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USAID Evaluation Highlights No. 56


Constituencies for Reform: Strategic Approaches for Donor-Supported Civic Advocacy Programs


March 1996

(PN-ABS-544)



Overview


By strengthening civic advocacy groups--nongovernmental

organizations that champion governmental reform--donors can make

a difference in countries moving toward democracy. Support for

civil society is a core component of USAID's democracy and

governance agenda. It reflects a growing realization of the value

to democracy of autonomous centers of social and economic power.


A team from the Agency's Center for Development Information and

Evaluation (CDIE) recently undertook a five-country assessment of

past and current investments in civil society. Countries studied

were Bangladesh, Chile, El Salvador, Kenya, and Thailand. This

assessment, the second in a series of inquiries into democracy,

examines the role of civic advocacy groups in advancing good

governance. 


What Is Civil Society?


Civil society consists of nonstate organizations that are engaged

in or have the potential for championing adoption and

consolidation of democratic reforms. The study found these

organizations can generate the public push for political reform,

then work to consolidate reform by holding the state accountable

for what it does. Such organizations include labor federations,

business and professional associations, human rights and

prodemocracy groups, environmental organizations, and policy

think tanks.


These organizations perform a variety of roles. They 


--   Advocate on behalf of the public

--   Analyze policy issues

--   Mobilize constituencies in support of policy dialog

--   Serve as watchdogs to ensure accountability in government

     functions

--   Most important, act as agents of reform in strengthening and

     broadening democratic governance


The Role of Civil Society in Democratic Transitions


While in principle civic advocacy organizations can contribute to

strengthening democratic governance, in practice their actual

contributions varied considerably in the five countries. They

played a preeminent role in some, but had little involvement in

others. 


What accounts for these differences? It appears that earlier

experience with democracy is critical. Chile's long experience

with a relatively advanced democratic political system provided a

reservoir from which civil society could draw in mobilizing

people for a "no" vote against continuing the authoritarian

regime of President Augusto Pinochet Ugarte in the 1988

plebiscite. Although Thailand's experiences with democracy in the

mid-1970s and late 1980s were more fleeting, they provided enough

practical experience that activists from those earlier periods

could work together in 1992 to spearhead a prodemocracy

coalition. 


By contrast, in Bangladesh, El Salvador, and Kenya, experiences

during very limited democratic openings in the past provided

inadequate groundwork for civil society roles in democratic

transitions of the early 1990s. In Bangladesh, popular organiza-

tions were involved in the 1990 movement against dictator H.M.

Ershad, but these groups were mainly student, professional, and

labor organizations connected to opposition political parties.

They do not conform with the commonplace definition of civil

society as operating independently of political parties.


In El Salvador, efforts at civil society mobilization in the

1970s were largely autonomous of both parties and government.

This was especially true for advocacy groups mobilized by the

Catholic Church in the late 1970s and the Christian communities

that promoted grass-roots mobilization for social justice and

political change. But in the 1980s these and other groups

representing non-elites were the targets of death squads and

government repression. They were in no position to influence the

peace accords of 1992. 


Finally, in Kenya, political freedom that existed after indepen-

dence in 1963 was gradually swallowed up by a movement toward

one-party rule that has lasted to the present. That leaves little

room for civil society to organize in behalf of reform. Donor

pressures to democratize the system did lead to a significant

opening in 1991, but dissension among opposition parties and

government manipulation of the 1992 parliamentary elections have

inhibited progress in the democratic transition.


A Strategic Perspective on Civil Society 


What insights can be gained from the five-country study and

applied to donor strategies for supporting civil society? First,

analysis of civil society and its facilitating role in democratic

transition should be an integral part of donor planning for

support of a political reform agenda. The agenda might include,

for example, constitutional or electoral reforms to make the

state more accountable and political parties more representative.

Or it could address judicial reform to strengthen the protection

of human rights. To revitalize the role of local governments, it

might also emphasize decentralization.


At the strategic level the thrust of analysis is to identify how

to advance host-country dialog on a reform agenda and on changing

the fundamental rules of the political game to make it more

democratic. At the tactical level it is important to identify

public issues that can serve as a source of energy in driving the

reform process. Frequently, issues emanating from particular

sectors--for example, labor, women's rights, the environment--can

generate spillover effects in support of major political reforms.

This has been the case with the environmental movement in

Thailand, which gained prominence by aligning itself with the

prodemocratic campaign against military rule in the early 1990s. 


One aspect of this approach is identifying constituencies that

have interests in supporting public dialog and advocacy,

particularly those that might share interests and provide a basis

for coalition-building. In Bangladesh and Thailand, for example,

labor unions and women's organizations may over time, as industry

grows, find much in common in advancing the cause of both unions

and women's rights. In both countries major industries primarily

employ women laborers.


Some constituencies are easier to organize than others. Labor and

business may be able to mobilize constituents for collective

action relatively easily. Other groups, such as small farmers,

may find it difficult to organize to pursue their own interests,

let alone a broad reform agenda. Likewise, some constituencies

will be more inclined than others to reach beyond their narrow

interests and press for fundamental democratic reforms. 


In a particular context, actors in civil society will exhibit

varied tendencies toward support of democratic reforms. Some may

oppose or remain neutral toward reform efforts. For example, in

resisting military rule, the business sector, religious

institutions, or labor unions in some instances may move to the

front lines, while in other cases they remain relatively neutral.


The art and craft of the democracy strategist, then, lies in

building and supporting coalitions of associations that are

proreform at a particular point along the democratic path. For

donors, support will stress enhancing a range of organizational

skills often lacking in civic advocacy organizations. In

particular, improvements are usually needed in networking,

advocacy, strategic planning, media relations, coalition

building, resource mobilization, and policy analysis and dialog.



Strategic Sequencing: Initiating and Consolidating Reform


The case studies indicate that opportunities for civil society to

organize and press for reform are conditioned by where a country

is in the transition to democracy. To determine how they can

tailor their support for civil society, it is important for

donors to understand the dynamics of transition. Study findings

suggest democratic transitions can be divided into four phases:

pretransition, early transition, late transition, and

consolidation.


Pretransition 


In this phase, civil society generally operates in an environment

of government repression and hostility toward political reform.

Rights of association and assembly are severely constrained, and

civic advocacy organizations may be subject to government

harassment or worse. But there may be enclaves--religious

institutions, NGOs, universities--that provide a limited space

where civic advocacy organizations and their leaders can take

refuge and build a network of reform constituencies.


Donor strategies under these constraints should include several

elements. First is preservation of existing civil society

resources. Donors may need to support safe havens where reform

groups take refuge and internally exiled reformers can find

employment, protection, and legal aid in the face of government

persecution. In Chile, the Ford and Inter-American Foundations,

Canada's International Development Research Centre, and European

donors provided financial support to civic advocacy organizations

that sheltered and employed social scientists and political

activists under censure by the Pinochet regime. 


The second task is defending the autonomy of civil society in

general. Authoritarian governments are aware that nongovernmental

organizations often shelter reformist elements, and they may seek

to weaken and control these organizations. If so, it is vital

that donors support the reformist community in resisting

government intrusion. And donors must support the organizations

in negotiating a governance regime that empowers them to regulate

themselves rather than submit to oppressive government oversight. 

A third task is cultivating a dialog within the reformist

community to develop coalitions, consensus on action agendas, and

strategies for political reform. The Chile case illustrates how

civic advocacy organizations created neutral forums and study

circles in which leaders of opposing factions could work

together. They succeeded in dispelling distrust and in finding

common ground as they prepared for the early transition phase. 


Early Transition 


This phase begins with a political opening in which an

authoritarian regime concedes in some demonstrable way that

legitimate rule requires popular consent, and rival political

elites seek a consensus for a more open political system. Free

elections are held and constitutional reforms adopted that

provide the legal basis for a new order. Most countries where

USAID has programs are in the early transition phase, a critical

time for laying foundations for a new democratic order. 


Regime acceptance of political liberalization opens opportunities

for civic advocacy organizations to educate the public and

mobilize support for fundamental reforms. However, these

organizations must act with vigor and speed, as events often move

rapidly in the early transition phase. This is most evident with

respect to elections, where civic advocacy organizations may need

to initiate a range of labor-intensive voter education and

registration programs. They may also monitor or even participate

in election administration.


In Chile, seven elections took place in a five-year span. All

were crucial in laying the foundations for restoring democratic

governance. Several civic advocacy organizations, including the

Crusade for Citizen Participation and its successor organization,

Participa, (both recipients of USAID support) organized massive

voter registration and education campaigns. They also trained

more than 5,000 electoral officials and political party

representatives working in voting centers. These activities

contributed significantly to Chile's peaceful democratic

transition.


Aside from labor-intensive activities during elections, a task of

the early transition phase is building a network of support for

fundamental political reform that reaches beyond the small cadre

of activist organizations that survived state repression earlier.

Promising allies include labor and women's organizations, student

unions, and professional associations. They may be found at both

local and national levels. 


Mobilizing groups behind a shared reform agenda provides the kind

of public visibility and weight needed in negotiations with

government. In Thailand, for example, the People's Constitutional

Assembly, organized by a group of reform organizations in 1992,

hammered out a unified platform. Some elements of it were later

reflected in the government's proposed constitutional amendments.


A third task for the early transition phase is creating a

favorable enabling environment for growth, autonomy, and

effective social action in civil society. Often, authoritarian

controls have undermined the institutional mechanisms and arenas

that enable civil society to engage the public and the state.

Thus, in the early transition phase, donors should attend to

enhancing the autonomy of the media and universities,

revitalizing the judicial system and municipal councils, and

introducing mechanisms (recall, referenda, public hearings, right

to petition) enabling civic advocacy organizations to represent

the cause of reform. 


These tasks are distinct from those of the pretransition phase,

and many civic advocacy organizations are unprepared to undertake

them. The donor's role can be particularly useful in the early

transition phase, whether it is a brief interlude or a protracted

period when elite factions negotiate a more gradual process of

political liberalization.


Donors can 1) provide technical and financial assistance to civic

advocacy organizations involved in voter education, registration,

and election monitoring efforts; 2) facilitate public dialog by

funding nonpartisan civic advocacy organizations that provide a

neutral ground where opposing elites come together to discuss

political reform; 3) facilitate this debate by enhancing the

capacities of think tanks, the media, and other activist

organizations in analyzing and proposing alternative reform

agendas.


Late Transition


At this stage a fundamental redirection of a more open political

system is under way. New rules for democratic governance have

been agreed on in the early transition phase, and the main task

is ensuring that political actors and governance institutions

conform to them. 


Civic advocacy organizations play a particularly important role

in the late transition phase. One of their major tasks is civic

education. This involves informing the general public about the

rules and institutional features of the new political order, the

means by which citizens can influence government, how they can

seek redress against arbitrary government actions, and how to

take advantage of new opportunities in community empowerment and

governance. Civic education should create and strengthen public

expectations that hold government and political actors

accountable to higher standards of behavior. 


A second task is monitoring compliance with new rules for

democratic governance. That will help ensure that where

noncompliance is discovered, the rules are enforced. Lack of

enforcement is all too common in developing countries; civic

advocacy organizations can help by assuming a watchdog role in

discovering and publicizing infractions by actors both within

government and without.


A third task involves building government-civil society

partnerships. In Thailand and Chile, for example, business

associations have supported governance reforms by financing

improvements and streamlining procedures in public agencies that

service the business sector.


Donor strategies in the late transition phase include providing

technical assistance to civic advocacy organizations engaged in

civic education and monitoring. They also include facilitating

more partnerships with government agencies. In addition, donors

can target assistance to civic advocacy organizations that

champion the cause of sectors that remain on the margins of the

political arena (labor, women, disadvantaged ethnic groups, for

example). 


Consolidation


In this phase, systemic and operational rules have essentially

been agreed on, and mechanisms to ensure political participation

and government accountability are in place. This phase features a

deepening of democratic governance within the culture and

institutions of society. It signals a growing capacity of society

and government to adapt to change and carry out reforms. 


An underlying issue is sustainability of civic advocacy

organizations--in particular, public interest organizations--as

actors in monitoring rule enforcement and mobilizing citizens and

communities to support reform agendas. Public interest

organizations that advocate reform and address issues of the

larger public good are needed for society to engage in effective

problem-solving. They take up issues that may not be addressed if

left to individual initiatives, largely because the costs for the

individual to engage in activist initiatives typically outweigh

individual benefits to be accrued. In this regard, unless society

establishes financial incentives (usually through tax policies)

to support these organizations, it is unlikely advocacy

organizations will contribute much to societal problem-solving.


Ideally, financial sustainability should be addressed in the late

transition phase, after more basic political issues have been

resolved. But many donors are terminating their assistance in the

early transition period (as in Thailand and El Salvador), without

devoting sufficient attention to creating a favorable enabling

environment for growth and sustainability of civil society. 


In the countries studied, few if any government incentives or tax

write-offs exist for corporate or individual contributions to

public interest organizations. Nor are most public interest

associations in the habit of seeking funding from the corporate

world or from the general public. Donors need to devote more

attention to creating a supportive policy environment and

building bridges between public interest organizations and

in-country funding sources.


Recommendations


The four-phase transition scheme may seem to imply a linear

progression to a democratic nirvana, but in fact the process is

uneven, messy, and subject to setbacks. Indeed, many transitions

may lead to some new hybrid form of authoritarian rule, and what

initially appears to be a democratic transition may turn out to

be a false start. Given the nonlinear nature of change, the

sequencing of donor activities in each phase must be flexibly

managed to cope with unanticipated obstacles or seize new

opportunities.


Nonetheless, the scheme provides a basis for advancing the

following recommendations on donor investments: 


1. Donors need to follow a disciplined approach in ensuring that

investments in civil society do not lose their focus and

relevance to the reform process. There is a risk investments in

civil society will be dissipated over a wide range of activities,

yielding minimal results. Study findings suggest support for

civil society should be viewed less as an end in itself and more

as a means for advancing a reform agenda aimed at greater

democratic governance. Investments in civil society should aim at

attaining structural reforms in the polity, sequenced according

to the transition phase under way in the particular country.


2. Donors need to be prepared to exercise considerable leverage

when supporting civic advocacy organizations engaged in fostering

democratic transitions in the pre- and early-transition phases.

Many political reforms undertaken in the case countries likely

would not have made as much headway without donor pressure and

support. This was the case in Kenya, where bilateral and

multilateral donors pressured the government to undertake polit-

ical reforms in 1992. In Chile and El Salvador, without

diplomatic pressure on the host country government, there would

have been little progress in protection of human rights.


During the pre- and early-transition phases, civic advocacy

organizations often are not strong enough to promote reform

processes alone. In such situations, the added weight of donor

partners (for example, through use of conditionality to press for

political liberalization) may well be critical to reform efforts.

Donor support may also be critical to the survival of activist

organizations. In the pre- and early-transition phases, they

operate in high-risk environments in which they are vulnerable to

government attack. 


3. Donors need to exercise caution when investing in

institution-building efforts in civil society during the early

phases of democratic transitions. Many civic advocacy

organizations are small, often with only a few staff members, and

directed by a charismatic leader. There may be little internal

democracy or leadership turnover, and linkages to potential

coalition partners or constituencies may be tenuous. Most are not

membership organizations. Because of their fragile base, in the

early transition phase many of these organizations will either

cease to exist as their leaders move into government positions or

they will be submerged within resurgent political parties. 


Given the precarious nature of many civic advocacy organizations

in the pre- and early-transition period, donors need to exercise

caution before investing major resources in any particular

organization. There will be exceptions, but institution-building

efforts directed at enhanced organizational capacities, greater

internal democracy, and broader coalitions and constituencies may

need to await some passage of time to determine which

organizations are prepared to engage seriously in such changes.


4. Donors need to devote significant attention to building a

favorable policy environment for the growth of civil society,

particularly with respect to expanding in-country funding sources

for this sector. Most civil society organizations depend in great

part on donor financing. Needed are strategies to promote

financial independence and sustainability. Creating an in-country

enabling environment for individual and corporate contributions

to public interest organizations (for example, by changing tax

laws) is one such strategy. Another, in which USAID has

pioneered, is providing funds for host country endowments and

foundations. 


It helps to be creative. In Thailand, for example, the Asia

Foundation is helping establish a "green" mutual fund to invest

in Thai companies that observe environmental standards. Part of

fund earnings will be earmarked for environmental causes,

including civic advocacy organizations within Thailand's

environmental movement. The mutual fund neatly joins an incentive

for private profit with support for public interest

organizations.


5. Donors need to be aware of potential trade-offs in countries

undergoing political transitions while also engaging in

fundamental economic reforms in the move from statist to

free-market economies. Many countries are undergoing significant

economic and political reforms simultaneously, although often at

different speeds. In these situations donors need to calculate

whether vigorous pursuit of reforms in one sector is likely to

destabilize and undermine commitment to progress in the other.

This is particularly the case with investments in civil society,

which for the most part are designed to mobilize public pressure

for political reform.


When a ruling coalition demonstrates genuine commitment to

painful economic reforms, it may be most appropriate to

complement this effort by supporting civil society organizations

that can help champion and consolidate these reforms. Although

such an approach may delay addressing systemic political reforms,

as this report suggests, economic reforms can contribute to

development of an autonomous commercial sector--which (if

organized collectively) can advocate and advance the