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entitled 'Campaign Finance Reform: Early Experiences of Two States That 
Offer Full Public Funding for Political Candidates' which was released 
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Report to Congressional Committees:

United States General Accounting Office:

GAO:

May 2003:

Campaign Finance Reform:

Early Experiences of Two States That Offer Full Public Funding for 
Political Candidates:

Public Funding of Political Campaigns:

GAO-03-453:

GAO Highlights:

Highlights of GAO-03-453, a report to Congressional Committees

Why GAO Did This Study:

In 2000 and 2002, Maine and Arizona held the nations first elections 
under voluntary programs that offered full state funding for political 
candidates who ran for legislative and certain statewide offices. The 
goals of these programs, passed as ballot initiatives by citizens in 
these states, included increasing electoral competition and curbing 
increases in the cost of campaigns.

Congress has considered legislation for public financing of 
congressional elections nearly every session since 1956, although no 
law has been enacted. In the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (P.L. 107-
155 (2002), Congress mandated that GAO study the results of the 
unique public financing programs in Maine and Arizona.

For the 2000 and 2002 elections in Maine and Arizona, this report 
provides: 

* Statistics on the number of candidates who chose to campaign with 
public funds and the number who were elected.

* Observations, based on limited data, regarding the extent to which 
the goals of the public funding programs were met.

What GAO Found:

In both Maine and Arizona, the number of legislative candidates who 
chose to use public financing for their campaigns increased greatly 
from 2000 to 2002. In perspective, 59 percent of Maines and 36 
percent of Arizonas current legislators successfully ran as publicly 
financed candidates in the 2002 election. Also, in Arizonas 2002 
election, publicly financed candidates won seven of the nine available 
seats in races for statewide offices, including Governor.

In comparing the 2000 and 2002 elections to those in 1996 and 1998, 
GAOs findings regarding changes in electoral competition were 
inconclusive. Various measurescontested races (more than one 
candidate per race), incumbent reelection rates, and incumbent victory 
marginsreflect mixed results. Also, these results may have been 
affected by term limits, redistricting, and other factors. Average 
legislative candidate spending decreased in Maine but increased in 
Arizona in 2000 and 2002, compared to previous years. Further, 
particularly in 2002, both states experienced increases in independent 
expendituresa type of campaign spending whereby political action 
committees or other groups expressly support or oppose a candidate. 
The extent of spending for public policy messages without explicit 
election advocacy is not known.

In sum, with only two elections from which to observe legislative 
races and only one election from which to observe most statewide 
races, it is too early to draw causal linkages to changes, if any, 
that resulted from the public financing programs in the two states.

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-453.

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click 
on the link above. For more information, contact Norman Rabkin at 
(202) 512-8777 or rabkinn@gao.gov.

[End of section]

Contents:

Letter:

Results in Brief:

Background:

Program Participation: More Candidates Opting to Use Public Financing:

Voter Choice: Legislative and Statewide Candidates in Publicly Funded 
Elections:

Electoral Competition: Analysis of Elections in Maine and Arizona:

Influence of Interest Groups: Mixed Views on Effects of Public 
Financing of Campaigns:

Campaign Spending: Average Candidate Spending Decreased in Maine but 
Increased in Arizona; Independent Expenditures Became More Prominent in 
Both States; Extent of Issue Advocacy Spending Not Known:

Voter Participation: No Clear Link to Public Financing Program:

Concluding Observations:

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:

Objectives:

Overview of Our Scope and Methodology:

Scope and Methodology: Statistical Information Regarding the 2000 and 
2002 Elections:

Scope and Methodology: Extent to Which Goals of Public Financing 
Programs Were Met:

Appendix II: Overview of the Public Financing Programs for Election 
Campaigns in Maine and Arizona:

Purposes of the Public Financing Programs:

Candidates Must Qualify to Receive Public Funding:

Amounts of Allowable Public Funding for Participating Candidates:

Revenue Sources for the Public Financing Programs:

Administration of the Public Financing Programs:

Reduced Contribution Limits and Additional Reporting Requirements for 
Nonparticipating Candidates:

Appendix III: Summary of Legal Challenges to Maine's and Arizona's 
Public Financing Programs:

Legal Challenges to the Maine Clean Election Act:

Legal Challenges to Arizona's Citizens Clean Elections Act:

Appendix IV: Survey of Candidates for Office in the Maine 2000 Elections:

Appendix V: Survey of Candidates for Office in the Arizona 2000 
Elections:

Appendix VI: Comments Received in Our Survey of Candidates for Office 
in Maine's and Arizona's 2000 Elections:

Comments Provided by Maine Candidates:

Comments Provided by Arizona Candidates:

Appendix VII: GAO Contacts and Acknowledgments:

GAO Contacts:

Staff Acknowledgments:

Other Acknowledgments:

Bibliography:

Tables:

Table 1: Maine's Primary and General Elections in 2000 and 2002--Number 
of Candidates Who Used Public Financing and Number of Races with at 
Least One Participating Candidate:

Table 2: Results of Maine's General Elections in 2000 and 2002--
Campaign Status and Number of Participating Candidates Elected by 
Office:

Table 3: Arizona's Primary and General Elections in 2000 and 2002--
Number of Candidates Who Used Public Financing and Number of Races with 
at Least One Participating Candidate:

Table 4: Results of Arizona's General Election in 2000 and 2002--
Campaign Status and Number of Participating Candidates Elected by 
Office:

Table 5: Average Number of State Legislature Candidates Per District 
Race in Maine and Arizona (1996, 1998, 2000, and 2002):

Table 6: Percentage of Participating Legislative Candidates by 
Political Party Affiliation in Maine and Arizona (2000 and 2002):

Table 7: Number of Third-party or Independent Candidates In Maine and 
Arizona State Legislative Races (1996, 1998, 2000, and 2002):

Table 8: Number of Arizona Corporation Commission Candidates (1994, 
1996, 1998, 2000, and 2002):

Table 9: Number of Candidates for Maine and Arizona Statewide Races 
(1994, 1998, and 2002):

Table 10: Maine and Arizona Citizenry Views (in Percentages) on Clean 
Election Law:

Table 11: Spending by Candidates for Statewide Offices in Arizona (1998 
and 2002):

Table 12: Spending by Candidates for Statewide Offices in Arizona by 
Participation Status (2002):

Table 13: Independent Expenditures in Maine and Arizona (1998, 2000, 
and 2002):

Table 14: Voter Turnout in Maine, Arizona, and the United States, 1988 
through 2000:

Table 15: Results of Logistic Regression Models Testing the Effect of 
Public Financing Programs on Competitive Races:

Table 16: List of Organizations (and Title of Individuals) Interviewed 
in Maine:

Table 17: List of Organizations (and Title of Individuals) Interviewed 
in Arizona:

Table 18: Seed Money Limits and Number of Qualifying $5 Contributions:

Table 19: Public Funding Available to Each Participating Candidate in 
2000:

Table 20: Revenue Sources and Amounts for Public Financing Programs in 
2000:

Table 21: Maine Clean Election Act Litigation:

Table 22: Arizona Litigation - Title of Ballot Initiative:

Table 23: Arizona Litigation - Nomination and Appointment Process to 
the Citizens Clean Elections Commission:

Table 24: Arizona Litigation - Sources for Public Funding:

Table 25: Comments Received in Our Survey of Candidates for Office in 
Maine's 2000 Elections:

Table 26: Comments Received in Our Survey of Candidates for Office in 
Arizona's 2000 Elections:

Figures:

Figure 1: Response of Candidates in the 2000 Election Regarding Which 
Factor (Term Limits or Public Funding) Played a Greater Role in 
Attracting New Candidates to Run for Office:

Figure 2: Percentages of Participating Candidates Who Answered That the 
Availability of Public Funding Was a Great or Very Great Factor in 
Their Decision to Run for Office in 2000:

Figure 3: Reasons Why Candidates Chose to Participate in the Public 
Financing Program:

Figure 4: Reasons Why Candidates Did Not Participate in the Public 
Financing Program:

Figure 5: Contested and Uncontested Races in Maine's Legislative (House 
and Senate) Primary Elections (1996, 1998, 2000, and 2002):

Figure 6: Contested and Uncontested Races in Arizona's Legislative 
(House and Senate) Primary Elections (1996, 1998, 2000, and 2002):

Figure 7: Publicly Financed Candidates in Maine's Contested Legislative 
Primary Races (2000 and 2002):

Figure 8:Publicly Financed Candidates in Arizona's Contested 
Legislative Primary Races (2000 and 2002):

Figure 9: Incumbent Reelection Rates in Maine's Legislative Races 
(1996, 1998, 2000, and 2002):

Figure 10: Incumbent Reelection Rates in Arizona's Legislative Races 
(1996, 1998, 2000, and 2002):

Figure 11: Competitive Legislative Races in Maine (1996, 1998, 2000, 
and 2002):

Figure 12: Competitive Senate Races in Arizona (1996, 1998, 2000, and 
2002):

Figure 13: Candidate Responses about Public Financing Program and 
Interest Group Influence:

Figure 14: Candidate Responses about the Public Financing Program and 
Confidence in Government:

Figure 15: Average Maine and Arizona Legislative Candidate Spending 
(1996, 1998, 2000, and 2002):

Figure 16: Average Maine and Arizona Legislative Candidate Spending by 
Participation Status (2000 and 2002):

Figure 17: Extent to Which Candidates in the 2000 Elections Agreed with 
the Statement That Independent Expenditures Would Become Increasingly 
Important in 2002 and Future Elections:

Figure 18: Extent to Which Candidates in the 2000 Elections Agreed with 
the Statement That Issue Advocacy Spending Would Increase in the 2002 
and Future Elections:

United States General Accounting Office:

Washington, DC 20548:

May 9, 2003:

The Honorable Trent Lott 
Chairman 
The Honorable Christopher J. Dodd 
Ranking Member 
Committee on Rules and Administration 
United States Senate:

The Honorable Robert W. Ney 
Chairman 
The Honorable John B. Larson 
Ranking Member 
Committee on House Administration 
House of Representatives:

Because the subject involves both politics and money, campaign finance 
reform can be contentious as well as complex. Congress has considered 
legislation for public financing of congressional elections nearly 
every session since 1956, although no law has been enacted. 
Traditionally, to identify promising ways to address complex or 
contentious issues, the federal government has drawn upon the diverse 
experiences of the "laboratories of democracy," the states. In this 
regard, Section 310 of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 
2002[Footnote 1] mandated that we study and report on the year 2000 
elections in two states, Maine and Arizona. To provide a broader 
perspective, we also obtained statistics and related information 
regarding the 2002 elections in the two states.

The 2000 and 2002 elections in Maine and Arizona were the first 
instances in the nation's history where candidates seeking state 
legislature seats or certain statewide offices had the option to fully 
fund their campaigns with public monies. Our review of the history of 
Maine's and Arizona's public financing programs, including discussions 
with key officials in each state, identified five goals of the 
programs. That is, the programs generally were intended to increase 
voter choice by encouraging more candidates to run for office; increase 
electoral competition by, among other means, having fewer uncontested 
races; reduce the influence of special interest groups and, thereby, 
enhance citizens' confidence in government; curb increases in the cost 
of campaigns; and increase voter participation (e.g., increase turnout 
for elections). Both programs became law through the respective state's 
ballot-initiative process--Maine (1996) and Arizona (1998).

Under the new campaign financing programs in Maine and Arizona, 
"participating candidates"--those who agreed to forego private 
fundraising and who qualified to take part in the respective state's 
public financing program--received a set amount of money for their 
primary and general election campaigns. Also, publicly financed 
candidates could receive additional matching funds based on spending by 
or for privately financed ("nonparticipating") candidates, who--while 
subject to state limits and disclosure rules--engaged in traditional 
means to raise money from individuals, corporations, and political 
action committees.

In accordance with the mandate specified in Section 310 of Public Law 
107-155, and as agreed with your offices, this study:

* Provides statistics showing the number of candidates who chose to use 
public funds to run for legislative seats or statewide offices in the 
2000 and 2002 elections in Maine and Arizona, the seats or offices for 
which they were candidates, whether the candidates were incumbents or 
challengers, whether the candidates were successful in their bids, and 
the number of races in which at least one candidate ran an election 
with public funds.

* Describes the extent to which the goals of Maine's and Arizona's 
public financing programs were met in the 2000 and 2002 elections. 
Specifically, we describe what changes occurred, if any, regarding five 
indicators--voter choice (number of candidates), electoral 
competition, interest group influence, campaign spending, and voter 
participation (voter turnout)--indicators related to the goals of the 
programs.

In conducting our study, we reviewed relevant studies and reports 
regarding campaign finance reform in the United States generally, as 
well as in Maine and Arizona specifically. We visited Maine and Arizona 
to interview responsible election officials and representatives of 
various interest groups. Also, for both states, we obtained and 
analyzed available statistical data and related information about the 
2000 and 2002 elections. To obtain further perspectives on the effects 
of public financing, we surveyed all candidates, including those who 
used public financing as well as those who did not, who ran in the 2000 
primary and general elections in Maine and Arizona. Further, we 
contracted with professional pollsters to obtain the views of 
projectable samples of citizens in Maine and Arizona. It should be 
emphasized that describing or interpreting the effects of public 
financing in Maine and Arizona should be approached cautiously, partly 
because one election cycle's results or even two election cycles' 
results may not be representative. Also, term limits, redistricting, 
the ambiguous environment that surrounded the implementation of the new 
campaign finance programs, and other factors not directly related to 
public or private financing can affect electoral campaigns and results. 
We conducted our work from April 2002 to March 2003 in accordance with 
generally accepted government auditing standards. Appendix I presents 
more details about our objectives, scope, and methodology.

Results in Brief:

In both Maine and Arizona, the number of legislative candidates who 
chose to use public financing for their campaigns increased greatly 
from 2000 to 2002. In the 2000 primary and general elections, 
approximately one of every three candidates in Maine and one of every 
four candidates in Arizona chose to participate in the state's public 
financing program. In the 2002 primary and general elections, 
participation increased significantly in both states, with about one-
half or more of all candidates participating. In perspective, after the 
2000 general elections, the elected legislators who had run with public 
funds held 33 percent of the total seats in Maine's legislature and 18 
percent of the total seats in Arizona's legislature. After the 2002 
general elections, the proportions increased to 59 percent of Maine's 
legislature and 36 percent of Arizona's legislature. Also, of the seven 
statewide offices in Arizona's 2002 general election, publicly funded 
candidates won seven of nine seats, which included Governor, Secretary 
of State, Attorney General, State Treasurer, State Mine Inspector, and 
Corporation Commissioner (two of three seats).[Footnote 2]

It is too soon to determine the extent to which the goals of Maine's 
and Arizona's public financing programs are being met. That is, with 
only two elections from which to observe legislative races and only one 
election from which to observe most statewide races, limited data are 
available to draw causal linkages to changes, if any, that occurred in 
voter choice (number of candidates), electoral competition, interest 
group influence, campaign spending, and voter participation (e.g., 
voter turnout)--five indicators related to the goals of the programs:

* Voter choice. While one goal of public financing was to encourage 
more candidates to run for office, the average numbers of state 
legislature candidates per district race in Maine and Arizona in the 
2000 and 2002 elections were not notably different than the averages 
for the two previous elections, 1996 and 1998. In both states, a higher 
proportion of Democratic candidates participated in the public funding 
program, and the number of participating third-party or independent 
candidates generally increased from the 2000 to the 2002 primary and 
general elections. Regarding races for statewide offices, most 
candidates in Arizona opted to participate in the public funding 
program in the 2002 elections. Our survey of candidates in Maine's and 
Arizona's 2000 elections found mixed perspectives as to which of two 
factors--public funding for campaigns or open seats due to term-limited 
vacancies--played a greater role (or equal roles) in attracting new 
candidates to run for office. However, most of the participating 
candidates who responded to our survey--55 percent in Maine and 56 
percent in Arizona--answered that the availability of the public 
financing program was a great or very great factor in their decision to 
run for office in 2000.

* Electoral competition. The public financing programs were expected to 
make elections more competitive, but our analyses were inconclusive. 
Experts generally agreed on three measures of competitiveness--
increases in the percentage of contested races (races with more than 
one candidate), decreases in incumbents' reelection rates, or 
reductions in the incumbents' victory margins. The percentages of 
contested legislative races in Maine's primary elections were 
relatively unchanged in 2000 and 2002, compared with 1998, and were 
less than the percentage of contested legislative races in 1996. The 
percentages of contested legislative races in Arizona's primary 
elections increased in 2000 and 2002, compared with1998; however, the 
percentage of contested races in 2000 was about the same as 1996. About 
85 percent of the contested legislative primary races in Maine's and 
Arizona's 2002 elections had publicly financed candidates. Legislative 
incumbent reelection rates remained about the same in both states after 
public financing was introduced. Incumbent victory margins, which we 
used to identify competitive races, reflected a mixed picture. That is, 
we defined a competitive race as one in which the difference in the 
percentage of vote garnered between the winning incumbent and the 
runner-up was 15 points or less; and, under this definition, trends (if 
any) were not clearly evident. Further analysis--examining several 
factors such as incumbency and candidate spending--showed that 
candidate participation in the public financing programs in Maine and 
Arizona had no effect on competitive races as defined by incumbent 
victory margins. However, the results of this analysis should be 
interpreted with caution, given the relatively few variables we used 
and the limited amount of data available.

* Interest group influence. Responses to our surveys of candidates and 
citizens in Maine and Arizona, as well as our interviews with interest 
group representatives, reflected mixed views. In our survey of 
candidates in Maine's and Arizona's 2000 elections, we asked them to 
what extent, if at all, they agreed with the statement that, once 
elected, candidates who participated in the public financing program 
have been more likely to serve the broader interests of their 
constituents as a whole and less likely to be influenced by specific 
individuals or groups. The survey results reflected mixed views. Most 
of the responding nonparticipating candidates--67 percent in Maine and 
68 percent in Arizona--answered to "little or no extent." In contrast, 
many of the responding participating candidates--42 percent in Maine 
and 56 percent in Arizona--answered to a "great or very great extent." 
Also, in our fall 2002 survey of voting-age citizens in Maine and 
Arizona, of the respondents who acknowledged some awareness of the 
respective state's applicable law, almost two-thirds in both states 
answered that there was no effect on their confidence in government or 
it was too soon to tell. Additionally, slightly more respondents in 
each state answered that the law had greatly or somewhat increased 
their confidence in state government--17 percent in Maine and 21 
percent in Arizona--than did respondents who answered that the law had 
greatly or somewhat decreased their confidence--8 percent in Maine and 
15 percent in Arizona.

* Campaign spending. Under the public financing programs in the 2000 
and 2002 elections, average legislative candidate spending decreased in 
Maine but increased in Arizona, compared to previous elections. Also, 
particularly in the 2002 elections, both states experienced increases 
in independent expenditures--a type of campaign spending whereby 
political action committees, other groups, or individuals communicate 
messages to voters that support or oppose a clearly identified 
candidate but without coordination with any candidate. The 2002 
increases in independent expenditures largely were associated with the 
gubernatorial races in both states. Because it is not regulated, the 
extent of spending for issue advocacy--that is, public policy messages 
that do not refer to a particular candidate--is not known.

* Voter participation. Although a goal of the public financing programs 
was to increase voter participation, turnout in Maine's and Arizona's 
2000 elections did not significantly differ from prior presidential 
election years. While turnout can be influenced by many factors, 
including the level of media interest and the extent of grassroots 
efforts to get out the vote, public financing of candidates was 
probably not a major factor in the 2000 elections. Our survey of 
voting-age citizens in Maine and Arizona in the fall of 2002 indicated 
that large segments of these populations--an estimated 60 percent in 
Maine and an estimated 37 percent in Arizona--were still unaware of the 
respective state's public financing program.

Overall, in response to our survey of candidates in Maine and Arizona, 
many of the respondents' comments followed ideological lines, as may be 
expected. For example, although there were some exceptions, 
nonparticipating candidates generally commented that public financing 
of political campaigns was an inappropriate use of tax dollars, whereas 
participating candidates usually endorsed public financing. 
Collectively, the widely divergent and sometimes virulent comments seem 
to indicate that reaching a consensus regarding the merits of the 
public financing programs may be unlikely, at least in the foreseeable 
future. Nonetheless, irrespective of political ideologies or 
partisanship, state agency officials and other observers told us they 
anticipate that--based on election strategies or other decisional 
factors--increasing numbers of candidates will choose to run with 
public funding in future years. If so, the continuation of the public 
financing programs may depend not only on efforts to substantiate the 
programs' merits but also on efforts to sustain public support for 
providing the larger amounts of total funds that will be needed.

We are not making any recommendations in this report.

Background:

As with most campaign finance reform issues, the concept of public 
funding for political campaigns--that is, a finance system in which the 
public treasury provides cash grants to candidates or political 
parties--generates impassioned arguments from both proponents and 
opponents. Generally, proponents of public funding assert that 
privately financed election campaigns (1) give disproportionate 
influence to special interest groups, other organizations, and wealthy 
individuals and (2) present fundraising burdens or barriers that 
dissuade many potential candidates from running for office, 
particularly women and minority candidates. On the other hand, 
opponents assert that public funding forces taxpayers to contribute to 
candidates whom they do not support, inappropriately inserts the 
government into the electoral process, and uses tax dollars that could 
be spent for higher-priority needs. Further, given an inherent link 
between political speech and political spending, some opponents argue 
that any limitation on campaign contributions restricts free speech and 
violates the First Amendment.

Competing arguments aside, there is widespread recognition that 
designing and implementing an effective campaign finance system is 
difficult due to the inherent complexities and the need to consider and 
reconcile multiple goals that are diverse and at times conflicting. For 
instance, according to one report:[Footnote 3]

"A well-functioning campaign finance system must protect freedom of 
speech, advance competitive elections, curtail special interest 
influence, and promote the equal political voice of all citizens, while 
minimizing the burden of regulation on candidates, contributors, [and] 
other participants in the process  Campaign finance reform requires 
respect for the open and dynamic character of the American political 
process, the evolving nature of campaigns, and the variety of 
circumstances and campaign styles across the country. Campaign finance 
reform must avoid burdening particular candidates or groups or 
providing advantages to their opponents. Reform must also take into 
account how candidates, contributors, and others will respond to 
particular efforts to regulate their behavior.":

In fact, in nearly every session since 1956, Congress has considered 
legislation for public financing of congressional elections, although 
no law has been enacted. Most recently, in the 107th Congress, 
companion bills were introduced in the House (H.R. 1637) and Senate (S. 
719) proposing public funding and certain media benefits to 
congressional candidates who would qualify by collecting a set number 
of $5 contributions and by refusing all other contributions to their 
campaign. The declarations section of H.R. 1637 states that public 
financing would enhance American democracy by, among other means, 
creating a more level playing field for incumbents and challengers, 
eliminating the potentially inherent conflict of interest caused by the 
private financing of election campaigns, and allowing elected officials 
more time to carry out their public responsibilities without the 
constant preoccupation with raising money. These bills were referred to 
committee in 2001, but no further action was taken before the Congress 
ended.

Despite the various complexities or challenges, several states, cities, 
or other local jurisdictions across the nation currently have public 
financing programs, although most are relatively limited in scale, 
covering only a small number of offices or providing only a small 
amount of the funds needed to finance a campaign. For example, programs 
that provide some public funding for state legislative candidates were 
introduced by Minnesota in 1976 and Wisconsin in 1977. Minnesota's 
program, which is funded by an optional state income tax check-off and 
by a fixed general fund appropriation, is available to candidates for 
state legislative seats and certain statewide offices who agree to set 
spending limits.[Footnote 4] Eligible candidates may receive up to 50 
percent of the spending limit in public funds, which are allocated 
based on a statutory formula. Wisconsin's program is also funded 
through an optional state income tax check-off and is available for 
legislative candidates as well as candidates for certain statewide 
offices who agree to spending limits and restrictions on contributions 
from political action committees.[Footnote 5] Public funds are awarded 
in the general election to candidates who received a set percentage of 
the total primary vote and are limited based on a statutory ceiling and 
the total number of candidates who applied for public funding.

More recently, in 1997, Vermont's legislature passed a campaign finance 
reform law that established a voluntary, full public financing program 
for candidates for statewide offices. The program was first implemented 
in the 2000 election for the offices of governor and lieutenant 
governor and was expanded in 2002 to include additional statewide 
offices.[Footnote 6] In 1998, by ballot initiative, voters in 
Massachusetts passed a law that created a voluntary, full public 
financing program for candidates for the state legislature and certain 
statewide offices, including governor and lieutenant 
governor.[Footnote 7] However, the law was not fully implemented due to 
funding controversy. In particular, for the 2002 elections, the state 
legislature did not release money to fund the law's implementation. 
After intervention of Massachusetts' Supreme Judicial Court,[Footnote 
8] some candidates in the 2002 election were funded with proceeds 
generated by the auctioning of state assets.

Published studies reviewing some of the longer standing public 
financing programs have reported mixed findings regarding effects. For 
example, a 1995 study of Minnesota's public financing program for 
legislative candidates reported that, after the program was introduced 
in 1976, incumbents' overall vote shares did not decrease, although 
challengers who received significant amounts of public funds due to the 
program's grant structure fared better against incumbents than those 
who had less money to spend.[Footnote 9] Similarly, a 1995 study of 
Wisconsin's program of public funding for legislative candidates 
reported that elections did not become more competitive after the 
program was introduced in 1977, but the spending gap between incumbents 
and challengers was narrowed.[Footnote 10] Further, recent studies of 
public funding programs in New York City and Los Angeles--programs that 
provide matching funds to participating candidates--reported that the 
programs have generally increased electoral competition and have helped 
challengers to mount credible campaigns against incumbents.[Footnote 
11] However, the studies noted that participating candidates in these 
programs were disadvantaged by spending limits or by limited funding 
when faced with high spending by opponents or large independent 
expenditures on their opponent's behalf.

Of the approximately 14 states with direct public financing programs, 
Maine and Arizona are unique in having functioning programs that offer 
full public funding for qualified candidates for the state legislature 
and certain statewide offices. In November 1996, Maine voters approved 
a citizen's initiative--the Maine Clean Election Act[Footnote 12]--
establishing the nation's first program of full public financing for 
qualified candidates for the state legislature and for one executive 
branch office (governor). Similarly, in November 1998, Arizona voters 
passed the Citizens Clean Elections Act,[Footnote 13] which provides 
full public funding for qualified candidates for the state legislature 
and various statewide (executive branch) offices.[Footnote 14] In both 
Maine and Arizona, candidates who choose to participate in the public 
funding programs must first qualify by raising a set number of $5 
contributions from voters. Regarding implementation of these acts, in 
both states, the public financing programs became available for 
candidates beginning with year 2000 elections.

Appendix II provides more detailed information about the design and 
implementation of Maine's and Arizona's public financing programs, and 
appendix III presents summary information about various legal 
challenges to Maine's 1996 statute and Arizona's 1998 statute, 
including challenges to funding sources for Arizona's program.

Program Participation: More Candidates Opting to Use Public Financing:

In the 2000 primary and general elections, about one of every three 
candidates in Maine and one of every four candidates in Arizona chose 
to use public financing for their campaigns. In the 2002 primary and 
general elections, participation in the public financing program 
increased significantly in both states, with about one-half or more of 
all candidates participating. Regarding results, 62 of the 116 publicly 
funded candidates in Maine's 2000 general election were elected to 
office, as were 110 of the 231 publicly funded candidates in the 
state's 2002 general election. In Arizona's 2000 general election, 16 
of the 44 publicly funded candidates were elected to office, as were 39 
of the 89 publicly funded candidates in the state's 2002 general 
election.

In perspective, after the 2000 general elections, the elected 
legislators who had run with public funds held 33 percent of the total 
seats in Maine's legislature and 18 percent of the total seats in 
Arizona's legislature. After the 2002 general elections, the 
proportions increased to 59 percent of Maine's legislature and 36 
percent of Arizona's legislature. Also, of the seven statewide offices 
in Arizona's 2002 general election, publicly funded candidates won 
seven of nine seats, which included Governor, Secretary of State, 
Attorney General, and State Treasurer.

Participating Candidates and Results Statistics for Elections in Maine:

Maine's 1996 voter-initiated system provides full public funding to 
qualified candidates for state legislative seats and the governor's 
office. The state legislature consists of 151 seats in the House of 
Representatives and 35 seats in the Senate. Incumbents in all 186 
legislative seats serve 2-year terms. Thus, in the primary and general 
elections, which are held biannually (i.e., in each even-numbered 
year), all legislative seats are on the ballot. In 2000, the first year 
for which public funds were available for election campaigns in Maine, 
candidates potentially eligible for such funds included all candidates 
for the state legislature.[Footnote 15]

In Maine's 2000 primary and general elections, approximately one of 
every three candidates chose to participate in the state's program for 
pubic financing of campaigns, as table 1 shows. Also, 33 percent of the 
primary election races and 47 percent of the general election races in 
2000 had at least one participating candidate. In the next election, 
2002, participation in the public financing program increased 
significantly. Specifically, in Maine's 2002 elections, 51 percent of 
all candidates in the primary election and 62 percent of all candidates 
in the general election were publicly funded. Further, 52 percent of 
the primary election races and 79 percent of the general election races 
in 2002 had at least one participating candidate.

Table 1: Maine's Primary and General Elections in 2000 and 2002--Number 
of Candidates Who Used Public Financing and Number of Races with at 
Least One Participating Candidate:

Candidates and races: 2000 Elections: 

Candidates: Nonparticipating (used private financing); Maine 
primary election: 253; Maine primary election: 69%; Maine 
general election: Number: 236; Maine general election: Percentage: 67%.

Participating (used public financing); Maine 
primary election: 116; Maine primary election: 31; Maine 
general election: Number: 116; Maine general election: Percentage: 33.

Total; Maine primary election: 369; Maine primary 
election: 100%; Maine general election: Number: 352; Maine 
general election: Percentage: 100%.

Races:[A]: 

With no participating candidates; Maine primary 
election: 231; Maine primary election: 67%; Maine general 
election: Number: 98; Maine general election: Percentage: 53%.

With at least one participating candidate; Maine 
primary election: 112; Maine primary election: 33; Maine 
general election: Number: 88; Maine general election: Percentage: 47.

Total; Maine primary election: 343; Maine primary 
election: 100%; Maine general election: Number: 186; Maine 
general election: Percentage: 100%.

2002 elections: 

Candidates: 

Nonparticipating (used private financing); Maine 
primary election: 196; Maine primary election: 49%; Maine 
general election: Number: 144; Maine general election: Percentage: 38%.

Participating (used public financing); Maine 
primary election: 208; Maine primary election: 51; Maine 
general election: Number: 231; Maine general election: Percentage: 62.

Total; Maine primary election: 404; Maine primary 
election: 100%; Maine general election: Number: 375; Maine 
general election: Percentage: 100%.

Races:[A]: 

With no participating candidates; Maine primary 
election: 176; Maine primary election: 48%; Maine general 
election: Number: 39; Maine general election: Percentage: 21%.

With at least one participating candidate; Maine 
primary election: 194; Maine primary election: 52; Maine 
general election: Number: 148; Maine general election: Percentage: 79.

Total; Maine primary election: 370; Maine primary 
election: 100%; Maine general election: Number: 187; Maine 
general election: Percentage: 100%.

Source: GAO analysis of state data.

Note: Maine has 151 House districts and 35 Senate districts. Voters 
elect one legislator for each district. The ballot for the 2002 
election cycle included gubernatorial candidates, who were eligible to 
participate in the public financing program.

[A] In counting election races, we included all races in which there 
was a candidate on the ballot regardless of whether or not the 
candidate faced a challenger.

[End of table]

In Maine's 2000 general election, of the 116 candidates who ran with 
public financing, 62 were elected to office. As table 2 shows, the 62 
elected participating candidates consisted of 35 incumbents and 27 
challengers. In Maine's 2002 general election, of the 231 candidates 
who ran with public financing, 110 were elected to office (55 incumbent 
and 55 challengers).

In perspective, after the 2000 general election, the elected 
legislators who had run with public funds (62 candidates) held 33 
percent of the 186 total seats in Maine's legislature. After the 2002 
general election, with 110 successful publicly funded candidates, the 
proportion increased to 59 percent of the state legislature.

Table 2: Results of Maine's General Elections in 2000 and 2002--
Campaign Status and Number of Participating Candidates Elected by 
Office:

Participating candidates: Incumbents, challengers, and results: 

2000 general election:

Campaign status of participating candidates: 

Number 
of incumbents; Maine House of Representatives: 26; Maine Senate: 11; 
Governor[A]: [B]; Totals: 37.

Number 
of challengers[C]; Maine House of Representatives: 55; Maine Senate: 
24; Governor[A]: [B]; Totals: 79.

Total 
number of participating candidates; Maine House of Representatives: 81; 
Maine Senate: 35; Governor[A]: [B]; Totals: 116.

Participating candidates elected: 

Number 
of participating incumbents elected; Maine House of Representatives: 
24; Maine Senate: 11; Governor[A]: [B]; Totals: 35.

Number 
of participating challengers elected[C]; Maine House of 
Representatives: 21; Maine Senate: 6; Governor[A]: [B]; Totals: 27.

Total 
number elected; Maine House of Representatives: 45; Maine Senate: 17; 
Governor[A]: [B]; Totals: 62.

2002 
general election: 

Campaign status of participating candidates: 

Number 
of incumbents; Maine House of Representatives: 42; Maine Senate: 20; 
Governor[A]: 0; Totals: 62.

Number 
of challengers[C]; Maine House of Representatives: 136; Maine Senate: 
32; Governor[A]: 1; Totals: 169.

Total 
number of participating candidates; Maine House of Representatives: 
178; Maine Senate: 52; Governor[A]: 1; Totals: 231.

Participating candidates elected: 

Number 
of participating incumbents elected[C]; Maine House of Representatives: 
36; Maine Senate: 19; Governor[A]: 0; Totals: 55.

Number 
of participating challengers elected[C]; Maine House of 
Representatives: 47; Maine Senate: 8; Governor[A]: 0; Totals: 55.

Total 
number elected; Maine House of Representatives: 83; Maine Senate: 27; 
Governor[A]: 0; Totals: 110.

Source: GAO analysis of state data.

[A] In Maine's 2000 election, the public financing program was not 
applicable to the Office of Governor. In the 2002 election, term limits 
prohibited the incumbent governor from running.

[B] Not applicable.

[C] As used in the table, "challengers" consist of all nonincumbent 
candidates. Thus, any candidate who was not an incumbent is counted as 
a challenger, even if that candidate did not face an opponent.

[End of table]

Participating Candidates and Results Statistics for Elections in 
Arizona:

As mentioned previously, Arizona's 1998 statute provides a system for 
full public funding to qualified candidates for state legislative seats 
and certain statewide offices. The state legislature consists of 60 
seats in the House of Representatives and 30 seats in the Senate. 
Members in all 90 legislative seats serve 2-year terms. Thus, in the 
primary and general elections, which are held biannually (i.e., in each 
even-numbered year), all legislative seats are on the ballot. In 2000, 
the first year for which public funds were available for election 
campaigns in Arizona, candidates potentially eligible for such funds 
included all candidates for the state legislature, as well as the 
candidates who ran for seats on the Corporation Commission.

In Arizona's 2000 primary and general elections, approximately one of 
every four candidates chose to participate in the state's program for 
public financing of campaigns, as table 3 shows. Also, 40 percent of 
the primary election and 34 percent of the general election races in 
2000 had at least one participating candidate. In the next election, 
2002, participation in the public financing program increased 
significantly--with about half of all candidates choosing to 
participate and with about two-thirds of all races having at least one 
participating candidate.

Table 3: Arizona's Primary and General Elections in 2000 and 2002--
Number of Candidates Who Used Public Financing and Number of Races with 
at Least One Participating Candidate:

Candidates and races: 2000 elections: 

Candidates: Nonparticipating 
(used private financing); Arizona primary election: Number: 174; 
Arizona primary election: Percentage: 75%; Arizona general 
election: Number: 117; Arizona general election: Percentage: 73%.

Candidates: Participating (used 
public financing); Arizona primary election: Number: 59; Arizona 
primary election: Percentage: 25; Arizona general election: 
Number: 44; Arizona general election: Percentage: 27.

Candidates: Total[A]; Arizona 
primary election: Number: 233; Arizona primary election: Percentage: 
100%; Arizona general election: Number: 161; Arizona general 
election: Percentage: 100%.

Races: 

With no 
participating candidates; Arizona primary election: Number: 74; Arizona 
primary election: Percentage: 60%; Arizona general election: 
Number: 28; Arizona general election: Percentage: 45%.

With at least one 
participating candidate; Arizona primary election: Number: 49; Arizona 
primary election: Percentage: 40; Arizona general election: 
Number: 34; Arizona general election: Percentage: 55.

Total; Arizona 
primary election: Number: 123; Arizona primary election: Percentage: 
100%; Arizona general election: Number: 62[C]; Arizona general 
election: Percentage: 100%.

2002 ELECTIONS: Candidates: 

Nonparticipating 
(used private financing); Arizona primary election: Number: 126; 
Arizona primary election: Percentage: 48%; Arizona general 
election: Number: 90; Arizona general election: Percentage: 50%.

Participating (used 
public financing)[B]; Arizona primary election: Number: 136; Arizona 
primary election: Percentage: 52; Arizona general election: 
Number: 89; Arizona general election: Percentage: 50.

Total; Arizona 
primary election: Number: 262; Arizona primary election: Percentage: 
100%; Arizona general election: Number: 179; Arizona general 
election: Percentage: 100%.

Races: 

With no 
participating candidates; Arizona primary election: Number: 46; Arizona 
primary election: Percentage: 36%; Arizona general election: 
Number: 23; Arizona general election: Percentage: 34%.

With at least one 
participating candidate; Arizona primary election: Number: 81; Arizona 
primary election: Percentage: 64; Arizona general election: 
Number: 45; Arizona general election: Percentage: 66.

Total; Arizona 
primary election: Number: 127; Arizona primary election: Percentage: 
100%; Arizona general election: Number: 68; Arizona general 
election: Percentage: 100%.

Source: GAO analysis of state data.

Note: Arizona has 30 legislative districts. Voters elect two 
representatives and one senator for each district. For House races, the 
top two vote-getters in each district's general election win the seats. 
The 2000 election cycle included only one statewide office, the 
Corporation Commission, with two of the Commission's three seats up for 
election. The ballot for the 2002 election cycle included seven 
statewide offices--Governor, Secretary of State, Attorney General, 
State Treasurer, Superintendent of Public Instruction, State Mine 
Inspector, and three seats for the Corporation Commission, which was 
expanded from three to five Commissioners. The number of candidates and 
races in this table include the relevant statewide offices for both 
years. For example, in 2000, the 62 general election races consisted of 
30 races for House of Representatives seats (with each race involving 2 
seats), 30 races for Senate seats, and 2 races for seats on the 
Corporation Commission; and, in 2002, the 68 general election races 
consisted of 30 House, 30 Senate, and 8 statewide office races.

[A] In the 2000 primary and general elections combined, a total of 237 
candidates ran for seats in the legislature or the Corporation 
Commission. Of this total, four candidates--two who ran as Independents 
and two with general election write-in status--did not run in the 
primary elections. Thus, the number of candidates in the primary 
elections was 233. In the 2000 elections, all 59 of the publicly funded 
(participating) candidates ran in the primaries; in contrast, in the 
2002 elections, 3 of the total 139 participating candidates ran in the 
general election only (see note b).

[B] Three participating candidates in the 2002 election cycle did not 
run primary campaigns; these were one Independent candidate for 
Governor and two Independent candidates for the legislature. Including 
the 3 Independents, a total of 139 candidates participated in the 
public financing program in the 2002 primary and general elections 
combined.

[End of table]

In Arizona's 2000 general election, of the 44 candidates who ran with 
public financing, 16 were elected to office--14 for legislative seats 
and 2 for the Corporation Commission. As table 4 shows, the 16 elected 
participating candidates consisted of 6 incumbents and 10 challengers. 
In the 2002 general election, of the 89 candidates who ran with public 
financing, 39 were elected (9 incumbents and 30 challengers) to office-
-32 for legislative seats and 7 for statewide offices.

In perspective, after the 2000 general election, the elected 
legislators who had run with public funds (14 candidates) held 18 
percent of the 90 total seats in Arizona's legislature. After the 2002 
general election, with 32 successful publicly funded legislative 
candidates, the proportion increased to 36 percent of the state 
legislature. Also, of the seven statewide offices in Arizona's 2002 
general election, publicly funded candidates won 7 of 9 seats, which 
included the state's chief executive (Governor), as well as the 
Secretary of State, the Attorney General, and the State Treasurer.

Table 4: Results of Arizona's General Election in 2000 and 2002--
Campaign Status and Number of Participating Candidates Elected by 
Office:

2000 general election: 

Campaign status of participating candidates: 

Number of incumbents; Arizona House of 
Representatives: 5; Arizona Senate: 1; Statewide offices[A]: 0; Totals: 
6.

Number of challengers[B]; Arizona House of 
Representatives: 25; Arizona Senate: 10; Statewide offices[A]: 3; 
Totals: 38.

Total number of participating candidates; Arizona 
House of Representatives: 30; Arizona Senate: 11; Statewide offices[A]: 
3; Totals: 44.

Participating candidates elected: 

Number of participating incumbents elected; Arizona 
House of Representatives: 5; Arizona Senate: 1; Statewide offices[A]: 
0; Totals: 6.

Number of participating challengers elected[B]; 
Arizona House of Representatives: 7; Arizona Senate: 1; Statewide 
offices[A]: 2; Totals: 10.

Total number elected; Arizona House of 
Representatives: 12; Arizona Senate: 2; Statewide offices[A]: 2; 
Totals: 16.

2002 general election[C]: 

Campaign status of participating candidates: 

Number of incumbents; Arizona House of 
Representatives: 9; Arizona Senate: 1; Statewide offices[A]: 2; Totals: 
12.

Number of challengers[B]; Arizona House of 
Representatives: 47; Arizona Senate: 16; Statewide offices[A]: 14; 
Totals: 77.

Total number of participating candidates; Arizona 
House of Representatives: 56; Arizona Senate: 17; Statewide offices[A]: 
16; Totals: 89.

Participating candidates elected: 

Number of participating incumbents elected; Arizona 
House of Representatives: 6; Arizona Senate: 1; Statewide offices[A]: 
2; Totals: 9.

Number of participating challengers elected[B]; 
Arizona House of Representatives: 21; Arizona Senate: 4; Statewide 
offices[A]: 5; Totals: 30.

Total number elected; Arizona House of 
Representatives: 27; Arizona Senate: 5; Statewide offices[A]: 7d; 
Totals: 39.

Source: GAO analysis of state data.

[A] In Arizona's 2000 elections, the public financing program was 
available to qualified candidates for only one statewide office 
(Corporation Commission). In the 2002 elections, in addition to the 
Corporation Commission, qualified candidates for six other statewide 
offices became eligible to receive public funding--Governor, Secretary 
of State, Attorney General, State Treasurer, Superintendent of Public 
Instruction, and State Mine Inspector.

[B] As used in the table, "challengers" consist of all nonincumbent 
candidates. Thus, any candidate who was not an incumbent is counted as 
a challenger, even if that candidate did not face an opponent.

[C] A 5-member independent redistricting commission was created with 
the passing of a ballot proposition in 2000 and was charged with 
redrawing Arizona's 30 legislative districts for the 2002 elections. 
Because all 30 legislative districts were redrawn for the 2002 
elections, most incumbents who chose to run for reelection did so in a 
district that was numbered differently from the district they 
represented in the previous term. In comparing the 2002 list of 
legislative candidates and the 2000 legislative roster, we labeled a 
2002 candidate as an incumbent if he or she held a seat from the 
previous session in the same chamber.

[D] These seven successful candidates involved races for the following 
statewide offices: Governor, Secretary of State, Attorney General, 
State Treasurer, State Mine Inspector, and Corporation Commission (two 
seats).

[End of table]

Voter Choice: Legislative and Statewide Candidates in Publicly Funded 
Elections:

In Maine and Arizona, there were not any notable changes in the average 
number of state legislature candidates per district race when comparing 
the 1996 and 1998 traditionally financed elections with the publicly 
financed elections in 2000 and 2002. While there were some instances of 
multiple-candidate races for legislative seats in Arizona, there was 
not a large presence of participating candidates in these races. In 
both states, a higher proportion of Democratic candidates participated 
in the public funding program, and the number of participating third-
party or independent legislative candidates generally increased from 
the 2000 to the 2002 primary and general elections. In the 2002 
elections, one-half or more of Maine's and Arizona's third-party or 
independent legislative candidates participated in the public financing 
program. Regarding races for statewide offices, most candidates in 
Arizona opted to participate in the public funding program in the 2002 
elections.

Our survey of candidates in Maine's and Arizona's 2000 elections found 
mixed perspectives as to which of two factors--public funding for 
campaigns or open seats due to term-limited vacancies--played a greater 
role (or equal roles) in attracting new candidates to run for office. 
Most of the nonparticipating candidates who responded--64 percent in 
Maine and 58 percent in Arizona--answered that open seats were a 
greater factor than public funding. Of the participating candidates who 
responded, the largest percentage in Maine (43 percent) answered that 
both factors played equal roles, and the largest percentage in Arizona 
(39 percent) answered that public funding was a greater factor.

Increasing Voter Choice Was a Goal of Public Financing Programs:

Proponents of the public financing initiatives in Maine and Arizona 
contended that public funding would encourage more individuals to run 
for office, thereby giving voters more choices on the ballot. Opponents 
have said that an increase in the number of candidates on the ballot 
alone would not necessarily result in more diversity or representation 
of a wider range of political views, nor guarantee that a broader array 
of issues would be debated in campaigns. During our study, the state 
officials and researchers we interviewed said that changes in the 
number of candidates per race--as well as changes in the breadth of 
party affiliations, such as third-party or independent representation-
-would be important indicators to measure over several election cycles.

Little Variance in Average Number of State Legislature Candidates Per 
District Race:

As table 5 shows, the average number of state legislature candidates 
per district race in Maine and Arizona did not vary greatly over the 4 
election years examined. In Maine, on average, there was about one 
candidate per race in the primary elections and about two candidates 
per race in the general elections.

In Arizona, the average number of candidates in the house primary 
elections was about two candidates per race, since up to two candidates 
per political party can be nominated for the general election. In the 
house general elections, two candidates are elected per district; the 
average number of candidates was about three per race in each of the 
election years. For Arizona's senate elections, the average number of 
candidates was about one for primary election races and about two for 
general election races.

Table 5: Average Number of State Legislature Candidates Per District 
Race in Maine and Arizona (1996, 1998, 2000, and 2002):

State: Maine: 

Legislature: House of Representatives; Primary and 
general election: Primary; Average number of candidates per district 
race: 1996: 1.2; Average number of candidates per district race: 1998: 
1.1; Average number of candidates per district race: 2000: 1.1; Average 
number of candidates per district race: 2002: 1.1; 
Primary and general election: State: General; Average number of 
candidates per district race: 1996: State: 2.0; Average number of 
candidates per district race: 1998: State: 1.8; Average number of 
candidates per district race: 2000: State: 1.9; Average number of 
candidates per district race: 2002: State: 2.0.

Legislature: Senate; Primary and general election: Primary; Average 
number of candidates per district race: 1996: 1.2; Average 
number of candidates per district race: 1998: 1.0; Average number of candidates per district 
race: 2000: 1.1; Average number of candidates per district race: 2002: 
1.1; Primary and general election: General; Average number of 
candidates per district race: 1996: 2.0; Average number 
of candidates per district race: 1998: 1.9; Average 
number of candidates per district race: 2000: 2.1; 
Average number of candidates per district race: 2002: 
2.0.

State: Arizona: 

Legislature: House of Representatives; Primary and 
general election: Primary[A]; Average number of candidates per district 
race: 1996: 2.5; Average number of candidates per district race: 1998: 
2.2; Average number of candidates per district race: 2000: 2.5; Average 
number of candidates per district race: 2002: 2.7; 
Primary and general election: State: General[B]; Average number of 
candidates per district race: 1996: State: 3.4; Average number of 
candidates per district race: 1998: State: 3.1; Average number of 
candidates per district race: 2000: State: 3.4; Average number of 
candidates per district race: 2002: State: 3.5.

Legislature: Senate; Primary and general election: Primary; Average 
number of candidates per district 
race: 1996: 1.2; Average number of candidates per 
district race: 1998: 1.2; Average number of 
candidates per district race: 2000: 1.4; Average 
number of candidates per district race: 2002: 1.4: Primary and general 
election: General; Average number of candidates per district race: 
1996: 1.8; Average number of candidates per district race: 1998: 
1.5; Average number of candidates per district race: 2000: 
1.9; Average number of candidates per district race: 2002: 1.7.

Source: GAO analysis of state data.

Note: All Arizona legislative districts were reconfigured in the 2002 
elections.

[A] The two candidates receiving the most votes in the Arizona primary 
are the party nominees in the general election.

[B] The two candidates in each house district receiving the most votes 
in the general election are elected.

[End of table]

Although there were no notable changes in the average number of 
candidates per race, there were some races in the Arizona 2000 house 
primary election that had large numbers of candidates on the ballot. 
For example, in one House district, nine Republicans ran for the party 
nomination; none of these candidates were publicly funded. In another 
district, eight Democrats ran for the party nomination, of which three 
were publicly funded. According to Arizona officials, the availability 
of public funding was not the main reason for the large numbers of 
candidates in some districts. The officials speculated that the 
increase in certain races resulted from open seats due to term limits.

As mentioned previously, we surveyed all candidates who ran for state 
legislature seats and applicable statewide offices in Maine's and 
Arizona's 2000 elections. The survey results showed mixed perspectives 
as to which of two factors--public funding for campaigns or open seats 
due to term-limited vacancies--played a greater role (or equal roles) 
in attracting new candidates to run for office. As figure 1 shows, most 
of the nonparticipating candidates who responded--64 percent in Maine 
and 58 percent in Arizona--answered that open seats were a greater 
factor than public funding. Of the participating candidates who 
responded, the largest percentages in Maine (43 percent) and Arizona 
(39 percent) answered that both factors played equal roles.

Figure 1: Response of Candidates in the 2000 Election Regarding Which 
Factor (Term Limits or Public Funding) Played a Greater Role in 
Attracting New Candidates to Run for Office:

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Further, most of the participating candidates who responded to our 
survey--55 percent in Maine and 56 percent in Arizona--answered that 
the availability of the public financing program was a great or very 
great factor in their decision to run for office in 2000 (see fig. 2).

Figure 2: Percentages of Participating Candidates Who Answered That the 
Availability of Public Funding Was a Great or Very Great Factor in 
Their Decision to Run for Office in 2000:

[See PDF for image]

Note: This question was asked only of candidates participating in the 
public financing program. All 104 Maine respondents were state 
legislative candidates. In Arizona, of the 39 respondents, 35 were 
state legislative candidates and 4 were Corporation Commission 
candidates.

[End of figure]

Political Party Affiliation of Publicly Funded Candidates in Maine and 
Arizona:

As shown in table 6, for the 2000 and 2002 elections in both states, 
about one-half or more of all participating candidates were affiliated 
with the Democratic party. Further, in both states, the percentage of 
participating Republican candidates generally increased from 2000 to 
2002 in the primary and general elections.

Table 6: Percentage of Participating Legislative Candidates by 
Political Party Affiliation in Maine and Arizona (2000 and 2002):

State: Maine - 2000; Legislature: House of Representatives; Primary and 
general elections: Primary[B]; Number of participating candidates: 80; 
Percentage of participating candidates: Democrat: 68%; Percentage of 
participating candidates: Republican: 29%; Percentage of participating 
candidates: Other[A]: 4%.

Primary and general elections: General[B]; Number of participating 
candidates: 81; Percentage of participating candidates: Democrat: 
70; Percentage of participating candidates: Republican: 23; 
Percentage of participating candidates: Other[A]: 6.

Legislature: Senate; Primary and general elections: Primary; 
Number of participating candidates: 36; Percentage of participating 
candidates: Democrat: 56; Percentage of participating candidates: 
Republican: 44; Percentage of participating candidates: Other[A]: 0.

Primary and general elections: 2002: General; Number of participating 
candidates: 2002: 35; Percentage of participating candidates: Democrat: 
2002: 54; Percentage of participating candidates: Republican: 2002: 46; 
Percentage of participating candidates: Other[A]: 2002: 0.

State: Maine - 2002:

Legislature: House of Representatives; Primary and general 
elections: Primary[B]; Number of participating candidates: 
156; Percentage of participating candidates: Democrat: 
62%; Percentage of participating candidates: Republican: 
35%; Percentage of participating candidates: Other[A]: 
4%.

Primary and general elections: General; Number of participating 
candidates: 177; Percentage of participating candidates: Democrat: 
58; Percentage of participating candidates: Republican: 34; 
Percentage of participating candidates: Other[A]: 8.

Legislature: Senate; Primary and general 
elections: Primary; Number of participating 
candidates: 50; Percentage of participating 
candidates: Democrat: 48; Percentage of 
participating candidates: Republican: 48; 
Percentage of participating candidates: Other[A]: House of 
Representatives: 4.

Primary and general elections: General; Number of 
participating candidates: 52; Percentage of 
participating candidates: Democrat: 46; Percentage of 
participating candidates: Republican: 50; Percentage of 
participating candidates: Other[A]: 4.

State: Arizona -2000: 

Legislature: House of Representatives; Primary 
and general elections: Primary[B]; Number of participating candidates: 
40; Percentage of participating candidates: Democrat: 68%; Percentage 
of participating candidates: Republican: 23%; Percentage of 
participating candidates: Other[A]: 10%.

Primary and general elections: General[B]; Number of participating 
candidates: 30; Percentage of participating candidates: Democrat: 
73; Percentage of participating candidates: Republican: 13; 
Percentage of participating candidates: Other[A]: 13.

Legislature: Senate; Primary and general elections: Primary; 
Number of participating candidates: 14; Percentage of participating 
candidates: Democrat: 86; Percentage of participating candidates: 
Republican: 14; Percentage of participating candidates: Other[A]: 0.

Primary and general elections: General; Number of participating 
candidates: 2002: 11; Percentage of participating candidates: Democrat: 
2002: 82; Percentage of participating candidates: Republican: 2002: 18; 
Percentage of participating candidates: Other[A]: 2002: 0.

2002: 

Legislature: House of Representatives; Primary and general 
elections: Primary; Number of participating candidates: 
86; Percentage of participating candidates: Democrat: 
50%; Percentage of participating candidates: Republican: 47%; 
Percentage of participating candidates: Other[A]: 3%.

Primary and general elections: General; Number of participating 
candidates: 56; Percentage of participating candidates: Democrat: 
57; Percentage of participating candidates: Republican: 36; 
Percentage of participating candidates: Other[A]: 7.

Legislature: Senate; Primary and general elections: Primary; 
Number of participating candidates: 25; Percentage of participating 
candidates: Democrat: 64; Percentage of participating candidates: 
Republican: 28; Percentage of participating candidates: Other[A]: 8.

Primary and general elections: Primary and general elections: 
General[B]; Number of participating candidates: Number of participating 
candidates: 17; Percentage of participating candidates: Democrat: 
Democrat: 65; Percentage of participating candidates: Republican: 
Republican: 18; Percentage of participating candidates: Other[A]: 18.

Source: GAO analysis of state data.

Note: All Arizona legislative districts were reconfigured in the 2002 
elections.

[A] Includes third-party (e.g., Green, Libertarian, and Reform) and 
independent candidates.

[B] Does not add to 100 percent due to rounding.

[End of table]

As table 7 shows, the number of third-party or independent legislative 
candidates who participated in the public funding program increased 
almost twofold or greater from the 2000 to the 2002 primary and general 
elections in Maine and the general elections in Arizona. In 2002, over 
one-half of Maine's third-party or independent candidates participated 
in the public financing program, as did one-half or more of Arizona's 
third-party or independent candidates. In Maine, most were candidates 
of the Green Independent Party, which had primary election ballot 
status in 2000 and 2002. Representatives of the Maine Green Independent 
Party told us that one of their goals was to qualify candidates for 
public funding in order to promote the party's platform.

Table 7: Number of Third-party or Independent Candidates In Maine and 
Arizona State Legislative Races (1996, 1998, 2000, and 2002):

State: Maine; Legislature: House of Representatives and Senate; Primary 
and general elections: Primary; Number of third-party or independent 
candidates: 1996: Total: 0; Number of third-party or independent 
candidates: 1998: Total: 1; Number of third-party or independent 
candidates: 2000: Total: 4; Number of third-party or independent 
candidates: 2000: Participating (% of total): 3 (75%); Number of third-
party or independent candidates: 2002: Total: 12; Number of third-party 
or independent candidates: 2002: Participating (% of total): 8 (67%).

Primary and general elections: General; Number of third-
party or independent candidates: 1996: Total: 24; Number 
of third-party or independent candidates: 1998: Total: 
17; Number of third-party or independent candidates: 2000: Total: 
30; Number of third-party or independent candidates: 
2000: Participating (% of total): 5 (17%); Number of 
third-party or independent candidates: 2002: Total: 28; 
Number of third-party or independent candidates: 2002: Participating (% 
of total): 16 (57%).

State: Arizona; Legislature: House of Representatives and Senate; 
Primary and general elections: Primary; Number of third-party or 
independent candidates: 1996: Total: 17; Number of third-party or 
independent candidates: 1998: Total: 8; Number of third-party or 
independent candidates: 2000: Total: 22; Number of third-party or 
independent candidates: 2000: Participating (% of total): 4 (18%); 
Number of third-party or independent candidates: 2002: Total: 8; Number 
of third-party or independent candidates: 2002: Participating (% of 
total): 5 (63%).

Primary and general elections: General; Number of third-party or 
independent candidates: 1996: Total: 
17; Number of third-party or independent candidates: 1998: 
Total: 7; Number of third-party or independent candidates: 
2000: Total: 19; Participating (% of total): 4 (21%); 
Number of third-party or independent candidates: 2002: 
Total: 14; Participating (% of total): 7 (50%).

Source: GAO analysis of state data.

[End of table]

Most Statewide Office Candidates Opted for Public Financing in 
Arizona's 2002 Election:

In Maine, the public financing program was not applicable for any 
statewide office races in 2000. In Arizona, candidates for one 
statewide office--the Corporation Commission--were eligible for public 
funds beginning in the 2000 elections. As table 8 shows, in Arizona's 
2000 primary election, five of the eight candidates for the Corporation 
Commission chose to participate in the public financing program, as did 
three of the six candidates in the general election. Two of the 
participating candidates were elected to office in 2000.

In 2002, five of the eight primary election candidates for the 
Corporation Commission were publicly funded, and five of the six 
general election candidates were publicly funded. Participating 
candidates won two of the three available seats.

Table 8: Number of Arizona Corporation Commission Candidates (1994, 
1996, 1998, 2000, and 2002):

Election: Primary; Candidates and seats: Number of candidates; 1994: 5; 
1996: 2[B]; 1998: 3; 2000[A]: 8; 2002: 8.

Number of participating candidates; 1994: [C]; 1996: [C]; 1998: [C]; 
2000[A]: 5; 2002: 5.

Election: General; Candidates and seats: Number of candidates; 1994: 3; 
1996: 4; 1998: 2; 2000[A]: 6; 2002: 6.

Candidates and seats: Number of open seats; 1994: 1; 1996: 1; 1998: 1; 
2000[A]: 2; 2002: 3.

Candidates and seats: Average number of candidates per open seat; 
1994: 3.0; 1996: 4.0; 1998: 2.0; 2000[A]: 3.0; 2002: 2.0.

Candidates and seats: Number of participating candidates; 1994: [C]; 
1996: [C]; 1998: [C]; 2000[A]: 3; 2002: 5.

Source: GAO analysis of state data.

[A] Public financing was first available in 2000 for this statewide 
office.

[B] Does not include 2 write-in candidates.

[C] Not applicable.

[End of table]

In Maine, the governor's election is the only statewide office race 
eligible for public campaign financing, and the 2002 elections were the 
first time public financing was available for this race. The Republican 
and Green Independent Party candidates were publicly funded in the 
gubernatorial primary, and the Green Independent candidate also ran in 
the general election. During the campaign, the Green Independent Party 
candidate spent about $837,000 in public funds to run his gubernatorial 
campaign against three traditionally financed competitors in the 
general election--a Democrat, a Republican, and an Independent. In the 
general election, the Green Independent Party candidate received about 
47,000 votes, or about 9.3 percent of the total votes cast.

In Arizona, candidates for six statewide offices were eligible for 
public funding for the first time in 2002 (see table 9). For these six 
statewide offices, 20 of the 30 candidates who ran in the primary 
election were publicly funded, and 11 of the 17 candidates who ran in 
the general election were publicly funded. Five of the six winners of 
these statewide races were publicly funded--that is, participating 
candidates won races for the offices of Governor, Secretary of State, 
Attorney General, State Treasurer, and State Mine Inspector.

Table 9: Number of Candidates for Maine and Arizona Statewide Races 
(1994, 1998, and 2002):

Maine:

Governor: 

Primary election; Election year: 1994: Total: 13; Election year: 1998: 
Total: 5[B]; Election year: 2002[A]: Total: 4; Election year: 2002[A]: 
Participating: 2.

General election; Election year: 1994: Total: 4; Election year: 1998: 
Total: 5[B]; Election year: 2002[A]: Total: 4; Election year: 2002[A]: 
Participating: 1.

Arizona: 

Governor: 

Primary election; Election year: 1994: Total: 6; Election year: 1998: 
Total: 7; Election year: 2002[A]: Total: 9; Election year: 2002[A]: 
Participating: 5.

General election; Election year: 1994: Total: 3; Election year: 1998: 
Total: 4; Election year: 2002[A]: Total: 4; Election year: 2002[A]: 
Participating: 2.

Secretary of State: 

Primary election; Election year: 1994: Total: 5; Election year: 1998: 
Total: 3; Election year: 2002[A]: Total: 5; Election year: 2002[A]: 
Participating: 4.

General election; Election year: 1994: Total: 3; Election year: 1998: 
Total: 2; Election year: 2002[A]: Total: 3; Election year: 2002[A]: 
Participating: 2.

Attorney General: 

Primary election; Election year: 1994: Total: 2[B]; Election year: 
1998: Total: 3; Election year: 2002[A]: Total: 5; Election year: 
2002[A]: Participating: 2.

General; Election year: 1994: Total: 2[B]; Election year: 1998: Total: 
3; Election year: 2002[A]: Total: 3; Election year: 2002[A]: 
Participating: 2.

State Treasurer: 

Primary election; Election year: 1994: Total: 2; Election year: 1998: 
Total: 2; Election year: 2002[A]: Total: 3; Election year: 2002[A]: 
Participating: 3.

General election; Election year: 1994: Total: 3; Election year: 1998: 
Total: 2; Election year: 2002[A]: Total: 2; Election year: 2002[A]: 
Participating: 2.

Superintendent of Public Instruction: 

Primary election; Election year: 1994: Total: 4; Election year: 1998: 
Total: 1[B]; Election year: 2002[A]: Total: 6; Election year: 2002[A]: 
Participating: 4.

General election; Election year: 1994: Total: 2; Election year: 1998: 
Total: 1[B]; Election year: 2002[A]: Total: 3; Election year: 2002[A]: 
Participating: 1.

State Mine Inspector: 

Primary election; Election year: 1994: Total: 1[B]; Election year: 
1998: Total: 1[B]; Election year: 2002[A]: Total: 2[B]; Election year: 
2002[A]: Participating: 2.

General election; Election year: 1994: Total: 1[B]; Election year: 
1998: Total: 1[B]; Election year: 2002[A]: Total: 2[B]; Election year: 
2002[A]: Participating: 2.

Source: GAO analysis of state data.

Note: The term of all offices is 4 years. The number of candidates in 
the primary elections is the total of all candidates listed on the 
ballot for all political party primaries (including Democrat, 
Republican, Libertarian, Reform, Green, and Independent). Write-in 
candidates are not included.

[A] Public financing was first available in 2002 for these statewide 
offices.

[B] Incumbent candidate ran for reelection.

[End of table]

Candidates' Views about Participation and Nonparticipation in the 
Public Funding Program:

Reasons why candidates chose to participate in the public funding 
program in the 2000 elections are presented in figure 3, which shows 
the results of our survey of candidates. Most of the participating 
candidates who responded--76 percent in Maine and 81 percent in 
Arizona--agreed to a great or very great extent with the statement that 
they chose to participate in the public funding program because they 
did not want to feel obligated to special interest groups or lobbyists. 
Further, about three-fourths of the responding participating candidates 
from both states (77 percent in Maine and 74 percent in Arizona) agreed 
to a great or very great extent with the statement that receiving 
public funds allowed them to spend more time discussing issues in their 
campaign.

Figure 3: Reasons Why Candidates Chose to Participate in the Public 
Financing Program:

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

On the other hand, an analysis of why candidates chose not to 
participate in the public funding program in the 2000 elections is 
presented in figure 4. About 60 percent or more of the nonparticipating 
candidates who responded to our survey answered that they agreed to a 
great or very great extent with the following statements:

* Public funds are better used for purposes other than election 
campaigns (59 percent in Maine and 64 percent in Arizona).

* Public funding forces taxpayers to fund candidates that they may not 
support (61 percent in Maine and 68 percent in Arizona).

Figure 4: Reasons Why Candidates Did Not Participate in the Public 
Financing Program:

[See PDF for image]

[A] Given the status of legal challenges to the respective state's 
clean election law (see app. III), this question was asked only of 
Arizona candidates.

[End of figure]

Figure 4 further shows that, in Arizona, unresolved legal challenges to 
the state's public financing program during the 2000 election cycle was 
a decisional factor to a great or very great extent for 42 percent of 
the nonparticipating candidates who responded to our survey. Legal 
challenges to Arizona's public financing program (see app. III) 
persisted throughout the 2000 and 2002 election cycles.

Electoral Competition: Analysis of Elections in Maine and Arizona:

To date, two election cycles (2000 and 2002) have occurred under the 
public financing programs in Maine and Arizona. In comparing data from 
these and the two most recent nonpublic financing years (1996 and 1998) 
using three measures of electoral competition--contested races, 
incumbent reelection rates, and incumbent victory margins--our analysis 
showed:

* The percentages of contested legislative races in Maine's primary 
elections were relatively unchanged in 2000 and 2002, compared with 
1998, and were less than the percentage of contested legislative races 
in 1996. The percentages of contested legislative races in Arizona's 
primary elections increased in 2000 and 2002, compared with 1998; 
however, the percentage of contested races in 2000 was about the same 
as 1996. About 85 percent of the contested legislative primary races in 
Maine's and Arizona's 2002 elections had publicly financed candidates.

* Legislative incumbent reelection rates remained about the same in 
both states after public financing was introduced.

* Incumbent victory margins, which we used to identify competitive 
races, reflected a mixed picture. That is, we defined a competitive 
race as one in which the difference in the percentage of vote garnered 
between the winning incumbent and the runner-up was 15 points or less 
and under this definition, trends (if any) were not clearly evident. 
Further analysis, which examined several factors related to election 
outcomes, found that whether a race included publicly financed 
candidates in 2000 and 2002 had no effect on this measure of 
competitiveness. However, the results of this analysis should be 
interpreted with caution, given the relatively few variables we used 
and the limited amount of data available.

Increasing Electoral Competition Was a Principal Goal of Public 
Financing:

A principal goal of public financing laws is to increase electoral 
competition. The term "electoral competition" refers to the level of 
competition for elected positions as demonstrated by whether races were 
contested and by the percentage of the vote candidates received. For 
example, levels of electoral competition can vary from none at all in 
the case of an uncontested race in which the sole candidate receives 
100 percent of the vote, to an election in which several candidates vie 
competitively for a position, each winning a significant portion of the 
vote. Proponents of the initiatives to adopt public financing laws in 
both states supported the goal of increasing electoral competition. In 
Maine, proponents said that the initiative would level the playing 
field so that challengers would have a chance against incumbents. The 
findings section of Arizona's Act states that the traditional election 
financing system gave incumbents an unhealthy advantage over 
challengers and discouraged qualified candidates without personal 
wealth or access to other funds from running. Further, state officials 
and other stakeholders we interviewed in both Maine and Arizona agreed 
that one purpose of the states' public financing laws was to increase 
electoral competition.

According to some political observers, "A chief standard of success for 
a public finance scheme is increasing competitiveness, which increases 
the voters' ultimate check on other abuses and is a measure of the 
responsiveness of a legislature."[Footnote 18] Proponents of public 
financing for campaigns contend that public funding could increase 
electoral competition by allowing candidates, especially candidates 
challenging incumbents, to overcome the financial hurdles that would 
otherwise prevent them from entering a race. Further, proponents argue 
that public funding promotes competition by giving more candidates the 
opportunity to effectively communicate with the electorate once they 
have entered the race.[Footnote 19] On the other hand, opponents we 
interviewed in Maine and Arizona believe that public financing does not 
attract candidates who have a broad base of constituency support and, 
therefore, even though more new candidates may enter races and win, the 
quality of representation will be questionable.

As a part of this review, we examined changes in electoral competition 
in state legislative races by comparing the two most recent nonpublic 
funding election years (1996 and 1998) with the two public funding 
election years (2000 and 2002). In reviewing public finance and 
election literature, we did not find a standard approach for measuring 
changes in electoral competition. However, we did identify three widely 
used measures of electoral competition--percentages of contested races, 
incumbent reelection rates, and incumbent victory margins. The first 
measure refers to the percentage of all races that had more than one 
candidate running for the position. Because the concern about 
competitive races is particularly focused on the ability of challengers 
to mount credible campaigns against incumbents, the other two measures 
specifically involve incumbents. Incumbent reelection rates examine the 
percentage of incumbents (running for reelection) who were reelected. 
Incumbent victory margin examines the difference between the percentage 
of the vote going to winning incumbents and the runners-up.

Contested Races in Maine and Arizona:

One measure of electoral competition is the percentage of all races for 
seats in the legislature that are contested. As previously mentioned, a 
chief goal in making public funds available for campaigns was to help 
potential candidates overcome the financial barriers that deterred them 
from running, which would result in fewer uncontested races. In Maine 
and Arizona, uncontested races were much more common in the primary 
than in general elections from 1996 to 2002.[Footnote 20] Thus, we 
focused solely on the primary elections and considered a primary 
election race contested if more than one candidate ran in the political 
party's district race.[Footnote 21] If public financing had enticed 
more candidates to run in the primary election races, we would expect 
that after 1998, increasing percentages of races would be contested.

Changes in Contested-Race Percentages:

In Maine, as figure 5 shows, the introduction of public financing in 
the 2000 election did not correspond with a significant increase in 
contested primary races. The percentages of contested legislative races 
in Maine's primary elections remained relatively unchanged in 2000 (7 
percent) and 2002 (8 percent), compared with 1998 (6 percent), and were 
less than the percentage of contested legislative races in 1996 (12 
percent). More detailed analysis, including coverage of additional 
years, would be necessary to determine whether the percentage of 
contested legislative primary races in 1996 (12 percent) was 
historically high and if the change from 1998 to 2002 differs from past 
changes in Maine.

Figure 5: Contested and Uncontested Races in Maine's Legislative (House 
and Senate) Primary Elections (1996, 1998, 2000, and 2002):

[See PDF for image]

Note: Of the 343 races in the 2000 elections, 25 (7.3 percent) were 
contested.

[End of figure]

In Arizona, as figure 6 shows, the percentages of contested legislative 
races in the state's primary elections were higher in 2000 (30 percent) 
and in 2002 (38 percent) than in 1998 (18 percent). However, the 
percentage of contested races in 2000 was about the same as in 1996 (29 
percent). More data encompassing additional election years before and 
after public financing was introduced would be necessary to identify 
any trend.

Figure 6: Contested and Uncontested Races in Arizona's Legislative 
(House and Senate) Primary Elections (1996, 1998, 2000, and 2002):

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Publicly Financed Candidates and Contested Races:

Two election cycles provide a limited basis for projecting whether the 
percentage of contested races will increase in Maine's and Arizona's 
primary elections. However, we examined the 2000 and 2002 races in 
Maine and Arizona to determine the extent to which contested races had 
publicly financed candidates. In Maine's legislative primary elections, 
as figure 7 shows, 56 percent of the contested races in 2000 had 
publicly financed candidates, and the percentage increased to 86 
percent in 2002. Overall, however, there were still many more 
uncontested races (318 and 338) than contested races (25 and 29) in 
both 2000 and 2002.

Figure 7: Publicly Financed Candidates in Maine's Contested Legislative 
Primary Races (2000 and 2002):

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

If publicly financed candidates had not run in Maine's 2000 and 2002 
primary elections, there would likely have been fewer contested races. 
For example, in our survey of candidates in Maine's 2000 election, we 
asked the publicly financed candidates to what extent the availability 
of public funding had been a factor in their decision to run for 
office. Of the 20 publicly financed challengers who ran in contested 
races in Maine's 2000 legislative primaries, 13 returned our survey 
questionnaire. Eight of those 13 candidates answered that the 
availability of public funding influenced their decision to run to a 
great extent. Only one candidate answered that the availability of 
public funding was of little or no importance in the decision to run.

In Arizona's legislative primary elections, as figure 8 shows, a 
significant percentage of the contested races in 2000 (40 percent) had 
publicly financed candidates, and the percentage more than doubled in 
2002 (85 percent). Similarly to Maine, however, there were still more 
uncontested races (83 and 66) than contested races (35 and 41) in 2000 
and 2002.

Figure 8: Publicly Financed Candidates in Arizona's Contested 
Legislative Primary Races (2000 and 2002):

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Since such a high percentage of the contested primary legislative races 
in Arizona's 2000 and 2002 elections had publicly financed candidates, 
as in Maine, there would likely have been fewer contested races if 
those candidates had not run. In our survey of candidates in Arizona's 
2000 election, we asked the publicly financed candidates to what extent 
the availability of public funding had been a factor in their decision 
to run for office. Of the 19 publicly financed challengers who ran in 
contested races in Arizona's 2000 legislative primaries, 12 returned 
our survey questionnaire. Half of those candidates answered that the 
availability of public funding influenced their decision to run to a 
great extent. Three of the 12 candidates answered that the availability 
of public funding was of little or no importance in their decision to 
run.

Incumbent Reelection Rates in Maine and Arizona:

A second measure of electoral competition is incumbent reelection rates 
in the general legislative elections in Maine and Arizona. Some 
political observers have asserted that electoral competition is 
primarily determined by the ability of challengers to mount credible 
campaigns against incumbents.[Footnote 22] Also, many believe that 
incumbents begin a race with numerous advantages over challengers--
advantages such as name recognition with the public, free media 
attention, and the opportunity to provide constituency 
services.[Footnote 23] For these reasons, incumbent reelection rates 
are typically high in states throughout the nation. For example, a 1991 
study--covering 10 election cycles (during 1968 through 1986) for 
legislative seats in 16 states--found that 92 percent of 11,711 house 
incumbents seeking reelection were successful. The same study reported 
that 88 percent of 2,547 senate incumbents were successful.[Footnote 
24] If public financing in Maine and Arizona helped to improve 
challengers' ability to mount credible campaigns against incumbents, 
one indication might be lower incumbent reelection rates in 2000 and 
2002, as compared to election years before public financing was 
introduced.

Incumbent Reelection Rates in Maine:

As figure 9 shows, the incumbent reelection rates in Maine's house 
remained relatively unchanged over the 4 years, with the exception of a 
slight increase in 2000 (91 percent). Comparatively, these reelection 
rates in Maine's house were near, but slightly below the 16-state 
average (92 percent) reported by the 1991 study mentioned previously. 
Although incumbent reelection rates for Maine's house did not change 
much over the 4 election years we reviewed, 4 of the 10 incumbents who 
were defeated in 2000, and 10 of the 14 incumbents who were defeated in 
2002 lost to publicly financed candidates.

Figure 9: Incumbent Reelection Rates in Maine's Legislative Races 
(1996, 1998, 2000, and 2002):

[See PDF for image]

Note: The numbers in parentheses represent the number of incumbent 
victories over total number of incumbents running for reelection in 
that year.

[End of figure]

As shown in figure 9, incumbent reelection rates in Maine's senate also 
did not change significantly after public financing was introduced. The 
incumbent reelection rates ranged from 91 percent to 100 percent--91 
percent in 1996 and 2000, 100 percent in 1998, and 92 percent in 2002. 
These rates for all 4 election years in Maine's senate were higher than 
the senate average (88 percent) from the 1991 study mentioned above. 
However, of the two senate incumbents who lost in 2000, one lost to a 
publicly financed candidate, and in 2002, both incumbents who were 
defeated lost to publicly financed candidates.

Incumbent Reelection Rates in Arizona:

Figure 10 shows incumbent reelection rates for Arizona's house and 
senate for the 4 most recent general election cycles. The house 
incumbent reelection rate was 98 percent in 1998 and then dropped 4 
percentage points in each of the two publicly funded 
elections.[Footnote 25] The 90-percent rate in 2002 was slightly lower 
than the 16-state average (92 percent) mentioned previously. On the 
other hand, the incumbent reelection rate in Arizona's senate was 96 
percent in 1998 and then increased to 100 percent in both 2000 and 
2002, the same rate as in 1996.

Figure 10: Incumbent Reelection Rates in Arizona's Legislative Races 
(1996, 1998, 2000, and 2002):

[See PDF for image]

Note 1: The numbers in parentheses represent the number of incumbent 
victories and the total number of incumbents running for reelection in 
that year.

Note 2: Because all 30 legislative districts were redrawn for the 2002 
elections, most incumbents who chose to run for reelection did so in a 
district that was numbered differently from the district they 
represented in the previous term. In comparing the 2002 list of 
legislative candidates and the 2000 legislative roster, we labeled a 
2002 candidate as an incumbent if he or she held a seat from the 
previous session in the same chamber.

[End of figure]

Incumbent Victory Margins in Maine and Arizona:

A third measure of electoral competition is incumbent victory margins. 
This measure involves examining the difference between the percentage 
of votes received by the winning incumbents and the second-place 
finishers. As discussed previously, incumbents enjoy many inherent 
advantages over challengers. One disadvantage most challengers face is 
the difficulty in raising campaign funds, which impacts their ability 
to run an effective campaign. In order to make their name and campaign 
message known to the public, challengers need to raise money for 
advertisements and other campaign activities. However, challengers are 
faced with a circular problem. Campaign contributors generally view 
challengers as more likely to lose an election than an incumbent; yet, 
challengers cannot run a competitive campaign unless they can raise 
money.[Footnote 26] For these reasons, according to proponents, public 
financing programs would allow challengers to compete more effectively. 
An indicator of competing more effectively would be a narrowing of the 
electoral gap between the incumbent winners and the runners-up, not 
simply whether some incumbents were defeated.

Although our review of applicable literature and our discussions with 
experts confirmed that measuring incumbent victory margins in 
legislative races is a good indicator of electoral competition, there 
is disagreement on which margin of difference indicates a competitive 
race. The studies we reviewed were essentially split between using a 
difference of 10 percentage points or less of the vote or using a 
difference of 20 percentage points or less of the vote. A margin of 10 
percentage points is considered to be more conservative than 20 
percentage points because the former represents a higher bar for 
challengers to meet. We took a central approach and defined a 
competitive race as one in which the difference in the percentage of 
the vote garnered between the winning incumbent and the runner-up was 
15 points or less. For example, consider a race with two candidates, 
one the incumbent and the other a challenger. If the incumbent garnered 
57 percent of the vote and the challenger garnered 43 percent of the 
vote, the incumbent's margin of victory would be 14 percentage points. 
Under our definition, this hypothetical race would be competitive 
because the incumbent won by 15-or-less percentage points.

Using our definition, we analyzed all of the legislative general 
election races in Maine and Arizona that had incumbent wins against at 
least one challenger during the four most recent elections--1996, 1998, 
2000, and 2002. If the public financing programs helped challengers to 
run more competitive races against incumbents, we would expect to find 
larger percentages of competitive races in 2000 and 2002 than in 1996 
and 1998.

Competitive Legislative Races in Maine:

Changes in the percentages of contested races after public financing 
was introduced varied between Maine's house and the senate. As figure 
11 shows, the percentages of competitive house races in 2000 (31 
percent) and 2002 (29 percent) were greater than the percentage in 1998 
(21 percent) but similar to the percentage in 1996 (32 percent). On the 
other hand, the percentage of competitive senate races in 2002 (50 
percent) was greater than each of the three previous election years.

In order to more thoroughly explore the relationship between publicly 
financed elections and competitive races, in further analysis we 
examined the effects of several factors relevant to election outcomes 
and found that whether a race included publicly financed candidates in 
2000 and 2002 had no effect on incumbent victory margins. That is, we 
analyzed the effect of participation in the public financing program on 
competitiveness after controlling for other factors, such as 
candidates' campaign status (incumbent or not) and candidates' 
spending.[Footnote 27] However, the results of this analysis should be 
interpreted with caution, given the relatively few variables we used 
and the limited amount of data available.

Figure 11: Competitive Legislative Races in Maine (1996, 1998, 2000, 
and 2002):

[See PDF for image]

Note: The numbers in parentheses represent the number of competitive 
races divided by the number of total races with incumbent wins, which 
gives the percentage at each data point.

[End of figure]

Since incumbent victory margins, as a measure of electoral competition, 
exclude races in which a challenger won, we also examined the general 
legislative races in 2000 and 2002 to determine the funding status of 
winning challengers. Of the 79 publicly financed legislative 
challengers who ran for a seat in Maine's 2000 general election, 27 
won, representing 44 percent of the total number of winning challengers 
that year. In Maine's 2002 general election, of the 168 publicly 
financed legislative challengers who ran, 55 won, representing 67 
percent of the total number of winning challengers that year.

Competitive Legislative Races in Arizona:

In Arizona, changes in the percentages of competitive general 
legislative races across the 4 election years were mixed. For Arizona's 
legislative elections, our analysis was limited to senate races only 
because the state's house races involve multimember districts, which 
does not lend itself to analysis using incumbent victory 
margins.[Footnote 28]

As figure 12 shows, 29 percent (2 of 7) of Arizona's senate races were 
competitive in 1998. This percentage increased to 40 percent (6 of 15) 
in 2000 and then dropped to 33 percent (2 of 6) in 2002. No trends are 
apparent in simply comparing the change in the percentages of 
competitive races across the 4 election years. However, similar to the 
finding in Maine, we analyzed the effects of several factors relevant 
to election outcomes and found that the presence of publicly financed 
candidates in a race had no effect on incumbent victory margins in 
Arizona's 2000 and 2002 senate races.[Footnote 29]

Figure 12: Competitive Senate Races in Arizona (1996, 1998, 2000, and 
2002):

[See PDF for image]

Note 1: The numbers in parentheses represent the number of competitive 
races divided by the number of total races with incumbent wins, which 
gives the percentage at each data point.

Note 2: Because all 30 legislative districts were redrawn for the 2002 
elections, most incumbents who chose to run for reelection did so in a 
district that was numbered differently from the district they 
represented in the previous term. In comparing the 2002 list of 
legislative candidates and the 2000 legislative roster, we labeled a 
2002 candidate as an incumbent if he or she held a seat from the 
previous session in the same chamber.

[End of figure]

Again, because the measure of incumbent victory margins excludes races 
in which a challenger won, we also examined Arizona's general election 
senate races in 2000 and 2002 to determine the funding status of 
winning challengers. Of the 10 publicly financed challengers who ran 
for a senate seat in Arizona's 2000 general election, only one 
succeeded, representing 10 percent of the total number of winning 
challengers in the senate that year. In Arizona's 2002 general 
election, of the 16 publicly financed challengers who ran for a senate 
seat, four won, representing 24 percent of the total number of winning 
challengers in the senate that year.

Influence of Interest Groups: Mixed Views on Effects of Public 
Financing of Campaigns:

Proponents and opponents of public financing programs have competing 
perspectives regarding the effect of such programs on the influence of 
interest groups. For instance, an operative question can be posed as 
follows: Do citizens feel that, once elected, candidates who ran their 
campaigns with public funding have been more likely to serve the 
broader interests of their constituents as a whole and less likely to 
be influenced by specific individuals or groups? This question is not 
readily amenable to quantitative analysis, and responses to our surveys 
of political candidates and citizens in Maine and Arizona--as well as 
our interviews with interest group representatives--reflected mixed 
views.

Reducing the Influence of Interest Groups Was a Goal of Public 
Financing:

As mentioned previously, proponents assert that an intended effect of 
public financing programs is to enhance the confidence of citizens in 
government by reducing the influence of special interests and 
increasing the integrity of the political process. For instance, the 
"findings and declarations" section of Arizona's 1998 Act stated, in 
part, that the current election-financing system "effectively 
suppresses the voices and influence of the vast majority of Arizona 
citizens in favor of a small number of wealthy special interests" and 
"undermines public confidence in the integrity of public officials.":

On the other hand, opponents assert that, under the traditional 
campaign finance system, the voices of all citizens are represented 
through competing interest groups. Opponents further assert there is no 
evidence that government-financed campaigns attract more worthy 
candidates than does the traditional system or that, once elected, the 
publicly subsidized candidates vote any differently as legislators than 
do traditionally financed candidates. Moreover, some opponents question 
whether the voters in Maine or Arizona read much beyond the title--
"clean elections"--of the ballot initiatives.

Mixed Responses from Our Survey of Political Candidates:

As mentioned previously, we surveyed all candidates who ran for state 
legislature seats and applicable statewide offices in Maine's and 
Arizona's 2000 elections. Among other questions, we asked candidates to 
what extent, if at all, they agreed with the statement that once 
elected, candidates who participated in the public financing program 
have been more likely to serve the broader interests of their 
constituents as a whole and less likely to be influenced by specific 
individuals or groups. As figure 13 shows, the survey results reflected 
mixed views. Most of the responding nonparticipating candidates--67 
percent in Maine and 68 percent in Arizona--answered to "little or no 
extent." In contrast, many of the responding participating candidates-
-42 percent in Maine and 56 percent in Arizona--answered to a "great or 
very great extent.":

Figure 13: Candidate Responses about Public Financing Program and 
Interest Group Influence:

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

In our survey, we also asked candidates to what extent, if at all, they 
agreed with the statement that their respective state's public 
financing program enhanced the public's confidence in government. Here 
again, the survey results reflected mixed views from nonparticipating 
and participating candidates. Of the responding candidates, figure 14 
shows that most of the nonparticipating candidates answered to "little 
or no extent," whereas many of the participating candidates answered to 
a "great or very great extent.":

Figure 14: Candidate Responses about the Public Financing Program and 
Confidence in Government:

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Further, our survey of candidates for office in Maine's and Arizona's 
2000 elections contained an ending statement inviting respondents to 
provide any comments they believed were important about the effects of 
the respective state's public financing program. Examples of comments 
from participating candidates included the following (see app. VI):

* To be elected to the state legislature and not feel beholden to 
anyone except constituents is a liberating feeling.

* The most important effect of the public financing program has been to 
free legislatures from the influence of campaign contributors.

* Public financing takes special interest money out of government. This 
approach is the only way that elections should be run, at the state 
level and nationally.

* Arizonans seem well aware that the link between special interest 
money and special interest laws is strong and want to change it. 
Arizona and Maine are leading the way in the nation.

On the other hand, examples of comments from nonparticipating 
candidates included the following (see app. VI):

* Special interests continue to exert tremendous influence on both 
privately and publicly funded candidates. The only difference is that 
the influence on privately funded candidates is fully disclosed and 
reported, while the influence on "clean" candidates is not disclosed 
anywhere.

* Under the public funding program, lobbyists are able to continue 
their influence by simply "volunteering" to collect $5 qualifying 
contributions for participating candidates.

* People voted for the public funding program because they thought 
dirty campaigning (e.g., personal attack ads) would stop. Yet, the 2000 
election was one of the dirtiest campaign scenes in years.

* The "clean election" designation for those taking advantage of the 
public funding program implies that the traditional candidate may not 
be "clean." This is unfortunate and should be changed.

Mixed Responses from Our Survey of Citizens:

We contracted with professional pollsters to obtain the views of 
projectable samples of voting-age citizens in Maine and Arizona. 
Generally, this polling effort was designed to determine the extent to 
which the citizenry were aware of the respective state's public 
financing program and to obtain citizenry views about whether the 
program has increased citizens' confidence in government and decreased 
the influence of special interest groups. The wording of the specific 
questions was developed by us, with some assistance from the polling 
organizations (see app. I).[Footnote 30]

As table 10 shows, we asked voting-age citizens their views regarding 
the effect of the public financing program on the influence of special 
interest groups. Of the polled citizens who acknowledged some awareness 
of the respective state's applicable law, over one-half in both states 
answered that there was no effect or it was too soon to tell. In Maine, 
more respondents answered that the law had greatly or somewhat 
decreased special interest influence (25 percent) than did respondents 
who answered that the law had greatly or somewhat increased special 
interest influence (7 percent).

As table 10 further shows, we also asked voting-age citizens their 
views regarding the effect of the public financing program on their 
confidence in government. Of the polled citizens who acknowledged some 
awareness of the respective state's applicable law, almost two-thirds 
in both states answered that there was no effect or it was too soon to 
tell. Additionally, slightly more respondents in each state answered 
that the law had greatly or somewhat increased their confidence in 
state government--17 percent in Maine and 21 percent in Arizona--than 
did respondents who answered that the law had greatly or somewhat 
decreased their confidence--8 percent in Maine and 15 percent in 
Arizona.

Table 10: Maine and Arizona Citizenry Views (in Percentages) on Clean 
Election Law:

Topic: Influence of special interest groups; GAO survey questions and 
response options: Would you say that the state's clean election law has 
greatly increased, somewhat increased, has had no effect, has somewhat 
decreased, or greatly decreased the influence of special interest 
groups on legislators, or is it too soon to tell?[A].

GAO survey questions and response options: Greatly increased; Maine 
voting-age citizens[A]: 2%; Arizona voting-age citizens[A]: 4%.

GAO survey questions and response options: Somewhat increased; 
Maine voting-age citizens[A]: 5; Arizona voting-age citizens[A]: 12.

GAO survey questions and response options: Had no effect; Maine 
voting-age citizens[A]: 21; Arizona voting-age citizens[A]: 25.

GAO survey questions and response options: Somewhat decreased; 
Maine voting-age citizens[A]: 21; Arizona voting-age citizens[A]: 9.

GAO survey questions and response options: Greatly decreased; 
Maine voting-age citizens[A]: 4; Arizona voting-age citizens[A]: 2.

GAO survey questions and response options: Too soon to tell; 
Maine voting-age citizens[A]: 34; Arizona voting-age citizens[A]: 39.

GAO survey questions and response options: Unsure or declined to 
answer; Maine voting-age citizens[A]: 12; Arizona voting-age 
citizens[A]: 9.

Topic: Citizens' confidence in state government; GAO survey questions 
and response options: Would you say that the states clean election 
law has greatly increased, somewhat increased, has had no effect, has 
somewhat decreased, or greatly decreased your confidence in state 
government, or is it too soon to tell?[A]

GAO survey questions and response options: Greatly increased; 
Maine voting-age citizens[A]: 2%; Arizona voting-age citizens[A]: 2%.

GAO survey questions and response options: Somewhat increased; 
Maine voting-age citizens[A]: 15; Arizona voting-age citizens[A]: 19.

GAO survey questions and response options: Had no effect; Maine 
voting-age citizens[A]: 39; Arizona voting-age citizens[A]: 33.

GAO survey questions and response options: Somewhat decreased; 
Maine voting-age citizens[A]: 5; Arizona voting-age citizens[A]: 10.

GAO survey questions and response options: Greatly decreased; 
Maine voting-age citizens[A]: 3; Arizona voting-age citizens[A]: 5.

GAO survey questions and response options: Too soon to tell; 
Maine voting-age citizens[A]: 26; Arizona voting-age citizens[A]: 26.

GAO survey questions and response options: Unsure or declined to 
answer; 9; Arizona voting-age citizens[A]: 4.

Source: Summary statistics of GAO-contracted polling of voting-age 
citizens of Maine and Arizona (see app. I).

Notes: These two questions were asked only if the citizen indicated 
some awareness of the state's clean election law. For Maine, the number 
of respondents for these questions was 157, and the maximum 95-percent 
confidence interval for these survey results is plus or minus 8 
percentage points. For Arizona, the number of respondents for these 
questions was 433, and the maximum 95-percent confidence interval for 
these survey results is plus or minus 5 percentage points.

[A] Percentages may not total 100 percent due to rounding.:

[End of table]

Interest Group Views on Effects of Public Financing Programs:

We interviewed interest group representatives[Footnote 31] in Maine and 
Arizona to obtain their views on the effects of the public financing 
programs--including changes, if any, in how they interact with 
political candidates and legislators after inception of the programs. 
Unlike our surveys of candidates and citizens, the results of our 
interest groups interviews are anecdotal and may not be representative 
of all interest groups in the states. Nonetheless, similar to the 
candidate and citizen survey results, the lobbyists we interviewed had 
mixed views.

Representatives of one interest group told us that traditional campaign 
contributions do not necessarily influence an elected candidate's 
subsequent voting record; rather, the contributions help donors obtain 
access to discuss issues. Another lobbyist said that public funding had 
not reduced the influence of special interests. This individual noted 
that publicly funded candidates often are beholden to unions, trade 
associations, or other organizations instrumental in helping these 
candidates raise the required number of $5 qualifying contributions. In 
contrast, another lobbyist said that public financing of campaigns has 
had a positive effect on the political process and has improved 
government. This individual explained that the relationship between a 
lobbyist and a candidate/legislator now tends to be more professional 
and focuses on the contents or merits of proposed legislation rather 
than on campaign contributions.

Some interest group representatives commented that the public funding 
programs--particularly as increasing numbers of candidates 
participate--are causing changes in the roles of lobbyists and interest 
groups. For instance, the representatives noted that (except for seed 
money and $5 qualifying contributions) publicly funded candidates are 
prohibited from soliciting campaign contributions, which results in 
fewer opportunities for lobbyists to inform these candidates about the 
interests of clients. The representatives also noted that more 
contribution money now is going to political action committees or other 
groups, which has led to increased spending ("independent 
expenditures") to support or oppose certain candidates.

Generally, the interest group representatives noted that it is too soon 
to tell whether legislators who ran with public funds serve the broader 
interests of their constituents any differently or better than do 
traditionally funded candidates.

Campaign Spending: Average Candidate Spending Decreased in Maine but 
Increased in Arizona; Independent Expenditures Became More Prominent in 
Both States; Extent of Issue Advocacy Spending Not Known:

Under the public financing programs in the 2000 and 2002 elections, 
average legislative candidate spending decreased in Maine but increased 
in Arizona, compared with previous elections. Also, particularly in the 
2002 elections, both states experienced increases in independent 
expenditures--a type of campaign spending whereby political action 
committees, other groups, or individuals communicate messages to voters 
that support or oppose a clearly identified candidate but without 
coordination with any candidate. The 2002 increases in independent 
expenditures largely were associated with the gubernatorial races in 
both states. Because it is not regulated, the extent of spending for 
issue advocacy--that is, public policy messages that do not refer to a 
specific candidate--is not known.

Campaign Spending was a Principal Concern of Public Financing 
Proponents:

According to proponents of the public financing programs in Maine and 
Arizona, escalating campaign costs helped deter candidates from running 
for office. For example, a 1992 study conducted by the Maine Citizens 
Leadership Fund, a group cited as a catalyst behind Maine's law, 
concluded in part that, "The cost of running for the Maine legislature 
is exploding." Additional findings in that report suggested that "next 
steps" should include eliminating access to wealth as a determinant of 
a citizen's influence within the political process, halting and 
reversing the escalating costs of elections, and challenging the 
assumptions that public elections can and should be privately financed. 
Similarly, the "findings and declarations" preamble to Arizona's law 
states that the "current election-financing system" allows Arizona 
elected officials to accept large campaign contributions from private 
interests; favors a small number of wealthy special interests; and 
drives up the cost of running for state office, discouraging otherwise 
qualified candidates who lack personal wealth or access to special-
interest funding.

Accordingly, the public funding programs in Maine and Arizona each were 
designed to have a two-pronged approach for reducing campaign spending. 
That is, each program:

* imposed spending limits and certain other requirements on candidates 
who chose to participate in the public financing program and:

* reduced the total amount of money that nonparticipating candidates 
were allowed to accept from each campaign contributor.

The intended outcome of this approach was to lower the cost of running 
for office by reducing and capping the amount of money available for 
campaign spending.[Footnote 32] Generally, campaign spending comprises 
two components--spending by candidates and independent expenditures. 
Both of these spending components are tracked by the agencies 
responsible for administering the public financing programs--Maine's 
Commission on Governmental Ethics and Election Practices and Arizona's 
Citizens Clean Elections Commission. Such tracking is important because 
publicly financed candidates can receive matching funds based on 
spending by or for traditionally financed candidates, or spending 
opposing a participating candidate.

On the other hand, neither commission tracks issue advocacy spending. 
Issue advocacy--interpreted by the courts as being protected free 
speech--usually takes the form of media advertisements that do not 
expressly advocate for or against a clearly identified political 
candidate. Generally, there are no requirements for reporting issue 
advocacy spending to any state or federal agency.

Average Legislative Candidate Spending Declined in Maine but Increased 
in Arizona:

Compared to the 1996 and 1998 elections, average legislative candidate 
spending decreased in Maine in the 2000 and 2002 elections but 
increased in Arizona, as figure 15 shows. Specifically, for Maine house 
races, average candidate spending in the recent elections (2000 and 
2002) was lower than the averages for previous elections (1996 and 
1998), although the 2002 average reflected an increase from 2000. For 
Maine senate races, average candidate spending decreased in each of the 
two recent elections. In Arizona, however, average legislative 
candidate spending increased substantially--by about 55 percent for 
house candidates and 80 percent for senate candidates--in the first 
year that public funding became available. These dissimilar spending 
trends may be partly due to differences in the two states' provisions 
for distributing funds to candidates who participated in the public 
financing program. In Maine's program, distribution amounts were based 
on whether the participating candidate ran for a house or a senate 
seat. But, in Arizona's program, equal amounts were distributed to 
participating legislative candidates, regardless of legislative office 
type (see app. II). Thus, in Arizona's 2000 elections, a participating 
house or senate candidate who faced a challenger in both the primary 
and general elections received a minimum of $23,389.[Footnote 33] This 
guaranteed minimum allocation was $6,189 more than the average amount 
that house candidates spent in 1998. If the release of matching 
funds[Footnote 34] had been triggered, the potential maximum allocation 
to a house candidate in Arizona would have been $70,166 in 2000, after 
adjustment for inflation.

Figure 15: Average Maine and Arizona Legislative Candidate Spending 
(1996, 1998, 2000, and 2002):

[See PDF for image]

Note: In the figure, we did not include any candidate who reported 
spending zero dollars or did not run in the general election. For those 
candidates, spending includes primary and general election amounts 
combined. With 1996 as the base year, we adjusted all spending amounts 
for inflation using the Department of Commerce's (Bureau of Economic 
Analysis) gross domestic product implicit price deflator.

[A] Includes one candidate who spent $143,199. When this candidate is 
excluded, the average drops to $15,065.

[End of figure]

For the two elections (2000 and 2002) under the public financing 
programs in Maine and Arizona, we compared average spending by 
nonparticipating and participating legislative candidates. As figure 16 
shows:

* In Maine house races, average spending by each type of candidate was 
roughly equal each year--with nonparticipating candidate spending 
slightly higher in 2000, and participating candidate spending slightly 
higher in 2002. For Maine senate races in 2000, average spending by 
nonparticipating candidates was comparatively higher. However, one 
candidate in the 2000 senate race spent $143,199 in winning the 
election (fig. 16, note a). In 2002 senate races, participating 
candidates spent more than nonparticipating candidates, on average.

* In Arizona, for house races in both years, average spending by 
participating candidates was considerably higher than average spending 
by nonparticipating candidates. For senate races, nonparticipating 
candidates had the higher spending average in 2000, whereas 
participating candidates had the higher spending average in 2002.

Figure 16: Average Maine and Arizona Legislative Candidate Spending by 
Participation Status (2000 and 2002):

[See PDF for image]

Note: In the figure, we did not include any candidate who reported 
spending zero dollars or did not run in the general election. For those 
candidates, spending includes primary and general election amounts 
combined. With 1996 as the base year, we adjusted all spending amounts 
for inflation using the Department of Commerce's (Bureau of Economic 
Analysis) gross domestic product implicit price deflator.

[A] Includes one candidate who spent $143,199. When this candidate is 
excluded, the average drops to $15,664.

[End of figure]

Spending by Statewide Office Candidates in Maine and Arizona:

In Maine, the gubernatorial election is the only statewide office race 
where candidates may choose to participate in the public financing 
program. The first election in which candidates for this office were 
eligible to participate was 2002. We compared candidate 
spending[Footnote 35] for the two most recent gubernatorial elections 
(2002 and 1998) in Maine:

* Total spending by gubernatorial candidates was about $930,000 in 1998 
and about $3.4 million in 2002.[Footnote 36] Average gubernatorial 
candidate spending was about $186,000 in 1998 and about $843,000 in 
2002.

* In 2002, only one gubernatorial candidate (Green Independent Party) 
ran with public funding in both the primary and the general elections. 
This candidate spent a total of approximately $837,000. One other 
candidate (Republican Party) ran and lost as a participating candidate 
in the primary election. This candidate spent approximately $296,000.

In Arizona, there are seven statewide office races where candidates may 
choose to participate in the program--Governor, Attorney General, 
Secretary of State, Corporation Commissioner, State Treasurer, 
Superintendent of Public Instruction, and Mine Inspector. In 2000, only 
candidates for Corporation Commissioner were eligible to participate in 
the public funding program. Candidates for the other statewide offices 
became eligible to participate in 2002. Table 11 compares spending for 
statewide offices in 1998 and 2002, the 2 most recent years where all 
statewide offices were on the ballot in Arizona.

Table 11: Spending by Candidates for Statewide Offices in Arizona (1998 
and 2002):

Dollars in thousands.

Governor; Average and total candidate spending by 
election year: 1998: Average: $833.3; Average and 
total candidate spending by election year: 1998: Total: $3,333.0; 
Average and total candidate spending by election year: 2002: Average: 
$1,131.3; Average and total candidate spending by election year: 2002: 
Total: $5,656.6.

Attorney General; Average and total candidate 
spending by election year: 1998: Average: $762.4; 
Average and total candidate spending by election year: 1998: Total: 
$1,524.8; Average and total candidate spending by election year: 2002: 
Average: $292.6; Average and total candidate spending by election year: 
2002: Total: $585.3.

Secretary of State; Average and total candidate 
spending by election year: 1998: Average: $239.3; 
Average and total candidate spending by election year: 1998: Total: 
$478.7; Average and total candidate spending by election year: 2002: 
Average: $159.9; Average and total candidate spending by election year: 
2002: Total: $479.6.

Corporation Commissioner[A]; Average and total 
candidate spending by election year: 1998: Average: $139.2; Dollars in 
thousands: Average and total candidate spending by election year: 
1998: 
Total: $278.3; Average and total candidate spending by election year: 
2002: Average: $97.2; Average and total candidate spending by election 
year: 2002: Total: $583.0.

State Treasurer; Average and total candidate 
spending by election year: 1998: Average: $69.0; 
Average and total candidate spending by election year: 1998: Total: 
$69.0; Average and total candidate spending by election year: 2002: 
Average: $106.5; Average and total candidate spending by election year: 
2002: Total: $213.1.

Superintendent of Public Instruction; Average and 
total candidate spending by election year: 1998: Average: $14.4; 
Average and total candidate spending by election 
year: 1998: Total: $28.8; Average and total candidate spending by 
election year: 2002: Average: $349.5; Average and total candidate 
spending by election year: 2002: Total: $699.0.

State Mine Inspector; Average and total candidate 
spending by election year: 1998: Average: $8.2; 
Average and total candidate spending by election year: 1998: Total: 
$8.2; Average and total candidate spending by election year: 2002: 
Average: $54.6; Average and total candidate spending by election year: 
2002: Total: $109.3.

Source: GAO analysis of state data.

Note 1: Spending amounts do not include any candidate who reported 
spending zero dollars or did not run in the general election. For those 
candidates, spending includes primary and general election amounts 
combined. With 1996 as the base year, we adjusted all spending amounts 
for inflation using the Department of Commerce's (Bureau of Economic 
Analysis) gross domestic product implicit price deflator.

Note 2: Because some races had a very small number of candidates, and 
some candidates spent a very small or very large amount, averages may 
be misleading. For example, in the 2002 race for Superintendent of 
Public Instruction, one of the three general election candidates spent 
nearly $600,000.

[A] In 1998, there was one open seat for Corporation Commissioner. In 
2000, there were two open seats for Corporation Commissioner--one for a 
term ending in 2005 and one for a term ending in 2007, where a total of 
about $311,000 and an average of about $78,000 was spent. In 2002, 
there were three Corporation Commission seats open; one race was for 
two seats with terms ending in 2005, and the other race was for one 
seat with a term ending in 2007.

[End of table]

For the 2002 election in Arizona, table 12 compares spending by 
nonparticipating and participating candidates for statewide offices. As 
shown, four of the seven statewide office races had both 
nonparticipating and participating candidates--Governor, Secretary of 
State, Corporation Commissioner, and Superintendent of Public 
Instruction. In three of the four races, the average and total spending 
amounts by participating candidates exceeded those of the 
nonparticipating candidates. In the race for the other statewide 
office--Superintendent of Public Instruction--the nonparticipating 
candidate spent about five times more than the participating candidate.

Table 12: Spending by Candidates for Statewide Offices in Arizona by 
Participation Status (2002):

Office: Governor; Average and total candidate 
spending by participation status: Nonparticipating candidates: 
Average: $658.3; Average and total candidate spending by participation 
status: Nonparticipating candidates: Total: $1,974.9; Average and total 
candidate spending by participation status: Participating candidates: 
Average: $1,840.8; Average and total candidate spending by 
participation status: Participating candidates: Total: $3,681.8.

Office: Attorney General; Average and total 
candidate spending by participation status: Nonparticipating 
candidates: Average: [A]; Average and total candidate spending by 
participation status: Nonparticipating candidates: Total: [A]; Average 
and total candidate spending by participation status: Participating 
candidates: Average: $292.6; Average and total candidate spending by 
participation status: Participating candidates: Total: $585.3.

Office: Secretary of State; Average and total 
candidate spending by participation status: Nonparticipating 
candidates: Average: $3.3; Average and total candidate spending by 
participation status: Nonparticipating candidates: Total: $3.3; 
Average and total candidate spending by participation status: 
Participating candidates: Average: $238.1; Average and total candidate 
spending by participation status: Participating candidates: Total: 
$476.3.

Office: Corporation Commissioner; Average and 
total candidate spending by participation status: Nonparticipating 
candidates: Average: $38.5; Average and total candidate spending by 
participation status: Nonparticipating candidates: Total: $38.5; 
Average and total candidate spending by participation status: 
Participating candidates: Average: $108.9; Average and total candidate 
spending by participation status: Participating candidates: Total: 
$544.5.

Office: State Treasurer; Average and total 
candidate spending by participation status: Nonparticipating 
candidates: Average: [A]; Average and total candidate spending by 
participation status: Nonparticipating candidates: Total: [A]; Average 
and total candidate spending by participation status: Participating 
candidates: Average: $106.5; Average and total candidate spending by 
participation status: Participating candidates: Total: $213.1.

Office: Superintendent of Public Instruction; 
Average and total candidate spending by participation status: 
Nonparticipating candidates: Average: $590.6; Average and total 
candidate spending by participation status: Nonparticipating 
candidates: Total: $590.6; Average and total candidate spending by 
participation status: Participating candidates: Average: $108.4; 
Average and total candidate spending by participation status: 
Participating candidates: Total: $108.4.

Office: State Mine Inspector; Average and total 
candidate spending by participation status: Nonparticipating 
candidates: Average: [A]; Average and total candidate spending by 
participation status: Nonparticipating candidates: Total: [A]; Average 
and total candidate spending by participation status: Participating 
candidates: Average: $54.6; Average and total candidate spending by 
participation status: Participating candidates: Total: $109.3.

Source: GAO analysis of state data.

Note: Spending amounts do not include any candidate who reported 
spending zero dollars or did not run in the general election. For those 
candidates, spending includes primary and general election amounts 
combined. With 1996 as the base year, we adjusted all spending amounts 
for inflation using the Department of Commerce's (Bureau of Economic 
Analysis) gross domestic product implicit price deflator.

[A] Not applicable.

[End of table]

Independent Expenditures Increasing in Maine and Arizona:

Maine's definition of "independent expenditures"[Footnote 37] 
generally follows that established by the U.S. Supreme Court in a 1976 
ruling.[Footnote 38] That is, independent expenditures are for campaign 
communications in the form of "express advocacy"--explicitly endorsing 
or opposing one candidate by using words such as "vote for," "elect," 
"cast your ballot for," "vote against," or "defeat."[Footnote 39] 
Arizona's definition includes the same guidance, but also broadens the 
definition of "express advocacy" to include, "A campaign slogan or 
words that can have no other reasonable meaning than to advocate the 
election or defeat of one or more clearly identified 
candidate(s)."[Footnote 40] In both states, all other political 
communications not falling into the express advocacy category, such as 
public policy messages that do not explicitly endorse or oppose a 
candidate, are called "issue advocacy" communications.[Footnote 41]

Typically, independent expenditures are undertaken in federal and state 
elections by political action committees to support or oppose 
candidates to a greater extent than permitted by rules applicable to 
direct campaign contributions. The Director of Maine's Commission on 
Governmental Ethics and Election Practices told us that, for 1998 and 
earlier years, the amounts of reported independent expenditures in the 
state were negligible. However, in the 2000 and 2002 elections in 
Maine, and in the 2002 elections in Arizona, independent expenditures 
increased significantly. The 2002 increases were largely associated 
with gubernatorial races in both states. More specifically (see table 
13):

* In Maine, of the $595,000 total independent expenditures in 2002, 
about 67 percent were associated with one gubernatorial candidate. The 
other 33 percent was associated with 118 legislative candidates.

* In Arizona, of the $2.6 million total independent expenditures in 
2002, more than 92 percent was associated with two gubernatorial 
candidates.[Footnote 42]

Table 13: Independent Expenditures in Maine and Arizona (1998, 2000, 
and 2002):

Dollars in thousands.

Maine; Independent expenditures by election year: 1998: negligible; 
Independent expenditures by election year: 2000: $136.0; Independent 
expenditures by election year: 2002: $595.0.

Arizona; Independent expenditures by election year: 1998: $80.7; 
Independent expenditures by election year: 2000: $38.3; Independent 
expenditures by election year: 2002: $2,610.4.

Source: Data provided by state officials.

[End of table]

Our survey of Maine's and Arizona's candidates in the 2000 elections 
included a question asking for views about the role of independent 
expenditures in future elections. Figure 17 shows that most of the 
traditionally funded candidates who responded--55 percent in Maine and 
52 percent in Arizona--agreed to a great or very great extent with the 
statement that independent expenditures will play an increasingly 
significant role in the 2002 and future elections. Also, many of the 
publicly funded candidates who responded--47 percent in Maine and 33 
percent in Arizona--expressed similar agreement. Further, this view was 
shared by many of the other knowledgeable individuals we interviewed in 
the two states.

Figure 17: Extent to Which Candidates in the 2000 Elections Agreed with 
the Statement That Independent Expenditures Would Become Increasingly 
Important in 2002 and Future Elections:

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Views on Issue Advocacy Spending in Maine and Arizona:

Because spending for issue advocacy is not regulated, we found no 
sources to quantify these funds in Maine and Arizona. Our survey of 
Maine's and Arizona's candidates in the 2000 elections included a 
question asking for views about future levels of issue advocacy 
spending. As figure 18 shows, most of the traditionally funded 
candidates who responded--63 percent in Maine and 55 percent in 
Arizona--agreed to a great or very great extent with the statement that 
increasing amounts of money will be spent for issue advocacy ads in the 
2002 and future elections. Also, many of the publicly funded candidates 
who responded--45 percent in Maine and 28 percent in Arizona--expressed 
similar agreement.

Figure 18: Extent to Which Candidates in the 2000 Elections Agreed with 
the Statement That Issue Advocacy Spending Would Increase in the 2002 
and Future Elections:

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Voter Participation: No Clear Link to Public Financing Program:

In the 2000 election, voter turnout in Maine increased 4 percentage 
points compared with the previous presidential election year (1996), 
whereas Arizona's turnout remained unchanged. Because voter turnout can 
be influenced by numerous factors, the extent (if any) to which the 
public financing programs in these states affected turnout is not 
easily quantifiable. However, these programs probably had limited 
effect on turnout in the 2000 elections, particularly given that many 
of Maine's and Arizona's voting-age citizens were unaware of their 
respective state's public financing program.

Comparison of 2000 Turnout to Previous Elections:

Voter turnout--usually defined as the number of votes cast in a race 
divided by the voting-age population--is an important component of 
citizens' participation in the political process. As a multiyear trend, 
turnout percentages in the United States indicate that much of the 
electorate is largely disengaged from politics, although turnout 
percentages consistently have been higher in presidential election 
years than in mid-term congressional election years. Regarding 
individual states, Maine's turnout generally has exceeded the national 
turnout percentages, while Arizona's turnout has been below the 
national figures.

Specifically, to provide an overview perspective, table 14 shows voter 
turnout in Maine, Arizona, and the United States for the 4 most recent 
presidential election years and 3 recent mid-term congressional 
election years. As shown, for the 2000 election (a presidential 
election year), voter turnout in Maine was 68 percent, which was an 
increase of 4 percentage points over turnout in the previous 
presidential election year, 1996--whereas, Arizona's turnout was 42 
percent in both of these years (2000 and 1996).

Table 14: Voter Turnout in Maine, Arizona, and the United States, 1988 
through 2000:

Election year: 1988[A]; Turnout as a percentage of voting-age 
population: Maine: 62%; Turnout as a percentage of voting-age 
population: Arizona: 46%; Turnout as a percentage of voting-age 
population: United States: 50%.

Election year: 1990; Turnout as a percentage of voting-age population: 
Maine: 57; Turnout as a percentage of voting-age population: Arizona: 
36; Turnout as a percentage of voting-age population: United States: 
37.

Election year: 1992[A]; Turnout as a percentage of voting-age 
population: Maine: 73; Turnout as a percentage of voting-age 
population: Arizona: 53; Turnout as a percentage of voting-age 
population: United States: 55.

Election year: 1994; Turnout as a percentage of voting-age population: 
Maine: 55; Turnout as a percentage of voting-age population: Arizona: 
39; Turnout as a percentage of voting-age population: United States: 
39.

Election year: 1996[A]; Turnout as a percentage of voting-age 
population: Maine: 64; Turnout as a percentage of voting-age 
population: Arizona: 42; Turnout as a percentage of voting-age 
population: United States: 49.

Election year: 1998; Turnout as a percentage of voting-age population: 
Maine: 45; Turnout as a percentage of voting-age population: Arizona: 
29; Turnout as a percentage of voting-age population: United States: 
36.

Election year: 2000[A]; Turnout as a percentage of voting-age 
population: Maine: 68; Turnout as a percentage of voting-age 
population: Arizona: 42; Turnout as a percentage of voting-age 
population: United States: 51.

Election year: Average of 1988, 1992, and 1996; Turnout as a percentage 
of voting-age population: Maine: 66%; Turnout as a percentage of 
voting-age population: Arizona: 47%; Turnout as a percentage of voting-
age population: United States: 51%.

Election year: Average of 1990, 1994, and 1998; Turnout as a percentage 
of voting-age population: Maine: 52%; Turnout as a percentage of 
voting-age population: Arizona: 35%; Turnout as a percentage of voting-
age population: United States: 37%.

Source: GAO analysis of state, Federal Elections Commission, and U.S. 
Census Bureau data.

Note: At the time of our study, data were unavailable to calculate 
turnout as a percentage of the voting-age population for the 2002 
elections.

[A] Presidential election year.

[End of table]

Voter Turnout Influenced by Many Factors:

According to some analysts, voter turnout can be predicted based on 
various factors, such as age, income, recency of registration, and 
previous voting history. For example, studies have shown that much 
higher percentages of older Americans vote than do younger citizens. 
Nevertheless, the extent (if any) to which Maine's and Arizona's public 
financing programs affected these states' voter turnout in the 2000 
elections is not easily quantifiable. That is, voter turnout can be 
influenced by a broad range of factors, including the following:

* The candidates and their messages: Do the candidates have personal 
popularity, or are the candidates uninspiring? Are there sharp issue 
distinctions?

* Mobilization efforts: How extensive are the parties' grassroots 
efforts to get out the vote?

* Media interest: Are there high-profile, competitive contests? Do the 
races have statewide or national importance?

* Campaign spending: What amounts of financial resources have 
candidates, parties, and interest groups expended on the campaign? 
Increased campaign spending, however, does not necessarily translate 
into greater numbers of voters at the polls.

* Negative advertising: Has negative advertising resulted in voter 
cynicism and disaffection? According to the Committee for the Study of 
the American Electorate,[Footnote 43] negative advertising does tend to 
decrease voter turnout.

In short, voter behavior is a complicated, multivariate topic--with no 
one reason explaining voting or nonvoting.

Many Citizens Unaware of Public Financing Program:

There is some indication, however, that Maine's and Arizona's public 
financing programs probably had limited effect on voter turnout in the 
2000 elections. That is, as part of our study, we contracted with 
professional pollsters to determine the extent to which a projectable 
sample of voting-age citizens in these two states were aware of the 
respective state's public financing program. According to the polling 
results, an estimated 60 percent of Maine's voting-age citizens and an 
estimated 37 percent of Arizona's voting-age citizens answered that 
they knew "nothing at all" about the public financing program.[Footnote 
44]

In actuality, these "unawareness" percentages may be understated in 
reference to the time of the 2000 elections. Our polling of voting-age 
citizens in Maine and Arizona was conducted in October 2002, which was 
almost 2 years after the 2000 elections. During this 2-year period, the 
respective public financing program received considerable amounts of 
publicity--based on the promotional efforts of program proponents, as 
well as on the legal challenges or other opposition voiced by 
opponents. Had our polling been conducted in late 2000, the unawareness 
percentages may have been even greater than 60 percent and 37 percent, 
respectively.

In sum, high levels of citizenry unawareness, coupled with a broad 
range of other potentially relevant factors, lessen the likelihood that 
the public financing program was a significant influence on voter 
turnout in Maine's and Arizona's 2000 elections.

Concluding Observations:

Under Maine's and Arizona's public financing programs, with only two 
elections from which to observe legislative races and only one election 
from which to observe most statewide races, it is too early to 
precisely draw causal linkages to resulting changes, if any, involving 
voter choice, electoral competition, interest group influence, campaign 
spending, and voter participation. Many factors can affect elections--
factors such as term limits and redistricting, state and local campaign 
issues, and even whether the particular year involved a presidential or 
a gubernatorial election. In implementing these new wide-ranging 
campaign finance reforms, state officials told us that many factors 
contributed to an uncertain and constantly changing environment--such 
as legal challenges to the program--which also affected these 
elections. Thus, it is difficult to separate or disassociate the 
effects of these factors from the effects of the public financing 
programs.

Moreover, even for other states that have a longer history with more 
limited forms of public financing, published studies have reported 
mixed findings on the effects of the programs. As represented in the 
available literature, there seems to be little agreement as to how 
public financing programs affect elections.

Our work indicated that perceptions of Maine's and Arizona's public 
financing programs are widely divergent and frequently ideologically 
based. Irrespective of differences in perceptions or ideologies, it is 
clear that--in both states--considerably larger numbers of candidates 
chose to participate in the public funding programs in 2002 than in 
2000. In both states, many observers told us they expected that future 
elections will experience continued growth in program participation. 
For example, political party officers we interviewed said that, even 
though they may oppose the program for ideological or other reasons, 
public funding presents strategic opportunities that any candidate must 
consider.

Some researchers have pointed out that, in some instances, electoral 
competitiveness may be enhanced by increased campaign spending. Thus, 
two goals of the public financing programs--increase electoral 
competition and curb increases in campaign spending--can be at odds 
with each other. Also, state officials and candidates told us that 
campaign spending can increase when political action committees, other 
groups, or individuals make independent expenditures in a competitive 
race to support a traditionally funded candidate--which, in turn, could 
trigger matching funds for a publicly financed candidate. Further, 
critics have argued that, in Maine, the public financing program's goal 
of curbing increases in campaign spending is undermined because 
participating candidates are allowed to form political action 
committees to raise funds and make independent expenditures to support 
or oppose other candidates.

Finally, in terms of legislative flexibility for making adjustments to 
meet future fiscal circumstances or other needs, one aspect of the two 
states' public financing programs is distinctly different. As mentioned 
previously, the respective programs became law in Maine and Arizona 
through citizen initiative. In Maine, once such an initiative has been 
supported and becomes law, the standard legislative process can be used 
to make subsequent changes or modifications. In Arizona, however, any 
law enacted through such a process is afforded unique protection. For 
an initiative-based law to be changed in Arizona, the modification 
(e.g., amendment) must be supported by three-fourths of the members of 
each body of the legislature, and the modification must also further 
the intent of the initial law. Thus, while Maine's public financing 
program is as flexible as any other general statute, Arizona's program 
is relatively inflexible. In response to our inquiries, for example, 
staff of Arizona's Citizens Clean Elections Commission told us that, 
although there were concerns that the reporting requirements of the 
state's 1998 Act were too complex and had led to many honest mistakes 
on the part of campaign volunteers, the prospects for changing the law 
were limited, given the legislative hurdles.

We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional 
committees and subcommittees. We will also make copies available to 
others on request. In addition, the report will be available at no 
charge on GAO's Web site at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staffs have any questions about this report or wish to 
discuss the matter further, please contact me at (202) 512-8777 or 
Danny R. Burton at (214) 777-5600. Other key contributors are 
acknowledged in appendix VII.

Norman J. Rabkin, Managing Director 
Homeland Security and Justice Issues:

Signed by Norman J. Rabkin: 

[End of section]

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:

Objectives:

In accordance with the mandate specified in Section 310 of the 
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-155, 2002), this 
study:

* Provides statistics showing the number of candidates who chose to use 
public funds to run for legislative seats or statewide offices in the 
2000 elections in Maine and Arizona, the seats or offices for which 
they were candidates, whether the candidates were incumbents or 
challengers, whether the candidates were successful in their bids, and 
the number of races in which at least one candidate ran an election 
with public funds.

* Describes the extent to which the goals of Maine's and Arizona's 
public financing programs were met in the 2000 elections. That is, we 
studied what changes, if any, occurred in voter choice (number of 
candidates), electoral competition, interest group influence, campaign 
spending, and voter participation (voter turnout)--five indicators 
related to goals of the programs.

To provide a broader perspective, as we agreed with the offices of the 
Chairmen and Ranking Members of the Senate Committee on Rules and 
Administration and the Committee on House Administration, this study 
also presents available statistics and related information regarding 
the 2002 elections in Maine and Arizona.

Overview of Our Scope and Methodology:

Initially, we conducted a literature search to identify relevant 
reports, studies, articles, and other documents regarding campaign 
finance reform in the United States generally, as well as in Maine and 
Arizona specifically. Because campaign finance reform can be both 
complex and contentious, we wanted to ensure that our background 
reading included a broad spectrum of views, encompassing both 
proponents and opponents of public financing. (See bibliography.):

Also, we reviewed information available on the Web sites of the state 
agencies responsible for administering the respective public financing 
program in the two study states--Maine's Commission on Governmental 
Ethics and Election Practices (www.state.me.us/ethics) and Arizona's 
Citizens Clean Elections Commission (www.ccec.state.az.us).

Generally, in directly addressing the objectives, we analyzed available 
statistical data on the 2000 and 2002 elections in Maine and Arizona, 
visited both states to interview election officials and interest group 
representatives, analyzed responses from a survey of all candidates who 
ran in the 2000 elections for seats in the Maine and Arizona 
legislatures and the Arizona Corporation Commission, and contracted 
with professional pollsters to obtain the views of voting-age citizens 
in both states. Further details about the scope and methodology of our 
work regarding each of the objectives are presented in separate 
sections below.

Scope and Methodology: Statistical Information Regarding the 2000 and 
2002 Elections:

To obtain the congressionally mandated and the agreed-upon statistical 
information regarding the 2000 and 2002 elections, we contacted 
officials at Maine's and Arizona's Office of the Secretary of State--
the agencies responsible for supervising and administering elections 
laws and activities, including certifying state candidates for the 
ballot and tabulating official election results. Also, we contacted 
officials at Maine's Commission on Governmental Ethics and Election 
Practices and Arizona's Citizens Clean Elections Commission--the 
agencies responsible for administering the respective state's public 
financing program, including certifying that applicable candidates have 
met qualifications for receiving public funds. Specifically, for each 
state, we obtained data showing:

* the number of candidates who chose to use public funds to run for 
legislative seats or statewide offices in the 2000 and the 2002 
elections,

* the seats or offices for which they were candidates,

* whether the candidates were incumbents or challengers,

* whether the candidates were successful in their bids,

* and the number of races in which at least one candidate ran an 
election with public funds (see tables 1 through 4).

As used in our report, "challengers" consist of all nonincumbent 
candidates. Thus, a candidate who was not an incumbent is called a 
challenger, even if that candidate did not face an opponent. Also, in 
counting races, we included all races in which there was a candidate on 
the ballot regardless of whether or not the candidate faced a 
challenger.

Scope and Methodology: Extent to Which Goals of Public Financing 
Programs Were Met:

In studying the extent to which the goals of the public financing 
programs in Maine and Arizona were met, we focused on identifying what 
changes, if any, occurred regarding five indicators--voter choice 
(number of candidates), electoral competition, interest group 
influence, campaign spending, and voter participation (voter turnout). 
The scope and methodology of our work included:

* conducting various data-based analyses of the 2000 and 2002 elections 
in both states;

* interviewing individuals in both states--e.g., elected officials, 
political party leaders, and interest group representatives--to obtain 
a wide range of perspectives;

* surveying all candidates who ran in the 2000 elections for seats in 
the Maine and Arizona legislatures and the Arizona Corporation 
Commission; and:

* contracting with professional pollsters to obtain the views of 
voting-age citizens in both states.

Specifically, the following sections separately discuss the scope and 
methodology of our work for each the five goal-related indicators. It 
should be emphasized that describing or interpreting the effects of 
public financing on elections should be approached cautiously, partly 
because 1 election cycle's results or even 2 election cycle's results 
may not be sufficient. Also, term limits, redistricting, the ambiguous 
environment that surrounded the implementation of the new campaign 
finance programs, and other factors not directly related to public or 
private financing can affect electoral campaigns and results.

Voter Choice:

To determine whether public financing encouraged more state legislative 
candidates to run for office, we calculated the average annual number 
of candidates per legislative primary and general election race for the 
4 most recent election years (1996, 1998, 2000, and 2002). Also, to 
determine whether there were different types of candidates running for 
office, we compared candidates' party affiliations and the number of 
third-party or independent legislative candidates for these 4 election 
years and determined if these candidates participated in the public 
financing program. Further, for applicable statewide offices, which 
generally have 4-year terms, we compared the number of candidates in 
the 3 most recent election years (1994, 1998, and 2002) and determined 
to what extent these candidates were publicly funded (2002). To conduct 
these analyses, we obtained data on candidates from:

* the state of Maine's Department of the Secretary of State and the 
Maine Commission on Governmental Ethics and Election Practices and:

* the state of Arizona's Secretary of State Office and the Citizens 
Clean Elections Commission.

Also, our survey (discussed below) of candidates in Maine's and 
Arizona's 2000 elections included questions about voter choice.

Electoral Competition:

In designing our approach, we first reviewed public finance literature 
and identified three widely used measures of electoral competition--
number of contested races (races with more than one candidate), 
incumbent reelection rates, and incumbent victory margins. We then 
analyzed election data in Maine and Arizona using these three measures:

* Number of contested races. We measured whether there was an increase 
in the number of contested (more than one candidate on the ballot) 
legislative primary election races in Maine and Arizona over 4 election 
years (1996, 1998, 2000, and 2002). For 2000 and 2002, we identified 
the extent to which the contested races had publicly funded candidates.

* Incumbent reelection rates. We measured whether there was a change in 
the number of incumbents being reelected to office in Maine and Arizona 
over 4 election years (1996, 1998, 2000, and 2002).

* Incumbent victory margins. For legislative general election races in 
Maine and Arizona, we measured the margin of difference between the 
incumbent winners of the races and the runners-up. Based on our 
literature review and discussions with researchers, we defined races as 
being "competitive" if the difference in votes garnered between the 
winning incumbent and the runner-up was 15 percentage points or less. 
We then examined the extent to which these competitive races had 
publicly funded candidates.

Also, our survey (discussed below) of candidates in Maine's and 
Arizona's 2000 elections included questions about electoral 
competition.

Logistic Regression Models:

To test the overall effect, if any, of Maine's and Arizona's public 
financing programs on competitive races as defined by incumbent victory 
margins, we used logistic regression models. Logistic regression is a 
standard multivariate statistical procedure for estimating the size and 
significance of the effects of categorical or continuous variables on 
dichotomous outcomes, such as whether or not election races were 
competitive. We tested the effect of five independent variables on our 
dependent variable, competitive races. As mentioned previously, we 
defined a competitive race as one in which the difference in votes 
garnered between the winner and the runner-up was 15 percentage points 
or less. Our five independent variables were four categorical 
variables--public financing program participation or nonparticipation, 
winning candidate campaign status (incumbent or not), election year 
(2000 or 2002), and legislative seat (House or Senate)--and one 
continuous variable, that is, total candidate spending by the winner 
and runner-up.

The size of the effects is measured by odds ratios, which indicate how 
the odds on being in one category of the outcome measure (in our case, 
an election race being competitive) vary across categories or values of 
the different variables being considered. Essentially, the odds of an 
election race being competitive were obtained by simply dividing the 
number of competitive races by the number of races that were not 
competitive. For example, among total races in which either candidate 
(the winner or the runner-up) participated in the public financing 
program, if 50 candidates were competitive while 10 were not, the odds 
on races with a participating candidate being competitive were 5.0 (or 
50 divided by 10). If, among total races in which neither candidate 
(the winner or the runner-up) participated in the public financing 
program, 100 were competitive while 10 were not, the odds on races with 
a nonparticipating candidate being competitive were 10.0 (or 100 
divided by 10). The odds ratio obtained by dividing the former odds by 
the latter (i.e., 5.0 divided by 10.0 equals 0.50) provides an estimate 
of the difference between races with and without publicly financed 
candidates and can be interpreted as indicating that the races with a 
participating candidate are half as likely to be competitive compared 
with races with nonparticipating candidates.

Table 15 shows the results--the odds ratio coefficients--of our tests 
using the logistic regression models. As indicated, the odds ratio 
coefficients associated with participation in Maine's public financing 
program (0.65) and Arizona's program (3.43) were not significant at the 
0.05 level. That is, the results indicate that participation did not 
significantly affect competitive races. However, these results should 
be interpreted with caution, given the relatively few variables and the 
limited amount of data included in the models.

Table 15: Results of Logistic Regression Models Testing the Effect of 
Public Financing Programs on Competitive Races:

Variables: Categorical variables: Public financing program 
participation: Races in which at least one candidate (the winner or the 
runner-up) participated in the program (versus races in which neither 
candidate participated); Odds ratio coefficients: Maine[A]: 0.65; Odds 
ratio coefficients: Arizona[B]: 3.43.

Variables: Categorical variables: Winning candidate campaign status: 
Races in which the winner was an incumbent (versus races in which the 
winner was not an incumbent); Odds ratio coefficients: Maine[A]: 
0.34[C]; Odds ratio coefficients: Arizona[B]: 1.18.

Variables: Categorical variables: Election year: Races in year 2000 
(versus races in year 2002); Odds ratio coefficients: Maine[A]: 
0.54[C]; Odds ratio coefficients: Arizona[B]: 3.99.

Variables: Categorical variables: Legislative seat: Races for House 
seats (versus races for Senate seats); Odds ratio coefficients: 
Maine[A]: 1.56; Odds ratio coefficients: Arizona[B]: d.

Variables: Continuous variable; Odds ratio 
coefficients: Maine[A]: Odds ratio coefficients: Arizona[B]: 
[Empty].

Variables: Total candidate spending: Total 
amount spent in a race by both candidates (winner and runner-up) 
combined; Odds ratio coefficients: Maine[A]: 1.03[C]; Odds ratio 
coefficients: Arizona[B]: 1.02[C].

Source: GAO analysis of state data.

Note: Our analysis included data for only the winner and the runner-up 
in elections with more than two candidates.

[A] Includes both House and Senate races.

[B] Includes only Senate races.

[C] Odds ratio coefficients that are significant at the 0.05 level.

[D] Data not applicable.

[End of table]

Interest Group Influence:

To address this topic, we included relevant questions in our survey of 
candidates in Maine's and Arizona's 2000 elections. Also, we contracted 
with professional pollsters who conduct omnibus telephone surveys with 
representative samples of voting-age citizens specifically in Maine and 
Arizona. Our surveys of candidates and citizens are discussed in more 
detail in separate sections below. Further, in both states, we 
interviewed various interest group representatives (see tables 16 and 
17).

Campaign Spending:

To determine changes in candidate spending in Maine and Arizona, we 
calculated average legislative candidate spending over 4 election years 
(1996, 1998, 2000, and 2002) and statewide candidate spending over 2 
election years (1998 and 2002). For comparisons across years and to 
observe any trends, with 1996 as the base year and using the Department 
of Commerce's (Bureau of Economic Analysis) gross domestic product 
implicit price deflator, we adjusted all candidate spending for 
inflation. Data on candidate spending in Maine were available for 1996, 
1998, and 2000 in annual and biennial reports published by Maine's 
Commission on Governmental Ethics and Election Practices. Candidate 
spending data for Maine's 2002 elections were available electronically 
from the Maine Public Access Campaign Finance site.[Footnote 45] Data 
for candidate spending in Arizona were provided to us electronically by 
the Office of the Secretary of State.

To the extent possible, we also identified independent expenditures as 
they related to these elections. Also, in both states, we obtained 
testimonial evidence regarding the significance of issue advocacy 
spending. Further, our survey (discussed below) of candidates in 
Maine's and Arizona's 2000 elections included questions about campaign 
spending.

Voter Participation:

To provide an overview perspective, we used data from the Federal 
Elections Commission and the U.S. Census Bureau to calculate voter 
turnout as a percentage of the voting-age populations in Maine, 
Arizona, and the United States for election years 1988 through 
2000.[Footnote 46] We focused in particular on comparing turnout in 
2000--the first year of the public financing programs in Maine and 
Arizona--and turnout in the 3 previous presidential election years 
(1988, 1992, and 1996). We focused on these years because turnout 
percentages across the nation consistently have been higher in 
presidential election years than in mid-term congressional election 
years.

Also, we reviewed various studies, articles, and other literature to 
obtain an understanding of the various factors that can influence voter 
turnout. Further, as discussed in more detail below, we contracted with 
professional pollsters to conduct a survey in October 2002 to determine 
the extent to which projectable samples of voting-age citizens in Maine 
and Arizona were aware of the respective state's public financing 
program.

Interviews in Maine and Arizona:

We interviewed various individuals in Maine and Arizona to obtain 
perspectives on the effects of the respective state's public financing 
program. We judgmentally selected interviewees to ensure coverage of 
one or both chambers of the state legislature, the major and 
independent political parties, candidates who participated in the 
state's public financing program and those who did not, agency 
officials responsible for administering the program, and interest 
groups (see tables 16 and 17). Regarding the last category (interest 
groups), our selections were based on a number of considerations, 
including (1) suggestions made by state agency officials knowledgeable 
about political activism in the state and (2) the amounts of financial 
contributions or expenditures made by groups, as reported in publicly 
available records.

Table 16: List of Organizations (and Title of Individuals) Interviewed 
in Maine:

Name of organization: House of Representatives; Title of individuals 
contacted: Speaker of the House (District 31); Notes: Democrat. Ran in 
2000 as a participating candidate; prohibited by term limits from 
running in 2002.

Title of individuals contacted: Name of organization: Floor Leader 
(Minority) (District 38); Notes: Name of organization: Republicans. 
Opposed to public financing for candidates.

Title of individuals contacted: Name of organization: Assistant Floor 
Leader (District 85).

Title of individuals contacted: Name of organization
Representative (District 99); Notes: Name of organization
Democrat. Elected in 2000; ran as a participating candidate in the 
public financing program. Formerly was Executive Director of the 
Commission on Governmental Ethics and Election Practices.

Name of organization: Senate; Title of individuals contacted: Floor 
Leader; (District 15); Notes: Democrat. Ran in 2000 as a participating 
candidate. Was lead plaintiff in lawsuit challenging the 
constitutionality of the public financing program (see app. III).

Title of individuals contacted: Name of organization: Senator (District 
6); Notes: Name of organization: Republican. First-time candidate 
elected in 2000; ran as participating candidate in public financing 
program. Defeated 16-year incumbent.

Title of individuals contacted: Senator (District 23); Notes: 
Democrat. Elected in 2000 in a race for an open seat; 
ran as a participating candidate.

Name of organization: Maine Democratic Party; Title of individuals 
contacted: Chair; Notes: Provided party views on effects of the Maine 
Clean Election Act.

Name of organization: Maine Republican Party; Title of individuals 
contacted: Executive Director.

Name of organization: Green Independent Party; Title of individuals 
contacted: Co-chairpersons.

Name of organization: Commission on Governmental Ethics and Election 
Practices; Title of individuals contacted: Executive Director; Notes: 
Responsible for administering the Maine Clean Election Act.

Name of organization: Department of the Secretary of State; Title of 
individuals contacted: Deputy Secretary of State (Bureau of 
Corporations, Elections and Commissions); Notes: Responsible for 
supervising and administering all elections of federal, state, and 
county offices and referenda; preparing ballot types and other 
elections materials; and tabulating official election results.

Name of organization: Department of Audit (State Auditor); Title of 
individuals contacted: Director of Audit; Notes: Responsible for 
determining whether monies in the Maine Clean Election Fund have been 
managed appropriately.

Name of organization: Maine Citizens for Clean Elections (a project of 
the Maine Citizen Leadership Fund); Title of individuals contacted: 
Steering Committee; Notes: Consists of many of the groups that promoted 
the ballot initiative that led to passage of the Maine Clean Election 
Act. Among others, the groups represented include the League of Women 
Voters, Common Cause, Northeast Action, and the Dirigo Alliance.

Name of organization: Maine Bankers Association; Title of individuals 
contacted: President-Treasurer; Notes: A trade organization 
representing the interests of Maine's banking industry, trust 
companies, and financial service providers.

Name of organization: Maine Medical Association; Title of individuals 
contacted: General Counsel; Notes: A voluntary association of Maine 
physicians. Services include legislative and regulatory assistance, 
such as tracking bills and facilitating dialogue with the legislature 
and the bureaucracy.

Name of organization: Preti, Flaherty, Beliveau, Pachios & Haley, LLC; 
Title of individuals contacted: Attorney; Notes: One of Maine's largest 
law firms. Client services include lobbying representation.

Name of organization: Colby College (Waterville); Title of individuals 
contacted: Associate Professor of Government; Notes: A nationally 
recognized expert on campaign finance reform.

Source: GAO.

Note: These individuals held these positions at the time of our 
interviews.

[End of table]

Table 17: List of Organizations (and Title of Individuals) Interviewed 
in Arizona:

Name of organization: House of Representatives; Title of individuals 
contacted: Representative (District 1); Notes: Democrat. Ran in the 
2000 election as a participating candidate in the public financing 
program.

Title of individuals contacted: Representative (District 6); Notes: 
Republican. Opposed to the public financing program.

Name of organization: Citizens Clean Elections Commission; Title of 
individuals contacted: Commissioner (Chair); Notes: Responsible for 
administering the Citizens Clean Elections Act.

Title of individuals contacted: Name of organization: Commissioner; 
Notes: Name of organization: Served as first chairman of the 
Commission. Current appointment expires in 2004.

Title of individuals contacted: Name of organization: Executive 
Director; Notes: Name of organization: Responsible for administering 
the Citizens Clean Elections Act.

Title of individuals contacted: Deputy Director; Notes: 
of the Secretary of State: [Empty].

Name of organization: Office of the Secretary of State; Title of 
individuals contacted: Election Services Division; Notes: Responsible 
for certifying state candidates, initiatives, and referenda for the 
ballot; certifying the results of statewide elections; and accepting 
the filing of campaign finance reports.

Name of organization: Corporation Commission; Title of individuals 
contacted: Commissioner; Notes: In the 2000 election, ran for statewide 
office (Corporation Commission) as participating candidate in the 
public financing program.

Name of organization: Office of the Auditor General; Title of 
individuals contacted: Auditor; Notes: Principal author of report 
issued by Arizona Auditor General, Citizens Clean Elections Commission 
Special Review (Jan. 11, 2002).

Name of organization: Clean Elections Institute, Inc; Title of 
individuals contacted: Executive Director; Notes: A nonprofit advocacy 
group "dedicated to the fair and impartial implementation of the 
Citizens Clean Elections Act.".

Name of organization: Arizona Democratic Party; Title of individuals 
contacted: Coordinated Campaign Director; Notes: Provided party views 
on effects of the Arizona Citizens Clean Elections Act.

Name of organization: Arizona Republican Party; Title of individuals 
contacted: Political Director; Notes: [Empty].

Name of organization: Arizona Green Party; Title of individuals 
contacted: Party activist; Notes: Formerly served as a Commissioner of 
the Citizens Clean Elections Commission.

Name of organization: Goldwater Institute; Title of individuals 
contacted: Director of Urban Growth and Economic Development Studies; 
Notes: Author of, Is Cleanliness Political Godliness? Arizona's Clean 
Elections Law after Its First Year (Nov. 30, 2001).

Name of organization: Arizona Education Association; Title of 
individuals contacted: President; Notes: Association membership is open 
to employees of all Arizona public schools, college and university 
employees, retired educators, and college students studying to be 
teachers. It is the state's largest professional organization.

Name of organization: Fennemore Craig (law firm); Title of individuals 
contacted: Government relations attorney; Notes: Specializes in the 
areas of lobbyist regulation and campaign finance at both the federal 
and Arizona levels. Advises candidates, contributors, and political 
committees on complying with campaign finance reporting requirements.

Name of organization: Arizona Chamber of Commerce; Title of individuals 
contacted: Chamber Staff; * Senior Vice President, Public Affairs; * 
Vice President, Marketing and Communications; * Manager, Public 
Affairs; Chamber Member Representatives; * Executive Director, Home 
Builders Association of Central Arizona; * Swift Transportation Co., 
Inc; Notes: The Chamber represents Arizona businesses in interfacing 
with legislators and regulators at the state capital and with members 
of Arizona's congressional delegation.

Source: GAO.

Note: These individuals held these positions at the time of our 
interviews.

[End of table]

Candidate Surveys:

To obtain further perspectives on the effects of public financing, we 
surveyed by mail all candidates, including those who used public 
financing as well as those who did not, who ran in the 2000 primary and 
general elections in Maine and Arizona. Among other topics, the 
questionnaires asked for candidates' opinions on various aspects of how 
public financing affected the 2000 primary and general elections in 
their states; their own decisions about whether or not to use public 
funding; participating candidates' experiences with the public 
financing program; and their opinions about public financing of 
campaigns, in general, and in the 2002 and future elections in their 
state. Overall, the two questionnaires were identical, with the 
exception of a few questions to account for differences between the 
states' election laws. We pretested the questionnaires with both 
participating and nonparticipating candidates in each state and made 
relevant changes to the questions based upon these pretests. Copies of 
the Maine and Arizona questionnaires, along with the results to each 
question, are in appendixes IV and V, respectively.

We mailed questionnaires to 379 candidates in Maine and received 269 
usable questionnaires; we mailed questionnaires to 237 candidates in 
Arizona and received 143 usable questionnaires. These completed 
questionnaires represented response rates of 72 percent for Maine and 
61 percent for Arizona.[Footnote 47] We made extensive efforts to 
encourage candidates to complete and return the questionnaires, 
including advance telephone calls to candidates informing them about 
the upcoming survey, up to three follow-up telephone calls to 
nonrespondents, and up to two follow-up mailings of the questionnaires. 
We performed this work during July through December 2002.

We conducted a response bias analysis to determine whether the 
candidates who returned completed questionnaires were substantially 
different from the candidates who were mailed questionnaires, in terms 
of whether they had been participating or nonparticipating candidates 
in the 2000 elections. For each state, we found that both participating 
and nonparticipating candidates returned completed questionnaires in 
approximately the same proportions in which the candidates had 
comprised the initial mail-out groups. For the Maine survey, 36 percent 
of the initial mail-out group was participating candidates, compared 
with 39 percent of the candidates who returned completed 
questionnaires. For Arizona, 24 percent of the initial mail-out group 
was participating candidates, and 27 percent who returned completed 
questionnaires were participating candidates. Therefore, we do not 
consider the results of our Maine and Arizona candidate surveys to have 
response bias on this characteristic.

Because this was not a sample survey, but rather a census of all 
candidates who ran for office in 2000, there are no sampling errors. 
However, the practical difficulties of conducting any survey may 
introduce errors, commonly referred to as nonsampling errors. For 
example, measurement errors are introduced if difficulties exist in how 
a particular question is interpreted or in the sources of information 
available to respondents in answering a question. In addition, coding 
errors may occur if mistakes are entered into a database. We took 
extensive steps in the development of the questionnaires, the 
collection of data, and the editing and analysis of data to minimize 
total survey error. To reduce measurement error, we conducted two 
rounds of pretesting of the questionnaires with both participating and 
nonparticipating candidates to make sure questions and response 
categories were interpreted in a consistent manner. In addition, we 
edited all completed surveys for consistency and, if necessary, 
contacted respondents to clarify responses. All questionnaire responses 
were double key-entered into our database (that is, the entries were 
100 percent verified), and a random sample of the questionnaires was 
further verified for completeness and accuracy. In addition, all 
computer syntax was peer reviewed and verified by separate programmers 
to ensure that the syntax was written and executed correctly.

Polls of Voting-Age Citizens:

Regarding changes in interest group influence due to public financing 
of campaigns, we contracted with professional pollsters who conduct 
omnibus telephone surveys with representative samples of voting-age 
citizens specifically in Maine and Arizona. Generally, this polling 
effort was designed to determine the extent to which citizens in each 
state were aware of their state's public financing program and to 
obtain their views about whether the program has decreased the 
influence of special interest groups, made legislators more accountable 
to voters, and increased confidence in government. The surveys 
consisted of two sets of questions that we developed, with some 
assistance from the polling organizations. As shown below, except for 
some minor wording differences customized for the respective state, the 
two sets of questions were the same for both Maine and 
Arizona.[Footnote 48] Questions 2, 3, and 4 in each set were not asked 
of any individual who, in response to question 1, acknowledged knowing 
"nothing at all" about the applicable state's clean election law or was 
unsure or declined to answer. We pretested the questions with members 
of the general public in each state and made relevant changes to the 
questions based upon these pretests.

Maine Survey Questions:

The questions used in the Maine survey were as follows:

1. I would like to ask you about Maine's clean election law. This law 
provides campaign money to candidates running for governor and for 
candidates to the state legislature. Would you say you know a lot, 
some, a little, or nothing at all about Arizona's clean election law?

2. Now, I would like to ask you about Maine legislators in general who 
ran their campaigns with public funds in the 2000 elections. Would you 
say that these sate legislators who received public funds have been 
much more, somewhat more, somewhat less, or much less accountable to 
voters than legislators who did not get public funds, or has it not 
made any difference?

3. To what extent do you think Maine's clean election law has decreased 
or increased the influence of special interest groups on legislators? 
Would you say the law has greatly decreased, somewhat decreased, has 
had no effect, has somewhat increased, or greatly increased the 
influence of special interest groups, or is it too soon to tell?

4. To what extent has Maine's clean election law increased or decreased 
your confidence state government? Would you say the law has greatly 
increased, somewhat increased, has had no effect, has somewhat 
decreased, or greatly decreased your confidence in state government, or 
is it too soon to tell?

Arizona Survey Questions:

The questions used in the Arizona survey were as follows:

5. I would like to ask you about Arizona's clean election law. This law 
provides campaign money to candidates running for statewide office, 
such as the Corporation Commission or governor and for candidates to 
the state legislature. Would you say you know a lot, some, a little, or 
nothing at all about Arizona's clean election law?

6. Now, I would like to ask you about Arizona legislators in general 
who ran their campaigns with public funds in the 2000 elections. Would 
you say that these state legislators who received public funds have 
been much more, somewhat more, somewhat less, or much less accountable 
to voters than legislators who did not get public funds, or has it not 
made any difference?

7. To what extent do you think Arizona's clean election law has 
decreased or increased the influence of special interest groups on 
legislators? Would you say the law has greatly decreased, somewhat 
decreased, has had no effect, has somewhat increased, or greatly 
increased the influence of special interest groups, or is it too soon 
to tell?

8. To what extent has Arizona's clean election law increased or 
decreased your confidence state government? Would you say the law has 
greatly increased, somewhat increased, has had no effect, has somewhat 
decreased, or greatly decreased your confidence in state government, or 
is it too soon to tell?

Contracted Polling Organizations:

To conduct the Maine poll, we contracted with Market Decisions (South 
Portland, ME). During October 15-31, 2002, the firm completed telephone 
interviews with 400 randomly selected adults (age 18 or older) in 
Maine. The sample of telephone numbers called was based on a list of 
telephone prefixes (the first 3 digits in the 7-digit numbers) used 
throughout the state. The polling results are considered generalizable 
to households with telephones, given that every residential telephone 
number had an equal probability of selection. Up to 10 calls were made 
with households to obtain completed interviews. The 400 completed 
interviews represent a survey response rate of 30 percent.

To conduct the Arizona poll, we contracted with Behavior Research 
Center, Inc. (Phoenix, AZ). During October 1-7, 2002, the firm 
completed telephone interviews with 713 heads of household in Arizona. 
To ensure a random selection of households proportionately allocated 
throughout the sample universe, the firm used a computer-generated, 
random digit dial telephone sample, which selected households based on 
residential telephone prefixes and included all unlisted and newly 
listed households. Telephone interviewing was conducted during 
approximately equal cross sections of daytime, evening, and weekend 
hours--a procedure designed to ensure that all households were equally 
represented regardless of work schedules. Up to 4 calls were made with 
households to obtain completed interviews. The 713 completed interviews 
represent a survey response rate of 35 percent.

Survey Error:

As indicated above, all surveys are subject to errors. Because random 
samples of each state's population were interviewed in these omnibus 
surveys, the results are subject to sampling error, which is the 
difference between the results obtained from the samples and the 
results that would have been obtained by surveying the entire 
populations under consideration. Measurements of sampling errors are 
stated at a certain level of statistical confidence. The maximum 
sampling error for the Maine survey at the 95-percent level of 
statistical confidence is plus or minus 8 percentage points, and the 
maximum for the Arizona survey is plus or minus 5 percentage points. 
Additionally, the results of these surveys may be subject to unknown 
nonresponse bias due to relatively low response rates.

A few of the Maine and Arizona citizens who were interviewed may have 
been 18 years of age at the time of the interviews in October 2002--
and, thus, would have been only 16 years of age (nonvoters) at the time 
of the elections in 2000. While the polling data do not permit an exact 
quantification of these young respondents, the numbers probably are 
quite small and would not affect the validity of the survey results. 
For the 713 completed interviews in Arizona, for example, polling data 
show that 54 respondents (7.6 percent) were in the age range of 18 to 
24 years.

Data Quality:

We assessed the quality of electronic data provided to us by officials 
in Maine and Arizona by testing the data for internal consistency; 
validating the data using other sources; and, to the extent possible, 
reviewing the associated documentation. Based on these tests, we 
determined that the data were sufficiently accurate for our purposes.

Commission Review of Draft Report:

As an additional quality-assurance measure, we asked officials of the 
state agencies responsible for administering the respective public 
financing program in the two study states to review a draft copy of our 
report for accuracy and clarity before its final issuance. 
Specifically, on April 16, 2003, we provided a report draft to the 
Chair of Maine's Commission on Governmental Ethics and Election 
Practices and the Chair of Arizona's Citizens Clean Elections 
Commission.

[End of section]

Appendix II: Overview of the Public Financing Programs for Election 
Campaigns in Maine and Arizona:

Maine voters, by a margin of 56 percent to 44 percent, passed the Maine 
Clean Election Act ("Maine's Act") in November 1996. Arizona voters, by 
a margin of 51 percent to 49 percent, passed the Citizens Clean 
Elections Act ("Arizona's Act") in November 1998. These ballot 
initiatives established optional financing programs for candidates 
desiring to use public funds to finance their campaigns, as an 
alternative to traditional fundraising means. The Maine and Arizona 
programs are unique in being the first instances of state programs that 
offer full public funding--not just partial funding--of election 
campaigns for qualified candidates seeking state legislature seats and 
certain statewide offices. Regarding implementation, both states' 
public financing programs became available for candidates beginning 
with elections in 2000. Generally, participating candidates--those 
candidates who agree to forego private fund raising and who otherwise 
qualify to take part in the respective state's public financing 
program--receive a set amount of money for their primary and general 
election campaigns. Under Maine's Act and Arizona's Act, 
nonparticipating candidates--those candidates who choose to continue 
using traditional means for financing campaigns--are subject to limits 
on contributions and new reporting requirements.

This appendix provides a brief overview of the public financing 
programs for election campaigns in Maine and Arizona. Detailed 
information is available on the Web sites of the state agencies 
responsible for administering the respective program--Maine's 
Commission on Governmental Ethics and Election Practices 
(www.state.me.us/ethics) and Arizona's Citizens Clean Elections 
Commission (www.ccec.state.az.us).

Purposes of the Public Financing Programs:

Generally, proponents assert that the purposes of campaign finance 
reform are to increase voter choice and electoral competition, allow 
candidates to give more attention to voters and less to donors, and 
reduce the influence of special interests on elected officials. That 
is, from an overall perspective, proponents assert that public 
financing programs should enhance the confidence of citizens in 
government by increasing the integrity of the political process and the 
accountability of officials.

As indicated, Maine's Act and Arizona's Act were passed by voters as 
ballot initiatives. Thus, unlike laws passed by state legislatures, 
these statutes have no accompanying legislative history that would 
document the progress of a particular proposal before the legislature. 
In reference to determining the purpose of statutes passed by this 
process, one court has noted that, "The search for legislative purpose 
or motive is always dangerous; it is even more difficult in the case of 
an initiative or referendum involving all the voters, where it is 
impossible to know what the multitude read, heard or believed in 
deciding how to vote."[Footnote 49] Nonetheless, in addition to the 
specific language of the statutes, available interpretive sources 
include various media accounts of the ballot initiatives, commentary 
materials prepared by organizations that sponsored the initiatives, and 
court decisions on various provisions of the statutes.

Purposes of Maine's Public Financing Program:

The Maine Clean Election Act has no section that specifically details 
the purposes, goals, or objectives of the law. To get the initiative on 
the ballot, a coalition of interest groups, the Maine Voters for Clean 
Elections,[Footnote 50] collected about 65,000 signatures. At that 
time, the coalition and other proponents advertised that the public 
financing program would "take big money out of politics" by limiting 
what politicians spend on campaigns, reducing contributions from 
special interests and increasing enforcement of election laws. They 
said that the initiative, if passed, would decrease the influence of 
wealthy individuals, corporations and political action committees in 
politics, and would level the playing field so that challengers would 
have a chance against incumbents. Politicians would then spend more 
time focusing on the issues that affect all of their constituents 
rather than spend time on pursuing money for their campaigns. Further, 
proponents also advertised that the public financing program would 
allow candidates who do not have access to wealth the opportunity to 
compete on a more equal financial footing with traditionally funded 
candidates, restore citizen's faith and confidence in government, and 
give new candidates a fighting chance against incumbents. According to 
Maine State officials and interest group representatives we 
interviewed, there was not any organized opposition to the initiative 
when it was on the ballot.

Purposes of Arizona's Public Financing Program:

Arizona's Act does have a "findings and declarations" section that 
addresses intent. Specifically, the "findings" subsection of the 
Citizens Clean Elections Act, passed by voters in 1998, noted that the 
state's current election-financing system:

* allows elected officials to accept large campaign contributions from 
private interests over which they have governmental jurisdiction;

* provides incumbents an unhealthy advantage over challengers;

* hinders communication to voters by many qualified candidates;

* effectively suppresses the voices and influence of the vast majority 
of Arizona citizens in favor of a small number of wealthy special 
interests;

* undermines public confidence in the integrity of public officials;

* costs average taxpayers millions of dollars in the form of subsidies 
and special privileges for campaign contributors;

* drives up the cost of running for state office, discouraging 
otherwise qualified candidates who lack personal wealth or access to 
special-interest funding; and:

* requires that elected officials spend too much time raising funds 
rather than representing the public.

Further, the "declarations" subsection of Arizona's 1998 Act stated 
that:

"The people of Arizona declare our intent to create a clean elections 
system that will improve the integrity of Arizona state government by 
diminishing the influence of special-interest money, will encourage 
citizen participation in the political process, and will promote 
freedom of speech under the U.S. and Arizona Constitutions. Campaigns 
will become more issue-oriented and less negative because there will be 
no need to challenge the sources of campaign money.":

Candidates Must Qualify to Receive Public Funding:

In Maine and Arizona, candidates who wish to receive public funds for 
campaigning must qualify by (1) agreeing to forego self-financing and 
all private contributions, except for a limited amount of "seed money" 
and (2) demonstrating citizen support by collecting a set number of $5 
contributions from registered voters. For example, as table 18 shows, a 
candidate for Maine's House of Representatives may raise $500 of seed 
money and must receive a $5 qualifying contribution from at least 50 
registered voters, and a candidate for Arizona's House of 
Representatives may raise $2,500 of seed money and must receive at 
least 200 qualifying contributions.

Table 18: Seed Money Limits and Number of Qualifying $5 Contributions:

State: Maine; State legislature and applicable executive branch 
offices: House of Representatives; Seed money limits[A]: Total cap: 
$500; Seed money limits[A]: Individual contribution limit: $100; Number 
of $5 contributions: 50.

State legislature and applicable executive branch offices: Senate; 
Seed money limits[A]: Total cap: $1,500; Seed money limits[A]: 
Individual contribution limit: $100; Number of $5 contributions: 
150.

State legislature and applicable executive branch offices: 
Governor; Seed money limits[A]: Total cap: Arizona: $50,000; Seed money 
limits[A]: Individual contribution limit: Arizona: $100; Number of $5 
contributions: Arizona: 2,500.

State: Arizona; State legislature and applicable executive branch 
offices: House of Representatives; Seed money limits[A]: Total cap: 
$2,500; Seed money limits[A]: Individual contribution limit: $100; 
Number of $5 contributions: 200.

State legislature and applicable executive branch offices: Senate; 
Seed money limits[A]: Total cap: $2,500; Seed money limits[A]: 
Individual contribution limit: $100; Number of $5 contributions: 
200.

State legislature and applicable executive branch offices: 
Corporation Commission; Seed money limits[A]: Total cap: $10,000; 
Seed money limits[A]: Individual contribution limit: $100; Number of 
$5 contributions: 1,500.

State legislature and applicable executive branch offices: Governor; 
Seed money limits[A]: Total cap: $40,000; Seed money limits[A]: 
Individual contribution limit: $100; Number of $5 contributions: 
4,000.

State legislature and applicable executive branch offices: Attorney 
General; Seed money limits[A]: Total cap: $20,000; Seed money 
limits[A]: Individual contribution limit: $100; Number of $5 
contributions: 2,500.

State legislature and applicable executive branch offices: Secretary 
of State; Seed money limits[A]: Total cap: $20,000; Seed money 
limits[A]: Individual contribution limit: $100; Number of $5 
contributions: 2,500.

State legislature and applicable executive branch offices: Treasurer; 
Seed money limits[A]: Total cap: $10,000; Seed money limits[A]: 
Individual contribution limit: $100; Number of $5 contributions: 
1,500.

State legislature and applicable executive branch offices: 
Superintendent of Public Instruction; Seed money limits[A]: Total cap: 
$10,000; Seed money limits[A]: Individual contribution limit: $100; 
Number of $5 contributions: 1,500.

State legislature and applicable executive branch offices: State 
legislature and applicable executive branch offices: Mine Inspector; 
Seed money limits[A]: Total cap: Total cap: $5,000; Seed money 
limits[A]: Individual contribution limit: Individual contribution 
limit: $100; Number of $5 contributions: Number of $5 contributions: 
500.

Source: GAO analysis of state data.

Note: In the initial year of implementation (2000), Maine's public 
funding program covered candidates for legislative seats only, and 
Arizona's program covered candidates for legislative seats and the 
Corporation Commission. Beginning in 2002, Maine's program was extended 
to cover candidates for governor, and Arizona's program was extended to 
cover candidates for governor and various other executive branch 
offices.

[A] To help with the qualifying process, candidates seeking to be 
certified to receive public funding may raise and spend limited amounts 
of seed money. In Arizona, these funds are called "early 
contributions," and the base amounts are established in statute and 
adjusted for inflation every 2 years. The adjusted amount of early 
contributions for Arizona's 2002 election cycle is limited to $110 per 
individual contributor.

[End of table]

Amounts of Allowable Public Funding for Participating Candidates:

After being certified by the state as having met qualifying 
requirements, participating candidates receive initial distributions 
(predetermined amounts) of public funding and are also eligible for 
additional matching funds based on spending by or for privately funded 
opponents. For example, in Maine's 2000 elections (see table 19):

* Each participating candidate in a contested race for the state House 
of Representatives received an initial distribution of pubic funds in 
the amount of $1,141 for the primary election and an amount of $3,252 
for the general election. Under Maine's Act, these amounts were based 
on average expenditures in similar races in the two previous election 
cycles (1998 and 1996).

* Also, under Maine's Act, the maximum allowable matching funds 
available to a participating candidate were capped at double the 
initial distribution that the candidate received for his or her 
contested race. Matching funds are triggered when the participating 
candidate is outspent by a privately funded opponent. Further, matching 
funds can be based on independent expenditures that benefit an 
opponent's campaign. Generally, independent expenditures are campaign 
expenditures made by individuals or groups without coordination with 
any candidate and are communications (such as political ads or 
mailings) that expressly advocate the election or defeat of a clearly 
identified candidate.

In Arizona's 2000 elections (see table 19), qualified candidates for 
the House of Representatives or Senate who were in contested party 
primary elections initially received $10,000. After the primary, 
successful major party candidates who were opposed in the general 
election then received an additional $15,000.[Footnote 51] Independent 
candidates received 70 percent of the sum of the original primary and 
general election spending limits, and unopposed candidates received 
only the total of their $5 qualifying contributions as the spending 
limit for that election. Participating candidates for the state 
legislature could also use $500 of their personal monies for their 
campaigns, and participating candidates for statewide offices could use 
$1,000.

Participating candidates also received matching funds when an opposing, 
nonparticipating candidate exceeded the primary or general election 
spending limits. Matching funds were also provided to participating 
candidates when independent expenditures were made on behalf of a 
nonparticipating candidate in the race.

Table 19: Public Funding Available to Each Participating Candidate in 
2000:

State: Maine; Office: House of Representatives; Type of race: 
Contested; Primary election public funds: Initial 
distribution: $1,141; Primary election public funds: Maximum allowable 
matching funds: $2,282; Primary election public funds: Total public 
funding: $3,423; General election public funds: Initial 
distribution: $3,252; General election public funds: Maximum allowable 
matching funds: $6,504; General election public funds: Total public 
funding: $9,756.

Type of race: Uncontested; Primary election public funds: 
Initial distribution: $511; Primary election public funds: Maximum 
allowable matching funds: 0; Primary election public funds: Total 
public funding: $511; General election public funds: 
Initial distribution: 0; General election public funds: Maximum 
allowable matching funds: 0; General election public funds: Total 
public funding: 0.

Office: House of Representatives and Senate; Type of race: 
House of Representatives and Senate: Contested; House of 
Representatives and Senate: Primary election public funds: 
Initial distribution: House of Representatives and Senate: $4,334; 
Primary election public funds: Maximum allowable matching funds: 
House of Representatives and Senate: $8,668; Primary election public 
funds: Total public funding: House of Representatives and Senate: 
$13,002; House of Representatives and Senate: General 
election public funds: Initial distribution: House of Representatives 
and Senate: $12,910; General election public funds: Maximum allowable 
matching funds: House of Representatives and Senate: $25,820; General 
election public funds: Total public funding: House of Representatives 
and Senate: $38,730.

Type of race: Uncontested; Primary election 
public funds: Initial distribution: $1,785; Primary election 
public funds: Maximum allowable matching funds: 0; Primary 
election public funds: Total public funding: $1,785; 
General election public funds: Initial distribution: 
0; General election public funds: Maximum allowable matching funds: 
0; General election public funds: Total public funding: 
0.

State: Arizona; Office: House of Representatives and Senate; Type of 
race: Contested; Primary election public funds: Initial 
distribution: $10,000; Primary election public funds: Maximum allowable 
matching funds: $20,000; Primary election public funds: Total public 
funding: $30,000; General election public funds: Initial 
distribution: $15,000; General election public funds: Maximum allowable 
matching funds: $30,000; General election public funds: Total public 
funding: $45,000.

Type of race: Uncontested[A]; Primary election public 
funds: Initial distribution: Primary election public funds: 
Maximum allowable matching funds: Primary election public 
funds: Total public funding: General election 
public funds: Initial distribution: General election public 
funds: Maximum allowable matching funds: General election 
public funds: Total public funding: [Empty].

Office: Corporation Commission; Type of race: Contested; 
Primary election public funds: Initial distribution: 
$40,000; Primary election public funds: Maximum allowable matching 
funds: $80,000; Primary election public funds: Total public 
funding: $120,000; General election public funds: 
Initial distribution: $60,000; General election public funds: 
Maximum allowable matching funds: $120,000; General election public 
funds: Total public funding: $180,000.

Type of race: Type of race: Uncontested[A]; Uncontested[A]: 
Primary election public funds: Initial distribution: Initial 
distribution: Primary election public funds: Maximum allowable 
matching funds: Maximum allowable matching funds: Primary 
election public funds: Total public funding: Total public funding: 
[Empty]: General election public funds: Initial 
distribution: Initial distribution: General election public 
funds: Maximum allowable matching funds: Maximum allowable matching 
funds: General election public funds: Total public funding: 
Total public funding: [Empty].

[End of table]

Source: GAO analysis of state data.

[A] In Arizona, each participating candidate in an uncontested race 
received public funding in an amount equal to $5 times the number of 
qualifying signatures that the candidate obtained.

In Maine, a total of about $865,000 in public funds was authorized in 
2000 for the 134 participating candidates who ran in the primary and/or 
general elections for state legislature. Candidates returned about 
$108,000 of unused money to the Maine Clean Election Fund. In Arizona, 
a total of $1.9 million in public funds was distributed in 2000 to the 
59 participating candidates--54 candidates for the state legislature 
and 5 candidates for the Arizona Corporation Commission.

Revenue Sources for the Public Financing Programs:

Various revenue sources are used to support the public financing 
programs. As table 20 shows, appropriations were by far the largest 
funding source in Maine in 2000, whereas a surcharge on civil and 
criminal fines and penalties was the leading source in Arizona. As 
noted in table 20, the constitutionality of this funding provision in 
Arizona's Act has been challenged in court but has been upheld.

Table 20: Revenue Sources and Amounts for Public Financing Programs in 
2000:

State: Maine; Revenue sources: Appropriations: On or before January 1st 
of each year, the state treasurer is to transfer $2 million from the 
General Fund to a special, dedicated fund (the Maine Clean Election 
Fund); Annual revenue (in thousands of dollars): $2,000; Percentage: 
70%.

Revenue sources: Tax check-offs: Under a tax check-off program, 
a Maine resident can designate that $3 be paid to the Maine Clean 
Election Fund. A husband and wife filing jointly may each designate 
$3; Annual revenue (in thousands of dollars): 523[A]; 
Percentage: 18.

Revenue sources: Qualifying contributions: The $5 qualifying 
contributions collected by participating candidates are deposited in 
the Maine Clean Election Fund; Annual revenue (in thousands of 
dollars): 56; Percentage: 2.

Revenue sources: Miscellaneous: Other income includes 
interest earned, penalties, and seed money collected by candidates and 
deposited in the Maine Clean Election Fund; Annual revenue (in 
thousands of dollars): 277; Percentage: 10.

Total; Annual revenue (in thousands of dollars): $2,856; 
Percentage: 100%.

State: Arizona; Revenue sources: Fines, forfeitures, and penalties: 
This source includes a 10-percent surcharge imposed on certain civil 
and criminal fines and penalties.[ B] Collections go in the Citizens 
Clean Elections Fund; Annual revenue (in thousands of dollars): 
$4,665; Percentage: 68%.

Revenue sources: Tax check-offs and donations: By marking an 
optional check-off box on their state income tax returns, Arizona 
taxpayers can make a $5 contribution to the Citizens Clean Elections 
Fund. A taxpayer that checks this box receives a $5 reduction ($10 if 
filing jointly) in the amount of tax. Also, taxpayers may redirect a 
specified amount of owed taxes--up to 20 percent or $500 (ceiling 
adjusted periodically), whichever is greater--to the Citizens Clean 
Elections Fund and receive a dollar-for-dollar tax credit; Annual 
revenue (in thousands of dollars): 1,943; Percentage: 28.

Revenue sources: Qualifying contributions: The $5 qualifying 
contributions collected by participating candidates are deposited in 
the Citizens Clean Elections Fund; Annual revenue (in thousands of 
dollars): 136; Percentage: 2.

Revenue sources: Filing and title certificate fees: This 
source includes all lobbyist fees.[C] Arizona's Act imposed a $100 
annual fee (amount adjusted periodically) on registered lobbyists who 
represent commercial or for-profit activities; Annual revenue (in 
thousands of dollars): 104; Percentage: 2.

Annual revenue (in thousands of dollars): StateAnnual revenue (in 
thousands of dollars): $6,848; Percentage: StatePercentage: 100%.

Source: GAO analysis of state data.

[A] Revenue reflects tax check-off income for previous years, when 
taxpayers were contributing to the Maine Clean Election fund, but no 
elections were held. For the 1999 tax year, $266,907 had been deposited 
into the Maine Clean Election Fund through income tax check-offs.

[B] In June 2002, the Arizona Court of Appeals ruled that the surcharge 
provision of the Arizona Act was unconstitutional and that collections 
of the surcharge should cease. In July 2002, pending its review, the 
Arizona Supreme Court issued an order to stay enforcement of the lower 
court's decision. Later that year, the Arizona Supreme Court reversed 
the Court of Appeals and held the surcharge provision to be 
constitutional. On January 9, 2003, the Institute for Justice appealed 
the Arizona Supreme Court decision on behalf of plaintiff May to the 
U.S. Supreme Court. However, the U.S. Supreme Court has decided to not 
hear the challenge to the Arizona law (see app. III).

[C] In December 2001, Arizona's Maricopa County Superior Court ruled 
that the lobbyist fee was unconstitutional. Lavis v. Bayless, No. CV-
2001-006078 (Arizona Superior Court, 2001). The collected money has 
been returned to lobbyists.

[End of table]

Table 20 also indicates that in 2000, about 18 percent of Maine's 
funding and about 28 percent of Arizona's funding came from state 
income tax check-off donations and other voluntary donations. In Maine, 
$523,000 in funding came from state income tax check-off donations that 
had accumulated from 2 tax years prior to the 2000 elections. For tax 
year 1999, approximately 63,000 state income tax returns were filed 
with check-off donations to the Maine Clean Election Fund, which 
represented about 10 percent of the 599,000 total returns filed in the 
state. In Arizona, the $1.943 million in revenue included $1.829 
million from state income tax check-off donations in 2000. These tax 
check-off donations came from approximately 246,000 of the 2.1 million 
state income tax returns filed, or about 12 percent of the returns 
filed through December 2000, for tax year 1999. In perspective, about 
11 percent of federal income tax returns had $3 check-off contributions 
to the Presidential Election Campaign Fund[Footnote 52] in tax year 
2000, which is used to finance qualified presidential candidates and 
national political parties.

Administration of the Public Financing Programs:

Both Maine's Act and Arizona's Act established commissions to implement 
the public financing program and enforce provisions of the Acts. In 
Maine, the responsibility for administering Maine's Act, including 
management of the Maine Clean Election Fund, was given to Maine's 
Commission on Governmental Ethics and Election Practices. The 
Commission consists of five members appointed by the Governor, subject 
to review by the joint standing committee of the state legislature 
having jurisdiction over legal affairs and confirmation by the state 
legislature. The Commission employs a director and staff to carry out 
the day-to-day operations of the program. In addition to financing 
election campaigns of candidates participating in the public financing 
program, the Maine Clean Election Fund also pays for administrative and 
enforcement costs of the Commission related to the Act. In 2000, the 
Commission's total expenditures from the fund were $861,774, including 
$111,081 in administrative costs.[Footnote 53] The administrative costs 
included staff payroll and other miscellaneous expenses.

As a part of the responsibility for implementing and enforcing Maine's 
Act, the Commission is to investigate violations of the requirements 
for campaign reports and campaign financing activities of both 
participating and nonparticipating candidates. The Commission has 
authority to assess civil penalties against any person who violates any 
provision of the act. A summary report released by the Commission in 
August 2001 reported that enforcement of the act required minimal 
Commission activity during the 2000 election year.

In Arizona, the Citizens Clean Elections Commission was newly created 
by Arizona's Act and consists of five members selected by the state's 
highest-ranking officials from opposing parties. These state officials 
choose one new commissioner per year. No more than two commissioners 
may be from the same political party or county, and commissioners may 
not have run for or held office, nor been appointed to or elected for 
any office for the 5 years prior to being chosen as a commissioner. As 
established by Arizona's Act, the Commission employs an executive 
director to facilitate administration of the program, including voter 
education and enforcement of the act's provisions. The executive 
director is, in turn, responsible for determining additional staffing 
needs and hiring accordingly. Arizona's Act caps Commission spending 
for a calendar year at $5 times the number of Arizona resident personal 
income tax returns filed the previous calendar year. Of that amount, 
the Commission may use up to 10 percent for administration and 
enforcement activities and up to 10 percent for voter education 
activities. The remainder of Commission spending goes to participating 
candidates' campaign funds. For example, in calendar year 2000, the 
Commission's spending cap was $9,979,355--$5 times the 1,995,871 
personal income tax returns filed in calendar year 1999 (for tax year 
1998). The Commission's total revenue for calendar year 2000 was less 
than the prescribed spending cap at $6,847,843. In 2000, the 
Commission's expenditures totaled $3,176,711--$668,562 for 
administration and enforcement, $590,725 for voter education, and 
$1,917,424 for campaign funds.[Footnote 54]

The Commission's responsibility for enforcing campaign finance laws 
established by Arizona's Act covers contribution limits, spending 
limits, and reporting requirements that affect both participating and 
nonparticipating candidates. Cases of possible violations may be 
initiated with the Commission in one of two ways: either by an external 
complaint or through information that comes to the Commission's 
attention internally. The Commission may assess civil penalties after 
investigating compliance matters and finding probable cause of a 
violation unless the candidate comes into compliance within a set time 
frame or a settlement agreement is reached. For example, in 2000, the 
Commission reviewed 19 externally generated complaints, 5 of which were 
forwarded to the office of the Secretary of State due to jurisdictional 
issues, while 9 cases were dismissed and 4 were dropped because the 
candidate came into compliance. The Commission reached a settlement 
agreement with the candidate in the remaining case. Of the 16 
internally initiated compliance matters in 2000, the Commission found 
only 1 case with probable cause of a campaign finance violation. The 
candidate in that case came into compliance within the required time 
frame.[Footnote 55]

Reduced Contribution Limits and Additional Reporting Requirements for 
Nonparticipating Candidates:

Before the passage of Maine's Act and Arizona's Act, political 
campaigns in the two states were financed completely with private 
funds, subject to certain statutory limitations on contributions from 
individuals and others. There were no limitations placed on 
expenditures by candidates of their personal wealth. Under the new 
laws, this latter aspect of campaign financing remains true for 
candidates who choose not to participate in the respective state's 
public financing program. That is, for their own races, 
nonparticipating candidates can still spend as much of their personal 
funds as they please.

On the other hand, nonparticipating candidates are subject to new 
limitations on the amounts of contributions they can accept. In Maine, 
for example, a nonparticipating candidate for the state legislature may 
accept up to $250 per donor, and a nonparticipating gubernatorial 
candidate may accept up to $500 per donor. Previously, the candidates 
could have collected up to $1,000 from individuals and up to $5,000 
from political committees and corporations. In Arizona, contributions 
from individuals and political committees are now limited to $270 per 
donor for nonparticipating candidates for the state legislature and 
$700 to nonparticipating candidates for applicable executive branch 
offices. Arizona's new limitations represent a 20 percent reduction 
from the contribution ceilings that existed previously.

In order to administer the public financing programs, nonparticipating 
candidates have additional reporting requirements. For example:

* In Maine, a nonparticipating candidate must notify the Commission on 
Governmental Ethics and Election Practices when his or her receipts 
total 101 percent of the Commission's initial allocation of pubic funds 
to a participating candidate.

* In Arizona, a nonparticipating candidate must file original and 
supplemental campaign finance reports with the Secretary of State when 
the candidate makes expenditures that exceed 70 percent of the primary 
election spending limit or receives contributions (less the 
expenditures through the primary) that exceed 70 percent of the general 
election spending limit.

[End of section]

Appendix III: Summary of Legal Challenges to Maine's and Arizona's 
Public Financing Programs:

The legal challenges to the public financing programs in Maine and 
Arizona raised many issues. The Maine Clean Election Act, passed in 
November 1996, took effect in the 2000 elections. Preceding the 
elections, elected officials, political action committees, and campaign 
contributors challenged the law in federal court on federal 
constitutional grounds. The litigation focused on First Amendment 
issues raised by what plaintiffs regarded as the impermissibly coercive 
nature of the act, limitations on campaign contributions, and the 
grouping of independent expenditures with a candidate's expenditures.

Arizona voters passed the Citizens Clean Elections Act in November 
1998, and it also took effect in the 2000 elections. An Arizona 
political action committee, an Arizona lobbyist, and Arizona voters 
challenged the act on state constitutional grounds. Furthermore, the 
challenges in Arizona included contesting the sources of funding, the 
validity of the title, and the process for selecting members that sit 
on the Citizens Clean Elections Commission.

This appendix provides a summary of the legal challenges to the Maine 
Clean Election Act and Arizona's Citizens Clean Elections Act.

Legal Challenges to the Maine Clean Election Act:

In a March 2000 opinion, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
First Circuit validated the Maine Clean Election Act. After 
consolidating appeals, the First Circuit upheld two lower court 
decisions and ruled that the First Amendment rights of candidates, 
contributors, and political action committees were not violated by the 
public finance scheme and contribution limits established in the Maine 
Clean Election Act.

Since the Maine Clean Election Act was first approved by a voter 
initiative, it has been the subject of a great deal of litigation. 
Almost immediately after voters of Maine approved the Act, the first 
suits were brought against the state. Eventually, after a number of 
cases were dismissed on procedural grounds, the federal district court 
for Maine ruled on the constitutionality of the act. Table 21 
summarizes the results of the legal challenges. Following table 21 is a 
more detailed synopsis of the court of appeals decision and the 
district court cases.

Table 21: Maine Clean Election Act Litigation:

Case citation: Daggett v. Commission on Governmental Ethics and 
Election Practices,; 205 F. 3d 445; (1st Cir. 2000); Synopsis of the 
legal challenge: U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit: The U.S. 
Court of Appeals consolidated the appeals from two lower court 
decisions. One set of appellants included past and current candidates, 
the Libertarian Party of Maine, and an individual campaign contributor. 
Their major complaint was that the statute was impermissibly coercive, 
thereby unconstitutionally burdening the First Amendment rights of 
candidates. The other set of appellants included an individual 
contributor and two political action committees. Their major complaint 
was that the provision for matching funds for independent expenditures 
was unconstitutional. Both sets of appellants also contested the 
constitutionality of the reduced contribution limits; Decision of the 
court: The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit upheld the 
constitutionality of the Act. The court held that: (1) Maine's public 
financing scheme provided a roughly proportionate mix of benefits and 
detriments to candidates seeking public funding, such that it did not 
burden the First Amendment rights of candidates or contributors; (2) 
the independent expenditures requirement did not limit the freedom of 
speech and association of the independent contributors; and (3) the 
reduced contribution limits of $250 did not infringe on appellants' 
First Amendment rights because the limits served an important 
government interest in avoiding corruption and were closely tailored to 
serve that interest.

Source: GAO analysis of court decision.

[End of table]

The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, in Daggett v. Commission on 
Governmental Ethics and Election Practices, 205 F. 3d 445 (1st Cir. 
2000), addressed three arguments. First, the court ruled that the $250 
contribution limits were supported by a "sufficiently important 
governmental interest to which the ceilings are closely tailored." 
Daggett v. Comm'n on Governmental Ethics and Election Practices, 205 
F.3d 445, 459. Relying on a recent U.S. Supreme Court decision, Nixon 
v. Shrink Missouri PAC, 528 U.S. 377 (2000), the First Circuit held 
that there was sufficient evidentiary support of the threat of 
corruption or its appearance to implement the limits. As to the 
consequences, the First Circuit decided that the limits on 
contributions had a minimal effect on people who wish to support a 
candidate directly.

The First Circuit also held that the matching funds provision for 
participating candidates does not violate the First Amendment rights of 
the nonparticipating candidates. Furthermore, the court agreed with the 
district judge that the reporting requirements imposed on privately 
financed candidates are not an undue burden and serve an important and 
narrowly tailored governmental interest. The court said that these 
sections of the act do not restrict the amount of money 
nonparticipating candidates can spend; rather, the sections level the 
playing field by providing matching funds for participating candidates.

Finally, the First Circuit held that the cumulative effect of the act 
was not impermissibly coercive. The court cited several examples of 
election laws in other states that were similar or more restrictive and 
not found coercive. The court concluded that neither the matching funds 
provision nor the labels associated with participating and 
nonparticipating candidates are such strong incentives that candidates 
are forced to accept public funding.

In the first district court case, Daggett v. Webster, 74 F. Supp. 2d 53 
(D. Me. 1999), plaintiffs challenged the act on a number of issues, 
mainly focusing on the trigger provision--that is, when privately 
funded candidates raise funds above a certain amount, publicly funded 
candidates receive matching funds--and additional reporting 
requirements imposed on privately funded candidates. Of the seven 
claims raised by plaintiffs, all were rejected by the district court:

* The court found the Maine Clean Election Act offers incentives, but 
the incentives are not overwhelming or of an order that can be said to 
create profound disparities.

* The court held that the Maine Election Commission is not labeling 
publicly funded candidates as "clean"; the state cannot control what 
candidates choose to call themselves or their opponents.

* The court stated there was nothing unfair and no profound disparity 
in providing publicly funded candidates matching funds equivalent to 
what their privately funded opponents raise.

* The court held that triggers, tied to the amount privately funded 
candidates raise and not to the amount they spend, is a legitimate 
approach for the legislation to take.

* The district court upheld the additional reporting requirements 
imposed on privately funded candidates who receive, spend, or obligate 
more than 1 percent over the amount distributed to their publicly 
funded opponents.

* The court held that independent expenditures spent to support a 
candidate (including negative ads targeting the candidate's opponent) 
must be reported by the candidate as money spent on his or her 
campaign.

* Finally, the court ruled that funds spent on public funding for 
primary elections are relatively small, and separate allocations for 
primary elections are necessary to make the act's public financing 
measure effective.

The other district court case, Daggett v. Webster, 81 F. Supp. 2d 128 
(D. Me. 2000), involved a challenge to the lowered contribution limits. 
Plaintiffs in that case challenged the $250 contribution limits for 
state legislative candidates and the $500 contribution limits for 
gubernatorial candidates. The court did not rule on the $500 limit on 
gubernatorial candidates because there was no gubernatorial race at the 
time. The district court did, however, uphold the $250 individual 
contribution limit to a state senate or house candidate. In reaching 
its decision, the court did not focus on the monetary limit but instead 
analyzed three constitutional interests at stake: contributors' free 
speech, candidates' free speech, and freedom of association. These 
constitutional interests were elucidated in the U.S. Supreme Court's 
opinion in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).

Legal Challenges to Arizona's Citizens Clean Elections Act:

The Arizona Supreme Court upheld the Citizens Clean Elections Act, but 
not before a number of provisions were severed by the courts because 
they were unconstitutional under the Arizona Constitution. Three 
separate cases made their way through the state judicial system before 
reaching the state's highest court. In the first case, the court ruled 
that despite an oversight by the drafters, the title of the ballot 
initiative was constitutional. The Arizona Supreme Court ruled in the 
second case that the nomination and selection of commissioners to the 
Citizens Clean Elections Commission was unconstitutional in part; 
however, the court also ruled that those parts could be severed, 
allowing the Citizens Clean Elections Act to stand. Finally, the court 
held that funding for public campaigns from a surcharge on criminal and 
civil fines was constitutional.

Before the initiative even got on the ballot of the general election, 
the act was challenged. The claims that were litigated in Arizona were 
different from those raised in Maine. Political action committees and 
individual citizens raised state constitutional challenges to the title 
of the act, and the process of appointing commissioners to the Citizens 
Clean Elections Commission, the sources of funding for the law. Tables 
22 through 24 provide a summary of the litigation. Following each table 
is a more detailed synopsis of the cases.

Table 22: Arizona Litigation - Title of Ballot Initiative:

Case citation: Meyers v. Bayless,; 965 P. 2d 768; (Ariz. 1998); 
Synopsis of the legal challenge: Arizona Supreme Court: The plaintiff, 
an Arizona voter, brought the action seeking the court to revoke the 
certification of the ballot initiative because it lacked a title; 
Decision of the court: The Supreme Court of Arizona held that even 
though the initiative did not have a title, Article II did have a title 
and it was the only article in the initiative. That combination of 
factors was enough for the court to hold that the initiative 
substantially complied with the title requirement.

Source: GAO analysis of court decision.

[End of table]

Before the Arizona initiative for clean elections was placed on the 
ballot, an action was brought seeking the court to revoke the 
certification of the ballot initiative because it lacked a title. The 
lower court in Arizona held that the words, "Citizens Clean Elections 
Act," which were not at the top of the measure but on the third line as 
the title of an article, met the title requirement. The Arizona Supreme 
Court agreed. The court held that for an initiative petition, the legal 
sufficiency standard requires substantial, not necessarily technical, 
compliance with the law.

Table 23: Arizona Litigation - Nomination and Appointment Process to 
the Citizens Clean Elections Commission:

Case citation: Citizens Clean Elections; Commission v. Myers,; 196 
Ariz. 516, 1 P.3d 706 (Ariz. 2000); Synopsis of the legal challenge: 
Citizens Clean Elections Commission and Arizonans for Clean Elections 
appealed the Superior Court decision. They argued that the sections 
challenged were constitutional or at least severable from the rest of 
the act. On cross-petition, VotePac challenged the validity of the 
title of the act and asserted that the requirement of Supreme Court 
members to select Clean Elections Commissioners violated the Arizona 
Constitution; Decision of the court: The Arizona Supreme Court heard 
this appeal on an expedited review process. The court held that: (1) 
the Commission on Appellate Court Appointments did not have the 
authority to nominate Clean Elections Commissioners; (2) the Commission 
on Appellate Court Appointments provisions could be severed from the 
act; (3) the Senate could concur with any removal decisions the 
Governor made of Clean Elections Commissioners; (4) the title of the 
act was still valid; (5) members of the Supreme Court could not appoint 
commissioners to the Clean Elections Commission; and (6) the section of 
the act requiring Arizona Supreme Court members to appoint Clean 
Elections Commissioners could be severed from the rest of the act.

Source: GAO analysis of court decision.

[End of table]

Prior to the 2000 elections, a registered Arizona political action 
committee and citizens of Arizona challenged the Citizens Clean 
Elections Act, seeking a declaration of the act's invalidity. The 
Superior Court for Maricopa County held that the act was invalid. See 
Votepac v. Bayless, CV 99-11937 (Superior Court of Arizona, 2000). The 
Citizens Clean Elections Commission and the Arizonans for Clean 
Elections appealed the decision of the Superior Court to the Arizona 
Supreme Court in an expedited review process.

The Arizona Supreme Court, in Citizens Clean Elections Commission v. 
Myers, 196 Ariz. 516, 1 P.3d 706 (Ariz. 2000), upheld the law, but 
required certain provisions--regarding how commissioners were 
nominated and appointed to the Citizens Clean Elections Commission--be 
severed for violating the Arizona Constitution. First, the Arizona 
Supreme Court held that the Commission on Appellate Court Appointments 
could not nominate Clean Elections Commissioners because it was beyond 
the scope of their constitutional authority under the state 
constitution. The court held that any exercise of legislative power is 
subject to the limitations imposed by the state constitution. In this 
case, the authority that the Citizens Clean Elections Act gave the 
Commission on Appellate Court Appointments to appoint Clean Elections 
Commissioners was beyond its scope. That section of the Act requiring 
the Commission on Appellate Court Appointments to nominate Clean 
Elections Commissioners was removed, and the governor was required to 
select Clean Elections Commissioners without the slate of candidates 
from the Commission on Appellate Court Appointments.

The Arizona Supreme Court next examined the section of the Citizens 
Clean Elections Act requiring senatorial concurrence in the governor's 
decision to remove any member of the Citizens Clean Elections 
Commission. The court disagreed with the trial court and held that 
there was no violation of separation of powers. Because the Citizens 
Clean Elections Commission is an independent agency, the requirement 
for senatorial concurrence does not hinder the governor's ability to 
carry out his or her duties.

The Arizona Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether it was 
unconstitutional under the state constitution for members of the 
Supreme Court of Arizona to make appointments to the Citizens Clean 
Elections Commission. The Arizona Supreme Court held that the act 
violated the doctrine of separation of powers to the extent that it 
included members of the court as officials who could appoint members of 
the Commission. The court reasoned that the appointment process was 
unrelated to the court's judicial power and that members of the court 
(an apolitical body) were called upon to make political decisions. The 
court held that the provision in question was severable from the rest 
of the Act and allowed the rest of the act to stand.

Table 24: Arizona Litigation - Sources for Public Funding:

Table 24: Arizona Litigation - Sources for Public Funding:

Case citation: May v. McNally,; 203 Ariz. 425, 55 P.3d 768; (Ariz. 
2002); Synopsis of the legal challenge: Secretary of State, State 
Treasurer, and Citizens Clean Elections Commission sought review of the 
Court of Appeals decision that struck down the 10-percent surcharge 
provision in the Citizens Clean Elections Act; Decision of the court: 
The Supreme Court of Arizona reversed the Court of Appeals and held the 
surcharge funding provision to be constitutional. The high court 
reasoned: (1) the surcharge was a tax assessed against all citizens who 
pay civil and criminal fines; (2) there was no defined association, so 
germaneness is irrelevant; (3) the government could use public funds to 
finance political speech; and (4) funds were allocated in a viewpoint 
neutral way to safeguard First Amendment rights.

Source: GAO analysis of court decision.

[End of table]

The most recent challenge to the Citizens Clean Elections Act focused 
on whether two of the act's sources of funding violated the First 
Amendment. The two sources that were challenged were an annual $100 fee 
from lobbyists who work for commercial or for-profit entities and a 10-
percent surcharge imposed on all persons paying civil and criminal 
fines, such as parking fines. The lobbyist fees were found to be 
unconstitutional by the Superior Court; however, the court also found 
the provisions severable. See Lavis v. Bayless, CV 2001-006078 
(Superior Court of Arizona, 2001). The 10-percent surcharge on civil 
and criminal fines was ultimately decided by the Arizona Supreme Court 
to be constitutional.

The Arizona Supreme Court found that those paying the surcharge were 
not linked to any one viewpoint or message; instead, the surcharge 
funded all qualified candidates. Furthermore, the court found that the 
surcharge was not applied in an unconstitutional manner or for an 
unconstitutional purpose.

The Institute for Justice, a public interest litigation organization, 
recently appealed the decision, on behalf of State Representative and 
plaintiff Steve May, to the U.S. Supreme Court. However, the U.S. 
Supreme Court has decided to not hear the challenge to the Arizona law.

[End of section]

Appendix IV: Survey of Candidates for Office in the Maine 2000 
Elections:

[See PDF for image]

[End of section]

Appendix V: Survey of Candidates for Office in the Arizona 2000 
Elections:

[See PDF for image]

[End of section]

Appendix VI: Comments Received in Our Survey of Candidates for Office 
in Maine's and Arizona's 2000 Elections:

Our survey by mail[Footnote 56] of all candidates for office in Maine's 
and Arizona's 2000 elections contained an ending statement inviting 
respondents to provide any comments they believed were important about 
the effects of the respective state's public financing program (see 
app. IV and V). We did not independently evaluate the merits of the 
respondents' comments. However, we did group and list the comments by 
topic, as presented in the following two sections--the first for 
comments provided by Maine candidates and the second for comments 
provided by Arizona candidates. With some exceptions, such as responses 
that were irrelevant or unclear, substantially all of the comments are 
arrayed by topic in a table in the respective section. To ensure 
inclusiveness and avoid subjectivity in presenting the comments, we did 
not eliminate any candidate's comments even though the comments perhaps 
were the same as (or very similar to) comments made by another 
candidate. Also, except for some minor editing for grammar or clarity, 
the comments are presented as worded by the responding candidates.

As perhaps may be expected, many of the comments followed ideological 
lines. For example, although there were some exceptions, 
nonparticipating candidates generally commented that financing the 
campaigns of political candidates was an inappropriate use of tax 
dollars, whereas participating candidates usually endorsed public 
financing. Collectively, the widely divergent and sometimes virulent 
comments seem to indicate that reaching a consensus regarding the value 
of the public financing programs may be unlikely, at least in the 
foreseeable future.

Comments Provided by Maine Candidates:

We received written comments from 157 respondents to our survey of 
candidates for office in Maine's 2000 elections. In reference to 
Maine's public financing program, the 157 respondents consisted of 97 
nonparticipating candidates and 60 participating candidates. Table 25 
presents the comments of the responding candidates.

Table 25: Comments Received in Our Survey of Candidates for Office in 
Maine's 2000 Elections:

Topic: Use of public funds; 

Nonparticipating candidate comments: The 
public financing program is a tax on the citizens of this state and is 
allowing a large amount of money to be spent by some individuals at 
taxpayers' expense; Tax funding of campaigns is an immoral and 
unproductive welfare program for politicians and will not work. I 
advocate abolishing all contribution and spending limits and reporting 
requirements. Campaign finance laws protect incumbents and enhance the 
power of the press, while destroying the First Amendment rights of 
others; I am opposed to spending Maine's hard-earned tax dollars on 
campaigns. If you are popular with your constituents and they believe 
in you and what you stand for, they will donate to your campaign; I 
totally disagree with using the state's tax dollars and general fund to 
finance candidates. If clean elections was based on only the amount 
collected for the signatures, I may support it. Otherwise, it adds one 
more layer of state bureaucracy; No taxpayer should be forced to 
support a candidate financially. Political action committee (PAC) 
spending and union support (i.e., workers paid with no management 
accounting for cost) made the so-called "clean" election system a joke. 
GAO's questionnaire is slanted towards the continuance of this 
outrageous program; My strongest objection to the program is that it 
forces taxpayers to fund candidates that they may not support; Many 
people complained to me that their money should not be used for 
everyone. They felt the candidate should raise his or her own money 
with a cap on the amount spent; Public funding is a bad way to 
finance campaigns; There are better uses of public money. If people 
would use it, accountability exists in the private funding system; 
Publicly funded elections fly directly in the face of freedom; Tax 
dollars should not be used for campaigns; Paying health insurance 
for our retired teachers should be done before we begin to subsidize 
names on ballots. Maine has the highest state and local taxes of any 
state in the nation, and our income tax hits its highest rate at 
approximately $14,000 per year. Our legislative districts are small; 
raising campaign contributions by canvassing door to door and attending 
PTA meetings is the norm. People know each other here; The money 
spent on this program could be spent on the needs of senior citizens, 
such as prescription drugs; Maine cannot afford to fund candidates 
at the expense of taxpayers; I am not a proponent of the public 
financing program. In difficult times, as we now have, I do not feel 
that taxpayers should be funding elections; Public financing is 
another drain on public funds; The public financing program is 
another sock-it-to-the-taxpayer form of taxation. In my opinion, voters 
were not aware of what they were voting for in 1996. The voters saw the 
words "clean elections" and thought it would solve the issue. The 
program infringes on the First Amendment guarantee of free speech; 
With $250 million or more in revenue shortfalls versus spending 
commitments, Maine should not be financing elections when there are 
insufficient funds to pay for day-to-day operations of government; 
Due to the present state deficit, the public funding program should be 
reduced or repealed. It is a luxury that the state can ill afford. It 
is hard for me to use taxpayers' money when there are so many more 
important needs; Public financing is wonderful for first-time 
candidates because they have difficulty raising money. But, special 
interests will always find ways to promote their allies. Thus, all in 
all, tax money can be put to better use; I ran with traditional 
financing in 2000 and with public financing in 2002. Public funding has 
made it easier to run as a state representative; I have more time to go 
to the voters' homes. But, I am not sure if they like candidates 
spending taxpayer money; Taxpayer funds should not be spent in this 
manner. Taxpayers have no real understanding of the process and the 
"games" that are played; There are lots of problems with this 
program. It should be repealed; Public financing has added millions 
of dollars to political campaigns without any other noticeable changes. 
We are spending public funds on something that is of no benefit to the 
taxpayers. Ask the person on the street if his or her legislator is a 
participant or not in the public financing program. The blank stare you 
get will answer your question; The current budget crisis will erode 
public support for taxpayer funding of politicians, as will the giving 
of $1 million in public funds to a Green Party candidate for governor; 

Participating candidate comments: This is a good program and should be 
continued, although some changes are needed; This is a great 
program. It needs to be continued, with some tightening-up of 
loopholes; This is a terrific program, even if it is not perfect; 
My personal experience was that the public financing program was a 
valid attempt at campaign reform; While the public financing program 
is not perfect, it begins the process of returning power to the 
people; The program has enhanced democracy and will return power to 
voters in the long run; This program helps the electoral process and 
is good for democracy; Maine's public financing program should be a 
pilot program for federal elections; The Maine Clean Election Act is 
the best thing that could ever happen to our government. It is a great 
example for national elections, and such reform should be greatly 
encouraged; I support the use of publicly funded elections. I think 
it is good for the people of Maine and, for that matter, any state.

Topic: Number of candidates and electoral competition; 

Nonparticipating 
candidate comments: The only reason more candidates will opt for public 
financing is that the law and its implementation are punitive towards 
traditionally funded candidates; This year (2002), there seem to be 
quite a few candidates, at least in my area, who have chosen to be 
clean election candidates. They did it only to avoid having to raise 
money. They did not talk to constituents to obtain the $5 
contributions; friends did it for them. The law has made candidates 
more lazy, especially incumbents; More candidates are choosing 
public financing because it involves no fundraising efforts. It is a 
somewhat lazy approach of letting taxpayers do your work; If the 
goal of Maine's public financing program was to elect people for office 
who would not normally be elected, I believe it was partly successful. 
Time will tell if the people got what they wanted; Maine's public 
financing system has proven to be very successful. It especially helped 
to recruit female candidates; The public financing program has made 
it easier to find candidates in rural districts; The program may 
have encouraged some candidates to run, but it has not had much effect 
in my opinion; This may be a simplistic view, but I think the Maine 
Clean Election Act does make a difference. Although I withdrew my 
candidacy, I considered it much more seriously because I knew public 
funding would help me to run a decent campaign against a very strong 
incumbent; The program has encouraged massive fraud by having 
insincere "paper candidates" take the money and run half-hearted 
campaigns just to tie up the incumbent. Also, they use the money (for 
phone banks, graphic artists, overhead, etc.) to support other 
competitive campaigns. Further, because fundraising expenditures are 
not deducted, conventional candidates have a financial disadvantage; 
People voted for the Maine Clean Election Act because they thought 
dirty campaigning (e.g., personal attack ads) would stop. Yet, the 2000 
election was one of the dirtiest campaign scenes that I have witnessed 
in over 30 years. I got many calls asking, "How come so and so can say 
that about her opponent?" I explained that all Maine's Act does is to 
ensure that tax dollars will pay for participating candidates' 
campaigns. This is a very bad piece of legislation; Races will 
continue to get nastier because, by law, independent expenditures and 
issue advocacy spending cannot be coordinated with or attributed to 
candidates; I am very concerned about how marginal third-party 
candidates will influence the outcome of close elections. I think we 
will have too many officials elected with less than 50 percent of the 
vote. We may need to have run-off elections; Public financing only 
clutters the field of candidates by putting radicals on the ballots--
radicals who get support only from a few other radicals. If a candidate 
cannot garner enough support to run, he is not capable of performing 
the duties of office. The people know who should run, and they show it 
with contributions. Get rid of public financing!; Soliciting 
contributions enlightens the voters about the political program of the 
potential candidate. Also, this traditional fundraising process shows 
the reluctance of voters to contribute or not contribute to the 
candidate's program; Public financing is creating a Green Party 
spoiler in the governor's race in the 2002 election; 

Participating 
candidate comments: The program gives a greater number of people a 
chance to run for office; I support Maine's public financing 
program. We have been able to recruit more candidates of diverse 
backgrounds; I know my opponent could not have run without public 
funding, and I am pleased that he did run; Without public funding, I 
would not have been able to launch a campaign or run as a candidate; 
Absent the public financing program, I seriously doubt that I would 
have ever run for office. And, I am sure that many other candidates 
were similarly influenced by the program; I remain a committed 
supporter of clean elections. A greater and more varied population of 
candidates is now able to run. The requirements are high enough to 
exclude candidates who lack community support or credibility. The 
system is well run in Maine; Public financing is changing the nature 
and number of candidates and campaigns in Maine. In particular, third-
party candidates are accessing funds to run viable campaigns. In 
general, my constituents seem to support the motivating principles that 
initiated this program but do not understand where the money is coming 
from; I have significant concerns when a third-party candidate, such 
as the Green Party's gubernatorial candidate in the 2002 election, can 
get public funding even though he received a mere 5 percent of the 
votes in the previous election. It is a terrible waste to use public 
funds for an unelectable candidate's propaganda; Candidates running 
for a higher or statewide office (e.g., governor) should have to 
demonstrate viability by first being elected to serve in a lower 
office; The only reservation I have is that public financing can be 
obtained by people who cannot win an election because they are too 
single-issue oriented or are not widely supported. They become 
spoilers, potentially causing candidates to be elected by a plurality 
rather than a majority; There are about 4,000 to 5,000 voters in 
each House district. A candidate's physical ability to campaign has at 
least as much to do with the outcome as money. It is possible to knock 
on every door in a district if necessary; Party loyalty and party 
organization are critical to helping a clean elections candidate. Such 
candidates must have a "campaign place" in order to be effective.

Topic: Interest Group Influence; 

Nonparticipating candidate comments: 
The implication that publicly funded candidates are "clean" and 
traditional candidates are not is offensive to me. The hypothesis that 
Maine legislators are driven by whoever provides financial support to 
campaigns is bogus. This program is a solution looking for a problem; 
; I resent the fact of being labeled a dirty candidate if I do not 
participate in the program; The "clean election" designation for 
those taking advantage of the public funding program implies that the 
traditional candidate may not be "clean." This is unfortunate and 
should be changed; The use of "clean" is a poor choice of words as 
it denotes a negative for the other candidates; I think the public 
is being deluded into thinking that public financing takes big money 
out of elections and that the term "clean candidate" means something. I 
also think partisanship is even more involved in elections now than 
when individuals had to pay their own way or raise their own funds; 
Maine's current law does not adequately limit the behind-the-scenes 
roles played by the most powerful players, that is, the parties and 
their most powerful lobby groups--business, labor, National Rifle 
Association, abortion rights, etc. They put out the most blatant 
negative ads and literature. Successful candidates know exactly to whom 
they are beholden, even if the candidates received no money directly 
from these groups; If the program's purpose was to ensure some 
integrity in the election process, it is a huge failure. If they lack 
integrity, candidates and supporters will always find loopholes; I 
feel that the program has increased negative presentations by advocacy 
groups, and it could have the effect of weakening the two-party system. 
Special interests rather than candidates will have the greatest voice. 
Without their consent, candidates could be endorsed by groups in ads 
that do not reflect the candidates' views; I believe the program has 
helped restore the public's faith in the integrity of candidates. 
Hopefully, many other states, and eventually Congress, will adopt 
public funding of elections; I did not accept funding from any 
group. I ran a low-key campaign and paid my own bills. In this way, 
when I walked through the door at Maine's House of Representatives, I 
was my own person. I owed no one person or any group anything; The 
public funding program removes a certain contact with people for 
fundraising. Some view traditional candidates as being influenced by 
funding services; others view such candidates as being responsive; I 
have found that voters generally do not care whether you are running as 
a publicly funded candidate or not. Maine's Act was passed as a knee-
jerk reaction to a ballot irregularity; Until honest people are 
elected, you will not have clean elections. Maine's law does the 
complete opposite of its intended purpose; 

Participating candidate comments: 
Accepting public financing gives me the feeling that I truly 
represent the people and not a lobby; Running as a clean election 
candidate was a liberating experience that most people seemed to 
appreciate; The program has contributed to lessening the impact on 
and control of candidacies by special interests. However, term limits 
have increased the impact of lobbies in the halls and committee rooms. 
The final result regarding the influence of lobbies may be negligible, 
but more "regular" people are running for office; Public confidence 
in politics is crucial if democracy is to survive. Publicly financed 
campaigns help to increase that confidence by leveling the playing 
field and driving candidates; back to grassroots campaigns that 
connect them directly with voters; There is no question that public 
financing requires constituent participation. Running a campaign is not 
about getting and raising money; it is about meeting and talking to the 
people and engaging them in the election process; I welcomed the 
ability to be independent from groups who try to exert influence on the 
basis of monetary support; To be elected to the state legislature 
and not feel beholden to anyone except my constituents is a liberating 
feeling; The most important effect of the public financing program 
has been to free legislatures from the influence of campaign 
contributors; The program has removed private fund raising. The 
issue is: How influential were the private check writers on the way 
legislators voted. It did not impact me, because I voted on the basis 
of whether legislation was good or bad for my constituents and the 
people of Maine; I like the idea of not having to answer to big 
companies after they give big bucks to your campaign; I felt a great 
deal of freedom after being elected because I had only my constituents 
to answer to; Make Maine's law stronger and continue to reduce the 
role of lobbying groups; The program may lead to changing this 
country from an oligarchy of corporate and special interests to 
something approaching democracy; I probably would not be a 
traditionally funded candidate because financial influence is too much 
of a precedent in state and national campaigns; It is time that the 
rich, both personal and companies, be stopped from running our country. 
With "clean elections," the candidates' time and energy will be spent 
on communicating and working with the people they represent; The 
general public is in great need of education regarding the benefits of 
publicly financed elections systems. The public believes that all 
politicians are bought and paid for by special interest groups, and the 
public is not all wrong; I wish PACs and special interests could be 
stopped from interfering with democracy; The way Maine's law is now 
written, a publicly funded candidate must demonstrate a strong fund-
raising ability and come up with more private donors than usually found 
in a traditional campaign. Where are likely donors found? Sources are 
the same as used by traditional candidates--groups with membership 
lists, such as political parties, unions, service organizations, non-
profit and activist entities, and church groups, as well as people you 
work with. In short, special interests have not been removed from 
campaigns.

Topic: Campaign spending: independent expenditures and issue advocacy 
spending; 

Nonparticipating candidate comments: Independent 
expenditures are a big problem for senate and statewide office races; 
Maine now has a soft money problem where none existed before. Our 
campaigns are now much more expensive, and the races have more dirty 
politics than ever. Political action committees (PACs) spend the same 
or more money now--in addition to the "clean funds," doubling 
expenditures. The public can no longer trace the money being dumped 
into campaigns. Special interest groups and lobbyists are stronger here 
now more than ever because it is almost impossible to get elected 
without PAC expenditures. More issue advocacy and soft money move 
through the party organizations. This program was a bad move for 
Maine; Maine's public financing program has created a major problem 
with soft money--independent expenditures and issue advocacy--where 
none existed before; The public financing program has created a soft 
money problem in Maine, when no problem existed prior to the change; 
Independent expenditures are increasing. Every candidate under a true 
clean election system should receive exactly the same amount of funds, 
and independent expenditures should not be allowed under the law; I 
ran as a traditional candidate in 2000. I am running with public funds 
in 2002 because my opponent is also publicly financed. There are too 
many ways that independent expenditures can be made and just as many 
ways the incumbent can spend to inform his or her constituency. Public 
financing is not always really an equal playing field. Why not just 
limit the amount of money a candidate can raise?; It is erroneous to 
believe that candidates are unaware of independent expenditures. Both 
Democratic and Republican party leaders use PACs to exploit the 
loophole; If public funds are used, PACs should be outlawed; The 
"clean" candidates are using "leadership PACs" to collect funds for 
other candidates. The parties are finding ways to get around limits. 
Labor unions and interest groups are just going on as usual; PAC 
money can be used by all except the candidate. It is much too easy to 
get around the regulations; In its infancy, the public funding 
program creates more of a hardship for the participating candidate, as 
the races most often are composed of one participating and one non-
participating candidates. Traditional candidates have the ability to go 
to special interest groups and bury a publicly financed opponent under 
a volume of ads; The public financing program does not help the 
system because more independent expenditures are occurring, which 
thwarts the intent of the program; I have already seen an extensive 
shift to advocacy advertising. It is a real change in how elections are 
done. Total spending has really grown; Independent candidates, such 
as myself, are seriously disadvantaged in that there are no limits on 
issue advocacy spending and independent expenditures, since no one does 
these on our behalf. I did not chose public financing, but not because 
of spending limits. I won each of my races with increasing majorities 
and spent far less than $6,000. Campaigns do not have to be expensive; 
I think that if you are running as a clean candidate, none of the 
parties should spend money on the candidate; 

Participating candidate comments: 

I am very concerned that independent expenditures and issue 
advocacy will be the major source of information for the voters. Both 
of these types of communications come from somewhere other than the 
candidate, perhaps even serving to trump the candidate's message due to 
unlimited funds. The increase in independent expenditure is an 
unintended consequence of public funding; Issue advocacy spending is 
a loophole in the clean elections law. Under current policy, 
participating candidates can benefit from such spending without 
breaking the rules of the public financing program. It puts candidates 
who follow the program fairly at a disadvantage. We must not allow 
issue advocacy communications to mention the names of candidates or 
parties; Independent expenditures are the only trouble spot. I do 
not know how to solve it, except by requirement to file (maybe 6 weeks 
before the election) an "intent" to make expenditures on behalf of a 
candidate. It drove me crazy when a group in 2000 did a mailing on my 
behalf that misled voters on where I stood on the issue. I had no 
control over the mailing, which also resulted in freeing up money for 
my opponent to spend; There is no accountability for independent 
expenditures. A publicly financed candidate is at the mercy of last-
minute independent expenditures for opponents and has no opportunity to 
respond in kind before the election; Candidates should not be 
allowed to create their own PACs; Leadership, particularly in the 
Democratic Party, continues to raise monies to share with candidates; 
There should be limits on independent expenditures and outside 
monies. I ran my campaign in one of Maine's poorest counties; to ask 
individuals to finance large amounts for politics is obscene; To 
limit "hard" money from going "soft," there must be restrictions (e.g., 
disclosure, disincentives, etc.) on independent expenditures.

Topic: Campaign spending: overall amounts; Nonparticipating candidate 
comments: 

There is more money in Maine politics than ever before. The 
clean elections law has done more harm than good; Public financing 
of elections has increased the amount of money spent on campaigns in 
this state. I am sorry that I voted as a legislator for this program; 
; Having a publicly financed opponent in 2000 drove my spending higher 
because I knew he had enough money for radio and TV; and, his party was 
running negative ads against some of our candidates. I bought several 
thousand dollars of radio ads that I had not planned to spend. I expect 
to spend less money in the 2002 election because my opponent did not 
qualify for public funds; I was unopposed in my 2000 campaign; the 
total cost was only about $1,900. Public financing reduces the fund-
raising of traditionally financed candidates. Some constituents who 
support public financing no longer contribute to the campaigns of 
privately funded candidates, although the constituents still support 
the candidate and did contribute in the past; I found that 
candidates who were in the public financing program bragged about the 
fact that they spent more money than when they were not in program 
because it was not money they had to raise; All candidates should be 
allowed to receive and spend no more than $5,000 per campaign year to 
support their campaign--or an amount equal to that of their opponent, 
if less than $5,000; I limited my campaign expenditures to $5,000 
and dedicated my efforts to the less-costly, door-to-door campaign; 
The provisions of the law that made corporate contributions illegal and 
reduced the maximum contributions from individuals were good; 
Allowing matching funds for little effort by a public financed 
candidate does not make sense. An example is the Green Party candidate 
in the 2002 gubernatorial race. Consistently unable to get votes from 
Maine voters, he will probably get over $1 million of taxpayer money 
and may become a "spoiler."; Lots of public money goes to the 
participating candidates, who spend about four times the amounts they 
would spend if taxpayer funds were not being used; The public funds 
are too easily spent--overkill on signs and junk--a big waste. Many 
candidates who use public funds know it is a joke; but, it is easy 
money; The amount of money needed to finance a House of 
Representatives race in rural Maine is not the same as that needed for 
urban areas. If the Maine Clean Election Act is retained, the initial 
dollars to be distributed to a participating candidate should be 
recalculated based on the particular district's record. Having an 
opponent who was publicly funded forced me to more than double my 
funding and expenditures in 2002 compared to 2000; Because public 
funding amounts are based on average expenditures in previous cycles, 
the program pours money into non-competitive races and provides 
insufficient funds for competitive districts; Public funding is more 
important in Senate races than House races because of geography and the 
need for more campaign dollars; In early 2002, thousands of dollars 
were given out in public financing for a special election to fill a 
vacated legislative seat. These sums led to a spending spree for a seat 
to be filled for only a few weeks; Participation in the public 
financing program makes a candidate think before spending. The program 
is a step in the right direction and is good for cleaner elections; 

Participating candidate comments: 
I feel that the public financing 
program decreased the amount of money spent in my race; Publicly 
financed campaigns helped me to be more responsible with my finances. I 
made a conscious effort to be more thrifty so as not to deplete the 
public coffer; Maine's public financing program has removed a lot of 
"big money" from legislative races; I take exception to the fact 
that candidates who participated in the public funding program were 
still able to be associated with PACs; If you are a "clean election 
candidate," you should not be allowed to form a PAC for a leadership 
position; A candidate should be allowed to spend only the allotted 
amount of money--with no other financing, such as PACs; 
Unfortunately, pressure to raise money for the party caucuses will 
continue to affect voting within the parties at the state level; 
More funds should be available to challengers than to incumbents, who 
have the advantage of receiving extra press coverage and using their 
office newsletters and materials from previous elections; In 2000, 
inadequate funding was available for Senate races. As an incumbent, I 
had a huge advantage over my publicly funded opponent. In 2002, I faced 
a traditionally funded opponent. Loopholes allowed him to raise money 
in an uncontested primary--money that never will be matched and gave 
him an unfair advantage; In 2000, I had no opposition in my race for 
the state legislature. However, because I am so passionate about public 
financing, I ran as a clean elections candidate. In 2002, I am running 
again with public funds. I have a Republican opponent and feel that I 
have more than enough money to win again.

Topic: Program scope; 

Nonparticipating candidate comments: 

All 
candidates should be on an equal playing field. Either all candidates 
or none should be publicly financed; The program is flawed because 
it is not mandatory and universal; Public financing should be for 
all candidates or none. As it stands now, the program is a farce; 
For this system to work, it must become a requirement across the board. 
I sincerely hope this will happen, because it then will accomplish what 
I would like to believe was the original purpose--to elect 
representatives unencumbered by obligation to select populations; 
The program should apply only to candidates for the state legislature 
and not to gubernatorial candidates; 

Participating candidate comments: 
I believe that public financing should not be granted to incumbents. 
The program's purpose should be to encourage newcomers and not to 
perpetuate career politicians.

Topic: Program administration; 

Nonparticipating candidate comments: 
The Maine Governmental Ethics and Election Practices Commission is run 
by the majority party. Thus, one party is "off the hook," and the other 
party's members are harassed; The reporting procedures are a burden 
and unreliable; Sections of Maine's law regarding reporting are 
problematic. What happens when a non-participant goes over time frames 
and limits for outside expenditures?; The reporting forms and 
information requirements are worse than those for tax purposes; The 
idea of publicly financed campaigns is good. It is my perception, 
however, that Maine's program adds to the time spent on filling out and 
filing forms. One of my greatest fears is that I may make a mistake on 
a form, or fail to submit a report on time, and be held up to criticism 
as an incompetent or a criminal. The system should be simplified if it 
is to be effective; The requirement for $5 contributions should be 
dropped; people do not understand it; The use of money orders for 
the $5 contributions should be banned. Anyone can generate money orders 
to get credit for the required number of contributors; I do not 
believe the public in general knows a great deal about the public 
funding process, unless they know a particular candidate who is running 
in the program; I did not run with public funds because I did not 
want to deal with the requirements. But, even though I got no public 
money, I ended up having to deal with the program's requirements anyway 
because my opponent participated. So, in the future, I think that I 
will run with public funds if my opponent does; Another bureaucracy 
will expand, more forms will be created, and the bureaucracy in general 
will begin to influence who runs for public office and how. Eventually, 
the state will be making more rules in how people should run; 

Participating candidate comments: 
The possibility of abuse should be 
studied so as to avoid candidates taking advantage of the process. 
Greater clarity needs to be brought to the process. A candidate was 
able to spend $385 for a dinner for four people, while I was not 
allowed to purchase a copy machine that cost less; My local 
jurisdiction consistently violated my civil rights and made it almost 
impossible for me to comply with the new law in a timely fashion; To 
be useful, matching funds based on last-minute expenditures by a non-
participating candidate should be sent out earlier than the last week 
of the campaign. Also, collection of the $5 contributions should be 
allowed in cash if the donees sign the appropriate form; There are 
lots of issues dealing with the timing of funds. My opponent "hid" his 
expenses until the last minute. So, my matching funds came too late to 
be helpful; Planned expenditures (with the knowledge of the 
candidate) timed just before the election must be controlled. The 
matching funds arrive so late they have to be returned because it would 
be a waste to run a responding ad for the election; When the $5 
contributions are received, the routing numbers on the checks should 
remain private for their protection. Also, the law needs to be more 
specific about whether more than one check is needed for contributions 
from family members; Other than the last-minute expenditures of 
funds on behalf of Republican and Democratic candidates--expenditures 
made so late (although no doubt planned much earlier) that the matching 
funds could not be intelligently spent--I believe that the public 
financing program worked well and was fairly implemented by the state 
officials; One loophole involves bank accounts opened by a 
candidate's family members and used to promote the candidate; I ran 
against an incumbent who was able to send out a flyer at state expense 
describing her accomplishments as a state senator, and she had weekly 
articles in the press. None of this counted as campaign expenses. The 
limitations of Maine's Act prevented me from countering this. I could 
afford only one flyer and just one or two small newspaper 
advertisements. Our press releases on issues were not considered 
newsworthy, while an incumbent senator's activities were. GAO's survey 
did not explore the effect that incumbency has on campaigning; There 
remain loopholes to be closed, such as last-minute expenditures that 
might incur a small "penalty" but would result in an election victory.

Topic: Other; 

Nonparticipating candidate comments: 

At the outset, the 
system seemed complicated. But, once tried, the participants showed 
that it could be almost fun, politically speaking. Candidates had an 
additional chance for face-to-face contact with potential constituents, 
and the candidates boasted about how well they were able to do; I 
did not use public funding because I did not have time during the busy 
legislative session; The public program is ridiculous. Repeal this 
program or remove the holes left for money to still flow in. In its 
current form, the program is a sham; The name of the program should 
be changed to "Maine's Taxpayer-Funded Elections Law."; In the 2000 
election, I came in on the deadline and was unable to qualify for 
public funding; the funds would have assisted me greatly. In the 2002 
election, I did qualify and find that I can better use my time talking 
with and listening to people in the district. I support the Maine Clean 
Election Act; No one wants to run for office. The biggest problem is 
low pay and the amount of time spent in the state capital. You have to 
be retired or a secondary wage earner in order to take the time 
needed; I am pleased to be running as a publicly funded candidate in 
my second campaign (2002); it proved to be simpler to manage; More 
time is needed to evaluate the program; For every hour of effort 
that goes into drafting a law, three are spend trying to skirt it; 
In 2000, my publicly financed opponent found numerous ways to get 
around the regulations. It made a mockery of the intent of the law. The 
program gave her free assistance, which was worth a great deal 
financially. Whatever one person invents, another person will find a 
way to circumvent; Influential parties and organizations are already 
trying to sway public opinion against public financing; The law had 
no effect on number of votes cast; The program is a wasted effort; 

Participating candidate comments: 

In Maine, the essential reality is 
that you are at a competitive disadvantage if you do not run as a 
participating candidate; My opponent and I both used public funds. 
We treated each other with respect, and we encouraged our supporters 
not to use dirty tricks. We cooperated in trying to show that a clean 
campaign was better for all, even though we disagreed remarkably on the 
issues; Term limits must be repealed. Limits are needed only on the 
number of years in committee chair and leadership positions. State 
agencies and lobbyists are becoming more and more powerful because of 
term limits; In 2000, I decided to run for office because of term 
limits. Because I was new to politics, the Democratic chair thought I 
should go with public funding. It was right for me at the time; The 
state legislature wanted to make many changes in the public funding 
program after the first election cycle. Small tweaking is okay; but, in 
my opinion, there should be no real big changes until after one or two 
more election cycles.

Source: Response to question 25 of GAO's survey of candidates for 
office in Maine's 2000 elections (see app. IV).

Note: Each sentence (or paragraph) entry under a given topic in the 
table is a comment uniquely attributable to one candidate. That is, 
under each topic, each entry is a comment from a separate person. Some 
candidates provided comments that covered more than one topic. In these 
instances, the table presents the applicable portion of the comments 
under the appropriate topic.

[End of table]

Comments Provided by Arizona Candidates:

We received written comments from 86 respondents to our survey of 
candidates for office in Arizona's 2000 elections. In reference to the 
state's public financing program, the 86 respondents consisted of 66 
nonparticipating candidates and 20 participating candidates. Table 26 
presents the comments of the responding candidates.

Table 26: Comments Received in Our Survey of Candidates for Office in 
Arizona's 2000 Elections:

Topic: Use of public funds; 

Nonparticipating candidate comments: The 
public financing program should be judged unconstitutional. Arizona 
laws already restrict campaign fundraising and provide for full 
disclosure. The public funding program is an issue of the Democrats, 
was given a catchy name on the ballot, and is supported by the liberal 
media. The program's purpose is to gain advantage over Republicans; 
The public was hoodwinked to approve this initiative (by a margin of 
less than 1 percent) with ads stating the initiative would "get dirty 
money out of politics."; The public financing program should be 
available for all city, state, and federal elections; Since the 
number of participating candidates increased significantly from 2000 to 
2002, many candidates must feel that public financing is a good 
program. I surely do. In 2000, there was too much uncertainty about the 
law to use it in a competitive district. I spent only $7,000 and lost 
by 180 votes out of 12,000. My opponent spent $40,000 or nearly $200 
for each of the 180 votes; Although it would have saved me time and 
money, I do not believe it is the government's role to finance 
campaigns. Taxes are too high, and these dollars should be used on 
beneficial programs; Public financing is campaign welfare; The 
program wastes public funds, infringes on free speech rights, goes 
against the founding principles of our country, and increases fraud; 
Arizona is in dire financial need. These funds should be spent on 
existing programs now being cut or eliminated. Candidates, staff, and 
precinct committeemen start looking like beggars trying to achieve 
their quotas of $5 contributions; The program is a socialist scam; 
Public funding is a terrible program and will destroy the democratic 
elections process if continued; Most candidates, including me, have 
little faith in the ability of the new public financing program to 
work; The program is tyrannical, punitive, and anti-American. It is 
lazy man's financing; All candidates should raise their own money. 
If you cannot raise money--i.e., you do not have support--you should 
not be given tax dollars. Yes, reform is needed, but funding everyone 
with public money is not the answer; The law is a disaster and is 
designed to benefit the state's Democratic Party; Arizona's law is a 
moral outrage, suppresses free speech, and violates political and civil 
rights. The public financing program fails in its objective to "take 
the money out of politics." The program simply creates a new political 
game with new rules and with money still playing a key role; The 
public funding program is bad policy, forces people to support 
candidates they do not agree with, and is unconstitutional; The 
public funding program is unconstitutional; The program is the worst 
concept to be proposed for elections. The government should not be 
buying elected officials; Public funding is a terrible program that 
should be discontinued. It is a sham by liberals to obtain money to get 
elected; Because I believe in true freedom of speech not hampered or 
helped through government, I do not support public financing of private 
campaigns. Further, the implementation of Arizona's Act has all but 
eliminated free, fair, and democratic elections in the state; 

Participating candidate comments: 

Public financing is a very good thing 
but definitely is not a panacea for our money-dominated political 
system; The program is costing taxpayers a lot of money that could 
be going to more worthwhile uses for the state; The program is an 
excellent example of campaign finance reform. All states should have 
it; Having run as a participating candidate, I am convinced of the 
value of public financing of elections. Candidates have more time to 
spend with voters, adequate funds are provided for message delivery, 
and participants must demonstrate that they possess the bona fides of a 
serious candidate.

Topic: Number of candidates and electoral competition; 

Nonparticipating candidate comments: 

There may be more candidates this year, but there 
is less debate about even fewer ideas. The hot issue in the Republican 
gubernatorial and Attorney General campaigns this year (2002), was cash 
versus accrual accounting and punctuality in campaign paper work. A 
vigorous campaign about education, taxes, and health care was lost 
because a government agency charged with regulating finance for 
traditional candidates could not decide what the rules were before the 
contest began and dictated the terms of the public dialogue by 
distracting the media and the public with press conferences, egregious 
fines, and threats to disqualify legitimate candidates from the ballot. 
Arizona gained candidates, but we lost debate on the issues that 
matter; Clean elections money allowed some good candidates to be 
able to run; I think it is a great way to get more people to run for 
office in Arizona. Had I known more, I would have run as a 
participating candidate in 2000; Why should taxpayers fund fringe 
candidates? What publicly funded candidate ran and won who would not 
have won with the traditional method of raising money?; It is very 
difficult to assess the Arizona system from the 2000 cycle. The system 
was in legal limbo for a significant time, and fewer candidates 
participated for that reason. The 2002 cycle has many more 
participating candidates and will be a more realistic test run. 
Hopefully, the system will fulfill its promises; There were no new 
people elected because of public funding. Term limits are the reason 
for new faces; The program is great. It increased the competition 
dramatically in 2002, and the effect should be huge by 2004; Public 
funding is insufficient to offset a well-heeled opponent; Pubic 
financing has opened up the political process to individuals who, in 
the past, either could not self-finance their campaign or had little or 
no access to contributors; The program increases the number of 
unqualified candidates; The program helps to bring in more 
candidates. Some changes are needed in the law, but it should not be 
repealed; Under the program, some not very bright people are getting 
elected, not because of their views or abilities but because they can 
make a bigger splash with signs and advertising. The balance now is too 
far in favor of publicly financed candidates; Under the public 
funding program, fringe candidates with no support run and waste 
resources; "Clean elections" is a bad law that favors incumbents 
with established name recognition; Public funding helped many new 
candidates run in 2000, especially in Tucson. The program was a 
significant boost to the Pima County Green Party, which ran candidates 
in most races. Many of these candidates made respectable showings at 
the polls. The program is very positive and should be continued; Too 
many candidates are running (prompted by term limits, redistricting, 
and government funding), and confusing elections are resulting. 
Candidates lacking viability are being encouraged (rather than 
discouraged) from running. The traditional funding system is an 
excellent way to separate the wheat from the chaff early on, before the 
public is forced to confront a herd of candidates on the ballot; 

Participating candidate comments: 
While I fully support the public 
financing program, the court challenges reduced its efficacy in both 
2000 and 2002; The program increased the number of candidates 
running; most are not qualified; Public financing is the only way 
that concerned, qualified, working individuals can become directly 
involved in the electoral and governing process. It provides for a more 
direct form of participation in our republican form of government; 
Clean elections open the door to the American dream of running for 
office. Now, not just the rich and those "in bed" with lobbyists can 
run. Qualified people can run and strengthen our democracy. I can only 
hope more states adopt public financing to clean up politics; More 
candidates are able to run for office; I ran for statewide office in 
2002. Without public funding, I would not have run; Since 2000 was 
the first election under the public financing program, participation 
was not as great as it is this year (2002).

Topic: Interest Group Influence; 

Nonparticipating candidate comments: 
Special interests can hide behind the collection of the $5 qualifying 
contributions. Under normal campaign limits, a special interest could 
at best raise 10 to 20 percent of a traditional candidate's money. With 
clean elections, a special interest can be responsible for collecting 
all of a participating candidate's $5 qualifying contributions. In 
reality, under clean elections, special interest involvement can be 
hidden or cloaked from disclosure; In Arizona, the publicly funded 
candidates accepted seed money from special interests at the same rate 
that I did as a non-participating candidate. If anyone believes that I 
can be influenced by $270, then they do not want me; Special 
interest groups and lobbyists have had, do have, and will always have a 
significant influence on the process; A candidate should serve his 
or her constituency instead of special interest groups; The public 
funding program does help to reduce the impact of lobbyists; The 
program does remove a lot of special interest money from the process, 
which results in better public policy; Having candidates interface 
with $5 contributors to get funding is much better than obtaining money 
from special interest contributors; The worst thing I disliked was 
that spokespersons for the Citizens Clean Elections Commission 
constantly referred to traditional candidates as bad apples. However, I 
felt that my integrity and honesty were intact; Any candidate still 
needs groups of people for support, whether it is for financial support 
or the vote. So, a participating candidate can still be lobbied. The 
public funding program does not make a participating candidate any less 
biased; Well-organized candidates were able to raise the $5 
qualifying contributions with the assistance of organizations, unions, 
and special interest groups. I would have had to do it all on my own, 
with individual contributions. That was not possible for me; I did not 
have a campaign organization to help; In 2000, I ran with 
traditional funding. But, in 2002, because of an extremely wealthy 
candidate in my race, I chose to try the public financing program. It 
has been a disaster, and I would never do it again. It was easier to 
obtain sufficient money through fundraisers than to collect the $5 
contributions. Labor unions collected most of the $5 contributions for 
Democratic candidates; there was not much work done by the candidates; 
; The cash nature of the $5 contributions makes bundling and illegal 
activity in collection significant and not trackable; Under the public 
funding program, lobbyists are able to continue; their influence by 
simply "volunteering" to collect $5 contributions for participating 
candidates; Public funding does not produce "clean" campaigns or any 
real fairness. Political influence of special interests remains 
undiminished. Influence is gained by arranging for qualifying 
contributions; Special interests continue to exert tremendous 
influence on both privately and publicly funded candidates. The only 
difference is that the influence on privately funded candidates is 
fully disclosed and reported, while the influence on "clean" candidates 
is not disclosed anywhere; 

Participating candidate comments: In 1996, 
I had to raise my own money. In 2000, it was wonderful not having to 
raise money and not having to jump through hoops to get endorsements to 
obtain money; To me, it was wonderful not having to go to individual 
committees to grovel for money. I felt more powerful and independent. 
It was a better feeling than when I ran in 1998; Public financing 
takes special interest money out of government. This approach is the 
only way that elections should be run, at both the state level and 
nationally; With public financing, my interaction with traditional 
lobbyists changed; they had to pursue me. Some PACs seemed to 
automatically oppose me, even though I might have supported their 
issues. These entities seemed to respect only those candidates whom 
they could support financially. Arizonans seem well aware that the link 
between special interest money and special interest laws is strong and 
want to change it. Arizona and Maine are leading the way in the nation. 
Let's hope a federal clean elections law is passed; Lobbyists will 
have less influence on candidates and legislators.

Topic: Campaign spending; 

Nonparticipating candidate comments: Clean 
elections allowed many people to just waste and spend money to run; 
I object to the fact that a participating candidate can get public 
money to match or equal the amount of money provided by supporters of a 
traditional candidate. Clean elections is a bad law; In my first two 
elections, I spent about $18,000, whereas my opposition spent $42,000. 
So, money did not buy the election; the message did; The program is 
unfair to non-participating candidates. Participating candidates get 
more money than non-participating candidates, which raises the cost of 
campaigns from being kitchen-table campaigns to high-priced, complex 
campaigns. Some candidates spend money on non-campaign activities. The 
money should not go directly to candidates; I feel strongly that 
there should be spending limits on all candidates; Public financing 
has greatly increased the cost of campaigns; The program has fueled 
the campaign services industry, allowing more money to go to owners of 
printing shops and yard sign makers. Public financing had little effect 
on the outcome of elections in 2000. Voters may be disappointed to know 
that tax dollars had this end result; The 2002 election is the most 
costly I have ever witnessed. We received more full color mailings than 
has ever been the case. In the 2000 election, at least one candidate 
took public money, hired family, and never appeared anywhere. 
Incumbents with campaign money from previous years still have an 
advantage. The limitations on campaign contributions to non-
participating candidates are arbitrary and unfair; Except for 
gubernatorial candidates, the amounts of public funding are 
significantly insufficient; Rural candidates are disadvantaged 
because of the huge, disproportionate cost of travel. Public funds are 
not available in time to meet the logistics of traveling to a sign 
printer and then distributing signs over vast areas and multiple 
communities; The 2002 election cycle has pointed out some glaring 
problems with Arizona's Act, including a possible inadequacy of funding 
and problems with interpretation of the law; It was disappointing to 
see how tax dollars were spent by the participating candidates--
computers and other equipment kept for personal use after the election, 
travel expenses, dinners out, and parties. It was a disgrace; In the 
primary election, the program does not provide enough money for a new 
candidate to complete against an incumbent or to compete in a 
redistricted area. Also, late in campaigns, non-participating 
candidates have a great advantage in planning and controlling 
expenses; Public funding can be used as an unfair weapon. In one 
primary in 2000, my publicly funded opponent obtained matching money 
and spent the entire amount on a smear campaign directed at me. The 
goal seemed not so much to win but to destroy my credibility in order 
to improve the chances of another competing candidate who had a similar 
political philosophy. Receiving six negative campaign flyers in the 
mail at one time--flyers that were publicly financed--was 
objectionable; Participating candidates were allowed a higher level 
of spending than me. As soon as I raised more than they were allowed in 
the primary, they received more funds. I should have been allowed to 
raise and spend as much as they were allowed in the primary and general 
elections; Public funding sounds good in theory but fails miserably 
in terms of producing positive results. Campaigns are more expensive. 
Statewide candidates spend a great amount of time begging for $5 
contributions. A traditional candidate actually has much more time to 
meet constituents, talk to them about issues, and get to know their 
concerns; There is no level playing field. Those accepting taxpayer 
financing enjoy a tremendous advantage over those who raise money from 
friends and family in terms of actual cash available for campaigning, 
as well as advantages in reporting requirements, disclosure of campaign 
strategy, and the burden of horrendous IRS-style audits. My publicly 
funded opponent was given funds to communicate with voters to match 
money that I spent to pay taxes, fund official legislative business, 
and raise funds. A taxpayer-financed candidate will generally enjoy a 
25-percent cash advantage over a traditionally funded one; 

Participating candidate comments: The proliferation of campaign 
materials direct mailed in the 2002 primary has become disgusting.

Topic: Program scope; 
Nonparticipating candidate comments: I believe 
all candidates should get public funds and that the $5 contributions 
requirement should be dropped. I dislike asking people for money, 
whether it's the public or special interests. I'd rather pay my own way 
or have each candidate get an equal amount. I would not participate in 
the public funding program unless all candidates received the funds, 
without the $5 contribution requirement; If you want a system for 
financially challenged candidates, establish a welfare program to 
provide seed money for individuals who can prove financial need; 

Participating candidate comments: [Empty].

Topic: Program administration; 

Nonparticipating candidate comments: 
The Citizens Clean Elections Commission does not have clear rules; it 
is very easy to make mistakes in filings, which can result in severe 
sanctions or penalties. This is discouraging possible new candidates 
from considering the public financing route. The absolute power of the 
Commission is scary; The reporting is not fair and equal for both 
types of candidates. Traditional candidates have to report more often 
than candidates who use public money. Clean elections changed the rules 
many times during the campaign; A non-participating candidate has to 
go through all the ridiculous reporting requirements. A participating 
candidate does not need to use funds to raise money; but, a non-
participating candidate does, and it gets counted towards what a 
participating candidate gets from the public. This is totally unfair; 
; There are too many reports; The reporting obligations are 
significant and time consuming, but the system is well thought-out; 
Our system is draconian in its reporting requirements. The Citizens 
Clean Elections Commission struggles with interpretation of the law and 
is often challenged. The law places unfair limits on contributions to 
non-participants. In short, it is a terrible law and should be 
repealed; The Citizens Clean Elections Commission is just another 
government agency gone amuck; Even when running unopposed, non-
participating candidates still have to do all the time-consuming 
reporting; The program puts unreasonable reporting demands on non-
participating candidates, which detracts from the campaigning process; 
; The Citizens Clean Elections Commission needs to be more 
professionally trained to give accurate answers. Information given out 
is often wrong or it changes without notification. Also, the Commission 
needs to be able to skim finance reports and act on violations. 
Enforcement is weak; Arizona's Act places different standards on 
participating and nonparticipating candidates in direct violation of 
the Fourteenth Amendment equal protection clause. Upon some perceived 
violation, an unelected board can remove a candidate's name from the 
ballot without any recourse for the state's citizens; A 
nonparticipating candidate has to go through all the ridiculous 
reporting requirements. Also, a participating candidate does not need 
to use funds to raise money, whereas the fund-raising expenditures made 
by a nonparticipating candidate are counted toward what a participating 
candidate gets in public funds. This is totally unfair; The Citizens 
Clean Elections Commission is the fourth branch of government and is 
accountable to no one. The Commission makes its own rules for all 
candidates; The Commission should have spent some time and money on 
public information ads. My district has many rural areas, and many 
people had not heard of the clean elections program. I spent most of my 
time trying to explain the law rather than discussing important 
education, health, and environment issues. Therefore, I was not able to 
get the qualifying signatures needed to obtain public funding; Under 
the public financing program, reporting is overly burdensome, and the 
Commission is not accountable to anyone. Before the program, Arizona 
already had a good system of limited contributions and open reporting 
requirements; As the rules change, candidates and their finance 
managers become confused about requirements; The additional 
requirements for both participating and non-participating candidates 
have become a political tool to bludgeon opponents with; The 
candidate debates and forums were not advertised sufficiently, and 
turnout was poor at best; Arizona's law has served only to get 
candidates in trouble due to the capricious, ad hoc nature of the 
Citizens Clean Elections Commission and its unfair, confusing campaign 
finance rulings and procedures; The Commission has gotten 
politically involved and hurt several campaigns; ; To assure 
compliance with reporting requirements necessitated having a full-time 
person, which resulted in less time for campaign issues; The 
Commission's red tape and subjective rulemaking are barriers to 
involvement. Constituents think the paperwork is ridiculous and a waste 
of time and would prefer to give me a $100 check rather than mess with 
a $5 contribution and paperwork. I stopped trying to qualify for public 
funds because I was taking 15 to 20 minutes to explain the program to 
voters rather than discussing issues. Also, the timeline for qualifying 
is absurd; funding can occur as late as 1 week before the election, 
which penalizes a participating candidate; The Commission has become 
an advocacy group that shoots from the hip publicly and has unclear 
rules and onerous obligations. The Commission has no accountability for 
its actions and is attempting to influence the outcomes of elections 
rather than simply reviewing the process; The current funding 
program uses processes that are very similar to the way the Soviet 
Union mismanaged its economy; Arizona's Act requires traditional 
candidates to disclose to their opponents on a daily basis their every 
campaign activity during the heat of the campaign. This is information 
that the "clean" candidates keep secret until after the election. Think 
about filing your taxes every day, itemizing every expenditure, and 
making it available on the Internet for all to see. It's practically 
the same for candidates who refuse government funds, but not for those 
who accept them. The cost of compliance is immense, and the advantage 
given your opponent is insurmountable. Also, this year (2002), the 
Commission decided to randomly audit 10 traditional candidates during 
the campaign, even though there were no allegations of impropriety. 
This served only as a means for the government to distract the 
candidates from their campaigns in order to give yet another advantage 
to the preferred "clean" candidates. Also, the Commission zealously 
audited every candidate against whom a "clean" candidate complained, 
regardless of whether the complaint had validity or not. This just 
another "service" the Commission provides to the candidates it 
prefers; The computer software was not compatible with a MAC; 

Participating candidate comments: 

Public funding needs to be available 
early in order for the recipient to plan his or her campaign 
advertising effectively. All printers and advertisers require payment 
in advance; The pamphlets (covering all candidates) distributed to 
every registered voter were very informative. Plus, the pamphlets 
included a vote-by-mail request form, which should help voter turnout; 
; I complained to the Secretary of the State and the Attorney General 
about an opponent who inappropriately received additional financing. 
Nothing was done about it; I never even received an answer; The 
Citizens Clean Elections Commission tells you what you can say, whom 
you can say it to, when you can say it, and how you say it. This is a 
grotesque violation of our First Amendment rights; I went to all of 
the available training programs but still was fined at the end of my 
campaign for not properly closing my committee. The Secretary of 
State's office took over a month to notify me, and the fine was $10 per 
day. Since I had spent all of my public money, the fine ($270) was mine 
to pay. My opponent tried to get the Commission to fine me for 
accepting an in-kind contribution of sign poles. To defend myself 
required much time and effort. Clearer rules would be helpful; Not all 
bugs were worked out during the first year (2000). Some candidates 
nearly lost their seats trying to do the process. Things tended to 
operate much better this year (2002); There should be stiffer 
penalties for participating and nonparticipating candidates who break 
the law.

Topic: Other; 

Nonparticipating candidate comments: Most candidates, 
myself included, had little faith in the ability of the new public 
financing program to work; Public funding would be fine if our law 
did not punish people who fund privately. As it is now, the law is very 
unfair; Public funding, the Redistricting Commission, and term 
limits have "dumbed down" the legislature; Several publicly funded 
candidates with less than creditable backgrounds are now running for 
legislative seats. The public funding program gives the candidates the 
power to run without much personal financial loss or scrutiny of past 
transgressions; I entered the 2000 campaign late in the process. I 
would have used public financing if my decision to run had not occurred 
2 weeks before submittal of petitions; Individual contribution 
limits should be lowered from $5 to $1; The program has resulted in 
more public debate and media coverage; Public funding laws in 
Arizona need to be improved by making them less complex and more 
consistent internally; The grossly misnamed law ("clean elections") 
violates the First Amendment; 

Participating candidate comments: 
[Empty].

Source: Response to question 23 of GAO's survey of candidates for 
office in Arizona's 2000 elections (see app. V).

Note: Each sentence (or paragraph) entry under a given topic in the 
table is a comment uniquely attributable to one candidate. That is, 
under each topic, each entry is a comment from a separate person. Some 
candidates provided comments that covered more than one topic. In these 
instances, the table presents the applicable portion of the comments 
under the appropriate topic.

[End of table]

[End of section]

Appendix VII: GAO Contacts and Acknowledgments:

GAO Contacts:

Norman J. Rabkin, (202) 512-8777 Danny R. Burton, (214) 777-5600:

Staff Acknowledgments:

In addition to the above, staff who made key contributions to this 
report were David P. Alexander, Leo M. Barbour, Lindy Coe-Juell, Glenn 
Dubin, Ann H. Finley, Marco F. Gomez, Nancy K. Kawahara, John W. 
Mingus, Jan B. Montgomery, Demian T. Moore, Terry L. Richardson, and 
Wendy Turenne.

Other Acknowledgments:

We gratefully acknowledge the time and cooperation of state agency 
officials, political party and interest group representatives, and 
other knowledgeable individuals in Maine and Arizona who assisted us in 
this study. Further, we thank the political candidates who responded to 
our survey questionnaires regarding the 2000 elections in Maine and 
Arizona.

[End of section]

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FOOTNOTES

[1] P.L. 107-155 (2002).

[2] Nonparticipating candidates won election for the third seat on the 
Corporation Commission and for the other statewide office 
(Superintendent of Public Instruction).

[3] The Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Commission on 
Campaign Finance Reform (Richard Briffault, Executive Director), 
Dollars and Democracy: A Blueprint for Campaign Finance Reform, Fordham 
University Press (New York, NY: 2000).

[4] Minn. Stat. Ann. ch. 10A (2002).

[5] Wis. Stat. Ann. ch. 11 (2001).

[6] 1997 Vermont Campaign Finance Reform Act, Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 17  
2801-2883 (2002).

[7] The Massachusetts Clean Elections Law, Ma. Gen. Laws ch. 55A 
(2002). From one perspective, Massachusetts' program can be 
characterized as a "partial" public financing program. That is, 
publicly financed candidate must collect campaign contributions, 
ranging from $5 to $100, which can be solicited only during the 
relevant qualifying period. In the 2002 gubernatorial race, for 
example, a publicly financed candidate could have collected $486,000 in 
cash contributions and $37,800 of in-kind contributions. Similarly, a 
publicly financed candidate for the state house of representatives 
could have collected $6,500 in cash contributions and $3,200 of in-kind 
contributions.

[8] Supreme Judicial Court for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Case 
No. SJC-08677 (Jan. 2002).

[9] Patrick D. Donnay and Graham P. Ramsden, "Public Financing of 
Legislative Elections: Lessons from Minnesota," Legislative Studies 
Quarterly, vol. 20, no. 3 (1995).

[10] Kenneth R. Mayer and John M. Wood, "The Impact of Public Financing 
on Electoral Competitiveness: Evidence from Wisconsin, 1964-1990," 
Legislative Studies Quarterly, vol. 20, no. 1 (1995).

[11] Paul Ryan, "A Statute of Liberty: How New York City's Campaign 
Finance Law is Changing the Face of Local Elections (2003)," and 
"Eleven Years of Reform: Many Successes-More to be Done: Campaign 
Financing in the City of Los Angeles (2001)," reports in the series 
"Public Financing in American Elections" sponsored by the Center for 
Governmental Studies, (Los Angeles, California), http://www.cgs.org/
publications (downloaded Feb. 20, 2003).

[12] Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 21-A  1121, et seq.

[13] Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann.  16-940, et seq.

[14] Applicable executive branch offices are Governor, Secretary of 
State, Attorney General, Treasurer, Corporation Commissioners, 
Superintendent of Public Instruction, and Mine Inspector.

[15] Under Maine's 1996 law, qualified candidates for office of 
Governor became eligible to receive public funding beginning in 2002. 

[16] Under Arizona's 1998 law, qualified candidates for other statewide 
offices--Governor, Secretary of State, Attorney General, Treasurer, 
Superintendent of Public Instruction, and Mine Inspector--can also 
qualify to receive public funding. Candidates for these offices were 
eligible to receive public funding beginning in 2002, the first year 
after passage of the law in which elections were held for these 
offices. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann.  19-951.

[17] Officials from the Maine and Arizona Secretary of State offices 
told us that they do not collect data on state candidates' race or sex. 
Therefore, we did not compare these demographics of candidates in the 
recent (2000 and 2002) and the previous elections. 

[18] Kenneth R. Mayer and John M. Wood, "The Impact of Public Financing 
on Electoral Competitiveness: Evidence from Wisconsin, 1964-1990," 
Legislative Studies Quarterly, vol. 20, no. 1 (1995), 75.

[19] Richard Briffault, "Public Funding and Democratic Elections," 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review, vol. 148 (1999), 568-572.

[20] The number of contested general election races for seats in 
Maine's and Arizona's house and senate averaged 77 percent of the total 
applicable races in election years 1996 through 2000, while the number 
of contested primary election races averaged 19 percent of the total 
applicable races. There were more contested general election races 
because candidates from both the Democratic and the Republican parties 
usually ran. In contrast, there was often only one candidate in the 
primary party races. 

[21] Arizona has multimember house districts, so that two 
representatives are elected from each district. Due to the multimember 
district arrangement, a contested primary race was one in which three 
candidates ran in a primary race, since two candidates automatically 
advanced to the general election race. 

[22] Kenneth R. Mayer and John M. Wood, "The Impact of Public Financing 
on Electoral Competitiveness," 74.

[23] Richard Briffault, "Public Funding and Democratic Elections," 569.

[24] James C. Garand, "Electoral Marginality in State Legislative 
Elections, 1968-86," Legislative Studies Quarterly, vol. 16, no. 1 
(1991), 14-15. The states included in this analysis were California, 
Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Iowa, Kentucky, Michigan, Missouri, 
Nebraska, New Mexico, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Utah, 
and Wisconsin.

[25] None of the incumbent losses in Arizona's house in the 2000 and 
2002 general elections were to publicly financed candidates. 

[26] Kenneth R. Mayer and John M. Wood, "The Impact of Public Financing 
on Electoral Competitiveness," 74.

[27] See appendix I for a discussion of the scope and methodology of 
our analysis.

[28] This measure of competition, incumbent victory margins, involved 
looking at the difference in the percentage of the vote garnered by 
winning incumbents and runners-up. Therefore, all races included in 
this analysis had a winning incumbent. In Arizona's multimember house 
districts (two representatives are elected in each district), there 
were several possible combinations of winning incumbents, including 
cases in which one incumbent won while the other lost. These possible 
combinations meant that incumbent victory margins in Arizona's house 
races could not be readily compared with victory margins in Arizona's 
senate races, nor to races for Maine's legislature. 

[29] See appendix I for a discussion of the scope and methodology of 
our analysis.

[30] In designing the questions, we used the term "clean election" 
because this wording has been widely used in the media, was used in the 
ballot initiatives, and also is part of the title of the respective 
state's law. Thus, in reference to voter awareness, the term "clean 
election" likely is more commonly recognized than an alternative term 
such as "public financing program." 

[31] These representatives included, for example, officers of and/or 
lobbyists for organizations such as the Maine Bankers Association, 
Maine Medical Association, Arizona Chamber of Commerce, and Arizona 
Education Association (see app. I). 

[32] For the 2000 elections, appendix II shows the amount of campaign 
funds provided to candidates who participated in the public funding 
programs and the contribution caps applicable to nonparticipating 
candidates.

[33] This is the actual 2000 election total allocation of $25,000--
adjusted for inflation to 1996 dollars to permit comparison to the 
inflation-adjusted average amount shown in figure 15 for 1998 and other 
years--for a participating candidate who faced a challenger and did not 
receive any matching funds. 

[34] After initial funding allocations, publicly financed candidates 
can receive additional funds (i.e., matching funds) based on spending 
by or for privately financed (nonparticipating) candidates, who--while 
subject to state limits and disclosure rules--engage in traditional 
means to raise money from individuals, corporations, and political 
action committees (see app. II). 

[35] Candidates who reported spending zero dollars or did not run in 
the general election are not included. Total and average spending 
amounts include primary and general election spending combined, unless 
otherwise described. With 1996 as the base year, we adjusted all 
spending amounts for inflation using the Department of Commerce's 
(Bureau of Economic Analysis) gross domestic product implicit price 
deflator. 

[36] The 1998 gubernatorial race included the incumbent, who received 
approximately 59 percent of the popular vote. In the 2002 election, the 
incumbent was prohibited by term limits from running.

[37] Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 21-A 1019.

[38] Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).

[39] Id. at 44.

[40] Arizona Citizens Clean Election Commission, Independent 
Expenditures A.R.S  16-941 (D): Candidates for Statewide and 
Legislative Offices, available at http://www.ccec.state.az.us/ccecscr/
pub/indExpend.asp (last visited April 25, 2003).

[41] Richard Briffault, The Political Parties and Campaign Finance 
Reform, 100 Colum. L. Rev. 620, 631 (2000). 

[42] In 2002, two registered campaign committees spent a combined total 
of $2,408,834 in Arizona. According to campaign finance reports filed 
with the Arizona Secretary of State, all of this spending was 
associated with the race for governor.

[43] Based in Washington, D.C., the committee is an independent 
research organization that focuses on issues involving citizen 
engagement in politics.

[44] Appendix I discusses the scope and methodology of the polls of 
voting-age citizens. The maximum sampling error for the Maine survey at 
the 95-percent level of statistical confidence is plus or minus 8 
percentage points, and the maximum for the Arizona survey is plus or 
minus 5 percentage points.

[45] www.mainecampaignfinance.com/public/home.asp

[46] At the time of our study, data were not available to calculate 
turnout as a percentage of voting-age population for the 2002 
elections.

[47] Two candidates in Arizona and six candidates in Maine were removed 
from the denominator when calculating response rates after we learned 
that these persons were deceased at the time of the survey.

[48] In designing the questions, we used the term "clean election" 
because this wording has been widely used in the media, was used in the 
ballot initiatives, and also is part of the title of the respective 
state's law. Thus, in reference to voter awareness, the term "clean 
election" likely is more commonly recognized than an alternative term 
such as "public financing program." 

[49] Daggett v. Webster, 81 F. Supp. 2d 128, 135 (D. Me. 2000).

[50] Including the American Association of Retired Persons (Maine 
Chapter), Maine A.F.L.-C.I.O., League of Women Voters of Maine, Common 
Cause/Maine, Natural Resources Council of Maine, Maine People's 
Alliance, Money and Politics Project, and Peace Action Maine.

[51] The Secretary of State adjusts these base amounts, established in 
Arizona's Act, for inflation every 2 years.

[52] Beginning in 1976, taxpayers have had the option of contributing 
to the Presidential Election Campaign Fund by checking off a box on 
their federal income tax return. Funding is provided to qualified 
presidential candidates for their primary campaigns and to major 
political parties for presidential nominating conventions, and grants 
to presidential nominees for their general election campaigns. In 1994, 
the check-off was increased from $1 to $3. 

[53] State of Maine, Report of the Commission on Governmental Ethics 
and Election Practices to the Joint Standing Committee on Legal and 
Veterans Affairs, Documenting, Evaluating and Making Recommendations 
Relating to the Administration, Implementation and Enforcement of the 
Maine Clean Election Act and Maine Clean Election Fund. Augusta, ME, 
2001.

[54] State of Arizona, Citizens Clean Elections Commission, Annual 
Report: January 1, 2000--December 31, 2000. Phoenix, AZ, 2000, 38-40.

[55] Id. 25.

[56] Appendix I discusses the scope and methodology of our work 
regarding the survey questionnaires we mailed to candidates. This work-
-including pretesting of the questionnaires, initial distribution, and 
follow-up inquiries--was conducted during July through December 2002. 
We mailed the survey to the candidates in mid-August 2002, which was 
close in timing to the primary election date in each state. Maine's 
primary election was June 11, 2002, and Arizona's primary election was 
September 10, 2002. Although the survey was mailed to candidates who 
ran in Maine's and Arizona's 2000 elections, some of the comments 
provided by the candidates were related to events surrounding the 2002 
elections in each state.

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