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January 2003:

MAJOR MANAGEMENT CHALLENGES AND PROGRAM RISKS:

Department of Justice:

GAO-03-105:

Agency at a Glance:

The Department of Justices mission includes:

* enforcing the law and defending U.S. interests according to the law,

* providing federal leadership in preventing and controlling crime,

* seeking just punishment for those guilty of unlawful behavior,

* ensuring fair and impartial administration of justice for all 

Americans, and;

* administering and enforcing the nations immigration laws fairly and 

effectively. [These immigration functions are transferring to the 

new Department of Homeland Security]:

Figure: The Department of Justices Budgetary and Staff Resources:

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

This Series:

This report is part of a special GAO series, first issued in 1999 

and updated in 2001, entitled the Performance and Accountability 

Series: Major Management Challenges and Program Risks. The 2003 

Performance and Accountability Series contains separate reports 

covering each cabinet department, most major independent agencies, 

and the U.S. Postal Service. The series also includes a 

governmentwide perspective on transforming the way the government does

business in order to meet 21st century challenges and address long-term 

fiscal needs. The companion 2003 High-Risk Series: An Update identifies 

areas at high risk due to either their greater vulnerabilities to 
waste, 

fraud, abuse, and mismanagement or major challenges associated with 
their 

economy, efficiency, or effectiveness. A list of all of the reports in 

this series is included at the end of this report.

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-03-105, a report to Congress included as part of 
GAOs 

Performance and Accountability Series:

January 2003: 

Performance and Accountability Series: 

Department of Justice: 

Why GAO Did This Report:

In its 2001 performance and accountability report on the Department 

of Justice, GAO identified five major management challenges. Justice 

has since made progress on (1) developing measurable performance 
targets 

in reducing illegal drugs and (2) improving management of its asset 

forfeiture program. However, three challenges remain and a fourth

managing the FBIs transformationwas added. GAO prepared this report 

to bring these major challenges to the attention of the Congress and 

Justice. This is part of a special series of reports on governmentwide 

and agency-specific issues.

What GAO Found: 

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, changed the nation 

forever and drew the countrys attention to the mission of the 

Department of Justice (Justice). In fulfilling its mission, Justice 

and its components confront several performance and accountability 

challenges in 2003. Congress recently passed legislation calling for 

the new Department of Homeland Security to absorb certain functions 

currently performed by Justicesuch as some information analysis and 

infrastructure protection capabilities and immigration enforcement 

and services. Regardless of which agency has responsibility for such 

functions, management challenges will persist.

 

* Transform the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI): After September 

11, 2001, the FBI began transforming its culture to be more proactive 

and preventive in responding to terrorism. The FBI faces several 

challenges in reorganizing, including realigning staff to address 

terrorism, building analytic capabilities, improving information 

sharing and information technology, recruiting employees with 

specialized skills, and managing the ripple effect of reorganization 

on the law enforcement community. Although the Department of Homeland 

Security will absorb some of the FBIs information analysis and 

infrastructure protection capabilities, the FBI still faces 

challenges that will require considerable attention.

* Enforce Immigration Laws and Provide Immigration Services: In 

carrying out its enforcement and service functions, the Immigration 

and Naturalization Service (INS) faces many challenges, including 

unfocused or ineffective efforts at combating benefit fraud, 

unauthorized employment, and alien smuggling; and problems with 

workload and information technology management. Although the INS 

will be transferred to the new Department of Homeland Security, 

these organizational, management, and programmatic challenges will 

remain.

* Support State and Local Efforts to Reduce Crime: While the Office 

of Justice Programs has taken steps to achieve more effective grant 

management procedures and systems, it has not resolved long-standing 

problems with monitoring grant programs, including data collection 

and sufficiently rigorous impact evaluation studies.

* Achieve Financial Accountability: Although Justice achieved an 

unqualified audit opinion on its fiscal year 2001 financial 

statements, material weaknesses remain in general and application 

controls over financial management systems, recording financial 

transactions, and preparing financial statements.

What Remains to Be Done: 

GAO believes Justice should;

* manage the FBIs transformation,

* improve enforcement of immigration laws and the provision of 

immigration services,

* better manage programs that support state and local crime reduction 

efforts, and;

* achieve financial accountability for fiscal year 2002 and beyond.

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-105.

To view the full report, click on the link above.

For more information, contact Norman J. Rabkin at 202-512-9110 or 

rabkinn@gao.gov:

Contents:

Transmittal Letter:

Major Performance and Accountability Challenges:

GAO Contacts:

Related GAO Products:

Performance and Accountability Series:

This is a work of the U.S. Government and is not subject to copyright

protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed 

in its entirety without further permission from GAO. It may contain 

copyrighted graphics, images or other materials. Permission from the 

copyrighted materials separately from GAOs product.

Transmittal Letter:

January 2003:

The President of the Senate:

The Speaker of the House of Representatives:

This report addresses the major management challenges and program risks 

facing the U.S. Department of Justice (Justice) as it works to carry 

out its multiple and highly diverse missions. The report discusses the 

actions that Justice has taken and that are under way to address the 

challenges GAO identified in its Performance and Accountability Series 

2 years ago, and major events that have occurred which significantly 

influence the environment in which the department carries out its 

mission. Also, GAO summarizes the challenges that remain, new ones that 

have emerged, and further actions that GAO believes are needed.

This analysis should help the new Congress and the administration carry 

out their responsibility and improve government for the benefit of the 

American people. For additional information about this report, please 

contact Norman J. Rabkin, Managing Director, at (202) 512-9110 or at 

rabkinn@gao.gov.

David M. Walker:

Comptroller General of the United States:

Signed by David M. Walker:

Major Performance and Accountability Challenges:

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, changed the nation forever 

and drew the countrys attention to the mission of the Department of 

Justice (Justice). According to its mission statement, Justice enforces 

the law and defends U.S. interests according to the law, leads the 

federal effort to prevent and control crime, seeks punishment for the 

guilty, and ensures fair and impartial administration of justice for 

all Americans. With budgetary resources for fiscal year 2002 at an 

estimated $36 billion and staff resources at 136,000, Justices 

responsibilities are divided among a number of components, including 

the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Immigration and 

Naturalization Service (INS), Office of Justice Programs (OJP), Drug 

Enforcement Administration (DEA), and U.S. Marshals Service (USMS). In 

helping Justice meet its overall mission, these components confront 

several major performance and accountability challenges.

In our last report of January 2001, we identified five major 

performance and accountability challenges for Justice and its 

components. These included (1) improving the enforcement of immigration 

laws and the provision of immigration and naturalization services, (2) 

better managing programs designed to support state and local efforts to 

reduce crime, (3) developing measurable performance targets to help the 

DEA determine its progress in reducing the availability of illegal 

drugs, (4) achieving excellence in financial management, and (5) 

improving the management and accountability of Justices asset 

forfeiture program. We noted the specific steps Justice had taken to 

address the challenges, while pointing out areas in which Justice had 

not made enough progress.

Since Justice has made significant progress and commitment in 

addressing two of the five challenges addressed in our last report, we 

have removed these from consideration in this report. For the challenge 

of developing measurable performance targets in reducing illegal drugs, 

the DEA has developed management plans to help measure program 

effectiveness and provide organizational accountability for priority 

performance targets; established performance targets for disrupting and 

dismantling international and domestic drug trafficking organizations; 

and developed an automated system to capture, verify, and validate data 

on all priority projects. In June 2002, the Justice Office of the 

Inspector General initiated a review to determine whether the DEA has 

developed strategic goals and objectives; established performance 

measures to evaluate achievement of its goals and objectives; and 

established a data collection, analysis, and reporting system for its 

performance measures. The other challenge we dropped from this report 

is improving management of Justices asset forfeiture program. We 

believe Justice has made good faith efforts to respond to our concern 

that it reduce its programs administrative costs by taking advantage 

of opportunities for cooperation and for sharing agency and contractor 

resources with the Department of the Treasurys asset forfeiture 

program.[Footnote 1]

Three challenges, however, continue to confront Justice--enforcing 

immigration laws while providing immigration services, managing 

programs that support state and local efforts to reduce crime, and 

achieving excellence in financial management. Furthermore, given the 

increased emphasis on homeland security, we have added one new 

challenge to Justices list--managing the transformation of the FBI. 

Addressing these four challenges will require sustained managerial 

attention and commitment, as well as oversight and evaluations from 

independent organizations.

On November 22, 2002, Congress passed legislation calling for the newly 

established Department of Homeland Security to absorb certain functions 

currently performed by Justice.[Footnote 2] For example, part of the 

FBIs National Infrastructure Protection Center and all of the INS will 

be transferred to the new department. Regardless of which agency has 

responsibility for such functions, these organizational, management, 

and programmatic challenges will remain.

Figure: Performance and Accountability Challenges: 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Manage the FBIs Transformation:

In December 2001 and May 2002, the Director of the FBI unveiled the 

first two phases of a plan to reorganize the Bureau. The first phase is 

designed to strengthen the FBIs management structure, enhance 

accountability, reduce executive span of control, and establish two new 

divisions for Records Management and Security. The second phase is 

designed to build an FBI with a national terrorism response capability 

that is larger and more mobile, agile, and flexible by shifting some 

resources from long-standing areas of focus, such as drugs, to 

counterterrorism and intelligence; building analytic capacity; and 

recruiting to address selected skill gaps. In light of the events of 

September 11, 2001, this shift is clearly not unexpected and is, in 

fact, consistent with the FBIs 1998 Strategic Plan as well as the 

current Department of Justice Strategic Plan, and is intended to move 

the FBI to be more proactive and preventive in fighting terrorism 

rather than reactive and investigative.

We discussed the FBIs proposed reorganization and realignment efforts 

and the challenges yet to be faced in a June 2002 testimony.[Footnote 

3] Our fundamental message was that any changes at the FBI must be part 

of, and consistent with, broader governmentwide transformations that 

are taking place. This is especially true as the establishment of a 

Department of Homeland Security is put into place. Some steps are 

critical and time sensitive. As a result, the FBI needs to develop a 

comprehensive transformation plan with key milestones and assessment 

points to guide its overall transformation efforts.

To effectively meet the challenges of the post-September 11 

environment, the FBI should consider employing the major elements of 

successful transformation efforts used by leading organizations here 

and abroad. These begin with gaining the commitment of the agency head 

and all in senior level leadership. It requires a redefinition and 

communication of priorities and values; a performance management system 

that will reinforce agency priorities; and a fundamental reassessment 

of the organizational layers, levels, units, and locations. Any 

realignment must support the agencys strategic plan and desired 

transformation. Organizations that have successfully undertaken 

transformation efforts also typically use best practices for strategic 

planning; strategic human capital management; senior leadership and 

accountability; realignment of activities, processes, and resources; 

and internal and external collaboration among others.[Footnote 4]

Realign Staff to Address Terrorism:

The reorganization plan redirects about 5 percent of FBIs fiscal year 

2002 agent workforce from drug, white-collar, and violent crime 

investigations to ensure that all available energies and resources are 

focused on the highest priority threat to the nation, i.e. terrorism. 

Careful monitoring will be needed to ensure that the agents working in 

counterterrorism can be appropriately used and to what extent 

additional resources will be needed.

Specifically, the FBI intends to shift a total of 518 agents from drug 

(400), white-collar crime (59), and violent crime (59) investigations 

to work on counterterrorism, security improvements, and training. This 

shift represents about 30 percent of the staff currently assigned to 

drug enforcement moving to counterterrorism, while for white-collar and 

violent crime the shift is not as substantial, representing about 2.5 

percent and 3 percent of their staff years, respectively. 

Counterterrorism resources go from about 15 percent of total agent 

resources to just under 20 percent. The plan also calls for building up 

the FBI headquarters Counterterrorism Division through the transfer of 

150 counterterrorism agents from field locations to Washington, D.C. 

These 150 positions would then be backfilled in the field through 

recruitment of new agents.

Other staff realignment issues include (1) reconsideration of the 56 

office structure in the field; (2) whether more de-layering of 

management is needed to optimize the functioning of the organization; 

and (3) significant succession planning issues--about 25 percent of the 

special agent workforce is eligible for retirement through 2005 and 80 

percent of the Senior Executive Corps was eligible to retire in 2001.

Build Analytic and Information-Sharing Capabilities:

The FBIs 1998 strategic plan identified shortcomings in its analytical 

capabilities. For example, many analysts lacked academic or other 

experience in the subject matter for which they were responsible and 

most had little or no training in intelligence analysis. To build the 

capacity to prevent future terrorist attacks, the FBI plans to expand 

its Office of Intelligence, which was created in December 2001. The 

Office will focus on improving the FBIs capacity to gather, analyze, 

and share critical national security information. In addition, the FBI 

plans to support the new Office by training analysts on the latest 

tools and techniques for both strategic and tactical analysis.

The FBI Director also indicated that he has taken and will take 

additional steps to enhance communication with the Central Intelligence 

Agency (CIA) and other outside organizations. Although there are 

certain legal restrictions in sharing information in a law enforcement 

setting, the recently passed USA PATRIOT Act, Public Law 107-56, 

contains a number of provisions that authorize information sharing and 

coordination of efforts relating to foreign intelligence 

investigations. For example, section 905 of the PATRIOT Act requires 

the Attorney General to disclose to the CIA Director foreign 

intelligence information acquired by Justice in the course of a 

criminal investigation, subject to certain exceptions. Internally, the 

plan includes new provisions that provide more authority to FBI field 

offices to initiate and continue investigations.

Comprehensive Written Policy Needed for National Infrastructure 

Protection Center:

The National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC) at the FBI is the 

national focal point for providing comprehensive analyses on threats, 

vulnerabilities and attacks; issuing timely warnings on threats and 

attacks; and coordinating the federal governments response to 

computer-based incidents. In April 2001[Footnote 5] we reported that 

the development of NIPCs analysis and warning capabilities were 

limited by multiple factors, including the lack of a comprehensive 

governmentwide or national framework for promptly obtaining and 

analyzing information on imminent attacks, a shortage of skilled staff, 

the need to ensure that NIPC does not raise undue alarm for 

insignificant incidents, and the need to ensure that sensitive 

information is protected. We recommended that NIPC develop a 

comprehensive written policy for establishing analysis and warning 

capabilities. Although the Director of NIPC generally agreed with our 

findings, we are not aware of any actions taken to address this 

recommendation. In addition, the 2002 Homeland Security Act transfers 

the NIPC (except for its Computer Investigations and Operations 

Section) out of the FBI and into the Department of Homeland Security.

Recruitment may Be More Difficult Due to Increased Competition for 

Specialized Skills:

The FBIs planned recruitment of additional agents, analysts, 

translators, and others with certain specialized skills and backgrounds 

may become more difficult because other law enforcement and commercial 

entities may be competing for the same qualified candidates 

(particularly those with specialized technology, language, and science 

skills). In total, the FBI is expected to hire 900 agents this year--

about 500 to replace agents who are projected to be leaving the agency 

and 400 to fill newly created positions.

Hiring new agents with foreign language proficiency, especially those 

with skills in Middle Eastern and Asian languages, is essential but 

could be difficult given competing market demands for their skills. In 

January 2002 we reported on the FBIs need for additional translators 

and interpreters.[Footnote 6] Of a total of about 11,400 FBI special 

agents, just under 1,800 have some foreign language proficiency, with 

fewer than 800 (about 7 percent) having language skills sufficient to 

easily interact with native speakers. Obtaining security clearances and 

basic training will add additional time to the process of enhancing the 

FBIs strength in language proficiency. While the FBI has shared 

linguistic resources with other agencies, more opportunities for 

pooling these scarce resources should be considered.

Improve Communications and Information Technology:

Long-standing communication problems for the FBI, such as antiquated 

computer hardware and software and the lack of a fully functional e-

mail system, hamper the FBIs ability to share time sensitive 

information internally and with other intelligence and law enforcement 

agencies. Sharing investigative information encompasses legal 

requirements related to law enforcement sensitive and classified 

information and its protection through methods such as 

encryption.[Footnote 7] There are also cultural barriers related to a 

tradition of agents holding investigative information close so as not 

to jeopardize evidence in a case. The need for more functional 

communication will be essential for successful partnering with other 

law enforcement agencies and the intelligence community. We do not 

believe the FBI will be able to successfully change its mission and 

effectively transform itself without significantly upgrading its 

communications and information technology (IT) capabilities.

In February 2002 we reported that the FBI needed to fully establish the 

management foundation that is necessary to begin successfully 

developing, implementing, and maintaining an enterprise 

architecture.[Footnote 8] Enterprise architecture is a comprehensive 

and systematically derived description of an organizations operations, 

both in logical and technical terms, that has been shown to be 

essential to successfully building major IT systems. While the FBI 

implemented most of the core elements associated with establishing the 

management foundation, it had not yet established a steering committee 

or group that has responsibility for directing and overseeing the 

development of the architecture. The FBI needs to fully implement the 

practices associated with effective enterprise architecture 

management, including having a written and approved policy for 

developing and maintaining the enterprise architecture and requiring 

that IT investments comply with the architecture. We have ongoing work 

evaluating the FBIs management of IT.

The Justice OIG shares similar concerns about the FBIs management of 

its IT investments. In a December 2002 report,[Footnote 9] the OIG 

reiterated the findings of our February 2002 report and added that the 

FBI does not have effective IT investment management processes, 

including lacking the architectural context for making internal IT 

investment decisions. In addition, the FBI Director has designated IT 

as one of the agencys 10 priorities.

Develop Internal Control System to Protect Civil Liberties:

Although the FBI wishes to become a more proactive agency, it also 

needs to be cognizant of individuals civil liberties. Guidelines 

created in the 1970s to stem abuses of civil liberties resulting from 

the FBIs domestic intelligence activities have recently been revised 

to permit agents to be more proactive. For example, permitting FBI 

presence at public gatherings, which generally had been inhibited by 

the prior guidelines. No information obtained from such visits can be 

retained unless it relates to potential criminal or terrorist activity. 

To better ensure that these new investigative tools do not infringe on 

civil liberties, appropriate internal controls, such as training and 

supervisory review, must be developed, implemented, and monitored.

Manage Reorganizations Ripple Effect on Law Enforcement Community:

These FBI reorganization changes may have a ripple effect on the nature 

and volume of work of other Justice Department units and their resource 

needs, including DEA, the Office of Intelligence Policy and Review, the 

U.S. Attorneys Offices, and the Criminal Divisions Terrorism and 

Violent Crime Section. For example, if the volume of FBI 

counterterrorism investigations increases substantially, one could 

expect an increased volume of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 

requests to the Office of Intelligence Policy and Review.[Footnote 10] 

Moreover, should those requests be approved and subsequent surveillance 

or searches indicate criminal activity, U.S. Attorneys Offices and the 

Terrorism and Violent Crime Section would be brought in to apply their 

resources to those investigations. In addition, one could expect more 

legal challenges to the admissibility of the evidence obtained and to 

the constitutionality of the surveillance or search.[Footnote 11] State 

and local law enforcement are also likely to be affected by a change in 

FBI focus. Although the major gap that state and local law enforcement 

may have to help fill because of this realignment is in the drug area, 

if additional FBI resources are needed for counterterrorism, state and 

local law enforcement may have to take on greater responsibility in 

other areas of enforcement as well.

Improve Enforcement of Immigration Laws and Provision of Immigration 

Services:

The U.S. government, primarily the INS[Footnote 12] with aid from other 

federal agencies such as the State Department, is faced with the 

formidable task of enforcing the nations immigration laws and 

providing immigration services to eligible legal aliens. Immigration 

enforcement is a complex, multifaceted function that includes, among 

other things, patrolling 8,000 miles of international boundaries to 

prevent illegal entry into the U.S.; inspecting over 500 million 

travelers each year to determine their admissibility; apprehending, 

detaining, and removing criminal and illegal aliens; disrupting and 

dismantling organized smuggling and trafficking; and investigating and 

prosecuting those who engage in benefit fraud, document abuse, and the 

willful hiring of undocumented workers. Immigration services include 

providing benefits, such as employment authorization and 

naturalization, to those who legally enter and reside in the United 

States. In this capacity, INS is expected to process millions of 

applications each year, make the right adjudicative decision in 

approving or denying the applications, and render decisions in a timely 

manner. INSs responsibilities in carrying out its enforcement and 

service functions are daunting and its past challenges are many.

Congress has continued to express concern about INSs ability to carry 

out its enforcement and service functions, and over the last several 

years has significantly increased INSs budget and staffing to help it 

deal with its considerable workload. INSs fiscal year 2003 budget 

request calls for a total of $6.3 billion in budget authority for 

enforcement, services and support activities, almost three times its 

fiscal year 1995 budget, and 37,100 in authorized positions, about 77 

percent more than in fiscal year 1995. (See fig. 1.) Since the 

September 11 attacks on the United States, concerns about shortcomings 

in this countrys immigration enforcement system have been highlighted. 

INS received $549 million in emergency counterterrorism funding 

following September 11, augmenting the $3.3 billion that had already 

been allocated to enforcement activities.

Figure 1: INS Budget Authority (immigration enforcement, services and 

support activities), Fiscal Years 1994-2003:

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

INS still has many challenges before it can achieve the intended 

results of both effective enforcement and service delivery. Those 

challenges relate to how the governments immigration function should 

be managed; that is, how to manage efforts to implement programs to 

control the border and reduce alien smuggling, reduce immigration 

benefit fraud, reduce unauthorized alien employment, remove criminal 

aliens, manage the immigration benefit application workload, and risks 

posed by the State Departments visa operations. In addition, INS is 

faced with significant IT challenges as it moves forward to implement 

legislation and other initiatives passed since the September 11 

attacks. Although INSs functions will be transferred to the new 

Department of Homeland Security, many of the management and 

programmatic challenges that we and others have identified will 

continue if these challenges are not addressed by the new department.

INS Estimates That Significantly More INS Resources and Time Needed to 

Fully Implement Border Control Strategy, Yet Overall Effectiveness 

Still Unknown:

The INS Border Patrol is responsible for preventing and deterring 

aliens from illegally entering the United States between ports of 

entry. We reported in August 2001 that the Border Patrol was in the 

seventh year of implementing a border control strategy.[Footnote 13] At 

that time it was in the second phase of a four-phase strategy that 

called for allocating additional Border Patrol resources along the 

southwest border. The Justice Office of the Inspector General (OIG) 

reported in 2002 that INS developed a northern border strategy in 2000, 

but implementation was initially delayed because of changes in 

administration and in INS leadership, and the events of September 11, 

2001.[Footnote 14] While INS has taken steps since our January 2001 

management challenges report to begin evaluating its southwest border 

strategy, it remains to be seen how reliable and meaningful the results 

of the assessment will be.

Before September 11, INS had generally allocated its agents in 

accordance with the strategy; that is, deploying agents and other 

resources first to the areas with the highest levels of illegal 

activity. In response to the September 11 terrorist attacks, INS 

accelerated deployment of personnel and resources to the northern 

border and plans to continue doing so in fiscal year 2003. In fiscal 

year 2002, 245 Border Patrol agents were allocated to the northern 

border, a tenfold increase compared to the 24 allocated in fiscal year 

2001. The southwest border had nearly 9,200 Border Patrol agents as of 

August 2002. (See fig. 2.) We reported in August 2001 that INSs 

preliminary estimates indicated that gaining control of the southwest 

border could take at least 5 more years and between 11,700 and 14,000 

Border Patrol agents, additional support personnel, and hundreds of 

millions of dollars in technology and infrastructure. It is unclear 

what impact redirecting resources to the northern border will have on 

gaining control of the southwest border.

Figure 2: Onboard U.S. Border Patrol Agents on the Southwest Border, 

Fiscal Years 1993 to August 2002:

[See PDF for image]

Note: The number of agents for fiscal year 2002 is as of August 2002.

[End of figure]

In addition to taking longer to control the southwest border than INS 

originally thought, questions about the overall effectiveness of the 

southwest border strategy remain. We reported in August 2001 that the 

primary discernable effect of the southwest border strategy appeared to 

be a shifting of illegal alien traffic, and at that time there was no 

clear indication that overall illegal entry had declined along the 

southwest border.[Footnote 15] However, after a relatively steady 

increase in yearly apprehensions between fiscal years 1993 and 2000, 

apprehensions declined 43 percent from 1.64 million in 2000 to 0.93 

million in 2002. Although INS maintained data on apprehended aliens in 

its automated fingerprint system, it had not analyzed the data to 

determine how many aliens had been arrested, how many times they had 

been arrested, where they had been arrested, and how the numbers 

changed over time in response to border enforcement efforts. Such 

information would provide a better understanding of the relationship 

between INSs strategy and overall illegal entry along the southwest 

border. In response to our recommendation that it use the data in its 

automated fingerprint system to help measure the results of border 

control efforts and refine its border enforcement strategy, INS 

established a working group to examine how the data could be used in 

such a manner.

In February 2002, INS issued a plan for evaluating its southwest border 

strategy. The plan listed numerous indicators INS will use to evaluate 

the overall effects of the strategy. For example, the plan indicated 

that INS would measure changes over time in the number apprehensions of 

illegal aliens between the ports of entry, locations of apprehensions, 

alien smuggling patterns, fees charged by smugglers, and the number of 

fraudulent entry attempts at the ports of entry. (See fig. 3.) It is 

too early to tell how INS will conduct its evaluation or the extent to 

which the study will yield reliable and meaningful results. INSs plan 

did not specify the time frame for completing the evaluation.

Figure 3: U.S. Border Patrol Apprehensions on the Southwest Border, 

Fiscal Years 1993-2002:

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Fragmented and Unfocused INS Efforts to Combat Immigration Benefit 

Fraud:

In January 2002,[Footnote 16] we noted that fraud to obtain immigration 

benefits was a significant problem that threatened the integrity of the 

legal immigration system because it results in INS granting valuable 

benefits to ineligible aliens. Fraud involves attempts by aliens to 

obtain benefits--such as naturalization, work authorization, and 

adjustment of status--through illegal means (e.g. using fraudulent 

documents). INS officials told us that they believed the problem was 

pervasive and serious and that some aliens were using the benefit 

application process to carry out illegal activities, such as crimes of 

violence, narcotics trafficking, and terrorism. While the extent of 

immigration benefit fraud is unknown, INS investigations have uncovered 

various schemes involving the filing of thousands of fraudulent 

applications.

Although immigration benefit fraud has grown more serious, 

institutionally, INS has not positioned itself to combat this 

significant problem. As we reported in January 2002, several 

difficulties have hampered INSs immigration benefit fraud 

investigations. Immigration benefit fraud has been a comparatively low 

priority within INS and resources devoted to it have been limited. For 

example, four INS services centers receive several million applications 

for immigration benefits yearly, yet in 2000, INS had only 40 positions 

dedicated to fraud detection and analysis. As we reported, INS lacked a 

comprehensive plan on how its different investigative components are to 

coordinate their immigration benefit fraud investigations and how INS 

had not established guidance to ensure the highest priority cases are 

investigated. In addition, INS lacked an agencywide case tracking and 

management capability to maintain important data on targets of fraud 

investigations. Finally, INS staff who adjudicate applications for 

immigration benefits did not have access to the data they needed to 

ensure that only eligible aliens obtain immigration benefits.

INS agreed with our January 2002 report that it should more effectively 

detect fraudulent applications and process applications in a more 

timely manner, and has begun to implement some of our recommendations. 

For example, in response to our recommendation that it better integrate 

its many units involved in benefit fraud enforcement, INS developed a 

strategic plan for combating immigration fraud describing, among other 

things, how its different investigative components were to coordinate 

their immigration benefit fraud investigations. In response to our 

recommendation that it develop a method to track and manage benefit 

fraud investigations, in April 2002, INS mandated that all 

investigative components begin using the automated agencywide Criminal 

Investigative Reporting System to track and manage all criminal 

investigations. Also following the September 11 attacks, the Attorney 

General mandated certain changes in processing immigration benefit 

applications. For example, he required that all applications be checked 

against a federal law enforcement database. Our ongoing work will 

evaluate changes made to the immigration benefit application process 

since the September 11 attacks.

Efforts to Reduce Unauthorized Employment Face Impediments:

Many immigration experts believe that as long as opportunities for 

employment exist, the incentive to enter the United States illegally or 

overstay visas will persist and that efforts at the U.S. borders to 

prevent illegal entry will be undermined. The Census Bureau estimated 

that there were about 8 million illegal aliens in the United States in 

2000.[Footnote 17] We testified in June 2002[Footnote 18] that hundreds 

of thousands of aliens unauthorized to work in the United States have 

used fraudulent documents to circumvent the process designed to prevent 

employers from hiring them. Employers who hire unauthorized workers 

face little chance of being investigated by INS, in part because 

resources for work site enforcement have been relatively small. In 

1998, INS devoted slightly over 300 work years to work site 

enforcement, which declined to about 124 work years in fiscal year 

2002. How much INS can accomplish with its limited work site 

enforcement resources is questionable. Although there has been a slight 

increase in the number of work years devoted to work site enforcement 

since September 11 (specifically, 124 work years in fiscal year 2002 

compared to 109 work years for fiscal year 2001), the resources 

allocated to work site enforcement continue to be limited. Therefore, 

we concluded that INS needed to ensure that it is making the best use 

of its limited enforcement resources.

Another impediment we testified about in June 2002 pertained to 

difficulty INS had coordinating work site enforcement with the 

Department of Labor. While INS implemented our 1999 

recommendations[Footnote 19] to seek assistance from state labor 

agencies in disseminating information to employers about its pilot 

programs for verifying employees eligibility to work, coordinating 

these efforts with Labor was difficult because the two agencies have 

different enforcement missions. Labor stated that if employees thought 

that Labor investigators were trying to determine their immigration 

status, the employees willingness to report workplace violations to 

Labor could be jeopardized.

As a result of the September 11 attacks, INS has changed its priorities 

regarding the types of employers that it will investigate. Prior to 

September 11, INS focused its work site investigations on employers in 

industries that traditionally relied on unauthorized workers, such as 

restaurants, hotels, and construction. INS now plans to turn its 

attention to employers in industries critical to the nations 

infrastructure, such as airports and municipal water supplies. For 

example, after September 11, INS launched Operation Tarmac to focus on 

companies employing individuals who have direct access to commercial 

aircraft or who provide airport security. According to a June 2002 INS 

testimony, Operation Tarmac had resulted in over 500 arrests of 

unauthorized aliens and over 260 criminal charges. INS also initiated a 

similar operation focusing on nuclear power facilities.[Footnote 20] As 

a result, INS plans to limit the number of investigations of 

traditional employers of unauthorized aliens. How this shift in focus 

will affect unauthorized employment by these traditional employers is 

unknown. Conceivably, it could reduce unauthorized employment in the 

more sensitive national security areas, leaving the general problem 

unsolved.

Improvements Needed in Identifying and Removing Criminal Aliens:

Based on nationwide data, we reported in 1997[Footnote 21] and again in 

1999[Footnote 22] that INS efforts to identify and remove imprisoned 

aliens needed improvement. INS had failed to identify all deportable 

criminal aliens, including aggravated felons. As a result, INS did not 

fully comply with the legal requirements that it (1) place criminal 

aliens who had committed aggravated felonies in removal proceedings 

while they are incarcerated or (2) take those aggravated felons into 

custody upon their release from prison. Therefore, many aggravated 

felons were released from prison without being taken into INS custody 

and subsequently rearrested for such crimes as assault, robbery, and 

drug offenses. In September 2002 the Justice OIG reached the same 

conclusion. Based on data primarily from California and Florida, the 

OIG reported that INS has not effectively managed its national program 

to identify and remove criminal aliens.[Footnote 23]

In June 2001,[Footnote 24] the OIG reported that INS was placing the 

traveling public at potential risk because it was not consistently 

following its policy of providing INS escorts for violent aliens being 

removed from the United States via commercial airlines. As a result, 

some potentially violent aliens were removed without escorts on 

commercial airlines. In addition, INSs escort policy failed to require 

escorts for some aliens who may pose a danger to the public. The 

Inspector General made a number of recommendations to INS for improving 

its escort procedures through actions such as training staff in the use 

of INSs escort standard, monitoring, verifying adherence to escort 

standard, and clarifying its responsibilities.

Shortcomings in Alien Antismuggling Efforts:

We, along with the Justice Inspector General,[Footnote 25] have issued 

reports identifying weaknesses in INSs antismuggling efforts. We 

reported in May 2000[Footnote 26] and in our last management challenges 

report, that alien smuggling was a significant and growing enforcement 

problem. Although INS had developed an antismuggling strategy with both 

domestic and international components, we found that INSs ability to 

implement and evaluate the domestic component of its strategy was 

impeded by several factors. First, INSs antismuggling program lacked 

program coordination, which resulted in multiple antismuggling units 

overlapping in their jurisdictions, made inconsistent decisions about 

which cases to open, and functioned autonomously and without a single 

chain of command. Second, INS lacked an agencywide automated case 

tracking and management system that prevented antismuggling program 

managers from being able to monitor their ongoing investigations, 

determining if other antismuggling units were investigating the same 

target, or knowing if previous investigations had been conducted on a 

particular target. Third, INS had limited performance measures to 

assess the strategys effectiveness to deter and disrupt alien 

smuggling.

We concluded that without improvements in its investigations and 

intelligence programs, INSs antismuggling efforts would continue to be 

hampered and INS would find it difficult, if not impossible, to meet 

the challenges posed by increasingly sophisticated major smuggling 

organizations. Since our January 2001 management challenges report, INS 

implemented our recommendation that it set up a case tracking and 

management system to facilitate sharing of case information and prevent 

duplication of effort. As noted earlier in this report, in April 2002, 

INS mandated that all investigative components begin using the 

automated agencywide Criminal Investigative Reporting System to track 

and manage all criminal investigations. INS also agreed to implement 

our other recommendations that it establish (1) criteria for opening 

antismuggling cases to help ensure that resources are focused on the 

highest priority cases, and (2) performance measures to gauge the 

effects of its efforts. INS also agreed to implement the Inspector 

Generals recommendations that it examine coordination, program 

structure, and communication issues to make improvements in its 

antismuggling program.

Problems Managing INSs Application Workload:

Despite years of increasing budgets and staff, INS has continued to 

experience significant problems managing its workload of processing 

applications for such services and benefits as naturalization, 

immigrant status adjustment, employment authorization, and granting 

asylum. Even though aliens pay fees to INS for processing their 

applications, and even though INSs budget for processing immigration 

benefit applications increased sevenfold from fiscal year 1994 to 2002, 

aliens have faced long waits for decisions on their cases and have had 

difficulty obtaining accurate information on how long they can expect 

to wait. As of October 2002, INS had a backlog of 5.2 million 

applications, an almost fivefold increase since October 1994.

We reported in May 2001[Footnote 27] that better automation capability 

and a more streamlined application process would enable INS to provide 

improved levels of service. Automation improvements would provide INS 

with the necessary information to determine whether (1) all the 

applications received are processed, (2) applications are worked on in 

the order in which they are received, (3) prompt and correct responses 

are provided to applicants inquiring about the status of their cases, 

and (4) aliens have been waiting very long to have their applications 

processed. Although INS believed that additional staff would reduce its 

application backlog problem, it was not in a position to determine the 

extent to which staff shortages played a part in this problem. INS did 

not know how to deploy its staff to process applications in a timely 

fashion because it lacked a systematically developed staff resource 

allocation model. We made a number of recommendations that would help 

INS improve the application process and its management of it. INS 

concurred with our recommendations and has begun to implement some of 

them. For example, in response to our recommendation that INS develop 

guidance and training on how to screen adjustment of status 

applications in order to reduce errors in granting work authorization, 

INS developed standard operating procedures. INS said it has 

implemented the procedures and also instituted quality assurance 

reviews of the adjudication process.

The Justices Inspector General said that since the September 11 

terrorist attacks, INS has made efforts to decrease the times needed to 

process applications for changing immigration status and extending 

stays.[Footnote 28] However, although INS made processing these 

applications a priority shortly after September 11, its processing 

times slowed because it had to meet a new requirement to run the 

applications through the Interagency Border Inspection System (IBIS) 

database before rendering a decision. In addition, in 2002, the 

President announced a 5-year, $500 million initiative to eliminate the 

backlogs of applications for immigration benefits and maintain a 6-

month processing time standard for all applications by the end of 

fiscal year 2003.

Problems Coordinating with State Department on Using the Visa Process 

to Screen for Potential Terrorists:

Given the events of September 11, 2001, there is public concern that 

terrorists or other criminals may be exploiting the visa granting 

process to gain entry into the United States. Generally, citizens of 

foreign countries must apply for and obtain a nonimmigrant visa travel 

document at U.S. embassies or consulates abroad before arriving at U.S. 

ports of entry for business, tourism, and other reasons.[Footnote 29] 

State Department consular officers issued 7.6 million visas in fiscal 

year 2001. All 19 of the September 11, 2001, terrorist hijackers were 

issued nonimmigrant visas. The granting of visas is a State Department 

responsibility. However, Justice entities, most importantly the FBI, 

are responsible for assisting the State Department by doing name checks 

of selected visa applicants to determine if they are potential 

terrorists and, therefore, should be denied a visa on terrorism grounds 

under section 212(a)(3)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act 

(INA).

In the months following the terrorist attacks, the State Department 

instituted two new name check procedures for selected categories of 

applicants. Until recently, the FBI had not implemented these two name 

checks in a thorough or timely manner. As a result of the initial 

delays, the Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force[Footnote 30] began 

conducting one of the two name checks for the FBI in late April 2002. 

Of the estimated 38,000 special name checks processed by August 1, 

2002, the task force had identified about 280 visa applicants who 

should be denied a visa under the INAs terrorism provision. The task 

force either believed these applicants are suspected terrorists, or, in 

the majority of the cases, needed additional information to determine 

the applicants true identity. As a result of delays in the FBIs name 

check processing, State received the refusal recommendation for about 

200 of these applicants after overseas posts had already issued them 

visas. The State Department revoked the visas in these cases as a 

prudent measure and notified the INS. In mid-September 2002, the 

executive branch changed the name check procedures in an attempt to 

reduce the review time for applicants subject to the name checks. In 

October 2002[Footnote 31] we recommended that the Assistant to the 

President for Homeland Security coordinate with the appropriate 

agencies to (1) reassess interagency headquarters security checks to 

verify that all are necessary and ensure their timely coordination 

among U.S. agencies; (2) consider reassessing, on an interagency basis, 

visas issued before the implementation of the new security checks for 

selected categories of applicants who may pose security risks; and (3) 

ensure that law enforcement and intelligence agencies are promptly 

providing information to the State Department on persons who may pose a 

security risk and who, therefore, should not receive a visa.

Also, Justice and State have different views on how to apply the INAs 

terrorism provision, section 212(a)(3)(B), to visa applicants whose 

names have resulted in a possible match against FBI or Foreign 

Terrorist Tracking Task Force databases.[Footnote 32] According to the 

State Department, it requires specific evidence to prove an applicant 

ineligible under this provision. State says that consular officers must 

know the specific actions or associations that may render an applicant 

ineligible to legally deny a visa. Justice, however, believes that a 

consular officer need not have specific evidence that the applicant 

participated in terrorist activities or associations to justify a visa 

denial. In addition, Justice believes that it will often be impossible 

to know for sure whether a visa applicant is indeed the same person 

contained in the relevant databases, even after all the applicants 

information is shared between the two departments. In that situation, 

State thinks it is appropriate to proceed cautiously and deny a visa on 

the theory that the name check match does provide the consular officer 

a reasonable ground to believe that the applicant presents a threat 

to national security and is, therefore, ineligible for admission. We 

recommended that the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security 

coordinate with the appropriate agencies to establish a governmentwide 

policy on the level of evidence needed to deny a visa on terrorism 

grounds.

The Presidents Department of Homeland Security proposal calls for visa 

policy-making authority to be transferred to this new department, while 

retaining administration of visas within the Department of State. 

Congress is studying this proposal and considering how the visas 

functions should be organized.

INSs Information Technology Management Weaknesses:

Each year INS has invested hundreds of millions of dollars on IT 

systems and activities to carry out its core missions of (1) preventing 

aliens from entering the United States illegally and removing aliens 

who succeed in doing so and (2) providing services or benefits to 

facilitate entry, residence, employment, and naturalization of legal 

immigrants. However, the September 11TH terrorist attacks and INSs 

critical role in preventing future attacks have increased INSs need 

for effectively leveraging technology to achieve mission goals. To 

illustrate, INS reportedly obligated about $297 million on IT 

activities in fiscal year 2001, and about $459 million in fiscal year 

2002, a 50 percent increase.

Despite the importance and prevalence of IT systems in accomplishing 

its core missions, INS has not yet established and implemented 

effective controls for managing its IT resources. Over the last decade, 

Justices OIG has reported that INS was not following established IT 

project management procedures. Most recently, the OIG reported in 

August 2001[Footnote 33] that despite having spent $31.2 million on its 

Automated I-94 system,[Footnote 34] INS did not know whether the system 

was meeting its intended performance goals. The root cause of the INS 

system problems has been an absence of effective enterprise 

architecture management and IT investment management. In August and 

December 2000, we reported on INSs management weaknesses in both of 

these areas and concluded that INS was not in a position to know 

whether its ongoing and planned IT investments are the right things to 

do or that they are being done the right way.[Footnote 35] That is, INS 

does not know whether these investments will produce value commensurate 

with costs and risk, whether they are aligned with an agencywide 

blueprint (enterprise architecture) defining how the agency plans to 

function in the future (operationally and technologically), or whether 

each investment is meeting its cost, schedule, and performance 

commitments.

To address these weaknesses, we made a series of recommendations in 

August and December 2000. In response to the recommendations, INS has 

developed an enterprise architecture, including a current and target 

architecture, and a transition plan. Similarly, INS has taken steps to 

implement rigorous and disciplined investment management controls. In 

particular, it has (1) developed policies and procedures for 

implementing its investment management process and (2) established 

selection criteria for assessing the relative merits of each IT 

investment that address cost, schedule, benefits, and risk. While these 

are positive steps, much remains to be done before INS can fully 

implement effective investment management controls and be in a position 

to make informed IT investment decisions.

Adding to these problems is the urgency for INS to strengthen its 

border security operations, which means that INS needs to expeditiously 

involve new system capabilities while it addresses its IT management 

shortcomings. In October 2001,[Footnote 36] we testified that the 

recent terrorist attacks and the demands that they have placed on INSs 

border security mission will require INS to effectively leverage 

technology as part of its response to these demands. Accordingly, we 

stated that INS will have to actively compensate for missing management 

controls by ensuring that the requisite human capital skills and 

expertise are brought to bear on IT projects supporting its border 

security mission; and in the long term, INS will need to establish 

controls for implementing and maintaining its enterprise architecture 

and follow through on its ongoing efforts to establish and implement 

effective investment management process controls.

Better Manage Programs Designed to Support State and Local Efforts to 

Reduce Crime:

Justice provides support to state and local efforts to prevent and 

control crime, administer justice, and assist crime victims. As part of 

its role, Justice awards grants to organizations, including state and 

local governments, through the Office of Justice Programs (OJP). 

Programs overseen by OJP include those administered by the Violence 

Against Women Office (VAWO),[Footnote 37] the Office of Juvenile 

Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP), the Executive Office for 

Weed and Seed (EOWS), the Office of Police Corps (OPC), and the Bureau 

of Justice Assistance (BJA), which includes the Drug Courts Program 

Office (DCPO). Our work over the past 5 years on a number of programs 

administered by these offices has (1) shown long-standing problems with 

OJP grant monitoring and (2) raised questions about the methodological 

rigor of some of OJPs impact evaluation studies. Monitoring and 

evaluations are needed to identify whether programs are operating as 

intended, reaching those who should be served, and ultimately making a 

difference in the fight against crime and delinquency.

Problems with OJP Grant Monitoring:

In March 2002[Footnote 38] we testified that our work at OJP since 1996 

has shown continuing grant monitoring problems among some bureaus and 

offices.[Footnote 39] We found that files for certain discretionary 

grants often lacked the documentation necessary to ensure that required 

monitoring activities occurred. Neither OJP nor our office could 

determine the level of grant monitoring performed by grant managers 

required by OJP and the comptroller generals internal control 

standards, which call for documentation of all transactions and 

significant events to ensure that management directives are carried 

out.[Footnote 40] As a result, we recommended that OJP (1) study and 

propose ways to systematically test or review grant files to ensure 

consistent documentation across OJP and (2) explore ways to 

electronically compile and maintain documentation of monitoring 

activities to facilitate more consistent documentation, more accessible 

management oversight, and sound performance measurement.

Others, including OJP and Justices OIG, have identified problems with 

grant monitoring. In 1996, an OJP-wide working group found that grant 

monitoring was not standardized in OJP and that a tracking system was 

needed to facilitate control of the monitoring process. In 2000, an 

independent contractor found that OJP lacked consistent procedures and 

practices for performing grant management functions across the 

agency.[Footnote 41] The contractor recommended that, among other 

things, OJP develop an agencywide, coordinated, and integrated 

monitoring strategy; standardize procedures for conducting site visits 

and other monitoring activities; and mandate the timeliness and filing 

of monitoring reports. Finally, the OIG reported on OJP-wide monitoring 

problems, having identified grant management as 1 of the 10 major 

management challenges facing Justice in 2000 and 2001.[Footnote 42] 

Among other things, the OIG stated that Justices multibillion dollar 

grant programs are a high risk for fraud, given the amount of money 

involved and the tens of thousands of grantees. Additionally, past OIG 

reviews determined that many grantees did not submit the required 

progress and financial reports and that program officials on-site 

reviews did not consistently address all grant conditions.

Too Early to Gauge Effectiveness of OJP Efforts to Resolve Grant 

Monitoring Problems:

It is too early to tell how effective OJPs efforts to resolve grant 

monitoring problems will be. In its Fiscal Year 2000 Performance Report 

and Fiscal Year 2002 Performance Plan, OJP established a goal to 

achieve effective grant management--in part by progressing toward fully 

implementing a new grant management system. This new system is intended 

to help set priorities for program monitoring and facilitate timely 

program and financial reports from grantees. At the time of our review 

in 2001, the new system covered grants for some organizations up to the 

award stage.[Footnote 43] When fully operational, it is envisioned to 

produce reports in response to informational requests, provide 

information pertaining to grantees and all resources provided by OJP, 

and maintain information from the opening to the closing of a grant 

award. However, it was still unclear whether the new system will 

include the full range and scope of monitoring activities.

We also reported that OJP had been working on other key efforts, such 

as new OJP-wide guidance for grant administration, including grant 

monitoring. In January 2001, OJP released its Grant Management Policies 

and Procedures Manual to update and codify OJPs policies and 

procedures regarding its business practices.[Footnote 44] At the time 

of our review, OJP had trained over 300 grant managers and had plans to 

train supervisors about the new guidance. However, there were no plans 

to test or systematically monitor compliance with the new guidelines to 

ensure that grant managers were fulfilling their responsibilities.

OJPs bureaus and program offices have taken steps to respond to our 

reports. For example, with respect to our 1999 Weed and Seed 

report,[Footnote 45] EOWS said it recognized the need to improve 

program monitoring and documentation of all monitoring visits. In a 

July 2000 letter, EOWS officials reported it had taken steps to improve 

program monitoring, including documentation of site monitoring visits. 

Also, VAWO has developed an internal monitoring manual that is intended 

to enhance accountability in performing oversight and help improve 

monitoring quality, consistency, and uniformity. OPC, another OJP 

program highlighted in the 2001 issue of this report, continues to make 

progress in obligating funds and establishing interagency agreements. 

By the end of September 2002 OPC plans to award a total of $53 million 

to 27 participating states, 22 of which are actively recruiting and 

training. Although OPCs service agreements with 1,402 police corps 

candidates[Footnote 46] is fewer than the 2,128 slots authorized, it 

does reflect moderate program expansion.

Concerns about Methodological Rigor of Impact Evaluation Studies:

We have also issued reports questioning the methodological rigor of OJP 

grant program impact evaluation studies. For example, as we reported in 

March 2002,[Footnote 47] three impact evaluations examining VAWO 

programs had methodological problems that question whether the 

evaluations will produce definitive results. These evaluations are 

particularly arduous because of variations in program implementation. 

In addition, VAWO sites participating in the impact evaluations did not 

appear to represent their programs, thereby limiting the evaluators 

ability to generalize the results. Further, the lack of nonprogram 

participant comparison groups hindered isolating external factors from 

the programs impact alone. Finally, data collection and analytical 

problems (e.g. related to statistical tests, assessment of change) 

compromised the evaluators ability to draw appropriate conclusions 

from the results. We recommended, among other things, that OJP assess 

its evaluation process and develop approaches to mitigate potential 

methodological design and implementation problems. The assistant 

attorney general agreed with the substance of our recommendations and 

has begun or plans to take steps to address them.

Our October 2001 review[Footnote 48] of 10 OJJDP impact evaluations 

undertaken since 1995 also raised some concerns about whether many of 

the evaluations would produce definitive results. Two of the 

evaluations that were in their later stages and three of those that 

were in their formative stages at the time of our review lacked 

specific plans for comparison groups. Furthermore, three of the five 

evaluations that were well into implementation at the time of our 

review had developed data collection problems. We recommended that 

OJJDP assess the five impact evaluations that were in their formative 

stages to address potential problems and intervene if necessary to help 

ensure definitive results. In commenting on a draft of our report, the 

assistant attorney general said that OJP would use our report to 

improve the quality of its evaluations and design programs to achieve 

greater impact. Two months after our reports issuance, OJP told us 

that OJJDP had decided to discontinue the one evaluation that was to 

use a comparison group because it was unable to identify a comparison 

site. In addition, OJJDP was considering scaling back and refocusing 

the scope of another evaluation because the program being studied did 

not lend itself to an impact evaluation with comparison groups.

Better Data Collection and Evaluation Efforts Needed to

Measure Impact of Federally Funded Drug Court Programs:

Despite the increasing number of drug court programs[Footnote 49] 

required to collect and maintain performance and outcome data, and 

despite our recommendations in 1997[Footnote 50] to improve evaluation 

efforts, Justices DCPO continues to lack vital information on the 

impact of its programs. Although certain DCPO programs must collect and 

provide performance measurement and outcome data, Justice has not 

effectively managed this effort because of (1) its inability to readily 

identify the universe of DCPO-funded drug court programs, including 

those subject to DCPOs data collection reporting requirements; (2) its 

inability to accurately determine the number of drug court programs 

responding to DCPOs semiannual data collection survey; (3) 

inefficiencies in the administration of DCPOs semiannual data 

collection effort; (4) the elimination of post-program impact questions 

from DCPOs data collection survey effort; and (5) insufficient use of 

the Drug Court Clearinghouse. Also, because of various administrative 

and research factors that have hampered Justices ability to complete 

the two-phase National Institute of Justice-sponsored national impact 

evaluation study, Justice cannot provide Congress and drug court 

program stakeholders with reliable information on program performance 

and impact.

To improve data collection on the performance and impact of federally 

funded drug court programs, we recommended in April 2002[Footnote 51] 

that the Attorney General (1) develop and implement a management 

information system to track and identify the universe of DCPO-funded 

drug court programs; (2) take steps to ensure and sustain an adequate 

grantee response rate to DCPOs data collection efforts; (3) take 

corrective actions toward grantees who do not comply; (4) reinstate the 

collection of post-program data, selectively spot checking grantee 

responses to ensure accurate reporting; (5) analyze performance and 

outcome data collected from grantees and report annually on the 

results; and (6) consolidate the multiple drug court program-related 

data collection efforts to ensure the primary focus is on DCPO-funded 

drug court programs. We also recommended that the Attorney General 

accelerate the funding and implementation of a methodologically sound 

national impact evaluation, consider ways to reduce the time needed to 

provide information on overall program impact, and implement 

appropriate oversight of this evaluation effort.

In response to our recommendations, Justice plans to (1) develop an 

management information system that would track the universe of DCPO-

funded drug court programs and (2) revamp DCPOs data collection 

efforts in conjunction with the National Institute on Drug Abuse. Both 

are expected to be completed in 2003. However, we believe that it is 

unclear whether Justices plans will address all of the insufficiencies 

we have cited or how well Justice will monitor grantee compliance with 

data collection, reporting, and evaluation requirements. Until Justice 

fully implements our recommendations, Congress, the public, and other 

stakeholders will continue to lack sufficient information to measure 

long-term program benefits and to assess how these programs affect 

criminal behavior of substance abuse offenders and whether these 

programs are an effective use of federal funds.

Achieve Financial Accountability for Fiscal Year 2002 and Beyond:

Justice achieved an unqualified audit opinion on its fiscal year 2001 

departmentwide financial statements, which was one of the Attorney 

Generals foremost priorities. Justice improved from receiving a mixed 

audit opinion on its fiscal year 2000 departmentwide financial 

statements[Footnote 52] to receiving an unqualified audit opinion in 

2001.[Footnote 53] One of key improvements made since we last reported 

is the financial statement audit results of the INS. INS was the only 

component of Justice that did not receive an overall unqualified audit 

opinion in fiscal year 2000. For the fiscal year 2001 financial 

statements, INS received its first overall unqualified audit opinion 

after gathering appropriate accounting records and documents to support 

its deferred revenue and vendor payable accounts. However, the auditors 

continued to report material internal control weaknesses at the INS and 

several other components. While obtaining an unqualified audit opinion 

on the fiscal year 2001 financial statements for Justice as a whole and 

for each of its components was an important milestone, it is not an end 

in and of itself. The end goal is to achieve financial accountability 

by having systems and controls in place that provide accurate, timely, 

and useful financial information to manage Justice and its components 

on a day-to-day basis.

Justice has 10 components for financial reporting purposes: (1) Assets 

Forfeiture Fund and Seized Asset Deposit Fund (AFF); (2) Working 

Capital Fund (WCF); (3) Offices, Boards, and Divisions (OBD); (4) USMS; 

(5) OJP; (6) DEA; (7) FBI; (8) INS; (9) Federal Bureau of Prisons 

(BOP); and (10) Federal Prison Industries, Incorporated (FPI). Five of 

these 10 components continue to have significant systems and material 

internal control weaknesses that preclude them from achieving the goal 

of financial accountability. The weaknesses identified can be 

categorized into three major areas: (1) ineffective general and 

application controls over financial management systems of various 

components, (2) lack of adherence to established policies and 

procedures for recording financial transactions in accordance with 

generally accepted accounting principles, and (3) ineffective financial 

statement preparation processes. Furthermore, the auditors for the same 

five components reported that they found internal control weaknesses 

that were significant departures from the systems requirements of the 

Federal Financial Management Improvement Act of 1996 (FFMIA). Until 

these material weaknesses are addressed, Justice, regardless of the 

type of audit opinion received, will continue to be at risk for errors, 

fraud, or noncompliance that may not be promptly detected.

The auditors reported a total of 13 material weaknesses[Footnote 54] 

for the Justice components for fiscal year 2001, compared to 15 and 14 

material weaknesses reported for fiscal years 2000 and 1999, 

respectively. While the 2001 results represent some improvement over 

prior years, the large number of remaining material weaknesses 

continues to indicate a lack of financial accountability in most 

Justice components. As previously noted, these material weaknesses are 

categorized into three main areas, which will be discussed in more 

detail in the next section.

Material Weaknesses in General and Application Controls over Component 

Financial Management Systems:

The auditors for 4 out of the 10 components reported weaknesses in 

general and application controls over financial management information 

systems. Specific concerns were found in the areas of entity-wide 

security, access controls, application software development and change 

controls, service continuity, segregation of duties, and system 

software. For example, the component auditors reported that:

* Several of the DEAs data processing systems (1) have an expired 

certification/accreditation, (2) cannot track personnel who are granted 

access to the system or whose access should be terminated, (3) do not 

have documented procedures for handling software changes, and (4) 

cannot trace data entries to source documents.

* Security plans have not been completed for two financial management 

applications at the USMS, and contingency plans were either outdated or 

incomplete.

* Although the financial management system of record at the INS has 
been 

in development for almost 5 years, the implementation is not complete, 

requiring the majority of INSs transactions to be entered into its 

legacy system, which has many inherent control weaknesses. Auditors 

reported that collectively, the DEA process presents significant risks 

to the continued operation of INSs financial management system as a 

whole.

The material weaknesses identified over program and application 

controls increase the risk that programs and data processed on these 

components systems are not adequately protected from unauthorized 

access or service disruption. These weaknesses could compromise 

Justices ability to ensure security over sensitive programmatic or 

financial data, reliability of its financial reporting, and compliance 

with applicable laws and regulations. Furthermore, without adequate 

controls over financial management systems, the components could 

experience a loss or manipulation of data as well as potential 

financial losses from expensive efforts to recover such system or data 

losses.

Material Weaknesses in Recording Financial Transactions in Accordance 

with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles:

The auditors reported that 4 of 10 components did not always follow 

policies or procedures in place to ensure that financial transactions 

were recorded in accordance with generally accepted accounting 

principles. Specifically, various component entities did not record 

financial transactions in accordance with certain Statements of Federal 

Financial Accounting Standards (SFFAS), which include the following:

* SFFAS No. 1, Accounting for Selected Assets and Liabilities--FBI 

auditors reported that inefficient vendor invoice approval and payment 

processes contributed to the initial under-reporting of liabilities and 

increased FBI payments for interest and penalties under the Prompt Pay 

Act. Auditors also reported that the DEA continues to have significant 

unreconciled differences between the collections and disbursements 

recorded in its accounting records and those recorded by the U.S. 

Treasury.

* SFFAS No. 3, Accounting for Inventory and Related Property--FPI 

auditors reported that financial accounting system deficiencies 

continue to exist in the capture, processing, reporting, and use of 

inventory data. These deficiencies affect the ability of the FPI to 

reasonably estimate overhead rates and consistently value finished 

goods inventories.

* SFFAS No. 5, Accounting for Liabilities of the Federal Government--

Auditors of the DEA, INS, and FBI reported that components processes 

to estimate accounts payable were not adequate or were not completed in 

a timely manner. Specifically, some methods used were not well 

supported, used noncurrent information, and did not properly record 

some obligations.

* SFFAS No. 7, Accounting for Revenue and Other Financing Sources--

Auditors of the INS and FPI reported that improvements are needed in 

the components accounting for earned and deferred revenues. In some 

instances, the components could not provide regular and timely support 

for general ledger entries, consistently or adequately perform 

collection efforts, or invoice customers in a timely manner.

The specific reporting deficiencies described raised concerns over the 

components abilities to make reasonable estimates, ensure the security 

of assets, value and support recorded transactions appropriately, and 

reduce unnecessary manual processing at year-end. Despite these 

concerns over ongoing compliance with the SFFAS, an unqualified opinion 

over the Justices financial statements was obtained due to significant 

manual correction efforts at year-end, which compensated for the lack 

of integrated systems sufficient to support accounting operations. 

However, the failure to address these reporting deficiencies may not 

only affect future audit opinions, but may also result in the failure 

to provide Justice management with meaningful information throughout 

the year that is essential in making timely operational decisions.

Material Weaknesses in Financial Statement Preparation Processes:

The auditors for 2 of the 10 components reported material weaknesses in 

the financial statement preparation process. In response to prior 

auditor recommendations, the Justice Management Division issued a 

number of departmentwide policies and held periodic meetings with the 

Justices components to discuss accounting and financial reporting 

requirements. A key product of these efforts was the issuance of 

Justices Financial Statement Requirements and Preparation Guide. This 

guide helped provide a solid foundation for improved financial 

reporting in 2001, however, the auditors continued to identify material 

weaknesses in the financial statement preparation process. For example, 

component auditors reported that:

* Draft financial statements and Managements Discussion and Analysis 

(MD&A) submitted for audit by several components were not properly 

prepared in accordance with existing Justice reporting requirements and 

were not adequately reviewed by management. The drafts were found to 

contain clerical errors, incomplete disclosures, and inconsistencies in 

the financial statements and note disclosures.

* Accrual-based financial transaction processing at DEA was not 
performed 

on an ongoing basis, resulting in substantial year-end efforts to 

obtain and analyze financial data necessary for financial statement 

preparation.

* The FBIs financial management department lacked the staff to perform 

the many tasks needed to produce annual financial statements and, 

therefore, could not fully comply with Justices financial reporting 

requirements.

* Requirements to accumulate and report interagency elimination entries 

to Justice were not consistently followed and resulted in the failure 

to meet internal timelines, data not being provided in required 

formats, and having financial activity among the components to go 

unconfirmed.

* The reconciliation of intragovernmental transactions with other 
federal 

agencies was not fully completed and increased the risk of inaccurate 

data being reported.

Proper financial management and reporting must be performed throughout 

the year and must be complete in order to eliminate extensive manual 

financial statement preparation efforts at the end of the fiscal year. 

These year-end efforts are more susceptible to error and increase the 

risk of misstatement in the Justices and components financial 

statements. The reduction of these manual efforts is especially 

important given the new financial reporting requirements of the Office 

of Management and Budget (OMB) for interim financial statements and the 

acceleration of 2002 year-end financial statement deadlines by 

approximately 1 month. Without improvements or fundamental changes to 

how Justice and its components manage their financial activities, there 

is a serious risk that the preparation and audit of Justices fiscal 

year 2002 financial statements will not comply with required deadlines. 

This could result in a modification to the auditors reports on 

Justices and its components financial statements, internal controls, 

and compliance with laws and regulations.

GAO Contacts:

Subjects covered in this report; Manage the FBIs Transformation; 

Realign staff; Build analytic capability; Need for comprehensive 

policy for National Infrastructure Protection Center; Recruitment 

may be more difficult due to increased competition for specialized 

skills; Improve communications and information technology; Develop 

an internal control system to protect civil liberties; Manage the 

ripple effect on the law enforcement community; Better Manage 

Programs Designed to Support State and Local Efforts to Reduce Crime; 

Problems with OJP grant monitoring; Too early to gauge effectiveness 

of OJP efforts to resolve grant monitoring problems; Concerns about 

methodological rigor of impact evaluation studies; Better DOJ 

data collection and evaluation needed to measure impact of federally 

funded drug court programs; Contact person: Laurie K. Ekstrand, 

Director; (202) 512-8777; ekstrandl@gao.gov.

Subjects covered in this report; INS estimated that significantly 

more INS resources and time needed to fully implement border control 

strategy, yet overall effectiveness still unknown; ; Efforts to combat 

immigration benefit fraud fragmented and unfocused; ; Efforts to reduce 

unauthorized employment face impediments; ; Improvements needed in 

identifying and removing criminal aliens; ; Shortcomings in alien 

antismuggling efforts; ; Problems managing application workload; 

Contact person: Richard M. Stana, Director; (202) 512-8777; 

stanar@gao.gov.

Subjects covered in this report; Problems coordinating with State 

Department on using the visa process to screen for potential 
terrorists; 

Contact person: Jess T. Ford, Director; International Affairs and 
Trade; 

(202) 512-4128; fordj@gao.gov.

Subjects covered in this report; INSs information technology 
management 

weaknesses; Contact person: Randolph C. Hite, Director; Information 

Technology Architecture and Systems Issues; (202) 512-6204; 
hiter@gao.gov.

Subjects covered in this report; Weaknesses in general and application 

controls over component financial management systems; ; Weaknesses in 

recording financial transactions in accordance with generally accepted 

accounting principles; ; Weaknesses in financial statement preparation; 

Contact person: Linda M. Calbom, Director; Financial Management and 

Assurance.; (202) 512-8341; calboml@gao.gov.

[End of table]

Related GAO Products:

Manage FBIs Transformation:

FBI Reorganization: Initial Steps Encouraging but Broad Transformation 

Needed. GAO-02-865T. Washington, D.C.: June 21, 2002.

A Model of Strategic Human Capital Management, GAO-02-373SP. 

Washington, D.C.: March 15, 2002.

Information Technology: Enterprise Architecture Use Across the Federal 

Government Can Be Improved. GAO-02-6. Washington, D.C.: February 19, 

2002.

Foreign Languages: Human Capital Approach Needed to Correct Staffing 

and Proficiency Shortfalls. GAO-02-375. Washington, D.C.: January 31, 

2002.

Critical Infrastructure Protection: Significant Challenges in 

Developing National Capabilities. GAO-01-323. Washington, D.C.: April 

25, 2001.

Information Security: Advances and Remaining Challenges to Adoption of 

Public Key Infrastructure Technology. GAO-01-277. Washington, D.C.: 

February 26, 2001.

Management Reform: Elements of Successful Improvement Initiatives. GAO/

T-GGD-00-26. Washington. D.C.: October 15, 1999.

Agencies Annual Performance Plans Under the Results Act: An Assessment 

Guide to Facilitate Congressional Decisionmaking. GAO/GGD/AIMD-

10.1.18. Washington, D.C.: February 1, 1998.

Agencies Strategic Plans Under GPRA: Key Questions to Facilitate 

Congressional Review. GAO/GGD-10.1.16. Washington, D.C.: May 1, 1997.

Executive Guide: Effectively Implementing the Government Performance 

and Results Act. GAO/GGD-96-118. Washington, D.C.: June 1, 1996.

Improve the Enforcement of Immigration Laws and Provision of 

Immigration Services:

Border Security: Visa Process Should Be Strengthened as an 

Antiterrorism Tool. GAO-03-132NI. Washington, D.C.: October 21, 2002:

Immigration Enforcement: Challenges to Implementing the INS Interior 

Enforcement Strategy. GAO-02-861T. Washington, D.C.: June 19, 2002.

Immigration Benefit Fraud: Focused Approach Is Needed to Address 

Problems. GAO-02-66. Washington, D.C.: January 31, 2002.

Immigration and Naturalization Service: Overview of Recurring 

Management Challenges. GAO-02-168T. Washington, D.C.: October 17, 2001.

Securing Americas Borders: INS Faces Information Technology Planning 

and Implementation Challenges. GAO-02-148T. Washington, D.C.: October 

11, 2001.

INS Southwest Border Strategy: Resource and Impact Issues Remain After 

Seven Years. GAO-01-842. Washington, D.C.: August 2, 2001.

Immigration Benefits: Several Factors Impede Timeliness of Application 

Processing. GAO-01-488. Washington, D.C.: May 4, 2001.

Alien Smuggling: Management and Operational Improvements Needed to 

Address Growing Problem. GAO/GGD-00-103. Washington, D.C.: May 1, 2000.

Information Technology: INS Needs to Strengthen Its Investment 

Management Capability. GAO-01-146. Washington, D.C.: December 29, 2000.

Information Technology: INS Needs to Better Manage the Development of 

Its Enterprise Architecture. GAO/AIMD-00-212. Washington, D.C.: August 

1, 2000.

Illegal Aliens: Significant Obstacles to Reducing Unauthorized Alien 

Employment Exist. GAO/GGD-99-33. Washington, D.C.: April 2, 1999.

Criminal Aliens: INS Efforts to Identify and Remove Imprisoned Aliens 

Continue to Need Improvement. GAO/T-GGD-99-47. Washington, D.C.: 

February 25, 1999.

INS Management: Follow-up on Selected Problems. GAO/GGD-97-132. 

Washington, D.C.: July 22, 1997.

Criminal Aliens: INS Efforts to Identify and Remove Imprisoned Aliens 

Need to be Improved. GAO/T-GGD-97-154. Washington, D.C.: July 15, 1997.

Better Manage Programs Designed to Support State and Local Efforts to 

Reduce Crime:

Drug Courts: Better DOJ Data Collection and Evaluation Efforts Needed 

to Measure Impact of Drug Court Programs. GAO-02-434. Washington, D.C.: 

April 18, 2002.

Violence Against Women: Problems with Grant Monitoring and Concerns 

about Evaluation Studies. GAO-02-641T. Washington, D.C.: April 16, 

2002.

Office of Justice Programs: Problems with Grant Monitoring and Concerns 

about Evaluation Studies. GAO-02-507T. Washington, D.C.: March 7, 2002.

Justice Impact Evaluations: One Byrne Evaluation Was Rigorous; All 

Reviewed Violence Against Women Office Evaluations Were Problematic. 

GAO-02-309. Washington, D.C.: March 7, 2002.

Justice Discretionary Grants: Byrne Program and Violence Against Women 

Office Grant Monitoring Should Be Better Documented. GAO-02-25. 

Washington, D.C.: November 28, 2001.

Juvenile Justice: OJJDP Reporting Requirements for Discretionary and 

Formula Grantees and Concerns About Evaluation Studies. GAO-02-23. 

Washington, D.C.: October 30, 2001.

Juvenile Justice: Better Documentation of Discretionary Grant 

Monitoring is Needed. GAO-02-65. Washington, D.C.: October 10, 2001.

Internal Control: Standards for Internal Control in the Federal 

Government. GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1. Washington, D.C.: November 1999.

Federal Grants: More Can Be Done to Improve Weed and Seed Program 

Management. GAO/GGD-99-110. Washington, D.C.: July 16, 1999.

Drug Courts: Overview of Growth, Characteristics, and Results. GAO/

GGD-97-106. Washington, D.C.: July 31, 1997.

Juvenile Justice: Selected Issues Relating to OJJDPs Reauthorization. 

GAO/T-GGD-96-103. Washington, D.C.: May 8, 1996.

Achieve Financial Accountability for Fiscal Year 2002 and Beyond:

Critical Infrastructure Protection: Significant Challenges Need to Be 

Addressed. GAO-02-961T. Washington, D.C.: July 24, 2002.

Information Security: Additional Actions Needed to Fully Implement 

Reform Legislation. GAO-02-470T Washington, D.C.: March 6, 2002.

Computer Security: Improvements Needed to Reduce Risk to Critical 

Federal Operations and Assets. GAO-02-231T. Washington, D.C.: November 

9, 2001.

Performance and Accountability Series:

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: A Governmentwide 

Perspective. GAO-03-95.

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of 

Agriculture. GAO-03-96.

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Commerce. 

GAO-03-97.

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Defense. 

GAO-03-98.

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Education. 

GAO-03-99.

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Energy. 

GAO-03-100.

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Health and 

Human Services. GAO-03-101.

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Homeland 

Security. GAO-03-102.

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Housing 

and Urban Development. GAO-03-103.

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of the 

Interior. GAO-03-104.

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Justice. 

GAO-03-105.

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Labor. 

GAO-03-106.

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of State. 

GAO-03-107.

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of 

Transportation. GAO-03-108.

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of the 

Treasury. GAO-03-109.

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Veterans 

Affairs. GAO-03-110.

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: U.S. Agency for 

International Development. GAO-03-111.

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Environmental Protection 

Agency. GAO-03-112.

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Federal Emergency 

Management Agency. GAO-03-113.

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: National Aeronautics and 

Space Administration. GAO-03-114.

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Office of Personnel 

Management. GAO-03-115.

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Small Business 

Administration. GAO-03-116.

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Social Security 

Administration. GAO-03-117.

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: U.S. Postal Service. 

GAO-03-118.

High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-03-119.

High-Risk Series: Strategic Human Capital Management. GAO-03-120.

High-Risk Series: Protecting Information Systems Supporting the Federal 

Government and the Nations Critical Infrastructures. GAO-03-121.

High-Risk Series: Federal Real Property. GAO-03-122.

FOOTNOTES

[1] We also removed the 2001 high-risk designation of Justice and 

Treasurys asset forfeiture programs from our 2003 High-Risk Series: An 

Update, GAO-03-119 (Washington, D.C.: Xxx. XX, 2003). 

[2] The Homeland Security Act of 2002 (H.R. 5005) established the 

Department of Homeland Security, was signed by the President on 

November 25, 2002, and became public law P.L. 107-296.

[3] U.S. General Accounting Office, FBI Reorganization: Initial Steps 

Encouraging but Broad Transformation Needed, GAO-02-865T (Washington, 

D.C.: June 21, 2002).

[4] For GAO reports discussing the elements of successful 

transformation in more detail, see Management Reform: Elements of 

Successful Improvement Initiatives, GAO/T-GGD-00-26 (Washington. D.C.: 

Oct. 15, 1999); Executive Guide: Effectively Implementing the 

Government Performance and Results Act, GAO/GGD-96-118 (Washington, 

D.C.: June 1, 1996); Agencies Strategic Plans Under GPRA: Key 

Questions to Facilitate Congressional Review, GAO/GGD-10.1.16 (Version 

1) (Washington, D.C.: May 1, 1997); Agencies Annual Performance Plans 

Under the Results Act: An Assessment Guide to Facilitate Congressional 

Decisionmaking, GAO/GGD/AIMD-10.1.18 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 1, 1998); 

and A Model of Strategic Human Capital Management, GAO-02-373SP 

(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 15, 2002).

[5] U.S. General Accounting Office, Critical Infrastructure Protection: 

Significant Challenges in Developing National Capabilities, GAO-01-323 

(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 25, 2001).

[6] U.S. General Accounting Office, Foreign Languages: Human Capital 

Approach Needed to Correct Staffing and Proficiency Shortfalls, GAO-02-

375  (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 31, 2002).

[7] U.S. General Accounting Office, Information Security: Advances and 

Remaining Challenges to Adoption of Public Key Infrastructure 

Technology, GAO-01-277 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 26, 2001).

[8] U.S. General Accounting Office, Information Technology: Enterprise 

Architecture Use Across the Federal Government Can Be Improved, GAO-02-

6 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 19, 2002).

[9] U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Audit 

Report: Federal Bureau of Investigations Management of Information 

Technology Investments, Report Number 03-09 (Washington, D.C.: December 

2002). 

[10] The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (P.L. 95-511), 

as amended, among other things, established legal standards and a 

process for seeking electronic surveillance and physical search 

authority in national security investigations seeking to obtain foreign 

intelligence and counterintelligence information within the United 

States.

[11] U.S. General Accounting Office, FBI Intelligence Investigations: 

Coordination Within Justice on Counterintelligence Criminal Matters is 

Limited, GAO-01-780 (Washington, D. C.: July 16, 2001).

[12] P.L. 107-296 directed the abolishment of INS after its functions 

are transferred to the new Department of Homeland Security. INSs 

Border Patrol, detention, removal, intelligence, investigations, and 

inspections programs will transfer to the new Bureau of Border 

Security, and its adjudication functions of immigrant visa petitions, 

naturalization petitions, asylum and refugee applications, and of its 

service centers will transfer to the new Bureau of Citizenship and 

Immigration Services.

[13] U.S. General Accounting Office, INS Southwest Border Strategy: 

Resource and Impact Issues Remain After Seven Years, GAO-01-842 

(Washington, D.C.: Aug. 2, 2001).

[14] U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, 

Follow-up Report on Border Patrols Efforts to Improve Northern Border 

Security (Redacted Version), Report No. I-2002-004 (Washington, D.C.: 

Feb. 2002)

[15] A July 2002 research report by the Public Policy Institute of 

California, which we did not independently assess, went even further by 

concluding that increased enforcement along the U.S.-Mexican border has 

failed to reduce unauthorized immigration.

[16] U.S. General Accounting Office, Immigration Benefit Fraud: Focused 

Approach Is Needed to Address Problems, GAO-02-66 (Washington, D.C.: 

Jan. 31, 2002).

[17] U.S. Census Bureau, ESCAP II: Demographic Analysis Results, 

Executive Steering Committee for A.C.E. Policy II, Report No. 1 

(Washington, D.C.: Oct. 13, 2001).

[18] U.S. General Accounting Office, Immigration Enforcement: 

Challenges to Implementing the INS Interior Enforcement Strategy, GAO-

02-861T (Washington, D.C.: June 19, 2002).

[19] U.S. General Accounting Office, Illegal Aliens: Significant 

Obstacles to Reducing Unauthorized Alien Employment Exist, GAO/GGD-99-

33 (Washington, D.C.: April 1999).

[20] Statement of Joseph R. Greene, Assistant Commissioner for 

Investigations, before the House Subcommittee on Immigration and 

Claims, regarding the INS Interior Enforcement Strategy, June 19, 2002.

[21] U.S. General Accounting Office, Criminal Aliens: INS Efforts to 

Identify and Remove Imprisoned Aliens Need to be Improved, GAO/T-GGD-

97-154 (Washington, D.C.: July 15, 1997).

[22] U.S. General Accounting Office, Criminal Aliens: INS Efforts to 

Identify and Remove Imprisoned Aliens Continue to Need Improvement, 

GAO/T-GGD-99-47 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 25, 1999).

[23] U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, 

Immigration and Naturalization Service Institutional Removal Program, 

Audit Report No. 02-41 (Washington, D.C.: September 2002).

[24] U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, The 

INS Escort of Criminal Aliens, Report No. I-2001-005 (Washington, D.C.: 

June 2001).

[25] U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, 

Survey of INSs Anti-Smuggling Units, Report No. I-2001-03 (Washington, 

D.C.: March 2001).

[26] U.S. General Accounting Office, Alien Smuggling: Management and 

Operational Improvements Needed to Address Growing Problem, GAO/GGD-00-

103 (Washington, D.C.: May 1, 2000).

[27] U.S. General Accounting Office, Immigration Benefits: Several 

Factors Impede Timeliness of Application Processing, GAO-01-488 

(Washington, D.C.: May 4, 2001).

[28] U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, The 

Immigration and Naturalization Services Contacts with Two September 11 

Terrorists: A Review of the INSs Admission of Mohamed Atta and Marwan 

Alshehhi, its Processing of their Change of Status Applications, and 

its Efforts to Track Foreign Students in the United States (Washington, 

D.C.: May 20, 2002).

[29] The United States also grants visas to people who intend to 

immigrate to the United States. In this report section, we use the term 

visa to refer to nonimmigrant visas only. Citizens of 28 countries 

that participate in the visa waiver program, Canada, and certain other 

locations are not required to obtain visas for business or pleasure 

stays of short duration.

[30] The President established the Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task 

Force, an interagency group under the auspices of the Department of 

Justice, on October 30, 2001. The task force was to ensure that, to the 

maximum extent permitted by law, federal agencies coordinate programs 

to (1) deny U.S. entry of aliens who are associated with, suspected of 

being engaged in, or supporting terrorist activity, and (2) locate, 

detain, prosecute, or deport any such aliens already present in the 

United States. The task force does not have legal authority to 

adjudicate visa applications or applications for immigration benefits.

[31] U.S. General Accounting Office, Border Security: Visa Process 

Should Be Strengthened as an Antiterrorism Tool, GAO-03-132NI 

(Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21, 2002).

[32] As of August 1, 2002, this dispute applied to 567 visa applicants 

whose names matched information in Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task 

Force databases.

[33] U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, The 

Immigration and Naturalization Services Automated I-94 System, Report 

Number 01-18 (August 6, 2001).

[34] The Automated I-94 system electronically captured arrival and 

departure data for nonimmigrants at four airports. The system was 

retired in February 2002.

[35] U.S. General Accounting Office, Information Technology: INS Needs 

to Better Manage the Development of Its Enterprise Architecture, GAO/

AIMD-00-212 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 1, 2000) and Information 

Technology: INS Needs to Strengthen Its Investment Management 

Capability, GAO-01-146 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 29, 2000).

[36] U.S. General Accounting Office, Securing Americas Borders: INS 

Faces Information Technology Planning and Implementation Challenges, 

GAO-02-148T (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 11, 2001).

[37] VAWO was renamed the Office on Violence Against Women (OVAW) in 

July 2002 as part of an OJP reorganization.

[38] U.S. General Accounting Office, Office of Justice Programs: 

Problems with Grant Monitoring and Concerns about Evaluation Studies, 

GAO-02-507T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 7, 2002).

[39] U.S. General Accounting Office, Justice Discretionary Grants: 

Byrne Program and Violence Against Women Office Grant Monitoring Should 

Be Better Documented, GAO-02-25 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 28, 2001); 

Juvenile Justice: OJJDP Reporting Requirements for Discretionary and 

Formula Grantees and Concerns About Evaluation Studies, GAO-02-23 

(Washington, D.C.: Oct. 30, 2001); Juvenile Justice: Better 

Documentation of Discretionary Grant Monitoring is Needed, GAO-02-65 

(Washington, D.C.: Oct. 10, 2001); and Juvenile Justice: Selected 

Issues Relating to OJJDPs Reauthorization, GAO/T-GGD-96-103 

(Washington, D.C.: May 8, 1996).

[40] U.S. General Accounting Office, Internal Control: Standards for 

Internal Control in the Federal Government, GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1 

(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 1999).

[41] Dougherty and Associates, Final Report of Finding & 

Recommendations for Improvement of the Grant Management Process 

(Alexandria, Va., 2000).

[42] U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Top 

Management Challenges in the Department of Justice - 2000, usdoj.gov/

oig/challenges/2000.htm (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 1, 2000) and 2001, 

usdoj.gov/oig/challenges/2001.htm (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 31, 2001).

[43] Since then, OJP created a chief information officer position 

charged with overseeing an agencywide grant management system.

[44] This document superseded OJP Handbook: Policies and Procedures for 

the Administration of OJP Grants (Washington, D.C., 1992).

[45] U.S. General Accounting Office, Federal Grants: More Can Be Done 

to Improve Weed and Seed Program Management, GAO/GGD-99-110 

(Washington, D.C.: July 16, 1999).

[46] This number is current as of July 5, 2002.

[47] U.S. General Accounting Office, Justice Impact Evaluations: One 

Byrne Evaluation Was Rigorous; All Reviewed Violence Against Women 

Office Evaluations Were Problematic, GAO-02-309 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 

7, 2002).

[48] U.S. General Accounting Office, Juvenile Justice: OJJDP Reporting 

Requirements for Discretionary and Formula Grantees and Concerns About 

Evaluation Studies, GAO-02-23 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 30, 2001).

[49] The main purpose of a drug court program is to use the courts 

authority to reduce crime by changing the defendants substance abuse 

behavior. In exchange for the possibility of dismissed charges or 

reduced sentences, defendants are diverted to drug court programs.

[50] U.S. General Accounting Office, Drug Courts: Overview of Growth, 

Characteristics, and Results, GAO/GGD-97-106 (Washington, D.C.: July 

31, 1997).

[51] U.S. General Accounting Office, Drug Courts: Better DOJ Data 

Collection and Evaluation Efforts Needed to Measure Impact of Drug 

Court Programs, GAO-02-434 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 18, 2002).

[52] INS and Justice received an unqualified opinion on the Balance 

Sheet and Statement of Custodial Activity and a qualified opinion on 

the Statements of Net Cost, Changes in Net Position, and Budgetary 

Resources and Financing for fiscal year 2000.

[53] In our prior report on management challenges at Justice issued in 

January 2001, we reported that Justice had improved from receiving a 

disclaimer of opinion on its fiscal year 1998 departmentwide financial 

statements to receiving a qualified opinion on its fiscal year 1999 

departmentwide financial statements.

[54] A material weakness is a condition in which the design or 

operation of one or more of the internal control components does not 

reduce, to a relatively low level, the risk that errors or 

irregularities, in amounts that would be material to the financial 

statements, may occur and not be detected promptly by employees in the 

normal course of performing their duties.

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