PROTECTING YOUR COMMUNITY FROM TERRORISM: 
Strategies for Local 
Law Enforcement 

Volume 3: 
Preparing for and 
Responding to Bioterrorism 

Office of Community Oriented Policing Services
Police Executive Research Forum


PROTECTING YOUR COMMUNITY FROM TERRORISM:
The Strategies for Local Law Enforcement Series

VOL. 3: PREPARING FOR AND RESPONDING TO BIOTERRORISM 

Melissa Reuland and Heather J. Davies 

with 

William J. Bratton
Jonathan E. Fielding 
Richard A. Goodman
Jerome M. Hauer
Ronald L. Iden
Cathy L. Lanier 
Phil T. Pulaski
Ruth A. Vogel
Dani-Margot Zavasky


This project, conducted by the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF), was supported by Cooperative 
Agreement #2002-HS-WX-K001 by the U.S. Department of Justice Office of Community Oriented Policing 
Services. Points of views or opinions contained in this document are those of the authors and do not 
necessarily represent the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice or the members of PERF. 

The opinions expressed are generally those based on the consensus of executive session attendees. However, not 
every view or statement presented in this report can necessarily be attributed to each individual participant. 

Websites and sources listed provide useful information at the time of this writing, but the authors do not endorse 
any information of the sponsor organization or other information on the websites. 

 Police Executive Research Forum, September 2004 

U.S. Department of Justice Office of Community Oriented Policing Services 

Police Executive Research Forum 
Washington, DC 20036 
United States of America 
September 2004 

ISBN 1-878734-83-0 
Library of Congress Number 2003105278 

Photos courtesy of (from top to bottom): 
Federal Emergency Management Association (1) 

U.S. Capitol Police (2)
The Arlington County (VA) Police Department (3-5)

Cover design by David Edelson, PERF 
Interior layout by David Edelson based on a design by Elliot Thomas Grant, etg Design 


CONTENTS

Acknowledgments ..................................................................................... v 
Foreword .......................................................................................... vii 

Chapters 

1. Introduction ..................................................................................... 1 

2. The Bioterrorist Threat .......................................................................... 5 

3. Law Enforcement Preparedness .................................................................... 15 
Forensic Epidemiology: Joint Training for Law Enforcement and Public Health Officials 
on Investigative Responses to Bioterrorism ......................................................... 21 
Valuable Partners Address The Threat ............................................................... 24 

4. Detection and Notification of Bioterrorist Attacks .............................................. 27 
Working Together to Protect Public Health .......................................................... 28 
Partnerships between Police and Public Health ...................................................... 30 
Designate Roles and Responsibilities ............................................................... 34 
Rapid Threat Assessment Kit: Los Angeles Police Departments Hazmat Unit ........................... 38 
Need for Coordination and Interoperability of Public Health Disciplines and Resources 
across Jurisdictional Lines ........................................................................ 48 

5. Intervention, Health Care Surge, and Communication .............................................. 43 
6. Recommendations ................................................................................. 53 
Bioterrorism References ............................................................................ 61 
Resource Section ................................................................................... 63 
Bioterrorism Web Resources ......................................................................... 65 

Appendices 

A. Participants and Observers ...................................................................... 69 

About the Authors .................................................................................. 73 
About the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS), U.S. Department of Justice ........ 81 
About the Police Executive Research Forum .......................................................... 83 


ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

ANY VALUE THIS PAPER HAS TO THE FIELD IS DUE TO THE DEDICATION OF THE 
many individuals involved in this project who work to improve how law 
enforcement prepares for and responds to bioterrorism. 

This paper is the result of an executive session 
the third in a series of fiveall made possible by 
the U.S. Department of Justice Office of 
Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) 
support and guidance. We are grateful to Director 
Carl Peed for believing in this project and for 
recognizing the need for law enforcement to maintain 
its commitment to community policing in a security-conscious 
world. We are very appreciative of 
our project monitor, Amy Schapiro, who has 
assisted us in planning and convening the series of 
executive sessions and the resulting white papers. 
We extend a special thanks to those who participated 
in the executive session (See Appendix A). 
They engaged in thoughtful and sincere discussions 
about how local law enforcement, fire, public health, 
and other government officials can partner, prepare 
for, and respond to bioterrorism. Just 
as impressive was their willingness to openly 
discuss sensitive issues and concerns regarding 
collaboration. They demonstrated a tremendous 
commitment to developing solutions and 
strengthening partnerships. 

In attendance at the executive session 
were several researchers who were tasked with 
identifying relevant research concerns. The 
National Institute of Justice (NIJ) funds their 
involvement in these sessions. Our NIJ grant 
monitor, Lois Mock, and these researchersJack 
Greene, David Klinger, Michael Mair, Steve 
Mastrofski, and Edward Richardswere an 
invaluable resource when transforming complex 
discussions into an informative discourse for law 
enforcement agencies. We are grateful for their 
sound observations. 

This session was extremely thought-provoking. 
Its success was achieved through the 
efforts of many individuals and organizations in 
Los Angeles. Special thanks go to The Getty 
Centers dedicated staff, especially Bob Coumbs, 
Director of Security, and Boneshia Perry, Event 
Manager, for hosting the executive session so 


smoothly and in such a spectacular setting. We 
also thank Chief William Bratton; Commander 
Mark Leap with the Los Angeles Police 
Department for assisting with logistics; the 
President of the Los Angeles Police Commission, 
Rick Caruso, for his thoughtful words during 
lunch; and the Los Angeles Police Department 
Westchester Training Academy. We appreciate the 
support of personnel from the Los Angeles Police 
Department and the Los Angeles County Sheriffs 
Department who graciously allowed us to view and 
observe the equipment and resources they would 
use to respond to a bioterrorist attack. Their 
dedication to building a stronger response team is truly 
remarkable. 

We also want to thank those who contributed to 
this paper by writing sidebar pieces: 
William J. Bratton, Jonathan E. Fielding, Richard 

A. Goodman, Jerome M. Hauer, Ronald L. Iden, 
Cathy L. Lanier, Phil T. Pulaski, Ruth A. Vogel, and 
Dani-Margot Zavasky. 

Several members of the PERF staff spent 
countless hours planning the executive session, 
fact-checking the content of the paper, reviewing 
drafts, and correcting mistakes. First and foremost, 
we are very appreciative of Martha Plotkin 
for all of her efforts in editing and providing 
suggestions for this document. Executive Director 
Chuck Wexler was instrumental in supporting and 
facilitating the executive session and providing 
feedback on this paper. We thank Rebecca 
Neuberger for managing the logistics of the two-
day event and making sure the executive session 
was a success, and Research Assistant Alex Hayes 
for compiling the references used in this document. 
Thanks are also due to David Edelson for 
his layout and design efforts. 

To those first respondersat every level of 
governmentwho work to make our nation safe 
from a biological attack, your efforts are truly 
valued. We hope this paper provides you with 
resources and information to further assist you in 
your efforts. 


FOREWORD

WHILE FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL POLICE AGENCIES WERE STILL REELING 
from the aftershocks of the September 11th attacks, they were faced 
with another form of terrorism that presented formidable challenges. 
That menace was bioterrorism. They were not alone in their struggle to 
assume new roles and responsibilities that would address this emerging threat. 
Emergency medical personnel, fire, public health workers, and other first 
responders were similarly trying to clarify their roles and learn 
how to begin work on a collaborative, multidisciplinary response. 

While trained to deal with hazardous materials, 
law enforcement never had to face a seemingly 
imminent threat of bioterrorism. The pressing 
need for a coordinated response was revealed in 
early experiences with anthrax. Using the postal 
system as the method of delivery, perpetrator(s) 
sent letters filled with anthrax-laden powder to 
targets in Washington, D.C, New York, Florida, 
and Connecticut. The attacks left several victims, 
including fatalities, and sent a wave of fear 
through those communities and an already anxious 
nation. These events revealed to health care 
professionals, emergency first responders, and law 
enforcement the stark vulnerabilities their respective 
agencies faced in preparing for and responding 
to bioterrorism. The need for these emergency 
responders to work together to develop policies, 
procedures, and protocols for dealing with this new 
style of criminal and terrorist attack presents a 
constant and urgent challenge. Many community 
leaders in the United States are still grappling with 
the risks and potential responses to such an act in 
their buildings, classrooms, or city streets. 

Much like the demand for interagency 
cooperation when investigating and prosecuting 
other forms of domestic terrorism, preventing and 
responding to a chemical or biological attack 
requires open lines of communication and mutual 
aid agreements among police, fire, public health, 
and other government agencies. As local, county, 
tribal, and state police agencies train personnel to 
take on new antiterrorism responsibilities, they 
must include instruction on detecting and 
responding to certain medical conditions and be 
aware of containment procedures for a bioterrorist 
attack. Addressing the growing threat of these 
attacks places mounting pressure on these agencies, 
especially the first responders who must prepare 
for myriad potential scenarios. Recognizing 
the need to redefine law enforcements roles and 
responsibilities, the Police Executive Research 
Forum (PERF) and the Office of Community 


Oriented Policing Services (COPS) convened its 
third executive session to address the options and 
issues associated with bioterrorism. Like the 
previous sessions in this series on protecting 
communities from terrorism, the meeting yielded valuable 
recommendations that agencies can tailor to the 
unique needs of their jurisdictions. 

This executive session was unprecedented 
in the range of expertise offered by its participants, 
who represented local and state police departments, 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), 
the Department of Health and Human Services 
(HHS), the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA), the Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention (CDC), and health and science 
professionals and scholars. Participants shared 
their insights, experiences, and recommendations 
in a candid and productive discourse. This white 
paper, based largely on the topics discussed at the 
session, examines the new roles law enforcement 
agencies must assume because of the numerous 
demands placed on them and the limited resources 
they can draw on if a biological attack occurs. 
PERF staff also conducted fieldwork to identify 
promising programs and approaches within the 
community policing context. The COPS Office 
and PERF are pleased to facilitate these forums 
and to provide the law enforcement profession 
with opportunities and products that encourage 
the sharing of effective strategies that address 
terrorism and advance community policing. 

Carl R. Peed 
Director, COPS

Chuck Wexler 
Executive Director, PERF 


CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

THE EMERGENCE OF BIOTERRORISM AS A MAJOR THREAT TO THE AMERICAN 
public demands that law enforcement redefine its responsibilities. Law 
enforcement officials must assess and prioritize steps for preventing, 
preparing for and responding to bioterrorism, while retaining the gains made 
through community policing. Working with other public officials, law enforcement 
agencies must begin by determining their communitys risk of and vulnerabilities 
to potential bioterrorist attacks. This can be an overwhelming endeavorexacerbated 
by competing demands for police service and limited resources. 

Only a comprehensive and cooperative strategy  
among police, fire, public health, and other government 
agencies can ensure proper readiness and 
response in dealing with bioterrorism. Yet, the 
level of collaboration and coordination needed to  
address these challenges carries its own difficulties, 
as each agency struggles to identify and 
resolve overlapping roles and responsibilities. As 
each agencys authority is defined and gaps are 
addressed, it will become apparent that local law 
enforcements role in the national effort to prevent 
or respond to a biological attack is critical.

Efforts to build bridges with the community 
have never been more pressing as law enforcement 
seeks to gain information on preventing a 
bioterrorist attack. Incidents in the United States 
involving anthrax and ricin have also underscored 
the need to enhance and redefine ongoing community 
policing efforts to help inform and educate
the public of potential biohazards.
Community policings emphasis on partnerships, 
trust, and problem solving is vital to preventing 
biological attacks and maintaining critical
relationships with all stakeholders.

The Project: Community
Policing in a Security-
Conscious World

The Police Executive Research Forum (PERF),1 
with support from the U.S. Department of Justice 
Office of Community Oriented Policing Services 
(COPS), has convened a series of executive sessions 
for law enforcement chief executives, various 
government leaders, and community members. 
These forums allow participants to explore 
important issues, debate different approaches, and 

_____________________________________________________________________________
1 PERF is a nonprofit membership organization of progressive policing professionals dedicated to advancing law enforcement 
services to all communities through experimentation and national leadership. Its members serve more than half the nations 
population and the organization provides training, technical assistance, research, publications and other services to its 
members and the profession. More information about PERF can be found at www.policeforum.org. 


exchange information. These sessions are also 
structured to provide law enforcement practitioners 
with opportunities to share and develop effective 
strategies for addressing terrorism while 
enhancing community policing. The discussions 
are captured in subsequent white papers that are 
widely disseminated to law enforcement and 
decision makers at all levels of government. 
(Additional white papers are planned for such 
topics as Intelligence and Information Sharing and 
Law Enforcement Partnerships with the 
Department of Homeland Security.) 

The first executive session, held on 
November 78, 2002, resulted in a white paper on 
Local-Federal Partnerships. The second session 
was held on June 56, 2003; it provided law 
enforcement with guidance on Working with 
Diverse Communities. These white papers are the 
first two in the series on Protecting Your 
Community From Terrorism: Strategies for Local 
Law Enforcement. (These reports are available as 
free downloads at www.policeforum.org and 
www.cops.usdoj.gov.) 

The Executive Session 

PERF convened the third executive session on July 
2425, 2003 at the Getty Center in Los Angeles. 
To facilitate a comprehensive discussion of the 
issues, the group was composed of local, state, and 
federal law enforcement executives; public health 
and fire officials; as well as other subject matter 
experts. (See Appendix A for a list of the participants 
and observers.) The session began with a 
presentation by Jerome M. Hauer, formerly the 
Acting Assistant Secretary with the Department of 
Health and Human Services (HHS) Office of 
Public Health Emergency and Preparedness, on the 
readiness of public health agencies for a terrorist 
event. Don Van Duyn from the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) then gave an assessment of the 
threat of a bioterrorist attack. Moderated by 
PERFs Executive Director, the day-and-a-half session 
resulted in a thorough discussion that identified 
the myriad challenges to collaboration among 
all first responders, as well as the issues and 
strategies for preparing for and responding to 
bioterrorism. The session featured two tabletop exercises: a 
suspicious letter and a clandestine release. 
Participants discussed what types of policies, 
procedures, and protocols are being used, and most 
importantly, what is still needed. Other aspects of 
the session included a presentation by President of 
the Los Angeles Police Commission Rick Caruso, 
who provided a private sector perspective on Los 
Angeles bioterrorism preparedness activities. The 
participants also had a chance to observe the 
LAPD Westchester Training Academy and learn 
about the resources used by the Los Angeles Police 
Department and the Los Angeles County Sheriffs 
Department. In the end, session participants 
proposed practical recommendations for law 
enforcement agencies when responding to a bioterrorist 
incident, determining jurisdictional responsibilities, 
and staffing incident command. 

The White Paper 

This white paper, the third in the series, summarizes 
participants discussions at the PERF executive 
session as well as follow-up site visits made by 
PERF project staff to New York City; Washington, 
D.C.; and Baltimore, Maryland. It is meant to 
advance law enforcements efforts to prepare for 
and respond to bioterrorism. The paper includes 
several sidebars to provide diverse viewpoints on 
topics that warrant additional attention. These 
sidebars were written either by executive session 


participants or individuals interviewed during site 
visits. 

The intent of this paper is to help local law 
enforcement agencies identify the opportunities 
and obstacles to effectively address bioterrorism 
threats as well as to build partnerships with other 
first responders. The paper begins with a discussion 
of the threat and describes the response challenges 
for first responders. Further, it details the 
biological agents that may possibly be used in an 
attack, the likelihood of each kind of threat, and 
the critical response issues law enforcement agencies 
must address. The remaining chapters discuss 
the five critical areas involved in planning for and 
responding to a bioterrorism event. These issues 
include detecting a biological attack; notifying the 
proper first responders; intervening (in coordination 
with fire, EMS, and public health responses); 
managing health care surge demands; and maintaining 
communication with all agencies and the 
public. A number of proven strategies, tactics, and 
promising approaches are identified that agencies 
can tailor to the concerns of a particular jurisdiction. 
Other strategies are untested, but are based 
on participants exchange of ideas and suggestions. 
The white paper reiterates the need for law 
enforcement professionals to strengthen their 
partnerships with other government agencies to make 
them more effective. The paper concludes with 
recommendations for local law enforcement agencies 
and other first responders as they navigate 
their new role in a counterterrorism context. 


CHAPTER TWO
THE BIOTERRORIST THREAT2

THE EVENTS OF SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 FOREVER CHANGED THIS NATIONS VIEW 
of our security if faced with a large-scale terrorist attack. The anthrax-
laden letters sent to New York City; Washington, D.C.; and Florida 
later that same year also demonstrated our vulnerability, particularly to a 
bioterrorist attack. With this new awareness of our susceptibility, law enforcement 
agencies have rushed to gain expertise in biology and medical science that would 
have been unthinkable just years before. With this knowledge, they have had to 
formulate potential responses to the worst possible scenarios. 

The discussion that follows puts the bioterrorism  
threat in perspective for law enforcement and 
describes the unique response challenges for their  
agencies. It details which biological agents might  

be used in an attack and describes critical law 
enforcement response issues. It also examines 
bioterrorism in the context of other potential ter- 
rorist threats and presents the relative likelihood 
of each kind of threat. 

The Potential "CBR" Threats

The term "CBR" is used by law enforcement agencies 
as shorthand to include all potential terrorist
threats that can have consequences for the health
of large numbers of people. These threats include 
chemical agents (C), biological agents (B), and 
radiation exposure (R).3 The health consequences
of their release will demand unique law enforcement 
responses that require a close working relationship

______________________________________________________________________________
2 This chapter was completed with the help of Jerome M. Hauer, the Director of Response to Emergencies and Disasters 
Institute (READI), and Assistant Professor at The George Washington University. At the time of the executive session, 
Hauer was the Acting Assistant Secretary of the Office of Public Health Emergency Preparedness, Department of Health and 
Human Services. 

3 Though some first responders refer to the threats as "CBRN " to include the potential use of nuclear weapons, that 
discussion topic is beyond the purview of this paper. 


with many professionals, including public health. 

The following is a brief overview of the 
CBR threats and the potential consequences of 
each type of threat. More detailed information 
about these agents can be found in several guides 
for first responders listed in the references and 
resources sections of this white paper (see pp. 
6167). The summaries that follow simply offer a 
context within which to consider the recommendations 
made in later sections. 

Chemical Threats 

Law enforcement professionals should be concerned 
about chemical agents, which include toxic 
industrial chemicals and military weapon agents. 
Toxic industrial chemicals, such as hydrogen 
cyanide, arsine, chlorine, and ammonia, can be 
obtained easily and thus may pose a greater risk 
than military agents. Terrorists can gain access to 
these chemicals through legal purchases and illegal 
means, including black market sales and theft as 
chemicals are transported across the United States 
in large quantities by tanker trucks and rail cars. 

In addition, harder-to-obtain military 
nerve agentssuch as sarin and VXare of concern 
because of the high mortality rates associated 
with contact and the speed with which people 
become ill once exposed. These agents act quickly 
by interfering with the nervous systems functioning 
and can be delivered as a vapor or liquid (Sidell, 
Patrick and Dashiell 2000). Treatment options are 
limited because antidotes are not always available. 

Biological Agents 

In contrast to chemical agents, biological agents 
that spread disease are even more difficult to 
obtain and to release effectively. The mechanisms 
used for releasing chemical agents would be inadequate 
for disseminating biological agents. These 
agents are of particular concern, however, because 
some of themsuch as smallpox and plaguecan 
spread easily from person to person. If a biological 
attack takes place, there is likely to be significant 
public anxiety and almost certain disruption of the 
daily work that supports the nations infrastructure 
that provides access to necessities. 
Accordingly, biological agents require special 
preparedness by law enforcement, fire, medical, and 
public health agencies. 

The Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC) has identified six "Category A" 
biological agentssmallpox, anthrax, plague, 
botulism, tularemia, and viral hemorrhagic fever 
(Rotz et al. 2002). The CDC defines these 
Category A agents as those that "the U.S. public 
health system and primary health care providers 
must be prepared to address [and] include 
pathogens that are rarely seen in the United 
States. High-priority agents include organisms 
that pose a risk to national security because they 
can be easily disseminated or transmitted from 
person to person; result in high mortality rates and 
have the potential for major public health impact; 
might cause public panic and social disruption; 
and require special action for public health preparedness."4 

Several biological agents are of particular 
concern. For example, should there be a large-
scale or simultaneous anthrax attack it would 
require sufficient vaccination. Antibiotics are used 

__________________________________________________________________________________
4 At the time of this writing, the definition of "Category A" agents could be obtained from the CDC Emergency Preparedness 
and Response website www.bt.cdc.gov/agent/agentlist-category.asp#catdef. 


to treat anthrax, but if treatment is not begun early, 
the fatality rate can range from 50 to 70 percent, 
depending on the type of anthrax (Inglesby et  
al. 2002). While anthrax has already been used to  
create fear, destabilize government operations, and  
to kill and injure citizens, the effects of a botulism5 
attack could be of even greater concern. The 
impact of botulism could have a devastating effect 
on the public.6 

Radiation Exposure

Though there are various scenarios in which terrorists 
can employ radiological agents, the most
commonly discussed is the threat of a dirty bomb, 
although other covert releases of a radiological 
material are also possible. Dirty bombs are radiological 
dispersal devices that combine conventional 
explosives with radioactive materials. The necessary 
ingredients for such bombs are readily available. 
Exposure to radiation from such a bomb can 
cause tissue damage, such as skin burns, or bone 
marrow depression to those in the immediate 
vicinity. In addition, individuals that are contaminated 
with radioactive material either in or on
their bodies can expose others to the effects of 
radiation.

A dirty bomb's detonation may cause 
immediate casualties, but the greater effect could
be wide-spread, long-term illnesses resulting from
radiation exposure. People do not need to come
into direct contact with the source of the radiation
to be affected (Maniscalco and Christen 2002). 
They need only to be under the plume of the radiation 
or in contact with others who are contaminated. 
Terrorists could use a dirty bomb to fuel
public fear and destabilize services. A dirty bomb
can create panic and deep psychological damage,
without causing much physical destruction.

Bioterrorist Attack: Low
Likelihood, Great Impact

A critical question on the minds of all law enforcement 
professionals is, "How likely is a bioterrorist 
attack?" There is, of course, no way to predict with 
certainty the likelihood of a bioterrorist attack or 
any other type of terrorist action. However, the 
intelligence community has assessed the relative
likelihood and impact of various terrorist threats. 

Image of Firgure i - Terrorist Threats
Most Likely to Least Likely 

Explosives 
Toxic Industrial Chemicals 
Radiological Dispersal Devices 
Biological Agents/Weapons 
Nuclear Weapons 

 
As depicted in Figure 1, some experts 
believe that the most likely near-term terrorist 
events are those involving explosives, followed by
events involving toxic industrial chemicals.7 The
likelihood that terrorists will use radiological dispersal 
devices and biological agents or weapons is

_________________________________________________
5 The CDC defines botulism as a "rare but serious paralytic illness caused by a nerve toxin that is produced by the bacterium Clostridium botulinum." More information on botulism can be found at www.cdc.gov. 

6 For more information on other agents, see the CDC's Emergency Preparedness and Response website at www.bt.cdc.gov. 

7 The figures in this section are based on Jerome M. Hauers assessment of the intelligence. 


in the middle of the range. Nuclear weapons are 
the least likely type of terrorist event. Yet, the 
impact of these various events on the public is 
nearly the reverse, with biological agents having 
the greatest impact, followed by nuclear devices, 
toxic chemical release, radiological dispersal 
devices and explosives (see Figure 2). 

Fig. 2 Level of Impact byWeapon Used
Greatest Impact to Least Impact 

Biological Agents/Weapons 
Nuclear Weapons 
Toxic Industrial Chemicals 
Radiological Dispersal Devices 
Explosives 

This combinationa mid-range possibility 
of occurrence with the greatest potential 
impactmakes planning for biological weapons 
an essential effort. Following the release of 
a biological agent, the demands placed on law 
enforcement agencies may be overwhelming. 

Presentation of Biological 
Agents 

Terrorists could leverage or present biological 
agents in at least four ways:8 

 through a credible threat; 
 through delivery of a letter or package; 
 through clandestine (covert) release in 
a building, subway, or outside environment; or 
 through a purposefully public (overt) release. 

A credible threat can be a communication 
made to law enforcement, another government 
authority, or the media that is a convincing 
declaration or evidence of a potential or actual attack.9 
The second possible scenario is the release of an 
agent when a letter or package is opened. With this 
kind of dispersal mechanism, the presence of a 
biological agent might be immediately apparent to 
those affected, particularly given public awareness 
about powdered substances after the experiences 
with mailed anthrax letters in fall 2001 or the 
more recent detection of ricin in a congressional 
mailroom. In contrast, a clandestine release could 
take days to detect. For example, the release of 
anthrax in a ventilation system of a building or 
subway might not be detected until those exposed 
became symptomatic (14 days). In a purposefully 
public release (of liquid anthrax, for example) 
detection would likely be almost immediate. 

The presentation mechanism used will 
often determine the law enforcement response, as 
will such other factors as the type or amount of an 
agent. For example, a letter or package containing 
a suspicious powder may be treated like any hazardous 
material and require a "lights and sirens 
response" from law enforcement. In contrast, a 
clandestine release of a communicable agent will 
first be a major public health emergency. The 

__________________________________________________________________________
8 There are other possible scenarios not covered by this list, including the combination of a physical attack with a cyber 
attack that would facilitate or enhance the impact of the biological attack. 

9 The information in this section is based on Jerome M. Hauers presentation at PERFs Executive Session in Los Angeles 
in July 2003. 


attack would be detected when non-traditional 
first responders such as emergency room physicians, 
EMTs, or family practitioners recognize 
something out of the ordinary in their patients and 
report it to the local health department. Law 
enforcement will be notified by public health 
authorities rather than through traditional 911 
calls. Consequently, it may be days or even weeks 
before law enforcement becomes aware that a 
bioterrorist event has occurred. The original site of 
the attack may be difficult, if not impossible, for 
law enforcement investigators to determine. 

The type of biological agent used also 
determines the window of opportunity during 
which properly prepared public health, law 
enforcement, and fire agencies can save the most 
lives. In a chemical attack, that window is minutes; 
in a bioterrorist attack it can be days. While 
this may seem like an advantage in bioterrorism 
response planning, there are numerous issues that 
require careful attention and pre-incident preparation 
to minimize the spread and severity of illness 
and loss of life. 

Critical Issues in Bioterrorism 
Response 

There are five critical issues involved in planning 
for and responding to a bioterrorism event. These 
are 

 detecting the event, 

 notifying the proper authorities, 

 intervening (in coordination with fire, 
EMS, and public health responses), 

 managing the surge of demands 
placed on health care and other sys
tems, and 

 maintaining effective communication 
with all agencies involved as well as 
with the public. 

These issues are reviewed briefly below to 
provide the reader with a concise overview of the 
areas in which planning must occur. Each of these 
issues is dealt with in more detail in Chapters 4 
and 5. 

Detection 

The first challenge in any bioterrorist attack will 
be to detect its occurrence and assess the scope 
and severity of the incident. Because the key to 
effective responses and minimal community 
impact will be early detectionparticularly for 
biological agents that cause communicable diseases 
public health and law enforcement must collaborate 
to develop effective recognition strategies. 

If a bioterrorist attack involves a clandestine release, 
primary care providers (family practitioners, 
emergency room doctors and nurses, and 
nurse practitioners) or the public health system 
will likely be the first to detect it. Consequently, 
as part of a community's preparedness, health care 
providers in clinical settings must be trained to 
recognize and communicate unusual happenings. 
Their ability to identify a pattern of illness or 
symptoms early on, and to convey their information 
and concerns to the public health department 
and law enforcement will be crucial. 

To assist in identifying the "unusual," the 
public health community has designed several passive
mechanisms to detect bioterrorist events. For 
example, several surveillance systems are in place 
across the country to track early indicators of a 
bioterrorist attack such as a spike in the sale of 
certain medications (e.g., over-the-counter diarrhea 
treatments) in a community, dramatic increases in 
calls to emergency medical services (EMS), or visits 
to emergency rooms. The BioWatch initiative 


(of the Department of Homeland Security) consists of 
a network of air sample collectors, which is 
in place in many cities to detect airborne particles 
of certain biological agents. Because the detectors 
are spread widely apart, this system will only work 
if a city experiences a very large release or what is 
called a "line source," in which an aircraft or vehicle 
sprays a long line of material as it travels. In 
addition, the system could miss some subway 
releases because the detectors are not yet installed 
in all stations below ground. At this writing, the 
Washington, D.C., Metropolitan Area Transit 
Authority has been among those testing and using 
a subway detector system. 

As first responders to the scene of a site or 
package release police officers, fire fighters, and 
EMS workers will need to be able to detect a potentially 
harmful substance.10 While some agencies 
use hand-held assays to accomplish this task, 
these devices are not reliable because they can give 
false positive (or even false negative) results. 
Accordingly, the federal government recommends 
that first responders not rely on these devices.11 
Line-level first responders must therefore be 
trained to recognize indicators of a bioterrorist 
attack and treat a letter or package as they would 
any unknown, potentially hazardous material. A 
sample should then be sent to a predesignated 
laboratory to test for the presence of a harmful 
biological agent. 

Notification 

Once someone suspects or detects that a bioterrorist 
event has occurred, timely notification of other 
government authorities is critical. Some health 
care providers may not know whom to call or may 
be reluctant to voice suspicions they fear could be 
premature. This can have significant consequences 
for the public health. For example, in an 
episode involving a monkey pox outbreak, the 
local health care practitioner did not call the CDC 
immediately because of inadequate training. If this 
agent had been smallpox, the disease could have 
spread to many more victims during the window 
of opportunity this provider missed. 

Once local medical professionals (including 
those at public health laboratories responsible 
for identifying unknown substances) have found 
something unusual, they must immediately 
communicate their suspicions to their local public 
health department and the CDC. Local law 
enforcement should be notified as well. If the 
medical community is not already working closely with 
the police and public health departments, efforts 
to communicate during a crisis may be problematic, 
thus raising the threat to public health. (For 
information on notification to the public see the 
Communication section on page 49.) 

Intervention 

Responding to a bioterrorist attack will involve two 
immediate efforts: First, the public health and 
medical system will focus on controlling the 
spread and severity of the disease and treating 
those who are ill. Second, law enforcement will 

_____________________________________________________________________________
10 See, the document published by the International Association of Fire Chiefs 2004 for an example of model procedures 
for responding to a package that may pose a biological threat. 

11 At the time of this writing, this information was obtained from the webcast transcript "Anthrax: What Every 
Clinician Should Know, Part 2," November 1, 2001. This document could be found at the following website: 
www.bt.cdc.gov/agent/anthrax/webcast/110101/anthrax-webcast-transcript110101.doc. 


concentrate on criminal investigation, offender 
apprehension, and public safety issues. In a 
bioterrorist attack, trained public health 
investigators will need to interview patients to determine 
the origin of the disease at the same time law 
enforcement officers must interview them to 
investigate the crime. Before an incident occurs, 
communities must develop a process by which 
these agencies can conduct joint interviews. In 
several communities, including New York City, 
investigators have worked for a number of years to 
develop a process to conduct joint epidemiological 
and law enforcement investigations.12 To this 
end, agency leaders must establish protocols to 
enable law enforcement and public health investigators 
to do their jobs and to effectively share 
information. These protocols must both safeguard 
the privacy of health information and maintain 
the confidentiality of sensitive case investigation 
information.13 

Public health intervention strategies 
designed to limit the spread of the disease are two-
prongedthey involve isolating sick victims and 
quarantining those individuals who have come in 
contact with victims. Experience has shown that 
the quarantine process works best if it is achieved 
voluntarily. Many logistical, ethical, and legal 
questions arise when imposing quarantine. Who 
has the authority to order quarantine? How does a 
community control even a voluntary quarantine of 
a large area? What level of law enforcement should 
be used to ensure compliance with an imposed 
quarantine? That is, what will law enforcement do 
with people who refuse to be quarantined? Should 
they be incarcerated? Should police use force? If so, 
what level of force? What are the criteria for who 
should be quarantined and how will their needs be 
met? Law enforcement chief executives and other 
government leaders must look at a range of 
options for quarantine, and concentrate on those 
that minimize law enforcements use of force 
while encouraging public involvement. 

In the event of a bioterrorist attack, the 
federal government may recommend that individuals 
in the area stay home or inside as they would 
for a snow day, a strategy known as "sheltering in 
place."14 It is only after community leaders 
successfully restrict the movement of large numbers 
of people that they can reduce the spread of the 
disease. The key to this strategy will be the integral 
involvement of community members and the efficient 
coordination between public health and 
police. 

Past experience with such public health 
crises as Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome 
(SARS) demonstrates that if a community must 
decide to isolate and quarantine its citizens to 
reduce the spread of a deadly disease, the governing 
authority will first turn to the law enforcement 
chief executives and public health officials for help. 

______________________________________________________________________________________________
12 See "Criminal and Epidemiological Investigation Report." U.S. Army Soldier and Biological Chemical Command (SBCCOM). 
Proceedings, 2000 NDPO/DoD Criminal and Epidemiological Investigation Workshop. January 19-21, 2000 for 
more information on joint investigations. 

13 See www.hhs.gov/ocr/hipaa/ for more information on the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPPA) 
privacy regulations that regulate sharing of medical information. 

14 For more advice on sheltering-in-place preparation, see www.ready.gov. For additional information on quarantine and 
police powers, see Richards et al., forthcoming. 


Consequently, joint advance planning in this area 
is essential. 

Health Care Surge Management 

In any significant bioterrorism event, there will be 
an enormous demand placed on the health care 
system. Accordingly, the ability of a community to 
effectively treat and isolate people in a bioterrorist 
attack will depend on that communitys "health 
care surge capacity." This capacity is expressed as 
the number of hospital beds, trained medical professionals, 
and medical equipment it will take to 
achieve this intervention. In large communities, it 
may involve converting armories, churches, and 
community centers into clinics. 

A stumbling block to meeting demands for 
health care may be a paucity of local equipment 
stocks needed to treat large numbers of seriously 
ill people. Jurisdictions need to be informed about 
where they can draw additional apparatuses. The 
Department of Health and Human Services has 
large stockpiles of antibiotics and vaccines as well 
as medical equipment, such as ventilators, that 
they can transport to anywhere in the nation within 
6 to 12 hours. Ventilators are particularly critical 
for treating certain biological agents (such as 
botulism and anthrax), but even federal sources 
may not be able to provide equipment for every 
jurisdiction in need. Planners in New York City, 
for example, have worked with supply vendors to 
supplement existing equipment by ensuring access 
to warehoused supplies. 

Another critical concern for planners is 
how to provide adequate staffing for treatment. In 
the recent experience with SARS (for which there 
is no vaccine at this writing), a significant portion 
of the health care providers who were exposed 
became ill. Given the risks to providers that will 
likely result from exposure to biological agents, 
there is a real concern about identifying and 
retaining the medical personnel necessary to carry 
out treatment and isolation. Concurrently, potentially 
overwhelming demands may be placed on 
law enforcement and EMS workers to provide 
security and support, such as monitoring clinics 
and transporting ill people to health care settings. 

Community leaders must address these 
critical staffing issues. Every effort should be 
made to protect first responders and health care 
professionals, including providing appropriate 
equipment and planning for their treatment if 
exposure leads to illness. Also, if police officers 
and health care workers are concerned about their 
loved ones, they may not come to work until they 
take measures to protect them. Therefore, plans 
should include treatment strategies for first 
responders as well as their families. 

Communication 

Multi-pronged communication strategies for the 
hours and days immediately following a bioterrorist 
attack must be developed. Communication 
plans should include protocols for communications 
among service providersincluding law 
enforcement, fire, EMS, and public health entities. 
These plans must address terminology issues, 
equipment interoperability, the need for redundant 
systems, and dispatch protocols. Communication 
strategies must also focus on notifying the public 
of the attack and treatment options. For instance, 
plans must address who will be the primary communicator 
and how that person will calm the community and 
release information about preventive 
care such as accessing antibiotics or vaccinations. 


The Law Enforcement Role in 
Responding to Bioterrorism 

Myriad important functions are involved in each 
of the five critical issue areas just discussed. 
Although law enforcement agencies do not directly 
provide all of these functions, among their many 
roles will be to support the public health response, 
to transport those in need to health care services, 
and to contribute to a coherent communication 
strategy. In addition, police must engage in such 
efforts as calming the community, preventing riots 
or violence around health care facilities, identifying 
and preserving the crime scene, conducting a 
criminal investigation, and responding to calls for 
service. 


CHAPTER THREE
LAW ENFORCEMENT PREPAREDNESS

EXECUTIVE SESSION PARTICIPANTS WHO HAVE DEVELOPED DETAILED BIO-
terrorism response plans provided recommendations for how state and 
local law enforcement agencies can enhance bioterrorism preparedness in 
the five critical areas described in Chapter 2detection, notification, 
intervention, health care surge management, and communications. These participants 
also stressed the importance of three overarching issues that must be considered 
in preparing for these critical areas: funding and resources, training, and intelligence.15 

The importance of focusing on readiness is reflected 
in the recent findings from a GAO study of state 
and local jurisdiction bioterrorism preparedness 
and response planning (GAO 2003). The GAO 
staff visited seven cities and their associated state 
governments in 2001 and 2002 to assess their preparedness 
in three areas: health care infrastructure 
capacity (hospital isolation facilities, respirators, 
laboratories); workforce adequacy (in health care 
and essential emergency response services such as 
police and fire); and degree of coordination, 
cooperation and communication among various 
responders to ensure a comprehensive approach to 
bioterrorism. These responders include public 
health professionals, hospital workers and police, 
fire, and EMS personnel. 

The GAO findings indicate a range of preparedness, 
with the best preparations found in 
jurisdictions with prior experience responding to 
either natural disasters, such as earthquakes, or 
major public events, such as political conventions 
or protests. The GAO researchers noted a lack of 
coordination between different regionsboth 
across state lines and national borders. The 
researchers cited the need for guidelines about 
what constitutes an adequate response plan. In 
addition, representatives from the study sites 
pointed out the need for shared best practices, 
derived from the experiences of jurisdictions with 
more expertise in bioterrorism planning and 
response. GAO analysis reinforces the importance 
of a standardized national incident management 
system (NIMS) and emphasizes the need for realistic 
drills and exercises that provide experience 

_______________________________________________________________________
15 The discussion of intelligence gathering and how to determine a credible threat is touched on only briefly in this white 
paper. Intelligence and information sharing is the focus of the subsequent white paper from Executive Session 4. 


prior to a major public event or natural disaster.16 

The following discussion presents the recommendations 
of executive session participants 
on funding and resources, training, and intelligence
as each of these issues is critical to bioterrorism 
preparedness. 

Funding and Resource Issues 

Executive session participants with significant 
expertise in planning for and responding to bioterrorism 
assert that law enforcement executives may 
not be fully prepared for the enormous demands 
that will be placed on their agencys resources during 
a bioterrorism incident, or the consequent 
impact on department budgets. In addition to incident 
management and investigation, law enforcement duties 
will include providing security at 
health care sites, keeping or restoring order, and 
assisting quarantine efforts. The budget shortfalls 
that result from planning and conducting these 
efforts could have serious consequences for routine 
law enforcement operations. Session participants 
stressed that local and state governments, as well 
as the federal government, must identify funding 
to augment already strained budgets and assess 
existing resources. 

Identifying Funds 

The limitation of resourcesand the need to share 
and coordinate resources across regionsprompted 
session participants to question how the federal 
government should distribute antiterrorism 
funding. They suggested that federal agencies 
should consider requiring regional or statewide 
cooperation to be eligible for federal grants. 
Further, participants noted that while direct funding 
to large cities may make sense for a variety of 
reasons, consideration must also be given to smaller 
cities and towns to access needed funds. While 
large cities may be at higher risk, session participants 
cautioned that much of America is rural and 
those areas need to prepare for a potential 
bioterrorism incident.17 

The choice of whether to fund large or 
small communities (or both) is only one of many 
funding concerns. Some session participants were 
troubled that while federal funding has gone mostly 
to law enforcement and fire departments, hospitals 
need sufficient resources to become involved 
in advance planning and to be better prepared to 
respond to a bioterrorism incident (Waeckerle 
2000). Session participants stressed that hospitals 
also need specialized equipment, supplies, and 
increased staffing. 

Waeckerle (2000) also noted that hospitals 
will need the federal government to provide 
protection from liability should their staff become 
contaminated, or unable to treat patients for other 
reasons related to a bioterrorism attack. The cities 
examined in the GAO report (2003) had similar 
concerns about funding streams and how funds 
would be shared among different response agencies 
(e.g., hospitals and government agencies). 

Assessing Resources 

In order to request appropriate funding, agencies 
should develop bioterrorism response plans and 

__________________________________________________________________________________
16 At the time of this writing, more information on National Incident Management System (NIMS) can be found at 
www.fema.gov/preparedness/nims/nims.shtm. 

17 Charlotte-Mecklenberg is an example of a well-known police-public health partnership that could be applied to smaller 
jurisdictions. 


then assemble the necessary human and technological 
assets to implement these plans. These 
should include command and oversight capacity to 
manage them. As a critical first step in bioterrorism 
preparedness, therefore, session participants 
urged law enforcement agencies to assess their 
existing resources, in terms of both staffing and 
equipment. 

A recommended mechanism for assessing 
such resources is a "gap analysis," which involves 
inventorying staffing and equipment capabilities 
from a wide variety of disciplines (e.g., the fire 
department) to identify redundancies and shortfalls. 
For example, many communities in the 
United States rely solely on volunteer fire departments 
for emergency response. Unfortunately, 
these departments do not typically have sufficient 
resources should they need to respond to a large 
bioterrorism event. In California, state planners 
addressed this gap by combining the volunteer fire 
department resources across several regions to 
enhance emergency response. A gap analysis can 
also be used to assess equipment needs and develop 
plans to purchase, maintain, and replace equipment. 
This assessment must be comprehensive 
and should be regional or even statewide. 

Training Issues 

Law enforcement training serves a variety of purposes
to enhance detection of a bioterrorism 
event, to reduce exposure to the agent, to ensure 
smooth coordination of on-scene hazardous materials 
responses, and to promote effective investigation 
and management of a contagious organism. 
Session participants stressed that all first 
responders at all levels must be trained initially and then 
given frequent in-service training. 

In particular, session participants emphasized 
that to maintain first responder readiness, 
agencies must offer frequent and consistent training 
on precautions to reduce exposure. This training 
should cover signs and symptoms of contamination 
by a potential bioterrorism agent and critical 
immediate response procedures. Detection will 
be enhanced if officers are informed about possible 
indicators of bioterrorism. In addition, labor 
unions and police executives have expressed concerns 
about officers safety and protecting their 
health. One session participant, for instance, 
recommended that agencies provide 8 to 16 hours of 
hazardous materials training for all recruits and 
in-service personnel. 

Law enforcement, public health, and 
other first responders should educate the 
community and private sector agencies/entities, 
especially private security, on the critical issues in 
responding to a potential biohazard. Private 
security is crucial to assisting law enforcement with 
identifying and locating terrorists or disrupting 
terrorist attacks, and is the primary guardian of 
many critical infrastructures or dangerous materials. 
Community members and private security 
forces are also critical information sources 
essential to counterterrorism efforts. They can help act 
as the "eyes and ears" of a comprehensive 
intelligence-gathering strategy, but only if they know 
what to look for. The private sector agencies/companies, 
especially private security, should be 
included in training on protecting critical 
infrastructure from biological attacks, such as 
 


vulnerability assessments, strategic planning efforts, 
and exercises.18 

Types of Training for Emergency 
Incidents 

Numerous emergency services providers will converge 
at the scene of a suspected bioterrorism incident. 
Session participants suggested conducting 
multi-agency training so that clear strategies 
engage all agencies across government. They also 
encouraged authorities to develop communication 
and command plans related to incident management 
systems. This training should include specialists 
and all personnel involved in on-scene 
responses for a particular jurisdiction. 

Executive session participants identified a 
range of training techniques to achieve their goals 
effectively and efficiently. These included tabletop 
exercises, field drills, classroom training, and 
computer simulations. For example, a growing number 
of communities are conducting field drills that 
involve officers, hospitals, private security, and 
community members who enact possible scenarios. 
These types of experiential learning methods 
are needed, in addition to standard classroom 
training, to help prepare first responders and to 
identify vulnerabilities and flaws in plans. 

A tabletop drill can be a valuable learning 
experience. For example, the tabletop drills in 
Chicago, Illinois and Seattle, Washington conducted 
in the spring of 2003 helped assess critical 
agency communication capabilities and problems 
as well as information deficits (Shenon 2003). The 
need for determining those outcomes is the very 
reason executive session participants support 
continued drills. They recognize, however, that these 
drills can be costly and are therefore not an option 
for all agencies or communities. For jurisdictions, 
after-action reports that identify lessons learned in 
completed drills can be quite valuable. 

In fall 2003, PERF staff conducted site visits 
with individuals from cities that were represented 
at the executive session. Personnel provided the 
project team with more detailed information 
about their field training drills. In the 
Washington, D.C. area, for instance, first responder 
preparedness was tested with a field experiment 
involving an unknown substance in a warehouse. 
In this "red envelope" drill, a dispatch call 
went out to all patrol officers. Washington 
Metropolitan Police Chief Charles Ramsey handed 
a note to the first patrol unit that responded 
indicating that a drill was being conducted. The note 
described the signs and symptoms that had been 
observedconsistent with the release of a chemical 
substanceduring a basketball game. (This 
same drill can be used for a biological attack. 
There would not necessarily be symptoms, but 
there could be signs of a substance (e.g., white 
powder) that would alert patrol officers of a 
potential agent.) If the first responders reacted in a way 
that would, in a real incident, have caused them 
serious harm or death, the police chief handed 
them a red card that read: "youre dead." If this 
situation actually had involved a deadly chemical, 
the first three patrol officers and two supervisors 
would have died as a result of their failure to 
follow protocol, despite the information they were 

_______________________________________________________________________________
18 For more information on law enforcement partnerships with private security see IACP and COPS Office National Policy 
Summit, Building Private Security/Public Law Enforcement Partnerships to Prevent and Respond to Terrorism and Public 
Disorder: Vital Issues and Policy Recommendations (2004). 


provided and the personal protective equipment 
(PPE) available in the trunk of all patrol cars. 

This drill demonstratednot just to the 
department commanders, but also to front-line 
officersthe need for more training on response 
protocols for a chemical or biological attack. The 
fact that the chief was on the scene, handing out 
the drill instructions, ensured that information 
about the drill would be carried throughout the 
agency. As a result of the drill, all patrol officers in 
the Washington, D.C. Metropolitan Police 
Department (MPD) at the time of this writing, are 
receiving 16 hours of terrorist response training, 
including the proper use of PPE and decision making 
for addressing chemical and biological agents 
and scenarios. In September 2003 a joint exercise 
was conducted in New York with the NYPD, the 
New York City Office of the Chief Medical 
Examiner, the New York City Department of 
Environmental Protection, the FBI, and New York 
City Department of Health. This exercise demonstrated 
the necessity for strong partnerships across 
disciplines before an event occurs. 

The CDC has developed a basic classroom 
training course, "Forensic Epidemiology: Joint 
Training for Law Enforcement and Public Health 
Officials on Investigative Responses to 
Bioterrorism," which draws on the Criminal and 
Epidemiological Investigation Handbook. This 
course brings together public health and law 
enforcement officials from the same region to meet 
each other, learn what each agency would do in a 
bioterrorism investigation, and train collaboratively. 
To be effective, a significant number of front-line 
police and public health personnel must attend the 
course to ensure all first responders from each 
agency are trained and able to work well together 
after this opportunity. The CDC course uses three 
scenarios based on actual incidents. Promoting a 
common language and knowledge base is at the 
core of the training. (A sidebar on page 21 provides 
more information on this training.) 

Agent-specific simulation models prepared 
by social scientists using computer software programs 
also can provide jurisdictions with insight 
into how different response systems (public health, 
law enforcement, and EMS) work, or dont work, as 
they interact with each other.19 The benefit of 
these models is their ability to test the impact of a 
variety of assumptions about the response of each 
system and then evaluate the outcome. These 
assumptions can be based on a variety of information 
sources, including how various agencies in this 
area or other communities have responded to actual 
crises, such as natural (e.g., earthquakes and 
floods) or manmade disasters (hazardous material 
spills). The major benefits of testing assumptions 
through simulations are the lack of disruption to 
ongoing operations and lower costs. 

Training for Contagious Organisms 

In the hours and days after a community has 
detected the release of a contagious biological 
agent, law enforcement officers will be placed 
squarely at the intersection of concerned, frightened, 
or potentially ill citizens and the government 
efforts designed to assist them. Law enforcement 
has been and will continue to be the "face of government"

______________________________________________________________________________________
19 The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), Technology Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce, 
hosted two workshops on "Modeling & Simulation for Emergency Response" on March 4-6, 2003 and March 2-3, 2004. The 
summary report of the presentations and breakout working sessions as well as a list of standards and tools relevant to 
modeling and simulation for emergency response are available at www.nist.gov/simresponse. 


for communities all across this country. 
It will be critical for the success of government 
plans to contain an outbreak that law enforcement 
officers remain calm and be well informed about 
the contagion, the health risks and benefits of 
vaccination, and available medical treatments. Law 
enforcement officers will need this information for 
two reasons: to pass it along to concerned citizens, 
and to reassure themselves, their coworkers, and 
their families that they can continue to work safely. 

Given the significance of law enforcement 
roles in the event of an outbreakincluding 
responding to calls for service, maintaining order 
and assisting with vaccinationpersonnel must 
be educated about contagious organisms. This 
education should include information about biological 
agents, their disease spread and manifestations, 
available vaccines and treatments, and the 
risks and benefits of those treatments. Law 
enforcement officers will also need to know how to 
interact safely with people who are potentially 
contagious. Session participants encouraged health 
department officials to be involved in first responder 
education (to include police, fire, EMS, and 
health care providers) about physical protection 
and mental health concerns. In addition, private 
security should be educated on contagious organisms 
and trained in the proper response protocols. 

Participants recommended that agencies 
conduct this education in such a way as not to 
cause unnecessary anxiety. The law enforcement 
agency should reach out to other police chiefs and 
sheriffs in its region to design training. Agencies 
should also consider including medical ethicists, 
physicians, public health professionals, and scientists 
expert in contagious diseases to develop staff 
training. 

A community must also develop and conduct joint 
exercises that test local capabilities in 
carrying out quarantine and isolation plans. 
Session participants noted the value of conducting 
large tabletop and operational exercises focusing 
on quarantine and isolation issues that address 
both local and regional response plans. 

In New York City, members of the police 
department and the FBI have conducted joint 
training to evaluate their involvement in effectively 
administering prophylactic anthrax treatments 
(such as antibiotics) or vaccines and conducting 
interviews to obtain information about the site of 
exposure (Rashbaum and Miller 2004). The New 
York City Department of Health and Mental 
Hygiene (DOHMH) administers preventative 
treatments, whereas the NYPD and FBI are responsible 
for conducting the criminal investigation. 

During the anthrax event that affected 
NBC television in New York City, the NYPD and 
FBI interviewed every individual who was given a 
screening questionnaire by the DOHMH prior to 
obtaining medical treatment. The NYPD learned 
from that experience that it was not necessary to 
do an in-depth interview on everyone who was 
screened. In the future, the NYPD is considering 
using the health screening questionnaire to decide 
whom to interview. But, this procedure will only 
be feasible if a small number of individuals need to 
be screened. If the DOHMH must administer 
treatment or vaccines to a large segment of the 
population, it would be virtually impossible to 
interview everyone. 


START TEXT BOX

FORENSIC EPIDEMIOLOGY:
JOINT TRAINING FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT AND PUBLIC HEALTH
OFFICIALS ON INVESTIGATIVE RESPONSES TO BIOTERRORISM

by Richard A. Goodman, Co-Director, Public Health Law Program, 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 

Since at least the mid-1970s, public health and law enforcement officials have conducted joint or 
parallel investigations of health problems possibly associated with criminal intent, or of crimes having 
particular health dimensions. However, the anthrax and other terrorist attacks of fall 2001 have dramatically 
underscored the needs that public health, law enforcement, and other public safety officials 
have for a clearer understanding of the goals and methods each discipline uses in investigating such 
problems. To foster improved understanding of the investigative goals and methods specific to each 
discipline, and to strengthen interdisciplinary collaborative effectiveness in response to future attacks 
involving biological and chemical agents, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), in 
partnership with other agencies, undertook development of a "Forensic Epidemiology" course for the 
joint training of law enforcement and public health officials. 

A primary goal of the Forensic Epidemiology training course is to enhance the combined effectiveness of 
law enforcement and public health when both disciplines conduct concurrent criminal and 
epidemiological investigations, respectively, in response to a threat or attack involving possible 
biological or chemical agents. The course objectives cover key topics in the basic areas of (1) criminal and 
epidemiological investigative methods; (2) operations and procedures; and (3) communication. These 
three areas, in turn, encompass a spectrum of specific operational and legal issues. 

The course addresses its primary goal and objectives by bringing together equal numbers of law 
enforcement and public heath officials who sit side-by-side for one-and-a-half-days to interact directly 
while working through three fact-based scenarios involving threats and attacks with potential biological 
agents. As preparation for working through three scenarios, all participants in forensic epidemiology 
training are given background information on each professional disciplines approaches to investigative 
responses. The domains essential to working through the scenarios are principles of public 
health and epidemiology (geared to the law enforcement and public safety participants), principles of 
law enforcement and criminal investigations (geared to the public health participants), the roles of the 
public health and crime laboratories, and coordination of joint investigations from the federal perspective 
of the FBI. 

The fact-based case scenarios used for this training are based on real events to ensure that the 
operational and legal issues that surface during the training are grounded in reality. In addition, the 
scenarios were selected because they represent a range of categories of bioterrorism- and chemical-related 
threats and problems likely to confront law enforcement and public health officials. The specific 
incidents are (1) an overt (announced) scenariothe receipt of a "white powder" letter; (2) a covert/overt 
scenariothe initial recognition in Florida of the anthrax attacks of October 2001 in which the problem 
first presented as one of possible naturally-occurring origin, but soon thereafter was recognized as 


having intentional and criminal origins; and (3) a covert scenariothe 1984 outbreak of Salmonella 
Typhimurium gastroenteritis, which presented and was investigated as a naturally occurring outbreak, 
but for which criminal intention was suspected only at a later stage in the investigation. 

In addition to the courses defined objectives, this training approach enables participants to 
consider a host of related legal and operational questions. Foremost is the issue of defining and clarifying 
the implications of the laws of entry into premises and workplaces during concurrent public 
health and criminal investigations. Another example relates to the now lowered threshold for considering 
the causal contribution of deliberate criminal behavior to the origin of a public health problem 
and related implications for the "covert/overt" scenariothat is, an event initially considered to be 
naturally occurring (or at least of deliberate but non-criminal origin), but which subsequently is re-classified 
as having potential criminal origins. Under these circumstances, critical questions that arise 
include, At what point during an investigation would roles shift in terms of which discipline is in the 
lead?, What are the implications of a shift in lead?, and What are the specific relevant constitutional, 
statutory, and other laws that apply to the problem? 

The Forensic Epidemiology course was designed by CDC to stand as a self-contained instructional template 
for use in any U.S. jurisdiction. The course initially was implemented in November 
2002 in North Carolina, where planning and cosponsorship involved a model partnership of state and 
federal law enforcement and public health organizations, including the state health department, the 
state bureau of investigation, the states field office of the FBI, a U.S. Attorneys office, and a school of 
public health. Participants represented the cosponsoring organizations, as well as local and state law 
enforcement, public health, other governmental and professional organizations, and the judiciary. The 
course was further piloted in other jurisdictions before being released for use nationally at a U.S. 
Department of Justice-sponsored meeting in spring 2003. Additional information regarding the availability 
and implementation of this training resource is available at www.phppo.cdc.gov/od/phlp. 

END TEXT BOX

Intelligence Issues and 
Bioterrorism 

Many executive session participants believed that 
a central law enforcement task in bioterrorism 
preparedness is to collect information and translate 
it into useful intelligenceintelligence that 
would permit authorities to intervene before biological 
agents could be released. Prevention of 
bioterrorism events arguably includes gathering 
information, analyzing it to identify threats, and 
sharing information with relevant partners. 
Unfortunately, participants see a lack of actionable 
intelligence that can be used both to prevent biological 
attacks and focus limited resources for preparedness 
efforts. So the question remains, how 
can law enforcement develop such intelligence? 
The remainder of this chapter provides a brief 
overview of tasks involved in generating intelligence 
on bioterrorism. A detailed examination of 
intelligence to prevent all types of terrorist attacks 
is the focus of a forthcoming white paper on the 
fourth executive session in this series. 

Information Gathering 

To enhance the overall intelligence capabilities 
needed to combat terrorism in the United States, 


local law enforcement agencies must make the 
most of information that officers can garner from 
members of the community. Agencies should 
reevaluate their intelligence-gathering techniques, 
and community reaction to those techniques, 
particularly among diverse communities.20 

Law enforcement agencies should pay particular 
attention to developing intelligence-gathering 
techniques for line-level officers, as they constitute 
the single largest resource at the street level 
for collecting this information. Session participants 
called for further discussion, however, about 
what officers should be looking for. Agencies can 
also actively encourage community members to 
provide information. This can be achieved through 
public education campaigns (or other techniques 
that solicit public input) that convey the need for 
various types of information and what protections 
would be offered to community members who 
come forward. 

Intelligence Sharing 

Efficient and effective information gathering and 
analysis is dependant on agencies working together. 
Once state and local law enforcement agencies 
enhance their efforts, they must work to share raw 
information and any resulting intelligence. 
Because information comes from a variety of 
sources and may come from many different agencies 
(fire, police, public health), it is imperative 
that agencies be able to quickly and effectively 
share information and analyses with others. 
Several participants at the executive session 
expressed concern about timely information sharing 
among agencies. Of concern was how bioterrorism 
information would be shared across functional 
responsibilities and disciplines (e.g., law 
enforcement, fire, and health); across local 
jurisdictions; and among local, state, and federal levels 
of government. 

Session participants also cautioned 
against information sharing related to 
bioterrorism that would lead to additional "stove-piping" of 
intelligence systems that are already poorly 
integrated. Session participants suggested building on 
existing intelligence systems (e.g., those designed 
to deal with illegal drugs), which would produce a 
single, seamless intelligence system useful for a 
wide range of threats (e.g., gangs, international 
terrorists, and others). The Los Angeles City/County 
Community Law Enforcement and Recovery 
(CLEAR) Program uses some of these systems 
now.21 

To address some of these concerns, the 
Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC) was 
created, which is meant to be a resource for 
identifying terrorism threats and sharing intelligence.22 
The TTIC fuses information and the analytic 
capabilities of different government organizations. 
It enables full integration of U.S. 
Government terrorist threat-related information 
and analysis and is structured to ensure rapid and 

______________________________________________________________________________________________
20 More information on the impact of intelligence gathering on diverse communities can be found in the white paper resulting from the second executive session. It can be downloaded for free at www.policeforum.org. 

21 At the time of this writing, more information on CLEAR can be found online at www.lapdonline.org/general_information/dept_pub_program/clear.htm. 

22 For information regarding TTIC, visit the CIA website at www.cia.gov or DHS website at www.dhs.gov. 
 


unfettered sharing of relevant information across 
departmental lines. TTIC collects intelligence from 
the Department of Homeland Security, the FBI's 
Counterterrorism Division, the CIA's 
Counterterrorist Center, the Department of 
Defense, and other federal agencies. It then provides 
threat analyses to state and local law enforcement 
through the Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs). 

Intelligence Analysis and Threat 
Assessment 

Executive session participants commented on local 
law enforcements challenge to be considered a "full 
partner" in the intelligence arena. They agreed that 
local law enforcement agencies presently have little 
intelligence analysis capability and stressed the need 
to improve or access that capacity. They also noted 
that obtaining an accurate threat assessment for 
bioterrorism is difficult because of limited information 
about how terrorists and their network might 
obtain, store, transport, and release biological agents 
in the United States. 

Session participants expressed the need for a 
better mechanism to determine if a threat is credible 
and when information should be released to local 
first responders. Typically, a federal entity identifies 
a threat and then local law enforcement is called on 
to protect targets. Local law enforcement wants a 
process that gives it a greater voice in decision making 
and information sharingbeyond that provided 
by the JTTFs. 

START TEXT BOX

VALUABLE PARTNERS ADDRESS THE THREAT 

by Assistant Director Ronald L. Iden, Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
Los Angeles Field Office23 

Los Angeles-area law enforcement, fire, safety, and health service agencies have for many years enjoyed 
a strong and productive working relationship in preparing for the threat of terrorism in general, and 
bioterrorism in particular. The FBI has been a full partner in those crucial preparedness efforts. We 
have found over the course of time that each agency brings unique knowledge and capabilities to bear, 
which are critical in dealing with that threat. In the Los Angeles area, three valuable partnerships 
address the threat of bioterrorism, the Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF), the Los Angeles County 
Terrorism Early Warning Group (TEWG), and the FBI's liaison with the UCLA Medical Center. 
The Los Angeles JTTF, which is staffed by area federal, state, and local law enforcement and 
intelligence agencies, is one of the oldest in the nation, having been formed in 1984. The JTTF facilitates 
terrorism-related information sharing among member agencies. Worldwide intelligence pertaining 
to bioterrorism-related capabilities, attacks, arrests, and more is shared through the JTTF with all 
member agencies. Bioterrorism threats and incidents are jointly investigated by participating agencies. 

_______________________________________________________________________________________________________
23 As this paper goes to print, Iden has accepted the position of Senior Vice President of Security for the Walt Disney 
Company. 


Bioterrorism-related training, including tabletop and field training exercises, are conducted jointly as 
well. Operation Westwind, a bioterrorism field training exercise coordinated by the Los Angeles JTTF 
and TEWG, involved 2,000 participants. 

The TEWG, which is composed of representatives from law enforcement, intelligence, fire, 
safety, and health service agencies, assesses and analyzes all terrorism-related information and develops 
protocols for response. It provides a forum that allows members the opportunity to fully discuss 
issues regarding preparedness and response, and to resolve any conflicts that arise in investigations and 
in the information-sharing process. Because the TEWG includes non-law enforcement members, information 
can be swiftly distributed to other agencies and businesses that have a need to know that 
information. 

Another partnership that has been of great value to the FBI and the TEWG has been with the 
UCLA Medical Center. UCLA has provided training on bioterrorism issues to the FBI and other local 
agencies. That partnership and training has allowed the participating agencies to receive in-depth 
information regarding bioterrorism issues that would otherwise not be available to them. It also provides 
another opportunity for agencies to interact with each other and strengthen relationships that are 
critical to bioterrorism preparedness. 

The most significant issue faced by the many agencies that have partnered in the bioterrorism 
effort has been the lack of understanding of one anothers missions, capabilities, and resources. That 
barrier has been overcome in Los Angeles by the unwavering commitment of all agency participants to 
effectively address this significant issue through joint training exercises and through collaborative real-
life responses to bioterrorism threats and suspected acts. Training opportunities and actual events are 
non-stop in a metropolitan area as large as Los Angelesand every agency that has any role to play 
has been a vital partner in that essential collaboration. 

The lesson that the FBI and all Los Angeles-area emergency and health agencies have learned 
in their many years of terrorism preparedness is that trust is essential to an effective working relationship, 
and that trust develops through commitment to full collaboration. By working with our local 
partners, we have learned how best to pool our resources and make the most effective use of our collective 
capabilities. 

END TEXT BOX

Summary

Bioterrorism preparedness planning involves careful 
consideration of the issues related to resources 
and funding, training, and intelligence. Many 
participants recognized that additional funds
as disbursed by local, state, and federal governments 
are essential for adequate preparedness. These 
funds support resource acquisition as well as 
training of all staff, both initially and through frequent 
in-service opportunities. Session participants also 
highlighted the critical need for training, using a 
range of techniques, to better prepare first responders 
for potential bioterrorism events and to safeguard 
their health. It is also imperative that public 
health, law enforcement, fire, and EMS agencies be 
able to quickly and effectively share information to 
enhance responses to bioterrorism. 


CHAPTER FOUR
DETECTION AND NOTIFICATION OF
BIOTERRORIST ATTACKS

DEPENDING ON THE NATURE OF A BIOLOGICAL AGENT AND ITS RELEASE 

mechanism, actions taken in the five critical areasdetection, notifi

cation, intervention, health care surge, and communicationmay 
happen almost simultaneously and all are affected by issues related to resources, 
funding, training, and intelligence.24 For clarity, however, these five steps will be 
addressed separately in the remainder of this white paper. To assist in bioterrorism 
planning efforts, this chapter details executive session participants issues 
and concerns with the first twodetection and notification. Detection focuses on 
collaboration, scene management, and the assessment of substances. 
Notification relates to communication between local, state, and tribal law 
enforcement and federal agencies as well as notification strategies between health 
care providers and law enforcement. 

Executive session participants noted repeatedly  
that because bioterrorism requires not only law 
enforcement, fire, and EMS responses, but public  
health and hospital responses as well, agencies 
must determine in advance the roles of all  
involved systems and actors. Overlapping and  
sometimes competing organizational missions  
need to be addressed. Session participants rein- 
forced the need for interagency and interdiscipli- 
nary cooperation.  

Another concern raised by participants at
the session was the need for pre-event on-scene 
response protocols that would define agency roles
and responsibilities and survive personality conflicts 
and turnover. Participants also noted that
because there is no single model protocol for every
jurisdiction, they encouraged agencies to allow for
flexibility within protocols and to make room for
needed revisions. For example, new infections may
emerge that dictate changes to protocols.

________________________________________________________________________________________________
24 For example, in a package release of anthrax, when law enforcement contains the package and calls for 
health laboratory analysis, this represents detection, notification, and intervention all at the same time. 


START TEXT BOX

WORKING TOGETHER TO PROTECT PUBLIC HEALTH 
by Assistant Chief Phil T. Pulaski and Medical Director Dani-Margot 
Zavasky, Counterterrorism Bureau, New York City Police Department 
The NYPD and the NYC Department of Health and Mental Hygiene (DOHMH) have always shared 
the goal of protecting the public health. The two agencies, however, have different perspectives and par-
adigms to address common problems.
 
The 2001 anthrax terrorist attacks placed the NYPD, DOHMH and FBI Joint Terrorism Task 
Force investigators, doctors, and laboratory scientists in an unprecedented situation. This was a serious 
nationwide terrorist attack; in New York City we suffered one inhalation anthrax homicide victim 
and seven non-fatal cutaneous anthrax victims. Key personnel from each agency, working long hours 
under enormous stress during a dynamic and rapidly unfolding crisis, were able to conduct a joint 
investigation that addressed the needs of both law enforcement and public health. This was the result of an 
extraordinary effort not simply to learn each others procedures and techniques, but also to understand 
them and respect the differences. It was only through mutual respect for each others dissimilarities 
that misunderstandings were reconciled, conflicts avoided and, ultimately, an atmosphere was created 
in which law enforcement and public health personnel learned from one another. Consequently, the 
best methods and techniques used by both law enforcement and public health were applied to the task 
of attempting to solve these horrific crimes and prevent any additional individuals from being infected. 

As the process of mutual understanding and respect progressed, exceptionally collegial professional 
relationships developed. Our DOHMH associates are no longer vaguely familiar names and 
phone numbers in a palm pilot with whom we are required to interact only after an emergency arises. 
Instead, they are well-known colleagues with whom we maintain frequent contact. We enjoy a rapport 
with our DOHMH partners and automatically keep each other informed of developing situations of 
mutual concern. Now when a crisis arises, we are not contacting virtual strangers. Instead, we are c
onferring with trusted partners with whom we have previously trained, planned, and worked to solve joint 
public health and law enforcement-related problems. 

The benefits of this outstanding relationship have been invaluable and not limited to bioterrorism. Where, 
other than New York City, could the Assistant Commissioner for Communicable 
Diseases phone the Chief of Counter Terrorism at 11:00 A.M. on a Saturday morning asking for assistance and 
receive this kind of response: 30 minutes later, the Chief of Bronx Detectives assigned several teams of 
experienced NYPD detectives the task of locating an unidentified individual in the Bronx 
who unknowingly possessed several kittens that might have had rabies. 

The investigation of the 2001 anthrax terrorist attacks created a very special relationship 
between the NYPD and the DOHMH. This relationship was further enhanced when the NYPD created the permanent 
full-time position of Counter Terrorism Medical Director and hired an experienced 
infectious disease physician. Today, executives, managers, supervisors, and staff from both agencies 
remain fully committed to ensuring that this extraordinary partnership continues to develop and grow 
even stronger. 

END TEXT BOX


Detection

Three important issues were raised at the executive 
session related to detection: collaborating to 
detect bioterrorism (issues related to working with 
hospitals and public health departments), managing 
the on-scene responses (concerns about incident command 
structure), and assessing potentially lethal substances 
(using appropriate personal 
protective devices and other technologies). 

Collaborating to Detect Bioterrorism 

Detection of bioterrorism will likely come either 
from the medical community or emergency first 
responders, such as law enforcement. If the conduit 
is the medical community, the key to detection 
will be effective surveillance mechanisms. 
Executive session participants highlighted the 
need for means to detect a significant increase in 
public health indicators that are symptomatic of 
high-risk biological agents (such as anthrax or 
smallpox). Because treatment for exposure to certain 
biological agents must be started quickly, day-
to-day monitoring of indicators is essential. 

A wide range of health care providers 
should be able to provide information that could 
alert authorities to potential bioterrorist attacks. 
These providers include nurses or doctors in hospitals 
or health care clinics, pharmacists, and 
emergency medical technicians. Information about 
the nature and extent of EMS responses for certain 
health conditions can be critical to identifying 
spikes in illness. In Los Angeles, for instance, EMS 
calls are reviewed daily to identify such spikes. 

To facilitate information exchange among 
such a large number of health care providers, 
executive session participants stressed that data from 
these sources should be reported through electronic 
channels to a centralized health data-gathering 
facility (e.g., local health department). Officials 
could then analyze any suspicious shifts in the 
pattern of relevant symptoms. When health care 
providers identify an illness that is outside the 
normal range, it is crucial that they report their 
suspicions to their local health department. The 
information should also be conveyed to law enforcement. 
Several executive session participants indicated 
that their partnerships with health care 
providers and the health department are only in 
their infancy. 

If instead a law enforcement officeror 
some other emergency first responder such as a fire 
fighterrecognizes that the incident is related to 
bioterrorism, his or her agency will need to initiate 
a close collaboration between the medical community, 
public health officials, and other emergency 
first responders. The need for effective interagency 
partnerships is apparent at the first point of detection. 
This type of collaboration is no longer unusual. Law 
enforcement agencies have formed partnerships with 
various members of their communities through ongoing 
community policing activities. They can easily 
build on those relationships 
to include the medical and public health communities. 
Close collaboration will enhance information sharing 
between these agencies and increase 
their ability to quickly detect possible bioterrorism. 

There is an impressive array of people and 
resources to support first responders that must not 
be overlooked in planning bioterrorism responses, 
especially in detection. The executive session 
participants detailed experiences that demonstrated 
the abilities of multiple agencies to work closely 
together and to navigate the complexities of combined 
responses. Many jurisdictions have effectively 
integrated multi-agency responses by clearly 
articulating and documenting each agencys role in 


START TEXT BOX

PARTNERSHIPS BETWEEN POLICE AND PUBLIC HEALTH 

by Jonathan E. Fielding, Director of Public Health and Health Officer, 

Los Angeles County Department of Health Services 
Not very long ago, law enforcement and public health inhabited very different and very distinct worlds. 
While the police were in pursuit of criminals, health staff were in pursuit of disease organisms. The 
separate worlds of criminals and contagion collided with the anthrax attacks of 2001. Suddenly, law 
enforcement officers needed to understand about infectious agents and what threats they might pose to 
their forces. And just as suddenly, public health staff needed to learn among other things about 911 
response times and chain of evidence rules. We were thrust into a new partnership. While still in their 
early stages, many communities in the nation are starting to explore and learn the mutual advantages 
of such a partnership. 

In Los Angeles, the health department is their full partner in the Terrorism Early Warning 
Group, in which law enforcement, fire, EMS, and health professionals convene to assess threats and 
plan coordinated responses. In many other areas, law enforcements only exposure to health departments 
is through EMS, and weve heard what traditional first responders say about EMS: "We thought 
you were the health department!" Alongside EMS, public health in Los Angeles has worked to understand 
and respond to the needs of law enforcement in preparing for bioterrorism, emerging infectious 
diseases and other public health emergencies. As we understand them, our new partners needs include 
rapid identification of biological agents to which they might have been exposed, determination of who 
has been exposed and who remains at risk, prompt and consistent guidance for proper protections from 
the agent, rapid treatment for or vaccination against the threat agent or quarantine, and follow up with 
all those who might have been exposed. 

While these are all issues that public health has followed since its origins, new to public health 
are the time pressures for response under which law enforcement operates and chain-of-custody issues 
in handling specimens. Communications have sometimes been hindered by the different ways in which 
police and health personnel use the same terms, such as surveillance, suspect, and case. To address 
some of these barriers, Los Angeles sponsored a Forensics Epidemiology conference to present through 
a case study method the similarities and differences involved in criminal investigations and disease 
investigations. Involving all three levels of government in law enforcement and in health, more than 
one hundred participants learned the uniqueness and commonalities of each others work. With understanding 
comes respect for the skills of professionals on each side; and from respect grows a willingness 
to trust the otherwith information, contact data, and a new commitment to remain involved in future 
planning and problem solving. 

To respond to law enforcements needs, the Los Angeles Public Health Authority is also working to 
significantly enhance public health laboratories ability for rapid disease identification. Also, 
communications improvements have been made by including law enforcement in our alert systems, and by 
exchanging emergency contact information. Public health is providing the Terrorism Early Warning 
Group with a public health professional to provide epidemiological data and analysis as well. Joint 
planning, exercises, and drills cement these connections. The new partnership between police and public 
health in Los Angeles continues to grow stronger, and all the residents of our county are the 
beneficiaries. 

END TEXT BOX


advance of a terrorist incident. These roles are 
detailed in written agreements among multiple 
jurisdictions within regions as part of their 
planning efforts. Agreements must be explicit and 
comprehensive. For example, at this writing, 
California has area-wide plans for disaster 
management and preparedness that specifies roles and 
decision-making authority for police, fire, public 
health, politicians, community members, and 
businesses. 

The most critical partners for law enforcement 
in the medical community include public 
health laboratories, hospitals, and public health 
departments. Public health laboratories are 
responsible for screening samples of suspicious 
substances and determining their nature. As such, 
executive session participants recommend that 
personnel in these facilities nationwide receive 
training to increase their capacity to screen samples 
for law enforcement and identify their components 
(Chyba 1998). Members of the JTTF in New 
York City, for instance, help train public health 
laboratory personnel on the evidence chain of 
custody. 

Executive session participants said it is 
vital that hospitals work closely with law enforcement 
as well. To strengthen that relationship, participants 
recommended inviting hospital CEOs 
and medical directors to meetings on identifying 
effective collaboration strategies. A solid relationship 
facilitates more active involvement in preparedness 
planning for bioterrorism. Participants 
also stressed the value of active partnerships with 
experts in the public health community, including 
epidemiologists and microbiologists who work in 
universities and hospitals around the country. 

The public health department is another 
critical partner in bioterrorism planning and 
response because it is charged with ensuring the 
welfare of the community, and has a staff of public 
health investigators (public health officers) who 
have unique authority to investigate infectious 
diseases and control their spread. Hospitals are 
required to report potentially infectious diseases 
they diagnose to the health department, which in 
turn is authorized to conduct contact tracing and 
even declare a quarantine if warranted (for more 
information on public health authority, consult 
Richards 2002 and Richards et al. forthcoming). 

In Baltimore, Maryland, area hospitals 
and the public health department have been working 
with law enforcement to plan for bioterrorism, 
including participating in tabletop exercises and 
drills. The Maryland Hospital Association became 
engaged in these efforts from the start. The 
associations signature on the invitation letter for area 
hospitals facilitated hospital cooperation. One of 
the exercises relied heavily on the involvement of 
key staff at each hospitalincluding an infection 
control practitioner (ICP) and the security personnel. 
Lessons learned during this drill spawned 
training by hospital staff for law enforcement on 
types of and effective use of personal protective 
equipment and on contagion of infectious 
diseases. 

Law enforcement agencies must be aware 
of the roles and responsibilities of hospitals' 
infection control practitioners. These practitioners, 
usually nurses, are responsible for notifying the 
department of public health if someone with an 
infectious disease is treated by their hospital. In 
addition, bioterrorism preparedness planners 
should be aware that many hospitals are accredited 
by the Joint Commission for the Accreditation 


of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO), which 
offers a "seal of approval that indicates a hospital 
meets high performance standards."25 JCAHO 
added a standard for hospital emergency management 
in January 2002 that requires hospitals to be 
involved in community-wide emergency response 
drills and to work with other emergency response 
agencies.26 In the case of bioterrorism responses, 
the collaboration should include local law enforcement. 

Several executive session participants indicated 
that the role of private security in detection 
activities also requires greater discussion and 
consideration. Given that the ratio of public to private 
police is approximately one to three,27 executive 
session participants stressed that private security 
has significant potential to detect a bioterrorist 
event. Law enforcement agencies should determine 
how to involve private security forces in 
planning and prevention efforts. According to 
participants, private security firms would welcome 
the collaboration with local law enforcement and 
resulting protocols on detection, notification, and 
response activities should they become aware of 
suspicious substances. 

Managing On-Scene Responses 

Executive session participants raised several 
questions regarding how best to manage on-scene 
responses. Jurisdictions represented at the 
executive session differed on which agency should 
respond first, the roles and responsibilities of each 
responder, and how these multiple agencies should 
handle redundancies and gaps in services. 
Although some participants believed first 
responders will work well together on a bioterrorism 
crime scene, others felt on-scene roles and 
responsibilities need to be better defined, particularly 
when communication is compromised. Some participants 
even expressed considerable cynicism 
that multi-agency efforts could work in actual 
practice. 

Roles of First Responders. In many jurisdictions 
represented at the executive session, a 911 
call would initiate both a police and fire response. 
In some localities, medical expertise is then 
brought to the scenein the form of emergency 
medical technicians and public health officialsto 
assist on potential bioterrorist scenes. Several 
executive session participants use teams of police, 
fire, ambulance, and public health personnel to 
respond to a scene. They stress that these teams 
must be regionalizedto address concerns about 
responding adequately both to large metropolitan 
areas as well as small townsand member agencies 
must focus on having compatible rather than 
competing plans. 

An important consideration in developing 
multi-agency response plans is to determine 
activities that first responders from each discipline 
should complete when they arrive, and then 
coordinate them. Executive session participants 
expressed conflicting views about which agency 
should have primary responsibility for activities at 

______________________________________________________________________________________
25 For more information on JCAHO, visit www.jcaho.org.
26 For more information please see www.jcrinc.com/subscribers/perspectives.asp?durki=2914#ref3link.
27 The following link provides statistics for public law enforcement/deputies and for private security officers:
www.bls.gov/oes/2002/oes333051.htm and www.bls.gov/oes/2002/oes339032.htm.


the scene of a potential bioterrorist event. For 
some participants, hazmat calls are traditionally 
classified as an accident and are appropriately 
managed as such by the fire department. These 
participants see bioterrorism (such as a package 
release of anthrax or a dirty bomb) as a deliberate 
act requiring a law enforcement response. Because 
these situations represent crime scenes, they 
contend that law enforcement must "own" these 
scenes initially. Even though the ownership of the 
scene may change later, law enforcement has the 
primary role of investigating the crime. If one 
accepts that law enforcement should take the lead, 
there is still debate about how local and federal law 
enforcement should cooperate to handle the investigation. 
Some agencies believe the fire department 
should have control of the scene of a bioterrorist 
event instead of police precisely because of the fire 
fighters expertise in hazmat. These decisions 
should be made at the regional level among all 
stakeholders before an event occurs. 

Most agencies represented at the executive 
session agreed that the fire departments role 
generally is to manage rescue operations, treat 
patients and provide hazmat management, whereas 
law enforcements role is to investigate the 
crime, manage the crime scene, and safeguard 
evidence and witnesses. This separation of 
responsibility would likely be blurred at a large bioterrorist 
event that involves a crime scene. For example, 
additional hazmat support may be needed and 
could be supplied in some jurisdictions either by a 
FBI hazmat team or by hazmat-trained personnel 
within the police department. This redundancy in 
capability signals the need for advance planning 
and communication. Some participants reiterated 
that a clearly delineated role for each agency in 
particular situations is critical to overcoming "turf" 
issues. 

Incident Command System. Many participants 
discussed the importance of establishing a 
unified command to coordinate multi-agency 
responses at the scene.28 California, for instance, 
mandates the use of the Incident Command 
System (ICS) at any critical incident or 
natural disaster for which reimbursement will be sought from 
the state. An investigation of the 1993 
Oakland/Berkeley fires response led to passage of 
the California Standardized Emergency 
Management System (SEMS) law in 1996.29 The 
law helps to ensure that valuable time is not lost 
responding to large, complex incidents by mutual 
aid agencies that use different methods of 
command organization, reducing confusion among 
agencies. SEMS outlines the principles of the ICS. 
Unified command includes all of the major players 
in an incident that need to share information, 
resources, and responsibility for the delivery of 
effective services. 

In the ICS, there must be one individual 
who makes the final decision in directing the focus 
of the entire group. The task of this Incident 
Commander during a terrorist incident is to 
coordinate a cooperative effort between 
the commanders of all the agencies 
(e.g., local fire department, 
local law enforcement, and the FBI). In an 
organizational chart in the shape of a triangle, the 
Incident Commander is at the top; however, multiple 

___________________________________________________________________________
28 More information on incident command can be found in Kane 2001. 

29 At the time of this writing, more information on SEMS can be found at the California Governors Office of Emergency 
Services website at www.oes.ca.gov/. 


START TEXT BOX

DESIGNATE ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES 
by Commander Cathy L. Lanier, Special Operations Division, 
D.C. Metropolitan Police Department 

When it comes to acts of terrorism, attacks that are biological in nature are by far the most disconcerting 
for first responders. For a variety of reasons the release of a biological agent is clearly one of the 
most difficult for police officers and fire fighters to respond to. While most law enforcement and fire 
agencies have had some experience with chemical incidents (usually in the form of a hazmat accident), 

they have little or no experience with harmful biological agents. To complicate matters further, it is 
challenging to train and adequately prepare for a biological attack, simply because of the nature of the 
weapon. 

Despite the challenges, first responders must prepare for the possibility that they may have to 
respond to and deal with a biological agent used as a weapon. In any case, event recognition will dictate 
the roles and responses of the various agencies that will be called on to deal with that event. 
Realistically, there are only three scenarios that police and fire fighters will encounter when it comes 
to biological terrorism. 

The first and most likely event will call for a response to a suspicious package containing an 
unknown substance. In this scenario in Washington, D.C., although law enforcement may be called to 
the scene first, it is up to the fire department to do preliminary testing to determine if the substance 
may in fact be a biological agent. This is a fairly simple test that indicates the presence of proteins and 
measures the pH level. These preliminary indicators will determine if further testing is necessary. 

The second scenario would involve an "announced event" where a claim of a biological release 
is received prior to the detection of an actual agent. Again, both the police and fire departments may 
respond to assess the validity of the alleged act; however, whether or not a harmful agent is found, a 
crime has occurred and the FBI would be responsible for the follow up. In this same scenario, if the 
substance does turn out to be a biological agent, the D.C. Department of Health would take the lead 
with regard to mitigation. 

The final, and most likely with regards to a genuine terrorist act, would be the response to an 
unannounced event, where the confirmation of the biological release is identified through individuals 
showing up at hospitals or physicians offices with signs and symptoms. In this case, the D.C. 
Department of Health would essentially lead other agencies for response and mitigation. 

Obviously, for each scenario the roles and responsibilities of law enforcement, fire, EMS, and 
the Department of Health will be different. The key is in ensuring that these roles and responsibilities 
are designated and agreed upon in advance in order to minimize confusion if a biological attack does 
become a reality. 

END TEXT BOX


agency bosses can reside in the top triangle. 
The premise of "whos in command" and the 
Unified Command system only work if all agencies 
are aware of each others primary needs. 

The progression of incident command 
responsibility for a terrorist act may pass from one 
group to another, depending on the stage of the 
incident. The fire department may assume the lead 
as the Incident Commander and set the goals for 
the operation during the initial fire, rescue, and 
medical response. Local law enforcement may 
assume command after fire-rescue-medical 
resources have neutralized the situation and while 
a preliminary criminal investigation is conducted, 
and before the FBI is prepared or able to assume 
control. Under the federal authority of the 
Presidential Decision Directive 39, the FBI is the 
lead investigative agency in any act of foreign or 
domestic terrorism and will lead the subsequent 
criminal investigation if it is determined or 
suspected that the incident is terrorism-related. 

When determining the Incident 
Command, the key players come together on the 
scene and form a Unified Command Group. The 
unified command is the strategy preferred by session 
participants to ensure that personnel from 
multiple agencies do not overlook an important 
response or duplicate efforts. In a unified command, 
the ranking on-scene representatives from 
each of the responding agencies work together to 
coordinate response activities. Ideally, each agency 
would also set up its own operations command. 
The agency representative on the unified command 
would then communicate with his or her operations 
commander to execute activities decided by 
the joint command leaders. 

The executive session participants believe 
it is critical to set command and control correctly. 
Ultimately, they said a command center may need 
to be activated. The FBI coordinates the federal 
response to an act of terrorism by establishing a 
Joint Operations Center (JOC), corresponding to 
the local governments Emergency Operations 
Center (EOC). The JOC is the location where all 
federal agency first responders first report and work 
for the duration of the incident, whereas the EOC 
is where all local first responders report and work 
during the incident. If at all possible, the EOC 
should be co-located with the JOC. At a minimum, 
a federal command officer should stay at the local 
EOC to facilitate effective communication between 
the groups involved in the Unified Command and 
to facilitate the sharing of resources, personnel, and 
information. Health care professionals may lack 
knowledge about Incident Command and Unified 
Command structures used by local and federal law 
enforcement and fire departments. Law enforcement 
may be unaware that hospitals also operate 
their own incident command system, called the 
Hospital Emergency Incident Command System 
(HEICS),30 which should be integrated into the 
unified command structures. 

Assessing the Substance 

Executive session participantsparticularly those 
from large jurisdictionsemphasized that agencies 
must train police and fire responders to conduct 
initial substance assessments. Once word of a 
potential attack spreads, responding agencies risk 
being overwhelmed by the heavy volume of calls 
that may occur when a community fears a bioterrorist 
attack. Hoaxes or a panicked public can bring 

____________________________________________________________________
30 To learn more about HEICS, go to www.emsa.ca.gov/Dms2/heics3.htm. 


agency responses to a standstill if the front line is 
not well trained to distinguish between real or 
imagined concerns. First responders must reduce 
the likelihood that agencies will become overwhelmed 
with call volume by conducting careful 
analyses, making quick determinations and 
promptly reassuring or directing the public. 

One of the most critical considerations 
associated with on-scene substance assessment 
and management is the level of personnel protective 
equipment that should be supplied to on-scene 
responders. Some participants stated that in some 
jurisdictions line-level personnel, labor unions, 
and chief executives have voiced concerns that 
agencies do not provide adequate officer protection. 
Law enforcement agencies have many choices in 
deciding how to budget bioterrorism preparedness 
funds appropriated by Congress. 
Informed decisions need to be made in the selection, 
maintenance, and use of appropriate personal 
protective equipment for front-line personnel. At 
the same time, law enforcement personnel must 
have a thorough understanding of the limitations 
and hazards associated with all levels of protective 
equipment. Table 1 illustrates the level of protection, 
description, type of protection afforded, and 
circumstance for use of each level of equipment. 
Session participants recommended that agencies 
carefully review their protective equipment and 
upgrade it if necessary to enhance officer safety at 
the scene. As an example, in one department, officers 
have level C personal protection equipment in 

TABLE 1 
PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT31 

LEVEL: D  
DESCRIPTION: Work uniform   
PROTECTION: Provides no respiratory protection and minimal skin protection.  
CIRCUMSTANCE: Should not be worn on any site where 
respiratory or skin hazards exist.  

LEVEL: C  
DESCRIPTION: Full facepiece, air purifying, canister-equipped respirator 
and chemical-resistant clothing. 
PROTECTION: Same skin protection as level B, but a lower level respirator. 
CIRCUMSTANCE: Worn when airborne substance is known, concentration is measured, 
criteria for using air-purifying respirators are met, and skin and eye 
exposures are unlikely. 

LEVEL: B  
DESCRIPTION: Chemical-resistant clothing (overalls and long 
sleeves) and self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA).  
PROTECTION: Provides splash protection.  
CIRCUMSTANCE: When the highest level of respiratory 
protection is needed but a lesser level 
of skin and eye protection is sufficient.  

LEVEL: A 
DESCRIPTION: Fully encapsulating chemical-resistant suit and self-
contained breathing apparatus (SCBA). Can only be worn for 15 to 30 
minutes due to overheating. Special training is required.  
PROTECTION: Provides full protection.  
CIRCUMSTANCE: When the highest level of respiratory, 
skin, eye, and mucous membrane protection is needed. 

_____________________________________________________________________________________________
31 This table was constructed from information obtained from the University of Nebraskas Medical Center. 
For more information on personal protective equipment see www.unmc.edu/bioterrorism/equpiment.htm. 

The Department of Homeland Security developed standards on protective gear for first responders. At this writing, 
more information on these standards can be found at www.dhs.gov. 


their trunks to protect against exposure to biological agents. More protection is provided to special 
teams who work on-scene. 

Session participants experiences have also 
demonstrated that simply providing personal 
protective equipment for officers does not constitute 
adequate preparedness. Additional measures are 
needed because much of the effectiveness of this 
protective equipment expires after a period of 
months or years and therefore must be replaced, 
and some of it requires special ongoing storage and 
maintenance. In addition, during stressful "red 
envelope" drills, even officers who had appropriate 
protective equipment in their patrol cars did not 
always remember when or how to use it. Agencies 
must repeatedly train officers to ensure proper use. 

Appropriately protected officers can use a 
variety of methods for assaying the nature of 
suspicious substances they encounter in the field. In 
some jurisdictions, either the patrol officer or the 
fire department performs that initial assessment 
at the scene. This initial analysis is often preliminary 
in that it provides only an early indication of 
the nature of the substance. After the initial 
analysis, samples are usually immediately sent for 
more complete analysis to the local public health 
laboratory. 

In Los Angeles, because of the volume of 
calls, the department developed a field test 
procedure that relies on microscopic identification at 
the scene. In this protocol, which takes approximately 
30 minutes, specially trained LAPD hazmat 
technicians use a microscope at the scene of a 
suspicious substance. Subsequently, they examine 
the substance under the microscope and make an 
initial assessment of its nature. At the same time, 
the team may send microscope images to public 
health laboratory authorities for consultation. 
They also have the ability to conduct additional 
field tests, such as a Polymerase Chain Reaction 
(PCR) to further enhance their capabilities. Other 
agencies use field tests such as protein tests, pH 
tests and basic magnifying glass, as well as more 
sophisticated analytic equipment. Many agencies 
are working to develop more sophisticated technological 
mechanisms to detect agents in the field. 

For those agencies that do not have the 
capability to conduct field-testing, the fire 
department or a specialized unit of the police department 
may be responsible for removing specimens for off-
site analysis. For example, in one major city there 
is no field analysis done. The department of health 
is less than 30 minutes from any location in the 
city and is notified immediately if it is determined 
that analysis is required. An emergency services 
unit transports the specimens, possibly with help 
from the FBI. Team members can expect a preliminary 
determination of the nature of the substance 
within one hour and a final determination within 
24 hours. In other jurisdictions in the nation, the 
fire department works with public health officers 
who respond to the scene to conduct basic tests. 
The public health official would then carry the 
substance to the state public health laboratory for 
further analysis. In this situation, results could 
take four hours. 

One difficulty agencies may encounter is 
what to do at the scene while waiting for 
laboratory analysis results. Those jurisdictions that have 
addressed this issue determined that police and 
fire couldnt legally prohibit residents from 
occupying the scene during the analysis period 
(Richards 2002). Typically health departments 
alone have the authority to prevent occupation 


RAPID THREAT ASSESSMENT KIT: 
LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENTS HAZMAT UNIT 
by Chief William Bratton, Los Angeles Police Department 

Following the anthrax incidents and the potential for other biological threats, the Los Angeles Police 
Departments Hazmat Unit, Hazardous Devices Section, Emergency Services Division, was equipped 
with technologies similar to those of other responders. Primarily, this consisted of bioassay tickets 
designed to confirm the presence of particular biological agents. Bioassay tickets had some critics and 
skeptics. While useful, this technology was insufficient for making critical field decisions. 

During the height of the bioterrorism threat responses, a member of the Hazmat Unit was an 
undergraduate student at the University of California, Irvine. With access to scientists and laboratories 
at this university specializing in the field of epidemiology and environmental sciences, the concept of 
using a field microscope for screening potential biological threats was born. 

The Rapid Threat Assessment Kit (RTAK) was designed to assist specialized responders in 
quickly assessing suspicious, unknown powder threats, using simple analytical instruments (portable 
phase microscope) and chemical indicator tests. The RTAK is based on scientific principles with a stepwise 
procedure to categorize the substance as either harmless or as a potential threat. The RTAK does 
not replace laboratory analysis. Instead, the RTAK quickly distinguishes potentially dangerous substances 
from harmless ones, allowing first responders to quickly address biological threats. 

The RTAK is an improvement in the set of tools available to technical responders. Existing tools 
typically focus on a specific biological agent. The RTAK considers a broader range of potential threats. 
Because the RTAK algorithm assesses the basic chemical and physical properties of substances, its 
strength is in sorting threats from non-threats. The entire procedure can be completed in 30 to 45 minutes. 
The assessment process reduces downtime at critical facilities and the number of samples transported to a 
laboratory. This ability also reduces economic impacts to city services. 

The RTAK is packaged in a ruggedized pelican case with a handle and wheels for mobility. The 
RTAK is intended to be transportable in any vehicle. In addition, the RTAKs case is waterproof for 
decontamination purposes, enabling it to be brought in and out of a warm or hot zone. 

The RTAK requires specialized training and field-testing. Local universities and laboratory professionals 
assisted with developing skills, such as sampling, slide preparation, and phase microscopy 
techniques. The training provided proficiency to deploy the technology in the field. Overall, the strength 
of the field microscope is its simplicity and solid scientific basis. The weakness is the required training 
and proficiency. The skills are highly perishable, which can be overcome by continuous training. 

Since development, the kit was incorporated into the Haztech Systems line of Technical WMD 
Responder tools. Haztech systems combined certain aspects of their technology with the RTAK to 
develop a Weapons of Mass Destruction field analysis kit and training program. The RTAK is now 


offered by Haztech Systems as the MicroCat WMD system. In addition, they have developed a five-day 
certification course at this writing. 

The Hazmat Unit also maintains additional technologies such as the Tetracore Bioassay 
Tickets, Guardian Readers, and Air Sampling Devices. These technologies are based solely on bioassay 
reliability. The Hazmat Unit uses all of these items as integral "pieces of the puzzle" to formulate 
response decisions. In addition, the Hazmat Unit is in the process of acquiring a portable Polymerase 
Chain Reaction (PCR) tool to further enhance decision-making capabilities. 

At the time of the executive session, the complete MicroCat WMD system cost $16,750. This 
has included the phased microscope and the materials to identify potential biological threats and 
chemical warfare agents. The kit has also included a basic radiological screening instrument. The five-
day certification course, which provides training on the use of the microscope and the system, was 
$900. Beyond the initial equipment costs, additional maintenance and expendables (slides, reagents) 
are minimal. 

This creative application of technological resources will position the LAPD to respond effectively 
to a potential terrorist attack. 

END TEXT BOX

based on a biological threat. In those cases where 
the health department is not involved, first 
responders must leave it up to the property owner 
to determine what to do with the building or 
other property where the suspicious package was 
found. 

Notification 

Some have argued that the "terror" in bioterrorism 
comes from the contagion factor and the fear of 
exposure (Chyba 1998). Because incubation periods 
may distance the initial point of exposure from 
the point of detection, vigilance against bioterrorism 
requires efficient, coordinated public health 
surveillance mechanisms. One aspect of this 
surveillance is its "sensitivity," or how likely the 
system in place is able to detect an attack. The second 
aspect of surveillance is "connectivity," or how 
efficiently information is conveyed to state and 
federal officials, and communicated to relevant 
personnel throughout each level. This is a notification 
function and was the concern of many executive 
session participants. 

Executive session participants suggested 
that written interagency agreements specify a 
decision tree and optimal information-sharing paths to 
facilitate notification of suspected bioterrorism. 
The decision tree would specify who is responsible 
for making determinations as well as ensuring 
actions are then performed by the appropriate 
partners. The document should specify, for instance, 
the threshold criteria for different levels of police 
intervention and how many personnel the agency 
should deploy for each level. 

During an event, once the initial assessment is 
made that a bioterrorist attack has 
occurred, agencies must set protocols to evaluate 
whether the incident is isolated or part of a 
pattern. Part of the process for determining the extent 
of the attack involves an investigation function, in 
which, for example, law enforcement first responders 
gather information from those who opened or 


handled a letter containing an agent. Another 
aspect is related to notification of the federal 
government so as to facilitate communication. If 
there were positive readings in multiple locations, 
session participants were concerned about how 
they would communicate and learn about these 
episodes. Communication from the local officials 
to the federal government and then back to local 
personnel would be improved through decision 
trees and contact flow diagrams. 

There are multiple notification routes, 
including traditional law enforcement and public 
health channels. For example, in Los Angeles, the 
public health department communicates with 
CDC and local hospitals about the information 
they have on a substance. CDCs role is to determine 
who has been exposed and possible remediation. 
CDC will also notify states through the 
Health Alert Network, which links public health 
departments across the country, which then notifies 
local law enforcement. 

If law enforcement believes an incident is 
a potential bioterrorist event, in some cases the 
responding officers would call the appropriate Joint 
Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs). Several participants 
were uncertain about exactly when to alert 
the their JTTF and health authorities. The session 
participants discussed the JTTFs role in the 
notification process. The JTTFs can make an initial 
threat assessmentto determine whether this is 
an isolated event or notbased on information 
coming in from local calls. Their initial threat 
assessment helps them determine law enforcement's 
subsequent actions, as does public healths 
analysis. Federal agency participants noted that 
the JTTFs and the FBI's Strategic Information and 
Operations Center (SIOC) would then notify all 66 
JTTFs in the event of a positive or negative finding. 
FBI information would be disseminated to 
law enforcement and health departments around 
the country. 

In addition to the alert system through the 
JTTFs, several participants discussed regional alert 
systems used if an emergency occurs. The 
Maryland Institute for Emergency Medical 
Services Systems (MIEMSS) is mandated to coordinate 
the states emergency medical systems.32 
The MIEMSS uses a statewide system of 
microwave towers to connect hospitals to the 
emergency dispatch communications system. 
After the events of September 11, staff at MIEMSS 
used that existing system to develop a Facility 
Resources Emergency Database (FRED), which is a 
web-based application that provides information 
to hospitals about an ongoing emergency. When a 
FRED alert goes out, the receivers computer 
sounds an audible alarm and the person is linked 
to information about the emergency. The FRED 
system also maintains information about hospitals 
and can request hospital capacity assessments 
and ambulance availability in an emergency. 

The District of Columbia Emergency 
Management Agency (DCEMA)33 ensures the 
continuity of government during and following 
major disasters by coordinating communications 
efforts. DCEMA's mission is to protect the lives 

_____________________________________________________________________________
32 More information on the Maryland Institute for Emergency Medical Services Systems (MIEMSS) can be found at 
http://miemss.umaryland.edu. 

33 For more information on the District of Columbia Emergency Management Agency, go to 
http://dcema.dc.gov/dcema/site/default.asp. 
 


and property of District residents and visitors during 
major emergencies and disasters through planning 
and timely operational response. DCEMA 
maintains the Executive Command and 
Communications Center (ECC), which provides 
communications and information regarding city 
conditions to the Executive Office and other 
District government officials. The ECC is staffed 
24 hours a day, 7 days a week, and additional 
personnel are available if a situation requires. 
DCEMA also manages the Emergency Operations 
Center (EOC), the civilian operations command 
center used during disasters and emergencies. 

In Washington, D.C., first responders activate 
the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) to 
facilitate the flow of information and begin 
coordinated management. The EOC is connected 
through multiple technologies to the Metropolitan 
Police Department Joint Operation Command 
Complex (JOCC), the law enforcement command 
center, as well as the operations centers of other 
critical agencies such as the District Department 
of Transportation and the Department of Health. 

These centers rely on multiple communication 
devices, including the Washington Area Radio 
Circuit and the Washington Hospital Association 
Network, which connects 29 hospitals including 
Walter Reed Army Medical Center, to facilitate 
notification of a possible bioterrorist attack. 

Summary 

This chapter discussed the issues and concerns 
executive session participants raised about detection 
and notification. Detection is dependant on 
collaboration, scene management, and the assessment 
of suspicious substances. Notification is an 
essential issue related to communications between 
local law enforcement and federal agencies as well 
as notification strategies between health care 
providers and law enforcement. Agencies must 
decide before an event occurs what the roles and 
responsibilities of all government agencies will be, 
including police, fire, public health, and hospitals. 
Interagency and interdisciplinary cooperation and 
on-scene response protocols tailored to individual 
jurisdictions are essential. 


CHAPTER FIVE
INTERVENTION, HEALTH CARE SURGE,
AND COMMUNICATION

THIS CHAPTER DETAILS THE VARIOUS LAW ENFORCEMENT ROLES DISCUSSED AT 
the executive session for intervening in a bioterrorist attack, managing 
the health care surge, and communicating in ways that reduce public 
fear. The executive session discussion addressed several themes related to law 
enforcement officers roles if real or threatened release of a biological agent 
occurs. A close working relationship between law enforcement and health care 
professionals is essential. Law enforcement personnel will often be in a support 
role rather than act as decision makers during these activities. Executive session 
participants stressed the need for advance planning on the specifics of these relatively 
new duties and responsibilities for police. 

Intervention  

The public typically turns to the police as their 
immediate contact for many matters related to 
the provision of government services whether or  
not those services are typically part of law enforcements 
responsibility. Because law enforcement is  
highly visible and accessible, the tendency to turn  
to police would be no different in the event of a 
bioterrorist attack. If one or more cases of smallpox 
were confirmed or even suspected, for  
instance, community members and government  
leaders would call on police to respond to dramat- 
ically increased calls for service as well as two gen- 
eral categories of duties: 1) investigating the crime  
of bioterrorism, and 2) assisting in health care
delivery. 

Investigating the Crime

The principle responsibility of law enforcement in
a bioterrorist event is to investigate the crime. If a
large outbreak is confirmed, investigating the
crime would be impossible unless police and public 
health investigators worked together when 
interviewing suspects. Teams comprised of law
enforcement and public health investigators can
collaborate on interview questions that gather
information both about exposure to agents and the
circumstances of an individual's exposure that


may constitute evidence of the crime. Joint interviewing 
can both streamline the investigative 
process and provide different perspectives on the 
information gathered.34 

Joint police/public health investigations 
pose significant legal challenges that agencies 
must explore before implementing policies. For 
example, public health officials generally have 
broader authority in search and seizure situations 
than do law enforcement personnel. Public health 
departments have been granted this authority to 
enable them to stem the spread of infectious disease 
promptly. Public health officials also may be 
more familiar with privacy regulations and how to 
support them while still sharing critical information 
with law enforcement. Police and public 
health authorities must consider the differences in 
their authority and goals, and then plan for how 
they will be addressed if an incident occurs. 
Planning is essential to reduce the chances that 
critical evidence will be lost due to role confusion 
and legal mandates.35 

Although a memorandum of understanding (MOU) alone 
will not create an effective working relationship 
between police and public health, 
one is clearly advised. To be effective, MOUs must 
have a sufficient level of detail in such areas as 
determining who will have authority for each function, 
which functions may be necessary to manage 
a threat, the chain of command for multi-agency 
actions, and the procedure for assuring that one 
agency can get needed help from another without 
delay. An agreement should be accompanied with 
legal documentation that supports departmental 
authority to enter into the agreement. 

Assisting Health Care Delivery 

Past experience with smallpox outbreaks, such as 
the one in New York City in 1947, dictates swift 
preventive and control measures, such as large 
cities being prepared to orchestrate a massive 
vaccination program. In this instance, one person 
infected 12 others while on a short trip to the city. 
Using the help of local law enforcement, officials 
instituted a vaccination of six million people in 
one monthand though tragic, only two people 
died (Chyba 1998). If a bioterrorist attack occurs 
today, law enforcement personnel would be called 
on to assist health care providers to locate and isolate 
(perhaps through quarantine) those individuals 
who have been in contact with infected people, 
to maintain order at health care centers and to 
provide support during mass administration of 
vaccinations or medical prophylaxis treatment. They 
would also be faced with unusual demands for traffic 
control, fear reduction, and other more traditional 
dutiesstretching their available resources 
to the fullest. 

In addition, law enforcement will also 
likely respond to numerous subsequent calls from 
fearful citizens who are ill and worried they may be 
infected. Others will want medicine or treatment 
to ensure they dont get infected in the days ahead. 
Potential "suspicious powder" incidents (even 

_______________________________________________________________________________________
34 See, also, the National Domestic Preparedness Office/Department of Defense Criminal and Epidemiological 
Investigation Report 2000 for more details. The issue of joint police and public health investigations is also addressed in 
the sidebar "Partnership Between Police and Public Health" in Chapter 3. 

35 For more information on these issues, see Richards 2002. At the time of this writing, this publication was available at 
www.cdc.gov/ncidod/EID/vol8no10/02-0465.htm. Also consult Goodman et al. 2003. 


those that turn out only to be spilled coffee creamer) 
can create significant panic. Police officers who 
are stationed in emergency rooms in large cities to 
help provide security could have direct contact 
with seriously or potentially ill people. They will 
also certainly encounter people who are frightened, 
possibly panicking, and in need of reassurance and 
guidance. 

Isolation and quarantine. In the event of 
a bioterrorist attack involving a contagious organism, 
law enforcement will have a vital role in disease 
containment measures such as isolation and 
quarantine. Law enforcement will be called upon 
to assist in locating known associates and possibly 
even casual contacts of infected people. This strategy 
is consistent with "ring vaccination," a strategy 
begun in the late 1960s and which ultimately 
helped eradicate smallpox in the United States.36 

Containment strategies usually involve 
quarantining exposed people and those who have 
had contact with them. Public health has the 
authority under law to quarantine a building, but 
does not have the power to enforce that law. 
Consequently, public health authorities must 
work closely with law enforcement to determine 
how to enforce isolation and quarantine scenarios. 
Executive session participants noted that 
mandatory quarantines would be extremely difficult 
to enforce and suggested instead using voluntary 
strategies. Law enforcement officials and public 
health officials would request exposed individuals 
be quarantined voluntarily. Elected officials 
(such as the mayor) would need to step forward to 
calm the public as well as request their full 
cooperation. Law enforcement would also need 
to assuage community fears and ensure public 
safety around treatment or quarantine facilities. 

Vaccination and prophylaxis. If there is a 
large-scale bioterrorist attack, public health 
officials may vaccinate or provide antibiotics 
to individuals in large geographic areas as prophylaxis. 
This type of widespread response may be necessary 
should multiple outbreaks occur simultaneously or 
in response to public pressure. In these 
situations, law enforcement officers will likely be 
responsible for maintaining order for personnel 
providing medical treatment in hospital emergency 
rooms, clinic settings, or temporary vaccination 
centers. 

If there is a significant anthrax attack, for 
instance, studies suggest that prompt distribution 
from the national stockpile of antibiotics may be 
the most critical step in reducing causalities and 
controlling public panic (Wein and Kaplan 2003). 
The Department of Health and Human Services 
(HHS) would work with the Department of 
Homeland Security to identify populations at risk 
and distribute antibiotics to them in any city in 
the United States in as little as six hours. HHS 
indicated at the executive session that they have 
the ability to deliver antibiotics to 20 million 
people for their immediate needs and 12 million 
people for 60 days. Executive session participants 
cautioned that public panic would occur if antibiotics 
were not distributed fairly and quickly. They 
warned that citizens will attempt any means 
even storming pharmacies and health care centers 
or riotingto obtain these medications. 

Several jurisdictions represented at the 
executive session have developed plans for receiving 
and transporting medical stockpiles to distribution 
sites. These sites (emergency rooms, pharmacies,

___________________________________________________________________________________________
36 More information on this strategy can be found at http://www.bt.cdc.gov/agent/smallpox/prep/cdc-prep.asp. 
 


and armories) will all be critical locations 
for law enforcement protection and crowd management. 
Executive session participants recommended that 
law enforcement agencies and public 
health officials prepare protocols and drill on the 
distribution process. 

Health Care Surge 

Although the critical issue of "health care surge" 
refers most directly to the spike in demand facing 
health care providers if a large outbreak occurs, law 
enforcement representatives at the executive 
session had several operational concerns related to 
their own staffing. Faced with current staff shortages, 
participants anticipated even greater personnel 
problems. To make the most resources 
available, the participants suggested proactive 
staff preparation, such as advance vaccines and 
education, and gathering and identifying such 
force multipliers as citizen groups and the 
National Guard. 

Staffing 

Those executive session participants who had 
experience planning for and managing bioterrorist 
attacks warned that demand for law enforcement 
personnel in these situations is enormous. One 
person may serve two or more first responder roles 
during normal operations but will not be able to do 
both when a crisis occurs.37 One participant 
estimated the demand would be six times the number 
of officers who ordinarily are available on a given 
shiftthat is if all officers come to workand 
many participants were concerned that approximately 
20 to 25 percent of the police force will stay 
home to protect loved ones and out of fear. 

Executive session participants proposed 
several strategies to minimize law enforcements 
absenteeism in the event of a bioterrorist attack. 
The first strategy is to provide adequate education 
in advance. This education should include information 
on how to protect oneself from exposure to 
biological hazards, how to protect suspects and 
reduce their exposure to others, and ways to 
identify risky situations before there is unintended 
exposure to a biological threat. 

Session participants also suggested that 
agencies provide first responders, their families 
and other key service providers with medical 
treatments in advance of a bioterrorism crisis. This 
strategy might reduce absenteeism caused by 
personnel who stay home to assure their families 
health. As an alternative to providing medical 
treatments in advance, participants suggest communities 
maintain and be ready to distribute adequate 
stockpiles of antibiotics for all key personnel 
and their families. 

As part of the advance preparations for 
bioterrorism, the federal government has attempted 
to implement a policy of vaccinating against 
smallpox approximately 500,000 first responders, 
including medical staff and public health workers 
(Turner 2004). These first responders could then 
be ready to respond to possible bioterrorism in 
their city or to assist in another city. The 
federal policy envisioned that at least some 
number of local law enforcement officers would be 
vaccinated. 

Local jurisdictions have had difficulty 
gaining voluntary compliance with this strategy 
for several reasons: Responders are concerned 

______________________________________________________________________________________________
37 See John F. Kennedy School of Government 2002 for more information on surge capacity and 
first responder roles during a critical incident. 


about the health risks associated with the vaccination 
itself, and many do not think the odds of a 
threat of a bioterrorist event outweigh the risks of 
complications from the vaccine. There is also concern 
about who would pay the health care costs 
should vaccinated responders become ill and supplemental 
staffing costs if workers need time off 
(Turner 2004). 

Force Multipliers 

In addressing surge problems for health care, some 
have suggested creating a pool of voluntary medical 
professionals who could deploy to the site of 
an attack with little notice (Wein and Kaplan 
2003). In community policing jurisdictions, partners 
in the communitywho are already a 
tremendous resource for police during non-crisis 
timescould be viewed as a similar asset during 
the event of a bioterrorist attack (Glass and 
Schoch-Spana 2002). Evidence for this capacity to 
help has been demonstrated by public reaction to 
previous natural disasters and disease outbreaks, 
where members of the public have often reacted 
effectively. Executive session participants 
recommended that community leaders develop programs 
that specify duties for appropriate organizations 
and individuals during a response to a bioterrorism 
crisis. For example, community members can 
organize groups to assist elderly or disabled 
neighbors who cannot leave their homes to evacuate or 
obtain treatments. Law enforcement executives 
are well situated to reach out to enlist this type of 
help because of existing relationships with many 
local groups. All individuals who will be assisting 
law enforcement to bolster their ranks must be 
trained and supervised to address community fear 
and needs for treatment. The Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) announced the development 
of the Private Sector Office, reflecting the 
recognition that private security is vital to 
homeland security efforts. The Private Sector Office38 
provides guidance on policies and regulations; 
works with federal labs; develops innovative 
approaches and technologies in research and development 
centers and through academia; and promotes 
public-private partnerships, programs, and 
best practices. 

Other response assistance will come from 
the federal government, including the National 
Guard and DHS. The National Guard could provide 
some of the force multiplier that is required, 
especially for such duties as securing facilities and 
escorting food and medical supplies to distribution 
centers. The National Disaster Medical System 
within DHS is also prepared to provide on-scene 
response teams that offer medical and veterinary 
services. These teams include approximately 35 to 
40 people who can be deployed for two to four 
weeks. DHS also has resources to assist mortuary 
services, such as identification of remains; casualty 
evacuation; and identification of medical bed 
capacity. DHS can also supplement hospital facilities 
and resources during incidents as well as provide 
some mental health resources. 

__________________________________________________________________________________________
38 At the time of this writing, more information on the DHS Private Sector Office can be found at 
www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?theme=9&content=3699. 


START TEXT BOX

NEED FOR COORDINATION AND INTEROPERABILITY OF PUBLIC 
HEALTH DISCIPLINES AND RESOURCES 
ACROSS JURISDICTIONAL LINES 
by Ruth A. Vogel, Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response, 
Commisioners Office, Baltimore City Health Department 

The attacks of September 11 and subsequent terrorism events have affected virtually all aspects of life 
including domestic security, public health and safety, environmental issues, and the health care community
all historically viewed as separate entities and issues. This changing environment has high
lighted the need for better coordination and interoperability of public health disciplines and resources 
across jurisdictional lines. A key determinant for appropriately addressing this need for collaboration 
is the inclusion and appropriate representation of public health resources and authorities acting in concert 
with emergency management officials, first responders, and public and private community-based 
partners. 

As a local health department that is implementing an "anti-terrorism" program, we have found 
through our efforts two salient needs: 1) improvement is needed regarding basic understanding of public 
health roles and responsibilities among all partners, and 2) public health must be represented in 
anti-terrorism and emergency preparedness planning initiatives. The infrastructure of a public health 
agency is complicated and includes a variety of programs and services whose roles and responsibilities 
are what essentially define the health and well-being of a community. The public health discipline is 
historically founded in prevention-based initiatives using epidemiology, risk assessments and surveillance 
to drive program goals, objectives, and activities. Many of the existing prevention-based programs also 
have a front-line component that provides defensive and ongoing management of natural 
and man-made public health threats. It is these existing resources that need integration for effective 
responses to any public health emergency. Consequently, we are currently focusing our efforts toward 
developing more effective initiatives that include the resources and assets of Maryland's state and local 
public health in coordinated prevention, planning, preparedness, response, recovery and mitigation 
efforts for both natural and man-made disasters. 

This first step to improving the integration of public health is recognizing that our roles are 
unique as they relate to homeland security and emergency response. The Baltimore City Health 
Department is working closely with other state, local, and regional agencies in Maryland to achieve 
this. For example, the State of Marylands Department of Homeland Security has coordinated a public health 
technical working group that through a collaborative effort with local public health at the 
table, agreed to the following objectives that are now being used to improve the public health role in 
Marylands emergency preparedness and response efforts: 


Objective: Improve the knowledge base of all response partners by providing basic public 
health "101"-type training so that partnering agencies and institutions can appropriately utilize 
resources within their respective emergency operations infrastructures. 

Objective: Enhance opportunities for "hands on" training and exercises that incorporate public health roles 
and responsibilities, both among disciplines and jurisdictions. 

Objective: Improve integration of federal partners and their resources for emergency planning 
and response services. 

In summary, the current efforts to improve and incorporate public health into existing emergency 
response systems have been largely based upon a crisis response mentality following September 11 and 
the anthrax events of 2001. Optimal response is contingent upon tactics that incorporate a collage of 
plans, agencies, and resources. It is clear that a more cohesive plan that can be easily adapted for a 
variety of public health emergencies is needed. The challenge is to ensure it is structured so that it 
represents all responders. 

END TEXT BOX

Communication

A significant issue in the aftermath of a bioterrorist 
attack will be to manage the public panic that 
could occur. Law enforcement agencies must use 
existing ties with communities to mobilize a 
recovery strategy that can get local areas back to 
functioning as soon as possible following the 
event. A clear communication plan and a consistent 
message to the public will be essential components 
of that recovery strategy. A communication plan 
should include the private sector, the 
mass media, and community organizations. 

Advance Public Education Campaign 

Experts agree that community leaders should 
engage in public information and education campaigns 
prior to a terrorist attack (Glass and 
Schoch-Spana 2002). Executive session participants 
noted that the general public is poorly 
informed about bioterrorism and what they should 
do after an attack. In a crisis, public education is 
almost impossible to provide through news 
reports. The public should be educated before an 
incident on such matters as whether they would be 
required to go to distribution centers to obtain 
antibiotics or vaccinations, and what preventive 
measures to take to limit their exposure. This 
education must also address treatment compliance, a 
concern that is based on experience with exposed 
postal workers in the anthrax attacks in fall 2001. 
Some of the workers did not comply with the full 
treatment regimen (Wein and Kaplan 2003). 

Executive session participants noted that 
advance public education strategies for dealing 
with the risks of bioterrorism should involve mass 
media communications (such as broadcast media, 


print media, and the Internet), public schools, 
businesses, religious groups, and various community 
and civic organizations. Several mass media 
experts emphasized the importance of early 
communication that is candid about what is, and is 
not, known about the nature of the threat. This 
information would be especially valuable for 
government officials who will be charged with 
providing the public with accurate information 
without instigating panic.39 

Developing the Public 
Communications Strategy 

Community policings focus on partnerships, 
trust, and problem solving are essential to police 
agencies efforts to better protect the public and 
communicate after a bioterrorist attack. During a 
critical incident, successful community policing 
will reduce fear as well as ensure that the combined 
efforts and resources of the police, local 
government, and community members will be 
deployed effectively. Honest communication with 
the public will be essential to maintaining their 
trust in a crisis. Executive session participants 
stressed the need for transparency in communication 
strategies and the need for taking a proactive 
approach. Some executive session participants 
stressed that the effect of a bioterrorist attack on 
the publics mental health would require a keenly 
coordinated and sensitive response. 

Making the announcement. A community must decide as 
part of its communication strategy which government 
authority will make the 
announcement that a bioterrorist attack has 
occurred. Executive session participants noted that 
in all likelihood this would be an elected official 
(such as the governor, county administrator, or 
mayor). Some participants stressed that a public 
health official should also be involved and the local 
law enforcement executives visibility would also 
help calm the public. 

Communications content. Executive session 
participants noted that communications 
should include information about how the agent 
was delivered, how illness is contracted, what the 
symptoms are, and how the public can protect 
itself from exposure. These participants urged 
giving individuals as much information as possible to 
reduce panic and fear. They indicated that 
community members would want to know what law 
enforcement is doing to investigate the crime and 
what the medical community is doing to treat 
illness. They also stressed how important it is for 
authorities to say what they do not know. 

Communications frequency. Session participants 
who had experienced a biological attack 
noted that while there may be a tendency to wait 
before making announcements about the attack, 
the media is likely to put tremendous pressure on 
the authorities to get information out quickly. 
These participants recommend beginning 
communications early (as soon as credible information 
dictates) and updating available information 
frequently. 

______________________________________________________________________________________
39 For more information to the Department of Homeland Security guidelines and resources on preparation for a terrorist 
attack, see www.ready.gov. 


Summary 

Partnerships and planning between law enforcement, 
other first responders, and the health care 
community are critical in preparing for a 
bioterrorist event. Planning with other government 
agencies will determine the roles and responsibilities 
of law enforcement officials and other stakeholders. 
Local law enforcement will shoulder a significant 
role in intervening in a bioterrorist attack, 
helping to manage the health care surge, and in 
communicating with the public to reduce fear. 

 


CHAPTER SIX
RECOMMENDATIONS

THIS WHITE PAPER HAS LOOKED AT THE LESSONS SHARED BY EXECUTIVE SESSION 
participants whose agencies have dealt with a bioterrorist event or have 
developed response plans to a biological attack. It has also provided 
recommendations for law enforcement agencies to enhance bioterrorism preparedness 
in the five critical action areas involved in planning for and responding to a 
bioterrorism event: detecting the event, notifying the proper authorities, 
intervening (in coordination with fire, EMS, and public health responses), managing 
the surge of demands placed on heath care systems, and maintaining effective 
communication with all agencies involved in a response as well as the public. 
Three overarching concerns common to all of these five critical areas were also 
discussed: funding and resources, training, and intelligence. 

There are numerous multi-agency efforts involved 
in carrying out each of the five critical function  
areas. Consequently, there is a need for interagency 
and interdisciplinary cooperation with clearly 
defined, on-scene response protocols that predetermine 
agency roles and responsibilities for each 
jurisdiction. While there may be some overlapping 
duties as some needs overtake available resources, 
generally the fire departments role may be to 
manage rescue operations, treat victims, and pro- 
vide hazardous materials response, whereas law  
enforcements role may be to safeguard evidence  
and witnesses, preserve and manage the crime  
scene, investigate the crime, calm the community,  
prevent violence around health care settings, 
and respond to calls for service.  

Specific recommendations for law enforcement 
agencies on developing bioterrorism
response plans are outlined in the previous chapters. 
Listed below are highlights of selected 
recommendations. 

Five Critical Areas
Detection 

Determining a bioterrorist act has been committed 
is dependent on law enforcement collaborating
with hospitals, other health care facilities, and
public health departments. Partnerships with
these and other stakeholders allow police to detect
bioterrorism, manage the on-scene response using
the Incident Command System, provide appropriate 
equipment and training to enhance officer and


public safety, and assess the potentially lethal 
substance with appropriate, available technology. 

> Public health and law enforcement must 
collaborate to develop effective detection strategies. 
A mechanism in each jurisdiction is needed 
to detect a significant increase in public health 
indicators that are symptomatic of high-risk biological 
agents. Law enforcement must collaborate 
with health care providers, including nurses or 
doctors in hospitals or health care clinics, 
pharmacists, emergency medical technicians, and 
others who are in a position to identify spikes in 
illness. 

> Line-level first responders must be trained to 
recognize indicators of a potential bioterrorist 
attack and treat suspicious letters or packages as 
they would any unknown, potentially hazardous 
material. Adequate, up-to-date personnel protective 
equipment should be provided to first responders 
to enhance officer safety at the scene. 
Agencies must repeatedly train officers to ensure 
compliance with equipment usage in the field. 

> As first responders to the scene of a potential 
bioterrorist attack, law enforcement personnel, 
fire fighters, and EMS workers must also be able to 
conduct preliminary assessments of potentially 
harmful substances using available technologies 
that are both sophisticated and practical. 

> Law enforcement agencies should invite 
health care leaders, such as hospital CEOs and 
medical directors, to planning meetings designed 
to identify effective collaborative bioterrorism 
response strategies. There should also be an active 
partnership between law enforcement and public 
health experts, including epidemiologists and 
microbiologists. 

> Law enforcement should be aware of local 
hospitals that are accredited by the Joint 
Commission for the Accreditation of Healthcare 
Organizations (JCAHO), which offers a "seal of 
approval that indicates a hospital meets high 
performance standards." JCAHO-accredited hospitals 
must conform to a standard requiring them to 
participate in emergency response training drills. 

> Law enforcement agencies should collaborate 
with private security firms and establish protocols 
on detection (as well as notification and 
response) activities should they become aware of 
suspicious substances. 

> Jurisdictions must effectively integrate 
multi-agency responses by clearly articulating and 
documenting each agencys role in detecting 
bioterrorism, before an attack occurs. Written 
agreements are encouraged for multiple jurisdictions 
within regions as part of their planning 
efforts. 

> A Unified Command must be established to 
coordinate multidisciplinary responses (e.g., local 
fire, local law enforcement, FBI, and others such as 
public works, public health, and EMS). The 
Unified Command includes all of the major players 
in an incident that need to share information, 
 


resources, and responsibility for the delivery of 
effective services.40 

Notification 

Once first responders or medical professionals 
detect that a bioterrorist event has occurred, they 
must initiate a broader team response by notifying 
the proper authorities. Notification occurs through 
lines of communication developed between local 
law enforcement and federal agencies as well as 
between health care providers and law enforcement. 

> On-scene response protocols must be in 
place to ensure timely notification of government 
authorities when a bioterrorist event is suspected 
or confirmed. In some cases, responding officers 
first contact the local Joint Terrorism Task Force 
(JTTF), which is then responsible for subsequent 
notifications. 

> Written interagency agreements should 
specify a decision tree and optimal information-
sharing paths to facilitate notification of suspected 
bioterrorism. The decision tree should specify who 
is responsible for making decisions, as well as 
which actions are then required by which partners. 

> Once local medical professionals (including 
those at public health laboratories responsible for 
identifying unknown substances) have found 
something unusual, they must immediately communicate 
their suspicions to their local public 
health department and the Centers for Disease 
Control. Local law enforcement should be notified 
immediately as well. 

(Notification to the public is covered under 
"Communication" below.) 

Intervention 

Local response to a bioterrorist attack involves 
both a public health and medical component (controlling 
the spread and severity of the disease and 
treating those who are ill) as well as a law enforcement 
component (concentrating on criminal 
investigation, offender apprehension, public safety 
issues, and assisting in health care delivery). 

> Law enforcement and public health agencies 
should develop a protocol that permits their 
investigators to conduct joint interviews and share 
information. Teams composed of law enforcement 
and public health investigators can collaborate on 
interview questions that gather information both 
about exposure to agents and the circumstances of 
an individuals exposure that may constitute 
evidence of the crime. Joint interviews can both 
streamline the investigative process and provide 
different perspectives on information. 

> Protocols must both safeguard the privacy of 
health information and maintain the confidentiality 
of sensitive case investigation information. 

> A memorandum of understanding (MOU) 
should identify specific persons with authority for 
each function during an intervention, the functions 

___________________________________________________________________________________________
40 For more information on multijurisdictional responses, setting up a Joint Operation Command Center, 
pre-event planning, and unified command, see Murphy and Wexler, forthcoming. In addition, more information on the National Incident 
Management System (NIMS) can be found at www.fema.gov/preparedness/nims/nims.shtm. 


that are necessary to manage a threat, the 
chain of command for multi-agency actions, and 
the procedure for assuring that one agency can get 
needed help from another without delay. 

> Law enforcement agencies must work with 
public health authorities to look at a range of 
options for isolation and quarantine scenarios, or 
to administer vaccinations or medical prophylaxis 
treatment, and concentrate on those that minimize 
force and maximize public involvement. 

> Law enforcement officers should know their 
responsibility for maintaining order during the 
process of distributing medical treatmentin 
hospital emergency rooms, clinic settings or 
temporary vaccination centersor enforcing isolation or 
quarantine. 

> Law enforcement agencies and public health 
officials must prepare protocols and practice the 
distribution process for mass vaccination or prophylaxis. 

Health Care Surge Management 

In any significant bioterrorist event, there will be 
enormous demands placed on both the health care 
system and emergency responders. As a result, the 
ability of a community to effectively manage a 
bioterrorist attack will depend partly on that 
communitys "health care surge" capacity and partly on 
its ability to maintain adequate emergency 
responses. 

> Law enforcement agencies must be aware 
that stockpiles of antibiotics and vaccines as well 
as medical equipment (e.g., ventilators) are available 
from the Department of Health and Human 
Services, vendors, or through sharing arrangements 
among neighboring regions. 

> Law enforcement must prepare for its role in 
supporting medical service providers, which can 
include providing security at health care settings, 
transporting ill people to hospitals, and managing 
traffic and crowds. 

> Law enforcement must plan for treating and 
protecting line officers and their family members 
before an attack occurs. 

> Law enforcement must seek remedies anticipated 
staffing shortages, including advance treatments 
and education for current personnel. Law 
enforcement must work with their emergency 
management agency to plan for how to access 
force multipliers, such as citizen groups and the 
Citizens Corps Citizen Emergency Response 
Team Program (CERT), the National Guard, private 
security, and the Department of Homeland 
Security. Law enforcement executives can use 
existing relationships with community groups to 
enlist their help in augmenting police responses in 
a bioterrorist attack. 

> Police executives need to compute the minimum 
number of sworn personnel and civilian staff 
who must be immunized so that the department 
can continue to function in the event of a 
contagious organism outbreak. Then, executives must 
work with personnel to determine the safest 
means for their protection and address their 
concerns. 


Communication 

> A multi-pronged communication strategy 
for early education efforts and for the hours and 
days immediately following a bioterrorist attack is 
essential for an effective emergency response plan. 
Communication plans must include protocols for 
communications among service providers 
including law enforcement, fire, EMS, and public 
health entities. These plans must address terminology 
issues, interoperability, dispatch protocols, 
and public notification of the attack and treatment 
plans. 

> A law enforcement agency must use existing 
ties within the community to mobilize a recovery 
strategy that can get the local area into a non-crisis 
mode as soon as possible following the event. 

> A clear communication plan and consistent 
message to the public will be an essential part of a 
recovery strategy. Early communication must be 
candid about what is and is not known about the 
nature of the threat. The effect of a bioterrorist 
attack on the publics mental health may be significant, 
so information on how to cope with the 
stress and any available referral agency resources 
should be shared. 

> Public education strategies for dealing with 
the risks of bioterrorism should involve mass 
media communications (such as broadcast media, 
print media, and the Internet), public schools, 
businesses, religious groups, and various community 
and civic organizations. This public awareness 
campaign must occur in advance of an attack, 
because it will not be possible for community leaders 
to effectively communicate critical information 
(such as appropriate public responses to biological 
agents, ways to access treatment regimens, and 
behaviors that reduce the potential for exposure) in 
a crisis. 

> Communities must decide as part of their 
communication strategy which government 
authority will make the announcement that a 
bioterrorist attack has occurred. A public health 
official should be involved, as should local law 
enforcement executives, as their visibility will help 
calm the public. The communication should 
include information about how the agent was 
delivered, how illness is contracted, what the 
symptoms are, and how citizens can protect themselves 
from exposure or get assistance if exposed. 

> Common cautions about not overwhelming 
emergency rooms, leaving roadways and emergency 
lanes open, not using cell phones unless 
necessary, and others may be useful as well. 

Three Overarching Themes 
Funding and Resource Issues 

Funding is a major issue in preparing for and 
responding to bioterrorism. Pooled resources will 
build strong partnerships between law 
enforcement, public health, fire, and other first 
responders. 

> Local, state, and federal governments must 
assess existing resources, in terms of both staffing 
and equipment, and identify funding to augment 
already strained budgets. A recommended mechanism for 
assessing such resources is called a "gap 
analysis," which is critical in identifying redundancies 
and shortfalls. A gap analysis can also be 


used to assess equipment needs and develop plans 
to purchase, maintain, and replace equipment. 

> Resources can be combined across several 
regions or statewide to enhance emergency 
responses. 

> Federal agencies should consider encouraging 
regional or statewide cooperation when awarding 
federal grants. Localities should consider the 
ways funds could be used to accomplish more than 
one purpose. 

> Law enforcement agency budgets are already 
strained to the limit as a shrinking police force 
deals not only with traditional crime-fighting 
duties, but also with antiterrorism duties. Funding 
for all first responders must be quickly and 
effectively distributed. 

> Law enforcement partnerships with the private 
sector, especially private security can also 
enhance funding and provide resourcessuch as 
staff, equipment, and monetary supportto 
effectively respond to an emergency. 

Training 

Law enforcement training serves a variety of 
purposesto enhance detection of a bioterrorist 
event, to protect and treat area individuals, to 
reduce exposure to the agent, to ensure smooth 
coordination of on-scene hazardous materials 
response, and to promote effective investigation 
and management of contagious agents. Personnel 
at all agency levels must be trained initially and 
then given frequent in-service training. 

> To maintain first responder readiness, agencies 
must offer frequent and consistent training on 
possible indicators of bioterrorism, precautions to 
take to reduce exposure, the signs and symptoms 
of contamination by a potential harmful biological 
agent, and critical immediate response procedures. 

> One executive session participant suggested 
that at a minimum agencies must provide eight 
hours of training (16 hours of training is 
preferable) on hazardous materials awareness for all 
recruits and in-service law enforcement department members. 

> Multi-agency training should be designed to 
ensure that clear strategies engage all agencies 
across government, and to work out communication 
and command issues related to incident management. 
This training should include specialists 
and all personnel involved in on-scene response for 
a particular jurisdiction. A local agency should 
reach out to other police chiefs and sheriffs as well 
as tribal and federal agencies in the region to 
design training. Medical ethicists, physicians, 
public health professionals, and scientists expert 
in contagious diseases should be used to help 
develop staff training. 

> Training should occur by any or all of the 
following means in each jurisdiction: tabletop 
exercises; computer simulations; and field training 
drills (both planned and unplanned) involving 
officers, hospitals, private security, other 
first responders, other stakeholders, and the 
public who can enact possible scenarios. 


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> Law enforcement officers must be educated 
on contagious organisms, and the risks and benefits 
of vaccination and medical treatments. This 
education should include information about the 
biological agents, their disease spread and 
manifestations, available vaccines and treatments, and 
the risks and benefits of those treatments. Law 
enforcement officers will also need to know how to 
interact safely with people who are potentially 
contagious. Health department officials should be 
involved in educating first responders (including 
police, fire, EMS, and health care providers) about 
physical protections and mental health concerns. 

> Private security should be educated on contagious 
organisms and trained on how to respond 
to them. Private security should also be included in 
training with law enforcement and other first 
responders when possible. 

> Communities must develop and conduct 
joint exercises that test local and regional capabilities 
in carrying out quarantine, evacuation, and 
isolation plans. 

> Training needs to be conducted in areas such 
as law enforcement's involvement in the process of 
administering prophylactic treatments (such as 
antibiotics) or vaccinations and conducting 
interviews to obtain information about the suspects 
and/or site of exposure. 

Intelligence Sharing 

Information related to terrorism in general and 
bioterrorism in particular may come from many 
different sources and may be obtained from many 
different agencies (fire, EMS, law enforcement, 
public health, and myriad others). It is imperative 
that agencies be able to quickly and effectively 
share information with others. 

> Government agencies should build on existing 
intelligence systems that would produce a single, 
seamless intelligence system useful for a wide 
range of threats (e.g., drugs, gangs, international 
terrorists, etc.). 

> The Terrorist Threat Integration Center 
(TTIC) should be supported as a resource for 
identifying terrorism threats and sharing intelligence, 
as it collects information from DHS, FBI, CIA, 
DoD, and others, and provides integrated threat 
analyses to state and local law enforcement 
through the JTTFs and other means. 

> Intelligence analysis within local law 
enforcement agencies should be upgraded or 
supplemented in order for local law enforcement to be 
better positioned as a "full partner" 
in the counterterrorism arena. 

> Jurisdictions must improve mechanisms for 
determining the criteria for when, a threat is 
deemed credible and when information is appropriate 
for federal agencies release to local first 
responders. 

Conclusion 

These highlighted recommendations from this 
white paper cover a wide range of issues for law 
enforcement and other government agencies as 
they prepare their response to a bioterrorist event. 
The text offers more detailed suggestions that can 
be tailored to the unique needs of a jurisdiction. 
These approaches are meant as a starting point for 
law enforcement and public health officials to 


develop a collaborative, proactive, and problem-oriented 
response to combat future bioterrorism and 
reduce fear within our communities. 


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Strategies for Local Law Enforcement Series. Vol.2: Working With Diverse Communities. Office of 
Community Oriented Policing Services/Police Executive Research Forum. 

Fidler, David P. "Bioterrorism, Public Health, and International Law." Chicago Journal of International 
Law 3: 726 (2002). 

Gostin, Lawrence O., Jason W. Saspin et al. "The Model State Emergency Health Powers Act: Planning for 
and Response to Bioterrorism and Naturally Occurring Infectious Diseases." Journal of the American 
Medical Association. 288, no. 5 (7 August 2002): 62228. 

Hoffman, Richard E. and Jane E. Norton. 2002. "Lessons Learned from a Full-Scale Bioterrorism 
Exercise." Emerging Infectious Diseases, 6(6): 65253. Available at www.cdc.gov/ncidod/eid/vol6no6/hoffman.htm. 

41 By inclusion here, neither PERF nor the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services endorses the content of these 
materials. 


Kellman, Barry. "Biological Terrorism: Legal Measures for Preventing Catastrophe." Harvard Journal of 
Law and Public Policy 24 (Spring 2001): 41792. 

Murphy, Gerard R. and Martha R. Plotkin. March 2003. Protecting Your Community From Terrorism: 
The Strategies for Local Law Enforcement Series. Vol.1: Local-Federal Partnerships. Office of Community 
Oriented Policing Services/Police Executive Research Forum. 

National Law Enforcement and Corrections Technology Center. 2004. What Every Public Safety Officer 
Should Know About Radiation and Radioactive Materials. Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Justice 
(NCJ 198193). Available at http://hps.org/hsc/documents/hderrad.pdf. 

U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. 2002. "Communicating in a Crisis: Risk 
Communication Guidelines for Public Officials." Washington D.C.: Department of Health and Human 
Services. 


BIOTERRORISM WEB RESOURCES 42

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), Emergency 
Preparedness and Response 
www.bt.cdc.gov 

The CDCs Emergency Preparedness & Response website is one of the most comprehensive informational 
site involving bioterrorism on the Internet. It offers fact sheets and overviews on lethal agents and 
diseases, including anthrax, Ricin, Sarin, smallpox, and others. Topics on biological agents include 
diagnosis/evaluation, environment/response, exposure management, infection control, preparation and 
planning, training opportunities and materials, vaccination, treatment, and surveillance and investigation. 
The site has information on radiation emergencies, chemical agents, and other disasters and emergencies. 
The site offers links to pertinent topics such as sheltering in place, mass trauma related to catastrophic 
events, emergency preparedness for business, and has a clinician registry for email updates on 
terrorism and emergency response. 

Center for Biosecurity University of Pittsburgh Medical Center 
(UPMC) 
www.upmc-biosecurity.org 

The Center for Biosecurity is an independent, nonprofit organization of the University of Pittsburgh 
Medical Center, with its base of operations located in Baltimore, MD. The Center works to prevent the 
development and use of biological weapons, to catalyze advances in science and governance that diminish 
the power of biological weapons as agents of mass lethality, and to lessen the human suffering that 
would result if prevention fails. The Center draws upon the expertise of multidisciplinary staff with 
experience in the government, medicine, public health, and bioscience. 

Center for Infectious Disease and Research Policy (CIDRAP), 
University of Minnesota 
www.cidrap.umn.edu 

CIDRAPs mission is to reduce illness and death from infectious diseases by conducting original, interdisciplinary 
research, and by facilitating public policy refinement and the adoption of science-based best 
practices among professionals and the public. The center focuses on timely and emerging issues of greatest 
significance to public health and strives to create solutions targeted for greatest impact. 

______________________________________________________________________________________________________
42 This list primarily includes the resource list created in 2003 for the Bureau of Justice Assistance-funded project, Police-
Medical Collaborations. While not exhaustive, these resources provided valuable information at the time at which they were 
compiled. Neither PERF nor the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services endorses the content of any listed web-
sites. 

 


Chemical Materials Agency (CMA) 
www.cma.army.mil 

This website has chemical agent facts sheets on nerve agents. 

Counter-Terrorism Training and Resources for Law Enforcement 
www.counterterrorismtraining.gov 

The Counter-Terrorism Training and Resources for Law Enforcement website offers access to counter-terrorism 
training opportunities, related materials and website links from the federal government, private 
and nonprofit organizations. The Counter-Terrorism Training Coordination Working Group convened by 
the U.S. Department of Justice's (DOJ's) Office of Justice Programs examined the counter-terrorism tools 
available to law enforcement and first responders and recommended the establishment of a website. The 
working group determined current training offered by DOJ components, identified duplication or gaps, 
and recommended the most effective mechanisms for delivering training. These resources will help law 
enforcement decision-makers develop strategic plans for professional training and local emergency 
response. 

National Association of County and City Health Officials (NACCHO) 
www.naccho.org 

At the core of NACCHOs bioterrorism programs is the belief that the capacities needed to effectively 
respond to bioterrorism allow for multi-use response infrastructure that improves the ability to respond 
to all hazards. NACCHO has been actively engaged in response activities since 1999. As part of a cooperative 
agreement with CDC, NACCHO has undertaken several programs that involve collaboration with 
local, state, and federal partners to strengthen and improve local health agencies capacity to respond to 
bioterrorism and other communicable diseases and environmental health threats. 

National Library of Medicine Specialized Information Services 
(Biological Warfare Page) 
www.sis.nlm.nih.gov 

The Specialized Information Services (SIS) Division of the National Library of Medicine (NLM) is responsible 
for information resources and services in toxicology, environmental health, chemistry, HIV/AIDS, 
and specialized topics in minority health. The website features an extensive database and other resources. 

United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious 
Diseases (USAMRIID) 
www.usamriid.army.mil 

The United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), Fort Detrick, 
MD, conducts research to develop strategies, products, information, procedures, and training programs 
for medical defense against biological warfare threats and naturally occurring infectious diseases that 
require special containment. USAMRIID, an organization of the U.S. Army Medical Research and 


Material Command (USAMRMC), is the lead medical research laboratory for the U.S. Biological Defense 
Research Program. The Institute plays a key role in national defense and infectious disease research at 
the largest biocontainment laboratory in the Department of Defense (DoD) for the study of hazardous 
diseases. 

U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 
www.fda.gov/oc/opacom/hottopics/bioterrorism.html 

The FDA's counterterrorism Web page covers biological agents such as anthrax, smallpox, botulism, 
plague, etc. It also has extensive material on public health initiatives/actions, preparedness, vaccines, and 
treatments. 

Other Resources 

U.S. Army Soldier and Biological Chemical Command www.sbccomm.army.mil 
For updated CDC Ricin see website www.emergencyemail.org/cdc.htm 
The Emergency Email Network, Inc. www.emergencyemail.org/ 


APPENDIX A

PARTICIPANTS AND OBSERVERS

Participants 43 

Sheriff Leroy Baca 
Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department 
Los Angeles, CA 

Fire Chief William Bamattre 
Los Angeles (City) Fire Department 
Los Angeles, CA 

Chief Anthony Batts 
Long Beach Police Department 
Long Beach, CA 

Assistant Director Joseph Billy 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, New York 
New York, NY 

Chief William Bratton 
Los Angeles Police Department 
Los Angeles, CA 

Chief Michael Brown 
California Highway Patrol, Southern Division 
Los Angeles, CA 

Assistant Chief John Buchanan 
Phoenix Police Department 
Phoenix, AZ 

President Rick Caruso 
Los Angeles Police Commission 
Los Angeles, CA 

Deputy Chief Bill Conger 
Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department 
Las Vegas, NV 

Intelligence Analyst Glen Cross 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
Washington Field Office 
Washington, DC 

Deputy Director Mike Dayton 
California Office of Homeland Security 
Los Angeles, CA 

Assistant Special Agent in Charge Thomas Donlon 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, New York 
New York, NY 

Chief Alex Fagan 
San Francisco Police Department 
San Francisco, CA 

Dr. Jonathan E. Fielding 
Director, Public Health and Health Officer, Los 
Angeles County Department of Health Services 
Los Angeles, CA 

Secretary Edward Flynn 
Massachusetts Executive Office for Public Safety 
Boston, MA 

Fire Chief P. Michael Freeman 
Los Angeles (County) Fire Department 
Los Angeles, CA 

__________________________________________________________________________
43 Participant ranks and agency affiliations are listed as of the time of the executive session. 


Chief Terrance Gainer 
U.S. Capitol Police 
Washington, DC 

Co-Director Richard Goodman 
Public Health Law Program, Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention 
Atlanta, GA 

Acting Assistant Secretary Jerome M. Hauer 
Office of Public Health Emergency Preparedness, 
Department of Health and Human Services 
Washington, DC 

Captain Joe Herbert 
New York City Police Department 
New York, NY 

Assistant Director in Charge Ronald Iden 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
Los Angeles Field Office 
Los Angeles, CA 

Assistant Chief Steve Kreis 
Phoenix Fire Department 
Phoenix, AZ 

David Ladd 
Director, Hazardous Materials Response 
Massachusetts Department of Fire Services 
Stowe, MA 

Commander Cathy Lanier 
Metropolitan Police Department 
Washington, DC 

Supervisory Special Agent Howard Leadbetter 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, New York 
New York, NY 

Commander Mark Leap 
Los Angeles Police Department 
Los Angeles, CA 

Chief Deputy Gary Lockhart 
Los Angeles (County) Fire Department 
Los Angeles, CA 

Chief Susan Manheimer 
San Mateo Police Department 
San Mateo, CA 

Special Agent in Charge Michael Mason 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
Sacramento Field Office 
Sacramento, CA 

Commanding Officer John Miller 
Critical Incident Management Bureau, 
Los Angeles Police Department 
Los Angeles, CA 

Chief Robert Olson 
Minneapolis Police Department 
Minneapolis, MN 

Deputy Chief Kerry Payne 
District of Columbia Department of 
Emergency Management 
Washington, DC 

Director Carl Peed 
U.S. Department of Justice 
Office of Community Oriented Policing Services 
Washington, DC 

Special Operations Supervisor Jim Rice 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
Washington Field Office 
Washington, DC 

Senior Deputy Director Mike Richardson 
Primary Care Prevention and Planning 
District of Columbia Department of Public Health 
Washington, DC 

Deputy Chief Michael Sellitto 
District of Columbia Fire Department 
Washington, DC 


Public Health Manager Nancy Shaver 
Phoenix Fire Department 
Phoenix, AZ 

General Manager Ellis Stanley, Sr. 
Los Angeles Office of Emergency Preparedness 
Los Angeles, CA 

Section Chief Don Van Duyn 
Counterterrorism Analysis Section, 
Federal Bureau of Investigation Headquarters 
Washington, DC 

Chief Superintendent Alan Webb 
London Metropolitan Police Department 
London, England 

Director Kevin Yeskey 
Department of Human Services 
Office of Emergency Response 
Rockville, MD 

OBSERVERS 44 

Deputy Chief Michael Berkow 
Los Angeles Police Department 
Los Angeles, CA 

Deputy Director Lawrence Fetters 
U.S. Department of Transportation, 
Federal Security 
Washington, DC 

Dean Jack Greene 
College of Criminal Justice 
Northeastern University 
Boston, MA 

Deputy Chief Michael Hillman 
Los Angeles Police Department 
Los Angeles, CA 

Commander Betty Kelepecz 
Los Angeles Police Department 
Los Angeles, CA 

Associate Professor David Klinger 
Criminology and Criminal Justice 
University of Missouri, St. Louis 
St. Louis, MO 

Senior Research Assistant Michael Mair 
Johns Hopkins University Bloomberg School of 
Public Health 
Baltimore, MD 

Director Steve Mastrofski 
Administration of Justice, Department of Public 
and International Affairs 
George Mason University 
Fairfax, VA 

Lieutenant Tom McDonald 
Los Angeles Police Department 
Los Angeles, CA 

Assistant Chief Jim McDonnell 
Los Angeles Police Department 
Los Angeles, CA 

Senior Social Scientist Lois Felson Mock 
National Institute of Justice 
Washington, DC 

Professor Edward Richards 
Paul M. Hebert Law Center 
Louisiana State University 
Baton Rouge, LA 

Captain Greg Roper 
Los Angeles Police Department 
Los Angeles, CA 

Captain Gary Williams 
Los Angeles Police Department 
Los Angeles, CA 

__________________________________________________________________________
44 Observer ranks and agency affiliations are listed as of the time of the executive session.  


Office of Community Oriented 
Policing Services Staff 
1100 Vermont Avenue, NW 
Washington, DC 20530 
Phone: 1-800-421-6770 
Fax: 202-616-2914 
Website: www.cops.usdoj.gov 

David Andelman 
Management Analyst 

Tamara Lucas 
Senior Policy Analyst 

Carl Peed 
Director 

Maria Carolina Rozas 
Assistant Director 

Amy Schapiro 
Senior Social Science Analyst 

Michael Seelman 
Senior Social Science Analyst 

Police Executive Research 
Forum 
1120 Connecticut Avenue, NW, Suite 930 
Washington, DC 20036 
Phone: 202-466-7820 
Fax: 202-466-7826 
Website: www.policeforum.org 

Heather Davies 
Research Associate 

Gerard Murphy45 
Deputy Director of Research 

Rebecca Neuburger 
Assistant Director 
Membership & Marketing 

Melissa Reuland 
Senior Research Associate 

Chuck Wexler 
Executive Director 

_________________________________________________________________________________
45 At this writing, Gerard Murphy is the Director of the Homeland Security and Technology Division in the 
National Governors Association Center for Best Practices. 


ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Melissa Reuland 
Senior Research Associate, 
Police Executive Research Forum 

Melissa Reuland joined PERF in 1995, following 
ten years of work in the social and medical sciences 
managing research projects and analyzing 
large sets of survey data. Currently, Reuland is the 
principal investigator and project director of the 

Community Policing Partnerships for Domestic 
Violence: Documentation and Assessment project, 
funded by the Office of Community Oriented 
Policing Services. She serves as project director for 
PERFs phase of the National Institute of Justice-
funded project: Explaining the Prevalence, 
Context, and Consequences of Dual Arrest in 
Intimate Partner Cases and is the principal 
investigator for the NIJ-funded project Local Law 
Enforcement and the Terrorist Threat, in which a 
team of nationally known researchers and experts 
will help develop a research agenda for law enforcement 
on terrorism responses. Reuland recently 
completed work for the law enforcement track of 
the Criminal Justice/Mental Health Consensus 
Project. She also directed PERFs prior project on 
the police response to people with mental illnesses, 
co-authoring a publication of the same name. 

Reulands PERF publications include several community 
policing and problem-solving curricula. She has also edited Information 
Management and Crime Analysis (1997) and 
Solving Crime and Disorder Problems (2001). 
Most recently, she wrote a guide on implementing 
police-based diversion for people with mental 
illness, which was published by the TAPA Center for 
Jail Diversion, U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services. Reuland received her master's in 
criminal justice from the University of Baltimore. 

Heather J. Davies 
Research Associate, 
Police Executive Research Forum 

Heather Davies, Ph.D., has experience in criminal 
justice and child welfare research, evaluation, 
training, and technical assistance. She is currently 
responsible for managing national-level terrorism 
research and policy development projects. She is 
the project director of the white paper series, 

Protecting Your Community from Terrorism: 
Strategies for Local Law Enforcement, and the 
subsequent Community Policing in a Security 
Conscious World project, to address local law 
enforcements concerns in preventing and preparing 
for terrorist acts. Davies is first author of the 
second white paper in this series, Working with 
Diverse Communities. Davies is also one of 
PERFs representatives for several terrorism 
research working groups. She is also the project 
coordinator on a Bureau of Justice Assistance-
funded project, Managing Multijurisdictional 
Cases: Lessons Learned from the Sniper 
Investigation. 

Prior to joining PERF in 2003, Davies was 
a senior research associate with the American Bar 
Associations Center on Children and the Law, and 
the Criminal Justice Section. She was the principal 
investigator on a project evaluating parental 


involvement practices of juvenile courts, and one 
on improving legal and judicial responses to 
parental kidnapping. Davies conducted an analysis 
of legal services provided by the District of 
Columbia's Office of Corporation Counsel to the 
Child and Family Services Agency. In addition, she 
served as the project manager on such studies as 
the implementation of the Michigan Lawyer-
Guardian Ad Litem Statute, a national assessment 
of law enforcement and community partnerships 
for helping children exposed to domestic violence, 
and an evaluation of domestic violence no-drop 
policies. Davies is the co-author of a National 
Center for Missing and Exploited Children monograph, 
Child Pornography: The Criminal Justice 
Response. She holds a bachelors degree in sociology 
from Virginia Tech, and a masters degree and a 
Ph.D. in justice, law and society from American 
University. Her dissertation addressed 

Understanding Variations in Murder Clearance 
Rates: The Influence of the Political Environment. 

CONTRIBUTING AUTHORS 46 

William J. Bratton 
Chief, Los Angeles Police Department 

Appointed the chief of the Los Angeles Police 
Department (LAPD) in October 2002, William J. 
Bratton oversees the operations of one of the largest 
major municipal law enforcement agencies in the 
United States. His responsibilities include the 
supervision of 9,304 sworn and 3,055 civilian 
employees. Bratton directs all patrol, investigative, 
and administrative operations. A strong advocate of 
transparent community policing that embraces 
partnership, problem solving, and prevention, he 
initiated a major reengineering of the LAPD to be 
more responsive to local community needs. 
Brattons vision includes a comprehensive and 
assertive strategy for dramatically reducing crime, 
disorder, and fear. Particular emphasis has been 
placed on gang-related crimes and the culture that 
creates it. He joined the LAPD with more than 32 
years of public and private sector law enforcement 
experience. 

His policing career began as a police sergeant 
in the U.S. Army Military Police. He then 
joined the Boston Police Department in 1970 and 
rose through the ranks to Superintendent of Police, 
the highest sworn rank, by 1980. In 1983, Bratton 
became chief of the Massachusetts Bay 
Transportation Authority Police Department. In 
1986, he was appointed as the Superintendent of 
the Metropolitan District Commission Police, 
which patrols the Boston Metropolitan Area. 

In 1990, he became Chief of Police/Senior 
Vice President for the New York City Transit 
Authority Police Department, where he won 
national recognition for his leadership by initiating 
reforms and strategies that eventually cut subway 
crime by nearly 50 percent. Then Bratton returned 
to the Boston Police Department as Superintendent 
in Chief and in 1993 was appointed as Police 
Commissioner. During his tenure, he significantly 
reduced crime and improved relations between the 
police and minority communities. 

Bratton returned to New York City in 1994 
when he was appointed as Police Commissioner. 
His leadership helped foster a 39 percent decline in 
serious crimes and a 50 percent reduction in homicides. 
From 19941996, he also initiated the internationally 
acclaimed COMPSTAT systema com

______________________________________________________________
46 The contributing author bios are listed in alphabetical order. 
 


puter-driven management accountability process 
that is integral to his decentralized management 
philosophy. From 19962002, Bratton worked in 
the private sector, where he formed his own 
consulting company, The Bratton Group, L.L.C. He 
also served as a senior consultant with Kroll 
Associates. 

He holds a bachelors degree in law 
enforcement from Boston State College/University 
of Massachusetts. He is a graduate of the FBI 
National Executive Institute and was a Senior 
Executive Fellow at Harvard Universitys John F. 
Kennedy School of Government, where he served 
as a Research Fellow. He is a graduate of the Senior 
Management Institute for Police (SMIP). From 
19931996, he served as the elected president of 
the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF), and 
again was elected as PERFs president in March 
2004. A frequent guest lecturer, writer, and 
commentator, he is the co-author of his autobiography, 
Turnaround. Among his many other honors and 
awards, Bratton holds the Schroeder Brothers 
Medal, which is the Boston Police Departments 
highest award for valor and the PERF Leadership 
Award. 

Jonathan E. Fielding 
Director, Public Health and Health Officer, Los 
Angeles County Department of Health Services 

Jonathan E. Fielding is Director of Public Health 
and Health Officer for Los Angeles County responsible 
for all public health functions including 
surveillance and control of both communicable and 
non-communicable diseases, and of health protection 
(including against bioterrorism) for the countys 
10 million residents. By 2004, he was directing a 
staff of 3,600 with an annual budget exceeding 
$600 million. 

He chairs the U.S. Community Preventive 
Services Task Force and was a founding member of 
the U.S. Clinical Preventive Services Task Force. 
Fielding is also a professor in the UCLA Schools of 
Medicine and Public Health and has authored over 
150 peer-reviewed articles, chapters, and editorials 
on a wide range of public health and preventive 
medicine issues. He is the editor of the Annual 
Review of Public Health, the vice-chairman of 
Partnership for Prevention and an elected member 
in the National Academy of Sciences Institute of 
Medicine. 

Formerly, Fielding was the Massachusetts 
Commissioner of Public Health and was a vice 
president of Johnson & Johnson. He received his 
medical and public health degrees from Harvard 
University and a M.B.A. in finance from the 
Wharton School of Business. 

Richard A. Goodman 
Co-Director, Public Health Law Program, 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 

Richard A. Goodman, M.D., J.D., is co-director of 
the Public Health Law Program, Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) in Atlanta, 
Georgia, and is the former editor of CDCs 
Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report (MMWR) 
Series. Goodman received his medical degree and 
completed a residency in internal medicine at the 
University of Michigan in Ann Arbor, and earned 
a law degree at Emory University in Atlanta. He is 
Board Certified in both Internal Medicine and 
Preventive Medicine. A commissioned officer in 
the U.S. Public Health Service, he holds the grade 


of Medical Director (Captain: O-6). Following 
completion of his internal medicine residency in 
1978, he joined CDCs Epidemic Intelligence 
Service Program and has remained on that 
agencys staff in assignments to the Georgia 
Department of Human Resources and to the 
UCLA School of Public Health. Goodman also 
holds appointments as a professor (adjunct) at the 
Rollins School of Public Health, Emory University, 
and at the College of Law, Georgia State 
University. He has published on a broad range of 
topics in applied epidemiology from surveillance 
and outbreak investigations of acute infectious diseases, 
to population-based studies of the epidemiology 
of homicide, and the law of public health. 
He also is the lead editor of Law in Public Health 
Practice, published by Oxford University Press. 

Jerome M. Hauer 
Acting Assistant Secretary, Office of Public 
Health Emergency Preparedness, 
Department of Health and Human Services 

As of this writing, Hauer is the first director of the 
Response to Emergencies and Disasters Institute 
(READI) and an assistant professor at The George 
Washington University. Working with the 
Department of Homeland Security, Hauers duties 
include coordinating and delivering first responder, 
medical, and public health training to the National 
Capital Region (NCR). Hauer also teaches at The 
George Washington University as an assistant professor 
in the School of Public Health and the 
School of Medicine. 

At the time of the executive session, 
Jerome Hauer was the Acting Assistant Secretary 
for the Office of Public Health Emergency 
Preparedness. He was responsible for coordinating 
the countrys medical and public health preparedness 
and response to emergencies, including acts 
of biological, chemical, and nuclear terrorism. 
Hauer also served as senior advisor to the 
Secretary for National Security and Emergency 
Management during the events of September 11, 
2001 and the nations anthrax crisis. He was the 
first director of the Mayors Office of Emergency 
Management in New York City. During his 
tenure, New York City developed the countrys 
first bioterrorism response plans and surveillance 
systems, and conducted the countrys largest 
bioterrorism tabletop exercise. 

Hauer holds a masters degree from the 
Johns Hopkins School of Public Health and has 
more than twenty years of experience in emergency 
management. He is the recipient of numerous 
honors, including the Outstanding Alumni of 
the Year award from the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg 
School of Public Health, the Indiana 
Commendation Medal for Exceptional 
Meritorious Service, Legion of Hoosier Heroes 
Award, and the Distinguished Alumni award from 
NYU. He is a member of the New York City Police 
Departments Honor Legion, and is an honorary 
assistant chief in the New York City Fire 
Department. 

Ronald L. Iden 
Assistant Director in Charge, Federal 
Bureau of Investigation, Los Angeles Field Office 

At the time of the executive session, Iden was the 
Assistant Director in Charge of the FBIs Los 
Angeles Field Office. He was later appointed as the 
Director of the California Office of Homeland 
Security on January 6, 2004, after 25 years of 
service with the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI). 


As this paper goes to print, Iden has accepted the 
position of Senior Vice President of Security for the 
Walt Disney Company. He holds a bachelors 
degree in the administration of criminal justice 
from the University of Illinois, as well as a 
masters degree in public administration from the 
Illinois Institute of Technology. 

From July 2001 until his retirement from 
the FBI in January 2004, Iden served in the FBIs 
Los Angeles Field Office. From 1998 to 2001, he 
was assigned as the Special Agent in Charge of the 
Los Angeles FBIs investigations of terrorism, 
foreign counterintelligence, financial crimes, and 
civil rights matters. From 1997 to 1998, Iden 
served as the Deputy Assistant Director of the 
FBIs Information Resources Division. In that 
capacity, he was responsible for the FBIs worldwide 
automation and information management 
requirements. Prior to that assignment, he served 
for one year as chief of the Information Resources 
Divisions strategic planning, budget, and personnel 
operations. 

From 1992 to 1996, Iden served as an 
Assistant Special Agent in Charge within the Los 
Angeles FBI Office where he was responsible for all 
violent crime investigations conducted by the FBI 
within the seven-county Los Angeles metropolitan 
area. He served as chief of the FBIs Public 
Corruption Unit at FBI Headquarters during 1991 
and 1992. In April 1990, while assigned to FBI 
Headquarters, he was tasked to supervise the FBIs 
investigation of the bombing deaths of a federal 
judge in Birmingham, Alabama, and a civil rights 
attorney in Savannah, Georgia. That investigation 
resulted in the convictions of all involved. 

In October 1984, while assigned to the 
FBIs San Juan Division, he was responsible for the 
investigation of a Puerto Rican terrorist groups 
involvement in a $7 million armored car robbery 
in Connecticut. That investigation resulted in the 
indictment of 17 terrorists and the dismantling of 
that terrorist organization. In May 1979, while 
assigned to the FBIs San Antonio, Texas, 
Division, he was assigned to investigate the assassination 
of a federal judge as well as the attempted 
assassination of a federal prosecutor. Those 
investigations resulted in the convictions of all 
involved. He was appointed as a Special Agent 
with the FBI in May 1978, after serving 10 years as 
a police officer with the Elk Grove Village, Illinois, 
Police Department. 

Cathy L. Lanier
Commander, Special Operations Division, 
D.C. Metropolitan Police Department 

Cathy L. Lanier is currently serving as commanding 
officer of the Special Operations Division of 
the Metropolitan Police Department where she 
manages members of the Emergency Response 
Team, Aviation and Harbor Units, Horse Mounted 
and Canine Units, Special Events/Dignitary 
Protection Branch, and the newly formed 
Domestic Security Office and Special Threat 
Action Teams. 

Lanier has been with the D.C. 
Metropolitan Police Department for fourteen 
years, rising through the ranks to become Captain 
in the Uniform Patrol Division. In 1999, she was 
appointed to the rank of inspector, where she 
served as the commanding officer of the 
Departments Major Narcotics Branch and 
Vehicular Homicide Units in the Special Services 
Division. 

After reaching the rank of commander, she 
returned to the Uniform Patrol Division where she 
served as the district commander of the largest and 


most diverse residential district in the city for 
nearly two years. In early 2002, Lanier was transferred 
to the Special Operations Division, becoming the 
first female commander to head the specialized 
units in the departments history. Since 
reaching the executive level of the department, 
Lanier has handled numerous large-scale special 
events, demonstrations, and civil disturbances to 
include the IMF/World Bank Conferences, the 
World Figure Skating Championship, and numerous 
"right to life" and "anti-war" marches on 
Washington. 

She is a graduate of the FBIs National 
Academy and the DEAs Drug Unit Commanders 
Academy. She is also certified at the technician 
level in hazardous materials operations. Lanier has 
a bachelors and masters degree in management 
and leadership from Johns Hopkins University, 
and will complete her second masters degree in 
homeland security in September 2005. 

Phil T. Pulaski 
Assistant Chief, Counter Terrorism Bureau, 
New York City Police Department 

Assistant Chief Phil T. Pulaski has been a member 
of the NYPD for 23 years where he has held 
numerous command positions. He currently 
serves as the Commanding Officer of the Counter 
Terrorism Bureau. As such, he is in command of 
the more than 135 NYPD detectives and supervisors 
assigned to the FBI/NYPD Joint Terrorism 
Task Force, and is also responsible for the NYPD 
programs involving critical infrastructure protection, 
counterterrorism force deployment/countermeasures, 
intelligence analysis, counterterrorism-
related training, and the evaluation of emerging 
counter terrorism-related technology. Pulaski is 
also responsible for overseeing the NYPDs 
Chemical, Biological, Radiological, 
Nuclear/Hazardous Materials Programs as well as 
the integration of those programs with other city, 
state, and federal agencies such as the NYC 
Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, NYC 
Department of Environmental Protection, NYS 
Civil Support Team, FBI, and the U.S. Department 
of Homeland Security. 

Prior to his current assignment, Pulaski 
was the NYPD Commanding Officer of the 
FBI/NYPD Joint Terrorism Task Force. As such, 
together with his FBI counterpart, he managed and 
directed terrorism-related investigations, including 
the 9-11 World Trade Center/Pentagon attacks and 
October 2001 anthrax attacks, as well as, the 
collection, vetting, and analysis of terrorism-related 
intelligence. He has also served as Commanding 
Officer, Manhattan Detectives; Commanding 
Officer, Bronx Detectives; Commanding Officer, 
Forensic Investigations Division; Acting Director, 
Police Laboratory; Commanding Officer, Special 
Investigations Division; Commanding Officer, 
Arson and Explosion Squad; and Managing 
Attorney, Legal Bureau. He holds a J.D. from St. 
Johns University Law School, and has been 
licensed to practice law for 24 years. He also holds 
both a masters degree and bachelors degree in 
engineering from Manhattan College, and worked 
as a civil engineer for the United States 
Environmental Protection Agency. He has also 
worked as an adjunct assistant professor at John 
Jay College of Criminal Justice. 

Ruth A. Vogel 
Executive Director, Office of Public 
Health Preparedness and Response, 
Baltimore City Health Department 

Ruth Vogel was appointed director of the Baltimore 


City Health Department's Office of Public Health 
Preparedness and Response in May 2002. She is 
the executive advisor to the mayor and the 
commissioner of health for all public health emergency 
preparedness, planning, and response issues. She 
serves on the Mayor's Joint Executive Committee 
for Homeland Security, the Citys Security 
Cabinet, and is a member of the Maryland Anti-
Terrorism Task Force. One of her primary responsibilities 
is to provide leadership on collaborative 
projects with key institutions and agencies within 
the Baltimore metropolitan region. 

Prior to her current position, she was the 
division director for the Baltimore City Health 
Department's Health Promotion and Disease 
Prevention. She was responsible for overall 
implementation of the HIV, STD, and TB Prevention 
Programs, and the Acute Communicable Disease 
Program. She was recognized nationally for her 
work with the Ujima Demonstration Project. 

Vogel has undergraduate degrees from the 
University of Minnesota in Nursing, and the 
University of North Dakota in community health. 
She completed her graduate work at Johns 
Hopkins University Bloomberg School of Public 
Health and Hygiene. 

Dani-Margot Zavasky 
Medical Director, Counter Terrorism Bureau, 
New York City Police Department 

Dani-Margot Zavasky has been serving the New 
York City Police Department as the Medical 
Director of Counter Terrorism since July 2002. 
She is the medical and science advisor regarding 
Chemical, Biological, and Radiological/Nuclear 
(CBRN) terrorism to the Deputy Commissioner of 
Counter Terrorism and is the police department 
liaison to the public health authorities. Her other 
responsibilities include developing and supporting 
CBRN-related defense policies and strategies, as 
well as assisting in the police department 
personnels CBRN terrorism training and education. 

Zavasky received her medical degree as 
well as her postgraduate residency training in 
internal medicine from the University of 
Washington in Seattle. She completed the 
fellowship program in infectious diseases at the 
University of Utah in Salt Lake City. She is board 
certified in internal medicine and infectious diseases. 
Prior to her assignment in the New York 
City Police Department, Dr. Zavasky had been a 
practicing physician in infectious diseases. 


ABOUT THE OFFICE OF COMMUNITY
ORIENTED POLICING SERVICES
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

THE OFFICE OF COMMUNITY ORIENTED POLICING SERVICES (COPS) WAS 
created in 1994 and has the unique mission to directly serve the needs 
of state and local law enforcement. The COPS Office has been the driving 
force in advancing the concept of community policing, and is responsible for 
one of the greatest infusions of resources into state, local, and tribal 
law enforcement in our nations history. 

Since 1994, COPS has invested over $10 billion to add community policing officers to the 
nations streets, enhance crime fighting technology, support crime prevention initiatives, and provide 
training and technical assistance to help advance community policing. COPS funding has furthered the 
advancement of community policing through community policing innovation conferences, the development 
of best practices, pilot community policing programs, and applied research and evaluation initiatives. 
COPS has also positioned itself to respond directly to emerging law enforcement needs. Examples 
include working in partnership with departments to enhance police integrity, promoting safe schools, 
combating the methamphetamine drug problem, and supporting homeland security efforts. 

Through its grant programs, COPS is assisting and encouraging local, state, and tribal law 
enforcement agencies to enhance their homeland security efforts using proven community policing 
strategies. Traditional COPS programs such as the Universal Hiring Program (UHP) give priority consideration 
to those applicants that demonstrate a use of funds related to terrorism preparedness or response through 
community policing. The COPS in Schools (CIS) program has a mandatory training component that 
includes topics on terrorism prevention, emergency response, and the critical role schools can play in the 
community response. Finally, COPS is implementing grant programs intended to develop interoperable 
voice and data communications networks among emergency response agencies that will assist in addressing 
local homeland security demands. 

The COPS Office has made substantial investments in law enforcement training. COPS created 


a national network of Regional Community Policing Institutes (RCPIs) to offer state and local law 
enforcement, elected officials, and community leaders training opportunities on a wide range of community 
policing topics. Most recently the RCPIs have been focusing their efforts on developing and delivering 
homeland security training. COPS also supports the advancement of community policing strategies 
through the Community Policing Consortium. Additionally, COPS has made a major investment in 
applied research that makes possible the growing body of substantive knowledge covering all aspects of 
community policing. 

These substantial investments have produced a significant community policing infrastructure 
across the country, as evidenced by the fact that at the present time, approximately 86 percent of the 
nations population is served by law enforcement agencies practicing community policing. The COPS 
Office continues to respond proactively by providing critical resources, training, and technical assistance 
to help state, local, and tribal law enforcement implement innovative and effective community policing 
strategies. 
 


ABOUT PERF

THE POLICE EXECUTIVE RESEARCH FORUM (PERF) IS A NATIONAL PROFESsional association of chief executives 
of large city, county, and state law enforcement agencies. PERFs objective is to improve the delivery of 
police services and the effectiveness of crime control through several means: 

 the exercise of strong national leadership, 
 the public debate of policing and criminal justice issues, 
 the development of research and policy, and 
 the provision of vital management and leadership services to law enforcement agencies. 

PERF members are selected on the basis of their commitment to the organizations objectives and 
principles. PERF operates under the following tenets: 

 Research, experimentation, and exchange of ideas through public discussion and debate are 
paths for the development of a comprehensive body of knowledge about policing. 
 Substantial and purposeful academic study is a prerequisite for acquiring, understanding, and 
adding to that body of knowledge. 
 Maintenance of the highest standards of ethics and integrity is imperative in the improvement of policing. 
 The police must, within the limits of the law, be responsible and accountable to citizens as 
the ultimate source of police authority. 
 The principles embodied in the Constitution are the foundation of policing. 

Categories of membership also allow the organization to benefit from the diverse views of criminal justice 
researchers, law enforcement of all ranks, and other professionals committed to advancing law 
enforcement services to all communities. 


NOTES

Additional Copies of this report can be downloaded free of charge from 
www.policeforum.org and www.cops.usdoj.gov. 


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