Title: Citizen Review of Police: Approaches & Implementation
Series: NIJ Issues and Practices
Author: Peter Finn
Published: March 2001
Subject: Law enforcement, program evaluation
209 pages
454,000 bytes

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Office of Justice Programs
810 Seventh Street N.W.
Washington, DC 20531

Office of Justice Programs
World Wide Web Site
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov

National Institute of Justice
World Wide Web Site
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij

Citizen Review of Police: Approaches and Implementation

by Peter Finn

March 2001
NCJ 184430

---------------------------

National Institute of Justice

Vincent Talucci 
Program Monitor

Advisory Panel*

K. Felicia Davis, J.D.
Legal Consultant and Director at Large 
National Association for Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement 
Administrator Citizen Review Board
234 Delray Avenue 
Syracuse, NY 13224

Mark Gissiner
Senior Human Resources Analyst
City of Cincinnati
Immediate Past President, 1995-99
International Association for Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement
2665 Wayward Winds Drive
Cincinnati, OH 45230

Douglas Perez, Ph.D. 
Assistant Professor
Department of Sociology
Plattsburgh State University
45 Olcott Lane
Rensselaer, NY 12144

Jerry Sanders
President and Chief Executive Officer
United Way of San Diego County
P.O. Box 23543
San Diego, CA 92193
Former Chief
San Diego Police Department

Samuel Walker, Ph.D.
Kiewit Professor
Department of Criminal Justice
University of Nebraska at Omaha
60th and Dodge Streets
Omaha, NE 68182

Lt. Steve Young
Vice President
Grand Lodge
Fraternal Order of Police
222 East Town Street
Columbus, OH 43215

*Among other criteria, advisory panel members were selected for their diverse
views regarding citizen oversight of police. As a result, readers should not infer
that panel members necessarily support citizen review in general or any
particular type of citizen review.

Prepared for the National Institute of Justice, U.S. Department of Justice, by
Abt Associates Inc., under contract #OJP-94-C-007. Points of view or
opinions stated in this document are those of the author and do not necessarily
represent the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

The National Institute of Justice is a component of the Office of Justice
Programs, which also includes the Bureau of Justice Assistance, the Bureau of
Justice Statistics, the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, and
the Office for Victims of Crime.

---------------------------

Foreword

In many communities in the United States, residents participate to some degree
in overseeing their local law enforcement agencies. The degree varies. The most
active citizen oversight boards investigate allegations of police misconduct and
recommend actions to the chief or sheriff. Other citizen boards review the
findings of internal police investigations and recommend that the chief or sheriff
approve or reject the findings. In still others, an auditor investigates the process
by which the police or sheriff's department accept or investigate complaints and
reports to the department and the public on the thoroughness and fairness of the
process.

Citizen oversight systems, originally designed to temper police discretion in the
1950s, have steadily grown in number through the 1990s. But determining the
proper role has a troubled history.

This publication is intended to help citizens, law enforcement officers and
executives, union leaders, and public interest groups understand the advantages
and disadvantages of various oversight systems and components.

In describing the operation of nine very different approaches to citizen
oversight, the authors do not extol or disparage citizen oversight but rather try
to help jurisdictions interested in creating a new or enhancing an existing
oversight system by:

o Describing the types of citizen oversight.

o Presenting programmatic information from various jurisdictions with existing
citizen oversight systems.

o Examining the social and monetary benefits and costs of different systems.

The report also addresses staffing; examines ways to resolve potential conflicts
between oversight bodies and police; and explores monitoring, evaluation, and
funding concerns.

No one system works best for everyone. Communities must take responsibility
for fashioning a system that fits their local situation and unique needs. Ultimately,
the author notes, the talent, fairness, dedication, and flexibility of the key
participants are more important to the procedure's success than is the system's
structure.

---------------------------

Acknowledgments

I thank the many individuals who patiently answered my questions and sent me
materials about their citizen oversight procedures. In particular, I thank the
following oversight directors and coordinators: Barbara Attard, Lisa Botsko,
Mary Dunlap, Suzanne Elefante, Patricia Hughes, Liana Perez, Melvin Sears,
Todd Samolis, Ruth Siedschlag, and Joseph Valu.

The following advisory panel members (whose titles are listed on the back of
the title page) provided a large number of helpful comments during a 1-day
meeting in Washington, D.C., and reviewed the draft report: K. Felicia Davis,
Mark Gissiner, Douglas Perez, Jerry Sanders, Samuel Walker, and Steve
Young. Among other criteria, advisory panel members were selected for their
diverse views regarding citizen oversight of police. As a result, readers should
not infer that the panel members necessarily support citizen review in general or
any particular type of citizen review.

Benjamin Tucker, former Deputy Director of Operations of the Office of
Community Oriented Policing Services, and Phyllis McDonald, Social Science
Analyst with the National Institute of Justice (NIJ), also participated in the
board meeting and made important contributions. Pierce Murphy, Community
Ombudsman in Boise, Idaho, provided valuable suggestions for improving the
report.

Vincent Talucci, Program Manager for the project at NIJ, provided wise
guidance and constant support. Terence Dunworth, Managing Vice President at
Abt Associates Inc., offered numerous suggestions for improving the report,
most important, a complete reconfiguration of the executive summary and
discussion of program costs. Mary-Ellen Perry and Joan Gilbert carefully
produced the numerous report drafts.

Peter Finn
Associate
Abt Associates Inc.

---------------------------

Executive Summary

Introduction

There has been a considerable increase in the number of procedures involving
citizen oversight of police implemented by cities and counties in the 1990s.
However, many of these procedures have had a troubled history involving
serious-even bitter-conflict among the involved parties. Citizen Review of
Police: Approaches and Implementation is designed to help jurisdictions that
may decide to establish-or wish to improve-an oversight system to avoid or
eliminate these battles. At the same time, the publication can help oversight
planners understand and choose among the many options available for
structuring a citizen review procedure. Finally, current oversight staff and
volunteers may find it useful to review the publication as a way of learning more
about the field.

To provide this assistance, Citizen Review of Police describes the operations of
nine very different systems of citizen oversight. However, the publication does
not promote any particular type of citizen review-or citizen review in general.
Rather, the report is intended to help local government executives and
legislators, as well as police and sheriff's department administrators, union 
leaders, and local citizen groups and public interest organizations, learn about
the advantages, drawbacks, and limitations of a variety of oversight systems
and components.

Types of Citizen Oversight

There is no single model of citizen oversight. However, most procedures have
features that fall into one of four types of oversight systems:

o Type 1: Citizens investigate allegations of police misconduct and recommend
findings to the chief or sheriff.

o Type 2: Police officers investigate allegations and develop findings; citizens
review and recommend that the chief or sheriff approve or reject the findings.

o Type 3: Complainants may appeal findings established by the police or
sheriff's department to citizens, who review them and then recommend their
own findings to the chief or sheriff.

o Type 4: An auditor investigates the process by which the police or sheriff's
department accepts and investigates complaints and reports on the
thoroughness and fairness of the process to the department and the public.

All four types of oversight are represented among the nine citizen review
systems described in this report (see exhibit 1).

Each type of system has advantages and drawbacks. For example, oversight
systems that involve investigating citizen complaints (type 1) can help reassure
the public that investigations of citizen complaints are thorough and fair.
However, hiring professional investigators can be expensive, and the
investigations model typically has no mechanism for soliciting the public's
general concerns about police conduct.

Whatever their specific advantages, any type of citizen oversight needs to be
part of a larger structure of internal and external police accountability; citizen
oversight alone cannot ensure that police will act responsibly.

Oversight Costs

Exhibit 2 presents the nine oversight systems arranged in ascending order of
budget levels along with their activity levels for 1997. As shown, there is a
theoretical relationship between the four types of oversight systems and cost.

o Type 1 oversight systems, in which citizens investigate allegations and
recommend findings (Berkeley, Flint, Minneapolis, San Francisco), are the
most expensive largely because professional investigators must be hired to
conduct the investigations-lay citizens do not have the expertise or the time.

o Type 2 systems, in which citizens review the internal affairs unit's findings
(e.g., Orange County, Rochester, St. Paul), tend to be inexpensive because
volunteers typically conduct the reviews.

o Type 3 systems, in which citizens review complainants' appeals of police
findings (Portland), can also be inexpensive because of the use of volunteers.

o Type 4 systems, in which auditors inspect the police or sheriff's department's
own complaint investigation process (Portland, Tucson), tend to fall in the
midlevel price range. On one hand, like type 1 systems, only a paid professional
has the expertise and time to conduct a proper audit. On the other hand,
typically only one person needs to be hired because the auditing process is less
time consuming than conducting investigations of citizen complaints.

In practice, however, there is an inconsistent relationship between oversight
type and cost. This is because, when examined closely, many oversight
operations are not "pure" examples of a type 1, 2, 3, or 4 system. For example,
two jurisdictions have combined two different oversight approaches: Portland
has a citizen appeals board (type 3) and an auditor who monitors the police
bureau's complaint investigation process (type 4); Tucson has both a citizen
board that reviews internal affairs findings (type 2) and an auditor (type 4).
Consequently, the actual cost for a given type of oversight system may be more
or less expensive than the cost of a pure type. Furthermore, each type of
oversight system can incorporate features that may increase or decrease its
expenses, ranging from providing policy recommendations to a mediation
option. The choice of staffing option also will affect expenditures, including
using volunteer staff or in-kind services and materials, hiring paid staff, or
diverting part of the time of an existing city or police employee to oversight
functions. As a result, it is difficult to predict an oversight system's actual costs
before determining all its features and activities.

Finally, more money may not buy more oversight activity or increase use of the
system-that is, boost the number of complaints, hearings, mediations, policy
recommendations, reviews, or audits. A variety of cost-insensitive
considerations-the public's perception of the system's fairness, the director's
impartiality and talent, the level of cooperation from the police or sheriff's
department, and restrictions on the kinds of complaints the system will be
prohibited from handling or required to accept-can prevent additional funds
from resulting in increased use of the oversight system. That said, an oversight
procedure that is underfunded will not only have difficulty achieving its
objectives, it also may create more controversy surrounding police
accountability than it resolves.

Conclusions

This report suggests at least four other significant conclusions regarding citizen
oversight of the police.

Local jurisdictions that wish to establish citizen review have to take on the
responsibility to make difficult choices about the type of oversight system they
should fashion. The tremendous variation in how the nine oversight systems
described in this report conduct business-and pay for their activities-may seem
discouraging: The lack of similarity makes it difficult for other jurisdictions to
make an automatic selection of commonly implemented citizen review features
around which they can structure their own oversight procedures. On the
positive side, this diversity means jurisdictions do not have to feel obligated to
follow slavishly any one model or approach; they have the freedom to tailor the
various components of their system to the particular needs and characteristics
of their populations, law enforcement agencies, statutes, collective bargaining
agreements, and pressure groups.

Many individuals and groups believe that citizen oversight, despite its serious
limitations, can have important benefits. Complainants have reported that they:

o Feel "validated" when the oversight body agrees with their allegations-or
when they have an opportunity to be heard by an independent overseer
regardless of the outcome.

o Are satisfied at being able to express their concerns in person to the officer.

o Feel they are contributing to holding the department accountable for officers'
behavior.

Police and sheriff's department administrators have reported that citizen
oversight:

o Improves their relationship and image with the community.

o Has strengthened the quality of the department's internal investigations of
alleged officer misconduct and reassured the public that the process is thorough
and fair.

o Has made valuable policy and procedure recommendations.

Local elected and appointed officials say an oversight procedure:

o Enables them to demonstrate their concern to eliminate police misconduct.

o Reduces in some cases the number of civil lawsuits (or successful suits)
against their cities or counties.

It is sometimes possible to overcome disagreements between oversight
operations and police and sheriff's departments. The report identifies many
points of conflict between oversight systems and police and sheriff's
departments-and with officer unions. However, as illustrated in exhibit 3, there
are positions each side can take and explanations it can offer that can
sometimes make the system acceptable to everyone involved. A critical step to
minimizing conflict is for the police or sheriff's department--and union
leadership--to act as colleagues in the planning process.

The talent, fairness, dedication, and flexibility of the key participants--in
particular, the oversight system's director, chief elected official, police chief or
sheriff, and union president--are more important to the procedure's success than
is the system's structure. The report identifies jurisdictions in which these
individuals have worked together cooperatively. An effective procedure for
selecting competent and objective oversight investigators, board members, and
administrators--and for training them thoroughly--is also critical for the oversight
procedure to thrive.

Exhibit 4 is a checklist oversight system planners can consult to help identify
some of the decisions they will have to make in designing and setting up a new
or revised review procedure. The exhibit indicates where in this report's text
each decision is discussed.

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Contents

Foreword

Acknowledgments

Executive Summary
Introduction
Types of Citizen Oversight
Oversight Costs
Conclusions

Chapter 1: Introduction
Key Points
What the Publication Is Intended to Do
Audiences and purposes for Citizen Review of Police
The need for the report
Features of the Report
Sources of information for the publication
Terminology used in the report
Types of Citizen Review
Potential Benefits of Citizen Oversight
Potential benefits to complainants
Potential benefits to police and sheriff's departments
Potential benefits to elected and appointed officials
Potential benefits to the community at large
Limitations to Citizen Review
Notes

Chapter 2: Case Studies of Nine Oversight Procedures

The Berkeley, California, Police Review Commission: A Citizen Board and the
Police Department Investigate Complaints Simultaneously
Background
The review process
Other activities
Staffing and budget
Distinctive features

The Flint, Michigan, Ombudsman's Office: An Ombudsman Investigates
Selected Citizen Complaints Against All City Departments and Agencies
Background
The review process
Other activities
Staffing and budget
Distinctive features

The Minneapolis Civilian Police Review Authority: An Oversight System
Investigates and Hears Citizen Complaints

Background
The complaint process
Other CRA activities
Staffing and budget
Distinctive features

The Orange County, Florida, Citizen Review Board: A Sheriff's Department 
Provides Executive Support to an Independent Review Board
Background
The CRB procedure
Other activities
Staffing and budget
Distinctive features

The Portland, Oregon, Police Internal Investigations Auditing Committee: A
City Council, Citizen Advisers, and a Professional Examiner Share Oversight
Responsibilities
Background
Citizen appeals of IA findings
Audits
PIIAC (city council and mayor)
Other activities
Staffing and budget
Distinctive features

The Rochester, New York, Civilian Review Board: Trained Mediators Review
Citizen Complaints
Background
Procedure
Other responsibilities
Staffing and budget
Distinctive features

The St. Paul Police Civilian Internal Affairs Review Commission: A
Police-Managed Board Recommends Discipline
Background
The review process
Staffing and budget
Distinctive features

San Francisco's Office of Citizen Complaints: An Independent Body
Investigates Most Citizen Complaints for the Police Department
Background
The complaint filing process
Other activities
Staffing and budget
Distinctive features

Tucson's Dual Oversight System: A Professional Auditor and a Citizen 
Review Board Collaborate
Background
The independent police auditor
Citizen Police Advisory Review Board
The relationship between the board and the auditor
Distinctive features

Chapter 3: Other Oversight Responsibilities
Key Points
Policy Recommendations
The process of developing policy recommendations
Examples of policy recommendations
Mediation
Formal mediation: The process
Potential benefits of mediation
Drawbacks to mediation
Early Warning Systems
Oversight involvement in EWS
Benefits and drawbacks of EWS
Notes

Chapter 4: Staffing
Key Points
Volunteer Board Members
Planning decisions
Selection of board members
Recruitment
Training
Inservice training
Investigators
Recruitment
Training
Executive Director or Auditor
Notes

Chapter 5: Addressing Important Issues in Citizen Oversight
Key Points
Outreach

Publicity materials
Postings
Media
Neighborhood groups and other agencies
Filing locations
Referrals by the police
Issues of Oversight Mechanics
Oversight's legal basis
Eligible complainants and cases
Subpoena power
Other structural issues
Minimizing Delays
Openness of Oversight Proceedings
Politics
Conflict among local government officials
Agendas on the part of volunteers
Notes

Chapter 6: Resolving Potential Conflicts Between Oversight Bodies and Police
Key Points
Preliminary Steps for Minimizing Conflict
Police Criticisms of Oversight Procedures
Citizens should not interfere with police work
Citizens do not understand police work
The process is unfair
Oversight Criticisms of the Police
Working With the Union
Historical conflict between most police unions and citizen oversight bodies
Approaches to collaboration
Time may help but is not the cure-all
Notes

Chapter 7: Monitoring, Evaluation, and Funding
Key Points
Monitoring
The intake process
Investigators' work
Board members' performance
Consumer Satisfaction Surveys
Evaluating the Citizen Oversight Process
Establishing objectives
The Albuquerque evaluation
Funding

The relationship between oversight costs and oversight activity
The relationship between cost and oversight type
The importance of adequate funding
Notes

Chapter 8: Additional Sources of Help
Key Points
Organizations
Selected Program Materials
Selected Publications and Reports
Individuals With Experience in Citizen Oversight of Police

Glossary

Appendixes
Appendix A: Rochester Internal Affairs Request for Board Member
Evaluations of Investigators' Investigations
Appendix B: Portland Auditor's Guidelines for Reviewing Internal Affairs
Investigations
Appendix C: San Francisco Complaint Intake Form
Appendix D: San Francisco Policy for Citizen Monitoring of Police During
Demonstrations
Appendix E: Cost Estimates for Different Modifications to Tucson's Existing 
Oversight Procedure

Index

List of Exhibits
Exhibit 1. Type and Selected Features of Nine Oversight Systems
Exhibit 2. 1997 Oversight System Costs in Relation to Responsibilities and
Activity
Exhibit 3. Concerns Many Police and Sheriff's Departments-and Union
Leaders-Express About Citizen Oversight-and Possible Responses
Exhibit 4. Decisions Oversight Planners Need to Make
Exhibit 1-1. Sample Tradeoffs Jurisdictions Need to Consider in Choosing an
Oversight Procedure
Exhibit 1-2. Potential Benefits of Citizen Oversight for Police and Sheriff's
Departments
Exhibit 1-3. Limitations to Citizen Oversight
Exhibit 2-1. Selected Features of the Nine Oversight Systems
Exhibit 2-2. Additional Features of the Nine Oversight Systems
Exhibit 2-3. Citizen Complaint Process in Berkeley
Exhibit 2-4. Berkeley Police Review Commission Budget, Fiscal Year
1998-99
Exhibit 2-5. Flint Office of the Ombudsman's Investigation Process
Exhibit 2-6. Flint Ombudsman's Office 1998-99 Budget
Exhibit 2-7. Disposition of 159 Signed Complaints in 1997
Exhibit 2-8. Minneapolis Civilian Police Review Authority Complaint Process
Exhibit 2-9. Minneapolis Civilian Police Review Authority 1998 Budget
Exhibit 2-10. The Orange County Citizen Review Process
Exhibit 2-11. Steps in the Portland Audit Procedure
Exhibit 2-12. Rochester Citizen Oversight Process
Exhibit 2-13. Center for Dispute Settlement CRB and Conciliation Budget for
Fiscal Year
1998-99--50
Exhibit 2-14. St. Paul Citizen Review Process
Exhibit 2-15. Police Civilian Internal Affairs Review Commission 1995 Budget
Exhibit 2-16. San Francisco's Oversight Process
Exhibit 2-17. Office of Citizen Complaints 1998-99 Budget
Exhibit 2-18. Citizen Oversight Process in Tucson
Exhibit 2-19. Tucson Independent Police Auditor Budgets for Fiscal Years
1997-98 and 1998-99
Exhibit 3-1. Portland Police Bureau Bulletin on Handcuffing Issued in Response 
to Auditor's Recommendation
Exhibit 3-2. Minneapolis Mediation Program Rules
Exhibit 3-3. Mediation Summary and Agreement Form
Exhibit 3-4. Potential Benefits of Mediation to Citizens and Police
Exhibit 5-1. Oversight Outreach Methods
Exhibit 5-2. OCC Incident Information Card
Exhibit 5-3. Flier Included in Letter the Portland Police Bureau Sends to
Complainants Notifying Them of Their Cases/Findings
Exhibit 5-4. Number of Days Each of 10 Complaints Remained at 3 San Jose
Police Department Offices
Exhibit 6-1. Concerns Many Police and Sheriff's Departments-and Union
Leaders Express About Citizen Oversight-and Possible Responses
Exhibit 7-1. Minneapolis Consumer Satisfaction Post-Outcome Survey
Exhibit 7-2. Costs of Nine Oversight Systems in 1997 in Relation to
Responsibilities and Activity
Exhibit 8-1. Individuals With Experience in Citizen Oversight of Police

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Chapter 1: Introduction

This chapter explains the purposes of Citizen Review of Police: Approaches
and Implementation and reports the benefits and limitations that participants
attribute to citizen oversight of the police. The report has seven other chapters:

o Chapter 2: nine case studies of citizen oversight.

o Chapter 3: three additional responsibilities oversight systems often undertake:
policy and training recommendations, mediation, and early warning systems.

o Chapter 4: recruiting, screening, and training oversight staff.

o Chapter 5: special issues related to citizen oversight, including outreach,
structure, openness, and politics.

o Chapter 6: resolving potential conflicts between oversight bodies and police.

o Chapter 7: monitoring, evaluating, and funding oversight systems.

o Chapter 8: organizations, materials, and individuals that can provide
assistance with establishing, improving, or evaluating oversight systems.

Following a glossary, appendixes provide sample materials from the
jurisdictions studied. In addition to the table of contents, readers may locate
specific topics of interest from the key points that precede each chapter and
from the index.

What the Publication Is Intended to Do

Audiences and purposes for Citizen Review of Police

This report has been written primarily for:

o Local government executives, including mayors and city managers.

o Local legislators, including city council members and county commissioners.

This report will also be of interest to:

o Law enforcement administrators, including chiefs, sheriffs, and their
management staff.

o Union leaders.

o Citizen groups and public interest organizations.

Oversight directors may find it helpful to ask new oversight investigators or
board members to read the publication to learn more about the field.

Citizen Review of Police describes citizen oversight procedures in nine
jurisdictions. The descriptions are intended to:

o Enable jurisdictions that may consider setting up a citizen oversight process to
benefit from the experience of communities that have already established
procedures.

o Enable jurisdictions that already have citizen review to improve their
procedures based on the experiences of these nine cities and counties.

The publication does not promote any particular type of citizen review--or
citizen oversight in general. Rather, it is intended to:

o Help jurisdictions decide whether they want to create some form of citizen
oversight of police or modify the system they already have.

o Help jurisdictions select a citizen oversight system that will best meet their
particular needs.

Citizen Review of Police does not evaluate the nine citizen oversight systems;
rather, it describes their operations and the problems they have faced. The
report also does not focus on the activities of police and sheriff's department
internal affairs units except insofar as they interact with civilian oversight bodies
(see "Larger Law Enforcement Agencies Have Internal Affairs Units to
Investigate
Allegations of Police Misconduct").

The need for the report

There has been a considerable increase in the number of oversight procedures
that various cities and counties have implemented in the 1990s (see "A Short
History of Citizen Review"). However, many of these procedures have had 
a troubled history that has involved opposition from concerned citizens and
community organizations and from law enforcement agencies and police unions.
In many cases, the procedures have been revamped, in some cases litigated,
and in at least one city (Washington, D.C.) abandoned.

One reason for controversy in many jurisdictions has been the lack of advance
planning for an oversight system.

The main problem with many citizen review procedures . . . is that they have not
had a clear vision of their role and mission . . . . This has usually been the result
of a failure of civic leadership. Both community activists and government
officials have not taken the trouble to study what other jurisdictions are doing,
to borrow the best practices and to learn from their mistakes.[1]

[Civilian oversight systems] are often put together quickly and with little thought
as to their workability or with much consideration as to how they fit into the
review systems already in place.[2]

Citizen Review of Police is intended to make it easier to plan an oversight
procedure (or decide how to improve an existing procedure) in a thoughtful
manner by presenting the options available for structuring a citizen review
mechanism.

Another reason for conflict regarding citizen oversight is that-even with advance
planning-public officials, police and sheriff's department executives, union
leaders, police officers, and community activists usually have different
expectations of what oversight should and can accomplish. This publication
should help these parties identify and agree on reasonable and feasible
objectives--and dispel unrealistic fears about what the process may do--so they
can try to avoid the battles that many other jurisdictions have experienced.

Features of the Report

Sources of information for the publication

The information presented in this report comes from five principal sources:

1. Literature on citizen oversight of the police (see chapter 8, "Additional
Sources of Help").

2. In-person interviews in Berkeley and San Francisco, California; Minneapolis
and St. Paul, Minnesota; and Rochester, New York, with oversight staff
(directors, board members, auditors, ombudsmen, investigators); complainants;
law enforcement administrators, internal affairs investigators, police union
leaders, and subject officers; local elected and appointed officials (e.g., city
council members, mayors, city managers); and representatives of citizen groups.

3. Telephone interviews with similar individuals in four other communities: Flint,
Michigan; Orange County (Orlando), Florida; Portland, Oregon; and Tucson,
Arizona.

4. Less comprehensive telephone interviews with other oversight staff across
the country (Kansas City, Missouri; Omaha, Nebraska; San Diego and San
Jose, California; and Syracuse, New York).

5. Five members of an advisory board assembled to guide and review the
publication (see the back of the title page).

The nine jurisdictions studied were selected based on the suggestions of the
advisory board. The oversight procedures studied represent a variety of
approaches to citizen oversight in different areas of the country and in
jurisdictions of varying size and governance (see exhibit 2-1 in chapter 2,
"Selected Features of the Nine Oversight Systems").

Terminology used in the report

Different law enforcement agencies use different terminology to denote identical
or similar activities. To avoid confusion, Citizen Review of Police usually uses
the following terms regardless of the local jurisdiction's actual terminology:

o Complainant (sometimes called "appellant").

o Board and board member (sometimes called panelist/panel member,
commission/commissioner).

o Executive director or director (sometimes called "officer" or "examiner").

o Police union (also called federation, association).

o Internal affairs (IA) (some departments have renamed their IA units
"professional standards").

"Findings That Review Boards and Police Departments Make" identifies and
defines the principal terms used to describe possible findings regarding
allegations of officer misconduct. A glossary following chapter 8 defines other
specialized terms used in the report.

Types of Citizen Review

According to experts, "There is no single model [of citizen oversight], and it is
difficult to find two oversight agencies that are identical."[3] However, most
oversight systems fall into one of four types:[4]

o Type 1: Citizens investigate allegations of police misconduct and recommend
findings to the chief or sheriff.

o Type 2: Police officers investigate allegations and develop findings; citizens
review and recommend that the chief or sheriff approve or reject the findings.

o Type 3: Complainants may appeal findings established by the police or
sheriff's department to citizens, who review them and then recommend their
own findings to the chief or sheriff.

o Type 4: An auditor investigates the process by which the police or sheriff's
department accepts and investigates complaints and reports on the
thoroughness and fairness of the process to the department and the public.

While some oversight procedures represent "pure" examples of these models,
many oversight systems are hybrid models that merge features from the four
different types into their own unique formulation. For example, the Office of
Community Ombudsman in Boise, Idaho, created in 1999, combines the
authority to investigate complaints-a type 1 oversight system-with the
responsibility to review internal affairs investigations to determine if they are
thorough and fair-a type 4 oversight system.[5]

Furthermore, as discussed in chapter 3, "Other Oversight Responsibilities," any
oversight system may undertake three other responsibilities in addition to
investigating, reviewing, or auditing citizen complaints:

1. Recommending changes to department policies and procedures and
suggesting improvements in training.

2. Arranging for informal or formal mediation.

3. Assisting the police or sheriff's department to develop or maintain an early
warning system for identifying potentially problematic officers.

To make an informed decision about which type of oversight procedure to
adopt and which additional responsibilities to undertake, jurisdictions need to 
examine tradeoffs inherent in fashioning an oversight system-what they will gain
and lose by the approach they select. Only with these tradeoffs in mind can
communities select a system that will best meet their local needs, resources, and
constraints. Exhibit 1-1 lists some of the tradeoffs jurisdictions need to consider
in selecting an oversight procedure.

In addition to weighing tradeoffs, selecting oversight features may depend on
several criteria:

o Which features does the public want?

o Which features are most effective in achieving the goals the community
expects the oversight procedure to achieve?

o Which features may create conflict with the police or sheriff's department or
the police union, and which features may disappoint community activists?

o How much will the features cost?

o How will the new features mesh with existing oversight procedures?

Potential Benefits of Citizen Oversight

Oversight systems have the potential to benefit complainants, police and
sheriff's departments, elected and appointed officials, and the public at large.
The extent to which benefits materialize depends not only on the type of
oversight procedure implemented but also, and critically, on how well these
groups work together. The working relationships among the groups in turn
depend to a tremendous extent on the personality, talents, dedication, flexibility,
and open-mindedness of the principal actors in each group-in particular, the
oversight director, the chief of police or sheriff, union leaders, the mayor, city
council members, and the city manager.

Potential benefits to complainants

Citizen oversight can have three benefits for complainants. Oversight can:

1. Help complainants feel "validated" in the minority of instances in which
oversight bodies agree with their allegations.

I was afraid the investigation would be rush-rush, but it was very thorough.
Before the hearing, the investigator was very comforting toward my son, who
was only 16 years old, going over the process in detail with him. When I
received a letter after the hearing that my son's allegations had been sustained, I
was surprised. I didn't have faith in the powers that be to be objective. I was
elated that my son had been heard and that the officer had to sit through the
entire hearing. My son was happy, too; he didn't think he'd win either. 
--mother of a juvenile complainant

The phenomenon of complainants [who] feel validated because the oversight
body agrees with their allegations is only part of the story. As the procedural
justice literature suggests, the process is as important as the outcome. People
feel validated when they feel they have an opportunity to be heard. Civilian
oversight is likely to enhance that feeling by virtue of appearing to be
independent of the police department. 
--Samuel Walker, Professor, University of  Nebraska at Omaha

2. Give complainants the satisfaction of expressing their concern in person to
the officer when oversight includes a mediation option.

Many complainants just want to be able to express their anger or concern face
to face with the officer in an impartial setting without being cut off, and that is all
they need.
--Jackie DeBose, Berkeley Police Review Commission board member

3. Help hold the police or sheriff's department accountable for officers'
behavior.

I felt I had done my civic duty. This was a young cop [I complained about]. I
coach people all the time [at his job], so I wanted this officer to get better
supervision and training so that in a similar event he would not engage in the
same misconduct. I felt good; the officer got the direction he needed. 
--a complainant

[R]eview [by the Police Review Commission] of this incident [in which the
commission exonerated officers of a complaint that their use of excessive force
resulted in a man's death] prompted development of a new Berkeley Police
Department Training and Information Bulletin regarding the risk of asphyxiation
during four-point restraints. Development of this bulletin was a pivotal issue in
bringing closure for the family and ensuring that their tragedy had some positive
effect. 
--Robert Bailey, former assistant city manager, Berkeley

Potential benefits to police and sheriff's departments

As summarized in exhibit 1-2, police and sheriff's department personnel have
identified several possible benefits citizen oversight can provide them,
depending on the type of oversight procedure adopted. Oversight can:

1. Improve the department's relationships and image with the community by:

o Helping to establish and maintain the department's reputation for fairness and
firmness in addressing allegations of police misconduct.

The board takes a lot of pressure or criticism off IA and the chief because
citizens are making the decisions about misconduct and the department can't be
accused of a coverup.
--an IA commander

Oversight makes the department's job easier because, if we couldn't point to
the board's sustained rate of 10 percent, we would be criticized and accused of
a coverup [because our internal rate would be just as low]. 
--a deputy chief

o Helping reduce or eliminate community concerns regarding specific
high-profile incidents of alleged misconduct.

Two Rochester police officers arrested two individuals on drug-dealing
charges. The mother of one of them claimed the two youths had been
innocently walking down the street when the officers approached them. One
officer got into a tussle with the mother's son and, the mother said, threw her
son through a store window. Some members of the community were outraged
at what they felt was police brutality. When the Civilian Review Board [CRB]
heard the case, it learned that the two men had drugs in their possession. In
addition, the store owner testified that the officers had bent over backwards to
be polite to the men--and that the son had pushed the officer into the store
window. Because the CRB exonerated the officers, the community calmed
down. 
--Andrew Thomas, Executive Director, Rochester Center for Dispute
Settlement

We love being able to send cases to the board because we get less pressure
from liberal groups about not properly disciplining officers. 
--an IA commander

2. Increase public understanding about the nature of police work, such as the
occasions when officers need to use force. Help the public develop realistic
expectations regarding actions officers are allowed to take--or departments have
the personnel to take--to abate crime and disorder.

3. Promote the goals of community policing. According to the Berkeley Police
Review Commission 1996 annual report:

Community Involved Policing, especially its "Problem Solving" method of
organizing police work, depends heavily on the involvement of especially those
citizens who are demographically and geographically closest to crime and
criminals. Therefore, it is undermined by hostility generated in the normal
unfolding of police/citizen interactions at precisely the point at which it needs the
most support.

Some police administrators agree.

Community policing is related to citizen review. It's another way to
communicate with the public, another source of community input.
--Fred Lau, Chief, San Francisco Police Department

For community policing to be effective, the integrity of the agency and the
community's trust in it are critical. The CRB [Citizen Review Board] contributes
to the trust because nonsworn citizens are involved in reviewing the agency. 
--Kevin Beary, Orange County (Florida) Sheriff

4. Improve the quality of the department's internal investigations of alleged
misconduct.

The board has improved our professional standards' investigative reports
because investigators get dressed down and embarrassed at hearings for any
sloppiness, such as drawing conclusions on flimsy evidence. As a result, if there
is any litigation on the complaint, the report will enhance the agency's position. 
--Capt. Melvin Sears, Orange County Sheriff's Office administrative
coordinator to the Citizen Review Board

Informally in discussions after hearings and in the questions board members ask
of PSD [professional standards division] investigators during hearings, [board]
members have made observations about deficiencies in the investigators'
reports that have resulted in improved reporting. For example, board members
kept objecting to the way officers and investigators included opinions in their
reports, rather than just the facts. 
--Maj. Karon LaForte, Orange County Sheriff's Office IA commander

Investigators do a better job investigating cases because they know that PIIAC
[Police Internal Investigations Auditing Committee] will be looking at their work
product, so they are less likely to take shortcuts in their research and reporting
than in the past. 
--Charles Moose, former Chief, Portland Police Bureau

5. Help reassure the public that the department already investigates citizen
complaints thoroughly and fairly.

Even when the department is capable of imposing appropriate discipline without
citizen review, an oversight procedure can reassure skeptical citizens that the
agency is doing its job in this respect. 
--Douglas Perez, former Deputy Sheriff, Professor, Plattsburgh (New York)
State University

6. Help some subject officers feel vindicated. The St. Paul oversight board
exonerated an officer after a citizen complained about an allegedly offensive
remark the officer had made to a block party. When the officer and Donald
Luna, the board chair, happened to meet at a graduation ceremony, the officer
said:

I want to thank you for the letter to the chief. I'd put in a lot of time and felt I
had deescalated a tense situation. I couldn't believe there had been a complaint;
I felt I deserved an award. I felt the commission understood me.

7.--Help discourage misconduct (see below).

If I live a normal lifespan, I'm a citizen longer than I'm a cop, so I want a system
of checks and balances to help prevent police misconduct. 
--Trevor Hampton, former Chief, Flint Police Department

8. Improve the department's policies and procedures (see chapter 3, "Other
Oversight Responsibilities").

Potential benefits to elected and appointed officials

By establishing or improving a citizen oversight mechanism, local officials can
demonstrate their concern to eliminate police misconduct-or publicize a
department's existing exemplary police behavior. Officials may also be able to
reduce the number of civil lawsuits (or successful suits) against the city or
county or the dollar value of successful awards. These suits can be
expensive.[6] During a 6-month period alone, deaths and injuries resulting from
police shootings resulted in more than 300 civil suits against the Washington,
D.C., police department, with nearly $8 million in court settlements and
judgments awarded.[7]

o Joan Campbell, the chairperson of the Minneapolis City Council Ways and
Means Committee, reports that, when citizens sue the city for alleged police
brutality, the judge asks if the Civilian Police Review Authority (CRA) sustained
the case. In many instances in which CRA has not, the council has a stronger
case for not settling with the complainant and for expecting the judge to rule in
the city's favor. As a result, the city has gone to court on more cases and won
most of them. Campbell also believes that CRA has reduced the number of
complaints that have gone to litigation because complainants feel they have
already had their day in court with the review board.

o According to Robert Bailey, former assistant city manager in Berkeley, the
Police Review Commission "saved the city at least $100,000 from one potential
lawsuit alone." Because they did not trust the police to investigate the matter
fairly, family members filed a complaint after a relative died from cardiac arrest
in police custody after being put into four-point restraints. The board decided to
hear the case en bloc and hired an independent toxicologist to review the
medical records and do more testing. The toxicologist, as had the coroner
previously, reported that use of force had not caused the person's
death-aspiration due to a drug overdose was the cause. The family decided not
to sue the city after the board concluded that the officers did not use excessive
force.

o Merrick Bobb, special counsel to Los Angeles County, reported: "In 1992 . .
. the County of Los Angeles had 800 police misconduct cases pending. And
the exposure to the taxpayers of the County of Los Angeles was calculated by
the County's lawyers as far in excess of $600 million. Today, 5 years later, in
1997, we find the caseload has dropped from 800 cases to a little over 200
cases. We find that the amount of money that is being spent has dropped for
the first time to below the 10 million mark in terms of judgments, settlements,
and attorneys' fees in such cases. . . . I think this is a testament to the effect of
civilian oversight, civilian review" initiated in 1993.[8]

o Troubled in part by fatal shootings by Albuquerque police officers (31 in 10
years) and extremely high annual payments for tort claims involving police
officers (up to $2.5 million per year), the Albuquerque city council hired two
consultants in 1996 to evaluate the city's existing oversight system and
recommend alternatives.[9]

Potential benefits to the community at large

Citizen oversight can benefit the entire community, not just individual
complainants. Oversight can:

1. Help to reassure the community that appropriate discipline is being imposed.
Even when departments are doing a top-notch job disciplining errant officers,
the public may lack confidence in the process. An oversight procedure that
provides citizens with a window into how the department operates can change
the opinion of these concerned citizens.

2. Help discourage police misconduct. While there is no empirical evidence that
oversight bodies can deter police misconduct,10 there are three ways in which
citizen review may help encourage officers to act appropriately.

o When oversight bodies recommend that an officer be retrained, the officer
may learn how to avoid the type of behavior that led to the citizen complaint.

o When police and sheriff's departments adopt policy and procedure changes
that oversight bodies recommend, officers may have a better understanding
regarding how they should perform their job.

o Oversight bodies may discourage some officers from engaging in misconduct
by reducing their chances for promotion.

I was nervous about whether a sustained case might hamper my promotion to
lieutenant. The chief had made it plain that an officer with sustained complaints
would not be looked at as favorably for promotion as officers with no or fewer
complaints. If you look at the people he's passed over, you can see that the
officers with complaints have been passed over.
--a lieutenant

The [review] board influences assignments to [desirable] details. We have
supervisors in units now who don't want "cowboys" in their units, so officers
with complaints could get passed over.
--an officer

3. Increase public understanding of police policies, procedures, and behavior.
Complainants learn about police procedures from oversight investigators, board
members, and officers during mediation. Board members themselves become
better educated about police procedures and can share their understanding with
other members of the community.

Finally, by holding special public hearings, oversight bodies may be able to
defuse tense community conflicts, channeling anger into constructive solutions.
Berkeley's charter requires the Police Review Commission (PRC) to hold
hearings at the request of board members or voters. PRC held a special public
hearing after University of California police officers were accused of using
excessive force against students during a campus demonstration. Although
contentious, the meeting resulted in recommendations regarding officer conduct
during demonstrations--several of which the department implemented--to help
prevent future discord.

Limitations to Citizen Review

As summarized in exhibit 1-3, citizen oversight has several inherent and
potential limitations.

Citizen oversight systems need to be part of a larger structure of internal and
external police accountability; by itself, citizen oversight cannot ensure that
police will act responsibly. An evaluation of New York City's oversight system
concluded, "In general, civilian complaint review procedures appear to be a
necessary but insufficient component of the [New York City Police]
Department's approach to controlling officer misconduct."[11] "Supplements to
Citizen Oversight" suggests other procedures that, taken together with citizen
oversight and an effective internal affairs unit, may improve police accountability
in departments in which officer conduct needs improvement.

The effectiveness of citizen oversight depends enormously on who the principal
parties are. In Minneapolis, there was "a complete turnaround" in the
relationship between the police department and the Civilian Police Review
Authority after a new chief and a new executive director took over and the new
mayor made clear she expected them to cooperate. Supporting this
observation, a subject officer in Minneapolis wrote on his anonymous customer
satisfaction survey in 1998, "It appears as though there have been some
changes in the factfinding process, which resulted in a more satisfactory
outcome. In the past I was unable to give a favorable opinion of the Civilian
Police Review Authority, but I was pleased with this openness."

Oversight bodies in the United States have limited authority. In particular, they
do not have the power to discipline officers or establish department policies. In
these areas, they are only advisory. Furthermore, oversight bodies have no
influence on some police managers or, as a result, many or most line officers.
According to one chief, "Boards can't be effective because officers fear IA, not
them." Concerns about liability and supervisor criticisms may typically
discourage misconduct much more than either citizen oversight or internal affairs
investigations.

In a related vein, oversight procedures generally focus on individual officers,
letting supervisors off the hook in terms of management's responsibility for--and
tremendous influence over--line officers' and deputies' behavior. As a result,
unless the oversight system includes making recommendations for policy and
procedure changes and has the ability to influence their adoption, department
supervisory and training practices that may be allowing misconduct to occur will
remain untouched. As one commentator observed, "The solution to rotten
apples is to fix the police barrel."[12] Some police chiefs and sheriffs agree that
they should be held accountable for preventing misconduct, and, if they fail,
they should be dismissed. One chief commented, "If IA is not up to snuff, give
the chief a chance to fix it, and, if he doesn't, fire him. So the solution [to police
misconduct] is to hold the chief accountable."

Some complainants who lose their cases (and even some who win) feel
dissatisfied with the process, the results, or both. Others are frustrated that they
cannot find out what the chief's or sheriff's finding was or whether and what
kind of discipline was imposed. According to Jackie DeBose, a member of
Berkeley's board, "I have run into several citizens who lost their cases, and they
were livid--they felt they had been done an injustice." The Vera Institute of
Justice in New York City surveyed a sample of 371 citizens who had filed
complaints with the city's Citizen Complaints Review Board.13 The Vera
Institute concluded that "the investigative process itself has a significant negative
influence" on citizen satisfaction because of how long the process took and the
lack of contact with and information about the subject officer and the final
outcome. Some complainants, and a small minority of the public, will not be
satisfied with any actions oversight bodies take. These individuals may have
unreasonable expectations of how the police should behave or unreasonable
hopes for what citizen oversight procedures can accomplish.

Finally, oversight procedures in some jurisdictions have exacerbated tensions
among local officials, police and sheriff's departments and unions, and citizen
groups and activists. This worsening of the status quo has occurred for many
reasons, such as unrealistic expectations on the part of activists or unrealistic
apprehensions by police and sheriff's departments about what the oversight
procedure would accomplish; failure to involve all affected parties in the
planning process; biased oversight staff; inadequate funding leading to long
delays in case processing; and political motives for setting up the procedure on
the part of local officials.

Despite these limitations, local government officials, law enforcement managers,
and citizens in many jurisdictions believe that citizen oversight can be of value.
The following chapters illustrate the potential benefits of citizen review as well
as its limitations.

Notes

1. Walker, Samuel, Achieving Police Accountability, Research Brief,
Occasional Paper Series, no. 3, New York: Center on Crime Communities &
Culture, 1998: 5.

2. Snow, Robert, "Civilian Oversight: Plus or Minus," Law and Order 40
(December 1992): 51-56.

3. Luna, Eileen, and Samuel Walker, "A Report on the Oversight Mechanisms
of the Albuquerque Police Department," prepared for the Albuquerque City
Council, 1997: 121.

4. Walker, Samuel, Citizen Review Resource Manual, Washington, D.C.:
Police Executive Research Forum, 1995.

5. An example of an oversight procedure that does not fall into any of these
four types exists in Charlotte, North Carolina. The city's Community Relations
Committee appoints a staff member to attend the Charlotte-Mecklenburg
Police Department's internal hearings of serious allegations against officers. The
staff member contributes to the findings of each review panel and can give a
minority report to the chief, city manager, and city council (which happened
once).

6. "How Much Force Is Enough?" Law Enforcement News 24 (500)
(November 30, 1998): 1. "The cost of a civil suit goes beyond expenses
incurred by individual police officers. Such factors as the cost of liability
insurance, litigation expenses, out-of-court settlements, and punitive damage
awards all make civil liability an extremely expensive proposition for police
officers, law enforcement agencies, governments, and, ultimately, taxpayers. . . .
After several lawsuits are filed, . . . premium prices can skyrocket, or
companies may refuse to ensure the department." Gaines, Larry K., Victor E.
Kappeler, and Joseph B. Vaughn, Policing in America, 2d ed., Cincinnati:
Anderson Publishing Company, 1997: 294.

7. "How Much Force Is Enough?", 1.

8. National Association for Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement conference
transcript, October 15-17, 1997, Lanham, Maryland.

9. Luna and Walker, "A Report on the Oversight Mechanisms of the
Albuquerque Police Department."

10. The oversight process lacks two qualities thought to be essential to deter
misconduct: certainty and severity of punishment (Sviridoff, Michele, and
Jerome E. McElroy, Processing Complaints Against Police: The [New York
City] Civilian Complaint Review Board, New York: Vera Institute of Justice,
1988: 35). Oversight procedures also often lack a third critical element for
deterrence: swiftness.

11. Sviridoff and McElroy, Processing Complaints Against Police, 38.

12. Bayley, David, "Getting Serious about Police Brutality," in Accountability
for Criminal Justice: Selected Essays, ed. Philip C. Sternberg, Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1995: 96.

13. Sviridoff and McElroy, Processing Complaints Against Police.

---------------------------

Key Points

o Citizen Review of Police: Approaches and Implementation is written primarily
for local government officials and legislators. Union leaders, local citizen groups,
and new oversight staff may also find the publication useful.

o The publication describes nine citizen oversight procedures to enable these
audiences to benefit from the experiences of communities that have already
established oversight procedures.

o While there is no single model of citizen oversight, most systems fall into one
of four types:

--Type 1: Citizens investigate allegations of police misconduct and recommend
findings to the chief or sheriff.

--Type 2: Police officers investigate allegations and develop findings; citizens
review and recommend that the chief or sheriff approve or reject the findings.

--Type 3: Complainants may appeal findings established by the police
department to citizens, who review them and then recommend their own
findings to the chief or sheriff.

--Type 4: An auditor investigates the process by which the police or sheriff's
department accepts and 

investigates complaints and reports on the process' thoroughness and fairness.

o Oversight bodies can also:

--Recommend changes in department policies and procedures and suggest
improvements in training.

--Arrange for mediation.

--Assist the police or sheriff's department to develop or operate an early
warning system for identifying problem officers.

o If they wish to implement citizen review, to make an informed decision about
which type of oversight procedure to adopt jurisdictions need to examine
tradeoffs inherent in choosing a model: Most features of every model have
drawbacks as well as benefits.

o Citizen oversight has the potential to benefit many groups.

o Complainants have reported feeling:

--"Validated" when their allegations are sustained--or merely appreciated
having an opportunity to be heard by an independent third party.

--Gratified they are able to address an officer directly.

--Satisfied the process appears to help hold police and sheriff's departments
accountable.

o Police administrators have said that oversight can:

--Improve their relationship and image with the community.

--Increase public understanding of the nature of police work.

--Promote the goals of community policing.

--Improve the quality of the department's internal investigations.

--Reassure a skeptical public that the department already investigates citizen
complaints thoroughly and fairly.

--Help subject officers feel vindicated.

--Help discourage misconduct.

--Improve the department's policies and procedures.

o Elected and appointed officials have indicated that oversight:

--Demonstrates their concern for police conduct to constituents.

--Can reduce the number, success rates, and award amounts of civil suits
against the city or county.

o Members of the community at large have suggested that oversight has helped
to:

--Reassure the community that appropriate discipline is being handed out for
misconduct.

--Discourage police misconduct.

--Increase their understanding of police behavior.

o There are serious limitations to what citizen review can accomplish. To be
most effective, citizen oversight must complement other internal and external
mechanisms for police accountability.

---------------------------

Larger Law Enforcement Agencies Have Internal Affairs Units to Investigate
Allegations of Police Misconduct

Most large police and sheriff's departments have internal affairs (IA) units
(sometimes called professional standards units) that investigate allegations of
officer misconduct filed by citizens or other officers. In some departments, IA
units not only recommend findings to the chief or sheriff, they also recommend
the types of discipline (sometimes following guidelines that provide a range of
punishments for different types of misconduct). 

In some departments, officers' supervisors investigate minor alleged
misconduct, leaving serious cases to the IA unit. Some departments use
supervisory panels composed of command-level staff who, after reviewing IA's
investigation results, come to a finding and, if appropriate, recommend
discipline. In smaller departments, the chief or sheriff investigates citizen
complaints, or the complaints become a command responsibility.

In all departments, the chief or sheriff makes the final determination of
discipline, although in some jurisdictions an appointed or elected official (e.g.,
police commission) may overrule the decision.

---------------------------

A Short History of Citizen Review

The demand for citizen oversight first occurred in the 1950s and 1960s as a
result of the civil rights movement and the perception in many quarters that law
enforcement responded to racial unrest with excessive force. Many of these
early review procedures were short lived.[1]

Citizen review revived in the early 1970s as urban African-Americans gained
more political power and as more white political leaders came to see the need
for improved police accountability. Most oversight procedures have come into
existence after a high-profile case of alleged police misconduct (usually a
shooting or other physical force incident), often involving white officers and
minority suspects. Racial or ethnic allegations of discrimination are often at the
heart of movements to introduce citizen oversight.[2]

By 2000, citizen review has become more widespread than ever before in the
United States. As of early 1998, there were more than 90 citizen review
procedures. Almost 80 percent of the largest cities had some form of 
citizen review.[3] However, only a small fraction of law enforcement agencies
in the country had citizen oversight.

1. Snow, Robert, "Civilian Oversight: Plus or Minus," Law and Order 40
(December 1992): 51-56.

2. Terrill, Richard J., "Civilian Oversight of the Police Complaints Process in the
United States: Concerns, Developments, and More Concerns," in Complaints
Against the Police: The Trend to External Review, ed. Andrew J. Goldsmith,
Oxford, England: Clarendon Press, 1991; see also Walker, Samuel, and Vic
W. Bumphus, "The Effectiveness of Civilian Review: Observations on Recent
Trends and New Issues Regarding the Civilian Review of Police," American
Journal of Police 11 (4) (1992): 1-26.

3. Walker, Samuel, Achieving Police Accountability, Research Brief,
Occasional Paper Series no. 3, New York: Center on Crime Communities &
Culture, 1998: 5.

---------------------------

Findings That Review Boards and Police Departments Make

Review boards and police departments generally use a common set of terms to
identify the findings that their investigations can lead to:

o Unfounded: The alleged act did not occur, or the subject officer was not
involved in the act; therefore the officer is innocent.

o Exonerated: The alleged act did occur, but the officer engaged in no
misconduct because the act was lawful, justified, and proper (sometimes called
"proper conduct"). 

o Not sustained: The evidence fails to prove or disprove that the alleged act(s)
occurred.

o Sustained: The alleged act occurred and was not justified (e.g., it violated
department policy).

Some oversight bodies and police departments come to findings that conclude
the subject officer committed an act that was inappropriate but that hold the
department responsible for the officer's misconduct:

o Policy failure: Department policy or procedures require or prohibit the act
(e.g., an officer may not use a cruiser to drive someone to a bus stop whose car
was towed).

o Supervision failure: Inadequate supervision--the officer's sergeant or
lieutenant should have informed the officer not to engage in the act or to
discontinue it (e.g., a sergeant asks a supervisor, "Here's what I've got. Is that
probable cause to arrest the guy?" and the supervisor gives the officer bad
advice).

o Training failure: The officer receives inappropriate or no training in how to
perform the act properly (e.g., distinguishing an intoxicated person from
someone going into diabetic shock).

---------------------------

Exhibit 1-1. Sample Tradeoffs Jurisdictions Need to Consider in Choosing an
Oversight Procedure
                                        
o Volunteers versus paid staff. Volunteer participants are lay community
members who represent the concerns of the public. Professionals conduct the
day-to-day work of citizen oversight, carrying out the public's wishes. On one
hand, an oversight procedure involving only paid staff usually will not be as
representative of the community as will a system that uses volunteers. On the
other hand, the amount of time required to provide adequate oversight can
normally be provided only by one or more paid staff who have been hired
specifically to dedicate themselves to oversight activities. As a result, many
oversight procedures use volunteers and paid staff.

o Public hearings versus private hearings. Public hearings may make the
community feel it has more control over police misconduct because officers'
alleged misconduct is made known. Private hearings are simpler logistically and
protect complainants and officers from public exposure.

o Investigative authority versus review authority. Investigating complaints can
help ensure they are done thoroughly and fairly, but hiring investigators can be
expensive. Reviewing cases is less expensive but requires department
cooperation in sharing records. Some oversight systems have both
responsibilities.

o Taking on additional responsibilities-policy recommendations, mediation, or
early warning systems:

-- Developing policy recommendations may involve a conflict of interest
because investigating and reviewing cases requires impartiality, but developing
policy recommendations may involve political advocacy. However, providing
policy recommendations may expand the oversight body's influence.

-- Mediation, usually held in private and kept confidential, may have less "teeth"
than a public hearing. However, mediation may encourage citizens to file
complaints; save the time and expense of a hearing; and educate officers about
the impact of their words, behaviors, and attitudes on the public.

-- Early warning systems can help identify potentially troublesome officers and
may deter officer misconduct, but they may alienate officers if unsustained cases
are included.

o Accepting complaints directly versus accepting them only by referral from the
police or sheriff's department. Citizens who may be reluctant to file complaints
with the department may file with the oversight body, but outreach must be
conducted to make citizens aware of this option.

---------------------------

Exhibit 1-2. Potential Benefits of Citizen Oversight for Police and Sheriff's
Departments

Law enforcement managers and line officers report that citizen oversight can
provide a number of benefits to police and sheriff's departments depending on the
type of oversight procedure adopted:

1. Improve the department's relationship and image with the community by:
a. Helping to establish and maintain its reputation for investigating alleged officer
misconduct with fairness and firmness.
b. Helping to reduce community concerns about possible police coverups in high-
profile cases.

2. Increase the public's understanding of police work, including the use of force.

3. Promote the goals of community policing.

4. Improve the quality of the department's internal investigations of alleged
misconduct.

5. Reassure the public that the department's internal investigations of citizen
complaints and its process for disciplining officers already are thorough and fair.

6. Help subject officers feel vindicated.

7. Help discourage misconduct among some officers.

8. Improve department policies and procedures.

---------------------------

Abolishing Citizen Oversight Will Not Save a Police or Sheriff's Department
Money

Getting rid of the oversight body will not save the police or sheriff's department
money. When the Minneapolis City Council was considering abolishing the
Citizen
Police Review Authority (CRA), Lt. Robert Skomra, the IA commander at the
time, examined the number of cases CRA handled. Skomra determined that, if
CRA disappeared, the police department would have to find the funds to at least
double and possibly triple the number of existing IA investigators. The department
would also have had to find desk space for the new investigators. Minneapolis
police Chief Robert Olson agreed: "If the CRA were abolished, I would have to
hire additional investigators."

---------------------------

Some Police Chiefs Have Established Citizen Oversight Procedures on Their
Own

Police chiefs have taken the initiative to establish citizen oversight procedures on
their own.

o When Robert Olson, chief of the Minneapolis Police Department since 1995,
was commissioner in Yonkers, New York, he established a civilian oversight
program because of the department's poor relations with the African-American
community. The review board he established included four civilians nominated by
a
citizen panel, an officer nominated by the police union, and three other officers
Olson selected. He approved all the candidates. The board, which met monthly,
reviewed completed IA cases and occasionally pending cases, and it had the
authority to direct IA to conduct additional investigations. The board
recommended findings, with Olson retaining the ultimate decision to decide caes
and impose discipline.

o William Finney, chief of the St. Paul Police Department, recommended the
Police civilian Internal Affairs Review Commission on his own initiative because
he
felt the need to gain citizen's perspective on department behavior. (See the St.
Paul
case study in chapter 2.)

---------------------------

Supplements to Citizen Oversight*

Several other procedures for maintaining citizen oversight of law enforcement
agencies can supplement a citizen review process. One or more of the
alternatives listed below can also substitute for citizen review in certain cases of
alleged police misconduct.

Legislative Control

Legislatures can monitor police behavior through investigations, appropriations
pressure, oversight committees, and other means.

Civil Litigation

Complainants may sue police officers in State court and seek common law tort
remedies. They may also sue in Federal court for violations of Federal civil
rights.

Criminal Prosecution

Prosecutors at the local, State, and Federal levels can apply applicable criminal
statutes to situations involving alleged police misconduct.

Federal Government Suits

Under a 1994 law, prosecutors may seek changes in the operations of local
police departments in Federal courts. Suits by the U.S. Department of Justice
can require reform through court-approved agreements in which police
departments agree to change the way they track and handle citizen complaints
and disciplinary decisions or by installing a Federal monitor to oversee the
department's activities in these areas. 

Supervisor Accountability

There are several internal actions police and sheriff's departments can take, if
needed, that may make a significant difference in helping to prevent police
misconduct, including effective applicant screening, recruit and inservice
training, peer review, and, perhaps most important, leadership training. Lt. Bret
Lindback with the Minneapolis Police Department emphasizes that chiefs and
sheriffs should be given funding to provide:

the best leadership training you can find to make supervisors and managers
accountable for what their guys do on the street. . . . You need to train them to
tell line officers, "You don't do that [misconduct, discourtesy] on my watch." A
week's training when you get your sergeant's bar isn't enough. You need
ongoing training, two or four times a year, to build good leadership skills.

Mary Dunlap, director of San Francisco's Office of Citizen Complaints (OCC),
agrees:

We need to review higher-ups' behavior to produce accountability among line
officers. Otherwise, the beat officer gets scrutinized and the supervisors are
never held accountable, never called to account.

OCC addresses supervisors who share responsibility for officers' misconduct
by charging them with failure to supervise the accused officer properly. In Banta
v. City and County of San Francisco (1998), the presiding judge of the
Superior Court dismissed a challenge to OCC's power to add an allegation
against a sergeant for failure to supervise.

In the last analysis, supervisor accountability extends to the chief or sheriff, who
must exercise active responsibility for ensuring that his or her officers and
deputies comport themselves appropriately. If the chief executive will not or
cannot ensure proper conduct, it is the obligation of the mayor, city manager, or
city council to find a new chief and the duty of the voters to elect a new sheriff.

*For a more complete discussion of the alternatives, see Perez, Douglas W.,
Common Sense About Police Review, Philadelphia: Temple University Press,
1994: 48-63.

---------------------------

Chapter 2: Case Studies of Nine Oversight Procedures

This chapter presents brief case studies of nine oversight procedures arranged
alphabetically by jurisdiction. The case studies concentrate primarily on the
operational procedures of the oversight mechanisms. Details about other
aspects of the jurisdictions' procedures are presented in other chapters of the
report:

o Chapter 3, "Other Oversight Responsibilities," describes how the jurisdictions
develop policy and procedure recommendations, implement mediation, and
assist with early warning systems.

o Oversight staffing arrangements are discussed in detail in chapter 4.

o Chapter 5, "Addressing Important Issues in Citizen Oversight," presents such
problematic areas as intake, outreach, and "politics."

o Chapter 6 identifies the most common areas of conflict between oversight
mechanisms and police and sheriff's departments.

o Monitoring, evaluation, and funding issues are addressed in chapter 7.

Exhibit 2-1 identifies the location, type of system, principal activities, and paid
staff and budget for each oversight mechanism. Exhibit 2-2 summarizes the
number of complaints, hearings, mediations, and other pertinent activities each
system conducted in 1997, the extent to which its proceedings are open to the
public, whether it has subpoena power, and the types of complaints it reviews.

As the exhibits illustrate--and the case studies that follow explain--there is
enormous variation in the structure and operations of the nine systems. In fact,
dissimilarity, rather than similarity, is the rule among the nine systems. In part
this is because radically different systems were selected for inclusion in this
report to illustrate the diversity in oversight mechanisms from which other
jurisdictions can choose if they wish to develop a procedure of their own or
modify an existing one. However, the diversity also reflects the fact that local
officials have shaped their oversight systems very differently to accommodate
unique local pressures (e.g., from activist groups, police unions, or office
holders), legal considerations (e.g., with regard to the types of information that
can be made public or the provisions of labor-management agreements),
funding resources, and honest disagreements about what would work best in
their communities.

All four types of oversight approaches listed in footnote a in exhibit 2-1 are
represented among the nine oversight systems. However, two jurisdictions have
combined two different approaches: Portland has a citizen appeals board (type
3) and an auditor who monitors the department's complaint investigation
process (type 4), while Tucson has a citizen board that reviews internal affairs
findings (type 2) and also an auditor (type 4). Other "models" are not pure
either; for example, while San Francisco's Office of Citizen Complaints involves
citizens in investigating complaints (type 1), OCC staff also prosecute cases at
chief's hearings and before the police commission, a responsibility-and
expense-that goes well beyond that of investigating complaints. Similarly, the
Minneapolis Civilian Police Review Authority (CRA) not only hires professional
staff to investigate complaints (type 1) but its volunteer board members also
hold hearings for complaints for which investigators have found probable cause.
Furthermore, the CRA executive director prosecutes these cases before the
civilian review board. While San Francisco's OCC and Minneapolis' CRA both
investigate most complaints in place of internal affairs, Berkeley's Police Review
Commission investigates cases simultaneously with internal affairs investigations.
The St. Paul Police Civilian Internal Affairs Review Commission and San
Francisco's Office of Citizen Complaints recommend discipline to the chief.

The independence of the nine oversight systems also varies considerably. The
St. Paul police chief proposed the idea of a review commission, nominates its
two sworn members, funds it, and houses it in the public safety building. While
San Francisco's OCC operates independently of the police department and is
funded by the city, its budget is a line item within the police department budget.
The OCC director reports to the San Francisco Police Commission, which tries
major discipline cases and ratifies policy and training changes. By contrast, an
independent dispute resolution center operates Rochester's Civilian Review
Board, appoints board members, and receives funding to staff the procedure
directly from the city council.

Oversight systems differ in other respects. While most systems may provide
policy and procedure recommendations to the local police or sheriff's
department, San Francisco's charter requires it to make policy
recommendations. In addition, some systems rarely make recommendations,
while others are constantly proposing them. Minneapolis and Rochester make
considerable use of mediation. Until 1999, Berkeley's mediation system,
although required by statute, was dormant, while San Francisco has had
difficulty getting complainants to agree to mediation. Other oversight systems
offer no mediation option.

The number of paid staff among the oversight systems examined ranges from 1
part-time person (St. Paul) to 30 full-time staff (San Francisco). Most systems
have between four and five paid staff. Largely reflecting the number of paid
staff, the systems' budgets range from almost no special funding in Orange
County to $2,198,778 in San Francisco. While four other budgets range from
$100,000 to $275,000, St. Paul's is slightly more than $37,000 and
Minneapolis' is slightly more than $500,000.

Exhibit 2-2 illustrates the significant diversity in the type and extent of oversight
activity levels. For example, San Francisco received 1,126 complaints in 1997,
and 715 citizens contacted the Minneapolis program. Berkeley investigated 42
complaints. Orange County held 45 hearings in 1997, Berkeley 12, and
Minneapolis 3. However, Minneapolis oversight staff also provided other
assistance to 715 additional citizens.

Exhibit 2-2 shows that the systems' openness to the public also differs widely.
At one extreme, Rochester reviews completed investigations in a private,
sealed-off room in the city hall basement-even the citizen panelists have no
access to internal affairs reports until the panelists meet, and they must
surrender the materials before they disband. The panelists' findings are not
made public. St. Paul's reviews also are conducted in private. By contrast,
Orange County invites 57 media outlets to every board hearing, and the board
members' findings are announced. Some systems mix privacy with openness.
Flint's ombudsman's office conducts its investigations in private but then
provides its detailed findings to the press and the city hall's public archives. The
chief's hearings in San Francisco are private, but police commission trials have
been attended by as many as 600 citizens and members of the press. Boards in
Berkeley, Minneapolis, and Tucson conduct public meetings at which individual
citizens can raise general concerns (not personal complaints) about police
conduct. The boards then take up the concerns between meetings or at a future
meeting. No oversight system publicizes the nature of the specific discipline
subject officers receive--many jurisdictions prohibit such disclosure.

This tremendous variation in how the nine oversight systems conduct business
may seem discouraging: The lack of similarity makes it difficult for other
jurisdictions to make an automatic selection of commonly implemented
oversight features around which they can structure their own oversight
procedures. This diversity forces jurisdictions to take the time to pick and
choose among a wide range of alternatives for designing their own oversight
systems and to assess the benefits and limitations of each possible component.
On the positive side, this diversity means jurisdictions do not have to feel they
are obligated to follow rigorously any one model or approach; they have the
freedom to tailor the various components of their system to the particular needs
and characteristics of their populations, law enforcement agencies, statutes,
union contracts, and pressure groups. Of course, the choices that are made
may have important consequences for how much the oversight system will cost,
how much it is utilized, and how satisfied citizens are with the complaint
process-considerations that will in turn partially determine which options to
select.

Although the choices may be daunting, there is expert help available for making
them. Key participants in all nine oversight systems have agreed to field
telephone calls from interested parties to share information about what works
best for them and why. The names and telephone numbers of these individuals
follow each case study. Chapter 8, "Additional Sources of Help," identifies
other individuals with national experience with oversight systems who are
available for consultation.

The Berkeley, California, 
Police Review Commission: 
A Citizen Board and the Police Department Investigate Complaints
Simultaneously

Background

After allegations of police use of excessive force in clearing street people from a
local park, Berkeley voters in 1973 approved a ballot initiative that created by
ordinance the Police Review Commission (PRC), the oldest continuously
operating citizen oversight agency in the Nation.

Citizens filed 42 cases with PRC in 1997. The board conducted hearings in 12
cases, which sometimes included multiple allegations (some of which came from
the previous year's filings). The board sustained at least 1 allegation in 2 of the
12 hearings, for a total of 4 sustained allegations. The board did not sustain 30
allegations. The board closed another 34 cases without hearings, either because
the case lacked merit or the complainant failed to cooperate. For the first half of
1998, in 5 of the 11 hearings held, there was at least 1 sustained allegation.

The review process

Exhibit 2-3 illustrates the Police Review Commission's procedures.

Intake
Citizens may file complaints directly with PRC within 90 days of the alleged
misconduct. The ordinance requires PRC to forward complaints to the police
department's internal affairs bureau within 30 calendar days. IA and PRC then
both investigate the case independently. PRC and the police department have
120 days to communicate their findings to the city manager and for the city
manager or chief to determine discipline.

Citizens who file a complaint initially with the police department's internal affairs
bureau may file the complaint subsequently with PRC within the 90-day limit,
after which the parallel PRC and IA investigations occur. The IA investigators
give complainants a brochure on the complaint process that mentions PRC, and
they tell citizens who express dissatisfaction with the IA investigation about the
PRC option. From 1994 through 1998, 53 percent of complainants registered
their complaints initially with IA rather than being referred by PRC.

Investigations
Either Barbara Attard, the PRC officer, or the PRC investigator conducts an
investigation of each complaint. Subject officers must appear and answer
questions, but they may appear with a union representative or lawyer.

Hearings
To hear each complaint, PRC staff impanel a board of inquiry consisting of
three of the nine board members. The three choose a chairperson from among
themselves. One week before the hearing, PRC staff provide the members with
a packet containing the results of their investigation along with relevant
ordinances, statutes, and department policies and procedures. Attard sends a
notice to the chief who, according to the ordinance, must order the involved
officer(s) to attend. A lieutenant, the duty command officer for the week, is
always present to answer questions about police policy, procedures, and
training.

As soon as the hearing begins, the chairperson makes clear that the board can
offer only recommendations to the city manager and the chief. The hearing then
proceeds as follows:

1. The complainant presents the complaint and introduces any witnesses.

2. Board members, and subject officers or their attorneys, may question the
complainant and witnesses.

3. Steps 1 and 2 are followed for the subject officer.

4. Each party may make a closing statement.

5. The board deliberates in closed session.

6. The board returns to announce its finding.

According to the ordinance, the parties may present evidence "on which
reasonable persons are accustomed to rely in the conduct of serious affairs,"
including hearsay. The chairperson rules on objections, but other board
members can overrule the chair. (See "A Hearing by Berkeley's Police Review
Commission.")

Findings
Board of inquiry findings are based on clear and convincing evidence. Possible
findings include unfounded, exonerated, not sustained, and sustained. PRC
presents its findings to the city manager and the chief. If the IA and PRC
findings differ, a designee of the city manager reviews the decision and
recommends to the city manager which finding to support. However, because
IA has already completed its investigation and recommended a finding to the
chief, the chief has typically already ruled on IA's finding and, if appropriate,
imposed discipline. Nevertheless, because the city manager has ultimate
authority in disciplinary matters, he can overturn the chief's decision after
reviewing PRC's finding. In practice, however, the city manager does not try to
reconcile different findings; the chief alone decides whether to reverse IA's
finding.

Appeals
Within 15 days after the complainant and subject officer have been sent PRC's
finding, either party may petition in writing for a rehearing. There had been no
rehearings as of October 1998 because police officers had never requested one
and complainants had not been able to document that they had newly
discovered evidence.

Commissioners and the PRC officer have no regular procedure for learning
what IA's dispositions are. California statute (832.7) provides that "Peace
officer personnel records and records maintained by any state or local agency, .
. . or information obtained from those records, are confidential and shall not be
disclosed in any criminal or civil proceeding except by discovery." As a result,
the complainant does not learn whether or what kind of discipline, if any, the
chief imposes. (See "A Citizen Has Mixed Feelings About the PRC Process.")

Other activities

PRC performs two additional functions.

Public forum for complaints and policy issues
At its general meetings held on the second and fourth Wednesday of every
month except August, PRC serves as a public forum at which citizens can
express concerns about police policies and procedures. The meetings,
announced in advance to the press, usually last about 90 minutes and draw as
many as 30 residents and media if there is a controversial issue of community
concern. An IA investigating sergeant attends every PRC general meeting.

At the meetings, the PRC chairperson asks for public comment, subcommittees
(e.g., on community outreach) give reports, and new business is taken up.
Barbara Attard gives a report on the number of new cases filed since the
previous meeting and identifies cases that she recommends be closed
administratively. She may invite a police unit (e.g., domestic violence, bicycle)
to come to describe its activities.

PRC's charter also requires it to hold special public hearings at the request of
board members or voters to 

air controversial matters related to allegations of police misconduct.

Policy recommendations
Either as a result of a public meeting or because of specific citizen complaints
that PRC has heard, board members and Attard recommend changes in
department policies and procedures. In the wake of riots in a local park in
1991, which resulted in over 30 complaints to PRC alleging officer misconduct,
the city council directed PRC to review and make recommendations on "all
aspects of crowd control policies at large demonstrations." After study and
deliberation, PRC recommended 12 specific changes that the department later
implemented (see chapter 3, "Other Oversight Responsibilities").

Staffing and budget

Each of the nine city council members appoints one PRC board member.
Board members may serve indefinitely until the appointing city council members
replace them. Most serve 5 or 6 years; four have served for at least 10 years.
Board members select one of their members to a 1-year nonrenewable term as
chairperson.

The city manager appoints the PRC officer and provides an investigator.
Officially, the PRC officer and investigator are the city manager's staff.
However, the public sees them as acting as the PRC commissioners' staff. The
city manager in effect delegates his role in supervising PRC to the PRC officer.
Two office assistants complete the staff.

PRC's budget for fiscal year 1998-99 was $277,255 (see exhibit 2-4). Until
1998, the budget declined steadily for several years, along with a reduction in
staffing levels from six full-time equivalents (PRC officer, two investigators,
three clerical support) in 1992 and 1993 to four full-time staff (two
professionals and two clerical support) in 1997.

Distinctive features

Berkeley's oversight procedure is unusual in that the oversight body and the
police department investigate many complaints simultaneously and
independently, rather than sequentially. The system has other interesting
features.

o Because the police department's IA unit and PRC conduct parallel
investigations, if a citizen files a complaint with PRC, the case has the
benefit-but incurs the expense-of two separate investigations.

o Although PRC must refer all complaints that citizens file with the board to the
police department for simultaneous investigation, internal affairs does not refer
cases routinely to PRC. While the PRC ordinance requires IA to refer all its
complaints, State law makes citizen complaints filed with IA confidential. As a
result, the PRC officer was trying to develop a referral process that would
comply with the statute and the PRC ordinance.

o The chief normally reviews IA findings on cases and, as appropriate, hands
out discipline before he or the city manager receives PRC's findings.

o PRC's twice monthly public meetings make it possible for any citizen to
express concerns about police misconduct or policies and procedures. The
hearings have resulted in PRC making significant recommendations to the
department for changes in policies and procedures.

For further information, contact:

Barbara Attard
Police Review Commission Officer
Police Review Commission
2121 McKinley Avenue
Berkeley, CA 94704
510-644-6716

Dash Butler
Chief of Police
Berkeley Police Department
2171 McKinley Avenue
Berkeley, CA 94703 
510-644-6568

The Flint, Michigan, Ombudsman's Office: An Ombudsman Investigates
Selected Citizen Complaints Against All City Departments and Agencies

Background

Sweden first incorporated the ombudsman concept in its constitution in 1909 as
a means of curbing governmental abuses and protecting citizen rights. Today, an
ombudsman typically investigates unlawful or unfair acts on the part of
government agencies and complaints about their services.

In 1974, Flint voters adopted a new charter establishing an Office of the
Ombudsman along with a strong mayoral form of government. Because some
citizens felt a stronger mayor would need some checks and balances, the
electorate simultaneously voted to include the ombudsman's office in the new
charter for a 5-year period. In a 1980 referendum, nearly 60 percent of the
residents voted to continue the ombudsman's office indefinitely.

The Flint City Charter states that "The Ombudsman may investigate official acts
of any agency which aggrieve any person." City departments are required to
provide information the ombudsman requests, and the office has the power to
subpoena witnesses (including police officers), administer oaths, and take
testimony. If elected officials or appointees refuse to cooperate, the charter
provides for an obstruction hearing that could result in their forfeiting their jobs.

The ombudsman establishes his or her own rules for receiving and processing
complaints, conducting investigations and hearings, and reporting findings. In
1996, the ombudsman's office investigated 662 cases, 313 of which (47
percent) involved complaints against police officers. In 1995, 389 of 741 cases
(52 percent) involved complaints against the police. The office sustains 2 to 4
percent of citizen complaints against the police annually.

The review process

Exhibit 2-5 shows the process the ombudsman's office uses to review
complaints.

Intake
People learn about the ombudsman's office from high-profile cases covered by
the media or by word of mouth from coworkers. The police department's IA
unit does not inform citizens about the ombudsman unless they report they are
unsatisfied with the department's answers to their questions. In addition, the
ombudsman's preferred response to complaints is to refer them to the
appropriate supervisor, accepting complaints primarily when the citizen does
not want to file with the police department or is dissatisfied with the supervisor's
response, or when the complaint appears to involve the use of excessive force.
Citizens who want to file complaints with the ombudsman must agree to be
interviewed at the ombudsman's office or at a location of their choosing. The
ombudsman assigns the citizens to one of two investigators who specialize in
police complaints.

Informal resolutions
The assigned investigator may telephone the IA commander to resolve the
complaint informally, such as clarifying a policy or procedure and then providing
the explanation to the complainant. The IA commander may also choose to ask
the shift commander of the subject officer to investigate the problem and then
explain the officer's behavior to the complainant. About one-quarter of
complaints reported to the ombudsman are settled by means of these informal
approaches.

The ombudsman office investigator's next option is mediation. If both parties
agree, the investigator arranges a meeting through the officer's supervisor, if
necessary walking the complainant to the police department to talk with the
supervisor. The citizen and supervisor meet together alone. If the citizen is not
satisfied, he or she then can file a complaint with the ombudsman.

Formal investigations
When the ombudsman's office accepts a complaint, the investigator sends the
chief a letter reporting the complaint and asking for a response to questions
from the officer. The chief sends the letter down the chain of command to the
subject officer, who usually responds to the questions in writing or, on rare
occasions, in an interview.

The investigator also interviews the complainant for his or her account of the
incident and the names of witnesses. Investigators usually tape the interview.
The investigator attempts to contact witnesses by telephone and, where
appropriate, sends letters to homes in the immediate area of the incident. As
needed, the investigator also takes photos at the scene, secures medical
records, and undertakes other pertinent investigatory activities. The
ombudsman's office has never subpoenaed a witness.

The investigator turns in a report to the chief investigator or deputy ombudsman
indicating agreement or disagreement with the citizen's allegation(s). The
investigator meets with the deputy or ombudsman to decide on a finding.

Findings
The ombudsman's office either sustains or does not sustain each allegation,
sustaining only if there is clear and convincing evidence. The office sends a
complete report of each investigation to the chief and the city council. The office
recommends whether there should be discipline but not the type of discipline.

When the ombudsman's office concludes the officer did something
wrong-which happens 5 to 10 times a year-it sends the officer and the chief a
synopsis of its investigation with its conclusion. The chief then conducts his own
investigation through IA or the officer's commander and makes a final
determination of how to proceed. (See "The Chief's Response to an
Ombudsman Investigation.")

The chief sends the ombudsman his finding. He does not inform the
ombudsman's office about IA's finding, and he has the discretion not to tell the
office whether he imposed any discipline. However, on occasion the city
council has asked the chief to explain his response to an ombudsman's report.

The ombudsman's investigator telephones or writes each complainant to report
the chief's decision. The typical case is resolved in 3 weeks.

Other activities

Because there is no shield of confidentiality in Michigan, the ombudsman's
office has considerable latitude in informing the press about its cases and
criticizing officers by name. The office routinely sends its case reports to the city
clerk as public documents for the city archives. However, the city charter
requires that "No report or recommendation that criticizes an official act shall be
announced until every agency or person affected is allowed reasonable
opportunity to be heard with the aid of counsel." As a result, the ombudsman's
office circulates the report on every sustained complaint to everyone named in
the report (except the complainant), giving them 5 days in which to challenge its
factual accuracy (but not the findings).

Staffing and budget

By a two-thirds majority of the nine members, the city council appoints the
ombudsman for a single 7-year term. A three-quarters majority on the council
can remove the ombudsman.

At one time, the office had as many as nine investigators, but by 1998 the
number had declined to five. Two investigators handle police complaints full
time, and the deputy investigator takes on some police complaints as well. The
ombudsman appoints a deputy ombudsman and the investigators. The office
has an attorney on contract to answer legal questions.

There was no ombudsman's office director between August 1995 and the end
of 1998. When the previous director was fired in 1995, a court ruled that the
city could not hire a new director as long as a civil suit by the fired employee
was still pending. The deputy ombudsman or senior investigator ran the office in
the absence of a director. In September 1998, a Michigan appeals court ruled
that the city could hire a new director.

As shown in exhibit 2-6, the ombudsman's 1998-99 budget was $540,744; 91
percent of the budget represented wages and benefits. With two investigators
devoting nearly full time to complaints against the police, and the deputy
devoting about one-quarter time to police cases, the proportion of the budget
devoted to complaints against the police is about $174,000.

Distinctive features

Few jurisdictions in the country make use of an ombudsman to review police
misconduct complaints.

o Because the ombudsman serves as a generalized complaint handler for all
government agencies, the city cannot be criticized for singling out the police for
oversight.

o The ombudsman's office provides citizens with an alternative place to file
complaints against the police department.

o The ombudsman's office helps IA to address complainants' concerns by
offering a satisfactory explanation for an officer's behavior that the complainant
could not or would not get from the subject officer or patrol desk.

o The office can subpoena department heads, including the chief, as well as
employees and all case files. It has never used this power.

o The office can-and does-criticize officers by name in the media for their
behavior. This may serve to deter some misconduct and anger officers. The
public has the opportunity to become aware of police misconduct when the
press prints the information.

o Politics could emasculate the office. Because the mayor appoints the chief
and the city council appoints the ombudsman, conflict between the two could
stymie the office's leverage if the mayor were to choose to ignore the
ombudsman whenever the ombudsman wished to take serious exception to a
chief's findings.

For further information, contact:

Jessie Binian
Ombudsman
Office of the Ombudsman
City of Flint
Flint Municipal Center North Building
120 East Fifth Street, Second Floor
Flint, MI 48502
810-766-7335

The Minneapolis Civilian Police Review Authority: An Oversight System
Investigates and Hears Citizen Complaints

Background

The Minneapolis city council established the Civilian Police Review Authority
(CRA) by ordinance in 1990 after African-American community leaders led
protests at city hall because officers had killed an elderly African-American
couple
in a raid and had broken up an apparently peaceful African-American college
student party in a Minneapolis hotel. In 1997, the city council and the mayor saw
the need to determine whether CRA was providing the appropriate oversight in
the
most cost-effective manner and if it had the structure and staff to do so. As a
result, they appointed a redesign committee that held focus groups, took public
testimony, looked at how other jurisdictions configured their citizen oversight
procedures, and then recommended changes in how CRA operated, most of
which the city council and the mayor adopted.

In 1997, 715 individuals contacted CRA with concerns about possible police
misconduct. Of these, 114 were satisfied with an explanation of the police
department's policies and procedures. Another 87 callers were satisfied when
investigators called the subject officers' supervisors to resolve the complaint. In
332 cases, there was no basis for a complaint, the caller was referred
elsewhere, or citizens failed to follow up their initial reports. Twenty-three cases
were pending.

The remaining 159 individuals signed formal complaints (see exhibit 2-7). Of
these, the CRA executive director found no probable cause in 46 cases
because of insufficient evidence. The executive director exonerated officers in
another 54 cases because the facts in the allegations were untrue or, while true,
did not constitute misconduct. The executive director dismissed another 30
cases, for example, because the complainant failed to cooperate. Fourteen
cases were successfully mediated, and five cases were pending as of the end of
the year. Of the 10 cases in which the executive director found probable cause,
9 were sustained, 6 by stipulation (see next section) and 3 at hearings. One
case was still pending at the end of the year.

The complaint process

Exhibit 2-8 is a flow chart that summarizes how CRA processes cases. The
following discussion explains each step.

Intake

When complainants contact CRA or the police department's IA unit, they are
told they have the choice of filing with either office but not both. Furthermore, if
they are unsatisfied with the finding from one office, they may not then file with
the other office. Only IA handles allegations of misconduct that require a
criminal investigation, could lead to an officer's being fired, or are high profile.

If the complainant files with CRA, the secretary assigns an investigator who
sees the walk-in immediately or telephones the caller to set up an appointment
to meet at CRA. The investigator fits each charge the complainant alleges into
one of eight general CRA types of complaints (e.g., excessive force,
inappropriate language). The investigator then identifies the department's policy
or procedure that appears to have been violated. The executive director may
dismiss the case during this preliminary investigation stage.

The investigator sends a letter to the complainant with a copy of the complaint
form asking the person to correct any errors and sign and return it within 15
days. The executive director sends a notice of the complaint filing to the officer,
deputy chief, and chief. When the investigator wants to take a formal statement
from the officer, the chief sends a Garrity warning (see "Glossary") requiring the
officer "upon pain of disciplinary action" to make an appointment with CRA to
answer questions.

CRA investigations

The investigator interviews any witnesses the complainant may have identified
and does any additional needed leg work, such as confirming visually that a
witness had an unobstructed view of an incident from her bedroom window and
enough street lighting to see the nighttime activity clearly. Investigators have
gone door to door in neighborhoods leaving business cards for potential
witnesses.

Investigators interview the subject officer last. About half the officers bring a
union representative or attorney, who may caucus with the officer but not
speak. The investigator sends two copies of a transcript of the taped interview
to the officer, one of which the officer signs and returns. At the conclusion of
the investigation, the investigator forwards the file to the executive director that
includes the investigator's conclusion regarding the probable cause for each
allegation. If the recommendation is that there is no probable cause, the
investigator recommends a finding of either insufficient evidence or exoneration.
If there is probable cause, the investigator cites the policy or procedure that the
subject officer appears to have violated. Patricia Hughes, the executive
director, makes a final determination regarding probable cause.

At this stage, but sometimes before the probable cause finding or during or after
the prehearing (see next section), the officer and CRA executive director may
strike the equivalent of a plea bargain, with the officer stipulating to one or more
allegations (that is, admitting guilt) in exchange for CRA dropping one or more
other allegations (see "Stipulations Reduce CRA's Caseload"). The complainant
is not consulted regarding the nature of the stipulation.

If there is no stipulation and no offer and agreement to mediate (see "Other
CRA activities" on page 34), the CRA chairperson appoints a three-member
panel to hear the case, designating one of the members (including himself, if he so
chooses) as the panel chair.

The evidentiary hearing

The subject officer appears with a union attorney at the CRA office for a
half-hour "prehearing" at which the panel chairperson and the CRA executive
director agree on the witnesses they will be bringing to the evidentiary hearing
and the information and materials that each side will be permitted to introduce,
such as the incident report, medical records, and department training manual.
The panel chairperson rules on what information may be introduced. The
prehearing makes it possible to avoid spending time at the hearing deciding
what type of evidence will and will not be admissible.

Based on the union attorney's and executive director's schedules, the panel
chairperson schedules a hearing 6 to 8 weeks after the prehearing. Panel
members (except the chairperson, who has attended the prehearing) know
nothing about the case until the hearing begins.

Each panel holds a private, audiotaped evidentiary (administrative) hearing
lasting from a few hours to, on occasion, several days. Patricia Hughes, CRA
executive director and a former assistant city attorney, prosecutes the case, and
the police union lawyer defends the officer. CRA does not have subpoena
power, but officers must testify under the Garrity ruling. After witnesses are
sworn in, each side questions its witnesses, who are then cross-examined by
the opposing side (followed by recross). The prosecutor explains why she
believes 
the officer's behavior violates a department policy or procedure.

Panel members may question witnesses and usually do. The chairperson rules
on any objections raised by the union attorney or executive director. The panel
may admit all evidence that furnishes proof of guilt or innocence, including
reliable hearsay if it is the type of evidence that "reasonable persons are
accustomed to rely on in the conduct of their serious affairs." While the officer
remains during the entire hearing, the complainant leaves the hearing after giving
his or her testimony because the Minnesota Data Practices Act give employees
(e.g., officers) privacy in administrative hearings. The prosecutor may present a
final rebuttal to the union attorney's closing statement.

Findings
The panel deliberates in private, using a clear and convincing standard to sustain
or not sustain the complaint(s). The CRA executive director sends a letter to
the subject officer and deputy chief presenting the panel's finding. Within 5 days
of receiving the panel's finding, the officer or complainant may write to ask the
panel to reconsider its finding. About 5 percent of cases are appealed; few
appeals are granted.

The police department's disciplinary panel reviews CRA's finding and
recommends discipline. The officer may appear before the disciplinary panel
with a union representative to challenge the offense severity but not to contest
the CRA finding. The panel forwards its disciplinary recommendation to the
chief for final review. The ordinance requires that the chief decide on discipline
based on the results of the hearing and then, within 30 days, provide CRA and
the mayor with a written explanation of the reasons for his or her action. The
chief may not reverse a CRA finding but has the authority to decide whether to
punish the officer and what discipline to impose. (See "A Sample Hearing.")

Other CRA activities

CRA has three other responsibilities.

Monthly CRA meetings
The CRA board members and staff hold an open meeting the first Wednesday
of every month at 5:00 p.m. in an office building. The executive director keeps
the public apprised of CRA's activities, providing updates on the number of
cases opened and resolved. The board asks if anyone in the audience wishes to
express general concerns about police behavior. Patricia Hughes relates the
following story:

A few citizens expressed objections at one meeting to the manner in which
officers were conducting apartment searches to find suspected drug dealers. In
these instances--a tiny minority of all drug searches-the officers had raided the
wrong address or the drug dealing had apparently been occurring while the
legal tenants were not present. However, because the raids involved no-knock
entries with shotguns and orders for everyone in the apartment to lie down at
once on the floor (including a woman sleeping in the nude), the tenants had
been embarrassed, frightened, and angry. I met with department inspectors to
share the public's concerns. The inspectors agreed with my recommendation that
the officers, when they fail to find the drug dealer, apologize to the tenants and
explain that they had to take severe measures in order to protect themselves
from drug dealers who are usually armed and often violent.

Mediation
After a citizen has filed a complaint against an officer, if both parties accept an
offer to mediate, Patricia Hughes sends the case to the Minneapolis Mediation
Program, a private, nonprofit organization with which CRA has a $1,500
annual contract to provide unlimited mediation services, typically 40 to 50
sessions a year. Under the terms of the contract, the program must arrange the
mediation within 14 days unless there are extenuating circumstances. Mediation
program staff telephone the parties to reconfirm they are willing to participate,
explain the process, and set a time and neutral place (e.g., a library or
neighborhood center) at the parties' convenience. The program informs Hughes
whether or not mediation is successful. If mediation is successful, Hughes
dismisses the complaint; if it is not, she sends the case back to her staff for
investigation. (See chapter 3, "Other Oversight Responsibilities," for additional
information about the mediation process in Minneapolis.)

Early warning system
The IA unit generates a quarterly report that lists the 10 officers with the most
complaints during the quarter and for the previous 12 months. The report
distinguishes complaints filed with IA and those filed with CRA. CRA generates
the totals for the complaints it receives.

Staffing and budget

By a majority vote, the city council appoints four board members through a
public application process. The mayor nominates three board members as well
as a chairperson from among the seven members. While the city council must
approve the mayor's nominees, it has never rejected one. All appointments are
for 4 years, subject to reappointment.

The CRA board hires, supervises, and fires (if necessary) the executive
director. The CRA chairperson supervises and evaluates her. He asks other
board members to fill out an evaluation on her each year and invites them to sit
in on the in-person evaluation. He considers how she has managed the office as
well as her litigation skills, public relations work, and timeliness (for example,
whether she allowed too many extensions because she failed to supervise the
investigators adequately). The executive director hires the three
investigators-typically former police officers from other departments-and
clerical staff.

The CRA's 1998 budget appropriation was $504,213 (see exhibit 2-9). More
than three-quarters of the funding is for the salaries and benefits of seven staff:
the executive director, three case investigators, a program assistant, and two
clerk typists.

Distinctive features

The Minneapolis oversight system is unusual in that paid staff investigate most
citizen complaints, while volunteers conduct hearings that result in findings the
chief must accept. The system has several other notable features.

o Because the board appoints the executive director, she may be better
shielded from political influence than if the mayor or city council appointed her.
However, because the board hires the executive director, there could be a
tendency on her part to accommodate the board's concerns rather than to act
as a check and balance on each other (for example, when the executive
director prosecutes cases before the board).

o Because most CRA investigators are former police officers, they have a good
understanding of the nature of police work (see chapter 4, "Staffing"). At the
same time, civilians with no professional experience as sworn officers conduct
the hearings. As a result, CRA combines law enforcement and citizen
perspectives.

o Using former police officers as investigators may result in bias in favor of
officers; their use may also reduce the program's capacity for objectivity in the
eyes of some citizens and community groups. Using former police officers as
investigators may reduce opposition to the process among line officers and
union leaders.

o Because the complainant may not attend the hearing except to give testimony
and hear the attorneys' concluding statements, the complainant does not know
why the case was won or lost.

o On one hand, offering stipulations reduces the number of cases CRA has to
hear, which enables it to hear other cases more expeditiously. On the other
hand, in some cases, stipulation can prevent mediation, when mediation might
be useful as a procedure for educating the officer and the complainant to each
other's points of view.

o By reducing the amount of time panelists have to spend at hearings deciding
what types of evidence to allow, prehearings speed the process. Prehearings
also offer another opportunity for subject officers to agree to stipulate as they
reconsider the strength of the case against them.

o In its investigatory capacity, CRA is supposed to be a neutral party between
the complainant and the police officer. However, if the case goes to a hearing,
the CRA executive director prosecutes the officer. This dual role could confuse
the public, complainants, and police officers.

For further information, contact:

Patricia Hughes, J.D.
Executive Director
Civilian Police Review Authority
City of Minneapolis
400 South Fourth Street, Suite 1004
Minneapolis, MN 55415-1424
612-370-3800

Liz Murray
Mediator
Minneapolis Mediation Program
Hyatt Merchandise Mart
1300 Nicollet Mall, Suite 3046
Minneapolis, MN 55403
612-359-9883

Robert Olson
Chief
Minneapolis Police Department
Room 130, City Hall
350 South Fifth Street
Minneapolis, MN 55415-1389
612-373-2853

The Orange County, Florida, Citizen Review Board: A Sheriff's Department
Provides Executive Support to an Independent Review Board

Background

In 1992, in response to the nationwide concern about police misconduct
generated by the Rodney King beating, the Orange County Sheriff's Office
established a process in which citizens could exercise oversight over deputies'
use of excessive force and abuse of power. In 1995, the elected Orange
County Commission amended the county charter to establish an independent
Citizen Review Board (CRB) that effectively replaced the sheriff's board.

CRB heard 45 cases involving 67 allegations of misconduct that the sheriff's
office investigated in 1997. The board disagreed with three IA findings,
exonerating deputies of two allegations of abuse of power that IA had sustained
and sustaining one abuse of power allegation in a case in which IA had
exonerated the deputy.

The CRB procedure

Exhibit 2-10 and the following discussion explain the citizen oversight
procedure in Orange County.

Intake
Most citizens call the sheriff's office's internal affairs unit to file complaints, but
others call the Citizen Review Board's number. The CRB's telephone number
rings at the sheriff's Research and Development Unit, which has a dedicated
line. The switchboard operator answers, "Citizen Review Board." When
citizens call, the secretary mails out the CRB complaint form, which
complainants return by mail or in person at the CRB office, located at the
sheriff's office. The CRB secretary turns cases over to the sheriff's office IA unit
for investigation and disposition.

Melvin Sears, a captain with the Research and Develop-ment Unit and the
CRB administrative coordinator, provides board members with all completed 
investigations a month before the cases are to be heard. The cases are complaints 
of alleged use of excessive force (including all discharges of a firearm, even if 
there has been no citizen complaint) and abuse of power (using one's official 
position for personal gain or privilege or for avoiding the consequences of illegal
acts). These types of cases are automatically slated for a future agenda. (See "A
CRB Hearing Through the Eyes of a Deputy Sheriff.") Complaints that are
questionable as to whether they fall within CRB's purview are given to the
chairperson, and he decides if they are appropriate for board review.

CRB hearings
CRB meets once a month in public session in a county administration building
meeting room. During the first part of the meeting, members approve the
minutes of the previous meeting and hear any reports from the chairperson, vice
chairperson, and Sears. The members then review cases in accordance with a
published agenda that has been circulated in advance to the public and 57
media outlets. The board hears about four cases at each meeting. The IA
investigating deputy is present at the hearing to answer questions about his or
her investigation. Sears advises on policy issues and provides administrative
support. The board has subpoena power, and county legislation provides for a
fine of up to $500 or imprisonment for up to 60 days for anyone convicted of
ignoring a CRB subpoena. However, the board has never subpoenaed anyone
because the sheriff has issued a standing order requiring deputies to appear
when called (but not requiring them to testify). The Central Florida Police
Benevolent Association provides interested deputies with representation, but
most deputies choose not to be represented because either they have decided
not to answer questions or, more commonly, having already been cleared by
IA, they feel they have nothing to fear. Finally, a criminal attorney, hired by the
county on a retainer basis, comes to every hearing to answer questions on
points of law, such as the proper interpretation of the State statute on assault.

Any board member may make a motion to place a complaint on a "consent
agenda" if he or she feels that IA's findings are appropriate and no further
review or meeting time is needed to discuss the merits of the complaint. Any
member may also have a complaint removed from the consent agenda and
subject to a full CRB review. The meeting minutes for the August 1998 meeting
show, for example:

Motion was made by Mr. Mills, seconded by Mr. Rankin and unanimously
agreed upon, to place this case on the consent agenda, thereby concurring with
the findings of the Professional Standards investigation that, based on a
preponderance of the evidence, the following violations were sustained [the
complaint and violation of policy followed].

Hearings follow Robert's Rules of Order. For each hearing, the following
individuals, in this order, give a statement and answer questions from board
members:

o The complainant.

o Any witnesses for the complainant (although they rarely appear).

o The sheriff's investigating agent.

o The subject deputy.

o Any other sheriff's employees present whom the chair chooses to recognize.

o The complainant again (to rebut the testimony presented by others).

At its discretion, the board may allow direct conversations among the parties.

Findings
The board spends 15 to 20 minutes deliberating each case in open session. The
chairperson calls for a vote, and each member explains his or her decision. A
majority rules, but almost all cases are unanimous. Decisions are based on a
preponderance of the evidence. The board chairperson signs a form letter that
Melvin Sears sends to each complainant after each hearing. There is no appeal.

CRB does not provide findings; rather, it sends a form memo to the sheriff
agreeing or disagreeing with the IA finding in each case. The board agrees with
IA findings 80-90 percent of the time. The board's decision is only advisory to
the sheriff. On rare occasions, the sheriff overrules the board:

A robbery detective on a stakeout fired a shotgun at a robber's car as it fled the
scene, blowing out a tire. Because the sheriff's office prohibits firing at
automobiles, IA determined that the deputy had violated department policy.
The CRB, however, exonerated the deputy because members did not want to
see deputies' hands tied so stringently-they wanted to provide deputies with
more latitude in the use of firearms. Nevertheless, the sheriff supported the 
IA finding and disciplined the deputy.

Other activities

The board may recommend fitness-of-duty evaluations, additional training, and
other measures for officers whose cases come before it. CRB also has the
authority to hire an investigator to conduct its own investigations. However,
when members feel more investigation is needed, they ask IA to do so and
bring back the case. The board has recommended several policy and
procedure changes that the sheriff has implemented (see the examples in
chapter 3, "Other Oversight Responsibilities").

Staffing and budget

Each of the seven members of the Orange County Commission nominates a
single board member subject to confirmation by the rest of the commissioners.
The sheriff selects two members of the board-always choosing civilians. Board
members serve for 2 years and may be reappointed for a total of 4 years. The
members elect a chairperson for a year, who chairs every hearing.

The county commission requires the sheriff to assign a captain and a secretary
unaffiliated with internal affairs to devote about 20 percent of their time to
providing administrative support to CRB. Melvin Sears schedules CRB
meetings and training sessions, informs complainants about the meetings, lines
up the meeting hall, sends the IA case investigation materials to members, and
prepares the annual CRB report. Sears keeps track of the board members'
attendance on a spread sheet so he can report excessive absences to the
county commissioners. The secretary records each hearing and provides the
minutes.

Sears' and his secretary's CRB work amount to a $20,000 contribution by the
sheriff's office (20 percent of their combined salaries). The sheriff also pays for
all the direct costs associated with the board's work, such as postage and
duplication. The sheriff pays for publishing CRB's brochure and letterhead
stationary. CRB's attorney submits a bill to Sears--typically $200-$250 per
month--who approves it and forwards it to the county for payment.

Distinctive features

An unusual feature of the Orange County oversight system is that a sheriff's
deputy has the responsibility for administering the Citizen Review Board's
activities. However, the board comes to its own conclusions in reviewing
internal affairs findings. Because of this arrangement, the oversight procedure
costs the taxpayer little.

o By keeping track of board members' attendance and reporting problems to
the county commission, the administrative coordinator exercises some quality 
control over the proceedings.

o Locating the CRB office in the sheriff's office saves money otherwise needed
to rent space and spares the administrative coordinator from having to shuttle
back and forth between the agency and an outside CRB location. However,
some complainants may be discouraged from filing because they are
uncomfortable going to the sheriff's office.

o By reviewing all cases involving discharge of a firearm, regardless of whether
a citizen filed a complaint, CRB can help identify problems among individual
officers or general failures of training and policy.

o Not handling allegations of deputy discourtesy reduces the burden on board
volunteers to hear many more cases. At the same time, this restriction results in
a lack of citizen oversight of these types of incidents.

o Having an attorney present at all hearings provides for instant legal advice,
without which there might be additional continuances of cases.

CRB's Web address is www.qualitywebs.net/crb. For further information,
contact:

Paul McQuilkin, Ph.D.
Chairperson
Orange County Citizen Review Board
55 West Pineloch Avenue
Orlando, FL 32806
407-823-2821

Capt. Melvin Sears
Administrative Coordinator
Orange County Citizen Review Board
55 West Pineloch Avenue
Orlando, FL 32806
407-858-4797

The Portland, Oregon, Police Internal Investigations Auditing Committee: A
City Council, Citizen Advisers, and a Professional Examiner Share Oversight
Responsibilities

Background

When the police arrested a number of gay persons in a park in 1993 for alleged
sexual activity in public, some neighbors and the arrested individuals
complained that the police had used excessive force and had singled out
homosexuals for special enforcement. The mayoral candidate promised to look
into the problem. As a result, the city auditor prepared an audit of both the
Portland Police Bureau's IA unit and the existing Police Internal Investigations
Auditing Committee (PIIAC) that had been created in 1982. A local Copwatch
organization also submitted a proposal for strengthening citizen oversight. As a
result of these efforts, in 1994 the mayor proposed, and the city council
approved,
changes to the city code that strengthened PIIAC's authority and provided for the
appointment of an auditor.

As shown in exhibit 2-11, Portland's oversight structure includes three
components: the four-member city council, citizen advisers, and a professional
examiner.

o Technically, the city council itself (including the mayor) is the Police Internal
Investigations Auditing Committee, although most people loosely refer to the
entire oversight procedure as PIIAC. By ordinance, the committee is required
to:

--Assist the police bureau in maintaining community credibility in its internal
affairs investigations by issuing public reports on the process.

--Provide a discretionary review process for complainants who are dissatisfied
with an IA investigation.

o The ordinance allows the committee to "utilize Citizen Advisors consisting of
13 persons to assist in performing its duties and responsibilities." Advisers:

--Hear appeals as a group at monthly meetings from citizens dissatisfied with
police internal affairs investigations of their complaints.

--Review all closed IA cases involving use of force.

--Individually conduct random audits of IA investigations.

o An examiner, hired by the mayor, coordinates the work of the committee and
citizen advisers and conducts much of the auditing herself.

In 1997, citizen advisers processed 21 appeals. The advisers or the auditor
monitored 98 cases.

Citizen appeals of IA findings

Citizens may appeal a complaint finding within 30 days after IA has completed
its investigation. If the complainant calls the examiner for a hearing, the
examiner sends the person an appeal application, schedules the hearing for a
future citizen advisory meeting, and arranges for the police bureau to send her
the investigation file, which she distributes to advisers to review before their
next meeting.

The examiner and an adviser of her choosing go separately to IA to review the
case file and confirm each other's assessment of the investigation. The examiner
then prepares a report that includes a summary and analysis of the case, a
critique of the investigation process, and recommendations for how the case
should be handled. She distributes the report to all the advisers and IA to
review. At times, she discusses the findings or the investigation process with the
IA captain before the advisers meet.

At its next monthly meeting, the full volunteer citizens advisory board can deny
the request for review. If the board accepts the appeal, it conducts a formal
hearing. Subject officers may attend but usually do not. However, officers'
names are not used-they are referred to as "officer A" and "officer B." If he
wants to know what transpires, the police union president attends. Someone
from IA is present to explain how it investigated the case.

Although the advisers have read the full report before the meeting, the citizen
adviser who reviewed the case gives a brief oral case summary to the other
advisers. The chairperson then asks the complainant, "Please tell us what you
would like us to know about this case." The complainant can not present new
evidence because the hearing is an audit, not an investigation. Advisers may
question the complainant, the subject officer (if present), and any witnesses who
have come. Advisers discuss the case in public and vote to do one of the
following:

o Affirm the police bureau's finding.

o Refer the case to IA for further investigation.

o Recommend that PIIAC (i.e., the city council) inform the chief in writing that
the finding does not support IA's determination.

o Refer the finding for reconsideration to the police bureau's Review Level
Committee (consisting of branch managers, the accused officer's manager, the
PIIAC auditor, one citizen adviser, and nonvoting representatives from the
police bureau and the city).

On the two or three occasions a year when the advisory board asks the Review
Level Committee to reconsider a finding, the examiner and the adviser who
reviewed the case participate in the meeting. On occasion, the Review Level
Committee has agreed to change an exonerated finding to one of insufficient
facts. On one occasion, the chief overruled the Review Level Committee's
recommendation and sided with the PIIAC advisers to sustain a complaint.

Advisory meetings last about 90 minutes, with 15-20 minutes devoted to each
appeal. After each monthly meeting, the examiner drafts a report for PIIAC
summarizing the advisory board's conclusions regarding each appeal.

Audits

Five citizen advisers volunteer to be on a PIIAC monitoring subcommittee.
Subcommittee members look at cases chosen at random by the examiner to
determine trends in quality, timeliness, and accuracy of the police bureau's IA
procedures and investigations.

Internal affairs sends the examiner all closed cases each month-30-40 cases.
The examiner assigns the cases to monitoring subcommittee members with a
worksheet to guide their review, but she does most of the reviews herself,
including all cases that involve the alleged use of excessive force or
discrimination and all cases IA sustains.

The examiner or the assigned subcommittee member goes individually to the
police bureau to review the entire file for each case in a private room. One of
them completes the worksheet with pertinent information about the case.
Officers' and complainants' names are not included in the reports. The examiner
and adviser spend 2-4 hours examining how thoroughly and fairly the investigation 
was conducted and whether the finding is solidly supported.

At each monthly monitoring subcommittee meeting, which is open to the public
and the press, advisers and the examiner discuss trends they may have spotted
in their investigations. (See "Troublesome Trends Revealed by Monitoring
Cases.") Based on the audit results, the examiner develops a draft quarterly
report, with subcommittee members' help, highlighting shortcomings in the
investigations, abuse trends, and recommended policy or training changes (see
"Other activities" on page 45). At the next monthly subcommittee meeting,
subcommittee members review the report-and pertinent statutes and general
orders that the examiner prepares for them-before the examiner submits it to
the full citizens advisory board at a public session for review and approval. The
examiner submits the approved report to PIIAC.

During her first year in 1994-95, Lisa Botsko, the examiner, used to send 60
percent of cases back to IA for additional work; by 1998, this had declined to
20 percent because "IA had figured out what I was looking for." Botsko heard
investigators saying, "Be careful, or PIIAC will send it back." (See "Auditors
Have Identified Problems With IA's Investigations.") Internal affairs also
improved its reports because the bureau improved its training and guidelines for
IA investigators.

PIIAC (city council and mayor)

The city council conducts PIIAC business once or twice a month during its
regular weekly meetings. The council may piggyback other council work onto
the PIIAC agenda; at other times, council members may not meet as PIIAC for
2 or 3 months because no appeals reach them. The examiner schedules the
meetings and the mayor chairs them.

Typically, PIIAC hears one or two appeals a month. Sessions are open to the
public and are televised by a local television cable channel. The complainant
may come to the meeting, and someone is present from IA to answer questions.
The committee has the power to compel attendance, testimony, and the
production of documents and can administer oaths.

The adviser and auditor present each case, and the complainant comments.
While the subject officer may sit in with the other members of the audience, he
or she is not questioned because the auditor listens in advance to the taped IA
interviews and, as needed, has already requested IA to ask any questions of the
officer she felt were omitted. Commissioners ask questions throughout. Each
commissioner then comments on the case and votes in public. A majority rules.
The committee informs the chief in writing of one of the following:

o No additional investigation is warranted.

o IA should reopen the case to conduct additional investigation and report its
findings to PIIAC.

o The finding should be changed (see "When PIIAC and IA Disagree on a
Finding").

Other activities

Based on its audits, the examiner recommends policy and procedure changes to
the police bureau in her quarterly reports that the city council, acting as PIIAC,
votes to adopt. The chief must respond to the report in writing within 60 days.
The response must indicate what policy or procedural changes within IA, if any,
he has instituted as a result of the report. If the chief does not respond within 60
days, the examiner sends an e-mail reminding him or telephones the IA
commander. If the chief still fails to respond, the city council can consider the
matter. Chapter 3 presents illustrative policy recommendations PIIAC has
made that the bureau has adopted.

Staffing and budget

Each of the four city council members appoints one adviser; the police
commissioner, who also is the mayor, appoints two advisers; and each of seven
neighborhood coalitions chartered by the city recommends an adviser 
to the city council for appointment. Advisers serve for 2 years, subject to
reappointment.

The mayor appoints and funds the examiner, who spends full time on oversight
activities. The examiner's salary is $43,000. The mayor's office also pays for
oversight-related duplication, telephone, and secretarial costs.

Distinctive features

The most unusual features of Portland's oversight system are, first, the use of
citizen advisers to review completed internal affairs investigations at the police
station and, second, the city council's role in hearing citizen appeals.

o By trying to ensure that IA investigations are done properly, the auditor's
approach may eliminate the need for independent professionals to investigate
citizen complaints. This approach may reduce the costs of citizen oversight.

o Because PIIAC does not accept citizen complaints, some individuals may not
report allegations of police misconduct because they may be afraid to take their
complaints to the police bureau. Citizens do have the option of filling out
complaint forms at the neighborhood coalitions represented among the citizen
advisers, which then forward the forms to IA.

o PIIAC examines only completed cases. As a result, PIIAC cannot shape the
conduct of individual investigations while they are in progress. However,
through its audits, PIIAC may be able to motivate investigators to do a better
job overall. By not investigating cases, the oversight procedure may receive
better cooperation from the police.

o Citizen advisers are not professional auditors. As a result, they may not
possess, or may need time to learn, the skills needed to conduct a competent
audit.

o Because a majority of citizen advisers are chosen by neighborhood
associations, citizens may be more likely to feel they are well represented in the
oversight process than if advisers were chosen by city officials.

o The system does not require police officers to participate in the audit process.

o Because PIIAC and advisory board meetings are public, and because PIIAC
must publish periodic reports, the media have an opportunity to focus on police 
misconduct, examine how the police bureau conducts its internal affairs
investigations, and publicize what they learn.

o PIIAC commissioners-even though they make up the city council-do not have
the power to overrule the chief's decision to sustain or not sustain complaints.
Police administrators are likely to feel it is important that the ultimate decision
remain with the department. Complainants may feel frustrated that elected
officials do not have the final say in their cases.

o Because the auditor works for the mayor, the chief executive is free to
increase or decrease the hours she devotes to PIIAC.

For further information, contact:

Examiner
Police Internal Investigations Auditing Committee
1221 Southwest Fourth Avenue, Suite 340
Portland, OR 97204-1995
503-823-4126

Bret Smith
Commander, IA Unit
Portland Police Bureau
1111 Southwest Second Street
Portland, OR 97204
503-823-0236

The Rochester, New York, Civilian Review Board: Trained Mediators Review
Citizen Complaints

Background

In 1976, after community groups expressed serious concern when police officers 
killed a woman who was brandishing a knife, the mayor appointed a commission
to explore how to improve police-community relations and reduce the use of
excessive force. One of the panel's recommendations was a citizen review
process. As a result, the city council approved legislation establishing a Complaint
Investigation Committee, consisting of review panels with two command police
officers and one citizen that met at police headquarters to review completed IA
investigations. In 1984, the council changed the composition of the panels to
include two civilians and two command officers and established a conciliation
process. In 1992, the council renamed the committee the Civilian Review Board
(CRB), excluded any police representation, and moved the reviews to the city
hall.

The city council contracts with the Center for Dispute Settlement to train and
provide the panelists and arrange for the reviews. Founded in 1973 by the
American Arbitration Association, the center is the third oldest not-for-profit
dispute resolution organization in the Nation. It offers alternative dispute
resolution
options to the court system and trains community members to conduct
conciliation. 
The city council chose the Center for Dispute Settlement to perform the citizen 
oversight function because it appeared to be the most capable organization in the 
city for conducting an impartial review of police behavior. Although most of the 
center's funding comes from the New York State Unified Court System, CRB's 
budget is a line item in the police department's budget.

In 1997, the police department submitted 26 completed cases out of 131 for
CRB review, or 20 percent. The 26 cases involved 80 allegations. For the first
9 months of 1998, CRB reviewed 58 cases involving 141 allegations. CRB
sustained 23 percent of cases in 1997 but only 7 percent during the first 9 months
of 1998.

Procedure

Exhibit 2-12 shows CRB's review process, which is discussed in detail in the
following section.

Intake
Citizens may file complaints by mail or in person at the Center for Dispute
Settlement office as well as at city hall or police headquarters. The center
received nine complaints in 1997, most referred by the mayor's office, and five
complaints during the first 9 months of 1998. After screening to make sure the
case has merit or is  suitable for conciliation (see following), the center forwards
the complaints to the police department's internal affairs unit for investigation. The
vast majority of complainants file directly with the police department.

IA sends for CRB review all investigations of cases that involve:

o Charges of use of excessive force.

o Conduct that, if proven, would constitute a crime.

o Other matters the chief chooses to refer to CRB.

During or after completion of each internal affairs investigation, IA calls Todd
Samolis, the CRB coordinator, to notify him to set up and schedule a panel to
review the completed case.

Hearings
Each CRB panel consists of three volunteers selected from a pool of 15-20
individuals who are certified mediators, have attended a shortened version of a
police academy (see below), and receive special training to function as
panelists. One of the three panelists is a chairperson who facilitates the review.
CRB held as few as two panels in January 1998 and as many as 13 in June; the
modal number (occurring in each of 5 months in 1998) was 7.

Reviews are held during the day in a soundproof, locked room in the city hall
basement where the CRB files are kept under lock and key. The investigating
sergeant for a given complaint brings the key to the room and unlocks it for the
panelists before the review.

The sergeant begins the session with a 3-5 minute summary of the case,
distributes copies of the case file (including pertinent department policies and
procedures), and leaves. However, the investigator leaves a pager number so
that panelists can call with questions during their deliberations. The CRB
legislation also requires the department to make available an officer with the
rank of captain or higher, neither from IA nor a commander of the officer
involved in the case, to answer questions related to department policy and
procedure. For example, panelists once called the designated captain to ask
whether it was department policy that officers take all subjects sprayed with
Mace to the hospital; he informed them that officers have the discretion to take
them to the police station basement to wash out their eyes.

Panelists do not have access to the IA investigator's case file in advance.
Instead, they review the file after the investigator has left. After the panelists
have completed their silent review, the chair introduces the allegations one by
one. Each member gives his or her recommended finding and rationale.
Questions and discussion follow.

Findings
On occasion, panelists ask the investigating sergeant to conduct additional
investigation, such as interviewing a new witness or reinterviewing an existing
witness. If the panel is still unsatisfied with the quality of the investigation, it can
appeal, in sequence, to the IA commander, the chief, the mayor, and the city
council. The city council, with its full subpoena power, can itself interview
witnesses and request documents. Panels have never needed to go beyond the
IA sergeant to request additional investigation. (See "A CRB Review Reverses
a Department Finding.")

At the end of the discussion (if they have not requested any additional
investigation), the chairperson tape records the panel's finding and justification.
As can IA investigators, panelists may choose among four findings: unfounded,
exonerated, unprovable, and sustained. Panels make their determination based
on a preponderance of the evidence. Although panelists do not vote, they
disagreed on only 5 of the 141 allegations they reviewed during the first 9
months of 1998. When not unanimous, the dissenting panelist may read his or
her finding into the tape along with the rationale for dissenting. After the taping,
the chairperson opens an envelope the investigating sergeant left that contains
IA's findings. The panels' findings are consistent with the IA findings about 95
percent of the time.

When the session is over, the chairperson telephones the investigator, who
retrieves the tape and written report. (City hall is a 5-minute walk from police
headquarters.) The IA unit sends CRB's findings, along with its own findings, to
the subject officer's division commander, the deputy chief, and the chief for
review. If the chief sustains the finding, the case goes through the chain of
command for penalty recommendations, starting with the officer's sergeant and
ending with the chief, who makes the ultimate disciplinary determination.

In 1997, the chief disagreed with 6 of the 80 panel findings. In all but one of the
six, he increased the severity of the finding--in four cases he changed it from
unfounded to unprovable. In each case, there were no independent witnesses to
verify the account of the incident. When the chief disagrees with a CRB finding,
the coordinator can take the disagreement to the mayor or the city council, but
he has never done so.

Other responsibilities

CRB also suggests policy changes, remedial training, and changes in IA
investigation procedures to the department, and the Center for Dispute
Settlement mediates selected citizen complaints.

Policy and other recommendations
CRB can make recommendations to the chief regarding revisions to police
policies and procedures relevant to a given case. Although CRB does not
recommend discipline, panelists may recommend case-related remedial training.

A mother and daughter filed a complaint because they felt they were being
treated as suspects when they called the police to disperse some gang members
who would not leave their porch. The mother and daughter objected so
strongly to the officers' attitude that the officers ended up arresting the two
women. A CRB panel exonerated the officers but recommended they be
retrained in interviewing and conflict resolution skills. The chief ordered the
retraining.

Todd Samolis, the CRB coordinator, meets with his IA counterpart every 3
months to go over each case to learn whether any policy, training, and
investigation procedure changes that panels may have recommended were
implemented. The chief sends CRB new or revised general orders that result
from a panel recommendation.

Conciliation
In 1984, a city council member suggested the Center for Dispute Settlement
provide a conciliation option in an effort to help build positive relations between
officers and citizens. Cases involving allegations of excessive use of force are
not eligible for conciliation.

Depending on where the complainant files the case, either Todd Samolis or an
IA investigator may ask the person if he or she would find conciliation an
acceptable alternative to an IA investigation and CRB review if the officer also
agreed to the procedure. Most complainants offered the option to conciliate
accept. When an officer's supervisor presents an officer with the option, about
half comply.

For conciliating citizen complaints against the police, Samolis chooses one of
the center's mediators who have participated in a 1-day extra training session
on police conciliation. Conciliations are confidential. The parties sign no written
agreement. Instead, the mediator indicates in the case file whether in the
complainant's judgment the matter was resolved or unresolved.

If the matter is resolved, Samolis sends a letter indicating closure to IA. Internal
affairs does not investigate the complaint, and the case is closed. Samolis
notifies IA if the matter is not resolved and the complainant wishes to have the
complaint investigated. In 1997, three out of the four conciliations were
successful. Of five conciliations conducted from January through September
1998, two were resolved, one was unresolved, for one the complainant did not
appear, and for one the officer did not appear.

Staffing and budget

CRB's activities are administered by Todd Samolis, the full-time coordinator;
by the half-time support of the Center for Dispute Settlement director of special
programs; and by the quarter-time support of the center's director of training
services. Candidates for panelist positions must first attend the Center for
Dispute Settlement's 25-hour principles of mediation course that provides State
mediation certification. The course includes extensive training in how to be
impartial. Candidates then serve an apprenticeship that involves observing
regular mediators in two or three sessions, co-mediating two or three sessions
with an experienced mediator, and conducting an observed pass/fail solo
mediation session. Finally, candidates attend a 2-week, 48-hour condensed
version of a police academy run by the police department that includes using
sidearms with a "Shoot/Don't Shoot" simulator, handcuffing, and explanations of
department policies and procedures.

CRB administrators nominate experienced panelists who have demonstrated 
exemplary ability as permanent chairpersons. The mayor approves their selection. 
CRB arranges for one of the chairpersons to run each panel before contacting
two
regular panelists to complete the panel.

The Center for Dispute Settlement's fiscal year 1998-99 budget for CRB and
conciliation was $128,069 (see exhibit 2-13). The budget includes $17,000 for
panel member and mediator stipends.

Distinctive features

Rochester's use of trained mediators to review cases is the oversight
procedure's most innovative feature.

o According to Todd Samolis, the CRB coordinator, "Training as mediators
goes to the essence of objectivity, including promoting listening skills, asking 
probing and open-ended questions, developing a rationale for each position
taken, and looking at all sides of a problem." However, if CRB's parent
organization were not a dispute resolution center, arranging to train board
members as mediators might be expensive.

o Panelists hold the position for life (subject to proper behavior). On the one
hand, their longevity provides them with considerable experience reviewing
cases that may enable them to act efficiently and objectively. On the other hand,
according to Robert Duffy, the chief of police, "Some of them may sort of
'settle in' and lose the fresh perspective citizens can bring to police work." In
addition, rotating panelists would enable CRB and police to educate more
community members to the nature of police work.

o By designating permanent chairpersons, usually from among long-time
panelists, only the most qualified and experienced panelists facilitate the
reviews.

o Cases are reviewed relatively quickly. (The city council deliberately chose a
system that would avoid the delays it found existed in some other jurisdictions.)
According to the city council resolution establishing the board, CRB has to
review cases within 2 weeks of IA's notification that its investigation is
complete.

o Panels are anonymous and not open to the public. As a result, panelists are
not under pressure to skew their decisions in response to the demands of public
or police interest groups. However, the public may lack confidence in CRB's
objectivity since citizens are not privy to the review process.

o Panelists do not have an opportunity to review IA case files before the panel
meets. This results in extra time being taken during the meeting while panelists
review the files and may create pressure to review the materials less thoroughly
than if panelists could review them at home at their leisure before the meeting.
Panelists also do not have the opportunity to ponder the cases in advance of the
meetings. However, by not distributing any IA case files outside the meeting
room, the police department is assured they will never be made public, for
example, by getting lost.

o By not handling allegations of police discourtesy and other less serious
complaints (unless they are part of a serious complaint), CRB can focus on
more important cases. However, the board might be able to handle many less
serious cases through mediation with greater satisfaction to complainants and
more objectivity than the police department may be able to achieve.

For further information, contact:

Todd Samolis
Coordinator of Special Projects
Civilian Review Board
300 State Street, Suite 301
Rochester, NY 14614
716-546-5110

Robert Duffy
Chief of Police
Rochester Police Department
City Public Safety Building
Civic Center Plaza
Rochester, NY 14614
716-428-7033

The St. Paul Police Civilian Internal Affairs Review Commission: A
Police-Managed Board Recommends Discipline

Background

Because of complaints about police misconduct, and in the aftermath of the 
Rodney King beating in Los Angeles, William Finney, the
St. Paul police chief, urged the city council to establish a commission to look
into forming a civilian oversight procedure. The resulting Police Civilian Internal
Affairs Review Commission began operation in December 1993. Located in
the fire department wing of the public safety building, the commission is
operated by the police department.

The commission met 12 times in 1997 to review 71 cases involving 149
allegations
(73 of them involved the alleged use of excessive force). The commission's
findings
were as follows:

o Unfounded: 53 (36 percent).

o Exonerated: 32 (22 percent).

o Not sustained: 41 (28 percent).

o Sustained: 23 (15 percent).

The commission also reviewed 24 cases of discharge of firearms and found
them all to be justified. The commission found a policy failure in two cases.

The review process

Exhibit 2-14 displays the citizen review procedure in St. Paul.

Intake
The St. Paul administrative code requires the commission to review all
completed IA investigations related to:

o Alleged acts of excessive force.

o Use of firearms (regardless of whether there has been a citizen complaint-see
"The Review Commission Hears All Discharge-of-Firearms Incidents").

o Discrimination.

o Poor public relations.

o Other complaints the chief or mayor chooses to refer to the commission. (The
chief sometimes refers internal complaints, particularly sexual harassment
cases.)

While about three-quarters of complainants contact the IA unit to file a
complaint, some contact the commission. The review commission coordinator
takes basic information about the complaint and refers the complainant to the
IA unit. The unit investigates serious allegations of misconduct itself but refers
minor problems down the chain of command to the subject officers' supervisors
for settlement. The IA commander reviews these settlements but does not send
them to the commission for review.

Case review
The commission coordinator, a nonsworn police department employee, collects
IA's investigative packets 2 weeks before each commission meeting, duplicates
them, and hand delivers a copy to each commissioner (some commissioners
pick them up in person) 1 week before they meet. The commission meets in the
chief's conference room the first Wednesday of every month from 

7:00 p.m. to about 10:00 p.m.

Because the Minnesota Data Practices Act gives employees (e.g., police
officers) privacy in administrative hearings, only commissioners, the commission 
coordinator, the IA commander and investigators, and a recording secretary
attend. 
Members hear about seven cases each meeting. The commission may
request--and has subpoena power to require--that individuals appear before it.

The IA investigator summarizes the first case and gives his or her
recommendation that the allegations be sustained, not sustained, exonerated, or
unfounded. The commissioners discuss each case, asking the investigator
questions as needed. The chairperson asks for a vote on the first allegation in
the case. If a majority sustains an allegation, they discuss what discipline to
recommend. Deliberations typically take 15-45 minutes per case. Most
decisions are unanimous. When there is disagreement, it is usually regarding the
discipline, not the finding. The commissioners may request that IA conduct
additional investigation. If they are still dissatisfied, they can hire an independent
investigator, although they have never done so.

The IA commander and investigator play no role in helping the commissioners
to resolve their differences and may not object to the commission's
recommendations. Commissioners may ask the commander what kinds of
discipline have been imposed before for the misconduct if it is a new type of
wrongdoing. Commissioners have access to the officers' previous disciplinary
records and can therefore recommend "progressive discipline"-more serious
sanctions for repeat offenders.

After the hearing
The chair sends the chief a memorandum after each hearing with the
commissioners' and IA's findings and, if the complaint has been sustained, the
commission's disciplinary recommendation. The commission has disagreed with
IA's finding in about a half dozen cases in its history.

A citizen complained that an officer's remark to a block party, "Don't call me
unless you call public housing first," meant that, if they did call, the officer would
not come. The officer claimed he had never said he would not come if called,
and no witnesses claimed he had said he would not come. Although IA had
sustained the complaint, the commission exonerated the officer. The chief sided
with the commission.
--Donald Luna

Since the commission's first meeting, William Finney, the current chief, has given it
the additional task of recommending disciplinary penalties for sustained cases.
Although the chief is not obligated to follow the commission's disciplinary
recommendations, Finney estimates that he disagrees with less than 2 percent of
the sanctions that the commission recommends. On one occasion, Finney met
with
the entire commission to explain why he chose to deviate from a recommended
discipline. When he has disagreed with the commission, Finney has usually
increased its recommended discipline. (See "The Chief Increases the
Commission's Recommended Punishment.")

There is no appeal of the commission's and chief's dispositions.

Staffing and budget

The review commission consists of five citizens and two police officers. The
mayor nominates the citizen members and the city council approves. The police
union's executive board nominates the two sworn members for approval by the
membership at a union meeting. Once approved, the chief recommends them to
the mayor for appointment. The two sworn police officers receive overtime pay
if meetings do not occur during their regular shifts. All commissioners serve
3-year terms, renewable once. The commission elects a chairperson and vice
chairperson from among the citizen members to preside over its proceedings.

A coordinator, appointed by the chief in consultation with the commission
chairperson, spends half of her time managing the complaint process. (She
spends the rest of her time coordinating the citizens' police academy.)

Exhibit 2-15 shows the commission's budget for 1995 (which has remained
largely unchanged in subsequent years). As shown, the entire appropriation was
$37,160, including half of the director's salary and $18,660 in direct costs.
However, because the commission has never exercised its option to hire an
independent investigator, the true costs are closer to $27,000 per year.

Distinctive features

The two special features of the St. Paul oversight system are the review
commission's inclusion of two active police officers from the city and its
mandate to recommend discipline.

o On one hand, some members of the community may not see the commission
as capable of being objective because it has two officers as commissioners, is
part of the police department, and meets at the police station. As a result, some
citizens may not trust the process. On the other hand:

--Because of who they are and their familiarity with how officers have been
trained, the sworn members of the commission tend to be tougher than the
civilian members in their findings and recommendations for discipline.

--Having two sworn officers on the board reduced friction between citizen
review advocates and the police union and other officers when the board was
being planned and in its subsequent operation.

o There are no disputes over gaining access to IA reports in a timely fashion
because the commission is internal to the department.

o Although the chief is not obligated to follow the commission's disciplinary
recommendations, the commission's ability to provide disciplinary advice allows
the chief to learn how community representatives view each officer's
misconduct and to impose punishment, if he so chooses, that reflects these
representatives' concerns.

o The St. Paul oversight procedure provides no public forum for individual
citizens and organizations to express complaints and concerns about the police
department's policies and procedures and officers' behavior.

o Officers are spared having to appear before the commission, but some may
feel frustrated that they cannot present their side of the story in person.

For further information, contact:

William Finney
Chief
St. Paul Police Department
100 East 11th Street
St. Paul, MN 55101
612-292-3588

Ruth Siedschlag
Coordinator
Police Civilian Internal Affairs Review Commission
100 East 11th Street
St. Paul, MN 55101
612-292-3583

San Francisco's Office of Citizen Complaints: An Independent Body
Investigates Most Citizen Complaints for the Police Department

Background

In 1982, the San Francisco City/County Board of Supervisors put the Office of
Citizen Complaints (OCC) on the ballot as a voter initiative after a series of
police clubbings of demonstrators led to pressure for a citizen oversight
procedure from liberal organizations and historically discriminated-against
communities, including the department's own African-American Officers for
Justice. A police commission, consisting of five members appointed by the
mayor, supervises both OCC and the police department. The commission hires
the chief and OCC director. The commission or the mayor may remove 
the chief. Only the commission may remove the OCC director.

OCC received 1,126 new complaints in 1997. Of 983 cases closed in 1997,
OCC sustained one or more allegations in 100 cases, or 10 percent. In 1997,
OCC held more than 50 hearings at the chief's level and prosecuted 6 cases
before the police commission.

The complaint filing process

Exhibit 2-16 diagrams the civilian oversight process in San Francisco. The
following text describes each step in the process.

Intake
The police department's internal affairs division (technically called the
Management Control Division) alone investigates complaints brought by officers
against each other and incidents involving off-duty officers and nonsworn
personnel. Internal affairs and OCC both investigate cases involving use of a
firearm. OCC alone investigates cases citizens initiate alleging misconduct-or
failure to perform a duty-by on-duty officers.

Internal affairs sergeants offer to help citizens who appear at the police station
to fill out the complaint intake form and forward it to OCC, but more than half
of these citizens choose to go to OCC (a 15-minute walk from police
headquarters) to fill out the form. Complainants also may telephone, mail, or fax
their complaint to OCC. Of the 1,126 complaints OCC received in 1997, 43
percent were made in person, 23 percent by phone, 21 percent by mail, 5
percent at the police department, and 6 percent by other means. Organizations
filed 24 of the complaints in 1997 (see "Organizations May File Complaints").

When a complainant appears in person, the receptionist asks the person to fill
out an intake form. The receptionist calls the intake investigator for the day
(each investigator generally does intake 11/2 to 2 days a month) or, if he or she
is busy or on break, the backup intake investigator (who is the following day's
intake investigator). If the citizen telephones to file a complaint, the receptionist
may refer the call to an investigator and generally mails the person the intake
form to complete and mail back. After OCC has received the form, an
investigator telephones the complainant and conducts a telephone interview or
arranges to interview the citizen in person. In serious cases, OCC makes an
investigator available 24 hours a day, 7 days a week.

The initial interview with the complainant
California State law and the police commission prohibit revealing any
information about a complaint to the public unless the case is heard by the
police commission (see "Police commission hearings" on page 59). The
investigator therefore tells the citizen the complaint will be kept confidential
unless the person makes it public. As a result, the investigator cannot locate or
interview witnesses by telling people about the complaint unless the complainant
agrees to their being told about the complaint.

Because investigators can log onto the police department's computer, they can
find the computer-aided dispatch data during the interview to identify which
officers were at the scene as well as to download the incident report.
Investigators also review the pertinent general orders and department bulletins
to determine whether the officers may have violated department policy.

Investigators tape record all interviews except when citizen informants refuse to
serve as witnesses. The typical interview lasts 15 minutes to 1 hour. OCC gives
the complainant a copy of the complaint form and sends another copy to each
named officer providing notification of the allegations as required by State law.
OCC sends a copy to the officer's commanding officer and to internal affairs.
(See "Added Allegations.")

The officer interview
The investigator develops an investigation plan that includes interviewing the
involved officer(s) and any witnesses and reviewing available written
documents. The plan may also include collecting evidence, such as visiting the
scene of the incident, photographing vehicles, and using the police department's
photo lab to take pictures of injured complainants.

Investigators interview officers after they have collected sufficient evidence to
determine the best questions to ask. Investigators may not sustain a case
without interviewing the officer in person. It is a violation of police department
general orders for subject officers to refuse to attend and answer questions at
an OCC interview. If an officer ignores the request after investigation by internal
affairs, the department generally handles a first violation with an admonishment,
the second with a reprimand, and the third with a 1-day suspension.

Investigators generally prepare questions in advance and follow written
guidelines in their initial questioning of subject officers. A union representative
often comes to the interview with the officer. During the interview, some union
representatives raise objections for the record, which the investigator has no
authority to rule on. Objections may be resolved later at a chief's hearing or
police commission hearing (see "Police commission hearings" on page 59) if an
allegation has been sustained.

Findings
The investigator writes a report presenting the results of the investigation and
the factual basis for each recommended finding. After review by one of three
senior OCC investigators, Mary Dunlap, the OCC director, reviews the file.
Findings are based on a preponderance of the evidence. Although the city
charter gives OCC the power to recommend specific discipline, it generally
does not; OCC can influence the severity of the punishment by recommending
that the police commission-with its authority to provide the most severe
sanctions (see "Police commission hearings" on page 59)-hear a case.

Office administrative staff prepare and mail letters containing preliminary
findings to each complainant and named officer. Either party may request an
investigative hearing with an independent hearing officer granted at the
discretion of the OCC director. OCC received 76 requests for investigative
hearings in 1997, granted 12, and held 7 in 1997 and 5 in 1998.

Internal affairs division
If an allegation is sustained, OCC sends the case report containing a summary
of the relevant evidence and law to internal affairs, whose staff decide whether
they agree with the finding. Internal affairs agrees with OCC's findings about 90
percent of the time. When this occurs, an IA commanding officer determines
the level of severity guided by the department's Disciplinary Penalty & Referral
Guidelines, which recommends specific sanctions for specific types of
misconduct. The IA officer sends the finding with the discipline recommendation
to the Management Control Division commanding officer. If the commander
agrees with the disposition, IA staff notify Prentice Sanders, the assistant chief, of
the recommended finding and punishment. With rare exceptions, Sanders agrees
with OCC's sustained findings and IA's disciplinary recommendation. Internal
affairs writes the subject officer a letter offering the option of "a chief's hearing" or
acceptance of the stated discipline.

When IA disagrees with an OCC finding, the IA officer-in-charge and the
OCC investigator discuss their disagreement. About half the time, they reach a
consensus. When they fail to reach a consensus, the OCC sustained disposition
with which IA disagrees remains in the officer's file, but no discipline is imposed
unless the OCC director asks the chief to submit the case to the police
commission for trial. When the chief and OCC disagree on whether disciplinary
action is appropriate in a case that OCC has sustained, the following procedure
is used:

1. The chief returns the file to the OCC director explaining his disagreement.

2. The OCC director reopens the investigation, if necessary. If she determines
on review that discipline is not warranted, the matter is closed. If she
determines that discipline is warranted, she prepares and forwards a "verified"
[i.e., by her] complaint to the chief.

3. If the chief files the verified complaint with the police commission, the
commission may elect to hold a hearing on the disciplinary charges against the
officer.

4. If the chief decides not to file the complaint with the police commission, he
must tell the commission in writing. After reviewing the chief's and OCC
director's decisions, the commission may order the chief to file the complaint.
The commission decides whether to hold a hearing to try the charges in the
complaint and, if the charges are sustained, to determine the discipline.

This procedure places the ultimate decision regarding disciplinary action in the
hands of citizens if the police commission chooses to hear a disputed case.

Although there has been only one instance (still ongoing) in which the chief has
been obliged to decide whether to file a verified complaint with the police
commission, there have been instances in which the commission has ruled on
disagreements that the chief and OCC have asked it to resolve.

When officers in a hostage situation heard the hostage taker, who was holding a
knife to the victim's throat, say he would kill her, they could have legally used
lethal force. However, an officer threw his baton instead, hitting the man on the
head and ending the crisis. OCC requested the officer be suspended because
department orders prohibit throwing a baton. The internal affairs division said
that using less-than-lethal force was preferable in the situation to using lethal
force. Because IA and OCC disagreed on the finding, the police commission
heard the case. The commission refused to sustain the allegation, ruling instead
that the department's policies on use of batons needed to be changed.

The chief's hearing
Fred Lau, the current chief of police, delegates the chief's hearing to Prentice
Sanders, the assistant chief. However, the chief reviews all of Sanders'
decisions. Sanders upheld OCC's sustained findings and imposed discipline in
74 of 88 chief's hearings held in 1998.

The Management Control Division schedules and runs the chief's hearings with
the subject officer, union representative, and the officer's captain present. An
OCC attorney prosecutes the case. The union representative gives the subject
officer's version of the incident and may introduce evidence exonerating the
officer. The captain often gives an opinion about the case as well. Because of
the informal nature of the chief's hearing, no sworn testimony is taken, although
Sanders may ask the officer some questions. About half the time, Sanders
makes a disciplinary decision at the hearing; the rest of the time, he decides
later. Officers may appeal Sanders' decision to the police commission if a
suspension of at least 1 day is ordered.

Police commission hearings
The police commission hears cases that:

o Subject officers have appealed and the commission agrees to accept.

o The chief forwards to it.

o Involve more than a 10-day suspension.

o The commission decides to hear because of a conflict between OCC and the
chief on a finding.

o Involve driving under the influence and domestic violence (most of which are
IA, not OCC, cases).

The commission holds a formal administrative hearing  to redetermine the finding, 
this time at the hearing level (versus OCC's investigation level), and to impose
punishment if the commissioners sustain the allegations. Commissioners first
conduct a factfinding hearing and then receive and review transcripts of that
hearing before a penalty hearing. At the final administrative hearing, all parties are
present. An OCC trial attorney prosecutes the case, and the union attorney or
privately retained counsel defends the officer. After opening statements, there is
direct and cross examination of the parties and witnesses. In highly publicized
cases, as many as 600 people have shown up to observe.

Commissioners, who deliberate in private, make their determination based on a
preponderance of the evidence. The commission's findings often are unanimous.
The commission can suspend officers for up to 90 days per offense or terminate
them. Officers may request a judicial review to appeal the commission's
decision. Of the 12 commission hearings held in 1998, 2 involved OCC cases.
Commissioner hearings are relatively infrequent because, when officers agree to
a suspension or resign rather than be fired, the hearing is canceled.

Other activities

OCC provides the police department with policy recommendations, arranges
mediation, and assists with the department's early warning system.

Policy recommendations
OCC submits policy recommendations to IA and includes them in its annual
report to the police commission. OCC's 1997 annual report provided 15 policy
recommendations arising out of citizen complaints.

If IA agrees with an OCC policy recommendation, it tries to negotiate a
solution with the OCC director-for example, restating an existing policy or
requiring additional training. In 1997, OCC recommended that officers with
complaint records be rejected as field training officers (FTOs). Internal affairs
and the department compromised on a new policy that includes a review of the
number of complaints against a candidate for FTO but excludes complaints
from more than 5 years previous to the FTO's candidacy. The union and police
commission both approved the change. Chapter 3, "Other Oversight
Responsibilities," identifies additional policy recommendations that OCC has
made.

Mediation
OCC provides a mediation option, but few citizens agree to the alternative,
apparently because they feel uncomfortable with the approach. Of the 22 new
cases eligible for mediation in 1997, 16 complainants (and 2 officers) refused to
mediate. Twelve cases were mediated during the year (including several cases
held over from the previous year). OCC uses volunteer mediators approved by
the San Francisco Bar Association.

Early warning system
Every 3 to 6 months, OCC submits a report to the police department and to
every commanding officer identifying the name and badge numbers of each
officer who has three or more OCC complaints (excluding unfounded
complaints) over the previous 6-month period or four or more complaints
within the year. The report for the first half of 1998 identified 78 such officers.
The first time their name appears, officers are given a performance review; the
second time, getting a promotion and special assignments may be in jeopardy
(and they cannot be a field training officer for 5 years).

Staffing and budget

In mid-1998, OCC had 15 full-time investigators (including two practicing trial
attorneys) and a total staff of 30. Proposition G, approved by San Francisco
voters in 1995, requires the city to hire one OCC investigator for every 150
police officers (see chapter 4, "Staffing"). As shown in exhibit 2-17, OCC's
fiscal year 1998-99 budget was $2,198,778.

Distinctive features

The most unusual feature of San Francisco's oversight process is that an
independent body in effect acts as the police department's internal affairs unit
for citizen complaints about police misconduct.

o With the exception of complaints by one officer against another and incidents
involving off-duty officers and nonsworn personnel, OCC alone conducts the
San Francisco Police Department's investigations involving alleged officer
misconduct. (The department and OCC investigate use of firearms
simultaneously and independently.) This approach may increase the
community's confidence in the independence of the oversight process. Some
police feel that OCC investigators are not competent to evaluate their behavior.

o Organizations, not just aggrieved individuals, may-and frequently have-filed
complaints with OCC. Allowing organizations to file expands the opportunity
for the community to contribute to the oversight of police behavior. It may also
encourage or enable groups with political agendas to try to influence the
oversight process.

o Each OCC investigator's finding is reviewed by as many as three supervisors.
Trained legal staff review every sustained case. Multiple reviews increase the
opportunity for quality control. Multiple reviews also require extra time and
expense.

o San Francisco voters approved an initiative that requires the city to hire one
OCC investigator for every 150 police officers to ensure that there are
adequate staff to address all citizen complaints. The required ratio also
increases program costs.

o OCC's findings cannot be changed by the police department; only the police
commission can overturn an OCC finding. The findings go into officers' files
even if the department refuses to hand out any discipline.

o Citizens in San Francisco can make the ultimate decision on whether an
officer is disciplined. If the chief and OCC director disagree on whether
disciplinary action in a sustained case is appropriate, and the chief decides not
to file the case with the police commission for a judgment, there is a process by
which the police commission may elect to review the case and decide to hold a
trial.

o In its investigatory capacity, OCC acts as a neutral party between the
complainant and the police officer. However, if the case goes to a chief's or
police commission hearing, OCC attorneys prosecute the officer. This dual role
may blur the program's mission in fact or in the public's and police department's
perception, resulting in antagonism from some community groups and the
police.

For further information, contact:

Mary Dunlap
Director, Office of Citizen Complaints
480 Second Street, Suite 100
San Francisco, CA 94107
415-597-7711

Fred Lau
Chief of Police
San Francisco Police Department
Hall of Justice
850 Bryant Street
San Francisco, CA 94103
415-553-1551

Prentice Sanders
Assistant Chief of Police
San Francisco Police Department
Hall of Justice
850 Bryant Street, Room 525
San Francisco, CA 94103
415-553-9087

Tucson's Dual Oversight System: A Professional Auditor and a Citizen Review
Board Collaborate

Background

In 1996, several Tucson police officers were sent to prison for assault, armed
robbery, and child molestation. As a result, some citizen groups and
complainants' attorneys felt the existing police oversight board, established in
1980, was not adequately supervising police misconduct. In response, the
mayor asked the city council's public safety committee to present options to the
city council for new forms of oversight. In March 1997, after intense debate,
the mayor and city council replaced the old board with a new and more
powerful Citizen Police Advisory Review Board. At the same time, they
established a new position of independent police auditor. The council hired
Liana Perez as the first auditor in July 1997.

From September 1, 1997, through June 30, 1998, 289 citizens contacted
Perez. She or her staff answered questions from 155 of the individuals who
called. 
The auditor's office took 96 formal complaints, which Perez  forwarded to the
police department for investigation. The remaining contacts were requests by 
citizens for Perez to monitor or review complaints they had
filed directly with the police department. During this 10-month period, she
monitored 63 ongoing investigations.

As explained in the following sections, the auditor and board have some
overlapping responsibilities as well as different duties.

The independent police auditor

The city manager appoints the auditor to a 4-year renewable term. He can
dismiss her, however, only with the approval of six of the seven city council
members. The city manager meets with Perez every 2 weeks, and every month
she submits a performance report to him. The auditor's office is located in city
hall.

The auditor's principal responsibilities are to:

1. Serve as an alternative to the police department for accepting citizen
complaints.

2. Monitor ongoing investigations as needed by sitting in on internal affairs
interviews.

3. Proactively audit--that is, review--completed IA investigations of citizen
complaints for fairness and thoroughness.

4. Review cases in which a citizen expresses dissatisfaction with the police
department's resolution of a complaint.

Intake
The auditor's full-time customer service representative accepts complaints in
person, in writing, by facsimile, or by telephone. Citizen review board members
(see "Citizen Police Advisory Review Board" on page 65), city council
members, and community groups refer complainants to the auditor. The auditor
forwards complaints to the police department's internal affairs bureau.

Monitoring
Exhibit 2-18 shows the auditing process and its relationship to the citizen review
board. As shown, every week the police department forwards a list of new
complaints to Liana Perez with the subject officers' names so she can decide
whether to sit in on any IA interviews before the investigations have been
completed. Perez monitors serious cases involving allegations of use of
excessive force. She monitors other cases based on:

1. Random selection.

2. A citizen's request that she attend.

3. A request from the citizen review board to attend.

Sometimes Perez attends the interviews to make the complainant feel more
comfortable-for example, if a female complainant wants another woman with
her-or if a complainant feels he or she will be unable to articulate the complaint
during a police interrogation. Perez sat in on one investigation when a woman
came to her with a complaint that involved several officers. Because Perez
knew that the officers' statements would be critical to a fair determination of
responsibility, she wanted to ensure that each officer would be interviewed
immediately after the other so they could not compare stories.

The city ordinance specifies that the auditor "cannot question witnesses but may
suggest questions to be asked" by IA investigators (See "An Officer's View of
the Auditor's Monitoring Activity"). Typically, Perez waits for a pause in the
questioning and then says she has a question, such as, "I'd like him to clarify
where he was standing when. . . ." The investigator then repeats the question to
the subject officer or witness. Some IA investigators permit Perez to ask
questions only at the end of each interrogation; others allow questions during
the interview. Some investigators allow her to ask questions directly of the
subject officer or witness.

The auditing process
Perez audits a random sample of completed investigations and all cases
involving allegations of excessive force. The police department must comply if
she requests additional investigation in a case. The auditor may also speak
directly with civilian witnesses regarding the fairness and completeness of
investigations.

The auditor does not sustain or disapprove of IA findings, and she does not
make disciplinary recommendations. Instead, she reports on whether the
investigation was fair and thorough. In effect, the auditor reviews IA's
performance, not subject officers' behavior.

Perez has not had to talk with the chief or city manager to resolve a
disagreement with IA. She did send back a case that IA did not sustain 
because she felt the investigating supervisor had disregarded key evidence 
implicating an officer. Internal affairs conducted additional interviews and
sustained the allegations.

Other activities
Perez looks for patterns of complaints in her audits and telephones the IA
commander if she finds a need for improvement. Perez expressed concern
about supervisors repeatedly overlooking previous complaints against individual
officers in deciding on discipline. As a result, the department formed, and
invited her to participate on, a task force to examine how discipline was being
meted out and how previous complaints should fit into the disciplinary decision.
If the chief refuses to implement a policy recommendation, the auditor can
appeal the refusal to the city manager, to whom both she and the chief report.

In fiscal year 1997-98, Perez arranged for four cases to be settled through
informal mediation because the citizens did not want to file formal complaints
but did want to express an objection to an officer's behavior. Perez brought the
parties together and mediated the disagreements herself.

Staffing and budget
The auditor's office includes two full-time staff: Perez and an administrative
assistant who takes citizens' initial complaints and has the authority to audit
completed investigations.

Exhibit 2-19 shows the auditor's budget for fiscal year 1997-98-when the
office was created-and for 1998-99. As shown, the startup budget was
$144,150, with almost 68 percent allocated to staff salaries. In addition,
$37,400 were allocated for what are likely to be one-time expenses, such as
the purchase of office furniture and computer equipment and software. As a
result, the requested 1998-99 budget is only $118,710, with 87 percent allocated 
to staff salaries.

Citizen Police Advisory Review Board

The Citizen Police Advisory Review Board has seven voting members. It also
has seven nonvoting members-four community advocate members and one
member each appointed by the city manager's office, police department, and
police union. The board elected Suzanne Elefante as its first chairperson.

Board operations
As shown in exhibit 2-18, the city ordinance authorizes the board to:

1. Refer citizens who wish to file complaints to the auditor and the police
department.

2. Request the auditor to monitor a particular case and present her findings.

3. Ask the police department to review a completed case.

4. Review completed IA investigations itself for fairness and thoroughness.

The board spent most of 1997-98 getting organized, including developing its
procedures, establishing subcommittees, and training board members.

Intake
About eight citizens a month call their council representatives to complain about
alleged police misconduct. Most council members give them the name and
telephone number of the member of the review board whom they have
appointed along with the auditor's telephone number. Board members, in turn,
typically refer complainants to the auditor because the citizens are usually
already unhappy with the IA investigation. When citizens file a complaint with
the board, not with an individual member, Suzanne Elefante checks to see
whether Liana Perez is already auditing the case. If she is, Elefante asks her to
report her findings to the board; if not, Elefante asks her to audit it.

Appeals of completed investigations
Complainants who are dissatisfied with the IA investigation or the auditor's
review may ask the board to review their cases. If the board agrees to review
the complaint, it requests and receives IA's case files to examine between
meetings. (State law makes IA investigations matters of public record.) The
board may ask Liana Perez to do additional investigation or answer questions
about the case if the auditor has already audited the case. After hearing from
Perez, the board may recommend a different finding to the chief or the city
council, but it has no power to enforce its recommendations.

Involvement of the public
The board meets from 6:30 p.m. to 9:00 p.m. the third Tuesday of the month in
the main downtown library. The city clerk's office places notices of board and
subcommittee meetings in newspapers and in city hall. The meeting begins with
a "call to the audience" for any complaints and issues, with each person allowed
to talk for up to 5 minutes. The board puts issues requiring more attention on
the agenda for a future meeting, including complainants who wish to appeal an
IA or auditor finding to the board. The auditor provides an update on the cases
she has been receiving and monitoring. The board discusses other topics, such
as the activities of off-duty officers. A police department IA member attends to
answer questions about department policies and procedures and to report on
IA activities during the previous month.

Other activities
The board may provide recommendations for changes in department policies
and procedures to the chief, the auditor, the city manager, or the mayor and city
council. Based on research by a board subcommittee that found that 11 of 26
police departments conducted random drug testing of all officers, the board
sent a memo to the chief recommending random drug testing. The chief has not
yet acted because testing is covered in the labor-management agreement, and
the union is negotiating a new agreement.

Staffing and budget
Each council member appoints one board member for a 4-year term 
(or until the end of the elected official's term). The board reports
to the mayor and the city council. The city clerk provides staff to type,
duplicate, and disseminate the board's minutes. There are no other board
expenses.

The relationship between the board and the auditor

The auditor and board do not officially report to each other. However, by city
ordinance the board:

o Monitors the auditor by examining her monthly reports and asking her questions
during monthly board meetings.

o May require the auditor to monitor or audit a case and report on her findings.

o May offer her recommendations.

The auditor and the board both have a legal mandate to review completed
cases, either on their own initiative or in response to a citizen complaint. There
has been no duplication of effort with reviews of IA investigations because the
board typically asks Perez to audit cases about which it has a concern and to
report back her findings; board members lack the time and expertise to conduct
more than a few reviews themselves. There also has been no duplication
because Perez has chosen to go to every board meeting, where board
members can routinely ask for updates on her previous month's cases and the
results of her monitoring activities.

Both the board and the auditor have made similar policy or procedure
recommendations. For example, an officer who had had a personal relationship
with a citizen took out a restraining order against the person and observed while
another officer served it. Because there was no clear department policy
prohibiting this specific action, IA exonerated the officer of the citizen's
allegation of inappropriate behavior. However, after reviewing the case, both
the auditor and the board independently requested the department to remind
officers that they need to report to the department's legal department whenever
they are involved in serving a restraining order in which the officer is a named
party.

The auditor handles the day-to-day work of citizen oversight, while the board
addresses general citizen concerns, not just complaints about specific acts of
alleged misconduct. As a result, one board member feels "the board acts as the
police department's eyes and ears for finding out the community's concerns
about police behavior--it is the community's pipeline to the police." When
citizens at a board meeting expressed concern that there was no random drug
testing for regular police officers (except for narcotics officers), the board set
up a subcommittee to research how other police departments conduct random
testing (see "Other activities" on this page).

Distinctive features

The most unusual feature of the oversight procedure in Tucson is the use of
both a paid, professional auditor and an independent volunteer citizen review
board. (See "San Jose, California's, Independent Police Auditor Has Some
Similarities and Differences With Tucson's Auditor.")

o According to Jos Ibarra, a city council member, "The dual system is good
for constituents because it provides checks and balances." The board can act
as a check on the auditor by the community to ensure that she is not operating
as "just another government bureaucrat" rather than as a neutral but aggressive
arbiter of complaints against the police. The auditor, in turn, provides the 
balance of ensuring that citizen complaints receive the concentrated and skilled
attention that the board does not have the time or expertise to provide. The
dual system also provides a check and balance in the sense that citizens can
seek help from one office if they are dissatisfied with the other office's response.
This may motivate each office to do an especially good job so that it is not
second 
guessed by the other.

o The auditor and board complement each other in some respects:

--The board provides for direct citizen involvement in police oversight, while
the auditor represents city government. According to Capt. George Stoner,
commander of the IA unit, "The dual system makes sure that the department
addresses all segments of the city"-citizens and each branch of local
government.

--The board enables community representatives to offer the lay perspective of
the citizen regarding IA investigations of alleged police misconduct, while the
auditor's office makes it possible for a professional investigator to examine the
department's investigations of alleged misconduct.

--The board provides a public forum in which citizens can express general
concerns about the department, while the auditor can address dissatisfaction
citizens have about how IA handled specific complaints.

--When the auditor and board agree on a recommended policy or procedure
change, the recommendation in effect has the backing of the city manager, city
council, and mayor. The auditor's and board's agreement on a recommendation
also means that a professional investigator and lay citizens have agreed on the 
need for a change. This broad-based support may have more weight with the 
chief and local government than if only the auditor or the board propose the
change.

--In time, a division of labor may evolve in which the auditor devotes most of
her efforts to reviewing cases (as she already does) and the board focuses on
developing policy recommendations.

o The dual oversight system provides citizens with two avenues outside the
police department for registering dissatisfaction with IA investigations.

o The dual oversight system can involve some redundancy-that is, the auditor
and board are both engaged in conducting audits and recommending policy
changes, activities that either one of them could do effectively without the other.
Redundancy could then impose an unnecessary financial cost on taxpayers. The
potential for redundancy will be increased if one of the following occurs:

--The auditor and chairperson of the board fail to cooperate because of
personality differences, lack of interpersonal skills, an uncontrolled desire for
publicity or power, or strongly held and antithetical views regarding the nature
of police work.

--Political dissension arises between the city manager, who appoints the
auditor, and the city council, which appoints board.

o Neither the auditor nor the board has the legal authority to conduct
investigations into alleged police misconduct themselves, and they do not have
subpoena power. Rather, they audit, monitor, and publicize IA's conduct 
of investigations. By ensuring that IA investigations are done properly, the
auditor approach may eliminate the need for independent professionals to
investigate citizen complaints. This may reduce the cost of citizen oversight.

o Citizens have three choices about where to file--or refile--a complaint: with IA,
the auditor, and the board. This approach enables complainants "to shop for the
best deal." It also, in the words of a police officer, gives them "three bites at the
apple": If they are dissatisfied with the finding by one office, they can take their
complaint to the others.

The auditor's Web address is www.ci.tucson.az.us/ia.html.
For further information, contact:

Liana Perez
Independent Police Auditor
Office of the Independent Police Auditor
255 West Alameda
First Floor, South
Tucson, AZ 85726-7210
520-791-5176

Suzanne Elefante
Chairperson, Citizens Police Advisory Review Board
2041 South Craycroft
Tucson, AZ 85711
520-790-4702

Capt. George Stoner
Tucson Police Department
270 South Stone Avenue
Tucson, AZ 85701
520-791-4441, ext. 1503

Teresa Guerrero-Daley
Independent Police Auditor, City of San Jose
4 North Second Street, Suite 650
San Jose, CA 95113
408-977-0652

---------------------------

Thumbnail Sketch: Berkeley

Model: citizens investigate (type 1)

Jurisdiction: Berkeley, California

Population: 107,800

Government: city council/city manager

Appointment of chief: city manager nominates, city council approves; city
manager can remove

Sworn officers: 190

Oversight funding: $277,255

Oversight staff: two full-time professionals; two full-time clerical

Oversight supervisor: city manager appoints Police Review Commission
officer

A nine-member, all volunteer Police Review Commission (PRC) appointed by
the city council holds public hearings of citizen complaints against the police
department (with three commissioners participating in each hearing).
A PRC officer appointed by the city manager forwards each complaint she
receives to the police department's internal affairs (IA) bureau, and she and IA
conduct simultaneous but independent investigations of the complaint. The PRC
officer forwards her investigation results to the PRC board for a hearing. After
the hearing, the board submits its findings to the city manager and the chief. Any
citizen may express concerns about department policies or procedures at full
commission meetings. Based on these public meetings and examination of
complaints citizens have filed, PRC recommends policy and procedure changes
to the city manager and chief.

---------------------------

A Hearing by Berkeley's Police Review Commission

The chairperson calls the meeting to order at 6:10 p.m. A complainant has
alleged that (1) an officer unlawfully taped a telephone conversation with her
and (2) failed to give proper explanation by stating that her complaint was a
civil, not a criminal, matter. The police officer's attorney begins by asking the
panel to dismiss the case on procedural grounds because the officer was an IA
investigator at the time of the incident. The chairperson refuses.

The chairperson then invites the complainant to state her complaint briefly. The
woman describes her call to the police after a business partner jumped her
locked fence, banged on her door, and demanded payment for an overdue bill.
The complainant asks to play the tape recording of her original 911 call, but the
chair rules the tape is irrelevant to this officer's case. (The complainant has filed
a complaint against another officer in which the tape is pertinent.) The chair
refuses two more requests by the officer's attorney to dismiss the case. On one
of the attorney's motions, he says he will get an opinion from the city attorney.
The officer's attorney asks the complainant several questions, after which two
board members ask her questions.

The officer (who comes in uniform) is sworn in, but he says he has no statement
to make. The complainant asks the officer several questions, including, "Don't
you feel bad about not protecting me [by coming out to her home when she
reported the trespass that was the origin of the case]?" The officer's lawyer
objects to the question, and the chair tells the complainant to save these kinds
of statements for her closing argument.

A commissioner asks the officer, "Do you tell people you are taping them?"
"Usually," he responds. The chair then asks the lieutenant, "Does the
department have a policy to record conversations and tell people whether they
are taping them?" The lieutenant says there is no rule, but the practice is usually
to tape and tell. Complainant: "May I say something?" Chair: "No."

The chair asks the officer why he did not tell the complainant to file a criminal
complaint and let the district attorney decide whether the incident was a criminal
matter. The officer shrugs his shoulders. The lawyer then asks the officer
questions and gives her closing statement, repeating her three motions for
dismissal. The complainant, too, gives a concluding statement, saying, "I am at a
disadvantage here because the officer has an attorney, but I cannot afford one."
She adds that it is insulting for the officer and his attorney to be chewing gum
throughout the entire proceeding. The officer gets up and throws out his gum;
his attorney does not.

The board leaves to deliberate at 7:15 p.m. and returns at 7:43 p.m. The chair
reports that the board voted 3 to 0 not to sustain the first allegation (illegal tape
recording) and 2 to 1 not to sustain the second allegation (improper advice).

As the meeting breaks up, the complainant tells the chair that she is very upset;
board members remain about 5 minutes longer to listen to her frustrations with 
the hearing process and outcome. The PRC officer explains to the complainant 
her right to appeal the decision.

---------------------------

A Citizen Has Mixed Feelings About the PRC Process

A Berkeley resident was stopped by a police officer and cited for a traffic
violation. The citizen felt he had not committed the violation but had been
singled out because of his ethnicity. A few weeks later, he heard about PRC
from a friend, who had read about it in the newspaper. Several weeks later, he
wrote a letter to PRC and the chief describing the incident and alleging several
acts of misconduct by the officer.

An internal affairs investigator telephoned the man to say that IA would
investigate the case independently of PRC. The IA investigator interviewed him
on the phone. The PRC investigator interviewed the man face-to-face in a
1-hour taped interview. The PRC investigator warned him that the outcome of
the case was uncertain. The complainant was frightened and tired and
concerned the police might retaliate against him for having filed the complaint.
But he followed through. After the interview, the investigator sent him a copy of
the transcript along with the officer's statement.

At the hearing, the complainant and the officer each gave a statement and asked
each other questions. The three board members asked them questions, too.
The commissioners then left the room for 20 to 30 minutes to deliberate. Two
board members found that the officer had engaged in an unprofessional
backtalk, but all three exonerated the officer on the other allegations. The board
member who dissented from the one negative finding explained his position.

The PRC investigator told the complainant at the end of the hearing that he
would not learn whether the officer would receive any discipline for the
sustained allegation. The complainant felt frustrated by this, but he also wanted
to put the episode behind him. Overall, the complainant said, "If a similar
incident happened again, I would still file a complaint with the PRC just to see
justice done."

---------------------------

Thumbnail Sketch: Flint

Model: citizens investigate (type 1)

Jurisdiction: Flint, Michigan

Population: 134,881

Government: strong mayor; city council

Appointment of chief: mayor appoints

Sworn officers: 333

Oversight funding: $540,744 (includes overseeing complaints against all city
agencies)

Oversight staff: seven full-time professionals (two exclusively handle complaints
against the police), one full-time secretary

Oversight supervisor: city council

The Flint, Michigan, City Office of the Ombudsman investigates complaints
from residents dissatisfied with any city agency, but about half of its complaints
are filed by citizens concerned with police officer behavior. The office settles
some complaints by providing citizens with information about police department
policies and procedures or through informal mediation. In serious cases, office
investigators interview complainants and witnesses and require written answers
to questions by subject officers. The office submits a report on each
investigated complaint to the chief, who arranges for an internal investigation
before deciding on a finding. The ombudsman's principal power lies in its ability
to criticize openly the behavior of officers by name to the press.

---------------------------

The Chief's Response to an Ombudsman Investigation

A man arrested on a domestic violence charge filed a complaint with the
ombudsman's office alleging an officer punched him in the face after the citizen
tried to headbutt the officer. The citizen also alleged that the officer threatened
to beat him up for hitting a woman.

An ombudsman's investigator interviewed the complainant, his girlfriend, and
the complainant's brother as well as the subject officer and two other officers at
the scene. Medical records indicated a 2 by 2-centimeter hematoma on the
right cheek. The citizen's girlfriend reported, "I heard him [the officer] say [to
the citizen on the phone that] he was gonna kick his a--." The citizen's brother
reported that "I heard one cop say that he [the complainant] hit [the officer]."

The subject officer wrote to the ombudsman that some words were exchanged
between him and the citizen, and when the citizen said "F--- you" and
headbutted him, the officer immediately struck the man with a closed fist to the
face. The other officers reported that the man was already handcuffed at the
time the officer hit him. The officer said he hit the man because "With the
quickness of the situation, I had no time to use my O.C. [oleoresin capsicum, or
pepper spray] or any other methods to control [the man] from striking again."

The ombudsman's report sent to the chief reproduced two department policies
pertinent to the complaint, one on self-control and one on the use-of-force
continuum. The latter policy includes the statement that "Above the holds and
maneuvers [in the continuum of force] are the STRIKINGS. The striking points
may be soft tissue, joints, or, in the extreme case, the suspect's head."

The ombudsman's office summarized the case by saying: 

Other methods available [to the officer for restraining the subject] would include
verbal persuasion, touching or pushing away, O.C. spray, a compliance hold,
the assistance of the other two officers to subdue Mr. [the complainant] . . . or
simply stepping away from Mr. ____ to deescalate the altercation. It is the
Ombudsman's determination that Officer ____ could have used any of the
above mentioned alternatives first, rather than punching Mr. ____ in the face.
Officer did not indicate in any reports to the Ombudsman that he felt his safety
or life were in danger.

The report concluded by saying that "Officer ____'s actions violated the Flint
Police Department' Use of Force Continuum . . . [and] the police department's
policy on self control. . . . Chief of Police Trevor Hampton should review
Officer ____'s actions and issue the appropriate discipline."

The chief wrote the ombudsman's office back as follows:

I am in receipt of your critical report. Please be advised that Mr. ____ did not
file a complaint with the Flint Police Department regarding this incident. As a
result of your report, I am initiating an investigation. If the findings of the internal
investigation show violations by members of the Flint Police Department,
appropriate action will be taken.

Three months later, the chief wrote again to say:

"The investigation involving the complaint of Mr. ____ has been reviewed and
evaluated by me. The charge has been sustained against Officer ____ and
appropriate disciplinary action will be taken."

---------------------------

Thumbnail Sketch: Minneapolis

Model: citizens investigate (type 1)

Jurisdiction: Minneapolis, Minnesota

Population: 358,785

Government: strong mayor, city council

Appointment of chief: mayor nominates, city council approves

Sworn officers: 919

Oversight funding: $504,213

Oversight staff: seven full time

Minneapolis' Civilian Police Review Authority (CRA) operates in two stages:

1. Paid, professional investigators and an executive director investigate citizen
complaints to determine whether there is probable cause to believe misconduct
occurred.

2. Volunteer board members conduct hearings to determine whether to sustain
the allegations in probable cause cases.

In 1998, subject officers stipulated to a sustained finding in about half of the
cases in which the CRA executive director found probable cause. CRA
arranged for successful mediation in another 14 cases. As a result, only 10
hearings were held in 1998.

---------------------------

Stipulations Reduce CRA's Caseload

Patricia Hughes, the CRA executive director, initiated stipulations after a police
union representative suggested that his client would agree to having committed
one allegation if CRA would drop the other complaints. Because the number of
hearings had created an accumulation of pending cases, Hughes saw
stipulations as an opportunity to reduce the backlog.

After a stipulation, CRA informs the chief of which allegations were sustained
and tells IA that the findings are the result of a stipulation. Officers have never
agreed to stipulate in cases of alleged use of excessive force.

Officers and their representatives have learned that if the executive director
decides there is probable cause that the officer committed the alleged
misconduct, a CRA panel will sustain all of the allegations in about three-
quarters of the cases. As a result, it is usually in the officers' best interest to
agree to a stipulation to get some of the allegations dropped.

Because officers have been increasingly willing either to stipulate or agree to
mediation, there were only five hearings from January 1, 1998, through
November
30, 1998.

---------------------------

A Sample Hearing

The chairperson called the hearing to order at 4:05 p.m. Patricia Hughes, the
CRA executive director, acting as the prosecutor, began by giving an opening
statement in which she described how an off-duty white officer, stationed at an
upscale hotel, was alleged to have made a racial slur against a black man, not a
hotel resident, for being messy while using the hotel restroom. The officer and
the man got into a heated discussion, after which the officer "trespassed" the
man-giving him notice that he would be subject to arrest if he returned to the
property.

The citizen filed a complaint for harassment and inappropriate behavior. The
union attorney said there had been numerous cases of vandalism and drug use
in the hotel restroom. As a result, the officer was just doing his job to protect
the premises in questioning the man about his behavior. The complainant was
sworn in and answered questions from the prosecutor, union lawyer, and panel
members. He then left.

The prosecutor introduced a friend of the complainant's who had entered the
hotel with him but had not used the restroom. However, the friend had heard
the conversation that transpired in the hotel lobby and confirmed the
complainant's story. Although this was hearsay evidence, the panel accepted it
because the witness was so close to the event in time and place. The officer
was then sworn in and given a Garrity warning. The officer denied having made
any racial slurs.

The hearing concluded with the prosecutor and union lawyer offering
concluding statements, and the prosecutor presenting a final rebuttal to the
lawyer's statement. The panel deliberated for about a half hour and found 2 to 1
for the complainant.

---------------------------

Thumbnail Sketch: Orange County

Model: citizens review cases (type 2)

Jurisdiction: Orange County, Florida (Orlando)

Population: 749,631

Government: county commission

Appointment of sheriff: elected

Sworn deputies: 1,134

Oversight funding: $20,000

Oversight staff: two part time

A nine-person Citizen Review Board selected by the Orange County
Commission and sheriff hears all cases involving the alleged use of excessive
force and abuse of power after the sheriff's internal affairs unit has investigated
them. Hearings are open to the public and the media. Board members also
make policy recommendations. A captain in the sheriff's office devotes about
20 percent of his time to coordinating the board's activities.

---------------------------

A CRB Hearing Through the Eyes of a Deputy Sheriff

The IA unit told Patrick Reilly, a deputy sheriff, that the father of a youth Reilly
had arrested had filed a complaint alleging use of excessive force in the form of
a controlled knee spike (kick). Later, IA informed Reilly that it had exonerated
him. However, the deputy knew that, because it was a use-of-force complaint,
CRB would hold a hearing.

Within 2 weeks, CRB sent Reilly a letter instructing him to appear for a hearing
and to bring any witnesses he chose. The deputy chose not to bring a union
representative because there was not going to be a criminal charge and he felt
confident he would be exonerated. Reilly did bring two other deputies who had
witnessed the kick. Eight of the nine board members were present.

The chairperson called Reilly's case (four other cases were heard that evening),
read the allegation, and asked for the deputy's side of the story. Reilly reports
that he was given as much time as he needed and every opportunity to defend
himself and clarify what he did and why. He did not feel he was on trial, and the
board seemed neutral. The board asked one of Reilly's two witnesses to speak
briefly. The IA investigator explained the sheriff's office use-of-force matrix and
policy, which the board had already examined. The complainant did not come.

The board concurred with the IA finding. The case took slightly more than an
hour. Reilly remained to sit in on the case that followed.

---------------------------

Thumbnail Sketch: Portland

Model: citizens hear appeals (type 3) and audit IA process (type 4)

Jurisdiction: Portland, Oregon

Population: 480,824

Government: strong mayor, city council

Appointment of chief: mayor appoints and can fire

Sworn officers: 1,004

Oversight funding: $43,000

Paid oversight staff: one full time

Appointed by council members and neighborhood coalitions, 13 "citizen
advisers" hear appeals from citizens dissatisfied with police investigations of
their complaints, review all closed cases involving the use of force, and conduct
random audits of IA investigations. The city council, meeting as the Police
Internal Investigations Auditing Committee (PIIAC), hears appeals from citizens
who are dissatisfied with the police department's investigation of their
complaints. A professional examiner coordinates the work of PIIAC and the
citizen advisers and conducts many of the audits herself. The examiner and
citizen advisers also provide the chief with policy recommendations.

---------------------------

Troublesome Trends Revealed by Monitoring Cases

In 1998, the examiner--Lisa Botsko (at that time)--and citizen advisers noticed
that several complainants reported that, when they asked police officers for
their badge numbers, the officers would reply, "I don't have a badge number."
Technically, this was accurate. However, officers do have identification
numbers. After Botsko shared this concern with the police bureau, the chief
clarified the pertinent general order to require officers to interpret requests for
their badge number as a request for their identification number.

Botsko and the advisers also noticed that a number of incident reports referred
to officers' use of a "distraction blow" without explaining its purpose. After
inquiring about the behavior, Botsko learned that the police bureau training
department taught the distraction principle (e.g., pushing the driver's head while
prying his or her hands off the steering wheel)-but not a blow-as a means of
diverting someone's attention. Indeed, the bureau considers a blow to be a use
of force that requires explanation in the incident report. It turned out that some
officers had learned the distraction blow technique at the State training
academy. As a result, the bureau agreed to explain during inservice training that
officers always have to explain in their reports why they struck someone and
refrain from using incorrect terminology.

---------------------------

Auditors Have Identified Problems With IA's Investigations

The types of problems Lisa Botsko, the first examiner, and citizen advisers
found in the past with some IA 

investigations have included:

o Interviewing only officers and no neutral witnesses.

o Neglecting to interview one or more important witnesses.

o Not taking photographs at the scene.

According to Botsko, leading questions asked by IA investigators remained a
problem--for example, asking, "Was the subject being deliberately provocative
and antagonistic to you?" instead of asking, "How was the subject behaving
toward you?" On one occasion, IA investigated two officers who had arrested
a juvenile for a sex crime without contacting the boy's parents before removing
him from school. On the audiotape of the interviews, the IA investigator
examined the parents "under a microscope," but not the officers--for example,
challenging the parents' statements but not the officers'. The investigator asked a
civilian witness, "What do you mean the officer was screaming?" but did not ask
the officer to describe his own behavior.

Botsko and the auditors also have criticized IA and precinct sergeants for not
following consistent procedures in collecting evidence regarding citizen
complaints, writing reports, and including documentation in the case file. When
Botsko reported to IA in 1997 that the precinct sergeants were not producing
consistent reviews, the police bureau agreed to implement annual training for
sergeants on how to prepare misconduct reports.

---------------------------

When PIIAC and IA Disagree on a Finding

PIIAC disagreed with an IA finding three times in 1997. In two cases, the chief
disagreed with PIIAC and agreed with IA that there had been no officer
misconduct. In one of those two cases, PIIAC voted 4 to 1 to sustain an
allegation of misuse of position against an officer who wrote a police report
documenting that his neighbors' unsupervised children were making noise on a
trampoline late one night after the officer had tried to resolve the problem by
talking with the parents. The report suggested that the State's Child Services
Division, which investigates child abuse cases, become involved. The chief
supported IA's exoneration of the officer. In the third case, PIIAC decided that
IA was incorrect in deciding that an officer had not violated bureau policy by
removing a child from school without notifying the child's parents. The officers
felt that informing the principal was adequate notification. The chief sided with
PIIAC.

---------------------------

Thumbnail Sketch: Rochester

Model: citizens review cases (type 2)

Jurisdiction: Rochester, New York

Population: 221,594

Government: strong mayor, city council

Appointment of chief: mayor nominates, council approves, mayor may remove

Sworn officers: 685

Oversight funding: $128,069

Oversight staff: one full time, three part time

The Rochester City Council contracts with a local dispute resolution center to
set up three-member panels of trained, certified mediators to review internal
affairs cases. The panels establish findings that the chief considers along with
IA's findings in imposing discipline. The panels also may recommend change
(related to the cases it reviews) in department policies, training, and IA
investigation procedures. In a separate process, the dispute resolution center
conducts about 10 formal citizen-police conciliations each year.

---------------------------

A CRB Review Reverses a Department Finding

Police officers got into a tussle with a suspect. An officer hit the man in the face
and then handcuffed him. The man filed a complaint alleging improper use of
force. An IA investigation cleared the officer of any wrongdoing. CRB
concluded the complainant was right. When the case came back to the
department and went through the chain of command, the deputy chief said he
agreed with the CRB panel and asked IA to do additional investigation. Based
on its additional investigation, IA ended up agreeing with CRB's finding.
According to Lt. James Sheppard, the IA commander, "It turned out that the
CRB panel had picked up on the fact that the man was lying flat on the ground
on his stomach with his arms under his chest when he was hit, and passive
noncompliance does not justify hitting a person."

---------------------------

Thumbnail Sketch: St. Paul

Model: citizens review cases (type 2)

Jurisdiction: St. Paul, Minnesota

Population: 259,606

Government: strong mayor, city council

Appointment of chief: mayor nominates, council approves, mayor may remove
only with council approval

Sworn officers: 581

Oversight funding: $37,160

Oversight staff: one part time

A seven-person commission that is part of and funded by the St. Paul Police
Department meets monthly to review cases investigated and decided by the
department's internal affairs unit. The commissioners, two of whom are St. Paul
police officers, make their own findings and, in sustained cases, recommend
discipline to the chief. The IA unit makes no disciplinary recommendations. The
chief is free to disregard the commission's disciplinary recommendations but not
its findings.

---------------------------

The Review Commission Hears All Discharge-of-Firearms Incidents

By statute, the review commission hears all cases in which an officer discharged
a firearm, regardless of whether a citizen filed a complaint. Most of the cases
involve euthanizing injured animals, especially deer. Others involve accidental
discharge.

An officer had drawn her sidearm while searching a warehouse for a reported
burglar. She had left the building to climb a grassy hill next to the warehouse to
continue the search when the man ran out of the building. The officer yelled at
the man to stop. She then slipped on the wet grass and fired her gun
accidentally. The man, thinking she had fired a warning shot, stopped running
and was arrested by another officer.

The officer reported the entire incident fully, but the department forbids the
accidental discharge of weapons. As a result, IA found her guilty of
misconduct, and the commission did, too. The commission recommended she
receive additional firearms training.

---------------------------

The Chief Increases the Commission's Recommended Punishment

According to Chief William Finney, "We had an officer who had a 'smart
mouth,' but she had never had a sustained complaint. When she finally got a
sustained finding from both IA and the commission, the commission
recommended supervisory counseling. However, because I knew she had had
a history of 'mouthing off,' I suspended her for a day."

Donald Luna, the review commission chair, has a similar story: A number of
citizens were playing games with an officer regarding the owner of a car that the
officer was trying to have moved: "It's not my car, it's his car; no it's her car."
They also began calling him derogatory names. After an hour of this, someone
in the crowd said, "Why do you have to be such an a-----e?" The exasperated
officer answered, "Well, I guess I'm just an a-----e. Now move the car." A
minister heard the remark and filed a complaint. The commission recommended
supervisory counseling; the chief gave him a 3-day suspension.

---------------------------

Thumbnail Sketch: 
               
San Francisco

Model: citizens investigate (type 1)

Jurisdiction: San Francisco

Population: 735,315

Government: strong mayor, city/county Board of Supervisors

Appointment of chief: police commission (appointed by the mayor) appoints,
commission or mayor may remove

Sworn officers: 2,100

Oversight funding: $2,198,778

Oversight staff: 30 full time

An independent Office of Citizen Complaints (OCC), with 15 full-time
investigators, investigates most citizen complaints against the San Francisco
Police Department and prepares findings. If the department's internal affairs
division agrees with the OCC finding, the case usually receives a chief's hearing
at which the assistant chief presides. An OCC attorney prosecutes the case.
The assistant chief typically approves the finding and metes out discipline
subject to the chief's approval. The police commission holds an administrative
trial for cases of alleged serious misconduct at which an OCC attorney again
acts as the prosecutor. OCC also provides policy recommendations to the
department, arranges for mediation, and provides early warning system data.

---------------------------

Organizations May File Complaints

The San Francisco Bay Area chapter of the National Lawyers Guild provided
legal support for a demonstration in 1997 on the anniversary of the Rodney
King beating in Los Angeles. After the demonstration, the guild mailed a
complaint to OCC alleging that police officers arrested demonstrators who
followed instructions to get onto the sidewalk along with demonstrators who
refused to move. OCC investigated the incident and notified the guild that it had
not sustained the allegation. In the meantime, the guild had received a positive
judgment in small claims court for false arrest and was awarded damages.
Based on these new developments, the guild asked OCC to reopen the case,
but the oversight body denied the request because the director believed that a
videotape clearly documented the demonstrators to be in the wrong and that
the OCC finding was therefore not in error. In addition, OCC determined that it
had investigated the case fully and was given no new evidence that would merit
granting the appeal.

---------------------------

"Added Allegations"

After explaining the complaint process and asking about the incident, the
investigator also asks the citizen questions designed to determine whether the
subject officer(s) engaged in misconduct that the complainant may not have
identified or been aware of-for example, the investigator may ask, "Did the
officer search your pockets or just do a pat search?" A juvenile might be asked,
"When you were taken to the station, were you cuffed to a bench? For how
long?" If the complainant is a woman, she might be asked, "Were you
transported to the station in a van with men in it?" The information the
complainant provides may form the basis for the investigator to charge the
officer with "added allegations"-misconduct that is related to the complaint but
that the complainant did not mention to OCC. (See chapter 6, "Resolving
Potential Conflicts.")

---------------------------

Thumbnail Sketch: Tucson

Model: citizens review cases (type 2) and audit IA procedures (type 4)

Jurisdiction: Tucson, Arizona

Population: 449,002

Government: strong city manager, city council, weak mayor

Appointment of chief: city manager

Sworn officers: 865

Oversight funding: $144,150 for the auditor, none for the board

Paid oversight staff: two full time

Tucson has both a full-time professional police auditor and a volunteer citizen
review board. Both the Independent Police Auditor, appointed by the city
manager, and a seven-member Citizen Police Advisory Review Board,
appointed by the mayor and the city council, independently review completed
IA investigations for thoroughness and fairness, and both make policy and
procedure recommendations to the police department. The auditor also reviews
cases when citizens appeal an IA finding, and she sits in on selected IA
interviews to monitor the investigation process. The board acts as a pipeline for
transmitting general community complaints to the police department. There has
been no duplication of effort because the board typically asks the auditor to
examine the cases it wants reviewed, and the auditor regularly attends and gives
reports of her activities at board meetings.

---------------------------

An Officer's View of the Auditor's Monitoring Activity

The uncle of a suspect an officer had arrested filed a complaint with IA claiming
the officer needlessly pointed a gun at him. The assigned IA investigator told the
officer there would be an investigation and that Liana Perez, the auditor, would
be present. The investigator told him Perez would have questions but the
investigator would repeat the questions to the officer, who should then direct his
answers back to the IA investigator, not to the auditor. Just before the
interview, the union representative also told the officer to wait for the
investigator to repeat each of the auditor's questions.

Perez asked several questions through the investigator to get a clear picture of
what happened. The officer had been part of a team doing a high-risk stop of a
homicide suspect who turned out to be the suspect's lookalike brother.
Because five members of the department's gang intelligence unit had been
involved in the incident, some of Perez' questions were designed to determine
when each one arrived, where they were positioned, and what they did. Her
goal was to determine whether any of the officers had seen the subject officer
point the gun but had not admitted to it in their reports. Perez also asked
questions to determine how far the subject officer was from the uncle, where
the officer was going to secure the weapon (which belonged to the suspect),
and whether there were any physical barriers to a clear view between the
officer and the uncle. IA exonerated the officer.

---------------------------

San Jose, California's, Independent Police Auditor Has Some Similarities and
Differences With Tucson's Auditor

Thirty-six percent of all complainants in San Jose file their cases with an
independent police auditor rather than with the police department. As in
Tucson, Teresa Guerrero-Daley, the auditor, forwards the paperwork to the
police department's internal affairs bureau, which conducts an investigation. The
bureau then sends all its materials on all cases-including those filed directly with
the police department-to the auditor. Exchange of information is simplified
because the two agencies share a common computerized database.

Guerrero-Daley examines the case files for thoroughness and fairness, and she
can request further investigation if she is not satisfied with a finding. She
monitors selected cases by sitting in on interviews or going to the scene of the
alleged incident. She becomes involved in all use-of-force cases. As can Liana
Perez in Tucson, Guerrero-Daley can require the IA investigators to ask
questions she may have of complainants and officers during interviews.

Command staff, not IA staff, determine a disposition after the investigation.
Complainants who disagree with the finding or disposition may appeal to the
auditor, who will review the case. If Guerrero-Daley disagrees with the 
disposition, she sends a memo to the chief. On the few occasions each year
when she and the chief disagree, they meet together with the city manager (who
appoints the chief) to reach a consensus. Guerrero-Daley can make specific
recommendations for training as well as for changes in policy and duty manuals.
The chief has adopted 90 percent of her recommendations.

With a staff of four professionals, the auditor's office has a budget of $320,000.
There is no citizen review board in San Jose. Other cities with auditors-located
primarily on the West Coast-include Seattle and Los Angeles. The
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department in North Carolina, on its own
initiative, hired a private accounting firm to audit and recommend improvements
to its complaints process.*

*See Walker, Sam, "New Directions in Citizen Oversight: The Auditor
Approach to Handling Citizen Complaints," in Problem-Oriented Policing:
Crime-Specific Problems, Critical Issues and Making POP Work, ed. Tara
O'Connor Shelley and Anne C. Grant, Washington, D.C.: Police Executive
Research Forum, 1998: 161-178.

---------------------------

Chapter 3: Other Oversight Responsibilities

In addition to investigating allegations of police misconduct and reviewing the
quality of completed investigations, citizen oversight bodies can undertake three
other responsibilities:

o Recommend policy and procedure changes and suggest training improvements.

o Arrange to mediate selected complaints.

o Set up or assist with the operation of an early warning system that identifies
officers with potential problems.

Each of these activities has the potential to contribute to helping police and
sheriff's departments remain or become accountable to the local community as
well as to reduce police misconduct.

Policy Recommendations

"Many experts regard the policy review function as an extremely important
aspect of citizen oversight. Policy review is designed to serve a preventive
function by identifying problems and recommending corrective action that will
improve
policing and reduce citizen complaints in the future" (emphasis in the original).[1]
Policy recommendations, including suggestions for training improvements, can
influence an entire department, not just, as with oversight review, individual
officers' behavior. According to Mary Dunlap, director of San Francisco's Office
of
Citizen Complaints, "Policy recommendations may be the most important work
OCC does: They improve police services and the department's relations with
the public."

Some police administrators believe that citizens do not have the necessary
understanding of police practices to make useful policy recommendations.
However, according to Capt. Gregory Winters, former officer-in-charge of the
San Francisco Police Department's Risk Management Office (which includes
the internal affairs unit), "The OCC's policy recommendations can be helpful
precisely because they think of questions which, because the staff lack expertise
[in police work], make you think." Adds Chief Fred Lau, "A lot of OCC's
[policy] recommendations make sense, but the police department doesn't
always realize they are needed."

The process of developing policy recommendations

Oversight bodies can identify the need for policy change in several ways.

o Through individual citizen complaints. The bracelet identification system
described in "The Orange County Sheriff Implements a Citizen Review Board
Suggestion" resulted from one family's complaint.

o Through review of closed cases. If the auditor in Tucson sees a need for a
policy change, she can suggest the modification to the chief. The oversight
board also can recommend the change to the chief. If the chief does not agree
to implement the policy recommendation, the auditor can appeal to the city
manager, to whom she and the chief report, and the city manager can require the
change. The board can appeal the chief's refusal to the mayor and city council. As
a result, when the auditor and board agree on a policy change, they have a great
deal of potential clout behind them.

o As a result of a general citizen concern. Citizens in Berkeley may attend any
regular Police Review Commission meeting or specially assembled public
hearing to raise concerns that the board can use to develop a recommendation
for a department policy change. One group of citizens petitioned for a public
hearing to complain about the University of California campus police's use of
pepper spray and batons to force demonstrating students out of the school's
administration building, which they had occupied and refused to leave. As a
result, the board developed recommendations on the department's use of
pepper spray and batons that the city council endorsed and the campus police
agreed to implement.

Examples of policy recommendations

Citizen oversight bodies can provide two general types of recommendations to
change police operations:

o Changes in the way the department conducts its internal investigations into
alleged misconduct.

o Changes in procedures that prescribe officer behavior.

Examples of both types of recommendations follow.

Recommendations for improving a department's own investigations of alleged
police misconduct
Portland's oversight system has been especially active in recommending
improvements to the police bureau's IA investigations.

o The Police Internal Investigations Auditing Committee recommended that IA
handle all use-of-force complaints rather than send them to the precincts for
investigation because of inconsistency of investigative quality at the precinct
level. The department agreed.

o The auditor became concerned that supervisors were overlooking officers'
patterns of complaints in deciding on discipline. As a result, the department has
formed, and invited the auditor to participate on, a task force to address how
discipline is being meted out and how patterns of complaints should fit into the
disciplinary decision.

Lt. James Shepard, commander of Rochester's internal affairs unit, submits a
form to board members to fill out and return assessing each investigation his
sergeants conduct (see appendix A).

Recommendations for improving policies governing officer behavior
Most of the oversight systems examined in this report have developed policy
recommendations designed to improve officer conduct.

o In the wake of riots in a local park in 1991 and with more than 30 complaints
from citizens regarding allegations of officer misconduct, the Berkeley City
Council directed the Police Review Commission (PRC) to review and make
recommendations on "all aspects of crowd control at large demonstrations." As
a result of its study and deliberations, PRC recommended 12 specific changes
that the department later implemented. The recommendations included:

-- Obtaining and using better amplified sound devices to address crowds and
monitoring the audibility of dispersal orders.

- -Providing clearer instructions as to what specific location or area is the
unlawful assembly site and the route by which persons will be allowed to
leave and providing a reasonable opportunity for demonstrators to comply with
the dispersal order.

--Training specific officers to serve as crowd liaisons at demonstrations.

--Barring the use of motorcycles as a means of force.

--Proscribing the use of flashlights to harass or intimidate individuals in crowd
control situations.[2]

o The Flint ombudsman's office saw that the department had no procedures for
addressing victims after a domestic violence incident. The department agreed to
develop a policy.

o The Orange County Citizen Review Board (CRB) agreed when IA did not
sustain a complaint against a deputy who had used a "knee spike" to hit a
noncompliant suspect in a specific portion of the body because the officer had
special training in using this type of pain compliance technique. However, the
board expressed concern that the agency's allowing a few trained deputies to
use this technique posed a potential liability issue for the sheriff's office. The
board observed that the department needed a clear written statement of when it
was appropriate to use the kick and where the technique fell on the continuum
of force. As a result, the sheriff's office developed a training bulletin that
provides information on the relationship of the knee spike to the agency's
use-of-force matrix. For example, the bulletin observes that "A knee spike can
be used as a Level 3, 5, or 6 response. If the knee spike is used as a Level 3
response, the target area of the strike must be a large muscle mass, such 
as the outside portion of the thigh."

o The Orange County CRB expressed concern about deputies who return to
duty after they have been involved in a shooting. As a result, the sheriff's office
included new language in its use-of-force policy that states that the agency's
staff psychologist will evaluate employees who have discharged their firearms
before they are released back to full duty.

o St. Paul's review commission heard a case in which an officer failed to
handcuff a suspect before putting him in the cruiser to transport him to the
station for booking. The officer had difficulty extracting the person from the
cruiser, and they got into a tussle. The officer had not followed the department's
policy to handcuff every arrestee before transporting the person. However,
officers and the board agreed that there are times when cuffing a noncompliant
subject on the streets can excite the crowd. As a result, the department rewrote
the wording of the handcuffing procedure to allow some officer discretion.

o In response to concerns raised by the auditor, the Portland Police Bureau
chief issued the bulletin shown in exhibit 3-1 requiring officers to document in a
report every use of handcuffs with individuals who are subsequently not arrested.

Mediation

A second important additional function some oversight bodies perform is to
arrange for selected complainants to mediate their complaints with subject
officers. In some cases, the mediation is informal. For example, the Tucson
auditor occasionally tells an officer's captain or lieutenant that the complainant
just wants to vent, especially when the officer did nothing wrong but simply did
not explain his or her actions to the citizen. Typically, however, the process
involves trained mediators who lead formal sessions at neutral locations.

Formal mediation: The process

Typically, the oversight body asks if the complainant is willing to mediate the
complaint. If the person agrees, the oversight body directly or through internal
affairs finds out if the officer is also amenable to mediation. If both parties agree, 
the organization that the oversight body uses to conduct mediations arranges a
time for them to meet with a mediator in a private location. If the complainant
expresses satisfaction with the result to the mediator at the end of the session, the
case is considered closed. The content of the mediation remains confidential and
typically nothing appears in the officer's file.

In some jurisdictions, complainants may not appeal the results of the
mediation--that is, if they leave unsatisfied, they may no longer file a complaint
with either the oversight body or the police department.

How two jurisdictions conduct mediation
Mediation is a major component of the Minneapolis and Rochester oversight
processes. Although the content of the mediation sessions is similar in both
cities, their oversight bodies arrange the process in a different manner.

Minneapolis. The Minneapolis Civilian Police Review Authority (CRA) refers
appropriate cases to the Minneapolis Mediation Program. Pairs of trained
volunteers mediate most of the sessions; program staff mediate the rest (see
"Using Mediator Teams Has Advantages"). The Minneapolis Mediation
Program requires volunteers to already be certified mediators and to attend its
own 40-hour mediation course. New volunteers sit in on several sessions with 
experienced mediators before mediating sessions themselves.

If mediation is successful, the director dismisses the complaint; if it is not, she
sends the case back to her staff for investigation. In Minneapolis, the parties
reach agreement in about 90 percent of the cases.

Exhibit 3-2 lists the program's mediation rules. As shown, the mediation
proceedings are confidential except that the Minneapolis Mediation Program
may inform CRA and the police department whether the parties met and
reached agreement. Minnesota statute prohibits using mediation discussions and
documents in subsequent legal or administrative proceedings.

Exhibit 3-3 is a copy of the form the parties sign. Two "terms of the agreement"
that participants actually signed follow:

o "Both parties agreed that the dialogue was helpful in allowing them to
understand each other's experiences and viewpoints."

o "The officer is sorry that the incident occurred and caused ____
embarrassment. . . . ____ acknowledges that the officer made the best decision
possible with the information available on the scene."

Occasionally, a participant agrees to followup action:

"Resources provided by [the complainant] will be forwarded to the Minneapolis
Police training unit Room 204 City Hall for training/treatment of 
hypoglycemic diabetes with recommendation they be included in officer
training."

One officer agreed to attend a cultural diversity course. Because there was no
course available in the community, he attended the cultural diversity session the
Minneapolis Mediation Program was running for its own volunteers. One
complainant agreed to go on a ride-along.

Rochester. In 1984, a Rochester City Council member suggested that the
Civilian Review Board (CRB) provide a conciliation option in an effort to help
build positive relations between officers and citizens. Eight types of complaints
are eligible for conciliation, such as "failure to take what complainant perceives
was appropriate action." Cases involving allegations of use of excessive force
are not eligible for conciliation.

CRB's parent agency, the Center for Dispute Settlement, has a pool of certified
mediators it can tap for all its mediation components (e.g., victim-offender
reconciliation). For mediating citizen complaints against the police, the agency
chooses a mediator from among a subgroup who have participated in a 1-day
extra training session on police conciliation.

The conciliation sessions are no different than traditional mediation sessions
except that there is no written consent agreement between the parties at the end
of a conciliation. At the end of the session, CRB sends a letter to internal affairs
indicating, if the mediation was successful, that the case is closed and no
investigation is needed. If the session was not successful, the letter informs IA
whether the complainant still wishes to have the complaint investigated. In
1997, three of the four conciliations were successful. Of five conciliations
conducted from January through September 1998, two were resolved, one was
unresolved, and in two the complainant or officer did not appear.

Potential benefits of mediation

As summarized in exhibit 3-4, mediation can benefit everyone involved.

Potential benefits to citizens

o Mediation may encourage some citizens to file complaints who would
otherwise be reluctant to come forward.

o Many citizens simply want the satisfaction of expressing their concerns face to
face with the officer-letting the officer hear their side of the case or
dissatisfaction with the officer's behavior. A survey of 371 citizens who had
filed complaints with New York City's Citizen Complaints Review Board found
that the desire for a direct encounter with the subject officer was "pervasive"
and "significantly associated with complainant satisfaction."[3]

o Citizens can learn about the basis for police officers' actions in ways that can
promote an improved understanding of the law enforcement officer's job.

--Many mediated cases involve incidents in which an officer stopped and
interrogated a suspect who turned out to be innocent, and the person became
angry at having been "falsely accused" or singled out "for no good reason."
Mediation lets officers describe how the information they had at the time led
them to a reasonable suspicion that the person might have been the offender.
(See "Two Successful Mediations.")

--Officers often have considerable discretion in what they do, and citizens
become upset when an officer chooses a course of action that is inconvenient
(e.g., having their car towed) or embarrassing (e.g., pat searching them in front
of neighbors). Alternatively, some citizens think officers have discretion in areas
where they do not. For example, an officer may refuse to let a delivery truck
drive down a street the driver normally uses to get to a retail store because the 
street is temporarily blocked off for a parade or local event. The officer could 
make an exception and let the driver go around the barricade, but, should the 
driver hit a pedestrian, the officer could be sued or disciplined.

o Like everyone, officers can be "having a bad day" and lose their temper with
citizens. In addition, citizens do not realize how frustrating it can be when
officers encounter repeated instances of citizen venality, venting at officers, or 
attempts to break the rules (e.g., driving in the breakdown lane). Officers are 
not justified in losing their temper and berating a citizen, but mediation can help
citizens understand why officers did so.

o If the case is likely to result in an exonerated, unfounded, or not sustained
finding by the review board, the complainant can feel better about a successful
mediation than receiving one of these findings.

Potential benefits to officers

o Mediation can educate officers to the effects their words, behaviors, and
attitudes can unwittingly
have on the public.

o If mediation is successful, nothing negative appears in the officer's record. In
San Francisco, any mediation the Office of Citizen Complaints schedules has
this result even if the complainant fails to show up and as long as the officer
appears. In Rochester, officers who agree to mediation do not have to go to IA
to be interviewed or answer written questions. An IA commander in another
city tells all department personnel, "I can't tell you how to respond to an offer of
mediation. But I can tell you that, if you go and it's successful, there will be no
record of the complaint in your files. So what do you have to lose? You don't
necessarily have to apologize or admit to wrongdoing, just explain why you did
what you did."

o Mediation can help reduce the hostility and fear some citizens develop toward
the police. Narcotics officers in Minneapolis raided an apartment looking for a
drug dealer who, it turned out, was selling drugs only when the legal tenant and
her three children were out of the building. Conducted at night with a no-knock
entry with shotguns, the raid terrified the family. During mediation, the officers
(who had done nothing wrong) apologized for the mistake and sat down and
talked with the children so they would not be scarred by the experience to
always be afraid of police officers.

o Just as mediation can give complainants an understanding of police behavior,
some officers can benefit from learning the reasons citizens behave they way
they do. For example, officers may learn that the only thing that upset the citizen
was not immediately being given an explanation for why he or she was
detained. As a result, mediation can enable some officers to learn what they can
do differently that may reduce friction with the public.

Mediation may also benefit the community at large. According to Andrew
Thomas, executive director of the organization that operates the Rochester
Civilian Review Board:

Since IA and the Civilian Review Board both fail to sustain allegations in so
many cases, it is important to move beyond assessing guilt or innocence in
cases of alleged police misconduct to building a better understanding among
citizens of what officers do and why they do it. If citizens gain an understanding
about an individual officer's behavior, they may begin to understand all officers'
behavior better.

Furthermore, if mediation results in improvements in officer conduct, the entire
community benefits. Finally, mediation saves taxpayers the expense of an
investigation and a hearing, or at least enables oversight and internal affairs staff
to devote more time to more serious cases or reduce their backlog of cases.

Drawbacks to mediation

Mediation can have disadvantages (see "Mediation Is Not Always Successful").

o Because mediation is almost always held in private and the results are
confidential, it may be seen as having less "teeth" than formal, public
proceedings. For example, Robert Bailey, former Berkeley assistant city
manager, believes that mediation circumvents the potential benefits of a public
hearing that exposes officer misconduct to citizens and the media.

o According to Charles Moose, former chief of the Portland Police Bureau,
some police administrators feel that mediation takes away their control over
discipline because a condition of successful mediation is that there will be no
further investigation and no discipline.

o Officers may go through the motions of appearing  to be contrite to avoid
having  the complaint appear in their files. According to Todd Samolis,
coordinator of the Rochester Civilian Review Board, "A number of officers come
for the wrong reasons--to keep the complaint out of their file or to pacify their
supervisors--but then they see it works: They hear the complainant in a new light
and see how they might have handled the situation differently." Or they see that
explaining their actions changes the complainant's attitude toward them. When
Minneapolis Mediation Program staff telephone participants a day or two after
the session, officers sometimes say, "I never really saw it from the citizen's
perspective" or "My actions really were inappropriate; I was having a bad day."

o Although mediators are trained to make sure that each participant is on equal
footing, some participants may have more of an advantage than others in certain
situations.

--Some officers are uncomfortable sitting in the same small room with
someone whom they have cited or arrested.

--Some mediators feel that officers appearing in uniform and armed may
intimidate some citizens. However, some citizens report they prefer to talk to an
officer who is in uniform so they feel they are not addressing an ordinary citizen
but the person in his or her law enforcement role.

o In Tucson, complainants may opt for mediation, file a complaint with the
auditor, file with the police department, or file with all three. Some police
administrators object when mediation allows complainants to have more than
"one bite of the apple" in this fashion. (However, in many jurisdictions, officers
accused of misconduct also have multiple recourse, such as arbitration and civil
service hearings.)

Mediation also has limitations.

o Mediation is suitable only for cases involving allegations of officer discourtesy
and other minor misconduct. Allegations of use of excessive force or
discrimination should not be mediated because, if sustained, they merit
punishment.

o Many officers refuse to participate in mediation. One officer said, "Why
should I have to explain to a citizen why I did my job?" Some officers are
reluctant to participate simply because, as an unknown procedure, mediation
makes them nervous. According to Robert Duffy, chief of the Rochester Police
Department, "Officers often find mediation threatening-people in authority have
difficulty hearing the other side. But we need to hear why people disagree with
us."

o Many complainants also are reluctant to participate. In 1997, San Francisco's
Office of Citizen Complaints received 22 complaints that investigators felt were
eligible for mediation, but complainants refused to participate in 16 of them.

Early Warning Systems

Early warning systems (EWSs) are procedures for keeping track of complaints
against officers and using the results to target officers with unusually high
numbers of complaints for supervisory counseling or retraining. The rationale for
EWS was provided by a report that found a relatively small number of Los
Angeles police officers were responsible for a disproportionate number of
use-of-force reports and citizen complaints: Of about 1,800 officers against
whom an allegation had been filed, 44 had 6 or more complaints against them.[4]
Other studies have found that between 5 and 10 percent of a department's
officers engage repeatedly in problem behavior.[5] As a result, in 1981 the U.S.
Commission on Civil Rights recommended that police and sheriff's departments
develop early warning systems to identify problem officers.[6]

Typically, EWS is designed to be informal, nonpunitive, and separate from the
normal disciplinary process. Usually, it involves counseling or retraining by
supervisory officers.[7]

Oversight involvement in EWS

Citizen oversight programs can become involved with an EWS in at least four
ways:

o Recommend that the police or sheriff's department adopt an EWS.

o Collaborate with the department in implementing an EWS.

o Operate EWS for the department.

o Audit the department's EWS system.

After holding a hearing for a second complaint against a deputy for two
separate shooting incidents, members of the Orange County Citizen Review
Board learned that the deputy had a history of 18 disciplinary incidents. By
making the lack of a tracking system public during its normal open hearing
process and by stressing that the department was in jeopardy of lawsuits and
negative media publicity by failing to discipline errant officers effectively, the
board reinforced and sped up the department's existing plans to develop an
early warning system. As of late 1998, the EWS software had been developed
and was in place, and the sheriff's office was working on a policy to implement
it.

Every 3 months, Minneapolis' Civilian Police Review Authority (CRA) sends
internal affairs the names of officers who have accumulated two or more
complaints within the previous 12-month period. A computer program
generates the information. Internal affairs examines its own list of officers with
multiple complaints and generates a report for commanders, the deputy chiefs,
and the chief that identifies officers who have had two misconduct complaints of
the same nature or three complaints of any nature combining both IA and CRA
cases during the previous 12-month period. The report indicates what the
complaints allege and whether they involve officers on duty or off duty. On
average, about 12 officers per quarter have their names in the report. According
to Lt. Dorothy Veldey-Jones, the IA commander:

Oftentimes a name will appear for one quarter and then never again.
Occasionally, names appear for two quarters, but by the third quarter they drop
off the list. Then, however, there are a few names that consistently appear on
the list; they may drop off for short periods of time, but they seem to reappear 
frequently.

The department is evaluating the system to determine what the best courses of
remedial action would be given the information the report provides.

The Portland auditor examined the Portland Police Bureau's EWS system and
ensured it was identifying the individuals who met the bureau's criteria for
inclusion on the list of potential problem officers.

Benefits and drawbacks of EWS

An early warning system can help police and sheriff's departments identify
officers who may be exhibiting a pattern of misconduct that suggests the need
for intervention before the officers commit more serious misconduct. However,
departments must determine carefully how many complaints, what type of
complaints, and the period of time that will trigger a specified supervisory
action. For example, officers on drug details may have numerous complaints
filed against them by drug dealers' attorneys in an attempt to intimidate the
officers into less aggressive enforcement. Jurisdictions also must decide whether
unsustained complaints will be included in the tally. While officers may object to
this practice, one lieutenant reported that an officer who has accumulated 10
unsustained cases may indeed be getting into trouble, and, at a minimum, his or
her supervisors need to be told to investigate whether there is a problem that
requires corrective action before it escalates.

Police Accountability: Establishing an Early Warning System involves a national
evaluation of early warning systems that discusses their benefits and limitations
in detail.[8]

The success with which oversight systems are able to improve police and
sheriff's departments' policies and procedures, conduct mediation, and assist
with an early warning system depends crucially on the number, skills,
impartiality, and dedication of their staff. The following chapter addresses the
issues involved in staffing an oversight system.

Notes

1. Luna, Eileen, and Samuel Walker, "A Report on the Oversight Mechanisms
of the Albuquerque Police Department," prepared for the Albuquerque City
Council, 1997: 128-129.

2. San Francisco's Office of Community Complaints (OCC) also drafted a
policy for crowd control in response to citizen complaints that officers were
handling demonstrations by yelling "disperse" and then scattering the
demonstrators by using their batons. The department adopted OCC's
recommended policy that officers ensure that demonstrators have enough time
to disperse and that there are enough avenues to leave the scene. Oversight
bodies in both San Francisco and Berkeley may have been especially active in
addressing their police departments' behavior in crowd control situations
because of the unusual number of demonstrations the two cities experience.
Both cities also were working with the police to improve officers' handling of
mentally ill persons. Officials in Albuquerque also are concerned about this
problem. The National Institute of Justice, the research arm of  the U.S.
Department of Justice, has published an Issues and Practices report
entitled Police Response to Special Populations: Handling the Mentally Ill,
Public Inebriate, and the Homeless (Finn, P.E., and M. Sullivan, Washington,
D.C., 1987, NCJ 107273) that describes efforts in 10 jurisdictions to enhance
police and sheriff's departments' efforts to handle the mentally ill misdemeanor
offender.

3. Vera Institute of Justice, Processing Complaints against Police in New York
City: The Complainant's Perspective, New York: Vera Institute of Justice,
1989.

4. Independent Commission on the Los Angeles Police Department, Report of
the Independent Commission on the Los Angeles Police Department, Los
Angeles: City of Los Angeles, 1991.

5. "Kansas City Police Go After Their 'Bad Boys,'" New York Times,
September 10, 1991; "Wave of Abuse Claims Laid to a Few Officers, Boston
Globe, October 4, 1992, cited in Walker, Samuel, "Revitalizing the New York
CCRB: A Proposal for Change," unpublished paper, Omaha: University of
Nebraska, Department of Criminal Justice, September 1997: 5.

6. U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Who Is Guarding the Guardians? A
Report on Police Practices, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Commission on Civil
Rights, 1981.

7. Luna and Walker, "A Report on the Oversight Mechanisms of the
Albuquerque Police Department," 137.

8. Walker, Samuel, and Geoffrey P. Alpert, Police Accountability: Establishing
an Early Warning System, IQ Service Report, vol. 32, no. 8, Washington,
D.C.: International City/County Management Association, 2000.

---------------------------

Key Points

o Citizen oversight bodies can undertake three other important responsibilities
in addition to investigating, reviewing, or auditing complaints.

o Oversight bodies can recommend policy and procedure changes as well as
training improvements. 

--Many experts regard this policy review function as the most important
responsibility citizen oversight bodies can undertake because it can improve 
services throughout an entire department, not just among selected officers.

--Many police administrators report that oversight bodies have made valuable
policy and training recommendations that they have implemented.

o Oversight bodies can make mediation available to selected complainants.
Minneapolis and Rochester make extensive use of formal mediation using
trained mediators to conduct the sessions. Mediation can potentially benefit:

--Complainants, many of whom are only interested in being able to express
their concerns to the officer.

--Subject officers, who can learn how their behavior can affect the public and
can avoid having the complaint included in their files.

--The community at large, as citizens improve their understanding of police
operations.

--Oversight bodies, which are spared the need to investigate and conduct
hearings for these complaints. Mediation can have disadvantages and has
limitations. For example, use-of-force cases are not suitable for mediation.

o Some oversight bodies assist police and sheriff's departments to set up or
maintain an early warning system to keep track of complaints against officers
who may need supervisory counseling or retraining.

---------------------------

The Orange County Sheriff Implements a Citizen Review Board Suggestion

A mentally challenged man who had wandered away from his home during the
night tried to enter a neighbor's residence thinking it was his own home. Officers
who responded to the neighbor's call reporting a burglary in progress arrested
the man, who spent 2 days in jail before his identity was discovered. The man's
parents filed a complaint, but the board exonerated the two officers involved in
arresting him, as did IA. However, the board recommended that the sheriff
work with the county commission to develop a method to identify people with
diminished mental capacity so they would not languish in jail for 48 hours.

Capt. Melvin Sears, the board's administrative coordinator, located a local
mental health association that agreed to adapt its existing software to administer a
program to distribute bracelets to these individuals. Kevin Beary, the sheriff,
agreed to provide $1,600 from his forfeiture fund to purchase the bracelets, print
an informational brochure, and purchase two Polaroid cameras to take photos for
the bracelets. Later, Beary wrote the board, "It is always a pleasure to see
positive results from an unfortunate incident. As you may recall, this is the result of
the CRB case involving Mr. ____."

---------------------------

Using Mediator Teams Has Advantages

Because two mediators facilitate every session in Minneapolis:

o There are always a man and woman mediator present.

o They can share perceptions about what is taking place and how to proceed.

o They can learn different mediation styles from each other.

o One mediator can pick up on verbal and behavioral cues the other may have
missed.

oThey can brainstorm on possible solutions when mediation reaches an impasse.

o They can debrief together afterward.

---------------------------

Exhibit 3-4. Potential Benefits of Mediation to Citizens and Police

Citizens may:

1. Be encouraged to file complaints.

2. Gain the satisfaction of talking directly with the officer.

3. Gain a better understanding of police work and why the officer acted in a
specific manner.

4. Learn why some officers are not always courteous.

5. Feel more satisfaction than if a hearing results in an exonerated, unfounded, or
not sustained finding.

Police officers may:

1. Learn how their words, behaviors, and attitudes can unwittingly affect the
public.

2. Avoid having a complaint included in their files if mediation is successful.

3. Reduce the negative image some citizens have about officers.

4. Gain an understanding of why the complainant acted the way he or she did.

---------------------------

Two Successful Mediations

An officer was ticketing a car parked on the wrong side of the street when the
owner came out of her house to complain. The officer ran the woman's name
through the computer and found that a person matching her description had an
outstanding warrant. The officer (a female) pat searched the woman and asked
her to wait in the back of the cruiser. The officer then received more
information indicating the woman was not the same person, so she released her.

The woman filed a complaint because she felt the officer had embarrassed her
in front of her children. The officer, in turn, was angry she had to mediate the
issue because she felt that, having done nothing wrong, the department should
have told the woman the case was closed.

At the session, the mediator sat between them and asked them to decide who
would talk first. The officer did, asking, "Was I rude?" "No." "Did I act
professionally?" "Yes." The officer then explained why she had asked the
woman to sit in the car, showing her the printout that indicated a person fitting
her description-approximate age, race, gender, and same last name-had a
warrant out for her arrest. The officer said, "I can understand why you were
embarrassed, but if I was going to have you sit in the back of my cruiser, I
needed to make sure you weren't carrying a gun that you could shoot me with
in the back of the head." The woman became less frustrated and ended up
satisfied with the officer's explanation.

* * *

The complainant reported he had been stopped for driving 45 miles per hour
(mph) in a 30-mph zone but that the street was wide and deserted at the time.
He said that the two officers in separate squad cars had yelled at him, pinned
him against his car (so that his buckle scratched his new BMW), spread-eagled
him, and did a pat-down search.

The officers present at the session explained to him, "You have to realize what
we thought we were seeing. We had been chasing you with our lights and siren 
on for six blocks and you hadn't pulled over." The complainant responded that, 
precisely because the officers had made no other move to pull him over for six
blocks, he was not sure they were signaling him to stop. The officer said he had
not forced the man's car to the curb because there were pedestrians on the
sidewalk for the first several blocks and the driver might have pulled onto the
sidewalk and hit someone. "So I waited until we had reached some railroad
tracks before forcing you to stop."

At one point, the mediators caucused so one could talk with the officer because
he was starting to get angry. The mediator presented the citizen's point of view
of feeling "violated" because he had no criminal record yet was being treated
like a criminal. Upon their return, the officer explained, "We also thought that
someone might have stolen the car, so we had to take precautions in case the
driver was truly a bad guy." This explanation seemed to convince the citizen of
the officer's good intentions. In turn, the officer could see that the man was only
reacting to a frightening and inexplicable police action. The parties both
apologized and signed a settlement.

---------------------------

Mediation Is Not Always Successful

A woman filed a complaint with an oversight body because an off-duty officer
checking ID cards at the door of a night club had confiscated her driver's
license. He concluded it was fake because the woman could not identify the
color of her eyes or the address listed on the card. Without the card, the
woman was unable to pick up her disability check the next day. As a result, the
woman filed a complaint. She wanted an apology and her license back.

After introductions, the complainant explained why she felt the officer had
treated her disrespectfully by not believing the license was hers and, in general,
"giving me a tough time" trying to enter the club. She said she wanted her license
back. (The mediators felt she looked young enough to have possibly been
underage.)

The officer talked for 3 minutes, saying that he was doing his job and was
convinced that the ID was fake because the photo did not match the woman. 
He turned the ID in to the police department because it was 
standard procedure, and he no longer had the authority to retrieve it for her.

The mediators rephrased both their statements; for example, noting to the
woman, "It's very important to you to get your license back." The woman
explained that she had been caught up in the Department of Motor Vehicles
bureaucracy trying to get it back, and began to cry. The mediators caucused,
taking her in the hallway to give her a chance to calm down and telling her, 
"We understand that this was very upsetting for you."

Back in the meeting, the mediators asked the parties what they wanted to
happen to have a satisfactory settlement. The woman repeated that the officer
did not need to treat her the way he did and that she wanted her license back.
The officer said again that he could do nothing about retrieving the license.

The mediators then caucused with the officer, who repeated that, because the
ID was clearly fake, he would not apologize and he was justified in seizing it.
Upon returning to the meeting, the woman became teary again and asked to
end the mediation. Everyone stood up, the mediators thanked the parties for
coming, and the officer and woman left.

---------------------------

Chapter 4: Staffing

Citizen oversight procedures may require three principal types of staff:

o Volunteer board members.

o Professional investigators.

o An executive director.[1]

Talented and fair staff in all of these categories are essential for citizen oversight
to achieve its potential benefits. Incompetent staff will not be able to perform
their responsibilities, while biased staff will create conflict that can grind the
process to a halt. Staff must also be flexible. Fred Lau, the San Francisco
police chief, said:

The OCC [Office of Citizen Complaints] executive director is extremely critical
to the relationship to the police department. If I didn't have a good working
relationship with Mary Dunlap, it would be horrible. She is willing not to be
rigid, sit down with department subject matter experts, and talk. She is tough
and tenacious, but we have never come to an impasse-we've never had to go to
the [police] commission for a tiebreaker.

As a result, the recruitment, selection, and training of oversight volunteers and
staff are extremely important. The following discussion examines these
processes for each of the three staff categories. The issue of staff supervision is
discussed in chapter 7, "Monitoring, Evaluation, and Funding."

Volunteer Board Members

If a jurisdiction chooses to have volunteer citizens review cases, the volunteers
need to be chosen with particular care because they usually have no formal 
credentials in the law enforcement field, may have inappropriate motives for
serving, and may be viewed as especially unqualified by some police and citizens.

Planning decisions

There are several early decisions jurisdictions must make before recruiting
volunteer board members.

o What will be the board's specific responsibilities-that is, what will members
be expected to accomplish? The nature of their assignments and how much time
they will need to achieve them in part will influence how jurisdictions answer the
other planning questions listed below. For example, if board members will be
expected to review--and, especially, hold hearings--on less serious cases of
misconduct (e.g., verbal abuse) rather than focus exclusively on serious cases
(e.g., use-of-excessive-force allegations), program planners need to provide
adequate staff to avoid long delays in case processing.

o How many members will the board have? There appears to be no correlation
between board size and the population of the communities they serve.[2] Most
boards have between seven and nine members. Factors to consider in deciding
on the number include:

--Not having so few members that, with two or three absences, there is no
quorum.

--Having enough members to represent the diversity of the local community.

--If small groups of board members will be conducting hearings (as in
Berkeley, Minneapolis, and Rochester), having enough members so that the
burden of holding hearings is not overwhelming.

The St. Paul mayor, with the consent of the city council, appoints three
alternative commissioners to serve in the event a regular member does not
attend a meeting or hearing due to illness or a conflict of interest.

o What will be the members' term of office, and can they be reappointed?
Terms should not be so short that board members leave as soon as they gain
valuable on-the-job experience[3] but not so long that undesirable members can
remain in office beyond their welcome. Portland appoints members for 2 years,
with the option of reappointment. Board members in Minneapolis and Tucson
serve for 4 years. In Berkeley, new council members may replace previous
members' selections before their 2-year term is over. In Tucson, board
members may not serve beyond the term of the mayor or council member who
appointed them.

o Will board members receive an honorarium? If so, how much? Some
compensation may be necessary to attract qualified volunteers as well as to
underscore that the community feels their work is important. Too much
compensation not only becomes expensive but may also erode the concept that
independent citizens, rather than paid staff employed by the city or county, are
overseeing police misconduct.

--Board members in Minneapolis receive $50 for each day they attend one or
more meetings or hearings or provide other board-related services.

--Panelists in Rochester who chair review meetings receive $50 for each
2-hour block of time they participate (they receive another $50 if they run at
least 15 minutes into the next 2-hour block); regular panelists receive $35.
Mediators receive $35 for each case. (See "Rochester's Board Members All
Are Trained Mediators.")

--Board members in Berkeley have been given $3 an hour (not to exceed $200
per month) since the Police Review Commission was established in 1974. Board
members in Omaha receive no compensation.

Selection of board members

Jurisdictions need to recruit and screen board members carefully.

Oversight legislation in Orange County, as in many other jurisdictions, requires
that "The composition of the CRB [Citizen Review Board] shall endeavor to
reflect the ethnic, racial and economic diversity of Orange County."

o The five civilian members of the St. Paul Police Civilian Internal Affairs
Review Commission include one woman, one African-American, one Hispanic,
and one gay person. They include the director of a community-based
organization, the vice president of a lighting fixture company, a court
psychologist, the director of enforcement for the State Commerce Department,
and an IBM project director.

o The seven Minneapolis board members consist of three African-Americans,
one Native American, and three Caucasians. Three members are women.
Members' occupations are the former assistant State ombudsman for
corrections, a minister, a professor who teaches police ethics, a retired social
worker and probation officer, a school teacher who is also a nonsworn Parks
Department police agent, a former city housing authority employee, and a
county public defender's office employee.

As Minneapolis' board composition suggests, many jurisdictions look for
volunteers with some type of background in the criminal justice system.
Portland's citizen advisers include a retired State patrol officer, a retired police
chief, a judge, and a defense attorney. Allowing current or former law
enforcement officers to serve is controversial (see "Should Police Officers and
Sheriff's Deputies Serve on Boards?"). Few jurisdictions choose active police
officers to serve; some local ordinances prohibit their selection. The Berkeley
ordinance prohibits all city employees from serving. Boards typically do not
include local activists, such as members of local chapters of the American Civil
Liberties Union or the Lawyers Guild.

Lisa Botsko's written description of Portland's citizen advisers' responsibilities
and duties includes the ability to:

o Work with persons of opposing viewpoints.

o Provide constructive criticism.

o Communicate effectively, verbally and in writing.

o Maintain confidentiality of information in IA files.

o Realize possible conflicts of interest such as relatives working with law
enforcement.

Recruitment

Most jurisdictions recruit board members through public announcements and by
word of mouth.

o Minneapolis has an open appointment process in which the city council's
Public Safety and Regulatory Services Subcommittee hosts public hearings at
which applicants present themselves. The subcommittee makes
recommendations to the full council for approval by majority vote.

o In Orange County, citizens can tell county commissioners they would like to
serve on the oversight board. In addition, because there are so many advisory
boards in Orange County, there is a board whose only task is to look for
people to serve on other county boards.

Some jurisdictions experience difficulty recruiting board members because of
the time commitment involved to be trained and to serve. Todd Samolis,
coordinator of the Rochester board, had to court candidates because of the
requirement to attend 48 hours of police academy training in the middle of
August. A board member in Berkeley reported she spends about 50 hours a
month reading materials and attending hearings. Board members in Orange
County devote an average of 10-16 hours a month, and in Minneapolis the
average is 10 hours a month. Most board members elsewhere spend a
minimum of 4 hours a month.

Training

Training requirements for board members differ. City ordinances in Tucson and
St. Paul specify that board members must attend mandatory comprehensive
training before they may review any cases. The Tucson ordinance identifies nine
areas of required training, from police department operations to confidentiality.
The police department and independent auditor provide the 40-hour training.
Some of the more common training methods follow.

Lectures 
Barbara Attard, Berkeley's Police Review Commission (PRC) officer, runs a
4-hour session on PRC procedures that includes presentations by the chief on
the discipline process and by the city attorney on open meeting regulations.
Melvin Sears, the Orange County Sheriff's administrative coordinator, trains
new members by reviewing the department manual and board manual, paying
special attention to use-of-force issues.

Materials review
Board members typically are provided with written materials that include
department general orders and other policies and procedures. Melvin Sears
gives all new board members in Orange County a large notebook that details
their responsibilities and includes many of the department's general orders.

Citizens' academy
Candidates for Rochester's board must attend a 2-week condensed version of
a police academy. Run by the police department, the 48-hour course involves 3
hours per evening for 2 weeks and two all-day Saturday sessions. The training
includes using sidearms with a "Shoot/Don't Shoot" simulator, practicing
handcuffing, and learning about department policies and procedures, such as
the use-of-force continuum. According to one board member, "I had never
fired a gun before. At first it was a strange sensation. But it helped me
understand how inaccurate handguns are and the officers' need for split-second
decisionmaking."

By ordinance, new board members in St. Paul may not be sworn in until they
have completed the 11-week, 33-hour citizens' academy that includes getting 
sprayed with a minor dose of pepper spray, using a baton, handcuffing each
other, and firing handguns using a "Shoot/Don't Shoot" simulator. The
Albuquerque city ordinance requires commission members to attend the citizens'
police academy. Most Orange County board members have attended a 36-hour
citizens' academy on their own.

Using a citizens' academy as a training tool is not without controversy. The
Minneapolis Civilian Police Review Authority was originally reluctant to have its
board members attend the citizens' academy because of concerns that they
might be "coopted" as a result of the process. By contrast, the police union
wanted attendance to be a requirement for board membership. As of 1998, six
of the seven board members had voluntarily attended the 12-week course.
When Paul McQuilken, chairperson of the Orange County board,
recommended that the county commission select board members only from
among individuals who had already attended the academy, some community
groups objected because they felt members would become too sympathetic to
the police. A board member in another jurisdiction downplayed this risk: "We
don't get brainwashed to believe blue."

The real issue, according to Mark Gissiner, president of the International
Association for Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement (IACOLE) from
1995-99, is whether the empathy for police work that board members may
develop by attending citizens' academies (not a bad thing in itself) makes it
difficult for them to focus in the future on whether officers violated department
policies and procedures.

Ride-alongs 
In Minneapolis, board members must do one ride-along after they have been
appointed. However, a police lieutenant in another city observed, "One or two
ride-alongs are useless [as a learning tool] because officers are on their best
behavior," and any one shift could be atypical. "Volunteer board members need
to go on several to begin to gain an understanding of police work," he said.
Reflecting this judgment, the St. Paul ordinance requires new board members to
go on at least 10 ride-alongs, 2 in each district and 1 with each of 4 specialty
units (e.g., traffic, search warrants, canine).Evelyn Scott, a board member in
Rochester, went on a ride-along and reported:

I ended up running through back alleys and backyards following an officer
chasing a suspect. The officer arrested the person, handcuffed him, put him in
the cruiser, and drove him to the booking area. When the suspect kept cursing
the officer the whole way, I realized how much patience officers have to have.
Later [when she was a board member], we had a case in which an officer
stopped a suspicious person. When the officer tried to frisk him, the man took
off. The officer chased him, and the man fired back. The officer then shot and
wounded the man. The citizen filed a complaint against the officer for use of
excessive force. Reviewing the case, I remembered my ride-along and recalled
how fast things happen, how quickly officers have to react, how situations that
look routine may be dangerous, and how officers may have to make an
instantaneous decision about whether to shoot.

On-the-job training 
In some jurisdictions, the bulk of the training occurs on the job; in all
jurisdictions, some of the required experience can be learned only by doing it.

Inservice training

The Albuquerque city ordinance requires board members to attend a yearly
4-hour training session conducted by a civil rights attorney. Tucson legislation
requires board members to pursue 48 hours of educational opportunities
annually, such as ride-alongs and the police department's citizens' academy.
The Orange County Sheriff's Department periodically provides members with
an hour of inservice training before (or instead of) regular board meetings that
has included explanations of:

o Deputies' procedures for dealing with armed and unarmed subjects in
relationship to body shape and size.

o The procedures the department's psychologist follows in conducting
fitness-for-duty evaluations.

o IA operations and chain-of-command procedures for reviewing
investigations.

o Office policy and procedures related to its use-of-force matrix and defensive
tactics that included simulated demonstrations by deputies followed by board
member participation in exercises designed to help them determine the level of
force used.

Investigators

For oversight systems that investigate alleged officer misconduct, selecting and
training investigators also requires careful attention. According to Mark
Gissiner, former IACOLE president and a senior human resources analyst for
Cincinnati who has investigated allegations of police misconduct since 1985:
"The investigation, analysis, and determination of whether excessive force
occurred is an extremely difficult task."[4]

Recruitment

Mary Dunlap, director of San Francisco's Office of Citizen Complaints,
requires candidates for investigator positions to have 2 years of investigative
experience, which may be in academic research. Dunlap also looks 
for individuals who can handle the stress of angry complainants and hostile,
armed officers. She tests applicants for tendencies to jump to conclusions, and
she interviews them to detect biases for or against law enforcement. (See "San
Francisco Mandates the Number of Oversight Investigators.")

Investigators in many jurisdictions have a law enforcement background. In
Minneapolis, two of three current investigators are former police officers with
other departments. According to Robin Lolar, one of the investigators:

My police background enables me to detect when officers aren't being truthful
in their reports by way of their creative writing. I can also sense when
complainants are leaving something out of their stories. I know what officers
can and can't do by way of stops and seizures. Knowing proper police
procedure saves me a lot of research time.

Lolar added, "Complainants feel comfortable knowing I am a former police
officer from outside of Minneapolis." (Minneapolis legislation forbids any
present or former city officer from becoming a Civilian Police Review Authority
[CRA] investigator.) The investigators' previous experience as police officers
helps address police union and subject officers' concerns that CRA does not
understand police work or is biased against officers. In fact, an IA sergeant
who was exonerated of misconduct by CRA reported, "The investigator
questioned me for 45 minutes and was very thorough and fair-in fact, I ended
up hiring him as a criminal investigator for the city attorney's office."

An auditor's report on the Kansas City, Missouri, Police Department
questioned how independent the city's Office of Citizen Complaints was from
the department because three of the five staff members had ties to the
department; two were former police officers, including one who was a former
department IA investigator. The police commission resolved not to hire former
officers again.

Oversight bodies must also consider carefully whether to hire investigators who
are members of activist groups. Even if activists are able to be objective on the
job, their volunteer activities off the job may create the perception-as might the
use of current or former police officers-that investigations may be biased.

Training

In Minneapolis, the director trains new investigators, who then sit in on cases
handled by the senior case investigator. Investigators have attended inservice
training conducted by police officers and others in use of force, verbal judo,
search warrants, cultural diversity, and domestic abuse; they also have
participated in seminars with a professional training firm on investigation,
interviewing, and interrogation techniques. In San Francisco, the Office of Citizen
Complaints' (OCC's) director, chief, and senior investigators, using a
standardized training manual OCC managers developed, lead 8 to 10 full-day
training sessions, followed by several weeks of working side by side with
supervisors who monitor and correct their intake interviews, complaint analyses,
witness searches, and officer interviews. The office follows up with two to four
trainings each month for all staff on a variety of subjects.

Lisa Botsko, Portland's first police auditor, developed a set of "Standards of
Review" that advisory board members are instructed to follow in conducting
reviews of IA cases and determining whether the oversight body needs to
review a case. The standards include guidelines related to the filing and intake
process for complaints, investigations, and findings. (See appendix B.)

Although she is not an investigator, San Francisco's OCC policy and outreach
specialist regularly attended recruit classes for 28 weeks at the police academy
to improve OCC's knowledge of police department basic training and to
establish rapport between OCC and recruits. "The bank of knowledge built by
attending the academy," she said, "is vital to understanding police procedures."

Executive Director or Auditor

The executive director (or auditor), along with the police chief or sheriff, is the
single most important person for ensuring that the oversight process is effective.
Hiring or appointing experienced individuals is critical to establishing or
maintaining the system's credibility. For example, Lisa Botsko, the Police
Internal Investigations Auditing Committee's auditor in Portland from 1993 to
1999, had been a private investigator for insurance fraud companies and had
conducted high security clearance investigations for the Federal Government's
Office of Personnel Management in its Denver regional office.

Most jurisdictions send out public notices when they are hiring an executive
director, but they also rely heavily on word of mouth to help identify the most
qualified individuals.

o The Berkeley city manager hired Barbara Attard because of her reputation as
an effective senior investigator for many years with San Francisco's Office of
Citizen Complaints.

o In Minneapolis, the Civilian Police Review Authority (CRA) president hired
Patricia Hughes, the current CRA executive director. The CRA chairperson,
Daryl Lynn, had previously hired Hughes as a counselor in 1975 to work in a
pretrial diversion program. Later, Hughes became an attorney and Lynn moved
to another position. Serendipitously, Lynn became a paralegal with the
Minnesota State public defender's office at a time when Hughes was an
attorney in the office, so he was able to see her litigation skills firsthand.

Word of mouth can be the best method of hiring staff because jurisdictions
more easily can identify individuals who are likely to be appropriate for the
position than if they have to rely exclusively on resumes and interviews. Echoing
what Police Chief Fred Lau said in San Francisco, Capt. Melvin Sears, the
Orange County sheriff's board administrative coordinator, confirmed, "Who the
people are is critical to the system's working."

Notes

1. In larger jurisdictions and in systems with a large volume of cases, programs
also will need administrative and clerical support staff as well as data entry
personnel. If the system prosecutes cases, it will need attorneys. San
Francisco's Office of Citizen Complaints employs a policy and outreach
specialist.

2. Walker, Samuel, Citizen Review Resource Manual, Washington, D.C.:
Police Executive Research Forum, 1995: 11.

3. A police officer said, "Board members don't understand police work-how
volatile and ugly bad guys are and the need to act quickly to avoid escalation.
But once on the board a while, they develop a sense of what takes place on the
street."

4. "Use of Force," paper presented at the 1995 Inter-national Association for
Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement World Conference, Vancouver, British
Columbia, Canada, 1995.

---------------------------

Key Points

o Citizen oversight bodies most commonly need three types of staff: volunteer
board members, professional investigators, and an executive director.

o Talented and fair staff are essential for any oversight procedure to be
effective.

o Because they may have no formal credentials, selecting board members is
especially tricky.

--Before recruiting board members, jurisdictions should establish the specific
responsibilities they expect the board to assume. Then jurisdictions need to
decide how large their board will be, members' terms of office, and their
honoraria, if any.

--A common selection criterion is to include diversity. Permitting current or
former police officers or sheriff's deputies to serve is controversial.

--The process of selecting board members can involve public hearings, private
interviews, and word of mouth.

--Training for board members can include lectures, materials review (e.g.,
department policies and procedures), attending a citizens' academy,
ride-alongs, and training as mediators.

o Some oversight systems involve the use of paid investigators.

--Investigators need to be able to handle the potential stress of interviewing
sometimes angry complainants and hostile officers.

--Many jurisdictions try to hire investigators with a law enforcement
background.

--Senior staff train new investigators. Novices also learn on the job.

o Along with the police chief or sheriff, the executive director or auditor will
have the greatest influence on whether the oversight system achieves its
objectives. Most jurisdictions make considerable use of word of mouth to find
the most qualified individual. 

---------------------------

Rochester's Board Members All Are Trained Mediators

Rochester trains all Civilian Review Board members in mediation. According to
Todd Samolis, the CRB coordinator:

Mediation training exercises focus on helping participants to become aware of
their biases--since everyone has them and they cannot be eliminated--so that as
board members they can keep these prejudices in check when they review IA
cases. Mediation training increases their ability to think impartially.

According to one board member, "The [mediation training] program was
probably the most educationally enlightening experience I've ever had."

Samolis also believes that "mediation training increases listening skills
dramatically. In addition, it helps panelists to absorb the information in the case
files in terms of who said what, when, and where-to keep things straight-and to
spot inconsistencies."

---------------------------

Should Police Officers and Sheriff's Deputies Serve on Boards?

The inclusion of law enforcement officers (whether current or former) on
volunteer oversight boards is a controversial issue. On the one hand, the St.
Paul oversight ordinance requires the city's board to include two active police
officers. (The St. Paul police union lobbied to have one officer for each citizen
board member but settled for two officers on a seven-person commission.)
Omaha's Citizens Complaint Review Board has one police union member. On
the other hand, Tucson's ordinance prohibits board members from being
current peace officers, while Berkeley's forbids current or former officers from
serving.

Many people argue that having one or two officers on the board provides
additional insight into police behavior. According to a former board member in
St. Paul, "It is good to have officers on the board because they have a
perspective citizen commissioners don't have; you want their frame of
reference. But [they cannot exercise undue influence because], with only two
members, they do not have a majority vote."

The Rochester board had two, then one, and now no officers as board
members. One long-time citizen member reported: "I liked having an officer on
the panel because, regardless of how much training civilians get, the officer is
better versed in department policies. And they took their jobs very seriously."
On a few occasions, police members drew other board members' attention to
improper procedures that subject officers had engaged in which were not
among the reasons for the citizens' complaints.

Opponents of allowing active or even former officers to serve as board
members argue that their participation violates the concept of independent
review: Officers, even if from other departments or retired, may not be able to
be objective about the culpability of another officer's conduct. The Orange
County charter establishing the Citizen Review Board is silent on the matter of
whether the sheriff's two appointees to the board may be deputies. However,
the sheriff has deliberately selected civilians to avoid any impression that the
board is biased in favor of the department. Indeed, to make sure the board 
remained neutral in the public's perception, when a county commissioner
nominated a correctional deputy to the board, the sheriff successfully asked the
commissioner to withdraw the nomination.

A board member in Minneapolis added:

All you need [to be a competent board member] is to be a citizen of sound
judgment. . . . You don't need to understand police work to know if someone is
mistreating someone else, such as calling them names. Abuse is obvious. And
the hearing brings out whether the officer violated department policies or
procedures.

A police officer observed, "I have heard comments from street cops that board
members are clueless, but then I hear the same thing said about IA investigators 
who haven't been on the streets for years."

---------------------------

San Francisco Mandates the Number of Oversight Investigators

Inadequate funds to provide for sufficient staff can doom an oversight system
because either investigations cannot be conducted thoroughly or cases will be
delayed-or both. As discussed in chapter 5, delays result in disillusioned
complainants and angry police officers as well as loss of memory and witnesses.

To avoid these shortcomings, in 1996 San Francisco voters approved
Proposition G, which amended the city and county charters to require that the
Office of Citizen Complaints (OCC) have at least 1 investigator for every 
150 sworn officers. As a result, in 1998 OCC had 15 investigators and 4
supervisory personnel to handle a department with 2,100 sworn officers. By
contrast, Minneapolis' Civilian Police Review Authority has only 4 investigators
for a police department with 919 sworn officers.

However, even with the charter amendment, it took San Francisco many
months to provide the money for OCC to hire the required investigators. And
even with the increased staffing level, OCC staff continue to be
overworked-each has 40-60 cases at any one time. Because officers generally
may be interviewed only while they are on duty, investigators frequently
conduct interviews at 6:00 a.m. if officers are working night shifts. Investigators
are granted compensatory time for working before or after hours, but not
overtime pay.

---------------------------

Chapter 5: Addressing Important Issues in Citizen Oversight

Jurisdictions setting up new citizen oversight procedures or improving an
existing system need to consider four important issues that are not discussed in
detail elsewhere in this report:

1. How to conduct effective outreach so that citizens know the oversight
process is available to them.

2. How to structure the oversight process.

3. How public the system's procedures will be.

4. How "politics" can interfere with the system's effective operation.

Outreach

Citizen oversight bodies use a variety of methods to advertise their availability
and services, but most have not done an effective job of publicizing themselves
because:

o They lack the resources to market their services effectively.

o Local media tend to focus only on scandals related to police misconduct, not
on mundane issues of how and why to file complaints.

o Police and sheriff's departments that take initial complaints may not make
complainants aware of the citizen oversight option.

Nevertheless, outreach is important because, if citizens are not aware of the
oversight body and its services, allegations of misconduct will go unreported.
Reflecting this perception, in 1998 San Francisco's Office of Citizen Complaints
(OCC) hired an additional staff person whose responsibilities specifically
include community outreach, while Berkeley's Police Review Commission has
established an outreach subcommittee.

To become widely known, oversight staff need to use multiple marketing
approaches. As the following discussion and exhibit 5-1 suggest, many
jurisdictions have implemented valuable outreach methods, but no jurisdiction
has incorporated all of them.

Publicity materials

The Minneapolis Civilian Police Review Authority has published a brochure
about its services in several languages. A map in San Jose's brochure identifies
where the office and validated parking are located. San Francisco's citizen
complaint form is formatted as a postage-paid, self-mailing letter (see appendix
C). The Berkeley Police Review Commission (PRC) distributes a foldover
business card describing PRC and the complaint filing process.

Postings

Most oversight bodies are listed in the telephone directory. However, because
the agency's function may not be clear from its name, the public may not realize
the agency is the place to contact to file a complaint against the police.
Furthermore, even independent oversight bodies are sometimes listed in the
phone book under "Police," which may discourage some citizens from filing
complaints because they believe the organization is a part of the police
department. San Francisco's Office of Citizen Complaints is listed in the
business section of the phone book twice, once as Office of Citizen
Complaints, San Francisco Police Department (boldface), with the police
department address, and a second time with OCC's physical location.

The Minneapolis Civilian Police Review Authority's (CRA's) brochures are
available, along with CRA business cards, in a wall display outside the mayor's
office. The city's free events calendar lists the name and telephone number of
the Civilian Police Review Authority under the "Police" heading.

Media

Tucson's auditor, as do other oversight directors, sends notices of each board
agenda to newspapers, radio, and television. The Sunday newspaper lists the
next council agenda. Some citizens learn of their jurisdiction's oversight body
when the media cover a high-profile case of alleged police misconduct that
involves the oversight system. A local cable station televises Portland's board
meetings when appeals are heard.

Neighborhood groups and other agencies

Liana Perez, Tucson's auditor, sends pamphlets to community and
neighborhood centers. She also alerts interested citizen groups to police issues,
such as when she told the Southern Arizona People's Law Center that she was
bringing up the issue of off-duty, uniformed officers working for merchants.
Orange County Citizen Review Board members distribute their brochure when
they give talks to civic groups.

Tucson's auditor uses the city's Citizen Neighborhood Services Department, a
resource office for the city's 200 neighborhood associations, to send fliers to
neighborhood associations offering to make presentations. OCC staff in San
Francisco usually earn compensatory time to attend street fairs, community
meetings, school assemblies, and other events while off duty to publicize the
office. (See "San Francisco's Office of Citizen Complaints Monitors Selected
Public Demonstrations.")

Filing locations

The more locations oversight bodies have in the community where citizens can
pick up complaint forms, the easier it will be for individuals to file who may not
have the time or assertiveness to travel to a central location. Citizens in San
Francisco may file a complaint at any city agency, including the mayor's office
and the sheriff's department. Citizens in Omaha may pick up forms in any
library branch. Melvin Sears, the Orange County Citizen Review Board
administrative coordinator, set up a Web site citizens can access to get
information about the board or to file a complaint online. The Web site on the
city page set up by Liana Perez in Tucson also allows citizens to file complaints
electronically.

Most oversight bodies lack the resources to set up satellite offices. According to
Mary Dunlap, director of the Office of Citizen Complaints in San Francisco,
"We should set up office hours in communities that are poor, young, and
otherwise likely to underreport alleged police misconduct, like satellite mayor's
offices, where we wouldn't take complaints but could explain the complaint
process."

Referrals by the police

According to Mary Dunlap, "Every district station should also have a display at
the window and a sign on the wall, along with brochures and complaint forms."
A sign to the right of the Berkeley Police Department receptionist desk in fact
says the following:

If you have a complaint regarding a Berkeley Police Officer's conduct or need
an explanation regarding a department practice, policy or procedure, you can
either

1. Contact the Watch commander or Senior Officer in charge.

2. Contact the Internal Affairs Bureau of the Berkeley Police Department.   
The phone number . . . is 664-6653.

3. Contact the City of Berkeley Police  Review Commission. The PRC is a 
civilian review board independent of the Berkeley Police Department. It is 
located at 2121 McKinley Avenue, phone 644-6716.

A brochure that Berkeley's internal affairs investigators give to complainants
includes a four-paragraph description of PRC with its address and telephone
number. The Portland Police Bureau includes a notice about the review board
with the letter it sends to complainants reporting their case findings (see exhibit
5-3).

Some Tucson beat officers hand out the independent police auditor's business
cards. Officers who work the beat where the auditor is located periodically
come in to ask for new supplies of cards, as do the secretaries at department
substations.

Issues of Oversight Mechanics

Jurisdictions need to address-or reexamine-several organizational issues related
to the structure of their oversight process.

Oversight's legal basis

Citizen review bodies have been established by municipal ordinance, State
statute, voter referendum, mayoral executive order, police chief administrative
order, and memorandum of understanding. The vast majority have been
established by municipal ordinance.[1] Typically, the authorizing body or
legislation grants the oversight body the power to adopt rules and regulations
and develop procedures for its own activities and investigations. Examples of
these rules include Berkeley's 16-page "Regulations for Handling Complaints
Against Members of the Police Department" and Minneapolis' 28-page
"Civilian Police Review Authority Administrative Rules." (See chapter 8,
"Additional Sources of Help.")

Eligible complainants and cases

San Francisco accepts anonymous complaints but sustains them only with
corroboration. Most jurisdictions permit aggrieved citizens and the parents of
juveniles to file complaints. San Francisco also allows organizations to file
complaints. The Berkeley Police Review Com-mission designated itself as the
complainant in one case. Many oversight systems do not accept complaints by
one officer against another officer.

Deciding what types of cases to review or investigate has important implications
for staffing needs, system costs, and, above all, case processing delays (see
"Minimizing Delays" on page 101). Mark Gissiner, past president of the 
International Association for Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement,
recommends, on the one hand, that systems not try to handle every type of
complaint because the result can be a large backlog of cases whose resolution is
delayed significantly, especially if hearings are held on each case. On the other
hand, Gissiner says, oversight systems should investigate or review all cases
involving use of firearms. Because most oversight systems have been established
in response to an incident in which the police shot someone, the public expects an
oversight body to review these cases. Indeed, the St. Paul and Orange County
boards automatically review all cases in which an officer has discharged a firearm,
even if there has been no complaint.

Jurisdictions must decide how long after the alleged misconduct occurred
complainants may file a complaint. Berkeley's Police Review Commission
requires complainants to file within 90 calendar days of the alleged misconduct,
with another 90 days allowed if six board members vote that the complainant
has demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that his or her failure to file
in time was the result of "inadvertence, mistake, surprise, or excusable neglect."
Not knowing about PRC's existence or procedures does not fall into any of
these categories. Furthermore, police testimony is not mandatory in cases that
are accepted during the "late filing" period.

Subpoena power

As of 1995,[2] almost 40 percent of review bodies had subpoena power-the
right to command an individual to appear to testify or produce
documents-including oversight procedures in Berkeley, Flint, Orange County,
Portland, and San Francisco. Legislation in Orange County provides for a fine
of up to $500 and imprisonment for up to 60 days for officers who refuse to
honor a board request to appear.

Most citizen oversight procedures 

that have subpoena power, including Berkeley's and San Francisco's, are
prohibited from undertaking an investigation until any pending criminal charges
against police officers have been adjudicated or unless they receive permission
from the district attorney to proceed.

Many oversight advocates and directors believe that having subpoena power
serves no useful purpose. If the oversight body already has authority under
Garrity v. New Jersey (see "The Legality of Forcing Officers to Testify"),
subpoena power adds nothing. If the oversight body lacks authority under
Garrity to compel testimony, there is still little reason to seek subpoena power.
Patricia Hughes, executive director of Minneapolis' Civilian Police Review
Authority, and Daryl Lynn, CRA's chairperson, can remember only one case in
which they could have benefited from having subpoena power. Indeed, the
Orange County review board, Portland's city council acting as the Police
Internal Investigations Auditing Committee, and the Flint ombudsman's office
have never used their subpoena power. Furthermore, a 1992 city council report
in Rochester suggested:

The advantage of using the investigative authority of the IA lies in the fact that
police officers are required to cooperate fully with the investigation since it falls
within the employer-employee relationships. If the investigative authority were 
transferred to an outside agency, accused officers would be able to have recourse
to their constitutional rights as citizens to avoid making any statement which might
tend to incriminate them. 

Trying to secure subpoena power could involve oversight planners in lengthy
court battles with officers' unions that they may not win. In addition, in the
process of the litigation, planners may incur significant legal costs (see the
second page of appendix E) and lasting poor relations with the police or
sheriff's department. Although subpoena power could in some limited
circumstances be useful for forcing citizens (e.g., complainants or, more likely,
witnesses) to testify or provide documents, oversight staff are unlikely to want
to exert such coercion.

Other structural issues

Jurisdictions that decide to have a citizen review board must settle other
organizational and operational issues, some of which include the following:

o Should the entire board hear or review every case, as in Orange County and
St. Paul, or should rotating groups of three or four members hear cases, as in
Berkeley, Minneapolis, and Rochester?

o Should board members know what IA's findings are in advance of their own
hearing? In Rochester, they do not.

o Legislation in Orange County and St. Paul permit boards to hire their own
investigators if they are dissatisfied with internal affairs' investigations, but
neither has ever done so. Although there are cost implications in hiring an
investigator, the option may help motivate IA to do a better job with its own
investigations.

o Where and when will hearings be held? As noted earlier, most jurisdictions
try to house their oversight bodies some distance from the police station.
(Because the St. Paul Police Department administers the oversight body,
housing it in the public safety building is not an issue.) Most board hearings in
Rochester take place during the day so the police department does not have to
pay IA investigating sergeants overtime to attend evening meetings. Sometimes
this creates a problem for employed board members who work a regular 
9-to-5 day.

o Will the standard of evidence for sustaining a complaint be a preponderance
of the evidence or the more stringent clear and convincing evidence? Some
boards use one, some the other. Subject officers favor the more stringent
standard, while complainants favor the more lenient standard.

o Finally, how can unacceptably long delays in reviewing and hearing cases be
avoided? Delays are a problem for some oversight bodies.

Minimizing Delays

Many oversight bodies struggle to keep the review, hearing, or auditing process
from taking months and even years to end. The annual report of the Tucson
independent police auditor observes: "A concern that is frequently raised by
complainants is the length of time taken to complete an investigation." Nearly
two-thirds of complainants interviewed in a study of New York City's citizen
oversight process reported the process took too long.3 According to Jerry
Sanders, former San Diego police chief, "Delays harmed the credibility of the
review process here more than anything else." Sanders adds, "They also put
officers under enormous stress" waiting for their cases to be decided.

Delays were such a problem in San Francisco that the police commission directed
the Office of Citizen Complaints to explain its backlog of cases. OCC's report,
issued in February 1998, observed that most cases were completed within 1 year
of receipt; when they were not, circumstances beyond OCC's control were often
responsible, including the unavailability of participants or documents; delays
requested by union representatives, criminal litigants, and attorneys; and staff
attrition. The San Jose independent auditor's annual report includes a chart
illustrating a sample of 10 cases and the number of days the complaint remained
at different stages of the review process (see exhibit 5-4).

To reduce delays, many jurisdictions have established deadlines by which
police departments and oversight bodies must complete their reviews.

o The city council requires the Rochester Civilian Review Board to review
cases within 2 weeks of IA's notification that its investigation is complete, but
the board sometimes misses the deadline when a high-profile case takes
precedence or it proves impossible to find three board members who can 
assemble within that 2-week period.

o The Minneapolis ordinance requires the Citizen Police Review Authority to
complete a preliminary review within 30 days after a citizen has signed a
complaint and complete an investigation within 120 days of the signing, with a
60-day extension allowed in rare circumstances. CRA has never missed a
deadline because the police union then might argue to have the case dismissed.

o As of January 1, 1998, a new provision in the California Government Code
requires the Office of Citizen Complaints to conclude investigations of
complaints and make findings within a year of filing, absent exceptional
circumstances.

Some oversight bodies establish internal rules for completing cases. However,
according to one activist, "Establishing hard deadlines without adequate money
for staff is a setup for failure."

Berkeley helped reduce its backlog of cases by amending its regulations so that
it would not be required to hold a hearing on every filed complaint, instead
allowing the director to recommend that the Police Review Commission 
summarily dismiss cases without merit. Patricia Hughes, executive
director of Minneapolis' Citizen Police Review Authority, came up with the idea
of plea bargaining cases through a stipulation procedure that decreased the
need for hearings dramatically, thereby reducing delays for other cases. (See
the Minneapolis case study in chapter 2.) A citizen advisers' monitoring report to
the Portland City Council highlighted delays in processing complaints at the police
bureau's internal affairs department and provided four strategies for reducing the
delay, including improved recruitment and staffing and the establishment of
timeliness goals for each stage in the review process.

When a delay is inevitable, Felicia Davis, administrator of the Syracuse, New
York, Citizen Review Board, sends the complainant a letter explaining where
the case is in the complaint process and the reasons for the delay. Davis says,
"In effect, I tell them, 'We haven't forgotten you.' This helps keep them
interested in and willing to pursue the case." Davis sends the letter after 60 days
when she knows the case will take more than 90 days to be decided.

Openness of Oversight Proceedings

Most citizen oversight advocates feel strongly that oversight proceedings benefit
from openness.

Many experts believe that one of the most important functions of citizen
oversight is to provide information to the public about the police department
and the complaint process. By itself, this information serves as a form of
oversight and accountability, providing voters, elected officials, and the news
media with relevant information about police activities. Information serves to
"open" police departments to the public.[4]

However, oversight procedures have to be sensitive to the legal and ethical
privacy rights of complainants and police officers. For example, State public
records, statutes, and labor-management agreements may limit the information
citizen oversight bodies can disseminate to complainants and the public.

o A California statute provides that "Peace officer personnel records and
records maintained by any state or local agency, . . . or information obtained
from those records, are confidential and shall not be disclosed in any criminal or
civil proceeding except by discovery." Disclosure, with narrow exceptions, is a
criminal offense.

o The corporation counsel to the city of Rochester advised that "the public
airing by the Police Advisory Board [sic] of its agreement or disagreement with
the findings of the Chief of Police would not appear to be fully in keeping with 
the intent of the New York State's Civil Rights Law, which makes all personnel 
records used to evaluate performance toward continued employment or
promotion of a police officer confidential."

Even when not prohibited, openness and access may discourage citizens who
want complaints kept secret from coming forward, and it may inhibit officers
from reporting misconduct by other police personnel.

When legal, activities that oversight procedures can consider making public
include:

o Hearings.

o Findings.

o Policy recommendations.

o Internal quality control findings.

Hearings in Berkeley and Orange County are open to the public. The Berkeley
ordinance requires that all commission meetings and agendas be publicized at
least 3 days in advance by written notice to newspapers, radio, and television
stations serving the city. The Orange County board invites 57 media outlets to
board meetings. Flint's ombudsman's office faxes its findings to the local
newspaper, two radio stations, and three television stations. Many oversight
bodies write complainants about the outcomes of their cases but, because of
legal limitations or the chief's decision, rarely report what discipline was
imposed-and sometimes whether discipline was imposed.

Finally, all oversight bodies prepare annual reports (and sometimes monthly or
quarterly reports). (See "The San Jose Office of the Independent Police
Auditor Annual Report Is Particularly Informative.") At a minimum, these
reports should include:

o The disposition of complaints.

o Patterns of complaints, such as:

--Type.

--Geographic area.

--Race, ethnicity, and gender of complainants.

--Characteristics of the officers (e.g., race, gender, assignment seniority).

o Any policy recommendations.

Politics

"Politics" may interfere in two respects with the effective operation of citizen
oversight.

Conflict among local government officials

Conflict among elected and appointed officials in a jurisdiction over the
operation of citizen oversight can disrupt the review process. In Flint, the mayor
appoints the police chief, but the city council appoints the ombudsman. If the
mayor and council do not see eye to eye, there is the potential for conflict with
the ombudsman becoming the chief's adversary. Even when there is a good
working relationship among the involved officials in a jurisdiction, turnover
through new elections or appointments can result in new personnel who wish to
have things done "their way."

Sometimes, ambiguity in the lines of authority and communication creates the
potential for controversy:

o The Portland mayor appoints and hires the auditor, but the auditor feels she is
legally responsible to the board-which is the city council sitting en bloc-because
she acts as the board's executive director. Who her true legal supervisor is has
never been tested. The auditor is also in an awkward position whenever her
reports are critical of the city because what she says could make the city liable for
damages. As a result, there were times when the mayor expressed concern about
the auditor's statements. 

o The Berkeley Police Review Commission officer is staff to the city manager,
who appoints her, but the perception among the public and police department is
that she is staff to PRC. The city manager in effect delegates his oversight role to 
the PRC officer. As a result, the officer needs to maintain good relations with
both PRC and the city manager.

In one jurisdiction, board members do not consult with the council members
who appointed them when reviewing specific cases. However, because some
council members tend to side with the police, and others are hostile to the
department, they appoint board members sympathetic to their respective
positions. As a result, the board is split between pro- and anti-police factions.

Politics also can work for the good. In some jurisdictions, the police chief
cooperates with the oversight process at least in part because the mayor demands
support for it. Because the Minneapolis city council president led the effort to
revamp the city's oversight system before she became president, all the involved
parties understand that she expects them to cooperate.

Agendas on the part of volunteers

When they are appointed by the mayor or council members, volunteer board
members may feel, as Lt. Robert Skomra, former head of IA in Minneapolis,
pointed out, that "they represent a special interest and see themselves as
champions for that group." As one city council member said, "Some board
members play to the tune of the city council member who appoints them." In
one jurisdiction, some board members have supported the electoral campaigns
of the council members who appointed them; these volunteers may feel
especially obligated to reflect "their" council member's political views.

A partial solution to this problem of volunteer bias may be mediation training.
Volunteer board members in Rochester all must become certified mediators,
which may increase their ability to provide impartial reviews (see chapter 4,
"Staffing"). Another approach to ensuring board members' objectivity is to
avoid having government officials select them. Each of seven neighborhood
coalitions recommends one individual adviser to serve as a citizen adviser in
Portland. Board members in Rochester are selected by the review board's
screening committee, consisting of board chairpersons and staff. As a result,
according to Anne Pokras, former director of special projects for the board's
parent agency, "Panelists have a heightened awareness that they represent no
one-that is, no politician-but everyone-that is, the community."

Some Portland residents have called for the election of board members.
However, according to a local activist, this might result in the police union's
providing more campaign funds to candidates sympathetic to their positions
than other candidates could raise (see "Working With the Union" in chapter 6).

Of course, not all disagreement among elected and appointed officials and not
all bias among oversight volunteers is politically motivated in the sense of
serving narrow self-interests. Many clashes over citizen oversight are the result
of genuine differences of opinion on what is, after all, a controversial topic.
Chapter 6 identifies some of these conflicts as they relate to oversight bodies
and police and sheriff's departments.

Notes

1. Walker, Samuel, Citizen Review Resource Manual, Washington, D.C.:
Police Executive Research Forum, 1995: 6-7.

2. Ibid., 13.

3. Sviridoff, Michele, and Jerome E. McElroy, Process-ing Complaints Against
Police in New York City: The Complainant's Perspective, Washington, DC:
Vera Institute of Justice, 1989: 109.

4. Luna, Eileen, and Samuel Walker, A Report on the Oversight Mechanisms
of the Albuquerque Police Department, prepared for the Albuquerque City
Council, 1997: 131.

---------------------------

Key Points

o Jurisdictions establishing citizen oversight procedures or seeking to improve
existing procedures need to consider four issues not discussed in detail elsewhere
in this report:

--Outreach.

--Oversight structural considerations.

--The openness of the procedures to the public.

--The role of "politics."

o Effective outreach is essential to a successful oversight system; otherwise,
allegations of misconduct will go unreported and the system will not be used.

o Despite its importance, most oversight bodies have lacked the resources to
market their services effectively.

o Jurisdictions that engage in outreach:

--Publish and distribute program brochures.

--Place information about the system in the telephone book, police stations,
and the mayor's office and on the Internet.

--Promote coverage in the local press beyond attention to high-profile cases.

--Give talks to neighborhood groups and other agencies.

--Arrange for citizens to pick up complaint forms at multiple locations.

o Some citizens are reluctant to file complaints because they fear retaliation
from the police. 

o Jurisdictions need to address several organizational issues related to the
structure of their oversight process, such as:

--Developing the oversight system's legal basis (typically by municipal
ordinance).

--Determining which complaints will be investigated, reviewed, or audited.

--Providing the system with subpoena power.

--Minimizing delays in case processing.

o Making oversight procedures public has potential benefits and drawbacks.

--Openness can increase the public's trust in the system but discourage citizens
who want to remain anonymous from filing complaints.

--There are often legal barriers to opening citizen oversight to the public.

O Most oversight bodies prepare annual reports for public dissemination. Some
reports include:

--The nature and status of each policy recommendation the body made that year.

--Demographic information about complainants and subject officers.

--Cases in which the chief or sheriff disagreed with the board's findings.

o "Politics" can seriously hamper the oversight system's effectiveness. Politics can
involve:

--Conflict among local government officials.

--Volunteer board members with a pro-police or anti-police "agenda."

---------------------------

Some Citizens Fear Officers May Retaliate

Some citizens are afraid to report allegations of police misconduct because
they fear officers will retaliate against them for complaining. One complainant
reported, "I was concerned about retaliation-I felt if the officer could find out
about this [complaint], I might want to rethink about whether to pursue the
case. But the investigator said don't be concerned-he had had only one case of
retaliation." Another complainant reported that he was waiting for someone in
his car when the officer against whom he had filed his complaint rode by in a
cruiser. After they made eye contact, the officer stopped and watched him.
When the complainant's friend arrived, the officer drove off.

A complainant in one city expressed concern that, because the oversight office
was located next to the police station, he was nervous that officers could see
him enter and leave the building. As a result, oversight bodies try to locate their
offices away from the police department. The Berkeley ordinance specifies that
the board meetings "shall not be held in the building in which the Police
Department is located."

However, oversight staff in most jurisdictions believe that actual retaliation is
rare. Tucson's auditor has received only one complaint alleging retaliation, while
San Francisco's Office of Citizen Complaints (OCC) received fewer than 10
complaints during the 3-year period between 1996 and 1999, none involving
violence. OCC confirmed only one allegation.

Examination of data collected from citizen surveys and debriefings as part of the
1977 Police Services Study in Rochester, New York, St. Louis, Missouri, and
Tampa-St. Petersburg, Florida, identified 455 individuals who felt they had a
reason to complain about police conduct but took no action. A relatively small
proportion of these citizens said they did not complain because they were afraid
of the police (3.2 percent) or felt that filing a complaint would make matters
worse (4.6 percent). The most common reason for not complaining (42
percent) was the belief that filing would do no good.*

Oversight bodies can try to reduce retaliation-or the fear of retaliation-by telling
complainants to report immediately any attempts at reprisal to the police
department and the oversight board, where the allegation will receive prompt
attention. San Francisco's OCC and Berkeley's Police Review Commission
brochures inform potential complainants that retaliation is illegal. OCC staff also
advise apprehensive would-be complainants to weigh whether they will be safer
by complaining (and thus becoming known and identified) or by not
complaining (and thus remaining vulnerable without any notice to those who
could act to protect them). Police and sheriff's departments can reduce the
chances of retaliation by developing and disseminating a clear policy prohibiting
reprisals. A bulletin, the "Policy of the Police Commission of the San Francisco
Police Department on OCC Cooperation," advises all members of the
department of the following:

1. Attempts to threaten, intimidate, mislead, or harass potential or actual OCC
complainants, witnesses, or staff members will be considered to be serious
violations of General Order L-1 deserving of severe forms of discipline
including, but not limited to, termination.

2. When the Chief of Police receives a sustained case involving a violation of
General Order L-1, such case will be referred to the Police Commission for
trial.

3. Members who are the subject of a complaint filed with the OCC shall not
contact the complainant or witness regarding the issues of the complaint.

*Walker, Samuel, and Nanette Graham, "Citizen Complaints in Response to
Police Misconduct: The Results of a Victimization Survey,"
Police Quarterly 1 (1) (1998): 65-89.

---------------------------

Exhibit 5-1. Oversight Outreach Methods

Although most oversight bodies have had difficulty making the public aware of
their existence and procedures, many have implemented parts of a
comprehensive marketing strategy.

Publicity materials:

o Brochures (some in foreign languages).

o Business cards.

Postings:

o Listings in the telephone directory.

o Brochure and business card racks in the mayor's office.

o An Internet site.

Media:

o Sending notices of hearings to the media.

o Placing announcements in newspapers.

o Televising hearings.

Neighborhood groups and other agencies:

o Mailing brochures and business cards.

o Making presentations.

Filing locations:

o Providing filing forms at multiple locations.

o Facilitating Internet filing.

Referrals by police:

o Posting signs in police stations.

o Handing out oversight brochures and business cards.

---------------------------

San Francisco's Office of Citizen Complaints Monitors Selected Public
Demonstrations

At the director's instruction, Office of Citizen Complaints (OCC) staff attend
situations where there has been a public perception or actual history of police
misconduct. Wearing OCC hats or jackets, they regularly monitor bicycle
rallies, community fairs, and public demonstrations. A group sponsoring an
Immigration Pride event wrote OCC asking staff to monitor the event because
it claimed there had been problems with the police in the past; OCC agreed to
go. No complaints resulted, and OCC staff did not observe any situations that
required investigation of alleged misconduct.

OCC staff believe that the observations can serve to document, interpret, and
evaluate the potential merits of OCC complaints, including establishing that
there is no basis for a complaint.

The agency has developed a written policy for monitoring demonstrations (see
appendix D) that specifies that "it is the policy of the OCC to monitor
demonstrations when it is determined to be consistent with OCC's mission, and
feasible and advisable to do so, in the joint determination of the Director and
Chief Investigator."

At least one monitor and a supervisor observe each demonstration. Staff do not
hand out intake forms and, except in emergencies, do not take complaints at the
scene. If a civilian wishes to make a complaint, a monitor offers to provide the
person with an OCC Incident Information Card (see exhibit 5-2) and, when
appropriate, a business card. After gathering as much information as possible
about the complaint, the monitor suggests the person contact OCC during
business hours for followup.

---------------------------

The Legality of Forcing Officers to Testify

Under Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967), whoever is the employer
of a police officer, including not only the chief but, by extension, the city
manager or mayor, can order the officer to answer questions "specifically,
directly, and narrowly relating to performance of his [or her] official duties" as
part of an internal, noncriminal investigation. Failure to answer questions related
to the scope of their employment may form the basis for disciplining and
dismissing officers. However, statements officers make under this requirement
cannot be used against them in any subsequent criminal proceeding unless the
officers are alleged to have committed perjury. Because officers can be
terminated if they do not answer administrative questions, internal affairs and
citizen oversight investigators typically read them their "Garrity rights"-a
guarantee that the information sought will not be used against them in a criminal
proceeding but that failure to respond to questioning could lead to disciplinary
action.

In 1998 the Colorado Court of Appeals in City and County of Denver and the
Public Safety Review Commission v. Scott Blatnik and Jerome Powell (97 CA
1662) held that law enforcement officers are entitled to assert their fifth
amendment privilege before a citizen review board. The court ruled that the
Denver Public Safety Review Commission could not compel subject officers to
testify during an inquiry into allegations of improper use of force once the
officers had invoked their privilege against self-incrimination. The city and
commission had sued to compel them to testify after the officers had invoked
the amendment. The court ruled that, because the commission was not the
officers' employer, it could not compel them to testify.

The court of appeals distinguished this case from a 1997 Federal court case,
Pirrozzi v. New York (950 F. Supp. 90 [S.D.N.Y. 1996], aff'd 117 F. 
3d 7223 [2d Cir. 1997]), which compelled an officer to testify under threat 
of discharge. In Pirrozzi, the court found that officers can be compelled to 
testify as a condition of employment by employers or those representing their
employers. Because New York City's review board is an integral part of the 
disciplinary process, and because departmental regulations require officers to
give statements to the board under threat of termination, subject officers cannot
invoke the protection of the fifth amendment.

The Berkeley city attorney issued a similar ruling in 1998. Because of the
Colorado case, a police officer took the fifth amendment during an interview
with the Police Review Commission investigator. As a result, Barbara Attard,
the PRC officer, asked the city attorney for a legal opinion. The attorney ruled
that, under a California statute similar to the Federal Garrity ruling, officers must
testify because PRC acts pursuant to the authority of the city manager, who is
the police department officers' employer.

---------------------------

The San Jose Office of the Independent Police Auditor Annual Report Is
Particularly Informative

The 1997 Year End Report of the San Jose Office of the Independent Police
Auditor is a particularly comprehensive and well-presented document. The
58-page, spiral-bound report, with a glossy burgundy cover, includes:

o Biographical sketches of office staff.

o An 11-page executive summary printed on burgundy-colored pages.

o A flowchart illustrating the complaint process.

o A discussion of complaint timeliness that includes a chart illustrating a sample
of 10 cases and the number of days a complaint remained at different stages of
the review process (see exhibit 5-4).

o The types of complaints and sustained cases by city council district for the
previous 3 years.

o A chart showing the type of alleged unnecessary force used by body area
affected and degree of injury.

o Demographic information about complainants, including gender, ethnicity,
age, educational level, and occupation.

o Statistical information about subject officers, including bureau, gender, years
of experience, type of allegation by years of experience, and police unit in
which they work(ed).

o A chart showing discipline imposed.

o A discussion of the criteria for evaluating internal affairs investigations and the
auditor's findings related to each criterion.

o Summaries of seven selected audited cases.

o A chart showing the status of every policy recommendation the auditor has
presented and its disposition since the office was established in 1993.

---------------------------

Chapter 6: Resolving Potential Conflicts Between Oversight Bodies and Police

There are conflicts in many jurisdictions between oversight bodies and police
agencies. To be sure, if there is no tension between them, the oversight body
may not be acting assertively to maintain or improve police accountability.
However, excessive conflict will destroy any oversight system.

Preliminary Steps for Minimizing Conflict

There are three preliminary steps jurisdictions can take that can substantially
reduce the potential for future conflict not only between the oversight body and
the police but among all parties involved in, or at least concerned about, citizen
oversight-local public and elected officials, union leaders, and community
activists.

1. Do not wait for a serious incident, typically a police shooting that creates a
public uproar, before setting up an oversight system. Because of the tensions
such an incident creates, it is difficult for the parties involved to approach the
planning task in a rational manner. As a result, the planning process may
perpetuate, rather than defuse, existing tensions. If the planning process has
begun only after a conflict, avoid discussion of the incident in the planning
process.

2. Involve representatives from all concerned parties as colleagues in the
planning process. Although it may require months to iron out differences, even if
they are not resolved to everyone's satisfaction, the implementation and
operation of the oversight procedure is likely to proceed more smoothly if all
the parties have participated in its planning. (See "Working With Activists.")

3. Specify precisely the review system's objectives. Without specific
objectives such as the ones listed in chapter 7, "Monitoring, Evaluation, and
Funding," the involved parties may lock horns because they have different
expectations of what the system should be doing and accomplishing. Even if all
the involved parties do not agree on what the oversight system should be trying
to accomplish, at least they will have the same understanding of its goals.

That said, it remains true that the most severe antagonism surrounding citizen
oversight is usually between the oversight body and the police or sheriff's
department and between the review process and union leaders. This chapter
reviews some of the principal sources of conflict between oversight bodies and
law enforcement agencies-including police unions-and suggests possible
solutions.

Police Criticisms of Oversight Procedures

Exhibit 6-1 summarizes the concerns many police and sheriff's departments
express about citizen oversight along with possible responses to their concerns.
As shown in the exhibit and discussed below, these concerns generally fall into
three categories:

1. Oversight procedures represent outside interference.

2. Oversight staff lack experience with and understanding of police work.

3. The oversight process is unfair.

Citizens should not interfere with police work

Most police administrators believe their agencies should have the final-and often
only-say in matters of discipline, policies and procedures, and training. Police
administrators feel they have to be held accountable for their officers' behavior
because they are in charge. Without final say over discipline, policy, and
training, their accountability is undermined. (See "Should Citizens Control the
Discipline Process?")

Police executives' objections to citizen oversight sometimes reflect their belief
that they already do a good job responding to citizen complaints. As a result,
when a finding from an oversight body disagrees with the department's internal
finding, some chiefs and sheriffs give little or no weight to the oversight body's
finding in determining discipline. In some jurisdictions, chiefs and 
sheriffs accept internal affairs findings and decide on discipline long before they
even receive the oversight body's findings. Some have never changed an IA
finding as a result of an oversight finding that was different.

Jurisdictions have used a variety of strategies to address concerns about outside
involvement in police matters. In most jurisdictions, local government has
established oversight bodies that are only advisory; their recommendations are
nonbinding on departments. Some review bodies can appeal the chief's or
sheriff's rejection of their recommendations to elected or appointed officials
who can require the department to act. However, because these officials have
this authority regardless of whether there is an oversight body, the oversight
procedure itself does not further diminish the police or sheriff's department's
authority. Even when citizen oversight bodies do have some authority over the
police, they have generally exercised it cautiously. For example, Flint and St.
Paul have never used their subpoena power to compel officers to testify;
Orange County and St. Paul have never exercised their right to hire an
independent investigator to second-guess an IA investigation.

Many internal affairs and other procedures for investigating citizen complaints
are already rigorous. However, the process typically is only as effective as the
current chief or sheriff requires it to be. Advocates of citizen oversight believe it
is important to have an independent review mechanism in place that can help IA
maintain its standards in case the next chief or sheriff fails to demand--and
ensure--fairness and thoroughness in the internal complaint investigations
process.

In addition, even with a conscientious chief or sheriff, because of turnover there
are usually some IA investigators who are not yet fully skilled in their jobs--and
who may switch assignments after they have become fully qualified. Finally,
even when a police or sheriff's department is being conscientious in imposing
appropriate discipline without citizen review, an oversight procedure can
reassure skeptical citizens that the agency is indeed following through
responsibly on citizen complaints.

Citizens do not understand police work

Some police oppose citizen oversight procedures because they believe that
oversight staff, lacking experience as police officers or sheriff's deputies, cannot
determine fairly whether officers have engaged in misconduct. Officers
frequently observe that State medical boards composed only of physicians
investigate doctors for malpractice, and only attorneys investigate lawyers for
misconduct. Similarly, some police argue, only law enforcement officers have
the knowledge to investigate and judge other sworn personnel.

There are at least four specific areas in which police officers feel citizens do not
understand police work:

1. Case law (and the agency's own rules) governing police behavior, such as
when officers may conduct searches (and what types of searches) and when
they may use deadly force against a fleeing felon.

2. The nature of police discretion, both in terms of what officers have the
flexibility to do and what they may not do.

3. How officers are trained, in light of the fact that, in the absence of a policy
or procedure, training is policy.

4. The manner in which the totality of the circumstances influences an officer's
behavior-for example, when courtesy is not always a viable option.[1]

Several considerations may reduce these concerns:

o By reviewing materials they receive before or at each hearing, which typically
include the work product of the IA investigation as well as relevant department
policies and procedures, board members report they generally can determine
whether officers engaged in misconduct. In addition, a department supervisor
attends hearings in many jurisdictions (e.g., Berkeley, Orange County, and
Tucson) or is available on call (e.g., Rochester) to answer questions about
department operations.

o Regarding board members' lack of expertise, Jackie DeBose, a 10-year
member of Berkeley's Police Review Commission, observes, "This is a citizens'
review, not a court of law, so they [board members] should look at the
problem as private citizens." In addition, Sgt. George Cardenas, the only sworn
member of Omaha's Citizens Complaint Review Board (CCRB), notes, "In
looking at whether officers violated a policy or procedure, board members are
pretty good at determining the answer. But most cases [in his jurisdiction] are of
the 'he said/she said' variety, so they don't need special expertise."

o Although selecting only individuals with police experience for board
membership would negate the purpose of citizen oversight, citizen review
systems that investigate allegations of misconduct can hire investigators with
pertinent law enforcement expertise. Most of the Minneapolis Civilian Police
Review Authority's investigators are former police officers who worked in other
jurisdictions. Of course, these investigators need to be screened, trained, and
supervised closely to make sure they do not show bias in favor of subject
officers during their investigations.

o Although it is generally true that only physicians and attorneys investigate their
respective colleagues for misconduct, many organizations and individuals have
in fact criticized these licensing boards for ineffectively monitoring and
disciplining members of their professions.[2] It is also notoriously difficult to find
physicians who will testify in court against other physicians and lawyers who will
testify against other lawyers. As a result, the analogy with only police
overseeing other police is a poor one. If anything, the analogy reinforces the
case for not leaving oversight to members of the profession being monitored.[3]
Furthermore, as Mary Dunlap, director of San Francisco's Office of Citizen
Complaints, points out, "Lay jurors already factually resolve allegations of
police misconduct [and physician and lawyer malpractice] in civil and criminal
justice trials that are a key element of the American justice system."

o Oversight directors need to educate officers about what their staffs do as well
as to describe their backgrounds and training. According to Todd Samolis,
coordinator of the Rochester Civilian Review Board, "At a panel for middle
school students that I ran jointly with 10 officers, the officers were stunned to
learn about the extensiveness of the mediation and academy training board
members receive, especially impartiality training." Oversight staff in Rochester
and Minneapolis attend roll calls so they can describe their operations and
training to officers.

The process is unfair

Although many officers believe that the oversight process is unfair because, as
previously discussed, citizen reviewers are unfamiliar with police work, officers
also find the process unfair for other reasons. Many officers feel oversight staff
have "an agenda"-that is, the staff believe it is their personal mission or
assignment from the elected officials who appointed them to reduce police
officers' power. As one chief said, "The problem is not the concept [of citizen
oversight] but using biased staff. . . . [For example,] staff ask complainants
exculpatory questions, but they don't ask exculpatory questions of officers that
would justify their behavior." According to a report evaluating Tucson's
oversight system, "The appointment of [board] members with strong political
agendas can result in their use of the review body as a tool for promoting those
causes."[4]

When they are biased, investigators and board members can sometimes come
across as hostile. An officer who was a witness at a board meeting felt the
process was so demeaning and insulting, she wrote a memo to the chief saying
she would walk out of any future hearings: "The board chairperson was
argumentative and condescending, and he in effect accused me of lying." Bias,
some officers feel, also leads staff to tolerate complainants who are only out to
get the police, such as drug dealers who regularly file complaints only to build a
specious defense on grounds of harassment and to slow down assertive officers
by getting complaints into their personnel folders.

Officers in several jurisdictions reported that some complainants take advantage
of the complaint process to benefit a planned or ongoing civil suit against the
city or officer. Because everything said at hearings in some jurisdictions is
discoverable, plaintiffs in civil cases in effect get free "prediscovery." Daryl
Lynn, chairperson of the Minneapolis Civilian Police Review Authority, reports
that "some [citizens] do file complaints just to get discovery of the police
department's case to use in a civil suit." After Mark Gissiner, a Cincinnati
human resources analyst, conducted an investigation and prepared a report that
concluded that an officer had used excessive force, a lawyer used the report to
sue the city for damages. The city settled for $300,000. A plaintiff's attorney in
another jurisdiction described how he makes use of the oversight process (see
"An Attorney Uses Citizen Oversight as a Screening Tool for Civil Suits").

Officers in several jurisdictions felt that the practice of "added allegations," also
called "collateral misconduct," was particularly unfair. Some oversight
procedures, including those in Berkeley, Flint, Rochester, and San Francisco,
investigate and sustain allegations that are not part of the citizens' original
complaint but that oversight staff discover in the course of their investigation or
review. For example, the complaint may be about the alleged use of foul
language, but the oversight body learns the officer was not wearing a badge at
the time of the incident or failed to file a report. One oversight body sustained
an added allegation against an officer for not "timing out"--recording the end
mileage on a wagon transport. These added allegations are not "citizen"
complaints but accusations of misconduct by the review body.

Officers complain that they are held accountable for tiny rule violations, such as
placing the wrong offense code on a citation. One chief said, "It gets tiresome
to get nitpicked." Officers also object to having "not sustained" findings included
in their file. Finally, many officers complain about the long delays the complaint
process sometimes entails. According to one, "Delays make it impossible for
officers to collect witnesses or even remember what happened."

Several actions and observations may help to temper police concerns that
oversight procedures are unfair.

o Every citizen oversight process should protect officers from petty and
vengeful complaints. "An important component of the intake process surrounds
development of procedures (and related training) to assess and dismiss
complaints that are unfounded . . . to permit frivolous complaints to be set aside
and not utilize [oversight] resources unnecessarily" or inappropriately implicate
and take up the time of officers.[5]

o Oversight boards need to let officers know when they decide in favor of
officers in specific cases so police do not develop or maintain the misperception
that the program is biased. (See "The Types of Board Findings Oversight Staff
Should Publicize to Officers.") Boards can also make clear that they sustain
citizen complaints at low rates that are not significantly higher-and sometimes
lower-than those of internal affairs units.[6] Lisa Botsko, Portland's first auditor,
went to training sessions for IA investigators to tell them how well they were
doing.

o Investigators and board members should ask neutral questions in a
nonaccusatory manner. One accused officer was pleased to report that the
Tucson auditor's questions during an IA interrogation of his alleged misconduct
were not judgmental but rather were designed "to get a clear picture of what
happened." He felt her questions "all made sense."

o Mary Dunlap, director of San Francisco's Office of Citizen Complaints,
observes that indecisive findings can be unsatisfying and unfair to both parties.
As a result, she wants to reduce the number of undecided cases--that is, have
more determinations that the case is unfounded, exonerated, or sustained. In
any case, it may be the police or sheriff's department decision, not the oversight
body's determination, to record unfounded cases in an officer's files.

o Reasonable doubt in a criminal case results in a "not guilty," not an "innocent,"
finding. It is perhaps not unreasonable, therefore, that in oversight cases, when
a preponderance of the evidence is lacking that the officer did not engage in
misconduct, an unsustained--not an unfounded or exonerated--finding is made.
Similarly, just as a criminal defendant found not guilty still has an arrest record,
it may not be unreasonable to include a record of unsustained cases in an
officer's personnel file. A reasonable compromise may be for the oversight
body not to report unsustained findings to the police or sheriff's department or
for the department not to include them in the officer's file until the number of
unsustained findings has reached an agreed-upon minimum number during a
specified period of time (e.g., three findings during a 2-year period).

o Police IA units themselves add allegations to citizens'--or their own--complaints
against officers. The Rochester Police Department's IA unit added what it calls
12 "satellite issues" as a result of investigations initiated for other reasons in
1997. A letter the Tucson Police Department sent to one complainant noted,
"This complaint has been closed as OTHER, meaning that the Officer
committed a violation of TPD [Tucson Police Department] Rules and
Procedures other than the alleged violation." In other words, in adding allegations,
citizen oversight bodies are merely following in police footsteps. In some
jurisdictions, such as San Francisco, oversight bodies are required to investigate
any added allegations they discover because their charter mandates that they
investigate any wrongdoing they uncover. Never-theless, San Francisco's internal
affairs unit is trying to work with the Office of Citizen Complaints on not
generating added allegations that do not represent deliberate misconduct--for
example, claiming an officer recorded the wrong code on a report. Finally, on the
one hand, added allegations are not citizen complaints and therefore, absent a
legal mandate to investigate them, might be considered beyond the oversight
body's purview. On the other hand, few citizens are familiar with their police or
sheriff's department general orders and therefore are unaware when an officer's
behavior violates these orders. A possible reconciliation of this dilemma may be
for oversight bodies to ask the complainant if he or she would like to add any
instances of misconduct discovered by the oversight body to the original
complaint. If the complainant does not wish to add them, the oversight body
could inform the department of the additional violations without including them
as part of the complaint.

o Board decisions can benefit, not just harm, officers who are sued civilly. In
one case, a citizen whose complaint a board did not sustain filed a civil suit, and
the city attorney had the oversight investigator testify. The investigator's
testimony helped the officer have the suit dismissed. (See chapter 1,
"Introduction," for further evidence that citizen oversight can prevent or reduce
award amounts in civil suits.) Whenever the department is sued, the Portland
Police Bureau internal affairs unit shares with loss-control personnel reports that
the Portland auditor routinely sends it in case the information can help the
department's case.

o Delay is a product of many people. Also, slowness is often an unavoidable
feature of many oversight bodies because they are overworked and
understaffed, just as it can take years for Federal and State equal opportunity
employment commissions to hear cases. Providing citizen oversight bodies with
adequate personnel and funding often can reduce delays dramatically, as
happened when San Francisco funded additional investigators for 
the Office of Citizen Complaints. Oversight bodies, such as Berkeley's, also can
develop a process for summarily dismissing inappropriate complaints to reduce
delays involved in scheduling hearings on legitimate complaints. Orange County
allows board members to place noncontroversial complaints on a "consent
agenda," bypassing the need for further discussion.

o Oversight staff and police need to meet and talk, whether to iron out specific
misconceptions or conflicts or to share information about what they are doing.
According to Prentice Sanders, assistant chief of the San Francisco Police
Department, in 1997 the police commission chairperson invited OCC and the
police department as well as interested citizen groups to four roundtable
discussions run by two independent professional facilitators to address concerns
about the oversight process. Everyone looked for common ground. All agreed
there was a problem with cases taking too long that needed to be addressed.
They also agreed to talk to each other in the future if a problem arose before
going to the press.

Oversight Criticisms of the Police

Oversight staff raise several concerns about their relationships with the police
and sheriff's departments whose investigations they review. Their most common
concerns are that in some cases:

o Officers refuse to answer questions.

o Departments resist providing needed records--or fail to provide them in a
timely manner.

o Officers do not understand the oversight system's mission and legitimacy.

o Departments ignore the oversight body's findings or policy and procedure and
training recommendations.

For example, the Berkeley Police Review Commission was trying to have the
police department provide it with the relevant police report and computer-aided
dispatch printout regarding radio and telephone communications before, not
after, the commission gives a copy of the citizen's complaint to the police
department. The Omaha Police Department was providing the Citizens
Complaint Review Board with the results of investigations 59 days after receipt
of complaints, leaving the board 1 day in which to review the findings according
to the ordinance. The mayor issued an executive order requiring submission
within 30 days or granting an automatic extension for the board's review. The
minutes of the January 1998 Police Internal Investigations Auditing Committee
(PIIAC) meeting in Portland record a citizen adviser as reporting:

An ad hoc subcommittee had met the previous week to discuss policy issues
regarding the Chief not accepting recommended findings on contested appeals.
The consensus [among subcommittee members] was to not pursue changes to
city code or union contracts; that's not something that could be accomplished
overnight. Rather, the recommended finding from City Council [acting as
PIIAC] is that he personally appear in a Council session to explain his rationale
. . . for now, this appears to be the only practical solution. There are
philosophical issues involved; if a disturbing pattern develops, this could be a
catalyst for change.

Some police and sheriff's departments have attempted to accommodate board
members' concerns.

o When the Tucson board complained that the police department's data were
difficult to follow, the chief had the board chairperson meet with the
department's statistical department, which developed a clearer way of presenting
the information for the board. The department also offered to provide a
photographer for a board project to develop a video for schools designed to
improve police relations with the Hispanic community.

o The San Francisco Police Commission required the department to issue a
general order mandating that officers submit to an Office of Citizen Complaints
interview because officers had been rendering OCC impotent by not showing up.
The department now responds to an officer's first violation of an order to appear
with an admonishment, the second with a reprimand, and the third with a 1-day
suspension. When some officers who did not care about losing a day's pay
continued to ignore the summons, the chief told them violations would influence
their promotion opportunities.

o Some departments also make special efforts to ensure their officers are
familiar with the oversight body's responsibilities and the officers' obligations to
it.

--At the San Francisco Police Department's invitation, Mary Dunlap teaches a
50-minute session at the police academy on "How to Avoid OCC."

--The Minneapolis Police Department's training commander arranged for
Patricia Hughes, the Civilian Police Review Authority's (CRA's) executive
director, to give a 90-minute presentation at each police academy to explain to
recruits how to stay out of trouble and what the citizen review process is.
Hughes presents eight sustained cases that have come before CRA, asking the
recruits what they would do in each situation. She compares their responses
with what the police officers actually did in the situations. An example of a case
Hughes presents is described below.

After several squad cars responded to a gang shooting, the last officer to arrive
saw a male in the back of a cruiser; the officer pointed his flashlight at the man,
and the man made an obscene gesture to the officer. "What would you do?"
Hughes asks. After getting the recruits' responses, Hughes continues. "The
officer walked around the car, opened the door, and punched him. Later, he
learned that the other officers had stowed the man in the cruiser because the
person had witnessed the shooting and was terrified he would be retaliated
against if the gang members knew he was going to testify. So, the man
overreacted when the officer made him visible with his flashlight." Hughes then
explains how citizens feel when officers engage in misconduct.

--According to Orange County Deputy Patrick Reilly, "All deputies know the
[Citizen Review] Board [CRB] exists-it is discussed in the academy and during
supervisor tests." In addition, CRB is the subject of an entire general order
dated August 7, 1997, that begins, "The purpose of this policy is to ensure all
agency employees are aware of the Orange County Citizen Review Board
(CRB)." After describing the board's composition, the bulletin goes on to
observe, "All agency employees shall appear before the CRB when formally
notified in writing. Failure to appear may result in disciplinary action."

--Other departments have gone out of their way to show good faith in working
with their oversight systems.

o Lt. Robert Skomra, former commander of the Minneapolis Police
Department's IA unit, on his own initiative, went to every Civilian Police
Review Authority meeting, bringing a different IA investigator with him each
time. "You can't tell people [i.e., CRA] you're a valuable asset unless you go in
person."

o Robert Duffy, when he became chief of the Rochester Police Department,
came to a meeting in which his IA investigators were training Civilian Review
Board members to introduce himself and to explain how valuable the board's
work was to the department.

Working With the Union

The local officers' union can be more important than the chief or sheriff--and
have different concerns than the chief or sheriff--in making sure citizen oversight
functions properly. The union can challenge the process in the courts, influence
line officers to cooperate with or hamper the procedure, and expedite or delay
proceedings when it represents subject officers during interviews and hearings.
It is therefore crucial for oversight planners, staff, and volunteers to address
union concerns about the review process.

Historical conflict between most police unions and citizen oversight bodies

Most police unions have traditionally opposed citizen oversight-often
successfully--through litigation or lobbying. In one jurisdiction, the union asked
city council members to vote against renewing the appointment of a board
member who had had the highest rate of recommendations for sustaining
complaints.

However, police unions have increasingly been unable to defeat citizen review
proposals. In some jurisdictions, unions have either chosen not to oppose
oversight proposals or even supported them. Opposition has declined in part
because leaders have decided that a review system was inevitable and because,
as one union president said, "We're not getting gored by it." According to a
union treasurer in another city, "If there had been no sworn [officers] on the
board, the union would have opposed it. But we knew we could not litigate
it-oversight was inevitable--so we wanted to make the best of what could have
been a bad situation." (See "Not All Police Unions Have Opposed Citizen
Oversight.")

Approaches to collaboration

There are several ways in which oversight planners can try to work with the
local officers' union.

Involve the union in planning the review procedure
In some jurisdictions, oversight planners have invited union leaders to help
design the new oversight system. As a result, although union leaders may not
agree with the procedure that is ultimately adopted, they have an opportunity to
shape its design, express their concerns, and get to know some of the
individuals who may be administering it.

o When planning the Boise oversight procedure, Pierce Murphy, the new
ombudsman, invited the union  president to accompany him to examine the 
Civilian Police Review Authority in Minneapolis. The Boise Police Department 
agreed to pay for the president's time and to reimburse his travel expenses.

o In 1997, the Albuquerque City Council established an ad hoc committee on
public safety consisting of three city counselors and staff to develop a citizen
oversight procedure. The committee in turn assembled a task force of seven
individuals representing community organizations (e.g., the American Civil
Liberties Union), the police department, and the officers' union. The group met
every 2 or 3 weeks for 6 months and ended up presenting five different models
to the city council for consideration. A legislative analyst merged the models
into a single ordinance, which the council approved.

When possible, accommodate union concerns
Union leaders have legitimate interests in how citizen oversight operates,
including:

o The use of subpoena power.

o The system's authority to impose discipline.

o Delays in case processing.

o The fairness of the procedures.

For example, according to Liana Perez, Tucson's auditor, "It's better not to try
to get subpoena power because then the union ties you up in court."
Furthermore, many oversight staff and researchers believe that subpoena power
is not a particularly useful tool. (See the discussion of subpoena power in
chapter 5, "Addressing Important Issues in Citizen Oversight.") Other examples
of meeting the union half way follow.

o The Rochester corporate counsel worked closely with the city council and the
mayor to fashion an oversight procedure that would not be subject to a
successful union suit. For example, the city council attorney reported that giving
the Civilian Review Board authority to establish mandatory findings and
discipline would make it vulnerable to litigation by the union, and the union
already had said it would sue if the council granted the board these powers. As
a result, this authority was omitted from the legislation.

o Rochester's first review board included police officers to accommodate union
concerns. Later, the city council enacted legislation excluding them. The
Rochester police union consented to a mediation option after the city council
agreed to exclude any final signed agreement and to call the process
"conciliation," not "mediation."

o Board members in another jurisdiction agreed to base their findings on clear
and convincing evidence rather than on a preponderance of the evidence after
the union agreed that officers could be required to testify.

o To address the concerns that the oversight system could cost the union
money, the Minneapolis statute requires that the Civilian Police Review Board
pay the union's legal fees when a complaint is not sustained after the executive
director has found probable cause.

o When first appointed, Lisa Botsko, Portland's first auditor, met with the union
president and treasurer initially "just to get to know them, learn their
perspectives, and tell them what I do." One of the grievances they expressed to
Botsko was how long it took to process complaints. As a result, Botsko
developed timelines for everyone involved in the review process.

Make sure the review process is scrupulously fair
Some union leaders report they have no objection to citizen review as long as it
treats officers fairly.

o I wasn't opposed to citizen review; I had researched it and hadn't found that
citizen review burns cops. I just didn't want it to be one sided.
--Butch Swinteck, treasurer, St. Paul Police Officers' Union

o The concept of oversight is excellent; it builds citizen trust in the department:
We can't be accused of covering anything up. The problem lies in the
practice-the procedure attracts staff with an axe to grind against us. For civilian
review of law enforcement to function properly, all parties to it, including
officers, must perceive the process to be impartial and professional. 
--John Evans, officer representative, San Francisco Police Officers' Association

According to Mark Gissiner, president of the International Association for
Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement from 1995-99, "Police officers feel that
oversight has a third standard for judging officers in addition to criminal
behavior and violation of general orders. But there should not be any other
standard; either the behavior is a crime or a violation of general orders-or it is
not. A lot of people feel oversight should be an advocate for complainants
because no one else seems to represent them. But oversight should not; it
should be a factfinder only with the authority to make recommendations based
on its findings." Of course, once an oversight body finds for the complainant,
depending on its legislative mandate, it may have to end up acting on the
complainant's behalf.

According to Lt. Steve Young, vice president of the Grand Lodge, Fraternal
Order of Police, in addition to basic fairness, "Union leaders are concerned that
any oversight system follow due process in how they treat officers." Oversight
bodies should, in consultation with the union, investigate thoroughly the due
process rights of officers reflected in State statute, case law, and labor's
contract with the department. For example, some union contracts require that
matters of discipline must be dealt with during working hours. Other contracts
limit the information oversight bodies can disseminate to complainants or the
general public. The oversight director can distribute a summary of these rights 
to all staff and volunteers, ask the union to report when it believes a right has 
been violated, and monitor how well staff are respecting these rights.

Oversight planners can address union concerns about fairness and due process
in part by working out a mutually satisfactory arrangement for officer
representation at investigatory interviews and hearings that, at a minimum,
respects the union contract's requirements regarding officer representation in
disciplinary investigations and hearings. The extent to which union leaders may
accompany and represent officers at oversight investigatory interviews and
hearings varies considerably. In Berkeley, subject officers may have
representation by a union agent or the union's legal counsel during all
investigations and hearings. Union representatives may attend interviews in
Minneapolis, but they may not speak during the investigation (they may caucus
to offer the officer advice).

Fairness may always be compromised if political leaders and local officials see
oversight simply as a means of placating citizen groups that are asking for a
review system. Steve Young observes, "Most union people feel officers are the
victim of politics-that city and county officials implement oversight to pander to
the complaints of a few vocal citizens and citizen groups. As a result, officials
need to articulate nonpolitical, legitimate reasons for implementing it."

Highlight shared objectives

Unions and oversight bodies share the same concern that internal affairs treat
officers fairly. As a result, some union leaders have used the citizen oversight
system to seek redress for their members whom they felt IA treated unfairly.

o In Portland, the union treasurer--over the objections of some rank-and-file
union members--filed a complaint against a lieutenant with the oversight body
after internal affairs rejected the complaint without investigation on the grounds
that it had no merit. The oversight body voted to send the complaint to IA for
investigation.

o When the union president told the Portland auditor about a case he felt IA
had handled poorly, Lisa Botsko asked for the case, saying, "That's my job,
and I'll audit it." She did, and reported, "The union was right about how the
case was mishandled."

o Although he opposed--and still objects to--having an auditor in Tucson, Mike
Gurr, the officers' association vice president, has since asked the auditor, Liana
Perez, to review sustained cases that he felt IA had not handled well, even
though the city manager and police department objected to his referring the
cases.

When police and sheriff's departments already are doing a good job
investigating citizen complaints, another objective that oversight bodies and
union leaders share is to reassure a frequently skeptical or hostile public, or 
certain community groups, that the department is in fact doing a good job. 
According to Thomas Mack, treasurer of the police federation that represents 
Portland Police Bureau officers, "The auditor's review of investigations is good 
because it opens up the files so people can see the department isn't covering up. 
And with community policing, it makes sense to look at what IA did. Many
[union] members believe IA's review is enough, but I feel, 'Let them take a look.'"

Time may help but is not the cure-all

Some unions may modify their views about the oversight procedure after they
have had a chance to see it in operation and find that its staff are unbiased and
competent. At the union's insistence, the St. Paul City Council agreed to include
a 1-year sunset clause in its oversight legislation. At the end of the year, union
leaders realized that the review process tended to be more lenient with officers
than internal affairs and decided not to oppose its being made permanent.

Despite everyone's best efforts, some areas of disagreement are likely to remain
between oversight planners and staff on the one hand and union leaders and
members on the other hand. Even when union leaders themselves may not
regard oversight as a cause for serious concern, members may still be leery.
According to Capt. David Friend, president of the local police union in Omaha:

Oversight has a necessary function and its role is important, but my membership
is not thrilled because the board is mostly civilians. The CCRB [the Omaha
oversight body] finds for the officer in 99 percent of cases, but it's hard to
convince cops the board isn't out to get them. Their feeling is, "Just because
you're paranoid doesn't mean they're not after you." So they still have a fear
that they could be the first to get skewered.

Notes

1. "A major problem with civilian review from the police perspective is the lack
of a working understanding of the environment in which [police] decisions are
made." "External Police Review: A Discussion of Existing City of Tucson
Procedures and Alternative Models, Report to the Mayor and Council," 1996:
12.

2. For example, "The [Massachusetts] Board of Registration in Medicine, . . .
according to a growing number of critics, was lax to the point of negligence in
policing doctors," Boston Sunday Globe, March 28, 1999: B1.

3. The argument that there should be citizen review of police departments
because officers alone have the legal authority to exercise lethal force is also
specious: doctors, airline pilots-even taxicab drivers-are also in positions that
place the lives of their clients in jeopardy.

4. "External Police Review," 12.

5. "External Police Review," 15.

6. Some officers report that, because they are afraid that oversight findings will
accumulate in their personnel files and hamper promotion or transfer to desired
details, they enforce the law less vigorously. However, "There is no evidence
gleaned from civilian review studies that would suggest that this piece of
subcultural wisdom is anything but folly . . . the only police review systems that
have generated any significant amount of counterproductivity have been internal
systems." (Perez, Douglas, Common Sense about Police Review, Philadelphia:
Temple University Press, 1994: 161-162.) According to Prentice Sanders, San
Francisco assistant chief, "Regarding officers who say OCC ties their hands and
they cannot do their jobs, I ask: 'How come there are many officers with lots of
arrests and no complaints?'"

---------------------------

Key Points

o Three preliminary steps can help significantly to reduce conflict among all the
parties involved in citizen oversight: 

--Either initiate the oversight system without the impetus of a controversial
police shooting or avoid consideration of the incident in the planning process.

--Involve representatives of all concerned parties in the planning of the
oversight procedure.

--Establish clear, measurable objectives for the oversight system.

o Many police administrators and officers have criticisms of local oversight
bodies, most of which fall into three categories:

--Citizens should not interfere with police work.

--Citizens do not understand police work.

--The process is unfair.

o Several considerations and actions can help address police concerns about
the oversight process, including:

--Recognizing the typically advisory role oversight bodies play but also
documenting the judicious role most oversight systems have adopted.

--Training board members thoroughly and publicizing how carefully they have
been prepared.

--Accepting that the mission of oversight is to provide for citizen, not
professional, review.

--Highlighting that oversight bodies agree with the police or sheriff's
department's findings in the vast majority of cases.

--Publicizing particularly high-profile cases in which the oversight body has
sided with the subject officer(s).

--Working to reduce delays in holding hearings and reviews.

--Explaining how oversight findings can benefit officers.

--Sitting down and resolving misconceptions and conflicts face to face.

o Oversight staff often have criticisms of the police. Their most common
concerns are:

--Officers may refuse to answer questions, and departments may refuse to
share records.

--Officers do not understand the oversight body's mission and legitimacy.

--Departments ignore the oversight body's findings or policy and procedure
recommendations.

o Some police departments have attempted to work constructively with their
local oversight bodies, including disciplining officers who fail to appear for 
questioning and arranging for oversight staff to explain their 
procedures to officers at the academy or at roll call.

o Oversight planners and review bodies need to take the initiative to involve
union leaders in their activities. Some unions no longer oppose citizen oversight
as strongly as in the past. Oversight planners successfully have:

--Involved union leaders in designing and setting up the review procedure.

--Accommodated some union concerns.

--Addressed union concerns about biased review procedures by ensuring the
review process is scrupulously fair.

--Highlighted shared objectives, such as a joint interest in fair treatment of
officers by internal affairs.

---------------------------

Working With Activists

Local activists have often been as critical of oversight systems as have police
departments and unions. Sometimes they criticize the system's lack of power;
other times, they report that oversight staff are not using the authority they have
to pursue cases of alleged police misconduct. One activist observed, "San
Francisco's citizen oversight organization has the most money and best structure
in the Nation, yet it sustains only 10 percent of cases."

A newsletter published by Dan Handelman, a member of Portland Copwatch,
an organization that tracks alleged police misconduct, objects to the fact that
the Portland police chief can ignore, and in the newsletter's opinion has ignored,
reversals of IA findings by the city council acting in its capacity as the city's
oversight board. However, in one of the two recent examples when the chief
did this, the council's vote to reverse was 3 to 2, suggesting that there was
room for honest disagreement. As a result, the chief's decision in this case,
although it rejected the council's decision, was not necessarily arbitrary.
However, the council's vote in the second matter was 4 to 1. 
In any case, Handelman's larger concern is that the city council--that is, elected
citizens--not the chief, should have the final say in determining whether officers
engaged in misconduct.

According to a board member in another city, "Some groups are very vocal
and bring police problems to the media and raise holy hell. But if they didn't, we
would not have achieved this level of oversight. So they play a beneficial role, 
but they can make life painful because they say some ridiculous things."

---------------------------

Should Citizens Control the Discipline Process?

Most oversight directors and researchers agree that citizens should not have
power to discipline officers. They believe that giving citizen oversight systems
that authority would be illegal or unwise because:

o It would violate State law, city charter, or collective bargaining agreements
with police unions.

o It would detract from holding the chief or sheriff accountable for ensuring
proper standards of professional conduct, making it possible for the top law
enforcement executive to argue, "Yes, my department has a problem with
police misconduct, but I can't do anything about it."*

*Luna, Eileen, and Samuel Walker, A Report on the Oversight Mechanisms
of the Albuquerque Police Department, prepared for the Albuquerque
City Council, 1997: 148.

---------------------------

An Attorney Uses Citizen Oversight as a Screening Tool for Civil Suits

A private attorney reported that he has used sustained citizen oversight cases as
evidence in civil suits, and he may let the oversight agency do its investigation
first so he can benefit from its work product when only a small settlement will
be involved. When the board does not sustain a case, he reexamines the
strength of his case. As a result, he uses the oversight system as a screening
device. However, he has still won cases the oversight body has rejected, but he
also lost a case the board sustained-even though there was a lower burden of
proof in the civil case (preponderance of evidence) than in the board hearing
(clear and convincing).

---------------------------

The Types of Board Findings Oversight Staff Should Publicize to Officers

A mayor pointed out, "Even though review boards side with subject officers in
the overwhelming number of cases, many officers still believe the board is out to
get them." As a result, it becomes especially important to let officers know how
specific reviews have favored them.

An Orange County sheriff's deputy wiped pepper spray on his hand and then
wiped it on an unconscious suspect to wake him up. The IA unit sustained the
violation of the department's pepper spray policy--excessive use of force--but the
board said he was a new deputy from another department where deputies had
carried ammonia capsules, and he was only using the spray as a substitute. The
board said the sheriff's department pepper spray policy needed revision
because it required automatic termination for misuse regardless of mitigating
circumstances. As a result, the department rewrote its policy so that misuse
would not require automatic termination. The deputy was suspended but not
terminated.

When three Office of Citizen Complaints (OCC) staff monitored New Year's
evening partying, they observed that San Francisco police officers used the
utmost restraint in preventing a riot by drunken revelers. OCC issued an oral
report to the police commission describing the officers' exemplary behavior.

---------------------------

Not All Police Unions Have Opposed Citizen Oversight

Union opposition to citizen review has never been monolithic. In particular,
some police unions representing minority officers have supported citizen review
as a means of reducing alleged police misconduct toward racial and ethnic
minorities.

o According to the National Black Police Association, an advocacy
organization composed of 150 chapters representing more than 30,000
African-Americans in law enforcement, there is "substantial evidence that the
police department and its leadership cannot properly discipline their
colleagues." The organization executive director goes on to report, "Most
traditional police associations and police unions are strongly opposed to
citizen's review of police . . . [but] the National Black Police Association . . .
strongly support[s] the implementation and use of civilian review of police
misconduct."

o A July 11, 1999, New York Times article reported, "Lieutenant Eric Adams,
president of a civic group representing New York's black police officers, said .
. . [a United States Attorney's] investigation [into the New York Police
Department's handling of brutality complaints] gives credence to complaints
long voiced in minority communities. He said the city needed an independent
agency with power to gather evidence, because as long as investigators depend
on the Police Department for information, their work will be compromised."

o The African-American Officers for Justice, composed of San Francisco
Police Department black officers, joined with liberal organizations in the city in
1982 to urge the Board of Supervisors to place citizen oversight on the ballot
as a voter initiative.

Not all rank-and-file members support their union's opposition to citizen
review. A sergeant in one jurisdiction reported he did not take a union
representative with him to a board hearing on a citizen's complaint because he
disagreed with the union's "rightwing positions."

---------------------------

Chapter 7: Monitoring, Evaluation, and Funding 

Some programs can flourish without any evidence of effectiveness simply
because they are seen as politically useful. Certainly, oversight systems can fall
into this category. However, most of the time securing adequate funding for a
program depends at least in part on being able to document that it is achieving
its objectives. Documenting success in turn can be done only if program 
activities are closely monitored. This chapter suggests methods of
monitoring and evaluating citizen oversight as a prelude to discussing funding
issues.

Monitoring

Examining several aspects of a citizen oversight system can suggest how well
the process is operating.

The intake process

Intake staff can discourage would-be complainants by an indifferent attitude,
lack of helpfulness, or dilatoriness. Program supervisors can assess intake staff
performance by casually or formally observing the process. They also can
require investigators and board members to ask complainants whether they
found the intake process complicated or discouraging. Customer satisfaction
surveys (see next section) can include questions about the intake process.
Oversight directors can also use "testers"--fake complainants--to monitor the
intake process (see "Using 'Testers' to Monitor the Intake Process").

Oversight bodies to which internal affairs units refer complainants can monitor
how conscientiously IA investigators are making referrals. The program
coordinator of Rochester's Civilian Review Board (CRB) asks each
chairperson to visit the police department's IA section four times a year to
review whether a random sample of six cases that were never sent to CRB
(e.g., because a citizen dropped the complaint) should have been forwarded.
CRB administrators talked with IA on the one occasion in which a chairperson
felt a case should have been referred because of its sensitive nature.

Investigators' work

Most programs have a procedure for reviewing the quality of their investigators'
work. Many tape record all interviews, not only to have a permanent record of
what complainants, officers, and witnesses said but also to review the
investigators' techniques.

In Flint, the senior investigator reviews the findings of every investigator, and the
ombudsman provides a final review. In San Francisco, one of three Office of
Citizen Complaints (OCC) senior investigators reviews every file, followed by a
review by the chief investigator. If investigators recommend the complaint be
sustained, one of two OCC attorneys reviews the case to assess whether the
evidence is sufficient and the findings comply with applicable laws, rules, and
orders. Mary Dunlap, the OCC director, reviews the file for a final
determination. Dunlap reviews about 1,500 packets a year, averaging 6 per
working day. It takes her 3-5 minutes to review simple cases, but complex and
important cases can take many hours. Because she feels that supervision of
investigators is critically important for quality control, Dunlap makes sure she
hires enough supervisors and provides them with extensive training and close
oversight. Each senior investigator is responsible for the same five investigators'
work product so they can monitor the investigators' progress over several
months or longer.

Any of the OCC reviewers may send inadequate packets back to investigators
for additional work. The most typical--although still uncommon--problem
supervisors find is that an investigator failed to ask the complainant or subject
officer an important question.

Board members' performance

Oversight directors typically attend all board hearings, giving them an
opportunity to observe board members' behavior. Directors need to be
especially sensitive to whether members appear biased for or against the police
(see "Can Repeated Contact With Police Officers Impair Oversight Staff
Objectivity?").

In Rochester, board members meet privately without the director's presence.
As a result, chairpersons are required to report another board person who
appears to be biased to the program coordinator, who then will meet with the
person to discuss the matter. A few board members have been dismissed when
it was discovered they discussed a case with a third party. In another
jurisdiction, the director removed a board member who had told a police
officer that she did not like his behavior, warning him, "And I'm a 
member of the citizen oversight board."

Consumer Satisfaction Surveys

Jurisdictions can inexpensively implement a customer satisfaction survey. The
Vera Institute of Justice in New York City surveyed a sample of 371 citizens 
who had filed complaints with the Citizen Complaints Review Board. The study
found:

o Most complainants (61 percent) had "moderate" objectives: an apology for
themselves or a reprimand of the officer(s).

o The desire for a direct encounter with the subject officer(s) was "pervasive"
and "significantly associated with complainant satisfaction."[1]

Minneapolis' Civilian Police Review Authority (CRA) hired Samuel Walker, a
consultant, to develop two customer satisfaction surveys. The board and union
attorney reviewed drafts of the surveys. Patricia Hughes, the executive director,
sends one survey twice a month to the previous week's complainants and the
second survey (see exhibit 7-1) to complainants and officers after their cases
have been settled. The anonymous survey includes an addressed, stamped
envelope to be mailed back to the city coordinator's office, which tabulates the
responses and sends a copy to Hughes.

Walker's analysis of 29 surveys completed by citizens and 21 completed by
officers found:

o Although most citizens were satisfied with how CRA staff treated them, 8 of
the 29 respondents reported they were not treated with respect.

o Almost half of the citizen respondents felt the outcomes of their cases were not
fair.

o Eighteen of the 21 responding officers felt the outcomes of their cases were fair.

Because only 29 of 174 citizens and 21 of 81 police officers to whom the
survey was sent returned them, it is difficult to know whether the responses 
are representative of more general satisfaction or dissatisfaction among all 
complainants and officers. Nevertheless, the responses are useful for documenting 
considerable satisfaction with CRA while pointing to areas for possible
improvement. Walker plans to reexamine the data after a year when 140-150
surveys should be available for analysis, at which time he will examine levels of
satisfaction in relation to the citizens' and officers' gender, race, and age.[2]

A Tucson city councilman telephones each constituent in his district who
appeals an IA investigation to see if the person was satisfied with the auditor's
review. For example, he called a mother who complained about an officer
pulling over her son. The woman reported she had learned from the auditor that
her son had been in possession of an illegal substance and had no valid driver's
license, facts of which she had not been aware. As a result, she now was
satisfied with the officer's behavior--and pleased with the auditor's review. Every
constituent but one whom the councilman has telephoned has reported being
satisfied with the oversight process.

Evaluating the Citizen Oversight Process

Two long-time observers of citizen review have reported, "There are no
thorough, independent evaluations of the effectiveness of any [citizen oversight] 
procedures, much less any comparative studies."[3] Although one 
comprehensive evaluation has been conducted since this statement was made,
the lack of evaluations is perhaps not surprising.

Establishing objectives

To evaluate the effectiveness of an oversight system, it first is necessary to
establish the objectives the procedure is designed to achieve--something few
oversight planners have done. The objectives need to be specific and
measurable. However, this crucial step is frequently omitted, making it
necessary to develop objectives for measuring program success after the fact.
In addition to hampering any evaluation, not establishing objectives from the
outset leaves program staff uncertain--or mistaken--about what they are
supposed to be doing.

Among the possible objectives planners can establish for citizen review of the
police are the following:

1. Increase the public's confidence that the police or sheriff's department is
addressing citizen complaints fairly and thoroughly.

2. Reassure the public that the police or sheriff's department appropriately
disciplines officers who engage in misconduct.

3. Defuse hostility toward public officials or the police or sheriff's department
expressed by residents or specific groups of residents. This typically is the
reason most oversight systems are established.

4. Improve the fairness and thoroughness of the police or sheriff's
department's investigations of citizen complaints (for example, by auditing the
department's own procedures or conducting investigations in tandem with or
instead of internal affairs department investigations).

5. Reduce misconduct by police officers, such as verbal abuse, use of
excessive force, and discriminatory enforcement of the law.

6. Reduce the number of police shootings.

7. Help ensure that officers who engage in misconduct are appropriately
disciplined.

8. Provide the public with an understanding of the behavior of police officers
and sheriff's deputies.

9. Provide the public with a "window" on how the police or sheriff's
department investigates allegations of officer misconduct.

10. Increase legitimate citizen complaints by, for example:

o Providing an avenue for filing complaints that is less intimidating than going to
the police or sheriff's department.

o Increasing confidence that complaints will be taken seriously.

o Providing more accessible locations for filing.

11. Provide an open and independent forum for the public to express general
concerns about the police or sheriff's department's operations or about officer
conduct.

12. Provide a mechanism through which citizens can suggest recommendations
for improving police policies and procedures and police training.

13. Establish a mediation option for resolving selected complaints to achieve
one or more of the potential benefits of mediation identified in chapter 3.

After establishing objectives, program planners and administrators need to
determine how they will know whether each one has been achieved in terms of:

o What level of activity will be considered a success (e.g., 10 fewer police
shootings in each of the next 2 years compared with the average number of
shootings during each of the previous 10 years; a 15-percent increase within 2
years of citizens who feel confident the department is disciplining officers
appropriately).

o How the necessary data will be gathered (e.g., police records of use of
firearms over a 12-year period; public survey of community attitudes toward
the police before the oversight procedure was initiated and 2 years later).

There are other barriers to evaluation in addition to the failure to develop
measurable objectives. Many administrators consider monitoring and evaluating 
program activities a low priority. They may lack the time, money, or expertise
to assess their programs, or they may be concerned that negative results may
jeopardize their funding and even their positions. Finally, even with solid
objectives and the time, skills, and will to conduct a useful evaluation, there may
be problems with the data that make it difficult to draw valid conclusions about
the oversight system's effectiveness (see "Data Barriers to Evaluating Oversight
Procedures").

The Albuquerque evaluation

Despite these concerns and barriers, assessing program effectiveness is
essential for learning how to improve oversight operations and for
demonstrating that the oversight process should be maintained or expanded.
Reflecting this need, the Albuquerque City Council commissioned a $27,602
evaluation of its oversight system and used many of the findings in restructuring
its procedures (see "The Albuquerque City Council Commissioned a Thorough
Evaluation"). Although this approach may cost more money than jurisdictions
are able to spend, other cities and counties easily can afford to implement parts
of the evaluation.

Funding

Oversight bodies have dramatically different budgets: Some, such as the review
board in Orange County, cost relatively little because they rely almost entirely
on volunteers and in-kind services, while others, such as those in Flint and
Minneapolis, run into the hundreds of thousands of dollars (see exhibit 7-2).
San Francisco's oversight budget is more than $2 million.

The relationship between oversight costs and oversight activity

In most organizations, there is a relationship between expenditures and
results-that is, the more money spent, the more or better the results. Are
increased expenditures for oversight associated with increased 
utilization--that is, do oversight systems get what they pay for? Exhibit 7-2
presents the nine oversight systems arranged in ascending order of budget levels
along with their activity levels for 1997. As shown, it is impossible to compare
activity levels among oversight systems because different systems engage in
different types of activities--for example, investigations, hearings, mediations,
and audits. Nevertheless, it is possible to examine five different relationships
between oversight budgets and activity levels.

1. There is no association between budget levels and overall activity levels
among the nine systems. For example, Rochester's level of activity (26 cases
reviewed, 4 cases mediated) appears to be less than Orange County's,
Portland's, and St. Paul's, even though its budget is much higher. Tucson, with a
budget of more than $144,000, monitored 63 investigations, while Portland,
relying on a single staff person's salary of $43,000, audited 98 cases and
processed 112 appeals.

2. There is a clear association between higher budgets and whether a system
conducts investigations: All four systems with the highest budgets are type 1
systems (which investigate citizen complaints). These systems are the most
expensive because they have to hire professional investigators rather than rely
on volunteers. It also appears that, the higher the 1997 budget among these
four type 1 oversight systems that conduct investigations, the more overall
activity (not just investigations) they engaged in. For example, while Flint
conducted more investigations (313) than either Berkeley (42) or Minneapolis
(159), Berkeley conducted 12 hearings and 34 preliminary investigations, and
Minneapolis provided assistance to 715 citizens as well as arranged for 14
cases to be mediated. (If the Minneapolis and San Francisco oversight bodies
did not conduct investigations, their respective police departments would have
to hire additional internal affairs investigators [unless they could transfer existing
personnel] to perform the work the oversight bodies had been conducting. As a
result, the additional money that oversight bodies need to conduct investigations
does not cost the city, town, or county more money. It merely saves the law
enforcement agency money.)

3. It is theoretically possible to compare the nine oversight budget levels with
the number of units of a specific type of service provided. The most
comparable unit of service to examine is the number of complaints filed or
reviewed.[4] Exhibit 7-2 shows the units of this type of service for each of the
nine oversight systems. As shown, there is no association between budget levels
and number of cases filed or reviewed. Portland, whose oversight systems
costs $43,000, reviewed 119 cases, while St. Paul, with a budget of $37,160,
reviewed 71 and Rochester, with a budget of $128,069, reviewed 26 and
mediated 4. Flint handled 313 cases with a prorated budget of $173,811 (the
system investigates complaints against other city agencies), while Minneapolis,
with a budget of more than $500,000, handled 159.

4. The final column in exhibit 7-2 shows how much it costs to process each
complaint that a citizen filed or oversight system staff reviewed in 1997 by
dividing the system's budget by the number of filed complaints or complaints
reviewed.[5] As shown, there is no correlation between cost per complaint filed
or reviewed and overall activity level. For example, Rochester's Civilian
Review Board, which reviewed cases in 1997, had a unit cost is $4,269, while
the oversight systems in Orange County, Portland, and St. Paul reviewed or
heard between 45 and 119 complaints with a cost per complaint filed of less
than $525. A similar discrepancy appears for Flint ($555 for each of 313
complaints) and Berkeley ($4,864 for each of 57 complaints).

5. Finally, as shown in exhibit 7-2, there is no relationship between a system's
budget and its cost per complaint filed. San Francisco, with the largest budget,
has a lower cost per complaint than Berkeley and Minneapolis, which have
smaller budgets. Rochester has a much higher cost per complaint reviewed than
Tucson and Flint, even though its budget is lower than theirs.

Why is there a weak correlation at best between budget levels and these
measures of oversight system activity?

o Oversight systems often cannot alter the number of complaints they
investigate or review even with increased funding because they are limited by
statute to accepting only certain types of cases (e.g., use of force-Rochester) or
are mandated to accept all cases within certain categories (e.g., use of
firearms--St. Paul).

o An oversight system's activity level for a given year may reflect considerations
that have nothing to do with budget levels. For example, there often are
anomalies in the number of complaints filed in a given year. A large and unruly
public demonstration may result in numerous complaints, or there may be a
decline in the number of cases forwarded by the internal affairs unit because the
unit loses staff or gets backed up investigating high-profile shootings. Changes
in oversight staffing levels--for example, through resignations--may affect system
activity in a given year irrespective of budget levels.

o More money for citizen oversight may fail to result in increased utilization if
staff do not make citizens aware of the opportunity to file complaints, if citizens
do not trust the system, if the police or sheriff's department refuses to
cooperate, or if other barriers to filing complaints are not addressed.

o Cost-per-complaint figures do not take into consideration each system's total
responsibilities or the in-kind services it uses. For example, Berkeley's cost per
filed complaint includes not only its cost of investigating the complaint but also
of holding hearings and making policy recommendations. Minneapolis spends
many hours every year helping hundreds of citizens who decide not to file a
complaint.

Does more money buy better quality service? Unfortunately, most systems do
not monitor the quality of their services. Furthermore, it was outside the
purview of this publication to examine quality of services. Finally, it was not
possible to examine oversight activity in some jurisdictions-for example,
hearings in Rochester are not open to the public.

The relationship between cost and oversight type

There is a theoretical relationship between the four types of oversight systems
(see chapter 1) and cost.

o Type 1 oversight systems, in which citizens investigate allegations and
recommend findings (Berkeley, Flint, Minneapolis, San Francisco), are the
most expensive because, as previously noted, professional investigators must be
hired to conduct the investigations--lay citizens do not have the expertise or the
time.

o Type 2 systems, in which citizens review internal affairs findings (e.g., Orange
County, Rochester, St. Paul), tend to be inexpensive because volunteers
typically conduct the reviews.

o Type 3 systems, in which citizens review complainants' appeals of police
findings (Portland), also can be inexpensive because of the use of volunteers.

o Type 4 systems, in which auditors inspect the police or sheriff department's
own complaint investigation process (Portland, Tucson), tend to fall in the
midlevel price range. On the one hand, like type 1 systems, only a professional
has the expertise and time to conduct a proper audit. On the other hand,
typically only one person needs to be hired because the auditing process is
much less time consuming than conducting investigations of citizen complaints.

In practice, however, there is an inconsistent relationship between oversight
type and cost. This is because, when examined closely, many oversight
operations are not "pure" examples of a type 1, 2, 3, or 4 system. As a result,
the actual cost for a given type of oversight system may be more or less
expensive than what a pure type would cost. For example, San Francisco's type
1 system requires extra staff to prosecute cases at chief's hearings and police
commission trials. While type 2 systems (e.g.,Orange County, St. Paul) generally
cost relatively little, Rochester's budget is more than $128,000 in part because
paid staff are involved in training and certifying citizen reviewers as mediators and
in subcontracting for mediation of selected cases.

There are other reasons why there is frequently no direct relationship between
type of oversight system and cost:

o Flint's ombudsman system probably achieves some economies of scale
because it investigates complaints from all city agencies, not just the police.

o The actual cost of any oversight system depends on the number of complaints it
hears, which in turn hinges on many considerations that are independent of its
budget, such as the kinds of complaints its charter permits it to accept or review
and how frequently officers in the local department engage in misconduct. For
example, some type 1 oversight systems investigate almost all citizen complaints
(e.g., Minneapolis, San Francisco), while others investigate only some (e.g.,
Berkeley, Flint).

o Type 1 and 2 oversight systems (e.g., Minneapolis) can reduce the expense
of holding hearings or conducting reviews by diverting some cases to mediation.

o Labor market rates for investigators and executive directors can influence an
oversight system's costs, as can the use of inhouse staff versus contracted staff
who receive no fringe benefits.

o Different systems provide different stipends to volunteer board members. For
example, Berkeley provides $3, while Rochester provides $35 (totaling
$15,800 in its 1997 budget).

In sum, it is difficult to predict what an oversight system's actual costs will be
before agreeing on what all its components and activities will be and before
selecting from among many mechanisms--and combinations of mechanisms--for
paying for oversight activities. That said, it is still important to provide a level of
funding that will make it possible to investigate, hear, or audit all the cases a
program can expect to handle.[6]

The importance of adequate funding

Without adequate funding, the oversight process may be just a political statement 
without any substance--"See what we're doing to hold the police accountable." 
According to Samuel Walker, an oversight researcher, when boards lack
effective investigative powers, necessary funds, and expertise, "We should really
think of that as consumer fraud-it is promising an independent review of
complaints and not delivering. And that's really fraud."[7] As a result, the Flint city
charter stipulates that the ombudsman "shall be granted a budget adequate to
allow such a staff as is reasonable and proper for the performance of the duties of
said office." Similarly, San Francisco's voters passed an initiative that requires the
city to fund one Office of Citizen Complaints investigator for every 150 police
officers.

Funding an oversight system with money from the police or sheriff's
department's budget, as is done in St. Paul and San Francisco,[8] may hamper
efforts to provide adequate funding for two reasons:

1. The more money chiefs allocate to citizen oversight, the less they have for
other important functions. In competing with these other functions, oversight
may come out the loser.

2. Departments that have an adversarial relationship with the oversight body
naturally will be reluctant to provide any more money for it than they have to.

A 1997 editorial, "The Starving Watchdog," in the San Francisco Examiner
suggested: 

[T]he [county/city] supervisors should ask why appropriations for the watchdog
agency [i.e., Office of Citizen Complaints] must be approved by the object of
its investigations, the Police Department, and included in the SFPD's proposed
budget. . . . It is asking a lot of Police Chief Fred Lau and his planners to cut
their own money requests for the benefit of civilians often derided by cops on
the beat as second-guessers.[9]

Furthermore, if the oversight process fails, citizens and public officials can
blame the department for not providing it with enough money.

Elected and appointed officials, not just police and sheriff's departments, also
may keep funding levels unrealistically low.

o Every year some members of the Minneapolis City Council want to abolish
the Civilian Police Review Authority because it is expensive. In the 1996 budget
process, some council members argued that CRA was a waste of $400,000
because the police department's IA unit should be investigating misconduct.[10]

o Although San Francisco residents voted in 1995 to require one Office of
Citizen Complaints investigator for every 150 officers, the Board of Supervisors
did not immediately allocate the money to hire additional investigators and
supervisors to monitor them.[11] During several months in 1997, staff attrition
reduced the number of investigators well below the charter requirement; at
many points, there were only 8 investigators (compared with 19 in 1998).
According to Mary Dunlap, OCC's director, "It was a battle [to get the
money]." Dunlap met and corresponded with supervisors and mayor's aides,
and she testified extensively to the Finance Committee of the Board 
of Supervisors during budget hearings. The OCC staff attorney organized a 
letter writing campaign to the mayor and supervisors from about a dozen
individuals and community groups, including the American Civil Liberties Union
and National Association for the Advancement of Colored People. 

The tasks of monitoring, evaluating, and securing funds for an oversight
procedure may seem intimidating. However, as the following chapter indicates,
there are many resources available that can assist oversight planners to address
these and other oversight planning tasks.

Notes

1. Vera Institute of Justice, Processing Complaints Against Police in New York
City: The Complainant's Perspective, New York: Vera Institute of Justice,
1989.

2. For additional guidelines for program evaluation, see Walker, Samuel, Police
Accountability: The Role of Citizen Oversight, Belmont, California: Wadsworth,
forthcoming.

3. Walker, Samuel, and Vic W. Bumphus, "The Effectiveness of Civilian
Review: Observations on Recent Trends and New Issues Regarding the
Civilian Review of Police," American Journal of Police 11 (4) (1992): 1-26.

4. It is possible to calculate mean costs by using another standard besides
complaints filed. However, complaints filed appear to be the most universal
activity among oversight systems, if audits and reviews of cases are considered
within the definition of "filings."

5. The mean cost per complaint filed may not be correct for all systems. In
Minneapolis and San Francisco, hearings and mediations for some complaints
that are filed are not conducted until the following calendar year, while some
complaints that are heard were filed the previous year. As a result, the mean
cost was calculated by dividing the budgets for these programs by the number
of cases investigated in 1997, exclusive of the number of hearings and
mediations held that year.

6. In its 1996 report to the city council examining reconfigured options for its
oversight mechanism, Tucson city staff provided startup, first-year, and
recurring cost projections for five different types of oversight responsibilities,
ranging from an expanded intake function to subpoena power to an
independent auditor model (see appendix E).

7. National Public Radio, Morning Edition, July 31, 1997, "Policing the Police."

8. However, the Board of Supervisors in San Francisco, not the police
department, establishes the Office of Citizen Complaints' budget.

9. San Francisco Examiner, "The Starving Watchdog," June 17, 1997.

10. To avoid funding cuts, some oversight staff may be tempted to accept cases
for investigation or review cases that do not merit intake. One city council
calculates its oversight body's cost per complaint. Because the number of
complaints declined one year, the cost per complaint rose. As a result, some
council members felt the board's funding should be reduced. Funding for
Berkeley's Police Review Commission has changed significantly 
and frequently over the years, for example, going from $346,233 in 1994 to
$196,732 in 1996 to $277,000 in 1998.

11. Investigators earn from $46,000 to $56,000, senior investigators earn from
$50,000 to $62,000, and the chief investigator earns from $54,000 to $71,000. 
In Minneapolis, Civilian Police Review Authority investigators earn from $38,000
to $51,000.

---------------------------

Key Points

o To justify their funding, oversight bodies need to be able to document their
effectiveness. To do so they need to collect monitoring data.

o Efforts to monitor oversight bodies should address:

--The simplicity, speed, and courteousness of the intake process.

--The quality of investigators' work product.

--The performance of board members.

o To evaluate the effectiveness of an oversight system, it first is necessary to
establish the objectives the procedure is designed to achieve-something few 
oversight planners have done.

o Comprehensive evaluations of citizen review have been rare. However, an
evaluation of Albuquerque's oversight mechanisms is a good example of a
thorough assessment.

o Jurisdictions can implement inexpensive "customer satisfaction" surveys that
can suggest how the oversight process may be improved.

o Jurisdictions need to fund their oversight procedures adequately to make sure
the mechanisms are effective and respected.

o Funding for oversight ranges from $20,000 (e.g., because the effort is run
almost entirely by volunteers) to more than $2 million. Determining funding
levels depends on the activities the oversight system will undertake and several
other considerations.

o There is an inconsistent relationship between the type of oversight system and
cost, although costs are generally higher when oversight involves investigating
citizen complaints.

o It is difficult to predict oversight costs before determining what the system's
features and activities will be.

o Although more money may not buy more oversight activity, an underfunded
procedure may be doomed to failure-and may create more controversy around 
police accountability than it resolves.

---------------------------

Using "Testers" to Monitor the Intake Process

To monitor the intake process, program directors can arrange for unknown
citizens to file fictitious complaints. Although using testers may anger program
staff, the technique is common in the private sector when retail businesses need
to make sure their personnel are providing good customer service. Testers can
provide valuable information regarding the thoroughness with which staff screen
citizens' complaints, how well they help complainants fill out necessary forms,
how accurately and politely they answer questions, and how expeditiously they
meet complainants' needs.

---------------------------

Can Repeated Contact With Police Officers Impair Oversight Staff
Objectivity?

A close observer of citizen oversight has reported that investigators' and board
members' "daily interactions with the police force allow them plenty of
opportunities to develop empathy and subliminal ties with those involved in 'real
law enforcement.'"* For the same reason, some citizens have objected to
oversight staff attending police citizen academies (see chapter 4, "Staffing"). A
report proposing the redesign of Minneapolis' Civilian Police Review Authority
(CRA) recommended that "Periodic monitoring should be done to ensure that
co-option does not become an issue (regarding staff)." However, CRA
responded, "There exists no known, objective, scientific measure for
'co-optation.' Therefore, 'monitoring' of this possibility must be subjectively
assessed by the Executive Director of the CRA and its Board members."

* Perez, Douglas W., Common Sense About Police Review, Philadelphia:
Temple University Press, 1994: 182-183.

---------------------------

Data Barriers to Evaluating Oversight Procedures

It would seem logical to evaluate the success of citizen oversight by determining
whether complaints increase or decrease after the system becomes operational.
The natural assumption is that, over time, complaints will decline as the
oversight system begins to play a part in reducing officer misconduct. However,
complaints may increase because the intake process has been simplified or
made more accessible or because public confidence in the review process has
increased. Furthermore, there are rarely complete-or any-baseline data on the
actual number of incidents of police misconduct.*

Case review data also are suspect. The number of cases reviewed by the
Rochester Civilian Review Board declined significantly one year and rose the
next. The decline occurred because there had been several shootings, and IA
investigators had to drop less serious investigations and delay examining new
ones while they investigated the complex and high-profile shootings. Staff
turnover among investigators further delayed investigations. More cases were
investigated the following year after staffing problems ended and investigators
caught up on their backlog of less serious cases.

Examining changes in community attitudes toward the police would provide
more valid information on oversight effectiveness. However, these data, too,
may be misleading because many other events may be taking place
simultaneously in the community that could change the public's attitudes toward
the police, including community policing or a new police chief who is more strict
or more lax about discipline than his or her predecessor. Finally, it is difficult to
compare the effectiveness of different citizen review models because they have
different goals, resources, and constraints.

*Walker, Samuel, and Vic W. Bumphus, "The Effectiveness of Civilian
Review: Observations on Recent Trends and New Issues Regarding the 
Civilian Review of Police," American Journal of Police 11 (4) (1992): 1-26.

---------------------------

The Albuquerque City Council Commissioned a Thorough Evaluation

Troubled by fatal shootings by Albuquerque police officers (31 in 10 years),
extremely high annual payments for tort claims involving police officers (up to
$2.5 million per year), and other concerns, the Albuquerque City Council in
1996 hired Eileen Luna and Samuel Walker, two well-known experts in citizen
review of police, to evaluate the city's oversight mechanisms. Luna and Walker's 
159-page report concluded: "The existing mechanisms for oversight . . . are not
functioning effectively" (emphasis in original).[1]

The researchers used five sources of data:

1. A survey administered in person to more than 357 rank-and-file officers
(44 percent of the total sworn officer force) consisting of 70 close-ended and
several open-ended questions.

2. Personal interviews with:

o Community members, including leaders and members of human rights, civil
rights, and neighborhood organizations; attorneys in private and public practice; 
and spokespersons for ethnic communities.

o Police officers, including the chief, command officers, union officers, and the
staff psychologist.

o Public officials, including the mayor, city council members, and advisory
board members.

3. A review of official documents, ranging from advisory board minutes to
internal affairs quarterly reports.

4. An audit of the internal affairs unit's general patterns and practices,
including:

o Complaint files for 1994-96.

o A consumer satisfaction survey administrated to everyone who had filed a
complaint during the previous 3 years.

5. A national survey of citizen oversight mechanisms.

The report concluded with 10 recommendations for improving the oversight
process in Albuquerque, including advocating that oversight procedure
administrators exercise fully the authority they already had and that the mayor
and city council take a more active role in overseeing the police department.

In October 1998, the city council enacted the Police Oversight Ordinance to
restructure the city's oversight system along the lines of the report's
recommendations. According to coauthor Samuel Walker, "The City Council is
to be commended. They paid an outsider to come in and then acted on those
[recommended] changes. Very often these reports just sit on a shelf."[2] The
council provided for an 18-month evaluation of the new oversight system.

1.Luna, Eileen, and Samuel Walker, A Report on the Oversight
Mechanisms of the Albuquerque Police Department, prepared for the
Albuquerque City Council, 1997.

2.Law Enforcement News, "Who's Watching the Watchers?" 29 (499)
(November 15, 1998).

---------------------------

Chapter 8: Additional Sources of Help

This chapter identifies resources with information about setting up and
improving citizen oversight systems. The resources are based on a limited
search and therefore are not comprehensive.

Organizations

The International Association for Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement
(IACOLE) is devoted to advancing the cause of citizen oversight of law
enforcement. The organization sponsors an annual world conference for
oversight practitioners and researchers, publishes a quarterly newsletter
(International Connection) with position papers and recent developments in the
field, provides information to jurisdictions interested in creating citizen oversight
agencies, and provides a compendium of oversight agencies and publications.
Address: P.O. Box 99431, Cleveland, OH 44199-0431; phone: 513-352-6240;
fax: 513-624-8042; e-mail: IACOLE1@fuse.pnet.

The National Association for Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement
(NACOLE) provides educational opportunities and technical assistance to
existing and emerging organizations that perform civilian oversight of law
enforcement. The organization provides a national forum for information
gathering and sharing for these organizations. Established in 1993, NACOLE
supports civilian review boards that are under attack by writing letters of
support to the local political establishment and community. In addition, the
organization will send someone when possible to testify on the behalf of civilian
review boards. The association is considering developing a mentor program
within NACOLE to make the informal networking that is occurring formal.
Address: 9420 Annapolis Road, Suite 302, Lanham, MD 20706; phone:
317-327-3429.

Selected Program Materials

The appendixes to this report contain a number of materials from oversight
bodies studied for the publication. In addition, many oversight bodies have
developed detailed reports of their procedures for handling citizen complaints,
including the following:

o The Berkeley Police Review Commission's "Regulations for Handling
Complaints Against Members of the Police Department" provides 16 pages of
detailed procedures for intake, investigations, and board reviews.

o Minneapolis' "Civilian Police Review Authority Administrative Rules"
provides 28 pages of guidelines for citizen review. The bound booklet
addresses the collection and dissemination of data, definitions, standing to file a
complaint, intake, grounds for dismissal, mediation, investigations, personal bias
or prejudice, rules of evidence, burden of proof, and disposition.

Oversight bodies also produce annual reports. Minneapolis' Civilian Police
Review Authority, Rochester's Civilian Review Board, San Francisco's Office
of Citizen Complaints, and San Jose's Office of the Independent Police Auditor
prepare especially informative annual reports (see the discussion on reports in
chapter 5, "Addressing Important Issues in Citizen Oversight").

For guidance in developing a program brochure, examine the brochures
prepared by the oversight bodies in Minneapolis, Rochester, San Francisco (in
English and Spanish), San Jose, and Tucson. Several jurisdictions have
prepared reports recommending modifications to their existing oversight
procedures. These reports provide valuable discussions of alternative
approaches to citizen oversight. See, for example, the following (available from
the oversight bodies):

o "Minneapolis Civilian Police Review Authority Redesign Report," November
1997, 29 pages, and the board's response to the report, "Response to
MCPRA Redesign Report," April 1998.

o "External Police Review: A Discussion of Existing City of Tucson Procedures
and Alternative Models, Report to the Mayor and Council," October 7, 1996, 
36 pages plus appendixes.

The Portland Copwatch organization developed a 10-page "Proposal for an
Effective Civilian Review Board" that is available from Portland
Copwatch/People Overseeing Police Study Group, P.O. Box 244296,
Portland, OR 97242; 503-288-3462. (See also "Albuquerque, Portland, and
Tucson Did Their Own Research.")

The Minneapolis and Rochester oversight bodies can provide additional
materials on conducting mediation.

Selected Publications and Reports

Bailey, Robert G. "The Re-Emergence of Civilian Review of Police: Seizing the
Opportunity and Understanding the Trade-Offs." Unpublished paper submitted
to the eighth annual IACOLE conference, September 1992, 8 pages. Discusses
tradeoffs in different ways citizen oversight can be structured. Order from
IACOLE (see address above).

Human Rights Watch. Shielded from Justice: Police Brutality and Accountability
in the United States, New York: Human Rights Watch, 1998, 440 pages.
Discusses factors that contribute to human rights violations; recommends
changes in police administration to reduce police misconduct; discusses civil
remedies, prosecution, and other approaches to accountability; and provides
case studies of misconduct and efforts at accountability in 14 cities. Address:
350 Fifth Avenue, 34th Floor, New York, NY 10118-3299; phone:
212-290-4700; fax: 212-736-1300; e-mail: hrwnyc@hrw.org.

Luna, Eileen, and Samuel Walker. A Report on the Oversight Mechanisms of
the Albuquerque Police Department. Prepared for the Albuquerque City
Council, February 28, 1997, 159 pages plus appendixes. See the description
of the report in chapter 7, "Monitoring, Evaluation, and Funding." Available
from the Albuquerque City Council, P.O. Box 1293, Albuquerque, NM
87103; phone: 505-768-3100.

New York Civil Liberties Foundation. Civilian Review of Policing: A Case
Study Report, New York: New York Civil Liberties Union, 1993, 155 pages.
Describes the operations of seven oversight systems and presents policy and
practice recommendations. Address: New York Civil Liberties Union, 132
West 43rd Street, New York, NY 10036; phone: 212-382-0557.

Perez, Douglas W. Common Sense About Police Review, Philadelphia: Temple
University Press, 1994, 322 pages. Discusses the nature of police misconduct,
the limits of reform, and methods of evaluating different approaches to
accountability; describes three types of police review systems: internal, civilian,
and monitoring; suggests methods of improving police accountability; and
proposes an ideal review system. Address: Temple University Press, 1601
North Broad Street, Philadelphia PA 19122.

Sviridoff, Michele, and Jerome E. McElroy. The Processing of Complaints
Against Police in New York City: The Perceptions and Attitudes of Line
Officers. New York: Vera Institute of Justice, 1989, 56 pages. Examines police
officer attitudes toward New York City's Civilian Complaint Review Board
based on focus groups with 22 officers. Address: Vera Institute of Justice, 377
Broad-way, New York, NY 10013; phone: 212-334-1300.

Walker, Samuel. Citizen Review Resource Manual, Washington, D.C.: Police
Executive Research Forum, 1995, 424 pages including appendixes. Defines
citizen review; discusses selected characteristics of existing procedures in the
country, including sources of legal authority, organizational structure, roles and
missions, board composition, disciplinary authority, and information 
dissemination; and includes as appendixes a variety of ordinances and statutes,
rules and procedures, annual reports, and other documents. Order from the
Police Executive Research Forum, 1120 Connecticut Avenue, Suite 930,
Washington, D.C. 20036; phone: 888-202-4563.

Walker, Samuel. Police Accountability: The Role of Citizen Oversight,
Belmont, California: Wadsworth, 2001. Addresses many of the same issues
covered in the present report. See address and phone number for Walker in
exhibit 8-1.

Walker, Samuel, and Vic W. Bumphus. "The Effectiveness of Civilian Review:
Observations on Recent Trends and New Issues Regarding the Civilian Review
of Police." American Journal of Police 11 (4) (1992): 1-26. Based on a survey
of 50 oversight procedures. Describes their general features, explains the
pattern of growth in citizen oversight, and discusses barriers to evaluating the
effectiveness of citizen review operations. 

Walker, Samuel, and Betsy Wright. Citizen Review of the Police, 1994: A
National Survey, Washington, D.C.: Police Executive Research Forum, January
1995, 19 pages. Based on an ongoing survey of oversight bodies. Discusses the
types of procedures in existence, dividing them into four models; tracks the
growth of oversight procedures since 1970; identifies which types of models are
most prevalent in cities of various sizes; and provides a matrix listing jurisdictions
by oversight model, name of the oversight body, year established, and jurisdiction
size. See ordering information above.

Individuals With Experience in Citizen Oversight of Police

The individuals identified in exhibit 8-1 are available to provide technical
assistance related to citizen oversight of the police by telephone. In addition,
chapter 2, "Case Studies of Nine Oversight Procedures," provides the names of
program coordinators and law enforcement administrators who are available to
provide telephone consultation.

---------------------------

Key Points

o Information for establishing and improving citizen oversight systems is available
from:

--Organizations.

--Oversight programs.

--Publications and reports.

--Individuals with experience in oversight systems.

o Some jurisdictions have engaged in comprehensive research on their own to
determine what type of oversight system would be best for their communities.
Their research strategies are instructive.

---------------------------

Albuquerque, Portland, and Tucson Did Their Own Research

Albuquerque, Portland, and Tucson conducted reviews of oversight procedures
in other jurisdictions to learn how best to improve their own oversight systems.

Albuquerque

According to Linda Stewart, an aide to the Albuquerque mayor, because of a
rash of police shootings in 1997, the city council established an ad hoc committee 
on public safety consisting of three city counselors and staff. Members visited 
San Jose and Long Beach and conducted conference calls with other cities. The 
city council's legislative policy analyst convened a town hall meeting for 300
people to hear their concerns. Finally, the committee appointed and the analyst
assembled a task force of seven individuals representing community organizations 
(e.g., the American Civil Liberties Union and the police department and union).

The group met every 2 or 3 weeks for 6 months to identify areas of agreement
and disagreement in terms of what kind of citizen oversight system to establish.
The members reviewed "stacks" of ordinances from other cities and also had an
evaluation report assessing the current oversight system. The task force
presented five different models to the city council for consideration. The
legislative analyst merged the best of the models into a single ordinance, which
the council approved.

According to Stewart, "The most important part of the process was inviting the
activists who were so dissatisfied with the police to sit down and forcing them
to explain what they wanted done." The mayor and chief supported the
ordinance, and the mayor was getting ready to sign it.

Portland

In 1992, the Portland City Council appointed the mayor to chair the Police
Internal Investigations Auditing Committee (PIIAC) with the expectation that
she would evaluate its operations and recommend improvements. (Members of
PIIAC had resigned in protest, alleging the group was ineffective.) The mayor
reviewed recent assessments of the PIIAC process, including a self-assessment
by the citizen advisers, the auditor's reports, and proposals from community
organizations. She also reviewed citizen oversight systems in other jurisdictions
and consulted with citizens who had filed complaints with PIIAC. She attended
adviser meetings and the city council's public hearing on PIIAC.

As a result of this research, the mayor prepared a report to the city council that
included five pages of recommended changes to the PIIAC process to address
primarily three identified PIIAC weaknesses: complainants' feelings of intimidation 
using PIIAC; the perceived failure of the citizen advisers to address policy issues
inherent in cases; and advisers' lack of information by which to assess the quality 
of IA investigations.

Tucson

In 1996, the mayor and city council of Tucson asked staff to provide
information on alternative models for external police review procedures,
including potential changes to the city's existing Citizen Police Advisory Review
Board. Staff consulted with involved parties throughout the city and obtained
additional information from a number of well-known practitioners and experts
from across the Nation. The resulting 33-page report identified the limitations of
the current commission, reviewed alternative models, and provided
recommendations for improving the city's current procedure and cost estimates
for each proposed improvement.

A mayor's and city council subcommittee, headed by an assistant city manager,
conducted a nationwide review of options and discussed them before adopting
its own ordinance. The assistant city manager telephoned cities and visited the
independent police auditor in San Jose. The assistant had a budget and survey
people assigned to her to conduct the survey. The subcommittee considered to 
whom the board and auditor should report, whether the board would have
investigation powers, and who would supervise the auditor. There was a historical
precedent for having a board because one had existed for several years. So it
was natural to continue the existing board. The auditor was assigned to the city
manager because the city charter puts the city manager in charge of all
administration. An auditor was selected because the subcommittee felt a board
was not the best avenue for citizens to bring complaints, monitor investigations,
and do alternative intake because of turnover among volunteers and lack of time.

The city council debated the proposed options, including doing nothing. Three
members of the council made up the public safety subcommittee, which
conducted the investigation. The council debated whether an auditor was
needed or only a strengthening of the existing board. There was a great deal of
intense debate before the auditor model was agreed on.

---------------------------

Glossary

Burden of proof. The standard used to conclude that an officer committed the 
alleged misconduct. (See "Preponderance of the evidence" and "Clear and
convincing evidence.")

Clear and convincing evidence. The degree of proof that will produce in the
mind of the trier(s) of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the allegations; an
intermediate burden of proof, being more than mere preponderance but not to
the extent of such certainty as is required by beyond a reasonable doubt.

Discipline. Punishment meted out for misconduct by officers. In increasing order
of severity, punishment may include:

o Verbal or written counseling by the officer's supervisor.

o Remedial training.

o Professional counseling (e.g., for substance abuse).

o Verbal reprimand (supervisor orders inappropriate behavior to be corrected).

o Written reprimand. 

o Suspension without pay (may include ineligibility for promotion,
department-paid health insurance premium payments, and off-duty enforcement
work).

o Probation.

o Demotion (reduction in rank, job classification, or pay grade or step).

o Termination.

Exonerated. See "Findings."

Findings. The internal affairs or citizen review oversight body's determination of
the legitimacy of a citizen's complaint. Options include:

o Unfounded: The alleged incident did not occur, or the subject officer was not
at the scene.

o Exonerated: The incident did occur, but the officer's actions were lawful and
proper.

o Not sustained: There is insufficient evidence to prove or disprove the
allegations.

o Sustained: There is sufficient evidence to conclude that the officer engaged in
misconduct.

o Policy failure: The officer acted incorrectly but, because the department had
no policy, an ambiguous policy, or contradictory policies prescribing the correct
behavior for the situation at issue, no blame is attached to what the officer did.

Garrity warning. Under Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967), as part
of an internal, noncriminal investigation, police officers can be ordered to give a
statement to their employer regarding actions they took while working for the
police department. A Garrity warning informs the officers of two conditions: (1)
failure to answer questions related to the scope of their duties may form the
basis for disciplining officers, including dismissal, and (2) any statements given
under this warning cannot be used in any subsequent criminal proceeding
against the officers unless the officers are alleged to have committed perjury in
their statements.

Internal affairs. Section, unit, or bureau within a law enforcement agency
responsible for investigating officer misconduct.

Not sustained. See "Findings."

Policy failure. See "Findings."

Professional standards. In some law enforcement agencies, a new name for the
internal affairs unit; in other agencies, a unit that houses several activities (e.g.,
inservice training) for which investigating officer misconduct is only one
responsibility.

Subject officer. The officer against whom a complaint has been filed.

Subpoena power. The authority to compel witnesses to appear and give 
testimony or produce relevant documents.

Preponderance of the evidence. Enough evidence to decide that one party in
the case has the stronger evidence on his or her (or its) side, however slight the
advantage may be, even when the trier has a reasonable doubt that the party is
in the right or the party's rightness is not even clear and convincing.

Suspension. Time off without pay. Suspended officers may not be allowed to
work off-duty details and may have to pay their own health insurance premiums
for the time they are suspended.

Sustained. See "Findings."

Unfounded. See "Findings."

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NCJ 184430