
   1993.   According  to Mr.  Orr, however,  SAE's schedule  update,
   dated  October 25,  1993, showed  that no  part of  the temporary
   barriers for the third, fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh  floors
   was completed.  Transcript at 4655-58; Hearing Exhibits R-112, R-
   113.
 
        338. Mr. Orr disagreed  with Mr. Coppi's  projected contract
   completion dates based  on what he identified as  erroneous start
   dates  for various strings of  critical activities.  For example,
   for  chart  3,  he  differed  with SAE's  date  for  approval  of
   limestone, suggesting that  this string of activities  would have
   extended beyond  the then-projected completion  date.  Transcript
   at 3995-97.  He offered  a similar analysis for beacon activities
   on charts  4 and 6.  For chart 6,  he differed with the dates for
   the steel roof  string of activities.   Transcript at  3996-4001;
   Hearing  Exhibit R-85.    Mr. Orr  concluded that  SAE's schedule
   analysis failed   to accurately portray the project.   Transcript
   at 4006.
 
 
        339. Appellant reviewed OKA's report criticizing Mr. Coppi's
   analysis and prepared an exhibit addressing the points where  OKA
   disagreed  with the  schedule analysis.   In responding  to OKA's
   criticism  of  the  as-built   data,  SAE  identified  twenty-one
   occurrences  where   OKA  agreed with  Mr. Coppi's  dates; twenty
   occurrences  where  OKA  misunderstood Mr.  Coppi's  time  impact
   analysis methodology; and  nine instances in which Mr.  Coppi and
   OKA disagreed  as to  the criticality  of strings of  activities.
   Hearing Exhibit A-922.  
 
   GSBCA 12841
 
        The CPM Schedule
 
        340. The contract required SAE to provide a CPM  schedule in
   the ADM  (activity- on-arrow  diagraming method)  format, and  to
   submit monthly schedule updates in the same format.  Appeal File,
   GSBCA  12253, Exhibit  2,     0311.   SAE  submitted its  120-day
   preliminary schedule in the PDM (precedent diagram method) format
   instead.  Finding 17.  The Government informed  SAE that it would
   accept the preliminary schedule in the PDM format but stated that
   the final  schedule and updates were to be  in the ADM format, as
   required under the contract.  Transcript at 4344-46.
 
        341. SAE  continued to  submit  its  proposed schedules  and
   updates  in  the  PDM format.    At  no time  did  SAE  request a
   substitution  permitting it  to use  the  PDM format  in its  CPM
   schedule.  Transcript at 4344-46.
 
        342. SAE,  relying   on  correspondence  from  OKA  to  GSA,
   contends  that GSA  agreed  to  accept its  schedule  in the  PDM
   format, which SAE maintains is functionally equivalent to the ADM
   format.  Hearing Exhibits A-90, A-91; Transcript at  150-53, 234-
   38.  In  a letter dated  March 24, 1992,   from OKA  to GSA,  OKA
   speculated that GSA may have waived the requirement for schedules
   to be submitted in the ADM format.  This letter also acknowledged
   that apparently  no formal action  had been taken by  GSA in that
   regard.  Hearing Exhibit A-90.  A  second letter from OKA to GSA,
   dated April 16,  1992, offered the observation that  when SAE had
   discovered that  converting its  schedules from a  PDM to  an ADM
   format would be a "detailed  and tedious task," SAE had requested
   relief.   According  to  this letter,  a  GSA representative  had
   agreed that  SAE could proceed with a  PDM format with the caveat
   that a "credit" might be required. Hearing Exhibit A-91.  
 
        343. The  contracting  officer  testified that  he  had  not
   agreed to a substitution  of the PDM format for the  required ADM
   format and that, in his view, PDM is not acceptable because it is
   less informative than ADM.  Transcript at 4345. 
 
 
        344. On May 19, 1992, the contracting officer issued RFP 69,
   seeking a  deduction  from  the contract  price  based  on  SAE's
   continued use of the  PDM format and for SAE's  failure to submit
   monthly schedule updates.  In  response, SAE requested an  upward
   contract adjustment in the amount of $17,698.  Hearing Exhibit R-
   94, Sub-exhibit 9; Transcript at 4345-46.  
 
        345. Thereafter, the  contracting officer  issued unilateral
   modification  AOG9, deducting $20,000  from SAE's contract.   The
   deduction  was  broken  down  as  follows:  1)  thirteen  monthly
   schedule  updates  that were  not  submitted as  required,  at an
   estimated additional cost of $1350  for OKA to review each update
   (totaling $17,550); and (2) a  charge for an unapproved change in
   CPM format  to ADM instead  of PDM in the  amount of $2450.   The
   contracting officer  explained that this latter charge was in the
   nature of "a fine."  Transcript at 4345-46. 
 
        346. On July 22, 1993, SAE requested a contracting officer's
   decision  with respect  to modification  AOG9,  arguing that  the
   modification should be rescinded.  The contracting officer denied
   this request on September 29, 1993.
 
   GSBCA 12842
 
        Cost of Additional Submittal Reviews
 
        347. With regard to submittal reviews, the contract provided
   that SAE would pay  the cost of review when a  submittal required
   resubmission  three or  more times.   Appeal  File,  GSBCA 12253,
   Exhibit  2,    01300.    On December  13,  1991, the  contracting
   officer  issued modification AC10, taking a contract deduction in
   the amount of $3421.65 for submittal review based on this clause.
   Hearing Exhibit R-94, Sub-exhibit 16.
 
        348. The  basis for this modification, according to GSA, was
   the requirement that the Government review various SAE submittals
   multiple times.    On  May  24,  1993,  the  contracting  officer
   forwarded  breakdown  sheets  for  additional multiple  submittal
   reviews,  informing SAE that  another contract deduction,  in the
   amount of $42,088.33 would be taken in the near  future.  Hearing
   Exhibit R-94, Sub-exhibit 4; Transcript at 4342-44.
 
        349. On May  26, 1993, the  contracting officer unilaterally
   issued modification AOD2, deducting the amount of $42,088.33 from
   SAE's contract  price.  By  letter dated September 29,  1993, SAE
   asked  the contracting officer  to rescind this  modification and
   requested a final decision.  The contracting officer denied SAE's
   request.  Hearing Exhibit R-94, Sub-exhibit 8.
 
                               Discussion
 
        These consolidated  appeals consist of seven  docket numbers
   comprising  numerous claims  and  challenges to  the  contracting
   officer's decisions and  deemed denials.  These dockets set forth
   claims as follows:
 
             GSBCA 12294 asserts a  claim for $196,261  in
             increased costs  and  thirty  days  of  delay
             caused  by   defective  specifications   with
             respect to the metal stud work.  
 
             GSBCA  12523 appeals a deemed denial of SAE's
             claim for  $2,436,519 and  319 calendar  days
             for additional work and delays brought  about
             by    alleged    design    deficiencies   and
             ambiguities   relating   to    the   building
             exterior,   including   inadequate   flashing
             design  and  details,  inadequate  stone  and
             masonry  attachment design  and details,  and
             relieving       angle       deflection/design
             deficiencies.  SAE  alleges that the exterior
             facade of  the  building was  the  source  of
             numerous   design   changes,   as   well   as
             unreasonable,    untimely,   and    confusing
             directives,   decisions,   redirectives,  and
             reversals  of  decisions  by  GSA,  including
             failure of the architect to  provide a proper
             design  for  the  attachment  system  of  the
             exterior limestone veneer  panels and failure
             to provide  a proper design for  the through-
             wall  flashing  for  the  exterior  limestone
             veneer panels.  In addition, SAE alleges that
             GSA  failed to  provide timely  resolution of
             design problems  which caused  deflection and
             deformation of the  exterior limestone veneer
             panel relieving angles.   SAE also complained
             that GSA  failed to ensure timely  reviews of
             submittals   and   timely    resolutions   of
             submittal  review problems  by Vitetta.   The
             major  delays  alleged   were  attributed  to
             limestone  shop  drawing  reviews; inadequate
             flashing design and  details; relieving angle
             deflection/design   deficiencies;   limestone
             approval; ground-face  block sample  approval
             delays;  and multiple  design changes  to the
             facade. 
 
             GSBCA 12690 appeals the contracting officer's
             deemed denial of  eighteen alleged individual
             constructive  changes  constituting  a  total
             claim   for  the   amount  of   $284,708  and
             appropriate extensions of time to account for
 
             G o v e r n m e n t - c a u s e d
             delay.[foot #] 16
 
             GSBCA 12710 appeals the contracting officer's
             decision to terminate for default appellant's
             right to proceed for failure to prosecute the
             work with the diligence that  will ensure its
             completion  by  the  time  specified  in  the
             contract.
 
             GSBCA 12841 disputes  a contracting officer's
             decision deducting the amount of $20,000 from
             the  contract  price  for failure  to  submit
             monthly schedule updates of  the CPM schedule
             and  for failure to  develop a CPM  using the
             arrow  diagram method  as required  under the
             contract.
 
             GSBCA   12842   disputes    the   contracting
             officer's  decision deducting  the amount  of
             $42,088.33  from the  contract  price on  the
             ground that SAE was liable for costs incurred
             for more than  two reviews by Vitetta  of the
             contractor's submittals.  
 
             GSBCA  12907  constitutes  an  omnibus  claim
             combining all of  the prior listed  delay and
             change claims as well as the challenge to the
             default  termination  of the  contract.  This
             claim incorporates the  allegations initially
             asserted in GSBCA 12253,  which set forth the
             delays  and   changes  associated   with  the
             differing   site   conditions    alleged   in
             connection  with  the   caisson  installation
             process.[foot #] 17        Based    on    all
             of the  events alleged in the complaint filed
             in   this  docket,   SAE  asserts   that  the
             termination for default should be overturned,
             that its  various  change  and  delay  claims
 
                                                                    
                   ----------- FOOTNOTE BEGINS ---------
 
        [foot #] 16 Given  the  scope  of  the  default  termination
   issues  addressed  in  this  decision,  it  was  recognized  that
   resolution  of  many  of   the  individual  subcontractor  claims
   presented  in this  docket and  in the  consolidated claim  under
   GSBCA  12907,  which  include post-termination  costs,  would  be
   premature.     These  matters  are  deferred  for  resolution  in
   conjunction  with   a  termination  for   convenience  settlement
   proposal.  See n.1.
              ___
 
        [foot #] 17 GSBCA 12253  was dismissed  by agreement  of the
   parties  after it  was determined  that  the claim  had not  been
   properly certified when presented to the Government.  
 
                   ----------- FOOTNOTE ENDS -----------
 
 
 
             should be granted, and  that an extension  of
             time  to the contract should be approved.  
 
        In  addressing these appeals,  the overarching issue  is the
   validity  of  the termination  for  default  of  SAE's  right  to
   proceed.    SAE's  claims with  respect  to  design deficiencies,
   differing site conditions, approval delays,  and the like, go  to
   the heart  of whether the  termination was proper or  whether SAE
   was  entitled  to  significant time  extensions  that  would have
   enabled it to complete performance in a timely manner.  
 
        GSA  contends  that  the termination  for  default  of SAE's
   contract  was justified  because SAE  failed  to make  sufficient
   progress in the performance of the contract to meet the scheduled
   completion date.   At  the time GSA  terminated the  contract for
   default,  on October 22,  1993, approximately seventy  percent of
   the  work had  been completed,  but  only five  days remained  to
   accomplish remaining  contract work under  extensions approved by
   GSA.  Further, the Government argues  that even if SAE could show
   entitlement  to  additional   extensions  of  time   to  complete
   performance, it still could not  have completed this project in a
   timely  manner, and  therefore  the  decision  to  terminate  for
   default was completely justified.  
        According to GSA, at the  time of termination it had already
   granted substantial and  generous time extensions to  account for
   any  delay reasonably  attributable to  the  Government.   Beyond
   these extensions, GSA argues, most, if not all, of the delays and
   hindrances encountered in performance were attributable solely to
   SAE.   In particular,  GSA faults what  it perceives to  be SAE's
   bidding  strategy and  early mismanagement  of  the project,  and
   delays  that  the  Government  regards  as  attributable  to  the
   contractor and its  subcontractors, for the lack of progress made
   in completion of  this contract.  Finally, GSA  asserts that even
   conceding the lion's  share of the delays identified  by SAE, the
   extension to which SAE would be entitled still falls short of any
   date by which SAE could reasonably have completed the contract --
   i.e., even if the Board were to grant all of the  time extensions
   claimed by  SAE for excusable, Government-caused,  and concurrent
   delay, the project was still doomed to late completion.
 
        It  is hornbook  law that  a  termination for  default is  a
   drastic  sanction to  be imposed  on a  contractor only  for good
   grounds and on  the basis of solid  evidence.  E.g., J.  D. Hedin
   Construction Co.  v. United  States, 408 F.2d  424, 431  (Ct. Cl.
   1969);   Foremost Mechanical  Systems, Inc.  v. General  Services
   Administration,  GSBCA  12335, et al., 95-1  BCA   27,382 (1994).
   It is the Government's burden to  demonstrate, by a preponderance
   of the evidence, that the  termination action was proper.  Lisbon
   Contractors, Inc. v. United States,  828 F.2d 759, 765 (Fed. Cir.
   1987).  
 
       For  a  termination  to  be  justified for  failure  to  make
  sufficient progress under  the default clause of the contract, the
  contractor's  performance  must  be  shown  to  have  lacked  such
  diligence  that the  Government  could not  have been  assured  of
  timely  contract completion.   Discount Co. v.  United States, 554
  F.2d 435, 441 (Ct. Cl.),   cert. denied, 434 U.S. 938 (1977).  The
  Government's  burden  is  to   show  that  at  the  time  of   the
  termination action "there was no  reasonable likelihood that  [the
  contractor] could  perform the  entire  contract  within the  time
  remaining  for  contract performance."    Lisbon Contractors,  828
  F.2d at  765.  To  sustain the default  termination there must  be
  convincing  proof   that   timely  performance   was  beyond   the
  contractor's reach.  Once the Government has made  its prima facie
  case  showing  facts that  justify the  default termination  for a
  lack of timely  performance, the  burden shifts to the  contractor
  to  show that  its  failure to  perform is  excusable.    See D.W.
  Sandau  Dredging,  ENGBCA  5812,   96-1  BCA     28,064;  American
  International Contractors, Inc.,  ASBCA 39544, et al., 95-2 BCA   
  27,920.   
 
       GSA asserts  that at the  time it  terminated SAE's right  to
  proceed under the contract,  contract completion was scheduled for
  the  end of  October 1993,  and that  SAE could not  possibly have
  completed the  remaining thirty percent of  the work in those  few
  remaining days.   SAE  counters  that  it was  making  substantial
  progress   under  the  contract  and  that  it   was  entitled  to
  significant additional extensions of time, over and above  the 135
  days  agreed  to  by  the  Government  prior  to  the  termination
  decision,  due  to  excusable  and  Government-caused   delays  to
  critical path work under  the contract.  As such, the  contracting
  officer's  decision to  terminate SAE's  contract for  default was
  inappropriate under Darwin Construction  Co. v. United States, 811
  F.2d  593  (Fed.  Cir. 1987).    Moreover,  SAE  argues  that  the
  contracting officer exercised no independent discretion  in making
  the termination decision, but terminated for  default based on the
  instructions of higher level officials within GSA.   
 
  Differing Site Condition
 
       GSA's position with respect to  the compensable delay  claim,
  as  well as  to  the  claim for  extra  work associated  with  the
  drilling of the caissons,  asserted by SAE as a consequence of the
  differing   site   conditions   encountered   by   SAE   and   its
  subcontractor  ADI,  is  that the  contract  does  not  permit any
  recovery  beyond  the  brief  extension  of  time  (fifteen  days)
  already granted  by the contracting  officer for the period during
  which the  caissons were redesigned  under a  stop work order  and
  the  unit   price  increases   granted  for  additional   drilling
  required.    Otherwise,  according  to  GSA,  the  level  of  work
  encountered  by ADI,  and the  level of inspection  that occurred,
  was  contemplated by  the  contract.   In particular,  GSA asserts
  that SAE  and its subcontractor could  not reasonably rely on  the
  materials and information provided  under the contract, which were
  only "estimates" of the soil conditions that might  be encountered
  by   the  contractor.     SAE   disagrees,  maintaining   that  it
  encountered conditions during  the installation  of caissons  that
  differed materially from those  it was led to anticipate based  on
  the contract documents and on which it  was to formulate its  bid.
 
 
       The  Differing Site  Condition  clause incorporated  into the
  contract, FAR 52.236-2, establishes two categories  of compensable
  conditions:  category I (site  conditions which differ  materially
  from  those indicated in the contract) and category II (conditions
  which  are  unknown and  differ  materially  from those  generally
  encountered      in      the      type      of      work     being
  procured).[foot #] 18           Vega      Roofing      Co.      v.
  International Boundary  & Water Commission, GSBCA 13576-IBWC, 97-2
  BCA   28,990;  TLC Engineering & Construction  v. General Services
  Administration, GSBCA  11057, 95-1 BCA    27,356, at 146,322.   As
  explained  below,  the  exculpatory  language  in  the   contract,
  Finding 24, does not affect recovery under this clause.  
       In a  seminal decision, also  in the  context of   subsurface
  conditions, the  Court of Claims  made the  following observations
  about the differing site condition clause:
 
 
                                                                    
                   ----------- FOOTNOTE BEGINS ---------
 
        [foot #] 18 This clause provides as follows:
 
             (a)  The Contractor shall  promptly, and
                  before    the     conditions    are
                  disturbed, give a written notice to
                  the  Contracting  Officer   of  (1)
                  subsurface   or   latent   physical
                  conditions at the site which differ
                  materially from those  indicated in
                  this  contract,   or  (2)   unknown
                  physical conditions at the site, of
                  an  unusual  nature,  which  differ
                  materially  from  those  ordinarily
                  encountered      and      generally
                  recognized as  inhering in  work of
                  the character  provided for  in the
                  contract.
 
             (b)  The   Contracting   Officer   shall
                  investigate  the  site   conditions
                  promptly   after    receiving   the
                  notice.    If   the  conditions  do
                  materially so  differ and  cause an
                  increase   or   decrease   in   the
                  Contractor's cost  of, or  the time
                  required for,  performing any  part
                  of  the work  under this  contract,
                  whether or not  changed as a result
                  of  the  conditions,  an  equitable
                  adjustment shall be made under this
                  clause and the contract modified in
                  writing accordingly.
     
 
                   ----------- FOOTNOTE ENDS -----------
 
 
 
            The purpose of the   changed conditions clause
            is  thus to  take at least some  of the gamble
            on  subsurface  conditions  out   of  bidding.
            Bidders need  not weigh the  cost and  ease of
            making their own  borings against the risk  of
            encountering an  adverse subsurface, and  they
            need  not  consider how  large  a  contingency
            should be added  to the bid to cover the risk.
            They  will have no windfalls and no disasters.
            The  Government benefits  from  more  accurate
            bidding,  without inflation  for  risks  which
            may  not eventuate.    It pays  for  difficult
            subsurface work  only when  it is  encountered
            and was not indicated in the logs.
 
            All   this   is  long-standing,   deliberately
            adopted procurement  policy, expressed in  the
            standard     mandatory    [differing     site]
            conditions clause  and enforced by the  courts
            and  the administrative  authorities  on  many
            occasions. .  . .   Faithful execution  of the
            policy  requires  that  the  promise   in  the
            changed  conditions clause  not be  frustrated
            by  an  expansive  concept  of  the   duty  of
            bidders to investigate  the site.   That duty,
            if not carefully limited, could force  bidders
            to  rely on  their own  investigations, lessen
            their  reliance  on logs  in the  contract and
            reintroduce   the  practice   sought   to   be
            eradicated --  the computation of  bids on the
            basis  of  the  bidders'  own  investigations,
            with  contingency elements  often substituting
            for investigation.  
 
  Foster Construction C.A. v. United States, 435 F.2d  873, 887 (Ct.
  Cl. 1970).   The contractor   is entitled  to rely on  information
  furnished  in  the contract  in  developing  its bid  and  is  not
  charged  with  knowledge of  local conditions  that it  might have
  derived from  experience in  the local  area or  by performing  an
  independent study.   See Ball, Ball  & Brosamer, Inc., IBCA  2841,
  97-2 BCA   29,072; Betancourt & Gonzalez, S.E., DOT  BCA 2789, 95-
  1 BCA    27,455; Sierra Blanca,  Inc., ASBCA  34848, et al.,  91-2
  BCA    23,990.   The  prospective contractor  is  not expected  to
  conduct an  extensive independent  investigation  of  the site  to
  verify  information   provided  in  the   bid  documents.     Mann
  Construction,  AGBCA  76-109,  80-2  BCA     14,674.  The  changed
  conditions  clause is  intended to encourage pricing  based on the
  information provided  in the bid  documents and  the results of  a
  reasonable  site  investigation.    Where  the  actual  conditions
  encountered   differ   from   those   indicated   or    reasonably
  anticipated, the contractor is entitled  to recover the  increased
  costs of the work  and, if delayed, an adjustment of the  required
  completion date.   Foster Construction, 435 F.2d at 887.
       In  the specific context of  addressing reasonable contractor
  reliance on Government-provided boring logs,  the U.S. Army  Corps
  of  Engineers  Board  of  Contract  Appeals  has explained  why  a
  contractor generally  should not  be  expected  to have  performed
  other analyses that might  have caused him to question the  boring
  logs:
 
 
            [I]t  is  not  reasonable  to  expect  a  busy
            bidder,  while  preparing  its  bid  within  a
            short   time,  to   undertake   the   detailed
            comparative analysis which would  be necessary
            to  uncover such  latent indications.   Blount
            Bros.  Constr. Co. v.  United States,  171 Ct.
            Cl.  478,  346  F.2d 962  (1965);  J.A.  Jones
            Constr. Co., ENG BCA  6164, 95-1 BCA   27,482.
            In  preparing its  bid, [the  contractor]  was
            not obliged to  conduct a geological or  other
            technical   investigation   or   make   expert
            judgments    about    geotechnical    matters,
            particularly   where   the  [Government]   had
            already  done  so.   Stock  &  Grove, Inc.  v.
            United States, 204 Ct. Cl.  103, 493 F.2d  629
            (1974); Foster Constr. C.A. v. United  States,
            193 Ct.  Cl. 587,  435  F.2d  873 (1970);  and
            Holloway Sand and  Gravel Co.,  ENG BCA  4805,
            89-2 BCA   21,713. 
 
  D.W.  Sandau  Dredging,  ENG BCA  5812,  96-1  BCA     28,064,  at
  140,156.
 
       With  respect to  a  type  I  differing site  condition,  the
  United  States Court  of  Appeals  for  the  Federal  Circuit  has
  observed that:
 
            Success of a Type I Differing Site  Conditions
            claim turns  on  the  contractor's ability  to
            demonstrate  that  the conditions  "indicated"
            in  the contract  differ materially from those
            it  encounters during  performance.    Arundel
            Corporation v.  United States, 515 F.2d  1116,
            1128 (Ct. Cl. 1975).   As a threshold  matter,
            then, this kind  of Differing  Site Conditions
            claim  is dependent on what  is "indicated" in
            the  Contract.   Foster Construction  C.A. and
            Williams  Brothers Company  v. United  States,
            435  F.2d  873,  881    (Ct.  Cl.  1970).    A
            contractor   cannot   be   eligible   for   an
            equitable  adjustment  for changed  conditions
            unless  the  contract  indicated   what  those
            conditions  would   supposedly  be.     S.T.G.
            Construction Co., Inc.  v. United  States, 157
            Ct. Cl. 409,  414 (1962) . .  . .  There  must
            be  reasonably plain  or positive  indications
            in the bid  information or  contract documents
 
            what  such  subsurface  conditions   would  be
            otherwise  than  actually  found  in  contract
            performance.   .  .   .       Pacific   Alaska
            Contractors, Inc.  v. United States, 436  F.2d
            461, 469 (Ct. Cl. 1971).
 
  P.J. Maffei  Building Wrecking  Corp. v.  United States, 732  F.2d
  913, 916 (Fed. Cir.  1984); accord Holloway  Construction Co., ENG
  BCA 4805,  89-2 BCA    21,713, at  109,183, quoting J.A.  Laporte,
  Inc.,  ENG  BCA  5252,  88-3  BCA     20,953   ("In  essence,  the
  underlying  issue in  a Type  I claim  is  whether the  contractor
  could reasonably have anticipated the conditions  encountered from
  indications  in  the contract  documents,  its  inspection of  the
  site,  and  its  general  experience  as  a  contractor.").    The
  contractor  is   not  expected   to  have  the   knowledge  of   a
  geotechnical expert  or trained geologist,  but need only have the
  expertise   reasonably  imputed   to  an  experienced  contractor.
  Finally, the  contractor must show  both that  conditions differed
  materially  from those  that reasonably  could have  been foreseen
  under   the  contract   and  that   it  relied  on   the  contract
  indications.  Id.[foot #] 19
                                                                    
                   ----------- FOOTNOTE BEGINS ---------
 
        [foot #] 19 More  specifically,  to  prevail  on  a  Type  I
   differing site  conditions claim,  the contractor  must show  six
   elements:
 
             (i)  the  contract  documents  must have
                  affirmatively      indicated     or
                  represented      the     subsurface
                  conditions which form  the basis of
                  the [contractor's] claim;
 
             (ii) the contractor must have acted as a
                  reasonably  prudent  contractor  in
                  interpreting      the      contract
                  documents;
 
             (iii)     the contractor  must have
                       reasonably relied  on the
                       __________
                       indications of subsurface
                       conditions     in     the
                       contract;
 
             (iv) the subsurface  conditions actually
                  encountered,  within  the  contract
                  site  area,   must  have   differed
                  materially   from  the   subsurface
                  __________
                  conditions  indicated  in  the same
                  contract area;
 
             (v)  the  actual  subsurface  conditions
                  encountered    must    have    been
                                                      (continued...)
 
                   ----------- FOOTNOTE ENDS -----------
 
 
       SAE asserts that the contract documents in fact  did indicate
  what  conditions  the contractor  might  reasonably  expect.   The
  project  documents contained  considerable information,  including
  design details, drawings,  and specific  geologic information  and
  tests, as to the subsurface conditions  that the successful bidder
  could expect  in drilling and installing  caissons.  The  contract
  documents  consisted of  specification section  02380, Appendix A-
  Geotechnical  Data,  and  drawings  9-S-1,  9-S-2,  9-S-13.    The
  contract   drawings  showed  estimated  bottom  elevations.    The
  Geotechnical  Report  showed  that  the  deeper   bedrock  surface
  occurred  24 to 33 feet  below the existing  surface, and that the
  "deeper  hard  bedrock   would  be  suitable  for   small-diameter
  drilled-in  caissons. .  . ."   The  boring  logs indicated  auger
  refusal   on  "Precambrian   'undifferentiated'   hard   bedrock,"
  "Precambrian  'undifferentiated' bedrock,"  and "[h]ard  fractured
  Precambrian  'undifferentiated' biotitel  feldspar Gneiss  bedrock
  of fair quality," Finding  27, and that the depth of auger refusal
  and  start of bedrock would occur between 24 to  33 feet below the
  existing surface,  with the majority  of auger  refusals occurring
  between  28 and 33 feet.   Finding 28.  Moreover, the solicitation
  established the basis  for pricing  this element of the  contract.
  Finding 26.  SAE and ADI bid accordingly.  Findings 31, 37.
 
       Based  on  the  drawings,  specifications,  and  geotechnical
  information   provided  in   the  bid   documents,  SAE   and  its
  subcontractor  expected that  drilling for  the caissons  would be
  through overburden soil, gravel, and decomposed  rock, to a  firm,
  60 tsf  bedrock bottom  approximately 32 feet  below the  existing
  ground surface at elevation 103.  This conclusion   was predicated
  on contract drawings  showing that the  bottom caisson occurred at
  approximately  the same  elevation  as  the  boring logs  and  the
  Geotechnical  Report's  indications  that  hard  bedrock would  be
  encountered at  30 to 32 feet  below the existing ground  surface.
  A comparison  of the borings,  consistent with the bedrock surface
  elevation, and the  planned caisson bottom elevations shown on the
  contract drawings,  showed that the two  were congruent.  SAE  and
  ADI correlated  the caisson  bottom  elevation  from the  drawings
 
                                                                    
                   ----------- FOOTNOTE BEGINS ---------
 
        [foot #] 19 (...continued)
                  reasonably unforeseeable; and
 
             (vi) the  contractor's   claimed  excess
                  cost  must  be shown  to  be solely
                  attributable   to  the   materially
                  different   subsurface   conditions
                  within the contract site.  
                  ________________________
 
   Weeks Dredging &  Contracting, Inc. v. United States,  13 Cl. Ct.
                   ----------- FOOTNOTE BEGINS ---------
   193, 218 (1987), aff'd, 861 F.2d 728 (Fed. Cir. 1988);  Youngdale
                    _____                                  _________
   & Sons Construction Co. v. United States, 27 Fed. Cl. 516, 530-37
   ________________________________________
   (1993).
 
                   ----------- FOOTNOTE ENDS -----------
 
 
  with  the  boring  logs and  found  the  bottom  elevation  to  be
  approximately six inches below the borings' indication of the  top
  of bedrock.
 
       ADI  relied  upon this  information  in  pricing the  caisson
  work.    ADI  anticipated  that  its  power  driven,  80,000-pound
  caisson  drill  rig  would  have  little  difficulty  in  drilling
  through  the  gravel-like materials  overlaying  bedrock  and then
  drilling six  inches into the hard  bedrock shown in the  contract
  documents.   Finding  38.   Based  on  the materials  provided  to
  bidders,  ADI  estimated  that  it  could  drill  caissons  at   a
  production  rate  of four  or  five  per day.    Once  performance
  commenced,  it became  clear  that this  would  not be  the  case.
  Indeed,  as OKA's  project manager  observed, the  rock conditions
  slowed caisson  production from "three  or four per day  to one or
  two per day and sometimes less."  Finding 64.  
 
       SAE further argues that the  modifications to the contract to
  redesign  the sockets  and reimburse  SAE for  additional drilling
  implicitly  recognize  that   the  contractor  had  encountered  a
  differing  site   condition.    GSA's  consultant,  Mellick-Tully,
  retained after initial  attempts to  drill as  directed under  the
  contract   were  unsuccessful,   determined  that  the  underlying
  premise  that 60  tsf  could readily  be  reached by  the  caisson
  driller  was  faulty.  Statements  in  the geotechnical  documents
  themselves to  the effect  that the  architect had  relied on  the
  boring  logs  and  other data  and  that  GSA  was  providing  the
  geotechnical data  and boring  logs in order  that the  contractor
  would   have  the  same   information  as  was  available  to  the
  Government  and the architect, support SAE's reasonable conclusion
  that it  was expected to  rely on  this information in  submitting
  its bid.  
 
       The  impact  of  the  subsurface  conditions  on  the caisson
  installation  process  and on  the  progress  of construction  was
  almost  immediate.    In the  first  two  holes  ADI  drilled,  it
  encountered unexpected conditions at the  bedrock strata that  had
  been indicated  in the  contract as  capable of  providing 60  tsf
  bearing capacity.  In response to this, GSA  lowered the specified
  bearing capacity  from 60 tsf  to 25  tsf and redesigned  13 of 85
  caissons.   When performance resumed,  ADI once  again encountered
  unexpected  subsurface  conditions.   These included  variable and
  jagged rock.  
 
       After  it  resumed  drilling,  ADI  continued   to  encounter
  frequent  variations  in the  rock  conditions  on a  hole-by-hole
  basis.   The  facts of  record and  Dr.  Tamaro's credible  expert
  testimony, Findings 80  to 97,  support SAE's contention that  the
  conditions encountered by appellant  and ADI represent the classic
  type I  differing site condition  described in  the clause and  in
  Foster  Construction.   SAE  and  ADI could  not  reasonably  have
  deduced  from  a review  of  the  contract documents  and  a  site
  investigation   that   the   unusual  drilling   conditions   that
  materialized were  present or might be  present.  ADI expected  to
  install    at   least    four   caissons    per    day.[foot #] 20
  This  plan was  not unrealistic based on  the information provided
  to bidders.   Indeed, OKA's contemporaneous observation  similarly
  recognized that  the caisson subcontractor  should have  been able
  to  drill and  install  three  to four  caissons a  day  under the
  conditions  contemplated under  the contract.   Finding  64.   The
  unusually difficult and adverse  soil and rock conditions present,
  which the contractor had no cause to anticipate or  plan for given
  the information  available, precluded  ADI from  achieving through
  usual  equipment  operations its  reasonably  intended  output  of
  approximately  four caissons per day.   As such,  we find that SAE
  has  met   its  burden  to  demonstrate  that  the  rock  drilling
  conditions encountered  at the Trenton  site constituted  a type I
  differing site condition entitling it  to an equitable  adjustment
  accounting for increased costs and schedule impact.  
 
       In  addition   to  the  increased   costs  of   drilling  and
  installing  the caissons  themselves, SAE  also contends  that GSA
  implemented  substantially  more  rigorous  inspection  procedures
  than would reasonably have  been planned for by the contractor  in
  the  bidding process.   It  is SAE's  position  that the  contract
  documents made  the contractor responsible  in the  first instance
  for the caisson inspection  and certification process and provided
  that GSA would only perform quality assurance checks  on caissons.
  This  view  is  not  entirely  consistent  with  express  contract
  language permitting GSA to  perform its own  inspections.  Finding
  43.   Mr. Tamaro testified, however, that, based on his reading of
  the contract provisions and his experience with this  general type
  of construction work, the contractor  would reasonably expect  the
  owner's quality assurance inspector to  monitor the first  several
  caissons to ensure that the  contractor's quality control  process
  was being  performed properly  and  would  then relinquish  direct
  control   over  the   inspection  process   to  the   contractor's
  inspector.  Finding 89.   The scope of work provided by OKA to its
  inspector,  Dames &  Moore, also  recognized the  expectation that
  inspection  would  occur  for  only  the  first  few  caissons  to
  establish  the   standards  for  an   acceptable  caisson  bottom.
  Hearing Exhibit A-262.   After ADI remobilized in late July  1991,
  and   encountered  extremely   variable  rock   conditions,  GSA's
  inspection  process  was substantially  more  extensive  and  time
  consuming than the process  described as usual  by Mr. Tamaro  and
  originally envisioned under the OKA scope of work.  At  least two,
  and  sometimes three, GSA inspectors entered every caisson hole to
  inspect  the  caisson  bottom.    On  some  occasions, these  team
  inspections were  repeated multiple  times on  each  caisson.   We
 
                                                                    
                   ----------- FOOTNOTE BEGINS ---------
 
        [foot #] 20 See Finding 34.   Despite the testimony  of SAE,
                    ___
   we view  as more  credible  the testimony  of ADI,  which was  to
   perform the work.  We thus adopt  the lower number (four per day)
   as  the  level   of  production  that  the   subcontractor  might
   reasonably have expected to achieve had the subsurface conditions
   indicated   in   the    Geotechnical   Report   been    genuinely
   representative of the actual conditions encountered. 
 
                   ----------- FOOTNOTE ENDS -----------
 
 
  conclude that  the additional inspections,  although permitted  by
  the  contract,   were  made  necessary   by  the   differing  site
  conditions, and, hence,  related additional costs are  compensable
  under that clause.      
 
       SAE  also presented  evidence,  through  its expert  witness,
  that  the   inspection  process  employed   by  GSA   resulted  in
  effectively requiring  the contractor  to  drill  deeper to  reach
  rock  of  higher quality  than  was  actually  required under  the
  contract as  modified.  That  is, the  inspectors required ADI  to
  drill  until it reached "hard  ringing rock" --  a level where the
  entire bottom  and sides of the  caisson consisted of hard,  sound
  rock.  In essence the  GSA inspectors required ADI  to reach 40 to
  60  tsf rock, as  opposed to the 25  tsf rock specified.  Findings
  92-95.
 
       GSA's  argument   that  the   exculpatory  language  in   the
  specifications   serves  to   exempt   the  Government   from  any
  responsibility for  increased costs or  schedule impact  caused by
  the  radically different  subsurface conditions encountered by the
  contractor   is  unconvincing.     First,   reading  the  contract
  documents as  a whole, it  is clear  that the Government  intended
  the contractor  to rely  on the  subsurface data  and boring  logs
  provided.  See Findings 21, 23.   In addition, the courts and this
  Board have  expressly recognized that  the results of test borings
  are  "considered  the  most  reliable  reflection   of  subsurface
  conditions."  United Contractors v. United  States, 368 F.2d  585,
  597  (1966);  accord Cherry  Hill  Construction,  Inc. v.  General
  Services  Administration,  GSBCA 11217,  92-3 BCA    25,179.   Our
  appellate  authority  has   also  recognized   that  "[p]articular
  protection  is given  by courts  to the  right of bidders  to rely
  upon drill hole data  in the Contract."  Foster Construction,  435
  F.2d at  888.  Although a  contractor may have  a duty  to inspect
  the site, in  this case, it is  undisputed that a  site inspection
  was in  fact performed and could have shed no  additional light on
  subsurface conditions  given that  the site  was  a paved  parking
  lot.  Finding 33.  This Board has thus recognized that:
 
 
            Consequently,  broad exculpatory clauses, like
            the ones  included in  this Contract,  "cannot
            be given their full  literal reach and 'do not
            relieve   the  defendant   of  liability   for
            changed  conditions  as  the   broad  language
            thereof  would  seem  to indicate.'"    United
            Contractors,   368  F.2d   at   598   (quoting
            Fehlhaber Corp.  v. United States, 138 Ct. Cl.
            571,  584,  151  F.  Supp.  817,   825,  cert.
            denied,  355  U.S.  877  (1957)).    In  other
            words,  the Government  cannot provide  boring
            logs,  so that bids can be based  on them, and
            at  the  same  time disclaim  the  validity of
            those logs.  To  do so would be to render  the
            differing  site conditions clause meaningless,
            as  to "type  I"  claims, by  eliminating  the
 
            standard from  which conditions  may be  found
            to  be at variance.   The reading given by the
            Court  of Claims  to the  exculpatory clauses,
            when placed in  the same contract  with boring
            logs  and a  differing site conditions clause,
            is the only one which gives meaning to  all of
            these provisions.  
 
  Cherry Hill  Construction, 92-3  BCA at  125,476; see  also P.  J.
  Dick,  Inc. v.  General Services  Administration, GSBCA  12036, et
  al.,  94-3 BCA   27,073.   In Cherry  Hill Construction, the Board
  also observed  that "[a] pattern  of test  holes across the  site,
  such  as   was  found  here,   is  considered   to  be  reasonably
  representative of  the site as  an entirety."    The  Geotechnical
  Report  provided by  GSA  to prospective  bidders on  the  Trenton
  project similarly  provided a  range of test borings  indicating a
  particular type of condition  that the contractor  could expect to
  encounter.    These  were  not  the  conditions  encountered  when
  construction commenced, however.
 
       In addition to  demonstrating that it  meets the criteria for
  proving a  type I differing  site condition,  SAE has also  made a
  case for a type II differing site condition  (conditions which are
  unknown and differ materially  from those generally encountered in
  the  type of  work being  procured)  as well.   Testimony  in  the
  record supports the conclusion that  subsurface conditions at  the
  project site were unusual,  unknown, and materially different from
  those ordinarily encountered and generally recognized as  inhering
  in  the type  of  foundation support  work  called for  under  the
  contract.   At  least one  other local  area  contractor asked  to
  visit  the project  site  commented  that  he had  not  previously
  encountered  anything like  what was  found at  the  project site.
  Transcript at  298.   Moreover, the contractors  bidding for  this
  work  were  not  required  to  look  beyond  the   evidence  of  a
  reasonable  site  visit  and  a  review  of  the  subsurface  data
  provided  in the  contract.   There is  no duty  to canvass  other
  local  contractors or  to hire  a geologist  in  preparing a  bid,
  especially when a geological  investigation has been performed and
  provided.  As the Board has stated,  "The law does not demand that
  [the contractor] have the  knowledge of an architectural historian
  and  ignore what the  contract has told it."   P.J. Dick, 94-3 BCA
  at 134,928.  The record does  not suggest that SAE or  ADI knew in
  advance of the subsurface conditions.
 
       To  conclude, the  contract contained  a Geotechnical  Report
  and  drawings  that  signified  to  the  reasonably  knowledgeable
  construction  contractor  that 60  tsf  rock would  be reached  at
  approximately  six  inches   below  the  top   of  rock.    Actual
  conditions,  however,  contained geotechnical  anomalies  and  the
  evidence  of record shows that the conditions  encountered at this
  site varied considerably from other Trenton area conditions.    As
  SAE points out, if the architect, which investigated  the site and
  designed the  caisson foundation, did  not detect  these anomalies
  and varying  conditions in  performing its contractual  obligation
  to investigate  adjacent sites and to  have a geotechnical  expert
  conduct test  borings, it is unreasonable  to expect that SAE  and
  its  subcontractor should  have  discovered or  somehow  predicted
  that  these  conditions  would  exist  prior  to  commencement  of
  drilling.   See Kinetic  Builders Inc.,  ASBCA 32627,  88-2 BCA   
  20,657, at  104,401 (If the  Government had  no reason to  suspect
  unusual  conditions, "we are at a loss to  see how appellant would
  have.").  
 
       To summarize,  we agree that SAE  and its subcontractor  have
  demonstrated  a  differing  site  condition  that  affected  their
  ability  to  proceed  as  planned  with  caisson  installation and
  impacted  the  schedule.    In  addition  to  requiring additional
  drilling, SAE  has shown  that its  progress was  hampered by  the
  resulting inspection  process.  We are  mindful that the  contract
  permitted GSA  to perform independent  inspections over  and above
  the certification process required of the  contractor's inspector,
  and  that  the  GSA  inspector  had  the  right  to  overrule  the
  contractor's inspector.   The  testimony supports the  conclusion,
  however,  that  the degree  of  inspection,  as a  result  of  the
  unanticipated  subsurface conditions, was  more onerous than would
  reasonably   have   been  anticipated   under   the   construction
  conditions described in the  solicitation and added  to the  delay
  experienced  by SAE.    In addition  to the  equitable  adjustment
  already allowed by  GSA, SAE is entitled  to a time extension  and
  to whatever  additional costs were occasioned  as a result of  the
  requirement  that  it drill  to  ringing  rock,  which Mr.  Tamaro
  persuasively  explained  was  tantamount  to  imposing  a   higher
  standard than the 25 tsf rock permitted under the modification. 
 
  Structural Steel & Exterior Skin Issues
 
       SAE's most  significant claim  for substantial extensions  of
  time  to  complete  performance  is  founded  on  numerous  issues
  arising  out of the metal  stud backup wall and  the exterior skin
  design  controversies.    It  is   abundantly  clear  that   these
  activities  dominated  the critical  path  of  construction for  a
  lengthy time period and that  significant delays were  encountered
  in these areas.   Where the parties differ is  in what caused  the
  delays and wherein  the fault lay.  SAE argues that the design was
  deficient  and that  the  architect,  which  acted  for  GSA,  was
  uncooperative in reviewing submittals, responding to requests  for
  information,  explaining its design intent,  and providing reasons
  for  rejecting  submittals.    In  addition,  SAE  urges that  the
  architect  improperly  tried to  shift  to  the contractor  design
  responsibilities that  it should have assumed.    GSA argues  that
  SAE  and its  subcontractors are  principally responsible  for the
  lengthy  delays  associated   with  this  aspect  of  construction
  because of incomplete and unsatisfactory shop drawings  submittals
  and poor construction management and practices.   
 
       The  building  itself,  with  the  metal  stud  back-up wall,
  represents an uncommon  design approach for a public building with
  a   complex  geometric   configuration.     As  SAE   points  out,
  construction contractors are not  normally expected to re-engineer
  projects or  perform significant design  functions in  the absence
  of  express language  in the  contract documents  alerting them to
  such  responsibilities.     Nor  is  the  construction  contractor
  ordinarily charged with determining  the feasibility of a project.
  See, e.g., Clovis Heimsath & Associates, NASA BCA  180-1, 83-1 BCA
    16,133.   Applying this  tenet, SAE  argues that the  Government
  was responsible for delays  associated with such  problems as line
  drawings of the limestone attachment  system which had  incomplete
  dimensions and sizes, and the inclusion in the  contract documents
  of  a detail with an  inappropriate wall tie.  SAE argues that the
  Government may  not provide  incomplete or inaccurate  information
  and then expect  the contractor to just "take it from there."  83-
  1 BCA at 80,130-31.  
 
       We agree,  given the abundance  of   testimony in the  record
  concerning the  criticality of  ensuring  that  this design  would
  function  appropriately,   and  the  prescriptive  nature  of  the
  specifications, that  the contract could  not fairly  be construed
  to shift the burden of providing design details  to the contractor
  and its subcontractors.   The availability of appropriate guidance
  and design details from the  architect was particularly  necessary
  here  given the  complex  geometry  of  the  building,  which,  as
  appellant's   expert  explained,   was   not  just   a   "vanilla"
  rectangular edifice.  Rather, the  building featured offset  walls
  at different levels, with numerous  corners  producing  additional
  windloads,  complexities  which   ultimately  were   addressed  by
  requiring placement  of metal  studs  eight  inches apart,  rather
  than  the  standard 12-16-24  inches  apart.   Transcript at  799-
  800.[foot #] 21      The   metal   stud   wall   system   selected
  by  the  architect,   although  potentially  economical,  was   an
  "unforgiving" system requiring  particular care in  design efforts
  to ensure all elements  of the wall system work properly  together
  to ensure a watertight building.  Transcript  at 810-11.  In  this
  case, it was particularly important to take care  in designing the
  attachment of the brittle limestone  and ground-face block  veneer
  to the flexible metal stud back-up wall.  Transcript at 813-14.
 
       The preponderance  of evidence  in  the  record supports  the
  conclusion that the design of  the building was  unconventional in
  the context of a project that was intended to have a long life  as
  a public  building.  Well  before the  bid documents were  issued,
  OKA  and  its  consultant,  SSVK,  expressed  concerns  about  the
 
                                                                    
                   ----------- FOOTNOTE BEGINS ---------
 
        [foot #] 21 This led  to the  claim for  labor and  material
   costs  and  delay  asserted  on  behalf  of  Interstate  for  the
   requirement to supply many more steel studs than were depicted on
   the  architectural drawings.    Mr.  Guedelhoefer  noted  in  his
   testimony that  while steel  stud back-  up walls are  ordinarily
   more  economical  than   masonry  cavity  walls,  in   this  case
   significant  economic advantages  were vitiated  by  the need  to
   space studs close  together to preserve the  structural integrity
   of the building.  Transcript at 800.
 
                   ----------- FOOTNOTE ENDS -----------
 
 
  proposed  design.    We are  not  told  how  these  concerns  were
  resolved, if  at all, prior to  issuing the solicitation for  bids
  to be submitted  by construction contractors.   After SAE received
  the award of the contract and proceeded with  performance, GSA, in
  the  midst  of the  construction  process,  again retained  expert
  consultants  to  review  and  modify  the  design.    Construction
  stalled  pending  resolution  of  shop  drawing  and  other issues
  related to  the exterior skin.   Although we  do not suggest  that
  the proposed design was  inherently inappropriate or incapable, as
  eventually  modified, of  satisfying  the Government's  needs,  or
  even   that   the   guidance   eventually   provided   necessarily
  constituted  a  change  to the  work  in  all  instances,  we  are
  persuaded that  sufficient ambiguities and technical  difficulties
  existed in the design documents to have given rise to many  of the
  delays experienced in  the construction process.  In this  regard,
  we  find  it  significant that  the  contemporaneous documentation
  authored by  OKA's project manager, who  was not called  by GSA to
  testify,  acknowledged that  many of  the problems  encountered in
  erecting the  limestone exterior had given  rise to at least  some
  four  to six months  of delay for which  the contractor could well
  be  entitled   to  recover.     Finding  315.     These  are   not
  circumstances  in which  it is  fair  or appropriate  to attribute
  delays  to  the  contractor  for  the   purpose  of  justifying  a
  termination for default.  
 
       In reaching this assessment, we  are especially persuaded  by
  the  fact that numerous  experts agreed  that the  building design
  presented potential concerns for durability  and longevity if  not
  handled  properly and  that the  documents as provided  to bidders
  did  not fully  cover all  areas of  concern.   The desire  of the
  contractor to  obtain unequivocal  guidance  and   direction  from
  Vitetta was not inappropriate.  As  Mr. Guedelhoefer, a structural
  engineering  expert, pointed  out, if  the design  is faulty,  the
  building  will  leak no  matter  how  well it  is  constructed  in
  accordance  with  the design.    These  concerns were  undoubtedly
  exacerbated   by  GSA's   November  1992   letter  to   all  three
  contractors --  SAE, Vitetta, and OKA  --  informing each that the
  Government  would  look to  them  severally  and jointly  for  any
  defects in the building.  
 
       As  such,  we find  Mr.  Guedelhoefer's  assessment that  the
  architect  was  exceptionally cautious  in approving  shop drawing
  submittals,  and  unusually  demanding  in  its  review  of  these
  documents, Finding  222, to  be  credible. The  testimony of  both
  appellant's  and  respondent's  experts  is  consistent  that  the
  contract  placed no  design  obligations on  SAE with  respect  to
  metal   stud   or   exterior   wall   issues.[foot #] 22       The
 
                                                                    
                   ----------- FOOTNOTE BEGINS ---------
 
        [foot #] 22 Moreover, GSA  agreed to a change order request,
   submitted  on behalf  of  SAE's subcontractor,  for  the cost  of
   designing  the  interior  stone anchorage,  which  was  virtually
   identical  to  the  exterior  stone  anchorage  specifications.  
                                                      (continued...)
 
                   ----------- FOOTNOTE ENDS -----------
 
 
  position  taken  by  SAE, that  it  was  entitled  to  substantial
  guidance  and  information from  the  architect,  rather than  the
  continuous stream  of shop  drawings  rejections  it received,  is
  supported by the eventual actions of GSA and  Vitetta in supplying
  the  requested design  details.   See Big  Chief  Drilling Co.  v.
  United States, 26  Cl. Ct. 1276 (1992); McNally Industries,  Inc.,
  ASBCA  43027,  93-3 BCA    26,130.    Moreover, a  review  of  the
  relevant  specifications  and  drawings  in  the  context  of this
  contract suggests that the  principal disputed requirements -- the
  limestone attachment system, the flashing  details, and the  metal
  stud  back-up  wall   --  constituted  design,   not  performance,
  specifications:
 
 
            The  specifications, which  were  prepared  by
            the  defendant,   are  a  classic  example  of
            "design"      specifications,     and      not
            "performance"   specifications.     In   other
            words, in these specifications,  the defendant
            set forth in  precise detail the materials  to
            be employed and the manner  in which the  work
            was  to  be performed,  and plaintiff  was not
            privileged  to  deviate  therefrom,   but  was
            required to  follow them as  one would  a road
            map.   In contrast, typical "performance" type
            specifications  set  forth  an   objective  or
            standard  to be  achieved, and  the successful
            bidder is expected  to exercise  his ingenuity
            in  achieving  the objective  or  standard  of
            performance, selecting the means  and assuming
            a   corresponding   responsibility  for   that
            selection.
 
  J.L. Simmons, Inc.  v. United States, 412 F.2d 1360, 1362 (Ct. Cl.
  1969).
 
       This conclusion is bolstered by the  fact that, midstream  in
  the  construction  process,  GSA retained  an  outside consultant,
  WJE,  to  review the  design.   That  consultant recommended  many
  changes   to   the   design.[foot #] 23      Regardless   of   the
                                                                    
                   ----------- FOOTNOTE BEGINS ---------
 
        [foot #] 22 (...continued)
   Transcript at 1187-88, 1190-91.   As SAE suggests, this  supports
   its position  that the  contractor  was not  charged with  design
   functions of this nature under the contract.
 
        [foot #] 23 GSA, in defending Vitetta's  actions, makes much
   of  the fact that  SAE was instructed by  Vitetta to install hard
   mortar  joints,  was  then  instructed  to  follow  the  caulking
   procedure recommended by  WJE, and then,  after the incidence  of
   deflecting relieving angles,  was told to return  to the approach
   initially designed by Vitetta.   This point does not detract from
   the fact that  the contractor, faced with an  unusual design, was
                                                      (continued...)
 
                   ----------- FOOTNOTE ENDS -----------
 
 
  reasons for the design changes,  these events clearly  contributed
  to  delays  and increased  costs experienced  by the  contractor. 
  SAE is  not required to demonstrate that omissions and ambiguities
  in or revisions to the  design documents were the  fault of GSA or
  that GSA,  through its architect,  possessed greater  expertise in
  masonry attachment  and flashing installation.   It  is sufficient
  to show that the design lacked adequate information  to enable the
  contractor to  construct the  building, that   the  Government and
  the architect did not timely  provide needed information, and that
  these circumstances contributed  to delay in the project.   Lewis-
  Nicholson, Inc.  v. United  States, 550  F.2d 26  (Ct. Cl.  1977);
  J.L. Simmons Co. v. United States, 412  F.2d 1360 (Ct. Cl.  1969);
  St.  Thomas Enterprises,  ASBCA 38069,  92-3  BCA    25,142; Hobbs
  Construction  & Development, Inc., ASBCA 30432, 32151,  91-2 BCA  
  24,014.   SAE has  met this  burden through  the testimony of  its
  expert, its on-site project  personnel, and its subcontractors, as
  well  as through documentary  evidence such  as the reports issued
  by the  consultants retained by  GSA.  We  note, however,  that in
  pricing changed and added work  in the next phase  of this case --
  resolution of quantum issues under  a termination for  convenience
  -- the parties  should consider  the obligation of the  contractor
  to  price  its  proposal  to  accomplish  the  complicated  design
  depicted in the architectural drawings.
 
       Insufficient Detail in Design Drawings
 
       One of  the major  areas of  disagreement  occurred with  the
  limestone for the project  and the attachment system to be used to
  connect  the exterior veneer to the metal stud  back-up wall.  SAE
  asserts that the  drawings as  to these features were  incomplete,
  and in some instances contained no details of  dimension and size;
  others contained misleading information,  and, in some cases, were
  generally  inadequate  to  the point  that  SAE  was  hampered  in
  completing  shop  drawings  that  would  be  approved  by Vitetta.
  Without the  information it needed,  and the  architect's approval
  of  the drawings,  SAE was  not  in a  position to  fabricate  the
  limestone  and  construct the  exterior  veneer  of the  building.
  Specifically,  in the  view of SAE and  its masonry subcontractor,
  dimensional information concerning  the size,  length, depth,  and
  diameter of limestone, and information  concerning the tie  anchor
  that  appeared  unsuitable  for  use  with  the  specified  veneer
  panels,  were items  that required  engineering judgment  and were
  not properly within  the ability of a  contractor to provide.  The
  submittal  process, from SAE's standpoint, turned the contractor's
  preparation  of shop  drawings into  a  guessing  game, where  the
 
 
                                                                    
                   ----------- FOOTNOTE BEGINS ---------
 
        [foot #] 23 (...continued)
   not at  fault for the  technical issues that arose  in connection
   with the  exterior skin.   The testimony supports  the conclusion
   that SAE tried  hard to work with OKA, GSA,  and Vitetta, despite
   the difficulties in  obtaining timely, definitive guidance  as to
   how these parties wished the building to be constructed.
 
                   ----------- FOOTNOTE ENDS -----------
 
 
  contractor  was  forced  to propose  an  approach  with  no  clear
  indication of what the architect's design intent actually was. 
 
       Although we agree that SAE had a basis  to seek clarification
  and  guidance  with  respect to  the  attachment  system,  we also
  understand GSA's position as explained by the architect.   Vitetta
  specified a  specific system  for  limestone  attachment.   Lepore
  sought to  substitute another system based  on its judgment as  an
  experienced  masonry  construction  contractor.   This  appears to
  have been  a well-intentioned   request, made  for the purpose  of
  easing  and enhancing the  construction process.  Although SAE and
  its  subcontractor adamantly  assert that  the specifications  and
  drawings   for  the  attachment   system  were   defective,  GSA's
  witnesses  just  as  staunchly  argue  that  the  proposed system,
  although requiring more  precision of the contractor, was a  valid
  design  approach,   which  was  not   defective.    There  was  no
  obligation  for  the Government  to  accept  Lepore's  substitute.
  Thus, GSA  contends that the  delay and  cost associated with  the
  back and  forth review process with  respect to submittals  should
  be chargeable entirely to SAE.   We disagree.  SAE has  shown that
  the  drawings   were  not  entirely  clear   --    based  on   its
  subcontractor's  extensive  masonry  construction  experience  the
  specified tie  did not appear  to be  suitable for the  particular
  veneer    to    be    installed.[foot #] 24        Although    the
  architect was  certainly entitled  to require  SAE to install  the
  anchorage system it specified,  and had no obligation to agree  to
  the less  stringent alternative approach  proposed by  Lepore, the
  main reason for the proposed modification to the  anchorage system
  was to cure the  ambiguity inherent in the  drawings  provided  by
  Vitetta.   The resolution of  the type of  tie anchor required  by
  the architect  was essential  for  construction  to proceed.    In
  addition  to  the  proposed  alternative  approach,  SAE  and  its
  subcontractor repeatedly asked Vitetta  to clarify what anchor was
  intended by the reference to  "tie no. 1"  on drawing A39.   Delay
  resulting from time  required to clarify the architect's intent is
  not the fault of SAE.  Taking into account  the contract documents
  and  specifications as  a  whole,  we cannot  subscribe  to  GSA's
  argument that the design responsibility for the tie anchor  system
  for  the exterior  veneer  and for  the flashing  installation was
  shifted to the contractor. 
 
       SAE   similarly  requested,  but   did  not  timely  receive,
  clarification  on  how  Vitetta  wanted  flashing  configured  and
 
                                                                    
                   ----------- FOOTNOTE BEGINS ---------
 
        [foot #] 24 The  evidence  of  record  contains  conflicting
   statements from the architect as to what was intended with regard
   to  the tie referenced  on drawing  A39.    The  incorporation by
   reference  into the  contract  documents  of  literature  that  a
   contractor  might be  able to  consult to  supply  missing design
   details  does not under  these circumstances suffice  to transfer
   design responsibility to the contractor, particularly where there
   is no guidance  in the contract as  to whether the literature  or
   the detailed design drawings would take precedence.  
 
                   ----------- FOOTNOTE ENDS -----------
 
 
  installed at  atypical wall junctions and  interfaces.  As  stated
  above, the record supports the conclusion that the architect,  and
  not the  contractor, was responsible  for providing  clear details
  of  the  building flashing  system  so  as to  ensure  that  water
  penetrating  the  building's exterior  does  not  remain there  to
  cause  deterioration  and  potential   failure  of  the   hardware
  anchoring the exterior veneer to the interior back-up  wall.  This
  was  particularly  critical here,  with  an  exterior wall  design
  potentially more subject to  water penetration problems than would
  ordinarily occur  with the  standard masonry cavity  design.   The
  contract requirement that  the subcontractor  retained to  install
  flashing have  expertise in flashing installation did not serve to
  shift  design  responsibilities  to  that  contractor.    Read  in
  context,  it  was  intended   to  insure  proper  installation  of
  flashing in  accordance with the  architect's instructions.   With
  respect  to flashing, SAE  was for  all intents and  purposes in a
  waiting  mode until the  issuance of  the report  of Mr.  Serke in
  March 1993.[foot #] 25  
 
       SAE    contends  that  the  contract  documents unambiguously
  place design responsibility on the architect-engineering firm  and
  not  on the contractor.   To the extent  that any provisions might
 
                                                                    
                   ----------- FOOTNOTE BEGINS ---------
 
        [foot #] 25 Although  GSA,  through  the  testimony  of  its
   architect, urged that a knowledgeable contractor should have been
   able  to figure  out, by  following  a manual  referenced in  the
   contract, how flashing should have  been installed, this does not
   absolve  GSA  and   its  architect   of  the   duty  to   provide
   clarification and direction when it is requested as it was by SAE
   and  its subcontractor.   The  fact that  the contract  refers to
   flashing  literature does  not  invalidate questions  and  issues
   raised by  SAE and subcontractors.  The Government has a  duty to
   cooperate  in responding to  good faith requests  for information
   and  clarification of  construction  details.    In the  face  of
   legitimate problems and concerns about the design of the exterior
   skin  of this  building,  the  Board is  not  persuaded that  the
   purpose  of SAE's  questions was  to  create delay.   See  Alsace
                                                         ___  ______
   Industries,  Inc., ASBCA  50720, 98-1  BCA    29,576.   Moreover,
   _________________
   considerable  weight attaches  to the  fact  that eventually  the
   Government directed Vitetta to design the flashing.  The evidence
   of  record is  convincing  as  to the  unusual  features of  this
   particular design.  Both Mr. Guedelhoefer and Mr. Becica conceded
   that the  nature of the design selected  required particular care
   by   the  architect  and  the  contractor  to  ensure  watertight
   construction.   Here, the need for more  than the usual amount of
   guidance   from  the  architect   and  the  Government   was  not
   inappropriate.   As  Mr. Guedelhoefer persuasively  testified, in
   light of the complexity of this design, it was not  reasonable to
   expect a contractor  to know or "figure out"  how flashing should
   be  installed to  ensure that  water  would be  kept  out of  the
   interior of the  building.  The unusual nature of  the design may
   well affect the  reasonableness of the  schedule and pricing  for
   the quantum phase of this matter. 
 
                   ----------- FOOTNOTE ENDS -----------
 
 
  be  deemed   ambiguous,  however,   SAE   points   out  that   its
  interpretations  are  as reasonable  as  any posited  by GSA,  and
  that,  where  a  contract  permits  of  more than  one  reasonable
  interpretation, it  must be construed  against the  drafter and in
  favor of  the contractor.   E.g., Occupacia  Corp., ENG BCA  5382,
  88-2 BCA   20,820. GSA did  not provide any evidence  showing that
  SAE's interpretation of the contract  requirements with regard  to
  the exterior wall system was unreasonable.  At  best, for example,
  with  respect to  flashing, GSA's  expert  suggested  that it  was
  possible  to  interpret  the  documents  to  state  a performance,
  rather than prescriptive design intent.    This does  not serve to
  advance GSA's  position, however, since it  shows only  that  more
  than  one  reasonable  interpretation  might  be  had  of contract
  specifications.      In  such   circumstances,  the   contractor's
  reasonable  interpretation prevails.  E.g.,  WPC Enterprises, Inc.
  v. United States, 323 F.2d  874, 876-77 (Ct. Cl.  1963).  At best,
  GSA and its  architect-engineer issued design specifications  that
  contained  insufficient  information  to  estimate  the labor  and
  materials necessary to complete  the job.  The contractor was  not
  required to  be able,  under the  pressure of  submitting a  fixed
  price bid in  a relatively short  time frame, to discern  that the
  drawings lacked  details such as  the flashing  design at atypical
  locations that would be needed to construct the building.
 
       Similarly,  architectural  drawings  depicting   metal  studs
  uniformly  spaced at  sixteen  inches  apart are  claimed  to have
  misled SAE  and its  subcontractor, who  maintain  they could  not
  have anticipated  that studs would have  to be placed much  closer
  together in  corner locations  to  ensure  adequate resistance  to
  wind     loads.[foot #] 26            Much    less    could    the
  contractor have determined  that it  would be  expected to  supply
  this  missing information.   SAE  argues that  these  are not  the
  types of  obvious discrepancies that a  contractor is required  to
  bring to the  attention of the Government.    See  Blount Brothers
 
                                                                    
                   ----------- FOOTNOTE BEGINS ---------
 
        [foot #] 26 Notably, SAE points out, in the bidding process,
   OKA brought to  GSA's attention the fact that  while some bidders
   had  recognized the possibility that additional metal studs might
   be required  at the  corners, others (including  SAE) had  simply
   followed the contract drawings in estimating needed materials and
   labor.   Although GSA  realized that varying  interpretations had
   been arrived at by contractors, it undertook no effort to clarify
   its  intent.   SAE  argues  that  where  GSA fully  knew  of  the
   conflicting  interpretations, it  had an  obligation to  disclose
   the  design  intent to  put  all  bidders  on an  equal  footing.
   Instead,  it  took advantage  of  the situation  to  obtain lower
   prices.  Thus, even if  the contractor, through a careful reading
   of  the specifications,  should have  been  on notice  that studs
   might have to be placed closed together at certain locations, the
   Government's  failure to  rectify the  confusion in  the face  of
   "superior knowledge"  still permits contractor recovery.   Helene
                                                              ______
   Curtis Industries, Inc.  v. United States, 312 F.2d  774 (Ct. Cl.
   _________________________________________
   1963).
 
                   ----------- FOOTNOTE ENDS -----------
 
 
  Construction  v. United  States,  346 F.2d  962, 972-73  (Ct.  Cl.
  1965).  SAE also points out that  the principles enunciated in WPC
  Enterprises and in Blount  Brothers are particularly applicable to
  the misleading nature of the  specifications and drawings  for the
  metal  stud back-up  wall  system.    SAE  and  its  subcontractor
  assumed that  these drawings, which depicted  spacing of studs  at
  sixteen inches even at  windows and corners, were designed to  the
  deflection   formulae   stated  in   the   specifications.     The
  Government, for its  part, argues that  the contract  required the
  contractor  to  perform  design  responsibilities  to  the  extent
  necessary  to ensure  proper construction  in accordance  with the
  architect's deflection criteria.   Nowhere did the  specifications
  specifically state  that despite what  was shown  in the drawings,
  metal studs  at the windows  and corners would  need to be  spaced
  significantly  closer  together  than  the  sixteen  inches  shown
  uniformly  throughout in  the drawings.   The  "Specifications and
  Drawings" clause of the  contract, however, stated  that the words
  "as  shown on  the drawings"  were to  be construed  to mean   the
  extent or  scope of the  work shown  on the drawings.   Given that
  SAE's interpretation of this  requirement was consistent with this
  language,  and  that  the   Government  could  have  avoided  this
  situation by  clarifying the  solicitation  when  it became  aware
  that bidders were construing  the requirements differently, SAE is
  entitled to recover for added work and delay  associated with this
  specification.
 
  CPM Methodology
 
       Under  the  contract,  SAE  was  required  to  employ  a  CPM
  methodology  for scheduling work and reporting on  progress to the
  work.   The underlying  intent and value of  the CPM in evaluating
  contract  progress has  been  explained  aptly  by  the  Court  of
  Claims:
 
 
            [T]he  critical  path method  is an  efficient
            way of  organizing  and  scheduling a  complex
            project    which    consists    of    numerous
            interrelated  separate small  projects.   Each
            subproject is  identified and classified as to
            the  duration  and  precedence  of  the  work.
            (E.g., one could not  carpet an area until the
            flooring  is down  and the  flooring cannot be
            completed until the underlying  electrical and
            telephone  conduits are  installed.) The  data
            is  then  analyzed,  usually  by  computer, to
            determine the most efficient schedule  for the
            entire  project.    Many  subprojects  may  be
            performed  at any time  within a  given period
            without  any effect  on the  completion of the
            entire  project.  However, some  items of work
            are given no leeway and  must be performed  on
            schedule; otherwise,  the entire project  will
            be delayed.   These latter  items of  work are
            on  the   "critical  path."     A  delay,   or
 
            acceleration, of work along the  critical path
            will affect the entire project.
 
  Haney v. United  States, 676 F.2d 584, 595 (Ct. Cl. 1982);  Fortec
  Constructors v.  United States, 8 Cl.  Ct. 490 (1985), aff'd,  804
  F.2d  141 (Fed  Cir.  1986);  Maron Construction  Co.  v.  General
  Services Administration, GSBCA 13625, 98-1 BCA   29,685.
 
       In Norair Engineering Corp.,  ENG BCA 3804, et al., 90-1  BCA
     22,327, at  112,204, the  board observed  that  "the device  of
  comparing  the as-built  progress with the original  planning is a
  worthy and  time-honored method  of identifying critical  delays."
  This is  the  type  of analysis  offered  by  Mr.  Coppi,  who  in
  preparing  his  CPM  schedule  analysis  compared  SAE's  baseline
  schedule   with  a   detailed,  comprehensive   as-built  schedule
  reflecting  actual dates and durations of construction activities.
 
 
       In particular,  Mr. Coppi  produced  his  as-built record  by
  determining all construction activities  performed each day on the
  project through October 22,  1993.  The baseline schedule used  by
  Mr. Coppi  was SAE's TRBL  schedule, revised  to incorporate OKA's
  comments with respect to  certain logic and duration changes.   We
  find that this baseline  schedule was reasonable.  Mr. Coppi  then
  analyzed project  events, evaluating their interrelationships  and
  their causes, to identify  and quantify the delays to the  project
  through October  22, 1993.  Mr.  Coppi then incorporated into  the
  baseline schedule the impact of each critical delay  event so that
  he  could evaluate  each successive  delay against  the as-planned
  schedule adjusted  to take into account  the actual status of  the
  project  and  the  remaining  work.     This  approach   has  been
  recognized to be appropriate:
 
            A  contractor's initial  network  analysis  is
            not   cast   in  bronze;   it  is   constantly
            changing;  that  is   the  advantage   of  the
            critical  path  method  of  scheduling.    The
            impact  of  each  change,  or  delay,  on  the
            previously  charted sequences  must be  fitted
            into the  network.   The  effect  may be  far-
            reaching.  Activities which were not  critical
            prior  to  the  new  event  may  be   rendered
            critical;  and  conversely, formerly  critical
            activities  may  develop float.   Whether  the
            change  or  delay  affects  the  critical path
            must be  determined on the basis of conditions
            existing immediately prior to its occurrence.
 
  Norair, 90-1 BCA at 112,205.
 
       It is  clear that  certain  activities  in this  construction
  project were necessarily on  the critical path and that delays  to
  these activities would necessarily affect  the completion date  of
  the project.  In particular, these include excavation  of the site
  and  completion of  the foundation  work (caissons  and concrete),
  structural steel,  and exterior skin.   This  approach, subscribed
  to by Mr. Coppi,  comports with the logic of the milestone  events
  prescribed  in  the contract  itself.    Finding 16.    Where  the
  parties  and the  experts differ  is in  ascribing  the basis  and
  responsibility for delays associated  with the completion of these
  activities.
 
       Although it  did not develop  its own  CPM schedule to  rebut
  that  prepared  by  Mr.   Coppi,  GSA,  through  its  construction
  manager,  OKA, offered  its differing assessment of  the causes of
  delay experienced on the project.  In particular,  GSA argues that
  the   lion's   share   of   delay   experienced   was  principally
  attributable to  SAE's mismanagement of  the project  and to  SAE-
  caused delay in approval  of curtain wall shop drawings, and  then
  manufacture and installation of the beacon.  
 
       In support of its position that  SAE mismanaged the  project,
  GSA points  to   the change  in the project  management team  that
  occurred early  in the project and  to an internal SAE  memorandum
  suggesting  that finalization  of subcontractor  contracts was not
  occurring  as rapidly  as had  originally  been projected  by SAE.
  GSA contends that these  events -- problems with the sheeting  and
  shoring subcontractor,  SAE's mismanagement  of the shop  drawings
  submittal process,  and delays in  the curtain wall activities and
  in the  roofing  activities  --  are the  overriding  delays  that
  caused  the project  to be  eighteen  months  behind the  original
  schedule  at the  time of  termination.   These  delay events,  in
  GSA's  view, were attributable  solely to SAE, and were noticeably
  absent from  SAE's CPM analysis,  thereby rendering  that analysis
  fatally flawed.  
 
       SAE, in its  reply brief, addresses these arguments.   First,
  despite GSA's  efforts to  suggest that  SAE's management of  this
  project was  faulty and  that lack  of progress  in entering  into
  subcontracts  with the  trades hampered  progress on  the project,
  there is no  concrete evidence that this was the case.  The change
  in  management occurred early  in the construction process and was
  effected principally to  improve interpersonal  relationships with
  OKA and Vitetta  staff, not  because the  SAE employees  initially
  overseeing  the project  were not  competent.   There  is no  firm
  evidence, either,  that subcontracts  were not entered  into on  a
  timely  basis  for  the  commencement  of  necessary  construction
  activities   as  they   became  critical   to  completion.     The
  subcontractors confirmed in  their testimony that their  contracts
  were  executed in  time for  timely submission  of shop  drawings,
  particularly shop  drawings needed to  proceed with  exterior wall
  construction.  
 
       GSA also  argues that the  beacon activities  caused much  of
  the  delay to  the critical  path.   SAE  disagrees, arguing  that
  Vitetta's actions  in holding up  the shop drawings submittals for
  lengthy  periods of time,  and in  returning the drawings unmarked
  because it could not determine  that the proposed system exhibited
  pressure  equalized  features,  in  fact  constituted  Government-
  caused delay  to the project.   SAE particularly takes issue  with
  the  reasonableness  of    Vitetta's  insistence  that  a  Kawneer
  engineer attest  to the pressure equalized  design of the 1600  IG
  system.   According  to SAE's  curtain wall  expert,  the question
  whether  the  1600  IG  system  exhibited  principles  of pressure
  equalization could have been  readily resolved by a review of  the
  product data submitted by  SAE on January 11, 1992, Transcript  at
  4522-36, 4552-59,   and a competent  design professional  could in
  this manner have determined  that the 1600 IG system was  pressure
  equalized.    At least  some portion of  the delay associated with
  the curtain  wall was thus  caused by  the architect's failure  at
  first to promptly  apprise SAE of  its concerns and  later by  its
  lack of familiarity with the  principles of pressure  equalization
  --  an  area of  knowledge  with  which SAE  urges  Vitetta  could
  reasonably  be  expected  to have  some  familiarity  as a  design
  professional.  GSA's  response to SAE's argument is that Kawneer's
  project manager offered  varying opinions as  to whether  the 1600
  IG system was pressure equalized.  GSA thus  contends that Vitetta
  reasonably  required that  an engineer  perform tests  and confirm
  that the system would meet design specifications.   
 
       On  balance, we conclude that each party  contributed to some
  of  the  delay  experienced  with  the  process  of  obtaining  an
  approved  curtain   wall   system.     A  good   portion  of   the
  responsibility for this particular delay,  however, may be  placed
  at SAE's door.   Both parties have a duty  to cooperate with  each
  other in facilitating performance of the contract.   The architect
  was troubled by perceived  ambiguities and design substitutions in
  Kawneer's  submissions   and  was  entitled   to  seek   from  the
  contractor the  information it  deemed  necessary  to satisfy  its
  concerns.  SAE and its curtain  wall subcontractor were obligated,
  and  in  the  best position,  to  provide  prompt  information  in
  response   to  the   architect's  questions   regarding   pressure
  equalization characteristics of the proposed system.  
 
       The  parties also  differ strenuously  in their  view of  the
  significance of delays encountered in  the shop drawings  approval
  process  and  construction  process  for  the  metal  stud back-up
  system and the exterior skin.   We have already, based on credible
  testimony from experts and  experienced subcontractors, agreed  to
  some extent with SAE's position  that the architect's  design-type
  specifications  and   drawings  suffered  from  inadequacies   and
  ambiguities.    GSA  and  Vitetta,   through  the  shop   drawings
  submittal  process,  rejected  submittals  for  failure   to  show
  compliance with the  specification drafted by the architect.   SAE
  has  construed these  rejections as  an effort to  convert certain
  aspects  of  the  design  to  performance  specifications  and  to
  require  SAE and  its subcontractors  to  provide solutions  to an
  incomplete  or unclear design.  Regardless, with  respect to these
  issues, SAE did not  get the guidance it needed  as quickly as  it
  should  have to enable prompt resolution of questions arising with
  respect to shop drawings.  
       Although concurrent delay did  occur during periods for which
  SAE has  ascribed delay  to the  Government, that  delay has  been
  identified  and   segregated  in  Mr.   Coppi's  analyses.     The
  Government has  not  presented  an independent  analysis  credibly
  identifying  how these  activities affected  the critical  path or
  quantifying  these delay  periods in  terms of  an  impact on  the
  critical path.  Absent an analysis  that would enable the Board to
  compare the two approaches and make a reasoned judgment  as to the
  credibility of  the relative  time lines  presented,  we are  left
  with  the significantly  more persuasive  approach taken  by   Mr.
  Coppi.   This approach  makes a  credible effort  to identify  all
  types of delay and  separate out the delay attributable solely  to
  the Government  from concurrent  delay  and  delay periods  solely
  attributable to SAE.  
 
       Although GSA  would have  us conclude that the  time required
  to obtain  approval of  a curtain  wall product  was the  critical
  delay  factor impacting timely  completion and  causing SAE  to be
  ineligible for time  extensions, this is contrary to the  schedule
  methodology employed  under the  contract  itself.   The  contract
  requires an analysis of whether a given delay  impacts progress on
  the critical path of contract  performance.  Under  this contract,
  delay in the curtain wall process did not  impact other activities
  until the building reached the point where enclosure  was required
  to achieve  a sufficiently  watertight  state  to permit  interior
  work  to proceed.   As  GSA itself  recognizes,  the building  was
  built from the ground  up.  Delays to foundation work,  structural
  steel  work, and  exterior  skin work  were the  dominant  factors
  impeding  progress  under the  contract  for much  of the  initial
  period of  performance.   Although GSA  may be  correct that  once
  these issues were resolved  the beacon and roof installation would
  be on  the critical path, significant  portions of the delay  that
  occurred in the earlier activity  strings are properly  attributed
  to or apportioned to the Government or to excusable events. 
 
       Finally,  the CPM  testimony for  both parties  suggests that
  there were  prolonged periods   where actions of both  SAE and the
  Government  concurrently delayed the  project, such as when it was
  necessary  to  rebuild  the  exterior  stonework  as a  result  of
  deflection of relieving angles, which  gave rise to  the discovery
  of improper welding procedures.  Where this is the  case, there is
  no legal  basis to permit  SAE to  recover compensation for  these
  delay  periods,  or entitlement  to  formal  time extensions  that
  would  make SAE eligible to  recover indirect costs.   At the same
  time, it  would not  be appropriate  to permit  the Government  to
  penalize  SAE  for these  delay  periods  by assessing  liquidated
  damages  and  imposing a  termination for  default for  failure to
  make progress.   See, e.g., Cogefar-Impresit U.S.A., Inc., DOT BCA
  2721, 97-2 BCA    29,188; L & H Construction Co., ASBCA 43833, 97-
  1 BCA   28,766 (additional separate opinion by presiding judge).
 
       All things  considered, we  are persuaded that SAE  has shown
  that  it was  entitled to  an extension  of  time, accounting  for
  Government-caused and excusable delays to  the project,   adequate
  to  enable  it  to  finish  construction  within  an appropriately
  extended project completion date.  The parties agree  that, at the
  time of contract termination,  the contract work was approximately
  seventy percent complete.  Just  prior to that  time, higher-level
  management officials  within GSA and  SAE had  been conferring  to
  reestablish  a  reasonable  completion  schedule  and  to  resolve
  outstanding claims  to  the extent   possible.   SAE's  contention
  that by this point  the vast majority of performance problems  had
  been resolved  sufficiently to  allow work  to  continue apace  is
  credible.   Moreover, we  do not  agree with  GSA's position  that
  even with a substantial  extension of time SAE could not  possibly
  have  completed performance in  a timely manner.   SAE  is a large
  contractor and its management had  recently reaffirmed its  desire
  to  cooperate  with  GSA  and  attain  contract  completion  in  a
  satisfactory manner.   Under the  circumstances, we  conclude that
  SAE has  shown that it was entitled to a sufficient time extension
  that, with appropriate  added resources, which it certainly was in
  a  position to  provide, it  could reasonably  have  been able  to
  complete performance in a timely fashion had it  been permitted to
  proceed.   GSA has  not sustained its burden  to show that, at the
  time   of   termination,  timely   performance   was  beyond   the
  contractor's  reach  --  i.e.,    that  there  was  no  reasonable
  likelihood that  the contractor  could achieve  timely completion.
  At the same time, in resolving quantum issues  in conjunction with
  the   termination  for   convenience  settlement   proposal,   the
  possibility that SAE's own  actions may have required it to  spend
  more than anticipated to complete performance  within the time  of
  the appropriately extended schedule should not be overlooked.   
 
  Abuse of Contracting Officer Discretion
 
       As a final point,  SAE raises the  alternative argument  that
  although GSA may  have established the "bare" fact of a default by
  showing that as of October  23, 1993, SAE could not have completed
  the  project  by  October 27,  1993,  this  does  not  suffice  to
  establish  the propriety  terminating the  contract for  default. 
  The contracting officer  was still required to exercise the  right
  to   terminate  the   contract  for  default  in   a  manner  that
  constituted an  appropriate exercise of  discretion.   The default
  article does not require the Government to terminate  on a finding
  of  default, but merely gives the procuring  agency the discretion
  to  do so,  and that  discretion must  be "reasonably  exercised."
  Darwin Construction Co. v. United States, 811 F.2d  593, 596 (Fed.
  Cir. 1987).   Under  the circumstances  arising here,  SAE argues,
  with   outstanding  claims   for  time   extensions  and   ongoing
  negotiations  between SAE  and GSA  officials to  agree  to a  new
  schedule and to resolve  some of the pending claims, the  decision
  to terminate for default was an abuse of this discretion. 
 
       Here, SAE  argues, in addition  to showing  that SAE and  its
  subcontractors  were  entitled  to  considerable  time  extensions
  based on  delays to critical  path activities as  a result of  the
  actions  or omissions  of  GSA, or  its  architect, the  facts  of
  record demonstrate that the decision  to default terminate was not
  an appropriate exercise of  discretion by the contracting officer.
  In particular,  SAE claims  that  the  contracting officer  simply
  bowed to the directive of  a superior within GSA.  In doing so, he
  discounted the opinions  of independent engineering  experts hired
  by  the  agency that  the  exterior  design of  the  building  was
  sufficiently flawed  to require a  variety of  corrective measures
  and disregarded  the view of OKA's  project manger, who had  daily
  dealings with  the contractors  and conditions  at the  site, that
  the  exterior wall had caused some four to six  months of delay to
  construction  of the  building. Finally,  the contracting  officer
  proceeded  with  default  termination   in  the  face  of  ongoing
  negotiations  between  GSA and  SAE  officials  to reestablish  an
  appropriate schedule and resolve existing monetary claims.
 
       GSA's response to these allegations  is that the  contracting
  officer had already issued a  modification extending the  contract
  completion  date  by  120 days  to  cover  all the  delays  to the
  project.  GSA also  argues that SAE had not submitted  appropriate
  time impact analyses  to justify any further  time extensions such
  that  the  contracting  officer  might  have  had  reason  to   be
  concerned  that  the  default  termination  action  would  not  be
  justified.  SAE's response to  this is that GSA's  intent that the
  120-day extension  of time  be inclusive  of all  delays does  not
  make it sufficient to  actually cover all Government-caused delays
  to the  project, and that GSA  could not reasonably have  believed
  that this  extension was adequate.   SAE asserts instead that  the
  contracting officer's  failure to  conduct  a  thorough review  of
  SAE's claims and carefully consider the likelihood that  SAE might
  be  entitled to  significant further  extensions of  time rendered
  the  decision to  terminate  for default  an abuse  of discretion.
  See  L  & H  Construction Co.,  ASBCA  43833, 97-1  BCA    28,766;
  Walsky Construction  Co., ASBCA 41541,  94-2 BCA    26,698;  Kurz-
  Kasch, Inc.,  ASBCA 32486, 88-3 BCA    21,053; Executive  Elevator
  Service,  Inc., VABCA 2152, 87-2 BCA   19,849; Western Contracting
  Corp., ENG BCA 3835, et al., 82-1 BCA   15,486.
 
 
        On  its face, the contracting officer's decision terminating
  the contract for default  is terse and  gives short shrift to  the
  many  pending  claims filed  by  SAE  for delay  and  extra  work.
  Finding 286.  Although the  contracting officer testified  that he
  visited the site a  few times each month and, through updates  and
  information provided by OKA, was familiar with the  issues arising
  in  construction,  we  are  not  persuaded  that  the  termination
  decision was a  product of the careful assessment of the facts and
  circumstances  contemplated   by  applicable  regulation  and  the
  guidance  in Darwin.  See  also D.W. Sandau Dredging,  96-1 BCA at
  140,154-55,  140,162-63.   As discussed  above, we  have concluded
  that the default termination was not warranted. 
 
  GSBCA 12841
 
       This  Government claim  asserts GSA's  entitlement to  make a
  deduction from the contract price for SAE's failure  to submit its
  CPM analysis in the contractually required  arrow-on-arrow diagram
  method (ADM)  format.   It is  undisputed that  SAE submitted  its
  schedules  in the precedent  diagram method (PDM), rather than the
  ADM,  format.   The contracting  officer testified  to his opinion
  that the  PDM format was less  informative than the ADM format and
  thus not acceptable as  a substitute.   SAE's witnesses  testified
  that the two methods  are functionally equivalent and that by  its
  conduct  and  that  of its  construction  manager, GSA  waived the
  requirement to provide schedules in the ADM format.
 
       SAE  also focuses,  in  its reply  to  this claim,  on  GSA's
  contention  that  it  failed  to submit  updated  schedules  as  a
  practical  matter.  SAE  points out that  it in  fact submitted to
  OKA  and GSA  regular  updates to  its  as-planned schedule.    On
  numerous  occasions,  OKA recognized  that SAE's  current schedule
  "was close to being approved" or was "reasonable and logical."  
       Although  SAE  has  persuaded us  that  it in  fact submitted
  periodic  schedule  updates,  it  did  not  ever  conform  to  the
  requirement to  use the ADM format.   We do  not agree  that OKA's
  review of the schedules submitted amounted to a  waiver by conduct
  of an  express contract requirement.   The schedules were not,  as
  SAE  recognizes, formally  approved,  despite the  fact that  as a
  practical matter, and for  lack of conforming schedules, they were
  used to proceed with  construction.  The Government did not  waive
  its entitlement to require SAE to submit  the CPM schedules in the
  specified format.  To the  extent GSA did agree  to accept the PDM
  formatted schedules, it expected monetary consideration.   Finding
  342.
 
       What  is  not  clear  is  what  the  proper   amount  of  the
  Government's  deduction  should   be.    We   have  no  basis  for
  evaluating the  appropriateness of the  OKA estimates  relied upon
  by the contracting officer to support  the proposed deduction, and
  under the circumstances we see no reason to  permit the assessment
  of  an additional charge  in the nature of a  "fine."  See Finding
  345.    Since we  are  deferring  quantum to  be  resolved  in the
  context of  the termination for  convenience settlement  proposal,
  however, this issue may be addressed in subsequent  proceedings as
  well.  
 
  GSBCA 12842
 
       GSA also claims  entitlement to a deduction of $42,088  based
  on   multiple  submittal  reviews  required   because  of  alleged
  deficiencies  in  SAE's  and  its  subcontractor's  shop  drawings
  submittals.   It  is the  Government's  burden  to establish  that
  multiple reviews were necessary because  of contractor failure  to
  conform to contract requirements in its submissions.   See Orbas &
  Associates, ASBCA  32922, et al., 87-3  BCA   20,051, at 101,521. 
  The record  establishes here  that  a  substantial number  of  the
  multiple reviews that occurred  were caused by design deficiencies
  and  lack of  clarity  in contract  documents,  rather than  as  a
  result   of  errors   reasonably  attributable   to  SAE   or  its
  subcontractors.  Multiple submissions  with respect to the curtain
  wall and roof  shop drawings do appear  to be attributable to SAE,
  and  compensable  to  the  Government,  to  the  extent   GSA  can
  demonstrate that  it actually paid  additional amounts  to Vitetta
  to perform  these extra reviews.   A  significant portion of  this
  claim,  however, must  be  rejected.    The determination  of  any
  amount to which the  Government may be entitled based on  multiple
  reviews of curtain wall and roofing shop drawings  is deferred for
  determination  in connection with  the termination for convenience
  proceedings.
 
 
                               Decision
 
       GSBCA 12710  is  GRANTED.   The  termination  for default  of
  SAE's contract to build  the Trenton Courthouse Annex is converted
  to  a termination  for the  convenience of  the  Government.   The
  individual claims  asserted in  GSBCA  12294,  GSBCA 12523,  GSBCA
  12690, and  GSBCA 12907 are GRANTED  IN PART consistent with  this
  decision.   SAE's appeals  of the  Government's claims asserted in
  GSBCA 12841 and 12842 are DENIED IN  PART.  The claims asserted in
  GSBCA 12690 and GSBCA  12907, to the extent not addressed in  this
  decision,  and  quantum issues  raised  under  GSBCA 12294,  GSBCA
  12523, GSBCA 12841,  and GSBCA 12842,  are deferred for resolution
  in  the  context  of  a  termination  for  convenience  settlement
  proposal.  Accordingly, GSBCA 12294,  12523, 12690, 12841,  12842,
  and   12907   are  DISMISSED   WITHOUT   PREJUDICE,   subject   to
  reinstatement,  within  eighteen  months   of  the  date  of  this
  decision,   in   connection   with  any   subsequent   proceedings
  concerning termination for convenience costs.  Rule 127(c).
  _______________________________
 
                                     CATHERINE B. HYATT
                                     Board Judge
 
  We concur:
 
 
 
  _________________________________
  ________________________________
  ANTHONY S. BORWICK            JOSEPH A. VERGILIO
  Board Judge                             Board Judge