Protecting Civil Rights:

A Leadership Guide for State, Local, 
and Tribal Law Enforcement 

Prepared by the 
International Association of Chiefs of Police 

September 2006 

International Association of Chiefs of Police logo

Protecting Civil Rights:

A Leadership Guide for State, Local, 
and Tribal Law Enforcement 

This project was supported by Grant Number 2003-HS-WX-K309 awarded by the U.S. 
Department of Justice Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (the COPS 
Office). Views expressed in this document are those of the International Association 
of Chiefs of Police and do not necessarily represent the official position or policies 
of the COPS Office or the U.S. Department of Justice. 


September 2006 

Dear Colleague: 

The International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) is pleased to present the new publication, 
Protecting Civil Rights: A Leadership Guide for State, Local, and Tribal Law Enforcement. Funded 
by the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, the guide examines the experiences 
of a wide cross section of agencies proactively engaged in protecting civil rights as well as 
those that have come under federally mandated monitoring resulting from investigations of 
patterns or practices of civil rights violations. The guide references the exemplary policies and 
practices of departments promoting civil rights as well as the content of the consent decrees 
and memorandums of agreement that individual police agencies have signed with the U.S. 
Department of Justice. The guide relies on information obtained from focus groups, as well as key 
advisors in the law enforcement community and the IACP standing committees on civil rights and 
professional standards. Finally, the guide is informed by the activities and staff of two distinct, yet 
complementary, agencies within the U.S. Department of Justice: the Special Litigation Section of 
the Civil Rights Division and the Community Relations Service. 

By bringing these sources together, the guide provides a comprehensive overview of 
the civil rights issues and challenges that todays law enforcement leaders face. It offers 
practical recommendations for addressing these challenges, but more important, it includes 
recommendations that encourage leaders to engage in full community partnerships in ways that 
both protect and promote civil rights. 

In short, this effort expresses the conviction that law enforcement leaders can and must learn as 
much as possible from the perspectives and direct experiences of their professional peers. Through 
such exchanges, chief executives can gain insights into the best ways to serve their communities 
using promising strategies and practices that are respectful, ethical, and effective. We hope that all 
law enforcement leaders will recognize the need for visionary leadership in these areas and will 
look to this guide as a valuable tool in their ongoing efforts to protect and promote civil rights. 

Sincerely, 

Chief Mary Ann Viverette Chief John Finnegan 
President, IACP Barnstable (Massachusetts) Police Department 
Gaithersburg (Maryland) Police Department Chair, IACP Civil Rights Committee 

Chief Charles A. Gruber 
South Barrington (Illinois) Police Department 
Chair, IACP Professional Standards Committee 


Acknowledgments 

Acknowledgments 

 
Many individuals representing different organizations and professional vantage points on 
the issue of civil rights in law enforcement made this publication possible. The scope of their 
direct contributions, advice, counsel, and editorial comments extends well beyond what can 
be acknowledged here. Contributors and advisors are discussed below under groupings 
based on their primary affiliation. This format is a matter of convenience and organization; 
it should in no way detract from the collaborative nature of this endeavor. Indeed, a 
tremendous amount of overlap and cross-fertilization occurred among these groups as this 
project unfolded. 

International Association of Chiefs of Police: Standing Committees 

Two standing committees of the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP), the 
Civil Rights and Professional Standards, played pivotal roles in this project from inception 
to completion. Members of these committees are listed in Appendix A and Appendix B, 
respectively, of this guide. Individual members contributed their unique insights and 
perspectives. Several are singled out below. 

Fittingly, we start with expressing deep appreciation to Barbara Bobi Wallace, whose 
professional commitment to civil rights and personal drive served as an inspiration for this 
project. Chief Wallaces enthusiasm was contagious. As the chairperson, she was the driving 
force behind the Civil Rights Committee and its collective embrace of this project. Ms. 
Wallace was chief of the Community Relations Unit of the FBI at the onset of the project. 
Although Bobi has since retired from the FBI and stepped down from the committees chair, 
her enthusiasm and vision remained driving forces in this effort. 

Charles A. Gruber, chief of the South Barrington (Illinois) Police Department and current 
chair of IACPs Professional Standards Committee, played a role parallel and complementary 
to Ms. Wallace. Throughout the course of the project his steadfast guidance, insights, and 
support were vital. The Leadership Guide has benefited immensely from his long-standing 
professional commitment to civil rights, his role in initiating IACPs Civil Rights Committee in 
1990, and his leadership. 

John Finnegan, chief of the Barnstable (Massachusetts) Police Department, assumed the chair 
of the Civil Rights Committee when Ms. Wallace retired. Chief Finnegans resolute support 
and direction helped sharpen the practical focus of the guide and helped to integrate it with 
the broader work of the Civil Rights Committee. Chief Finnegan was instrumental providing 
feedback as well as in soliciting valuable input and insights from committee members. 

As a whole, the Civil Rights and Professional Standards Committees provided support and 
guidance. Individual members took on various chapters for review and a debt of gratitude 
is extended to all. A special debt of gratitude is extended to Leonard Cooke, director of the 
Virginia Department of Criminal Justice Services, for the detailed review that he and his 

 


staff provided across all chapters. Chief Richard Rappoport, Fairfax City (Virginia) Police 
Department, provided extensive comments and edits on the topic of racial profiling (Chapter 
5), a particularly complex and challenging chapter. In the same vein, Chief Charles Reynolds, 
retired from the Dover (New Hampshire) Police Department, provided keen insights and 
direction on use-of-force issues (Chapter 4). Chief Susan Riseling, University of Wisconsin 
Madison Police Department, contributed perceptive commentary that helped to improve the 
tone and language of the guide. Chief Patrick Oliver, retired from the Fairborn (Ohio) Police 
Department, imparted thoughtful insights and edits, particularly on the content related to 
ethics and community outreach. Chief James Hussey, from the Cohasset (Massachusetts) 
Police Department, provided commentary and suggestions about the role of personnel 
management as a means of promoting civil rights. 

Project Advisory Group 

In April 2004, project staff convened an advisory group in Memphis to discuss the project 
and the direction it should take. Besides representatives serving on IACPs Civil Rights and 
Professional Standards Committees, project staff brought together others specializing in 
civil rights accountability and oversight. Under the umbrella of an advisory group, many 
individuals representing different perspectivesincluding academia and persons experienced 
as monitors for federal consent decree and memorandums of understandinghelped provide 
direction in the projects early stages. Advisory group members also provided review and 
direction on substantive content as an annotated outline for the guide was developed and 
revised. Members of the Project Advisory Group are listed in Appendix C. 

Project Focus Group 

In April 2005, the IACP convened a group of law enforcement executives from across the 
nation in Pittsburgh to provide feedback and to help hone a draft of recommendations for law 
enforcement policies and practices to promote civil rights. This Project Focus Group included 
representatives from agencies that had successfully navigated federal oversight or were in 
the process of doing so. 

The Pittsburgh Bureau of Police played a key role in helping organize this meeting and 
provided a wealth of information relevant to its reforms and the successful conclusion of 
oversight under a federal consent decree. We are particularly indebted to Chief Robert 
McNeilly (now retired), Deputy Chief Earl Woodyard, and Commander William Valenta 
(retired), for their assistance, consultation, and their overall contributions to the field, 
particularly with respect to early intervention strategies. The full list of participants in Project 
Focus Group is in Appendix D. 



U.S. Department of Justice 

From within the Department of Justice the project relied on the expertise and assistance from 
three separate offices. 

First, we are indebted to the Special Litigation Section (SPL) within Civil Rights Division. As 
the section responsible for conducting pattern or practice investigations, brokering consent 
decrees and memorandums of agreement, and overseeing reforms, the SPL played a pivotal 
and patient role in helping IACP staff understand the complexities and nuances of the 
process. We are particularly indebted to the direct roles that Shanetta Y. Cutlar, chief of the 
SPL, and Tammie Gregg, deputy chief, played as advisors and facilitators in this endeavor. 
Staff from throughout the SPL provided comments on early outlines of the guide and were 
instrumental in helping ensure that the document was comprehensive and well balanced. 

Second, we are also indebted to the Community Relations Service (CRS) within the 
Department of Justice. Director Sharee Freeman was a loyal advisor throughout the course 
of this project. George Henderson, general counsel for CRS, and Timothy Johnson, senior 
conciliation specialist, were instrumental in helping project staff understand the role of CRS 
in promoting civil rights and distinguishing CRS role addressing civil rights concerns from 
that of the Civil Rights Division. Mr. Henderson was also instrumental in convening a group 
of CRS staff to help underscore and illustrate the scope and variety of assistance. 

The third component within the Department of Justice to whom we owe our deepest 
gratitude is the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS). We thank the COPS 
Office not just for funding the project, but also for providing consistent and active support as 
well as direct contributions. Director Carl Peed was instrumental in helping initiate the project. 
His participation in and support for the project was invaluable and helped to underscore the 
important role that community policing, and the COPS Office in particular, have played in 
promoting policing that is more fair, more responsive to the community, and more effective. 
Deputy Director Pam Cammarata served as the COPS project manager. Her support, insights, 
and direct involvement helped to bring us together with other COPS grantees involved in 
similar work. These contacts and our participation in various workshops and symposia 
sponsored by COPS were indispensable in helping define the scope of the project and 
ensuring that our approach was balanced and complementary to the efforts other COPS 
grantees working on projects focused on civil rights. A final debt of gratitude is extended to 
two contract employees of COPS: Judith Beres for her editing of this document and Ayonna 
Johnson for her work on the layout of this document. 



IACP Leadership and Project Personnel 

Many IACP personnel provided guidance, support, and input into this project. Leadership and 
project staff that had an impact on this work include the following. 

Executive Staff 

Chief Mary Ann Viverette Eugene Cromartie 
President Deputy Executive Director 
Dan Rosenblatt John Firman 
Executive Director IACP Research Center Director 
Project Staff 
John Markovic Major Keven Gray 
Project Director and Principal Author Maryland State Police 
IACP Fellow 
Christine Allred Lieutenant Sharon Malloy 
Content Editor and Writing Consultant U.S. Capitol Police 
IACP Fellow 
Colin May Darron Mason 

Project Assistant and Contributing Author IACP Intern 

Sergeant Steven Brochu Serena Werner 

Charlotte-Mecklenburg (North Carolina) IACP Intern 
Police Department 
IACP Visiting Fellow 

Lieutenant Ed Dadisho 

Suisun City (California) Police Department 
(Formerly with Los Angeles Police Department) 
IACP Visiting Fellow 


Executive Summary 

Executive Summary 

PROTECTING CIVIL RIGHTS: 
A Leadership Guide for State, Local, and Tribal Law Enforcement 

BACKGROUND 

Protecting Civil Rights: A Leadership Imperative 

All law enforcement leaders recognize the ethical and legal imperatives to which they and 
their officers must adhere to ensure that civil rights of all individuals in their communities are 
protected. Law enforcement officers, in fact, are the most visible and largest contingent of 
the nations guardians of civil rights. Every police officer commits to upholding the nations 
prime guarantor of rights, the U.S. Constitution, when sworn into office. To be effective, 
a police department and its individual officers must be seen primarily as protectors of 
civil rights, rather than agents of social control whose main purpose is to limit individual 
freedoms. The effectiveness of police in their varied missionsfrom law enforcement to 
community servicedepends on the trust and confidence of the community. Public trust and 
confidence are severely reduced when individuals civil rights are compromised. And when 
any community perceives that its civil rights are systematically violated by the police, all 
sense of trust, cooperation, and partnership between the police and that community will be 
undermined. 

Understanding these ethical imperatives, law enforcement leaders must be continually 
vigilant to ensure that the actions of their officers do not violate civil rights and do not 
compromise public support. Officers are granted a tremendous amount of authority and 
discretion to enforce the law, that is, to protect individual rights from being infringed upon by 
others in the community. At the same time, officers themselves must act within the confines 
of the Constitution while executing their tremendous power and wide discretion. They must 
never consider themselves above the law while executing their responsibility to enforce 
the law. This commitment is what distinguishes police in constitutionally based, democratic 
societies like ours from police in nondemocratic countries, where they too often are perceived 
as oppressive agents of a government whose main purpose is to restrict, rather than protect, 
the rights of civilians. 

Across the United States, law enforcement personnel have an overwhelmingly positive 
record of accomplishment for respecting and protecting civil rights. Leaders should find it 
heartening and a source of pride that the vast majority of the countless interactions that 
officers have with civilians result in actions that are conducted lawfully, professionally, and 
within constitutional boundaries. The fact that the overwhelming majority of police officers 
routinely respect civil rights under the most trying and volatile conditions is remarkable. 
Given the risks inherent in police work and the grave consequences that can occur when civil 
rights are violated, law enforcement leaders must be unwavering in holding their officers 
accountable. Their officers are vested with authority and discretion that can be abused. Unlike 



any other profession, the possibility of violating civil rights, or being perceived as violating 
civil rights, is inherent in many of the duties officers are required to perform on a day-to-day 
basis. Unfortunately, the notoriety and harm that arise from even isolated instances of civil 
rights violations can easily overshadow the vast majority of police-civilian encounters that are 
performed respectfully and professionally. 

Law enforcement leaders bear the tremendous responsibility to ensure that individual officers 
and units within their agencies uphold the law and its most basic guarantees. Realistically, 
law enforcement leaders recognize that on rare occasions officers will violate a civilians civil 
rights, wittingly or unwittingly. On even rarer occasions, groups of officers or small factions 
within an agency may act without regard for civil rights, perhaps even asserting that effective 
law enforcement can come only at the expense of civil rights. Leaders must be resolute in 
their responses to isolated incidents of civil rights violations to minimize damage and set a 
clear example. In the case of officers who systematically violate civil rights, their behavior 
must not be tolerated and action must be decisive and uncompromising. Effective leaders, 
supported by the managers who serve them, must strive to identify and intervene when 
officers exhibit potentially problematic behavior before it escalates to the point of violating 
civil rights. 

Against this backdrop, the seriousness of law enforcement leaders responsibility to 
communicate a consistent and far-reaching commitment to civil rights protections cannot be 
overstated. Although laws, departmental policy directives, and standard operating procedures 
are critically important, law enforcement executives leadership and communication skills are 
the most critical elements for ensuring that officers regularly exercise sound judgment and 
engage in professional and ethical policing. 

Law enforcement leaders can and must demonstrate a fundamental and complete allegiance 
to civil rights protections in a coordinated manner using multiple approaches. They must 
clearly convey a simultaneous commitment to effective law enforcement and civil rights 
protection; they must codify this commitment in their agencys mission statements; they 
must ensure that their departments polices are clear, sound, and consistent with civil rights 
guarantees; they must train and supervise officers in manners that are consistent with this 
commitment; and they must respond to alleged civil rights violations with vigilance and with 
fair and decisive action. As law enforcement leaders succeed in these regards and make these 
efforts transparent to the public, they validate the core premise that civil rights protection 
is not only an ethical and legal imperative but a practical imperative as well. Protecting 
civil rights is good for police, good for the community, and essential for maintaining the 
partnerships that must exist between the two. 

Federal Investigations: A Response to Patterns or Practices of Civil Rights Violations 

Despite the ethical, legal, and practical imperatives to protect civil rights, law enforcement 
officers occasionally abrogate their oaths. When these unwitting or intentional violations 
of citizens civil rights go unaddressed, they can escalate into more widespread patterns 
or practices of civil rights violations that can undermine the credibility of an entire law 



enforcement agency and erode public trust and confidence. Moving beyond isolated 
instances, pattern or practice violations of civil rights comprise an urgent call to law 
enforcement executives and the municipal, county, or state governments under which they 
serve to reassume the ultimate responsibility for ensuring that officers uphold their oaths of 
office and adherence to constitutional guarantees. 

During the last decade, the federal government has responded to such situations in the rare, 
but urgent circumstances where allegations of pattern or practice civil rights violations have 
arisen. The passage of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 (Public 
Law No: 103-322) enabled the federal government to take action to remedy any pattern or 
practice of conduct by state and local law enforcement agencies that deprives persons 
of rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the 
United States. In response to this enabling legislation, the Special Litigation Section of 
the Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Department of Justice assumed the responsibility for 
investigating alleged pattern or practice civil rights violations and for establishing remedies to 
such violations. 

During the last decade, the Special Litigation Section has investigated an array of alleged 
pattern or practice civil rights violations including the following: 

 Unlawful or excessive use of force 
 Inadequate training on use-of-force techniques 
 Racial profiling 
 Illegal stops and searches 
 Intimidation by police 
 Harassment of civilians in retaliation for reported misconduct 
 Inadequate supervision 
 Failure to investigate alleged officer misconduct. 

Investigations by the Special Litigation Section resulting in a determination of actionable civil 
rights violations generally have been resolved through negotiated agreements in the form 
of memorandums of agreement (MOA) or consent decrees. Through such agreements, the 
federal government and law enforcement agencies agree to a course of action to correct the 
patterns of civil rights violations and to remedy the conditions that allowed the violations to 
occur. Since 1994, 14 agencies have been or currently are under federal monitoring as a result 
of civil rights violation investigations. While these 14 agencies represent an infinitesimal 
fraction of the countrys nearly 18,000 state, county, local, tribal, and special jurisdictional law 
enforcement agencies, the impact of these federal investigations and agreements has been 
and continues to be profound and far-reaching. 

 


ASSERTING A LEADERSHIP ROLE 

The very existence of these investigations reminds us of the critical messages and 
management strategies that law enforcement leaders must assertor reassertin their 
efforts to protect and promote civil rights. Accordingly, the International Association of 
Chiefs of Polices (IACP) release of Protecting Civil Rights: A Leadership Guide for State, Local, 
and Tribal Law Enforcement is meant to serve as a compass for law enforcement leaders 
committed to affirmatively addressing civil rights issues. The guide originated in a series of 
discussions among representatives from U.S. Department of Justicespecifically the Office 
of Community Oriented Policing Services and the Special Litigation Section of the Civil Rights 
Divisionand the IACP. It realizes their shared conviction that the accumulated knowledge 
of law enforcement leaders who have undergone a federal civil rights investigation and 
resultant monitoring, coupled with that of law enforcement leaders who have proactively 
demonstrated exemplary records of protecting and promoting civil rights, can and should 
benefit all other law enforcement leaders. To make this accumulated knowledge available to 
law enforcement leaders, the IACP took several discrete steps. 

First, the IACP engaged in a comprehensive review of federal pattern and practice 
investigatory processes. This review revealed that these processes are constantly evolving. 
For instance, the Special Litigation Section has increasingly relied on expert consultants with 
direct law enforcement experience for providing technical assistance to departments under 
investigation. The investigations themselves have become increasingly transparent to the 
departments. The IACPs review also revealed that these processes are highly individualized. 
They are shaped by the nature of the allegations, by the findings specific to each jurisdiction, 
and by the tone and comprehensiveness of an agencys response. While these investigations 
often are viewed as adversarial, new leaders with reform agendas and who were intent 
on resolving inherited civil rights problems, often made the best of these situations. These 
leaders were committed to responding positively to the direction and assistance that federal 
intervention could offer and worked with the Special Litigation Section and its consultants 
to establish cooperative investigatory processes. In fact, several chief executives were 
instrumental in requesting that the investigations take place. Leadership responses such as 
these have enabled the Special Litigation Section to work effectively with these agencies and 
to build on the agencies preexisting successes. 

Second, the IACP engaged in a comprehensive review of the MOAs and consent decrees 
resulting from these federal investigations. These agreements are of broad value because 
they condense the insights of formal and extensive inquiries about civil rights violations 
into clear and practical mandates for new courses of action. These agreements articulate 
specific remedies for patterns of civil rights violations including the excessive use of force, 
racial profiling, and other forms of police misconduct. They also address accountability or 
management practices, such as early intervention systems and critical incident reviews, that 
can help address and prevent civil rights violations as well as limit department liability. These 
agreements provide valuable insight for chief executives who are determined that effective 
law enforcement and the protection of civil rights will be missions that are complementary to 
their agencies. 



Third, the IACP explored other agencies internal solutions to protecting and promoting 
civil rights. During the same decade that 14 agencies underwent federal investigation and 
resultant monitoring for pattern or practice civil rights violations, other agencies addressed 
challenging civil rights concerns on their own initiatives. In developing the guide, the IACP 
recognized that these agencies would be an equally important, if not more important, 
source of insight. Law enforcement leaders in these agencies worked to protect community 
members civil rights by proactively enacting sound policies, comprehensive training, far-
reaching and close methods of supervision, and more effective systems of accountability. 

Finally, the IACP gathered all of this information into this concise, yet comprehensive guide. 
In its first chapter, Protecting Civil Rights: A Leadership Guide for State, Local, and Tribal 
Law Enforcement Leaders familiarizes law enforcement leaders with federal pattern or 
practice investigatory processes as well as general resources and strategies available to all 
departments committed to protecting and promoting civil rights. In the remaining chapters, 
the guide offers in-depth discussions of the policies, procedures, and practices that are critical 
to civil rights protection. 

For the benefit of law enforcement leaders, the guide crystallizes these in-depth discussions 
into concise recommendations. In summary, Protecting Civil Rights is designed to enable law 
enforcement leaders to learn from their peers who have engaged in deliberate strategies, 
both with and without federal intervention, to protect civil rights. 

SELECTED RECOMMENDATIONS 

Protecting Civil Rights recognizes that the motivation to safeguard civil rights must emerge 
out of law enforcement executives visionary leadership, but then must be continually 
reinforced by internal, and in some instances external, accountability mechanisms. 
Accordingly, the guide offers recommendations in six substantive areas including early 
intervention, the civilian complaint process, use of force, racial profiling, personnel 
management, and data management. The following is a sampling of key recommendations. 

Early Intervention Strategies 

 All agencies, regardless of size, should strive to incorporate the core concepts of early 
intervention into their personnel management practices. Early intervention strategies, 
when properly designed and implemented, allow supervisors to address concerns about 
officers behavioral patterns before they escalate to a point where discipline would be 
needed. Many large agencies have now developed sophisticated early intervention 
systems that rely on computerized data-driven approaches that automatically alert 
supervisors to potential problems. Any size department, large, medium, or small, 
however, can use early intervention strategies in its day-to-day supervisory practices 
without needing to rely on sophisticated technology solutions. 



 Agencies seeking to develop early intervention should look to their peers for ideas, but 
must recognize that they will have to tailor their own system to their departments 
needs. Every departments supervisory and information management practices are 
unique. Because these practices are at the core of early intervention strategies, there is no 
one-size-fits-all strategy. Nonetheless, agencies should look to their peers for practical and 
technological advice on how to plan for and build these systems and then carefully tailor 
the best features of these external systems to meet their own departments structure, data, 
and needs. 

 Agencies should strive to include as many stakeholders as possible in the planning of 
early intervention systems. Many individuals, groups, and associations have a stake in 
early intervention strategies. When designing these strategies, agencies should seek input 
from a wide cross section of internal representatives including rank-and-file officers, 
supervisors, personnel managers, and data management/information technology staff. 
Many departments have also found it useful to seek external input by involving the police 
union and the community in the planning process. 

 Agencies should ensure that supervisors have the appropriate experiences, skills, and 
training to perform their early intervention responsibilities. An early intervention data 
management system is not a panacea for resolving personnel problems and officer 
misconduct issues. The system will only work as well as those who use it. First-line 
supervisors must be trained specifically in the use of the system and in making sound 
early intervention judgments for the system to be an optimal management tool that will 
result in genuine and effective assistance being provided to officers. The success of early 
intervention strategies relies principally on first-line supervisors who are trained on, 
skilled in, and motivated to use these systems. 

 Agencies must ensure that the early intervention system remains distinct from the 
disciplinary system. Properly designed early intervention systems are preemptive and can 
reduce reliance on reactive disciplinary measures. Law enforcement leaders must make 
certain that these systems operate independently to avoid the perception among officers 
that early intervention is simply another form of discipline. 

 Agencies should develop a discrete policy directive addressing the purpose and functional 
elements of the departments early intervention system. Once an early intervention 
system is developed, the department should also develop a clear and precise policy that 
addresses the systems purposes and outlines the processes of notification, review, and 
intervention when potentially problematic behavior is identified. 


The Civilian and Internal Complaint Process 

 Every department should have a clear policy and well-defined practices for handling 
civilian and internally generated complaints against officers or against the department as 
a whole. Clear policies and well-defined practices are critical for the effective functioning 
of an agencys complaint process. These policies and practices for handling civilian and 
internal complaints may be treated as a stand-alone section of the departments policy 
manual or may be embedded within other appropriate policy sections (i.e., Internal 
Affairs Unit Policy). Civilian complaint data must be systematically analyzed and used 
for personnel management purposes, to refine policy and training, and as a general 
barometer of citizen satisfaction. 

 Departments should establish an accessible complaint-filing process that allows for the 
receipt of complaints about officer misconduct from a wide range of sources.To respond 
effectively to concerns raised by the community and by personnel within the department, 
agencies must ensure that the process of filing complaints is open, accessible, and free of 
unnecessary inconveniences that would inhibit individuals from filing complaints. Because 
requiring civilians to file complaints in police facilities can be inconvenient or intimidating, 
many departments are making civilian complaint forms available at other public places, 
e.g., at libraries or community centers, and more agencies are allowing civilians to file 
complaints on agency web sites.

 Departments should establish complaint investigation processes that are comprehensive 
and fair. Departments will receive complaints ranging from the relatively minor grievances 
of community members who felt that they were treated rudely to serious allegations 
against officers for actions that would constitute criminal behavior if proven true. A 
department must set up an investigatory process that takes all complaints seriously and 
that fairly and effectively deals with this broad range of diverse complaints. 

 Departments should specifically select and train personnel responsible for investigating 
complaints. While departments may rely on the chain of command or use specific 
units (e.g., Internal Affairs) to investigate complaints of police misconduct, they should 
recognize that such investigations are unique and apart from other agency investigative 
functions and that they may require different aptitudes and skill sets. Departments should 
select and train their personnel carefully to ensure that the complaint investigation 
process is taken seriously and that all investigations are comprehensive, fair, and 
adequately documented.

 Departments must protect officers against fraudulent complaints. Occasionally, civilians 
lodge complaints out of frustration, retribution, or to purposely undermine legitimate 
law enforcement actions. Departments must ensure that complaint investigators identify 
and appropriately dismiss fraudulent complaints through thorough investigation. In 
such instances, cases should be documented as unfounded and officers should be fully 
exonerated. Departments should never use fraudulent complaints to assess the officer for 
early intervention or disciplinary processes. 



Managing Use of Force 

 All departments should have a clear use-of-force policy that specifically addresses both 
deadly and nondeadly use of force and is consistent with all legal and professional 
standards. Regardless of size or function, all departments should have a use of force 
policy with directives on deadly and nondeadly force. These policies must be clear and 
easy to interpret. The policies should not be less restrictive than applicable state laws or 
professional standards. 

 A departments use-of-force policy must address all available use-of-force options, clearly 
place these options on a use-of-force continuum, and associate these options with 
corresponding levels of subject resistance. A departments use-of-force optionsweapons 
and techniqueswill evolve over time. Departments must continually review and update 
their use-of-force policies to keep pace with these changes.

 A departments polices and training should specifically address alternatives to use of force 
and encourage their use in appropriate circumstances. While policies and training typically 
and appropriately address the use of force, they should also directly address alternatives 
to the use of force. Policies should encourage officers to consider alternative techniques 
such as verbal judo and containment whenever possible, yet never at the expense of 
compromising the safety of officers and the general public. 

 Every department should have a clear policy and set of standards for determining what 
level of force requires formal written documentation by involved officers. Every use-of-force 
policy must stipulate the level of force at which a formal written use-of-force report 
is required. While this threshold may vary depending on individual departments use-of-force 
options, their practices, and their precedents, the consensus recommendation of the 
advisors to this project is that any instance of force above soft-hand control should be 
considered a reportable use of force.

 Every department should have a clear policy and set of standards for determining 
what level of force requires formal review by the chain of command or a specialized 
review unit (e.g., critical incident review team). Similarly, while every use-of-force policy 
should stipulate at what level of force deployments are to be reviewed, the consensus 
recommendation of the advisors to this project is that any instance of force above soft-
hands control should be considered a reviewable use of force. Systematically reviewing 
all use-of-force reports above a designated threshold, not just those reports that raise 
general suspicion, is a critical accountability tool, both for maintaining civil rights and 
for limiting department liability. Larger departments often develop graduated review 
protocols that are relevant to the level of force used and potential liability involved. This 
is based on the premise that deployments of deadly force, for instance, should be more 
thoroughly reviewed than deployments of nondeadly force. 



Addressing Racial Profiling 

 All departments should have a clear and unequivocal departmental policy prohibiting 
racial profiling and promoting bias-free policing. Such a policy directive should include a 
clear and unambiguous departmental definition of racial profiling and related terminology. 
It must also clearly convey that behavior and evidentiary standardsnot race or 
ethnicityshall guide police stop-and-search decisions. The policy should be sufficiently 
restrictive so that it prohibits the use of race-motivated pretext stops (stopping a car for 
a minor traffic violation when the real motive for the stop is the race or ethnicity of the 
driver). The policy should articulate the limited circumstances in which race or ethnicity 
can be used in a decision to take police action. Race and ethnicity can be used as a 
specific descriptor about a suspect or suspects in a crime. In other words, race or ethnicity 
should be used in the same manner as other physical descriptorssuch as hair color, 
weight, or gendermight be used in identifying specific suspects. Similar limitations 
are expressed in the U.S. Department of Justices Guidance Regarding the Use of 
Race by Federal Law Enforcement Agencies (June 2003) as they apply to investigative 
circumstances.

 In conducting activities in connection with a specific investigation, Federal law enforcement 
officers may consider race and ethnicity only to the extent that there is trustworthy 
information, relevant to the locality or time frame, that links persons of a particular race or 
ethnicity to an identified criminal incident, scheme, or organization. 

 Departments must embed the ideals of bias-free policing in their mission statements, 
training, accountability mechanisms, and community outreach. While a clear policy 
against racial profiling is the foundation for bias-free policing, law enforcement leaders 
must reinforce this policy throughout their departmental practices. Clearly demonstrating 
intolerance for racial profiling at every turn is critical for limiting acts of racial profiling by 
individual officers, curbing the communitys perceptions of racial profiling, and sustaining 
trust throughout all segments of a diverse community. 

 All departments must consider carefully whether or not to collect racial profiling data, 
while every department that collects racial profiling data must abide by applicable 
state laws and mandates.To assess the presence or prevalence of racial profiling, many 
departments are collecting data on traffic stops voluntarily or as a result of state mandates 
or legal rulings. Departments efforts to collect, analyze, interpret, and respond to racial 
profiling data are highly complicated and tend to be expensive and resource intensive. 
Every law enforcement leader must educate himself or herself about these processes 
and should complete some level of cost-benefit analysis to determine whether racial 
profiling data collection are advisable for his or her department. Leaders should also 
weigh the benefits of proactively collecting such data against the potential costs of having 
to collect such data reactively and according to methods or rules imposed by outside 
interests. Above all, it should be recognized that departments that signal their willingness 
to address racial profiling in a forthright and deliberate manner are in a better position to 
maintain and enhance their communities level of trust in the department. 



Personnel Management 

With the current shortage of recruit candidates that many law enforcement agencies are 
facing, agency executives are struggling to maintain their authorized staffing levels and 
have expressed that it is increasingly difficult to compete for the ideal candidates who show 
a high aptitude for service-oriented policing and an unfaltering respect for civil rights. As 
a result, executives and personnel management staff must be more proactive and more 
creative in their pursuit of candidates. The guide addresses these challenges with several 
recommendations, including the following: 

 Agencies must recruit, hire, and promote personnel in a manner that best ensures that 
officers throughout the ranks reflect the communities that they serve. Many agencies 
have worked diligently to recruit and retain personnel from groups who have historically 
been underrepresented in law enforcement. While improvements have been made in 
the recruitment of ethnic and racial minorities and women in many departments, police 
executives must continue to work closely with their local governments and communities 
to devise specific strategies to diversify their police agencies. Improved community trust 
and confidence in the agency and better insights into the community from within the 
agency are among the benefits of such strategies. 

 Agencies should start the recruitment process early. Many agencies have found that they 
can bring in quality applicants by fostering familiarity with the agency and identifying 
young candidates with a predisposition to a career in law enforcement. Many agencies 
find some of their most promising candidates, for instance, among members of police 
explorer troops and participants in Police Athletic Leagues. Departments not currently 
doing so should consider sponsoring such activities for the specific recruitment benefits, 
as well as the overall benefit gained through enhanced community outreach and building 
trust with the youthful members of the community. 

 Agencies should consider changing maximum age restrictions. While agencies must look 
to our youth for future recruits, many are recognizing the strengths that experienced 
adults can bring to law enforcement. Numerous agencies, motivated in part by a 
commitment to community policing and in part by a move away from action-oriented 
recruitment, have increased their maximum age restrictions or done away with them 
altogether. Changing the maximum age restriction welcomes persons with more maturity 
and life experience who may be better prepared to deal effectively with the stress inherent 
in policing, be less likely to engage in impulsive actions, and who can serve as mentors to 
younger recruits. 

Data Management 

Effective law enforcement leaders collect and analyze volumes of data to enhance their 
management practices. The policing profession has made tremendous progress in 
information technology and information-driven management during the last decade. 
Relying increasingly on CompStat models and problem-oriented policing approaches, law 



enforcement leaders have made real progress in measuring crime and disorder and in 
tracking traditional policing actions such as citations issued, arrests made, and clearance 
ratios. Increasingly, agencies data-management practices are becoming more innovative and 
are more often addressing community engagement and civil rights protection as outcome 
measures. As many agencies are now enhancing their reliance on data collection and analysis 
in these areas, the guide offers the following recommendations: 

 Agencies should publicly share data that reflect community policing efforts and key civil 
rights issues. Many agencies have become more open and transparent in their efforts to 
share data with the public. It is now more common, for instance, for agencies to provide 
summary data about their use-of-force deployments or about their receiving, processing, 
and disposing of citizen-generated complaints. While agencies must maintain the privacy 
and confidentiality of individual officers and civilians involved in the process, sharing 
such data in aggregated form or in sanitized case synopses builds community trust and 
can help initiate and inform joint problem-solving strategies. Agencies are increasingly 
tabulating and publishing data about positive civilian-police interactions, including 
participation in community policing meetings or citizen police academies. These data are 
often shared with the public through agency web sites or annual reports and can used 
to target outreach to particular communities that may not yet be sufficiently engaged in 
partnership with the police. 
  Agencies must recognize that sharing data with the public carries certain risks and 
involves certain responsibilities. Agencies sharing data publicly must make certain to put 
all data in context and discuss the limitations inherent in the collection of administrative 
data. Data, taken out of context, can be misleading. Law enforcement agencies must be 
very deliberate in their data-sharing strategies. An increase or decrease in the number of 
citizen complaints filed, for instance, may reflect positive or negative changes in officers 
behavior. These statistical trends, however, may also reflect changes in department 
policies or in practices governing the complaint process. When agencies take steps to 
make the complaint process more open and accessible, e.g., through allowing complaints 
to be filed on the web, they should expect the number of complaints filed to increase. 
Management should be prepared to explain the reasons for these policy-driven increases 
and turn them into opportunities for improving public relations, community outreach, and 
agency assessment. 

A Continuing Effort 

To some observers, the era of civil rights ended in the 1960s. To others, the equation for 
balancing civil rights against public safety and security concerns changed abruptly following 
the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Clearly, todays law enforcement executives are 
confronted with challenges that they have never before faced and perhaps never imagined. 
Technology, tactics, laws, and political policies will continually evolve and have an impact 
on civil rights. While an understanding of historical and contextual factors is important, what 
remains constant is the fact that law enforcement leaders must keep abreast of promising 
practices in the areas where policing and civil rights intersect, all while remaining loyal to 



the constitutional rights guaranteed to the public they are sworn to serve. This guide was 
designed with these objectives in mind, but also with the recognition that the issue of civil 
rights in law enforcement is not static. 

The IACP is committed to remaining at the forefront of civil rights issues, including efforts to 
help devise better ways to measure police success. Success must be broadly assessed and 
recognized as more than just crime reduction. Success must also be recognized as service 
to the public, adherence to the democratic principles of openness and transparency, and 
faithfulness to the direct role that law enforcement plays in protecting and promoting civil 
rights. Law enforcements use of evolving technologyincluding the use of conducted energy 
devices (CED, commonly referenced under the brand name Taser) and the use of hot-spot 
mapping to identify areas for concentrated enforcementare giving rise to new civil rights 
issues that the IACP is intent on tracking. Changes in funding priorities, shifting paradigms 
about policing, and new challenges will continue to evolve. Accordingly, the IACP recognizes 
that Protecting Civil Rights is a living document, one that will require periodic updates. 


Contents

Acknowledgements ................................................................... i
Executive Summary ................................................................ vii

Chapter One ; Protecting Civil Rights: A Leadership Guide for State, 
Local, and Tribal Law Enforcement .................................................. 1
Introduction ....................................................................... 1 
The Origins of the Leadership Guide ................................................ 3 
Federal Investigation and Oversight of Pattern or Practice Violations .............. 4 
Additional Federal Assistance: The Community Relations Service .................... 13 
Proactively Protecting Civil Rights: Creating a Culture Bound by Rules ............ 19 
Overview of Chapters .............................................................. 20 
Sources of Information ............................................................ 23 

Chapter Two: Sustaining Community Outreach and Engagement: The Intersection 
of Civil Rights and Community Policing ............................................ 27
Introduction ...................................................................... 27 
Chapter Overview and Objectives ................................................... 27 
A Definition of Community Policing ................................................ 28 
The Evolution of Community Policing in a Post9/11 Era ............................ 29 
The Prevalence of Community Policing .............................................. 31 
Promising Practices: Protecting and Promoting Civil Rights through 
Community Policing Strategies ..................................................... 33 
Conclusion ........................................................................ 44 
Suggestions for Further Reading ................................................... 44 

Chapter Three: Developing an Early Intervention Strategy .......................... 49
Introduction ...................................................................... 49 
Chapter Overview and Objectives ................................................... 49 
A Definition of Early Intervention ................................................ 50 
The Evolution of Early Intervention ............................................... 50 
The Prevalence of Early Intervention .............................................. 52 
The Benefits of Early Intervention ................................................ 52 
Basic Components of Early Intervention Systems .................................... 55 
Indicators: The Foundation of Early Interventions Systems ......................... 56 
Acting on Indicators: The Workings of Early Intervention Systems .................. 58 
Integration of Early Intervention Systems into Comprehensive Personnel 
Assessment Systems ................................................................ 67 
Identifying Exemplary Performers .................................................. 68 
Moving Beyond Individual Assessment ............................................... 68 
Unit and Agencywide Assessment .................................................... 68 
 

Assessment over Time .............................................................. 69
Recommendations ................................................................... 69
Conclusion ........................................................................ 76
Suggestions for Further Reading.................................................... 76

Chapter Four: Managing the Complaint Process ...................................... 81
Introduction ...................................................................... 81
Chapter Overview and Objectives ................................................... 81 
A Definition of the Civilian Complaint Process .................................... 82
The Evolution of the Civilian Complaint Process ................................... 82
The Prevalence of the Civilian Complaint Process .................................. 85
The Benefits of the Civilian Complaint Process .................................... 86
The Core Principles of the Complaint Process ...................................... 86
Variations in the Civilian Complaint Process ...................................... 90
Assessing Civilian Involvement in the Complaint Process ........................... 90
A Typology of Complaint Processes Based on Citizen ................................ 91
Considerations for Civilian Review in Complaint Processing ........................ 93
Statistical Snapshot of Civilian Involvement in the Complaint Review 
Processes ......................................................................... 93
The Basic Steps in Handling Civilian and Internal Complaints ...................... 94
CEnsuring Accountability in the Complaint Process ................................ 102
Recommendations .................................................................. 106
Conclusion ....................................................................... 109
Suggestions for Further Reading .................................................. 109

Chapter Five: Managing Use of Force .............................................. 113
Introduction ..................................................................... 113
Chapter Overview and Objectives .................................................. 114
Issues in Defining Use-of-Force .................................................. 115
Use-of-Force Continuum ........................................................... 119
Near Universal Prevalence of Use-of-Force Policies ............................... 126
Evolutions in UseofForce Policies .............................................. 127
CCore Components of Effective Management of Use-of-Force ......................... 127
Recommendations .................................................................. 145
Conclusion ....................................................................... 148
Suggestions for Further Reading .................................................. 148

Chapter Six: Addressing Racial Profiling: Creating a Comprehensive 
Commitment to Bias-Free Policing ................................................. 153 
Introduction ..................................................................... 153
Chapter Overview and Objectives .................................................. 154
Differing Definitions of Racial Profiling ........................................ 155
The Prevalence of Efforts to Address Racial Profiling ............................ 159
Multiple Motivations for Addressing Racial Profiling ............................. 160
Core Components for Addressing and Preventing Racial Profiling ................... 161


Beyond the Basic Components: Considering Racial Profiling Data 
Collection and Analysis .......................................................... 168 
Steps in Data Collection and Analysis Process .................................... 173 
Recommendations .................................................................. 185 
Conclusion ....................................................................... 188 
Suggestions for Further Reading .................................................. 189 

Chapter Seven: Personnel Management Issues in the Context of Protecting 
Civil Rights and Serving the Community ........................................... 193
Introduction ..................................................................... 193 
Chapter Overview and Objectives .................................................. 194 
Recommendations .................................................................. 194 
Conclusion ....................................................................... 206 
Suggestions for Further Reading .................................................. 206 

Chapter Eight: DataManagement Issues in the Context of Protecting 
Civil Rights and Serving the Community ........................................... 209
Introduction ..................................................................... 209 
Chapter Overview and Objectives .................................................. 210 
Data Management Issues Raised in Preceding Chapters .............................. 210 
Rationales for Expanding Data Collection and Analysis by Including 
Nontraditional Data .............................................................. 212 
The Importance of Context in Analyzing Data Trends ............................... 213 
Recommendations .................................................................. 216 
Conclusion ....................................................................... 230 
Suggestions for Further Reading .................................................. 231 

Appendixes 
Appendix A: IACP Civil Rights Committee .......................................... 235
Appendix B: IACP Professional Standards Committee ................................ 238
Appendix C: Project Advisory Group ............................................... 239
Appendix D: Project Focus Group .................................................. 241
Appendix E: Community Relations Service U.S. Department of 
Justice .......................................................................... 242 


I. Protecting Civil Rights: ALeadership Guide for State,Local, and Tribal LawEnforcement 



Protecting Civil Rights: A Leadership Guide 
for State, Local, and Tribal Law Enforcement 

We must scrupulously guard the civil rights and civil liberties of all citizens, whatever their 
background. We must remember that any oppression, any injustice, any hatred is a wedge 
designed to attack our civilization.1 

President Franklin Delano Roosevelt 

Introduction 

Civil rights are the rights and freedoms that every person possesses. In the United States, these 
rights are embodied in the United States Constitution, in numerous amendments, and by acts 
of Congress. Although these rights are based on the federal constitution, the 14th Amendment 
makes them applicable to the states. Civil rights are often categorized into rights of due process, 
equal protection under the law, and freedom from discrimination. Perhaps the most famous 
and influential civil rights act, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, extended civil rights protection by 
making discrimination because of race, color, national origin, or religion unlawful in federally 
funded entities and other enterprises such as employment, education, housing and public 
accommodations. Under this act, any state or local government or public interest that receives 
federal funding is required to abide by this law. While civil rights and minority rights have a clear 
and important historical association, civil rights in the broadest perspective are basic human 
rights to which all in our society are entitled. 

Law enforcement agencies have the ethical and legal imperative to abide by and uphold civil 
rights. Indeed, when sworn to duty, police officers commit to uphold the foundation of our 
civil rightsthe United States Constitution. This commitment is embodied, for instance, in the 
model oath of honor adopted by resolution at the 107th Annual Conference of the International 
Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) in 2000: 

On my honor, I will never betray my badge, my integrity, my character, or the public trust. 
I will always have the courage to hold myself and others accountable for our actions. I will 
always uphold the Constitution, my community, and the agency I serve.2 

Ideally, all law enforcement officers and agencies uphold their commitment to protect and 
promote civil rights while enforcing the law. They do this not only because it is an ethical and 
legal imperative, but because it is a practical imperative as well. From a community outreach 
perspective, many law enforcement leaders assert that officers who steadfastly protect and 
promote civil rights succeed where others do not. A fundamental commitment to protecting 
civil rights is good policy: it is good for the police, good for the community, and good for 
maintaining the partnerships that exist between the two. 

The core principle of this guide is that effective law enforcement and the protection of civil 
rights are complementary pillars for policing in a democratic society. Law enforcement 

 


leaders who understand this principle will not fall into the trap of believing that effective law 
enforcement has to come at the expense of civil rights protection. 

Despite the ethical, legal, and practical imperatives to protect civil rights, officers occasionally 
abrogate their oaths. When this occurswhen officers unwittingly or intentionally violate 
citizens civil rightslaw enforcement leaders must take action. Law enforcement leaders 
must assume the final responsibility for ensuring that officers uphold their oath of office. This 
responsibility requires clear commitment and constant vigilance. Law enforcement leaders 
must address every isolated civil rights violation, or these acts may escalate into widespread 
patterns or practices that will undermine the credibility of the agency and erode public trust 
and confidence. 

This is a challenging responsibility. In fact, during the last decade, 14 law enforcement 
agencies have been investigated and have subsequently come under federally imposed 
monitoring for alleged patterns or practices of civil rights violations. While these 14 
agencies represent but an infinitesimal fraction of the countrys nearly 18,000 state, county, 
local, and tribal law enforcement agencies, the impact of the investigations has been 
profound and far-reaching. Protecting Civil Rights: A Leadership Guide for State, Local, and 
Tribal Law Enforcement is, in part, about how lessons learned by agencies under this federal 
oversight process can be used to enhance the learning of other law enforcement agencies. 

There is much to learn. The experiences of the agencies that have been investigated and 
of those that, as a result, now operate under federal consent decrees or memorandums of 
agreement (MOA) are compelling. Although facing the scrutiny of a federal investigation and 
possibly a protracted period of monitoring can be daunting, many law enforcement leaders 
have responded constructively to the realities of federal oversight. These chief executives 
have revitalized their organizations commitments to civil rights. Other law enforcement 
leaders have even recognized the process as a catalyst to bring about positive and necessary 
change. Indeed, several pattern or practice investigation requests were initiated by police 
chiefs. 

Other agencies are learning lessons about civil rights protection as well. During the same 
decade that these 14 agencies have been under federal investigation or have been monitored 
for patterns or practices of civil rights violations, other departments have been addressing 
challenging civil rights issues on their own. In many of the latter agencies, executives have 
worked to protect citizens civil rights by proactively enacting sound policies, comprehensive 
training, improved methods of supervision, and more effective systems of accountability. 
Through these means, law enforcement leaders have identified and responded to challenges 
such as the excessive use of force, racial profiling, and other forms of police misconduct. In 
part, Protecting Civil Rights is also intended to communicate those lessons learned by law 
enforcement agencies and communities that have benefited from such proactive leadership. 

In summary, Protecting Civil Rights offers lessons learned from law enforcement leaders 
and agencies who have taken reactive and/or proactive steps to protect and promote civil 
rights throughout their communities. This guide recognizes that the motivation to take these 
steps emerges out of visionary leadership, but must be continually reinforced by internal and 
external accountability mechanisms. 

 


The Origins of the Leadership Guide 

Protecting Civil Rights originated in a series of discussions among representatives from the 

U.S. Department of Justice Civil Rights Division-Special Litigation Section (SPL), the Office 
of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS), and the IACP. These discussions revealed 
a shared visionthat the accumulated knowledge resulting from pattern and practice 
investigations and agreements could provide valuable lessons for law enforcement executives 
who want to take proactive measures to assure that effective law enforcement, public 
safety, and the protection of civil rights are complementary missions within their agencies. 
Accordingly, the guides recommendations are largely the result of analysis of the provisions 
imbedded in the consent decrees and MOAs themselves. These mandates reflect the insights 
of intensive and long-term investigations into civil rights violations. Project staff relied heavily 
on these agreements to help ensure that this guide is comprehensive and responsive to the 
full range of areas in which civil rights violations can occur. 

Simultaneously, however, project advisors and staff recognized that the efforts of agencies 
proactively and effectively engaged in the protection and promotion of civil rights would be 
an equally important source of insight. In searching out insights among agencies that were 
not forced to reform as a result of federal intervention, staff and advisors quickly learned that 
the distinction between proactive and reactive reform was an oversimplification. Some 
agencies that initially reacted to federal investigations undertook reforms that went beyond 
the demands of their federal requirements. Accordingly, Protecting Civil Rights draws on 
lessons learned by agencies across the spectrum, including agencies that have dealt with civil 
rights protection either proactively, reactively, or both. 

The advisors and staff of Protecting Civil Rights encountered dedicated advocates of civil 
rights protections among the leaders in many agencies, including those under federal civil 
rights agreements. In some agencies operating under consent decrees and MOAs, new, 
reform-minded leaders were intent on resolving the problems that they had inherited and 
that had given rise to the investigations. In other agencies, existing executives responded 
positively to the direction and assistance that federal intervention made available. The efforts 
of all agency leaders to protect and promote civil rights are sources of insight. 

Accordingly, this introduction to Protecting Civil Rights will familiarize the reader with the 
processes by which agencies protect and promote civil rights. First, it will acquaint the reader 
with the process by which agencies with alleged pattern or practice civil rights violations are 
investigated and monitored. Then, it will review the general resources and strategies available 
to and used by all departments committed to protecting and promoting civil rights. Such 
information should enable readers to make practical use of subsequent substantive chapters 
on community policing, early intervention, the complaint process, use of force, racial profiling, 
and personnel and data management issues. This introduction will conclude with an overview 
of these individual chapters. 

 


Federal Investigation and Oversight of Pattern or Practice Violations 

The following section offers an overview of the federal role in investigation and oversight of 
pattern or practice civil rights violations. This specialized area of federal intervention focuses 
on the conduct of law enforcement agencies and is distinct from processes that address civil 
rights actions against individuals in law enforcement. Federal investigations and oversight in 
response to allegations of agencies patterns or practices of violating civil rights are relatively 
recent phenomena that have evolved rapidly over the last decade. 

Origins 

Federal intervention on behalf of law enforcement agencies allegedly exhibiting a pattern or 
practice of civil rights violations began in 1994. The enabling language came from the Violent 
Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, a multifaceted and far-ranging crime bill 
perhaps best known for its authorization of federal funding to put 100,000 new police officers 
on the street. Although other facets of the actincluding a federal version of the three-
strikes-rule, an expansion of the list of federal crimes eligible for the death penalty, and 
an increase in funding for services and enhancement of prosecution in the area of violence 
against womenwere relatively well known, Section 14141, one of the lesser known facets 
of the 1994 act, expanded the role of the United States Attorney General to affect remediation 
of systematic misconduct by state or local law enforcement agencies, so-called patterns or 
practices. The relevant sections of the act follow: 

United State Code 

Title 42 - The Public Health And Welfare 
Chapter 136 - Violent Crime Control And Law Enforcement 
Subchapter Ix - State And Local Law Enforcement 
Part B - Police Pattern or Practice

(a) Unlawful conduct 

It shall be unlawful for any governmental authority, or any agent thereof, or any person 
acting on behalf of a governmental authority, to engage in a pattern or practice of 
conduct by law enforcement officers or by officials or employees of any governmental 
agency with responsibility for the administration of juvenile justice or the incarceration of 
juveniles that deprives persons of rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by 
the Constitution or laws of the United States. 

(b) Civil action by Attorney General 

Whenever the Attorney General has reasonable cause to believe that a violation of 
paragraph [a] has occurred, the Attorney General, for or in the name of the United States, 
may in a civil action obtain appropriate equitable and declaratory relief to eliminate the 
pattern or practice.3 



The Definition of Pattern or Practice 

Section 14141, which makes government agencies directly responsible for unlawful conduct 
of their employees if that behavior rises to the level of a pattern or practice, was considered 
precedent setting. Individual actions of law enforcement officers that constitute civil rights 
violations have long been actionable in federal courts under Title 42, Chapter 21  1983. The 
1994 act, however, gave the U.S. Department of Justice authority to hold law enforcement 
agencies responsible when individual actions formed a pattern of misconduct or were part 
of systematic practices underlying the misconduct. 

Federal courts have defined the meaning of pattern or practice. According to a Supreme 
Court ruling in an employment discrimination case based on the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
the term pattern or practice is not to be construed as a term of art, but rather as words 
[that] reflect only their usual meaning.4The Court indicated that these words were intended 
to apply only where the denial of rights consists of something more than an isolated, 
sporadic incident, but is repeated, routine, or of a generalized nature.5 

Based on Section 14141, federal courts can order local or state government agencies to 
eliminate patterns or practices deemed unlawful. Two criteria must be met for a case to be 
actionable under Section 14141. First, as discussed, the alleged misconduct must constitute 
a pattern or practice, not just individual or sporadic acts. Second, that misconduct, if proved 
true, must constitute a violation of federally protected civil rights. 

Federal Investigation and Oversight Responsibility 

In response to the 1994 act, the Special Litigation Section (SPL) of the Civil Rights Division 
(officially abbreviated as CRT)6 of the Department of Justice was given the responsibility 
of reviewing and investigating alleged misconduct and enforcing Section 14141. One of 
12 sections of the CRT, the SPL is responsible for enforcing federal civil rights pattern or 
practices in the following four areas:7 

(1) Conditions of institutional confinement. 

(2) Law enforcement misconduct. 

(3) Access to reproductive health facilities and places of religious worship. 

(4) Protection of institutionalized persons religious exercise rights.8 

For the purposes of this guide, we are concerned with pattern or practice violations as 
they relate specifically to law enforcement misconduct. The Civil Rights Divisions web site 
describes the SPLs work in this area as follows: 

The Special Litigation Section enforces the police misconduct provision of the Violent 
Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, which authorizes the Attorney General 
to seek equitable and declaratory relief to redress a pattern or practice of illegal conduct by 
law enforcement agencies or agencies responsible for the administration of juvenile justice. 
The Section also enforces the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, which 
authorizes the Attorney General to initiate civil litigation to remedy a pattern or practice of 
discrimination based on race, color national origin, gender or religion involving services by 
law enforcement agencies receiving financial assistance from the Department of Justice.9 

 


The SPL is located in Washington, D.C., but occasionally acts in coordination with regional 

U.S. Attorneys offices. All Section 14141 reviews are civil actions, not criminal. This does not 
preclude the fact that criminal actions, initiated by another component of the Department of 
Justice or local authorities, may be simultaneously directed at individuals for specific acts. 

Patterns or Practices Addressed 

On the basis of the 1994 act as well as other such acts, the CRT has addressed an array of 
alleged pattern or practice violations. The CRT has addressed patterns including, but not 
limited to, the following: 

 Unlawful or excessive force, including unjustified use of deadly and nondeadly force 
 Racial profiling or discriminatory enforcement based on race, ethnicity, gender, or other 
group status 
 False arrests 
 Harassment of civilians in retaliation for reported misconduct 
 Illegal stops or searches 
 Intimidation. 

On the basis of the 1994 Act, the CRT has also addressed systematic practicesor the 
absences of practicesincluding the following: 

 Inadequate training on use of force and other law enforcement techniques 
 Inadequate supervision 
 Failure to adequately investigate allegations of officer misconduct 
 Failure to address misconduct through appropriate means (e.g., training, retraining, 
discipline, or other forms of intervention). 

The Stages of Federal Investigation and Oversight 

The process that the CRT and, in particular, the SPL use to address alleged pattern or practice 
violations can be understood as a series of steps that parallel, in many ways, the processes 
that law enforcement agencies themselves use in the investigations they carry out. Although 
federal investigatory processes are guided by clear legal standards, they often are quite 
fluid. In fact, both the investigatory processes and the resolution depend on the nature of the 
allegations. Investigatory processes may also be affected by the level of cooperation provided 
by the agency under investigation and may vary as the findings of the investigation unfold. In 
reality, the investigation and resolution of every pattern or practice case conducted by the CRT 
have been unique. Not only have they been individually shaped by the nature of allegations, 
findings, and agency responses, but the CRTs response to investigating and responding 
to pattern or practice allegations during the last decade has quite naturally evolved. When 
compared to other legal traditions in the United States, pattern or practice investigations and 
the resulting oversight of law enforcement agencies are still developing. 

As a result, detailing a standard set of circumstances that will suggest definitively when 
an agency can expect a federal investigation or how that investigation will proceed is not 
possible. However, common stages and general patterns within the investigatory process 
have been established. The following discussion outlines five stages in the investigation and 

 


resolution of federal pattern or practice complaints, and identifies some of the variations that 
may occur as such investigations unfold. 

Stage 1: Alleged Activities Come to Light 

Federal investigations of the past decade reveal that allegations of pattern or practice violations 
may come to the attention of the SPL in a variety of ways. The SPL may be apprised of police 
misconduct allegations through complaints brought directly by individuals, advocacy groups, 
local political officials, police personnel, or local prosecutors. In addition, allegations of civil 
rights violations may come to the attention of the CRT through the media or through civil or 
criminal suits filed in local or federal courts. Oftentimes a combination of allegations and events 
give rise to the CRTs involvement. The following examples demonstrate the variety of ways in 
which the CRT is alerted of the need for investigation: 

 The investigation of the Pittsburgh Bureau of Police stemmed from a 1996 lawsuit filed 
by the American Civil Liberties Union on behalf of the NAACP, a community group called 
Parents Against Violence, and 66 individuals alleging various forms of police misconduct. 

 The investigation of the Prince Georges (Maryland) County Police Department followed 
a series of incidents, including a number of high-profile shootings, instances in which 
suspects and bystanders were bitten by canines, and a number of large jury awards. 
The incidents, dating to 1995, sparked heated media and public attention and resulted in 
investigation by the FBI and then the CRT. 

 In 1999, Washington, D.C. Mayor Anthony Williams and Chief Charles Ramsey of the 
Metropolitan Police Department requested an investigation of the department to assess 
potential patterns of excessive use of force. 

 In 2002, Mayor Charles Luken of Cincinnati requested that CRT review the police 
departments use of force. The mayors request came after several days of civic unrest 
following a police-involved shooting. 

Stage 2: Initial Assessment 

During an initial assessment, the CRT determines whether it has authority to pursue the 
case that has come to its attention. In this stage of the process, the primary objective of CRT 
attorneys is to determine whether a particular allegation would constitute a federal pattern or 
practice violation if it were proven true. CRT staff gathers relevant information from a variety of 
sources. Specifically, CRT staff may attempt to obtain information from the complainant or may 
access media sources to determine whether patterns of violations are evident. CRT staff may 
also obtain information about civil suits, criminal proceedings, or legal documents related to the 
underlying complaint. For instance, if concerns were raised about a pattern of excessive use of 
force, CRT staff would obtain relevant public documents. CRT staff may also interview persons 
whose civil rights were allegedly violated as well as advocacy or special interest groups. In 
accord with various state laws, CRT staff will not interview police personnel at this stage. 

When an initial assessment does not produce evidence tending to support the existence of a 
pattern or practice violation, the preliminary inquiry is closed.10 When an initial assessment 
does discover evidence that tends to support the allegation, internal memoranda, subjected 
to a thorough, multistage review, are prepared. These memoranda may culminate in a 
recommendation from the head of SPL within the CRT to the Assistant Attorney General (AAG) 

 


seeking to investigate. The AAG makes a final determination about whether to proceed with a 
formal pattern or practice investigation. 

Stage 3: Formal Investigation 

The formal investigation begins when CRT notifies the jurisdiction that a pattern or practice 
investigation will take place. This notification typically takes the form of a letter to the agencys 
legal counsel, most often preceded by a telephone call. At this stage, CRT investigations 
become comprehensive and far-reaching. Investigations routinely include the following: 

 An inventory and thorough assessments of an agencys relevant policies and procedures 

 A review of training documents and practices 

 A review of accountability and disciplinary practices 

 An assessment of routine police activities, including direct observation of training sessions 
and participation in patrol ride-alongs 

 A request for and a review of relevant forms, such as use-of-force report forms and citizen 
complaint forms 

 During the formal investigation, in-depth interviews are typically conducted with police 
command staff and all relevant stakeholders, which typically include rank-and-file 
officers, police union representatives, and parties who believe they were subject to police 
misconduct. The parties interviewed are not necessarily limited to the complainants. 

A Two-Part Process 
The formal investigation typically falls into two phases. The first phase focuses on the 
collection of available documentation in the form of policies and procedures as well as 
interviews with rank-and-file officers. Once this phase is completed, the second phase 
begins as CRT staff request relevant documents about police behaviors and actions being 
investigated. Documents requested could include those such as use-of-force reports, arrest 
reports, or citizen complaint forms. They may also request documentation of investigatory 
proceedings related to use-of-force or misconduct investigations. 

While awaiting the receipt of the requested forms and internal investigatory reports, CRT staff 
routinely complete a technical assistance letter. This letter outlines the findings of the first 
phase of the formal investigation and makes recommendations. This letter, however, does not 
determine whether a pattern or practice of civil rights violations has occurred. 

Technical Assistance Letters 

Regardless of whether an investigation results in a finding of a pattern or practice violation, 
the CRT spends considerable time conducting investigation, particularly in assessing agency 
policies and practices and in engaging the technical assistance of experienced police practice 
consultants. The CRT routinely provides technical assistance letters to agencies while 
they are under investigation. In effect, these letters itemize the deficiencies found during 
the investigation and make recommendations about remedies. This technical assistance 
goes beyond a focus on policies and practices to address issues such as supervision and 

 

accountability. Since technical assistance letters are offered before the formal investigation is 
completed and before final determinations are made, they carry no implication as to whether 
a pattern or practice violation has occurred. In essence, city officials, police chiefs, and city 
attorneys are being notified of areas of deficiency that do not necessarily reach the threshold 
of unconstitutionality. 

As pattern or practice investigations have evolved over the last 10 years, CRT has relied 
more heavily on subject matter consultants with direct law enforcement experience, and 
has provided technical assistance letters and exit interviews throughout the course of 
the investigation, rather than just at the end. This reflects a conscious shift toward more 
transparency in the investigation process and has resulted in a greater emphasis on technical 
assistance as opposed to relying solely on adversarial legal processes. 

Tone of Formal Investigations 
Although the investigation is formal, at this point the cooperation of the department under 
investigation is voluntary. Departments are under no legal obligation to cooperate, and the 
CRT has no subpoena power at this stage. 

During the decade that the CRT has been involved in these investigations, the level of 
cooperation received from departments has varied. Some departments have been highly 
compliant to requests for information and, in these instances, the tone of the investigation 
can be described as cooperative. Other departments have been resistant to the CRTs 
requests. Although, over the decade, the tone of the investigations has generally reflected a 
greater spirit of cooperation, the balance of power in the relationship between the CRT and 
the law enforcement agency clearly rests with the CRT. For its part, the CRT has increasingly 
relied on consultants in various areas of expertise with direct law enforcement experience 
to provide technical assistance.11 The CRT has also consciously shifted toward a more 
transparent investigatory process. 

It is important to note that an agencys failure to cooperate will not terminate the CRTs 
investigation. Instead, the investigation will continue and CRTs findings will be based on 
sources from outside the department who are willing to cooperate. 

It is also important to note that while agencies usually are not required to participate 
voluntarily in investigations, The Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 196812 
stipulates that agencies must cooperate if the allegation of pattern and practice is based on 
race. Agencies with federal funding risk losing their funding, depending on the outcome of a 
hearing. 

A Time-Relevant Process 
While past patterns or practices that formed the basis of the complaint are relevant for 
screening purposes, CRTs main objective in the investigation is to determine how the 
department is operating at the time of the investigation. In some instances, departments 



have already begun to make changes before or during CRTs formal investigation. If such 
is the case, CRT will acknowledge such progress and attempt to work with the department 
to build on these successes. Department cooperation can be recognized in letters from the 
CRT outlining investigatory findings. An excerpt from an investigatory findings letter to the 
Washington (D.C.) Metropolitan Police Department is illustrative. 

We recognize that in the past two years, MPD has achieved a significant reduction in the rate 
at which it uses deadly force and the rate at which its canines bite subjects. In 1998, eleven 
fatalities resulted from MPDs use of deadly force. Fatalities decreased to four in 1999 and to 
two in 2000. Due to important changes in its canine operations, over the same time period, 
canine bites have decreased from occurring approximately 70 percent of the time that canines 
are deployed to slightly over 20 percent.13 

Stage 4: Determination of Action 

Following the formal investigation, the CRT must determine whether a case is actionable. 
It makes this determination on the bases of the investigations findings and the steps 
that departments may have already taken to remedy civil rights violations. Three basic 
determinations are possible: 

1. No pattern or practice violation is found to exist at the time of the investigation. 

2. A pattern or practice violation is found to exist and the CRT and law enforcement agency 
come to a negotiated agreement involving the government entitymunicipality, county, or 
statewhich funds and oversees the law enforcement agency. 

3. A pattern or practice violation is found to exist and the CRT files a formal suit in federal 
court. 

The vast majority of pattern or practice investigations that have resulted in a determination 
of actionable civil rights violations have been resolved through negotiated agreements in the 
form of either a consent decree or an MOA. At present, 14 jurisdictions have been signatories 
to 16 separate consent decrees or MOAs. Several agencies now operate under two federal 
agreements. In June 2003, the Detroit Police entered into two separate consent judgments 
agreements analogous to consent decrees. One of these deals with issues regarding the use 
of force and one deals with arrest and detention policies and practices. In January 2004, the 
Prince Georges County Police Department entered into an MOA regarding the general use of 
force and a consent decree with respect to use of canines as a force option. 

To date, only one investigationinvolving the Columbus (Ohio) Division of Policehas 
resulted in a formal suit. Before being adjudicated, however, that suit was set aside after 
a letter of resolution was submitted by the mayor of Columbus that specified numerous 
remedies that the police department would undertake. In this particular case, the remedies 
set forth in this letter were considered acceptable by the Assistant Attorney General for Civil 
Rights. 
 


Consent Decrees and Memorandums of Agreement 

Whether an investigation results in a consent decree or an MOA, the basic outcome is an 
extensive list of provisions with which the agency promises to comply and for which a 
federally approved monitor provides oversight for a specified time period. In general terms, 
an MOA is an agreement between the department and the CRT that details specific remedies 
to correct the patterns and practices of civil rights violations found during the investigatory 
stage. A consent decree results in a similar set of specific remedies, but takes the form of 
a judicial decree. As stipulated in both consent decrees and MOAs, the law enforcement 
agency admits no fault or liability, but in effect agrees to cease certain practices and to 
engage in specified remedies. On its part, CRT asserts within the agreement that it is acting 
pursuant to Section 14141 in seeking declaratory or equitable relief to remedy a pattern or 
practice of conduct by law enforcement officers that deprives individuals of rights, privileges 
or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States.14 

In practice, the individual consent decrees and MOAs have been negotiated agreements 
involving the police agency, superseding government agency (e.g., the mayors or city 
managers office), and the Department of Justice. Some agreements, such as the MOA for 
the Buffalo Police Department, also include the police union as a signatory. Whether an 
investigation culminates in a consent decree or MOA may depend on a variety of factors. 
Included among these is the likelihood that compliance can be achieved cooperatively and 
with full support from within the department and city leaders. If an agency has demonstrated 
cooperation and progress in remedying problems during the investigatory phase, the CRT 
may determine that an MOA is a better vehicle to co-facilitate reform. Flexibility in this 
process of determination allows the CRT to respond to particular circumstances. In the case 
of the Prince Georges County Police Department, for instance, the investigation of excessive 
force resulted in two agreements. An MOA was signed with provisions on general use-of-force 
policies, training, and accountability while a separate consent decree was signed to 
address policies, training, and accountability specifically related to canines as a use-of-force 
option. 

Stage 5: Independent Monitoring 

Consent decrees and MOAs generally establish a period of formal and systematic federal 
monitoring of the law enforcement agency investigated. In fact, all existing consent 
decrees and MOAs have resulted in such oversight. Ideally, the independent monitoring or 
auditing function is held by a mutually agreeable person. In the case of consent decrees, if 
parties cannot arrive at a mutually agreeable person within a reasonable period, the court 
determines the appropriate monitor from a list provided by the parties. In the case of MOAs, 
the process is similar, but is not decided by the court. For instance, the MOA may include 
provisions that an independent third party, rather than the court, should resolve any impasse 
in selecting a mutually agreeable monitor. 



Because of the extensive authority, influence, and responsibility that this monitor will hold, 
the fact that an agency has a role to veto a monitor can be crucial. The authority and key 
responsibilities of the monitor include, but are not limited to, the following: 

 The monitor is to be given access to all relevant documentation, including policy directives 
and training material bearing on the provisions. 

 The monitor is to be given access to records and data systems to assess compliance and 
conduct quality assurance analysis. This may include access to use-of-force reporting 
forms and the early warning system. 

 The monitor is to be given access to department personnel for purpose of assessing 
compliance. 

 The monitor is to report on a regular basis regarding the agencys compliance with each 
provision articulated in the consent decree or MOA. 

As with the investigatory process and the drafting of agreements, independent monitoring 
is guided by clear policies that allow for some level of flexibility. In several agreements the 
role of the monitor has included both oversight and consultative services. Indeed, technical 
assistance is often formally included as part of federal agreements. This is illustrated by the 
following excerpt from the Steubenville (Ohio) Police Department consent decree: 

The auditor shall offer the City technical assistance in coming into compliance with this 
Decree, including with: policy development, forms, training, management information 
systems. The auditor shall perform the policy review function specified in the Decree, and 
also shall audit and evaluate compliance with the Decree.15 

An experienced monitor can help the department make sense of the complex and extensive 
provisions of the consent decree or MOA by breaking them down into a comprehensible and 
actionable set of steps. Most important, a cooperative and constructive relationship among 
the law enforcement agency, the independent monitor, and the Department of Justice can 
help set the foundation for continued accountability once the federal agreement has been 
terminated and monitoring is no longer taking place. 

Duration of Federal Investigation and Oversight 

Federal investigations and the resulting monitoring are labor-intensive for departments 
and for the CRT. Still, the Department of Justice seeks to complete investigations and its 
monitoring function in a responsible and timely manner. The DOJ web site, last updated in 
January 2003, states that the CRT will attempt to complete investigations within 18 months 
from the time it begins the formal investigation.16 The document further states, however, that 
this length of time can be affected by the complexity of the case, the existence and quality of 
related documentation within the agency, and the degree of cooperation. In some instances, 
cooperation may actually serve to lengthen the investigatory phase. If the agency has begun 
to implement meaningful reforms that may bear on its patterns or practices, the CRT may 
wish to wait until those reforms have taken effect before concluding its investigation and 
making a final determination. Other factors may also lengthen the duration of an investigation. 
For instance, if separate criminal investigations are underway, the SPL may defer to that 
investigation and wait for it to be completed before commencing its investigation. 
 

 

The minimal length of time for which monitoring must take place and the conditions that 
must be met before federal monitoring is terminated are specified in detail in the language of 
the consent decrees or MOAs. The exact conditions of monitoring have evolved over the time 
that pattern or practice have been in use. The first consent decree, signed in Pittsburgh in 
December 1999, established the following provisions regarding federal oversight: 

At any time after five (5) years from the date of entry of this Decree, and after substantial 
compliance has been maintained for no less than two years, the City may move to terminate 
this Decree. Any motion to terminate must detail all aspects of the Citys compliance with 
each provision of this Decree, supported by affidavits and supporting documentation.17 

While the next two consent decrees, those with the Steubenville (Ohio) Police Department 
and the New Jersey State Police, followed this precedent, subsequent agreements have 
reduced the minimal time of required oversight. For instance, the Prince Georges County 
(Maryland) Police Department consent decree, signed in January 2004, stipulated a 3-year 
follow-up period with 2 years of substantial compliance. 

The Potential Benefits of Federal Investigation and Oversight 

The CRTs investigation and monitoring processes are structured but do afford a certain 
amount of fluidity that can be of benefit to individual agencies and prudent leaders. As civil 
rights violation investigations proceed, these investigations can develop into cooperative 
processes in which CRT staff and consultants with law enforcement expertise provide needed 
technical assistance to the agency. Some law enforcement leaders actually find that meeting 
the CRT half way and facing the realities of reform is a necessary and productive, though 
not necessarily easy, path. The Pittsburgh Bureau of Police was the first agency to emerge 
from federal monitoring under Section 14141. It has been widely acclaimed for its success. 
The study, Turning Necessity into Virtue: Pittsburghs Experience with a Federal Consent 
Decree, chronicles how the department effectively managed the oversight process. This 
report found that Pittsburgh Bureau of Police went beyond the spirit of the agreement in Its 
implementation of comprehensive early intervention system that improved policing practice 
and helped to ensure protection of civil rights.18 

Additional Federal Assistance: The Community Relations Service 

Other forms of federal assistance are available to agencies committed to addressing civil 
rights challenges, problems, or concerns. In fact, law enforcement agencies need not reach 
the crisis of a pattern or practice violation or a community demonstration alleging biased 
based policing before seeking out the aid of the federal government. Another division of 
the Department of Justice is empowered to assist individual law enforcement officials, 
community leaders, or advocacy groups to deal with civil rights-related issues 

This division, the Community Relations Service (CRS), has had substantial experience in 
bringing police agencies and communities together where racial conflict, the potential 
for violence, or actual violence related to race, color, or national origin have inhibited 
cooperation. Since its inception more than 4 decades ago (1964), CRS has facilitated 
hundreds of mediation agreements designed to resolve civil rights conflicts between 

 

communities and local and state entities, including law enforcement agencies. CRS operates 
10 regional offices and 4 field offices across the country. CRS services are free, neutral, and 
confidential. The work takes place in accordance with its mission statement, available on the 
CRS web site (www.usdoj.gov/crs): 

The Community Relations Service is the [U.S. Justice] Departments peacemaker for 
community conflicts and tensions arising from differences of race, color, and national origin. 
Created by the Civil Rights Act of 1964, CRS is the only Federal agency dedicated to assist 
State and local units of government, private and public organizations, and community groups 
with preventing and resolving racial and ethnic tensions, incidents, and civil disorders, and 
in restoring racial stability and harmony. CRS facilitates the development of viable, mutual 
understandings and agreements as alternatives to coercion, violence, or litigation. It also 
assists communities in developing local mechanisms, conducting training, and other proactive 
measures to prevent or reduce racial/ethnic tension. CRS does not take sides among disputing 
parties and, in promoting the principles and ideals of non-discrimination, applies skills that 
allow parties to come to their own agreement. In performing this mission, CRS deploys highly 
skilled professional conciliators, who are able to assist people of diverse racial and cultural 
backgrounds.19 

Historically, CRS has been a low-profile agency. This is the result, in part, of a provision in its 
enabling legislation that requires the agency to provide conciliation assistance in confidence 
and without publicity. CRS work can become public when parties to the conciliation or 
mediation choose to make their agreements public. Mediation agreements between a law 
enforcement agency and a community based organization are sometimes made public as a 
demonstration of the agencys proactive community policing initiative. In the accompanying 
text box, this guide provides examples of successful community/police agreements that have 
become public. 

Spotlight on the U.S. Department of Justice Community Relations Service 

As mentioned in the introduction to this guide, the Community Relations Service (CRS) 
within the U.S. Department of Justice provides mediation and conciliation services to 
communities and to the local and state government agencies that serve these communities. In 
accordance with its mandate, CRS assists community and government agencies in addressing 
conflicts and tensions arising from differences of race, color, and national origin. CRS offices 
are geographically organized into regions, with regional and field offices as indicated in 
the map below. A list of the specific locations and contact information for these offices is 
available on the CRS web site and is provided in Appendix E of this guide. The CRS National 
Headquarters is located in Washington, D.C. 

 


Map of Regional and Field Offices 
Community Relations Service 
Image of Community Relations Service regional and field offices map
~ Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands are served by the Northeast Region 
~ Guam is served by the Western Region 

CRS offers its mediation and conciliation services when there is an underlying conflict 
between a local or state government entity and its residents; and also when there is a conflict 
between two different racial groups. CRS creates the opportunity for communities to reach 
voluntary conciliations through formal agreements. While CRS maintains a strict commitment 
to confidentiality, the parties to the conciliations often choose to make their agreements 
public. At least 13 agreements involving law enforcement agencies have been so publicized 
over the past few years, often in the form of a memorandum of understanding (MOU). CRS 
also intervenes and helps build relationships between community groups and government 
agencies such as schools and public institutions. 

Given the CRS mandate to deal with issues of race, color, and national origin, many of the 
agreements involving law enforcement agencies were initiated in the aftermath of critical 
incidents involving allegations of excessive use-of-force within the minority community or 
pursuant to allegations or perceptions of racial profiling. The content of these agreements, 
however, may be far-reaching in scope and spirit. Agreements also may reinforce many of the 
concepts, strategies, and tools addressed in this guide. 

 


In many ways, the agreements facilitated by CRS address the same substantive topics 
that appear in the consent decrees and memorandums of agreement that have resulted 
from investigations by the Civil Rights Division (CRT). The main difference between the 
agreements brokered by CRS and those implemented by CRT is that CRTs agreements stem 
from a determination or finding based on a pattern or practice investigation. These consent 
decrees have the force of law. Since CRS has no authority to enforce the law, agreements 
facilitated by CRS are between the parties that sign the agreement and are maintained 
voluntarily. To the extent that these agreements are voluntarily publicized with the consent 
of parties, the parties then have an additional vested interest to maintain and live up to the 
agreements. The map below shows the location of the 13 most recent publicized agreements. 
What follows below the map is a synopsis of three recent agreements. 

Publicized Agreements Involving Law Enforcement
Facilitated by the Community Relations Service Since 1992
Image of US map of cities with publicizes agreements involving law enforcement

Richmond, Kentucky: The Richmond Police Department entered into a memorandum 
of agreement with various public officials and the local chapter of the NAACP and other 
community representatives in November 2004. At the core of this agreement was an 
acknowledgement that minority residents were fearful of the potential of police to misuse 
force. As a result, the Richmond Police Department agreed to revise its policy to better 



address these concerns, to define an administrative threshold for reportable use of force, 
and to enhance accountability. In the spirit of building bridges and trust with the community, 
he Department committed to establishing a police/community relations council that would 
serve as an advisory body, providing comment on police policy and training. The Department 
also reaffirmed its commitment to diversify its work force through recruitment and retention 
efforts as well as reaffirmed its commitment to engage in bias-free policing. In addition, the 
Department agreed to implement a wide variety of training programs that would promote 
outreach and civil rights. 

Randolph, Massachusetts: In 2004, CRS worked with the Randolph Police Department to 
help it respond to allegations of police harassment and racial profiling by members of the 
Randolph, Massachusetts minority community. CRS worked jointly with the Randolph Fair 
Practices Committee and the Randolph Police Department to enable the police to change 
the communitys perception of the police department and respond in a concrete way to 
allegations of disparity of treatment based on race. With CRS help, the parties developed an 
MOU whereby the Randolph Police Department pledged to continue ongoing, mandatory 
cultural and racial diversity training for all police department personnel, established a 
monitoring system for police traffic stops to determine if racial profiling is taking place, and 
established an ombudsman program to focus on neighborhood issues surrounding race-
based harassment of residents, among other detailed provisions. The primary purpose of this 
MOU is to establish a dialogue between the police department and local minority residents 
that better enables each party to work cooperatively. This is the goal of CRS mediation. It 
brings parties together in a neutral setting where issues from both parties can be discussed 
and resolved jointly. 

Minneapolis, Minnesota: In December 2003, the Unity Community Mediation Team and 
the Minneapolis Police Department entered into a memorandum of agreement. This detailed 
and comprehensive agreement addressed improving police department responsiveness to 
and treatment of persons with mental illness and developmental disabilities. Other unique 
features of the agreement included a commitment by the police department to provide 
outreach material in the Spanish, Hmong, and Somali languages. 

These highlighted agreements, and the others facilitated by CRS, address a broad range 
of community outreach and civil rights issues that have been addressed throughout this 
manual. A common thread in the agreements facilitated by CRS, but constructed by the 
parties involved, include frank acknowledgements of existing problems and concerns that are 
coupled with a commitment to building the trust, communication, and partnerships necessary 
to address underlying issues. While CRS is the vehicle for helping improve police community 
relations, clearly, CRS mandate is not the same as the CRT regarding its procedural and legally 
binding approach. The scope of CRS agreements, however, is similarly comprehensive and is 
focused on achieving the same goals. Law enforcement leaders committed to taking proactive 
approaches to protecting and promoting civil rights can learn a lot from the content of CRS 
agreements. 

 


Although CRS involvement on behalf of law enforcement agencies working through civil 
rights challenges is restrictedit cannot provide direct assistance to a jurisdiction unless there 
is some underlying conflict or allegation with respect to race, color, or national originCRS 
can refer interested parties to other sources for assistance. In addition, CRS is empowered 
to provide training to any law enforcement agency or community on general strategies for 
addressing civil rights issues or measures to prevent civil rights violations such as on the 
following topics responding to allegations of racial profiling; building trust between police and 
the community; law enforcement mediation; community dialogues; hate crimes; and others. 
Most training provided by CRS is accredited by state Police Officer Standards Training (POST) 
offices. All CRS training is free of charge. 

Fulfilling its mission to undertake proactive actions to prevent or reduce racial and ethnic 
tension, CRS engages in outreach to law enforcement agencies and community groups. 
Often these actions include providing training to both law enforcement staff and community 
leadership. In the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks, CRS developed a compelling 
and focused training symposium using locally based trainers from the Arab, Muslim, and the 
Sikh communities. This half-day symposium entitled Arab, Muslim & Sikh Protocol Awareness 
Training Seminar has been presented to numerous law enforcement agencies across the 
country. Many law enforcement agencies sponsor CRS training events and include community 
leadership in the classes. CRS training can also be tailored to specific local needs. 

Another resource developed by CRS in response to September 11 is a police roll call video 
available on CD or DVD entitled, The First Three to Five Seconds, which is being used for 
training in law enforcement agencies across the country. This film, made for law enforcement 
audiences, familiarizes police with the Arab and Muslim cultures. The film stresses the vast 
diversity that exists within the Arab and Muslim cultures and provides practical advice for 
officers about traditional customs and beliefs. As a result of this training, officers are better 
able to interact with members of these communities in ways that are respectful and lessen the 
risk of engaging in behavior, often inadvertently, that might offend Arabs or Muslims within 
the communities they serve. Copies of the CD or DVD are available at no charge from CRS. 

Distinct Roles of the Civil Rights Division, Special Litigation Section, and the Community 
Relations Service 

While the SPL of the CRT and the CRS operate under the Department of Justice and both 
deal with civil rights issues, it is important to understand their distinct functions. Some in law 
enforcement have been confused by their respective roles. 

CRS is a separate, independent agency within the Department of Justice. Its SPL has a 
narrowly defined legal mandate to bring remedy to patterns or practices that violate the 
Constitution or laws of the United States. It does this through investigations and potentially 
through litigation. Only CRT is empowered to investigate alleged pattern and practice 
violations, to authorize agreements as a remedy, or to litigate cases when other remedies have 
failed. 

In contrast, the CRSs function does not involve investigations, enforcement, or litigation. 
CRS is empowered to facilitate collaborative agreements between departments and various 
community or advocacy groups on issues involving allegations of civil rights concerns. CRS 

 


is not, however, a party to these mediation agreements that often take the form of MOAs. The 
parties to these MOAs facilitated by CRS are entirely free to walk away from the agreements 
without any legal repercussions. By contrast, consent decrees and MOAs developed by CRT 
are legally binding and strict accountability mechanisms are built into the process. 

Proactively Protecting Civil Rights: Creating a Culture Bound by Rules 

While law enforcement agencies confronting serious civil rights challenges should and do 
seek out federal assistance when necessary, hundreds of agencies are working internally 
within their departments and in partnership with their communitiesto ensure that their 
members adhere to ethical policing and protect the civil rights of the individuals they serve. 
These agencies work through two complementary strategies: first, they establish a policing 
culture that respects and protects civil rights and second, they establish sound accountability 
mechanisms. Of course, law enforcement agencies that establish both best succeed at 
protecting and promoting the civil rights of those individuals who live and work within their 
communities. Neither a culture-based nor an accountability-based approach alone is sufficient. 

An ideal policing culture is one in which all officers are instilled with a respect and tolerance 
for diversity, a belief in the individual dignity of all persons, and a commitment to community 
service. While such a culture is a critical foundation for the protection of civil rights, it is, by 
itself, inadequate. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine a police agencya complex organization 
with the broad responsibility to serve and protect the public under strict legal scrutinyto 
function without the guidance of clear procedural rules, both internal and external to the 
agency. 

Sound accountability mechanisms must consist of clear expectations, clear rules, and 
effective means by which to manage the performance of individual officers to ensure 
that they are meeting agency expectations and abiding by agency rules. Accountability 
mechanisms must also address problems as they arise through both corrective measures, 
such as counseling and retraining, and disciplinary processes. While relying solely on rules 
and accountability mechanisms may have some effect, this would likely result in resentment 
and disenfranchisement among officers. Rules are most likely to be embraced and adhered 
to when they are presented in the context of a policing culture. A core message of Protecting 
Civil Rights, then, is that law enforcement executives must be able to interweave the best 
of police culture and rule-bound accountability to provide effective law enforcement while 
protecting the civil rights of all. 

The Evolution of Culture and Rules in Policing 

Of course, policing cultures and rules evolve. Law enforcement, historically, has experienced 
shifts in its sense of mission as well as in its strategies for realizing its mission. The most 
recent shifts have occurred with the rise of community policing in the 1980s and the CompStat 
model of data-driven management in the early 1990s, led by the New York City Police 
Department. Although seen by some as competing approaches to policing, these popular 
and, now, rather fluid concepts have been molded to meet the needs of individual agencies 
and communities.20 Indeed, many law enforcement agencies express a commitment to both 
community policing and CompStator a CompStat-style ofpolicing. And some police 
scholars do argue that community policing and CompStat are compatible.21 



Protecting Civil Rights seeks to emphasize that there are elements of both strategies that 
can and do contribute to effective civil rights protections. In its first chapter, this guide will 
discuss the ways in which community policing philosophies and practices can help promote a 
policing culture that is sensitive and responsive to civil rights. In subsequent chapters, it will 
address the core elements of management that are essential to law enforcement executives 
who are working to protect and promote civil rights. This guide clearly advocates, for instance, 
that police leaders use the strategies of accountability, supervision, and information-driven 
management that are at the core of CompStat. Law enforcement executives can rely on 
these strategies to manage and reduce citizen complaints, the excessive use of force, and 
police misconduct in the same manner that they rely on them to reduce crime or increase 
productivity. This guide also advocates that agencies working to protect and promote civil 
rights adopt the proactive and preventive strategies that CompStat recommends for general 
agency management. 

The incorporation of community policing and CompStat into law enforcement in general has 
been seen as revolutionary. Protecting Civil Rights suggests that invoking these strategies 
specifically in the service of law enforcement leaders, agencies, and officers dedicated to 
protecting and promoting civil rights will be just as revolutionary. 

Overview of Chapters 

Following this introduction, Protecting Civil Rights is divided into five chapters that are 
considered key building blocks for promoting and sustaining a commitment to civil rights 
protections. Each of the next five chapters addresses a major civil rights issuecommunity 
policing, early intervention, the complaint process, use of force, and racial profilingthat 
has been at the core of a pattern or practice investigation. While much of the material in 
these chapters is drawn from provisions embodied in federal consent decrees and MOAs, the 
chapters also rely on examples of illustrative policies and promising practices emerging out 
of a broad range of law enforcement agencies that have demonstrated a clear commitment to 
protecting civil rights. Each chapter ends with a series of recommendations. The concluding 
seventh and eighth chapters address personnel issues and issues of data collection, 
management, and analysis related to police efforts to protect civil rights. These chapters are 
outlined, in brief, below. 

Chapter 2  Sustaining Community Outreach and Engagement:The Intersection of Civil Rights 
and Community Policing 

Exploring the connection between community engagement and civil rights protection, the 
chapter argues that effective community policing serves as a strong foundation from which 
agencies may protect and promote the civil rights of all community members. Acknowledging 
that community policing encourages the empowerment of citizens through participation 
in problem-solving partnerships with the police, this chapter emphasizes the need for 
community policing that is tailored to individual communities and that is institutionalized in 
individual agencies from the chief executive on down to the officer on the street. Of course, 
to best protect and promote civil rights, community policing strategies must engage the 
entire community. To this end, the chapter investigates strategies such as strengthening 
 


police-community relations in distressed neighborhoods, improving minority and immigrant 
outreach, and enhancing community understanding of policing through citizen academies. 
Repeatedly, the chapter underscores the reality that civil rights and community engagement 
are inextricably linked. 

Chapter 3  Developing an Early Intervention Strategy 

The chapter will enhance law enforcement executives understanding of early intervention 
systemssystems that analyze officer performance for the purpose of identifying and 
addressing potential problems before disciplinary action is required. The chapter is attentive 
to the commonalities of effective early intervention systems: the proactive focus on potential 
problems, the dependence on data collection, and the reliance on strong supervisory review. 
It also identifies some of the major differences in such systemsfrom the vast variety of 
performance indicators that agencies track to predict risk to the differing thresholds at which 
departments may determine that a review of an officers performance is required. Through 
its attention to such details, this chapter suggests not only that early intervention is an 
appropriate tool for all agencies (not just large agencies with sophisticated data-management 
technologies), but that early intervention strategies can benefit individual officers, entire 
agencies, and whole communities by promoting a culture of accountability and emphasizing a 
commitment to ethical policing. 

Chapter 4  Managing the Complaint Process 

An accessible, transparent, thorough, and fair citizen complaint process is not only a tool that 
instills public confidence, but a tool that improves a departments ability to be responsive to 
the community. Police executives who act on the substantiated concerns of the community 
members they serve garner the support of the public while enhancing their own policing. 
This chapter considers the challenges of managing an effective complaint process. Federal 
consent decrees and MOAs have revealed that complaint processes in some departments 
are inaccessible and ineffectual. This chapter addresses those concerns by investigating the 
complaint process in detail. From the initial filing of a complaint to its final adjudication, this 
chapter serves as a primer for executives looking to improve their agencys complaint process. 

Chapter 5  Managing Use of Force 

The authorization to use force is a tremendous power that bears with it a tremendous a 
responsibility. Federal consent decrees and MOAs consistently require departments to modify 
their use-of-force policies, training practices, and accountability mechanisms to ensure 
that citizens civil rights are protected. Accordingly, this chapter addresses departments 
management of the use of force. It not only considers the most prevalent use-of-force options, 
but it explores executives responsibility to ensure that the use of force is no greater than 
necessary to ensure public and officer safety, that excessive force is not tolerated, and that 
allegations of excessive or unlawful force are thoroughly investigated. This chapter stresses 
law enforcement leaders responsibility to establish a policing culture as well as strong 
accountability structures that are intolerant of unlawful and excessive force. It also stresses 
the benefits to officer, agency, and community of keeping overall levels of force to a minimum 
while ensuring public and officer safety. 



Chapter 6  Addressing Racial Profiling: Creating a Comprehensive Commitment to Bias-Free 
Policing 

The prevalence of racial profiling is a hotly contested topic among the media, the public, 
and police personnel. Addressing the community perception of racial profiling and taking 
proactive steps to prevent racial profiling deserves commensurate levels of attention from 
police leaders. This chapter focuses on the challenges law enforcement executives confront 
as they work to address and prevent racial profiling. The chapter begins by analyzing the role 
of race as a consideration in police discretion and decision-making. Against this backdrop, it 
considers law enforcement executives efforts to establish clear policy directives against racial 
profiling, train staff on this complex and multifaceted issue, and establish sound accountability 
mechanisms. The chapter also considers the challenges that attend to racial profiling data 
collection and analysis. Its insights will be invaluable to law enforcement executives who 
currently collect data as well as those who are contemplating data collection in response to 
political and public pressures. Finally, the chapter offers insights into managing highly visible 
instances of perceived racial profiling in such a way as to build confidence with the public as 
well as within the department. 

The chapters just discussed correspond to the core areas of concern addressed in the 
provisions of federal consent decrees and MOAs. In essence, these substantive areas are 
those for which prudent police chiefs are constantly refining their policies, training, and 
accountability. Several other issues such as personnel and data management, however, 
transcend these individual topics to demand the attention of law enforcement executives at 
every turn. The seventh and eighth chapters consider these issues. 

Chapter 7  Personnel Management Issues in the Context of Civil Rights 

Personnel are the most valued resource in any police agency. They are also the most 
expensive and represent an agencys single most substantial investment. Law enforcement 
leaders must possess sufficient vision and skill to ensure that the right people with the right 
qualities are hired as officers. They must then train and hold on to these officers. This chapter 
identifies the strategies that make these goals achievable. It explores methods by which 
to maintain a diverse force that is reflective of the community; select officers committed 
to community service; and evaluate, reward, and promote officers on the basis of their 
community policing skills and their commitment to protecting civil rights. Finally, this chapter 
also considers the challenges facing chief executives who must hire excellent officers at a time 
when there is a scarcity of applicants. 

Chapter 8  Measuring and Evaluating Outcomes in the Context of Civil Rights 

To evaluate the effectiveness of their personnel and to assess whether the agency is meeting 
its missions, executives rely on performance data. Data-driven management strategies have 
spread rapidly to law enforcement agencies of all sorts and sizes. Presently, law enforcement 
executives regularly collect, manage, and analyze data to gauge an agencys overall 
performance in preventing crime and operating efficiently. Increasingly, law enforcement 
agencies are using nontraditional performance data and analysis to assess their success in 
protecting and promoting civil rights. This chapter considers the benefits and challenges of 

 


effective data management. Although these issues are touched on in earlier chapters, this 
final chapter offers overall advice on data quality issues as well as systematic data collection, 
analysis, and interpretation. It also discusses the capacities and limitations inherent in 
using administrative data and suggests other avenues of data collection to supplement 
administrative data and to better assess both officer and agency performance with respect to 
civil rights. 

Sources of Information 

In the preparation of Protecting Civil Rights, IACP staff relied on several sources of 
information. These include the following: 

 All publicly available information on civil rights pattern or practice investigations and 
agreements, including the content of all consent decrees and MOAs as well as publicly 
available documents providing technical assistance recommendations to departments 
under federal investigation. 

 IACPsponsored roundtable discussions with law enforcement leaders, both those 
involved in pattern or practice agreements and those from agencies known for exemplary 
civil rights practices. 

 The expertise of staff at the COPS Office. This agency has provided federal support for 
community policing efforts through direct funding to local law enforcement and through 
an extensive array of publications, seminars, and trainings promoting fair and effective 
policing practices. 

 Consultation with members of IACPs standing committees on civil rights and on 
professional standards. Committee members have been selected on the basis of their 
demonstrated commitment to enhancing the quality of policing and protecting civil rights. 
Several members serve as subject matter expert consultants to the Department of Justice 
in civil rights pattern or practice investigations. 

 Roundtable discussions and focus groups of similar projects, most notably the Community 
Policing Consortiums technical assistance project on helping law enforcement agencies 
self-evaluate their policies and practices on civil rights. 

 Consultation with several federal justice agencies, most notably two agencies within 
the Department of Justice: the Special Litigation Section of the Civil Rights Division and 
the Community Relations Service. These two agencies approach civil rights issues from 
different, but complementary perspectives. 

 An extensive array of professional and scholarly literature available on the substantive 
issues addressed in this guide, including individual agency policy directives and model 
policies offered by professional associations and state oversight agencies. 

 


Endnotes 

1 
Roosevelt, Franklin Delano. Greeting to the American Committee for the Protection of the 
Foreign-born. Washington, DC. January 9, 1940. 

2 
International Association of Chiefs of Police. Law Enforcement Oath of Honor. www. 
theiacp.org/profassist/ethics/oath_honor_word.doc. 

3 
Pubic Law 103-322, title XXI, Sec. 210401, September 13, 1994, 108 Stat. 2071. 

4 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. U.S., 431 U.S. 324, 336 n.16 (1977) 

5 
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977) 

6 
Within the U.S. Department of Justice CRT is commonly used as the acronym for the Civil 
Right Divisions, while CRD is used to reference the Criminal Division. 

7 
The 12 sections are Appellate Section, Coordination and Review Section, Criminal Section, 
Disability Rights Section, Educational Opportunities, Section, Employment Litigation 
Section, Housing and Civil Enforcement Section, Office of Special Counsel for Immigration 
Related Unfair Employment Practices, Special Litigation Section Voting Section, and 
Administrative Management Section 

8 
Overview. November, 22, 2002. U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, Special 
Litigation Section. Retrieved November 13, 2005 from www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/overview. 
htm. 

9 
Overview. November 22, 2002. U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, 
Special Litigation Section. Retrieved November 13, 2005 from www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/ 
overview.htm. Note that the receiving financial assistance provisions clause is limited 
to Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. The Violent Crime Control and 
Law Enforcement Act of 1994 applies to all state and local agencies, whether or not they 
receive federal assistance. 

10 
Frequently Asked Questions. January 31, 2003. U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Rights 
Division, Special Litigation Section. Retrieved November 13, 2005 from www.usdoj.gov/crt/ 
split/faq.htm. 

11 
Brown, Shanetta C. Introductory Remarks. Community Policing Consortium: National 
Civil Rights Symposium. Mayflower Renaissance Hotel, Washington, DC. June 12, 2005. 

12 
42 USC  3789d.  3789d 

13 
Department of Justice Investigation of Use of Force by the Washington Metropolitan 
Police Department. No date. U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, Special 
Litigation Section. Retrieved November 13, 2005 from www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/documents/ 
dcfindings.htm. 

14 
Law Enforcement Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C.  14141 

15 
United States v. City of Steubenville, Ohio Consent Decree. September 3, 1993. U.S. 
Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, Special Litigation Section. Retrieved on 
November 11, 2005 from www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/documents/steubensa.htm. 

16 
Frequently Asked Questions. January 31, 2003. U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Rights 
Division, Special Litigation Section. Retrieved November 13, 2005 from www.usdoj.gov/crt/ 
split/faq.htm. 

17 
United States v. City of Pittsburgh Consent Decree. February 26, 1997. Retrieved November 
13, 2005 from www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/documents/pittscomp.htm. 



18 
Davis, Robert, Christopher W. Ortiz, Nicole J. Henderson, Michelle Massie, and Joel Miller. 
Turning Necessity into Virtue: Pittsburghs Experience with a Federal Consent Decree. New 
York: Vera Institute of Justice, 2002. 

19 
Homepage. No date. U.S. Department of Justice, Community Relations Service. Retrieved 
November 18, 2005 from www.usdoj.gov/crs. 

20 
Walsh, William F., and Gennaro F. Vito. The Meaning of Compstat: A Theoretical Analysis. 
Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice 20.1 (2004): 51-69. 

21 
Magers, Jeffrey S. Compstat: A New Paradigm for Policing or a Repudiation of 
Community Policing? Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice 20.1 (2004): 70-79. 

22 Funded by U.S. Department of Justice Office of Community Oriented Policing Services 
(COPS), the Community Policing Consortium (CPC) is a partnership of five professional 
police associations. They are the International Association of Chiefs of Police; National 
Organization of Black Law Enforcement Executives; National Sheriffs Association ; 
Police Executive Research Forum; and the Police Foundation. These agencies, who have 
all committed to the philosophy of community policing, provide research, training, and 
technical assistance through the CPC to further the development of the community 
policing model and its adoption by law enforcement agencies across the country. 


II. Sustaining Community Outreach and Engagement: The Intersection of Civil Rights 
and Community Policing 



Sustaining Community Outreach and 
Engagement: The Intersection of Civil 
Rights and Community Policing 

[P]olice chiefs must know that the concepts of community policing and the concepts of 
protecting human and civil rights are inseparable. They are one and the same. And for law 
enforcement you cant have one without the other.1 

Chief Charles Gruber, South Barrington (Illinois) Police Department 

Introduction 

During the past 2 decades, law enforcement executives from all types of agenciesmunicipal 
police departments, sheriffs offices, tribal agencies, state police departments, and special 
jurisdictional police departmentshave adopted community policing strategies. The 
differences across these agenciesincluding variations in size, mission, management, and 
the nature of the communities they servemean that these leaders implementations of 
community policing often look quite different. Despite these differences, however, community 
policing efforts are recognizable for several core commonalities. Most notably, for the 
purposes of this guide, they are built on partnerships with the community that promote trust, 
respect for diversity, and tolerance. These partnershipsthe core of successful, genuine 
community policing strategieshave been credited with helping to resolve the us-versus-them 
mindset that too often has existed in agencies and communities alike. 

The concept of community policing certainly is a familiar one to law enforcement leaders. Not 
all, however, may have considered the inextricable ties between the core tenets of community 
policing and civil rights protections as articulated in the above quote. 

Chapter Overview and Objectives 

This chapter explores the inextricable links between civil rights and community policing 
strategies. Following a brief definition of community policing, an assessment of evolving 
attitudes toward community policing in the aftermath of September 11, and an analysis 
of indicators of the prevalence of community policing, this chapter offers a review of five 
substantive community policing strategies for protecting and promoting civil rights. The 
chapter underscores each strategy by providing examples of innovative programs. Each 
example is notable for its success in using active community engagement and police-
community partnerships to protect and promote civil rights and to better engage residents in 
the civic process. 



A Definition of Community Policing 

Many have described community policing as a philosophy of policing, rather than as a set 
of rules. The U.S. Department of Justice Office of Community Oriented Policing Services 
(COPS) defines community policing as: [A] policing philosophy that promotes and supports 
organizational strategies to address the causes and reduce the fear of crime and social 
disorder through problem-solving tactics and community-police partnerships.2 

Considering this conceptual definition, it is not surprising that there is no established 
programmatic checklist for what qualifies a department as practicing effective community 
policing. Each partnership is as unique as the community and police department that are part 
of it. While recognizing the uniqueness of each partnership, however, the following elements 
are often cited as key components: 

 Adopting community service as the overarching philosophy of the organization 

 Making an institutional commitment to community policing that is internalized throughout 
the command structurefrom the chief executive to the officers in the streets 

 Emphasizing geographically decentralized models of policing that stress services tailored 
to the needs of individual communities rather than a one-size-fits-all approach for the 
entire jurisdiction 

 Empowering citizens to act in partnership with the police on issues of crime and more 
broadly defined social problems (e.g., fear of crime, disorder, decay, public nuisances, and 
quality of life) 

 Using problem-oriented or problem-solving approaches involving police personnel 
working with community members. 

In addition to enacting these key components, departments committed to effective 
community policing also work to increase levels of interaction between the police and 
community residents. They do this through practices and techniques that include the 
following: 

 Holding regular (e.g., monthly), formal meetings with community members on a local 
level (e.g., beat meeting or precinct meetings) 

 Making greater use of citizen advisory groups or councils 

 Directing outreach efforts toward key community leaders and stakeholders including those 
from business, educational, and faith-based communities as well as representatives from 
civilian associations such as neighborhood groups and tenant organizations 

 Promoting geographic and functional decentralization by providing first-line supervisors 
and front-line officers with greater flexibility and discretion in dealing with the community 

 Identifying and/or training selected officers and/or units to serve as liaisons with particular 
communities and interest groups (e.g., Hispanic outreach teams, senior citizen services 
teams) 

 


 Increasing use of foot and bicycle patrol to allow officers to interact more frequently with 
community members 

 Establishing and expanding citizen academies designed to offer community residents an 
operational overview of their police agency and its internal culture 

 Increasing the use of civilian volunteers who provide assistance to the police. 

As a whole, community policing strategies allow agencies the opportunity to establish 
more frequent contact and more meaningful relationships with a broad cross-section of 
their community. In addition, each practice described above provides police personnel of 
all ranks with more opportunities to engage with citizens in building trust, confidence, and 
partnerships. Community policing strategies not only make participants feel they are part of 
the policing process, they can actually increase overall levels of civic involvement. Achieving 
this goal successfully can actually serve to promote, rather than just protect, the civil rights of 
community members. 

Law enforcement agencies, often in partnership with community members, have relied on 
the SARA model of problem-solving in many areas. SARA comprises scanning to identify 
the problems, analyzing as a means to study the problem and identify potential solutions, 
responding by using methods tailored to address the specific problem, and assessing 
problem-solving success through evaluation methods. Clearly, this model can be applied to 
civil rights issues as illustrated in several of the examples discussed later in this chapter. 

The Evolution of Community Policing in a Post-9/11 Era 

In the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, many analysts and observers 
have expressed concern about the future of community policing. When properly and fully 
implemented, community policing efforts can be time-consuming and resource intensive. 
Community policing and associated problem-solving strategies are, as political science 
Professor Wesley Skogan has suggested, difficult to sustain. He notes that they require a 
great deal of training, close supervision, strong analytic capacity, and organization-wide 
commitment.3 

Some community policing advocates fear that, in response to terrorism, police departments 
may feel that they have less time and fewer resources to devote to community policing 
efforts. On a practical level, departments are stretched to meet the new demands that 
confronting terrorism imposes including prevention, protective patrol, and preparedness. 
Challenges to maintain these efforts have become more acutely pronounced during times of 
shrinking municipal, state, and federal budgets and as police ranks and candidate pools are 
reduced through military call-ups to support war efforts. In response, some law enforcement 
agencies may feel the need to resort to a heavier reliance on, some may say retreat to, 
reactive strategies. 



Many community policing advocates, however, have become ever more assertive about the 
critical role of community policing in the aftermath of September 11. These advocates argue 
that community policing philosophies and strategies actually can enhance antiterrorism 
efforts and intelligence gathering. Director Carl R. Peed of the COPS Office suggests that 
as departments seek out the most effective ways to combat terrorism they will embrace 
community policing strategies: 

Since September 11, many state and local law enforcement agencies have sought new and 
effective methods of protecting our countrys cities and counties, and have come to realize 
that community policing is more important now than ever before. Community policing 
encourages collaborative partnerships, employs problem-solving strategies, engages the 
community in its own protection, and requires organizational change within law enforcement 
to support effective decision making and efficient operations. Community policing can assist 
law enforcement agencies identify and respond to public concerns about terrorism, and help 
provide vital insight into a communitys vulnerabilities and needs.4 

While Director Peed underscores the effectiveness of community policing strategies for 
combating terrorism generally, others specifically emphasize the role community policing 
can play to enhance localized intelligence gathering. Decentralized management and 
accountability, as well as assignment of officers to specific beats on a more permanent basis, 
can result in stronger, more trusting relationships with the community. These relationships, 
in turn, can translate into greater vigilanceor extra eyes and earsin reporting suspicious 
behavior and in enhancing intelligence-gathering efforts. As Drew Diamond, a former police 
chief, and his colleague Bonnie Bucqueroux suggest: 

Our goal shouldbe to provide as many opportunities as possible for people to tell police 
what they know, without singling themselves out for retaliation.We want people from all 
walks of life to trust police enough to place the call, and we also need officers who will listen. 
Neither will happen if the police become an occupying army.If we are to maintain recent 
reductions in violent crime and uncover the terrorists living among us, while preserving the 
civil rights that make our society special, we must insist on community policing now more 
than ever.5 

Recognizing what police can obtain from a trustful community in terms of leads and alerts to 
suspicious behavior is only one side of the coin. Community policing emphasizes mutually 
beneficial relationships. Furthermore, new community needs have arisen following the 
terrorist attacks. Ellen Scrivner, deputy superintendent of the Chicago Police Department 
and former deputy director of the COPS Office, provided the following reminder of what 
communities may now need from police in a post-September 11 era: 

Community fears when crime was spiraling out of control pales in comparison to the fears 
of suicide bombers and chemical attacks that kill innocent people going about their everyday 
lives.6 



The Prevalence of Community Policing 

Given that there are many varieties and definitions of community policing, it should not 
be surprising that a precise tally of law enforcement agencies engaged in community 
policing is difficult to establish. According to the 2003 Law Enforcement Management and 
Administrative Statistics Survey (LEMAS) conducted by the Bureau of Justice Statistics, 
an overwhelming majority94 percentof law enforcement agencies with 100 or more 
full-time sworn officers indicated that they practiced community policing in some manner. 
Percentages varied according to the type of agency surveyed. Overall, 99 percent of municipal 
police departments with 100 or more sworn personnel with arrest power indicated that they 
implemented community policing in some manner. By comparison, 92 percent of county 
police departments, 89 percent of sheriffs offices, and 82 percent (39 of 48 responding) of 
state police agencies indicated that they had addressed community policing in some manner. 
The numbers of tribal and regional police agencies included in the survey were too few to 
make reliable estimates. 

Methodological Note on Bureau of Justice Statistics Law Enforcement Data 

The Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) administers both a census and survey of law enforcement 
agencies, both conducted on a periodic basis, as part of its Law Enforcement Management 
and Administrative Statistics (LEMAS) program. The two most recent LEMAS efforts are 
the census conducted in 2000 and the survey conducted in 2003. 

The Census of State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies provides a baseline 
tabulation of the nations police agencies operating in the U.S. and contains basic information 
about personnel, operational capacity, technological capacity, key equipment, and policies and 
programs. 

BJS administers the LEMAS survey every 3 or 4 years. This survey captures more detailed 
information than is captured through the census. The survey is targeted to all law enforcement 
agencies with 100 or more full-time equivalent sworn personnel, as well as a representative 
sample of smaller agencies. This sampling strategy results in a nationally representative 
sample of 2,859 agencies that represent the approximately the 18,000 publicly funded state 
and local law enforcement agencies (determined by the census) that operate on a full-time 
basis in the U.S. 

The data presented in this guide are drawn from the 2000 census and 2003 survey. A subset 
of questions in the survey were only asked of agencies with 100 sworn officers, while others 
were asked of all sampled agencies regardless of size. 

For the survey-based analysis and comparisons made in this and other chapters of the guide, 
readers should be aware that the number of responses for agencies with less than 100 sworn 
officers are based on randomly selected agencies. As a result of the BJS stratifiedrandom 
 


sampling processes, however, these analyses provide scientifically reliable estimates when 
sufficient numbers are included in the categories compared. For some less common agency 
types (e.g., tribal police), too few agencies were included in the sample for reliable comparisons 
to be made across agency-size categories. More information on the survey methodology can 
be found on the BJS-LEMA web site (www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/lawenf.htm).

The concept of community policing, of course, may be implemented in a variety of ways. 
The LEMAS survey allowed responding agencies to identify one of three ways in which they 
implemented community policing.7The most common form of implementation reported 
was a specific community policing unit with full-time staff. This accounted for 55 percent of 
responding agencies.The other two methods, each accounting for 19 percent of responses, 
were implementation by dedicated community policing personnel (but no unit) and by other 
means.8

In the LEMAS survey, prevalence of community policing implementation, as well as methods 
of implementation, varied by agency size. In general, the likelihood of implementation 
increased with agency size. And, while the clear majority of agencies (regardless of size) 
implemented some type of community policing, the method of implementation for municipal 
agencies and sheriffs offices varied according to the size of the agency.These results are 
indicated in the charts below. 

Municipal Enforcement Agencies
Methods of Addressing Community Policing
Bar graph showing municpal enforcement agencies methods of addressing community policing

Sheriffs Offices 
Methods of Addressing Community Policing
Bar graph showing sheriffs' offices methods of addressing community policing
 


While the LEMAS survey determined that the overwhelming majority of agencies report that 
they implement community policing in some manner, this self-reported index should not 
be interpreted as a definitive measure of the prevalence of community policing among the 
nations law enforcement agencies. This response to the questionnaire says little about the 
depth of commitment or the degree to which community policing is institutionalized and 
internalized across the command structure and in operational contexts. The LEMAS survey 
itself, contains a series of other questions addressing community policing implementation 
and the prevalence of other components (e.g., use of problem-solving strategies and the 
citizen police academies) by which to assess variations in community policing in more detail. 
Any attempt to characterize a law enforcement agencys philosophical and organizational 
approach requires in-depth assessment.9 

Promising Practices: Protecting and Promoting Civil Rights through 
Community Policing Strategies 

The high prevalence of community policing reported among law enforcement agencies 
across the nation is an encouraging sign if one maintains that comprehensive community 
policing initiatives and civil rights protections are inseparable, as is a core tenet of this guide. 
Far from suggesting that community policing strategies can be applied mechanically or that 
that there is a single or most preferred way to implement community policing, however, this 
guide recognizes that implementation may vary widely. In the following sections, this chapter 
illustrates five strategies that are consistent with the core tenets of community policing. The 
programs used to illustrate these strategies are just a small sampling from among many 
successful implementations of community policing strategies that protect and promote civil 
rights. 

Each of these programs illustrates the variety of ways that local agencies implemented 
community outreach strategies to fit local needs. Of course, the reader should realize that 
many of the examples are multifaceted. That is, they may address community policing and 
traditional policing strategies simultaneously. Moreover, the five strategies outlined here 
are not mutually exclusive. Indeed, most of the promising practice examples presented here 
simultaneously address several of these strategies. 

Strategy One: Improving Police-Community Relations in Distressed Neighborhoods 

Law enforcement leaders who have embraced community policing and problem-solving 
approaches recognize that partnerships are vital, yet not all communities have equal capacity 
to organize themselves. Many agencies have diverse jurisdictions, including some areas of 
affluence and other areas that are impoverished, run down, and lacking adequate resources. 
These latter areas are frequently those in which police presence is most critical, but in which 
police-community relations, unfortunately, have been most strained. Many police executives 
have recognized that they can take the lead in developing partnership strategies to reduce 
neighborhood stress, enhance the quality of life, and empower residents. Through these 
comprehensive outreach strategies, the police agencies are more likely to be perceived as 

 

partners and allies rather than indifferent bureaucrats, preservers of the status quo, or even 
occupying forces.Through such strategies, police officers learn to work effectively with law-
abiding residentsthe overwhelming majority of residents in these areasnot only to reduce 
levels of victimization but also to improve the overall quality of life. 

The following examples are only two of many such programs that have been successfully 
implemented across the nation. 

Robert Hartley Housing Complex Project10 

The Robert Hartley Housing Complex Project was initiated by the New Rochelle (New York) 
Police Department in the early part of 1999. This project, which is still in progress, began as 
the police and the community used the problem-solving technique of scanning to identify a 
six-block area as the area with the most recurring problems of concern to the public and the 
police. Comprising mostly municipal housing buildings, the area is centrally located in New 
Rochelle, the seventh largest city in New York with a population of 72,500. 

Drug dealings, shootings, assaults, and robberies were prevalent in this area. As a result, 
residents not only experienced a good deal of fear, but made increased calls for police 
services. Regrettably, community members felt a pervasive distrust of the police on whom 
they relied. They perceived the police to be insensitive and lacking understanding of the 
needs of the community. 

These circumstances were only complicated as the city of New Rochelle, always ethnically 
diverse, experienced population increases in Blacks and Hispanics. These increases resulted in 
racial tensions as the composition of neighborhoods altered. They also resulted in problems 
for police who addressed these tensions while managing increasingly complex police-
community relations issues. 

In March 1999, local clergy, community leaders, and the New Rochelle Police Department 
responded to the distrust of police and increasing racial tensions by partnering to create 
Citizens for a Better New Rochelle. Upon its formation, the group adopted the following 
mission statement: 

The police and community working together to provide a mutually respectful relationship 
through open lines of communication and cooperation. 

Citizens for a Better New Rochelle consists of members from the New Rochelle Police 
Department, the clergy, the NAACP, the New Rochelle Municipal Housing Authority, 
the Youth Bureau, the City Council, the United Tenants Council, the Community Action 
program, and private citizens. With the Citizens for a Better New Rochelle in place, the police 



formulated a multifaceted response plan to deal with distrust and racial tension that included 
the following components: 

 Training for a Neighborhood Watch Patrol 

 Assignment of housing officers to patrol the area on foot 

 Assignment of beat officers to patrol the area on foot and bicycle 

 Assignment of Critical Incident Unit officers to park and walk patrol during hours of 
past criminal activity as well as to patrol Lincoln Park during summer basketball league 

 Establishment of Community/Police Liaison Office to provide local residents with an 
immediate bridge to the department 

 Involvement of departments community resources coordinator to provide crisis 
intervention services to residents experiencing serious family and personal problems 
through information referral and counseling. 

The New Rochelle Police Department conducted an assessment by collecting pre-response 
and post-response data to determine whether their goals were being met. They determined 
that their project effectively and efficiently scanned, analyzed, responded and assessed (SARA) 
the recurring problems of distrust and racial tension. Their assessment also demonstrated 
that the police and the community attained the specified goals of the Robert Hartley Housing 
Complex Project. 

Agency Profile: Population 72,500; Officers 179 

Community Action Team 11 

In 1998, the El Paso (Texas) Police Department collaborated with various community and 
police organizations to form the Community Action Team. The Community Action Team 
works to decrease crime and improve the quality of life in El Paso. The purpose and the 
practices by which the team realizes this purpose are detailed in a mission statement on the 
programs web page and reproduced below. (www.elpasotexas.gov/police/yip_cat.asp): 

Function: The mission of the Community Action Team is to work in partnership with the 
community, the police regional commands and various community agencies. Together, areas 
of high crime and quality-of-life issues will be identified and targeted to reduce the fear and 
incidence of crime, and restore the neighborhoods pride and commitment, while employing 
the departments community policing and problem solving tactics. 

Strategies: The concept requires the establishment of a team, consisting of six officers and 
one sergeant. The team will work to resolve the crime and quality of life issues that exist 
within each predetermined neighborhood. 

The duties of the team will extend well beyond an officers normal duties. The concept 
requires the officers and supervisor to work as a team (with the community), identify crime 
indigenous to a neighborhood, and employ problem-solving tactics. In addition, the team 



will address the quality-of-life issues that are apparent and those that are brought to its attention 
by citizens or other sources. 

The team will employ a wide-range of tactics to accomplish its objectives. The team must also 
remain flexible due to the various range of problems present in each of the targeted neighborhoods. 
For example: officers will conduct neighborhood surveys, speak with residents to determine their 
concerns and thoughts, conduct foot patrol in neighborhoods, identify new problems, conduct 
surveillance of suspected criminal activity, initiate community involvement through neighborhood 
watch and other community programs, and, where applicable, initiate the abatement process. 

Agency Profile: Population 650,000; Officers 1,126 

Strategy Two: Reaching Out to Engage Minority Communities 

Strained relationships between minority communities and the police may seem, to some, 
as ubiquitous. Many police departments, however, have built bridges to diverse community 
groups through effective community policing strategies. While such outreach strategies are 
often associated with major urban cities, or particular distressed inner-city neighborhoods, 
many departments use a broader strategy recognizing that minority populations are 
themselves diverse in socioeconomic status, culture, religion, and other characteristics. The 
concerns of minority members in smaller or rural communities may be quite distinct, as is 
demonstrated in the following example. 

Building Community Bridges12 

In 2001, under the chief of police at the time, the Camillus (New York) Police Department 
started an outreach program called Building Community Bridges. The program was intended to 
improve access to the Camillus Police Department for minority groups and other segments of the 
population that felt their needs were not understood as thoroughly as the needs of other segments 
of the Central New York community. 

In a bold and proactive effort, Chief Perkins and his department invited representatives of diverse 
groups directly into department planning sessions where they were given an excellent opportunity 
to have their concerns heard. Organizations such as the Onondaga Commission on Human Rights, 
the NAACP, the New York Civil Liberties Union, and the Inter-Religious Council of Central New 
York have attended these meetings as have elected officials from Camillus, the Spanish Action 
League of Syracuse, and the Syracuse Model Neighborhood Facility. 

By bringing together all segments of the communitythe residential population, visiting shoppers, 
and the commuting workforcethis effort is building a law enforcement agency of which the 
whole community is proud. 

Agency Profile: Population 23,000 (Town of Camillus including Village of Camillus); Officers 19 

 


Strategy Three: Reaching Out to Engage Immigrant Communities 

Although police may attempt to reach out to all groups within their community, they may 
not succeed in engaging all equally. Immigrant groups can be among the most difficult for 
police to engage because of the unique challenges they confront, including limited English 
proficiency. Police also may struggle to engage immigrant groups where a large number 
of group members are themselves struggling to overcome negative perceptions of the 
police that are the result of realities in their home countries. It is important for police to 
understand that many immigrants come from countries where police are perceived, often 
with good reason, as coercive agents of the government. These immigrants must first shed 
their inherent distrust of police before they can begin to appreciate the positive role that 
police may play in their new communities in this nation. Besides language and trust issues, 
challenges may be exacerbated by the lack of organizational capacity of recent immigrants 
and the existence of undocumented workers. While it may seem nearly impossible for law 
enforcement agencies to forge significant partnerships with these groups, successful efforts 
are becoming more common. 

Dedicated and concentrated effort by police can win the trust of immigrant groups. 
Departments that have proactively reached out to immigrant communities through language 
immersion and cultural awareness programs have begun to build partnerships that 
departments that expect immigrant groups to take part in police programs or services of their 
own initiative will never realize. The following examples illustrate how several departments 
have organized to respond to the needs of immigrants. In one example, a department found 
success in reaching out to multiple immigrant communities spread over a wide geographic 
area by establishing a specialized unit. In another department, the agency responded to a 
need that they identified for a particular immigrant group. 

International Relations Unit13 

In 2000, the Charlotte-Mecklenburg (North Carolina) Police Department established the 
International Relations Unit to serve as the departments liaison when dealing with issues 
associated with the international community. The ultimate goal was to enhance the quality 
of life within the international community in Charlotte-Mecklenburg. This program consists 
of the following key components and principles: 

Mission Statement 
The International Relations Unit (IRU) of the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department is a 
countywide resource committed to improving the quality of life, reducing crime, and fostering 
mutual trust and respect with members of the international community. 

Personnel 
The IRU is composed of six full time officers and one sergeant who have fluency in a second 
language and or an understanding of a second culture. Currently, the IRU is composed 
of members who speak Spanish, Vietnamese, Laotian, and Thai. These officers facilitate 

 

communication and improve understanding between police and members of the International 
community. 

Unit Priorities 

 To assist the international community, patrol officers, and police detectives with finding 
solutions to problems and concerns 

 To conduct training within the international community and public/private organizations 
to improve service and reduce the number of victims 

 To conduct language and cultural awareness training within the police department 

 To provide assistance with police investigations that affect the international community 

 To use specialized training, expertise, and experience to improve relationships with the 
international community 

 To participate in community events that directly affect the international community 

 To assist with the recruitment of culturally diverse and bilingual officers 

 To act as a liaison between the police department and the international community. 

Agency Profile: Population 746,500; Officers 1520 

Operacion Apoyo Hispano (Operation Hispanic Outreach)14 

A surging Hispanic population posed a challenge to the Clearwater (Florida) Police 
Department. The Hispanics were hesitant to approach the police and many long-time 
residents were suspicious of their new neighbors. Those attitudes have changed thanks to a 
truly unique collaboration between the police department and the YWCA. The comprehensive 
program encompasses everything from crime concerns to social and economic opportunity 
for Hispanics. Housed in a city-owned building, the one-stop center has an active outreach 
component and provides immigration and child care services along with interpretation and 
victim advocacy. Hispanics now come forward and report crimes to the police, resulting in a 
number of successful prosecutions. In 1 year, more than 175 Hispanic residents received crisis 
intervention and counseling at the center. 

Agency Profile: Population 109,000; Officers 264 

 


Strategy Four: Helping Residents Understand Police Operations and Culture 

Law enforcement agencies engaged in genuine and effective community policing regularly 
engage their officers in cultural awareness training to learn more about the particular 
communities they serve. As police better understand the culturesthe value systems, 
taboos, and social ritualsof the communities that they serve, they are able to interact 
more respectfully and effectively with individuals from those communities. By the same 
token, citizens can benefit from learning about their law enforcement organization that, in 
many ways, has a culture of its own. The formation of Citizen Academies has become an 
effective vehicle for achieving this goal. As explained the National Citizens Police Academy 
Associations web site: 

[A]gencies have formed Citizen Police Academy programs that create an expansion of their 
community based efforts. These programs are intended to open the lines of communication 
between the Community and the Police Department. Generally, the relationship between the 
police and the citizen is one of love/hate. To the Citizen, it may frequently appear that the 
police are not doing their job or are exceeding their boundaries. By allowing citizens a firsthand 
look at what rules, regulations and policies the police follow, some of the misunderstanding 
may be alleviated. The objective of the Citizen Police Academy is not to train an individual 
to be a Reserve Police Officer but to produce informed citizens. The Citizens and Police 
Officers meet each other face to face in a neutral, friendly setting and each becomes a person 
to the other. In the past, citizens have simply seen a uniform, now they have an understanding 
about the person behind the badge.15 



As indicated in the following examples, many departments successfully tailor their citizen 
academies to particular populations, including youth groups or immigrant groups. 

The Beaverton Police Departments Student Academy16 

The Beaverton (Oregon) Police Department formed its Student Academy to provide high 
school students with a better understanding of law enforcements role in society. Like many 
law enforcement agencies across the nation, the Beaverton Police Department had seen a 
decreasing amount of respect for authority among some of its younger residents. Childrens 
ideas of what police officers do are more often based on what they see on television shows 
and in the movies than on actual positive interactions with police officers. 

The Beaverton Police Department embraced the philosophy of community policing in 1993. 
As part of that effort, the Beaverton Police Department established a Citizens Academy as 
a tool to bring community members and law enforcement officers together. This program 
experienced great success. As a result, the department developed its Student Academy 
on similar ideals. Designed to reach out to young people, the Student Academy uses the 
strategies of communication, education, and hands-on experience. 

Strategy #1  Communication: The goal of the Student Academy is to break down barriers 
to communication by providing an opportunity for police and students to work together. It is 
difficult to build bridges with young people when their initial perception of law enforcement 
is negative. During the Student Academy, young citizens and officers are able to spend quality 
time together and learn more about each other. 

Strategy #2  Education: Students are educated on the need for proper procedures in law 
enforcement. These procedures are explained to students in order to combat the perception 
that police officers pick on them. Students are told what can happen to police officers, 
perpetrators, victims, or innocent bystanders when police procedures are not followed. 

Strategy #3  Hands-On Experience: Students attend mini workshops that provide them with 
basic education and hands-on experience with topics such as traffic, forensic science, and use 
of force. Students participate as well in simulated scenarios. 

The Beaverton Police Student Academy is a positive forum for young citizens and police 
officers alike as it provides accurate information about the role of law enforcement. 

Agency Profile: Population 80,000; Officers 117 

 
 

Hmong Finish Course on Policing In Minnesota 

The following Associated Press article regarding the success of the Hmong Course on 
Policing in St. Paul appeared in the Minneapolis-St. Paul Star-Tribune on March 31, 2005. 

ST. PAUL (AP) --Several Hmong residents completed a citizens academy designed to give 
them a better understanding of the police and how they do their jobs. 

The graduates Wednesday, most of them Hmong community leaders, said their new 
understanding of the Police Department will help them resolve disputes within the 
community. 

This will really help us to learn the different departments in the police, said Bao Yang, who 
attended the academy with her husband. 

A majority of the class members were from the Hmong 18 Council, the historical leaders 
of the Hmong community. The council represents each of the 18 Hmong family clans 
and typically resolves family disputes that arise from divorce, adultery, runaway children or 
domestic abuse. 

St. Paul has one of the largest Hmong populations in the country. 

The 11-week academy, not an accredited law enforcement course, is free to anyone aged 21 
or older. 

Police Chief John Harrington said the graduates may now qualify to serve on the Police 
Community Internal Affairs Commission, which currently does not have a Hmong member. 

Some of the graduates said they appreciated simply learning who the police were. 

Vue Chu said he plans to begin a citizens patrol in his East Side neighborhood. Brandon 
Moua said he wants to enter the police academy. 

While the students were learning, they taught police officers a few things about the Hmong 
18 Council, said Sao Lee, of St. Paul, who attended the academy with his wife. 

They didnt know how the Hmong 18 Council works, so now (the relationship) is much 
closer, he said. 

Agency Profile: Population 275,000; Officers 579 



Strategy Five: Cooperative Approaches to Addressing Racial Profiling Concerns 

One of the reasons that law enforcement agencies have embraced community policing 
strategies is because they realize that they can be more efficient and effective by working 
cooperatively with the community rather than working alone. Increasingly, police 
departments are adopting this same principle as they strive to deal with the issue of racial 
profiling. One such strategy is described below. 

Addressing Racial Profiling through Building Trust17 

Enhancing trust between the citizens of Wichita, Kansas and the Wichita Police Department 
has been an aspiration of the department since its transition to a community policing 
philosophy in the mid 1990s. A desire to proactively address the issue of racial profiling 
and community concerns about race-based policing led the Wichita Police Department to 
undertake the Building Trust Initiative. 

In May 2000, the Wichita Police Department joined with the community to develop a 
comprehensive plan to address the issue of racial profiling. From the beginning, it was 
apparent that the term racial profiling did not adequately describe the communitys 
concerns. The core issue was trust. Using the SARA model, the department relied on its 
philosophy of community involvement in problem solving. 

The Kansas Region of the National Conference for Community and Justice served as the 
community facilitator to gather community input on the initiatives three major components: 
collecting data on traffic and pedestrian stops, increasing the ease and opportunities for 
community members to voice their concerns about police activity, and developing cultural 
diversity and customer service training for all members of the department. 

As a result, the department integrated committee recommendations and the analysis from 
its stop studycomposed of 37,000 traffic and pedestrian stopsto promote a change 
in departmental police culture. Innovations included revising the traffic stop policy, 
simplifying and publicizing the citizen complaint process, creating a regulation on racial 
profiling, designing and implementing training on customer service and cultural diversity, and 
diversifying recruiting practices. 

The Building Trust Initiative has resulted in positive, sustainable change. Racial profiling 
complaints have dropped significantly from 2001 to the present. Trust relationships have 
grown and positive organizational change has occurred because policies, practices, and 
training now reflect the departments core values. Citizens accurately perceive that the Wichita 
Police Department is truly community oriented and is not afraid to examine its organization 
for potential weaknesses. The Building Trust Initiative has created a model to address racial 
profiling issues that can be easily replicated by other law enforcement agencies. 
 
 

The Building Trust Initiative has not come to its final conclusion. Strategies to sustain 
changes and to measure ongoing success include the collection and analysis of a second set 
of data on pedestrian/traffic stops (2004), a critical review of the state of Kansass racial-
profiling study, continued customer service training for new employees, and a review of 
professional standards complaints regarding racial profiling. While pleased with the outcomes 
of its Building Trust Initiative, the Wichita Police Department recognizes that the issue of 
race-based policing requires constant vigilance. 

Agency Profile: Population 380,000; Officers 646 
 


Conclusion 

This chapter has asserted that law enforcement agencies that adopt community policing 
philosophies and that use the types of strategies highlighted in this chapter can better 
succeed in their critical mission of protecting and promoting civil rights. This is not intended 
to suggest that community policing is a panacea or that law enforcement agencies that 
do not officially embrace community policing are not able to ensure that they enforce the 
law while protecting civil rights. Building bridges throughout the community that a law 
enforcement agency serves, under any philosophical banner, is a critical cornerstone of 
protecting civil rights. These efforts, of course, can be made stronger by systematic analysis 
and adoption of a problem-solving approach. While customer-service orientations embraced 
by departments are highly valuable, they must be reinforced by the types of policies, training, 
practices, and accountability tools discussed in the rest of this guide. 

Suggestions for Further Reading 

Many publications addressing community policing exist in the literature. More information 
about those supported through the U.S. Department of Justice Office of Community Oriented 
Policing Services can be found at www.cops.usdoj.gov/Default.asp?Item=118. 

A short list of resources relevant to community policing and its nexus with the enhancement 
of mutual respect and the protection and promotion of civil rights are listed below. 

Davies, Heather J., and Gerard R. Murphy. Protecting Your Community From Terrorism: 
Strategies for Local Law Enforcement  Volume 2: Working with Diverse Communities. 
Police Executive Research Forum, Washington, DC; 2004. 

Ethics Toolkit: Enhancing Law Enforcement Ethics in a Community Policing Environment 
presented by The International Association of Chiefs of Police and the U.S. Department of 
Justice Office of Community Oriented Policing Services. www.theiacp.org/profassist/ethics. 

Khashu, Anita, Robin Busch, and Zainab Latif. Building Strong Police-Immigrant Community 
Relations: Lessons from a New York City Project, Vera Institute of Justice, New York, NY; 
2005. www.cops.usdoj.gov/mime/open.pdf?Item=1576. 

Peed, Carl R. Making a Mark: Police Integrity in a Changing Environment. Police 
Executive Research Forum, Washington, DC; 2002. www.cops.usdoj.gov/mime/open. 
pdf?Item=781. 

Scrivner, Ellen. Mutual Respect in Policing: Lesson Plan. Police Executive Research Forum, 
Washington, DC; 2006. Including VHS tape @ 22:47 minutes. 

 

Endnotes 

1 
Gruber, Charles. A Chiefs Role in Prioritizing Civil Rights. The Police Chief. November 
2004 Available on web at www.policechiefmagazine.org/magazine and selecting Archive. 

2 
What is Community Policing. November 2000. Office of Community Oriented Policing 
Services. Retrieved on November 1, 2005 from www.cops.usdoj.gov/default.asp?Item=36. 

3 
Skogan, Wesley, and Lynn Steiner. CAPS at Ten: Community Policing in Chicago; An 
Evaluation of Chicagos Alternative Policing Strategy. Chicago/Evanston IL: Chicago 
Community Policing Evaluation Consortium, 2004. 

4 
Peed, Carl. Applying Community Policing Principles Post 9/11. Making a Mark. 
Introductory Letter. January 16 2003. Retrieved November 1, 2005 from www.cops.usdoj. 
gov/mime/open.pdf?Item=780. 

5 
Diamond, Drew and Bonnie Bucqueroux. Community Policing Is Homeland Security. 
policing.com. October 30, 2005. Available on the web at www.policing.com/articles/ 
terrorism.html. 

6 
Scrivner, Ellen. Building Training Capacity for Homeland Security: Lessons Learned from 
Community Policing. The Police Chief October 2005. www.policechiefmagazine.org/ 
magazine select Archive. 

7 
For this question, community policing was part of a list of programs and tasks. For 
each task, respondents were requested to answer, How does your agency address the 
following problems/tasks? Response categories for all programs and tasks were the 
same. The response selections were: (1) Agency HAS specialized unit with FULL-TIME 
personnel to address this problem/task or, under the general heading of  Agency DOES 
NOT HAVE a specialized unit with full-time personnel choices were (2) Agency has 
dedicated personnel to address this problem/task, (3) Agency addresses this problem/ 
task, but does not have dedicated personnel, or (3) Agency does not address this 
problem/task (emphases in original). 

8 
Other means may include a broad diversity of implementation strategies. The use of 
this response by the Chicago Police Department provides an illustrative example. Chicago 
is recognized widely as having an ambitious community policing strategy. Rather than 
making community policing the task of a particular unit or designated personnel, the 
department expects community policing to be the responsibility of every officer. Other 
survey respondents who also have indicated that they implement community policing 
trough other means do not necessarily follow the Chicago model. 

9 
See for instance McGuire, Edward R. Organizational Structure in American Police Agencies: 
Context, Complexity, and Control. Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2003. 

10 This program was an applicant in the 2002 IACP Webber Seavey Award for Quality in Law 
Enforcement and an applicant for the Herman Goldstein Award for Excellence in Problem 
Oriented Policing, also in 2002. Text is derived from the Webber Seavey program abstract. 

11 
This program received the Herman Goldstein Award for Excellence in Problem Oriented 
Policing in 2000, was a finalist for the 2001 IACP Webber Seavey Award for Quality in Law 
Enforcement, and was an applicant in the 2002 Innovations in American Government 
Program. More information on this program is available at www.innovations.harvard.edu 
and on the departments web site at www.eppd.org 

12 
Perkins, Lloyd, and Thomas Winn. Crime Prevention and Community Programs: Building 

 

Bridges.The Police Chief October 2005. The text was adapted from the article. 

13 
The text above was obtained from the programs web page at www.ci.charlotte.nc.us/ 
Departments/Police/Crime+Info/International+Relations/Home.htm. The publication Law 
Enforcement Services to a Growing International Community. The manual is available on 
CMPDs web site at www.cmpd.org and the North Carolina Governors Crime Commissions 
web site at www.ncgccd.org. 

14 
This program was a semifinalist for the IACP 2005 Weber Seavey Award for Quality in Law 
Enforcement. The text was adapted from the award publication available on the web at 
www.theiacp.org/awards/webber/2005WSAbstracts.pdf. 

15 
Frequently Asked Questions. The National Citizens Police Academy Association (NCPAA). 
Retrieved November 15, 2005 from www.nationalcpaa.org/faq.htm 

16 
This program was a semifinalist for the IACP 2003 Weber Seavey Award for Quality in 
Law Enforcement. The text was adapted from the award publication available on the 
web at www.motorola.com/governmentandenterprise/contentdir/en_US/Files/General/ 
WebberSeavey2003Winners.pdf. 

18 
This program was an applicant in the 2003 IACP Weber Seavey Award for Quality in Law 
Enforcement. The text was adapted from the award submission submitted to the IACP. 
 

III. Developing an Early Intervention Strategy 


Developing an Early Intervention Strategy 

The costs associated with hiring and training a police officer run in the thousands of dollars. 
It is in the officers and our best interest to intercede when an officer is struggling personally 
or professionally. Without early intervention, we risk losing personnel from our ranks that 
we might well have been able to keep with intervention.1 

James Hussey, Chief of Cohasset (Massachusetts) Police Department 

Introduction 

When carefully designed and implemented, early intervention systems can benefit individual 
officers, police departments, and the community. Increasingly being integrated into broader 
personnel assessment or risk-management systems, early intervention management 
strategies provide a means of identifying officers who may be headed for trouble. This strategy 
offers a crucial opportunity to intervene on behalf of these officers, their departments, and 
their communities. At the individual level, early intervention can save officers careers and 
potentially save lives. Police departments justifiably devote considerable resources and offer 
extensive training to prevent on-duty deaths and injuries. Nevertheless, at least twice as many 
law enforcement officers are lost each year to suicide as are killed in the line of duty.2 Properly 
implemented early intervention strategies can provide the assistance that officers working in a 
highly stressful profession urgently may need. 

Individual officers, police departments, and their communities benefit when departments 
succeed in addressing the factors that contribute to officers risk for errors in professional 
judgment, alcohol abuse, and suicide as well as other personal and professional problems. To 
be fully effective, early intervention must be accepted by officers, supervisory personnel, and 
communities as an important alternative and complement to disciplinary systems. Through 
early intervention policies and practices, departments benefit from proactive prevention 
and actually reduce the need for reactive discipline. When well designed, early intervention 
programs stress positive performance. The same focused supervisory techniques used to 
identify the first signs of a problem can also be used to identify and encourage officers whose 
performance is markedly above average. Communities benefit from a law enforcement agency 
that has enhanced its commitment to accountability, both internal and external. 

Chapter Overview and Objectives 

This chapter offers a working definition of early intervention, in part, by drawing on 
information about early intervention from federal consent decrees and memorandums 
of agreement (MOA) as well as from promising and innovative early intervention efforts 
from police departments throughout the nation. It explores a range of practices commonly 
associated with early intervention and addresses both its benefits and its challenges. 
 


This chapter acknowledges that, much like CompStat and problem-oriented policing, early 
intervention is a data-driven management strategy. Early intervention efforts are only 
as effective as the information that is gathered and the managers who use it. The most 
technologically sophisticated early intervention systems will be severely compromised if data 
that inform decisions are not collected systematically and if managers are not motivated and 
trained to take advantage of this tool. Although more and more departments are using early 
intervention systems, clear data standards and uniform practices have yet to be established. 

This chapter deliberately considers early intervention within the context of police departments 
other operations. Early intervention efforts do not exist in a vacuum. They must be considered 
in a broad context, i.e., as part of an integrated agencywide management approach. Early 
intervention must be coordinated with many areas of police practice. It must be deployed in 
ways that are consistent with department policies, field operations, supervisory practices, 
personnel practices, data management practices, and community outreach strategies. 

Finally, this chapter argues that early intervention is cost-effective. Although early intervention 
requires a considerable commitment of department resources and personnel, its effectiveness 
in identifying indicators of risk among police officers is being demonstrated in a growing 
number of departments. While the sheer number, variety, and complexity of early intervention 
systems prohibit a precise cost-benefit analysis at this time, many departments are 
recognizing that the short-term costs of implementing early intervention, though significant, 
are less than the long-term costs they will incur without such a system in place. 

A Definition of Early Intervention 

Early intervention refers to a series of interrelated personnel management processes that 
help supervisors identify, assess, and evaluate employees performance for the purposes of 
addressing potential concerns in a timely manner. Early intervention allows supervisors to 
address problems in officers performance before these problems escalate to the point of 
requiring disciplinary action. Samuel Walker, professor of criminal justice at the University 
of Nebraska Omaha specializing in police accountability, defines early intervention systems 
as the systematic collection and analysis of data on officer performance for the purpose of 
identifying problems that need to be corrected.3 

The Evolution of Early Intervention 

Early intervention strategies are continually evolving. Paralleling the development of 
improved management techniques and technological innovations across all operational 
areas of law enforcement, early intervention strategies are becoming more prevalent and 
more sophisticated. Leading examples of early intervention systems include those at the Los 
Angeles County Sheriffs Department, the Miami-Dade Police Department, the Phoenix Police 
Department, and the Pittsburgh Bureau of Police.4 While all four of these model systems 
are located in large departments, law enforcement agencies of various sizes and various 
jurisdictionsmunicipal, county, state, and specialare now adopting early intervention 
systems and tailoring them to meet their own needs. 



The spirit of early intervention is similarly evolving. Initially, many early intervention systems 
were designed primarily to detect, and even remove, officers who constituted a risk to their 
department. Now, these systems tend to be more far-reaching and refined. Todays early 
intervention systems are designed to identifyat the first sign of a potential problemofficers 
who might benefit from assistance in the form of counseling, retraining, and other forms 
of nonpunitive intervention. In this way, early intervention is realizing the vision of those 
forward-thinking law enforcement leaders who first recognized the value of nonpunitive 
approaches to promoting police integrity and spearheaded some of the first early intervention 
efforts. 

Indeed, many departments are expanding their use of early intervention systems to identify 
and reward exemplary officers. The same data systems and management techniques that 
allow departments to identify officers who may benefit from nonpunitive intervention 
allow departments to identify officers who are exemplary performers. Early intervention 
systems may be used to identify an officer who, for example, may be working on highly 
active and risky details such as drug or gang interdiction units where suspect complaints 
are commonplace, but who receives very few citizen complaints or use-of-force citations. 
Departments are also using early intervention systems to identify officers who receive public 
commendations or awards. 

Early intervention systems are expanding in other ways as well. Many departments are 
using early intervention to enhance management and performance assessment of nonsworn 
personnel. 

Early Intervention: Terminology with a Purpose 

The terms early intervention, early warning, personnel assessment, and risk 
management are often used interchangeably for early intervention systems. The federal 
consent decrees and MOAs generally refer to early warning or risk management systems 
or adopt the name of the specific system that was in use in the jurisdiction at the time of 
the agreement, e.g., The Personnel Performance Management System by the Washington, 
D.C., Metropolitan Police or TEAMS II by the Los Angeles Police Department. 

When discussing specific systems, this guide, like the consent decrees and MOAs, uses 
the term used by the specific agency. When discussing these systems generally, however, 
this guide uses the term early intervention exclusively. As Samuel Walker suggests, the 
term early intervention better conveys the nondisciplinary and corrective characteristics 
of these systems while the term early warning has connotations that appear more 
ominous to police personnel.5 An early intervention process based on objective screening 
and careful supervisory assessment followed by intervention strategies chosen to meet 
the specific needs of an individual officer is consistent with a management philosophy 
that advocates professional development and assistance over management based solely on 
compliance and punishment. 

Terminology can make a major difference. Relying on the term early intervention instead 
of early warning is a better reflection of the true aim of these systems and may help 
impart a less threatening image to personnel and police unions. 



Bar graph showing munipal police department and sheriffs' offices with computerized 
personnel performance monitoring/assessment systems
Municipal Police Department and Sheriffs Offices 
w/ Computerized Personnel Performance Monitoring/Assessment Systems

The graph presented here illustrates
findings across municipal police 
departments and sheriffs offices by 
agency size. Among municipal police 
departments and sheriffs offices,  
the likelihood of an agency having a 
computerized early intervention system 
generally increased with size. Except for 
the largest category, early intervention 
systems are more common in municipal
departments than in sheriffs office of 
similar size.7

The Benefits of Early Intervention 

When properly implemented and managed, early intervention offers numerous benefits to law 
enforcement agencies. The benefits associated with early intervention include the following: 

 Enhancing police integrity 

 Promoting a culture of accountability and reconciling the ideals of internal and external 
accountability 

 Emphasizing the departments commitment to ethical policing 

 Decreasing reliance on negative sanctions and punitive actions 



 Providing supportive intervention to sustain, revive, and advance individual careers 

 Supporting and increasing efficiency of first-line supervisors 

 Promoting clearer and more consistent communication between supervisors and 
subordinates across the organization 

 Improving staff retention, thereby limiting the costs associated with staff turnover and lost 
investments in recruitment and training 

 Increasing overall management efficiency 

 Improving officer morale 

 Decreasing liability and costs of civil suits associated with misconduct and use of force 

 Enhancing community relations, particularly when community generated data are made 
part of the early intervention system 

 Reinforcing problem-oriented policing (POP) approaches for both internal and external 
problems 

 Underscoring the departments commitment to information and data-driven management 
strategies. 

Core Principles of Early Intervention 

Although early intervention systems vary in scope and complexity according to agencies 
size, mission, and management priorities, three core principles are critical to successful early 
intervention. 

1. Effective early intervention identifies potentially problematic behaviors in individual officers 
rather than identifying and removing problematic officers. 

Successful early intervention proactively identifies and addresses precursors to misconduct 
rather than imposing sanctions for actual misconduct. As the expression early intervention 
implies, these systems seek to recognize potentially problematic behaviors early on, when 
nondisciplinary, corrective actions will have the greatest likelihood for success. When early 
intervention systems indicate a need for intervention, these systems seek to problem-solve 
with the goals of redirecting and enhancing an officers performance, rather than isolating or 
ostracizing that individual for the purposes of discipline or termination. 

The Gladstone (Missouri) Department of Public Safety emphasizes the necessity for 
identifying problematic behaviors early on in order to ensure a problem-oriented versus a 
person-oriented approach in its description of the Personal Early Warning System: 

The Personnel Early Warning System [is] a time-sensitive system effectively designed to 
organize critical performance and evaluation data in a format conducive to promptly identify 
early indicators of certain performance and/or stress related problems and to facilitate any 
necessary or appropriate follow-up activities. 

Source: Gladstone (Missouri) Department of Public Safetys Policy Manual 
Agency Profile: Population 23,246; Officers 42



Through such an approach, early intervention not only assists individual officers, but also 
benefits an entire agency by sending the message that positive reinforcement, professional 
development, and education are favored over negative sanctions. To send this message 
unequivocally, management must emphasize and ensure that early intervention focuses on 
detecting problematic behaviors in officers rather than identifying, labeling, and weeding-out 
problematic officers. This latter task should remain the function of the disciplinary system, 
which ideally would be used as a last resort only if early intervention fails. 

2. Effective early intervention depends on the collection of relevant data and the use of that 
data in decision making. 

Many law enforcement departments have embraced data-driven strategiesincluding 
problem-solving and CompStat-style managementto fight crime and maintain public 
order. Early intervention is predicated on the same commitment to data-driven management. 
Prudent police managers recognize the power of data-driven management practices in 
improving public safety. They are now recognizing that these same strategies can be focused 
inward to improve personnel performance and integrity and to manage risk. 

While it is critical that departments demonstrate a commitment to the collection of relevant 
data and the use of that data in decision-making processes, early intervention systems do not 
require sophisticated information technology systems. Small and medium-sized departments 
can achieve the same objectives as larger, more technologically advanced agencies by relying 
on consistent and comprehensive record-keeping practices. The federal MOA between the 
Department of Justice and the Villa Rica (Georgia) Police Department indicates that early 
intervention can succeed even when a computerized database is not used: 

The VRPD [Villa Rica Police Department] shall develop a formal system to monitor officer 
conduct. This system shall include information on investigations, complaints (including civil 
lawsuits), uses of force, training histories, supervisory reviews, and disciplinary and other 
corrective actions. The VRPDs system need not be computerized, but shall contain triggers set 
to detect behavior which raises concerns and requires supervisory review. The VRPD shall 
require supervisors to review the data regarding officers under their command on a regular 
basis, and should establish guidelines regarding the specific events that require additional 
supervisory review and consideration of corrective action.8 (Emphasis added.) 

While early intervention can succeed with or without sophisticated computerized systems, 
technology does provide the benefit of allowing supervisors to access large volumes of 
organized data by automating certain processes. For example, supervisors direct observations 
of and interactions with officers may be augmented by reference to an early intervention 
database. In addition, department personnel may set specific criteria by which the database 
automatically indicates an individual officer as exhibiting potentially problematic behavior. 



3. Effective early intervention requires strong and effective supervisory review. 

Early intervention succeeds as thoughtful and thorough supervisors make appropriate use 
of the data at their command. Early intervention systems are only a tool, not a substitute, for 
strong and effective supervisors. The critical importance of supervision to successful early 
intervention efforts is emphasized in many department policies as well as in federal consent 
decrees and MOAs. The Rock Hill (South Carolina) Police Department explicitly identifies 
supervisors responsibilities within its Personnel Early Warning System: 

1. First and second level supervisors will familiarize themselves with their subordinates and 
routinely observe their demeanor, appearance, and conduct. 

2. Supervisors will remain alert for indications of behavioral changes or stressors that may 
affect a Department members performance. 

3. When supervisors perceive or determine that a Department member has problems or is 
causing problems, they will assess the situation and take appropriate action in accordance 
with this general order and the other policies and procedures of the Department, including 
referral to the City Employee Assistance Program or a police chaplain, informal counseling 
by a supervisor, and other remedial action. 

Source: Rock Hill (South Carolina) Police Department General Orders Manual 
Agency Profile: Population 50,000; Officers 107

Under the consent decree of the Detroit Police Department, the department is required 
to develop a Review Protocol for commanders and supervisors using the departments 
Risk Management System. The consent decree requires that commanders and supervisors 
promptly review records of all officers recently transferred to their sections and units and 
further stipulates that commanders and supervisors be evaluated on their ability to use the 
risk management system.9 

Law enforcement executives can increase the likelihood that these systems will be effective 
and accepted if they ensure that early intervention occurs in a preventive, timely, and 
problem-oriented (versus reactive) manner that it is data-driven and is seen as a tool (rather 
than a substitute) for good supervision. 

Basic Components of Early Intervention Systems 

The fact that the scope and complexity of early intervention systems and their associated 
administrative features vary widely by agency and the fact that these systems are constantly 
evolving make a thorough review of early intervention systems challenging. Nevertheless, 
the basic components of these systems are identifiable. These components receive detailed 
discussion in the early intervention policies of individual police departments, the language of 
the consent decrees and MOAs, and the professional and academic literature describing these 
systems. 



The following discussion presents the basic components of early intervention systems and 
provides an overview of these components as documented by agencies and in the language of 
consent decrees and MOAs. 

Indicators: The Foundation of Early Interventions Systems 

Early intervention systems are built on a foundation of performance indicators that are 
believed to be indicative of potentially problematic behavior. While early intervention 
systems vary widely because of the number and scope of performance indicators used, the 
most commonly included indicators are citizen complaints, use-of-force reports, and firearm 
discharges. Although performance indicators are the foundation of early intervention systems, 
very little assessment of the relative strengths and weaknesses of the various indicators in 
predicting risk have occurred. To date, there is little standardization of which indicators should 
be used, but there is growing interests among agencies to share experiences as the use of 
these systems continues to evolve. 

As early intervention systems become more prevalent and more sophisticated, the number 
of indicators is growing. Today, early intervention systems commonly include incidents 
of resisting arrest, instances of civil litigation, vehicle pursuits, accidents/vehicle damage, 
sick days, and secondary employment as performance indicators. Some early intervention 
systems are even incorporating more particularized indicators to predict risk. For instance, 
while many departments simply specify use-of-force incidents as an indicator, others count 
only use-of-force incidents that exceed a certain level of force or consider use-of-force ratios 
that statistically account for variations in arrest activity. Similarly, while many departments 
merely tabulate sick days and then assess them against fixed-threshold or department-wide 
standards, others specifically flag sick days that are contiguous to vacations or holidays for 
greater scrutiny. 

The following text box lists the performance indicators used in the Phoenix Police 
Departments Personnel Assessment System (PAS) and the Pittsburgh Police Bureaus 
Performance Assessment Review System (PARS). The performance indicators used in these 
systems are among the most comprehensive in the nation. Both systems can be used to 
identify officers exhibiting behaviors indicative of risk. Both systems can also be used to 
identify officers who are exemplary performers because their performance indicators include 
commendations and citizen compliments. Finally, it is important to note that, for both systems, 
many of these performance indicators are not indicators per se, but sources of information 
that are used for contextual reference. For instance, both the Phoenix and Pittsburgh systems 
track arrests as an indicator although a mere count of arrests is not indicative of any risk. 
Rather, the number of arrests can be used to put other indicators in context (e.g., use-of-force 
ratios relative to activity such as arrests, field interrogations, or citations). 



Indicators Tracked by the Phoenix Police Departments PAS10 

 Assignment history 
 Discipline
 Employee use of force 
  Firearms qualification data 
 Suspect use of force  
 All O.T. worked and % paid & held  
 All citizens, supervisory, & PSB  employee requested notes  
 Complaints  
 Police accidents  
 Refer to driving analysis 
 Interrogations  
 Significant event radio codes from CAD  
 Industrial Injuries  
 Use-of-force ratios  
 Industrial exposures  
 Department reports  
 Training records  
 Employee summary report  
 Leave time history & balances 
 PAS contact information 
 Police Shootings
 Employee photo 
 Work-hour summary
 Threshold summary report
 Arrests
 Employee assistance options
 Discretionary arrest codes
 Peer support
 Citations, traffic & criminal 
 Critical Incident Stress Team
 Pursuits
 Chaplains
 Internal audits
 Mental health professionals
 Off-duty work data
 24/7 crisis lines
 Commendations, awards, & letters of appreciation

Indicators Tracked by the Pittsburgh Police Bureaus PARS11 

 Accidents 
 Arrests 
 Counseling 
 Civil claims 
 Complaints 
 Criminal investigations 
 Discipline 
 Lawsuits 
 Missed court dates 
 Traffic stops 
 Weapons discharge 
 Search and seizure 
 Use of force 
 Sick time 
 Other absences (e.g., suspensions) 
 Grievances 
 Secondary employment 
 Injuries 
 Citations, traffic and criminal 
 Pursuits 
 Off-duty work data 
 Discretionary arrest codes (false 
information, escape, resisting arrest, 
disorderly conduct, no identification) 
 


When departments rely on more comprehensive performance indicators, their ability to 
predict risk and identify exemplary performers may be enhanced, but there may also be an 
increased tendency for individual officers to be indicated as exhibiting potentially problematic 
behavior. As these data-driven systems expand, it is increasingly imperative to ensure strong 
and effective supervision. The existence of indicated behavior does not necessarily mean 
that potentially problematic behavior exists. Managers and supervisors must not fall into the 
trap of assuming that a complicated risk-indicator system, based on a sophisticated statistical 
algorithm, represents a magic formula that automatically and precisely determines risk. 
Both the Phoenix Police Departments PAS and the Pittsburgh Police Bureaus PARS rely on 
standardized statistical reports that are regularly reviewed by supervisors, but that also allow 
for ad hoc reporting and analysis. The need for the careful review of performance indicators 
by experienced and well-trained supervisors who assess information within the context of the 
precipitating event and the individual officers career cannot be overstated. 

Acting on Indicators: The Workings of Early Intervention Systems 

Having established a foundation of performance indicators, early intervention systems 
succeed as supervisors respond to indications that officers may benefit from intervention. 
This process generally occurs in four steps. First, early intervention identifies officers who 
may require intervention. Second, early intervention requires a mandatory supervisory review 
to determine if intervention should occur. Third, early intervention requires supervisors to 
identify and implement the most appropriate form of intervention. Fourth, early intervention 
recommends post-intervention monitoring. Drawing, again, on consent decrees, MOAs, 
successful early intervention systems, and professional literature, the following discussion 
reviews the means by which various early intervention systems accomplish these steps. 

Step One: Identifying Officers Who May Require Intervention 

The first step for successful early intervention is to identify officers who may require 
intervention. Standard management practices across all agencies should ensure that 
supervisors remain continually aware of officers behavior. Frequentideally dailycontact 
and periodic reviews of officer performance on a systematic basis should enable superiors to 
identify and direct increased attention to officers who are exhibiting potentially problematic 
behaviors or whose behavior does not appear to comply with agency expectations or 
standards maintained by their peers. 

Early intervention offers the added advantage of augmenting supervisors direct interactions 
and observations based on reference to an objective set of performance indicators. An 
individual department typically will organize these performance indicators according to 
a specified threshold. Whenever officers behaviors reach this department-established 
threshold, supervisors review their records and assess officer performance to determine 
whether intervention is appropriate. A variety of thresholds are currently in use. For example, 
a threshold may be reached once a certain number of indicatorssuch as use-of-force 
incidentsoccur over a certain period, such as 3 months. Other methods of using statistical 
thresholds may involve calculations that are more complex. This section will review the most 
prevalent types of early intervention thresholds. 



Fixed Threshold Alerts 

Fixed thresholds are the most straightforward. Fixed thresholds are reached whenever a 
certain number of indicators occur over a specified period. Below is a hypothetical version of 
text adapted from several early intervention system policy directives (which have since been 
updated). 

Early Intervention System Criteria 

Officers will be targeted for review by the early Intervention system if he or she is found to 
have an accumulated total of four incidents from the following categories within a 6-month period 
the officers name will be placed on the early warning system review list for attention. 

1. Vehicle pursuits initiated by officer. 
2. Preventable vehicle accidents. 
3. Uses of force determined NOT to be in compliance. 
4. Citizen complaints filed. 
5. Any instance of department discipline. 

Most departments that implement these thresholds require that officers who meet a fixed 
threshold receive required mandatory supervisory review to determine if intervention is 
warranted.12 

Point System Threshold Alerts 

Compared to fixed thresholds, point system thresholds are a slightly more complex method of 
triggering mandatory supervisory review. In point systems, different performance indicators 
are given different point values. Officers are indicated for review when they reach a certain 
number of points within a specified period. The Greenville (South Carolina) Police Department 
uses a point system for specific performance indicators in its Personnel Early Warning System, 
as follows: 

Complaint = 2 points
Disciplinary action = 2 points
Use of force = 1 point
Vehicle pursuit = 1 point
Vehicle collision = 1 point 

Source: Greenville (South Carolina) Police Departments policy manual 
Profile: Population 56,000; Officers 184

Department thresholds are reached if an officer receives six points in a 3-month period or 20 
points in a year. 
 


Peer-Based Threshold Alerts 

Peer-based thresholds acknowledge the reality that different officers are more or less likely to 
reach a fixed threshold or a point system threshold given their assignment. Officers working 
on a specialized gang or drug unit or in a high-crime district, for instance, are more likely 
to be the subjects of citizen complaints or experience more situations where use of force is 
warranted. Accordingly, peer-based thresholds are adjusted to acknowledge the risk inherent 
in officers various assignments. Officers who are being assessed relative to a peer-based 
threshold, for instance, may be indicated if they are one standard deviation above the mean of 
their peers for specified performance indicators. Peers are defined by a variety of criteria. For 
example, an officers peers may be defined as those working the same zone and same shift. As 
a result, these thresholds adjust for different risk levels associated with different assignments. 

The Pittsburgh Police Bureau pioneered the use of early intervention peer-based thresholds 
when developing its Performance Assessment and Review System in response to the 1997 
consent decree with the Department of Justice. In developing this peer-based threshold, 
Pittsburgh actually went well beyond the scope of requirements specified in the consent 
decree. Today, that system is a model for other departments, including many under federal 
consent decrees and MOAs. A Prince Georges County (Maryland) Police Department Consent 
Decree Status Report specifically credits Pittsburghs system as exerting a major influence over 
its system.13 

Single-Event Threshold Alerts 

As various thresholds become increasingly sophisticated, many departments still recognize 
that certain incidents should automatically indicate an officer for review. A mandatory 
supervisory review is in order whenever a death, whether of a suspect, bystander, or fellow 
officer, results from the actions of a police officer or whenever an officer uses force defined 
as deadly. The implication of such a review is not that the officers behavior was necessarily 
problematic. Instead, a review is performed in recognition of the fact that deaths, injuries, or 
shootings that result from officers actions are traumatic experiences for which counseling or 
other forms of intervention may be advisable. 

Alerts not Based on Automated Threshold 

The use of thresholds, which provide crucial alerts for mandatory supervisory review, is a 
key feature of early intervention systems. Departments that use early intervention, however, 
quickly recognize that intervention sometimes may be warranted before a threshold is 
reached. Supervisors should act when they observe signs of potential problems rather than 
waiting for a problem to manifest itself in statistically indicated behavior. Supervisors may be 
aware of stresses in officers personal lives such as marital discord, illness, or problems with 
children. Supervisors may observe sudden changes in personality, such as when a normally 
quiet and reserved officer suddenly seeks out attention or when an outspoken officer appears 
unusually quiet. Such behavioral cues should be heeded as signs of problems that may 
affect an officers performance or judgment on the job. These may be signs that the officer 
might later act out, on or off the job, in career-ending ways. Department thresholdsno 
matter how extensive or nuancedwill not always alert supervisors to the myriad problems 
that officers may experience. Alert, conscientious, and diligent supervisors are the critical 
component in even the most technologically sophisticated early intervention strategy. 

 


In the experience of the Phoenix (Arizona) Police Department, nonthreshold alerts have come 
from supervisors, peers, family members, and officers themselves. Supervisors in Phoenix 
see this as an encouraging trend suggesting that officers and their families recognize the 
Phoenix Police Departments PAS as a genuine effort to assist employees.14 

Benefits of Timely Indicators 

Early intervention can be most effective if it is administered in a timely manner. Thus, it 
deserves note that computerized early intervention systems can offer the additional advantage 
of generating an automatic notification whenever an officer has crossed a department-defined 
threshold. The sooner supervisors learn of potentially problematic behavior, the sooner they 
can review this behavior and take steps, if necessary, to prevent escalation. In many manual 
and some automated systems, agencies tabulate performance indicator data on a quarterly 
basis. This standard compromises the timeliness of early intervention efforts. Data recorded 
and reviewed in real time is the most useful. Departments with fully automated systems 
may alert supervisors as soon as an officer crosses a threshold. These automated alerts may 
take the form of briefing reports submitted to appropriate supervisors or automated e-mail 
notifications. 

Step Two: Mandatory Supervisor Review for Indicated Officers 

Once an early intervention system indicates an individual officer, most departments require 
a mandatory supervisory review to determine whether the indicated officer is, indeed, in need 
of intervention. 

It is important to emphasize again that supervisors are making a critical decision at this point. 
The fact that an officer is indicated does not automatically mean that he or she is in need of 
intervention. While early intervention systems are an effective tool to indicate officers in need 
of intervention, legitimate police activity can and does indicate officers who do not require 
intervention. Indicated officers should not be projected in a prejudicial or negative light. 
Instead, supervisors must remember that indication is the first step in a multistep process and 
is not in itself determinative of the need for intervention. Supervisors must play the critical 
role in determining whether intervention is warranted. 

Understandably, supervisors may prefer to err on the side of caution. Early intervention exists 
to identify and address potentially problematic behavior before escalation. Departments, 
however, must rely on a supervisors experience and insight in determining if, in fact, there is 
need for intervention. Being indicated does not mean that intervention is imminent. Indeed, in 
certain circumstances, the decision not to intervene may be the appropriate decision. 

While the review requirement is almost universal, there are no widely established criteria or 
precise protocols for performing this review. There should be absolute consensus, however, 
that supervisors play the critical role in the decision process. The computerized alert is simply 
a tool. 



Text from the Colorado Springs (Colorado) Police Department manual suggests the breadth of 
information and experience on which supervisors will need to draw: 

The analysis of the facts should include consideration of the totality of circumstances 
surrounding each incident and/or complaint, drawing on knowledge of human behavior, 
department polices and procedures, and the insight of the involved supervisors and 
managers. 

Source: Colorado Springs (Colorado) Police Department manual 
Agency Profile: Population 315,000; Officers 501

Indeed, supervisors experience, training, and direct working knowledge of their officers at this 
stage of the process are especially critical. By considering the context in which the indicating 
events occurred, supervisors are best able to use their personal knowledge of the officer and 
his or her professional judgment of the officers behavior to determine whether intervention 
is required. Department policies should identify factors that reviewing supervisors should 
consider in their decision regarding intervention. The following discussion investigates these 
factors. 

Supervisors should ascertain whether the indicating events reflect a pattern or an isolated 
incident or incidents. Behaviors that reflect a pattern may require intervention where isolated 
incidents may not. For instance, an officer may have been indicated because of four citizen 
complaints within a 1-week period. Upon assessment, the supervisor may determine that all 
the complaints were generated by members of a family alleging that the office was rude to a 
specific person in the family, a person that the officer lawfully arrested. Noting that the officer 
has never had a citizen complaint for rudeness or for any other reason in his 5-year career, the 
supervisor may decide that no intervention is needed even though the indicator threshold was 
met. 

Supervisors should determine whether there are links between the indicating events. Similar 
events may be indicative of underlying problems. A string of complaints in which an officers 
is alleged to have been using foul and discourteous language, may be related to personal 
problems the officer is experiencing. Seemingly dissimilar indicators may also have a 
common link. For instance, a supervisor may need to determine whether an inordinate use of 
sick days or missed courts dates are related to an officers secondary employment. 

Supervisors should consider the full context in which indicating events occur. In supervisors 
efforts to assess an officers behavior and performance, context is critical. Supervisors should 
always seek to determine if there are factors, including factors outside the department, 
contributing to an officers behavior. For instance, an officer may be experiencing marital 
problems, a death in the family, or problems with children that influence work performance. 
Understanding the critical factors, both on and off the job, will help supervisors decide when 
to intervene and to tailor needed interventions to individual officers needs. 
 
 

Supervisors should ascertain whether deficiencies in policies or training might have 
contributed to indicating events. In a thorough assessment of indicating events, a supervisor 
may determine that unclear policies or inadequate training contributed, in part or in whole, to 
the problem. Police work is remarkably complex; policies and training cannot anticipate every 
situation. If novel situations expose problems with existing policies or training, supervisors 
should respond by providing feedback to appropriate department personnel. If either unclear 
polices or inadequate training is a major contributing factor in indicating an officer, the 
supervisor may well decide that no intervention for that officer is needed. 

Supervisors should determine what, if anything, should or could have been done differently 
to prevent the indicating events. Supervisors may prevent unfortunate events in the future 
by fully understanding how officers might have acted differently in the past. For instance, 
if an officer is indicated for crossing a use-of-force threshold or a single event threshold 
for excessive use of force, the supervisor should review how these situations might have 
been handled differently. If intervention is needed, discussing different ways of handling the 
situations may become an important part of that intervention. 

Supervisors should document their reviews of indicated officers. Just as there are no widely 
established criteria or precise protocols for performing mandatory supervisory reviews, 
there are no hard and fast guidelines governing the documentation of these reviews. Some 
departments require formal written reports in which supervisors are required to respond with 
highly specific detail. Other departments are much less formal. Departments should determine 
what purposes the required documentation of reviews would serve. The requirements for 
the highly detailed, formally written reports used in the Early Intervention Program at the 
Colorado Springs Police Department follow: 

The report of the [Early Intervention Program] analysis will include a brief summary of the 
facts of each incident and/or complaint that qualified the employee for the EIP. This report 
should include the findings and conclusions based on the supervisors analysis, as well as a 
recommended assistance. Suggested assistance may include, but is not limited to: 

1. Assessment that no problem behavior exists. 
2. Need for remediation or training. 
3. Referral to the department psychologist for counseling or further referral to Employee 
Assistance Program [EAP]. 
4. Peer training/assistance. 
5. Change of working environment. 
6. Documentation of an approved performance plan. 

This performance plan will be designed to assess further and correct any identified performance 
concerns, and may include any or all of the above corrective measures. This performance plan 
may include progressive discipline for any failure to meet the stated requirements. In reference 
to use of force incidents, supervisors should address the following when documenting their 
review of the initial investigation: 

1. Supervisor notification. 
2. Photos taken of the suspect. 
3. Detailed description of the suspects actions. 
4. Detailed description of the employees actions. 

 


5. Documentation of all employees involved. 
6. Listing of all officers and witnesses present. 
7. City of Colorado Springs listed as the victim in all resisting, interference, and obstructing 
cases. 
8. Employee listed as the victim in all Assaults on a Peace Officer cases. 
9. Statement of when/if resistance stops. 
10. The employees job assignment(s) during the reporting period. 
11. The employees Internal Affairs and Staff Resources Section records. 
12. The number of arrests made during the reporting period. 
13. Any other information or statistics that may be pertinent. 

Final Review of EIP Analysis Report 

The report, with the recommended assistance, will be completed by the officers supervisor 
and presented to the involved Lieutenant. The Lieutenant will review the recommendation 
and provide any necessary insight and/or recommendation(s). The Division Commander will 
then review the summaries and provide any necessary insight and/or recommendation(s). The 
Division Commander will make the final decision on any recommended action as a result of 
an EIP Analysis Report. The original EIP Analysis Report will be delivered and maintained 
by the Office of Professional Standards, Internal Affairs Section, and a copy placed in the 
employees EIP file. The completed EIP Analysis Report will be delivered to the Internal 
Affairs Section within thirty days of the initial notification that an employee has qualified for 
the EIP. The Division Commander of the affected employee will ensure that: 

1. The employee is fully informed of the findings and disposition of this analysis. 
2. All final recommendations are fully implemented. 
3. A copy of this analysis may be retained in the employees evaluation file. 

Source: Colorado Springs Police Department Manual
Agency Profile: Population 315,000; Officers 501
 


Step Three: Selecting and Implementing Appropriate Intervention 

When supervisors determine that intervention is warranted, they are given considerable 
leeway in deciding what form that intervention should take. Intervention ranges from the very 
informal, such as a discussion of the indicating event with a supervisor, to the more formal, 
such as a referral to psychological counseling, stress management, or substance abuse 
programs through a departments employee assistance program (EAP). The most common 
intervention options available for officers include the following: 

 Training/retraining in specific problem area 

 Transfer/reassignment 

 Counseling 
o By supervisors 
o By peers 
o By mental health professional 

 Alcohol/substance abuse counseling 

 Referral to EAP. 

While intervention options may vary from department to department, all interventions should 
share two characteristics. First, interventions should be designed to assist the officer in 
correcting the problem. Intervention must be undertaken with the goal of creating a response 
that will benefit the officer, the department, and the community in a proactive, not punitive, 
way. Second, interventions should be tailored to the needs of the individual. In contrast to 
the disciplinary process, early intervention is not intended to be a quid pro quo system. Two 
officers indicated for similar events (e.g., an inordinate number of use-of-force incidents 
when compared with their peers) may be experiencing different underlying problems. While 
retraining may be an appropriate intervention for one, the other may require retraining and 
counseling. Supervisors should expect that interventions could vary widely. 

Step Four: Post-Intervention Monitoring 

Precise protocols for post-intervention monitoring are as uncommon as they are for 
intervention itself. In this step, supervisors benefit from flexibility and informality as they 
monitor their officers. As with intervention, the success of post-intervention monitoring 
depends on the experience and skill of supervisors who may tailor their monitoring to the 
needs of the individual officer. During post-intervention monitoring, the supervisors efforts 
should focus on the officer. For instance, if an officer is indicated because of three use-of-force 
incidents in a year, any subsequent use-of-force incident should be reviewed thoroughly. 
Increased supervision, including random roll-bys to observe the officers performance in the 
field may also be warranted. 

In addition to monitoring individual officers, supervisors must monitor their own success in 
managing early intervention efforts alongside disciplinary procedures and in sustaining the 
viability of the early intervention system in the minds of their officers. 

Supervisors should clearly understand the difference between early intervention strategies 
and disciplinary strategies and distinguish between the two. Supervisors should also expect 
monitoring of these efforts by their superiors. Early intervention is meant to identify and 
address problematic behavior at its first appearance rather than waiting until disciplinary 
action is required. Wisely and increasingly, police executives are adopting early intervention 



strategies because of their preventive benefits. Early intervention can ensure that officers are 
not punished for effective, active, and appropriately aggressive policing. It can also ensure 
that disciplinary action remains a tool of last resort. Still, early intervention does not supplant 
the appropriate use of discipline. Departments policies must remain clear in recognizing that 
some behaviors require discipline and are best handled through the standard disciplinary 
process. 

Departments using early intervention alongside their traditional disciplinary system are 
likely to see disciplinary proceedings take place for at least two reasons. First, disciplinary 
systems remain necessary in cases of alleged official misconduct and in instances when 
officers allegedly violate criminal law. This is the case in departments with or without early 
intervention. Second, disciplinary systems are necessary in cases in which early intervention 
was attempted but unsuccessful because an officer refused or was unable to comply. Ideally, 
the effective use of early intervention strategies will result in a corresponding decrease in 
disciplinary measures. 

Police executives are ultimately responsible for ensuring that their departments achieve 
the proper balance between early intervention and traditional disciplinary protocols. The 
discretion granted to first-line supervisors under early intervention strategies is critical. It 
necessitates a heightened level of review by command staff to guard against misapplication, 
either intentional or unintentional. Supervisory decisions should be reviewed frequently and 
systematically by the chain of command to ensure that early intervention is not used in cases 
where discipline is mandated by a departments policies. Review procedures should also 
guard against the opposite: instances in which disciplinary procedures are used where early 
intervention is more appropriate. 

Supervisors should monitor their efforts to preserve the credibility of early intervention. 

Although it is now common practice for a department to keep early intervention strategies 
conceptually and operationally distinct from its disciplinary system, this does not obviate the 
need for employee safeguards when implementing early intervention. In keeping with ethical 
and professional personnel management practices, many departments adhere to standards 
of confidentiality and policies that promote employee access. Not only are these standards 
ethical, but they also can contribute to officers confidence in early intervention. 

Maintaining Confidentiality 

Departments commonly specify that early intervention data files, whether electronic or 
manual, be held in confidence. Data is shared only with immediate supervisors and the chain 
of command directly involved in decisions regarding intervention. Supervisors should only 
be permitted to view data regarding officers serving beneath them in the chain of command. 
When formal reports or memorandums are issued as a result of supervisory review, 
departments generally treat these documents as confidential. The chief, however, may exercise 
discretion and make reports or memorandums available to appropriate supervisors for further 
review or when it serves the interests of the department. 

Allowing Employee Access 

Increasingly, departments also specify that officers early intervention data be accessible 
to them. Accessibility offers several benefits. First, open access policies increase the 
transparency of the system and underscore the message that early intervention exists to assist 
 


employees. Second, open access offers officers the opportunity to challenge or amend critical 
information used in early intervention, thereby providing an additional layer of checks and 
balances. Access may be given to both individuals who have been indicated and those who 
have not. The latter individuals may simply wish to know how close they are in coming to a 
threshold in order to take self-directed action to avoid being indicated. 

Integration of Early Intervention Systems into Comprehensive Personnel 
Assessment Systems 

Increasingly, law enforcement agencies are turning to personnel assessment or risk-
management systems instead of more narrowly focused early intervention systems. 
These more comprehensive systems typically contain the elements of early intervention 
systems, but provide other personnel management functions as well. These systems track 
officer performance data (e.g., responses to calls for service, arrests, and citations issues) 
including indicators of positive, neutral, and negative connotation. Through standardized 
report procedures and ad hoc queries, such systems yield consistent and reliable measures 
of performance. Increasingly, departments are using these systems to inform and support a 
wide range of personnel issues. Many departments routinely and systematically will assess 
performance indicators anytime an officer is transferred, promoted, or reassigned. Such 
indicators can be of invaluable assistance to supervisors when they receive transferred 
officers. Also, broadly focused personnel assessment systems can be useful tools for annual 
performance assessments and promotional decisions. The fact that these systems are broad 
enough to capture positive, neutral, and negative data means that these systems are more 
likely to be accepted by rank-and- file officers. The fact that they are now often used to manage 
both sworn and nonsworn personnel may contribute to a sense that the system is more 
evenly applied and inherently fairer. 

The Challenges of Complex Personnel Management Systems: 
Dealing with Data

The growth of early intervention systems and the development of more comprehensive 
personnel management systems require departments to manage increasing amounts of data. 
Fortunately, the need for effective data management parallels a greater reliance on data-driven 
strategies in policing generally. Data technology throughout law enforcement is increasingly 
comprehensive and sophisticated. More and more agencies are developing enterprisewide or 
gateway data solutions that make them more efficient in data-collection efforts while avoiding 
needless duplication. 

In simple terms, a gateway data system draws information from discrete data systems in 
ways that are transparent to the user. For instance, rather than storing all indicator data on 
a database system dedicated exclusively to early intervention, a gateway system pulls relevant 
data from systems designed for other purposes. For instance, an early intervention system 
that tracks sick days and use-of-force incidents may rely on a gateway system that pulls sick 
day information from a centralized city database that keeps track of city employee timesheets 
and use-of-force data from a police department database maintained on an internal server. 



This same early intervention system may also pull data from the agencys records management 
system to determine the ratio of use-of-force incidents to felony arrests for a particular 
officer. 

Consistent with this data integration approach, many departments treat their early intervention 
data as part of their broader data-collection system. For instance, the Pittsburgh Bureau of 
Police and the Phoenix Police Department both rely on gateway data systems for their early 
intervention efforts. 

Identifying Exemplary Performers 

Departments that capture positive, neutral, and negative data in their early intervention or 
personnel assessment systems have begun to rely on these indictors not only to identify 
officers in possible need of intervention, but also to identify exemplary performers. 
Recognizing and rewarding officers for exemplary performance can serve as an incentive 
for others, provide opportunities for peer mentoring, and reinforce the message that early 
intervention truly assists officers. The Pittsburgh Bureau of Police relies on PARS to assess 
which officers are worthy of promotions as well as to decide whether to accommodate officer-
initiated requests for duty transfers or outside training. For instance, if a patrol officer requests 
a transfer to the traffic division, PARS can be queried to determine whether that officer made 
traffic stops a priority as a patrol officer and whether the officer performed satisfactorily in 
these duties (e.g., did the officer routinely show up in traffic court?). PARS is effectively used 
as part of broad personnel performance assessments. 

Moving Beyond Individual Assessment 

While early intervention systems and even more comprehensive personnel management 
systems have been advocated mainly as a tool to assess individual performance, prudent 
managers have realized that these systems allow analysis of entire units, entire agencies, and 
of individual, unit, and agency performance over time. 

Unit and Agencywide Assessment 

Just as early intervention and personnel management systems allow for the analysis of 
individual officers behavior, these systems allow for the analysis of unit and agency activity. 
For instance, although precincts 1 and 2 may have similar demographics, crime problems, 
and land-use profiles, an early intervention or personnel management system might reveal 
that precinct 1 has far more citizen-generated complaints and use-of-force incidents than 
precinct 2. Once in possession of these facts, managers will want to determine whether these 
disparities require action. Is one unit managed more effectively than the other? Are there 
differences in staffing levels? Are the relatively high levels of complaints and use-of-force 
incidents in precinct 1 evenly distributed or are these levels more attributable to a particular 
shift or even a particular officer or group of officers? Early intervention and personnel 
management systems enable agencies to answer such performance questions. 



Assessment over Time 

Similarly, early intervention systems and personnel management systems can be used to 
assess trends over time. For instance, managers may use simple line charts to compare use-
of-force incidents across months or quarters. Through such analysis, they may assess whether 
the introduction of a new technology or procedure had an impact on use-of-force incidents 
and whether that impact varied across units. Similarly, managers who invite citizens to file 
complaints or commendations over the agencys web site may rely on data from an early 
intervention or personnel management system to determine whether this policy change had 
an impact on the volume of complaints and commendations as well as whether this impact 
was more or less pronounced for some geographic units compared to others. Managers might 
even compare performance indicators across different generations of academy graduates or 
determine whether trends in use-of-force incidents correlate with periodic refresher courses. 
These managers might decide to readjust a 3-year training cycle if indicators reveal dramatic 
increase in incidents 2 years after training. 

While early intervention systems and more comprehensive personnel management systems 
allow managers to address these questions effectively, they must remain vigilant in their 
management of data and their supervisory efforts. As with individual assessments, unit and 
agencywide assessments and assessments made over time must be made in context. For 
instance, a department that publicizes its complaint process in a series of public forums and 
then begins to allow community members to file complaints on the agency web site should 
expect a rise in complaints. Rather than perceiving an agencywide surge in complaints as 
a problem, the department may well point to this as an indicator of the effectiveness of its 
strategy. Only after such a change is in effect for some time would tracking of complaints once 
again become a meaningful indicator of public perception and officer performance. 

Recommendations 

Based on assessment of federal consent decrees and MOAs, as well as the preceding 
discussion, the IACP offers the following recommendations. The International Association of 
Chiefs of Police (IACP) reminds readers that these recommendations may require periodic 
revision because early intervention systems and related management strategies are evolving 
rapidly. The IACP also reminds readers that any departments ability to implement early 
intervention strategies may be affected by local laws and collective bargaining agreements. 

The recommendations below correspond sequentially with the goals of creating an early 
intervention system, implementing the system, and promoting the system to relevant 
stakeholders. 

1. Organize a working committee that involves a broad cross-section of participants in the 
planning, development, and implementation of early intervention. 

Executives, managers at all levels, line officers, and administrative staff will have a vested 
interest in early intervention strategies. The performance of sworn and nonsworn personnel 
may be monitored by the early intervention system and many individuals and units will be 



required to contribute data to or use the data within the early intervention system. As a result, 
departments planning, developing, and implementing an early intervention system should 
organize a broadly representative working committee. Even after the early intervention system 
is implemented, this working committee should remain intact to monitor the system, make 
necessary adjustments to the system, and assess the impact of new or revised policies on the 
system. 

2. Involve relevant government bodies in the planning and implementation processes. 

Municipal, county, and state governments have a clearly vested interest in early intervention 
systems that are used in their law enforcement agencies. The reputation of these government 
entities depends in large degree on the performance and reputation of their law agencies. 
Prudent government leaders will recognize the benefits that can come with meaningful early 
intervention strategies and will understand that an investment in early intervention strategies 
can reduce liability and costs in the long run. Government bodies fund these systems and 
stand to benefit from them. They should be involved in their planning and implementation. 

3. Involve police unions, whenever possible, in the planning and development of early 
intervention. 

Unions have a keen interest in any system that has a potential impact on their members. 
To date, union reaction to early intervention has been mixed. This is the result of the vast 
diversity of early intervention systems now in operation. Differences also exist because some 
departments developed early intervention systems reactively, such as under the requirement 
of federal consent decrees or MOAs, while other departments developed early intervention 
on their own initiative. At a minimum, police unions should be informed about the planning 
and development of early intervention. Whenever possible, union representatives should 
be brought into the planning and development process as active participants. Departments 
should emphasize the differences between an early intervention system and the disciplinary 
system as well as the potential benefits of early intervention to officers. 

4. Inform the community about the planning and development of early intervention and 
involve them in planning, when appropriate. 

Departments should inform community stakeholders about the development of early 
intervention. Departments may even choose to involve community stakeholders in the 
development process. Community involvement may range from a simple review to active 
participation in the working committee. Involvement of community stakeholders may be 
warranted if similar processes had already been successfully completed. For instance, if the 
department has successfully used community input in designing its citizen complaint process, 
they may invite involvement again. Departments may consider developing community surveys 
to determine which indicators are of most concern to the community. The survey results may 
help department personnel decide which indicators should be included in the system or what 
thresholds the department should use for various indicators. 



5. Determine the scope of early intervention that is most appropriate for a department. 

Early intervention requires that an agency engage in a regular review of officers performance 
along a defined set of indicators. Each agency should determine the scope of the system 
that best serves its needs. Many smaller departments with reasonable ratios of first-line 
supervisors to rank-and-file officers may already engage in early intervention strategies 
without a formal program or model. For some of these departments, the formalization of these 
efforts into policies or directives may be all that is needed. Many larger departments, however, 
may realize that their early intervention should be developed as part of a more comprehensive 
and automated personnel management system that draws on existing data systems. The 
decision regarding the scope of early intervention should be based on the size, function, and 
existing data technology of the individual agency. Design of early intervention systems should 
take advantage of what similar agencies have already experienced. 

6. Involve information technology (IT) staff, data systems operators, and end users of existing 
data systems in the planning, development, and implementation of early intervention. 

Any early intervention system that involves computerized data must involve representatives 
from the IT staff, data systems operators, and end users of existing data systems that may 
feed into the early intervention system. Whether designing a dedicated early intervention data 
system or deploying a gateway system that draws from a variety of existing data systems, IT 
staff will need to create appropriate query and report capabilities that meet end users needs. 
End users of other data systems (e.g., the records management system or the personnel 
system) will be able to provide critical input on the quality of that data and can help assess 
whether existing data collection practices will be sufficient for the early intervention system. 
Data input operators can provide critical information about current data quality issues, 
particularly as they relate to paper forms generated in the field. 

The development of early intervention is likely to occur while improvements are being 
made in data management systems. IT staff and data systems operators will be critical in 
considering compatibility issues as they update computer-aided dispatch systems, web sites, 
records management system, and other data systems. 

7. Carefully assess other agencies early intervention systems and experiences. 

Although there is no such thing as one-size-fits-all early intervention, there is no reason that a 
department should start from scratch when designing its early intervention system. Agencies 
that have developed large-scale early intervention systems have charted new territory 
in policy, data system design, data management, and changes to supervisory practices. 
Managers should learn from the challenges that had been faced by peers in other departments 
rather than learning through trial and error. 



Departments, regardless of size or function, should familiarize themselves with model early 
intervention systems. These include the following: 

 Pittsburgh Bureau of PolicePerformance Assessment Review System, 
www.city.pittsburgh.pa.us/police 

 Miami-Dade Police DepartmentEmployee Identification System, formerly Employee 
Profile System, www.mdpd.com 

 Los Angeles Sheriffs DepartmentPersonnel Performance Index, www.lasd.org 

 Phoenix Police DepartmentPersonnel Assessment System, www.phoenix.gov/police/pas.html 

 Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police DepartmentEarly Intervention System, www.charmeck. 
org/Departments/Police/Services+A-Z/Home.htm (select directives then select 300-018 
Performance Review and Development.PDF). 

Departments should also use other agencies web sites as well as published material to 
explore the variety of systems in operation. Departments may solicit input from colleagues 
across the nation through IACPNet or web-based list-serves. At a minimum, departments 
should consider what early intervention systems are in use in neighboring jurisdictions. 

Although departments tend to borrow best practices from early intervention systems in 
other departments, they seldom adopt other systems in their entirety. Early intervention 
systems generally rely on indicators driven by local supervisory practices that vary across 
departments. As a result, few commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) systems are available. While 
it is doubtful that any department could simply use another departments early intervention 
database, there may be portions of a software program that could be modified to meet the 
needs of another department. In such an instance, the agencys IT staff or qualified software 
development consultants should play a role. Any consideration of standard software, including 
COTS software, should carefully assess the extent to which that system conforms to the 
agencys data collection efforts and the extent to which the software can be customized to 
meet the agencys particular needs. 

8. Ensure that supervisors have the appropriate experiences, skills, and training to perform 
their early intervention responsibilities. 

Supervisors must be qualified to perform their early intervention responsibilities. In 
departments with a strong history of close supervision and ongoing feedback, the need for 
additional training for supervisors may be negligible. If these are not in place, however, 
considerable support and training of supervisory personnel may be warranted. Depending on 
the complexity and sophistication of the early intervention system, supervisors may require 
training in collecting data, querying the system, assessing early-indicator data in context, 
writing reports to document decision-making processes, and intervention, intervening, and 
follow-up monitoring. Departments planning and implementing an early intervention strategy 
should be aware that it might warrant reassessment of the way supervisory personnel are 
selected, trained, and evaluated. 



9. Ensure that early performance indicators are well-established, clearly understood, and fair. 

Using performance indicators that are not collected consistently and reliably can be 
counterproductive and may compromise early intervention system efficacy and fairness. This 
is a particular area of concern for highly discretionary police actions. For instance, some early 
intervention systems use field interviews (sometimes called field interrogations) as an early 
intervention system indicator. Use of indicators such as these would be advisable only if there 
was a consistent definition of the term and only if supervisors are assured that all officers 
consistently fill out these forms. If officers conduct field interviews but can avoid recording 
them so they can fly under the radar screen, it compromises both the fairness and utility of the 
early intervention system 

10. Ensure that early intervention data are collected and entered in a timely manner. 

In addition to being reliable, early intervention data must be timely if the system is to identify 
potentially problematic behavior and intervene as needed. Implementing an early intervention 
system may require an agency to commit resources for timely data collection and entry as 
well as take measures to assure data quality. 

11. Carefully consider how to best document supervisors early intervention decisions and 
selection of interventions. 

While selection of performance indicators and mechanisms for tracking indicators and 
setting thresholds for mandatory supervisory review have received ample attention in 
policing literature, far less attention has been paid to early intervention review processes and 
documentation of those reviews. Some departments with early intervention systems require 
early intervention review reports that follow a specific protocol while others are entirely silent 
on the issue of reports. 

Departments that require periodic review using early intervention performance data (e.g., 
quarterly reviews) typically will require specific report formats to ensure compliance by 
supervisors and to ensure consistency in the review process. Recognize that these reviews 
should be used address exemplary behavior as well as indicate the need for intervention. 

The department should consider that heavy reliance on formal protocols and stringent 
reporting requirements that deal only with indicators of problem performance may lead some 
to believe that the early intervention process is just another format of the disciplinary process. 
While individual departments may differ in organizational culture and the documentation 
processes, documentation processes should in no way compromise the benefits of a truly 
nonpunitive early intervention program and inhibit informal intervention options being used 
when appropriate. 

12. Continually review and refine early intervention indicators and thresholds. 

To work effectively, early intervention must respond to changing conditions within the 
department and community. Managers must regularly review and refine early intervention 
indicators and thresholds. Departments that introduce new use-of-force options may need 



use-of-force thresholds. Similarly, departments that make their citizen complaint process more 
accessible and more transparent may need to adjust their citizen complaint thresholds. 

13. Ensure that early intervention policies and practices do not conflict with other department 
policies and practices. 

Early intervention systems and personnel management systems may be far-reaching and 
complex. As a result, early intervention policies and practices must be carefully reviewed to 
ensure that they do not conflict with other policies and practices. For instance, departments 
that rely on a point system to quantify their officer productivity should handle high-discretion 
arrests (e.g., resisting arrest or disorderly conduct without other charges) appropriately. It 
would be confusing and contradictory, for instance, if high-discretion arrests are treated 
positively for accumulating productivity points but are used as an indicator of risk in early 
intervention. 

14. Establish the differences between early intervention and the disciplinary process through 
a separate written policy for early intervention systems. 

To distinguish early intervention from the disciplinary system, departments should have a 
formal written policy. Departments may consult neighboring jurisdictions written policies, 
relevant standards published at the state level, Commission on Accreditation for Law 
Enforcement Agencies (CALEA) standards (standard 35.1.15), or the IACP Model Policy on 
Early Warning Systems (volume 5, number 82). 

15. Clearly articulate the differences between early intervention and the disciplinary process 
in day-to-day communications and operations by making early intervention an integral part of 
the standard supervisory process. 

Departments deploying early intervention must understand and clearly articulate the 
differences between the two systems, both in policy and day-to-day practice. The proactive 
and preventive nature of early intervention should never be confused with the reactive, 
punitive measures of the disciplinary system. If early intervention is perceived as an extension 
of the disciplinary system, it will be resisted by the officers and steadfastly opposed by the 
union. While the disciplinary system may be administered by a special unit, often the internal 
affairs unit, early intervention strategies are best administered through the normal chain of 
command, with first-line supervisors assuming primary responsibility. Emphasizing the facts 
that individual officers can access the system and that data will be made available only to the 
officers immediate chain of command will help to establish the differences between early 
intervention and the disciplinary system. It must always be recognized, however, that early 
intervention efforts may be used alongside disciplinary actions in certain circumstances. In 
cases where discipline is warranted or required as a matter of policy, individuals may still 
benefit from assistance provided through the early intervention process. 
 


16. Educate rank-and-file officers about early intervention. 

Early intervention is designed to promote and protect the well-being of individual officers. 
The introduction of early intervention to a department, however, can be challenging. 
The introduction of early intervention can be perceived as a change to the departments 
organizational culture and viewed as a threat to the status quo. Managers must educate rank-
and-file officers about the purpose and workings of the early intervention system, making sure 
to emphasize its intent to assist officers.

17. Educate community groups and community leaders about early intervention. 

When properly designed, implemented, and managed, early intervention can be an effective 
public relations tool and can enhance public confidence in the police. Community groups and 
community leaders should be educated about early intervention. 

One of the most effective and economical means of educating the community is to present 
information about early intervention on the department web site. The web site should 
articulate the differences between early intervention and the disciplinary system. The web site 
should explain the general purposes of the early intervention system and discuss specifically 
how it relates to citizen-generated complaints and excessive force allegations. The web site 
should identify the ways in which early intervention benefits the community, the department, 
and the individual officer. 

The Phoenix (Arizona) Police Department uses its web site to offer a comprehensive and clear 
introduction to its PAS. The following is an excerpt from its web page: 

Early Intervention and Personnel Assessment System FAQs 

The Personnel Assessment System, (PAS), is the Phoenix Police Departments Early 
Identification and Intervention System. PAS was originally created to make our employees 
more successful. It is a non-disciplinary system designed to identify possible problematic 
behaviors with employees, and to offer assistance using intervention options to modify those 
behaviors before discipline is required. 

This program will also assist in reducing future police department liability using risk 
management programs and techniques already in place. The department also found that by 
using an extensive case management system within PAS, supervisor accountability is being 
held to a higher standard. 

On January 1, 2004, the Phoenix Police Department fully implemented PAS and began to 
send out Intervention Reviews. Many department employees have received training, which is 
an ongoing process and crucial to the success of this program. PAS is available for review to 
all departmental employees.16 

Source: Phoenix (Arizona) Police Department Manual
Agency Profile: Population 1,321,045; Officers 2,626


Conclusion 

Early intervention is a management strategy, not just a technological solution. The concepts 
of early intervention must be seen primarily as a supervisory strategy and not as a 
technologically driven panacea. Early intervention strategies and technological solutions are 
evolving rapidly and the experiences of several agencies suggest that they have tremendous 
potential, They can save individual careers, help safeguard a departments investment in 
training and career development, help personnel get the services they need, reduce agency 
liability, and identify and reinforce exemplary performance. While tech-savvy agencies 
may benefit from sophisticated data-driven early intervention alerts, smaller agencies can 
benefit from incorporating similar concepts into their supervisory routines. Law enforcement 
executives should look to what other agencies of similar size are doing in this area and 
determine how those practices might be adapted to their departments. 

Suggestions for Further Reading 

As early intervention systems and related supervisory practice are becoming more prevalent, 
a growing number of publications and resources are becoming available. This is a partial list. 

Davis, Robert C., Nicole J. Henderson, Janet Mandelstam, Christopher W. Ortiz, and Joel 
Miller. Federal Intervention in Local Policing: Pittsburghs Experience with a Consent 
Decree. Vera Institute of Justice, New York; 2006. (includes discussion of the role of 
the Pittsburgh Bureau of Polices early intervention strategy as part of the agency 
successfully coming to terms with a federal consent decree) 
www.cops.usdoj.gov/mime/open.pdf?Item=1662. 

DeCrescenzo, Dino. Focus on Personnel: Early Detection of the Problem Officer. FBI Law 
Enforcement Bulletin; April 2005: 4. Available on the web at www.highbeam.com (Use 
the keyword/title search). 

Jacocks, A. M., and M.D. Bowman. Developing and Sustaining a Culture of Integrity. The 
Police Chief. April 2006:4. www.policechiefmagazine.org/magazine (Select through 
Archives). 

Walker, Samuel. Early Intervention Systems for Law Enforcement Agencies: A Planning and 
Management Guide. Police Executive Research Forum, Washington, DC; 2003. 
www.cops.usdoj.gov/mime/open.pdf?Item=925. 

Walker, Samuel, Stacy Osnick Milligan with Anna Berke. Strategies for Intervening with 
Officers through Early Intervention Systems: A Guide for Front-Line Supervisors. 
Police Executive Research Forum, Washington, DC; 2006. 
www.cops.usdoj.gov/mime/open.pdf?Item=1671. 

 


Walker, Samuel, Stacy Osnick Milligan with Anna Berke. Supervision and Intervention 
within Early Intervention Systems: A Guide for Law Enforcement Chief Executives. 
Police Executive Research Forum, Washington, DC; 2005. 

www.cops.usdoj.gov/Default.asp?Item=1634. 

Walker Samuel. The New World of Police Accountability. Sage Publications Inc., Thousand 
Oaks (California); 2005 


Endnotes 

1 
Hussey, James, Chief of Cohasset (Massachusetts) Police Department. Personal 
Correspondence. December 1, 2005. 

2 
Violanti, John M., John Vena, and James Marshal. Suicides, Homicides, and Accidental 
Deaths: A Comparative Risk Assessment of Police Officers and Municipal Workers. 
American Journal of Independent Medicine 1996: 99-104. 

3 
Walker, Samuel. The New World of Police Accountability. Thousand Oaks (California): Sage 
Publications, 2005. 

4 
Interview of Samuel Walker. Best Practices Review (Publication of the Police Assessment 
Resources Center) October 2002: 14-17. 

5 
Walker, Samuel. The New World of Police Accountability. Thousand Oaks (California): Sage 
Publications, 2005. 

6 
The full text of the relevant question on the LEMAS survey is, Does your agency have 
a currently operational computer-based personnel performance monitoring/assessment 
system (e.g., early warning or early intervention system) for monitoring or responding to 
officer behavior patterns before they become problematic? 

7 
There is slight anomaly in this pattern for municipal departments: 52 percent (20 of 38) 
of the largest municipal agencies (>= 1000 sworn officers with arrest power) responding 
to the survey versus 62 percent (21 of 34) of the next largest category. In addition, the 82 
percent figure for the largest sheriffs office is based on a limited number of respondents. 
There were only 11 sheriffs offices of that size among the respondents and nine reported 
having an early intervention system. 

8 
United States v. City of Steubenville, Ohio Consent Decree (09/03/97) Available on the web 
at www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/documents/steubensa.htm. 

9 
United States of America v. City of Detroit, Michigan and the Detroit Police Department 
Consent Decree (06/12/03). www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/documents/dpd/detroitpd_uofwdcd_613. 
pdf. 

10 
Early Intervention and Personnel Assessment System FAQs. Phoenix Police Department. 
Retrieved February 01, 2006 from www.phoenix.gov/POLICE/pas1.html. 

11 
Information obtained from site visit to Pittsburgh Bureau of Police on February 22, 2005. 

12 
Correspondence with several departments that had previously used fixed thresholds, 
reveal that they have replaced them with what they consider more flexible methods that 
rely more heavily on supervisory skills. 

13 
Third Quarter Status Report. Prince Georges County Police Department & the U.S. 
Department of Justice, 2005. www.goprincegeorgescounty.com/Government/PublicSafety/ 
Police/pdfs/Consent_Decree_1-7-05.pdf. 

14 
Comments made by Detective Toye Nash of the Phoenix Arizona Police Department at 
May 10, 2005. Symposium on Early Intervention System Workshop at the Police Executive 
Research Forum in Washington, DC. 

15 
Vaughn, Michael S., Tab W. Hunter, and Rolando V. del Carmen. Assessing Legal Liabilities 
in Law Enforcement: Police Chiefs Views. Crime and Delinquency 2001, 3-27. 

16 
The Personal Assessment System. Phoenix Police Department. Retrieved October 10, 
2005 from www.phoenix.gov/POLICE/pas.html. 

 

IV. Managing the ComplaintProcess 



Managing the Complaint Process 

A simple declaration that all complaints against any member of the police department will be 
received and investigated leaves little room for dispute. It also prevents the age-old problem 
of certain complaints being discounted or rejected for purely subjective reasons. It is difficult 
to explain to a citizen why one complaint was accepted and one rejected for basically the same 
offense. It puts supervisors in awkward positions when a peer has accepted a complaint that 
they have rejected in the past.1 

Chief Beau Thurnauer, Coventry (Massachusetts) Police Department 

Introduction 

An accessible, fair, and transparent complaint process is a hallmark of police responsiveness 
to the community and is consistent with the goals of community policing. In addition, a 
thorough assessment of all allegations of police misconductwhether these allegations are 
initiated externally by civilians or internally by other department personneloffers police 
managers an opportunity to proactively address concerns from a problem-solving perspective. 
Too often, the processing of complaints has been viewed simply as an adjudicative process 
in which complaints are investigated and in which dispositions and disciplinary sanctions 
are applied. Under this traditional approach, the principal parties are the aggrieved person 
making the allegation and the officer whose behavior is in question. An emerging perspective, 
however, recognizes that the community and the department as a whole are important 
stakeholders in the complaint process. Under this more comprehensive view, the civilian 
complaint process serves not only to redress grievances; it also serves as a management tool, 
a forum to address public concerns and to enhance public relations, and an opportunity to 
refine policies and training. 

Chapter Overview and Objectives 

Drawing on federal consent decrees and memorandums of agreement (MOA) as well as on 
promising and innovative efforts from police departments across the nation, this chapter 
explores the benefits and challenges of civilian complaint processes. In its introductory 
paragraphs, the chapter offers a working definition of the civilian complaint process. This 
definition is followed by an analysis of the ways in which the civilian complaint process is 
evolving as well as an overview of the prevalence of civilian complaint processes currently in 
use in law enforcement agencies. 

Moving beyond these introductory materials, the chapter explores the core principles 
of the civilian complaint process. The chapter asserts that the civilian complaint process 
succeeds to the extent that it isand is perceived as beingcomprehensive, accessible, 
fair, and transparent. To the extent that civilians feel able to file a complaint with reasonable 
convenience, feel sure that every complaint receives a fair investigation resulting in a timely 



resolution, and feel aware of the workings and rulings of the civilian complaint process, this 
process will build community confidence in the police departments determination to serve 
ethically and efficiently. 

From its exploration of core principles, the chapter turns to a consideration of the basic 
components of the civilian complaint process from the initial filing of complaints to their final 
adjudication. It explores the standards that emerged from the federal agreements regarding 
the handling of complaints, as well as those that have been enacted proactively in different 
departments across the nation. 

Finally, this chapter offers a series of recommendations to police departments establishing 
and implementing a civilian complaint process. Like the chapters discussion of the civilian 
complaint process itself, these recommendations result from the careful consideration of 
federal consent decrees and MOAs, as well as practices from police departments across the 
nation. 

A Definition of the Civilian Complaint Process 

The civilian complaint process is the series of steps by which law enforcement agencies 
accept, investigate, and adjudicate allegations of misconduct or incompetence on the part 
of police personnel.2 In the language of the consent decrees and MOAs, such complaints 
may address any action or inaction by [agency] personnel which the source considers to be 
contrary to law, proper procedure, good order, or in some manner prejudicial to the individual, 
the [agency], or to the community.3 While such complaints are, in fact, filed mostly by 
civilians, complainants may also arise from agency personnel or anonymous sources. 

The Evolution of the Civilian Complaint Process 

Residents, business persons, and other civilians are consumers of police services. When 
they perceive that they have been aggrieved by acts ranging from discourteous treatment 
to criminal misconduct on the part of police personnel, they have the right to be heard and 
to seek remedy. In recognition of this right, police executives have facilitated the acceptance 
and timely resolution of individual grievances. When warranted, they have acknowledged the 
mistakes of their agency personnel. 

While this civilian complaint process has long existed, police executives attitudes toward 
the process are changing. Although police executives once tended to focus narrowly on the 
adjudication of alleged misconduct and, as a result, to view civilian complaints entirely in a 
negative light, many are now using civilian complaints as a barometer of public satisfaction 
and as a general management tool. By engaging in a comprehensive, accessible, fair, and 
transparent civilian complaint process, police executives are enhancing their agencies image 
as professional and ethical organizations while underscoring their commitment to addressing 
community concerns. By regarding civilian complaints as critical pieces of a data-driven 
management strategy, police executives are gauging the performance of individual officers, 
seizing important opportunities to modify policies and procedures, and better guarding 
against future misconduct on the part of police personnel. 



On the level of the individual officer, many police executives rely on civilian complaints as 
an important indicator by which to gauge officer performance in early intervention systems. 
For instance, an inordinate number of civilian complaints about an individual officer can 
alert supervisors to potentially problematic behavior that could benefit from nondisciplinary 
intervention. Serious and substantiated civilian complaints may also identify instances in 
which disciplinary action is required. 

At aggregate levels, an analysis of civilian complaint trends can be used to determine whether 
the agency as a whole or particular units within the department are moving in the right 
direction. If, for instance, one precincts civilian complaints are trending up while all others 
are dropping, the police chief and commanders may want to determine what factors are 
contributing to such an anomaly and what actions, if any, need to be taken. Conversely, if one 
precincts civilian complaints are trending down while all others are holding steady or rising, 
police executives would want to determine the reason for the precincts apparent success and 
take steps to assure that similar successful management practices could be transferred to 
other precincts. 

Police executives who proactively use civilian complaint data from a management perspective 
can use the process to fine-tune agency performance and enhance community trust. An open 
and constructive approach to handling civilian complaints, instead of a reactive and defensive 
approach, casts that agency in a positive light. 

Publicizing a Positive Attitude About Civilian Complaints 

Increasingly, police departments rely on effective complaint processes to inspire public 
confidence and reinforce community relations. While many of these departments recognize 
that discouraging civilian complaints can seriously undermine community relations 
particularly in minority and other communities that historically have felt disenfranchised 
others recognize that their departments actually benefit by publicizing their openness to 
the complaint process. Police departments of varying sizes and types across the nation 
are realizing the benefits of comprehensive, accessible, fair, and transparent complaint 
processes on their web sites and in their official policies. The following three examples from 
departments of different sizes are illustrative of this type of approach. 

Example 1 
Many employees view the internal affairs function as strictly negative. Quite the opposite 
is true. When properly run, the internal affairs function will protect the innocent employee 
from untrue allegations while maintaining citizen confidence and trust. To ignore or treat 
citizen complaints with anything less than the utmost of concern will increase the number of 
complaints, cause a loss of trust and result in demands for citizen review boards. 

Source: Midvale (Utah) Police Departments Policy Manual
Agency Profile: Population 28,000; Officers 45
 


Example 2 
Citizen Complaint Process: The mission of the Portland Police Bureau is to maintain and 
improve community livability by working with all citizens to preserve life, maintain human 
rights, protect property, and promote individual responsibility and community commitment. 
Our goals state that our employees must be guided by the principles that every individual has 
infinite dignity and worth and that we must show respect for the citizens we serve and for the 
men and women of the Bureau. 

A citizen complaint, and its subsequent investigation, causes police to examine the service that 
we provide to our community and to make necessary improvements in the way we provide 
services. 

Source: Portland (Oregon) Police Bureau web site (www.portlandonline.com/police) 
Agency Profile: Population 509,610; Officers 1,028 

Purpose and Intent: It is the guiding principle of the Waite Park Police Department that 
all allegations of employee misconduct or criticism of its services be acknowledged and 
addressed. To succeed in this endeavor, this order establishes a comprehensive departmental 
process to respond to such inquiries and complaints. Its purpose is to provide citizens with a 
fair and effective avenue to voice their legitimate grievances against the actions of the Police 
Department, yet to protect departmental employees from false charges of misconduct and 
wrongdoing. 

OBJECTIVES: 

a) To maintain the communitys support and confidence in its Police Department by providing 
a process that assures responsiveness to citizens inquiries and complaints. 

b) To create a process for dealing with inquiries and complaints, whether originating internally 
or externally, that permits police managers to monitor departmental compliance with 
established departmental rules, procedures, and norms. 

c) To clarify employee rights and the due process protection that will be afforded departmental 
employees in the investigation of inquiries and complaints. 

Source: Waite Park (Minnesota) Police Departments Policy Manual 
Agency Profile: Population 7,562; Officers 12 
 


The Prevelance of the Civilian Complaint Process

Major benchmarks for police standards, including the Commission on Accreditation from Law Enforcement 
Agencies (CALEA) and International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) Model Policies, call for 
policies and procedures for the civilian complaint processes. CALEA standards for complaint
processes, for instance, are imbedded with its section of Internal Affairs (52), recognizing that
larger departments may have specific internal affairs units, whereas a smaller agency may have to
designate this responsibility to an individual officer. 4 As is discussed in subsequent sections,
some agencies rely, if full or in part, on civilian review boards to review civilian-generated
complaints.

Without exception, all the federal pattern or practice agreements related to law enforcement agencies
address the complaint process.  The language within the consent decrees and MOAs realted to the
complaint process is extensive and addresses both civilian complaints and internal complaints.

The foundation of any complaint process, whether conducted by internal affairs, designated personnel
within the department, or by civilian boards is the establishment of clear policy directives. Results
from the 2003 Sample Survey of Law Enforcement Agencies (LEMAS)conducted by the Bureau of Justice 
Statistics (BJS) provided an opportunity to assess the prevalence of policy directives on civilian 
complaints by department size and type. Details about LEMAS methodology and data are available 
in the text box on page 31 in Chapter 2. 

As the LEMAS results below indicate, across agencies of all sizes, the vast majority of 
municipal departments and sheriffs offices reported having civilian complaint policies. While 
the likelihood of having such a policy was higher in larger departments, these policies are 
still the norm even in the smallest departments. Among agencies surveyed, about three in 
four municipal departments with four or fewer full-time officers had such a policy. Based on 
the LEMAS survey data, all state police agencies, all county police agencies, and all regional 
police agencies had civilian complaint policy directives.5 

Municipal Agencies Law Enforcement Agencies Sheriffs Offices 
with Citizen Complaint Policy Directives with Citizen Complaint Policy Directives 
Bar graph showing munipal agencies law enforcement agencies with citizen complaint policy directives

Sheriffs' Offices with Citizen Complaint Policy Directives
Bar graph showing sheriffs' offices with citizen complaint policy directives
 


The Benefits of the Civilian Complaint Process 

When police executives recognize that the civilian complaint process may serve as an 
important management tool and a critical component to creating community trust, they begin 
to realize the following benefits: 

 Enhancing the investigative process to assess officer culpability and to assess the agency 
need to enhance policies and training 

 Rendering clear findings in individual cases 

 Identifying individual officers who may be in need of intervention, either nondisciplinary or 
disciplinary, as appropriate 

 Identifying pockets of risk within the department 

 Providing opportunities to modify and improve policies and training 

 Developing strategies to reduce or prevent misconduct 

 Enhancing organizational efficiency 

 Ensuring accountability within the agency 

 Ensuring responsiveness and accountability to the community 

 Enhancing community trust as well as building and sustaining community relations. 

The Core Principles of the Complaint Process 

Effective policing depends on the trust and confidence of the community. Police rely on 
individuals within the community to report crimes, serve as witnesses, and occasionally offer 
assistance. From a community policing and service-oriented perspective, the communitys 
satisfaction with police services is of paramount importance. This satisfaction is the result, in 
part, of how police handle the discrete instances of dissatisfaction that are brought to their 
attention through civilian complaints. The civilian complaint process may turn dissatisfaction 
into confidence as police adhere to four core principles that underlie an effective complaint 
process. 

1. An effective complaint process must be comprehensive. It must accept and act on all 
civilian complaints.The system should also integrate complaints from other sources, 
including internal complaints as well as alleged acts of misconduct that arise in the context of 
civil or criminal proceedings against agency personnel. 

Across departments, the preponderance of misconduct allegations are made by civilians 
nonpolice personnelwho have had contact with the police. These contacts may involve 
individuals who seek police assistance; are crime victims; are crime suspects; are witnesses, 
or potential witnesses; and those who have been stopped for traffic violations. While an 
agencys complaint process must treat these civilian complaints seriously, it must not 
discourage or ignore the complaints that arise from other sources. 

Another significant source of misconduct complaints is department personnel themselves. 
Historically, some observers have argued that police maintain a blue wall of silence and 
that officers who observe misconduct among their fellow officers are reluctant to report it. 
Many departments, however, have implemented strict stipulations that hold police officers 
 


accountable for knowingly failing to report misconduct of fellow officers. By expanding 
the scope of their complaint process to address not only civilian complaints but also the 
complaints of officers themselves, departments underscore their commitment to ethical 
policing and strict accountability. 

The language of federal consent decrees and MOAs expresses an unwavering commitment 
to addressing internal complaints. These agreements stipulate that officers are required to 
report other officers misconduct. For instance, the consent decree with the Pittsburgh Bureau 
of Police underscored the departments existing polices and practice: the City shall continue 
to require officers to report misconduct by other officers. Misconduct by fellow officers shall 
be reported directly to OMI [Office of Municipal Investigations] or through an officers chain of 
command.6 

The MOA of the Buffalo Police Department expresses a similar requirement and, although it 
acknowledges the limitations imposed by the local collective bargaining agreement, enjoins 
the department to attempt to surmount these limitations: 

To the extent allowed under the applicable collective bargaining agreement in force on the 
effective date of this Agreement, the City shall require officers to report misconduct by 
other officers. To the extent not already allowed under the applicable collective bargaining 
agreement in force on the effective date of this Agreement, the City shall initiate negotiations 
and shall bargain in good faith for the right to require officers to report misconduct by other 
officers.7 

While the most common sources of misconduct allegations are civilian complaints and the 
reports or allegations of other officers, there is a growing recognition that a comprehensive 
complaint process should address complaints arising from other, nontraditional sources. 
For example, allegations of misconduct may emerge during internal investigations, or 
instances of alleged misconduct may come to light through civil or criminal suits filed against 
officers or through media reports. Federal consent decrees and MOAs stress the importance 
of investigating all misconduct complaints, regardless of source. For instance, the Los 
Angeles Police Department (LAPD) consent decree requires that the city inform the police 
department whenever a person serves a civil lawsuit on or files a claim against the City 
alleging misconduct by an LAPD officer or other employee of the LAPD.8This consent decree 
also stipulates that the department will require all officers to notify without delay the LAPD 
whenever the officer is arrested or criminally charged for any conduct, or the officer is named 
as a party in any civil suit involving his or her conduct while on duty (or otherwise while acting 
in an official capacity). Other federal agreements go further to stipulate that such notifications 
are required regardless of whether this behavior occurs while the officer is on or off duty. 

This comprehensive approach is advocated not only in federal consent decrees and MOAs, 
but also in the language of individual police agency policies, in state standards, and in 
professional standards such as CALEA and IACP model policies. The IACP Model Policy on 
Standards of Conduct, for instance, requires that officers who are arrested, cited, or come 
under investigation for any criminal offense in this or another jurisdiction shall report this fact 
to a superior as soon as possible.9 



2. An effective civilian complaint process must be accessible. Civilians must understand, have 
easy access to, and feel comfortable with complaint filing procedures. 

In addressing the civilian complaint process, federal consent decrees and MOAs are consistent 
and unequivocal on the need for accessibility. In general, these consent decrees and MOAs 
require that filing a complaint be reasonably convenient. They also set a tone of inclusiveness 
rather than exclusiveness by requiring that, at a minimum, all complaints must be accepted 
and afforded some level of investigatory review. 

In many of the pattern or practice investigations leading up to consent decrees and MOAs, 
the access to civilian complaint processes were found to be inadequate. Several of these 
investigations found that police were taking actions to actively discourage or effectively 
preempt certain civilian complaints. Some disincentives to reporting complaints are inherent 
within complaint forms themselves. For instance, language on complaint forms sometimes 
stipulates that a civilian complaint will not be accepted unless notarized. When followed by 
language stating that knowingly making false, untrue, or malicious complaints will be subject 
to criminal prosecution, some would-be complainants may be intimidated. 

In response to these conditions, the language of consent decrees and MOAs seeks to establish 
civilian complaint policies, procedures, and actions that ensure that no civilian is intimidated, 
discouraged, or impeded from making a complaint and that all complaints are taken seriously. 

When considered together, the federal consent decrees and MOAs, recommendations from 
professional organizations such as CALEA standards and IACP Model Policies, and policies 
of individual departments provide a clear picture of the evolving standard. It is not enough 
that civilians who come in contact with the police merely be given an opportunity to file 
complaints. Departments under federal agreements were required to develop proactive public 
outreach strategies to inform the community of their right to file complaints. The general intent 
of these strategies is to enhance accessibility by creating greater awareness regarding the 
complaint process. The specific public outreach requirements stipulated in the federal consent 
decrees and MOAs include the following: 

 Establish public information campaigns about complaint filing procedures 

 Establish methods for filing complaints other than formal written complaints including: 
o Telephone hotlines 
o Web-based filings 
o E-mail filings 
o Fax submissions 

 Post information about complaint filing procedures on the agencys web site 

 Provide complaint notifications, complaint filing instructions, and complaint forms in 
multiple languages, as appropriate, considering the particular jurisdictions population. 

While the common thread through federal consent decrees and MOAs is that the complaint 
filing process should be accessible, these agreements vary substantially because they are 
responsive to individual investigations and are tailored to the specific circumstances and 
organizational capacities of different departments. The following sections of the MOA between 

 


the Washington, D.C., Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) and the U.S. Department of 
Justice provide an illustrative example of the specific requirements made on the department 
to ensure open and broad access to file civilian complaints. 

92. 
Within 90 days from the effective date of this Agreement, MPD shall make it possible 
for persons to initiate complaints with MPD in writing or verbally, in person, by mail, 
by telephone (or TDD), facsimile transmission, or by electronic mail. MPD shall accept 
and investigate anonymous complaints and complaints filed by persons other than the 
alleged victim of misconduct. MPD shall ask anonymous and third-party complainants for 
corroborating evidence. MPD shall not require that a complaint be submitted in writing or 
on an official complaint form to initiate an investigation. 

93. 
Within 120 days from the effective date of this Agreement, the City shall institute a 24-hour 
toll-free telephone hotline for persons to call to make a complaint regarding officer 
conduct. The hotline shall be operated by OCCR. The City and MPD shall publicize the 
hotline telephone number on informational materials and complaint forms. The City shall 
tape record all conversations on this hotline and shall notify all persons calling the hotline of 
the tape recording. The City shall develop an auditing procedure to assure that callers are being 
treated with appropriate courtesy and respect, that complainants are not being discouraged 
from making complaints, and that all necessary information about each complaint is being 
obtained. This procedure shall include monthly reviews of a random sample of the tape 
recordings.10 

3.An effective civilian complaint process must be fair and thorough.The investigation of 
civilian complaints must proceed according to high standards. 

In their discussion of the investigation of civilian complaints, federal consent decrees and 
MOAs consider a broad range of issues including standards of proof, thoroughness of 
investigations, supervisory roles, and quality of data. While these agreements impose specific 
requirements on specific departments as a result of findings from individual investigations, 
a standard of fairness is common across the agreements. In general, federal consent decrees 
and MOAs require that departments give civilian complaints thorough, rigorous, unbiased, 
and timely investigation. Indeed, in many ways, federal consent decrees and MOAs call for 
investigatory procedures that parallel criminal investigations. 

4. An effective civilian complaint process must be transparent. Departments should keep 
complainants apprised of specific complaint proceedings and the community apprised of 
summary information regarding the civilian complaint process. 

The federal consent decrees and MOAs are resolute in requiring that the civilian complaint 
process be transparent both at the level of the individual complainant and of the community 
as a whole. In general, consent decrees and MOAs require that complainants be periodically 
informed of the progress of the complaint investigation. They also require that complainants 



be notified of the outcome at the conclusion of this process. These requirements are in 
keeping with standards established by professional organizations including the CALEA policy 
on internal affairs standards: 

The agency keeps the complainant informed concerning the status of the complaint, to 
include at a minimum: (a) verification of receipt that the complaint has been received for 
processing; (b) periodic status reports; and (c) notification of the results of the investigation 
upon conclusion.11 

Federal consent decrees and MOAs establish the transparency of the civilian complaint 
process at the community level by requiring monitoring of the process by independent 
auditors and by requiring departments to maintain and periodically disseminate to the public 
a statistical summary report regarding complaints files and resolution of those complaints. 
Many departments routinely include this summary information in their annual reports or 
on their web sites. Ensuring the transparency of the civilian complaint process by providing 
summary information is sound public policy. 

Variations in the Civilian Complaint Process 

The nature of the civilian complaint process varies considerably by department. This is the 
result, in part, of the varying roles that civilians play in overseeing the process. In some 
departments, civilian complaint review boards are composed entirely of civilians and 
are empowered to conduct investigations and issue subpoenas independently. In many 
departments, particularly smaller departments, the responsibility for overseeing the civilian 
complaint process is internal. Many departments have civilian complaint processes that fall 
somewhere in between independent civilian review boards and strictly internal processes. 

The following discussion considers, first, the varying levels of civilian involvement in the 
civilian complaint process; second, the basic components of the processfiling, investigation, 
and resolutionthat occur whether civilians or police department personnel oversee the 
handling of civilian complaints; and third, the actions taken by departments to ensure both 
internal accountability and accountability to the public they serve. 

Assessing Civilian Involvement in the Complaint Process 

Increasingly, police executives recognize the advantages of taking proactive steps to establish 
civilian complaint processes that are comprehensive, accessible, fair, and transparent. 
Historically, the impetus for establishing a civilian complaint process has emerged both from 
within and without departments. Law enforcement leaders continually must balance pressures 
from within the department and police unions versus outside the departmentthrough 
politicians, activists, and community groupsin assessing how involved civilians should be in 
the processing of complaints. 

In the absence of meaningful internal oversight, or in response to processes that were 
perceived as ineffectual, civilian groups and advocacy organizations have felt compelled to 
call for an external complaint process and demand an active role in its oversight. Prudent 



police executives understand that taking the initiativerather than reacting to others 
dissatisfactionoffers them the best opportunity to design and implement an effective 
civilian complaint process. In particular, making decisions regarding civilian involvement in 
that process provides police executives with the opportunity to address important matters of 
public concern in a proactive, forthright manner, rather than in reaction to some crisis or in 
response to adverse public sentiment. 

Making decisions regarding the structure of civilian complaint processes and the degree of 
civilian involvement is remarkably complex. While numerous arguments exist both for and 
against civilian involvement in the civilian complaint process, it is beyond the scope of this 
guide to examine these arguments in depth or make recommendations. Instead, readers 
should consult the IACP Ethics Toolkit article, Police Accountability and Citizen Review: A 
Leadership Opportunity for Police Chiefs, which offers several critical tools for department 
decision makers.12 

As a brief overview, the article offers essential action steps for assessing a departments need 
for civilian involvement in the complaint and misconduct resolution process: 

 Assess whether a problem exists 

 Examine existing literature and practice regarding forms of citizen review and their impacts 

 Confer with constituencies that must be involved in the decision to establish a citizen 
review device 

 Work with citizens and government officials to understand how the review process may 
affect them 

 Understand possible/probable outcomes of citizen review 

 Complete a preliminary cost analysis to determine the financial impact on the department 
and the city. 

A Typology of Complaint Processes Based on Citizen Involvement 

In many jurisdictions, complaint procedures arise out of complex political processes and 
sometimes in response to publicized incidents of police misconduct. Not surprisingly, there 
are countless variations of the theme. Again, it is beyond the scope of this chapter to review all 
of these; however, the following classification from the IACP Ethics Toolkit helps put the range 
of options in perspective. 

Class I: Citizen Review Board. Citizen complaints are reviewed and investigated, and 
recommendations for disciplinary or policy action are made by a board comprised wholly 
of citizens. The board may or may not have subpoena power. Under this model, a citizen 
review board handles each step on the continuum from original complaint through review, 
investigation and recommendations for sanctions. This is the most independent citizen review 
model. 

Class II: Police Review/Citizen Oversight. Complaints are reviewed and investigated, and 
recommendations for disciplinary or policy action are made by law enforcement officers, with 
oversight of each case by a citizen or board of citizens. 
 
 

Under this model, the steps on the complaint continuum are handled by the police. A board 
of citizen reviewers, or a single individual, reviews those actions/determinations. Since law 
enforcement conducts the initial fact-finding investigation, the Class II model is considered 
less independent than Class I. 

Class III: Police Review/Citizen-Police Appeal Board. Complaints are reviewed and 
investigated by law enforcement officers in the Internal Affairs Unit, which recommends 
disciplinary action to the chief. Complainants who are not satisfied with outcomes of 
investigations can appeal for review to a board composed of both citizens and sworn 
officers. 

Under this model, the complaint process is handled by the police. In the event a complainant 
is not satisfied with the outcome of his or her case, a board that includes police officers 
undertakes review of how the case was originally investigated. Citizen participation is limited 
to appeal review only. 

Class IV: Independent Citizen Auditor. An independent citizen auditor or auditor system 
reviews the law enforcement agencys internal complaint review process (IA) and makes 
recommendations as needed. 

Under this model, the complaint process is fully in the hands of the police. However, an 
auditor or audit team has access to that process and reviews it for effectiveness and accuracy 
of findings, making recommendations to improve the process as needed. The auditor reviews 
completed complaint cases and contacts complainants to assess satisfaction with outcome. 

 

Considerations for Civilian Review in Complaint Processing 

Law enforcement leaders must weigh carefully both the advantages and disadvantages of 
civilian review, considering factors such as the local political climate. Demands by the public, 
by special-interest groups, and by politicians can often put the police executive in a difficult 
position. Calls for civilian involvement in the process often will have to be weighed against 
the opposition of the rank-and-file and the police union. If civilian review is seen as a viable 
option, determining the level of civilian involvementfrom far-reaching investigatory and 
subpoena power to a limited advisory functionis a decision that police executives will want 
to consider carefully. 

Decisions about civilian review must be made in consideration of many factors. The article 
mentioned above from the IACP Ethics Toolkit addresses multiple considerations in this 
process, particularly as they relate to department size and existing police-community relations. 

Not all police departments need or would derive substantial value from formalized citizen 
review. In jurisdictions where community trust is solid and durable, strong police-community 
bonds exist, community access is institutionalized, and misconduct is not frequent nor 
egregious, citizen oversight is neither likely to emerge as an issue nor to have a profound 
impact on existing conditions. Smaller departments, in particular, have the advantage of 
constant informal interaction with citizens to maintain close ties and receive information and 
guidance. As communities and police agencies grow in size, lines of citizen/police contact 
may need strengthening through formality. Community leaders may suggest a citizen review 
mechanism to ensure involvement in problem resolution at the officer and/or department 
level. Even in these cases, alternative interventions may satisfy needs.13 

Statistical Snapshot of Civilian Involvement in the Complaint Review 
Processes 

Given the variations in local practice, it is difficult to assess the level of civilian involvement 
in the complaint process; however, greater civilian involvement tends to be associated with 
larger departments. 

The 2003 Sample Survey of Law Enforcement Agencies (LEMAS) addresses the question 
of whether law enforcement agencies with 100 or more full-time sworn officers with arrest 
powers have within their jurisdictions a civilian complaint review board or agency that 
is empowered to investigate use of force complaints. (The LEMAS survey contains no 
corresponding questions about whether civilian review boards/agencies exist for other types 
of civilian complaints.) 

Considering the specificity of this question, the LEMAS survey reveals that approximately 
19 percent of municipal law enforcement agencies with 100 more sworn officers with arrest 
power use some form of civilian review in which civilians are empowered to review use-of
 


force complaints. The comparable figure for county police departments is 25 percent and for 
sheriffs departments is 6 percent. None of the 49 state police agencies indicated they had 
such civilian review process for use-of-force complaints. 

As the charts below indicate, for municipal police departments and sheriffs offices, the 
likelihood of civilian review for use of force generally increases with agency size. Based on 
these data, it would appear that in municipal departments some level of civilian involvement 
occurs in the slight majority of departments with more than 500 sworn officers with arrest 

Municipal Police Departments and Sheriffs Offices Percent with Civilian 
Review Boards/Agencies Empowered to Review Use-of-Force Complaints
Image of Bar graph showing municipal police departments and sheriffs' offices percent with civilian 
review boards/agencies empowered to review use-of-force complaints 

The LEMAS survey further revealed that, overall, about one in four of these civilian review 
boards had independent investigative authority with subpoena powers. 

The Basic Steps in Handling Civilian and Internal Complaints 

Whatever level of civilian involvement a department may establish, the basic steps necessary 
for the handling of complaints remain the same. These include the filing of complaints, the 
investigation of complaints, and the resolution of complaints. While different departments 
may handle these basic operations differently, the following discussion offers an overview of 
important commonalities. 

Step One: The Complaint Receipt and Filing Process 

Although federal consent decrees and MOAs impose specific requirements on specific 
departments, they enjoin all departments to establish an accessible civilian complaint process. 
Making the civilian complaint process accessible depends on a number of organizational, 
community, and public relations considerations. The single most important factor, though, 
may well be the demeanor and behavior of officers on the streets. Notifying civilians about 
powers. 

 


their right to file a complaint is the critical gate-keeping event. The willingness of officers 
to meet this requirement, therefore, is critical to an open and successful civilian complaint 
process. 

To ensure accessibility, the federal consent decrees and MOAs consistently issue the following 
requirements regarding officer conduct in the complaint filing process: 

 Officers are to provide their name and badge number to civilians on request. 

 Officers are required to provide complaint procedure information to civilians on request. 

 Officers are required to have complaint forms available for civilians on request. 

To underscore the importance of an accessible complaint process, consent decrees and 
MOAs stipulate that departments must hold officers accountable when they fail to provide 
notification of complaint filing procedures or when they, in any way, inhibit the civilian 
complaint process: 

 The agency should have policies and procedures for disciplining officers who fail to notify 
a civilian of the complaint process when the civilian indicates a desire to file a complaint. 

 The agency should have policies and procedures prohibiting any act that impedes or 
intimidates a civilian from making a complaint; these policies should contain disciplinary 
actions. 

Such policy requires many departments to initiate separate investigations against officers who 
fail to notify civilians of their right to file a complaint. The LAPD consent decree is clear on this 
point: 

The LAPD shall initiate a Complaint Form 1.28 investigation against (i) any officer who 
allegedly fails to inform any civilian who indicates a desire to file a complaint of the means 
by which a complaint may be filed; (ii) any officer who allegedly attempts to dissuade a civilian 
from filing a complaint; or (iii) any officer who is authorized to accept a complaint who 
allegedly refuses to do so.14 

As noted in the discussion of core principles, entire departments as well as individual officers 
must accept the responsibility of ensuring accessible civilian complaint processes. Federal 
consent decrees and MOAs consistently urge departments to take the following measures: 

 Departments should have an open and accessible process by which they accept complaints 
in multiple formats (e.g., in person, by mail, and by e-mail). 

 Departments should allow complaints to be filed in different public or private facilities and 
should specifically assure that complainants have options other than having to go to a 
police facility to file a complaint. 



In addition to offering directives to officers and departments regarding the filing of complaints, 
the federal consent decrees and MOAs also stipulate a number of conditions and behaviors 
by personnel that are aimed at making the initiation process open and unbiased. Specifically, 
the consent decrees and MOAs set a tone of inclusiveness rather than exclusiveness regarding 
complaints. They insist that all complaints be taken seriously. Among the measures regarding 
the intake of complaints that ensure that the complaints are treated seriously are the 
following: 

 Officers who perform complaint intake are prohibited from making assessments about the 
complainants mental capacity or about the veracity of the allegations (they may, however, 
make factual comments about the complainants demeanor or physical condition). 

 Third-party complaints (e.g., those by witnesses) are allowed. 

 Anonymous complaints are allowed. 

While the consent decrees and MOAs thus work toward inclusiveness, they do not stipulate 
that certain complaints, such as anonymous complaints, should necessarily have the same 
weight as other complaints throughout the process. For instance, while the LAPD consent 
decree stipulates that anonymous complaints must be received and investigated, it also 
stipulates that an anonymous complaint that is not substantiated should not be used against 
an officer as a basis for discipline or to deny promotion. 

Beyond merely making the complaint process accessible, some department policies expressly 
acknowledge the right of individuals to file complaints and contain language that helps 
facilitate complaints. The following excerpt illustrates this approach. 

If the complainant needs assistance completing the form, offer whatever assistance is 
required. Refusing to provide an initial complaint form is a violation of state law and of 
department guiding principle and procedure. 

Attempting to screen or discourage those who ask for forms is not an option. As soon as a 
form is requested, it needs to be provided. Contacts do not have to justify their request for 
a form. 

Source: Waite Park (Minnesota) Police Department Guiding Principles 
Agency Profile: Population 7,562; Officers 12

Step Two: The Complaint Investigation Process 

The federal consent decrees and MOAs require that departments give complaintsspecifically 
civilian complaintsfull and rigorous investigatory attention. To do this effectively and 
appropriately, complaints first must be categorized. 

Categorization of Complaints 

Police executives, administrators, and civilian reviewers have long recognized that not all 
civilian complaints are of the same gravity or require the same type of investigation or 


intervention. Civilian complaints range from gripes to allegations of felony offenses. To 
be clear, this does not mean that certain types of low-level complaints can be summarily 
dismissed. 

Because the procedures for investigating complaints depend on the nature and seriousness of 
the allegation, many departments define multiple categories of complaints. These categories 
often will determine, particularly in larger departments, the administrative processes type of 
misconduct hearing that will take place. 

Complaints usually are categorized according to the seriousness of the allegation. For 
instance, the Boise (Idaho) Police Department identifies less serious allegations as Class II 
complaints, which are defined as those involving allegations of driving violations, demeanor 
complaints, and minor enforcement complaints. Class I complaints are defined as those 
that allege more egregious behaviors. They are specifically defined as all other allegations 
including serious allegations of policy or criminal conduct. In addition to these classes, the 
Boise Police Department also categorizes some complaints as Citizen Inquiries.15 Although 
civilian inquiries may be generated like other complaints, they are commonly questions 
about whether procedures were followed or generalized comments that are not directed at an 
individual officer or employee. 

Other departments use similar classification schemes. For instance, the Missouri City (Texas) 
Police Department categorizes complaints into two classes quite like to those of the Boise 
Police Department. In Missouri City, Class I allegations refer to violations of federal, state or 
local laws, use of force, or incidents of potential public concern/outcry. Class II allegations 
involve other types of complaints, including complaints of rudeness/discourtesy, inadequate/ 
incomplete case investigation, and improper tactics/procedures.16 

Some departments opt for more detailed classification schemes. For instance, the Tempe 
(Arizona) Police Department and the Prince Georges County (Maryland) Citizen Complaint 
Oversight Panel each rely on multiple category schemes. These are illustrated below. 

Complaints received will generally fall into one of the following categories: 

(1) Serious Misconductallegations which may constitute a violation of criminal law 
or conduct that could result in suspension, disciplinary pay reduction, demotion, or 
termination. 

(2) Minor Misconductallegations which do not appear to be a violation of criminal 
law and which would not result in suspension, demotion, disciplinary pay reduction, or 
termination. 

(3) Policy Infractionallegations which are not of a serious nature, but involve some 
infraction of department policy. 

(4) Inquirythose complaints against department policy. 



(5) Administrative Investigationinitiated at the direction of the Chief of Police and 
conducted by the Internal Affairs component. 

Source: Tempe (Arizona) Police Departments Policy Manual Agency 
Profile: Population 165,000; Officers 327

COMPLAINT CLASSIFICATION 

All incoming complaints are assigned to the following investigative categories based on the 
most serious allegation in the complaint: 

Special Investigations (SI): Complaints that allege a criminal act or could result in a criminal 
charge or investigation, such as domestic violence, DWI/DUI, theft, unauthorized access to a 
criminal data base, uses of force that result in injury and all discharges of firearms. A special 
investigation team within the police department investigates these complaints. 

Internal Affairs Investigations (IA): Complaints alleging use of abusive, derogatory or 
inappropriate language, most uses of force that do not result in injury, and certain types of 
misconduct. 

Field Cases Investigations (FC): Complaints alleging offenses such as unbecoming conduct, 
unreported misconduct, process violations, minor uses of force, and failure to attend to duty. 
These complaints are referred directly to district commanders for investigation. 

Police Supervisory Investigations (PS): Complaints initiated by police supervisory staff 
regarding an officers performance of or failure to perform his assigned duties. 

Source: Prince Georges County (Maryland) Citizen Complaint Oversight Panel: 2003 Annual 
Report17 

Agency Profile: Population 795,000; Officers 1,400 

 


Investigatory Procedures for Categorized Complaints 

As discussed, legitimate complaints are most often categorized according to their level of 
seriousness. Not surprisingly, complaints of differing levels of seriousness are handled 
through different investigatory procedures. Commonly, less serious complaints are reviewed 
by the chain of command while more serious complaints are reviewed by specialized units 
within the department or external boards or commissions that have various degrees of 
independence from the department. For instance, the policy of the Tempe Police Department 
calls for supervisory and command personnel to resolve complaint allegations involving 
minor incidents or inquiries. The policy, however, requires that more serious allegations be 
recorded on the departments Employee Complaint/Commendation Report and be brought to 
the attention of the chief of police for further processing that may include referral to Internal 
Affairs. 

While allowing for variation according to the needs of different departments, the federal 
consent decrees and MOAs nevertheless are firm in the requirement that all departments give 
all complaintsparticularly civilian complaintsthorough, rigorous, unbiased, and timely 
investigation. In their discussion of the investigatory process, the agreements explore a wide 
range of issues including the thoroughness of investigation, standards of proof, quality of 
data, the role of supervisors, and timeliness of dispositions. In considering these issues, the 
agreements are deliberately prescriptive and proscriptiveaddressing both what departments 
ought to do and ought not to do. 

Thorough Investigations 

The federal consent decrees and MOAs establish the following conventions to ensure the 
thoroughness of complaint investigations: 

 Involved officers and witness officers are obligated to appear for investigative interviews. 

 Supervisors and command staff who were at the scene of the relevant incident should be 
interviewed. 

 Photographs of officers and complainants injuries should be taken, if applicable. 

 All related audio and visual recordings (e.g., from in-car cameras) should be reviewed for 
evidentiary content. 

 Investigators are required to canvas the scene for relevant evidence, if applicable. 

 Investigators are required to actively seek out witnesses, if applicable. 

 Investigatory processes should assess the consistency of information across statements by 
complainants, officers, and witnesses. 

 Investigatory processes should be documented in standardized reports. 

Rigorous Legal Standards 

The federal consent decrees and MOAs establish the following conventions to ensure the 
integrity of complaint investigations from a legal perspective: 

 The evidentiary standard for complaint resolution is preponderance of evidence. 

 A finding or admission of guilt by the complainant on criminal charges related to the 
incident should not be considered evidence weighing against the complainant. 



 Unavailability of the complainant or withdrawal of the complaint should not automatically 
result in the complaint investigation being dismissed. 

 During the complaint filing and investigation process, no civilian can be required to waive 
his or her right to sue for police misconduct unless he or she has a lawyer present. 

In many ways, the language of the consent decrees and MOAs calls for investigatory 
procedures that parallel the rigor and legal standards required in criminal investigations. 

Unbiased Investigations 

The federal consent decrees and MOAs establish several evidentiary and investigatory 
conventions to ensure that investigations are not conducted in a manner that allows biases in 
favor of the police. These are particularly germane to internal investigations. 

 Officers statements should never receive automatic preference over the complainants 
statements. 

 Group interviews of complainants, witnesses, and indicated officers are prohibited. 

 Leading questions are prohibited during investigatory processes. 

 Officers named in the complaint should not be materially involved in the investigation. 

 Officers not named in the complaint but who nevertheless supervised, approved, or were 
directly involved in the conduct that is the subject of the alleged complaint should not be 
materially involved in the investigation. 

 Officers not named in the complaint but who may be party to the complaint investigation 
(e.g., required to give an investigatory interview) should not be materially involved. 

Timely Investigations 

Although the federal consent decrees and MOAs establish the clear expectation that 
complaint investigations must be timely, the actual timelines established for the completion of 
complaint investigation differ across departments. The most common timeline for complaint 
investigation completion, stipulated in agreements with Buffalo, Cincinnati, Washington, D.C., 
and Montgomery County, was 90 days. The New Jersey State Police agreement, however, 
stipulated 45 days while the Steubenville, Ohio agreement stipulated 30 days. In the LAPD 
agreement, the expected timeline to complete complaint investigation was 5 months, but 
this directive was couched in the following language: 

All investigations of complaints shall be completed in a timely manner, taking into account: 

(a) the investigations complexity; (b) the availability of evidence; and (c) overriding or 
extenuating circumstances underlying exceptions or tolling doctrines that may be applied to 
the disciplinary limitations provisions (i) applicable to LAPD officers and (ii) applicable to 
many other law enforcement agencies in the State of California. The parties expect that, even 
after taking these circumstances into account, most investigations will be completed within 
five months.18 
 


As the LAPD agreement makes clear, the timeliness of an investigation must be defined 
considering several factors, including the number of complaints a department must 
investigate, the resources it has to dedicate to investigations, and the complexity of each 
complaint. Departments should also consider the impact of state laws or collective bargaining 
agreements on their ability to investigate complaints in a timely manner. All departments 
should establish and adhere to a reasonable timeline. They also should stipulate that there 
may be exceptions to these timelines when exceptional circumstances arise. Certainly, 
the fairness and comprehensiveness of complex complaint investigations should not be 
compromised by time constraints. 

Step Three: The Complaint Resolution Process 

The federal consent decrees and MOAs stipulate that the resolution of any complaint must be 
based on an investigation that is thorough, rigorous, unbiased, and timely and that adheres to 
a preponderance of evidence standard. The agreements also address the appropriate methods 
by which the resolutions of complaint investigations are made known. 

Disposition 

All complaint investigations must be resolved with a disposition or conclusion of fact. 
Although the terminology varies slightly across consent decrees and MOAs, these dispositions 
range from full exoneration of the officer to the full substantiation of the complaint allegation. 
The dispositions most commonly stipulated in the consent decrees and MOAs fall into the 
following four categories with their accompanying definition: 

 Sustained: Preponderance of the evidence shows that misconduct or inappropriate 
behavior occurred. 

 Unfounded: Preponderance of the evidence shows that misconduct or inappropriate 
behavior did not occur. 

 Exonerated:The conduct described by the complainant or other referral source occurred, 
but did not violate the agencys policy and/or relevant laws. 

 Not Sustained/Not Resolved/Insufficient Evidence:There is insufficient evidence to 
determine whether the alleged misconduct occurred. 

Record of Disposition 

The federal consent decrees and MOAs stipulate that complaints should be resolved in 
writing. While the agreements do not prescribe a particular format for these reports, they do 
stipulate that the reports should contain both the disposition of the complaint and the grounds 
for that decision. Some agreements further stipulate that the report identify any apparent 
inconsistencies among statements of complainants, witnesses, and officer interviews that 
became apparent during the investigation. All reports should explain any sanctions imposed 
on the officer who is the subject of the complaint, including disciplinary and nondisciplinary 
actions. Finally, the consent decrees and MOAs are resolute in requiring that complainants be 
notified of the outcome at the conclusion of the process. 



Ensuring Accountability in the Complaint Process 

Departments of all sizes and jurisdictions dedicate significant resources to establish and 
operate civilian complaint processes. The federal consent decrees and MOAs seek to ensure 
that these resources are expended productively by demanding accountability both within the 
department and for the benefit of the public the department serves. 

Internal Accountability 

The federal consent decrees and MOAs seek to ensure accountability for the civilian complaint 
process within departments through careful stipulations regarding supervisory roles. These 
stipulations govern the way individual supervisors handle individual complaints as well as 
they way departments as a whole supervise the complaint process in general. For instance, 
consent decrees and MOAs require that an officers direct supervisor should be notified 
as soon as possible anytime an officer is named in a civilian complaint or is subject to an 
internal misconduct allegation. These agreements also clearly delineate supervisory authority 
in general. For instance, consent decrees and MOAs decree that the authority for resolving a 
complaint investigationoften dependent, as noted earlier, on the nature and seriousness of 
the allegationgenerally rests with the supervisor or a specifically designated investigatory 
officer, such as one assigned to the departments internal affairs unit. In general, the federal 
consent decrees and MOAs stipulate that the chief and supervisor have an oversight role and 
may call for the involvement of specifically designated investigatory officers, as needed, to 
ensure a fair investigation. 

In addition to these stipulations, which guarantee the careful handling of individual 
complaints, the consent decrees and MOAs stipulate a general monitoring of the overall 
progress, timeliness, and completeness of all complaint investigations. Depending on 
the agency size and the jurisdiction of complaint review (e.g., by chain of command or 
within internal affairs), managers are responsible for the overall monitoring. As a part of 
this monitoring process, some departments were required to engage external auditors or 
monitors to conduct audits of the complaint investigations. These audits should be designed 
to determine whether the complaint process is upholding standards of thoroughness, rigor, 
and timeliness. Similar internal auditing regimens, often under the auspices of a professional 
standards are common, particularly in larger departments. 

The complaint process audit outlined in the Pittsburgh consent decree is representative of 
the substance and scope that the agreements seek to establish for departments auditing 
processes generally: 

71. The auditor shall perform quality assurance checks of OMI investigations. The City shall 
provide the auditor with full access to all OMI staff and records (including databases, files, and 
quarterly statistical summaries), the automated early warning system described in Paragraph 
12, all information regarding officer use of force and searches and seizures (including the 
use of force reports required by Paragraph 15, and the search and seizure reports required 
by paragraph 15), all information required in Paragraph 16, and all relevant City manuals of 
policies and procedures that the auditor deems necessary to fulfill his or her duties, as defined 
 


below. The auditor shall review and evaluate the following information, and issue a quarterly 
report to the parties and the Court describing the review and analysis: a. All OMI final reports 
as described in Paragraph 63, and all remedial training and disciplinary records described in 
Paragraphs 41 and 21(c). The City shall forward all OMI final reports and all disciplinary 
and training records to the auditor immediately upon their completion. b. The substance and 
timeliness of at least 50% of all OMI investigations completed during each quarter of the 
Citys fiscal year. c. Statistical information on the number and types of complaints of PBP 
misconduct, the timeliness of the investigations, the disposition, and any remedial training, 
counseling, discipline, transfers, or reassignments. d. Discipline, remedial training, mandatory 
counseling, transfers, and reassignments actually imposed as a result of each complaint. e. 
Officer use of force, searches and seizures, and traffic stops.19 

The Role of Internal Affairs 

In most departments, internal affairs units play a role in the complaint investigation and 
resolution process. In some departments, particularly smaller departments, internal affairs 
units may play the primary role in investigating serious complaints or all complaints. While 
adjudicating complaints in a fair and equitable manner is a clear mandate, internal affairs units 
must attend to a broader range of concerns than just the adjudication on individual cases. As 
with external oversight bodies, they must demonstrate a commitment to enhance public trust 
and assess whether deficiencies in department policies, procedures, or training may have 
contributed to the problematic behavior. These objectives apply whether internal affairs plays 
the sole role in investigating complaints or works in tandem with civilian oversight. 

Accountability Through Data Management 

Federal agreements establish provisions that promote individual and departmental 
accountability for the civilian complaint process through the effective collection and 
management of complaint data. Provisions common across the consent decrees and MOAs 
include the following: 

 The department is to assign a tracking number to each unique complaint. 

 The department should establish a written protocol for use of the complaint information 
system. 

 The department should take appropriate steps for linking and integrating complaint data 
with the early intervention (risk-management or personnel assessment) system. 

 The department is required to maintain complaint data for a specified period of time for 
the purpose of maintaining complaint histories on individual employees or summary 
reports by agency or unit. (the period of time, which varies by department, may reflect the 
influence of factors such as state law or collective bargaining agreements). 

Taken together, these provisions aid agency management in using complaint data to enhance 
accountability. Many agencies have proactively adopted similar data-management strategies, 
including integrating complaint data into their early intervention systems, and publishing 
summary data as a means of keeping their communities informed. 



Public Accountability 

The federal consent decrees and MOAs also seek to ensure accountability of the civilian 
complaint process by stipulating that departments make summary reports of misconduct 
complaints available to the public. The agreements impose the following requirements: 

 The department is to maintain summary reporting ability, including the ability to create 
complaint history summaries by individual officer or by unit. 

 The department is to maintain and periodically disseminate to the public a statistical 
summary report regarding complaints files and resolution of those complaints. 

While the agreements impose the requirements across departments, departments share 
summarized information on the filing, investigation, and resolution of complaints with the 
public in various ways. Some departments routinely include this information in their annual 
reports. Other departments post this information on their web sites. 

While the sophistication and level of detail of these summary reports vary considerably 
by department, providing such reports is sound public policy. The very availability of this 
summary information sends an important message of transparency and accountability to the 
public. With summary information in hand, the public can better understand the workings 
of the complaint process. If the summary report contains monthly, quarterly, or yearly 
comparisons, then the public is able to assess whether complaints are generally on the rise or 
dropping. If the summary report breaks down particular types of complaints, such as rudeness 
or excessive force, by time period, then the public is able to make similar assessments at a 
more detailed level. 

Departments are holding themselves accountable to the communities they serve by offering 
these summary reports in clear and informative formats. For instance, the table below, 
available on the web site of the Seattle (Washington) Police Department (SPD), provides 
information regarding trends of complaint allegations during 6 years. 

Type of Allegation               1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2003 
Unnecessary Force                  79   64   61   94  105   80 
Conduct Unbecoming on Officer      39   35   50   65   85  105 
Violation of Rules                 42   48   36   21   71   82 
Misuse of Authority                39   39   21   20   19   20 
Improper Language                  45   34    8    5    6    5 
Failure to Take Appropriate Action 23   29   20   12   12   14 
Violation of Law                    7    5   15   12   15    8 

Source: Seattle Police Department Office of Professional Accountability 
Annual Report Fall 2003 
www.ci.seattle.wa.us/police/OPA/Docs/OPA_AR_03.pdf 
 


In another example, the Charlotte-Mecklenburg police rely on their Internal Affairs 2004 Annual 
Report to inform the public about trends in civilian complaints against department employees. 
Below are just two of the many illustrations included in that report. 

Complaints Events Received/Sustained 2003 2004 Change 

2003
Citizens Complaint Events 144
Sustained Portion and % of Total 39 (27%) 

Department Complaint Events 237 
Sustained Portion and % of Total 200 (84%) 

Total Complaint Events 381
Sustained Portion and % of Total 239 (53%)

2004
Citizens Complaint Events 162
Sustained Portion and % of Total 30 (18%)

Department Complaint Events 243 
Sustained Portion and % of Total 297 (81%) 

Total Complaint Events 405 
Sustained Portion and % of Total 227 (55%)  

Change
Citizens Complaint Events 11%
Sustained Portion and % of Total -9%

Department Complaint Events 2.5%  
Sustained Portion and % of Total -3%

Total Complaint Events 5.9% 
Sustained Portion and % of Total -7% 
 

2003 
Total Employees Receiving Complaints 192
Sustained 39
Not Sustained 115
Exonerated 20 
Unfounded 18 

2004
Total Employees Receiving Complaints 216
Sustained 35 
Not Sustained 138 
Exonerated 34
Unfounded 9 

Source: Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department Internal Affairs 
2004 Annual Report 
www.charmeck.org/Departments/Police/Home.htm 



Recommendations 

On the basis of its assessment of federal consent decrees and MOAs as well as the preceding 
discussion, the IACP offers the following recommendations. The IACP reminds readers that 
the complaint process may be affected by the local laws and collective bargaining agreements 
under which a department operates. 

The recommendations correspond sequentially with the goals of establishing a civilian 
complaint process, implementing the process, and remaining accountable to the community 
served and officers within the department. 

Establishing a Clear Policy and Process 

1. Establish clear policies and procedures for addressing civilian and internal complaints about 
officer misconduct. 

These policies and procedures for handling civilian and internal complaints may be treated 
as a standalone section of the departments policy manual or may be embedded within other 
appropriate policy sections (e.g., internal affairs unit policy). 

2. Establish, through policies and procedures, a clear central authority or authorities 
responsible for the investigation and resolution of misconduct allegations. 

Depending on the size of the department, authority to investigate and resolve a complaint may 
be vested in an individual such as the chief, in the normal chain of command, in a specialized 
unit such as the internal affairs unit, or in some combination of the above. Depending on the 
size and organizational capacities of the department, different authorities and investigator 
processes may be in order for different classes of complaints. This authority or authorities 
should be clearly articulated in policy. 

3. Classify complaints into different categories to ensure appropriate investigatory procedures. 

Departments must clearly define the behaviors that constitute misconduct and must categorize 
these behaviors according to severity to ensure that an appropriate investigation of alleged 
misconduct occurs. 

4. Establish open and accessible complaint filing processes. 

Departments complaint filing processes should not be so burdensome or complicated as to 
make civilians reluctant to file complaints. Departments should establish multiple means for 
filing complaints. These might include filing complaints in person, by phone, by fax, by mail, 
by e-mail, and via the Internet. Instructions and forms should be available in a clear format 
and in languages commonly in use by the population served. 



5. Accept all allegations of misconduct by police officers from all available sources. 

Although most allegations of officer misconduct will arise through civilian or internal 
complaints, departments should actively seek out and require reporting of information 
about officer misconduct from other sources including arrests of officers (particularly those 
that occur in other jurisdictions); criminal proceedings against officers; and private civil 
actions related to official conduct, whether on or off-duty. Officers should be required to 
report such information about themselves. Departments should establish agreements with 
local prosecutors and state attorneys who may provide notification of such proceedings. 
Departments should also be prepared to respond to misconduct allegations brought to light 
exclusively through the media. 

Investigative Processes 

6. Establish fair, thorough, and transparent investigatory processes. 

Departments must establish processes that ensure a thorough, rigorous, unbiased, and timely 
investigation of every complaint. To implement such investigations, departments must devote 
adequate resources to the complaint process and specify reporting protocols and dispositional 
outcomes to be used at the conclusion of investigations. 

7. Select and train investigators based on specific knowledge and skills that are necessary to 
conduct misconduct investigations. 

Departments should not assume that persons who are skilled and experienced in criminal 
investigations are automatically qualified to conduct misconduct investigations. Although 
some skills may be transferable, other skills are unique to the misconduct investigation 
process. Officers investigating civilian complaints should be selected and trained based on 
skills and knowledge relevant to the specific duties associated with complaint investigations. 

8. Policies and investigative practices should stress fairness and balance, both ensuring public 
confidence in thorough, unbiased investigations and a commitment to protecting officers 
against false complaints. 

To maintain the trust and confidence of both the public department and personnel, 
investigations must be rigorous yet must protect their officers against false or fabricated 
allegations. Departments must take great care in distinguishing between fabricated allegations 
and those that could arise out of confusion or misunderstanding by the complainant. At a 
minimum, false accusations should be stricken from an officers record and deleted from any 
early intervention or personnel assessment management system. 


Accountability 

9.Track and analyze complaints for the purposes of assessing overall performance and 
improving policies, procedures, and training. 

Departments should fully integrate complaint data into a comprehensive data management 
strategy. For purposes of assessment, departments should consider complaint data, alongside 
citizen satisfaction surveys, community group meeting feedback, and ongoing dialogue 
with a wide cross-section of community leaders, as an indicator of citizen satisfaction with 
the department. Civilian complaint data must always be analyzed in context. For instance, 
departments might expect and even welcome a spike in complaints when policies or 
procedures are changed in order to make the complaint process more open and accessible 
to civilians. When comparing the number and type of complaints generated across units and 
across time, police managers must acknowledge and factor in such policy changes. Analyses 
of complaint data should continually inform department policies and community outreach 
efforts. 

10. Make summary reports available to the public of complaint data analyzed by type, by 
disposition, and by time period. 

By making such information available on web sites and/or through annual reports, 
departments will demonstrate the transparency of the civilian complaint process to their 
communities. 



Conclusion 

Given the nature of law enforcement interactions, complaints by civilians in the communities 
they serve and internal complaints raised by personnel within the department are a familiar 
occurrence in all agencies. Law enforcement leaders have a critical choice to make on 
how best to handle complaints. They may treat them as isolated events which need to 
be adjudicated. They may also assess complaint data from a broader problem-solving 
perspective by using complaint data to assess individual performance, unit performance, and 
as a barometer of the departments success in carrying out its customer-oriented mission. 
Sweeping complaints under the rug is not only an unethical practice; it also deprives 
managers of potentially useful information. 

Many departments are incorporating complaint data into early intervention strategies or as 
part of a broader personnel management system. While paying careful attention to providing 
individuals unfettered access to the complaint process, departments must also ensure that 
they provide a process by which civilians can file formal commendations about police officers. 
Data on both complaints and commendations should be used for assessment purposes. 

Suggestions for Further Reading 

Law enforcement agencies respond to and process civilian and internally generated 
complaints in a wide variety of ways. The breadth and complexity of this issue extends beyond 
the issues addressed in this chapter. The following publications are recommended for further 
reading. 

Bobb, Merrick. Internal and External Police Oversight in the United States. Presentation from 
an international conference of police oversight at The Hague in October 2005. Police 
Assessment Resource Center, Los Angeles. 
www.parc.info/pubs/index.html#issues 

International Association of Chiefs of Police. Police Accountability and Citizen Review: A 
Leadership Opportunity for Police Chiefs. Alexandria (Virginia): 2000. www.theiacp.org/ 
documents/pdfs/Publications/policeaccountability.pdf 

Walker, Samuel, Carol Archbold, and Leigh Herbst. Mediating Citizen Complaints Against 
Police Officers: A Guide for Police and Community Leaders. Police Executive Research 
Forum, Washington, DC; 2002. www.cops.usdoj.gov/mime/open.pdf?Item=452 

Walker Samuel. The New World of Police Accountability. Sage Publications Inc., Thousand Oaks 
(California): 2005 



Endnotes 

1 

Thurnauer, Beau. Best Practices Guide for Internal Affairs: A Strategy for Smaller 
Departments. Big Ideas for Smaller Departments. Winter 2004. Chief Thurnauer, a 22-year 
veteran of the Manchester, Connecticut, Police Department, retired with the rank of captain 
in 1998. He currently serves as the chief of police in Coventry, Connecticut with a staff of 13 
sworn officers. 

2 

For the purposes of this chapter, discussion of law enforcement employment discrimination 
allegations are excluded. This should not be interpreted to mean that equal employment 
opportunity is not an important civil rights issue. Having personnel who are representative 
of the community they serve is a critical consideration addressed in Chapter 7 of this guide. 
This topic is omitted because it is an internal civil rights issue and not within the main 
purview of this document, protecting civil rights of community members. 

3 
Memorandum of Agreement Between the United States Department of Justice and the City 
of Cincinnati, Ohio and Cincinnati Police Department. (4/12/02). www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/ 
Cincmoafinal.htm. 

4 
Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies (CALEA) standard 52.1.1. 

5 
The 2003 LEMAS survey did not break out university police, railroad police, and other 
special jurisdictional police as distinct types. Of the tribal police agencies included in the 
survey, 12 of 15 indicated that they did have a policy directive of citizen complaints, but 
the sample size for tribal police is not large enough to make reliable projections to all tribal 
police agencies or to compare across agency size. 

6 
United States v. City of Pittsburgh Consent Decree. (02/26/97). www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/ 
documents/pittscomp.htm. 

7 
Agreement Between the United States Department of Justice and Buffalo City Police 
Department, the Police Benevolent Association, Inc., and the American Federation of State, 
County, and Municipal Employees Local 264 (9/19/02). www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/documents/ 
buffalo_police_agreement.htm. 

8 
United States v. City of Los Angeles (6/15/2001). Available on the Web at www.usdoj.gov/crt/ 
split/documents/laconsent.htm. 

9 
International Association of Chiefs of Police Model Policies. Standards of Conduct, August 
1997. 

10 Memorandum of Agreement Between the United States Department of Justice and 
the District of Columbia and the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department 
(06/13/2000). www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/documents/dcmoa.htm. 

11 
Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies (CALEA) standard 52.1.5 

12 International Association of Chiefs of Police. Police Accountability and Citizen Review: A 
Leadership Opportunity for Police Chiefs. Alexandria (Virginia): 2000. www.theiacp.org/ 
documents/pdfs/Publications/policeaccountability.pdf. 

13 International Association of Chiefs of Police. Police Accountability and Citizen Review: A 
Leadership Opportunity for Police Chiefs. Alexandria (Virginia): 2000. www.theiacp.org/ 
profassist/ethics/police_accountability.htm. 

14 
United States v. City of Los Angeles Consent Decree. (6/15/2001). www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/ 
documents/laconsent.htm. 
 


15 International Association of Chiefs of Police. Police Accountability and Citizen Review: 
A Leadership Opportunity for Police Chiefs. Alexandria (Virginia): 2000. Boise Police 
Department reference available at www.theiacp.org/profassist/ethics/police_accountability. 
htm. 

16 Missouri City (Texas) Police Department, Professional Standards. Last updated on 

08/06/2002 Retrieved from www.iacpnet.com. 
17 www.co.pg.md.us/Government/BoardsCommissions/pdfs/CCOP_2003-FY2004_Report.pdf 
18 United States v. City of Los Angeles Consent Decree (6/15/2001). www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/ 

documents/laconsent.htm. 
19 United States v. City of Pittsburgh Consent Decree (02/26/97). www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/ 
documents/pittscomp.htm. 


V. Managing Use of Force 


Managing Use of Force 

Police departments everywhere have no greater responsibility than to ensure that our officers, 
who are entrusted by the public to use force in the performance of their duties, use that force 
prudently and appropriately. In addition, when deadly force is used, police departments have 
a solemn obligationto the public and to the officers involvedto investigate these cases 
thoroughly, accurately and expeditiously.1 

Chief Charles Ramsey, Washington, DC Metropolitan Police Department 

Introduction 

Occasionally, a use-of-force incident can catapult an individual officer, a whole department, 
or the entire law enforcement profession into headline news. The mere mention of Rodney 
King, Amadou Diallo, or Abner Louima, for instance, illustrates the serious concerns that these 
events can raise in the public forum. Highly visible incidents such as these have an enormous 
impact not only on the individuals involved, but also on their departments and on law 
enforcement in general. The unjustified use of force or the use of force that fails to comply with 
established policy standards damages lives, erodes confidence in the police, destroys careers, 
and exposes individual officers, departments, and municipalities to substantial civil liability. 
Individual officers also may be held criminally liable. If excessive force appears to be systemic, 
it may expose the department to a federal pattern or practice investigation. 

The law enforcement profession may feel confident, however, in the fact that the use of 
forcelet alone the misuse of forceamong police officers is a remarkably rare occurrence. 
Two large-scale prevalence studiesone based on voluntary submission of police data2 and 
one based on a representative national sample survey of the public3found that the use 
of physical force on the part of officers occurred in less than 1 percent of police and citizen 
encounters. 

Given the fact that most routine police encounters are not confrontational, some suggest 
that the ratio of use of force to arrests is a more appropriate and revealing standard. A study 
examining 7 years of data from the Montgomery County (Maryland) police departments 
found a rate of 6.4 force incidents per 100 adult custody arrests, which, as the authors note, is 
infrequent considering the context.4,5 

In his review of research on use of force, University of Central Florida Professor Kenneth 
Adams observes, whether measured by use-of-force reports, citizen complaints, victim 
surveys, or observational methods, the data consistently indicates that only a small 
percentage of police-public interactions involve the use of force.6 Thus, data collected by 
police departments and backed by scholarly research make clear that the overwhelming 
majority of police-citizen contacts are carried out routinely with no use of physical force. 

Still, police executives have the responsibilityboth to their communities and to their 
officersto effectively handle the small, but serious number of instances in which force is 



misused. A small percentage of police encounters with the public involve excessive use of 
force or force without cause. Some officers occasionally stumble into a misuse of force. A 
small number of officers repeatedly exercise poor judgment or willful disregard for use-of-force policies. 
Police executives must work to limit such incidents. They must ensure that use 
of force is kept to a minimum, that excessive force is not tolerated, and that any allegation of 
excessive or unlawful force is thoroughly investigated. 

To this end, a police executives ability to manage use of force through clear polices, effective 
training, and sound management is of paramount importance. Through these tools, police 
executives must require officers to limit their use of force to that which is reasonably 
necessary for effective law enforcement and for the protection of officers and civilians. As a 
result, the public should be able to expect that police officers will use force only to the extent 
necessary to achieve lawful law enforcement objectives and never as a method of retaliation 
or as an outlet for frustration. Police executives are also responsible for assuring that proper 
accountability mechanisms are in place. Police executives, appropriately, should track agency 
patterns in use of force and offer proper intervention or disciplinary action for officers found to 
have engaged in unlawful use of force. 

Finally, police executives must be prepared to respond in highly visible moments when 
officers have been accused of excessive use of force or force without cause. What police 
leaders say and do in these moments has a tremendous effect on the publics response as 
well as on the morale of rank-and-file police officers. In response to any incident involving an 
excessive use-of-force allegation, a police executive must balance concern for the public with 
concern for officers. The chief must ensure that the incident will be investigated thoroughly 
and fairly while avoiding pressure from either side to rush to judgment. Only in this way will 
the chief sustain the confidence of the department and the community that the department 
serves. 

Chapter Overview and Objectives 

This chapter addresses law enforcement leaders management of the use of force within their 
departments. Although teaching officers to use force to ensure their own and others safety 
and to respond to resistance is an ongoing and critical responsibility, this chapter is not meant 
to be a primer on use-of-force techniques. Instead, it focuses on the tremendous responsibility 
that law enforcement officers bear as a result of their authority to use force. Law enforcement 
leaders must remain vigilant in assisting officers to manage this awesome responsibility if 
citizens civil rights are to be protected. 

Accordingly, this chapter begins with an investigation of the way in which force is discussed 
and defined in law enforcement agencies. It explores various levels of forcefrom the 
implied force of an officers presence to deadly forceas well as the reliance on use-of-force 
continuums to aid officers in their efforts to know when and with what level of force to 
respond to any given circumstance. 



The chapter proceeds from this groundwork to explore four core components of effective 
use-of-force management. The chapter asserts that every law enforcement leader must 
design a clear and comprehensive use-of-force policy, implement training that both hones 
officers skills in using force and offers them alternatives to this use, maintain accountability 
mechanisms to ensure that excessive force or force without cause is not tolerated, and 
establish media and public relations outreach strategies before any critical use-of-force 
incident threatens to distance the department from the community it is sworn to serve. By 
combining proper use-of-force policies, training, accountability mechanisms, community 
outreach, and public relations strategies, law enforcement leaders can effectively limit 
individual, departmental, and municipal liability while promoting confidence and trust among 
their own rank-and-file officers and community members. To promote these ends, the chapter 
concludes with a series of recommendations. 

Issues in Defining Use of Force 

Discussions of the use and misuse of force revolve around common phrases that are 
consistently used but not always uniformly defined. The following discussion is intended to 
clarify these terms for the purposes of this guide. 

Use-of-Force Definitions in Context 

While use of force is a common phrase in law enforcement and in scholarly research such as 
the studies mentioned in the chapter introduction, the meaning of the term can be ambiguous. 
It is best understood in the particular contexts in which it is used. 

In the context of departmental policy directives, use of force as a general term is rarely 
defined. Instead, these policies define at least two classes of force: deadly force (often referred 
to as lethal force) and nondeadly force (sometimes called nonlethal or less-lethal force). These 
policies then stipulate the use of various weapons, equipment, and techniques that fall under 
these two general headings. 

In the context of training, departments often do define use of force; generally, they define the 
phrase rather broadly. Many departments expressly stipulate that all police encounters or 
at least involuntary police contacts such as traffic stops, pedestrian stops, and arrests imply 
some sense of force. Under this broad conceptualization of the issue for purposes of training, 
use of force is seen as a graduated continuum that ranges from the mere presence of an 
officerimplied forceto the use of deadly force options. This use-of-force continuum as a 
training tool will be discussed in greater detail below. 



Outside the training room, however, the use of force generally is defined more narrowly to 
refer to specific actions that are over and above an agency defined threshold and excludes 
the type of routine activities that occur during arrest and other encounters. In this sense, force 
is seen as a response to subject resistance. The following excerpt from the memorandum of 
agreement between the Department of Justice and the Detroit Police Department provides 
a summary of the term as it commonly is understood from an operational law enforcement 
perspective: 

The term force means the following actions by an officer: any physical strike or instrumental 
contact with a person; any intentional attempted physical strike or instrumental contact that 
does not take effect; or any significant physical contact that restricts the movement of a 
person. The term includes the discharge of firearms; the use of chemical spray, choke holds, 
or hard hands; the taking of a subject to the ground; or the deployment of a canine. The 
term does not include escorting or handcuffing a person with no or minimal resistance. Use 
of force is lawful if it is objectively reasonable under the circumstances and the minimum 
amount of force necessary to effect an arrest or protect the officer or other person.7 

Deadly and Nondeadly Force 

Virtually all policy directives focused on the use of force draw distinctions between deadly and 
other types force. Deadlyor lethalforce generally is construed as any action that is readily 
capable of causing death or serious physical injury. According to a federal memorandum of 
agreement in effect in Washington, D.C., the term deadly force means any use of force likely 
to cause death or serious physical injury, including but not limited to the use of a firearm or a 
strike to the head with a hard object.8 Other federal agreements use very similar definitions. 
It is important to note that the implication of many of these definitions is that death or serious 
injury need not be the intended outcome, just a possible outcome of the force used. For 
instance, some departments define warning shots and choke holds as deadly force. 

By definition, all other uses of force are considered nondeadlyor less-lethaluses of force. 
Some departments define nondeadly force by specifying the instruments, weapons, and 
techniques that fall under this category. These might include specific references to batons, 
flashlights, chemical agents, conducted energy device (CED) and canine deployments. A CED 
is sometimes referred to as an electronic control weapon (ECW) or a TaserTM, a name of one 
well-known manufacturer. 
 


Debates regarding distinctions between deadly and nondeadly uses of force certainly exist. 
Differences of opinion exist on terminology to describe the general types of force, and 
departments struggle to determine where certain techniques should be placed. The use-of-force 
continuum is useful in this context. A graphic teaching tool, it can be used to illustrate 
the distinctions between deadly and nondeadly force options. 

A Note on Terminology Used in this Guide 

In policies, training, and general discussions, various terminologies are used in distinguishing 
between two categories of force. Consistent with IACPs model policy on use of force,9 
this guide uses the terms deadly and nondeadly force, except when using specific terms from 
quoted or referenced sources. One article suggests this distinction is more consistent with 
legal standards and less ambiguous than others. Fourth Amendment law speaks of two 
categories of force: deadly and nondeadly. The term less-lethal potentially confuses the 
fact that electronic control weapons, appropriately used, are by definition nondeadly force 
devices. It also suggests that the use of electronic control weapons is questionable in 
anything but deadly force situations.10 

The term Taser refers to one particular manufacturer. Besides Taser, however, there 
are other manufactures such as Stinger. Although generic terms are being used in lieu 
of common brand names, these have varied and perhaps add to the confusion. Generic 
terms include conducted energy devices (CEDs), electro-muscular-disruption-technology 
(EMDT), and occasionally stun guns. Taking the lead from a recent publication of 
training guidelines that were developed by the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) in 
consultation with law enforcement professionals this guide uses the term conducted energy 
device or CED.11 Other terms are used when directly referencing or quoting terms used 
by other sources. 

Reasonableness of Force 

In general, legitimate force is described as those reasonable actions that are necessary to 
protect persons or property from illegal harm or to bring about obedience to a valid police 
order. Stemming from the Fourth Amendment, reasonableness is the legal standard that must 
guide the decision to use force and the amount of force used. This standard of reasonableness 
has several implications. One is that an officer is permitted to use the amount of force 
necessary only to overcome the resistance or aggression that is presented by the subject. In 
addition, when the resistance or the aggression of the subject is reduced, the officer(s) must 
reduce his or her force correspondingly. The consent judgment between the Department of 
Justice and the Detroit Police Department invokes the reasonable-force standard in describing 



legitimate uses of force: Use of force is lawful if it is objectively reasonable under the 
circumstances and the minimum amount of force necessary to effect an arrest or protect the 
officer or other person.12 

Understanding two additional legal inferences about the standard of reasonable force is 
important. First, reasonableness is not assessed from hindsight, but is based on careful 
attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case and as would be seen 
from the perspective of a reasonable officer responding to the particular case.13 Second, in 
assessing reasonableness, courts have been deferential to the reality that officers are making 
split-second decisions under difficult circumstances.14 

Excessive Force 

In general, excessive force is defined as being unlawful force or force that exceeds the 
appropriate thresholds defined by a departments policy directives. The standard for 
distinguishing excessive force from allowable force is, as discussed above, the standard of 
reasonableness. Policy directives generally note that the standard of reasonableness is based 
on the perspective of the officer on the scene at the time the force decision is being made. 
The following excerpt from a sample policy from the Virginia Department of Criminal Justice 
Services is representative of an excessive-force definition based on this legal standard and 
helps ground the legal terminology in a clear operational context. 

Force is excessive when its application is inappropriate to the circumstances, resulting 
in serious physical injury or death to a suspect. In determining whether force has been 
excessively applied, the primary concern is whether the on-scene officer reasonably believes 
that its application was necessary and appropriate. Based on the reasonableness standard, 
excessive force may be determined based on: 

1. The severity of the crime. 
2. The nature and extent of the threat posed by the suspect. 
3. The degree to which the suspect resists arrest or detention. 
4. Any attempts by the suspect to evade arrest by flight or fight. 

In evaluating the reasonable application of force, officers must consider their own age, size, 
strength, skill level with department weapons, state of health, and the number of officers 
relative to the number of suspects. 

This and other similar directives are necessary for providing context and establishing 
parameters for proper conduct. It would be impractical, however, for officers to perform the 
detailed mental checklist suggested in the language when dealing with exigent circumstances 
in the field. The use-of-force continuum is offered in many departments as a practical way to 
train officers to assess situations and from which to make force decisions in the field.15 



Use-of-Force Continuum 

In their day-to-day work, police officers must make difficult, split-second decisions about 
whether to use force and what level of force to use. These decisions must be consistent with 
departmental policy and legal standards. Written departmental policies taken by themselves 
can be vague and difficult for officers to apply in the field. As a result, many departments 
have used a use-of-force continuuma tool that helps officers visualize variations in levels 
of forceas a means of clarifying written policies. Indeed, most departments use a use-of-force 
continuum in training, and many departments now explicitly incorporate a use-of-force 
continuum into their departmental policy. 

Several examples of use-of-force continuums/matrices are presented below: 

Iamge of use of force continuum

Level of Threat                       Corresponding Force 
(1) Compliant (blue level)            Communication, such as verbal commands 

(2) Passive resistance (green level)  Low-level physical tactics, such as grabbing a suspects arm 

(3) Active resistance (yellow level)  Use of come-along holds, pressure points, and chemical sprays 

(4) Assaultive with the potential     Defensive tactics, such as striking maneuvers with the hands or a    
for bodily harm (orange level)        baton

(5) Assaultive with the               Deadly force
potential for serious bodily 
harm or death (red level)  

Image of Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) Use-of-Force Model. 
From GAO/GGD=96-17 ATF Use of Force, page 39


Image of Florida Department of Law Enforcement Recommended Response to Resistance Matrix

Checked areas represent 
authorized, acceptable 
beginning response levels. 
Any response in an unchecked 
area requires explanation. 
Refer to definitions for 
each level of resistance and 
response. 

Image from the Florida Department of Law Enforcement, Criminal Justice
Professionalism Program, Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission
Defensive Tactics Curriculum, Legal and Medical Risk Summary
June 2002, Page 4 (supplied by the Tallahassee Police Department). 



DPSST Force Continuum 

Level of Force 
VI Deadly

Method of Force 
Any force readly capable of causing death or serious physical injury 

Level of Resistance 
Lethal

Threat 
Resistive 

Level of Force 
V Serious Physical Control 

Method of Force
Neck Restraint 
Impact Weapon 
Focused Blows 
Mace (CN/CS) 
OC Restraints

Level of Resistance
Ominous 
Active
Static

Threat 
Resistive 

Level of Force
IV Physical Control 

Method of Force
Hair Takedown 
Joint Takedown 
Digital Control 
Joint Comealong 
Pressure Points 
Electronic Stun Device 
Temp. Restraints 
OC Restraints

Level of Resistance
Ominous 
Active
Static

Threat 
Resistive 

Level of Force
III Physical Contact 

Method of Force
Escort Position 
Directional Contact 

Level of Resistance
Verbal

Threat 
Undecided

Level of Force
II Verbal Communication 

Method of Force
Direct Order Questioning 
Persuasion 

Level of Resistance
Verbal

Threat 
Undecided

Level of Force
I Presence

Method of Force 
Display of Force Option 
Body Language/Demeanor 
Identification of Authority 

Level of Resistance
None 

Threat
Complying 

Image from the Oregon Department of Public Safety and Training Standard (DPSST). 
Obtained from Portland State University Public Safety Office web site 
www.cpso.pdx.edu/html/forcepolicy.htm 



Origins and Evolution of Use-of-Force Continuums 

The use-of-force continuum originated in the early 1980s. The first continuum was a line with 
officer presence or verbal commands at one end and deadly force at the other. The continuum 
has now seen countless revisions and adaptations. While no single use-of-force continuum 
has been universally accepted, some states such as Florida and Oregon have either adopted or 
recommended a continuum for statewide use. This tool is not without its detractors, but while 
its effectiveness in various forms has been debated, and will continue to be debated, it is a 
widely used training tool and the foundation of manyif not mostdepartments use-of-force 
policies. 

Several Department of Justice investigations, consent decrees, and memorandums of 
agreement (MOA) address the use-of-force continuum. The federal MOA for the Washington, 
D.C., police, for instance, requires that that department continue to use its continuum and 
incorporate it as part of its academy and annual training. In its consent decree, the Detroit 
Police Department is required to revise its use-of-force policy and continuum to meet the 
following stipulations: 

The use-of-force policy shall incorporate a use-of-force continuum that: 

a. 
identifies when and in what manner the use of lethal and less than lethal force are 
permitted 
b. 
relates the force options available to officers to the types of conduct by individuals that 
would justify the use of such force 
c. 
states that de-escalation, disengagement, area containment, surveillance, waiting out a 
subject, summoning reinforcements, or calling in specialized units are often the appropriate 
response to a situation.16 

Benefits and Drawbacks of the Use-of-Force Continuum 

Proponents of the use-of-force continuum maintain that it is a practical training tool that helps 
officers make decisions that effectively balance safety considerations with individual rights. 
Proponents argue that in conjunction with proper trainingscenario training and shoot-dont-shoot 
trainingthe use-of-force continuum enables officers to make sound decisions quickly. 
They also argue that the use-of-force continuum is a useful tool during post-incident reviews 
and investigatory interviews where it can help the officer and investigators articulate what 
level of force was used and why that level of force was necessary under the circumstances. 
Proponents also note that the continuum has proven to be a useful tool in court where it 
can help juries understand the standards by which officers operate in making use-of-force 
decisions. 

While many feel that the continuums advantages are clear and obvious, others have 
questioned its usefulness in real-life situations. Some have voiced concerns, for instance, 
that training and responses based on a rigid matrix, in which lower level force options must 
be ruled out before higher level options can be used, are unrealistic.17 These critics contend 



that in real-life encounters where serious threats or levels of resistance must be met with 
suitable force in a timely manner, the use-of-force continuum can cause officers to hesitate 
and thus put the officer, fellow officers, and by-standers in jeopardy. Critics also contend that 
real-life encounters are far more complex than the continuum implies and that use-of-force 
continuums too often fail to incorporate adequately important issues such as disengagement, 
de-escalation, or other cooling-off strategies. 

An alternative to the use-of-force continuum is the circular situation force model that is 
common in the United Kingdom and Canada, and gaining popularity in the United States. In 
a glossary included in a publication on policy and training guidelines relevant to conductive 
energy device guidelines by the PERF Center on Force and Accountability, this model is 
described as follows: 

A circular force training model that promotes continuous critical assessment and evaluation 
of a force incident in which the level of response is based upon the situation encountered and 
level of resistance offered by a subject. The situational assessment helps officers determine 
the appropriate force option, ranging from physical presence to deadly force.18 

Selecting a Use-of-Force Continuum 

With so many use-of-force continuumsranging from the very simple to the complex 
available for adoption or modification, law enforcement executives must make careful and 
deliberate decisions. While law enforcement leaders may find it tempting to simply adopt 
another agencys continuum or a model continuum, they must take the steps to ensure that 
the selected use-of-force continuum is tailored to their agency. In the process of developing 
a continuum or adopting and then tailoring a continuum to their own needs, several 
considerations are especially important from a civil rights perspective. 

 The use-of-force continuum should match the departments actual use-of-force options. 
It should include all techniques, nondeadly weapons, and deadly weapons available to 
department personnel. It should include standard-issue weapons that are made available 
to all officers, as well as weapons that are made available only to specialized units like the 
SWAT team. 

 The use-of-force continuum should clearly demonstrate where each weapon and technique 
fits onto the continuums graduated scale and match this scale to levels of subject 
resistance and actions. 

 If an agency uses canines in any effort to control or apprehend suspects or other subjects, 
that canine deployment should be placed on the continuum. Distinctions should be made 
about whether a department uses a find-and-bark strategy, a find-and-bite strategy, or 
both. Such distinctions may be important in accurately placing the use of canines on the 
use-of-force continuum. 



 As departments adopt CEDs, beanbag guns, and other weapons being developed at a 
rapid pace and marketed as nondeadly options by vendors, they must make careful and 
deliberate decisions regarding where to place these technologies on their use-of-force 
continuums. Placement must depend on the particular manner in which a tool will be 
deployed within the particular department. For instance, some departments have opted 
to allow CEDs to be used only when other forms of deadly force would be justified while 
other departments policies stipulate that CEDs can be used as a nondeadly option, at a 
level similar to pepper spray. 

CEDs: Decisions Regarding Deployment 

The deployment of Conductive Energy Devices (CEDs) has become one of the most hotly 
debated topics in law enforcement. News regarding sudden and unexpected deaths following 
CED deployments has brought the issue to the publics attention. 

The safety and viability of CEDs as a use-of-force option is fiercely contested. In a recent 
study, Amnesty International reported that 74 in-custody deaths have occurred since 2001 as 
a result of CED-related incidents (November 2004). That study recommended suspending 
the use of these devices until more information is provided on safety, standards, training, and 
medical protocols. On the other hand, many of the more than 5,000 police departments that 
have deployed CEDs have documented substantial drops in officer and subject injuries, thus 
reinforcing manufacturer claims that CEDs offer an effective nondeadly use of force when 
used within the context of proper policies, procedures, and training. 

In response to the need for more definitive information on the use and management of 
these devices, the IACP has published an executive brief, Electro-Muscular Disruption Technology: 
A Nine Step Strategy for Effective Deployment. This brief offers a step-by-step guide to aid law 
enforcement agencies in selecting, acquiring, and using the technology. The full text of the 
report is available on IACP web site19 (www.theiacp.org/research/RCDCuttingEdgeTech. 
htm). 

While the full report provides a comprehensive guide for law enforcement agencies to develop 
their own strategies for CED deployment, some basic considerations, especially regarding 
community relations and accountability, are important enough to review here. 

The Nine Step Strategy 

1. Building a leadership team with members who can address issues relative to acquisition, 
costs, policies, training, liability, and evaluation. 

2. Placing CEDs on the use-of-force continuum. 

3. Assessing the costs and benefits of using CEDs. 

4. Identifying roles and responsibilities for CED deployment. 

5. Engaging in community outreach. 

6. Developing policies and procedure for CEDs. 

7. Creating a comprehensive training program for CED deployment. 

8. Using a phased deployment approach for CEDs. 

9. Assessing CED use. 



Community Relations 

Departments must consider the potential impact on community relations in its cost-benefit 
analysis. An agency decision to include CEDs as a force option will elicit a reaction in many 
communities, even if they concur that the devices falls under the category of nondeadly 
force. If the community believes that a department has a history of using excessive force 
or is racially biased in its use of force, it would behoove that department to seek input from 
community stakeholders as part the decision-making process. Proactive outreach on the 
part of the department and regular meetings with the community can build mutual trust and 
respect. 

Accountability 

Departments must consider any CED deployment as a use of force that is both reportable 
and reviewable by the chain of command. CED use should be documented and assessed as 
part of the agencys early intervention strategy. CED usage should also be part of a data-
driven management strategy in which both the pluses and minuses of the tool and of the 
manner of deployment are continually evaluated. 

Evaluation 

Departments evaluating their deployment of conducted energy devices must ask the following 
key questions: 

 Does the deployment of CEDs correspond to decreases in officer and suspect injuries, 
or the extent of injuries? 

 Does deployment result in greater or lesser overall use-of-force incidents within the 
department? Is there any evidence to suggest the CEDs are being used in instances 
where no physical use of force would have been used before this tool became available? 

 Does deployment result in increases or decrease in use-of-force complaints? 

Although answers to these questions are beginning to emerge from analyses within individual 
departments, no systematic research has yet been conducted. Law enforcement leaders 
should note that the results of departmental evaluations will depend on the particular policies, 
strategies, and types of deployments unique to particular departments rather than on the 
qualities inherent in the CED tool itself. Considering that these tools are relatively new, are 
controversial in the public forum, and that no consensus yet exits about the best methods 
of deployment, law enforcement leaders must remain vigilant and continually assess their 
departments deployments of CEDs in light of evolving standards. 



Near Universal Prevalence of UseofForce Policies

The need for use-of-force policies in law enforcement is widely accepted. The Commission on 
Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies (CALEA) has promulgated accreditation standards as 
part 1.3 of its Law Enforcement Role and Authority Chapter. In 1989, the IACP issued its first 
model policy and concept paper on use of force. That policy was last updated in February 2005.20  
Other professional agencies and associations, as well as numerous state organizations, also 
have developed model policies. 

Based on 2003 Law Enforcement Management and Administrative 
Statistics (LEMAS) census data (and reflecting terminology from a data-collection instrument), 
the vast majority of municipal police departments and sheriffs offices have policies on the 
use of deadly force and less-than-lethal force (specific terminology from LEMAS questionnaire). 
Details about LEMAS methodology and data are available in the text box on page 31 in Chapter 2.   

As the charts below reveal, although a smaller percentage of municipal departments and sheriffs 
offices have a written policy directive on less-than-lethal force than have a policy on deadly 
force, the clear majority of all agencies, regardless of size, have policies for both categories 
of force. These charts use the terminology for force categories that are used in the LEMAS survey 
instrument.

Bar graph showing municipal law enforcement agencies use of force policy directives by type
Use-of-Force Policy Directives by Type Use-of-Force Policy Directives by Type

Bar graph showing sheriffs' offices use of force policy directives by type
Use-of-Force Policy Directives by Type Use-of-Force Policy Directives by Type 

 


Evolutions in UseofForce Policies 

While almost universally implemented, specific use-of-force policies still vary by jurisdiction 
and continue to change over time. As noted above, use-of-force policies evolved to 
incorporate use-of-force continuums in the 1980s. More recently, federal consent decrees 
and memorandums of agreement (MOA) have required departments to modify their policies, 
training, and accountability mechanisms to better ensure the protection of civil rights. 
Departments have also adjusted use-of-force policies in response to other factors, including 
civil suits and court settlements. Many departments have adjusted, and continue to adjust, 
their policies to conform to evolving professional standards or in direct response to particular 
incidents that have raised legal issues or heightened public concern. 

Core Components of Effective Management of Use-of-Force 

The authorization to use force is an awesome power that carries with it a tremendous amount 
of responsibility. For all the variability in the tone and language of use-of-force policies, 
departments have discovered that certain core components within these policies will result 
in the effective limitation of use of force, strict accountability, and the effective response to 
incidents in which force is misused. 

As noted above, police officers must use force only when reasonably necessary and must use 
only the amount of force necessary to overcome resistance or to achieve compliance with the 
law. As clear as this imperative is, the decision to use force and the judgment of the proper 
level of force can be difficult and complex. When making use-of-force decisions, officers must 
simultaneously address their own safety, the safety of surrounding persons, and the well-being 
and civil rights of the subject. 

Of course, the difficult and delicate nature of these decisions makes the need for clear policies, 
effective training, strong supervision, and strict accountability absolutely paramount. When 
officers are involved in emotionally charged and potentially violent encounters, the combined 
influence of policies, training, and accountability are critical. Indeed, assurance must be made 
that these elements must be integrated and consistent to best ensure that officers respond in 
a reasoned and disciplined manner. 

This chapter asserts that use of force can be managed as a law enforcement strategy, while 
still protecting civil rights, if law enforcement leaders take care to establish policies and 
practices (1) that are comprehensive; (2) that carefully consider and alternatives to use of 
force and consideration of special circumstances and persons; (3) that incorporate strong 
accountability mechanisms; and (4) that are attentive to public and media relations. The 
following sections discuss each of these components in more detail and lay out some of 
the key elements that have been addressed in the consent decrees and MOAs as key issues 
relating to civil rights. 
 


Component One: Comprehensiveness 

To effectively manage the use of force, departments must establish use-of-force policies that 
clearly address all force techniques and technologies available to their officers. They must also 
consider the broad range of issues related to those deployments. 

Use-of-force policies succeed as they clearly establish their departments expectations 
regarding each and every force option available to officers. This is especially critical as 
departmental policies evolve in response to civil rights concerns. The following paragraphs 
address several use-of-force options and issues that have direct implication on civil rights 
concerns. Where relevant, these paragraphs include language from federal consent decrees 
and MOAs and department policies. 

Verbal Warnings 

Use-of-force policies increasingly incorporate a discussion of verbal warnings. Encouraging 
the use of verbal warnings before the deployment of force reinforces the commitment to 
ensuring that the use of force is no greater than necessary to ensure public and officer safety. 
Policies generally stipulate that verbal warnings should be issued when appropriate and 
possible, but should never compromise the safety of officers or of the public. Several federal 
agreements stipulate the use of verbal warnings prior to the deployment of particular use-of-force 
options. The MOA with the Cincinnati Police Department requires using a verbal warning, 
when feasible, before beanbag shotguns or foam rounds are used. This MOA also requires 
that a loud and clear announcement be made before canines are released. The federal 
agreements with the Cincinnati, District of Columbia, Detroit, and Prince Georges County 
(Maryland) Police Departments require, with limited exceptions, that verbal warnings be 
issued before the deployment of chemical or Oleoresin Capsicum (OC) spray. The excerpt from 
the agreement with the District of Columbias Metropolitan Police Department is illustrative: 

The policy shall require officers to issue a verbal warning to the subject unless a warning 
would endanger the officer or others. The warning shall advise the subject that OC spray 
shall be used unless resistance ends. The policy shall require that prior to discharging the 
OC spray, officers permit a reasonable period of time to allow compliance with the warning, 
when feasible.21 

When verbal warnings are issued, it is also imperative that they be appropriate to the 
circumstances. They must be delivered with clarity and forcefulness. Although these types 
of warning typically are made during exigent circumstances, officers should maintain their 
professional demeanor to the extent possible. They should avoid profanity or language that is 
disrespectful or demeaning to the subject. 

 


Warning Shots 

Use-of-force policies also are increasingly addressing warning shots. A search of policies 
submitted to IACPNet revealed 15 departments that address warning shots in their 
policy directives. All but two of these departments prohibited warning shots under any 
circumstances. Increasingly, agencies are prohibiting warning shots altogether or narrowly 
limiting the circumstances in which they are allowed. The policy of the Savannah-Chatham 
(Georgia) Metropolitan Police Department is illustrative of a narrowly defined exception for 
allowing the use of warning shots: 

Warning shots are forbidden with the only exception being the Marine Patrol Unit and under 
the following circumstances: 

 Warning shots may be used for mission accomplishment (e.g., to compel a non-compliant 
vessel to stop as a security measure in Homeland Security defense). 

 Warning shots are a signal to a vessel to stop, for waterway security zone incidents 
involving terrorist attacks and may be fired only by Marine Patrol personnel who are 
trained in the use of rifles. The use of warning shots will not endanger any person or 
property, including persons aboard a suspect vessel and warning shots shall not be fired 
over land. 

Source: Savannah-Chatham (Georgia) Metropolitan Police Department
Agency Profile: Population 198,000; Officers 575

Choke Holds 

Federal agreements and use-of-force policies that address choke holds acknowledge the 
seriousness of this use-of-force option. The use of choke holdsor similar procedures such 
as carotid control holdshas long been a topic of debate. The purpose of the technique is to 
incapacitate an aggressive subject temporarily to gain control of the situation. But because of 
the risk involved with these techniquesthey are intended to restrict the airflow through the 
windpipe or flow of blood to the brainsome departments have prohibited them outright, 
while others have narrowly defined the circumstances under which the can be used. Most 
departments that allow this option classify the choke hold as deadly force. Federal agreements 
underscore this definition and advocate the restrictive use of choke holds. In relevant consent 
decrees and MOAs, the Department of Justice states that departments policies should 
explicitly prohibit the use of choke holds and similar carotid holds except where deadly force 
is authorized.22 The policy of the Des Moines (Washington) Police Department, for instance, 
underscores the seriousness of this use-of-force option: 

The choke hold shall be considered deadly force and officers will use this hold only in defense 
of human life. Anytime this hold is used, an officers report will be submitted. 

Source: Des Moines (Washington) Police Department
Agency Profile: Population 29,267; Officers 43

 


Canine Deployments 

Use-of-force policies address canine deployments in detail. Some departments use dogs to 
help establish subject compliance as well as to apprehend dangerous or fleeing suspects 
or escapees. As with other uses of force, canine deployments must be based on balancing 
the risks inherent in their use against the risks that arise in the absence of their use. In 
all instances, canine deployments should be attended by strict selection, training, and 
accountability measures that apply to both handlers/trainers and dogs. The Manchester 
(Connecticut) Police Department policy explicitly addresses canine deployments: 

Use of Force 

1. The use of specially trained police canines for law enforcement responsibilities constitutes 
a real or implied use of force. The police officer/handler may only use that degree of force 
that is reasonable to apprehend or secure a suspect, protect him/herself, protect another 
officer and/or a civilian as governed by General Order 1-6 Use of Force. The police officer/ 
handler shall file the appropriate reports documenting the use of force as required by General 
Order 1-6 Use of Force. 

2. The police officer/handler and other officers shall adhere to the following levels of force 
when protecting the canine. 

a. The use of Less Lethal Force may be used to protect the canine from an assault or 
attempted assault. 

b. The use of Lethal Force shall not be used to protect the life of the canine. The canine 
is a piece of equipment utilized by the police officer/handler. 

c. The police officer/handler may use the canine in preventing the infliction of less lethal 
and lethal force against him/herself, another officer and/or civilian. 

3. Canine warning 

a. The canine warning should consist of the following or similar announcement: 
This is the Manchester Police Canine team, speak to me now/stop now or I will send 
the dog. 

b. The police officer/handler shall deliver a series of warnings to ensure that the suspect 
has had ample warning, that the canine shall be used to apprehend him/her. 

c. A warning allows the suspect time to surrender and shall also alert any innocent persons 
in the same area of the canines teams presence and intention. 



d. The canine warning should not be given when, in the opinion of the handler, doing so 
would cause undue risk to the canine teams presence and intention. 

e. At NO time shall the canine teams police officer/handler use his/her canine to affect 
the arrest of a person(s), who cannot escape or resist the officer, nor to intimidate, coerce 
or frighten the suspect(s). 

Source: Manchester (Connecticut) Police Department
Agency Profile: Pop. 52,500; Officers 119

Discharging Firearms at or from Moving Vehicles 

Increasingly, use-of-force policies specifically address the issue of shooting at or from moving 
vehicles. Most policies prohibit these acts altogether or strictly limit the circumstances in 
which such shooting is justified. A sample directive from the Virginia Department of Criminal 
Justice Services addresses this issue: 

Firing at a moving vehicle is prohibited except where the officer reasonably believes that: 

(1) An occupant of the other vehicle is using, or threatening to use, deadly force by a means 
other than the vehicle; OR (2) A vehicle is operated in a manner deliberately intended to strike 
an officer or a citizen and all other reasonable means of defense have been exhausted (or 
are not present), including moving out of the path of the vehicle, and the safety of innocent 
persons would not be unduly jeopardized by the officers action.23 

Police training must stress that one clear option in response to moving vehicles is for 
the officer to evade the car. Courts have used the criterion of whether the officer had an 
opportunity to move out of the way as a factor in determining the reasonableness of force.24 

Pursuits 

Departments have been increasingly careful to consider the advisability of pursuits from 
a cost-benefit perspective. A variety of broad concerns including public safety, officer 
safety, fiscal liability, and civil rights, have refined the circumstances in which departments 
will deploy this use-of-force option. Indeed, pursuit policies and practices have evolved 
tremendously over the last several decades. Pursuits that would have been initiated years ago 
based on so-called contempt of cop motivations have been significantly curtailed by recent 
policies and training that stress alternative responses. While curtailing pursuits is often seen 
as a safety and civil liability issue, the topic raises issues of reasonableness as well as equal 
protection. Pursuits have been specifically addressed in several of the federal consent decrees 
and MOAs. 

 

Vehicle Pursuits 

The most recent data available from the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) reveals that 
approximately 95 percent of law enforcement agencies have policies on vehicle pursuits. Law 
enforcement agencies have long recognized that vehicle pursuits are dangerous, high-liability 
events. A substantial percentage of police pursuits end in crashes.25 High-visibility pursuits 
that end with injuries or property damage can undermine public trust and confidence. Vehicle 
pursuits also raise considerable risks of fiscal liability. Officers in car chases may experience 
the phenomena of adrenaline rush that clouds their judgment. Additionally, when pursuits 
within a particular jurisdiction overwhelmingly involve minority drivers, they can also 
heighten the perception that racial profiling is taking place. 

The BJS survey revealed that 59 percent of law enforcement agencies have restrictive 
policies. These policies limit officers from using pursuit unless specific criterions such as 
seriousness of offense, safety, or fleeing-vehicle speed are met. The following policy except 
from the Illinois State Police is representative of those that would be described as restrictive in 
the BJS survey terminology: 

[The Illinois State Police] will initiate a motor vehicle pursuit only [emphasis added] when an 
officer has an articulable reason to believe the occupant(s) of a fleeing vehicle has committed 
or attempted a forcible felony which involves the infliction or threatened infliction of great 
bodily harm or is attempting to escape by use of a deadly weapon, or otherwise indicates 
they will endanger human life or inflict great bodily harm unless apprehended without delay. 
All officers involved in a pursuit must, at all times, be able to justify their reasons for the 
pursuit. 

Source: Illinois State Police Directives Manual
Agency Profile: Pop. 12,713,634; Officers 2,089

Other agencies that have not developed restrictive policies are nevertheless increasingly 
attentive to the need to balance the capture of suspects fleeing in vehicles with the need to 
protect both the public and police officers from unnecessary risks. The BJS survey cited above 
revealed that 27 percent of agencies have judgmental policies that leave the decision up 
to the discretion of the officer. In BJS survey terminology, the IACPs model policy would be 
described as a judgmental or discretionary policy. It explicitly recognizes that vehicle pursuits 
are inherently dangerous and that the risks of pursuit must be weighed against the risks of not 
apprehending the subject: 

The decision to initiate pursuit must be based on the pursuing officers conclusion that 
the immediate danger to the officer and the public created by the pursuit is less than the 
immediate or potential danger to the public should the suspect remain at large.26 
 


Foot Pursuits 

Foot pursuits appear less frequently in use-of-force policies than vehicle pursuits. Although 
the risk of collateral damage may not be as high, foot pursuits do have attendant risks and 
civil rights implications. Officers are often injured during foot pursuits and, at the time of 
capture, can experience the phenomena of adrenaline rush which can cloud their judgment 
and diminish their capacity to react with appropriate restraint. Thus, foot pursuits require 
careful consideration as a policy and training issue. 

As a result of pattern and practice investigations, the Cincinnati Memorandum of Agreement 
and the Detroit Consent Judgment each enjoined the departments to develop policies specific 
to foot pursuits. The Cincinnati MOA required the following: 

The CPD will develop and adopt a foot pursuit policy. This policy will require officers to 
consider particular factors in determining whether a foot pursuit is appropriate. These factors 
will include, inter alia, the offense committed by the subject, whether the subject is armed, 
the location (i.e., lighting, officer familiarity), and the ability to apprehend the subject at a 
later date. The policy will emphasize alternatives to foot pursuits, including area containment, 
surveillance, and obtaining reinforcements.27 

Accordingly, the Cincinnati Police Department enacted a specific policy directive on foot 
pursuits, which includes the following excerpt: 

Whenever an officer decides to engage, or continue to engage, in a foot pursuit a quick risk 
assessment must take place. They must evaluate the risk involved to themselves, to other 
officers, the suspect, and the community versus what would be gained from pursuing the 
suspect.28 

Component Two: A Focus on Alternatives to Force 

To effectively manage the use of force and limit its application to situations in which it is 
warranted, departments should stress alternatives to force, incorporate these into their 
policies, and offer specific training in these alternatives in ways that complement traditional 
training in force techniques. 

Policy guidelines, instructional literature, and training programs on the use of force 
focused, specifically, on issues such as the proper use of firearms, other weapons, and 
policing equipment; proper physical restraint and handcuffing techniques; and officer 
safetyare commonplace. Such instruction often includes detailed information regarding 
the characteristics of armed persons and officer survival techniques. An officers use-of-force 
knowledge base, gained through academy training and subsequent field training, must be 
continually honed and reinforced through roll-call training and yearly in-service training. It 
must also be continually tested through qualification tests and simulations. 
 


While this training is absolutely necessaryindeed, vitalto ensuring effective policing as 
well as the safety of the officers and public, it must be balanced with training that provides 
viable alternatives to the use of force. Some police executives have expressed concern about 
the balance of training and instruction directed to how to use force as opposed to how not 
to use force. As one police chief noted: 

For every hour we spend training our officers in the skills necessary to de-escalate conflict and 
to avoid the use of force, we spend many more hours teaching officers use-of-force tactics. 
The message is clear to our officers: use of force is not only appropriate but it is the favored 
tool for controlling subjects and situations.29 

Many departments are attempting to achieve more balance by adding training in de-escalation 
options, as well as training in recognizing and handling situations in which use-of-force 
decisions may be particularly critical, such as encounters with the mentally ill. 

Verbal De-escalation 

Acting on the realization that many violent encounters between a police officer and a subject 
begin as verbal confrontation, departments have adopted verbal de-escalation training to 
help officers prevent the need for use of force and to enhance officer safety. Verbal judo, one 
popular form of de-escalation, is also known as tactical communication. Much like physical 
judo, verbal judo stresses the use of deliberate verbal response rather than reflexive reaction 
to others words and deeds. Officers are also instructed in the use of conflict management 
tactics to check their impulse to respond on the basis of personal feeling. The following 
excerpt from the Pittsburgh Bureau of Police Consent Decree illustrates the purpose of these 
techniques: 

The PBP shall train all officers in the use of verbal de-escalation techniques as an alternative 
to the use of force, and shall incorporate such techniques into all other training that implicates 
the use of force. Such training shall include specific examples of situations that do not 
require the use of force, but may be commonly mishandled, resulting in force being used 
(for example, individuals verbally challenging an officers authority or asking for an officers 
identifying information).30 
 


Recognizing and Responding to the Mentally Ill 

Many police departments proactively are enacting policies and providing training that 
equips officers with basic skills for recognizing mental health issues and responding to 
them appropriately. Police officers are often called into situations where they are required to 
confront persons with known mental illness or other debilitating conditions. In other cases, a 
persons mental illness or temporary mental incapacitation may first become apparent during 
the encounter. Departmental policies and training prepare the officers to handle the situation 
at hand, to recognize symptoms of mental impairment, and to obtain those services that the 
subject needs. The policy of the North Royalton (Ohio) Police Department describes the special 
attention and consideration that a mentally ill subject should receive: 

Intervention Approach 

1. Incidents dealing with a mentally ill person require tactful, patient responses. To the extent 
possible an officer should: 

a. Attempt to learn about the person [and] the situation by talking with the mentally ill, 
his family, friends, [and] witnesses. 

b. Regardless of the persons conduct, respond to them in an objective, non-abusive, 
non-threatening manner to calm [and] control the person. 

c. Not deceive the mentally ill person. (Deception thwarts the chance for trust. Trust 
enhances the opportunity for controlling the subject in a non-violent manner.) 

2. If it appears a situation involving a mentally ill person requires police action, a minimum 
of two officers will be dispatched. A lone officer who encounters such a person will request 
backup [and] wait for it to arrive unless a life threatening circumstance is occurring. 

Source: North Royalton (Ohio) Police Department
Agency Profile: Population 28,000; Officers 39

 


Departments that do not have specific policies for dealing with the mentally impaired should 
develop these policies. The IACP has two model policies: Dealing with the Mentally Ill31 and 
Encounters with the Developmentally Disabled.32 Also, CALEA recently promulgated new 
standards for police encounters with persons suffering from mental illness.33 

A growing number of departments have established designated units, often called crisis 
intervention teams (CITs) that are specifically trained to respond to mentally ill subjects and 
to attend to their unique needs. The Department of Justice MOA with the Cincinnati Police 
Department (CPD) specifies the core elements of such a unit to be developed in that city. 

The CPD will create a cadre of specially trained officers available at all times to respond to 
incidents involving persons who are mentally ill. These specially trained officers will assume 
primary responsibility for responding to incidents involving persons who are mentally ill. 
They will be called to the scene of any incident involving a person who is mentally ill, unless 
the need for fast action makes this impossible. These officers will respond to any radio run 
known to involve a person who is mentally ill (including escapes from facilities or institutions). 
The officers selected for this training should be highly motivated volunteers and should 
receive high level, multi-disciplinary intervention training, with a particular emphasis on de-
escalation strategies. This training will include instruction by mental health practitioners and 
alcohol and substance abuse counselors. The CPD will develop and implement a plan to form 
a partnership with mental health care professionals that makes such professionals available to 
assist the CPD on-site with interactions with persons who are mentally ill.34 

Component Three: Assuring Accountability in the Use of Force 

To effectively manage the use of force, departments must establish strong accountability 
mechanisms to ensure that use-of-force incidents are reported, reviewed, and, as necessary, 
investigated, and that the results of these processes are used to enhance department 
management. 

As previously noted, the authorization to use force is an awesome power that carries with 
it a tremendous amount of responsibility. Departments fulfill this responsibility, in part, by 
implementing strong supervision and strict accountability mechanisms. Use-of-force policies 
commonly require systematic reports, reviews, and, as necessary, investigations, of use-
of-force incidents involving physical force. The need for these systematic steps cannot be 
overstated. They are the subject of extensive discussion in federal consent decrees and MOAs. 

Use-of-Force Reporting 

Although use-of-force policies typically do not require reporting for low levels of force (i.e., 
when handcuffs are applied in a routine manner or with soft-hands control), these policies 
increasingly require that use-of-force incidents be reported if the level of force meets or 
exceeds an agency defined threshold. While this level varies by department, it is most often 
 


set at some less-lethal force level (e.g., anything above soft-hands control). Typically, these 
policies specify the format and required elements of use-of-force reports. The following policy 
of the Colorado Springs (Colorado) Police Department illustrates such reporting requirements: 

NON-LETHAL FORCE [REPORTING]: When a chemical agent, the baton, or any other 
non-lethal instrument of physical force has been used against any person, the officer(s) 
involved shall document the incident by inclusion either in a case report or incident report. In 
all instances, a copy of the report shall be sent through channels to the Division Commander. 
A cover memorandum containing supplementary or explanatory information may be attached 
at the officers discretion or if necessary to complete the required information. Details of the 
memorandum and/or report shall include: 

 Circumstances surrounding the action 
 Type of force used 
 Reasons for the use of force 
 Extent of injury to the officer or other person 
 Medical treatment required 
 The name of the medical facility used 
 Other pertinent information the officer wishes to include. 

Source: Colorado Springs (Colorado) Police Department
Agency Profile: Population 315,000; Officers 501

Reporting Medical Intervention and Follow-up 

In addition to requiring reports whenever a use-of-force incident exceeds a certain level of 
force, policies generally require medical follow-up in the event that a use-of-force incident 
results in an apparent injury or claim of injury involving the subject, bystanders, or officers. 
Additionally, policies mandate medical follow-up when certain force options are exercised 
(e.g., CEDs or chemical sprays) even when injury is not apparent or there is no claim of 
injury. Typically, all apparent injuries, complaints of injuries, and medical attention must be 
documented and reported, even when the level of force used was below the agency defined 
threshold for reporting. The following policies from the Marietta (Georgia) Police Department 
and the Oregon State Police are representative of such requirements: 

Medical Care [after use of Oleoresin Capsicum Spray/Foam] 

A. Police officers and Civilian Transport Officers shall notify communications as soon as 
possible after the use of O.C. spray/foam. Police officers and Civilian Transport Officers 
shall request fire rescue, an ambulance, and a supervisor. A police officer or Civilian Transport 
Officer shall accompany the individual to the hospital and shall remain there until properly 
relieved, or until the individual is released from medical care by hospital personnel. 



B. Should the individual resist attempts to decontaminate by medical personnel, the 
police officer or Civilian Transport Officer will document this refusal to cooperate in the 
departmental incident report, and monitor the individual closely while at the hospital and 
during all phases of transport. The police officer or Civilian Transport Officer will then notify 
detention personnel of the individuals resistance to treatment so the detention personnel can 
closely monitor the individual. 

Source: Marietta (Georgia) Police Department
Agency Profile: Population 45,856; Officers 135

In all use-of-force incidents, including those in which a person is injured, or an employee 
becomes aware that a person has reported to have sustained an injury during the course of 
action taken by the sworn employee, a supervisor will be notified as soon as practicable. The 
supervisor will review the specific circumstances of the respective case and determine if a 
report to General Headquarters through the chain of command is needed. 

Source: Oregon State Police (www.egov.oregon.gov/osp)
Agency Profile: Population 3,480,000; Officers 871

Reviewing Use of Force 

Policies often require formal review of use-of-force incidents, generally when such incidents 
exceed an agency specified level of force. In some departments, the threshold for reviewable 
force is consistent with the threshold for reportable force. Typically, reviewable use-of-force 
incidents include any use of force involving a weapon, whether deadly or nondeadly, and any 
use of force involving apparent or alleged injury or death. In virtually all departments, the 
discharge of a firearm must be reviewed. 

In many departments, the type of review depends on the level of force used. Some 
departments draw a distinction between review required with relatively low levels of force and 
higher levels. Lower level use of force will result in an initial supervisory review that may be 
followed by reviews up the chain of command. Higher levels of force often result in automatic 
review by specialized units (e.g., internal affairs or critical incident units) and/or independent 
bodies (civilian review boards). The following policy of the Des Moines (Washington) Police 
Department lays out a protocol for reviewing standard use-of-force reports: 

Review Of Use Of Force Reports: Team sergeants are responsible for reviewing case reports 
and the department Use-of-Force report form. Sergeants will forward all reports to the 
Operations Commander for review and submittal to the Chief of Police. 

Appropriate reports will be prepared for each incident in which a Use-of-Force Report is 
necessary by the end of the shift on which the incident occurred. It must include the facts that 
made the use of force necessary and shall explain in detail the nature and amount of force 
used. It is the responsibility of the supervisor reviewing the report to insure that thorough 
and accurate documentation is provided. 

Source: Des Moines (Washington) Police Department
Agency Profile: Population 29,267; Officers 43



First-line supervisors should be held accountable for assessing both individual cases and 
overall use-of-force patterns by their subordinates. Individual officers who show more 
frequent use of force or a tendency to use higher levels of force when compared to peers 
in similar assignments should be assessed more closely for possible intervention. Ideally, 
this function should be integrated into a broader early intervention strategy, as discussed in 
Chapter 3 of this guide. 

Use-of-Force Investigations 

Going beyond report reviewing, many departments have recognized the value of thoroughly 
investigating all serious use-of-force incidents. To limit liability and assure accountability, 
these departments require thorough, open, and fair investigations by qualified investigators 
whenever an officer discharges a firearm, deploys other deadly force, or whenever the 
deployment of force results in death or serious injury. While investigation protocols may 
differ, the following elements are a vital part of an investigatory process that will ensure 
accountability within the department and confidence within the community: 

 The investigation should include a full chronology of events that occurred before, during, 
and immediately following the use of force. 

 The investigation should be fair, thorough, and conducted with the same rigor as is 
afforded to major crime investigations. Although many use-of-force investigations will 
reveal that the use of force is justified, the transparent and rigorous nature of these 
investigations can shore up public confidence. 

 The investigator should be selected and trained specifically to fulfill this task. Efforts should 
be made by police leaders to identify particular persons who are well suited to this role 
because not all individuals have the aptitude or commitment to perform these types of 
investigations. The ability of individual investigators to conduct thorough investigations 
should be continually assessed. The systematic review of investigatory reports and taped 
investigatory interviews should be part of the overall assessment. 

 The investigation should apply the consequences for willful and blatant use of excessive 
force clearly and uniformly. They should result in the appropriate level of discipline to re-enforce 
the message that unlawful force will not be tolerated. 

While all investigations share the above-mentioned elements, departments will vary in how 
the investigatory processes are organized. Large police departments may have sufficient 
resources to support specific units that investigate incidents of serious nondeadly and deadly 
force deployment. Smaller agencies, however, may have neither the resources nor the staff 
to support these units. Indeed, the incidence of deadly force deployments may be so rare 
in smaller agencies that specific investigatory units may not make sense even if resources 
could be made available. Many smaller police agencies will turn to outside agencies, 
often the state police, to conduct these investigations. Other innovative approaches also 
exist. The investigatory processes identified in the text boxesone adopted in the Boston 
(Massachusetts) Police Department and another in Champaign County, Illinois, where several 
local police agencies have pooled their resources and established the Multi-Jurisdictional 
Investigation Teamdemonstrate two different approaches. 



The Boston Team Model of Force Investigations 

The Boston Police Department has a Firearms Discharge Investigation Team (FDIT) 
divided into two units, a red team and a blue team. Despite the name, the FDIT 
investigates other types of force besides firearms discharges. The red team responds to 
deaths or major injuries, while the blue team investigates non-lethal discharges, less-lethal, 
and animal dispatches. The FDIT protocol divides components of investigation, assigning 
responsibilities to squads that provide distinct and uniform information, without overlap, to 
the team commander. Investigators are divided into four teamsCrime Scene, Interview, 
Intelligence, and Organizationaleach headed by a team leader. In addition to the teams, an 
incident coordinator assists the lead investigator/incident commander in procuring personnel 
and equipment, obtaining logistical support, and keeping a record of who did what and 
when. Each team has specific responsibilities as outlined in the protocol; for example the 
responsibilities for the Crime Scene Team include: Securing the scene and setting an access 
point; obtaining information needed for search warrant application, if applicable; logging all 
persons and equipment entering the scene; and relevant photography and videotaping at the 
scene. The scene team is also responsible for obtaining crime scene evidence and seeking 
out other relevant evidence (e.g., bank surveillance tapes). 

Source: Boston (Massachusetts) Police Department, Firearms Discharge Investigation Team 
Agency Profile: Population 604,000; Officers 2050 

Champaign County Multi-Jurisdictional Team Approach to Investigations : 

The Champaign County (Illinois) Serious Use of Force Investigation Team is composed of 
five agencies (combined sworn 370), representatives from the Illinois State Police and the 
local district attorney. The team serves as the primary response and investigation unit to 
an officer-involved shooting in the county (pop. 175,000). Each agency has two response 
personnel assigned to the team. For any incident the representative for the agency being 
investigated may not be the lead case investigator, but can serve as a facilitator of information 
for the lead agent. 

The team came about in response to a controversial shooting in mid-1990s and has evolved 
since. One issue that arose frequently was that officers involved were often unsure of what 
was going to happen in the investigation, so the team came up with a guide for line officers that 
delineates the step in the investigation process and the role of the officer being investigated in 
that process. This guide has proven effective and is now utilized in yearly in-service trainings 
of all officers in the five agencies. The team recently developed an updated field investigation 
manual that every investigator has and serves as the guide for conducting the inquiry. The 
manual includes the county-wide use of force policy and the memorandum of understanding 
that was used to establish the teams. Administrative forms such as a team-leader assignment 
sheets, as well as checklists for interview teams, crime scene technicians, and other involved 
parties. Also included are neighborhood canvass forms and photo evidence forms. 

Source: Sgt. Bryant Seraphin, Urbana (Illinois) Police Department Team Coordinator 
 


Concurrent Criminal Investigations 

Occasionally, use-of-force investigations will reveal that the officers actions constitute 
potential criminal behavior. While internal proceduresincluding supervisory reviews, internal 
affairs division reviews, and department-based critical incident team reviewsare suitable for 
addressing alleged or apparent use-of-force violations, criminal behavior must be addressed 
through appropriate criminal procedures. Federal agreements are unequivocal on this 
point. As an excerpt from the MOA with the Metropolitan Police Department in Washington, 
D.C., makes clear, [the] MPD shall consult with the USAO [United States Attorneys Office] 
regarding the investigation of an incident involving deadly force, a serious use of force, or any 
other force indicating potential criminal misconduct by an officer.35 

Department policies and practices may vary as to whether the departments internal use-of-force 
investigation would be ongoing at the same time as the prosecuting attorneys criminal 
investigation. If investigations are simultaneous, all reasonable attempts should be made by 
both the department and the prosecutors office to coordinate efforts. However, there may be 
certain circumstances under which it might not be advisable to share information or under 
which the department may need to suspend its investigation, or parts of its investigation, in 
deference to the prosecutor. As the following excerpt from the MOA with the Metropolitan 
Police Department in Washington, D.C., states: 

If the USAO [United States Attorneys Office] indicates a desire to proceed criminally based 
on the on-going consultations with MPD, or MPD requests criminal prosecutions in these 
incidents, any compelled interview of the subject officers shall be delayed, as described in 
paragraph 60. However, in order to ensure the collection of all relevant information, all other 
aspects of the investigation shall proceed. The USAO shall respond to a written request by 
MPD for charges, declination, or prosecutorial opinion within three business days, by either 
filing charges, providing a letter of declination, or indicating the USAOs intention to continue 
further criminal investigation.36 

Use-of-Force Reports, Reviews, and Investigations as Management Tools 

Many departments have found value in using aggregated use-of-force data to assess trends 
and patterns and to help make informed management decisions. Current policies often require 
agencies to conduct some form of aggregate analysis to detect patterns and trends in the use 
of force across the department. Aggregate analyses at the individual or unit level allow for 
comparisons against normative standards consistent with early intervention management 
strategies discussed in Chapter 3. For instance, do particular officers or units have inordinately 
high reportable or reviewable use-of-force incidents relative to similar officers or units? 
Aggregate analyses at the agency level can serve a critical feedback and accountability 
function. For instance, does analysis reveal that reportable use-of-force incidents increase 
when particular force options are introduced, removed, or replaced? Such analyses can 
 


identify the need to change policies, to revisit training, to update a departments use of force 
options, or to redefine weapon deployment practices. The Pittsburgh Bureau of Police relies on 
use of force analyses to improve agency management: 

The Pittsburgh Bureau of Police issues what it calls Subject Resistance Reports for 
reportable uses of force.37 These reports serve the purpose of allowing a mechanism for 
standardized review of cases and also provide valuable information that can be used in 
quantitative analyses. Information from these reports is tracked and maintained as part of 
the Bureaus Personnel Performance System (PARS) and reviewed quarterly at COMPSTAR. 
Trends and patterns of subject resistance incidents (use of force) are reviewed by managers. 
Analysis includes comparisons across police sectors; precipitating circumstances (e.g., warrant 
arrests, prisoner transports, etc); how use-of-force incidents trend alongside monthly calls 
for service and arrest data. From a managerial perspective, data analysis allows department 
leaders to spot trends and take effective action to mitigate issues.38 

Component Four: Maintaining Public and Media Relations 

To effectively manage the use of force, departments must handle media and public relations 
proactively rather than reactively. 

Use-of-force incidents that make headline news or appear as the lead story on the local 
evening news present both a challenge and an opportunity for police executives. In high-
profile cases, police executives face the potential challenge of serving two constituencies 
the rank-and-file officers and the local residentswho are sometimes at odds regarding 
use-of-force incidents. Whether holding a press conference or responding to the media on 
such volatile issues, police executives should maintain a posture of neutrality, fairness, and 
transparency. In maintaining this posture, police executives may realize opportunities to 
communicate effectively with the community. The media is the primary vehicle through which 
agencies communicate with the public. Police executives should establish a media relations 
strategy that makes proactive use of this outlet for communication rather than dealing solely 
in a reactive mode during moments of crisis. 

Establishing Community Support Prior to Critical Use-of-Force Incidents 

Police executives must proactively build relationships of trust with community leaders, 
community members, and the local media before critical incidents occur. Developing and 
sustaining such contacts through community meetings, participation in community events, 
citizen academies, public awareness campaigns, and the department web site is an essential 
part of any community outreach strategy. Establishing and maintaining strong ties with 
political, religious, and business leaders within the community will benefit the department. 
Developing a foundation of trust with the community can be thought of as putting money 
in the bank, so that community support can be drawn on when needed. Police executives 
should be particularly attentive to proactively informing community stakeholders about the 
departments use-of-force policies, practices, and accountability mechanisms. It is better that 
the public is informed of these details before a critical use-of-force incident occurs than after. 
 


Departments should avail themselves of the resources that will help them establish good 
community and public relations and that promote education regarding use-of-force policies 
and practices. The U.S. Department of Justice Community Relations Service (CRS) provides 
several resources that can help police establish good relations with key community 
stakeholders and community members before critical incidents occur as well as guidelines 
that executives can use to assist in mediation with community members after an incident. 

Police executives should consider CRSs practical handbooks including Principles of Good 
Policing: Avoiding Violence Between Police and Citizens (September 2003), Responding 
to Incidents Involving Allegations of Excessive Use of Force: A Checklist to Guide Police 
Executives (Revised September 2003), Distant Early Warning Signs (DEWS) System (November 
2001), and Community Dialogue Guide (September 2003). These and other publications are 
available for download at www.usdoj.gov/cr. 

Police executives, or designees such as public information officers, are often expected to make 
statements immediately following critical and often controversial use-of-force incidents. When 
doing so, police executives must remain objective and neutral. It is never advisable to express 
premature judgments about incidents before investigations are completed. While initial 
evidence may seem to point in a certain direction, it is a disservice to the purported victim of 
excessive force, the community, and the officer(s) involved to make premature statements. The 
message police executives should strive to convey as soon after a controversial use-of-force 
incident as possible is that the incident is under investigation and that the investigation will be 
thorough. Police executives should underscore this message by discouraging any speculation 
by the media, the public, or other police personnel before the investigation is complete. A 
police executive may express empathy for the subject who may have been harmed and for the 
officers involved, as appropriate, but in doing so should avoid any suggestion of bias toward 
either side. 

Sharing Use-of-Force Data with the Public 

Many departments elect to share aggregate information about use of force with the public 
through web sites or annual reports. Using the department web site to publish use-of-force 
reports sends an important message of accessibility and transparency. In some instances, 
federal agreements have stipulated providing aggregate use-of-force data to the public. 
The MOA between the Department of Justice and the Metropolitan Police Department in 
Washington, D.C., establishes such a requirement: 

MPD shall prepare quarterly public reports that include aggregate statistics of MPD use-
of-force incidents broken down by MPD districts covering each of the geographic areas of 
the City, indicating the race/ethnicity of the subject of force. These aggregate numbers shall 
include the number of use-of-force incidents broken down by weapon used and enforcement 
actions taken in connection with the use of force. The report shall include statistical 
information regarding use-of-force investigations conducted, including the outcome. 
The report shall also include the total number of complaints of excessive force received, 
broken down by MPD Districts, and the number of complaints held exonerated, sustained, 
insufficient facts, and unfounded.39 



While the Metropolitan Police Department in Washington, D.C, does publish detailed 
statistical summary reports on a quarterly basis,40 other agencies report data at the case level, 
describing them with short synopses. The Iowa City (Iowa) Police Department, for instance, 
provides monthly reports with brief narrative descriptions on its web site.41 A portion of the 
web site is depicted below: 

IOWA CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT
USE OF FORCE REPORT
October 2005

OFFICER 
20,44 

DATE 
100105 

INC# 
49648 

INCIDENT 
Open Container 

FORCE USED 
Subject was placed under arrest and 
resisted handcuffing efforts. Officers 
attempts to use control techniques were 
unsuccessful. Officers than exposed the 
subject to a chemical irritant and used 
control techniques to place handcuffs on 
the subject. 

OFFICER
95,09 

DATE
100205 

INC#
49892 

INCIDENT
Public Intoxication 

FORCE USED
Subject was placed under arrest and resisted 
handcuffing efforts. Officers used control 
techniques to place handcuffs on the 
subject. 

OFFICER
31 

DATE
100305 

INC#
50091 

INCIDENT
Vehicle Pursuits 

FORCE USED
Officers attempted to stop a vehicle 
reference a welfare check on the driver. 
The driver failed to yield and a pursuit 
began. After a short distance the pursuit was 
discontinued. 

OFFICER
36 

DATE
100605 

INC#
50573 

INCIDENT
OWI 

FORCE USED
Subject to assault officers. Officers used 
control techniques to place handcuffs on 
the subject. 

In many departments, internal policies or collective bargaining agreements with police unions 
may affect the type of information that can be publicly posted. If information is posted at the 
incident level, data must be sanitized to not to allow any civilian subject or officer to be 
personally identified. 



Recommendations 

On the basis of its assessment of federal consent decrees and MOAs as well as the preceding 
discussion, the IACP offers the following recommendations on use-of-force policies and 
practices. Because use-of-force optionstechniques and technologiescontinue to evolve, 
these recommendations should not be considered static. The recommendations below 
correspond sequentially to the goals of creating clear and comprehensive use-of-force 
policies, effective use-of-force training, robust accountability mechanisms, and fair and 
transparent media and public relations. 

1. Implement a clear use-of-force policy that specifically addresses both deadly and nondeadly 
use of force and that is consistent with all legal and professional standards. 

Regardless of size or function, all agencies should have a use-of-force policy with directives on 
deadly and nondeadly force. These policies, which must be clear and easy to interpret, should 
not be less restrictive than applicable state laws or professional standards. 

2. Implement a comprehensive use-of-force policy that addresses all available use-of-force options, 
clearly places these options within a force continuum or a force model, and 
associates these options with corresponding levels of subject resistance. 

Special care should be taken to assure that the departments use-of-force policy is 
comprehensive. The policy must cover all use-of-force deployment optionstechniques and 
technologiesauthorized within the department. It should include the use-of-force options 
available to all sworn officers as well as options available only to specialized units (e.g., canine 
units or SWAT teams). The following two recommendations provide more detail that may be 
applicable to certain departments. 

3. Address canine deployment as a use-of-force option in policies and develop detailed 
directives regarding its use. 

Departments should make clear that canine deployment for pursuit purposes or to establish 
subject compliance is a use-of-force option. Use-of-force policies should articulate whether a 
department relies on a find-and-bark and/or find-and-bite strategy. Policies should require 
that, whenever feasible, a clear verbal warning be issued and a reasonable allowance of time 
made for subjects to comply before canines are released. 

4.Address CEDs (conducted energy devices)often referred to by the brand name Taseras 
a use-of-force option in policies and develop detailed directives regarding its use. 

Although no clear consensus yet exists regarding the relative benefits and risks of CEDs, these 
devises are clearly a use-of-force option and must be included on the use-of-force continuum 
in every department where they are in use. Determining where CEDs should appear in the 
use-of-force continuum should depend on the specific manner of deployment allowed by the 
agencys policy directive. The consensus opinion of advisors to this project is that CEDs should 



be placed no lower than irritant spray. Regarding TasersTM, the Police Executive Research 
Forum recently announced its recommendation that these weapons should be used only on 
people who are aggressively resisting arrest.42 

Policies should require that, whenever feasible, a clear verbal warning be issued and a 
reasonable allowance of time made for subjects to comply before a CED is deployed. Agencies 
should also carefully consider including provisions, special-risk considerations, or restrictions 
regarding the use of CEDs on particular subjects including the young, the elderly, the 
mentally disturbed, persons with known medical conditions, and persons on drugs. Finally, a 
departments CED policy should address the duration of electrical charges and the number of 
charges that may be applied to a subject. These types of limitations on CED deployment are 
likely to evolve as more departments consider their use, fine-tune their policies and training, 
and as more data become available about potential risks of this technology 

5. Review and update use-of-force policies to reflect changes in use-of-force options, laws, and 
standards. 

Whenever techniques or technologies that are used as use-of-force options are acquired or 
upgraded, relevant policies should be reviewed and updated as necessary. In addition to 
monitoring the development of new techniques and technologies that may affect use-of-force 
options, department personnel should monitor relevant legal cases, medical research, and 
professional research that may necessitate use-of-force policy revisions. 

6. Provide specialized and comprehensive training and testing for the departments full range 
of use-of-force options. 

Departments should provide training to ensure competency in all use-of-force options used 
within the department. Specific performance and competency testing criteria should be used 
and requalification should occur on a regular basis. The steps that officers who fail to requalify 
must take should be fully articulated. Training and competency testing should be kept current 
with changes in the use-of-force options available within the department or as officers are 
assigned to specialized assignments or units with access to different force options. 

7. Provide specialized training on verbal de-escalation techniques and other appropriate 
alternatives to the use of force. 

To minimize use of force by preventing escalation, use-of- force policies should expressly 
encourage verbal de-escalation techniques and provide the necessary training. Training should 
be of the highest standards and officers should receive periodic refresher courses. 

8. Specify the circumstances under which supervising officers, or specialized units such as 
force investigation teams (FIT), must report to the scene of a use-of-force incident. 

Use-of-force policies must define what is meant by a serious use-of-force incident and 
must require supervisors to report to the scene of all serious use of force incidents, including 
all incidents in which deadly force is deployed and all incidents resulting in serious injury to 
or death of an officer, subject, or bystander. Use-of-force policies should also, to the extent 
practical, require supervisors or FITs to report to the scene of any incident in which excessive 



force is alleged. The presence of supervisors or FITs provides support to officers at the scene 
and enhances accountability. 

9. Clearly stipulate the level of force at which a written use-of-force report is required. 

Use-of-force policies should clearly stipulate the level of force at which written use-of-force 
report is required. The consensus recommendation of the advisors to this project is that 
any instance of force above soft-hand control should be considered a reportable use of 
force. If the department does not use a use-of-force continuum, then the force options, the 
circumstances of deployment, and the outcomes that result in a reportable use of force must 
be explicitly articulated. Policies should require a use-of-force report any time there is an 
apparent injury or a complaint of injury, even if the force used otherwise would have been 
below the reportable force threshold. Policies should require a use-of-force report any time 
there is a complaint about the level of force deployed. These reports must be initiated whether 
the complaint is filed by the subject or by a third party who witnessed the use of force. Reports 
aid supervisors and investigators in resolving such complaints. 

10. Clearly stipulate the level of force at which a use-of-force review is required. 

Use-of-force policies should clearly stipulate the level of force at which use-of-force review 
is required. The consensus recommendation of the advisors to this project was that, as with 
reportable force, any instance of force above soft-hands control should be considered a 
reviewable use of force. 

11. Ensure that accountability mechanisms including use-of-force investigations for 
allegations of excessive force or force without cause are fair, thorough, rigorous, and 
transparent. 

Unlawful or excessive use of force is contrary to the ethics of policing, creates tremendous 
liabilities, and undermines the credibility of the department in the eyes of the public and 
the department members themselves. In response, law enforcement leaders must hold 
themselves, their supervisors, and their officers to the highest levels of accountability. 
Investigatory processes must be fair, thorough, rigorous, and transparent. They must be 
staffed with investigators who are appropriately motivated, skilled, and trained for these 
duties. Disciplinary actions should be fair, while making it explicit that no unlawful or willfully 
excessive force will be tolerated. 

12. Collect and analyze use-of-force data for organizational management and assessment 
purposes. 

Departments should collect data that will allow them to analyze the frequency of use-of-force 
incidents over time and across units. Data collection should be frequent enough to enable 
analysis on a monthly or quarterly basis. Analyses should assess the impact of changes in 
policy, training, or force options. Analyses should assess trends in use-of-force complaints 
and use-of-force-related injuries to officers and subjects. Use-of-force data should be routinely 
reviewed by supervisors and, ideally, incorporated into the data-management system as part 
of early intervention. Ultimately, police executives should assess whether they are moving 



in the right direction with use of force, whether use-of-force standards are equally applied 
across the department (with appropriate consideration of difference in risk across units and 
assignments), and whether the trends reflect professional standards and a commitment to the 
community and civil rights. 

13. Establish proactive media and public relations strategies regarding department use-of-force 
policies and practices. 

Departments should not wait for a critical use-of-force incident to occur before beginning to 
educate the media, public officials, and the general public regarding use-of-force policies and 
practices. Establishing community outreach strategies will build the social capital on which 
departments may draw in the event of a critical use-of-force incident. 

Conclusion 

The use force in police-citizen encounters is one of the most complex and emotionally charged 
issues in law enforcement. Officers must make decisions that are compliant with applicable 
laws, professional standards, and departmental policies, often in the context of split-second 
life-or-death circumstances. While the safety of officers and civilians remain a paramount 
concern, law enforcement leaders must create accountability mechanisms to ensure that 
the application of force remain within legal strictures or reasonableness. As force tools 
and techniques continually evolve, departments must carefully consider their use-of-force 
options. Maintaining public relations and respect for civil rights must continually be part of the 
decision-making equation. 

Suggestions for Further Reading 

Because use of forceand the proper deployment of associated weapons and techniques 
remain a complex and often debated issue, much has been written on the topic, particularly 
from an operational and legal perspective. As can be seen from the forgoing discussion, use 
of force raises civil rights and community outreach implication as well. Recent publications on 
use of force that address these issues include the following. 

Alpert, Geoffrey P., and Roger G. Dunham. Understanding Police Use of Force: Officers, 
Suspects, and Reciprocity. Cambridge University Press, New York; 2004. 

U.S. Department of Justice Community Relations Service. Police Use of Force: 
Addressing Community Racial Tensions. August 2002. www.usdoj.gov/crs/pubs/ 
pubbullpoliceuseofforcedraftrevision72002.htm 

Walker Samuel. The New World of Police Accountability. Sage Publications Inc., Thousand 
Oaks (California); 2005. 

Peters, John G. Force Continuums: Three Questions. The Police Chief. January 2006. 



Endnotes 

1 
Ramsey, Charles H. in a letter to Deputy Attorney General of the United States Available on 
January 6, 1999. Available on the web at www.dcwatch.com/police/990106.htm. 

2 
Police Use of Force in America. Alexandria (Virginia): International Association of Chiefs of 
Police, 2001. 

3 
Langan, Patrick A., Lawrence Greenfeld, Steven K. Smith, Matthew R. Durose, and David J. 
Leven. Contacts between Police and the PublicFindings from the 1999 National Survey. 
United States Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics (February 2001) NCJ184957. 

4 
Hickey, Edward R.; Garner, Joel H., The Rate of Force Used by the Police in Montgomery 
County, Maryland, Executive Summary [and Final Report]: A Report to the Montgomery 
County Department of the Police and the National Institute of Justice. Washington, D.C.: 
United States Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice (March 2002) NCJ199877. 

5 
It is also relevant to note, that departments with expansive early intervention systems, 
such as Pittsburgh and Phoenix discussed in Chapter 3, collect the basic data (reportable 
use of force and arrest data) that allow for routine calculation of rates per arrest. 

6 
Adams, K. (1996). Measuring the Prevalence of Police Abuse of Force. In W. A. Geller, and 
Toch, H. (Eds.), Police Violence: Understanding and Controlling Police Abuse of Force 
(pp. 52-93). New Haven (Connecticut): Yale University Press. Adams maintains that the 
proportion of encounters that involve use of force can vary as definitions of use of 
force vary. In the cited studies, for instance, the routine application of handcuffs was not 
considered a use of force. Defining routine handcuffing as use of force would certainly 
drive the rate of using force much higher. The rate of use of force is also influenced by 
the types of police citizen contact that are examined. Studies that focus on exclusively on 
arrests rather than traffic stops tend to identify considerably higher rates of use of force 
since arrests are more likely to involve resistance, confrontation, and retaliation than 
traffic stops. Still, even considering these measurement issues, the use of force remains a 
rare event. 

7 
United States v. City of Detroit, Michigan, and the Detroit Police Department, Consent 
Judgment. (June, 12, 2003) Available on web at www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/documents/dpd/ 
detroitpd_uofwdcd_613.pdf. 

8 
United States Department of Justice and the Metropolitan Police Department of the District 
of Columbia. (June 13, 2001) Available on web at www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/documents/ 
dcmoa.htm. 

9 
International Association of Chiefs of Police Model Policies. Use of Force. February 2005. 

10 Means, Randy, and Eric Edwards. Chiefs Counsel: Electronic Control Weapons: Liability 
Issues. The Police Chief, November 2005: 10-11. 

11 See Police Executive Research Forum, Center on Force & Accountability. PERF Conducted 
Energy Device Policy and Training Guidelines for Consideration and the associated 
document Conducted Energy Device (CED) Glossary of Terms. October 2005. 

12 
United States v. City of Detroit, Michigan and the Detroit Police Department Consent 
Judgment (06/12/03). Available on the web at www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/documents/dpd/ 
detroitpd_uofwdcd_613.pdf. 

13 
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979). 

14 
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989) 

14 

Managing Use of Force

15 
Sample Directives for Virginia Law Enforcement Agencies. Use of Force Directive. 
Effective Date: July 1, 1999. Virginia Division of Criminal Justice Services. Available on web 
at www.dcjs.virginia.gov/cple/sampleDirectives/manual/pdf/2-6.pdf. 

16 
United States of America v. City of Detroit, Michigan and the Detroit Police Department 
Consent Decree (06/12/03). Available on web at www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/documents/dpd/ 
detroitpd_uofwdcd_613.pdf. 

17 Petrowski, Thomas D. Use-of-force Policies and Training: a Reasoned Approach - Legal 
Digest The FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, October 2002. Available on the web at www.fbi. 
gov/publications/leb/2002/oct02leb.pdf. 

18 Police Executive Research Forum, Center on Force & Accountability. Conducted Energy 
Device (CED) Glossary of Terms. October 2005 

19 Electro-Muscular Disruption Technology A Nine-Step Strategy for Effective Deployment. 
Alexandria (Virginia): International Association of Chiefs of Police, 2005. Available on the 
web at www.theiacp.org/research/RCDCuttingEdgeTech.htm. 

20 
International Association of Chiefs of Police Model Policies. Use of Force. February 2005. 

21 Memorandum of Agreement Between the United States Department of Justice and 
the District of Columbia and the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department. 
(06/13/2001) Available on the web at www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/documents/dcmoa.htm. 

22 Memorandum of Agreement Between the United States Department of Justice and the City 
of Cincinnati, Ohio and Cincinnati Police Department. (4/12/2002) Available on the web at 
www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/Cincmoafinal.htm. 

23 
Sample Directives for Virginia Law Enforcement Agencies. Use of Force Directive. Effective 
Date: 1 July 1999. Virginia Division of Criminal Justice Services. 17 Nov. 2005 Available on 
the web at www.dcjs.virginia.gov/cple/sampleDirectives/manual/pdf/2-6.pdf. 

24 
Acosta v. City and County of San Francisco 83 F.3d 1143, 1147 (9th Cir. 1996) 

25 
Alpert, Geoffrey, Dennis Kenney, Roger Dunham, William Smith and Michael Cosgrove. 
Police Pursuit and the Use of Force, Final Report. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of 
Justice, National Institute of Justice, 1996, NCJ-64833. 

26 
International Association of Chiefs of Police Model Policies. Use of Force. February 2005. 

27 
Memorandum of Agreement Between the United States Department of Justice and the City 
of Cincinnati, Ohio and Cincinnati Police Department. (4/12/02). Available on the web at 
www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/Cincmoafinal.htm. 

28 
Streicher, Thomas H. Staff Notes. May, 20 2003. Cincinnati Police Department. Available on 
10 October. 2005 from www.cincinnati-oh.gov/police/downloads/police_pdf5988.pdf. 

29 Gruber, Charles. A Chiefs Role in Prioritizing Civil Rights. The Police Chief International 
Association of Chiefs of Police. November 2004. Available on the web at www. 
policechiefmagazine.org/magazine select Archive. 

30 
United States v. City of Pittsburgh Consent Decree. (02/26/97) Available on web at www. 
usdoj.gov/crt/split/documents/pittscomp.htm. 

31 
International Association of Chiefs of Police Model Policies. Dealing with the Mentally Ill. 
February 2005. 

32
International Association of Chiefs of Police. Model Policies. Encounters with the 
Developmentally Disabled. March 2003.

33 
Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies (CALEA) standard 41.2.8. 
 


34 
Memorandum of Agreement Between the United States Department of Justice and the City 
of Cincinnati, Ohio and Cincinnati Police Department. (4/12/2002) Available on the web at 
www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/Cincmoafinal.htm. 

35 
Memorandum of Agreement Between the United States Department of Justice and 
the District of Columbia and the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department. 
(06/13/2003) www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/documents/dcmoa.htm. Note: Operating in a federal 
jurisdiction, the U.S. Attorneys Office (USAO) in the District of Columbia holds the same 
responsibilities that local prosecutors hold in other jurisdictions. 

36 
Memorandum of Agreement Between the United States Department of Justice and 
the District of Columbia and the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department. 
(06/13/2003) www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/documents/dcmoa.htm. 

37 
By policy, the Pittsburgh Police Bureau Subject Resistance Report From must be completed 
for any use of force with the exception of: (1) mere presence of police officers and canines, 
(2) verbal commands, (3) handcuffing with no or minimal resistance when transporting, 
(4) come along holds, (5) physical removal of peacefully resisting demonstrators, and (6) 
displaying or unholstering of a firearm.

38 Davis, Robert C., Christopher W. Ortiz, Nicole J. Henderson, Joel Miller, and Michelle K. 
Massie. Turning Necessity into Virtue: Pittsburghs Experience with a Federal Consent Decree. 
New York: Vera Institute of Justice, 2002. 

39 Memorandum of Agreement Between the United States Department of Justice and 
the District of Columbia and the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department. 
(06/13/2003) www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/documents/dcmoa.htm. 

40 
Metropolitan Police Department Use of Force Statistics 2005 (Quarter 2). Force Investigation 
Team. September 29, 2005. Available on the web at: www.mpdc.dc.gov/mpdc/frames. 
asp?doc=/mpdc/lib/mpdc/publications/useofforce/FIT_2005_Q1.pdf. 

41 
Use of Force Report: October 2005. Iowa City Police Department. Available on web at www. 
icgov.org/police/useofforce.asp. 

42 
Crowe, Robert. Police Think Tank Urges Rules for Taser Use. Houston Chronicle. October 20 
2005 (Internet). See also: Police Executive Research Forum, Center on Force & Accountability. 
PERF Conducted Energy Device Policy and Training Guidelines for Consideration. October 
2005. 
 

VI. Addressing Racial Profiling: Creating a
Comprehensive Commitmentto Bias-Free Policing 



Addressing Racial Profiling: Creating a 
Comprehensive Commitment to Bias-Free 
Policing 

The practice of racial profiling has no place in law enforcement. It is an activity that 
undermines the public trust vital for an effective community policing organization. Police 
must be perceived as both providers of public safety and deferential to the civil liberties 
of those they have sworn to protect and serve. While the majority of police officers serve 
their communities in a professional and ethical manner, the debate over the reality of racial 
profiling as a practice in law enforcement is loudest on the side of its existence on a national 
level.1 

Chief Russ Leach, Riverside (California) Police Department 

Introduction 

Questions regarding the existence of and the extent to which racial profiling is practiced 
among police officers are subject to fervent debate in the media, in academia, and in law 
enforcement agencies themselves. In this debate, perspectives vary broadly. Some observers 
suggest that the extent of racial profiling is wildly exaggerated and go so far as to call racial 
profiling a myth. Others consider racial profiling to be a widespread and systematic problem 
in law enforcement agencies across the country. Still others, however, fall in between these 
views. Some of these latter observers feel that racial profiling may be endemic to particular 
departments or particular units within departments, but not generally widespread. Others 
acknowledge the existence of racial profiling and express their grave concerns but assert that 
it is a rare practice invoked by only a few officers. In his 2001 address before a Joint Session 
of Congress, President George W. Bush put the problem of racial profiling in the following 
context: 

[Racial profiling] is wrong, and we will end it in America. In so doing, we will not hinder 
the work of our Nations brave police officers. They protect us every day, often at great risk. 
But by stopping the abuses of a few, we will add to the public confidence our police officers 
earn and deserve.2 

Public opinion polls reveal that racial profiling is a concern to a clear majority of Americans. 
A recent Gallup Poll found that 81 percent of Americans thought racial profiling to be wrong 
and that 59 percent felt that racial profiling was widespread.3 While the poll revealed expected 
differences between the perceptions of Whites and African-Americans, a solid majority of 
White (56 percent), and more than three out of four African-American (77 percent) survey 
respondents indicated they believed the practice was widespread. However prevalent racial 
profiling actually is, public perceptions implore police executives to address it. 



Many law enforcement executives deserve credit for their proactive approaches to bias free 
policing. Their earnest attempts at preventing racial profilingthrough issuing strong policy 
directives, providing comprehensive training, requiring supervisory review and accountability, 
and collecting and reviewing stop and search dataare impressive. These efforts are 
especially remarkable because they are often complex, resource intensive, and politically 
thorny. Data collection, in particular, is a complicated undertaking. Currently, civil rights 
groups, the media, and state and federal government officials are making increased demands 
for racial profiling data collection. Many agencies are required to collect data on racial 
profiling as part of their mandated statewide data collection or as a result of legal decisions 
or settlements including federal consent decrees and memorandums of understanding. No 
law enforcement agency including an agency that has not been singled out for engaging in 
racial profiling or that has a racially or ethnically homogeneous populationis immune to the 
potential of confronting the complexities of racial profiling data collection. Indeed, as more 
agencies collect datawhether mandated or voluntarilyit may become increasingly difficult 
for other agencies to withstand the pressure to do so. As a result, enforcement leaders are 
increasingly looking for guidance regarding this multifaceted and volatile issue. 

Chapter Overview and Objectives 

Racial profiling is a remarkably complex topic. Beginning with an in-depth consideration of the 
various and differing definitions of racial profiling, this chapter acknowledges that complexity. 
It still strives, however, to offer law enforcement leaders clear and compelling directives on 
steps they can take to address and prevent problems within their individual agencies. To this 
end, the chapter explores the five core responsibilities that every department has (1) to design 
policies prohibiting the practice of racial profiling, (2) to implement a sound training regimen 
that reinforces departmental policies, (3) to sustain accountability mechanisms that measure 
adherence to professional, legal, and ethical standards as well as the specific effectiveness 
of training, (4) to communicate with the community, and (5) to establish consistency and 
continuity in the pursuit of all of these efforts. 

Having offered these directives, the chapter turns to the consideration of racial profiling data 
collection and analysis. While this practice appears to be increasingly prevalent, the standards 
guiding it are still evolving. Law enforcement leaders struggle with questions ranging from 
whether to collect data, to what data to collect, to how that data should be analyzed to yield 
definitive conclusions. This chapter does not recommend that every department pursue racial 
profiling data collection and analysis. Instead, it is intended to help police make informed 
decisions and navigate the complex statistical, political, and public relations issues related to 
this practice. 

The chapter concludes with a series of recommendations for law enforcement leaders working 
to prevent racial profiling within their departments. Still, the chapter is not intended to provide 
exhaustive coverage or even definitive conclusions regarding all facets of racial profiling. 
Readers interested in exploring the issues surrounding racial profiling in greater detail should 
reference the documents listed under Suggestions for Further Reading at the end of this 
chapter. 



Differing Definitions of Racial Profiling 

As law enforcement agencies work to address perceptions of racial profiling in the community 
and to self-assess agency performance in this area, it is vital that they understand what racial 
profiling is. Regrettably, no single, standard definition of racial profiling exists. Differing 
definitions reflect the differing perspectives of attorneys, police officers, civil rights activists, 
and researchers. Although few among them would condone racial profiling as a legitimate law 
enforcement technique, there is only limited consensus on what particular behaviors actually 
constitute racial profiling. Police leaders must concern themselves not just with their own 
departments definitions of racial profiling; they must be able to articulate and explain these 
definitions in operational terms to representatives from media and the public who may have 
entirely different perspectives on what constitutes racial profiling and how the term is defined. 

An Evolving and Broadening Concept 

What is clear to all observers, however, is that the issue of racial profiling has expanded in 
the public consciousness and that the categories of persons who may be racially profiled 
have expanded beyond those that existed when the term first became popular. Racial profiling 
initially emerged out of concerns that African-Americans and Hispanics were more likely to be 
stopped by police and were being treated differently by police during those stops than other 
citizens. In the 1980s, some drug interdiction efforts targeted African-American and Hispanic 
drivers on the presumption that they were more likely to be involved in drug trafficking. 
Thus, the terms driving while black and driving while brown were among the earliest 
expressions of racial profiling. 

Now, however, some observers more broadly construe racial profiling to include any police 
actionnot merely traffic stopsthat targets an individual based on a variety of group 
statuses other than race. Concerns over racial profiling extend beyond the African-American 
and Hispanic race categories. For instance, flying while Arab and flying while Muslim 
are now considered part of the racial profiling lexicon. In fact, the focus on racial profiling 
actually extends well beyond race. In addition to considering the race, ethnicity, color, 
national origin, or ancestry of an individual that is subject to police action, the term is often 
extended to address groups of individuals defined by gender, sexual orientation, religion, age, 
occupational status, socioeconomic status, immigrant status, or ability to speak English. 

Although alternative terms such as bias policing have been used to convey this broader 
focus, for the purposes of this chapter we will continue to use the term racial profiling with 
the understanding that it applies to broadly defined police actions on the basis of broadly 
defined group statuses. Through constant attention by the media, the term racial profiling 
has become a household word that, as most people understand, addresses a spectrum of 
groups beyond just those defined by race. 



Sorting Through Definitions 

Given this broader understanding, it is critical to consider the more common definitions of 
racial profiling and briefly assess the implications of each. In general terms, definitions often 
vary in the degree to which they allow for raceor another group statusto be a factor in 
police action. Differing definitions of racial profiling hold that race should: 

 Not be considered the sole factor in a police action. 

 Not be the primary or motivating factor in a police action. 

 Not be a factor in a police action except in the manner that hair color, weight, or other 
physical descriptors are used in instances of identifying a suspect for a specific crime. 
Commonly referred to as the be on the lookout or BOLO exception, this definition is 
often used in combination with or as an elaboration of the above definitions. 

 Not be a factor in a police action under any circumstances. 

Factor-Based Definitions 

The basic difference in racial profiling definitions is how much of a role race can, or should, 
play as a factor in those decisions. These definitions consider the circumstances under 
which race may be considered in deciding whom to target as well as how restrictive those 
circumstances must be. As evidence of the existence of various definitions of racial profiling, 
consider the following passages, drawn from a variety of sources including police policy 
directives, that carry different implications about the degree to which race, ethnicity, national 
origin, or other group status can be used in police decisions. 

The Texas American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) report cited, but did not endorse, the 
following definition of racial profiling as common in a number of Texas law enforcement 
agencies: 

Acts initiating law enforcement action, such as a traffic stop, a detention, a search, issuance of 
a citation, or an arrest based solely upon an individuals race, ethnicity, or national origin or on 
the basis of racial or ethnic stereotypes rather than upon the individuals behavior.4 

The following definition, published on the Fairborn (Ohio) Police Department web site, 
prohibits police actions that rely on race as a primary or motivating factor: 

Except as provided in this policy, race/ethnicity/human diversity shall not be motivating factors 
in making law enforcement decisions.5 (Emphasis added.) 

Source: Fairborn (Ohio) Police Department
Agency Profile: Population 33,000; Officers 45



The following definition, an excerpt from a U.S. District Court case, prohibits police actions 
other than the BOLO exception: 

The term racial profiling means the consideration by an officer in any fashion or to any 
degree, of the race or ethnicity of any civilian in deciding whether to surveil, stop, detain, 
interrogate, request consent to search, or search any civilian; except when officers are seeking 
to detain, apprehend or otherwise be on the lookout for a specific suspect sought in connection 
with a specific crime who has been identified or described, in part, by race or ethnicity and the 
officer relies, in part, on race or ethnicity in determining whether reasonable suspicion exists 
that a given individual is the person being sought.6 (Emphasis added.) 

These directives, which capture the sole factor, primary or motivating factor, and BOLO 
exception prohibitions regarding racial profiling, are representative of those definitions that 
most commonly appear in police policy directives and training curriculum. As is evident, in 
order of presentation, the definitions range from narrow prohibitions to broad prohibitions 
of using race (or other status) as a basis for police action. None of the definitions prohibit the 
consideration of race altogether. 

Few individuals inside or outside of law enforcement would argue that race should never be 
used as a factor in police action. Within the context of all of the above examples, race can and 
should be considered a factor when police are responding to the description of a suspect for a 
particular crime. In such a context, race is merely a descriptor of the suspect in the same sense 
as hair color, weight, age, and gender. Indeed, many agency policies stipulate that the BOLO 
exception is the only exception under which race may be used in police decisions to stop or 
search a person. 

Clarification of the Term Profiling 

The term profiling has a long history in law enforcement. It is important to distinguish the 
practice of racial profiling, which is unlawful, from other types of profilingsuch as criminal, 
psychological, and geographic profilingthat have useful and lawful roles in policing. Criminal 
profiling, for instance, is used to discern investigative leads when suspect information is 
sketchy, such as was the case in the Washington, D.C.-area sniper case in 2002. Criminal 
profiling involves using evidence gathered from crime scenes, coupled with information 
about subject modus operandi and suspect behavior obtained from victims and witnesses, to 
develop an offender description based on psychological and other scientific principles. The 
goal of criminal profiling is to provide a description of the probable suspect or suspects 
based on scientific principles. The suspect description often comprises psychological 
traitsbehavioral tendencies, personality traits, or psychopathologiesand demographic 
descriptors such as expected gender, age, race, or geographic location. 
 


Race-based versus Behavior-based Definitions 

The above definitions addressed how much of a role race could play as a factor in police 
decisions. An alternative approach stresses that behavior rather than race should be the 
operative factor. The definition below from the U.S. Department of Justice publication, A 
Resource Guide on Racial Profiling Data Collection Systems: Promising Practices and Lessons 
Learned, defines the prohibited act of racial profiling as based on the person rather than 
behavior. 

Any police-initiated action that relies on the race, ethnicity or national origin rather than the 
behavior of an individual or information that leads the police to a particular individual who 
has been identified as being, or having been, engaged in criminal activity.7 

Another approach is illustrated in the definition from the U.S. Department of Justices 
Guidance Regarding the Use of Race by Federal Law Enforcement Agencies, dated June 
2003, which describes the unlawful practice in the following terms: 

Racial profiling at its core concerns the invidious use of race or ethnicity as a criterion in 
conducting stops, searches and other law enforcement investigative procedures. It is premised 
on the erroneous assumption that any particular individual of one race or ethnicity is more 
likely to engage in misconduct than any particular individual of another race or ethnicity. 

Criticism of Sole-Factor Definitions 

Sole-factor definitions of racial profiling attract frequent criticism because they are perceived 
as too narrow with regard to the behavior they prohibit. Critics believe that the sole-factor 
definition of racial profiling is operationally too easily exploited. Specifically, critics contend 
that if an officer can articulate any reason for his or her action other than race or other group 
status, then the real underlying reason is masked and the legal onus of racial profiling is lifted. 

This argument is sometimes broached by referring to the term pretext stops. Although the 
precise meaning of the term may be debated, pretext stops are those in which an officer can 
cite a reason or reasons for the stop other than the actual reason. As the Supreme Court has 
stated, pretext stops are generally legal and permissible. 

The decision in Whren v. U.S provides the legal precedent that most observers agree effectively 
permits pretext stops. In this case, Washington, D.C. Metropolitan police officers who had 
identified a suspicious vehicle in a known drug area used the violation of traffic laws as the 
stated basis of the stop. Drugs were found as a result of the stop and the officers did not 
deny that the traffic violation was a pretext for general drug related suspicion. In its decision, 
the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that subjective intentions were not relevant to establishing 
probable cause. In other words, the fact that the suspects were stopped on the pretext 
of a traffic violation was determined by the court not to matter. In the language of the 
federal appeals court ruling, which was upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court, a traffic stop is 
permissible as long as a reasonable officer in the same circumstances could have stopped the 
car for the suspected traffic violation. [emphasis added]8 
 


However, as critics of the sole factor definition contend, pretext stops are problematic if the 
real reason for the stop is race. Under the sole factor definition, a police officer intent on
stopping someone on the basis of race merely needs to wait for some violation to occur to use it 
as the stated reason for the stop.  Even if the officer concedes that race played a role in the 
stop, it isnt the sole reason for the stop.

In short, critics argue that under the sole-factor definition, a hypothetical officer who routinely 
stops African-Americans for rolling stops or obscured license plates but does not stop Whites for 
the same infractions is not technically engaging in racial profiling because a reason other than 
race can be used to justify the stops. Critics of the sole-factor definition argue that the real 
question should be whether race influenced the officers decision to stop the individual.

Through the efforts both within and outside of law enforcementincluding local chapters of the ACLU, 
civilian review boards, as well as organizations like the National Organization of Black Law Enforcement 
Executives and the National Latino Peace Officers Associationso-called sole-factor definitions are 
increasingly being abandoned in favor of definitions which are seen as clearer and broader in their 
definitions of unlawful stop activity, and more effective in protecting civil rights.

The Prevalence of Efforts to Address Racial Profiling

Whether racial profiling is perceived as an isolated practice or a widespread problem, every agency 
must work toward the goal of bias-free policing. To this end, many agencies have already begun to 
address racial profiling through developing sound policies, training, and adequate supervision 
and accountability mechanisms.

Prevalence of Policies 

Policies on racial profiling and bias-free policing are now commonplace in most law 
enforcement agencies, particularly larger agencies. Results from the 2003 Sample Survey of 
Law Enforcement Agencies (LEMAS), conducted by BJS, reveals that 43 of 48 (90 percent) 
state police agencies responding to the survey reported having policy directives on racial 
profiling. Based on the survey, 62 percent of municipal police departments and 63 percent of 
sheriffs offices reported having racial profiling policies. As is evident in the graphs below, the 
prevalence of racial profiling policy directives generally increases with department size. Details 
about LEMAS methodology and data are available in the text box on page 31 in Chapter 2. 

Image of municipal agencies departments with racial profiling policy directives bar graph
Municipal Agencies Departmentswith Racial Profiling Policy Directives with Racial Profiling Policy Directives

Image of sheriffs' offices with racial profiling policy directives bar graph
Sheriffs Offices with Racial Profiling Policy Directives with Racial Profiling Policy Directives 



Prevalence of Racial Profiling Training and Accountability 

The LEMAS survey did not address the presence of training or accountability with respect to 
racial profiling. No national data was available to address this issue. As we have discussed 
in other chapters, however, the collection of racial and ethnic data is central to many 
accountability strategies now being used in police departments. For instance, to help ensure 
accountability, agencies are increasingly relying on their existing early intervention systems 
(see Chapter 3) and incorporating traffic stop data as a way to assess the performance 
of individual officers. Through the reliance on citizen complaint processes and related 
data analysis (see Chapter 4), law enforcement leaders and supervisors can assess which 
communities are experiencing problems with the department, including complaints that 
specify biased treatment. In addition to these efforts, many agencies have begun to collect 
and analyze racial profiling data either voluntarily or by mandate as a result of state regulation 
or individual lawsuits. This chapter will address the prevalence of data collection in a later 
section. 

Multiple Motivations for Addressing Racial Profiling 

Law enforcement leaders must make every effort to prevent acts of racial profiling. The 
foremost reason to take an unequivocal position against the practice and deal with the issues 
in a forthright manner is because it is the right thing to do. Racial profiling is unlawful and 
unconstitutional. The use of race by law enforcement agencies is strictly limited by the Equal 
Protection Clause of the 14thAmendment and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 which 
prohibits agencies that receive federal funding from engaging in racially discriminatory 
practices. Increasingly, through legislation or executive orders, states have mandated that law 
enforcement agencies establish policies banning racial profiling. 

Other motivations for taking steps to prevent racial profiling, and proactively addressing 
community perceptions of racial profiling, include the following: 

 Sustaining the equality that is fundamental to ethical policing in a democratic society: The 
fundamental focus on equal protection under the law is an established hallmark of policing 
in democratic societies. During the last 2 decades, growing commitments to community 
policing and service-oriented approaches in the United States has served to extend the 
concept of equal protection to one of equal service. All consumers of police services 
whether they are living, working, or visiting the jurisdictionexpect and deserve both 
equal protection and equal service under the law. Bias policing, in any form, undermines 
this fundamental right. 

 Enhancing trust and confidence in the police: To the extent that racial profiling is allowed 
to exist or that perceptions of racial profiling persist, the legitimacy of police authority 
is diminished. This may be felt most strongly among historically disadvantaged and 
disenfranchised communities that ironically are often most dependent on police services 
for public safety. A communitys trust and confidence in the police is directly related to the 
extent to which a department takes a proactive approach to prevent racial profiling and 
address alleged racial profiling in a forthright manner. 

 


 Enhancing the philosophy and practices of community policing: Racial profiling reinforces 
a negative us-versus-them mentality within communities and law enforcement agencies. 
Communities that feel they are racially profiled are less likely to report crime, less likely to 
cooperate as witnesses, and less willing to form constructive problem-solving partnerships 
with police. Members of these communities who come into contact with the police may act 
with more hostility because of real or perceived biased treatment. As Lorie Fridell (2005) 
suggests in a publication issued by the Police Executive Research Forum, Decades of 
profound reform reflected in community policing are threatened by perceptions of racially 
biased policing and its practice.9 By addressing the communities concerns about racial 
profiling, law enforcement agencies realize the full benefits of community policing. 

 Building capacity to recruit minorities and other qualified individuals to work in law 
enforcement: Many agencies work toward the ideal of mirroring the demographic 
composition of the jurisdictions they serve. Real or perceived racial profiling directly 
undermines efforts to recruit minorities and other qualified individuals who may perceive 
an agencyor the entire law enforcement professionas being fundamentally biased 
against certain groups. This is a particularly pressing concern for departments that struggle 
with shortages of recruits. Meaningful efforts to address racial profiling can reduce feelings 
of disenfranchisement and make law enforcement careers more desirable. Moreover, 
a proactive approach to addressing racial profiling will help draw candidates of all 
backgrounds who share a commitment to bias-free policing and are motivated by public 
service ideals. 

 Limiting financial liability: Allegations of racial profiling may result directly in payouts 
associated with civil lawsuits and settlements. An ounce of prevention may be worth a 
pound of cure. Agencies that take proactive steps to prevent racial profiling can reduce the 
costs associated with these payouts. 

Core Components for Addressing and Preventing Racial Profiling 

Police departments benefit as they succeed in addressing and preventing the perception, as 
well as the actual occurrence, of racial profiling. Although departments efforts to address and 
prevent racial profiling may differ according to management priorities and legal mandates, the 
enactment of five core components will offer all departments the best possibility of success. 

Component One: Clear and Compelling Policies 

To address and prevent racial profiling, departments must establish clear and comprehensive 
policies against it and agency missions that promote equal protection and equal service to all. 

The first step in preventing racial profiling is the development of a clear departmental policy 
banning the practice. This policy directive must unambiguously define and denounce racial 
profiling. Ambiguous policy definitions and directives are of no assistance to officers on the 
street and have no value for developing relationships of trust between the department and the 
community. 

Departmental policies should clearly convey that behavior and evidentiary standardsnot 
raceshould guide police stop-and-search decisions. To this end, departmental policies should 
specify that race should play no role in decisions of whom to stop or search except under very 



narrow circumstances where race descriptors are linked to a suspect for a particular crime (the 
BOLO exception). Finally, departmental polices should reinforce the legal standards for stops, 
searches, and other police actions. These policies should deter officers from making racially 
discriminatory pretext stops by stipulating that officers must be able to articulate how they 
established reasonable suspicion or probable cause for every stop or search. 

Departmental policies to address and prevent racial profiling should move beyond a focus 
only on equal protection. In most departments, the majority of police activity revolves around 
service rather than enforcement of the law. Departments commitment to fair and equitable 
policing and to the tenets of community policing should ensure that all persons, groups, and 
communities within a jurisdiction are afforded equal service. 

Many such policies are already in place and successfully allow departments to address and 
prevent racial profiling. The policy of the Dearborn Heights (Michigan) Police Department, 
for example, addresses racial profiling and unequivocally prohibits the practice, yet contains 
language that does not compromise on aggressive enforcement: 

I. PURPOSE 

The purpose of this policy is to explicitly state that racial and ethnic profiling in law 
enforcement are totally unacceptable; to provide guidelines for officers to prevent such 
occurrences; and to protect our officers from unwarranted accusation when they act within 
the directives of the law and policy. 

II. POLICY 

It is the policy of the Dearborn Heights Police Department to patrol in a proactive manner, 
to aggressively investigate suspicious persons and circumstances, and to actively enforce the 
motor vehicle laws, while insisting that citizens will only be stopped or detained when there 
exists reasonable suspicion to believe they have committed or are committing an infraction 
of the law. 

Discussion 

A fundamental right that is guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States to all who live 
in this nation is the equal protection under the law. Along with this right to equal protection 
is the fundamental right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures by governmental 
agents. Citizens are free to walk and drive our streets, highways and other public places 
without police interference so long as they obey the law. They also are entitled to be free from 
crime and from the depredations of criminals, and to drive and walk our public ways safe 
from the actions of reckless and careless drivers. 

The Dearborn Heights Police Department is charged with protecting these rights for all, 
regardless of race, color, ethnicity, sex, sexual orientation, physical handicap, religion or other 
belief system. 
 


Because of the nature of our business, police officers are required to be observant, to identify 
unusual occurrences and law violations and to act upon them. It is this proactive enforcement 
that keeps our citizens free from crime, our streets and highways safe to drive upon, and 
detects and apprehends criminals. 

This policy is intended to assist our police officers in accomplishing this total mission in a way 
that respects the dignity of all persons and yet sends a strong deterrent message to actual and 
potential lawbreakers that if they break the law, they are likely to encounter the police. This 
policy is to address the agency accepted protocols for conducting all motor vehicle stops with 
the exception of high risk stops. 

Source: Dearborn Heights (Michigan) Police Department10
Agency Profile: Population 60,000; Officers 88

Departments that successfully establish clear and comprehensive policies denouncing racial 
profiling and expressing a commitment to equal protection should underscore this message in 
their mission statement. Below are several examples of the countless law enforcement agency 
mission statements that embrace these ideals. 

Our mission, collectively as a department and as individual officers, is to provide an exemplary 
level of service and protection to the residents and businesses of the City of Town & Country 
and to all those who may visit, work in, or travel through our community. 

We will serve the community through professional conduct at all times and the enforcement 
of criminal and traffic laws without prejudice or bias, with respect for the rights of all people, 
to assure a safe and secure environment for all. 

Source: Town and Country (Missouri) Police Department
Agency Profile: Population 10,894; Officers 34 

It is the mission of the Hamden Department of Police Services to protect the rights and 
integrity of all persons without prejudice or bias against race, religion, ethnic and national origin 
or sexual orientation within its jurisdiction; to safeguard the diversities of our communities 
and its citizens, to be free from criminal attack, threats of violence and persecution, secure in 
their possessions, and vigilant that together we can enjoy peace and harmony. 

Source: Hamden (Connecticut) Police Department web site 
Agency Profile: Population 55,000; Officers 107



Component Two: Meaningful Training 

To address and prevent racial profiling, departments must move beyond rote training and 
standard lectures. Training should inculcate attitudes of bias-free policing. 

Departmental policies that define, prohibit, and denounce racial profiling form a critical 
foundation, but the existence of even the best policy is not, by itself, enough. Training officers 
to avoid racial profiling and to practice bias-free policing is a critical responsibility for all 
departments. Police executives must ensure that all training strategies are coordinated, free 
of internal contradictions, and clearly and consistently communicated across the command 
structure. To this end, police executives must be vigilant in ensuring that training about racial 
profiling policies in the academy is not subverted by field training officers (FTO) or front-line 
supervisors who tell their officers to forget what they learned in the academy. FTOs and 
departmental culture must not be allowed to contradict explicit department policies and 
clear messages communicated through training. Training at every level must send the clear 
message that department policies are to be taken seriously. 

The scope and content of racial profiling training will necessarily depend on the specific 
programs in effect in a particular department. For instance, if an agency is involved in racial 
profiling data collection, specific instruction on data-collection protocols should be included. 
Racial profiling training for all departments, however, should include instruction on relevant 
legal and ethical standards, instruction on handling stops effectively, and instruction on 
diversity and cultural awareness. 

As departments offer training in these critical areas, many are discovering that particular 
training techniques are especially effective. Many departments have found that to engage 
officers, the use of active, scenario-based trainings are more effective than passive, lecture-
based training. Many departments have also found that to instill a commitment to bias-free 
policing in officers, positive, nonaccusatory trainings are more effective than those that stress 
compliance based on negative sanctions or fear. 

Understanding the Legal and Ethical Rationale for Bias-Free Policing 

Racial profiling training should stress adherence to the constitutional protections afforded 
every citizen as well as to the state and local laws that prohibit racial profiling. Based on clear 
definitions and scenario training, officers should be taught to apply these standards in real-life 
settings. Officers must understand that all citizens are guaranteed equal protection under the 
law. Officers should also understand that preventing racial profiling is an ethical as well as a 
legal imperative. Training should alert officers to the detrimental effects of racial profiling on 
effective policing and community relations. 

Developing an Understanding of Cultural Diversity 

To prevent racial profiling, departments commonly offer training in diversity and cultural 
awareness. Diversity and cultural awareness training sensitizes officers to the multicultural 
communities in which they work. This training often encourages officers to acknowledge 
and come to terms with any biases they may have as a first step in overcoming them. It 
also encourages officers to build respect for the diverse cultures among which they work. It 
accomplishes this by encouraging officers to develop a fuller understanding and appreciation 
 


of different ethnic or cultural groups within their jurisdiction. This training addresses the 
different value systems that may define various cultural groups. It offers officers practical 
instruction on interpreting such value systems and the behaviors that may result from them. 
Such training may focus specifically on how officers ought to treat members of major cultural 
groups within the jurisdiction in day-to-day encounters. 

Police Chief Gary R. Coderoni of the Muscatine (Iowa) Police Department acknowledges 
the power of diversity and cultural awareness training to build on officers understanding 
of multiple cultures to incorporate them into the community they police. In an FBI Law 
Bulletin article, The Relationship between Multicultural Training for Police and Effective Law 
Enforcement, Coderoni writes: 

Cultural diversity training helps police break free from their traditional stance of being apart 
from the community to a more inclusive philosophy of being a part of  the community. 
Realizing the difficulty of becoming a part of something that they do not understand causes a 
desperate need for an intense and ongoing educational process for developing an understanding 
of cultural differences and how those differences affect policing a free and culturally diverse 
society.With appropriate, well-developed training, law enforcement agencies can provide 
their officers with the tools to understand, appreciate, and deal with the cultural differences 
that impact their daily interactions with the citizens they are sworn to protect.11 

Departments ability to prevent racial profiling is enhanced through continual diversity and 
cultural awareness training. Changes in community demographics, such as the emergence of 
new immigrant groups within a departments jurisdiction, make continual training a necessity. 
Similarly, changes in the political climate, such as a potential backlash crimes against Arab, 
Muslim, and Sikh populations following September 11, 2001, also necessitate continual review 
and adjustments of diversity and cultural awareness training. Officers who better understand 
the cultures with which they are surrounded provide better services to individuals within these 
cultures. 

The Community Relations Service (CRS) of the U.S. Department of Justice has developed 
training material to promote awareness of Arab, Muslim, and Sikh cultures. This outreach 
has resulted in various regional train-the-trainer seminars. In addition, CRS sponsored 
the development of The First Three to Five Seconds, a video on Arab and Muslim cultural 
awareness suitable for play at roll call.12 

Courtesy and Respect in Stops 

From a technical standpoint, racial profiling occurs when race or other group status is an 
inappropriate factor in an officers decision to stop an individual or to take action (i.e., search 
or arrest) subsequent to that stop. Perceptions of racial profiling, however, may arise as a 
result of the way in which even an appropriate stop is handled. Departments that train and 
supervise officers in handling stops with courtesy, professionalism, and respect may diminish 
perceptions of racial profiling. 



All departments should train officers to handle stops effectively by doing the following: 

 Introducing themselves at the time of encounter 

 Stating the reason for contact as soon as possible even if the civilian does not ask 

 Keeping detention time as short as possible 

 Answering all relevant questions posed by the civilian to the fullest extent possible 

 Referring the civilian to an appropriate source within the department if unable to answer 
all questions 

 Providing the civilian with complete name and badge number upon request 

 Remaining respectful and polite 

 Thanking any civilian who turns out to be cleared of any wrongdoing for his or her time 
and apologizing for the inconvenience. 

The motorist who is approached with courtesy, professionalism, and respect; told the reason 
for the stop; and detained for a minimal amount of time is less likely to perceive biasbe 
it racial, gender, etc.as the reason for the stop than an individual treated disrespectfully. 
Officers behavior can have a beneficial effect on diminishing community perceptions of racial 
profiling. 

Component Three: Maintaining a Culture of Accountability 

To address and prevent racial profiling, departments must maintain a culture of accountability 
by establishing the proper accountability mechanisms and developing a culture of 
accountability. 

Departments that have established policies against racial profiling and have instituted 
ongoing training should then monitor officers responsiveness to these policies and training. 
Establishing and maintaining external and internal accountability mechanisms should be a 
critical piece of every departments efforts to address and prevent racial profiling. Externally, 
departments should ensure the open receipt and thorough assessment of citizen complaints 
regarding racial profiling. Internally, departments should ensure that early intervention 
systems or personnel performance systems are fully operational, used effectively by 
supervisors, and contain quality data that are complete and up-to-date. 

As an external accountability mechanism, citizen complaints can provide valuable information 
regarding racial profiling for at least three reasons. First, the citizen complaints may expose 
isolated incidents of racial profiling that would otherwise remain hidden within aggregate 
statistics. For instance, racial profiling by a few officers might be masked by overall patterns 
of equal enforcement within a departments stop-and-search data. Second, citizen complaints 
will allow law enforcement officials to assess the extent to which perceptions of racial bias 
exist in different communities or geographic sectors. The more that officials know about where 
perceptions of racial bias exist, the better they can use this information to inform internal 
training, community outreach, and community education programs. Finally, citizen complaints 
can be tracked alongside stop-and-search data as a way of validating or cross-checking trends. 
While citizen complaint data serve this useful role, it is important to remember that merely 
counting complaints of racial profiling is not necessarily a statistically reliable gauge of racial 
profiling itself. Not all persons complain and complaint activity is affected by how open and 
accessible a departments complaint process is to the community. 



As an internal accountability mechanism, departments operating early intervention or 
personnel performance systems should incorporate stop-and-search data into these systems, 
which will allow law enforcement supervisors to compare individual officers with their peers. 
If an officer exhibits inordinately high ratios of minority stops compared with peers serving in 
similar duties and geographic areas, intervention may be warranted. Supervisors must first 
review the circumstances that may have given rise to any statistical disparity based on race or 
ethnicity. When appropriate, supervisors should provide training and counseling to officers for 
whom data suggest racial profiling patterns in enforcement activity or delivery of services and 
for whom the behavior is determined to be unintentional. When supervisors detect a pattern 
of willful and blatant racial profiling, they must use appropriate disciplinary processes. The 
proper selection and training of supervisors clearly is key to the success of this approach. 

Departmental hiring and promotion processes should be designed with these commitments 
to bias-free policing in mind. To the extent possible, departmental hiring processes should 
seek out individuals who demonstrate conscientious attitudes about equal protection and 
equal service. These processes should screen out persons who demonstrate racial bias or 
animus. Similarly, departmental processes should seek to retain and promote persons who 
demonstrate effective law enforcement practices while upholding the ideals of unbiased 
enforcement and equitable provision of services. 

Component Four: Maintaining Broad-based Community Relations 

To address and mitigate community groups perceptions of racial profiling, departments must 
communicate regularly with the communities they serve. 

Having established clear and comprehensive policies against racial profiling, training 
strategies, and accountability mechanisms, departments should avail themselves of every 
opportunity to communicate these efforts with their communities. At the level of individual 
street encounters, officers should demonstrate the effectiveness of departmental training by 
ensuring that every subject who is stopped understands the reason for the stop as well as 
the subjects right to complain if he or she feels that the police action was racially based or 
the subject feels mistreated in any way. On a departmental level, police executives should 
publicize departmental policies and mission statements that advocate bias-free policing 
through agency web sites, annual reports, and other vital forums for communicating with the 
public. Additionally, police executives should be willing to meet with concerned community 
groups and leaders to discuss racial profiling and to develop collaborative solutions to this 
problem. Finally, a departments commitment to equal protection and service and bias-free 
policing should be a central tenet of the departments community policing strategy. 

Component Five: Sustaining a Systemic Approach 

To address and prevent racial profiling, departments must ensure the ongoing consistency of 
the policies, training, accountability mechanisms, and community outreach that they establish. 

Departments will succeed in addressing and preventing racial profiling to the extent that 
they recognize that their efforts to establish policies, offer training, maintain accountability, 
and communicate with their communities do not exist in isolation from each other. Each 
department must ensure, on a continuing basis, that these efforts are consistent with each 
other as well as with all departmental policies. To the extent that departments succeed in this 



regard, the existence of racial profiling policies, training, accountability mechanisms, and 
means of communicating with their communities will enable them to detect early on any 
trends in behavior that might result in negative perceptions among community members or in 
violations of the standards of bias-free and community policing. 

Beyond the Basic Components: Considering Racial Profiling Data 

Collection and Analysis 

In addition to the above-mentioned efforts to prevent racial profiling that the International 
Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) recommends to all departments, there currently is a 
marked trend toward the collection and analysis of racial profiling data. A growing number of 
states are mandating collection of traffic stop data to assess patterns of potential racial bias. In 
addition, local agencies may be required to collect racial profiling data as a result of lawsuits, 
court settlements, consent decrees, and memorandums of understanding. Finally, a growing 
number of local agencies are collecting data voluntarily to proactively respond to public 
concerns. 

At this point, the IACP believes that a blanket recommendation that all departments should 
engage in the collection and analysis of racial profiling data is premature. Although the 
IACP does not offer a general recommendation, it acknowledges that officers behavior is 
being increasingly scrutinized and that, as increasing numbers of agencies collect stop-and-search data, 
pressure to collect data will increase. Against this backdrop, the issue of whether 
and how best to collect racial profiling data will need to be continually reassessed by law 
enforcement leaders. A basic understanding of data collection and analyses processes and 
controversies is critical, even for those executives who are not currently facing the challenges 
of racial profiling allegations or data collection. 

Many departments have found value in partnering with universities to enhance research and 
evaluation across a wide spectrum of policing practices and strategies. A recent publication 
by the IACP, Improving Partnerships Between Law Enforcement Leaders and University Based 
Researchers, addresses these issues.13 University researchers can also provide valuable 
assistance with methodology, analysis, and drawing conclusions from data collected on racial 
profiling, and can enhance credibility. It is also important, however, that the researchers are 
able to approach the problem from a practical, rather than ivory tower perspective. They 
should have an appreciation of police work as it is experienced in the streets. 

Assessing the Prevalence of Racial Profiling Data Collection and Analysis 

Although racial profiling data collection is becoming increasingly prevalent, there is no precise 
count of the number of police agencies engaged in these efforts. The fact that more agencies 
are collecting data as mandated or voluntarily is obvious. For instance, the collection of data 
on traffic stops was required for 8 of 14 law enforcement agencies that currently are, or have 
been, under federal agreements (consent decrees or memorandums of agreement [MOA]) 
with the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice. In other agreements, for instance 



with the Cincinnati Police Department, the MOA required the department to videotape traffic 
stops. Additionally, several recent statewide assessments of racial profiling data collection and 
analysis efforts recently released their findings: 

 In May 2004, the Institute on Race and Justice at Northeastern University released a 
study of racial profiling in Massachusetts, addressing data on approximately 250 law 
enforcement agencies.14 

 In February 2005, a report by the Steward Research Group and the Texas Criminal Justice 
Coalition analyzed data from more than 1,000 law enforcement agencies in Texas. The 
data on which the report was based had been mandated by Texas Senate Bill 1074, which 
required law enforcement agencies across the state to collect data and report detailed 
statistical summaries of traffic stop data. This particular report, rather than focusing on stop 
rates, addressed disparities in search rates and rates at which contraband was found.15 

 On July 1, 2005, Illinois released its racial profiling report, The Illinois Traffic Stop Study. 
The analysis, conducted by the Northwestern University Center for Public Safety, 
addressed data from nearly 1,000 municipal, county, and state police, and special 
jurisdiction agencies for the calendar year 2004.16 

As is evident from these three recent statewide efforts, data collection has become the norm in 
some areas of the nation. Despite this, however, it is rather difficult to assess national trends. 
Individual states have their own policies, data-collection protocols, and other idiosyncrasies. 
The same holds true for departments that have initiated data collection on their own. 

The Data Collection Resource Center, part of the Institute on Race and Justice at Northeastern 
University, maintains a web site that assesses a complex array of information about 
mandatory and voluntary data-collection efforts on a state-by-state basis. Data available on 
this site underscores how each states approach to racial profiling data collection (as well as 
requirements about policies, training, and the processing of complaints) is unique. Some 
states have enacted legislation requiring data collection while others have enacted legislation 
that encourages collection. Still, other states require data collection only from certain 
departments. Most states that require data collection have stipulated a limited window of time 
under which data collection is required. Colorado House Bill 1114 enacted in 2001, for instance, 
mandated data collection for all traffic stops occurring between July 1, 2001 and December 
31, 2004. Other states have similar provisions. As a result, classification of states into a simple 
dichotomy of requires data collection and does not require data collection would be extremely 
difficult because the conditions vary and the time frames are dynamic. 

States also vary in the type of events for which data collection is required. Some require data 
to be collected for all traffic stops, while others require data collection only for traffic stops 
resulting in defined actions (e.g., citations, arrests, or use of force). Some expressly include 
pedestrian stops, and others do not. In some states, mandatory data collection is required 
by all agencies, while in other states only specified agencies are mandated to collect data. 
Northeastern Universitys Data Collection Resource Center provides a valuable resource 
for keeping up with the status of state legislation and executive orders. It is also links to 
information about data collection and other efforts of state legislatures and executives to 
promote bias-free policing. 



The Benefits and Limitations of Racial Profiling Data Collection and Analysis 

In determining whether or not to collect and analyze racial profiling data, individual 
departments must consider the benefits and limitations of the process. Departments should 
weigh not only financial considerations, but also considerations of department morale, 
community relations, public perceptions, and the potential useor misuseof collected 
data. While departments may realize benefits in addition to those they realize as they work to 
prevent racial profiling through other means (policies, training, and an internal accountability 
mechanism), they may expose themselves to additional risks if they elect to collect data. 
The potential benefits and risks, presented below, underscore why individual agencies must 
consider this choice carefully. Decisions about data collection can have a profound effect 
on the department and the community it serves, particularly in those communities where 
perceptions of a problem exist. 

Benefits 

Racial profiling data collection may result in specific benefits in addition to those benefits that 
agencies gain through other efforts, such as clear policies and training, to promote bias-free 
policing. Potential benefits include the following: 

 Creating an effective management tool that is consistent with evolving data-driven 
management standards: Analyses comparing racial profiling data on officers who perform 
similar duties in similar neighborhoods may enable agencies to identify officers who may 
be engaging in racial profiling and to determine in what instances intervention or discipline 
may be appropriate. 

 Sending a clear message to the community: The fact that an agency collects racial 
profiling data may have an important symbolic value. Data collection sends the message 
to the community that the department is willing to assess itself. Denying that there is a 
problem and refusing to address the issue can result in substantial community resentment. 

 Establishing a foundation for constructive dialogue with the community: Agencies that 
collect racial profiling data can use the results to establish an important foundation for 
constructive dialogue with the community, particularly when data collection and analysis 
is approached from a perspective of partnership and in the context of genuine community 
policing. 

 Ensuring control and flexibility to meet particular agency needs: Agencies that take 
proactive steps to collect data ensure their own control and maintain more flexibility in 
instituting a process that meets their needs. Failure to take proactive steps can result in a 
mandated data collection process that may be inflexible and out of the agencys control. 

Limitations and Drawbacks of Data Collection and Analysis 

Although the collection of racial profiling data collection and analysis can potentially provide 
the benefits discussed above, specific risks are also associated. Potential risks include the 
following: 

 Draining agency resources: Data collection efforts often are costly and time-consuming. 
They can take resources away from other areas of priority. Absent concerns articulated by 
citizen groups or problematic histories involving allegations of racial profiling, agencies 
may find little need to collect these data. Collecting data proactively when there is no 



pattern of past behavior that would warrant these efforts could cause undue financial 
burdens, particularly in times of budgetary shortfalls or when staffing levels are below 
target. 

 Effect on agency morale: Data-collection requirements that appear to be imposed 
unilaterally by a chief, by state law, or by court mandate can cause morale problems. 
In particular, mandated collection may drive a wedge of distrust between first-line 
supervisors and front-line officers. (If the department is required to collect data or 
determines that data collection is warranted, efforts should be made to mediate these 
problems through effective leadership, communication, and supervisory practices.) 

 Inconclusive results: Analyses of racial profiling data seldom yields unequivocal results. 
Although analyses may reveal disproportionalities in stop rates, data seldom definitively 
reveal whether or not an agency is engaged in systematic racial profiling. Given 
methodological challenges, such as benchmarking, alternative interpretations will exist 
even when racial disparities in stops appear pronounced. Even when disparities are not 
evident, some may feel that that racial profiling still exists and that the data either mask 
the problem or are misleading. While racial profiling data collection presents the hope that 
a complex problem can be adequately understood by being measured, some observers 
feel that the analysis of these data generates more confusion rather than helping resolve 
a problem. (Most proponents of data collection concede that data collection and analysis 
problems exist, but counter that the effort is a step in the right direction.) 

 Arming critics with data: Related to the previous limitation, some observers contend 
that collecting racial profiling data, which is inevitably open to interpretation, arms those 
who may be predisposed to believe that racial profiling exists with data to challenge and 
critique the police. Law enforcement agencies are being asked to bear the burden and cost 
of collecting information that ultimately may be used against them. 

 Depolicing: At the individual level, fear of being implicated as a racial profiler could result 
in officers avoiding activity that might expose them to this label. In an effort to avoid 
accusations of profiling, the number of traffic stops or pedestrian stops individual officers 
make may decline. At the department level, this depolicing may result in diminished public 
safety and less effective law enforcement. Again, however, if the agency deems that racial 
profiling data collection is necessary or is required by state mandate, these concerns 
should be mediated with effective leadership, supervision, and accountability mechanisms. 

 Potential of encouraging spurious stops: Some have argued that the imposition of traffic 
stop data collection may result in spurious stops of nonminority drivers as officers attempt 
to offset statistical disparities that might otherwise exist. Again, however, these concerns 
can be abated by imposing proper supervisory and accountability mechanisms. 

Assessing Benefits and Limitations of Data Collection and Analysis 

When not required to do so by state law or agency mandates specific to the agency (e.g., 
consent decrees, litigation settlements, or judgments), a police executives decision about 
racial profiling data collection is complex and will often be made in a politically charged 
environment. Decisions about data collection also entail legitimate and highly practical 
concerns about resource allocation and the potential complexities of data analysis and 



interpretation. As a result, chief executives must consider the problem of whether or not to 
voluntarily collect racial profiling data in the broadest context. This process, however, must 
include a forthright appraisal of an agencys past history and its reputation across the entire 
community. Absent a specific problem, some chiefs and sheriffs may feel completely confident 
in their decisions not to collect data, particularly when they already benefit from widespread 
community support. 

In short, this guide does not offer a blanket recommendation about the advisability of 
collecting data to assess racial profiling. Clearly, the perception or actual practice of racial 
profiling is an issue with which all law enforcement executives must concern themselves. 
Because of differences in demographics, in police functions, and historical circumstances, 
each executive will have to address this critical issue from his or her agencys own 
perspective. Whether or not a department collects racial profiling data, however, it should 
be prepared to confront the issue through clear and compelling policies, training, and 
accountability mechanisms. Departments must also demonstrate to the community, through 
mission statements and targeted outreach where necessary, that they are committed to bias-
free policing. 

Basic Questions Addressed by Racial Profiling Data Collection and Analysis 

If agencies decide to collect data, racial profiling data collection and analysis can serve as 
an accountability mechanism to ensure that a departments policies against and training 
about racial profiling are effective. Departments that collect and analyze racial profiling data 
generally try to determine whether minority groups are stopped more often than other groups 
and whether they are treated differently during those stops. 

To answer the first part of this question, analysis is first directed at establishing whether 
minorities are stopped in proportion toor disproportionately totheir representation in the 
population. For instance, results from The Illinois Traffic Stop Study found that minority drivers 
accounted for 32.77 percent of traffic stops while they made up 28.48 percent of the estimated 
driving population. Expressed as a ratio, the minority stop ratio was 1.15 (32.77/28.48), 
compared against a theoretical baseline ratio of 1.0 (28.48/28.48), which would be the situation 
if minorities were stopped in equal proportion to their representation in the estimated driving 
age population. Individual department ratios varied around the statewide average. For 
instance, ratios in the three largest cities were 1.15 for Chicago, 2.07 for Rockford, and 1.71 for 
Peoria. The ratio for the Illinois State Police was determined to be 0.6, meaning that the state 
police stop fewer minorities than are estimated to be in the Illinois driving population. 

In the Illinois study, and in nearly every study of racial profiling data, the first analytical step 
is to establish whether disproportionality in stops exists. It is important to note, however, that 
the mere existence of disproportionality does not necessarily mean that racial profiling is 
taking place. 

The collection of stop data is also necessary to address two key questions: (1) whether 
minorities are searched more or less often when stopped; and (2) whether minorities are more 
or less often found to possess contraband as a result of those searches. 
 


Steps in Data Collection and Analysis Process 

To help illustrate the complex data collection and analysis process, the following sections 
break the process into a sequence of steps. These sections are not intended to provide an 
exhaustive discussion of the myriad issues related to data collection and analysis. Readers 
should also recognize that this is a rapidly evolving area of studying terms of policy, data 
collection, and research methodology. 

Step One: Collecting Racial Profiling Data 

Any agency that decides to collect and analyze racial profiling data confronts the critical 
decision of what data to collect. Agencies may collect information regarding drivers, legal 
and procedural variables, passengers, and the officers themselves. While the scope of data 
collection varies widely across agencies, language from federal consent decrees and MOAs 
helps bring clarity to this complicated issue. The consent decree of the Pittsburgh Bureau of 
Police (PBP), for instance, includes the following requirements: 

The City shall develop, and require all officers to complete, a written report each time a PBP 
officer makes a traffic stop. The record shall include the officers name and badge number; 
the race and gender of the individual searched or stopped; approximate time and location; 
whether the stop involved a frisk or pat-down search; any weapons, evidence, contraband 
found during the search; whether the individual involved was arrested or cited, and if so, the 
charges.17 

Differences of opinion exist about the advisability of collecting various data. For instance, 
controversy still exists as to whether information should be collected about officers involved 
in stops and how that information may be used. To varying extents, this is affected by local 
bargaining agreements, policies, or state law. 

Drawing on data from the federal agreements, related literature, and individual agency 
practice, the IACP staff identified the following data elements that are often collected and 
analyzed. Individual consent decrees and MOAs between police agencies and the U.S. 
Department of Justice stipulated different data elements, depending on the particular 
circumstances that existed at each locale. 

The list of the broad range of data elements in the subsections below does not imply that 
these are the scope of data that the IACP recommends to collect across all agencies engaged 
in data collection. Other resources, including the Department of Justice Office of Community 
Oriented Policing Services publication on How to Correctly Collect and Analyze Racial Profiling 
Data: Your Reputation Depends on It!, should also be referenced as a resource.18 Clearly, each 
agency should make its own decisions based on available resources and the issues that it 
feels need to be analyzed. The data elements are organized under general categories and are 
meant to serve as reference points to aid agency personnel in assessing what data should 
be collected. The potential relevance and analytic function of each data element is discussed 
briefly. 



Driver Characteristic Data 

 Race/Ethnicity of Driver 

The officer should record the race/ethnicity of the driver. Clearly a critical data element, 
this is a remarkably challenging one to collect and analyze. The officer may not know what 
the drivers race/ethnicity is and may not find this information on a drivers license. In such 
circumstances, most departments encourage officers themselves to identify, to the best 
of their ability, the race/ethnicity of the driver. Although this remains a contentious topic, 
departments offer two justifications for this approach over having officers ask the driver to 
identify his or her race/ethnicity. First, the officers own perception of the drivers race/ethnicity 
is what really matters given that racial profiling is focused on potential police bias.19 Second, 
asking individuals to identify their race/ethnicity is awkward and potentially offensive even in 
routine conversation. The potential for offense is heightened in a traffic stop situation. 

Classifying this information to analyze it effectively presents additional challenges. Currently, 
there is no definitive classification scheme. Data systems vary not only in their categorization 
of race/ethnicity, but in their treatment of these as single or separate dimensions. Many 
departments, through forms and data systems, for example, require officers to determine 
whether a driver is White, Black, Hispanic, Asian, or Native American. In some departments, 
this may be sufficient. In others, it will not be sufficient. For instance, allegations of racial 
profiling rose sharply after September 11, 2001 in areas with high concentrations of Arabs, 
Muslims, and persons of Middle Eastern origin. Appropriate analysis of racial profiling data 
can occur only to the extent that appropriate categories of race/ethnicity are used. Similarly, 
departments must ensure that their categories of race/ethnicity correspond to the categories of 
the population groups to which they will be compared. For instance, if departments intend to 
use census data to measure the proportions of minority populations in their jurisdictions, they 
will have to convert this census datawith its more complicated race/ethnicity categoriesto 
be consistent with their own terminology.20 

 Gender of Driver

The officer should record the gender of the driver. Racial profiling has often been identified as 
particularly problematic for gender subgroups such as African-American and Hispanic males. 
Recording the gender of the driver allows departments to analyze these subgroups separately.

 Age of Driver

The officer should record the age of the driver. Racial profiling may be statistically 
confounded by issues of age. For instance, community demographics may be such that the 
age composition of African-Americans is substantially different from that of Whites. Because 
young drivers are stopped more often than older drivers, if one demographic group contains 
proportionally more young drivers than the other, the analysis ought to address this. Date of 
birth may be obtained from drivers license information. If not, an approximation of the age is 
usually sufficient.

Legal and Procedural Data 

 Reason for Stop 
The officer should record the reason for the stop, whether it is a violation of a traffic law 
or suspicious behavior. In the case of a traffic violation, the specific violation should be 
recorded. In the case of suspicious behavior, a description of the behaviorin greater detail 


than appeared suspiciousshould be recorded. Standard forms that include checkboxes 
equipment violation, moving violation, BOLO, etc.should be extensive enough to cover and 
distinguish between high-discretion stops (e.g., minor equipment violations or driving a few 
miles above the speed limit) and low-discretion stops (e.g., reckless driving, DUI, or excessive 
speeding). 

 Methods Used in Detection

The officer should record the method used in detecting the alleged violation or suspicion. For 
instance, in the case of speeding, the officer should note whether the stop was based on use 
of radar, by pacing, or some other method. In the case of a stop based on suspicious behavior, 
the officer should record the nature of the suspicion, including whether the stop was in 
response to a BOLO notification or specific articulable behavioral factors of the subject.

 Disposition
The officer should record the way in which the stop was disposed. Typical checkbox categories 
should include verbal warning, written warning, citation issued, custody arrest, or field 
interview card completed.

 Search

The officer should record whether a search was conducted. 

 Basis of Search/Type of Search

The officer should record whether the search was consensual or based on other factors such 
as incident to arrest, probable cause, or inventory search. The officer should also record 
whether the search was of the driver, a passenger, and/or the vehicle.

 Consent Search

Some departments require officers to indicate whether the officer attempted to make 
a consent search and record whether on not the subject consented to be searched.

 Contraband Found/Seized

The officer should record whether contraband was found, of what type (e.g., drugs or 
weapons), and, if applicable, the amount seized.

 Other Items Found/Seized

The officer should record whether other items, such as instruments of crime (e.g., burglary 
tools) or fruits of crime were found.

 Location of Stop

The officer should record the location of the stop by reference to cross streets, the street 
address in front of which the stop occurred, or the highway milepost. In departments with 
appropriate technology, the data may be mapped and compared to maps of other activities 
such as crimes, police calls for service, etc. This may be a particularly useful data element in 
that it can be used to assess whether stops are geographically correlated with the location 
of other police events (e.g., calls for service, crime incident sites, or sites of frequent traffic 
accidents). It may be useful to know, for instance, how traffic stop locations relate to accident 
locations and how these patterns may be related to the demographics of neighborhoods.

 

 Vehicle Information 

The officer should record standard information about the vehicle including make, model, year, 
color, license plate number, and state of issue. Officers should also report on the status of 
the vehicle in the event that the driver was not allowed to drive away (e.g., vehicle towed or 
vehicle left parked at location). 

 Duration of Stop 

The officer should record the duration of the stop, by noting either the beginning and ending 
times of the stop or by noting the duration of the stop in minutes. 

 Passenger Data 
 Number of passengers in car 
 Race/ethnicity of passengers 
 Gender of passengers 
 Age of passengers. 

 Officer Data 
 Name of officer 
 Badge/ID number of officer 
 Duty status of officer (on duty/off duty). 

Many departments collect officer data to ensure that their data collection and analysis efforts 
will result in an understanding of racial profiling at the agency level, the unit level, and the 
individual level. Collecting the officers name and/or badge/ID number is critical if the agency 
is attempting to identify individuals who may be engaged in racial profiling. In this event, stop 
data can become a critical element in early intervention efforts. If supervisors determine that 
profiling was unintentional or based on a misunderstanding of policies and procedures, they 
may attempt to work with these officers through counseling and/or retraining. If profiling is 
determined to be blatant and intentional, disciplinary proceedings are warranted. 

In other departments, however, collective bargaining agreements discourage or prohibit the 
collection of officer data. A compromise position between these two options exists. Some 
departments allow the collection of data about officers with the assurance that the data will 
be used only within the department. Under such provision, the identity of individual officers is 
not revealed. The St. Paul (Minnesota) Police Department uses an approach similar to this. 

Step Two: Posing the Questions that Racial Profiling Data Can Answer 

To determine whether particular groups are stopped more often or treated differently during 
those stops than other groups, departments ask four fundamental questions based on the data 
collected. 

(1) Are some groups stopped disproportionately based on race, ethnicity, or other status? 

To establish whether any given group is stopped in proportion toor disproportionately 
toits population, a department must first analyze the data it collects to determine what 
percentage of stops involve a particular status group and then compare this number with the 
 


percentage of the population that the status group comprises. Determining that latter number 
is a complicated statistical problem that will be discussed at length below. In The Illinois 
Traffic Stop Study, the data on minority stops collected by departments was compared to the 
estimated percentage of minority drivers in the population. Based on that comparison, the 
study revealed that minorities were 15 percent more likely to be stopped than their proportion 
in the estimated driving population would suggest. 

(2) Following stops, are different groups issued citations, written warnings, or verbal warnings 
at different rates? 

This question of disposition seeks to understand whether different groups are treated 
differently once a stop has occurred. A traffic stop can involve one or more of several 
outcomes. Departments interested in evaluating the possible presence of racial profiling 
seek to determine how many citations or verbal warnings a particular status group receives 
when compared to other groups. Answering this question is more statistically straightforward 
than determining whether a group is stopped disproportionately because there is no need 
to establish baseline estimated driving populations. Departments can simply compare the 
outcomes for a particular group to the outcomes of other groups. For instance, The Illinois 
Traffic Stop Study determined, on the basis of statewide data, that minority drivers were 
issued citations in 68.00 percent of stops, written warnings in 16.50 percent of stops, and 
verbal warnings/stop cards in 15.48 percent of stops while the comparable rates for Caucasian 
drivers were 60.51 percent, 24.77 percent, and 14.71 percent, respectively. 

(3) Following stops, are different groups searched at different rates? 

Departments interested in evaluating the possible presence of racial profiling also seek to 
determine how many times a particular status group is subject to searches when compared to 
other groups. The central concern is whether minorities are more often subjected to searches 
subsequent to stops than other groups. On the basis of statewide data, the Illinois study found 
that 2.27 percent of stops of minorities resulted in consent searches while 0.88 percent of 
stops of Caucasians resulted in consent searches. 

(4) Following searches, do rates of finding contraband vary across the different groups? 

By asking this hit rate question, departments seek to determine what proportions of 
searches for different status groups result in contraband. The Illinois Traffic Stop Study did not 
address contraband hit rates. A 2002 Missouri study that posed this question revealed that 
contraband hit rates varied across drivers race/ethnicity.21 Based on the specific categories 
used in that analysis, hit rates varied from 22.60 percent for Whites to 17.47 percent for Blacks, 

17.26 percent for Hispanics, 14.76 percent for Asians, and 7.90 percent for Native Americans. 

Findings that show variation in contraband hit rates often spur debate among observers. 
Some contend that the lower contraband hit rate for minorities, such as illustrated in the 
Missouri study, are suggestive of the fact that minorities are more often stopped at lower 
levels of suspicion. Relatively high hit rates for Whites suggest that they are stopped only for 
higher levels of suspicion that may be more consistent with reasonable suspicion standards. 



Step Three: Analyzing Racial Profiling Data 

Having collected data and having posed the critical questions that these data can answer, 
departments face the responsibility of analyzing the data to provide those answers. As 
the discussion of the questions implied, answering the question of whether groups are 
stopped in proportionor disproportionatelyto their presence in the population requires 
more complicated analyses than answering the remaining questions regarding disposition, 
searches, and contraband hit rates. 

To answer this question of proportionality, departments must compare their own stop data 
against the percentage of the population that the defined minority group or groups comprise. 
Establishing this comparison or baseline index, while complicated and methodologically 
challenging, is critical to analysis. For instance, the Illinois study measured its stop rate 
against an estimated minority percentage of the driving population likely to have driven in the 
jurisdiction. Clearly, this is not a straightforward and unambiguous measure. 

Different studies have relied on a variety of baseline comparisons. For instance, in attempting 
to determine whether African-Americans are disproportionately stopped for speeding, traffic 
stop studies have calculated the stop rate by dividing the number of African-Americans 
stopped by the number of African-Americans who reside in the jurisdiction (census data), by 
the number of African-Americans in the driving age population (refined census data), or by 
the number of African-American persons with drivers licenses in the jurisdiction. The question 
of which comparison method will yield the most accurate assessment of profiling is present 
often is referred to as the benchmark issue. 

A Conceptual Overview of Benchmarking 

Benchmarking refers to the process of measuring data against an established standard for the 
purpose of evaluation or judgment. In a field such as land surveying, for example, the term 
benchmark connotes a precise measurement (e.g., of elevation) that is established against 
a fixed reference point (e.g., sea level). Ideally, a benchmark provides an objective and 
unambiguous standard against which to judge data. 

As analysts have attempted to define these baseline populations for purpose of assessing 
racial profiling, however, they have inevitably fallen short of this ideal. The reasons they have 
fallen short, however, are not due to any limitations of the analysts. Rather, there are a host 
of methodological and practical challenges to benchmarking that are difficult and expensive 
to overcome. As a result, establishing proportionalityor disproportionalityin an effort to 
determine whether racial profiling occurs, often falls short of the ideal notion of benchmarking 
that may exist in other disciplines. 

A Simplified Example of Benchmarking 

To illustrate the challenges that benchmarking presents, consider a simplified municipal police 
department with only two groups of drivers. If the departments study finds that 25 percent 
of a municipal police departments traffic stops involve African-American drivers and that 75 
percent involve White drivers, the department can make no inference about racial profiling 
unless they are able to compare these data with the percentages of African-Americans and 
Whites in the population. Suppose that 20 percent of the population in that municipality 
(based on census data) are African-American and that 80 percent are White. Clearly, African-
Americans are over-represented among the traffic stop population relative to the residential 



population. Expressed in the statistical terms used in The Illinois Traffic Stop Study, the ratio 
of African-American drivers stopped to their population percentage is 1.25, meaning that 
African-Americans are 25 percent more likely to be stopped than their representation in the 
population would suggest. This simplified hypothetical example raises critical questions. 
Does this disproportionality in and of itself indicate racial profiling? Is it based on the correct 
comparison population? 

As the analysis of racial profiling data has progressed, more sophisticated methods of 
benchmarking have been developed as analysts attempt to better answer these questions. 
For instance, in response to early analyses of racial profiling data, many observers were quick 
to note that the residential population may not represent the driving age population. Now, 
benchmarks based on residential population are generally deemed inadequate. Alternatives 
have been offered, each with advantages and disadvantages of its own. To a large extent, the 
choice of benchmarks must be dependent on the population data available in a particular 
jurisdiction as well as the resources available to support racial profiling analysis. In any event, 
there is not yet a fixed method of benchmarking population. 

Common Benchmarking Methods 

Different departments and different analysts rely on different benchmarks, depending on the 
data available to them and on the resources they have to collect benchmark data. The text that 
follows below provides synopses of common benchmarking options as well as the benefits 
and limitations associated with each as they relate to traffic stop data. 

Alternative Benchmarks for Traffic Stop Data: Pros and Cons 

Alternative benchmarks, as presented below, represent a sequential progression in the 
sophistication of benchmarking methods. Most analysts agree that observational methods 
are preferable, but they are extremely resource intensive. New methods for benchmarking 
that use sophisticated driving population estimates (DPE) are being lauded as a major step 
forward to using standard census data. These methods are complex, but do not require the 
costs and time commitments necessary for observational approaches. 

Simple Census Breakdown by Race/Ethnic Groups: The earliest and most basic method 
of benchmarking is to use the census data collected every 10 years. From these data, an 
agency can compare the racial and ethnic breakdown of persons stopped to corresponding 
population breakdowns based on census data. This information can be easily obtained for 
just about any jurisdiction whose boundaries correspond with a municipality, county, or state. 
If precinct or district boundaries correspond to census tracts, data can be aggregated and 
comparisons can be made across geographic regions within a department. 

While census data are a practical and free source of information, numerous limitations have 
been associated with using basic census data as a benchmark. 

 A law enforcement agencys categories of race and ethnicity may not match those used 
in the census. This may be a minor problem because census categories could potentially 
be converted to match the departments categories. Appendix B of the book, By the 
Numbers: A Guide for Analyzing Race Data from Vehicle Stops, provides a detailed 
explanation and examples of this process. 
 


 In addition, census data may not be truly representative at the time of the profiling 
analysis. Full census data are collected every 10 years, although some population 
estimates can be obtained between censuses, but these are estimates based on samples 
and usually are not reliable for smaller jurisdictions or areas with small population bases. 

 Also limiting the value of census data is the fact that minority populations in some 
areas tend to be undercounted in the census. This applies to areas with concentrations 
of immigrants, particularly areas with high numbers of illegal immigrants. Given that 
counts based on official minority populations (the denominator) will tend to be 
undercounted, stop rates for these groups have the potential for being inflated. 

 The racial and ethnic proportion in the general population breakdowns may not mirror 
the respective proportions in the driving population. Differences in age distributions 
between the racial and ethnic groups, for instance, may contribute to differences in the 
real proportion of driving age persons in the different groups. In addition, economic 
factors may vary between groups and contribute to different rates of car ownership, in 
driving patterns, or time behind the wheel. 

 Perhaps the most problematic limitation of using census data about residential 
populations, however, is that the drivers on the road at risk of being stopped in any 
jurisdiction include both residents and nonresidents. The real at-risk population may 
be quite different from the residential population counts obtained from the census. 
For instance, if a predominately White suburb has a shopping mall that draws many 
minorities from a neighboring jurisdiction, the residential population base of driving-age 
individuals clearly would not be representative of persons using the roads, particularly 
during hours when the mall is in operation. 

Driving Age Population Breakdowns: A better alternative to the simple population 
proportion is the use of driving-age population data for respective racial and ethnic groups. 
This corrects for the possibility of different age distributions among these groups. Most 
often, this is based on counting only persons above the minimum driving age (e.g., 16 years 
old). This requires a bit more sophistication in extracting data from publicly available census 
data, but is an improvement over the simple, unadjusted breakdowns discussed above. This 
method, however, is still subject to many of the limitations noted above (undercounting 
of minorities, immigrants, and not accounting for drivers who are not residents of the 
jurisdiction). 

Observational methods: As an alternative and an improvement over the above two 
benchmarks, some researchers have sought to create an estimate of the racial and ethnic 
composition of drivers within the jurisdiction through observational methods. In general, 
this method involves using independent observers to determine a racial breakdown of 
drivers by establishing a statistically representative comparison sample. Since observers 
cannot be everywhere and cannot observe at all times, analysts typically use some type 
of representative sampling. While this method avoids many of the limitations of the 
benchmarks described above, obtaining statistically representative samples of drivers tends 
to be costly, time-consuming, and is not without its own limitations. 

One of the often-cited limitations of observational methods is that the race/ethnicity of 
drivers on the road is difficult to determine reliably, particularly on high-speed highways and 
particularly at night. Another limitation often cited is that an estimate of drivers on the road 
 


based on race and ethnicity categories may not account for differences in driving habits. In 
other words, this method assumes that the racial and ethnic groups are all equal in terms 
of the behaviors (e.g., speeding) and conditions (e.g., clearly visible equipment violations or 
expired vehicle tags) that might give rise to legitimate traffic stops. 

Racial/ethnic breakdown of drivers on the road who are violating the traffic laws: To 
overcome the last limitation, some analysts have attempted to assess the racial breakdown 
of persons on the road who are in violation of the law. In essence, analysts assess both the 
race/ethnicity of the driver and the behavior of the driver. A study by John Lamberth, for 
instance, focused on the New Jersey Turnpike and compared the racial make-up of drivers 
who were observed driving at least 6 miles over the speed limit to the proportions stopped 
for traffic violations.22 He found that African-Americans accounted for 14 percent of the 
drivers on the road and 15 percent of the drivers who were observed by researchers to be 
driving at least 6 miles over the speed limit. Depending on the section of highway and using 
only cases where police noted the race/ethnicity of the driver, at least 35 percent of those 
stopped were African-American. 

This study is noteworthy for its attempt to control for differences in the risk of being 
stopped based on specific driving behavior that violates the law. It was limited, however, by 
the fact that it did not take into account other types of violations (e.g., equipment violations 
or erratic driving). Some critics also question how realistic this criterion was. Would the 6 
mile-per-hour over the speed limit criteria used to define the comparison (or baseline group) 
actually result in many stops by the police in real-life circumstances? Critics contend that 
analysis based on a different threshold (i.e., a presumably more realistic 10 or 15 miles per 
hour over the speed limit), or analysis that included other reasons for traffic stops besides 
speeding might have yielded markedly different findings. 

Driving Population Estimates Accounting for Resident Mobility between Jurisdictions: 
New methods being developed are based on sophisticated travel models that attempt to 
estimate the racial and ethnic breakdown of drivers. These models address the shortcomings 
associated with the previous methods, most notably the problem of not accounting for 
the presence of nonresident drivers. To date, the most ambitious of such efforts is a DPE 
developed at the Institute on Race and Justice at Northeastern University The model relies 
on census data for establishing a benchmark, but adjusts the census data to account for 
persons who come into or leave a particular jurisdiction.23 This model has been called the 
push-pull model because it statistically attempts to account for factors that push people to 
drive into surrounding areas or pulls people in from outside jurisdictions. The census data 
used in the model are more refined than the driving-age population discussed above. The 
DPE model includes several relevant jurisdiction-level statistics, such as the percent of car 
ownership and information about the number of persons commuting to and from work. 

As with any statistical model, the DPE model is a simplification of highly complex human 
behavior; however, it has been cited as being highly promising and is a clear improvement on 
other nonobservational methods. While the model was developed for analysis of data from 
Rhode Island and Massachusetts, it may not be as well-suited for use in areas with different 
population characteristics or road networks. Indeed, the developers themselves caution that 
the model should be further refined and would have to be adapted to suit other types of 
jurisdictions.24 Readers can refer to the original study for a more detailed explanation. 


Comparison to Accident Data: Some agencies and consultants have attempted to use 
accident data as a reasonable proxy for a benchmark for drivers on the road. In some cases, 
the benchmark has been set against those drivers involved in accidents who were not at fault 
or to those not involved in hit-and-run accidents. The presumption is that these groupings 
of drivers are less likely to be statistically biased in racial/ethnic composition. While this may 
be a convenient source of information (not as difficult to obtain as observational methods 
or statistically complex driving population estimates), they are problematic in several ways. 
Notably, they may reflect variations in accident reporting (for instance, certain population 
groups such as the uninsured and illegal immigrants may under-report accidents) and 
geographically based risk (in some areas minority populations are concentrated in areas 
with heavier concentrations of traffic and accidents). Some of this bias can be addressed by 
comparing the relevant populations (stopped persons versus not-at-fault accident drivers) 
within specific geographic areas such as a stretch of highway known for being dangerous 
and where accidents are unlikely to go unreported. Some analysts see such a geographically 
specific approach as a potential proxy for observational methods that can be cheaper and 
less time-consuming to collect. While expressing some caution, for instance, the Alpert 
Group believes that not-at-fault accident data holds promise as a benchmark: 

[A]ccident data will not necessarily reflect the driving population for an entire city, 
county, or state, but rather will reflect the driving population in those areas where 
accidents are most likely to occur. Nonetheless, in the context of a racial profiling 
study, the effect of this bias is minimized because police traffic stops tend to be 
concentrated on the same roadways on which accidents occur. Consequently, if 
they can be validated as an approximation of the driving population through traffic 
observation or other means, then not-at-fault accident data should provide an 
excellent benchmark against which to compare police traffic stop activity, most of 
which occurs conjointly with traffic accidents [emphasis added].25 

Step Four: Drawing Inferences from Proportionality Findings 

Some observers suggest that the proof of racial profiling is in the outcome and that 
findings of disproportionality in traffic stop data automatically imply that racial profiling 
exists. As the above discussion of data analysis reveals, however, the questions about how 
disproportionality is determined and whether disproportionality can be equated with racial 
profiling are subject to intense debate. Does the fact that The Illinois Traffic Stop Study 
revealed some level of disproportionality in the cities of Chicago, Rockford, and Peoria mean 
that racial profiling is necessarily taking place in those cities? In addition to the difficulties of 
establishing an objective and unambiguous population benchmark, alternative explanations 
may exist for disproportionalities. Such explanations may include the following: 

 The differences in stop rates may reflect differences in behavior. Minorities might be 
stopped more because they more often engage in traffic violations or drive older vehicles 
more likely to have visually apparent equipment violations. 

 The differences in stop rates may reflect differences in police deployment. Minorities, 
particularly African-Americans and Hispanics, are more apt to be poor and live in areas 
 


where crime is high and police presence is greater. Their higher stop rates might be 
attributable to a greater police presence in their neighborhoods.

 With respect to search rates, differences between groups might be attributable to 
variations in educational levels and in knowledge that consent search requests can be 
denied. 

Pedestrian Stops: The Unique Challenges of Street Encounters 

Much discussion and debate surrounding racial profiling focuses on traffic stops. In many 
urban areas where car ownership rates are low and where reliance on public transportation 
is high, the issue of racial profiling frequently arises in the context of pedestrian stops. 
Indeed, the Los Angeles Police Department Consent Decree requires the collection of 
data on pedestrian stops that parallels data collected on traffic stops. Pedestrian stops raise 
concerns about racial profiling that are similar to traffic stops. Data collection and analysis 
for pedestrian stops is probably even more challenging, controversial, and convoluted than 
for traffic stop data. 

Pedestrian stops present at least two unique challenges for departments determined to collect 
and analyze racial profiling data. First, police officers stop pedestrians for reasons that may 
not appear as straightforward as their reasons for traffic stops. The Austin (Texas) Police 
Department presents both traffic and pedestrian stop data on its web site. As the selected 
portions of text below indicate, differences in the factors that affect the traffic stop and 
pedestrian stop rates are clearly noted.26 

Traffic and Pedestrian Stops, 2003 

Traffic Pedestrian Total Stops Austin 
Demographics 
White 91,663 52% 9,108 46% 100,771 51% 53% 
Hispanic 56,025 32% 5,254 26% 61.279 31% 31% 
Black 23,069 13% 5,477 27% 28,546 14% 10% 
Asian 4,062 2% 107 1% 4,169 2% 5% 
Other 2,375 1% 67 0% 2,442 1% 1% 
Grand Total 177,194 100% 20,013 100% 197,207 100% 100% 

Traffic stops make up 90 percent of all stops and the background of the drivers closely 
mirrors the demographics of Austin. The primary reason for making a traffic stop is a 
violation of the transportation code (speeding, illegal turn, etc.) Pedestrian stops make up 
10 percent of all stops and reflect the neighborhoods where walking beat officers patrol: 
downtown and east 11th and 12th Streets. The primary reason for a pedestrian stop is when 
someone is acting suspicious. 

Source: Austin (Texas) Police Department 
Population 623,327; Officers 1,189 



Where the primary reason for most traffic stops is relatively concretea perceived 
violationthe primary reason for pedestrian stops is more subjectivegeneralized suspicion. 
This challenge, noted by the Austin Police Department, is likely to apply to other urban 
departments as well. 

A second challenge is that traffic stops are easy to identify and count, whereas perceptions 
of what constitutes a pedestrian stop can be more ambiguous. Police encounters with 
pedestrians include a wide range of interactions that police might call consensual contacts, 
walk and talks, field interviews, and stop and frisks. Although civilians may not always 
be cognizant of the legal distinctions among these types of encounters, police officers are. 
From the police officers perspective, the critical and operative distinction among these 
interactions is the occurrence or absence of detention. For instance, Texas Senate Bill 1074 
stipulates the following definition for use throughout the state. 

Pedestrian stop means an interaction between a peace officer and an individual who is 
being detained for the purpose of a criminal investigation in which the individual is not 
under arrest. 

Similarly, beginning in 2003, the Chicago Police Department started encouraging the collection 
of Contact Cards containing demographic data about persons whom officers encounter 
and who are not necessarily considered suspicious persons.27 These stops are discretionary, 
but detailed information about the stopped persons address, aliases, and gang affiliations may 
be noted. Persons who are subjected to these discretionary contacts may feel they are being 
singled out or even racially profiled and may never be cognizant of whether the encounter 
was a street detention or not. The question about disproportionality in nondetention stops 
has received scant attention relative to questions about traffic stops and street encounters that 
are considered detentions. 

Thus, potential problems exist to the extent that the police officers and civilians perceptions 
of their street interactions differ. While it is relatively easy to ensure that all traffic stops are 
recorded, this might not be the case with pedestrian stops. Officers may fail to perceive or 
record instances of detention, or some officers may wittingly decide that they can get away 
with not recording them. Courts have generally defined the difference between a detention 
and other types of contact as lying within the reasonable civilians perception. If a reasonable 
person would feel free to leave after such an encounter, even if the civilian in the encounter 
claims to have felt differently, then the encounter is considered consensual. If a reasonable 
person would not feel free to leave, then the civilian is, by definition, detained. A detention 
need not be explicitly stated. Rather, it can be implicit in the officers words and deeds. As a 
result, pedestrian stop data may be incomplete.28 

One solution to such a problem is to treat pedestrian stops as equivalent to traffic stops. 
Rather than leaving the distinction between a street detention and other street encounters 
unarticulatedand therefore within the perception of a reasonable person whose 
perspectives may differdepartment policy and training should require that the officer 
articulate when a detention stop is being made. This requirement could help ensure that data 
collection related to pedestrian stops would be completed. 
 


Recommendations 

On the basis of its assessment of federal consent decrees and memorandums of agreement 
as well as the preceding discussion, the IACP offers the following recommendations. These 
recommendations correspond to the imperatives of creating clear departmental policies 
prohibiting racial profiling, implementing sound training, and sustaining accountability 
mechanisms. Specific recommendations are also offered to agencies engaged in racial 
profiling data collection and analysis. 

1. Develop a clear and unequivocal departmental policy prohibiting racial profiling. 

This policy directive should include a clear and unambiguous departmental definition of 
racial profiling and related terminology. The policy should clearly convey that behavior and 
evidentiary standardsnot race or ethnicityshould guide police stop-and-search decisions. 
In writing policies, departments should be aware of the potential message conveyed by 
clauses such as solely on the bases of race, ethnicity.. The consensus opinion of advisors 
to this project is that such language is to be avoided. The policy should specify that the only 
circumstances where the consideration of race (or other group status) is permissible is in be 
on the look-out (BOLO) situations. 

2. Ensure that the departmental policy is, at the very least, consistent with all laws and 
professional standards applicable to its jurisdiction. 

Many states have specific legislation or Police Officer Standards Training (POST) standards 
that prohibit racial profiling. Any local departmental policy should be consistent with these 
standards or more exacting than these standards. 

3. Ensure that departmental policies and practices designed to promote bias-free policing are 
designed to protect all relevant groups within the jurisdiction. 

Departments vary in the extent to which they specify which groups should be protected from 
profiling and are entitled to equal service. Department policies should be written to be as 
inclusive as possible. If the department makes reference to a specific list of group statuses, 
it would be advisable to include a but not limited to clause to assure that other groups 
are not by implication excluded from these protections. For the purposes of training and 
outreach, an agency must make efforts to remain aware of the relevant demographic groups 
within its jurisdiction. Given expanded concerns about racial profiling in the post-September 
11 world, agencies should make certain that their policies and training address fair and equal 
treatment of persons of Middle Eastern, Arab, Muslim, and Sikh backgrounds. 

4. Develop comprehensive and effective training programs to reduce racial biases among all 
personnel engaged in stop-and-search activity. 

The departmental commitment to preventing racial profiling must be reinforced with officer 
training that focuses on legal and ethical standards, handling stops, and cultural awareness. 
 


5. Ensure that training is ongoing, comprehensive, relevant, and compelling. 

Training on issues of racial profiling should include all relevant topics including operational 
definitions, legal considerations, accountability mechanisms, and (if applicable) data-
collection requirements. This training should be ongoing and addressed in all instructional 
settings, i.e., in the academy, during field training, and as part of in-service training. Training 
should address the complexities of racial profiling in a forthright manner. The best way to 
achieve meaningful and memorable training is by incorporating realistic examples, scenario-
based training, and active discussion among participants. 

6. Reinforce bias-free policing throughout agency culture. 

While racial profiling training should begin in the academy, as part of field training, and be 
regularly updated through in-service training, the message should be routinely reinforced in 
a variety of settings. Any changes in policies or procedures should be routinely addressed in 
roll calls and any apparent problems identified through early intervention systems or citizen 
complaints should be clearly communicated. Executives must periodically reinforce this 
message as part of comprehensive and coordinated community outreach strategies. 

7. Embed the ideals of bias-free policing within the departments mission statement. 

The departments commitment to bias-free policing should be reinforced in the agencys 
mission statement. Often appearing on agency web sites or in annual reports, the mission 
statement provides the department with a critical medium for communicating its commitment 
to bias-free policing to the public as part of the agencys core values. 

8. Ensure that the departmental commitment to bias-free policing is part of an ongoing 
community outreach program. 

In addition to setting the tone with a clear policy directive against racial profiling and a 
mission statement advocating bias-free policing, departments should avail themselves of 
every opportunity to reinforce this message with community groups and through public 
service announcements. 

9. Incorporate stop-and-search data as performance indicators in early intervention systems. 

Early intervention systems that incorporate stop-and-search data will enable departments 
to identify and intervene on behalf of officers who seem to unwittingly demonstrate biased 
behaviors. 

10. Use appropriate disciplinary mechanisms for officers who show a pattern of willful racial 
profiling. 

Willful and blatant racial profiling is unethical and unlawful. Appropriate disciplinary 
processes should be use in response to any officer displaying such behavior. 



11. Continually and systematically maintain organizational personnel practices that reinforce 
bias-free policing and a commitment to equal protection and service. 

To the extent possible, department hiring and promotion processes should assess candidates 
and officers on their commitments to maintain bias-free policing and a service-oriented 
approach. Performance assessments should include measures addressing and rewarding 
these attributes. 

12. Promote a diverse police force that is reflective of the community that the police 
department serves. 

Racial profiling may arise out of misperceptions about other groups. Departments can help 
limit misperceptions by encouraging a diverse police force that reflects the demographics of 
the community. All personnel will be better informed about and more sensitive to issues of 
racial bias to the extent that they learn directly from their peers. A diverse and representative 
police force will also help bridge gaps between the police and the community and may help 
diminish perceptions of racial bias. 

13. Rely on citizen complaints as a gauge of perceptions of racial profiling. 

Departments that pay careful attention to, and that systematically assess, citizen complaints 
will better understand the perceptions of racial bias that exist in the community. Such an 
understanding will enable departments to refine racial profiling training and enhance related 
community outreach and public education efforts. 

Recommendations to Agencies Engaged in Racial Profiling Data Collection and Analysis 

14. Ensure the quality and accuracy of stop-and-search data. 

Whether racial profiling data is collected voluntarily or by mandate, departments should 
ensure that the data are complete and accurate. Data auditing procedures should be 
conducted routinely to ensure that all stops and all searches are recorded. Officers who fail 
to complete stop-and-search data forms as stipulated in department policy should be held 
accountable through retraining or discipline. Auditing procedures also should ensure that 
the information officers record is accurate, recognizing that there may be some reasonable 
differences when officers are asked to determine race through their own observations. 

15. Set the foundation for discussions with the community before the release of racial 
profiling data. 

Once data are released, individuals and groups within the community inevitably will make 
their own assessments about the meaning of stop data. Law enforcement leaders will be 
in a better position to influence a productive discussion, however, if they have established 
cooperative and trustful relationships prior to the release of data. Toward that end, a police 
agency should make certain that the community is aware of the policies, training, and 



accountability mechanisms that the agency uses to prevent racial profiling. Ideally, the 
community should be aware that disproportionality does not necessarily mean that profiling 
has occurred. Departments that already are thoroughly engaged in community policing 
efforts have a head start in these discussions and in maintaining a favorable image with the 
community. 

16. Use racial profiling data-collection efforts and findings as a basis of dialogue with the 
community. 

Police leaders should be prepared for a variety of opinions and viewpoints in response to 
release of data, including some respondents who automatically equate disparity with bias. 
Many members of the community, however, will realize that variations in the manner in 
which police are deployed across the community and variations in concentration of police 
may contribute to the disparity. Police leaders may find it useful to reenforce the message 
that stop data often relates to other indices such as calls for service and crime incidents. It 
so doing law enforcement executives must be careful not to be defensive or dismissive 
of community concerns. The inclusion of academics or outside experts in data analysis 
and presentation may prove helpful and can add credibility. These experts should be 
independent of the department so that they are perceived as credible. 

Conclusion 

This chapter has attempted to address the highly complex topic of racial profiling. It should 
be clear to police leaders that they must develop policies, training, and accountability 
practices to address the issue of racial profiling, both being attentive to community 
perceptions and committed to preventing its occurrence. 

As to the formidable challenges of data collection, the foregoing discussion may have 
raised more new questions than it has answered. Some law enforcement agencies are 
required to collect data, and in many of those circumstances the methods of data collection 
are prescribed. Other law enforcement leaders need to be as aware of the complex issues 
as possible and assess voluntary data collection from a cost-benefit perspective. Major 
considerations in that analysis are the type and the extent of data to be collected as well 
as the sophistication of the benchmarking method to be used. Each of these considerations 
has implications affecting cost, data analysis, and conclusions that will be drawn from data. 
When presenting racial profiling data to the community, law enforcement leaders need to be 
aware of the limitations of analysis and the existence of various plausible explanations for 
disparities the data may reveal. In addition, they need to work carefully with the community 
to foster an understanding of the findings in the proper context. 



Suggestions for Further Reading 

For more information about some of the complex questions and issues raised in this chapter, 
the reader may want to refer to the following publications. 

Blank, Rebecca M,, Marilyn Dabady, and Constance F. Citro, Editors. Measuring Racial 
Discrimination. National Research Council. Racial Discrimination, Division of Behavioral 
and Social Sciences and Education. The National Academy Press, Washington, DC; 2004. 

Fridell, Lorie A. By the Numbers: A Guide for Analyzing Race Data from Vehicle Stops. U.S. 
Department of Justice Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, Washington, DC; 
2004. www.cops.usdoj.gov/Default.asp?Item=1476 

Fridell, Lorie, Robert Lunney, Drew Diamond ,and Bruce Kubu. Racially Biased Policing: A 
Principled Response, Report/Evaluation. U.S. Department of Justice Office of Community 
Oriented Policing Services, Washington, DC; 2005. www.cops.usdoj.gov/mime/open. 
pdf?Item=1598 

Fridell, Lorie A. Understanding Race Data from Vehicle Stops: A Stakeholders Guide. U.S. 
Department of Justice Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, Washington, DC; 
2005. www.cops.usdoj.gov/mime/open.pdf?Item=1577 

Fridell, Lorie A. Racially Biased Policing: Guidance for Analyzing Race Data from Vehicle 
Stops. U.S. Department of Justice Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, 
Washington, DC; 2005. www.cops.usdoj.gov/mime/open.pdf?Item=1578 

McMahon, Joyce and Amanda Kraus. A Suggested Approach to Analyzing Racial Profiling: 
Sample Templates for Analyzing Car-Stop Data. Police Executive Research Forum, 
Washington, DC; 2005. www.ncjrs.gov/App/Topics/Topic.aspx?topicid=177 

McMahon, Joyce, Joel Garner, Ronald Davis, and Amanda Kraus. How to Correctly Collect 
and Analyze Racial Profiling Data: Your Reputation Depends On It! U.S. Department of 
Justice Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, Washington, DC: 2002. www. 
cops.usdoj.gov/mime/open.pdf?Item=770 



Endnotes 

1 
Leach, Russ. Racial Profiling: A Police Managers Perspective. Risk Management Issues in 
Law Enforcement  A Public Entity Risk Institute Symposium. Retrieved December 18, 2005 
from www.riskinstitute.org/symposiumdocs/RacialProfiling-PERISymposiumPaper.pdf. 

2 
Bush, George W. Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on Administration Goals. 
Washington, DC. February 27, 2001. 

3 
Ludwig, Jack. Americans See Racial Profiling as Widespread. May13, 2003. The Gallup Poll. 
Retrieved on November 8, 2005 from www.poll.gallup.com. 

4 
American Civil Liberties Union and Texas Criminal Justice Coalition. Prohibiting Racial 
Profiling: An Analysis of Local Implementation. January 2002. Retrieved October 31, 2005 
from www.criminaljusticecoalition.org/files/userfiles/racial_profiling/prohibiting_rp.pdf. 

5 
Bias-Based Profiling. Fairborn, Ohio. Retrieved November 1, 2005 from www.ci.fairborn. 
oh.us/dept/pd/pd_bbp.htm. 

6 
Michael Ledford, Jr., Karen Ledford v. City of Highland Park, U.S. District Court for the 
Northern District of Illinois Eastern Division, August 2, 2000. 

7 
Ramirez, Deborah, Jack McDevitt, and Amy Farrell. A Resource Guide on Racial Profiling 
Data Collection Systems Promising Practices and Lessons Learned. U.S. Department of 
Justice, Washington, D.C.: 2000. 

8 
Whren v. U.S., 16 U.S. 95-5841 (1996). 

9 
Fridell, Lorie A. By the Numbers: A Guide for Analyzing Race Data from Vehicle Stops. U.S. 
Department of Justice Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, Washington, DC: 
2004. 

10 
2002. www.hamden.com/content/219/228/283/default.aspx. 

11 
Coderoni, Gary. The Relationship between Multicultural Training for Police and Effective 
Law Enforcement. FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin. November 2002. www.fbi.gov/ 
publications/leb/2002/nov2002/nov02leb.htm. 

12 
More information about the training and the video can be obtained on the CRS web site: 
www.usdoj.gov/crs. 

13 
Unresolved Problems & Powerful Potentials: Improving Partnerships Between Law 
Enforcement Agencies and University Based Researchers. International Association of 
Chiefs of Police, Washington, D.C.: 2004. 

14 
Ramirez, Deborah, Jack McDevitt, and Amy Farrell. Massachusetts Racial and Gender 
Profiling Final Report: Executive Summary. Northeastern University Institute on Race and 
Justice, Boston: 2004. 

15 
Stewart, Dwight, and Molly Totman. Racial Profiling: Dont Mind If I Do Ya? An Examination 
of Consent Searches and Contraband Hit Rate at Texas Traffic Stops. Stewart Research 
Group and Texas Criminal Justice Coalition, Austin (Texas): 2005. 

16 
Weiss, Alexander, and Aviva Grumet-Morris. Illinois Traffic Stop Statistics Act: Report for 
the Year 2004. Springfield: Illinois Department of Transportation, 2001. 

17 
U.S. Department of Justice and City of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh Bureau of Police, and 
Department of Public Safety Consent Decree, April 1997. www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/ 
documents/pittssa.htm. 
 


18 
McMahon, Joyce, Joel Gardner, Ronald Davis, and Amanda Kraus. How to Correctly 
Collect and Analyze Racial Profiling Data: Your Reputation Depends on It! U.S. Department 
of Justice Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, Washington, DC: 2002. www. 
cops.usdoj.gov/default.asp?Open=True&Item=770. 

19 
Davis, Ronald. Racial Profiling: What Does the Data Mean? December 2001. Americans for 
Effective Law Enforcement. www.aele.org/data.html. 

20 
See for example Appendices A and B in Fridell, Lorie A. By the Numbers: A Guide for 
Analyzing Race Data from Vehicle Stops. U.S. Department of Justice Office of Community 
Oriented Policing Services, Washington, D.C.: 2004. 

21 
2000 Annual Report on Missouri Traffic Stops, Office of the Attorney General. Retrieved 
November 1, 2005 from www.ago.mo.gov/racialprofiling/2000/racialprofiling2000.htm. 

22 
Lamberth, John. Revised Statistical Analysis of the Incidence of Police Stops and Arrests 
of Black Drivers/Travelers on the New Jersey Turnpike Between Exits or Interchanges 1 and 
3 from the Years 1988 through 1991 (1996) 

23 
Farrell, Amy, Jack McDevitt, Shea Cronin, and Erica Pierce. Rhode Island Traffic Stop 
Statistics Act: Final Report. Northeastern University Institute on Race and Justice, Boston: 
2003. 

24 
Farrell, Amy. Remarks made at Integrating Transportation Flow and Police Stop Data for 
Analysis of Racial Profiling with Spatial Data Analysis Symposium. Mayflower Hotel, 
Washington, DC. July 29, 2005. 

25 
Miami-Dade Police Department Racial Profiling Study. The Alpert Group, November 2004. 
www.miamidade.gov/irp. 

26 
2003 Racial Profiling Report. March 1, 2004. Austin Police Department. Retrieved November 
30, 2005 from www.ci.austin.tx.us/action/2003_profiling.htm. 

27 
Rosenbaum, Dennis, and Cody Stephens. Reducing Public Violence and Homicide in 
Chicago: Strategies and Tactics of the Chicago Police Department. Center for Research in 
Law and Justice University of Illinois at Chicago, 2005. 

28 
United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980). 


VII. Personnel ManagementIssues n the Context of Protecting Civil Rights 
and Serving the Community 



Personnel Management Issues in the 
Context of Protecting Civil Rights and 
Serving the Community 

The hiring of a law enforcement officer is the single most important function of any law 
enforcement agency. It is the officers whom we hire who provide service to our community 
members. The quality of all law enforcement service is reduced to the officers our community 
members are dealing with. No amount of organization or equipment will replace the human 
relation skill of the individual officer. Selecting the best candidates in the marketplace is 
paramount.1 

Chief Patrick Oliver (retired), Fairborn (Ohio) Police Department 

Introduction 

Among the most important steps that law enforcement leaders can take to ensure ethical 
policing and respect for civil rights is to maintain, protect, and preserve their agencies 
most valued resourcetheir employees. Law enforcement leaders must develop targeted 
recruitment strategies, maintain careful selection processes, and retain experienced, high-
quality officers. They must make their agencies places where officers want to establish and 
pursue long-term careers. Law enforcement leaders also must inspire their command staff 
and human resources personnel to be motivated by the goals of identifying, hiring, and 
keeping the best candidates. These candidates are those who possess not only the aptitudes 
and attributes to engage in traditional, action-oriented policing, but also those who will 
perform in increasingly multifaceted policing environments. Law enforcement leaders must 
establish and then sustain a cadre of officers who are dedicated to ethical service-oriented 
policing that is respectful of the civil rights of all community members while maintaining 
safety and public order. 

Law enforcement leaders today face many challenges in recruiting, hiring, and retaining 
high-quality officers. With many departments facing a shortage of police applicants,2 law 
enforcement leaders struggle to maintain targeted staffing levels while trying to attract the 
best candidates. Many factors have converged to contribute to the recruitment shortfalls 
that plague many departments. Low unemployment and a strong job market in the late 
1990s meant that prospective candidates could approach agencies selectively or opt for 
higher paying jobs in the private sector. And, more recently, the military call-up in response 
to September 11 terrorist attacks has reduced the pool of potential candidates as well as 
the ranks of sworn officers who have been called to fulfill their commitments as military 
reservists.3Together, these factors have contributed to record lows in the number of police 
applicants. 



Law enforcement leaders also confront the challenge of retaining the officers they had 
successfully recruited, particularly young, college-educated recruits. These individuals are 
too often lured into private industry or other agencies. One study estimated that 14 percent 
of state and county officers in Florida and 20 percent of local police officers terminate 
within 18 months of their hire date.4 A recent study of North Carolina agencies found a 14.2 
percent attrition rate overall, with smaller agencies experiencing a higher average attrition 
rate (18.2 percent) than larger agencies (10.2 percent). Officers leave the law enforcement 
profession entirely or seek employment in other agencies for many reasons including varied 
opportunities, better pay, and less stressful environments. 

Regrettably, high turnover is costly and presents a significant challenge to law enforcement 
leaders. Training and recruiting are considerable expenses. This investment is lost when 
officers leave to join a neighboring jurisdiction or a different industry with better pay or better 
working conditions. Besides the recruitment and training costs, agencies confront an even 
higher cost when their experienced officers leave the force. Research in several departments 
has demonstrated that officers with more tenure are more judicious in their use of force6 and 
less likely to have complaints lodged against them.7The benefits of having a good balance 
of experienced officers to complement and mentor new recruits cannot be underestimated. 
The retention of highly experienced, high-caliber officers committed to protecting the civil 
rights of the community they serve is critical for agency stability. Failure to select and retain 
exemplary officers can have devastating negative effects in the long run, including poor 
community relations and cooperation and increased fiscal liability through lawsuits and high 
turnover. 

Chapter Overview and Objectives 

This chapter offers a series of recommendations on how to handle the challenges that 
law enforcement leaders and personnel managers confront as they work to recruit, hire, 
and retain high-quality officers. The recommendations in this chapter are offered with the 
recognition that law enforcement agencies are continually being asked to do more with less 
and while many face shortages in applicants. This chapter urges law enforcement leaders 
and personnel managers to act with diligence and innovation. It also advocates that law 
enforcement leaders and personnel managers remain steadfast in their commitment to 
attracting and retaining qualified officers. The need to uphold the core values of community 
oriented policing, customer-service approaches, and civil rights protectionseven in the face 
of significant recruitment and retention challengesremains vitally important. 

Recommendations 

Recommendations for recruitment, selection, and hiring are provided under separate 
headings. Throughout this guide, community policing and protection of civil rights have been 
stressed as complementary themes. These recommendations are offered with this focus in 
mind and are not meant to be an exhaustive list of considerations for recruitment, selection, 
and hiring. 



Recommendations for Recruitment and Hiring 

In their efforts to recruit, select, and hire qualified officers committed to effective law 
enforcement while protecting the civil rights of all in the community, law enforcement 
agencies should do the following: 

1. Undertake an agencywide self-assessment to determine the attractiveness of the agency 
as a workplace. 

To meet current recruiting and hiring challenges, law enforcement leaders and their managers 
should undertake a serious assessment of their agencies then take the necessary steps to 
improve the attractiveness of their agencies as a workplace. Current officers are a vital source 
of information on workplace quality and satisfaction. Police management should rely on 
formal (e.g., focus groups or anonymous surveys) and informal methods to elicit officers 
opinions on agency strengths and weaknesses. 

First-line supervisors or designated personnel managers should also perform routine exit 
interviews with employees leaving the department to identify both the attributes that make 
the agency a good place to work and those that contribute to job dissatisfaction. In particular, 
exit interviews with officers leaving after a short tenure or through lateral transfers should 
focus on what specific benefits and changes in the organizational culture, if any, might have 
persuaded them to remain with the department. 

Although police management may not be able to address all perceived agency workplace 
weaknesseslaw enforcement leaders, for instance, have little influence over base salaries 
or standard benefitsthey will enhance their ability to recruit and hire high-quality officers as 
they address deficiencies within their control. 

Large agencies with sufficient financial resources may wish to hire outside consultants 
to perform management studies focused on recruitment, hiring, and retention issues. 
All agencies should continually strive to make themselves aware of the strengths and 
weaknesses of their departments as a place to work. This must remain a critical focus of law 
enforcement leaders and their personnel managers. 

2. Build on the results of agency assessment to develop a recruiting and hiring strategy. 

Given current shortages of potential police applicants, law enforcement leaders can no 
longer passively wait for applicants to come to them. To attract high-quality applicants, law 
enforcement leaders must develop proactive recruiting and hiring strategies that emphasize 
the strengths of their agencies when considered in contrast to private sector workplaces or 
other law enforcement agencies. 

3. Capitalize on agency personnel for recruitment efforts. 

Law enforcement leaders should use agency officers to recruit others. No one is better able to 
represent the strengths of a law enforcement agency than the officers who work within that 
agency. Two strategies are common. 



The first is to offer incentives to existing personnel who refer successful candidates. 
Incentives can be monetary or something else of value such as days off. To ensure that staff 
are referring appropriate clients, the incentive should be tied to some achievement milestone 
for the referred recruit, such as qualifying for the academy or successfully completing 
academy training. 

A second strategy is to identify particular officers who can be used specifically for recruitment 
and outreach, typically on a part-time basis. These officers will staff booths at job fairs or 
community functions and who can be identified as points of contact for interested persons. 

Selecting which agency officers to use in recruiting efforts should be purposeful and result 
in putting forward those officers who most favorably represent the department, exhibit 
enthusiasm for the job, and are good ambassadors of the department. Leaders must carefully 
choose officers who represent the highest qualities of the agency and who will convey the 
agencys mission effectively and accurately. Police executives and senior officers should 
make certain that these recruitment positions are held in high esteem in the agency and are 
perceived as positions of status by those who fill them. Quality recruiting officers who exhibit 
the attributes most valued by the department are the most likely to draw recruits with similar 
characteristics. 

4. Recognize police explorer troops, police athletic leagues, and other youth organizations as 
promising forums for future recruits. 

Police agencies can succeed in attracting more recruits by beginning the recruiting process 
early. They can attract recruits of high quality and motivation by focusing on persons who 
are already predisposed to law enforcement careers. Hundreds of youth gain familiarity 
with agencies through explorer troops and police athletic leagues. Many law enforcement 
agencies recognize the potential of such programs to serve as pools of potential recruits. 
Agencies that currently do not support these programs should consider creating them. 
Developing these youth programs and actively encouraging program participation throughout 
the community can pay dividends once participants reach the age of eligibility. 

Besides their recruitment benefit, these programs also provide the advantage of improving 
community outreach with youth. Involving youth from at-risk neighborhoods, may benefit the 
youth, the community, and the law enforcement agency. The structure and direction offered 
by these programs can steer individuals along the right path, while helping to draw recruits 
from the neighborhoods that are often under-represented within the ranks of policing. 

5. Recognize civilians involved in community policing efforts as promising recruits. 

Besides focusing on youth, law enforcement leaders and personnel managers also should 
recruit among the graduates of citizen police academies and persons involved in community 
policing efforts such as neighborhood watch groups or attendance at agency-community 
meetings. Among the individuals brought together by these activities are those already 



familiar with law enforcement work and generally possess a strong commitment to law 
enforcement agencies and their missions. Appropriate individuals within these programs 
might be convinced to make law enforcement a second career. Agencies not currently 
engaged in these programs should consider creating them for recruitment and other benefits. 

6. Consider changing maximum age restrictions. 

Law enforcement leaders and personnel managers are increasingly looking to experienced 
adults as promising recruits. Many departments have increased the maximum age restrictions 
for recruits, while some departments have even done away with these restrictions altogether. 
Law enforcement agencies, such as the Hillsborough County Sheriffs Office discussed below, 
are realizing the benefits of hiring mature individuals with significant life experiences. Older 
recruits may handle stress more effectively and may be less prone to impulsive action than 
their younger counterparts with less life experience. Mature candidates with previous life 
experiences may be more attracted to community policing and the customer service facets of 
policing, on average, than young recruits who may be drawn by action-oriented facets. 

Departments that have increased or done away with maximum age restrictions can expand 
their pool of potential recruits. Clearly, other considerations such as physical fitness and 
mental health must continue to be considered. 

7. Develop recruitment strategies tailored to ethnic and minority communities. 

Law enforcement leaders have long recognized the benefits of having agency personnel who 
mirror the communities they serve. While most agencies are dealing with overall recruiting 
and hiring challenges, many are experiencing even more acute challenges in recruiting 
and hiring minority and female candidates. The limited availability or hesitancy of minority 
group members to seek out careers in law enforcement is a reality in many jurisdictions. 
Research has consistently found that African-Americans and Hispanic-Americans have less 
favorable opinions of the police on average than do nonminorities. In addition, recruitment 
of candidates from within immigrant communities often is forestalled by requirements for 

U.S. citizenship. Recruitment remains difficult even among naturalized citizens or children of 
immigrants. Many children of immigrants may not perceive policing as a viable career, often 
because the police from their home parents native countries are perceived as corrupt and 
as instruments of government repression. A text box on page 41 of Chapter 2, for instance, 
discusses how police in St. Paul, Minnesota, developed a citizens academy specifically for 
the sizable Hmong population residing there. Similar outreach programs, geared toward 
educating immigrant populations about local policing practice and building trust, are 
becoming more commonplace in other jurisdictions. 

The quality of relationships between individual departments and local minority communities 
varies widely. Some agencies still find themselves in the position of needing to overcome 
high levels of distrust within minority communities, yet many are making strides in minority 
recruitment. Certainly, the agencys wider approach to community outreach and record of 



accomplishment in civil rights are important factors in building trust. The specific strategies 
discussed below should be considered when seeking to recruit more minority candidates. 
They are also consistent with the key tenets of community policing. 

 When recruiting within ethnic and minority communities, work through existing 
community organizations, social and faith institutions, and media outlets particular to 
those communities. Particular attention should be focused on those organizations that 
have both stature in the relevant communities and a positive working relationship with 
the police. 

 To enhance recruiting within ethnic and minority communities, develop and maintain 
good relations with key stakeholders including clergy, educators, business owners, and 
representatives of community organizations. A general commitment to reaching out to 
a wide cross-section of stakeholders across all communities in the jurisdiction creates a 
sense of equity and inclusion that can pay dividends in recruitment. Law enforcement 
leaders need to remain keenly aware of demographic changes and dynamics within all 
neighborhoods within their jurisdiction to identify new organizations and new leaders. 

 When recruiting within ethnic and minority communities, select recruiters from within the 
department who have connections to these communities. Ultimately, the goal is to use 
high-caliber officers who can personally attest to the qualities of the department. Persons 
with a similar background as the potential recruits are able to relate more directly to the 
candidate. 

The Farmington (Connecticut) Police Department applies several of these strategies in its 
efforts to attract minority and female recruits. A description of its recruiting efforts is posted 
on the department web site. 

The department will work in conjunction with the Town Managers office in establishing 
the recruitment efforts for the police department. Female and minority employees will 
participate in job fairs and other functions in area high schools to demonstrate a commitment 
to equal employment. Job fairs and similar community events will be a primary focus of the 
Towns effort to attract more minority candidatesThe Department will send notification 
to community organizations with information for our website link to gather information 
on job openings. In addition, the consultant hired to do the testing process [will place] 
announcements in [multiple newspapers]. The department will update the website in 
conjunction with recruitment processes. The recruitment plan will be evaluated annually in 
October by the police department and Town Managers Office.8 

Source: Town of Farmington (Connecticut) and Police Department
Agency Profile: Population 23,641; Officers 411



11. Develop recruitment materials that accurately reflect agency interests in balancing 
traditional policing and community policing. 

Departments that have adopted community policing approaches still retain traditional law 
enforcement functions. In an era of budget constraints, demands resulting from confronting 
the challenges of terrorism, and diminished federal funding for personnel, law enforcement 
agencies are required to do more with less. Consequently, todays officers are expected to be 
more well-rounded than ever before. Todays recruits need to meet the physical, cognitive, 
and moral standards that have long been the foundation of policing. They must possess the 
ability to cope with stressful situations. They must also possess other attributes that suit 
them to the unique demands of community policing and to work ethically, professionally, and 
effectively with culturally diverse communities. As one author states, the model community 
policing officer must have the traits of kindnessnot to be mistaken for weaknessand 
desire to serve as a potential mentor for young adults.9 While the need for officers with a 
wide array of attributes presents recruiting challenges, the call to hire officers on the basis of 
their commitment to service and their ability to interact with youth can actually expand the 
pool of potential recruits if police executives and their managers think outside of traditional 
policing. 

When it comes to recruitment, many agencies still present themselves as largely paramilitary 
organizations with an emphasis on the action-oriented rather than service-oriented elements 
of the job. Some do this despite their concerted efforts to incorporate community policing 
alongside traditional policing in day-to-day operations. Recruitment materials should present 
an accurate and balanced image of all of the attributes expected of police officers. While 
agencies should continue to express the need for candidates who are physically fit and 
capable of reacting quickly to crisis situations, they must also communicate the need for 
candidates who possess considerable analytic ability, strong communication skills, a sense of 
diplomacy, and a commitment to community service. Agencies should make their allegiance 
to community policing evident in all recruitment materials. As they do so, they are more likely 
to target the right recruits. Edward J. Tully, a former FBI special agent and former director of 
the Major City Chiefs Association, summarized this approach well: 

Do not use your limited resources pursuing individuals looking for the excitement in policing, 
as they will join anyway! Rather, look for those that believe and support the values of your 
organization. It is the part-time waiters or waitresses at your local restaurants, the tellers at 
your community financial institutions, the substitute teachers at your childrens schools, or the 
salespersons at your favorite stores that can be the future of your agency.10 



The textbox describing a program used by Hillsborough County Sheriffs Office in Florida 
outlines a comprehensive hiring strategyincluding many of the elements contained in the 
recommendations abovethat is grounded in a customer-service model of policing. 

Hillsborough County Sheriff s Office: Hiring in the Spirit of Service 

Building on their implementation of a community policing strategy that originated in the 
late 1980s, the Hillsborough (Florida) County Sheriff s Office developed a Hiring in the 
Spirit of Service program in August 2004. The comprehensive strategy addresses marketing, 
community involvement, job analysis, and candidate screening. The program integrates two 
mutually re-enforcing objectives; allowing the community to provide input on personality 
attributes that the sheriff s office should use in selecting recruits and hiring deputies who are 
devoted to community service. As a result of these efforts, the sheriff s office has devised a 
highly targeted marketing strategy to attract the officers who are committed to the agencies 
mission and who strive to reflect the attributes that the community most desires. 

After a series of meetings with community groups, the sheriff s office identified a set of 
desired traits for deputies: leadership, integrity, flexibility, interpersonal communication, and 
community service. This information obtained from the meetings led to the development of 
a questionnaire that was distributed to a cross-section of community group members. That 
questionnaire indicated that the top five skills desired were communications, admission of 
shortcomings, lack of procrastination, work patterns, and frustration tolerance. 

As part of their recruitment strategy, the sheriff s office uses a cadre of deputies who convey 
to potential candidates their personal experiences and the reasons why they personally find 
their jobs rewarding. Printed testimonials from these deputies are used as part of the 
process and a high-quality printed recruitment packet, Courage, Integrity, Compassion: Could You 
Answer the Call?, is widely distributed. The packet includes series of testimonials and basic 
information about the department, including agency mission, candidate requirements, and job 
benefits. The overall recruitment and outreach strategy is designed to achieve diversity within 
the department, not only demographically but also in terms of life experiences. The sheriffs 
office does not have a maximum age limit (but does require physical agility), which allows 
them to appeal to persons who may be looking for second careers. 



Instead of just focusing on the paramilitary skills traditionally emphasized in law enforcement 
recruiting, the broad goal of recruitment is to attract persons with sound managerial, 
organizational, communication, and people skills. Recruitment strategies integrate the 
qualities of deputies valued by the community and incorporate them into the sheriffs offices 
pre-employment screening and testing processes. 

The press release announcing the program is available at 
www.hcso.tampa.fl.us/Press_Releases/2004/August/04-326.htm. 

Brochures and videos of Hiring in the Spirit of Service can be obtained from program 
manager, Lorelei Bowden, Hillsborough County Sheriffs Office (lbowden@acso.tampa.fl.us) 

Source: Hillsborough County (Florida) Sheriff s Office
Agency Profile: Population 1,055,000; Officers 1,125

12. If necessary, recruit broadly beyond the jurisdictional boundaries. 

Unfortunately, law enforcement agencies find themselves competing for scarce candidates. 
The New York City Police Department, the Los Angeles Police Department, and other large 
departments are engaged in ambitious national recruiting campaigns. As a result, small 
agencies and agencies whose salaries are below the regional norm face stiff competition. This 
not only affects their risk of losing qualified candidates but also puts them in the position of 
losing trained rookies and experienced officers through lateral transfers to other departments. 

To remain competitive with agencies that recruit ambitiously at the national level, agencies 
must broaden their recruitment efforts while continuing to stress the benefits associated with 
working in their particular jurisdiction. Recruitment need notand, indeed, should notbe 
limited to jurisdictional boundaries. 

While potential recruits from smaller municipalities may be drawn to the big cities, the same 
big cities may contain potential recruits who may be lured by the benefits associated with 
smaller jurisdictions. Realistically, smaller departments may not have the power to draw 
candidates to the same degree that larger departments do, but they still should strive to 
recruit regionally. In addition, these departments could benefit by devoting some effort to 
assessing where current members of the force had been living when they applied and by 
comparing notes and strategies with nearby departments, particularly those of similar size. 



13. Consider the benefit of using the Internet for recruiting and processing applicants. 

Many departments are leveraging the Internet to inform the public about their agency 
and specifically to broaden their reach in recruiting candidates. While web sites can be an 
added resource for recruitment, they are not a panacea and may give rise to more work. 
For instance, a poorly designed web site may draw candidates who are not well suited for 
the agencys policing mission. This creates more candidates to process, many of which will 
be screened out. It is paramount for agencies to design their web sites so that they are 
consistent with their agencys mission and provide details about specific qualifications. 

The following excerpts from San Antonio (Texas) Police Department, the Littleton (Colorado) 
Police Department, and the Phoenix (Arizona) Police Department demonstrate the ways in 
which web sites can become effective recruitment tools for hiring candidates committed to 
community service. 

Our department is seeking men and women from all backgrounds who welcome a challenge, 
and share our philosophy of community service. To those who accept the challenge, we offer 
not only excellent training, great pay and benefits, and ample opportunities for advancement, 
but also the opportunity to provide a service to the community as San Antonio Police 
Officers.11 

Source: San Antonio (Texas) Police Department
Agency Profile: Population 1,144,646; Officers 2,054

The mission of the Littleton Police Department, in partnership with our community, is to 
protect life and property, safeguard constitutional rights, enhance the quality of life, and 
reduce fear through professionalism, problem solving, and personal commitment.12 

Source: Littleton (Colorado) Police Department
Agency Profile: Population 43,000; Officers 72

A great force in a great cityThe slogan used on recruiting billboards around Phoenix in 
1955 really is as true today as it was back then. The main difference is that we dont refer 
to our department as a police force, because we go beyond just being a force in the 
community. The Phoenix Police Department is a professional organization dedicated to 
providing unparalleled service to the community we represent. As such, one thing certain to 
never change is the fact that being a police officer is A Job You Can Be Proud Of . This 
section of our web site is devoted to providing you with everything you need to know about 
becoming a police officer for our agency.13 

Source: Phoenix (Arizona) Police Department
Agency Profile: Population 1,300,000; Officers 2,800
 


Using the Internet can reach a wider audience and, when carefully designed, can provide an 
opportunity to streamline a paperwork process. More departments are allowing applicants to 
provide basic information on line, which saves resources because department personnel do 
not have to enter information from pen-and-paper forms. In addition, more departments are 
following a strategy that now is widespread in the United Kingdom, using a Do you have 
what it takes? approach. These web pages can be effective ways to market the department, 
while providing an opportunity for prospective recruits to prescreen themselves. 

Examples of interactive online application forms: 

 Pennsylvania State Police (www.psp.state.pa.us) 

 Philadelphia Police Department (www.ppdonline.org/career/career_apply.php). 
The British approach to the online recruitment and applications can be found at the following 
sites: 

 www.policecouldyou.co.uk/home 

 www.policecouldyou.co.uk/apply. 

As discussed above, these Internet approaches must meet truth in advertising standards. 
An attempt to lure persons with action-oriented narrative and graphics may attract the 
wrong balance of candidates. It will result in the need to screen out a significant number of 
applicants and may result in attrition when the action-oriented recruits find out what the job 
really entails. 



Recommendations for Retention 

Having worked hard to recruit and hire qualified officers committed to public safety and 
the protection of community members civil rights, law enforcement leaders and personnel 
managers must continue to work to retain them. In their efforts to retain qualified officers, 
law enforcement agencies should do the following: 

14. Provide opportunities for diverse and challenging work that is tailored to the specific 
interests of individual officers. 

On a national level, the traditional commitment to establishing a career within a single 
organization is being replaced by a notion of serial employment. Law enforcement 
employment, however, continues to be presented as a career, with good reason. Law 
enforcement agencies can counteract the tendency of favoring serial employment by offering 
careers in which officers continually feel productive, valued, and challenged. 

Law enforcement leaders and personnel managers should ensure that individual officers who 
exhibit aptitudes for particular types of work are recognized for special skill sets and are given 
opportunities to have exposure to or specialize in these areas. Agencies should offer training 
and educational opportunities to hone individual officers skills and interests. For instance, 
individual officers could be encouraged to act as liaisons with particular communities, to 
perform outreach to schools, to engage in language immersion programs, or to become field 
training officers. 

Law enforcement leaders should work particularly hard to establish recognition and 
esteem for all department positions. For instance, law enforcement leaders and personnel 
managers must recognize the critical role of patrol officers. In the event that opportunities for 
advancement within such roles are limited, they should create specialized positions, such as 
master patrol officers, to sustain the interest of their officers and create value and esteem for 
all positions. 

15. Create an environment in which officers feel genuine ownership in the agency. 

One of the most promising ways to retain high-quality officers is to ensure that they share 
in the agencys mission and act as vital contributors to that mission. Law enforcement 
leaders and personnel managers must empower their officers to become stakeholders in 
the organization. In many ways, community policing strategies are well designed to achieve 
this objective. Although community policing is implemented in a variety of ways in different 
jurisdictions, there is some evidence to suggest the community poling is associated with 
higher levels of job satisfaction.14 A genuine sense of joint ownership in the agency and the 
community is a promising strategy for retention. 
 


16. Offer competitive compensation and benefits. 

To the extent possible, law enforcement leaders and personnel managers should ensure that 
their officers are competitively paid and supported through job benefits. The level of pay itself 
is not the sole factor in retaining quality police officers. The total package of benefits as well 
as the quality and reputation of the department can be important considerations in drawing 
recruits. 

The impact that law enforcement leaders can have on salary and benefit packages may be 
limited. At the very least, however, police executives should remain up to date about how 
surrounding jurisdictions compare in pay and benefits. They should also be prepared to make 
the case to potential recruits that some benefits may compensate for lower pay. Better health 
benefits or more opportunities for advancement and educational opportunities, for instance, 
may compensate for lower starting salaries. 

17. Ensure that officers are given the support they need to handle the stresses of their 
occupation. 

Law enforcement will always be a stressful occupation, but the varied expectations placed 
on todays officers heighten that stress. Todays officers are both crime fighters and engaged 
community problem-solvers. An officer may deal with a traumatic accident, put himself or 
herself in danger, handle a routine traffic stop, and respond empathically to a lost Alzheimer 
sufferer during the course of a single shift. The resulting stress manifests itself in higher-than-average 
rates of suicide, substance abuse, domestic violence, and symptoms such as posttraumatic stress disorder. 
Stress can reduce officer effectiveness as well as heighten the risk 
for verbal mistreatment of civilians and use of excessive force. Too many officers leave law 
enforcement prematurely because of stress. Stress can contribute to the need for disciplinary 
action and, ultimately, dismissal. Stress may shorten careers when officers feel compelled to 
leave because health concerns or concerns about relationships at home. 

Law enforcement leaders and personnel managers must ensure that officers are given the 
support they need to deal with a stressful and demanding job. Law enforcement leaders may 
offer this support, in part, through the development of genuine early intervention systems 
and associated supervisory practices explored extensively in Chapter 3 of this guide. Early 
intervention strategies allow supervisors to identify problematic behavior and provide 
nondisciplinary intervention to help officers get back on track. In this sense, these systems aid 
law enforcement leaders in retaining officers by providing them with the support they need 
to deal with a stressful environment. Apart from or in conjunction with early intervention 
systems, many agencies also rely on employee assistance programs to provide support 
to personnel and their families in times of need. Law enforcement leaders and personnel 
managers must be steadfast in ensuring that these programs are perceived as aids to 
individual officers and not as parts of a punitive disciplinary system. 



Conclusion 

Recruiting, hiring, and retaining good officers who can simultaneously respond to the 
physical demands and stress of policing while maintaining a commitment to community 
service and respect for civil rights is a daunting task. This work is time-consuming and 
can be expensive. Careful recruitment and selection procedures should be thought of as a 
long-time investment. In responding to shortages, quick fixes such as lowering standards 
or hiring officers who have left other departments under questionable circumstances can 
have negative and costly repercussions, both in the short term and the long term. Lowering 
standards may result in higher rates of dismissal. Attempting to lure officers with flashy 
action-oriented recruitment drives with an emphasis on weaponry and high technology 
could result in attrition by officers once they discover that the job is not what was promised. 
Recruitment should not be treated as a process isolated from overall management. The 
image that the department projects to recruits must be consistent with the departments 
mission statement and reflective of its culture. Truth in advertising is critical for maintaining a 
departments credibility with the recruits, with existing staff, and with the community. 

Suggestions for Further Reading 

Police personnel issues evolve as the police profession evolves and society changes. 
Addressing current shortages in candidates for policing, while maintaining commitment to 
integrity, high standards, and sustaining a service-oriented mission, presents a formidable 
challenge to todays law enforcement executive. The two recent publications listed below 
speak to current challenges and efforts to overcome those challenges. 

Scrivner, Ellen. Innovations in Police Recruitment and Hiring: Hiring in the Spirit of Service. 
U.S. Department of Justice Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, Washington, 
DC; 2006. www.cops.usdoj.gov/mime/open.pdf?Item=1655 

Taylor, Bruce, Bruce Kubu, Lorie Fridell, Carter Rees, Tom Jordan, and Jason Cheney. The Cop 
Crunch: Recruiting and the Hiring Crisis in Law Enforcement (presented in a three-part 
series) The Police Foundation, Washington, DC; May, 2006. www.policeforum.org 
 


Endnotes 

1 
Henson, Henry P., and Kevin L. Livingston. Law Enforcement Officers Wanted: Good People 
for a Thankless Job. FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin. April 2003. www.fbi.gov/publications/ 
leb/2003/apr2003/april03leb.htm. 

2 
Hall, Mimi. Police, Fire Departments See Shortages Across USA. USA Today, November, 
28, 2004:3. www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2004-11-28-police-shortages-cover_x.htm. 

3 
Tita, Bob, Paul Merrion, and Greg Hinz. Tallying the Cost of War. Crains Chicago Business, 
November 14, 2003 (Internet). 

4 
Criminal Justice Attrition Study. Tallahassee: Florida Department of Law Enforcement. (Not 
Dated). Retrieved October 12, 2005 from www.fdle.state.fl.us/cjst/Publications/Attrition_ 
Study. 

5 
Yearwood, Douglas, and Stephanie Freeman. Analyzing Concerns among Police 
Administrators: Recruitment and Retention of Police Officers. The Police Chief, March 
2004:3. www.policechiefmagazine.org/magazine select Archives. 

6 
Terrill, William. Use of Force Analysis, July 1, 2001 - December 31, 2002: Final Report. City of 
San Antonio Texas Police Department, 2003. www.sanantonio.gov/sapd/pdf/UOFcomplete. 
pdf. 

7 
Cao, Liqun and Bu Huang Bu. Determinants of Citizen Complaints Against Police Abuse of 
Power. Journal of Criminal Justice 28.3 (May/June 2000): 203-213. 

8 
Recruiting Information. Respecting History Planning the Future. Town of Farmington 
Connecticut. Retrieved November 10, 2005 from www.farmington-ct.org/TownServices/ 
PoliceDepartment/Recruiting.aspx. 

9 
Kocher, Charles J. Screening for Success in Community. Community Policing Exchange. 
(March/April 1999) Retrieved on November 1, 2005 from www.communitypolicing.org/ 
publications/exchange/e25_99/e25koche.htm. 

10 
Tully, Edward. Filling Vacancies, Effective Recruiting Strategies. March 15, 2005. Retrieved 
October 30, 2005 through www.IACPNet.com. 

11 
San Antonio Police Department Recruiting Detail: Career Opportunities with SAPD. 
Official Website of the City of San Antonio Police. Retrieved October 30, 2005 from www. 
ci.sat.tx.us/sapd/Recruiting.asp. 

12 
Littleton Police Department: Mission Statement. Littleton Police Department web page. 
Retrieved October 28, 2005 from www.littletongov.org/police/default.asp. 

13 
Police Officer Recruitment. Phoenix Police Department Website. Retrieved on October 28, 
2005 www.fromphoenix.gov/POLICE/pdjob1.html. 

14 
Brody, David, Christianne DeMarco, and Nicholas Lovrich. Community Policing and Job 
Satisfaction: Suggestive Evidence of Positive Workforce Effects From a Multijurisdictional 
Comparison in Washington State. Police Quarterly, Fall 2002: 181-205. 


VIII. Data-Management Issues n the Context of Protecting Civil Rights and Serving the Community 



Data-Management Issues in the Context of 
Protecting Civil Rights and Serving the 
Community 

To work effectively with the community law enforcement must be willing to share information. 
We must first have the ability to collect and manage information before we develop strategies 
to disseminate the information in ways that will inform and benefit the community. This 
openness will build trust.1 

Chief James Hussey, Cohasset (Massachusetts) Police Department 

Introduction 

To what extent can data-management strategiesparticularly those that have been credited 
with helping police agencies improve efficiency in personnel management and public 
safetybe of help to police executives pursuing commitments to protecting civil rights and 
to policing from a customer-service perspective? Despite the fact that law enforcement 
agencies have made great strides in data management over the last decade, the answer to 
this question is still unfolding. 

During the last decade, more agency leaders have asserted that data-driven strategies have 
played a major role improving the management of police agencies, perhaps even a direct 
role in crime reduction. Data-driven management is considered a cornerstone of the highly 
popular CompStat approach, which originated in the New York City Police Department 
(NYPD) and now is being emulated in scores of law enforcement agencies throughout the 
United States and the world.2 According to Jack Maple, a former NYPD transit officer who 
later became a deputy superintendent, the success of CompStat relies on accurate, timely 
intelligence clearly communicated to all.3 

The overall value of data for improving the functioning of law enforcement agencies has 
never been more clearly recognized and valued than in the present. Leaders have witnessed 
increases in the volume of data collected and the proliferation of CompStat-like data-driven 
strategies. The Chicago Police Departments CLEAR (Citizen Law Enforcement Analysis and 
Reporting)4 program and the Tucson Police Departments TOP (Targeted Operational Planning)5 
program are two recent examples of ambitious data-driven management systems that are 
receiving acclaim for their comprehensiveness and sophistication. 

Despite these broad and far-reaching advances, the new era of data-driven management 
still remains largely focused on traditional police data and missions. This traditional focus 
persists even though the mission of law enforcement agencies has expanded greatly over the 



same decade in which technological advances have taken place. With proper organization 
and sound data-management policies, this chapter asserts that agency leaders can take action 
to ensure that data management strategies are used to enhance more contemporary (less 
traditional) agency missions, including the protection of civil rights, improving community 
outreach, and enhancing residents engagement in the civil process. 

Chapter Overview and Objectives 

This chapter underscores the lessons addressed in previous chapters about the effective use 
and dissemination of data and highlights promising practices. This chapter stresses that the 
same benefits that have been derived from management and analysis of traditional police 
data can be achieved by using less-traditional data to improve contemporary police missions. 

As policing has evolved from a reactive model to one that stresses proactive and preventive 
approaches, data collection has also evolved. As part of this process, some agencies are 
focusing more attention on indicators of police performance relevant to civil rights and 
community policing models that stress partnership, service orientations, and problem 
solving. 

Prudent leaders are proactive in their use of both traditional and non-traditional data. Rather 
than waiting for crises to occur and potentially having their own data used against them, 
law enforcement leaders are taking proactive steps to use data to manage their performance 
and hone their public image. They are embracing data-driven management strategies not 
only to limit liability, but also to improve agency performance in the areas of civil rights and 
community policing. They are collecting data about issues such as use of force and citizen 
complaints to clarify their missions, enhance responsiveness to the community, measure 
progress, improve transparency, and to showcase their successes. 

This chapter begins by briefly reviewing data-management issues raised in preceding 
chapters and then presents four core reasons why law enforcement executives should 
consider augmenting their collection of traditional data with nontraditional data. In addition, 
this chapter offers a series of recommendations consistent with this approach. 

This chapters recommendations regarding data collection, analysis, and dissemination focus 
specifically on nontraditional data. In many ways, however, these data create the same types 
of methodological questions and challenges raised by traditional measurements of police 
performance, data such as Uniform Crime Reports (UCR), calls for service, citations issued, 
arrests, and clearance rates. 

Whether tracking crime or assessing officers performance in respecting civil rights, law 
enforcement leaders must take the necessary steps to ensure optimal quality data and fully 
acknowledge the capacities and limitations of their data. Administrative data, no matter how 
carefully collected, will always carry inherent limitations. An intimate understanding of an 
agencys data-collection processes and data quality is critical. This is true whether conducting 
analysis solely for internal use or when sharing information with the public. 



Data-Management Issues Raised in Preceding Chapters 

The importance of data collection and analysis in the protection of civil rights is interwoven 
throughout the preceding chapters of this guide. As was discussed in Chapter 2, law 
enforcement agencies committed to community policing and community outreach often 
depend on data-driven management for problem-solving strategies and often rely on surveys 
of residents to assess performance from a customer service perspective. In departments 
of all sizes, successful early intervention strategies (Chapter 3) depend on systematically 
collected information that helps supervisors make informed decisions regarding interventions 
designed to address problematic behavior in officers before they escalate to misconduct 
that require disciplinary means. Early intervention strategies in a growing number of large 
departments are built around computerized data-management systems, some of which rely 
on very ambitious and comprehensive data-collection efforts. Data on civilian and internal 
complaints (Chapter 4) and on use of force (Chapter 5) are among the indicators most 
commonly used to assess officer performance in these early intervention systems. Through 
web sites and annual reports, more agencies are making aggregate-level data about the 
quality of police performance, in particular use of force and civilian complaint data, available 
to the public. Rather than treating civilian complaints and allegations of excessive force as 
isolated cases that need to be administratively adjudicated, departments are now recognizing 
they can treat these data as a barometer of citizen satisfaction and then analyze the data to 
spot patterns and craft solutions. The shift from adjudication of individual cases to a more 
comprehensive management perspective is consistent with the tenets of problem-solving 
approaches. 

Law enforcement leaders are also facing pressing demands in response to allegations of 
racial profiling and are confronting decisions about whether or not to collect data on traffic 
and pedestrian stops (Chapter 6). Police leaders whose agencies have chosen toor are 
being required tocollect racial profiling data remain in dire need of assistance in addressing 
complex issues of data collection, analysis, and interpretation. They confront significant 
challenges regarding how to best interpret and use findings to engage in constructive 
dialogue with their communities. 

Finally, police leaders are facing challenges in recruiting, hiring, and retaining qualified 
personnel to meet the new challenges of law enforcement (Chapter 7). These challenges 
include additional responsibilities brought about by post-September 11 demands while 
striving to maintain commitments to community policing. Even as they try to do more with 
less, many leaders continue their efforts to make their agencies mirror the communities 
they serve. Given these realities, it would be difficult to overstate the importance of data 
collection, management, and analysis in assessing and managing civil rights protections and 
sustaining a commitment to community policing. 



Rationales for Expanding Data Collection and Analysis by Including 
Nontraditional Data 

Law enforcement leaders have heard the common adage that to manage effectively they 
must measure. Data collection and analysis are critical to effective policing, but these 
efforts can be daunting, time-consuming, and costly. The costs, however, of not adequately 
supporting data collection, maintenance, and analysis may be far greater. Quality data 
collection and analysis can improve law enforcement management and operational efficiency. 
Not having relevant data, or not having the ability to access and properly analyze the data, 
can increase an agencys liability risk and undermine its credibility. 

In contrast, when a law enforcement agency engages in comprehensive data collection 
and analysis and shares that information with the public, it exhibits its ability to serve 
the community with fairness and transparency. Data collection and analysis can validate 
police performance and enhance public relations. Moreover, data can be most beneficial if 
managers treat data as a feedback mechanism and use it to retool policies, procedures, and 
practices for both traditional law-and-order missions and those defined from a customer-
service perspective. As law enforcement leaders broaden their missions under the banners 
of community policing or improving quality of life, they must make every effort to spotlight 
their successes in these areas by using concrete measurement, systemic analysis, and public 
dissemination of findings in formats that the public can readily understand. 

Police agencies benefit when they collect and analyze traditional crime data such as calls for 
service, traffic citations issues, crime incidents, arrests, and response times. Many of these 
are traditional measures that police executives use to focus on internal agency functions. 
Increasingly, police managers are recognizing the benefit of collecting and analyzing less 
traditional data, including indices such as community meeting attendance, citizen complaints, 
and satisfaction surveys, all of which help police gauge how well they are serving the 
community and protecting the rights of citizens. 

Collecting and sharing nontraditional data relating to civil rights protections and community 
outreach can benefit law enforcement in at least four ways. 

Benefit One: Data collection and analysis promote effective management and accountability 

The first rationale for collecting and analyzing nontraditional data is the same as for 
collecting traditional data: data are critical to effective management. Even if law enforcement 
agencies collect these data only for internal uses (for some reason opting not to share data 
and analysis with the public), effective managers can capitalize on this information to assess 
officer performance, modify policies and training, fine-tune practices, develop new strategies, 
and hold individuals responsible. As has been discussed in the preceding chapters, leaders 
can readily track and analyze indices such as civilian complaints, civilian commendations, 
and use-of-force deployments with these objectives in mind. Fundamentally, this requires 
a commitment to collect and analyze these nontraditional indices with the same vigor and 
diligence that agencies routinely commit to collecting traditional police data. 



Under CompStat-style management strategies, commanders may be held liable for spikes in 
crime or rewarded for crime reductions. They are reprimanded or rewarded based on their 
units ability to meet performance measures such as crime rates, activity levels, clearance 
rates, or reductions of overtime hours. If nontraditional data are collected, analyzed carefully, 
and understood in context, commanders can also be held responsible for upswings in civilian 
complaints or spikes in use-of-force incidents. At the same time, they could be rewarded 
when civilian complaint data show decreases or when citizen commendations attributed to 
unit personnel increase. 

The Importance of Context in Analyzing Data Trends 

As discussed with respect to early intervention systems in Chapter 3, contextual factors are 
always a critical consideration in the analysis of data. Increases in deployment of reportable 
use of force, for instance, may not necessarily be indicative of lapses in restraint among a 
departments officers. If analysis indicates that this trend corresponds to increases in subject 
resistance, the focus of attention could be directed to problematic groups or areas within the 
community rather than to officers. In a similar vein, use-of-force deployments and levels of 
civilian complaints will track statistically to some extent with levels of crime and arrest. Taken 
together, different work shifts and geographic assignments often correspond to different 
levels of risk exposure and different types of police-civilian encounters. Neighborhoods 
with higher densities of late-night liquor license establishments, for instance, may give rise to 
higher incidences of reportable use-of-force deployments and civilian complaints stemming 
from altercations with police. Managers and analysts always must gauge their interpretations 
of trends with these contextual factors in mind. 

While it would be unwise to hold qualitatively different precincts or divisions to the same 
expectations, comparisons within units can be made over time. Each subdivision/shift can be 
assessed over time to determine whether it is moving in the right direction and in a manner 
that is consistent with the departments overall trends. A prototype for this type of analysis 
was illustrated clearly in the study Can Effective Policing Also Be Respectful? Two Examples 
in the South Bronx.6 In that study, researchers found that while crime was dropping in New 
York City during a period in the 1990s, there was a corresponding citywide increase in civilian 
complaints. Although some observers would speculate that this indicated that increases 
in citizen complaints were an inevitable outcome of crime-control efforts, the researchers 
found evidence to refute that generalization. Specifically, they identified two precincts in the 
Bronx where both crime and citizen complaints dropped during the study period. On closer 
examination, the researchers were able to identify how the commanders in these precincts 
were able to oversee drops in both indices. Common contributing factors in both precincts 
were the strong leadership qualities of the commanders and their ability to identify and hold 
accountable those officers responsible for a disproportionate share of complaints. Although 
outside researchers conducted the analysis, similar analyses could be conducted by department 
analysts to assess internal trends and identify promising practices within a department that are 
worthy of emulation throughout the department. 



Benefit Two: Data collection and sharing help enhance the credibility of the agency and 
contribute to building trust with the community. 

A second rationale for law enforcement to engage in collection and analysis of nontraditional 
data is that these efforts can help engage the community and other important constituencies 
as allies, rather than as mere consumers of police services. Data presented in clear and 
compelling formats can go a long way toward informing the public, managing public 
relations, and actively engaging residents in community policing strategies. Agency leaders 
who strive to be proactive and deliberate in sharing data are in a better position to ensure 
that information is understood in context and will be better positioned to demonstrate their 
successes. In addition, law enforcement leaders can help cultivate common understandings 
of civil rights issues and remedies by routinely sharing outcome measures with the public. 
These proactive approaches clearly are better than those that are apt to be seen as reactive or 
defensive, such as responding only when critical incidents spark outside requests for data. 

Sharing information with the public can facilitate two-way communication. Objective and 
clear data routinely made available to the public can help communities develop a fairer and 
more balanced perspective of the police and the actions that they take. At the same time, 
police will be in a better position to access accurately and realistically the publics reaction to 
the data and their general perception of the agency. 

Benefit Three: Data collection and analysis support broadly defined problem-solving 
strategies and partnership building. 

A third rationale for collecting and analyzing nontraditional data is closely related to the 
second. Collection of these types of data can expand police-community problem-solving 
efforts. While community members expect departments to keep them safe, they also expect 
departments to be responsive to their needs and treat them respectfully and fairly. In some 
jurisdictions, residents have come to rely on the police to help them become more engaged 
in civic processes. The same problem-solving strategies that have won favor in addressing 
crime and public disorder can be used to assess civil rights and community outreach 
problems and to craft joint solutions. 

Analysts may uncover, for instance, that the police are responding to a flood of calls from 
an immigrant community but are not getting members of that community to attend local 
precinct meetings. When a police leader takes proactive measures to reach out to leaders 
within this community, the department can begin to develop broader community networks. 

Discussions about the data and continued analysis of information with leaders from the 
immigrant community can be useful for developing collaborative approaches and building 
partnerships. Having cemented relationships with key community stakeholders, police can 
work collectively with leaders to help foster new relationships with the wider immigrant 
community and to cultivate long-term relationships. Several examples of just this approach 
were provided in the Chapter 2 on community policing. Data help the police and community 
to understand and define issues from a similar perspective; data form a foundation for 
constructive partnerships; and data provide the ability to measure progress. These are key 
components of the problem-solving process. 



Benefit Four: Data collection and analysis efforts can be used to establish new allies and 
bring more resources to the table. 

A fourth reason for expanding data collection and analysis efforts is that relevant outcomes, 
particularly successful ones, can be widely shared. When police inform journalists, legislators, 
and other government officials about what they do they take a proactive role managing their 
public image. Officials from other government agencies, such as the mayors or governors 
office, will want to associate themselves with successful practices and positive outcomes. 
This can result in positive exposure and the funding necessary to maintain effective practices. 

Risks of Not Sharing Data with the Public 

If the benefits of sharing data are not enough to convince leaders, considering what happens 
when agencies do not share data may be compelling. In the absence of adequate data 
sharing, the public, the media, and oversight agencies may be prone to draw their own 
conclusions. Without the proper context, they may be more apt to engage in knee-jerk 
responses to exceptional events like a highly publicized use of lethal force, or fall back into 
the politically expedient response of blaming the police. 

Collecting and sharing relevant data can be invaluable to law enforcement leaders by 
helping put isolated incidents in a broader and more definitive context. A chief with reliable 
and compelling data about an overall downward trend in use-of-force deployments or 
civilian complaints, for instance, will be in a better position to quell public outcries when 
controversial incidents occur. Similarly, a sheriff who can readily demonstrate that his or her 
deputies lethal-force deployment rates compare favorably to similar jurisdictions will be in 
a better position to manage public relations when isolated use-of-force deployments raise 
public concern. 



Recommendations 

Recognizing the benefits discussed above, this chapters recommendations are focused on 
basic data-management issues that will promote data sharing and will optimize the value of 
the data shared, particularly data that relate to civil rights and community outreach. 

These recommendations are not intended to be an all-inclusive treatise on data management. 
Presented in this manner, law enforcement executives need not be experts in data 
management or statistical analysis to find the recommendations useful. Recommendations 
appear under three categories: data collection, data analysis, and data dissemination. 

Data Collection Recommendations 
In their data collection efforts, all law enforcement agencies should do the following: 

1. Capitalize on sources of data that already exist within the department. 

To assess and manage their performance in protecting civil rights and promoting community 
policing, law enforcement agencies should make full use of data that they already routinely 
collect. As police agencies have expanded their mission beyond traditional policing, data 
other than those associated with reactive responses to crime have become increasingly 
relevant. As a result, a fair amount of data relevant to civil rights protection and community 
policing is already collected for routine administrative purposes. 

Although these data are collected with increasing frequency, the data are not always fully 
used for purposes of management and evaluation. For instance, data on citizen complaints 
or reportable uses of force may be tracked to assess individual officers through an early 
intervention system. Partially as a result of alleged civil rights violations and the imposition 
of several consent decrees and memorandums of agreement, for example, more departments 
are tracking their deployment of canines as a force-control option. Departments and units are 
being held accountable for reducing the overall deployment of canines in this manner and for 
keeping their bite-to-release ratios to a minimum. 

These types of data are being used in departments to assess the overall direction of the 
department or to compare whether all units are moving in the right direction. Prudent police 
executives and managers should make the best use of the following types of information and 
use it to assess and refine their protections of civil rights. 

 Use-of-force incidents, ideally broken down by types of deployment/equipment use, by 
geographic unit, and by subject demographics 

 Citizen complaint data, ideally broken down in the manner mentioned above 

 Traffic stop and pedestrian stop data with sufficient detail to assess racial profiling 

 A broad range of data used within early intervention or personnel performance 
management systems. 



The public expects both equal protection and equal service from the police. Police also 
have at their disposal administrative data that can be used to assess whether they are 
serving the needs of the public and whether they are serving all constituent groups within 
their community effectively and equitably. Administrative data used to assess and refine 
community policing could include the following: 

 Community participation at police-sponsored meetings (e.g., monthly precinct or beat 
meetings), for comparison purposes ideally broken down by the participants gender, age, 
race/ethnicity, and area of residence 

 Police attendance and involvement in community-sponsored meetings and activities, 
including those sponsored by churches, civic organization, or tenant associations 

 Community participation in police-sponsored activities such as police athletic leagues, 
police explorer programs, or citizen academies, ideally broken down by the demographic 
categories listed above 

 Community volunteer participation in the agency. 

Police agencies should use such information to identify particular groups or neighborhoods 
for which additional outreach efforts may be warranted as well as to document agency 
successes such as improvement in minority participation. 

2. Agencies should continually seek to expand nontraditional data-collection efforts 

To assess and manage their performance in protecting civil rights and promoting community 
policing, law enforcement agencies should review and expand their data-collection efforts 
on a continuous basis. As police agencies have adopted community policing and customer-
oriented approaches, many have successfully expanded their use of surveys and customer 
feedback. This enables agencies to compensate for limitations associated with administrative 
data. For instance, little research exists to shed light on the extent to which the volume of 
citizen complaints that an agency receives is a reflection of the behavior of its officers or its 
openness and willingness to receive and investigate complaints.7 Collecting data on citizens 
opinions of police performance through systematic surveys is one way to offset some of the 
limitations associated with administrative data. Survey data can also serve as a method of 
cross-validating administrative data. If survey data indicate that satisfaction is increasing and 
that misconduct complaints against officers are also increasing, this may actually indicate 
that efforts to make the citizen complaint process more open have been effective. 

Using citizen complaints to assess police performance is critical, for instance, but it must 
be recognized that not all persons who have experienced negative encounters with the 
police will report them. Indeed, the willingness to complain (or to compliment) the police 
may vary considerably across the jurisdiction or by demographic groups. Surveys, whether 
sophisticated and scientific or more modest in design, can be of great benefit, as discussed 
below. 

Agencies should consider two basic types of surveys and recognize the relative benefits and 
limitations of each. 



 Use community surveys that strive to be representative of the jurisdiction at large and 
that can represent the view of distinct communities within the jurisdiction 

Law enforcement agencies that embrace community policing often consider community 
surveys a core component of their data-collection strategy. Community surveys are very 
flexible. Questions on community surveys can be tailored to address issues that are of 
concern to police managers or issues that are of concern to community members. Questions 
also can be designed to identify and compare issues confronting different communities 
served by the police department. The communities may be defined geographically or by 
demographic traits. 

Biggest Problems in Experimental Districts: Wave 1 Survey Results 
Bar graph showing biggest problems in experimental districts: wave 1 survey results 

The graph displayed here , for example, illustrates the responses elicited through a 
community survey conducted in five police districts in Chicago at a time when the police 
department was piloting its community policing program.8 These responses demonstrate 
quite clearly the types of problems that are shared across these communities as well as those 
 


that are unique to particular communities. Such data can be valuable to district commanders 
when planning their community policing strategies and working with the community to 
establish neighborhood-specific problem-solving priorities. 

While similar types of conclusions could possibly be gleaned from existing data sources, such 
calls to station houses or crime reports, these would be subject to a reporting bias because 
different communities may be more or less willing to call the police. A random scientific 
survey can compensate for some of these statistical biases and can help to validate inference 
drawn from administrative data. 

Community surveys, in particular, can be crafted to assess whether citizens are satisfied 
with different facets of police service. The graph titled 2004: Citizen Satisfaction with Police 
Responsiveness illustrates how residents in Shoreline, Washington who reported having 
direct interactions with officers from the King County Sheriffs Officethe agency with which 
the city contracts to provide police servicesrated officer responsiveness in 2004.9 

Citizen Survey Results Re: Officer Responsiveness 

The City of Shoreline via Northwest Research Group administered the Police Satisfaction 
Survey in 2004. Shoreline anticipates surveys again in the fall of 2007. 

Citizens of Shoreline who interacted with the police gave the following responses to survey 
questions about police officer responsiveness. 

Bar graph showing 2004 citizen satisfaction with police responsiveness survey results



Community satisfaction surveys can also assess whether levels of satisfaction vary across 
communities. Groups within a jurisdiction may vary in their satisfaction with police services. 
In larger jurisdictions, agencies may wish to collect survey data in sufficient sample sizes 
and with full demographic information about the respondents to make comparisons across 
different geographic areas and across different groups defined by variables such as race/ 
ethnicity, age, gender, and home ownership status. A wide variety of studies and national 
opinion polls demonstrate that levels of citizen satisfaction are statistically related to these 
demographic factors.10 For assistance in conducting community surveys see the publication 
Conducting Community Surveys: A Practical Guide for Law Enforcement Agencies.11 

 Use opportunistic (nonscientific) surveys. 

Police departments need not limit themselves to scientific surveys. Surveys that are designed 
to be scientifically representative can be expensive and time-consuming, in large part 
because of the rigorous procedures and standards required for obtaining random samples. 
Other options, such as short questionnaires distributed in neighborhoods, distributed on 
car windshields, or made available on an agencys web site, can be collected more easily 
and cheaply. They can still be very useful, but must be interpreted with more caution than 
representative scientific surveys. 

Increasingly, police departments are collecting data using consumer-based feedback 
approaches through the Internet. While similar in format to those discussed earlier, these 
surveys are considered opportunistic rather than scientific because participation is voluntary. 
The graphic represents a portion of an opportunistic survey form made available on the web 
from the Kent Police in England.12 

Image of survey
Q4) In your opinion what priority should Kent Police give to each of the following? 
(Please tick the appropriate answers) 
Reducing serious crimes i.e. murder, rape 
Protecting children from abuse 
Fighting Drugs 
Reducing burglaries for peoples homes 
Providing information and advice to the public 
Answering 999 telephone calls 
Providing a visible Police presence 
Reassuring victims and witnesses of crime 
Reducing vehicle crime 
Responding to 999 calls for assistance 
Reducing public disturbances i.e. fights 
Protecting people from domestic violence 
Answering non-999 telephone calls 
Reducing crime against minority groups 
High Priority Medium Priority Low Priority No Priority 



While such data collection can be of real benefit to police departments, it is important to 
sound a clear note of caution regarding opportunistic sampling. The voluntary nature of 
these types of surveys makes them prone to statistical bias. Responses are likely skewed by 
the fact they are available only to persons with web access. Also, people with the strongest 
opinionseither for or against a given policy or practiceare most likely to respond to 
surveys such as these. No generalizations can be made about the wider community because 
the findings based on opportunity samples reflect only those opinions of persons responding 
to the survey or data-collection instrument. If data from opportunistic surveys are shared 
with the public, the information must include a disclaimer to the effect that the data reflect 
the results of a nonscientific survey. 

Another example of an opportunistic data-collection effort is the Maryland State Polices use 
of traffic stops as an occasion to get feedback from motorists. The form below provides a 
systematic way to collect both commendations and complaints of citizen-trooper interaction 
in traffic stops. 

Image of commendation/complaint form
COMMENDATION/COMPLAINT FORM 

Please provide the following information if you wish to commend or express your concerns 
about the actions of a Maryland state trooper. 

YOUR NAME _________________________________________________ or call 1-800-525-5555 In Maryland 
YOUR ADDRESS _________________________________________________ 1-800-333-9890 Outside Maryland 
DATE/TIME/LOCATION OF ENCOUNTER ___________________________________________ TDD 1-410-486-0677
DESCRIBE ENCOUNTER ___________________________________________________________________________ 

MSP 225(8-03) DETACH THIS CARD, PLACE IN ENVELOPE, APPLY POSTAGE AND MAIL TO ADDRESS ON REVERSE SIDE. 

In this particular example, the respondents are allowed to describe the nature of the contact 
in their own words. This narrative information is systematically reviewed by supervisors to 
assess the performance of individual officers and to assess aggregate patterns in the agency 
and across geographically defined troops. 

This type of free-field response format does not limit the type of information a person may 
submit. Since the response is open-ended, the type of information submitted may be rich 
in content but may be more difficult to analyze statistically. Supervisors or analysts at the 
Maryland State Police first would have to code information from the text to tabulate how 
many complaints alleged rudeness, excessive force, or racial profiling. 
 


Agencies are increasingly relying on their web sites to collect both complaint and 
commendation information. The Fairfax County (Virginia) Police Department13 (www. 
fairfaxva.gov/Police/inform.asp) and the Phoenix (Arizona) Police Department14 (www. 
phoenix.gov/EMAIL/emcommend.html) are two of many examples by which feedback can be 
submitted online. 

3. Agencies must pay close attention to data quality and completeness. 

All organizations collecting data confront data quality and completeness issues. Given 
the scope of administrative data collection occurring in law enforcement agencies, these 
concerns range from mundane issues such as mis-keyed data to major issues such as 
misclassifications of crimes. 

In law enforcement agencies, data analysts and data consumers must also recognize that 
data frequently tell only a partial story. For instance, law enforcement leaders recognize that 
UCR data reflect only those crimes known to the police rather than all crimes occurring within 
a jurisdiction. In addressing data relevant to civil rights protection and the promotion of 
community policing, data quality concerns are critically important. 

The following recommendations specify further law enforcement agencies obligations to 
control the quality of the data they collect. 

 Collect data in a standardized and uniform manner. 

Law enforcement agencies must make every effort to ensure that data are collected in 
a standardized and uniform manner. This is true whether the agencies rely on existing 
administrative data, community surveys, or customer feedback forms. Even in the case of 
administrative data, the importance of quality assurance and consistency of data collection 
cannot be overstated. The collection of racial-profiling data, for instance, illustrates the 
complications that can arise in the process of standardization. The collection of racial-
profiling data is an inherently subjective determinationofficers must ascertain the race 
or ethnicity of a motorist based on their perceptionsand yet every effort must be made, 
through training and data instrument design, to assure as much consistency as possible. 
Agencies must train officers specifically on how to fill out traffic stop forms. If, for instance, 
a traffic stop form contains the options Black, White, and Hispanic, the agency must 
prepare an officer to record information about an individual he perceives to be Black and 
Hispanic. Perhaps the agency will change its form to include categories such as White-
Hispanic, White-non-Hispanic, Black-Hispanic, Black-non-Hispanic, etc., or perhaps the 
agency will direct officers to record Hispanic ethnicity in a field separate from race. In any 
event, standardization is critical. 

 Offer clear operational policies on data collection. 

Just as agencies must ensure that officers collect data in a standardized and uniform manner, 
they must ensure that officers know when such data must be collected. Agencies must offer 
clear operational policies on data collection. For instance, an agency must specify whether or 
not it requires officers to collect racial profiling data for all traffic stops or only for those stops 
that result in a formal action. Alternatively, in the case of pedestrian stops, agencies must 
 


draw clear distinctions between a street detention that requires the completion of a form 
from any other type of pedestrian-officer interaction that does not require data collection. 
Departmental policies and training must be consistent and clear. If they are not, officers will 
not complete data forms consistently and, as a result, missing observations will become a 
threat to the integrity of the agencys data collection and analysis efforts. Inconsistencies in 
data collection can skew results. Agencies must not collect incomplete or inconsistent data 
only to have analysis of these data result in misinformation. 

 Engage in routine data auditing and validation. 

To maximize the collection of complete, consistent, and accurate administrative data, 
agencies should engage in routine data auditing and validation. Law enforcement 
supervisors routinely and rigorously review and approve traditional data-collection forms 
such as incident and arrest reports, as well as nontraditional data-collection forms, including 
use-of-force report forms and citizen complaint forms, which are used to assess civil rights 
protections and to promote community policing. In the case of racial profiling data forms, for 
instance, agency supervisors may check officers designations of driver race/ethnicity against 
department of motor vehicle data to ensure accuracy. Routine data auditing may reveal 
whether particular individuals or units exhibit a greater-than-normal tendency to fall back 
on unknown or not applicable as a response. The same review and quality assurance 
measures that are undertaken for the purpose of assessing individual officers and to make 
sure that the forms are in compliance with policy also will enhance the reliability of aggregate 
statistical analyses. 

To ensure compliance with operational policies governing data collection, agencies have 
been known to use sting audits. For instance, in its consent decree with the Los Angeles 
Police Department, the Department of Justice calls for sting audits to identify officers who 
discourage the filing of a complaint or fail to report misconduct or complaints.15 While the 
main purpose of these audits is to ensure compliance with policies, procedures, and ethical 
requirements, such audits also help to enhance the reliability of the data collected and 
analyzed. 

Data Analysis Recommendations 

Once data have been collected, the data must be analyzed. Data analysis generally requires 
specialized skills, including a familiarity with statistics and research methodology. To 
respond productively to the results of data analysis, police executives, managers, and, when 
appropriate, the public, must understand the information. Law enforcement data analysts, 
therefore, must ensure that the results of their analyses are accessible, are presented in a 
straightforward manner, and are comprehensible. The following recommendations address 
such steps. 

4. Acknowledge the limitations inherent in data. 

An accurate understanding of data analysis and results depends on a keen awareness of the 
limitations often inherent in administrative data. Data analysts must make such limitations 
clear to their chief, supervisory personnel, and the public. In the analysis of traditional 



crime data, for instance, when presenting a departments annual UCR crime counts or rates, 
analysts routinely make clear that they have analyzed reported crime or incidents known 
to the police. It is important to distinguish between these known data and the total number 
of crimes (which includes an unknown number of unreported crimes). 

The same caveats routinely applied to traditional data should be applied to nontraditional 
data. Analysts should make clear that indices such citizen complaints, for example, are prone 
to similar underreporting. Not every citizen who has a grievance against an officer will file a 
formal complaint. 

Analysts should also make clear that the implications of such underreporting could be 
affected by a host of factors. In the case of citizen complaints, for instance, it is important for 
analysts to communicate the fact that the number of citizen complaints filed can be affected 
by factors such as the openness of the complaint process and that, for this reason, making 
comparisons of the number of complaints filed across different law enforcement agencies is 
inadvisable. 

5. Analyze and interpret data in context. 

Analysts should make clear that the results of their data analysis must be placed in context to 
be understood correctly. The publicand sometimes even police executives and managers 
may see rising and falling trends in crime incidents, use-of-force incidents, or citizen 
complaints and feel inclined to make inferences about these trends without considering 
context. For instance, community members may be alarmed to learn that the number 
of crimes in a jurisdiction rose 30 percent in a given year until they understand that the 
jurisdictions population increased by 40 percent in the same year. 

Similarly, community members may be concerned about a rising trend in citizen complaints. 
If this increase, however, is the result of policy changes dictated by a federal consent 
decree that required the agency to make its citizen complaint process more accessible and 
less burdensome, an apparently alarming spike in citizen complaints should be presented 
and interpreted in the proper context. Analysts, whether they are sworn officers or civilian 
employees, must be trained and proficient in data analysis and familiar with the capacities 
and limitations of agency data so that the information can be presented in the proper context. 

The general term for putting one data measure in the context of another data measure 
such as understanding the number of crimes in the context of a population shiftis called 
normalizing the data. Following the logic of data normalization, analysts should assess 
trends in citizen complaints or use-of-force incidents within the context of those police 
activities most likely to generate complaints or necessitate the use of force. For instance, if 
the number of traffic citations and arrests rise, a commensurate increase in the number of 
use-of-force incidents may not be alarming. 
 


Analysts should regularly normalize data. In general, the number of citizen complaints 
should be presented in the context of the number of police-citizen contacts. Similarly, the 
number of use-of-force incidents should be presented in the context of the number of arrests. 
Analysts who establish ratios of such as these, allow police executives, managers, and, when 
appropriate, the public to understand trends in their proper context. 

Comparison of Numbers of Complaints Received 

PRC & IAB

Line graph showing comparison of number of complaints received by Berkley's Police Review
Commission and Internal Affairs Bureau

Analysts also facilitate understanding of data by establishing comparisons between data. 
Graphics should provide viewers with the opportunity to compare and contrast related 
indices. The graph included here illustrates trends of citizen complaints for the Berkley 
(California) Police Department by comparing those processed through the independent Police 
Review Commission (PRC) to those processed by the departments Internal Affairs Bureau.16 

6. Analyze data over sufficient periods of time. 

Of course, trends in data emerge over time. Analysts must assume responsibility for 
ensuring that law enforcement executives, managers, and, when appropriate, the public, 
understand trends accurately by presenting them over a sufficiently long period of 
observation. 

Truncated periods of observation may yield inaccurate or misleading results. For instance, 
in the following hypothetical example, the first graph would seem to suggest that a 
departments verbal judo training had no clear impact in the 6-month period following 



implementation. If the period of observation is extended to include a longer period both 
before and after the training, however, the implications about the effectiveness of the training 
are altogether different. 

The second graph allows the viewer to recognize that use-of-force incidents are seasonal and 
that use-of-force deployments generally increase in the summer months.  As a result, the viewer 
presented with the first graph may inaccurately conclude that the departments verbal judo 
training failed while the viewer presented with the second graph is likely to attribute the 
increase in use-of-force incidents immediately following the verbal judo training to the arrival 
of summer.  As a result, while the viewer of the first graph may advocate discontinuing verbal judo 
training, the viewer of the second graph would recognizeaccuratelythat the number of monthly 
use-of-force incidents from January to May 2004 is substantially lower than that for January to May 
2004 and recommend that the training be continued.

Bar graph showing use of force incidents before and after verbal judo training in June 2004

Bar graph showing use of force incidents 6 months following verbal judo training in June 2004



This hypothetical example illustrates a general truth: it is vitally important to assess trends 
over a sufficiently long period of observation. This is true when police executives are 
assessing the impact of a programmatic change, a change in policy, or assessing the impact 
of the introducing new equipment. Ensuring that a sufficiently long period of observation is 
established may be particularly critical following the introduction of practices or equipment 
that may be viewed as controversial. For instance, analyses regarding the introduction of 
conducted energy devices (CEDs or Tasers) should track data for months before and after 
their introduction to provide an accurate appreciation for the effects of this new technology. 
Examining trends over the long term results in more meaningful, reliable analyses. 

7. Break data down into meaningful categories (disaggregation). 

Whenever possible, data should be broken down into discrete categories to make the 
analysis more meaningful. While it is useful to know, for instance, whether citizen complaints 
are rising or falling, it is even more meaningful to know more specifically whether citizen 
complaints regarding rudeness, racial profiling, and excessive force in particular are rising or 
falling. 

Image of line graph 

The hypothetical graph presented here demonstrates the usefulness of dividing total 
citizen complaints into discrete categories. Police executives and managers responsible 
for designing training initiatives would surely want to note that while the number of total 
complaints has fallen during 4 years, the number of complaints regarding officer rudeness 
has actually increased. 

Data should also be presented with relevant contextual factors. Indicating the rate of 
complaint per officer would be particularly important, for instance, if the size of the 
department changes appreciably over time. 



8. Map data and results when possible. 

During the last decade, law enforcement analysts have embraced mapping as an effective 
way to understand the distribution of crime within their jurisdictions and to respond more 
effectively to public safety problems through tactical and strategic analysis. Agencies are 
now beginning to realize these same benefits as they work to protect civil rights and promote 
community policing. Analysts within the police and from community-based organizations 
now are beginning to map use-of-force incidents and citizen complaints to understand their 
geographic distribution, interpret the patterns, and to plan accordingly. 

Map showing use of force incidents and violent crime pattern for calendar year 2004 in 
Charlotte-Mecklenburg North Carolina

Analysts should be sure, when mapping nontraditional data such as use-of-force deployments 
or citizen complaints, to normalize the data or put it into its proper context. The graphic 
included here, from the Charlotte-Mecklenburg (North Carolina) Police Departments 2004 
Internal Affairs Annual Report, illustrates the utility of such data normalization in mapping.17 

The map clearly shows that the geographic concentrations of use-of-force incidents 
correspond to the concentrations of arrests. The department uses similar maps to illustrate 
that use-of-force incidents also geographically corresponded to other police activities such as 
violent crime incidents, citizen calls for service, and officer-initiated computer-aided dispatch 
calls. Such maps can be effective tools for guiding discussions with community leaders 
about the factors associated with the use of force. 



9. If necessary, hire staff with data analysis skills and/or use consultants, including university 
based researchers. 

Data analysis ranges from the basic, such as tracking crime levels or community meeting 
attendance over time, to the highly complex. Collecting, analyzing, and drawing inferences 
from racial profiling data or engaging in scientifically defensible evaluations of innovative 
agency programs, for instance, require expertise in statistics and research methodology. 
Executives in larger agencies sometimes have the luxury of hiring skilled analysts and 
researchers that smaller departments cannot afford. Leaders of agencies of any size 
occasionally may need to hire research experts. 

A recent IACP publication on improving partnerships between police leaders and university 
based researchers provides practical solutions for making the most of these partnerships.18 
Independent and objective assessment of agency performance is among the benefits of these 
partnerships. Openness to sharing data and being evaluated by outside experts also helps 
build community trust. Use of university based researchers can be more cost-effective then 
hiring private consultants, particularly when the data analysis meets the needs of both the 
police agency and the university researcher. The work of independent university researchers 
may be supported by grant funds and a departments willingness to engage outside 
researchers and evaluators can increase its opportunity to obtain grant funds. Under fiscal 
constraints and general tenets of accountability, federal and state funding agencies are being 
more selective in the programs they support. Increasingly, funding decisions are being made 
on an empirically based what works standard. 

Data Dissemination Recommendations 

In addition to the basic rules of data collection and data analysis, there are useful guidelines 
to follow when sharing data with the public. The following recommendations can help to 
ensure that law enforcement agency data will not be misinterpreted. 

10. Assess carefully and continually whatand in what formatinformation should be 
shared with the public. 

While most of the graphs and maps illustrating this chapter were drawn from publicly 
available annual reports or web sites, law enforcement leaders and their data management 
staff must carefully and continually assess what information to share with the public and in 
what format that information should appear. Although sharing data with the public can be 
a double-edged sword, law enforcement leaders should recognize the net benefits of data 
sharing. It is true that when trends are not favorable, data sharing creates the potential for 
public relations challenges. It is also true, however, that when trends are favorable, data may 
serve to enhance the image of the department. 

Sharing both favorable and unfavorable data sends the message that the department is 
committed to transparency and has nothing to hide. When such transparency is coupled with 
sustained outreach to all communities within the jurisdiction, police executives will be well 
positioned to address any negative trends and work cooperatively with a community from a 
problem-solving perspective to address any concerns raised by the data. 



With any commitment to data sharing, certain safeguards must be in place. Foremost 
among these is that all legal and administrative requirements regarding the privacy and 
confidentiality of the subject and of police officers must be upheld. Just as important, no 
data should be released if release would constitute a breach of public safety. Departments 
must also be sensitive to the restrictions on sharing certain types of data that may exist as a 
result of collective bargaining agreements. 

11. Revisit data presentation strategies and formats to ensure optimal effectiveness in public 
information. 

Consistency in reporting data is a hallmark of good analysis because it permits analysts and 
consumers of that data to compare performance over time. Departments, however, should 
not let commitments to consistency inhibit them from changing or enhancing formats when 
necessary. Clearly, if data report formats result in confusion or are not understood by the 
intended audiences, then alternative forms of presentation should be considered. Actively 
sharing data and seeking feedback from the public on a continuous basis, through public 
meetings or in the course of problem-solving, will help ensure that data are being presented 
meaningfully and clearly, in ways that both the police and the public can understand. 

Changes in policies, procedures, or the addition of new units may affect reporting formats 
and trends. For instance, if a department switches from internal review of citizen complaints 
to the use of a citizen review board, new report data and outcome formats will be required. 
Likewise, if a department changes the level of force for which reports are required, 
adjustments should be made and noted in standardized reports. Similar modifications should 
be made if changes are made to geographic boundaries (e.g., new alignments or an existing 
unit being split in two). 

Conclusion 

This chapter addressed how law enforcement agencies can collect, analyze, and share data 
related to their missions to protect civil rights and to reach out to their constituents and 
partners in the community. Overall, this chapter stressed that law enforcement leaders 
should incorporate these outcomes, alongside traditional law enforcement measures, in their 
efforts to capitalize most effectively on data-management strategies. Several illustrative 
examples were provided. Examples, however, are becoming more prevalent and novel 
approaches, such as mapping civilian complaint and police use-of-force locations, continue 
to emerge. Data management should be considered a core component of any community 
outreach plan and as a tool to assess an agencys effectiveness in protecting and promoting 
the civil rights of all persons within the community it serves. 



Suggestions for Further Reading 

Data management and analysis affect all facets of law enforcement. Publications that address 
data collection from the perspective of protecting civil rights and promoting community 
partnerships and trust include the following. 

Carter, David L. Law Enforcement Intelligence: A Guide for State, Local, and Tribal Law 
Enforcement Agencies. U.S. Department of Justice Office of Community Oriented 
Policing Services, Washington, D.C.: 2004. www.cops.usdoj.gov/Default.asp?Item=1439. 

Skogan, Wesley G., Susan M. Hartnett, Jill DuBois, and Jason Bennis. Policing Smarter 
Through IT: Lessons in Enterprise Implementation. U.S. Department of Justice Office of 
Community Oriented Policing Services, Washington, D.C.: 2004. www.cops.usdoj.gov/ 
Default.asp?Item=1331. 

Fridell, Lorie A. Understanding Race Data from Vehicle Stops: A Stakeholders Guide. U.S. 
Department of Justice Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, Washington, D.C.: 
2005. www.cops.usdoj.gov/mime/open/pdf?Item=1577. 

Weisel, Deborah. Conducting Community Surveys: A Practical Guide for Law Enforcement 
Agencies. U.S. Department of Justice Office of Justice Programs, Washington D.C.: 2003l. 
www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/ccspglea.pdf. 



Endnotes 

1 
Hussey, James, Chief of Cohasset (Massachusetts) Police Department. Personal 
Correspondence. December 1, 2005. 

2 
Weisburd, David, Stephen D. Mastrofski, Rosann Greenspan, and James J. Willis. The 
Growth of Compstat in American Policing. Washington, DC: Police Foundation, 2004. 

3 
Dussault, Raymond. Jack Maple: Betting on Intelligence. Government Technology. April 
1999. www.govtech.net/magazine/story.php?id=94865&issue=4:1999. 

4 
Skogan, Wesley G., Susan M. Hartnett, Jill DuBois, Jason Bennis, So Young Kim, Dennis 
Rosenbaum, Lisa Graziano, and Cody Stephens. Policing Smarter Through IT: Learning 
from Chicagos Citizen and Law Enforcement Analysis and Reporting (CLEAR) System. 
U.S. Department of Justice Office of Community Oriented Policing Service, Washington, 
DC: 2003. www.cops.usdoj.gov/mime/open.pdf?Item=1264. 

5 
See reference to the program in Strategic Visions: Our Blueprint for the Future (Tucson 
[Arizona] Police Department 2002 Annual Report). Tucson Police Department, 2002. 

6 
Davis, Robert C., Pedro Mateu-Gelabert, and Joel Miller. Can Effective Policing Also Be 
Respectful? Two Examples in the South Bronx. Police Quarterly, 2005: pp. 229-247. 

7 
Skogan, Wesley, and Kathleen Frydl, eds. Fairness and Effectiveness in Policing: The 
Evidence. The National Academy Press (National Research Council of the National 
Academies), Washington, D.C.: 2004. (See page 161). 

8 
Reproduced from: Skogan, Wesley G. Measuring What Matters: Crime, Disorder, and Fear. 
Measuring What Matters: Proceedings from the Policing Research Institute Meetings. U.S. 
Department of Justice: National Institute of Justice and the Office of Community Oriented 
Policing Services, July 1999, pp 37-54. www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles1/170610-2.pdf. 

9 
Service Efforts and Accomplishments 2004: Fifth Annual Report of Police Performance. King 
County Sheriffs Department for the City of Shoreline, Washington: 2004. www.metrokc. 
gov/sheriff/_downloads/partners/seasho04.pdf. 

10 
See for instance: Satisfaction with PoliceWhat Matters? U.S. Department of Justice Office 
of Justice Programs, National Institute of Justice, Washington, D.C.: 2002. www.ncjrs.gov/ 
pdffiles1/nij/194077.pdf. 

11 
Weisel, Deborah. Conducting Community Surveys: A Practical Guide for Law Enforcement 
Agencies. U.S. Department of Justice Office of Justice Programs; Washington D.C.: 2003l. 
www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/ccspglea.pdf. 

12 
Your Police Service Survey. Kent Police, United Kingdom. Retrieved on October 10, 2005 
from www.kent.police.uk/sites/internetsurvey/questionnaire.php. 

13 
www.fairfaxva.gov/Police/inform.asp. 

14 
www.phoenix.gov/EMAIL/emcommend.html. 

15 
United States v. City of Los Angeles Consent Decree (June 15, 2001). www.usdoj.gov/crt/ 
split/documents/laconsent.htm. 

16 
City of Berkley Police Review Commission: 2003 Statistical Report. www.ci.berkeley.ca.us/ 
prc. 
 


17 
Internal Affairs 2004 Annual Report. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department. www. 
charmeck.org/Departments/Police/Home.htm. 

18 
Unresolved Problems & Powerful Potentials: Improving Partnerships Between Law 
Enforcement Agencies and University Based Researchers. International Association of 
Chiefs of Police, Washington, D.C.: 2004. 


Appendixes AE 



Appendix A 

IACP Civil Rights Committee 

The following people either are current members of the IACP Civil Rights Committee or were 
members during the time that the Protecting Civil Rights project was in progress. 

Chairs 

John J. Finnegan 
Chief of Police 
Barnstable (Massachusetts) Police 
Department 

Barbara S. Wallace 
(previous chair)
Chief (retired)
Community Relations Unit 
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D.C.

IACP Board Members with Committee 
Oversight 

Joseph C. Carter 
Chief of Police 
Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority 
Police Department 
Boston, Massachusetts 

Mary Ann Viverette 
(previous oversight /current member) 
Chief of Police 
Gaithersburg (Maryland) Police Department 

Committee Members 

Francis Amoroso 
Regional Director 
New England Regional Office 
Community Relations Service 
U.S. Department of Justice 
Boston, Massachusetts 

John J. Bennett 
Chief of Police 
Caln Township (Pennsylvania) Police 
Department 

Erik G. Blake 
Chief of Police 
Oak Bluffs (Massachusetts) Police 
Department 

Lawrence C. Burnson 
Chief of Police 
Homewood (Illinois) Police Department 

Melvin J. Carraway 
Federal Security Director (retired) 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
Washington, D.C. 

Michael J. Carroll 
Chief of Police 

West Goshen Township (Pennsylvania) 
Police Department 

John P. Chase 
Chief of Staff, Preparedness 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
Washington, D.C. 

Leonard G. Cooke 
Director 
Virginia Department of Criminal Justice 
Services 
Richmond, Virginia 
 


Janet A. Crumley 
Captain 
Carter County (Tennessee) Sheriffs 
Department 

Shanetta Y. Cutlar 
Chief 
Special Litigation Section 
Civil Rights Divisions 
U.S. Department of Justice 
Washington, D.C. 

Edward J. Delaney (retired) 
Chief of Police 
Orange (Connecticut) Police Department 

Dean M. Esserman 
(past member) 
Chief of Police 
Providence (Rhode Island) Police 
Department 

Preston L. Felton 
First Deputy Superintendent 
New York State Police 

Sharee Freeman 
Director 
Community Relations Service 
U.S. Department of Justice 
Washington, D.C. 

Rafael P. Hernandez, Jr. 
Deputy Chief 
Tallahassee (Florida) Police Department 

James M. Hussey 
Chief of Police 
Cohasset (Massachusetts) Police Department 

Scott M. Jordan 
Chief of Police 
Tustin (California) Police Department 

Charles R. McDonald 
Chief Investigator 
Illinois Law Enforcement Training and 
Standards Board 
Edwardsville, Illinois 

William McManus 
Chief of Police 
Minneapolis (Minnesota) Police Department 
(formerly with Dayton, Ohio Police 
Department) 

Bobby D. Moody 
Chief of Police 
Marietta (Georgia) Police Department 

Jerry Oliver 
(past member)
Chief of Police (retired)
Detroit (Michigan) Police Department

Patrick Oliver 
Chief of Police (retired)
Fairborn (Ohio) Police Department

Sonya T. Proctor 
Chief of Police and Security 
Amtrak 
Washington, D.C. 

Louis F. Quijas 
Assistant Director 
Law Enforcement Coordination 
Federal Bureau of Investigation 
Washington, D.C. 

Richard J. Rappoport 
Chief of Police 
Fairfax City (Virginia) Police Department 

Charles D. Reynolds 
Chief of Police (retired)
Dover (New Hampshire) Police Department



Susan Riseling 
Chief of Police 
University of Wisconsin-Madison Police 
Department 

Marcia Thompson 
Mediator 
Resolving Conflict Institute, LLC 
Alexandria, Virginia 

Paul Vorvis 
(past member) 
Inspector 
Toronto (Canada) Police Service 
 


Appendix B 
 

IACP Professional Standards Committee 

The following people either are current members of the IACP Professional Standards 
Committee or were members when the Protecting Civil Rights project was in progress. 

Chair 
Charles A. Gruber 
Chief of Police 
South Barrington (Illinois) Police 
Department 

IACP Board Members with Committee 
Oversight 

Mary Ann Viverette 
Chief of Police 
Gaithersburg (Maryland) Police Department 

Joseph Estey 
(previous oversight) 
Chief of Police 
Hartford (Vermont) Police Department 

Joseph Polisar 
(previous oversight) 
Chief of Police 
Garden Grove (California) Police 
Department 

Committee Members 

Elena Danishevskaya 
Chief of Police 
Memphis (Tennessee) Police Department 

James W. McMahon 
Director 
New York State Office of Homeland Security 
New York, New York 

Ronald Miller 
Chief of Police 
Kansas City (Kansas) Police Department 

Mark OToole 
Captain 
Lynn (Massachusetts) Police Department 

Dennis E. Nowicki 
Chief of Police (retired) 
Charlotte-Mecklenburg (North Carolina) 
Police Department 

Steven J. Sarver 
Chief of Police 
Colerain Township (Ohio) Police Department 
 


Appendix C 

Project Advisory Group 

The following people participated in the Project Advisory Group meeting in Memphis, 
Tennessee in April 2004 to help launch the Protecting Civil Rights project. They provided 
feedback on the substantive outline of the project and helped define the scope of the 
Leadership Guide. 

James H. Bolden 
Director of Police (retired)
Memphis (Tennessee) Police Department

Pamela Cammarata 
Deputy Director 
Office of Community Oriented Policing 
Services 
U.S. Department of Justice 
Washington, D.C. 

Allyson Collins 
Deputy Director 
Police Assessment Resource Center 
Los Angeles, California 

Steve Conrad 
Chief 
Glendale (Kentucky) Police Department 
(formerly assistant chief, Louisville Metro 
Police Department) 

Edward T. Crawford 
Chief of Police (retired)
Kent (Washington) Police Department

Shanetta Y. Cutlar 
Chief 
Special Litigation Section 
Civil Rights Division 
U.S. Department of Justice 
Washington, D.C. 

Ronald Davis 
Chief of Police 
East Palo Alto (California) Police 
Department 
(formerly with the Oakland Police 
Department) 

Joseph R. Fuentes 
Superintendent 
New Jersey State Police 
West Trenton, New Jersey 

Jim Ginger 
Chief Executive Officer 
Public Management Resources, Inc. 
Willis, Virginia 

Charles A. Gruber 
Chief of Police 
South Barrington Police (Illinois) 
Department 

Bobbie J. Johnson 
Superintendent 
Boston (Massachusetts) Police Department 

Russ Leach 
Chief of Police 
Riverside (California) Police Department 

Robert McNeilly 
Chief of Police (retired)
Pittsburgh (Pennsylvania) Bureau of Police
 


Dennis E. Nowicki 
Chief of Police (retired) 
Charlotte-Mecklenburg (North Carolina) 
Police Department 

Carl Peed 
Director 
Office of Community Oriented Policing 
Services 
U.S. Department of Justice 
Washington, D.C. 

Richard J. Pennington 
Chief of Police 
City of Atlanta (Georgia) Police Department 

Timothy Ross 
Research Director 
Vera Institute of Justice 
New York, New York 

Jeffrey Schlanger 
President 
Kroll Government Services 
Washington, D.C. 

George Selim 
Special Assistant to the Director 
U.S. Department of Justice 
Community Relations Service
Washington, D.C.
(formerly with the Arab American Institute)

Ronal W. Serpas 
Chief of Police 
Metropolitan Nashville (Tennessee) Police 
Department 

Barbara S. Wallace 
Chief (retired)
Community Relations Unit 
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D.C.
 


Appendix D 

Project Focus Group 

The following people participated in the Project Focus Group in Pittsburgh in April 2005. They 
provided feedback on chapter content and helped hone recommendations for policies and 
practices that were included in the Leadership Guide. 

Orlando Barnes 
Lieutenant Colonel 
Prince Georges County (Maryland) Police 

Michael J. Carroll 
Chief of Police 
West Goshen Township (Pennsylvania) 
Police Department 

Richard Eddington 
Chief of Police 
Mount Prospect (Illinois) Police Department 

Joseph R. Fuentes 
Superintendent 
New Jersey State Police 
West Trenton, New Jersey 

Brenda Bernot 
Lieutenant 
Pennsylvania State Police 
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 

Shanetta Y. Cutlar 
Chief 
Special Litigation Section 
Civil Rights Division 
U.S. Department of Justice 
Washington, D.C. 

Charles A. Gruber 
Chief 
South Barrington (Illinois) Police 
Department 

Sandra (Sam) Pailca 
Director 
Office of Professional Accountability 
Seattle (Washington) Police Department 

Lloyd Perkins 
Chief of Police 
Village of Skaneateles (New York) Police 
Department 
(formerly with Camillus [New York] Police 
Department) 

Michael Semkiu 
Deputy Chief 
Mount Prospect (Illinois) Police Department 

William Valenta 
Commander (retired)
Pittsburgh (Pennsylvania) Bureau of Police

Earl Woodyard 
Assistant Chief 
Pittsburgh (Pennsylvania) Bureau of Police 
 


Appendix E 

Community Relations Service U.S. Department of Justice 

National Headquarters 
Community Relations Service 
U.S. Department of Justice 
600 E Street, N.W., Suite 6000 
Washington, DC 20530 
Voice: 202.305.2935 
Fax: 202.305.3009 
Web: www.usdoj.gov/crs 

Region I  New England Region 
(Serving: CT, MA, ME, NH, RI, VT) 
Community Relations Service 
U.S. Department of Justice 
408 Atlantic Avenue, Suite 222 
Boston, MA 02110 
Voice: 617.424.5715 
Fax: 617.424.5727 

Region II  Northeast Region 
(Serving: NJ, NY, Puerto Rico, U.S. Virgin 
Islands) 
Community Relations Service 
U.S. Department of Justice 
26 Federal Plaza, Suite 36-118 
New York, NY 10278 
Voice: 212.264.0700 
Fax: 212.264.2143 

Region III  Mid-Atlantic Region 
(Serving: DC, DE, MD, PA, VA, WV) 
Community Relations Service 
U.S. Department of Justice 
2nd and Chestnut Streets, Suite 208 
Philadelphia, PA 19106 
Voice: 215.597.2344 
Fax: 215.597.9148 

Region IV  Southeast Region 
(Serving: AL, FL, GA, KY, MS, NC, SC, TN) 
Community Relations Service 
U.S. Department of Justice 
75 Piedmont Avenue, N.E. Suite 900 
Atlanta, GA 30303 
Voice: 404.331.6883 
Fax: 404.331.4471 

Region 4 Field Office 
Community Relations Service 
U.S. Department of Justice 
51 S.W. First Avenue, Suite 624 
Miami, FL 33130 
Voice: 305.536.5206 
Fax: 305.536.6778 

Region V  Midwest Region 
(Serving: IL, IN, MI, MN, OH, WI) 
Community Relations Service 
U.S. Department of Justice 
55 West Monroe Street, Suite 420 
Chicago, IL 60603 
Voice: 312.353.4391 
Fax: 312.353.4390 

Region V Field Office 
Community Relations Service 
U.S. Department of Justice 
211 West Fort Street, Suite 1404 
Detroit, MI 48226 
Voice: 313.226.4010 
Fax: 313.226.2568 

Region VI  Southwest Region 
(Serving: AR, LA, NM, OK, TX) 
Community Relations Service 
U.S. Department of Justice 
1420 West Mockingbird Lane, Suite 250 
Dallas, TX 75247 
Voice: 214.655.8175 
Fax: 214.655.8184 
 


Region VI Field Office 
Community Relations Service 
U.S. Department of Justice
515 Rusk Avenue, Suite 12605
Houston, TX 77002
Voice: 713.718.4861 
Fax: 713.718.4862 

Region VII  Central Region 
(Serving: IA, KS, MO, NE) 
Community Relations Service 
U.S. Department of Justice 
1100 Main Street, Suite 1320 
Kansas City, MO 64105 
Voice: 816.426.7434 
Fax: 816.426.7441 

Region VIII  Rocky Mountain Region 
(Serving: CO, MT, ND, SD, UT, WY) 
Community Relations Service 
U.S. Department of Justice 
1244 Speer Blvd., Suite 650 
Denver, CO 80204 
Voice: 303.844.2973 
Fax: 303.844.2907 

Region IX  Western Region 
(Serving: AZ, CA, GU, HI, NV) 
Community Relations Service 
U.S. Department of Justice 
888 South Figueroa Street, Suite 1880 
Los Angeles, CA 90017 
Voice: 213.894.2941 
Fax: 213.894.2880 

Region IX Field Office 
Community Relations Service 
U.S. Department of Justice 
120 Howard Street, Suite 790 
San Francisco, CA 94105 
Voice: 415.744.6565 
Fax: 415.744.6590 

Region X  Northwest Region 
(Serving: AK, ID, OR, WA) 
Community Relations Service 
U.S. Department of Justice 
915 Second Avenue, Suite 1808 
Seattle, WA 98174 
Voice: 206.220.6700 
Fax: 206.220.6706
 

For More Information: 

To obtain details on COPS programs, call the 
COPS Office Response Center at 800.421.6770 

Visit COPS Online at www.cops.usdoj.gov 

September 2006 
e06064100 

ISBN: 1-932582-71-1