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Testimony:



Before the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives:



United States General Accounting Office:



GAO:



For Release on Delivery Expected at 2:00 p.m., EST

Wednesay, March 5, 2003:



Weapons of Mass Destruction:



Observations on U.S. Threat Reduction and Nonproliferation Programs in 

Russia:



Statement of Joseph A. Christoff, Director,

International Affairs and Trade:



Weapons of Mass Destruction:



GAO-03-526T:



Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:



I am pleased to be here today to discuss efforts by the Departments of 

Defense, Energy, and State to help Russia secure, destroy, and 

dismantle weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and prevent their 

proliferation.



After the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia inherited the 

worlds largest arsenal of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. 

The Soviets extensive military resources and autocratic rule allowed 

it to maintain and secure this vast arsenal. As Russia adopted economic 

reforms and moved toward an open society, its economy and central 

controls deteriorated, making it difficult to maintain security at 

these weapons sites. Recognizing these difficulties, the Congress 

authorized funds for programs to help destroy Russian weapons and 

improve WMD security. The events of September 11th have increased U.S. 

concerns that terrorists might obtain nuclear materials or weapons at 

poorly secured sites.



GAO has reviewed U.S. threat reduction and nonproliferation efforts in 

Russia since 1993. Today, I will present our overall observations on 

the progress and key challenges of these programs based on published 

GAO reports since 1993.[Footnote 1]



Summary:



Over the past decade, the United States has responded to increased 

proliferation risks in Russia by providing $6.4 billion for Departments 

of Defense, Energy, and State programs in the former Soviet Union. The 

United States has made important progress in three areas. First, the 

Department of Defense helped destroy 463 Russian nuclear submarines, 

long-range bombers, and strategic missiles to support Russias efforts 

to meet treaty requirements. Second, the Department of Energy installed 

security systems that helped protect 32 percent of Russias weapons-

usable nuclear material. Third, the United States supplemented the 

income of thousands of Russian weapons scientists so they would be less 

inclined to sell their skills to countries of concern.



However, U.S. threat reduction and nonproliferation programs have 

consistently faced two critical challenges: (1) the Russian government 

has not always paid its agreed-upon share of program costs and (2) 

Russian ministries have often denied U.S. officials access to key 

nuclear and biological sites. Regarding program costs, Russia did not 

pay, for example, its previously agreed-upon share of $275 million to 

design and build a nuclear storage site at Mayak. As of January 2003, 

the United States plans to spend $385 million for a scaled-down version 

of this site. Russia has also failed to pay operation and maintenance 

costs for security equipment the United States installed at sites with 

weapons-usable nuclear material. As a result, DOE plans to spend an 

additional $171 million to ensure that this equipment is properly 

maintained. Regarding access, Russia will not allow DOD and DOE the 

level of access they require to design security improvements, verify 

their installation, and ensure their proper operation. As a result, the 

agencies have been unable to help protect substantial portions of 

Russias nuclear warheads and weapons-usable nuclear material. In 

addition, many Russian biological sites that store dangerous biological 

pathogens remain off-limits to the United States. Russia justifies 

these access restrictions on the grounds that it is protecting its 

national security interests.



Background:



Russia inherited the worlds largest arsenal of weapons of mass 

destruction after the collapse of the Soviet Union. This arsenal 

includes approximately:



* 30,000 nuclear weapons,



* 600 metric tons of weapons-usable nuclear materials,



* 40,000 metric tons of declared chemical weapons,



* 2,100 systems (missiles and bombers) for delivering weapons of mass 

destruction, and:



* About 40 research institutes devoted to the development and 

production of biological weapons.



In addition, the Soviet collapse also left 30,000 to 75,000 senior 

nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons scientists and thousands of 

less experienced junior scientists without full-time employment.



To date, Congress has authorized more than $6.4 billion for several 

programs to help Russia and other countries in the former Soviet Union 

reduce the proliferation threats posed by their weapons of mass 

destruction.



In 1992, Congress authorized DOD to establish the Cooperative Threat 

Reduction Program. The program remains the largest and most diverse 

U.S. program addressing former Soviet weapons of mass destruction 

threats. Most Cooperative Threat Reduction projects (1) destroy 

vehicles and launchers that deliver nuclear weapons and their related 

facilities and (2) secure Russias nuclear weapons and materials to 

prevent their proliferation.



The Department of State helped establish and, with DOD, funded the 

International Science and Technology Center in Moscow to help fund 

peaceful research carried out by underpaid weapons scientists in 1994. 

The Center supplements the income of scientists, purchases equipment 

for scientific research, and supports programs to help scientists 

identify and develop commercially viable research projects. The 

Centers sponsors include the United States, the European Union, and 

Japan.



In 1995, DOE launched the Material Protection, Control, and Accounting 

Program to help secure former Soviet weapons-usable nuclear materials. 

It later created the Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention Program 

and the Nuclear Cities Initiative to engage unemployed weapons 

scientists in various peaceful commercial projects. The Department also 

has two other initiatives to reduce former Soviet stockpiles of weapons 

useable material. These programs are designed to convert highly 

enriched uranium and weapons-usable plutonium to fuels that can be used 

in civilian nuclear power plants.



In 1998, DOD initiated efforts to help secure Russian sites with 

dangerous biological pathogens in response to intensified efforts by 

Iran and other countries of proliferation concern to acquire biological 

weapons expertise and materials.[Footnote 2] In 1999, Congress approved 

funds to begin enhancing security at Russias chemical weapons storage 

sites.



U.S. Programs Have Made Progress in Three Areas:



The United States has made progress in helping reduce threats from the 

weapons, materials, and personnel working in weapons development. 

First, the most important progress the United States has made to date 

has been in support of Russias efforts to eliminate strategic nuclear 

delivery systems as required by the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty 

(START). START I required Russia to reduce the number of delivery 

vehicles from 2100 to 1600.[Footnote 3] Further cuts are required under 

START II. Through the Cooperative Threat Reduction program, the 

Department of Defense has helped de-fuel, transport, and destroy excess 

missiles and bombers, and destroy excess launchers.[Footnote 4] 

According to the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, 24 nuclear ballistic 

missile submarines, 44 long-range heavy bombers, and 395 

intercontinental missiles that previously contained nuclear warheads 

have been destroyed as of 2002. These efforts have been successful 

because the United States and Russia had mutually agreed-upon goals 

rooted in START and the Russians provided relatively open 

access.[Footnote 5]



The Department of Energy has made progress in securing Russias 

plutonium and highly enriched uranium. As we reported in February 

2001,[Footnote 6] DOE had installed systems that helped improve 

security over 32 percent of Russias weapons-usable nuclear material. 

Much of DOEs progress was at Russian civilian and navel fuel storage 

sites. At those sites, DOE completed the installation of security 

systems at nearly 60 percent (73 of 125) of the buildings and had work 

under way at 26 percent (33 of 125) of the remaining 

buildings.[Footnote 7] In addition, within 2 years of beginning a 

program to help the Russian Navy secure its nuclear warheads, DOE had 

begun installing security systems at 41 of 42 sites. The installation 

of security equipment such as fences, sensors, video cameras, and 

access control systems at these sites has reduced the risk of theft of 

nuclear material and nuclear warheads.



The United States also seeks to reduce proliferation risks associated 

with under-employed, highly trained scientists who could be tempted to 

sell their expertise to terrorists or countries of concern. As we 

reported in May 2001,[Footnote 8] the Departments of Defense, Energy, 

and State have supplemented the incomes of thousands of former Soviet 

weapons scientists. For example, in 2000, about 6,800 senior weapons 

scientists were engaged in research projects such as developing 

vaccines and devising techniques to enhance environmental cleanup. 

However, the U.S.-sponsored research generally provides only part-time 

employment for Russian scientists. Consequently, the departments know 

little about the scientists activities outside these programs.



U.S. Threat Reduction Programs in Russia Face Key Challenges:



Since 1991, U.S. threat reduction programs in Russia have faced two key 

challenges. First, Russia has not always adhered to agreements to pay 

its share of program costs, and second, Russia has not always provided 

the access DOD and DOE require to design security improvements, verify 

their installation, and ensure their proper operation.



Russia Has Not Always Provided Its Share of Funding for Programs:



Three programs illustrate the difficulty of relying on Russia to 

provide agreed-upon funds for threat reduction programs. In 1992, 

Russia requested assistance from the United States to build a site to 

store nuclear material from dismantled warheads. DOD agreed to help 

Russia build a Pentagon-sized facility at Mayak to store the plutonium 

and limited its contribution to no more than one half ($275 million) of 

the total estimated cost. However, as we reported in 1999,[Footnote 9] 

Russia did not fund its $275 million share of the project. As a result, 

the United States, as of January 2003, plans to spend $385 million to 

design and build a scaled-back version of the facility. In addition, as 

we testified in March 2000,[Footnote 10] the United States does not 

know if Russia will be able to pay the annual operating costs of more 

than $10 million after the facility is completed in 2004.



Since 1994, DOD has been negotiating with Russia to design and build a 

destruction facility for chemical weapons. Under the terms of the 

Chemical Weapons Convention, Russia is required to destroy its entire 

chemical weapons stockpile by 2012. Russia estimates that it will cost 

$3.5 to $5 billion for multiple facilities to destroy this stockpile. 

In November 2001, we testified that DOD estimated that it will cost the 

United States $890 million to design and build a single 

facility.[Footnote 11] However, the successful completion of the 

project was based on the assumption that Russia will pay an additional 

$750 million in operational costs and related infrastructure such as 

gas and water lines, storm sewers, and a rail line to link the 

destruction facility with a nearby chemical weapons storage site. 

However, through 2001, Russia had only provided $25 million toward this 

effort.



Russia also apparently faces significant limitations on its ability to 

pay for the operation and maintenance of U.S.-provided security 

equipment such as cameras, electronic locks, and motion detectors. As 

we reported in February 2001,[Footnote 12] when DOE began to help 

secure Russias weapons-usable nuclear material in 1995, the agency 

assumed that Russia would be able to pay for the long-term operation 

and maintenance of the security systems DOE planned to install. 

However, DOE soon learned that Russian officials said they lacked the 

resources to pay for these costs. As a result, as of February 2001, DOE 

planned to spend $171 million to cover the cost of equipment 

warranties, operating procedure development, and training. Without U.S. 

funding, the operation and maintenance of security systems at these 

sites would be reduced, leaving nuclear materials more vulnerable to 

theft.



Russia Has Denied DOD and DOE Access to Significant Nuclear and 

Biological Sites:



Russia has not provided DOD and DOE the access to sites that they 

require to design security improvements, verify their installation, and 

ensure their proper operation. Russia justifies these access 

restrictions on the grounds that it is protecting its national security 

interests. As a result, DOD and DOE have been unable to help protect 

substantial portions of Russias nuclear warhead stockpile and weapons-

usable nuclear material. In addition, several Russian biological sites 

of potential proliferation concern have been off-limits to the United 

States. The following three examples illustrate the lack of access the 

agencies have encountered.



The United States has long-standing concerns about the security 

conditions at Russias nuclear warhead sites. In 1997, DOD began 

efforts to help secure these sites. As we reported in June 

2001,[Footnote 13] the Russian Ministry of Defense does not provide 

U.S. personnel with access to nuclear weapons storage sites. This has 

blocked DOD from installing security improvements such as fences, 

sensors, and access control systems to prevent outsiders from breaking 

in and employees from stealing on the inside.



As we reported in February 2001,[Footnote 14] DOEs lack of access to 

buildings in Russias nuclear weapons complex is a significant 

challenge to improving security over weapons-usable nuclear material in 

Russia. DOE requires access to these buildings to design security 

systems and confirm their installation. The Russian Ministry of Atomic 

Energy had denied DOE access to 73 percent of the buildings with 

weapons-usable material in the nuclear weapons complex. As a result, 

DOE was unable to improve security over hundreds of metric tons of 

weapons-usable nuclear material.



The Russian government has refused to grant the United States access to 

biological facilities managed by the Ministry of Defense. As we 

reported in April 2000,[Footnote 15] the United States is concerned 

that offensive research may continue to take place at these facilities. 

It is believed that these sites maintain a national collection of 

dangerous pathogens, including Ebola and Marburg viruses. U.S. 

officials stated that they are concerned that dangerous pathogen stocks 

could be stolen and used for illicit purposes.



The Departments of Defense and Energy have worked with the Russian 

government over the years to gain access to these sites but with 

limited success. As a result, the United States employs alternatives to 

onsite access through the use of photographs and videotapes before and 

after the installation of security systems, visual inspections by a 

single member of a U.S. project team, and written certification by 

Russian site directors.



Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, this concludes my prepared 

statement. I will be happy to answer any questions you may have.



Contacts and Acknowledgments:



For future contacts regarding this testimony, please call Joseph 

Christoff at (202) 512-8979. Gene Aloise, R. Stockton Butler, Joseph 

Cook, Lynn Cothern, Muriel Forster, Beth Hoffman Leon, Hynek Kalkus, 

David Maurer, Maria Oliver, Jeffrey Phillips, Daniele Schiffman, F. 

James Shafer, and Pierre Toureille made key contributions to the 

reports on which this testimony is based.



[End of section]



GAO Related Products:



Cooperative Threat Reduction Program Annual Report. GAO-03-341R. 

Washington, D.C.: December 2, 2002.



Arms Control: Efforts to Strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention. 

GAO-02-1038NI. Washington, D.C.: September 30, 2002.



Nuclear Nonproliferation: U.S. Efforts to Help Other Countries Combat 

Nuclear Smuggling Need Strengthened Coordination and Planning. GAO-02-

426. Washington, D.C.: May 16, 2002.



Cooperative Threat Reduction: DOD Has Adequate Oversight of Assistance, 

but Procedural Limitations Remain. GAO-01-694. Washington, D.C.: June 

19, 2001.



Weapons of Mass Destruction: State Department Oversight of Science 

Centers Program. GAO-01-582. Washington, D.C.: May 10, 2001.



Nuclear Nonproliferation: DOEs Efforts to Assist Weapons Scientists in 

Russias Nuclear Cities Face Challenges. GAO-01-429. Washington, D.C.: 

May 3, 2001.



Nuclear Nonproliferation: Security of Russias Nuclear Material 

Improving; Further Enhancements Needed. GAO-01-312. Washington, D.C.: 

February 28, 2001.



Nuclear Nonproliferation: Implications of the U.S. Purchase of Russian 

Highly Enriched Uranium. GAO-01-148. Washington, D.C.: December 15, 

2000.



Biological Weapons: Effort to Reduce Former Soviet Threat Offers 

Benefits, Poses New Risks. NSIAD-00-138. Washington, D.C.: April 28, 

2000.



Weapons of Mass Destruction: Some U.S. Assistance to Redirect Russian 

Scientists Taxed by Russia. NSIAD-00-154R. Washington, D.C.: April 28, 

2000.



Cooperative Threat Reduction: DODs 1997-98 Reports on Accounting for 

Assistance Were Late and Incomplete. NSIAD-00-40. Washington, D.C.: 

March 15, 2000.



Nuclear Nonproliferation: Limited Progress in Improving Nuclear 

Material Security in Russia and the Newly Independent States. RCED/

NSIAD-00-82. Washington, D.C.: March 6, 2000.



Nuclear Nonproliferation: Status of Transparency Measures for U.S. 

Purchase of Russian Highly Enriched Uranium. RCED-99-194. Washington, 

D.C.: September 22, 1999.



Weapons of Mass Destruction: Effort to Reduce Russian Arsenals May Cost 

More, Achieve Less Than Planned. NSIAD-99-76. Washington, D.C.: April 

13, 1999.



Nuclear Nonproliferation: Concerns With DOEs Efforts to Reduce the 

Risks Posed by Russias Unemployed Weapons Scientists. RCED-99-54. 

Washington, D.C.: February 19, 1999.



Nuclear Nonproliferation and Safety: Uncertainties About the 

Implementation of U.S.-Russian Plutonium Disposition Efforts. RCED-98-

46. Washington, D.C.: January 14, 1998.



Weapons of Mass Destruction: Review of DODs June 1997 Report on 

Assistance Provided. NSIAD-97-218. Washington, D.C.: September 5, 1997.



Cooperative Threat Reduction: Status of Defense Conversion Efforts in 

the Former Soviet Union. NSIAD-97-101. Washington, D.C.: April 11, 

1997.



Weapons of Mass Destruction: DOD Reporting on Cooperative Threat 

Reduction Assistance Has Improved. NSIAD-97-84. Washington, D.C.: 

February 27, 1997.



Nuclear Safety: Status of U.S. Assistance to Improve the Safety of 

Soviet-Designed Reactors. RCED-97-5. Washington, D.C.: October 29, 

1996.



Weapons of Mass Destruction: Status of the Cooperative Threat Reduction 

Program. NSIAD-96-222. Washington, D.C.: September 27, 1996.



Nuclear Nonproliferation: Status of U.S. Efforts to Improve Nuclear 

Materials Controls in Newly Independent States. NSIAD/RCED-96-89. 

Washington, D.C.: March 8, 1996.



Nuclear Safety: Concerns With Nuclear Facilities and Other Sources of 

Radiation in the Former Soviet Union. RCED-96-4. Washington, D.C.: 

November 7, 1995.



Weapons of Mass Destruction: DOD Reporting on Cooperative Threat 

Reduction Assistance Can Be Improved. NSIAD-95-191. Washington, D.C.: 

September 29, 1995.



Weapons of Mass Destruction: Reducing the Threat From the Former Soviet 

Union--An Update. NSIAD-95-165. Washington, D.C.: June 17, 1995.



Weapons of Mass Destruction: Reducing the Threat From the Former Soviet 

Union. NSIAD-95-7. Washington, D.C.: October 6, 1994.



Nuclear Safety: International Assistance Efforts to Make Soviet-

Designed Reactors Safer. RCED-94-234. Washington, D.C.: September 29, 

1994.



Soviet Nuclear Weapons: Priorities and Costs Associated with U.S. 

Dismantlement Assistance. NSIAD-93-154. Washington, D.C.: March 8, 

1993.



FOOTNOTES



[1] Appendix I contains a list of reports GAO has published since 1993 

on U.S. threat reduction and nonproliferation efforts in the former 

Soviet Union. 



[2] Biological Weapons: Effort to Reduce Former Soviet Threat Offers 

Benefits, Poses New Risks (GAO/NSIAD-00-138, Apr. 28, 2000).



[3] Under the terms of START I, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine were 

required to eliminate their entire stockpile of about 400 strategic 

nuclear delivery vehicles.



[4] Weapons of Mass Destruction: Status of the Cooperative Threat 

Reduction Program (GAO/NSIAD-96-222, Sep. 27, 1996).



[5] Weapons of Mass Destruction: U.S. Efforts to Reduce Threats from 

the Former Soviet Union. GAO/T-NSIAD/RCED-00-119, Mar. 6, 2000. 



[6] Nuclear Nonproliferation: Security of Russias Nuclear Material 

Improving; Further Enhancements Needed (GAO-01-312, Feb. 28, 2001).



[7] Russia stores weapons-usable nuclear material at three types of 

sites. Civilian sites produce nuclear fuels and materials for civilian 

application; naval fuel sites store stockpiles of highly enriched 

uranium used in submarines and icebreakers; and the nuclear weapons 

complex fabricates, refurbishes, and dismantles nuclear weapons and 

components.



[8] Weapons of Mass Destruction: State Department Oversight of Science 

Centers Program (GAO-01-582, May 10, 2001) and Nuclear 

Nonproliferation: DOEs Efforts to Assist Weapons Scientists in 

Russias Nuclear Cities Face Challenges (GAO-01-429, May 3, 2001).



[9] Weapons of Mass Destruction: Effort to Reduce Russian Arsenals May 

Cost More, Achieve Less Than Planned (GAO/NSIAD-99-76, Apr. 1999).



[10] Weapons of Mass Destruction: U.S. Efforts to Reduce Threats from 

the Former Soviet Union (GAO/T-NSIAD/RCED-00-119, Mar. 6, 2000).



[11] Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing U.S. Policy Tools for 

Combating Proliferation (GAO-02-226T, Nov. 7, 2001).



[12] GAO-01-312.



[13] Cooperative Threat Reduction: DOD Has Adequate Oversight of 

Assistance, but Procedural Limitations Remain (GAO-01-694, Jun. 19, 

2001).



[14] GAO-01-312.



[15] GAO/NSIAD-00-138.