UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                        FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA


                                   )
ELOUISE PEPION COBELL, eta!.,      )
                                   )
                 P!aintiffs,       )    Civi! Action No. 96-1285 (RCL)
                                   )
                                   )
                                   )
GALE A. NORTON, eta!.,             )
                                   )
                 Defendants.       )
___________________________________________________________________________)


              DEFENDANTS' REPLY IN FURTHER SUPPORT OF
         MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER QUASHING PLAINTIFFS'
              NOTICE OF DEPOSITION OF ROBERT HATFIELD

       P!aintiffs' opposition to Defendants' October 20, 2005 motion for a protective order has

not undermined the need or justification for a protective order. Indeed, P!aintiffs do not cite one

precedent that contradicts or refutes the amp!e grounds set forth in Defendants' motion justif!ying

a protective order. To the contrary, P!aintiffs' opposition underscores why a protective order

regarding Mr. Haffie!d's deposition is warranted.

I.     Plaintiffs Are Not Entitled To Take Discovery Related To Purported Retaliation

       Defendants acknow!edged that discovery re!ated to records management is permitted

under the Court's orders, see Def. Mot. at 2, 4, and have not contended that P!aintiffs may not

question Mr. Haffie!d about retaining, safeguarding and protecting individua! Indian trust

records. To the extent that P!aintiffs wou!d restrict their questioning to the topic of current

records preservation efforts, Defendants wou!d not oppose a deposition of Mr. Haffie!d,

consistent with the Court's prior ru!ings.


     In their opposition, however, Plaintiffs reveal the true purposes of the noticed deposition:

to question Mr. Hatfield regarding their allegations of retaliation against Ms. Deborah Lewis, a

Department of the Interior appraiser, and Ms. Mary Johnson, a witness in the IT security hearing.

P/al nt!ffs' Opposition to Defendants 'Motion for a Protective Order Quashing Plaint !ffk 'Notice

ofDeposition ofRobert Hatfield and Supporting Memorandum ofPoints andAuthorities at 2-3

(Nov. 3, 2005) ("P1. Opp."). They imply, without stating, that they seek discovery to promote

contempt allegations. See P1. Opp. at 3 & n.6 (citing Defendants' Motion). These are not proper

subjects for discovery. Plaintiffs fail to make the necessary prima facie showing that could

possibly entitle them to discovery related to their claims that the conduct of Robert Hatfield "and

others" - who allegedly "acted in concert to retaliate against" Ms. Lewis and Ms. Johnson -

violates the Court's Anti-Retaliation Order. See Central Soya Co. v. Geo. A. Hormel & Co., 515

F. Supp. 798, 799 (W.D. Okla. 1980). And, although Plaintiffs fail to address any grounds for

seeking criminal contempt, they conclude their brief by stating that "this Court is empowered to

  imposFel .. . punitive sanctions." P1. Opp. at 4. The lack of a sound basis for discovery in

support of possible contempt charges is revealed in Plaintiffs' filing, and supports Defendants'

decision to move for a protective order in the face of Plaintiffs' initial refusal to disclose the

subject mailer of the noticed deposition of Mr. Hatfield.

     A.    Man Johnson

     Plaintiffs fail to articulate any basis, much less aprimafacie showing, that Defendants

have retaliated against Mary Johnson. ! P1. Opp. at 2-3. Contrary to Plaintiffs' claim that

Defendants "cannot deny that all mailers related to the despicable efforts to retaliate against

Mary Johnson are equally within the scope of plaintiffs' discovery," P1. Opp. at 3, Defendants

deny both that there have been any efforts to retaliate against Ms. Johnson and that her dealings


                                -2-


with Interior are subject to discovery in this case. Plaintiffs have presented no basis for the

Court to conclude otherwise.1

     Significantly, Plaintiffs appear to be attempting to get in through the back door what they

could not get in through the front. Although not readily apparent from the obtuse discussion of

the purported - and groundless - allegation of "retaliation" against Ms. Johnson in their

opposition brief, Plaintiffs' vague references to Ms. Johnson appear to relate to the appraisal of

her property. See P1. Ex. 1 at 3-4 (grievance letter), cited in P1. Opp. at 2 n.5. This is evident

from a review of Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1, and the fact, if nothing else, that Mr. Haffield is an

appraiser in the Navajo region who has recently reviewed an appraisal for Ms. Johnson. Thus,

Plaintiffs seek to depose Mr. Haffield on the subject of appraisals, or asset management, that, of

course, the Court foreclosed in its previous orders. Cobell v. Norton, 226 F.R.D. 67, 76-81

(D.D.C. 2005); see Defendants' Mot. at 3-4. Plaintiffs are thus not permitted to question Mr.

Haffield regarding the vague allegations related to Mary Johnson.

     B.    Deborah Lewis

     Assuming that Plaintiffs seek to develop only civil contempt allegations against Mr.

Haffield, the Court should not permit Plaintiffs to conduct discovery into those allegations when

they have not established aprimafacie case of contempt. An opposition to a motion for a

protective order is certainly not the proper place for Plaintiffs to first make their allegations of

contempt.


     1 Equally unfounded is Plaintiffs' claim that Mrs. Johnson is "suffering as a consequence
of [Secretary! Norton's failure to ensure the integrity of electronic trust records and other
breaches of trust.....P1. Opp. at 3. Plaintiffs cite no evidence from the 59-day evidentiary
hearing at which Mrs. Johnson testified in support of this claim. Indeed, neither Mrs. Johnson
nor any other witness connected Mrs. Johnson's asserted problems with the state of IT security
or any specific breach of trust.

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     Contempt proceedings are, by nature, collateral matters. While the scope of civil

discovery permitted by Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)U) may be broad, it is not infinite. Before the

parties and witnesses expend the time and cost of discovery on a collateral matter, the Court

should first determine that there has been aprimafacie showing of civil contempt. In the

absence of such a showing, Plaintiffs should not be allowed to engage in the discovery fishing

expedition they are poised to undertake in the hope of reeling in evidence in support of their

claims. Plaintiffs ignore the cases cited in Defendants' motion (at 5-6) in asserting that

Defendants "cite no relevant authority that supports their claim that plaintiffs are barred from

discovery. . . with respect to violations of the Anti-Retaliation Order.....P1. Opp. at 3. The

Court should not ignore them.2

     Plaintiffs not only fail to address that case law, but fail to make out aprimafacie case of

any sort of contempt. In the analogous context of Title VII discrimination cases, aprimafacie

showing has been described as follows:

     In order to establish a prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff must show that (1)
     he engaged in protected activity, (2) he was qualified for the promotion, (3) the
     employer took an adverse personnel action, and (4) a causal connection existed
     between the protected activity and the adverse action. The initial burden is not
     great, as the plaintiff need only establish facts adequate to permit an inference of
     retaliatory motive.

Forman v. Small, 271 F.3d 285, 299 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). Plaintiffs have not

made such a showing here.3


     2 Defendants responding to complaints have the ability to challenge the legal and factual
sufficiency of plaintiffs' allegations by filing a motion to dismiss in lieu of an answer before
being required to respond to discovery. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12. Requiring Plaintiffs to demonstrate a
prima fade case of civil contempt before allowing them to proceed with discovery would serve a
similar purpose and promote judicial economy.

      Defendants are also unaware of any basis for relying on an unsworn, hearsay letter -
                                                                                 (continued...)

                               -4-


     Plaintiffs fail to show a connection between Mr. Haffield's actions as supervisor of Ms.

Lewis and her role as Plaintiffs' witness. Plaintiffs allege that Mr. Hatfield's actions toward Ms.

Lewis constitute retaliation simply because she is a witness. That cannot be the test of retaliation

because, if it were, witnesses would be unconstrained in their conduct by virtue of the fact that

any discipline automatically would constitute retaliation. To demonstrate retaliation, Plaintiffs

must show that Mr. Hatfield took action not because of Ms. Lewis's conduct as an employee but

because of her testimony. Plaintiffs have not made that showing. Cf United States cx reL

Yesudian v. Howard University, 153 F.3d 731, 736 (D.C. Cir.1998) (to prevail on a

whistleblower claim, "employee must demonstrate that: (1) he engaged in protected activity.

and (2) he was discriminated against 'because of that activity"; second element requires

employee to show: (a) "the employer had knowledge the employee was engaged in protected

activity"; and (b) "the retaliation was motivated, at least in part, by the employee's engaging in

[thati protected activity").

     Plaintiffs ignore the fact that despite Ms. Lewis's criticism of the appraisal work done at

the Navajo Region Appraisal Office in her December 2, 2004 affidavit, she began work there for

Mr. Hatfield six months later. P1. Exh. 1 at 4 (grievance letter). Despite her affidavit, she

transferred to the office whose work she had criticized. Id. Plaintiffs do not allege that her

transfer was an act of retaliation. Now, eleven months after providing her testimony to

Plaintiffs, she claims retaliation, which is not only unsupported, but too remote in time. See

Clark County School Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 273-74 (2001) ("cases that accept mere


     3C. .continued)
Deborah Lewis's grievance to Mr. Haffield, Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1. The letter, from a labor union
representative and not from Ms. Lewis, is devoid of direct evidence and Plaintiffs offer no
supporting affidavit. The exhibit constitutes evidence of nothing and especially does not
constitute aprimafacie showing of retaliation.

                               -5-


temporal proximity between an employer's knowledge of protected activity and an adverse

employment action as sufficient evidence of causality to establish a prima facie case uniformly

hold that the temporal proximity must be 'very close").

     Finally, Plaintiffs certainly have not met this Court's requirement set out more than three

and a half years ago that "you need to specif!y by person so that each of them can respond to

what the specifications would be and what the evidence would be so that each of them can have

an opportunity to have due process." Cobell v. Norton, Civ. Action No. 96-1285 (RCL),

Transcript of March 15, 2002 Status Hearing, at 23:7-10. The Court should, accordingly,

disregard these new and unsubstantiated charges as a basis for discovery.

     For these reasons, Mr. Haffield should be afforded the protection of this Court, and no

questions should be allowed regarding the Deborah Lewis matter.

     No matter how unfounded, Plaintiffs also appear to be attempting to establish criminal

contempt on the part of Mr. Haffield "and others." P1. Opp. at 4 (citing the Court's power to

impose "punitive sanctions"). Plaintiffs apparently seek to hold Mr. Haffield "and others" in

contempt for past conduct that cannot necessarily be cured, such as his reprimand of Ms. Lewis

for insulting Mr. Haffield and disregarding his direction as her supervisor. Such conduct, if

established that it could not be purged, could only lead to criminal, and not civil, contempt.

Thus, as with Plaintiffs' proposed discovery related to Ms. Ronnie Levine, this discovery is an

effort to expand this litigation into yet another collateral proceeding.4 Because Plaintiffs - in

     Z! Defendants' hereby incorporate by reference the arguments supporting their motion for
a protective order concerning civil and criminal contempt in the Levine-related discovery.
Memorandum ofPoints andAuthorities in Support ofDefendants 'Motion for a Protective Order
Quashing Plaint!ffs 'Amended Notices ofDeposition Served Sept. 29, 2005 at 3-5 (Oct. 7, 2005)
[Dkt. No. 31861; Defendants ' Reply in Support ofMotion for a Protective Order Quashing
Plaint!ffs 'Amended Notices ofDeposition Served Sept. 29, 2005 (Oct. 31, 2005) [Dkt. No.
                                                        (continued...)

                               -6-


opposing Defendants' motion for a protective order to quash Plaintiffs' deposition notices

seeking discovery in the Levine matter - urge the Court to disregard the Court of Appeals'

binding ruling in Cobell v. Norton, 334 F.3d 1128 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (Cobell VIII), it is reasonable

to anticipate that in this situation Plaintiffs could trample on the due process rights of Mr.

Haffield, whom Plaintiffs may directly accuse of criminal as well as civil contempt. Because

Plaintiffs could seek to establish grounds for criminal contempt sanctions, to permit them to use

the broad discovery provisions of the Civil Rules would thwart the care that has been taken in

the crafting of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to protect the due process rights of

accused individuals. The Court should, therefore, grant the government's motion and enter the

protective order as proposed.

II.    Defendants Have Not Proposed A New Discovery Standard

       Finally, Plaintiffs devote much of their opposition belittling Defendants' proper response

to Plaintiffs' refusal to identif!y the subjects to be addressed in the deposition. Plaintiffs contend

that Defendants have "conjure[d! up another baseless standard that they say plaintiffs must meet

before discovery can be taken.....P1. Opp. at 1. According to Plaintiffs, Defendants "will

permit discovery only if they can comprehend the nature and scope of the discovery sought." Id.

These contentions are simply false. Defendants have neither set forth a "standard" to be met nor

asserted that a notice for the taking of a deposition is required to specif!y the subject mailer of the

examination. With no indication of any limit to the scope of the deposition, and given Plaintiffs'

stated scope of depositions related to the Levine mailer, Defendants rightfully relied upon rulings

of this Court that forbid discovery into particular subject mailers to preclude inquiry into those


       4C. continued)
32041

                                         -7-


subject matters with Mr. Haffield.5 Moreover, Plaintiffs' past refusal to abide by the limits

imposed by the Court on the Anson Baker deposition justif!y this motion for a protective order.

Plaintiffs' opposition reveals that here too they would seek discovery beyond the scope

permitted by this Court's rulings and other applicable precedent discussed above. Defendants'

good faith objections, as stated plainly in Defendants' motion and further elaborated upon here,

constitute an effort to provide for efficient management of discovery, consistent with the past

orders of the Court.

                              CONCLUSION

     For all the foregoing reasons, the Court should grant Defendants' motion for a protective

order by limiting any deposition of Robert Haffield to questions regarding current records

management.

DATED: November 14, 2005          Respectfully submitted,
                                  ROBERT D. McCALLUM, JR.
                                  Associate Attorney General
                                  PETER D. KEISLER
                                  Assistant Attorney General
                                  STUART E. SCHIFFER
                                  Deputy Assistant Attorney General
                                  J. CHRISTOPHER KOHN
                                  Dir ector


                                   Robert E. Kirschman, Jr.
                                  ROBERT E. KIRSCHMAN, Jr.
                                  (D.C. Bar No. 406635)
                                  Assistant Director
                                  JOHN R.KRESSE
                                  Trial Attorney
                                  Commercial Litigation Branch


      Although not required by the rules, if Plaintiffs in good faith had been forthright about
the subjects to be addressed in the proposed deposition during the parties' "meet and confer"
discussion, Defendants' motion for a protective order could have been limited and focused upon
the relevant issues.

                                   -8-


Civil Division
Mailing Address:
P.O. Box 875
Ben Franklin Station
Washington, D.C. 20044-0875
Phone (202) 307-3242
Fax (202) 514-9163


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                      CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

     I hereby certif!y that, on November 14, 2005 the foregoing Defendants 'Reply in Further
Support ofMotion for Protective Order Quashing Plaint!ffs 'Notice ofDeposition ofRobert
Hatfield was served by Electronic Case Filing, and on the following who is not registered for
Electronic Case Filing, by facsimile:


                         Earl Old Person (Pro se)
                         Blackfeet Tribe
                         P.O. Box 850
                         Browning, MT 59417
                         Fax (406) 338-7530


                                   /s/ Kevin P. Kingston
                                   Kevin P. Kingston