MENU TITLE: Solving Crime Problems in Residential Neighborhoods: Comprehensive Changes in Design, Management, and Use .

MENU TITLE: Solving Crime Problems 
in Residential Neighborhoods: Comprehensive 
Changes in Design, Management, and Use                  
Series: NIJ Issues and Practices
Published: April 1997
157 pages
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U.S. Department of Justice
Office of Justice Programs
National Institute of Justice
 
Solving Crime Problems 
in Residential Neighborhoods:
Comprehensive Changes in Design, 
Management, and Use

by Judith D. Feins, Ph. D.
Joel C. Epstein, Esq.
Rebecca Widom

April 1997

------------------------------

Issues and Practices in Criminal Justice is a
publication series of the National Institute of
Justice.   Each report presents the program options
and management issues in a topic area, based on a
review of research and evaluation findings,
operational experience, and expert opinion on the
subject. The intent is to provide information to
make informed choices in planning, implementing,
and improving programs and practice in criminal
justice.

------------------------------

National Institute of Justice

Jeremy Travis
Director

John Spevacek
Samuel C. McQuade
Program Monitors

Advisory Panel

Ronald Clarke, Dean
Rutgers University 
School of Criminal Justice
15 Washington Street
Newark, NJ 07102

Dan Fleissner, Manager
Research and Grants
Seattle Police Department, 
Community Policing Bureau
700 Third Avenue, Room 540
Seattle, WA 98104

Severin Sorensen, President
SPARTA Consulting Corporation
7313 Woodmont Avenue
Bethesda, MD 20814

Stephen Tise
Tise, Hurwitz, and Diamond, Inc. Architects
370 Washington Street
Brookline, MA 02146

------------------------------

Prepared for the National Institute of Justice,
U.S. Department of Justice by Abt Associates Inc.,
under contract #OJP-94-C-007. Points of view or
opinions stated in this document are those of the
authors and do not necessarily represent the
official position or policies of the U.S.
Department of Justice.

------------------------------

The National Institute of Justice is a component of
the Office of Justice Programs, which also includes
the Bureau of Justice Assistance, the Bureau of
Justice Statistics, the Office of Juvenile Justice
and Delinquency Prevention, and the Office for
Victims of Crime.

------------------------------

Table of Contents
     
Foreword       

Acknowledgements              

Executive Summary             

Chapter 1: Crime and Place: What Do We Know?  
     
Objectives and Audience       
Overview of the Report         
What Is Place-Specific Crime Prevention?     
 Displacement of Crime or Diffusion of
 Benefits?      
 Need for Continuing Research       
Introduction to Selected Programs       
 Public Housing Development: Lockwood
 Gardens, Oakland, California
       
 Private Rental Complex: Castle Square
 Apartments, Boston, Massachusetts
       
 Urban Neighborhood: Genesis Park,
 Charlotte, North Carolina
          
 Suburban Community: The Village of Oak
 Park, Illinois
      
 Other Sites Contacted by Telephone      

Chapter 2: Crime and Place: Defining the
Problem        

Involving Key Players         
 Enlisting Police Involvement       
 Building on Existing Relationships      
 Organizing the Community      
 Obstacles to Coordination and
 Cooperation         
  Resident Involvement in Crime      
  Past Tensions       
  Fear of Retaliation      
  Population Changes       
  Negative Press    
  
Defining the Crime Problem         
 Gathering Information About Crime and
 Disorder       
 Linking Crime to Location          
 Identifying Key Physical Features
       
Identifying Managers and Potential Managers of
an Area        
 Why Is Management Important?       
 Who Are the Managers?         
 Analyzing Current Management       

Analyzing Current Use Patterns of an Area    
 Who Lives Here?          
 Who Works Here?          
  Drug Dealers and Organizations       
  Gangs       
 Who Else Uses the Area?       

Chapter 3: Planning for Change: Program
Design
         
A Primer of CPTED Strategies and Tactics     
 Selecting Approaches that Work for Your
 Community
 Maintaining a Menu of Approaches
        
Identifying Resources         
 Types of Resources       
 Priority or Key Resources          

First Steps: Where to Begin        
 Enhanced Security        
 Resident Organization         
 Choosing Where to Begin       
 Getting Ahead of the Problem       

Chapter 4: Making Changes: Program
Implementation      

Changing the Physical Environment
       
Changing Management: Who's in Charge Here?   
 Making Changes in Security Management   
  Policing         
  Private Security      
  Residents        
 Making Changes in Property Management   
     

Chapter 5: Putting the Pieces Together: Results
and Lessons Learned      

Changing Uses of an Area: Results of
Place-Specific Crime Prevention         
 Taking Back the Turf          
 Reducing Crime and Keeping It Down  
  Genesis Park          
  Lockwood Gardens      
  Oak Park         
  Castle Square Apartments        
  Five Oaks        
 Were the Changes Just Displacement?
     
Lessons Learned          
 Changing Attitudes       
 Managing Security        
 Maintaining Communication          
 Securing the Right Kinds of Funding     
 Taking Advantage of Technology          
 Avoiding the Pitfalls of the Past       
Crime and Place Revisited          

Appendix A:    Glossary of Acronyms          

Appendix B:    Review of the Research Literature  
     
Appendix C:    Guidelines and Checklists for
Place-Specific Crime Prevention Programs          

Appendix D:    Sources of Information, Training,
and Technical Assistance     

Appendix E:    Summary of Program Characteristics
for Place-Specific Crime Prevention Programs     
     
Appendix F:    Crime Statistics for Selected
Sites          

------------------------------

Foreword

Can residential neighborhoods be designed-or
redesigned-to promote safety? This Issues and
Practices report is intended to inform law
enforcement officials, urban planners and
architects, multifamily housing managers, and
public housing administrators about place-specific
crime prevention-the diverse array of coordinated
environmental design, property management, and
security strategies that can be employed to reduce
crime and fear of crime in urban and suburban
neighborhoods. Practical lessons gleaned from a
varied set of sites that blend physical design
changes and management changes are presented. These
approaches are consistent with and support the
community-oriented and problem-oriented policing
models being implemented by many law enforcement
agencies across the United States.

Today's place-specific crime prevention approaches
supersede earlier theories about environmental
design, drawing on more active strategies and
management techniques yet retaining a focus on
specific locations. Municipalities, public housing
authorities, private developers, and community
organizations in city and suburban neighborhoods
can choose from a variety of strategies to
strengthen their own particular crime prevention
efforts. This report emphasizes that local leaders
of the groups or agencies initiating
change-together with residents, local law
enforcement administrators, and government and
community leaders-are the people best suited to
determine the most appropriate place-specific crime
prevention approaches. Also underscored is the
importance of improving management practices and
using culturally sensitive policing strategies in
combination with environmental design or redesign
solutions.

Housing developments-both public and private-are
being renovated in many parts of the United States.
As this report shows, pairing physical design
changes with management changes that support,
facilitate, and reinforce their preventive effects
on disorder and illegal activity can be a highly
effective strategy for combating criminal activity.
This report builds on prior National Institute of
Justice research efforts, including Partnerships
for Neighborhood Crime Prevention and other
research conducted during the past 20 years. Many
of these publications and related documentation are
available from the National Institute of Justice.

Place-specific crime prevention may involve opening
up a public space to create better natural
surveillance, shutting down a crack house,
modifying leases and tenant screening practices,
training residents to patrol their own buildings,
or creating on-site police substations or security
offices. The most effective place-specific crime
prevention strategies take into account the
geographic, cultural, economic, and social
characteristics of the target community. Thus, the
selection of place-specific crime prevention
tactics and elements should be made in close
collaboration with the community, after sustained
observation of its current patterns of use.

By emphasizing that crime prevention is not a "one
size fits all" effort, and that some neighborhoods
or communities will require more attention and
ingenuity than others in crafting effective
strategies, this report stresses the importance of
a thorough analysis of local problems and needs, as
well as ongoing monitoring and evaluation of the
place-specific strategies selected and their
effectiveness in reducing crime and disorder.

Jeremy Travis
Director
National Institute of Justice

------------------------------

Acknowledgements

We wish to thank the many individuals in the study
sites who patiently answered our questions and
provided us with materials about their efforts to
prevent crime and increase security in residential
settings. In particular, we thank the hosts and
lead respondents at each site we visited:

o Mr. Arthur Winn (Winn Development Company) and
Ms. Deborah Backus (Castle Square Tenants
Organization, Inc.), Boston, Massachusetts;

o Ms. Patricia Garrett (Charlotte-Mecklenburg
Housing Partnership) and Mr. John Hayes (Charlotte
Housing Authority), Charlotte, North Carolina;

o Lieutenant David Krauss (Oakland Housing
Authority and Oakland Police Department), Oakland,
California; and

o Mr. Frank Pond (Rehabilitation Supervisor,
Village of Oak Park), Oak Park, Illinois.

We hope that these respondents will convey our
thanks to the many others from their sites with
whom we met or spoke during the course of this
research. In addition, we thank the individuals
from the 11 other sites whom we contacted by
telephone for extensive information-gathering about
their place-specific crime prevention efforts.

The four advisory board members for this project
provided very useful guidance during a one-day
meeting in Washington, DC, as well as through
periodic phone consultations and reviews of the
draft report. We extend our thanks to Dr. Ronald
Clarke of the Rutgers University School of Criminal
Justice; Mr. Dan Fleissner, Manager of Research and
Grants for the Seattle Police Department; Mr.
Severin Sorensen, President of SPARTA Consulting
Corporation; and Mr. Stephen Tise, principal of
Tise, Hurwitz, and Diamond, Inc. (architects).

A number of other individuals participated in the
advisory meeting in June 1995 and provided valuable
suggestions for shaping this work. We thank Dr.
Adele Harrell (Urban Institute), Dr. Harold
Holtzman (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development, Office of Policy Development and
Research), and Mr. Robert Langworthy (National
Institute of Justice [NIJ]) for their interest and
contributions.

John Spevacek, program manager for the development
of this report at NIJ, provided support and
beneficial advice to the project. We thank Richard
Titus, NIJ's crime prevention specialist, for
inspiring us to take a new look at crime prevention
through environmental design (CPTED) in the 1990's
and for guiding and assisting us throughout the
project. Cheryl Crawford, the contracting officer's
technical representative at NIJ, and Virginia
Baldau, director of NIJ's Program Development
Division, Office of Development and Dissemination,
provided helpful suggestions for improving the
report.

At Abt Associates, Theodore Hammett's technical
review brought about important improvements to our
drafts. Jon Norman ably assisted us in completing
the project. Mary-Ellen Perry and Myraida Rivera
masterfully coordinated production of the report,
and Karen Minich and Wendy Sanderson expertly
prepared the final publication. We thank them all.

Judith D. Feins
Joel C. Epstein     
Rebecca Widom
Abt Associates Inc.

------------------------------

Executive Summary

This publication examines place-specific crime
prevention: making changes for security and crime
prevention in urban and suburban neighborhoods.
Place-specific crime prevention refers to programs
of physical design changes, public and private
management changes, and use-pattern changes that
are targeted to a particular place and its crime
problems. The goal of this report is to inform law
enforcement officials, urban planners and
architects, multifamily housing managers, and
public housing administrators about the diverse
array of coordinated environmental design and
management strategies that can be employed to
reduce crime and fear of crime in housing complexes
and residential neighborhoods. This approach works
well with the community-oriented and problem-oriented 
policing models being implemented by law enforcement 
agencies across the United States.

Place-specific crime prevention approaches go
beyond narrow theories about environmental design
or defensible space. The integration of strategies
to modify the use and management of places has
strengthened environmental design or redesign as a
practical approach to crime prevention in varied
settings. Place-specific crime prevention builds on
crime prevention through environmental design
(CPTED, physical changes) and draws on the results
of research on active crime prevention tactics
(such as community policing and community crime
prevention) to emphasize modification of design,
use, and management of a specific place to prevent
and reduce crime.

This report presents practical lessons gleaned from
a varied set of sites operating security and
anticrime programs that combine physical design
changes and management changes. Efforts by
municipalities, public housing authorities, private
developers, and nonprofit organizations in city and
suburban neighborhoods are the focus. The
information presented should prove useful to
practitioners and agencies creating their own
place-specific crime prevention programs. The
findings in this report stress that the nature and
configuration of the place-specific crime
prevention approach are best determined by local
leaders of the groups or agencies initiating
change, with the cooperation and participation of
other government and community leaders, local law
enforcement administrators, and residents. The
importance and efficacy of improved management
practices and culturally sensitive policing
strategies, in combination with environmental
design or redesign solutions, are also stressed.

This publication is based on a combination of
information from programs around the country, a
review of the literature, and consultation with
experts in the field. Visits were made to four
sites, each representing a different place-specific
crime prevention approach:

o Castle Square Apartments, a private rental
housing complex in Boston, Massachusetts;

o Lockwood Gardens, a development of the Oakland
Housing Authority in East Oakland, California;

o The central city Genesis Park neighborhood in
Charlotte, North Carolina, and

o The suburban village of Oak Park, Illinois.
Telephone interviews with 11 other sites provided
additional examples of place-specific
interventions. In addition to a diversity of CPTED
approaches, the selected sites display a range of
innovative policing and housing management
strategies; most have achieved measurable success
in reducing crime.

Examples of place-specific crime prevention
approaches from the study sites include: closing
pedestrian tunnels and opening up hidden areas to
resident and management view (Castle Square
Apartments, Boston); shutting down a crack house
through civil lawsuits (Clinton Hill neighborhood,
Brooklyn, New York); fencing and gating the
community (Lockwood Gardens, Oakland; Mar Vista
Gardens, Los Angeles, California; Diggs Town,
Norfolk, Virginia); rerouting traffic and limiting
vehicular access to a community (Genesis Park,
Charlotte, North Carolina; Oak Park, Illinois;
Bridgeport, Connecticut; Five Oaks, Dayton, Ohio);
installing high-technology pan-tilt-zoom cameras as
the centerpiece of a three-development surveillance
system (Grant Manor, Boston); creating on-site
police substations or security offices (Lockwood
Gardens, Oakland; Oak Park, Illinois); and
organizing the community to approve a special tax
assessment for better street lighting and other
public improvements (El Cortez Heights, Tucson,
Arizona).

The most effective place-specific crime prevention
strategies are those that take into account the
geographic, cultural, economic, and social
characteristics of the target community. Thus, the
selection of place-specific crime prevention
strategies and tactics should be made in close
collaboration with the community, after sustained
observation of its current patterns of use. The
experiences of the study sites reveal two major
lessons:

o Physical design modifications, management
changes, and changes in use should be tailored to
specific locations and coordinated in their
planning and implementation.

o The most effective security and crime
prevention efforts are those that involve a
coalition of different players working together to
define the problem and then seek solutions.

By emphasizing that crime prevention is not a "one
size fits all" effort, and that some communities
may require more attention and ingenuity than
others in crafting effective strategies, this
report stresses the importance of a thorough
analysis of the problems and needs of a given
community, as well as ongoing monitoring and
evaluation of the place-specific strategies
selected.

The varied examples presented in this publication
demonstrate that physical design changes and
management changes-enhanced security, improved
property management, and greater resident
involvement-can be combined effectively to combat
criminal activity, reduce disorder, improve safety,
and enhance the quality of life in a variety of
urban and suburban residential settings.

------------------------------

Chapter 1

Crime and Place: What Do We Know?

This chapter presents an overview of place-specific 
crime prevention: coordinated programs of physical
redesign and public and private management changes
targeted to a particular community and its crime
problem. The first section sets out the objectives
and organization of the report and provides a brief
discussion of the sites studied. The next section
gives an overview of the report's organization. The
third section discusses the sources of
place-specific crime prevention and the issue of
crime displacement and diffusion of crime control
benefits. The final section introduces the array of
sites from which data and examples will be drawn
throughout the report.

Objectives and Audience

The goal of this publication is to inform law
enforcement officials, urban planners and
architects, multifamily housing managers, and
public housing administrators of the diverse array
of coordinated environmental design and management
strategies that can be employed to reduce crime and
fear of crime in urban and suburban neighborhoods.
The place-specific crime prevention approach is
consistent with and supports the community-oriented
and problem-oriented policing models being
implemented by many law enforcement agencies across
the United States. This publication emphasizes the
importance and efficacy of improved management
practices and culturally sensitive policing
strategies in combination with environmental design
or redesign solutions.

In preparing this report, the authors have built on
prior research efforts, including Partnerships for
Neighborhood Crime Prevention[1] and other research
sponsored by the National Institute of Justice
during the past 20 years.[2] The report also
incorporates practical lessons gleaned from the
efforts of municipalities, public housing
authorities, private developers, and nonprofit
organizations in city and suburban neighborhoods to
operate security and anticrime programs that
combine physical design changes and management
changes.
 
The nature and configuration of these
place-specific crime prevention approaches were
determined by local leaders of the groups or
agencies initiating change, with the cooperation
and participation of residents, local law
enforcement administrators, and government and
community leaders.

Overview of the Report

Chapter 1 describes place-specific crime prevention
and briefly describes the sites and programs from
which information for this publication is drawn.
Chapter 2 identifies techniques for defining and
analyzing the crime problem in a particular locale.
It considers the physical features of an area that
influence crime and public safety, discusses the
concept of place management and ways of determining
the stakeholders, and helps the reader think about
how an area's use-by residents and others-influences 
security. Chapter 3 describes how the study sites have 
designed their interventions and draws lessons from 
their experiences. Program design includes not only 
selecting strategies and tactics but also mobilizing 
available resources and knowing where and how to start 
initiating change.

Chapter 4 describes program implementation. The
first section examines how to bring about changes
in the physical environment through design and/or
redesign and renovation. The second section
discusses options for changing management-including
policing, property management, and the role of
residents-in order to solidify and sustain the
security features of the redesign.

In conclusion, chapter 5 presents an examination of
results-what sites claim to have achieved through
their security and crime prevention efforts. The
results discussed in the first section include
"taking back the turf" (reclaiming the area for
legitimate use by residents and others), reducing
crime and keeping it down, and dealing with any
issues of crime displacement. The second section
summarizes a number of lessons shared by the
diverse set of communities profiled in this report.
The chapter ends with a recapitulation of the major
points of the publication.

Several appendixes provide additional material,
ideas, and contact information for the resources
needed to implement place-specific crime prevention
programs:

Appendix A contains a glossary of the acronyms and
terms used in this report.

Appendix B consists of a review of the research
literature on place-specific crime prevention,
covering such subjects as defensible space, CPTED,
community- or problem-oriented policing, rational
offender theory and routine activities theory,
situational crime prevention, and community or
neighborhood crime prevention.

Appendix C provides useful checklists and similar
material for program planning and implementation.

Appendix D offers information on sources of
training and technical assistance for
place-specific crime prevention efforts.

Appendix E summarizes information on the 11 sites
contacted but not visited for the study.

Appendix F contains crime statistics for sites
highlighted in this report.

What Is Place-Specific Crime Prevention?


The term place-specific crime prevention refers to
coordinated programs of change-specifically,
physical design, security, and property management
changes-that are targeted to a particular place and
its problems. The term combines the concept of
redesign with management changes, which require
public managers (such as police, parks departments,
or housing authorities) and private managers (such
as property owners or private security companies)
to rethink their roles in creating and maintaining
public safety.

Coining a new term can present a problem, as it
lacks reader recognition, requires special
explanation, and runs the risk of expanding jargon
rather than understanding. However, when existing
terms are too specific to convey the full scope of
the concept being addressed, or when-as in this
case-multiple data from research and practice,
which may be classified under a variety of names,
come together to form a whole, a new term is
needed.

In this report, the term place-specific crime
prevention refers to approaches that go beyond
narrow theories about environmental design, drawing
on more active strategies and techniques yet
retaining a location-centered focus. In its
emphasis on management, place-specific crime
prevention seeks to improve on CPTED, which relies
on physical modifications to influence human
behavior. As noted by Reiss and Roth,[3]

------------------------------

The reason for the inconsistent and temporary
effects [of a CPTED demonstration project in
Hartford] appears to be that crime and violence
arise from interactions between the social
environment and the physical environment, which
cannot be controlled entirely through manipulations
of the physical environment. The communal feeling
of territoriality and mutual protection, on which
the defensible space concept rests, 
apparently failed to materialize.

------------------------------

Place-specific crime prevention addresses the
interaction between social and physical environment
by changing the design, management, and use of a
place. (See components of place-specific crime
prevention in exhibit 1.) The theories and
practices contributing to the definition of
place-specific crime prevention used here are
detailed in exhibit 1. One particularly important
concept is the notion of situational crime
prevention, which, although combining some of the
same elements, has not generally made the link to
management changes and changes in resident role
that are included in place-specific crime
prevention.[4] (See appendix B for a more extensive
review of the literature.)

Displacement of Crime or Diffusion of Benefits?

The possibility of crime displacement is one of the
major challenges raised when place-specific crime
prevention efforts are proposed. Many practitioners
express concern that place-specific programs will
simply move or displace crime from the target area
to other areas or other victims, without reducing
the overall crime level. As noted by Clarke and
Weisburd, "under this view, situational changes
[can] affect the pattern of crime but not its
volume: the latter [is] determined by motivational
factors."[5]

While law enforcement officials and other
practitioners appear to accept crime displacement
as a common occurrence, there has been relatively
little research on the subject. Despite the
potential for different types of displacement (not
just in time or space but by target, method, crime
type, or perpetrator), research on what situations
give rise to varying types and levels of
displacement, and why, is lacking. (A review of the
limited research literature on displacement is
contained in appendix B.)

One review of published articles on crime
prevention began to address the question of
displacement by classifying studies by type of
intervention strategy used and other factors.[6] A
high proportion of the studies showing no
displacement examined interventions that increased
the effort needed to commit a crime, involvedcombinations of preventive measures rather than
single measures, and implemented preventive
measures throughout the jurisdiction (neighborhood,
city, county, or country).[7] This analysis suggests
that external factors do affect the potential for
and patterns of crime displacement.

Researchers contend that the view of displacement
as automatic and widespread is based on
questionable assumptions about criminal motivation,
most notably that the impetus to commit a crime
comes completely from within the offender and is
not affected by external factors. They argue that
rational offender theory (see appendix B) better
explains when and why displacement may occur.[8]
Distinctions also have been made between benign and
destructive displacement.[9] If there is displacement
of criminal activity to more serious offenses, or
to already heavily victimized areas or populations,
then it would seem that displacement does pose a
significant concern. However, if interventions more
evenly distribute victimization among different
neighborhoods or populations, if they redirect
activity to less serious crimes, or if they
displace only a portion of the initial amount of
crime, there is a net benefit.

Rational offender theory would also suggest that
crime prevention measures may produce diffusion of
benefits rather than displacement of crime. This
would occur if offenders experience increased fear
of detection (that is, they perceive that the risk
of committing a crime has increased) and/or
decreased likelihood of gain (that is, they
perceive that the reward of crime is reduced)
beyond the actual scope of the intervention.
Diffusion of benefits is defined by Clarke[10] as
"the spread of the beneficial influence of an
intervention beyond the places which are directly
targeted, the individuals who are the subject of
control, the crimes which are the focus of
intervention, or the time periods in which an
intervention is brought." When potential offenders
are deterred (by increased fear of detection and
greater actual or perceived risk of arrest) or
discouraged (by reduced actual or perceived rewards
of crime) beyond the degree merited by the
preventive measures taken, diffusion of benefits
will occur. Exhibit 2 shows how these possible
secondary effects of crime prevention differ.
Clearly, practitioners should seek to design
interventions that reduce the total amount of crime
and/or that displace activity to less serious crime
or to less victimized populations. Better still
would be the design of interventions whose effects
reach beyond their target and thus produce
diffusion of benefits.

Need for Continuing Research

Although several fields of crime prevention theory
and research contribute to the definition of
place-specific crime prevention and several
evaluations of promising place-specific crime
prevention programs have already been conducted
(see appendix B), further research evaluating these
strategies is essential. Methodological and
practical difficulties, such as the variety of
possible outcome measures, the complexity of the
interventions,[11] and the limits to generalization
that accompany programs designed for specific local
configurations and conditions, have made
comprehensive evaluation so challenging and costly
that full studies are few. Thus, only
far-from-definitive evidence exists to determine
whether place-specific crime prevention works, how
it works, and under what conditions.[12]

Continued research about the factors shaping
displacement of crime and diffusion of benefits is
especially necessary. Displacement poses a
significant challenge to the design of crime
prevention research, since no empirical study can
conclusively show that displacement has not
occurred. Crime can be displaced to different
activities, locations, times (day/night, 
weekend/weekday), and populations of
potential victims. Considering all of these
possibilities would generate an infinite list of
outcomes, and measuring these outcomes would
require an infinite (and impossible) amount of data
collection.

By and large, evidence about displacement has
therefore been a by-product of crime studies, and
evidence of diffusion of benefits is rare.[13]
Evaluation research needs to be designed even more
carefully if diffusion of benefits is to be
detected and measured rather than misinterpreted.
In urging the recognition and pursuit of benefit
diffusion when designing crime control programs,
Clarke and Weisburd[14] point out that "to extract
the maximum benefits from the techniques [of
situational crime prevention], they need to be
pursued in tandem with an active program of
research into the ways that offenders perceive and
react to the ever-changing criminal opportunity
structure."

Introduction to Selected Programs

This section presents a brief synopsis of the
place-specific crime prevention efforts in the four
sites visited. The sites represent four diverse
settings in which place-specific crime prevention
might be implemented: public housing developments,
private rental complexes, urban neighborhoods, and
suburban communities.

Public Housing Development: Lockwood Gardens,
Oakland, California

Lockwood Gardens is a family public housing
development of 371 units, on a single site in East
Oakland, California. Owned and managed by the
Oakland Housing Authority (OHA), the site is
completely residential, with grassy open spaces
among the buildings, which consist of one-story
bungalows containing two side-by-side units, and
two-story walk-ups with individual entrances.
Residents of Lockwood Gardens are extremely poor;
as of March 1993, the mean income was just over
$8,000, compared to a citywide mean income of over
$25,000. Eighty percent of the families are headed
by women, and children ages 12 years and younger
make up 41 percent of the residents.

Between 1991 and 1993, Abt Associates Inc. studied
the OHA's efforts (under a U.S. Department of
Housing and Urban Development [HUD] Public Housing
Drug Elimination Program grant) to reduce crime and
fear at Lockwood Gardens.[15] Crime data from that
period show a major concentration of drug activity
accompanied by intimidation, harassment, burglary,
and theft. Three people were murdered on or
adjacent to the site in late 1991. The OHA's early
anticrime efforts, which involved only prevention
programming, were unsuccessful in reducing crime or
improving the quality of life for residents.

Working with residents, the OHA subsequently
developed a more active and comprehensive anticrime
strategy that combined design changes, security
patrols, and management changes. The entire site
was attractively fenced in 1993 and 1994, with
entrances initially guarded 24 hours a day. The OHA
security force, reorganized under a lieutenant from
the Oakland Police Department, acquired a mobile
substation and used it at Lockwood for a sustained
period. In addition, the OHA decentralized its
management and maintenance operation to the site
level, to improve tenant relations and to increase
both interior and exterior maintenance at Lockwood
and other public housing developments in the area.

Private Rental Complex: Castle Square Apartments,
Boston, Massachusetts
 
This private, affordable housing development
represents a crime-infested area reclaimed through
changes in design, use, and management. The
previous owner of Castle Square Apartments (CSA)
had allowed the property to deteriorate severely,
and a private real estate developer originally
sought to buy it, with the intent of waiting for
the use restrictions (requiring that it house a
partially low-income population) to expire.
However, the residents had other ideas. After a
long process of legal and financial negotiations
involving the previous owner, the residents, the
prospective buyer, and several governmental
agencies, CSA has emerged as a significant
improvement in its South End neighborhood.

The new owner-a partnership of the private
developer and the residents-brought in an architect
to plan rehabilitation with an eye to security. The
buildings at CSA are stacked duplexes (two-floor
unit above two-floor unit) and seven-story elevator
buildings containing one- and two- bedroom units.
The street front was redesigned with harder
security elements for the commercial spaces.
Fencing and landscaping were added to the site, and
a gate system, which is locked after 9 p.m., was
installed. The open stairwells and lobbies of the
elevator buildings were enclosed and controlled.
Believing that these design features had proven
their worth, the architect was applying them in
other local sites when this report was being
researched. The Boston police, who coordinated an
intensified patrol schedule with the physical
renovation of CSA, have since scaled back the
number of area patrols. Since the place-specific
crime prevention and management changes were
implemented at Castle Square, the number of police
calls for service from the apartments-a common
measure of the level of crime in a community-has
declined sharply. Children are out in the
playgrounds again, and an adjacent park once
frequented by drunks and derelicts has been
reclaimed by the residents.

CSA had an active residents' organization with a
significant security agenda. The development's
prospective buyer, Arthur Winn, also had strong
ideas about management and security for central
city housing. The partnership forged between Winn
and the residents played a central role in the
planning for a renewed Castle Square. This site
provides an example of a private rental complex in
a center-city area that by all accounts has been
turned around through a combination of design, use,
and management changes.

Urban Neighborhood: Genesis Park, Charlotte, North
Carolina

Now known as Genesis Park, this inner-city
Charlotte neighborhood was until recently the worst
eight square blocks of the city in terms of crime
and drug activity. The area, and the adjacent
Charlotte Housing Authority's (CHA's) Fairview
Homes development, had long been a center of heroin
trafficking. The CHA's anticrime efforts in
Fairview Homes had documented positive effects in
the early 1980's,16 but the adjoining neighborhood
continued to be dangerous, with 21 murders on the
two main thoroughfares between 1988 and 1993. The
deteriorated dwellings and overgrown yards
contained many squatters and numerous drug and shot
houses (where liquor is sold by the drink). The
streets were open-air markets for a variety of
drugs.

In 1993, the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Housing
Partnership (a nonprofit organization with
extensive city and private-sector support) quietly
began to purchase properties in the neighborhood.
Coordination with the Charlotte Police Department
enabled the Partnership to target shot houses and
drug houses for acquisition. With extensive
rehabilitation, the old rental duplexes were
converted into affordable single-family homes, many
of which are now being sold to low-income families
in conjunction with the CHA's programs to foster
self-sufficiency among public housing residents.
The Partnership assists prospective buyers in
resolving credit problems and also provides
homeownership classes and follow-up support in the
form of a residents' association. In addition to
the housing rehabilitation, which has been carried
out with careful attention to security features,
traffic barriers were installed to create a more
complex traffic pattern and to prevent drug traffic
from cutting through the area. The name of the
neighborhood and the names of its most notorious
streets were officially changed. A community-
policing program is in place, and the
Partnership works actively with other property
owners and managers in the neighborhood to address
any remaining problems of disorder or crime.

Genesis Park provides an example of a complex
intervention in a troubled, low-income
neighborhood, with the goal of reducing crime and
improving the quality of life for residents. The
housing is private, and both private and public
organizations have contributed to the changes.
According to police statistics, crime in Genesis
Park dropped by 74 percent from 1993 to 1994, and
the neighborhood moved from number 1 to number 41
in a ranking by neighborhood of violent crime rates
in the city.

Suburban Community: The Village of Oak Park,
Illinois

Oak Park, a middle-class suburb of Chicago that
borders on the city's West Side (one of the highest
crime areas in the United States), takes pride in
being an open and diverse community with excellent
schools and a high quality of life. The village has
many points of interest, including the Frank Lloyd
Wright Home and Studio, two historic districts, and
the Ernest Hemingway birthplace and museum. Oak
Park's housing consists of 45 percent multifamily
and 55 percent single-family dwellings. A community
known for its racial diversity assurance program,
in 1968 Oak Park made a commitment to open housing
with the passage of an ordinance guaranteeing equal
access in the sale and rental of homes and
apartments. The village-which is only 9 miles or 20
minutes from Chicago's Loop via mass transit or the
Eisen-hower Expressway-has excellent public
transportation and automobile access.

Over the past 30 years, Oak Park has vigorously
sought to maintain and enhance the quality of life
for all its residents. The village has enacted
ordinances, created programs, formed coalitions,
built organizations, and analyzed and reanalyzed
itself, in order to build strength through
diversity and unity. As part of its long-term
proactive strategy, Oak Park has experimented with
CPTED and other place-specific crime prevention
techniques, including cul-de-sacs and improved
lighting. Oak Park's Security Improvement Grant
(SIG) Program for multifamily building owners is an
important part of the village's crime prevention
strategy, as about one-third of Oak Park's
population lives in small, older apartment
buildings, many of which need to be made secure.
Under SIG, the village offers multifamily building
owners a free security inspection by Oak Park
police, who make suggestions for changes to the
property. If the owner elects to make all of the
proposed changes, the Village of Oak Park
reimburses the owner for 40 percent of the cost. If
the owner elects to make only some of the proposed
improvements, Oak Park covers 20 percent of the
cost.[17]

With burglary by far the greatest crime problem in
Oak Park, burglary reduction is the primary goal.
The improvements proposed by the police usually
involve target-hardening and access-control
strategies such as locks, gates, and fencing. Many
of these interventions have been implemented in the
eastern third of the village, the part closest to
the Austin neighborhood of Chicago's West Side.
Aside from SIG, Oak Park has implemented some
physical design changes, including the creation of
cul-de-sacs at many locations throughout the
village. The street closings are designed to reduce
traffic, improve safety, and strengthen
neighborhoods. To facilitate police protection (as
well as street cleaning and snow removal), village
law also forbids overnight parking on most streets.

Oak Park's single-family areas have a 20-year
history of block parties, which bring neighbors
together and encourage them to look out for each
other. In these single-family neighborhoods, the
village is often able to close off streets or
reroute traffic on the day of a block party. Oak
Park police also employ a variety of strategies; in
the context of community policing, the department
uses specially trained crime prevention officers
and regularly schedules community meetings to bring
officers and neighborhood residents together to
discuss local problems.

Other Sites Contacted by Telephone

In addition to conducting visits at the four sites
described previously, telephone interviews were
conducted with 11 programs that have implemented
significant, coordinated environmental design and
management changes with the goal of reducing crime.
At each of the telephone sites, two interviews were
conducted with key contacts familiar with the local
program and conditions. Information obtained by
phone was supplemented, if possible, by written
materials provided by these sites.

The opportunity to visit programs and inspect the
changes made greatly increased the level of nuance
and detail available for analyzing the four primary
study sites. However, these 11 sites improved our
knowledge of place-specific crime prevention
efforts around the United States, and they are
widely cited in the remainder of the report. 
A synopsis of the most salient features of these
sites and their programs is presented in appendix
E.

Endnotes

1. J.D. Feins, Partnerships for Neighborhood
Crime Prevention (Washington, DC: U.S. Department
of Justice, National Institute of Justice, June
1983).

2. See for examples: R.A. Gardiner, Design
for Safe Neighborhoods: The Environmental Security
Planning and Design Process (Washington, DC:
National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal
Justice, 1980); A. Wallis and D. Ford, eds., Crime
Prevention Through Environmental Design: The
Commercial Demonstration in Portland, Oregon
(Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, 
National Institute of Justice, 1980); A. 
Wallis and D. Ford, Crime Prevention Through 
Environmental Design: An Operational Handbook 
(Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, 
National Institute of Justice, 1980). More recent 
work in this field sponsored by NIJ is summarized 
in R. Titus, Crime Prevention Through Environmental 
Design at the National Institute of Justice 
(unpublished report, May 1994).

3. A.J. Reiss and J.A. Roth, "Perspectives
on Violence," in Understanding and Preventing
Violence, (Washington, DC: National Research
Council, 1993): 148.

4. One exception to this statement may be
the work of S.L. Sorensen and E. Walsh, Crime
Prevention Through Environmental Design and
Situational Crime Prevention in Public Housing:
Workshop Curriculum, HUD Crime Prevention and
Security Division, Technical Assistance Workshop(s)
(Bethesda, MD: SPARTA Consulting Corporation, March
1995).

5. R.V. Clarke and D. Weisburd, "Diffusion
of Crime Control Benefits: Observations on the
Reverse of Displacement," in Crime Prevention
Studies, v. 2, ed. R.V. Clarke (Monsey, NY:
Criminal Justice Press, 1994): 167.
 
6. Overall, 22 of the studies identified no
displacement, whereas 33 reported some form of
displacement (no instance of complete displacement;
most instances quite limited). See R.B.P.
Hesseling, "Displacement: A Review of the Empirical
Literature," in Crime Prevention Studies, v. 3, ed.
R.V. Clarke (Monsey, NY: Criminal Justice Press,
1994): 197-230.

7. Ibid., 217.

8. R. Clarke and D. Cornish, "Situational
Prevention, Displacement of Crime and Rational 
Choice Theory,"in Situational Crime Prevention: 
From Theory to Practice, ed. K. Heal and G. 
Laycock, (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 
1986): 1-16.

9. R.V. Clarke, ed., Situational Crime
Prevention: Successful Case Studies, (New York: 
Harrow and Heston, 1992): 22-27.

10. Ibid., 169.

11. "Where there are various approaches to
reducing crime in public housing, it is tempting to
advocate an 'integrated' or comprehensive approach,
acting on the full range of variables which might
be implicated. Such a solution may well at first
sight make sense, and it will certainly placate
those unhappy about 'underlying' problems. However,
we have some reservations. A comprehensive approach
is costly and difficult to implement; more
important-at least as far as evaluation goes-it
runs the danger of fudging the issue of what works
best."
 
-P. Mayhew and R.V.G. Clarke, "Crime
Prevention and Public Housing in England," in Crime
and Public Housing: Proceedings of a Workshop Held
in September 1980, ed. M. Hough and P. Mayhew
(London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1982): 6.

12. In a wide-ranging review article, Barry Poyner
offers an interesting approach to answering these
questions. Surveying 122 evaluations of crime
prevention projects and scoring each study by the
strength of the findings, Poyner examines the
evidence for using different crime prevention
measures against different types of crimes. See B.
Poyner, "What Works in Crime Prevention: An
Overview of Evaluations," in Crime Prevention
Studies, v. 1, ed. R. V. Clarke (Monsey, NY:
Criminal Justice Press, 1993): 7-33.

13. According to one researcher, there are two
reasons for the latter fact. First, if displacement
has received only peripheral attention, benefit
diffusion has hardly even been recognized as an
explicit possibility. Second, researchers' common
use of nearby areas as a basis for comparison in
detecting changes in crime incidence (i.e., a
nonequivalent control group design) means that-if
diffusion of benefits also reduces crime in these
areas-the intervention being studied will be
reported to have had little or no impact, instead
of the extra impact of benefit diffusion being
recognized. See J.E. Eck, "The Threat of Crime
Displacement," Criminal Justice Abstracts, v. 25
(1993): 539-540.

14. R.V. Clarke and D. Weisburd, "Diffusion of
Crime Control Benefits: Observations on the Reverse
of Displacement," in Crime Prevention Studies, v.
2, ed. R.V. Clarke (Monsey, NY: Criminal Justice
Press, 1994): 179.

15. T.M. Hammett, J.D. Feins, T. Mason, and I.
Ellen, Public Housing Drug Elimination Program
Resource Document, vol.1 (Final Report) and vol.2
(Case Studies) (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of
Housing and Urban Development, July 1994).

16. J.G. Hayes, The Impact of Citizen Involvement
in Preventing Crime in Public Housing: A Report of
the Fairview Homes Crime Prevention Program.

17. Oak Park recently decided to decrease the
percentage of the cost it pays per building,
thereby increasing the number of building owners it
can assist. The percentages were originally 50
percent (rather than 40) for full improvements and
25 percent (rather than 20) for partial
improvements. There is a ceiling for reimbursement
at $400 per unit and $16,000 per building.


Exhibit 1. Place-Specific Crime Prevention
Components and Sources

Components

Physical design changes

o Target-hardening

o Controlling access

o Increasing opportunities for surveillance

o Targeting crime "hot spots"

o Improving image

Management changes

o Revamping security (including policing)

o Altering property ownership and/or management

o Expanding the role of residents

Use changes

o Increasing use at different times of the day and
night

o Increasing the variety of business uses

o Increasing use by residents and others for
leisure activities

Sources (Theories and Practices)

Physical crime prevention

o Defensible space

o Symbolic barriers (delineating public vs. private
space)

o Crime prevention through environmental design
(CPTED)

Understanding criminal behavior

o Rational choice theory

o Routine activity theory

Recent developments in crime prevention theory

o Situational crime prevention (combines physical
and other means of reducing crime opportunities)

Developments in local crime prevention practice

o Community crime prevention
o Neighborhood crime prevention

Recent developments in local law enforcement
practice

o Community-oriented policing (COP)

o Problem-oriented policing (POP)

o Call management/police response analysis
(MIS/GIS)

o Expansion of law enforcement role (better
coordination with other agencies)

_o Neighborhood-based planning and service
approaches

------------------------------

Exhibit 2. Displacement of Crime or Diffusion of
Benefits?

Destructive displacement shifts criminal activity
 
o to more serious offenses

o to already heavily victimized areas or
populations

o outside of primary targets

Benign displacement shifts criminal activity

o to less serious offenses

o to areas with a lower incidence of crime

o with victimization distributed among different 
neighborhood or populations

Diffusion of benefits shifts criminal activity

o to areas with a lower incidence of crime

o beyond primary targets

------------------------------

Chapter 2

Crime and Place: Defining the Problem

Defining the problem is a critical step in planning
for change. This chapter examines how to define and
analyze crime problems in urban and suburban
neighborhoods. It opens with a discussion of how to
involve key players in the effort to analyze the
crime problem and identifies obstacles that may be
encountered along the way. It then reviews the
physical features of an area that can influence
crime and public safety; the concept of management
and how it can be analyzed in a specific area are
also discussed. The chapter concludes with an
examination of how an area's use-by residents and
others-may affect the crime problem. Working
together to analyze physical features, management,
and use, the key players can define the problem,
which is the first step toward solving it.

Involving Key Players

The most effective crime prevention efforts are
those that involve a coalition of different players
who cooperate to define the problem and then seek
solutions. Although it may seem more logical or
more convenient to work only with the police when
analyzing a crime situation and then later to
involve other players in designing the solution,
such an approach has two drawbacks. First, it will
not produce the comprehensive, detailed, and
geographically targeted analysis required for
designing effective place-specific interventions.
Second, it will not give the other key players a
sense of ownership in the definition; because they
were not consulted initially, they may not agree
with the proposed definition or with its
implications for how to improve security in the
area.

Even before the renovation of Boston's Castle
Square Apartments, several residents from the
Castle Square Tenants Organization (CSTO) had been
involved in the local Police Captain's Advisory
Board, which met monthly with the South End's
police commander to discuss community concerns. The
prospective private buyer for the complex, Winn
Development Company, needed to know the nature of
the environment and how it would affect managing
the site in the future. A number of other
individuals and organizations also played important
roles in defining the crime problem for Castle
Square.

At Mar Vista Gardens, a public housing development
in Los Angeles, residents, staff of the housing
authority, police, and nearby homeowners'
associations were involved from the start in
examining the crime problem in the development;
these discussions served as background for crime
prevention proposals and options for the complex.
Neighbors, like residents, often have a critical
perspective on a community's crime problem.
Spillover of drug selling and gang activity into
the surrounding community was widely recognized at
Mar Vista, and Mar Vista Gardens' neighbors
complained frequently to the police about a high
level of drive-by drug selling at the development.
These neighbors were able and willing to help
define the problem.

Enlisting Police Involvement

Obtaining police support and involvement is an
essential first step in defining and analyzing a
particular area's security and crime problem, for
at least two reasons:

1. Because of their familiarity with crime
problems in the area, local law enforcement
personnel can serve as a source of information and
a foil against which to check possible
interventions such as design changes.

2. Enlisting police involvement from the start
demonstrates to law enforcement officials that
those initiating the security and crime prevention
effort acknowledge the primacy of the police role
in making and keeping the community a safe place to
live. This can also help break down barriers and
improve relations between residents and police by
providing them with a nonconfrontational reason to
sit down together.

After being alerted by East Bridgeport residents,
the police department of Bridgeport, Connecticut,
conducted a rigorous analysis of crime and
calls-for-service data and found that traffic
patterns on the city's east side-particularly its
location along Interstate 95-made the area
vulnerable to drug activity. The civilian employee
of the department who analyzed the problem-an
enthusiastic exponent of crime prevention through
environmental design (CPTED)-was put in charge of
developing a response.[1] He sought the involvement
of a local architect, who drew up plans for
rerouting traffic throughout the area. The
Bridgeport Fire Department also became involved
early on, out of concern about access to the area
for fire and other emergency vehicles. The
involvement of area residents and business people
was not sought until the implementation of the
Bridgeport program, which came to be known as the
Phoenix Project, was underway. Ultimately,
residents' and business owners' concerns led the
city to alter its ambitious traffic modification
plan.

In the 1980's, Five Oaks in Dayton, Ohio, was a
small neighborhood in transition from mostly
middle-class white to working-class white and
African-American residents. Concerned about the
racial and economic changes taking place there and
about a rising crime rate, a community group-the
Five Oaks Neighborhood Improvement Association
(FONIA)-began working to organize residents and to
make the neighborhood's needs a priority with city
agencies. At the request of the Dayton Police
Department, architect and CPTED expert Oscar Newman
was brought to Dayton to discuss general
neighborhood stabilization issues, and he became
involved in the analysis of the Five Oaks
situation.[2]Police sweeps and vigorous law
enforcement in 1992 helped raise police awareness
of the situation and got the neighborhood back
under control.
 
Building on Existing Relationships

For many communities, the battle against crime is
not new. Individuals and organizations involved in
past anticrime efforts may prove to be key players
in examining the current situation.

As noted previously, problem assessment at Castle
Square Apartments in Boston was facilitated by the
prior involvement of several residents in the local
Police Captain's Advisory Board. Similarly,
existing relationships in Oak Park, Illinois, have
played an important role in developing the suburban
community's proactive anticrime stance. For 30
years, the village has experimented with a variety
of methods to attract new residents, ensure
diversity, and maintain public safety. The
village's planning department, the Austin Boulevard
Alliance, the police department, the Housing
Programs Advisory Committee, and the Oak Park
Regional Housing Center are currently active, and
the long history of coalitions and cooperation
provides a strong foundation for their 
efforts.

Organizing the Community

Enlisting the involvement of community residents in
analysis of crime problems is indispensable. While
calls for service and other police records detail
reported criminal activity, building residents can
describe hidden drug selling in a high-rise
stairwell or the inner courtyard of a building.
Outreach to these residents through anonymous tip
lines and other confidential means of communicating
information to the police may turn fearful and
reluctant people into key informants in the
definition of a community's crime problem.

Furthermore, there is great potential power in the
collective voices and actions of local residents
who have organized to work on community issues.
Prior research and experience suggest that those
interested in crime prevention should make use of
established neighborhood organizations, rather than
seek to start a new organization.[3] If no such
organization exists, bringing together a group to
define and tackle the public safety problem may be
difficult. Residents may want to enlist the
involvement of skilled community organizers who
bring to the effort an appreciation of the issues
around which the community can best be organized.
Community organizers can also help pace a
neighborhood's efforts by helping to pick its
approaches and its battles.

The Citizens Committee for New York City (CCNYC)
recommends gathering a small group of concerned
people to brainstorm about who might be able to
help address the problems being discussed and how
group members might involve these people or groups.
In Brooklyn, CCNYC not only facilitated the
organization of the Clinton Hill Block Association
(CHBA) but also helped to keep its efforts focused
on preventing drug dealing in vacant buildings, a
problem with which many area residents could
identify. CCNYC helped CHBA keep its initial goals
modest and achievable.

The sense that outsiders are the primary source of
the crime problem provides a unifying theme for
resident organizing. In Bridgeport, Connecticut,
the police exploited the finding that much of east
Bridgeport's drug trade was supported by drive-by
suburban purchasers who accessed the area via
Interstate 95. Similarly, neighbors of the Mar
Vista Gardens housing development in West Los
Angeles came together with development residents
out of their common concern about drug activity,
much of which seemed to be generated by wealthy
outsiders driving into the community and the
development. However, organizing crime prevention
efforts based on these ideas can run the risk of
reinforcing existing social divisions (by race or
class), and communities targeting "outsiders"
should take care not to support de facto
segregation.

Obstacles to Coordination and Cooperation

Communities may face a variety of obstacles when
seeking increased coordination and cooperation,
even for purposes of defining the crime problem.
Awareness is the first step toward dealing with
such obstacles and can ensure that the effort to
define and address security problems in a
neighborhood is not derailed.

Resident Involvement in Crime. Blaming outsiders
for the crime problem may be useful for organizing,
but it often oversimplifies the situation. There
may be residents who are part of the problem,
either as customers for drug dealers or as
offenders. In addition, some residents may-as a
result of intimidation or by virtue of personal
ties-permit illegal activities in their apartments;
it is extremely difficult to get accurate
information on such involvement. It is also hard to
draw distinctions among residents, who may know all
too well each others' family members or problems.
Rather than asking people to inform on others, an
indirect means can be found to signal that criminal
involvement will no longer be tolerated.

Past Tensions. A history of failure, tensions, or
outright animosity may make many residents
reluctant to work with the management, the police,
or the municipality. In addition, past tensions
between minority groups-or between one group and
the police-may require that these groups or
organizations reconcile themselves before they
attempt to define the crime problem, much less plan
or implement place-specific security changes.
 
In the largely African-American Clinton Hill
neighborhood of Brooklyn, a history of poor
community relations with the police department and
district attorney (DA) had to be overcome before
residents could view the police and DA as their
allies. Initial police and DA reluctance to assist
the Clinton Hill Block Association in its efforts
to shut down business at a known drug location was
a further obstacle to reconciliation.

Fear of Retaliation. Fear of retaliation is a
well-known deterrent to crime prevention activity
by citizens. Understandably, both residents and
area business owners may be reluctant to become
involved with crime prevention initiatives out of
fear of physical retaliation by neighborhood drug
dealers and others.

However, it is also true that engaging in
collective action makes participants less fearful
and more optimistic about the prospects for the
neighborhood.[4] Local churches and other
institutions can help community residents overcome
fear by restoring a sense of community. In North
Portland, Oregon, a variety of churches and
community leaders, as well as a youth gang task
force, have helped residents overcome the sense of
despair created by the perception that their
neighborhood is unsafe.
 
Population Changes. Population changes can make it
difficult to involve key players in defining a
neighborhood's crime problem. Simple turnover of
residents-ordinary movement in a mobile society or
increased turnover due to negative neighborhood
conditions-can undermine existing organizations and
remove actual or potential local leaders from the
scene. In addition, shifting racial demographics or
the socioeconomic mix can leave old and new
residents uncertain about how to affect the local
situation. In the view of the supervisor of the
Crime Prevention Unit of the Dayton Police
Department, changing demographic patterns in an
area have a lot to do with the fear of crime. When
speeding cars, gun shots at night, and "open-air
drug markets" coincide with shifting demographics,
all contribute to residents' sense that things in
their neighborhood are out of control.

Stabilizing the community (and stemming "white
flight") appears to have been a large part of the
goal of organizers in Five Oaks (Dayton, Ohio) and
in Oak Park, Illinois. In Five Oaks, crime rates
were highest along the southeastern and eastern
borders of the neighborhood, areas with higher
concentrations of rental residential property,
generally poorer residents, and more people of
color. The connection between fear of crime and
white flight, while sad, is quite clear. In Oak
Park, the village's affirmative and proactive
programs to ensure diversity have been coordinated
with crime prevention efforts, and white flight has
not ensued. Thus, in both communities, efforts have
been made to stabilize the population without
excluding people of color; improving 
security and preventing crime have become part of
the more general objective of improving quality of
life and encouraging current residents to stay and
seek positive change.

Negative Press. Negative press coverage can
reinforce fear and discourage efforts to analyze
and then address security problems. Negative
perceptions created by the media can even produce a
self-fulfilling prophecy, as residents and property
owners withdraw from caring for their properties in
particular neighborhoods.
 
Because of the media's central role in influencing
the public's perception of crime, communities may
want to involve local newspapers or other media
outlets in addressing the crime problem. It is
possible for the press to help mobilize key
players. In Charlotte, North Carolina, a series of
articles in the Charlotte Observer entitled "Taking
Back Our Neighborhoods" thoroughly documented crime 
problems in various parts of the city. Rather than 
being a negative, discouraging depiction of the 
community, these articles were written as a call 
to action for citizens and organizations concerned 
about quality of life.

Defining the Crime Problem

Defining the relationship between crime and place
is a critical step in determining how best to
increase security and prevent crime in a particular
neighborhood or housing development. Defining the
problem involves several activities:

o Gathering information about crime and
disorder.

o Combining this information with geographical
data to map specific locations where one or more
offenses have occurred.

o Assessing the physical layout and features
that could be contributing to vulnerability in
these locations.

In collecting and analyzing this information, it is
important to take into account the perceptions of
the key players, who are likely to have different
points of view and also real differences in
knowledge about local crime conditions. At Castle
Square Apartments (CSA) in Boston, for instance,
the police were acutely aware of problems generated
by an "old drunk" location that was the site of
daily brawls, noisy arguments, and frequent
stabbings. In contrast, CSA residents were far more
concerned about the muggings and break-ins within
the development, and the prostitutes and drug
dealers carrying their business into the backyards
and parking lots.

Gathering Information About Crime 
and Disorder

Whether it is a particular incident or a
long-standing pattern that has mobilized key
players to address security issues, it is vital to
gain a more complete picture of crime in the area
before changes can be made. Police department
records, including calls for service and incident
reports, are the most obvious source for
information on reported crime. It may not be easy
to obtain aggregate (tabulated) data for the
specific, narrowly defined neighborhood or housing
development. Calls or incident data may only be
available in raw form by address, which would
require considerable time and effort to gather and
analyze. Indeed, the early involvement of police
officials may be necessary to gain access to such
information.

At such an early stage, it is also useful to look
at crime data more widely, putting the specific
area in the context of one or more police beats or
quadrants. If, like Oak Park, the area of concern
borders another jurisdiction, data must be gathered
from the adjoining city or town for its specific
adjacent beat(s) or quadrant(s). A working
relationship between the police in the two
jurisdictions can facilitate access to these data.

Police crime data have limitations, however,
particularly where fear and/or friction may inhibit
reporting of crime. Fear-even apart from actual
victimization-influences residents and can
contribute to fostering undesirable conditions. For
example, if fear keeps some people off the streets
or out of common areas during the evening, the lack
of foot traffic may increase residents' perceived
or actual vulnerability to being mugged. Further,
signs of disorder play a recognized role in
security problems but are not covered in police
statistics.[5] For these reasons, and also to take
advantage of the knowledge and observations of
residents and others who regularly use the area, it
is important to gather additional information about
patterns of crime and disorder through various
methods, including:

o Interviewing or surveying residents about
their perceptions and experiences, considering both
actual victimization and fear.

o Making observations about local conditions,
using a windshield survey, a block-face checklist,
or similar instrument.

o Interviewing police officers assigned to the
local area for their informal observations and
impressions.

o Convening focus groups of residents or people
who work in the area for a guided discussion of
crime and fear.

o Simply gathering accounts of incidents or
conditions that are observed and associated with
fear and crime by residents.

Such information can be extremely useful, even if
it is more anecdotal than systematic, particularly
if gathered in a way that makes it readily linked
to specific locations.

Linking Crime to Location

For defining the security problem in a neighborhood
or housing complex, the link between crime and
location should be as detailed as possible.
Ideally, crime data by type of offense and disorder
data by type of problem (e.g., abandoned cars,
graffiti, trash) could be mapped against a
three-dimensional representation of the area,
showing not only the particular block or street
address but also the corner of the parking lot or
the level of the stairwell where an incident or
problem occurred.

For a number of the sites studied for this report,
community policing officers proved to be the
critical source for detailed information linking
crime and disorder to particular locations within
the site. In Charlotte, community policing preceded
the effort to revitalize the area. As one
respondent said, "The police department was already
out here with community policing, knew everyone by
name, before CMHP [the Charlotte-Mecklenburg
Housing Partnership] came on the scene. Pat and
Mike [the two community policing officers] and
their captain were already there in the
neighborhood." CMHP worked closely with the police
to identify drug and liquor houses, thus targeting
potential property acquisitions.

In Oakland, California, the Oakland Housing
Authority's (OHA's) planning department first
became involved in the analysis of crime problems
in the late 1980's, when fencing was needed to cut
the escape route from 14th Street along the rear
boundary of Lockwood Gardens. As their experience
broadened, the designers and architects began to
look at other OHA sites and their crime statistics.
As a result, the housing authority acknowledged the
vulnerability of various sites and began
redesigning them for enhanced security. Exhibit 3
shows a sketch of one OHA site's design problems.

Simple pin maps (with one pin for each police call
for service) have long been used to facilitate
identifying locations with high crime rates or "hot
spots." Advances in computer mapping, a technique
increasingly used among law enforcement agencies,
make identifying hot spots, managing detailed
information, and processing specific inquiries
easier.[6] Indeed, such computer maps begin to make
causal analysis a possibility. For example, in San
Diego, computer mapping revealed that robberies
were clustered in two different areas. In the midst
of each area was a convenience store; the robberies
were clustered around these locations in the
neighborhood.[7] The existence of these crime hot
spots and the ability to identify what causes them
are an effective argument for place-specific crime
prevention.

------------------------------

In San Diego, computer mapping revealed that
robberies were clustered in two different areas. In
the midst of each area was a convenience store; the
robberies were clustered around these locations in
the neighborhood. The existence of these crime hot
spots and the ability to identify what causes them
are an effective argument for place-specific crime
prevention.

------------------------------

In some jurisdictions, there are efforts underway
to achieve a high level of locational detail by
putting new technology in the hands of patrol
officers. For example, the Charlotte-Mecklenburg
Police Department and the Charlotte Housing
Authority (CHA) are jointly experimenting with the
use of handheld global positioning system (GPS)
devices to record precise locations of crime in
terms of latitude and longitude. For multistory
buildings, experimental report formats for
gathering information in the field using laptop
computers require detail about the floor from which
the call originated.

Even with less sophisticated techniques, detailed
mapping can be created to help define the security
problem. Large-scale street maps showing building
outlines (footprints)[8] can be annotated to show
other features, such as an underpass through a
building into the site interior, a vacant corner
overgrown with trees, or a bank of pay telephones
next to a store. The specific locations of crimes
and signs of disorder can then be coded on the maps
(using pins, stickers, cut-outs, or markers of
different colors) to provide a basis for assessing
how the physical layout and features of the
neighborhood or housing complex are related to the
security problems there. Discussing the maps with
all interested parties (including police officers
familiar with the area, residents, housing owners
and managers, neighbors, and people employed
nearby) may well provide further information about
crime and fear and help with analyzing current use
patterns of the area (as discussed in more detail
later in this chapter).

Identifying Key Physical Features

Linking crime and disorder data to location should
produce different results in different settings.
While a number of sound generalizations about
physical features underlie CPTED, these
generalizations do not predict the specific
patterns of crime in particular places, because the
local patterns result from the confluence of many
more factors than physical characteristics.
Examples from a number of communities show what was
learned from linking crime and location
information.

The Lockwood Gardens development in East Oakland,
California, is surrounded almost entirely by
industrial and commercial facilities, except for an
adjoining elderly housing complex also owned and
managed by the OHA.[9] Analysis by the OHA and the
observations of staff and residents showed the
following patterns of crime and disorder relative
to the development's physical layout and features:

o An open-air drug market existed along 65th
Avenue in the middle of the development. The major
concentration of activity was at the curve of the
street, where lookouts could be posted to watch
traffic turning in from East 14th Street and from
Fenham Street.

o The liquor store, car wash, and check-cashing
operation on the East 14th Street border of
Lockwood Gardens were independent magnets for
problems. The primary escape route from police
actions at these establishments was along the back
fence inside Lockwood Gardens, until the OHA closed
off access.
 
o Drug dealers used the front porches of the
bungalows along 65th Avenue for hanging out and
conducting business, terrorizing those who lived in
the apartments. Some of the buildings were
perpetually vacant because the dealers would harass
and frighten any new tenants into fleeing. The
dealers even used attack dogs (pit bulls and
Rottweilers) to threaten and intimidate residents,
keeping them off the street.
 
o The interior of the development contained
vacant buildings that served as hiding places for
drugs. The playlots were places for dealers and
users to congregate. From time to time, apartments
would be taken over by the dealers for use as crack
houses.

This analysis suggested that automobile and
pedestrian access to the site, as well as
conditions in the complex's interior, contributed
to a situation in which the residents were
virtually unable to leave their apartments. Two
murders at Lockwood Gardens in 1991 and threats of
bodily harm to the OHA's district manager the same
year confirmed the need for sweeping interventions.

Conditions in the area of Charlotte, North
Carolina, that became known as Genesis Park were
somewhat similar to those at Lockwood Gardens in
1991. The area was called Kenney/Gibbs/Wayt, and it
was known as Charlotte's biggest drug market. The
neighborhood was built up around 1950 and is
entirely residential, except for a supermarket and
laundromat directly across Oaklawn Avenue.
Populated by very low-income renters (many on fixed
incomes), as well as by drug dealers, liquor
sellers, and squatters, the area was dense with
dilapidated houses and overgrown yards. Between
1984 and 1989, there were increasing vacancies on
Kenney and Gibbs Streets and more deterioration of
the housing.

Until the early 1980's, Fairview Homes (a public
housing development adjacent to the neighborhood)
was reputed to be the center of heroin distribution
for the southeast United States. Because dealers
continuously moved back and forth between Fairview
Homes and Kenney/Gibbs/Wayt (depending on where the
police and the clients were), the CHA built an
8-foot concrete wall between the two areas during a
modernization project in 1983 and 1984. The wall
cut the traffic between the public housing site and
the neighborhood, which enabled the problem to be
divided and tackled in two separate pieces. At
Fairview Homes, a community crime prevention
program started by the CHA showed strong positive
results.[10] According to some observers, the wall
made it possible to reduce and keep crime levels
down at Fairview Homes. To some extent, the wall
also made it possible for the private sector to
take on the problems of Kenney/Gibbs/Wayt some
years later.[11]

An analysis conducted by the community policing
officers and the observations of a local pastor and
others showed the following patterns of crime and
disorder relative to the neighborhood's physical
layout and features:

o In 1984, Fairview Homes and Kenney/Gibbs/Wayt
were the most active violent crime areas in the
city and the worst street drug markets. Cocaine was
sold on Kenney Street, heroin on Gibbs Street and
Oaklawn Avenue, and marijuana and liquor at the far
ends of the streets. Crack cocaine arrived in the
mid-1980's and surged in late 1985-1987; Kenney
Street switched to a crack cocaine market. Dealers
routinely flagged down any cars that came through
and offered drugs for sale.

o The neighborhood's western boundary,
Interstate 77, played an important role in the drug
traffic. Clientele came from other parts of North
Carolina and from South Carolina to buy drugs.

o The neighborhood was a scene of loitering,
disorder, fights, stabbings, and shootings. The
headquarters of the Mustang gang, which trafficked
in guns and drugs, was located on Gibbs Street.
Murders were attributed to the presence of the
Mustang gang and to the other drug activity.

o In addition to the open-air drug market, the
area had many drug houses (shooting galleries) and
liquor houses (unlicensed sellers of liquor by the
drink). Both residents and outsiders frequented
these establishments.

This analysis suggested that both street activity
and illegal use of residential properties needed to
be addressed. Because of considerable involvement
in illegal activity by area residents, the housing
partnership was careful about renewing leases for
existing tenants in houses bought by the CMHP.

Castle Square Apartments in Boston, Massachusetts,
is a 500-unit housing development containing a mix
of housing types. The complex also contains
commercial space along Tremont Street and a
supermarket and parking garage along Herald Street
(the site's northern edge). There is automobile
access to the parking lots within the development
from two streets. CSA's immediate surroundings are
largely commercial and institutional. The highway
on one side, a telephone company facility on
Shawmut Avenue, and the Area D police station
across Tremont Street separate CSA somewhat from
the rest of the South End neighborhood, which "came
back" from considerable decay to renovation and
gentrification in the 1970's and 1980's.[12]

CSA was originally developed in 1965 under a U.S.
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)
program that made the rents affordable by providing
a mortgage at below-market interest rates. When the
original developer decided to sell it in 1987, CSA
was being badly neglected, yet it was an attractive
property because its mortgage could be prepaid and
the use restrictions (requiring low-income
occupancy) would soon expire. A good location
(close to downtown) and gentrification in the South
End made the complex attractive for investment,
either as market-rate rental housing or for
conversion to condominiums.

When residents began to organize the Castle Square
Tenants Organization (CSTO) in 1987, in response to
the rumored sale, physical conditions were poor and
signs of disorder widespread. By the time the
property actually changed hands in early 1992,
conditions had worsened. Specifically:

o There were frequent muggings within the site
(with prowlers hiding behind trash cans in the
front yards or under the open stairs or up the
stairs). There were first-floor window break-ins,
and fourth floor break-ins via the rooftops. The
hallways were the locale for drug buys and drug
use, mainly by nonresidents.

o Major prostitution activity along the parking
garage side of the site frequently spilled over
into the backyards of the duplexes. A bank of pay
phones was heavily used for the drug trade (before
the advent of cellular phones).
 
o Drug traffic and loitering characterized the
site day and night. The parking lots could be used
by anyone. Condoms, broken bottles, and used
needles littered the grounds.

o The park on the corner of East Berkeley and
Tremont Streets, known as "Indian Park" because it
was used by many Micmac Indians from the South End
area, was the site of daily brawls, noisy
arguments, and stabbings.

This analysis suggested to the new owners-a
partnership between Winn Development Company and
CSTO-that intervention was required on many fronts
to address the problems of crime and disorder at
CSA, because the problems within the housing site
were compounded by problems beyond its boundaries
involving other organizations and populations.

For the village of Oak Park, Illinois, problems of
crime and disorder were anticipated as spillover
from Chicago, which it borders. The denser, eastern
part of Oak Park-an area with much affordable
housing-abuts rough Chicago neighborhoods: Austin
to the east and Galewood to the north. The older
small apartment complexes in eastern Oak Park are
similar to the housing just across the boundaries.

In the late 1960's, Chicago's Austin neighborhood
saw classic blockbusting. "Previously, racial lines
in Chicago's neighborhoods had been firmly drawn.
Until the late 1960's, Austin had been 100 percent
white," according to one observer. As Austin
underwent rapid property turnover and racial
change, its character changed, with disorder and
decay resulting from the blockbusting and other
unscrupulous real estate dealings that took
advantage both of whites' fear and of blacks'
pent-up demand for decent housing.

The analysis of Oak Park's situation carried out by
the village at the time found the following:
     
o Poor management of properties seemed to be
spreading to Oak Park. Along Austin, Harrison, and
other streets with multi-family buildings, there
were large numbers of vacant apartments and
considerable deterioration.

o Burglary was by far the greatest crime threat,
and burglary prevention and/or reduction was the
obvious goal. Sometimes there was a little
spillover of gang activity and graffiti.

o Funneling east/west traffic on the village's
eastern border (and north/south traffic on the 
village's northeastern boundary) into several 
major corridors might enable police to better 
control access to Oak Park from adjacent Chicago 
neighborhoods.

This analysis suggested that intervention was
required to address not only the security problems
but also the actual or potential decline of the
rental properties in the eastern part of the
village. Further, it appeared that changes in
traffic patterns could enhance the effectiveness 
of other changes.

Identifying Managers and Potential Managers of an
Area

Once the patterns of crime and disorder and their
relationship to the physical features of the place
have been analyzed, it is time to consider who
currently manages the area. In its broadest sense,
management means the responsibility for maintaining
order in one or more aspects of a place.[13] Who are
all the parties that currently take some
responsibility for the neighborhood or housing
complex? Are there aspects of the place for which
no one is currently responsible? What other parties
could or should take some responsibility, and for
what aspects?

Why Is Management Important?

Management is a critical factor in improving
security and preventing crime, both of which are
essential to bringing about and sustaining positive
changes in a neighborhood or housing complex.
Perhaps the most important lesson learned from the
sites examined for this study is that changes in
management must accompany and reinforce the
physical design changes in order for there to be
greater security over the long term.

What makes management so important? First, its
absence results in physical deterioration and
disorder, which in turn creates conditions that
attract criminal activity to an area. This is the
familiar "broken windows" syndrome in which
visible, physical signs of neglect (such as
abandoned vehicles left on the street or graffiti
left on walls) suggest that disorderly or criminal
behavior will not be curbed.

Second, if no person or organization exercises
"ownership" of a space, then there is no
enforcement of community norms. Whether outside or
inside buildings, anonymous public spaces encourage
the users to withdraw into themselves and treat all
others as strangers. Eyes are averted, thoughts
elsewhere; people mind their own business and do
not observe, much less challenge, the behavior of
others. These conditions do not encourage active
crime prevention.

Third, and more positively, management can
implement changes for security, sustain the
improvements, reconstruct social accountability,
and lead to further positive change. Indeed, some
might argue that there are effective strategies
that can be used by management, exclusive of
physical changes, to reduce crime and fear. But
physical changes without management's persistence
in reinforcement are unlikely to succeed. For
example, the Macon Housing Authority management's
persistence in repeatedly replacing broken bulbs
(at considerable cost) convinced drug dealers they
were not going to win and it was time to move on.

Who Are the Managers?

Broadly understood, management encompasses:

o Both formal and informal exercise of
responsibility;

o Both conventional and alternative management
entities, and

o Both public and private entities.

Formal management is exercised by persons or
organizations officially charged with
responsibility for an area. In the public sector,
the official management of cities and towns and
their neighborhoods lies with local government.
Thus, the conventional managers are the line
departments that carry out executive functions,
such as public safety, streets and sanitation, city
planning, health, social services, and the like. In
this sense, local police departments are the
primary managers of security for their
jurisdictions.

Although they are usually independent local
authorities rather than line units of city
government,[14] public housing agencies (PHAs) are
another example of public sector managers. In this
case, they are the owners of property and have
responsibility for operation of the housing and
other facilities they own. Most PHAs directly
manage their housing developments, although a
number have experimented with private or resident
management (as discussed later in this chapter).

In the private sector, formal management of
neighborhoods and housing complexes is largely the
responsibility of property owners and their
designees. Ranging from the homeowner who keeps the
grass and shrubs trimmed, to the landlord who makes
regular repairs, to the large management company
with maintenance and grounds crews for a whole
development, private management is the locus of
responsibility for at least the physical condition
of buildings and any surrounding open areas.
Further, for rental property, it is private owners
and managers who decide who shall live there,
exercising more or less care in tenant screening
and selection.

Most neighborhoods and many housing complexes
contain nonresidential land uses, such as
commercial or office space, institutional
facilities (e.g., schools or churches), and
recreational facilities (e.g., parks or
playgrounds), or industrial property. These land
uses bring other private managers into the picture,
such as business owners, shop managers,
corporations, and religious or educational
organizations.

Aside from these formal managers, a variety of
alternative or innovative management entities are 
increasingly found in urban and suburban neighborhoods. 
Examples include local business and property owners'
associations, neighborhood or residents'
organizations, community coalitions, housing
partnerships, community development corporations,
and resident management corporations.[15] These
generally have their origins in private, voluntary
organizations-groups of owners or residents coming
together for a shared purpose. They may become
formally organized and incorporated nonprofit
organizations. Some coalitions and partnerships
have public entities (such as city agencies) as
members or components.[16] Exhibit 4 shows examples
of organizations that played important management
roles in the security and crime prevention programs
studied for this report.

Analyzing Current Management

Keeping in mind this broadened concept and these
varied examples of management, analysis of current
management in a neighborhood or housing complex
should be fairly straightforward. What individuals,
agencies, or organizations own or manage
residential property in the area?[17] What
corporations or institutions own or manage
commercial or industrial facilities, and
institutional or recreational features? What
agencies of local government are responsible for
the maintenance of security, sanitation, and public
infrastructure (streets, sidewalks, lighting)?

Are there associations of residents, local
businesses, or property owners that have a vested
interest in the area? Even if they are already
involved as key players, these groups can now be
considered in terms of the role they currently
play-or could play in the future-in managing the
neighborhood or housing complex. The absence of
alternative or innovative entities may suggest the
need for organizing particular groups (such as
residents or local businesses) or for establishing
a coalition or partnership involving public and
private entities with a stake in the security and
future of the area.

Local properties and facilities should also be
examined to identify which management entities have
security responsibilities. It may be helpful to
create a list of major local features and
separately identify general management and security
management. This might show, for example, that an
office complex with well-staffed maintenance and a
private, interior security force depends entirely
on the police department for exterior security. Or,
it might reveal that a group of businesses have
joined together to hire private guards to patrol
their commercial block during certain times of the
day or days of the week, supplementing police
coverage.

Analyzing current management may also identify the
jobs that are not being done (for example,which
owners or agencies are not meeting maintenance
needs, or which areas are not being secured either
by the police or by owners). The results of this
analysis may well coincide with problem areas or
"hot spots" identified in the examination of key
physical features and how they relate to problems
of crime and disorder (see previous section). If
not, it is particularly important to go back and
make sure that the known problem areas are examined
in terms of current and future potential management
responsibility.

Analyzing Current Use Patterns of an Area

The final aspect of the local picture to be
analyzed involves current use: who lives in the
neighborhood or housing complex, who uses it daily
for work, and who else is drawn there for other
purposes. Answering these questions can provide
additional insight on crime or disorder problems
and also suggest certain strategies for improving
security and preventing crime.

Who Lives Here?

Understanding who lives in the community is an
essential part of defining the problem, because
place-specific crime prevention solutions designed
without an understanding of the needs and habits of
the population are doomed to failure. It is also
vital to ascertain-to the greatest extent
possible-how much the current residents may be
involved in the area's drug or crime activity. This
is another question that may be best answered
through informal observation by others living or
working in the area. When the cleanup of the
Genesis Park neighborhood of Charlotte got under
way, CMHP maintained low rents for the acceptable
tenants (who paid their rent, maintained their
homes, and did not engage in any criminal or
nuisance activities) in properties purchased by the
partnership. However, problem tenants were evicted,
and residents engaged in illegal activity were
arrested.[19]
 
However, it may take changes in management (as in
the Charlotte example) before problems with current
residents can be addressed. That is one reason why
(with appropriate constitutional limits on the
power of the police to question people on the
street) tactics like fencing, gating, and other
forms of access control seem so appealing. The
ability of a private or public housing development
to limit access, except for (1) those who live
there, (2) those with legitimate business there,
and (3) guests of actual residents, can mean the
difference between control of the site and a
community run by outsiders engaged in illicit drug
selling or other criminal activity.

Who Works Here?

The working population of an area can have a
significant influence on its safety, and local
employers can play an important management role.
Legitimate businesses potentially increase foot
traffic and other uses of public space. Employers
may be asked-either by employees or by key players
in the neighborhood-to get involved in crime
prevention and security efforts. Local companies
can also be a source of volunteers for community
improvement.

However, the working population of a site often
takes on a different character after normal
business hours. As if one shift were ending and
another beginning, illegitimate operations often
start up after normal business hours. Drug dealers
tend to arrive and set up shop during the mid- to
late-afternoon. Drug dealers and gang members must
be counted among the people who work in a
neighborhood, and analyzing area use by dealers and
gangs is critical for purposes of improving
security.

Seemingly legitimate activities may serve as covers
for drug dealing and other illegal behavior. At one
public housing development in Woonsocket, Rhode
Island, drug dealers disguised their work by
pretending to do automobile repairs. A raised car
hood signaled to buyers that the dealers were open
for business, while an opened trunk sent the
message that police were watching and buyers should
come back later. Similarly, in Charlotte, North
Carolina, one drug dealer in public housing stashed
his for-sale drugs in the clothes of the baby that
he pushed around in a carriage during his work
day.[20]

Sometimes, local businesses are part of the problem
affecting the neighborhood. One of the hardest
areas to patrol around Lockwood Gardens in Oakland
is 14th Street near 65th Avenue. The cluster of
liquor stores, check-cashing outlets, and car wash
attracts many nonresidents who loiter and drink
there. The car wash is thought to be a money-
laundering front for profits from weapons and
drugs (which are sold out of a shack at the rear of
the property). On one occasion, an OHA security
officer confiscated five weapons from the car wash,
but the court case against the owner was lost when
the witness disappeared.

Drug Dealers and Organizations. Drug markets have
characteristics in common with other forms of local
business, but their advertising is often perceived
by residents as a sign of disorder in the
neighborhood. Common forms of advertising for 
dealers include cars being repaired on the street 
(as noted previously, with hoods and trunks up or down 
to designate the product or to indicate whether the 
coast is clear) and graffiti to mark the turf of 
different sales organizations. In Bridgeport, 
Connecticut:

     . . . Stylized graffiti "tags" written on fire
hydrants, sidewalks, or the wall of a building at
the selling location indicate the product sold.
Drug shoppers can identify a specific dealing spot
by the graffiti . . . . STP stands for Silver Top
Posse and BTP for Black Top Posse, the "products"
[crack vials] sold by local crews.[21]
 
The East Bridgeport community is economically
depressed with little legitimate employment. When
conditions were at their worst there, the illicit
drug trade appeared to employ large numbers of
local youths. In the afternoons and evenings, boys
and young men could be seen working the corners,
steering customers' cars to sales locations,
selling, or working as lookouts and spotting police
patrols.

Gangs. Gangs are highly structured organizations
that work in specific areas, some with a
headquarters location and a regular workforce. Gang
activity can be highly disruptive to the life of a
neighborhood. Today, community concerns about gangs
involve their connection to drug activity and
rising gun violence. Parents across the United
States express concern about the spread of violent
big-city gangs-even in small cities that are not
generally plagued by drugs and violence. 

At Iris Court, a public housing development in
Portland, Oregon, the proximity of a high school
appears to have contributed to the level of gang
activity. While some gang members live in the
development, others are attracted by the school and
by the fact that Iris Court sees a great deal of
foot traffic by all sorts of youth. In addition, on
most nights there is a lively presence of
nonresidents who come to the apartments to party
and to deal, buy, and use drugs.

Though a city without a notable gang problem in
1989, by 1994 Macon, Georgia, had a number of
offshoots of West Coast gangs including the Insane
Crips from Los Angeles and Folks from Chicago.
Relatively innocuous "wanna be" gangs were then
taken over by out-of-town recruiters and became
much more involved with drug selling and money.
Drug activity and violence increased, and organized
crime from Miami-the Jamaican Posse and the Florida
Boys- established itself in Macon.

Considerable evidence confirms that gangs are
spreading, recruiting members in new cities and
neighborhoods around the United States.
Acknowledging gangs to be organized, structured,
and often rather disciplined organizations will
help in understanding their ability to adapt to
changing conditions. Unlike freelance drug dealers,
for example, gangs may be able to sit out a police
crackdown, only to return in force once the law
enforcement initiative has waned. This limits the
effectiveness of intensified drug enforcement and
underscores the importance of place-specific 
crime prevention combining environmental and 
management changes.

Who Else Uses the Area?

People come to a community for a variety of
reasons. Developing an appreciation of the
legitimate reasons to use the area-and
distinguishing them from illicit aims-is an
essential part of the process of defining the crime
problem. A new supermarket at Castle Square joins
the businesses on the Tremont Street side of the
apartment complex in attracting neighborhood
residents. These businesses and their patrons have
benefited from the improved security at the site.
By contrast, the bank of telephones outside the old
supermarket was frequently used by suspected
prostitutes; removing the phones helped remove this
activity from the site.

Accurately identifying both legitimate and illicit
uses of an area will help ensure that a program of
place-specific crime prevention strategies does not
unduly burden legitimate users and businesses.
Respecting the needs of these entities will pay off
when it comes time to seek their cooperation in
implementing proposed changes. Respecting the needs
of businesses is an important step toward gaining
their involvement in defining the local problem and
developing the place-specific solution.

------------------------------

Accurately identifying both legitimate and illicit
uses of an area will help ensure that a program of
place-specific crime prevention strategies does not
unduly burden legitimate users and businesses.
Respecting the needs of these individuals will pay
off when it comes time to seek their cooperation in
implementing proposed changes. Respecting the needs
of businesses is an important step toward gaining
their involvement in defining the local problem and
developing the place-specific solution.

------------------------------

Endnotes

1. Thomas Rebollar, who has since past away,
conceived the project.

2. Evaluation of the Five Oaks Neighborhood
Stabilization Plan (Dayton, OH: Office of
Management and Budget, City of Dayton, January
1994): 3.

3. J.D. Feins, Partnerships for Neighborhood
Crime Prevention (Washington, DC: U.S. Department
of Justice, National Institute of Justice, June
1983): 25.

4. W.G. Skogan and M.G. Maxfield, Coping
with Crime: Individual and Neighborhood Reactions
(Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1981): 233.

5. See J.Q. Wilson and G.L. Kelling, "Broken
Windows: The Police and Neighborhood Safety," The
Atlantic Monthly (March 1982).

6. F. Taxman and J.T. McEwen, Interagency
Workgroups: Geographical Tools to Develop Crime
Control Strategies, DRAFT prepared for NIJ, August
30, 1994; F. Taxman and J.T. McEwen, The Drug
Market Analysis Project: Defining Markets and
Effective Law Enforcement Practices, DRAFT prepared
for NIJ, September 13, 1994; F. Taxman and J.T.
McEwen, "Applications of Computerized Mapping to
Police Operations," prepared for Crime Prevention
Series: Crime, Place and Police, ed. J. Eck and D.
Weisburd (Nov. 8, 1994): 4. See also T.F. Rich,
"Research in Action: The Use of Computerized
Mapping in Crime Control and Prevention Programs,"
(Washington, DC; U.S. Department of Justice,
National Institute of Justice, July 1995).

7. F. Taxman and J.T. McEwen, "Applications
of Computerized Mapping to Police Operations,"
prepared for Crime Prevention Series: Crime, Place
and Police, ed. J. Eck and D. Weisburd, (Nov. 8,
1994): 3.

8. Such maps are widely available, either
through the city or county tax assessor's office or
through private companies serving the real estate
industry.

9. For background on Oakland's drug situation and 
earlier efforts to control it, see C.D. Uchida, B. 
Forst, and S.O. Annan, "Controlling Street-level 
Drug Trafficking: Evidence from Oakland and 
Birmingham," Research in Brief, (Washington, D.C.: 
U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of 
Justice, June 1992); also C.D. Uchida, B. Forst, 
and S.O. Annan, "Modern Policing and the Control 
of Illegal Drugs: Testing New Strategies in Two 
American Cities," Research Report (Washington, 
D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute 
of Justice, Police Foundation, May 1992)
 
10. J. G. Hayes, The Impact of Citizen Involvement
in Preventing Crime in Public Housing: A Report of
the Fairview Homes Crime Prevention Program
(Charlotte, NC: City of Charlotte, 1982).

11. However, according to CMHP, the wall-or
perhaps the proximity of public housing on the
other side of the wall-is now contributing to
difficulties in marketing the rehabilitated homes
on the adjacent street.

12. More generally, the gentrification of the
South End has involved substantial displacement of
poor people of color, with middle-class gay men the
principal group of new occupants. Political
controversy has, of course, accompanied these
changes.

13. In the language of routine activity theory,
managers are capable guardians able to prevent
disorder and violence. L.E. Cohen and M. Felson,
"Social Change and Crime Rate Trends: A Routine
Activity Approach," American Sociological Review 44
(1979): 588-608.

14. Public housing authorities (PHA's) are largely
creatures of state law, with the same type of legal
status as public transit or turnpike authorities,
convention and tourism authorities, and the like.
While most PHA's across the United States have
jurisdictions coterminous with local government,
some members of the Boards of Commissioners for
PHA's are often appointed by nonlocal officials, 
particularly by state governors. There may also 
be local mayoral appointees and/or locally
elected members.

In some places, PHA's have been remade into 
line agencies of local government, often to
make them more responsive to local needs. These
experiments have not shown any clear advantage;
there are highly successful examples (such as
Madison, WI) where there is mutual support between
the housing agency and other branches of local
government, and there are obviously unsuccessful
examples (such as Washington, DC) where the housing
agency became responsive to mayoral patronage
rather than the needs of residents.

15. On the effects of resident management in
public housing, see ICF, Incorporated, Evaluation
of Resident Management in Public Housing
(Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Housing and
Urban Development, December 1992).

16. The growth of these alternative management
entities around the United States is attributable
to several factors: the theme of citizens'
participation fostered by Federal social programs
of the 1960's and 1970's (such as Model Cities and
the Community Action Program); a resurgence of
grass-roots organizing, with labor movement origins
but focusing now on poor and minority residents of
declining urban areas; the fiscal crisis of many
cities, which has brought a greater focus on
mobilizing private resources; and the tax
limitation movement in various States, which has
put fiscal constraints on local government in
smaller cities and suburbs, so that mobilizing
private resources becomes a means of sustaining
facilities and programs in these areas as well.

17. It can sometimes be difficult to identify the
actual owners of property if blind trusts or other
legal vehicles are used to mask ownership. In this
situation, there are published guides to title
searching as well as local organizations that can
help you gain maximum information. Legal advice can
also be sought, through public agencies or a
private attorney.

18. As CMHP acquired properties in the
neighborhood, it arguably became an official
manager. However, the role it has taken has gone
far beyond management of its properties.

19. Now the area is occupied by low- to moderate-
income working families and a few renters.

20. See S.L. Sorensen and E. Walsh, Crime
Prevention Through Environmental Design and
Situational Crime Prevention in Public Housing:
Workshop Curriculum, HUD Crime Prevention and
Security Division, Technical Assistance Workshop(s)
(Bethesda, MD: SPARTA Consulting Corporation, March
1995): 8.

21. J. Epstein and S. Sifre, "Bridgeport: Cutting
Off Access by the Suburban User" (Cambridge, MA:
Abt Associates Inc., February 1994): 7.

------------------------------

Problem-Solving With SARA
The SARA (Scanning, Analysis, Response, Assessment)
problem-solving model can facilitate the process of
creating, evaluating, and modifying interventions.
The steps in SARA are scanning (initial gathering
of data), analysis (examining the data gained from
scanning to understand the problem[s] to be
addressed), response (implementing and
intervention), and assessment (analyzing data
gathered through and after the intervention to
measure its success). These steps do not need to be
mutually exclusive, or clearly linear in time, but
rather indicate the importance of ongoing research
and evaluation of problems and solutions.

------------------------------

Beyond Crime and Disorder: Other Contributors to 
Community Problems

As progress is made in "defining the problem,"
aspects of a local area other than crime or signs
of disorder per se may be identified as
contributing to the problem. Nonsecurity issues
cited by respondents as important to the formation
of their security programs include the following:

o The deterioration in rental property
conditions in Oak Park and in Charlotte's
Kenney/Gibbs/Wayt neighborhood.

o For Castle Square Apartments, the loss of
businesses-and especially of the A&P
supermarket-that had occupied commercial space
along the front of the complex.

o For Lockwood Gardens in Oakland, Mar Vista
Gardens in Los Angeles, and other public housing
developments, the level of hopelessness and apathy
among the residents, their isolation from each
other, and their sense that the neighborhood did
not belong to them. Also the pattern of residents
letting outsiders live with them or even subleasing
their units to drug dealers.

o The proximity of "nuisance" businesses, such
as liquor stores and check-cashing operations, with
spillover of traffic and disorder into residential
areas (Clinton Hill in Brooklyn, New York; Lockwood
Gardens) and the related effects of commercial and
industrial zoning on nearby residential
neighborhoods (Bridgeport, Connecticut).

o Lack of recreational programs and facilities
for youth, as well as limited educational and 
job opportunities, leading to self-destructive
behavior such as gang and drug involvement, teen
pregnancy, and exposure to HIV (Castle Square;
Lockwood Gardens; Mar Vista; Macon, Georgia;
Bridgeport).

o The physical appearance of conventional public
housing in many places-its starkness, uniformity,
relatively high density, and lack of amenities or
embellishment (Pitts Plaza in San Francisco; Diggs
Town in Norfolk, Virginia; Fairview Homes in
Charlotte, North Carolina).

o The proximity of major interstate highways,
bringing drug traffic, gang organizing, and other
problems from bigger cities or even from other
states (Bridgeport, Charlotte, Oakland).

Because they can significantly affect the success
of interventions to reduce crime and disorder, it
is important to identify issues and conditions that
may limit options, or suggest certain strategies,
or that may need to be addressed through other
means at the same time that security interventions
are undertaken.

------------------------------

Who Lives Here?

The sites used as examples in this report have an
extraordinary range of population mixes.

Castle Square Apartments, in Boston's South End, is
home to 1,500 people of diverse racial and ethnic
backgrounds. Roughly half the residents are Chinese
or from other countries in Asia, while 20 percent
are African-American, 15 percent are white, and 5
percent are Hispanic. Most tenants have low
incomes. The site is also home to several hundred
elderly residents.

El Cortez Heights is a desirable neighborhood
centrally located on the north side of Tucson,
Arizona. Consisting primarily of single-family
homes, El Cortez Heights has one apartment building
that was not supposed to be built there but somehow
"slipped in." "It's just a real nice neighborhood,"
according to a long-term resident. Predominantly
populated by the elderly back in 1971, now there
are also younger professional people, mostly
without children. The area is ethnically mixed;
while predominantly African-American 20 years ago,
it is now home to people from a variety of
backgrounds.

Oak Park, Illinois, is a middle-class Chicago
suburb with a population that is 75 percent white,
18 percent African-American, and 7 percent other
races. In the eastern third of the village, there
are more low-income individuals. But even there,
Oak Park is a long way from a site such as
Oakland's Lockwood Gardens, where the entire
population is extremely poor.
 
Lockwood Gardens' population is 82 percent 
African-American, 16 percent Asian, and 2 percent
white. Almost half the development's residents are
below the age of 18. Some 80 percent of the
occupied units have female heads of household.

-----------------------------
     
Chapter 3

Planning for Change: Program Design

This chapter discusses some important
considerations in planning a place-specific
security and crime prevention program. It opens
with an inventory of the numerous crime prevention
through environmental design (CPTED) strategies and
tactics that have been used to improve the security
of the physical environment. With examples from the
study sites, it then addresses how to identify and
mobilize program resources. The common problem of
not knowing where to start when tackling a complex
problem is also addressed, with examples and advice
from the sites.

A Primer of CPTED Strategies and Tactics

Once a community has defined and analyzed its crime
problem, it is time to begin planning for change.
Selecting the strategies and tactics to be
implemented at a site involves the same careful
analysis needed to understand the crime problem.
While bricks and mortar and razor ribbon may be an
effective means of keeping a problem out, a
fortress appearance sends a negative message.
Creating an environment that is both attractive and
functional is important, because people live there
and because improving the image of an area
contributes to crime prevention.

This section draws heavily from a curriculum on
place-specific crime prevention techniques created
for the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development's (HUD's) Crime Prevention and Security
Division, which, in 1995, was presented in a series
of technical assistance workshops on CPTED and
situational prevention in public housing.[1]
Strategies applicable to a wide range of
neighborhoods and housing complexes are described
and illustrated with site examples; exhibit 5
summarizes the major categories of strategies.

Target hardening includes improvements that make
unauthorized access more difficult. Installing
strong doors, locks, and window screens, reinforced
glass, and alarms can significantly reduce the
chance that criminals will gain access to the
structure. In Macon, Georgia, the housing authority
has improved the building exteriors in most of its
developments by installing foam-core steel doors,
dead-bolt locks, and marine glazing windows (which
make climbing through broken windows very
dangerous).

Access control can be achieved by keeping doors and
gates locked and interior common spaces fenced off
from public access. Establishing visitor check-in
booths and guard houses, reducing the number of
entrances and exits, and issuing pass cards can
help management maintain control of a site.
Emergency stairwells can be restored to their
intended purpose by equipping them with
alarm-connected panic bars and removing exterior
door handles. Roof-top access doors at Castle
Square Apartments were converted into
emergency-exit-only doors, to reduce burglar access
to upper-floor apartments.

Checking resident identification can be a
particularly effective means of controlling crime
in both public housing developments and private
apartment complexes. Buzzer and intercom systems,
security check-in booths, resident identification,
and metal detectors can be used to ensure that only
residents and legitimate visitors are entering a
building.[2] In Macon, Georgia, housing authority
employees and elderly residents are issued a credit
card-like key that activates entrances through
motion rather than insertion (which can be
difficult for elderly or disabled residents). A
scanner reads the card from the carrier's pocket or
purse when she or he approaches the door; if the
carrier's code is recognized as valid, the door
opens. Limiting the number of apartments sharing a
corridor or entrance and creating key access to
laundry rooms (and even elevators) are other means
of access control. Even simple changes like
assigning parking spaces and requiring parking
permits can make a big difference in controlling
use of the environment.

Deflecting offenders involves broadcasting a
message that sale or use of drugs and other illicit
activity will not be tolerated in the area. By
changing the traffic patterns, closing streets, and
making problem areas into "No Parking" or "No
Standing" zones, offenders can be moved along, if
not removed altogether. Even the positioning of a
litter container or the relocation of a bus stop
can help achieve the desired effect. In Oak Park,
Illinois, signs in residential areas on the
village's perimeter warn drivers that the rear
alleys are not for through traffic. Drivers caught
using these routes are ticketed, reinforcing the
message that these are not through streets to be
used for covert access or to avoid traffic along
busy North Avenue.

Closing crack houses and repairing "broken windows"
means recognizing the signs of physical disorder or
of a deteriorating situation before they get out of
control. Criminals can be deprived of the loci of
their trade, whether it be a drug house where users
can consume the product or other drug market
enablers. Garbage-strewn lots offer dealers a place
to hide their drugs; if lots are cleaned up, other
stashes must be found. Removing old couches and
mattresses from a park next to Castle Square
Apartments in Boston and shutting down a crack
house in Clinton Hill in Brooklyn helped residents
regain control of their neighborhoods.

Cameras and other formal surveillance are means for
direct observation of the site to ensure that no
illicit activity goes unnoticed. Closed-circuit
television, portable camera systems, and police
call boxes are potentially useful aids to formal
surveillance. The closed-circuit TV cameras and
monitor installed at Grant Manor in Boston are the
center of a surveillance system for three housing
complexes in close proximity.[3]One security company
is monitoring all three sites (via remote cameras),
requiring fewer personnel than would have been
needed without the cameras and thus making more
efficient use of security funds.

------------------------------

The closed-circuit TV cameras and monitor installed
at Grant Manor in Boston are the center of a
surveillance system for three housing complexes in
close proximity. One security company is monitoring
all three sites (via remote cameras), requiring
fewer personnel than would have been needed without
the cameras and thus making more efficient use of
security funds.

------------------------------

Trained resident patrols are an effective means of
mobilizing residents' vested interest in safety as
well as a means of formal surveillance. At the
Chicago Housing Authority, resident patrols have
been successfully mounted under extreme conditions
of disorder and violence in family high-rise
developments; among other effects, the patrols have
improved communication among the residents and
given participants a sense of control over their
environments.[4] Police substations or security
offices can be created on-site at a housing
development (as was done at Lockwood Gardens) or at
an automatic bank teller facility, as was the case
in Oak Park, Illinois.[5]

Surveillance by employees involves enlisting
individuals who work in the target area-such as
housing authority staff, bus drivers, or crossing
guards-to help identify problem locations and
individuals. This strategy asks those who are
already at a location to be an extra set of eyes
and ears for safety. Surveillance by employees,
paired with greater vigilance by residents, can
exponentially increase a community's capacity to
monitor itself.

Improving natural surveillance can take the form of
improved street and interior lighting, removal of
non-see-through fencing and barriers, and even
pruning of trees, shrubs, and hedges. Removing
alcoves and other interior blind spots, and
redesigning vulnerable exterior areas such as
unattended parking lots or covered walkways, can
also improve opportunities for natural surveillance
by residents and others (see photo, this page).
Relocating vulnerable areas such as playgrounds to
locations near sources of natural surveillance is
also effective.

With the goal of improving natural surveillance,
the Macon Housing Authority employees and
residents, together with power company employees,
regularly tour the developments at night to
identify where new lighting might be installed.
When the Castle Square Apartments in Boston were
rehabilitated, pedestrian tunnels from Tremont
Street and Shawmut Avenue into the site were
closed, and a covered walkway alongside the old
supermarket was opened up to light, air, and
surveillance.

Removing inducements to crime may take the form of
keeping a building's apartments rented (as vacant
units tend to be targets for vandalism and run the
risk of being turned into drug houses), or banning
overnight street parking (as has been done in Oak
Park).[6] In Cleveland, Ohio, the police have taken
things a step further by housing officers who
volunteer for the program (on a rotating basis) in
newly renovated houses that had previously been
abandoned.[7]

Signage and bans on use, sometimes known as
symbolic barriers, can be an effective means of
controlling the environment. Strategies such as
"Drug-Free Zones" and posted guest and visitor
policies or "No Trespassing" signs do, however,
rely on a level of enforcement adequate to maintain
their credibility. When such policies are not
enforced, offenders quickly learn to ignore them.
In Charlotte, there is formalized cooperation
between the police department and the Charlotte
Housing Authority (CHA). One or two officers per
district go through training with the CHA and
become "designated agents" of the housing authority
who enforce bans against individuals and generally
enforce loitering and trespassing regulations.

Selecting Approaches That Work for Your Community

The most effective place-specific crime prevention
strategies are those that take into account the
geographic, cultural, economic, and social
characteristics of the target community. Thus, the
selection of CPTED tactics and elements should be
made in close collaboration with the community,
after sustained observation of its current patterns
of use, and after the other steps in defining and
analyzing the problem have been accomplished (see
chapter 2).

Environmental design solutions should be respectful
of the habits and behavior of law-abiding area
residents. Restricting dealer access while
preserving the area (or providing alternative
outdoor spaces) is preferable to removing 
benches or removing trees and bushes if many
residents will miss the chance to sit outdoors. The
community park at Castle Square Apartments, a
neighbor of the Villa Victoria complex, was
designed by a local architect with considerable
input from Chinese-American and other residents.
The enclosed space has elements of an oriental
garden. Now people of all ages come to sit or play
in an area that was once a favorite hangout for
derelicts and drunks. It is an oasis that brings
residents of all ethnic backgrounds together (see
photo this page). Villa Victoria, a housing
development in Boston's South End that is home to a
large Puerto Rican population, was constructed
around a central square, as is often found in the
Spanish Caribbean. Small shops and play areas line
the plaza, and on warm days older men and women, as
well as young families, sit out in the square. Over
time, the design has generally proven effective at
giving residents a sense that they live in a
community. The goal, of course, is to make the
environment safe, but not at the expense of those
legitimately living or working in the community.

------------------------------

The community park at Castle Square Apartments, a
neighbor of the Villa Victoria complex, was
designed by a local architect with considerable
input from Chinese-American and other residents.
The enclosed space has elements of an oriental
garden. Now people of all ages come to sit or play
in an area that was once a favorite hangout for
derelicts and drunks. It is an oasis that brings
residents of all ethnic backgrounds together (see
photo this page).

------------------------------

Villa Victoria, a housing development in Boston's
South End that is home to a large Puerto Rican
population, was constructed around a central
square, as is often found in the Spanish Caribbean.
Small shops and play areas line the plaza, and on
warm days older men and women, as well as young
families, sit out in the square. Over time, the
design has generally proven effective at giving
residents a sense that they live in a community.

------------------------------

Maintaining a Menu of Approaches

The primer provided previously is not a
comprehensive list of every possible CPTED
intervention, but it is designed to offer an
overview of strategies and tactics communities may
wish to employ in implementing their own
place-specific crime prevention approaches. Because
some neighborhoods have considerably more difficult
or complex crime problems than others, these
communities may require more attention and
ingenuity in crafting effective strategies than the
less troubled ones. While the primer offers lessons
for the broadest possible range of community types,
the applicability of these lessons to a particular
site will vary considerably.

In acknowledgement of the fact that crime
prevention is not a "one size fits all" exercise,
the Citizen's Committee for New York City has
prepared a manual that lists "menus" of different
crime prevention strategies for use in different
situations. (Contact information for the Citizen's
Committee is provided in appendix D.)

Identifying Resources

Assistance with security and crime prevention can
come from a variety of sources, and a wide range of
them should be considered in the program planning
process. Communities require access to a variety of
skills in order to plan and implement
place-specific crime prevention strategies.
Professionals such as architects, planners, and
contractors may be needed to work with the
residents, managers, and police on physical design
changes. Experienced housing managers can make a
significant contribution to planning for management
changes. And, of course, local law enforcement
officials should play a role in planning security
features of the program.

In taking an inventory of resources, it makes sense
to be over-inclusive rather than narrowly focused.
Fiscal austerity and ever-increasing demands on law
enforcement budgets (as on city government more
generally) are two central reasons for widening the
net; these are the same reasons suggested in
chapter 2 for using a broadened concept of place
management that brings other players into the game.
Thus, in focusing attention on the roles of
management and resident organizations, this report
suggests a number of less obvious places to look
for assistance in making neighborhoods and housing
complexes safer places to live.

Types of Resources

In all communities, there are untapped groups,
individuals, and even sources of funding that
should not be overlooked in planning a
place-specific crime prevention program. The major
types of resources are training and technical
assistance, funding, in-kind contributions,
professional skills, and institutional involvement.
In scouting potential resources, those planning a
local program will want to consider these
questions:

o What is their relationship with local
community-based organizations, potential funding
sources, local media, police, and city government?

o How are relations between the target community
and the rest of the city generally?

o Are there issues on which residents have
worked with others in the past?

o Are there issues of concern to others in the
community with which they can assist? In other
words, can a quid pro quo be worked out?

o Are there pro bono or low-cost professional
services that can be relied on (such as advisors or
researchers from a local university)? If so, what
sorts of services should be obtained this way?

o Are any local businesses willing to contribute
materials and/or labor to assist with the physical
redesign or renovation (e.g., by donating dead-bolt
locks, building and construction labor, landscaping
materials and tools, or the like)?

In Oak Park, Illinois, the Austin Boulevard
Alliance (a local block association), the
public/voluntary Housing Programs Advisory
Committee (HPAC), and the Oak Park Building
Owners/Managers Association all contribute to the
village's effort to prevent and address problems
with burglary and related crime. All three groups
serve as important sounding boards against which
the village has been able to try out ideas like the
Security Improvement Grant program.

Castle Square Apartments in Boston's South End
presents an unusual example of a community in which
all of the sometimes competing forces came together
to create something greater than the sum of its
parts. A demonstration of the breadth of the
resources and expertise brought together in the
Castle Square negotiations is the fact that
professional support and advisors to the Castle
Square Tenants Organization (CSTO), and to the
project generally, included senior staff from the
state's Community Economic Development Assistance
Corporation, a Greater Boston Legal Services
attorney, the police department's Area D Deputy
Superintendent, Boston Redevelopment Authority
staff, and State and Federal housing agency
officials. Also involved in the Castle Square
project was the Massachusetts Housing Finance
Agency, which holds a $25 million purchase money
mortgage on the property. With Community
Development Block Grant money and a city tax break,
residents spearheaded economic growth in the
neighborhood by attracting a new, neighborhood-
oriented, independent supermarket to the site.

From the mid-1980's, the Macon Housing Authority
(MHA) recognized the need for a comprehensive crime
prevention program in its public housing
developments. The agency consulted at length with
the HUD regional administrator about resident
involvement, lease enforcement, tenant screening,
greater police involvement, youth development, drug
education, and at-risk youth intervention programs.
However, a $225,000 HUD demonstration project grant
was not enough to pay for the comprehensive
approach everyone wanted. The need for additional
funding and expertise prompted the housing
authority to build a broader community coalition
that included other city agencies and local social
service providers, thereby accessing expertise on
drug prevention and related services for residents.
According to the director of the MHA, "People have
to trust you in order for the program to work." But
it took trust coupled with office space (in which
to house social services and an on-site police
substation) to recruit agencies such as the Macon
Arts Alliance, the Family Counseling Center, and
the Central Georgia Center on Family Violence into
the program. In addition, Federal public housing
modernization funding enabled the MHA to create or
rehabilitate on-site community rooms for resident
use, which in turn made it much easier to get the
residents involved.

In Tucson, the El Cortez Heights community has
received assistance from university students in
horticulture classes and from junior high students
(who have joined in neighborhood and yard
cleanups); artists and individuals with experience
in construction have also volunteered their time.
"If you just ask, people are more than willing to
help out," notes a Tucson organizer. As for area
residents themselves, "They just have to want it
and work for it, and contact the right people in
their town to help them and give input. It's hard
work, and people can help. You have to meet and
organize and decide what problems you want to deal
with."

Exhibit 6 shows the various types of resources used
in selected study sites. A number of the larger
programs at other sites (including Lockwood
Gardens, Mar Vista Gardens, Commonwealth, and Pitts
Plaza) involved major redevelopment efforts under
HUD funding for public housing modernization. The
Comprehensive Grant Program is one source of
continuing support for large-scale physical
redesign and management improvements.

Priority or Key Resources

While Castle Square's good fortune may not be
typical of all communities' experiences with
obtaining professional and in-kind resources, local
program planners need to think creatively about
resources that may be available to them in their
own communities. According to most respondents,
four resources in particular are indispensable to 
a community's crime prevention efforts:

o Police. For the Director of Anti-Crime
Activities at the Citizens Committee for New York
City, police are a particularly important resource
because they can help organize the community (as
they often have money to do so) and can help
communities gain access to other government
agencies.

o Staff time from a nonprofit community-based
organization (CBO). The CBO can serve as a catalyst
in organizing the neighborhood, and the benefits of
enlisting a professional community organizer should
not be underestimated.
 
o Volunteer time. While paid staff may be doing
a great job, without the residents' involvement the
project is far less likely to succeed.
 
o Media. Media coverage to publicize victories
and hold politicians accountable is essential. The
media should be enlisted at the outset and can be
kept informed of local efforts through press
releases and guided tours of the target area.
Specifically, the Citizens Committee for New York
City (CCNYC) encourages communities to
". . . send press advisories. Talk to an editorial
board. Make this a broad issue that appeals to the
media. Stress the involvement of a core group of
organizers, including law enforcement and social
service experts."

Despite prior resident efforts, the Phoenix Project
in Bridgeport, Connecticut, would never have gotten
off the ground if it were not for the enthusiastic
support of the city's police chief and mayor. Both
leaders threw themselves behind the plan without
reservation. In particular, their statements to the
local and Statewide press about Bridgeport's
problem-and its solution-garnered much-needed
interest and support for the effort. Efforts to
recruit in-kind support from the state highway
department and a local contractor directly
benefited from the public proclamations and
behind-the-scenes encouragement that the mayor and
police chief gave to the project.

Elsewhere, priority or key resources that initially
may not have appeared all that special may, in
fact, have been the long-sought impetus behind a
program. In Los Angeles, anti-crime activities in
the city's public housing developments started with
a HUD Public Housing Drug Elimination Program
(PHDEP) grant, which was later supplemented by
housing authority operating budget support. Despite
this, however, participation from other agencies
was lacking. It was not until a community center
was constructed at the Mar Vista Gardens
development that service providers came knocking.
Residents and the Housing Authority of the City of
Los Angeles (HACLA) found that, once they had one
service provider on board, others wanted to be
involved. At Mar Vista Gardens, residents undertook
a major effort to recruit local providers.
Companies and institutions donated goods, services,
and information to events.

No matter how valuable the contributions of
professionals and institutions recruited to help a
program, they do not outweigh the contribution of
the residents themselves. The knowledge, time,
effort, dedication, and energy of residents
mobilized to improve their own housing complexes or
neighborhoods are the most valuable resources of
all for place-specific crime prevention efforts,
particularly over the long term. When the changes
stop seeming new and the police begin to focus on
another neighborhood, the residents are still there
and still care.

First Steps: Where to Begin

Once a community's crime problem has been defined
and analyzed, two different first steps are
commonly taken to begin a security program that
combines design, management, and use changes. Some
programs start with enhanced policing and/or other
security; others start with resident or community
organizing. In this section, the advantages of each
are examined, and some considerations are offered
for deciding where a specific local program should
begin and how it should proceed.

Enhanced Security

Among the study sites, both Lockwood Gardens
(Oakland) and Genesis Park (Charlotte) began with
enhanced security. In the Charlotte neighborhood,
the first step was a community policing effort that
began in 1991. It was a rather limited effort at
first, but it tackled an area with an entrenched
problem, an area that had made the transition from
the worst heroin to the worst crack cocaine market
in Charlotte. Previously, the police typically went
into Kenney/Gibbs/Wayt with 2- to 3-car backup (and
3 to 4 cars for a drug sweep). With community
policing, two Charlotte Police Department officers
went door-to-door in the neighborhood during the
daytime, meeting residents and gaining familiarity
with all the legal and illegal activity, the drug
market patterns, and the drug and shot houses. The
payoff for taking the initial step with community
policing includes the following:

o The officers developed a fine-grained and
location-specific familiarity with all the problems
of crime and disorder and identified a substantial
number of hot spots.

o Insights were gained about the relative roles
played by area residents (including squatters) and
nonresidents in the crime and disorder. The
officers could predict which illegal activities
would move out under pressure and which would need
to be rooted out through changes in property
ownership and management.

o Area residents became familiar with the two
community policing officers and learned to rely on
their presence. As trust developed, so did
information the police could use to arrest dealers,
seize guns and stolen goods, and trigger housing
code enforcement. Small improvements began to take
hold.

In this way, community policing set the stage for
the initial purchases of property by the
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Housing Partnership (CMHP).
The police put up traffic barriers to stop
drive-throughs and escapes when CMHP became the
principal property owner. Then, the Drug
Interdiction Unit began using CMHP houses for
stakeouts and strictly enforced antiloitering and
trespassing statutes. When these actions shifted
drug buyers to other markets, the sellers,
following their customers, began to move out.
Control had been reestablished, and public safety
became a possibility again in the neighborhood.

At Lockwood Gardens, the Oakland Housing Authority
(OHA) had tried harsh policing tactics to combat
crime and drugs, but the agency's security
operation had been tainted by civil liberties
violations and corruption in 1989 and 1990. As a
result, when OHA received its initial PHDEP grant
from HUD in 1990, no security component was
funded.8 Under this grant, some CPTED elements were
implemented (primarily improved lighting), as well
as extensive youth programming and an effort to
organize a residents' association. But, according
to the Oakland Police Department (OPD) lieutenant
who came (on loan) to head the OHA's security
program in 1991, "For an entrenched drug and crime
presence, you need more than physical or prevention
programming." Perhaps it was no surprise, then,
when an evaluation of the early PHDEP efforts at
Lockwood Gardens showed that there had been no
change in the blatant and serious drug and crime
activity, that intimidation and harassment of
residents by the dealers continued, and that the
high level of fear among residents remained.[9]

A new and different approach was clearly needed. As
the OPD lieutenant built a more professional
security operation with stricter recruitment and
training, he also worked within the OHA to
reanalyze the situation at Lockwood. The idea of
fencing the site-first suggested by a security
consultant-became part of a new PHDEP grant
application in 1991. However, even while the grant
was funded by HUD and the OHA began serious work
with residents and designers on physical changes,
the OHA security department chose a community
policing effort as a fresh start to enhance
security in the development. One officer was
assigned to Lockwood full-time and spent his shifts
walking, meeting people, and going door-to-door to
introduce himself to the residents.[10] This occurred
at the same time that, according to another
officer, the Oakland police generally needed two
cars to drive through the site: "You couldn't leave
a police car on the street and walk in [when
answering a call]; you drove up on the lawn to get
as close as possible to where you were going. OPD
wouldn't come through here without three cars! They
were shot at; bottles and rocks were thrown." As in
Charlotte, community policing in this drug-ridden
and dangerous site had several important payoffs,
including improved information, the beginning of
resident trust, and some reduction in resident fear
and pessimism. According to the OHA's district
manager for East Oakland, community policing was
needed to build bridges with the residents, to
enable the police to be seen as part of the
solution rather than part of the problem (a hard
sell after the security scandal): "Community
policing creates an atmosphere of communication and
respect; you don't treat residents as the problem
(as police did in the past) but emphasize the
partnership of police and residents. You build
trust."

With the completion of an attractive perimeter
fence around Lockwood in early 1994 came an
intensive coordinated security effort combining
sworn OHA officers with private security guards.
There was one officer on-site 24 hours a day,
supervising three to four guards. The kiosks at the
entrances to the sites were manned, and every car
coming through was stopped. This high-visibility
effort was sustained for 7 months, with substantial
visible impact on the level of street drug activity
and intimidation.[11] Changes in OHA management and
maintenance occurred at the same time, and resident
participation began to increase.

It obviously matters what form the initial enhanced
security takes. Lockwood Gardens and Genesis Park
started with community policing, which had
particular advantages much appreciated by both
residents and managers. By contrast, in Norfolk's
Diggs Town public housing development, the initial
security step took the form of focused patrol. Some
residents saw the police crackdown (without prior
communication from the police department) as
heavy-handed. The negative reaction to this
policing mode lasted for some time. Further, the
police crackdown did not rid the area of drugs for
long, since it was believed that "the police just
[drove] by as an exercise." Some dealers were soon
back standing on corners. Later improvements in
Diggs Town were attributed not to security activity
but to increasing cooperation among residents, the
housing authority, the school board, and social
service agencies.

Resident Organization

Several of the sites studied for this report chose
resident or community organizing as their first
step in place-specific crime prevention. Castle
Square Apartments (CSA) in Boston, Clinton Hill in
New York City, and El Cortez Heights in Tucson all
began with a grass-roots effort and incorporated
security, physical, and property management changes
later.

The former president of the CSTO moved into the
complex in 1980 and remembers how she saw it slide
downhill. An initial, unsuccessful effort to
organize the tenants was made in 1985, when
condominium conversion was widespread in Boston and
rumors of CSA being on the market first surfaced.
In 1987, when the threat of sale became real,
organizing was tried again, and this time a strong
response led to the formation of CSTO. With support
from many residents, and with encouragement and
technical assistance from a number of public and
private agencies, CSTO played from a very strong
hand as negotiations of the sale proceeded.

From the prospective buyer's point of view, in 1987
the Castle Square property was clearly being
neglected, and yet it was attractive for upgrading
as rental property or conversion to condos. The
buyer negotiated a 3-year option to purchase.
During a period of extended negotiations with HUD,
the residents made their voices heard; for example,
they were able to obtain a substantial cash
settlement from the seller, on the grounds that
management neglect had made their living
circumstances unhealthy and dangerous. This led to
a meeting between CSTO and the buyer and ultimately
to development of a legal partnership between them.
The deal covered acquisition, rehabilitation, and
long-term management of the complex (using a
"seamless design/build/manage approach"), with both
partners fully involved in all aspects. At the end
of 15 years, CSTO will come into full ownership of
the development.

One element of the Castle Square story does
resemble that of sites starting their crime
prevention programs with enhanced security. Three
months before the sale of CSA to the partnership
became final, a drug dealer pulled a knife on the
leader of the residents' group, and the property
owner did not respond even to this example of
violence at the site. The incident convinced the
buyer to put a security force in place then and
there, even before legal ownership. A paid security
force and a paid Boston Police Department detail
were assigned to CSA for some months, while new
management took over and the property was
rehabilitated; the detail was gradually phased out
and the level of security was reduced once site
control was regained.

In the Clinton Hill area of Brooklyn, the crime
prevention program started in 1992, when there was
a string of murders in the neighborhood; the death
of a shopkeeper who was known and liked by many
residents was the final straw, according to one
resident activist. The residents formed the Clinton
Hill Block Association (CHBA). When contacts with
the police produced no cooperation or crime data,
CHBA moved forward on its own, with advice and
assistance from CCNYC. Sure that the murders were
related to heavy drug dealing in the neighborhood,
residents used their own experience and knowledge
of local conditions to determine the type of crime
they wanted to target: the problem of abandoned
buildings housing drug markets.

Involving the police and DA's office was a long and
difficult process, but finally the police did
identify 1000 Fulton Avenue as a particularly
active drug house. Members of the CHBA then brought
individual civil suits alleging nuisance against
the owner of that building. (The CHBA was afraid to
bring suit in its own name against the owner, out
of fear of potential retaliation). The organization
had to convince the DA's office to pursue the cases
and convince the police to give them information to
support the claim that this building was a menace.
Considerable time was then spent going to court to
follow the case through. The judge eventually ruled
that the building would have to be securely boarded
up (in the short term) and later remodeled to allow
police access and legal use. After this first
victory, police and resident relations improved, as
police began to trust residents more and residents
felt more empowered. Unfortunately, the landlord
did not make appropriate renovations, and in a
second round, the court ruled that the building had
to be permanently boarded up.

The first steps taken in Tucson's El Cortez Heights
neighborhood were similar to those in Clinton Hill:
organizing the residents. However, in this case,
the police played an important role in helping the
neighborhood get mobilized. The Tucson Police
Department (TPD) had operated Safe by Design (a
CPTED program) and Crime-Free Multihousing programs
with grant funds, and they were ready to assist El
Cortez Heights residents with crime data and with
organizing advice. According to one neighborhood
association member, residents started by meeting
with the police officers, obtained assistance from
them, and then formed a community action team that
went door-to-door in the area, asking people about
problems in the neighborhood. Organizing a
neighborhood watch, they obtained statistics from
the TPD on a variety of felonies and misdemeanors
(aggravated assault, burglaries, car theft,
malicious mischief, domestic violence, weapons,
prostitution, narcotics violations, juvenile
violations). While it appeared that most of the
crime was committed by people coming from outside
the neighborhood, there were also a few
undesirables living there. Residents then discussed
the results of the crime analysis and problem
survey at a larger community meeting in order to
clarify each problem, suggest solutions, and set
priorities. According to one resident,

[We] formed a neighborhood association recognized
by the city, with a political voice. The police
were initially aggressive in enforcement, and they
also did neighborhood watch and community-based
work. They [the residents' association] needed to
get people involved, and fortunately they did,
because they saw some good things happen fairly
soon, and that inspired them to keep with it.

Choosing Where to Begin

The experiences of these sites and the related
literature suggest that the choice of starting
point for a place-specific crime prevention program
should be made based on answers to the following
questions:

o Are residents of the housing complex or
neighborhood too frightened or too embattled by
crime and drugs to come out and participate in
anticrime efforts or community organizations?

o Is there no existing community organization
that could add security and crime prevention to its
issue agenda?

o Are the police unused to working directly with
citizens' groups or unresponsive to residents'
requests for information or assistance?

o Is the police department operating in a
reactive rather than proactive mode, primarily
responding to calls for service rather than moving
toward community policing or problem-oriented
policing?

If the answer to the first two questions is
"yes"-that is, if residents are too frightened and
isolated by the level of crime and disorder in the
neighborhood and if there is no existing community
organization that can take on the issue from a
resident base-then experience argues for starting
with enhanced security. The police department
should be part of this effort, although (if the
department's means or willingness are limited) it
may be necessary to find resources for private
security as well.

On the other hand, if the answer to the last two
questions is "yes"-that is, if the situation is
characterized by an unresponsive and/or reactive
police force-then it may be necessary to organize
residents first, even though this can be difficult
under severe conditions. Finding allies-through the
process of identifying and enlisting key players
(as discussed in chapter 2)-will be all the more
necessary in such cases, as the support of these
allies can encourage and reassure residents in
their efforts to organize. At the same time, if a
public agency, such as the housing authority or the
mayor's office, can supply the impetus and pressure
needed to evoke a police response, this action will
probably prove critical to initiating changes to
improve security and prevent crime.

Getting Ahead of the Problem

Another option-most appropriate for communities
where the crime problem is incipient rather than
entrenched-is to be proactive. By bringing police
and residents together before the problem grows, a
broad-based place-specific crime prevention program
can be more easily designed and implemented. Of the
four main sites examined for this report, only Oak
Park could really get ahead of the crime problem.
In fact, by being proactive, Oak Park has been able
to prevent neighborhood deterioration, encourage
racial diversity without resegregation, and largely
avoid the kinds of security problems experienced by
other sites.

Endnotes

1. S.L. Sorensen and E. Walsh, Crime
Prevention Through Environmental Design and
Situational Crime Prevention in Public Housing:
Workshop Curriculum, HUD Crime Prevention and
Security Division, Technical Assistance Workshop(s)
(Bethesda, MD: SPARTA Consulting Corporation, March
1995).

2. To maximize the effectiveness of
intercoms and buzzer systems, residents should be
trained in their proper use.

3. These are all privately owned complexes
with mortgages from the Massachusetts Housing
Finance Agency (MHFA). That agency is now spending
$3 million annually on security for some 9,000
units in three Boston neighborhoods. The MHFA looks
on the security expenditure as wise asset
management, as the security program protects a
multimillion dollar investment.

4. T. Hammett, J. Feins, T. Mason, and I.
Ellen, Public Housing Drug Elimination Program
Resource Document: Final Report (Washington, DC:
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development,
n.d.), 95, 124, 128; see also S.J. Popkin et al.,
An Evaluation of the Chicago Housing Authority's
Anti-Drug Initiative: A Model of Comprehensive
Crime Prevention in Public Housing (Cambridge, MA:
Abt Associates Inc., October 1995).

5. O.P. Burden, "Promoting a Bright Idea
from Abroad," Law Enforcement News, February 14,
1995. In Japan, the koban (mini-station) brings a
police presence into every neighborhood and
village. Borrowing from the Japanese model, several
U.S. cities (including Los Angeles, Baltimore,
Philadelphia, and San Juan, Puerto Rico) have
established kobans.

6. In 1995, the overnight parking ban was
relaxed in some areas to provide more parking,
helping landlords compete with other areas for good
tenants.

7. The program is one component of
Cleveland's Youth Firearms Violence Initiative,
funded by the U.S. Department of Justice.

8. The OHA applied for security funding, but
HUD did not approve it because of the recent widely
publicized security abuses.

9. T. Hammett, J. Feins, T. Mason, and I.
Ellen, Public Housing Drug Elimination: Program
Resource Document: Final Report: 115, 124. See also
the accompanying volume of case studies (Public
Housing Drug Elimination Program Resource Document:
Case Studies): 251-83.

10. Officer Jerry Williams received a special
citation from Attorney General Janet Reno for his
innovative and entrepreneurial approach to police
work.

11. Discussing his year on the graveyard shift at
Lockwood Gardens, one officer said that at those
hours of the night, the people he encountered were
mostly nonresidents. He would stop and query
everyone he met; after 2 months, there was no one 
around within the development. He then extended 
his foot patrol beyond the boundaries and cleared an 
area two blocks around the site.
 
------------------------------
 
Chapter 4

Making Changes: Program Implementation

In this chapter, the implementation of
place-specific crime prevention programs is
discussed from two perspectives: changing the
physical environment and changing the management
structure or practice. Changes in use and the
results that sites have achieved are examined in
chapter 5.

Changing the Physical Environment

Changing the physical environment in a neighborhood
or housing complex may involve a wide range of
applications of crime prevention through
environmental design (CPTED) strategies and
tactics. As discussed in chapter 3, the changes may
involve reconfiguring the relationship between
interior and exterior space (e.g., by altering the
shape or appearance of the common areas,
controlling access to the area or building through
fencing or gates, target hardening through the
installation of sturdy doors, locks, or grills).
The changes may redefine the boundaries between
private and public space (e.g., by creating private
yards or individual unit entrances), or they may
open up hidden areas and create the possibility of
surveillance where there was none before. In most
of the instances described here, the physical
redesign involves a number of physical changes
grouped together in a way that addresses
place-specific problems of crime and disorder.

Further, at all of the sites visited for this
report, physical design changes have been
coordinated with changes in site management and
use. Involving residents in street cleanups or
planting trees and flower beds to signal ownership
and care are actually hybrid activities that
involve changing both the physical environment and
management practice in a community. Because of this
inevitable overlap, some hybrid practices are
included in this section, even though they could
have been discussed in the next section or in
chapter 5. The hybrid practices described in this
section are not repeated in later sections.

In Oakland, California, the place-specific crime
prevention strategy pursued at Lockwood Gardens
included improved site lighting, the addition of
perimeter fencing and security gates, the repair of
building exteriors, and new landscaping, including
entrance signs announcing the Lockwood Gardens
Community (see photo this page). The perimeter
fences are 8 and 12 feet in height, while
waist-high fencing was installed along 66th Avenue
to restrict access to the front yards of units
facing that street. There are new security gates at
65th Avenue and East 14th Street, at both ends of
Fenham, and at Eastlawn and 66th Avenue. The Fenham
gates are padlocked, and the other two gates are
designed to provide access through a magnetic
card/keypad opening system (exhibit 7).[1]

The fencing and gates make it difficult for fleeing
suspects to run into Lockwood Gardens from East
14th Street to hide, or for drug dealers to do
business from apartments in the development.[2] The
kiosks at the gates imply regular surveillance,
although they are no longer staffed full-time by
security guards. Oakland Housing Authority (OHA)
staff know that the access control would be much
more effective if the gates were kept shut.
Presently, however, they stay open, because these
are public streets and the Oakland City Attorney
has ruled that OHA would have to take them over (as
private streets) in order to keep the gates closed.
This would mean assuming all financial
responsibility for infrastructure and street
repairs and replacements, responsibilities the OHA
cannot afford.[3]

At Castle Square Apartments in Boston's South End,
numerous security-related physical changes were
made to the complex during an extensive renovation
of the buildings and site (exhibit 8). Among the
four programs visited for this report, Castle
Square undoubtedly represents the most thorough and
careful physical redesign for security and crime
prevention.

Oak Park, Illinois, has made extensive use of
cul-de-sacs in an effort to control traffic,
improve safety, strengthen neighborhoods, and
enhance property values. Cul-de-sacs also help to
address the problem of burglary, which the village
views as its primary crime concern. Numerous
cul-de-sacs have been created on the northern and
eastern boundaries of the village. These street
closings along Austin Boulevard and North Avenue
limit access from Chicago (on Oak Park's north and
east sides) to selected traffic corridors.
Automobile use of the alleyways behind residences
is restricted to individuals who live there or have
legitimate business in the area. Other cars,
trucks, or pedestrians traveling the alleys are
viewed with suspicion and can be stopped and
ticketed.

To soften their appearance, plantings and trees
have been placed at the traffic barriers that
create the cul-de-sacs. According to one Austin
Boulevard landlord and resident, "The cul-de-sacs
add resident parking and beauty and keep people and
cars away. A cul-de-sac at my block was a
consideration, a plus in my decision to buy the
property. Cul-de-sacs can add to value and help me
to know my neighbors." Today, cul-de-sacs are
created only by request of area residents. Those
that do get approved are subject to an initial
trial and review process, through which the village
assesses their likely effectiveness.

Oak Park's Security Improvement Grant (SIG)
program-a cost-sharing program run by the village
to improve building security-is the other major
element of the village's strategy for changes in
physical design. Once an application for the
program has been processed, an officer from the Oak
Park Police Department's Crime Prevention Unit
conducts an inspection of the candidate building.
The inspections, which routinely take about 1 hour,
focus on access control, target hardening,
lighting, and other tactics for making older
buildings less vulnerable to contemporary criminal
methods. Traditional target-hardening tactics and
improved lighting on the outside of the property
(as well as for basements and other interior common
areas) have been emphasized. SIG inspections also
often propose the pruning of landscaping that can
provide cover for burglars or others.

The portion of Oak Park with the highest population
density is a stretch of Austin Boulevard. More than
50 percent of Austin Boulevard's buildings have
received SIGs since the program was started in late
1990. On this street, some building owners have
sought to overcome the public perception of a local
crime problem by changing building addresses-e.g.,
from Austin Boulevard to an east/west street name.
Others have gated and fenced the Austin Boulevard
side of their properties, moving the building
entrance to the east/west street (see photo this
page).

Exhibit 9 shows the elements of the SIG inspection
in Oak Park. For each item, the inspector indicates
either an [S] for Secure or a [U] for Unsecured.
The inspector also prepares a narrative description
of what can be done to remedy problems and improve
security. To illustrate the kinds of changes made
under the program, two buildings treated under SIG
are described below.

The first is a multifamily building on the southern
boundary of the Eisenhower Expressway in Oak Park.
Most of the SIG changes that have been made to the
building involve target-hardening, as follows:

o New locks and window latches have been
installed on outer doors, and the buzzer system has
been moved from an indoor alcove to the outside of
the building.

o New, secure mailboxes have been installed,
and-for security reasons-only last names are used
on the boxes.

o New fluorescent lighting fixtures have
replaced many of the old incandescent bulbs, and
lighting throughout the building is on timers. New
lights have been installed in the apartments, and
there is new lighting in the building's basement
and on the interior stairs. Where incandescent
lighting remains, protection has been provided
around the bulbs.

o Plexiglas covers have been secured over the
basement windows, with glass blocks used on the
boiler room window and the laundry room windows
(which require ventilation).

o A jimmy-proof lock has been installed on the
basement door, and a 24-hour light has replaced
incandescent lighting in the basement. Illumination
of the public area in the basement has been an
important change.

o New storm doors with dead-bolt locks have been
installed on the rear entry of apartments that are
accessible at the ground floor. Lock stops have
been placed on all apartment windows (the village
code requires working windows), and Plexiglas
panels have been placed over the glass section of
rear apartment doors. The transoms on these doors
have also been reinforced.

According to the building's manager, since the SIG
renovation, "tenants who leave doors and windows
opened are now our biggest source of problems. This
is a problem even where targets have been
hardened."

The second building that illustrates SIG is a
1960's vintage multi-family building in a very
pretty section of Oak Park.  Because of the
building's open but obscured courtyard and
waist-high plate glass windows, the property was
highly burglary-prone. The building's most
significant safety improvements include:

o A 6-foot wrought iron fence has been installed
across the front of the apartment complex. Access
is now through a locked gate in the center of the
fence. Visitors can be buzzed-in by apartment
residents.

o Sturdy metal grating has been placed over low
ground-floor windows around the sides of the
building. These grates can be released/opened from
inside the apartments.

o A problem identified at this property and many
others involves unsecured air conditioners; these
can be easily removed to offer thieves access to
apartments (as well as to the air conditioners
themselves). The SIG inspections always suggest
that air conditioners be secured from inside the
apartment, so that they can neither be pushed
inside nor pulled out.

o Other scheduled security improvements include
the installation of storm window inserts on outer
bathroom windows and replacement of the mailboxes.

Simple ideas that often get overlooked can make a
difference as well. The officer who conducts most
of Oak Park's SIG inspections always recommends
putting signs to label the doors leading to the
boiler room (and other equipment) to prevent people
from thinking there is something in the room worth
stealing. Similarly, he advises building owners to
avoid inadvertently advertising that property is
there for the taking by keeping building, garage,
and shed doors closed when not in use.

Owner-occupants tend to be the Oak Park building
owners who follow the officer's suggestions most
diligently, perhaps because they have the greatest
stake in keeping their areas crime-free. According
to the village's rehabilitation supervisor, those
most likely to take advantage of the SIG program
and "the best building owners and managers tend to
be locals and others who believe or buy into Oak
Park's philosophy about crime prevention and
diversity."

A final element of Oak Park's focus on physical
changes to reduce crime and disorder concerns auto
theft. Under the Beat Auto Theft (BAT) program, the
Oak Park Police Department offers village residents
a free rear-window sticker that allows police to
stop their cars between the hours of 
1 a.m. and 5 a.m. The purpose of the sticker is to
prevent auto theft, by warning that the drivers of
stickered cars will be obliged to produce valid
drivers' licenses and auto ownership papers when
stopped by police. If drivers do not produce the
documents, they will be detained until the car's
ownership is verified. The sticker reads as
follows:

Oak Park Police
Auto Theft Program
WARNING
This vehicle can be stopped by any authorized
law enforcement officer in Illinois between
the hours of 1 - 5 a.m.

In Genesis Park, traffic modification through the
installation of barriers on Brewton Drive (formerly
Wayt Street) has created a cul-de-sac on a once
crime-plagued street. The change has stopped
drivers from turning left onto Eureka and peeling
out, while barriers on Peaceful Way and Tinnin
prevent cars from circling the block. Requests have
been made for improvements to the fence that
divides the interstate from the neighborhood.

Although not expressly a physical crime prevention
strategy, addressing the "broken windows" syndrome
through the clean-up of area lots, the boarding-up
of vacant houses, and the repair of streets,
sidewalks, and curbs may deter those who select
their targets by looking for signs of neglect in a
community (see photo, page 46).[4] A new sign at the
entrance to the area and new landscaping (trees and
flowers) help send the message that Genesis Park is
a cared-for community.

Commonwealth Apartments is a 12-acre public housing
development in the Brighton section of Boston that
originally consisted of 600 apartments. Before
Commonwealth was redesigned, its interior hallways,
building lobbies, entryways, and parking areas were
widely feared by residents and neighbors alike. The
buildings' courtyards, a nearby park, and a walkway
leading to Brighton High School were also feared as
being crime-ridden. Stolen cars would routinely
turn up in the parking lots, and drug use was
common in building hallways. Lighting, where it
existed, was inadequate; lights would often be shot
out.

The redevelopment reworked the existing structures
substantially. The most striking change was
probably the shift from common-entryway buildings
to townhouses. For the architects charged with
redesigning Commonwealth Apartments, creating
defensible space required reducing the population
density, increasing the amount of living space
indoors and outside, and placing the playgrounds
and tot lots within view of the townhouses. The
number of units was reduced to 392 (114 of which
are reserved for the elderly). Lighting and locks
were improved. The management office was relocated
to a place from which the entire development can be
monitored. (The old office was in the basement and
offered little opportunity for natural
surveillance.) Discussing Commonwealth, a professor
of planning at the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology explained:

Even the worst of large, concentrated housing
projects can be rejuvenated. Boston's Commonwealth
development is now arguably the single greatest
success story in the country of turning around a
severely distressed development. It took a
determined-and $30 million-effort by the housing
authority, the project's tenant organization, and a
private developer to make it happen, but the result
is not just a tenant population that has the
highest employment rate among public housing
residents in the city, it is a housing project
where suburbanites actually park their cars before
taking public transit downtown.[5]

At Grant Manor, another private complex in Boston's
South End neighborhood near Castle Square, a new
camera system was installed on the first floor of
the development's high-rise building. The eight
pan-tilt-zoom (PTZ) cameras can see at night, and
on clear days they can see for almost a mile.
Cameras were also installed in the hallways and
elevators. Secured side doors with stronger doors
and locks (connected to an alarm system, so that if
someone exits, the alarm sounds and the camera is
activated) supplement the efforts of a single
security officer who roams the development 24 hours
per day. Motion sensors in the upper hallways and
on rooftops, improved lighting, and keeping trees
pruned to improve visibility for the cameras are
other strategies being employed at Grant Manor.

------------------------------

Even the worst of large, concentrated housing
projects can be rejuvenated. Boston's Commonwealth
development is now arguably the single greatest
success story in the country of turning around a
severely distressed development. It took a
determined-and $30 million-effort by the housing
authority, the project's tenant organization, and a
private developer to make it happen, but the result
is not just a tenant population that has the
highest employment rate among public housing
residents in the city, it is a housing project
where suburbanites actually park their cars before
taking public transit downtown.

- Lawrence Vale, Massachusetts 
  Institute of Technology

------------------------------

Grant Manor is part of a program being run by the
Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency (MHFA), with
funding from HUD. This program strives to return
former HUD-foreclosed properties to private ownership, 
with the resident involvement and physical improvements
needed to make the housing viable in the long run.
The properties are to be sold to resident-based
organizations. MHFA holds the permanent mortgage
for Grant Manor and considers the security program
necessary to protect that investment.

At Grant Manor, several months of working with
residents preceded the security improvements. The
whole process was resident-centered, so that
residents knew the security plan, knew how things
would work, and got what they wanted. One result is
that resident calls to security and the police are
now much more specific and helpful, so that
officers can more easily respond to emergencies and
make arrests.

Important components of the Grant Manor program are
resident education and participation in a coalition
that includes the Boston Police Department. MHFA
also trains all the private security guards on
cultural diversity and tries to hire bilingual
officers (Spanish- or Creole-speaking). At this
private housing complex, where many residents are
of Haitian descent, understanding Haitian norms is
important if the guards want to build trust among
residents, who are likely to distrust police due to
experiences in their native country.

Changing Management: Who's in Charge Here?

The changes made in the management of housing
complexes and neighborhoods bear a vital connection
to the physical changes examined previously.
Management changes support, reinforce, and maintain
the preventive effects of CPTED modifications on
disorder and illegal activities. Indeed, some argue
that physical changes by themselves-without
management reinforcement-will not bring about the
desired improvements in public safety and quality
of life.

Chapter 2 of this report offered a broadened
definition of management: the responsibility for
maintaining order in one or more aspects of a
place. Under this definition, a variety of
participants have actual or potential roles in the
management of specific places. As important as the
need to link physical redesign to a detailed
analysis of the relationship between crime and
place is the need to make management changes that
recognize and build on the particular context. By
keeping in mind the contrast between management
practices before and after the security and crime
prevention initiatives, it becomes obvious how many
different aspects of the housing complexes and
communities were addressed, and how the various
management changes were interconnected and
reinforced one another.

Management changes designed specifically to improve
security are discussed first. Security changes
involve police, private security guards, and
residents, and affect how each group understands
its responsibilities for order and safety and how
it carries them out. The section concludes with a
review of the elements of changed property
management practices.

Making Changes in Security Management

In the place-specific crime prevention context,
improving security may involve making changes in
policing, in private security arrangements, and in
the role residents play in crime prevention. Each
of these management changes is addressed here; the
four visited sites are discussed first followed by
a wider set of site examples.

The prevailing conditions at Oak Park, Lockwood
Gardens, Genesis Park, and Castle Square Apartments
that led key players to initiate security and crime
prevention changes at these sites have been
described previously. Physical redesign addressed a
range of factors that contributed to crime and
disorder in these neighborhoods and housing
complexes, such as easy access and exit from the
site, anonymous open spaces, unlit public areas,
and passageways used for hidden transactions. The
changes in physical design were careful and
thorough, as described in the previous section. The
changes in security management were equally careful
and thorough; they are summarized in exhibit 10.

In the Kenney/Gibbs/Wayt neighborhood of Charlotte,
security management had been the sole
responsibility of the police. The Charlotte Police
Department was in a totally reactive policing mode,
responding in force to calls for service from the
area but absent otherwise. The changes in security
for Genesis Park-which began with community
policing and continued with police assistance
(e.g., escorts for workers during the first 9
months)-were critical to the Charlotte-Mecklenburg
Housing Partnership's (CMHP's) success in
recruiting the initial homebuyers. They also
enabled homebuyers to finish the rehabilitation of
their units with "sweat equity" (their own labor).
When the first few residents moved in, CMHP bought
beepers for the community police officers.
Residents had the community police officers' beeper
numbers and could signal them if trouble was
brewing. The police always called back from "clean"
phones (not their car phones), so no one could
intercept the call and retaliate against the
reporter. As CMHP continued to acquire and shut
down the drug houses and shot houses, disorder was
reduced, enabling the new residents' presence to be
felt in the neighborhood. Police were given the key
to the model home and could use it at night,
stopping to make a call, grab some coffee, or do
some paperwork. CMHP also bought bicycles so the
police could ride in the neighborhood (which
attracted attention when houses were being shown).
The streets were brought under control, one by one,
through this combination of security, public and
private management, and resident action.

A combination of community policing, private
security, and paid police details was needed at
Castle Square Apartments during the period in which
the partnership of developer and residents acquired
the complex and carried out the redesign and
rehabilitation. Before the new partnership took
over, there was no communication between management
and the police, no monitoring or enforcement of
loitering or trespassing regulations, no
restrictions on parking by nonresidents, and no
real effort to maintain public safety. In contrast,
the new management company supervises the private
security force and coordinates its activities with
the police, who have shifted their predominant mode
to community policing. The police enforce trespass
bans and also use the Massachusetts statute that
increases penalties for drug offenses committed
within 1,000 feet of a school.[6] (There are four
schools near CSA.)

In Oak Park, the security management changes were
less dramatic, since the village was primarily
being proactive. While the main crime prevention
initiatives taken by the village focused on target
hardening and access control, they have been
accompanied by more vigorous enforcement of traffic
and parking regulations. In recent years, Oak Park
has coupled these efforts with a shift to a
community policing model.

At Lockwood Gardens, the management changes may
seem less dramatic than the significant changes in
physical design, particularly the fencing of the
site. Yet, there were sweeping security and
property management changes, even though the OHA
continued to own and operate the development.
Chapter 3 describes the combination of community
policing and additional security that the OHA
initiated to regain control of Lockwood Gardens.
Sworn officers and private guards worked together
to provide enhanced security through the
construction period and staffed the two kiosks for
a number of months after the construction's
completion.

Exhibit 11 summarizes experiences with enhanced
security at the four visited sites and other sites.
Included are changes in policing, in private
security, and in the role of residents. Each of
these items is examined in greater detail in the
following pages.

Policing. The shift to community policing or
problem-oriented policing has been an element of
many place-specific crime prevention programs, but
various observers of these efforts have noted that
an essential component is the long-term assignment
of specific officers, particularly at the beginning
of the community policing effort. Continuity of
assignment ensures that the officers will be able
to develop thorough familiarity with the area,
including all those who frequent it around the
clock and across the seasons.[7] Even more important,
continuity of staffing gives the residents time to
develop comfort in communicating with the officers
and ultimately to develop trust.

Community policing assignments can be very intense,
especially when neighborhoods are undergoing major
changes. As a result, officers may experience
burnout. When police staffing does change, there
should be ample time allowed for overlapping
assignments, so that the familiar officer can
introduce the new one to the residents and the
area. When community policing assignments changed
in Genesis Park and Lockwood Gardens-as they did
after 2 years or more-it was difficult for both
residents and program staff to accept the loss of
their initial community officers and adapt to the
new personnel.

Maintenance of a regular police presence in the
community, even after it is visibly more orderly
and the residents feel less fear, is another
important element of security changes in many study
sites. Whether it is a mini-station or an ongoing
community policing assignment, it needs to last; if
it is a mobile command station, it needs to return
with some frequency to the neighborhood. Oak Park
has addressed the need for a regular police
presence in two ways: (1) by creating satellite
police stations and (2) by encouraging officers to
live in the districts and work from their homes.

Private Security. A common theme of security
changes is the establishment of working
relationships between police and other members of
the community, including property owners and
managers, resident groups, business associations,
and private security guards. Regular communication,
joint planning, and periodic joint action serves to
strengthen these relationships. In terms of private
security guards-who are often disdained by police
due to their lack of training and narrower focus on
a site (among other factors)-it is particularly
important to have a mutually recognized, clear
delineation of responsibility. This was the case in
Oakland, where the domains of the OHA security
personnel and the OPD officers were differentiated
by type and severity of offense and by physical
location on or off public housing authority
property.

A working relationship among police, private
security, and property managers has multiple
advantages. The private security personnel are
there to enforce management rules (such as
resident-only parking) and to keep order (for
example, keeping resident teens from noisily
congregating in the parking lot late at night). The
police are there to reinforce these missions and to
act if disorder leads to illegal activity.

Use of trespass statutes brings the police role
closer to that of private security. Some public and
private property managers have made considerable
use of these laws with the direct involvement of
the police. In Charlotte, there is formalized
cooperation between the police department and the
Charlotte Housing Authority (CHA). One or two
police officers per district go through training
with the CHA and are made "designated agents" of
the housing authority, with power to enforce bans
and loitering/trespassing regulations. If a police
officer (responding to a call) goes into a public
housing unit and finds unauthorized people, and if
they do not cooperate, they can be arrested on the
spot. Officers can also take immediate arrest
action against anyone banned from CHA property.[8]
Similarly, the CMHP posts "No Trespassing" signs on
vacant property they own in Genesis Park; with
police as designated agents, trespassers can be
sent directly to jail without a warrant. The
housing authority invites judges and the district
attorney to an annual meeting at the agency to talk
about problems and issues between the CHA and the
legal system. This is an open forum with CHA
residents to let the judges and DA see how serious
tenants are about safety and order. CHA staff feel
that as a result, the court is now taking trespass
cases more seriously and is no longer voluntarily
dismissing them.

Residents. Vital security changes can be made by
involving residents. Neighborhood, block, and 
lobby watches are now widely used to increase
surveillance and crime reporting without putting
individuals at risk. Resident patrols monitor
activity and report problems to security guards
and/or the police.[9] More generally, active
community associations seek to maintain a visible
presence and "eye on the neighborhood" in order to
warn anyone potentially involved in disorder or
illegal activity that they will be observed and
reported. At Castle Square Apartments in Boston's
South End, residents are centrally involved in
management, as committees of the Castle Square
Tenants Organization (such as Training and
Security) set policies through the partnership and
monitor management performance. CSTO will come into
full ownership of the complex in 2006, only 10
years from now, and the residents are determined to
be ready. In 1995, festivities organized by
residents at Castle Square, part of the National
Night Out, served as a sort of "going away party"
for crime and drugs.

Use of civil liability suits by residents appears
to be a growing trend in the area of residential
security. This may 
be done through an organized campaign-as in Clinton
Hill-or by individuals harmed through owner or
manager neglect of security. Residents may well
find they are not alone in their quest to improve
the quality of urban life by attacking nuisances
such as crack houses and drug sale locations. In
New York City, attorneys with the police
department's Civil Enforcement Initiative (CEI) act
as an in-house law firm, providing advice and
problem-solving services to the department. In
1995, by using real property laws, the CEI enabled
the police to confiscate 150 drug-infested
buildings. CEI has also helped the police seize the
vehicles of patrons soliciting prostitutes.10

In what may be the first time a landlord has been
held liable for the actions of a tenant that caused
the death of a police officer in the line of duty,
in 1995 a Massachusetts Superior Court jury awarded
$1.5 million to the family of a Boston police
detective shot to death by drug dealers.[14]
According to lawyers for the deceased detective's
family, the decision will have a far-reaching
impact on landlords, putting them on notice that
they cannot turn a blind eye to the criminal
activities of their tenants: "As a matter of public
policy, landlords can no longer avoid the obvious
if they know their tenants are dealing drugs. If
you know your tenant is selling drugs, you've got
to take steps to evict them."[15] The impact of this
ruling on cases in which building residents allege
landlord negligence or breach of a contract or duty
to maintain safe and secure premises remains to be
seen. However, in recent years a clear trend toward
tenant suits against building owners has emerged.[16]

In another Massachusetts case, the state's highest
court ruled that public housing tenants have a
right to sue housing authorities for failing to
abate drug-related crime in their housing
developments.[17] The high court's decision partially
reversed a 1990 ruling that dismissed a lawsuit on
behalf of two tenants who claimed that drug-related
crime in their developments was so bad that they
were afraid to leave their apartments. The 1994
ruling says that a trial should be held to
determine whether the housing authority is
complying with its responsibility as a landlord to
provide tenants with the peaceful enjoyment of
their apartments. This decision also means that
residents must be given a chance to prove that the
housing authority violated a Massachusetts law
requiring that landlords aggressively identify and
prosecute non-tenants who commit crimes on their 
property.[18]

In a 1993 California case, an appeals court ruled
that the owners of an apartment complex who failed
to remove a drug-dealing operation on the premises
were liable to neighbors for creating a nuisance.19
The action was brought in small claims court by 75
plaintiffs against owners of a Berkeley apartment
building that was alleged to be frequented by drug
dealers, drug users, and prostitutes.[20] This is
another way in which resident or neighbor
collective action can be effective in bringing about
management changes for improved security.[21]

------------------------------

In a 1993 California case, an appeals court ruled
that the owners of an apartment complex who failed
to remove a drug-dealing operation on the premises
were liable to neighbors for creating a nuisance.
The action was brought in small claims court by 75
plaintiffs against owners of a Berkeley apartment
building that was alleged to be frequented by drug
dealers, drug users, and prostitutes.

------------------------------

Making Changes in Property Management

Like security changes, property management changes
support, facilitate, and reinforce the preventive
effects of CPTED modifications on disorder and
illegal activities. The major participants in the
area of security changes were the police, private
security guards, and residents. Concerning property
management, the major participants are the owners
and managers (whether public or private) of
residential property in the community and the
residents themselves.

Exhibit 12 shows the interrelated management
changes made at the four sites visited for this
report. In the area that became Genesis Park,
ownership of nearly all residential property was by
absentee landlords, with the result that the
neglected and overgrown conditions of the housing
were ignored as long as the rent payments came in.
The dilapidated apartments housed poor families who
did not have the means to move elsewhere. Some of
the houses had been abandoned and were occupied by
squatters. The city did not enforce building codes
or provide many public services. Drug dealers
"owned" the streets, and residents lived in fear.

The Charlotte-Mecklenburg Housing Partnership's
involvement in the area began with the premise that
opportunities for moderate-income homeownership
were scarce relative to the need. If this area's
neglected rental units could be rehabilitated into
quality homes and sold at moderate prices, it was
believed that the area could be stabilized by
encouraging resident organization and supporting
resident efforts to maintain the community. CMHP
would work with the city to bring in needed
infrastructure improvements and would work with the
CHA's programs encouraging economic self-sufficiency 
for residents (as well as developing a self-
sufficiency program of their own). Thus, the
program as planned involved changes in private
property ownership and management, public
management, and resident action. The photos on page
54 show the difference before and after renovation
and conversion to homeownership.

The management changes at Castle Square Apartments
also involved changes to private management, public
management, and resident roles. The former owner's
haphazard and neglectful leasing and maintenance
practices, which had contributed greatly to the
decline of the complex, were replaced by strict,
professional management practices. Thorough tenant
screening, constant monitoring of conditions,
attentive care of buildings and grounds are all
evident at CSA; the management company is
responsible to the partnership for the results.
Ongoing communication with the police and with
other public agencies has meant that the complex
receives the needed public services and has
obtained some public improvements. In addition, the
partnership has taken over site control from the
city, so that it has greater control over security,
snow removal, tree pruning, sidewalk repairs, and
parking within the development.

In Oak Park, the conditions of the late
1960's-particularly in the eastern part of the
village-testified to declining rental property
maintenance. Public services were adequate, but
residents still felt threatened and frightened by
the early signs of deterioration, disorder, and
diminished quality of life. Over the years since
then, the village has initiated a range of
management changes addressed to private property
owners, including the Security Improvement Grants
program and licensing multifamily building owners
as businesses (with required training in fair
housing and CPTED, as well as mandatory attendance
at community meetings).

The Residence Corporation, an independent nonprofit
organization founded in 1966, also plays an
important role in Oak Park's strategy. The
Corporation buys multifamily buildings in bad
physical condition and rehabilitates them. It
manages the reoccupied buildings (as well as some
others that are privately owned), and it supports
the village's policy of racial and economic
diversity in all these buildings. It may buy
single-family homes that are in foreclosure and
sell them for owner-occupancy. By limiting the
number of vacant buildings, the Residence
Corporation reduces the likelihood that they will
be stripped or used by drug dealers or squatters.
Finally, the village's policies and performance are
monitored by influential resident bodies such as
the Housing Programs Advisory Committee.

At Lockwood Gardens, on the property management
side, the following changes were initiated by the
housing authority:

o Housing management, assisted by
round-the-clock observations of the community
policing officers, identified problem tenants and
evicted a number of people. Where unauthorized
persons were living in the units, the leaseholders
were offered the choice of putting them on the
lease or getting help to remove them (such as
through a restraining order). Women are often
battered in situations where their boyfriends are
dealing drugs; the community policing officers
helped enforce restraining orders. (The OHA also
performed some transfers for resident safety.)

o The management and maintenance operations of
the housing authority were decentralized to
Lockwood Gardens. Residents now go to the on-site
satellite office for everything but paying rent.
There are two managers, a management aide, and a
maintenance crew stationed there to serve three
large developments, which add up to 650 public
housing units in a small area.

o A new emphasis on strong lease enforcement was
introduced.

o Applicant screening is still done centrally,
but site managers show the units to people sent
from the central office. As the site manager at
Lockwood Gardens meets applicants and shows them
around, he watches for signs of trouble-e.g.,
needle tracks or other physical signs of substance
abuse. If he thinks this will not be the right
environment for someone, he can hold out the
referral until a more appropriate spot for the
individual becomes available.

OHA management also took important steps to involve
the residents in the changes at Lockwood Gardens.
The community services department was restructured
into Resident and Community Services, which has outreach
workers and resident advisors. This helped foster
relationships that made the resident council a
reality. Community policing also led to
identification of resident leadership. Management
began to work with Resident and Community Services
on resident leadership and organizing; the resident
council received training pertaining to lease
rights and responsibilities.

Finally, in a seemingly symbolic change that has
proven to be of real significance, site management
began to encourage residents to use the outdoor
space at Lockwood as if it were their own. Gardens
have proliferated and flourished, not only in the
privatized back yards, but also around the fronts
of buildings and along the walks. Neighbors have
also started to garden together, crossing racial
and ethnic boundaries.[22] Thus, even in a situation
where the same agency continued to own and manage
the development, a constellation of vital
management changes was implemented in conjunction
with the physical redesign for security and crime
prevention.

Exhibit 13 summarizes the initiatives that the
larger group of sites have taken to make changes in
property management. Changing property ownership is
a rather drastic intervention, yet one that appears
to be used in a variety of settings. It is widely
believed that homeowners have a greater stake, both
financially and emotionally, than renters and
therefore take better care of their homes and
communities. This is not necessarily true, however,
as this report has offered examples of renters
gaining a vital stake in the care and management of
their communities (examples include Castle Square
Apartments and Commonwealth Apartments). However,
this belief is one of the key assumptions that led
to CMHP's interventions to convert Genesis Park to
a neighborhood of homeowners.[23] It is also widely
observed that rental properties generally receive
better care when their owners reside there or very
nearby; it is too easy for absentee landlords to be
ignorant of-or to ignore-both physical and human
problems in their buildings. Shifts in ownership
were a keystone of the changes brought about in
Genesis Park and Castle Square Apartments. In Oak
Park, the Residence Corporation has taken steps to
acquire certain residential and commercial
properties in order to prevent their deterioration
or conversion to inappropriate uses. (These
properties may remain in Residence Corporation
ownership and continue in rental or commercial use,
or they may be resold.)

Also included in the category of changes in public
management are all initiatives that public agencies
have taken to improve security and prevent crime in
various study sites. Some of these changes concern
public-sector responsibilities and services, such
as code enforcement, trash pick-up, street
cleaning, and the like. Others involve
public-sector investments, such as the City of
Charlotte's work to:

o Diagnose the drainage/flooding problems that
plagued the Genesis Park area (due to old clay
pipes and broken concrete pipes) and provide proper
drainage;

o Repair and repave streets;

o Install new sidewalks on the major streets;

o Install or repair curbs, and

o Improve street lighting (working with Duke
Power and the Department of Transportation).[24]

Public sector initiatives like these generally help
to signal that a community is cared for and valued;
more specifically, they may prevent or correct a
"broken windows" situation. Other public management
changes that have supported anticrime programs
include funding neighborhood improvement efforts
(as in Bridgeport, Connecticut) and licensing
multifamily building owners as businesses (as in
Oak Park, to improve the owners' understanding and
compliance with local ordinances). Even the
attention of community policing officers to problem
properties-whether hot spots or eyesores-is a form
of public management in support of crime reduction
and prevention.

Because housing authorities are public agencies,
their actions to change property management to
improve safety also fall under the category of
public management. In exhibit 13, a large number 
of improvements made in public housing were identified 
in Charlotte, Oakland, Macon, Norfolk, Los Angeles, 
and San Francisco.

Many improved housing authority practices have
parallels in private property management. Stricter
tenant screening, lease revisions and resident
training to understand the rights and
responsibilities created by the lease, increased
use of parking regulations and other posted rules,
use of written notices and mediation procedures to
deal with tenant problems, and willingness to evict
or use trespass statutes when necessary have all
been used by both private and public property
managers to restore order and reduce crime in their
complexes.

Residents are a vital force in changing property
management, and there are roles that individual
residents can play to improve management of their
developments and neighborhoods. However, most of
the entries in exhibit 13 represent ways that
resident organizations can contribute to management
improvements. Tenant patrols, screening committees,
and management and security oversight committees
all provide impetus and input to make effective
property management a means to achieve improved 
quality of life.

Endnotes

1. The new physical design, paired with the
OHA's community policing strategy and the enhanced
on-site security patrols, are an expensive
solution, although it is widely believed in Oakland
that the conditions here warranted it. The gating
and fencing were quite costly (some $556,000), and
private security runs about $260,000-$270,000 per
year. Sworn officers cost the city more than
$100,000 per year. A PHDEP grant from HUD has paid
the cost of keeping on the sworn officers, but the
private security guards have been terminated.
Funding for the officers ended in early 1997.

2. Metropolitan areas with a high
concentration of privately operated gated
communities include Miami, Los Angeles, San Diego,
Chicago, New York City, Houston, and Phoenix. See
"Where the Gates Are," Governing (December 1995):
14.

3. At OHA's Tassafarango development, the
housing authority did work out with the city a
system for closing the gates without taking
ownership of the streets. However, negotiations
over the Lockwood situation have been suspended,
and the housing authority's Director of Security is
concerned that, without use of the gates, the
resident security program will not be able to hold
the line after the site-dedicated officers are
gone.

4. See S.L. Sorensen and E. Walsh, Crime
Prevention Through Environmental Design and
Situational Crime Prevention in Public Housing:
Workshop Curriculum, HUD Crime Prevention and
Security Division, Technical Assistance Workshop(s)
(Bethesda, MD: SPARTA Consulting Corporation, March
1995).

5. Professor Lawrence Vale, cited in "Cover
Story/Housing," Governing (August 1995): 17, 19.

6. Mass. Gen. Laws, chapter 94C, Section
32J, Possession of Controlled Substances Within
School Boundaries.

7. Of course, police administrators need to
be aware that long-term assignments have the
potential for increasing corruption.

8. The CHA ban process is based on crime
analysis (patterns of repeated calls for service)
and on identification of people in the home who do
not belong there and are causing trouble. The
Probation and Parole program sends the CHA's
security coordinator a list of their subjects who
live legally or illegally in CHA housing.

9. S. Sorensen, "Resident Patrols," Model
Program Briefs 2 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department
of Housing and Urban Development, HUD 1444-PIH-RP).

10. "Aiming a Civil Weapon at Criminal Offenders,"
Governing (November 1995): 35-36.

11. Young Lawyers Section of Bar Association of
D.C.: Cracking Down on Crack Houses," D.C. Bar
Report (October/November 1995): 15.

12. Ibid., citing William Lawler, Esq., of the
American Alliance for Rights and Responsibilities.

13. Ibid., 15.

14. K. Cullen, "Landlords Told to Pay $1.5m in
Police Death," Boston Globe, September 13, 1995.

15. Ibid.

16. With many suits against property owners
settled out of court, there are few reliable
figures available. However, while a 1984 study by a
Washington security expert turned up 186 suits in
the 25 years from 1958 to 1982, a more recent
update of the study found 267 cases from 1983
through 1992 - an increase of 266 percent a year.
See C.H. Deutsch, "Returning to the Scene of the
Crime, to Sue the Owner," New York Times, June 3,
1994, citing a 1994 study by Norman Bates,
President, Liability Consultants Inc, of
Framingham, Massachusetts.

17. J. Ellement, "Tenants Gain Legal Tool in War
on Drug Crime," Boston Globe, March 15, 1994.

18. Ibid. Also see M. Grunwald, "Family of Boy
Killed at Roxbury Project Sues Landlord," Boston
Globe, November 1, 1995.

19. S.B. Goldberg, "Bad Neighbors-Landlord Liable
for Drug-dealing on Premises," ABA Journal,
(February 1994): 95.

20. Ibid. The case, Albert G. Lew v. The Superior
Court of Alameda County, involved the appeal of a
trial court judgment awarding $218,325 in damages
to the plaintiffs. The defendants had appealed the
judgment arguing that landlords were not
responsible for the tortious acts of third parties.
Citing the leading case of Martinez v. Pacific
Bell, the appeals court found that the basis for
imposing liability on the owners of the Berkeley
building was "on a theory of active fault on the
part of petitioners [the defendants] in the
management of their property." During the trial,
the plaintiffs had presented testimony by a local
police sergeant who had made 260 drug-related calls
to the site over a period of a year and a half. A
city manager also testified that the building was a
"fortress" for the sale of drugs and that the
problem could have been alleviated through
"cooperative and aggressive management." See Albert
G. Lew v. The Superior Court of Alameda County, No.
AO58265 (California Court of Appeals, November 30,
1993). See also Martinez v. Pacific Bell, 225 Cal.
App. 3d 1557 (1990).
 
21. For a broader discussion of applying civil
remedies, see P. Finn and M.O. Hylton, Using Civil
Remedies for Criminal Behavior: Rationale, Case
Studies, and Constitutional Issues (Washington,
D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, National
Institute of Justice, October 1994).

22. This development is discussed further in
chapter 5.

23. The terms of the first mortgages made to the
new homeowners in Genesis Park give CMHP the right
of first refusal when the house is resold. In this
way, CMHP will continue to have some leverage for
maintaining the neighborhood.

24. Of course, the lighting changes are also
physical changes for crime prevention.

------------------------------

Operation Crackdown: Using Public Nuisance Laws To
Fight Drug Dealing

In Washington, D.C., the Young Lawyers Section of
the Bar Association of the District of Columbia
recently launched "Operation Crackdown," a public
service initiative that uses the district's public
nuisance law to rid residential neighborhoods of
crack houses and street dealers.[11] An attorney
involved with the program stresses the importance
of community involvement:

To file suits we need plaintiffs. The community
groups make perfect plaintiffs because their lives
are being affected. In working with the pro bono
attorneys we provide, they keep logs that detail
the disturbances-the number of people coming and
going, the late night noise, the number of police
visits, and so forth.[12]

Lawyers from Operation Crackdown use the
information provided by the community groups to go
to court and obtain injunctions requiring the
building owners to take remedial action. Such
actions may include tenant evictions and installing
high intensity lights (to illuminate dark alleys or
vacant lots).[13]

------------------------------

Chapter 5

Putting the Pieces Together:
Results and Lessons Learned

This chapter discusses the results of place-
specific crime prevention efforts in sites around 
the United States and considers the lessons that 
planners, police, public and private managers, and 
residents have learned from their local efforts. 
Examining both the changes achieved by these programs 
and the problems that still need resolution, the chapter
synthesizes the lessons learned to aid those planning new
initiatives or modifying existing ones.

The chapter begins with a discussion of how the
physical design changes and management changes may
have affected patterns of use at various sites.
Changes in use include differences in the kinds of
activities taking place (particularly resident
activity), changes in the levels of crime and
disorder, and the issue of displacement in specific
sites.

The following section discusses the significant
lessons local respondents identified as they
examined their programs and modified or fine-tuned
them to work better. The need for program
monitoring and feedback is clear, yet formal
feedback mechanisms are rarely built into local
efforts. Even without formal review, thoughtful
program operators seek to strengthen and sustain
the results they have achieved by learning from
experience.

Changing Uses of an Area: Results of Place-Specific
Crime Prevention

In this report, a variety of programs have served
as examples of how physical design changes and
management changes can be combined to reduce
disorder and improve safety. What have these
programs achieved? What kinds of outcomes have been
observed or documented?

Taking Back the Turf

In many of the neighborhoods and housing
developments considered for this report, restoring
the community to its intended purpose has allowed
residents to take back the turf from drug dealers,
muggers, prostitutes, derelicts, and other
offenders and nuisances. A positive change in the
manner in which a playground, street corner, or
building lobby is used is the reward for successful
efforts to alter the physical environment and
change the management of a disorderly or
crime-ridden community.

Place-specific physical changes for crime
prevention combined with changes in management have
contributed to new, legitimate patterns of resident
use of outdoor space at Lockwood Gardens, the
public housing development in Oakland. According to
several respondents, the physical changes there
have had considerable positive impact on residents'
quality of life. In general, many more people are
using the outdoor areas of the development. In the
evenings, residents bring card tables and chairs
outside, to sit and chat with each other while
children play around them. A community gardening
effort has resulted in neighbors of different
ethnic and racial backgrounds working together to
grow a wide variety of flowers and vegetables (see
photo, page 60).

The former president of the Castle Square Tenants
Organization (CSTO) in Boston emphasizes that the
goal of the site redevelopment was to make Castle
Square a decent and safe place to live again.
Neighbors used to cross over from the Castle Square
side of Tremont Street to avoid the dark block with
tunnels leading from the complex's interior.
Security improvements-including new lighting-and a
face-lift have encouraged area residents to seek
out the Castle Square side of Tremont Street. The
cleanup and redevelopment of the park on the corner
of East Berkeley and Tremont Streets have also
dramatically transformed the use of the site. Where
homeless people once drank, fought, and slept,
Asian-American and other Castle Square residents 
now pose for graduation photos in a graceful 
oriental-style garden. People who work nearby come 
to have lunch in the garden. With an influx of new 
stores in the area, the neighborhood around East 
Berkeley and Washington Streets has also greatly 
improved from a business standpoint.

In Oak Park, Illinois, a commitment on the part of
the village and the efforts of the Austin Boulevard
Alliance (ABA) helped to bring the village's
eastern corridor back from the brink of residential
decline. Now, most of Austin Boulevard's apartments
are rented, and the streets in the commercial area
are busy with customers.

In Genesis Park in Charlotte, drug-related traffic
through the area has declined considerably with the
shutdown of the neighborhood's numerous drug and
shot houses. Nonresidents are a far less frequent
sight in the neighborhood, and cars no longer pull
over along Interstate 77 so that buyers can come
through the fence to purchase drugs. Instead, a
newly formed local youth group is planning
activities while seeking greater involvement from
area parents. There is also a youth choir and new
community gardens. The area's First Baptist Church
West is interested in starting an enrichment
program for local children, and the neighborhood
association will soon have its own building for
meetings.

At Mar Vista Gardens in Los Angeles, the fear of
crime may have actually been greater than the crime
itself, but the new fencing has clearly given
residents a greater sense of security. The changes
in behavior are unmistakable: previously, residents
did not leave their apartments or let their
children out to play; now they freely use the
streets and grounds. According to a captain with
the police department of the Housing Authority of
the City of Los Angeles, "You can get the feeling
of a community by driving through it and seeing the
number of kids out playing, and that is how to
measure community environment. [In Mar Vista
Gardens,] the parents [now] feel safe." Drug
dealers have proven that Mar Vista's new fencing is
only effective so long as it is maintained by the
housing authority. Shortly after installation,
dealers cut holes through the fence in strategic
places, facilitating their flight from police
during chases. Despite this, restricting access to
the development has helped reduce dealing targeted
to drive-by drug purchasers who used to come from
other parts of the city and region.

At the Iris Court development in Portland, Oregon,
a cul-de-sac created as part of place-specific
crime prevention changes is closed to traffic for
an annual street fair. At the fair, social service
agencies set up information booths; the event also
features a barbecue, live music, and games for
children. With many police in attendance, the fair
is a combination street party and public relations
activity. In 1996, the residents of Iris Court
worked with the police to plan the fair, which in
earlier years had just been police-sponsored.

Of course, the physical and management changes in
these sites are not without some problems.
Commenting on the attractive porches that are large
enough for families to sit on, one resident of
Diggs Town in Norfolk noted, "I love the porches,
but in some areas it just means that the drug
dealers have a place to stand to get out of the
rain." In Oak Park, the village's many cul-de-sacs
have made it difficult to travel by car from east
to west (Chicago to Oak Park) in residential areas,
because very few streets go through. According to a
member of the Oak Park Housing Program's Advisory
Committee, "The motivation for the cul-de-sacs was
fear of crime and of racial change, not just
concern about traffic." Others complain that the
traffic barriers are put up in a piecemeal manner.
"They're put up on public streets. Do residents own
that street?"

Those using an area for illegal or disorderly
activities sometimes offer clear resistance to the
changes being made. When the new site lighting was
installed at Lockwood Gardens in Oakland, the wires
were cut repeatedly and the lights shot out, but
the Oakland Housing Authority (OHA) repaired them
every day. Even earlier, when the escape route from
14th Street across the rear of the site was
blocked, the housing authority kept strengthening
the fence materials (starting with strong steel
picket, then welding on crossbars, then adding
dense wire mesh) until the attempts to cut through
it were definitively thwarted and "the bad guys
gave up." 

Well-conceived place-specific physical design
strategies and innovative management policies can
help turn around problem neighborhoods and housing
developments, changing their use from illegal to
legitimate activities and improving the quality of
life for residents. At the same time, it is clearly
important to stay on top of a problem through
attentive property management. Letting down one's
guard, however briefly, can mean a return to
trouble.

------------------------------

Well-conceived place-specific physical design
strategies and innovative management policies can
help turn around problem neighborhoods and housing
developments, changing their use from illegal to
legitimate activities and improving the quality of
life for residents. At the same time, it is clearly
important to stay on top of a problem through
attentive property management. Letting down one's
guard, however briefly, can mean a return to
trouble.

------------------------------

Reducing Crime and Keeping It Down

A common objective of all the sites discussed in
this report was to reduce crime in the targeted
areas. Official crime data are available for the
four visited sites. In addition, the City of Dayton
examined crime data in its evaluation of the
neighborhood stabilization efforts in Five Oaks.
However, police crime data have recognized
limitations, particularly in their sensitivity to
rates of reporting. As residents become more
familiar and trusting of police efforts in an area,
crime reporting may increase early in a
place-specific crime prevention program. Police
crime data can be useful for examining trends, but
it is also helpful to access other sources that
confirm, contradict, or at least help interpret the
patterns revealed.[1]
 
Another important caveat concerns the difficulty of
attributing observed changes in crime to the
effects of crime prevention efforts. Without
rigorous research, the sites examined cannot
demonstrate a causal connection between the design
and management changes made and the crime trends
tracked. Thus, although both police and residents
believe they have brought about reductions in crime
and violence, the trends are suggestive of impacts,
not proof of them.[2] Official crime data from the
following five sites appear to substantiate the
observations of local respondents on the success of
their place-specific crime prevention programs. In
each of the neighborhoods or housing complexes,
there were substantial reductions in reported crime
after the interventions, compared to the levels of
violent and property crime before the changes in
physical design, security, property management, and
resident roles were made. Conditions improved, and
police and residents attribute the improvements to
the crime prevention efforts, although causality
cannot be proven.

Genesis Park.  An analysis of trends in reported
offenses for the Genesis Park neighborhood was
prepared by the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police
Department (CMPD).[3] (The data are shown in appendix
F, exhibit F-1.) Due to the sophisticated
geographical information system being implemented
by the CMPD, the boundaries of the reporting area
corresponded directly to those used by the
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Housing Partnership (CMHP)
and the residents when they refer to Genesis Park.
The Genesis Park crime data show that the number of
reported offenses in the neighborhood generally
increased from 1984 to 1989, then declined in 1993
(after the start of community policing, CMHP
property acquisition, and neighborhood cleanup),
and declined even further in 1994. Overall, the
drop from 1989 to 1994 was 78 percent for violent
crimes, 39 percent for property crimes, and 63
percent for all Part I offenses combined. Part II
offenses-which are of interest because they include
drug violations and vandalism-show a similar
pattern, with a decrease of 73 percent from 1989 to
1994. There were no homicides in Genesis Park in
1994, although there were more rapes reported than
in the previous year.

Respondents familiar with Genesis Park corroborate
this picture. Some of the positive results they
cite include: (1) that elderly women (who lived in
the neighborhood for years but were hostages in
their own homes) are now willing to come outside
during the day; (2) that many organizations other
than CMHP are now claiming credit for the idea
and/or the changes made in Genesis Park; and (3)
that home sales are increasing and marketing the
homes is getting easier. Says the residents'
association president, "We've come a long way from
the time when people wouldn't come to visit."

Respondents noted that there had been some increase
in crime beginning early in 1995. (Exhibit F-2
shows data from CMPD comparing the first 6 months
of 1995 with the same months of 1994.) The data
confirm respondents' reports; they show an increase
in property crime as well as in Part II offenses.
CMHP and the residents' association are also aware
of some recent problems with drugs in two of the
houses built by Habitat for Humanity in Genesis
Park. The neighborhood is concerned, and the
residents' association invited the police captain
and the executive director of Habitat to a
community meeting about it. Despite these problems,
CMHP's president recognizes some positive benefit,
specifically the response of the residents when the
problems arose.

Lockwood Gardens. Due to prior research on Lockwood
Gardens, it was possible to examine the levels of
reported crime in Lockwood Gardens over a 4-year
period (1991-1994) and to examine whether these
levels had changed relative to the surrounding
area.[4] (The data are shown in exhibit F-3.) The 4
years of crime data span the following changes at
the development:

o Implementation of an initial "drug
elimination" program with prevention components
only, in 1991 and 1992;

o Beginning of community policing in early 1993;

o Construction of the perimeter fence beginning
in mid-1993, with completion of landscaping and
kiosks in early 1994, and

o Concentrated deployment of private security
guards and OHA security officers, coinciding with
the construction and lasting until spring 1995.

As exhibit F-3 shows, there were no reported
homicides or rapes in Lockwood Gardens in 1993 or
1994. The number of robberies in Lockwood Gardens
was much reduced from the prior 2 years, and they
accounted for a smaller percentage of the robberies
in the area. Felony assaults also showed some
reduction in number within Lockwood, in contrast to
increasing numbers in the area as a whole. Thus,
despite the likelihood that the rate of crime
reporting increased when community policing began,
the reported violent crimes at Lockwood Gardens
accounted for just 5.4 percent of such crimes in
the surrounding area in 1993 and 4.8 percent in
1994. (By contrast, Lockwood generated 12.2 percent
of the reported violent crimes in 1991 and 9.9
percent in 1992.)

The pattern of changes for reported Part I property
crimes was less uniform than for violent crimes.
Even so, reported property crimes in Lockwood
Gardens were 4.5 percent of the area's in 1993 and
4.0 percent in 1994, compared to 5.5 percent and
4.6 percent in 1991 and 1992, respectively. Taking
all these reported Part I offenses together, the
proportion occurring in Lockwood Gardens was
clearly reduced in the period after security was
increased and physical design changes were
initiated. By 1994, total Part I crimes (except
arson) had decreased by 46.5 percent from the 1991
level and had also fallen in relation to reported
offenses in the surrounding area. These data
support the observations of respondents and the
changes in behavior reported for residents of the
development, although they do not prove a direct
causal link between the program and these results.

Oak Park. The data available to examine crime
changes in Oak Park were much less detailed than
those for Lockwood Gardens and Genesis Park.
(Exhibit F-4 shows the numbers of Part I offenses
for the entire village; however, the place-specific
crime prevention changes we have
described-including traffic modifications and the
Security Improvement Grants [SIGs]-were focused
primarily on the eastern part of the village.) In
the period between 1989 and 1994, there were
reductions in robberies, aggravated assaults, and
arson, while murders, sexual assaults, and thefts
(including motor vehicle thefts) fluctuated without
long-term change. The SIG program was targeted to
burglary reduction in particular, but (relative to
1989) there were large numbers of burglaries in
1992 and 1993; the drop in 1994 cannot be assumed
to be the start of a trend. Thus, perhaps because
they are village-wide, the Oak Park crime data do
not clearly indicate improvements in the levels of
offenses targeted by the local program.

Castle Square Apartments. Boston Police Department
(BPD) data on Part I offenses (except arson) were
made available for the Castle Square Apartments
(CSA) for 1990 through 1994. (The data are shown in
Exhibit F-5.) Enhanced security began at CSA in
February 1992, with renovations and other changes
following; thus, the BPD data span the period of
change. The data show notable percentage declines
over the 4 years in nearly all crime categories,
with violent crimes dropping more than property
crimes. The property offenses of burglary and motor
vehicle theft fluctuated; even in these categories,
however, the incidences in 1993 and 1994
represented a reduction compared to earlier years.
There was a 58 percent decline in the overall
number of Part I offenses between 1990 and 1994.
Between 1992 and 1994, the overall improvement was
slightly lower, but total Part I offenses were
still reduced by almost half.

Five Oaks. The Five Oaks neighborhood of Dayton
experienced a decline in building conditions
between 1990 and 1992, with average sales prices
for homes also decreasing during that period.
Further, a sharp upward turn in both violent and
property crime from 1991 to 1992 led to the
formation of a Dayton Police Department Five Oaks
"Strike Force" as a temporary response, increasing
arrests for prostitution and drug offenses.[5] The
Neighborhood Stabilization Plan, designed by the
city and the Five Oaks Neighborhood Improvement
Association (FONIA) with the help of architect and
planner Oscar Newman,[6] consisted of:

o 35 street closures to divide Five Oaks into
mini-neighborhoods (completed between July and November
1992).

o 26 alley closures to reinforce the traffic
changes (completed between October 1992 and January
1993).

o Targeted loans for exterior property
improvements under the city's Real Estate
Assistance Challenge (REACH) program, to address
deteriorating physical conditions (begun in
December 1992).

An evaluation of the Neighborhood Stabilization
Plan, conducted by the City of Dayton, examined
changes in crime from 1989 to 1993 as one of the
indicators of program effects.[7] (Exhibit F-6 shows
the crime data reported in the Five Oaks
evaluation.) The numbers make it clear how sharp an
increase there was in both violent and property
crimes between 1991 and 1992, leading FONIA and the
police department to take action. Violent crimes
increased by 44 percent and nonviolent/property
crimes by nearly 12 percent between 1991 and 1992.
However, in the 11 months of 1993 after the crime
prevention changes were implemented, property
crimes fell by 52 percent, and all tabulated
offenses fell by 26 percent. On examining a longer
time period, it was discovered that in 1993 Five
Oaks was dealing with lower numbers of serious
offenses than at any time in the previous 5 years.
Thus, the City of Dayton concluded that the Five
Oaks neighborhood stabilization effort achieved its
goals.

Were the Changes Just Displacement?

As chapter 1 noted, the issue of displacement is
often raised to challenge both the objectives and
perceived successes of place-specific crime
prevention. If criminals are intent on committing
offenses, according to this critique, then they
will find a place to commit them; deflecting
offenders from one location simply produces victims
elsewhere. There have been strong theoretical
challenges to this model of offender behavior, as
well as empirical studies that document diffusion
of benefits and not simply displacement of crime.
Further, the distinction made between destructive
displacement (to more serious offenses or to
already heavily victimized populations) and benign
displacement (to less serious crimes, at lower
incidence, or toward a more even distribution
across communities or population groups)[8] should be
kept in mind as the displacement question is
addressed relative to the study sites.

When asked whether they had noticed changes (either
diffusion of benefits or displacement of crime) in
the surrounding areas following the modifications
in physical design and management made by their
programs, respondents offered a variety of views.
In Charlotte, a staff member of CMHP noted possible
displacement from Genesis Park to Druid Hills
(about 2 miles away) and Cummings Avenue, saying,
"The pockets already in place grow; they offer the
least resistance." An officer in the Planning Unit
of the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department made
this observation, "The dead-end streets, the
pockets next to highways and other nonresidential
uses are the ideal places for drug activity. These
physical features are isolating, and the lack of
access creates or increases vulnerability." Because
CMHP works in other neighborhoods, the organization
is considering broad alliances with many different
groups, all working together at neighborhood
watches and similar efforts. An official at the
Charlotte Housing Authority (CHA) agrees that as
community policing widens and target-hardening
spreads, fewer communities will be available for
drug trafficking.

In Oakland, the police lieutenant in charge of
OHA's security department believes that the changes
in Lockwood Gardens did displace some criminal
activity. Initially, the "bad actors" were pushed 
out onto 14th Street, the bordering commercial 
area; in fact, one dealer was killed because he 
moved onto someone else's turf there. Dealers still 
frequent the liquor store near the corner of 65th 
Avenue, but they do not venture onto Lockwood Gardens 
property and never enter the property in a group as 
they did in the past. As crime has been displaced from 
Lockwood, the Oakland Police Department (OPD) has dealt 
with more crime in the surrounding commercial area. 
Thus, in a sense, OHA security efforts forced the OPD
response. There were scattered complaints about
displacement in the first few months of concentrated 
security at Lockwood Gardens, but now area merchants have 
made more positive adjustments; for example, one liquor 
store will call the OHA security office when drug 
dealers reappear there. Considering the question of displacing
drug-related crime more broadly, the lieutenant noted:

Some of the market was resident demand, and now
they go elsewhere to buy. If the market is there,
someone else will move in to serve it if the
initial dealer is arrested or removed. Demand
reduction is necessary to prevent this from
happening. But the enforcement strategy is
necessary to turn the community around, change
their attitude.

In Boston, the area commander for the Boston Police
Department sees displacement from Castle Square of
the drug dealers and prostitutes, who move between
the Combat Zone and the South End, as well as of
some homeless people. In Tucson, considering the
changes in El Cortez Heights, a crime prevention
officer said:

Some [crime] has been displaced and some
eliminated. Let's assume that you won't get rid of
it all, but we can get rid of a lot and manage the
rest. People in next-door neighborhoods got more
involved and didn't complain to the police more.
They said, "How can we get involved?" They started
doing similar community things; not all of [the
strategies], but some.

Perhaps the most eloquent response to displacement
came from the president of the East Bridgeport
Community Council. Although she did not see any
evidence of crime displacement from the changes
made in her neighborhood, she said, ". . .
Displacement is a stupid misconception. Because if
it were true, it's like saying, 'Let's leave the
crime in one specific area. That's better for
everyone else.' No, it's better in someone else's
backyard!" She also spoke about working with other
resident organizations in the city, helping them
write grants, and working together to mobilize city
hall. This and other cooperative efforts among
nearby communities represent an important-albeit
indirect-diffusion of benefits from efforts to
reduce crime and improve safety in these
communities.

Lessons Learned

What did the various sites learn through informal
and formal monitoring and analysis that helped them
improve their place-specific crime prevention
programs? The lessons fall into six categories: (1)
changing attitudes; (2) managing security; (3)
maintaining communication; (4) securing the right
kind of funding; (5) taking advantage of
technology; and (6) avoiding the pitfalls of the
past. In considering these lessons, program
planners may wish to think about building a
feedback loop into their place-specific crime
prevention programs. The value of feedback and the
need for monitoring and evaluation to strengthen
operating programs cannot be overstated.

Changing Attitudes

Changes in the attitudes of key players were noted
as a significant result of the place-specific crime
prevention programs studied for this report.
Residents, police, and property owners/managers all
learned from their involvement in anti-crime
efforts, and the lessons most often had to do with
the value of their partners or the possibility of
bringing about real change in community conditions.

Resident support is critical for implementing
place-specific crime prevention programs, and
resident involvement and input in shaping the
changes is even more important. However, a change
in resident attitudes is often required for the
necessary support and involvement to be
forthcoming. At Mar Vista Gardens in Los Angeles,
the president of the Resident Management
Corporation (RMC), a long-term resident, learned
that it takes time for people to realize that they
can do something about a problem. Many people at
Mar Vista Gardens believed that the police would
not do anything about crime caused by people from
outside the development. The RMC president learned
that it is necessary to push government to care,
but that organized residents can succeed in getting
the response they need. Describing the process at
Robert B. Pitts Plaza, a redeveloped public housing
development in San Francisco, an architect with the
housing authority's modernization department
explained, "[Changing a community] takes a lot of
work and commitment, and the commitment has to come
from the housing authority and residents. The onus
mostly lies with the residents. They have to take
some responsibility and stand up for themselves."

Police attitudes have changed as law enforcement
officials have learned to recognize the impact of
crime prevention programs and residents' vital role
in them. The local Boston Police commander sees the
redesign of Castle Square Apartments as a major
improvement for that part of the South End
community. Management vigilance (including much
greater resident reporting than before) and
well-lit parking areas have kept the outside
dealers out, reducing the need for some of the
vigorous traffic and drug enforcement previously
required in the area. Thus, such efforts can
effectively reduce the load on local police
departments.

Involvement in place-specific crime prevention can
also change the attitudes of property owners or
managers. Making place-specific changes to the
physical environment and to management can be a
win-win proposition when a private developer and a
tenant organization work together. The initiative
at Castle Square Apartments in Boston's South End
taught the developer and head of the private
management company that "You can make money and do
good at the same time. You can work with residents
as partners and respect them fully." The
collaborative effort at Castle Square also
demonstrated to residents that the interests of the
two sides were not necessarily in conflict. The
joint venture showed that residents could work
together with a private developer for everyone's
benefit.

Finally, it can be difficult to make inroads in the
attitudes of people who are not involved in an
area's changes. In Charlotte, the CMHP at first did
not have a good marketing program to attract
prospective buyers. The reputation of the old
Kenney/Gibbs/Wayt neighborhood caused many
prospective buyers to decline an invitation to see
the newly renovated homes in Genesis Park. In
addition to hiring an experienced real estate
broker to head the marketing effort, CMHP quickly
learned that it helped if one of the required
homeowner classes for first-time buyers was held in
the Genesis Park model house, so that people
preparing to buy could see the positive changes in
the area; those who have been to Genesis Park are
far more likely to consider buying a house there.

Even with their success in selling Genesis Park
homes (nearly 60 were occupied at the end of 1996),
CMHP knows more attitudes remain to be changed.
While the partnership's overall goals for Genesis
Park are broad-making it a decent place to live by
creating affordable homeownership opportunities for
hard-working, low-income families with ambition-a
more immediate goal is simply to get pizza delivery
in the neighborhood, which will be a symbol that
the general public considers Genesis Park to be a
safe area.

Managing Security

At Castle Square Apartments, the CSTO and Winn
Management Company found that implementing changes
taught them how to phase out paid police details
and reduce paid security staffing gradually as they
regained control of the site. In their experience,
it was important to sustain a strong security
presence for some time after crime reductions
suggested this was no longer necessary. This
strategy guarded against the expectations of drug
dealers and prostitutes that enforcement would be
short-lived, which would have allowed them to
return to the site shortly after the burst of
security activity was over; apparently, this lesson
had been learned from years of dealing with
traditional police deployment rather than community
policing and resident involvement in crime
prevention.

Lessons about managing security have also been
learned at Lockwood Gardens in Oakland. Unable to
sustain financially the commitment of high levels
of staff and private security guards to the site,
OHA phased out the private guards in early 1995. In
addition, OHA security has been experimenting with
changing the number of officers assigned to the
community policing shifts (also sometimes skipping
the graveyard shift) and with parking the mobile
command center on 65th Avenue at irregular
intervals, to keep the drug dealers and other
offenders off their guard.

Maintaining Communication

In Genesis Park in Charlotte, CMHP construction
organizers have found that work proceeds in a
smoother fashion when communication and
coordination with the Charlotte Police Department
and other organizations is maintained on a daily
basis. The experience with Genesis Park taught CMHP
staff the importance of working partnerships with
other organizations. Teamwork certainly makes
everything easier, but effective teamwork depends
on frequent communication. This lesson was brought
home vividly to the coordinator of the neighborhood
reinvestment program for the Charlotte Engineering
Department: On his first day of work in Genesis
Park in 1990, as he began diagnosing the chronic
drainage problems in the area, he was caught in the
midst of gunfire and a police action. That
convinced him of the need to coordinate his actions
with the police department on a daily basis.

For the long term, all the organizations involved
in the revitalization of Genesis Park have
representation on the project committee, which
meets twice a month for mutual updates and
planning. The reporting is very detailed, the
assignments concrete, and the work moves ahead.

Securing the Right Kinds of Funding

Voicing a sentiment widely expressed among
respondents in all study sites, the commander of
Area D for the Boston Police Department noted that
funding for physical crime prevention is essential.
Given the scarcity of funding available for any
public-nonprofit ventures these days, creativity
about funding is indeed essential for community
organizations, housing authorities, and other
organizations engaged in the redesign of
neighborhoods and buildings for safety.

Lockwood Gardens in Oakland has benefited
considerably from a paid private security detail,
plus extensive gating and fencing. The physical
changes were paid out of OHA Comprehensive Grant
Program (CGP) funds, which may be used for housing
modernization and, to a limited degree, for certain
management improvements. CGP funding is still being
made available by the U.S. Department of Housing
and Urban Development (HUD) for upgrading public
housing around the United States. The Lockwood
security guards are paid from a Public Housing Drug
Elimination Program grant that will expire in 1997.
Residents of the once crime-plagued development are
deeply concerned about security at the development
once funding expires, as the housing authority does
not anticipate being able to continue carrying the
cost of the private security detail. Many at the
development fear that it is only a matter of time
and money before they lose all of the ground they
only recently gained against offenders at Lockwood
Gardens.

Both the Castle Square Apartments redevelopment
deal and the CMHP property purchases in Genesis
Park were made possible by masterful assemblies of
equity funds and credit from a wide variety of
public and private sources. For CMHP, however, the
most important funding has come from Charlotte's
Innovative Housing Fund; although not the largest
amount, this is funding with few strings attached,
and it has enabled the partnership to buy and hold
Genesis Park houses in inventory while
rehabilitating other parts of the community. On
Gibbs and Kenney Streets, the first of the streets
to be tackled, it was quite difficult to sell the
renovated houses because of continuing problems in
the rest of the neighborhood, especially along
nearby Wayt Street. The solution was to buy the
entire 2000 block of Wayt; rehabilitation of these
houses is scheduled for 1997. Without the
Innovative Housing funds, it is unlikely the
partnership could have made the project work as
well as it has.

Oak Park makes creative use of Community
Development Block Grant (CDBG) funding and Village
Housing bonds for its broad strategy. The Residence
Corporation's revolving acquisition fund (for
buying deteriorating or foreclosed properties)
comes from interest-free CDBG loans, and its
rehabilitation money comes from bond funds. The
Housing Bonds also provide the SIG rehabilitation
grants to owners implementing security
improvements.

Taking Advantage of Technology

Several technologies hold great promise for
improving security at sites like those visited for
this report. A sergeant with Area D of the Boston
Police Department reported that cameras at Castle
Square Apartments moved the dealers away from the
front of buildings. In Macon, Georgia, the
successful use of electronic card keys at a Macon
Housing Authority development for the elderly has
sparked consideration of their use at other
developments. Similarly, positive results with
eight pan-tilt-zoom (PTZ) cameras at Grant Manor in
Boston (which allow a single staff person to
monitor outdoor and indoor activity in three
developments both day and night) have encouraged
another property manager, the Boston Housing
Authority, to consider their use at public housing
developments in the city. Other examples of
potentially cost-saving technology at use in some
sites include the magnetic card/keypad opening
system on the gates in Lockwood Gardens (which
could help substitute for private security guards,
if agreement could be reached with the city about
closing the gates) and use of the mobile security
van at OHA developments in lieu of permanently
stationed officers.

Avoiding the Pitfalls of the Past

Not all of the changes made at the studied sites
are accepted as obvious progress. In San Francisco,
an architect involved in the redesign of the Robert
B. Pitts Plaza believes that cities are doomed to
failure as long as poor people continue to be
concentrated together. He is vocal in his
opposition to the large concentrations of public
housing in particular parts of the city. In this
view, even reducing the density of poor people to
the level achieved at the Pitts site is not enough.
Crime around Pitts Plaza has remained constant. The
social aspects that contribute to crime in the
community have stayed the same or intensified, and
the actual situation may not have improved at all.
The architect noted, "Because Pitts is a new
development filled with new people, things haven't
gotten as apparent or as bad. [But] we still have
two sister projects [in the neighborhood] that are
basically the same as Yerba Buena Plaza West [the
predecessor of Robert B. Pitts Plaza] was, and they
cause most of the problems in that neighborhood."

Another pitfall concerns the materials used to
implement some of the place-specific design
changes. Public housing construction has tended to
use extremely durable-but also extremely cold and
institutional-materials. Now efforts are being made
to blend renovated developments with the style and
materials of other housing in the area. At the
Diggs Town development in Norfolk, and at Pitts
Plaza in San Francisco, however, some of the
construction materials used proved to be of
inadequate quality or durability for the sites. In
Norfolk, for example, some of the new porches are
already falling apart, and shoddy wooden
construction in San Francisco may need to be
replaced in only a few years. In no time at all
after the Diggs Town light fixtures had been
installed, vandals had broken into the control
boxes at the base of the outdoor fixtures and cut
the wires on a number of strategically placed
poles. These fixtures, installed to improve
opportunities for surveillance at prime drug
dealing locations, were temporarily rendered
useless by the vandalism. The Norfolk Redevelopment
and Housing Authority (NRHA) learned from the
vandalism that all of the regular screws used to
close the control boxes needed to be replaced with
tamper-proof screws.

The tendency to blame all crime and disorder on
outsiders, creating divisions where coalitions
could be built, is yet another pitfall to be
avoided. Some would argue that the crime prevention
strategies used in Oak Park rest on the premise
that most criminals active in Oak Park come from
Chicago. In the view of many village residents, the
source of crime still resides there, and Chicago
police are viewed as well-intentioned but lacking
the resources to tackle the problem. Crime
prevention in Oak Park, including the use of
cul-de-sacs and the SIG program, is believed to
have greatly reduced the opportunity for Chicago
troublemakers to commit crimes in Oak Park.
 
For Oak Park's residents however, this "us and
them" philosophy in no way contradicts the
village's commitment to diversity, strict code
enforcement, and remaining a good place to live.
Perhaps the most important lesson that efforts like
Oak Park's and the program at Mar Vista Gardens in
Los Angeles (another site in which financially
better-off residents pointed a finger at a poorer
community as the source of the problem) have taught
the larger communities is that their woes are, in
fact, metropolitan or even regional concerns.
Whatever the desires of some Oak Park and West Los
Angeles residents, neither community will ever be
able to cut itself off from crime entirely.
Instead, the initiatives have taught both
communities the importance of collaboration with
others, whether it be the housing authority, city
government, or a nearby residents' association.

Crime and Place Revisited

With the exception of Oak Park-for which only
village-wide statistics were available-the crime
statistics presented here clearly show that crime
in the communities was reduced overall. The decline
in the number of offenses committed in most crime
categories suggests (although it does not prove)
that the strategies and design changes the sites
implemented have had positive impacts on the
quality of life for residents in these communities.
Close observers indicate that, even if there was
some displacement (particularly of drug sales, as
demand reduction was not addressed in these
programs), it was by no means complete. In fact,
for Lockwood Gardens (where data were available on
crime trends in the surrounding area), reductions
were seen for the area as a whole in 1994. This may
indicate that some diffusion of benefits occurred
from the wide range of changes made at Lockwood
Gardens, although the scope and methods of this
study do not allow a firm conclusion to be drawn on
this point.

In addition, the changes made appear to have
contributed to improved day-to-day relationships
among residents, law enforcement, nonprofit
organizations, and other relevant local community
members. The process of working together to
implement the place-specific crime prevention
programs has helped foster greater familiarity and
better understanding among the groups. As a result,
the communities now have a track record and
experience to build from as they seek to tackle
further problems together.

The overall achievements of the place-specific
crime prevention programs in Charlotte, Oakland,
Boston, and Oak Park can be summarized as follows:

o Planning and execution of a well-conceived set
of physical redesign elements, based on close
analysis of the ways the built environment was
being used;

o Implementation of wide-ranging changes in the
management of private and public property in each
community, with the involvement of private owners
and managers, public agencies, and residents;

o Expansion or reorientation of security
efforts, involving a shift to community policing
and (in some cases) the coordinated use of private
security forces;

o Strengthening of the role of residents in
addressing community conditions, through the
development of communication and cooperation with
law enforcement officials, private owners and
managers, and other local players; and

o Reduction in crime and other improvements in
the quality of life in the community, as indicated
by police data and by observers and participants in
the local programs.

In addition, there were two major lessons learned
from the sites visited:

o Physical design modifications, management
changes, and changes in use should be tailored to
specific locations and coordinated in their planning 
and implementation.

o The most effective security and crime
prevention efforts are those that involve a
coalition of different players working together to
define the problem and then seeking solutions.

Through this research, the importance of selecting
approaches that work for a particular community has
become clear. As noted in chapter 3, the most
effective place-specific crime prevention
strategies are those that take into account the
geographic, cultural, economic, and social
characteristics of the target community. It is also
important that place-specific strategies respect
the habits and behavior of area residents. Crime
prevention is not a ""one size fits all" effort,
and some communities may require more attention and
ingenuity than others in crafting effective
strategies. Thorough analysis of the problems and
needs of a given community, as well as ongoing
monitoring and evaluation of the place-specific
strategies selected, are vital.

The report's many site examples demonstrate how the
physical environment can be altered by changing the
shape or appearance of the common areas,
controlling access to the site and buildings, and
improving natural surveillance opportunities.
Redefining the boundaries between private and
public space, opening up hidden areas, and
target-hardening are all important place-specific
crime prevention strategies. If management is
defined as the responsibility for maintaining order
in one or more aspects of a place, then a variety
of participants have an actual or potential role in
the management of specific places. Pairing physical
design changes with management changes that
support, facilitate, and reinforce their preventive
effects on disorder and illegal activities can be
highly effective. Indeed, place-specific crime
prevention seems to hold potential for addressing
current security and safety problems in many
residential areas in ways that are durable and
flexible enough to meet future needs.

Endnotes


1. Two recent studies that have used a
combination of methodologies to improve
interpretation of police crime data are T. 
Hammett et al., Public Housing Drug 
Elimination Program Resource Document (Washington,
DC: U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development, June 1994) and S. Popkin et al., An
Evaluation of the Chicago Housing Authority's
Anti-Drug Initiative: A Model of Comprehensive
Crime Prevention in Public Housing (Cambridge, MA:
Abt Associates Inc., October 1995). The Hammett
study of the Public Housing Drug Elimination
Program used qualitative, quantitative, and
ethnographic data to examine program impacts. The
Popkin study used resident survey data on crime
victimization (as well as on perceptions of local
conditions) in combination with official offense
counts.

2. The difficulties of evaluating crime
prevention efforts are discussed in appendix B.

3. The police forces of the City of Charlotte and
Mecklenburg County were consolidated over a period
of 2 years, culminating in combining patrol
responsibilities in March 1995. Thus, it was the
Charlotte Police Department that had jurisdiction
over community policing and responding to service
calls in Genesis Park until March 1995. At that
time, a change in police districts related to the
consolidation was the reason for reassignment of
Genesis Park's two original community policing
officers.

4. The area is defined as Oakland Police
Department Beats 29 and 30. The beat counts are
inclusive of Lockwood Gardens counts.

5. Evaluation of the Five Oaks Neighborhood
Stabilization Plan (Dayton, OH: Office of
Management and Budget, City of Dayton, January
1994): 5.

6. See the entry for the Institute for Community
Design Analysis in appendix D.
     
7. Evaluation of the Five Oaks Neighborhood
Stabilization Plan (Dayton, OH: Office of
Management and Budget, City of Dayton, January
1994).

8. R. Clarke, ed., Situational Crime Prevention:
Successful Case Studies (New York: Harrow and
Heston, 1992): 22-27.

------------------------------

Appendix A
Glossary of Acronyms

AA    Alcoholics Anonymous
ABA   Austin Boulevard Alliance, Oak Park, Illinois
ADI   Anti-Drug Initiative of the Chicago
      Housing Authority, Chicago, Illinois
AFDC  Aid to Families with Dependent Children
BHA   Boston Housing Authority, Boston, 
      Massachusetts
BOMA  Building Owners/Managers Association, Oak
      Park, Illinois
BPD   Boston Police Department, Boston, 
      Massachusetts
BRA   Boston Redevelopment Authority, Boston,
      Massachusetts
CBO   Community-based organization
CCNYC Citizens Committee for New York City, New
      York, New York
CCTV  Closed-circuit TV
CDBG  Community Development Block Grant Program,
      U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development
CDC   Community development corporation
CEI   Civil Enforcement Initiative, New York
      City Police Department, New York, New York
CGP   Comprehensive Grant Program, U.S. Department
      of Housing and Urban Development
CHA   Charlotte Housing Authority, Charlotte, North
      Carolina
CHBA  Clinton Hill Block Association, Brooklyn, New
      York
CHPC  Citizens Housing and Planning Council, New
      York, New York
CMHP  Charlotte-Mecklenburg Housing Partnership,
      Charlotte, North Carolina
CMPD  Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department,
      Charlotte, North Carolina
COP   Community-oriented policing
CPD   Charlotte Police Department, Charlotte, North
      Carolina (prior to consolidation with county
      police)
CPTED Crime prevention through environmental
      design
CRDA  Community Response to Drug Abuse Demonstration
      Program
CSA   Castle Square Apartments, Boston, 
      Massachusetts
CSAP  Center for Substance Abuse Prevention
CSTO  Castle Square Tenants' Organization, Boston,
      Massachusetts
DEED  Diggs Town Economic Empowerment Demonstration,
      Norfolk, Virginia
FONIA Five Oaks Neighborhood Improvement 
      Association, Dayton, Ohio
GED   Graduate equivalency diploma
GIS   Geographical information system
GPS   Global positioning system (satellite locating
      system for nonmilitary use)
HACLA Housing Authority of the City of Los
      Angeles
HPAC  Housing Programs Advisory Committee, Oak Park,
      Illinois
HUD   U.S. Department of Housing and Urban 
      Development
LAPD  Los Angeles Police Department, Los Angeles,
      California
MHA   Macon Housing Authority, Macon, Georgia
MIS   Management information system
MHFA  Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency, Boston,
      Massachusetts
NA    Narcotics Anonymous
NCPI  National Crime Prevention Institute,
      University of Louisville, Louisville, Kentucky
NIJ   National Institute of Justice, U.S.
      Department of Justice
NRHA  Norfolk Redevelopment and Housing 
      Authority, Norfolk, Virginia
OHA   Oakland Housing Authority, Oakland, California
OPD   Oakland Police Department, Oakland, California
PHA   Public housing agency or authority
PHDEP Public Housing Drug Elimination Program,
      U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development
POP   Problem-oriented policing
PTZ   Pan-tilt-zoom (camera)
RICO  Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
      Act
RMC   Resident management corporation/council
SARA  Scanning, analysis, response, assessment
SFHA  San Francisco Housing Authority, San
      Francisco, California
SIG   Security Improvement Grant Program, Oak
      Park, Illinois
TPD   Tucson Police Department, Tucson, Arizona
      UCLA University of California at Los Angeles

------------------------------

Appendix B
Review of the Research Literature

Several methods of research and practice, from
defensible space to community policing, have
addressed relationships between crime and place.
Together, these methods result in "place-specific
crime prevention." One constant aspect of
place-specific crime prevention approaches has been
the creation or modification of the physical
environment to prevent crime. However, the
integration of strategies to modify the use and
management of sites has strengthened environmental
design or redesign as a practical approach to crime
prevention in varied settings. Place-specific crime
prevention builds on crime prevention through
environmental design (CPTED; physical changes) and
draws on the results of research on active crime
prevention tactics (such as community policing and
community crime prevention) to emphasize
modification of design, use, and management of a
specific place to prevent crime. The evolution of
place-specific crime prevention has created a need
for information on both the implementation and
outcomes of these interventions. The theories
underlying these techniques, as well as practical
how-to manuals that were developed to foster their
use are discussed in this appendix.

Part of the theoretical basis for many
place-specific crime prevention strategies is the
assumption that many offenders are rational and
will not commit crimes where they perceive the
risks to outweigh the potential benefits. In
contrast to earlier assumptions that offenders are
motivated solely by personality, genetics and/or
upbringing, rational offender theory assumes that
individuals choose criminality based on perceived
benefits, risks, and degrees of difficulty in
committing a crime or choosing a particular
target.[1]  For place-specific crime prevention
strategies, rational offender theory suggests that
making the commission of a crime difficult and/or
risky enough will convince the majority of
potential offenders not to commit the crime in that
specific place. If rational offender theory and its
premise (that the offender is an opportunist who
weighs the criminal opportunity against the risk of
being apprehended) are correct, the potential
offender would not necessarily look for another
setting or more convenient opportunity for
committing the crime. Thus, there may be overall
reductions in crime as a result of place-specific
interventions.

Physical Crime Prevention: Defensible Space and
CPTED

There is a long tradition of research on the
relationship between physical design and crime. We
owe to Jane Jacobs an understanding of urban life
that incorporates attention to the physical design
and human use of spaces in a theory of urban
viability. Jacobs argued that increased citizen
surveillance, or "eyes on the street," would help
to maintain vitality and reduce crime in inner-city
neighborhoods.[2] Architect and planner Oscar Newman
soon tested and refined this idea, thereby
describing defensible space. Focusing on individual
buildings and public housing developments rather
than city blocks or neighborhoods, Newman claimed
that increased visibility and separation of space
into areas assigned to smaller groups of residents
would encourage residents' sense of territoriality
and improve their feeling of ability to control
that space, as well as their willingness to do so.[3]
Presumably, potential offenders would perceive this
attitude and the resulting greater level of
ordinary activity, and would be discouraged from
committing crimes within those spaces. 

Research on defensible space led to the recognition
of related physical strategies for crime
prevention, such as target-hardening (use of
dead-bolt locks, steel-core doors, and so on). The
field known as CPTED, including work on defensible
space and additional physical crime prevention
strategies, has been applied to a wide range of
sites and facilities, from public housing to luxury
estates, from office buildings to parking
structures, and from amusement parks to museums.[4]
 
Timothy Crowe summarizes CPTED as the practice that
comes from the assumption that ". . . the proper
design and effective use of the built environment
can lead to a reduction in the fear of crime and
the incidence of crime, and to an improvement in
the quality of life."[5] According to CPTED theory,
properly designed spaces encourage or allow
expression of a sense of territoriality among the
users of the space by providing opportunities for
crime prevention. CPTED interventions have included
design features such as:

o Target-hardening (use of tamper-resistant
materials such as polycarbonate windows, steel
doors, stronger locks).

o Access control (gates, traffic barriers, and
guarded entrances).

o Means for surveillance (ranging from windows
on outdoor public spaces to closed-circuit
televisions).

o Territoriality (fencing, gating, and other
strategies to identify physical spaces with smaller
groups of users).[6]
 
Some CPTED practitioners also make efforts to
include community representatives in the design
process in order to tailor specific physical
changes to the needs of the users of the space.
However, even with resident input, CPTED theorists
tend to focus on design changes alone, without
consideration of either accompanying or
coordinating the physical changes with strategies
to alter management or use.

Some CPTED strategies, particularly access control,
can encourage discrimination. The California
Supreme Court recently upheld a lower court's
decision against allowing gates to limit access to
public streets in Los Angeles's Whitley Heights
district.[7] The legal basis for the appellate court
decision rested on the state vehicular code, which
provides that "local authorities may not place
gates . . . on any street which deny or restrict
access of certain members of the public to the
street, while permitting others unrestricted access
to the street."[8] Although in some situations much
of the crime may appear to be committed by people
from outside the area, CPTED practitioners must be
careful to avoid creating de facto segregation due
to assumptions that any outsider is a criminal. For
example, in order to stimulate business and
decrease crime in Oak Park, Illinois, streets in a
commercial area were closed to cars, and planners
designed limited and predictable access and egress
routes. This design intervention reduced
shoplifting and vandalism, yet all people still had
equal access to the public streets.[9]

Another example, which is striking because of the
community context (an extremely impoverished
neighborhood of south-central Los Angeles), is the
Vermont-Slauson fenced and gated shopping center.
CPTED practitioners have praised Vermont-Slauson
for several reasons: (1) it is attractive; (2)
crime rates are quite low; (3) many of the stores
are minority owned, providing good role models for
children and residents; and (4) profits from the
mall have been reinvested into affordable housing
in the surrounding neighborhood.[10] The
Vermont-Slauson shopping center also emerged
relatively unscathed after the 1992 riots in Los
Angeles.

Active Crime Prevention: 
Community Policing and 
Community Crime Prevention

An emerging awareness that police departments alone
cannot prevent or punish all of the criminal
behavior in our society has led to research in
active community-based crime prevention. First
discussed as problem-oriented policing, the field
of community policing is the contemporary locus of
widespread efforts to improve police practice.
Community policing does not derive from the type of
causal theory about criminal behavior previously
described for CPTED. Rather, it entails a
coordinated or partnership approach to solvingproblems and suggests new tools for policing.
Rosenbaum and Eck believe that community and
problem-oriented policing strategies attempt to
improve the efficiency, equity, and effectiveness
of police practice, through problem-solving and
evaluation.[11] Although some expect that community
policing can fix everything, in practice community
policing programs usually employ only a subset of
available strategies.[12] The following are
strategies that have been included in
community-policing programs to a greater or lesser
extent:

o Problem-oriented policing focuses on patterns
of crime and uses research and cooperation,
sometimes with other agencies and/or citizens'
groups, to find a response or solution.

o Public relations strategies can include
advertising campaigns and walking or bicycle
patrols to improve community relations. Moderating
the public's expectations of police performance is
one public relations goal. Also, police agencies
have become more conscious of racism, both actual
and perceived, in their ranks. Rosenbaum and Eck
note that the word "community" (in community
policing) is often used euphemistically for
communities of color or others outside the
mainstream.[13] Ideally, police departments would
actively address racism beyond the realm of public
relations.

o Softening rigid hierarchies in police
departments is intended to improve police
efficiency. This follows a trend in management
toward total quality management, emphasizing
teamwork and collective responsibility rather than
rigid positions and divisions of labor.

o Formal partnerships between police, community
members, and other public agencies can be developed
to identify problems, improve relations, and plan
strategies for prevention. Unfortunately, fear of
crime or retaliation may discourage citizens from
participating in such partnerships. Also, police
officers need to educate themselves about racial
and cultural differences in order to establish and
maintain such a partnership with communities of
color.

o Assigning officers to foot or bicycle patrols
and opening neighborhood substations is meant to
improve police visibility and accessibility, and
thus improve responses to residents' concerns.
Informal interaction between residents and police
officers has different advantages and disadvantages
than the more formal community partnerships;
however, the success of both depends on the
interest of all parties in communicating and
cooperating.

Community or neighborhood crime prevention programs
differ from community policing in that they tend to
be initiated by community organizations rather than
police departments. In some ways, neighborhood
crime prevention is the predecessor to and
grass-roots counterpart of community policing. Both
sets of strategies share the assumption that crime
prevention must involve citizens and police, but
they differ in available resources and strategies.
The following are widely used neighborhood crime
prevention tactics:[14]

o Neighborhood, block, or apartment watches.

o Identifying and inventorying valued property
with engraved numbers, and placing stickers in
windows to alert potential burglars that all
valuables are traceable.

o Home security surveys (examining homes and
suggesting physical changes, such as
target-hardening and expanded lighting, to improve
security).

o Resident street or building patrols.

o Crime reporting projects.

o Resident-initiated and implemented physical
environment changes (such as pruning trees in parks
or painting over graffiti).

o Police-community boards.

o Home security improvements.

o Escort services.

Neighborhood crime prevention projects can have the
multiple benefits of reducing crime, empowering
residents, and strengthening community institutions
and organizations.

Place-Specific Crime Prevention: Combining Design
and Active Strategies

Although advocates of defensible space have clearly
recognized the importance of user participation in
defensible-space interventions,[15] they have not
emphasized strategies to ensure that defensible
space is actually defended. Research in the field
of community crime prevention has shown that
designing or redesigning defensible spaces is only
a starting point. Greenberg and colleagues[16]
studied links between crime rates, physical
characteristics, land use, and residents' sense of
territoriality in neighborhoods in Atlanta. They
found that boundary characteristics (such as
traffic on boundary streets, socioeconomic status
of surrounding neighborhoods, and insulation from
through-traffic) and land use (such as purely
residential versus mixed residential and
commercial) distinguished high- and low-crime
neighborhoods. The researchers developed a
household survey to measure territoriality but
found that high- and low-crime neighborhoods did
not significantly differ on this measure. Thus,
assuming the accuracy of their measure, even if
physical (re)design does directly influence
informal territorial control, territoriality does
not appear to be related to neighborhood crime
rates. It appears that a sense of territoriality
must be accompanied by specific land use and
boundary characteristics, and perhaps by more
formal active crime prevention strategies.

Many have criticized CPTED and defensible space
theories and the research supporting them.[17] The
assumption that people are "naturally" territorial
may be naive, particularly in contemporary urban
settings. Racial, ethnic, language, and class
divisions may make a sense of neighborhood identity
difficult to establish. Further, defensible space
and territoriality are difficult to quantify,
making conclusive evaluations difficult.[18] As noted
previously, a sense of informal territoriality
among residents is not sufficient to affect crime
rates.[19] Finally, users' and potential users' fear
of victimization or retaliation, whether or not
they are closely related to the realities of crime
in the area, also have a notable dampening effect
on both individual and collective behavior.[20] Thus,
strategies to address and reduce fear may need to
be implemented before the crime prevention benefits
of spatial (re)design can be realized.

Situational crime prevention developed in Britain
on a course parallel with the development of CPTED
in the United States. However, in response to the
perceived limitations of the theory supporting
CPTED, situational crime prevention theorists
emphasize legal and management issues in addition
to design concerns. According to Ronald Clarke, a
leading exponent of situational crime prevention:

Because it encompasses the entire range of
environments (and objects) involved in crime and
because it encompasses legal and management as well
as design solutions, situational prevention is . .
. broader than CPTED (which tends to be focused on
design of the built environment).[21]

Still, although the theory emphasizes these
multiple solutions, the practice of situational
crime prevention has lagged somewhat. Clarke's book
of successful case studies includes few examples of
projects integrating design, use, and management
strategies.[22]

In this report, the term place-specific crime
prevention is used to refer to approaches that go
beyond more narrow theories about environmental
design, drawing on more active strategies and
techniques yet retaining a location-
centered focus. Place-specific crime prevention
seeks to improve on CPTED's exclusive reliance on
physical modifications to influence human behavior.
As Reiss and Roth note:

The reason for the inconsistent and temporary
effects [of a CPTED demonstration project in
Hartford] appears to be that crime and violence
arise from interactions between the social
environment and the physical environment, which
cannot be controlled entirely through manipulations
of the physical environment [emphasis added]. The
communal feeling of territoriality and mutual
protection, on which the defensible space concept
rests, apparently failed to materialize . . ..[23]
 
Place-specific crime prevention addresses this
interaction by intervening in the social
environment as well as the physical environment of
a place, thereby analyzing and altering the
interactions among design, use, and management.

Although the term may be new, concepts supporting
place-specific crime prevention are not. The works
of Richard Gardiner, Allan Wallis, and Daniel Ford
from the late 1970's and early 1980's suggest
place-specific crime prevention principles. Wallis
and Ford's evaluation of a CPTED demonstration
project in Portland, Oregon, emphasized the
importance of going beyond defensible space and
including community organizations and police.[24]
Gardiner has long advocated integrating urban
village (community crime prevention), urban
fortress (access control and target-hardening), and
defensible space models for crime prevention.[25]
Circulation, public facility location, open space,
zoning, parking and other urban support systems
must support legitimate use of the area for
effective crime prevention. For example, in Freeway
Park in Seattle, Washington, a lack of foot traffic
combined with design flaws allowed criminals to
take over. Although the police used extensive
resources to remove illegitimate users from the
park, the lack of legitimate park users and active
management allowed criminal activity to return
after police shifted their attention elsewhere. In
contrast, skateboarders' legitimate use drove drug
dealers out of Skateboard Park in Portland,
Oregon.[26]

More recently, Taylor and Harrell have written an
extremely cogent examination of the evolution of
place-specific crime prevention approaches and of
the evidence supporting their use.[27] They identify
assumptions about offender behavior that underlie
manipulation of physical features for crime
prevention. In particular, they believe that
offenders consider the following factors when
deciding to commit a crime:

1. How likely and easy is it to enter the area?

2. How visible, attractive, and vulnerable are
the targets in the area, once entrance is gained?

3. What are the chances of being seen committing
the crime?

4. If seen, what are the chances that others will
intervene?

5. Whether seen or not, how quickly and directly
can the area be left after the crime is
committed?[28]

Notice that these factors point directly to the
interrelationship of physical design (items 1, 3,
5), management (items 1, 3, 4, 5), and use (items
2, 3, 4) of a specific place.

Similarly, Fleissner and Heinzelmann advocate
integrating attention to physical characteristics
and crime with analysis of the activities of the
people who use a given space.[29] CPTED techniques
can control access, facilitate surveillance, and
increase users' sense of security; community
policing can prevent fear of crime from becoming
isolating and self-fulfilling. Fleissner and
Heinzelmann argue that CPTED and community policing
can and should complement each other.[30]
 
The theoretical work on routine activities also
points to design, use, and management of places as
all being critical to crime prevention. If crime
results when motivated offenders and vulnerable
targets converge in space and time in the absence
of a capable guardian,[31] then prevention requires:

1. Making access to the area more difficult for
motivated offenders, through design changes and
ongoing management.

2. Making targets less vulnerable, by encouraging
more users to be present and by teaching users
basic safety practices (for example, to prevent
purse-snatching, an older woman should carry her
purse out of sight or with the strap across her
chest, not over one shoulder).

3. Ensuring that the area is suitably guarded,
through a combination of encouraging legitimate
users and making it clear that the area is managed.

If these three steps are taken, neither users nor
managers should fear to act if they see an offense
being committed.

The requirement of active management of places may
be criticized as unrealistic in an era of austere
public budgets and lean private business
operations. It therefore seems important to clarify
here what is meant by the managerial component
(although it is discussed more fully in chapter 2).
The management of places has both formal and
informal aspects. Formally, we look to public
services-including not only policing but also
planning, public works, and sanitation-for the
management of our public spaces. Attention was
drawn most vividly to the need for management of
public spaces by Wilson and Kelling's 1982 article
"Broken Windows."32 The authors describe the potent
effects of signs of disorder-such as abandoned
cars, graffiti, and broken windows-on the residents
of urban neighborhoods and the users of public
streets and sidewalks. Removing and preventing such
signs of disorder as they occur on public property
is the responsibility of police and other public
sector agencies. These agencies must work in
concert to avoid the fear-generating and
use-dampening effects of disorder on urban and
suburban neighborhoods.

However, active management also includes informal
components, such as residents taking responsibility
for the street in front of their homes. All
evidence reviewed here points to the likelihood
that active formal management will encourage and
strengthen informal management, so that suitable
and capable guarding of spaces-from disorder as
well as from crime-becomes a shared responsibility
and a more potent force against crime.

Evaluation Research and Findings


In the evaluation literature on community or
neighborhood crime prevention, community-oriented
policing, and design-based crime prevention
programs, both the findings and the programs
themselves vary significantly. Programs differ in
tactics, goals, participants, locations, and
available resources. Evaluations and their results
differ by methods of analysis, measures of success
(outcome measures), and interpretations of
findings. Measurement problems in this field are
well known. For example, the crime level may look
very different if one study measures it using the
number of calls for service and another uses
conviction rates.[33] Similarly, a higher count of
convictions might mean that police and prosecutors
are doing a better job, or that there have been
more crimes overall. 

Few interventions and even fewer evaluations make
use of the full range of place-specific crime
prevention strategies. Accordingly, only a few
exemplary evaluations are discussed here, bearing
in mind that the emergence of place-specific crime
prevention has created a compelling need for
further, more integrated studies.
 
In 1973, the Hartford Neighborhood Crime Prevention
Program targeted burglary, robbery, and
purse-snatching in two neighborhoods by integrating
the efforts of police, citizens, and CPTED. In one
neighborhood, there was additional policing and
citizen organizing to prevent crime, while in the
other, those interventions were combined with
modifications of the physical space. One study
found that the Hartford program significantly
reduced theft crimes in both neighborhoods,[34] but
another study concluded that these results were
short lived.[35]

The National Institute of Justice (NIJ) funded
three early CPTED demonstrations in the late
1970's. One project focused on a mixed commercial
and residential area in Portland, Oregon, and
incorporated the efforts of community organizations
and the police department in addition to design
modifications. The Portland project was the most
successful, clearly reducing some types of crime.[36]


A rare and early instance of an evaluation
addressing the full range of place-specific crime
prevention strategies is the study of crime
reduction in Fairview Homes (a public housing
development in Charlotte, North Carolina).[37] The
crime prevention program combined physical design
changes, management improvements, resident
organizing, and partnerships between public
agencies and private neighborhood organizations.
The study showed that "the two goals of the
program-increased reporting of crime and reduced
incidents of victimization-were not only met but
exceeded."[38]
 
The Chicago Housing Authority has implemented a
program called the Anti-Drug Initiative (ADI),
which includes building sweeps for guns, drugs, and
illegal occupants; improved security through guards
and lobby access control; eviction of unauthorized
tenants; improved responses to residents' service
and maintenance needs; and drug prevention and
intervention programs. The ADI has involved police
officers, public housing management, residents, and
social service providers. An early evaluation of
this program found evidence that it was fairly
successful in reducing crime and drugs in public
housing; the study suggested that tenant stability
and community base were essential to the ADI's
success.[39]

Other evaluations have examined elements of
place-specific crime prevention rather than
comprehensive efforts. Several have focused on
patrols and policing. At the New York City Housing
Authority (NYCHA), resident patrols involve 15,000
participants, and housing developments with active
patrols appear to experience less crime and
vandalism and more social cohesion than those
without active patrols.[40] However, the causal
relationship here has not been established; greater
social cohesion may well be a prerequisite for,
rather than a result of, effective resident
patrols.

Also in New York City, police bicycle patrols
operating in public housing developments achieved
more arrests (particularly drug arrests), fostered
better community relations, and gathered more
intelligence than the previous policing mode, in
which cruisers were assigned to the same
neighborhood.[41] A community policing and access
control project in Lawrence, Massachusetts,
improved resident/police relations but did not
significantly affect drug-related crime.[42]
 
The Seattle Police Department has implemented a
particularly successful community policing program
focused on building partnerships among citizens,
police, and other public agencies. Evaluations of
this project have concluded that:

o Traditional policing and community policing
must be combined.

o Crime and fear of crime are lower in
neighborhoods where territoriality or neighborhood
pride is expressed through the appearance of the
neighborhood.

o Community policing may create turf conflicts
among police and other agencies unaccustomed to
partnerships.

o As much of the police department as possible
should cooperate on a coordinated community
policing effort.

o Community policing may increase the number of
less urgent citizen calls for service.

o Community policing requires skills different
from those needed for traditional policing.

o Successful partnerships should expand
membership (including more agencies and citizen
groups) and goals (considering the needs of more,
and more varied, populations).[43]

A recent process evaluation of the Community
Responses to Drug Abuse (CRDA) demonstration,
designed by the National Training and Information
Center and the National Crime Prevention Council,
found that local community organizations
accomplished a great deal, including creation of
partnerships, changes in police-community
relations, and enhanced capacity to mobilize
anticrime and antidrug 
resources.[44]
 
An evaluation of interventions operated by public
housing agencies (PHA's) and funded by the U.S.
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)
through the Public Housing Drug Elimination Program
(PHDEP) examined both the implementation and impact
of these local antidrug and anticrime efforts.[45]
Local agencies designed the programs (which could
include physical improvements, security activities,
drug prevention, and/or drug treatment) on the
basis of conditions and needs in specific targeted
public housing developments. This study employed a
variety of research methods and assessed
effectiveness on a range of possible impacts,
including reductions in drug-related crime,
improvements in resident quality of life, increased
resident empowerment, establishment of linkages
with other organizations, and creation of broader
neighborhood effects. The study found some
diminution of open-air drug activity in 10 of the
15 sites that received intensive study, as well as
increased resident feelings of safety and freedom
of movement, some increases in resident
empowerment, and some improved linkages with
external agencies and groups.[46] Data are also
available from the study on the nationwide use of
PHDEP funds for security-related physical
improvements.

Another body of research related to place-specific
crime prevention has focused on the role of
management in maintaining livable communities in
subsidized housing developments and has called
effective managers the "saints" of urban
neighborhoods.[47] A recent evaluation of the effects
of community development corporations (CDC's) on
their neighborhoods found that poverty, crime, and
gang activity are major factors affecting property
management and that property managers can create
safer conditions for their residents by using a
range of techniques, including:[48]

o Screening prospective tenants.

o Setting and enforcing rules (in addition to
lease requirements) designed to protect the
physical property and the safety, privacy, and
peace of residents.

o Using for-cause eviction to remove problem
tenants (after other means of resolving the
problems did not succeed), to demonstrate that
rules must be followed and illegal behavior will
not be tolerated.

o Maintaining secure premises and keeping the
properties clean and in good repair to benefit both
residents and the surrounding neighborhood.

o Providing security coverage, where necessary,
through use of private guards (through contracted
services or an in-house security force).

Another recent study of the management challenge
for nonprofit managers of affordable housing found
"many examples of non-profit doing good jobs under
these conditions [widespread unemployment, poor
maintenance, vandalism, drug dealing, and
gangs]."[49] Quoting one site manager, the report
tied some management difficulties to design
problems: "This development is a suburban dream.
The problem with the dream and the very cozy layout
with the many corners and crannies is that it is
not built for security and defensible space."[50] The
study documented improvements made to overcome this
design flaw, including target-hardening and access
control, but noted that these changes were costly.

These two studies are limited by their lack of
impact analysis. While both used indicators of
building condition and gathered data on resident
satisfaction, they did not examine crime data or
focus on whether security measures reduced crime
incidence, victimization, or fear of crime in the
housing complexes, buildings, or surrounding areas.
Indeed, the lack of analysis demonstrating program
impacts will prove characteristic of a number of
sites used in this report.  While there are data to
suggest that each program highlighted in this
report has achieved positive results, there is a
great need for further research in this field
despite the methodological and practical
difficulties.

Displacement of Crime or Diffusion of Benefits?

The possibility of crime displacement is one of the
major challenges raised when place-specific crime
prevention efforts are proposed. Many practitioners
express concern that place-specific programs will
simply move (or displace) crime from the target
area to other areas or other victims, without
reducing the overall crime level. Put more
formally, "under this view, situational changes
[can] affect the pattern of crime but not its
volume: the latter [is] determined by motivational
factors."[51]

While law enforcement officials and other
practitioners appear to accept crime displacement
as a common occurrence, relatively little empirical
research has focused directly on this phenomenon.
Two fairly recent surveys of the crime control
literature have examined the existing studies that
address displacement and analyze the evidence they
contain. A 1993 review of 33 studies (covering a
wide range of crimes and settings) found that only
3 showed evidence of much displacement, 12 others
found evidence of some displacement, while the
remaining 18 found no such evidence.[52] Perhaps more
important, despite the potential for different
types of displacement (not just in time or space
but by target, method, crime type, or perpetrator),
there is a notable lack of research on what
situations give rise to varying types and levels of
displacement and why.[53]

A more recent review of 55 published articles on
crime prevention began to address the question of
displacement by classifying studies based on the
type of intervention strategy used and other
factors.[54]  Overall, 22 of the studies identified
no displacement, while 33 reported some form of
displacement (none of the studies found complete
displacement; most instances were quite limited). A
high proportion of the studies showing no
displacement examined interventions that increased
the effort needed to commit a crime, involved
combinations of preventive measures rather than
single measures, and implemented preventive
measures throughout the jurisdiction targeted.[55]
This analysis suggests that external factors do 
affect the potential for and patterns of crime 
displacement.

Some researchers persuasively contend that the
perception of displacement as being automatic and
widespread is based on questionable assumptions
about criminal motivation, most notably that the
impetus to commit a crime comes completely from
within the offender and is not at all affected by
external factors. They argue that rational offender
theory better explains when and why displacement
may occur.[56] Distinctions also have been made
between benign and destructive displacement.[57] 
If there is displacement of criminal activity to more
serious offenses, or to already heavily victimized
areas or populations, then it would seem that
displacement does pose a significant concern.
However, if interventions more evenly distribute
victimization among different neighborhoods or
populations, if they redirect activity to less
serious crimes, or if they displace only a portion
of the initial amount of crime, there is a net
benefit.

Rational offender theory would also suggest that
crime prevention measures may produce diffusion of
benefits rather than displacement of crime. This
would occur if offenders experience increased fear
of detection (i.e., they perceive that the risk of
crime has increased) and/or decreased likelihood of
gain (i.e., they perceive that the reward of crime
is reduced) beyond the actual scope of the
intervention. Hesseling [58] notes evidence that
"some crime prevention measures have the unexpected
and beneficial effect of reducing crime in adjacent
control areas or for other targets," and Clarke and
Weisburd[59] argue that "recent evidence leads to the
conclusion that the latter process [diffusion of
benefits] may be no less common than the former
[displacement of crime]."

Diffusion of benefits is defined by Clarke[60] as
"the spread of the beneficial influence of an
intervention beyond the places which are directly
targeted, the individuals who are the subject of
control, the crimes which are the focus of
intervention, or the time periods in which an
intervention is brought."[61] Two processes underlie
diffusion: deterrence (through increasing the fear
of detection and thus the actual or perceived risk
of arrest) and discouragement (through reducing the
actual or perceived reward of crime).[62] When
potential offenders are deterred or discouraged
beyond the degree merited by the preventive
measures taken, diffusion of benefits will occur.
Clearly, practitioners should seek to design
interventions that reduce the total amount of crime
and/or that deflect activity to less serious crime
or to less victimized populations. Even better
would be the design of interventions whose effects
reach beyond their target and thus produce
diffusion of benefits.

Publications for Practitioners

Several manuals on design and active crime
prevention strategies have been published. (Those
currently available are listed in appendix D, with
information on how to obtain them.)
 
NIJ and HUD have each published information on
implementing active crime prevention strategies.
HUD has produced brief pamphlets with information
on successful resident patrols and community
policing programs, in addition to resources for
more information on starting similar programs.[63]
HUD also published a series of case studies of
anti-drug programs in public housing[64] and a guide
for community groups dealing with street drug
markets.[65] Most recently, HUD published an expanded
monograph on Oscar Newman's defensible space
work.[66] NIJ funded a more extensive manual on
community crime prevention, with information on
successful programs and tactics, and resources for
information and evaluation.[67] Sparrow, Moore and
Kennedy discuss police coalitions with community
groups and government agencies, describe success
stories, and argue for building such
partnerships.[68]

Prior to this publication, only two texts have
addressed the need to combine an analysis of
design, use, and management to optimize crime
prevention strategies. The earlier of the two is
Wallis and Ford's work from the Portland, Oregon,
CPTED demonstration project. To its credit, this
text emphasizes the importance of ongoing
evaluation and the inclusion of existing community
groups. Wallis and Ford emphasize that the
environment includes more than buildings, and that
successful interventions depend on the active
support of the users of a space: "In the CPTED
approach, then, 'environment' includes not only the
physical aspects of the setting, but social
programs, managerial approaches, and law
enforcement efforts as well."[69] The more recent
text was directed at public housing but has wider
applicability. This text-actually a workshop
curriculum prepared for HUD's Crime Prevention and
Security Division in 1995-formed the basis for
technical assistance workshops with local officials
and planners. It offers a variety of examples
within a framework grounded in the literature of
situational crime prevention.[70]

Endnotes

1. Rational choice or rational offender theory is
now widely accepted for a variety of reasons
discussed in "Editorial," Crime Environments and
Situational Prevention: European Journal of
Criminal Policy and Research v. 3, no. 3 (1995): 1. 
See also D. Cornish and R.V. Clarke, The Reasoning
Criminal: Rational Choice Perspectives on Offending
(New York: Springer Verlag, 1986).

2. J. Jacobs, The Death and Life of Great
American Cities (New York: Random House, 1961).

3. O. Newman, Design Guidelines for Creating
Defensible Space (Washington, DC: National
Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice,
Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, April
1976).

4. Secure and Livable Communities: Crime
Prevention Through Environmental Design, Paper
Abstracts and Speaker Biographies (Washington, DC:
AIA/ACSA Council on Architectural Research and
National Institute of Justice, 1993).

5. T. Crowe, Crime Prevention Through
Environmental Design: Applications of Architectural
Design and Space Management Concepts (Boston:
National Crime Prevention Institute, 1991): 1.

6. L. Curtis and I. Kohn, "Citizen Self-help and
Environmental Design: The Theory and Practice of
Crime Prevention in American Subsidized Housing" in
Crime and Public Housing: Proceedings of a Workshop
Held in September 1980, ed. M. Hough and P. Mayhew
(London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1982):
12.

7. "Neighborhood Anti-crime Plan Gets the Gate:
Court Rejects L.A. Community's 10-Year Effort to
Control Access," Law Enforcement News, (July 20,
1994): 5. The California Supreme Court refused
without comment to hear an appeal of the state
appellate court decision.

8. Ibid.

9. R. Gardiner, Design for Safe Neighborhoods:
The Environmental Security Planning and Design
Process (Washington, DC: National Institute of Law
Enforcement and Criminal Justice, 1978): 77.

10. R. Titus, "Security Works: Shopping Enclaves
Bring Hope, Investment to Blighted Inner-City
Neighborhoods." Urban Land (Jan. 2, 1990).

11. D. Rosenbaum and J. Eck, "The New Police
Order: Effectiveness, Equity, and Efficiency in
Community Policing," in The Challenge of Community
Policing: Testing the Promises, ed. D. Rosenbaum
(London: Sage Publications, 1994): 3-23.

12. Ibid.; H. Goldstein, The New Policing:
Confronting Complexity (Washington, DC: U.S.
Department of Justice, National Institute of
Justice, December 1993).

13. D. Rosenbaum and J. Eck, "The New Police
Order: Effectiveness, Equity, and Efficiency in
Community Policing," in The Challenge of Community
Policing: Testing the Promises, ed. D. Rosenbaum
(London: Sage Publications, 1994): 11.

14. J. Feins, Partnerships for Neighborhood Crime
Prevention (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of
Justice, National Institute of Justice, June 1983):
15-18.

15. Oscar Newman defined defensible space as "a
term used to describe a residential environment
whose physical characteristics-building layout and
site plan-function to allow inhabitants themselves
to become the key agents in ensuring their own
security. However, a housing development is
'defensible' only when residents choose to adopt
this intended role-a choice that is facilitated by
the development's design. Defensible space
therefore is a sociophysical phenomenon." O.
Newman, Design Guidelines for Creating Defensible
Space (Washington, DC: National Institute of Law
Enforcement and Criminal Justice, Law Enforcement
Assistance Administration, April 1976): 4. Emphasis
added.

16. S. Greenberg, W. Rohe, and J. Williams, "Safe
and Secure Neighborhoods: Physical Characteristics
and Informal Territorial Control in High and Low
Crime Neighborhoods," unpublished paper submitted
to the National Institute of Justice (September
1981).

17. P. Mayhew, "Defensible Space: The Current
Status of a Crime Prevention Theory," The Howard
Journal of Penology and Crime Prevention, 18
(1979):150-159. Cited in R.V.G. Clarke, Situational
Crime Prevention: Successful Case Studies (New
York: Harrow and Heston, 1992).

18. D. Dingemans, "Evaluating Housing Environments
for Crime Prevention." Submitted for publication in
Crime Prevention Review.

19. S. Greenberg et al., "Safe and Secure
Neighborhoods."

20. F. DuBow, E. McCabe, and G. Kaplan, Reactions
to Crime: A Critical Review of the Literature
(Washington, DC: National Institute of Law
Enforcement and Criminal Justice, November 1979).

21. R.V.G. Clarke, Situational Crime Prevention:
Successful Case Studies (New York: Harrow and
Heston, 1992): 7.

22. Ibid.

23. A.J. Reiss and J.A. Roth, "Perspectives on
Violence," Understanding and Preventing Violence,
(Washington, DC: National Research Council, 1993):
148.

24. A. Wallis and D. Ford, eds., Crime Prevention
Through Environmental Design: The Commercial
Demonstration in Portland, Oregon (Washington, DC:
U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of
Justice, 1980).

25. R. Gardiner, Design for Safe Neighborhoods:
The Environmental Security Planning and Design
Process (Washington, DC: National Institute of Law
Enforcement and Criminal Justice, September 1978):
16.

26. Ibid.

27. R. Taylor and A. Harrell, "Physical
Environment and Crime," NIJ Research Report
(Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice,
National Institute of Justice, NCJ157311, 1996).

28. Ibid., 3-4.

29. D. Fleissner and F. Heinzelmann, "Crime
Prevention Through Environmental Design and
Community Policing," Research in Action
(Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice,
National Institute of Justice, NCJ157308, 1996).

30. Ibid.

31. R.V.G. Clarke, ed., Situational Crime
Prevention: Successful Case Studies (New York:
Harrow and Heston, 1992): 10.

32. J.Q. Wilson and G.L. Kelling, "Broken Windows:
The Police and Neighborhood Safety," The Atlantic
Monthly (March 1982).

33. Many argue that more weight should be given to
incident data of calls for service; these are less
manipulable than conviction rates, which can be
influenced by the level of commitment to
prosecution.

34. R. Gardiner, Design for Safe Neighborhoods, p.
67.

35. A.J. Reiss and J.A. Roth, eds., "Perspectives
on Violence," in Understanding and Preventing
Violence (Washington, DC: Research Council, 1993):
148.

36. A. Wallis and D. Ford, Crime Prevention
Through Environmental Design: The Commercial
Demonstration in Portland, Oregon (Washington, DC:
U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of
Justice, 1980).

37. J. Hayes, The Impact of Citizen Involvement in
Preventing Crime in Public Housing (Charlotte, NC:
Fairview Homes Crime Prevention Program, 1982).

38. Ibid., i.

39. S. Popkin, L. Olson, A. Lurigio, V. Gwiasda,
and R. Carter, "Sweeping Out Drugs and Crime:
Residents' Views of the Chicago Housing Authority's
Public Housing Drug Elimination Program," Crime and
Delinquency, 41, no. 1 (January 1995): 73-99.

40. S. Sorensen, "Resident Patrols," Model Program
Briefs 2 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of
Housing and Urban Development, HUD-1444-PIH-RP).

41. S. Sorensen, "Bicycle Patrols," Model Program
Briefs 1 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of
Housing and Urban Development, HUD-1444-PIH-BP).

42. Ibid.

43. "Community Policing in Seattle: A Model
Partnership Between Citizens and Police," Research
in Brief (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of
Justice, National Institute of Justice, August
1992).

44. D. Rosenbaum, S. Bennett, B. Lindsay, and D.
Wilkinson, Community Responses to Drug Abuse: A
Program Evaluation (Washington, DC: U.S. Department
of Justice, National Institute of Justice, February
1994): 24-27.

45. T. Hammett, J. Feins, T. Mason, and I. Ellen,
Public Housing Drug Elimination Program Resource
Document (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of
Housing and Urban Development, 1993).

46. Ibid., Executive Summary, pp. vi-ix.

47. L. Keyes, Strategies and Saints: Fighting
Drugs in Subsidized Housing (Washington, DC: The
Urban Institute Press, 1992).

48. M.L. Sullivan, More Than Housing: How
Community Development Corporations Go About
Changing Lives and Neighborhoods (New York:
Community Development Research Center, New School
for Social Research, 1993), Chapter 5.

49. R. Bratt, L. Keyes, A. Schwartz, and A. Vidal,
Confronting the Management Challenge: Affordable
Housing in the Nonprofit Sector (New York:
Community Development Research Center, New School
for Social Research, 1994): 11.

50. Ibid., 125.

51. R.V. Clarke and D. Weisburd, "Diffusion of
Crime Control Benefits: Observations on the Reverse
of Displacement," in Crime Prevention Studies, v.
2, R.V. Clarke ed. (Monsey, NY: Criminal Justice
Press, 1994): 167.
 
52. See J.E. Eck, "The Threat of Crime
Displacement," Criminal Justice Abstracts v. 25
(1993): 529.

53. Ibid., 527-28.

54. R.B.P. Hesseling, "Displacement: A Review of
the Empirical Literature," in Crime Prevention
Studies, v. 3, Ronald V. Clarke ed. (Monsey, NY:
Criminal Justice Press, 1994): 197-230.

55. Ibid., 217.

56. R. Clarke and D. Cornish, "Situational
Prevention, Displacement of Crime and Rational
Choice Theory," in Situational Crime Prevention:
From Theory to Practice, K. Heal and G. Laycock,
eds., (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office,
1986): 1-16.

57. R.V. Clarke, ed., Situational Crime
Prevention: Successful Case Studies, pp. 22-27.

58. R.B.P. Hesseling, "Displacement: A Review of
the Empirical Literature," p. 217.

59. Ibid., 217.

60. R.V. Clarke and D. Weisburd, "Diffusion of
Crime Control Benefits: Observations on the Reverse
of Displacement," in Crime Prevention Studies, v.
2, ed. R.V. Clarke (Monsey, NY: Criminal Justice
Press, 1994): 179.

61. Ibid., 169.

62. Ibid., 173.

63. S. Sorensen, "Resident Patrols," Model Program
Briefs 2 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of
Housing and Urban Development, HUD-1444-PIH-RP);
and S. Sorensen, "Bicycle Patrols," Model Program
Briefs 1 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of
Housing and Urban Development, HUD-1444-PIH-BP).

64. T. Hammett, J. Feins, T. Mason, and I. Ellen,
Public Housing Drug Elimination Program Resource
Document, vol. 3: Case Studies (Washington, DC:
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development,
1993).

65. American Alliance for Rights and
Responsibilities, The Winnable War: A Community
Guide to Eradicating Street Drug Markets
(Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Housing and
Urban Development, 1991).

66. O. Newman, Creating Defensible Space
(Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Housing and
Urban Development, April 1996).

67. J.D. Feins, Partnerships for Neighborhood
Crime Prevention (Washington, DC: U.S. Department
of Justice, National Institute of Justice, 1983).

68. M. Sparrow, M. Moore, and D. Kennedy,
"Partnerships," in Beyond 911: A New Era for
Policing (New York: Basic Books, 1990): 172-196.

69. A. Wallis and D. Ford, eds., Crime Prevention
Through Environmental Design: An Operational
Handbook, p. 4.

70. S.L. Sorensen and E. Walsh, Crime Prevention
Through Environmental Design and Situational Crime
Prevention in Public Housing: Workshop Curriculum,
HUD Crime Prevention and Security Division,
Technical Assistance Workshop(s) (Bethesda, MD:
SPARTA Consulting Corporation, March 1995).

------------------------------

Appendix C
Guidelines and Checklists for Place-
Specific Crime Prevention Programs

Exhibit C-1. Situational CPTED Matrix for Public
and Indian Housing

Exhibit C-2. Worksheet: Increasing the Effort
Needed to Commit Crime

Exhibit C-3. Worksheet: Increasing the Risks
Associated with Crime

Exhibit C-4. Worksheet: Reducing the Rewards of
Crime

Exhibit C-5. Crime Prevention Through
Environmental Design (CPTED)

Exhibit C-6. Home Security Checklist

------------------------------

Exhibit C-5. Crime Prevention Through
Environmental Design (CPTED)

I. What is the Need for CPTED?
a. Crime
b. Fear of crime
c. Improve the quality of life in
the neighborhoods and the
workplace

II. Society's Response to Crime
a. Public sector
b. Private sector
c. Criminal justice system
d. Self-help type programs

III. Crime Concepts
a. "Urban Fortress Model"
This model represents a view of crime prevention 
which places sole reliance on securing buildings and 
areas so outsiders cannot gain access without approval.
-Isolate the resident from an environment which is 
perceived to be hostile.
-Designed to be effective against burglary and other 
crimes against residences.
b. "Defensible Space Model"
This model promotes that the design of the physical 
environment has the capacity to either deter or 
facilitate crime by enhancing the resident's ability 
to monitor and control his own environment.
-Based on the public housing projects conducted by 
Oscar Newman, he identified the following variables:
-Territoriality
The capacity of the physical environment to create                
for each individual perceived zones of territorial 
influence that results in a proprietary interest and 
felt responsibility.
-Design elements such as building placement, heights,
and size limitations.
-Natural surveillance
The capacity of physical design to provide
surveillance opportunities for residents.
-The defensible space concept proposed that if 
territoriality is achieved, it will help to 
eliminate or reduce the vulnerability to crime and, 
therefore, aid in deterring possible offenders.
c. "Urban Village Model"
It identifies social disorganization as a primary 
cause of crime, defining it as the breakdown in
the mechanism that fosters personal relationships, 
cooperation, recognition, and morale.
-The urban village model depends
primarily on social homogeneity.

IV. Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design                 
CPTED advocated that with the proper design and                  
effective use of the building environment it will 
lead to a reduction in the incidence of crime and 
the fear of crime.
-For several thousand years, an awareness of how                  
the environment shapes behavior has been used by                  
architects, city planners, and residential dwellers 
to elicit desired behaviors.
-CPTED promotes a positive change in the attitude                 
of the citizens.
-There are three Basic CPTED Strategies
a. Access control
This is a design concept directed at decreasing                   
crime opportunity. Access control strategies are                  
typically classified as:
-Organized (guards, receptionists, etc.)
-Mechanical (locks, physical security)
-Natural (spatial definition)
-An objective of access control is to deny access to              
a crime target and to create a perception of risk in              
offenders.
b. Surveillance
This is a design concept directed primarily at 
keeping intruders under observation. Therefore,                   
the primary thrust of a surveillance is to 
facilitate observation. Surveillance strategies 
include:
-Patrol (security, police, citizens)
-Mechanical (lighting, CCTV)
-Natural (windows, street observations)
c. Territoriality
This concept suggests that physical design can                    
contribute to a sense of territoriality. Thus, 
the physical design can create or extend a sphere 
of influence so that users develop a sense of 
proprietorship, and potential offenders perceive                 
that territorial influence.
-At the same time, it was recognized that natural                 
access control and surveillance contributed to a                  
sense of territoriality, making it effective for
crime prevention.
d. "Three-D" Approach
"Three-D" approach to space assessment provides                   
a simple guide in determining how the space is                    
designed and used.
-All human space has some designated purpose.
-All human space has social, cultural, legal or
physical definitions that prescribe the desired and               
acceptable behaviors.
-All human space is designed to support and control               
the desired behaviors.
e. CPTED planning
-Crime analysis
-Demographics
-Land use
-Observations
-Interviews
-Coordination and communication
-Crime analysis
-Police
-Reported crime
-Trends and patterns
-M.O.
-Demographics
-City planning, census bureau
-Nature of the population
-Land use
-City planning, zoning, engineering
-Describe the physical allocations and 
use of land
-Observations
-Go out into the neighborhoods
-What is happening, where, when, how
why
-Interviews
-People's perceptions
-Survey
-Coordination and communication
-Between policy, security, planners, 
architects, engineers
f. How policy and security
can use CPTED
-Police
o  Organize neighborhoods and
business

o  Neighborhood watch, business
watch, citizen patrols, security surveys

o Community and business organizing

o Enabling legislation

-Private

o Problem identification

o Building construction with
CPTED

o Crime prevention programs

o Employee and citizen
participation

g. Optimizing CPTED
-Communication
-Security, architects,planners, engineers, 
and community
-What is the "State-of-the-Art"
-Evaluation and maintenance
-Reduce liability and improve the quality of life

------------------------------

Appendix D

Sources of Information, Training, and Technical
Assistance

Information Sources (Publications)

American Alliance for Rights and Responsibilities
Suite 1112 
1725 K Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20006
(202) 785-7844

The Winnable War: A Community Guide to Eradicating
Street Drug Markets, by Roger Conner and Patrick
Burns, is one of the most recent publications of
the American Alliance for Rights and
Responsibilities (AARR). This publication offers
detailed advice on how to combat drugs in urban
areas and provides insight through examples.

AARR is a nonprofit membership organization working
primarily in three areas: drug and alcohol abuse;
the rights and responsibilities of families; and
the security of public spaces. AARR works to find
solutions that balance rights and responsibilities
in public policy questions. The group works to find
legal and operational solutions to problems facing
urban areas and also works to defend legislated
solutions that are challenged in court.
 
American Institute for Architectural Research
Attn: Pradeep Dalal, Research Associate
1735 New York Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20006-5292
(202) 879-7753
(202) 626-7425 (Fax)
dalalp@aia.org (e-mail)


Founded in 1995 in cooperation with the Association
of Collegiate Schools of Architecture, the American
Institute for Architectural (AIA) Research's
mission is to support architectural research and
design excellence by identifying the research needs
of the architectural discipline. AIA Research
advocates research that:

o Addresses compelling societal needs to which
the professional and educational architectural
communities can contribute knowledge and skills.

o Contributes to architecture as a learned and
knowledge-based discipline.

o Demonstrates ways to integrate research as
part of the design process and to utilize design as
part of the research process.

o Builds on and extends prior knowledge.

o Engages in interdisciplinary collaboration,
both within and beyond the design and building
professions.

In pursuit of these goals, in 1996, with support
from the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development, AIA Research convened a national forum
on the role of environmental design in reducing
crime in public housing. Four monographs were
developed as follow-up activities to a similar
conference held in 1995:

D. Fleissner and F. Heinzelmann, Crime
Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) and
Community Policing ($2.50; also available through
the National Criminal Justice Reference Service).

M. Smith, CPTED in Parking Facilities ($2.50).

W. Brill and C. Gordon, The Expanding Role of
CPTED in Premises Liability ($2.50).

R.B. Taylor and A.V. Harrell, Physical
Environment, Crime, Fear, and Crime-Related
Problems: Implications for Prevention and Community
Viability ($2.50; also available through the
National Criminal Justice Reference Service).

To order any of the above documents, send payment
to AIA Research, 1735 New York Avenue, N.W.,
Washington, D.C. 20007. Payment may be made by
check (payable to AIA) or by Visa or MasterCard.

Cadwalader, Wickersham, and Taft
Marketing Department
100 Maiden Lane
New York, NY 10038
(212) 504-6000

A Civil War: A Community Legal Guide to Fighting
Street Drug Crime is an informational guide
intended to help community groups understand how
civil measures (in addition to criminal ones) can
be used to combat drug-related problems within
their community. The book focuses on five areas:

1. Using common law actions, such as small-claims
actions, as alternatives to criminal procedures.

2. Seeking help from government agencies
regarding revocation of permits and licenses to
individuals and/or businesses who allow illicit
drug-related activities.

3. Using the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO) or similar state laws to
dismantle crack houses.

4. Having the government use forfeiture/seizure
laws to seize drug-related areas and materials.

5. Combating drug activities in housing units.

To obtain copies of A Civil War: A Community Legal
Guide to Fighting Street Drug Crime, write to
Cadwalader, Wickersham, and Taft. The book is
available free to New York State residents and for
$5 (to cover postage) for all non-residents. (At
this writing, only 800 of the original 8,000 copies
are left.)

Center for Community Change
Carol Juergens, Publications
Center for Community Change
1000 Wisconsin Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20007
(202) 342-0567
(202) 342-1132 (fax)

The Center for Community Changes (CCC) offers a
variety of useful publications on improving public
housing in the United States including these:

How to Save and Improve Public Housing: An
Action Guide

The HOME Program: A Basic Guide for Community
Organizations.

These manuals emphasize practical methods of
transforming urban areas into more livable spaces.
CCC also publishes Community Change (a quarterly on
issues involving housing projects).

Citizens Housing and Planning Council
218 West 40th Street, 12th Floor
New York, NY 10018
(212) 391-9030
(212) 391-9033 (fax)

The Citizens Housing and Planning Council (CHPC)
has published an informative short booklet by
Timothy Vance, entitled How to Get Drug Enterprises
Out of Housing. CHPC is a nonprofit,
public-interest organization concerned with
housing, planning, and urban development in New
York City. Since 1937, CHPC has been dedicated to
developing sound housing policy for low- and
moderate-income families, and rational, realistic,
and fair city planning. CHPC serves the public as a
watchdog, civil resource, educator, and advocate.
 
Crime Prevention Coalition
National Crime Prevention Council
1700 K Street, N.W., 2nd Floor
Washington, DC 20006

The Crime Prevention Coalition publishes Crime
Prevention in America: Foundations for Action, a
short book detailing principles for communities to
use in preventing crime. The guide relates general
ideas and specific examples of how individual
communities have implemented them. The Crime
Prevention Coalition works for individual,
community, and law enforcement cooperation and
coordination to help prevent crime.

National Criminal Justice Reference Service
P.O. Box 6000
Rockville, MD 20850
(800) 851-3420

The National Criminal Justice Reference Service
(NCJRS) was created to provide research findings
from the U.S. Department of Justice to criminal
justice professionals, prosecutors, and criminal
justice researchers. Most recent publications are
available from NCJRS at no charge. They include:
          
o F. Earls and A. Reiss, "Breaking the Cycle:
Predicting and Preventing Crime," Research Report
(1994).

o P. Finn and M. O'Brien Hylton, "Using Civil
Remedies for Criminal Behavior-Rationale, Case
Studies, and Constitutional Issues," Issues and
Practices (October 1994).

o D. Fleissner, N. Fedan, D. Klinger, and E.
Stotland,"Community Policing in Seattle: A Model
Partnership Between Citizens and Police," Research
in Brief (1992).

o D. Fleissner and F. Heinzelmann, "Crime
Prevention Through Environmental Design and
Community Policing," Research in Action (1996).

o H. Goldstein, "The New Policing: Confronting
Complexity," Research in Brief (1993).

o T. Rich, "The Use of Computerized Mapping in
Crime Control and Prevention Programs," Research in
Brief (1995).

o J. Roth, "Understanding and Preventing
Violence," Research in Brief (1994).

o R. Taylor and A. Harrell, "Physical
Environment and Crime," Research Report (1996).

o C. Uchida, B. Forst, and S.O. Annan,
"Controlling Street-Level Drug Trafficking:
Evidence from Oakland and Birmingham," Research in
Brief (1992).

o C. Uchida, B. Forst, and S.O. Annan, "Modern
Policing and the Control of Illegal Drugs: Testing
New Strategies in Two American Cities," Research
Report (1992).

o B. Webster and E. Connors, "The Police, Drugs,
and Public Housing," Research in Brief (1992).

U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development
451 Seventh Street, S.W.
Washington, DC 20410
(202) 708-1197
HUD USER (800) 245-2691 (for publications'
availability)

The Office of Public and Indian Housing, U.S.
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD),
publishes some useful materials on crime prevention
for public housing practitioners.

o H. Cisneros. Defensible Space: Deterring Crime
and Building Community (1995).

o "Community Policing," Model Program Briefs 9
(HUD-1444-PIH-CP).

o T. Hammett, J. Feins, T. Mason, and I. Ellen,
Public Housing Drug Elimination Program Resource
Document (1993).

o O. Newman, Creating Defensible Space (1996).

o S. Sorensen, "Bicycle Patrols," Model Program
Briefs 1 (HUD-1444-PIH-BP).

o S. Sorensen, "Resident Patrols," Model Program
Briefs 2 (HUD-1444-PIH-RP)
 
Technical Assistance and Training

American Association of Retired Persons: Criminal
Justice Services
601 E Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20049
(202) 434-2277

The American Association of Retired Persons,
Criminal Justice Services division, provides crime
prevention training manuals and multi-media
presentations as a public service. The organization
also offers a structured course on helping law
enforcement officers deal more effectively with
senior citizens.

Citizens Committee for New York City
Felice Kirby, Director
Crime Activities Committee
Citizens Committee for New York City (CCNYC)
305 7th Avenue, 15th Floor
New York, NY 10001
(212) 989-0909
(212) 989-0982 (fax)

Founded in 1975 by the late Senator Jacob Javits,
the Citizens Committee for New York City (CCNYC)
supports community-based action to improve
conditions in urban neighborhoods through a variety
of institutes, projects, and grants. CCNYC offers
training in and technical assistance for community
leadership, organizing neighborhood antidrug and
crime prevention initiatives, and community
policing. The CCNYC is developing a manual about
crime prevention activities targeting housing
developments and residential neighborhoods.
 
Civil Enforcement Initiative
Attn: Robert Messner, Managing Attorney
Civil Enforcement Unit
New York City Police Department
2 Lafayette Street, 5th Floor
New York, NY 10007
(212) 374-2546. 
(212) 374-2735 (fax)

The New York City Police Department's Civil
Enforcement Initiative (CEI) is an in-house law
unit that provides legal advice and problem-solving
services to the department. CEI's goal is to
improve the quality of life of city residents by
making use of the law to confiscate drug-infested
buildings and by helping the police seize vehicles
of patrons soliciting prostitutes.

General Federation of Women's Clubs: Crime
Prevention Program
Johnie Ruth Sturgeon
709 N. Oak Street 
Vidalia, LA 71373
(318) 757-4151

The General Federation of Women's Clubs (GFWC)
supports women's clubs across the country in a
variety of activities. The GFWC Crime Prevention
Program focuses on three areas: violence against
women, violence against children/youth, and
community crime prevention. In its pursuit of crime
prevention, GFWC works to:

o Study and raise awareness of crimes prevalent
within given communities.

o Support and/or form crime prevention
partnerships with local law enforcement agencies as
well as with neighborhood associations.

o Participate in and/or organize crime
prevention events in the community.

GFWC works toward informing and activating
communities to fight crime cooperatively.
 
Institute for Community Design Analysis
Oscar Newman
383A Round Hill Road
Hensonville, NY 12439
(518) 734-4482

The Institute for Community Design Analysis,
founded by Oscar Newman, is a nonprofit research
corporation that formulates housing policies for
Federal, State, and local governments. The
organization offers consulting and design services
to address local problems.

The Institute for Criminal Justice Studies
Canyon Hall
Southwest Texas State University
San Marcos, TX 78666
(512) 245-3030

The Institute of Criminal Justice Studies conducts
a broad, year-round curriculum of crime prevention
courses for the Texas law enforcement community and
for crime prevention practitioners nationwide. It
also distributes a variety of brochures and course
manuals.

Midwest Academy
225 Ohio Street
Suite 250
Chicago, IL 60610
(312) 645-6010

Midwest Academy provides training and consulting
services for organizations of low- and
moderate-income people in areas such as organizing,
planning, staffing, and fundraising.

National Association of Town Watch
P.O. Box 303
Wynnewood, PA 19096
(610) 649-7055

National Association of Town Watch serves as a
clearinghouse for community groups to exchange
crime prevention techniques and tips and to
disseminate local crime prevention news. The
program seeks to provide national affiliation and
recognition for local crime prevention efforts. It
offers fundraising programs, promotional materials,
training guides, and technical assistance. It also
sponsors the annual "National Night Out Program,"
which involves 8,800 communities across the
country, to encourage greater bonds between
neighbors and better relations with local law
enforcement agencies.

The National Criminal Justice Association
Suite 618
444 North Capitol Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20001
(202) 624-4620


The National Criminal Justice Association gives
assistance in the development and implementation of
statewide crime prevention programs. In particular,
it offers management, administration, and
organizational training for these programs.

National Crime Prevention Institute
University of Louisville
Louisville, KY 40292
(502) 852-6987
(502) 852-6990 (fax)
training@ulkyvm.louisville.edu (e-mail)

NCPI offers both a basic and an advanced course on
crime prevention through environmental design
(CPTED). The institute will soon offer on-site
training to communities. NCPI strives to make crime
prevention the primary goal of all police officers
in the United States.

Operation Crackdown
Attn: Young Lawyers Section
Bar Association of the District of Columbia
1819 H Street, N.W., 12th Floor
Washington, DC 20006
(202) 223-6600
(202) 293-3388 (fax)

The Young Lawyers Section of the Bar Association of
the District of Columbia has launched "Operation
Crackdown," a public service initiative that uses
the District's public nuisance law to rid
residential neighborhoods of crack houses and drug
dealers. Operation Crackdown lawyers employ the
information provided by community groups and others
to go to court and obtain injunctions against
landlords, requiring them to take remedial action,
such as tenant evictions and installing
high-intensity lights to illuminate dark alleys or
vacant lots. 

Project for Public Spaces, Inc.
Fred I. Kent III, President
153 Waverly Place
New York, NY 10014
(212) 620-5660

Project for Public Spaces (PPS), Inc., was founded
in 1975 to improve the livability of urban areas
and to enhance the quality of life in cities. PPS
seeks to develop public spaces that benefit all
users. The organization specializes in translating
research into planning and design, particularly for
community revitalization, with the emphasis on:

o User analysis.

o Programming and community consensus building.

o Conceptual design and guidelines.

o Design review.

o Master planning/urban design.

o Management programs.

o Amenity and art selection.

PPS offers technical assistance in the form of
workshops, publications, and films. A listing of
publications and films is available from the above
address.

SPARTA Consulting Corporation
Attn: Ellen Walsh
7313 Woodmont Avenue
Bethesda, MD 20814
(301) 656-6600, Ext. 12
(301) 656-6770 (fax)

SPARTA Consulting Corporation is a Social Political
Analysis, Research, and Technical Assistance firm
that provides state-of-the-art technology
integration of social and political policy
analysis, evaluations and research, technical
assistance and training, geographic data analysis,
and analytical services.

SPARTA Consulting Corporation has been awarded
funding to conduct technical assistance and
training for Public and Indian Housing (PIH) Crime
Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED).
The purpose of this grant is to provide
state-of-the-art CPTED training and technical
assistance to housing authority staff, residents,
resident councils, resident management
corporations, housing authority security directors,
local law enforcement officials, local government
officials, architects, and other community leaders.
SPARTA will meet these needs by providing the
following services to the housing community:

o A national architectural CPTED redesign round
table conducted with the American Institute of
Architects.

o Three regional CPTED workshops.

o On-site technical assistance.

o Multi-site video conferencing with CPTED
experts.

o A series of crime prevention publications.

o Electronic dissemination of CPTED resources
through the World Wide Web and Internet.

o Immediate hard-copy dissemination via fax-back
services.

For further information on SPARTA's offerings
(including the architectural round table, CPTED
workshops, and other crime prevention information),
please contact Ellen Walsh at the address shown
above.

------------------------------

Appendix F

Crime Statistics for Selected Sites

Exhibit F-1. Reported Offenses, Genesis Park
Community (1984-1994)

Exhibit F-2. Reported Offenses, Genesis Park
Community (January-June, 1994-1995)

Exhibit F-3. Reported Offenses, Lockwood Gardens
(Compared to Surrounding Beats)

Exhibit F-4. Reported Offenses, Oak Park,
Illinois (1989-1994)

Exhibit F-5. Reported Part I Offenses, Castle
Square Apartments, Boston (1990-1994)

Exhibit F-6. Reported Offenses, Five Oaks
Neighborhood (January-November, 1989-1993)