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Faces Significant Challenges' which was released on September 04, 2003.

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Report to the Committee on International Relations, House of 
Representatives:

September 2003:

U.S. Public Diplomacy:

State Department Expands Efforts but Faces Significant Challenges:

[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-951] GAO-03-951:

GAO Highlights:

Highlights of GAO-03-951, a report to the House Committee on 
International Relations 

Why GAO Did This Study:

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, focused attention on the 
need to improve public diplomacy efforts to cultivate a better public 
opinion of the United States abroad. However, recent opinion research 
indicates that many foreign publics, especially in countries with 
significant Muslim populations, view the United States unfavorably. 
GAO examined changes in the State Departments (State) public 
diplomacy efforts since September 11, whether State has an overall 
strategy for its public diplomacy programs, how it measures their 
effectiveness, and challenges it faces in implementing these programs. 

What GAO Found:

Since September 11, State expanded its public diplomacy efforts in 
Muslim-majority countries considered to be of strategic importance in 
the war on terrorism. It significantly increased program funding and 
the number of Foreign Service officers in South Asia and the Near 
East. It also launched new initiatives targeting broader, younger 
audiencesparticularly in predominantly Muslim countriesand plans to 
continue them in the future. 

After September 11, State acknowledged the lack of, and the need for, 
a comprehensive strategy that integrates all of its diverse public 
diplomacy activities. Such a strategy is still in the development 
stage. The absence of an integrated strategy could impede States 
ability to direct its multifaceted efforts toward concrete and 
measurable progress. Furthermore, an interagency public diplomacy 
strategy has not been completed that would help State and other 
federal agencies convey consistent messages and achieve mutually 
reinforcing benefits overseas.

State is not systematically and comprehensively measuring progress 
toward its public diplomacy goals. Its overseas performance 
measurement efforts focus on anecdotal evidence and program outputs, 
rather than indicate progress in changing foreign publics 
understanding and opinions of the United States.

States efforts face significant challenges, including insufficient 
time and staff to conduct public diplomacy tasks. Public affairs 
officers responding to our survey said that burdensome administrative 
and budgetary processes divert their attention from public diplomacy 
programs. In addition, about 21 percent of Foreign Service officers in 
language-designated public diplomacy positions overseas lack 
sufficient foreign language skills. We also found that about 58 
percent of public affairs officers responding to our survey believe 
the amount of time to attend public diplomacy training is inadequate.

What GAO Recommends:

Among GAOs recommendations are that the Secretary of State develops a 
strategy that considers private sector public relations techniques in 
integrating its public diplomacy efforts and directing them toward 
common and measurable objectives; and strengthens efforts to train 
Foreign Service officers in foreign languages and public diplomacy. 
State generally concurred with our recommendations. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-951.

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click 
on the link above. For more information, contact Jess T. Ford at (202) 
512-4128 or fordj@gao.gov.

[End of section]

Contents:

Letter: 

Results in Brief: 

Background: 

State Has Expanded Its Efforts in Muslim-majority Countries Since 
September 11: 

State Lacks a Strategy for Public Diplomacy Programs: 

State Lacks Measurable Indicators of Progress Toward Public Diplomacy 
Goals: 

State Faces Other Significant Challenges: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendixes:

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

Appendix II: Survey Development and Results: 

Appendix III: Questionnaire for State Department Public Affairs 
Officers: 

Appendix IV: Comments from the State Department: 

Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

Staff Acknowledgments: 

Table: 

Table 1: Increases in Public Diplomacy Resources by Region for Fiscal 
Years 2001 through 2003: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: Key Uses of State's Public Diplomacy Budget Resources, Fiscal 
Year 2003: 

Figure 2: State's Organizational Structure for Public Diplomacy: 

Figure 3: Typical Public Diplomacy Section at a Large U.S. Embassy: 

Figure 4: Elements of a Typical Public Relations Strategy: 

Abbreviations: 

USAID: U.S. Agency for International Development:

USIA: U.S. Information Agency:

Letter September 4, 2003:

The Honorable Henry J. Hyde 
Chairman 
The Honorable Tom Lantos 
Ranking Minority Member, Committee on International Relations 
House of Representatives:

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, focused attention on the 
need to improve U.S. public diplomacy efforts designed to promote 
better appreciation of the United States abroad and greater receptivity 
to its policies among foreign publics. Opinion research indicates that 
publics in many foreign countries have unfavorable views of the United 
States, and dislike for U.S. foreign policy poses a particularly 
difficult diplomatic challenge. This is especially the case in 
countries with significant Muslim populations. The approximately $1 
billion nonmilitary budget for U.S. public diplomacy is almost evenly 
divided between the State Department (State) and the Broadcasting Board 
of Governors, which oversees the activities of U.S. government-
sponsored broadcasting overseas.[Footnote 1] This report focuses on the 
State Department's public diplomacy efforts. A related report assesses 
those of the Broadcasting Board of Governors.[Footnote 2]

This report examines (1) changes in State's public diplomacy resources 
and programs since September 11, particularly in countries with 
significant Muslim populations; (2) whether State has an overall 
strategy for its public diplomacy programs; (3) how State measures 
their effectiveness; and (4) what other significant challenges State 
faces in executing these programs.

To address all of our objectives, we administered a survey to the heads 
of public affairs sections at U.S. embassies worldwide covering such 
issues as guidance from various State Department offices; sufficiency 
of budgetary, staff, and other resources; and ability to adequately 
measure performance. The response rate to our survey was 76 percent. To 
grasp the range of State's key public diplomacy programs and how 
programs and resources have changed since September 11, we reviewed 
State budget requests, annual reports, and other program documentation. 
We also met with officials in State's Office of the Undersecretary for 
Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, the Bureau of Educational and 
Cultural Affairs, the Bureau of Public Affairs, the Office of 
International Information Programs, and regional bureaus. To assess 
whether State has an overall strategy for its public diplomacy 
programs, we reviewed relevant planning, program, and other 
documentation. We also met with cognizant State officials and a number 
of academics specializing in public diplomacy and international affairs 
issues and private sector officials from U.S. public relations and 
opinion research firms with international operations. To assess how 
State measures the effectiveness of its public diplomacy programs and 
to understand private sector methods for gauging the success of 
persuasive techniques, we met with officials in State's Office of 
Strategic and Performance Planning and the academic and private sector 
officials mentioned above. To gain a firsthand view of the challenges 
faced in executing public diplomacy programs overseas, we analyzed 
program documentation and met with U.S. embassy officers, host-country 
government officials, and private sector and nongovernmental 
organization representatives in the United Kingdom, Morocco, and Egypt. 
For further information on our overall scope and methodology, see 
appendix I. For further information on the development and results of 
our survey, see appendix II.

Results in Brief:

Since September 11, State has expanded its public diplomacy efforts in 
Muslim-majority countries considered to be of strategic importance in 
the war on terrorism. In the two fiscal years since the terrorist 
attacks, State's overall public diplomacy budget increased by about 9 
percent[Footnote 3] in real terms, with the largest percentage of 
overseas increases going to two regions with significant Muslim 
populationsSouth Asia and the Near East. During this time, public 
diplomacy funding for South Asia rose by 63 percent and for the Near 
East by 58 percent.[Footnote 4] In the same period, authorized numbers 
of Foreign Service officers in these two regions increased by 15 
percent and 27 percent, respectively. Since September 11, State has 
developed plans and programs that emphasize reaching a broader and 
younger audience in countries with large Muslim populations. For 
example, State launched the Shared Values initiative, the first phase 
of which featured a series of minidocumentaries on Muslim life in 
America to demonstrate that the United States is an open society, and 
that Americans and Muslims share certain values and beliefs. State 
estimates that the program reached approximately 288 million people in 
the Middle East, South Asia, and East Asia. State's plans for future 
years include new exchange programs for high school students, expanded 
programs to teach English, and a continuation of the Shared Values 
initiative.

After September 11, State acknowledged the lack of, and need for, a 
strategy that integrates all of its diverse public diplomacy activities 
and directs them toward common objectives. However, the strategy to 
coordinate these efforts into a cohesive program is still in the 
development stage. The absence of an integrated strategy may hinder 
State's ability to plot and navigate a course to channel its 
multifaceted programs toward concrete and measurable progress. State's 
ability to develop an integrated strategy is complicated, in part, by 
the lack of an interagency public diplomacy strategy to guide 
governmentwide communication efforts. This makes it difficult to convey 
consistent messages and thus achieve mutually reinforcing benefits.

State is not systematically and comprehensively measuring progress 
toward its public diplomacy goals. State's overseas performance 
measurement efforts emphasize anecdotal evidence and program outputs, 
such as reporting favorable articles written by foreign journalists 
after they complete tours in the United States or by counting the 
number of speeches given by ambassadors, rather than gauging progress 
in changing foreign publics' understanding and attitudes about the 
United States. In addition, at the three overseas posts we visited, no 
reporting requirements were in place to determine whether the posts' 
annual performance targets were met. Public affairs officers generally 
do not conduct systematic program evaluations and receive only limited 
audience polling data to help measure progress. While establishing 
direct links between public diplomacy programs and results is 
difficult, the experiences of other U.S. government agencies and the 
private sector in assessing information dissemination campaigns offer 
some best practices, including the need to define success, what it will 
take to get there, and how it should be measured. The absence of 
concrete measures of progress limits State's ability to correct its 
course of action or direct resources toward activities that offer a 
greater likelihood of success.

State faces a number of additional challenges to its public diplomacy 
efforts. Many public affairs officers reported having insufficient 
resources to effectively conduct public diplomacy: more than 40 percent 
of those we surveyed said the amount of time available to devote 
exclusively to executing public diplomacy tasks was insufficient, and 
more than 50 percent reported that the number of Foreign Service 
officers available to perform such tasks was inadequate. Public affairs 
officers also reported that the unique administrative and budgetary 
requirements associated with their programs were burdensome and 
hindered public diplomacy efforts overseas. About 21 percent of the 
officers posted overseas in language designated positions have not 
attained the level of language speaking proficiency required for their 
positions, hampering their ability to engage with foreign publics. 
Further, about 58 percent of the heads of embassy public affairs 
sections reported that Foreign Service officers do not have adequate 
time for training in the skills required to effectively conduct public 
diplomacy.

This report makes several recommendations to the Secretary of State to 
help improve State's planning, coordination, execution, and assessment 
of U.S. public diplomacy efforts. State generally agreed with our 
findings, conclusions, and recommendations. We have reprinted State's 
comments in appendix IV.

Background:

State's overall public diplomacy goal is to inform, engage, and 
influence global audiences. This goal is aimed at reaching out beyond 
foreign governments to promote better appreciation of the United States 
abroad, greater receptivity to U.S. policies among foreign publics, and 
sustained access and influence in important sectors of foreign 
societies. Public diplomacy is carried out through a wide range of 
programs that employ person-to-person contacts; print, broadcast, and 
electronic media; and other means. Traditionally, U.S. public diplomacy 
focused on foreign elites--current and future overseas opinion leaders, 
agenda-setters, and decision makers. However, the dramatic growth in 
global mass communications and other trends have forced a rethinking of 
this approach, and State has begun to consider techniques for 
communicating with broader foreign audiences.

State's public diplomacy budget totaled an estimated $594 million in 
fiscal year 2003. About 41 percent, or $245 million, is slated for the 
International Visitor, Fulbright, and other educational and cultural 
exchange programs. Roughly 38 percent, or about $226 million, of 
State's public diplomacy budget goes to its regional bureaus, primarily 
to cover the salaries, expenses, and activities of public diplomacy 
officers posted at U.S. embassies. State embassy officers engage in 
information dissemination, media relations, cultural affairs, and other 
efforts. Around 12 percent, or about $71 million, funds speaker 
programs, publications, and other activities. The remaining 9 percent, 
or $51 million, funds programs related to public diplomacy, such as 
programs carried out by the National Endowment for Democracy. Figure 1 
shows the key uses of public diplomacy resources.

Figure 1: Key Uses of State's Public Diplomacy Budget Resources, Fiscal 
Year 2003:

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

The U.S. government public diplomacy community primarily consists of 
the White House, State,[Footnote 5] the Broadcasting Board of 
Governors, the Department of Defense, and the Central Intelligence 
Agency. Although it is not a central player in public diplomacy, the 
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) also plays a role. 
The Secretary of State serves as a member of the Broadcasting Board of 
Governors--an arrangement that is intended to strengthen coordination 
efforts between State and the Board. The U.S. Advisory Commission for 
Public Diplomacy, a bipartisan panel created by Congress and appointed 
by the President, provides advice on U.S. government public diplomacy 
activities. Figure 2 illustrates State's organizational structure for 
public diplomacy.

Figure 2: State's Organizational Structure for Public Diplomacy:

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

State's Undersecretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs is 
responsible for the overall leadership and coordination of State's 
public diplomacy efforts. The Undersecretary coordinates the efforts of 
the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, the Bureau of Public 
Affairs, and the Office of International Information Programs. Public 
diplomacy personnel are also located in State's regional and functional 
bureaus and at overseas posts, but these individuals report to the 
management of their own respective organizational entities and not to 
the Undersecretary. Foreign Service officers in the public affairs 
sections of U.S. embassies have primary responsibility for executing 
many of the specific programs. While the Undersecretary does not manage 
the staffing process for public diplomacy personnel stationed overseas, 
she has authority over all program resources for both domestic and 
overseas public diplomacy activities. However, all Foreign Service 
officers posted overseas, including those in the public affairs 
sections of U.S. embassies, report ultimately to the Chiefs-of-Mission 
in their respective host countries. Figure 3 depicts the structure of a 
typical public diplomacy section at a large U.S. embassy overseas.

Figure 3: Typical Public Diplomacy Section at a Large U.S. Embassy:

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Public Opinion of the United States in Many Muslim-majority Countries 
Has Worsened:

Favorable public opinion of the United States has declined worldwide in 
recent years, according to a number of opinion research firms. A study 
conducted by The Pew Research Center for the People and the Press in 
2002 found that negative opinion of the United States was most 
prevalent in the Muslim countries of the Middle East and in central 
Asia, even in those:

whose governments have close ties to the United States.[Footnote 6] For 
example, in Egypt, only 6 percent of those surveyed had a favorable 
view of the United States. The study also showed that, between 1999 and 
2002, favorable opinions of the United States declined from 52 percent 
to 30 percent in Turkey and from 23 percent to 10 percent in Pakistan. 
Another study released by the Pew Research Center in March 2003 showed 
that public opinion of the United States further declined among its 
allies due to antiwar sentiment and disapproval of the administration's 
international policies.[Footnote 7] For example, public opinion of the 
United States in Turkey further decreased from 30 percent to 12 percent 
during the Iraq campaign. And the Pew Center's recent report, released 
in June 2003, concluded that opinion of the United States in Muslim-
majority countries has remained negative, with negative feelings 
increasing dramatically in several cases.[Footnote 8] While favorable 
opinion of the United States in Turkey and Pakistan increased a few 
points in spring 2003, the report showed a dramatic decrease in 
favorable opinion in Morocco, Jordan, the Palestinian Authority, and 
many other countries over the past few years.

Zogby International released a poll in April 2002 that concluded that 
Arabs and Muslims generally hold a favorable view of American movies, 
television, science, technology, and education but have generally 
unfavorable views of the United States when it comes to its policy 
toward Muslim countries and Palestinians.[Footnote 9] U.S. policy 
toward Muslim countries was given single-digit favorable ratings by 
Egypt, Iran, Indonesia, Kuwait, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia. Public 
opinion of U.S. policy toward the Palestinians in the same countries 
ranked even lower overall.

State Has Expanded Its Efforts in Muslim-majority Countries Since 
September 11:

Since September 11, State has expanded its efforts in Muslim-majority 
countries that are considered strategically important in the war on 
terrorism. State significantly increased the program funding and number 
of Foreign Service officers in its bureaus of South Asian and Near 
Eastern Affairs. State has also launched a number of new initiatives 
targeting broader, younger audiences--particularly in predominantly 
Muslim countries--and plans to continue these initiatives in the 
future. These initiatives include expanding exchange programs targeting 
citizens of Muslim countries, informing foreign publics about U.S. 
policies in the war on terrorism, and demonstrating that Americans and 
Muslims share certain values.

State Increased Resources in Muslim-majority Countries:

State has increased its public diplomacy resources overall since 
September 11, with the largest relative overseas increases going to 
Muslim-majority countries. In the two fiscal years since September 11, 
State's public diplomacy resources increased from $544 million in 
fiscal year 2001 to $594 million in fiscal year 2003, or about 9 
percent in real terms. During the same period, the number of authorized 
Foreign Service officers involved in public diplomacy overseas also 
increased, from 484 to 539,[Footnote 10] or approximately 11 percent. 
While State's bureau of Europe and Eurasia still receives the largest 
overall share of overseas public diplomacy resources, the largest 
percentage increases in such resources since September 11 occurred in 
State's bureaus of South Asian and Near Eastern Affairs, where many 
countries have significant Muslim populations.[Footnote 11] Public 
diplomacy funding increased in South Asia from $24 million to $39 
million and in the Near East from $39 million to $62 million, or by 63 
and 58 percent, respectively. During the same period, authorized 
American Foreign Service officers in South Asia increased from 27 to 31 
and in the Near East from 45 to 57, or by 15 percent and 27 percent, 
respectively. Table 1 shows the increases in public diplomacy resources 
by region from fiscal year 2001 through 2003.

Table 1: Increases in Public Diplomacy Resources by Region for Fiscal 
Years 2001 through 2003:

(Dollars in millions).

Region: South Asia: 

Funding; 2001: $24; 2003[A]: $39; Percentage change: 63%.

Authorized officers; 2001: 27; 2003[A]: 31; Percentage change: 15%.

Region: Near East. 

Funding; 2001: $39; 2003[A]: $62; Percentage change: 58%.

Authorized officers; 2001: 45; 2003[A]: 57; Percentage change: 27%.

Region: Africa. 

Funding; 2001: $55; 2003[A]: $65; Percentage change: 18%.

Authorized officers; 2001: 79; 2003[A]: 89; Percentage change: 13%.

Region: East Asia and the Pacific. 

Funding; 2001: $78; 2003[A]: $86; Percentage change: 9%.

Authorized officers; 2001: 80; 2003[A]: 83; Percentage change: 4%.

Region: Western Hemisphere. 

Funding; 2001: $77; 2003[A]: $80; Percentage change: 4%.

Authorized officers; 2001: 92; 2003[A]: 99; Percentage change: 8%.

Region: Europe and Eurasia[B]. 

Funding; 2001: $161; 2003[A]: $160; Percentage change: 0%.

Authorized officers; 2001: 161; 2003[A]: 180; Percentage change: 12%.

Source: State Department.

[A] The 2003 funding estimates include approximately $20 million in 
reprogrammed funds for educational and cultural exchanges from 2002:

[B] Estimates for Europe and Eurasia include costs for two staff 
assigned to the European Office of the UN and Other International 
Organizations in Geneva, Switzerland.

[End of table]

More Resources Directed to Exchange and Information Programs Focusing 
on the Muslim World:

In 2002, State redirected 5 percent of its exchange resources to better 
support the war on terrorism and to strengthen U.S. engagement with 
Muslim countries. In 2003, State has continued to emphasize exchanges 
with Muslim countries through its Partnership for Learning Program--
designed to target young and diverse audiences through academic and 
professional exchanges such as the Fulbright, International Visitor, 
and Citizen Exchange programs. State has also carried out increased 
exchanges through its Middle East Partnership Initiative, which 
includes computer and English language training for women newly 
employed by the Afghan government and a program to assist women from 
Arab countries and elsewhere in observing and discussing the U.S. 
electoral process.

State's Office of International Information Programs has also developed 
new initiatives to support the war on terrorism. It expanded its 
interactive Web site in Arabic, Persian, and other languages to inform 
broad audiences about U.S. policy initiatives, including the war on 
terrorism. It launched a new Web site to provide information on changes 
in U.S. visa policies and immigration procedures after September 11, 
including those that predominantly affect citizens of Muslim-majority 
countries. It employed staff to monitor Arab television and news 
reports for misinformation and hostile propaganda targeted at the 
United States and to counter that information by presenting the facts 
through various media. In addition, it developed several products to 
support the war on terror including the following:

* a print and electronic pamphlet titled The Network of Terrorism, 
distributed in 36 languages via hard copy, the Web, and media 
throughout the world, which documented the direct link between the 
September 11 perpetrators and al Qaeda;

* a publication titled Iraq: From Fear to Freedom to inform foreign 
audiences of the administration's policies toward Iraq;

* a print and electronic pamphlet titled Voices for Freedom in which 
Iraq-born professionals describe the brutality of Saddam Hussein's 
regime and their hopes for Iraq's future;

* an Arabic youth magazine; and:

* an 18-minute documentary dubbed in eight languages titled Rebuilding 
Afghanistan, which depicts U.S. and allied efforts in the 
reconstruction of Afghanistan.

Media Campaign Highlights Shared Values:

In 2002, State's Bureau of Public Affairs launched a campaign called 
Shared Values to stimulate dialogue and increase understanding between 
Americans and people from predominantly Muslim countries. State 
developed a series of five short-form minidocumentaries to demonstrate 
that the United States is an open society and not at war with Islam, 
and that Americans and Muslims share certain values and beliefs. These 
minidocumentaries were dubbed in Arabic, Bahasa, Urdu, and French. 
State aired them via paid media for about 5 weeks during the holy month 
of Ramadan in Indonesia, Pakistan, Kuwait, and Malaysia. Several 
countries--Egypt, Morocco, and Lebanondid not allow State to air the 
documentaries because they viewed them as U.S. government propaganda. 
However, State also aired the documentaries on Pan Arab media, which 
consists of satellite broadcasts that reach audiences in a number of 
Arab countries, including Egypt and Lebanon. State estimates that the 
program reached approximately 288 million people in the Middle East, 
South Asia, and East Asia.

To complement the paid media campaign, State disseminated print and 
electronic pamphlets and other materials on the theme of Muslim life in 
America; sent speakers to Kuwait, Lebanon, and Jordan to promote 
additional interest in the Shared Values initiative; and held a 
satellite town hall meeting between Americans and Indonesians. State 
also worked with the Council of Muslim Americans for Understanding to 
create an interactive Web site, in multiple languages, called "Open 
Dialogue." The site is intended to create a forum for dialogue between 
Muslim Americans and other Muslims of the world.

Plans for Future Programs in Muslim Countries Under Way:

State's Public Affairs Bureau will continue its Shared Values program 
by conducting additional research, developing media products, and 
conducting public relations efforts in the Muslim world. State plans to 
work with private voluntary organizations, USAID, U.S. businesses, and 
international journalists and broadcasters to develop print, video, and 
other television stories to inform large audiences about U.S.-led 
initiatives in developing countries. For example, in Egypt, where State 
did not air the minidocumentaries, it worked with local Egyptian TV and 
the Egyptian government to air three stories of USAID projects in the 
country. State plans to continue partnerships with USAID and other 
entities to demonstrate American generosity to audiences in Muslim-
majority countries and the rest of the world.

State has developed other plans and programs for the future that 
emphasize a broader and younger audience in predominantly Muslim 
countries. State's plans include exchange programs for high school 
students with significant Muslim populations and expanded English 
teaching programs to communicate American values to audiences overseas. 
State plans to make more information available in Farsi and South Asian 
languages. It also plans to dedicate 15 percent of its Speaker Program 
budget to an "Impact Series" that will focus on key themes, one of the 
first being "Outreach to the Muslim World." In addition, State is 
working with the Smithsonian Institution to develop 15 multimedia 
exhibits called "American Corners," which will provide access to 
reference materials on the United States in selected Muslim-majority 
countries.

State Lacks a Strategy for Public Diplomacy Programs:

The growth in programs to the Muslim world marks State's recognition of 
the need to increase diplomatic channels to this population. However, 
State lacks a comprehensive and commonly understood public diplomacy 
strategy to guide implementation of these programs. The absence of an 
integrated strategy could impede State's ability to direct its 
multifaceted efforts toward concrete and measurable progress. 
Furthermore, there is no interagency public diplomacy strategy to guide 
State's and all federal agencies' communication efforts. This limits 
the government's ability to convey consistent messages to overseas 
audiences and thus achieve mutually reinforcing benefits.

State Does Not Have an Integrated Public Diplomacy Strategy:

After September 11, State acknowledged the lack of, and need for, a 
strategy that integrates all of its diverse public diplomacy activities 
and directs them toward common objectives. However, the strategy is 
still in the development stage. The Acting Undersecretary for Public 
Diplomacy and Public Affairs told us that she is creating a new office 
of strategic planning to lead this effort. She said it was too early to 
predict when such a strategy might be completed. She also noted that, 
when the new Undersecretary is appointed, the direction of the strategy 
could change.

State officials told us that such a strategy is particularly important 
because State's public diplomacy operation is fragmented among the 
various organizational entities within the agency. Public affairs 
officers who responded to our survey indicated that the lack of a 
strategy has hindered their ability to effectively execute public 
diplomacy efforts overseas. More than 66 percent of public affairs 
officers in one region reported that the quality of strategic guidance 
from the Office of the Undersecretary in the last year and a half was 
generally insufficient or very insufficient. More than 40 percent in 
another region reported the same. We encountered similar complaints 
during our overseas fieldwork. For example, in Morocco, the former 
public affairs officer stated that so little information had been 
provided from Washington on State's post-September 11 public diplomacy 
strategy that he had to rely on newspaper articles and guesswork to 
formulate his in-country public diplomacy plans.

Private Sector Public Relations Tools Could Be Relevant to State's 
Needs:

Private sector public relations efforts and political campaigns use 
sophisticated strategies to integrate complex communication efforts, 
involving multiple players. Although State's public diplomacy efforts 
extend beyond the activities of public relations firms, many of the 
strategic tools that such firms employ are relevant to State's 
situation.

We held a roundtable discussion with some of the largest public 
relations firms in the United States to identify the key strategic 
components of their efforts. According to these executives, initial 
strategic decisions involve establishing the scope and nature of the 
problem, identifying the target audience, determining the core 
messages, and defining both success and failure. Subsequent steps 
include conducting research to validate the initial decisions, testing 
the core messages, carrying out prelaunch activities, and developing 
information materials. Each of these elements contains numerous other 
steps. Only when these steps are completed may the tactical program be 
implemented. Further, the program must be implemented while 
continuously measuring progress and adjusting tactics accordingly. 
Figure 4 illustrates the elements of a typical public relations 
strategy.

Figure 4: Elements of a Typical Public Relations Strategy:

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

The private sector officials emphasized the importance of synchronizing 
these activities in a systematic way so that the efforts are mutually 
reinforcing in advancing the campaign's overall objectives. They 
pointed out that, without a carefully integrated plan, the various 
elements are at risk of canceling one another out and possibly even 
damaging the overall campaign.

A report by the Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy[Footnote 12] 
and one issued in 2002 by the United Kingdom-based Foreign Policy 
Center[Footnote 13] emphasized the importance of employing 
communications consultants, pollsters, and media specialists to provide 
relevant expertise to State on media trends, market trends, production 
techniques, and emerging technologies. A report published by the 
Council on Foreign Relations[Footnote 14] also recommended increased 
private sector involvement, including the creation of an independent, 
not-for-profit, Corporation for Public Diplomacy. The officials who 
participated in our roundtable indicated a high level of interest in 
State's public diplomacy efforts and conveyed their willingness to 
assist State in developing its strategy.

Interagency Public Diplomacy Strategy Has Not Been Established:

To date, an interagency public diplomacy strategy that sets forth the 
messages and means for governmentwide communication efforts to overseas 
audiences has not been implemented. Because of their differing roles 
and missions, the White House, State, and other public diplomacy 
players often focus on different audiences and use varying means to 
communicate with them. The idea of an interagency strategy would be to 
consider the foreign publics in key countries and regions, the relevant 
U.S. national interests there, what U.S. government communication 
channels are available, and how to optimize their use in conveying 
desired themes and messages.

The lack of an interagency strategy complicates the task of conveying 
consistent messages and thus achieving mutually reinforcing benefits. 
State officials told us that, without such a strategy, the risk of 
making communication mistakes that are damaging to U.S. public 
diplomacy efforts is high. They also said that the lack of a strategy 
diminishes the efficiency and effectiveness of governmentwide public 
diplomacy efforts. Reports by the Defense Science Board Task 
Force,[Footnote 15] the Council on Foreign Relations,[Footnote 16] and 
Wilton Park[Footnote 17]an executive agency of the British Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office, as well as reports by the Advisory Commission on 
Public Diplomacy[Footnote 18] and National Defense 
University,[Footnote 19] concluded that a sophisticated interagency 
communications strategy is needed to synchronize agencies' target 
audience assessments, messages, and capabilities.

Our overseas fieldwork in Egypt and Morocco underlined the importance 
of interagency coordination. Embassy officers there told us that only a 
very small percentage of the population was aware of the magnitude of 
U.S. assistance being provided to their countries. Egypt is the second 
largest recipient of U.S. assistance in the world, with assistance 
totaling more than an estimated $1.9 billion in 2003. Assistance to 
Morocco totaled more than an estimated $13 million in 2003. USAID and 
embassy officials in both countries are currently testing new 
approaches and cooperating more closely to better publicize USAID's 
efforts; however, they noted that the idea of USAID taking a more 
aggressive role in promoting its work was not necessarily universally 
supported within USAID.

Most interagency communication coordination efforts have been ad hoc in 
recent years. Immediately after September 11, the White House, State 
Department, Department of Defense, and other agencies coordinated 
various public diplomacy efforts on a day-to-day basis, and the White 
House established a number of interim coordination mechanisms. One such 
mechanism was the joint operation of the Coalition Information Centers 
in Washington, London, and Islamabad, set up during the early stages of 
U.S. military operations in Afghanistan in 2001. The centers were 
designed to provide a rapid response capability for correcting 
inaccurate news stories, proactively dealing with news items likely to 
generate negative responses overseas, and optimizing reporting of news 
favorable to U.S. efforts.

More recently, the White House established a more permanent 
coordination mechanism. On January 21, 2003, the President issued an 
executive order forming the White House Office of Global 
Communications. The office is intended to coordinate strategic 
communications from the U.S. government to overseas audiences. The 
President also established a Strategic Communication Policy 
Coordinating Committee, co-chaired by the State Department and the 
National Security Council and to work closely with the Office of Global 
Communications, to ensure interagency coordination in disseminating the 
American message across the globe. It is the committee's long-term 
objective to develop a National Communications Strategy. One high-level 
State official told us that the war in Iraq had delayed efforts to 
develop the strategy, and that it would not be in place until September 
2003 at the earliest.

State Lacks Measurable Indicators of Progress Toward Public Diplomacy 
Goals:

State is not systematically and comprehensively measuring progress 
toward its public diplomacy goals. Its overseas performance measurement 
efforts focus on anecdotal evidence and program outputs, rather than 
gauging progress toward changing foreign publics' understanding and 
attitudes about the United States. Public affairs officers responding 
to our survey reported that their missions had insufficient staff to 
conduct systematic program evaluations. In addition, limited 
availability and use of polling data hamper State's ability to track 
progress. Although it is difficult to establish direct links between 
public diplomacy programs and results, other U.S. government agencies 
and the private sector have some best practices for assessing 
information dissemination campaigns, including the need to define 
success and how it should be measured.

State's Current Performance Plan Does Not Include Measurable Indicators 
of Progress:

State's current performance plan does not feature measurable indicators 
of progress toward public diplomacy goals. State's agencywide fiscal 
year 2003 performance plan includes a wide range of public diplomacy 
activities that are used to address various strategic goals, but the 
plan directly addresses only one type of public diplomacy activity--
educational and cultural exchanges--as a specific strategic and 
performance goal in and of itself. The performance indicator that State 
cites for this goal does not address the ultimate outcomes that are 
desired for these programs. For example, State reported that 94 percent 
of exchange program participants viewed their experiences as valuable, 
based on "highly successful or valuable" ratings in program 
evaluations.[Footnote 20] While it is useful to know that participants' 
experiences were favorable, this information does not demonstrate 
progress toward the more fundamental objective of achieving changes in 
understanding and attitudes about the United States.

While State plans to improve its public diplomacy measures in 2004, its 
plans still lack some important elements. For example, State cites the 
intended use of independent surveys and polls to determine the success 
of its programs, but it does not define what would constitute success, 
nor does it specify what the surveys would measure or the frequency of 
measurement. In other cases, State cites targets that are too vague to 
measure. For example, its plans for evaluating international 
information programs include the target, "evidence shows that 
information provided has reached the intended user." State officials 
acknowledged that these indicators and targets were not measurable and 
stated they are working to develop more quantitative indicators that 
can be measured. State also plans to measure public diplomacy 
performance on a global basis rather than by geographic region, as 
called for by the Office of Management and Budget.

Overseas Performance Measurement Efforts Emphasize Anecdotes and 
Program Activity:

While performance measurement efforts at individual overseas posts vary 
greatly, many focus on anecdotes or the amount of program activity in 
their host country. For instance, posts might report on foreign press 
coverage of conferences and speakers sponsored by U.S. embassies; on 
favorable articles written by foreign journalists after they complete 
tours in the United States; or on the activities of other former 
exchange program participants. State has developed a database for posts 
to record anecdotal evidence of results in specific instances. However, 
posts are not required to follow up on exchange program participants on 
a systematic or periodic basis. Other posts simply count the number of 
public diplomacy activities that take place in their host country. For 
example, some posts tally the number of speeches given by the 
ambassador or the number of news articles placed in the host-country 
media. While such measures shed light on the level of public diplomacy 
activity, they reveal little in the way of overall program 
effectiveness.

Overseas Posts Not Required to Report Whether Performance Targets Are 
Met:

Notwithstanding the relative usefulness of individual posts' 
performance measurement efforts, there are currently no reporting 
requirements in place to determine whether posts' performance targets 
are actually met. At one overseas post we visited, the post had 
identified polling data showing that only 22 percent of the host-
country's citizens had a favorable view of the United States. The post 
used that figure as a baseline with yearly percentage increases set as 
targets. However, the former public affairs officer at the post told us 
that he did not attempt to determine or report on whether the post had 
actually achieved these targets because there was no requirement to do 
so. Officials at the other two overseas posts we visited also cited the 
lack of any formal reporting requirement for following up on whether 
they met their annual performance targets. Officials in State's Office 
of Strategic and Performance Planning said that such a requirement is 
currently under consideration.

Insufficient Data and Resources Hinder Performance Measurement:

Public affairs officers at U.S. embassies generally do not conduct 
systematic program evaluations. Moreover, they noted that measuring the 
impact of public diplomacy programs is difficult because the full 
effects of such programs may not be known for years. For example, 
tracking the activities of former exchange program participants over 
the course of many years is a labor-intensive effort. About 79 percent 
of the respondents to our survey reported that staffing at their 
missions was insufficient to conduct systematic program evaluations. 
Many officers also reported that staffing at posts was insufficient to 
carry out the long-range monitoring required to adequately measure 
program effectiveness. Some officers said that this is especially 
problematic at smaller posts, where public diplomacy sections may 
consist of very few Foreign Service officers.

Even if sufficient staffing were available, State would still have 
difficulty conducting long-range tracking of exchange participants 
because it lacks a database with comprehensive information on its 
various exchange program alumni. Although State's records are better 
for more recent exchange participants, its ability to locate 
individuals who participated prior to 1996 is limited. State had 
planned to begin building a new worldwide alumni database with 
comprehensive data, but Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs 
officials told us that State had received insufficient funds to do so. 
State officials told us that the new database would require about 
$600,000 in additional funding.[Footnote 21] State is currently 
considering less costly alternatives that involve using its existing 
information systems. For example, State has hired contractors to review 
the paper archives of exchange programs and convert alumni data to 
electronic form. However, bureau officials said they lack the funds to 
conduct the type of outreach necessary to verify and update alumni 
addresses and other information. They estimated that such an outreach 
effort would require approximately $3.4 million in additional 
funding.[Footnote 22] State is requesting two new positions to assist 
in the administration of alumni activities.

State's Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs surveys exchange 
program participants on their program experiences, their activities 
afterwards, and their impressions of the programs' effects on them. The 
bureau uses these and other data to evaluate specific exchange programs 
every 5 to 7 years on a rotating basis. The bureau has also recently 
initiated an effort to ask individuals who have completed exchange 
programs to recall specific attitudes and knowledge before the programs 
and how those had changed as a result of the programs. However, for 
most of its exchange programs, State does not systematically conduct 
pre-and post-program surveys that directly test and compare participant 
attitudes and knowledge before and after participation. Evaluation 
experts in the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs acknowledged 
that conducting such surveys would provide more meaningful data on the 
effectiveness of exchange programs, but bureau officials estimated that 
such an approach would require approximately $2.2 million annually to 
pretest all alumni about their attitudes. It would also require two 
additional staff persons or hiring an evaluation firm to help with the 
data collection and analysis.

Limited Polling Data Make Progress Assessments Difficult:

A number of public affairs officers suggested that expanded use of 
overseas opinion research would provide a useful basis for measuring 
public diplomacy progress. Private sector officials from public 
relations and opinion research firms and the Ad Council agreed. Common 
public relations firm measurement techniques include surveys and 
polling to develop baseline data, immediate follow-up research, and 
additional tracking polls over a period of time to identify long-term 
changes. Reports by the Council on Foreign Relations,[Footnote 23] 
Wilton Park,[Footnote 24]and the Defense Science Board Task 
Force[Footnote 25] also emphasized the need for increased use of 
foreign opinion research for public diplomacy efforts. The officials 
who attended our roundtable noted that incorporating performance 
measurement so pervasively into a campaign is costly. However, this 
cost is considered essential to the campaign's success. The officials 
estimated that, based on their experience with similar information 
campaigns, of State's roughly $500 million to $600 million public 
diplomacy budget, $30 million to $50 million should be spent on opinion 
research and performance measurement. State's Bureau of Intelligence 
and Research currently spends about $3.5 million annually on overseas 
opinion research.

The director of the Office of Research in State's Bureau of 
Intelligence and Research said that, with additional funding, State 
could more regularly monitor foreign opinion overseas. Although State 
conducts overseas opinion research on foreign perceptions of the United 
States and its foreign policy in all but a handful of countries, it 
does not have sufficient funds to conduct more than one or two surveys 
in each country per year. The director told us that, in certain high 
priority countries, he would like to conduct monthly surveys to track 
fast-changing circumstances. Focus group studies in high priority 
countries would also be helpful in providing more in-depth analyses of 
attitudes. The official estimated that increased polling and focus 
groups in high priority countries would require an estimated $1.5 
million in additional annual funding. State could also employ advanced 
"data mining" technology that would combine data collected in State's 
research with that of other surveys to detect patterns that would help 
researchers tie trends and shifts in opinion to specific events and 
efforts. The official estimated that such technology would require a 
one-time investment of roughly $1 million and an ongoing annual cost of 
about $75,000. State could also explore using the Internet to conduct 
overseas surveys, as a complement to conventional polling efforts. The 
official said that this project could be launched for as little as 
$200,000.

Even the limited polling that State does conduct is not fully utilized 
by public affairs officers overseas. About 46 percent of our survey 
respondents reported that they rarely, if ever, receive such data. 
Thus, they may not always be aware of changes in foreign audiences' 
attitudes toward the United States. The Broadcasting Board of Governors 
also conducts audience research efforts in a number of foreign 
countries that could be useful to public affairs officers. However, in 
regions of the world where the Board broadcasts its programs, more than 
91 percent of our survey respondents reported that they rarely, if 
ever, receive such data. State officials told us that they provide both 
the State polling data and the broadcasting audience research data to 
the public diplomacy office directors in State's regional bureaus. 
However, it is up to each regional bureau to review the data and ensure 
that it reaches the appropriate public affairs officers overseas. State 
officials told us that some regional bureaus are probably more diligent 
in doing so than others, and that some public affairs officers may not 
even be aware that such data are available to them. State plans to 
emphasize the availability of such data in new public training courses 
it is developing at the Foreign Service Institute.

Other U.S. Government Agencies and the Private Sector Offer Strategies 
for Assessing Performance:

A recent GAO report on strategies for assessing U.S. government 
information dissemination efforts recognized that establishing a causal 
link between agency actions and the ultimate impact of such programs is 
difficult.[Footnote 26] However, the report points out that by 
systematically identifying the incremental outcomes expected at each 
step, U.S. government agencies were able to construct a logical 
framework, or logic model, that demonstrated how achieving short and 
intermediate outcome goals could lead to a certain level of assurance 
that expected results would be realized. For example, the Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention constructed a logic model to gauge the 
reinforcing effects of media and community-based campaigns to reduce 
tobacco use. Short and intermediate outcome goals included changes in 
knowledge and attitudes about tobacco use, adherence to and enforcement 
of no-smoking regulations, reduced smoking initiation among young 
people, and increased smoking cessation among adults. Long-term 
outcomes included decreased smoking, reduced exposure to environmental 
tobacco smoke, and reduced tobacco-related mortality. In State's case, 
short-term outcomes for public diplomacy programs could include target 
audience knowledge and awareness of U.S. principles, beliefs, and 
policies. Intermediate outcomes could include positive changes in 
attitude toward specific U.S. policies. Long-term outcomes could 
include implementation of U.S. foreign policy issues prompted by U.S. 
public diplomacy programs such as educational and cultural exchanges.

The private sector officials with whom we met agreed with our 
assessment of the difficulty in establishing direct causal links 
between public diplomacy programs and results. However, they noted that 
establishing convincing correlations is a reasonable expectation. For 
example, to measure the effectiveness of a campaign to promote the use 
of seat belts, the Ad Council conducted precampaign attitudinal surveys 
to gauge awareness and understanding of the importance of wearing seat 
belts and then administered weekly surveys during the campaign to track 
the progression of attitude shifts. It also counted the number of Web 
site hits and 1-800 telephone calls that occurred in response to the 
campaign. Ad Council officials told us that they ultimately established 
correlations between these measures and Department of Transportation 
statistics on seat belt deaths. Ad Council and other private sector 
officials said that, to establish such correlations, effectiveness 
measures must be incorporated into every aspect of a program from its 
outset. The officials emphasized that before a program is even 
launched, evaluators should establish a definition for success; 
identify priorities; and determine what should be measured, how it 
should be measured, and how frequently.

Although State's public diplomacy efforts extend beyond information 
dissemination, many of the logic model concepts would still be 
applicable to State's situation. Such an approach could be particularly 
useful in evaluating the combined effect of State's wide-ranging public 
diplomacy activities. Our report noted that for comprehensive 
initiatives that combine various approaches to achieving a goal, a 
logic model can help articulate how those approaches are intended to 
assist and supplement one another. Evaluations of performance can then 
assess the effects of an integrated set of efforts. The lack of an 
integrated system for measuring public diplomacy performance hinders 
State's ability to correct its course of action or to direct resources 
toward activities that offer a greater likelihood of success. Officials 
in State's Educational and Cultural Affairs bureau told us that they 
are currently in the process of developing a performance measurement 
system for the bureau's exchange programs that includes the components 
identified in our report.

State Faces Other Significant Challenges:

State's public diplomacy efforts face some additional significant 
challenges. Among them are insufficient time and staffing resources to 
conduct public diplomacy tasks. Public affairs officers also reported 
that burdensome administrative and budgetary processes often divert 
their attention from public diplomacy programs. A significant number of 
Foreign Service officers involved in public diplomacy efforts overseas 
lack sufficient foreign language skills. In addition, many public 
affairs officers reported that the amount of time available to attend 
public diplomacy training is inadequate.

Insufficient Time and Staff:

More than 40 percent of the public affairs officers we surveyed 
reported that the amount of time they had to devote exclusively to 
executing public diplomacy tasks was insufficient. During our overseas 
fieldwork, officers told us that, while they manage to attend U.S. and 
other foreign embassy receptions and functions within their host 
country capitals, it was particularly difficult to find time to travel 
outside the capitals to interact with ordinary citizens. Some officers 
said they were too busy and there was not enough staff to take such 
trips. More than 50 percent of those responding to our survey reported 
that the number of Foreign Service officers available to perform public 
diplomacy duties was inadequate. Although State increased the actual 
number of Americans in public diplomacy positions overseas from 414 in 
fiscal year 2000 to 448 in fiscal year 2002, State still had a 
shortfall of public diplomacy staff in 2002, based on the projected 
needs identified in State's latest overseas staffing model. In 2002, 
State's overseas staffing model projected the need for 512 staff in 
these positions; however, 64 of these positions, or 13 percent, were 
not filled.[Footnote 27]

We reported in 2002[Footnote 28] that as part of its Diplomatic 
Readiness Initiative, State has launched an aggressive recruiting 
program to rebuild the department's total workforce. Under this 
initiative, State requested 1,158 new employees above attrition over 
the 3-year period for fiscal years 2002 through 2004. However, it does 
not have numerical targets for specific skill requirements such as 
language proficiency or regional expertise. Although State officials 
are optimistic that enough new hires are being brought in to address 
the overall staffing shortage, there are no assurances that the 
recruiting efforts will result in the right people with the right 
skills needed to meet specific critical shortfalls.

Burdensome Administrative and Budgetary Processes:

Officers responding to our survey, those with whom we met overseas, and 
numerous other State officials also pointed to the amount of extra time 
public diplomacy practitioners are required to spend on administrative, 
budgetary, and personnel matters due to the unique nature of the 
program. They indicated that these processes had been a particular 
problem for embassy public affairs sections since the former USIA 
merged with State in 1999. At that time, USIA's administrative 
personnel who were familiar with the administrative requirements of 
public diplomacy activities became part of State's administrative 
operations in Washington and at embassies overseas and were no longer 
dedicated solely to public diplomacy activities. Public affairs 
officers said that State's administrative processes were often too slow 
and inflexible to handle the logistics and timing required to set up 
media and cultural events and other program activities. Because these 
activities are so different from those conducted in the course of 
traditional government-to-government diplomacy, State management 
officers are often unfamiliar with them.

For example, embassy public affairs section officials in one country 
told us that the planned filming of USAID projects was held up because 
embassy procedures did not allow making advance cash payments to the 
television crew. Instead, the embassy preferred either making 
electronic fund transfers in dollars or issuing checks. The officials 
noted that, unlike in the United States, businesses in the developing 
world usually demand cash payments in advance because they do not have 
sufficient working capital to provide services and then wait for 
payment. Also, the businesses often do not have bank accounts that can 
accept electronic fund transfers in dollars. In this case, getting the 
television crew paid and working required the head of the public 
affairs section to become personally involved in persuading the embassy 
administrative section to act.

Public affairs officers told us that this example is typical and that 
having to continually intervene in resolving routine administrative 
issues leaves them less time to actually conduct public diplomacy 
efforts. State officials told us they recognized the problem and had 
designated certain administrative personnel at some embassies to work 
with public affairs sections to reduce the time spent by those sections 
on administrative matters. However, the officials said there were still 
insufficient numbers of such designated personnel.

Shortfalls in Foreign Language Skills:

Insufficient foreign language skills pose another problem for many 
officers. As of December 31, 2002, 21 percent of the 332 Foreign 
Service officers filling "language-designated" public diplomacy 
positions overseas did not meet the foreign language speaking 
requirements of their positions.[Footnote 29] The highest percentages 
not meeting the requirements were in the Near East, where 30 percent of 
the officers did not meet the requirement. Although State had no 
language-designated positions for South Asia, it had eight language-
preferred[Footnote 30] positions, none of which were filled by officers 
who had reading or speaking capability in those languages. It is 
important to note that most of the foreign languages required in these 
two regions are considered difficult to master, such as Arabic and 
Urdu. In contrast, 85 percent of the officers filling French language-
designated positions and 97 percent of those filling Spanish language-
designated ones met the requirements. Officers' opinions on the quality 
of the foreign language training they received also varied greatly by 
region. For example, 67 percent of the officers in one region reported 
that the quality of language training was either generally or very 
sufficient, while 67 percent in another region reported that training 
quality was generally or very insufficient.[Footnote 31]

Foreign Service officers posted at the overseas embassies we visited 
and other State officials told us that having fluency in a host 
country's language is important for effectively conducting public 
diplomacy. The foreign government officials with whom we met in Egypt, 
Morocco, and the United Kingdom agreed. They noted that, even in 
countries where English is widely understood, speaking the host 
country's language demonstrates respect for its people and its culture. 
In Morocco, officers in the public affairs and other sections of the 
embassy told us that, because their ability to speak Arabic was poor, 
they conducted most embassy business in French. French is widely used 
in that country, especially in business and government. However, 
embassy officers told us that speaking Arabic would provide superior 
entre to the Moroccan public. The ability to speak country-specific 
forms of Arabic and other more obscure dialects would generate even 
more goodwill, especially outside the major cities.

Some Foreign Affairs officers pointed to State's policy of limiting 
most overseas tours to 2 or 3 years as a factor that contributes to 
insufficient language skills. They also said this policy makes it more 
difficult to cultivate personal relationships that in some countries 
take a long time to develop. They noted that the diplomatic corps of 
some other countries with major overseas diplomatic presences allow 
longer overseas tours and that their diplomats demonstrate superior 
foreign language skills as a result. Officers at the embassies we 
visited also noted that, because public diplomacy efforts should and 
often do involve political and economic officers and others outside the 
public affairs section, it is important that they be proficient in host 
country languages as well. A number of officers in these other sections 
told us that language proficiency was a problem for them as 
well.[Footnote 32] State officials told us that they are aware of this 
concern but that they rely on tools other than lengthened tours of duty 
to foster language skills, such as offering pay incentives to officers 
who are proficient in foreign languages used in certain countries. 
Also, they said officers who have the required language proficiency 
have a competitive advantage over those who do not in bidding for 
overseas positions.

According to the department, the largest and most significant factor 
limiting its ability to fill language-designated positions is its long-
standing staffing shortfall. As mentioned above, State's Diplomatic 
Readiness Initiative is designed to replenish the ranks. Other planned 
actions include bolstering efforts to recruit job candidates with 
target language skills, sending language training supervisors to posts 
to determine ways to improve training offerings, and developing a new 
"language continuum" plan to guide efforts to meet the need for higher 
levels of competency in all languages, especially those critical to 
national security concerns.

Little Time for Training:

Time to attend public diplomacy training presents another challenge. 
About 58 percent of the officers responding to our survey reported that 
the amount of time available for such training is inadequate. In 
September 2003, State plans to launch a new public diplomacy training 
program, increasing the current 3 weeks of available public diplomacy 
training to 19. It has also added public diplomacy components to its 
training curriculum for certain officers outside the public diplomacy 
cone, including economic and political officers, ambassadors, and 
deputy chiefs of mission. Nonetheless, officers told us that unless a 
significant "float" of Foreign Service officer staffing is established 
for training, it would be difficult for officers to attend the 
training. They noted that many of their posts had positions that were 
vacant for some time before they began their tour there. Under these 
circumstances, there was tremendous pressure to begin their tours as 
soon as possible, leaving little or no time for training. State is 
expecting staffing increases resulting from the Diplomatic Readiness 
Initiative to enable it to create a "training float" that will allow 
staff sufficient time to receive training in foreign languages and 
other key skills.

Conclusions:

Since the war on terrorism began, the need for a positive American 
message to the world has never been more important. Opinion research 
reveals that many foreign publics, especially those in Muslim-majority 
countries, have highly unfavorable perceptions of the United States, 
and State has sought to enhance its public diplomacy efforts in these 
countries. But the absence of an integrated and commonly understood 
strategy for State's public diplomacy efforts makes it difficult for 
State to direct its diverse efforts in a systematic manner to achieve 
measurable results. The methods and techniques of private sector public 
relations campaigns merit consideration in developing and implementing 
such a strategy. Also, because State is not systematically and 
comprehensively measuring progress toward its public diplomacy goals, 
its ability to correct its course of action or to direct resources 
toward activities that offer a greater likelihood of success is 
limited. While the difficulty of measuring State's long-term influence 
on audiences overseas should not be underestimated, private sector 
public relations firms and other U.S. government agencies provide some 
reasonable examples of where to begin. Shortfalls in staffing, 
burdensome administrative and budgeting processes, Foreign Service 
officers with insufficient foreign language proficiency, and 
insufficient time for public diplomacy training pose additional 
challenges for State.

Recommendations for Executive Action:

To improve the planning, coordination, execution, and assessment of 
U.S. public diplomacy efforts, we recommend that the Secretary of 
State:

* develop and widely disseminate throughout the department a strategy 
that considers the techniques of private sector public relations firms 
in integrating all of State's public diplomacy efforts and directing 
them toward achieving common and measurable objectives;

* consider ways to collaborate with the private sector to employ best 
practices for measuring efforts to inform and influence target 
audiences, including expanded use of opinion research and better use of 
existing research;

* designate more administrative positions to overseas public affairs 
sections to reduce the administrative burden;

* strengthen efforts to train Foreign Service officers in foreign 
languages; and:

* program adequate time for public diplomacy training into State's 
assignment process.

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:

State provided written comments on a draft of this report (see app. 
IV). State generally concurred with the report's observations and 
conclusions. State said that it intends to implement our 
recommendations and that it has already begun taking measures to do so 
in some areas.

While State agreed with our recommendation to consider ways to employ 
private sector best practices for measuring the effectiveness of its 
public diplomacy efforts, it said that the report did not adequately 
describe the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs' efforts to 
gauge the effectiveness of exchange programs. We have incorporated 
additional information on these efforts into the report.

:

We are sending copies of this report to other interested members of 
Congress, the Secretary of State, and the Chairman of the Broadcasting 
Board of Governors. We also will make copies available to others upon 
request. In addition, this report will be available at no charge on the 
GAO Web site at [Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov] http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please 
contact me at (202) 512-4128. Other GAO contacts and staff 
acknowledgments are listed in appendix V.

Jess T. Ford 

Director, International Affairs and Trade:

Signed by Jess T. Ford: 

[End of section]

Appendixes:

[End of section]

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:

To obtain information on all of our objectives, especially those 
related to public diplomacy effectiveness measures and critical public 
diplomacy challenges, we administered a survey to the heads of public 
affairs sections at U.S. embassies worldwide. The response rate to our 
survey was 76 percent. See appendix II for further details on the 
development and results of our survey.

To examine the range of the State Department's (State) key public 
diplomacy programs and how programs and resources have changed since 
September 11, we reviewed State budget requests, annual reports, and 
other program documentation. We also met with officials in State's 
Office of the Undersecretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, 
the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, the Bureau of Public 
Affairs, the Office of International Information Programs, and regional 
bureaus in Washington, D.C.

To assess whether State has an overall strategy for its public 
diplomacy programs and how it measures the effectiveness of these 
programs, we reviewed relevant planning, program, and other 
documentation; analyzed survey results; and met with cognizant State, 
academic, and private sector officials.

* We reviewed State's efforts to develop its own strategy and its 
involvement in developing an interagency public diplomacy strategy.

* We reviewed State's current agencywide strategic and performance 
plans, its agencywide plans for 2004, and the performance plans of 
selected functional and regional bureaus and overseas missions.

* We analyzed State's performance measurement methods that were 
identified in the results of our survey of public affairs officers at 
U.S. embassies.

* We met with officials in State's Office of Strategic and Performance 
Planning and Bureau for Intelligence and Research and with other State 
officials involved in strategic and performance planning for public 
diplomacy efforts in Washington, D.C.

* We discussed private sector methods for evaluating the effectiveness 
of persuasive techniques with representatives of the Public Diplomacy 
Institute at George Washington University, School of Media and Public 
Affairs; Ketchum; and Weber Shandwick Worldwide, in Washington, D.C.; 
and the Ad Council, in New York City. We also hosted roundtable 
discussions in Washington, D.C., with high-level officials from some of 
the largest public relations and opinion research firms in the United 
States. The firms represented at these discussions included APCO 
Worldwide; Fleishman-Hillard, Inc.; Greenberg Quinlan Rosner Research, 
Inc.; Hill and Knowlton, Inc.; Ketchum; The Pew Research Center for the 
People and the Press; Porter Novelli International; Weber Shandwick 
Worldwide; and Zogby International. We also received information from 
Gallup International.

To identify the critical challenges faced in executing public diplomacy 
programs, we reviewed relevant program and other documentation, 
analyzed survey results, met with State officials domestically and 
overseas, interviewed foreign government and nongovernmental 
organization officials, and met with a number of other outside 
observers of U.S. public diplomacy issues.

* We analyzed impediments to public diplomacy efforts that were 
identified in the results of our survey of public affairs officers at 
U.S. embassies.

* We analyzed data on State's foreign language designated public 
diplomacy positions worldwide and compared them with data on the 
numbers of officers actually meeting the designated language 
requirements.

* We analyzed projected staffing needs identified in State's overseas 
staffing model and compared them with data on the number of positions 
actually filled.

* We met with officials in State's Office of the Undersecretary for 
Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, the Bureau of Educational and 
Cultural Affairs, the Bureau of Public Affairs, the Office of 
International Information Programs, and regional bureaus in Washington, 
D.C.

* We met with U.S. embassy officers, host-country government officials, 
and private sector and nongovernmental organization representatives in 
the United Kingdom, Morocco, and Egypt to gain a firsthand view of 
public diplomacy challenges faced overseas. These countries were 
selected based on congressional interest as well as their respective 
geopolitical situations, strategic significance to the United States, 
and roles in the war against terrorism. They were also selected to 
provide an appropriate mix with respect to the scale of in-country U.S. 
public diplomacy operations, the size of U.S. foreign assistance 
efforts, the types of public diplomacy challenges faced, and the 
methods used in conducting public diplomacy.

* We consulted with representatives of the Advisory Commission on 
Public Diplomacy, the Council on Foreign Relations, and a number of 
retired public diplomacy practitioners.

We conducted our work from May 2002 through May 2003 in accordance with 
generally accepted government auditing standards.

[End of section]

Appendix II: Survey Development and Results:

To assess the State Department's public diplomacy performance 
measurement efforts and identify critical challenges faced in executing 
public diplomacy activities, we conducted a survey of the heads of 
public affairs sections at U.S. embassies and certain U.S. missions to 
international organizations and major U.S. consulates around the world. 
The survey was conducted using a Web-based instrument from March 5 to 
May 29, 2003.

The questionnaire was developed from October through December 2002 by 
social science survey specialists and other individuals knowledgeable 
about public diplomacy issues. We also obtained a series of comments 
and feedback from key State Department staff in December 2002 and 
January 2003. The questionnaire was then pretested in December 2002 and 
January 2003 with five current and former State Department officials 
who had served as heads of public affairs sections at U.S. embassies 
overseas to ensure that the questionnaire was clear and unambiguous, 
independent, and unbiased.

We developed our list of the study population based on information from 
the Office of the Undersecretary for Public Diplomacy and Public 
Affairs, particularly concerning which missions to international 
organizations and major consulates should be included in the survey. In 
all, we sent the survey to the 156 individuals we identified as our 
study population and received completed surveys from 118 of these, for 
a 76 percent response rate. Members of the survey population were sent 
an initial notification of the survey prior to the release of the 
survey on the Web and an initial survey invitation when the survey was 
released. These were followed by two reminder E-mails. The survey 
population was also offered the opportunity to download a copy of the 
questionnaire to fill in by hand and return via fax. Individuals who 
had not responded after these measures received calls from the project 
staff to explain the importance of the study and encourage them to 
respond. An exception to this protocol was made for respondents serving 
in the Near East during the Iraq conflict. Follow-up phone calls were 
not made to those serving in countries in the region of the conflict. 
Data for this study were entered directly into the Web instrument by 
the respondents and converted into a database for analysis.

In appendix III, we present the results of the closed-ended questions 
to our survey.

[End of section]

Appendix III: Questionnaire for State Department Public Affairs 
Officers:

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

[End of section]

Appendix IV: Comments from the State Department:

United States Department of State:

Washington, D.C. 20520:

AUG 20 2003:

Dear Ms. Westin:

We appreciate the opportunity to review your draft report, "U.S. PUBLIC 
DIPLOMACY: State Department Expands Efforts but Faces Significant 
Challenges," GAO-03-951, GAO Job Code 320131.

The enclosed Department of State comments are provided for 
incorporation with this letter as an appendix to the final report.

If you have any questions concerning this response, please contact Jan 
Brambilla, Under Secretary's Office for Public Diplomacy and Public 
Affairs, at (202) 647-9109.

Sid L. Kaplan, 

Acting Assistant Secretary for Resource Management and 
Chief Financial Officer:

Signed by Sid L. Kaplan: 

Enclosure:

As stated.

cc: GAO/IAT - John Brummet State/OIG - Luther Atkins State/R - 
Charlotte Beers State/H - Paul Kelly:

Ms. Susan S. Westin, Managing Director, International Affairs and 
Trade, U.S. General Accounting Office.

Department of State Comments on the Draft Report U.S. Public Diplomacy: 
State Department Expands Efforts but Faces Significant Challenges (GAO-
03-951):

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 changed the lives, minds 
and hearts of people throughout the world. A war on terrorism began and 
continues today. We cannot effectively deal alone with threats and 
challenges, which are common to all of humanity. Through effective 
public diplomacy and exchanges we are building alliances of common 
interests based on a foundation of trust and respect. The past year, 
the Office of the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public 
Affairs has worked with department bureaus to support the War on 
Terrorism, focusing on our commitment to both Afghanistan and Iraq, and 
on the Muslim world through programs and funding. Our strategy 
emphasizes policy advocacy supported by information about American 
culture and values, as well as the multifaceted educational and people-
to-people programs of exchanges funded through the Bureau of 
Educational and Cultural Affairs. We are also placing increased 
emphasis on research and analysis, specifically of international media 
coverage of key issues. Primary issues for American public diplomacy 
are the War on Terrorism, including Afghanistan and Iraq, HIV/AIDS, and 
strengthening relationships among the community of nations with which 
we share common interests in advancing security, prosperity and 
democracy.

The report makes five recommendations and we offer the following 
comments for each recommendation.

* The Office of the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public 
Affairs will expand engagement with private sector public relations 
firms to draw on their expertise in strategies and tactics for 
influencing international public opinion. U.S. public diplomacy 
strategy will necessarily flow from the foreign policy priorities set 
by the President, and primary objectives will be formulated at a 
strategic level: supporting the war on terrorism; advancing democracy 
and prosperity. Specific objectives and the techniques to achieve them 
will be determined on a regional or country-by-country basis. We 
welcome the recommendation to consider private sector techniques as we 
pursue "integrating all of State's public diplomacy efforts...":

Full integration of public diplomacy functions into all aspects of the 
Department's work, policy formulation as well as implementation, is a 
primary operational goal of the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy 
and Public Affairs and entire senior leadership of the Department.

* We agree with this recommendation and will continue to collaborate 
with the private sector to measure the 
effectiveness of public diplomacy activities; and programs "to inform 
and influence target audiences."; We agree with the report's statement 
that "it is difficult; to establish a 
direct link between public diplomacy and results," (p. 14) given the 
multiplicity of forces which affect public perceptions and the 
complexity of issues involved. Nevertheless, we are committed to 
determining, as far as possible, the effectiveness of various public 
diplomacy programs on a global basis and the impact of resources 
dedicated to them. Recently, we collaborated with the private sector to 
measure the effectiveness of our Shared Values program geared toward 
Muslim audiences. We expect that methods will be developed to evaluate 
the effectiveness of all public diplomacy programs. Public diplomacy 
will only be one factor which, along with the substance of policy, 
concrete actions, and other outside influences, including competing 
communications efforts, affects public perceptions and attitudes 
towards, the United States and given issues. We note the reports 
recognition that public opinion research to measure program 
effectiveness in the way used by private firms is very costly. We will 
explore with private sector partners the logic model concepts, which 
could be applicable to State's situation.

* The regional executive directors are following-up with the respective 
posts to determine the most efficient allocation of resources to 
accomplish public diplomacy support.

* The report identified impediments for increased language training, 
including staffing shortfalls. The Diplomatic Readiness Initiative is 
working effectively to alleviate these shortfalls. GAO stressed the 
importance of language fluency for PD officers and we agree with the 
assessment.

* The report correctly notes that a significant "float" of foreign 
service officer staffing will go far to alleviate current constraints 
that used to be acute, especially when officers were needed at post 
yesterday. Training was a luxury that could only be accommodated when 
there was no pressure to assign officer.

The report does not adequately describe the Office of Program 
Evaluation's role in the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs 
(ECA). This office contracts with independent, external, professional 
evaluators to conduct outcome and impact evaluations of its exchange 
programs. Specific programs are evaluated every five to seven years on 
a rotating basis to determine the extent to which they are achieving 
their legislative mandates and program goals. Through questionnaires, 
interviews and focus groups, the evaluators measure changes in 
knowledge, understanding, attitudes and behavior of over 2,700 
different ECA program alumni annually using internationally recognized 
social science research and statistically valid methodologies, 
including logic models--a requirement in all evaluation projects. With 
an annual budget of $1.5 million, this unique office in the Department 
has completed 20 evaluations using 13 separate evaluation firms since 
1999.

We are committed to maintaining the highest standards in the 
development and execution of our public diplomacy programs.


[End of section]

Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:

GAO Contact: 

Diana Glod (202) 512-8945:

Staff Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the individual named above, key contributors to this 
report included Rick Barrett, Lyric Clark, Janey Cohen, Michael Courts, 
Rebecca Gambler, Edward Kennedy, Heather Von Behren, and Monica 
Wolford.

(320131):

FOOTNOTES

[1] U.S. international broadcasting operations include the Voice of 
America, WorldNet Television and Film Service, Radio/TV Marti, Radio 
Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Radio Free Asia, Radio Sawa, and Radio 
Farda.

[2] U.S. General Accounting Office, U.S. International Broadcasting: 
New Strategic Approach Focuses on Reaching Large Audiences but Lacks 
Measurable Program Objectives, GAO-03-772 (Washington, D.C. July 15, 
2003).

[3] Fiscal year 2003 figures are estimates. Percentage calculations 
were computed using constant 2003 dollars. 

[4] Public diplomacy funding for the regions was calculated by adding 
public diplomacy funds allocated by regional bureau under the 
Appropriation for Diplomatic and Consular Programs to funds allocated 
by regional bureau under the Appropriation for Educational and Cultural 
Exchange Programs.

[5] On October 1, 1999, the U.S. Information Agency (USIA) was 
integrated into the State Department. The Office of the Undersecretary 
for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs was created to oversee the 
public diplomacy programs that USIA had administered. USIA's Office of 
Research and Media Reaction was merged into State's Bureau of 
Intelligence and Research. USIA's administrative support personnel and 
functions were transferred into nonpublic diplomacy functions, such as 
State's Bureau of Administration. USIA's international broadcasting 
operations were taken over by the newly created Broadcasting Board of 
Governors. Although State may provide policy guidance and advice, the 
Board is independent from State. 

[6] The Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, What the 
World Thinks in 2002, Pew Global Attitudes Project (Dec. 4, 2002). Pew 
surveyed 38,000 people in 44 countries over a 4-month period (July 
through October 2002) to assess how the publics of the world view their 
lives, their nation, the world, and the United States. Muslim countries 
surveyed included Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Pakistan, Turkey, and 
Uzbekistan.

[7] The Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, America's 
Image Further Erodes, Europeans Want Weaker Ties, Pew Global Attitudes 
Project (Mar. 18, 2003). Pew interviewed more than 5,500 people in 
France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Poland, Russia, Turkey, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States from March 10 through 17, 2003.

[8] The Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, Views of a 
Changing World, Pew Global Attitudes Project (June 2003). 

[9] Zogby International, The Ten Nation Impressions of America Poll 
(Apr. 11, 2002). Zogby International surveyed 10 Muslim countries 
between March 4 to April 3, 2002, to determine how adults in certain 
countries feel about American people and culture, and about U.S. policy 
in the Middle East region. The countries surveyed included Egypt, 
France, Indonesia, Iran, Kuwait, Lebanon, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, 
United Arab Emirates, and Venezuela.

[10] This number includes authorized Regional English Language Officers 
overseas and authorized Information Officers overseas. Authorized 
positions for domestic public diplomacy officers and Foreign Service 
nationals overseas totaled approximately 688 and 1,702, respectively, 
in fiscal year 2003. These numbers have remained relatively static 
since September 11.

[11] These countries include Afghanistan, Algeria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, 
Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, 
Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, 
and Yemen.

[12] U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, Building America's 
Public Diplomacy Through a Reformed Structure and Additional Resources 
(Washington, D.C. September 2002).

[13] Mark Leonard, Foreign Policy Center, Public Diplomacy (London, 
United Kingdom: 2002).

[14] Independent Task Force on Public Diplomacy, Public Diplomacy: A 
Strategy for Reform, Council on Foreign Relations, (July 30, 2002).

[15] Defense Science Board Task Force, Managed Information 
Dissemination (Washington, D.C. October 2001). 

[16] Public Diplomacy: A Strategy for Reform.

[17] Wilton Park, Changing Perceptions: Review of Public Diplomacy 
(United Kingdom: March 2002). 

[18] U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, Building America's 
Public Diplomacy through a Reformed Structure and Additional Resources 
(Washington, D.C. September 2002).

[19] National Defense University, Winning with Words: Strategic 
Communications and the War on Terrorism (Washington, D.C. 2002).

[20] This figure was reported in State's most recent performance and 
accountability report, for fiscal year 2002.

[21] This money was cut from the fiscal year 2004 request, but State 
intends to request it again in fiscal year 2005. 

[22] Funding for this program was also cut from the fiscal year 2004 
request.

[23] Public Diplomacy: A Strategy for Reform.

[24] Changing Perceptions: Review of Public Diplomacy.

[25] Managed Information Dissemination.

[26] U.S. General Accounting Office, Program Evaluation: Strategies for 
Assessing How Information Dissemination Contributes to Agency Goals, 
GAO-02-923 (Washington, D.C. Sept. 30, 2002).

[27] State's overseas staffing model operates on a 2-year cycle. Fiscal 
year 2002 is the latest year for which data are available on the 
numbers of positions actually filled. 

[28] U.S. General Accounting Office, State Department: Staffing 
Shortfalls and Ineffective Assignment System Compromise Diplomatic 
Readiness at Hardship Posts, GAO-02-626 (Washington, D.C. June 18, 
2002). 

[29] Language-designated positions are graded for both speaking and 
reading proficiency. Most officers who do not meet one requirement do 
not meet the other one either, so the percentages are similar. For 
purposes of clarity, our figures refer only to the requirements for 
speaking proficiency.

[30] These are positions for which language capability is preferred but 
not required. 

[31] GAO reported on the insufficient language proficiency of Foreign 
Service officers in 2002. See U.S. General Accounting Office, Foreign 
Languages: Human Capital Approach Needed to Correct Staffing and 
Proficiency Shortfalls, GAO-02-375 (Washington, D.C. Jan. 31, 2002).

[32] State would not provide updated information on the language 
proficiency of officers outside the public diplomacy cone, as they 
considered this information to be outside the scope of our review.

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