Building A 3-1-1 
System For Police 
Non-Emergency Calls 

A Case Study of the City of 
Austin Police Department: 
Executive Summary 

Austin Police Department
Austin's Answers 
For Police Non-Emergencies
Greater Austin Crime Commission

Prepared by 21st Century Solutions


Acknowledgements 
& Disclaimers

This report could not have been completed without the full coop-
eration of the women and men of the Emergency Communica-
tions Division and the Austin Police Department. We thank all 
of the Emergency Communications Division staff who took time 
from their busy schedules to talk with us about their work and 
who allowed us to observe their activities. 

We are especially grateful to Mr. Ed Harris, Emergency Commu-
nications Division Manager, who supported our work enthusiasti-
cally and provided us with complete access to all activities and 
documents associated with 3-1-1. 

Ms Tammy Tomeff, Ms. Denise Baker, and Mr. Cary Roberts were 
generous with their time and patiently answered all of our ques-
tions about what they had done and how they had implemented 
3-1-1. 

Ms. Barby Eide gave us her support, advice, and assistance 
throughout the project. Ms. Ronnelle Paulsen was always avail-
able to help us and consistently supported and guided our work. 

We thank the Austin Police Department, the Information Systems 
Department, and City of Austin staff for their cooperation and 
assistance. 

We thank the representatives from Motorola and Avaya who 
allowed us to observe their proprietary sessions with APD and 
ISD staff. 
 

This project was supported by Grant No. 2000-CK-WX-K114, 
awarded by the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, 
U.S. Department of Justice. Points of view in this document are 
those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official 
position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Any errors of fact, omission, or interpretation are those of the 
authors and are not the responsibility of the Austin Police Depart-
ment or the COPS Office. 

Shellie E. Solomon 
Craig D. Uchida 
21st Century Solutions, Inc. 
Consulting on Crime and Public Policy 
www.e-21stCenturySolutions.com 
(301) 438-3132 

September 2003 

Copyright  2002 by Shellie E. Solomon, Craig D. Uchida and 21st Century Solutions, 
Inc in cooperation with the Austin Police Department. The U.S. Department of Justice 
reserves a royalty-free, nonexclusive, and irrevocable license to reproduce, publish or oth-
erwise use, and to authorize others to use, this book for Federal Government purposes. 
No part of this book may be reproduced in any forms, by any means (including electronic, 
photocopying, recording or otherwise) without the prior written permission of the U.S. 
Department of Justice and the authors. 


Executive 
Summary 
Overview 

This Technical Assistance Guide for 3-1-1 describes 
the decision-making process of the Austin Police 
Department (APD) as it implemented its 3-1-1 
system in 2000-2001. We cover issues of vendor 
selection, costs, call-routing 
and call-tracking system options, marketing strategies, 
staff hiring and training options, educating 
the public on 3-1-1 use, system maintenance and 
performance, and provide lessons learned in putting 
together a 3-1-1 system. This executive summary provides 
highlights of the Guide. 

Background 

In 1996 the Office of Community Oriented 
Policing Services (COPS Office) announced its 
intent to relieve the burden of 9-1-1 calls that had 
been placed upon law enforcement over the last 
30 years. The COPS Office had requested that 
the FCC reserve 3-1-1 for use as a national number 
for non-emergencies. The FCC responded 
to the request and, in 1997, reserved 3-1-1 for 
use as a national, voluntary, non-toll, non-emergency 
phone number. By FY 2000, the COPS 
Office had awarded funding to 10 jurisdictions 
to establish 3-1-1 systems, with the Baltimore 
Police Department being the first to receive such 
funding. Other jurisdictions receiving COPS funding 
were: Birmingham (AL), Dukes County (MA), 
Framingham (MA), Houston (TX), Los Angeles 
(CA), Miami (FL), Orange County (FL), Rochester 
(NY) and Austin (TX). For more information on the 
history of COPS Office 3-1-1, please refer to the 
3-1-1 Fact Sheet located on the COPS web site at 
www.cops.usdoj.gov. 

The Austin Police Department 

The Austin Police Department (APD) 
provides police services for a city of over 650,000 
people, with a sworn force of over 1,200 officers, 
and 600 civilians. In 1998 APD implemented 
Neighborhood-Based Policing, a philosophy that 
incorporates tenets of community policing. Since 
1998, partnerships and collaborations with the 
community have increased, major organizational 
changes have occurred, and problem solving by 
officers has been encouraged and facilitated. 
The Chief has set two important goals for patrol 
officers  respond to calls for service and engage 
in problem solving activities. 

To achieve the goals of the department, 
APD recognized the limitations of its 9-1-1 system. 
Call volumes were growing faster than the 
citys population. Existing technology and staff 
levels could not support a continually growing call 
load. It was not logical or viable public policy to 
hire more and more 9-1-1 operators as the call 
volumes were predicted to grow indefinitely. 9-1-1 
system technology could not be improved to use 
more efficient and advanced software because of 
interagency compatibility issues. 

In rare instances, such as weather emergencies, 
APD suspected that some 9-1-1 callers 
were not able instantly to reach emergency operators. 
Callers instead would hear a ringing phone 
or be placed on hold or receive a busy signal 
because all of the phone lines were busy. In 
potential life-and-death emergency situations, this 
outcome was alarming to any emergency service 
provider. 

APD believed that 40-50 percent of their 
9-1-1 calls were either police non-emergencies 
or situations that were not appropriate for police, 
fire, or rescue operations. They knew this was the 
case in city-wide crisis situations, such as weather 
emergencies. 3-1-1 offered a potential solution, if 
implemented and marketed correctly. 

At the same time, however, the department 
wanted citizens to participate in neighborhood 
based policing. The Chief wanted citizens 
to become the eyes and ears for the police. APD 
made a number of organizational changes to encourage 
better customer service and more citizen 
feedback. 3-1-1 is one of these changes. 





Implementing 3-1-1 

At the most basic level, implementing 
3-1-1 requires changing citizen perceptions. 
Citizens know to contact police by calling 9-1-1. 
What seems to have been lost over time is that 
citizens should use 9-1-1 to request emergency 
services from police, fire and/or rescue services. 
Put differently, citizens must realize that not all 
emergencies are equal. Some emergencies 
cannot or should not be handled by the police, fire 
or rescue services. However, citizens often do not 
have a readily accessible alternative number when 
faced with a non-emergency issue requiring police 
assistance or when faced with an emergency 
that can or should not be addressed by police, fire 
or rescue officials. 3-1-1 can be the alternative in 
these situations. 

APDs implementation of 3-1-1 focused 
on developing highly trained and skilled call 
takers, building critical partnerships and changing 
public perceptions of 9-1-1. APD assured 3-1-1 
callers that 3-1-1 staff were cross-trained as 
9-1-1 operators capable of handling potential 
emergencies. They also provided these call takers 
with advanced technological tools to resolve caller 
issues effectively. 

APD partnered with key city departments 
and private entities to ensure that 3-1-1 was 
implemented appropriately in a timely manner. 
Technology partners built the tools for call takers. 
Civic and community leaders notified the public 
of the upcoming service and the need for this 
service. 

In the Technical Assistance Guide, we 
document how APD identified their needs for a 3-1-1 
system, designed and procured that system 
and marketed it to the residents and businesses 
of Austin. We note that at each phase of the 
project, APD maintained a citizen focus. APD 
purchased technology to improve efficiency 
and reorganized their internal emergency 
communication operations. When they introduced 
3-1-1, they explained the problems of overtaxing 
9-1-1 and provided an alternative at the same 
time. They encouraged citizens to continue to 
partner with them to create safer neighborhoods 
by using 3-1-1 to report non-emergency public 
safety concerns. 

Timing played an unexpected role in 
the implementation of APDs 3-1-1 system. 
Exactly one week after the national tragedies of 
September 11, 2001, 3-1-1 became operational 
in Austin. September 17, 2001 was the planned 
start up date, even before the tragedies. APD 
seized the moment of additional media coverage 
of public safety to stress how important it was 
to keep 9-1-1 reserved for emergency calls. 

The Need for 3-1-1 

When a city or community considers 
implementing a 3-1-1 system, it is important that 
they first assess the environment and audience. 
APD executives understood who they were serving 
and what concerns they sought to remedy. 

The police department and city recognized 
that the Austin metropolitan area had grown 
by 41 percent from 1990 to 2000. They saw a 
growth in the Hispanic and Asian communities 
as well as an increase in residents between the 
ages of 20 and 44. With the growth in population 
came an increase in the number of 9-1-1 calls. 
The department estimated that calls increased 
slowly from 1992 to 1997, but increased by about 
11 percent per year since 1997. In 2000-01, 
the department estimated that it was on track 
to receive over one million calls, a 43 percent 
increase from the 692,000 calls received in 1992. 

As part of its assessment the department 
estimated that about 40 to 60 percent of its 9-1-1 
calls were not true emergencies. This meant 
that about 240,000 to 360,000 calls could be 
handled by highly trained call takers rather than 
police officers dispatched to the scene. The 
executives within department also examined how 
they handled calls, the alternative non-emergency 
numbers they currently used, the types of call 
takers they employed, and their vision for a 
3-1-1 system. 


Based on this assessment and vision, 
the department sought to achieve technological 
benefits, increase the education of the public 
about 9-1-1 and 3-1-1, lay the foundation for an 
easy-to-remember city wide number, and improve 
problem solving activities. 

Choosing a 3-1-1 Model 

Nationally, cities are implementing three 
different models for their 3-1-1 systems. These 
include: 

> Model 1. Basic police: 3-1-1 as a police only 
non-emergency 

> Model 2. Basic city: 3-1-1 as a city services, 
not including police 

> Model 3. Integrated: 3-1-1 as a total city, 
including police non-emergency. 

The Austin Police Department selected 
Model 1, the basic police model, for three primary 
reasons: funding availability, ease of implementation, 
and intended purposes for the system. 

Lessons Learned. Agencies that are considering 
a 3-1-1 system should consider the desired outcome 
they wish to achieve, the political realities of 
their communities, and available resources. 

Partnerships 

Partners played a key role in ensuring the 
implementation of Austins 3-1-1 operation in a 
timely and effective manner. Key partnerships 
included: 

> Coordinating with the 9-1-1 oversight 
organization in the Austin area for 
conceptualizing and planning for 3-1-1  
Capital Area Planning Commission 
(CAPCO); 

> Relying on the citys Information Systems 
Department (ISD) for technical advice and 
expertise; 

> Working closely with the City Purchasing 
Department to learn about procurement 
policies and to purchase equipment and 
training; 

> Building strong ties with the technology 
and phone vendors to understand data 
needs, phone systems, and costs; 

> Leveraging the support of the Greater 
Austin Crime Commission to market 3-1-1; 

> Linking with the City Public Information 
Office to broadcast the 3-1-1 message. 

Lessons Learned. Partnerships were critical at 
each stage of the 3-1-1 implementation process. 
Once partnerships were established, roles and 
expectations were made clear, lines of communication 
were drawn, and the decision-making 
structure was clarified. 

Equipment/Technology: 
Procurement Process 

Selecting and purchasing the proper equipment 
for 3-1-1 was dependent upon the model 
(police only, non-emergency number) and the plan 
envisioned by APD managers. 

Hardware requirements. Eleven new workstations a
nd a dedicated server with appropriate 
wiring were purchased and installed. Monitors 
with touch screens were important additions. 

Telephony requirements. Soft phones  a 
phone number pad that appeared on the computer 
monitor and personal headsets were purchased. 
Call management software allowed APD to track 
calls from different sources. Voice recording software 
was also purchased. A 5-cent tariff for routing 
calls was charged by the phone company. 

Software requirements. APD team members 
considered numerous software components. 
Decisions were based on balancing needs versus 
desires. One of the primary concerns was 
selecting software that would assist call takers 
in handling with citizens who called in. Call 
takers needed tools that would allow them to collect 
accurate addresses, document caller concerns, 
highlight situations where multiple callers were 


reporting the same information, and ask pre-determined 
questions that were specific to the nature of 
the call. 

Procurement planning for the 3-1-1 operations 
began almost one year prior to implementation. 
Five phases took place: project definition; 
analysis phase, design; procurement; construction, 
and implementation. 

Lessons Learned. Partner with the purchasing 
department experts to determine the options that 
are available for procuring equipment. Currently, 
the marketplace for 3-1-1 solutions is limited. 
Only a few companies are providing products 
focused on government needs. 

Equipment/Technology: Call Routing and 
Call Tracking 

APD learned that the public has a number 
of ways to contact and gain access to the police 
department. These include: 

> Calls from a home or business within the 
city limits. 

> Calls from a home or business outside the 
city limits. 

> Calls from pay phones. 

> Calls from cellular phones. 

> Call from within the police department. 

While these appear straightforward, they 
involve different phone companies, different costs, 
and different ways that calls need to be routed 
and tracked. 

Lessons Learned. Think through different scenarios 
in the development phase. Observe call takers over 
an extended period of time and track the 
types of calls they receive. Develop a baseline of 
9-1-1 calls prior to the implementation of 3-1-1. 

Staffing 

To staff the new 3-1-1 operation (24 hours, 
seven days a week), APD used existing Emergency 
Communications personnel and added ten new 
positions. Thirty-three full time equivalents (FTEs) 
were assigned to 3-1-1. APD Emergency Communications 
personnel are cross-trained to work in 
9-1-1 and 3-1-1. 

Call takers were faced with changes in their 
job description and in their skill requirements. 
Managers were faced with morale issues and 
training concerns. Acceptance of these changes 
required a change in attitude by call takers about 
the purpose and scope of their job. Managers 
reassured call takers about their new jobs, built 
excitement about the changes, and addressed 
harmful rumors. They also set new standards for 
performance and realigned the 3-1-1 call taker 
position with department priorities. 

Lessons Learned. Realize that staff is half of the 
focal relationship between the callers and the 
police department. It is critical that staff fully 
understand and accept the 3-1-1 concept prior 
to implementation. Focus on morale issues and 
rumor control. 

Training 

Call takers, supervisors, technical staff, 
and patrol officers were provided different levels of 
training about the new 3-1-1 system. 

Because changes were made to policies 
and procedures regarding the way in which call 
takers related to the public, extensive training 
and re-training of communications staff occurred. 
Class room training, hands-on experience, and 
one-on-one training were provided to call takers. 

Technical support staff received training 
from the vendor and supervisors received a training 
session on call tracking software. In addition, 
supervisors were trained on using the new voice 
recording software. Patrol officers received an 
introduction to the 3-1-1 concept at roll calls. 

Lessons Learned. Use the train-the-trainer method 
to build acceptance. Provide training, especially 


refresher training, at multiple points during the 
implementation process. When conducting computer 
training, use live systems in a hands-on 
setting. Hold vendors accountable for documentation. 

Logistics 

In Austin, the 3-1-1 unit is under the direction 
of the Emergency Communications Division of 
APD. This division manages all emergency communications 
for the city. Call takers and dispatchers 
for police, fire, and emergency services were 
housed at police headquarters, with separate 
locations for the call takers and dispatchers. The 
3-1-1 unit was located on a separate floor from the 
9-1-1 operation and the dispatchers. A new facility 
resolved the physical space limitations faced by 
the city and police. In late 2003 a new communications 
center will fully integrate 3-1-1, computer-
aided dispatch, and the records management 
system under one roof. 

Lessons Learned. Recognize the impacts of physical 
space on morale and on system operations. 

Timeline 

Concept to implementation of 3-1-1 in 
Austin took two years. A full year was spent on 
planning, securing funding, and creating support 
for change. The equipment and technology phase, 
including project definition, analysis, design, 
procurement, construction and implementation took 
another year. During the second year, the marketing 
strategy was developed and implemented. 
Training occurred about three months prior to full 
implementation of the system. 

Lessons Learned. Establish and distribute a 
formal timeline at an early stage of the process. 
Include details about the tasks, responsibility for 
the tasks, due dates, and the linkages between 
tasks. A project manager should be responsible 
for tracking progress according to the timeline. 
Maintain momentum with frequent meetings that 
require action, not just discussion. 

Public Education/Marketing 

The success of APDs 3-1-1 effort relied on 
the departments ability to change public perceptions 
and use of 9-1-1. 

APD took critical steps in marketing 3-1-1 
to the public. Working with the Greater Austin 
Crime Commission, APD formed a marketing team, 
developed a plan, and formed partnerships to 
ensure that the message about 3-1-1 would be 
broadly disseminated. 

The team produced a new logo, brochure, 
wallet cards, and bookmark quiz in English and 
Spanish. A media briefing and kick-off event 
brought newspaper and television coverage to the 
project. 

Lessons Learned. Recognize that changing public 
perceptions about 9-1-1 is the key to success of 
a basic police model. When developing a public 
education strategy and budget, be creative and set 
goals high. Rely on key stakeholders such as the 
Public Information Office to assist with the effort. 

System Maintenance 

Once the 3-1-1 system was established, 
APD developed processes and procedures to maintain 
it. System maintenance includes developing 
provisions for anticipated problems with the equipment 
and operational levels. APD believed that 
the system should operate 99.9999 percent of the 
time and be out of service for less than four hours 
in the event of a disaster. They anticipated that 
3-1-1 would receive about 1,500 calls per day. If 
more calls came in, a hold system was included. 
That is, callers were placed on hold and told how 
long they would have to wait before a call taker 
could respond. Callers could also leave a voice 
message which would be retrieved by a supervisor. 

A longer term maintenance issue involved 
ensuring the software did not become dated or 
obsolete. APD negotiated with the vendor to provide 
updates as they were developed for one year. 


A maintenance agreement for off-site
technical support was also included. For phone 
equipment and computer hardware, maintenance 
agreements were also in place. 

APD was also concerned about personnel 
turnover. In the past, the turnover rate for call 
takers was 47 percent annually. The development 
of a single policy and procedures manual, new 
operating principles, overtime and rotation opportunities, 
better salaries, and a quasi-career track 
reduced the turnover rate to 5 percent. 

Lessons Learned. In general, the 3-1-1 operation 
is relatively stable. However, hardware and software 
glitches do occur and maintenance agreements 
should be in place. Work with technical 
staff to develop acceptable levels of down time. In 
addition, some staff turnover should be anticipated, 
though this can be minimized. 

System Performance 

APD was concerned about tracking a number 
of performance measures. In particular, the 
department wanted to measure the individual 
performance of call takers and supervisors. On 
a department wide scale, they wanted to demonstrate 
the value of 3-1-1 by determining whether 
a reduction in the number of non-emergency calls 
on 9-1-1 occurred; how much time was spent per 
phone call; whether the system was overwhelmed 
as indicated by hang-ups; and whether citizens 
complained about non-responsiveness. 

These measures were built into the system 
and can be analyzed on a daily, weekly, monthly or 
quarterly basis. 

Lessons Learned. Track 3-1-1 performance daily. 
Use measures that provide in-depth information 
about what the system is accomplishing and how 
call takers are performing. 


Building A 3-1-1 
System For Police 
Non-Emergency Calls 

A Case Study of the Austin 
Police Department 



Acknowledgements 
& Disclaimers 

This report could not have been completed without the full cooperation 
of the women and men of the Emergency Communications 
Division and the Austin Police Department. We thank all of the 
Emergency Communications Division staff who took time from their 
busy schedules to talk with us about their work and who allowed us 
to observe their activities. 

We are especially grateful to Mr. Ed Harris, Emergency Communications 
Division Manager, who supported our work enthusiastically 
and provided us with complete access to all activities and documents 
associated with 3-1-1. 

Ms. Tammy Tomeff, Ms. Denise Baker and Mr. Cary Roberts were 
generous with their time and patiently answered all of our questions 
about what they had done and how they had implemented 
3-1-1. 

Ms. Barby Eide gave us her support, advice and assistance 
throughout the project. Ms. Ronnelle Paulsen was always available 
to help us and consistently supported and guided our work. 

We thank the Austin Police Department, the Information Systems 
Department and City of Austin staff for their cooperation and assistance. 

We thank the representatives from Motorola and Avaya who 
allowed us to observe their proprietary sessions with APD and 
ISD staff. 


This project was supported by Grant No. 2000-CK-WX-K114, 
awarded by the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, 
U.S. Department of Justice. Points of view in this document are 
those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official 
position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Any errors of fact, omission or interpretation are those of the 
authors and are not the responsibility of the Austin Police Depart-
ment or the COPS Office. 

Shellie E. Solomon 
Craig D. Uchida 
21st Century Solutions, Inc. 
Consulting on Crime and Public Policy 
www.e-21stCenturySolutions.com 
(301) 438-3132 

September 2003 

Copyright  2002 by Shellie E. Solomon, Craig D. Uchida and 21st Century Solutions, 
Inc in cooperation with the Austin Police Department. The U.S. Department of Justice 
reserves a royalty-free, nonexclusive and irrevocable license to reproduce, publish or oth-
erwise use, and to authorize others to use, this book for Federal Government purposes. 
No part of this book may be reproduced in any forms, by any means (including electronic, 
photocopying, recording or otherwise) without the prior written permission of the U.S. 
Department of Justice and the authors. 


Table of 
Contents 
& Bookmarks 

Introduction Page 1 
Chapter I: Need for 3-1-1 Page 3 
Chapter II: Choosing the Model Page 15 
Chapter III: Partnerships Page 21 
Chapter IV: Equipment/Technology: Procurement Process  Page 29 
Chapter V: Equipment/Technology: Call Routing and Call Tracking Page 39 
Chapter VI: Staffing Page 45 
Chapter VII: Training Page 51 
Chapter VIIi: Logistics Page 57 
Chapter IX: Timeline Page 61 
Chapter X: Public Education/Marketing Page 67 
Chapter XI: System Maintenance Page 75 
Chapter XII: System Performance Page 81 
Chapter XIII: Lessons Learned Page 85 
Endnotes Page 93 
Glossary of Terms and List of Abbreviations Page 95 
About the Authors Page 101 


APDs 
3-1-1 Core 
Concepts 
Introduction 

At the most basic level, implementing 3-1-1 requires changing 
citizen perceptions. Citizens know to contact police by calling 
9-1-1. What seems to have been lost over time is that citizens 
should use 9-1-1 only to request emergency services from police, 
fire and/or rescue services. Put differently, citizens must realize 
that not all emergencies are equal. Some emergencies cannot or 
should not be handled by police, fire or rescue services. However, 
citizens often do not have a readily accessible alternative number 
when faced with a non-emergency issue requiring police assis-
tance or when faced with an emergency that can or should not 
be addressed by police, fire or rescue officials. 3-1-1 can be the 
alternative in these situations.
 
Austin Police Department (APD) executives recognized the limita-
tions of their 9-1-1 system. Call volumes were growing faster than 
the citys population. Existing technology and staff levels could not 
support a continually growing call load. It was not logical or viable 
public policy to hire more and more 9-1-1 call takers since call vol-
umes were predicted to grow indefinitely. 9-1-1 system technology 
could not be improved to use more efficient and advanced software 
because of interagency compatibility issues. 

In rare instances, such as weather emergencies, APD suspected 
that some 9-1-1 callers were not able instantly to reach emer-
gency call takers. Callers instead would hear a ringing phone or be 
placed on hold or receive a busy signal because all of the phone 
lines were busy. In potential life-and-death emergency situations, 
this outcome was alarming to any emergency service provider. 

APD believed that 40 to 50 percent of their 9-1-1 calls were either 
for police non-emergencies or situations that were not appropriate 
for police, fire or rescue operations. They knew this was the case 
in city-wide crisis situations, such as weather emergencies. 3-1-1 
offered a potential solution, if implemented and marketed correctly. 

APD is committed to neighborhood-based policing. Neighborhood-
based policing requires a customer service focus. 3-1-1 supports 
this philosophy of policing. The Chief wanted citizens to become 
the eyes and ears for the police. APD made a number of organi-
zational changes to encourage better customer service and more 
citizen feedback. 3-1-1 is one of these changes. 



APDs implementation of 3-1-1 focused on developing highly trained 
and skilled call takers, building critical partnerships and changing public 
perceptions of 9-1-1. APD assured 3-1-1 callers that 3-1-1 staff were 
cross-trained as 9-1-1 call takers capable of handling potential emer-
gencies. They also provided these call takers with advanced technologi-
cal tools to resolve caller issues in an effective and efficient manner. 

APD partnered with key city departments and private entities to ensure 
that 3-1-1 was implemented appropriately and in a timely manner. 
Technology partners built the tools for call takers. Civic and community 
leaders notified the public of the upcoming service and the need for this 
service. 

In the chapters that follow, we document how APD identified the need 
for a 3-1-1 system, designed and procured that system, and marketed 
it to the citizens. We note that at each phase of the project, APD main-
tained a citizen focus. They identified characteristics of Austin citizens, 
procured technology to improve efficiency, and reorganized their internal 
emergency communication operations. When they introduced 3-1-1, 
they explained the problems of overtaxing 9-1-1 and provided an alter-
native at the same time. They encouraged citizens to continue to part-
ner with them to create safer neighborhoods by using 3-1-1 to report 
non-emergency public safety concerns.
 
Timing played an unexpected role in the implementation of APDs 3-1-1 
system. Exactly one week after the national tragedies of September 
11, 2001, 3-1-1 became operational in Austin. September 17, 2001, 
was the planned start date, even before the tragedies. APD seized the 
moment of additional media coverage of public safety to stress how 
important it was to keep 9-1-1 reserved for emergency calls. 

Citizens benefited by being able to contact police for general informa-
tion in this time of great uncertainty. They also were able to use the 
system to report non-emergency issues, such as the rash of flag thefts 
that occurred after the tragedy. While calls to APD increased during 
the crisis period and the follow-up anthrax scares, calls to APDs 9-1-1 
center decreased. This shows the remarkable impact of a 3-1-1 system 
during a period of public uncertainty and crisis. 


The Need for 3-1-1 
Chapter I 

INTRODUCTION 

Improving citizen interactions with Austin Police Department 
(APD) encouraged the 3-1-1 effort. This chapter 
discusses how APD executives assessed the need for a 
3-1-1 system. We begin by examining the characteristics 
of Austin and of the Austin Police Department. We examine 
the 9-1-1 system and describe how the Citys growth 
rate affected emergency response needs. Although all 
stakeholders were focusing on improving citizen interac-
tions with the police department, each held a slightly different 
perspective on why the 3-1-1 system was needed. 

When a city or community is considering whether to 
implement a 3-1-1 system, it is important that they first 
assess the environment and audience. APD understood 
who they were serving and what concerns they sought 
to remedy. They asked the following questions during 
the six months dedicated to investigating the potential 
benefits and costs of a 3-1-1 system. 



QUESTIONS IN THIS CHAPTER INCLUDE: 

Questions about the City: 
> What are the characteristics of Austin? Who lives there? What industries 
operate there? 

> What types of changes have occurred in Austin over the past 10 years? 

> What types of crime and quality of life problems do Austin residents and 
businesses face? 
Questions about the Police Department: 

> What are the characteristics of the Police Department? How many sworn 
officers are employed and how are the organized? 

> What is the philosophy of APD in regards to policing their community? 

> What is the relationship between the citizens of Austin and the Austin 
Police Department? 

Questions about the 9-1-1 System: 

> How is the 9-1-1 system operated and managed? 

> What is the call volume for the 9-1-1 system currently? What is it 
expected to be? 

> When do citizens call 9-1-1? What happens to these calls? 

> What are the advantages and limitations of the 9-1-1 system? 

> What is the vision for emergency and police communication in Austin? 

Questions about the Vision for 3-1-1: 

> What issues can a 3-1-1 system help resolve? 

> What is the vision for 3-1-1? 

> Why does 3-1-1 serves as an alternative to 9-1-1? 

> What are the perceived advantages of a 3-1-1 system? 

> What are the perceived disadvantages of a 3-1-1 system? 


Austin. Austin has a diverse and growing population. 
Over the past 10 years, the Hispanic, 
Asian and other minority populations have been 
growing exponentially. The majority of citizens 
are young and educated, with many working in 
the high tech industry. They are involved in their 
communities and city government. Austin Police 
Department relies on neighborhood-based 
policing concepts, leveraging this high level of 
citizen involvement. Fortunately, the crime 
rates are relatively low compared with that of 
other major cities. 

The City of Austin is the 16th largest city in the 
country with a population of 656,562. The 
Austin metropolitan area is home to over 1.2 
million people and is the 38th largest region 
nationally. Austins population grew by 41 percent 
from 1990 to 2000, averaging 3 percent 
growth per year. As a result, Austin is becoming 
a multicultural city with a population that is 53 
percent White, 31 percent Hispanic, 10 percent 
Black and 5 percent Asian. The Hispanic population 
has grown by 88 percent since 1990, 
while the Asian population has more than 
doubled, increasing from 13,503 to 30,858. 1 

Forty-three percent of the residents are 
between the ages of 20 and 44, and 30 percent 
are under age 19. The Austin areas 
adult population is highly educated. Eighty-two 
percent have graduated from high school, 35 
percent have earned a bachelors degree and 
11 percent have received a graduate degree.2 

The technology industry drove much of the 
economic growth of the area during the last 
decade. Currently, Austins high-tech employment 
represents almost 15 percent of the total 
non-agricultural employment. Although the 
region is gaining numerous biotech and software 
firms, the anchor of Austins high-tech 
industry is hardware driven. The major employers 
are University of Texas, Dell Computer Corporation, 
the City of Austin, Motorola and the 
Austin Independent School District. 3 

Austins labor force was 737,787 with an unemployment 
rate of 2 percent in 2000. Recent 
layoffs by the high-tech industry increased this 
rate in 2001. The nominal per capita income 
was $33,111 and the average household 
income was $84,904. The median household 
income was $49,218.4 

Austin is located in Central Texas along the 
Colorado River. It covers 232 square miles and 
is surrounded by hills with altitudes ranging 
from 425 feet at the river to 1,000 feet in the 
northwest hills. Austin has four major highways 
serving it, with Interstate 35 cutting through the 
center of town. The climate is temperate, with 
300 days of sunshine annually and an average 
rainfall of 32 inches per year. 5 

UNDERSTANDING THE CITY
Austin ranked as the third 
safest major city in the U.S. 
with regard to violent crime 
and 35th safest city with 
regard to property crimes. 
 
Crime in Austin. Austin ranked as the third 
safest major city in the U.S. with regard to violent 
crime and the 35th safest city with regard 
to property crimes. Austinites experienced 
approximately 4.8 violent crimes per 1,000 
population and 52.4 property crimes per 1,000 
in fiscal year 2000. Ninety-four percent of 
residents reported feeling safe walking alone 
in their neighborhoods during the day and 70 
percent reported feeling safe walking alone in 
their neighborhoods at night.6 

In fiscal year 2000, 12 drug-related offenses 
and 3.8 gang-related offenses, were reported 
per 1,000 people. There were 1,254 serious-injury 
producing collisions and 11.6 traffic 


fatalities per 100,000 people. 229,212 traffic 
citations were issued during FY 2000. Over 8,000 
abandoned vehicles were investigated, with nearly 
half of them removed from public property within 
14 working days.7 

Austin has taken an aggressive approach to maintaining 
and revitalizing its neighborhoods.  There are numerous 
active neighborhood associations in the city.   Over 
23,000 volunteer hours were logged in the police 
department alone during 2001.8

Austin Police Department.  The Austin Police Department 
provides police services with a sworn force of over 
1,270 and 600 civilians. The FY 2000-01 budget was 
$125 million.    Austin Police Departments top four 
goals are to reduce violent crime, reduce property 
crime, improve traffic safety and improve quality 
of life.  The Department is organized into five Bureaus: 
Community Policing Bureau North, Com-munity Policing 
Bureau South, Investigation Bureau, Community 
Policing Support Bureau, and the  Administration Bureau. 
The City is committed to maintaining a ratio of 1.9 
officers per 1,000 residents and has increased the 
budget to address projected population increases, 
especially those related to annexations.9

Since 1998, APD has practiced Neighborhood-Based 
Policing, a philosophy that incorporates 
tenets of community policing.  Since that time, 
partnerships and collaborations with the community 
have increased, major organizational changes 
have occurred and problem-solving by officers has 
been encouraged and facilitated.  The Chief set two 
important goals for patrol officers: respond to calls 
for service and engage in problem-solving activities.

In a previous report that assessed community 
policing in Austin10, we found that neighborhood-

based policing  had permeated the department.  
From the executive ranks to patrol officers to civilians, 
everyone we interviewed and observed was 
aware of the concept and the manner in which it 
was being implemented. Furthermore, a majority of 
officers and civilians were supportive of the Chiefs 
approach and were dedicated to implementing 
neighborhood-based policing. 

Image of Figure 1: APD Organization Chart

We also found that the 
department had taken important steps in interacting 
and engaging the community to solve problems 
and improve the quality of life for residents.  
Officers (District Representatives in particular) 
were using problem-solving on a regular basis to 
solve long-term problems.  Finally, we found that the 
department had made important organizational 
changes consistent with community policing principles 
in the prior two years.  

Briefly, the organizational changes we documented 
in 2000 and that continue today include the following:

> Decentralization.  Within each of seven geographic 
areas a commander oversees patrol officers, 
motor officers, street detectives, district 
representatives, street response officers and 
civilian support.


> Shift schedules. Officers no longer rotate days, 
evenings, nights and relief shifts every 28 days. 
Rather, officers are assigned to specific districts 
within command areas for specific times. 

> District Representatives and Street Response 
Units. Each command area has five to seven officers 
serving as District Representatives (DRs), liaisons 
between patrol officers and neighborhoods, 
who engage in problem-solving. Street Response 
Units assist DRs through plain clothes or uniformed 
responses to hot spots. 

> Civilianization. To allow patrol officers to focus 
on responding to calls for service and problem-solving, 
civilians have been added to the rolls. Crime 
scene technicians, lab technicians, victim service 
counselors and community liaisons have been 
added. 

> New general orders, policies and procedures. 
In April 2000, elements of community policing 
and problem-solving were included in the general 
orders. Performance evaluations now include 
language about problem-solving and community 
interaction. 

> Accountability. Assistant Chiefs, commanders, 
lieutenants, sergeants, and officers are accountable 
for crime reduction and maintaining order. 

In the 2000 report, we made the following comments about APD: 

It appears that APD is well on its way to full 
implementation of its philosophy of neighborhood-based 
policing. While all is not perfect 
within APD, a strong foundation has been built. 
Because they have engaged in long-term planning 
and training efforts, the organization is 
poised to become a high performance department as 
the staff, including the large group of 
new officers, adjust to their roles and 
expectations. 11 

From the performance measures in the budget, 
it is clear that APD is focusing on its four priority 
goals. APD executive ensure accountability at 
all ranks and seek ways to improve performance 
in all areas. They are committed to citizen satis

faction and 80 percent of residents report being 
satisfied with police cooperation in addressing 
neighborhood concerns.


9-1-1 in Austin. Currently, the City of Austin (COA) 
Emergency Communications Center receives all 
calls for service for the three public safety entities, 
(Police, Fire and EMS) via the 9-1-1 system. The 
Austin Police Department houses the Emergency 
Communications Center and serves as the 9-1-1 
primary public safety answering point. Funding, 
guidelines and regulations for 9-1-1 systems in the 
State of Texas are provided by the Commission on 
State Emergency Communication. The Capital Area 
Planning Council (CAPCO) serves as the regional 
coordinator for the 9-1-1 systems and monitors 
APDs 9-1-1 system. Within APD, 9-1-1 is operated 
by the Emergency Communications Division that is 
under the Community Policing Support Bureau. 

When a 9-1-1 call is received, a 9-1-1 call taker will 
initially triage the call. Should the caller need Fire, 
EMS or another outside emergency service agency 
(e.g., Travis County Sheriff, DPS, Travis County Fire 
Control) the 9-1-1 call taker transfers that caller 
to the appropriate agency. If the caller is in need 

Image of Figure 2: 9-1-1 Call Routing flow chart


of immediate law enforcement assistance from 
the Austin Police Department, then the call taker 
enters a call directly into the computer for dispatch. 
If it is initially determined that immediate 
assistance is not needed and the caller can make 
a report over the phone then the operator can 
transfer the caller to a 3-1-1 operator. 

Since 1992, 9-1-1 calls have increased with the 
growth in population in Austin. Over the last three 
years, call volume has increased even more. Figure 
3 shows that call volume increased by an average of 
only 2.4 percent for the first five years.  However, 
in FY 97-98 9-1-1 calls increased 10.6 percent and 
since that time call volume has steadily increased 
at a rate of 4.4 per-cent annually.  This average 
increase is about two percent higher than Austins 
current population growth forecasts. In 2000-01, 
Austin 9-1-1 was on a track to receive over one 
million calls, 13 percent more than during 1998-99.    
The additional increase can be attributed to the 
explosion in cell phone use as well as to the 
citys staggering growth.

Image of Figure 3: 9-1-1 and Dispatch Call Loads bar graph

Once received, calls are classified by the 
following priority levels:

> Priority One (1) calls are dispatched immediately.  
These calls are described as an incident where 
1) there is an immediate threat to life and safety; 
2) a violent criminal act is in prog-ress or has 
just occurred; 3) there is imminent critical danger 
to the public. Examples include assaults, bomb 
threats, kidnapping, riots, rob-beries, and shootings.

> Priority Two (2) calls are dispatched within five 
minutes. These calls are described as an incident 
where 1) a non-violent criminal actis in progress; 
2) a criminal offense has just occurred; 3) the s
uspects are in the area;4) a criminal offense is 
imminent; 5) the poten-tial for violence or imminent 
danger exists; and 6) a public disorder is occurring.  
Examples include burglary (just occurred), dangerous 
animal, disturbance and theft.

> Priority Three (3) calls are dispatched within 
15 minutes.  These calls are described as an 
incident where 1) a delay is not likely to result 
in further injury, loss of property, or adversely 
affect an investigation; 2) the situation is 
not current, but may eventually be hazardous; 
and 3) there is a witness on scene with suspect 
information.  Examples include assisting 
motorist/not blocking, criminal mischief (just 
occurred), 911 open line, and suspicious noise 
(just occurred).

> Priority Four (4) calls are report-only calls. 
These are dispatched as soon as possible 
and are described as an incident where 1) the 
protection of life and property is not an issue 
and 2) the delay is not likely to adversely affect 
an investigation. Examples include abandoned 
property, checking welfare, a fireworks violation, 
and prostitution. 

> Teleserve Calls that are transferred to 3-1-1. 
These calls are described as incidents where 
1) there is no threat to life or injury to a person 
and/or there is no retrievable evidence; 2) it is 
unlikely that a suspect can be apprehended; 
3) the incident is old and there is little or no 
suspect description available. Examples include 
auto thefts, assault by threat, credit card 
abuse, request to locate a missing person and 
theft.12 



Looking closer at the 9-1-1 calls in FY 2000-01, 
87,000 (16 percent) are Priority One calls, 80,000 
(15 percent) are Priority Two calls, 253,000 (47 
percent) are Priority Three calls and 122,000 (23 
percent) are Priority Four calls. The average time 
to process a 9-1-1 Priority One call was 1.33 minutes 
and the average time to dispatch the call was 
1.83 minutes in 2000-01. Although call volume 
has increased, there has been a variation in dispatched 
calls for service. In FY 2000-01, calls for 
service actually decreased by over six percent. Of 
the 877,469 calls received in 1998-99, 315,299 
were dispatched to police officers to address. Once 
dispatched, the average time to arrival was 4.83 
minutes. 13 

Non-Emergency Calls to 9-1-1. In FY 2000-01, 
the department estimated that between 40 percent 
and 60 percent of calls received through the 
911 system were not true emergencies. If this 
was the case and the trend were to continue, then 
about 240,000 to 360,000 calls for service annually 
could be handled by highly trained call takers 
rather than police officers. 

The Emergency Communications Manager stated 
that public education about 9-1-1 a decade ago 
worked very well --in fact too well. Like many other 
jurisdictions, most citizens knew to call 9-1-1 in an 
emergency. Citizens in Austin had started relying 
on 9-1-1 and police for purposes other than emergencies 
in too many instances. He cited several 
calls that were inappropriate 9-1-1 calls, including 
a caller reporting problems with a neighbors crowing 
rooster. 

The centralized 9-1-1 system serves a very important 
public safety need. However, because of the state 
regulations focused on keeping the 9-1-1 system 
integrated statewide and accessible to all agencies, 
regardless of level of technological sophistication, 
APD was not allowed to alter the technology supporting 
the 9-1-1 system. They 
were not able to take advantage of the advances 
made in database management to route calls and 
work orders more efficiently or to learn more about 
the nature of their calls. They also were not able 
to integrate the 9-1-1 system with other records 
management and computer-aided dispatch systems 
to assist in collecting, analyzing and reporting on 
the data. Being reliant on State funding and State 
timelines for system upgrades hampered the ability 
to modify and modernize the existing 9-1-1 system. 

Vision for emergency and police communication 
in Austin. Austin voters approved the use of $22.9 
million in a 1998 bond election to build a Combined 
Emergency Communication Center. Other participating 
entities added funding to create a total facility 
budget of approximately $39 million. 

The 79,667 square foot facility was part of a major 
regional upgrade of all emergency communications 
systems and facilities. The Center replaces the City 
of Austin and Travis County 9-1-1 Communications 
Center and provides critical upgrades to the current 
emergency service systems. The Center includes the 
Austin and Travis County Regional Emergency Operations 
Center and integrates emergency services with 
a new, regional Transportation Management Center 
for the Texas Department of Transportation. 

The technological systems being upgraded include 
9-1-1 call handling, a new 800-MHz trunked voice 
radio system, computer-aided dispatch, mobile 
data terminals, automatic vehicle location, and 
transportation and transit services. The Combined 
Emergency Communications and Transportation 
Management Center became operational in the Fall 
of 2003. 

Image of Figure 4: Rendition of the New Combined Communication Center 


The Vision for 3-1-1. In this section we ask: 

> What issues can a 3-1-1 system help resolve? 

> What is the vision for 3-1-1? 

> Why does 3-1-1 serve as an alternative to 9-1-1? 

> What are the perceived advantages of a 3-1-1 system? 

> What are the perceived disadvantages of a 3-1-1 system? 

Designing and implementing a 311 system in 
APD enabled the department to address several 
growing concerns about the 9-1-1 system. APD 
believed that 3-1-1 might address non-emergency 
situations in a more appropriate fashion 
and that 3-1-1 could lead to better management 
of resources to improve performance on priority 
goals such as response times. 

Some of the principal problems APD sought to 
address with the 3-1-1 system included: 

> Providing a viable alternative to 9-1-1 for citizens 

> Developing a response that would allow APD 
to keep up with population growth 

> Developing a response that would assist in 
addressing peak call loads 

> Identifying a way to maintain appropriate 
staffing levels 

> Creating a way to transfer non-public safety 
calls for city services to the correct agency. 

In addressing these problems, APF officials 
believed the 3-1-1 system would allow APD to 
improve efficiency of its call operations, improve 
customer service, and raise public awareness 
about the use of 3-1-1 and 9-1-1. Beyond these 
benefits, they thought 3-1-1 could help APD to 
achieve one of its major goals of freeing up officer 
time to concentrate on problem-solving activities. 
The 3-1-1 system could also serve as an 
information resource for problem-solving efforts. 
In the sections that follow, we describe problems 
with the 9-1-1 system and how APD officials 
thought 3-1-1 would address them and enhance 
the Departments operations. 

Provide a Viable Alternative to 9-1-1. The impetus 
to set up a 3-1-1 system started from a seemingly 
simple basis. When the Chief arrived in 
1998, he recognized that citizens did not have a 
viable alternative to calling 9-1-1. APD had one 
non-emergency phone number listed, 974-5000. 
It was a private business exchange (PBX) used to 
reach personnel within the Department. Two civilian 
call takers acting as receptionists answered 
this number five days a week from 8:00 a.m. until 
5:00 p.m. After 5:00 p.m. and on weekends, this 
number was answered by an answering machine 
advising callers to call later or to call 9-1-1. The 
civilian call takers were trained to transfer calls 
to the appropriate divisions or persons and did 
answer citizen questions generally. 

The Chief recognized that this situation ran counter 
to the goals and vision for the police department. 
He stated that citizens were essentially 
forced to call 9-1-1 to report any problem - emergency 
or non-emergency. The other easy alternative was 
not to call the police. This situation did 
not encourage residents to be another set of 
eyes and ears for the Department. 

Internally, 9-1-1 call takers had no place to route 
calls that were made about non-emergency situations. 
They were forced either to answer the 
questions or tactfully dismiss the callers. APD did 
not have any form of non-emergency call center. 
In 1996, a prior administration had taken initial 
steps to improve 9-1-1s responsiveness. APD 
executives had recognized that 9-1-1 was severely 
understaffed and authorized adding another 21 
call takers to the existing staff of 35. 

They also used the COPS MORE grant program14 
to create Teleserve and to fund 10 full-time 
Teleserve call taker positions. Teleserve call takers 
took non-emergency police reports over the 
phone. The majority of reports involved property 
crimes such as burglary of a vehicle or a residence. 

Funding for the positions through the COPS MORE 
program ended in 1999, and five call taker positions 
were converted to permanent positions, 


while the remaining five were eliminated 
from the budget. These additional call 
taker positions decreased 
the average number of calls handled 
per 9-1-1 operator by almost 50 percent. 
Since that time, the average 9-1-1 
call taker workload has increased 
almost 10 percent per year. 

The Teleserve unit was staffed by 28 
call takers and took approximately 
5,000 calls per month. Beginning 
in July 2000, the Teleserve unit 
became a 24-hour, 7-days a week 
operation. Teleserve call takers 
received calls directly on a seven-
digit number listed in the yellow 
pages, from transfers from the 9-1-1 
call takers and by doing call backs 
to victims or complainants who left 
messages. Even with the Teleserve 
unit, the Chief did not feel that APD 
was achieving its goal of providing a 
quality alternative to 9-1-1. He directed his staff to 
find a way to build a 3-1-1 system. 

Relieving the Overburdened 9-1-1 System. APD 
was committed to keeping up with population 
growth and developing a response that would 
assist with addressing peak call loads. These goals 
served as the primary impetus for starting the 3-1-1 
initiative nationwide. 

The U.S. Department of Justice COPS Office made 
a concerted effort to assist law enforcement 
agencies in handling the growing volume of 9-1-1 
calls by requesting that the FCC reserve the 3-1-1 
number for non-emergency calls. It was believed 
that the growing volume of 9-1-1 calls could eventually 
overwhelm the capabilities of emergency 
communications centers, resulting in delayed 
responses to emergency calls and inadequate 
responses to non-emergency calls. These challenges 
were facing many cities across the country. 



The FCC responded to this request and, in 1997, 
reserved 3-1-1 for use as a national, voluntary, 
non-toll non-emergency phone number. Since 
then, the COPS Office has provided more than $5.5 
million in funding to implement 3-1-1 
programs in 10 jurisdictions. Austin 
received funding under the 3-1-1 
Technical Assistance for Start-Ups funding program in 
FY 2000. 

The concern about overburdening the 9-1-1 system 
serves as a primary motive for those most responsible 
for emergency communications in APD. 

As a performance-based organization, the 
Assistant Chief for the Operations Support 
Bureau during the implementation of 3-1-1 was 
most concerned about how long it was taking 
officers to respond to emergency situations. He 
measured the time that elapsed between the time 
the caller placed the 9-1-1 call and the time that an 
officer arrived on the scene. This was a key performance 
indicator for effectiveness of the police 
department. He focused on questions such as: was 
the police department able to handle emergency 
situations in a timely and consistent manner? How 
could APD reduce the response time, even if only 
by seconds? Congestion caused by non-emergency 
calls on the 9-1-1 system certainly affected this 
important performance measure. 

The Emergency Communications Manager took 
this concern to a more detailed level. The most 
urgent concern was when the 9-1-1 system was 
being overwhelmed. He looked at this issue from 
two points of view. First he asked, will there be too 
many calls on the 9-1-1 system in the future based 
on population growth? And second, at what specific 
points in time could there eventually be too many 
calls, such as during weather or safety emergencies? 

FUTURE OF 9-1-1 
The Emergency 
Communication Manager 
asked, Will there be too 
many calls on the 9-1-1 
system in the future based 
on population growth? 
And second, at what 
specific points in time 
could there eventually be 
too many calls? 
June 14, 2000 




As previously mentioned, by 1999, the number of 
9-1-1 calls was growing about 2 percent faster than 
the population in Austin. Many of these calls were 
about non-emergency situations. 

Daily statistics showed that peak call loads 
occurred on Fridays and Saturdays. When these 
statistics were broken down by hour, call volume 
started off from a low at around 5:00 a.m. and 
steadily increased through the rest of the day. 
Activity peaked around rush hour (5:00 to 6: 
00 p.m.) and then steadily decreased through 
the course of the evening. Call loads during the 
weekend (12:00 p.m. Friday through 11:59 a.m. 
Sunday) were about 56 percent higher between 
11:00 p.m. and 3:00 a.m. than during the rest of 
the week. 

While the 9-1-1 system was working extremely well 
on normal days, during crisis events such as New 
Years Eve (in particular, the millennium celebration) 
and severe weather, it was sometimes overburdened. 
Calls went unanswered (ringing phone) 
or were placed on hold beyond a 10-second period, 
falling short of the performance goals for 9-1-1. 
Even more worrisome were the busy signals that 
some callers may have been receiving when they 
called 9-1-1 because other callers were using all of 
the phone lines. 

If callers were reporting non-emergency matters, 
a potential emergency call could not be received. 
3-1-1 provided an avenue for the non-emergency 
matters, allowing a greater probability that true 
emergency calls would be received by 9-1-1. While 
the overburdened situation was occurring in rare 
crises, the Emergency Communication Manager 
foresaw that 3-1-1 would prevent this situation. He 
combined public re-education about the purpose 
of 9-1-1 with the introduction of 3-1-1. APD guided 
the public potentially to overtax the 3-1-1 system 
rather than the 9-1-1 system in these rare situations. 
This would allow true life and death emergencies 
access to the services while less serious 
problems like electrical outages could be handled 
more appropriately. 

Furthermore, on average days, the 3-1-1 system 
would potentially allow 9-1-1 call takers to achieve 
the performance measure of answering all 9-1-1 
calls within 10 seconds. Consistently meeting 
this goal would aid in improving overall emergency 
response time. Prior to 3-1-1s implementation, 
9-1-1 call takers were able to answer calls within 
10 seconds 90 percent of the time on average. 

Achieving Technological Benefits. The 3-1-1 system 
would provide for technological efficiency and 
customer service gains that could not be achieved 
within the 9-1-1 system. With the new system, APD 
sought to integrate the 3-1-1 call management 
system with a new records management system 
and a new CAD system. They intended to create an 
integrated system that would allow them to gather 
information efficiently, to analyze it comprehensively 
and to report it dynamically. 

From the operator perspective, the introduction 
of a 3-1-1 call management system should allow 
a way to address many apparent inadequacies in 
their current situations. Call takers were able to 
tell system developers where they had developed 
off-line or separate systems to manage information. 
They also were able to make suggestions how to 
meet customer needs better. 

Developers eventually incorporated these suggestions 
and helped to provide better, systematic 
methods to resolve issues. Examples of this 
included the ability to access all city agency numbers 
within the system, the ability to enter data into 
one system and have it populate other systems, 
and the ability to email information to the individual 
responsible for resolution. All of these technological 
advances improved the call takers ability to 
perform and improve their working situations. 

Public Education Opportunity. One of the benefits 
of implementing a 3-1-1 system should be the 
opportunity to re-educate the public about the 
purpose of 9-1-1 and the role of police in their 
communities. Over the years, many citizens had forgotten 
the true purpose of 9-1-1 and were using it to 
report problems and seek assistance, regardless 


of the magnitude of the problem. The Emergency 
Communication Manager used a real example of 
an individual calling 9-1-1 to complain about his 
irritation with his neighbors rooster crowing in 
the morning. This situation was neither a life and 
death emergency nor essentially a police matter. 
While this appears to be an extreme situation, 
there were hundreds more abuses of the 9-1-1 
system on a daily basis throughout the country. 15 

A simple way to address these abuses is to 
remind the public about the importance of using 
9-1-1 for emergency calls only. Introducing 3-1-1 
created an opportunity to do this, while also 
providing an alternative method for contacting 
officials who could assist with these matters. 

Laying the Foundation for an Easy-to-Remember 
City-Wide Number. The City Manager investigated 
the establishment of the 3-1-1 non-emergency 
number for police services as a way to pilot test 
a city-wide number. Austin had 22 call centers 
for its various services. This situation resulted 
in duplication of effort, confusion for customers 
and cost inefficiencies. Based upon progress 
with the 3-1-1 police non-emergency number, the 
City Manager requested that city agencies work 
together to create an easy-to-remember number 
for the City, relying on the success of 3-1-1 as a 
model. 16 

Improving Problem-Solving Activities. With the 
introduction of 3-1-1 coupled with APDs organizational 
emphasis on neighborhood-based policing, 
an opportunity should be created to free time for 
officers to do more problem-solving. Even with 
call prioritization, inappropriate 9-1-1 calls were 
being dispatched due to lack of information about 
the situations. 

As the citizens of Austin became more familiar 
with 3-1-1 and relearned the purpose of 9-1-1, 
they could improve their use of the 9-1-1 system 
and reduce the total number of dispatched calls. 
This ultimately could increase the time available 
for officers to participate in or conduct problem-
solving efforts. 

Also as APD encouraged citizens to take a more 
active role in policing their communities, and to 
serve as the eyes and the ears of APD through 
3-1-1, better information about neighborhood 
problems could emerge. Using the new 3-1-1 
customer service request system, APD could 
systematically gather that data, query it and 
report pertinent information. The authors anticipated 
that District Representatives would become 
particularly involved, using 3-1-1 information as a 
resource for their activities. 


Chapter II 
Choosing a 3-1-1 Model 

INTRODUCTION 

3-1-1 can be used to address questions from citizens 
about police matters, city matters, or both. This chapter 
discusses criteria used to decide the scope of a 3-1-1 
operation. We examine three possible 3-1-1 models. 
APD chose to implement a focused model - a basic 
police model. This model enables APD to concentrate on 
providing better customer service and to gather infor-
mation from citizens about public safety issues. It is a 
direct attempt to remove calls from the 9-1-1 system. 


QUESTIONS IN THIS CHAPTER INCLUDE: 

Questions about the types of 3-1-1 models: 
> What 3-1-1 models are available? What is unique about each model? 
> How would a city staff and use resources in each model? 
> How can the models be implemented in a phased approach? 

Questions about choosing the Police Non-Emergency Only Model: 
> What role does funding play? 
> How do implementation requirements vary among the models? 
> How do specific needs impact the choice of a 3-1-1 model? 
>  What issues about the intended purpose for 3-1-1 should be considered? 


3-1-1 Models. The three models implemented 
as 3-1-1 systems in over 15 cities include: 

Model 1: Basic Police: 3-1-1 as a police only 
non-emergency number 

Model 2: Basic City: 3-1-1 as a city services 
number, not including police 

Model 3: Integrated: 3-1-1 as a total city 
number, including police non-emergency. 

In Model 1, citizens are advised to call 3-1-1 
when they are experiencing a police-related 
non-emergency where no threat to life exists 
or no crime is in progress. These situations 
include: 

> property crimes that are no longer in 
progress and the offender is no longer on 
the scene, such as vandalism, theft, graffiti, 
stolen autos and garage burglaries 

> animal control problems 

> illegally parked vehicles or vehicles 
blocking alleys or driveways 

> telephone numbers, addresses or hours of 
operations for Police Departments division 
or programs. 

In most cities that have chosen this model, 
call takers are trained for both 3-1-1 and 9-1

1. They are able to handle 3-1-1 calls that may 
evolve into emergency situations and to transfer 
those calls to emergency dispatch systems and 
call takers if necessary. 

In Model 2, 3-1-1 for city services only, citizens 
are advised to call 3-1-1 when they experience 
situations that require a city service to respond. 
These include, but are not limited to, reporting: 
 Code violations 
 Stray animals 
 Potholes 
 Abandoned or junked cars 
 Broken water mains or fire hydrant leaks 
 Garbage collection problems 
 Icy or flooded streets 
 Broken traffic signals 
 High weeds 
 Trash or illegal dumping 
 Mosquito control needs 

Customer service representatives staff this 
system. They are not typically trained to handle 
9-1-1 calls and are not connected to emergency 
dispatch systems. 

Finally, Model 3 establishes 3-1-1 as the 
non-emergency number for all city services 
including police non-emergencies. Citizens are 
advised to call 3-1-1 for all non-emergency city 
service requests, ranging from police reports 
to public works to transportation to civil issues. 
Within this system, call takers may or may not 
be trained as 9-1-1 call takers. 

Chicago and Houston are using Model 3, while 
Baltimore started 3-1-1 as the basic police-only 
system (Model 1) and is now evolving to the full 
service center concept of Model 3. 

In all cities, the original intent of reducing the 
burden on 9-1-1 systems was stated as the primary 
reason for implementing 3-1-1. Secondary reasons 
included improving access to city 
services and allowing for more coordinated city 
response to customer needs. 

Selecting the Police Non-Emergency Model 

The Austin Police Department (APD) chose 
to implement 3-1-1 as a basic police system 
(Model 1) for three reasons: funding availability, 
ease of implementation and the intended 
purpose for the system. 

Funding Availability. APD began investigating 
ways to create a 3-1-1 system prior to learning 
of the opportunity for grant funding from 
the COPS Office. After assessing the available 
staffing, facilities and technological capabilities, 
they realized that they would need additional 
resources. Limited inquires were made into 
working with other city agencies on developing 
the 3-1-1 system. 


Selecting the 3-1-1 Model

Three reasons drove 
APDs choice of the basic 
police model of 3-1-1: 
1) funding availability 
2) ease of implementation 
3) intended purpose 
of the system. 


They undertook extensive efforts to justify using 
limited State funds designated for 9-1-1 systems. 
Numerous meetings and presentations about the potential 
benefits of a 3-1-1 system for the 9-1-1 system were made to 
the Capital Area Planning Council (CAPCO) 
and to the Texas Commission on State 
Emergency Communications. Ultimately, 
the Commission determined that it could not 
grant approval to use 9-1-1 funds for a 3-1-1 
system due to legislative rules and regulations. 

While still exploring alternative funding sources, 
APD was invited to apply for the third round 
of Federal funding for the implementation of 
3-1-1 systems. APD received a grant from the 
COPS Office for $369,210. This grant was less 
than their original estimates. They restructured 
their effort by combining the private business 
exchange (PBX) and Teleserve units into the 
3-1-1 operations. Although this scenario posed 
additional difficulties, APD decided to use existing 
staff and facilities for 3-1-1. Twenty-eight 
call takers and supervisors handled Teleserve 
Operations. Their job responsibilities were refocused 
to handle all 3-1-1 issues. (We discuss 
their new job requirements in the Training Chapter.) 

For the public education component of its 
effort, the Emergency Communication Manager 
sought funding from private organizations and 
worked with CAPCO to coordinate funding for 
printed materials to promote 9-1-1 and 3-1-1. 
(These efforts are discussed more thoroughly in 
the Marketing chapter.) 

APD has faced serious facilities constraints for 
housing emergency communications staff. 
As discussed in Chapter One: The Need for 3-1-1, 
APD Emergency Communications will be moving 
into a new $39 million Combined Emergency 
Communications Center in the Fall of 2003. Until 
that time, the 3-1-1 operations are physically 
constrained to 11 terminals. 

These constraints were the primary reason that 
3-1-1 operations were limited to basic police 
non-emergency situations. APD was not able 
to financially support or physically house 
enough call takers to handle larger citywide 
operations. 

Ease of Implementation. With Federal grant 
funding came a requirement and the expectation 
of a reasonable timeline for implementation. 
In the grant application, APD stated that 
the system would be operational by May 2001. 
APD could have asked the COPS Office for a 
grant extension to allow for more time to consider 
a city-wide number. However, three factors 
related to the timeline drove the decision 
to have a basic police system - coordination, 
procurement, and risk of failure issues. 

Coordination. In Austin, the city operates 22 
call centers. When APD approached city officials 
about the 3-1-1 system, the officials suggested 
that the basic police system could serve 
as a pilot test for implementing a one-stop city 
phone number. The officials were interested in 
the concept of the one-stop city phone number 
but were unsure which agency would be best 
suited to manage it. 


Attempts had been made in the past to create 
a central city hotline. The hotline had not been 
well publicized and was under-used. City personnel 
had also attempted to clarify key telephone numbers 
in the blue pages of its phone 
books. However, citizens continued to voice 
frustration about not being able to locate the 
appropriate person within city departments. 
Some citizens called APDs main phone number 
or teleserve number to get this assistance. However, 
APD call takers were not trained to know 
who handled the various city services and were 
unable to transfer non-emergency calls using 
their telephony technology. They had developed 
off-line systems to address these needs in 
limited cases. 

With funding from the COPS Office, APD was 
able to address its immediate need to remove 
some non-emergency calls from 9-1-1 while 
not assuming responsibility for resolving citywide 
coordination issues. APD neither had the 
resources nor the time to address these complicated 
coordination and bureaucratic turf issues. 

The coordination issues included determining 
chains of command, accountability and joint 
responsibilities. They also required addressing 
the multiple-source funding requirements 
involved in continuing day-to-day operations of 
the call center. By focusing on the police-only 
non-emergency response, the project limited 
the political disruption that otherwise could 
have been expected in coordinating a multiple 
call-center scenario. In addition, they were 
able to implement a system designed to meet 
the specific needs of their organization without 
having to meet the requirements other organizations. 
They were also able to maintain a clear 
line of decision-making for the development of 
the system. 

Procurement. A major factor in implementing 
any technological response is the procurement 
of hardware and software to support the system 
or processes. In the state of Texas, systems 
developed to support public safety issues are 
allowed to use direct procurement as an alternative 
to the request for proposal (RFP) process. 
Direct procurement simplifies the process and 
reduces the time required for purchasing hardware 
and software. 

Austin officials did not realize this provision 
until they were in the process of obtaining the 
system. It was an an important factor in their 
ability to implement the system in an expedited 
fashion. 

Risk of Failure. As with any complex effort, 
especially technology efforts, the size of a 
project is directly related to the risk of failure for 
that effort. By containing the system to a basic 
police system, staff were able to avoid many 
potential implementation hurdles. 

Initially, staff were able to establish clear 
system objectives and a reasonable scope of 
work. They were able to form a manageable 
implementation team and to develop clear 
communication protocols and processes. 

The complexity of the technology was limited. 
The system operates as a client-based system 
with 11 terminals and reasonable security 
measures. Technology managers did not have 
to maintain extensive backup and recovery 
systems or deal with multiple building wiring 
issues. 

As a follow-on, the training requirements, 
implementation planning and marketing efforts 
were not overwhelming or overburdening to the 
staff who were handling 3-1-1 system implementation. 
Most members of the implementation team, 
especially those from APD, were 
handling 3-1-1 implementation in addition to 
their existing job responsibilities. Were the 
system to have been a city-wide system with 
multiple agencies involved, much more time 
and effort would have been required to 
coordinate these components. 


Austins Intended Purpose for 3-1-1 
3-1-1 is a number intended to provide 
citizens with an alternative to 9-1-1. 


Intended Purpose. From Chiefs point of view, 
3-1-1 was a number intended to provide citizens 
with an alternative to 9-1-1. 9-1-1 is an 
emergency number for police, fire and rescue 
situations. The Austin Police Department 
sought 3-1-1 to provide an alternative to 9-1-1 
for nonemergency calls, to improve police services 
and to ensure 9-1-1 would be available for 
emergency situations. 

He believed that 3-1-1 ought to be maintained 
as a police non-emergency 
number. While he supported the establishment of 
a city-wide, easy-to-remember number, he sought to 
maintain the integrity of 3-1-1 as a police non-emergency 
number and to avoid assuming management responsibility for 
a city-wide call center. 

One of the main concerns facing 3-1-1 nationwide is: 
will 3-1-1 reduce the call load for 9-1-1 - one of 
the principal reasons for creating it -- or will it 
merely result in more calls while not reducing 
calls to 9-1-1? 

If the 3-1-1 number is advertised as a police 
non-emergency number, the likelihood that 
citizens will use it for instances where they 
may have called 9-1-1 but now can call 3-1-1 
instead of 9-1-1 for nonemergency calls is 
higher. Also if they believe they will receive the 
appropriate level of police response they seek, 
they will be more likely to use 3-1-1. If 3-1-1 
is a broadbased city-services number, citizens 
may be more inclined to call 9-1-1 to reach 
desired police services, thereby defeating the 
intended purpose of APDs 3-1-1. This is not 
to say that in some cities, the broader-based 
city services number is not a beneficial alternative 
for 9-1-1, but it was not perceived to be an 
effective solution for the Austin situation. 

Beyond the impact issues, APD managed one 
of the smaller, albeit most critical, call centers 
in the city. Austin is one of the few cities in the 
country that operates a municipal electric utility, 
Austin Energy. As a result, Austin Energy operates 
the largest call center in the city. APD and 
Austin Energy had a dedicated line between 
them to report electrical outages and other 
electrical utility problems. Austin Energy dispatches 
all types of utility problem calls, including 
public works and water response, once they 
are transferred from the 9-1-1 center. Other 
large call centers include Health and Human 
Services, Public Works, Water 
and Wastewater and Solid Waste Services. 

Because 3-1-1 would 
address a critical mission for APD and would 
operate with only 10-11 call takers, the Chief 
did not want to assume management responsibility 
for the city-wide service call center. This 
long-term responsibility presented many management, 
financial, training and facility challenges that 
APD was not prepared to assume. 

Austin city officials are currently in the process 
of developing a plan to create a one-stop city 
number. The APD Emergency Communications 
Manager co-chairps of this citywide committee 
with the Deputy CIO of the Information Systems 
Department. At this time, APD resisted the use 
of 3-1-1 as the city-wide number, but is 
demonstrated how the customer service request 
software and other technologies could be expanded 
to support this effort. 


INTRODUCTION 

Chapter III
Partnership Development 


Partnerships are not as evident in the basic police model 
of 3-1-1 as in other models. Even so, partners played a 
key role in ensuring timely and effective implementation 
of Austins 3-1-1 operation. Key partnerships included: 

> Coordinating with the 9-1-1 oversight organization, 
CAPCO 

> Relying on the Information Systems Department (ISD) 

> Working closely with the City Purchasing Department 

> Building strong ties with technology and telephone 
vendors 

> Leveraging the support of the Greater Austin Crime 
Commission 

> Linking with the City Public Information Office 

We discuss how these partnerships formed, their signifi-
cance and their impacts. We also note that as the APD 
3-1-1 system succeeds, more partnerships have formed. 
Many of these partnerships involve other city agencies 
reaching out to the Police Department for assistance. 


QUESTIONS IN THIS CHAPTER INCLUDE: 

Questions about the Key Partners in the Police-only model: 

> What types of partners are needed for successful implementation? 
> What entities will potentially benefit from a 3-1-1 system? How can and 
should they be involved in development and implementation? 
> What entities can assist with the integration of the 3-1-1 technology with 
existing 9-1-1 systems and city systems? 
> What entities are involved in the procurement of services? 
> What is the role of local phone exchange carriers and competitive carriers? 
> What will be the local governments relationship with the various 
technology vendors? Can public-private partnerships be fostered? 
> What organizations can build community support? Who can help with 
the public education efforts? 
> What will be the relationship with the media and who can assist in the 
facilitation of that relationship? 
> What significance do these partners play during the different phases of the 
project? 
> When should partnerships be formed to maximize the benefits? 
> How can communication with key partners be maintained at an appropriate 
level? 

Questions about How Partnerships Are Built: 
> Which partnerships are formal and which are informal? 
> What types of agreements are appropriate to formalize partnerships? 
> How do team members play a role in building partnerships? 
> Who is authorized to enter into formal partnership agreements? 


Building Support 

9-1-1 Ties to 3-1-1. 3-1-1 evolved as a solution to 
improve customer service and address overtaxing 
of the 9-1-1 system. The Emergency Communication 
Manager contended that we have done a 
great job of making people aware of 9-1-1. We 
need to do a better job of reminding people of 
the purpose of 9-1-1. In order to make 3-1-1 a 
success, the Emergency Communication Manager 
built a strong relationship with 9-1-1s regulatory 
organization, the Capital Area Planning Commission 
(CAPCO).  

This partnership was fundamental to improving service 
of 9-1-1 via 3-1-1. CAPCO staff participated in 
conceptualizing and planning for 3-1-1. Staff 
assisted in developing the marketing plan.  CAPCO 
leaders publicly supported the implementa-tion of 
3-1-1 and provided $10,000 to support the marketing 
campaign.  They also publized 3-1-1 through their 
monthly newsletter (see Figure 5).

CAPCO identified avenues to com-bine advertising 
for 9-1-1 and 3-1-1.  They worked to re-educate the 
public about the purpose of 9-1-1 as an emergency 
number while promoting 3-1-1 as an alternative for 
non-emergency situations.  They also assisted with 
negotiations with Southwestern Bell and the other 
telephone service providers.

Designing and Building the System

IT Expertise. Often police departments rely on 
outside vendors or internal specialists for 
technology procurement and implementation.  
In Austin, the Department maintains a small 
information technology staff that is co-managed 
by the citywide Information Systems Department 
(ISD).  Additional Information Systems staff persons 
are co-located in the Department to support 
enterprise-wide efforts.  APD sought and received 
expert technical assistance from ISD management 
for 3-1-1 development. ISD dedicated staff to the 
development of 3-1-1. ISD appointed a Project 
Manager and a team of two other staff to support 
the  effort.  One team member managed the 
telephony technology while the other managed 
hardware and server implementation.  These staff 
worked with the Emergency Communication Manager 
to define 

Image of Figure 5 CAPCO newsletter article about 3-1-1


and implement the project within the time period. 
They were funded by ISD, within the City of Austins 
budget. 

The formal partnership between these two city 
organizations was fundamental to the success 
of the project. The Project Manager was trained 
in project management for information technology 
deployment. She knew how to organize 
the project and assured that it was delivered in 
a timely and useful manner. Her focus on the 
technology and equipment components allowed 
the Emergency Communication Manager to 
concentrate on training, change management 
and marketing. 

Once the project was delivered, the Project 
Manager created the necessary documents 
to formally transfer the project to APD and to 
ensure that long-term maintenance and support 
agreements were in place. 

Procurement Expertise. Expertise was needed 
for the technology development and for the 
procurement of that technology. Governments 
establish extensive policies and procedures 
for obtaining goods and services. As a result, 
procurement is a perplexing maze to most of 
those trying to implement a concept. However, 
within each government are individuals tasked 
with understanding and enforcing procurement 
policies and procedures. 

APD and the ISD staff recognized the complexity 
of procuring a 3-1-1 system. They sought 
expert advice from the Purchasing Office prior 
to initiating the procurement process. By reaching 
out for this advice, the 3-1-1 team built a 
partnership with the Purchasing Office and 
learned key information about procurement 
policy. 

They learned that the public safety procurement 
authority allows agencies to procure items to 
improve the safety of citizens using methods 
that are simpler than the standard request for 
proposal process. This partnership saved the 
team from three to nine months, eliminating the 
lengthy RFP process. 

Vendor Expertise. Once procurement was set 
into motion, Austin PD and the 3-1-1 core team 
established a working relationship with two 
primary software vendors, Motorola (Suncoast 
Division) and Avaya. Motorola supplied the Customer 
Relations Management (CRM) software 
and Avaya supplied the telephones and telephone 
system software. The relationship with 
Avaya was an expansion of an existing relationship 
with the City of Austin. 

Installing the 3-1-1 operation was a win-win 
situation for Austin and for the vendors. Austin 
received an operational system in less than a 
year and the vendors received a working demonstration 
of their products for use in future 
marketing. Both the vendors and city officials were 
enthusiastic and committed to the 
endeavor. 

As part of the contractual agreement, Motorola 
and Avaya installed their equipment and software 
at the Austin Police Department. The 
contractual agreements were clear about 
expectations for both the vendors and the City. 
Installation involved loading Austin-specific 
data, configuring the systems to integrate existing 
APD systems and problem-solving or debugging the 
software in the APD environment. 
Austin ISD staff and Department staff prepared 
data for transfer to the vendors, tested functionality 
and answered questions about existing 
operations and systems. 

During the intense construction and installation 
process, the public-private partnership 
emerged. Vendor staff, APD staff and ISD staff 
work side-by-side. They identified data required 
by the system, formatted it for uploading and 
resolved problems when data was not compatible 
between the two systems. They also worked 
together to set APD-specific parameters and 
functions. 


Finally, the vendors transferred their knowledge 
of the products to the staff in an appropriate 
and useful manner. They demonstrated how 
the systems operated and how to troubleshoot. 
They made themselves available during the 
initial start-up process and resolved last-minute 
issues with the telephone system and the CRM 
software. 

One area of concern about the CRM software 
was the lack of official product documentation. 
Although this information was not provided 
immediately, Motorola recognized the issue 
and sought remedies to address it prior to final 
release of the product. 

By establishing a team spirit and welcoming the 
vendors onto the team as equal partners, the 
3-1-1 core team created a success story for how 
public-private partnerships can improve government 
services. The importance of this partnership should 
not be overlooked. Often government 
entities and vendors do not develop quality working 
relationships. Instead they negotiate over 
what is expected versus what is delivered. These 
tense relationships often lead to program failure. 

Local Phone Service Carrier Role. In addition to 
the partnerships with Motorola and Avaya, APD 
entered into a formal agreement with Southwestern 
Bell, the local exchange carrier. This 
partnership involved many issues. As the only 
local carrier, Southwestern Bell only would agree 
to provide the 3-1-1 service at a five-cent charge 
per call. (In Baltimore, Verizon provided the service 
free of charge.) Given this fee, APD negotiated that 
Southwestern Bell would filter out 3-1-1 
calls orginating outside APDs jurisdiction so that 
APD would not be charged for them. 

To make this happen, Southwestern Bell hired 
a consultant to work with APD Geographic Information 
Software (GIS) staff. The consultant 
installed a GIS filtering system that routed calls 
orginating outside the jurisdiction to a message 
stating that 3-1-1 service was not available to 
them. The filtering system lacked the specificity 
required to ensure that all such calls were filtered. 
It would only filter calls down to the zip+ 
four level. Austins annexation policy allowed 
for situations where homes and business in the 
same zip+ four area may or may not have been 
within the city limits. This issue is discussed in 
more detail in Chapter IV. 

Southwestern Bell worked with APD to meet all 
public notification requirements. As a regulated 
entity, Southwestern Bell had to announce the 
new 3-1-1 service in the Texas Register for 60 
days prior to putting the service on-line. 

A key problem with the partnership with Southwestern 
Bell was that the project contact 
changed multiple times. Each time the 3-1-1 
project manager would make an agreement with 
the project contact, that contact would be transferred 
or leave for a different position. These 
changes in personnel negatively affected this key 
partnership. 

On a positive note, Southwestern Bell provided 
funds to support the marketing campaign 
through the Greater Austin Crime Commission. 
They provided $25,000 in Foundation grants to 
support the development of education materials. 
This level of funding was appreciated and 
reasonable given that the City of Austin would be 
paying Southwestern Bell more than $45,000 
a year for the service based on the five-cent 
tariff. Cities seeking this type of donation from 
their local carriers should be aware that carrier 
foundation programs have grant application 
schedules. They should attempt to meet the 
schedules to avoid delays in receiving the support. 

Competitive Carriers. All other telephone service 
providers for the area, including those owning 
local pay phone and cellular phone services, 
needed to be notified. Bell staff informed the 
3-1-1 team of this requirement, but refused to 
reveal the identities of these companies. After 
much research, the team found a source for 
a list of these companies. CAPCO, the 9-1-1 


regulator, maintained a list and shared it with 
APD. APD forwarded registered letters to over 
90 companies informing them of the steps they 
needed to take in order to participate in the 3-1-1 
service. Many did opt to participate. 

APD established a seven-digit number 
in the Austin PBX switch for these companies 
to use to access 3-1-1. Under the 
arrangement, when callers who dialed 3-1-1 
reached the switch of the service provider, the 
call was transferred to a seven digit number 
and forwarded to APDs PBX switch. Because 
the call goes to the APD seven-digit number, 
it does not incur the Southwestern Bell tariff. 
However, since the call does not go through 
Southwestern Bells switch, its point of origin 
cannot be assured to be within the APD geographic 
jurisdiction. 

3-1-1 call takers can distinguish when they 
receive a competitive local exchange carrier 
(CLEC) call from their telephone equipment. 
They immediately determine if the call is in the 
APD jurisdiction, prior to resolving the issues. 
Managers also track the number of CLEC calls 
monthly. 

Creating the Buzz 

Community Support. One of the first partnerships 
APD established to support the 3-1-1 
project was with the Greater Austin Crime Commission 
(GACC). APD understood that marketing 3-1-1 was 
essential to its success. However, 
funds were not provided by any source to conduct 
the marketing. 

GACC was established in October 1997 to support 
law enforcement, raise public awareness 
about crime prevention programs, and promote 
a cooperative and coordinated anti-crime effort 
in our community. GACC established strategic 
partnerships with law enforcement, agreeing to 
serve as the non-profit foundation for charitable 
gifts to the Austin Police Department; produce 
public service messages designed to reduce 
non-emergency calls to 9-1-1 They maintained 
custodial accounts for several Police 
Department divisions 


Implementation Partnerships 
Partnerships allowed APD to 
meet implementation 
deadlines and create 
the necessary buzz to 
make the public aware of 
3-1-1s existence. 


The founders of GACC are recognized community 
leaders and knowledgeable business professionals. 
APD leveraged the talents of GACC 
to support the marketing campaign. GACC 
members used their community clout to: 

> secure pro-bono work from leading 
graphic artists to design the publicity 
materials 

> attract media to press conferences 

> distribute brochures through retail outlets. 

GACC staff also worked with corporations to 
solicit donations to support the marketing campaign. 
They secured $35,000 in private support in 
addition to the $15,000 they provided 
directly. This was an important function since 
the police department cannot solicit or accept 
private support. 

Internal Support: Public Information Office. 

Within the City of Austin, the Public Information 
Office (PIO) played a key role in broadcasting 
the 3-1-1 message. They worked with other city 
departments to include announcements about 
3-1-1 in electricity bill mailings, the City 
newsletter, District School Announcements and Health 


and Human Services bulletins. Jointly with PIO, 
they created web page links, making 3-1-1 a 
priority announcement on the home pages for 
both the City of Austin and the Police Department. 
Finally, PIO staff served as liaison to the 
Mayors and City Managers offices for scheduling 
appearances at media announcements. 
PIO staff saved APD staff significant time in 
coordinating announcements and spreading 
the message. 

Summary. Partnerships were critical at each 
juncture of 3-1-1 implementation. Starting 3-1-1 
as a police non-emergency number allowed 
APD to build a manageable and useful system 
for the police department. However, partnerships 
allowed them to succeed at meeting 
implementation deadlines and at creating the 
necessary buzz to make the public aware of 
3-1-1s existence. 


Chapter IV 
Procurement Process 

INTRODUCTION

Procuring equipment is often the greatest hurdle to implementa-
tion. Procurement requires an understanding of the scope and 
needs of a project. This chapter discusses the steps that Austins 
3-1-1 team took to identify what equipment to procure and how 
they procured that equipment. 

Project managers envisioned a fully integrated 3-1-1 system. 
They researched the services citizens requested and were likely 
to request. They observed and talked with call takers to identify 
where technology could make them more effective. Finally, proj-
ect managers created diagrams and models documenting their 
vision of a functional 3-1-1 system within existing personnel, 
environmental and financial constraints. 

The team sought equipment to support their vision. They devel-
oped detailed blueprints outlining the functional requirements 
for each hardware and software product. They also distin-
guished between those functionalities that are essential and 
those that are luxuries. 

We provide details about the research that was conducted, how 
different vendors were evaluated, how traditional procurement 
steps were expedited, and what equipment was procured. We 
discuss the functionality sought from each component of the 
3-1-1 system. 


QUESTIONS IN THIS CHAPTER INCLUDE:

Questions about What Equipment Is Needed: 
> How does the scope of the police-only model of 3-1-1 impact equipment 
selection? 
> What types of hardware and software are pertinent to 3-1-1 systems? 
> What are the approximate costs of these pieces of equipment? 
> Which items are priorities and necessary for use? 
> Which items are luxuries? 

Questions about How to Procure the Equipment: 
> What are the steps involved in procuring equipment for 3-1-1? 
> How is research about the equipment conducted? 
> What are the major findings from the research about the equipment? 
> What procurement policies are followed? 
> How long does the procurement process take to complete? 
> Who is involved in the procurement process? 

Questions about Requirements Beyond the Start-Up Period: 
> What maintenance and replacement policies are incorporated into the 
procurement? 
> What upgrades are planned in the procurement? 
> Is the hardware and software scalable to a larger 3-1-1 operation in the 
future? 
 

Equipment Needs. Limiting the scope of the 
3-1-1 operations to the basic police model set 
the parameters for the hardware and software 
requirements. The Department estimated that 
the system would support a 24-hour-a-day, 
seven-day-a-week operation. It would accommodate 
projected call volumes of 50,000 to 
100,000 calls per month. Eleven call takers 
or concurrent users and two managers would 
be connected at any one time. The operation 
started with a limited process when compared 
to other 3-1-1 city-wide installations. 

Technically, the hardware and phone system 
requirements are complex. They involve networking, 
compatibility and integration requirements. 
In this chapter, we discuss these 
requirements in broad terms and for laymen 
system users. We recommend that technical 
professionals seek additional information from 
information technology sources. The lists provided 
in this chapter are not comprehensive for 
a 3-1-1 system as each agency has different 
existing systems, IT environments and IT 
configurations. In addition, the price information 
has been approximated to recognize proprietary 
information agreements between the City of 
Austin and the vendors. The estimates are provided 
to establish a typical range of the types of 
expenses incurred in procuring technology for a 
3-1-1 system. 

Hardware Requirements. The limited installation 
translated into providing 11 new workstations 
and a dedicated server with appropriate 
wiring. System requirements of the software 
components (discussed below) drove the hardware 
needs. The workstations are 800 Mhz with 
single processors, 256 mb of memory, 4 gb hard 
drive capacity and 19-inch monitors with touch 
screens. They are network-ready with no phone 
card and no monitor/keyboard switch boxes. 
Each workstation cost approximately $2,500, 
including the Touchscreen monitors and emulation 
software.17 Procurement took about four 
weeks, using an existing City of Austin contract. 
Eleven workstations are set up in the 3-1-1 
common workspace, with one in the managers 
office. The 12th workstation is used as the 
telephone call voice recording station. 

The server is a dual processor, expandable to 
quad, with 800 Mhz, 1 gb memory, 2-9 gb drives 
and 6-18 gb drives. The server cost about 
$7,500 and was procured using an existing City 
of Austin contract and delivered within about 
four weeks. It is housed with other servers in a 
secure and temperature-controlled environment 
located in Austin PD Headquarters. 

Adopting the basic police model of 3-1-1 
resulted in lower overall hardware requirements 
and costs. APD was able to reconfigure existing 
space and wiring to accommodate the new 
hardware. Even so, the team assured that the 
hardware they selected could be expanded to 
support a larger operation. 

Telephony Requirements. For the telephony 
equipment, the sets are soft phones with observing 
capabilities. Each soft phone costs approximately 
$1,000. New headsets were obtained 
so that each call taker could have his or her 
personal headset. APD procured 51 headsets at 
$150 each. Call takers were adamant that each 
person should have his or her personal headset 
for hygiene and health reasons. 

Behind-the-scenes telephony equipment and 
service charges included an array of items. To 
establish the 3-1-1 service and the 5-cent tariff, 
APD worked with Southwestern Bell to apply to 
the Public Utility Commission for approval. 
Application costs were $4,000 initially and services 
changes were $600 per month . 

Southwestern Bell reprogrammed each of its 
Central Offices to route 3-1-1 calls in specified 
geographic areas. This involved reprogramming 
the table for call routing in each geographic 
area. Austin has 18 geographic areas covered 
by 3-1-1. The initial costs of these reprogramming 
services were approximately $4,500. 


Each time APD needs to make a change to the 
table for call routing, Southwestern Bell charges 
$610. These types of changes will be required 
when Austin completes new annexation. 

Each month, APD pays approximately $3,000 
for the routing of 3-1-1 calls through the Central 
Offices based on the 5-cent tariff. Southwestern 
Bell is also providing summary call reports at a 
cost of $10 per month for the calls that route 
through their Central Offices in the 18 geographic 
areas. 

To accept calls from the Southwestern Bell T-1 
switch to the APD switch, APD procured a smart 
trunk interface card. The card cost approximately 
$4,000 and the installation charges were 
$2,000. APD also purchased a CSU that allows 
for a test point to protect the Southwestern Bell 
network from the Austin equipment. This technology 
price was $1,500. 

Avaya provided the call management software. 
3-1-1 call management was an enhancement to 
the existing call center software. This software 
provided benefits well beyond the 3-1-1 service 
and allowed Austin to track all calls received on 
the Private Business Exchange (PBX) switch. The 
software cost $150,000 and was procured as 
part of a larger City of Austin telecommunications 
upgrade. Each month the license fee for the 
software is $1,000. 

APD procured new voice recording software at a 
cost of approximately $50,000. This equipment 
helps APD ensure that call takers are providing 
the highest level of customer service on a daily 
basis. It also provides vocal documentation of 
the 3-1-1 calls in the event that a 3-1-1 calls 
escalates into an emergency call. 

Features that are priorities and necessary for 
use versus features that are luxuries. The 
Austin 3-1-1 team did not face multiple decision 
points about needs versus luxuries in evaluating 
the hardware and telephony technology. The 
components added for 3-1-1 were standard to the 
current computer and telephony technology available 
and planned in the Department. The soft 
phone/touch screen technology was the most 
significant upgrade. 

Requirements for the hardware and telephone 
system revolved around integration with existing 
hardware, limits on the space available, ergonomics 
for call takers and requirements of the CRM 
software (explained below). The desktop computers 
required sufficient drive space and memory to 
operate multiple programs simultaneously. They 
also needed network cards. 

As an upgrade, the desktops were equipped with 
large screens that are touch-screen compatible, 
much like those used in restaurants. With the 
desktop interface phone software, call takers are 
able to access a soft phone. A phone number 
pad appears on the computer monitor and call 
takers touch the screen with their fingers or a flat 
object to dial, i.e., a soft phone. While not 
essential to the operation of a 3-1-1 system, this 
technology speeds the dialing process by integrating 
it with the central piece of equipment, the computer, 
rather than requiring the use of a separate 
telephone. 

Aside from the soft phone integration, the phone 
systems include headset compatibility, access 
to at least two phone lines, multiple hold options 
and caller identification screens. 

Software Requirements. While a limited operation 
allowed for a more manageable hardware 
procurement process, software procurement 
involved balancing needs versus desires. Some 
software components were directly tied to the 
hardware and telephony equipment and have 
been discussed above. However, we list them 
here to provide a complete record of the software 
within the system. 

The software components included: 

> 3-1-1 Customer Relationship Management 
(CRM) software 

> 3-1-1 Server Disaster Recovery software 

> 3-1-1 Server Defragmenter software 

> Client PC Emulation Software license 


> Client PC Internet Explorer Browser 

> Client PC MS-Office Software for Supervisor 
Workstation 

> Non-concurrent Database Engine User 
Licenses and Server License 

> Call Management Incoming call reporting 
software 

Team members spent the majority of their time 
selecting software for the system. Particular 
attention was given to selecting the CRM software. 
The team anticipated that this software 
would guide the interactions between call 
takers and APD customers. At the very least, 
it would support, not hinder, the call takers as 
they attempted to gather necessary information. 

Call takers needed tools that would allow 
them to collect accurate address information, 
document caller concerns, highlight situations 
where multiple callers were reporting the same 
information, and ask pre-determined questions 
specific to the nature of the call. For example, 
if a caller were to report a traffic signal failure, 
the tools should allow the call taker to document 
the location of the traffic signal, determine 
whether a report had already been taken, 
assess the level of danger, learn whether any 
accidents had occurred and document caller 
information. Call takers also needed a tool 
that could store phone directory and policy 
information for one-click access. 

Other evaluation criteria set the standards for 
how the CRM software integrated with existing 
and proposed systems and hardware. As 
discussed in Chapter 1, APD had planned its 
move into the new communications center in 
2003. With this move, they were expecting to 
introduce new CAD, radio and records management 
technology and software. The ability to 
integrate 3-1-1 software into the enterprise 
components served as an important undercurrent 
in the selection process. 

The CRM software required the most evaluation 
and system needs analysis. This software 
represented the principal cost and operational 
changes associated with 3-1-1 implementation. 
A variety of CRM software existed on 
the market. Prices ranged from $50,000 
to $250,000, depending upon the features 
included. 

The team evaluated software options against 

these dimensions: 

-Software Functionality 

-Phone System Interfacing 

-Data Sharing Capabilities with other programs 

-Interface with Enterprise Call Center 

-System Software and Hardware Specifications 

-Licensing Requirements 

-Performance 

-Documentation 

-Support 

-Training 

-Maintenance 

-Warranty 

-Security 

In each area, the team defined what the CRM 
software must do as opposed to the functionality 
that would be nice to have. Table 1 
shows an example of the type of evaluation tool 
prepared for software functionality. 

Table 1 shows that APD required the CRM 
software to log all incoming 3-1-1 calls, record 
key caller information, verify that geographic 
location was in the APD jurisdiction, record 
information specific to the problem, escort the 
caller when transferring calls, create statistical 
reports, and so forth. Luxury items sought 
included the ability to record the disposition of 
the call, to document where the call was transferred 
to and to capture key information from 
other enterprise systems. 

For Phone System Interfacing, only luxury items 
were identified. The team wanted the software 
to be capable of capturing and storing ANI information 
(caller number, address, etc.) and speed 
dial base information. For example, if an operation 


used speed dial #2 to contact the manager of 
emergency communications, the software would 
capture the directors entire phone number, not 
just the 2 that was dialed. 

Table 1: Requirements for CRM Software 
Table colum headers - Requirement, Must Have, Luxury 
Row Data:
Software functionality 
Log all incoming 3-1-1 calls Record the disposition of the 3-1-1- call in the call record, 
including: 
Record basic information about each call, including: 
- disposition type 
- time/date call taken - disposition narrative 
- name of caller - time/date the call was disposed 
- address of caller - time/date 3-1-1 call was terminated 
- request type - call-taker handling the call 
- request narrative - department, organizational unit and phone number 
where the call was transferred 
Verify the georgraphic location of the caller and 
the APD geographic jurisdiction 
- name and phone number the call was transferred to 
Provide informaiton to questions - corresponding CAD incident number, if applicable 
Escort callers to other organizations and organizational units that can address their need 
- corresponding police reporting system number, if 
applicable 
Provide access to CAD to create related CAD 
incident reports 
Provide access to police reporting system 
(DEORS) 
Create and run pre-defined and user-defined 
statistical reports regarding any aspect of 3-1-1 
call data 
Run selected reports and queries on-demand or automatically at user-selected intervals or at user-predesignated 
times. 
END TABLE


Under the Data Sharing Capabilities with Other 
Programs criteria, the team wanted the software to 
be capable of open database connectivity (ODBC) 
with future CAD and RMS systems. As a luxury, the 
software would allow for an automatic connection, 
directly and effortlessly transferring the data. 

The team also looked ahead to determine city-wide 
3-1-1 solutions. They sought software that would 
allow work orders to be transferred between city 
organizations via the ODBC connection with a future 
enterprise or citywide call center. 

With respect to System Software and Hardware 
Specifications, Licensing Requirements, Performance, 
Documentation, Support, Maintenance, 
Warranty and Security criteria, the teams must 
have requirements mirrored standard information 
system requirements. For example, the 
vendor was to provide information about software 
and hardware specifications prior to purchase of 
their software. Options for support services and 
time extensions to standard warranty and service 
periods were considered. 

The primary requirements that the team specified 
were that the CRM software must operate 
as a relational database and on a Windows NT-
based server and client network. This specification 
promoted compatibility with existing and 
planned changes for other information systems 
(such as CAD) and the city platforms. Meeting this 
requirement ensured that the 3-1-1 software was 
compatible with the APD standard and that the 
current staff had the skill sets to implement and 
maintain it. 

Finally, the team required the vendor to provide 
all training for call takers, supervisors, managers, 
web-users, system administration and database 
administration. The trainings had to be flexible 
to avoid disruptions of the 24/7 Teleserve operations. 
They also sought train-the-trainer sessions 
and expected these to be reasonably priced. 

The police-only model limited license costs for the 
software selected, but did not alter the basic features 


Table 2: Estimates of Costs of 3-1-1 Technology (2000) 

Table column headers - Cost per Item, Quantity, Total Cost 

Row Data:

Computer Hardware 

Workstation cost with the Touchscreen monitors 
and immulation software $ 2,500 12 $ 30,000 

Server, dual processor, expandable to quad, 
with 800 Mhz, 1 gb memory, 2-9 gb drives 
and 6-18 gb drives $ 7,500 1 $ 7,500 

Telephony Equipment 

Softphone $ 1,000 11 $ 11,000 

Headsets $ 150 51 $ 7,650 

Public Utility Commission Tariff Application: 
Initial Costs $ 4,000 1 $ 4,000 

Monthly Public Utility Commission Fee* $ 600 12 $ 7,200 

Table Reprogramming Services at 
SWB Central Offices: Start $ 4,500 1 $ 4,500 

Table Reprogramming Services at 
SWB Central Offices: Change Fee $ 610 0 $ -

Monthly 3-1-1 Routing Charge (5 cents tariff)* $ 3,000 12 $ 36,000 

Monthly Summary Statistic Reports* $ 10 12 $ 120 

Smart Trunk Interface Card $ 4,000 1 $ 4,000 

Installation of Smart Trunk Interface Card $ 2,000 1 $ 2,000 

CSU to protect SWB network $ 1,500 1 $ 1,500 

Call Management Software** 
(PBX wide software) $ 150,000 0 $ -

Monthly Call Management Software
License Fee (PBX wide software) $ 1,000 1 $ 1,000 

New Voice Recording Software $ 50,000 1 $ 50,000 

Customer Relationship Management (CRM) software $50,000 to $250,000 


*Ongoing Monthly Costs
**One Time Costs procured as part of a City of Austin telecommunications upgrade.



or capabilities of the software. The software 
was designed to operate city-wide, if that need were 
to arise. Many benefits of streamlined communication 
between departments were lost. In fact, 
altering the software to work within the limits of 
the police-only model involved some adjustment to 
the user interfaces. 

Training was required to explain components 
that were included for an integrated system, but 
that would not be used in Austin at the time of 
implementation. Call takers were required to 
understand that although the software included 
functionality to transfer work orders and track 
progress, that functionality would not be activated 
in the police-only model. Additional manual steps 
were established to complete tasks that the software 
would have accommodated in an integrated 
circumstance. 

Questions about How to Procure the Equipment: 

Procurement planning for the 3-1-1 operations 
began almost one year prior to implementation. It 
included the following phases: 

Project Definition: Determining the project 
scope and resources (three months) 

> Analysis Phase: Determining what was 
needed and why it was needed (three months 
- concurrent with project definition) 

> Design Phase: Determining how to obtain 
what was needed either through buying an 
off-the-shelf software package to customize or 
building an information system (two months) 

> Procurement Phase: Evaluating and purchasing the hardware and software (six to 
eight months) 

> Construction Phase: Installing, configuring, 
tuning and testing the software and hardware 
(three to four months - overlapping with procurement phase) 

> Implementation Phase: Turning the systems 
on for use and final debugging (two weeks) 

Project Definition, Analysis and Design. The 
Manager of Emergency Communications worked 
with the Director of Planning and Research and 
three staff from the Information Services Department 
(ISD) of the City of Austin to define the 
project scope. During this phase, the Emergency 
Communication Manager determined what type 
of operations he sought, what functions were 
definitely required, and what functions were not 
needed. 

During the analysis phase, the ISD Project Manager 
used business functional and data modeling 
to develop functional decomposition and entity-
relationships diagrams. These tools specified 
what call takers did when answering calls and the 
data they needed to do their jobs. She sat with 
Teleserve call takers, watching how they took calls 
from the queue, what steps they took in answering the 
calls and how they resolved the calls. In 
this effort, she did not document the process of 
taking calls but focused specifically on the functional 
requirements of call taking. 

The Project Manager documented environmental 
factors that would impact the selection process 

- what skills were available within the team and 
what physical limitations exist, especially as 
related to physical space. She considered the 
option of building an information system versus 
buying software off-the-shelf. At this point, the 
team realized that to build a system would require 
more work than available staff could handle. 

Procurement Phase. To evaluate market options, 
the Project Manager conducted Internet research 
for two months. She looked at websites for other 
cities with 3-1-1 call centers, conducted key word 
searches in well-known search engines, and 
perused known IT solution vendor web sites. Four 
to six vendors provided CRM software. Unfortunately, 
none was designed specifically for a police 
3-1-1 operation; rather it was designed for businesses
 concerned with customer service. 

Of the vendors available, two sold CRM software 
in the government arena. Further, only two vendors 
included a geo-code component in their files. 
This functionality was a requirement because APD 
would only accept 3-1-1 calls from its jurisdiction. 
The software needed to be able to identify which 


calls were within the jurisdiction and which 
were not. Also, APD used geo-based data to 
analyze crime trends and department resource 
needs. The Project Manager soon learned 
that this functionality was the key distinguishing 
feature and expense of the CRM software 
products. 

The Project Manager invited all six firms to 
provide day-long demonstrations of their products. 
Two accepted the invitation. During 
the demonstrations, the core team, made up 
of the three ISD staff, the Manager of Emergency 
Communications and two of his staff, 
participated. The Emergency Communication 
Manager wanted the call takers to have the 
opportunity to see the vendors and to become 
invested in the new system. Call takers participated 
in rotating two-hour open forum demonstrations 
in which the vendors took questions 
and showed how their products would address 
the operation in question. 

During these demonstrations, the team reaffirmed 
its requirement that the system operate on a 
relational database engine and have 
a proven track record of responding to public 
agency needs. Only one vendor, Motorola, met 
these two requirements. Motorolas system 
had been installed in three large cities. The 
team contacted peers in these cities and made 
a field trip to one of them, to obtain references 
and see the system in operation. 

The Project Manager approached the purchasing 
department to learn what options she had 
for procuring the necessary hardware and 
software. Normally, the department allowed 
three purchasing options: RFPs or Requests 
for Proposals, a time-consuming public bidding 
process; adding to an already-existing contract 
between the vendor and the City, under certain 
circumstances; and sole source purchasing, 
buying directly from a single vendor without a 
public bidding process. The Project Manager 
learned that the City had a policy of allowing 
sole source purchasing when that best served 
the interests of public safety. This was certainly 
the case for the 3-1-1 system. In the process of 
becoming educated in procurement protocol, 
the Project Manager also formed a critical, 
positive working relationship with Purchasing. 

In partnership with the purchasing department, 
the team determined that the 3-1-1 project 
qualified under the rules and guidelines of 
the umbrella authority. They were allowed to 
purchased the software and hardware directly 
without issuing an RFP. 18 

Motorola wrote a 50-page proposal responding 
to specific functionality requirements outlined 
in the RFP. Negotiations between ISD 
and Motorola began immediately. Use of this 
authority saved the team between three and 
five months compared with the time required 
for processing an RFP. 

To procure the telephony components, the 
ISD Voice Engineering Supervisor executed 
modifications to existing contracts. Using these 
vehicles allowed expedited delivery and limited 
paperwork. She estimated the number of 
phone lines that would be needed based on the 
number of current Teleserve calls. This provided 
her with the call volume. She estimated 
that they would need lines to support at least 
10 call takers and 10 calls in the queue -- or 23 
lines. The calls were routed over a Sonet network. 

Construction Phase. Once the procurement process 
was set in motion, the vendors agreed to 
begin the construction phase. Avaya installed 
the call tracking software for the PBX switch. 
They provided a half day of training on this 
software and discussed how it would meet some of 
the requirements for the CRM software. These 
functionalities enhanced the managers ability 
to assess the system operation and to improve 
the skills of their call takers. Features provided 
by the call tracking software included identifying 
the source of the phone call (3-1-1 number, 
Teleserve number, or internal and external PBX 
numbers); logging time spent by call takers 
on calls, follow-up to calls, report writing and 


breaks; and tracking time in each state by call 
taker. The department also installed a system to 
record calls for customer service reviews and for 
potential crises or problem situations. 

For the CRM software construction, Motorola 
practically installed the system before Motorola 
and the City of Austin executives signed the 
final contract. (The basic components had been 
agreed upon, allowing the legal teams of both 
parties to review and approve the language.) 

Construction involved a cooperative effort between 
the vendors and the team. The team provided the 
hardware, set-up area and Austin-specific data. 
The vendors installed the software, uploaded the 
data and configured the screens for the Austin 
operation. 

Within this contract was a detailed test procedure. 
Motorola was required to demonstrate the 
softwares functionality against this test, using 
Austin data and configuration prior to acceptance 
of the system by APD. Following the installation, the 
Project Manager and the APD Training Coordinator 
participated in a demonstration, led by Motorola 
staff, of the functionality of the software against 
this test. 

During the test, one key feature was not functional 
- address identification based on geo-data from APD.  
Because of the differ-ence between geo-data formats, 
the data from APDs GIS  could not be uploaded into 
the CRM  software without significant reformatting.  
The main problem was the difference in base maps 
and geographical fields used by APDs GIS and 
Motorolas CRM software. The format for the 
coordinates for the addresses dif-fered systematically, 
meaning that  making changes in APDs GIS program 
would have been time-consum-ing and costly.  Resolving 
the issue took extensive APD staff time and vendor
effort.  This address identification functionality 
allowed call takers to enter an address and/or 
street intersection to verify that it was within 
APDs jurisdiction and to determine if more than 
one call had been received for that address.  

Because of APD staffing constraints, Motorola was 
not able to fully resolve the geo-data issues. 
Although this functionality was not fully operational,
 APD provided an initial acceptance of the 
software and began customizing and testing it for 
use approximately one month prior to the official 
start date. APD formally accepted the software 
approximately two weeks prior to the start date. 
During the first two days of calls, the vendors, 
Motorola and Avaya, remained on-site to resolve 
problems as they arose. 

Maintenance, Support and Upgrades. The vendors 
supporting the 3-1-1 operation in Austin are 
providing maintenance and support as needed. 
Agreements about the level of support were 
established in the respective contracts. In 
addition, agreements about automatic shipping of 
upgrades were negotiated within the contracts. 


Figure 6: Screen Shot of APD CRM System. 


 
Chapter V 
Call Routing and Tracking 


INTRODUCTION

Routing and tracking phone calls turned out to be more compli-
cated than imagined. While designing the system, 3-1-1 team 
members learned that the public has multiple ways to access 
the police department. In Austin, calls into the 3-1-1 call center 
originate from five phone type locations. These include: 

> calls from a home or business within Austin city limits 
> calls from a home or business not within Austin city limits 
> calls from pay phones 
> calls from cellular phones 
> calls from within the Austin Police Department. 

To place these calls, individuals may dial 3-1-1, the Austin Tele-
serve phone number (974-5750), the Austin Police Department 
general number (974-5000), or the internal APD operator (0). 
Once a caller reaches the 3-1-1 call center, call takers focus on 
resolving their issues and gathering the appropriate level of infor-
mation about public safety issues. Calls are routed or resolved, 
depending upon the nature of the issues involved. Calls may be 
forwarded to specific individuals or departments within the police 
department, resolved by taking a police report or call report, 
dispatched or answered without any follow-up action by the call 
taker. 

Software obtained with the phone system tracks where the call 
originated and the duration of the call. The Customer Relations 
Management (CRM) software tracks the disposition of a limited 
number of calls, especially those requiring action by other city 
agencies. Teleserve calls are tracked based on the incident 
number in the CAD system and the records management system 
(DEORS). Information calls are forwarded or resolved without the 
creation of specific call tracking documentation. By establish-
ing these different routing and tracking processes, APD staff 
are able to focus resources to improve customer service and 
strengthen the relationship with citizens trying to improve their 
neighborhoods. 


QUESTIONS IN THIS CHAPTER INCLUDE: 

Questions about Where Calls Originate: 
> How are calls directed into the 3-1-1 call center? 
> What steps are necessary to filter and direct calls into 3-1-1? 
> What issues are specific to calls from pay phones and cellular phones? 
> What types of work-arounds can be used to address issues specific to calls 
from competitive local carriors? 

Questions about How Calls are Routed: 
> What options does a call taker have to resolve a call? 
> What happens when emergency calls (9-1-1) are made to 3-1-1? 
> How does the implementation of 3-1-1 change a Teleserve operation? 

Questions about How Calls are Tracked: 
> How is APD tracking calls that are coming into 3-1-1? 
> What impact did APD expect 3-1-1 to have on 9-1-1 calls? 
> How has 3-1-1 impacted 9-1-1 during its start up period? 
> What information is maintained about the disposition of 3-1-1 calls? 


Origination Points for 3-1-1 Calls. Calls into 
3-1-1 originate from five major categories: 

> Calls from homes and businesses located 
in the Austin city limits. 

> Calls from homes and businesses not 
located in the Austin city limits. 

> Calls from pay phones in the Austin city 
limits. 

> Calls from cellular phones 

> Calls from within the Police Department. 

Further, calls reach 3-1-1 call takers when individuals 
dial any of the following: 

> 3-1-1 

> APDs seven-digit general phone number (974-5000) 

> APDs seven-digit Teleserve phone number (974-5750) 

> 0 from within the APD building and/or phone network. 

Calls made by dialing 3-1-1 from homes and 
businesses are first routed to a Southwestern 
Bell transfer station. Southwestern Bell is 
charging a tarriff; 5 cents is charged to the City 
of Austin for each 3-1-1 call filtered through 
their switch. To ensure that APD only receives 
calls within its jurisdiction, Southwestern Bell 
agreed to include a geo-based filtering system 
in its transfer station. Relying on this geo-file, 
3-1-1 calls made from within the city limits 
are passed through to the 3-1-1 call center. 
Calls that originate from outside the city limits 
receive a message stating that the City of 
Austin 3-1-1 service is not available to the 
caller. It further advises them to contact their 
local police department for assistance. 

While this process appears straightforward, 
Austins annexation policies create situations 
in which the city limit is difficult to determine 
by citizens. In some situations, houses on 
one side of the street are within the city limits 
whereas those on the other side are not. In 
extreme cases, the city limit falls in the middle 
of buildings and splits apartment complexes. 
The geo-file used by the Southwestern Bell 
transfer equipment is based on the zip-plus 
four postal code. This method does not reflect 
the level of specificity required to filter all calls 
from addresses located along the city limit 
line. Some calls may be passed through that 
are not within APDs jurisdiction. Call takers 
are responsible for screening these calls based 
upon more specific geo-data within the CAD 
system. 

Calls made from pay phones and cellular 
phones present a host of issues to the 3-1-1 
team. Pay phones and cellular phone services 
are owned and operated by many different companies, 
known as competitive local exchange 
carriers (CLEC) companies. The majority of pay 
phones in the Austin city limits are owned and 
operated by Southwestern Bell, making the 
addition of 3-1-1 service easy. 


To address this problem, APD established a 
protocol for interested service providers other 
than Southwestern Bell. It involved establishing 
a seven digit number that could be used to 
reroute calls to 3-1-1. APD worked with CAPCO, 
the 9-1-1 regulators, to identify all the pay 
phone owners and cell phone carriers. They 
sent a certified letter to over 90 CLEC companies 
explaining what steps to complete to 
offer 3-1-1 services to their customers. It was 


up to the CLEC companies as to whether they 
altered their switch stations to accommodate 
3-1-1. Those who chose to offer the 3-1-1 
service set up their switches such that when 
a person dialed 3-1-1, the switch would translate 
the call to the seven-digit number at the 
APD switch; the call would then be passed on 
to the 3-1-1 call center. 

Initially, APD received limited negative publicity 
for 3-1-1 because AT&T cellular phone 
users could not reach 3-1-1. AT&T, a major 
cellular service provider in the area, publicly 
denied receipt of the certified letter notifying 
them of the steps to take to offer 3-1-1. 
APD was able to respond to this publicity in 
a positive manner by producing a copy of 
the certified letter and receipt. They publicly 
encouraged AT&T and other cellular phone 
service providers to recognize the public 
demand for 3-1-1 and to take the steps 
necessary to offer the service. 

Citizens and businesses also reached the 
3-1-1 call center when they dialed the APD 
general seven digit number and when they 
dial the APD Teleserve seven digit number. 
By rerouting these numbers, APD combined 
its Teleserve and private business exchange 
operation (PBX) with 3-1-1. They reassigned 
staff positions from the Teleserve and PBX 
operations to 3-1-1 and used existing staff 
positions in the most efficient manner possible. 
Team members caution that using existing personnel 
to staff a new 3-1-1 operation 
presents challenges associated with change 
management. APD did so because funding 
and staffing availability made this their only 
option. 

APD internal calls for operator assistance 
were also rerouted from the PBX operation 
to the 3-1-1 call center. This switch initially 
caught officers off guard. Some reported that 
they hung up after hearing the 3-1-1 greeting, 
thinking they had misdialed. Again this 
staffing decision made more efficient use of 
limited staff positions. 

How Calls Are Routed. Once a call reaches 
the 3-1-1 call center, it is routed to an available 
call taker automatically. Call takers answer 
the call, Austin 3-1-1. May I help you? Daily 
call takers answer over 900 calls during the 
day and evening shifts and over 200 during the 
night shift. If no call takers are available to take 
calls, callers may opt to leave a message. Call 
takers are in a busy status and unavailable to 
receive incoming calls when they are answering 
a call, completing report writing after a call, or 
on a break. 

The phone system software reports call taker 
status in real time for managers. Managers are 
able to view the number of calls waiting, the 
length of time that the longest call has been 
waiting, how many call takers are immediately 
available for incoming calls and how many call 
takers are currently logged on the system. In 
addition, they can view specific information 
about each call taker, including the telephone 
extension of the console that the operator is in, 
the current state of the call taker, the amount 
of time spent on the current call, and which 
line the caller called to reach a 3-1-1 operator. 
Much of this information is displayed using 
easy-to-understand graphics, such as a Green 


ready for a call, or a Blue Coffee Cup, 
meaning that the call taker is finishing a report. 
Managers can also request historical reports to 
determine the average length of time call takers 
spend taking each call, writing reports or taking 
breaks. This information is available for individuals 
and/or in aggregate form for a group of call 
takers. It can be queried based on time periods 
ranging from shifts to days to weeks to months. 

When a call is received, if it is a 3-1-1 type 
call requesting services from the PD or from 
another city agency, call takers enter that 
information into the CRM system. These calls 
include calls reporting street light failures, 
animal control issues and other city service 
calls. Call takers are prompted with questions 


to ensure they gather the necessary information 
required to resolve the call. The CRM software 
is able to track duplicate calls, such as multiple 
calls reporting a street light failure at the same 
intersection. 

If the call is a Teleserve call, the call taker 
enters a police report into the CAD and RMS 
system (DEORS). On average, these calls 
require more time than other calls. Situations 
designated as Teleserve calls include burglary 
reports where the perpetrator has clearly left 
the crime scene, vandalism calls or missing 
persons calls. 

As discussed in Chapter VII: Training, shifting 
from the Teleserve operation to the 3-1-1 
operation required that Austin call takers alter 
their roles. As their experience grew, Teleserve 
call takers became more involved in obtaining 
in-depth information for detectives to use 
in investigating police reports. With 3-1-1 
implementation, both detective and call takers 
realigned their expectations about what information 
should be collected during the initial 
contact. The 3-1-1 call takers are required to 
focus on quickly resolving and transferring calls. 

For the rare case where a call received at the 
3-1-1 call center is an emergency call, the 3-1-1 
call takers are certified 9-1-1 call takers. 
The call taker takes the required information 
and forwards the call to a dispatcher. The only 
difference that a dispatcher will notice about 
these calls is that they lack the automatic ALI 
information19 - the address information. 3-1-1 
call takers attempt to obtain the address information 
to the best of their ability and in most 
cases are expected to be able to gather that 
information readily. 

3-1-1 callers who request general information 
or ask to be transferred to another APD department 
receive answers or are transferred without call 
takers creating documentation. Call 
takers escort callers to their destinations in 
the majority of cases, ensuring that the caller 
reaches a person, or is informed of the transfer 
to voice mail. In cases where the caller is 
seeking information from an entity outside of 
the City of Austin government, the call taker 
searches an internet resource list and provides 
the appropriate phone number to the caller. 

In the current system, 3-1-1 call takers are not 
able to use the CRM software to determine the 
status of follow-up on issues reported through 
3-1-1. If a caller calls back to check on the 
status of a service request, the 3-1-1 call taker 
must direct them to the appropriate responder 
for further information. With the link to an 
enterprise call center, APD hopes in the future 
to implement this tracking ability with the CRM 
software. This will improve the level of customer 
service to callers without overburdening 
the APD 3-1-1 call takers. 


Chapter VI 
Staffing 

INTRODUCTION 

Regardless of the technology changes, the success of 3-1-1 lies 
in the interaction between the citizens who use it and the call 
takers accepting the calls. The Austin Police Department (APD) 
implemented 3-1-1 by reassigning existing staff from the Tele-
serve Unit and the PBX operation. 

While doing this limited the level of training required for call 
takers, it created challenges associated with change manage-
ment. Call takers were faced with changes in their job descrip-
tion and in their skill requirements. Three months before these 
changes took effect, Teleserve changed from a ten-hour oper-
ation to a 24-hour operation, creating a new shift structure. 
Acceptance of these changes required a change in attitude by the 
call takers about the purpose and scope of their job. 

While all of these changes were significant, 3-1-1 managers reas-
sured call takers about their new jobs, built excitement about the 
changes, and addressed harmful rumors in a timely and effective 
manner. They also set new standards for performance and 
realigned the 3-1-1 call taker position with department priorities. 


QUESTIONS IN THIS CHAPTER INCLUDE: 

Questions about the Number of Call Takers Needed: 
> How many call takers are scheduled per shift? 
> How long are the shifts? 
> How are shifts covered in peak times? 
> What is the call load? 

Questions about the Skills Call Takers Need: 
> Do call takers understand the purpose of 3-1-1? 
> What are the advantages and disadvantages of employing civilian call 
takers for 3-1-1? 
> What are the advantages of employing certified 9-1-1 call takers as 3-1-1 
call takers? 
> How are call takers selected? 

Questions about Motivating Call Takers: 
> What is the turnover rate for call takers? 
> What are common concerns about 3-1-1 from call takers? 
> What management steps are essential to reassure call takers when 
implementing 3-1-1? 
> How can rotations through emergency communications divisions benefit 
3-1-1? 
> What benefits or perks aid in motivating call takers? 


Number of Call Takers. To staff the new 3-1-1 
operation, APD used existing communication personnel 
plus ten new positions from City budget for 
fiscal year 2000-01. In total, 33 Full Time Equivalents 
(FTEs) were assigned to the 3-1-1 operation 
as follows: 

Table 3: Shift Assignments 
Table Column Headers - Shift, Supervisor, Lead, Call Taker, Total FTEs 
Row Data:
6 a.m. - 2 p.m. 1 1 9 11 
2 p.m. - 10 p.m. 1 1 9 11 
10 p.m. - 6.a.m. 1 1 9 11 
Total 3 3 27 33 

The operation is a 24-hour/7-day operation. Shifts 
were eight hours in length. Below is an example of 
a typical 3-1-1 shift schedule: 

Table 4: Shift Schedule 
Table column headers - Employee, Sun, Mon, Tue, Wed, Thu, Fri, Sat 
Row Data:
Supervisor OFF OFF 
Lead OFF OFF 
Call Taker #1 OFF OFF 
Call Taker #2 OFF OFF 
Call Taker #3 OFF OFF 
Call Taker #4 OFF OFF 
Call Taker #5 OFF OFF 
Call Taker #6 OFF OFF 
Call Taker #7 OFF OFF 
Call Taker #8 OFF OFF 
Call Taker #9 OFF OFF 
# of Call Takers on duty 7 8 6 6 7 8 8 

APD converted their Teleserve operation, staffed 
with 21 individuals, and their PBX or APD main 
number operation (2 individuals) to 3-1-1. Operating 
3-1-1 did not have an impact on the staffing level of 
the 9-1-1 call takers levels at 72 call takers.

On average, each call taker in the Teleserve operation 
handled between 40 and 70 calls per shift. In 
a few cases, the duration of Teleserve calls was 
approaching 20 minutes prior to the implementation 
of 3-1-1. Call takers became experts in gathering 
detailed information for detectives, asking a range 
of questions. 

Spending this amount of time on 3-1-1 calls was 
not possible and contrary to one of the goals of 
3-1-1 --to remove non-emergency calls from 9-1-1. 
If callers are unable to reach a 3-1-1 operator 
because all the lines are busy, they will likely 
resort to calling 9-1-1. Managers worked with detectives to 
explain how 3-1-1 would support them, but not assume their 
responsibilities. 3-1-1 call takers 
gather essential information 
from these Teleserve type 3-1-1 calls. 

With the implementation of 3-1-1, call takers handle 
on average 80 calls per shift. The duration of the 
calls averages less than two minutes. During peak 
periods, when the line is busy, 3-1-1 callers 
can choose to talk to an answering machine 
or wait for an operator. Leads and supervisors 
return calls within an hour. On Teleserve type 
3-1-1 calls, the duration of some calls is 
longer than the average 3-1-1 call. However, 
with training, call takers were taking less time 
to fill out the Teleserve questionnaire. 

Required Skills and Training. APD Emergency 
Communications personnel were cross-
trained to work in three major units, 9-1-1, teletype 
and 3-1-1. Every six months, call takers rotated 
between the divisions, allowing for shift changes. 
The rotations build the skill levels of everyone in the 
division, promote understanding and cooperation 
between the units, and improve staffing options for 
peak times and overtime requirements. 

Most important, 3-1-1 call takers were certified as 
9-1-1 emergency call takers. In the event that a 
3-1-1 call escalates to a 9-1-1 emergency, the call  


takers are trained to handle the call appropriately 
and forward it to dispatch. Providing this level 
of service was critical to APDs vision of 3-1-1. It 
ensured that if callers dialed 3-1-1 by mistake in 
an emergency situation, highly trained call takers 
would handle their call. 

Understanding of 3-1-1. Most Teleserve call 
takers were previously 9-1-1 call takers and/or 
teletype call takers. When asked about their 
view of 9-1-1 compared to Teleserve, these call 
takers felt that Teleserve was a different type of 
position and a different way to expand their skills 
and experiences in the police department. To 
take a police report in Teleserve, the call takers 
were required to know more about the laws and 
codes in Austin and to understand the divisions 
within the police department. Typically, 9-1-1 
call takers were responsible for determining the 
nature and urgency of the callers emergency 
and for routing the call to dispatch for a patrol 
response, a much different role than taking a 
police report. 

At the introduction of 3-1-1, Teleserve call takers 
were suspicious about their changing roles. They 
enjoyed the depth of their jobs, acting as fact 
finders to properly fill out police reports. They 
took pride in directing callers to the proper entity 
to resolve police situations. Call takers were 
particularly concerned that they would become 
general purpose call takers, much like a 4-1-1 
service for the City. 

To diminish these concerns, managers took a 
number of steps. First, they involved call takers in 
the procurement process for the CRM software. 
Call takers questioned vendors during the 
demonstration about how the system would handle 
different day-to-day situations. This step introduced 
call takers to the types of tools they would 
have access to in their new positions. 

During the training for the software, managers 
picked leaders from the call takers to participate 
in train-the-trainer sessions. The individuals 
identified the advantages of the new software 
and discussed it with their peers. They assisted 
with training everyone on the software. During 
this intense training period, managers were able 
to learn and address misconceptions and rumors 
that were developing as the implementation of 
3-1-1 grew closer. 

As the call takers became more familiar with tools 
they would have and learned more about the key 
purpose of 3-1-1, they began to understand their 
roles more clearly. Call takers realized that they 
were already fielding a number of non-emergency 
calls in Teleserve and in 9-1-1. They realized that 
these calls were having an impact on their ability 
to meet performance standards in the 9-1-1 
division. They also realized that the new tools 
would help them handle these non-emergency 
calls in a more professional and expeditious 
manner. Finally, call takers realized that as 3-1-1 
call takers, they would expand their knowledge of 
the police department and the city government. 
With this new knowledge, they would be able to 
problem-solve situations more easily and would 
become more valuable employees. 

To stress the value of the 3-1-1 positions, the 
Emergency Communication Manager involved call 
takers in the media reports announcing 3-1-1. 
He allowed reporters to interview call takers and 
to film them for news stories. Call takers showed 
off their new tools and discussed how 3-1-1 
would help the public gain access to important 
police department information. 

Convincing the call takers of the benefits of 3-1-1 
was difficult for managers. However, APD was 
successful in educating call takers about the 
primary purpose of 3-1-1 -to remove non-emergency 
calls from 9-1-1. They demonstrated the 
personal benefits of being a 3-1-1 call taker and 
thus avoided a major turnover of staff. 

After the training and prior to the kick-off date, 
all call takers signed a 3-1-1 work agreement. 
This work agreement clearly laid out expectations 
that each employee would provide a high level of 
customer service. It also spelled out what call 
takers could expect from their supervisors and 
what actions they were to take if they did not feel 


their supervisors were assisting them. Finally, it 
documented managements understanding that 
the implementation of 3-1-1 presented many 
challenges to all involved. 

Laying the Groundwork. 

One of the significant factors 
in APDs success with personnel was its recognition of 
the understaffing and underpayment of call taker positions. 
In the years prior to 3-1-1 implementation, APD 
undertook a major overhaul 
of the emergency communications division. From 1994 
to 1996, APD more than doubled the number of 9-1-1 
call takers from 35 to 79, allowing the department to 
catch up with the increase in Austins population. This 
staffing change reduced the average number of calls 
handled by a 9-1-1 call taker by almost 50 percent. 

In addition, APD increased the pay for call takers from 
$11.00 per hour to $14.82 per hour. This rate applied 
to all call takers, whether they were 9-1-1 call takers 
or Teleserve call takers. Addressing workload and 
pay issues was the first step in recognizing call takers as 
integral to the police department response to customer needs. 
Establishing shifts and developing seniority protocols and 
career tracks also improved call taker positions. 
These actions reduced call taker turnover from 
40 percent per year. For the past two years, 
APD has a waiting list of individuals seeking to 
be call takers. 

Within the Division, one factor affcting APD was 
the physical separation of the call takers. 9-1-1 
call takers and dispatchers are located on the 
fourth floor in a secure area. Teleserve call 
takers were located on the third floor. 


Figure 7: 3-1-1 Work Agreement 
____ I understand that 3-1-1 will be a highly publicized number. Exemplary service 
will be expected. I will treat every caller with the respect, courteousness and empathy 
that they deserve. 
____ I understand that the implementation of 3-1-1 may cause an increase in our call 
volume. As a part of the 3-1-1 team, I believe that I can make a difference in the 
outcome of this program. I will make every effort to efficiently handle every call I 
receive. I will assume an active role in every call I handle and refer callers that need 
special attention to my supervisor or lead. 
____ I understand that the time I spend on the calls, in queue and in not ready will 
be monitored by the supervisor or lead on duty. Calls that exceed 8 minutes long 
will set off a visual alarm alerting the supervisor or lead that I may need assistance 
with my call. 
___I understand that I am the most important part of the Austin Police Departments 
3-1-1 team. It is up to me to expect the most I can from my Supervisor and Lead. If 
he or she is unable to assist me with a question or problem and does not make a valid 
attempt to resolve the question or problem it is up to me to refer the lack of assistance 
to his or her supervisor. I understand that in order to make 3-1-1 work for the city, I 
will need to expect nothing but the best from those in a position to assist me. 
___I understand the use of the internet will be allowed. It will allow me to better assist 
the citizens of Austin in their questions. I understand that ALL use of the internet 
is monitored and that any user found abusing the privilege by pursuing personal 
business online will be subject to disciplinary action up to and including termination. 
___I understand that as with every new thing there will be a great deal of modifications 
to the way I currently do things. I will attempt to embrace these changes and offer 
other suggestions to those in a position to create change. 
___ I understand that the 3-1-1 softwares resource pages are easily updateable 
and can be modified relatively easily. I expect my supervisors and leads to help me 
become a more efficient call taker by updating these resources when they are given 
suggestions. I will follow up with the supervisor if I do not feel that the update has 
occurred in a timely manner. 

Somehow, physical location became a status 
issue among the call takers. Those call takers 
on the fourth floor were assumed to have higher 
status than call takers on the third floor. While 
this issue seems minor, it was a real and difficult 
problem for managers to address. They 
abolished the distinction between the types of 
call takers. All call takers were given the same 
performance plan, regardless of whether they 
were 9-1-1 or 3-1-1 call takers. 


With the implementation of 3-1-1, call takers on 
the third floor suddenly assumed a more glamorous 
and glitzy role. They used more modern 
equipment and software. They were able to 
solve a wider range of caller issues with relative 
ease. The press interviewed and featured them 
on television. These actions caught the attention 
of call takers from other areas. Some began 
to inquire about when they could rotate into the 
division. 

Summary. In the basic police model, training 
and certifying 3-1-1 call takers for 9-1-1 calls 
provides a number of benefits. It guarantees 
that callers have access to emergency services 
if required. It allows managers to meet staffing 
needs more easily in peak situations. It promotes 
career advancement for call takers, allowing 
them to rotate through the emergency services 
operations. Finally, it motivates staff to work as 
a team and recognize the importance of 3-1-1 in 
responding to customer needs. 

Success of 3-1-1 depends on positive interactions 
between callers and call takers. APD 
ensured that call takers understood their roles 
and the purpose of their jobs in the larger 
scheme of the Department. Call takers were 
able to succeed because they had appropriate 
tools and management support and were able to 
concentrate on the tasks at hand. 


Chapter VII
Training 

INTRODUCTION 

Training is required for smooth implementation of new processes or 
systems. The establishment of 3-1-1 in Austin required a multi-fac-
eted training approach. This chapter describes the training that took 
place prior to the start of the 3-1-1 system and discusses plans for 
future training. 

Two major themes were incorporated into each training session. The 
first theme addressed the importance of removing non-emergency 
calls from 9-1-1 by providing 3-1-1 as a viable alternative. All of 
those involved with 3-1-1 were trained and asked to participate in 
the public re-education about the purpose of 9-1-1 as an emergency 
number. 

The second training theme promoted the concept that for 3-1-1 to 
be a viable option, calls had to be answered in a timely, effective and 
courteous manner. The Emergency Communication Manager recog-
nized that call takers were dedicated to providing excellent customer 
service. In some cases, providing this level of service to callers 
resulted in others receiving a diminished level of service. Their calls 
were not answered in a timely manner. 

The training highlighted this imbalance. Trainers demonstrated how 
the new technological tools and operating policies would focus the 
requests for information and types of responses call takers would 
make to callers. Structuring the interactions with set questions 
would assure that all callers would receive a high level of customer 
service while having their issues handled in a timely and effective 
manner. 

Supervisors, Teleserve call takers, 9-1-1 call takers and technology 
systems staff received intensive training on the new 3-1-1 opera-
tions. Police dispatchers, district representatives and police officers 
participated in brief reviews of the intent of 3-1-1 and their roles in 
promoting it. 

Methods of training included train-the-trainer vendor trainings, one-
on-one trainings and on-the-job training experiences. Training is 
planned for new hires. 
 

QUESTIONS IN THIS CHAPTER INCLUDE:

Questions about What Training is Needed: 
> What changes are being made to department policies and procedures? 
What changes in service expectations are required to handle the added call 
volumes? 
> How does the customer service request system software work? What do 
call takers need to do to enter calls into the system? What do supervisors 
need to do to review and manage call loads? How can supervisors use the 
system to help them supervise and develop their staff? 
> How does the telephony component operate? What do call takers need to 
do to use the telephone software? What types of reports can the supervisors 
request from the software? How can the supervisors use these reports to 
manage their staffs workload and to ensure quality service? 

Questions about Who to Train: 
> What training do call takers need to operate 3-1-1 stations? 
> What training do supervisors need to manage 3-1-1 operations? 
> What training do systems or technical staff need to facilitate the software 
and hardware components of the 3-1-1 operations? 
> How are District Representatives informed and educated about 3-1-1? 
> How are patrol officers informed and educated about 3-1-1? 

Questions about How and When Training is Conducted: 
> What level of training is needed from the software vendors? Who 
participates in this training? When is the optimal time to have the 
vendor conduct the training? 
> What training is best handled by internal resources? When is this training 
provided? 
> How is on-the-job training coordinated? 

Questions about What Training Will Be Available Beyond the Start-Up Period: 
> What types of in-service training are planned? 
> How will new call takers be trained about 3-1-1? 
 

What Training Is Needed 

Department Policy Training. One of the most 
important training components for a 3-1-1 
police non-emergency system is training on 
revised department policies and procedures. In 
addition, new and experienced call takers benefit 
from reviewing service expectations held by 
their supervisors. Training addresses issues 
such as: 

> how much information a call taker collects 
> how much information a call taker provides 
> how call takers balance the goal of providing 
excellent customer service with the need 
to handle calls in a timely manner.


To conduct this training, APD Emergency Communications 
staff initially reviewed and revised their department 
policies and procedures to incorporate 3-1-1 protocols. 
They used this opportunity to review and update their 
procedures. Supervisors from each of the divisions within 
Emergency Communications (including 9-1-1 operations, 
Dispatch and Teleserve) spent two days going through 
the policies and procedures line-by-line. 

They discussed which policies and procedures 
were being followed and which were not. If 
the policies were not being followed, they 
discussed the likely reasons. If the policy or 
procedures had been or needed to be changed, 
they revised the source document. Based upon 
these sessions, all call takers were re-trained 
on department emergency policies and procedures. 

Beyond policies and procedures, expectations 
about levels of customer service were reviewed. 
Supervisors reviewed data about average time 
spent with callers and how that average had 
increased over time. Supervisors felt that call 
takers were providing a higher level of customer 
service than required in some cases. 
They believed that the longer average call time 
could have a negative impact on overall levels 
of service because other calls were not being 
answered in a timely manner. 

The Emergency Communications Manager 
believed that Teleserve call takers - the future 
3-1-1 call takers - needed a refresher course 
in the requirements and expectations for their 
jobs. He also thought that Department staff 
relying on Teleserve call takers to support their 
efforts needed to be reminded of the limits of 
Teleserve operations. 

To facilitate this, he first met with command 
staff and detectives to ensure that detectives 
understood the role of Teleserve. He worked to 
realign detectives expectations about reports 
from Teleserve with his expectations of what 
Teleserve could reasonably deliver. Following 
this effort, the Emergency Communication staff 
hosted two 8-hour refresher courses during 
which the Emergency Communication Manager 
explained the expectations for the 3-1-1 call 
takers, including expectations of more focused 
report taking. 

Detectives relying on Teleserve from property 
crimes, robbery, sex crimes, auto theft, and 
forgery participated. They presented specific 
report requirements and types of questions that 
they would need 3-1-1 call takers to ask. 


This type of refresher course is critical, 
especially when using existing Teleserve staff. It 
is natural that when call takers become more 
knowledgeable about report-taking and receive 
guidance to ensure high quality customer 
service, they will begin to spend more time 
with callers. They are trying to meet the needs 
of callers and detectives to the best of their 
abilities. This results in more calls holding for 
longer periods of time. 

The Emergency Communication Manager was 
seeing this trend. In some cases call takers 
were taking 20 minutes or more to resolve 
calls. This ran counter to the needs of the 3-1-1 
system. Call takers needed to understand that 
they were to gather only necessary information 
and then move on to the next caller. Otherwise, 
callers who were holding would become 
frustrated. They would hang up and might call 
9-1-1. Once callers believed that 3-1-1 might 
not meet their needs in a timely manner, they 
could reject 3-1-1 and not consider it a viable 
alternative. 

Call Management System Training. With the 
introduction of new software and hardware, 
training is required to avoid frustration and 
accidental misuse by users. The Emergency 
Communication Manager required that all 3-1-1 call 
takers be fully trained on the software prior to 
touching it. To meet this requirement, the training 
staff coordinated vendor train-the-trainer 
and supervisor trainings on the customer relationship 
management (CRM) software and on 
the telephony call management and soft phone 
software. 

Train the Trainer Sessions. The CRM vendor 
training involved two 12-hour train-the-trainer 
sessions for users or 3-1-1 call takers and 
two two-day training sessions for supervisors 
and group administrators. During these trainings, 
vendors explained the system capabilities, 
requirements and functions. Specifically, 
vendor trainers reviewed each screen, button 
and field of the system. They demonstrated 
each function. They provided overview explanations, 
conducted live demonstrations of the 
software and oversaw a hands-on lab exercise. 
All training was conducted on a live test database. 

With the live test database, when the vendor 
trainers or the training participants entered 
information into the software forms as if they 
were taking a 3-1-1 call, the information was 
written to a database on a server. The participants 
were able to see what the software 
did with each entry. If participants entered an 
invalid type of data, perhaps alpha-characters 
in a field that required numbers, they received 
error messages. Further, participants could 
track their entries through all the forms in the 
software and see its full functionality. 

For example, if a participant entered a call 
about a streetlight being out at a specific corner 
and a second participant entered the same 
information, trainees could see how the system 
tracked and reported duplicate information 
from multiple call takers. At this point, the call 
taker could tell the caller that they had already 
received a call about this signal and were 
addressing the situation. The call taker would 
be able to move on the next call without having 
to document the duplicate information. 

Ten experienced Teleserve call takers were 
selected to participate in the train-the-trainer 
training. They were selected based upon their 
experience with Teleserve, their perceived leadership 
within their shifts, and their demonstrated technical 
abilities. 

All Teleserve supervisors participated in the 
group administrator and supervisor training. 
During the group administrator training, supervisors 
learned how to create system options, 
manage user access, and obtain reports. 
Examples of the functions available to supervisors 
included: 

> creating lists of questions that call takers 
should ask for particular call types. For 


example, in a streetlight outage incident, the 
call taker would be prompted by the software to 
ask Have any accidents occurred in 
the area? 

> limiting the screens that users or call 
takers can access on their systems. For 
example, supervisors can remove menu 
buttons that allow a user to access screens 
or forms related to printing system-wide 
reports. Removing this menu option prevents 
call takers from seeing the work of 
other call takers. 

> creating daily reports that provide statistics 
on service request types, such as how 
many traffic light calls were received on a 
given day. 

One-on-One Training. Following vendor training, 
the training manager, revised the vendor 
training manual and developed realistic APD 
examples to use in explaining the functions of 
the software to all call takers. She met with 
each call taker individually at a workstation to 
conduct one-on-one training. In two to three 
hour sessions, the training manager walked 
through the revised vendor manuals to explain 
the software and demonstrate the software 
functions on the workstation. Call takers were 
able to use realistic scenarios to practice using 
the software during these one-on-one sessions. 
They were able to learn at their own pace. 

Following this training, call takers practiced 
using the software during on-the-job training. 
Two call takers were assigned to a workstation 
to practice taking calls and entering information 
into a test database. The test database 
mirrored the actual relational database built 
for the live system that was turned on September 
17, 2001. By having call takers practice 
entering information into the test database, the 
APD training staff achieved two goals - first, to 
provide call takers with a safe environment to 
learn how to use the software without fear of 
messing up the real data and second, to identify 
potential problems with the actual database 
coding. 

Evaluation Results. All of the participants were 
requested to fill out evaluation forms regarding 
the training sessions. 

In general, all those trained by the vendor rated 
the training as either good or excellent. Participants 
remarked that the use of trainer monitors 
was a key component to the training sessions. 
The training room was set up so that three computer 
monitors were operating at each station. 
Two participants used the monitors and CPU, 
and at the same time, were able to watch the 
instructors monitor. 

Comments about the vendor training suggested 
the need for a better understanding of 
the purpose of 3-1-1 system prior to attending 
the training and more use of APD-specific 
examples. It was also recognized that individuals 
learned the system at very different rates. 
Some felt the two-day training was too long, 
while a few would have liked more time. 

Technical Training. Technical support staff 
participated in the group administrator training. 
However, they thought that they required additional 
training about the database functionality, 
relationships and security requirements. This 
training was provided by the vendor through a 
series of conference calls. During an extended 
conference call, a vendor training assistant 
came to APD to demonstrate functionality as 
the vendors technical expert discussed it over 
the phone with the APD technical staff. This 
was not ideal but fulfilled the requirements. 

Telephone Software. All supervisors participated 
in a 4-hour training session on the call 
tracking software associated with the soft 
phone technology. This training covered how 
to watch real-time call tracking of their 
subordinates and how to query reports about 
call activities over specified periods of time. 
This software allowed supervisors to better 
understand, monitor, counsel and manage the 
activities of their call takers. Their role was 
important in assisting the call takers to transition 


to answering calls more quickly and in a 
more focused manner. 

Five supervisors and/or Teleserve leads were 
also trained on how to access and review the 
voice recordings of calls to 3-1-1. This training 
took approximately one hour. Again, this 
training allowed supervisors to better monitor 
and counsel their call takers to ensure quality 
customer service, balanced with job efficiency 
requirements. 

Call takers were given brief training on the soft 
phone technology and software. This training 
involved reviewing the functions of the equipment, 
such as how to read the call tracking 
screen on the phone and how to transfer a call. 
The trainer demonstrated how to operate the 
telephone functions by touching the screen of 
the monitor using the softphone software. 

General Training about 3-1-1. Over the first 
few weeks of the implementation of 3-1-1, the 
3-1-1 training staff attended officer show-ups 
(roll calls) to introduce the 3-1-1 concept and 
explain its purpose to patrol officers. District 
Representatives received numerous email 
notifications advising them about 3-1-1 and its 
purpose. Managers anticipated that District 
Representatives would participate in the marketing 
and general education of the public. In 
addition, District Representatives received 
numerous referrals about neighborhood issues 
from 3-1-1 calls. 

When Was Training Conducted. Training for 
the software systems started approximately 
two months prior to the system start date. This 
allowed time to enter and customize data into 
the CRM software for APD needs. Refresher 
and review training sessions for 3-1-1 call 
takers were conducted up to two weeks prior 
to the start date of 3-1-1. In-service training 
is planned for all Emergency Communications 
staff over the three months following the kickoff 
date. All of the training was incorporated 
into orientation training provided for all new 
hires. 


Chapter VIII
Logistics 

INTRODUCTION 

We examine the organizational alignment and physical space 
requirements of the 3-1-1 operations in this chapter. In Austin, the 
3-1-1 unit is under the direction of the Emergency Communications 
Division within the Austin Police Department. This Division manages 
all emergency communications for the City of Austin. Included are 
call takers and dispatchers for police, fire, and emergency services. 

At the time this guide was written, call takers and dispatchers were 
physically separated in the Austin Police Department headquarters. 
The 3-1-1 operation was located in a small area on a separate floor 
from the 9-1-1 operation and the dispatch operation. 

Austin residents passed a bond issue in 1999 to build a new Emer-
gency Communications Center. This new facility resolved physical 
space and technical issues faced by the Department. A new caller 
aided dispatch (CAD) system and a new records management 
system (RMS) are expected to accompany its completion. The 3-1-1 
operation is to be integrated with these systems. 

In this chapter, we discuss how Austin implemented 3-1-1 and over-
came physical space constraints that encouraged organizational divi-
sion between call takers and dispatchers. 
 
Figure 8: Rendition of New Emergency Communication Center 


QUESTIONS IN THIS CHAPTER INCLUDE: 

Questions about What Organizational Alignments Impact 3-1-1: 
> Where can organizational responsibilities for 3-1-1 rest in the police only 
model? 
> What units interact with 3-1-1 operations in the police only model? 

Questions about What Are the Fundamental Physical Space Requirements for 
This Size 3-1-1 Operation: 
> How much office space did APD allocate to 3-1-1? 
> What space requirements are inherent with a 3-1-1 operation? 

Questions about the Impacts of Physical Space Constraints on Organizational 
Communications and Operations: 
> How does physical space constraints impact operations? 
> What communication steps are necessary to address these issues? 


Organizational Alignments Impact on 3-1-1. 

The Manager of Emergency Communications 
oversees 3-1-1 operations in Austin. He works 
for the Assistant Chief responsible for community 
policing support. The Emergency Communication Manager 
is responsible for managing 
all aspects of emergency communications, 
including 9-1-1 and dispatch services. Currently, 
the division employees 155 FTE. 

To ensure public safety, APD set a policy that all 
3-1-1 call takers would be certified as 9-1-1 call 
takers. This ensured that if a 3-1-1 call escalated 
to an emergency situation, the 3-1-1 call 
taker woudl be prepared to staff the call and 
forward it to dispatch for appropriate action. 


In addition, it allowed for rotations of staff through the 
units of Emergency Communications. As a 24/7 operation, 
APD emergency communications used a rotating shift. Every six 
months, call takers changed shifts and could change units. 
9-1-1 call takers could rotate into 3-1-1 or teletype positions. 
Rotations ensured that staff were cross-trained, understood 
how the units worked together, and developed career-enhancing 
skills. 

Figure 9: Originai 3-1-1 Call Center verted to the 3-1-1 call center. 

3-1-1 call takers worked with a broader range of 
units, both in the police department and external 
to the department, than 9-1-1 call takers. 
Within the department, 3-1-1 call takers 
filed police reports that were reviewed by the 
Reports Unit and analyzed by the Planning and 
Research Unit. Detectives relies on the reports 
from 3-1-1 calls for investigations. Outside the 
department, 3-1-1 call takers need to understand 
the roles of other city agencies to appropriately 
refer calls to them. 

Physical Space. APDs emergency communication 
units were physically separated in 
APD headquarters. The 9-1-1 call center was 
located on the fourth floor across an open 
corridor and elevator area from the dispatch 
areas. Dispatchers were separated into three 
adjacent areas by semi-permanent walls. One 
area housed police dispatchers, another was 
for fire dispatchers and another for emergency 
services dispatchers. The manager, was located 
in another building across a parking lot from 
headquarters. 

When the Teleserve unit was established, 
semipermanent walls were erected on the third floor 
creating a700-square-foot open area. In this 
trapezoid-shaped area, APD installed 11 mobile 
desk units along the walls and one supervisory 
desk. The Teleserve area was con-


With the construction of the new Communication 
Center underway, this space was a temporary 
solution. It did have its drawbacks, 
however. At any one time, 11 or more conversations 
were occurring in a relatively small 
space. Depending on voice levels, concentration 
could be distracted at best. In the 9-1-1 
call center and the police dispatch call center, 
half-walls improved privacy and eliminate noise 
overflow. 

In addition, a small space was allocated in the 
information technology area for the 3-1-1 server 
and equipment. 

Communication Challenges. Separation of the 
units created some real and perceived communication 


challenges between the units. If 
the 9-1-1 system went down, runners were 
assigned to physically transport paper notes to 
the dispatch center across the corridor. Communication 
among the fire, emergency services 
and police dispatchers sometimes was stifled 
by the physical separation. 

Likewise, the 3-1-1 operations were on a different 
floor from the 9-1-1 and dispatch centers. 
In order to communicate information that could 
not be electronically transmitted, 3-1-1 staff 
had to take an elevator upstairs. 

These separations affected sharing of information 
among the units and on-the-job cross-
training. Asking questions about specific calls 
required time; in emergency situations, quickness 
is essential. Asking questions and sharing 
information about policies was also slowed. 

To overcome these problems, APD instituted the 
cross-training rotation. In addition, APD managers 
spent significant time and effort conducting 
training and updating staff on policy changes. 
Supervisors were well-informed about all operations. 
Most had worked in all units prior to 
becoming a supervisor. They assisted in problem-solving 
between the divisions. 

The Emergency Communications Manager, his 
managers and staff anticipated the opening of 
the new emergency communications center. 
While they worked well within their existing 
logistical arrangements, they knew that co-location 
of staff and the expansion of space would 
enhance their operations. Combined with the 
new computer systems, they expected vast 
improvements in information handling and customer 
service. 


Chapter IX 
Timeline 

INTRODUCTION

From concept to 3-1-1 system implementation in Austin, two years 
elapsed. When the Chief hired the Manager of Emergency Commu-
nications in 1999, one of the managers first challenges was to build 
a 3-1-1 call center. Once the plan was defined and the COPS Office 
grant was approved, implementation took one year. 

Project managers created and followed a detailed timeline and 
project management plan. Sufficient time was included for training, 
testing, marketing and debugging. Almost everyone involved com-
mented after the start date that they were pleased that APD nailed 
the timeline. Consistent weekly meetings helped maintain the 
momentum and assured problem-solving. 

Well before the national tragedies of September 11, 2001, APD had 
already scheduled the 3-1-1 kick-off for September 17, 2001. In 
planning, APD had focused on using 9-1-1 day, September 11th, to 
bolster press and support for 3-1-1. As it turned out, the timing of 
the 3-1-1 kick-off was an unexpected blessing to the Police Depart-
ment and the citizens of Austin. APDs preparation paid off at a time 
when tensions were escalating. 3-1-1 provided a needed alternative 
to 9-1-1 and an important source of general information for citizens. 


QUESTIONS IN THIS CHAPTER INCLUDE:

Questions about the Timeline for Planning, Securing Funding and Creating Sup-
port for Change: 
> How much time is required to assess a concept and develop a plan to 
make it a reality? 
> What steps are involved in developing a concept for implementation? 
> How do funding timelines impact concept development? 
> What steps need to be taken up front to create support for implementing 
a new concept? 

Questions about the Timeline for Equipment and Technology: 
> How much time should be budgeted for each phase of technology procurement? 
> What are the standard technology steps APD followed to install the new 
system? 
> How does the procurement process impact the timeline? 
> How can project managers maintain momentum during an extended 
implementation process? 

Questions about the Timeline for Training and System Acceptance: 
> When should training for a new 3-1-1 system occur? 
> How much time and what steps are needed to ensure call takers are able 
to effectively use the new system by the start date? 

Questions about the Timeline for Marketing: 
> How much time is needed to develop a marketing plan for 3-1-1? 
> When should marketing for 3-1-1 commence? 
> What tasks are important in implementing a marketing campaign with 
limited funding? 
 

First Steps: Planning, Securing Funding and 
Creating Support for Change. Implementing 
a police only 3-1-1 system redefines the 
police role to some extent. This action publicly 
demonstrates that police are not responding 
to all calls and that some calls are not true 
emergencies. In Austin, this concept was not 
entirely welcome. Citizens were accustomed to 
a police officer arriving at their homes or 
places of work every time they contacted 
the police. 

Continuing that level of service was not possible 
and not appropriate. Defining non-emergencies 
involved policy and operational changes. The 
Chief was dismayed that Austin only operated a 9: 
00 am to 5:00 p.m. non-
emergency number. The first step to changing 
this situation involved creating the Teleserve 
unit. This unit allowed citizens to file police 
reports over the phone without an officer being 
involved. It was funded under the COPS MORE 
program in 1995. 

The Chief recognized that while he was freeing 
officer time on a limited number of calls 
(approximately 3,000 per year), he had not yet 
conquered the vast majority of non-emergency 
9-1-1 calls. With the hiring of the Manager 
of Emergency Communications, he wanted 
to find a solution. He sought to create a true 
non-emergency call center to improve 9-1-1 
responses and to provide Austinites with an 
non-emergency alternative to 9-1-1. 

The Emergency Communication Manager used 
his first six months to develop staff and cost 
estimates for developing a 3-1-1 operation. 
He assessed current staffing and equipment. 
Talking with call takers, he identified what tools 
were needed. He worked with information 
technology staff to develop estimates for 
equipment and technology requirements. He also 
analyzed call data to determine target 9-1-1 
call reductions to demonstrate success with the 
new system. Most importantly, he formulated 
a vision for APDs 3-1-1 operation. The Emergency 
Communication Manager defined how 
3-1-1 would address the critical concerns with 
9-1-1 and how it would improve APDs interactions 
with its citizens. 

The Emergency Communication Manager used the first six months 
to develop a manpower and cost estimate for 
developing a 3-1-1 operation. Planning 
Using this plan, police department officials 
began identifying avenues for obtaining funding. 
They developed presentations for the 9-1-1 
oversight board, CAPCO and for City Hall. The 
Planning and Research Director reached out 
to the COPS Office and was able to identify a 
grant opportunity. The search for funding took 
approximately six months. 

It should be noted that timing was key. Austin 
contacted the COPS Office three to six months 
before the end of the Federal fiscal year. It is 
not uncommon for Federal agencies to make 
program and funding decisions in this time 
period. 

Because APD laid the groundwork for 3-1-1 by 
implementing Teleserve, individuals inside and 
outside the department were able to envision 
how the 3-1-1 system could improve the operations 
of the department. In addition, APD staff 
could demonstrate the success of Teleserve as 
an indicator of the anticipated impact of a 3-1-1 
system. 


The public was also prepared for changes in police 
interactions. The public understood their options 
for obtaining information and for accessing the 
department without a personal police encounter. 

Equipment and Technology Procurement. From 
design to implementation, the equipment and 
technology components required approximately 
one year to put into place. Upon receipt of the 
COPS Office grant, three ISD staff were assigned 
to the project. They followed the standard IT steps 
for developing the 3-1-1 solution. These steps 
included: 

Project Definition 

Analysis Phase 

Design Phase 

Procurement Phase 

Construction Phase 

Implementation Phase 

The project definition phase covered approximately 
four months and examined the scope and 
resources available for the project. The analysis 
phase overlapped with the project definition 
phase and focused on determining what APD 
needed and why they needed it. 

During these phases, the ISD Project Manager 
developed the detailed project plan, including 
the timeline. The timeline listed each task to be 
completed, who was responsible for completing 
it, the start and end dates, and what tasks were 
related. She coordinated weekly core team meetings 
to discuss progress on each task, to review 
upcoming tasks, to problem-solve on any delinquent 
task, and to add any new tasks that may 
have appeared. These weekly meetings occurred 
throughout the equipment and technology phases 
until APD formally accepted the system from ISD. 
The meetings were critical for maintaining focus 
and momentum to complete the project on time. 

The design phase involved identifying the functions 
that were needed and the available options 
for obtaining those functions. Basically, the Project 
Manager and her team conducted an intensive 
internet search for available 3-1-1 systems. About 
one month was spent on this phase. 

Procurement is often the phase that leads to 
implementation delays and failure. By building 
a strong partnership with the Purchasing Office 
of the City of Austin, the core team learned that 
Austin had a special safety umbrella procurement 
policy. Under this policy any items that would 
improve the safety of the public could be obtained 
without issuing a standard request for proposals. 
The team demonstrated that 3-1-1 would improve 
the safety of the citizens of Austin by removing 
non-emergency calls from the 9-1-1 system. 

Application of this policy eliminated the need for 
an RFP and all the details associated with the process. 
Instead, the 3-1-1 core team hosted one-day 
demonstration sessions for vendors. They proceeded 
straight to receipt of a statement of work 
proposal for the selected vendors. For other items, 
they were able to modify existing contracts, which 
also saved time. In some cases, equipment was 
received within four weeks of placing the order. 

The construction phase involved working with 
vendors to install, customize and debug the equipment 
and software. This phase took approximately three 
months, the most hectic time. Many 
tasks depended on the completion of other tasks. 
Vendors and APD staff depended on each other to 
complete these tasks. 

During the construction phase, the importance 
of the Geographic Information System (GIS) link 
became critical and complex for APD. Problems 
with this link created delays of up to three weeks 
for some tasks. However, the Emergency Communication 
Manager and the ISD Project Manager 
redirected staff to use this time to test other 
components of the system and to finish training. 

During the implementation phase, vendors worked 
closely with APD staff to ensure that the system 
would operate properly and to make any necessary 
adjustments. This phase took approximately two 
weeks. Vendor staff participated in the operation 
on-site during the first two to three days of operation. 


Training and System Acceptance. APDs decision 
to use existing staff as 3-1-1 call takers 
resulted in fewer requirements for training, but 
led to resistance to change among personnel. 
Teleserve call takers were trained on 9-1-1 
policies and some were aware of dispatch operations. 
They were experts with police reporting 
and the CAD system. 

3-1-1 introduced new software and a new telephone 
system, and required a broader range of 
knowledge. Not only did 3-1-1 call takers need 
to understand police reports and patrol functions, 
they needed to be aware of operations 
in all areas of the department and in other city 
agencies in order to make appropriate referrals. 
The requirement raised anxieties for the call 
takers. 

As 9-1-1-trained call takers, these individuals 
initially were not willing to become general purpose 
call takers. Teleserve had allowed them to specialize 
and increase their expertise. Call takers 
in Teleserve had acquired in-depth knowledge of 
offense categories and reporting requirements. 
At first, the expansion of Teleserve appeared to 
dilute their expertise. Instead of being specialists, 
they would know a little about everything. 
They did not view this as a positive outcome. 

To overcome staff anxieties, APD 3-1-1 managers 
took a number of steps. During the procurement phase, 
all call takers participated in 
the evaluation of vendor demonstrations. This 
introduced them to the 3-1-1 plan eight months 
prior to implementation. 

Once the software was constructed, 10 call 
takers participated in a train-the-trainer vendor 
class. This 12-hour training was conducted 
three months prior to implementation. The 
managers also participated in this training, as 
well as a half-day training on the phone tracking 
software. 

About ten weeks prior to implementation, all call 
takers participated in one-on- one training with 
the training manager. She relied on call takers 
who attended the vendor class to help explain 
how the CRM system operated. This training was 
conducted on a live test database. Using a live 
system allowed call takers to experience a real 
operating environment well before the kick-off 
date. One month before implementation, a limited 
number of call takers tested the system by 
completing test plans on the master database. 

In addition, all call takers were trained in 
Teleserve and 3-1-1 responsibilities. During this 
training, the Emergency Communication Manager and 
his assistant managers reviewed other 
areas of the police department and city administration 
that call takers needed to know. They 
outlined how call takers would learn these skills 
through the CRM system. Finally, they presented 
performance expectations and obtained signed 
agreements from the call takers stating that they 
understood their responsibilities. 

Approximately two weeks before implementation, 
all call takers began using the system for 
Teleserve calls. At this point, all were accessing 
the master database. This use was limited, but 
allowed call takers to access the database and 
learn the functions in a live setting. 

Timeline for Marketing. Development of the 
marketing component took approximately six 
months. The Chief and the Emergency Communication 
Manager believed that the original 
intent of 9-1-1 needed to be re-explained to the 
public in order for 3-1-1 to work. 

The Chief appealed to the Greater Area Austin 
Crime Commission (GACC) for help with the 
marketing effort. This organization was formed 
in October 1997, to support law enforcement, 
raise public awareness about crime prevention 
programs, and promote a cooperative and 
coordinated anti-crime effort in the community. 
The Commission assumed responsiblity for the 
project and coordinated planning meetings four 
months prior to the start date. The marketing 
team consisted of APD staff from the public 


information office, the community outreach office 
and the emergency communications staff. Representatives 
from CAPCO and the City of Austin 
public information office were involved. Finally a 
media consultant was hired to provide advice to 
the marketing team. 

The Executive Director of the Commission led the 
marketing team in creating a slogan and developing 
a logo by the end of the first month. He worked 
with graphic design experts to create the logo and 
brochures. Orders for materials were placed two 
months prior to the event. 

Through weekly meetings, the marketing team 
identified potential contributors, defined outlets 
for public announcements, and prepared a press 
announcement. The initial press announcement 
occurred one and a half months before the start 
date. At this press event, the team had hoped to 
talk with media managers about providing public 
service announcements and other complementary 
media coverage. Using the clout of GACC, APD 
was able to generate significant interest in 3-1-1. 
However, the event evolved into a press release 
about the effort rather than a plea for media 
assistance. 

Prior to this announcement, the Commission Executive 
Director had prepared a grant application to 
the Southwestern Bell Foundation to solicit 
funding for the brochures and handouts. He also had 
solicited funding for additional marketing materials 
from other sources. The solicitation effort had 
taken approximately four months of persistent and 
continuous attention in order to raise $35,000. 

District representatives and community liaisons 
distributed brochures at public meetings in the 
month preceding implementation. Newsletter 
announcements appeared in utility bills, school 
handouts and city materials in the month immediately 
preceding the announcement. 

An earlier public service announcement had been 
planned in combination with 9-1-1 day, but was 
pre-empted by the national emergency and tragedies 
on September 11, 2001. APD did proceed 
with the 3-1-1 announcement a week later on 
September 17, 2001. This announcement received 
significant newspaper and television news coverage. 

Following the announcement, 3-1-1 marketing 
team members continued to pass out written 
materials at all public meetings and to patrol 
officers. 

Table 5: Timeline for 3-1-1 Implementation 


Chapter X 
Public Education/ Marketing 

INTRODUCTION 

At its most basic level, implementing 3-1-1 requires activating the 
phone number and creating a change in public perception and use 
of 9-1-1. APDs policy changes, staffing shifts and new software 
systems leveraged the 3-1-1 phone number concept to improve 
efficiency and customer service. However, the future success of 
APDs 3-1-1 effort would rely upon their ability to change the pubics 
perception and use of 9-1-1. 

This chapter focuses on the steps APD took to market 3-1-1 to the 
public. It details how they developed the marketing plan, who they 
engaged to help market 3-1-1, and the key messages and methods 
they employed. Marketing efforts were rooted in the Directors phi-
losophy that without reeducating the public about 9-1-1, even all the 
bells and whistles of 3-1-1 could not achieve his primary goal of 
reducing 9-1-1 call loads. 

The national tragedies of September 11, 2001 played an unex-
pected role in the success of the marketing campaign. APD seized 
the opportunity to demonstrate how 3-1-1 would improve public 
safety in Austin at this critical time. The media responded positively 
to their message. 


QUESTIONS IN THIS CHAPTER INCLUDE:

Questions about the Marketing Plan for 3-1-1: 
> How did APD approach marketing for 3-1-1? 
> Who should be involved in marketing 3-1-1? 
> What planning should be conducted? 
> What are the key elements in the plan? (i.e., Is there a special audience 
such as a Spanish speaking community?) 

Questions about How Funding Is Secured for Marketing: 
> What are the sources of funding for marketing? 
> How much funding should communities attempt to secured to publize 
3-1-1? 
> How can the funding used? 

Questions about How 3-1-1 Is Publicized: 
> Who should be involved in marketing 3-1-1? 
> How effective were the different marketing channels for APDs effort? 
 

Leveraging Community Support. Once the 
3-1-1 concept paper was drafted, the Chief 
and the Emergency Communications Director 
approached the Greater Austin Crime Commission 
(GACC) for support. GACC was formed 
in October 1997 to support law enforcement, 
raise public awareness about crime prevention 
programs, and promote a cooperative and 
coordinated anti-crime effort in the community. 
Its 32 members are recognized business 
and community leaders. The President was 
a former chancellor of the University of Texas. 
The Commission agreed to become APDs marketing 
partner. 

The assistance of these well-known community 
leaders opened doors to the print and television 
media for APD staff. The Commission was 
also able to reach corporate funding decision-
makers and encourage significant donations. 

More importantly, APD was able to garner the 
talents of an internationally known graphic 
designer. His firm developed and tested the 
logo and marketing materials for 3-1-1. They 
worked to assure audience recognition and a 
positive response to the 3-1-1 concept. The firm 
donated its time to the project. 

Developing the Marketing Plan. GACCs 
Executive Director assumed leadership of the 
3-1-1 marketing team. The team consisted of 
APD staff from the public information office, 
the community outreach office, and emergency 
communications staff. Representatives from 
CAPCO and the City of Austin public information 
office were also involved. Finally, an outside 
media consultant was hired by GACC to provide 
advice and conduct research on media efforts 
in other communities. 

Prior to convening the team, the Commission 
Executive Director conducted a two-phase 
research effort to outline a marketing plan. First, 
he reviewed literature on developing marketing 
and product branding plans, generally. These 
materials provided information on why and how 
to develop a marketing strategy, templates for 
marketing action plans, and ways to measure 
success. 

The second phase of the Commission Executive 
Directors review involved contacting other 
jurisdictions that had implemented 3-1-1. He 
requested information about their marketing 
activities and asked for samples of their 
materials. He also joined the technical team on site 
visits to Baltimore, San Antonio and Dallas. 
Based on his research, he developed a chart 
highlighting the 3-1-1 marketing strategies that had 
been tried by others,and noted his perceptions of 
the impacts of these strategies. 

With the Emergency Communication Manager, 
the Commission Executive Director drafted a 
two-page 3-1-1 Marketing Action Plan Overview. 
He convened the marketing team four 
months prior to the planned 3-1-1 start date. At 
this meeting, he discussed his research findings, 
displayed sample marketing materials from other 
3-1-1 sites, and disseminated his marketing 
action plan including the following: 

> the target launch date 

> objectives for the marketing effort 

> control points for decision-making and 
financial oversight 

> key milestones and dates 

> a budget estimate for the effort by media 
category 

> evaluation measurement tools 

> special media news events 

> print materials to be developed 

> potential community partners 

The team briefly reviewed the plan and adopted 
it. Some team members were aware of the first 
tasks, determining a logo and slogan. After 
the plan was adopted, these team members 
reported on their brainstorming ideas for the 
logo. The team built on these ideas and proceeded 
to brainstorm about logos and slogans, 
potential media outlets and potential community 
partners for funding. 


By the end of the first month of meetings, 
Austins 3-1-1 initiative had a logo and slogan. The 
team created the slogan, Austins Answers, 
with great care. They pondered a number of 
choices, often testing potential slogans on APD 
staff who were not involved with the project. 
Once the choices were narrowed, they discussed 
variations of the chosen slogan such as Austin 
Answers or Austins Answer. In part, the final 
choice was driven by the decision to use APDs 
famous search and rescue dog, Austin, as the 3-1-1 
mascot, especially in order to reach children. 
Austin attended the marketing meetings with his 
handler, though he did not add many comments. 

Selection of the logo also involved extensive 
thought. The Commission Executive Director worked 
directly with a well-known graphic 
designer, to develop and test alternative logos to 
brand Austins 3-1-1 effort. The team conducted 
a written vote to choose among the top three 
designs. Once the final design concept was 
presented to the team, a discussion ensued about 
whether to have dashes between the numbers, 
similar to the required 9-1-1 marketing style. 

During the logo selection meeting, team 
members also presented text for a potential 
brochure. The team discussed ways to reach 
target audiences such as children, the elderly 
and the Hispanic-speaking population. In addition 
to a brochure, team members designed a 
quiz to point out the differences between 
3-1-1 and 9-1-1 calls especially for use with 
children. 

By the middle of the second month, production on all printed 
materials started. These materials included: 

> 5 1/2 by 8 1/2 tri-fold brochures, 
compliant with US Postal Service mail 
standards 

> 2 1/2 by 3 1/2 wallet cards contrasting 
when to call 3-1-1 with when to call 9-1-1 

> 4 1/4 by 11 bookmark cards, explainingiling 
when to call 3-1-1 instead of 9-1-1 on 
one side, with a quiz with matching 40 
situations with 3-1-1 or 9-1-1 on the other 
> pencils 
> bumper stickers 
> logo T-shirts 
> logo balloons 

The brochure, wallet cards and bookmark 
quiz were printed in both English and Spanish 
to reach Austins Figure 11: APD 3-1-1 Logo 
diverse population. The brochure: 

> provided a four-paragraph 
description of 3-1-1 as a toll-free telephone 
number that allows people within the city 
limits to request police services in non-
emergency situations 

> discussed why 3-1-1 was needed 

> identified who would answer 3-1-1 calls 
(i.e., cross-trained 9-1-1 call takers) 

> explained when to call 3-1-1 versus when 
to call 911, including a list of potential situations 

> explained what would happen if a person 
dialed 3-1-1 when they intended to dial 9-1-1 
(again highlighting the cross-trained call 

Image of Figure 10: 3-1-1 Marketing Materials takers) 

> noted that the APDs main 
number (974-5000) would 
remain in service and was 
available to callers outside the 
city limits with non-emergency 
requests 

> highlighted non-emergency 
calls to APDs 9-1-1 system by 
pulling out quotes of callers 
questions, such as Will trick-
or-treating be legal tonight 
because of the rain? 

While the materials were being-
printed the team continued 


to meet weekly. Next steps involved solidifying 
donations from corporations, developing and 
coordinating insertion of newsletter articles, 
and scheduling special media events. 

Figure 12: Bookmark 9-1-1 v. 3-1-1 Quiz

Seeking Donations. Based upon the Chiefs 
and the Emergency Communication Managers 
initial presentation of the 3-1-1 concept, GACC 
provided $10,000 to the marketing endeavor. 
They also took the lead in soliciting other support. 
As public employees, APD staff could not 
seek funding directly from private individuals or 
corporations. The Commission Executive Director 
established an advertising budget estimate 
of $85,000 in his marketing action plan. He 
planned: 

$15,000 for design 

$10,000 for print materials 

$15,000 for television spots 

$10,000 for radio spots 

$25,000 for production 

$10,000 for coordination. 

He also set an advertising target with a two-to-one 
spending ratio. For every dollar spent by GACC 
on advertising, he sought two dollars in cost-free 
media coverage, such as public service announcements. 

The Commission Executive Director, with the assistance 
of the media consultant, contacted CAPCO, 
the 9-1-1 oversight organization, Southwestern 
Bell and Motorola for possible donations. These 
three organizations were directly involved with the 
3-1-1 effort. 

CAPCO agreed to provide $10,000 for print media 
that would highlight both 3-1-1 and 9-1-1. They 
also agreed to create teasers within their advertising 
and public recognition events to spark interest 
in the 3-1-1 announcement planned for September 17th. 

Responding to a grant application to their foundation, 
Southwestern Bell contributed $25,000. 
Once pledged, foundation funding takes time 
to secure. Fortunately, GACC was able to cover 
expenses until the funds were received. 

Motorola did not respond to the Commission 
Executive Directors solicitations for help with marketing 
expenses, despite repeated inquiries. 

The team discussed approaching other potential 
donors. However, time and personnel limitations 
did not permit aggressive follow-up on these 
leads. 


In the end, $45,000 was used almost 
exclusively to develop print media. 
GACCs influence helped secure pro-bono 
services from the designer. This saved the 
marketing team $15,000 of the funds that 
had been planned for design. 

APD did not run radio, television or print 
advertisements. They did seek and obtain 
significant cost-free television and print 
coverage for 3-1-1. We will discuss how they 
achieved this in the next section. 

Involve the Media 
The GACC 
President invited 86 editors and 
station managers to a media 
briefing about 3-1-1. 

Marketing 3-1-1 

Pre-Kick Off Marketing. Television coverage 
of APDs 3-1-1 plans began on July 31, 2001. 
GACC President invited 86 editors and station 
mangers (radio and television) to a media 
briefing. The media advisory stated that: 

The 3-1-1 launch is the citys largest 
public safety initiative in recent memory. 
The Austin Police Department and the 
Greater Austin Crime Commission need 
your help to educate the public concerning 
the importance of this new system. 

Media kits included: 
> a 3-1-1 system overview 
> a list of 3-1-1 media contacts 
> a 2-page description of the need for 3-1-1 
> a 2-page introduction of the Greater 
Austin Crime Commission 
> the COPS Office press release about the 
3-1-1 grant. 

Although GACC President invited editors and 
managers to the 11:00 a.m. briefing, entire 
crews arrived with cameras and reporters. The 
GACC President introduced the 3-1-1 concept 
and the need for community involvement to 
market the new service. The Emergency Communications 
Director followed him, providing a 
more detailed description of APDs goals with 
3-1-1. The Emergency Communication Manager 
fielded questions from reporters about the costs 
of the service, other cities that were using 3-1-1 
and the reasons people call 9-1-1 with non-
emergencies. He used the example of the man 
who called 9-1-1 about his neighbors noisy 
rooster. 

Despite their best efforts, this briefing evolved 
into a press release for 3-1-1 rather than a 
discussion about how to garner future media 
support and coverage. 

During the six oclock news that evening (July 
31, 2001) 3-1-1 was announced to the public. 
The news stations reported that 3-1-1 would 
not be operational until September 17, 2001. 
Fortunately, the Emergency Communication 
Manager anticipated that the public might miss 
that critical information. Prior to the briefing, 
he confirmed that the 3-1-1 number had been 
established and connected. On August 1, 
2001, 3-1-1 calls began trickling into the 
Teleserve operation. 

Following this television announcement, APD 
received editorial reviews in print media. In 
addition, the Emergency Communication Manager 
and other APD executives received numerous 
requests for interviews. APD decided not to 
allow any press walk-throughs of the operation 
until the official kick-off date. 

Over the next month, members of the marketing 
team began handing out printed brochures 
and attending community meetings. The school 
district provided every student with printed 
brochures about 3-1-1 in combination with their 
educational efforts about 9-1-1. 


On the morning of September 11, 2001, 
APD Emergency Communica-tion staff was 
preparing to participate in a media event 
highlighting 9-1-1 day at the Texas State 
Capitol.  An APD Call Taker was to be recognized 
as an outstanding 9-1-1 operator during the 
ceremony.  According to the plan, CAPCO staff 
was going to fore-shadow the announcement of 
3-1-1 as an alternative to 9-1-1 at the end 
of this event.

Unfortunately, the terrorist attacks in New York 
City and Washington DC occurred on that day.  As 
was the case in every community and city in the 
US, APD quickly refocused its activities.  Calls 
to 9-1-1 and Teleserve surged.  The entire 3-1-1 
team realized that it was even more imperative 
than before that the public announcements about 
3-1-1 occur the following week.

Kick Off Marketing. On September 17, 
the Mayor, Chief and other city and 
APD executives gathered to officially 
announce the service during a media 
briefing. APD seized the opportunity to 
remind everyone that public safety is 
a community concern and that 9-1-1 
was endangered by the growing 
number of non-emergency calls.

All of the major media carriers attended the 
briefing. Immediately following the briefing, 
camera crews and reporters participated in an 
open house. The Emergency Communication 
Manager encouraged everyone to watch and 
interview call takers. 

All three major networks carried the 3-1-1 
announcement, spending between 45 seconds 
and three minutes on the story. This was a 
remarkable level of coverage, especially given 
the extensive amount of news about national 
events and local reactions to the events. 
Securing this level of television coverage had a 
positive impact on the dis-semination of 
information about 3-1-1. 

Follow-up Marketing. Following the official 
kick-off announcement, APD received scattered 
coverage about 3-1-1 over the next two months.  
At one point, AT&T asserted to the press that APD 
did not advise them how to access 3-1-1. This 
assertion was in response to AT&T customer complaints 
that they were not able to access the service. 
The Emergency Communica-tion Manager was able to 
refute the assertion by pro-ducing the certified 
letter that had been sent to AT&T during the 
implementation phase of the project.  He used 
this media inquiry to encourage other phone 
carriers to real-ize that 3-1-1 was a service 
that customers desired.

In addition, 3-1-1 was featured in a story 
about a rash of flag thefts.  With the rise 
in demonstrations of patriotism, American flags 
were being stolen from houses and businesses.  
Victims were calling 3-1-1 to report the thefts.  
The news stations covered the story and 
reminded viewers to contact 3-1-1, not 9-1-1, 
in the event of a flag theft. 

Aside from the news coverage, APD staff distributed 
printed brochures, quizzes and other marketing 
materials following the official kick-off date.  
All supplies were exhausted by mid-December.
As an ongoing marketing effort, APD and GACC 
developed a web-based version of the brochure.  
The web site is located at 
http://www.austincrime.org/311/index.html.




Based upon initial assessments, it appeared 
that APDs multi-pronged marketing strategy 
succeeded in shifting citizen perceptions. 9-1-1 
call loads appeared to have decreased, in spite 
of heightened concerns over terrorism. Six 
months after the announcement, the marketing 
team was investigating ways to continue 
its campaign and spread the word about the 
service. APD officers assisted in posting flyers 
in downtown businesses as part of this follow-
up outreach effort. 


Chapter XI
System Maintenance 

INTRODUCTION 

Once a 3-1-1 system is implemented, procedures must be put into 
place to maintain it. System maintenance includes developing provi-
sions for anticipated problems with the equipment and operational 
levels. Specifically, we discuss how APDs 3-1-1 call center handled 
peaks in demand and temporary staff shortages. These issues are 
examined from the point of view of equipment performance and 
staffing options. We also look at how staff were incorporated into 
the call center. We address how information was diffused to new call 
takers and to rotating call takers. 
 

QUESTIONS IN THIS CHAPTER INCLUDE: 

Questions about How 3-1-1 Handles Peaks in Demand: 
> What is the average number of abandoned calls during a shift? 
> What happens to callers when they cant reach an operator? 
> When messages are left, what is the response? 
> What redundancies are built into the systems? 

Questions about How New Call Takers are Brought On Board: 
> What training is provided to new call takers for 3-1-1? 
> How do rotations between divisions function? 
> How are policies and procedures translated to new staff? 


Handling the Call Load. Once the 3-1-1 
hardware and software solutions had been 
designed, ISO staff analyzed the scope of the 
effort prior to procurement. They determined 
that the project was limited in size, with only 11 
call takers plus a supervisor. For bandwidth to 
support the center, they needed a solution for 
12 people. For up time, the 3-1-1 managers 
could accept approximately four hours of downtime 
in disaster recovery. The size of the system 
and the length of the disaster recovery window 
allowed for a broad solution with limited redundancy. 

The Telephony Coordinator and the 
Hardware Coordinator did not need to 
build a system that could be operational 
within seconds. This type of system would 
require multiple mirror systems running 
simultaneously to ensure that if one 
or more systems failed, a replacement 
system could be activated immediately. 
That level of redundancy was not necessary here. 

The criteria used to make hardware and 
software decisions included: 

> Growth rate - APD did not anticipate extensive 
growth and advised planning for only 12 
stations 

> Disaster recovery time - Four hours were 
allowed to bring the system back to full 
operation 

> Up time - The system needed to be 
available most of the time. In the event of a 
disaster, it needed to be unavailable for no 
longer than four hours. To ensure this level 
of availability, extensive system redundancy 
was not required. 

> Bandwidth - Limited to supporting 12 
staff. 

> Number of people to support - 12 existing 
users. 

The Hardware Coordinator followed the rule of 
9s. Under this rule managers stated that the 
system should operate 99.9999 percent of the 
time, not 99.99999999999999999999 of the 
time. 

The 3-1-1 core team relied on current Teleserve 
and PBX call volume as the baseline for 
system requirements. They anticipated that 
3-1-1 would receive approximately 1,500 calls 
per day. In case more calls were sometimes 
received, a hold system was included. Callers 
would hear a recording explaining that they 
could continue to hold for the next available 
call taker, with an estimate of the length of 
time they were likely to be on hold. They would 
also be advised that they could leave a message. 
Supervisors would retrieve messages 
once per hour and return calls. 

System Redundancy
The system should operate 99.9999 percent 
of the time . . . and be out of service 
for less than four hours in the event of a disaster. 
 
Because of the unique situation created by the 
September 11 tragedies, 3-1-1 received more 
calls than anticipated. Managers tracked the 
calls and identified problems based on the 
number of dropped calls, the number of calls 
per operator, and the number of messages. 
Two additional work stations were added to 
address these overrun issues. 

Software Updates. A longer-term maintenance 
issue involved ensuring that the CRM and 
phone software would not become dated or 
obsolete. APD negotiated with Motorola to 
provide updates as they were developed, for 
one year. The City purchased a maintenance 
agreement that provided limited (20 hours) 
off-site technical support for the software, as 
well. Additional support could be purchased 
later, at agreed-upon rates documented in the 
contract. City-wide maintenance and support 
agreements were in place with Avaya and Dell 


for the phone equipment and computer hardware. 

New Employees. Even though APD has reduced 
call taker turnover drastically (from 47 percent 
per year to 5 percent per year), new call takers 
are hired occasionally. APD offers orientation 
classes for new call takers. These individuals 
participate in a two-week course to certify them 
as 9-1-1 call takers and to explain how Austins 
Emergency Communications Division functions. 
They learn about the policies and procedures 
that apply to all call takers. They also learn 
about specific issues for 9-1-1 call takers, 3-1-1 
call takers and teletype call takers. Generally, 
call takers start their assignments as 9-1-1 call 
takers. 

Managers developed a single policy and procedures 
manual for all call takers when 3-1-1 
was introduce. Managers for each of the units, 
(9-1-1, 3-1-1 and dispatch) participated in 
multiple work sessions to revise and update the 
manual to reflect current operating procedures. 
They identified which were not being followed, 
the reasons they were not, and whether they 
needed to be included or deleted. They also 
identified practices that had not previously 
been documented. Working together, they 
established standard ways of handling situations. 
This intense effort was aimed at easing 
the transition for call takers when rotating 
within shifts and across units, and to ensure 
consistent responses to customers by all units. 

When call takers started in the 3-1-1 unit or 
were rotated to 3-1-1 from another unit, they 
sat with an experienced call taker for two 
weeks. During the first week, they listened to 
how calls were answered and resolved. Using 
a remote headset, they linked into the phone 
system of the trainer. They learned about the 
reporting systems on the desktops. During the 
second week, new call takers began to answer 
calls while the experienced call taker listened. 
When the experienced call taker certified that 
the new call taker can handle calls solo, on-
the-job training, was complete. Generally, the 
trainer remained available to the new call taker 
to answer questions and assist with problem 
calls as they arose. Leads and supervisors also 
worked with the new call taker. 

APD created flexibility among its emergency 
communications units by: 

> standardizing call taker responsibilities 

> creating uniform policies and procedures 

> instituting systematic on-the-job training. 

Based on these operating principles, APD was 
able to offer overtime and rotation opportunities 
among units to meet unit-based staffing 
shortages. This helped maintain workload 
distribution. They also created a quasi-career 
track for call takers. Call takers could learn all 
the functions of emergency communications 
and apply for management positions. 

By expanding the breadth of the job, management 
made the call taker position more 
interesting. Call takers faced very different 
experiences based on whether they were 
focused on responding to emergencies in the 
fastest possible manner (9-1-1), or resolving 
citizen information and reporting issues (3-1-1). 
To ensure that call takers were exposed 
to these different experiences, positions were 
rotated every six months. Call takers switched 
shifts and/or units. Rotations ensured that 
information was distrubuted throughout the unit 
and that call takers were cross-trained. 

Summary. Appropriate levels of redundancy 
existed in the 3-1-1 equipment and in staff 
knowledge. Expectations derived from existing 
data and operating knowledge were used to 
design the system. Redundancy ensured that 
the call center operated in a supportive and 
continuous manner. The systems were built 
to function with limited down-time (four hours) 
and to allow for limited growth over time. Support 
and maintenance agreements provided for 
software updates on a regular basis, to ensure 
that they did not become obsolete. 


Performance of both equipment and staff waa 
tracked and monitored daily. If issues were 
identified, such as too many dropped calls 
they were researched and addressed in a timely 
manner. 

Staff were cross-trained on a regular basis 
through standardized policies and procedures 
and rotations among units. When the 3-1-1 
call center reaches peak operating capacity, 
resources can be added in an appropriate time 
frame. 


Chapter XII
System Performance 

INTRODUCTION 

A major issue for 3-1-1 call centers nationwide is convincing the 
public to dial 3-1-1. Theoretically, 3-1-1 service provides key 
information about city services, meeting an anticipated public need. 
However, if the public does not know about the service or does not 
demand the service at a sufficient level to justify expenses, questions 
about proper resource allocation arise. 

As city budgets tighten, all cost centers must demonstrate that they 
are providing a public good in an effective and cost-efficient manner. 
The 3-1-1 core team was aware of this requirement. They designed 
the system and procured software capable of tracking the performance 
of the system and of the call takers operating the system. 

This section provides information about how to APD uses 3-1-1 
system to measure performance. For example, managers and 
supervisors use the system to track the volume of phone calls 
received overall, how quickly calls are answered, how long call takers 
remain on the line, and how many calls are abandoned. This section 
does not provide findings regarding the overall effectiveness of 3-1-1 
or describe whether calls to 9-1-1 increased or decreased over time. 
Those issues are addressed in the formal evaluation conducted by 
21st Century Solutions, Inc. (forthcoming). 

During the visioning process for the 3-1-1 system, management 
established four measures of success: 
1. Reduce the number of non-emergency calls on the 9-1-1 system by 
35 percent. 
2. Handle non-emergency calls in an efficient manner, i.e., low average 
call times. 
3. Handle calls without overwhelming the 3-1-1 system, i.e., avoid 
hang-ups due to customer waiting times. 
4. Receive few to no complaints from community members using 3-1-1. 

Management uses tracking systems to guide call takers in improving 
their performance. Management evaluates call taker performance, 
develops constructive criticisms, and establishes benchmarks for 
improvement using individual statistics from the tracking systems. 
To motivate call takers, individuals who exceed benchmark performance 
levels and improve system operations are recognized frequently. 


QUESTIONS IN THIS CHAPTER INCLUDE:

Questions about How APD Assesses Its Performance with 3-1-1: 
> How are 3-1-1 calls tracked? 
> How often do Emergency Communications managers report on 3-1-1 
statistics? 
> What performance indicators do they use? 

Questions about How Call Tracking Statistics Are Used to Manage Employees: 
> How can managers use statistics from the 3-1-1 system? 
> How can call takers use statistics from the 3-1-1 system? 
 

APD Performance. Emergency communications 
Technical Services Supervisors track call 
volume daily. The Supervisor prepares a report 
highlighting the number of call takers, as well 
as calls received, answered and abandoned for 
the 9-1-1 and the 3-1-1 systems. This report 
is forwarded to all emergency communications 
managers daily. 

Image of Figure 15: APD Daily Performance Report 

Each month, this report is summarized. Managers 
discuss trends and problem areas. They 
implement changes, as needed. Based on 
these discussions, the Emergency Communication 
Manager prepares monthly reports 
for the Assistant Chief of Operations and the 
Chief. His report outlines key successes, areas 
of improvement and planned activities for the 
coming month. 

Maintaining this consistent reporting allows 
managers and executives to stay aware of 
changes in emergency communication requirements. 
The information about 9-1-1 calls helps 
managers forecast the potential impact of a 
3-1-1 system. 

The call tracking software for Austins 3-1-1 
system allows managers to track data by the 
source of the call; a direct 3-1-1 call, a 
Teleserve number call, a general number call or an 
internal transfer call. Managers disaggregate 
types of call data to estimate how many 3-1-1 
calls are being received above and beyond 
normal Teleserve and PBX call loads. 

As noted, this chapter on performance measures 
provides information about how APD 
uses the 3-1-1 system to measure performance. 
The chapter does not provide findings 
regarding the overall effectiveness of 3-1-1 
or describe whether calls to 9-1-1 increased 
or decreased over time. Those issues are 
addressed in the formal evaluation conducted 
by 21st Century Solutions, Inc. (2003). We 
offer the following examples only to demonstrate 
how Austin managers are using performance data 
from their tracking system to 
address internal reporting needs. 

For 3-1-1, the Emergency Communication Manager 
made performance presentations to the 
command staff of APD and the City Manager 
at major milestone dates. After the system had 
been in place for approximately a month, he 
reported on 3-1-1 activity. 

In this presentation, the Emergency Communication 
Manager stated that 3-1-1 resulted in a 
reduction of 16 percent of calls into the 9-1-1 
call center. Prior to 3-1-1, the 9-1-1 call center 
averaged 2,586 calls a day. 9-1-1 now handles 
an average of 2,179 calls a day. He presented 


charts showing call load for 9-1-1 and 3-1-1 by 
day. These charts clearly demonstrated how 
3-1-1 was reducing 9-1-1 call loads on a daily 
basis. 

He made follow-up presentations at the three-
month and six-month marks. In each time 
period, statistics demonstrated how 3-1-1 was 
achieving the first performance goal, reducing 
the 9-1-1 call loads. Even in light of the 
national tragedies of September 11, 2001, 
9-1-1 call loads appeared to have been reduced 
in Austin. 

To track customer satisfaction with 3-1-1, 
assistant managers employ two performance tools. 
First, an assistant manager listens to recordings 
(about 20 minutes) of a select number 
of calls each quarter. The assistant manager 
assesses how call takers handled callers and 
callers reactions and notes how customer 
service might be improved. The training coordinator 
also calls a random number of callers and 
conducts a customer satisfaction survey. 

When the system was first implemented, the 
Emergency Communication Manager also 
responded to any customer comments that 
were received by the Chiefs Office. 3-1-1 
received early press coverage because AT&T 
cellular customers could not reach 3-1-1 from 
their phones. Initially, AT& T had stated that the 
APD had not informed them about the need to 
offer the service. However, the APD was able 
to produce a copy of the certified letter with 
receipts to document its delivery, and thus 
deflected the negative press. Aside from that 
incident, 3-1-1 has received accolades in 
editorials in the press. 

Call Taker Performance. Management tracks 
the performance of call takers in real time 
during daily shifts. [Tracking systems performance 
is discussed in Chapter XIII: System 
Maintenance.] 

The software installed with the phone system 
allows management to monitor how long call 
takers are with callers, how long they spend 
completing follow-up reports, and how long they 
take for breaks. It also documents how many 
calls are taken per shift, per call taker, and the 
source of the calls received. The system stores 
this information for up to 5 years. Management 
listens to tapes of calls quarterly. 

The CRM system tracks resolutions by call type. 
Using this data, managers can quickly identify 
when incorrect information is being provided 
and who is disseminating that information. This 
allows them to contact the call taker(s) and 
advise them of the correct information quickly 
-- and discretely. 

Using these data, APD management developed 
benchmarks for performance plans, provided 
constructive criticism to improve call taker 
techniques, and identified solutions to recurrent 
problems faced by callers. As an example, 
management developed internet-based fact 
sheets to answer common caller questions and 
provided city contact phone and address lists. 

Management also uses individual performance 
data to commend call takers on their performance. 
Because of the precise accounting in 
the systems, call takers can distinguish themselves 
more easily. Not only can they demonstrate the 
quantity of calls they are handling, 
but the system documents the depth and quality 
of their services to Austin citizens. 

Summary. Access to real-time information in an 
information service center is critical. Austins 
3-1-1 center tracks how and what information is 
requested and disseminated. APD quickly demonstrated 
to their executives how 3-1-1 appears 
to aid in the delivery of services by their 
department using call volume statistics. Using the 
tracking software, managers encourage individual 
call takers to improve their performance in 
terms of the quantity of calls they are handling 
and the quality of services they are providing. 


Chapter XIII 
Lessons Learned 

INTRODUCTION

Austin implemented 3-1-1 to provide citizens with an alternative to 
calling 9-1-1. The Chief believed that citizens should have a way to 
seek assistance from APD about issues that were not emergencies. 
He wanted to encourage citizens to become eyes and ears for the 
Department. Citizen involvement is fundamental under the Chiefs 
philosophy of neighborhood-based policing. 3-1-1 is a method of 
encouraging and allowing for a broader range of citizens to become 
involved. 

APD staff responsible for Emergency Communications sought to 
ensure that citizens could reach 9-1-1. The growing call volumes 
overtaxed the 9-1-1 system in crisis situations. APD knew that 40-60 
percent of 9-1-1 calls were non-emergency calls. 3-1-1 provided a 
viable solution for removing these calls from the 9-1-1 queue.
 
The 3-1-1 team understood that 3-1-1 reinforced the overall depart-
ment philosophy. They also viewed it as a solution to a potential 
crisis with 9-1-1. Understanding where 3-1-1 fit into the big picture 
for this goal-oriented Department served as a powerful underlying 
motivator throughout the process of creating the service. Those 
responsible for developing the plan and securing funding framed 
issues around how 3-1-1 would positively affect public safety. Once 
implementation began, IT managers responsible for designing and 
for procuring the technology defined appropriate project scopes 
and functional needs using this framework. Managers led call 
takers to accept new job responsibilities by explaining how the call 
takers would be important contributors within APDs overall mission. 
Clearly placing 3-1-1 within the context of overall agency goals eased 
the implementation process at each stage. 

In this chapter, we discuss what lessons were learned at each stage 
of the implementation process. In some cases, APD anticipated 
what needed to be done; time proved them correct. In other cases, 
managers wished they had known how to resolve issues more easily. 
As external observers, we saw two overall key lessons emerge. One, 
as discussed above, is that 3-1-1 should be proposed within the 
context of wider agency goals. If the mission of the new service 
is clear, everyone at every level will have an easier time contributing 


to successful implementation throughout the process. Second, 
anointing a champion to reinforce this mission is critical. In Austin, 
the Emergency Communications Manager served as the project 
champion. While many people were involved, he was the point 
person responsible for making decisions, clarifying expectations and 
keeping 3-1-1 on the priority list of Department activities. 


SUMMARY OF LESSONS BY CHAPTER: 

Need. Before implementing 3-1-1, understand the needs of the community, 
the 9-1-1 call volume and the types of calls received at 9-1-1. If an excessive 
number of non-emergency calls are being received by 9-1-1, investigate the rea-
sons citizens are calling 9-1-1 rather than another number. 

Choosing the Model. Determine which 3-1-1 model -- the basic police model, the 
basic city model or the comprehensive model -- will meet the needs based on the 
desired outcome, political realities of the community and available resources. 

Partnerships. Look for partners at each step of the process and be flexible 
about what these partners can provide. Once partnerships are established, be 
clear about roles and expectations. Also ensure that everyone knows and under-
stands who makes the final decisions. 

Equipment/Technology: Call Routing and Call Tracking. Think through differ-
ent scenarios in the development phase. Observe call takers over an extended 
period and track the types of calls they receive. Develop a baseline of 9-1-1 calls 
prior to the implementation of 3-1-1. 

Equipment/Technology: Procurement Process. Partner with the purchasing 
department experts to determine what options are available for procurement. 
If there is an easy way to procure the technology, use it. Currently, the market-
place for 3-1-1 solutions is limited. Only a few companies are providing products 
focused on government needs. Finally, make sure that your 3-1-1 technical team 
includes a GIS expert at the design stages. 

Staffing. Realize that staff is half of the focal relationship between callers and 
the police department. It is critical that staff fully understand and accept the 3-
1-1 concept prior to implementation. Focus on morale issues and rumor control. 


SUMMARY OF LESSONS BY CHAPTER: continued

Training. Use the train-the-trainer model to build acceptance. Provide training, 
especially refresher training, at multiple points during the implementation pro-
cess. When conducting computer training, use live systems in a hands-on set-
ting. Hold vendors accountable for documentation. 

Logistics. Recognize the impacts of physical space on morale and on system 
operations. Ensure that you have the organizational clout to make announce-
ment of 3-1-1 an important event for the organization. 

Timeline. Establish and distribute a formal timeline. Be detailed about what 
tasks must be completed, who will be completing them, when they are due and 
what other tasks are dependent on their completion. Have a project manager 
focused on tracking progress according to the timeline. Maintain momentum 
with frequent meetings that require action, not just discussion. 

Public Education/Marketing. Recognize that changing public perceptions about 
9-1-1 is the key to success of a basic police model. When developing a public 
education strategy and budget, be creative and set your financial goals high. 
Rely on key stakeholders such as the Public Information Office to assist you with 
the effort. Take advantage of unexpected situations. 

System Maintenance. Plan for limited redundancy. 

System Performance. Track 3-1-1 performance daily. Use measures that pro-
vide in-depth information about what the system is accomplishing and how call 
takers are performing. 


Need. Before implementing 3-1-1, understand 
the community, the 9-1-1 call volume and the 
types of calls received at 9-1-1. If an excessive 
number of non-emergency calls are being 
received by 9-1-1, investigate the reasons 
citizens are calling 9-1-1 rather than another 
number. 

APD understood that they were serving a relatively 
sophisticated citizenry with high expectations 
for government and police services. 
Executives saw that the 9-1-1 call volume was 
growing faster than the population. They recognized 
that 40-60 percent of their 9-1-1 calls 
were non-emergency calls, many about civil 
matters. Citizens were calling 9-1-1 because 
they knew they could reach the police department 
and there was not a viable alternative. 
3-1-1 made sense under these conditions. 

Choosing the Model. Determine which 3-1-1 
model-- the basic police model, the basic city 
model or the comprehensive model-- will meet 
the needs based on the desired outcome, political 
realities of the community and available 
resources. 

APD used 3-1-1 in its most basic form to remove 
non-emergency police calls from 9-1-1. When 
calling 9-1-1, citizens were seeking police 
intervention. The basic police model ensured that 
3-1-1 callers would know they were contacting 
the police and would be discouraged them from 
reverting to 9-1-1 as the preferred police contact. 

Further, APD understood that developing a 
centralized city call center involved extensive 
coordination and management efforts. As one 
of the smallest call centers of the 22 operating 
in the city, the police department did not choose 
to assume leadership of this enterprise operation. 
Establishing the basic police model allowed 
them to pilot test implementation strategies 
and new call management technologies. It also 
allowed them to build a system within available 
financial and personal resources in a timely 
fashion. 

Partnerships. Look for partners at each step 
of the process and be flexible about what these 
partners can provide. Once partnerships are 
established, be clear about roles and expectations. 

APD partnered with other city organizations (the 
Information Systems Department, the Purchasing 
Division and the Public Information Office), 
private telephony and software vendors, 9-1-1 
regulators (CAPCO), community leaders (Greater 
Austin Crime Commission) and media during 
implementation. Each partner provided unique 
expertise vital to the successful implementation 
of 3-1-1. 

Because City officials anticipated building an 
enterprise-wide call center based on APDs 
3-1-1 experience, the Information Systems 
Department assumed a significant role in the 
development process. Early in the process, the 
Emergency Communication Manager worked 
with ISD executives to clarify who would make 
decisions about APDs 3-1-1 effort - APD. This 
early clarification was critical to keeping the 
project focused and the lines of communication 
clear. 

Equipment/Technology: Call Routing and Call 
Tracking. Think through different scenarios in 
the development phase. Observe call takers 
over an extended period and track the types 
of calls they receive. Develop a baseline of 
9-1-1 calls prior to the implementation of 3-1

1. These data will enable you to differentiate 
between the call load that would have been 
generated through the standard non-emergency 
number(s) and the part of the call load that is 
new to the operation. 

APD relied on the experience of management 
to define how calls would be received and how 
they would be routed and tracked. Initially, APD 
struggled with how to identify competitive local 
exchange carriers (CLEC) operating cellular 
services and pay phones. The first alternative 
would have denied citizens using these services 


access to 3-1-1. However, APD officials realized 
that allowing some citizens access while denying 
it to others would jeopardize the success 
of the effort. They redoubled their efforts and 
reached out to their partner, CAPCO, to assist in 
identifying these companies. 

ISD staff observed call takers in order to devise 
specifications for how to route and track calls. 
They watched what kinds of calls were received 
and how these calls were resolved. These 
observations served as the basis for the functional 
specifications of the telephony and call 
management software. 

Equipment/Technology: Procurement Process. 

Partner with purchasing department experts to 
determine what options are available for 
procurement. If there is an easy way to procure 
the technology, use it. Currently, the marketplace 
for 3-1-1 solutions is limited. Only a few 
companies are providing products focused on 
government needs. Finally, make sure that 
your 3-1-1 technical team includes a GIS expert 
during the design stage. 

APD avoided months of difficult procurement 
tasks by building a partnership with the experts 
in Austins Purchasing Department. They 
learned of a special umbrella rule allowing 
direct procurement of products and services 
that improve the public safety. This rule allowed 
them to avoid the request-for-proposal process 
and to jump-start technology procurement. 
They also used modifications of existing contracts 
wherever possible. 

ISD staff involved with the project spent extensive 
time attempting to identify vendors for 
3-1-1 solutions. What they learned is that few 
exist, especially with proven solutions for public 
agencies. 

One lesson that APD learned the hard way 
is the importance of involving a GIS expert 
throughout the 3-1-1 implementation process. 
Address data are key components when linking 
3-1-1 data to other enterprise data systems 
such as CAD and reporting systems. GIS technology 
is a complex and specialized field. APD 
did not involve GIS staff until the construction 
phase. During this hectic time, they learned 
that the specifications and formats of APDs GIS 
data did not meet CRM or SWB system specifications. 
It took extensive communication, data 
reformating and time to address this issue. In 
the end, APD was not able to fully incorporate 
the GIS address data into the CRM system. This 
has limited the usefulness of the CRM software. 

Staffing. Realize that staff is half of the focal 
relationship between callers and the police 
department. It is critical that staff fully 
understand and accept the 3-1-1 concept prior to 
implementation. Focus on morale issues and 
rumor control. Resolving these issues requires 
that you address root problems first, such as 
staffing shortages and pay issues. 

When implementing a new system, weigh the 
benefits of refocusing existing staff against 
those of hiring new staff. Change presents 
serious challenges that may outweigh any potential 
savings in training costs. In either case, 
empower and trust your employees to solve 
problems. 

APD understood that the success of 3-1-1 
depended on changing citizens use of 9-1-1. To 
be encourages to use 3-1-1, callers needed to 
have positive experiences with 3-1-1 call takers. 
Beyond the technological tools, call takers 
needed knowledge and customer service skills 
to address caller needs in an effective and 
efficient manner. 

To implement 3-1-1 with existing Teleserve and 
PBX staff, APD managers had to redefine the 
call taker position, address intra-unit communication 
and morale issues, and realign expectations. All 
tasks required excellent change 
management skills. Managers created a single 
call taker performance plan, developed a career 
track for call takers and addressed rumors 


proactively. Executives met with command staff 
and divisions relying on Teleserve staff to realign 
expectations and build support for the new 3-1-1 
operation. 

Training. Use the train-the-trainer model to 
build acceptance. Provide training, especially 
refresher training, at multiple points during the 
implementation process. When conducting computer 
training, use live systems in a hands-on 
setting. Hold vendors accountable for 
documentation. 

APD started training on the new 3-1-1 system 
three months prior to the kick-off date with 
vendor train-the-trainer sessions. Using this 
method allowed them to expose recognized leaders 
to the concepts and to learn about potential 
concerns of staff. Leaders built excitement and 
positive feedback about the new tools within 
their respective shifts. One lesson learned for 
the leaders during these sessions is that it is 
important for managers to provide as much 
information as possible about the new system, as 
soon as possible. Resistance to 3-1-1 developed 
from a lack of understanding of the vision and of 
the changes that were planned. 

Participants learned the new software in a 
hands-on environment. They were able to see 
how the system reacted under different scenarios. 
APD also allowed enough time for their staff 
to learn the new tools at their own paces. This 
eased fears and tensions about the new job. 

With respect to vendors, ISD staff made sure 
that vendors provided the necessary technology 
documentation to support and maintain the 
hardware and software. Initially, Motorola did 
not have this documentation available. 

Logistics. Recognize the impacts of physical 
space on morale and on system operations. 
Ensure that you have the organizational clout to 
make the announcement of 3-1-1 an important 
event for the organization. 

Physical space at APD headquarters was limited. 
Emergency Communication units were spread 
throughout the building. The space provided was 
not ideal for a call center. These physical space 
constraints affected the call takers morale and 
communication. Managers recognized these 
issues and took steps to address them. They 
also demonstrated that the situation would 
improve by posting pictures of the construction 
of the new communication center. 

Within the organization, the Emergency Communication 
Manager promoted the activities of the 
Emergency Communication staff. He ensured 
that executives were aware of staff contributions 
to the operation of the Department. The kick-off 
of 3-1-1 was no exception. His marketing team 
coordinated a media event involving the Mayor, 
City Manager and Chief. When the cameras 
appeared in the call center, call takers proudly 
showed off their new tools and were recognized 
for their contributions to the Police Department. 

Timeline. Establish and distribute a formal 
timeline. Be detailed about what tasks must be 
completed, who will be completing them, when 
they are due and what other tasks are dependent 
on their completion. Have a project manager 
focused on tracking progress according to 
the timeline. Maintain momentum with frequent 
meetings that require action, not just discussion. 

The ISD Project Manager created a multi-page 
timeline. Working with the Emergency Communication 
Manager, she built in sufficient time 
to allow for inevitable problems. This timeline 
detailed each phase of implementation, including 
the training and marketing phases. Under 
her direction, the team relentlessly tracked, 
reported and most importantly, completed tasks 
as documented in the timeline during weekly 
meetings. 

The marketing and training team leaders developed 
timelines, but not to the same level of 
specificity. They also held frequent team meetings. 
Although they accomplished all of their 
goals, at some meetings, focus seemed to drift 


and frustration developed. A more specific 
task timeline might have avoided these issues. 

Overall, all involved in the APD 3-1-1 effort felt 
that their timeline worked splendidly. The project 
was completed on schedule. 

Public Education/Marketing. Recognize that 
changing public perceptions about 9-1-1 is the 
key to success of a basic police model. When 
developing a public education strategy and 
budget, be creative and set your financial goals 
high. Rely on key stakeholders such as the 
Public Information Office to assist you with the 
effort. Take advantage of unexpected situations. 

APD managers asserted that the success of 
3-1-1 depended on public re-education about 
9-1-1. Public education was perhaps the most 
critical aspect of this effort. 

APD sought the assistance of community leaders 
with this important aspect. APD leveraged 
the clout of community leaders involved with 
the Greater Austin Crime Commission to gain 
media and corporate support. GACC leaders 
also enlisted the support of a well-known 
graphics firm to brand Austins 3-1-1 effort. APD 
relied on the communication experts in the 
Public Information office to access the 
marketing outlets with the greatest potential 
for citizen contact. 

Brainstorming from the perspective of the various 
team members played a significant role 
in the planning for marketing and fundraising. 
One area that proved very difficult was identifying 
sufficient personnel to actually contact corporations 
and businesses for financial support. 
GACC members found that securing corporate 
donations was a labor-intensive undertaking. 
The unexpected events of September 11 
changed the landscape for the 3-1-1 marketing 
effort. APD and GACC officials quickly adjusted 
their materials and proceeded according to 
plan. They were able to use these unfortunate 
circumstances to demonstrate the value of 
3-1-1 to the communitys public safety needs. 
The media quickly accepted and promoted this 
message. 

System Maintenance. Plan for limited redundancy. 
In general, the 3-1-1 operation is relatively 
stable. However, hardware and software 
glitches do occur. Work with technical staff to 
develop acceptable levels of downtime. 

In addition, some staff turnover should be 
anticipated. APD developed a cross-training method 
for incorporating new staff in a positive manner. 

System performance. Track 3-1-1 performance 
daily. Use measures that provide in-depth information 
about what the system is accomplishing 
and how call takers are performing. 

APD tracks 3-1-1 calls and call resolution daily. 
Using this information, they provided success 
stories with data within the first two months 
of operation. Frequent reports allowed the 
Department to maintain interest in and attention 
on 3-1-1. 

Detailed performance data allowed managers to 
work with call takers to improve their 
performance. Managers were able to identify 
potential areas of concern and to discuss them 
with the call takers before significant problems 
could occur. Most importantly, performance 
measures allowed call takers to demonstrate 
their achievements. Feedback on performance 
measures served as a motivator for positive job 
performance. 


Endnotes 
Sources 

1 
Austin City Source: Austin, Texas Basic Facts. Available on the web at 
www.ci.austin.tx.us/citymgr/basicfac.htm 

2 
Ibid. 

3 
Ibid. 

4 
Ibid. 

5 
FY 2001-02 City of Austin Budget, Police Department Section. Available on 
the web at www.ci.austin.tx.us/budget/01-02/downloads/pb02_police.pdf 

6 
Ibid. 

7 
Ibid. 

8 
Ibid. 

9 
Ibid. 

10 
Craig D. Uchida, Shellie E. Solomon and Edward R. Maguire. Neighbor-
hood-Based Policing, Austin Style, An Assessment. Washington, DC: 21st 
Century Solutions, Inc., September 2000 

11 
Ibid. 

12 
APDs call prioritization and dispatch policies did not change as a result of 
the new 3-1-1 system. 

13 
FY 2001-02 City of Austin Budget, Police Department Section. See note 5. 

14 
COPS MORE is a program funded by the U.S. Department of Justice, Office 
of Community Oriented Policing Services. Since 1995, COPS MORE has 
provided funding to law enforcement agencies for technology, civilians, and 
overtime in an effort to redeploy officers and deputies into community 
policing activities. 

15 Rana Sampson, Misuse and Abuse of 911, Problem-Oriented Guide 
Police Series, U.S. Department of Justice, COPS Office, 2002. 


Endnotes 
Sources 

16 
While this city-wide route has been the method of other 3-1-1 efforts, 
the Chief has identified specific reasons for maintaining 3-1-1 as a police 
non-emergency number and for not taking on the responsibilities to be the 
headquarters for Austins single number. These issues will be discussed 
in the next chapter about choosing the 3-1-1 model. 

17 
Emulation software allows communication with a mainframe application 
by a personal computer. 

18 
While the COPS Office understands APDs rationale for making a sole 
source procurement of the 3-1-1 hardware and software, they encour-
age other jurisdictions to follow the standard competitive RFP process as 
outlined in The Law Enforcement Tech Guide: How to plan, purchase and 
manage technology SEARCH Group, COPS Office. 2002. See Part IV: 
Acquiring the Technology for specific steps. 

19 
Texas State privacy laws prohibit forwarding of address information for 
non-emergency uses. 


Glossary of Terms
Abbreviations 
Listed Alphabetically 
 
3-1-1 Phone number reserved with the Federal Communications 
Commission for non-emergency calls 

9-1-1 Phone number reserved with the Federal Communications 
Commission for emergency calls. 

ALI Automatic Location Identification. When a person makes 
a 911 call using a traditional phone with ground wires, 
the call is routed to the nearest public safety answering 
point (PSAP) that then distributes the emergency call 
to the proper services. The PSAP receives the callers 
phone number and the exact location of the phone from 
which the call was made. 

ANI Automatic Number Identification. A telephone network 
feature that passes the number of the phone the caller is 
using to the call center in real-time. 

APD Austin Police Department 

Automatic Vehicle Locator (AVL) 
An automatic vehicle locator is a device that makes use 
of the Global Positioning System to enable a business 
or agency to remotely track the location of its vehicle 
fleet by using the Internet. These devices combine 
GPS technology, cellular communications, street-level 
mapping, and an intuitive user interface. AVL systems 
generally include a network of vehicles that are equipped 
with a mobile radio receiver, a GPS receiver, a GPS 
modem and a GPS antenna. This network connects with 
a base radio consisting of a computer station as well as 
a GPS receiver and interface. GPS uses interactive maps 
rather than static map images on the Web. This means 
users can perform conventional GPS functions such as 
zoom, pan, identify and queries. 

AVAYA Telephony vendor selected by Austin to support the 3-1-1 
system. 

blue pages The section of the phone book dedicated to listing 
government phone and location information. 

CAD Computer Aided Dispatch. A CAD system allows emergency 
operations and communications to be augmented, 
assisted, or partially controlled by an automated system. 
It can include, among other capabilities, computer 
controlled emergency vehicle dispatching, vehicle status, 
incident reporting and management information. 

call center An umbrella term that refers to reservations centers, 
help desks, information lines or customer service 
centers, regardless of how they are organized or what 
types of transactions they handle. 


Glossary of Terms
Abbreviations 
Listed Alphabetically 

call taker A person who handles incoming or outgoing calls. Within 
emergency call centers, this person is a trained civilian 
or officer responsible for handling emergency and non-
emergency situations. 

call volume Number of calls received in a given time period. 
calls abandoned 
Number of calls where the caller hangs up before 
reaching a call taker. 

calls answered Number of calls received and handled by call takers or 
peripheral equipment. Answered calls do not include 
calls that are abandoned or receive busy signals. 

calls offered All of the attempts callers make to reach the call center. 
There are three possibilities for offered calls: 1) they can 
get busy signals, 2) they can be answered by the system, 
but hang up before reaching a call taker, 3) they can be 
answered by a rep. 

calls received Number of calls detected and seized by a trunk or private 
business exchange. Received calls are either abandoned 
or answered by a call taker or peripheral equipment such 
as an answering machine. 

CAPCO Capital Area Planning Council. A regional planning 
council organized in 1970 to serve local governments in 
its 10-county region in and around Austin. The primary 
focus of CAPCO is to serve as advocate, planner and 
coordinator of initiatives that, when undertaken on 
a regional basis, can be more effective and efficient. 
These include emergency services, elderly assistance, 
law enforcement training, criminal justice planning, 
solid waste reduction, infrastructure development, and 
housing and economic development. 

Central Office Can refer to either a telephone company switching center 
or the type of telephone switch used in a telephone 
company switching center. The local central office 
receives calls from within the local area and either 
routes them locally or passes them to an inter-exchange 
carrier (IXC). On the receiving end, the local central office 
receives calls that originate in other areas, from the IXC. 

CIO Chief Information Officer 

CLEC Competitive Local Exchange Carriers. Telephone 
companies responsible for providing local connections 
and services in addition to the primary local exchange 
carrier. 

COA City of Austin 


Glossary of Terms
Abbreviations 
Listed Alphabetically 

COPS MORE Grant program of the U.S. Department of Justice, 
Office of Community Oriented Policing Services entitled 
Making Officer Redeployment Effective. Since 1995, 
COPS MORE has provided funding to law enforcement 
agencies for technology, civilians and overtime in an 
effort to redeploy officers and deputies into community 
policing activities. 

COPS Office Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, U.S. 
Department of Justice 

CRM Customer Relations Management software. Computer 
software packages are created by a number of vendors 
using database tools and business rules to manage 
customer information. 

DEORS Austin Police Department Records Management System 
dispatcher A trained civilian responsible for distributing calls for 
service to officers in a designated sector of a community. 

District Representatives (DR) 
Sworn Austin Police Officers whose primary job 
responsibilities are to serve as liaisons between 
patrol officers and neighborhood members. District 
Representatives engage in extensive problem-solving 
activities and are relieved of handling calls for service. 

DPS Texas Department of Public Safety 
emergency call A call received where there is a threat to life or injury to a 
person. 

EMS Emergency Medical Services 

emulation software 
Software that allows communication with a mainframe 
application by a personal computer. 

GACC Greater Austin Crime Commission. Organization formed 
in Austin in 1997 to support law enforcement, raise 
public awareness about crime prevention programs and 
promote a cooperative and coordinated anti-crime effort 
in the community. 

gb Gigabyte. One billion data bits on a computer. 

GIS Geographic Information System. Computer software that 
allow users to visualize, explore, query and analyze data 
geographically. 

ISD Information Systems Department. 

MDT Mobile Data Terminal. Ruggedized wireless computing 
devices to send and receive information over a wireless 
data network. 


Glossary of Terms
Abbreviations 
Listed Alphabetically 

MHz Megahertz. One million cycles per second, used 
especially as a radio-frequency unit. 

Motorola Customer Relations Management software vendor 
selected by Austin. 

network ready A personal computer that includes a component which, 
when connected, allows the computer to access a 
network made up of circuits and computers for the 
exclusive use of an organization or group of affiliated 
organizations. 

non-emergency call 
A call received by police which involves no threat to life or 
injury to a person and there is no retrievable evidence. 

observing capabilities 
A phone system that allows supervisors to hear and track 
phone conversations in real time. 

ODBC Open database connectivity. An open standard 
application programming interface (API) for accessing 
a database. By using ODBC statements in a program, 
users can access files in a number of different 
databases, including Access, dBase, Excel, and Text. 

PBX Private Branch Exchange. An in-house telephone 
switching system that interconnects telephone 
extensions, as well as to the outside telephone network. 

PIO Public Information Office 

RMS Record Management System. RMS is an agency-wide 
system that considers the reasons, the processes 
and the means necessary for a document to exist and 
be used. RMS must cover the entire life span of the 
document, from its generation to its destruction. It 
provides for the effective storage, retrieval, retention, 
manipulation, archiving and viewing of information, 
records, documents or files that are related to a single 
subject. Records related to law enforcement issues 
could include crime reports, law enforcement personnel 
records, criminal records, and crime analysis. 

rule of 9s The system should operate 99.99999 percent of the 
time not 99.99999999999999 of the time. This rule 
allows for technicians to establish the level of certainty 
regarding impacts of system failures. In this situation, a 
rare system failure is allowable without creating a public 
safety emergency. 

softphones A phone that allows users to easily make and receive 
calls by using a simple graphical user interface on a PC 
or laptop computer screen. 

Southwestern Bell 
Local Exchange Carrier in the Austin Area 
Abbreviations 

Glossary of Terms
Abbreviations 
Listed Alphabetically 

Street Response Officers 
Sworn Austin Police Officers whose primary job 
responsibilities are to conduct proactive intervention, 
intelligence and interdiction operations. Street Response 
Unit officers engage in extensive problem-solving 
activities and are relived of handling calls for service. 

T-1 Switch A T1 switch is a telephone line which is a 1.544 
megabit T-carrier channel. A T-carrier channel is a digital 
transmission service from a common carrier. Data can 
be transmitted rapidly using a T-carrier such as a T-1 
because a T-carrier service has multiplexors (a device 
that merges several low-speed transmissions into one 
high-speed transmission and vice versa) at both ends 
that merge the various signals together for transmission 
and then splits them at the destination. A T1 can handle 
24 voice or data channels at 64 Kbits/sec. 8,000 frames 
are transmitted per second. 

telephony The technology and manufacture of telephone 
equipment. 

teleserve Call center that is established within police departments 
where trained civilians take police reports over the 
phone from citizens for non-emergency police-related 
situations and police officers are not dispatched to the 
scene, in general. 

Texas Commission on State Emergency Communications 
The appointed regulatory board responsible for 
overseeing emergency communication operations 
in the State of Texas. The Commission helps cities 
implement and maintain enhanced 9-1-1 emergency 
communications. 

touchscreen monitors 
Computer monitors that cause system operations via 
electric charges or signals when system call takers touch 
the screen with a finger or pointed object. 


Glossary of Terms
Abbreviations 
Listed Alphabetically

trunked voice radio system 
A trunked radio system automatically selects from a 
pool of available channels when a radio user presses 
the push-to-talk button on a mobile or portable unit. 
As soon as one transmission ends, the system can 
use the channel for another. Trunking permits a large 
number of users to share a relatively small number 
of communication paths - or trunks. This sharing of 
communication paths is managed automatically by 
a computer. Channel selections and other decisions 
normally made by the radio user are made by the central 
controller, a computerized switch. Channel assignment is 
automatic and completely transparent to the individual 
users. 

voice recording station 
Multiple channel automatic audio recording software. 
Typical applications include telephone line recording (call 
recording), radio communication recording, control room 
voice recording and remote conferencing. 
 

About the Authors 
Biographies 

Shellie E. Solomon is the former senior financial manager with the Census 
Bureau, and senior manager at the Justice Department. Ms. Solomon has 
over 12 years experience in operations and management, budgets, strategic 
planning, criminal justice evaluation, and technology. She oversaw budget 
operations for Census 2000 and managed the annual budget of $1.3 billion 
for the COPS Office Grants Division for four years. 

With 21st Century Solutions Inc,, Ms. Solomon has served as the on-site 
project director for the community policing evaluations in Fort Lauderdale, 
FL and Miami, FL as well as for the school-based evaluation in Miami, FL 
She serves as the research associate for the 3-1-1 evaluation in Austin, 
TX, iris scanning as emerging school technology evaluation in New Egypt, 
NJ, the lethality review in Colorado Spring, CO and National Assessment 
of School Based Partnership Program. She is working with U.S. Attorneys 
offices on gun tracking and safe zone implementation. She has assisted with 
projects involving performance measurement, resource allocation, system 
implementation, and internet applications. 

Ms. Solomon holds degrees from the University of Oklahoma and Rochester 
University and is the recipient of the JustWorks award from the U.S. 
Department of Justice for innovation in government. 

Craig D Uchida is a former senior executive at the U.S. Department of 
Justice and professor of criminology at the University of Maryland. He has 
over 23 years of experience in criminal justice research, planning, and 
administration. During his years at the Justice Department he served as 
the Director of Criminal Justice Research at the National Institute of Justice 
(NIJ) and as the Assistant Director of Grants Administration at the Office of 
Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS Office). He was responsible 
for developing and implementing the grant making process, making grant 
awards, and monitoring. When he left the COPS Office he had provided 
$3.4 billion to over 9,000 law enforcement agencies for hiring over 65,000 
officers. His efforts at the COPS Office resulted in two major U.S. Department 
of Justice Awards  the Attorney Generals Distinguished Service Award in 
1995 and the JustWorks Award for innovation in government in 1997. He 
has published numerous articles and book chapters in criminology and is the 
editor of two books on drug enforcement and police innovation. 

Dr. Uchida holds a doctorate in criminal justice and two Masters degrees. He 
is currently President of Justice and Security Strategies, Inc., a consulting firm 
specializing in crime and public policy and homeland securities policies and 
an adjunct professor at George Mason Universitys Administration of Justice 
Program.