DHS-FEMA Region {___} 
{City, State} 

CLASS SCHEDULE

COURSE CODE: L156 
BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY FOR 
CONTINUITY OF OPERATIONS (COOP) TRAIN-THE-TRAINER 
{Month Date  Month Date, Year} 

Course Manager Place 
{First and Last Name} {Location of Class} 

DAY 1 {Day of Week, Month Date, Year} 

8:30 a.m. Welcome and Administrative {Course Manager} 
Announcements {Course Manager - Title} 
{Course Manger  Organization} 
Unit 1 (C): Introduction and Course Eric Letvin, P.E., Esq. CFM 
Overview Principal Engineer 
URS Corporation 
Linthicum, MD 
Or 
Scott Tezak 
Project Manager 
URS Corporation 
Boston, MA 
10:15 Break 
10:30 Unit 2 (C): Asset Value Assessment Wesley Lyon, PMP 
Senior Engineer 
Raytheon UTD 
Springfield, VA 
Or 
Phil Lehman, DVM 
Principal Scientist 
Raytheon UTD 
Springfield, VA 
Or 
Robert Cizmadia, CPP, FSO 
VP, Security Operations 
Sage Security Group 
Herndon VA 

July 19, 2007 


11:45 Lunch 

12:45 p.m. Unit 3 (C): Threat and Hazard Assessment Wesley Lyon, Phil Lehman, or 
Robert Cizmadia 

2:00 Break 

2:15 Unit 4 (C): Vulnerability Assessment Michael Kaminskas, P.E., BSCP 
Senior Engineer 
Raytheon UTD 
Springfield, VA 

DAY 1 {Day of Week, Month Date, Year} (continued) 
3:30 p.m. Break 
3:45 Unit 4 (C) Continued Michael Kaminskas 
4:15 Unit 5 (C): Risk Assessment and Risk Eric Letvin or Scott Tezak 
Management 
5:00 Adjourn 
DAY 2 {Day of Week, Month Date, Year} 
8:30 a.m. Unit 6 (C): FEMA 452 Risk Assessment Michael Kaminskas 
Database 
9:45 Break 
10:00 Unit 7 (C): Explosive Blast Michael Kaminskas 
12:00 p.m. Lunch 
1:00 Unit 8 (C): Chemical, Biological, and Wesley Lyon, Phil Lehman, or 
Radiological (CBR) Measures Robert Cizmadia 
2:45 Break 
3:00 Unit 9 (C): Site and Layout Design Eric Letvin or Scott Tezak 
Guidance 


5:00 Adjourn 
DAY 3 {Day of Week, Month Date, Year} 
8:30 a.m. Unit 10 (C): Building Design Guidance Michael Kaminskas 
9:45 Break 
10:00 Unit 10 (C) (Continued) Michael Kaminskas 
11:30 Lunch 
12:30 p.m. Unit 11 (C): Electronic Security Systems Wesley Lyon, Phil Lehman, or 
Robert Cizmadia 
1:30 Unit 12 (C): Case Study Preview (Goal: 
Brief building owner on prioritized 
recommendations and justifications for 
security work.) 
Michael Kaminskas 
2:15 Break 
2:30 Unit 12 (C): Presentation of Group Case 
Study Results and Discussion (10-minute 
presentation and 5-minute discussion per 
team) 
Students/All Instructors 
3:30 Unit 13 (C): Train-the-Trainer Eric Letvin or Wesley Lyon 
4:30 Unit 14 (C): Course Summary, 
Evaluation, and Graduation 
{Course Manager} 
5:00 Course Adjourns 


Unit I (C): Introduction and Course Overview 

Unit I (C) 

COURSE TITLE Building Design for Homeland Security for Continuity of Operations 
(COOP) Train-the-Trainer 

UNIT TITLE Introduction and Course Overview 

OBJECTIVES 1. Describe the goal, objectives, and agenda for the course 

2. Describe and find material in the course reference manual and 
student activity handout 

SCOPE The following topics will be covered in this unit: 

1. 
Welcome and Opening Remarks 
2. 
Instructor Introductions 
3. 
Administrative Information 
4. 
Student Introductions 
5. 
Course Overview 
6. 
Course Materials 
7. 
Activity: Refamiliarize with Case Study materials 

REFERENCES 1. FEMA 426, Reference Manual to Mitigate Potential Terrorist 
Attacks Against Buildings 

2. Case Study  Appendix C: COOP, Cooperville Information / 
Business Center 


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UNIT I (C) CASE STUDY ACTIVITY: 
CASE STUDY OVERVIEW 
(COOP Version) 

Requirements 

SQUARE FOOTAGE ANALYSIS  Does the CI/BC Building have sufficient space to 
accommodate the DAI essential functions? 

Criteria used to evaluate square footage (rules of thumb): 
Workstations in Business Center office areas average 100 square feet in floor space. 
Additional workstations or tables are available on a one-days notice. 

There is no formal Federal Government-wide standard for office space per person. However 
EPA and GSA recommend 225-230 usable square feet per person which includes all 
individual and shared space such as workstations, circulation, storage, filing space, and 
conference rooms. The minimum functional workstation footprint is 64 to 80 square feet 
(an 8 foot by 8 foot to 8 foot by 10 foot cubicle). 

A good approach is to use 100 square feet as the minimum space needed for each work station to 
allow for movement around office and filing/storage space for deployed equipment and files. 

a. Available Unclassified Square Footage for Personnel: ____________________________ 

(1) Shift Personnel Requiring Unclassified Square Footage: __________ 
(with no secure computer terminal co-located) 

NOTE: DAI configures their cubicles such that secure computer terminals are in 
secure space and the unclassified computer terminal required for these personnel are 
properly configured for placement in the same cubicle/workstation within the secure 
space. 

See Page SM I-C-8 for Alternate Facility Description Personnel Shift Configuration 


(2) 
Minimum Required Unclassified Square Footage for Personnel: ___________ 
(3) 
Maximum Required Unclassified Square Footage for Personnel: ___________ 
(4) 
Available Unclassified Square Footage per person: ______________________ 

b. Available Secure (Classified) Square Footage for Personnel: ______________________ 

(1) 
Shift Personnel Requiring Secure Square Footage: __________ 
(with unclassified computer terminal co-located)
See Page SM I-C-8 for Alternate Facility Description Personnel Shift Configuration 

(2) 
Minimum Required Secure Square Footage for Personnel: ___________________ 
(3) 
Maximum Required Secure Square Footage for Personnel: ___________________ 
(4) 
Available Secure Square Footage per person: ______________________________ 


BACKGROUND INFORMATION 

The needed information from Appendix C, Case Study, is contained here to answer the square 
footage questions. Use only the Case Study data to answer the student activity questions. 
However, feel free to ask questions of the instructors based upon your experience. 

ESSENTIAL FUNCTIONS  NOTE: Table information is summarized in the last row of 
the table. 

Priority Essential Function Req 
Square 
Footage 
Req # 
Personnel 
Req # Computer 
Terminals 
(U) Unclassified 
(S) Secure 
Req # 
Telephones 
(U) Unclassified 
(S) Secure 
Req Cell 
Phone 
Coverage 
(Y or N) 
1 Orchestrate 
national level 
4 
COOP 
(U) 2 (U) 2 Y 4 
response to any 
loss of artificial 
intelligence 
production 
capability and loss 
of AI revenue 
Site 
Managers 
10 
Staff 
(U) 5 
(S) 5 
(S) 5 N 
required for 
payments to US 
citizens 
2 Consult with and 
provide reports 
and other technical 
4 
COOP 
Site Fin 
(U) 2 (U) 2 Y 4 
assistance to 
appropriate 
Federal agencies 
that may be 
impacted by loss 
of AI component 
availability and 
resultant revenue 
Sys Mgrs 
12 
Staff 
(U) 6 
(S) 6 
(S) 6 N 
flow 
3 Process and post 
financial 
36 (U) 18 (U) 18 N 
documents 
supporting 
monthly cash flow 


Priority Essential Function Req 
Square 
Footage 
Req # 
Personnel 
Req # Computer 
Terminals 
(U) Unclassified 
(S) Secure 
Req # 
Telephones 
(U) Unclassified 
(S) Secure 
Req Cell 
Phone 
Coverage 
(Y or N) 
to Agencies that 
distribute AI 
revenues to 
entitlement 
recipients 
4 Operate personnel 
/ payroll system to 
ensure all DAI 
28 (U) 14 (U) 14 N 
personnel receive 
payments 
5 Manage 
operations, 
security, safety, 
and health 
20 (U) 10 
(S) 2 
(U) 10 
(S) 2 
Y-4 
programs for all 
DAI personnel, 
programs, and 
operations 
6 Manage 
Department-wide 
computer security 
functions 
10 (U) 5 
(S) 5 
(S) 5 N 
7 Provide liaison 
with state, local, 
and tribal officials 
on status of critical 
AI production, 
availability, and 
shortfalls. 
26 (U) 13 (U) 13 Y 5 
Summary of 
Essential 
Function 
Requirements 
Mgrs 8 
Staff 142 
(U) 75 
(S) 18 
(U) 59 
(S) 18 
17 


ADDITIONAL INFORMATION  Consider during each student activity throughout 
course. 

FEMA 452 COOP questions  answered 

1. 
Deployment Planning 
2. 
Alternate Facility Description 

Information from other FEMA sources: 

3. 
FEMA 452 Risk Assessment Database v3.0, Checklist Questions  Section 14 COOP 
Facility: Additional Concerns 
4. 
Glossary of COOP terminology, FEMA Independent Study (IS) 546, 

Continuity of Operations (COOP) Awareness Course. 

5. 
Alternate Facility Selection Factors, FEMA IS 547, Introduction to Continuity 
of Operations. 
6. 
Components of an Effective Vital Records Program, FEMA IS 547. 
7. 
FPC-65 Testing Requirements. 

2. DEPLOYMENT PLANNING 

a. 
Minimum distance to alternate facility ____60____ miles. 
b. 
Required access to transportation: 

_____?____ Yes/No Privately Owned Vehicle 

_____?____ Yes/No Agency Arranged Transportation 

_____?____ Yes/No Mass Transit 

Types of Mass Transit at Primary Facility: 

___Yes____ Yes/No Bus 

___Yes____ Yes/No Rail 

___Yes____ Yes/No Taxis 

Types of Mass Transit at Alternate Facility: 

___Yes____ Yes/No Bus 

___Yes____ Yes/No Rail 

___Yes____ Yes/No Taxis 


3. Alternate Facility Description: 

a. How soon after decision to deploy must site be available? 
___12_____ # of hours 
b. Number of Persons to be supported overall (all shifts) ___150___ # people 
Shift ___A_____ Number of Persons on shift ___75_____ # people 
Shift ___B_____ Number of Persons on shift ___75_____ # people 
Shift _________ Number of Persons on shift __________ # people 
c. When this alternate facility is activated, how many hours per day and days per week will 
it operate? 
____24____ # hours per day 
____7_____ # days per week 
d. If people must stay overnight at the site, indicate the total billet requirement. 
____150______ # billets per day 
Where will billets be located? 
There is sufficient hotel room space in the local area to handle part or all 
of the Emergency Relocation Group. Local colleges can be contacted for 
use of dormitory space, but this would be limited to the summer months 
per a preliminary inquiry. 
e. If necessary, the number of meals served on site per day? 
____150___ # of meals per day 
How will meals will be provided, and for what meals (breakfast, lunch, dinner, and for 
which shift)? 
Local eateries are not 24 hour operations, thus the lunch meal on the night 
shift will need to be catered and, for consistency, the lunch meal on the day 
shift should also be catered. Breakfast and dinner for both shifts are at the 
discretion of the individual prior to starting shift and after ending shift. There 
are many caterers/delicatessens/restaurants in the local area that could provide 
a variety of delivered foods for one or both meals. 


f. Facility requirements for auxiliary power sources (generators) 

___1,500 KVA___ power requirement (maximum) 

___1,000 KVA___ critical load (on UPS) 

___1250 eKW / 1563KVA___ generator capability/capacity 

___26 hours___ duration (hours, days, weeks) (minimum) 

Based upon the refueling of the fuel tank(s) each day (24 hours). 
Recommend ensuring there are at least 3 fuel suppliers in different 
localities to ensure servicing of the fuel tank during any power outage 
contingency. 

g. Auxiliary power fuel requirement 

Estimating Rule of Thumb: 0.08 gallons / KW / hour 

___100___ # gallons per hour (1250 KW x 0.08 gallons / KW / hour) 

___22 hours___ duration capability (full tanks  hours, days, weeks) 

(with day tank 80% full)
Increase fuel capacity with another tank or use a portable tank during the 
peak summer months when the maximum load is expected to occur. 
Alternately, during an exercise ensure this COOP site is fully functional 
and measure actual load to better understand consumption and duration 
capability. Adjust capacity requirements accordingly. 

h. Parking requirement 
___0___ Unsecured stalls 
___0___ Secured stalls 
_447 in front & 155 in rear_ Total stalls available (therefore no parking problem even if 
all Emergency Relocation Personnel bring a POV) 
i. Vehicle fuel requirement 
___0___ # gallons per day (all vehicles to be refilled at local gas stations) 


j. Water requirement 

___112.5 to 22,500___ # gallons per day 

Estimating Rules of Thumb: 
2-quarts - 2 gallons per person per day for consumption/minimal washing 
50 gallons / person / day for personal use (drinking, washing, flushing, food prep) 
100 gallons / person / day for all building uses 
150-160 gallons / person / day for water production 
Cooling Tower evaporates 3 gallons / minute / 100 tons of air conditioning or 4,320 

gallons per day / 100 tons of air conditioning. Cooling Tower sumps for these size 
units contain 150-300 gallons. Thus without water supply, cooling towers can last 
about 50-100 minutes before they have insufficient water to operate properly 
(piping not filled) 

Estimated consumption using Rules of Thumb: 
75 CI/BC employees + 150 Emergency Relocation Group personnel = 225 
225 persons x 0.5 = 112.5 gallons / day minimum for 

consumption/minimal washing 
225 persons x 100 = 22,500 gallons / day for all building uses 

Available water if water main shut off: 
Bottled water = 5 dispensers x 3 spare jugs x 5 gallons per jugs = 75 
gallons, up to 100 gallons if each dispenser has a new jug. 
NOTE: Will have to arrange additional bottled water and reserves to 
supply COOP operation. 

k. Radio requirement 

None 

l. Satellite communication requirement 

A satellite link is needed for secure and non-secure worldwide 
communications as a backup to telephone landlines. This may already be 
in the ERG Office Go Kit. 

m. Other requirement 

None listed. 


3. FEMA 452 Risk Assessment Database v3.0 
Checklist Questions  Section 14 COOP Facility: Additional Concerns 

14-1: Essential Functions: Have the essential functions been identified and prioritized to 
establish the planning parameters for the alternate operating facility? 

14.2: Essential Functions: Have reliable processes and procedures been established to acquire 
resources necessary to continue essential functions and sustain operations until normal 
business activities can be reconstituted, which could be up to 30 days? 

14-3: Communications: Does the alternate operating facility provide interoperable 
communications, including a means for secure communications, with all identified 
essential internal and external organizations, customers, and the public? 

14-4: Communications: Have the internal and external communications capabilities at the 
alternate operating facility been validated quarterly? 

14-5: Communications: Does the COOP facility have wireless / cell phone capability? Have 
wireless and cell phone providers been reviewed and compared to ensure the best service 
is provided? Are services available / compatible within the building to support essential 
functions and missions? 

14-6: Test, Training, and Exercises: Has there been annual testing of primary and backup 
infrastructure systems and services at alternate operating facilities (e.g., power, water, 
fuel)? 

14-7: Test, Training, and Exercises: Have physical security capabilities been tested / exercised 
annually and shown to able to be in place within 12 hours of COOP plan activation? 

14-8: Planning Requirements: Is the alternate operating facility located in an area where 
power, telecommunications, and internet grids are distinct from those of the primary 
facility? 

14-9: Planning Requirements: Is the distance between the primary facility and the alternate 
operating facility sufficient to allow it to continue essential agency functions? 

14-10: Planning Requirements: Has the organization identified which essential services and 
functions that can be continued from remote locations (e.g., home facilities or other 
alternative workplaces) and those that need to be preformed at a designated department 
or agency operating facility? 

14-11: Planning Requirements: Does the alternate facility have detailed site preparation and 
activation plans or have pre-positioned supplies and resources in order to achieve full 
operational capability within 12 hours of notification? 

14-12: Planning Requirements: Is the COOP facility able to accommodate all emergency 
relocation group members in a safe and efficient manner? 


14-13: Planning Requirements: Does the COOP facility contain the sufficient amount of 
phones, computers, and necessary equipment needed to sustain COOP operations? 

14-14: Vital Records: Has the organization identified vital records needed to perform its 
essential functions during a COOP event? 

14-15: Vital Records: Do emergence response group members have access to their vital records 
at the alternate facility? Are they available within 12 hours or less of a COOP plan 
activation. 

14-16: Vital Records: Are periodic review / updates of the vital records program conducted to 
address any new security issues, identify problem areas, and identify additional vital 
records that may result from new agency programs or functions? 

14-17: Vital Records: Are there separate COOP servers? Are they placed in a secure area? Are 
there backup procedures? 

14-18: Vital Records: Has a risk assessment of vital records been performed to determine: 

a. 
Identify risks involved if vital records are retained in their current location 
and medium, and the difficulty reconstituting them if they are destroyed. 
b. 
If off site storage is necessary? 
c. 
Determine if alternative storage media is advisable? 
d. 
Determine if it is necessary to duplicate records to provide a vital records 
copy? 

14-19: Human Capital: Is adequate Personal Protective Equipment available for all emergency 
response group members while on-site? 

14-20: Human Capital: Are there sufficient quantities of Personal Protective Equipment for 
emergency response group members to sustain operations for 30 or more days? 

14-21: Human Capital: Are medical facilities, proper caregivers, and first aid kits available for 
emergency response group members if and when needed? 

14-22: Human Capital: Is there access to essential resources such as food, water, fuel, and 
municipal services at the facility? 

14-23: Security: Does the site provide physical security that meets all requirements established 
by annual threat assessments and physical security surveys? 


4. Glossary of COOP Terminology 
FEMA Independent Study (IS) 546 

Continuity of Operations (COOP Awareness Course 

Alternate communications: Provide for the capability to perform essential functions, in 
conjunction with other agencies, until normal operations can be resumed. 

Continuity of Government Plans: Developed and implemented in the event of a catastrophic 
emergency to ensure that our government continues to exist and function. 

Continuity of Operations: A Federal initiative, required by Presidential Directive, to ensure that 
Executive Branch departments and agencies are able to continue their essential functions under a 
broad range of circumstances. 

Delegations of Authority: Formal documents that specify who is authorized to act on behalf of 
the agency or other key officials for specific purposes. 

Devolution: The capability to transfer statutory authority and responsibility for essential 
functions from an agency's primary operating staff and facilities to other employees and 
facilities. 

Essential Functions: Those functions that enable an organization to provide vital services, 
exercise civil authority, maintain the safety of the general public, and sustain the industrial or 
economic base during an emergency. Essential functions must continue with no or minimal 
disruption. 

Exercises: Events that allow participants to apply their skills and knowledge to improve 
operational readiness. Exercises also allow planners to evaluate the effectiveness of previously 
conducted tests, training, and exercises. 

Federal Preparedness Circular 65: Issued by FEMA to provide specific and detailed guidance 
regarding COOP capabilities. 

Full-Scale Exercise: Test the agency's total response capability for COOP situations. These 
exercises are as close to reality as possible, with personnel being deployed and systems and 
equipment being implemented. 

Functional Exercise: Simulate a function (e.g., alert, notification) within a real incident. 
Functional exercises test a single part of COOP activation to be tested independently of other 
responders. 

"Go Kit": A kit that should be assembled by each employee and his or her family and should 
include personal items and necessities, financial and legal documents, and the name and phone 
number of an out-of-area contact. 

Hands-On Training: Can provide practice in specialized skills (e.g., notification procedures), 
allow for practice of newly acquired skills, and help maintain proficiency at infrequently used 
skills. 


Multi-Year Strategy and Program Management Plan: The long-term plan for keeping the 
COOP up to date. 

Occupant Emergency Plans: Intended to ensure the safety of personnel in the event of an 
incident inside or immediately surrounding an agency's building. 

Orders of Succession: Provide for the orderly and predefined assumption of senior agency 
offices during an emergency in the event that any officials are unavailable to execute their legal 
duties. All orders of succession should include the conditions under which succession will take 
place, the method of notification, and limitation on delegations of authority by successors. 

Orientations: The first type of training conducted in an exercise program. Orientations are 
usually conducted as briefings and are a good way to introduce the general concepts of a COOP 
plan; announce staff assignments, roles, and responsibilities; present general procedures; and 
describe how the COOP plan will be tested and exercised and within what timeframes. 

Presidential Decision Directive 67: Issued by former President Bill Clinton, requiring all 
Federal departments and agencies to develop plans in response to all hazards and a full spectrum 
of threats. 

Reconstitution: The process by which surviving and/or replacement agency personnel resume 
normal agency operations from the original or replacement primary facility. 

Relocation: Involves the actual movement of essential functions, personnel, records, and 
equipment to the alternate operation facility. Relocation may also involve transferring 
communications capability to the alternate facility, ordering supplies and equipment that are not 
already in place at the alternate facility, and other planned activities, such as providing network 
access. 

Tabletop Exercise: A simulation activity in which a scenario is presented and participants in the 
exercise respond as if the scenario was really happening. 

Test: An evaluation of a capability against an established and measurable standard. 

Test, Training, and Exercise Program (TT&E): Includes measure to ensure that an agency's 
COOP program is capable of supporting the continued operation of its essential functions 
throughout the duration of a COOP situation. TT&E program should be a blend of test, training, 
and exercise events to ensure that it is comprehensive in that it includes all three components and 
reflects lessons learned from previous TT&E events. 

Training: Instruction in core competencies and skills and is the principal means by which 
individuals achieve a level of proficiency. 

Vital Records: Records that are vital to an agency and its operations. The records include 
emergency operating records and legal and financial records. 


5. Alternate Facility Selection Factors 
FEMA Independent Study (IS) 547 

Introduction to Continuity of Operations 

Factor Explanation 
Location Select a site that provides a risk-free environment, if possible, and is 
geographically dispersed from the primary work location. This will 
reduce the chance that the site will be affected by the same event that 
required COOP activation. 
Construction The alternate facility should be constructed so that it is relatively safe 
from the high-risk hazards in the area. 
Existence of an 
MOU/MOA 
The General Services Administration may have space available that is 
suitable for an alternate facility. Another option may be to enter into a 
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) or Memorandum of Agreement 
(MOA) with another agency to share space during COOP activation. 
Space The alternate facility must have enough space to house the personnel, 
equipment, and systems required to support all of the organization's 
essential functions. 
Billeting and Site 
Transportation 
Billeting and site transportation should be available at or near the 
alternate facility. Sites that are accessible by public transportation and 
that provide billeting or are near hotels offer important advantages. 
Communication The site will need to support the agency's COOP information technology 
and communication requirements. The agency will need to acquire any 
capabilities not already in place. 
Security Security measures, such as controlled access, should be an inherent 
part of the alternate facility. 
Life Support 
Measures 
Access to life support measuresfood, water, and other necessities 
should be available onsite or nearby. 
Site Preparation 
Requirements 
The amount of time, effort, and cost required to make the facility 
suitable for the agency's needs is critical. The more "turnkey" the 
facility is, the better. 
Maintenance Consider the degree of maintenance required to keep the facility ready 
for COOP operations. Lower-maintenance facilities offer a distinct 
advantage in case of no-warning COOP activation. 


6. Components of an Effective Vital Records Program 
FEMA Independent Study (IS) 547 

Introduction to Continuity of Operations 

Component Description 
Vital Records 
Directive 
A directive from senior leadership that establishes the vital records 
program and assigns responsibility for vital records management. The 
directive should: 
Specify the purpose and scope of the program. 
Assign roles and responsibilities. 
Provide for staff training. 
Require periodic review and testing of the program. 
Appropriate 
Medium 
The determination of an appropriate medium for each type of vital record 
to enable the Emergency Relocation Group (ERG) to access the records 
within 12 hours, or less, as required, of activation. Agencies should 
strongly consider: 
Multiple redundant media for storage of vital records. 
Methods to facilitate the rapid recovery of records necessary to 
ensure business survival. 
Records 
Inventory 
A complete inventory of the records identified as vital to agency 
operations. The inventory should include: 
The location of the records. 
Complete access information. 
Risk 
Assessment 
An assessment that: 
Identifies the risks involved if the vital records are retained in their 
current locations and in their current mediaand the difficulty of 
reconstituting them if they are destroyed. 
Determines the level of physical security and confidentiality of the 
records. 
Determines offsite storageperhaps in a regional office or in 
commercial storage. 
Identifies whether alternate storage media are advisable. 
Determines whether duplication may be required for records that 
will be stored off site, are static, or are available in hardcopy only. 


Records 
Protection 
Methods 
The selection of appropriate protection methods for all vital records, 
including whether: 
Dispersal to other locations may be required. If records are to be 
dispersed, the site must have controlled access separately from the 
site where the records were created or used regularly. 
Special media protection methods are required. 
Update 
Procedures 
Procedures for routinely updating vital records so that they always contain 
the most current information. 
Recovery 
Strategy 
The identification of records recovery experts and vendors who can assist 
with the recovery of vital records in the event of damage or loss. 
Vital Records 
Packet 
A packet that includes: 
A list of key personnel and disaster staff including up-to-date 
telephone numbers or other contact information. 
A complete inventory of the vital records and their precise 
locations. 
Necessary keys and/or access codes for the records. 
The locations of alternate operating facilities. 
The packet should be reviewed periodically to ensure that the information is 
current. 
Training A training program for all staff involved in the vital records program. 
Training for vital records should focus on the vital records policies and 
procedures as well as personnel responsibilities. 
Review 
Program 
A strategy for periodic review of all vital records. The program should: 
Address new security issues that have been identified since the last 
review. 
Update information in the vital records as necessary. 
Identify additional vital records. 
Provide an opportunity to familiarize staff with the program. 
Testing 
Capabilities 
A testing strategy that evaluates capabilities for: 
Protecting classified and unclassified vital records and databases. 
Providing access to vital records from alternate facilities. 
Testing is required semiannually. 


7. FPC-65 COOP Testing Requirements 

(Potential impact on alternate facility indicated by bold italics) 

Testing is an important part of COOP readiness. By testing, agency personnel can tell if the 
policies and procedures work as they should, when they should. Testing is critical for: 

Alert, notification, and activation procedures. 

Communications systems. 

Vital records and databases. 

Information technology systems. 

Major systems at the alternate facility (e.g., power, water). 

Reconstitution procedures. 

FPC-65 requires testing of certain aspects of the COOP plan. The agency test program must 
include: 
Quarterly testing of alert, notification, and activation procedures. 

Semiannual testing of plans for the recovery of vital classified and unclassified records 
and critical information systems, services, and data. 

Quarterly testing of communications capabilities. 
Annual testing of primary and backup infrastructure systems and services at alternate 
operating facilities (e.g., power). 


Unit II (C): Asset Value Assessment 

Unit II (C) 

COURSE TITLE Building Design for Homeland Security for Continuity of Operations 
(COOP) Train-the-Trainer 

UNIT TITLE Asset Value Assessment 

OBJECTIVES 1. Identify the assets of a building or site that can be affected by a 
threat or hazard 

2. 
Explain the components used to determine the value of an asset 
3. 
Determine the critical assets of a building or site 
4. 
Provide a numerical rating for the asset and justify the basis for the 
rating 

SCOPE The following topics will be covered in this unit: 

1. 
The core functions and critical infrastructure listed on the threatvulnerability 
matrix 
2. 
Various approaches to determine asset value  FEMA, Department 
of Defense, Department of Justice, and Veterans Affairs 
3. 
A rating scale and how to use it to determine an asset value 
4. 
Activity: For the assets identified in the Risk Matrix, use the 
information in the Case Study, review the asset value for each asset 
of interest, and provide rationale for the asset value rating given. 

REFERENCES 1. FEMA 426, Reference Manual to Mitigate Potential Terrorist 
Attacks Against Buildings, pages 1-10 to 1-14 

2. 
FEMA 452, Risk Assessment: A How-To Guide to Mitigate 
Potential Terrorist Attacks Against Buildings, pages 2-1 to 2-26 
3. 
Case Study  Appendix C: COOP, Cooperville Information / 
Business Center 


Asset Value Rating Considerations (Impact or Consequences if asset is lost or damaged) 

1. Criticality to the overall organization, agency, company, or government entity goals 

. Higher criticality means higher value 

o Number of users affected 
o Direct economic loss and cost to rebuild 
o Potential number of deaths from an attack 

2. Criticality to the goals of the specific unit, location, branch, or office being assessed 

. 
Higher criticality means higher value 
o Number of users affected 
o Direct economic loss and cost to rebuild 
o Potential number of deaths from an attack 

. 
Example, the loss of the kitchen at a Veterans Affairs Hospital is important to that 
hospital, but the loss of that kitchen is not critical to the overall goals of the 
Department of Veterans Affairs. 

3. Ease of replacement 

. 
Harder to replace (measured in months to years) means higher value 
. 
Easier to replace (measures in days) means lower value 

4. Relative value of assets 

. 
Just like in fire protection assessment, the higher the cost of the items individually 
and in aggregate, the higher the value 
. 
For people performing functions, the number of critical personnel and the number of 
total personnel in the facility determine the relative rating; the higher the number of 
people the higher the value 
. 
Critical personnel may be harder to replace due to the time needed for education, 
training, and experience to meet functional needs; similar to ease of replacement but 
with much longer timelines 

5. What are the consequences of destruction, failure, or loss of function of the asset in terms 
of fatalities and/ or injuries, property losses, and economic impacts? (Similar to 
criticality above) 

. 
Number of users affected 
. 
Direct economic loss and cost to rebuild 
. 
Potential number of deaths from an attack 

6. What is the likelihood of cascading or subsequent consequences should the asset be 
destroyed or its function lost? 

. Interdependency  will loss of the asset have an effect upon other assets in the same 
or different Critical Infrastructure Sectors 


UNIT II (C) CASE STUDY ACTIVITY: 
ASSET VALUE RATINGS 
(COOP Version) 

Asset value is the degree of debilitating impact that would be caused by the incapacity or 
destruction of a buildings assets. Page 1-13 of FEMA 426 provides an Asset Value Scale 
(Table 1-1) to quantify asset value, as well as definitions of the ratings. Table 1-2 on page 1-14 
of FEMA 426 provides a format to summarize the value of the major categories of a buildings 
assets. FEMA 452, pages 2-17 to 2-19 provide additional information. 

Requirements 

Refer to the Appendix C Case Study to determine answers to the following questions: 

The first question / answer below are provided as an example. The other questions have the 
pages identified where the answers may be found. 

Identifying Building Core Functions 

1. What are Cooperville Information / Business Centers (CI/BC) primary services or outputs? 
[Page C-5 to Page C-6] 

Information Division -- IT services support for over 20 private and government 
organizations/clients. CI/BC supports over 1,000 users and over 100 applications 
as a primary data center and as a disaster recovery backup site to include field 
technicians and help desk. Many clients depend on CI/BCs ability to provide real 
time IT support, on a 24 x 7 basis. Others rely on the companys IT backup 
services. 

Business Center  Provides day-to-day office space and office, telephone, and 
computer support to short-term clients, including Information Division 
requirements. 

2. 
What critical functions/activities take place at CI/BC? [Page C-31 to Page C-35] 
3. 
Who are the buildings primary occupants and visitors? [Page C-5 to Page C-6] 


4. 
What inputs from external organizations are required for CI/BCs success? [Page C-5 to 
Page C-6 and Page C-17 to Page C-35] 

Identifying Building Assets and Quantifying Asset Value Ratings 

Use the following process to complete the following tables  CI/BC Critical Functions Asset 
Value Ratings and CI/BC Critical Infrastructure Asset Value Ratings 

Adjust your asset value ratings of CI/BCs critical functions and critical infrastructure based 
upon the COOP needs of DAI. 

1. Refer to Table 1-1 in FEMA 426 and the associated value descriptions for the ratings 
listed below 

 
Very High (10) 
 
High (8-9) 
 
Medium High (7) 
 
Medium (5-6) 
 
Medium Low (4) 
 
Low (2-3) 
 
Very Low (1) 

2. 
Consider the questions on page 1-11 in FEMA 426 as you rate CI/BCs assets. 
3. 
Refer to Table 1-2 in FEMA 426, Nominal Building Asset Value Assessment and 
use the descriptions of these asset categories as found in the Appendix C Case Study 
to focus the rating. Another approach is to use an asset value rating of 5 (mid-range) 
and do a pair-wise comparison to each asset category as the process continues, raising 
or lowering the rating from 5 as the team compares asset value inputs collected from 
the Appendix C Case Study. 

NOTE 1: The first two rows in both tables are completed as examples. Nominal ratings are 
provided in all other asset categories. 

1. 
Confirm the teams Asset Value Rating for each category [agree, raise, or lower 
the indicated rating] 
2. 
Provide Rationale for each rating [whether changed or unchanged] 
3. 
Enter asset value rating on the Risk Matrix 


NOTE 2: Consult Table 1-22, pages 1-46 to 1-92, in FEMA 426. Look at the content of the 
questions to understand the various infrastructure asset categories. 
For example, Utility Systems apply to all utilities outside the 3-foot drip line of the 
building (from the source to the building, but primarily on the site), while 
Mechanical, Plumbing, Gas, Electrical, Fire Alarm, Communications, and 
Information Technology Systems are inside the 3-foot drip line of the building. 

CI/BC Critical Functions Asset Value Ratings 

Asset Value Numeric 
Value 
Rationale 
1. Administration Medium-Low 4 Redundancy and staff skills that can be 
replaced. Senior managers and financial 
systems in the same area increase value. 
Low to medium economic cost to 
replace. Can impair in the short term the 
core functions and processes. DAI 
COOP value is minimal as ERG is selfcontained, 
at least for the first 30 days. 
2. Engineering/IT 
Technicians 
High 8 Staff skills require specialized 
expertise, but can be replaced. Key 
equipment and resources needed for 
24/7 ops. High economic cost to 
replace. Can impact core functions and 
processes for extended period of time. 
DAI COOP value is high as this 
function ensures connectivity and 
communications. 
3. Loading 
Dock/Warehouse 
Medium-Low 4 


Asset Value Numeric 
Value 
Rationale 
4. Data Center Very High 10 
5. Communications High 9 
6. Security Medium High 7 


Asset Value Numeric 
Value 
Rationale 
7. Housekeeping Very Low 1 

CI/BC Critical Infrastructure Asset Value Ratings 

Asset Value Numeric 
Value 
Rationale 
1. Site Medium-Low 4 CI/BC does not own building or site, but 
location is critical to access and support 
to clients. Cost is $10 - $20 per square 
foot which indicates other office 
complexes in area are competitive. 
Moderate consequences or minor 
impairment of core processes and 
functions if must move from site. DAI 
COOP value can be higher than CI/BC, 
due to CI/BC backup of DAI data. 
2. Architectural Medium 5 Signage and business office information 
couple the building to other park tenants 
(geographically clustered, centralized). 
Nothing overly descriptive that requires 
the use of this building, but moderate to 
severe consequences or impairment if 
lost. Limited architectural flexibility 
either exterior or interior. DAI COOP 
value no different than CI/BC, as long as 
signage remains non-descript. Building 
layout will be as is. 


Asset Value Numeric 
Value 
Rationale 
3. Structural 
Systems 
High 8 
4. Envelope 
Systems 
Medium 5 
5. Utility Systems Medium 5 


Asset Value Numeric 
Value 
Rationale 
6. Mechanical 
Systems 
High 8 
7. Plumbing and 
Gas Systems 
Medium 6 
8. Electrical 
Systems 
High 8 


Asset Value Numeric 
Value 
Rationale 
9. Fire Alarm 
Systems 
Medium 5 
10. IT / 
Communications 
Systems 
High 9 


Unit III (C): Threat/Hazard Assessment 

Unit III (C) 

COURSE TITLE Building Design for Homeland Security for Continuity of Operations 
(COOP) Train-the-Trainer 
UNIT TITLE Threat/Hazard Assessment 

OBJECTIVES 1. Identify the threats and hazards that may impact a building or site 

2. 
Define each threat and hazard using the FEMA 426 methodology 
3. 
Provide a numerical rating for the threat or hazard and justify the 
basis for the rating 
4. 
Define the Design Basis Threat, Levels of Protection, and Layers of 
Defense. 

SCOPE The following topics will be covered in this unit: 

1. 
From what offices is threat and hazard information available? 
2. 
The spectrum of event profiles for terrorism and technological 
hazards from FEMA 386-7. 
3. 
The FEMA 426 approach to determine threat rating. 
4. 
A rating scale and how to use it to determine a threat rating. 
5. 
Activity: Identify the threat rating of the four threats selected for 
this course (Cyber Attack, Armed Attack, Vehicle Bomb, CBR 
Attack) against each identified asset using the Case Study and 
provide the rationale for these threat ratings. 

REFERENCES 1. FEMA 426, Reference Manual to Mitigate Potential Terrorist 
Attacks Against Buildings, pages 1-14 to 1-24 

2. 
FEMA 452, Risk Assessment: A How-To Guide to Mitigate 
Potential Terrorist Attacks Against Buildings, pages 1-1 to 1-30 
3. 
Case Study  Appendix C: COOP, Cooperville Information / 
Business Center 


Threat/Hazard Rating Considerations (Likelihood of Attack or Occurrence) 

1. Asset visibility to terrorists, proximity to technological hazards, or locality for natural 
hazard 

. 
Higher visibility, closer proximity to technological hazards, or location within 
specific locality for natural hazards raise threat rating 
o Iconic structure is considered highest visibility 

. 
Lower visibility, far from technological hazards, and not located where earthquake, 
wind, fire, or flood are known dangers would lower threat rating 
. 
List from FEMA 386-2 as potential hazards 
o Avalanche 
o Coastal Erosion 
o Coastal Storm 
o Dam Failure 
o Drought 
o Earthquake 
o Expansive Soils 
o Extreme Heat 
o Flood 
o Hailstorm 
o Hurricane 
o Land Subsidence 
o Landslide 
o Severe Winter Storm / Ice Storms, Heavy Snows, Transportation restricted 
o Tornado 
o Tsunami 
o Volcano 
o Wildfire 
o Windstorm 
o Added: Extended loss of water, sewage, or electric utilities 
o Added: Extended loss of garbage or debris collection 

2. Usefulness of assets with cash value, with direct application to attackers goals, or with 
publicity value 

. Generally, higher the cash value, greater applicability to terrorist goals, and great 
publicity value, the higher the threat from criminals and terrorists and the higher the 
rating 

3. Asset availability 

. 
If available at one location only  high threat rating) 
. 
If available everywhere  low threat rating 

4. Number of local incidents in the past 

. The higher the number of incidents (all potential sources) the higher the threat rating 

5. Number of incidents in the geographic area in the past 

. The higher the number of incidents (all potential sources) the higher the threat rating 


 Unit Plan: III 

6. Potential for future incidents -- subjective view of likelihood that can be adjusted for the 
following: 

. 
The higher the number of terrorist organizations operating with ability or desire to be 
in the vicinity the higher the threat rating 
. 
The higher the number of potential technological hazards sites nearby the higher the 
threat rating 
. 
The expected future occurrence of flood, wind, and seismic activity in the specific 
locality the higher the threat / hazard rating 

7. Accessibility to asset (this is used as a threat input by many methodologies, but could be 
viewed as a vulnerability consideration as explained below) 

. 
The fewer layers of defense in place, the higher the threat rating  This is based upon 
the terrorist assessment of the building as a future successful target 
. 
DETER and DETECT measures as defined on page 1-9 of FEMA 426 are methods 
for reducing the threat 
. 
DENY measures as defined on page 1-9 of FEMA 426 are methods of hardening the 
site and building and would be described better as mitigation of vulnerability 

8. Effectiveness of law enforcement (including counter intelligence) 

. Greater the effectiveness, the lower the threat rating  Detect 

9. Cyber 

. 
Does function or infrastructure have any components using electronics, software, or 
data (information technology) or communications 
o If yes, then threat is high due to the ease of identifying / pinging these systems 
o If no, then threat is low 
o Level of threat is relative to the value of information contained or the 
consequences of change that would draw the terrorist or hacker to want to 
enter the system 

. 
Cyber experts go into much greater detail, but essentially are looking at a common 
vulnerability standard vice a threat rating 


UNIT III (C) CASE STUDY ACTIVITY: 
THREAT/HAZARD RATING 
(COOP Version) 

After assets that need to be protected are determined, the next step is to identify the threats and 
hazards that could harm the building and its inhabitants. Hazards are categorized into two 
groups: natural and manmade. For the sake of this course, the four primary threats selected are 
Cyber Attack, Armed Attack, Vehicle Bomb, and CBR Attack. 

Requirements 

Refer to the Appendix C Case Study data and complete the following worksheets. Each student 
as part of their assessment team will interpret the CI/BC threat information and should select and 
justify a threat/hazard rating number with rationale. 
For example: 

 
Any function with key IT systems connected to the Internet should get high cyber 
threat values. 
 
The threat of explosive blast should be looked upon as either as directly targeted or as 
collateral damage. Before giving a consistently low rating, consider your answer to 
Activity # 1 below as it would have been applied to the Murrah Building in 
Oklahoma City in 1995. 
 
A CBR attack or nearby HazMat spill could impact the entire facility. 

Thus, to illustrate threat assessment, two activities were selected for their different methodology. 

 
Activity # 1 uses the FEMA 452 Criteria that has its basis in the rating process 
developed by the US Marshals Service after the Murrah Building bombing in 
Oklahoma City. The US Marshals Service process was then used by GSA to begin 
assessing Federal buildings. This method tends to look at the building as a whole. 
 
Activity # 2 uses the FEMA 426 methodology of applying a threat rating using 
specific or generic tactics in a given threat scenario against a specific asset, such as 
critical functions or critical infrastructure. Thus, this method tends to look at the 
various components of the building so as to focus limited resources to achieve 
maximum risk reduction by taking care of the most critical assets. 

Final Action: Transfer answers from the Activity # 2 Threat Ratings tables below to the Risk 
Matrix poster after team agreement on answer. 


Activity # 1: Determine the threat score for a 500-lb. vehicle bomb as applied to CI/BC 

Familiarize yourself with the process of determining the primary threats according to the FEMA 
452 criteria (Table 1-4, page 1-21, FEMA 452 and provided on the next page (SM III-C-5) of 
this unit) by determining the threat score for a 500-lb. (TNT equivalent) vehicle bomb using the 
information on the next page and in the Appendix C Case Study. 

As shown in Table 1-5, page 1-22, FEMA 452, you can use this scoring methodology to 
determine your primary threats based upon the threats that achieve the highest scores. However 
note that the criteria actually intersperses Asset Value Rating, Threat Rating, and Vulnerability 
Rating as indicated below: 

 
Access to Agent (Threat  capability of potential threat elements) 
 
Knowledge/Expertise (Threat  capability of potential threat elements) 
 
History of Threats/Actual Usage (Threat  rhetoric and actual use by potential threat 
elements) 
 
Asset Visibility / Symbolic (Asset Value  but in eyes of potential threat elements as 
a target) 
 
Asset Accessibility (Vulnerability) 
 
Site Population / Capacity (Asset Value or Threat (Targeting)) 
 
Level of Defense (Vulnerability) 

FEMA 452 Table 1-5 Excerpt 
Scenario Access 
to Agent 
Knowledge/ 
Expertise 
History of 
Threats 
Against 
Buildings 
Asset 
Visibility/ 
Symbolic 
Asset 
Accessibility 
Site 
Population/ 
Capacity 
Level of 
Defense 
Score 
Improvised Explosive Device (Bomb) 
500 lb. 
Vehicle 
Bomb 


FEMA 452 Criteria, Table 1-4 
Scenario Access to 
Agent 
Knowledge/ 
Expertise 
History of 
Threats 
Against 
Buildings 
Asset 
Visibility/ 
Symbolic 
Asset 
Accessibility 
Site 
Population/ 
Capacity 
Level of Defense 
9-10 Readily 
available 
Basic 
knowledge/ 
open source 
Local 
incident 
Existence 
widely 
known/ 
iconic 
Open access, 
unrestricted 
parking 
> 5,000 Little or no defense 
against threats. No 
security design was 
taken into 
consideration and no 
mitigation measures 
adopted. 
6-8 Easily 
producible 
Bachelor or 
technical 
school/open 
scientific or 
technical 
literature 
Regional/ 
State 
Existence 
locally 
known/ 
landmark 
Open access, 
restricted 
parking 
1,001-5,000 Minimal defense 
against threats. 
Minimal security 
design was taken into 
consideration and 
minimal mitigation 
measures adopted. 
3-5 Difficult to 
produce or 
acquire 
Advanced 
training/rare 
scientific or 
declassified 
literature 
National Existence 
published / 
well-known 
Controlled 
access, 
protected entry 
251-1,000 Significant defense 
against threats. 
Significant security 
design was taken into 
consideration and 
substantial mitigation 
measures adopted. 
1-2 Very 
difficult to 
produce or 
acquire 
Advanced 
degree or 
training/ 
classified 
information 
International Existence not 
well known/ 
no symbolic 
importance 
Remote 
location, 
secure 
perimeter, 
armed guards, 
tightly 
controlled 
access 
1-250 Extensive defense 
against threats. 
Extensive security 
design was taken into 
consideration and 
extensive mitigation 
measures adopted. 


Activity # 2: Determine the Threat Ratings for Cooperville Information / Business Center 

This is the FEMA 426 method for determining the Threat Rating. The rating scale is a scale of 
1 to 10, with 1 being a very low probability of a terrorist attack and 10 a very high probability. 

NOTE 1: In the previous student activity to determine Asset Value Rating, there was only one 
value of an asset  it did not change based upon threat or situation. The impact if the asset was 
damaged or lost is a view of its value. 

NOTE 2: In like manner, the Threat Rating will tend to be the same across all assets. Variances 
can occur across large buildings where all functions may not exist in all portions of the building 
or the targeting of the asset may be negligible  no history, no capability, no intent. 

Recommendation: For Cyber Attack against an asset that has no computer and no 
connection to the internet the Threat Rating should be based upon the asset having 
a computer internet connection. Then handle the lack of computer and/or lack of 
internet connection under the Vulnerability Rating. Then if the asset gets a future 
computer and/or future internet connection only the Vulnerability Rating need be 
adjusted. 

Activity # 2: In the Critical Functions and Critical Infrastructure Threat Ratings below, Armed 
Attack has threat ratings and rationale completed as an example. Review Armed Attack and 
adjust as the team sees fit and then complete the remainder of the Threat Ratings tables. 

CI/BC Critical Functions Threat Ratings 

Function Cyber Attack Armed Attack Vehicle Bomb CBR Attack 
1. Administration 3 
2. Engineering / IT 
Technicians 3 
3. Loading Dock / 
Warehouse 3 


Function Cyber Attack Armed Attack Vehicle Bomb CBR Attack 
4. Data Center 3 
5. Communications 3 
6. Security 3 
7. Housekeeping 3 
Rationale 
3  Low threat 
based upon lack of 
intentions, history, 
or targeting in the 
local, regional, 
state, and national 
levels. 
Criminal activity 
notwithstanding is 
normally focused 
on more transient 
sites with easy get 
away access. 


CI/BC Critical Infrastructure Threat Ratings 

Infrastructure Cyber Attack Armed Attack Vehicle Bomb CBR Attack 
1. Site 3 
2. Architectural 3 
3. Structural 
Systems 3 
4. Envelope 
Systems 3 
5. Utility Systems 5 
6. Mechanical 
Systems 5 
7. Plumbing and 
Gas Systems 3 
8. Electrical 
Systems 3 


Infrastructure Cyber Attack Armed Attack Vehicle Bomb CBR Attack 
9. Fire Alarm 
Systems 3 
10. IT / 
Communications 
Systems 
3 
Rationale 
3  Low threat 
based upon lack of 
intentions, history, 
or targeting of 
infrastructure on 
the local, regional, 
state, and national 
levels. 
5 -- Medium threat 
on certain 
infrastructure 
systems (normally 
found outside the 
building envelope) 
that have been 
targeted and 
impacted by armed 
attack. 


Unit IV (C): Vulnerability Assessment 

Unit IV (C) 

COURSE TITLE Building Design for Homeland Security for Continuity of Operations 
(COOP) Train-the-Trainer 
UNIT TITLE Vulnerability Assessment 

OBJECTIVES 1. Explain what constitutes a vulnerability. 

2. 
Identify vulnerabilities using the Building Vulnerability Assessment 
Checklist. 
3. 
Understand that an identified vulnerability may indicate that an asset 
is vulnerable to more than one threat or hazard and that mitigation 
measures may reduce vulnerability to one or more threats or hazards. 
4. 
Provide a numerical rating for the vulnerability and justify the basis 
for the rating 

SCOPE The following topics will be covered in this unit: 

1. 
Review of types of vulnerabilities, especially single-point 
vulnerabilities and tactics possible under threats/hazards for which 
there are no mitigation measures. 
2. 
Various approaches and considerations to determine vulnerabilities  
FEMA (primarily), with inputs from Departments of Defense, 
Justice, and Veterans Affairs. 
3. 
A rating scale and how to use it to determine a vulnerability rating. 
4. 
Activity: Determine the vulnerability rating, with rationale, for each 
asset-threat/hazard pair of interest, using the four threats selected for 
this course (Cyber Attack, Armed Attack, Vehicle Bomb, CBR 
Attack) as applied against the identified assets. Achieve team 
concurrence on answers. 

REFERENCES 1. FEMA 426, Reference Manual to Mitigate Potential Terrorist 
Attacks Against Buildings, pages 1-24 to 1-35 and pages 1-45 to 1 
93 

2. 
FEMA 452, Risk Assessment: A How-To Guide to Mitigate 
Potential Terrorist Attacks Against Buildings, pages 3-1 to 3-20 
3. 
Case Study  Appendix C: COOP, Cooperville Information / 
Business Center 


Vulnerability Rating Considerations (susceptibility to damage resulting from that attack 
tactic being used against that asset or hazard occurring that affects that asset) 

1. Effectiveness of threat tactic / hazard against asset 

. The greater the predicted or modeled effectiveness the greater the vulnerability 

o Number of people injured or killed 
o Amount of building destroyed 
o Level of publicity expected to occur 

2. Redundancy 

. 
Back-up facility or equipment that offsets the loss of the asset 
o Partial back-up: 10 to 90% 
o One full back-up: 100% 
o Additional back-up depending upon workload: 125%, 150%, 200% 

. 
The greater the redundancy the less the vulnerability; but too much redundancy can 
reduce reliability 

3. Layers of Defense and depth of layers 

. 
DENY measures as defined on page 1-9 of FEMA 426 are methods of hardening the 
site and building and would be described better as mitigation of vulnerability 
. 
How far do the mitigation measures keep the threat away from the asset? 

o The more complete the Layers of Defense and the greater the depth (stand-off 
distance) of these layers the lower the vulnerability. 

4. Cyber 

. 
Can a terrorist or hacker get any access to the function or infrastructure that has 
components of electronics, software, data (information technology), or 
communications 
o If none of these components, the vulnerability is very low 
o If components are all stand alone, the vulnerability is also very low, but 
probably greater than one 
.. Example: electric typewriters give off varying radio frequencies during 
operation that allows specific key strokes to be identified and, therefore, 
recreated 

o If components use wireless, radio frequency, cell phones, land lines, or hardwired 
internet or communications connections then vulnerability is based 
upon DETECT (anti-virus or access attempts), DETER (access protocols, 
physical security), DENY (firewalls, encryption, shielding), or other measures 

. 
Cyber experts have detailed and in-depth approaches to assessing vulnerability. A 
proposed industry standard is CVSS (Common Vulnerability Scoring System) which 
prioritizes vulnerabilities and indicates to system administrators the tasks they should 
expend available manpower upon. 


UNIT IV (C) CASE STUDY ACTIVITY: 
VULNERABILITY RATINGS 
(COOP Version) 

Vulnerability is any weakness that can be exploited by an aggressor or, in a non-terrorist threat 
environment, make an asset susceptible to hazard damage. Vulnerabilities may include: 

 
Critical functions or systems that lack redundancy and if damaged would result in 
immediate organization disruption or loss of capability (Single-Point Vulnerability) 
 
Redundant systems feeding into a single critical node 
 
Critical components of redundant systems collocated 
 
Inadequate capacity or endurance in post-attack environment 

Vulnerability rating requires identifying and rating the vulnerability of each asset-threat/hazard 
pair of interest. In-depth vulnerability assessment of a building evaluates specific design and 
architectural features and identifies all vulnerabilities of the building functions and building 
systems. 

Vulnerability Rating Activities 

1. Complete the tables for Critical Functions and Critical Infrastructure Vulnerability Ratings. 

 
Some ratings and rationale are provided as examples. 
 
Adjust ratings as desired by team consensus and provide rationale for the provided or 
adjusted ratings as appropriate. 
 
Refer to the Appendix C Case Study as needed. 

2. Transfer the vulnerability ratings to the Risk Matrix poster after reaching team consensus on 
the answers. 


Vulnerability Rating Requirements 

Refer to the Appendix C Case Study and rate the vulnerability of the following assetthreat/
hazard pairs of interest. Transfer vulnerability ratings to the Risk Matrix and achieve team 
consensus on the answers. 

Some ratings and rationale are provided as examples. Adjust ratings as desired by team 
consensus and provide rationale for the provided or adjusted ratings as appropriate. 

CI/BC Critical Functions Vulnerability Ratings 

Function Cyber Attack Armed Attack Vehicle Bomb CBR Attack 
1. Administration 4 8 8 8 
2. Engineering/IT 
Technicians 
4 6 8 8 
3. Loading Dock/ 
Warehouse 
2 8 8 8 
4. Data Center 3 3 8 8 
5. Communications 8 3 8 8 
6. Security 4 6 8 8 
7. Housekeeping 1 2 8 8 

RATIONALE 
Cyber Attack is based upon the level of interaction the function has with the internet or other 
communications systems. 

High End: Do not expect much vulnerability at this level. CI/BC is an Information 

Company whose business it is to ensure security of its systems and products. 
A variety of firewalls and other security systems are in place to protect the 
company and its clients. The firewall solution is based on the Cisco PIX to 
provide highly resilient firewall protection. Other security systems include 
reporting and analysis tools and network detection devices, which help 
protect the companys computers from hacking. 

If Engineering/IT Technicians included building operations and maintenance personnel 
whose systems are accessible from home through passwords and firewalls to monitor and 
adjust parameters of concern, this would be a high end vulnerability due to the current 
configuration of such software. This was not included in the Case Study, therefore, not 
given a high vulnerability rating. 


Communications set at the high end due to wireless networks that are less secure than 
wired networks and are more accessible to the terrorist. 

Middle: Administration, Engineering/IT Technicians, and Security are mid-range rated due 
to the use of systems connected to the internet that are required for their daily operations, 
but the level of mitigation capability is not as great as would be found in the Data Center. 

Low End: While not explained in the Case Study, the Loading Dock/Warehouse and 
Housekeeping are expected to have very little or no interaction with the internet or 
communications systems per se. Their main interaction may be through cell phone 
communications. The Loading Dock / Warehouse may have an internet link to identify 
dates, times, and access information for deliveries or for purchasing / warehousing items. 

The Data Center is also on the low end due to the security explanation given under High 
End above. 

Armed Attack 

High End: 

Middle: 

Low End: 


Vehicle Bomb 

High End: 

Middle: 

Low End: 

CBR Attack 

High End: 

Middle: 

Low End: 


CI/BC Critical Infrastructure Vulnerability Ratings 

Infrastructure Cyber Attack Armed Attack Vehicle Bomb CBR Attack 
1. Site 8 
2. Architectural 1 
3. Structural Systems 1 
4. Envelope Systems 1 
5. Utility Systems 2 
6. Mechanical Systems 8 
7. Plumbing and Gas 
Systems 
1 
8. Electrical Systems 1 
9. Fire Alarm Systems 1 
10. IT/Communications 
Systems 
8 

RATIONALE 
Cyber Attack is based upon connectivity to the internet and communications systems.

High End: 

Middle: 

Low End: 


Armed Attack 

High End: 

Middle: 

Low End: 

Vehicle Bomb 

High End: 

Middle: 

Low End: 


CBR Attack is also global, but takes into account the effect of the CBR agents on the 
equipment, its operation, and the accessibility of operations and maintenance personnel to ensure 
system operations. 

High End: As with Vehicle Bomb, a high end rating is appropriate for Site as there are no 
mitigation measures for a CBR attack. Vulnerability Ratings of 9 or 10 would also be 
justifiable. This tactic will deny access to the building and its critical functions and critical 
infrastructure based upon the type and persistency of agent. 

Likewise, the Mechanical Systems have no mitigation measures in place, specifically 
HVAC, warranting a high rating. As the IT/Communication Systems require 24/7 attention 
and they are linked to the HVAC system, IT/Comms warrants a high rating as their 
operation can be severely impacted during and after a CBR attack. 

Middle: 

Low End: Low end vulnerability rating is given to Architectural, Structural Systems, and 
Envelope Systems as the CBR attack will have little to no effect upon these systems 
performing their functions. Decontamination will be the main response. 

Utility Systems will also continue to function properly during and after a CBR attack, but 
these systems may require maintenance access which will be hampered by the persistency 
of any agents. Thus, a higher vulnerability rating is warranted. 

Similarly, Plumbing and Gas Systems, Electrical Systems, Fire Alarm Systems will 
generally continue to operate during and after a CBR attack. Maintenance can be delayed 
until decontamination is complete. 


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Unit V (C): Risk Assessment/Risk Management 

Unit V (C) 

COURSE TITLE Building Design for Homeland Security for Continuity of Operations 
(COOP) Train-the-Trainer 
UNIT TITLE Risk Assessment / Risk Management 

OBJECTIVES 1. Explain what constitutes risk. 

2. 
Provide a numerical rating for risk and justify the basis for the 
rating. 
3. 
Evaluate risk using the Risk (Threat-Vulnerability) Matrix to capture 
assessment information. 
4. 
Identify top risks for asset-threat/hazard pairs of interest that should 
receive measures to mitigate vulnerabilities and reduce risk. 

SCOPE The following topics will be covered in this unit: 

1. 
Definition of risk and the various components to determine a risk 
rating. 
2. 
The FEMA 426 approach to determining risk. 
3. 
A rating scale and how to use it to determine a risk rating. One or 
more specific examples will be used to focus students on the 
following activity. 
4. 
The relationships between high risk, the need for mitigation 
measures, and the need to identify a Design Basis Threat and Level 
of Protection. 
5. 
Activity: Determine the risk rating for the asset-threat/hazard pairs 
of interest. Identify the high risk ratings for the Case Study. 

REFERENCES 1. FEMA 426, Reference Manual to Mitigate Potential Terrorist 
Attacks Against Buildings, pages 1-35 to 1-44 

2. 
FEMA 452, Risk Assessment - A How-To Guide to Mitigate 
Potential Terrorist Attacks Against Buildings, pages 4-1 to 4-9 
3. 
Case Study  Appendix C: COOP, Cooperville Information / 
Business Center 


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UNIT V (C) CASE STUDY ACTIVITY: 

RISK RATINGS 

(COOP Version) 

One approach to conducting a risk assessment is to assemble the results of the asset value 
assessment, the threat/hazard assessment, and the vulnerability assessment, and determine a 
numeric value of risk for each asset-threat/hazard pair of interest using the following formula: 

Risk Rating = Asset Value Rating x Threat Rating x Vulnerability Rating 

Requirements 

1. 
Use the following worksheet tables or the Risk Matrix poster to summarize the CI/BC asset 
value, threat/hazard, and vulnerability assessment ratings conducted in the previous three unit 
activities. Reach team consensus on answers. 
2. 
Use the formula above to determine the risk rating for each asset-threat/hazard pair identified 
under Critical Functions and under Critical Infrastructure. 
3. 
Transfer the ratings to the Risk Matrix poster and circle all high risk ratings in RED using a 
whiteboard marker. 

CI/BC Critical Functions Risk Ratings 

Function Cyber 
Attack 
Armed 
Attack 
Vehicle 
Bomb 
CBR 
Attack 
1. Administration 
Risk Rating 
Asset Value Rating 
Threat Rating 
Vulnerability Rating 
2. Engineering/IT 
Technicians 
Risk Rating 
Asset Value Rating 
Threat Rating 
Vulnerability Rating 


Function Cyber 
Attack 
Armed 
Attack 
Vehicle 
Bomb 
CBR 
Attack 
3. Loading Dock/ Warehouse 
Risk Rating 
Asset Value Rating 
Threat Rating 
Vulnerability Rating 
4. Data Center 
Risk Rating 
Asset Value Rating 
Threat Rating 
Vulnerability Rating 
5. Communications 
Risk Rating 
Asset Value Rating 
Threat Rating 
Vulnerability Rating 
6. Security 
Risk Rating 
Asset Value Rating 
Threat Rating 
Vulnerability Rating 
7. Housekeeping 
Risk Rating 
Asset Value Rating 
Threat Rating 
Vulnerability Rating 


CI/BC Critical Infrastructure Risk Ratings 

Infrastructure Cyber 
Attack 
Armed 
Attack 
Vehicle 
Bomb 
CBR 
Attack 
1. Site 
Risk Rating 
Asset Value Rating 
Threat Rating 
Vulnerability Rating 
2. Architectural 
Risk Rating 
Asset Value Rating 
Threat Rating 
Vulnerability Rating 
3. Structural Systems 
Risk Rating 
Asset Value Rating 
Threat Rating 
Vulnerability Rating 
4. Envelope Systems 
Risk Rating 
Asset Value Rating 
Threat Rating 
Vulnerability Rating 
5. Utility Systems 
Risk Rating 
Asset Value Rating 
Threat Rating 
Vulnerability Rating 


Infrastructure Cyber 
Attack 
Armed 
Attack 
Vehicle 
Bomb 
CBR 
Attack 
6. Mechanical Systems 
Risk Rating 
Asset Value Rating 
Threat Rating 
Vulnerability Rating 
7. Plumbing and Gas 
Systems Risk Rating 
Asset Value Rating 
Threat Rating 
Vulnerability Rating 
8. Electrical Systems 
Risk Rating 
Asset Value Rating 
Threat Rating 
Vulnerability Rating 
9. Fire Alarm Systems 
Risk Rating 
Asset Value Rating 
Threat Rating 
Vulnerability Rating 
10. IT/Communications 
Systems Risk Rating 
Asset Value Rating 
Threat Rating 
Vulnerability Rating 


Unit VI (C): FEMA 452 Risk Assessment Database 

Unit VI (C) 

COURSE TITLE Building Design for Homeland Security for Continuity of Operations 
(COOP) Train-the-Trainer 

UNIT TITLE FEMA 452 Risk Assessment Database 

OBJECTIVES 1. Explain the database install process (Options 2 and 3). 

2. 
Identify where to save photos, maps, drawings, plans, etc. to 
interface with the database. 
3. 
Explain the information required for the database to function within 
each screen, how to move between screens, and switch between the 
assessment tool operating mode and the master database operating 
mode. 
4. 
Explain the benefit and approaches to setting priorities on identified 
vulnerabilities. 
5. 
Explain how to use the database to produce standard reports and 
search the database for specific information. 

SCOPE The following topics will be covered in this unit: 

1. 
The installation of the FEMA 452 Risk Assessment Database 
(Options 2 and 3). 
2. 
Inputting data into the database and linking associated information, 
such as GIS images, Miscellaneous files, and Photos. 
3. 
Navigation in the database to operate all functions. 
4. 
Risk management capability using the database. 
5. 
Activity: Students will follow the instruction unit. 

Option 1: Students install software prior to arriving at course with 
help of System Administrator as required and begin 
familiarization. This unit completes the familiarization. 

Option 2: In a demonstration / performance mode, follow the 
instruction unit, installing the databases, and navigating the 
databases following the instructors presentation. 

Option 3: Install the databases and navigate them outside the 
instruction unit at some time on Day 2. 


Unit VI (C): FEMA 452 Risk Assessment Database 

REFERENCES 1. FEMA 426, Reference Manual to Mitigate Potential Terrorist 
Attacks Against Buildings, Chapter 1 

2. 
FEMA 452, Risk Assessment - A How-To Guide to Mitigate 
Potential Terrorist Attacks Against Buildings, pages 4-1 to 4-10 
3. 
FEMA 452 Risk Assessment Database CD with Install Wizard 
(latest version) 


Unit VI (C): FEMA 452 Risk Assessment Database 

UNIT VI (C) CASE STUDY ACTIVITY: 
FEMA 452 RISK ASSESSMENT DATABASE 
(COOP Version) 

To this point the assessment procedures have been done manually to understand the thought 
process. Once the process is understood, the need to be able to manage assessment information, 
especially from multiple assessments, becomes evident. This unit shows the features of the 
FEMA 452 Risk Assessment Database v3.0, 16 January 2007, in a demonstration/performance 
instruction approach or a presentation approach with software installation being done either 
before arriving at the course or sometime later on Day 2. 

Requirements 

Minimum hardware and software requirements: 

Pentium 4 or equivalent 

Windows XP 

MS Access 2002 

256 MB of RAM recommended for all components 

Option 1: 
Students should have individual personal laptops that they have brought to the course. They have 
downloaded the database software either from the FEMA Risk Management Series web site or 
from a FEMA Floodmaps e-mail. They will work with their Systems Administrator as required 
to ensure the laptop meets the minimum hardware and software requirements listed above and 
that the software installation is successful. They students may begin familiarization with the 
software, but that will require some review of the Users Guide. 

During the course, the instructor will use PowerPoint slides with database screen captures to 
illustrate the various features of the software. The database installation slides will be hidden as 
the laptops will already be loaded with the database and other files. 

Option 2:
This option works best when the students are conversant in loading software on their laptop, 
have the necessary minimum requirements on their laptop, and have administrator rights for 
loading software. The instructor will provide a CD to each student as part of the course handouts. 
The CD contains the install wizard programs to install the database on the laptop. It also contains 
other files to illustrate the user interface, input, and functions of the database. 

As the instructor presents the instruction unit, the student will follow on their laptop so that at the 
end of the instruction block the student has an initial familiarization of the database features, how 
to use the database as a risk assessment/risk management tool, and has it loaded on the laptop for 
their personal use in the future. 


Unit VI (C): FEMA 452 Risk Assessment Database 

It the student does not have a laptop, they may look over the shoulder of someone who does have 
a laptop or just follow along the slide presentation which uses screen captures of the software 
throughout the processes demonstrated. 

Option 3: 
When few students have laptops, the laptop users do not have administrator rights, or laptop 
users have other restrictions on loading new software, the demonstration / performance approach 
becomes too time consuming and detracts from the learning experience of most of the students. 
In this case, presentation of the PowerPoint visuals without demonstration / performance is the 
approach to use. Then at an identified time on Day 2, those who want to load the software on 
their laptops can do so with the help of the instructors. The instruction unit flows more smoothly 
in this situation and software loading problems only impact those who are loading the software. 


Unit VII (C): Explosive Blast 

Unit VII (C) 

COURSE TITLE Building Design for Homeland Security for Continuity of Operations 
(COOP) Train-the-Trainer 
UNIT TITLE Explosive Blast 

OBJECTIVES 1. Explain the basic physics involved during an explosive blast event, 
whether by terrorism or technological accident. 

2. 
Explain building damage and personnel injuries resulting from the 
blast effects upon a building. 
3. 
Perform an initial prediction of blast loading and effects based upon 
incident pressure. 

SCOPE The following topics will be covered in this unit: 

1. 
Time-pressure regions of a blast event and how these change with 
distance from the blast. 
2. 
Difference between incident pressure and reflected pressure. 
3. 
Differences between peak pressure and peak impulse and how these 
differences affect building components. 
4. 
Building damage and personnel injuries generated by blast wave 
effects. 
5. 
Levels of protection used by the Department of Defense and the 
General Services Administration. 
6. 
The nominal range-to-effect chart [minimum stand-off in feet versus 
weapon yield in pounds of TNT-equivalent] for an identified level of 
damage or injury. 
7. 
The benefits of stand-off distance. 
8. 
Approaches to predicting blast loads and effects, including one using 
incident pressure. 
9. 
Activity: Use charts and tables presented to reinforce their proper 
application and determine required stand-off for the Case Study 
Design Basis Threat. 

REFERENCES 1. FEMA 426, Reference Manual to Mitigate Potential Terrorist 
Attacks Against Buildings, Chapter 4 

2. Case Study  Appendix C: COOP, Cooperville Information / 
Business Center 


Unit VII (C): Explosive Blast 

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Unit VII (C): Explosive Blast 

UNIT VII (C) CASE STUDY ACTIVITY: 
STAND-OFF DISTANCE AND THE EFFECTS OF EXPLOSIVE BLAST 
(COOP Version) 

The requirements in this units activity are intended to provide a check on learning about 
explosive blast and understand the impacts of the Case Studys Design Basis Threat. 

Requirements 

1. 
In the empty cells in the table below, identify whether the adjacent description defines 
incident pressure or reflected pressure. 
2. 
Refer to Figure 4-5 in FEMA 426 (page 4-11) to answer the following questions regarding 
the explosives environment: 
 
What is the minimum stand-off distance from explosion of a 100-pound (TNT equiv.) 
bomb to have a level of confidence that severe wounds from glass (without fragment 
retention film) will not occur? 
 
What damage would be sustained at 400 foot stand-off from a 5,000-pound (TNT equiv.) 
explosion? 

3. 
Refer to Figure 4-10 and Table 4-3 in FEMA 426 (pages 4-17 and 4-19, respectively) to 
answer the following questions regarding the explosives environment. 
 
What is the minimum stand-off required to limit the incident pressure to under 0.5 psi for 
a 100-pound (TNT equiv.) bomb? 
 
What incident pressure would be expected at 500 feet from a 500-pound (TNT equiv.) 
bomb and what is the approximate damage that can be expected? 

Definition Type of Pressure 
Characterized by an almost instantaneous rise from 
atmospheric pressure to peak overpressure. 
When blast wave impinges on a structure that is not 
parallel to the direction of the blast waves travel, the 
pressure wave is reflected and reinforced. 


Unit VII (C): Explosive Blast 

4. Refer to Figure 4-5 (page 4-11) in FEMA 426 to answer the following questions. 

 For the Design Basis Threats of the selected Case Study being used in this course 
offering, determine the standoff distance for the damage or injury indicated: 

o ________ pounds TNT-equivalent 
Glass  Severe Wounds  ______ feet 
Potentially Lethal Injuries  ______ feet 
Threshold, Concrete Columns Fail  ______ feet 

o ________ pounds TNT-equivalent 
Glass  Severe Wounds  ______ feet 

Potentially Lethal Injuries  ______ feet 
Threshold, Concrete Columns Fail  ______ feet 


Unit VIII (C): Chemical, Biological, and Radiological (CBR) Measures 

Unit VIII (C) 

COURSE TITLE Building Design for Homeland Security for Continuity of Operations 
(COOP) Train-the-Trainer 
UNIT TITLE Chemical, Biological, and Radiological (CBR) Measures 

OBJECTIVES 1. Explain the five possible protective actions for a building and its 
occupants. 

2. 
Compare filtration system efficacy relative to the particles present 
in CBR agents. 
3. 
Explain the key issues with CBR detection. 
4. 
Identify the indications of CBR contamination. 

SCOPE The following topics will be covered in this unit: 

1. 
The five protective actions for a building and its occupants: 
evacuation; sheltering in place; personal protective equipment; air 
filtration and pressurization; and exhausting and purging. 
2. 
Air filtration and cleaning principles and its application. 
3. 
CBR detection technology currently available. 
4. 
Indications of CBR contamination that do not use technology. 

REFERENCES 1. FEMA 426, Reference Manual to Mitigate Potential Terrorist 
Attacks Against Buildings, Chapter 5 

2. 
FEMA 426, Appendix C, Chemical, Biological, and Radiological 
Glossary 
3. 
Case Study  Appendix C: COOP, Cooperville Information / 
Business Center 


Unit VIII (C): Chemical, Biological, and Radiological (CBR) Measures 

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Unit VIII (C): Chemical, Biological, and Radiological (CBR) Measures 

UNIT VIII (C) CASE STUDY ACTIVITY: 
CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, AND RADIOLOGICAL (CBR) MEASURES 
(COOP Version) 

The requirements in this units activity are intended to provide a check on learning about the 
nature of chemical, biological, and radiological agents and associated mitigation measures. 

Requirements 

1. Identify the prevalent CBR threat(s) that exist and/or are identified as the Design Basis 
Threat in the selected Case Study. 

Design Basis Threat 
Chemical:

Biological: 

Radiological: 

Other: 

Refer to Table 5-1 on page 5-12 of FEMA 426 and answer the following questions: 

2. What size filtration unit (MERV) is required to filter out 80 percent of Legionella and dust 
particles (1 to 3 microns)? 


Unit VIII (C): Chemical, Biological, and Radiological (CBR) Measures 

3. 
What range of MERV is required to remove 85 percent of smoke particles greater than 0.3 
micron in size? 
4. 
What mitigation measures can be used in HVAC systems to destroy bacteria and viruses? 


Unit IX (C): Site and Layout Design Guidance 

Unit IX (C) 

COURSE TITLE Building Design for Homeland Security for Continuity of Operations 
(COOP) Train-the-Trainer 
UNIT TITLE Site and Layout Design Guidance 

OBJECTIVES 1. Identify site planning concerns that can create, reduce, or eliminate 
vulnerabilities and understand the concept of Layers of Defense. 

2. 
Recognize protective issues for suburban site planning. 
3. 
Compare the pros and cons of barrier mitigation measures that 
increase stand-off or promote the need for hardening of buildings at 
risks. 
4. 
Understand the need for keeping up with the growing demand for 
security design. 
5. 
Understand the benefits that can be derived from appropriate 
security design. 
6. 
Understand the benefits of adopting a creative process to face 
current design challenges. 
7. 
Understand the benefits of including aesthetic elements compatible 
with security and architecture characteristics of building and 
surrounding environment. 
8. 
Apply these concepts to an existing site or building and identify 
mitigation measures needed to reduce vulnerabilities. 

SCOPE The following topics will be covered in this unit: 

1. 
Land use considerations both outside and inside the property line. 
2. 
Site planning issues to include site design, layout and form, 
vehicular and pedestrian circulation, and landscape and urban 
design. 
3. 
Creating stand-off distance using perimeter controls, non-exclusive 
zones, and exclusive zones along with the design concepts and 
technology to consider. 
4. 
Design considerations and mitigation measures for site security. 


Unit IX (C) 

REFERENCES 1. FEMA 426, Reference Manual to Mitigate Potential Terrorist 
Attacks Against Buildings, Chapter 2; Checklist at end of Chapter 1 

2. FEMA 430, Primer for Incorporating Building Security Components 
in Architectural Design, pages XXX 

3. FEMA 452, Risk Assessment: A How-To Guide to Mitigate 
Potential Terrorist Attacks Against Buildings, pages 5-1 to 5-16 

4. Case Study  Appendix C: COOP, Cooperville Information / 
Business Center 


UNIT IX (C) CASE STUDY ACTIVITY: 
SITE AND LAYOUT DESIGN GUIDANCE 
(COOP Version) 

In this student activity, the emphasis is identifying vulnerabilities in the site and layout design. 
The Building Vulnerability Assessment Checklist in FEMA 426 (Table 1-22, pages 1-46 to 
1-93) provides a tool for vulnerability assessment of the proposed and existing sites and 
buildings. 

Requirements 

Assign sections of the checklist to group members who are most knowledgeable and qualified to 
perform an assessment of the assigned area. Refer to the Appendix C Case Study to determine 
answers to the questions. Then review results as a team to identify vulnerabilities and possible 
mitigation measures. 

Activity # 1: Complete the selected vulnerability checklist questions in the following 
Vulnerability Questions table. 

Note: There are 29 questions below (13 in Section 1, 5 in Section 2, and 11 in 

Section 5), so it is recommended that the team split up the questions among 

themselves taking 3-5 questions each and review the Appendix C Case Study for 

answers. Apportion the available time for gathering the answers and then provide 

each other the answers while performing the actions below. 

Activity # 2: Upon completion of the questions refer back to the vulnerability ratings determined 
in the Unit IV (C) Student Activity. Based on this more detailed analysis, decide if any 
vulnerability rating needs adjustment. Adjust the Risk Matrix poster accordingly for any changes 
in vulnerability rating. 

Activity # 3: Select mitigation measures to reduce vulnerability and associated risk from the site 
and layout perspective. Concentrate on the three highest risk ratings on the Risk Matrix poster as 
adjusted by Activity # 2. Use the Site and Layout Design Mitigation Measures table found at the 
end of this unit to capture this information. 

Activity # 4: Consider the mitigation measures of Activity #3 to be installed, estimate the new 
vulnerability ratings as if these measures were in place, and calculate the new risk ratings. 
Capture your information in the Site and Layout Design Mitigation Measures table. 


Section Vulnerability Question Guidance Observations 
1 Site 
1.1 What major structures 
surround the facility (site 
or building(s))? 
What critical 
infrastructure, 
government, military, or 
recreation facilities are in 
the local area that impact 
transportation, utilities, 
and collateral damage 
(attack at this facility 
impacting the other 
major structures or attack 
on the major structures 
impacting this facility)? 
Critical infrastructure to 
consider includes: 
Telecommunications 
infrastructure 
Facilities for broadcast TV, cable 
TV; cellular networks; newspaper 
offices, production, and 
distribution; radio stations; satellite 
base stations; telephone trunking 
and switching stations, including 
critical cable routes and major 
rights-of-way 
Electric power systems 
Power plants, especially nuclear 
facilities; transmission and 
distribution system components; 
fuel distribution, delivery, and 
storage 
Gas and oil facilities 
Hazardous material facilities, 
oil/gas pipelines, and storage 
facilities 
Banking and finance institutions 
Financial institutions (banks, credit 
unions) and the business district; 
note schedule business/financial 
district may follow; armored car 
services 
Transportation networks 
Airports: carriers, flight paths, and 
airport layout; location of air traffic 
control towers, runways, passenger 
terminals, and parking areas 
Bus Stations 
Pipelines: oil; gas 
Trains/Subways: rails and lines, 
railheads/rail yards, interchanges, 
tunnels, and cargo/passenger 
terminals; note hazardous material 
transported 
Traffic: interstate 
highways/roads/tunnels/ bridges 
carrying large volumes; points of 
congestion; note time of day and 
day of week 
Trucking: hazardous materials 
cargo loading/unloading facilities; 
truck terminals, weigh stations, and 
rest areas 
Waterways: dams; levees; berths 
and ports for cruise ships, ferries, 


Section Vulnerability Question Guidance Observations 
roll-on/roll-off cargo vessels, and 
container ships; international 
(foreign) flagged vessels (and 
cargo) 
Water supply systems 
Pipelines and process/treatment 
facilities, dams for water 
collection; wastewater treatment 
Government services 
Federal/state/local government 
offices  post offices, law 
enforcement stations, fire/rescue, 
town/city hall, local 
mayors/governors residences, 
judicial offices and courts, military 
installations (include type-active, 
Reserves, National Guard) 
Emergency services 
Backup facilities, communications 
centers, Emergency Operations 
Centers (EOCs), fire/Emergency 
Medical Service (EMS) facilities, 
Emergency Medical Centers 
(EMCs), law enforcement facilities 
The following are not critical 
infrastructure, but have 
collateral damage potential to 
consider: 
Agricultural facilities: chemical 
distribution, storage, and 
application sites; crop spraying 
services; farms and ranches; food 
processing, storage, and 
distribution facilities 
Commercial/manufacturing/ind 
ustrial facilities: apartment 
buildings; business/corporate 
centers; chemical plants (especially 
those with Section 302 Extremely 
Hazardous Substances); factories; 
fuel production, distribution, and 
storage facilities; hotels and 
convention centers; industrial 
plants; raw material production, 
distribution, and storage facilities; 
research facilities and laboratories; 
shipping, warehousing, transfer, 
and logistical centers 
Events and attractions: festivals 
and celebrations; open-air markets; 
parades; rallies, demonstrations, 
and marches; religious services; 


Section Vulnerability Question Guidance Observations 
scenic tours; theme parks 
Health care system components: 
family planning clinics; health 
department offices; hospitals; 
radiological material and medical 
waste transportation, storage, and 
disposal; research facilities and 
laboratories, walk-in clinics 
Political or symbolically 
significant sites: embassies, 
consulates, landmarks, monuments, 
political party and special interest 
groups offices, religious sites 
Public/private institutions: 
academic institutions, cultural 
centers, libraries, museums, 
research facilities and laboratories, 
schools 
Recreation facilities: 
auditoriums, casinos, concert halls 
and pavilions, parks, restaurants 
and clubs (frequented by potential 
target populations), sports arenas, 
stadiums, theaters, malls, and 
special interest group facilities; 
note congestion dates and times for 
shopping centers 
References: FEMA 386-7, FEMA 
SLG 101, DOJ NCJ181200 
1.2 Does the terrain place the 
building in a depression 
or low area? 
Depressions or low areas can trap 
heavy vapors, inhibit natural 
decontamination by prevailing 
winds, and reduce the effectiveness 
of in-place sheltering. 
Reference: USAF Installation 
Force Protection Guide 
1.4 Is a perimeter fence or 
other types of barrier 
controls in place? 
The intent is to channel pedestrian 
traffic onto a site with multiple 
buildings through known access 
control points. For a single 
building, the intent is to have a 
single visitor entrance. 
Reference: GSA PBS-P100 


Section Vulnerability Question Guidance Observations 
1.5 What are the site access 
points to the site or 
building? 
The goal is to have at least two 
access points  one for passenger 
vehicles and one for delivery 
trucks due to the different 
procedures needed for each. 
Having two access points also 
helps if one of the access points 
becomes unusable, then traffic can 
be routed through the other access 
point. 
Reference: USAF Installation 
Force Protection Guide 
1.7 Is there vehicle and 
pedestrian access control 
at the perimeter of the 
site? 
Vehicle and pedestrian access 
control and inspection should 
occur as far from facilities as 
possible (preferably at the site 
perimeter) with the ability to 
regulate the flow of people and 
vehicles one at a time. 
Control on-site parking with 
identification checks, security 
personnel, and access control 
systems. 
Reference: FEMA 386-7 
1.10 What are the existing 
types of vehicle anti-ram 
devices for the site or 
building? 
Are these devices at the 
property boundary or at 
the building? 
Passive barriers include bollards, 
walls, hardened fences (steel cable 
interlaced), trenches, ponds/basins, 
concrete planters, street furniture, 
plantings, trees, sculptures, and 
fountains. Active barriers include 
pop-up bollards, swing arm gates, 
and rotating plates and drums, etc. 
Reference: GSA PBS-P100 
1.13 Does site circulation 
prevent high-speed 
approaches by vehicles? 
The intent is to use site circulation 
to minimize vehicle speeds and 
eliminate direct approaches to 
structures. 
Reference: GSA PBS-P100 


Section Vulnerability Question Guidance Observations 
1.14 Are there offsetting 
vehicle entrances from 
the direction of a 
vehicles approach to 
force a reduction of 
speed? 
Single or double 90-degree turns 
effectively reduce vehicle approach 
speed. 
Reference: GSA PBS-P100 
1.16 Does adjacent surface 
parking on site maintain 
a minimum stand-off 
distance? 
The specific stand-off distance 
needed is based upon the design 
basis threat bomb size and the 
building construction. For initial 
screening, consider using 25 
meters (82 feet) as a minimum 
with more distance needed for 
unreinforced masonry or wooden 
walls. 
Reference: GSA PBS-P100 
1.19 Do site landscaping and 
street furniture provide 
hiding places? 
Minimize concealment 
opportunities by keeping landscape 
plantings (hedges, shrubbery, and 
large plants with heavy ground 
cover) and street furniture (bus 
shelters, benches, trash receptacles, 
mailboxes, newspaper vending 
machines) away from the building 
to permit observation of intruders 
and prevent hiding of packages. 
If mail or express boxes are used, 
the size of the openings should be 
restricted to prohibit the insertion 
of packages. 
Reference: GSA PBS-P100 


Section Vulnerability Question Guidance Observations 
1.20 Is the site lighting 
adequate from a security 
perspective in roadway 
access and parking 
areas? 
Security protection can be 
successfully addressed through 
adequate lighting. The type and 
design of lighting, including 
illumination levels, is critical. 
Illuminating Engineering Society 
of North America (IESNA) 
guidelines can be used. The site 
lighting should be coordinated with 
the CCTV system. 
Reference: GSA PBS-P100 
1.21 Are line-of-sight 
perspectives from 
outside the secured 
boundary to the building 
and on the property 
along pedestrian and 
vehicle routes integrated 
with landscaping and 
green space? 
The goal is to prevent the 
observation of critical assets by 
persons outside the secure 
boundary of the site. For individual 
buildings in an urban environment, 
this could mean appropriate 
window treatments or no windows 
for portions of the building. 
Once on the site, the concern is to 
ensure observation by a general 
workforce aware of any pedestrians 
and vehicles outside normal 
circulation routes or attempting to 
approach the building unobserved. 
Reference: USAF Installation 
Force Protection Guide 
1.23 Are all existing fire 
hydrants on the site 
accessible? 
Just as vehicle access points to the 
site must be able to transit 
emergency vehicles, so too must 
the emergency vehicles have 
access to the buildings and, in the 
case of fire trucks, the fire 
hydrants. Thus, security 
considerations must accommodate 
emergency response requirements. 
Reference: GSA PBS-P100 
2 Architectural 
2.2 Is it a mixed-tenant 
building? 
Separate high-risk tenants from 
low-risk tenants and from publicly 
accessible areas. Mixed uses may 
be accommodated through such 


Section Vulnerability Question Guidance Observations 
means as separating entryways, 
controlling access, and hardening 
shared partitions, as well as 
through special security 
operational countermeasures. 
Reference: GSA PBS-P100 
2.3 Are pedestrian paths 
planned to concentrate 
activity to aid in 
detection? 
Site planning and landscape design 
can provide natural surveillance by 
concentrating pedestrian activity, 
limiting entrances/exits, and 
eliminating concealment 
opportunities. Also, prevent 
pedestrian access to parking areas 
other than via established 
entrances. 
Reference: GSA PBS-P100 
2.4 Are there trash 
receptacles and 
mailboxes in close 
proximity to the building 
that can be used to hide 
explosive devices? 
The size of the trash receptacles 
and mailbox openings should be 
restricted to prohibit insertion of 
packages. Street furniture, such as 
newspaper vending machines, 
should be kept sufficient distance 
(10 meters or 33 feet) from the 
building, or brought inside to a 
secure area. 
References: USAF Installation 
Force Protection Guide and DoD 
UCF 4-010-01 
2.15 Are critical assets 
(people, activities, 
building systems and 
components) located 
close to any main 
entrance, vehicle 
circulation, parking, 
maintenance area, 
loading dock, or interior 
parking? 
Critical building components 
include: Emergency generator, 
including fuel systems, day tank, 
fire sprinkler, and water supply; 
Normal fuel storage; Main 
switchgear; Telephone distribution 
and main switchgear; Fire pumps; 
Building control centers; 
Uninterruptible power supply 
(UPS) systems controlling critical 
functions; Main refrigeration and 
ventilation systems if critical to 
building operation; Elevator 


Section Vulnerability Question Guidance Observations 
Are the critical building 
systems and components 
hardened? 
machinery and controls; Shafts for 
stairs, elevators, and utilities; 
Critical distribution feeders for 
emergency power. Evacuation and 
rescue require emergency systems 
to remain operational during a 
disaster and they should be located 
away from attack locations. 
Primary and backup systems 
should be separated to reduce the 
risk of both being impacted by a 
single incident if collocated. Utility 
systems should be located at least 
50 feet from loading docks, front 
entrances, and parking areas. 
One way to harden critical building 
systems and components is to 
enclose them within hardened 
walls, floors, and ceilings. Do not 
place them near high-risk areas 
where they can receive collateral 
damage. 
Reference: GSA PBS-100 
2.16 Are high value or critical 
assets located as far into 
the interior of the 
building as possible and 
separated from the public 
areas of the building? 
Critical assets, such as people and 
activities, are more vulnerable to 
hazards when on an exterior 
building wall or adjacent to 
uncontrolled public areas inside the 
building. 
Reference: GSA PBS-100 
5 Utility Systems 
5.1 What is the source of 
domestic water? 
(utility, municipal, wells, 
lake, river, storage tank) 
Is there a secure alternate 
drinking water supply? 
Domestic water is critical for 
continued building operation. 
Although bottled water can satisfy 
requirements for drinking water 
and minimal sanitation, domestic 
water meets many other needs  
flushing toilets, building heating 
and cooling system operation, 
cooling of emergency generators, 
humidification, etc. 
Reference: FEMA 386-7 
5.4 Does the building or site 
have storage capacity for 
Operational facilities will require 
reliance on adequate domestic 
water supply. Storage capacity can 


Section Vulnerability Question Guidance Observations 
domestic water? 
How many gallons of 
storage capacity are 
available and how long 
will it allow operations 
to continue? 
meet short-term needs and use 
water trucks to replenish for 
extended outages. 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities. 
5.5 What is the source of 
water for the fire 
suppression system? 
(local utility company 
lines, storage tanks with 
utility company backup, 
lake, or river) 
Are there alternate water 
supplies for fire 
suppression? 
The fire suppression system water 
may be supplied from the domestic 
water or it may have a separate 
source, separate storage, or 
nonpotable alternate sources. 
For a site with multiple buildings, 
the concern is that the supply 
should be adequate to fight the 
worst case situation according to 
the fire codes. Recent major 
construction may change that 
requirement. 
Reference: FEMA 386-7 
5.10 What fuel supplies do the 
building rely upon for 
critical operation? 
Typically, natural gas, propane, or 
fuel oil is required for continued 
operation. 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities 
5.11 How much fuel is stored 
on the site or at the 
building and how long 
can this quantity support 
critical operations? 
How is it stored? 
How is it secured? 
Fuel storage protection is essential 
for continued operation. 
Main fuel storage should be 
located away from loading docks, 
entrances, and parking. Access 
should be restricted and protected 
(e.g., locks on caps and seals). 
References: GSA PBS-P100 and 
Physical Security Assessment for 
the Department of Veterans Affairs 
Facilities 


Section Vulnerability Question Guidance Observations 
5.12 Where is the fuel supply 
obtained? 
How is it delivered? 
The supply of fuel is dependent on 
the reliability of the supplier. 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities 
5.14 What is the normal 
source of electrical 
service for the site or 
building? 
Utilities are the general source 
unless co-generation or a private 
energy provider is available. 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities 
5.15 Is there a redundant 
electrical service source? 
Can the site or buildings 
be fed from more than 
one utility substation? 
The utility may have only one 
source of power from a single 
substation. There may be only 
single feeders from the main 
substation. 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities 
5.18 What provisions for 
emergency power exist? 
What systems receive 
emergency power and 
have capacity 
requirements been 
tested? 
Is the emergency power 
collocated with the 
commercial electric 
service? 
Is there an exterior 
connection for 
emergency power? 
Besides installed generators to 
supply emergency power, portable 
generators or rental generators 
available under emergency contract 
can be quickly connected to a 
building with an exterior quick 
disconnect already installed. 
Testing under actual loading and 
operational conditions ensures the 
critical systems requiring 
emergency power receive it with a 
high assurance of reliability. 
Reference: GSA PBS-P100 


Section Vulnerability Question Guidance Observations 
5.19 By what means do the 
main telephone and data 
communications 
interface the site or 
building? 
Typically communication ducts or 
other conduits are available. 
Overhead service is more 
identifiable and vulnerable. 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities 
5.21 Does the fire alarm 
system require 
communication with 
external sources? 
By what method is the 
alarm signal sent to the 
responding agency: 
telephone, radio, etc.? 
Is there an intermediary 
alarm monitoring center? 
Typically, the local fire department 
responds to an alarm that sounds at 
the station or is transmitted over 
phone lines by an auto dialer. 
An intermediary control center for 
fire, security, and/or building 
system alarms may receive the 
initial notification at an on-site or 
off-site location. This center may 
then determine the necessary 
response and inform the 
responding agency. 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities 


Site and Layout Design Mitigation Measures 
(COOP Version) 

Asset-Threat/Hazard 
Pair 
Current Risk 
Rating 
Suggested Mitigation 
Measure 
Revised Risk 
Rating 


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Unit X (C): Building Design Guidance 

Unit X (C) 

COURSE TITLE Building Design for Homeland Security for Continuity of Operations 
(COOP) Train-the-Trainer 
UNIT TITLE Building Design Guidance 
OBJECTIVES 1. Explain architectural considerations to mitigate impacts from blast 
effects and transmission of chemical, biological, and radiological 
agents from exterior and interior incidents. 
2. Identify key elements of building structural and nonstructural systems 
for mitigation of blast effects. 
3. Compare and contrast the benefit of building envelope, mechanical 
system, electrical system, fire protection system, and communications 
system mitigation measures, including synergies and conflicts. 
4. Apply these concepts to an existing building or building conceptual 
design and identify mitigation measures needed to reduce 
vulnerabilities. 
SCOPE The following topics will be covered in this unit: 
1. Architectural considerations, including building configuration, space 
design, and special situations. 
2. Building structural and nonstructural considerations with emphasis on 
progressive collapse, loads and stresses, and good engineering 
practices. 
3. Design issues for the building envelope, including wall design, 
window design, door design, and roof system design with approaches 
to define levels of protection. 
4. Mechanical system design issues, including interfacing with 
operational procedures, emergency plans, and training. 
5. Other building systems design consideration for electrical, fire 
protection, communications, electronic security, entry control, and 
physical security that mitigate the effects of a threat or hazard. 
6. Activity: Select mitigation measures that reduce vulnerability and 
associated risk from the building perspective for the highest risk pairs 
(asset - threat/hazard) identified in Unit V (C). 


REFERENCES 1. FEMA 426, Reference Manual to Mitigate Potential Terrorist Attacks 
Against Buildings, pages 3-1 to 3-46 and 3-48 to 3-52; Checklist at 
end of Chapter 1 

2. 
FEMA 427, Primer for Design of Commercial Buildings to Mitigate 
Terrorist Attacks 
3. 
FEMA 430, Primer for Incorporating Building Security Components 
in Architectural Design 
4. 
FEMA 452, Risk Assessment: A How-To Guide to Mitigate Potential 
Terrorist Attacks Against Buildings, pages 5-1 to 5-16 
5. 
Case Study  Appendix C: COOP, Cooperville Information / 
Business Center 


UNIT X (C) CASE STUDY ACTIVITY: 
BUILDING DESIGN GUIDANCE 
(COOP Version) 

In this student activity, the emphasis is identifying vulnerabilities in the building design. The 

Building Vulnerability Assessment Checklist in FEMA 426 (Table 1-22, pages 1-46 to 1-93) 

provides a tool for vulnerability assessment of the proposed and existing sites and buildings. 

Requirements 

Assign sections of the checklist to group members who are most knowledgeable and qualified to 
perform an assessment of the assigned area. Refer to the Appendix C Case Study to determine 
answers to the questions. Then review results as a team to identify vulnerabilities and possible 
mitigation measures. 

Activity # 1: Complete the selected vulnerability checklist questions in the following 
Vulnerability Questions table. 

Note: There are 25 questions below (9 in Section 2, 4 in Section 3, 1 in Section 
4, 3 in Section 6, 3 in Section 8, 3 in Section 9, and 2 in Section 10), so it is 
recommended that the team split up the questions among themselves taking 3-5 
questions each and review the Appendix C Case Study for answers. Apportion the 
available time for gathering the answers and then provide each other the answers 
while performing the actions below. 

Activity # 2: Upon completion of the questions refer back to the vulnerability ratings determined 
in the Unit IV (C) Student Activity. Based on this more detailed analysis, decide if any 
vulnerability rating needs adjustment. Adjust the Risk Matrix poster accordingly for any changes 
in vulnerability rating. 

Activity # 3: Select mitigation measures to reduce vulnerability and associated risk from the 
building perspective. Concentrate on the three highest risk ratings on the Risk Matrix poster as 
adjusted by Activity # 2. Use the Building Design Mitigation Measures table found at the end of 
this unit to capture this information. 

Activity # 4: Consider the mitigation measures of Activity #3 to be installed, estimate the new 
vulnerability ratings as if these measures were in place, and calculate the new risk ratings. 
Capture your information in the Building Design Mitigation Measures table. 


Section Vulnerability Question Guidance Observations 
2 Architectural 
2.7 Is access control 
provided through main 
entrance points for 
employees and visitors? 
(lobby receptionist, signin, 
staff escorts, issue of 
visitor badges, checking 
forms of personal 
identification, electronic 
access control systems) 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities 
2.9 Is access to elevators 
distinguished as to those 
that are designated only 
for employees and 
visitors? 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities 
2.10 Do public and employee 
entrances include space 
for possible future 
installation of access 
control and screening 
equipment? 
These include walk-through metal 
detectors and x-ray devices, 
identification check, electronic 
access card, search stations, and 
turnstiles. 
Reference: GSA PBS-P100 
2.15 Are critical assets 
(people, activities, 
building systems and 
components) located 
close to any main 
entrance, vehicle 
circulation, parking, 
maintenance area, 
loading dock, or interior 
parking? 
Are the critical building 
systems and components 
Critical building components 
include: Emergency generator 
including fuel systems, day tank, 
fire sprinkler, and water supply; 
Normal fuel storage; Main 
switchgear; Telephone 
distribution and main switchgear; 
Fire pumps; Building control 
centers; Uninterruptible Power 
Supply (UPS) systems controlling 
critical functions; Main 
refrigeration and ventilation 
systems if critical to building 
operation; Elevator machinery and 
controls; Shafts for stairs, 
elevators, and utilities; Critical 


Section Vulnerability Question Guidance Observations 
hardened? distribution feeders for emergency 
power. Evacuation and rescue 
require emergency systems to 
remain operational during a 
disaster and they should be 
located away from potential attack 
locations. Primary and backup 
systems should be separated to 
reduce the risk of both being 
impacted by a single incident if 
collocated. Utility systems should 
be located at least 50 feet from 
loading docks, front entrances, 
and parking areas. 
One way to harden critical 
building systems and components 
is to enclose them within 
hardened walls, floors, and 
ceilings. Do not place them near 
high-risk areas where they can 
receive collateral damage. 
Reference: GSA PBS-P100 
2.16 Are high-value or critical 
assets located as far into 
the interior of the 
building as possible and 
separated from the public 
areas of the building? 
Critical assets, such as people and 
activities, are more vulnerable to 
hazards when on an exterior 
building wall or adjacent to 
uncontrolled public areas inside 
the building. 
Reference: GSA PBS-P100 
2.19 Are loading docks and 
receiving and shipping 
areas separated in any 
direction from utility 
rooms, utility mains, and 
service entrances, 
including electrical, 
telephone/data, fire 
detection/alarm systems, 
fire suppression water 
mains, cooling and 
heating mains, etc.? 
Loading docks should be designed 
to keep vehicles from driving into 
or parking under the building. If 
loading docks are in close 
proximity to critical equipment, 
consider hardening the equipment 
and service against explosive 
blast. Consider a 50-foot 
separation distance in all 
directions. 
Reference: GSA PBS-P100 


Section Vulnerability Question Guidance Observations 
2.20 Are mailrooms located 
away from building main 
entrances, areas 
containing critical 
services, utilities, 
distribution systems, and 
important assets? 
Is the mailroom located 
near the loading dock? 
The mailroom should be located 
at the perimeter of the building 
with an outside wall or window 
designed for pressure relief. 
By separating the mailroom and 
the loading dock, the collateral 
damage of an incident at one has 
less impact upon the other. 
However, this may be the 
preferred mailroom location. 
Off-site screening stations or a 
separate delivery processing 
building on site may be costeffective, 
particularly if several 
buildings may share one 
mailroom. A separate delivery 
processing building reduces risk 
and simplifies protection 
measures. 
Reference: GSA PBS-P100 
2.23 Are stairwells required 
for emergency egress 
located as remotely as 
possible from high-risk 
areas where blast events 
might occur? 
Are stairways maintained 
with positive pressure or 
are there other smoke 
control systems? 
Consider designing stairs so that 
they discharge into other than 
lobbies, parking, or loading areas. 
Maintaining positive pressure 
from a clean source of air (may 
require special filtering) aids in 
egress by keeping smoke, heat, 
toxic fumes, etc. out of the 
stairway. Pressurize exit 
stairways in accordance with the 
National Model Building Code. 
Reference: GSA PBS-P100 and 
CDC/NIOSH, Pub 2002-139 
2.26 Are emergency systems 
located away from highrisk 
areas? 
The intent is to keep the 
emergency systems out of harms 
way, such that one incident takes 
out all capability  both the 
regular systems and their backups. 
Reference: FEMA 386-7 


Section Vulnerability Question Guidance Observations 
3 Structural Systems 
3.1 What type of 
construction? 
What type of concrete 
and reinforcing steel? 
What type of steel? 
What type of 
foundation? 
The type of construction provides 
an indication of the robustness to 
abnormal loading and load 
reversals. A reinforced concrete 
moment-resisting frame provides 
greater ductility and redundancy 
than a flat-slab or flat-plate 
construction. The ductility of steel 
frame with metal deck depends on 
the connection details and pretensioned 
or post-tensioned 
construction provides little 
capacity for abnormal loading 
patterns and load reversals. The 
resistance of load-bearing wall 
structures varies to a great extent, 
depending on whether the walls 
are reinforced or unreinforced. A 
rapid screening process developed 
by FEMA for assessing structural 
hazards identifies the following 
types of construction with a 
structural score ranging from 1.0 
to 8.5. A higher score indicates a 
greater capacity to sustain load 
reversals. 
Wood buildings of all types - 4.5 
to 8.5 
Steel moment-resisting frames - 
3.5 to 4.5 
Braced steel frames - 2.5 to 3.0 
Light metal buildings - 5.5 to 6.5 
Steel frames with cast-in-place 
concrete shear walls - 3.5 to 4.5 
Steel frames with unreinforced 
masonry infill walls - 1.5 to 3.0 
Concrete moment-resisting frames 
- 2.0 to 4.0 
Concrete shear wall buildings - 
3.0 to 4.0 
Concrete frames with 
unreinforced masonry infill walls 
- 1.5 to 3.0 
Tilt-up buildings - 2.0 to 3.5 
Precast concrete frame buildings - 
1.5 to 2.5 
Reinforced masonry - 3.0 to 4.0 
Unreinforced masonry - 1.0 to 2.5 
References: FEMA 154 and 


Section Vulnerability Question Guidance Observations 
Physical Security Assessment for 
the Department of Veterans 
Affairs Facilities 
3.5 Will the structure suffer 
an unacceptable level of 
damage resulting from 
the postulated threat 
(blast loading or weapon 
impact)? 
The extent of damage to the 
structure and exterior wall 
systems from the bomb threat may 
be related to a protection level. 
The following is for new 
buildings: 
Level of Protection Below 
Antiterrorism 
Standards - Severe damage. 
Frame collapse/massive 
destruction. Little left standing. 
Doors and windows fail and result 
in lethal hazards. Majority of 
personnel suffer fatalities. 
Very Low Level Protection - 
Heavy damage. Onset of 
structural collapse. Major 
deformation of primary and 
secondary structural members, but 
progressive collapse is unlikely. 
Collapse of non-structural 
elements. Glazing will break and 
is likely to be propelled into the 
building, resulting in serious 
glazing fragment injuries, but 
fragments will be reduced. Doors 
may be propelled into rooms, 
presenting serious hazards. 
Majority of personnel suffer 
serious injuries. There are likely 
to be a limited number (10 percent 
to 25 percent) of fatalities. 
Low Level of Protection - 
Moderate damage, unrepairable. 
Major deformation of nonstructural 
elements and secondary 
structural members and minor 
deformation of primary structural 
members, but progressive collapse 
is unlikely. Glazing will break, 
but fall within 1 meter of the wall 
or otherwise not present a 
significant fragment hazard. 
Doors may fail, but they will 
rebound out of their frames, 
presenting minimal hazards. 
Majority of personnel suffer 


Section Vulnerability Question Guidance Observations 
significant injuries. There may be 
a few (<10 percent) fatalities. 
Medium Level Protection - Minor 
damage, repairable. Minor 
deformations of non-structural 
elements and secondary structural 
members and no permanent 
deformation in primary structural 
members. Glazing will break, but 
will remain in the window frame. 
Doors will stay in frames, but will 
not be reusable. Some minor 
injuries, but fatalities are unlikely. 
High Level Protection - Minimal 
damage, repairable. No permanent 
deformation of primary and 
secondary structural members or 
non-structural elements. Glazing 
will not break. Doors will be 
reusable. Only superficial injuries 
are likely. 
Reference: DoD UFC 4-010-01 
3.6 Is the structure 
vulnerable to progressive 
collapse? 
Is the building capable of 
sustaining the removal of 
a column for one floor 
above grade at the 
building perimeter 
without progressive 
collapse? 
In the event of an 
internal explosion in an 
uncontrolled public 
ground floor area, does 
the design prevent 
progressive collapse due 
to the loss of one 
primary column? 
Do architectural or 
structural features 
Design to mitigate progressive 
collapse is an independent 
analysis to determine a systems 
ability to resist structural collapse 
upon the loss of a major structural 
element or the systems ability to 
resist the loss of a major structural 
element. Design to mitigate 
progressive collapse may be based 
on the methods outlined in ASCE 
7-98 (now 7-02). Designers may 
apply static and/or dynamic 
methods of analysis to meet this 
requirement and ultimate load 
capacities may be assumed in the 
analyses. Combine structural 
upgrades for retrofits to existing 
buildings, such as seismic and 
progressive collapse, into a single 
project due to the economic 
synergies and other cross benefits. 
Existing facilities may be 
retrofitted to withstand the design 
level threat or to accept the loss of 
a column for one floor above 
grade at the building perimeter 
without progressive collapse. 
Note that collapse of floors or roof 


Section Vulnerability Question Guidance Observations 
provide a minimum 6inch 
stand-off to the 
internal columns 
(primary vertical load 
carrying members)? 
Are the columns in the 
unscreened internal 
spaces designed for an 
unbraced length equal to 
two floors, or three 
floors where there are 
two levels of parking? 
must not be permitted. 
Reference: GSA PBS-P100 
3.10 Will the loading dock 
design limit damage to 
adjacent areas and vent 
explosive force to the 
exterior of the building? 
Design the floor of the loading 
dock for blast resistance if the 
area below is occupied or contains 
critical utilities. 
Reference: GSA PBS-P100 
4 Building Envelope 
4.2 Is there less than 40 
percent fenestration per 
structural bay? 
Is the window system 
design on the exterior 
faade balanced to 
mitigate the hazardous 
effects of flying glazing 
following an explosive 
event? 
(glazing, frames, 
anchorage to supporting 
walls, etc.) 
Do the glazing systems 
with a -inch (-inch is 
better) bite contain an 
application of structural 
silicone? 
Is the glazing laminated 
The performance of the glass will 
similarly depend on the materials. 
Glazing may be single pane or 
double pane, monolithic or 
laminated, annealed, heat 
strengthened or fully tempered. 
The percent fenestration is a 
balance between protection level, 
cost, the architectural look of the 
building within its surroundings, 
and building codes. One goal is to 
keep fenestration to below 40 
percent of the building envelope 
vertical surface area, but the 
process must balance differing 
requirements. A blast engineer 
may prefer no windows; an 
architect may favor window 
curtain walls; building codes 
require so much fenestration per 
square footage of floor area; fire 
codes require a prescribed 
window opening area if the 
window is a designated escape 
route; and the building owner has 


Section Vulnerability Question Guidance Observations 
or is it protected with an 
anti-shatter (fragment 
retention) film? 
If an anti-shatter film is 
used, is it a minimum of 
a 7-mil thick film, or 
specially manufactured 
4-mil thick film? 
cost concerns. 
Ideally, an owner would want 100 
percent of the glazed area to 
provide the design protection level 
against the postulated explosive 
threat (design basis threat 
weapon size at the expected standoff 
distance). However, 
economics and geometry may 
allow 80 percent to 90 percent due 
to the statistical differences in the 
manufacturing process for glass or 
the angle of incidence of the blast 
wave upon upper story windows 
(4th floor and higher). 
Reference: GSA PBS-P100 
6 Mechanical Systems (HVAC and CBR) 
6.1 Where are the air intakes 
and exhaust louvers for 
the building? 
(low, high, or midpoint 
of the building structure) 
Are the intakes and 
exhausts accessible to 
the public? 
Air intakes should be located on 
the roof or as high as possible. 
Otherwise secure within CPTEDcompliant 
fencing or enclosure. 
The fencing or enclosure should 
have a sloped roof to prevent the 
throwing of anything into the 
enclosure near the intakes. 
Reference: GSA PBS-P100 states 
that air intakes should be on the 
fourth floor or higher and, on 
buildings with three floors or less, 
they should be on the roof or as 
high as practical. Locating 
intakes high on a wall is preferred 
over a roof location. 
Reference: DoD UFC 4-010-01 
states that, for all new inhabited 
buildings covered by FEMA 426, 
all air intakes should be located at 
least 3 meters (10 feet) above the 
ground. 
Reference: CDC/NIOSH, Pub 
2002-139 states: An extension 
height of 12 feet (3.7 m) will place 
the intake out of reach of 
individuals without some 
assistance. Also, the entrance to 
the intake should be covered with 
a sloped metal mesh to reduce the 


Section Vulnerability Question Guidance Observations 
threat of objects being tossed into 
the intake. A minimum slope of 
45 is generally adequate. 
Extension height should be 
increased where existing 
platforms or building features 
(i.e., loading docks, retaining 
walls) might provide access to the 
outdoor air intakes. 
Reference: LBNL Pub 51959: 
Exhausts are also a concern 
during an outdoor release, 
especially if exhaust fans are not 
in continuous operation, due to 
wind effects and chimney effects 
(air movement due to differential 
temperature). 
6.3 Are there multiple air 
intake locations? 
Single air intakes may feed 
several air handling units. Indicate 
if the air intakes are localized or 
separated. Installing low-leakage 
dampers is one way to provide the 
system separation when 
necessary. 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities 
6.4 What are the types of air 
filtration? Include the 
efficiency and number of 
filter modules for each of 
the main air handling 
systems. 
Is there any collective 
protection for chemical, 
biological, and 
radiological 
contamination designed 
into the building? 
MERV  Minimum Efficiency 
Reporting Value 
HEPA  High Efficiency 
Particulate Air 
Activated charcoal for gases 
Ultraviolet C for biologicals 
Consider mix of approaches for 
optimum protection and costeffectiveness. 
Reference: CDC/NIOSH Pub 
2002-139 


Section Vulnerability Question Guidance Observations 
8 Electrical Systems 
8.1 Are there any 
transformers or 
switchgears located 
outside the building or 
accessible from the 
building exterior? 
Are they vulnerable to 
public access? 
Are they secured? 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities 
8.4 Are critical electrical 
systems collocated with 
other building systems? 
Are critical electrical 
systems located in areas 
outside of secured 
electrical areas? 
Is security system wiring 
located separately from 
electrical and other 
service systems? 
Collocation concerns include 
rooms, ceilings, raceways, 
conduits, panels, and risers. 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities 
8.6 Does emergency backup 
power exist for all areas 
within the building or for 
critical areas only? 
How is the emergency 
power distributed? 
Is the emergency power 
system independent from 
the normal electrical 
service, particularly in 
critical areas? 
There should be no single critical 
node that allows both the normal 
electrical service and the 
emergency backup power to be 
affected by a single incident. 
Automatic transfer switches and 
interconnecting switchgear are the 
initial concerns. 
Emergency and normal electrical 
equipment should be installed 
separately, at different locations, 
and as far apart as possible. 
Reference: GSA PBS-P100 


Section Vulnerability Question Guidance Observations 
9 Fire Alarm Systems 
9.1 Is the building fire alarm 
system centralized or 
localized? 
How are alarms made 
known, both locally and 
centrally? 
Are critical documents 
and control systems 
located in a secure yet 
accessible location? 
Fire alarm systems must first warn 
building occupants to evacuate for 
life safety. Then they must inform 
the responding agency to dispatch 
fire equipment and personnel. 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities 
9.2 Where are the fire alarm 
panels located? 
Do they allow access to 
unauthorized personnel? 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities 
9.3 Is the fire alarm system 
standalone or integrated 
with other functions such 
as security and 
environmental or 
building management 
systems? 
What is the interface? 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities 


Section Vulnerability Question Guidance Observations 
10 Communications and IT Systems 
10.5 Are there redundant 
communications systems 
available? 
Critical areas should be supplied 
with multiple or redundant means 
of communications. Power outage 
phones can provide redundancy as 
they connect directly to the local 
commercial telephone switch off 
site and not through the building 
telephone switch in the main 
telephone distribution room. 
A base radio communication 
system with antenna can be 
installed in stairwells, and 
portable sets distributed to floors. 
References: GSA PBS-P100 and 
FEMA 386-7 
10.15 Is there a mass 
notification system that 
reaches all building 
occupants? 
(public address, pager, 
cell phone, computer 
override, etc.) 
Will one or more of 
these systems be 
operational under hazard 
conditions? 
(UPS, emergency power) 
Depending upon building size, a 
mass notification system will 
provide warning and alert 
information, along with actions to 
take before and after an incident if 
there is redundancy and power. 
Reference: DoD UFC 4-010-01 


Building Design Mitigation Measures 
(COOP Version) 

Asset-Threat/Hazard 
Pair 
Current Risk 
Rating 
Suggested Mitigation 
Measure 
Revised Risk 
Rating 


Unit XI (C): Electronic Security Systems 

Unit XI (C) 

COURSE TITLE Building Design for Homeland Security for Continuity of Operations 
(COOP) Train-the-Trainer 
UNIT TITLE Electronic Security Systems 

OBJECTIVES 1. Explain the basic concepts of electronic security system 
components, their capabilities, and their interaction with other 
systems. 

2. 
Describe the electronic security system concepts and practices that 
warrant special attention to enhance public safety. 
3. 
Use the assessment process to identify electronic security system 
requirements that can mitigate vulnerabilities. 
4. 
Justify selection of electronic security systems to mitigate 
vulnerabilities. 

SCOPE The following topics will be covered in this unit: 

1. 
Perimeter layout and zoning of sensors. 
2. 
Intrusion detection systems and sensor technologies. 
3. 
Entry-control systems and electronic entry control technologies. 
4. 
Closed circuit television and data-transmission media. 
5. 
Control centers and building management systems. 
6. 
Definitions of the degree of security and control. 

REFERENCES 1. FEMA 426, Reference Manual to Mitigate Potential Terrorist 
Attacks Against Buildings: 

a. 
Pages 3-46 to 3-50 
b. 
Appendix D 
c. 
Security Systems and Security Master Plan sections of Building 
Vulnerability Checklist, pages 1-81 and 1-92 

2. Case Study  Appendix C: COOP, Cooperville Information / 
Business Center 


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UNIT XI (C) CASE STUDY ACTIVITY: 
ELECTRONIC SECURITY SYSTEMS 
(COOP Version) 

In this unit, the emphasis will be upon the various components and technology available for use 
in electronic security systems. The Building Vulnerability Assessment Checklist in FEMA 
426 can be used as a screening tool for preliminary building design vulnerability assessment or 
for assessment of an existing building and site. 

Requirements 

Refer to the Appendix C Case Study to determine answers to the questions. Then review results 
as a team to identify vulnerabilities and possible mitigation measures. 

Activity # 1: Complete the selected vulnerability checklist questions in the following 
Vulnerability Questions table. 

Activity # 2: Upon completion of the questions refer back to the vulnerability ratings determined 
in the Unit IV (C) Student Activity. Based on this more detailed analysis, decide if any 
vulnerability rating needs adjustment. Adjust the Risk Matrix poster accordingly for any changes 
in vulnerability rating. 

Activity # 3: Select mitigation measures to reduce vulnerability and associated risk from the site, 
layout, and building perspectives. Concentrate on the three highest risk ratings on the Risk 
Matrix poster as adjusted by Activity # 2. Use the Electronic Security System Mitigation 
Measures table found at the end of this unit to capture this information. 

Activity # 4: Consider the mitigation measures of Activity #3 to be installed, estimate the new 
vulnerability ratings as if these measures were in place, and calculate the new risk ratings. 
Capture your information in the Electronic Security System Mitigation Measures table. 

Section Vulnerability 
Question 
Guidance Answers/ 
Observations 
12 Security Systems 
Perimeter Systems 
12.1 Are black/white or 
color CCTV (closed 
circuit television) 
cameras used? 
Are they monitored 
and recorded 24 
hours/7 days a 
week? By whom? 
Security technology is frequently 
considered to complement or supplement 
security personnel forces and to provide a 
wider area of coverage. Typically, these 
physical security elements provide the first 
line of defense in deterring, detecting, and 
responding to threats and reducing 
vulnerabilities. They must be viewed as an 
integral component of the overall security 
program. Their design, engineering, 
installation, operation, and management 
must be able to meet daily security 


Section Vulnerability 
Question 
Guidance Answers/ 
Observations 
Are they analog or 
digital by design? 
What is the number 
of fixed, wireless, 
and pan-tilt-zoom 
cameras used? 
Who are the 
manufacturers of the 
CCTV cameras? 
What is the age of 
the CCTV cameras 
in use? 
challenges from a cost-effective and 
efficiency perspective. During and after an 
incident, the system, or its backups, should 
be functional per the planned design. 
Consider color CCTV cameras to view and 
record activity at the perimeter of the 
building, particularly at primary entrances 
and exits. A mix of monochrome cameras 
should be considered for areas that lack 
adequate illumination for color cameras. 
Reference: GSA PBS P-100 
12.2 Are the cameras 
programmed to 
respond 
automatically to 
perimeter building 
alarm events? 
Do they have builtin 
video motion 
capabilities? 
The efficiency of monitoring multiple 
screens decreases as the number of 
screens increases. Tying the alarm system 
or motion sensors to a CCTV camera and 
a monitoring screen improves the manmachine 
interface by drawing attention to 
a specific screen and its associated 
camera. Adjustment may be required after 
installation due to initial false alarms, 
usually caused by wind or small animals. 
Reference: Physical Security Assessment 
for the Department of Veterans Affairs 
Facilities 
12.4 Are panic/duress 
alarm buttons or 
sensors used, where 
are they located, and 
are they hardwired 
or portable? 
Call buttons should be provided at key 
public contact areas and as needed in 
offices of managers and directors, in 
garages and parking lots, and other highrisk 
locations by assessment. 
Reference: GSA PBS P-100 


Section Vulnerability 
Question 
Guidance Answers/ 
Observations 
12.5 Are intercom call 
boxes used in 
parking areas or 
along the building 
perimeter? 
See Item 12.4. 
12.7 Who monitors the 
CCTV system? 
Reference: DOC CIAO Vulnerability 
Assessment Framework 1.1 
12.9 Are the perimeter 
cameras supported 
by an uninterruptible 
power supply, 
battery, or building 
emergency power? 
Reference: Physical Security Assessment 
for the Department of Veterans Affairs 
Facilities 


Electronic Security System Mitigation Measures 
(COOP Version) 

Asset-Threat/Hazard 
Pair 
Current Risk 
Rating 
Suggested Mitigation 
Measure 
Revised Risk 
Rating 


Unit XII (C): Case Study 

Unit XII (C) 

COURSE TITLE Building Design for Homeland Security for Continuity of Operations 
(COOP) Train-the-Trainer 
UNIT TITLE Case Study 

OBJECTIVES 1. Explain building security design issues to a building owner for 
consideration prior to a renovation or new construction. 

2. 
Explain the identification process to arrive at the high-risk assetthreat/
hazard pairs of interest. 
3. 
Justify the recommended mitigation measures, explaining the 
benefits in reducing the risk for the high-risk situations of interest. 

SCOPE The following topics will be covered in this unit: 

1. Activity: Preparation and presentation of the highest risks identified 
by the groups, the vulnerabilities identified for these risks, and 
recommended mitigation measures to reduce vulnerability and risk. 

a. 
The top three risks will be prioritized as well as the top three 
recommended mitigation measures with rationale and 
justification. This includes any consideration for changes to the 
Risk Matrix from knowledge gained in Units IX, X, and XI. 
b. 
Identify all requirement gaps that need to be provided for 
Cooperville Information / Business Center to be a fully 
functional COOP facility supporting the U.S. Department of 
Artificial Intelligence. 

REFERENCES 1. FEMA 426, Reference Manual to Mitigate Potential Terrorist 
Attacks Against Buildings 

a. 
Pages 2-50 to 2-58 
b. 
Pages 3-50 to 3-52 
c. 
Chapter 5 
d. 
Appendix D 

e. 
FEMA 452, Risk Assessment: A How-To Guide to Mitigate 
Potential Terrorist Attacks Against Buildings, pages 5-1 to 5-18 
f. 
Case Study  Appendix C: COOP, Cooperville Information / 
Business Center 


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UNIT XII (C) CASE STUDY ACTIVITY: 
FINALIZATION AND PRESENTATION OF GROUP RESULTS 
(COOP Version) 

In this activity, students work with their groups to finalize their assessments, decide on high 
priority risk concerns, determine appropriate mitigation measures, identify COOP requirements 
gaps, and present findings to the class. 

The student presenter(s) will decide on the number of asset-threat/hazard pairs to present and the 
mitigation measures to apply. Of great importance is the rationale for the selection of these high 
risk asset-threat/hazard pairs and the rationale for the recommended mitigation measures. No 
Cost / Low Cost recommended mitigation measures are always welcome as procedural changes 
can derive significant benefit. 

In light of limited resources that building owners / decision makers have to work with, the 
presenter(s) will identify the top three asset-threat/hazard pairs that their assessment identified 
and the top three mitigation measures that they would recommend to have funded using those 
limited resources. 

Since this facility is also being assessed for COOP capability to support the Federal Agency, 
identify any requirements that are not currently present in the CI/BC building. 

Requirements 

Activity #1: Based on findings from the previous activities and understanding of course content, 
complete the Assessment Team Briefing Summary table on the next page. One 
entry is provided as an example. Add at least three additional entries. Identify the 
top three risks and the top three mitigation measures. 

Activity #2: Complete the COOP Requirements Gaps table for all COOP requirements gaps 
identified and recommendations to satisfy / correct them. This table is at the end of 
this Student Manual Unit. 

Activity #3: Select one or two presenters from the assessment team to brief the teams 
conclusions and recommendations with rationale and justifications. The 
presentation should be 5-7 minutes in length. Ensure points in activities above are 
covered. 


Risk #1: 

Function(s) / Infrastructure: ______________________________ 
Risk Ratings: ______________________________ 

Risk #2: 

Function(s) / Infrastructure: ______________________________ 
Risk Ratings: ______________________________ 

Risk #3: 

Function(s) / Infrastructure: ______________________________ 
Risk Ratings: ______________________________ 

Assessment Team Briefing Summary 

Prioritized Asset- 
Threat/Hazard Pair 
Requirements to Mitigate Rationale 
Design basis threats include 

Protect building and internal 

Priority #: __________ functions and infrastructure car bomb and truck bomb, 

from explosive blast. 

with truck bomb more 

Envelope Systems / Vehicle difficult to mitigate 

Bomb Priority #: __________ 

 Apply known standards, 

1. Use planters, plinth walls, 

such as GSA Level II 

landscaping and / or 

Blast/Setback Standards or 

reconfiguration of parking to 

DoD Standards 1,8, 9 and 

increase standoff. 

10 / Recommendation 17 

 Note that known standards 

Priority #: __________ 

are based upon a design 

2. Harden glazing with 

basis threat that may or 

Fragment Retention Film on 

may not equate to design 

windows or replace with 

basis threat selected for 

laminated glass as this is the 

the assessment 

weakest exterior component. 

 Increasing stand-off will 
reduce blast pressure and 

Priority #: __________ 

hardening will reduce 

3. Harden walls by installing 

blast pressure damage. 

vermiculite between wythes so 

Enclosing the overhang 

they function as a single 

will significantly reduce 

system. 

reflective blast pressure on 
the first floor front side. 


Prioritized Asset- 
Threat/Hazard Pair 
Requirements to Mitigate Rationale 
Priority #: __________ 

 Fragment retention film 

4. Reduce reflective blast 

can be selected to reduce 

pressure by approaching 

summer heat gain to 

property manager about 

reduce air conditioning 

closing in overhang area. 

load. 

 Vermiculite can add to 
insulation factor of walls 
to reduce heating and 
cooling load on the 
building. 


Prioritized Asset- 
Threat/Hazard Pair 
Requirements to Mitigate Rationale 

COOP Requirements Gaps 

COOP Requirement Gap Action to Correct 


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Course Title: Building Design for Homeland Security COOP T t-T 
Unit XIII (C): Train-the-Trainer 

Unit XIII (C) 

COURSE TITLE Building Design for Homeland Security for Continuity of Operations 
(COOP) Train-the-Trainer 

UNIT TITLE Train-the-Trainer 

OBJECTIVES 1. Discuss basic adult learning principles as they apply to participants 
in Building Design for Homeland Security. 

2. 
Explain the key functions of instructional delivery as they apply to 
Building Design for Homeland Security. 
3. 
Describe the key steps of instructional preparation as they apply to 
Building Design for Homeland Security. 

SCOPE The following topics will be covered in this unit: 
1. Learning styles and preferences, characteristics of adult learners, 
adult learning assumptions (experience, motivation, active 
participation and variety) 
2. Adult training methodologies used in Building Design for Homeland 
Security 
3. Steps for instructional preparation, preparing the environment, 
preparing yourself, expecting the unexpected 
REFERENCES No references are required for this unit. 


Course Title: Building Design for Homeland Security COOP T-t-T 

Unit XIII (C): Train-the-Trainer 

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Preparing To Train Adults

Instructional Skills 

Prepared for: 

Federal Emergency Management Agency 
Emergency Management Institute Revised January 2007 


Contents 

General Information 

This section identifies the purpose, objectives, and contents of this reading 1 packet. 

How Adults Learn 

Adults differ in interests, intelligence, life experiences, ability to 
concentrate, ability to remember, sense of well-being, imagination, and 

2 self-confidence. This section provides a basis for understanding adult 
learning by describing the unique physical, emotional, and intellectual 
characteristics of adult learners. 

Adult Learning: Strategies for Success 

11 By following the strategies presented in this section, you will increase the 
likelihood of motivating adult participants and ensuring that learning 
occurs. 

Learners as Individuals 

Every time you train, you will be faced with the different learning styles and 
preferences of the participants. This section will prepare you to identify 

19 learners preferences and take steps to accommodate their differing needs. 
It includes a discussion about how to handle events that fail to show 
respect for individual learners. 

Job Aids and Self Inventories 

10 Adult Learning Characteristics (Job Aid #1) 

18 Instructor Effectiveness Inventory 

24 Accommodating Individual Learners (Job Aid #2) 

27 Learning Preference Inventory 

35 Strategies for Addressing Insensitive Events (Job Aid #3) 

36 Reading Assessment 


General Information 

Purpose 

The purpose of this reading packet is to 
teach you how to apply adult learning 
principles when instructing courses. It 
takes into consideration the unique 
characteristics including the learning 
styles and cultural backgrounds of your 
participants. As an instructor, you have 
probably asked yourself some or all of the 
following questions about adult learners: 

 
Can participants learn equally well? 
 
What motivates participants to learn? 
 
How do I know when learning has 
occurred? 
 
What instructional methods can I use 
to help participants learn the best? 
 
How can I accommodate the 
different learning styles and 
preferences of the participants when 
instructing? 

The reading materials will address these 
questions. You will read about adult 
learning characteristics, adult learning 
principles, and learning styles and 
preferences. You will have several 
opportunities to practice applying the 
information presented by completing a 
series of practical exercises. 

Objectives 

After reading this packet, you will be 
able to: 

 
Discuss key adult learning 
characteristics. 
 
Explain the differences between 
training and learning.
 
Use the principles of adult learning 
when instructing. 
 
Identify your own learning style. 
 
Accommodate different learning 
preferences when instructing. 

Contents 

How Adults Learn provides a basis for 
understanding adult learning by 
describing the physical, emotional, and 
intellectual characteristics of adult 
learners. 

Adult Learning: Strategies for Success 

explains how to design and deliver 
effective training by following adult 
learning principles. These principles 
address the different physical, emotional, 
and intellectual characteristics that affect 
how adults learn. 

Learners as Individuals summarizes the 
different learning preferences of adult 
learners and provides guidelines for 
accommodating learning preferences 
during training. While reading this section, 
you will complete the Learning 
Preferences Inventory that allows you to 
identify your own unique learning style. 


How Adults Learn

Overview 

Adults differ in interests, intelligence, life 
experiences, ability to concentrate, ability 
to remember, imagination, and sense of 
well being and self-confidence. Each of 
these factors influences how well and how 
fast a person learns and what you, as an 
instructor, must do to train adults 
effectively. This section provides a basis 
for understanding adult learning by 
describing the unique physical, emotional, 
and intellectual characteristics of adult 
learners. It also presents the differences 
between training and learning, and it 
prepares you for identifying when 
successful learning has occurred. 

Highlights 

When you complete this section, you will 
be able to: 

 
Describe the characteristics of adult 
learners. 
 
Explain the differences between 
training and learning.

Contents 
3 Exercise: Self-Assessment of Adult 

Learning 
4 Adult Learning Characteristics 
8 Training is Different from Learning 
9 Exercise: Has Learning Occurred? 
10 Job Aid #1: Adult Learning 

Characteristics 


Exercise: 
Self-Assessment of Adult Learning 

Instructions: This short exercise will help you assess your current understanding of adult 
learning. 

True or False: 

 
Adults can learn equally well at every age . True . False 
throughout their lifespan. 
 
The greatest amount of vision loss in adults . True . False 
occurs after the age of 60 years. 
 
All adults experience a decline in their . True . False 
physical and sensory abilities as they 
grow older. 
 
Learning is an internal process that ones . True . False 
physical, emotional, and intellectual 
framework will affect. 
 
Adults engage in learning because they . True . False 
believe that it will help them cope with 
problems in later life. Their time perspective 
is one of postponed application. 
 
Adults benefit little from individualized . True . False 
attention and reinforcement. 
 
Studies have shown that most adults have a . True . False 
higher level of retention in learning when they 
read information rather than hear information. 
 
Adults rely heavily on the vicarious . True . False 
experiences of their instructors and textbooks. 
 
Most adults have preferred methods for . True ( False 
learning new knowledge and skills. 

 
Adults learn best when the learning ( True ( False 
environment is informal and unstructured. 
 
Adults respond well to traditional, ( True ( False 
lecture-format learning. 
 
Like children, adults progress through ( True ( False 
developmental stages that impact their 
readiness to learn. 

. 

Adult Learning Characteristics 

Social science and practical experience 
tell us that the characteristics of 
adult learners fall into three distinct 
categories: 

 
Physical characteristics 
 
Emotional characteristics 
 
Intellectual characteristics 

Lets examine the physical 
characteristics of adult learners 
first. Physical traits such as lifelong 
learning abilities and physiological 
changes due to aging directly impact an 
adults learning experiences. 

Physical Characteristics 

Lifelong Learning 

Unfortunately, many people still believe you 
cant teach an old dog new tricks. This old 
adage is simply not true. Adults can learn 
throughout their lifespan, but they show a 
decline in the rate of learning with age. 
However, this decrease in the speed of 
learning occurs primarily in adults who get 
out of the practice of learning. Those who 
stay in practice can learn most things as 
well at 60 years of age as they could at 20, 
and they learn some things better. 

New Dog 
Tricks 
Physiological Changes 

Although adults can learn throughout their 
lifetime, they do experience a decline in 
their physical and sensory abilities as they 
grow older. Sometimes this affects their 
learning. 

For example, all adults experience: 

 
Vision Loss. Beyond the age of 
20 years, every person shows some 
decline in visual acuity. The greatest 
amount of vision loss occurs 
between the ages of 40 and 
55 years. 
 
Hearing Loss. People reach their 
peak hearing performance before 
age 15, and then there is a 
consistent decline until age 65. 
Hearing loss in adults can have a 
marked influence on their level of 
self-confidence and can increase 
feelings of isolation. 

 Less Tolerance of Cold and Heat. 

Adults show a lower tolerance for 
learning environments that are too 
warm or too cold. 

 Fatigue. As adults get older, they 
tire more easily. 


Not all physiological changes in adults are 
in the direction of decline. For example, 
although muscular strength, vigor, and 
speed of reaction tend to decline with age, 
other skills such as skill reliability and 
accuracy improve with practice. 

In addition to the physical characteristics of 
adults that affect learning, there are 
emotional traits as well that help determine 
the success of adult learning experiences. 

Emotional Characteristics 

Independent Self-Concept 

Adults see themselves as responsible, selfdirecting, 
and independent, and they want 
others to see them the same way. Adult 
learners tend to avoid, resist, and resent 
placement in situations where they are not 
treated like adults (e.g., being told what to 
do and what not to do, talked down to, 
embarrassed, punished, judged). 

Often, adults fail to learn under conditions 
that are inconsistent with their feelings, 
thoughts, or actions. 

Self-Motivated 

In addition to having an independent selfconcept, 
adults are also self-motivating. 
That is, adults want to learn when they have 
a need to do so. They want to know how 
the skill and/or knowledge will help them. 
Studies show that adults prepare 
themselves to learn by determining the 
benefits of learning, as well as the 
disadvantages of not learning. 

PLUMBING 
MADE 
EASY 
Reinforcement 

Although adult learners are self-directed, 
they do benefit from, and respond positively 
to, reinforcement from their instructors and 
peers. 


Established Emotional 
Frameworks 

Another unique characteristic of adult 
learners is that they have established 
emotional frameworks that are part of their 
values, attitudes, and tendencies. Adult 
learning involves changing behaviors and 
possibly changing parts of this emotional 
framework. Change can be disorienting and 
anxiety provoking. 

An adults ability to change, and therefore to 
learn, is directly proportional to the degree 
of emotional safety he or she feels. 

HIGH 

LOW 

HIGH 

Immediate Application 

Adults tell children that most of their 
learning will become useful to them in later 
life. Therefore, their time perspective of 
learning is one of postponed application. 
Adults, on the other hand, engage in 
learning largely in response to current life 
problems, pressures, and needs. 

They believe that learning will improve their 
ability to deal with issues they face now. 
Hence, their time perspective of learning is 
one of immediate application. 

Finally, with physical and emotional 
characteristics, there also are intellectual 
traits that directly influence learning in 
adults. 

Intellectual Characteristics 

Accumulated Experience 

Adults enter educational activities with more 
life experiences than children. Having lived 
longer, adults have accumulated a much 
greater volume of experiences from which 
to draw. Adults also have different kinds of 
experiences than children. Adults, 
therefore, are a rich resource for one 
anothers learning. They enjoy sharing 
experiences with other learners, and they 
tend to be less dependent on their 
instructors and textbooks. 

Previous Learning 

In addition to having a greater amount of 
accumulated experience than children, 
adult learners also possess a large bank of 
previous learning that can be both an asset 
and a liability. Previous learning can be 
beneficial because adults learn best when 
they are able to link new knowledge and 
skills with what they have learned 
previously. The linkage allows the adult 
learners to draw upon existing knowledge 
and skills and decreases anxiety about 
learning new areas. 

EXPERIENCE 
SCHOOL 
BOOKS 
PAST 
JOBS 
PARENTS 
SENSES 

Previous learning, however, can also be a 
hindrance to learning. If the new 
knowledge and skills to be acquired 
contradict the learners existing 
knowledge and skills, then the learner: 

 
May dismiss or reject the new 
knowledge and skills and stick with 
what he or she knows and can do. 
 
May experience interference from 
the existing knowledge and skills as 
he or she tries to learn the new 
knowledge and skills. In this case, 
the adult learner needs to unlearn 
previous learning before acquiring 
the new knowledge or skill. 

Active Learning 

Another intellectual trait of adults that 
impacts learning is their need to 
participate actively in the instructional 
process. Adults learn by reading, 
listening, and watching, but they learn 
better when they are active participants in 
the learning process. 

Studies show that 3 days after learning 
new information, adults retain1: 

10% of What They Read 

20% of What They Hear  

30% of What They See 1 

50% of What They See and Hear 11 +  

70% of What They Say  

90% of What They Say as They Do It 

Studies also show that adults have unique 
learning preferences, as the next section 
describes. 

Learning Preferences 

Most adults have preferred methods for 
learning new knowledge and skills. Adult 
learners respond better when the 
presentation of new material utilizes a 
variety of instructional methods. This 
appeals to their different senses. 

The section that begins on page 20 covers 
learning preferences in detail. 
Adult learners respond better when 
the new material utilizes a variety of 
instructional methods. 
1Sharon Fisher, Adult Learning, Amherst, MA: 
Human Resource Development Press, Inc., 1988. 
Let me explain 
what Im doing. 

Training is Different 
from Learning 

Too often, educators and trainers make 
the mistake of believing that successful 
learning has occurred simply because 
they have communicated certain 
information or demonstrated skills to their 
participants. Training, however, does not 
always result in learning. There are 
specific criteria you can use to determine 
whether learning has actually occurred. 

Training Versus Learning 

The term training applies to any manner 
of imparting information or skills that 
others may learn. In comparison, learning 
is the acquisition and mastery of such 
knowledge or skills. In other words, 
learning is an end product of successful 
training. 

As an instructor, it is your job to 
eliminate barriers to learning so 
that learning will be observable, 
applicable, and verifiable. 

Training . Learning 

Training does not always result in learning 
for many reasons, including: 

 
During training, learners can become 
inattentive, thus failing to acquire 
and master the knowledge and skills 
necessary for learning. 
 
The instructors style and techniques 
do not match the learners 
preferences. 

 
The knowledge and skills being 
taught may be too complex for the 
audience, who may become bored, 
confused, or frustrated. 
 
The learners see no direct value in 
learning the material. 
 
Training may be all theory and no 
practice. 

Learning is an end product of 
successful training. 

To prove that learning has occurred, you 
should use the following criteria: 

 
There is an observable change in 
behavior. Both the learner and the 
instructor observe a change in 
behavior. 
 
The learner applies the knowledge 
and skills in practice exercises. 
 
Valid and reliable testing verifies the 
acquisition and mastery of 
knowledge and skills. 

LEARNING MUST 
BE: 
5 OBSERVABLE 
5 APPLICABLE 
5 VERIFIABLE 
As an instructor, it is your job to eliminate 
barriers to learning so that learning will be 
observable, applicable, and verifiable. 


Exercise: 
Has Learning Occurred? 

Instructions: Read each of the following learning situations and determine whether or not 
learning has really taken place. Explain (in the appropriate space) how you know that 
learning has or has not occurred. 

Learning Situation #1: 

A group views a video about blast effects. 
Has learning occurred? Yes _____ No _____ 
If yes, explain how you know learning has occurred. If no, explain how you know that 

learning has not occurred. 

Learning Situation #2: 

In training, Bill Baker encounters the Threat-Vulnerability Matrix for the first time. From the 
lecture he becomes familiar with the matrix, but in a practical exercise, he cannot 
determine the risk rating for each asset-threat/hazard pair. 

Has learning occurred? Yes _____ No _____ 

If yes, explain how you know learning has occurred. If no, explain how you know that 
learning has not occurred. 

Answer Key: #1-No, there was not an observable change in behavior because the learner did not practice 
applying the knowledge from the video. #2-No, the learner was unable to apply the new knowledge during a 
practical exercise. 


Job Aid #1: 
Adult Learning Characteristics

The following summarizes the characteristics of adult learners. Use this checklist as a 
guide when preparing training presentations. 

5 Adults, when older, may not be able to hear or see as well as they could when 
they were younger. 
5 Adults are less inclined to be impulsive; they require time to think through 
problems. 
5 Adults see themselves as capable of self-direction. 
5 Adults need to have a part in determining what they learn. 
5 Adults must want to learn before learning takes place. 
5 Adults have values, attitudes, and tendencies that influence their willingness 
to learn. 
5 Adults need individual attention and reinforcement to achieve personal goals. 
5 Adults possess a large volume of previous learning that influences learning. 
5 Adults learn by doing. 
5 Adults may not respond well to lectures. 
5 Adults must have training methods adapted to their needs. 
5 Adults prefer a variety of training methods. 
5 Adults learn best in an informal environment. 
5 Adults need to transfer new learning to their situations. 
5 Adults learn by sharing experiences. 
5 Adults stimulate each other. 
5 Adults want practical knowledge and skills. 
5 Adults prefer specific usable information rather than theoretical information. 
5 Adults have other responsibilities that may distract them or call them away 
from class. 


Adult Learning: 
Strategies for Success

Overview 

The unique adult learning characteristics 
you read about in the previous section 
point out the need for some specific 
strategies to use when designing and 
delivering training to adults. By following 
the strategies this section introduces, you 
will increase the likelihood of motivating 
adult participants and ensuring that 
learning occurs. 

Highlights 

When you complete this section, you will 
be able to use specific strategies 
effectively for addressing adult learning 
characteristics when training. 

Contents 
12 Exercise: How Adult Learning 
Characteristics Impact Training 
13 Training Strategies That Address Adult 
Learning Characteristics 
17 Exercise: Applying Training 
Strategies to Past Experiences 
18 Instructor Effectiveness Inventory 


Exercise: 
How Adult Learning 
Characteristics Impact Training 

Instructions: For training to be successful, you must understand how adult learning 
characteristics impact the way you plan and deliver your training. Review the adult 
learning characteristics in the left-hand column, and, for each characteristic, select the 
most appropriate training strategy from the right-hand column. When you finish this 
matching exercise, check your answers against the answer key on bottom of this page. 

Adult Learning Characteristic 

_____ Adults can learn by reading, 
listening, and watching, but they 
learn best if they participate 
actively in the learning process. 

_____ Most adults have preferred 
methods for learning new 
knowledge and skills. 

_____ Adults engage in learning in order 
to help them cope with current 
issues and problems. They seek 
learning that they can apply 
immediately. 

_____ Adults have a large bank of 
previous learning that can be both 
an asset and a liability to learning. 

_____ Adults enter training with a large 
volume of life experiences from 
which to draw. 

_____ Adults perceive themselves as 
independent and capable of selfdirection. 
They desire others to see 
them the same way. 

_____ All adult learners experience a 
decline in sensory abilities (e.g., 
hearing, vision, physical 
conditioning). 

Training Strategy 

a. 
Plan your training so that you 
measure successful learning in terms 
of accuracy and reliability, rather than 
speed and volume. 
b. 
Provide learners with opportunities to 
identify what they want and need to 
learn; to plan and to carry out their 
own learning activities; and to 
evaluate their own progress toward 
self-selected goals. 
c. 
Plan training activities around your 
participants issues and concerns 
about what they will be doing in 
their jobs. 
d. 
Maximize learning by doing. 
e. 
Provide job aids to assist in 
unlearning previous information that 
is interfering with new learning. 
f. 
Match the instructional methods you 
select to your participants learning 
preferences. 
g. 
Use the learners life experiences to 
introduce and discuss new concepts. 

SM XIII-C-16 


Training Strategies That Address 
Adult Learning Characteristics

There are many specific strategies you 
can use in training to address the 
physical, emotional, and intellectual 
factors of adult learning that was covered 
previously. Using these strategies will 
enable you to maximize the participants 
learning by: 

 
Creating an environment that 
optimizes learning. 
 
Making the learning applicable to 
adults past learning and present 
situation. 
 
Actively involving the learners in the 
training process. 

Strategies to Address 
Physical Characteristics 

Lifelong Learning 

To help adults learn well at any age, you 
should create a learning environment that 
meets the needs and abilities of your adult 
learners. Creating this environment 
involves: 

 
Developing your activities so that 
you measure successful learning in 
terms of accuracy and reliability 
rather than speed and volume. 
 
Providing learning exercises that 
require analysis and processing 
rather than impulsive, quick-on
your-feet responses. 

The Reality 

We realize that learning conditions may be 
less than perfect when you are teaching. 
Recognizing the importance of the physical 
environment will allow you to do as much as 
is within your control, given your particular 
conditions. 

Physiological Changes 

The following techniques will provide a 
learning environment that minimizes the 
extent to which learners physical 
conditioning and health interfere with 
learning: 

 
Provide good lighting without glare. 
 
Provide sound amplification with 
good acoustics. 
 
Provide conditions that minimize 
fatigue and anxiety. 
 
Allow adult learners to take breaks. 
 
Provide healthful food during breaks. 
 
Use job aids and memoryenhancement 
devices to help 
learners retain information. 


Strategies to Address 
Emotional Characteristics 

Independent Self-Concept 

In order to respect adults independent 
self-concepts, you need to provide your 
learners with opportunities to identify what 
they want and need to learn; to plan and 
to carry out their own learning activities; 
and to evaluate their own progress toward 
self-selected goals. 

Follow these strategies to accomplish this 
objective: 

 
Assume the role of learning 
resource rather than the more 
traditional role of teacher. 
 
Allow adult learners to direct their 
own learning as much as possible. 
 
Treat adult learners as adults. 
Avoid talking down to adult 
learners. Instead, use content 
and style appropriate to their 
developmental level. 
 
Avoid putting adult learners in 
situations where they will feel 
embarrassed. 

MY GOALS: 
I need to learn 
I want to learn 
My plan is to 

" 

Reinforcement 

Adults respond positively to reinforcement. 
So, as an instructor, you should: 

 
Respond to the verbal and nonverbal 
feelings that adult learners express. 
 
Provide meaningful reinforcement to 
adult learners. Learners must 
perceive the reinforcement as 
positive from their frames of 
reference. 
 
Provide opportunities for peer 
feedback and reinforcement. 
Reinforcement from other adult 
learners can be as powerful as the 
reinforcement that instructors 
provide. 

SM XIII-C-18 


Self-Motivated 

Adults are self-motivated learners. Follow 
these strategies to address this adult 
learning characteristic: 

 
Make sure that adult learners get an 
opportunity to explore why they need 
to learn the knowledge or skills the 
training will present. 
 
Make learning activities relevant to 
the participants learning objectives. 
 
Explain the possible benefits to gain 
by learning the knowledge or skills to 
be presented. 
 
Provide opportunities to apply and 
try out new learning as part of 
training. Instructors can motivate 
adult learners by convincing them of 
benefits. However, to stay motivated, 
adult learners need a chance to see 
the benefits for themselves. 

Established Emotional Frameworks 

Because adult learners have established 
values, attitudes, and tendencies, and 
because learning involves changing parts of 
this framework, you should: 

 
Provide a learning environment that 
is non-threatening. 
 
Avoid making adult learners change 
too many behaviors all at once. Have 
them learn one new behavior and 
master it before attempting to learn 
another new behavior. 
 
Allow adult learners to hang on to 
established values, attitudes, and 
tendencies, unless these get in the 
way of learning. 

Immediate Time Perspective 

 
Adults engage in learning largely in 
response to current life problems, 
pressures, and needs. Therefore, you 
should: 
 
Plan your training activities around 
your learners issues and concerns. 
 
Make the training problem-centered, 
not subject matter-centered. 
 
Emphasize your function as one of 
helping learners look at problems 
and try new approaches. 
 
Dont tell your learners what would 
be good for them. 


Strategies to Address 
Intellectual Characteristics 

Accumulated Experience 

To draw upon the adults extensive life 
experiences, you should: 

 
Use instructional techniques that tap 
the learners experience, such as 
group discussion, case studies, role 
playing, demonstrations, group 
interviews, and skill practice 
exercises. 
 
Use your learners life experiences to 
introduce and discuss new concepts. 

Previous Learning 

Help your learners build bridges between 
existing learning and new learning by: 

 
Using analogies and common 
examples when instructing. 
 
Allowing learners to explore what
they know about an area before 
providing instruction. 
 
Giving learners credit for what they 
know or are able to do.
 
Using learners who have mastered 
areas to assist other learners.
 
Providing job aids or helping learners 
develop their own job aids to assist in 
unlearning previous learning that is 
interfering with new learning. 

Active Learning 

Involve your adult learners in the learning 
process. Some suggested strategies are: 

 
Pair lectures or reading assignments 
with activities such as discussions, 
exercises, practice activities, role 
plays, and job simulations. 
 
Maximize learning by doing. 

SM XIII-C-20 


Exercise: 
Applying Training Strategies 
to Past Experiences 

The purpose of this exercise is to help you validate the training strategies that this section 
just discussed by applying them to your own past experiences as an adult learner. Follow 
the instructions below to complete this exercise. 

1. Think of one training session you attended in the past that was ineffective for you as 
an adult learner. Jot down the ineffective elements in the appropriate space below. 
Write the strategies that were used during the training across from each element. 

INEFFECTIVE TRAINING 

Ineffective Elements Strategies Ignored 

2. Think of one training session you attended in the past that was effective for you as an 
adult learner. Jot down the effective elements in the appropriate space below. Write 
the strategies that were used during the training across from each element. 

EFFECTIVE TRAINING 

Effective Elements Strategies Used 


Instructor Effectiveness Inventory 

Instructions: Evaluate yourself as an instructor by answering the following questions in 
preparation for an effective training session. Answering no to any of these questions 
indicates a need to adjust your training strategy to meet the needs of your learners. If you 
have never instructed, just read this job aid; do not check the boxes. 

DO YOU AS AN INSTRUCTOR: YES NO 
Provide a learning environment that minimizes the extent to which the 
learners physical conditioning and health interfere with learning? 
. . 
Provide breaks for learners? . . 
Use job aids and other memory-enhancement devices? . . 
Allow your learners to identify what they want and need to learn? . . 
Allow your learners to set their own goals? . . 
Relate the material to the learners goals? . . 
Treat learners like adults? . . 
Focus on real world problems? . . 
Repeatedly reinforce skills and knowledge through various learning methods 
and participant practice? 
. . 
Provide a learning environment that is non-threatening? . . 
Provide meaningful reinforcement to learners? . . 
Provide learning activities that relate to the learners experience? . . 
Involve participants in the learning process and minimize passive learning? . . 
Allow for useful debate and exchange of ideas? . . 
Identify and accommodate for participants learning preferences? . . 
Use a variety of instructional methods? . . 
Inform your learners of what you expect of them at the end of training? . . 


Learners as Individuals 

Overview 

Each time you lead a training course, you 
will face the different learning styles and 
preferences of your participants. Some 
participants may learn better through 
visual stimulation, while others may better 
acquire knowledge through auditory 
means. Some participants may prefer to 
learn with background sound, such as 
classical music, while others need 
complete silence to concentrate. Some 
participants will prefer to study with 
others, while some may be more 
productive working on their own. This 
section will prepare you to identify your 
learners preferences and will take steps 
to accommodate their different learning 
styles. 

Highlights 

When you complete this section, you will 
be able to: 

 
Identify your own learning style. 
 
Identify others learning preferences 
and strategize ways to 
accommodate them when 
instructing. 

Contents 

20 Learning Styles and Preferences 
24 Job Aid #2: Accommodating 
Individual Learners 
27 Learning Preference Inventory 
35 Job Aid #3: Strategies for 
Addressing Insensitive Events 


Learning Styles and Preferences

Most adults have preferred methods for 
learning new knowledge and skills. Adult 
learners respond better when an instructor 
presents new material through a variety of 
instructional methods. This appeals to their 
different senses. Adult learners may have 
preferences about any or all of the following 
factors. 

Physical Factors 

Learners have different preferences 
regarding their physical environment, 
including: 

 
Noise Level: Some learners can 
block out surrounding noises and 
function effectively despite noisy 
distractions. Other learners can 
adjust only to selected sounds and 
require that nearly all noisy 
distractions be eliminated. Still 
others prefer specific background 
sounds while studying. 
 
Lighting: Room illumination also 
appears to affect the learning 
process. Some learners can function 
with ease only when the learning 
setting is well lit. However, other 

QUIET 
PLEASE 
learners may consider that same 
degree of lighting to be excessive. 
If the lighting is incorrect for the 
learner, it can reduce concentration by 
over stimulating the learner or by lulling 
the learner to sleep. 

 Room Temperature: Room 
temperature is another environmental 
factor that can affect ones ability to 
learn. Some learners require a warm 
environment before they can study, 
while other learners may find the 
amount of warmth that relaxes 
certain learners actually makes them 
uncomfortable. Some learners 
function best in a cool room, while 
other learners are not at their best 
unless they are in a warm setting. 


 
Room Setting: The structure of the 
room setting can also affect ones 
ability to learn. Some learners prefer 
an informal setting such as a lounge 
area or their own living room. Other 
learners concentrate best when they 
are studying at a desk in a more 
formal setting. 
 
Time of Day: The final preference 
area in the physical dimension is the 
time of day. Each of us develops our 
own internal clock, making us more 
alert at certain times of the day. 
Therefore, some learners 
concentrate and learn best in the 
morning. Other learners are most 
productive in the afternoon or 
evening. 

 


 
Besides having preferences about their 
physical learning environment, adults also 
have a variety of emotional needs that 
impact their ability to learn. 

Emotional Factors 

. 

 
Social Needs: Individuals have 
different social needs when learning. 
Learning can occur when learners 
work alone, with someone else, or 
with a small group. The learning task 
may influence this preference. For 
example, your learners may prefer to 
work alone when learning theoretical 
material, but prefer to work with 
someone else when applying the 
theory to a real problem. Even 
though your learners will probably 
engage in learning both alone and 
with others, they may prefer one 
arrangement over the other. 
 
Motivation: In addition to having 
different social preferences, adults 
also have unique motivational needs. 
Motivation is a necessary ingredient 
for learning. 

 
EMPLOYEE 
OF THE MONTH 
 

Extrinsic motivation may come from 
external sources such as clients and fellow 
employees. Motivation can also be intrinsic, 
or in other words, come from inside 
ourselves. Learners usually need a 
combination of extrinsic and intrinsic 
motivation. However, individual learners 
may have a strong preference for one 
source of motivation above the other. 

When motivation is extrinsic, we depend on 
receiving external reinforcement. External 
reinforcement may include anything we like 
or want. The same external reinforcement 

Im proud of 
myself! Its 
just what I 
wanted. 
Intrinsic motivation is another way of saying 
self-motivation. When we are intrinsically 
motivated, we are not looking for some 
external source of reinforcement. Rather, 
we are reinforcing ourselves. An example of 
internal reinforcement is feeling good about 
ones self after mastering a new skill: I 
conducted that training course even more 
smoothly than the last one! 

Adults also differ in intellectual factors 
known as learning styles, which describe 
how they acquire and retain information. 
Some adults learn best by hearing 
information, others by seeing information, 
and still others by touching and doing. 

Intellectual Factors 

Adults have different learning styles, 
including: 

 Auditory: Some adults may be 
auditory learners. Auditory learners 
are those who can easily 
differentiate among sounds and can 
reproduce symbols, letters, or words 
by hearing them. Learners who favor 
auditory learning must be able to 
remember what they just heard. 

Some adults learn best by 
hearing information, others by 
seeing information, and still 
others by touching and doing. 

While auditory learning can enhance 
learning for some people, it can also 
frustrate learning for others. Some 
learners prefer to read words rather 
than hear them spoken. Reading 
allows the learner to set the pace and 
review passages with ease. 


 
Visual: Adults can also be visual 
learners who learn best by seeing an 
image or conjuring up an image in 
their mind. These learners prefer 
instructional materials that include 
many maps, pictures, symbols, 
graphs, and lists. 
 
Kinesthetic: Finally, adults who are 
kinesthetic learners learn best 
through their tactile sense or through 
experiencein other words, by 
touching or doing. For example, 
kinesthetic learners find it easier to 
remember things that they have 
written down over things that they 
have heard. A kinesthetic learner is 
the one who underlines in bold or 
takes notes while reading. 

All learning is ultimately kinesthetic. 
Learners preferences relate to the 
timing of the kinesthetic experience and 
the amount of kinesthetic experiences 
needed. Strong kinesthetic learners 
need practice exercises early in the 
learning process. 

Other learners prefer to engage in 
kinesthetic experiences only after they 
have mastered new learning through 
auditory or visual means. 

All learning is 
ultimately kinesthetic. 

As instructors, you must be able to identify 
the unique learning styles and preferences 
of your participants and accommodate these 
differences with a variety of instructional 
techniques, methods, and media. The 
following job aid summarizes individual 
learning styles and suggests strategies for 
accommodating your learners styles. 


Job Aid #2: 
Accommodating Individual Learners

This table summarizes individual learning preferences and provides strategies for 
accommodating your learners unique learning styles, whenever it is possible to do so. 

IF YOUR LEARNERS PREFER: THEN: 
PHYSICAL FACTORS 
 Background noise while 
studying 
 Play soft music during your instruction. 
 Encourage your learners to study in open 
places like lounges, rather than quiet libraries. 
 A quiet learning setting  Encourage your learners to use ear plugs or a 
special audiotape with white noise when 
studying. (White noise is nonspecific noise 
that can block out other noise.) 
 Arrange for periods of quiet time. 
 A brightly lit learning setting  Select learning environments with a lot of 
windows or other sources of direct light. 
 A darker learning setting  Select darker learning environments without a 
lot of windows or direct light. 
 Encourage these learners to move away from 
the windows and other sources of direct light. 
 Encourage these learners to wear tinted 
glasses to cut down on the amount of light or 
glare. 
 A warm learning climate  Encourage learners to sit near the heating 
source and bring extra clothing. 


Job Aid #2: 
Accommodating Individual Learners 

(Continued) 

IF YOUR LEARNERS PREFER: THEN: 
PHYSICAL FACTORS (Continued) 
 A cool learning climate  Encourage learners to move away from the 
heating source and wear cool clothing. 
 Adjust the room temperature by opening 
windows, lowering the thermostat setting, or 
bringing in fans. 
 Studying in the morning  Arrange your lesson plans so that: 
- You cover the more difficult areas in the 
morning when learners have the most 
energy. 
- Learners work on the easiest areas in the 
afternoon. 
 Studying in the afternoon  Arrange your lesson plans so that: 
- Learners work on the easiest areas in the 
morning. 
- You save the more difficult areas for the 
afternoon when learners have the most 
energy. 
EMOTIONAL FACTORS 
 Learning alone  Prepare a lot of individualized learning 
activities for your group. 


Job Aid #2: 
Accommodating Individual Learners 

(Continued) 

IF YOUR LEARNERS PREFER: THEN: 
EMOTIONAL FACTORS 
(Continued) 
 Learning with others  Prepare a lot of group activities for your 
learners. 
 Extrinsic motivation  Provide a lot of individualized attention and 
positive reinforcement to your learners. 
 Have peers provide feedback to one another. 
 Intrinsic motivation  Continue to provide reinforcement, but to a 
lesser degree than with extrinsically motivated 
learners. 
INTELLECTUAL FACTORS 
 Auditory learning  Encourage learners to talk through steps in an 
activity. 
 Encourage oral reporting. 
 Use tape-recorded instruction and other audio 
equipment. 
 Visual learning  Provide visual directions and demonstrations. 
 Use maps, graphs, charts, and other 
visual aids. 
 Kinesthetic learning  Encourage your learners to take notes while 
they read, listen, or watch. 
 Employ role-playing and simulation exercises. 
 Let learners assist you in creating learning 
aids. 


Learning Preference Inventory 

Instructions: Read each statement below. Indicate your level of disagreement or 
agreement with each statement by circling a number to the right of the statement. 

Strongly 
Disagree 
1 
Disagree 
2 
Neither 
Disagree 
Nor Agree 
3 
Agree 
4 
Strongly 
Agree 
5 

1. When I read, I like to 
have a lot of light. 
1 2 
2. I learn well by hearing 
how to do something; i.e., 
from a tape, a record, or 
a lecture. 
1 2 
3. I would rather study in a 
library than in a lounge. 
1 2 
4. I find it difficult to study 
when there is music in 
the background. 
1 2 
5. I feel that I am 
self-motivated. 
1 2 
6. I work or study well in 
the evening. 
1 2 
7. I have trouble 
concentrating when I am 
working or studying with 
other people. 
1 2 
8. I like to draw or use 
diagrams when I learn. 
1 2 

3 
3 
4 
4 
5 
5 
3 
3 
4 
4 
5 
5 
3 
3 
3 
4 
4 
4 
5 
5 
5 
3 4 5 


Learning Preference 
Inventory (Continued) 

Strongly 
Disagree 
1 
Disagree 
2 
Neither 
Disagree 
Nor Agree 
3 
Agree 
4 
Strongly 
Agree 
5 

9. I am comfortable at 
times when those 
around me say its 
too warm. 
1 2 3 4 5 
10. I like my family or 
friends to know that I do 
a good job at work. 
1 2 3 4 5 
11. I enjoy learning new 
things about my work. 
1 2 3 4 5 
12. Its difficult for me to 
concentrate when I 
am cold. 
1 2 3 4 5 
13. Noise and background 
conversations and/or 
music really bother me 
when I have to 
concentrate. 
1 2 3 4 5 
14. I work or study well in 
the afternoon. 
1 2 3 4 5 
15. I prefer to work or 
study alone. 
1 2 3 4 5 
16. I have trouble studying 
when I sit on a soft 
chair or couch or lie on 
the floor. 
1 2 3 4 5 
17. When I work, I like to 
turn on all the lights. 
1 2 3 4 5 
18. I like my instructors or 
supervisors to 
recognize my efforts. 
1 2 3 4 5 
19. I learn well by trying to 
do things myself, with 
my own hands. 
1 2 3 4 5 


Learning Preference 
Inventory (Continued)

Strongly 
Disagree 
1 
Disagree 
2 
Neither 
Disagree 
Nor Agree 
3 
Agree 
4 
Strongly 
Agree 
5 

20. I concentrate best 
when I am sitting up 
at a desk. 
1 2 3 4 5 
21. I would rather be warm 
than cold. 
1 2 3 4 5 
22. I prefer working in 
bright light. 
1 2 3 4 5 
23. The things that I 
remember best are the 
things that I hear. 
1 2 3 4 5 
24. I learn best by doing on 
the job. 
1 2 3 4 5 
25. I get a lot of satisfaction 
from doing the best 
I can. 
1 2 3 4 5 
26. I work better when I 
know that my work will 
be checked. 
1 2 3 4 5 
27. I learn well by seeing 
how to do something; 
i.e., looking at a 
diagram or picture, or 
watching someone else 
do it. 
1 2 3 4 5 
28. I get less done when 
I work with someone 
else. 
1 2 3 4 5 
29. I work or study well in 
the morning. 
1 2 3 4 5 
30. I find it difficult to block 
out noise when I am 
trying to work. 
1 2 3 4 5 


Scoring Your Learning 
Preference Inventory 

Instructions: Take your scores from the Learning Preference Inventory and enter each 
item score where indicated on this score sheet. Add the item scores under each category 
to get an idea of your learning preferences. 

Physical Preferences: Learning Setting 

Noise Level Item # Score 
4 _____ 
13 _____ 
30 _____ 
Total Score _____ 

 Total scores of 10 or more indicate that noises bother you when you are trying to 
learn. 

 Total scores of 9 or less indicate that noises do not bother you when you are trying 
to learn 
Lighting Item # Score 
1 _____ 
17 _____ 

22 _____ 
Total Score _____ 

 
Total scores of 10 or more indicate that you prefer to learn in bright lighting. 
 
Total scores of 9 or less indicate that you do not prefer to learn in bright lighting. 


Physical Preferences: Learning Setting (Continued) 

Temperature Item # 
9 
Score 
12 
21 
Total Score 

 
Total scores of 10 or more indicate that you prefer to learn in warmer temperatures. 
 
Total scores of 9 or less indicate that you prefer to learn in cooler temperatures. 
 
Total scores of 10 or more indicate that you prefer a formal learning setting. 
 
Total scores of 9 or less indicate that you prefer an informal learning setting. 

Structure Item # Score 
3 
16 
20 
Total Score 


Physical Preferences: Time of Day 

 Item # Score 
Morning Score 29 _____ 
Afternoon Score 14 _____ 
Evening Score 6 _____ 

Total Score _____ 

 
Total scores of 4 or 5 indicate a preference for learning at that time of day. 
 
You may have more than one time preference for learning, or time may not make a 
difference to you. 

Emotional Preferences: Social Needs 

Alone or With Others Item # Score 
7 _____ 
15 _____ 
28 _____ 
Total Score _____ 

 
Total scores of 10 or more indicate that you prefer to learn alone. 
 
Total scores of 9 or less indicate that you prefer to learn with other people. 


Emotional Preferences: Motivation 

Extrinsic Motivation Item # Score 
10 
18 
26 
Total Score 

 
Total scores of 10 or more indicate that external reinforcements may be important to 
you. 
 
Total scores of 9 or less indicate that external reinforcements may not be very 

important to you. 

Intrinsic Motivation Item # 

5 

11 

25 

Total Score 

Score 

 
Total scores of 10 or more indicate that you seem to be self-motivated. 
 
Total scores of 9 or less indicate that you may not be self-motivated. 


Intellectual Preferences: Learning Styles 

Auditory Learning 

Visual Learning 

Kinesthetic Learning 

 Item # Score 
2 
23 
Auditory Total 
Item # Score 
8 
27 
Visual Total 
Item # Score 
19 
24 
Kinesthetic Total 

 
In each area (auditory, visual, kinesthetic), total scores of 7 or more indicate a 
preference for that type of learning. 
 
You may prefer more than one type of learning, or types of learning may not make a 
difference to you. 


Job Aid #3: 
Strategies for 
Addressing Insensitive Events 

Listed below are examples of events that may occur during training that add to personal 
biases and stereotypes and that fail to show respect for differences in people. Also 
included are possible strategies for responding appropriately to these events in the 
training room. It is critical that, as an instructor, you are aware of these events and that 
you are prepared to respond appropriately. Refer to this when preparing for training. 

POSSIBLE EVENT STRATEGY 
Telling jokes about gender, ethnicity, or a 
profession. 
 Do not publicly denounce the person 
telling the joke. 
 As soon as the person has finished 
telling the joke, announce that these 
types of jokes are inappropriate and 
illegal and will not be tolerated. 
Praising or negatively reinforcing only 
some participants. 
 Be aware of your own biases, and 
concentrate on recognizing all 
participants equally. 
 Avoid negative reinforcement (e.g., 
punishing, sarcasm, putting down 
participants) altogether. 
Failing to prepare for a participant with 
special needs. 
 Apologize to the participant. 
 Ask the participant how you can be 
of assistance. 
 In the future, be aware of who your 
course participants are so you can 
prepare for those with special needs. 
Making sexual remarks.  Inform the offender(s) that making 
sexual remarks is illegal and will not be 
tolerated in the training room. 
 If a participant has been offended by the 
remarks, ask the offender to apologize. 


Reading Assessment 

Instructions: Place your answers to the following questions on the answer sheet on 
page 40. When you finish this assessment, check your answers against the answer key 
on page 42. 

1. Which of the following combinations of training methods is most consistent with 
adult learning principles? 

a. 
Lectures and reading assignments 
b. 
Reading assignments, demonstrations, and tests 
c. 
Reading assignments, group discussions, and practical exercises 
d. 
Lectures and case studies 

In questions 2 through 5, match the descriptions on the left with the correct learning style 
on the right. 

2. I get a lot of satisfaction from doing the best I can. a. Visual Learning 

b. External reinforcement 

3. I learn well by seeing how to do something. 

c. Internal reinforcement 

4. I work better when I know my work will be checked. d. Social needs 

e. Auditory learning 

5. 
I learn well from videos and lectures. 
6. 
John has felt unprepared in responding to questions from COOP facility 
managers about their mitigation options. In response, he has searched DOD 
and DHS websites for best practices. Which adult learning characteristic is 
being illustrated in this scenario? 
a. 
Active learning. Adults learn best when they are active participants in the 
learning process. 
b. 
Immediate application. Adults engage in learning to help them deal with 
issues they face now. 
c. 
Accumulated experience. Adults bring more life experiences to the learning 
environment than children. 
d. 
Reinforcement. Adult learners benefit from, and respond to, reinforcement. 


Reading Assessment (contd) 

7. Tom is conducting Building Design for Homeland Security. During his workshop, 
a participant cracks a joke about a particular ethnic group. What is the most 
appropriate way for Tom to handle this event? 

a. 
At the next break, take the person aside and tell him or her that these types 
of jokes are inappropriate and illegal. 
b. 
As soon as the person has finished telling the joke, announce that these 
types of jokes are inappropriate and illegal and will not be tolerated. 
c. 
Laugh now, but tell the person about your discomfort later in private. 
d. 
Use the situation as an opportunity to discuss cultural sensitivity with the 
entire class. 

8. With the Y axis labeled Emotional Safety, what should the X axis be labeled? 

HIGH 
LOW HIGH 

a. 
Practice 
b. 
Number of instructors 
c. 
Learning 
d. 
Number of course participants 


Reading Assessment (contd) 

9. Select the method from which adults will retain the most information after 3 
days. 

a. 
Information they speak 
b. 
Information they hear 
c. 
Information they read 
d. 
Information they see 

10. You involve your participants in the learning process by combining reading 
assignments with job simulations. This is an example of which adult intellectual 
characteristic? 

a. 
Accumulated experience 
b. 
Active learning 
c. 
Previous learning 
d. 
Physiological changes 

11. One can learn more effectively by: 

a. 
Engaging in the class and in small group activities. 
b. 
Listening to lecture and taking notes. 
c. 
Working alone and asking the presenter questions. 
d. 
Expecting to be entertained during training. 

12. During the morning session, you notice that course participants seem very tired. 
After lunch, you decide to address the fact that they have a low energy level. 
What learning activity should you select? 

a. 
Video 
b. 
Lecture 
c. 
Group exercise 
d. 
Power Point presentation 


Reading Assessment (contd) 

13. A participant who draws diagrams and pictures to understand information, and 
who learns new skills best by watching others, is most likely a: 

a. 
Visual learner 
b. 
Auditory learner 
c. 
Social learner 
d. 
Self motivated learner 

For questions 15 through 20, review the adult learning characteristic on the left and 
determine the most appropriate training strategy from the right. 

14. 
Adults can learn by reading, a. Provide learners with opportunities to 
listening, and watching, but they identify what they want and need to 
learn best if they participate learn; to plan and to carry out their own 
actively in the learning process. learning activities; and to evaluate their 
own progress toward self-selected 
goals. 

15. 
Most adults have preferred 
methods for learning new 
knowledge and skills. b. Plan training activities around your 
participants issues and concerns. 

16. 
Adults engage in learning in 
order to help them cope with c. Maximize learning by doing. 
current issues and problems. 
They seek learning that they 
can apply immediately. d. Provide job aids to assist in 
unlearning previous information that 
is interfering with new learning. 

17. 
Adults have a large bank of 
previous learning that can be both 
an asset and a liability to learning. e. Match the instructional methods you 

select to your participants learning 
preferences. 

18. 
Adults enter training with a large 
volume of life experiences from f. Use the learners life experiences to 
which to draw. introduce and discuss new concepts. 

19. 
Adults perceive themselves as 
independent and capable of selfdirection. 
They desire others to 
see them in the same way. 


1. 
______ 
2. 
______ 
3. 
______ 
4. 
______ 
5. 
______ 
6. 
______ 
7. 
______ 
8. 
______ 
9. 
______ 

10.______ 

11.______ 

12.______ 

13.______ 

14.______ 

15.______ 

16.______ 

17.______ 

18.______ 

19.______ 

READING ASSESSMENT 

ANSWER SHEET 


Reading Assessment 

ANSWER KEY 

1. 
c 
2. 
c 
3. 
a 
4. 
b 
5. 
e 
6. 
b 
7. 
b 
8. 
c 
9. 
a 
10. 
b 
11. 
a 
12. 
c 
13. 
a 
14. 
c 
15. 
e 
16. 
b 
17. 
d 
18. 
f 
19. 
a 


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Course Title: Building Design for Homeland Security COOP T t-T 
Unit XIV (C): Course Wrap-Up 

Unit XIV (C) 

COURSE TITLE 
UNIT TITLE 
OBJECTIVES 
SCOPE 
Building Design for Homeland Security for Continuity of Operations 
(COOP) Train-the-Trainer 
Course Wrap-Up 
1. Reflect upon the reasons for attending the course provided during 
Unit 1 Introductions (any Case Study version) and the conduct of 
course. 
a. Expectations met? 
b. Likes and dislikes? 
c. Value? 
2. Provide written feedback to the Course Director and Instructors 
through course evaluation forms and verbal comments related to the 
course specifically or building design for Homeland Security in 
general. This feedback is critical to improving the course. 
The following topics will be covered in this unit: 
1. Discussion of general issues and concerns. 
2. Course evaluations  forms and verbal comments. 
3. Distribution of course certificates. 
REFERENCES No references are required for this unit. 

SM XIV-C-1 


Course Title: Building Design for Homeland Security COOP T-t-T 

Unit XIV (C): Course Wrap-Up 

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SM XIV-C-2 


APPENDIX C: COOP CASE STUDY 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (DAI) 

COOP SITE ASSESSMENT OF 

COOPERVILLE INFORMATION / BUSINESS CENTER (CI/BC) 

INTRODUCTION TO DAI 

The mission of the U.S. Department of Artificial Intelligence (DAI) is to keep abreast of critical US 
and foreign artificial intelligence technology (software and hardware) and the manufacturing 
capability (plants and skilled personnel) employed to use this technology in support of the national 
economic and foreign policy strategy. Artificial intelligence (AI) is used extensively by the military 
and transportation industries in the U.S. and its allies. Revenues from licensing of production and 
use of AI technology funds the MedicUS program for senior citizens. AI technology use and 
production in non-allied countries would be detrimental to the interests of the United States. The 
primary DAI facility/office performing the essential functions of interest in this assessment is 
located northeast of COOP City at the DAI Building. 

Current Relationship between DAI and CI/BC and Reason for COOP Alternate Facility 
Assessment 

CI/BC is a backup site for mirroring all critical computer information from DAI using dedicated 
fiber optic systems with encryption and supervision. The CI/BC facility is of interest as a Continuity 
of Operations (COOP) alternate facility. Due to the loss of an alternate facility that was being shared 
with another Federal Government agency, CI/BC is being assessed as a replacement for that 
alternate facility no longer available. 

Essential DAI Functions in Priority Order with Personnel, Information Technology, and 
Communications Minimum Requirements 

1. Orchestrate the national level response to any loss of artificial intelligence production capability 

and loss of AI revenue required for payments to citizens of the United States. 
Personnel: 4 COOP Site Managers and 10 Staff 
Equipment -- Managers: Unclassified computer terminals, landline telephones, and cell 

phones 
Equipment -- Staff: Unclassified and classified computer terminals and secure telephone 
capability 

2. Consult with and provide reports and other technical assistance to appropriate Federal agencies 

that may be impacted by loss of AI component availability and resultant revenue flow. 
Personnel: 12 Staff 


Equipment -- Staff: Unclassified and classified computer terminals and secure telephone 
capability. 

3. Process and post financial documents supporting monthly cash flow to Agencies that distribute 

AI revenues to entitlement recipients. 
Personnel: 4 COOP Financial Systems Managers and 36 Staff 
Equipment -- Managers: Unclassified computer terminals, landline telephones, and cell 

phones 
Equipment -- Staff: Unclassified computer terminals and landline telephones 

4. 
Operate the personnel/payroll system to ensure all DAI personnel receive payments. 
Personnel: 28 Staff 
Equipment -- Staff: Unclassified computer terminals and landline telephones 
5. 
Manage operations, security, safety, and health programs for all DAI personnel, programs, and 

operations. 
Personnel: 20 Staff 
Equipment -- Staff: Unclassified computer terminals and landline telephones, except for 

security (4 personnel) that also require classified computer terminals, 
secure telephone capability, and cell phones 

6. 
Manage the Department-wide computer security functions. 
Personnel: 10 Staff 
Equipment -- Staff: Unclassified and classified computer terminals and secure telephone 
capability 

7. 
Provide liaison with state, local, and tribal officials on the status of critical AI production, 

availability, and shortfalls. 
Personnel: 26 Staff 
Equipment -- Staff: Unclassified computer terminals, landline telephones, and 5 cell 

phones for team use 

A satellite link is needed for secure and non-secure worldwide communications as a backup to 
telephone landlines (secure and unclassified) and cell phones. 

DAI Emergency Relocation Group and Support for Other Personnel 

DAI has a little over 4,000 personnel, with 250 identified as primary or backup relocation team 
members at the DAI Building. The core of the Emergency Relocation Group is 150 personnel that 
work in 12 hour shifts to continue the critical functions for 24 hours per day and 7 days per week. 
Primary and backup relocation team members maintain personal Go kits at their places of residence 
and an office-specific Go kit at their normal duty location. 

DAI has a plan for assisting the families of Emergency Relocation Group personnel as well as 
employees on travel if an incident affects more than just the DAI Building. 


In case of pandemic flu outbreak, the primary and backup Emergency Relocation Group personnel 
and their families have received preventive flu shots and supplemental shots, when available, based 
upon the identified strain. The COOP plan may be activated as a preventive measure by relocating 
some or all primary Emergency Relocation Group personnel to the alternate site and leaving the 
remaining primary and backup Emergency Relocation Group personnel at the primary site to use 
geographic separation to reduce the risk of widespread infection on essential functions. 

DAI also has a communications contact plan for employees to get information upon activation of the 
COOP plan and to report their status if not at the primary or alternate facility. A web site is also set 
up for two-way information flow between employees and Human Resources/supervisors. This 
communication plan includes either using a recorded message on primary facility phone numbers 
directing callers to an alternate facility number or automatic redirection of those numbers to the 
phone numbers at the alternate facility, once the alternate facility is functional. 

General DAI COOP Alternate Facility Requirements 

The minimum distance required between the primary and alternate facility is 60 miles. The alternate 
facility must be available within 12 hours of the decision to activate. 

A SCIF (Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility) is needed due to the military requirements 
of artificial intelligence and other national security uses. To the highest security clearance for the 
classification of materials, the SCIF requires classified computer terminals, secure phones, secure 
fax, and one or more safes. Safes are not required if the SCIF is manned 24 hours a day. The Secure 
Room in the Computer Center is SCIF rated. The Secure Office and Secure Conference Room in the 
Business Center are constructed to SCIF requirements and can be approved for DAI use. 

Supplies to sustain the Emergency Relocation Group in its previous Alternate Facility location 
required 2,400 cubic feet of storage. This does not include computers or communications equipment. 
It does include health-related supplies needed for a pandemic outbreak and supplies needed to 
sustain 30 days of operations. 

There is no formal Federal Government-wide standard for office space per person. However EPA 
and GSA recommend 225-230 usable square feet per person which includes all individual and shared 
space such as workstations, circulation, storage, filing space, and conference rooms. The minimum 
functional workstation space is 100 square feet, with the workstation footprint itself being between 
64 and 80 square feet and the remaining square footage for storage and movement. 

Geographic Relationship between Primary Facility and Alternate Facility Being Assessed 

Driving distance: 78 miles, 1.75 hours 

There are more than sufficient taxi companies at the primary and alternate facility locations to 
support using public mass transportation as the means to move between the two facilities. 


Bus schedules: 5 daily itineraries, between 01:30 am to 12:00 pm, taking 2 hours and 55 minutes 
the nearest terminals to each building. Charter buses companies are also available. 

Train schedules: 20 daily itineraries, taking at most 45 minutes between the nearest stations. 

Figure 1. Transportation Links between DAI Building and CI/BC 


INTRODUCTION TO CI/BC 

The Cooperville Information / Business Center (CI/BC) is a state-of-the art information technology 
(IT) services company located in a major metropolitan city in a typical suburban business office 
park. CI/BC also has a Business Center that is available on a daily basis to individuals and 
companies for workstation/office space, office equipment, computer, meeting space, and any other 
business support required on a temporary basis. The companys information mission is to provide 
information technology and services support to include hosting servers, databases, applications, and 
other hardware and software; develop, install, and maintain software applications; provide field 
support IT technicians; and provide 24-hour help desk support. The companys Business Center 
mission is to provide temporary office support on a short term basis to business travelers or 
companies who need additional space, including some space at higher security levels. The Business 
Centers standard hours are 6:00 am to 6:00 pm, but up to 24 hour support can be provided with 
advance notice. 

Figure 2. Cooperville Information / Business Center (CI/BC) 

The Information Division of CI/BC has over 20 clients and supports approximately 1,000 users and 
100 applications as a primary data center and as a disaster recovery backup site. CI/BC clients 
include local, regional, and Federal government offices and commercial entities. Many clients 
depend on CI/BCs ability to provide real time IT support, on a 24 x 7 basis. Others rely on the 
companys IT backup services. Major clients and support contracts include: 

 
Fortune 500 companies 


 
National and regional banks and credit unions 
 
A major airline 
 
Large prime defense contractors 
 
Government agencies, including one classified client 
 
U.S. Department of Artificial Intelligence 

CI/BC is certified to provide IT support and storage to government clients at Top Secret levels, using 
dedicated classified equipment and networks. CI/BCs technology ranges from leading edge 
mainframe and desktop computers and optical mass storage devices to wired and wireless networks. 
CI/BC has over 75 employees and approximately 40 employees are in the building at shift change 
with about 25 at any other time. Work schedules are flexible and employees have their own access 
capability as explained under security later. Visitors to the Information Division (usually less than 5 
at a time) sign-in with the receptionist who contacts the person being visited. The staff person being 
visited provides escort for the information visitors in the building. Visitor access to Information 
Division areas is through the mezzanine and then down to the first floor. Business Center users are 
usually restricted to the first floor office area, unless special needs are coordinated. 

The Business Center has two employees on shift with overlap during normal hours and can provide 
additional staff as needed during and after normal hours. The main receptionist is one of these 
people. The Business Center personnel have no security clearances, but Information Division 
personnel provide support when clearances are required and verified. 

The CI/BC building is strategically located near many of CI/BCs clients and management does not 
want to move from the facility or location. 

CI/BC has contracts for its services with all its clients. It also has contingency contractual 
agreements (similar to a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA)) with some clients in case there is an 
emergency need for additional computer support, Business Center office space, or both. An MOA is 
an agreement or acknowledgment among parties outlining the terms and details of an agreement 
between parties, including each parties requirements and responsibilities. 

Impact of COOP operations upon CI/BC day-to-day functions 

There will be no disruption of Information Division daily operations. However, the Business Center 
will have to alter operations based upon DAI COOP requirements. Fortunately, the Business Center 
does not allow any long-term commitment of its facilities. It has normally functioned on a day-today 
basis with a first-come, first-served approach. This is covered in each contingency contractual 
agreement and CI/BC is willing to give DAI first priority. 


GENERAL SITE DATA AT COOP ALTERNATE FACILITY 

The Cooperville Information / Business Center is located approximately 15 miles outside of a major 
urban city in the suburbs, and adjacent to a major interstate highway. There are several commercial 
iconic properties, one military installation, and several government offices within a 5-mile radius of 
the CI/BC building. 

5-Mile Radius 

Figure 3. CI/BC Corporate Business Park 5-Mile Radius 

Regional Information of Interest to DAI 

The nearest nuclear power plant is 63.4 miles from the CI/BC building. 

Equipment rental, U.S. Postal Service, freight services (air, motor transport, Fed-Ex, UPS, DHL, 
etc.), department or general merchandize stores, building or electrical materials, and financial 
services (banking) are all available within a 10 mile radius of the CI/BC building. 


There are multiple gas stations within 0.5 miles of CI/BC as well as gas stations along all routes 
between CI/BC and lodging / dining. There is no specific Federal vehicle requirement for the DAI 
Emergency Relocation Group as privately owned vehicles have the only fuel requirement. 

Appendix C: COOP Case Study 

Figure 4. Lodging and Dining near Cooperville Information / Business Center 

There are various levels of dining available at and near the lodging within 10 miles of CI/BC. Many 
of these open at 06:00 am and close at 11:00 pm. There are caterers available that will deliver food at 
any time day or night, weekday or weekend. Lodging costs range from $40 per day to $250 per day, 
depending upon hotel/motel chain and amenities. Some hotels have shuttle buses that may be 
available for use to get personnel from hotel to CI/BC and back, vice the need for taxis. 

Some local colleges within 25 miles have dormitories; however they have year round classes that 
result in a waiting list for rooms during fall and spring semesters. The summer semester usually has 
available rooms. 


Local Imagery 

Appendix C: COOP Case Study 

Figure 5. CI/BC Business Park Perimeter and Surrounding Buildings 

Business Park Perimeter and Surrounding Buildings 

The office building is part of a corporate business park. CI/BC does not control the front parking 
area, signage, or other general site conditions such as stormwater drainage, lighting, or vehicle and 
pedestrian traffic flow and movement. Front parking spots are approximately 44 feet from the CI/BC 
lobby and there are a total of 447 spaces in the front lot and a total of 155 spaces in the rear parking 
behind the building. The business park is responsible for grounds maintenance, including cutting the 
grass, planting flowers, trimming trees, sweeping the parking lot, and towing unauthorized vehicles. 
Trash service is the responsibility of tenants. CI/BC has a large dumpster located at the rear of the 
loading dock area approximately 50 feet from the building. CI/BC receives mail and packages at the 
front office lobby desk. Large packages and equipment are delivered to the rear loading dock. There 
is no separate mail room, but there is an internal administrative space with copiers, printers, supplies, 
and staff mailboxes. The front desk receptionist is responsible for sorting and screening all mail. 

The business park is adjacent to a major interstate highway and there are a number of storage tanks, 
manufacturing and production facilities, and other commercial properties across the interstate. 


Site Imagery 

The CI/BC office space has client and staff parking in the front and a rear parking and loading 
dock area for supply trucks, vendors, and trash. 

The front parking area is unrestricted, but the back parking area is enclosed with chain link fencing 
on the perimeter of the property. There is no gate or means to prevent vehicles from transiting 
around the rear of the business park. 

Figure 6. CI/BC Office Location 


Hazardous Material (HazMat) Sites 

There are a significant number of hazardous waste sites in near proximity to the CI/BC building. The 
vast majority are small generators such as gas stations, dry cleaning, and other commercial 
businesses. Large generators include the petroleum storage and production facility located across the 
interstate. 

Figure 7. HazMat Sites Near the CI/BC Building 

The prevailing weather pattern in the summer and fall is from the south Atlantic and the Gulf of 
Mexico. Warm, moist air brings thunderstorms and higher humidity. In the fall, cooler air from 
the north and west returns. Winter weather blasts across the state from the northern or central 
part of the continent. With no other weather activity, the prevailing wind is normally from the 
west-northwest. 


Emergency Response Capabilities 

The local emergency response capabilities include primary police, fire, and medical facilities 
approximately 8 to 10 miles away. There are multiple means of ingress and egress to the CI/BC 
building complex and the site is served by fire mains with a hydrant located approximately 200 feet 
from the CI/BC office. There are also a number of medical and dental clinics near the office for 
medical and dental treatment that does not require emergency response. 

Figure 8. Emergency Response Capabilities Near the CI/BC Building 


Building Layout by Function 

Appendix C: COOP Case Study 

Figure 9. CI/BC Functions and Building Layout 

The square footage (SF) uses of the facility are as follows: 

First Floor 
MEP (Mechanical, Electrical, Plumbing) systems, includes loading dock -- 3,580 SF 
Storage -- 620 SF 
Information Division Computers and Communications -- 3,200 SF 
Information Division Secure Space -- 600 SF 
Business Center Office Space -- 11,000 SF 

Includes Main Conference Room -- 1,100 SF which can be partitioned in half 
Includes Secure Office Space -- 745 SF 
Includes Secure Conference Rooms -- 930 SF 

Mezzanine 
Management and Staff -- 1,050 square feet 
Information Division -- 1,250 square feet 
Business Center -- 1,000 square feet 


Potential Blast Effects  Nominal Car Bomb 

The nominal range to effects chart radius of influence of a nominal car bomb detonation at the front 
entrance indicates that the building would experience significant damage, but likely not suffer 
progressive collapse. The front faade of the building is approximately 75 percent glass and has an 
8-foot overhang. The north half of the south faade is also 75% glass and has an 8-foot overhang. 
There is no glass on the rest of the south faade or in the rear of the building. The terrain slopes 
upward from the parking lot to the main entrance, and is landscaped with flower beds and trees. Key 
staff would probably be killed and administrative functions destroyed as they are along the 
mezzanine windows facing the front parking lot, but the Computer Center and Communications 
Center functions would likely survive relatively intact. The Business Center rooms with windows 
facing the front parking lot would see significant additional damage. 

Potential Blast Effects 
Red Ring (20 ft)  Structural Damage 
Orange Ring (100 ft)  Probable Lethal Injuries 
Yellow Ring (150 ft)  Severe Injuries from Glass 
Figure 10. Car Bomb Blast Effects (Front Entrance Parking) 


Potential Blast Effects  Nominal Truck Bomb Detonated Nearby 

A tractor-trailer truck bomb detonation on the interstate would also significantly damage the CI/BC 
building, primarily glass breakage and potentially some structural damage. If the truck bomb were to 
detonate near the tank farm, the ensuing explosion, fire, and plume could have significant impact on 
the CI/BC building. 

Potential Blast Effects 
Red Ring (100 ft)  Structural Damage 
Orange Ring (500 ft)  Probable Lethal Injuries 
Yellow Ring (1,000 ft)  Severe Injuries from Glass 
Figure 11. Truck Bomb Blast Effects (Interstate Highway) 


Potential Blast Effects  Nominal Truck Bomb Detonated On Site 

A delivery truck bomb detonation at the rear of the CI/BC building at the loading dock would result 
in significant structural damage and potentially progressive collapse. The Computer Center, 
Communications Center, and other critical functions could be destroyed. Critical infrastructure that 
could be destroyed includes the mechanical and electrical room. 

Potential Blast Effects 
Red Ring (35 ft)  Structural Damage 
Orange Ring (190 ft)  Probable Lethal Injuries 
Yellow Ring (350 ft)  Severe Injuries from Glass 
Figure 12. Truck Bomb Blast Effects (Loading Dock) 


BUILDING DATA 

The CI/BC building was built in the 1990s using conventional construction techniques. The building 
has a 19,000-square foot main floor for offices, computers, and MEP. There is a 3,300-square foot 
mezzanine (a second floor over the front part of the office). 

Appendix C: COOP Case Study 

Occupancy B, S-1 
Construction Type 2C 
No. of Floors 1 floor and mezzanine, high bay in rear 
Total Height 20 feet (first floor finished level to bottom of high bay roof joists) 
High Rise Code No 
Fire Suppression Fully sprinklered, wet pipe 
Floor Area 
First Floor 19,157 sf 
Mezzanine 3,380 sf 
Total 22,537 sf 
Number of Exits 6 
Exits from Mezzanine 3 
Occupancy Load 
First Floor 102 occupants 
Mezzanine 31 occupants 
Restrooms 5 total 
First Floor 2ea Male 
Water Closets 4 total 
Urinals 2 total 
Lavatories 2 total 
First Floor 2ea Female 
Water Closets 6 total 
Lavatories 4 total 
Mezzanine 1ea Unisex 
Water Closets 1 total 
Lavatories 1 total 
Area Separation No 
Fire Alarm System Yes 
Monitored Sprinkler Yes 
Fence 4 feet high, rear only, to keep people from falling down a steep incline 
Applicable Codes 
Building 1996 BOCA National Building Code 
w/ 2000 VUSBC amendments 
Electric 1996 VUSBC, 1996 NEC 
Plumbing 1995 IPC w/1996 supplement 
Mechanical 1996 International Mechanical Code 


Fire 1996 BOCA National Fire Prevention Code 

Accessible 1996 BOCA, 1992 CABO/ANSI 117.1 

BOCA  Building Officials and Code Administrators International, Inc 
USBC  Uniform Statewide Building Code 
NEC  National Electric Code 
IPC  International Plumbing Code 
CABO/ANSI 117.1  Uniform Federal Accessibility Standards 

BUILDING STRUCTURE 

The exterior walls are made of concrete masonry units (CMUs) with a brick veneer on the outside. 
Steel framework supports the structure, and exposed columns are enclosed in gypsum wallboard. 
The interior walls are gypsum wallboard on metal studs. The roof is a metal deck on steel joists with 
4-inch concrete, waterproofing, insulation and gravel on top. It is slightly angled to allow water to 
drain. The roof overhangs the front entrance by 8 feet. This provides a covered area for employees to 
stay dry on rainy days. Cylindrical columns consisting of steel columns with brick faade support the 
overhang. 

Windows are double glazed, -inch thick annealed glass. 

With a loading dock on the west side, it is possible for vehicles to park right next to the building. 
Normal parking for employees is in front; the closest row is 44 feet from the nearest point on the 
building. 

The company does not have a mail room; incoming mail is normally processed by the receptionist 
just inside the front door. Large packages shipped to the company (computers, etc.) are delivered to 
the loading dock in the rear and handled by the Computer Center staff. 

MECHANICAL SYSTEMS 

Heating for the CI/BC building is provided by a combination of natural gas and electricity. This 
provides a regulated environment for the sensitive computer and communications equipment, and a 
comfortable environment for employees and users of the Business Center. 

HVAC Supply 

The main heater sends hot air into the heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) room, next 
to the mechanical and electrical (M&E) room. From here it is distributed throughout the building. 
Offices, restrooms and the employees lounge are directly heated by this warm air. The Computer 
Center and the Communications Center use Digital Environmental Managers (DEMs) to direct the 
warm air where it is needed, add or remove humidity from the air, or even cool some areas while 
warming others. 


Appendix C: COOP Case Study 

Figure 13. HVAC Supply 

The air used to heat or cool the CI/BC building is filtered in the HVAC room using standard 
industrial grade MERV 8 filters. Outside make-up air is brought in through a vent in the wall located 
at ground level. The vent is alarmed to prevent intruder access. A screened exhaust duct is on the 
roof. Airflow throughout the building is through a series of ducts hidden in the ceiling of each area. 
The ducts are divided in half to allow them to serve as supply and return headers. The divider is 
insulated to minimize heat transfer from one side to the other. 

The Computer Center has two additional air cooling units located in the Computer Center and uses 
the main chilled water supply. The Computer Center maintains a slight net positive pressure 
compared to the main office areas. 

HVAC Return 

The return air for the main office space has sufficient room inside the ductwork and mechanical 
room area to incorporate additional filters and equipment. 


Appendix C: COOP Case Study 

Figure 14. HVAC Return 

Chilled Water Distribution (Cooling) 

Cooling (or heat removal) is done by chillers in the M&E room. Three Trane 100-ton chillers are 
available; normally only two are needed to cover most cooling loads, except for very excessive 
summer conditions when three chillers are sometimes needed. The chillers remove heat from the 
chilled water system, and use the condenser water system to send the waste heat to two rooftop 
cooling towers. The chilled water is then routed from the chillers to air handlers for the majority of 
the building; cooling for the Computer Center and the Communications Center is done by directing 
chilled water to the DEMs. Chiller operation along with chilled water and condenser water flow are 
managed from a single control unit in the M&E room. A single chilled water pump provides 
adequate flow for all cooling situations; a backup pump is available at the push of a button. The 
same is true for the condenser water pumps. 

The DEMs in the Computer Center and the Communications Center use airflow to transfer heat from 
electronic equipment to the chilled water, and return cool air to the equipment. Humidity is raised or 
lowered as necessary for each area of the room. The DEMs operate without the need for frequent 
monitoring by technicians; parameters and flow rates are controlled from a central station based on 
the needs of individual pieces of equipment. 


Appendix C: COOP Case Study 

Figure 15. Chilled Water System 


Air Intake 

The air intake is exposed and of typical louver construction. 

Figure 16. Air Intake 


Natural Gas 

Natural gas enters the building through a high-pressure meter, and a pressure regulator and 
low-pressure meter under the loading dock staircase. The piping goes through the overhead to the 
M&E room at the buildings southwest corner. Branches split off for two gas powered space heaters 
in the high-bay area by the loading dock. The main gas line goes to the main heater in the M&E 
room. 

Figure 17. Loading Dock Area 


Appendix C: COOP Case Study 

Figure 18. Gas Meters Under Loading Dock Stairs 

FIRE PROTECTION AND LIFE SAFETY 

A key concern for CI/BC is fire. The building has been designed to meet the latest National Fire 
Protection and Life Safety Codes at the time of construction. Sprinklers are located throughout the 
building, along with hand-held portable fire extinguishers. There are six exits that can be used for 
evacuation. 

The fire protection and life safety systems consist of a wet-pipe single stage sprinkler system 
throughout the building, ceiling mounted automatic fire and smoke detectors connected to the central 
business park fire annunciator panel located in the next building and HVAC fire and smoke dampers 
in the M&E room air handling unit (AHU). There are no manual fire pull stations which is allowed 
under local codes where the building is fully sprinklered, the system is monitored, and the fire 
annunciator panel alerts the fire department. The sprinkler system header is continuously 
pressurized, with water being held back by the temperature actuated valve on the sprinkler head. 
Each sprinkler head is individually activated by heat; any valve reaching 130 F would open. This 
system would allow a kitchen or office space fire to be suppressed, without unnecessarily dousing 
critical computer equipment with water. However, the sprinkler heads are exposed in the overhead of 
each room, and can be accidentally activated if bumped by a ladder, pole, etc. 


None of the ingress or egress doors have the new generation illuminating markings, only the 
standard door or ceiling mounted exit signs and emergency lighting. Should a fire occur, other than 
the fire detector flashing lights, there is no mass notification system specifically for fire. 

Egress stairwells are limited to the two stairwells on opposite ends of the mezzanine toward the front 
of the building. These are open stairwells without any specific fire protection design incorporated 
and are part of the steel construction of the mezzanine. A third stairwell of like construction leads 
from the mezzanine to the Computer Center on the first floor. 

The water to the fire protection system within the building and the fire hydrants in the office park 
comes from the local municipal distribution mains which is also the source for all water uses in the 
building  rest rooms, kitchen/break room, HVAC equipment, etc. There is only one water supply 
line to the CI/BC building. Per request from employees, four bottled water dispensers are throughout 
the building, with an average of 3 water bottles (5 gallons each) in reserve at any given time for each 
dispenser. There are two similar dispensers in the Business Center. 


Sprinkler Head 

Appendix C: COOP Case Study 

Figure 19. Sprinkler Head 

There are 20 hand-held dry chemical fire extinguishers located throughout the building, 5 on the 
mezzanine level, and 15 on the first floor. Filled with monoammonium phosphate under 
approximately 200-250 pounds pressure, these extinguishers are designed to combat Class A, B, and 
C fires. The fire extinguishers are visually inspected to make sure pressure is in the allowable band 
on a monthly basis by a local company. 

The Computer Center and the Communications Center are equipped like the rest of the building. 
CI/BC has a long-term plan to install a clean agent suppression system in the electronic spaces, but 
construction has not yet started. 

The Security Officer maintains the fire evacuation and response plan, has posted fire evacuation 
routes in key office hallways and break areas, and has a key to the building section that has the main 
fire panel. The main fire panel is located in the lobby area of the next building section, which is open 
to unrestricted access during normal business hours. In the event of a fire, the panel alerts the local 
fire department and the security company using dedicated telephone lines. 


ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS 

Main power for the CI/BC office is provided by the Hazardville Electric Power Company through 
two transformers outside the building. Two sets of buried transmission lines deliver 12,470 volt 
(12.47KV) power to the building from a nearby substation. 

Transformers 

The two 12.47KV feeders lead to two separate transformers outside the building, one near the north 
side, and the other near the south side. The two pad-mounted transformers are rated at 3,000KVA 
total (1,500KVA each) and they reduce the 12.47KV power to 480/277 volts for distribution around 
the building. 

Both transformers are continuously on line, and feed separate loads. Neither is generally loaded 
above 50 percent, and a tie breaker allows either transformer to support all building loads, except 
during the peak cooling days when three chillers may be operating. 

Figure 20. One of Two Transformers On Site 


Diesel Generator 

Backup power for CI/BC is provided by a single diesel generator, located in a shed in the rear 
parking lot. Specs for this Detroit Diesel Model 1250DS-4 Spectrum unit follow: 

Model 12V4000 Engine Model 7M4052 Generator 
4-Cycle Voltage 480/277 VAC 
Turbocharged, Intercooled 3 Phase/60 Hz 
V-12 Cylinder Configuration 1250 eKW/1563KVA 
2975 Cubic Inch Displacement 1879 Amps 
1800 RPM Sustained Short Circuit Current up to 
Max Power 1380 bKW/1850 BHP 300 % of Rated for 10 Seconds 
Exhaust Temperature 402 C/755 F Brushless, Rotating-Field 
Water Cooled, Electric Start Pilot Excited 
100 GPH Fuel Consumed at 100 % Load 
76 GPH Fuel Consumed at 75 % Load 1 Year Limited Warranty 
52 GPH Fuel Consumed at 50 % Load 

The backup generator is equipped with a 250-gallon day tank, normally kept at least 80 percent 
full. The day tank draws fuel from a 2,000-gallon main fuel tank, buried under the parking lot near 
the diesel generator shed. A small electric pump is used to fill the day tank when necessary. Note 
that a rule of thumb for generator fuel consumption is 0.08 gallon/KW load/hour. 

The day tanks level is measured using a sight glass. The level of the main fuel tank is measured 
with a probe each quarter by a visiting Detroit Diesel representative, who also starts the engine to 
run unloaded for about 20 minutes. Fuel is delivered by truck from a local supplier, who normally 
responds the day after being called. 

The diesel generator is configured to automatically start upon loss of commercial power to the CCB. 
This happens about twice a year due to electrical storms or utility maintenance in the neighborhood. 
An automatic bus transfer switch aligns the generator to the CCB as soon as the generator is ready to 
support the bus loads. This normally takes less than 5 seconds. In addition, a manually operated tie 
breaker is available to supply backup power to the SB via the CCB; however, the SB cannot receive 
backup power by itself. The backup diesel generator has never had to support CI/BCs power 
demands for longer than about 2 hours, and never with more than one chiller operating. It has never 
been tested for an extended period under a heavy load. 

An uninterruptible power supply (UPS) is located inside the buildings high-bay area. Rated at 
1000KVA, it is designed to support all loads on the CCB for up to 60 minutes. The diesel generator 
has never taken more than 30 seconds to start and assume the bus loads. If the diesel generator did 
not start on a loss of commercial power, 60 minutes would be ample time for CI/BC personnel to 
conduct an orderly shutdown of Computer Center equipment. 


The batteries to support the UPS are in a small room next to the UPS room. The only 
instrumentation in the room is a thermometer. The 50 lead-acid batteries are inspected semi-annually 
by the manufacturers representative. A capacity test discharge was conducted when the batteries 
were installed 2 years ago. The 60-minute endurance was calculated from that test. 

Electrical Loads 

CI/BCs electrical loads are divided between two main electrical buses, the CCB and the SB. They 
are located in separate closets of the building. A tie breaker allows the buses to be connected, so 
they can be powered by a single main transformer, or to allow SB loads to be carried by the backup 
diesel generator. The system is monitored by a digital energy management system, which provides 
indications, alarms, and instructions. Critical systems, such as those supporting fire alarms, security 
alarms, CCTV system, telephone system, etc. are connected to the CCB. The chillers, pumps, 
cooling towers, fans, etc., are all powered from the Support Bus (SB). The DEMs (Digital 
Environmental Managers in the Computer Center) and all of the building thermostats receive power 
from the Computer Center Bus (CCB). 

Figure 21. Electrical One-Line Diagram 


Mechanical and Electrical Room 

Typical of many commercial office buildings, the mechanical and electrical systems share common 
utility penetrations and floor space. There are no redundant utility service entrances into the 
building, except for the separate electrical feeds from each transformer. 

Figure 22. Mechanical and Electrical Room 


INFORMATION OPERATIONS 

The Computer Center is the heart of CI/BCs information operations. The rest of CI/BC Information 
Division exists to support the Computer Center. The Business Center receives support from the 
Computer Center in both unclassified and classified formats. Each workstation in the Business 
Center has LAN connections that allow rapid reconfiguration to connect to different servers and 
systems based upon the authorization and needs of the Business Center users. Multiple LAN 
connections are available in each office and conference room to accommodate any room 
configuration. Workstations in Business Center office areas average 100 square feet in floor space. 
Additional workstations or tables are available on a one-days notice. 

Computer Center 

Figure 23. Computer Center 

Hardware 

The Computer Center is composed of several interconnected systems and one independent system 
for classified data processing. The systems run VMS, Unix, or Windows. Although the equipment 
list changes almost monthly as systems are upgraded and new clients needs are being met, as of 
April 2003, the computers included the following: 

 
One 4-processor Silicon Graphics Power Challenge 
 
Three dual-processor Silicon Graphics Origin 200 servers 


 
One dual-processor Silicon Graphics Octane 
 
Five Microway Dec Alpha 500 MHz systems (four Unix, one VMS) 
 
Three DEC Alpha 600 5/266 systems 
 
Two IBM RISC 6000/560 systems with 160 and 128 Megabytes (MB) of memory 
 
One Stardent 3000 with 128 MB of memory, triple scalar and vector processors 
 
One DEC Alpha-based (RISC) Model 3000/400 VMS workstation 
 
One DEC VAX station 4000/90 system with 128 MB of memory 
 
Sixteen Windows based workstations 

All computers have access to large-capacity disk storage units, with shared mounting of major disk 
units throughout the complex. The VMS systems are configured as a VAX cluster; the Unix systems 
have common user accounts and files. The major systems are reachable from throughout the center 
and also through an Ethernet. The networks interface to the company-wide network and through it to 
the Internet. 

Because some customers rely on CI/BC to support their data storage needs, the Computer Center 
also contains a massive data storage jukebox. A StoreAll Model 5500 provides fully automated 
storage, using robot arms to provide rapid retrieval. Its capabilities include: 

 
3.0 Terabyte Total Capacity 
 
2.5 Megabyte Per Second (MBps) Transfer Rate 
 
500 CD Per Hour Change Rate 
 
10,000 CD Storage Rack 

Client data are backed up as requested by the clients, as frequently as once per day, except for one 
Federal client that uses CI/BC as a real-time mirror site similar to those of credit card companies. 
The Back-O-Matic digital backup system manages the backup process, selecting which data are 
backed up on which day. All backups are done to CD; these are stored in the StoreAll Model 5500. 
CI/BC maintains an off-site storage location for clients that require backup data to be stored at a 
separate site. Classified backup data for certain government clients are stored in a special fireproof 
safe in the Secure Space. 

Backup procedures for CI/BCs computer operating systems, digital telephones, and other company 
systems are similar as for their clients. Most of CI/BCs computer systems can be used to backup 
another system. For those systems without in-house backups, replacement sources are identified. In 
most cases, replacement hardware can be delivered and set up within 2 days. 

COMMUNICATIONS 

Data 

CI/BC has two T1 lines and one T3 line connected at the demark to ATTs high performance 
backbone network. The ATT fiber connectivity provides more than enough bandwidth for CI/BCs 
current needs and planned future expansion. 


Telecom and Network Connections 

 
Two T1 lines (1.544 MBps) 
 
One T3 (45 MBps) 
 
Frame Relay 
 
Narrowband ISDN (64/128 KBps) 

Figure 24. Telecom and Network Cabling 


Appendix C: COOP Case Study 

Figure 25. Telecom and Network Equipment 

The Cisco powered network features multiple 7500 VXR+ routers. Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) 
reroutes traffic between the routers and to the Internet. A variety of switches in the Communications 
Center and at client sites are used to ensure connectivity. Some clients use Hot Standby Routing 
Protocol (HSRP), which provides additional redundancy. 

A variety of firewalls and other security systems are in place to protect the company and its clients. 
The firewall solution is based on the Cisco PIX to provide highly resilient firewall protection. Other 
security systems include reporting and analysis tools and network detection devices, which help 
protect the companys computers from hacking. 

Communications to support CI/BCs classified government clients cannot be discussed in detail. 
Nevertheless, they use leased lines for point-to-point connectivity, and they are robust, with diversity 
and redundancy built in. 

Voice 

Although CI/BC does not provide voice communications services to its information customers, the 
need to communicate with them quickly and reliably is important. Therefore, the company has 
invested in NEC DS2000 telephone systems, which come with 8-slot cabinets that can handle 32 
lines from 48 stations. The systems digital processor provides reliability, speed, and features to keep 
CI/BC staff members in touch with their customers. 


This same system supports the Business Center workstations in the offices and conference rooms. 
The voice connections in offices and conference rooms are co-located with the LAN connections 
allowing any room configuration desired. 

There is excellent cell phone coverage within the CI/BC building and for a 20 mile radius around it. 

PHYSICAL SECURITY 

Much of the companys guidance for security comes from the National Industrial Security Program 
Operating Manual (NISPOM), the governments guide to protecting contractor facilities. The 
NISPOM is promulgated by the Defense Security Service (DSS) and is available on the World Wide 
Web at: http://www.dss.mil/isec/nispom_0195.htm. 

CI/BCs Security Officer uses a layered approach to physical security. The outermost physical 
security layer is provided by a contract security firm and the Defense Protective Service (DPS). 

The contract security firm periodically patrols the parking lots in marked vehicles. The security 
officers are not armed, but they carry cellular phones to contact the local police. These officers do 
not have security clearances, and are not allowed to enter the Information Division spaces and 
Business Center secure spaces of the CI/BC building if no employees are present. 

The DPS officers patrol the entire National Capital Region (NCR) and are tasked to respond to 
emergencies at Defense Department or contractor facilities. DPS officers are armed and have law 
enforcement authority. They are allowed to enter the CI/BC building, but normally do not as part of 
their rounds. 


Security Lighting and Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) 

The parking lot behind the CI/BC office is well lit and monitored by older generation analog CCTV 
cameras using telephone wires that are connected to video displays in the CI/BC Security Officers 
office and recorded on standard VHS tape. The CCTVs are commercial grade black and white with a 
180-degree field of view that the security officer can control via the display panel. The front parking 
lot is lit, but not monitored. 

Figure 26. Security Lighting 


Door and Window Alarms, Proximity Card and Badge Readers, Motion Sensors 

CI/BCs middle layer of security is the building envelope. The building is monitored by door and 
window alarms, which connect to ADT, the nationwide alarm company. Unauthorized opening of 
any door or window will immediately notify ADT via telephone. ADT will normally call the CI/BC 
Security Office prior to contacting the police and DPS. CI/BC employees have proximity cards and 
electronic badges to allow them to enter the front and loading dock doors without activating the 
alarm. Visitors are buzzed in the outer door into the reception area by the receptionist. The reception 
area is rectangular with the receptionist desk at one end, the reception area in the center, and the 
straight-line access path between outer and inner doors at the other. There is room for a metal 
detector and a small x-ray machine, but none are currently installed. Escorts provide visitors access 
past the reception area using their employee proximity cards and electronic badges. Business Center 
users are similarly buzzed in by the receptionist but do not need special access to the general 
Business Center spaces. Business Center users needing access to secure Business Center spaces are 
provided single day proximity cards and electronic badges activated by the receptionist. 

Figure 27. Proximity Card Reader and Alarm Sticker 


Appendix C: COOP Case Study 

Figure 28. Electronic Badge Reader 

Figure 29. Motion Sensor 

The innermost layer of physical security involves the Computer Center and the Communications 
Center. Equipped with locked doors, these two rooms meet the governments requirements for 


handling classified material. Only authorized employees possess the necessary proximity cards and 
PINs to gain access. The Information Division offices on the mezzanine are similarly controlled and 
the internal stairwell to the Computer Center is behind the Information Division access door. 
Unauthorized access to these spaces will sound sirens, flash lights, and notify the CI/BC Security 
Officer and DPS. The access doors are not manned or monitored with cameras. The crawl spaces 
created by the raised floor in the Computer Center are barricaded by a wire fence in the three 
locations where it can be accessed from other parts of the building. 

Other secure areas inside the building are equipped with keyed door locks for access, i.e. the 
Mechanical and Electrical Room, telecom closets, and the like. 


EMERGENCY RESPONSE 
Emergency Operations Center 

In the event of an emergency, CI/BC senior management uses the large conference room as an 
Emergency Operations Center. The room is equipped with network and telephone connections and 
cell phones are able to receive a signal. 

Figure 30. Large Conference Room/Emergency Operations Center 

The nearest fire station is approximately 2 miles north of the CI/BC building. Seven other fire 
stations are within 5 miles of the site. Firefighters are trained as Emergency Medical Technicians 
(EMTs) and Hazardous Material Technicians. Many are also skilled in technical rescue (high places, 
confined spaces, etc.). Ambulances are also dispatched from these stations. Emergency response 
time for emergencies is estimated to be 8-10 minutes. Fire hydrants are available in the office park. 

The nearest hospital with an emergency room is 5 miles away. Other emergency response 
information includes: 

 
Exit signs: Located above each exit. 
 
Battery operated emergency lights: Strategically placed throughout the building. 
 
Emergency exits: Normally closed and locked doors have panic bars for use in 
emergencies. 


 
Announcing system: The telephone system has a building-wide announcing feature that can 
be activated by pressing one button at any phone. This provides a form of mass notification 
capability. 
 
Evacuation plan and escape ladders for the mezzanine: None. 
 
Emergency stairway: Emergency stairways from mezzanine are located on opposite ends of 
the non-Information Division spaces. 


NATURAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL HAZARDS 

Natural Disaster Hazards 

The countys Local Emergency Planning Committee provided the following information regarding 
natural disasters: 

 
The state experiences an average of 7 tornadoes/hurricanes per year. 
 
The state experiences 80-100 days per year with one or more lightning strikes. 

Seismic Risk 

The following was obtained from the United States Geological Survey web site: 

The CI/BC building and the DAI Building are in the old Seismic Zone 1 which has a value of 

0.075 (0.075g or 7.5%g) per the 1994 Uniform Building Code. 
Damage at 7.5% g acceleration is approximately: Damage negligible in buildings 
of good design and construction; slight to moderate in well-built ordinary 
structures; considerable damage in poorly built or badly designed structures; some 
chimneys broken. Noticed by persons driving motor cars. 

Updated information is that the CI/BC building is in a zone of 8%-10%g acceleration with a 2% 
probability of exceedance in 50 years. The 2 percent probability of exceedance in 50 years means 
a 2,500-year return period. Previously 10 percent probability of exceedance in 50 years (return 
period of 475 years) was the most common standard used in the industry for assessing seismic 
risk, and was also the basis for most building codes for seismic design. The 10% probability of 
exceedance for the CI/BC building location was 3%g acceleration, a much lower g value, but a 
higher probability of occurrence The return period is the period of time that the event is not 
expected to occur more than once. The 50-year period is the expected design life of a building. 


Appendix C: COOP Case Study 

Figure 31. Seismic 2% Probability of Exceedance in 50 Years 


Appendix C: COOP Case Study 

Figure 32. Probability of Earthquake with Magnitude Greater Than 4.75 
within 100 Years and 50 Kilometers 

The figure above relates to the previous information in that an earthquake with a Richter magnitude 
greater than 4.75 has a probability of 0.03 within 100 years and 50 kilometers or 3 occurrences in 
100 years. A 4.75 magnitude earthquake has an effective peak ground acceleration of approximately 
1.5%g. 

Overall, the CI/BC building is in an area of low seismic as is the DAI Building. However, the DAI 
Building has about twice the probability of being hit by a 4.75 or greater magnitude earthquake than 
the CI/BC building. 


Flood Risk 

Flood information was obtained from the Federal Emergency Management Agency flood maps web 
site. Like seismic, the site of the CI/BC building is at very low risk of flooding with the closest 
flooding some 2 km away. 

Figure 33. 100 Year Flood Plain 

Technological Disasters Hazards 

CI/BC is surrounded by a number of commercial activities and key national critical infrastructure 
to include Hazardous Material (HazMat) facilities, HazMat being transported on the roads and 
rails, a nearby fuel tank farm, and an airport. 

HazMat Facilities 

There are two large manufacturing plants with large quantities of hazardous materials stored on site 
within 2 miles of the CI/BC building, one to the north and the other to the southwest. In addition, 
there are more than a dozen Tier II HazMat facilities within 3 miles of the building (in all 
directions). 


The prevailing weather pattern for the area in the summer and fall is from the south Atlantic and the 
Gulf of Mexico. Warm, moist air brings thunderstorms and higher humidity. In the fall, cooler air 
from the north and west returns. Winter weather blasts across the state from the northern or central 
part of the continent. With no other weather activity, the prevailing wind is normally from the south 
in the summer and from the north-northwest in the winter. 

None of the nearby facilities were contacted during this analysis. There is no information available 
regarding accidents or incidents involving these facilities. 

Highway Movement of HazMat 

A major interstate highway is located within  mile of the CI/BC building. Approximately 5,000 
trucks per day pass the CI/BC office on the nearby interstate highway. About 30 percent of these 
trucks (1,500 trucks/day) carry placards indicating that HazMat is aboard, but only about 5 percent 
(250 trucks/day) carry sufficient HazMat to warrant placarding. 

Approximately 50 percent of the HazMat passing the CI/BC office is Class 3 (flammable and 
combustible liquids). Class 2 (gases) and Class 8 (corrosives) each constitute about 15 percent. 
Approximately 10 percent of the trucks carry more than one class of HazMat. 

Figure 34. HazMat Truck on Nearby Interstate Highway 


The State Police Department inspects 5-10 percent of the HazMat carrying trucks on interstate 
highways. 

Approximately 476 incidents involving the transportation of HazMat occur each year in the county 
in which CI/BC is located. Most of these involve flammable gas and liquids. Only one HazMat 
incident took place on a highway within 2 miles of CI/BC in the period 1995 to 2002. 

Rail Movement of HazMat 

CSX Transportation and Norfolk-Southern Railway maintain a transportation corridor approximately 
 mile from CI/BC. There appear to be no restrictions on the material carried along these rail lines. 
Neither company was available for interviews. 

Nevertheless, rail traffic has been informally monitored in this area. It is estimated that 
approximately 10,000 railcars of HazMat move through this area each year. Hazardous materials 
range from liquid petroleum products to chlorine to anhydrous ammonia. 
There are no recent records of any HazMat spills or incidents involving rail transportation in the 
county in which CI/BC is located. 

Liquid Fuels 

A leg of the Piedmont Petroleum Pipeline (PPP) runs underneath the office park in the vicinity of the 
CI/BC building. Part of Piedmonts regional network, this portion of the pipeline normally carries a 
variety of refined products, including commercial and military jet fuels, diesel and three grades of 
gasoline, home heating fuels, etc. Four buried pipes carry approximately 20 million gallons per day. 

There is no available information regarding any pipeline ruptures or incidents in the vicinity of 
CI/BC. 

Fuel Tank Farm 

Connected to the pipeline, less than 1 mile from CI/BC, is a 20-million gallon capacity fuel farm. 
Operated by the Shellexxico Company, this tank farm stores a variety of petroleum products, 
primarily gasoline. Although representatives of Shellexxico were unavailable for an interview, their 
operations appear to conform to industry standards. Thirteen tank trucks were observed leaving the 
tank farm in a 1- hour period, indicating a calculated movement rate of approximately 300 trucks per 
day (about 3 million gallons of fuel). 


Appendix C: COOP Case Study 

Figure 35. Shellexxico Tank Farm 

Based on terrain elevation data, the ground level of the tank farm is 49 feet higher than the ground 
level at CI/BC. Only some of the fuel tanks are bermed, but leaking fuel is not likely to reach 
CI/BCs office park; the interstate highway between the two is 16 feet lower than the tank farm and 
the office park is about 5 feet higher than the same interstate. 

Figure 36. Computerized Elevation Looking Northwest 


Appendix C: COOP Case Study 

Figure 37. Computerized Elevation Looking Northeast 

Figure 38. Topography Map of Local Area 
(elevation also in meters) 


Air Traffic 

Two airports are in the vicinity of CI/BC. One is a major international airport approximately 8 miles 
away. The other is a small, but busy general aviation airport less than 2 miles away. The office park 
in which CI/BC is located is in direct line with one of the approach and departure paths of this 
regional airport. 

The website for the regional airport indicates it is capable of handling business jets, and providing jet 
fuel and high octane aviation gasoline and other services. 

The international airport is tower controlled and handles approximately 100,000 flights per year. 

THREAT ANALYSIS 

The following information was obtained from the regional office of the FBI and the State Police. 

Terrorist Threat 

Since September 11, 2001, the terrorist threat in the area has been Yellow or Orange. Yellow has 
been the norm, except for the anniversary of the 9/11 attacks and during the recent war in Iraq. 

Yellow Definition: Elevated risk of terrorist attack, but a specific region of the United States or 
target has not been identified. 

Orange Definition: Credible intelligence indicates that there is a high risk of a local terrorist attack, 
but a specific target has not been identified. 

The elevated and high threat condition is not due to any specific information or threat to the area in 
which the CI/BC office is located, but rather due to the proximity to the metropolitan area, nearby 
military installations, etc. 

There is no known threat to CI/BC or any of its officers or employees. There are no known threats to 
any of the companies within the office park. Nearby commercial entities that are likely terrorist 
targets include the Shellexxico tank farm, two rail lines, the busy interstate highway, and the 
transformer substation. 

Although CI/BC is probably not a primary target, there is a military installation within 10 miles, two 
large prime contractors and one Federal agency office in the business park. There would be potential 
collateral damage or targeting of CI/BC as an alternate if those organizations were targeted and 
attacked. 

Intelligence Threat 

The CI/BC Security Officer maintains close coordination with government security officers and law 
enforcement agents as part of his normal duties. All CI/BC employees hold security clearances, 


Secret or higher, except administrative and Business Office staff. This makes the cleared personnel 
potential targets for foreign intelligence services. Although there has been no known case of a CI/BC 
employee being approached by a foreign intelligence agent, this is certainly a possibility. The 
company follows counterintelligence guidance and procedures from the Defense Security Service 
and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) regarding: 

 
Risk management of classified programs in industry 
 
Threat awareness 
 
Deterrence of illegal technology transfers 
 
Facilitating the prevention of economic espionage in defense contractor facilities 

Criminal Threat 

Gangs and Drugs 

There are several gangs operating in the metropolitan area and they have been responsible for a 
number of gang related murders. Drug activity continues to be a problem in the metropolitan area, 
but less so in the suburbs. There has not been any gang or drug activity near the CI/BC building. 

Violent Crime 

The 2002 Crime Index, which is composed of murder, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault, 
burglary, larceny-theft, and motor vehicle theft, was relatively unchanged from 2001 figures. In 
2002, a woman waiting at a bus stop near CI/BCs office complex was assaulted; there have been no 
other reported crimes in the neighborhood. 

Year 2000 Area Crime Comparison (Rates per 100,000 population) 

Crime County State United States 
Murder 1.30 5.7 5.5 
Rape 10.74 22.8 32.0 
Robbery 41.32 88.9 144.9 
Aggravated Assault 40.02 164.3 323.6 
Burglary 155.95 429.9 728.4 
Larceny 1950.84 2064.8 2457.3 
Vehicle Theft 197.27 251.6 414.2 


Other Crimes 

Employee Fraud and Identity Theft have become a growing problem in the state in which CI/BC is 
located. County crime statistics indicate these problems are prevalent nearby, and a nearby business 
lost $11,000 to trusted employees in 2001, but there have been no indications of such problems at 
CI/BC. 

DESIGN BASIS THREAT 

The senior management of CI/BC reviewed the site, building, and threat information collected, and 
determined the Design Basis Threat to be: 

Explosive Blast: Car Bomb - approximately 250 lb. TNT equivalent. Truck Bomb - approximately 
5,000 lb. TNT equivalent. 

Chemical: Large quantity gasoline spill and fire toxic plume from the adjacent tank farm, small 
quantity (tanker truck and rail car size) spills of HazMat materials (chlorine). 

Biological: Anthrax delivered by mail or in packages, smallpox distributed by spray mechanism 
mounted on truck or aircraft around metropolitan area. 

Radiological: Small dirty bomb detonation within the 10-mile radius of the CI/BC building. 

Criminal Activity/Armed Attack: High powered rifle or handgun exterior shooting (sniper attack 
or direct assault on key staff, damage to infrastructure [i.e., transformers, chillers, etc.]). 

Cyber Attack: Focus on IT and building systems infrastructure (SCADA, alarms, etc.) accessible 
via internet access. Computer Center and Communications Center supporting infrastructure (e.g., 
firewalls, routers, main distribution rooms, backup tapes storage, etc.) location, redundancy, and 
power supply meet National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and industry standards 
for physical access and protection. The analysis is not to include information assurance assessment 
activities (e.g., password, network monitoring, host and intrusion detection, etc.). 

LEVEL OF PROTECTION 

Based on the Design Basis Threat and after reviewing the General Services Administration (GSA) 
and Department of Defense (DoD) standards, senior management selected the preliminary Levels of 
Protection most applicable to CI/BC, with the guidance that adoption of any recommendations 
would be to the most stringent standard and would be in compliance with life safety codes. After the 
vulnerability and risk assessments were complete and mitigation options developed, final selection 
of mitigation options would be made by senior management and determined on a benefit/cost and 
risk reduction basis. The Levels of Protection to be used as the basis for the vulnerability and risk 
assessments are: 


Interagency Security Committee (ISC) Level II 

A Level II facility has between 11 and 150 employees and from 2,500 to 80,000 square feet. 

1. Perimeter Security 

a. 
Security control for parking (surface lots, adjacent structures, underground garages 
under the Lessor's control) is solely limited to the assignment (marked "reserved") of 
authorized Government parking spaces and vehicles. 
b. 
Adequate lighting, with emergency power backup, for the exterior of the building 
is required. Parking areas shall also be adequately lighted. 
c. 
24-hour CCTV surveillance cameras with time-lapse video recording may be 
required as deemed necessary by a Security Specialist. 
d. 
Application of shatter-resistant material shall be applied on exterior windows. 

2. Entry Security 

a. 
Security Guards may be required, as deemed necessary by a Security Specialist. 
b. 
Intrusion Detection System (IDS) with central monitoring capability may be 
required, as deemed necessary by a Security Specialist, for the building exterior. 
c. 
Peepholes in exterior doors may be required, as deemed necessary by a Security 
Specialist, when an IDS is not appropriate. 
d. 
An intercom system, used in conjunction with a peephole, may be required as 
deemed necessary by a Security Specialist. 
e. 
Entry control with CCTV and door strikes may be required to allow employees to 
view and communicate remotely with visitors before allowing access, as deemed 
necessary by a Security Specialist. 
f. 
Exterior entrances shall have high security locks. 

3. Interior Security 

a. 
A visitor control/screening system is not required for this level. 
b. 
Utility areas shall be secured and only authorized personnel shall have access. 


c. 
Emergency power sources to critical systems (i.e., alarm systems, radio 
communications, computer facilities, CCTV monitoring, fire detection, entry control 
devices, etc.) are required. 
d. 
The following requirements pertain to the added protection of the building 
environment from airborne chemical, biological, or radiological attacks. 
(1) 
Access to mechanical areas and building roofs shall be strictly controlled. 
(2) 
Access to building information, including mechanical, electrical, vertical 
transport, fire and life safety, security system plans and schematics, computer 
automation systems, and emergency operations procedures shall be required. 
Such information shall be released to authorized personnel only. Names and 
locations of Government tenants shall not be disclosed within any publicly 
accessed document or record. 
(3) 
Procedures (should airborne hazards be suspected or found) are required 
for the notification of the lessor's building manager, building security guard 
desk, local emergency personnel, or other Government emergency personnel, 
for the possible shutdown of air handling units serving any possibly affected 
areas. 

4. Administrative Procedures 

a. 
Building managers and owners are required to cooperate with and participate in the 
development and implementation of Government Occupant Emergency Plans (OEPs). 
b. 
Conduct background security checks and/or establish security control procedures 
for contract service personnel as deemed necessary. 
c. 
The Government reserves the right, at its own expense and manpower, to 
temporarily upgrade security during heightened security conditions due to emergency 
situations such as terrorist attacks, natural disaster and civil unrest. The measures 
shall be in accordance with the latest version of the Homeland Security Advisory 
System. 

5. Blast/Setback Standards 

a. The following blast/setback standards shall be met: 

1. For Level II, a 20 foot setback1 guideline with appropriate window glazing, as 
prescribed by WINGARD 3.15 or later or WINLAC 4.3 software, to achieve a 
glazing performance condition of 3b2 and a faade protection level of "medium"3 
given a blast load standard of 4 psi/28 psi-msec is required. 


1 

 Setback refers to the distance from the face of the building's exterior to the 
protected/defended perimeter (i.e., any potential point of explosion). This would mean the 
distance from the building to the curb or other boundary protected by bollards, planters, or 
other street furniture. Such potential points of explosion may be, but not limited to, such areas 
that could be accessible by any motorized vehicle (i.e., street, alley, sidewalk, driveway, 
parking lot). 

2 Glazing Performance Condition 3b provides for a high protection level and a low hazard 
level. For a blast of 4psi/28psi-msec, the glazing cracks and fragments enter the space and 
land on the floor not further than 10 feet from the window. 

3 

A "Medium Level Protection" to the facade will result in moderate, but repairable damage. 
The facility or protected space will sustain a significant degree of damage, but the structure 
should be reusable. Some casualties may occur and assets may be damaged. Building 
elements other than major structural members may require replacement. 

DoD Standards 

CI/BC senior management evaluated the DoD standards and determined that they would attempt to 
meet the intent and objective of as many of the recommendations as possible. Of particular concern 
are blast, CBR, and associated operations/locations of functions and equipment such as mail rooms, 
dumpsters, loading docks, and emergency shut down. 

The DoD level of protection selected is low, and the building category is Primary Gathering 
Building. 

UFC 4-010-01 APPENDIX B 
DoD MINIMUM ANTITERRORISM STANDARDS FOR NEW AND EXISTING 
BUILDINGS 
Standard 1 Stand-off Distances 
Standard 2 Unobstructed Space 
Standard 3 Drive-Up/Drop-Off Areas 
Standard 4 Access Roads 
Standard 5 Parking Beneath Buildings or on Rooftops 
Standard 6 Progressive Collapse Avoidance 
Standard 7 Structural Isolation 
Standard 8 Building Overhangs 


Appendix C: COOP Case Study 

Standard 9 Exterior Masonry Walls 
Standard 10 Windows and Skylights 
Standard 11 Building Entrance Layout 
Standard 12 Exterior Doors 
Standard 13 Mail Rooms 
Standard 14 Roof Access 
Standard 15 Overhead Mounted Architectural Features 
Standard 16 Air Intakes 
Standard 17 Mail Room Ventilation 
Standard 18 Emergency Air Distribution Shutoff 
Standard 19 Utility Distribution and Installation 
Standard 20 Equipment Bracing 
Standard 21 Under Building Access 
Standard 22 Mass Notification 
Recommendation 1 Vehicle Access Points 
Recommendation 2 High-Speed Vehicle Approach 
Recommendation 3 Vantage Points 
Recommendation 4 Drive-Up/Drop-Off 
Recommendation 5 Building Location 
Recommendation 6 Railroad Location 
Recommendation 7 Access Control for Family Housing 
Recommendation 8 Stand-off for Family Housing 
Recommendation 9 Minimize Secondary Debris 
Recommendation 10 Building Separation 


Appendix C: COOP Case Study 

Recommendation 11 Structural Redundancy 
Recommendation 12 Internal Circulation 
Recommendation 13 Visitor Control 
Recommendation 14 Asset Location 
Recommendation 15 Room Layout 
Recommendation 16 External Hallways 
Recommendation 17 Windows 

Level of 
Protection 
Potential Structural 
Damage 
Potential Door and 
Glazing 
Hazards 
Potential Injury 
Low Moderate damage  
Building damage will not 
be economically 
repairable. Progressive 
collapse will not occur. 
Space in and around 
damaged area will be 
unusable. 
Glazing will fracture, 
potentially come out of 
the frame, but at a 
reduced velocity, does 
not present a significant 
injury hazard. (Very 
low hazard rating) 
Doors may fail, but 
they will rebound out of 
their frames, presenting 
minimal hazards. 
Majority of personnel 
in damaged area suffer 
minor to moderate 
injuries with the 
potential for a few 
serious injuries, but 
fatalities are unlikely. 
Personnel in areas 
outside damaged areas 
will potentially 
experience minor to 
moderate injuries. 

Location Building 
Category 
Stand-off Distance or Separation Requirements 
Applicable 
Level of 
Protection 
Conventional 
Construction 
Stand-off 
Distance 
Minimum 
Stand-off 
Distance 
Applicable 
Explosive 
Weight 
Controlled 
Perimeter or 
Parking and 
Roadways 
without a 
Controlled 
Perimeter 
Primary 
Gathering 
Building 
Low 45 m 
148 ft 
25 m 
82 ft 
Car Bomb 


NOTE: The DoD Applicable Level of Protection for a Primary Gathering Building is Low as 
shown in the above table. The CI/BC management has selected this Level of Protection for 
CI/BC employees even though they are not DoD personnel. CI/BC management has selected 
an Applicable Explosive Weight of approximately 250 pounds (TNT equivalent) as a 

representative car bomb based upon the threat analysis. 
Figure 39. DoD Stand-off Distance 


INDEX 

Bomb Blast Effects 

Car Bomb....................................... C-14 
Truck Bomb...........................C-15, C-16 

Building Data 

Applicable Codes 
..............C-17, C-18, C-24, C-42, C-52 
Fire Systems.................................... C-17 
Occupancy....................................... C-17 

Building Layout 

Square Footages.............................. C-13 

Building Systems and Equipment 

Electrical Systems 

 Buses  Computer Center & 
Support........................C-28, C-29 

 Diesel Generator..........C-28, C-29 

 Electrical Loads.C-27, C-28, C-29 

 Generator Fuel Supply.......... C-28 

 Transformers.....C-27, C-29, C-30 

 Uninterruptible Power Supply 
(UPS)...........................C-28, C-29 
Fire Protection and Life Safety 

 Bottled Water........................ C-25 

 Clean Agent Suppression 
System.................................. C-26 

 Stairwells.and Exits C-17, 
C-24, C-25, C-39, C-40, C-41 

 Emergency Lighting....C-25, C-40 

 Fire Extinguishers 
..........................C-24, C-26, C-29 

 Fire Alarm System 
..........................C-17, C-25, C-29 

 Main Fire Panel...........C-24, C-26 

 Manual Pull Stations............. C-24 

 Mass Notification Systems 
....................................C-25, C-41 

 Water Sprinkler System 
...........................C-17, C-24, C-26 

Mechanical and Electrical Room 
...........................................C-24, C-30 
Mechanical Systems 

 Air Intake....................C-19, C-22 

 Chillers....C-20, C-27, C-28, C-29 

 Chilled Water Distribution 
(Cooling)...........C-19, C-20, C-21 

 Digital Environmental Managers 
(DEMs).............C-18, C-20, C-29 

 Filters.................................... C-19 

 Fire and Smoke Dampers...... C-24 

 HVAC Return.............C-19, C-20 

 HVAC Supply.............C-18, C-19 

 Natural Gas.......C-18, C-23, C-24 

 Restrooms.........C-17, C-18, C-25 
Structure and Envelope................... C-18 

 Columns................................ C-18 

 Walls................................. C-18 

 Windows / Glazing / 
Fenestration.......C-14, C-15, C-18 

Communications 

Data................................................. C-32 
Satellite........................................... C-2 
Telecom and Network Connections and 
Equipment..........................C-33, C-34 
Telephones and Lines.....C-1, C-2, C-26, 
C-29, C-32, C-36, C-37, C-40, C-41 

Computer Center 

Data Backup....................C-1, C-5, C-32 
Hardware......................................... C-31 
Information Operations.........C-31, C-32 

Computer Equipment outside Computer 
Center....C-1, C-2, C-3, C-5, C-6 

Cooperville Information / Business 
Center 

Impact of COOP operations on 
CI/BC........................................... C-6 
Introduction to CI/BC..................... C-5 


Relationship: DAI & CI/BC.......... C-1 

Design Basis Threat........................... C-52 

 Biological 

 Chemical 

 Criminal Activity/Armed Attack 

 Cyber Attack 

 Explosive Blast 

 Radiological 

Emergency Response 

Emergency Response Center.......... C-40 
Evacuation Plans...................C-26, C-41 
Local Capabilities..................C-12, C-40 

Firewalls............................................... C-34 

General Regional / Site Data 
Business Park and Surrounding 
Buildings...................................... C-9 

 Mail and Package Delivery 

 Parking 

 Tenant Services 
COOP Alternate Facility Site.......... C-7 
Of Interest to DAI........................... C-7 

 Banking 

 Dining 

 Equipment Rental 

 Freight/Shipping Services 

 Gas Stations 

 Lodging 

 Nuclear Plant 

 Shopping 

 US Postal Service 

Geographic Relationship 

Primary versus Proposed Alternate 
Facility...................................C-3, C-4 
Transportation available between 
facilities..................................C-3, C-4 

Hazardous Materials (HazMat) 

Generators, Large and Small 
...........................C-11, C-45, C-47, C-48 
Prevailing Wind Patterns 
...............................................C-11, C-46 
Transported............................C-46, C-47 

Hazards 

Air Traffic....................................... C-50 
Earthquake (Seismic)..C-42, C-43, C-44 
Flood............................................... C-45 
HazMat....C-45, C-46, C-47, C-48, C-49 
Hurricanes....................................... C-42 
Lightning......................................... C-42 
Tornadoes........................................ C-42 

Level of Protection.............................. C-52 
DoD Standards..C-55, C-56, C-57, C-58 
ISC Level II...............C-53, C-54, C-55 

Mail Room...................................C-9, C-18 

Physical Security 

Alarms...................................C-29, C-37 
Access Control 
.........C-6, C-19, C-26, C-37, C-38, C-39 
Closed Circuit Television (CCTV)
...............................................C-29, C-36 
Contracted Security Firm................ C-35 
Defense Protective Service............. C-35 
Defense Security Service......C-35, C-51 
Security Lighting............................ C-36 
Sensors...................................C-37, C-38 

Secure Rooms / SCIFs 

.........................C-3, C-13, C-32, C-35, C-37 

Stand-Off.....................................C-9, C-18 

Threats 

Criminal.................................C-51, C-52 
Intelligence............................C-50, C-51 


Terrorist...........................................C-50 

U.S. Department of Artificial Intelligence 

Alternate Facility Requirements..... C-3 
Emergency Relocation Group......... C-2 
Essential Functions......................... C-1 
Introduction to DAI.........................C-1 
Relationship: DAI & CI/BC.......... C-1 
Support for Other Personnel........... C-2 

Utilities 

Cell Phone.............................C-35, C-40 
Data................................................. C-32 
Electricity..........C-18, C-27, C-29, C-30 
Fire Mains and Hydrants 
.....................................C-12, C-25, C-40 
Natural Gas..................C-18, C-23, C-24 
Telephone..............................C-26, C-37 
Water............................................... C-25 

Workstations.............C-3, C-5, C-31, C-35 

Figures / Graphics 

1. Transportation Links between DAI 
Building and CI/BC.................. C-4 

2. Cooperville Information / Business 
Center (CI/BC).......................... C-5 

3. CI/BC Corporate Business Park 
5-Mile Radius............................C-7 

4. Lodging and Dining near 
Cooperville Information / Business 
Center........................................ C-8 

5. CI/BC Business Park Perimeter and 
Surrounding Buildings.............. C-9 

6. CI/BC Office Location.............. C-10 

7. HazMat Sites Near the CI/BC 
Building.................................... C-11 

8. Emergency Response Capabilities 
Near the CI/BC Building.......... C-12 

9. CI/BC Functions and Building 
Layout....................................... C-13 

10. Car Bomb Blast Effects (Front 
Entrance Parking)......................C-14 

11. Truck Bomb Blast Effects (Interstate 
Highway)...................................C-15 

12. Truck Bomb Blast Effects (Loading 
Dock).........................................C-16 

13. HVAC Supply........................... C-19 

14. HVAC Return........................... C-20 

15. Chilled Water System............... C-21 

16. Air Intake.................................. C-22 

17. Loading Dock Area................... C-23 

18. Gas Meters Under Loading Dock 
Stairs......................................... C-24 

19. Sprinkler Head.......................... C-26 

20. One of Two Transformers 
On Site...................................... C-27 

21. Electrical One-Line Diagram C-29 

22. Mechanical and Electrical 
Room......................................... C-30 

23. Computer Center....................... C-31 

24. Telecom and Network 
Cabling...................................... C-33 

25. Telecom and Network 
Equipment................................. C-34 

26. Security Lighting...................... C-36 

27. Proximity Card Reader and Alarm 
Sticker....................................... C37 

28. Electronic Badge Reader........... C-38 

29. Motion Sensor........................... C-38 

30. Large Conference Room/Emergency 
Operations Center..................... C-40 

31. Seismic 2% Probability of 
Exceedance in 50 Years............ C-43 

32. Probability of Earthquake with 
Magnitude Greater Than 4.75 within 
100 Years and 50 Kilometers.... C-44 

33. 100 Year Flood Plain................ C-45 

34. HazMat Truck on Nearby Interstate 
Highway.................................... C-46 

35. Shellexxico Tank Farm............. C-48 


36. 
Computerized Elevation Looking 
Northwest..................................C-48 
37. 
Computerized Elevation Looking 
Northeast................................... C-49 
38. 
Topography Map of Local Area 
(elevation also in meters).......... C-49 
39. 
DoD Stand-off Distances.......... C-58