APPENDIX L. MONITORING THE EFFECTS OF PRE- AND POST-TANF WELFARE REFORM
                              INITIATIVES

                                CONTENTS

Introduction and Summary of Findings
  Overview
  Summary of Findings
  Implications for TANF
Economic Status of Single-Mother Families
  Overview
  Cash Welfare Receipt
  Rates of Employment
  Work and Welfare Among Poor Single Mothers
  Effects of Earnings, Transfers, and Taxes on Single Mothers'
            Poverty
  Earnings-Poor Single Mothers after Taxes and Transfers
  Income Sources Among Poorest Single Mothers
  Consumption Expenditures
Findings from Impact Studies of Welfare Reform Initiatives
  Methodology Issues in Impact Studies
  Welfare-to-Work Impacts
  Family Formation and Structure Impacts
  Economic Status Impacts
  Child Well-Being Impacts
  Cost Benefit Issues
Findings from Leaver Studies
  Monitoring Studies
  Welfare Leavers
Ongoing and Future Research
  Efforts by Governmental Agencies
  Efforts by Other Organizations
  Ethnographic Studies
Detailed Tables
References

                  INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

                                Overview

    This appendix summarizes what has been learned from major
welfare reform efforts since the mid-1980s to promote work and
responsibility by parents of needy children who receive cash
aid. During this period, two major Federal welfare reform laws
were enacted, the Family Support Act of 1988 (Public Law 100-
485) and the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act of 1996 (Public Law 104-193). In addition,
there were numerous State and local welfare reform initiatives.
    Welfare programs and pilot projects have tested such
reforms as work requirements, rewards and penalties, time
limits on benefits, education and training provisions, and
personal behavior provisions (for example, rules to promote
marriage, school attendance, and immunization, and to penalize
additional births). Some projects offered enriched support
services. The object of this experimentation was to find out
what was successful in achieving the goals of public assistance
programs for needy families with children, especially the goal
of self-support. Congress and welfare administrators wanted to
know what worked and for whom and at what cost. Findings
reported here are based primarily on programs and initiatives
that preceded the 1996 law, which replaced the program of Aid
to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and its Job
Opportunities and Basic Skills (JOBS) Training Program with
block grants for Temporary Assistance for Needy Families
(TANF). The pre-1996 State reforms tested many policy changes
now found in State TANF Programs.
    The original (1935) purpose of AFDC was to encourage care
of needy children in their homes. Over the years, the goal of
aiding single-mother families changed, as the movement of
American mothers into the work force changed perceptions of
mothers' employability and as frustration mounted over the size
and character of AFDC rolls. Added to the AFDC law in 1956 were
the goals of strengthening family life and promoting ``family
self-support.'' To encourage self-support, Congress later
created two work and training programs, the Work Incentive
Program in 1967 and JOBS in 1988 (Family Support Act).
    Initially, Congress permitted States to decide who must
participate in the Work Incentive Program, but in 1971 it
required States to register mothers unless they were caring for
a child under age 6. In 1988, Congress tightened the work rule,
exempting from JOBS mothers with a child under age 3 (and
permitting States to require mothers to work upon the first
birthday of their youngest child). The Reagan, Bush, and
Clinton administrations gave many States permission to
experiment with welfare by waiving specific AFDC rules. (These
waivers allowed States to impose restrictions on the receipt of
benefits, increase financial work incentives, and establish
``personal responsibility'' requirements for recipients.)
    TANF has given States much more freedom to design their own
programs. Many States have built their TANF Programs on
elements of their waiver programs and some have converted their
welfare-to-work waiver programs into their TANF Program. Thus,
while the evaluations discussed in this appendix are primarily
of programs that preceded the 1996 law, some of the findings
reported in these evaluations have application to TANF
Programs.
    The 1996 law also broadened the goals of family welfare.
TANF has four objectives: (1) enable needy parents to care for
children in their homes; (2) end dependence of needy parents on
government benefits by promoting job preparation, work, and
marriage; (3) prevent and reduce out-of-wedlock pregnancies;
and (4) encourage formation and maintenance of two-parent
families. Unlike JOBS, TANF makes no exemptions from work
requirements, but it allows States to exempt those with a child
under age 1. States may exempt others if they wish, but those
exempted must still be counted in the denominator when work
participation requirements are calculated.
    To learn from AFDC/JOBS/TANF Programs and experiments,
Congress has mandated and supported national data collection
efforts as well as evaluations of specific State or local
initiatives. It has even authorized specific demonstrations,
including major reform projects in Washington (Sec. 9121 of
Public Law 100-203), New York (Sec. 9122 of Public Law 100-
203), Minnesota (Sec. 8014 of Public Law 101-239), and
Wisconsin (Sec. 233 of Public Law 103-432). All these projects
included research designs. To help assess the effects of
changes in welfare policy and programs, this appendix offers
three complementary analyses from both national data sources
and State or local research efforts.
 1. The first is an analysis of national data about female-
        headed families with children, which provides the
        overall setting. It examines single mothers' receipt of
        welfare, their work, and their economic well-being. It
        describes national trends from 1987 to 1998, a period
        during which the national AFDC/TANF caseload soared to
        a historic peak in fiscal year 1994 and then dropped by
        nearly half by 1999. However, this analysis does not
        attribute changes over time in welfare receipt,
        employment, or economic well-being of single mothers in
        the general population to any cause, including welfare
        policy.
 2. The second analysis is a synthesis of findings from
        evaluations of some of the State welfare reform
        initiatives. These evaluations examine the difference
        that policy changes made on selected outcomes, or their
        ``impact.'' They do so by comparing outcomes, such as
        earnings and employment rates, under a set of new
        policies versus what would have occurred without those
        new policies. Though impact evaluations are designed to
        measure the effect a program has on selected outcomes,
        their results are most valid for the particular place
        and time in which the evaluation was conducted and the
        population examined in the study. These evaluations
        were conducted on programs begun before enactment of
        the 1996 welfare reform law, but many have implications
        for current TANF Programs.
 3. The third analysis is an examination of studies of former
        cash welfare recipients (welfare ``leavers''). Like the
        national data, these studies do not attribute their
        findings to welfare policy changes as they do not make
        comparisons with groups that were under prior policies.
        Nor do they cover the full population of interest.
        Nonetheless, they are a population of particular
        interest and ``leaver studies'' constitute the bulk of
        research available since enactment of TANF.

                          Summary of Findings

    This appendix focuses on outcome measures, which are
indicators of how families with children are faring. We focus
on four categories of outcomes:
 1. Welfare to work, including employment rates, earnings,
        welfare benefit amounts, and welfare recipiency rates;
 2. Family formation and structure, including marriage rates,
        birth rates, and abortions;
 3. Economic status, primarily measured by income, with
        supplementary information on consumption of goods and
        services and measures of material well-being and
        hardship; and
 4. Child well-being, primarily measures of a child's
        development and behavior.
Welfare to work
    The employment rate of single mothers rose steadily from 57
percent in 1992 to almost 71 percent in 1999 (chart L-5), and
their employment rate now exceeds that of married mothers. The
rise in work by single mothers is especially dramatic for those
with a child under age 3; their employment rate was relatively
flat (hovering around 35 percent) from 1988 until 1993, then
turned upward and climbed to 56 percent by 1999 (chart L-6). At
the same time, fewer mothers, even very poor ones, are
receiving cash welfare. In the 1987-93 period, cash welfare was
received by about 63 percent of mothers who were poor on the
basis of pretransfer cash income; by 1998, the share dropped to
41 percent (chart L-3).
    The overall trend of increasing work and declining welfare
is consistent with policies that increase mandated work or job
preparation for welfare mothers. Impact evaluations show the
same trend. Evaluations find that mandatory welfare-to-work
programs generally increase employment, and often also increase
average earnings and decrease cash assistance payments. These
findings apply both to programs with a strong employment focus
(``work first'') as well as to programs that provide education.
Of course, the strong economy over this period also had a
positive impact on the employment of single mothers.
Family formation and structure
    The number of single-mother families increased from 8.4
million in 1989 to about 9.9 million in 1993, but remained
relatively constant from 1993 to 1998, averaging between 9.8
and 10 million during those years (chart L-2). Some think this
population ceased growing because of changed attitudes and
policies, but reasons are unclear.
    As noted above, one of TANF's goals is to promote formation
and maintenance of two-parent families; another is to reduce
out-of-wedlock pregnancies. In fiscal year 1996, the last full
year of AFDC, 60 percent of AFDC children for whom data were
available lived with a single parent who had not married the
other parent, and 13 percent lived with two parents (25 percent
were with a divorced or separated parent, and 2 percent with a
widowed parent). Many of the evaluations did not examine family
formation issues. The majority of pre-TANF evaluations of
welfare initiatives that examine marriage report no impacts for
single-parent families. Evaluators did find that the Minnesota
Family Investment Program (MFIP) decreased the percentage of
marriage breakup and increased the rate of marriage among
single or cohabiting parents. One popular initiative aimed at
reducing nonmarital pregnancies is adopting a family cap
(paying no benefit or a reduced benefit for a new baby born to
a mother already on welfare), but evaluations of programs that
include family caps show inconclusive impacts. Evaluations of
programs targeted on teenage AFDC mothers found no significant
impacts on rates of pregnancies or childbearing.
Economic status
    Overall, from 1987 to 1998, income has grown and poverty
has decreased among mothers raising children alone (data from
the Current Population Survey (CPS) of the U.S. Census Bureau).
These trends reflect, in part, increased work and less reliance
on welfare among these mothers. However, among the poorest
mothers (the bottom 20 percent illustrated in chart L-9),
income has fallen because these mothers have lost more in cash
welfare and food stamps than they have gained in earnings and
the earned income credit (EIC).
    Many impact evaluations find that even welfare-to-work
programs that succeed in moving recipients to jobs often do not
raise family income. For instance, the National Evaluation of
Welfare-to-Work Strategies (NEWWS), which covered 11 JOBS
Programs in 7 sites, found no increases in combined income from
earnings, cash assistance, and food stamps in the second year
of the programs. In these programs, increases in earnings
offset, but did not exceed, reductions in cash benefits and
food stamps. However, the composition of income changed. A
bigger share came from earnings, a smaller share from welfare.
    However, programs that combine mandated participation in
employment-focused activities with generous earnings disregards
(which permit working recipients to keep more of their welfare
benefits) have been effective in raising earnings and
employment. Two of these programs (MFIP and Connecticut's Jobs
First) with especially generous treatment of earnings and
relatively high welfare payment levels have also raised total
income of participants, and the MFIP Program reduced the
incidence of poverty. However, their income gains have come at
the cost of increasing welfare payments and prolonging the
duration of welfare payments. Continued welfare receipt may
convey continued health insurance through Medicaid for some
participants. Because these programs allowed participants to
keep more of their benefits while they worked, they could be
said to increase ``dependence'' on welfare. However, because
they decreased the share of participants who relied on welfare
alone, they also could be said to decrease welfare dependence.
    Studies of former welfare recipients conducted by the
States (``leaver'' studies) address the question of how those
who have left welfare are faring. Most families who left TANF
or AFDC waiver programs between 1995 and 1998 did so because of
employment. In the quarter after exit, administrative data
indicate that employment rates ranged from 50 to 64 percent.
Among welfare leavers who worked, survey data indicate that
average hourly wages ranged from $5.50 to $8.16. Average wages
in these States are above the Federal minimum wage and are
above the welfare guarantee (cash and food stamps) for the
State. However, income from these wages alone would leave a
family of three below the poverty level in most States. Within
1 year or at the time of the leaver study, from 13 to 36
percent of leavers had returned to welfare. This count excludes
``churners,'' persons who returned to welfare within 1 or 2
months of exit.
    Measuring the economic well-being of a family raises some
issues. The CPS uses reports of annual family income to measure
income and poverty. However, analysis of income and spending
data from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics Consumer
Expenditure Survey (CEX) shows that some of the poorest single
mothers actually buy more in goods and services than would be
supported by their income. This finding suggests that they have
access to funds from sources other than reported income (e.g.,
borrowing, withdrawing savings, other family members,
boyfriends, or informal support networks). Impact evaluations
also encounter problems in measuring economic well-being. The
most common measure is the combination of a program
participant's earnings, cash welfare, and food stamps. This
approach ignores the income of other household members (e.g.,
husbands, boyfriends, roommates) who might pool their economic
resources with the participant, as well as other sources of
income such as Social Security or Supplemental Security Income
(SSI). Leaver studies have begun to report measures that
examine whether welfare leavers have experienced any types of
``hardship.'' Measures of hardship have included receipt of
other types of assistance to complement earnings, as well as
measures that examine difficulties experienced since exiting
cash welfare.
 Child well-being
    In recent years, the proportion of AFDC/TANF adults who
work has more than doubled, from 11 percent in fiscal year 1996
to 23 percent in fiscal year 1998, and there is growing
interest in how increased work by these parents affects their
children. The NEWWS evaluation found small and conflicting
impacts, or no impact at all, on various measures of child
well-being for respondents with only school-aged children. For
instance, 4 of the 11 programs were reported to increase the
percentage of children who attended a special class for
behavioral or emotional problems; 2 of the programs were
reported to decrease this percentage. The MFIP Program that
increased family income was found to decrease the incidence of
problem behaviors; it also improved school performance. The New
Hope Program in Milwaukee, which failed to increase family
income, was found to improve the behavior of boys, but to
increase aggression among girls.

                         Implications for TANF

    Findings presented in this appendix indicate that ending
dependence on government benefits through job preparation,
work, and marriage--the second objective of TANF--may be an
elusive goal. Available evaluations generally show that welfare
initiatives have little or no impact on marriage. And although
welfare-to-work programs generally increase earnings and
employment, they do not necessarily end dependence and raise
income. Programs that increase incomes instead have been found
to reduce dependence on welfare; they continue at least partial
welfare payments when recipients go to work. Evaluations
indicate that, at least in the short run, many TANF recipients
will be unable to escape poverty through work unless taxpayers
provide an earnings supplement of some kind (see table 7-12 in
section 7).
    TANF's lifetime time limit on eligibility for federally
funded assistance conflicts with enhanced earnings disregards.
The time limit may induce some persons to leave welfare quickly
and ``bank'' welfare months for later use in time of need
(although research has not found this effect), but generous
earnings disregards are an incentive to remain on welfare while
working. The disregards permit recipients to increase income by
combining work with a reduced welfare grant. Generous earnings
disregards also are an incentive to join the rolls, and they
may reward persons who would have worked anyway, even if all
earnings were used to reduce the grant. Eventually, when a
family reaches the Federal time limit, the State can no longer
pay an earnings supplement unless it uses its own funds to pay
the cost (or grants the family a hardship time limit extension,
within a Federal caseload cap set in the law).
    Under TANF, the $16.5 billion of Federal funding received
by States for aid to needy families is fixed each year through
fiscal year 2002. Federal welfare funding no longer is a
function of the caseload size, the benefit levels paid, the
generosity or stringency of program rules, or the State's
relative per capita income. Because the national TANF caseload
now is only about half the size of the record-large AFDC
caseload on which the fixed block grant is based, States
generally have available much larger Federal funding per
welfare family than before TANF. States may use these funds for
a wide array of aid and services, not restricted to cash
recipients, provided they are related to one of TANF's goals.
    Rules about State funding have changed under TANF and also
give the States more discretion. No longer do States have to
pay a specified share of benefit expenditures, depending on per
capita income, and a flat share of administrative costs.
Instead, they must meet a ``maintenance-of-effort'' requirement
of 75 or 80 percent of their spending in a recent baseline year
($10.4 billion yearly, or $11.1 billion if they fail work
participation rates). These amounts are below fiscal year 1994
State AFDC/JOBS spending levels by 25 percent and 20 percent,
respectively.
    Many welfare reform initiatives, such as the operation of a
welfare-to-work program, cost Federal and State governments
money. The costs of welfare reform initiatives can be recouped
if over the long run welfare payments are reduced. Employment-
focused (``work first'') programs, on average, have lower costs
than those that promote education. Thus, it is more likely that
costs of a ``work first'' program can be recouped than those of
an education-focused program. Moreover, the benefits from a
``work first'' program tend to be immediate, while those from
an education-focused program take time to emerge. Additionally,
earnings supplements that encourage work and raise incomes also
cost money; they prolong the duration of welfare.
    Fixed funding is often viewed as an incentive for States to
operate less expensive programs. However, the TANF Block Grant
is fixed at a level based on historically high caseloads.
Should caseloads remain down, States would continue to have the
resources to engage in more costly welfare initiatives, as many
of them appear to be doing now.

               ECONOMIC STATUS OF SINGLE-MOTHER FAMILIES

                                Overview

    This section examines trends in welfare, work, and economic
well-being among families headed by single mothers, the group
that is the main focus of TANF Programs. The analyses use
national household survey data, specifically, the U.S. Census
Bureau's March CPS and the Bureau of Labor Statistics' CEX. CPS
data were examined from March 1988 (income year 1987) to March
1999 (income year 1998). CEX data were examined from 1994
through 1997. (The most recent year for which public use files
were available in early 2000, when this analysis was completed,
was 1997.)
    The analyses seek to describe the changing circumstances of
single mothers over the period, but do not attempt to isolate
the effects of particular policy changes or to ascribe
causation. These analyses are presented to provide background
and context for the subsequent discussions of research focused
specifically on welfare reform initiatives. Given the precision
of estimates obtained from the CPS and CEX, this section
focuses primarily on overall trends, rather than specific year-
to-year changes.
    The number of single mothers grew by 17 percent over the 4-
year period from 1989 to 1993, but has since leveled off and
remained at around 10 million (chart L-2). Dramatic changes in
work, welfare, and poverty among this population have occurred
in recent years, especially since 1992-93, as detailed in the
following charts. Highlights include:
  --The percentage of single mothers who worked at some time
        during the year rose from 67 percent in 1992 to 80
        percent in 1998 (chart L-1). By March 1998, the
        employment rate for single mothers with children under
        age 18 surpassed that of comparable married mothers
        (chart L-5). Employment gains have been greatest for
        single mothers with children under age 3 (chart L-6).
  --The percentage of single mothers who received cash welfare,
        based on CPS data, shrank from 35 percent in 1993 to 19
        percent in 1998 (chart L-1).
  --The percentage of poor single mothers (on the basis of
        pretransfer income) who reported receiving cash welfare
        declined from 63 percent in 1993 to 41 percent in 1998
        (chart L-3). Declines occurred even among those with
        very low pretransfer income (e.g., below 25 percent of
        poverty) (chart L-4).
  --The percentage of single mothers who were poor based on
        money income, after cash transfers (the official
        poverty measure), declined from 45 percent in 1993 to
        37 percent in 1998 (chart L-1 and chart L-8). If in-
        kind food assistance and the EIC (net of taxes) were
        counted as income, the poverty rate would have dropped
        from 41 percent in 1993 to below 30 percent in 1998
        (chart L-8).
  --1997 marked a transition year in which, for the first time
        over the period examined, the share of poor single
        mothers who worked during the year exceeded those who
        received welfare (chart L-7).
  --Average total income of single mothers in the bottom
        quintile declined from 1994 to 1998, despite a gain of
        $1,005 in net earnings and EIC transfers, because of a
        greater decline ($1,788) in cash welfare and food
        stamps (chart L-10). However, in the second lowest
        quintile, gains in earnings and the EIC by single
        mothers offset declines in cash welfare and food
        stamps, resulting in higher total income in 1998 than
        at any time during the preceding 11 years for this
        subset of the population (chart L-11).
  --Between 1994 and 1997, consumption expenditures for single-
        mother families grew at a robust rate: 18 percent over
        the period, much higher than the increase in prices
        over the same period (8 percent). Some of this increase
        is attributable to work-related expenses
        (transportation, child care, payroll taxes), as welfare
        receipt decreased and work increased (table L-1).
        Consumption expenditures increased even for the poorest
        single mothers (chart L-12).

CHART L-1. WELFARE, WORK AND POVERTY STATUS AMONG SINGLE MOTHERS, 1987-
                                   98
<GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT>

    Source: Prepared by the Congressional Research Service.
Based on analysis of U.S. Census Bureau March 1988-99 Current
Population Survey data.

                          Cash Welfare Receipt

    CPS data show an increase in cash welfare receipt (AFDC,
TANF, or other assistance) among single mothers during the late
1980s and early 1990s and a decrease in the mid-to-late 1990s
that corresponds to the caseload rise and fall documented by
administrative data. Chart L-2 shows that the total number of
single mothers increased from 8.4 million in 1989, to about 9.9
million in 1993, an increase of 1.5 million, or 17 percent.
Since 1993, the number of single mothers has remained fairly
stable, between 9.8 and 10 million, but the number of single
mothers receiving cash welfare has fallen each year.

  CHART L-2. SINGLE MOTHERS: POVERTY AND CASH WELFARE RECEIPT, 1987-98
<GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT>

    Source: Prepared by the Congressional Research Service.
Based on analysis of U.S. Census Bureau March 1988-99 Current
Population Survey data.

    The number of single mothers in families receiving cash
welfare increased from 2.5 million in 1989, to 3.4 million in
1993, an increase of 900,000, or 36 percent over the 4-year
period. Since 1993, the number of single mothers reporting cash
welfare has fallen to 1.9 million (a 44 percent decline). Over
the same period, the number of poor single mothers who reported
receiving no cash welfare increased by 532,000, from 1.721
million in 1993 to 2.253 million in 1998 (the middle shaded
area shown in chart L-2).
    Chart L-3 shows that cash welfare recipiency rates among
single mothers overall, and among poor single mothers based on
their pretransfer income (cash income excluding cash welfare),
remained fairly steady during the 1987-93 period, but have
fallen considerably since. Among single mothers who were poor
based on their pretransfer cash income, the share who received
cash welfare generally hovered around 63 percent over the 1987-
93 period. As the chart shows, the likelihood of cash welfare
receipt has decreased since 1993 among this population. In
1993, the cash welfare recipiency rate among single mothers
with pretransfer income below poverty was 63 percent; by 1998,
it had fallen to 41 percent.

   CHART L-3. SINGLE MOTHERS: CASH WELFARE RECIPIENCY RATES, 1987-98
<GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT>

    * Pretransfer income is cash income other than cash welfare
payments.

    Source: Prepared by the Congressional Research Service.
Based on analysis of U.S. Census Bureau March 1988-99 Current
Population Survey data.

    Chart L-4 shows cash welfare recipiency rates based on
families' pretransfer (i.e., precash welfare) income relative
to poverty. The top line of the chart depicts the share of
single mothers without other income who reported receiving cash
welfare. The line shows that nearly 90 percent of single
mothers with no pretransfer income reported receiving cash
assistance in 1987-90. However, since 1990, the reported rate
of cash welfare recipiency for this group has continuously
declined, to 77 percent in 1996, and to 61 percent by 1998.
Similarly, for families with very low pretransfer income (below
25 percent of poverty), and for families with pretransfer
incomes between 25 and 50 percent of poverty, cash welfare
recipiency also shows dramatic declines: for the former group
from 72 percent in 1996 to 56 percent in 1998, and for the
latter group from 60 percent in 1995 to 45 percent in 1998.

 CHART L-4. CASH WELFARE RECIPIENCY RATES AMONG SINGLE-MOTHER FAMILIES
             BY PRETRANSFER INCOME POVERTY STATUS, 1987-98
<GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT>

    Source: Prepared by the Congressional Research Service.
Based on analysis of U.S. Census Bureau March 1988-99 Current
Population Survey data.

    Likewise, food stamp recipiency rates among low-income
households have also fallen considerably since 1994. In 1994,
71 percent of single-mother families with household income
below 130 percent of poverty (the Food Stamp Program's gross
income qualifying limit) reported receiving food stamp
benefits; by 1998, the share fell to 57 percent. Among those
with household incomes below 50 percent of the low-household
income threshold, in 1994, 80 percent reported food stamp
receipt; in 1998, 70 percent reported food stamp receipt.

                          Rates of Employment

    While welfare receipt has declined, dramatic gains in
single mothers' employment have occurred since 1994. Chart L-5
shows that for most of the period shown, the employment rate
for single mothers with children under the age of 18 was below
that of comparable married mothers. However, by March 1998, the
employment rate of single mothers surpassed that of married
mothers. The employment rate among single mothers rose steadily
from a recent low of about 57 percent in March 1992 and 1993,
to about 71 percent in March 1999.
    Most dramatic has been the increase in employment among
single mothers who have a child under the age of 3; their
employment rate increased from a recent low of 35.1 percent in
March 1993 (18.1 percentage points below the rate for married
mothers) to a high of 55.8 percent in March 1999 (just 1.2
percentage points below their married counterparts) (chart L-
6). Single mothers with a youngest child age 3-5 also
experienced marked employment gains over the mid-to-late 1990s.
Their employment rate grew from a recent low of 54.1 percent in
March 1992, to 69.8 percent by March 1999, a 15.7 percentage
point increase, surpassing that of their married counterparts
by 6.7 percentage points (not shown). Single mothers whose
youngest child was of school age (age 6-17) had employment
rates about equal to those of their married counterparts over
the 1988-99 period (not shown).

CHART L-5. EMPLOYMENT RATES OF MARRIED AND SINGLE MOTHERS WITH CHILDREN
                  UNDER AGE 18, MARCH 1988-MARCH 1999
<GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT>

    Source: Prepared by the Congressional Research Service.
Based on analysis of U.S. Census Bureau March 1988-99 Current
Population Survey data.

    The healthy economy, combined with a transformed welfare
system, improvements in the EIC, and increases in the minimum
wage, are among the factors thought to have encouraged work
among single mothers in recent years. TANF, and the AFDC
waivers that preceded it, transformed cash assistance from a
needs-based entitlement to a program of temporary assistance,
encouraging work and personal responsibility. Imposition of
work requirements, time limits, and sanctions, and in some
States, more generous earnings disregards, all serve to
encourage work, either in lieu of welfare, or for a temporary
period, in conjunction with welfare. The EIC, which is
conditioned on earnings, is thought to encourage work among
most groups, especially single parents who were not working, or
who were marginally attached to the labor market. Increases in
the EIC, passed by Congress in 1993 and phased in between 1994
and 1996, have increased the financial incentive for many
single mothers to work. Other factors, such as increased
funding for child care subsidies, may also have contributed to
making work possible for more single mothers.

CHART L-6. EMPLOYMENT RATES OF MARRIED AND SINGLE MOTHERS WITH CHILDREN
                   UNDER AGE 3, MARCH 1988-MARCH 1999
<GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT>

    Source: Prepared by the Congressional Research Service.
Based on analysis of U.S. Census Bureau March 1988-99 Current
Population Survey data.

               Work and Welfare Among Poor Single Mothers

    As shown in the previous section, poor single mothers are
less likely to be receiving cash welfare than in previous
years. Likewise, like all single mothers, poor single mothers
are now more likely to be working. Changes in poor mothers'
participation in work and welfare first became evident in the
early-to-mid 1990s, with rates of welfare receipt declining
after 1993, and rates of employment increasing after 1992 (see
chart L-7, top 2 lines). A crossover point was reached between
1996 and 1997, when the chances that a poor single mother would
be working exceeded the chances that she would be receiving
welfare.
    Chart L-7 shows that the share of poor single mothers who
received cash welfare at any time during the year fell from
about 60 percent in the 1987-93 period, to just over 40 percent
in 1998. The rate of decline in welfare receipt among poor
single mothers was greatest between 1996 and 1997, a period
coinciding with the passage and implementation of national
welfare reform legislation. Similarly, the share of poor single
mothers who were working at any time during the year increased
from just above 40 percent in 1992, to about 53 percent in
1998, with the greatest increases occurring in 1996 and 1997.
    The share of poor single mothers who relied on cash welfare
without working dropped from a peak of 45 percent in 1991, to
about 22 percent in 1998, while the share who worked without
relying on cash welfare has increased from a recent low of
about 23 percent in 1993, to just above 34 percent in 1998.
Most of the increase in work without welfare occurred in 1996
and 1997. The share of poor single mothers who combined work
and welfare over the year has remained relatively constant,
between 17 and 19 percent, except for 1 year (1989, when the
share was about 15 percent).

  CHART L-7. POOR SINGLE MOTHERS: WORK AND WELFARE STATUS DURING THE
                             YEAR, 1987-98
<GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT>

    Source: Prepared by the Congressional Research Service.
Based on analysis of U.S. Census Bureau March 1988-99 Current
Population Survey data.

    The share of poor single mothers who reported that they
neither worked, nor received cash welfare during the year (the
dashed line in chart L-7), has increased each year since 1993
(15.2 percent), reaching nearly 25 percent in 1998. This
surprising combination may reflect a mix of circumstances,
including income or support from other sources such as family
members, support from unrelated household members (which is not
included in the official poverty measure), and other means of
support from outside the household not counted on the CPS. It
may also reflect income reporting problems on the CPS,
especially with regard to welfare income. \1\ Finally, welfare
sanction and diversion policies may have contributed to the
increased number of poor mothers neither working nor receiving
welfare.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ A comparison of AFDC/TANF administrative statistics and CPS-
estimated caseload counts suggests that the CPS undercounts actual
cases, and that the CPS undercount has worsened in recent years. From
1987 to 1991, the CPS accounted for roughly 80 percent of the AFDC
administrative caseload count, but by 1998 the CPS was capturing only
about 64 percent. Worsened reporting of cash welfare on the CPS makes
it difficult to gauge how much of the drop in welfare receipt among
single mothers represents eligible families who do not receive
assistance, rather than families who do not report actual welfare aid
on the CPS. To at least some extent, the declining welfare recipiency
rates discussed in this section are likely due to increased
underreporting of cash welfare on the CPS. See Bavier (2000) for a
detailed discussion of cash welfare underreporting on the CPS and other
surveys.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

  Effects of Earnings, Transfers, and Taxes on Single Mothers' Poverty

    As shown in chart L-1, single mothers' poverty status has
improved since 1993. Changes in the economy and changes in
welfare policy and other programs, such as the EIC, have both
direct and indirect effects on poverty. However, the official
U.S. poverty measure counts only family cash income (excluding
capital gains and lump-sum or one-time payments) against a
family's poverty threshold, which varies by family size and
composition, to determine whether a family is counted as poor.
The definition does not include the value of in-kind benefits,
such as food stamps, school lunches, or public housing
subsidies, nor does it include the effects of taxes or tax
credits such as the EIC. Inclusion of in-kind benefits and the
EIC provides a more comprehensive income definition than the
official definition. Additionally, other unrelated household
members may contribute to the family's economic well-being, but
determining the extent to which resources are shared among
unrelated household members is often difficult.
    Chart L-8 shows the effects of income from these other
sources on poverty among all single mothers. Components of
family income are sequentially added and measured against
families' poverty thresholds, as one moves from the top line of
the chart to subsequent lines below:

CHART L-8. EFFECTS OF EARNINGS, TRANSFERS, AND TAXES ON FAMILY POVERTY
       AND HOUSEHOLD LOW-INCOME STATUS ON SINGLE MOTHERS, 1987-98
<GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT>

    Source: Prepared by the Congressional Research Service.
Based on analysis of U.S. Census Bureau March 1988-99 Current
Population Survey data.

  --Line 1: The top line shows the percent of single mothers
        who would be counted as poor if only family earnings
        were counted against the poverty line.
  --Line 2: The second line down includes other sources of cash
        income, in addition to earnings, that were already
        counted above. However, this line does not include cash
        welfare.
  --Line 3: The third line down adds cash welfare to the other
        sources already mentioned, and with those sources,
        represents the income definition used in the official
        poverty measure.
  --Line 4: The fourth line down shows the value of in-kind
        food assistance (i.e., food stamps, free and reduced
        price school lunches, Special Supplemental Nutrition
        Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC)
        payments) when added to cash income and compared to the
        family poverty threshold.
  --Line 5: The fifth line down shows the effect of adding the
        value of the EIC, less Federal and State income taxes
        and payroll taxes, to line 4.
  --Line 6: The bottom (dashed) line shows the effects of
        counting all income in the household in which the
        single mother lives, not just that of her own family,
        and comparing it to an unofficial ``household low-
        income threshold.'' The household low-income threshold
        used here applies family poverty income thresholds,
        which are based on family size and composition, to
        households, based on household size and composition. It
        must be noted that official poverty measurement is
        based on a family concept, which assumes that family
        members share income and economies of scale that result
        from shared living arrangements. It is generally agreed
        among researchers that assumptions regarding income
        sharing and shared economies of scale among related
        family members, who have ties based on blood, marriage,
        and adoption, do not apply to the same extent among
        unrelated household members. Consequently, these
        estimates of household low-income status likely
        overstate the effect of household income on reducing
        poverty among families headed by single mothers.
    In viewing chart L-8, note that the trend in earnings is
the principal factor affecting the declining trend in poverty,
whereas the other income sources, with the exception of the
EIC, affect the level of poverty, more than its trend over
time. Evidence of this effect is that most lines in the chart,
with the exception of the EIC, roughly run parallel to the ones
above.
Effect of earnings and other nonwelfare cash income on poverty
    Chart L-8 shows that between 1993 and 1998, single mothers'
poverty, based on family earnings alone, fell from 56.2 percent
to 47.9 percent (line 1). Adding other cash income, except cash
welfare, to family earnings (line 2), reduces poverty in 1993
from 56.2 percent to 47.4 percent, and in 1998, from 47.9
percent to 38.8 percent.
 Effect of cash welfare on poverty
    When added to other income, cash welfare benefits have only
a small impact on the poverty rate, as these benefits generally
are not sufficient, even when combined with other cash income,
to lift families above the Federal poverty threshold. As shown
by table 7-13 (breakeven points) in section 7, in all but eight
States, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) families
that go to work lose eligibility for benefits before earnings
reach the poverty line, usually long before. Consequently, cash
welfare benefits have little impact on the poverty rate. The
addition of cash welfare (line 3, representing the official
income definition for measuring poverty) reduces poverty only
slightly, from 47.4 percent (line 2) to 45.2 percent in 1993,
and from 38.8 percent to 37.3 percent in 1998. Nonetheless,
cash welfare benefits can have a significant impact on the
level of poor families' incomes, affecting the degree to which
their incomes fall below the poverty income standard. This
impact is not captured by changes in the poverty rate.
Effect of in-kind food assistance on poverty
    The fourth line from the top in chart L-8 shows the effect
on the poverty rate of single mothers by counting government
food assistance, in the form of food stamp benefits and school
lunch benefits and WIC payments. The line shows that food
assistance reduces the poverty rate of single mothers from
about 2-3 percentage points over the period. The antipoverty
effectiveness of food assistance seems to have lessened
somewhat in recent years. In 1995, food assistance reduced the
poverty rate from 40.2 percent (its official measure) to 36.9
percent, a 3.3 percentage point (8.1 percent) reduction in
poverty. In 1998, food assistance reduced the poverty rate from
its official rate of 37.3 percent, to 35.2 percent, a 2.1
percentage point (5.6 percent) reduction.
Effect of EIC and taxes on poverty
    As noted above, the net effect of the EIC (after counting
the effect of reductions in income from Federal and State
income taxes and FICA taxes) (line 5), when added to total
family cash income and food assistance (line 4), causes a
divergence in trend from the lines above. This is especially
notable after 1993. A major expansion of the EIC, passed by
Congress in 1993 and phased in between 1994 and 1996, increased
the amount of the EIC work bonus families might receive. The
antipoverty effectiveness of the EIC was approximately three
times greater in 1998 than in 1993. In 1993, the EIC reduced
the poverty rate (counting food assistance) among single
mothers from 42.7 percent (line 4), to 40.7 percent (line 5), a
2.0 percentage point (4.6 percent) reduction. In 1998, the EIC
reduced poverty from 35.2 percent to 29.7 percent, a 5.5
percentage point (15.7 percent) reduction.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ Note that the value of the EIC on the CPS is based on U.S.
Census Bureau imputations, rather than actual reported tax credits.
Also, the EIC is different than most sources of income, as most
families receive the EIC as a lump-sum refund.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    As receipt of the EIC is conditioned on earnings, the
growing impact of the EIC in part reflects the rise in work
rates among single mothers. Among those who are working and
poor (before counting the EIC), the EIC helps lift the income
of some above the poverty line. Although the EIC expansion
provided additional income to low-income families who were
already working, it may also have helped induce increased
employment among family heads with low to moderate earnings
potential, and thus contributed to the decline in poverty based
on earned income only that has occurred since 1993 (shown as
the top line in the chart).
    Note too, that to the extent that changes in cash welfare
programs in recent years have encouraged work, these changes
may have had an indirect effect on poverty by increasing
earnings and, through earnings, making the EIC available to a
greater number of families.
 Effect of all household income on poverty
    The household low-income line (bottom line) shows that if
all household members' income were shared equally among
household members, the poverty rate among single mothers would
drop by at most 3-4 percentage points over the 1987-98 period.
Adding other members' household income, and counting them as
though they were family members who shared income equally,
reduced the post-in-kind transfer, posttax, poverty rate in
1993 from 40.7 percent to 36.8 percent; in 1998 the post-in-
kind transfer, posttax, poverty rate would have dropped from
29.7 percent to 26.2 percent. Again, this is most likely an
overstatement of the possible effect that shared household
living arrangements might have on single mothers' poverty
status, because of uncertainty about the extent to which such
income is actually shared.

         Earnings-Poor Single Mothers After Taxes and Transfers

    This section focuses specifically on single mothers with
family incomes below poverty, based on family earnings alone,
to gauge the effects of other income, transfers and taxes over
time. This group, shown in the top line in chart L-8 for the
1987-98 period, accounted for about half of all single mothers.
Chart L-9 shows their distribution, relative to the poverty
threshold, after cash income from all sources, in-kind food
assistance, and taxes (including the EIC) is taken into
account. Unlike chart L-8 above, which simply measured whether
income was below poverty, chart L-9 examines the degree of
poverty after taxes and transfers, for families defined as poor
based on family earnings alone. The chart includes families
with no earnings, as well as those who have earnings but whose
earnings fall below poverty.
    The chart shows that while the majority of ``earnings-
poor'' single mothers have seen improvements in income relative
to poverty since 1991, the improvement occurred mostly in 1994
and 1995 (although it continued after a slight decline in
1996). Since 1996, the bottom 40 percent of these single
mothers have seen no improvement in their income relative to
poverty, and the bottom 20 percent have actually seen declines
in their income status relative to poverty.
    The chart shows, for example, that over the 1987-98 period,
the top 20 percent of single mothers who were poor based on
earnings alone had income from other sources that helped bring
their families' incomes above the poverty line. Over the
period, these families became somewhat more economically
secure: in 1987, the top 20 percent of earnings-poor mothers
had a net in-kind aftertax income that was 5 percent or more
above the poverty line. By 1998, the top 20 percent of
earnings-poor single mothers had net income that was 25 percent
or more above poverty. The chart shows strong net income gains
relative to poverty among earnings-poor single mothers over the
1993-95 period, followed by a slight decline in 1996, for all
but the bottom 20 percent of mothers. Since 1996, mothers in
the top half of the distribution show income gains relative to
poverty. However, those in the bottom 40 percent show no gain
in income security since 1996, and those in the bottom 20
percent show a decline in their level of income security. The
bottom 20 percent of earnings-poor single mothers show a
comparatively large decline in net income relative to poverty
in 1997 (from 52 percent of poverty in 1996, to 46 percent of
poverty in 1997 and 1998).

CHART L-9. POSTTAX POST-IN-KIND TRANSFER INCOME AS A PERCENT OF POVERTY
 AMONG SINGLE MOTHERS CONSIDERED POOR BASED ON FAMILY EARNINGS ALONE,
                                1987-98
<GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT>

    Source: Prepared by the Congressional Research Service.
Based on analysis of U.S. Census Bureau March 1988-99 Current
Population Survey data.

            Income Sources Among Poorest Single Mothers \3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \3\ In addition to the analysis which follows, see: Primus, et al.
(1999); Bavier (1999); and Haskins (in press) for other research
discussing recent declines in income among the poorest families.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The composition and level of income among the poorest
single-mother families has changed markedly in recent years,
reflecting increased earnings supplemented by increased earned
income credits (EIC) and reductions in cash welfare and food
stamps. For single mothers in the bottom fifth (bottom
quintile), increased earnings and EIC have not been sufficient
in recent years to offset losses in cash welfare and food
stamps, resulting in reduced income since 1996. Families in the
bottom 20-40 percent (second quintile) also received less cash
welfare and food stamps in recent years, but in 1998, increased
earnings and EIC were sufficient to offset these losses.
    Charts L-10 and L-11 examine sources of income among the
bottom quintile (bottom 20 percent) and the second lowest
quintile (bottom 20-40 percent) of single-mother families,
respectively, based on their pretax cash income relative to
poverty. The charts show the average annual income, in 1998
dollars, from the following sources: cash public assistance
(Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), TANF, and
general assistance); Supplemental Security Income (SSI); food
stamps (market value); child support and alimony; other cash
income other than earnings; net earnings (earnings net of the
employee share of FICA payroll taxes and any Federal or State
income taxes); and the EIC. The employee share of FICA payroll
taxes, and any Federal or State income tax payments are also
shown as negative values. Note that these estimates are based
on year-to-year income comparisons of cross-sectional survey
data, rather than a comparison of incomes for the same families
over time.

 CHART L-10. BOTTOM QUINTILE OF SINGLE-MOTHER FAMILIES: AVERAGE ANNUAL
              INCOME BY SOURCE, 1987-98 (IN 1998 DOLLARS)
<GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT>

    Note._Quintiles based on ranking of ratios of family cash,
pretax income, relative to poverty. Taxes include Federal and
State income taxes and FICA taxes.

    Source: Prepared by the Congressional Research Service.
Based on analysis of U.S. Census Bureau March 1988-99 Current
Population Survey data.

    Chart L-10 shows an upsurge in annual average income among
single mothers in the bottom quintile, from 1993 to 1994.
Average total income increased from $6,119 to $6,997; an
increase of $878, or 14 percent. Components of the increase
were: cash public assistance, $97 (4 percent); food stamps,
$257 (12 percent); SSI, $84 (56 percent); net earnings, $316
(50 percent); and EIC, $152 (131 percent).
    From 1994 through 1996, average total income among the
bottom quintile of single-mother families remained essentially
unchanged, drifting down slightly perhaps, despite dramatic
changes in its composition. In 1995 and 1996, earnings of
single mothers in the bottom quintile continued to increase, as
did EIC, while cash assistance (AFDC and general assistance)
and food stamps fell. The growing importance of the EIC as an
earnings supplement over the 1994-96 period can be illustrated
by examining the average EIC as a share of average earnings.
From 1993 to 1996, the EIC ``work bonus'' had doubled, from 18
percent to 37 percent of earnings.

 CHART L-11. SECOND QUINTILE OF SINGLE-MOTHER FAMILIES: AVERAGE ANNUAL
              INCOME BY SOURCE, 1987-98 (IN 1998 DOLLARS)
<GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT>

    Note._Quintiles based on ranking of ratios of family cash,
pretax income, relative to poverty. Taxes include Federal and
State income taxes and FICA taxes.

    Source: Prepared by the Congressional Research Service.
Based on analysis of U.S. Census Bureau March 1988-99 Current
Population Survey data.

    Chart L-10 further shows that average cash welfare and food
stamp benefits reported by single mothers in the bottom
quintile continued to decline in 1997 and 1998, and that
earnings combined with the EIC did not rise enough to offset
this loss. As a result, average total family income for this
population was lower in 1997-98 than in 1994-96; however, it
was higher than in all years preceding 1994, with the exception
of 1987. Average annual cash welfare assistance received by
single mothers in the bottom quintile in 1998 was 43 percent
below what this group had received, on average, in the most
recent high year of 1994 ($1,410 versus $2,486). Food stamps
for this group in 1998 were 29 percent below their 1994 value
($1,710 versus $2,422). In contrast, net earnings were 67
percent higher in 1998 than in 1994 ($1,612 versus $966), and
nearly 2\1/2\ times higher than in 1993 ($1,612 versus $650).
Nonetheless, while combined cash assistance and food stamps
fell by $1,788 from 1994 to 1998, net earnings combined with
EIC grew by $1,005, and offset only 56 percent of the loss in
cash welfare and food stamps over the period.
    Chart L-11 is similar to chart L-10, but shows average
income by source for the second quintile of single-mother
families, ranked by their income relative to poverty. The chart
shows comparatively large gains in average total income from
1993 to 1995, due largely to increased earnings and EIC. Over
this period, average total income increased from $11,396 to
$14,433, a gain of nearly 27 percent. With the exception of
1996, average earnings for single mothers in the second
quintile continued to grow; however, earnings and the EIC were
insufficient to offset declines in cash assistance and food
stamps in 1996 and 1997. From 1995 to 1997, combined earnings
and EIC gains ($792) offset only 63 percent of the loss in
combined cash assistance and food stamp benefits ($1,253) over
the period.
    By 1998, average total income among single mothers in the
second quintile reached a new high. In 1998, earnings in
combination with the EIC were more than offsetting the loss in
combined cash assistance and food stamps that occurred over the
1995-98 period. The gain in average net earnings, in
combination with EIC ($2,343), more than offset the $1,894 loss
in combined cash assistance and food stamps. By 1998, average
net earnings accounted for over half of these families' incomes
($7,329 in earnings out of a total net income of $14,625) and
cash assistance ($1,177) accounted for just 8 percent. In
contrast, in 1987, earnings accounted for about 28 percent of
this group's income ($3,363 in earnings out of a total net
income of $12,013) and cash assistance ($4,157) comprised about
35 percent. In 1998, average total income for families in the
second quintile ($14,625) was nearly 22 percent above that in
1987 ($12,013).

                        Consumption Expenditures

    Though annual income information is the basis of most
official measures of economic well-being (e.g., poverty
statistics), it suffers some drawbacks. Income during any one
period imperfectly measures the value of goods and services a
family can consume, since families may liquidate savings,
borrow money, or access some other sources of funds. This
section presents information on consumer expenditures from the
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics Consumer Expenditure Survey
(CEX), as a complement to the preceding analysis of income data
from the Current Population Survey (CPS). Consumption data are
derived from the CEX, which has a relatively small sample size
of 5,000 households, compared to the CPS which has a sample of
47,000 households. The small CEX sample size, relative to the
CPS, means that data from the CPS are likely to be more
reliable, and large year-to-year differences are required for
changes estimated from the CEX to meet standard tests of
statistical significance. Differences noted in the text met
tests of statistical significance, using ``replicate sample''
techniques (Mosteller & Tukey, 1977).
Average consumption for single mothers
    Table L-1 summarizes information on consumption
expenditures, welfare receipt, and work for single-mother
families from 1994 to 1997. The CPS data described above showed
that poverty continued to decline for these families over these
years. The CEX data show that consumer expenditures grew for
this group over the period, by 18 percent. This is well above
inflation during the 1994-97 period (8 percent). The CEX
information, like the CPS data, shows a sharp decline in
welfare receipt and an increase in work among single mothers
over this period.

 TABLE L-1.--CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURES, WELFARE RECEIPT, AND WORK EXPERIENCE FOR SINGLE-MOTHER FAMILIES, 1994-97
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                 Year                    Percent
                            Category                           ----------------------------------------  change,
                                                                  1994      1995      1996      1997     1994-97
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 Average consumption expenditures.............................   $19,633   $19,830   $21,405   $23,245      18.4
Expenditures on ``work-related'' categories...................     4,136     4,361     5,050     5,178      25.2
Other consumption expenditures................................    15,497    15,469    16,355    18,068      16.6
Welfare receipt (percent).....................................      33.9      32.8      23.2      20.3     -40.2
Average number of workers in family...........................      0.93      0.92      1.00      1.02       9.8
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note.--Data are from quarterly interview surveys; quarterly expenditures have been annualized for purposes of
  display; year noted represents year of the interview; actual expenditures may have occurred in the prior year;
  dollars are not inflation-adjusted.

Source: Congressional Research Service tabulations of data from the U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor
  Statistics Consumer Expenditure Survey.

    The table shows overall consumption expenditures for
single-mother families but also divides consumption
expenditures into: (1) a category that explicitly includes
spending on items commonly associated with work
(transportation, child care, and retirement contributions
including the employee share of Social Security payroll taxes);
and (2) all other expenditures (including expenditures to meet
basic needs, such as food and shelter). As shown in the table,
some of the overall increase in consumption expenditures for
single mothers is attributable to work expenses. The work
expenses category showed a 25 percent increase over the 1994-97
period, while other expenses grew by 17 percent. The increase
in work expenses is consistent with other trends shown in the
table, such as the decline in welfare receipt and increase in
work.
Consumption expenditures for the poorest families
    Analyses of national income surveys (for example, the CPS)
have shown that income growth among the poorest single mothers
stagnated after 1994. Information from the CEX also shows that
income for the poorest one-fifth of single mothers has not
grown since 1994 (the estimates actually show a decline in
income, but that decline is too small to meet standard criteria
of statistical significance). However, even among the poorest
single-mother families, consumption expenditures have
increased.
    Chart L-12 shows aftertax income, consumption expenditures
classified as work expenses, and other consumption expenditures
for the bottom quintile of single-mother families during 1994-
97. The chart shows that income remained relatively stable,
while consumption expenditures--both those commonly thought of
as work expenses and other consumption expenditures--increased.

   CHART L-12. AFTERTAX INCOME, WORK EXPENSES, AND OTHER CONSUMPTION
 EXPENDITURES FOR THE POOREST FIFTH (INCOME QUINTILE) OF FEMALE-HEADED
                           FAMILIES; 1994-97
<GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT>

    Note._Data are from quarterly interview surveys; quarterly
expenditures have been annualized for purposes of display; year
noted represents year of the interview, actual expenditures may
have occurred in the prior year. Information is for ``complete
income reporters'' only. Dollars are not inflation adjusted.

    Source: Congressional Research Service tabulations of data
from the U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics
Consumer Expenditure Survey.

    The chart also shows that, for the low-income population,
reported consumption expenditures typically exceed reported
incomes. Over the 1994-97 period, this gap appeared to grow.
There are a number of possible explanations:
 1. Some who have low incomes are temporarily poor. For those
        families that are experiencing a temporary dip in
        income, withdrawing savings can finance consumption
        expenditures that exceed income.
 2. Some low-income people might access credit markets to pay
        for spending that exceeds income. Poor families
        increased their credit card debt in the early-to-mid
        1990s (Bird et al., 1999) to a greater extent than
        other families. If this trend continued into the later
        1990s, it could account for some of the growing gap in
        spending and income among the low-income population.
 3. Income might be underreported relative to spending,
        particularly for certain types of income. Edin and Lein
        (1997) discuss various survival strategies that very
        low-income, single mothers use to make ends meet:
        network-based or agency-based support, unreported work
        and work in the underground economy, and cash
        contributions from families, friends, boyfriends, or
        former spouses who live elsewhere. These latter types
        of ``income'' are unlikely to be reported as income on
        household surveys.
Interpreting the consumption data
    This analysis of consumption expenditures complements, but
does not substitute for, the analysis of income data presented
earlier. However, its finding that many of the lowest income
families can consume well above their income underscores the
difficulties in measuring the economic well-being of single
mothers and their families.

       FINDINGS FROM IMPACT STUDIES OF WELFARE REFORM INITIATIVES

                  Methodology Issues in Impact Studies

    A large body of research on the effects of welfare reform
initiatives is available from impact evaluations. Unlike the
national data discussed above, which show trends in outcomes
related to welfare reform but do not attribute these trends to
any single cause, impact evaluations are designed to measure
the difference a program makes on outcomes related to its
goals. For example, a welfare-to-work program will be evaluated
based on the difference between employment, earnings, and
welfare receipt under the program versus the outcomes produced
by an alternative set of policies. The focus of an impact
evaluation is the incremental difference in outcomes observed
under one set of policies versus another.
Random assignment experiments
    There are a number of different techniques available to
evaluate the impact of policy changes, but most evaluations
conducted after the passage of the Family Support Act in 1988
used random assignment to experimental and control groups.
These studies assign potential participants to two or more
groups. Individuals assigned to a control group are subject to
current policies (no policy change); individuals assigned to
the experimental group (or groups) are subject to a different
package of policy initiatives, such as time limits on
assistance, or sanctions for failing to comply with a mandatory
work requirement. Because individuals are randomly assigned to
these groups, any differences between the experimental and
control groups may be attributed to the policy initiative
itself. This difference is therefore the impact of these policy
changes.
    For a policy to have an impact, it must be determined that
the impact was not simply a chance occurrence. Differences
between experimental and control groups that pass statistical
significance tests are reported as policy impacts. Whether a
difference is determined to be an impact generally depends on
two factors: (1) the size of the difference between the
experimental and control groups, and (2) the size of the sample
in the evaluation. Impact evaluations with smaller research
samples tend to report fewer impacts. In these smaller samples,
the difference may need to be substantial in order to pass
tests of statistical significance. On the other hand, impact
evaluations with larger research samples tend to report more
policy impacts.
Data used in impact evaluations
    Most impact studies use one of two types of data:
administrative data or survey data. Administrative data are
those used in administering Federal-State transfer programs.
They are sometimes used for research because it is possible to
economically collect large amounts of data on individuals over
time without the response errors that occur if participants are
asked about their public assistance receipt or work activities.
However, administrative data come from data systems used to
determine eligibility and benefits, not systems designed
specifically for research. Therefore, evaluators are limited to
the outcomes collected as well as the format in which these
outcomes are collected.
    Welfare and food stamp receipt generally come from public
assistance data files used to store information on a recipient
household's characteristics, income, and benefit receipt.
Employment and earnings information generally are from
unemployment insurance (UI) wage files that track UI wages and
taxes paid on behalf of an employee and are used to determine
UI eligibility and benefits upon involuntary unemployment.
These files do not collect information on all sources of
employment, since the self-employed and Federal employees are
not covered by the UI system. UI taxes and benefits are also
based on quarters of earnings, and therefore UI wage files
contain information only about quarterly earnings (not hourly
wages, for example). Administrative data also do not capture
information from outside the State. Therefore, if program
participants move, their work and welfare activity are not
going to be reflected in either the UI or public assistance
administrative files.
    Researchers also use survey data to examine the effects of
policy changes. Unlike administrative data, the primary purpose
of survey data, which is collected through telephone surveys,
mail surveys, or in-person interviews, is evaluation.
Therefore, surveys are designed by those involved in the
evaluation effort to solicit information on the outcomes of
interest to the evaluation team. In addition, compared to
administrative data, the costs of collecting survey data are
higher. Because it is usually not possible to survey every
individual in the targeted population, surveys often focus on a
representative sample of the population, with the goal of
generalizing these results to the larger group. For these
results to be generalized, a large majority of the survey
sample must participate. While evaluation studies that measure
the impact of welfare policies on those who remain on the
welfare rolls often obtain data on most participants, studies
of former welfare recipients almost always have trouble with
missing data because it is difficult to find participants once
they leave the program. Another concern with survey data is
that individuals may fail to understand the questions asked or
respond truthfully and accurately.
Interpreting impact evaluations
    The findings of impact evaluations are most valid for the
particular place, time, context, and policy examined in the
study. Generally, more confidence can be placed in findings
that are replicated in a number of different settings. The
findings of a random assignment evaluation are also limited to
the population studied. This is often smaller than the entire
population that might be affected by a policy. Most random
assignment evaluations of welfare policy changes examine only
those already receiving or applying for assistance. However,
welfare policy changes might affect those not receiving
assistance by making welfare more or less attractive to them.
Random assignment impact evaluations generally do not measure
these ``entry effects.''
    In general, evaluation studies of welfare policy changes
measure the effect of a package of initiatives (for example, a
State's AFDC waiver program), rather than the effect of a
single policy initiative. Researchers interested in the effect
of a specific policy initiative have turned to a more
sophisticated method of analysis, often introducing a third
comparison group. In the Minnesota Family Investment Program
(MFIP) and the Vermont Welfare Restructuring Project (WRP), for
example, participants in a third comparison group (besides the
regular experimental and control groups) were subject to the
same policy initiatives as the experimental group, but were
also subject to an additional policy initiative (for example, a
requirement to work after 6 months of assistance). With the
same random assignment and basic assumptions, any observed
differences between the two experimental groups may be
attributed to the additional policy initiative.
    Researchers have also used a third comparison group to
evaluate an additional package of policy initiatives, an
example being the National Evaluation of Welfare-to-Work
Strategies (NEWWS). In the NEWWS design, the control group was
subject to the former AFDC rules, one experimental group was
subject to a package of work first initiatives and a second
experimental group was subject to a package of basic education
initiatives. Any observed differences between each of the
experimental groups and the control group could be attributed
to the different package of initiatives. The goal of this
evaluation design was to measure the effect of a program that
stressed work first versus a program that focused more
specifically on education.
    The limitations of random assignment experiments have led
some to use alternative methods to estimate the impact of
policy changes. A few evaluations have used a ``quasi-
experimental'' design. While the experimental design allows
researchers to evaluate the program's impact, measured as the
difference between the experimental and control groups, the
quasi-experimental design allows researchers to evaluate the
program's what-if effect. This is measured by comparing
outcomes, after implementation of the policy changes, to those
that would have been expected without the policy change, using
administrative data as a baseline. Statistical techniques are
used to ``control'' for various factors that could affect the
examined outcomes (these factors would be controlled for in the
experimental design through random assignment). While quasi-
experimental designs use administrative data and therefore
allow for a much larger sample, results can be sensitive to the
specific technique used as they rely on many assumptions.
Included studies
    The remainder of this section presents results from a
review of impact evaluations of programs undertaken since
passage of the Family Support Act of 1988 that serve the cash
welfare population and, in a few cases, other low-income
individuals. The discussion focuses on evaluations available as
of June 2000. The discussion is organized into four sections:
 1. Welfare to work, which focuses on findings related to
        earnings, employment, and receipt of cash assistance;
 2. Family formation and structure, which focuses on findings
        related to marital status and childbearing;
 3. Economic status, which focuses on findings related to the
        overall income and well-being of single mothers
        including health assistance and child care; and
 4. Child well-being, which focuses on findings related to
        child development, including academic achievement,
        behavior, and health status.
    These categories were chosen based on the stated purposes
of TANF, and on the types of outcomes evaluated in the studies.
Each of the four sections begins with a background discussion
of the relevant policy issues, highlights evaluations with
noteworthy results, and provides a brief overview of
evaluations that have reported information for outcomes
relevant to that section. Since many of the evaluations
examined impacts on several different outcomes (e.g., welfare
to work and child well-being), the same evaluations are
discussed in more than one of the four sections.
    Most of these evaluations are based on pre-TANF policies.
However, their results have informed the creation of TANF and
many of the policy initiatives tested have been included in
State TANF Programs. States have broad flexibility to design
their TANF Programs with minimal Federal requirements. Each
TANF Program is unique and therefore, the results for one study
may not be generalizable to a program in another State.
Ideally, the results highlighted in this appendix should be
interpreted in the context of the specific program's
environment (such as the State's economy and population), in
addition to the overall design and implementation of the
program. Table L-2 describes major policies tested in these
evaluations.

                        Welfare-to-Work Impacts

    Promoting work to end dependence on government benefits is
part of the stated purpose of the Temporary Assistance for
Needy Families (TANF) Program. TANF requires recipients to
engage in work (as defined by the State) within 2 years, and
requires States to penalize recipients who fail to meet work
requirements. In addition, States are subject to work
participation standards.
    The effect of welfare programs on work has been the focus
of a voluminous amount of research since the late 1960s.
Studies that concentrate on the effects on employment,
earnings, and continued welfare receipt constitute the bulk of
the research undertaken since the 1988 enactment of the Family
Support Act.

             TABLE L-2.--POLICY CHANGES UNDER WELFARE REFORM
------------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------------------------------------------------
Asset limit increase......................  Set countable asset limit
                                             above the $1,000 of AFDC
                                             law and/or permit
                                             recipients to have a
                                             vehicle of greater value
                                             than allowed by AFDC law
                                             ($1,500 in equity value).
Child support liberalization..............  Disregard more than $50
                                             monthly of child support.
Earnings disregard enhancement............  Disregard more earnings than
                                             AFDC law allowed (after 4
                                             months of work, the AFDC
                                             disregard was $120
                                             monthly).
Education-focused programs................  Require participation in a
                                             program of education and
                                             training.
Employment-focused program................  Require participation in an
                                             employment-focused program,
                                             such as job search.
Family cap................................  Deny increase in family
                                             benefit (or pay less than
                                             full benefit) for new baby
                                             conceived or born to mother
                                             already on welfare.
Food stamp benefit combined with cash       Combine cash aid and food
 grant.                                      stamps into one cash grant.
Mixed employment/education program........  Assign recipients to either
                                             an employment-focused or
                                             education/training program.
Personal responsibility sanctions.........  Penalize family for failure
                                             to meet personal
                                             responsibility rules like
                                             assuring school attendance
                                             or taking the child for
                                             immunizations.
Time limit................................  End family benefits when
                                             adult has received
                                             assistance for a specified
                                             period.
Time limit (adult only)...................  Reduce family benefits (end
                                             adult share) when adult has
                                             received assistance for a
                                             specified period.
Transitional benefits extension...........  Extend transitional Medicaid
                                             and/or child care beyond
                                             the 12 months required by
                                             AFDC law (for those who
                                             lose eligibility for cash
                                             aid due to increased
                                             earnings).
Two-parent family eligibility.............  End special eligibility
                                             rules for two-parent
                                             families.
Wage supplementation......................  Use welfare benefit to
                                             subsidize wages of
                                             recipients.
Work requirements: younger child..........  Require mothers with
                                             children younger than age 3
                                             to participate in work/
                                             training (AFDC required
                                             work if youngest child was
                                             3, but permitted States to
                                             lower this to age 1).
Work sanctions............................  Penalize work failure more
                                             severely than AFDC/Job
                                             Opportunities and Basic
                                             Skills (JOBS) law allowed
                                             (e.g., loss of adult
                                             benefit and use of
                                             protective payee).
Work-trigger time limit...................  Require work as a condition
                                             of continued eligibility
                                             for assistance after being
                                             on the rolls for a
                                             specified period.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Generally, the post-Family Support Act research shows:
 1. Mandatory welfare-to-work programs are associated with
        increased employment, and often also increased average
        earnings and decreased cash assistance payments. This
        includes welfare-to-work programs with a strong
        employment focus (``work first'') as well as programs
        that provide education. The magnitude of the impacts
        varies greatly among the programs evaluated.
 2. Though both employment- and education-focused programs have
        succeeded in raising employment and earnings, their
        impacts show up at different times. ``Work first''
        programs have immediate impacts, but they sometimes
        fade. Such programs often speed up the process of
        finding a job for those who would have worked anyway,
        and some who find a job subsequently lose it.
        Education-focused programs sometimes have delayed
        impacts on raising employment and earnings. Two of the
        most effective programs--California's Greater Avenues
        for Independence Program (GAIN) in Riverside during the
        1980s and early 1990s, and the Portland, Oregon program
        of the 1990s--were mixed services programs that were
        ``work first'' for some participants, but provided
        basic education for those determined to need it before
        entering the labor force.
 3. Some programs that combine mandated participation in
        employment-focused activities with enhanced disregards
        of earnings (a financial incentive to work) have been
        particularly effective in raising earnings and
        employment. Moreover, these impacts persist. However
        (especially in States with high case benefit levels),
        they sometimes increase cash assistance payments and
        months on welfare as the enhanced earnings disregard
        permits working people to be on welfare at higher
        levels of earnings. No increase in cash assistance was
        found in States with low benefit levels.
 4. Most of the evidence from programs that included time
        limits (Connecticut, Florida, and Virginia) failed to
        show impacts on receipt of cash benefits before
        families reached the time limits. In other words,
        anticipation of benefit-termination time limits did not
        cause recipients to leave welfare early. However, all
        three programs also had enhanced earnings disregards
        that could have offset any behavioral response to the
        time limit. The disregards continue cash assistance
        eligibility for some whose earnings otherwise would
        exceed program limits.
 5. The ``messages'' and expectations that a program conveys to
        participants affect its impact. Program messages, or
        the strength of the messages, often vary from site to
        site. For example, all California GAIN Programs in the
        late 1980s and early 1990s operated under the same
        statewide rules. However, the Riverside program
        projected a strong message that its purpose was for
        recipients to get employed quickly. Probably as a
        result of this message, the Riverside program also had
        some of the largest employment and earnings impacts of
        evaluated welfare-to-work programs. The program message
        might also affect how participants respond to time
        limits. Because of the variation in program messages,
        even among programs with the same rules, it is
        difficult to generalize evaluation findings from a
        specific site to other programs that might nominally
        have similar rules.
Background and analytical issues
    Research shows that offering cash welfare to families
reduces work effort (Danziger, et al., 1981). The decision to
work requires a choice between the benefits that can be
obtained in the work force and those available from allocating
time to domestic activities (such as childrearing) or leisure.
Though the low-income population is diverse, the low wages that
are offered to most make welfare an economically more
attractive option than a job. Additionally, some who are
working might decide to reduce their hours of work and make up
part of their lost earnings with the welfare payment.
    The major issues in welfare-to-work evaluations can be
classified into two groups:
 1. Can programs be designed to overcome the work disincentives
        inherent in welfare? Specifically, can work efforts be
        increased by lowering the rate at which earnings cause
        a cut in benefits, or, can these disincentives only be
        overcome by requiring mandatory participation in a work
        or job preparation program?
 2. Can programs be offered that increase the earnings
        capacities of welfare recipients so that work becomes
        more attractive than welfare? What type of programs are
        most effective, ``work first'' or education-focused?
        \4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \4\ For an overview of theoretical issues of the labor supply of
women, see Killingsworth & Heckman (1986). See Becker (1965) for a
discussion of theory of the allocation of time between market
activities (work) and domestic activities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Work incentives/disincentives.--Empirical research dating
back to the 1960s provides evidence that welfare is a
disincentive to work (Danziger et al., 1981; Moffitt, 1992). To
counteract the work disincentives, policies have been sought to
either lessen the disincentive or require some participation in
work or job preparation activities.
    One set of policies seeks to ``make work pay,'' often by
reducing the rate at which a family loses welfare benefits as
their earnings increase. Under the former AFDC Program, after 4
months on a job, cash benefits were reduced $1 for each
additional $1 in earnings above $120 a month. Thus, a family's
total income did not change with increased work effort, as it
faced an implicit marginal tax rate of 100 percent for earnings
above $120 monthly.
    Increasing the amount of earnings disregarded in
calculating welfare benefits lowers the implicit tax rate faced
by recipient families. However, the bulk of empirical research
on the effectiveness of work incentives, for both increasing
work and reducing welfare receipt, was discouraging (Moffitt,
1992). Increasing earnings disregards raises the level of
income at which a family loses eligibility for benefits. This
keeps more families on the rolls and could actually decrease
work, through reductions in work effort that are at least
partially offset by the welfare payment. The welfare caseload
could increase, rather than decrease, as some who were
previously ineligible for benefits would be made eligible by
increasing earnings disregards. Nonexperimental research
indicates that any increase in work effort by those already on
the rolls would be canceled out by reduced work effort among
new recipients.
    The disappointing findings of research on work incentives
during the 1970s and 1980s may have played a role in
policymakers' decisions to consider programs of mandatory
participation in work activities or job preparation. Work
incentives were sharply limited by the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1981 (Public Law 97-35), which also
permitted States to require welfare recipients to work in
exchange for their benefits. Mandatory welfare-to-work programs
impose a ``time cost'' on welfare recipients, which reduces
their ability to allocate more time to domestic activities or
leisure. For some programs (e.g., those that require work in
exchange for welfare), the imposition of this time cost makes
welfare less attractive and theoretically should reduce welfare
participation. However, if these activities also provide
benefits to recipients (such as education and training), the
time costs might not result in reduced participation.
     Enhancing earnings capacities.--Higher earnings are
associated both with higher levels of formal education and
training and job experience (Willis, 1986).\5\ Though the
welfare population is quite diverse, the most disadvantaged
recipients tend to have relatively low levels of schooling as
well as relatively little work experience. Higher earnings
capacities can be expected to make work more attractive than
welfare. However, there has been an ongoing debate about which
of the following policies are more likely to move and keep
people off welfare by enhancing their earnings capacity:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \5\ Earnings and earnings capacities of individuals are usually
analyzed using ``human capital theory,'' which relates wages to the
skills individuals bring to a job (Becker, 1964). The most common
empirical model of wages was developed by Mincer and Polachek (1974),
with earnings estimated as a function of schooling and job experience.
For estimates of earnings capacities for single women with children,
see Haveman and Buron (1993).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
  --programs that quickly move recipients into work to acquire
        work experience, often by forgoing formal education and
        training, with job search the most common first
        activity required,
  --programs that encourage recipients to acquire education and
        skills, often by deferring work and acquisition of job
        experience, or
  --programs that provide a mix of services, with the first
        activity determined by an assessment of individual
        skills and needs.
Highlights of selected evaluations
    The post-Family Support Act welfare reform programs
experimented with a wide variety of welfare-to-work strategies.
In general, where evaluations compared participants assigned to
a mandatory welfare-to-work program with recipients not
assigned to the program, those in the welfare-to-work program
had higher employment rates, higher average earnings, and lower
average welfare benefits. Average earnings impacts are
calculated based on the earnings of all members of an
experimental or control group, including nonworking members who
have $0 earnings. Average earnings have been increased by: (1)
increasing employment; (2) increasing hourly wages of those
employed; or (3) a mix of both. The followup period for these
evaluations varies. For evaluations with a followup period of 2
years or less, impacts reflect short-term effects of a program.
     Mandatory welfare-to-work programs.--Almost all of the
welfare-to-work programs evaluated since passage of the Family
Support Act are mandatory work or job preparation programs.
That is, welfare recipients were required to participate in
activities or face a financial sanction. The degree of the
financial sanction varied from program to program.
Additionally, the degree to which participation requirements
were enforced varied from program to program, but most were at
least nominally mandatory.
    The Job Opportunities and Basic Skills (JOBS) Program
created by the Family Support Act of 1988 mandated
participation of most able-bodied Aid to Families with
Dependent Children (AFDC) parents whose youngest child was age
3 or older in a program that provided a wide array of
employment and education and training services. States had the
option of mandating participation for parents with a child as
young as age 1. Services were provided subject to available
funding. The purpose of JOBS was to assure that needy families
with children obtained education, training, and employment
services to help them avoid long-term welfare dependence.
    There were two major evaluations of the JOBS Programs--an
evaluation of the Nation's largest JOBS Program, California's
GAIN (Riccio et al., 1994); and NEWWS (U.S. Department, 2000a).
Both evaluations were fielded in multiple sites, and tested a
number of different approaches to moving welfare recipients
into the work force. GAIN was a single program, but was
implemented differently in different sites. NEWWS is an
evaluation of 11 different welfare-to-work programs. In the
GAIN and NEWWS evaluations, recipients assigned to the program
group were subject to participation requirements and were
provided services; those assigned to the control group were not
subject to participation requirements or provided services, but
could otherwise seek employment and training in their
communities. These evaluations provide information about the
impact of welfare programs operating in the early-to-mid 1990s,
before widespread use of AFDC waivers and before the creation
of TANF.
    Over a 3-year followup period, the GAIN Program produced
employment gains in five out of six sites, earnings gains in
three out of the six sites, and reductions in cash welfare
payments in four out of the six sites. The GAIN Program
provided basic education for those assessed in need of
education (i.e., they lacked a high school diploma or basic
skills) and job search for others. However, county-by-county
implementation of GAIN varied, with some counties emphasizing
education more than others. The impacts in Riverside were
particularly noteworthy; the employment rate was increased by
26 percent and average total earnings were increased by 49
percent over the 3-year followup period. The Riverside program
was characterized by a strong employment message provided to
all, even those assigned to basic education under GAIN's rules.
    Impacts from 2 years of followup data are available for all
11 programs in the NEWWS evaluation. NEWWS tested programs that
had an employment-focused approach as well as education-focused
programs. The 11 programs are: Atlanta, Georgia (employment-
focused); Atlanta (education-focused); Grand Rapids, Michigan
(employment-focused); Grand Rapids (education-focused);
Riverside, California (employment-focused); Riverside
(education-focused); Columbus, Ohio (integrated case
management); Columbus Ohio (traditional case management);
Detroit, Michigan; Oklahoma City (applicants only); and
Portland, Oregon. Statistically significant increases in the
percent ever employed in year 1 or 2 were found in all programs
except for Oklahoma City (a program that evaluated impacts on
applicants only) and the two Columbus, Ohio programs (that
tested integrated and traditional case management). However, by
the last quarter of year 2, significant impacts were found for
the two Columbus programs, so that the evaluation found
increases in employment for all programs except Oklahoma City.
    The NEWWS evaluation provides a comparison of programs
emphasizing job search with those emphasizing basic education.
Participants without a high school diploma or general education
degree (GED) were less likely to enroll in basic education
without mandated participation in a welfare-to-work program.
However, education-focused programs had small impacts on
participation in vocational and postsecondary education. This
is due, in part, to many participants with a high school
diploma or GED in both the experimental and control groups
enrolling in these activities on their own. Evaluators also
noted some other barriers to vocational and higher education,
such as failing to meet entrance requirements (other than a
high school degree) or the timing of required program
activities failing to coincide with the timing of an academic
year or semester.
    Comparison of mandatory programs: ``work first'' versus
education and training.--Though NEWWS found positive impacts
across both ``work first'' and education-focused programs,
there were differences in both the degree and timing of these
impacts.
    Chart L-13 shows the employment impacts of the 11 NEWWS
programs over the 2-year followup period. The impact is
expressed as the percent increase or decrease in the program
group's employment rate, compared with the control group's
employment rate. The chart shows the overall impact (percent
change in the percent ever employed over the 2 years), as well
as the impact in the last quarter of the second year. As shown
in the chart, employment-focused programs had somewhat larger
percentage impacts, though it was common for the impact to be
less at the end of the 2-year period than over the entire
period. Education-focused programs, on the other hand, tended
to have their greatest impact at the end of the 2-year period.
    The fading of program impacts in some ``work first''
programs reflects a combination of two factors. Some who find a
job subsequently lose it. In addition, some control group
members eventually find jobs on their own without the aid of
services provided to those in the experimental group. That is,
some of the impact of employment-focused programs is simply an
acceleration of the job finding process for those who would
have gone to work anyway.
    The Portland, Oregon program is notable for relatively high
overall impacts (18 percent increase in employment and 35
percent increase in average earnings over the 2-year period),
as well as relatively high impacts at the end of the 2-year
period. Portland represents a mixed services program, much like
the Riverside program included in the GAIN evaluation. Both
programs emphasized employment as their goal. However, both
programs also directed some participants to basic education if
they were determined to need skill building before entering the
work force. Though the importance of job finding was the goal
of both programs, the messages conveyed to participants
differed. The Riverside message was that recipients should try
to obtain any job, even one with low pay and no benefits as a
``stepping stone'' to a better job in the future. The Portland
message was that recipients should try to find ``good jobs,''
those that pay above the minimum wage and provide benefits, and
that it was OK to turn down some jobs. Despite similarities in
earnings impacts, the Riverside GAIN and Portland NEWWS
programs produced these impacts differently. Increases in
employment contributed to both programs' impacts, but Portland
also increased average hourly pay for those who worked. In
Riverside GAIN, employed members of the experimental group had
slightly lower average hourly pay than employed members of the
control group (U.S. Department, 1998).

CHART L-13. NATIONAL EVALUATION OF WELFARE-TO-WORK STRATEGIES: IMPACTS
                           ON EMPLOYMENT RATE
<GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT>

    * Denotes impact that is not statistically significant.

    Note._LFA on the chart denotes labor force attachment,
employment-focused programs; HCD refers to human capital
development, the education-focused programs.

    Source: Prepared by the Congressional Research Service
based on information from the U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services and the U.S. Department of Education (2000a).

    The best test, among available evaluations, of whether
employment-focused or education-focused programs are more
effective can be found in the NEWWS evaluations in Atlanta,
Grand Rapids, and Riverside. As mentioned, the NEWWS evaluation
had an experimental group subject to an employment-focused
program and an experimental group subject to an education-
focused program. Both treatment groups were measured against
the same control group. Therefore, the evaluators were able to
measure the impact of an employment-focused program, the impact
of an education-focused program, and the impact of the two
approaches in comparison with each other.
    Table L-3 shows the comparison of the impacts of the
employment-focused and education-focused programs. Generally,
both types of programs increased earnings. Exceptions were
education-focused programs for those without a high school
diploma or GED, and the employment-focused program in Grand
Rapids for those who had a high school diploma, though impacts
for the programs themselves are not shown in the table.
However, when differences between the two approaches were
found, employment-focused programs tended to increase earnings
more than education-focused programs over the 2 years,
especially among those without a high school diploma or GED.
Additional years of followup data might change these results,
since there is a pattern of declining impacts for employment-
focused programs as well as increasing impacts for education
and training programs. However, previous studies have found
that employment and earnings impacts of education-focused
programs sometimes also fade after 2 years, although one
program (Baltimore Options) did produce earnings increases at
the end of 5 years (Friedlander & Burtless, 1995).

   TABLE L-3.--NEWWS. COMPARISON OF EMPLOYMENT-FOCUSED WITH EDUCATION-
   FOCUSED PROGRAMS IN ATLANTA, GRAND RAPIDS, AND RIVERSIDE: IMPACT ON
                          EARNINGS OVER 2 YEARS
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                              Comparison of employment-
                                                 focused program and
                                              education-focused program
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Full sample
    Atlanta...............................  Employment-focused program
                                             impact greater by $521.
    Grand Rapids..........................  No difference.
No high school diploma or GED
    Atlanta...............................  No difference.
    Grand Rapids..........................  Employment-focused program
                                             impact greater by $1,063.
    Riverside.............................  Employment-focused program
                                             impact greater by $707.
With high school diploma or GED
    Atlanta...............................  No difference.
    Grand Rapids..........................  No difference.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Table prepared by the Congressional Research Service based on
  information from the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services and
  the U.S. Department of Education (December 1997).

    Comparison of mandatory welfare-to-work programs: AFDC
waivers.--The findings from welfare-to-work experiments
conducted in the mid 1990s under AFDC waivers are not as
consistent as those from evaluations of JOBS Programs.
Evaluations of waiver programs compare participants subject to
the welfare reform initiatives with those subject to regular
AFDC/JOBS rules. Unlike the evaluations of JOBS Programs, which
compared participants in a welfare-to-work program with those
not subject to welfare-to-work rules, the waiver evaluations
measured the incremental effect of new program rules above and
beyond the effects of AFDC/JOBS requirements.
    A number of the waiver evaluations (Arizona, New Jersey,
Texas) failed to find consistent impacts on employment,
earnings, and welfare receipt. However, some waiver programs
did have considerable effects; they increased employment and
earnings and reduced welfare receipt (Delaware and Indiana).
Delaware's ABC Program increased the employment rate of
participants by 20 percent and increased earnings by 16 percent
in the first year. Delaware also reduced cash assistance
receipt by 5 percent in the first year. Indiana increased
employment by 2 percent over 2 years and earnings by 5 percent.
Indiana's program cut cash assistance payments by 20 percent,
with impacts growing in the second year.
    Another set of waiver programs in a number of States used
enhanced earnings disregards as an inducement to work. These
programs are discussed in the next section.
    Combining mandatory participation and financial
incentives.--Under waivers of AFDC requirements, States were
permitted to experiment with higher earnings disregards than
were set forth in Federal law. These programs combined
financial incentives with mandatory work participation
requirements, and their evaluation results are useful for
anticipating the effects of changes made under TANF. Despite
the disappointing evidence of earlier research on the effect of
increasing earnings disregards, most States have coupled higher
earnings disregards with mandatory work requirements in their
TANF Programs.
    Earnings disregards in selected evaluated programs.--Under
AFDC rules, States disregarded $120 plus one-third of remaining
earnings for the first 4 months on a job when calculating
benefits. For the next 8 months, the disregard was reduced to
$120, and thereafter (after 12 months) to $90, a standard work
expense. Most States under their TANF Programs have increased
their disregards from those that prevailed under AFDC.
  --Connecticut: 100 percent of earnings up to the Federal
        poverty level. This applies to both cash assistance and
        food stamps.
  --Florida Family Transition Program (FTP): $200 and 50
        percent of remaining earnings.
  --Minnesota MFIP: Benefits equal the maximum grant, increased
        by 20 percent minus net income. Net income includes an
        earnings disregard of 38 percent of gross earnings.
        MFIP consolidated cash assistance and food stamps into
        a single benefit.
  --Vermont WRP: $150 plus 25 percent of remaining earnings.
  --Virginia Initiative for Employment Not Welfare (VIEW): 100
        percent of earnings until the cash benefit plus net
        earnings equal the Federal poverty level.
    The combination of financial incentives and mandated
participation in work or job preparation has produced higher
employment and earnings. Financial incentives alone, without a
participation mandate, tend to produce smaller or no impacts on
employment and often no impacts on earnings. MFIP and
Connecticut's Jobs First, both programs that combined financial
incentives and mandated participation, produced fairly large
employment impacts. The final report on MFIP showed a 35
percent increase in employment and a 23 percent increase in
earnings among long-term, single-parent recipients 9 quarters
after the program began. Connecticut's Jobs First evaluation
showed a 10 percent increase in the employment rate and an 11
percent increase in earnings over the 30-month followup. The
impacts of both programs were sustained over time.
Additionally, both programs had large impacts on the most
disadvantaged participants, those without a high school degree,
without work experience, and with long spells on welfare.
    In the case of MFIP and Connecticut's Jobs First Program,
increases in employment and earnings were accompanied by
increases, not reductions, in welfare payments and receipt of
assistance. In these programs, the enhanced earnings disregards
permitted some working recipients who would have been
ineligible for AFDC to combine work and welfare. These programs
could also cause a reduction in work effort or earnings, as
those who would have worked anyway accept lower paying jobs or
work fewer hours than would otherwise be the case, making up
the difference in lost income with the increased welfare
payment received while working. Whether increases in work
effort by those already on the rolls are canceled out by
reduced work effort by those not previously eligible for
benefits (as found in earlier nonexperimental research) cannot
be told from these evaluations. The findings of these
evaluations are limited to the population studied: those who
already applied for and/or received cash assistance. Thus,
these evaluations cannot be used to understand ``entry''
effects; i.e., how programs affect the likelihood of low-income
people to apply for welfare in the first place.
    Some evaluations of State programs that combined enhanced
earnings disregards with mandated participation yielded
different results than those found in Minnesota and
Connecticut. Increased cash assistance payments were not found
in the Florida FTP, the Vermont Welfare Restructuring Project
(WRP), or the Virginia VIEW Program. Florida and Virginia pay
lower benefits than do Minnesota and Connecticut, and the
Vermont earnings disregard is less generous than those found in
Minnesota or Connecticut. Further, in Connecticut and
Minnesota, the cash and food stamp earnings disregards were
both changed, while the Food Stamp Program in Florida, Vermont,
and Virginia operated under Federal food stamp earnings
disregard rules.
    Time limits: impacts before reaching the time limit.--Three
evaluations are available on the possible effects of benefit-
termination time limits on welfare-to-work outcomes: the
Florida FTP Program, Connecticut's Jobs First Program, and the
Virginia VIEW Program. The findings from the Florida,
Connecticut, and Virginia programs are useful in anticipating
the effects of TANF's time limit. All three programs combined
time limits with other welfare reform initiatives, particularly
enhanced earnings disregards that allowed some working
participants who would have been ineligible for AFDC to
continue receiving assistance and combine work and welfare.
Most State TANF Programs are operating under policies that
combine increased earnings disregards with time limits. To the
degree that generous earnings disregards increase months of
receipt for working recipients, they increase the risk of
reaching the time limit, though they also reduce the risk of
reaching the time limit without earnings.
    Generally, there is little evidence that anticipation of
time limits spurred recipients to leave welfare early. No
change in cash assistance receipt was recorded before
participants reached the time limit in Florida or in two of the
three sites evaluated in Virginia. Cash assistance increased in
Connecticut. It is possible that the behavioral effect of time
limits, which serve as a spur to leave welfare early, and the
enhanced earnings disregards, which permit working recipients
to stay on welfare longer, cancel each other out. In
Connecticut, the effect of the very generous earnings disregard
might have overwhelmed the effect of the short time limit.
    One site in Virginia (Petersburg) did show reduced cash
assistance receipt after recipients became subject to time
limits. In Petersburg, program staff actively encouraged
working participants to leave the rolls, and save months of
eligibility for future use. In other Virginia sites and in
Connecticut and Florida, evaluators noted that staff did not
actively encourage participants to save remaining months of
eligibility. These results are further evidence that the
program message conveyed by local administrators affects
participant behavior.
    Welfare time limits have also had a high profile in the
media and public discussions. Evaluations often found that many
in the control group incorrectly thought they were subject to
the time limit. In Connecticut, for example, 23 percent of the
control group thought they were subject to a time limit. This
misunderstanding by control group members would have the effect
of reducing the impact of the time limit, since it is measured
as the difference in outcomes between the program group and the
control group.
    Programs for teenage parents.--Teen parents on welfare are
at particular risk of becoming long-term recipients. The New
Chance Demonstration, the Teenage Parent Demonstration (TPD),
and Ohio's Learning, Earning, and Parenting (LEAP) Program all
targeted teenage parents. New Chance was a voluntary program of
education and services for AFDC mothers who had children as
teenagers and dropped out of high school. The TPD required
participation and provided enhanced services to teen parents.
Neither set of programs produced lasting impacts on employment
and earnings. New Chance slightly reduced employment and
earnings early in the program, as participants engaged in
education. The TPD produced some early impacts, but these did
not last. Evaluators of the TPD found that impacts that
occurred while young mothers were enrolled in the program were
not sustained once the mandated participation requirements and
expectations of the program ended for them.
    Ohio's LEAP Program imposed financial sanctions on those
who failed to meet school attendance requirements, and provided
bonuses for those who did attend school. Over the 4-year
followup period, there were no employment and earnings impacts,
but there was a 5 percent decrease in cash welfare.
    Detail for welfare-to-work impact evaluations.--For
detailed information about the major impact evaluations
conducted after the passage of the Family Support Act of 1988,
see table L-9 at the end of this section.

                 Family Formation and Structure Impacts

    Two of the objectives of TANF are to ``prevent and reduce
the incidence of out-of-wedlock pregnancies'' and to
``encourage the formation and maintenance of two-parent
families.'' Policy initiatives to promote these objectives have
included imposing a family cap (paying no benefit or a reduced
benefit for a new baby born to a mother already on welfare) and
removing special eligibility requirements for two-parent
families. However, the bulk of post-Family Support Act research
has focused on broader efforts to alter welfare, especially by
increasing work, and the impact of these efforts on earnings
and employment (as discussed in the previous section). The
impact of policy initiatives on nonmarital births and marriage
has received much less attention.
    Available findings generally show:
 1. The majority of evaluations of welfare-to-work programs
        that examine marriage rates and birth rates for single-
        parent families report no impacts. One evaluation of an
        AFDC waiver program (Minnesota's MFIP) did report an
        increase in marriage among single-parent families and a
        decrease in marriage breakup among two-parent families.
 2. State AFDC waiver initiatives that included family cap
        policies have produced inconclusive results. While New
        Jersey reported a decline in birth rates for AFDC
        mothers, Arkansas reported no impacts on birth rates
        for AFDC mothers as a result of family cap policies.
 3. The few programs that have targeted teenage parents have,
        in general, reported no impact on the number of births.
Background and analytical issues
    Since the 1970s, the overall birth rate for married women
has declined, but the number of nonmarital births has
substantially increased (see appendix M). This increase in
nonmarital births has been attributed to women delaying the
decision to marry, but not the decision to have a child
(Bachrach, 1998). Growth in the welfare caseload, to a historic
peak in 1994, was driven in part by the increase in the number
of single female-headed households. Since 1994, caseloads have
declined at a largely unexpected rate (almost half by fiscal
year 1999), but the number of single mothers has remained
relatively constant (between 9.8 and 10 million each year).
Therefore, while the increase in single mothers may explain
much of the earlier increase in the welfare caseload, the
decrease in the welfare caseload has not been accompanied by a
similar decrease in the number of single mothers.
    Economic models of marriage decisions contend that single
people marry if the marriage provides a benefit to both
individuals. For couples to remain married, both individuals
must continue to benefit from the union (Becker et al., 1977).
Welfare programs provide a means for single mothers to live
independently, and therefore, like employment, may serve as a
disincentive to marriage. AFDC assisted single mothers and many
believed AFDC and other welfare programs encouraged divorce or
single parenthood by offering a financial alternative to
marriage. The Family Support Act of 1988 required every State
to operate Aid to Families with Dependent Children--Unemployed
Parent (AFDC-UP) Programs, which provided assistance to
eligible two-parent families but contained special eligibility
requirements for such families. Specifically, the principal
wage earner in the family was required to have a significant
work history and was not allowed to work 100 hours or more per
month. Many believed these eligibility requirements had a
negative impact on decisions to marry or remain married.
Although earlier nonexperimental research found no relationship
between the presence of State AFDC-UP Programs and marital
stability (Winkler, 1995). Under TANF, a significant number of
States have removed these special two-parent eligibility
requirements in their efforts to promote and support marriage.
    In addition to being a possible disincentive to marriage,
welfare programs are seen by some as providing an incentive for
nonmarital childbearing. In a purely economic sense, many argue
that by increasing the cost of having children by limiting or
denying benefits to children born to mothers already on welfare
(the ``family cap''), public policy may be able to encourage
people to postpone having a child or to limit family size.
Others argue that by providing easier access to family planning
services, and also by enhancing these services, public policy
may decrease the cost of preventing unwanted or unplanned
pregnancies, which may decrease the number of births. Still
others argue that family size decisions, as well as decisions
to marry or divorce, are subjective and personal and have
little to do with economic calculations.
    The nonexperimental research examining the effects of
welfare on marriage and fertility produced mixed results.
Earlier studies led many to conclude that the welfare system
had no effect on these outcomes. However, recently, a slight
majority of studies have concluded that welfare has led to a
decrease in marriage and an increase in childbearing (Moffitt,
1998). These studies use various methodologies, different
sources of data, and explore different periods of time. Many
contend that the findings reported are sensitive to the factors
and methods used to examine this relationship.
Highlights of selected evaluations
    The impact of policy initiatives on marriage and fertility
has proven difficult to examine. As discussed above, marriage
and childbearing decisions are highly personal, and it may be
difficult to directly influence these decisions through policy.
In contrast, many believe that certain policy changes may
reduce welfare entry by encouraging persons to marry or delay
decisions to have children. However, welfare evaluations only
capture the effect of policy initiatives on those who already
receive welfare. Therefore, these evaluations measure only the
effect of policy changes on encouraging marriage among single
women who are already receiving welfare, and promoting marital
stability among married couples that also are already receiving
welfare. Likewise, welfare evaluations only discern the effect
of policy changes on subsequent births; those that occur after
a woman has already been on welfare.
    Impact on marriage.--The Seattle-Denver Income Maintenance
Experiment, conducted in the 1960s and 1970s, was the first
experimental test of the impact of transfer programs on
marriage. The analysis suggested that this program, which
guaranteed a minimum income level, increased marital
dissolution among white and black couples and increased rates
of marriage or remarriage among Hispanic single-parent
families. However, reanalysis of these findings has led many to
question the impacts originally reported. Further, differences
between policy changes and the program structure and
environments make comparisons between the Seattle-Denver Income
Maintenance Experiment and the more recent evaluations
difficult.
    The Family Support Act of 1988 authorized a set of State
experiments that liberalized eligibility for two-parent
(unemployed) families by permitting them to work 100 or more
hours monthly, without making other policy changes. By limiting
other policy changes, many hoped that the evaluations of the
three approved State demonstrations--California, Utah,
Wisconsin--would provide insight into the impact of changes to
the 100-hour rule. Reports on these demonstrations have been
completed, but have not been released.
    The majority of the pre-TANF evaluations of ``work first''
and education-focused programs, which examine marriage among
individuals already receiving welfare, report no impacts for
single-parent families. One evaluation of an AFDC waiver
program, the Minnesota Family Investment Program (MFIP),
reported an impact on the percent of parents who were married 3
years after the program began. However, this impact varied
depending on the population examined and the types of services
individuals received, as illustrated in table L-4.

   TABLE L-4.--MINNESOTA FAMILY INVESTMENT PROGRAM: IMPACTS ON MARITAL
                 STATUS 3 YEARS AFTER THE PROGRAM BEGAN
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                           Full MFIP Program (financial
          Single-parent families             incentives plus mandatory
                                                  participation)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Long-term welfare recipients............  Increase in percent currently
                                           married.
Recent applicants.......................  No impact.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

                                                                Full program (financial
                                         Financial incentives       incentives plus        Effect of adding the
  Single-parent families: subgroups            package                 mandatory         mandatory participation
                                                                     participation)            requirement

Long-term welfare recipients: urban----Increase in percent------No impact..............--No impact.-------------
 counties.                              currently married.
Recent applicants: urban counties....  No impact..............  No impact..............  No impact.
Child outcome sample: single mothers   Increase in percent      Increase in percent      No impact.
 with children ages 2-9 when program    currently married.       currently married.
 began.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                                           Financial incentives package
                                          and elimination of special two-
           Two-parent families                  parent eligibility
                                                   requirements

Welfare recipients: urban counties......--Increase in percent currently-
                                           married.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Source: Table prepared by the Congressional Research Service based on
  information in Miller et al. (2000).

    Overall, among long-term recipients in urban and rural
counties, MFIP increased the percent who were married 3 years
after the program began. The program had no impact on the
percent of recent applicants who were currently married 3 years
after the program began. The evaluation of MFIP was unique in
its design. In addition to the control group, which was subject
to the old AFDC rules, single-parent families in the research
sample were assigned to one of two treatment groups. Those in
the first treatment group, the financial incentives package
group, were subject to changes including the enhanced disregard
of earnings (financial incentives). Those in the second
treatment group, the full program group, were subject to these
same changes, but were also required to participate in MFIP's
employment and training services once they had received
assistance for 24 of the past 36 months. This three-way design
allowed the researchers to disentangle the effects of the
program's two major components--financial incentives and
mandatory employment and training services.
    The previous welfare-to-work section reported that programs
like MFIP, which combine mandatory participation in employment
and training with enhanced earnings disregards, have been
particularly effective in raising earnings and employment among
single mothers who are long-term welfare recipients. However,
among long-term, single-parent recipients in urban counties,
this combined approach in Minnesota produced no impact on
marriage 3 years after the program began. As table L-4
illustrates, while there was an increase in the percent of
recipients who were currently married among those subject to
the financial incentives package, there was no impact for those
who were subject to the full package of MFIP benefits. Again,
there were no impacts on marriage reported for applicants in
urban counties assigned to either of the treatment groups.
    The MFIP evaluation also included a survey of mothers who
were single and had children between the ages of 2 and 9 when
they entered MFIP. Among these women, the combined program
increased the percent who were married 3 years later. As table
L-4 illustrates, this increase is entirely a result of the
financial incentives, as the addition of the mandatory
participation requirement had no impact on the percent who were
currently married. While these results are difficult to
reconcile, they provide some evidence that financial
incentives, rather than mandatory employment and training
services, may have an impact on marriage among single mothers.
    Two-parent families in MFIP were subject to different
provisions than single-parent families, including the financial
incentives package, a requirement that one parent work or
participate in employment-related activities when the family
had received assistance for 6 of the past 12 months, and the
removal of special two-parent eligibility requirements. Many
believed the removal of these eligibility requirements would
promote marital stability by allowing two-parent families to
remain together through difficult times such as loss of work.
While the research design does not disentangle the effect of
this specific reform (the elimination of special two-parent
eligibility requirements), there is some evidence that MFIP
enhanced marital stability. Among the sample of two-parent
recipient families, the evaluation reported an increase in the
percent who were currently married 3 years after the program
began. The evaluation also reported a decrease in the percent
divorced or separated and a decrease in the percent cohabiting
with a partner 3 years after the program began.
     Impact on fertility.--A policy initiative designed to
discourage repeat births to welfare mothers that has received a
great deal of attention is the family cap. Family caps were
implemented by 19 States through AFDC waivers and additional
States added them under Temporary Assistance for Needy Families
(TANF). State programs implementing the family cap deny
additional cash assistance for children conceived and born to
mothers while they are receiving welfare.
    New Jersey and Arkansas, two of the States that received
waivers from the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
(DHHS) to implement a family cap, conducted evaluations of
their programs. The New Jersey evaluation reported a decrease
in births among both ongoing cases (those receiving welfare
before implementation of the Family Development Program, FDP)
and new cases (those who joined the welfare rolls after
implementation of the FDP), as well as an increase in abortions
among new cases (Camasso et al., 1998a). Arkansas reported no
impact on the number of births to Aid to Families with
Dependent Children (AFDC) mothers (Turturro et al., 1997).
However, both studies indicate confusion among participants as
to which rules and program services applied to them. This
potential ``contamination'' (i.e., individuals believing they
were subject to the family cap when they were not) has led many
to express concern about the validity of these results.
    Evaluators in New Jersey supplemented their experimental
evaluation with nonexperimental analysis, comparing outcomes,
such as birth and abortion rates, after implementation of the
waiver with those that would have been expected without the
policy change, and using statistical techniques to ``control''
for other factors that could affect births and abortions. This
analysis supported the results of the experimental evaluation
by concluding that the waiver program led to fewer births and
more abortions than would have been expected given demographic
trends in New Jersey at the time. However, given these mixed
results and the limited amount of available information, many
contend that the effectiveness of the family cap on
discouraging births to women already receiving cash assistance
remains unclear.
     Impact on teenage parents.--A few demonstration programs
examined initiatives to promote education and training and to
discourage nonmarital births among teenage parents. While these
programs led to some short-term impacts, none reported long-
term impacts on pregnancies, births, or use of birth control.
Evaluators of these programs contend that the ``right'' mix of
interventions to help teenage parents has not been found.
    The TPD Program targeted teenage parents who were pregnant
with, or had given birth to their first child, and were
receiving welfare for the first time. Participants were
provided with case management services and workshops on
employment and life planning, in addition to an employment
preparation and training component. No impacts on pregnancies,
births, or the use of birth control were reported. The TPD did
report an increase in the number of abortions in Chicago, but
no impact on the number of abortions was found in Camden or
Newark.
    The New Chance Program, with a design similar to the TPD,
was undertaken in 16 sites around the country. Participation in
the program was voluntary. The goal of New Chance was to enable
participants to acquire education and vocational education to
secure jobs and thereby postpone childbearing decisions. No
long-term impacts on pregnancies, births, abortions or birth
control were reported 42 months after the program began. The
evaluation did report that women in the New Chance Program were
more likely than women in the control group to be pregnant
during 9 of the first 24 months after random assignment. The
evaluators attribute this to the fact that at the 18-month
point, although not at the 42-month point, women in the New
Chance group were more likely to be living with a male partner.
    A third teen intervention program, Ohio's LEAP Program,
targeted school attendance among teenage parents, with the hope
of increasing the number who would graduate from high school.
While the program did increase the rates at which participants
completed 9th, 10th, and 11th grade, LEAP had no impact on the
number of subsequent births 3 years after followup.
    Table L-5 provides a summary of the studies reviewed in
this section on family formation and structure outcomes.
Additional information about the studies may be found in table
L-9, at the end of this appendix.

     TABLE L-5.--FAMILY FORMATION AND STRUCTURE OUTCOMES FOR IMPACT
  EVALUATIONS CONDUCTED SINCE THE PASSAGE OF THE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT OF
                                  1988
------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Marital status               Births                 Abortions
------------------------------------------------------------------------
National Evaluation of Welfare-to-Work Strategies (NEWWS)
National Evaluation of Welfare-to-Work Strategies: Evaluating
 Alternative Welfare-to-Work Approaches: Two Year Impacts for Eleven
 Programs, June 2000

Of the 11 programs      Of the 11 programs       Not reported.
 examined, only 1        examined, only 1
 program reported an     program reported an
 impact. Riverside LFA   impact. Columbus
 reported a decrease     traditional program
 of 20% (11% vs. 13%)    reported a decrease of
 in percent married      41% (3% vs. 8%) in the
 and living with         percent who had a baby
 spouse.                 since study entry.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
New Chance Demonstration
New Chance: Final Report on a Comprehensive Program for Young Mothers in
 Poverty and Their Children, October 1997

Not reported.           No impact on             No impact on percent
                         pregnancies or births    who had ever had an
                         during the 42-month      abortion by the 42-
                         followup period.         month followup
                         Decrease in number of    interview.
                         months between last
                         terminated pregnancy
                         at random assignment
                         and onset of next
                         pregnancy of 1% (36
                         vs. 38).
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Teenage Parent Demonstration (TPD)
Moving into Adulthood: Were the Impacts of Mandatory Programs for
 Welfare-Dependent Teenaged Parents Sustained After the Programs Ended?,
 February 1998

Not reported.           No impact on percent     Increase in percent who
                         who had pregnancies,     reported an abortion
                         births, or               78 months after intake
                         miscarriages over the    in Chicago of 23% (23%
                         78-month followup.       vs. 19%). No impact in
                                                  Camden and Newark.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Arizona: Employing and Moving People Off Welfare and Encouraging
 Responsibility (EMPOWER)
Arizona: Evaluation of the Arizona EMPOWER Welfare Reform Demonstration,
 May 1999

No impact.              Decrease of 60% (2% vs.  Not reported.
                         4%) in births to unwed
                         minors.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Arkansas: Welfare Waiver Demonstration
Arkansas Welfare Waiver Demonstration Final Report, June 1997

Not reported.           No impact on number of   Not reported.
                         births to AFDC case
                         heads 5 years after
                         the program began.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
California: Greater Avenues for Independence (GAIN)
GAIN: Benefits, Costs, and Three-Year Impacts of a Welfare-to-Work
 Program, September 1994

No impact.              No impact on percentage  Not reported.
                         who have given birth
                         within 2-3 years after
                         program began.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Connecticut: Jobs First
Jobs First: Implementation and Early Impacts of Connecticut's Welfare
 Reform Initiative, February 2000

No impact.              No impact on the         Not reported.
                         percentage who gave
                         birth or did not give
                         birth.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Minnesota: Family Investment Program (MFIP)
Reforming Welfare and Rewarding Work: Final Report on the Minnesota
 Family Investment Program, Volume 1: Effects on Adults, June 2000

Long-term single-parent families
Increase of 51% (11%    Not reported.            Not reported.
 vs. 7%) in percent
 currently married at
 the time of the 3-
 year interview.

Long-term single-parent families--urban counties
No impact.              Not reported.            Not reported.

Long-term single-parent families--urban counties: Without mandated
 participation
Increase of 89% (11%    Not reported.            Not reported.
 vs. 6%) in percent
 currently married at
 the time of the 3-
 year interview.

Recent applicants--urban counties
No impact.              Not reported.            Not reported.

Two-parent recipient families
Increase of 40% (67%    Not reported.            Not reported.
 vs. 48%) in percent
 currently married at
 the time of the 3-
 year interview.

Reforming Welfare and Rewarding Work: Final Report on the Minnesota
 Family Investment Program, Volume 2: Effects on Children, June 2000
Increase of 82% (11%    No impact on percent     Not reported.
 vs. 6%) in percent      who had a child during
 currently married at    the 3-year followup
 the time of the 3-      period.
 year interview.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
New Jersey: Family Development Program (FDP)
A Final Report on the Impact of New Jersey's Family Development Program:
 Experimental-Control Group Analysis, October 1998

Not reported.           Ongoing cases: Decrease  Ongoing cases: No
                         in cumulative number     impact
                         of own births per
                         1,000 individuals
                         December 1992-December
                         1996 for ongoing cases
                         of 11% (319 vs. 358)
                        New cases: Decrease in   New cases: Increase in
                         cumulative number of     cumulative number of
                         own births per 1,000     abortions per 1,000
                         individuals December     individuals December
                         1992-December 1996 of    1992-December 1996 of
                         12% (269 vs. 304).       14% (356 vs. 312).

A Final Report on the Impact of New Jersey's Family Development Program:
 Results from a Pre-Post Analysis of AFDC Case Heads from 1990-1996,
 October 1998
Not reported.           Decrease in own births   Increase in abortions
                         that would have been     that would have been
                         expected without the     expected without FDP
                         FDP of 32% (35,785 vs.   of 3% (39,114 vs.
                         24,469).                 40,330).
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ohio: Learning, Earning, and Parenting (LEAP)
Final Report on Ohio's Welfare Initiative to Improve School Attendance
 Among Teenage Parents: Ohio's Learning, Earning, and Parenting (LEAP)
 Program, August 1997

Not reported.           No impact on number of   Not reported.
                         subsequent births 3
                         years after followup.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: Some percentage changes reported in this table may differ if
  calculated based on the reported findings, due to rounding. The
  percentage changes reported in this table reflect the percentage
  changes as reported in the individual evaluations.

Source: Table prepared by the Congressional Research Service based on a
  review of research evaluations. Information concerning the data, the
  target populations, and the package of initiatives included in each
  evaluation is highlighted in the table of welfare-to-work outcomes in
  the previous section. The outcomes presented in this table should be
  supplemented with the details of the evaluation highlighted in the
  welfare-to-work table.

                         Economic Status Impacts

    The previous sections discussed impacts of welfare reform
initiatives on employment and earnings and on family formation
and structure. This section summarizes findings of evaluations
about the impact of welfare reform initiatives on the economic
well-being of families. It uses combined income from earnings,
cash welfare, and food stamps as the primary measure of
families' material status. This section also summarizes
information on poverty, health insurance status, and child care
costs and arrangements as available from some evaluations.
    Though raising a family's income and reducing poverty are
not explicit TANF goals, Federal law requires TANF State plans
to outline how the States intend to provide needy parents with
services to enable them to ``leave the program and become self-
sufficient.'' Attainment of self-sufficiency implies a rise in
family income. Additionally, other sections of TANF law
(besides its explicit goals) reflect interest in the overall
economic well-being of TANF families or families with children
in general. For example, States are required to report on their
child poverty rate, and if their child poverty rate increases
by more than 5 percent over a year as a result of TANF
implementation, the State is required to file a ``corrective
action'' plan with the Federal Government. TANF also requires
DHHS to include information on average income in its annual
report to Congress on families that reached the TANF time limit
or had teen parents.
    Generally, the available evaluations find:
 1. Welfare-to-work programs often succeed in moving recipients
        to employment but not in raising incomes. Studies of
        programs from the AFDC/Job Opportunities and Basic
        Skills (JOBS) era (1988-96) show that increases in
        earnings generally offset but did not exceed reductions
        in AFDC cash benefits and food stamps.
 2. Some welfare-to-work programs that combined mandatory
        participation requirements with enhanced earnings
        disregards (which permit working recipients to keep
        more of their benefits) raised incomes and reduced
        poverty. However, the rise in income most often
        occurred because of increases in earnings and by
        increasing, not decreasing, welfare payments. Enhanced
        disregards permitted families to combine work and
        welfare at higher levels of earnings than were possible
        under AFDC.
 3. Little can be said about the impact of family formation
        decisions on economic well-being from these
        evaluations. The available evaluations also do not show
        any impact of attempts to increase the incentives for
        mothers to cooperate with efforts to obtain and enforce
        child support orders or increase the employment of
        noncustodial parents. The Parent's Fair Share
        Demonstration showed an increase in child support
        payments without a corresponding increase in employment
        and earnings (Doolittle et al., 1998).
 4. Two evaluations of programs with time limits (Florida and
        Connecticut) are available. Neither program produced
        evidence that the group subject to the time limit had
        lower combined incomes than the comparison group not
        subject to the time limits. This was true even after
        some in the group subject to time limits could have
        actually reached the limit.
 5. Some welfare-to-work programs increase children's
        participation in formal child care. Welfare-to-work
        programs that increase employment and reduce cash
        assistance receipt sometimes reduce health insurance
        coverage. Medicaid coverage while recipients are on
        cash assistance (and transitional Medicaid for those
        who have worked their way off cash aid) is not always
        replaced by employer-provided health insurance.
Background and analytical issues
    The economic well-being of a family is greatly affected by
both the employment status of its adult members and its family
structure. Female-headed families with children are far more
likely to be poor than families with children headed by a
married couple, even when single mothers work. In 1998, a
single mother who worked full time year-round was eight times
more likely to be poor than her married counterpart, 13.3
percent compared to 1.6 percent (U.S. Census Bureau, 1999).
Though recent welfare reform initiatives have made some policy
changes intended to promote marriage or marital stability and
reduce out-of-wedlock births, evaluations have shown few
impacts. In addition to marriage, other decisions about living
arrangements (e.g., cohabitation, living with extended family
members, living with others) and sharing economic resources
affect the material well-being of families with children. In
fact, for single-mother families, the earnings of ``other''
members of the household have been found to be particularly
important in understanding their economic circumstances (Bane &
Ellwood, 1986; Schoeni & Blank, 2000).
    Success of a welfare-to-work program in increasing earnings
and employment and reducing welfare receipt does not
automatically translate into increased economic resources
available to a family to raise its standard of living.
Participants might not increase earnings enough to offset
losses in needs-tested cash and food benefits. Leaving welfare
and going to work entails other losses:
  --Using a portion of income to pay for work expenses.--The
        economic gain from working is reduced by work-related
        expenses, such as taxes, child care, or transportation
        costs.
  --Potential loss of health insurance.--Receipt of cash
        welfare generally also conveys health care coverage in
        the form of Medicaid. (This was automatic under AFDC;
        it is no longer under TANF, although Medicaid coverage
        is still required for certain TANF families and former
        recipients.) Increased nonwelfare income can cause a
        loss of Medicaid coverage. Though transitional Medicaid
        is potentially available for those who lose coverage
        because of an increase in earnings, this transitional
        coverage is limited to 1 year (2 years in some States).
        Medicaid coverage is sometimes not replaced by
        employer-provided health insurance, as some former
        recipients find jobs that do not offer health benefits.
    A complete examination of the economic well-being of
families who participated in welfare-to-work programs would
require a comprehensive measure of economic resources and work
expenses of participants, such as a measure of the family's
disposable money and near-money income after tax payments and
work expenses (Citro & Michael, 1995). None of the evaluations
had such comprehensive measures.
    The most common measure of income in these evaluations was
combined income from earnings, cash assistance, and food
stamps, probably because these data are readily obtained from
administrative records. However, this is not a complete measure
of total income, and it will be designated as ``combined
income'' for the remainder of this section. The income of
husbands, partners, and other household members is not taken
into account when examining economic well-being in studies
based on administrative records. Some evaluations survey
program participants to obtain more comprehensive measures of
income, including that of other household members.
    A comprehensive measure of economic resources would include
noncash benefits such as health insurance and child care
subsidies, and would subtract taxes paid but add benefits from
Federal and State earned income credits (EICs). Only the most
recent studies include this information, and EIC income must be
estimated since information about its receipt is unavailable
from most of the data sources used in these evaluations. It
should also be noted that even these recent studies are of
programs in operation before the 1993 major expansion of the
Federal EIC, the expansion of child care funding in the 1996
welfare reform law, and establishment of the State Children's
Health Insurance Program in the 1997 Balanced Budget Act.
Highlights of selected evaluations
    In examining the economic well-being of welfare families,
evaluations of programs after the 1988 Family Support Act can
be divided into two groups:
 1. Evaluations of programs operating under AFDC/JOBS rules
        with recipients subject to former Federal rules for
        counting earnings. After 4 months on a job, an AFDC
        recipient essentially lost $1 for each additional $1 in
        earnings. These programs, while successful in raising
        employment and earnings, often failed to increase
        combined income from earnings, AFDC, and food stamps by
        statistically significant amounts.
 2. Recent evaluations of programs with enhanced earnings
        disregards, which permit recipients to keep more of
        their welfare benefit as earnings increase. These
        programs sometimes did raise income. Two of them (Jobs
        First in Connecticut and the Minnesota MFIP) did so by
        increasing not decreasing welfare payments, which
        supplemented earnings.
    The second set of evaluated programs is important in
anticipating the effects of the TANF Program, as 45 States had
liberalized the treatment of earnings under TANF, as of January
1, 2000. However, TANF has a 5-year time limit on the use of
Federal funds to provide assistance, including earnings
supplements in the form of earnings disregards. States may
continue to pay these supplements using their own funds. States
also may use Federal TANF money or State dollars outside their
welfare program and its rules (including the 5-year limit) to
provide State EICs to low-income families with children.
    AFDC/JOBS evaluations.--The National Evaluation of Welfare-
to-Work Strategies (NEWWS), which covered 11 programs in 7
sites, is the largest evaluation of programs operating under
AFDC/JOBS rules. The second largest evaluation of JOBS covered
the California program of Greater Avenues for Independence
(GAIN), which was evaluated in six counties. Both evaluations
showed that under these programs, success in moving recipients
from welfare to work was not likely to increase combined
income. For the California GAIN evaluation of the late 1980s
and early 1990s, no significant impacts in combined income were
found in five of the six sites examined at the end of year 3.
Across the 11 programs in the NEWWS evaluation, there were no
significant increases in combined income from AFDC, food
stamps, and earnings in year 2 despite earnings increases in
most programs (including Portland). If estimated EIC income is
added to combined income, significant increases are found in
two NEWWS programs in year 2 (Portland and the Atlanta
education-focused program). Generally, these programs did
change the composition of income so that participants relied
more on earnings and less on welfare. However, their earnings
gains were offset by losses in welfare benefits, and the net
effect was a statistical ``wash'' with no perceptible change in
combined income. However, these programs did change the
composition of income so that participants relied more on
earnings and were less dependent on welfare.
    These programs also did little to remove participants from
poverty. However, some relatively small impacts on the share of
participants above the poverty line were found in GAIN and
NEWWS. This occurred even in programs that had no change in
average income.
    Impact of more generous earnings disregards.--Increasing
earnings disregards above those that existed under AFDC is
often seen as a work incentive. However, these increased
earnings disregards also permit participants to continue to
receive cash assistance at higher levels of earnings than they
could under AFDC, thus supplementing their earnings with a
continued cash benefit. Earnings disregards, even when offered
as a work incentive, might also serve as income supports for
working people.
    The Connecticut Jobs First, Florida Family Transition
Program (FTP), Minnesota MFIP, Virginia Initiative for
Employment Not Welfare (VIEW), and Vermont WRP Programs all
combined mandated participation with enhanced earnings
disregards (see welfare-to-work section for details on the
earnings disregards). In Vermont, no increase in total income
was reported. Virginia's VIEW Program reported some increases
in combined income for some quarters of the followup, but no
consistent pattern of increased income was found.
    Connecticut, Florida, and Minnesota each showed
comparatively large impacts on combined income from earnings,
cash assistance, and food stamps. Minnesota's MFIP Program is
notable because of its explicit goals to increase income and
reduce poverty among families with children. MFIP showed a 15
percent increase in combined income for single, long-term
recipients over the 3-year followup. MFIP also produced a 9
percent increase in combined income over the followup for
recent applicants. Programs that essentially set welfare-to-
work goals but offered enhanced earnings disregards also showed
increases in combined income. Connecticut showed a 10 percent
increase in combined income over the 30-month followup, and
Florida showed a combined income increase of 5 percent over 3
years.
    Raising the income of participants often comes at a cost.
Only in Florida did increased income result from a program with
declines in both cash and food stamp receipt. In Minnesota and
Connecticut, the increase in income came at the cost of
increasing welfare payments. Thus, at least in the short run,
these programs impose costs, and do not provide savings, for
the government.\6\ Additionally, these programs raised the
incomes of some people who would have worked anyway. The
evaluations indicate that higher earnings disregards or income
supports for working people actually cause a reduction in work
effort and earnings for some people who would have worked
without the policy change.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \6\ For single-parent families, the estimated annual increase in
MFIP costs to the government was about $2,000 per family. The two major
components of this cost were higher welfare payments and the costs of
continued Medicaid coverage.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The findings of the Connecticut and Minnesota evaluations
might not be applicable to other States. The impact on income
is a function of complex interactions that depend on the size
of the cash welfare grant, the Food Stamp Program, and the size
of the program's earnings impact. In Minnesota and Connecticut,
the earnings disregards for food stamps, in addition to cash
assistance, were increased. Connecticut permitted a 100 percent
disregard of earnings below the Federal poverty income
guidelines for both cash and food stamps, while Minnesota
combined cash and food aid into a single grant. On the other
hand, Florida, Vermont, and Virginia increased earnings
disregards only for cash aid. Virginia has one of the larger
earnings disregards for its cash benefit program, yet its
program failed to consistently increase total income. In
Virginia, increases in earnings produced income gains (with
reductions, not increases, in cash benefits) in only one of
three sites evaluated.
    Impact after reaching the time limit.--In only two programs
evaluated thus far did some participants actually reach a
State-imposed time limit: Connecticut and Florida. The
evaluation of Virginia's VIEW has information on only 24
months. Its time limit is 24 months, so it only has information
on participants before they reach the time limit.
    Florida's FTP Program had the first recipients in the
Nation to reach time limits. However, during the course of the
3-year followup at the Florida evaluation site, only 7 percent
of all participants reached a time limit.\7\ Connecticut is the
major evaluation available with relatively large numbers of
recipients who reached the time limit. About 40 percent of
participants reached the 21-month time limit within the 30-
month followup period, though many obtained extensions of the
time limit because they had low earnings.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \7\ This reflects the percent in the report sample (for whom
outcomes are reported) who reached the time limit. The Florida FTP
followup is for a 3-year period. Most recipients are subject to a 24-
month benefit limit in any 60-month period. However, certain
disadvantaged recipients are subject to a limit of 36 months within a
72-month period. None of the very disadvantaged recipients could have
reached the time limit during the 3-year followup period. Additionally,
many who were subject to a 24-month limit had months of potential
assistance remaining. They had either been off the rolls for some
months (e.g., working) or exempted from the time limit during some
months and had those months not count toward their 24-month limit.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Connecticut grants unlimited 6-month extensions to those
who have complied with Jobs First rules and who make good faith
efforts at finding employment but earn less than the old AFDC
payment standard plus $90 (the old AFDC standard work expense
deduction). Therefore, the time limit affects only those who
would have been ineligible for AFDC but retained eligibility
for TANF because of the generous (100 percent of poverty)
earnings disregard or those who have not made good faith
efforts to find employment.
    The combined income impact in Connecticut differs early in
the followup (before recipients could reach the time limit)
compared with later in the followup, as some participants did
reach the time limits. At quarter 6 (before families could have
reached the time limit), the combined income of those in the
experimental group was 15 percent higher than those in the
control group. In quarter 10 (when some families reached the
time limit), there was no impact. That is, once the time limit
is reached, Connecticut's combined income impacts are similar
to those in other welfare-to-work programs that do not have
more generous earnings disregards.
    Though the income gains vanished toward the end of the
followup, the Connecticut program did not produce income
losses. That is, even after the time limit could have been
reached, the group subject to the time limit did not have
average incomes lower than the group not subject to the time
limit. This is due, in part, to higher earnings in the group
subject to new program rules that include the time limit. It
might also be due to the way in which the time limit was
implemented. Connecticut's time limit essentially removes from
the rolls those who would have been ineligible for AFDC because
their earnings are too high, but it leaves on the rolls (via
extensions) those who would have been income-eligible for AFDC.
The wider import of the findings from Connecticut's program
depends on how States implement their time limits, particularly
for those recipients who are without earnings at the point when
they reach the time limit.
    Supplements to increase the rewards from work.--During the
1990s, a number of national ``make work pay'' initiatives were
enacted:
 1. The Federal EIC was significantly expanded in 1993;
 2. Federal funding to the States to help low-income parents
        pay for child care was significantly increased in the
        1996 welfare reform law; and
 3. Federal matching funds for a new State Children's Health
        Insurance Program were provided in the Balanced Budget
        Act of 1997.
    In addition, TANF-enhanced earnings disregards provide
income supplements for those who combine welfare and work. They
also keep families on welfare, which may convey benefits and
services in addition to cash assistance. For example, MFIP
increased health care coverage by keeping working families on
cash assistance and, hence, Medicaid, longer. (The MFIP
evaluation was conducted pre-TANF, when AFDC recipients were
automatically covered by Medicaid.)
    There is considerable interest in how those who leave
welfare for work are faring. None of the available evaluations
include data on the use of recent initiatives to ``make work
pay.'' However, some evaluations of programs conducted before
the expansion of work supports showed that those who left
welfare for work, not only were likely to have no more income
than they did while on welfare, but were also at risk of being
without health insurance and incurring child care costs.
    The GAIN and NEWWS evaluations of AFDC/JOBS Programs
provided some evidence that success in moving welfare
recipients to work can actually result in reduced health
insurance coverage. Reduced coverage was found in two GAIN
sites. Of the 11 programs evaluated in NEWWS, reduced health
insurance coverage was found in three. Though the programs
increased receipt of employer-provided health insurance and use
of transitional Medicaid, this was not enough to offset the
loss of automatic Medicaid coverage while on cash assistance,
as some jobs did not come with employer-provided health
insurance.
    Additionally, NEWWS provided evidence that welfare-to-work
programs can increase the use of child care, particularly paid
child care. Parents who pay for child care also might incur
substantial costs. For those parents employed at the end of the
2-year followup period for NEWWS who paid for child care, the
average proportion of weekly earnings used for child care
ranged from about 30 percent in several sites, to 50 percent in
Riverside, California, and Detroit.\8\ NEWWS also found that
welfare-to-work programs could increase the use of subsidized
child care. (Health insurance coverage and child care costs for
those who leave welfare are two issues often discussed in State
``leaver'' studies, discussed later in this appendix.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \8\ The subgroup of working parents who paid for child care and
lacked a high school diploma or basic skills in the Riverside
employment-focused program reported paying a very high 74 percent of
weekly earnings for child care. However, the overall Riverside group in
the employment-focused program reported they paid 55 percent of their
earnings for child care, more typical of the other groups in Riverside
who reported working and paying for child care.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Though supplements for working poor families may raise
family incomes, this comes at a direct cost to the government.
Additionally, people may change their behavior in response to
these work supports. The Wisconsin New Hope Program was a pilot
that tested substantial work supports for low-income persons
who worked 30 hours a week. The supports included a cash
supplement, paid health insurance, and paid child care. New
Hope increased employment and earnings for those who were not
working at the time they entered the program. However, for
those who were working full time (or more) at the time they
entered the program, there was a reduction in their hours of
work (although not the rate of employment). Those who were
working more than full time tended to reduce their hours of
work down to full-time schedules.
    The New Hope Program generally succeeded in raising the
economic well-being of program participants. For those who were
already working full time when they entered the program,
however, there was a decrease in cash income of 8 percent in
year 2, reflecting their reduced hours of work. Nonetheless,
participants were likely to be better off on average, because
their health insurance and child care were paid for.
Additionally, the New Hope Program resulted in a decrease in
employer-provided health insurance coverage, since all
participants working full time were given health insurance
through the program. Participants might have been more willing
to accept jobs without health insurance or not seek another job
that came with health insurance, because New Hope already
provided them with such coverage.
    Child support.--That welfare-to-work programs might succeed
in raising employment and earnings but not income led to
initiatives to supplement a mother's earnings. Supplements may
be paid from the government (discussed above). Another type of
supplement is a payment from the absent father in the form of
child support payments.
    Three types of initiatives that seek to increase child
support payments have been evaluated:
 1. Incentives for the custodial parents to help establish
        child support orders;
 2. Increasing the amount of child support a family on welfare
        receives if the noncustodial parent pays child support
        (passing through child support payments); and
 3. Increasing the earnings potential of noncustodial parents.
    The New York Child Assistance Program (CAP) provided
financial rewards to custodial parents that established child
support orders. The program succeeded in producing increases in
the establishment of orders, but failed to increase
collections.
    Only preliminary (1-year) results are available from
Wisconsin's demonstration of a 100 percent passthrough of child
support to families enrolled in its W-2 (welfare/work) program.
No consistent impacts were found on establishment of paternity,
child support orders, or percentage of cases with a payment.
There were no signs during the 1-year followup period that
noncustodial parents were more apt to make child support
payments if they knew the receiving family, and not the
government, would be the beneficiary of the payment. Families
in the group that received the 100 percent passthrough did, of
course, receive more child support than families that received
only the $50 passthrough. Moreover, families that received the
100 percent passthrough were more likely to leave W-2 or ``move
up'' in the program to higher levels of work activity.
    The Parent's Fair Share Demonstration (seven sites)
attempted to boost the incomes of noncustodial parents through
employment services (job search, education and training).
Through a six-quarter followup, the program increased
employment in only three of the seven sites (Dayton, Ohio; Los
Angeles, California; and Springfield, Massachusetts) and failed
to increase the earnings of noncustodial parents in any of the
sites. This demonstration boosted the percent of noncustodial
parents that paid child support in only one site (Grand Rapids)
and boosted the average amount of child support paid in two
sites (Dayton and Grand Rapids).
    Detail for economic status impact evaluations.--Table L-10,
at the end of this appendix, shows economic status impacts for
evaluations conducted after passage of the Family Support Act
of 1988. Because economic well-being is affected by both
welfare to work and family formation and structure outcomes,
the table also summarizes outcomes for these categories. The
major economic well-being outcome shown in the table is income
as measured in the evaluation. Unless otherwise noted, the
impacts shown are for the entire evaluation followup period.
For detail on each evaluation shown in the table, see table L-
9.

                        Child Well-Being Impacts

    Most Federal and State welfare policies apply directly to
parents, not children. They are aimed at promoting mothers'
work and reducing their dependence on welfare. At the time of
passage of TANF, some proponents maintained that the new
program would help children by increasing earnings and hence
family income, thereby providing more resources to meet
children's needs, and by giving children the positive role
model of a working parent. However, policies that promote and
support work may also alter the child's well-being in other
ways. For example, they may increase tension or stress in the
adult's life because of the need to balance work with home and
child care responsibilities. In addition, requiring mothers to
work reduces their time to nurture children and requires them
to find other care givers. Some critics maintained that TANF
time limits and mandatory work requirements could result in
harmful outcomes for children. Thus far under TANF, there has
been a sharp rise in work by welfare mothers, and there is
growing interest in how welfare to work and other policies have
affected children.
    With regard to outcomes for children, post-Family Support
Act research generally shows:
 1. A small number of evaluations have reported child well-
        being outcomes. Additional States will be releasing
        evaluations of child well-being impacts over the coming
        months.
 2. The few evaluations of policy changes that directly impact
        children provide mixed results. The Georgia Preschool
        Immunization Project increased the rate of
        immunizations among children subject to the
        requirement, but Michigan's savings incentive for
        students produced no impacts on their earnings or
        employment.
 3. Evaluations of policies that do not directly target child
        outcomes show few, if any, impacts on child well-being.
        The few impacts found have been small. NEWWS reported
        favorable impacts for children (e.g., school-related),
        but negative impacts were also reported in some sites
        (e.g., removal from mother's care). The Minnesota
        Family Investment Program (MFIP) reported generally
        favorable impacts for children, and these impacts may
        be attributed to the financial incentives in this
        program. Unlike the programs in the NEWWS evaluations,
        MFIP also reported positive impacts on measures of
        income.
Background and analytical issues
    Research has illustrated the negative effects of poverty on
children. Poor children generally score lower on assessments of
health, cognitive development, school achievement, and
emotional well-being. Poor children are more likely to be
raised by a single parent, to be raised in neighborhoods with
higher rates of crime, and to attend schools with fewer
resources (Brooks-Gunn, Duncan, & Maritato, 1997). These
findings have led many to contend that programs that raise the
income of families may positively affect child well-being.
    Under Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF),
States have designed programs that directly target outcomes
such as employment, income, and receipt of cash assistance
through work requirements, work incentives, and time limits on
assistance. Measuring the impact of these welfare reform
initiatives on children requires a look at the pathways through
which they might indirectly affect child well-being. This is
difficult, as these pathways may be directly or indirectly
affected by policy (Child Trends, 1999).
    Additional complexity is introduced because welfare
policies may affect children in different ways at different
ages. For example, many of the pre-TANF evaluations report
results 2 years after the welfare evaluation began. Therefore,
children who were age 4 when the evaluation began would be
interviewed or assessed at age 6; children who were age 2 when
the program began would be interviewed or assessed at age 4.
The impact of policies on children needs to be interpreted in
light of their age and developmental stage.
Highlights of selected evaluations
    In general, evaluations of welfare initiatives that report
outcomes for child well-being have examined two types of
policies:
 1. Policies designed to directly target child outcomes,
        including child immunization rates, school attendance,
        and employment and earnings of children; and
 2. Policies that may indirectly affect child outcomes,
        including the child's behavior, academic functioning,
        and health and safety.
    Policies that directly target child outcomes.--Policies
that directly target child outcomes include requirements for
up-to-date immunizations and exemption of a student's earnings
from a family's counted income and resources. The impact of
these policy initiatives can be measured and interpreted in a
relatively straightforward manner. For example, researchers
interested in the impact of up-to-date immunization
requirements in the Georgia Preschool Immunization Project
examined differences in immunization rates between an
experimental group subject to the requirement and a control
group not subject to the requirement. An evaluation of the
Michigan waiver program, To Strengthen Michigan Families
(TSMF), employed the same type of experimental design.
Highlights from these two evaluations include:
  --Preschool Immunization Project.--In 1992, Georgia received
        a waiver from the U.S. Department of Health and Human
        Services (DHHS) to implement a provision requiring up-
        to-date immunizations for welfare children. If children
        did not receive the immunization, the welfare benefit
        was decreased by the amount of that child's benefit.
        The evaluation of this provision found that
        immunization rates were higher for children in the
        group subject to this requirement.
  --TSMF.--The TSMF evaluation operated from October 1992
        through September 1996. TSMF provided that earnings of
        children who were students were to be disregarded as
        resources and thus could be put into savings accounts
        without counting against the Aid to Families with
        Dependent Children (AFDC) asset limit.\9\ The program
        also created an incentive for families to provide up-
        to-date immunizations for their children. While no
        results were reported for immunizations, the evaluation
        also reported no impact on the earnings or employment
        of children. At the same time, the program found no
        impacts on placement in a foster home or on child abuse
        or neglect.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \9\ Under longstanding AFDC law, a child/student's earnings also
had to be disregarded as income.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Policies that may indirectly impact child outcomes.--
Evaluations of policy changes that may indirectly affect child
well-being are often difficult for researchers, as collecting
and interpreting appropriate outcome data is not
straightforward.
    When TANF was passed, some maintained that this new welfare
program would help children by increasing family earnings and
providing a role model of a working parent. Others maintained
that work requirements and time limits on assistance would harm
children by increasing stress in the home environment and
reducing time for mothers to nurture and guide their children.
Both statements indicate the importance of understanding and
evaluating the indirect effects of policy on children. By
affecting their parents, work requirements and time limits may
indirectly affect overall child well-being.
    Impact of mandatory participation requirements.--The Family
Support Act of 1988 for the first time made single mothers with
children as young as age 3 subject to mandatory participation
requirements. The Teenage Parent Demonstration (TPD), which
began in 1987 and operated in three sites, required teenage
mothers to participate in work or training activities, thereby
increasing their use of child care when their children were
very young. Two of the sites--Camden, New Jersey and Chicago,
Illinois--reported that these programs had neither harmful nor
beneficial effects on child development. In the third site--
Newark, New Jersey--a few negative impacts were reported, as
children scored lower on math and reading achievement tests and
the mothers also rated their children lower on a measure of
social behavior. However, the differences were small and, the
researchers contend, not developmentally meaningful.
    NEWWS, which was mandated under the Family Support Act of
1988, also included mandatory requirements for participants in
the 11 programs. The NEWWS evaluation is unique in that the
evaluation provides results for labor force attachment programs
(LFA, or work first programs) and for human capital development
programs (HCD, or education-focused programs). Table L-6
presents results from the 2-year followup survey of families
with school-aged children from the NEWWS evaluation.
    Impacts of these welfare-to-work programs on school-aged
children differed among the 11 programs in the 7 sites
evaluated. Most of the programs had impacts on only one or two
outcomes. Two programs, the Atlanta HCD and the Detroit
program, had no impacts on any of the measurable outcomes. Four
of the programs which operated in two sites (Grand Rapids and
Riverside) increased the percent of children who attended a
special class for behavioral or emotional problems, while two
programs decreased the percent of children in these classes.
Two programs, the Grand Rapids HCD and the Columbus
traditional, increased the percent of children who were removed
from their mother's care because the mothers could not handle
or care for them, based on information provided by the parents.
There were no impacts reported by any of the 11 programs on the
percent of children who were taken to the hospital for
accidents, injury, or poisoning.

 TABLE L-6.--IMPACTS ON CHILD WELL-BEING FOR ALL SCHOOL-AGED CHILDREN IN
      THE NATIONAL EVALUATION OF WELFARE-TO-WORK STRATEGIES (NEWWS)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                      Increase in         Decrease in
             Outcome                  occurrence          occurrence
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Impact on percent suspended from  Riverside LFA.....  No programs.
 school.
 Impact on percent receiving or   Oklahoma City.....  Atlanta LFA
 requiring help for behavioral                        Portland
 or emotional problems.
Impact on percent who attended a  Grand Rapids LFD..  Atlanta LFA
 special class for behavioral or  Grand Rapids HCD..  Columbus
 emotional problems.              Riverside LFA.....   integrated
                                  Riverside HCD \1\.
Impact on percent who repeated a  No programs.......  Riverside LFA
 grade.
 Impact on percent who attended   No programs.......  Columbus
 a special class for learning                          integrated
 problems.
Impact on percent who were        Grand Rapids HCD..  No programs.
 removed from mother's care.      Columbus
                                   traditional.
Impact on percent who were taken  No programs.......  No programs.
 to hospital for accident,
 injury, or poisoning.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Unlike the other HCD programs included in this table, the Riverside
  HCD only includes individuals who lack a high school diploma.
  Individuals in the other HCD programs were randomly assigned prior to
  this skills assessment and therefore may or may not have a high school
  diploma.

Note.--Results based on a survey of recipients in the 11 programs
  participating in the NEWWS evaluation.

Source: Table prepared by the Congressional Research Service based on a
  review of the NEWWS evaluation: U.S. Department of Health and Human
  Services and U.S. Department of Education (June 2000b).

    While mandatory participation requirements are of interest
to policymakers, under TANF, States also are implementing
policies that ``make work pay'' through enhanced earnings
disregards. These disregards enable individuals to continue
receiving welfare at higher income levels. Programs that
contain mandatory participation requirements (like NEWWS)
increase earnings and employment, but do not appear to have any
overall effect on income. However, programs that combine
mandatory participation requirements with enhanced earnings
disregards (like MFIP) do appear to increase income.
    As a component of the MFIP evaluation, the sample included
single mothers with children who were between the ages of 5 and
12, 3 years after the program began. Among this sample of
single mothers, MFIP increased the percent who worked 30-34
hours per week, but also increased the percent who worked 20-29
hours per week. MFIP also decreased the percent of these
mothers who had been abused by a domestic partner over the
followup period (last 3 years). In general, MFIP had a
favorable impact on children, by decreasing the incidence of
behavior problems, and had favorable impacts on achievement
measures such as performance in school and engagement in
school. These favorable impacts for children, as well as the
decrease in domestic abuse among the mothers, were attributed
to the financial incentives in the MFIP, as the mandatory
participation requirement had no impact on these outcomes.
However, MFIP also increased the percentage of children who
required a visit to an emergency room or clinic.
    Table L-7 illustrates the impacts on child well-being in
the MFIP Child Report and the NEWWS Child Outcome Study Report.
The results for NEWWS differ from those discussed earlier for
this evaluation, as the results shown in the table are based
specifically on the Child Outcome Study. In the NEWWS
evaluation, the child outcome sample includes children who were
between the ages of 5 and 7 at the time of interview, with
information provided for one child (the ``focal'' child, who
was randomly chosen) for each family. Therefore, while table L-
6 shows impacts for all school-aged children of the parents
surveyed in the 11 programs, table L-7 shows impacts for
children in 6 programs in NEWWS between the ages of 5 and 7 at
the time of the interview. In the MFIP evaluation, the child
study sample was between the ages of 5 and 12 at the time of
the interview.
    As table L-7 illustrates, MFIP found favorable impacts on
behavior of children. Two programs in NEWWS (Atlanta LFA and
Grand Rapids LFA) reported unfavorable impacts on behavior.
Both MFIP and NEWWS reported favorable impacts on measures of
academic functioning such as school performance (MFIP) and
school readiness (NEWWS). Two of the programs in the NEWWS
evaluations also reported unfavorable impacts on the health of
the children, as reported by the parents. While this impact was
found in the NEWWS Child Outcome Study, no impact was reported
for any of the programs in the NEWWS evaluation when the sample
was extended to include all school-aged children (as
illustrated in table L-6).
    Evaluators of the New Chance and New Hope Programs also
reported impacts on child outcomes. At least initially,
enrollment in these programs was voluntary. Once in the
programs, participants were required to participate in
specified activities to maintain eligibility.
    Table L-8 highlights selected outcomes from the New Chance
and New Hope evaluations for all children, and also based on
the gender of the child. As with the previous evaluations
highlighted in this section, the few impacts found were small.
Children in the New Chance evaluation were between the ages of
5 and 10 at the time of the interview (the table is limited to
those who were 18 months or older when the program began).
Children in the New Hope evaluation were between the ages of 3
and 12 at the time of the interview, 2 years after the program
began. Unlike the NEWWS and TPD evaluations, the child well-
being outcomes in these reports were based on information
supplied by parents as well as teachers. The results are
reported separately for parents and teachers.

 TABLE L-7.--IMPACTS ON WELL-BEING OF CHILDREN FROM THE MINNESOTA FAMILY
   INVESTMENT PROGRAM (MFIP) EVALUATION AND THE NATIONAL EVALUATION OF
                   WELFARE-TO-WORK STRATEGIES (NEWWS)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                    MFIP: long-term
             Outcome                 recipients in       NEWWS: child
                                    urban counties      outcome sample
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Behavioral measures/adjustment    Favorable impact    Impacts were
 outcomes.                         on incidence of     favorable and
                                   problem behaviors   unfavorable, and
                                   and on likelihood   were confined to
                                   of a high level     two programs. The
                                   of behavioral and   Atlanta LFA
                                   emotional           program had an
                                   problems.           unfavorable
                                                       impact on total
                                                       behavioral
                                                       problems, but
                                                       favorable impacts
                                                       on externalizing
                                                       behavior problems
                                                       and positive
                                                       behavior. Grand
                                                       Rapids LFA had
                                                       unfavorable
                                                       impacts on
                                                       externalizing
                                                       behavioral
                                                       problems.
Academic functioning/cognitive    Favorable impact    Favorable programs
 functioning.                      on performance in   impacts related
                                   school,             to academic
                                   performance in      functioning were
                                   school below        found. The
                                   average, and        Atlanta LFA
                                   engagement in       program had three
                                   school.             favorable
                                                       impacts, and the
                                                       Atlanta HCD and
                                                       Riverside HCD
                                                       programs each had
                                                       one favorable
                                                       impact.
Health..........................  No impacts were     Unfavorable
                                   reported for        program impacts
                                   general health      were reported for
                                   rating.             general health
                                                       rating. Two were
                                                       reported in the
                                                       Riverside LFA and
                                                       two in the
                                                       Riverside HCD.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Table prepared by the Congressional Research Service based on
  information in: Gennetian and Miller (2000), and U.S. Department
  Health and Human Services and U.S. Department of Education (2000b).

    In both New Chance and New Hope, most of the reported
favorable impacts occurred primarily among boys. In the New
Chance Program, while parents reported unfavorable behavior
among boys (in decreased measures of autonomy and increased
measures of depression), the teachers reported favorable
impacts on their behavior. Similarly, a favorable impact on
behavior for boys was found in the New Hope Program. While few
impacts were reported for girls, these impacts were all
negative and related to behavioral problems. However, as table
L-8 illustrates, the impacts vary based on the source of
information (parent or teacher). In addition, while not
illustrated in the table, women in New Chance rated their
children as having more behavior problems, but this impact was
concentrated among young women who were at risk of depression
at baseline.

                             TABLE L-8.--SELECTED FINDINGS ON CHILD WELL-BEING FROM THE NEW CHANCE AND NEW HOPE EVALUATIONS
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                          New Chance                                                   New Hope
                                 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                     Child sample                                                Child sample
                                    (Boys & Girls)           Boys                Girls          (Boys & Girls)           Boys                Girls
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
School readiness/education progress:
Parent report...................  Decrease in         No impact.........  Decrease in         No impact.........  No impact.........  No impact.
                                   academic                                academic
                                   performance.                            performance.
Teacher report \1\..............  No impact.........  No impact.........  Decrease in         Increase in         Increase in         No impact
                                                                           measures of         measures of         measures of
                                                                           school readiness.   academic            academic
                                                                                               performance.        performance and
                                                                                                                   classroom skills.

Social behavior:
Parent report...................  Decrease in         Decrease in         No impact.........  No impact.........  Increase in         No impact.
                                   measures of total   measures of                                                 measures of total
                                   behavior.           autonomy.                                                   behavior.
Teacher report..................  No impact.........  Increase in         Decrease in         Increase in         Increase in         No impact.
                                                       measures of         measure of total    measures of total   measures of total
                                                       social competence.  positive behavior.  behavior.           behavior.

Problem behavior (externalizing and internalizing problems):
Parent report...................  Increase in         Increase in         Increase in         No impact.........  No impact.........  No impact.
                                   measure of total    measure of          measure of total
                                   behavior problems.  anxiousness/        behavior problems.
                                                       depression.
Teacher report..................  No impact.........  Decrease in total   No impact.........  No impact.........  Decrease in         Increase in
                                                       behavior problem                                            measures of         measures of
                                                       score.                                                      aggression,         aggression and
                                                                                                                   hyperactivity,      frequency of
                                                                                                                   and frequency of    disciplinary
                                                                                                                   disciplinary        action.
                                                                                                                   action.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ In New Chance, the teacher report cells contain results from a test of school readiness components.

Source: Table prepared by the Congressional Research Service based on information in Bos et al. (1999) and Quint et al. (1997).

    The New Hope evaluation gathered additional information to
further examine the different impacts reported among boys and
girls as part of their ethnographic study. Indepth interviews
with members of the Child and Family Study sample were
conducted to supplement the data collection. These interviews
suggested that mothers in the program group believed that the
boys were much more threatened than the girls by outside
pressures such as gangs, and therefore spent more of the
program's resources (such as child care subsidies for extended
day programs) on the boys.
    Role of child care.--Mandatory work programs that provide
child care assistance found evidence of increased placements in
formal, center-based care as illustrated in the MFIP evaluation
and in some programs in the NEWWS evaluation. The evaluations
of New Hope and New Chance also found increased placements in
formal, center-based care among families in the program group.
The extent to which formal, center-based child care is
associated with greater educational opportunities and cognitive
and language gains for children has been the subject of
research (see section 9). This increase in the use of formal,
center-based care has also been used in some of the evaluations
to explain increases in ``unfavorable'' outcomes for children.
    Unlike changes in earnings and employment, impacts on
measures of child well-being are difficult to interpret. While
some evaluations simply report an impact as favorable or
unfavorable, it is generally not enough to report
``unfavorable'' impacts without further discussions of these
outcomes. For example, as previously discussed, 2 of the 11
NEWWS programs increased the proportion of children who were
removed from their mother's care, as reported by their parents.
No additional information on the placement of these children is
available, such as whether these children are in foster care,
living with their fathers, or living with other relatives, and
therefore, it is difficult to evaluate this finding.
Ongoing efforts
    While MFIP and NEWWS have reported initial impacts of
welfare policy changes on child well-being, additional States
will be releasing evaluations of child well-being impacts over
the coming months. In addition to Minnesota, four States--
Connecticut, Florida, Indiana and Iowa--have received grants
from DHHS to evaluate child well-being impacts as part of their
efforts to evaluate welfare reform.

                          Cost Benefit Issues

    Many welfare reform initiatives, such as the operation of a
welfare-to-work program, cost Federal and State governments
money. Evaluations of welfare reform initiatives often examine
the benefits achieved by a program in relation to their costs
(cost benefit analysis). The costs of welfare reform
initiatives can be recouped if, over the long run, welfare
payments are lowered. Employment-focused (``work first'')
programs, on average, have lower costs than those that promote
education. Thus, it appears more likely that costs of a ``work
first'' program can be recouped than costs of an education-
focused program. Moreover, the benefits from a ``work first''
type of program tend to be immediate, while those from an
education-focused program take time to emerge. However, the
benefits of ``work first'' programs often peak in the first few
years, and longer followup reports indicate that overall
impacts may be minimal. In education-focused programs,
individuals forgo immediate earnings for education and training
services. The benefits of these programs often come much later
than programs that promote work first, because individuals
enter employment and often leave welfare after they complete
their education programs.
    Under pre-TANF law, the Federal and State governments could
have recouped welfare reform costs over the long run if the
program succeeded in reducing welfare rolls. Under TANF, States
receive block grants and are required to maintain a minimum
level of State spending, regardless of changes in the size of
their caseload. Nonetheless, States may continue to benefit
from reducing the rolls, as this ``frees up'' money for other
purposes for which they can use Federal TANF or State
maintenance-of-effort funds.
    Cost benefit analyses report both the benefits and costs to
the government and the benefits and costs to participants.
Programs that increase participant income provide a benefit to
the participants. As discussed in previous sections, programs
that provide enhanced earnings disregards (such as the
Minnesota MFIP) create an incentive to work by allowing welfare
recipients to keep more of their cash welfare benefit in
combination with their earnings. These programs increase
participant income. However, they also constitute a cost to the
government.
    Though cost benefit analyses are useful in examining some
TANF goals, such as reducing dependence on government benefits
through increased work, they are unlikely to be informative
about the benefits of achieving other TANF and welfare policy
goals. Cost benefit analysis is considered a much less
effective tool for programs where many of the benefits cannot
be quantified in monetary terms, and for programs where goals
other than efficiency are important (Boardman et al., 1996).
Goals of the welfare programs examined in this appendix include
promotion of work and ending dependence on cash welfare, but
many of these programs also include self-sufficiency and child
and family well-being among their stated purposes. These goals
are not easy to quantify in monetary terms. For example,
welfare reform initiatives may increase employment among single
mothers, but may also require increased use of formal child
care arrangements. Although the financial cost of child care
may be known, its impact on child well-being is more difficult
to measure.

                      FINDINGS FROM LEAVER STUDIES

    Since 1994, the welfare caseloads have dropped 48 percent,
with the fastest caseload declines occurring since passage of
the welfare reform law in 1996. As the caseloads have declined,
there has been growing interest in how former welfare
recipients (``leavers'') are faring. This section briefly
summarizes more than 30 State studies of the circumstances of
families who left TANF, or AFDC waiver programs with some TANF-
like requirements. These studies constitute the bulk of
research available since the enactment of TANF. This section
reviews only studies completed as of January 2000 and focuses
on families with an adult who formerly received cash welfare
(that is, the results exclude cases in which the only recipient
was a child).

                           Monitoring Studies

    The studies undertaken by the States to track those who
have left welfare are fundamentally different from the impact
evaluations discussed in the previous sections. Impact
evaluations are designed to measure the difference between two
sets of policies to determine how policy changes have affected
reported outcomes. Studies of welfare leavers are monitoring
studies, which are not designed to determine the impact, or
effect, of a policy initiative. Rather, monitoring studies
track those who have left welfare and provide information on
why they left welfare and how they are currently doing.
    States are only required to provide information to DHHS on
a recipient's final month of cash welfare; they are not
expected to track closed cases in order to collect information
on families for months after the family has left the rolls.
Nonetheless, many States have chosen to examine the
circumstances and characteristics of this population. Because
these studies have been initiated by individual States,
comparability across the studies is difficult. The studies
track recipients who left welfare during different periods of
time and remained off welfare for different periods of time;
the studies also have followed welfare leavers for different
lengths of time. To help standardize this information and
support State data collection efforts, DHHS has awarded funding
to 14 sites in fiscal year 1998 to support monitoring
studies.\10\ The 14 DHHS studies use a common definition of the
``leaver'' population, studying those who leave cash assistance
and remain off the rolls for at least 2 months (U.S. Department
of Health and Human Services, 2000).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \10\ Grants were awarded to Arizona, the District of Columbia,
Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Massachusetts, Missouri, New York, South
Carolina, Washington, Wisconsin, Cuyahoga County (Ohio), Los Angeles
County (California), and a consortium of San Mateo, Santa Clara and
Santa Cruz counties in California. Any reports available as of January
2000 are included in this appendix.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    State leaver studies have used both administrative data and
survey data to monitor former welfare recipients. Studies that
use administrative data are able to track a much larger number
of former recipients if they appear in the data sets. For
example, most individuals who leave welfare for employment
appear in the State's unemployment insurance (UI) wage files.
However, these files collect quarterly data, and information on
the hourly wage rate and number of hours worked per week is not
available.
    To collect information on outcomes such as the hourly wage
rate, States have conducted surveys of a sample of welfare
leavers with the goal of generalizing these results to the
entire population of leavers. However, studies that use survey
data have found that gathering information from individuals who
no longer receive cash welfare is difficult. Information
collected through a survey represents the situations of those
who respond to the survey. If a number of individuals do not
respond, the results become difficult to interpret. Previous
reviews of State leaver studies have not included results from
studies with low response rates, given the difficulty in
generalizing these results to a larger population (U.S. General
Accounting Office, 1999).
    All State leaver studies available as of January 2000 are
included in this review, regardless of their response rate. It
is important to be aware that the results shown reflect
information about individuals who responded to the surveys, and
no information is available on those who did not respond. If
the nonrespondents differ from the respondents, these results
should not be generalized to a larger population. This section
presents preliminary information about welfare leavers on a
State-by-State basis.

                            Welfare Leavers

Reason for case closing
    The most common reasons for case closings among former
welfare recipients are employment- and income-related. Those
who left for income-related reasons include those for whom
income exceeded cash welfare eligibility guidelines and those
who report additional income in the household, such as income
from other household members. Among those States that
explicitly ask whether marriage was a factor, fewer than 5
percent of former welfare recipients listed marriage as a
reason for case closing.
    With the new TANF requirements, there has been a growing
interest in recipients who leave welfare for reasons other than
employment. Three studies (Connecticut, North Carolina, and
Virginia) included only recipients who left welfare because
they hit a State-imposed time limit that was shorter than the
Federal 60-month time limit. States also examined sanctions as
reasons for case closings. Two of the studies (Iowa and
Tennessee) included only recipients who left because of a
sanction, and 20 percent of recipients leaving welfare in
Arizona indicated that a sanction was the reason for case
closing. Some States also examined whether failure to
redetermine eligibility or failure to cooperate was a reason
for case closing. In Maryland, one in four cases was closed for
failure to reapply or redetermine eligibility. Finally, a small
number of States that used surveys to collect information asked
about ``hassle'' affecting the desire to continue receiving
assistance. However, hassle does not appear to be a common
reason for case closing. In Florida, only 2 percent of former
recipients expressed that welfare was ``too much hassle.''
Employment and earnings
    Highlights of the State welfare leaver studies related to
employment and earnings include:
  --Employment rates.--In studies based on administrative data
        (11 States), employment rates ranged from 50 to 64
        percent in the quarter after exit but increased to 66-
        86 percent when based upon employment at any time since
        exit. Studies using survey data (29 States) found
        generally higher employment rates and a broader range,
        from 35 to 83 percent, at the time of the survey.
  --Earnings.--In studies based on administrative data (11
        States), quarterly earnings in the first quarter after
        exit ranged from $2,192 to $3,393; by the fourth
        quarter earnings had risen by about 12 percent, on
        average. Survey data (14 States) reported that average
        hourly wages ranged from $5.50 to $8.16.
    Survey data indicated that most welfare leavers were
employed in retail or clerical occupations. Studies that use
survey data also showed wide variation in self-reported reasons
for unemployment among welfare leavers. From 14 to 48 percent
of unemployed leavers (in eight reporting States) cited
inability to find a job or to find one that paid enough. Other
reasons included: physical or mental illness (self) from 11 to
49 percent (8 reporting States); physical or mental illness of
another person from 7 to 49 percent (7 States); child care
problems from 5 to 45 percent (10 States); and transportation
problems from 4 to 35 percent (10 States).
Income
    One of the primary reasons for conducting monitoring
studies of welfare recipients is to determine their current
economic circumstances. The impact evaluations discussed
earlier show that welfare-to-work programs have succeeded in
increasing earnings and employment among program participants,
but the impact on overall income depends on the types of
program services. Those programs that offer financial
incentives to work through enhanced earnings disregards, have
succeeded in raising the overall income of participants.
However, a number of these individuals remain on the rolls, as
their increased income includes continued cash assistance.
Programs that do not include financial incentives have not seen
an increase in overall income, but rather indicate that
individuals are replacing welfare benefits with earnings.
    The welfare leavers studies, which focus on those who have
left cash welfare, tell a similar story. Some of these studies
indicate that average hourly wages ranged from $5.50 to $8.16
an hour. In these States, the average wages are above the
minimum wage, and are above the welfare guarantee for the
State. However, income from the wages alone would still leave a
family of three below the poverty level in most States.
    There is growing interest in the need for ``work
supports.'' Many families that leave welfare are not covered by
health insurance and are having difficulty paying for, or
acquiring, child care. The impact evaluations illustrate that
welfare-to-work programs that provide financial incentives to
work and keep people on welfare also may keep them on Medicaid
and, therefore, provide continuous health insurance coverage.
The leaver studies indicate that those who have left welfare
altogether for employment, have not always replaced their
previous Medicaid coverage with employer-provided health
insurance. In addition, individuals who have left welfare have
indicated some barriers to child care (Schumacher & Greenberg,
1999).
Returns to welfare
    In nine States, from 13 to 36 percent of leavers returned
to welfare within 1 year or at the time of the survey. This
count excludes ``churners,'' or persons who returned to welfare
within 1 or 2 months after exit. In two other States, some
leavers said they would return to TANF if it were possible.
Hardship
    Measures of hardship have included receipt of other types
of assistance to supplement earnings, as well as difficulties
experienced since exiting cash welfare. The measures collected
differ by State, and there is substantial variation in the
outcomes. For example, survey data indicated that from 3 to 30
percent of former recipients (in 10 reporting States) received
help from food pantries. In addition, between 8 and 43 percent
were unable to get medical attention (11 States), 5-22 percent
had moved or been evicted since exiting the rolls (12 States),
and 10-59 percent had been behind in paying, or unable to pay,
1 or more utility payments (12 States).
Detail for leaver studies
    Table L-11, at the end of this appendix, presents selected
outcomes from the State evaluations of former welfare
recipients.

                      ONGOING AND FUTURE RESEARCH

    Even before passage of the 1996 welfare reform law,
numerous governmental and other organizations were involved in
efforts to determine the effects of welfare policy changes.
Many of these evaluations began under the old AFDC Program, but
have continued under TANF. The creation of TANF also led to a
number of new, ongoing projects to monitor the effects of
welfare reform.

                    Efforts by Governmental Agencies

    The welfare reform law of 1996 appropriated more than $200
million for fiscal years 1996-2002, for evaluation efforts
related to welfare reform. This includes $10 million annually
for the U.S. Census Bureau to collect data on families in the
1992 and 1993 panels of the Survey of Income and Program
Participation. This continuation of the Survey of Income and
Program Participation, called the Survey of Program Dynamics,
is intended to provide a nationally representative sample of
the population to enable evaluations of the impact of TANF. The
welfare reform law also appropriated $6 million annually for
the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) to
conduct a longitudinal study of children and families who come
in contact with the child protection system, commonly referred
to as the National Survey of Child and Adolescent Well-Being
(see section 11 for more details on this survey). As of June
2000, data collection for these efforts is underway, and the
U.S. Census Bureau has begun to release data files for the
Survey of Program Dynamics.
    Amounts appropriated by the 1996 law also include $15
million for each of fiscal years 1997-2002 to support ongoing
efforts by DHHS to monitor and evaluate various welfare reform
initiatives. At the point when TANF was created, DHHS had
awarded waivers to 43 States under section 1115 of the Social
Security Act, allowing them to waive certain Federal AFDC
requirements but requiring them to conduct an evaluation of the
waiver programs. Initiatives undertaken through these waivers
include ending benefits for violations of work requirements
(sanctions), imposing time limits on assistance, and offering
generous work rewards. Under TANF, States have the option of
continuing these waivers for as long as they were initially
approved, but are no longer mandated to evaluate their
programs. To date, most of the information available on the
impacts of welfare reform initiatives has been provided through
waiver evaluations begun under Aid to Families with Dependent
Children (AFDC) and sponsored by DHHS.
    As part of its research agenda to evaluate the impact of
welfare reform, DHHS has provided support for various
activities including:
  --Continuation of 9 existing waiver evaluations and support
        of 10 ``modified'' waiver evaluations (to evaluate
        welfare reform initiatives begun under waivers and
        subsequently incorporated into State TANF Programs).
        Reports on the effects of policy changes in eight of
        the existing waiver evaluations are reviewed in this
        appendix. However, most of these evaluations are
        ongoing, and longer followup reports will be available
        in the future.
  --Evaluations of the effects of welfare reform on children.
        In addition to the National Survey of Child and
        Adolescent Well-Being, DHHS is funding child impact
        studies to augment the welfare reform waiver
        evaluations in five States (Connecticut, Iowa,
        Minnesota, Indiana, and Florida). As of June 2000, only
        Minnesota had released a report on the effects of
        welfare reform on children.
  --Evaluations of the effectiveness of new State investments
        to improve job retention and advancement for low-income
        parents. This project provides planning grants to build
        knowledge about alternative employment and retention
        and career advancement strategies to help welfare
        recipients sustain employment and advance. As of June
        2000, DHHS had awarded grants to five States ready to
        move into the phase of implementing and testing their
        strategies, and had awarded planning grants to six
        States for further development of their initiatives.
    Congress has also appropriated specific funding for
research on welfare reform outcomes. These funds are being used
by DHHS to support a range of initiatives, including studies of
single mothers diverted from welfare (diversion) and studies of
former welfare recipients (leavers). In fiscal year 1998, the
welfare outcomes grants awarded by DHHS emphasized former
recipients of TANF, with all 14 awardees studying this
population. The fiscal year 1999 welfare outcomes grants
awarded by DHHS have an emphasis on TANF diversion, with six of
the seven grantees focusing their studies on the applicant
population, and one grantee studying former welfare recipients.
Reports on both these efforts will continue to be released in
the future.

                     Efforts by Other Organizations

    In addition to DHHS, numerous organizations have undertaken
efforts to monitor the effects of welfare reform. These
include: \11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \11\ For a more detailed list of projects planned and underway to
monitor the effects of welfare reform, see the 1998 Green Book Appendix
L: Monitoring the Effects of Welfare Reform (Committee, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 1. Assessing the New Federalism.--This project is being
        conducted by the Urban Institute in Washington, DC, and
        is a major foundation-funded, multiyear comprehensive
        assessment of how State income support systems have
        changed as a result of welfare reform. The project
        includes a National Survey of America's Families which
        interviews nearly 50,000 people to provide
        comprehensive information on the well-being of adults
        and children as welfare reform is being implemented in
        the various States. The survey provides national
        estimates, as well as State-specific estimates for 13
        States selected for intensive study. The Urban
        Institute has begun to release reports, as well as data
        files from the National Survey of America's Families.
 2. State Policy Documentation Project.--This project, operated
        by the Center for Law and Social Policy and the Center
        on Budget and Policy Priorities in Washington, DC,
        monitors and reports on program changes
        (administration, eligibility, services and benefits
        provided) that States legislate and implement. The
        project covers changes in food stamps, general
        assistance, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families
        (TANF), and Medicaid Programs.
 3. Study of State Capacity.--Conducted by the Rockefeller
        School of Government at the State University of New
        York in Albany, this 4-year study focuses on State
        governments' capacity to implement social programs,
        including family and children's services, welfare, work
        force development programs, and Medicaid. The study
        will conduct indepth case studies of up to 18 States,
        and particular management topics will be addressed in
        all 50 States. DHHS has also funded a topical study to
        examine ``culture'' change at the caseworker level as
        part of this larger effort.

                          Ethnographic Studies

    Many of the evaluation studies underway are conducting
indepth interviews with a small number of individuals to
evaluate the effects of welfare reform. These ethnographic
studies often complement larger data collection efforts and
provide more detailed information on program participants. For
example, the Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation is
conducting a 5-year study of the effect of welfare reform in
four large urban areas--Los Angeles, Miami, Cleveland, and
Philadelphia. A component of this evaluation, the ethnographic
study, will chronicle, indepth and over time, how approximately
40 welfare-reliant families in each site cope with the new
rules and policies (Quint et al., 1999).

                            DETAILED TABLES

    Table L-9 provides information about impact evaluations
conducted after the passage of the Family Support Act of 1988.
It includes information on the population that was studied
(universe), the time period when persons were assigned to
experimental and control groups (random assignment), the number
of months or years following random assignment for which data
were collected (followup), and the source of the information
used in the evaluation (data type).
    The table also includes information on the types of policy
changes that were evaluated. These policy changes are
categorized in the table using standardized terminology.
However, it should not be assumed that all programs are
identical to one another. Rather, there are likely numerous
design and other differences among programs that all tested the
same general policy approach (see table L-2 preceding the
discussion of welfare-to-work outcomes, for a description of
policy changes under welfare reform).
    Table L-9 shows three major welfare-to-work outcomes:
earnings, employment rates, and cash assistance payments.
Unless otherwise noted, the outcome shown is as measured over
the entire followup period. The outcomes are displayed as
percentage changes. Some percentage changes reported in this
table may differ if calculated based on the reported findings,
due to rounding. The percentage changes reported in the table
reflect the percentage changes as reported in the individual
evaluations. Additionally, the actual levels (e.g., earnings
amounts, employment rates) are shown in parentheses (outcomes
for the experimental group versus outcomes for the control
group) as reported in the individual evaluations. The table's
earnings data represent earnings over the entire research
sample and group, and include zero earnings for individuals for
whom no work is reported. This illustrates the impact of the
program on average earnings. (Average earnings for only those
who actually did work would be higher.)
    Table L-10 shows welfare-to-work, family formation, and
economic status impacts for evaluations conducted after passage
of the Family Support Act of 1988. Table L-11 presents selected
outcomes from the State evaluations of former welfare
recipients. For studies that use administrative data, the
length of followup is reported. For studies that use survey
data, the response rate is reported. Unlike the impact
evaluations in tables L-9 and L-10, the average earnings
reported in table L-11 for former welfare recipients are
calculated among only those who report employment, rather than
the entire sample of former welfare recipients regardless of
employment status.

  TABLE L-9.--WELFARE-TO-WORK OUTCOMES FOR IMPACT EVALUATIONS CONDUCTED
           SINCE THE PASSAGE OF THE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT OF 1988
------------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------------------------------------------------
National Evaluation of Welfare-To-Work Strategies
National Evaluation of Welfare-to-Work Strategies: Evaluating
 Alternative Welfare-to-Work Approaches: Two Year Impacts for Eleven
 Programs, June 2000
Author: Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation under contract for
 the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services and U.S. Department of
 Education
Sites: Atlanta, GA; Grand Rapids, MI; Riverside, CA; Columbus OH;
 Detroit, MI; Oklahoma City, OK; Portland OR

Atlanta            Universe: JOBS     Policy changes:   Earnings:
employment-         mandatory         --Employment-      Increase of 16%
 focused            population         focused program   ($5,820 vs.
                    (parents of                          $5,006)
                    children age 3                      Employment rate:
                    or older)                            Increase of 7%
                   Random                                (66% vs. 62%)
                    assignment: 1/92-                   Cash assistance:
                    1/94                                 Decrease of 8%
                   Followup: 2 years                     ($4,553 vs.
                   Data type:                            $4,922)
                    Administrative
                    data, survey
Atlanta            Universe: JOBS     Policy changes:   Earnings:
education-focused   mandatory         --Education-       Increase of 10%
                    population         focused program   ($5,502 vs.
                    (parents of                          $5,006)
                    children age 3                      Employment rate:
                    or older)                            Increase of 5%
                   Random                                (64% vs. 62%)
                    assignment: 1/92-                   Cash assistance:
                    1/94                                 Decrease of 6%
                   Followup: 2 years                     ($4,634 vs.
                   Data type:                            $4,922)
                    Administrative
                    data, survey
Grand Rapids       Universe: JOBS     Policy changes:   Earnings:
employment-         mandatory         --Employment-      Increase of 22%
 focused            population         focused program   ($5,674 vs.
                    (parents with                        $4,639)
                    children age 1                      Employment rate:
                    or older)                            Increase of 11%
                   Random                                (78% vs. 70%)
                    assignment: 9/91-                   Cash assistance:
                    1/94                                 Decrease of 19%
                   Followup: 2 years                     ($5,944 vs.
                   Data type:                            $7,347)
                    Administrative
                    data, survey
Grand Rapids       Universe: JOBS     Policy changes:   Earnings:
education-focused   mandatory         --Education-       Increase of 13%
                    population         focused program   ($5,219 vs.
                    (parents with                        $4,639)
                    children age 1                      Employment rate:
                    or older)                            Increase of 8%
                   Random                                (75% vs. 70%)
                    assignment: 9/91-                   Cash assistance:
                    1/94                                 Decrease of 11%
                   Followup: 2 years                     ($6,512 vs.
                   Data type:                            $7,347)
                    Administrative
                    data, survey
Riverside          Universe: JOBS     Policy changes:   Earnings:
employment-         mandatory         --Employment-      Increase of 30%
 focused            population         focused program   ($5,488 vs.
                    (parents of                          $4,213).
                    children age 3                       Increase for
                    or older)                            those without a
                   Random                                high school
                    assignment: 6/91-                    diploma or
                    6/93                                 basic skills of
                   Followup: 2 years                     32% ($4,124 vs.
                   Data type:                            $3,133)
                    Administrative                      Employment rate:
                    data, survey                         Increase of 34%
                                                         (60% vs. 45%).
                                                         Increase for
                                                         those without a
                                                         high school
                                                         diploma or
                                                         basic skills of
                                                         43% (56% vs.
                                                         39%)
                                                        Cash assistance:
                                                         Decrease of 14%
                                                         ($8,292 vs.
                                                         $9,600).
                                                         Decrease for
                                                         those without a
                                                         high school
                                                         diploma or
                                                         basic skills of
                                                         14% ($8,894 vs.
                                                         $10,302)
Riverside          Universe: JOBS     Policy changes:   Earnings: No
education-focused   mandatory         --Education-       impact
                    population         focused program  Employment rate:
                    (parents of                          Increase of 24%
                    children age 3                       (48% vs. 39%)
                    or older)                           Cash assistance:
                    without a high                       Decrease of 10%
                    school diploma                       ($9,253 vs.
                    or basic skills                      $10,302)
                   Random
                    assignment: 6/91-
                    6/93
                   Followup: 2 years
                   Data type:
                    Administrative
                    data, survey
Columbus           Universe: JOBS     Policy changes:   Earnings:
integrated case     mandatory         --Education-       Increase of 10%
 management         population         focused program   ($7,565 vs.
                    (parents of                          $6,892)
                    children age 3                      Employment rate:
                    or older)                            No impact over
                   Random                                2-year followup
                    assignment: 9/92-                    period. Last
                    7/94                                 quarter of year
                   Followup: 2 years                     2: increase of
                   Data type:                            11% (52% vs.
                    Administrative                       47%)
                    data, survey                        Cash assistance:
                                                         Decrease of 13%
                                                         ($4,775 vs.
                                                         $5,469)
Columbus           Universe: JOBS     Policy changes:   Earnings:
traditional case    mandatory         --Education-       Increase of 10%
 management         population         focused program   ($7,569 vs.
                    (parents of                          $6,892)
                    children age 3                      Employment rate:
                    or older)                            No impact over
                   Random                                2-year followup
                    assignment: 9/92-                    period. Last
                    7/94                                 quarter of year
                   Followup: 2 years                     2: increase of
                   Data type:                            8% (50% vs.
                    Administrative                       47%)
                    data, survey                        Cash assistance:
                                                         Decrease of 10%
                                                         ($4,939 vs.
                                                         $5,469)
Detroit            Universe: JOBS     Policy changes:   Earnings:
                    mandatory         --Education-       Increase of 9%
                    population         focused program   ($4,369 vs.
                    (parents with                        $4,001)
                    children age 1                      Employment rate:
                    or older)                            Increase of 7%
                   Random                                (62% vs. 58%)
                    assignment: 5/92-                   Cash assistance:
                    6/94                                 No impact
                   Followup: 2 years
                   Data type:
                    Administrative
                    data, survey
Oklahoma City      Universe: New      Policy changes:   Earnings: No
                    applicants in     --Education-       impact
                    JOBS mandatory     focused program  Employment rate:
                    population                           No impact
                    (parents with                       Cash assistance:
                    children age 1                       Decrease of 6%
                    and older)                           ($3,391 vs.
                   Random                                $3,624)
                    assignment: 9/91-
                    5/93
                   Followup: 2 years
                   Data type:
                    Administrative
                    data, survey
Portland           Universe: JOBS     Policy changes:   Earnings:
                    mandatory         --Mixed            Increase of 35%
                    population         employment/       ($7,133 vs.
                    (parents with      education         $5,291)
                    children age 1     program          Employment rate:
                    and older)                           Increase of 18%
                   Random                                (72% vs. 61%)
                    assignment: 2/93-                   Cash assistance:
                    12/94                                Decrease of 17%
                   Followup: 2 years                     ($5,818 vs.
                   Data type:                            $7,014)
                    Administrative
                    data, survey
------------------------------------------------------------------------
New Chance Demonstration
New Chance: Final Report on a Comprehensive Program for Young Mothers in
 Poverty and Their Children, October 1997
Author: Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation
Sites: Sixteen sites in ten States: California, Colorado, Florida,
 Illinois, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania

                   Universe: Mothers  Policy changes:   Earnings: No
                    16-22 years old   --Child care       impact over 42-
                    who (1) had       --Enhanced         month followup
                    first given        family planning   period. Months
                    birth age 19 or    services          1-6: Decrease
                    younger, (2)      --Parenting        of 27% ($263
                    were receiving     workshops         vs. $358).
                    AFDC, (3) did     --Required         Months 7-18:
                    not have a high    participation     Decrease of 17%
                    school diploma     in education-     ($1,096 vs.
                    or GED, and (4)    focused program   $1,323). Months
                    were not           (first-year)      18-42: No
                    pregnant when      then employment   impact
                    they entered the                    Employment rate:
                    program.                             No impact over
                    Participation in                     42-month
                    the New Chance                       followup
                    Demonstration                        period. Months
                    was voluntary                        1-6: Decrease
                   Random                                of 26% (15% vs.
                    assignment: 8/89-                    20%). Months 7-
                    7/91                                 42: No impact
                   Followup: 42                         Cash assistance:
                    months                               Percent who
                   Data type: Survey                     ever received
                                                         AFDC over 42-
                                                         month followup
                                                         period:
                                                         Increase of 1%
                                                         (99% vs. 98%)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Parent's Fair Share (PFS) Demonstration
Building Opportunities, Enforcing Obligations: Implementation and
 Interim Impacts of Parent's Fair Share, December 1998
Author: Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation
Sites: Los Angeles, CA; Jacksonville, FL; Springfield, MA; Grand Rapids,
 MI; Trenton, NJ; Dayton, OH; Memphis, TN

                   Universe:          Policy changes:   Earnings: No
                    Noncustodial      --Enhanced child   impact for
                    parents            support           seven sites
                   Random              establishment     combined. Site
                    assignment: 4/94- --Mixed            with impact:
                    12/95              employment/       Jacksonville,
                   Followup: 18        education         FL: decrease of
                    months             program           13% ($7,843 vs.
                   Data type:         --Promote parent   $8,990)
                    Administrative     interaction      Employment rate:
                    data                                 No impact for
                                                         seven sites
                                                         combined. Sites
                                                         with impacts:
                                                         Dayton, OH
                                                         increase of 17%
                                                         (81% vs. 70%),
                                                         Los Angeles, CA
                                                         increase of 19%
                                                         (70% vs. 58%),
                                                         Springfield, MA
                                                         decrease of 9%
                                                         (78% vs. 86%)
                                                        Cash assistance:
                                                         Not reported
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Teenage Parent Demonstration (TPD)
Moving into Adulthood: Were the Impacts of Mandatory Programs for
 Welfare-Dependent Teenaged Parents Sustained After the Programs Ended?,
 February 1998
Author: Mathematica Policy Research, Inc.
Sites: Chicago, IL; Camden, NJ; Newark, NJ

                   Universe:          Policy changes:   Earnings: No
                    Teenagers who     --Child care       impact
                    were first-time   --Mixed           Employment rate:
                    parents            employment/       Camden:
                    receiving AFDC     education         Increase of 8%
                   Random              program           (75% vs. 70%).
                    assignment: 7/87- --Provide for      Newark:
                    4/90               work-related      Increase of 7%
                   Followup: 6 years   expenses          (75% vs. 70%).
                   Data type:                            Chicago:
                    Administrative                       Increase of 4%
                    data, child                          (78% vs. 76%)
                    development                         Cash assistance:
                    assessments,                         Camden: No
                    survey                               impact. Newark:
                                                         No impact.
                                                         Chicago:
                                                         Decrease of 5%
                                                         ($11,645 vs.
                                                         $12,216)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Alabama: Avenues to Self-Sufficiency through Employment and Training
 Services (ASSETS)
Evaluation of the Alabama Avenues to Self-Sufficiency Through Employment
 and Training Services (ASSETS) Demonstration, January 1997
Author: Abt Associates Inc.
Sites: Three counties in Alabama: Clarke, Limestone, and Madison

                   Universe: AFDC     Policy changes:   Earnings: Year 3
                    and food stamp    --Applied AFDC     impacts: Clarke
                    cases. Focus on    child support     County:
                    participants age   cooperation       Decrease of 11%
                    16-59 for          requirement to    ($2,758 vs.
                    employment and     food-stamp-only   $3,096).
                    training           households        Limestone
                    services          --Asset limit      County: No
                   Study duration: 7/  increase          impact. Madison
                    90-6/94           --Food stamp       County:
                   Data type:          benefit           Decrease of 5%
                    Administrative     combined with     ($2,925 vs.
                    data               cash grant        $3,076)
                                       (food stamp      Employment rate:
                                       cashout)          Percent
                                      --Mixed            employed in
                                       employment/       12th quarter:
                                       education         Clarke County:
                                       program           Decrease of 11%
                                      --Personal         (37% vs. 41%).
                                       responsibility    Limestone
                                       sanctions         County:
                                                         Decrease of 8%
                                                         (36% vs. 39%).
                                                         Madison County:
                                                         Decrease of 5%
                                                         (36% vs. 38%)
                                                        Cash assistance:
                                                         Year 3 impacts
                                                         Clarke County:
                                                         Increase of 9%
                                                         ($1,930 vs.
                                                         $1,779);
                                                         Limestone
                                                         County:
                                                         Decrease of 9%
                                                         ($1,107 vs.
                                                         $1,222);
                                                         Madison County:
                                                         Increase of 3%
                                                         ($1,446 vs.
                                                         $1,409)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Arizona: Employing and Moving People Off Welfare and Encouraging
 Responsibility (EMPOWER)
Evaluation of the Arizona EMPOWER Welfare Reform Demonstration, May 1999
Author: Abt Associates Inc.
Sites: Three sites in Phoenix and one site on the Navajo Reservation

                   Universe: Ongoing  Policy changes:   Earnings: No
                    recipients as of  --Family cap       impact
                    10/95             --Personal        Employment rate:
                   Random              responsibility    No impact
                    assignment: 10/    sanctions        Cash assistance:
                    95                --Required         Average monthly
                   Followup: 3 years   participation     cash benefit:
                   Data type:          in employment     Decrease of 6%
                    Administrative     and training      ($137 vs. $146)
                    data, survey       services for
                                       minor parents
                                      --Required unwed
                                       minor parents
                                       to live with
                                       parent or
                                       responsible
                                       adult
                                      --Time limit
                                       (adult only)
                                      --Transitional
                                       benefits
                                       extension
                                       (Medicaid)
                                      --Two-parent
                                       family
                                       eligibility
------------------------------------------------------------------------
California: Greater Avenues for Independence (GAIN)
GAIN: Benefits, Costs, and Three-Year Impacts of a Welfare-to-Work
 Program, September 1994
Author: Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation
Sites: Six counties in California: Alameda, Butte, Los Angeles,
 Riverside, San Diego, and Tulare

Alameda            Universe: Long-    Policy changes:   Earnings:
                    term recipients   --Mixed            Increase of 30%
                    who were GAIN      employment/       ($6,432 vs.
                    mandatory (for     education         $4,941)
                    single parents,    program          Employment rate:
                    child age 6 or                       Increase of 20%
                    older)                               (49% vs. 41%)
                   Random                               Cash assistance:
                    assignment: 7/89-                    Decrease of 4%
                    5/90                                 ($17,593 vs.
                   Followup: 3 years                     $18,375)
                   Data type:
                    Administrative
                    data, survey
Butte              Universe: GAIN     Policy changes:   Earnings: No
                    mandatory         --Mixed            impact
                    recipients (for    employment/      Employment rate:
                    single parents,    education         No impact
                    child age 6 or     program          Cash assistance:
                    older)                               No impact
                   Random
                    assignment: 3/88-
                    3/90
                   Followup: 3 years
                   Data type:
                    Administrative
                    data, survey
Los Angeles        Universe: Long-    Policy changes:   Earnings: No
                    term recipients   --Mixed            impact
                    who were GAIN      employment/      Employment rate:
                    mandatory (for     education         Increase of 13%
                    single parents,    program           (39% vs. 35%)
                    with children                       Cash assistance:
                    age 6 or older)                      Decrease of 6%
                   Random                                ($17,314 vs.
                    assignment: 7/89-                    $18,319)
                    3/90
                   Followup: 3 years
                   Data type:
                    Administrative
                    data, survey
Riverside          Universe: GAIN     Policy changes:   Earnings:
                    mandatory         --Mixed            Increase of 49%
                    recipients (for    employment/       ($9,448 vs.
                    single parents,    education         $6,335)
                    with child age 6   program          Employment rate:
                    or older)                            Increase of 26%
                   Random                                (67% vs. 53%)
                    assignment: 8/88-                   Cash assistance:
                    3/90                                 Decrease of 15%
                   Followup: 3 years                     ($11,284 vs.
                   Data type:                            $13,267)
                    Administrative
                    data, survey
San Diego          Universe: GAIN     Policy changes:   Earnings:
                    mandatory         --Mixed            Increase of 22%
                    recipients (for    employment/       ($9,786 vs.
                    single-parent      education         $8,014)
                    families, with     program          Employment rate:
                    child age 6 or                       Increase of 10%
                    older)                               (62% vs. 57%)
                   Random                               Cash assistance:
                    assignment: 8/88-                    Decrease of 8%
                    9/89                                 ($13,283 vs.
                   Followup: 3 years                     $14,419)
                   Data type:
                    Administrative
                    data, survey
Tulare             Universe: GAIN     Policy changes:   Earnings: No
                    mandatory         --Mixed            impact
                    recipients (for    employment/      Employment rate:
                    single parents,    education         Increase of 8%
                    with child age 6   program           (60% vs. 55%)
                    or older)                           Cash assistance:
                   Random                                No impact
                    assignment: 1/89-
                    6/90
                   Followup: 3 years
                   Data type:
                    Administrative
                    data, survey
------------------------------------------------------------------------
California: Los Angeles Jobs-First Greater Avenues for Independence
 (GAIN)
Los Angeles Jobs-First GAIN evaluation: First-Year Findings on
 Participation Patterns and Impacts, June 1998
Author: Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation
Site: Los Angeles County

                   Universe: Jobs     Policy changes:   Earnings:
                    First GAIN        --Employment-      Increase of 31%
                    mandatory          focused program   ($3,187 vs.
                    recipients (for                      $2,438)
                    single parents,                     Employment rate:
                    caring for a                         Increase of 25%
                    child age 3 or                       (54% vs. 43%)
                    older)                              Cash assistance:
                   Random                                Decrease of 8%
                    assignment: 4/96-                    ($5,363 vs.
                    9/96                                 $5,795)
                   Followup: 1 year
                   Data type:
                    Administrative
                    data
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Connecticut: Jobs First
Jobs First: Implementation and Early Impacts of Connecticut's Welfare
 Reform Initiative, February 2000
Author: Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation
Sites: New Haven and Manchester

                   Universe: Jobs     Policy changes:   Earnings:
                    First enrollees   --Asset limit      Increase of 11%
                   Random              increase          ($13,244 vs.
                    assignment: 1/96- --Child support    $11,951)
                    6/96               liberalization   Employment rate:
                   Followup: 30       --Earnings         Increase of 10%
                    months             disregard         (82% vs. 74%)
                   Participation in    enhancement      Cash assistance:
                    welfare-to-work   --Employment-      Increase of 10%
                    requirement: For   focused program   ($9,256 vs.
                    experimental      --Family cap       $8,416)
                    group, parents    --Time limit
                    with child age 1  --Transitional
                    or older. For      benefits
                    control group,     extension
                    parents with       (Medicaid and
                    child age 2 or     child care)
                    older             --Two-parent
                   Data type:          family
                    Administrative     eligibility
                    data, survey      --Work
                                       requirements:
                                       younger child
                                      --Work sanctions
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Delaware: A Better Chance (ABC)
The Early Economic Impacts of Delaware's ABC Welfare Reform Program,
 December 1997
Author: Abt Associates Inc.
Sites: Five of Thirteen Delaware welfare offices: Carroll's Plaza,
 Georgetown, Hudson, Thatcher, and Williams

                   Universe: Ongoing  Policy changes:   Earnings: No
                    cases and new     --Earnings         impact over 1-
                    applicants         disregard         year followup
                   Random              enhancement       period.
                    assignment: 10/   --Enhanced         Increase in
                    95-9/96            family planning   average total
                   Followup: 1 year    services          earnings only
                   Data type:         --Family cap       in quarter 4
                    Administrative    --Personal         (for those
                    data, survey       responsibility    enrolling
                                       sanctions         during ABC's
                                      --Required minor   first 6 months
                                       parent to live    of operation
                                       with adult        (11/95-3/96) of
                                       guardian          16% ($1,214 vs.
                                      --Time limit       $1,047)
                                      --Two-parent      Employment rate:
                                       family            Increase of 20%
                                       eligibility       (57% vs. 48%)
                                      --Work-trigger    Cash assistance:
                                       time limit        Decrease of 5%
                                                         ($2,775 vs.
                                                         $2,930)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Florida: Project Independence
Florida's Project Independence: Benefits, Costs, and Two-Year Impacts of
 Florida's JOBS Program, April 1995
Author: Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation
Sites: Nine counties in Florida: Bay, Broward, Dade, Duval,
 Hillsborough, Lee, Orange, Pinellas, and Volusia

                   Universe: AFDC     Policy changes:   Earnings:
                    parents (child    --Mixed            Increase of 4%
                    age 3 and older)   employment/       ($5,766 vs.
                   Random              education         $5,539)
                    assignment: 7/90-  program          Employment rate:
                    8/91                                 Increase of 4%
                   Followup: 2 years                     (66% vs. 64%)
                   Data type:                           Cash assistance:
                    Administrative                       Decrease of 6%
                    data, survey                         ($4,028 vs.
                                                         $4,293)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Florida: Family Transition Program (FTP)
FTP: The Family Transition Program: Implementation and Three-Year
 Impacts of Florida's Initial Time-Limited Welfare Program, April 1999
Author: Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation
Site: Escambia County

                   Universe: Single   Policy changes:   Earnings:
                    parents subject   --Child care       Increase of 18%
                    to FTP work       --Earnings         ($11,442 vs.
                    requirements       disregard         $9,679)
                    (not disabled,     enhancement      Employment rate:
                    caring for a      --Education-       Increase of 5%
                    child age 7        focused program   (82% vs. 78%)
                    months or older)  --Time limit      Cash assistance:
                   Random                                Decrease of 11%
                    assignment: 5/94-                    ($3,703 vs.
                    2/95                                 $4,147)
                   Followup: 3 years
                   Data type:
                    Administrative
                    data
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Illinois: Community Group Participation and Housing Supplementation
 Demonstration
Community Group Participation and Housing Supplementation Demonstration:
 Final Report, June 1995
Author: Abt Associates Inc.
Site: West Garfield Park neighborhood in Chicago, IL

                   Universe:          Policy changes:   Earnings: No
                    Volunteers        --Provision of     impact
                    living in          services by      Employment rate:
                    severely           community-based   Decrease of 15%
                    distressed         organization      (22% vs. 26%)
                    neighborhoods                       Cash assistance:
                   Random                                No impact
                    assignment: 7/88-
                    8/91
                   Followup: Varies
                    from 35 to 54
                    months (analysis
                    ends 6/94)
                   Data type:
                    Administrative
                    data, survey
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Indiana: Welfare Reform Evaluation
The Indiana Welfare Reform Evaluation: Program Implementation and
 Economic Impacts After Two Years, November 1998
Author: Abt Associates Inc. and the Urban Institute

                   Universe: AFDC     Policy changes:   Earnings:
                    recipients and    --Asset limit      Increase of 5%
                    applicants         increase          ($7,344 vs.
                   Random             --Family cap       $6,967)
                    assignment: 5/95- --Mixed           Employment rate:
                    12/95              employment/       Increase of 2%
                   Followup: 2 years   education         (79% vs. 77%)
                   Participation in    program          Cash assistance:
                    welfare-to-work   --Personal         Decrease of 20%
                    requirement: For   responsibility    ($2,339 vs.
                    experimental       sanctions         $2,921)
                    group, changed    --Required minor
                    in 6/97 from       parent to live
                    parents with       with adult
                    children age 3    --Time limit
                    or older to        (adult only)
                    parents with      --Two-parent
                    children age 2     family
                    or older           eligibility
                   Data type:         --Work
                    Administrative     requirements:
                    data, survey       younger child
                                      --Work sanctions
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Iowa: Family Investment Program (FIP)
Iowa's Family Investment Program: Two-Year Impacts, December 1998
Author: Mathematica Policy Research, Inc.
Sites: Nine counties in Iowa: Black Hawk, Linn, Polk, Pottawattamie,
 Woodbury, Clinton, Des Moines, Jackson, and Jones

                   Universe: Ongoing  Policy changes:   Earnings:
                    and applicant     --Asset limit     Ongoing cases:
                    assistance         increase         Year 1: Increase
                    cases.            --Benefit          of 8% ($2,923
                   Ongoing cases:      determination     vs. $2,714)
                   Random              the same for     Year 2: Increase
                    assignment: 10/    parents and       of 8% ($4,955
                    93                 stepparents       vs. $4,583)
                   Followup: 2 years  --Earnings        Applicant cases:
                   Applicant cases:    disregard        Year 1: Increase
                   Random              enhancement       of 12% ($6,828
                    assignment: 10/   --Personal         vs. $6,126)
                    93-9/94            responsibility   Employment rate:
                   Followup: 1 year    sanctions        Ongoing cases:
                   Participation in   --Required         No impact
                    welfare-to-work    participation    Applicant cases:
                    requirement: For   in employment     Increase of 6%
                    experimental       and training      (77% vs. 73%)
                    group, parents     services for     Cash assistance:
                    with child age 3   both persons in  Ongoing cases:
                    months or older.   two-parent       Year 1: No
                    For control        family            impact
                    group, parents    --Transitional    Year 2: Decrease
                    with child age 3   benefits          of 4% ($2,468
                    or older           extension         vs. $2,569)
                   Data type:          (child care)     Applicants: No
                    Administrative    --Two-parent       impact over 1-
                    data               family            year followup
                                       eligibility       period
                                      --Work            Quarter 1:
                                       requirements:     increase of 7%
                                       younger child     ($547 vs. $510)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Michigan: To Strengthen Michigan Families (TSMF)
Final Impact Report: The Evaluation of To Strengthen Michigan Families
 (TSMF), September 1997
Author: Abt Associates Inc.
Sites: Four local offices: Kalamazoo (Kalamazoo Co.), Madison Heights
 (Oakland Co.), McNichols/Goddard (Wayne Co.), and Schaeffer/Six Mile
 (Wayne Co.)

                   Universe: Three    Policy changes:   Earnings:
                    cohorts           --Asset limit     Ongoing cohort:
                   Ongoing cohort:     increase          Increase of 7%
                   Random             --Earnings         ($3,343 vs.
                    assignment: 10/1/  disregard         $3,120)
                    92                 enhancement      Other cohorts:
                   Followup: 4 years  --Mixed            No impact
                   Middle cohort:      employment/      Employment rate:
                   Random              education        Ongoing cohort:
                    assignment: 10/    program           Increase in
                    92-9/94           --Personal         average
                   Followup: 2 years   responsibility    quarterly
                   Last cohort:        sanctions         employment rate
                   Random             --Two-parent       of 4% (37% vs.
                    assignment: 10/    family            36%)
                    94-9/95            eligibility      Other cohorts:
                   Followup: 1 year   --Work sanctions   No impact
                   Data type:                           Cash assistance--
                    Administrative                       all cohorts: No
                    data                                 impact
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Minnesota: Family Investment Program (MFIP)
Reforming Welfare and Rewarding Work: Final Report on the Minnesota
 Family Investment Program, June 2000
Author: Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation
Sites: Seven counties in Minnesota: Hennepin (Minneapolis), Anoka,
 Dakota, Mille Lacs, Morrison, Sherburne, and Todd

Long-term single-  Universe: Single,  Policy changes:   Earnings:
 parent families    long-term         --Asset limit      Increase of 23%
                    recipients in      increase          ($955 vs. $779)
                    urban and rural   --Direct child    Employment rate:
                    counties           care paid to      Increase of 35%
                   Random              provider          (50% vs. 37%)
                    assignment: 4/94- --Earnings        Cash assistance:
                    3/96               disregard         Increase of 11%
                   Followup: 3 years   enhancement       ($1,745 vs.
                   Participation in   --Food stamp       $1,569)
                    welfare-to-work    benefit
                    requirement: For   combined with
                    experimental       cash grant
                    group, parents    --Work
                    with child age 1   requirements:
                    or older (on       younger child
                    welfare rolls     --Work-trigger
                    for 2 years).      time limit
                    For control
                    group, parents
                    with child age 3
                    or older
                   Data type:
                    Administrative
                    data, survey
Long-term single-  Universe: Single,  Policy changes:   Earnings:
 parent families--  long-term         --Asset limit     Quarterly
 urban counties     recipients in      increase          earnings:
                    urban counties    --Direct child    Year 1: Increase
                   Random              care paid to      of 30% ($699
                    assignment: 4/94-  provider          vs. $537)
                    3/96              --Earnings        Year 2: Increase
                   Followup: 3 years   disregard         of 24% ($1,129
                   Participation in    enhancement       vs. $913)
                    welfare-to-work   --Food stamp      Year 3 (quarters
                    requirement: For   benefit           1-3): Increase
                    experimental       combined with     of 11% ($1,441
                    group, parents     cash grant        vs. $1,298)
                    with child age 1  --Work            Employment rate:
                    or older (on       requirements:    Average
                    welfare rolls      younger child     quarterly
                    for 2 years).     --Work-trigger     employment
                    For control        time limit        rate:
                    group, parents                      Year 1: Increase
                    with child age 3                     of 41% (46% vs.
                    or older                             33%)
                   Data type:                           Year 2: Increase
                    Administrative                       of 35% (53% vs.
                    data, survey                         39%)
                                                        Year 3 (quarters
                                                         1-3): Increase
                                                         of 26% (56% vs.
                                                         45%)
                                                        Cash assistance:
                                                        Average
                                                         quarterly
                                                         benefits:
                                                        Year 1: Increase
                                                         of 9% ($1,946
                                                         vs. $1,810)
                                                        Year 2: Increase
                                                         of 10% ($1,627
                                                         vs. $1,484)
                                                        Year 3 (quarters
                                                         1-3): Increase
                                                         of 13% ($1,380
                                                         vs. $1,227)
Long-term single-  Universe: Single,  Policy changes:   Earnings: No
 parent families--  long-term         --Asset limit      impact
 urban counties,    recipients in      increase         Employment rate:
 without mandated   urban counties    --Direct child     Average
 participation     Random              care paid to      quarterly
                    assignment: 4/94-  provider          employment
                    3/96              --Earnings         rate:
                   Followup: 3 years   disregard        Year 1: Increase
                   Data type:          enhancement       of 21% (40% vs.
                    Administrative    --Food stamp       33%)
                    data, survey       benefit          Year 2: Increase
                                       combined with     of 9% (43% vs.
                                       cash grant        39%)
                                                        Year 3 (quarters
                                                         1-3): Increase
                                                         of 8% (48% vs.
                                                         45%)
                                                        Cash assistance:
                                                         Average
                                                         quarterly
                                                         benefits:
                                                        Year 1: Increase
                                                         of 13% ($2,035
                                                         vs. $1,810)
                                                        Year 2: Increase
                                                         of 20% ($1,774
                                                         vs. $1,484)
                                                        Year 3 (quarters
                                                         1-3): Increase
                                                         of 24% ($1,518
                                                         vs. $1,227)
Recent single-     Universe: Single   Policy changes:   Earnings: No
 parent             applicants        --Asset limit      impact
 applicants--urba   (short-term        increase         Employment rate:
 n counties         recipients) in    --Direct child     Average
                    urban counties     care paid to      quarterly
                   Random              provider          employment
                    assignment: 4/94- --Earnings         rate:
                    3/96               disregard        Year 1: Increase
                   Followup: 3 years   enhancement       of 6% (52% vs.
                   Participation in   --Food stamp       49%)
                    welfare-to-work    benefit          Year 2: Increase
                    requirement: For   combined with     of 7% (57% vs.
                    experimental       cash grant        53%)
                    group, parents    --Work            Year 3 (quarters
                    with child age 1   requirements:     1-3): Increase
                    or older (on       younger child     of 5% (58% vs.
                    welfare rolls     --Work-trigger     55%)
                    for 2 years).      time limit       Cash assistance:
                    For control                          Average
                    group, parents                       quarterly
                    with child age 3                     benefits:
                    or older                            Year 1: Increase
                   Data type:                            of 26% ($1,289
                    Administrative                       vs. $1,024)
                    data, survey                        Year 2: Increase
                                                         of 26% ($907
                                                         vs. $722)
                                                        Year 3 (quarters
                                                         1-3): Increase
                                                         of 26% ($709
                                                         vs. $561)
Long-term single-  Universe: Single,  Policy changes:   Earnings: No
 parent families--  long-term         --Asset limit      impact
 rural counties     recipients in      increase         Employment rate:
                    rural counties    --Direct child     Average
                   Random              care paid to      quarterly
                    assignment: 4/94-  provider          employment
                    3/96              --Earnings         rate:
                   Followup: 3 years   disregard        Year 1: Increase
                   Participation in    enhancement       of 37% (44% vs.
                    welfare-to-work   --Food stamp       32%)
                    requirement: For   benefit          Year 2: Increase
                    experimental       combined with     of 13% (50% vs.
                    group, parents     cash grant        45%)
                    with child age 1  --Work            Year 3 (quarter
                    or older (on       requirements:     10): No impact
                    welfare rolls      younger child    Cash assistance:
                    for 2 years).     --Work-trigger     Average
                    For control        time limit        quarterly
                    group, parents                       benefits:
                    with child age 3                    Year 1: Increase
                    or older                             of 16% ($1,915
                   Data type:                            vs. $1,646)
                    Administrative                      Year 2: Increase
                    data, survey                         of 33% ($1,583
                                                         vs. $1,192)
                                                        Year 3 (quarter
                                                         10): Increase
                                                         of 37% ($1,345
                                                         vs. $983)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
New Jersey: Family Development Program (FDP)
A Final Report on the Impact of New Jersey's Family Development Program:
 Experimental-Control Group Analysis, October 1998
Author: Rutgers University
Sites: Ten counties in New Jersey: Atlantic, Camden, Cumberland, Essex,
 Hudson, Mercer, Middlesex, Monmouth, Passaic, and Union

                   Universe: AFDC     Policy changes:   Earnings:
                    families          --Continued       Ongoing cases:
                   Random              benefits to       No impact over
                    assignment: 10/    families with     4-year followup
                    92-12/94           stepfathers as    period
                   Followup: Varies.   long as family   Year 1: Decrease
                    Up to 17           income below      of 25% ($522
                    quarters (for      150% of State's   vs. $695)
                    cases ongoing 10/  need standard    Year 2: Decrease
                    92)               --Family cap       of 18% ($1,522
                   Participation in   --Transitional     vs. $1,848)
                    welfare-to-work    benefits         New cases: No
                    requirement: For   extension         impact over 4-
                    experimental       (Medicaid)        year followup
                    group, parents    --Work             period
                    with children      requirements:    Year 3: Decrease
                    age 2 or older.    younger child     of 13% ($2,953
                    For control                          vs. $3,407)
                    group, parents                      Year 4: Decrease
                    with children                        of 14% ($3,966
                    age 3 or older                       vs. $4,605)
                   Data type:                           Employment rate:
                    Administrative                       No impact
                    data                                Cash assistance:
                                                         No impact
------------------------------------------------------------------------
New York: Child Assistance Program (CAP)
The New York Child Assistance Program: Five-Year Impacts, Costs, and
 Benefits, November 1996
Author: Abt Associates Inc.
Sites: Three counties in New York: Monroe (Rochester), Niagara (Niagara
 Falls) and Suffolk (Long Island)

                   Universe: Single-  Policy changes:   Earnings:
                    parent AFDC       --Asset limit      Increase of 20%
                    cases              increase (no      ($15,882 vs.
                   Random              resource limit)   $13,268)
                    assignment: 4/89- --Earnings        Employment rate:
                    3/90               disregard         Increase of 13%
                   Followup: 5 years   enhancement       (29% vs. 26%)
                   Data type:         --Food stamp      Cash assistance:
                    Administrative     cashout           No impact
                    data, survey      --No child
                                       support
                                       passthrough
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ohio: Transitions to Independence Demonstration (Ohio JOBS)
JOBS Assignments in Ohio: Patterns and Impacts, December 1994
Author: Abt Associates Inc.
Sites: Fifteen counties in Ohio: Brown, Champaign, Clermont, Franklin,
 Lake, Lawrence, Montgomery, Perry, Pickaway, Richland, Seneca, Stark,
 Summit, Trumbull, and Wyandot

                   Universe: JOBS     Policy changes:   Earnings: 12th
                    mandatory adults  --Mixed            quarter impacts
                    (for single        employment/       for those
                    parents with       education         assigned to:
                    child age 6 or     program          Basic education:
                    older, after 6/                      Decrease of 34%
                    91, child age 3                      ($410 vs. $624)
                    or older)                           Postsecondary
                   Random                                education: No
                    assignment: 1/89-                    impact
                    12/91                               Job club:
                   Followup: 3 years                     Increase of 22%
                    (early cohort),                      ($991 vs. $811)
                    2 years (later                      Job readiness:
                    entrants)                            No impact
                   Data type:                           Community work
                    Administrative                       experience: No
                    data                                 impact
                                                        Employment rate:
                                                         Employed in
                                                         12th quarter
                                                         for those
                                                         assigned to:
                                                        Basic education:
                                                         Decrease of 17%
                                                         (24% vs. 29%)
                                                        Postsecondary
                                                         education: No
                                                         impact
                                                        Job club:
                                                         Increase of 28%
                                                         (42% vs. 33%)
                                                        Job readiness:
                                                         Increase of 14%
                                                         (39% vs. 34%)
                                                        Community work
                                                         experience: No
                                                         impact
                                                        Cash assistance:
                                                         Not reported
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ohio Transitions to Independence
Final Impacts for JOBS and Work Choice, December 1994
Author: Abt Associates Inc.
Sites: 15 counties in Ohio for JOBS Demonstration: Brown, Champaign,
 Clermont, Franklin, Lake, Lawrence, Montgomery, Perry, Pickaway,
 Richland, Seneca, Stark, Summit, Trumbull, and Wyandot; One county for
 Work Choice: Montgomery County

 Final Impacts     Universe:          Policy changes:   Earnings:
 for JOBS           Mandatory JOBS    --Mixed           Early entrants:
                    adults (for        employment/       No impact
                    single parents,    education        Later entrants:
                    caring for a       program          Year 1: Decrease
                    child age 6 or                       of 14% ($2,003
                    older)                               vs. $2,322)
                   Random                               Year 2: Decrease
                    assignment: 1/89-                    of 14% ($2,939
                    12/91                                vs. $3,421)
                   Followup:                            Employment rate:
                    Successive                          Early entrants:
                    cohorts assigned                     Increase of 8%
                    to treatment and                     (61% vs. 57%)
                    control groups                      Later entrants:
                    beginning in                         No impact over
                    1989 and                             followup period
                    followed for 1,                     Year 2: Decrease
                    2, or 3 years                        of 7% (46% vs.
                   Data type:                            49%)
                    Administrative                      Cash assistance:
                    data                                 No impact
Final Impacts for  Universe: AFDC     Policy changes:   Earnings:
 Work Choice        recipients with   --Mixed           Early entrants:
                    young children     employment/       Increase of 14%
                    (1-5 years old)    education         ($1,484 vs.
                   Random              program           $1,307)
                    assignment: 1/89-                   Later entrants:
                    3/90                                 Decrease of 19%
                   Followup: 18                          ($800 vs. $992)
                    months for early                    Employment rate:
                    entrants; 1 year                    Early entrants:
                    for later cohort                     Increase of 9%
                   Data type:                            (41% vs. 38%)
                    Administrative                      Later entrants:
                    data                                 No impact
                                                        Cash assistance:
                                                         No impact
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ohio: Learning, Earning, and Parenting (LEAP)
Final Report on Ohio's Welfare Initiative to Improve School Attendance
 Among Teenage Parents: Ohio's Learning, Earning, and Parenting (LEAP)
 Program, August 1997
Author: Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation

                   Universe:          Policy changes:   Earnings: No
                    Pregnant          --Personal         impact over 4-
                    teenagers and      responsibility    year followup
                    custodial teen     sanctions         period.
                    parents who were  --School           Increase in
                    on AFDC            attendance        quarters 3-4 of
                   Random              bonus             25% ($315 vs.
                    assignment: 8/90-                    $252)
                    9/91                                Employment rate:
                   Followup: 4 years                     No impact over
                   Data type:                            4-year followup
                    Administrative                       period.
                    data, survey                         Increase in
                                                         percent ever
                                                         employed
                                                         quarters 5-8 of
                                                         8% (44% vs.
                                                         41%)
                                                        Cash assistance:
                                                         Years 3 and 4:
                                                         Decrease of 5%
                                                         ($5,185 vs.
                                                         $5,459)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Texas: Achieving Change for Texans (ACT)/TANF
Achieving Change for Texans Evaluation: Net Impacts Through December
 1997, August 1998
Author: Texas Department of Human Services

Time limits        Universe: TANF     Policy changes:   Earnings: No
                    recipients        --Asset limit      impact
                   Random              increase         Employment rate:
                    assignment: 6/96- --Personal         No impact
                    12/97              responsibility   Cash assistance:
                   Followup: Varies    sanctions         No impact
                   Participation in   --Time limit
                    welfare-to-work    (adult only)
                    requirement: For  --Transitional
                    experimental       benefits
                    group, parents     extension
                    with child age 4   (Medicaid and
                    or older (5 in     child care)
                    some cases). For  --Two-parent
                    control group,     family
                    parents with       eligibility
                    child age 3 or
                    older
                   Data type:
                    Administrative
                    data
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Responsibilities,  Universe: TANF     Policy changes:   Earnings: No
 employment, and    families          --Asset limit      impact
 resources in      Random              increase         Employment rate:
 choices counties   assignment: 7/96- --Personal         No impact
                    12/97              responsibility   Cash assistance:
                   Followup: Varies    sanctions         Decrease in
                   Participation in   --Transitional     time on TANF.
                    welfare-to-work    benefits          The proportion
                    requirement: For   extension         of time spent
                    experimental       (Medicaid and     on TANF out of
                    group, parents     child care)       the maximum
                    with child age 4  --Two-parent       possible was
                    or older (5 in     family            55% for the
                    some cases). For   eligibility       experimental
                    control group,                       group, 57% for
                    parents with                         the control
                    child age 3 or                       group
                    older
                   Data type:
                    Administrative
                    data
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Responsibilities,  Universe: TANF     Policy changes:   Earnings: No
 employment, and    recipients        --Asset limit      impact
 resources in      Random              increase         Employment rate:
 nonchoices         assignment: 1/97- --Two-parent       No impact
 counties           12/97              family           Cash assistance:
                   Followup: Varies    eligibility       Decrease in
                   Participation in                      time on TANF.
                    welfare-to-work                      The proportion
                    requirement: Not                     of time spent
                    applicable,                          on TANF out of
                    program not                          the maximum
                    offered in these                     possible was
                    counties                             64% for the
                   Data type:                            experimental
                    Administrative                       group, 67% for
                    data                                 the control
                                                         group
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Vermont: Welfare Restructuring Project (WRP)
Forty-Two-Month Impacts of Vermont's Welfare Restructuring Project,
 September 1999
Author: Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation
Sites: Statewide (VT) with detailed focus on 6 of Vermont's 12
 districts: Barre, Burlington, Newport, Rutland, Springfield, and St.
 Albans

Single-parent      Universe:          Policy changes:   Earnings:
 families           Families          --Asset limit      Average
                    applying for and   increase          quarterly
                    receiving         --Child support    earnings:
                    assistance         passthrough       Increase of 8%
                   Random              (only first $50   ($1,162 vs.
                    assignment: 7/94-  disregarded)      $1,071)
                    6/95              --Earnings        Employment rate:
                   Followup: 42        disregard         Increase of 10%
                    months             enhancement       (85% vs. 77%)
                   Data type:         --Transitional    Cash assistance:
                    Administrative     benefits          Quarterly cash
                    data               extension         benefits:
                                       (Medicaid and     Decrease of 6%
                                       child care)       ($772 vs. $820)
                                      --Work-trigger
                                       time limit
Single-parent      Universe:          Policy changes:   Earnings: No
 families,          Families          --Asset limit      impact
 without mandated   applying for and   increase         Employment rate:
 participation      receiving         --Child support    No impact
                    assistance         passthrough      Cash assistance:
                   Random              (only first $50   No impact
                    assignment: 7/94-  disregarded)
                    6/95              --Earnings
                   Followup: 42        disregard
                    months             enhancement
                   Data type:         --Transitional
                    Administrative     benefits
                    data               extension
                                       (Medicaid and
                                       child care)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Virginia: Independence Program
Early Impacts of the Virginia Independence Program, November 1999
Author: Mathematica Policy Research, Inc.
Sites: Three counties in Virginia: Lynchburg, Prince William, and
 Petersburg (VIEW counties)

 Lynchburg         Universe: AFDC     Policy changes:   Earnings: No
                    cases that were   --Asset limit      impact
                    on the rolls as    increase         Employment rate:
                    of 7/95           --Earnings        Year 1: Increase
                   Random              disregard         of 14% (58% vs.
                    assignment: 7/95   enhancement       51%)
                   Followup: 2 years  --Employment-     Year 2: No
                   Participation in    focused program   impact
                    welfare-to-work   --Family cap      Cash assistance:
                    requirement: For  --Personal        Year 1: Decrease
                    experimental       responsibility    of 5% ($2,419
                    group, parents     sanctions         vs. $2,539)
                    with child 18     --Required minor  Year 2: No
                    months or older    parents to live   impact
                   Data type:          with adult
                    Administrative    --Time limit
                    data              --Transitional
                                       benefits
                                       extension
                                       (Medicaid and
                                       child care)
                                      --Two-parent
                                       family
                                       eligibility
                                      --Welfare
                                       diversion
                                      --Work
                                       requirements:
                                       younger child
                                      --Work-trigger
                                       time limit
Prince William     Universe: AFDC     Policy changes:   Earnings: No
                    cases that were   --Asset limit      impact
                    on the rolls as    increase         Employment rate:
                    of 7/95           --Earnings         No impact
                   Random              disregard        Cash assistance:
                    assignment: 7/95   enhancement       No impact
                   Followup: 2 years  --Employment-
                   Participation in    focused program
                    welfare-to-work   --Family cap
                    requirement: For  --Personal
                    experimental       responsibility
                    group, parents     sanctions
                    with child 18     --Required minor
                    months or older    parents to live
                   Data type:          with adult
                    Administrative    --Time limit
                    data              --Transitional
                                       benefits
                                       extension
                                       (Medicaid and
                                       child care)
                                      --Two-parent
                                       family
                                       eligibility
                                      --Welfare
                                       diversion
                                      --Work
                                       requirements:
                                       younger child
                                      --Work-trigger
                                       time limit
Petersburg (Post-  Universe: AFDC     Policy changes:   Earnings:
 VIEW)              cases that were   --Asset limit     Year 1: Increase
                    on the rolls as    increase          of 18% ($2,144
                    of 7/95           --Earnings         vs. $1,823)
                   Random              disregard        Year 2: Increase
                    assignment: 7/95   enhancement       of 20% ($3,553
                   Followup: 2 years  --Employment-      vs $2,950)
                   Participation in    focused program  Employment rate:
                    welfare-to-work   --Family cap      Year 1: No
                    requirement: For  --Personal         impact
                    experimental       responsibility   Year 2: Increase
                    group, parents     sanctions         of 11% (60% vs.
                    with child 18     --Required minor   54%)
                    months or older    parents to live  Cash assistance:
                   Data type:          with adult        No impact in
                    Administrative    --Time limit       post-VIEW year.
                    data              --Transitional     However,
                                       benefits          decrease in
                                       extension         last 2 quarters
                                       (Medicaid and     (2 out of 3
                                       child care)       VIEW quarters):
                                      --Two-parent      Quarter 8:
                                       family            Decrease of 10%
                                       eligibility       ($345 vs. $381)
                                      --Welfare         Quarter 9:
                                       diversion         Decrease of 13%
                                      --Work             ($294 vs. $336)
                                       requirements:
                                       younger child
                                      --Work-trigger
                                       time limit
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Wisconsin: Milwaukee's New Hope Demonstration Project
New Hope for People With Low Incomes: Two-Year Results of a Program to
 Reduce Poverty and Reform Welfare, April 1999
Author: Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation
Site: Milwaukee, Wisconsin

                   Universe: Low-     Policy changes:   Earnings: Full
                    income adult      --Paid child       sample: No
                    volunteers         care              impact over 2-
                    (below 150% of    --Paid health      year followup
                    poverty) living    insurance         period
                    in two high-      --Wage            Year 1: Increase
                    poverty            supplementation   of 9% ($6,833
                    neighborhoods in                     vs. $6,250)
                    Milwaukee                           Employed full
                   Random                                time entering
                    assignment: 8/94-                    program: No
                    2/95                                 impact
                   Followup: 2 years                    Not employed
                   Data type:                            full time
                    Administrative                       entering
                    data,                                program:
                    ethnography                          Increase of 13%
                    survey                               ($11,898 vs.
                                                         $10,509)
                                                        Employment rate:
                                                         Full sample:
                                                         Increase of 6%
                                                         (96% vs. 90%)
                                                        Employed full
                                                         time entering
                                                         program: No
                                                         impact
                                                        Not employed
                                                         full time
                                                         entering
                                                         program:
                                                         Increase of 7%
                                                         (94% vs. 87%)
                                                        Cash assistance:
                                                         Full sample: No
                                                         impact
                                                        Employed full
                                                         time entering
                                                         program: No
                                                         impact over 2-
                                                         year followup
                                                         period
                                                        Year 2: Decrease
                                                         of 38% ($736
                                                         vs. $1,181)
                                                        Not employed
                                                         full time
                                                         entering
                                                         program: No
                                                         impact
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Table prepared by the Congressional Research Service based on a
  review of research evaluations.

 TABLE L-10.--ECONOMIC STATUS OUTCOMES FOR IMPACT EVALUATIONS CONDUCTED
           SINCE THE PASSAGE OF THE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT OF 1988
------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Evaluation      Welfare to work   Family formation   Economic status
------------------------------------------------------------------------
National Evaluation of Welfare-To-Work Strategies
National Evaluation of Welfare-to-Work Strategies: Evaluating
 Alternative Welfare-to-Work Approaches: Two Year Impacts for Eleven
 Programs, June 2000

Atlanta            Earnings:          Marital status:   Income: No
employment-         Increase of 16%    No impact         impact
 focused           Cash assistance:   Births: No
                    Decrease of 8%     impact
                   Food assistance:
                    No impact
Atlanta            Earnings:          Marital status:   Income: No
education-focused   Increase of 10%    No impact         impact
                   Cash assistance:   Births: No
                    Decrease of 6%     impact
                   Food assistance:
                    No impact
Grand Rapids       Earnings:          Marital status:   Income:
employment-         Increase of 22%    No impact        Year 2: Decrease
 focused           Cash assistance:   Births: No         of 4% ($7,443
                    Decrease of 19%    impact            vs. $7,746)
                   Food assistance:
                    Decrease of 8%
Grand Rapids       Earnings:          Marital status:   Income: No
education-focused   Increase of 13%    No impact         impact
                   Cash assistance:   Births: No
                    Decrease of 11%    impact
                   Food assistance:
                    Decrease of 3%
Riverside          Earnings:          Marital status:   Income:
employment-         Increase of 30%    Decrease of 20%  Year 2: Decrease
 focused           Cash assistance:    (11% vs. 13%)     of 5% ($7,516
                    Decrease of 14%    in percent        vs. $7,874)
                   Food assistance:    married and
                    Decrease of 13%    living with
                                       spouse at end
                                       of followup
                                      Births: No
                                       impact
Riverside          Earnings: No       Marital status:   Income:
education-focused   impact             No impact        Year 2: Decrease
                   Cash assistance:   Births: No         of 8% ($7,149
                    Decrease of 10%    impact            vs. $7,768)
                   Food assistance:
                    Decrease of 10%
Columbus           Earnings:          Marital status:   Income: No
integrated case     Increase of 10%    No impact         impact
 management        Cash assistance:   Births: No
                    Decrease of 13%    impact
                   Food assistance:
                    Decrease of 9%
Columbus           Earnings:          Marital status:   Income: No
traditional case    Increase of 10%    No impact         impact
 management        Cash assistance:   Births: Decrease
                    Decrease of 10%    of 41% (3% vs.
                   Food assistance:    8%) in percent
                    Decrease of 7%     who had a baby
                                       since study
                                       entry
Detroit            Earnings:          Marital status:   Income: No
                    Increase of 9%     No impact         impact
                   Cash assistance:   Births: No
                    No impact          impact
                   Food assistance:
                    Decrease of 2%
Oklahoma City      Earnings: No       Marital status:   Income: No
                    impact             No impact         impact
                   Cash assistance:   Births: No
                    Decrease of 6%     impact
                   Food assistance:
                    No impact
Portland           Earnings:          Marital status:   Income: No
                    Increase of 35%    No impact         impact
                   Cash assistance:   Births: No
                    Decrease of 17%    impact
                   Food assistance:
                    Decrease of 9%
------------------------------------------------------------------------
New Chance Demonstration
New Chance: Final Report on a Comprehensive Program for Young Mothers in
 Poverty and Their Children, October 1997

                   Earnings: No       Marital status:   Income: No
                    impact             Not reported      impact
                   Cash assistance:   Births: No
                    Increase of 1%     impact
                   Food assistance:
                    No impact
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Teenage Parent Demonstration (TPD)
Moving into Adulthood: Were the Impacts of Mandatory Programs for
 Welfare-Dependent Teenaged Parents Sustained After the Programs Ended?,
 February 1998

Camden             Earnings: No       Marital status:   Income: Increase
                    impact             Not reported      of 8% ($840 vs.
                   Cash assistance:   Births: No         $778)
                    No impact          impact
                   Food assistance:
                    No impact
Newark             Earnings: No       Marital status:   Income: No
                    impact             Not reported      impact
                   Cash assistance:   Births: No
                    No impact          impact
                   Food assistance:
                    No impact
Chicago            Earnings: No       Marital status:   Income: No
                    impact             Not reported      impact
                   Cash assistance:   Births: No
                    Decrease of 5%     impact
                   Food assistance:
                    No impact
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Arizona: Employing and Moving People Off Welfare and Encouraging
 Responsibility (EMPOWER)
Evaluation of the Arizona EMPOWER Welfare Reform Demonstration, May 1999

                   Earnings: No       Marital status:   Income: No
                    impact             No impact         impact
                   Cash assistance:   Births: Decrease
                    Decrease of 6%     of 60% (2% vs.
                   Food assistance:    4%) in births
                    No impact          to unwed minors
------------------------------------------------------------------------
California: Greater Avenues for Independence (GAIN)
GAIN: Benefits, Costs, and Three-Year Impacts of a Welfare-to-Work
 Program, September 1994

Alameda            Earnings:          Marital status:   Income: No
                    Increase of 30%    No impact         impact
                   Cash assistance:   Births: No
                    Decrease of 4%     impact
                   Food assistance:
                    No impact
Los Angeles        Earnings: No       Marital status:   Income: No
                    impact             Not reported      impact
                   Cash assistance:   Births: Not
                    Decrease of 6%     reported
                   Food assistance:
                    Decrease of 6%
Riverside          Earnings:          Marital status:   Income: No
                    Increase of 49%    No impact         impact
                   Cash assistance:   Births: No
                    Decrease of 15%    impact
                   Food assistance:
                    Decrease of 9%
San Diego          Earnings:          Marital status:   Income: No
                    Increase of 22%    No impact         impact
                   Cash assistance:   Births: No
                    Decrease of 8%     impact
                   Food assistance:
                    Decrease of 6%
Tulare             Earnings: No       Marital status:   Income: Quarter
                    impact             No impact         13: Increase of
                   Cash assistance:   Births: No         8% ($2,014 vs.
                    No impact          impact            $1,865)
                   Food assistance:
                    No impact
------------------------------------------------------------------------
California: Los Angeles Jobs-First Greater Avenues for Independence
 (GAIN)
Los Angeles Jobs-First GAIN evaluation: First-Year Findings on
 Participation Patterns and Impacts, June 1998

                   Earnings:          Marital status:   Income: No
                    Increase of 31%    Not reported      impact
                   Cash assistance:   Births: Not
                    Decrease of 8%     reported
                   Food assistance:
                    Decrease of 8%
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Connecticut: Jobs First
Jobs First: Implementation and Early Impacts of Connecticut's Welfare
 Reform Initiative, February 2000

                   Earnings:          Marital status:   Income: Increase
                    Increase of 11%    No impact         of 10% ($26,933
                   Cash assistance:   Births: No         vs. $24,555)
                    Increase of 10%    impact
                   Food assistance:
                    Increase of 6%
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Delaware: A Better Chance (ABC)
The Early Economic Impacts of Delaware's ABC Welfare Reform Program,
 December 1997

                   Earnings: Quarter  Marital status:   Income: No
                    4: Increase of     Not reported      impact
                    16%               Births: Not
                   Cash assistance:    reported
                    Decrease of 5%
                   Food assistance:
                    Decrease of 6%
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Florida: Project Independence
Florida's Project Independence: Benefits, Costs, and Two-Year Impacts of
 Florida's JOBS Program, April 1995

                   Earnings:          Marital status:   Income: No
                    Increase of 4%     Not reported      impact
                   Cash assistance:   Births: Not
                    Decrease of 6%     reported
                   Food assistance:
                    Decrease of 3%
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Florida: Family Transition Program (FTP)
FTP: The Family Transition Program: Implementation and Three-Year
 Impacts of Florida's Initial Time-Limited Welfare Program, April 1999

                   Earnings:          Marital status:   Income: Increase
                    Increase of 18%    Not reported      of 5% ($20,083
                   Cash assistance:   Births: Not        vs. $19,215)
                    Decrease of 11%    reported
                   Food assistance:
                    Decrease of 8%
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Indiana: Welfare Reform Evaluation
The Indiana Welfare Reform Evaluation: Program Implementation and
 Economic Impacts After Two Years, November 1998

                   Earnings:          Marital status:   Income: No
                    Increase of 5%     Not reported      impact
                   Cash assistance:   Births: Not
                    Decrease of 20%    reported
                   Food assistance:
                    Decrease of 3%
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Iowa: Family Investment Program (FIP)
Iowa's Family Investment Program: Two-Year Impacts, December 1998

                   Earnings:          Marital status:   Income:
                    Increase of 8%     Not reported     Year 1: Increase
                   Cash assistance:   Births: Not        of 4% ($6,668
                   Year 1: No impact   reported          vs. $6,425)
                   Year 2: Decrease                     Year 2: Increase
                    of 4%                                of 4% ($7,486
                   Food assistance:                      vs. $7,176)
                   Year 1: Decrease
                    of 1%
                   Year 2: Decrease
                    of 3%
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Michigan: To Strengthen Michigan Families (TSMF)
Final Impact Report: The Evaluation of To Strengthen Michigan Families
 (TSMF), September 1997

                   Earnings:          Marital status:   Income:
                   Ongoing cohort:     Not reported     Ongoing cohort:
                    Increase of 7%    Births: Not        Increase of 1%
                   Other cohorts: No   reported          ($8,849 vs.
                    impact                               $8,967)
                   Cash assistance:                     Other cohorts:
                    All cohorts: No                      No impact
                    impact
                   Food assistance:
                   Ongoing cohort:
                    Decrease of 1%
                    (average monthly
                    receipt)
                   Other cohorts: No
                    impact
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Minnesota: Family Investment Program (MFIP)
Reforming Welfare and Rewarding Work: Final Report on the Minnesota
 Family Investment Program, June 2000
Note: The MFIP Program combined cash welfare and food stamps into one
 benefit, referred to in these entries as ``welfare.''

Long-term single-  Earnings:          Marital status:   Income: Increase
 parent families    Increase of 23%    Increase of 51%   of 15% ($2,700
                   Welfare: Increase   (11% vs. 7%)      vs. $2,348)
                    of 11%             married at the
                                       end of 3 years
                                      Births: Not
                                       reported
Long-term single-  Earnings: Year 3   Marital status:   Income: Year 3
 parent families--  (quarters 1-3):    No impact         (quarters 1-3):
 urban counties     Increase of 11%   Births: Not        Increase of 12%
                   Welfare: Year 3     reported          ($2,882 vs.
                    (quarters 1-3):                      $2,525)
                    Increase of 13%
Long-term single-  Earnings: No       Marital status:   Income: Year 3
 parent families--  impact             Increase of 89%   (quarters 1-3):
 urban counties,   Welfare: Year 3     (11% vs. 6%)      Increase of 10%
 without mandated   (quarters 1-3):   Births: Not        ($2,769 vs.
 participation      Increase of 24%    reported          $2,525)
Recent             Earnings: No       Marital status:   Income: Year 3
 applicants--urba   impact             No impact         (quarters 1-3):
 n counties        Welfare: Year 3    Births: Not        Increase of 6%
                    (quarters 1-3):    reported          ($2,740 vs.
                    Increase of 26%                      $2,578)
Two-parent         Earnings:          Marital status:   Income: Increase
 recipient          Decrease of 18%    Increase of 40%   of 5% ($3,958
 families           ($2,193 vs.        (67% vs. 48%)     vs. $3,769)
                    $2,682)            married at the
                   Welfare: Increase   end of 3 years
                    of 38% ($1,889    Births: Not
                    vs. $1,367)        reported
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ohio: Learning, Earning, and Parenting (LEAP) Program
Final Report on Ohio's Welfare Initiative to Improve School Attendance
 Among Teenage Parents: Ohio's Learning, Earning, and Parenting (LEAP)
 Program, August 1997

                   Earnings: No       Marital status:   Income: No
                    impact             Not reported      impact
                   Cash assistance:   Births: No
                    Years 3 and 4:     impact
                    Decrease of 5%
                   Food assistance:
                    Not reported
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Vermont: Welfare Restructuring Project (WRP)
Forty-Two-Month Impacts of Vermont's Welfare Restructuring Project,
 September 1999

Single-parent      Earnings:          Marital status:   Income: No
 families           Increase of 8%     Not reported      impact
                   Cash assistance:   Births: Not
                    Decrease of 6%     reported
                   Food assistance:
                    No impact
Single-parent      Earnings: No       Marital status:   Income: No
 families,          impact             Not reported      impact
 without mandated  Cash assistance:   Births: Not
 participation      No impact          reported
                   Food assistance:
                    No impact
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Virginia: Independence Program
Early Impacts of the Virginia Independence Program, November 1999

Lynchburg          Earnings: No       Marital status:   Income: No
                    impact             Not reported      impact
                   Cash assistance:   Births: Not
                    Year 1: Decrease   reported
                    of 5%
                   Food assistance:
                   Year 1: Decrease
                    of 5%
                   Year 2: Decrease
                    of 12%
Prince William     Earnings: No       Marital status:   Income: No
                    impact (annual     Not reported      impact
                    income, 2         Births: Not
                    quarters did see   reported
                    increases)
                   Cash assistance:
                    No impact
                   Food assistance:
                    Year 2: Decrease
                    of 7%
Petersburg         Earnings:          Marital status:   Income:
                   Year 1: Increase    Not reported     Year 1: Increase
                    of 18%            Births: Not        of 7% ($7,041
                   Year 2: Increase    reported          vs. $6,612)
                    of 20%                              Year 2: Increase
                   Cash assistance:                      of 8% ($7,196
                    No impact. 2 of                      vs. $6,697)
                    3 post-VIEW
                    quarters, did
                    see decreases
                   Food assistance:
                    Year 1: Increase
                    of 3%
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Wisconsin: Milwaukee's New Hope Demonstration Project
New Hope for People With Low Incomes: Two-Year Results of a Program to
 Reduce Poverty and Reform Welfare, April 1999

Employed full      Earnings: No       Marital status:   Income:
 time upon          impact             Not reported     Year 1: Increase
 entering the      Cash assistance:   Births: Not        of 14% ($11,190
 program            Year 2: Decrease   reported          vs. $9,843)
                    of 38%                              Year 2: Decrease
                   Food assistance:                      of 8% ($14,146
                    No impact                            vs. $15,294)
Not employed full  Earnings:          Marital status:   Income: Year 2:
 time upon          Increase of 13%    Not reported      Increase of 13%
 entering the      Cash assistance:   Births: Not        ($11,213 vs.
 program            No impact          reported          $9,915)
                   Food assistance:
                    Year 2: Increase
                    of 14%
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note.--Some percentage changes reported in this table may differ if
  calculated based on the reported findings, due to rounding. The
  percentage changes reported in this table reflect the percentage
  changes as reported in the individual evaluations.

Source: Table prepared by the Congressional Research Service based on a
  review of research evaluations. Information concerning the data, the
  target populations, and the package of initiatives included in each
  evaluation is highlighted in the table of welfare-to-work outcomes in
  the previous section (table L-9). The outcomes presented in this table
  should be supplemented with the details of the evaluation highlighted
  in table L-9.

    TABLE L-11.--SELECTED OUTCOMES FROM EVALUATIONS OF FORMER WELFARE
                               RECIPIENTS
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                 Health care/child care/
        Study            Earnings/recidivism              food
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Alabama: Alabama Welfare Reform Follow-up Survey, January 2000
Universe: All cases   Earnings: Average hourly  Health assistance:
 closed between 7/98   wage: $6.08               Receiving Medicaid
 and 11/98 that       Hours of employment:       (self/children): 33.7%/
 contained a valid     Average hours per week:   72.8%
 Alabama phone         33.9                     Child care assistance:
 number               Employment rate: At time   Receiving help paying
Data type: Survey      of survey: 53.8%          for child care: 20.4%
 conducted between 5/ Recidivism: Receiving     Food assistance:
 99 and 7/99, 7-12     cash assistance at time  Receiving food stamps:
 months after exit     of survey: 15.1%          59.9%
Response rate: 416                              Receiving WIC: 34.9%
 respondents
 surveyed
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Arkansas: Evaluation of Arkansas's Transitional Employment Assistance
 (TEA) Program, July 1999
Universe: Cases       Earnings (cases closed 7/ Health assistance (cases
 closed between 6/96   97-9/98):1st quarter      closed 7/98-9/98):
 and 12/98             after exit: $2,034; 4th   Receiving Medicaid
Data type:             quarter after exit:       within 2 months of exit
 Administrative data   $2,299                    (adults/children): 56%/
Followup: Up to 4     Employment rate (cases     60%
 quarters (varies)     closed 7/96-9/98): 1st
                       quarter after exit:
                       50%; Ever employed
                       since exit: 66%
                      Recidivism: Ever
                       received cash aid from
                       6/96-12/98: 23.2%
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Arizona: Cash Assistance Exit Study: First Quarter 1998 Cohort Final
 Report, January 2000
Universe: All cases   Earnings: 1st quarter     Health assistance: Head
 closed between 1/98   after exit: $2,211; 4th   of household ever
 and 3/98 that         quarter after exit:       received Medicaid in
 remained closed for   $2,511                    the 4 quarters since
 at least 2 months    Employment rate: 1st       exit: 71.7%
Data type:             quarter after exit:      Child care assistance:
 Administrative data   53.1%; 4th quarter        Ever received child
Followup: 12 months    after exit: 50.1%; Ever   care in the 4 quarters
                       employed since exit:      since exit: 21.8%
                       73.3%                    Food assistance: Ever
                      Recidivism: Ever           received food stamps in
                       received cash aid in      the 4 quarters since
                       the 4 quarters since      exit: 66.5%
                       exit: 27.7%
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Arizona: Cash Assistance Exit Study: First Quarter 1998 Cohort Final
 Report, January 2000
Universe: All cases   Earnings: Average hourly  Health assistance:
 closed between 1/98   wage: $7.52; Average      Receiving Medicaid at
 and 3/98 that         total monthly household   the time of survey
 remained closed for   income: $1,467            (adult/children): 58.7%/
 at least 2 months    Hours of employment:       71.8%
Data type: Survey      Average hours per week:
 conducted 12-18       34.9
 months after exit    Employment rate: At time
 from cash             of survey: 58.4%
 assistance
Response rate: 72%
------------------------------------------------------------------------
California: Examining Circumstances of Individuals and Families Who
 Leave TANF: Assessing the Validity of Administrative Data (Interim
 Report), May 1999
Universe: One-parent  Earnings: 1st quarter     Health assistance: Ever
 cases closed in       after exit: $3,480; 4th   received nonassistance
 1997 that remained    quarter after exit:       Medi-Cal in the 12
 closed for at least   $3,869                    months since exit
 2 months             Employment rate: 1st       (adults/children):
Data type:             quarter after exit:       34.6%/35.9%
 Administrative data   55.4%; 4th quarter       Food assistance: Percent
Followup: 12 months    after exit: 54.0%; Ever   of leavers with a
                       employed since exit:      member of their family
                       73.7%                     ever receiving
                      Recidivism: Family         nonassistance food
                       member ever received      stamps in the 12 months
                       cash aid in the 12        since exit: 8.5%
                       months after exit:
                       19.4%
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Colorado: Evaluation of the Colorado Works Program: First Annual Report,
 November 1999
Universe: Adult       Earnings: 1st quarter     Health assistance:
 cases closed 7/97-9/  after exit: $2,400; 5th   Enrolled in Medicaid in
 97 that had not       quarter after exit:       the first 2 months
 reopened as of 12/    $2,905                    after exit (adults/
 98                   Employment rate: 1st       children): 29%/36%
Data type:             quarter after exit:
 Administrative data   52.4%; 5th quarter
Followup: 5 quarters   after exit: 51.5%
 (15 months)          Recidivism: Cases
                       reopened by 12/98:
                       18.8%
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Colorado: Evaluation of the Colorado Works Program: First Annual Report,
 November 1999
Universe: Adult       Earnings: Median wage     Health assistance:
 cases closed 7/97-9/  per hour for respondent   Receiving Medicaid at
 97 that had not       working: $8.16            time of survey (adults/
 reopened as of 12/   Hours of employment:       children): 14.9%/43.2%
 98                    Less than 35 hours per   Child care assistance:
Data type: Survey      week: 25.7%; 35 hours     Employed respondents
 conducted             or more per week: 74.3%   receiving government or
 approximately 2      Employment rate: At time   employer child care
 years after program   of survey: 65%; Ever      subsidy: 14%
 exit, mostly          employed since exit:     Food assistance: Percent
 between 6/99 and 8/   89%                       of eligible respondents
 99                                              receiving food stamps:
Response rate: 78%                               47%
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Connecticut: Connecticut Post-Time Limit Tracking Study: Six-Month
 Survey Results, January 1999
Universe: Cases       Earnings: Average hourly  Food assistance:
 closed because of     wage (primary job):       Receiving food stamps:
 the 21-month time     $7.82; Average per week   50.2%; Average amount
 limit on cash         (from all jobs): $270     of food stamps: $218
 assistance in 9/97   Hours of employment:
 or 10/97 that did     Average hours per week
 not receive an        at all jobs: 34.9
 extension            Employment rate: At time
Data type: Survey      of survey: 83.0%
 conducted 6 months   Recidivism: Someone in
 after exit            the household may have
Response rate: 82%     received TFA or AFDC in
                       the month before
                       interview: 3.8%
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Florida: After Leaving WAGES: Statewide Sample, March 1999
Universe: Cases       Earnings: $5.15 or less:  Health assistance:
 closed 10/96-9/98     11.6%; $5.16-$6.99:      Receiving health care
Data type: Survey      43.9%; $7 or more:        (respondents/children):
 conducted in 10/98    36.1%                     48.6%/69.7%
 and 11/98            Hours of employment:      Receiving Medicaid
Response rate: 51.5%   Less than 40 hours:       (family): 67.7%
                       43.9%; 40 or more:       Child care assistance:
                       53.6%                     Receiving government
                      Employment rate: At time   child care assistance:
                       of survey: 56.9%          17.8%
                      Recidivism: Would go      Food assistance:
                       back on WAGES if they    Receiving food stamps:
                       could: 32.4%              56.6%
                                                Receiving WIC: 28.9%
                                                Receiving School Lunch
                                                 Program: 55.1%
                                                Receiving Summer Feeding
                                                 Program: 7.4%
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Georgia: Amended Quarterly Progress Report: Outcomes for Single-Parent
 Leavers by Cohort Quarter for January-March 1999 1st Quarter 1997
 Leavers, April 1999
Universe: Single-     Earnings: 1st quarter     Not reported
 adult cases closed    after exit: $2,193; 4th
 in 1997 that          quarter after exit:
 remained closed to    $2,389
 cash aid for at      Employment rate: 1st
 least 2 consecutive   quarter after exit:
 months                64.2%; 4th quarter
Data type:             after exit: 53.3%; Ever
 Administrative data   employed since exit:
Followup: 12 months    73.9%
                      Recidivism: Returned in
                       4th quarter after exit:
                       13.4%
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Idaho: Project Self-Reliance: TAFI Participant Closure Study (II), March
 1998
Universe: Cases       Earnings: Less than       Health assistance:
 closed 7/97-12/97     $5.25: 27%; $5.25-$7:     Receiving Medicaid: 80%
Data type: Survey      51%; $7.01 or more: 21%  Child care assistance:
 conducted in 1/98    Hours of employment: 40    Survey respondents
 between 1 and 5       hours or more per week:   receiving help from
 months after exit     32.7%                     child care program
 from cash            Employment rate: At time   (government): 15.2% of
 assistance            of survey: 52.9%          total
Response rate: 16.5%                            Food assistance:
                                                Receiving food stamps:
                                                 77%
                                                Receiving WIC: 41%
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Illinois: When Families Leave Welfare Behind: First Survey Findings,
 January 1999
Universe: Cases       Earnings: Average hourly  Health assistance:
 closed in 12/97 and   wage: $7.78               Receiving Medicaid:
 6/98 that remained   Hours of employment:       (adult/children): 54.4%/
 closed for at least   Average hours worked      59.1%
 2 months              per week: 35.8           Private health insurance
Data type: Survey     Employment rate: At time   (families): 29.7%
 conducted in 11/98    of survey: 65.3%; Ever   Child care assistance:
 and 12/98, 5-11       employed since exit:      Receiving State help
 months after exit     85.2%                     with weekly out-of-
 from cash            Recidivism: Returned to    pocket child care
 assistance            TANF since leaving:       expenses: 35.8%
Response rate: 30.5%   20.0%                    Food assistance:
                                                Receiving food stamps:
                                                 35%
                                                Receiving WIC: 26.8%
                                                Receiving School Lunch
                                                 Program: 40.0%
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Indiana: Who Is On and Who Is Off? Comparing Characteristics and
 Outcomes for Current and Former TANF Recipients, September 1997
Universe: Families    Earnings: Less than $6    Health assistance:
 who had received      per hour: 39.4%; $6-      Receiving Medicaid
 AFDC sometime         $7.99: 40.7%; $8 or       (families): 52.9%
 between 5/95 and 5/   more: 19.9%              Covered by health
 96                   Hours of employment:       insurance (adults/
Data type: Survey      Full time employment      children): 46.0%/65.1%
 conducted early in    (35 or more hours per    Child care assistance:
 1997, 12-18 months    week): 61.7%              Received child care
 after individuals    Employment rate: At time   assistance from a
 enrolled in the       of survey: 64.3%; Ever    community organization
 State's welfare       employed since exit:      since exit: 6.4%
 demonstration         84.3%                    Food assistance:
 program                                        Receiving food stamps:
Response rate: Not                               37.9%
 reported                                       Receiving WIC: 24.6%
                                                Receiving School Lunch
                                                 Program: 46.2%
                                                Receiving School
                                                 Breakfast: 34.7%
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Iowa: Iowa's Limited Benefit Plan (LBP), May 1997
Universe:             Earnings: Average weekly  Health assistance:
 Individuals in        earnings: $170.20        Received Medicaid: 66.4%
 active welfare       Hours of employment:      Health insurance
 cases who, in 11/     Average number of hours   available from most
 95, 12/95, or 1/96    worked: 31.27;            recent job held: 36.4%
 entered month 7 of    percentage working 40    Child care assistance:
 their initial         or more hours per week:   Child care is a type of
 assignment to the     38.1%                     support received from
 LBP                  Employment rate: Ever      family, friends and
Data type: Survey      employed since exit:      neighbors since Family
 conducted between 2/  52.6%                     Investment Program
 96 and 4/96 (during                             benefits were
 months 7 and 12 of                              terminated
 the limited benefit                            Food assistance:
 plan)                                          Received food stamps:
Response rate: Not                               63.5%
 reported                                       Received WIC: 29.9%
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Kansas: Statistical Summary of Leaver Survey: Twelve Month Survey
 Results, June 1999
Universe: Cases       Earnings: Less than $5    Health assistance:
 closed 12/97-11/98    per hour: 10%; $5.01-     Receiving medical
Data type: Survey      $7: 51%; $7.01 or more:   assistance (families):
 conducted 12 months   33%                       60%
 after exit           Hours of employment:      Child care assistance:
Response rate: 51.8%   Full-time employment      Receiving child care:
                       (more than 37.5 hours/    6%
                       week): 65%               Food assistance:
                      Employment rate: At time   Receiving food stamps:
                       of survey: 36%            30%
                      Recidivism: Temporary
                       Assistance to Families
                       (TAF) cases reopened:
                       18%; Average months off
                       cash assistance: 7
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Kentucky: From Welfare to Work: Welfare Reform in Kentucky (No. 2)
 Second Year Survey of Discontinued K-TAP Recipients, January 1999
Universe: Cases       Earnings: $5.15 or less   Health assistance:
 closed 1/97-11/97     per hour: 13.1%; $5.16-  Receiving Medicaid
 that were still       $6.99: 46.1%; $7 or       (adult): 27.8%
 closed at the time    more: 37.4%              Medical card or passport
 of the survey        Hours of employment: 40    (children): 60.4%
Data type: Survey      or more hours per week:  Receiving other medical
 conducted 10/98       59.5%                     insurance (adults/
Response rate: 42%    Employment rate: Left      children): 27.0%/18.6%
                       program for employment:  Child care assistance:
                       48.3%                    Respondents using some
                      Recidivism: Would return   type of child care:
                       to K-TAP if possible:     37.5%
                       18.2%                    Respondents using and
                                                 paying for child care:
                                                 69.9%
                                                Respondents using and
                                                 paying for child care
                                                 who receive payment
                                                 assistance; 28.1%
                                                Food assistance:
                                                Receiving food stamps:
                                                 45.6%
                                                Receiving WIC: 24.7%
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Louisiana: Exiting Welfare: The Experiences of Families in Metro New
 Orleans, June 1998
Universe: Cases       Earnings: Average         Health assistance:
 closed 1/98-3/98      monthly income--          Receiving Medicaid:
Data type: Survey      working: $802.59;         39.8%
 conducted in 4/98     Average monthly income-- Child care assistance:
 and 5/98              not working: $403.65;     Receiving child care
Response rate: 17.5%   Average total monthly     assistance: 3.2%
                       household income:        Food assistance:
                       $533.41                  Receiving food stamps:
                      Hours of employment:       49.0%
                       Full time (40 or more    Receiving WIC: 23.5%
                       hours per week): 18.7%;
                       Part time: 14.9%
                      Employment rate: At time
                       of survey: 33.6%
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Maryland: Life After Welfare: Fourth Interim Report, October 1999
Universe: Cases       Earnings: 1st quarter     Not reported
 closed for any        after exit: $2,202; 4th
 period of time from   quarter after exit:
 10/96-3/99            $2,545; 9th quarter
Data type:             after exit: $2,701
 Administrative data  Employment rate 1st
Followup: Up to 30     quarter after exit:
 months (varies)       52.5%; 4th quarter
                       after exit: 51.0%; 9th
                       quarter after exit:
                       52.7%
                      Recidivism: 24 months
                       after exit (excludes
                       ``churners''): 25.8%
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Massachusetts: How Are They Doing? A Longitudinal Study of Households
 Leaving Welfare Under Massachusetts Reform: Round 4 Findings, April
 1999
Universe: Cases       Earnings: Full-time       Health assistance:
 closed 12/96-6/97     average weekly           Children's medical
 that were closed      earnings: $323; Part-     coverage: 92.4%
 for at least 30       time average weekly      Children receiving
 days                  earnings: $172            private insurance
Data type: Survey     Hours of employment:       coverage: 10.0%
 conducted 1 year      Full time (30 or more    Children receiving HMO
 after exit            hours per week): 34.4%;   coverage: 8.2%
Response rate: 63%     Part time (less than 30  Children receiving other
                       hours per week): 18.6%    coverage: 1.8%
                      Employment rate: At time  Child care assistance:
                       of survey: 53.0%;         Used/using transitional
                       Someone in the            child care in the last
                       household had worked in   3 months: 12.6%
                       the last 3 months:       Food assistance:
                       73.0%                     Receiving food stamps:
                      Recidivism: Returned to    6.5%
                       welfare at the time of
                       the survey: 20.9%
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Michigan: Longitudinal Study of Family Independence Program (FIP)
 Recipients: 1998 Closed FIP Cases, 1998
Universe: Cases that  Earnings: Average hourly  Not reported
 were receiving cash   wage: $7.02
 assistance (FIP) in  Hours of employment:
 1/97, but were        Average hours worked
 closed at time of     per week: 31.7
 survey               Employment rate: At time
Data type: Survey      of survey: 71.1%
 conducted 6/98-9/98  Recidivism: All of the
Response rate: 44.5%   cases included in the
                       analysis were closed at
                       the time of the survey.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mississippi: Tracking of TANF Clients: First Report of a Longitudinal
 Study, January 1999
Universe: Cases       Earnings: Average hourly  Health assistance:
 closed 1/98-4/98      wage: $5.77 ($5.97       Children receiving
 for any length of     urban, $5.57 rural)       Medicaid: 44%
 time                 Hours of employment:      Children receiving
Data type: Survey      Average hours per week:   private insurance: 10%
 conducted 7/98-9/98   35; Full time (35 or     Child care assistance:
Response rate: 86.7%   more hours per week):     Respondents using child
                       67% (75% urban; 59%       care in the last 6
                       rural); Part time: 33%    months who received
                       (25% urban; 41% rural)    State-sponsored
                      Employment rate: At time   payments: 56%
                       of survey: 35% (27%      Food assistance:
                       rural, 46% urban); Ever  Receiving food stamps:
                       employed in last 6        58% (47% urban, 67%
                       months: 47% (52% urban;   rural)
                       43% rural)               Participate in School
                      Recidivism: Received       Lunch Program (of
                       TANF, Medicaid, and       families with school
                       food stamp benefits at    age children): 82%
                       least 1 month since
                       originally leaving the
                       rolls: 47% (37% urban;
                       73% rural)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Missouri: Preliminary Outcomes for 1996 Fourth Quarter AFDC Leavers,
 September 1999
Universe: All single- Earnings: 1st quarter     Health assistance:
  and two-parent       after exit: $2,192; 8th   Receiving Medicaid at
 AFDC/TANF caseheads   quarter after exit:       any time during the 8-
 (those receiving a    $3,055                    quarter followup period
 cash payment) who    Employment rate: 1st       (self/children): 48.0%/
 were active during    quarter after exit:       59.2%
 9/96, 10/96, and/or   58.1%; 8th quarter       Food assistance:
 11/96, and who left   after exit: 56.7%; Ever   Receiving food stamps
 AFDC during the 4th   employed since exit:      at any time during the
 quarter of 1996 and   79.5%                     8-quarter followup
 remained off the     Recidivism: Returned to    period: 74.9%
 rolls for at least    cash assistance at any
 the following month   time during the 8-
Data type:             quarter followup
 Administrative data   period: 17.2%
Followup: 2 years (8
 quarters)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Montana: Montana's Welfare Reform Project: FAIM February 1998 Update,
 February 1998
Universe: Cases       Earnings: Over the 18-    Not reported
 closed that           month period: $5,908
 remained closed      Employment rate:
 from 3/96 to 9/97     Reported employment
Data type:             earnings: 57%
 Administrative data
Followup: 18 months
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Montana: Montana's Welfare Reform Project: FAIM February 1998 Update,
 February 1998
Universe: Current     Earnings: Earning less    Health assistance:
 and former            than minimum wage: 11%   Receiving Medicaid:
 recipients at time   Hours of employment:       74.5%
 of survey             More than 20 hours per   Employed respondents
Data type: Survey      week: 47%                 with health insurance:
 conducted 12/97-1/   Employment rate: At time   39%
 98                    of survey: 66%           Child care assistance:
Response rate: 208                               29 survey respondents
 respondents                                     were enrolled in Job
                                                 Supplement Program,
                                                 with 6 utilizing
                                                 publicly funded child
                                                 care
                                                Food assistance:
                                                Receiving food stamps:
                                                 63%
                                                Receiving School Lunch
                                                 Program: 55.3%
                                                Receiving WIC: 47.6%
------------------------------------------------------------------------
New Jersey: Work-first New Jersey (WFNJ) Evaluation: How WFNJ Clients
 are Faring Under Welfare Reform: An Early Look: Leaver Sample, October
 1999
Universe: Cases who   Earnings: Average total   Health assistance:
 entered the program   monthly income: $1,170    Receiving health
 from 7/97 to 12/98,  Employment rate: At time   insurance: 73% (62%
 a subsample of        of survey: 56%            public and 11%
 which were former                               private); 75% of the
 welfare recipients                              children of leavers had
Data type: Survey                                health insurance
 conducted 21 months                            Child care assistance:
 after exit                                      Employed former clients
Response rate: 81%                               receiving government
                                                 child care subsidies:
                                                 22%
                                                Food assistance:
                                                 Receiving food stamps:
                                                 33%
------------------------------------------------------------------------
New York: After Welfare: A Study of Work and Benefit Use After Case
 Closing, December 1999
Universe: Cases       Earnings: 1st quarter     Health assistance:
 closed 1/97-3/97      after exit: $3,393; 4th   Receiving Medicaid in
 that were closed      quarter after exit:       the 4th quarter after
 for at least 2        $3,602                    case closing: 45%
 months               Employment rate: 1st      Food assistance:
Data type:             quarter after exit:       Receiving food stamps
 Administrative data   50%; 4th quarter after    in the 4th quarter
Followup: 12 months    exit: 48%; Ever           after case closing: 26%
                       employed since exit:
                       62%
                      Recidivism: Returned in
                       4th quarter: 19%
------------------------------------------------------------------------
North Carolina: Evaluation of the North Carolina Work First Program:
 Status of Families Leaving Work First After Hitting the 24-Month Time
 Limit, May 1999
Universe: Cases       Earnings: Median monthly  Health care:
 closed in 8/98        earnings: Self-          Receiving Medicaid
 because of a time     employed: $259.80;        (families/children):
 limit                 Working for an            84.5%/93.2%
Data type: Survey      employer: $947.19        Receiving other health
 conducted in 11/98   Hours of employment:       insurance (families):
 and 12/98             Full-time employment      7.2%
 (supplemented with    (40 or more hours per    Receiving insurance from
 administrative        week): 37.9%              employer: 5.1%
 data)                Employment rate: At time  Child care assistance:
Response rate: 76.5%   of survey: 63.1%; Ever    Respondents who use
                       employed since exit:      child care and receive
                       80.5%                     a child care subsidy
                      Recidivism: All cases      from the county: 66.7%
                       closed because of time   Food assistance:
                       limit are ineligible     Receiving food stamps:
                       for TANF cash benefits    70.8%
                       for 3 years              Receiving WIC: 4.6%
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ohio: How Are They Managing? A Six-Month Retrospective of Cuyahoga
 County Families Leaving Welfare, 1999
Universe: Cases       Earnings: Total family    Health assistance:
 closed in the 4th     income (including cash   Receiving Medicaid
 quarter of 1998 and   value of food stamps)     (adults/children): 59%/
 1st quarter of 1999   greater than or equal     69%
 for at least 2        to 100% of 1998 poverty  Receiving private health
 months                level: 55%                insurance (adults/
Data type: Survey     Employment rate: At time   children): 17%/15%
 conducted 6 months    of survey: 67%; Ever     Child care assistance:
 after exit            employed since exit:      Receiving child care
Response rate: 70%     87%                       assistance: 22%
                      Recidivism: Returned at   Food assistance:
                       least once: 24%           Receiving food stamps:
                                                 53%
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Oklahoma: Family Health and Well-Being in Oklahoma: An Exploratory
 Analysis of TANF Cases Closed and Denied October 1996-November 1997:
 Sample of Adult and Children, September 1998
Universe: Cases that  Earnings: Average hourly  Health assistance:
 were closed or        wage: $6.51              Receiving Medicaid only:
 denied for any       Hours of employment:       60.6%
 reason from 10/96-    Average hours worked     Receiving private (work-
 11/97 regardless of   per week: 34; Full-time   related) and Medicaid:
 whether they were     employment (40 or more    9.2%
 receiving TANF at     hours per week): 50.3%   Receiving private (work-
 the time of the      Employment rate: At time   related) only: 8.6%
 survey                of survey: 50.3%;        Receipt by child--
Data type: Survey      Respondents who live in   Medicaid, only: 62.6%
 conducted 1/98-4/98   households with at       Medicaid/private
Response rate: 53.3%   least one employed        insurance: 18.5%
                       individual: 68.5%        Child care assistance:
                      Recidivism: Received       Eligible households
                       TANF at least once        receiving child care
                       since 10/96: 33.6%        assistance: 33.9%
                                                Food assistance:
                                                Receiving food stamps
                                                 only: 8.9%
                                                Receiving WIC/other
                                                 (including food banks),
                                                 only: 25.7%
                                                Receiving food stamps
                                                 and WIC: 40.1%
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Pennsylvania: Welfare Reform After Two Years: Technical Report on Former
 Welfare Recipients in Pennsylvania (March 1997-March 1999), November
 1999
Universe: Cases that  Earnings: Annualized      Health assistance:
 were closed 3/97-12/  income: 4th quarter       Received Medicaid for
 98 that remained      after exit: $11,711;      some period of time
 closed. Food stamp    8th quarter after exit:   since exit: 76%
 and Medicaid          $13,759                  Food assistance:
 participation data   Employment rate: Ever      Received food stamps
 is reported from 3/   employed since exit:      for some period of time
 97 to 4/99            68%                       since exit: 65%
Data type:            Recidivism: Only cases
 Administrative data   that remained closed
Followup: Up to 8      were included in the
 quarters (varies)     sample
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Pennsylvania: Welfare Reform After Two Years: Technical Report on Former
 Welfare Recipients in Pennsylvania (March 1997-March 1999), November
 1999
Universe: Cases that  Employment rate: At time  Health assistance:
 were closed 2/98-11/  of survey: 58.4%; Ever   Receiving Medicaid
 98 that remained      employed since exit:      (households): 81.6%
 closed for 6          80.8%                    Receiving private
 consecutive months   Recidivism: All of the     insurance: 27.2%
Data type: Survey      cases in the sample      Child care assistance:
Response rate: 29%     were still closed at      Respondents with
                       the time of the survey    extended/afterschool
                                                 care for children who
                                                 receive State child
                                                 care payment
                                                 assistance: 42.1%;
                                                 Respondents with
                                                 preschool children and
                                                 a caretaker who receive
                                                 State child care
                                                 payment assistance:
                                                 64.4%
                                                Food assistance:
                                                Receiving food stamps:
                                                 51.2%
                                                Receiving WIC: 26.4%
                                                Receiving School Lunch
                                                 Program: 47.2%
                                                Receiving Summer Feeding
                                                 Program: 25.6%
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Rhode Island: Where Are They Now? A Post-Cash Administrative Data Study,
 May 1999
Universe: Cases       Recidivism: Cases         Not reported
 closed in 4/97 and    reopened within the
 4/98 that remained    year: 4/97: 29.9%; 4/
 closed for at least   98: 30.5%
 31 days
Data type:
 Administrative data
Followup: 12 months
------------------------------------------------------------------------
South Carolina: Survey of Former Family Independence Program Clients:
 Cases Closed During January Through March, 1998, June 1999
Universe: Cases with  Earnings: Average hourly  Health assistance:
 at least one adult    wage: $7                 At least one household
 subject to FIP work  Hours of employment:       member covered by
 requirements closed   Average hours worked      Medicaid: 77.6%
 1/98-3/98 that        per week: 35.1; Work 30  Receiving private
 remained closed up    or more hours per week:   insurance (adults/
 to the time of the    81.4%                     children): 7.2%/7.4%
 survey               Employment rate: At time  Child care assistance:
Data type: Survey      of survey: 54.7%; Ever   Receiving assistance
 conducted 1/99-4/     employed since exit:      (all households): 9.9%
 99, 12-15 months      80.7%                    Among those using care,
 after exit from      Recidivism: Pretty sure    30% receive subsidy for
 cash assistance       they will not need        preschool; 27.4% for
Response rate: 75.0%   welfare again: 51.0%      school-aged
                                                Food assistance:
                                                Receiving food stamps:
                                                 52.6%
                                                Receiving School Lunch
                                                 Program: 52.1%
                                                Receiving WIC: 27.1%
                                                Receiving Summer Feeding
                                                 Program: 4.9%
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Tennessee: Summary of Surveys of Welfare Recipients Employed or
 Sanctioned for Non-Compliance, March 1998
Universe: Cases       Earnings: Average hourly  Health assistance:
 sanctioned/closed     wage: $5.50               Receiving TennCare: 88%
 for noncompliance    Employment rate: At time  Child care assistance:
 with Families First   of survey: 39%            Receiving child care:
 Program              Recidivism: Think they     16%
 requirements since    will return to Families
 1/97                  First: 47%
Data type: Survey
 with data collected
 through 10/97
Response rate: 56%
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Tennessee: Summary of Surveys of Welfare Recipients Employed or
 Sanctioned for Non-Compliance, March 1998
Universe: Cases       Hours of employment:      Health assistance:
 sanctioned/closed     Full time: 25%; Part      Receiving TennCare: 91%
 for their refusal     time: 17%                Child care assistance:
 to sign a personal   Employment rate: At time   Receiving child care:
 responsibility plan   of survey: 42%            21%
 since 1/97           Recidivism: Think they
Data type: Survey      will return to Families
 with data collected   First: 25%
 through 10/97
Response rate: 59%
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Texas: The Impacts of Welfare Reform Changes in Texas: Early Findings,
 December 1998
Universe: Cases       Earnings: Average hourly  Health assistance:
 closed in 11/97       wage: $6.28 ($6.15 for    Received Medicaid since
 that remained off     redirects; $6.35 for      exit (leavers/
 TANF for 6 months,    leavers)                  redirected): 74%/66%
 as well as a sample  Hours of employment:      Food assistance:
 of cases redirected   Average hours per week:   Received WIC since exit
 from TANF through     34 (34.1 hours/week for   (leavers/redirected):
 Texas Works in 12/    leavers and 34.7 for      33%/42%; received food
 97                    redirects)                stamps (leavers/
Data type: Survey,    Employment rate: At time   redirected): 68%/64%
 supplemented with     of survey: 55% (59% of
 administrative data   leavers and 50% of
Response rate: 51%     those redirected); Ever
                       employed since exit:
                       68% (75% of leavers and
                       62% of those
                       redirected)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Texas: Why People Leave Welfare II: An Expanded Follow-up Study of the
 Effects of Welfare Reform, December 1998
Universe: Cases       Earnings: Average         Health assistance:
 closed 11/97-2/98     monthly salary: $771      Receiving Medicaid at
Data type: Survey     Hours of employment        time of interview: 62%
Response rate:         (among the 48% who left  Child care assistance:
 Ranged from 54% to    cash assistance for       Receiving child care
 66%                   employment): Employed     assistance at time of
                       full time: 75%            interview: 12%
                      Employment rate: Percent  Food assistance:
                       who left cash             Receiving food stamps
                       assistance for            at time of interview:
                       employment: 48%           56%
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Virginia: Experiences of Virginia Time-Limit Families in the Six Months
 After Case Closure: Results from an Early Cohort, Final Report,
 November 1999
Universe: Cases       Earnings: Average hourly  Health assistance: Among
 closed 2/99-6/99      wage: $5.99               working, percent who
 due to the State     Hours of employment:       enrolled in employer-
 time limit            Average hours per week:   provided health
Data type: Survey      33.5                      benefits: 28.8%
 conducted 6-12       Employment rate: At time  Child care assistance:
 months after exit     of survey: 71%; Ever     Among working or in
 from cash             employed since exit:      training, percent who
 assistance            85.5%                     receive at least some
Response rate: 78%    Recidivism: Receiving      government assistance:
                       income from TANF in       28.7%
                       month before interview:  Among working or in
                       2.4%                      training, percent who
                                                 were aware of
                                                 government assistance
                                                 but chose not to
                                                 participate: 34.7%
                                                Food assistance:
                                                 Receiving income from
                                                 Food Stamp Program in
                                                 month before interview:
                                                 76.1%
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Washington: A Study of Washington State TANF Departures and Welfare
 Reform: Cohort II, April 1999
Universe: Single-     Earnings: 1st quarter     Food assistance:
 and two-parent        after exit: $2,710; 4th   Receiving food stamps 1
 cases closed in 4th   quarter after exit:       year after the
 quarter 1997 for at   $3,018                    selection quarter: 30%
 least 2 months       Employment rate: 1st
Data type:             quarter after exit:
 Administrative data   51%; Ever employed in 4
Followup: 12 months    quarters after exit:
                       73.9%
                      Recidivism: Ever
                       returned in the 4
                       quarters after exit:
                       23.2%
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Washington: Washington's TANF Single-Parent Families After Welfare,
 January 1999
Universe: Single-     Earnings: Average hourly  Health assistance:
 parent cases closed   wage (currently           Receiving Medicaid
 in 8/97 that          employed and ever         (adults/children): 44%/
 remained closed at    employed since exit):     64%
 the time of the       $8.09                    Child care assistance:
 survey               Hours of employment:       Department of Social
Data type: Survey      Average number of hours   and Health Services
 conducted mid-10/98-  worked per week (for      subsidies in families
 11/98                 the current or most       with children under 13
Response rate: 52%     recent job): 36           whose parent is at work
                      Employment rate: At time   when child not in
                       of survey: 71%; Ever      school: 38%
                       employed in the last 12  Food assistance:
                       months: 87%              Receiving food stamps:
                      Recidivism: Likely to      45%
                       return to welfare        Receiving help from food
                       within 6 months (of       banks: 29%
                       those who said they      Receiving help from
                       were worse off): 48%      charitable
                                                 organizations: 12%
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Wisconsin: Post-Exit Earnings and Benefit Receipt Among Those Who Left
 AFDC in Wisconsin, January 1999
Universe: Cases       Earnings: 1st quarter     Health assistance (5th
 closed for at least   after exit: $2,440; 5th   quarter after exit):
 2 consecutive         quarter after exit:      Receiving Medicaid only:
 months between 8/95   $2,751                    23.4%
 and 7/96             Employment rate: 1st      Receiving Medicaid and
Data type:             quarter after exit:       food stamps: 26.0%
 Administrative data   72.4%; 5th quarter       Food assistance (5th
Followup: 15 months    after exit: 75.8%; Ever   quarter after exit):
                       employed in the year     Receiving food stamps
                       following exit: 81.7%     only: 2.3%
                      Recidivism: Returned to   Receiving Medicaid and
                       AFDC within 15 months     food stamps: 26.0%
                       of leaving: 30%
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Wisconsin: Survey of Those Leaving AFDC or W-2 January to March 1998:
 Preliminary Report, January 1999
Universe: Cases       Earnings: Employed at     Health assistance:
 closed between 1/98   time of interview--      Households receiving
 and 3/98, that        hourly wage $7.42         Medicaid or Healthy
 remained closed at   Hours of employment:       Start: 87%
 the time of the       Mean hours per week at   Private insurance
 survey                best job for those        (anyone in household):
Data type: Survey      currently employed: 36;   26%
 conducted 8/98-11/    Mean hours per week at   Child care assistance:
 98, 6-9 months        best job for those who   Receiving child care
 after exit from       had worked since their    assistance: 17%
 cash assistance       exit but are currently   Leavers with preschool
Response rate: 69%     unemployed: 33            children who said they
                      Employment rate: At time   needed child care: 66%
                       of survey: 62%; Ever     Leavers with school-age
                       employed since exit:      children who said they
                       83%                       had some kind of
                      Recidivism: Agree or       extended or afterschool
                       strongly agree that       care: 30%
                       they are pretty sure     Food assistance:
                       they will not need to    Receiving food stamps:
                       be on welfare again:      49%
                       60%                      Receiving School Lunch
                                                 Program: 47%
                                                Receiving WIC: 38%
                                                Receiving Summer Feeding
                                                 Program for Children:
                                                 5%
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Wyoming: A Survey of Former POWER Recipients, May 1998
Universe: Cases       Earnings: (all            Health assistance:
 closed 1/97-3/98      respondents): Less than  Receiving Medicaid
Data type: Survey      $5 per hour: 3.5%;        (families): 82.5%
 conducted in 3/98     $5.01-$7.50: 47%; $7.51  Receiving health
Response rate: 31.8%   or more: 9.0%             insurance other than
                      Hours of employment: 40    Medicaid: 17%
                       or more hours: 47%       Child care assistance:
                      Employment rate: At time   Receiving public
                       of survey: 61%            assistance day care:
                      Recidivism: Back on        28%
                       POWER at the time of     Food assistance:
                       the survey: 2.5%          Receiving food stamps:
                                                 61%
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Table prepared by the Congressional Research Service based on
  information compiled from the individual State evaluations and the
  National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL).

                               REFERENCES

Ahn, J., & Fogarty, D. (1999). A study of Washington State TANF
        departures and welfare reform: Cohort II. Olympia, WA:
        Department of Social and Health Services.
Bachrach, C. (1998). The changing circumstances of marriage and
        fertility in the United States. In R. Moffitt (Ed.),
        Welfare, the family, and reproductive behavior:
        Research perspectives. Washington, DC: National Academy
        Press.
Bane, M., & Ellwood, D. (1986). Slipping into and out of
        poverty: The dynamics of spells. Journal of Human
        Resources, 21(1), 1-23.
Bavier, R. (1999). An early look at the effects of welfare
        reform (unpublished manuscript). Washington, DC: Office
        of Management and Budget.
Bavier, R. (2000). Accounting for increases in failure to
        report AFDC/TANF receipt  (unpublished manuscript).
        Washington, DC: Office of Management and Budget.
Becker, G., Landes, E., & Michael, R. (1977). An economic
        analysis of marital instability.  Journal of Political
        Economy, 85(6), 1141-1188.
Becker, G. (1964).  Human capital. Chicago: University of
        Chicago Press.
Becker, G. (1965). A theory of the allocation of time. Economic
        Journal, 75, 493-517.
Beeler, J., Brister, B., Chambry, S., & McDonald, A. (1999).
        Tracking of TANF clients: First report of a
        longitudinal study. Jackson, MS: Millsaps College.
Bird, E., Hagstrom. P., & Wild, R. (1999). Credit cards and the
        poor. Focus, 20(2), 40-43.
Boardman, A., Greenberg, D., Vining, A., & Weimer, D. (1996).
        Cost-benefit analysis: concepts and practice. New
        Jersey: Prentice Hall.
Bloom, D., Farrell, M., Kemple, J., & Verma, N. (1999). FTP:
        The family transition program: Implementation and
        three-year impacts of Florida's initial time-limited
        welfare program. New York: Manpower Demonstration
        Research Corporation.
Bloom, D., Melton, L., Michalopoulos, C., Scrivener, S., &
        Walter, J. (2000). Jobs First: Implementation and early
        impacts of Connecticut's welfare reform initiative. New
        York: Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation.
Bos, J., & Fellerath, V. (1997). Final report on Ohio's welfare
        initiative to improve school attendance among teenage
        parents: Ohio's Learning, Earning, and Parenting (LEAP)
        Program. New York: Manpower Demonstration Research
        Corporation.
Bos, J., Huston, A., Granger, R., Duncan, G., Brock, T.,
        McLoyd, V. (1999). New Hope for people with low
        incomes: Two-year results of a program to reduce
        poverty and reform welfare. New York: Manpower
        Demonstration Research Corporation.
Brooks-Gunn, J., Duncan, G., & Maritato, N. (1997). Poor
        families, poor outcomes: The well-being of children and
        youth. In G. Duncan & J. Brooks-Gunn (Eds.),
        Consequences of Growing Up Poor. New York: Russell
        Sage.
Bureau of Business and Economic Research. (1998). Summary of
        surveys of welfare recipients employed or sanctioned
        for non-compliance. Memphis, TN: University of Memphis.
Camasso, M., Harvey, C., Jagannathan, R., & Killingsworth, M.
        (1998a). A final report on the impact of New Jersey's
        Family Development Program: Experimental-control group
        analysis. New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers
        University.
Camasso, M., Harvey, C., Jagannathan, R., & Killingsworth, M.
        (1998b). A final report on the impact of New Jersey's
        Family Development Program: Results from a pre-post
        analysis of AFDC case heads from 1990-96. New
        Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University.
Cancian, M., Haveman, R., Kaplan, T., & Wolfe, B. (1999). Post-
        exit earnings and benefit receipt among those who left
        AFDC in Wisconsin. Madison, WI: University of
        Wisconsin-Madison.
Child Trends. (1999). Children and welfare reform: A guide to
        evaluating the effects of State welfare reform
        policies. Washington, DC: Author.
Citro, C., & Micheal, R. (1995) Measuring poverty: A new
        approach. Washington DC: National Research Council.
Committee on Ways and Means. (1998). Green Book. Background
        material and data on programs within the jurisdiction
        of the Committee on Ways and Means. Washington, DC:
        U.S. Government Printing Office.
Coulton, C., Pasqualone, C., Bania, N., Martin, T., Lalich, N.,
        Fernando, M., & Li, F. (1999). How are they managing? A
        six-month retrospective of Cuyahoga County families
        leaving welfare. Cleveland, OH: Case Western Reserve
        University.
Crew, R., & Eyerman, J. (1999). After leaving WAGES.
        Tallahassee, FL: Florida State University.
Cummings, S., & Nelson, J. (1999). From welfare to work:
        Welfare reform in Kentucky (No. 2) second year survey
        of discontinued K-TAP recipients. Frankfort, KY:
        Cabinet for Families and Children.
Danziger, S., Haveman, R., & Plotnick, R. (1981). How income
        transfer programs affect work, savings, and the income
        distribution. Journal of Economic Literature, 29, 975-
        1028.
Department of Health and Welfare. (1998). Project Self-
        Reliance: TAFI participant closure study. Boise, ID:
        Author.
Department of Human Services. (1998). The impacts of welfare
        reform changes in Texas: Early findings. Austin, TX:
        Author.
Department of Human Services. (1999). Where are they now? A
        post-cash administrative data study. Cranston, RI:
        Author.
Department of Public Health and Human Services. (1998).
        Montana's welfare reform project: FAIM  (February 1998
        update). Helena, MT: Author.
Department of Public Welfare. (1999). Welfare reform after two
        years: Technical report on former welfare recipients in
        Pennsylvania  (March 1997-March 1999). Harrisburg, PA:
        Author.
Department of Social and Health Services. (1999). Washington's
        TANF single parent families after welfare. Olympia, WA:
        Author.
Department of Social and Rehabilitation Services. (1999).
        Statistical summary of leaver survey: Twelve month
        survey results. Topeka, KS: Author.
Department of Social Services. (1999). Survey of former Family
        Independence Program clients: Cases closed during
        January through March, 1998. Columbia, SC: Author.
Department of Work force Development. (1999). Survey of those
        leaving AFDC or W-2 January to March 1998: Preliminary
        report. Madison, WI: Author.
Doolittle, F., Knox, V., Miller, C., & Rowser, S. (1998).
        Building opportunities, enforcing obligations:
        Implementation and interim impacts of parent's fair
        share. New York: Manpower Demonstration Research
        Corporation.
Edin, K., & Lein, L. (1997). Making ends meet: How single
        mothers survive welfare and low-wage work. New York:
        Russell Sage.
Fein, D. (1994). JOBS assignments in Ohio: Patterns and
        impacts. Cambridge, MA: Abt Associates Inc.
Fein, D. (1997). Who is on and who is off? Comparing
        characteristics and outcomes for current and former
        TANF recipients. Cambridge, MA: Abt Associates Inc.
Fein, D., Beecroft, E., Blomquist, J. (1994). Final impacts for
        JOBS and Work Choice. Cambridge, MA: Abt Associates
        Inc.
Fein, D., Beecroft, E., Hamilton, W., Lee, W., Holcomb, P.,
        Thompson, T., & Ratcliffe, C. (1998). The Indiana
        welfare reform evaluation: Program implementation and
        economic impacts after two years. Washington, DC: Abt
        Associates Inc. and Urban Institute.
Fein, D., & Karweit, J. (1997). The early economic impacts of
        Delaware's ABC welfare reform program. Cambridge, MA:
        Abt Associates Inc.
Foster, E. (1999). Amended quarterly progress report: Outcomes
        for single-parent leavers by cohort quarter for
        January-March 1999. Atlanta, GA: Georgia State
        University.
Fraker, T., Nixon, L., Jacobson, J., Gordon, A., & Martin, T.
        (1998). Iowa's Family Investment Program: Two-year
        impacts. Washington, DC: Mathematica Policy Research,
        Inc.
Fraker, T., Nixon, L., Losby, J., Prindle, C., & Else, J.
        (1997). Iowa's Limited Benefit Plan (LBP). Washington,
        DC: Mathematica Policy Research, Inc.
Freedman, S., Mitchell, M., & Navarro, D. (1998). Los Angeles
        Jobs-first GAIN evaluation: First-year findings on
        participation patterns and impacts. New York: Manpower
        Demonstration Research Corporation.
Friedlander, D., & Burtless, G. (1995). Five years after: The
        long-term effects of welfare-to-work programs. New
        York: Russell Sage.
Gennetian, L., & Miller, C. (2000). Reforming welfare and
        rewarding work: Final report on the Minnesota Family
        Investment Program (Volume 2: Effects on children). New
        York, NY: Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation.
Gordon, A., & Agodini, R. (1999). Early impacts of the Virginia
        Independence Program. Princeton, NJ: Mathematica Policy
        Research, Inc.
Gordon, A., Kuhns, C., Loeffler, R., & Agodini, R. (1999).
        Experiences of Virginia time-limit families in the six
        months after case closure: Results from an early
        cohort, Final report. Princeton, NJ: Mathematica Policy
        Research, Inc.
Hamilton, W., Burstein, N., Baker, A., Earle, A., Gluckman, S.,
        Peck, L., & White, A. (1996). The New York Child
        Assistance Program: Five-year impacts, costs, and
        benefits. Cambridge, MA: Abt Associates Inc.
Haskins, Ron. (In press). Effects of welfare reform at three
        years. In Public Law Chase-Lansdale & G. Duncan (Eds.),
        For better and for worse: State welfare reform and the
        well-being of low-income families and children. New
        York: Russell Sage.
Hargreaves, M., Kornfeld, R., & Mills, G. (1995). Community
        group participation and housing supplementation
        demonstration: Final report. Cambridge, MA: Abt
        Associates Inc.
Haveman, R., & Buron, L. (1993). Escaping poverty through work:
        The problem of low earnings capacity in the United
        States, 1973-88  Review of Income and Wealth (Series
        39), 141-157.
Hendra, R., & Michalopoulos, C. (1999). Forty-two-month impacts
        of Vermont's Welfare Restructuring Project. New York:
        Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation.
Hunter-Mann, J., & Bloom, D. (1999). Connecticut post-time
        limit tracking study: Six-month survey results. New
        York: Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation.
Julnes, G., Halter, A., Anderson, S., Frost-Kumpf, L., Schuldt,
        R., & Staskon, F. (1999). When families leave welfare
        behind: First survey findings. Springfield, IL:
        Illinois Department of Human Services.
Kemple, J., Friedlander, D., & Fellerath, V. (1995). Florida's
        Project Independence: Benefits, costs, and two-year
        impacts of Florida's JOBS Program. New York: Manpower
        Demonstration Research Corporation.
Kerpelman, L., Connell, D., Gunn, W., Schmitz, R., &
        Wilwerding, J. (1999). Georgia Preschool Immunization
        Project evaluation: Final report. Cambridge, MA: Abt
        Associates Inc.
Killingsworth, M., & Heckman, J. (1986). Female labor supply: A
        survey. In O. Ashenfelter & P. Layard (eds.), Handbook
        of Labor Economics (Volume 1). New York: North Holland.
Kisker, E., Rangarajan, A., & Boller, K. (1998). Moving into
        adulthood: Were the impacts of mandatory programs for
        welfare-dependent teenaged parents sustained after the
        programs ended? Princeton, NJ: Mathematica Policy
        Research, Inc.
Kohl, L., Rall, C. & Tobin, P. (1998). Longitudinal study of
        Family Independence Program (FIP) recipients: 1998
        closed FIP cases. Lansing, MI: Family Independence
        Agency.
Kornfeld, R., Peck, L., Porcari, D., Straubinger, J., Johnson,
        Z., Cabral, C., & Mills, G. (1999). Evaluation of the
        Arizona EMPOWER Welfare Reform Demonstration.
        Cambridge, MA: Abt Associates Inc.
London, R., & Valvano, V. (1999). Evaluation of the Colorado
        Works Program: First annual report. Oakland, CA:
        Berkeley Planning Associates.
London, R., Walsh, S., Smith, C., & Strong, M. (1999).
        Evaluation of Arkansas's Transitional Employment
        Assistance (TEA) Program: Fourth Bi-Annual Report.
        Oakland, CA: Berkeley Planning Associates.
Mancoske, R., Kemp, A., & Lindhorst, T. (1998). Exiting
        welfare: The experiences of families in metro New
        Orleans. New Orleans, LA: Southern University at New
        Orleans.
Mancuso, D., & Moses, A. (1999). Examining circumstances of
        individuals and families who leave TANF: Assessing the
        validity of administrative data (Interim report).
        Belmont, CA: County of San Mateo Human Services Agency.
Massachusetts Department of Transitional Assistance. (1999).
        How are they doing? A longitudinal study of households
        leaving welfare under Massachusetts reform. Boston:
        Author.
Maximus. (1999). Evaluation of the North Carolina Work First
        Program: Status of families leaving Work First after
        hitting the 24-month time limit. McLean, VA: Author.
Meyer, D., & Cancian, M. (1999). Initial findings from the W-2
        Child Support Demonstration Evaluation. Madison, WI:
        University of Wisconsin-Madison.
Miller, C., Knox, V., Gennetian, L., Dodoo, M., Hunter, J., &
        Redcross, C. (2000). Reforming welfare and rewarding
        work: Final report on the Minnesota Family Investment
        Program--Volume 1: Effects on adults. New York:
        Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation.
Mincer, J., & Polachek, S. (1974). Family investments in human
        capital: Earnings of women. Journal of Political
        Economy, 82, S76-S108.
Moffitt, R. (1992). Incentive effects of the U.S. welfare
        system: A review. Journal of Economic Literature, 20,
        1-61.
Moffitt, R., (Ed.). (1998). The effect of welfare on marriage
        and fertility. Welfare, the family, and reproductive
        behavior: Research perspectives. Washington, DC:
        National Academy Press.
Mosteller, F., & Tukey, J. (1977). Data analysis and
        regression. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
Nemir, C., Sanders, R., & Warren, D. (1998). Why people leave
        welfare II: An expanded follow-up study of the effects
        of welfare reform. Austin, TX: Texas Legislative
        Council.
Primus, W., Rawlings, L., Larin, K., & Porter, K. (1999). The
        initial impacts of welfare reform on the economic well-
        being of single-mother families with children.
        Washington, DC: Center for Budget and Policy
        Priorities.
Quint, J., Edin, K., Buck, M., Fink, B., Padilla, Y., Simmons-
        Hewitt, O., & Valmont, M. (1999). Big cities and
        welfare reform: Early implementation and ethnographic
        findings from the Project on Devolution and Urban
        Change. New York: Manpower Demonstration Research
        Corporation.
Quint, J., Bos, J., & Polit, D. (1997). New chance: Final
        report on a comprehensive program for young mothers in
        poverty and their children. New York: Manpower
        Demonstration Research Corporation.
Rangarajan, A., & Wood, R. (1999). Work-first New Jersey (WFNJ)
        evaluation: How WFNJ clients are faring under welfare
        reform: An early look. Princeton, NJ: Mathematica
        Policy Research, Inc.
Riccio, J., Friedlander, D., & Freedman, S. (1994). GAIN:
        Benefits, costs, and three-year impacts of a welfare-
        to-work program. New York: Manpower Demonstration
        Research Corporation.
Rockefeller Institute of Government. (1999). After welfare: A
        study of work and benefit use after case closing.
        Albany, NY: Author.
Roff, L., McCallum, D., & Stem, J. (2000). Alabama welfare
        reform follow-up survey. Montgomery, AL: Alabama
        Department of Human Resources.
Ryan, S., Thielbar, M., Choi, S., Qu, J., Deng, M., &
        Ellebracht, L. (1999). Preliminary outcomes for 1996
        fourth quarter AFDC leavers. Columbia, MO: University
        of Missouri.
Schexnayder, D., Olson, J., Schroeder, D., Betsinger, A., &
        Sim, S. (1998). Achieving change for Texans evaluation:
        Net impacts through December 1997. Austin, TX: Texas
        Department of Human Services.
Schoeni, R., & Blank, R. (2000). What has welfare reform
        accomplished? Impacts on welfare participation,
        employment, income, poverty, and family structure
        (Working Paper 7627). Boston: National Bureau of
        Economic Research Workings Paper.
School of Social Work, University of Maryland-Baltimore.
        (1999a). Life after welfare: third interim report.
        Baltimore, MD: Maryland Department of Human Resources.
School of Social Work, University of Maryland-Baltimore.
        (1999b). Life after welfare: Fourth interim report.
        Baltimore, MD: Department of Human Resources.
Schumacher, R., & Greenberg, M. (1999). Child care after
        leaving welfare: Early evidence from State studies.
        Washington, DC: Center for Law and Social Policy.
Turturro, C., Benda, B., & Turney, H. (1997). Arkansas Welfare
        Waiver Demonstration Final report. Little Rock, AR:
        University of Arkansas at Little Rock.
Tweedie, J., Reichert, D., & O'Connor, M. (1999). Tracking
        recipients after they leave welfare. Washington, DC:
        National Conference of State Legislatures.
U.S. Census Bureau. (1999). Poverty in the United States: 1998
        (Report P60-207). Washington, DC: U.S. Government
        Printing Office.
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. (2000). Summary
        of research on welfare outcomes funded by ASPE.
        Washington, DC: Author.
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services and U.S.
        Department of Education (1997). National evaluation of
        welfare-to-work strategies: Evaluating two welfare-to-
        work approaches, two-year findings on the labor force
        attachment and human capital development programs in
        three sites. Washington, DC: Authors.
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services and U.S.
        Department of Education (1998). National evaluation of
        welfare-to-work strategies: Evaluating two welfare-to-
        work approaches, implementation, participation
        patterns, cost, and two-year impacts of the Portland
        (Oregon) welfare-to-work program. Washington, DC:
        Authors.
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services and U.S.
        Department of Education (2000a). National evaluation of
        welfare-to-work strategies: Evaluating alternative
        welfare-to-work approaches: two year impacts for eleven
        programs. Washington, DC: Authors.
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services and U.S.
        Department of Education (2000b). National evaluation of
        welfare-to-work strategies: Do mandatory welfare-to-
        work programs affect the well-being of children?
        Washington, DC: Authors.
U.S. General Accounting Office. (1999). Welfare reform:
        Information on former recipients' status (HEHS-99-48).
        Washington, DC: Author.
Werner, A., & Kornfeld, R. (1997). Final impact report: The
        evaluation of to strengthen Michigan families (TSMF).
        Cambridge, MA: Abt Associates Inc.
Werner, A., Rodda, D., Pan, E., & Plimpton, L. (1997).
        Evaluation of the Alabama avenues to self-sufficiency
        through employment and training services (ASSETS)
        demonstration. Cambridge, MA: Abt Associates Inc.
Western Management Services, LLC. (1998). A survey of former
        POWER recipients. Cheyenne, WY: Author.
Westra, K. (2000). Cash assistance exit study: First quarter
        1998 cohort final report. Phoenix, AZ: Department of
        Economic Security.
Williams, L. (1998). Family health and well-being in Oklahoma:
        An exploratory analysis of TANF cases closed and denied
        October 1996-November 1997: Sample of adult and
        children. Oklahoma City, OK: Oklahoma Department of
        Human Services.
Willis, R. (1986). Wage Determinants: A Survey and
        Reinterpretation of Human Capital Earnings Functions.
        In O. Ashenfelter & R. Layard (Eds.), Handbook of Labor
        Economics (Volume 1). New York: North-Holland.
Winkler, A. (1995). Does AFDC-UP encourage two-parent families?
        Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 14(1), 4-24.