doc_fn:    draftord/473/m4731-1.html
DocType:   Draft
ID:        DOE M 473.1-1
Title:     Manual for Physical Protection of Safeguards and Security
Summary:
Org:
Date_Issue: 06/18/1997
Date_Close:
VdkVgwKey: draftord-15
Directive: 473.1
Text:


DATE:          JUNE 17, 1997

REPLY TO:           HOWARD LANDON,
               OFFICE OF ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT, HR-62

TO:            DIRECTIVES POINTS-OF-CONTACT AT DP, EH, EM, ER, NN,
               OPERATIONS OFFICES, AND FIELD OFFICES

SUBJECT:       DOE M 473.1-1, MANUAL FOR PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF
               SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY INTERESTS

The attached subject draft Manual, a revision of DOE M 5632.1C-1, is being forwarded for your
review and comment.

The requirements of this manual should have been implemented under the requirements of DOE
Manual 5632.1C-1, dated 7-15-94.  The changes in protection requirements in DOE M 473.1-1
are results from implementation experience with the DOE M 5632.1C-1, differing requirements of
Departmental facilities brought about by adjustments in Departmental and National policy and by
technical advances.  Some of these changes include the removal of the Chapters on the Protection
and Control of Classified Matter, Protection of Unclassified Irradiated Reactor Fuel in Transit,
and the Acceptance and Validation Programs.  In place of those removed, new Chapters on
Protection of Classified Matter, the Radiological and Toxicological Sabotage Program and
Security Design Criteria are inserted.  The Department's Classified Information Systems Security
Program was republished as DOE O 472.1, and the Acceptance and Validation Program was
included in DOE O 470.1 Chapter III.  The implementation of the graduated approach to
protection facilitates a reduction in the technical considerations for the less sensitive systems while
not increasing the more stringent requirements of systems of a more sensitive nature.
Administrative changes have also been made.

This Manual is composed of 14 Chapters that provide detailed requirements for protection of
safeguards and security interests.  Chapter I addresses five essential ingredients for a successful
program; site specific characteristics; design basis threat; protection strategy; planning; and
graduated protection.  Chapter II through IV address protection and control of special nuclear
material, protection requirements for classified matter, and radiological and toxicologic sabotage. 
Chapter V discusses Security Areas that are used to protect the safeguards and security interests
discussed in Chapters II and III.  Chapter XI is a collection of the security design criteria taken
from DOE O 6430.1A that was canceled by DOE O 240.1, and which did not capture security
requirements.  The remaining chapters provide supporting information and requirements for
effective implementation of safeguards and security programs.Comments on the Manual are due by July 18, 1997.  Late comments will be held for
consideration during the Manual's next annual review.  MAJOR ISSUES and SUGGESTED
COMMENTS should be designated as such when submitted.  MAJOR ISSUES shall be limited to
those instance where the Manual, in its entirety or its identified requirements, would have an
adverse effect on DOE policy objectives, mission accomplishment, economy, efficiency, or other
management concerns that would preclude its publication.

COMMENT SUBMISSION FOR DOE Manual 473.1-1:

Directives Points-of-Contact at Headquarters Elements: Submit comments to Marti Lydick, HR-
41, Room 8F-084 Forrestal; send to MARLENE.LYDICK@HQ.DOE.GOV; or send via e-mail. 
In addition, send a copy to Darryl Toms, Protection Program Operations, NN-512.1, Room E-
378, Germantown; send facsimile to (301) 903-8717; or send via e-mail to
Daryl.Toms@hq.doe.gov.

Directives Points-of-Contact at Field Elements:

a.   Submit consolidated comments to Marti Lydick, HR-41, Room 8F-084, Forrestal; send to
     MARLENE.LYDICK@HQ.DOE.GOV; or send via e-mail.  In addition, send a copy to
     Darryl Toms, Protection Program Operations, NN-512.1, Room E-378, Germantown;
     send facsimile to (301) 903-8717; or send via e-mail.  The package shall include as an
     attachment, the comments provided by contractor organizations.

b.   Operations Offices will send a copy of their comments to the Associate Deputy Secretary
     for Field Management, FM-1, Room 5A-115, Forrestal.

Contractor Organizations: Submit comments directly to their appropriate Field Elements.

Contacts: Questions concerning the processing of the Manual should be directed to Ms. Lydick,
HR-41, at (202) 586-3278.  Questions concerning the content of the Manual should be directed to
Mr. Toms, NN-512.1, at (301) 903-7087.
                MANUAL FOR PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF 
                SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY INTERESTS

1.   PURPOSE. This Manual provides detailed requirements to supplement DOE O 473.1,
     PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY INTERESTS, which
     establishes requirements and responsibilities for the protection of special nuclear material
     (SNM), nuclear weapons, vital equipment, classified matter, assets, and facilities.

2.   SUMMARY.  This Manual contains detailed requirements for protection of safeguards
     and security interests.  

     a.   Chapter I addresses five essential parts of a successful program:  site-specific
          characteristics, design basis threat, strategy, planning, and graded protection.  

     b.   Chapters II and III address the protection of SNM and classified matter.  

     c.   Chapter IV addresses the protection of DOE facilities against radiological and
          toxicological sabotage.  

     d.   Chapter V discusses Security Areas that are used to protect the safeguards and
          security interests discussed in Chapters II and III.  

     e.   Chapter VI through XIII provide supporting information and requirements for
          protection elements that effectively implement safeguards and security programs.  
     f.   Chapter XIV is a collection of the security design criteria taken from DOE O
          6430.1A, GENERAL DESIGN CRITERIA.   DOE O 420.1 and O 430.1,
          canceled O 6430.1A but did not capture security requirements.  

3.   CANCELLATIONS:  DOE Manual 5632.1C-1, MANUAL FOR THE PROTECTION
     AND CONTROL OF SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY INTERESTS, dated 7-15-94,
     and the security requirements of canceled DOE O 6430.1A.

4.   REFERENCES AND DEFINITIONS.  

     a.   See Attachment 1 for a list of references pertinent to the protection of safeguards
          and security interests.  

     b.   Definitions of terms commonly used in the Safeguards and Security Program are
          provided in the "Safeguards and Security Glossary of Terms," which is maintained
          and distributed by the Office of Safeguards and Security.  

5.   DEVIATIONS.  Deviations  to this Manual shall be approved through procedures
     established in DOE O 470.1, SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY PROGRAM.

6.   ASSISTANCE.  Questions concerning this Manual should be directed to the Protection
     Operations Program Manager at 301-903-5693.

7.   IMPLEMENTATION.  Most requirements in this directive are the same as those
     contained in the superseded directives.  Implementation plans for any requirements that
     cannot be implemented within 6 months of the effective date of this Manual or within
     existing resources shall be developed by Heads of Field Elements and submitted to the
          Office of Safeguards and Security.                                  
CONTENTS


CHAPTER I, PROTECTION PLANNING
     
1.   Site-Specific Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . .I-1
2.   Threat. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .I-1
3.   Protection Strategy.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .I-1
4.   Planning. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .I-2
5.   Graded Protection.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .I-3
6.   Performance Assurance.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .I-3

CHAPTER II, PROTECTION OF SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL AND VITAL
EQUIPMENT

1.   General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . II-1
2.   Access. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . II-2
3.   Protective Force Posts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . II-2
4.   Storage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . II-2
5.   Category I Quantities of Special Nuclear Material.. . . II-4
6.   Category II Quantities of Special Nuclear Material.   . II-5
7.   Category III Quantities of Special Nuclear Material . . II-5
8.   Category IV Quantities of Special Nuclear Material. . . II-6
9.   Vital Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . II-7

     Table II-1, Access Authorization Requirements . . . . . II-3

CHAPTER III, PROTECTION OF CLASSIFIED MATTER
     
1.   General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .III-1
2    Storage Requirements. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .III-2
3.   Protecting Container Information. . . . . . . . . . . .III-6

CHAPTER IV, RADIOLOGICAL AND TOXICOLOGICAL SABOTAGE PROTECTION
     
1.   General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . IV-1
2.   Protection Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . IV-1
3.   Assessment of Risks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . IV-2
4.   Protection of Radiological/Toxicological Sabotage TargetsIV-3

     Table IV-1,  Radiological and Toxicological Sabotage Consequence ValuesIV-4

CHAPTER V, SECURITY AREAS
     
1.   General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .V-1
2.   Property Protection Area. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .V-4
3.   Limited Area. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .V-5
4.   Exclusion Area. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .V-6
5.   Protected Area. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .V-7
6.   Vital Area. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .V-9
7.   Material Access Area. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . V-10
8.   Other Security Areas. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . V-12

CHAPTER VI, PROTECTION ELEMENT: INTRUSION DETECTION AND ASSESSMENT
     SYSTEMS
     
1.   General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VI-1
2.   General Requirements. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VI-1
3.   Interior Intrusion Detection System Requirements. . . . VI-3
4.   Exterior Intrusion Detection System Requirements. . . . VI-4
5.   Intrusion Detection System Alarm Annunciation at the Central and Secondary Alarm
     Station . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VI-5
6.   Radio Frequency Alarm Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . VI-6
7.   Lighting Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VI-8
8.   Auxiliary Power Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VI-9
9.   Protection of Intrusion Detection Systems . . . . . . .VI-10

     Table VI-1,  Alarm System Protection Requirements . . .VI-14
          
CHAPTER VII, PROTECTION ELEMENT:  ACCESS CONTROL AND ENTRY/EXIT
     INSPECTIONS
     
1.   General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .VII-1
2.   Automated Access Control Systems. . . . . . . . . . . .VII-2
3.   Entry/Exit Inspections. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .VII-3

CHAPTER VIII, PROTECTION ELEMENT:  BARRIERS AND LOCKS
     
1.   Barriers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VIII-1
2.   Locks.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VIII-5

CHAPTER IX, PROTECTION ELEMENT:  SECURE STORAGE

1.   Vaults And Vault-Type Rooms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . IX-1
2.   Security Containers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . IX-5

CHAPTER X, PROTECTION ELEMENT:  COMMUNICATIONS
     
1.   General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .X-1
2.   Duress Systems. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .X-1
3.   Radios. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .X-1
4.   Special Response Team Radio Communications. . . . . . . .X-2

CHAPTER XI, PROTECTION ELEMENT:  MAINTENANCE

1.   General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . XI-1
2.   Corrective Maintenance. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . XI-1
3.   Preventive Maintenance. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . XI-1
4.   Maintenance Personnel Access Authorization. . . . . . . XI-2
5.   Recordkeeping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . XI-2

CHAPTER XII, PROTECTION ELEMENT:  POSTING NOTICES
     
1.   General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .XII-1
2.   Trespassing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .XII-1

CHAPTER XIII, PROTECTION ELEMENT:  SECURITY BADGES 
     AND CREDENTIALS

1.   Security Badges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . XIII-1
2.   Issuance, Use, Recovery, and Destruction of Security BadgesXIII-1
3.   Types of Credentials. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . XIII-3
4.   Issuance of Credentials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . XIII-4
5.   Accountability of Badges, Credentials, and Shields. . XIII-5
6.   Storage of Security Badge Materials, Unissued Badges, Credentials, and ShieldsXIII-6
7.   Terminating Security Badges, Credentials, and Shields XIII-6


CHAPTER XIV, SECURITY DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS

1.   General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .XIV-1
2.   Security Area Barriers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .XIV-1
3.   Intrusion Detection Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . XIV-10
4.   Access Control Systems and Entry/exit Inspections . . XIV-16
5.   Barriers.   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . XIV-17
6.   Physical Security Technical Surveillance Countermeasures Construction StandardsXIV-22
7.   Secure Storage Architectural Requirements . . . . . . XIV-28
8.   Communication Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . XIV-29

Attachment 1 - References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
                                                           1-1 
                              CHAPTER I
                         PROTECTION PLANNING

1.     SITE-SPECIFIC CHARACTERISTICS.  Protection programs shall be tailored to address
       specific site characteristics and requirements, current technology, ongoing programs, and
       operational needs and the measures necessary to achieve acceptable protection levels that
       reduce inherent risks on a cost-effective basis.  

2.     THREAT.  Physical protection afforded safeguards and security interests shall be based
       upon the "Design Basis Threat for the Department of Energy Programs and Facilities
       (U)."  Consideration should also be given to site and regional threats and emergency
       situations, such as civil disturbances and disasters.  

3.     PROTECTION STRATEGY.

  a.   Strategies for the physical protection of SNM and vital equipment shall
       incorporate the applicable requirements established in Chapter II.  Protection
       strategies may be graded to address varying circumstances and may range from
       denial, to containment, to recapture/recovery and/or pursuit.  

       (1)  A denial strategy shall be used when unauthorized access presents an
            unacceptable risk for:

            (a)  the theft of Category I SNM, 

            (b)  the initiation (or credible threat of initiation) of nuclear dispersal or
                 detonation, or 

            (c)  the use of available nuclear materials for onsite assembly of an
                 improvised nuclear device.  

       (2)  A containment strategy shall be used to prevent the unauthorized removal
            of Category II or greater SNM that can roll up to Category I.

       (3)  Should denial and/or containment referenced in 3a(1) and (2) above fail, a
            recapture/recovery and/or pursuit strategy would then be required.  Forces
            capable of rapid reaction are vital to the implementation of such recapture
            or recovery efforts.

  b.   Strategies for the physical protection of classified matter shall incorporate the
       applicable requirements established in Chapter III.  The strategy shall be based on
       efforts that will detect or deter unauthorized disclosure, modification, loss of
       availability, and removal from a site or facility of classified information or sensitive
       but unclassified information.  

  c.   Strategies for the physical protection of radiological/toxicological sabotage targets
       shall incorporate the applicable requirements established in Chapter IV.  Protection
       strategies shall be designed to prevent radiological/toxicological sabotage acts that
       would pose significant dangers to the health and safety of employees, the public, or
       the environment.  These strategies may be graded to address varying circumstances
       and may range from denial, to containment, and/or to consequence mitigation. 

  d.   Strategies for the physical protection of other safeguards and security interests
       shall be developed commensurate with the safeguard and security interest
       importance.

       (1)  A strategy ranging from detection to deterrence shall be used for security
            interests whose loss, theft, compromise, and/or unauthorized use will
            seriously affect the national security and/or the health and safety of DOE
            and contractor employees, the public, the environment, or DOE programs.

       (2)  A strategy of detection and deterrence shall be used for safeguard and
            security interests whose loss or theft will have a negative financial impact
            on the Department.

       (3)  A strategy of denial shall be used to address the introduction of certain
            articles into DOE facilities that would impact the health and safety of DOE
            and contractor employees (e.g., hand-carried, mailed, and vehicle-
            transported explosives, firearms, and chemical and biological agents).

4.     PLANNING.

  a.   Site Safeguards and Security Plans.  The details of site physical protection
       measures shall be addressed in the Site Safeguards and Security Plan (SSSP), as
       required by DOE O 470.1.  

  b.   Security Plans.  At locations where an SSSP is not required due to the limited
       scope of safeguards and security interests, a security plan shall be developed to
       describe the protection program in place.

5.     GRADED PROTECTION.  

  a.   Graded Protection.  

       (1)  Protection shall be applied in a graded manner.  The level of effort and
            magnitude of resources expended for the protection of a security interest
            shall be commensurate with the security interest's importance or the impact
            of its loss, destruction, or misuse.  The highest level of protection shall be
            given to security interests whose loss, theft, compromise, sabotage, and/or
            unauthorized use will have serious impact on the national security, financial
            security, and/or the health and safety of DOE and contractor employees,
            the public, the environment, or DOE programs.  For example, use of a
            weapon of mass destruction by a terrorist(s) could have severe
            consequences necessitating the highest reasonably attainable level of
            security.  

       (2)  Protection of other interests shall be graded accordingly.  Protection-
            related plans shall describe and document the rationale used for selecting
            the graded protection provided the various safeguards and security
            interests.  Asset valuation, threat analysis, and vulnerability assessments
            shall be considered, along with the acceptable level of risk and any
            uncertainties, to determine if the risk is significant and what protection
            measures should be applied.  Heads of DOE Elements shall provide a
            rational and cost-effective protection framework applying risk management
            as the underlying basis for making security-related decisions.  
  b.   A rational, cost-effective protection framework shall be provided applying risk
       management as the underlying basis for making security-related decisions.  It
       should be recognized that risks will be accepted (i.e., that actions cannot be taken
       to reduce the potential for or consequences of all malevolent events to zero);
       however, an acceptable level of risk will be determined based on evaluation of a
       variety of facility-specific goals and considerations.  

  c.   Protection plans shall describe, justify, and document the graded protection
       provided various safeguards and security interests.  

6.     PERFORMANCE ASSURANCE.  Safeguards and security systems shall be tested as
       required by DOE O 470.1 to ascertain effectiveness in providing countermeasures to
       address design basis threats.
                                              CHAPTER II
      PROTECTION OF SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL AND VITAL EQUIPMENT


1.     GENERAL.  This chapter outlines requirements for the protection of Categories I through
       IV quantities of SNM and vital equipment.  The following requirements shall apply.

  a.   A facility shall not receive, process, transmit, or store SNM until that facility has
       been approved as required by DOE O 470.1.  

  b.   Nuclear material production reactors and fuel shall be protected consistent with the
       category of SNM involved and/or the consequences of radiological sabotage.

  c.   An integrated system of positive measures shall be developed and implemented for
       the protection of Category I SNM (nuclear weapons).

  d.   Protection afforded SNM shall be graded according to the nuclear material
       safeguards category, as defined in Figure I-2 of DOE 5633.3B, CONTROL AND
       ACCOUNTABILITY OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS, and shall reflect the specific
       nature of SNM existing at each site.  DOE 5633.3B shall be used to determine the
       potential to accumulate a Category I quantity of SNM by theft from more than one
       location (roll-up) within the same Protected Area.

  e.   Factors such as ease of separability, accessibility, and concealment; quantity,
       chemical form, isotopic composition, purity, and containment; portability;
       protection strategies; radioactivity; and self-protecting features, shall be considered
       in determining physical protection for each category of SNM.  

  f.   When SNM is classified because of its configuration or content, or because it is
       part of a classified item, it shall receive the physical protection required by the
       highest level of classification of the configuration, content, item, or category of
       SNM involved.

  g.   Protective force personnel shall be available and positioned to respond to a verified
       threat occurrence to contain, interrupt, and/or neutralize adversaries within the
       required response times.

  h.   Intrusion detection shall be accomplished through a combination of intrusion
       sensors and tamper-indicating devices, material surveillance procedures, material
       accounting and tracking, and/or specialized nuclear measurement techniques.  

  i.   Delay mechanisms shall be employed to prevent removal or unauthorized use of
       Category I and II quantities of SNM.  Delay mechanisms may include passive
       barriers (e.g., walls, ceilings, floors, windows, doors, security bars), activated
       barriers (e.g., sticky foam, pop-up barriers), and obscurants (e.g., cold smoke).

  j.   Specific protection requirements, such as systems and protective personnel
       response capabilities necessary to satisfy identified protection needs, shall be
       documented.

2.     ACCESS.  Access controls shall be in place to ensure that only properly cleared and
       authorized personnel are permitted unescorted access to SNM and vital equipment. 
       Access authorizations (security clearances) shall be accomplished according to DOE O
       472.1B, PERSONNEL SECURITY ACTIVITIES.  See Table II-1 of this Manual for
       SNM access authorization requirements.  Access authorization requirements for vital
       equipment shall be comparable to Category I SNM.

3.     PROTECTIVE FORCE POSTS.  See DOE 5632.7A, PROTECTIVE FORCE
       PROGRAM, or DOE O 473.2, PROTECTIVE FORCE PROGRAM when implemented.

4.     STORAGE.  Each facility shall have controls for all categories of nuclear materials held in
       storage, consistent with the graded safeguards approach.  (See Chapter IX of this Manual
       for elaboration). Controls for storage shall:

  a.   be formally documented;

  b.   ensure that only authorized personnel have access to the storage repositories (see
       Chapter I);

  c.   prevent and/or detect unauthorized access;

  d.   describe procedures used to authenticate material movements into or out of a
       repository;

                              TABLE II-1
                  ACCESS AUTHORIZATION REQUIREMENTS



                           Special Nuclear
                          Material Category
                     Minimum Level of Access  
                        Authorization Required
                               Remarks


                                I and

                    II with credible roll-up to I
                                  Q
Hands-on access or
transportation of Category I
quantities of SNM may require
additional measures, such as
Personnel Security Assurance
Program participation and/or
enhanced material surveillance
procedures, to further reduce
the probability of insider acts.


                              II and III
                                  L 
Unless special circumstances 
determined by site
vulnerability assessment,
require Q access authorization
to minimize risk.   Document
in Site Safeguards and
Security Plan.


                                  IV
                                 None
Unless special circumstances 
determined by site
vulnerability assessment
require access authorization 
to mitigate risk.   Document in
Site Safeguards and Security
Plan.




  e.   include procedures for investigating and reporting abnormal conditions;

  f.   provide a record system to document ingress/egress to repositories; and

  g.   define procedures for conducting inventories and daily administrative checks.

5.     CATEGORY I QUANTITIES OF SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL.

  a.   In-Process.  Material shall be used or processed within Material Access Areas. 
       DOE 5633.3B, Page III-3, Paragraph 3b(1), requires a material surveillance
       program to detect unauthorized material flows and transfers.  Any location within
       a Material Access Area that contains unattended Category I quantities of SNM in
       use or process shall be equipped with an intrusion detection system or other
       effective means of detection approved by the cognizant local DOE authority for
       safeguards and security.

  b.   Storage.  Material shall be stored within a Material Access Area.  

       (1)  When not in process or when unattended, material falling under
            Attractiveness Level A shall be stored in a vault.  Storage facilities for
            Category I SNM Attractiveness Level A, constructed after 7-14-94, shall
            be underground or below-grade construction.  

       (2)  Material falling under Attractiveness Level B shall be stored in a vault or
            provided enhanced protection that exceeds vault-type room storage [e.g.,
            collocated with protective force response station and/or activated
            barrier(s)].  

       (3)  Material falling under Attractiveness Level C shall, as a minimum, be
            stored in a vault-type room.  

  c.   In-Transit.  Protection requirements for material in transit shall be as follows.

       (1)  Domestic offsite shipments of Category I quantities of SNM shall be made
            by the Transportation Safeguards System, managed by the Albuquerque
            Operations Office.

       (2)  Packages or containers containing SNM shall be sealed with tamper-
            indicating devices.

       (3)  Protection measures for movements of material between Protected Areas at
            the same site, or between Protected Areas and staging areas at the same
            site, shall be under direct surveillance by the number of Security Police
            Officers necessary to protect against threats as established in the "Design
            Basis Threat for Department of Energy Programs and Facilities (U)," and
            documented in the SSSP.  

6.     CATEGORY II QUANTITIES OF SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL.  

  a.   In-Process.  Material shall be used or stored only within a Protected Area.  DOE
       5633.3B, Page III-3, Paragraph 3b(1) requires a material surveillance program to
       detect unauthorized material flows and transfers.  Any location within a Protected
       Area that contains unattended Category II quantities of SNM in use or process
       shall be equipped with intrusion detection systems or other effective means of
       detection approved by the cognizant local DOE authority for safeguards and
       security.

  b.   Storage.  When not in process or when unattended, material shall be stored in a
       vault or vault-type room located within a Protected Area.

  c.   In-Transit.  Shipments shall conform to the shipment requirements for Category I
       quantities of SNM. (See Paragraph 5c above.)

7.     CATEGORY III QUANTITIES OF SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL.  

  a.   In-Process.  Material shall be processed within a Security Area that provides, at a
       minimum, the protection of a Limited Area.

  b.   Storage.  When not in process or when unattended, material shall be stored, at a
       minimum, within a Limited Area and secured within a locked security container or
       locked room.  The container or locked room containing the matter shall be under
       the protection of an intrusion detection system or protective patrol at intervals not
       to exceed 8 hours.  

  c.   In-Transit.

       (1)  Domestic offsite shipments of classified configurations of Category III
            quantities of SNM may be made by the Transportation Safeguards System.

       (2)  Methods of shipping unclassified configurations:

            (a)  Truck or Train.  Truck or train shipments shall meet the following
                 requirements.

                 1    Government-owned or exclusive-use truck, commercial
                      carrier, or rail may be used to ship Category III quantities of
                      SNM.  

                 2    A detailed inspection of the transport vehicle shall be
                      conducted before loading and shipment.  Cargo
                      compartments shall be locked and sealed while en route.
 
                 3    Personnel assigned to escort shipments shall maintain
                      periodic communication with a control station operator who
                      can request appropriate local law enforcement agency
                      response, if needed.  

                 4    Shipments shall be made without intermediate stops except
                      for emergency reasons, driver relief, meals, refueling, or
                      transfer of cargo.

            (b)  Air Shipment.  Air shipments of Category III quantities of SNM
                 may take place if not otherwise prohibited by statute or otherwise
                 limited by implementing instructions.  The shipments shall be under
                 the direct observation of the authorized escorts during all land
                 movements and loading and unloading operations.

       (3)  Movements of Category III quantities of SNM between Security Areas at
            the same site shall be according to the appropriate locally-developed
            security plan.  

8.     CATEGORY IV QUANTITIES OF SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL.  

  a.   In-Process.  Material shall be processed according to procedures approved by the
       cognizant local DOE authority for safeguards and security.

  b.   Storage.  When not in process or when unattended, material shall be stored
       according to the procedures approved by the cognizant local authority for
       safeguards and security.

  c.   In-Transit.

       (1)  Domestic offsite shipments of classified configurations of Category IV
            quantities of SNM may be made by means of the Transportation
            Safeguards System, under procedures approved by the Albuquerque
            Operations Office as deemed appropriate, and by agreements between the
            Manager, Albuquerque Operations Office, and the respective Heads of
            Field Elements.  

       (2)  Shipments of unclassified configurations of material may be made by truck,
            rail, or water, in commercial, for-hire, or leased vehicles.  If not otherwise
            prohibited by state or federal laws, Category IV quantities of SNM may
            also be shipped by air.

            (a)  Shipments (except laboratory analysis samples or reference
                 materials) shall be arranged with a capability to trace and identify,
                 within 24 hours of request, the precise location where a shipment
                 went astray, in the event that it fails to arrive at the destination at
                 the prescribed time.  

            (b)  Shipper shall be required to give the consignee an estimated time of
                 arrival before dispatch, and follow up with a written confirmation
                 not later than 48 hours after dispatch.

            (c)  Consignee shall promptly notify the shipper by telephone and
                 written confirmation upon determination that a shipment has not
                 arrived by the scheduled time.

9.     VITAL EQUIPMENT.  SSSPs shall define applicable threats and measures to protect
       vital equipment from hostile actions.
                             CHAPTER III
                   PROTECTION OF CLASSIFIED MATTER


1.     GENERAL.  DOE Order 471.2, INFORMATION SECURITY PROGRAM, of 9-26-95,
       establishes the Information Security Program for the control of classified and sensitive
       information in use.  The protection of classified SNM shall be in accordance with Chapter
       II of this Manual if the SNM categories and attractiveness levels dictate more stringent
       requirements; otherwise the provisions of this chapter apply.

  a.   Classification levels shall be used to determine the degree of protection and control
       required for classified matter.

  b.   Classified information, regardless of its form, shall be afforded a level of protection
       against loss or compromise commensurate with its level of classification.

  c.   Classified matter shall be stored in a manner to allow detection and deterrence of
       unauthorized access.  

  d.   When possible, classified matter shall be processed, handled, and stored in security
       areas providing control measures equal to or greater than those present in Limited
       Areas.  When classified matter is not processed, handled, and/or stored within
       Limited Areas or above, additional control measures shall be required.  Control
       measures shall include technical, physical, personnel, and/or administrative
       measures.  

  e.   Facilities, buildings, rooms, structures, etc., shall be afforded the protection
       measures necessary to prevent unauthorized persons from gaining access to
       classified matter.

       (1)  Measures shall be in place to prevent persons from viewing or hearing
            classified information.  
       
       (2)  Conference rooms and areas specifically designated for classified
            discussions shall follow Technical Surveillance Countermeasures Program
            requirements.
 
  f.   Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities shall be afforded physical
       protection in accordance with the Director of Central Intelligence Directives 1/21
       (see Attachment 1).  Any unresolved issues pertaining to this subject shall be
       referred to the Director of Safeguards and Security for coordination.

2.     STORAGE REQUIREMENTS.

  a.   Restrictions on Use of Secure Storage Repositories.

       (1)  Funds, firearms, medical items, controlled substances, precious metals, or
            other items susceptible to theft shall not be stored in the same secure
            storage repository used to store classified matter.

       (2)  Secure storage repositories shall not bear any external classification or
            other type markings that would indicate the level of classified matter
            authorized to be stored within the container.  For identification purposes,
            each security container shall externally bear an assigned number.

  b.   Requirements.  Security containers required for the storage of classified matter
       shall conform to the GSA standards and specifications and applicable requirements
       of Chapter IX of this Manual.  Classified matter that is not under the personal
       control of an authorized person shall be stored as prescribed below.
       
       NOTE:  Inspections by the protective force shall consist of examination of the
       exposed surfaces of the container, vault, vault-type-room and steel filing cabinets
       to determine if there has been any force entry and to ensure that the container is
       locked.

       (1)  Top Secret Matter.  Top Secret matter may be stored in one of the
            following ways:

            (a)  In a locked, General Services Administration (GSA)-approved
                 security container with one of the following supplemental controls:

                 1    Under intrusion detection alarm protection with protective
                      force response within 15 minutes of annunciation of the
                      alarm.

                 2     Protective force, with inspections on a 2-hour basis.

                 3    The security container be equipped with a lock meeting
                      Federal Specification FF-L-2740 only if the container is
                      located in a Limited, Exclusion, Protected, or Material
                      Access Area.  

                 4    Within a Limited Area or above, random protective force
                      patrols  at least once every 8 hours during nonworking
                      hours.  Facilities with large numbers of security containers
                      shall patrol at least 25 percent of the containers once every
                      24 hours.

            (b)  In a vault approved by the cognizant DOE element.  The vault shall
                 be designed and constructed of masonry units or steel-lined
                 construction and equipped with GSA-approved vault door.  (A
                 GSA-approved modular vault meeting Federal Specification
                 FFV-2737 may be used in lieu of the above.) The vault shall be
                 equipped with intrusion detection protection with protective force
                 response within 15 minutes of alarm annunciation.

            (c)  In a vault-type room approved by the cognizant DOE element.  The
                 vault-type-room shall be under intrusion detection alarm protection
                 with protective force response within 15 minutes of alarm
                 annunciation.  The vault-type room shall be located within a
                 Limited, Exclusion, Protected, or Material Access Area.

       (2)  Secret Matter.  Secret matter shall be stored in a manner authorized for
            Top Secret matter or in one of the following ways:

            NOTE:  Secret matter not stored in security areas providing control
            measures equal to or greater than those present in Limited Areas shall be
            maintained in an accountability system as required in DOE O 471.2.

            (a)  In a locked GSA-approved security container.

            (b)  In a vault approved by the cognizant DOE element; the vault shall
                 be designed and constructed of masonry units or steel-lined
                 construction and equipped with GSA vault door.  (A GSA-
                 approved modular vault meeting Federal Specification FFV-2737
                 may be used in lieu of the above.)

            (c)  Steel filing cabinets not meeting  GSA requirements (such
                 containers approved for use prior to 7-15-94 may continue to be
                 used until there is a need for replacement) shall be equipped with an
                 automatic unit locking mechanism and three-position, dial-type,
                 built-in combination lock.  In addition, one of the following
                 supplementary controls is required;

                 1     Within a Security Area providing, as a minimum, the
                      protection level of a Limited Area or above.

                 2     Under intrusion detection alarm protection with protective
                      force response within 30 minutes of alarm annunciation; or

                 3     Inspections of the container every four  hours by protective
                      force.

            (d)  In a vault-type room approved by the cognizant DOE element with
                 one of the following supplemental controls:

                 1    within a Security Area providing as a minimum the
                      protection level of a Limited Area or above;

                 2    under intrusion detection alarm protection with protective
                      force response within 30 minutes of alarm annunciation; or,

                 3    under inspection every 4 hours by protective force.

       (3)  Confidential Matter.  Confidential matter shall be stored in a manner
            authorized for Secret matter, except that supplemental controls are notrequired.

  c.   Nonstandard Methods of Storage.

       Within the minimum protection level of a Limited Area, nonstandard methods of
       storage may be applied for Top Secret, Secret, and Confidential material whose
       size, weight, construction, or other characteristics preclude storage as discussed in
       the subparagraphs above.

       (1)  Local safeguards and security authorities shall base their protection
            measures upon the results of documented vulnerability analyses.  These
            vulnerability analyses shall address the nature of the matter to be protected
            (e.g., size, weight, composition, radioactivity, and importance to an
            adversary and/or the Department) in relation to the threat.  Additionally,
            vulnerability analyses must consider the portability of the classified matter,
            ease of concealment, time needed to gain access, ease of gaining access,
            protective force response time, and the potential consequences of gaining
            unauthorized access.
  
       (2)  Measures (e.g., barriers, locks, intrusion detection systems, and protective
            force) tailored to address the specific nonstandard condition, as determined
            by local safeguards and security authority shall be implemented to provide
            protection to deter unauthorized access to classified matter.

       (3)  Measures to be implemented for each nonstandard condition shall be
            documented in the applicable security plan and approved by the cognizant
            DOE security office.

       (4)  For protective force to be employed as a specified supplemental protection
            measure, due consideration should be given to ensuring the interval for
            those inspections is less than the time required for an adversary to gain
            undetected access to the classified matter and/or remove the classified
            matter and escape detection.

  d.   Protective Force Personnel.

       (1)  If an unattended secure storage repository containing classified matter is
            found open, the repository shall be secured by designated protective
            personnel and a custodian notified immediately.  The contents shall be
            checked no later than the next workday.  If there is an indication of a
            violation or compromise, the contents shall be checked immediately by a
            custodian, being careful not to destroy fingerprints or other physical
            evidence.  The violation or compromise shall be reported and inquiries
            conducted as required by DOE O 471.2 and DOE O 470.1,
            SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY PROGRAM.

       (2)  Protective personnel, private security firms, or local law enforcement
            personnel shall respond to intrusion detection alarms, as documented in
            approved security plans.

  e.   Alternate Storage Locations.

       (1)  With prior written DOE approval, a bank safe deposit box/vault may be
            used  to store Secret or Confidential matter, provided that the lock and
keys to the box/vault are changed prior to such use and the customer's key
is furnished only to persons authorized access to the contents.  

       (2)  Federal Records Centers, approved as outlined in DOE O 470.1, may be
            used to store classified information.



3.     PROTECTING CONTAINER INFORMATION.

  a.   Protection of Security Containers and Combinations.  The outside of the security
       container shall not be marked to indicate that the contents are Top Secret, Secret,
       or Confidential.  Security containers, vaults, and vault-type rooms used to protect
       safeguards and security interests shall be kept locked when not under direct
       supervision of an authorized individual.  Combinations shall be protected at the
       classification level and category of the matter being protected.  A minimum
       number of authorized persons (i.e., personnel having access authorization for the
       information kept in that container) shall have the combination to the storage
       container or access to the information stored within the security container.

       (1)  To ensure proper protection of the combination, part 2 of SF700 shall be
            marked with the highest classification level and category (indicate if
            National Security Information, Restricted Data or Formerly Restricted
            Data) of the information being stored within the secure storage container. 
            Classifier information is not required to be affixed to part 2 of the SF700.

       (2)  To comply with classification guidance, part 2A should be marked onlywith the highest classification level of the combination.  The category is notmarked on this part of the form.  Classifier information is not required to be
            affixed to part 2 of the SF700.

       (3)  All persons who know the container's combination must be listed on the
            SF700.  If needed, a continuation page may be used.

  b.   Changing Combinations.  Combinations shall be changed by an appropriately
       cleared, authorized individual.  Combinations shall be changed at the earliest
       practical time following:

       (1)  initial receipt of a GSA-approved security container or lock;

       (2)  reassignment, transfer, or termination of employment of any person who
            knows the combination, or when the DOE access authorization granted to
            any such person is downgraded to a level lower than the category of matter
            stored, or when the DOE access authorization has been administratively
            terminated, suspended, or revoked;

       (3)  compromise or suspected compromise of a security container or its
            combination, or discovery of a security container unlocked and unattended.

  c.   Selection of Combination Settings.  Combination numbers shall be selected at
       random, avoiding simple ascending or descending series such as 10-20-30 or 50-
       40-30.  Care shall also be exercised to avoid selecting combinations of numbers
       that are easily associated with the person(s) selecting the combination (e.g., birth
       dates, anniversaries, social security numbers, or telephone extensions).

  d.   Security Repository Information.  Applicable requirements concerning security
       repositories are provided below.

       (1)  Security Container Information.  An SF-700, "Security Container
            Information," shall be completed for all security containers, rooms, vaults,
            and other approved locations for the storage of classified matter.  

            (a)  Part 1 of the SF-700 shall be affixed to the security container to
                 ensure high visibility.  On rooms or vaults, Part 1 of the SF-700
                 shall be affixed to the inside of the door containing the combination
                 lock.  On security containers, it shall be placed on the inside (back
                 front) of the locking drawer or on the front of the locking drawer,
                 at the user's discretion.

            (b)  Part 2 and 2a of each completed copy of SF 700 shall be classified
                 at the highest level of classification of the information authorized
                 for storage in the repository.  

       (2)  Security Container Check Sheets.  An integral part of the security check
            system shall be ensuring that classified matter has been properly stored and
            that security containers, vaults, or vault-type rooms have been secured. 
            SF-702, "Security Container Checklist," shall be used to record the end-of-
            day security checks.

            (a)  The SF-702 shall be used to record the names and times of the
                 persons who have opened, closed, or checked a particular
                 container, room, or vault holding classified information.

            (b)  The SF-702 shall be used in all situations requiring the use of a
                 security container check sheet and shall be affixed to the container
                 or entrance to a room or vault.

       (3)  Activity Security Checklist.  SF-701, "Activity Security Checklist,"
            provides a systematic means of checking end-of-day activities for a
            particular work area, allowing for employee accountability in the event that
            irregularities are discovered.  The checklist identifies such activities as
            checking security containers, desks, and wastebaskets for classified matter
            and ensuring that windows and doors are locked, ribbons for classified
            typewriters and automated data processing equipment have been secured,
            and security alarms have been activated.  Use of the SF-701 is optional
            except in situations requiring detailed end-of-day security inspections,
            when its use is mandatory.

       (4)  Records.  Completed SF-701s and SF-702s shall be maintained according
                        to General Record Schedule 18.                             CHAPTER IV
         RADIOLOGICAL AND TOXICOLOGICAL SABOTAGE PROTECTION


1.  GENERAL.  Safeguards and security planning shall include protection of the health and
    safety of employees, the public, and the environment against potential adverse impacts of
    radiological and toxicological sabotage.  Protection shall be provided in a graded manner,
    consistent with the level of hazards present.  The following requirements shall apply.

    a.  Facilities representing a "significant" radiological/toxicological sabotage threat
        shall document in the SSSP the sabotage assessment process and the facility
        program for protection against such a threat.

    b.  A facility may be considered to present a "significant" potential
        radiological/toxicological sabotage threat when any of the following materials are
        present at the facility:

        (1) SNM that is respirable or that can be assimilated into the human body;

        (2) quantities of radioactive materials sufficient to achieve a critical mass;

        (3) radioactive materials in excess of quantities listed in Title 10 Code of
            Federal Regulations (CFR) 30.72;

        (4)     hazardous chemicals in quantities greater than 10,000 lbs (or 4,540 Kgs);

          (5)  extremely hazardous substances in quantities greater than "Threshold
               Planning Quantities" (TPQ) listed in SARA Title III, found at 40 CFR 255,
               Appendices A and B.

2.   PROTECTION PLANNING.  

     a.   Safety analysis reports completed for accident scenarios, emergency event
          classification, vulnerability analysis reports (VARs), protection actions, and
          consequence assessments, as well as other pertinent information that can be used
          to assess risks and/or consequences of sabotage release scenarios, shall be
          considered in the radiological/toxicological sabotage analysis.  Paragraph 4 of this
          chapter should be considered in formulating the radiological/toxicological sabotage
          targets.

     b.   The methodology for completing a radiological/toxicological sabotage assessment
          shall parallel that used for completing the vulnerability analysis for theft/diversion
          of SNM, and shall be integrated into the site VAR(s).

     c.   Consequence values, as shown in Table IV-1, shall consider how acts of
          radiological and toxicological sabotage would affect the public, employees, and the
          environment.

     d.   Radiological/toxicological sabotage analysis completed after the date of this
          Manual shall consider a wide variety of factors, such as materials, locations, site-
          specific features, and existing security and safety features.  The analysis shall
          include the development and analysis of a spectrum of scenarios leading to
          radiological/toxicological releases.  

3.   ASSESSMENT OF RISKS.  The DOE Design Basis Threat, regional threat assessments,
     and when available, local threat descriptions, shall be the basis for the site/facility
     vulnerability assessment and for which the protection program is designed.  The threat,
     targets, and protection strategies shall be documented in the SSSP.

     a.   The radiological/toxicological sabotage assessment shall consider the complete
          spectrum of available resources in identifying and developing preventive, response,
          and mitigation options.  

          (1)  Within the limits of the DOE Design Basis Threat, every combination of
               insider and outsider threat shall be analyzed to determine which threats
               apply to specific site facilities.

          (2)  For the facility and target involved, the protection strategies pertaining to
               denial and mitigation and the title of the responsible office for each plan or
               procedure in which the strategies are described shall be documented.  

          (3)  Documentation shall describe procedures for the mitigation of a
               radiological/toxicological sabotage event, and risk acceptance shall be
               documented.

     b.   Hazardous materials shall be identified.  Threshold quantities of hazardous
          materials shall be screened to eliminate those facilities whose vulnerability to
          sabotage is limited by the lack of sufficient inventory.  Note that this evaluation
          should be based on a maximum level of hazardous materials that are expected or
          that may be present at the facility.

4.   PROTECTION OF RADIOLOGICAL/TOXICOLOGICAL SABOTAGE TARGETS.

     a.   The analysis of all radiological/toxicological sabotage target assessments shall be
          included in the SSSP Vulnerability Analysis Report (VAR).

          (1)  All SNM identified as theft targets under the provisions of Chapter II of
               this Manual shall also be identified as potential radiological/toxicological
               sabotage targets and afforded a radiological/toxicological sabotage
               analysis.  

          (2)  If the radiological/toxicological sabotage targets are not subject to the
               SNM theft protection requirements of Chapter II, an evaluation will be
               made to determine if the potential targets are afforded protection equal to
               or greater than similar material in the commercial or private sector.  If the
               targets are afforded this level of protection, no further analysis is required.

          (3)  A radiological/toxicological sabotage analysis must be performed for those
               radiological/toxicological sabotage targets not subject to (1) or (2) above,
               not found in the commercial or private sector, and not afforded a
               protection level equal to or greater than that provided for in the
               commercial or private sector.

     b.   The following prevention and mitigation options shall be implemented in a graded
          manner, based on the results of the radiological/toxicological sabotage analysis:

          (1)  safeguards and security features to prevent or detect adversary actions (i.e.,
               access and materials controls, surveillance, additional barriers/alarms, and
               entry/exit inspections);

          (2)  additional controls or equipment that would prevent the sabotage release
               scenario (i.e., providing automatic shutdown if components fail, adding
               backup systems, or establishing Protected/Vital Areas); and

          (3)  event-mitigating actions, such as establishing shelters, emergency
               notifications/evacuations, reducing and/or removing inventory quantities,
               or changing storage locations.

                            TABLE IV-1
             RADIOLOGICAL AND TOXICOLOGICAL SABOTAGE
                        CONSEQUENCE VALUES


Consequence
Value
Impact
Effects on the Public, Employees, and the
Environment from Acts of Radiological or
Toxicological Sabotage


1.0
Catastrophic
On- and off-site fatalities and injuries, long-term
denial of facility (greater than 2 years) due to damage
or radiation contamination, and off-site denial of food,
water, or habitat due to contamination for more than 1
year.


0.8
High
Off-site injuries and on-site fatalities and injuries, on-
site facility denial for 1 to 2 years, and off-site denial of
food, water, or habitat due to contamination for less
than 1 year.


0.5
Moderate
On-site injury (no off-site injury), on-site facility denial
for 6 months to 1 year, and denial of food, water, or
habitat due to contamination for less than 6 months.


0.2
Low
On-site injury, on-site facility denial for less than 1
month, and no impact on food, water supply or habitat.


                                 
                                 
                                 
                                                               CHAPTER V
                            SECURITY AREAS


1.    GENERAL.  The local DOE safeguards and security authority may determine the
      application of the Security Area requirements for Property Protection Areas.  The
      following applies to Security Areas.

      a.  Access shall be controlled to limit entry to appropriately cleared and/or authorized
          individuals.  

          (1) Any person allowed to enter a Security Area who does not possess an
              access authorization at the appropriate level shall be escorted at all times by
              a cleared and knowledgeable individual.  

          (2) Local authorities shall establish escort-to-visitor ratios in a graded manner
              for each of these Security Areas.  

      b.  Access control requirements may be layered as appropriate for the situation.  At
          succeeding boundaries, access controls may be more stringent.  

      c.  A personnel identification system (e.g., security badge system) shall be used to
          control access.  

      d.  Automated access control systems may be used as approved by the cognizant local
          DOE authority for safeguards and security.  
      
          (1) Automated access controls, when used for access to any security area,
              except property protection areas designated by the local authority, shall
              require the minimum of the verification of a valid DOE Standard Badge
              and personal identification number.

          (2) When remote automated access control systems are used for access to
              security areas, each barrier penetration shall provide the same degree of
              penetration resistance as the barrier itself.  Anti-tailgating means and
              procedures must be implemented.

          (3) Both central and secondary alarm stations shall be used to monitor
              automated access control systems used to protect Category I SNM,
              Category II SNM capable of roll-up to Category I, and Top Secret matter.

          (4) Automated access control system events (e.g., annunciation of a door
              alarm, tamper alarm, or anti-passback indication feature, or the occurrence
              of an unauthorized entry attempt) shall be treated in the same manner as an
              intrusion alarm for the area being protected.
 
      e.  Means shall be provided to deter unauthorized intrusion into Security Areas.  Such
          means include the use of intrusion detection sensors and alarm systems, barriers,
          random patrols, and/or visual observation.  The protection program shall include
          suitable means to assess alarms.  Intrusion detection and assessment systems used
          for the protection of Category I SNM, Category II SNM capable of roll-up to
          Category I, and Top Secret matter shall be monitored in both central and
          secondary alarm stations.  See Paragraph 1, Page VI-1 for amplified requirements.

      f.  Entrance/exit inspections, as required, shall be made by protective personnel or
          with detection equipment designed to detect prohibited articles.  (See
          subparagraph (2) below.)  Inspections of personnel, hand-carried items, packages
          and mail, and/or vehicles shall provide reasonable assurance that prohibited articles
          are not introduced and that safeguards and security interests are not removed from
          the area without authorization.

          (1) Inspections.  Inspection procedures, requirements, and frequencies shall be
              developed based on a graded approach and included in the appropriate
              security plan.  Where random entry or exit inspections are permissible, the
              inspection shall be conducted on a percentage basis, determined by the
              local cognizant DOE authority for safeguards and security, using
              techniques that ensure randomness.  

          (2) Prohibited Articles.  The following articles are prohibited from all Security
              Areas:  any explosives or other dangerous weapon, instrument, or material
              likely to produce substantial injury or damage to persons or property
              (Reference: Title 10 CFR Part 860, and Title 41 CFR Part 101-19.3); any
              controlled substances (e.g., illegal drugs and associated paraphernalia, but
              not prescription medicine); hazardous chemicals; and any other items
              prohibited by law.  The local cognizant DOE authority for safeguards and
              security may authorize the introduction of explosives and weapons used to
              conduct official Government business.  

          (3) Controlled Articles.  The following privately owned articles are not
              permitted in a Limited, Exclusion, Protected, or Material Access Area
              without prior authorization of the local cognizant DOE authority for
              safeguards and security:

              (a) recording equipment (audio, video, optical, or data);

              (b) electronic equipment with a data exchange port capable of being
                  connected to automated information system equipment;

              (c) cellular telephones;

              (d) radio frequency transmitting equipment; and

              (e) computers and associated media.  

          (4) Concentric Security Areas.  When a Security Area other than a Material
              Access Area is within a larger Security Area, additional entry/exit
              inspections are not required at the inner Security Area perimeter if
              inspections conducted at the outer Security Area boundary are at the same
              level as required for the inner Security Area boundary.  Entry and exit
              inspections shall be conducted at Material Access Area boundaries
              regardless of outer boundary inspections.  

      g.      Clearly defined physical barriers, such as fences, walls, and doors, shall be used to
              define the boundary of a Security Area.  Barriers shall meet the following
              requirements, as well as supplementary requirements defined in Chapter VII,
              Paragraph 1, of this Manual.

          (1) Barriers shall direct the flow of personnel and vehicles through designated
              entry control portals.  

          (2) Barriers and entry control portals, supplemented by other systems such as
              patrols or surveillance, shall be used to deter and detect introduction of
              prohibited articles or removal of safeguards and security interests.

          (3) Barriers shall be used to deter and/or prevent penetration by motorized
              vehicles where vehicular access could significantly enhance the likelihood
              of a successful malevolent act, associated with Protected Areas and high
              level security areas.  

          (4) Barriers shall be capable of controlling, impeding, or denying access to a
              Security Area.

      h.  Emergency personnel and vehicles may be authorized immediate entry to security
          areas when escorted by properly cleared and authorized personnel.  Personnel and
          vehicles shall be subject to exit inspections upon completion of the emergency
          situation.

      i.  Signs shall be posted to convey information on the Atomic Weapons and Special
          Nuclear Rewards Act; prohibited articles; the inspection of vehicles, packages, or
          persons either entering or exiting; notification of video surveillance equipment; and
          trespassing, if applicable.  Signs prohibiting trespassing shall be posted around the
          perimeter and at each entrance to a Security Area except when one Security Area
          is located within a larger posted Security Area.  See Chapter XII for further
          details.

      j.  Visitor logs are required at Protected Areas, Material Access Areas, and Exclusion
          Areas.  Requirements for other Security Areas, if any, and procedures for visitor
          logs at Security Areas shall be developed and approved by the cognizant local
          DOE authority for safeguards and security.  DOE F 1240.1, "Foreign Visitors
          Security Register," and DOE F 5630.6, "Visitors Security Register," shall be used. 
          Logs shall be retained in accordance with DOE O 200.1, INFORMATION
          MANAGEMENT PROGRAM, and General Records Schedule 18.  
      
2.    PROPERTY PROTECTION AREA.  A Property Protection Area is a Security Area
      established by local authority to protect DOE property.  A Property Protection Area may
      be established to protect against damage, destruction, or theft of Government-owned
      property, and for public access.  Measures taken shall be adequate to give reasonable
      assurance of protection and may include physical barriers, access control systems,
      protective personnel, intrusion detection systems, and locks and keys.  Protective
      measures taken shall be determined by local authorities and shall provide appropriate,
      graded protection as follows.

      a.  Access controls may be implemented to protect DOE property and facilities. 
          When access to a Property Protection Area is controlled by an automated access
          control system, the system shall verify the validity of the DOE standard badge (i.e.,
          that the badge serial number read by the system matches the serial number assigned
          to the badge holder).

      b.  Signs prohibiting trespassing, where necessary, shall be posted around the
          perimeter and at each entrance to the Property Protection Area in accordance with
          Title 10 CFR Part 860, Trespassing on Administration Property, and Title 41 CFR
          Part 101-19.3, Federal Property Management Regulation.  See Chapter XII.

      c.  Vehicles and hand-carried items entering or exiting are subject to inspection to
          deter and/or detect unauthorized introduction of contraband and removal of
          Government assets.

      d.  Physical barriers may be used to protect property and facilities.  

      e.  Property Protection Area security measures may range from facilities open to
          public access to that of a Protected Area, at the discretion of the local authority
          and as implemented in the SSSP.

3.    LIMITED AREA.  A Limited Area is a Security Area defined by physical barriers, used to
      protect classified matter and/or Category III quantities of SNM, where protective
      personnel or other internal controls can prevent access by unauthorized persons to
      classified matter or SNM.  

      a.  Requirements.  A Limited Area shall have barriers identifying its boundaries and
          encompassing the designated space, access controls to provide reasonable
          assurance that only authorized personnel are allowed to enter and exit the area,
          and random entrance/exit contraband inspections.  Limited Area access
          requirements shall be administered as follows.

          (1) Individuals permitted unescorted access shall have access authorization and
              need-to-know consistent with the matter under protection within the area.  

          (2) When access to a Limited Area is authorized for a person without
              appropriate access authorization or need-to-know, measures shall be taken
              to prevent compromise of classified matter.  

          (3) Access to safeguards and security interests within a Limited Area, when
              not in approved storage, shall be controlled by the custodian(s) or
              authorized user(s).

      b.  Personnel and Vehicle Access Control.  Validation of the identity and access
          authorization of persons allowed access shall be administered by protective
          personnel (e.g., protective force or other appropriately authorized personnel)
          and/or automated systems and shall be accomplished at the Limited Area
          entrance(s).  Access control requirements shall be as follows.

          (1) Privately-owned Government employee and contractor vehicles shall be
              prohibited from a Limited Area.  

          (2) Government-owned or Government-leased vehicles shall be admitted only
              when on official business and only when operated by properly cleared and
              authorized drivers, or when escorted by properly cleared, authorized
              personnel.  Emergency service vehicles (e.g., ambulances, fire trucks, and
              police vehicles), may be granted immediate access when escorted by
              properly cleared and authorized personnel.  The local safeguards and
              security authority shall implement procedures for search and access of
              service and delivery vehicles on official business; however, escort by
              properly cleared and authorized personnel is required.  Entry of service and
              delivery vehicles shall be kept to an operational minimum.  

          (3) Where access to a Limited Area is controlled by an automated access
              control system, the system shall verify the following: valid access
              authorization, valid Personal Identification Number, and valid DOE
              standard badge (i.e., the badge serial number read by the system matches
              the serial number assigned to the badge holder).  

4.    EXCLUSION AREA.  An Exclusion Area is a Security Area defined by physical barriers
      and subject to access control, where mere presence in the area would result in access to
      classified matter.  

      a.  Requirements.  An Exclusion Area shall have barriers identifying its boundaries
          and encompassing the designated space and access controls and entrance/exit
          inspections to provide reasonable assurance that only authorized personnel are
          allowed to enter and exit the area.  Exclusion Area requirements shall be
          administered as follows.

          (1) An Exclusion Area shall meet all requirements for a Limited Area.  An
              analysis should be conducted to determine if a valid biometric template is
              required to protect Top Secret classified matter and Restricted data.  

          (2) Access requirements are as follows.

              (a) Individuals allowed unescorted access shall have access
                  authorizations and need-to-know consistent with the matter to
                  which they would have access by mere virtue of their presence in
                  the area.

              (b) When access to an Exclusion Area is authorized for a person
                  without appropriate access authorization and need-to-know,
                  measures shall be taken to prevent compromise of classified matter
                  while the individual is in the area.

      b.  Personnel and Vehicle Access Control.  Validation of the identity and access
          authorization of persons allowed access shall be accomplished at the Exclusion
          Area entrance(s) and shall be administered by protective personnel and/or
          automated systems.

          (1) Private vehicles shall be prohibited from Exclusion Areas.

          (2) Government-owned or Government-leased vehicles shall be admitted only
              when on official business and when operated by properly cleared and
              authorized drivers.  Emergency service vehicles (e.g., ambulances, fire
              trucks, and police vehicles) may be granted immediate access when
              escorted by properly cleared and authorized personnel.  The local
              safeguards and security authority shall implement procedures for search
              and access of service and delivery vehicles on official business; however,
              escort by properly cleared and authorized personnel is required.  Entry of
              service and delivery vehicles shall be kept to an operational minimum.

          (3) Where access to an Exclusion Area is controlled by an automated access
              control system, the system shall verify the following: valid access
              authorization, valid Personal Identification Number, and valid DOE
              standard badge (i.e., the badge serial number read by the system matches
              the serial number assigned to the badge holder).  

5.    PROTECTED AREA.  A Protected Area is a Security Area encompassed by physical
      barriers, surrounded by perimeter intrusion detection and assessment systems, and
      equipped with access controls to protect Category II quantities of SNM and/or to provide
      a concentric security zone surrounding a separately defined Material Access Area or Vital
      Area.

      a.  Requirements.  The requirements for a Protected Area shall be as follows.
 
          (1) Entrance inspections of personnel, vehicles, and hand-carried items shall be
              conducted to deter and detect the unauthorized introduction of contraband. 
              Specific inspection procedures and SNM/metal detection levels and
              limitations shall be established and documented.  

          (2) Exit inspections of personnel, vehicles, and hand-carried items shall be
              conducted to deter and detect the unauthorized removal of SNM.  Specific
              inspection procedures and SNM/metal detection levels and limitations shall
              be established and documented.  When the Protected Area encompasses a
              Material Access Area, and no Category II or greater quantity of SNM is
              contained outside the Material Access Area, then no exit inspection is
              required.  

              (a) A physical or electronic inspection shall be separately conducted of
                  vehicles, personnel, packages, and all other containers at all routine
                  exit points for Protected Areas that contain Category I quantities
                  (or lesser quantities with credible roll-up to a Category I quantity).  

              (b) Exit inspection procedures and detection levels for SNM and
                  shielding shall be established consistent with the material type,
                  form, quantity, attractiveness level, size, configuration, portability,
                  and credible diversion amounts of SNM contained within the area.

              (c) Exit inspections shall be capable of detecting shielded SNM (e.g.,
                  by using a combination of SNM and metal detectors) and shall meet
                  requirements for metal and SNM detection as determined by the
                  Manager, Operations Office.

              (d) Procedures used shall ensure that unalarmed portals shall have the
                  means to detect SNM.

          (3) Exits shall be alarmed or controlled at all times.

          (4) Protected Area perimeter intrusion detection and assessment systems shall
              be monitored in a continuously manned central alarm station.

          (5) Protective force response time to an intrusion detection shall be less than
              the delay time that can be demonstrated from alarm activationuntil
              intruders could complete adverse actions.  
                                                                     
      b.  Personnel and Vehicle Access Control.  Validation of the identity and access
          authorization of persons authorized access shall be administered by armed
          protective force personnel and/or an automated access control system as
          determined by local safeguards and security authorities.  Access control
          requirements shall be as follows.

          (1) Private vehicles shall be prohibited from a Protected Area.  

          (2) Government-owned or Government-leased vehicles shall be admitted only
              when on official business and only when operated by properly cleared and
              authorized drivers, or when escorted by properly cleared, authorized
              personnel.  Service and delivery vehicles shall be admitted only when on
              authorized business and when driven or escorted by properly cleared,
              authorized personnel.  Entry of service and delivery vehicles shall be kept
              to an operational minimum.  

          (3) Where access to a Protected Area is controlled by an automated access
              control system, the system shall verify the following: valid access
              authorization, valid Personal Identification Number, and valid DOE
              standard badge (i.e., the badge serial number read by the system matches
              the serial number assigned to the badge holder).  

6.    VITAL AREA.  A Vital Area is a Security Area located within a Protected Area used for
      the protection of vital equipment.  All vital equipment shall be contained within a Vital
      Area.

      a.  Requirements.  In addition to protection strategies at a Protected Area, the
          following requirements shall be met.

          (1) Area boundaries shall conform to the layered protection concept, with a
              separate Vital Area perimeter located within a separate and distinct
              Protected Area.  

          (2) The perimeter of each Vital Area shall be monitored to deter and detect
              unauthorized entry attempts.  

          (3) Vital equipment shall be protected with an intrusion detection system.

          (4) Exits shall be alarmed or controlled at all times.

          (5) Protective force response time to an intrusion detection shall be less than
              the delay time that can be demonstrated from alarm activation until
              intruders could complete adverse actions.  

      b.  Personnel and Vehicle Access Control.  The local safeguards and security authority
          shall implement procedures for personnel and official vehicles for Vital Area
          access.  The procedure shall require the validation of the identity and access
          authorization of persons authorized access and shall be administered by protective
          personnel or an automated access control system.  Access control requirements
          shall be as follows.

          (1) Private vehicles shall be prohibited from a Vital Area.

          (2) Government-owned or Government-leased vehicles shall be admitted only
              when on official business and only when operated by properly cleared and
              authorized drivers, or when escorted by properly cleared and authorized
              personnel.  Service and delivery vehicles shall be admitted only when on
              authorized business and when driven by or escorted by properly cleared
              and authorized personnel.  

          (3) Where access to a Vital Area is controlled by an automated access control
              system, the system shall verify the following: valid access authorization,
              valid Personal Identification Number, and valid DOE standard badge (i.e.,
              that the badge serial number read by the system matches the serial number
              assigned to the badge holder).  

7.    MATERIAL ACCESS AREA.  A Material Access Area is a Security Area defined by
      physical barriers and subject to access control, used for the protection of Category I
      quantities of SNM or Category II quantities of SNM with credible roll-up to a Category I
      quantity.  A Material Access Area shall be contained within a Protected Area and shall
      have separately defined physical barriers constructed to provide sufficient delay time to
      control, impede, or deter unauthorized access.  Area boundaries shall conform to the
      layered protection concept, with a separate Material Access Area perimeter located within
      a separate and distinct Protected Area.  Material Access Area barriers shall direct the flow
      of personnel and vehicles through designated portals.  

      a.  Requirements.  Inspections shall provide reasonable assurance against the
          unauthorized introduction of prohibited articles or removal of SNM by force,
          stealth, or deceit.  

          (1) Entrance inspections of personnel, vehicles, and hand-carried items shall be
              conducted to deter and detect the unauthorized introduction of prohibited
              articles.  

          (2) Exit inspections of personnel, vehicles, and hand-carried items shall be
              conducted to deter and detect the unauthorized removal of SNM.  Specific
              inspection procedures and SNM/metal detection levels and limitations shall
              be established and documented.  

              (a) A physical or electronic inspection shall be separately conducted of
                  vehicles, personnel, packages, and all other containers at all routine
                  exit points for Material Access Areas that contain Category I
                  quantities (or lesser quantities with credible roll-up to a Category I
                  quantity).  

              (b) Exit inspection procedures and detection levels for SNM and
                  shielding shall be established consistent with the material type,
                  form, quantity, attractiveness level, size, configuration, portability,
                  and credible diversion amounts of SNM contained within the area.

              (c) Exit inspections shall be capable of detecting shielded SNM (e.g.,
                  using a combination of SNM and metal detectors) and shall meet
                  requirements for metal and SNM determined by the Manager,
                  Operations Office.

              (d) Procedures used shall ensure that unalarmed portals have the means
                  to detect SNM.

          (3) Protective force response time to an intrusion detection shall be less than
              the delay time that can be demonstrated from alarm activation until
              intruders could complete adverse actions.  

          (4) Exits and all openings larger than 96 square inches (619.20 square
              centimeters) shall be alarmed with intrusion detection sensors or controlled
              at all times.  (See Chapter VIII, Paragraph 1.g.(2).)

          (5) Material in process or stored within an unattended Material Access Area or
              within a vault or vault type room within the Material Access Area shall be
              protected by intrusion detection sensors.

          (6) Intrusion detection sensors and assessment systems shall be monitored in a
              continuously manned central alarm station.

      b.  Personnel and Vehicle Access Control.  Validation of the identity, access
          authorization, and authority to enter for persons allowed access shall be
          accomplished at Material Access Area entrances.  Access control shall be
          administered by armed protective force personnel and/or automated access control
          systems as determined by local safeguards and security authorities.  

          (1) Private vehicles shall be excluded from a Material Access Area.  

          (2) Government-owned or Government-leased vehicles shall be admitted to
              Material Access Areas only when on official business.  Drivers must have
              the proper access authorization or be escorted by authorized personnel
              with the proper access authorization.

          (3) Exit detection levels for SNM and shielding shall be established consistent
              with the form, quantity, attractiveness level, and credible diversion
              amounts/attempts of SNM contained within the area.

          (4) Where access to a Material Access Area is controlled by an automated
              access control system, the system shall verify the following: valid access
              authorization, valid Personal Identification Number, valid DOE standard
              badge (i.e., that the badge serial number read by the system matches the
              serial number assigned to the badge holder), and valid biometric template.

8.    OTHER SECURITY AREAS.  Other security areas shall be administered as follows and
      as outlined in pertinent DOE directives.

      a.  Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities.  The Department of Energy
          follows requirements in Director of Central Intelligence Directive 1/21 for the
          construction of Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities.

      b.  Central Alarm Station.  A central alarm station shall be used in protection of
          Category I and II quantities of SNM.  A central alarm station shall meet the
          requirements of a hardened post and shall be located, as a minimum, within a
          Limited Area.  Requirements are as follows.

          (1) An access control system shall be used to restrict admittance to persons
              who require access in the performance of official duties.

          (2) A central alarm station shall be attended constantly by appropriately trained
              security personnel who possess access authorizations commensurate with
              the most sensitive asset that is under the protection of the central alarm
              station.

      c.  Secondary Alarm Stations.  Facilities with Category I or II quantities of SNM shall
          have a secondary alarm station.  Used as an alternative alarm annunciation point to
          the central alarm station, the secondary alarm station shall be maintained at a
          location continuously manned, such that a response can be initiated if the central
          alarm station cannot perform its intended function.  Secondary alarm stations shall
          meet the operational requirements of central alarm stations with the exception of
          hardening and location within a Limited Area.  The secondary alarm station need
          not be fully redundant to the central alarm station, but shall be capable of providing
          effective control response to safeguards and security incidents.  

      d.  Local Law Enforcement Agency or Private Alarm Station.  If response by local
          law enforcement agency/protective personnel to alarm activity is required for
          facility approval, the response shall meet the specifications for Grade AA as
          contained in Underwriters Laboratories Standard 611, "Central-Station Burglar-
          Alarm Systems."

      e.  Secure Communications Centers and Automated Information System Centers.  

          (1) Centers handling classified messages or information shall be located, as a
              minimum, within a Limited Area.

          (2) Separate access controls and barriers shall be established to restrict
              admittance to persons employed therein or who require access in the
              performance of official duties.

          (3) Access authorizations, consistent with the highest level and category of
              classified information handled, shall be required for all persons assigned to
              or having any unescorted access to these centers.  A list of persons
              authorized such access shall be maintained within the center, and a record
              of all visitors entering the facility shall be maintained.

                              CHAPTER VI
    PROTECTION ELEMENT: INTRUSION DETECTION AND ASSESSMENT SYSTEMS


1.     GENERAL.  Intrusion detection systems shall be installed to provide reasonable assurance
       that breaches of security boundaries are detected and alarms are generated at a
       continuously manned alarm annunciation point.  Intrusion detection systems shall be
       provided for Protected Areas (as required in Chapter V, Paragraph 5), for Vital Areas, (as
       required in Chapter V, Paragraph 6), and for Material Access Areas and SNM (as
       discussed in Chapter V, Paragraph 7, and Paragraphs 2, 3, and 4 below).  Intrusion
       detection systems shall be provided for protection of classified matter as described in
       Chapter III, pragraph 2b.  Intrusion detection systems shall also be provided for vaults,
       vault-type rooms, Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities, Classified Automated
       Information System facilities, and Secure Communications Centers.  For other
       applications, the impact of loss or destruction of property and facilities shall be considered
       when assessing the need for intrusion detection systems.  

2.     GENERAL REQUIREMENTS.  Specifications for intrusion detection systems shall be as
       follows.

  a.   A means for timely detection of intrusion shall be provided by the use of intrusion
       detection systems and/or protective force fixed posts and/or mobile patrols. 
       Timely assessment of intrusion detection system alarms shall be provided by
       electronic systems and/or patrols.  Electronic assessment systems shall be fixed in
       place.  When used for detection, patrols shall be conducted at random intervals, at
       a documented frequency.

  b.   Intrusion detection systems shall provide operable coverage in all environmental
       conditions common to that area and under all common types of lighting conditions.

  c.   Visual observation by protective personnel on patrol or in fixed posts may
       complement intrusion detection systems and increase the probability of early
       detection.  

  d.   There shall be an effective method by which to assess all intrusion detection system
       alarms (e.g., intrusion, false, nuisance, system failure, and tamper), and radio
       frequency (RF) jamming.  

  e.   Response capability to intrusion detection system alarms shall be provided to
       protect DOE safeguards and security interests.  The response capability may be
       provided by assigned protective personnel or by the local law enforcement agency,
       as applicable.  Response times shall be appropriate for the protection strategy
       employed at the site.

  f.   Intrusion detection systems shall employ  multiple detection layers for Category I
       and II SNM targets.  Complementary sensor selection is required when multiple
       types of sensors are deployed.

  g.   Intrusion detection systems shall be designed, installed, operated, and maintained
       to ensure that the number of false and nuisance alarms does not reduce the system
       effectiveness.  System effectiveness metrics results shall be recorded.

  h.   Intrusion detection systems and their associated components, such as sensors,
       multiplexers, power supply cabinets, processors, junction boxes, and alarm access
       panels that service Protected Areas, Material Access Areas, or Vital Areas, shall
       resist tampering and provide an alarm to indicate tampering.  

  i.   Intrusion detection systems shall be monitored continuously by personnel assigned
       to assess alarms and intrusion activities.  Monitoring personnel shall initiate the
       appropriate responses.  

  j.   Compensatory measures shall be provided during times when the intrusion
       detection system is not in operation or not operating effectively.  RF devices used
       to protect Category I SNM are considered temporary compensatory measures that
       require deviation approval.  

  k.   Systems installed after 9/14/94, used in the protection of Category I quantities of
       SNM, shall employ redundant, independently routed communication paths to avoid
       a single point failure.  If the communication path is in a "loop" configuration, it
       must feature reverse polling to meet this requirement.  The redundant pathways
       shall begin at a data collection point and be conveyed and reported independently
       to a physically separated central alarm station and secondary alarm station.  The
       use of two RF alarm communication devices to protect Category I SNM, one as
       the primary path and the other as secondary path, does not satisfy the DOE
       requirement for redundant communications paths.  Several intrusion detection
       sensors may be connected to a common data collection point.  

  l.   Records shall be kept on each alarm.  The alarm record shall contain, as a
       minimum: date and time of the alarm; cause of the alarm or a probable cause if
       definite cause cannot be established; and the identity of the recorder or the
       operator on duty.  The record shall be reviewed, analysis performed, and
       corrective measures taken as applicable.

  m.   Alarm monitoring systems shall annunciate system and system component failure,
       including RF systems alarms, in the alarm station(s).  For the protection of
       Category I and II quantities of SNM, alarms shall be annunciated in both the
       central and secondary alarm stations.  Systems shall indicate the type and location
       of the alarm source.

  n.   In existing intrusion detection systems where dedicated telephone cable pairs are
       used to connect the intrusion detection system to the alarm station and/or
       annunciating point, cable pairs shall not be routed through telephone switching
       equipment.  

  o.   The system shall have a means of providing the system operator, response force, or
       maintenance personnel the location of the alarm.  

  p.   RF alarm communication devices shall use approved Digital Encryption System
       (DES) encryption or other National Security Agency-approved encryption
       techniques.

  q.   RF alarm communication devices, including those RF devices used as
       compensatory measures to protect Category I SNM, shall meet all requirements of
       this Manual and shall be analyzed to determine if they provide adequate protection
       in terms of target identification, threat definition, and overall effectiveness of the
       physical protection system.

  r.   Systems and system components shall be functionally tested in accordance with
       established procedures at a documented frequency .  Chapter III of DOE 470.1
       contains the performance assurance program requirements for systems protecting
       Category I and II SNM.  The testing program for all other security interests shall
       be developed by the local safeguards and security authority.

  s.   Public vehicle parking and drive areas shall be maintained at the explosive threat
       quantity distance from Protected Area perimeter intrusion detection and
       assessment systems.  

3.     INTERIOR INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS.  The approved
       interior intrusion detection systems shall be documented in the SSSP.  

  a.   The probability of detection for each safeguards and security physical protection
       system shall be established and documented.

  b.   Balanced magnetic switches shall initiate an alarm upon attempted substitution of
       an external magnetic field when the switch is in the normally secured position and
       whenever the leading edge of the door is moved 1 inch (2.5 centimeters) or more
       from the door jam.

  c.   Volumetric detectors shall detect an individual moving at a rate of 1 foot per
       second, or faster, within the total field-of-view of the sensor and its plane of
       detection.

4.     EXTERIOR INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS.  Approved
       exterior intrusion detection systems shall be documented in the  SSSP.  Requirements for
       Protected Areas, Material Access Areas, and Vital Areas are as follows.
 
  a.   The perimeter intrusion detection system shall be capable of detecting an individual
       (weighing 35 kilograms or more) crossing the detection zone walking, crawling,
       jumping, running, or rolling (at speeds between 0.15 and 5 meters per second), or
       climbing the fence, if applicable, at any point in the detection zone with a detection
       probability of 90 percent, at a 95 percent confidence level.  

       (1)  Testing shall be conducted at the time of initial perimeter intrusion
            detection system installation and at least annually thereafter to validate this
            detection probability and confidence level.  

       (2)  If operational testing or effectiveness testing indicates degradation of the
            intrusion detection system or portion thereof, then that portion of the
            intrusion detection system shall be revalidated.  When calculating detection
            probability for multiple sensor systems, detection is assumed if any of the
            sensors detect the intrusion.  

  b.   Intrusion detection systems shall cover the entire perimeter of a detection area,
       including the tops of buildings situated in the detection area.

  c.   All openings in barriers, unattended gates and/or portals, and culverts and sewers
       that have openings  larger than 96 square inches (619.20 square centimeters)
       where the smallest dimension is larger than 6 inches (15.24 centimeters) shall have
       detection capabilities at least as effective as the rest of the intrusion detection
       system, except when protected by access delay systems providing delay
       comparable to tunneling or wall penetration.  The intrusion detection system shall
       be operational when the opening is not attended.

  d.   Intrusion detection systems in adjacent detection zones shall overlap sufficiently to
       eliminate areas of no detection between detection zones.  The length of alarm
       zones shall be consistent with the characteristics of the sensors used in that zone.

  e.   Perimeter intrusion detection systems shall be designed, installed, and maintained
       so as to deny adversaries a means to circumvent the detection system.

  f.   The isolation zone between fences shall be at least 20 feet (6 meters) wide.

  g.   The isolation zone between fences shall be clear of fabricated or natural objects
       that would interfere with detection equipment or the effectiveness of the
       assessment.

  h.   Wires, piping, poles, and similar objects that could be used to assist an intruder
       traversing the isolation zone or that could assist in the undetected ingress or egress
       of an adversary or matter shall be protected by the detection and assessment
       system or constructed in a manner that deters their use.

  i.   The detection zone of each intrusion detection system sensor (where applicable)
       shall not provide a pathway (e.g., dips, obstructions) that an individual might use
       to avoid detection.

  j.   The detection zone of each intrusion detection system shall be kept free of snow,
       ice, grass, weeds, debris, and any other item that degrades intrusion detection
       system effectiveness.  When the above action cannot be accomplished in a timely
       manner, and when degradation of detection capabilities exists, compensatory
       measures shall be taken to provide timely detection.

5.     INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEM ALARM ANNUNCIATION AT THE CENTRAL
       AND SECONDARY ALARM STATION.

  a.   Alarms for the protection of Category I and II SNM and Top Secret matter shall
       be distinguished at the central alarm station from alarms protecting other security
       interests.  Annunciation of these alarms shall take priority over the alarms for other
       security interests.

  b.   Facilities not protecting Category I and II SNM and Top Secret matter and using
       commercial alarm station monitoring services shall have its sensors connected by
       direct, continuously supervised, leased line, or by such other means as to
       distinguish its alarms from all alarms for other customers that are monitored by the
       monitoring service.

  c.   Alarms shall annunciate audibly and visually to both the central and secondary
       alarm stations.

  d.   Action to acknowledge alarms shall be straightforward and easily performed. 
       Reporting and acknowledgment of a multiple alarm scenario must address alarm
       priorities to ensure system credibility/reliability is not diminished.

  e.   Intrusion detection system status indicators shall be provided to indicate when the
       system is not in working order and to indicate tampering with any essential system
       component, including analyzing all RF alarm communication physical protection
       devices for state-of-health (SOH) and for their capability to detect intentional and
       non-intentional jamming attempts.

  f.   Where applicable, the alarm control system shall have the capability to call the
       central alarm station and secondary alarm station operators' attention to a closed-
       circuit television camera (CCTV) alarm-associated video recorder/monitor.  The
       picture quality shall allow the operator to recognize and discriminate between
       human and animal presence in the camera field-of-view.

  g.   Video recorders, when used, shall be actuated by alarm signals and shall operate
       automatically.  The response shall be sufficiently rapid to record an actual
       intrusion.

  h.   When CCTV is used as the principal means for assessing alarms and for
       determining response level, CCTV cameras shall have tamper-protection and
       loss-of-video alarm annunciation.  Fixed CCTV shall be used when cameras are the
       principle means of alarm assessment.  Movable pan-tilt-or-zoom lens cameras may
       be used for surveillance and as back-up to fixed primary assessment cameras.

  i.   If remote CCTV assessment of a perimeter intrusion detection system is used, the
       coverage shall be complete, with no gaps between zones and no areas that cannot
       be assessed because of shadows or objects blocking the camera field.  When such
       conditions are temporary, compensatory measures shall be put into effect.

6.     RADIO FREQUENCY ALARM SYSTEMS.  When RF alarm communications are used,
       the RF link that replaces the direct hardwire link between the sensor and the central alarm
       station display panels shall maintain a high level of security.  RF alarm communications
       systems used for the protection of Category I SNM shall be limited to emergencies and
       temporary situations.  (The requirements of this paragraph do not apply to mobile and
       SNM presence alarm monitoring systems.)   Emergency and temporary use of RF alarm
       communications shall not exceed 120 days per application.  

  a.   RF Alarm Communications.  To ensure protection requirements, RF alarm
       communication systems, as a minimum, shall meet all of the following
       requirements.

       (1)  Approved Digital Encryption Standard  (DES) encryption or other
            National Security Agency approved encryption techniques shall be
            provided.

       (2)  The RF alarm communication system shall only be used as a redundant or
            alternate path with hardwire being the primary method.  Using two RF
            frequencies to protect Category I, one as the primary and the other as
            secondary path, does not satisfy the DOE requirement for redundant
            communications paths.  Compensatory measures will be required.  It may
            be adequate to use exposed, supervised hardwire along with RF as a
            redundant communication path for temporary applications.  

       (3)  The SOH interval shall be determined by analyzing the entire physical
            protection system for the particular application.  The SOH must be less
            than the adversary task time minus the assessment time plus the response
            time: [SOH <Adversary Task Time - (Assessment time + Response Time)].

       (4)  RF alarm communication systems shall be capable of automatically
            changing the encrypted SOH and alarm messages so the messages are not
            always the same.

       (5)  The systems shall be capable of detecting intentional and unintentional
            jamming attempts.

       (6)  The systems shall acknowledge unique status messages for alarm, tamper,
            and power conditions.

       (7)  The systems shall be capable of providing random or operator-initiated
            polling features to ensure communication link integrity.

       (8)  The systems shall provide redundant alarm communication paths that are
            self-checking and that annunciate system failure in the alarm stations. 
            Alarm messages that are not acknowledged because of a blocked
            transmission path shall be latched and communicated later through a status
            or SOH message.

       (9)  The systems shall have tamper-resistant or tamper-alarmed transmitters in
            both the access and secure mode.

       (10) The systems shall have battery back-up capabilities.

       (11) The systems shall not produce spurious signals that interfere with other
            intrusion detection system components.

       (12) The systems shall provide unique electronic address code for each sensor
            and line supervision from sensor to transmitter.

       (13) The systems shall provide a means of interfacing to the site annunciator
            system.

       (14) The systems shall ensure that compensatory measures are implemented if
            all or part of the system is being jammed.

       (15) The systems shall provide effective communications in all weather
            conditions.

       (16) The systems shall address multiple alarm scenario procedures to ensure
            system credibility is maintained (i.e., is not diminished).

  b.   In addition to the above requirements, the site implementing procedures for an RF
       alarm communication system should:

       (1)  provide a well-planned encryption scheme to include management of keys,
            two-person rules, etc.;

       (2)  be capable of operating in Government frequency bands;

       (3)  be installed and maintained by using the "two-person" rule;

       (4)  not be changed on a network (e.g., from secure mode to access mode);

       (5)  be functionally tested in accordance with established performance
            assurance procedures at a frequency that is documented  (DOE O 470.1,
            Chapter III); and

       (6)  have a vulnerability assessment conducted on the system to determine the
            risk if the system is "spoofed" or "jammed."

7.     LIGHTING REQUIREMENTS.  Protective illumination shall be provided to permit
       detection and assessment of adversaries and to reveal unauthorized persons.  

  a.   Protective lighting in Protected Areas, Material Access Areas, and Vital Areas
       shall be adequate to provide 24-hour visual assessment.
 
       (1)  Lights shall provide a minimum 2 foot-candle illumination at ground level
            for at least a 30-foot (9.14-meter) diameter around protective personnel
            posts and 0.2 foot-candle illumination for 150 feet (45.72-meters) in all
            directions.  

       (2)  Where protective lighting at remote locations is not feasible, protective
            personnel patrols and/or fixed posts may be equipped with night vision
            devices.  Night vision devices shall not be used routinely in lieu of
            protective lighting at ingress and egress points but may be used in the event
            of loss of lighting.  
                 
       (3)  Light glare shall be kept to a minimum in situations where it would impede
            effective operations of protective personnel; interfere with rail, highway, or
            navigable water traffic; or be objectionable to occupants of adjacent
            properties.

       (4)  Light sources on protected perimeters shall be located so that illumination
            is directed outward wherever possible.

  b.   Protective lighting for other applications shall be as specified in local security
       plans.

8.     AUXILIARY POWER SOURCES.  Intrusion detection systems for protection of
       Category I and II SNM, vital equipment, and Top Secret matter shall have auxiliary power
       sources as specified below.  Auxiliary power for systems protecting other assets shall be as
       approved in applicable security plans.  
  
  a.   Auxiliary power shall be available and capable of maintaining full operation of the
       intrusion detection and assessment system for 8 hours, or such time as would be
       needed to implement contingency plans.  The period of time necessary to
       implement contingency plans shall be documented.

  b.   Transfer to auxiliary power shall be automatic upon failure of the primary source
       and shall have no effect on operation of the security system or device.  The alarm
       station shall receive an alarm indicating failure of the security system primary
       power and transfer to the auxiliary power source.  For the protection of Category I
       and II quantities of SNM and vital equipment, both the central and secondary
       alarm stations shall receive the alarm.

  c.   Rechargeable batteries, when used, shall be kept fully charged or subject to
       automatic recharging whenever the voltage drops to a level specified by the battery
       manufacturer.  Non-rechargeable batteries shall be replaced whenever their voltage
       drops 20 percent below the rated voltage or manufacturer's recommendations.  An
       alarm signal shall be activated to indicate this condition.

  d.   Auxiliary power sources shall have the capability to facilitate operational testing
       and routine maintenance.

9.     PROTECTION OF INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEMS.

  a.   General.  Security-related equipment shall be protected from unauthorized access
       in a graded manner consistent with the security interest under protection.  For
       protection of Category I and II SNM, vital equipment, and Top Secret and Secret
       Restricted Data classified matter, detection/alarm devices, wiring between
       detection/alarm devices and data gathering panels, RF alarm transmission links,
       and transmission lines from data gathering panels to annunciators shall be
       tamper-indicating in both the access and secure modes.  System components used
       to protect Government property and security interests other than those itemized
       above shall be protected, consistent with a cost/benefit analysis determined by each
       facility.

  b.   Physical Protection.  The requirements for physically protecting intrusion detection
       system components are listed below.  

       (1)  The alarm control panel or data gathering panel physical protection
            requirements shall be based on /UL-681, which states that unless the
            control unit or data gathering panel is protected by a detection device
            specifically intended for the protection of an enclosure, these components
            must be located within the area of greatest protection; that is, the interior
            of the area being protected.  When these components are not installed in
            the area of greatest protection, the installation wiring from a control panel
            or data gathering panel to the alarm detection devices is to be physically
            protected from access or be alarmed to indicate attempted access.

       (2)  Electronic enclosures and junction boxes shall be secured against
            unauthorized access and shall be equipped with tamper alarms; otherwise,
            they shall be either  welded shut or under lock and key control.

  c.   Line Supervision.  Line supervision is required for intrusion detection systems
       protecting safeguards and security interests.  Where data encryption is used for line
       supervision, key changes shall be made at 1-year intervals or whenever
       compromise is suspected.  The requirements for line supervision are listed below.

       (1)  Classes of Line Supervision.  Performance-based definitions (extracted
            from Federal Specification W-A-450C) are listed below in descending
            order of protection.  For consistency in DOE applications, the following
            interpretations shall be used.

            (a)  Classes A through C shall apply to transmission of bytes of data.  In
                 general, Classes A through C apply to alarm links between data
                 gathering panels, between data gathering panels and central alarm
                 computers or alarm annunciator panels, and between computers.  

                 1    For Class A, as a minimum, the data transmission shall be
                      encrypted using Federal Information Processing Standard
                      (FIPS) 46-1, the Data Encryption Standard (DES), and
                      ANSI X3.92-1981; equipment shall operate, as a minimum,
                      in the Cipher Feedback (CFB) mode.

                 2    For Class B, as a minimum, the data transmission shall be
                      treated in one of the following ways:

                      a    encrypted using a proprietary encryption scheme,
                           which results in nonrepetitive communications;

                      b    pseudo random polling scheme;

                      c    nonencrypted data transmitted over fiber-optic cable
                           enclosed in conduit;

                      d    nonencrypted data transmitted over fiber-optic cable
                           monitored by an optical supervision system.

                 3    For Class C, unencrypted data transmission examples
                      include the following:

                      a    RS-232, RS-485, etc., data transmissions standards;

                      b    standard repetitive polling schemes; and

                      c    exception reporting with repetitive polling for health
                           checks.
            (b)  Classes D through F shall apply to transmission of information
                 through changes in the analog signal.  In general, Classes D through
                 F apply to alarm links between a sensor and a data gathering panel.  

                 1    Class D supervision is in the form of a combination of
                      various frequencies of ac, pulsed dc, or a combination of ac
                      and dc.

                 2    Class E supervision is in the form of an ac signal.

                 3    Class F supervision is in the form of a dc signal.

       (2)  Line Supervision Options.  Different combinations of line supervision are
            allowed depending on link routing.  Different examples of an alarm link
            remaining within the Security Area, going through a lower Security Area,
            and going through an unsecured area, are presented in Table VI-1 for the
            two primary segments of alarm data transmission:  from sensor to data
            gathering panel, and from data gathering panel to data gathering panel or
            central processing unit.

  d.   Alarm Annunciation and Response.  Data gathering panel to data gathering panel
       or data gathering panel to central processor (Classes A through C) line supervision
       alarms shall be annunciated in both the central and secondary alarm stations,
       indicating the type of alarm (data error, loss of communication, tamper, etc.) and
       the affected equipment.  
  
       (1)  Sensor to data gathering panel (Classes C through F) line supervision
            alarms shall be annunciated in both the central and secondary alarm stations
            (if required), indicating the sensor or sensors affected.  As a minimum,
            intrusion detection device tamper switches and tamper switches associated
            with an intrusion detection device (junction boxes, pry tamper, etc.),
            located within the same general area shall be wired to the affected device
            alarm circuit, to cause an interruption of the 24-hour supervision circuit,
            resulting in an alarm condition at the monitoring location.  

       (2)  For protective force personnel response, a line supervision or tamper alarm
            shall be treated the same as an intrusion alarm for the area being protected. 
            For data gathering panel to data gathering panel or data gathering panel to
            central processor (Classes A through C), protective force personnel shall
            be put on alert and system maintenance personnel notified when line
            supervision alarms indicate a loss of only one communications path of a
            redundant system. 

       (3)  On annunciation of a tamper or line supervision alarm, the alarm condition
            shall be assessed.  Tamper/line supervision alarms shall be tested through
            the range of required operation to verify effectiveness.  Compensatory
            measures shall be implemented to protect the alarmed location until the
            required testing and repairs, if applicable, are completed.  To negate the
            possibility of signal substitution, alarms shall be tested through physical
            actuation rather than by a computer generated, remote test feature.

  e.   Radio Frequency Alarm Response.  RF alarm events (e.g., SOH alarm, sensor
       alarm, tamper alarm, and RF jamming indications) shall be treated the same as an
       intrusion alarm for the area being protected.
          TABLE VI-1.  ALARM SYSTEM PROTECTION REQUIREMENTS          TABLE VI-1.  ALARM SYSTEM PROTECTION REQUIREMENTS
                             CHAPTER VII
    PROTECTION ELEMENT:  ACCESS CONTROL AND ENTRY/EXIT INSPECTIONS


1.    GENERAL.  

      a.  Requirements.  Access control points shall meet the following requirements.

          (1) Access control points shall be designed to provide positive control over
              vehicular and pedestrian traffic.

          (2) Motorized gate controls, where used, shall be located within, or
              immediately adjacent to, protective personnel posts at access points. 
              Motorized gates shall be designed to facilitate manual operation.

          (3) Access control points shall facilitate ingress and egress of emergency
              vehicles and fire protection equipment.

          (4) The number of access control points shall be minimized to establish and
              maintain the level of integrity required for each particular Security Area.  

      b.  Functions.  The following functions shall be performed at access control points.

          (1) A barrier to personnel entering Security Areas shall be provided until entry
              is requested and authorized.

          (2) Except where material surveillance procedures are required, portals directly
              protecting SNM shall permit entry of only one person per request.  If no
              emergency portals are available in the secured area, portals shall be capable
              of permitting unimpeded ingress by authorized emergency personnel.

          (3) Automated access control systems shall read data entered by the person
              requesting access, and if the data is successfully compared to existing data,
              the portal shall be electrically unlocked.  Where required, the system shall
              provide reasonable assurance that the material surveillance procedure has
              been met prior to allowing access.

          (4) Access from one Security Area into another Security Area with increased
              protection requirements shall be controlled.


      c.  Inspections.

          (1) Explosive detection inspections shall be in depth, with increasingly
              restrictive inspections as levels of security increase. Material Access Areas
              and vaults used to store Category 1A SNM are expected to have the most
              restrictive inspections.

          (2) Policy on explosive detection will be based on the threat quantity and shall
              consider the inspection for prohibited articles on people, hand-carried
              matter, deliveries, packages, and materials.

          (3) The procedures for countering the introduction of explosives onto a
              site/facility shall consider the introduction of explosives by all type vehicles. 
              

2.    AUTOMATED ACCESS CONTROL SYSTEMS.  

      a.  Equipment.  A security badge may be used to electronically store information
          relevant to the badge and badge holder for automated access control systems. 
          Automated access control equipment, where used, shall meet the following
          requirements.

          (1) The probability of an unauthorized individual gaining access through
              normal operation of the equipment shall be documented.

          (2) The probability of an authorized individual being rejected for access
              through normal operation of the equipment shall be documented.

          (3) The access authorization list shall be updated when an individual's access
              authorization has changed or when the individual is transferred or
              reassigned.

          (4) Badge readers at Protected Areas and Material Access Areas shall be
              equipped with anti-passback protection.

      b.  Protection.  Badge readers and associated equipment used to protect Category I
          and/or II SNM, vital equipment, and/or classified matter shall be protected in the
          following manner.

          (1) Door locks opened by badge readers shall be designed to relock
              immediately after the door has closed to deter another person from opening
              the door without following procedures.

          (2) Badge reader boxes, control lines, and junction boxes shall be supervised,
              tamper-alarmed, or equipped with tamper-resistant devices.  Data gathering
              panels, or multiplexers, and other similar equipment shall be tamper-
              alarmed or otherwise secured.

          (3) Auxiliary power shall be provided at installations where continuous service
              is required.

          (4) The system shall record attempted unsuccessful unauthorized access.

          (5) Access transactions that are or can be displayed, and where authorization
              data, badge-encoded data, and personal identification or verification data is
              input, stored, displayed, or recorded, shall be protected.  Protection may be
              accomplished by continuous surveillance by authorized personnel,
              structural safeguards, or other means.

          (6) If keypad devices with scrambled number keypads are not used, the keypad
              devices shall be installed in such a manner, or have a shielding device
              mounted, so an unauthorized person in the immediate vicinity cannot
              observe the selection of keys.

          (7) Transmission lines that carry access authorization, personal identification,
              or verification data between devices/equipment shall be protected against
              the introduction of data that would permit unauthorized access.

          (8) Access to records and information concerning encoded data and personal
              identification numbers shall be restricted to individuals cleared at the same
              level as the information contained within the specific area or areas where
              identification data or Personal Identification Numbers are used.  Access to
              identification or authorization data, operating system software, or any
              identifying data associated with the access control system shall be limited
              to the least number of people possible consistent with operational
              requirements.  

          (9) Records reflecting active assignments of badges, Personal Identification
              Numbers, levels of access, security clearances, and similar system-related
              records shall be maintained.  Records concerning personnel removed from
              the system shall be retained for 1 year unless a longer period is specified by
              other requirements.

3.    ENTRY/EXIT INSPECTIONS.

      a.  Inspection Equipment.  Metal detectors, SNM monitors, explosives detectors, and
          X-ray machines, as described below, may be used in lieu of or to supplement
          protective personnel conducting inspections for prohibited articles and
          Government property (e.g., SNM).  
 
          (1) General.  

              (a) Passage of individuals, vehicles, and/or packages through a portal
                  (e.g., walk-through) metal detector and/or SNM monitor shall be
                  observed and controlled by protective force personnel.  Hand-held
                  and/or portable metal detectors and SNM monitors, as applicable,
                  should be available and may be used to resolve alarms.

              (b) Auxiliary power should be provided to portal metal detectors and
                  SNM monitors.  Hand-held detectors and monitors may be used as
                  compensatory measures if auxiliary power is not feasible.

              (c) Bypass routes around portal metal detectors and/or SNM monitors,
                  as applicable, shall be closed or monitored to deter unauthorized
                  passage of personnel and hand-carried articles.

              (d) Measures shall be taken to preclude the unauthorized changing of
                  control settings.

              (e) Alarms shall annunciate audibly and visually.

          (2) Portal Metal Detectors.  Portal metal detectors shall meet the detection
              requirements established in Paragraph 3b(2).  

          (3) Special Nuclear Material Monitors.

              (a) SNM monitors shall meet detection requirements established in
                  DOE 5633.3B.

              (b) False alarm rates shall not exceed an average of one per 8-hour
                  period.

          (4) X-Ray Machines.

              (a) X-ray machines shall be capable of imaging a 26-gauge wire at Step
                  5 of an American Society for Testing and Materials step wedge.
                  [Reference: American Society of Testing Materials (ASTM)
                  Standard 792-88, "Standard Practice for Design and Use of
                  Ionizing Radiation Equipment for the Detection of Items Prohibited
                  in Controlled Access Areas."]

              (b) Compensatory measures shall be available at each location to
                  provide equal detection probabilities in the event of X-ray machine
                  failure.

          (5) Explosives Detectors. Detection systems shall be capable of detecting the
              threat quantity for the facility.

      b.  Entry Inspection Procedures.  

          (1) Explosives Detection.  Personnel, vehicles, and packages shall be inspected
              at the entrances to Limited Areas, Protected Areas, and Material Access
              Areas to deter the introduction of explosives.  Local safeguards and
              security authorities may establish inspection requirements for other types of
              Security Areas and other DOE safeguards and security interests.

              (a) Explosives detection systems shall be used in the inspection process
                  when a threat quantity is less than the level that can be detected
                  using conventional means (e.g., visual inspections).

              (b) The threat quantities of explosives shall be determined through
                  analysis.  The threat quantity is a one-time introduction of an
                  amount of explosives that would cause unacceptable impact to
                  national security or pose significant dangers to the health and safety
                  of employees, the public, or the environment.  

              (c) Detection shall be based on the one-time introduction of the threat
                  quantity.  Detection may be performed on a random basis with the
                  extent and frequency determined by the cognizant local DOE
                  authority for safeguards and security.

              (d) Explosives detection systems shall be capable of supplementing the
                  inspection process performed by the protective personnel.  The
                  explosives detection systems shall be capable of detecting
                  explosives entering a Security Area concealed in packages and/or
                  on the human body.  

          (2) Metal Detection.  Metal detectors used to inspect personnel entering a
              Security Area shall provide reasonable assurance that weapons are not
              introduced without authorization.

              (a) Portal metal detectors used for Protected Area entry applications
                  shall, at a minimum, detect test weapons listed in Paragraphs (b)1and 2 below in all locations throughout the detection field.

              (b) Portal metal detectors used for Material Access Area entry
                  applications shall, at a minimum, detect test weapons listed in
                  Paragraphs (b) 1, 2, and 3 below in all locations throughout the
                  detection field.  The following shall be used as standard test
                  weapons:

                  1   steel and aluminum alloy 0.25-caliber automatic pistol,
                      manufactured in Italy by Armi Tanfoglio Giuseppe, sold in
                      the United States by Excam as Model GT27B and by F.I.E. 
                      as the Titan (weight: approximately 343 grams);

                  2   Aluminum Model 7, 0.380-caliber Derringer, manufactured
                      by American Derringer Corporation (weight: approximately
                      200 grams).

                  3   stainless steel 0.22-caliber long rifle mini-revolver;
                      manufactured by North American Arms (weight: 
                      approximately 129 grams).

          (3) X-Ray.  X-ray machines are considered an acceptable means of inspecting
              bulk and hand-carried items for prohibited articles entering Protected Areas
              and Material Access Areas.

      c.  Exit Inspection Procedures.  Where required, personnel, vehicles, and hand-carried
          items, including packages, briefcases, purses, and lunch pails, shall be subject to
          exit inspections to deter and detect unauthorized removal of safeguards and
          security interests from applicable Security Areas.  Personnel inspections for SNM
          may be accomplished through the use of collocated SNM monitors and metal
          detectors.  Personnel inspections for classified matter or other safeguards and
          security interests may be accomplished by a visual inspection.

          (1) Metal Detectors.  Metal detectors are an acceptable means of inspecting
              for metallic SNM shielding.  When credible theft scenarios do not require
              the detection of an object (such as lead), and when requirements are
              properly documented, detection limits suitable to specific situations shall be
              established.

          (2) Special Nuclear Material Monitors.  The use of SNM monitors is an
              acceptable means of inspecting for concealed SNM.  
                             CHAPTER VIII
               PROTECTION ELEMENT:  BARRIERS AND LOCKS


1.     BARRIERS.

  a.   General.  Physical barriers, such as fences, walls, doors, or activated barriers, shall
       be used to deter and delay unauthorized access to Security Areas.  Physical
       barriers shall serve as the physical demarcation of the Security Area.  

       (1)  Barriers shall be used to facilitate effective and economical use of
            protective personnel and to direct the flow of personnel and vehicular
            traffic through designated portals in a manner to permit efficient operation
            of access control systems.

       (2)  Permanent barriers shall be used to enclose Security Areas, except during
            construction or transient activities, when temporary barriers may be
            erected.  Temporary barriers may be of any height and material that
            effectively impedes access to the area.

       (3)  Application of barriers shall provide protection with respect to the
            safeguards and security interests being protected.  The penetration
            protection features (e.g., doors and openings) at each barrier shall provide
            the same degree of penetration resistance as the barrier itself.  

       (4)  Sound attenuation for those areas designated for classified discussions shall
            be incorporated in accordance with the Technical Surveillance
            Countermeasures Procedural Guide.

  b.   Fencing.  When used for deterrence purposes, fencing shall meet the following
       minimum construction requirements:

       (1)  Fences shall be installed not less than 20 feet (6 meters) from the building
            or material under protection.  If the distances specified cannot be
            accommodated because of property lines, building locations, health and
            safety, or other site-specific considerations, and unacceptable risk is
            created, then supplementary protective measures shall be provided.

       (2)  Fencing shall extend to within 2 inches (5 centimeters) of firm ground, or
            below the surface if the soil is unstable or subject to erosion.  Surfaces shall
            be stabilized in areas where loose sand, shifting soils, or surface waters may
            cause erosion and thereby assist an intruder in penetrating the area.  Where
            surface stabilization is impossible or impractical, concrete curbs, sills, or
            similar types of anchoring devices, extending below ground level, shall be
            provided.

       (3)  Physical protection features shall be implemented at all locations where
            storm sewers, drainage swells, and site utilities intersect the fence
            perimeter.  Unattended openings, as identified in Paragraph 1g, below, shall
            be protected.  

       (4)  Fencing Materials and Specifications.

            (a)  Galvanized steel chain link fabric, consisting of a minimum of 11
                 gauge with mesh openings not larger than 2 inches, shall be used at
                 Security Areas, except at Property Protection Areas, where its use
                 is optional.  This fencing shall be topped by three or more strands
                 of barbed wire on single or double outriggers.  Double outriggers
                 may be topped with coiled barbed wire (or with barbed tape coil
                 where approved for use by the cognizant DOE authority for
                 safeguards and security).  When single barbed wire outriggers are
                 used, they shall be angled outward, away from the Security Area.  

            (b)  Overall fence height, excluding barbed wire or barbed tape coil
                 topping, shall be a minimum of 7 feet (2.13 meters).  

            (c)  Wood fencing may be used when nonmagnetic requirements are
                 established and to bar vision into limited personnel access areas. 

            (d)  Solid fencing, which could increase need for protective personnel,
                 should be used judiciously.  

            (e)  Woven wire fencing should be limited to railway and highway
                 rights-of-way.  

            (f)  Barbed wire fencing may be used for boundaries of open,
                 undeveloped area.

       (5)  The installation of vehicle barriers shall be considered where the secured
            perimeter borders public vehicular traffic areas.

       (6)  Fence lines shall be kept clear of vegetation, trash, equipment, and other
            objects that could impede observation.

       (7)  Gate hardware for security fencing shall be installed in a manner to mitigate
            tampering and/or removal (e.g., by brazing, peening, or welding). 

       (8)  Security fences are not required around Property Protection Areas, unless
            documented in the SSSP.  .
       
       (9)  Alternative barriers may be used in lieu of fencing if the penetration
            resistance of the barrier is equal to or greater than the standard fencing
            described in 1.b.(4) above.

  c.   Walls.  Walls serving as Security Area boundaries shall meet the following
       requirements.

       (1)  Building materials shall offer penetration resistance to, and evidence of,
            unauthorized entry into the area.  Construction shall meet local building
            codes.

       (2)  When transparent glazing material is used, visual access to the classified
            material shall be prevented by the use of drapes, blinds, or other means.
       
       (3)  Insert-type panels (if used) shall be such that they cannot be removed from
            outside the area being protected without showing visual evidence of
            tampering.

       (4)  Walls that constitute exterior barriers of Security Areas shall extend from
            the floor to the structural ceiling, unless equivalent means are used.
  
  d.   Ceilings and Floors.  Ceilings and floors shall be constructed of building materials
       that offer penetration resistance to, and evidence of, unauthorized entry into the
       area.  Construction shall meet local building codes.  

  e.   Doors.  Doors and doorjambs shall provide the necessary barrier delay rating
       required by the security plan.  As a minimum, requirements shall include the
       following.

       (1)  Doors with transparent glazing material may be used if visual access is not
            a security concern; however, they shall offer penetration resistance to, and
            evidence of, unauthorized entry into the area.  

       (2)  A sight baffle shall be used if visual access is a factor.  

       (3)  An astragal shall be used where doors used in pairs meet.

       (4)  Door louvers, baffle plates, or astragals, when used, shall be reinforced and
            immovable from outside the area being protected.

  f.   Windows.  The following requirements shall apply to windows.

       (1)  When primary reliance is placed on windows as physical barriers, they shall
            offer penetration resistance to, and evidence of, unauthorized entry into the
            area.
       
       (2)  Frames shall be securely anchored in the walls, and windows shall be
            locked from the inside or installed in fixed (nonoperable) frames so the
            panes cannot be removed from outside the area being protected.

       (3)  Visual barriers shall be used if visual access is a factor.
 
  g.   Unattended Openings.

       (1)  Physical protection features shall be implemented at all locations where
            storm sewers, drainage swells, and site utilities intersect the fence
            perimeter.  

       (2)  Compensatory measures must be used when unattended openings in
            security barriers meet the following criteria:  

            (a)  the opening is larger than 96 square inches (619.20 square
                 centimeters) in area and larger than 6 inches (15.24 centimeters) in
                 the smallest dimension; and 

            (b)  the opening is located within 18 feet (5.48 meters) of the ground,
                 roof, or ledge of a lower Security Area; or 

            (c)  the opening is located 14 feet (4.26 meters) diagonally or directly
                 opposite windows, fire escapes, roofs, or other openings in
                 uncontrolled adjacent buildings; or

            (d)  the opening is located 6 feet (1.83 meters) from uncontrolled
                 openings in the same barrier.

  h.   Activated Dispensable Barriers, Deterrents, and Obscurants.  Activated
       dispensable barriers, deterrents, and obscurants, if used, shall meet the following
       requirements.

       (1)  Obscurants shall consider spatial density versus time.

       (2)  Other dispensable materials shall be prudently implemented and individually
            evaluated for delay effectiveness.

       (3)  Controls and dispensers shall be protected from tampering and shall not be
            collocated.

  i.   Vehicle Barriers.  Vehicle barriers shall be used to preclude, deter, and where
       necessary, prevent penetration into Security Areas when such access cannot
       otherwise be controlled.  

  j.   Hardware.  Screws, nuts, bolts, hasps, clamps, bars, wire mesh, hinges, and hinge
       pins shall be fastened securely to preclude removal and to ensure visual evidence of
       tampering.  Hardware accessible from outside the area shall be peened, brazed, or
       spot-welded to preclude removal, or otherwise be secured by hardware that is
       resistant to tampering (e.g., nonremovable hinge pins).

2.     LOCKS.

  a.   General.  The requirements for security locks shall be applied in a graded fashion. 
       Consideration shall be given to the safeguards and security interest being
       protected, the identified threat, existing barriers, delay time provided by the lock,
       and other protection measures afforded when determining which requirements to
       follow.  

       NOTE:  Additional information can be found in the U.S.  DOE Security Container
       and Locking Device Guide, dated 10/93.

  b.   Key locksets shall meet American National Standards Institute Standard A156.2,
       American National Standards for Bored and Preassembled Locks and Latches.

  c.   Lock Hardware.

       (1)  Lock bars shall be 1-1/4 inch (31.75 millimeters) by 3/16 inch (4.76
            millimeters) or equivalent in cross section and constructed of material
            hardened to Rockwell C59 to C63 standards.

       (2)  Hasps and yokes on repositories containing classified matter shall be
            constructed of material hardened to Rockwell C59 to C63 standards; be at
            least 1/4 inch (6.35 millimeters) in diameter, or equivalent cross section;
            and be secured to the repository by welding or riveting.

       (3)  Panic hardware or emergency exit mechanisms used on emergency doors
            located in Security Areas shall be operable only from inside the perimeter
            and shall meet all applicable Life Safety Codes.

  d.   Key Management.  Security keys shall be protected at the same level as the asset
       under protection.  An inventory and accountability system shall be implemented.  

       NOTE:  Additional information can be found in the U.S. DOE Security Container
              and Locking Device Guide.                              CHAPTER IX
                 PROTECTION ELEMENT:  SECURE STORAGE


1.     VAULTS AND VAULT-TYPE ROOMS.

  a.   Construction.  

       (1)  Vaults.  The minimum standards required for construction of vaults, other
            than modular vaults, apply to all new construction, reconstruction,
            alterations, modifications, and repairs.  Wall, floor, and roof construction
            shall comply with nationally recognized standards of structural practice. 
            Delay time to forcible entry provided by wall, floor, or roof shall be equal
            to or greater than the delay time provided by concrete poured in place,
            with a minimum 28-day compressive strength of 2,500 pounds per square
            inch (17,237 kilo-Pascal).  As an alternative to minimum concrete thickness
            or structural criteria specified in the following sections, activated barriers
            may be used to reduce construction and achieve the same delay time.  

            (a)  Floor and Walls.  The thickness of the floor and walls must be
                 determined by analysis of the forcible entry delay times and the
                 structural requirements, but may not be less than reinforced
                 concrete 8 inches thick (20 centimeters).  Walls shall be extended to
                 the underside of the roof and ceiling slab above.

            (b)  Roof and/or Ceiling.  The roof and/or ceiling shall be a monolithic,
                 reinforced concrete slab of a thickness to be determined by analysis
                 of the forcible entry delay times and the structural requirements, but
                 not less than reinforced concrete 8 inches thick (20 centimeters).

            (c)  Vault Door and Frame Unit.  The door and frame shall meet
                 Federal Specification AA-D-600B, "Door, Vault, Security."

            (d)  Miscellaneous Openings.  Any miscellaneous openings, open ducts,
                 pipes, registers, sewers, and tunnels of such size and shape as to
                 permit unauthorized entry [in excess of 96 square inches (619.20
                 centimeters square) in area and over 6 inches (15.24 centimeters) in
                 its smallest dimension] shall be equipped with barriers such as wire
                 mesh, 9-gauge expanded metal, or rigid steel bars at least one-half
                 inch (1.3 centimeters) in diameter and welded vertically and
                 horizontally 6 inches (15.24 centimeters) on center.  The rigid steel
                 bars shall be securely fastened at both ends to preclude removal. 
                 Where wire mesh, expanded metal, or rigid metal bars are used,
care shall be exercised to provide reasonable assurance that
classified matter within the vault cannot be removed with the aid of
any type of instrument.  After installation, the annular space
between the sleeve and the pipe or conduit shall be filled with lead,
wood, waterproof caulking, or similar material to give evidence of
surreptitious removal.

            (e)  Locks.  Locks shall provide delay times commensurate with the
                 barrier structure.

       (2)  Modular Vaults.  Depending on the delay time requirements to protect
            against forcible entry, modular vaults may be constructed to provide the
            required security.  If a modular vault will meet the delay requirements and
            it is desired, it shall be constructed in accordance with Federal
            Specification AA-V-2737, "Modular Vault Systems."

       (3)  Vault-Type Rooms.  The following minimum standards are required for all
            new construction, reconstruction, alterations, modifications, and repairs of
            existing areas.

            (a)  Hardware.  Heavy-duty builder's hardware shall be used in
                 construction, securely fastened to preclude surreptitious removal
                 and to ensure visual evidence of tampering.  Hardware accessible
                 from outside the area shall be peened, pinned, brazed, or spot-
                 welded to preclude removal.

            (b)  Walls.  Construction may be of materials offering resistance to, and
                 evidence of, unauthorized entry into the area.  If insert-type panels
                 are used, a method shall be devised to prevent the removal of such
                 panels without leaving visual evidence of tampering.  Should any of
                 the outer walls be adjacent to space not controlled by DOE, the
                 walls must be constructed of more substantial building materials,
                 such as brick, concrete, corrugated metal, etc.  If visual access is a
                 factor, area barrier walls shall be of opaque or translucent
                 construction.  

            (c)  Windows.  Those windows that open and are less than 18 feet (5.48
                 meters) from an access point (e.g., another window outside the
                 area, roof, ledge, or door) shall be fitted with -inch (1.3-
                 centimeter) bars that are separated by no more than 6 inches (15.24
                 centimeters), plus crossbars to prevent spreading, 18-gauge
                 expanded metal, or wire mesh securely fastened on the inside.  If
                 visual access is a security concern, the windows shall be closed and
                 locked and shall be made translucent or opaque.  During
                 nonworking hours, the windows shall be closed and securely
                 fastened to preclude surreptitious entry.

            (d)  Doors.  Doors shall be of wood or metal and of substantial
                 construction.  Windows, panels, or similar openings  shall be
                 secured with 18-gauge expanded metal or wire mesh securely
                 fastened on the inside.  If visual access is a security concern, the
                 windows shall be translucent or opaque.  When doors are used in
                 pairs, an astragal shall be installed where the doors meet.

            (e)  Door Louvers or Baffle Plates.  When used, door louvers or baffle
                 plates shall be reinforced with 18-gauge expanded metal or wire
                 mesh fastened inside the area.

            (f)  Ceilings.  

                 1    When wall barriers do not extend to the true ceiling and a
                      false ceiling is created, the false ceiling must be reinforced
                      with wire mesh or 18-gauge expanded metal to serve as a
                      true ceiling, or ceiling tile clips must be installed.  
  
                 2    When wire mesh or expanded metal is used, it must overlap
                      the adjoining walls and be secured to show evidence of any
                      tampering.  

                 3    When ceiling tile clips are used, a minimum of four clips
                      must be installed per tile.  The clips must be installed from
                      the interior of the area, and each clip must be mounted to
                      preclude surreptitious entry.  

                 4    In some instances, there may be a valid justification for not
                      erecting a solid suspended ceiling as part of the area.  For
                      example, in areas where overhead cranes are used for the
                      movement of bulky equipment, the air conditioning system
                      may be impeded by the construction of a solid suspended
                      ceiling, or the height of the classified matter may make a
                      suspended ceiling impractical.  In such cases, special
                      provisions, such as motion detection devices, shall be used
                      to provide reasonable assurance that surreptitious entry to
                      the area cannot be obtained by entering the area over the
                      top of the barrier walls.  The use of suspended ceilings is
                      discouraged; however, where used, specific applications
                      must be approved by the cognizant local DOE authority for
                      safeguards and security.

            (g)  Miscellaneous Openings.  Miscellaneous openings shall meet the
                 requirements for vaults given in Paragraph 1a(1)(d) of this chapter.

            (h)  Locks.  Locks shall provide delay times commensurate with the
                 barrier structure.

  b.   Intrusion Detection Systems.  

       (1)  Vaults.  Doors, or similar movable openings allowing access into vaults and
            modular vaults, shall be equipped with intrusion detection system devices. 
            In addition, a balanced magnetic switch, or other equally effective device,
            shall be used on each door or movable opening to provide detection of
            attempted or actual unauthorized access.

       (2)  Vault-Type Rooms.  Intrusion detection systems for vault-type rooms shall
            detect penetration through floors, walls, ceilings, and openings, or
            movement within the facility envelope, consistent with that required to
            remove or compromise matter within the vault-type room.  

            (a)  Where intrusion detection system sensors are used to detect facility
                 envelope penetration, the openings discussed above shall be
                 referenced for the minimum required detectable size of penetration. 
                 The only exception is on-grade, concrete floors that do not require
                 detection.  

            (b)  Where intrusion detection system sensors are used to detect
                 movement within the facility envelope, sensor coverage shall be
                 provided for credible pathways from the facility envelope to the
                 matter being protected.  Credible pathways shall consider visual
                 protection and shall be documented.  If the distance between the
                 true floor (or ceiling) and the false floor (or ceiling) does not
                 exceed 6 inches (15.24 centimeters), intrusion alarms are not
                 required between the two floors (or ceilings).

            (c)  Doors, or similar movable openings allowing access into vault-type
                 rooms, shall be equipped with intrusion detection system devices. 
                 A balanced magnetic switch, or other equally effective device, shall
                 be used on each door or movable opening to allow detection of
                 attempted or actual unauthorized access. 
 
  c.   Vault-Type Room Complex.  Vault-type room criteria may be extended to multiple
       rooms, including an entire building.  Open storage of Secret and Confidential
       classified matter is allowed in a vault-type room complex.  The complex envelope
       shall meet penetration resistance, intrusion detection, and access control
       requirements of a vault-type room.  Individuals shall be authorized for access to all
       safeguards and security interests within the vault-type room complex before they
       are allowed to enter, unless supplementary protective measures are employed. 
       Requirements for a vault-type complex are listed below.

       (1)  Barrier requirements shall apply to the outer walls, floor, and ceiling. 
            Outer walls shall extend from true floor to true ceiling.  Interior walls may
            extend only to a false ceiling and/or raised floor.  Interior doors, windows,
            and openings may exist between different work areas.

       (2)  The requirement to detect unauthorized access may be accomplished
            through direct visual observation by an individual authorized in the area or
            through intrusion detection sensors.  Detection of inner wall penetration or
            motion within the vault-type complex is not required.  False ceilings and
            raised floors are permitted.

       (3)  Intrusion sensors associated with walls, floors, and ceilings that are not
            under constant visual surveillance but are associated with the vault-type
            room complex envelope shall be activated and capable of detection at all
            times.

2.     SECURITY CONTAINERS.

  a.   General.  

       (1)  The GSA establishes the national minimum standards and specifications for
            commercially manufactured security containers.  Containers purchased
            after 7-14-94 shall conform to the latest GSA standards and specifications.

       (2)  Physically modified containers are not considered approved by the GSA.

  b.   Security Container Requirements.  
       
       (1)  Test Certification Label.  Security containers, cabinets, or repositories shall
            bear a test certification label on the inside of the locking drawer or door
            and shall be marked "General Services Administration-Approved Security
            Container" on the outside of the top drawer or door.

       (2)  Maintenance.  Maintenance information shall be maintained for all
            containers.  A history for each security container describing damage
            sustained and repairs accomplished shall be retained for the life of the
            security container.

       (3)  Transfer of Security Containers.  When a security container is transferred
            from one organization to another, the custodian from the original
            organization shall certify, in writing, that all classified matter has been
            removed prior to the transfer.  Certification shall be made to the
            organization's security office and shall include the security container's
            make and property tag number (or other unique identifying numbers or
            markings), the custodian's name and organization, and the statement "All
            classified matter has been removed from this (these) security container(s)
            prior to transfer from my organization to (receiving organization)." The
            organization level at which this requirement shall apply (e.g., Division,
            Branch) is to be determined by the cognizant local DOE authority for
            safeguards and security.
  
  c.   Damage and Repair of General Services Administration-Approved Security
       Containers.  Neutralization of lockouts or repair of any damage that affects the
       integrity of a security container approved for the storage of classified information
       shall be accomplished only by appropriately cleared locksmiths.
                              CHAPTER X
                 PROTECTION ELEMENT:  COMMUNICATIONS


1.     GENERAL.  Communications equipment shall be provided to aid reliable information
       exchange between protective personnel.  The communications equipment shall meet the
       following requirements.

  a.   Facilities with Protected Areas, Material Access Areas, and Vital Areas shall have
       a minimum of two different technologies of voice communications to link each
       fixed post, central alarm station, secondary alarm station, and protective force
       personnel dispatch point within the facility.

  b.   Alternate communications capabilities shall be available immediately upon failure
       of the primary communications system.  Channels considered critical to protective
       personnel communications shall have backup stations.  Records of the failure and
       repair of all communications equipment shall be maintained in a form suitable for
       compilation by type of failure, unit serial number, and equipment type.

  c.   Systems shall remain operable in the event of loss of primary electrical power.

2.     DURESS SYSTEMS.  Facilities with Protected Areas, Material Access Areas, and Vital
       Areas shall have duress capabilities between mobile and fixed posts and shall meet the
       following requirements.

  a.   Activation of the duress alarm shall be accomplished in as unobtrusive a manner as
       practicable.

  b.   Duress alarms shall not annunciate at the post initiating the duress alarm.  

  c.   The duress alarm for a central alarm station shall annunciate at the secondary alarm
       station or another fixed protective force post.
  
  d.   The duress alarm for the secondary alarm station shall annunciate at the central
       alarm station or another fixed post.

  e.   Mobile duress alarms shall annunciate at the central alarm station, secondary alarm
       station, or another fixed post.

3.     RADIOS.  

  a.   A continuous electronic recording system shall be provided for all security radio
       traffic.  The logging recorder shall be equipped with a time track and shall cover all
       security channels.  The continuous electronic recording of security radio traffic
       requires approval of the Office of IRM Policy, Plans, and Oversight or the Office
       of Security Affairs, as covered in DOE 1450.4, CONSENSUAL LISTENING-IN
TO OR RECORDING TELEPHONE/RADIO CONVERSATIONS.

  b.   Portable radios shall be capable of two-way communication on the primary
       security channel from within critical buildings and structures.  If safety or process
       procedures prohibit transmission within a building or structure, an alternate means
       of communication shall be provided.  

  c.   Mobile radios and base station radios shall be capable of maintaining two-way
       communication with the facility central alarm station on the primary channel.

  d.   Fixed post radios, mobile radios, and portable radios, through the radio system,
       shall be capable of accessing operational and support channels used for security.

       (1)  These radios shall have sufficient power and sensitivity for two-way
            communications with the facility base stations on the primary channel.

       (2)  Security communication channels shall be restricted to security operations.

  e.   Base station radios, controlled from the central alarm station, shall include
       emergency response channels.

  f.   Portable radios shall contain sufficient battery capacity to operate for 8 hours at
       maximum expected duty cycle.  Procedures for radio or battery exchange, or
       battery recharge, can be used to meet this requirement.

4.     SPECIAL RESPONSE TEAM RADIO COMMUNICATIONS.  Special Response Team
       radio communications equipment shall be capable of transmitting routine and emergency
       information.  Equipment shall meet all requirements of the radio system for the rest of the
       facility, except that the Special Response Team two-way radio communications shall be
       equipped with digital encryption, meeting the requirements of DOE 5300.3D,
       TELECOMMUNICATIONS: COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY.  Special Response
       Team radio equipment shall use channels separate from the normal operational channels.  
                              CHAPTER XI
                   PROTECTION ELEMENT:  MAINTENANCE


1.    GENERAL.  Security-related subsystems and components shall be maintained in operable
      condition.  General policy and objectives are provided in DOE O 430.1, LIFE-CYCLE
      ASSET MANAGEMENT.  A regularly scheduled testing and maintenance program is
      required.  System maintenance shall be applied in a graded fashion, with consideration
      given to the interests/targets being protected, the identified threat, and other protection
      measures.  The physical protection program shall include a testing and maintenance
      program that encompasses security-related components and subsystems.  

2.    CORRECTIVE MAINTENANCE.  

      a.  Corrective maintenance shall be initiated within 24 hours of the indication that a
          malfunction of site-determined critical system elements has occurred for systems
          protecting Category I and roll-up II quantities of SNM, vital equipment, and Top
          Secret matter.  Compensatory measures shall be implemented immediately when
          any part of the critical system is out of service and shall be continued until
          maintenance is complete and the critical system element is back in service.

      b.  Corrective maintenance shall be initiated within 72 hours of detection of
          malfunction for a noncritical system element protecting Category I and II SNM,
          vital equipment, and Top Secret matter.  Corrective maintenance for a noncritical
          system protecting other assets shall be determined by local authority.  The local
          cognizant authority for safeguards and security shall determine if compensatory
          measures are necessary.

3.    PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE.  Preventive maintenance shall be performed on critical
      safeguards and security-related subsystems and components.  Preventive maintenance
      shall, at a minimum, be performed in accordance with manufacturer's specifications and
      recommendations.  The following system elements shall be included in a preventive
      maintenance program:

      a.  intrusion detection and assessment systems,

      b.  central alarm station/secondary alarm station alarm annunciators,

      c.  protective force equipment,

      d.  personnel access control and inspection equipment,

      e.  package and matter inspection equipment,

  f.   vehicle inspection equipment,

  g.   security lighting, and

  h.   security system-related emergency power or auxiliary power supplies.

4.     MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL ACCESS AUTHORIZATION.  Personnel who test,
       maintain, or service critical systems shall have access authorization consistent with the
       category of SNM and/or classified matter being protected, unless such testing and
       maintenance are performed as bench services away from the Security Area or are
       performed under the supervision of an appropriately cleared custodian knowledgeable of
       the system and/or critical component.  Systems or critical components bench-tested or
       maintained away from a Security Area by personnel without the appropriate access
       authorization shall be inspected and operationally tested by qualified and cleared personnel
       prior to being put into service.

5.     RECORDKEEPING.  Records of testing shall be retained in accordance with the
       requirements of DOE O 200.1.
                             CHAPTER XII
                 PROTECTION ELEMENT:  POSTING NOTICES


1.     GENERAL.  Selection of facilities, installations, and real property for posting of signs
       shall be based upon the need to supplement other federal statutes protecting against
       espionage, sabotage, or degradation  of safeguards and security interests.  Signs listing
       prohibited articles, as stated in Chapter V, Paragraph 1i. of this Manual, shall be posted at
       entrances to Security Areas.  Additional prohibited article signs may be erected at inner
       Security Areas as determined by the cognizant local DOE authority for safeguards and
       security.  Warning signs and/or notices shall be posted at entrances to areas under
       protection advising that physical protection surveillance equipment is operational.  

2.     TRESPASSING.  

  a.   Statutory and Regulatory Provisions.  

       (1)  Title 10 CFR Part 860 and Section 229 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954,
            as amended, prohibits unauthorized entry and unauthorized carrying,
            transporting, or otherwise introducing or causing to be introduced any
            dangerous weapon, explosives, or other dangerous instrument or matter
            likely to produce substantial injury or damage to persons or property into
            or upon any facility, installation, or real property subject to the jurisdiction,
            administration, or in the custody of the Department of Energy.  The statute
            provides for posting of regulations and penalties for violations.

       (2)  Title 10 CFR Part 1048 and Section 662 of the Department of Energy
            Organization Act prohibits unauthorized entry upon and unauthorized
            carrying, transporting, or otherwise introducing or causing to be
            introduced any dangerous instrument or material likely to produce
            substantial injury or damage to persons or property into or onto the
            Strategic Petroleum Reserve, its storage or related facilities, or real
            property subject to the jurisdiction, administration, or in DOE custody.

       (3)  Title 41 CFR Part 101-19.3 provides rules and regulations governing entry
            to public buildings and grounds under the charge and control of GSA.





  b.   Posting Proposals.  The administration of posting proposals are as follows.

       (1)  Conditions.  Proposals for the posting of facilities, installations, or real
            property, or amendment to or revocation of a previous proposal, shall be
            submitted when the following occurs.

            (a)  The property is owned by or contracted to the United States for use
                 by the Department of Energy.

            (b)  The property requires protection under Section 229, Atomic
                 Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and/or Section 662 of the
                 Department of Energy Organization Act.  

            (c)  A previous notice needs to be amended or revoked.

       (2)  Contents.  

            (a)  Each proposal for posting shall contain the name and specific
                 location of the installation, facility, or real property to be covered
                 and the boundary coordinates.  If boundary coordinates are not
                 available, the proposal shall furnish reasonable notice of the area to
                 be covered, which may be an entire area or any portion thereof that
                 can be physically delineated by the posting indicated in Paragraph
                 2c below.

            (b)  Each proposal for amendment or revocation shall identify the
                 property involved, state clearly the action to be taken (i.e., change
                 in property description, correction, or revocation), and contain a
                 new or revised property description, if required.

  c.   Posting Requirements.

       (1)  Upon approval by the Director of Security Affairs, a notice designating the
            facility, installation, or real property shall be published in the Federal
            Register and shall be effective upon such publication, providing the notices
            stating the pertinent prohibitions and penalties are posted.

       (2)  Property approved by the Director of Security Affairs for coverage under
            Section 229, Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, shall be posted at
            entrances and at such intervals along the perimeter of the property to
            provide reasonable assurance of notice to persons who enter therein.  Signs
            shall measure at least 11 inches by 14 inches (28 by 36 centimeters).  

  d.   Notification to the Federal Bureau of Investigation.  Notification of the date of
       posting, relocation or removal of posting, or other change, and the identity of the
       property involved shall be furnished promptly to the applicable office of the
       Federal Bureau of Investigation exercising investigative responsibility over the
              property.                             CHAPTER XIII
         PROTECTION ELEMENT:  SECURITY BADGES AND CREDENTIALS


1.     SECURITY BADGES.  

  a.   Employee Badges.  DOE shall have a standard security badge, which will be issued
       to DOE federal and non-federal personnel whose duties require access to DOE
       facilities.  Specifications for the standard badge are set forth in the Functional
       Requirements Document for the DOE Standard Badge.  This format provides for: 
       uniform placement of required features such as organization identification, serial
       number, magnetic stripe, and photograph; designated indicators for access
       authorizations; and other features.  

  b.   Provisional Badges.  Provisional badges are designed to meet all requirements of
       the standard employee badge and may be issued to visitors and to employees who
       have lost or forgotten their badges.  Provisional badges are similar in appearance
       to standard badges and can be used by those sites wanting to carry the standard
       badge concepts forward to visitors and temporary employees.  The format for the
       provisional badge is given in the Functional Requirements Document for the DOE
       Standard Badge.  Provisional badges will not be accepted for access at any site
       other than the site where the badge was issued.

  c.   Site-Specific Badges.  Sites may develop and issue site-specific badges to address
       a variety of issues.  Sites may develop site-specific badges as an alternative to
       provisional badges.  These badges shall be designed to meet site-specific
       requirements.  Site-specific badges shall not be green in color.  Site-specific badges
       shall be developed for site-specific application including issuance to cleared and
       uncleared foreign nationals, the press, and conference attendees, and as other
       situations dictate.  Site-specific badges will not be accepted for access at any site
       other than the site where the badge was issued.

2.     ISSUANCE, USE, RECOVERY, AND DESTRUCTION OF SECURITY BADGES.

  a.   Issuance of Security Badges.  Cognizant local DOE authorities for safeguards and
       security shall prescribe procedures for requesting and approving issuance of
       security badges.  A DOE employee, DOE contractor, or visitor who has been
       granted a DOE access authorization (see DOE O 472.1B) may be issued a security
       badge that denotes the individual's access authorization.  The badge issued to
       federal and non-federal employees should be issued by the organization/badging
       authority reporting to the DOE Element holding the personnel security file. 
       Federal and non-federal employees shall be issued only one badge for use within
       the DOE complex.  All standard badges issued by other than the assigned badging
       authority shall be confiscated.

  b.   Site Usage.  Appropriately-coded security badges shall be used and accepted as
       evidence of an access authorization (or security clearance).  Such security badges
       shall be accepted for admittance to Limited and Protected Areas without a need
       for additional badging.  

       (1)  Site or facility procedures may be established to require presentation of
            additional photo-identification media.  Verification of an individual's DOE
            access authorization level and determination of "need-to-know" remain the
            responsibility of the individual or organization being visited prior to
            granting access to SNM (according to Table II-1 of this Manual) and/or
            releasing classified information.

       (2)  Sites shall not use the information on the magnetic stripe for any purpose
            other than access control without the permission of the Office of
            Safeguards and Security.  The information on the magnetic stripe shall not
            be collected and stored outside of DOE access control applications.
       
  c.   Individual Requirements.  The individual receiving the badge is responsible for:

       (1)  thoroughly and accurately completing required forms and photos;

       (2)  reading, viewing, and signing appropriate briefing material prior to receipt
            of a security badge;

       (3)  protecting security badges against loss, theft, or misuse and reporting a
            lost, stolen, or misused badge to the cognizant security office within 24
            hours of discovery;

       (4)  maintaining the badge in good condition and protecting the integrity of the
            badge by ensuring that the badge is not altered, photocopied, counterfeited,
            reproduced, or photographed;

       (5)  returning the security badge to the local safeguards and security authority
            when it is no longer valid or when requested by the supervisor, safeguards
            and security office, or protective force personnel;

       (6)  wearing the badge conspicuously, photo side out, in a location above the
            waist and on the front of the body while having access to DOE facilities
            (this requirement may be nullified for health or safety reasons);

       (7)  ensuring that badges are not used as a means of identification for unofficial
            purposes (e.g., cashing checks).

  d.   Recovery of Security Badges.  DOE security badges are the property of the
       Government and must be returned to the issuing office whenever an individual is
       transferred, terminates employment, or otherwise no longer requires the badge. 
       Individuals who no longer have a valid requirement for access to DOE facilities
       shall surrender their badges to the local DOE safeguards and security authority. 
       Cognizant local DOE authorities for safeguards and security shall prescribe
       procedures for recovery of security badges.  The badge may be recovered and
       reissued, with a new photograph, if there is significant change in facial appearance. 
       

  e.   Badge Destruction.  Cognizant local DOE authorities for safeguards and security
       shall prescribe procedures for destroying security badges that are no longer
       needed.  Destruction shall be accomplished in a manner to preclude reconstruction
       of a badge.  If destruction is not immediate, used badges shall be stored in a secure
       manner until they can be destroyed.  Provisional badges that do not include
       individuals' photos shall be recovered and may be reissued.

3.     ACCOUNTABILITY OF BADGES, CREDENTIALS, AND SHIELDS.

  a.   Records.  Records shall be maintained by issuing offices showing the disposition of
       security badges, credentials and shields.  Such records shall include, as a minimum: 
       description and serial number of item issued; date of issuance; and name,
       organization, and date of destruction.  Records shall be maintained in accordance
       with the requirements of Schedule 18 of the General Records Schedule.

  b.   Lost Badges, Credentials, and Shields.  A record of missing security badges,
       credentials and shields shall be maintained.  Personnel and/or systems controlling
       access to Security Areas shall be provided current information regarding missing
       badges, credentials and shields in order to prevent badge misuse.  The loss or
       recovery of badges, credentials and shields shall be reported immediately to the
       issuing office.  

4.     STORAGE OF SECURITY BADGE MATERIALS, UNISSUED BADGES,
       CREDENTIALS, AND SHIELDS.  Stocks of badging materials, unissued security
       badges, credentials, and shields shall be stored to ensure their protection against loss,
       theft, or unauthorized use.

5.     TERMINATING SECURITY BADGES, CREDENTIALS, AND SHIELDS.  Badges,
       credentials, and shields issued to employees, contractors, and other individuals shall be
       recovered at the final security checkpoint or earlier, and the individual(s) shall be escorted
       from the site if circumstances or conditions indicate such action is needed.  Recovered
       credentials shall be destroyed.  Recovered shields may be retained and reissued.


                             CHAPTER XIV
                   SECURITY DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS


1.     GENERAL.  This chapter contains specific security design criteria that shall be considered
       in the design of both new and existing physical security systems, as well as the retrofit of
       existing facilities and systems.  
       
2.     SECURITY AREA BARRIERS.  Permanent physical boundaries shall be used to enclose
       Security Areas except during construction or transient activities, when temporary barriers
       can be erected.

  a.   Parking Areas.  Parking areas shall be exterior to, and not be located within 15 feet
       of DOE Security Areas that are equivalent to or more restrictive than Limited
       Areas, as specified in this Manual.  Futhermore, parking areas shall be located with
       a minimum stand-off distance of 50 feet from buildings within a limited area, and
       75 feet from buildings located with a protected area.  Location of parking areas
       near security areas shall address possible interference with intrusion detection
       sensor fields, as well as clear zones, special Response Team (SRT) activities, and
       the design basis threat quantity.

  b.   Penetrations of Security Barriers or Security Areas.

       (1)  Sites/facilities shall implement protection features at all locations where
            utilities (e.g., sewers, storm drains, drainage swales, cable trays, piping,
            ductwork, hoisting, conveying, material handling systems, etc.) intersect
            the perimeter of Security Areas.  The protection features at each barrier
            penetration shall provide the same degree of penetration resistance as the
            barrier itself.  If a penetration cannot be closed off with the same degree of
            penetration resistance, then an intrusion detection system shall be used. 
            This provision applies when the opening at which the barrier is penetrated
            is more than 96 square inches (619.20 square centimeters), over 6 inches
            (15.24 centimeters) at its smallest dimension, and located less than:

            (a)  18 feet above the ground, roofs, or ledges of a lower security area;
                 or

            (b)  14 feet diagonally or directly opposite windows, fire escapes, roofs,
                 or other openings in uncontrolled buildings; or

            (c)  6 feet from uncontrolled openings in the same barrier.

       (2)  Overhead utilities shall not pass between a security area and a lower
            security area without physical protection features to prevent access.  Utility
            equipment and supports shall not be located in clear zones or Security
            Areas that are equivalent to or more restrictive than Protected Areas. 
            Locating equipment and supports in these areas may provide cover or
            otherwise aid individuals illegally crossing security boundaries.

       (3)  Sites/facilities with a security barrier penetrated by an elevator shall provide
            access control systems for the elevator, with equivalent security as that of
            the barrier penetrated.  The power distribution and control circuits for such
            elevators shall meet the design requirements for secure circuits.

       (4)  The use of cable trays shall be considered for large, multiple-cable
            applications in both interior and exterior locations.

       (5)  Utility corridors that penetrate security barriers shall provide the same
            degree of penetration resistance as that provided by each barrier they
            penetrate.  This provision applies when the unattended opening within the
            utility corridor is more than 96 square inches (619.20 square centimeters)
            and more than 6 inches (15.24 centimeters) at its smallest dimension.

  c.   Protected Area.

       (1)  Protected Area boundaries are designed to detect/deter an outsider attack. 
            The attempted removal of safeguards and security interests by an insider
            shall also be a design consideration for site/facility boundaries.  The design
            shall allow for appropriate personnel, vehicle, and materials/packages
            portals while deterring or preventing an insider from passing material over
            it for later retrieval.  Proximity to buildings or overhanging structures shall
            be considered in barrier design.

       (2)  Portal systems shall allow for the passage of personnel while detecting the
            presence of SNM and other prohibited items.  While material control and
            accountability concerns generally relate to insiders bringing SNM out,
            physical security concerns at portals include procedures and equipment to
            detect explosives or weapons being brought in by any means.  Portal design
            shall include separate package inspection stations so that packages can be
            inspected separately.  The following applies to the design of portals.

            (a)  Portal monitors shall be installed so that items cannot be passed
                 around the portal without being detected.

            (b)  Portal monitors shall be co-located with protective force posts so
                 that an adequate response to an alarm is initiated.   Protective Force
                 stations shall be designed to provide an unobstructed view of the
                 portal to allow visual observation of any attempt to bypass systems.

  d.   Material Access Area.

       (1)  The Material Access Area boundary is designed to deter or detect the
            unauthorized movement of material through it, while allowing for
            authorized personnel access, authorized material movement, and
            emergency evacuation as necessary.

       (2)  Material Access Area barriers shall define the boundary and provide
            sufficient delay time to impede, control, or deter unauthorized access.  

       (3)  Penetrations in the floor, walls, or ceiling for piping, heating, venting, air
            conditioning, or other support systems shall be designed so as not to create
            accessible paths that facilitate the removal of safeguards and security
            interests.

       (4)  Sites/facilities shall design portal systems to facilitate the passage of
            personnel while detecting the presence of SNM or other prohibited
            material.  Although material control and accountability concerns generally
            relate to insiders removing SNM, physical security concerns at portals
            include the detection of explosives or weapons.  In addition,
            equipment/package portals are sometimes designed so that protective
            personnel can monitor tools and packages separately from personnel. 
            SNM portal monitors shall be distanced or otherwise shielded from nuclear
            materials in the process area.  This applies not only to locations of static
            storage, but to passageways or conveyer systems that allow the passage of
            SNM within the facility.

       (5)  System designers shall consider planned and emergency evacuations of
            Material Access Areas.  Doors used for evacuations through the Material
            Access Area boundary shall be alarmed.  Designers shall make provisions
            to ensure that evacuations do not provide a theft opportunity.  One
            strategy is to provide a fenced evacuation zone outside the alarmed door,
            under the surveillance of the protective force, for a containment area
            during emergency evacuation conditions.  SNM detectors shall be used to
            sweep the evacuation zone afterwards to make sure no SNM has been left
            behind.  SNM detectors are most effective in small areas with low
            background radiation levels.  

       (6)  Sites/facilities shall transfer nuclear material into and out of the Material
            Access Area at well-defined locations (usually loading docks), subject to
            specific procedures that prevent unauthorized transfers.  Facilities may
            simplify transfer operations if the transporting vehicle can be transferred
            directly into and out of the Material Access Area.  Doors at such transfer
            locations shall be fitted with alarms with communications capability with
            the central alarm station.  Nondestructive assay capability at the site shall
            be considered for verification of the shipment.  Radiological control
            measurements may also be involved in processing a shipment.

  e.   Other Security Areas.  Areas with restricted access requirements in addition to
       access to the security area include secure communications centers, sensitive
       compartmented information facilities, central alarm stations, secondary alarm
       stations, local law enforcement agency or private alarm stations, and automated
       information system centers.  (See Chapter V, Paragraph 8, for specific
       requirements for DOE's Other Security Areas.)

  f.   Security Area Architectural Requirements.

       (1)  Operating and equipment areas that contain relays, switches, electronic
            devices, and other dust-sensitive equipment shall be designed to be
            relatively dust-free.  To minimize the intrusion of dirt and dust, these areas
            shall be windowless and without skylights or roof windows.  All exterior
            doors shall be weatherstripped.  Access shall be through vestibules, foyers,
            corridors, or other buffer areas.  Operating areas shall be located and
            constructed to minimize outside noise interference and treated acoustically
            to maintain a low internal sound level commensurate with operating
            requirements.

       (2)  Shielded enclosures shall avoid internal building support columns, which
            would degrade the efficiency of the enclosure.  

       (3)  Shielding against the electromagnetic or electrostatic effects of nuclear
            weapons, as required, shall be provided for those facilities located in
            structures specifically designed to withstand 5 psi or greater over pressure
            effects of nuclear weapons. [See Federal Emergency Management Agency
            (FEMA) CPG2-17.]

       (4)  Flexible conduit connections for communications cables serving hardened
            centers shall incorporate sufficient slack to withstand potential
            displacement without impairing the installation or replacement of cables. 
            Designers shall provide floor inserts to secure the equipment to the floor
            through shock mounts designed to withstand anticipated blast effects. 
            Ceiling inserts shall be provided to brace equipment racks and cabinets and
            to support overhead cable racks or trays.

       (5)  Where radio communications or control equipment requires one or more
            exposed antennae having no significant blast resistance, the design shall
            provide for replacing the antennae from inside the shelter.  Normally
            retracted "pop-up" antennae, operable from inside the hardened area, shall
            be provided.

       (6)  Information on lightning protection is available in Military Handbook-419. 
            For additional information, refer to Federal Information Processing
            Standard (FIPS) PUB 94.

       (7)  All electrically grounded towers shall be electrically protected in
            conformance with National Fire Protection Agency (NFPA) 78.  Ground
            conductors shall be without intervening splices and protected against
            mechanical damage.  If ground conductors must be enclosed within a tower
            foundation, separate ground conductors shall be brought to at least two
            legs of the tower and extended to the air terminal.  The emergence point of
            ground conductors from the foundation shall be sealed to prevent the
            entrance of moisture and shall be protected from mechanical damage. 
            Where guy supports are used, ground rods shall be installed at each anchor
            and connected to all guys terminating at that location.  A ground
            counterpoise system shall be used only when required to meet the needs of
            the communications system or as necessary to ensure effective grounding.

  g.   General Human Factors.

       (1)  Equipment, including control panels, work tables and counters, enclosures,
            seating, storage, special clothing, and any other equipment designed for an
            operator, shall be ergonomically designed to accommodate human body
            dimensions.  

       (2)  The design of equipment for personnel shall accommodate a wide variety
            of body dimensions.  Equipment dimensions shall accommodate the fifth to
            ninety-fifth percentile of the user population.  For recommended data
            representing these percentiles (from military studies), see Nuclear
            Regulatory Guide (NUREG) 0700 and Military Standard 1472C.  These
            references also provide recommended dimensions and other guidance for
            stand-up and sit-down consoles and other work stations, for accessibility of
            equipment and instruments, for furniture and equipment layouts, and for
            traffic flow.

  h.   General Physical Security Requirements.  Sites/facilities shall protect the location
       of a central alarm station as follows.

       (1)  Commercial central alarm stations shall be UL Class AA installations.

       (2)  Sites/facilities shall protect automated information systems as follows.

            (a)  All elements of an automated information system, including remote
                 terminals, printouts, output devices, storage media, and memory,
                 shall be afforded physical security protection commensurate with
                 the most highly classified security interest processed by the system.  

            (b)  An automated information system facility shall be located in a
                 Security Area to provide adequate protection.  It shall be secured to
                 a level commensurate with the most highly classified security
                 interest handled by the system.  The area or facility shall be securely
                 locked and alarmed when unattended by authorized personnel.

            (c)  Access to locations with automated information systems remote
                 terminals shall be limited to authorized users by methods prescribed
                 by the computer systems security officer (CSSO).

       (3)  Automated information systems centers and remote interrogation points
            that process classified information shall consider the following.

            (a)  A control zone of 50 feet is usually sufficient for most installations
                 to preclude a successful unauthorized interception except for
                 input/output devices and CRTs.  These devices shall be considered
                 independently.

            (b)  A control zone, as used in the preceding criterion, is defined as the
                 contiguous space above, below, and around equipment and
                 distribution systems and under sufficient physical and technical
                 control to preclude interception of compromising emanations.  The
                 phrase "sufficient physical and technical control" means the degree
                 of control such that the protective force responsible for protecting a
                 controlled space has the authority and ability to investigate and
                 remove any person or device of a suspicious nature that is detected.

            (c)  When contained within a larger Limited Area, automated
                 information systems centers and remote interrogation points used to
                 process classified information shall have separate access controls
                 and barriers.  These access controls and barriers restrict access to
                 classified information to only those persons with the need-to-know
                 who require the information to perform their official duties.

  i.   Radio Control Centers.  

       (1)  Layout.  The space and utility requirements of radio control centers shall
            comply with DOE O 200.1.

       (2)  Architectural.

            (a)  Centers essential to security functions shall be without windows,
                 skylights, and roof windows.

            (b)  Barrier penetrations shall conform to the 96-square-inch rule.
  
  j.   Radio Repeater Stations.

       (1)  Layout.  A radio repeater station shall be placed in a location to ensure all-
            weather access for vehicles and personnel to the station building, antennae,
            standby generator plant, and fuel storage tank.  The design shall minimize
            risk of damage to the antenna structure and supporting guy lines from
            vehicular traffic and shall provide for future expansion.

       (2)  Architectural.

            (a)  Exterior walls shall be windowless.  Roofs shall be without
                 skylights or roof windows.

            (b)  Where antenna towers, poles, or masts are located away from the
                 building, interconnecting cables shall be placed underground or
                 adequately supported by a messenger wire (or cable).  The building
                 end of the messenger wire shall not be secured to the bulkhead
                 panel unless the panel and appurtenances are designed to support
                 the load.

  k.   Special Security Areas.  Security requirements for DOE Sensitive Compartmented
       Information Facilities, Special Access Programs, or Top Secret areas where
       classified information is discussed, processed, stored, or produced are established
       by the cognizant program security office for that specific program.

  l.   Central Alarm Stations.

       (1)  Layout.

            (a)  The design of central alarm stations shall include all alarm
                 communications and auxiliary power equipment necessary for
                 continuous operation of the system.  Such equipment shall be
                 located within the station or within contiguous areas having the
                 same degree of physical security and access control.

            (b)  Space shall be provided within the station for maintenance and
                 storage of spare units of line supervisory and alarm equipment.

       (2)  Architectural.

            (a)  Exterior walls shall be windowless, and roofs shall be without
                 skylights and roof windows.  Central alarm stations that require
                 windows for visual surveillance of areas outside the station shall be
                 fitted with bullet-resistant glass [Underwriters Laboratories (UL)-
                 752, High Powered Rifle].

            (b)  Personnel entryways shall be fitted with substantially-constructed
                 doors, equipped with locks operable from within the centers.  The
                 size and other characteristics (e.g., reflective or wired glass) of
                 viewing ports or windows provided in entry doors shall be as
                 determined by responsible DOE element safeguards and security
                 and fire protection authorities.  Fire codes do not permit windows
                 or other openings in Class A fire doors.

            (c)  Structural integrity shall be sufficient to protect against
                 unauthorized personnel intrusion.  Structural openings shall be kept
                 to a minimum.  Physical security operations personnel shall be
                 consulted to determine requirements for structural protection of air
                 intake and exhaust systems and requirements for other special
                 security features.

            (d)  Central and secondary alarm stations shall be designed with
                 substantial walls, ceilings, and floors to provide protection for
                 security personnel and communications equipment.

            (e)  Central alarm stations shall have access control systems and barriers
                 to restrict admittance to persons who are employed therein or  who
                 require access in the performance of official duties on a
                 need-to-know basis.

            (f)  Central alarm stations (and protective force communications center)
                 shall be equipped with radio and telephone channels of
                 communication with local law enforcement agencies.  An
                 alternative communications capability from a secondary alarm
                 station shall be provided for use in the event the primary station is
                 compromised.  Radio communications equipment shall remain
                 operable in the event of a loss of primary electric power.

            (g)  Heating, ventilation, and air conditioning systems shall be designed
                 with air filtration features to protect against infiltration of aerosol
                 and gas incapacitating agents.

  m.   Protective Force Post.

       (1)  The nature of the threat shall determine the location and manning of fixed
            and mobile posts.  A protective force post shall, when practicable, be
            situated to provide the best available unobstructed view of the surrounding
            terrain.   Planning for response times shall address the delay provided by
            physical barriers after initial detection of the intrusion.

       (2)  Permanent protective force posts for controlling access to areas containing
            weapons, nuclear test devices, complete nuclear assemblies, or Category I
            or II roll-up quantities of SNM shall meet the following  requirements.

            (a)  All routine and emergency fixed posts shall be located to enhance
                 the efficiency of routine duties and to ensure that likely routes of
                 adversary ingress and egress are clearly observable.

            (b)  All routine and emergency fixed posts shall provide adequate
                 human engineering so that protective personnel occupying the posts
                 can perform their duties efficiently.  All routine-duty fixed posts
                 shall provide occupants with adequate protection from weather and
                 temperature variations.

            (c)  Exterior walls, windows, and doors shall be constructed of or
                 reinforced with materials that result in a bullet penetration
                 resistance equivalent to the "high-powered rifle rating" given in
                 UL-752.

            (d)  Storage of weapons, ammunition, and explosives shall comply with
                 the requirements of DOE 5632.7A, Chapter VI, Paragraph 1b(2).

       (3)  In protective force towers intended to serve as fighting positions,
            consideration shall be given to providing protected firing ports, a minimum
            of 60 square feet of net floor area per person, and exterior walls
            conforming with National Institute of Justice (NIJ) Standard 0108.01.

3.     INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEMS.

  a.   Interior System Specifications.

       (1)  Joint Use.  Telephone circuits shall be used for other telecommunications
            and alarm services to the maximum extent practicable.  If separate
            conductors are required, they shall be routed through the main
            telecommunications and signal raceway systems if raceway systems are
            present.  Separate wire-ways and cabinets shall be used only when
            necessary to meet security, technical, or code requirements or to achieve
            significant economies.

       (2)  Hazardous Locations.  Telecommunications and alarm equipment and
            conductors shall be located outside areas subject to explosion, fire, flood,
            chemical fumes, excessive dust, radiation or vibration, and excessive
            electrical or electromagnetic noise levels.  Where telecommunications and
            alarm services shall be extended into these areas, equipment and installation
            shall be suitable to protect against the hazard.

  b.   Exterior System Specifications.  

       (1)  Security systems shall be designed to avoid unnecessary duplication of
            facilities.  Auxiliary power supply facilities, exterior power supply pole
            lines, and underground power supply duct bank systems shall be used
            jointly for the installation unless joint facility use degrades system
            performance.  Joint use shall not expose the security system to damage or
            unauthorized access.  Power wiring and signal wiring shall not share the
            same conduit.

       (2)  Supervisory and line-tamper circuits shall provide protection
            commensurate with the requirements in this Manual.

  c.   Lighting Criteria.

       (1)  Illumination shall be adequate to detect adversaries, reveal unauthorized
            persons, and, at pedestrian and vehicular entrances, allow examination of
            identification and vehicles.

       (2)  Protective lighting, as part of a security system, shall be used as needed for
            proper protection of classified matter.

       (3)  Maximum use shall be made of high-efficiency, high-intensity discharge
            (HID) lamps, such as metal halide or high-pressure sodium vapor lamps. 
            HID lamps are highly efficient and economical in operation, and their use in
            protective lighting systems is encouraged.  

       (4)  HID lamps require a relight period of approximately 3 minutes following
            any power interruption. Therefore, where HID lamps are used and
            continuous lighting is required, a standby lighting system shall be
            considered to ensure maintenance of minimum protective lighting during
            HID lamp startup and re-strike periods.  Fixtures next to each other shall,
            when practical and appropriate, be placed on different circuits so that only
            part of the lighting is extinguished if one circuit becomes inoperative.

       (5)  For facilities requiring protective lighting, consideration shall be given to
            having an auxiliary lighting capability of the type and size required in
            relation to the importance of the facility, reliability of regular power
            sources, and feasibility of using portable lighting equipment.

       (6)  Other than at portals, lighting shall be installed that does not illuminate
            patrol paths or protective force personnel manning fixed posts.  Lighting
            used to deter adversaries shall illuminate outward from the fixed post.
       
  d.   Interior Lighting.  

       (1)  Interior lighting systems shall comply with the Illuminating Engineering
            Society (IES) Lighting Handbook.  Nonuniform lighting practices shall
            comply with 41 CFR 101-20.116-2.

       (2)  Maximum use shall be made of fluorescent and HID lamps.  Where HID
            lamps are used, there shall also be a standby lighting system to meet
            auxiliary lighting requirements during HID lamp re-strike periods.  For
            HID lighting used indoors, careful consideration of the required color
            rendition shall be made from visual and health safety perspectives.

       (3)  Fixtures shall have diffusers and lenses constructed of noncombustible
            materials.

       (4)  Lighting fixture types, location, and illumination levels shall be coordinated
            with the equipment and functions of telecommunication, alarm, and
            automated data processing centers to provide the required illumination
            without:

            (a)  interfering with prompt identification of self-illuminated indicating
                 devices,

            (b)  creating reflecting glares that might detract from adequate
                 observation of essential equipment, or

            (c)  creating electrical or electromagnetic interference detrimental to
                 proper operation of equipment.

  e.   Exterior Lighting.  Exterior lighting systems shall comply with the IES Lighting
       Handbook.  System control shall use time clock and/or photocell to provide
       illumination only when needed.

  f.   Power Sources.

       (1)  All intrusion detection systems for protection of Category I SNM and
            Category II SNM that rolls up to Category I amounts, radiological
            sabotage targets, and Top Secret matter shall have a primary and auxiliary
            power source.

       (2)  Power sources shall contain a switching capability to facilitate operational
            testing to determine adequate auxiliary power sources.  Qualified service
            personnel shall maintain such power sources.

       (3)  The secondary power supply, other than that of a public utility, shall be
            vented sufficiently to preclude deterioration of any of its components
            because of operation under high temperatures.
  
  g.   Primary Power Supply.

       (1)  Alarm and Communication Systems.  Normal primary power for protective
            alarm and communications systems shall come directly from the onsite
            power distribution system or, for isolated facilities, directly from the public
            utility.  Where several primary power sources are available, the most
            reliable source shall be used.

       (2)  Electric Power Distribution Systems. Such systems shall be filtered to
            reduce emanation of detectable electromagnetic signals to acceptable levels
            as directed by the responsible DOE telecommunications and security
            personnel.  Installations shall comply with the requirements of DOE
            5300.2D, TELECOMMUNICATIONS: EMISSION SECURITY
            (TEMPEST) DOE 5300.3D, TELECOMMUNICATIONS:
            COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY, and DOE 5300.4D,
            TELECOMMUNICATIONS: PROTECTED DISTRIBUTION
            SYSTEMS.  Additional guidance can be obtained from the Office of
            Computer Services and Telecommunications Management, DOE
            Headquarters.

       (3)  Telecommunications, Alarm, and Automated Information Systems
            Facilities and Radio Repeater Stations.  Essential equipment shall be
            connected to an uninterruptible power supply (UPS) or to auxiliary power. 
            Where continuity of service is required for critical cord-connected
            equipment, twist-lock-type connectors shall be used.

       (4)  Automated Information Systems Facilities.  Emergency shutdowns of
            power for Automated Information System facilities shall comply with
            DOE/EP 0108 and NFPA 75.  Also see FIPS PUB 94 for additional
            information.

       (5)  Radio Control Centers.  The determination of power supply requirements
            shall assume that all transmitters are keyed simultaneously while associated
            receivers and other equipment and building services are in operation.

       (6)  Power Supply Lines.  Circuits shall be arranged so that faults, failures, or
            maintenance on less-critical circuits do not jeopardize critical loads. 
            Protective devices shall be used and coordinated for sequential operation
            from the load to the source.  Line location shall be established in
            accordance with clearance requirements stated in ANSI-C2 and shall be
            routed within established rights-of-way for each facility.  Minimum
            rights-of-way shall extend 5 feet beyond outside conductors.  The
            responsible DOE authority shall establish facilities and areas that require
            additional clearances for security and safety.

  h.   Standby and Auxiliary Systems.

       (1)  Standby and auxiliary systems shall serve loads set forth in NFPA 110.

       (2)  Optional standby systems shall be provided for production process
            operations if the process, on loss of power, could become unstable or result
            in a severe monetary loss.

       (3)  UPS shall be provided for equipment that cannot sustain functions through
            the momentary power loss that occurs when an alternate power source
            comes on line and picks up the load.

       (4)  Auxiliary power shall be provided for protective alarm and communications
            systems as dictated by the system requirements.  Switch-over to auxiliary
            power shall be automatic on failure of the primary power source and shall
            be indicated on an annunciator panel.  The annunciator shall be located in
            an occupied area and shall indicate any problems with the auxiliary system.

       (5)  Auxiliary or standby power shall service security alarm and supervisory
            sensing devices that have been designated essential.

       (6)  Auxiliary power systems shall comply with NFPA 37, NFPA 70, NFPA
            101, NFPA 110, and Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers
            (IEEE) 446.

       (7)  Auxiliary power systems shall be capable of maintaining full operation of
            auxiliary loads for the full time specified (nominally, a minimum of 8
            hours).  Such power sources shall have the necessary built-in features to
            facilitate operational testing on a periodic basis to verify their readiness.

       (8)  Where auxiliary generators are required for loads of 25 kVA and smaller,
            gasoline or liquefied petroleum gas engines may be used.  For loads greater
            than 25 kVA, diesel engines shall be used.  Steam-turbine generators may
            be used if steam is being produced for onsite processes.  Gas turbines may
            be used if a Load Control Center (LCC) analysis warrants and if the
            National Electrical Code (NEC) criteria to auxiliary power throw-over time
            are met.

       (9)  Use of diesel engines shall comply with Federal Communications
            Commission (FCC) Technical Report No. 69.

       (10) Batteries, when required, shall be rechargeable and shall be kept fully
            charged when primary power is available.  The charger shall automatically
            switch from float to fast charge rates at a preset drop in DC bus voltage. 
            The charger shall be capable of charging the battery from a fully discharged
            state to not less than 85 percent of the rated ampere-hour capacity within
            24 to 72 hours.  See also IEEE 308.  

       (11) Selective manual or automatic switching systems shall be used to turn off
            all unnecessary lighting during inactive periods, consistent with safety and
            security requirements.  

       (12) Interior service transformer installations shall comply with NFPA 70.  The
            minimum number of transformers necessary to satisfy initial and projected
            facility loads and operational continuity, safety, and security requirements
            shall be used.  Transformer protection and appurtenances shall comply with
            IEEE C37.91.  Transformer installation shall comply with Factory Mutual
            (FM) 5-4/14-8.

  i.   Uninterruptible Power Systems.

       (1)  A UPS shall be provided for those loads requiring guaranteed continuous
            power.  Application of UPS systems shall comply with IEEE 446.  UPS
            installations may be Safety Class 1 (Seismic Category I functional) or the
            standby type, depending on the classification of the loads served.

       (2)  Electric lines serving explosives facilities shall be installed underground
            from a point not less than 50 feet away from such facilities.  This also
            applies to communications and instrumentation lines and security alarm
            systems.
 
4.     ACCESS CONTROL SYSTEMS AND ENTRY/EXIT INSPECTIONS.  Access control
       systems and entry/exit inspection portals shall allow the movement of authorized
       personnel, vehicles, packages, and material along normal routes, while detecting and
       delaying movement of unauthorized personnel and contraband.

  a.   Control Points.  Entry and access control points shall:

       (1)  provide a barrier to personnel entering security areas until entry is
            requested and/or authorized and

       (2)  be controlled to prevent unauthorized access to security areas or removal
            of security interests.  In general, the following apply.

            (a)  Exits from security areas shall be adequate to satisfy the life safety
                 requirements of NFPA 101.  Some exits may be provided for
                 emergency use only.

            (b)  Entrances to and exits from security areas shall be equipped with
                 doors, gates, rails, or other movable barriers that direct and control
                 the movement of personnel or vehicles through designated portals.

            (c)  Door locks and latches used on security area perimeters shall
                 comply with the requirements of NFPA 101.

  b.   Automated Access Control Systems.

       (1)  Automated access or badge reader systems may be used in place of
            protective force, or in conjunction with personnel to control access into
            security areas unless additional screening is required, such as at a Protected
            Area or Material Access Area boundary.  However, sufficient protective
            force personnel may be used to augment the inspections for contraband,
            with the automated access system determining final access.

       (2)  Portals using automated access or badge reader systems for access control
            must ensure that the barrier portal is protected from floor to ceiling, and
            that it has no opening that exceeds the standards established by this
            Manual.

5.     BARRIERS.  Barriers that deny or impede access to classified matter and SNM constitute
       an important part of the protection system.

  a.   Portal Barriers.  Entry and exit portals shall provide equivalent delay as provided
       by the remainder of the barrier system.  For Protected Area perimeters, electrically
       operated fence gates shall be considered and protection provided against vehicle
       ramming.  Techniques used to fulfill the barrier delay requirements may include
       speed-reducing curves, hydraulic bollards, specially-designed gates and vehicle
       traps, and steel cables attached to perimeter fence posts.

  b.   Temporary Security Fencing.  During construction or transient activities,
       temporary security fencing shall be installed to:

       (1)  exclude unauthorized vehicular and pedestrian traffic from the construction
            site;

       (2)  restrict authorized vehicular traffic to designated access roads;

       (3)  protect construction materials and installed work from sabotage and
            curiosity seekers;

       (4)  protect unsecured construction sites against vandalism or theft;

       (5)  provide construction site integrity and a clear zone to suit site-specific
            conditions; and

       (6)  provide consistency with site-specific security and protection goals and
            operational requirements.

  c.   Permanent Security Fencing.  When used for protection purposes, fencing shall
       meet the following construction requirements.

       (1)  Alternative barriers may be used instead of fencing if the penetration
            resistance of the barrier is equal to or greater than standard fencing.

       (2)  Fencing shall be limited to that required for safety, physical security, and
            activity control.  In each case, the most economical type of fence that
            satisfies the particular functional or security requirements shall be selected. 
            Fencing shall be grounded around substations, fuel storage areas, and other
            areas where static electricity or electrical discharge could create a
            hazardous condition.

       (3)  Areas under security fencing subject to water flow, such as bridges,
            culverts, ditches, and swales, shall be blocked with wire or steel bars with
            adequate provision for the passage of flood flows so that the area provides
            a penetration delay equal to that of the security fence.

       (4)  Depressions where water flow is not a problem shall be covered by
            additional fencing suspended from the lower rail of the main fencing. 
            Weed control may justify paving the area beneath fences.

  d.   Design Considerations.

       (1)  Where appropriate, the following design criteria shall be shown on the
            drawings or specified in the contract document:

            (a)  materials (e.g., fence fabric, posts, concrete, fence anchor sills or
                 bottom rails, tension wires, barbed wire, and outriggers);

            (b)  grading (e.g., horizontal alignment, vertical alignment, clearance
                 from obstructions, utility crossings, and surface and subsurface
                 drainage);

            (c)  soil stabilization (i.e., 3 inch maximum variation in planar surface
                 for microwave or active infrared);

            (d)  permanent vegetation control (i.e., herbicide along the base of fence
                 and within a clear zone 20 feet (6 meters) to each side of a fence or
                 permanent pavement beneath a microwave or active infrared beam
                 line);

            (e)  electrical grounding;

            (f)  closures (e.g., gate sizes, types, clearances, hardware, motor
                 operators, control systems, and direction of swing);

            (g)  barriers heights including buildings located on the barrier to impede
                 unauthorized access to security areas (effective delay shall be
                 documented within a conceptual design report).

       (2)  A clear zone shall be provided along each side of security fence perimeters
            to facilitate intrusion detection and assessment.  Where a double fence is
            provided, a minimum clear zone of 20 feet (6 meters) shall be considered to
            the inside and outside of the inner and outer fences.  Where minimum
            distances cannot be provided, supplementary protective measures shall be
            considered (e.g., greater fence height or other protective measures). 
            Where feasible, wider clear zones shall be provided.

       (3)  Vehicle barriers (i.e., wire-rope-type) shall be considered for installation
            outside the inner fence where the secured perimeter bounds heavy vehicular
            traffic areas.  Guidance from Sandia (SAND) Report No. 87-1926 shall be
            considered.

       (4)  Tension wires or top rail shall be considered for installation along the top
            edge of the fence fabric.

       (5)  Posts, bracing, and other structural members shall be located on the inside
            of secured perimeters.  Where the galvanized finish has been removed or
            damaged during installation, the posts, bracing, and other structural
            members shall be coated with zinc-enriched paint.

       (6)  Electrical grounding shall be provided for all permanent security fencing in
            accordance with the NEC.  

  e.   Patrol Roads and Walkways.

       (1)  All-weather patrol roads or walkways shall be provided along the inside of
            the perimeter security fence surrounding Security Areas if the security
            fence is to be patrolled by protective force personnel.  Turnouts shall be
            considered for use at frequent intervals if roadway shoulders are not
            available for vehicle parking.

       (2)  Roadway lighting shall comply with the ANSI C136 series and with the
            IES Lighting handbook.

  f.   Gates and Entry Control Points.

       (1)  Points of vehicle and pedestrian access to security areas shall provide the
            same level of protection as that provided at all other points along the
            security perimeter.  

       (2)  The number of Entry Control Points (ECPs) shall be limited to establish
            and maintain security integrity.  ECPs shall be designed to provide positive
            security control over vehicular and pedestrian traffic that enters the secured
            area.  ECPs shall be structurally hardened, as necessary, to meet
            site-specific criteria.

       (3)  ECP designs shall also facilitate ingress and egress of emergency vehicles,
            such as fire protection equipment.

       (4)  Where feasible, the ECP shall be placed between the Intrusion Detection
            Alarm (IDA) zone and the inner fence.  This configuration provides a
            continuous IDA zone across the ECP during low-traffic periods.

       (5)  Motorized gates shall be considered for primary access points.  Where
            practicable, motorized gate controls shall be located within protective force
            stations at each access point.  Motorized gates shall be designed to
            facilitate manual operation during power outages.

       (6)  Electrical continuity shall be provided across all gate openings.  Operating
            mechanisms for motorized gates shall be grounded.

       (7)  The number of ECPs within each security boundary shall be minimized. 
            ECP design features shall comply with NFPA 101.

       (8)  Primary and auxiliary alarm and communication systems shall be provided
            between ECPs and the response force communications center.  

       (9)  A UPS shall be considered for loads that, if interrupted, would degrade the
            security of the associated area.  Underwriters Laboratories 752 or NIJ
            Standard 0108.01 shall be considered for facilities housing UPS systems.

  g.   Vehicle Barriers.  Above-grade vehicle barriers shall be considered to preclude
       intruder concealment.  Speed reducers shall be considered for use at ECPs to slow
       approaching adversary vehicles to within vehicle barrier design limits if needed to
       achieve site-specific threat/target system response requirements consistent with the
       operational and protection goals of the facility.  SAND 87-1926 shall be
       considered in designing vehicle barriers.

  h.   Security Doors.  Doors and doorjambs shall provide the necessary barrier delay
       rating required by the security plan.

       (1)  Frequently used doors shall have a vision panel except where privacy,
            security, or fire safety requirements preclude installation.

       (2)  Where primary reliance is placed on doors as physical security barriers, the
            doors shall provide a penetration resistance equal to that of the adjoining
            walls, ceilings, and floors.  If visual access is not a factor, doors with glass
            panels may be used; however, the door panels shall comply with Paragraph
            5i below, on windows, or be equipped with wire mesh fastened securely to
            the door, preferably on the inside.  

       (3)  Where more than one door is required for a security area, single doors or
            double doors with a removable mullion between them shall be used.

       (4)  Doors that serve exclusively as exits from security areas shall not be
            accessible from outside the Security Area.

       (5)  Doors that serve as exits from Security Areas shall comply with NFPA 101
            and DOE security requirements.

       (6)  Doors that serve as emergency exits from spaces shall not open into spaces
            of greater security.

       (7)  Where used to enhance penetration resistance, wire mesh shall be 2 square
            inches or smaller mesh of No. 11 American Wire Gauge or heavier steel
            wire or expanded metal.

       (8)  For offices or rooms where Secret or Top Secret information is discussed
            on a recurring or routine basis and where the wall constitutes part of the
            security area perimeter, doors shall be constructed of materials of low
            sound conductivity to prevent a person outside the room with reasonable
            access to the wall from overhearing a conversation at normal voice level
            within the room without the use of hearing instruments or equipment.

       (9)  Access doors to security posts shall be provided with positive locking
            devices to prevent unauthorized entry.

  i.   Security Windows.  The following requirements apply to windows.

       (1)  Where double or triple glazing is required, insulating glass units, not
            multiple glazing, shall be used.

       (2)  Windows and curtain walls shall be designed for wind loads in accordance
            with the Uniform Building Code.

       (3)  Where primary reliance is placed on windows as physical security barriers,
            the windows shall:

            (a)  provide a penetration resistance equal to the adjoining walls,
                 ceilings, and floors; 

            (b)  be constructed of shatter-resistant, laminated glass panes of
                 9/32-inch minimum thickness or other material providing an equal
                 degree of resistance; 

            (c)  be installed in fixed (e.g., unopenable) frames so that the panes
                 cannot be removed from outside the area being protected.  

            The frames shall be securely anchored in the walls, and windows shall lock
            from the inside.  Swing-out steel sashes (industrial-type) are acceptable for
            window installation, provided the windows can be securely locked or are
            permanently sealed shut.

       (4)  Where used to increase penetration resistance, wire mesh shall be 2 square
            inches or smaller mesh of No. 11 American Wire Gauge or heavier steel
            wire or expanded metal.

  i.   Locks.  For lock and security container design criteria, consult the DOE Security
       Container and Locking Device Guide, dated October 1993.

6.     PHYSICAL SECURITY TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE COUNTERMEASURES
       CONSTRUCTION STANDARDS.  Prior to the initiation of new construction or the
       renovation of existing facilities, the Technical Surveillance Countermeasures (TSCM)
       Operations Manager shall be consulted regarding security requirements.  

  a.   Life Safety.  Security design criteria [including sensitive compartmented
       information facility (SCIF) design criteria] and recommendations shall not be
       construed to supersede life safety mandates.  
  
  b.   Special Access Programs.  Security requirements for SCIFs, Special Access
       Programs, or Top Secret areas where classified information is discussed,
       processed, stored, or produced are established by DCID 1/21 for SCIFs, and by
       the cognizant program security office for Special Access Programs and Top Secret
       Restricted Data programs.

  c.   Requirements.  Security requirements established by specific programs (e.g.,
       Classified Automated Information Systems, Technical Surveillance
       Countermeasures, Communications Security, Protected Distribution Systems, and
       TEMPEST) are in addition to the minimum DOE standards.  The Office of
       Security Affairs, and in some cases, the Assistant Secretary for Human Resources
       and Administration, shall approve such requirements.

  d.   Construction.  Physical security construction criteria are governed by whether the
       facility is located on or off Government property, whether internal graded security
       systems are already installed, and the threat at that location.

  e.   Facilities Located on U.S. Government Property.

       (1)  Classified and sensitive unclassified discussion and processing areas shall be
            located within a Limited Area, as a minimum, and shall have protection in
            depth provided by a security system, patrols, access controls, and
            protective force response under the policy of graded protection.  

       (2)  Walls, ceilings, and floors shall be permanently constructed.  All
            construction, to include that above false ceilings and below raised floors,
            shall be completed to provide visual evidence of any attempted or actual
            unauthorized penetration.

  f.   Perimeter Doors.  

       (1)  Routine access to areas subject to these technical TSCM construction
            standards shall be limited to one door.  Other doors may be required by life
            safety codes.

       (2)  If a perimeter door is equipped with hinges located on the exterior side of
            the door where it opens into an uncontrolled area, the hinges shall be
            treated to prevent the removal of the door (e.g., by means of spot welding,
            set screws, etc.).

       (3)  Perimeter doors shall be:  solid-core wooden doors, 1.75 inches thick as a
            minimum; wooden doors faced on the exterior side with a minimum of 16-
            gauge sheet metal; or commercial doors of metal-clad construction.  These
            doors shall be equipped with a heavy-duty pneumatic closer to achieve
            proper locking.  

       (4)  Emergency exit doors shall be secured with deadlocking panic hardware on
            the inside and have no exterior hardware.

  g.   Windows.

       (1)  Windows represent a significant threat to the security of an area and are
            not recommended in areas being constructed or remodeled for use as a
            classified discussion or processing area.  

       (2)  All windows that might reasonably afford visual observation of documents,
            materials, or activities shall be made opaque or equipped with blinds,
            drapes, or other coverings to preclude visual observation.

       (3)  Perimeter windows shall have a window protection intrusion detection
            system, unless the windows are sealed or equipped on the inside with a
            locking mechanism to make them permanently inoperable.

  h.   Locks and Locking Devices.  Classified or sensitive unclassified discussion and
       processing areas that are not approved for open storage of classified security
       interests shall be secured with a high-security locking device with a pick-resistant
       key way.  The number of keys to the locking device shall be limited to assigned
       personnel.  

  i.   Vents, Ducts, and Similar Openings.  Vents, ducts, and similar openings exiting 
       the perimeter of the security area shall be equipped as follows.
  
       (1)  The protection of openings greaterthan 96 square inches (610.20 square
            centimeters). is dependent on many variables, including the physical
            location(s) of the facilities, level of information to be protected, type of
            area, number and type of protective force, hours of operation, type of
            construction, and degree of the threat, that shall be considered when
            deciding whether barriers or intrusion detection is to be used.  The
            cognizant TSCM Operations Manager shall make these decisions.

       (2)  Sound baffles shall be installed in the air handling duct when it is necessary
            to provide the appropriate Sound Transmission Class (STC) protection.

       (3)  Vents, ducts, and other similar openings penetrating a security area from an
            area of lesser security shall have readily-accessible inspection panels of
            sufficient size to simplify the inspection of installed security devices. 
            Inspection panels shall also permit examination of the interior of the vent
            and duct runs for the presence of unauthorized objects.  Whenever
            possible, these access ports shall be installed within the perimeter of the
            classified discussion area.  However, if the ports are to be located outside
            the classified area perimeter, the following requirements apply.

            (a)  All hinge pins and hasps shall be secured against unauthorized
                 removal (e.g., by means of spot welding, preening of mounting
                 bolts, etc.).

            (b)  Inspection panel ports or openings shall be secured, at a minimum,
                 by high security, pick-resistant padlocks.

  j.   Intrusion Detection System.  The purpose of an intrusion detection system is to
       detect an intrusion or attempted intrusion into a classified or sensitive unclassified
       discussion or processing area and to notify appropriate protective personnel.  The
       use of an IDS is dependent on many variables: the physical location(s) of the
       facilities, level of information to be protected, the type of area, the number and
       type of protective force, hours of operation, type of construction, and the degree
       of the threat.  These shall all be considered when deciding if an IDS is to be used.  

  k.   Acoustical Security Standards.

       (1)  Acoustical Protection Measures. The sound attenuation properties of the
            materials and construction techniques used to build security facilities shall
            be adequate to prevent normal room conversation from being overheard
            outside the Security Area without the aid of electronic listening equipment,
            either inadvertently by the casual passerby or deliberately by
            eavesdropping.  The retention of sound within the perimeter of a facility
            where classified discussions are held is rated using a description value, the
            Sound Transmission Coefficient (STC).

       (2)  Sound Masking.  The use of sound-cover music or noise-masking systems
            shall not normally be used instead of appropriate acoustical security
            measures.

       (3)  Sound Group.

            (a)  Sound group designations are used to specify minimum acoustical
                 design and construction requirements for various security areas. 
                 The following are the recommended sound group designations.



                 Building Areas and Functions            Sound Group
                 
                      Office space                            3
                      Executive suite                         3
                      Private offices                         2
                      Open work space                         3
                      Laboratory                              2

                 Conference Areas

                      Briefing or conference rooms            3
                      Training - planning room                3
                      Conference rooms with movable partitions                              3

                 Auditoriums

                      Auditorium with sound amplification                    4
                           (no speakers on common walls)
                      Auditorium without sound amplification                 3
                      Projection rooms                        3

            (b)  Sound Attenuation Classification Standards.

                 1    The term "STC" is used in architectural acoustics to
                      describe the transmission attenuation afforded by various
                      construction materials and other building components.  The
                      following transmission attenuation groups generally describe
                      the normal security criteria of facilities.  

                      NOTE: Results of instrumented acoustical tests that are
                      based on weighted frequency characteristics may not exactly
                      correlate with the characteristics described for these groups.

                      Sound Group 1.  STC of 30 or better.  Loud speech can be
                      understood well.  Normal speech cannot be easily
                      understood.

                      Sound Group 2.  STC of 40 or better.  Loud speech can be
                      heard but is hardly intelligible.  Normal speech can be heard
                      faintly, if at all.

                      Sound Group 3.  STC of 45 or better.  Loud speech can be
                      faintly heard but not understood.  Normal speech is
                      inaudible.

                      Sound Group 4.  STC of 50 or better.  Very loud sounds,
                      such as loud singing, brass musical instruments, or a radio at
                      full volume can be heard only faintly or not at all.

                 2    In areas of new construction, it is important that 
                      specifications are referenced to standardized testing
                      parameters.  Test procedures to be followed for measuring
                      the attenuation levels of a completed structure are those
                      prescribed in American Society for Testing and Materials
                      (ASTM) E-336.7, "Recommended Practices for
                      Measurement of Airborne Sound Insulation in Buildings,"
                      and ASTM E-413, "Standard Classification for
                      Determination of Sound Transmission Class."

  l.   Wiring.  Electrical, communications, and signal wiring shall be limited to those
       circuits required to support mission-essential equipment.  All inactive electrical,
       communications, signal wiring, and accessories shall be removed.  If removal is not
       practical, the items shall be rendered unusable or inaccessible by stripping, binding
       together, and properly grounding the excess wire.

  m.   Facilities Located Off U.S.  Government Property.  When a facility is located off
       U.S. Government property, all criteria for facilities located on Government
       property apply.  The following criteria also apply.

       (1)  Windows.  Windows at ground level (i.e., less than 18 feet above ground
            or above a lower security area) shall be constructed from materials that
            provide protection from forced entry.  The protection provided shall be
            equivalent to the strength of the adjacent walls.  This degree of protection
            shall be used for classified discussion and processing areas at ground level
            where the exterior perimeter of the area can be easily accessed, and, in high
            threat areas, where DOE does not own, lease, or have day-to-day control
            of the property.  Security barriers shall be installed so that they cannot be
            removed from outside the facility.

       (2)  Perimeter windows at ground level shall have an intrusion detection system
            in addition to the above requirements.

       (3)  Vents, Ducts, and Similar Openings.  Vents, ducts, and similar openings
            exiting the perimeter of the classified discussion area shall be equipped as
            follows.

            (a)  Openings of less than 96 square inches(619.20 square centimeters)
                 that have one dimension of less than 6 inches (15.24 centimeters)
                 do not require barriers to prevent unauthorized entry of personnel. 
                 However, such openings shall have sound baffles, dielectric breaks,
                 and a security screen ( 9-11 gauge metal with openings no larger
                 than one-half inch) installed.

            (b)  Openings 96 square inches (619.20 square centimeters) or larger in
                 barriers shall be protected at the inside perimeter of the area, with
                 the following installed:

                 (1)  a security barrier constructed to provide the same degree of
                      penetration resistance as is provided for that perimeter
                      barrier or

                 (2)  an intrusion detection device, when determined necessary by
                      the cognizant TSCM Operations Manager and

                 (3)  9- to 11-gauge metal screen with maximum one-half-inch
                      square mesh to preclude or make difficult the introduction
                      of a clandestine listening device and

                 (4)  a section of non-conducting material (e.g., rubber or
                      canvas) installed at the perimeter barrier of the secured area. 
                      This nonconductive sleeve shall electrically isolate and assist
                      in the acoustic isolation of the duct from the adjacent
                      external area.  This nonconductive section shall begin at the
                      secured area perimeter and extend inward.  There shall be
                      no exposed metallic duct work between the secured area
                      perimeter and the nonconductive section.

7.     SECURE STORAGE ARCHITECTURAL REQUIREMENTS.  

  a.   Vaults.  Vaults shall be fire-resistant, windowless enclosures with approved door
       locks and alarms, fire suppression and detection systems, and interior
       motion-detection devices.  

  b.   Doors.  Doors shall comply with UL 155 and UL 10A.  For a vault not containing
       SNM, the type of door and frame complying with Class 5 Standards of Federal
       Specification AA-D-600B shall provide the desired level of protection.  For a vault
       containing SNM, a type of door and frame complying with GSA-approved Class 5
       vault door(s) shall be the desired level of protection.

8.     COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS.  Communication is the most vital function of a
       protection system because the proper performance of all system functions depends on
       communication.  Information must be transferred through the network quickly and
       reliably.  Protection system communications support two vital functions:  alarm
       communication/display and protective force communications.

  a.   Alarm Communication and Display.  An alarm communication and display system
       transmits alarm signals from intrusion detection sensors and displays the
       information to a security alarm station operator for action.  A good alarm system
       shall include fast reporting time (real-time reporting), supervision of all
       communication cables, easy and quick discovery of single-point failures, isolation
       and control of sensors, and expansion flexibility.

       (1)  Design Considerations.  The designer of the alarm display system shall
            decide the following:

            (a)  information to be displayed,

            (b)  how to present the information,

            (c)  how the operator will communicate with the system, and

            (d)  how to arrange the equipment at the operator work station.

       (2)  Integration.  The alarm communication and display system is an integrated
            system of people, procedures, and equipment, and shall be designed with
            specific needs and resources of the site in mind.

       (3)  Alarm Assessment.  The sensors are connected to the alarm communication
            and display panel, and shall have a means to communicate the alarm to the
            response force.  Communication to the response force from the central
            alarm station operator is normally by voice.  Using two-way radios is the
            most common method.  Alarm panels at patrol posts, paging systems, and
            telephone lines are acceptable alternatives.

  b.   Protective and Response Force Communications.  Protective force
       communications include the procedures and hardware that allow members to
       communicate with each other.  The most common system consists of radios that
       can operate on low power, are battery operated, and can be hand-held.

       (1)  Radios.  Conventional radio systems can be vulnerable to eavesdropping,
            transmission of deceptive messages, and jamming.

       (2)  Alternate Means of Communication.  Alternate means of communication
            shall be in place, such as telephones, intercoms, public address systems,
            hand signals, sirens, lights, pagers, couriers, computer terminals, flares,
            duress alarms, smoke, or whistles.  

       (3)  Design Considerations.  The design of a communication system for the
            protective and response force shall address specific features, such as cost,
            complexity, resistance to eavesdropping, vulnerability to transmission of
            deceptive messages, and susceptibility to jamming.  Special response team
            members are required to use digitally encrypted radio and channels separate
            from the normal operations channels.  

  c.   Antenna Towers, Poles, and Masts for Communications Systems.

       (1)  Antennas or reflectors, transmission lines, and other equipment to be
            mounted on the antenna structures and the location, number, height,
            material, arrangement, and orientation of antenna structures shall comply
            with DOE O 200.1.

       (2)  Design drawings and specifications shall be used as guidance for the
            following:

            (a)  typical antenna mast suitable for supporting various types of VHF
                 or UHF antennas (drawing shows mounting details);

            (b)  underground, hardened, and remotely controlled telescoping
                 pushup antenna structures and facilities for high-frequency
                 applications.

                              REFERENCES

1.     Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, Public Law 97-425, as amended.

X.     Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 30.72, [insert title], which...

2.     Title 10 CFR 73.37, Requirements for Physical Protection of Irradiated Reactor Fuel in
       Transit, which identifies procedures for protecting licensee shipments of irradiated reactor
       fuel.  Appendix D establishes training requirements for escorts of licensee shipments. 
       Appendix E establishes levels of physical protection to be applied to international
       shipments.

X.     Title 10 CFR Part 1048, [insert title], which...

3.     Title 42 U.S.C. 7270b, Department of Energy Organization Act, which:

  a.   authorizes issuance of regulations concerning unauthorized:  

       (1)  entry into or upon the Strategic Petroleum Reserve, its storage or related
            facilities, or real property subject to the jurisdiction, administration, or in
            the custody of the Secretary of Energy under Part B of Title I of the
            Energy Policy and Conservation Act (42 U.S.C. 6231-6247); and

       (2)  carrying, transporting, or otherwise introducing or causing to be
            introduced any dangerous weapon, explosives, or other dangerous
            instrument or material likely to produce substantial injury or damage to
            persons or property into or upon such property; and

  b.   provides that any person who willfully violates regulations issued under 42 U.S.C.
       7270b is guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall be punished upon conviction by a fine
       of not more than $5,000, imprisonment of not more than 1 year, or both.

4.     Title 42 U.S.C. 2011, et seq., Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended:  
 
  a.   Chapter 12, Control of Information, sections 141-146, inclusive, which set forth
       the principles for the control of Restricted Data;
 
  b.   Chapter 18, Enforcement, sections 221-233, which set forth the authority
       necessary to protect Restricted Data and to protect property and establishes
       criminal penalties for violation of provisions of the Atomic Energy Act;

  c.   Chapter 18, Enforcement, section 229, which sets forth the authority to issue
       regulations and establish penalties for violating these regulations relating to the
       entry upon or carrying, transporting, or otherwise introducing or causing to be
       introduced any dangerous weapon, explosives, or other dangerous instrument or
       material likely to produce substantial injury or damage to persons or property, into
       or upon any facility, installation, or real property of the DOE or NRC.  

 5.    Title 10 CFR Part 710, Criteria and Procedures for Determining Eligibility for Access to
       Classified Matter or Significant Quantities of special nuclear material, which establishes
       policies on personnel security clearances.  

 6.    Title 10 CFR Part 860, Trespassing on Administration Property, which is issued for the
       protection and security of facilities, installations, and real property subject to the
       jurisdiction or administration of, or in the custody of, DOE.  

 7.    Title 10 CFR Part 1048, Trespassing on Strategic Petroleum Reserve Facilities and Other
       Property, which is issued for the protection and security of:  

  (a)  the Strategic Petroleum Reserve, its storage or related facilities, and real property
       subject to the jurisdiction or administration or in the custody of DOE under Part B,
       Title I of the Energy Policy and Conservation Act, as amended (42 U.S.C. 6231-
       6247); and 

  (b)  persons upon the Strategic Petroleum Reserve or other property subject to DOE
       jurisdiction under Part B, Title I of the Energy Policy and Conservation Act.

 8.    Title 14 CFR Part 108, Airplane Operator Safety, which establishes a security program for
       scheduled passenger operations, public charter passenger operations, and persons on an
       aircraft or airport engaged in such operations.

X.     Title 29 CFR Part 1910.200, Appendix C, "Information Sources," which...

 9.    Title 32 CFR Part 2001, National Security Information, which sets the requirements for
       the classification of information.  

10.    Title 41 CFR Chapter 101, Federal Property Management Regulations, which sets forth
       introductory material concerning the Federal Property Management Regulations System;
       its content; types; publications, including federal specifications and standards; authority;
       applicability; numbering; deviation procedures; as well as agency consultation,
       implementation, and supplementation.  

11.    Title 48 CFR Section 952.204-2, Security Requirements, which provides clauses to be
       included in contracts that involve or are likely to involve classified information, and
       section 952.245-2, Government property (fixed-price contracts), which includes clauses to
       be inserted in all contracts and modifications to contracts involving Government property.

12.    Title 49 CFR 171-179, Research and Special Programs Administration, Hazardous
       Materials Regulations, which identifies federal rules for packaging and transporting
       hazardous materials, hazardous substances, and hazardous wastes, and section 173.22,
       "Shippers Responsibility," which describes physical protection requirements for the
       shipment of unclassified irradiated reactor fuel.

13.    Executive Order 12829, National Industrial Security Program, of 1-6-93, which
       establishes a single, integrated, cohesive industrial security program to protect classified
       information and to preserve the Nation's economic and technological interests.

14.    Executive Order 12958, Classified National Security Information, of 4-17-95, which
       provides requirements concerning classification of information.  

15.    DOE O 151.1, COMPREHENSIVE EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM, of 9-
       25-95, which identifies overall policy and requirements for an emergency management
       system.  Specifically, Chapter IV, OPERATIONAL EMERGENCY HAZARDOUS
       MATERIAL PROGRAM, and Chapter V, OPERATIONAL EMERGENCY EVENTS
       AND CONDITIONS, establish requirements for site-specific emergency plans and
       procedures for radiological emergencies (including malevolent threats or acts) occurring in
       DOE reactor and non-reactor nuclear facilities.  

XX.    DOE O 200.1, INFORMATION MANAGEMENT PROGRAM, of 9-30-96, which ...

16.    DOE O 232.1, OCCURRENCE REPORTING AND PROCESSING OF OPERATIONS
       INFORMATION, of 9-25-95, which establishes a system for reporting operation
       information related to facilities and processing that information to provide for the
       appropriate corrective action.  

17.    DOE O 430.1, LIFE-CYCLE ASSET MANAGEMENT, of 8-24-95, which establishes
       DOE policies and procedures for planning the development and use of sites and facilities,
       provides general policy and objectives for the management and performance of cost-
       effective maintenance and repair of property, and provides design criteria for use in the
       acquisition of the Department's facilities.

18.    DOE O 451.1, NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT COMPLIANCE
       PROGRAM, of 9-11-95, which establishes policies and procedures for implementing a
       DOE National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) program.

19.    DOE O 460.1, PACKAGING AND TRANSPORTATION SAFETY, of 9-27-95, which
       establishes policies and procedures for approval of package designs for radioactive
       materials

20.    DOE O 460.2, DOE MATERIALS TRANSPORTATION AND PACKAGING
       MANAGEMENT, of 9-27-95, which establishes policies and procedures for materials
       transportation and packaging operations.

21.    DOE O 470.1, SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY PROGRAM, of 9-28-95, which
       provides policies for the safeguards and security program, specifically Paragraph f, which
       establishes the deviation program.  

  Chapter I, SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY PROGRAM PLANNING, which
  establishes a standard approach to protection program planning.  

  Chapter III, PERFORMANCE ASSURANCE PROGRAM, which establishes a
  systematic process for demonstrating the adequacy and functional reliability of critical
  system elements.

  Chapter V, FACILITY CLEARANCES AND REGISTRATION OF SAFEGUARDS
  AND SECURITY ACTIVITIES, which establishes DOE requirements for onsite security
  and/or nuclear materials surveys of facilities with safeguards and security interests.  

  Chapter VIII, CONTROL OF CLASSIFIED VISITS PROGRAM, which establishes
  standards and procedures for controlling visitors to DOE and DOE contractor,
  subcontractor, and access permittee facilities.

22.    DOE O 471.2, INFORMATION SECURITY PROGRAM, of 9-26-95, which establishes
       the policies, procedures, and responsibilities for the protection and control of classified
       and sensitive information, specifically:

  Chapter III, CLASSIFIED INFORMATION SYSTEMS SECURITY, which establishes
  requirements, policies, and responsibilities for the development and implementation of a
  DOE program to ensure the security of information stored in classified computer systems.

23.    DOE O 472.1B, PERSONNEL SECURITY ACTIVITIES, of 3-24-97, which establishes
       the policy, responsibilities, and authorities for implementing the DOE Personnel Security
       Program.
  
24.    DOE 1240.2B, UNCLASSIFIED VISITS AND ASSIGNMENTS BY FOREIGN
       NATIONALS, of 8-21-92, which establishes authorities, responsibilities, and policy, and
       prescribes administrative procedures for visits and assignments by foreign nationals to
       DOE facilities.

26.    DOE 1450.4, CONSENSUAL LISTENING-IN TO OR RECORDING TELEPHONE/
       RADIO CONVERSATIONS, of 11-12-92, which specifies the Department of Energy
       policy regarding the consensual listening-in to or recording of conversations on radio and
       telephone systems.

X.     DOE 5300.2D, TELECOMMUNICATIONS: EMISSION SECURITY (TEMPEST), of
       5-18-92, which ...

27.    DOE 5300.3D, TELECOMMUNICATIONS:  COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY, of 8-
       3-93, which establishes policy, responsibilities, and guidance concerning the
       communications security and automated information systems security aspects of
       telecommunications services of the Department of Energy.

X.     DOE 5300.4D, TELECOMMUNICATIONS: PROTECTED DISTRIBUTION
       SYSTEMS, of  03-04-94, which ...

28.    DOE 5632.7A, PROTECTIVE FORCES PROGRAM, of 4-13-94, which prescribes DOE
       policies and responsibilities for the protective force charged with the protection of
       safeguards and security interests.

29.    DOE 5633.3B, CONTROL AND ACCOUNTABILITY OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS,
       of 9-7-94, which prescribes DOE policies and responsibilities for control and
       accountability of nuclear materials.  

30.    DOE 5639.8A, SECURITY OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION AND
       SENSITIVE COMPARTMENTED INFORMATION FACILITIES, of 7-23-93, which
       establishes responsibilities and authorities for the protection of Foreign Intelligence
       Information and Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities.  

31.    Access Delay, Technology Transfer Manual, SAND 87-1926/UC-515, Sandia National
       Laboratories, of 9-89, which defines the role of barriers in a physical protection program,
       provides a source for penetration times for barriers, and defines methods for upgrading
       existing barriers.  

32.    DOE Technical Surveillance Countermeasures Program Procedures, of August 94, which
       contains procedures, responsibilities, and authorities applicable to the Department's
       Technical Surveillance Countermeasures Program.  This Manual is classified.

33.    "Alarm Communication and Display Technology Transfer Manual," SAND 90-0729/
       UC-515, Sandia National Laboratories, of 5-17-90, which provides a description of the
       hardware and techniques required to implement an alarm communication and display
       system.

XX.    American Nuclear Standard Institute (ANSI) X3.92-1981, [insert title], of XX-XX-XX,
       which ...

XX.    ANSI C136 series, which ...

XX.    ANSI C2,  [insert title], of XX-XX-XX, which ...

XX.    American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) E-336.7, "Recommended Practices
       for Measurement of Airborne Sound Insulation in Buildings," of XX-XX-XX, which ...

XX.    ASTM E-413, "Standard Classification for Determination of Sound Transmission Class,"
       of XX-XX-XX, which

34.    ASTM C1112-93, "Standard Guide for Application of Radiation Monitors to the Control
       and Physical Security of Special Nuclear Material," which describes the state-of-the-art of
       radiation monitors in order to establish the context in which to write performance
       standards for monitors.

35.    ASTM F 792-88, "Standard Practice for Design and Use of Ionizing Radiation Equipment
       for the Detection of Items Prohibited in Controlled Access Areas," which covers the use
       of ionizing radiation imaging techniques for the detection of questionable items, such as
       weapons and devices intended to trigger explosives, in order to determine their presence in
       hand-carried baggage, packages, checked or unaccompanied luggage, cargo, or mail at
       screening points for controlling access to secure areas.

36.    CGSS-3, Classification Guide for Safeguards and Security Information, of 8-1-94, Office
       of Classification and Technology Policy, which provides classification determinations for
       National Security Information (NSI) concerning nuclear safeguards and various aspects of
       security and guidance for classifying documents and materials containing NSI, Formerly
       Restricted Data, and/or Restricted Data.

XX.    Data Encryption Standard (DES), of XX-XX-XX, which...

37.    Department of Transportation Advisory Circular 108-3, of 11-81, "Screening of Persons
       Carrying United States Classified Material," which delineates procedures for screening
       persons carrying classified matter on aircraft.

38.    Department of Transportation OHMT-89.01, "Guidelines for Selecting Preferred Highway
       Routes for Highway Route Controlled Quantities of Radioactive Materials," of 1-89,
       which establishes federal risk-assessment guidelines for the States to designate alternate
       routes.

39.    "Design Basis Threat for the Department of Energy Programs and Facilities, (U)" of 1-4-
       96, issued by the Director of Security Affairs, which identifies and characterizes the range
       of potential adversary threats to the Department's programs and facilities, which could
       adversely impact national security, the health and safety of employees or the public, the
       environment, or DOE safeguards and security interests. 

40.    Director of Central Intelligence Directive (DCID) 1/7, "Security Controls on the
       Dissemination of Intelligence Information," of 4-16-96, which establishes policies,
       controls, and procedures for the dissemination and use of intelligence information and
       materials bearing the Director of Central Intelligence authorized control markings.

41.    DCID 1/14, "Personnel Security Standards and Procedures Governing Eligibility for
       Access to Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI)," of 1-22-92, which enhances the
       security protection of SCI through standards, procedures, security programs, and a
       facilitated security certification process among Department/agencies.

42.    DCID 1/16, "Security Policy for Uniformed Protection of Intelligence Processed in
       Automated Information Systems and Networks (U)," of 7-19-88, which establishes
       policies and procedures for the security of classified intelligence information processed or
       stored in automated systems and networks.

43.    DCID 1/19, "Security Policy for Sensitive Compartmented Information," of 2-19-87,
       which establishes policies and procedures for the security, use, and dissemination of SCI.

44.    DCID 1/20, "Security Policy Concerning Travel and Assignment of Personnel with Access
       to Sensitive Compartmented Information," of 12-29-91, which establishes the minimum
       policy concerning assignment and travel of U.S. Government civilian and military
       personnel, Government consultants, and employees of Government contractors who have,
       or who have had, access to SCI.

45.    DCID 1/21, "Physical Security Standards for Sensitive Compartmented Information
       Facilities," of 1-30-94, which provides standards for the protection of classified
       information requiring extraordinary security safeguards.

46.    DCID 1/22, "Technical Surveillance Countermeasures," of 7-3-85, which establishes the
       policy and procedures for the conduct and coordination of technical surveillance
       countermeasures.
  
47.    DoD 5210.41M, "Nuclear Weapons Security Manual (U)," of April 1995, which
       prescribes minimum security for nuclear weapons.

48.    DoD 5220.22M, "National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual (NISPOM)," of
       1-95, and DoD 5220.22M-Sup 1, "National Industrial Security Program Operating
       Manual Supplement (NISPOMSUP)," of 2-95, which establish common security
       requirements for all cleared contractors performing work for all Executive Branch
       departments and agencies.

49.    Entry Control Systems, Technology Transfer Manual, SAND 87-1927, Sandia National
       Laboratories, of 12-8-88, which provides a compilation of information regarding entry
       control systems and their application to physical protection programs.

50.    Exterior Intrusion Detection Systems Technology Transfer Manual, SAND 89-1923/UC-
       515, Sandia National Laboratories, of 2-28-90, which provides a discussion of each class
       of detection systems and how to select the proper sensors and how to combine them into
       an effective perimeter subsystem.

XX.    Factory Mutual (FM) 5-4/14-8, of XX-XX-XX, which...

XX.    Federal Communications Commission (FCC) Technical Report No. 69, of XX-XX-XX,
       which...

XX.    Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) CPG2-17, of XX-XX-XX, which...

XX.    Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 46-1, (date), which ...     

XX.    FIPS PUB 94 (date), which ... 

51.    Federal Specification W-A-450-C, "Alarm Systems Protective, Interior," which provides
       specifications for interior alarm systems.  
 
52.    Federal Specification AA-D-600B, "Door, Vault, Security," which provides specifications
       for vault doors.  

53.    Federal Specification AA-V-2737, "Modular Vault Systems," which describes a
       relocatable system for storing classified matter that provides a minimum of 15 minutes of
       protection against a multilevel tool attack, including torches, portable electric drills, power
       saws, hydraulic jacks, and other tools.

54.    Federal Specification FF-L-2740, "Locks, Combination," which covers changeable,
       combination locks designed to be mounted on safes, security files, vault doors, and similar
       items.

55.    Federal Specification FF-P-110, "Padlock, Changeable Combination," which covers
       changeable combination locks intended for use as determined for low-level resistance to
       forced entry and high level manipulation or surreptitious action.

56.    Federal Specification FF-P-2827, "Padlock, Key Operated, General Field Service," which
       describes two sizes of "U"-shaped shackle, key-operated, heavy-duty commercial
       padlocks.  

57.    General Records Schedule 18, "Security and Protective Service Records," of June 1988,
       National Archives and Records Administration.

XX.    Illuminating Engineering Society Lighting Handbook, of XX-XX-XX, which...

XX.    Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE) C37.91, of XX-XX-XX, which...
XX.    IEEE 308, of XX-XX-XX, which ...


XX.    IEEE 446, of XX-XX-XX, which ...

XX.    Military Handbook-419, [insert title], of XX-XX-XX, which...

58.    Military Specification MIL-L-15596G, "Locks, Combination for General Services
       Administration-Approved Security Containers, Vault Doors, and Safe Lockers," which
       covered  commercially available combination locks bearing the Underwriters Laboratory
       label for Groups 1 and 1R as defined in UL 768, and was canceled on 5-5-93.

59.    Military Specification MIL-P-17802, which covers key-operated, pin tumbler, dead-bolt
       padlocks, and padlock sets for military use.

60.    Military Specification MIL-P-43607G, "Padlock, Key Operated, High Security, Shrouded
       Shackle," which covers one type of key-operated, high-security, shrouded shackle padlock
       that employs a dead bolt locking mechanism.  

XX.    Military Standard MIL-STD-1472C, [insert title], of XX-XX-XX, which...

XX.    National Fire Protection Agency (NFPA) 37, of XX-XX-XX, which...

XX.    NFPA 70, [insert title], of XX-XX-XX, which...

XX.    NFPA 78, [insert title], of XX-XX-XX, which...

XX.    NFPA 101, [insert title], of XX-XX-XX, which...

XX.    NFPA 110, [insert title], of XX-XX-XX, which...

XX.    National Institute of Justice (NIJ) Standard 0108.01,  [insert title], of XX-XX-XX, which
       ...

XX.    Nuclear Regulatory Guide (NUREG) 0700,  [insert title], of XX-XX-XX, which...

61.    Protecting Security Communications, Technology Transfer Manual, SAND 90-0397/UC-
       515, Sandia National Laboratories, of 1-90, which discusses the functions of a security
       communications network, its susceptibility to disruption, and the means by which security
       radio communications may be protected.

62.    Safeguards and Security Glossary of Terms, Office of Safeguards and Security, of 12-18-
       95, which contains standardized definitions of terms used in the Safeguards and Security
       Program.

XX.    UL 10A,  [insert title], of XX-XX-XX, which...

XX.    UL 155,  [insert title], of XX-XX-XX, which...

63.    Underwriters Laboratories Standard 365, "Police Station Connected Burglar Alarm
       Systems and Units," which states requirements covering construction, performance, and
       maintenance of police station connected burglar alarm units and systems.

64.    Underwriters Laboratories (UL) Standard 752, "Standard for Bullet-Resisting
       Equipment," which provides a standard for bullet-resisting equipment.  

XX..   U.S.  Department of Energy Security Container and Locking Device Guide, 10-93, which
       contains information on locks and security storage devices.

65.    Video Assessment Technology Transfer Manual, SAND 89-1924/UC-515, Sandia
       National Laboratories, of 8-21-89, which provides a compilation of information regarding
       video assessment systems used in physical protection programs.

66.    Volume 50 FR 46452, "Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan," of 11-18-85,
       Federal agency responsibilities during peacetime radiological emergencies including those
       in transportation.

67.    U.S.  Department of Energy Security Container and Locking Device Guide, 10-93, which
       contains information on locks and security storage devices.
       
<<EOD>>