Title: The Appropriate and Effective Use of Security Technologies in U.S.
Schools: A Guide for Schools and Law Enforcement Agencies
Series: Research Report
Author: Mary W. Green
Published: National Institute of Justice, September 1999
Subject(s): Crime in schools, crime prevention, crime prevention through
environmental design, and juvenile justice deliquency 
111 pages
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U.S. Department of Justice
Office of Justice Programs
National Institute of Justice

U.S. Department of Education
Safe and Drug-Free Schools Program

U.S. Department of Energy
Sandia National Laboratories

National Institute of Justice
Research Report

The Appropriate and Effective Use of Security Technologies in U.S.
Schools

A Guide for Schools and Law Enforcement Agencies

-------------------------------

U.S. Department of Justice
Office of Justice Programs
810 Seventh Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20531

Janet Reno
Attorney General

Raymond C. Fisher
Associate Attorney General

Laurie Robinson
Assistant Attorney General

Noel Brennan
Deputy Assistant Attorney General

Jeremy Travis
Director, National Institute of Justice

Office of Justice Programs
World Wide Web Site
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov

National Institute of Justice
World Wide Web Site
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij

-------------------------------

The Appropriate and Effective Use of Security Technologies in U.S.
Schools

A Guide for Schools and Law Enforcement Agencies

Mary W. Green
Sandia National Laboratories
September 1999

NCJ 178265

National Institute of Justice
Jeremy Travis
Director

Raymond Downs
Program Monitor

This project was supported under award number 97-IJ-R-072 from the
National Institute of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department
of Justice. Points of view in this document are those of the authors and do
not necessarily represent the official position of the U.S. Department of 
Justice.

-------------------------------

The National Institute of Justice is a component of the Office of Justice
Programs, which also includes the Bureau of Justice Assistance, the
Bureau of Justice Statistics, the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency
Prevention, and the Office for Victims of Crime.

-------------------------------

Foreword

Creating safe schools is the responsibility of the entire community in
which a school or school system resides, but responsibility for maintaining
them on a day-to-day basis lies principally with school administrators and,
to a lesser extent, the local law enforcement agency. To assist schools in
this task, the U.S. Department of Education and the U.S. Department of
Justice have sponsored, often jointly, both research and demonstration
programs to collect data and test useful new ideas that will expand
understanding of school violence and disorder and lead to new programs
to reduce these problems. 

This document provides basic guidelines to law enforcement agencies and
school administrators and encourages their collaboration as they decide
what, if any, security technologies should be considered as they develop
safe school strategies. In the wake of recent high-profile school tragedies
with multiple homicides, many of this Nation's communities have urged
their school districts to incorporate security technology into their safety
programs. This guide should help schools, in concert with their law
enforcement partners, analyze their vulnerability to violence, theft, and
vandalism, and suggest possible technologies to address these problems in
an effective manner. This guide describes existing commercially available
technologies and urges thoughtful consideration of not only the potential
safety benefits that may accrue from their use but also the costs that
schools may incur for capital investments, site modifications, additional
staffing, training, and equipment maintenance and repair.

Topic areas included in this guide are: security concepts and operational
issues, video surveillance, weapons detection devices (walk-through and
hand-held metal detectors and x-ray baggage scanners), entry controls, and
duress alarms. 

Though this document does not replace the use of appropriate expert
advice or provide detailed instructions on installing equipment or making
cost estimates, it does offer practical guidance that should enable schools
and law enforcement agencies to make better informed decisions on
security technology. 

Safety and security technology can only be one tool in a comprehensive
program that each school must develop to create a safe learning
environment that is perceived to be safe by all students and staff.

Jeremy Travis
Director, National Institute of Justice
U.S. Department of Justice

Bill Modzeleski
Director, Safe and Drug-Free Schools Program
U. S. Department of Education

Preface

A team of security specialists from the Security Systems and Technologies
Center at Sandia National Laboratories first talked with local schools in
1991. It was our intent to share what we had learned about the strengths
and weaknesses of security technologies through our work with the U.S.
Department of Energy (DOE) in many public schools.

After visiting some 120-plus schools across the country, completing our
DOE-funded work to improve security at Belen High School in New
Mexico and performing additional school security work for the National
Institutes of Justice (NIJ), we have learned that school security, like
security for other applications, is not simple and straightforward. We have
learned a lot about the unique aspects of school security from the many
students, parents, and school and law enforcement personnel we met
during the course of our work. At any particular school, security is the
product of funding, facilities, building age, building layout, administrators,
teachers, parents, kids, personalities, campus order, security personnel,
procedures, the neighborhood, policies, the school board, local law
enforcement, fire codes, local government, politics, and reputation. No two
schools will have identical and successful security programs--hence, a
security solution for one school cannot just be replicated at other schools
with complete success.

What did become clear after working with more than 100 schools during
the past 7 years is that school administrators need a good information
resource on technologies for physical security problems. This guidebook,
The Appropriate and Effective Use of Security Technologies in U.S.
Schools, is anticipated to be the first in a series of manuals designed and
written for use by school administrators and law enforcement agencies.
The goals of these documents are to provide nontechnical,
nonvendor-specific information on:

o The kinds of security products available on the market.

o The strengths and weaknesses of these products and their expected
effectiveness in a school environment.

o The costs of these products, including installation, long-term
operational and maintenance expenses, manpower, and training.

o Requirements to include in Requests For Quotes (RFQs) to get a good
product for an application.

o Legal issues that may need to be addressed.

Although security products can certainly have many different applications,
this document covers products that can be applicable to some of the issues
of violence in schools: video surveillance, weapon detection, entry control,
and duress alarms. Future volumes are expected to cover issues and
products such as bomb threats and explosives detection; drug residue and
drug vapor detection; drug use detection; alcohol use detection; interior
and exterior intrusion detection sensors; alarm communications;
antigraffiti sealers; false fire alarm pulls; glass-break sensors; two-way
radios; fencing; antitheft property marking; doors, locks, and key control;
Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) principles;
and parking lot safety. Most of the issues and philosophies covered in
these manuals are geared toward middle schools and high schools, but
elementary schools will likely find several of the technologies to have
possible applications at their facilities.

Although this document addresses nontechnology measures that we felt
were important for the completeness of the topic, there are many good
resources and references available that address these
people/policy/procedure/program issues much better. See the Resources
section at the back of this book.

Feedback from law enforcement agencies, schools, and product
manufacturers/vendors is welcome, especially regarding any oversights or
errors on our part. This guidebook is intended to provide an overview of
security technology product areas that might be appropriate and affordable
for school applications. Appropriate 

corrections or additions will be included in future updates. (We apologize
if our cost estimates for hardware do not reflect current pricing; this
document was written more than a year before actual publication.)

I would like to extend our deep appreciation to the many schools who have
allowed us to visit them and to assess the security vulnerabilities of their
facilities and operations (and to take photos of the good things on their
campuses, as well as the bad). I never failed to learn something new at
every school we have visited. I found there to be many great schools in
this country, with very motivated and hard-working administrators giving
110 percent of their energies to keep their students safe. I was humbled by
the intense and stressful hours they worked and the ultimate importance of
their jobs.

My thanks to the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) for providing the
funding to conduct the research that allowed me to prepare this guidebook.
I hope that we have met the high standards NIJ has set for providing the
best that science and technologies have to offer in fighting crime in the
United States. I owe special gratitude to Dennis Miyoshi, Director of
Sandia's Security Systems and Technologies Center; Dennis has always
been an advocate for schools and was the greatest ally in accomplishing
Sandia's school security work.

Information regarding the availability and ordering process for these
manuals and any updates may be obtained at the NIJ Web site:
www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij; the Justice Technology Information Network
(Justnet): www.nlectc.org; or by calling 1-800-248-2742.

I would be interested in hearing from readers regarding their successes, as
well as their failures, in dealing with school security technology issues.

Mary W. Green
mgreen@sandia.gov
Sandia National Laboratories
Mail Stop 0782
P.O. Box 5800
Albuquerque, NM 87185

Since 1941, Sandia National Laboratories has been a U.S. Department of
Energy facility whose primary mission is providing engineering support
for the U.S. nuclear weapons program. For the past 30 years, the Security
Technologies and Research Division at Sandia has been the principal
provider of research, design, development, and testing of leading-edge
technologies to solve physical security problems at high-risk U.S.
facilities.

Today, the Sandia facility in Albuquerque, New Mexico, employs more
than 8,000 scientists, engineers, mathematicians, technicians, and support
personnel to provide service in the national interest. More than 150 of
these personnel are dedicated solely to research and development of
security technologies.

Acknowledgments

Written by: Mary W. Green, Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque,
New Mexico

Original art work by: Steven Scatliffe, Tech Reps, Inc., Albuquerque,
New Mexico

Photos by: George Wagner, Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque,
New Mexico, Steven Scatliffe, Tech Reps, Inc., Albuquerque, New
Mexico

Document preparation: Rosanne C. Rohac, Tech Reps, Inc.,
Albuquerque, New Mexico, Elaine Perea, Tech Reps, Inc., Albuquerque,
New Mexico

Additional contributors: Janet Ahrens, Sandia National Laboratories,
Albuquerque, New Mexico, Tim Malone, Sandia National Laboratories,
Albuquerque, New Mexico, Dale Murray, Sandia National Laboratories,
Albuquerque, New Mexico, Charles Ringler, Sandia National
Laboratories, Albuquerque, New Mexico, George Wagner, Sandia
National Laboratories, Albuquerque, New Mexico, Fred Wolfenbarger,
Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, New Mexico

Library research: Kay Kelly, BEI, Albuquerque, New Mexico

Reviewers: Raymond Downs, Program Manager, National Institute of
Justice; William Modzeleski, Director, Safe and Drug-Free Schools
Program, U.S. Department of Education; Joe N. Anderson, Director of
School Safety and Security, Metropolitan Nashville Public Schools;
Michael S. Ganio, Sr. Manager, Security Services, Orange County
Public Schools; John J. McLees, Executive Director, Philadelphia Office
for School Safety; Tom Hall, School Police Chief, San Diego Unified
School District; Kenneth Trump, President and CEO, National School
Safety and Security Services; Gary Underwood, Chief, San Bernardino
Police, School Safety Department; Paul Schultz, Chief of Police, LaVista
Police, LaVista, Nebraska; Ronald Sloan, Chief of Police, Arvada Police
Department, Arvada, Colorado; John C. Martinez, Deputy Chief, Dallas
Police Department; J.M. Hutt, Sergeant Arapahoe County Sheriff's Office,
Englewood, Colorado; Tod Schneider, Crime Prevention Specialist, Police
Services Division, Eugene, Oregon; Ed Hardy, Chief, Special
Investigative Unit, Broward County School District, Sunrise, Florida;
Donovon Collins, Chief, Dallas Independent School District Police; Mel
Seo, Auxiliary Service Specialist, Hawaii Department of Education; Jack
Lazzarotto, Director, Police Services, Clark County School District,
Las Vegas, Nevada; Charles Clark, Director, Security Emergency
Preparedness, Long Beach Unified School District; Wesley Mitchell,
Chief, Los Angeles School Police; Sharon O'Connor, Tech Reps, Inc.,
Albuquerque, New Mexico

Contents

Foreword--iii
Preface--v
Acknowledgments--vii

Chapter I The Big Picture: Security Concepts and Operational Issues

Chapter II Video Surveillance
A. Video cameras
1. Why video cameras?
2. Why not video cameras?
3. Good applications versus poor applications
4. To monitor or not to monitor
5. Color versus black-and-white cameras
6. Fixed versus pan-tilt-zoom cameras
7. Hardwired versus wireless systems
8. A more technical discussion of formats, resolution, pixels, lenses,
and field of view
9. Camera housings
10. Placement and mounting
11. Lighting requirements and nighttime applications
12. Covert cameras
13. Maintenance and expected lifespan
14. Price ranges
15. Going out on bid for equipment and system maintenance contracts
16. Signage for use of cameras on school grounds
17. Legal aspects of the use of video cameras in schools
B. Video recording equipment
1. VCRs: the weak link
2. Multiplexers
3. Time-lapse recorders
4. Event recorders
5. Digital recorders

Chapter III Metal Detection
A. Walk-through metal detectors for personnel
1. Do metal detectors really work?--The basics
2. Space requirements and layout
3. Throughput
4. Hardware costs and manpower costs
5. Procedures for the operator
6. Instructions for the scannee
7. False alarms
8. Sources of interference
9. Acceptance testing and performance testing
10. Maintenance and expected lifespan
11. Working with the vendor
B. Hand-held scanners for personnel
1. The name of the game: Policies and procedures
2. Space requirements
3. Throughput
4. Hardware costs and manpower costs
5. Procedures for the operator
6. Instructions for the scannee
7. Maintenance and expected lifespan
8. Working with the vendor
C. X-ray baggage scanners
1. Safety concerns
2. Setup and space requirements
3. Throughput
4. Hardware costs and manpower costs
5. Procedures for the operator
6.Instructions for the scannee
7. Acceptance testing and performance testing
8. Maintenance and expected lifespan
9. Working with the vendor

Chapter IV Entry-Control Technologies
A. Limiting entry/exit points
B. Entry-control approaches
1. WHO lets you in
2.What you HAVE
3. What you KNOW
4. Who you ARE

Chapter V Duress Alarm Devices and Their Role in Crisis Management

Resources: Books, Publications, Web Sites, and Conferences


Chapter I The Big Picture: Security Concepts and Operational Issues

Most schools in the United States are safe institutions, with disciplinary
issues creating most disruptions. However, because of the 1998 campus
slayings involving students, firearms, and multiple victims, schools and
school programs are working harder to reach out to students, to teach them
to be good citizens, to identify potentially dangerous personalities, and to
develop appropriate intervention strategies. There are many excellent
programs around the country that address the issues of bullying, anger,
hate, abuse, drugs, alcohol, gangs, lack of role models, vandalism, and so
forth. It is of great importance to the United States that these programs be
pursued expeditiously. Unfortunately, these programs cannot be successful
overnight (indeed, many must be initiated early in a child's life in order to
be most effective) and do not yet exist in all schools. Meanwhile, security
incidents are occurring in schools that must be dealt with now--
perpetrators must be caught and consequences must be administered.
School administrators would like to discourage security infractions by
means of any deterrent available to them. One such approach sought more
often today involves security technologies.

Security technologies are not the answer to all school security problems.
However, many security products (e.g., cameras, sensors, and so forth) can
be excellent tools if applied appropriately. They can provide school
administrators or security officials with information that would not
otherwise be available, free up manpower for more appropriate work, or be
used to perform mundane tasks. Sometimes they can save a school money
(compared to the long-term cost of personnel or the cost impact of not
preventing a particular incident). Too often, though, these technologies are
not applied appropriately in schools, are expected to do more than they are
capable of, or are not well maintained after initial installation. In these
cases, technologies are certainly not cost effective.

Why security technologies?

To reduce problems of crime or violence in schools: (1) the opportunities
for security infractions should be eliminated or made more difficult to
accomplish, (2) the likelihood of being caught must be greatly increased,
and (3) consequences must be established and enforced. Item 3 is a social
and political issue and needs to be addressed head on by school boards and
communities across the country. This guide addresses only items 1 and 2.

Simply providing more adults, especially parents, in schools will reduce
the opportunities for security infractions and increase the likelihood of
being caught. However, adding dedicated professional security staff to
perform very routine security functions has many limitations: 

o Locating qualified people may be difficult.

o Humans do not do mundane tasks well.

o Manpower costs are always increasing.

o Turnover of security personnel can be detrimental to a security
program.

o As in other security environments, more repetitious tasks become
boring.

Hence, the possible role of security technologies expands. Through
technology, a school can introduce ways to collect information or enforce
procedures and rules that it would not be able to afford or rely on security
personnel to do.

Why security technologies have not been embraced by schools in the past

Anyone working in the security field is aware that there are thousands of
security products on the market. Some of them are excellent, but many
claim to be "the very best of its kind." And, unfortunately, there are a
significant number of customers in the country who have been less than
pleased with the ultimate cost, maintenance requirements, and
effectiveness of security technologies they have purchased. Schools have
been no exception to this and have a few inherent problems of their own:

o Schools do not usually have the funding for aggressive and complete
security programs.

o Schools generally lack the ability to procure effective security
technology products and services at the lowest bid.

o Many school security programs cannot afford to hire well-trained
security personnel.

o School administrators and their staff rarely have training or experience
in security technologies.

o Schools have no infrastructures in place for maintaining or upgrading
security devices--when something breaks, it is often difficult to have it
repaired or replaced.

o Issues of privacy and potential civil rights lawsuits may prohibit or
complicate the use of some technologies.

The issues come down to applying security technologies in schools that
are effective, affordable, and politically acceptable but still useful within
these difficult constraints.

Effectiveness versus affordability versus acceptability

Effectiveness, affordability, and acceptability are difficult tradeoffs and,
occasionally, a seemingly ineffective solution to a security problem is
chosen because of a lack of funding or pressure from the community to do
something.

Although many effective security measures are too expensive for schools,
cost alone is not often the ultimate driver. Most major changes to security
policies, including the introduction of technologies, are often brought on
not by foresight but as a response to some undesirable incident.

This is not to say that a good argument should be made for applying every
physical security approach in every school. "Appropriate" preparation is,
by far, the greater "art" in security system design, and it includes an
evolving plan, beginning with defining a particular school's risks.

A systematic approach to identifying the security risks at a school

Note: The following discussion considers all security risks to
schools--violence, drugs, theft, and vandalism--not just those that may be
addressed by the technologies covered in this volume. Depending on the
acceptance and demand for this guide, future additional volumes will
address the remaining technologies in greater detail.

In the past, schools have rarely understood the need or had the time or
resources to consider their security plans from a systems
perspective--looking at the big picture of what they are trying to achieve in
order to arrive at the optimal security strategy. A school's security staff
must understand what it is trying to protect (people and/or high-value
assets), who it is trying to protect against (the threats), and the general
environment and constraints that it must work within--the characterization
of the facility. This understanding will allow a school to define its greatest
and/or most likely risks so that its security strategy consciously addresses
those risks. This strategy will likely include some combination of
technologies, personnel, and procedures that do the best possible job of
solving the school's problems within its financial, logistical, and political
constraints.

Why is this careful identification of risk important? Because few facilities,
especially schools, can afford a security program that protects against all
possible incidents. 

No two schools are alike and, therefore, there is no single approach to
security that will work ideally for all schools. From year to year, even, a
school's security strategy will need revision because the world around it
and the people inside it will always be changing.

Defining a school's assets. For this school year, what is most at risk? The
protection of the students and staff is always at the top of this list, but the
measures taken to protect them will usually be driven by the defined
threats. Are the instruments in the band hall very attractive targets for theft
or vandalism? Is the new computer lab full of the best and most easily
resold computers? Though desirable, a school cannot possibly afford to 
protect everything to the same level of confidence.

Defining a school's threats. For this school year, who or what is your
school threatened by? Gang rivalries? Fights behind the gym? Drugs
hidden in lockers? Guns brought to school? Outsiders on campus?
Drinking at lunchtime? Vehicle breakins? Graffiti in the bathrooms?
Accidents in the parking lot? How sophisticated (knowledgeable of their
task of malevolence) or motivated (willing to risk being caught or injured)
do the perpetrators seem to be? Measures taken to protect against these
threats are driven by the characterization of the facility and its
surroundings as mentioned earlier. 

Characterizing a school's environment. Any security strategy must
incorporate the constraints of the facility so that all strengths, weaknesses,
and idiosyncrasies are realized and provided for. How risks are approached
will largely be driven by facility constraints. If theft and vandalism are
primary risks for your school, answers to questions regarding the physical
plant will determine the optimal security measures. Is the school new or
old? Are the windows particularly vulnerable? Does everyone who ever
worked at the school still have keys? What is the nighttime lighting like?
Does the interior intrusion sensor system work well, or do the local police
ignore the alarms due to a high false-alarm rate? Are visitors forced or
merely requested to go through the front office before accessing the rest of
the school?

If outsiders on campus are a primary concern, it will be necessary to
recognize the facility's ability to control unauthorized access. How many
entry points are there into the buildings? Are gangs present in the area?
Are the school grounds open and accessible to anyone, or do fences or
buildings restrict access (exhibit 1.2)? Is there easy access to the school
roof? Where are hiding places within the building or on the premises? Is
the student population small enough so that most of the staff would
recognize most of the students and parents? 

If issues of violence are a major concern, a thorough understanding of
employees, student profiles, and neighborhood characteristics will be
necessary. What is the crime rate in the neighborhood? Is the school
administration well liked by the students? Are teachers allowed access to
the school at night? Are students allowed off campus at lunch time? How
much spending money do students generally have? Are popular hangouts
for young people close by and, for business establishments, does
management collaborate with the school? Are expelled or suspended
students sent home or to an alternative school? How many incidents of
violence have occurred at the school over the past 4 years? What is the
general reputation of the school, and how does it appear to an outsider?
Are your most vocal parents prosecurity or proprivacy? Do your students
like and respect your security personnel well enough to pass them pieces
of information regarding security concerns? Once the school's threats,
assets, and environmental constraints are understood, the security needs
can be prioritized such that the school's security goals are understood by
all those involved.

Identifying security needs and then securing the funding to pay for them
are usually unrelated at most schools. Schools have to have a "Plan B," for
program design which may be the perfect "Plan A"--but spread out over
several years of implementation. If the desirable strategies (e.g., fencing,
sensors, locker searches, speed bumps) are too costly or unpalatable to the
community, a school may then need to modify the facility constraints (e.g.,
back entrances locked from the outside, no open campus for students, no
teacher access after 10 p.m., all computer equipment bolted down, no
lockers for students, and so forth).

Most school districts or school boards will be more supportive of security
measures and the requested funding if they are well educated about the
most likely risks faced each year and the options available. A security staff
should not have the wide-open charter to "keep everything and everybody
safe." A school board should be briefed as often as once a month as to
what the current security goals are and what strategies are recommended,
realizing that these will and must continue to evolve. If a school board
member is clearly aware of a school's most important concerns and what
is required to achieve them, then he or she is less likely to be swayed by an
irate parent into making a decision that will handicap reasonable security
efforts.

Designing the school security system

After identifying the risks or concerns at a noneducational facility, a
methodical approach to the security plan would then examine possible
solutions to each area of vulnerability from the perspective of:

Detection--Delay--Response

For any problem, it is necessary first to detect that an incident or problem
is occurring. For example, when someone is breaking into a building, it is
necessary that this act be detected and that information be supplied to the
authorities as soon as possible. Next, this adversary must be delayed as
long as possible so that the response force may arrive. A simple example
of delay would be firmly bolting computer components onto large heavy
desks, so that a thief is forced to use more time removing the bolts.
Finally, someone, such as the police, must respond to the incident to catch
the thief redhanded.

For a school environment, it is probably more appropriate to expand this
model:

Deterrence--Detection--Delay--Response/Investigation--Consequences

See exhibit 1.3 for more detail.

The most appealing step in any school security system should be to
convince the perpetrator that he or she should not do whatever it is he or
she is considering, whether the action is perceived as too difficult, not
worthwhile, or the chances of being caught are quite high. Clearly, most
security measures employed in facilities are intended for the precise
purpose of deterrence, whether it be to discourage a thief, a drug dealer, or
an errant employee. (Note: Deterrence is not generally considered part of
the security strategy for most high-risk government facilities; this is due in
part to the fact that quite a bit of deterrence comes "free" with other
security measures, and it would be difficult to attribute a lack of security
problems to any particular deterrence effort.)

Unlike other facilities, where a perpetrator would be handed over to the
authorities, and the consequences determined by law, a school often has
the authority and/or opportunity to establish the consequences for
incidents that occur on their campus. It is imperative, however, that
schools do not assume authority that they do not have. Issues governed by
law must be reported to the appropriate authority.

To illustrate the application of this model, consider the problem of
nighttime breakins and theft in a school building. A model for the security
strategy to address this might be:

Deterrence--Close off the parking lot or driveways to vehicle traffic at
night. Post signs that video cameras are in use on the campus (but only if
you actually do have cameras). Use fencing strategically, but where
fencing would be unacceptable, consider a barrier of thorny pyracantha
bushes (exhibit 1.4). Allow a law enforcement officer to live on campus.

Detection--Install an intrusion detection system in all school hallways,
administrative offices, and rooms with high-value assets. Use motion
sensors, magnetic switches on doors, heat sensors, and/or glass-break
sensors as appropriate. Send alarm signals to the police, the officer on
campus, and the school principal.

Delay--Bolt computers and TVs to desks and walls so that removing them
is difficult and time consuming.

Response/Investigation--Police and/or campus security arrives on the
scene, makes arrests.

Consequences--Enforce consequences where possible and the school has
the authority to do so. (This becomes an additional deterrent for the future,
especially if nonsensitive pieces of information regarding the incident are
released to staff, students, and the community.)

Schools do not normally have the opportunity for real-time detection and
real-time response to security incidents; after-the-fact investigation is
normally the best a school can hope for.

Although this model may not be appropriate for all aspects of security at a
school, it can serve as a methodology for consideration. Its use can prevent
some less-thought-out strategies. A true example of this is a large urban
high school that was planning to purchase $100,000 worth of exterior
cameras to combat nighttime vandalism being inflicted on the exterior of
the building. This plan was halted abruptly when the school was asked
who would be available to watch the monitors from the 40-plus cameras
(detection) and who would be able to respond quickly enough to these
sporadic and relatively small incidents (response). A better and cheaper
alternate plan was devised that included using antigraffiti sealer on all
brick surfaces, some strategically located wrought iron fencing that could
not easily be climbed, and the replacement of a few particularly vulnerable
windows with glass block.

A spectrum of physical security approaches

It will be assumed that consequences for undesirable actions have been put
into place at a school; otherwise, there is little or no deterrence to be
gained from any physical security measures designed to detect, delay, and
respond to an incident. A wide array of security measures involving
people, campus modifications, and/or technologies can be considered for
most concerns, keeping in mind the unique characteristics of each school.
A recurring message from school administrators is that the majority of
their problems are brought onto campus by outsiders or expelled/
suspended students so measures to keep outsiders off campus will
generally be of global benefit. (Although this is not the case in all
incidents, school administrators quite often find it more palatable to
parents if security measures are justified based on the exterior threat rather
than the suspicion of their children.) The following is a partial list of
possible security measures to address various security issues:

(Most of the following suggested security measures are in use in one or
more U.S. schools, but a few may not yet have been attempted. In any
case, there is no comprehensive body of knowledge regarding their
effectiveness. More research is needed to get a national picture on
particular technologies. Also keep in mind that a school should always
contact its legal counsel before participating in any new security program
that involves searching or testing of people or property.)

Outsiders on campus

o Posted signs regarding penalties for trespassing.

o Enclosed campus (fencing).

o Guard at main entry gate to campus.

o Greeters in strategic locations.

o Student I.D.s or badges.

o Vehicle parking stickers.

o Uniforms or dress codes.

o Exterior doors locked from the outside.

o A challenge procedure for anyone out of class.

o Cameras in remote locations.

o School laid out so all visitors must pass through front office.

o Temporary "fading" badges issued to all visitors.

Fights on campus

o Cameras.

o Duress alarms.

o Whistles.

Vandalism

o Graffiti-resistant sealers.

o Glass-break sensors.

o Aesthetically pleasing wall murals (these usually are not hit by
graffiti).

o Law enforcement officers living on campus.

o 8-foot fencing.

o Well-lit campus at night.

Theft

o Interior intrusion detection sensors.

o Property marking (including microdots) to deter theft.

o Bars on windows.

o Reinforced doors.

o Elimination of access points up to rooftops (exhibit 1.5).

o Cameras.

o Doors with hingepins on secure side.

o Bolting down computers and TVs.

o Locating high-value assets in interior rooms.

o Key control.

o Biometric entry into rooms with high-value assets.

o Law enforcement officer living on campus.

Drugs

o Drug detection swipes.

o Hair analysis kits for drug use detection (intended for parental
application).

o Drug dogs.

o Removal of lockers.

o Random searches.

o Vapor detection of drugs.

Alcohol

o No open campus at lunch.

o Breathalyzer test equipment.

o No access to vehicles.

o No lockers.

o Clear or open mesh backpacks.

o Saliva test kits.

Weapons

o Walk-through metal detectors.

o Hand-held metal detectors.

o Vapor detection of gun powder.

o Crimestopper hotline with rewards for information.

o Gunpowder detection swipes.

o Random locker, backpack, and vehicle searches.

o X-ray inspection of bookbags and purses.

Malicious acts

o Setback of all school buildings from vehicle areas (exhibit 1.6).

o Inaccessibility of air intake and water source.

o All adults on campus required to have a badge.

o Vehicle barriers near main entries and student gathering areas.

Parking lot problems

o Cameras.

o Parking decals.

o Fencing.

o Card I.D. systems for parking lot entry.

o Parking lots sectioned off for different student schedules.

o Sensors in parking areas that should have no access during schoolday.

o Roving guards.

o Bike patrol.

False fire alarms

o Sophisticated alarm systems that allow assessment of alarms (and
cancellation if false) before they become audible.

o Boxes installed over alarm pulls that alarm locally (screamer boxes).

Bomb threats

o Caller I.D. on phone system.

o Crimestopper program with big rewards for information.

o Recording all phone calls, with a message regarding this at the
beginning of each incoming call.

o All incoming calls routed through a district office.

o Phone company support.

o No pay phones on campus.

o Policy to extend the school year when plagued with bomb threats and
subsequent evacuations.

Bus problems

o Video cameras and recorders within enclosures on buses.

o I.D.s required to get on school buses.

o Security aides on buses.

o Smaller buses.

o Duress alarm system or radios for bus drivers.

Teacher safety

o Duress alarms.

o Roving patrols.

o Classroom doors left open during class.

o Cameras in black boxes in classrooms.

o Controlled access to classroom areas.

Legal issues

Within each section of this manual, some legal issues have been noted
regarding the use of various technologies. A reasonable approach to using
any new security device would include checking with your legal
organization, talking to schools in the area that have already implemented
the measure, and inviting local law enforcement to come in to discuss the
device's possible use. Although every possible ramification cannot be
foreseen, it does help to be aware of issues that might be raised and to be
aware of current thinking about ways to address each of these.

Evaluating a school's security system design

The staff assigned to handle security concerns should plan to meet on a
regular basis for collaboration on new problems, needed changes to
existing approaches, and the exchange of information and intelligence.
New problems and proposed solutions may sometimes be presented
(where appropriate) to school employees, the student council, the parent
advisory group, the local police, or other schools in the area. Although
including more people may lengthen the decisionmaking process, making
representatives of these groups a part of the security upgrade team for
issues that would involve them will ensure buy-in. A side benefit will be
that word will spread throughout the community that the school is taking
active security measures, which will act as a deterrent.

New school design

Many school buildings in the United States have been constructed to
achieve an inviting and open-to-the-community feeling, with multiple
buildings, big windows, multiple entrances and exits, and many
opportunities for privacy. Needless to say, these layouts are not conducive
to many current requirements to address security needs. To combat broken
windows and nighttime thefts, the country also went through a brief period
of designing schools with almost no windows; the cavelike results these
designs produced were soon found to be objectionable to many people.

Incorporating the principles of Crime Prevention Through Environmental
Design (CPTED) in the design or remodeling of a school can contribute
greatly to the control and security of the campus. There are several good
sources of CPTED literature available through the Web; CPTED as
applied specifically to schools will be covered in a subsequent volume.

If a district has the luxury of looking forward to a new school in the future,
it is imperative that trained security personnel, who are familiar with the
area and the community, and who will be responsible for day-to-day
security operations in the new facility, are involved in every step of the
new design. This is critical to ensuring that the design of the new school
minimizes vulnerabilities. There are architectural firms specializing in
schools that incorporate good security principles; a security-conscious
design can actually help compensate in the long term for tight security
budgets, fewer security personnel, and less sophisticated security gadgets.
The following are some suggestions to keep in mind for a new facility; the
funding, location, geography, streets, and neighborhood will usually drive
which ideas are feasible for each new school. Although this list includes
only a few basic security technologies (such as cameras, sensors, and so
forth), the facility design should not preclude their straightforward
installation in the future.

o Limit the number of buildings--one building is best--to limit outsiders
on the campus.

o Minimize the entrances to the school building--having one or two main
entrances/exits will support efforts to keep outsiders off campus. Allow
enough room at the main entry in the event that a screening area (i.e., for
weapon or drug detection) needs to be incorporated later on. Alarm other
exits for emergency use only.

o Minimize the line of sight from secluded off-campus sites onto student
gathering areas, the main entry doors, playgrounds, patios, and so forth
(exhibit 1.7). (This suggestion must be tempered against the benefits
gained from the natural, desirable surveillance by neighbors, passers-by,
officers on patrol, and so forth)

o Allow for a security person to be posted at a single entrance onto
campus to challenge each vehicle for identification of all occupants. Buses
and school employees should have a separate (and controlled) entrance.

o Provide a dropoff/pickup lane for buses only.

o Minimize the number of driveways or parking lots that students will
have to walk across to get to the school building.

o Build single-stall bathrooms to mitigate bathroom confrontations and
problems.

o Enclose the campus. (This is more a measure to keep outsiders out
rather than to keep insiders in.) Beside defining property boundaries, a
robust fence forces a perpetrator to consciously trespass, rather than
allowing casual entry.

o Make certain that the school building and classroom areas can be
closed and locked off from the gym and other facilities used during off
hours.

o Minimize secluded hiding places for unauthorized persons, both inside
and outside buildings.

o Do not eliminate windows, but use them strategically. Consider
incorporating clerestories or secure skylights that allow light in but that are
less vulnerable than typical windows.

o Maximize the line of sight within buildings.

o Large wide spaces, like hallways or commons, should have sufficient
vertical dimension so space does not feel restrictive to students.

o Consider installing student lockers in classrooms or other areas easy to
monitor so that there is no single locker area that becomes a bottleneck,
and there is always the deterrence of an adult nearby (exhibit 1.8).

o Do not cut corners on communications, especially those required for
security. Make certain that your facility has built in the necessary receivers
and transmitters throughout the structure to allow for dependable two-way
radio and cellular phone use. (Sometimes radio frequency communication
is not possible deep within a large, structurally dense facility.)

o Where possible, have buildings and other student gathering areas set
back from the streets, driveways, or parking areas by at least 50 feet.

o Install a basic security alarm system throughout all hallways,
administrative offices, and rooms containing high-value property, such as
computers, VCRs, shop equipment, laboratory supplies, and musical
instruments.

o Allow a law enforcement officer to live on campus. (In some school
districts, an officer is allowed to move his or her own trailer to a strategic
location on campus and receive free utilities in exchange for prenegotiated
and formally contracted responsibilities.) The deterrent effect of a police
vehicle parked on campus all night and weekend can be great. Such an
arrangement can also provide both detection and response in situations
where damage is being inflicted upon the facility, but no alarm system
would normally detect it (exhibit 1.9).

o Provide a separate parking area for work-study students or those who
will be leaving during the school day. (This allows the main student
parking lot to be closed off during the school day.)

o Make certain that exterior lighting is sufficient for safety. Lights
mounted on the exterior of buildings often are inadequate for adjoining
driveways or parking lots.

o Do not underestimate the value of trees and landscaping on a school
campus. An attractive, well-maintained school is generally less attractive
to thieves.

Exhibit 1.10 shows a school with several of these ideas incorporated.
(Note: This is not an actual architectural drawing, does not incorporate
basic facility requirements, and is not drawn to scale.)

The role of order maintenance

One additional consideration that cannot be overlooked is the perception
of a lack of order on a school campus. If a school is perceived as unsafe
(i.e., it appears that no adult authority prevails on a campus), then
"undesirables" will come in, and the school will actually become unsafe.
This is an embodiment of the broken window theory: one broken window
left unrepaired will encourage additional windows to be broken.
Seemingly small incidents or issues such as litter on a school campus can
provide the groundwork for (or even just the reputation of) a problem
school. Issues of vandalism and theft can be almost as harmful to a school
as actual violence because they can create a fertile environment for loss of
control and community confidence.

Issues contributing to a school's overall order maintenance must therefore
be taken seriously, not unlike any other public facility. Reducing theft,
deterring vandalism and graffiti, keeping outsiders off campus, keeping
the facility in good repair, improving poor lighting, maintaining attractive
landscaping, and  getting rid of trash are all important to school security
(exhibit 1.11).

Technologies such as cameras, sensors, microdots (for identifying
ownership), and antigraffiti sealers can contribute significantly in many
(but not all) situations and are possible approaches to further support a
school's order maintenance.

Too often school districts undervalue the ultimate importance of reliable
and conscientious maintenance, janitorial, and groundskeeping staff. Their
ultimate contribution to the order maintenance of a school can be
enormous. Additionally, the janitorial staff needs to be selected with
almost the same care as the teaching staff because they have great access
to and knowledge of a school facility. Contracting out this work without
complete background checks of all workers can lead to many problems in
the long run.

Chapter II Video Surveillance

A. Video cameras

1. Why video cameras?

The peace of mind of both students and faculty at a school can often be
quickly enhanced by the installation of video cameras as part of a closed
circuit television (CCTV) system. This change of attitude may result in
even further-reaching effects on a campus than would be expected by the
use of cameras alone. As mentioned in the introductory chapter of this
guide, a sense of safety and authority will directly influence people's
opinions and impressions, which will ultimately contribute to the overall
order maintenance of a facility and how that facility is treated by
occupants and outsiders.

To the school's security personnel who must handle day-to-day security
issues, the best thing about cameras is the deterrence factor they introduce
to outsiders who do not belong on campus and to students and employees
who do. Information regarding security measures, such as cameras at the
local school, will generally spread through a community. This type of
reputation can make outsiders reconsider an unwelcome visit to the
historically easy mark of the neighborhood--the school. It can be assumed
that most kids are not going to step way out of bounds if they believe they
will likely be caught, which is often possible through the appropriate
application of cameras. In a school security system, the ideal goal should
be to convince kids not to even attempt to do something that is
unacceptable.

Addressing an incident after it occurs is good, but not as good as if it had
never happened. Once a perpetrator is caught, there is a chain of events
involving confrontation, denial, parental involvement, consequences, and
perhaps even the involvement of law enforcement and the legal system.
School administrators will be forced to spend a great deal of time on the
matter, and all participants will find the process distasteful.

Another strength of cameras is the strong evidence they can preserve on
tape. Even if law enforcement is not brought in regarding an incident, the
recorded tape can be invaluable to a school administration. Many schools
report that when students are brought into the school office after an
incident and shown a tape of themselves in an illegal or unacceptable
act--even if the tape might not have been of sufficient resolution and detail
to use for prosecution purposes in a court of law--the student will usually
admit to the incident.

The ultimate usability of a video recording is dependent on many
variables. It is possible for a camera system to produce tapes on which
individuals are unidentifiable or their actions are indiscernible. Be certain
that a camera system provides the kind of information you need before you
pay for it. These requirements should be clearly spelled out in the purchase
agreement, along with a specified time period during which the school can
adequately test it.
 
Video recordings are also beneficial for use with parents. Although nearly
all parents want to believe their children are innocent of wrongdoing, some
parents will deny their child's guilt despite the credible testimony of
others to the contrary. However, as many school administrators and
teachers have discovered, parents quickly accept their child's role in an
incident when shown a videotape of the incident. Most parents want to do
the right thing, but hard evidence is often required for some to concede
over a matter involving their own child.

From a cost standpoint, the use of CCTV in public areas on school
grounds can free up manpower. If cameras are covering a large patio area
where students congregate during breaks, adults who normally would be
assigned to oversee that area can instead be made available to monitor
other areas of concern.

Finally, the solid documentation that a video recording provides can be
invaluable in situations involving liability claims. Although it is possible
that this may occasionally work against a school, most schools welcome
this concrete evidence so that testimony regarding an incident does not
consist solely of hearsay.

2. Why NOT video cameras?

o CCTV systems are expensive. Installation can also be expensive, as
well as logistically difficult.

o Choosing the correct camera equipment requires some technical
knowledge (exhibit 2.2).

o A single camera can effectively view a smaller area than would be
intuitively expected, hence many applications can require more cameras,
equipment, and expense than was originally expected.

o Cameras can be stolen or vandalized.

o Ongoing maintenance and operational support are required.

o Some applications or areas do not warrant camera use.

o Some communities or individuals will challenge the legality of using
cameras.
o Insiders with full knowledge of the installed video system's
capabilities can possibly circumvent the system to their advantage.

o If it becomes well known where cameras are being used at a school,
students may simply move their misbehaviors to a different part of
campus.

3. Good applications versus poor applications

An effective use of cameras in schools is viewing the recorded tape after
an incident has occurred. Examples of reasonable goals for a school video
system are capturing scenes indicating who started a fight in the hallway,
who is smoking marijuana in the parking lot, who stole all the blank
computer disks out of the computer laboratory, or if a particular person did
indeed try to run down someone with his or her truck in the school
driveway. Less reasonable goals, or at least more difficult or manpower
intensive, are trying to use camera scenes to stop a student fight in its early
stages, prevent someone from bringing weapons into the facility, or catch
a thief before he makes his escape.

A visible camera may not help if a school's goal is to identify a nighttime
thief in the band hall or computer lab if the thief simply covered his or her
face or disguised himself or herself. However, it may still add substantially
to deterrence; a would-be thief may never be sure if there will be some
type of immediate response to the video recording or exactly where all the
cameras are located.

Depending upon each situation, video cameras can support security
initiatives in the following applications:

o Parking lots and driveways.

o Cafeterias.

o Patio and entry areas.

o Hallways.

o Gymnasiums.

o Main administrative offices (exhibit 2.3).

o Band halls.

o School stores.

o Computer rooms.

o Science laboratories.

o Supply closets.

Schools may want to consider classroom installation of the cameras and
recorder enclosures that are currently so popular for use on school buses.
For buses, a camera is placed in the black box only when requested by a
bus driver, thereby reducing the number of camera systems that must be
purchased. Usually, the deterrence factor derived from students never
knowing when a camera is actually present can discourage much of the
misbehavior. (This is not to be confused with the use of a dummy camera,
where a potential victim is under the illusion that he or she is being
monitored and, therefore, help will be forthcoming in the event of an
attack; this can create extensive liability concerns for a facility.)

In an application with a camera looking in an easterly or westerly
direction, extreme glare may occur during sunrise or sunset. If this type of
placement cannot be avoided, the camera should be mounted as high as
possible and then angled downward to view below the horizon. If sunrise
and/or sunset are not critical time periods for a particular application, then
it may be acceptable to simply have an unusable picture during these
times.

Similarly, vehicle headlights and other sources of glaring light,
particularly during night operations, should be considered. A system that
is designed with the potential problem sources recognized can be
compensated for. After initial installation is complete, it is much more
difficult to compensate for these problems. Oftentimes, funding is no
longer available to make needed adjustments.

Viewing a scene such as a dark doorway that contains a significant shadow
can be quite difficult (exhibit 2.4). Newer cameras with better electronics
help compensate for these types of applications, but they are more
expensive.

Seasonal problems should be anticipated and addressed before purchasing
an exterior camera system. Conditions to be aware of are blowing snow,
built-up ice on a camera housing, dust storms, trees that block the scene in
summer, temperature extremes, or north sides of buildings with shadows
that may affect scene assessment during winter months.

4. To monitor or not to monitor

Each year, a great number of camera systems are bought in the United
States with the objective of assigning a security person to constantly
monitor the scenes from the video cameras in real time. The objective of
such installations is that some sort of response may then be dispatched
immediately and an undesirable incident prevented or stopped, basically
using the live person watching the monitor as a detector. This is quite
often an unrealistic approach to security, particularly in school
applications.

Experiments were run at Sandia National Laboratories 20 years ago for the
U.S. Department of Energy to test the effectiveness of an individual whose
task was to sit in front of a video monitor(s) for several hours a day and
watch for particular events. These studies demonstrated that such a task,
even when assigned to a person who is dedicated and well-intentioned,
will not support an effective security system. After only 20 minutes of
watching and evaluating monitor screens, the attention of most individuals
has degenerated to well below acceptable levels. Monitoring video screens
is both boring and mesmerizing. There is no intellectually engaging
stimuli, such as when watching a television program. This is particularly
true if a staff member is asked to watch multiple monitors, with scenes of
teenagers milling about in various hallways, in an attempt to watch for
security incidents (exhibit 2.5).

A practical security application of real-time viewing of a video monitor
might be the intent to actively allow or disallow individuals to enter a
particular locked door. In this case, the security person at or near the video
monitors receives an alarm or other announcement that a person desires
entry into that facility or area. The security person would then focus his or
her attention directly on the screen and make a decision (according to
procedures) as to whether to release the remote lock on a door to allow the
person access.

Most schools have a security staff, whether it be an assistant principal
assigned security as one of his or her duties, a few security aides equipped
with two-way radios, or an impressive number of sworn police officers.
Few schools, however, find themselves with surplus security-staff time.
Because of the ineffectiveness of people monitoring video scenes in real
time, it would seem to be a very poor use of school security staff. One
possible exception is when a certain incident is expected at a school during
a finite time period. For example, if cars in a parking lot are frequently
broken into during the noon hour, security staff may want to actively
monitor their cameras' outputs during this period so that they may
immediately assess an incident in progress and apprehend the suspect.
This would be particularly appropriate if the suspect is not known and not
a member of the school.

The use of cameras and a real-time display unit without the benefit of a
recorder is not recommended. It is true that a video camera and monitor
alone are much cheaper than a complete video system with recording and
multiplexing capabilities. However, the hard evidence made available in
the form of a video recording can more than make up for the cost of a
recording system. Ease of prosecution and the likely prevention of future
incidents by this individual are additional benefits.

5. Color versus black-and-white cameras

In a high-security application, when an alarm has been generated signaling
a presence in an off-limits area, it is likely to be sufficient to be able to
assess the alarm condition with a black-and-white camera. The objective
here is merely to determine that it is a person intruding (any person) and
that a response should be prepared or dispatched.

In a school application, the security objective of recording video scenes
would generally be to determine who the perpetrator of an incident was. In
this type of after-the-fact assessment, it is most important to identify, not
just detect, the intruder. Because of this, color cameras are probably more
helpful for most school applications than black-and-white cameras. Color
recordings will contain much more information about the scene that was
viewed, i.e., the boy who broke the window had red hair, a dark yellow
jacket, and drove away in a light blue car. This can be critical for school
applications; the school principal can match the characteristics of the
recorded suspect with those of students or outsiders known to frequent the
area. Quite often, when a suspected student is brought in and shown a
recording of himself or herself in an incident, he or she will admit to a role
in it, even though there may not have been quite enough detail on tape for
a positive identification.

Color cameras usually have lower resolution than black-and-white
cameras. However, for the school application, the ability to recognize the
color of clothing, color of vehicle, and so forth is often more important
than a more detailed image. The amount of information on a video
recording that is required to prosecute a suspect in a court of law may be
much greater in many instances than what a school video system will
normally collect.

The cost of color cameras is slowly approaching the cost of
black-and-white cameras. Currently, the cost of a color camera as
compared to an equivalent black-and-white camera is anywhere from 30
percent to 70 percent greater. Most school applications will find the higher
priced color cameras necessary for their goals. An exception to this would
be a camera applied in a small interior room or area where any potential
perpetrators will be close enough so that their faces will be easily
identifiable in black and white.

When using either black-and-white or color cameras under low light level
conditions (such as at night with artificial lighting) it is necessary to
evaluate the effectiveness of the existing lighting. Generally, security
applications of cameras require higher light levels and more evenly
distributed lighting than is found in parking lots with typical safety
lighting. Also, if school officials plan to use their cameras for nighttime
applications, color cameras will require a higher lighting level than black
and white cameras. (See the section on lighting requirements and
nighttime applications.)

6. Fixed versus pan-tilt-zoom cameras

Two types of camera configurations are available on the market: the fixed
camera and the pan-tilt-zoom camera. Fixed cameras are mounted in a
stationary position (although what the camera is mounted on may actually
move, such as on a police vehicle). These cameras will view the same
scene until physically relocated. The scene is typically recorded and, less
often, the scene is also viewed simultaneously on a monitor by security
personnel.

Pan-tilt-zoom cameras can operate in either of two modes. The mode for
which these cameras are most useful allows the scene that is viewed to be
controlled by an operator sitting at a video monitor. This operator can
control the direction and angle of the camera as necessary. These cameras
typically have a zoom option that will allow the operator to focus on parts
of a scene, such as zooming in on a suspected perpetrator. The second
mode for pan-tilt-zoom cameras is an automatic mode, in which the
camera automatically scans back and forth over a certain portion of its
range. Normally a pan-tilt-zoom camera should be protected and shielded
from view by an opaque enclosure (domes are quite common) so that it is
difficult for a would-be perpetrator to tell where the camera is actually
aimed.

Most applications in schools are better served by fixed cameras. One
consideration is that the pan-tilt-zoom camera can cost around three to five
times as much as an equal quality fixed camera. More important, though,
is the fact that pan-tilt-zoom cameras, when run by an operator, consume
the time of a security staff member. When run in automatic mode, the
chance of the pan-tilt-zoom camera looking (and recording) in the
direction where an incident is occurring is much less likely than the chance
that it will be looking in the wrong direction (exhibit 2.6). Pan-tilt-zoom
cameras also introduce a mechanical component to the system that will
require more regular maintenance (e.g., oiling gears, replacing motors, and
so forth) and that will be one of the more likely fail points.

Pan-tilt-zoom cameras may be employed during a fixed portion of the day,
such as the lunch period, if an operator is available to watch and track
suspects with this camera. Gateway High School in Denver, Colorado, has
a dozen fixed cameras located throughout the campus but also successfully
uses one pan-tilt-zoom camera overseeing the parking lot that allows an
operator to watch suspected perpetrators before and after classes.
Gateway's goal is to record a suspected individual while he or she is
involved in a regularly occurring incident of which the school is already
quite aware.

With these considerations, it would usually be more cost-effective and
more reliable to capture incidents using multiple fixed cameras looking in
different areas from a single point than to use a single pan-tilt-zoom
camera. (This does not take into account installation costs.)

7. Hardwired versus wireless systems

Traditionally, camera systems have cabling that runs directly between the
camera and the recording mechanism (or viewing monitor). These
hardwired runs are usually recommended by manufacturers to not exceed
500-1,000 feet, using RG-59 coaxial cable. Signal equalizers/amplifiers
will be required to compensate for signal loss if distances become much
greater than 1,000 feet. See exhibit 2.7 for typical transmitting distances.

For exterior applications, cabling for camera systems should be placed
within a watertight conduit. Underground cabling should be buried below
the frostline or a minimum of 24 inches deep. Direct buried cables
(without conduit) are subject to damage by rodents (if no rodent shield is
provided), accidental digging, and intentional tampering. Above-ground
cabling that is not in a conduit is very susceptible to tampering, as well as
environmental degradation. With coaxial cable runs, ground loops (in
video applications, this is a current flowing along the shield of the coaxial
cable due to a voltage difference in the ground between the ends of the
cable) and interference from radio frequencies (RF) or other signals must
be considered. Coaxial cables should not be run next to, or parallel with,
power lines over long distances. Equipment, such as hum transformers and
electronic video clamps, is available in instances where interference is a
problem.

With exterior coaxial cable runs, close lightning strikes can induce voltage
surges on the cable that can damage equipment on both ends. To protect
equipment, surge protectors are installed at both ends of the cable run. 

Fiber optic cabling is an excellent alternative to coaxial cable. With fiber
optics, there are no concerns with noise, RF interference, ground loops, or
voltage surges. Fiber optic systems require a transmitter at the camera end
and a receiver at the monitoring end. Fiber optic systems are more costly
than coaxial cable systems for short runs but become more cost effective
with longer cable runs (greater than 3,000 feet). Installation of fiber optics
is also more expensive, requiring trained and experienced installers and
specialized tools for handling and connecting.

For interior applications, cabling for hardwired camera systems should be
placed within a metal conduit if it is exposed or accessible by building
occupants, including maintenance staff. A good example of this is cabling
run above loose/replaceable ceiling tiles.

Short-distance, low-power RF wireless camera systems for video signal
transmission are becoming more popular. (Wiring is still required for
power.) A transmitter is required at the camera, as well as a receiver at the
recording end. This will add an estimated $1,000 or more to the price of
the system for each distinct camera location (multiple cameras can be at
one location, as in exhibit 2.8). In many cases, however, wireless may be
cheaper (and certainly easier) than running cabling.

Acceptable distances between a transmitter and receiver may range up to
about 1,500 feet if the camera transmitter is in direct line-of-sight of the
receiver. If equipment is located such that data transmissions must go
through walls, fences, and so forth, the detail of the transmission can
quickly degrade if the transmitter/receiver distance is already close to the
manufacturer's recommended maximum distance. Installation distances to
be implemented for camera transmissions should be much less than
manufacturer recommendations if the transmitter and receiver are not
within each other's line of sight.

The advantage of wireless camera systems is, of course, that cabling does
not have to be run underground, through the air, or behind walls and
ceilings. Therefore, the chance of tampering is much less. However,
wireless applications where distances are close to manufacturer limitations
may experience interference from very unusual sources, e.g., a nearby
parked truck. Previous installation experience is usually required to set up
such a system, due to the different antennas available that can perform
differently in unique setups.

Short-distance, low-power RF transmission systems, such as a school's
wireless camera system, usually do not require licensing by the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC). Higher power systems will require
an FCC license.

8. A more technical discussion of formats, resolution, pixels, lenses, and
field of view

A basic familiarity with camera terminology is probably adequate for most
school administrators who plan to go out on bid for a CCTV system.
However, for the benefit of those who might be responsible for choosing
or upgrading camera equipment, the following discussion presents these
technical specifications in more depth.

Formats. Camera format relates to the size of the camera imaging device.
Most solid-state cameras used in security applications today are 1/2 -inch
or 1/3 -inch format. There are some 2/3 -inch cameras still in use, and
some 1/4 -inch format cameras are beginning to appear on the market. The
trend has been to make camera formats smaller as picture element
densities have increased, giving the manufacturer more imaging devices
per production run, reducing costs, and allowing for smaller cameras.

Resolution. Resolution is the ability to resolve or see small details in an
image. Resolution for CCTV cameras (as well as for TV monitors and
recorders) is usually specified in terms of horizontal lines of resolution.
Horizontal lines of resolution relates to the number of independently
resolvable elements (small details) in three-fourths of the picture width.
CCTV cameras range from 200 to more than 1,000 lines of horizontal
resolution. Higher resolution cameras generally cost more than lower
resolution cameras. For a typical color security camera system (system
includes camera, cabling, recorder, and TV monitor) that uses a standard
National Television Systems Committee (NTSC) color video signal
format, 300 to 400 lines of horizontal resolution are common.
Black-and-white systems for tighter security applications typically range
from 500 to 700 lines of resolution. Cameras with more than 800 lines of
resolution are commonly used in broadcast TV, medical, or industrial
applications.

Pixels. Active picture elements, sometimes referred to as pixels, is a term
used specifically with cameras and is directly related to horizontal lines of
resolution. Active picture elements are the actual number of light-sensitive
elements that are within the camera imaging device. Active picture
elements are expressed with a horizontal number (the number of elements
horizontally across the imager device) and a vertical number (the number
of elements vertically on the imager). A camera specified with 768H by
494V picture elements has 494 rows of picture elements vertically, with
each row having 768 elements horizontally. For black-and-white cameras,
horizontal lines of resolution relate to picture elements by a three-fourths
factor (by definition of horizontal lines of resolution) so a black-and-white
camera with 768 active picture elements will have 576 horizontal lines of
resolution. This would hold true for color cameras as well, except that the
NTSC format limits signal bandwidth which reduces resolution. 

Lines of resolution, camera format, and lens focal length (discussed later)
are the camera-specific part of what determines if a camera scene will be
useful for a particular application. Other items to consider include lighting,
shadowing, camera aiming, and camera sensitivity. Before selecting a
camera and lens combination for an application, one must determine what
is desired to be seen in the image. Just being able to see a person in a
specific area, such as a parking lot, will require one set of minimum
criteria for camera and lens selection. Being able to identify a person by
facial features (if the person faces the camera) will require a different set
of criteria. For identification purposes, a person must be much larger in a
scene than for the purpose of just determining if a human is present.

Because a camera scene is observed on the TV monitor, the entire CCTV
system resolution must be considered. This includes the camera and lens
combination, the camera signal transmission equipment (such as coaxial
cable and amplifiers), the TV monitor, and the recorder. All components
of the system must have adequate resolution for the application desired.

For observation of a camera scene to determine only if a human is in the
scene (or to be able to distinguish between a person and an animal), a
minimum criteria of 6 horizontal TV lines across a 1-foot-wide object
within the scene is used. (In terms of active picture elements, this means
that a 1-foot-wide object would cover 8 horizontal active picture elements
for each row of picture elements for the height of the object on the camera
imager.) For identification of a person by facial features, 16 horizontal
lines (21 pixels) of resolution subtending a 1-foot-wide object is needed.

The lens focal length (discussed in the next section), camera format, and
how far an object is from the camera will determine how large an object is
within the scene, as well as how many active picture elements the object
covers on the camera imaging device. Higher resolution cameras (for
example, 576 horizontal lines or higher) can be used to distinguish objects
farther away (smaller in the scene) than a lower resolution camera
(approximately 250 horizontal lines) allows. In other words, an object can
be smaller in the scene for higher resolution cameras and still meet the
minimum horizontal resolution criteria. The significance of this is that
fewer higher resolution cameras will be needed than low-resolution
cameras in some interior and many exterior applications.

Lenses. A camera lens focuses light reflected from objects within a scene
onto the imaging device of the camera. The imaging device converts light
to an electrical signal. Lens focal length and aperture are two important
parameters to consider.

Lens focal length describes the relative magnification of the lens. The
camera field of view (defined below) will be dependent on the lens focal
length, along with the camera imager format size. Similar to the camera
imager format, there is a format size for lenses. For most cases, the lens
format size should be matched to the camera imager format size.
Mismatched format sizes can result in the focused image being too large or
too small for the camera imaging device. Different camera and lens
formats can be used satisfactorily in a few instances. 

Except for the most uncommon sizes, there usually is not a large price
difference between various lens sizes. The most common sizes are 4.8mm,
5.6mm, 8mm, 12mm, 16mm, 25mm, and 35mm. A 35mm lens has the
longest range with the narrowest field of view. The 4.8mm lens can see
much shorter distances, but it will have a much wider field of view. Most
lens sizes can be used in exterior applications, depending on the view
desired. Shorter focal length lenses, such as 4.8mm or 5.6mm, are typical
for interior applications, due to the shorter distances involved.

The important thing to consider is that the camera field of view depends
on the focal length and format size. Camera field of view is expressed in
horizontal and vertical angular fields of view. Most camera manufacturers
or manufacturers' representatives who sell lenses with their cameras can
provide charts that list the angular fields of view for common lens sizes.
Exhibit 2.10 shows the difference between two different lens focal lengths.

The lens aperture, or speed of a lens, is a relative measure of the ability of
the lens to gather light. Aperture is expressed as the F-number. The
F-number is the ratio of lens focal length to its clear aperture. Clear
aperture is the diameter of the inside of the lens where light passes through
when the lens iris is fully open. A lens that is designated as an F/2 will
have a clear aperture size that is one-half its focal length, meaning that a
16mm focal length lens will have a clear aperture of 8mm. The lower the
F-number of a lens, the more light the lens can gather. This becomes
important when operating a camera at low light levels, such as at night
with artificial lighting. Most security camera lenses today have F-numbers
of 1.8 to 1.4. These are usually adequate for night applications given that
the minimum light levels for CCTV are provided.

Not all lenses are the same, however. Two different lenses with the same
F-number can have different light-gathering capabilities. This is
particularly true when it comes to fixed focal length lenses versus variable
focal length (zoom) lenses. Zoom lenses have more glass elements than
fixed focal length lenses. Because of the additional glass elements, an
F/1.8 zoom lens will not be able to pass as much light as an F/1.8 fixed
lens with fewer glass elements. An amount of light transmission is lost in
each glass element. This is important to consider during night operation
under artificial lighting. A zoom lens will require higher lighting levels
than a fixed focal length lens if an equivalent picture quality is desired.

Most lenses for security cameras will have an adjustable iris to control the
amount of light that is received at the camera imager. The iris is either
manually adjustable or electronically controlled. The electronic iris (or
auto-iris) monitors the camera video signal output and will open the iris
for decreasing light levels and close it for increasing light levels. This
keeps the video level (brightness and contrast) fairly constant under
varying lighting conditions. In the case of a manual iris lens, the user or
installer adjusts the iris opening for the proper video signal level for the
expected operational lighting level. If light levels change, an adjustment to
the iris will be required in order to maintain a proper video signal level.
Manual iris lenses are used mostly in interior applications where no
outside light comes in and the light levels remain constant. For all exterior
and many interior applications, an auto-iris lens will be necessary. 

A relatively new feature in many cameras is the electronic shutter. The
electronic shutter is part of the imaging device and can perform close to
the same function as an electronic iris. It controls the amount of light that
the light-sensitive elements within the camera imager receives. Electronic
shutters have limitations, however. They may not have as much range as
auto-iris lenses. This is an important consideration for exterior
applications. If light control is totally dependent on a shutter (a manual iris
lens is used instead of an auto-iris) in an exterior application, the shutter
may not be able to reduce light enough on bright, sunny days, resulting in
portions of the picture washing out. If the manual iris lens is partially
closed to compensate for bright sunshine, low-light conditions may
produce a dark, noisy picture. Many shuttered cameras intended for
exterior use will also come with an auto-iris lens.

Field of view. Field of view (FOV) relates to the size of the area that a
camera will see at a specific distance from the camera. The field of view is
dependent on lens focal length and camera format size. 

The FOV width and height can be calculated using the following formulas:

FOV Width = Format (horizontal in mm) x Distance in feet from camera
divided by Focal length

FOV Height = 0.75 x FOV width

Manipulating the FOV formula allows a calculation of the distance in feet
from the camera for a required FOV width. The formula becomes:

Distance (in feet from camera)  =  FOV width x Focal length divided by
Format (horizontal in mm)

Before the FOV for a camera is selected, the minimum desired resolution
for an intruder or object to be viewed must be determined (i.e., whether it
is desired to identify a person or to just determine if a person is within the
scene). This will limit the maximum FOV width and is referred to as the
resolution-limited FOV (exhibit 2.11). The resolution-limited FOV width
can be determined by using camera resolution in horizontal lines per foot
and the number of lines of resolution per foot required to identify an
intruder. The following formula is used to calculate the resolution-limited
FOV width:

Resolution-limited FOV width  =   Camera resolution divided by Number
of lines of resolution

A resolution of 16 lines per foot is considered acceptable for identifying
most people. If a camera with 350 horizontal lines of resolution is utilized,
the resolution-limited FOV width for a resolution of 16 lines per foot can
be calculated as follows:

Resolution-limited FOV width = 350 divided by 16 = 22

The following table presents the horizontal camera format sizes of the
imager for various size imagers:

Example: Calculate the maximum distance from a 350-line, horizontal
resolution, 1/2-inch format camera with a 75mm lens to the
resolution-limited FOV width at 16 lines per foot resolution.

Distance = 22 x 75 divided by 6.4 = 258

Exhibit 2.11 illustrates that there is camera coverage beyond the
resolution-limited area but the resolution will decrease as the distance
from the camera increases. People may be seen but not identified beyond
the resolution-limited FOV area. The figure also demonstrates that, as
people walk toward the camera and into the blind area, they disappear
from view starting with their feet.

Another method of calculating the field of view is to use a lens selection
wheel. These are mechanical computing wheels that are available from
many lens manufacturers and CCTV manufacturers. They will give a good
approximation of FOV parameters.

A viewfinder can also be used to determine the field of view of a lens.
This is a specially designed lens through which one can view the scene of
interest. The scene is masked through the lens in such a way as to
represent the picture that will be seen on the monitor. The scene desired
can be dialed up on the viewfinder and the focal length of the lens required
for the particular imager format size of the camera read from the side of
the viewfinder. A viewfinder only determines a lens focal length value;
other parameters must still be calculated.

Some lens manufacturers have developed tables for determining the field
of view. The format size and focal length of the camera is cross-referenced
to the column of the desired distance, and the width/height of the field of
view is read from that column.

In summary, whether a camera scene is useful depends on whether objects
can be distinguished in the scene. Camera resolution, camera format size,
lens focal length, as well as lighting, shadowing, camera aiming, and
camera sensitivity all play a role in being able to distinguish objects.
Resolution and performance of other components such as TV monitors,
recorders, and signal transmission equipment must be considered also.
Cameras are specified with the number of horizontal lines of resolution
and active picture elements. Most security cameras available today range
from 300 to 700 horizontal lines of resolution. Black-and-white security
cameras commonly have a horizontal resolution of 500 to 600 lines, while
color cameras for security applications have 300 to 400 lines. In many
exterior applications and some interior applications, a greater number of
low-resolution (200-300 lines) cameras may be necessary in order to
distinguish objects than would be necessary using higher resolution (500-
600 lines) cameras.

9. Camera housings

One of the first considerations in selecting a camera housing is the
environment. Is the camera to be installed outdoors or indoors? For indoor
housings, the overall conditions where the camera is to be installed must
be considered. Is the camera to be installed in a classroom, pool area,
gymnasium, hallway, lobby area, or inside a school bus? A camera
housing design can either help or hinder the installation and maintenance
of a camera. In the outdoors, a watertight housing is desired; in some areas
a heater may be required. Good ventilation is required in warmer climates.
Domed enclosures are a special version of housings that can be used to
conceal the position of the camera(s) via the use of viewing windows and
various liners. The dome housing may also offer a more attractive look
that can be designed to blend into its environment.

When installing housings in areas that drop below 30 degrees F, the
housing should have a heater. This is not so much to keep the camera
warm as it is to protect the lens and to keep the viewplate free from
condensation. Many auto-iris and zoom lenses can begin to experience
mechanical problems at temperatures close to and below freezing. For this
reason, the housing heater should be located toward the front of the
housing, preferably in a U-shape or circle around the lens area. This will
keep the lens warm and the front faceplate clear. The camera itself will
provide ample heat (under most conditions) to keep it operational. Check
the specifications listing for the camera's operating temperatures. In
extremely cold environments, it may be necessary to purchase a housing
that is also insulated. Extremely cold environments would be any location
where temperatures drop to less than -30 degrees F.

A sunshield may be required in some locations. A sunshield can provide
artificial shade and serve as a glare screen. A sunshield can lower the
internal temperature of a housing by 10-15 degrees F and can reduce the
effects of sunrise/sunset glare. Dome housings, because of their overall
design, do not usually have a sunshield option.

In warmer climates, housing ventilation may be required. Many housings
or domes have an optional fan attachment and air vents. Filters over the
vents will need to be cleaned or replaced on a regular basis, thus adding to
maintenance requirements. Sealed housings with fans for heat dissipation
or condensation control can be used, but are usually more expensive.

Humidity can do the most damage to cameras and other electronic
equipment. If the camera is to be installed in an obviously high-humidity
area, a pressurized environmental housing may be required. These are
purged and pressurized with dry nitrogen. The sealed pressurized housing
ensures that changing outside pressures will not force any dirt, humidity,
and/or oxygen into the tube. Cabling for these units is installed through the
back via a specialized plug.

Corrosion caused by salt can be a major problem in areas of the country
with high humidity that are near an ocean (such as Florida). In pool areas,
chlorine is a problem. These different types of corrosives can reduce the
life expectancy of a camera or lens dramatically. Therefore, if an
environment is considered corrosive, only those housings or domes that
are considered environmentally sealed should be used.

A camera's vulnerability to vandalism must be taken into consideration
(exhibit 2.12). A housing or dome that can accommodate a lock may be
required. To prevent tampering, the housing should be made of steel,
although fairly tough plastic housings are available. Such tamper-proof
housings or domes are often made of 10-gauge (or higher) steel.

Some situations call for bullet-resistant housings. These units are usually
constructed of 12-gauge stainless steel. The front glass will be constructed
of a 1/4 -inch or thicker Lexan-type material. Two squares of 1/4 -inch
plate glass sandwiched around a 1/4 -inch square of Lexan can probably
prevent scratching of the surface due to washing, wind, and dust.

When choosing a proper housing or dome, it is important to consider the
actual dimensions of the unit. Refer to the camera and lens specification
sheets to determine the size of the housing. Leave enough room for cable
connectors. The objective is to keep the unit small but allow room for
everything to fit and to be accessible. Ideally, the selected housing will
allow the camera to be focused and the parameters adjusted while the
camera is mounted inside the housing. This depends on the design of the
housing. Some housings have a hinged cover, opening from the top, that
allows for easy focusing and adjustment. If mounted inside near the
ceiling, this type of housing may not be feasible. Some housings allow the
cover to slide off the base for easy adjustment of the camera parameters.

The prices of camera housings vary considerably. When going out on bid,
be certain that your requirements document includes the features you will
need.

10. Placement and mounting

To avoid the effects of blooming, streaking, and glare, all of which can
wash out the video image, exterior cameras should be mounted below the
nighttime lighting sources and aimed downward to shun direct sunlight,
especially that occurring during sunrise and sunset. This may require a
minimum mounting height of 18-20 feet. An even higher mounting height
will help prevent vandalism of the camera. Consider the height required if
a truck can be parked directly beneath the camera, where a perpetrator
could stand on the truck's cab to reach the camera. Cameras should always
be mounted on solid surfaces to prevent wind movement and vibration.
Wooden poles can twist with high winds over a period of time and cause
the camera view to change. Under these conditions, the camera may
periodically require direction alignment.

In the interior environment, cameras cannot be mounted higher than the
ceiling so it may be easier for an intruder out-of-view of the cameras to
vandalize or tamper with them. This situation can be helped if the scene
viewed by two cameras includes the other camera, such as cameras
mounted at each end of a hallway or room and aimed to include a view of
the other.

Cabling to the cameras must be protected from vandalism and tampering.
In interior installations, wires can be hidden from view and therefore
protected by routing them through the ceiling and/or walls. However, the
small amount of wiring that may run from the camera to the wall or ceiling
must be in a conduit. Also be aware that employees with access to the
ceiling could tamper with your camera wiring.

For exterior camera installations, the video and power cabling to the
cameras should be installed in a conduit. For underground runs, special
cabling for direct burial should be used if the cable is not installed in a
conduit. The cable running up poles or buildings to the cameras must be in
a conduit because this is a very vulnerable location for vandalism and
tampering.

Camera mounts should be selected to handle the weight of the camera,
lens, and housing. A good rule of thumb is to select a mount that will
handle twice the weight of the load as calculated from the specification
sheets of the selected components. Mounts are usually specified as indoor
or outdoor mounts. A mount designated for installation outside also can be
used for interior installations, but an indoor mount should not be used
outdoors. Outdoor mounts are treated for corrosive effects not normally
encountered indoors (although one common exception would be in a
high-humidity area such as an indoor pool). Some mounts have separate
mounting bases and must be selected for either suspended ceiling or solid
wall/ceiling mounting locations. Pole mount brackets are available for
some outdoor camera mounts. The mounts should have adjustable heads to
allow for up/down and sideways adjustment of the camera field of view.
Mounts also come in different lengths, and this may be a consideration
when a camera housing adds to the length requirement. Primarily, the
mount should be rigid enough and mounted securely enough to the surface
so that the camera does not vibrate under normal operating conditions.

Many camera manufacturers and distributors also carry a full line of
camera mounts, as well as housings for their cameras. Mounts are priced
anywhere from approximately $30 to $150.

11. Lighting requirements and nighttime applications

Most schools generally will not attempt to use exterior CCTV cameras
during the nighttime because of the high light levels that are required.

For exterior nighttime CCTV applications, proper lighting is very
important. A number of lighting types are available. These types include
incandescent, fluorescent, and high-intensity discharge. Incandescent
lighting is the most expensive to operate and includes the flood or quartz
lights that are commonly used for exterior home security applications.
Most fluorescent lighting is used indoors for office and work area lighting.
High-intensity discharge lighting is the least expensive to operate (more
light is produced with less power consumption) and is the most common
for commercial exterior lighting applications. It includes high-pressure
sodium and low-pressure sodium lighting. A disadvantage of
high-intensity discharge lighting is the restrike time. If a momentary
power outage occurs, these lights will go out and can take up to several
minutes to return to full brightness. The advantages of high- and
low-pressure sodium lighting, however, outweigh this disadvantage for
CCTV applications.

Low-pressure sodium lighting is the most desirable choice for exterior
CCTV applications because it is somewhat more efficient to operate than
high-pressure sodium, and the types of light fixtures available provide a
fairly uniform light pattern. A disadvantage to low-pressure sodium is the
monochromatic yellow light it produces, which some people find
objectionable.

Important items to consider for nighttime camera lighting are illumination
level, camera sensitivity, lens type, light-to-dark ratio, area of illumination
in the camera field of view, and lighting position. Note: These are not
simple issues to be addressed by a neophyte. Be certain that you discuss
lighting issues with your local power company or lighting expert.

Illumination level, camera sensitivity, and lens type. Lighting levels must
be high enough for the camera to produce a useable image. The light level
required will depend on camera sensitivity and lens type and quality.
Black-and-white cameras generally have more light sensitivity than color
cameras and are recommended for most nighttime applications. A
minimum illumination level of 1.5 foot-candles, as measured on a
horizontal plane 1 foot off the ground, is recommended for a
black-and-white camera with a sensitivity specification of 0.007 foot-
candles faceplate illumination. This assumes the camera has a
good-quality, F/1.4 fixed focal lens. A color camera or a camera with a
zoom lens will require a higher light level in order to get equivalent
brightness and contrast.

Light-to-dark ratio. A recommended maximum light-to-dark lighting ratio
is 6 to 1 (as measured on a horizontal plane 1 foot off the ground). This
maximum applies to the entire area of interest that the camera is viewing.
It is also recommended to design the lighting for a 4-to-1 ratio to allow for
some degradation over time. A 6-to-1 light-to-dark ratio will prevent areas
that are so dark or so bright that a person or object would be obscured.

Area of illumination in the camera field of view. A minimum illumination
of 70 percent of the camera field of view is recommended. A camera is an
averaging device. If too little of the field of view is illuminated, the
camera will average between the illuminated areas and the nonilluminated
areas, resulting in blooming and loss of picture detail in the illuminated
area.

Lighting position. The position of lighting in relation to the camera field
of view is also important. As much as possible, light sources must be kept
out of the camera's field of view. Lights that are illuminating a camera
scene should be mounted higher than the cameras. When determining a
location and field of view for a camera, extraneous light sources, such as
building-mounted lighting for pedestrians that will be in the camera view,
must be considered. Extraneous light sources can cause blooming and
streaking in a camera, rendering portions of the field of view unusable.
Distant light sources that are relatively dim are usually not a problem.

Other lighting. Another type of lighting is known as infrared (IR) or near
infrared. The spectrum for this lighting is just below red and is not visible
to the human eye. Most black-and-white cameras have sensitivity into the
infrared. A black-and-white camera can be used with this type of lighting
to observe areas at night without having lighting that is visible to humans.
To make use of IR lighting, the camera must not have an IR cut filter.
Cameras can be ordered without IR cut filters; be sure to specify no IR cut
filter when ordering.

Commercial IR light sources include incandescent and the light emitting
diode (LED). The incandescent type typically use a 300- to 500-watt lamp
and a visible light cut filter. These are expensive to purchase
($800-$1,200) and expensive to operate and maintain (2,000 hours is a
nominal life expectancy of the incandescent lamp). The LED type emits
light in the IR and is also expensive to purchase (around $1,200) but uses
less power and has a much longer life expectancy. The incandescent type
will provide more illumination than the LED type. With either type of IR
light, more light fixtures will be required to illuminate an area than with
visible lighting. While IR lighting has the advantage of not being visible to
humans, it is fairly expensive.

Alternatives to lighting. There are two camera technologies that can see at
night without the use of artificial lighting. These technologies are
intensified cameras and thermal cameras, though they are probably both
cost-prohibitive for most schools. Intensified cameras use a
photomultiplier (light intensifying) tube in front of the camera imaging
device. Depending on the generation of the photomultiplier tube, these
cameras can produce a picture in conditions ranging from moonlight to
starlight. Disadvantages of these cameras include initial costs,
maintenance costs, and lower resolution. Costs for an intensified camera
can begin around $8,000. The photomultiplier tube has a life expectancy in
the range of 8,000 to 10,000 hours, requiring replacement every 1-2 years
depending on the amount of use. In terms of horizontal TV lines,
intensified cameras have lower resolution than a good-quality surveillance
camera.

Thermal cameras are sensitive to thermal energy radiated by objects. The
low-end and minimum-performance thermal cameras start around $7,000.
The high-performing thermal cameras range up to $30,000 and require
equipment for cooling the thermal imaging device. This cooling
equipment can be maintenance intensive. Resolution is also lower than in
general CCTV surveillance cameras. Uncooled cameras are currently
coming down in price and may offer a better alternative in the future.

12. Covert cameras

There may be times when it is suspected or known that unlawful events,
including drug deals, fighting or intimidation, vandalism, or nighttime
theft, are occurring on campus. With cameras in plain view, it is clear to
all where not to carry out such dealings but; where incidents of concern
are out of sight, it may be beneficial to temporarily install a camera hidden
from view of the suspects (exhibit 2.13). (Schools should make certain that
they consult an attorney before utilizing hidden cameras.)

Cameras hidden from the view of suspects under investigation are referred
to as covert cameras. In school applications, these cameras are generally
hidden behind a wall or ceiling or within a common building fixture. In
some instances, it may be practical to use a normal size, readily available
camera if a convenient hidden location is available, such as behind an air
duct. It would be reasonable for a school district to have at least one
smaller camera available for covert applications. 

A whole new industry has arisen in the past few years that specializes in
these tiny, easily hidden cameras. These tiny cameras designed for hidden
applications are available in black-and-white or color. Microphones are
included with some cameras, but caution is advised in their use due to
state laws regarding privacy of conversations. An amazing array of
disguised cameras already installed within smoke detectors, clocks,
speakers, light switches, junction boxes, neckties, caps, and so forth are
available in security trade journals; it is then up to the security department
to appropriately place the item where it will not be suspicious. The size of
available covert cameras themselves measure about 1.25 inches square.
The lenses, including pinhole lenses, come in sizes ranging from 2.5mm to
25mm. Covert kits will provide both the camera and a set of several lenses
that will handle a wide range of applications, from wide-angle to
telephoto. Passive infrared cameras and surface-mount cameras also are
available. They can allow surveillance in some low-light environments.
Voltage requirements for the cameras are normally 9 or 12 volts dc and
can be battery powered.

The video recorder that will be necessary to record the images captured by
a covert camera must also be hidden from view. This may not be a simple
matter. The smallest video recorder is much larger than the smallest
camera. It requires ventilation, a somewhat clean environment,
accessibility, and it makes noise. It may be necessary to install the recorder
in a separate secure room or even in another building.

The video signal must be transmitted from the camera to the recorder.
Coaxial cable is needed for these connections. Wireless covert board
cameras are available. Although their use can greatly simplify installation,
their transmission ranges are limited to about 300 feet.

Covert black-and-white board cameras start at around $150, with a
resolution of about 380 lines. Color covert cameras are close to $300, with
a resolution of around 330 lines. For these operations, black-and-white
cameras may be adequate or even desired. Many covert situations occur in
fairly small areas, and a higher resolution black-and-white camera may be
more appropriate than a lower resolution color camera. Cameras already
mounted covertly within a fixture can cost between $250 and $500.
Wireless cameras can range from $500 to $1,000 or more.

13. Maintenance and expected lifespan

After successful installation, the required regular maintenance of a fixed
camera is normally to clean the outside lens. Depending on the strength of
the camera's mounting and the stability of the structure it is attached to,
occasional repositioning of the camera to correct the viewing angle may be
required, especially for exterior applications. (It is not unusual to see one
or more incorrectly positioned camera scenes on the monitors of an
established security communications room because regular maintenance of
camera mountings has not been provided for.)

Housings will protect the camera lens from dust and dirt, but the glass
front of the housing must be kept clean. Some super housings come with
their own wiper blades and wiper fluid dispenser. The dispenser
mechanism is activated remotely by an operator to keep the camera scene
clear. However, this feature can add to the required regular maintenance as
the dispenser must be refilled with fluid as needed.

The dome enclosures for interior ceiling-mounted cameras (usually
pan-tilt-zoom cameras) are intended to reveal the presence of a camera but
not its current direction or field-of-view. Dust (or mischief) can obscure
the view, but otherwise, maintenance is low.

The average lifespan of a modern solid-state camera is greater than 5
years. Many camera failures occur early in a camera's life. This allows for
most cameras with defects to be returned during the warranty period.

Cameras do occasionally need repair, so the availability of parts should be
considered. This can make a good deal on an older camera system less
fortuitous. If a camera unit used in a critical application must be sent away
for repair, it is wise to have a backup camera available. Maintenance
contracts should always address repair time and the availability of loaner
units.

In the absence of a maintenance contract, there are many local repair shops
in most medium and large cities. Check the availability of local repair
options before you purchase your system. There are several resources for
camera maintenance available to customers across the country who are
willing to ship their equipment; repair generally takes less than 2 weeks.
Most of these resources may be located on the Web.

14. Price ranges

Standard-resolution solid-state cameras can cost between $300 and $1,000.
High-resolution cameras can range anywhere from $1,500 to $8,000. For
most school applications, the standard-resolution camera is probably
adequate. The less expensive cameras (nearer to $300) need more light to
accurately capture a scene. The more expensive cameras ($1,000 or more)
tend to be more sensitive, using more sophisticated electronics so that they
require less light to accurately capture a scene.

15. Going out on bid for equipment and system maintenance contracts

While it is difficult to prevent every possible mistake when going out on
bid for CCTV systems, there are a few commonsense approaches that
should be incorporated in every request for quote (RFQ). The security
equipment industry is no different from any other supplier; they will bid
on and provide what is asked for. Even generally standard options that
would seem reasonable to assume would be included should not be
assumed to be part of any RFQ. If you can precisely describe what you
require, the bidders will be less apt to submit bids on dissimilar systems.

Do not accept or pay for a camera system until it has been installed and is
demonstrated to operate according to your specifications. Remember, the
vendor doesn't like surprises any more than you do so specify your
acceptance criteria very clearly in the RFQ. This includes the "quality" of
installation (exhibit 2.14); occasionally a contractor may try to save money
by merely tacking cabling along the top of a wall instead of running the
cabling within a conduit and within the ceiling. Don't assume anything.

When going out on bid, the ideal specifications for a CCTV system would
describe the desired capabilities or goals of the system, not the quantities
of different components. For example, if it is desired to have cameras
viewing the locker bay area to discourage and identify daytime thieves, do
not request "two cameras, one installed at the end of each hallway." A
more profitable request could be: "The images saved to videotape and
viewed on the system monitor will allow the customer to distinguish, as a
measure of acceptance testing, between the geometry teacher and the
school secretary standing anywhere within the locker bay area, with at
least one image per camera captured and recorded per second. Quoted
product and installation should be vandal-proof, such that an individual,
given a few minutes of uninterrupted time, would not be able to vandalize
the equipment without being recorded on tape and being identifiable,
providing they are not wearing any type of mask." Include room
dimensions and even a few photographs of the area for which the
requested equipment is intended, or offer all potential bidders a tour of the
area.

It is common for the prices received from such a request to be
substantially higher than the school originally intended. It is efficient to
include a request in the original RFQ for two different camera layouts and
their associated costs. One layout would provide the exact capability
requested. The second layout would be the best possible configuration
within a specified dollar amount, with the expected capabilities as well as
deficiencies that are expected with this layout, clearly identified by the
vendor. It is to both the school's and vendor's benefit to request these two
different layouts--a principal or security official armed with such
information can approach the school district or school board to request the
additional funding necessary to meet the goals of the security system if the
less expensive system will perform substantially below the school's
requirements.

Typical warranties on video cameras are 90 days, with up to a year or
more for more sophisticated cameras. It is common for cameras that are
defective to fail fairly quickly after installation. Be prepared for this;
assign a person to be responsible for checking regularly on the functioning
of the equipment and to immediately remove failing components and
return them to the manufacturer within the warranty period, or to contact
the vendor and make certain that he responds in a reasonable amount of
time.

If a school does desire to have a maintenance contract, either because of
lack of internal manpower or because of available funding, the vendor
should specify the maximum time it will take to respond to calls for help
and the maximum time the customer will have to be without this
equipment if a repair is required. It is possible for a school to request faster
response times or even that the maintenance contractor provide loaner
equipment for any down time greater than 24 or 48 hours; however, this
will increase contract costs.

16. Signage for use of cameras on school grounds

Very visible and hard-to-miss signs at the entrances to a school campus
and at major entrances into school buildings serve many purposes. Their
value to security should not be underestimated. Signs are not overly
expensive, but the price of not having one can sometimes be astronomical.

o Signs that inform the public and the school occupants that certain
security measures are in force can provide a frontline deterrent. Without
any other knowledge, an outsider faced with the choice of vandalizing a
school with security warning signs or a school with no signs or other
obvious indications of self-defense will choose the latter.

o As described in the section of this manual on legal issues, liability can
be minimized through the use of signs. A piece of information that can be
important to include on a warning sign is whether cameras are not being
monitored. There have been a few lawsuits in the United States that have
been filed and consequently won because someone at a facility was
attacked, but the victim did not try to defend himself or herself against the
perpetrator; he or she was under the impression that, because a video
camera was aimed directly at him or her, help would surely arrive soon.
This is a common assumption. Sample wording for a school sign regarding
this particular issue could be:

WARNING: This facility employs video surveillance equipment for
security purposes. This equipment may or may not be monitored at any
time.

o Covert approaches to security can sometimes be open to contention,
especially by someone who is caught in this way. The use of covert
cameras can be extremely effective in providing evidence for prosecution;
however, not all school districts or school boards will support their use. It
may not be necessary, however, to post signs regarding every security
detail being incorporated on a campus. It may be quite sufficient to insert a
warning regarding the use of covert cameras in the school policy
document that is signed by every student and parent at the beginning of the
school year and in the contracts signed by every employee. (Don't forget
to include this information in contracts for outside services.)

17. Legal aspects of the use of video cameras in schools

Laws concerning privacy issues and civil rights may vary widely, so
before beginning any electronic surveillance program, be sure to check
with your school attorney. However, the following generalities are fairly
consistent across most of the country:

Cameras may not be used in an area where there is a "reasonable
expectation of privacy." Examples of these are bathrooms, gym
locker/changing areas, and private offices (unless consent by the office
owner is given). Examples of where cameras are generally acceptable are
in hallways; parking lots; front offices where students, employees, and
parents come and go; gymnasiums; cafeterias; supply rooms; and
classrooms. The use of cameras in classrooms is often debated by teachers
who want cameras for protection and teachers who do not. At this point in
time, it is probably wise to use cameras in classrooms only when the
teacher is given an option and notification that a camera is to be used.

Signage can be an important legal component in the use of video cameras
in schools. As mentioned in the previous section, it is important that the
presence of video cameras not lead a person to believe he or she will be
rescued if attacked. Dummy cameras should not be used (which is in
contrast to the "black boxes" on buses, in which cameras may or may not
be located at any time). While a fake camera can create a temporary
deterrent to some security incidents, the potential liability it creates due to
a victim's impression of being rescued quickly is not acceptable. 

Audio recording is often considered to be of greater legal concern than
video recording in most States. The recording of conversations is viewed
as more of an invasion of privacy, as conversations often take place where
the participants do not expect to be overheard.

B. Video recording equipment

1. VCRs: the weak link

The video cassette recorder (VCR), commonly used in most school
surveillance systems, is the weakest link in the video system due to its
mechanical nature. (The more reliable but much more expensive digital
recorder is discussed later.) Industrial quality VCRs range in price from
$500 to $4000. A school can plan to spend approximately $500 to $1,200
for a good-quality VCR appropriate for most of its applications. (This
price range does not necessarily include some of the desirable features
discussed later.) The inexpensive $200 VCR is not recommended for
nonhome use.

Unfortunately, the most ignored maintenance task in most school security
departments is the regular servicing and cleaning of VCRs. VCR heads
should be cleaned after every 100 hours of use--about every 4 days of
constant recording. This head cleaning can be accomplished using
isopropyl alcohol and industrial swabs and takes about 10 minutes. The
cleaning tapes that are available to clean VCR heads are not
recommended, as they can cause excessive wear on the heads. The entire
VCR unit should be serviced every 2,400 hours, or about every 3 months
of constant use. This complete servicing includes replacement of bands
and rubber components. If well-serviced, a typical VCR will last about 4-5
years with constant use. At least one moderately expensive ($200-$300)
head replacement should be expected during this time.

Premium-quality tapes are recommended for the constant use experienced
in most school applications. These tapes will cost about $10 each and are
available from your VCR vendor. Their expected quality lifespan is about
25 recordings. Recording over the same tape indefinitely is not
recommended because this practice introduces several logistical problems.
Sometimes incidents are reported several days after they occur, and the
video of the incident has already been recorded over. 

A good recording plan includes 6 new tapes every fall and spring, labeled
Monday, Tuesday, . . . Friday, and Weekend. Each morning, the
appropriate tape is put into the VCR. When an incident occurs, that
particular tape should be pulled and labeled as "removed," along with the
date it was most recently recorded on. A new tape labeled with that day of
the week should replace the original. If faithfully done, this will probably
be adequate for most schools. By replacing the tapes every spring and fall,
the tape quality is not compromised.

VCRs, which operate at temperatures between 32 degrees F and 104
degrees F, need to be used indoors where relative humidity is less than 80
percent and the air is free of noncondensing moisture. Because an 
industrial time-lapse recorder is designed to run 24 hours a day for long
periods of time, proper physical location of the unit must be considered.
Recorders generate heat, and because heat is the worst enemy of the
recorder (next to dirt), the recorder must be placed in a well-ventilated
location. If the recorder is to be installed in an environment where there is
a lot of dust or dirt in the air, provisions must be made to keep the unit
clean. (A single grain of dirt in the right place can crack a video head.) If a
recorder must be placed in a dirty environment, a housing with a fan, vent
holes, and filters should be used.

Another important consideration in setting up a VCR is locating it in a
secure, protected area (exhibit 2.15). VCRs are attractive targets for
thieves, but even more importantly, tapes can be stolen or destroyed if
there is an illegal incident to be covered up. VCRs should usually be
placed in a strong locking cabinet within a locked room. Only the school
principal and one security person should have the key to this cabinet.

2. Multiplexers

Multiplexers can be used to combine two or more individual video camera
signals and send them to a single recorder. This is often referred to as
timeshare multiplexing and allows up to 16 video camera signals to be
recorded on a single half-inch videocassette simultaneously and played
back as individual pictures or combinations of pictures upon command. A
multiplexer could be either a simplex multiplexer or duplex multiplexer.
The simplex multiplexer can only display a full-screen image of one
selected camera or a sequence of selected cameras while recording. A
duplex multiplexer can also display multiscreen images while still
recording. Essentially, a multiscreen display consists of a split screen that
allows for the viewing of all camera images on the system simultaneously
(exhibit 2.16).

Timeshare multiplexing can also be used to transmit multiple video
camera signals (up to 16) from one point to a second point by a single
cable or transmitter (microwave, fiber optic, infrared). Another
multiplexer at the second point can be used to separate the multiple video
signals back into individual video signal outputs.

A duplex multiplexer is higher in cost than a simplex multiplexer.
Generally, a duplex multiplexer is used if someone is watching or
operating the system while it is recording; if it is unmanned, as in many
school applications, a simplex multiplexer is more cost-effective. A true
duplex system allows the user to watch multiple screens while recording
without affecting the multiplexed output to the video camera recorder
(VCR). A simplex system allows for full-screen or sequenced viewing in
the record mode. If multiscreens are activated during the recording, the
multiscreen itself might be recorded, thereby not allowing full-screen
playback. A duplex system also allows for recording and playback
simultaneously if two VCRs are connected. The multiplexer should
provide two monitor inputs if this feature is used so live viewing of the
facility is not lost. In most applications, a simplex unit is suitable and
more economical if recording can be stopped while the video is reviewed.
The recorded videotape can then be retrieved in a full-screen or in a
multiscreen configuration.

Most multiplexers available from established manufacturers feature
camera titling for recording and a permanent time/date stamp on each
frame of recorded video.

Another feature is compensation for camera synchronization. Multiplexers
are equipped with an alarm input for each camera. When activated, these
can be used to generate an output to the VCR to place both the multiplexer
and VCR into the 2-hour recording mode (real time) for a predetermined
period of time. Some multiplexers allow only images from the alarm
camera to be recorded, but others allow a choice of interleaving (every
other field). Onscreen programming of the multiplexer allows for simpler
programming and review of settings. Programming features should display
VCR tables because it is important to synchronize the multiplexer to the
particular model and brand of VCR to avoid missing crucial information.

3. Time-lapse recorders

Time-lapse recorders have the ability to incrementally record at specific
time intervals, recording a single field or frame of video information with
each increment. In the 2-hour (real time) recording mode, a video recorder
is recording 60 fields or 30 frames of video information each second. To
determine the time interval between pictures recorded at specific speeds,
the following formula can be used (based on using a T120 tape at 60 Hz):

Recording speed divided by 120 = Seconds between frames

Because the tape is slowed down in the time lapse mode, and the video
heads record only specific fields of information, some actions are easily
lost. If a tape recorded in real time (2-hour) was compared to a tape
recorded at a 240-hour speed, there would be lost information between
them. The slower the tape speeds during recording, the more information
that can be lost. Exhibit 2.17 presents recording intervals for various
recording tape speeds.

There are some low-priced time-lapse recorders (approximately $500) on
the market today, but dependability and resolution may be sacrificed if an
industrial-quality recorder with at least 400 lines of resolution
(approximately $1,200-$2,700) is not specified. A high-resolution camera
and monitor may be used with good results during realtime viewing, but if
the playback tape has been recorded with a standard time-lapse recorder
with low resolution, the results may be disappointing. For best results, a
high-resolution industrial-quality recorder should be used.

4. Event recorders

It may not be necessary to have all the features of a time-lapse recorder.
Time lapse was developed to give a continuous flow of recorded
information that could span long periods of time in a very small, storable
format. If a school is able to interface its intrusion detection or other type
of alarm system with their CCTV system (which is viewing the area where
an alarm is occurring), an event recorder is capable of turning itself on to
record that event almost instantaneously. Not only does this feature allow
a tape to be used for very long periods of time, as no recording is being
done during uneventful times, but event recorders are generally cheaper
than time-lapse recorders.

5. Digital recorders

The security industry now has access to technology that allows the digital
recording of full-motion video. Over the next few years this type of system
will likely become even more accessible, with an increase in digital
storage technology and a decrease in the overall costs associated with
hardware. Digital storing and recording have many advantages over a
time-lapse or event recorder. The most important advantage is that digital
recorders require no human intervention, which means no maintenance
and no cleaning. On the other hand, a major disadvantage is that the
security industry has yet to establish standards for compressing digital
information for recording (compressed digital information takes up less
storage space). Hence, it is common to experience compatibility problems
between alarm monitoring systems.

For school applications, a major consideration is the increased cost of
digital recorders over conventional video recorders. A minimum system
for digitally stored images on a hard drive is estimated to cost at least
$3,000. Without video compression hardware/software, the digital storage
system is not very practical; it has been estimated that the cost for a single
stored image is $0.94 for black-and-white and $2.81 for color. Using the
compression methods available today increases the storage capacity with
acceptable video quality by approximately 10 times. The additional cost of
the compression system is at least $1,500, making the cost of the complete
digital recording system about $4,500, which yields a cost-per-image of
$0.047 for black-and-white and $0.141 for color video.For comparative
purposes, the cost of storing images on a typical video cassette recorder is
many times less--each T120 video cassette holds 432,000 black-and-white
or color images at a cost of roughly $0.003 per image (including the cost
of the VCR).

While the cost of digital storage systems has been decreasing and will
continue to decrease as technology improves and the capacity of these
devices increases, the cost of tape will probably be much lower than the
cost of hard drives for some time to come. Consequently, the security
industry will likely parallel the computer industry in storage techniques,
using hard drives for short-term storage but keeping archival storage on
low-cost tape systems.

Chapter III Metal Detection

A. Walk-through metal detectors for personnel

1. Do metal detectors really work?--The basics

Metal detectors work very well--they are considered a mature technology
and can accurately detect the presence of most types of firearms and
knives. However, metal detectors work very poorly if the user is not aware
of their limitations before beginning a weapon detection program and is
not prepared for the amount of trained and motivated manpower required
to operate these devices successfully.

A metal detection device in school security applications is used primarily
to locate undesirable objects that are hidden on a person's body. When a
questionable item or material is detected by the device, the detector
produces an alarm signal; this signal can be audible, visible (lights), or
both. Unfortunately, a metal detector alone cannot distinguish between a
gun and a large metal belt buckle. This shortcoming is what makes
weapon detection programs impractical for many schools; trained
employees are needed to make these determinations.

Metal detectors are usually not effective when used on purses, bookbags,
briefcases, or suitcases. There is usually a large number of different
objects or materials located in or as part of the composition of these
carried items that would cause an alarm.

If you ask the average person what a metal detector does and what
property to which it is most sensitive, the answer to the first question
would probably be that it is a device that detects only metal. The answer to
the second question likely would be that a metal detector is more likely to
detect metal objects with heavier mass. Both answers are incorrect.

A metal detector actually detects any conductive material--anything that
will conduct an electrical current. The typical pulsed-field portal metal
detectors generate electromagnetic pulses that produce very small
electrical currents in conductive metal objects within the portal archway
which, in turn, generate their own magnetic field. The receiver portion of a
portal metal detector can detect this rapidly decaying magnetic field during
the time between the transmitted pulses. This type of weapon detection
device is "active" in that it generates a magnetic field that actively looks
for suspicious materials or objects. A magnetometer, a passive device, was
much more in use 20 years ago in the detection of weapons. The
magnetometer depends on the Earth's magnetic field--it looks for a
distortion caused by the presence of ferromagnetic (attracted to a magnet)
material. 

Counter to intuition, the mass of a particular object is not significant in
metal detection. The size, shape, electrical conductivity and magnetic
properties are the important properties. 

For example, when a long thin wire is taken through a portal
(walk-through) metal detector, and the wire is in any geometry except one
in which the two ends (or any two points on the wire) are touching, it will
rarely be detected. However, shape this same wire into a closed circle and
the metal detector will most likely go off, even though the mass of the
wire has not changed.

Delving even deeper into metal detector sensitivity, consider the
orientation of an object. Take the same closed-loop wire described in the
previous paragraph. Lay this loop on its side so that it is parallel to the
ground. In this configuration, the portal metal detector is less likely to see
it, but, if the wire loop is upright and parallel to the side panels of the
metal detector, the detector will be much more likely to go off in this
orientation.

Some people fear the use of a metal detector on themselves because of the
possible side effects of being subjected to the magnetic field. This fear is
unfounded; metal detectors emit an extremely weak magnetic field, weak
enough to be of no concern even to heart patients with pacemaker-type
devices. Indeed, the use of an electric hair dryer subjects the user to a
much stronger field than would be received by a metal detection device.

Another widely held belief about metal detectors is that they are a
straightforward technology, where the equipment does all the work. This
is not true at all. The average first-time consumer will undoubtedly expect
a metal detector to be much smarter and more helpful than it can possibly
be. A metal detector is only as good as the operator overseeing its use.

In many facilities, the misconception exists that someone known by the
operator, such as a fellow employee or a security person, should be
allowed to circumvent the system. It must be clearly established that in
order to ensure the integrity of any routine metal detection program,
everyone must be subjected to the program requirements, including
students, parents, teachers, custodial and maintenance staff, security
personnel (except for sworn police officers who are required to carry a
weapon), school administrators, and visitors. To require less would be
counterproductive and prejudicial. Signage can be of great help: a sign at
the school entrance explaining the importance of the detectors in
maintaining a safe and comfortable learning environment provides policy
notification. If a more aggressive approach is needed for a particular
community, entry signs could spell out a particular school or district 
policy that requires the screening of all who enter the school, with access
denied to those who refuse.

2. Space requirements and layout

The portal metal detector, also called a walk-through detector, is a
stand-alone structure that resembles a deep door frame (exhibit 3.1). The
typical walk-through detector will take up a space on the floor about 3 feet
across and 2 feet deep. (This does not mean that if you have a 3 feet by 2
feet space at the entrance to your facility you necessarily have space for
using a walk-through detector.) The typical height of most portal detectors
is around 7 feet. Weight of a unit can vary from around 60 pounds to as
much as 150 pounds; however, the awkward shape of most portals
prohibits their being easily moved by one person. Portals are generally
freestanding and are rarely attached to the floor or surrounding structures.
Power requirements are for one plug to a typical 110-volt wall outlet.

The first space factor to take into consideration is where people who are
waiting to walk through the portal (scannees) will stand. Ideally, there
would be no wait for use of the portal, but this is probably unrealistic in a
school environment where the entire population of students will be
arriving over a very short period of time. Each school has to determine
how many scannees will arrive and at what rate. Most detection programs
will need to operate indoors, or at least under some type of shelter, and
most schools are going to want to provide a comfortable environment for
those waiting. This usually means that there must be enough shelter for the
queue of scannees that might build up at any one time and that they should
not be overly crowded. There should also be some way of clearly forming
a line for scannees to stand in if they will be arriving at a much greater rate
than can be processed; eliminating the opportunity for cutting in line
would clearly be important in a school to reduce possible fights.

To avoid sending conflicting signals to the detector, the scannee waiting in
line to use the portal next should be kept back 3 feet from the current user
walking through the portal. Operators of the equipment and scannees who
have already walked through also need to be at least 3 feet from the portal
in all directions. (Contrary to a scene in a popular movie of several years
ago, a gun thrown along the outside of a metal detector by the scannee
before entering the portal and retrieved on the other side after the scannee
got through would cause an alarm.) Likewise, if more than one portal
metal detector is being used, each needs to be at least 10 feet from the
others unless they have been synchronized.

Without very special instructions and limitations for the scannee
population, it would be most difficult to conduct a metal detection
scanning program with only the use of portals. Hand-held scanners are
usually required for use on scannees who have triggered an alarm walking
through the portal but who fail to be able to immediately determine what
object on (or in) the person caused the alarm. Also, it is highly
recommended that any routine metal detection program incorporate the
use of x-ray equipment for bookbags and purses because of the ease with
which a contraband item or material could be hidden within carried
baggage. (See the sections in this chapter on hand-held metal detectors and
x-ray equipment for baggage.) This equipment mandates additional space.

Space for the scannee to follow procedures is also required. A person
about to walk through the portal needs room to place his or her carried
items on the x-ray machine, room to put his or her pocket items (coins,
keys, heavy belt buckles) in a special pass-through container, space to pick
up these items, and space to turnaround to walk through the portal a
second time if necessary.

It is very important that there be neither space nor opportunity for
particular members of the population, including employees, to walk
around the detection system (exhibit 3.2). Very definitive boundaries must
be established to prevent circumvention of the system and prevent
passback of contraband, where such prohibited items are handed from
outside the screening area to those who have already successfully cleared
the scanning process.

In designing the layout of the metal detection system, the composition of
surrounding walls, furniture, nearby electromagnetic equipment (such as
an elevator), nearby plumbing in the walls, and even metal trash cans must
be taken into account. The optimal effectiveness of a portal metal detector
can be easily degraded by a poor location, a casually placed metal stool, or
the nearby use of electromagnetic devices. See the section about sources of
interference elsewhere in this chapter.

In schools, the metal detection equipment and personnel will generally be
located directly within the front or main student entrance. Unfortunately,
the design of most schools does not lend itself to a comfortable staging
area for this process. There is usually not nearly enough interior or
covered space to allow for all the students waiting to enter the system.
This may mandate that the metal detection staging area be located further
within the facility, which may place administrative offices outside the
cleared area. Conscious decisions must be made and potential risks must
be realized when designing the weapon detection program.

A greater problem is often that the layout of schools will not allow for the
limiting of only one or, at most two, entry points. Few schools can afford
to have multiple entry setups with complete metal detection programs. The
cost of the equipment would be quite high, but not nearly as prohibitive as
the manpower to run these multiple systems.

3. Throughput

A well-trained and motivated operator should generally be able to process
between 15 and 25 people per minute through a portal detector. This does
not include investigation of alarms, nor does it take into consideration
intentional or unintentional delays that might be expected in a student
population.

Assuming that scanning personnel are well-trained, a school's throughput
is going to be driven by three things: (1) the number of devices, (2) the
rate at which students arrive, and (3) the motivation of the students to
cooperate and move through the system quickly and the ability of the
school staff to make certain that scannees move along quickly. The
breakdown of equipment or the arrival of visitors who are not familiar
with the scanning routine will also cause a definite slowdown; the impact
of this must also be considered by the school administration but is not
taken into account here. (The need for backup equipment must be
considered by each facility, whether the equipment is borrowed from the
vendor or a pool of spare equipment is shared within a district.)

Keep in mind that any population that is aware that it has to regularly go
through the scanning process will soon compensate and adjust their
routine. These adjustments will generally be that: (1) the population will
attempt to take fewer prohibited items with them into the facility
(hopefully), (2) scannees will learn which otherwise acceptable items in
their possession will still cause an alarm and will tend to shy away from
these items (except maybe in the case of students who wish to create a
hassle and who are undaunted by any consequences for doing so), and (3)
the population will allow for the additional few minutes in their schedule,
perhaps even going so far as to come early enough to miss the main rush.
Travelers flying out of busy airports know to allow for a few minute delay
at the metal detection scanners and will not cut their arrival time so close
that they miss their flight. Students will do likewise, whether they need to
show ID cards at the front gate, go through a metal detection system or
meet with their friends before class. However, unreasonably long waits of
15 minutes or more could result in staff, students, and parents alike
reevaluating the need for a metal detector program. Nobody wants to add
significantly to their workday, especially if they are not compensated for
it. Employee organizations may bargain for extra pay for this additional
at-school time.

Exhibits 3.3 and 3.4 depict the average number of students that would be
waiting at each 5-minute interval before school to enter the weapon
detection system for a school population of 1,000 and 2,000, respectively.
For these calculations, it was assumed that metal detection equipment is in
good working condition and optimally laid out, operators are motivated
and comfortable in their tasks, and students move smoothly through the
process. The arrival rate resembles a school morning where the bulk of
students arrive within a 10- or 15-minute window, perhaps resembling a
school whose students rely primarily on buses for transportation. (Whether
or not the assumed arrival rate is truly typical of student arrival times is
unknown; its use here is for enlightenment purposes only.) The overall
throughput is gauged in terms of the number of students who will be
waiting to enter the metal detection process at any particular time. The
assumption is made that the portal metal detector will be the bottleneck of
the scanning process and that other supporting components of the
detection program will be able to perform their functions in an equal or
lesser amount of time (although this may not necessarily be true at a
particular school, depending on its setup). It is also assumed that the
process will be set up such that students who fail the initial portal
screening will be immediately funneled to an alternative screening point
and will not have to reenter or further delay those at the main entry portal.

For students prepared to clear the portal who have minimized
alarm-causing items and materials in their possession, the actual
processing time through a metal detection program should be less than 10
seconds. For students who are not prepared, the processing time may add
an additional 3-5 minutes or more for scanning the body with hand-held
metal detectors and/or manual bag searches. This does not include the
additional delay of waiting to be scanned.

After carefully calculating the necessary metal detection equipment, space,
and personnel, and making adjustments for individual school
characteristics, the administration may realize that there simply aren't
enough resources available to handle its students in an acceptable manner.
Some schools have overcome these limitations by staggering the
schoolday start times for students, thereby spreading out the school's
limited metal detection resources. Unfortunately, schools that rely heavily
on bus service may not be able to utilize this solution.

4. Hardware costs and manpower costs

Portal metal detectors vary widely in price. Portals on the market range
from as little as $1,000 up to as much as $30,000. The moderately-priced
models around $4,000 to $5,000 probably offer the features and
reliabilities required for a school metal detection program. Models closer
to $1,000 are not recommended due to lack of sensitivity of these devices.
Models in the higher price ranges generally offer enhanced capabilities
that would not be necessary or warranted in a school environment.

The initial purchase price of a portal metal detector is almost insignificant
compared with the ongoing personnel costs to operate the equipment in a
complete weapon detection program. An excellent example that illustrates
this fact is the successful weapon detection program run by the New York
City (NYC) Board of Education in about 50 of its inner-city high schools
(exhibit 3.5). For just one of its schools with about 2,000 students, the
weapon detection program requires 9 security officers for approximately 2
hours each morning. Two officers run the two initial portal metal
detectors, two officers run the baggage x-ray machines, one officer runs
the secondary portal metal detector for students who fail the initial
detector, two officers (a male and a female) operate the hand scanners on
students who fail the secondary metal detector, and two officers keep the
students flowing smoothly and quickly through the system, such that
nobody is able to bypass any part of the system. It should be noted that the
only way these schools are able to avoid huge waiting lines, even with this
much equipment and this many officers, and still get everybody to class on
time is by a complete restructuring of their class periods. There is a
significant staggering of first period start times so that the students arrive
over a 90-minute period. On average, NYC school safety officials estimate
that they fund approximately 100 additional security officer hours a week
for each of their schools that screen for weapons.

To make any metal detection program effective, school access during the
rest of the school day, during off-hours, and during special activities needs
to be tightly controlled. A motivated student can defeat a lax system. If
there is a comprehensive metal detection program at the front entrance to
the school, but the back entrance through the cafeteria is unguarded, the
funding and efforts put into a well-meaning program can be wasted. A
successful metal detection program cannot be poorly funded or run by an
administration that is reticent to make major changes to school policies
and procedures.

5. Procedures for the operator

The vendor of a particular portal metal detector will provide training and
procedures that are geared toward the operation of its equipment. In
addition, each school will need to develop specific procedures and policies
as to the logistics of its metal detection program. This will include how to
process or direct a student who has caused an alarm. The rest of this
section will familiarize a facility with what to expect and to provide some
general recommendations.

Once a portal metal detector has been set up and has been demonstrated to
operate accurately in its current position and with its current settings, the
operator will not be required to adjust the control settings. The operator of
the portal should be aware of the possible sources of interference with the
equipment; something as seemingly insignificant as setting a metal trash
can alongside the portal metal detector after it has been put into operation
can introduce an area of less sensitivity within the scanning area of the
equipment. (See the section on sources of interference.)

Some points for the operator to be aware of are:

a. Do not allow the scannee to proceed through the portal too fast.
Ideally, drawn footprints can be located at the base of the portal within the
scanning zone. The operator should insist that each scannee actually place
his or her feet on these footprints before proceeding. This will ensure that
the scannee has not gone through the portal so fast that he or she could
have been inadequately scanned.

b. Make certain that no other person is located within a 3-foot radius of
the equipment while a scan is being performed. This includes the operator,
unless he or she is devoid of any metal on his or her person.

c. Provide a rescan of any person who causes an alarm, even if he or she
is able to identify what must have caused the alarm, such as a belt buckle
or necklace. Confirm that this person no longer causes an alarm after the
offending item is removed from his or her possession. (Particular
programs may provide for a second, more sensitive scan to be performed
by a different portal or by a person with a hand-held metal detector rather
than by the original portal.)

d. Do not allow anyone on the outside of the cleared area the opportunity
to hand something to a person who has already been cleared by the portal
on the inside of the cleared area (exhibit 3.6).

For a portal metal detector that is located semipermanently in one position,
the operator will need only to turn the equipment's power switch on, wait
approximately 10 seconds for the unit to warm up, and do a quick
performance test (see the section on acceptance testing and performance
testing). This process should take less than 5 minutes each morning. For a
portal metal detector that is moved into position each morning and put
away afterward, more extensive procedures will be required. The
equipment vendor will be able to give the school good advice as to what
additional morning routines will be necessary.

6. Instructions for the scannee

The instructions provided to students, employees, and visitors need to be
as short and simple as possible. The following example instruction set
could be provided to students and employees in the student handbook and
should be posted at the entry to the weapon detection area.

a. Remove any metal items from your body or pockets and put them in
your purse or bookbag.

b. Place hats, carried jackets, purses, bookbags, and briefcases on the
conveyer belt for the x-ray machine (or on the table to be searched by an
officer).

c. Stay back from the portal until signaled by the operator to proceed.

d. Walk at a moderate pace through the portal, one person at a time, being
sure to momentarily place your feet on the footprints at the base of the
portal before proceeding.

e. If an audible alarm sounds as you go through the portal, follow the
directions of the security officer for further scanning or search.

7. False alarms

No portal metal detector is manufactured with the correct adjustments that
meet all users' needs. These adjustments or settings are generally made by
the vendor when the detector has been installed in the area where it will
ultimately be operational. Given equivalent environments, however,
different facilities have different requirements for equipment sensitivities.
A metal detection program in the U.S. Treasury Department will have very
different equipment settings than a program for a school weapon-detection
portal. The optimal settings for each facility will be a set of tradeoffs that
balance false-positive errors against false-negative errors.

A false-positive error occurs when an alarm occurs for an otherwise
acceptable item, such as a metal key ring. These errors occur more
frequently in a program that seeks to err on the side of security. False
positives can be extremely annoying to scannees and can increase the
manpower required to support a metal detection program. Constant
false-positive alarms can also cause the operators of a system to become
desensitized to alarms, so that they eventually fail to fully investigate the
sources of all alarms.

A false-negative error occurs when no alarm is triggered by an
unacceptable item, such as a weapon. These errors may occur more
frequently in a program that seeks to err on the side of convenience. A
system set more toward false negatives can slightly increase the risk of a
weapon entering the facility but generally helps a metal detection program
to run as smoothly and quickly as possible. In such a program, when an
alarm does occur, the operators will be more likely to take it seriously and
to investigate fully what caused the alarm. Many school system programs
will be set in this manner.

Most portal metal detectors are additive; they will generate an alarm based
on the total response received from the metal detected on a scannee. An
alarm does not necessarily mean just one suspicious item has been
detected. Because of this, a scannee who has multiple "borderline" items
on his other body has a better chance of causing a false alarm. See exhibit
3.7 for a pictorial description.

8. Sources of interference

Even the best portal metal detector will fail to operate properly if it is not
located in an area that minimizes outside interference. There are many
different shapes and forms of interference to a metal detector. School
administration and security staff should be aware of potential problems.
Below is a partial list of possible interference sources (see also exhibit
3.8):

o A metal stool or metal trash can placed close to the portal.

o Fluorescent lights located directly above the operating area of the
portal and within 1-2 feet of the top of the portal.

o Motors or anything that causes a spike of electromagnetic energy
nearby (within a few feet).

o An elevator motor. If it is a large motor, the elevator can cause
interference even up to 10-15 feet away.

o Nearby air ducts in the wall with metal components that
expand/contract slightly when the cooling/ heating system is in operation.

o Plumbing within a nearby wall such that the pipes vibrate when water
is running through them.

o Chain link fencing.

Most nearby metal structures will not prohibit use of a portal metal
detector. However, the instrument sensitivities of the detector should be
set to allow for the presence of these structures. Any change in position of
the portal in relation to nearby metal structures can affect the equipment's
sensitivity.

9. Acceptance testing and performance testing

Acceptance testing is a series of rigorous trials designed to determine if a
walk-through metal detector is accomplishing what is expected of it. This
series of tests is performed after installation and must be repeated after any
relocation of the equipment or change to the surrounding environment.
The vendor of each particular type of portal will have a series of tests to be
performed after setup. Vendor tests are designed to aid in determining the
ideal sensitivity settings of the equipment for a particular location and the
contraband items of greatest concern. Each school should also have a
series of rigorous tests that it will run before accepting or paying for any
piece of equipment. The same set of tests can be used by the school later if
there is any change to the equipment's environment, especially if the
school cannot afford to bring the vendor back in to support them later.

A series of acceptance tests can be devised with knowledge of the
weapons that are likely to be present in any particular community. (This
threat varies widely in different parts of the country and can change over
the years. As no facility can protect itself from every possible weapon in
existence, the local law enforcement agency or the school's security
department can help determine the most likely threats for that area.)

1. Determine the three or four most likely weapons for a particular
school.

2. Obtain replicas or equivalent-composition and similarly shaped items
for each of these weapons from the vendor, local law enforcement agency,
or school security department. 

3. Place these items one at a time on the body of a tester who will walk
through the portal with the item placed in various hard-to-detect locations.
Conduct about 20 walk tests per location per item. Good locations to test
include: the hand, and stuck up into the sleeve, stuck into a sock on the
exterior of the leg, stuck into the inside front of the belt, and hidden inside
a baseball cap. (Note that this amounts to 20 different trials for each of
four different weapons for each of four different body locations--a total of
320 trials.)

4. Determine the three or four most likely borderline items that are
acceptable items to bring into the school but that may cause an alarm.

5. Place these items one at a time on the body of a tester who will walk
through the portal with the item placed in typical locations--i.e., glasses on
face, pocket change in pocket, necklace around the neck. The tester should
walk through 20 times with each item.

A particular portal may be said to be accepted when at least 19 of each of
the 20 walk-through tests for each weapon results in an alarm, and at least
19 of each of the 20 walk-through tests for each acceptable item does not
result in an alarm.

In contrast, a performance test is a much shorter and simpler set of trials
that should be conducted by the operators of the system at the beginning of
each morning before the equipment goes into operation. This test may
consist of walking through the portal four or five times with a piece of
metal on different locations of the body. If the portal goes off on each
walk-through, then the system is said to be performing well and is ready
for operation. If the system fails these tests, and no obvious reason for
these failures is evident, such as the recent relocation of a metal object
next to the portal, the vendor should be called, and the device should be
taken out of operation until serviced.

10. Maintenance and expected lifespan

A good portal metal detector is generally quite reliable and unlikely to
need much repair after it is installed and found to be performing well,
other than for accidental or careless damage to the equipment. Because of
this, the warranties that come with the equipment are probably all that is
needed; a maintenance contract is probably not necessary. (Performance
tests need to be run on a regular basis. See the section on acceptance
testing and performance testing.)

A portal metal detector can be expected to have a fairly long life, probably
ten years or more. The useful life of the detector will more likely be
limited only by newer and better technologies available on the market in
subsequent years.

11. Working with the vendor

Vendors of portal metal detectors may be willing to come to a school with
the equipment and perform a demonstration. After the vendor has set up
the portal, preferably in the area the school is considering for the ultimate
placement of the equipment, and the device's own internal diagnostics and
acceptance tests have been run, the demonstrator should be told to set the
sensitivities to what he or she considers to be the optimal settings. After
this point, the demonstrator should not be allowed to adjust these settings
further. (If allowed to constantly readjust the equipment, a less scrupulous
demonstrator could constantly reset a device with the knowledge of what
is to be the target for each test, such that each target is detected or not
detected, as desired.) The school would then run its own set of tests to
determine the sensitivities of the equipment. This should include walking
volunteer students through with weapon replicas and walking students
through who have normal borderline items on their body. (See the section
on items that can cause false alarms.) After two or three such
demonstration sessions by different vendors, most law enforcement
agencies or school security departments will develop a familiarity with
portal metal detector features and what their own application may require.

When issuing a bid for a portal metal detector, a school should require in
the RFQ that a bidder meet a series of performance tests, such as those
defined in the section on acceptance testing and performance testing. The
vendor who is chosen must be required to set up his equipment where
desired at the school and then meet the required performance tests. It
should also be specified that the vendor will not be paid until these
requirements are met. Language in the contract should allow the school to
withdraw the contract if the chosen vendor fails to meet these obligations
within 2-3 weeks after initial installation.

B. Hand-held scanners for personnel

1. The name of the game: Policies and procedures

Battery-operated, hand-held metal detection devices are a very viable
technology for use by schools, and most detectors on the market work
quite well (exhibit 3.9). By moving the wand of a hand-held metal detector
around and close to a scannee's body, the operator can fairly accurately
locate sources of metal (or more accurately, sources of conductive
materials) that may be on, or even in, a person's body. When a suspect
area is located, the hand-held device will generally give off an annoying
squeal. These devices do not have the ability to discriminate between an
actual weapon and some piece of benign metal. The responsibility of the
operator of the device is to judge whether the squeal he or she heard is
truly suspect, then to investigate and determine the cause of it. A very
common use of hand-held metal detectors is in airports, where these
devices allow the security staff to more accurately locate the source of an
alarm on a scannee's body, after a scannee has already walked through a
portal system and caused an alarm. 

Although most hand-held metal detection devices on the market work
well, the hand-held metal detector is only as good as the operator using it.
Some vendors and users of hand-held metal detectors say that there are
only three things that need to be considered for their successful use:
procedures, procedures, and procedures. A disinterested or unmotivated
operator can negate much of the benefit that could be derived from a
school's metal detection program. While it is not difficult to learn to use a
hand-held metal detector correctly, school administrators should not
underestimate the value of annual training for their operators, as well as
training for staff who may be called upon to serve as backup or
supplemental operators. A complete training course, including practice
time, should take no more than an hour. However, on-the-job practice is
definitely key in allowing the school to achieve the throughput that will be
required to process students quickly.

Policies and logistics for use are also very important. Though hand-held
metal detectors are affordable, it would be unusual for a school of any size
to screen all students and employees each morning using only hand-held
detectors. Manpower would be far and away the major cost of such an
endeavor. Using a throughput rate of about two students per minute, a
school would need one operator for a full hour for every 120 students. This
assumes the students' arrival rate is evenly spread across 1 hour, which is
not very likely.

If a school is attempting to do a complete screening of students each
morning, the hand-held metal detector will more likely be used as a
supplement to portal metal detectors. As in airports procedures, the
hand-held detectors allow the security staff to more accurately locate the
source of an alarm on a student's body, after a student has already walked
through a portal system and caused an alarm.

Most schools that desire to establish some type of weapon detection effort
(but less than a full-scale, every-morning, every-person effort) will set up
a policy to allow random spot checks on students or complete student
population scanning as deemed necessary. It is very difficult to do truly
random checks with any hope of locating weapons. There is almost always
a small but distinct group of kids that a school is most concerned about
possibly carrying a weapon. These high-risk students are going to object if
you search them more than once, and they would quickly compensate for
this anyway, by forcing another student to carry their weapon onto the
campus for them. One of the more successful approaches being used is for
a school administration to choose an entire classroom at a time and scan
every person (including the teacher) in the room.

Complete student population scanning with only the use of hand-held
detectors can be undertaken when a school feels that major weapon issues
are evolving suddenly and quickly, i.e., a member of the school staff has
received information from a reliable source. The school administration and
staff need to realize the great amount of time this will take and be prepared
to handle the discipline of the crowd of waiting students.

One approach that may help some schools is to establish a policy that
allows the school to do a weapon detection scan of any student who
arrives at school late in the morning. This may provide the school with a
lot of leverage. There could be some excellent deterrence created if
students knew they would definitely be scanned when they are running
late, if only to convince them to not be late.

It would also be beneficial for information regarding the potential use of
metal detectors at school events to be printed on all tickets for games,
dances, and so forth.

A school should seriously consider having both a male and a female
operator of hand-held detectors in order to perform scans on students of
both genders.

2. Space requirements

The use of hand-held metal detectors requires only slightly more space
than that already occupied by the operator and the scannee. Unlike portal
metal detectors, hand-held metal detectors are not nearly so sensitive to
their surroundings; their sensitive zone is usually within just a few inches
of the device's paddle. Metal walls, elevators, fluorescent lights, and
plumbing that can affect portals do not usually have any affect on
hand-held devices. The school must provide enough space for the students
who are waiting to be scanned and about a 6- by 6-foot area for the actual
scanning process. It is also necessary to have a table or other stable
structure for students to place their purses and bookbags on and for them
to lean on when they lift their shoes to be scanned. (See the sections about
procedures for the operator and instructions for the scannee.)

It is not recommended that this scanning process take place in a private
room or area. To avoid possible misconduct, accusations of misconduct, or
a confrontation with a student who does end up actually having a weapon,
all of the weapon detection program functions should be performed in
view of everybody else. The exception is the unusual circumstance
wherein a person is suspected of hiding some type of contraband in a
private area of their body.

3. Throughput

In an environment where scannees are unfamiliar with the routine of
hand-held metal detector use, such as at a courthouse, accurately scanning
an individual may take as much as a couple of minutes to do well,
especially when there are multiple alarm sources on one person, i.e., belt
buckle, pocket knife, and steel shanks in boots. However, in a school
environment, after the program has become routine, and where the
students are generally cooperative and anxious to get through the metal
detection system quickly, it should take no more than about 30 seconds to
scan an individual with a hand-held detector. Assuming there are no
difficult or ambivalent students, most schools can plan to hand scan two
students per minute per operator. 

A good routine for any school weapon detection program involves training
the student, staff, and parent populations. If the program requirements are
repeated in presentations, in classrooms, and in writing, it will take much
less time to settle into a routine. Instructional posters located at the
scanning equipment should include diagrams of how a scannee should
stand. For a complete, full-scale metal detection program to be held every
morning for every member of the school, about 1-2 weeks will be needed
for students to acclimate themselves by coming a few minutes earlier and
wearing clothing and accessories that are less suspect. The first week of
any metal-detection program will be chaotic.

4. Hardware costs and manpower costs

Most hand-held metal detectors on the market range from about $20 to
about $350. Schools should plan to spend between $150 and $200 for
detectors that have desirable features, including a long detection paddle (to
reduce the amount of passes necessary across a person's body), a warning
light or beep when the batteries are beginning to run low, and an audible
feedback alarm that squeals louder or changes pitch for larger suspicious
items and softer for less suspicious items (such as a zipper). Even the least
expensive detectors will work, but more time may be required to perform a
complete scan, and the procedures for the scan may be more intrusive.
These smaller detectors are convenient if a school administrator or security
person wishes to carry a smaller detector on their belt at all times.

Hand-held metal detectors run on either a 9-volt battery or on a
rechargeable NiCad battery. A new or freshly recharged battery will last
for approximately 1 hour of constant scanning. The rechargeable units
may require that the battery be recharged by itself. Other hand-held
detectors have a jack or plug built into them so it is unnecessary to remove
the battery to recharge. (It is suggested that, for hand-held detectors that
are used very infrequently, such as once a month, batteries should be
removed when the unit is not in use.) A staff member should be assigned
the responsibility for recharging batteries each night and/or making certain
that new batteries are always available.

Obviously, manpower costs drive the use of hand-held metal detectors. As
mentioned in the section on throughput, a trained operator can scan
approximately two people per minute. For each operator and all backup
operators, a thorough training course along with some practice time should
take no more than an hour at the beginning of each school year. A school
should not forget to formally train security personnel who are hired after
the start of the school year. (Some metal detector vendors provide an
instructional videotape that can be useful, but the tape should not be used
as the only source of initial training and practice.)

5. Procedures for the operator

While it is not difficult to learn to use a hand-held metal detector correctly,
school administrators should not underestimate the value of annual
training for their operators, as well as training for staff who may be called
upon to serve as backup or supplemental operators. However, on-the-job
practice is important in allowing the school to achieve the type of
throughput that will be required in order to process students quickly.

Every school will want to tailor its own set of operator procedures to take
into consideration its students' and community needs. Some generic
procedures:

o The detector should be passed over the scannee's body at a distance of
no more than 3 to 4 inches. Avoid touching the body or clothing with the
detector. However, for some baggier clothing, such as pants or jackets, it
may be necessary to hold the detector against or more into the fabric while
scanning in order to stay within 3 to 4 inches of all body surfaces.

o Most hand-held metal detectors should be set at their highest
sensitivity. An exception to this is if there is significant interference from
metal reinforcing in a floor or other nearby material that could cause
constant alarms unless the detector's sensitivity is turned down.

o The body scan should be performed each time in the same pattern so
that the operator always knows what parts of the body still need scanning.
A sample routine, illustrated in exhibit 3.10, follows:

1. Ask the scannee to place all carried items, plus any caps or headgear on
a table (procedures for manual search of baggage are not covered in this
text). The scannee should stand with his or her feet about 18 inches apart,
facing away from the table and about 2 feet in front of it. Footprints
outlined on the floor or drawn on a mat can greatly help position the
scannee properly. Ask the scannee to hold his or her arms out to the sides,
parallel to the floor.

2. Quickly run the hand-held detector across some piece of conductive
material on your own body, such as a belt buckle. The ensuing squeal of
the detector will assure you that the scanner is still operating properly.

3. Start at the top of one shoulder of the scannee. With the paddle of the
detector held horizontally and parallel to the front of the body, sweep
down one side of the front of the torso, down the leg to the ankle, then
move to the other ankle and sweep back up the front of this opposite leg
and torso, ending with the opposite shoulder. (If a particular detector's
detection paddle is less than half the width of the average body, or if a
particular body is wider than twice the width of the detection paddle, the
pattern will have to be modified to achieve adequate coverage.)

4. Sweep the detector paddle over the outside top of the arm from the top
of the shoulder to the bottom of the wrist, then up the inside of the arm to
the armpit. Sweep down that side of the body to the ankle, then up the
inside of that leg and down the inside of the opposite leg, then back up the
other leg from the ankle to the underarm. Repeat the sweep of the inside
and outside of this arm. Note that it would be particularly important to
avoid touching the paddle up against the scannee's body when scanning
up and down between the legs.

5. Ask the scannee to turn around. (Arms can be put down now.) The
pattern used to scan the front of the body should now be repeated over the
back of the body.

6. Ask the scannee to grab the edge of the table for support, then to lift
one foot up in back of him- or herself. Scan across the bottom of the shoe.
Repeat for the other foot. The operator should expect to hear a short squeal
from the detector when scanning the bottom of shoes or boots with steel
shanks or steel toes. Both shoes should cause equivalent squeals.

7. For the head area, start at the top of the forehead and scan around the
top of the head down to the back of the neck.

o Given that the type of hand-held detector being used is the kind that
provides different volumes of feedback, i.e., a soft squeal versus a much
louder squeal, the operator will be able to distinguish between the
detection of a smaller innocuous item or material, such as a zipper, and the
detection of a larger, more suspicious item. It is important to be attuned to
these different volumes to recognize when further investigation is required
for a particular scannee.

o When the detector identifies a suspicious item and there is no visible
source for the alarm (clothing is shielding the source object), ask the
person to show you what they have in that area. For example, for an alarm
along the arm or wrist, have the scannee pull up his or her shirt sleeve.
Using your detector, duplicate the squeal you heard before, but now over
the visible item.

o Do not let the scannee influence you as to what is actually causing an
alarm (exhibit 3.11). For instance, if the detector denotes the presence of a
suspicious item under a shirt sleeve, do not fail to completely investigate
the source of the alarm even though the scannee assures you that it is just
his or her watch. 

o If the person you are about to scan caused an alarm when walking
through a portal metal detector, and your job is to try to locate the source
of that alarm on his or her body, do not stop the complete scanning process
just because you come across one alarm-causing item. Continue the scan
even though you find one or more items in the process.

o The lower abdominal area is particularly difficult to scan because this
area is private in nature and because of the metal items usually found in
this area: belt buckles, metal buttons or snaps, and metal zippers. When
doing the initial front body scan, if an alarm occurs in this area, there are
two possible ways to further investigate: 

a. Ask the scannee to undo any belt he or she might have on and have him
or her pull the belt ends away from the middle of the body. Now scan the
zipper area; the feedback volume from your hand-held metal detector
should tell you if it is now only sensing a zipper and/or a metal snap, or if
a more suspicious item is present and further investigation is needed.

b. A second approach that some schools use is that, if the lower
abdominal area is causing an alarm on the hand-held detector, ask the
scannee to bend the front of his or her front waistband forward, to
ascertain that no weapon is hidden behind it. Facilities need to be available
for situations where further investigation can be accomplished privately,
but only in the presence of two or more school employees who are the
same gender as the scannee.

6. Instructions for the scannee

Education is important in enabling your scanning program to operate
smoothly. Before the initiation of a weapon detection program,
presentations and handouts should describe to the students, employees,
and parents the items or materials that will make it more difficult to get
through the scanning process quickly. If your school is also using x-ray
technology for purses, bookbags, and so forth, consider asking students to
put all alarm-causing items into their bags before they enter the scanning
process.

For visitors and first-time scannees, it is very helpful (and will save time)
to give them an idea of the process they are about to go through.
Particularly helpful are posted instructions that are simple and quick to
read, with diagrams showing what is expected of the scannee. An example
of such instructions follows:

Welcome to our school. For the safety of our students, employees, and
visitors, our policies require that EVERY person be scanned and his or her
carried items searched to prevent weapons from entering our school.

When it is your turn, please stand first on the footprints on the floor.
Extend your arms out to your sides, parallel to the floor.

If requested by the security personnel, please open your belt and extend
both belt ends away from the front of the body.

To scan shoes, please grab the edge of the table and hold each foot, one at
a time, out in back of you.

7. Maintenance and expected lifespan

If not accidentally or intentionally abused, most good hand-held metal
detectors will require no maintenance. Extended maintenance contracts are
usually not required beyond the initial warranty period. The only in-house
maintenance that will be required is to provide for the recharging of
batteries each night and/or making certain that new batteries are always
available.

Most good hand-held metal detectors should have a useful lifespan of
about 5 years, much more if used infrequently and possibly less if in
constant use.

8. Working with the vendor

If a school is required to go out on bid for one or more hand-held metal
detectors, it is recommended that the contract require the following
optimal features:

o A variable pitch of alarms that provides more information to the
operator using it, i.e., a softer squeal for an innocuous item, like a zipper,
and a louder squeal for a bigger, more suspicious item.

o A detector paddle or zone that is at least 10 inches long.

o A signal that indicates the battery is beginning to run low, as opposed
to an abrupt termination of operation.

C. X-ray baggage scanners

1. Safety concerns

X-ray equipment is available for the detection of weapons within baggage
or other carried items. For single-energy units appropriate for school
applications, a vacuum tube emits x-rays on and through these items.
These x-rays come from inside the top of the unit and scan downward as
baggage is automatically moved through the equipment. Sensors collect
the magnitude of the signals that make it through scanned items, with low
Z-number material allowing more energy through and material with high
Z-numbers allowing less energy through. (A "Z number" is the atomic
number of a particular element; a low Z in x-ray terms is any atomic
number less than 26. A high Z in x-ray terms is any atomic number equal
to or greater than 26.) The resulting images are transferred to a TV
monitor, where an operator must carefully examine each image for
evidence of firearms or knives.

The safety aspect of x-ray equipment for baggage inspection has improved
greatly over the past two decades. This application of x-rays previously
used a large cone of energy in order to make an image of an entire piece of
baggage at one time. Today's x-ray machines for baggage use a much
lower energy pencil-thin beam of radiation that generally scans
back-and-forth across a piece of baggage as the baggage moves beneath it.
More sensitive sensors can now adequately capture an image with these
lower dosage x-rays. Infrared (IR) beams installed within the equipment
can accurately start and stop the x-ray beam source so that the x-rays are
not operational when there is not a piece of baggage located in imaging
position. Add to these improvements the excellent shielding built into
x-ray detectors, and it is easy to understand what has made modern
baggage detectors quite safe and of negligible health risk to either the
operator of the equipment or to the general public. Indeed, the radiation
exposure to operators from baggage scanners has been shown to be only a
few microrems per hour, which is equivalent to standing in the sunlight for
a few minutes. Even smoking a cigarette gives a person a larger dose of
radiation. About the only potential health risk from an x-ray baggage
machine would be to someone attempting to ride the conveyor belt
through the equipment, which would still result in substantially less
radiation exposure than would be gained from a medical x-ray.

There have been concerns raised about the safety of exposing food to
baggage x-ray machines. The U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
has approved much higher doses of radiation for normal food preservation
methods than any food items would receive going through x-ray baggage
equipment. Most scientists feel that the FDA is quite conservative in the
limits it has established.

Over the past 10-15 years, x-ray detectors have become quite safe for
camera film because of lower dose x rays. This would include the x-ray
equipment most schools would normally consider purchasing today but
not, perhaps, an older piece of equipment that has been donated for the
school's use. One modern exception to this is the much more sophisticated
$1million x-ray machines that are used on some airline flights to examine
checked baggage. This equipment is used to search checked baggage for
explosives, and it may well damage camera film.

2. Setup and space requirements

A typical x-ray baggage scanner will have a footprint about 4 by 4 feet in
size. This does not include any type of conveyor belt to automatically
move items into and out of the x-ray imaging area. The smallest conveyor
belt that would probably be useful for a school application is 8 feet in
length, which would add about 2 feet on either side of the detector itself.
Conveyors can come in almost any size; typical conveyors for airports are
a total of 10-12 feet in length.

Smaller desktop x-ray units are available but are used primarily for
screening letters and mailed parcels.

Unlike portal metal detectors used for personnel, x-ray baggage scanners
are not sensitive to their surroundings. Virtually no clearance is needed
around the equipment except for space for on operator to sit or stand at the
controls, which are located to the side of the unit.

A school should have the factory or vendor install, set up, and calibrate the
x-ray detector. After installation, moving the equipment to a different
onsite location is generally not a problem. While the equipment should not
be abused, it is not overly delicate.

3. Throughput

The expected throughput of an x-ray baggage scanner will depend on two
things: the efficiency of the operator and the amount of clutter in a typical
bag at this particular school. Clutter can also affect the speed of the
operator. Carried purses and bookbags that contain many high Z-material
items, such as metal rulers, screwdrivers or other tools, metal aspirin tins,
foil-wrapped items, and so forth, can significantly slow down an operator
who is examining each piece of baggage. Fortunately (or unfortunately), in
most schools where the security equipment operators become familiar with
the individual students and the kinds of things they usually carry, the
speed of an operator will increase.

Generally, between 10 and 20 items per minute can be examined using an
x-ray baggage scanner. As many as 30 items per minute can be effectively
scanned if most of the items are benign, i.e., contain no obvious metal
items larger than a coin or button, none of which are touching in the
image. Dense clutter within a bag will necessitate that bag being pulled off
the conveyor to be manually searched.

4. Hardware costs and manpower costs

X-ray detectors for baggage are not cheap. Most appropriate for schools is
a single-energy unit (one radiation source) costing about $30,000. There
are much more expensive models on the market, ranging from $250,000 to
$1 million, but these are used in applications concerned more with the
detection of explosives. The detection of drugs is also possible, but the
sophisticated equipment needed is too expensive for most schools. Schools
will generally use a black-and-white monitor with the x-ray machine.
Some models add the convenience of a color monitor, which may not add
any valuable information to be used in decision making by the operator.
Again, costs limit most schools to black-and-white monitors.

The conveyor belt needed to feed items into and out of the x-ray detector
will generally be priced as part of the total system cost.

The manpower cost for operating this equipment is very high. For
low-volume applications, in which baggage comes through slower than
one bag per minute, one full-time operator will be sufficient to help with
the placement of bags on the conveyor belt, operate the controls, view the
monitor, make a judgment regarding each bag, and perform any needed
manual searches. However, it is generally recommended that one operator
work at the monitor of an x-ray machine no more than 2 hours at a time
and preferably no longer than one-half hour at a time, trading tasks with
another security person.

Most high-volume facilities, including airports and schools, will have two
operators assigned to each x-ray detector. In this way, the operators can
switch off the task of watching the monitor and of performing manual
baggage searches as required. Airports will normally give these operators
a break every 2 hours because of the intensity of the work, but most
schools will not be engaged with intensive baggage scanning for more
than 2 hours.

For schools, it is not the length of time an operator has to work that is of
concern; rather, the issue is the number of operators needed during a
relatively short period of time and the number of x-ray units required to
maintain an adequate throughput during the morning rush. While it is
probably a simple matter to hire one security aide to work 8 hours a day, it
is much more difficult to find eight security aides to work 1 hour a day.
(Eight or more security personnel would normally be required to support
the equipment and processes in a complete weapon-detection program at a
school with 2,000 students.) For this reason, it is not unusual for a school
administration to use fellow administrators, teachers, and other employees
to supplement the security personnel running the equipment each
schoolday morning. Employees may be pleased to earn the extra money,
but the administration must be certain that all receive adequate training.

Who will run the equipment the other 7 hours of the schoolday? This can
be expensive and a somewhat low payback effort. An approach
implemented by some schools is to enforce a policy that the school doors
are basically locked one-half hour after school begins in the morning.
Although this is a rather harsh stance, it may be necessary in a school
where resources are limited but the threat of weapons is quite high.

Vendors will normally provide initial training at no additional expense. A
4-hour course will adequately introduce a new operator to the overall use
and safety information of an x-ray detector, but practice and experience is
equally important. Interesting training aids are currently available from
some vendors. Prepared images of baggage going through the x-ray
scanner can be played back on the TV monitor for operator practice.
Another feature on some equipment will randomly superimpose the image
of a suspicious (but fictitious) item over the actual images being captured
during the normal work time. These phantom images may help operators
to stay aware so that they are not lulled into complacency by the routine
absence (hopefully) of any weapons coming into a facility.

5. Procedures for the operator 

The actual operation of an x-ray baggage scanner is straightforward.
Vendors will provide recommended procedures for operating their specific
equipment, and each school will probably tailor this for its own
environment. However, as with the radiologist who examines medical
x-rays, the challenging part of operating x-ray equipment for weapon
detection is knowing what to look for. The untrained or disinterested
operator can negate any possible benefit that could be gained in a weapon
detection program.

The TV monitor that displays the black-and-white x-ray images of
baggage it is scanning can usually be used in the positive or negative, i.e.,
solid objects can be displayed as light or dark objects. There are two types
of color systems on the market. There are colorized single-energy (one
radiation source) systems in which the color is arbitrarily assigned based
on the level of energy transmitted. The second type is a dual-energy (two
radiation sources) system that assigns color based on the effective
Z-number of the material. The first type is inexpensive but adds no useful
information to the display. The second type adds useful information but
would normally be cost-prohibitive for most schools (exhibit 3.13).

Some general guidelines for the operator of an x-ray detector are:

o The different models of x-ray detectors utilize various techniques and
angles for transmitting the radiation and receiving it on its sensors. Your
vendor will inform you as to the best orientation for items being scanned
by your equipment. For example, for an x-ray detector that uses a
fan-shaped beam emanating from the top of the equipment's interior in a
downward direction, the vendor will give instructions similar to: 

--Do not put a bag down on a conveyer belt such that the images captured
will be of the narrowest perspective of the bag. Lay the bag down on its
widest side to allow the x rays to penetrate the least amount of material.
Be careful that no part of the bag is outside the zone of detection, which is
generally defined by the width of the conveyor belt that is used.

o What you are looking for is a solid dark object (if display is set this
way) that could be a weapon, part of a weapon, or hiding a weapon. A best
case scenario (for the operator) is a revolver that is lying on its side so that
its shape is obvious. The same is true for a knife of substantial size if it is
lying on its flat side. What becomes difficult, and where most operator
training and judgment come into play, is when a weapon is in a different
orientation so that it is viewed from the top, bottom, or back of the
weapon. A revolver will generally still have a revolver shape that reveals
its cartridge. An automatic weapon viewed from the top, however, will
produce an image that is an innocuous rectangle 4 inches or more in
length. (Keep in mind that there are some weapons available today such
that the length is less than 3 inches.) An automatic or semiautomatic
weapon viewed from the back is an even smaller rectangle. And,
unfortunately, a knife can be very difficult to detect if it is made of any
material other than metal.

o Clutter occurs where several dark items are grouped together in an
x-ray image, such that the actual size and shape of each item cannot be
reasonably determined. More often than not, clutter is the cause of manual
searches in weapon detection programs.

o Surprisingly, band instruments can usually be put through an x-ray
machine successfully; the normal thinness of the metal of most
instruments will allow the x-ray detector to see within and behind the
instrument for any hidden weapon. The school should screen all of the
different types of instruments beforehand to determine if any of the
instruments (or their cases) will be a problem for the x-ray detector.

o When in doubt about an object in a bag, investigate!

6. Instructions for the scannee

Hopefully, as students grow accustomed to what items in their bags and
purses trigger an alert to the operator of the x-ray equipment, they will
tend not to bring these items to school with them. This may not be the case
for disruptive students, who may go out of their way to slow down the
system. School administrators may want to consider having some type of
consequences in place if this behavior continues.

Educating students and parents in advance about what to expect from the
x-ray process and which of the items they carry will result in bag searches
can help speed up the process at the beginning of a scanning program.
However, do not share with the students information regarding the
system's weaknesses and what makes it difficult to recognize weapons
hidden inside bags. This information should remain restricted to
appropriate school and law enforcement personnel responsible for
security.

A simple set of instructions located at the x-ray detector can remind
students quickly of what is expected of them. An example of such a sign
is:

Place all large jewelry, watches, belts with metal buckles, large keyrings,
loose change, and other detector-sensitive items in your backpack or purse.
(This first sentence is for a school that also has portal metal detectors.)

Lay all books, notebooks, purses, bags, lunches, backpacks, briefcases,
hats, coats, jackets, and electronic devices on their widest side on the
conveyor belt. (Adjust according to whatever orientation is best for your
equipment.)

Do not stack items; place them on the conveyor belt separately. It is easy
to reduce the chance of security personnel going through your things
manually--DO NOT CARRY A LOT OF JUNK IN THEM!

There should be a sign on the other side of the x-ray detector:

Please immediately check for all of your personal valuables and
possessions. The school is not responsible for your things. If you have
irreplaceable items, please do not bring them to school.

7. Acceptance testing and performance testing

The American Society for Testing Material (ASTM) has defined a test
procedure that most schools will want to use as part of the initial
acceptance test and also incorporate into their regular performance testing.
This test uses a 10-step wedge of milled aluminum (exhibit 3.14). Across
the bottom of the step wedge are several wavy wires of different gauges.
The x-ray detector is performing well if, when this step wedge is sent
through the detector, 10 different shades of gray are clearly distinguishable
and a certain number of the wires are also seen. (A very good x-ray
detector will see even the smallest gauge of wire behind the thickest step
of the step wedge.) This step wedge will be available through your vendor,
who will likely employ the same tool for its own testing purposes.

Schools should initially run this test to accept the equipment and on a
regular basis, such as once a month, for validating that the system is still
performing well. Any significant decrease in the number of wavy wires
that are visible may indicate that the unit needs repair.

8. Maintenance and expected lifespan

Most companies offer extended warranties or maintenance contracts for
x-ray baggage scanners. Service contracts are generally more expensive
than what you can expect to spend over the life of the equipment for
repair. However, depending on the fiscal arrangements at each facility,
some schools may want to establish a service contract up front, when they
have the funding available. (Schools can never be certain what their
budget will be in subsequent years, and coming up with $5,000 for a repair
bill 3 years from now may not be possible.) In the absence of such a
contract, schools should contact the factory when repair is needed. 

Most x-ray baggage scanners will have a life of 10 years or more.
Technology advancements are more likely than failure to render them less
useful. Over the course of this time, there is a reasonable chance that a
facility will need to replace the vacuum tube that is the source of the x
rays.

There is little regular maintenance required for this equipment. The largest
moving part, the conveyor belt, often is self-oiling, and the facility may
only need to add oil to a reservoir occasionally. Individual vendors may
recommend certain procedures be run periodically (once a month or so) to
test for radiation leakage, even though the chance of such leakage in
modern x-ray detectors is small. Heavy damage, malicious acts, or
purposely holding the shielding flaps aside while the machine is in
operation would normally be required to allow radiation leakage.

9. Working with the vendor

There are several excellent products on the market that would be
appropriate for use by schools. A school security person or administrator
should take the time to visit one of the national trade shows where most of
this equipment is on display. Seeing the equipment and talking with
vendors can often help a facility gain a better understanding of the
products that they are considering using. Such a visit allows schools to
identify the vendors they would like to seriously consider.

Because of the high cost of this equipment, schools may want to invite at
least two different vendors to visit their campuses and demonstrate their
equipment. This is not a trivial expense for a vendor and should not be
done unless a particular product is actually under consideration. When
equipment is available for testing on campus, the security personnel can
become familiar with the operation of the equipment and what options
might be appropriate for their school's needs. If at all possible, a school
should involve the people who are going to run the equipment in the
decisionmaking process.

Given that all the available x-ray baggage scanners are priced similarly,
operate easily, offer substantial training up front, and have good quality
monitor images, schools will be most concerned about service. If a service
contract is being purchased, it may be possible to include language in the
RFQ requiring the chosen vendor to provide service and repair within 3-5
work days or to substitute a backup system within 48 hours. This may be
easy to incorporate within a large city but impossible in more rural
locations. If a particular school district is planning on purchasing several
units for multiple schools, the district may be able to negotiate an excellent
price that will include one backup unit that will be stored by the vendor for
use when needed. This backup unit may be a used product that is in good
working order and easy to bring in quickly and set up during a crisis.

Chapter IV Entry-Control Technologies

Many school administrators contend that the majority of the security
problems and incidents at their schools are the result of an unauthorized
person being on campus (albeit the vast majority of these unauthorized
persons are in some way related to the school or to students at the school).
These trespassers can include a school's own suspended or expelled
students, students from rival schools, irate parents seeking revenge against
a student or employee, gang members, or even drug dealers. It is logical,
then, that if a school were able to carefully control exactly who was able to
enter the campus or school buildings, security incidents would drop
significantly. This is easier said than done.

Schools can often prevent or discourage the casual intruder. Some of the
less technical, though often quite effective, approaches to deterring
unauthorized entry are:

o Posted signs warning that unauthorized trespassers are subject to arrest.

o Signs that inform visitors that all vehicles brought onto campus are
subject to search by the school.

o A guard who is checking identifications at the main entrance gate to
the campus.

o Vehicle parking stickers so that any vehicle found parked on campus
without a sticker, other than in the monitored visitor lot, is subject to being
ticketed and towed.

o Uniforms for students, which make outsiders very identifiable.

o A school policy of no hats; no droopy pants; no t-shirts with alcohol,
drug, violence, or gang affiliation messages; or no exposed tattoos, which 
again can help make outsiders identifiable. 

o Greeters at all open entrances to school (these can be parent
volunteers).

o Minimal numbers of entrances to the campus and to the school.
Superfluous exterior doors should be locked to prevent entry from the
outside and labeled inside: "For emergency exit only--alarm will sound."

o A policy that anyone walking around campus during classtime will be
challenged for a pass and/or student ID and is subject to being searched or
even scanned by a metal detector to be checked for weapons and/or drugs.

o The main student parking lot (which does not include parking for
work-study students) closed off and locked during the day. Make entry to
school during the schoolday possible only through the front office.

o Fencing around campus that will discourage the casual intruder and
better define school property.

o A policy that, when a student is expelled or suspended, his or her
student ID is confiscated and (for a larger school) his or her picture is
made available to the security staff.

A. Limiting entry/exit points

Most U.S. school buildings in use today were originally designed to foster
learning, mimicking universities to some extent. Often, their layouts
provided many secluded niches to allow students privacy in which to
study; separate buildings to house the various disciplines; multiple
entrances and exits in buildings to maximize fire safety and emphasize
freedom; and spread-out campuses to prevent congestion and to be open to
the community. Fences became passe, perhaps for appearance but more
likely to cut expenses. Some schools even have public streets running
through the campus. These designs were very appropriate and greatly
enjoyed 30-40 years ago. Entry control in these facilities has been limited
in the past to the coincidence of an adult noticing an outsider on campus
and challenging that outsider.

For current security needs, controlling the access of students, employees,
and visitors has become paramount. Without major remodeling for some
schools, the manpower required to accomplish access control could be
enormous, both for entry into buildings and onto the campus itself. (One
fairly new high school in Colorado consists of 1 large building but has
more than 100 exterior doors.) Technologies such as card swipes or
keypads can greatly reduce this manpower requirement, but not without
significant expense.

To best control a school building and/or campus, the number of entryways
into the building or onto the campus must be severely limited. Just as with
any high-security facility, restricting normal entrance to only one or two
locations can greatly reduce the number of security personnel or security
devices that must be supported. But limiting entry points can be very 
difficult for some schools, due to building layout, required emergency
egress, property boundaries, the surrounding neighborhood, and adjacent
streets.

Some urban schools have no campus per se; their buildings sit directly on
streets on one or more sides. This can somewhat reduce the entry control
problem but has some inherent problems of its own.

For those schools with campuses, fencing is usually important to control
entry onto the school grounds. It is important that schools and
communities recognize that enclosing a campus with fencing is more to
keep outsiders out than to keep insiders in, although its presence does tend
to reduce truancy during the schoolday. Controlling campus entry requires
fencing or other physical barriers.

Fencing does not have to be unattractive. Razor tape or barbed wire is
rarely appropriate for a school setting but may sometimes be necessary
due to vandalism or theft at a school. If adequate funding is available,
wrought iron fencing can enhance the appearance of some campuses,
while providing a very difficult barrier to climb over. Less expensive but
still providing an excellent barrier is an 8-foot chain link fence (exhibit
4.1) with small mesh (1-inch to 11/2-inch). Unlike a typical 6-foot chain
link fence, it is difficult to pull up on an 8-foot high fence and a smaller
mesh will not allow toeholds. This more desirable 8-foot fencing material
is usually about twice the cost per running foot as the cost of standard
6-foot fencing material, but it is probably worth the extra cost, depending
on the particular school's risks.

A robust fence defines property boundaries and forces a perpetrator to
consciously trespass rather than allowing idle wandering onto a campus
that has no fencing. The goal of fencing is to deter the casual or
unmotivated trespasser. No fence can keep out someone determined to
enter the campus who comes prepared or who is very motivated (i.e.,
brings a ladder or wire clippers, smashes through the fence with a vehicle,
and so forth).

Fencing may be less important for a school that is located in a somewhat
remote location. If the majority of students, faculty, and visitors must
necessarily get to a particular school on buses or in cars, then the act of
restricting vehicle entry to one or two driveways and posting a guard at
these locations to validate all vehicle occupants may be adequate without
the enclosure of fencing.

For campuses where entry into the building(s) is controlled/restricted and
students do not congregate outside during the day, again, fencing may be
less useful.

B. Entry-control approaches

Once entrances to a facility are limited in number, the process of allowing
or denying access is generally accomplished through one of four
approaches. The first and most common approach is manpower intensive,
and the remaining three employ technology devices. The level of actual
security achieved is generally believed to be from 1 to 4, lowest security to
highest security, but this is subject to many other variables. These four
approaches are:

1. A security guard controls entry; ID cards or other means of
identification may be checked. (Who lets you in)

2. A special ID card/badge with automatic readers. (What you have)

3. A PIN number for entering on a keypad. (What you know)

4. A biometric device for feature recognition. (Who you are)

The following sections provide further details. The second, third, and
fourth approaches utilize technology, as illustrated in exhibit 4.2.

1. Who lets you in. A security person (or a person assigned to this duty)
is located at some particular entry point, either at the vehicle entrance onto
campus or at the main entry doors into the building. This security person
establishes that the person wishing to enter is a valid student, employee, or
visitor. In smaller schools, this can often be accomplished with no more
than the recognition of the person by the security person. In larger schools,
this validation can be accomplished through issued ID cards (usually with
photos), badges, vehicle stickers, or mandatory school uniforms. Although
this is not considered a high-security approach for the reasons listed
below, it can be one of the most expensive approaches for most schools.

o Strengths: A security person can do more than simply check an ID
card. He or she may also notice if something appears amiss, such as if a
student is drunk or acting strangely. A security person can also prevent
two or more students from entering using one ID card.

o Weaknesses: A security person in this task can become bored and may
become careless or move to a different job. A security person's attention
can be diverted. A dishonest security person could allow unauthorized
individuals to enter. Using a person for entry control is an ongoing
expense for the school. A simple picture ID card can be stolen and used by
someone else; experience has shown that security personnel can
sometimes fail to identify persons who have an ID card with someone
else's picture.

o Costs: Depending on the part of the country, each security guard will
cost between $8,000 and $30,000 per year, plus training, uniforms, and so
forth. (This does not apply to the costs of an actual law enforcement
officer.) One guard can be expected to handle roughly 250-350 cars per
hour, providing that vehicle occupants are prepared to show ID
immediately.

o Every member of a school's security organization must have a
thorough background check before being hired, with references and
previous employers called. If possible, periodically require drug testing on
a random basis.

2. What you have. In this approach, an ID card or badge is specially
encoded to be recognized by a card reader. Validation of the card can be
designed to electronically open a door lock, allow a turnstile to operate, or
lift a mechanical arm that extends across a vehicle driveway. Viable card
technologies for schools include bar codes or magnetic strips for
card-swipe readers (such as those used for most credit cards) or passive or
active radio frequency (RF) cards for proximity readers, which can
validate a card several inches to several feet away (depending on the cost
of the system). Card-swipe readers are probably more subject to vandalism
as their read heads are fairly delicate. Proximity readers can be protected
with a solid piece of plexiglass because actual contact of the card is not
required. A proximity card reader might be an ideal entry control system
for a teacher's parking lot, or for a computer lab. The newer smart cards
are probably overkill for an entry control system.

o Strengths: No manpower is involved. These are mature technologies.
Validation of a card can be turned off if the card is lost or stolen. When
used in conjunction with a floor-to-ceiling turnstile, an authorized person
cannot bring in unauthorized persons (exhibit 4.3). It is also possible to
automatically update an attendance database when an ID card is read.
These cards are generally tamperproof, and some have features that make
them very difficult to counterfeit.

o Weaknesses: For an electronic lock or vehicle barrier, there is no way
to ascertain that only a single authorized person is entering. Cards can be
lent out. Cards can be used by others until the card is turned off by the
school administration. Card-swipe readers can be subject to vandalism if
in a vulnerable location. Card readers require a certain level of overhead to
maintain, and regular updating of their databases is mandatory.

o Costs: Prices for the equipment to produce high-quality, tamperproof
ID cards, with software to develop attractive customized designs, have
come down greatly in just the past few years. A sophisticated printer that
embeds the ink into the card cost as much as $25,000 just 4 years ago.
Today, an entire system (a printer, a digital camera, and the software to
operate them) that is more than adequate for most school's needs can be
purchased for $6,000-$8,000. While every product is different, and there
are many features that can be added that raise the price considerably, the
supplies (inks, card blanks, and so forth) that a school must continually
purchase to create cards readable by a card-swipe reader will cost the
school about $1 per card. Supplies for cards readable by a proximity
reader will run between $3 and $10 per card, depending on the capabilities
of the system. Card-swipe readers and proximity readers cost between
$150 and $300 per reader. The electronics, field panel, and computer
system necessary to support a modest number of readers (typically, eight
or fewer) will cost around $2,000-$3,000. Installation is usually a job most
appropriate for an electrician.

3. What you know. A personal identification number (PIN) or special
code is entered on a keypad. This is usually used in conjunction with an ID
card and card reader. Alone, a PIN used on a keypad could be easily
compromised by an onlooker; if used in conjunction with a card reader,
the level of security is substantially higher. Sophistication of keypads runs
from very simple entry devices to unique scramble keypads that
effectively allow only the user to view the numbers and that scramble the
numbers differently for each use.

o Strengths: The PIN and ID card can be turned off when no longer
appropriate. A stolen ID card is not enough for a trespasser to use for
entry. It is also possible to automatically update an attendance database
when an ID card is read and the PIN entered.

o Weaknesses: More administrative effort is required to maintain a card
system and keypad system. Except when used with a floor-to-ceiling
turnstile, it is possible for an authorized person to allow unauthorized
persons entry. Users can forget their PINs. Users can lend out their PINs
and cards. Keypads are vulnerable to mechanical malfunction as well as
vandalism.

o Costs: Simple stand-alone keypads, hooked directly to an electric door
latch, lock, or strike, may cost less than $200 for all the necessary
hardware. However, installation may be difficult on an existing door.
More sophisticated keypad systems that may be part of a network of
keypads can cost from $1,200 to several thousand dollars.

o An ideal application for a keypad system is for a relatively small
population size that does not change often. (For example, the chemistry
storage room that only the chemistry teachers have a code to enter.) For
these applications, where the keypad is not subjected to abuse or a harsh
environment, a keypad system can go for many years without any
additional maintenance or adjustment.

4. Who you are. An electronic device verifies the identity of a person
through the use of a personal attribute, such as hand or finger shape,
fingerprint, voiceprint, signature dynamics, retinal pattern, or iris pattern
(exhibit 4.4). These devices, known as biometric identifiers, can be very
accurate. The chances of such devices mistakenly allowing an
unauthorized person into a facility is usually much lower than the chances
of a guard inaccurately matching faces to picture badges. Biometrics are
commonly used in high-security applications where unauthorized access
into a facility is unacceptable. Recently, two elementary schools in New
Mexico have been using hand geometry systems to verify custodial
parents, as the abduction of a child by a noncustodial parent is one of their
greatest vulnerabilities.

o Strengths: This form of identification cannot be lent to other people. A
particular person's identification can be deleted from the database when
no longer appropriate. There is nothing for a user to forget to bring with
him or her. Hand or finger geometry appear to be viable, affordable, and
user friendly biometric devices for medium- or low-security applications.
Retina or iris pattern scanners are probably the most accurate of all
biometric devices, and are most appropriate for high-security facilities.
Voice recognition systems have improved significantly over the past few
years but still have some weaknesses to overcome before their use is
widespread.

o Weaknesses: Not all biometric devices are user friendly. Some devices
are very difficult for certain individuals to use. Except when used with a
floor-to-ceiling turnstile, it is possible for an authorized person to let in
unauthorized persons. Some of these technologies are not completely
mature, in that their occasional tendency to falsely reject an authorized
person can be unacceptable in a school environment. The devices are
subject to damage from vandalism. It usually takes longer to use a
biometric device than a card reader or keypad.

o Costs: These technologies continue to improve, and new biometric
devices are always being brought to market. Prices for most of these
devices have stabilized over the past 5 years. A stand-alone biometric unit
can run between $1,200 and $5,000. A system that oversees and monitors
biometric units at several doors can cost between $10,000 and $50,000.

Working with the vendor. Identification cards that are readable by an
electronic device are probably the more viable technology for schools to
consider for entry control. Dozens of different manufacturers are offering
hundreds of devices that produce a wide variety of card styles and features.
Visiting one of the security trade shows, such as the American Society of
Industrial Security (ASIS) conference held each year, will familiarize an
individual with most of the products available on the market. Some good
questions to ask the vendor are:

o What is the cost of the basic printer, basic digital camera, and basic
software? What additional features are available for each of these, how
much are they, and what do these upgrades provide?

o What kind of computer will be required to run the system and with
what memory and storage capabilities? What is the general speed of data
input and card production that can be expected? What can be done (e.g.,
upgraded components) to speed this up? (An acceptable system may take
between 1 and 2 minutes to produce one ID card.) 

o Does the printer create both sides of the cards at once, or does the card
have to be manually flipped?

o Will the vendor come and install the system and get it working
initially?

o Will the vendor program the software initially for the first card design?

o What is the bulk cost of all of the supplies that will be needed? Is it
reasonable to buy enough supplies for the next several years, or do some
of the materials have a limited shelf life? How long are these particular
supplies expected to be available?

o What maintenance is required on the printer and how often (i.e., after
how many cards?)

o How long does it take to turn the system on before it is prepared to
accept data for the first card?

o Is there any limit on the number of cards that can queue up waiting for
the printer at any one time?

o What additional security options are available for the cards? (For
example, some vendors offer hologram overlays, which may add $0.25 to
the price of each card.)

o What are the names and phone numbers of schools in your State that
are already using this device? How long have they had their systems?

o Did the other schools using this system find it difficult to use the
system? Is training simple? Have they had any equipment breakdowns
yet? Did any of the supplies not produce the number of cards they said it
would? How many additional blank cards should be purchased for errors,
re-dos,and so forth?

o How much space is necessary to set up the equipment and allow
enough room for operators and waiting students?

o What happens if the system breaks in the middle of the registration of
students?

Chapter V Duress Alarm Devices and Their Role in Crisis Management

It would be very unusual for a school to never experience a crisis situation.
A crisis can be any incident whereby the health or well-being of one or
more students or one or more employees is in imminent danger, or part or
all of the school facility will potentially be destroyed or made unavailable.
A list of crises could include:

o A threatening or drunk student or employee.

o A trespasser on campus.

o A fight.

o The breakout of a contagious disease.

o An irate and threatening parent on campus.

o Sudden unavailability of a teacher or a bus driver.

o A weapon known to be on campus.

o Massive vandalism.

o A utility outage (no water, electricity, heating, cooling, or telephone
service).

o Bad weather (weather too bad to allow students to return home via
normal methods or at normal times).

o A vehicular accident with injuries, either in or near the school parking
lot or during a school-sponsored event.

o An extremely ill student or employee.

o A gas main leak or toxic spill on or near campus.

o A bomb threat.

o A gang confrontation on or near school property.

o A suicide.

o A hostage situation.

o A shooting, stabbing, murder, or rape.

o A bomb detonation inside the school facility or adjacent to school
facilities (a car bomb).

o A local or National emergency that sends community residents to seek
temporary shelter at the school.

For a school, a crisis that requires immediate response can be as harmless
(but inconvenient) as the lack of a key to open the gym for an evening
sporting event. Unfortunately, recent tragedies in the United States have
demonstrated the need for schools to be prepared to respond to
emergencies as serious as shootings or bombs.

How a school responds to this wide range of incidents is in itself an entire
discipline--that of crisis management and planning. Every school needs a
well-thought-out, annually updated crisis plan, with regular training for all
those who might be involved. Not all schools have a plan, and many plans
in existence were issued by the school district such that, by virtue of their
generic nature, they may be inadequate for a true emergency. This plan
needs to make assignments of who is in charge during different types of
emergencies; who is the alternate in charge; who is called first, by whom,
from where, and using what; whether students are relocated and how; how
students are provided food, water, or shelter in the interim; what type of
statement is made to the press and by whom; and who is in charge when
emergency teams (fire, police, and so forth) arrive on the scene. These are
only a few of the specifications called for. In the best of all possible
situations, a predetermined team of school employees will immediately
muster upon occurrence of a serious situation. Team members would
know who to look to for decisions and then proceed automatically in their
roles for the particular plan chosen to be implemented.

For the sake of this discussion, it will be assumed that a school has a
current crisis plan in place. The issue that will be of concern here is how
an employee (or student) can notify security, school personnel, and/or
local emergency services that a crisis is occurring or is imminent. Types of
communication that may be viable are yelling/screaming, sending
someone else for help, using the public address (PA) system, using a
telephone, or calling on a two-way radio. (Two-way radios will be a
selected technology topic in a subsequent manual.)

Now consider that the person who needs to summon help is in a situation
where these options are not viable. This situation may be constrained by
the need for extreme urgency or discretion (because of an intimidating
situation) or because of the vulnerable location of the person summoning
help. The provision that allows a person to summon help under one or
more of these constraints is defined as a "duress alarm."

Modern duress alarms are generally electronic devices that vary widely in
capabilities and price. There are three general overlapping categories of
duress alarms that can send one or more levels of distress signals to a
particular location:

o A panic-button alarm--a pushbutton mounted in a fixed location.

o An identification alarm--a portable device that identifies the owner of
the device.

o An identification/location alarm--a portable device that identifies,
locates, and tracks the person who activated the duress alarm.

(One additional category could possibly be the cellular telephone. While
this approach is neither as discrete nor as automatic as the other three
categories of alarm devices, a cellular telephone is highly recommended
equipment for every principal and the primary security person. Land lines
for telephone service are occasionally unavailable, whether due to
inclement weather, accidents, or through malicious actions.)

The panic button is by far the most common type of duress alarm presently
found in schools (exhibit 5.1). The simplest application would be a
strategically located button that, when initiated, would engage a dedicated
phone line. A prerecorded message specifying the school, its location, and
the urgency is sent to several locations, such as the police department, the
district security office, and so forth. Such a system could be pulled
together for a few hundred dollars by the local handyman, plus the
ongoing cost of the phone line.

Commercially available duress panic button systems provide a pushbutton
mounted on classroom walls or under teachers' desks. In a duress situation,
a teacher or other employee depresses the panic button, which transmits a
signal, via wiring, to a location where a visible and/or audio alarm would
be activated at a console. This console would provide information that
would identify the classroom where the panic button was activated, but not
who activated it. A more advanced system may incorporate the PA system,
which allows the teacher and the administrative personnel to hold a
two-way conversation by using the existing room PA speakers and
installed internal wiring. The cost of this system for an average school
would be approximately $10,000.

There are several weaknesses to a panic-button system. In a classroom
situation, it is possible that the panic button would not be readily available
in a duress situation. It may be across the room from the teacher's desk or
even accidentally blocked by furniture or posters. Also, this configuration
lends itself to nuisance alarms triggered by mischievous students. This
problem can be offset by hiding the pushbutton or requiring a teacher to
enter a PIN on a keypad before use. (The latter is not recommended for
schools because of the potential liability of a student attempting,
unsuccessfully, to summon help in a threatening situation.) Such a system
does not actually identify the person using it, only the owner of the device,
but does locate the alarm to a particular classroom or wherever the
pushbutton is physically mounted. A panic-button system is cost-effective
when installed during the school's initial construction, rather than as a
retrofit, and can be a simple and effective system for many types of
emergencies.

A second type of system incorporates a pagerlike device that has a panic
button built in and is either worn by school personnel or may be installed
within a foot switch located under a desk. When the panic button is
pushed, a wireless alarm signal is sent to the closest installed wireless
sensing unit (a type of repeater) which would then send the signal on to
the alarm console. The personnel at the console would receive a coded
number and this number would correspond to a teacher. This system does
not usually give specific locations other than to the general
preprogrammed zone of the repeater. Increasing the number of zones
requires more wireless sensing units to be installed, which increases the
cost and complexity of the system. A major limiting factor for this system
is that the pagerlike device must have a clear line of sight to the nearest
sensing unit for an accurate transmission. In other words, walls, glass,
roofs, floors, and so forth will degenerate the transmitted signal which
decreases the precision of identifying an individual under duress.

This type of system may also incorporate a two-way radio built into the
pager that would allow communication between the console operator and
person under duress, but this larger pager is more awkward to wear. Also,
if a school has an existing PA system, a duress system could utilize the
existing PA system wiring to send the signal from the sensing unit to the
alarm console. This hybrid system would use both wireless and preexisting
wires to reduce the hardware and installation costs. An estimated cost for
this type of system would be about $50,000.

A third system, a smarter version of the previous system, can identify,
locate, and track the person who activated the duress alarm of his or her
pager. Again, school personnel would push the panic button in a duress
situation, and this action would send a wireless alarm signal to a more
sophisticated wireless sensing unit. The sensing unit would forward the
signal to the alarm console. An extensive wireless infrastructure identifies,
locates, and tracks the pager device (and hence the person under duress)
within school property (exhibits 5.2 and 5.3). The electronics and software
of such a system produces a positioning symbol on a console panel or
maplike display. (Telephone calls to several vendors during the summer of
1998 revealed that these systems generally cost approximately $100,000
for a 40-acre school area.)

Advanced and promising technologies. The Global Positioning Satellite
(GPS) technology that is currently identifying, locating, and tracking
everything from military soldiers to car rental vehicles has not been shown
to be as successful when used inside buildings or around large or tall
buildings. GPS requires an unobstructed signal from the ground
transmitter unit to an Earth-orbiting satellite. Some advanced duress
systems use a hybrid design that tracks outside personnel with GPS
technology and RF or infrared systems for tracking personnel inside
facilities. The cellular phone system infrastructure is improving greatly in
capabilities and coverage, which in the future may be a great asset to
duress alarm signals. Advances in low earth-orbiting satellite technology
that transmits data may also prove to be beneficial in making duress alarm
systems more intelligent in the future.

Duress alarm system technologies are improving at a very fast pace but
will likely have to come down substantially in cost before they will be
affordable to most schools. Before going out on bid for the purchase of
such a system, it is recommended that school administrators communicate
with current users or request to participate in a demonstration of the
proposed system.

Resources: Books, Publications, Web Sites, and Conferences

The list below includes private, professional, and government
organizations and publications that are sources of information for school
security and safety issues. The list is not exhaustive. It is intended to be
representative of the many resources that are now available. Please note
that this list includes for-profit organizations as well as not-for-profit
entities.

Many public libraries can provide Internet access as a regular patron
service if it is not available at your institution.

Education Resources Information Center (ERIC)
2277 Research Blvd., 7A
Rockville, MD 20850
Voice: 301/519-5789
Fax: 301/519-6760
E-mail: acceric@inet.ed.gov
Web site: http://www.aspensys.com/eric

Now under the auspices of the National Library of Education and the
Office of Educational Research and Improvement, ERIC produces two
monthly indexes, Resources in Education (RIE) and the Current Index to
Journals in Education (CIJE). These indexes are available in print, on
CD-ROM and via the Internet. The ERIC database, which can be searched
via the Internet, now features more than 1 million citations, which include
school security, school safety, school violence, legal issues, and the use of
technology in these areas. 

U.S. Department of Education
600 Independence Ave., S.W.
Washington, DC 20202-0498
Voice: 800/USA-LEARN
Web site: http://www.ed.gov

The Department's Web site contains a wealth of useful information
including guides; publications; resource directories; the full text of some
Department publications, such as Early Warning, Timely Response: A
Guide to Safe Schools; and links to other useful sites.

Safe and Drug-Free Schools Program
Office of Elementary and Secondary Education
U.S. Department of Education
600 Independence Ave., N.W.
Washington, DC 20202-6123
Voice: 202/260-3954
Fax: 202/260-7767
Web site: http://www.ed.gov/offices/OESE/SDFS

National Criminal Justice Reference Service (NCJRS)
P.O. Box 6000
Rockville, MD 20849-6000
Voice: 800/851-4320 or 301/519-5500
E-mail: askncjrs@ncjrs.org
Web site: http://www.ncjrs.org

One of the most extensive sources of information on criminal and juvenile
justice in the world. NCJRS is a collection of clearinghouses supporting
all bureaus of the U.S. Department of Justice Office of Justice Programs,
which includes the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention.

Among the NCJRS services that are available through its Web site are:

Justice Information Center (JIC) with links to resources on many specific
topics including juvenile justice and drugs and crime.

NCJRS Abstracts Database, which provides summaries of criminal justice
literature--government reports, journal articles, books, and more--and
which is searchable free on the Web. 

National School Safety Center (NSSC) 
4165 Thousand Oaks Blvd., Suite 290
Westlake Village, CA 91362
Voice: 805/373-9977
Fax: 805/373-9277
Web site: http://www.nssc1.org

A nonprofit partnership of the U.S. Department of Justice, the U.S.
Department of Education, and Pepperdine University, NSSC was created
in 1984 with the charge to promote safe schools--free of crime and
violence--and to help ensure quality education for all American children.

NSSC has a number of publications, films/tapes, and posters available for
sale. SEE ALSO: Publications.

National Alliance for Safe Schools (NASS)
P.O. Box 1068
College Park, MD 20741
Voice: 301/935-6063
Fax: 301/935-6069
E-mail: nass@erols.com
Web site: http://www.safeschools.org

Founded in 1977 by a group of school security directors to provide
technical assistance, training, and research to school districts interested in
reducing school-based crime and violence.

NASS products and services include school security assessments;
educational programs for troubled youth; training programs for
administrators, teachers, and students; various publications; and safe
school workshops, which are held at different locations around the
country. The NASS Web site includes descriptions of the workshops and a
2-3 month calendar of workshop locations. SEE ALSO: Publications.

National Crime Prevention Council
1700 K St., N.W., Second Floor
Washington, DC 20006-3817
Voice: 202/466-6272
Fax: 202/296-1356
Web site: http://www.ncpc.org or www.weprevent.org

An organization dedicated to helping millions of people across the United
States prove that building a sense of community and taking commonsense
precautions can cut crime and counter fear.

A major thrust of the Council is "stopping school violence" with many
useful suggestions and links included on their Web site.

Keep Schools Safe
Contact: Attorney General of each State
Web site: http://www.keepschoolssafe.org

A joint initiative of the National Association of Attorneys General and the
National School Boards Association, which have joined together to
address the escalating problem of youth violence. 

The Web site was launched to facilitate sharing of ideas and program
information by providing up-to-date information on successful programs
and ideas.

Center for the Prevention of School Violence
20 Enterprise St., Suite 2
Raleigh, NC 27607-7375
Voice: 800/299-6054 or 919/515-9397
Fax: 919/515-9561
E-mail: Available from Web site
Web site: http://www2.ncsu.edu/ncsu/cep/PreViolence/CtrPreVio

Established in 1993 at North Carolina State University, the Center serves
as a primary point of contact for dealing with the problem of school
violence. The Center is currently working on several special projects and
is a nationally recognized resource for school resource officer (SRO)
programs.

National School Boards Association
1680 Duke St.
Alexandria, VA 22314
Voice: 703/838-6722
Fax: 703/683-7590
E-mail: info@nsba.org
Web site: http://www.nsba.org

A nationwide advocacy outreach organization for public school
governance. The Web site provides links to information services of the
organization, including its Council of School Attorneys and Keep Schools
Safe, a joint effort with the National Association of Attorneys General.

American Association of School Administrators (AASA)
1801 North Moore St.
Arlington, VA 22209
Voice: 703/528-0700
E-mail: phouston@aasa.org
Web site: http://www.aasa.org

One of elementary and secondary education's longstanding professional
organizations. Strives for the development of highly qualified leaders and
supporting excellence in educational administration. Initiates and supports
laws, policies, research, and practices that will improve education.

National Association of School Resource Officers (NASRO)
P.O. Box 40
Boynton Beach, FL 33425-0040
Voice: 888/316-2776
Web site: http://www.rt66.com/nasro

A nonprofit organization made up of school-based law enforcement
officers and school administrators. The association serves as the largest
training organization for school-based police and district personnel in the
Nation. NASRO sponsors an annual training conference each summer and
regional training throughout the year. SEE ALSO: Conferences/meetings.

National Association of School Safety and Law Enforcement Officers
P.O. Box 118
Catlett, VA 20119-0118
Voice: 540/788-4966

An organization of persons engaged in school security and school police
operations.

International Association of Campus Law Enforcement Administrators
638 Prospect Ave.
Hartford, CT 06105-4298
Voice: 860/586-7517
E-mail: info@iaclea.org
Web site: http://www.iaclea.org

The membership of this association includes campus law enforcement
directors and staff, criminal justice faculty members, municipal chiefs of
police, companies offering campus law enforcement products and services,
and colleges and universities throughout the United States, Canada, and
the United Kingdom.

Campus Safety Association
1121 Spring Lake Drive
Itasca, IL 60143-3201
Voice: 708/775-2026

Members of this organization are professionals concerned with safety at
educational institutions. 

American Society for Industrial Security (ASIS)
1625 Prince St.
Alexandria, VA 22314
Voice: 703/522-5800
Fax: 703/243-4954
Web site: http://www.asisonline.org

A primary focus of this organization is to increase the effectiveness and
productivity of security professionals by developing educational programs
and materials that focus on the fundamentals as well as the latest
advancements in security management. ASIS sponsors a variety of
educational courses and seminars, an annual national seminar and exhibit,
numerous publications, a trade journal, and a security industry buyer's
guide.

Educational Institutions is an ASIS standing committee. The ASIS Web
site has a great deal of information, including full text of various
documents. SEE ALSO: Publications and Conferences/meetings.

International Association of Professional Security Consultants (IAPSC)
1444 I St., Suite 700
Washington, DC 20005-2210
Voice: 202/712-9043
Fax: 202/216-9646
Web site: http://www.iapsc.org

A nonprofit professional association of independent, nonproduct-affiliated,
professional security consultants. The IAPSC Web site includes a
directory of experts; full text of the current issue of the association
newsletter; and information on events and other services. SEE ALSO:
Conferences/meetings.

Teacher's Workshop
1250 Overlook Ridge
Bishop,GA 30621
Voice: 800/991-1114
Fax: 706/769-4137
E-mail: rbender@teachersworkshop.com
Web site: http://www.teachersworkshop.com

A source of practical staff development opportunities through
teleconferencing, a speaker's bureau, video curricula, or special
conference events. The Teacher's Workshop Web site includes
information on the various categories of opportunities offered. Each
category includes topics on school violence and its prevention. SEE
ALSO: Publications.

National School Safety and Security Services (NSSSS)
P.O. Box 110123
Cleveland, OH 44111
Voice: 216/251-3067
E-mail: KENTRUMP@aol.com
Web site: http://www.schoolsecurity.org

An independent, Ohio-based, National consulting firm specializing in
training and technical assistance on secondary and elementary (K-12)
school security, crisis management, gangs, juvenile crime issues, and crisis
preparedness. 

NSSSS services include presentations and training; security assessments;
expert witness and litigation consultation; and related management
consulting. The NSSSS Web site includes information on services, links to
other useful sites, and a regularly updated list of publications related to
NSSSS service areas. SEE ALSO: Publications.

General Web Sites

NOTE: There are hundreds of Web sites that contain valuable information
and resources on the topics of school security, school safety, school
violence and prevention, and so forth, and more are added every week. We
could not begin to include them all. In addition to the sites included with
their organization above, listed below are a few general sites that contain
many links to school security information:

National Clearinghouse for Educational Facilities (NCEF)
Web site: http://www.edfacilities.org

With its mission to serve as a resource for the Nation's school personnel
and allied professionals who plan, design, construct, and maintain
educational facilities, NCEF acquires, manages, and disseminates
information relating to educational facilities.

The Clearinghouse is sponsored by the U.S. Department of Education's
National Library of Education. Subtopic links at this site include safety
and lighting. 

Mickey's Place in the Sun--Violence and Violence Prevention
Web site: http://people.delphi.com/mickjyoung/violence.html

Each of the 14 subtopic links for this Topic include organizations,
publications, and other resource links.

BASA-TECH Webliography
Web site: http://www.nettech.org/basics/projects/weblio.htm

An annotated listing of education-related Web sites.

Security Magazine On The Web
Cahners Publishing Company
Fax: 303/470-4546
Web site: http://www.secmag.com

Security Magazine and its sister publication, Security Distributing &
Marketing (SDM) Magazine, are available in print form. However, the
Web site listed here contains a great deal of useful information on a
variety of security topics, including advertised security products; school
security solutions; a daily news service made up of a network of global
news media and business information by topic (e.g., protecting our
children and school (K-12) security), which is updated daily and contains
full text articles; a new product database; and a list of experts and
columnists. 

Conferences/meetings

American Society of Industrial Security (ASIS)
Annual Seminar & Exhibits
Includes educational sessions, ASIS security marketplace bookstore, and
more than 500 exhibiting companies. Attendance: 15,000 or more security
professionals

For information contact:
ASIS
1625 Prince St.
Alexandria, VA 22314-2818
703/519-6200

International Association of Professional Security Consultants (IAPSC)
Annual Conference

For information contact:
IASPC
1444 I St., Suite 700
Washington, D.C. 20005-2210
Voice: 202/712-9043
Fax: 202/216-9649

Note: This conference is generally held in April.

National Association of School Resource Officers (NASRO) Annual
Conference

Largest gathering of school-based police officers and school security
professionals in the United States.

For information contact:
NASRO
P.O. Box 40
Boynton Beach, FL 33425-0040
Voice: 888/316-2776

Note: This conference is generally held in July.

International Security Conference & Exposition (ISC EXPO)

Includes leading-edge seminars and workshops that are organized into
core conference tracks that reflect major security topics. More than 400
exhibitors showcase security equipment. The seminars and workshops
generally include sessions specific to school security. Information specific
to the EXPO program and exhibitors is usually available on the Web site
about a month prior to the EXPO date.

For information contact:
ISC EXPO
Customer service
Voice: 800/840-5602

NOTE: Many publications, including those of professional organizations,
include a list of upcoming meetings/events as a regular feature. In
addition, several Web sites, such as the sites for ERIC, NCJRS, ASIS,
SIA, and SDM Magazine, have links to lists of upcoming events. 

Publications

Note: Many of the publications included below are available through
interlibrary loan at a school or public library.

Books/reports

Blauvelt On Making Your Schools Safe, Peter D. Blauvelt, National
Alliance for Safe Schools, 1997.

Campus Public Safety and Security: With Guidance As Well for High
Schools and Private Secondary Schools, James W. Wensyel, Charles C.
Thomas, Ltd., 1987.

Campus Security and Law Enforcement, John W. Powell, et al., American
Society for Industrial Security, second edition, 1994.

Combating Fear and Restoring Safety in Schools, June Arnette and
Marjorie C. Walsleben, U.S. Department of Justice, 1998 (NCJ 167888).

Creating Safe and Drug-Free Schools: An Action Guide, U.S. Department
of Education and U.S. Department of Justice, 1996 (paper and electronic
formats).

Crime in the Schools: Reducing Fear and Disorder with Student Problem
Solving, Dennis J. Kenney and T. Steuart Watson, Police Executive
Research Forum, 1998.

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design, Crowe,
Butterworth-Heinemann, 1991.

Dealing With Youth Violence: What Schools and Communities Need to
Know, Rose Duhan-Sells, editor, National Education Service, 1996.

Early Warning, Timely Response: A Guide to Safe Schools, U.S.
Department of Education, 1998 (paper and electronic formats).

Educated Public Relations: School Safety 101, National School Safety
Center, 1993.

Effective Strategies for School Security, Peter D. Blauvelt, National
Association of Secondary School Principals, 1981.

Gangs in Schools: Breaking Up is Hard to Do, National School Safety
Center, 1993.

Legal Issues Surrounding Safe Schools, Reed B. Day, National
Organization on Legal Problems of Education, 1994.

Maximum Security: The Culture of Violence in Inner-City Schools, John
Devine, 1996.

Practical School Security: Basic Guidelines for Safe and Secure Schools,
Kenneth Trump, Corwin Press, 1998 (hardcover and paperback).

Safe Schools: A Handbook for Violence Prevention, R.D. Stephens,
National Educational Service, 1995.

Safe Schools: A Security and Loss Prevention Plan, James Barry Hylton,
Butterworth-Heinemann, 1996.

Safe Schools, Safe Students: A Guide to Violence Prevention, Drug
Strategies, Inc., 1998.

Safety and Security Administration in School Facilities: Forms, Checklists
& Guidelines, Sara N. DiLima, editor, Aspen Publishers, Inc., 1996.

School Discipline Notebook, National School Safety Center, 1992.

School Safety Check Book, National School Safety Center, 1990.

School Safety Workbook, National School Safety Center, 1996.

School Violence Intervention: A Practical Handbook, J.C. Conoley and A.
P. Goldstein, editors, Guilford Publications, Inc., 1997.

Schools, Violence and Society, A.M. Hoffman, editor, the Greenwood
Publishing Group, 1996.

Student Searches and the Law, National School Safety Center, 1996.

Techniques for Managing a Safe School, Beverley H. Johns and John P.
Keenan, Love Publishing Co., 1997.

Teens, Crime, and the Community: Education and Action for Safe Schools
and Communities, Judy Zimmer, et al., West Educational Publishing, third
edition, 1998.

Toward Better and Safer Schools, A.G. Cuervo, et al., National School
Boards Association, 1985.

Violence Prevention and Reduction in Schools, William Bender (et al),
editor, PRO ED, Inc., Spring 1999.

Journals/newsletters

The American School Board Journal, monthly, National School Boards
Association, 1680 Duke St., Alexandria, VA 22314, 703/838-6722,
info@nsba.org, www.nsba.org.

Campus Security Report, monthly, Rusting Publications, 402 Main St.,
P.O. Box 190, Port Washington, NY 11050, 516/883-1440. 

Inside School Safety, monthly, Aspen Publishers, Inc., 7201 McKinney
Circle, Frederick, MD, 800/638-8437, www.aspenpublishers.com.

International Association of Campus Law Enforcement Administrators
(IACLEA)--Campus Law Enforcement Journal, 638 Prospect Avenue,
Hartford, CT 06105, 860/586-7517.

School Safety, three times/year, National School Safety Center, 4165
Thousand Oaks Blvd., Suite 290, Westlake Village, CA 91362,
805/373-9977, www.nssc1.org.

School Security Report, monthly, Rusting Publications, 402 Main Street,
P.O. Box 190, Port Washington, NY 11050, 516/883-1440.

Security Distributing & Marketing (SDM) Magazine, monthly, Cahners
Publishing Company, 1350 E. Touhy Ave., Des Plaines, IL 60018-3358
(Frequently includes articles on school security).

Security Magazine, monthly, Cahners Publishing Company, 1350 E.
Touhy Ave., Des Plaines, IL 60018-3358, www.secmag.com (Frequently
includes articles on school security).

Security Management, monthly, American Society for Industrial Security,
1625 Prince St., Alexandria, VA 22314, 703/522-5800,
www.asisonline.org.

Security News, monthly, Terra Publishing, Inc., 4250 North State St.,
Salamanca, NY 14779-9700, 716/945-5091 (Frequently includes articles
on school security).

Security Technology & Design, quarterly, Locksmith Publishing Corp.,
850 Busse Highway, Park Ridge, IL 60068, 708/692-5940,
www.simon-net.com/asp/library.asp? Provider ID=23 (Frequently includes
articles on school security).

Updating School Board Policies, National School Boards Association,
1680 Duke St., Alexandria, VA 22314, 703/838-6722, info@nsba.org,
www.nsba.org. (Frequently includes articles on school security).

Directories

Thomas Register of American Manufacturers, A directory of 150,000 U.S.
and Canadian manufacturers and their products available in paper and/or
CD format at many large public libraries and available free on the Internet.
The directory is searchable on the Internet by company name, product
name, or brand name. An easy, free registration is required before
searching.

American Society for Industrial Security (ASIS) Security Industry Buyer's
Guide, An annual directory that is available with a subscription to Security
Management. It is searchable by type of equipment.

National Security Institute Product & Services Directory, An online
directory searchable by company type and/or product and services.
Listings in the directory are available free of charge to appropriate
vendors.

Security Industry Association (SIA) Membership Directory, Directory of
manufacturers, distributors, and service companies in the electronic
security industry. Available for a fee to nonmembers. 

Security Industry Association (SIA) Directory of Specialists, Directory of
security professionals that is indexed by specialty area and geographic
region. Available for a fee to nonmembers.

-------------------------------

About the National Institute of Justice 

The National Institute of Justice (NIJ), a component of the Office of
Justice Programs, is the research agency of the U.S. Department of Justice.
Created by the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, as
amended, NIJ is authorized to support research, evaluation, and
demonstration programs, development of technology, and both national
and international information dissemination. Specific mandates of the Act
direct NIJ to: 

o Sponsor special projects, and research and development programs, that
will improve and strengthen the criminal justice system and reduce or
prevent crime. 

o Conduct national demonstration projects that employ innovative or
promising approaches for improving criminal justice. 

o Develop new technologies to fight crime and improve criminal justice. 

o Evaluate the effectiveness of criminal justice programs and identify
programs that promise to be successful if continued or repeated. 

o Recommend actions that can be taken by Federal, State, and local
governments as well as by private organizations to improve criminal
justice. 

o Carry out research on criminal behavior. 

o Develop new methods of crime prevention and reduction of crime and
delinquency. 

In recent years, NIJ has greatly expanded its initiatives, the result of the
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 (the Crime
Act), partnerships with other Federal agencies and private foundations,
advances in technology, and a new international focus. Some examples of
these new initiatives: 

o New research and evaluation are exploring key issues in community
policing, violence against women, sentencing reforms, and specialized
courts such as drug courts. 

o Dual-use technologies are being developed to support national defense
and local law enforcement needs. 

o The causes, treatment, and prevention of violence against women and
violence within the family are being investigated in cooperation with
several agencies of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. 

o NIJ's links with the international community are being strengthened
through membership in the United Nations network of criminological
institutes; participation in developing the U.N. Criminal Justice
Information Network; initiation of UNOJUST (U.N. Online Justice
Clearinghouse), which electronically links the institutes to the U.N.
network; and establishment 
of an NIJ International Center. 

o The NIJ-administered criminal justice information clearinghouse, the
world's largest, has improved its online capability. 

o The Institute's Drug Use Forecasting (DUF) program has been expanded
and enhanced. Renamed ADAM (Arrestee Drug Abuse Monitoring), the
program will increase the number of drug-testing sites, and its role as a
"platform" for studying drug-related crime will grow. 

o NIJ's new Crime Mapping Research Center will provide training in
computer mapping technology, collect and archive geocoded crime data,
and develop analytic software. 

o The Institute's program of intramural research has been expanded and
enhanced. 

The Institute Director, who is appointed by the President and confirmed by
the Senate, establishes the Institute's objectives, guided by the priorities of
the Office of Justice Programs, the Department of Justice, and the needs of
the criminal justice field. The Institute actively solicits the views of
criminal justice professionals and researchers in the continuing search for
answers that inform public policymaking in crime and justice.