U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of Community Oriented Policing Services 

DOJ Seal
COPS logo

Center for Problem-Oriented Policing logo
Center for Problem-Oriented Policing 
Got a Problem? Weve got answers! 

Log onto the Center for Problem-Oriented Policing web site 
at www.popcenter.org for a wealth of information to help 
you deal more effectively with crime and disorder in your 
community, including: 

 Web-enhanced versions of all currently available Guides 
 Interactive training exercises 
 Online access to research and police practices 
 Online problem analysis module. 


Designed for police and those who work with them to 
address community problems, www.popcenter.org is a great 
resource in problem-oriented policing. 

Supported by the Office of Community Oriented Policing 
Services, U.S. Department of Justice. 


Problem-Oriented Guides for Police 
Problem-Specific Guides Series 
Guide No. 15 

Burglary of Retail 
Establishments 

Ronald V. Clarke 

This project was supported by cooperative agreement 
#99-CK-WX-K004 by the Office of Community Oriented Policing 
Services, U.S. Department of Justice. The opinions contained herein 
are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the official 
position of the U.S. Department of Justice. 

www.cops.usdoj.gov 

ISBN: 1-932582-14-2 

August 2002 


About the Problem-Specific Guides Series 

The Problem-Specific Guides summarize knowledge about 
how police can reduce the harm caused by specific crime 
and disorder problems. They are guides to prevention 
and to improving the overall response to incidents, not 
to investigating offenses or handling specific incidents. 
Neither do they cover all of the technical details about 
how to implement specific responses. The guides are 
written for policeof whatever rank or assignmentwho 
must address the specific problem the guides cover. The 
guides will be most useful to officers who: 

 
Understand basic problem-oriented policing 
principles and methods. The guides are not primers in 
problem-oriented policing. They deal only briefly with the 
initial decision to focus on a particular problem, methods 
to analyze the problem, and means to assess the results 
of a problem-oriented policing project. They are designed 
to help police decide how best to analyze and address a 
problem they have already identified. (A companion series 
of Problem-Solving Tools guides has been produced to aid in 
various aspects of problem analysis and assessment.) 
 
Can look at a problem in depth. Depending on the 
complexity of the problem, you should be prepared to 
spend perhaps weeks, or even months, analyzing and 
responding to it. Carefully studying a problem before 
responding helps you design the right strategy, one that is 
most likely to work in your community. You should not 
blindly adopt the responses others have used; you must 
decide whether they are appropriate to your local situation. 
What is true in one place may not be true elsewhere; what 
works in one place may not work everywhere. 





 
Are willing to consider new ways of doing police 
business. The guides describe responses that other police 
departments have used or that researchers have tested. 
While not all of these responses will be appropriate to 
your particular problem, they should help give a broader 
view of the kinds of things you could do. You may think 
you cannot implement some of these responses in your 
jurisdiction, but perhaps you can. In many places, when 
police have discovered a more effective response, they have 
succeeded in having laws and policies changed, improving 
the response to the problem. (A companion series of 
Response Guides has been produced to help you understand 
how commonly-used police responses work on a variety of 
problems.) 
 
Understand the value and the limits of research 
knowledge. For some types of problems, a lot of useful 
research is available to the police; for other problems, 
little is available. Accordingly, some guides in this series 
summarize existing research whereas other guides illustrate 
the need for more research on that particular problem. 
Regardless, research has not provided definitive answers to 
all the questions you might have about the problem. The 
research may help get you started in designing your own 
responses, but it cannot tell you exactly what to do. This 
will depend greatly on the particular nature of your local 
problem. In the interest of keeping the guides readable, 
not every piece of relevant research has been cited, nor has 
every point been attributed to its sources. To have done so 
would have overwhelmed and distracted the reader. The 
references listed at the end of each guide are those drawn 
on most heavily; they are not a complete bibliography of 
research on the subject. 








 
Are willing to work with others to find effective 
solutions to the problem. The police alone cannot 
implement many of the responses discussed in the guides. 
They must frequently implement them in partnership with 
other responsible private and public bodies including other 
government agencies, non-governmental organizations, 
private businesses, public utilities, community groups, 
and individual citizens. An effective problem-solver must 
know how to forge genuine partnerships with others 
and be prepared to invest considerable effort in making 
these partnerships work. Each guide identifies particular 
individuals or groups in the community with whom 
police might work to improve the overall response to that 
problem. Thorough analysis of problems often reveals 
that individuals and groups other than the police are in 
a stronger position to address problems and that police 
ought to shift some greater responsibility to them to do 
so. Response Guide No. 3, Shifting and Sharing Responsibility 
for Public Safety Problems, provides further discussion of this 
topic. 



The COPS Office defines community policing as 
a policing philosophy that promotes and supports 
organizational strategies to address the causes and reduce 
the fear of crime and social disorder through problem-
solving tactics and police-community partnerships. These 
guides emphasize problem-solving and police-community 
partnerships in the context of addressing specific public 
safety problems. For the most part, the organizational 
strategies that can facilitate problem-solving and police-
community partnerships vary considerably and discussion of 
them is beyond the scope of these guides. 

These guides have drawn on research findings and police 
practices in the United States, the United Kingdom, 
Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the Netherlands, and 
Scandinavia. Even though laws, customs and police 


practices vary from country to country, it is apparent that 
the police everywhere experience common problems. In 
a world that is becoming increasingly interconnected, it is 
important that police be aware of research and successful 
practices beyond the borders of their own countries. 


Each guide is informed by a thorough review of the 
research literature and reported police practice and is 
anonymously peer-reviewed by line police officers, police 
executives and researchers prior to publication. 

The COPS Office and the authors encourage you to 
provide feedback on this guide and to report on your 
own agencys experiences dealing with a similar problem. 
Your agency may have effectively addressed a problem 
using responses not considered in these guides and your 
experiences and knowledge could benefit others. This 
information will be used to update the guides. If you wish 
to provide feedback and share your experiences it should 
be sent via e-mail to cops_pubs@usdoj.gov. 

For more information about problem-oriented policing, 
visit the Center for Problem-Oriented Policing online at 
www.popcenter.org. This website offers free online access 
to: 

 the Problem-Specific Guides series 
 the companion Response Guides and Problem-Solving Tools series 
 instructional information about problem-oriented policing 
and related topics 
 an interactive problem-oriented policing training exercise 
 an interactive Problem Analysis Module 
 a manual for crime analysts  online access to important police research and practices 
 information about problem-oriented policing conferences 
and award programs. 



Acknowledgments 

The Problem-Oriented Guides for Police are produced by the 
Center for Problem-Oriented Policing, whose officers are 
Michael S. Scott (Director), Ronald V. Clarke (Associate 
Director) and Graeme R. Newman (Associate Director). 
While each guide has a primary author, other project 
team members, COPS Office staff and anonymous peer 
reviewers contributed to each guide by proposing text, 
recommending research and offering suggestions on 
matters of format and style. 

The project team that developed the guide series 
comprised Herman Goldstein (University of Wisconsin 
Law School), Ronald V. Clarke (Rutgers University), 
John E. Eck (University of Cincinnati), Michael S. Scott 
(University of Wisconsin Law School), Rana Sampson 
(Police Consultant), and Deborah Lamm Weisel (North 
Carolina State University.) 

Members of the San Diego; National City, California; and 
Savannah, Georgia police departments provided feedback 
on the guides format and style in the early stages of the 
project. 

Cynthia E. Pappas oversaw the project for the COPS 
Office. Research for the guide was conducted at the 
Criminal Justice Library at Rutgers University under the 
direction of Phyllis Schultze. Suzanne Fregly edited this 
guide. 


contents 

About the Problem-Specific Guides Series i

Acknowledgments v

The Problem of Burglary of Retail Establishments 1

Related Problems 1

Factors Contributing to Burglary of Retail Establishments 4 

Location 6 

Premises 6 

Size 7 

Goods Sold 7 

Length of Time in Business 8 

Security Precautions 8 

Understanding Your Local Problem 9

Asking the Right Questions 12

Offenses 12

Offenders 13

Targets 13

Locations/Times 14

Measuring Your Effectiveness 15

Responses to the Problem of Burglary of Retail Establishments 17 

Police Responses 19

Retailer Actions 22

City Planning Measures 26


Appendix: Summary of Responses to Burglary of Retail Establishments 29 

Endnotes 33



References  35
About the Author 41
Recommended Readings 43
Other Problem-Oriented Guides for Police 47



The Problem of Burglary of Retail 
Establishments 

Retail burglaries are a problem for many communities. A 
British survey found that stores lose as much to burglars 
as they do to shoplifters. These losses impact the viability 
of businesses and, consequently, of the communities 
around them. Although much research has been conducted 
on burglary in general, little of it has specifically focused 
on retail burglariesbreak-ins at stores to steal cash or 
goods. However, the research that has been done points 
to a number of effective responses to the problem. This 
guide reviews what is known about retail burglaries, 
suggests ways to analyze them in your jurisdiction, and 
provides guidance as to appropriate responses. 

 This guide also covers smash-
and-grabs and so-called "ram raids." 
Smash-and-grabbers rely on the 
element of surprise to break display 
windows or showcases and escape 
before the alarm sounds. Ram 
raiders use stolen vehicles to smash 
their way into buildings, usually after 
hours. They grab what they want 
and make a quick escape, often in 
another vehicle. 

The businesses covered in the guide include shops in 
downtown areas, in strip malls, in covered malls (or 
shopping precincts, as they are known in the United 
Kingdom), and in retail parks. They also include standalone 
superstores, neighborhood stores and rural stores, 
as well as restaurants, beauty parlors and off-track betting 
establishments. Not covered are wholesale warehouses or 
retail outlets in industrial parks. 

Related Problems 

The problem of retail burglaries needs to be distinguished 
from those of (1) other retail thefts and (2) other 
commercial burglaries. These problems, which should be 
addressed separately, include: 

 robberies of retail establishments 
 shoplifting 





 stockroom thefts by employees 
 thefts by delivery personnel 
 insurance frauds involving false burglary reports made by 
store owners 
 burglaries of banks (considered a separate problem due to 
banks' much greater security) 
 burglaries of other commercial spaces such as offices, 
manufacturing premises, transport facilities, construction 
sites, and cargo-handling facilities 
 false burglar alarms. 

Compared with residential burglaries, commercial 
burglariesespecially retail burglarieshave been the 
subject of few studies. In part, this is due to the much 
larger number of residential burglaries, but it is also 
generally believed that commercial burglaries have less 
serious consequences for victims and for the community 
at large. However, growing recognition of the important 
part small businesses play in urban regeneration has 
heightened concern about crimes that might reduce their 
viability.1 In turn, this has led to more research on crimes 
against businesses (including retailers), particularly in 
the United Kingdom, Holland and Australia. As a result, 
we now know more about retail burglaries, though our 
knowledge is still patchy. The following are the best-
established facts: 

 There seem to be no comparable 
data for the United States, though 
the commercial burglary rate 
(calculated for the number of 
premises at risk) in one large 
northeastern city in 1968-69 was 
found to be nearly 10 times higher 
than the residential burglary rate 
(Conklin and Bittner 1973). 


 
Even though there are considerably fewer retail burglaries 
than residential burglaries, the risk of retail burglary per 
number of premises is very high. For example, a national 
survey in Britain found that, in 1993, 24 percent of retail 
establishments were burgled, compared with just 4 percent 
of residences.2, This is because stores tend to be empty at 
night; may, if big, offer many entry points to burglars; and 
may contain a lot of goods (and, sometimes, cash). 



 
Most retail and residential burglars are young men who 
commit a variety of predatory crimes. Interviews reveal 
that their main motivation is economic, though some 
burglars also claim to enjoy the excitement. They do not 
do much planning, but show some care in selecting safer 
targets. They claim to be little deterred by physical security, 
but try to avoid being seen. Many have drug or alcohol 
habits.3 
 
A small number of retail burglars are highly prolific, 
accounting for many burglaries. Some retail burglars are 
also more sophisticated in their planning and methods. 
They work in small gangs and generally rely on disabling 
the alarm, which allows them more undisturbed time on 
the premises. They target high-value goods and the safe, 
which they may remove entirely. 
 
Most retail burglaries occur at night or on weekends, when 
stores are closed (while most residential burglaries occur 
on weekday afternoons, when residents are not likely to be 
home).4 
 
Retail burglars generally enter the premises through doors 
or windows. They force door locks, break through doors or 
side panels, or force/break windows. The use of vehicles 
to break through doors or windows (ram raiding) is much 
less common. 
 
Substantial variations in burglary risks exist among stores, 
depending on the location, premises, goods sold, and 
security. 
 
As with some residences, some stores suffer substantial 
repeat victimization.5 This is due to their location or 
security, the attractiveness of their goods, and the fact that, 
once successful, burglars may strike the same premises 
again. National data for Britain show that 2 percent of 
retail premises experienced a quarter of the retail burglaries 
in 1993.6 A repeat burglary can occur soon after the initial 
oneusually within a month.7 


 For example, the commercial 
victimization survey conducted by 
the British government in 1995 
found that only 2 percent of break-
ins were ram raids (Mirlees-Black 
and Ross 1995). 


 
The average financial loss due to burglary is about 20 
percent greater for stores than for residences. Perhaps for 
this reason, a larger proportion of retail burglaries (about 
95 percent) are reported to the police than domestic 
burglaries (80 to 85 percent).8 According to a national 
British survey of retailers, stores lose as much to burglary 
as to shoplifting, and only very rarely recover stolen 
goods.9 
 
Burglary, especially repeat burglary, can have serious 
consequences for stores. They can become insolvent, and 
owners are sometimes forced to lay off staff, increase 
prices or close the stores. Staff can suffer psychological 
effects similar to those suffered by people whose homes 
have been burgled.10 They report feeling that their personal 
space has been invaded, and they worry that the offenders 
might return when they are on the premises. 
 
Unless burglars are caught in the act, they are very difficult 
to detect. The clearance rate for burglaries as a whole 
(figures for retail burglaries are not available) is the lowest 
for the eight UCR index crimes. 


Factors Contributing to Burglary of Retail 
Establishments 

Understanding the factors that contribute to your problem 
will help you frame your own local analysis questions, 
determine good measures of effectiveness, recognize key 
intervention points, and select appropriate responses. 

Not all stores face the same burglary risks. Some are in 
areas with low crime rates, and some are not. Some are 
open for longer hours, perhaps around the clock. Some 
sell goods that are less attractive to thieves due to their 
low value or bulk. Some are located where they receive 
constant surveillance from passing traffic or pedestrians. 


Research tends to confirm these factors' effects on 
burglary risks, though there are several reasons why we 
can draw few definitive conclusions: 

 
As mentioned, researchers have only recently begun to 
focus on retail burglaries, and we still lack large studies 
(particularly in the United States) that have adequately 
measured important risk factors. 
 
Many of the risk factors overlap. For example, liquor 
stores in deprived areas might be at greater risk because 
of their location and the goods they sell. However, owners 
are aware of the risk, and they might have more security 
in place than owners of other neighborhood stores or of 
liquor stores in safer areas. To sort out these relationships 
would require a very large and complex study. 
 
Many risk factors, such as the strength of window bars or 
the ease of driving vehicles to the back of a store, are quite 
subtle and difficult to measure in large surveys. 
 
Despite the predictable role of certain risk factors, there 
is still a considerable element of chance and opportunity 
in burglary, which is impossible to detect in research. For 
instance, a particular store might be burgled because a 
thief happened to overhear an employee talking about a 
temporary breakdown in store security. 


For all these reasons, we cannot yet make firm statements 
about all the risk factors in retail burglaries. However, by 
piecing together research findings in the United States 
and abroad, we can be fairly sure that the risks vary with 
the following store factors: location, premises, size, goods 
sold, length of time in business, and security precautions. 



Location 

Studies of crimes against small U.S. businesses have found 
that retail burglary rates are highest in deprived inner-
city neighborhoods, and lowest in small towns and rural 
locations. This probably reflects variations in the number 
of offenders living close to the stores.11 

Premises 

People's presence in and near stores protects them from 
burglary, and this factor varies with the nature of the 
premises. For example, several studies have suggested 
that stand-alone superstores located away from the 
downtown area are particularly at risk, because the sites 
are deserted at night. Supermarkets open around the 
clock are protected from burglary by the staff's constant 
presence, and mall stores seem to be at reduced risk 
because they tend to be protected by security guards after 
hours. Shops in busy downtown areas also appear to have 
lower burglary risks, again due to the constant surveillance 
passersby provide.12 

 Stores with attractive goods can 
have higher burglary rates even if 
they close late (Mirlees-Black and 
Ross 1995). 

Kip Kellogg 
Image of store open 24 hours
Stores that are open around the clock are protected from burglary 
by the constant presence of staff. 


Size 

National victimization surveys conducted in Australia and 
the United Kingdom have found that smaller shops have 
lower burglary rates than larger ones.13 This may be due 
partly to location (downtown shops tend to be smaller than 
those in retail parks or malls), and partly to the smaller 
number of goods to steal. 

Goods Sold 

Research has clearly established that shoplifters exhibit 
strong preferences in the goods they steal, and that 
stores carrying these goods are particularly at risk (see 
the Shoplifting guide in this series). In the United States, 
shoplifters favor tobacco products (particularly cigarettes), 
health and beauty products, recorded music and videos, 
and clothing (designer, in particular). The more-limited 
research on retail burglaries shows similar preferences,14 
with some predictable variations resulting from differences 
in shoplifting and burglary methods. For example, 
burglars are more likely to target electronic goods, such as 
videocassette recorders and televisions, than are shoplifters, 
who would have difficulty taking such goods out of a store 
without being seen. A comparison of supermarket goods 
stolen by shoplifters and burglars found that both groups 
targeted cigarettes, liquor, and health and beauty aids, but 
as would be expected, the burglars stole these in much 
larger quantities than did the shoplifters. The burglars also 
robbed store ATMs.15 


Length of Time in Business 

Newer businesses have higher victimization rates than 
older businesses.16 This might indicate that stores become 
more experienced in preventing crime the longer they are 
in businessor that store survival depends on resisting 
crime. 

Security Precautions 

Stores at greatest risk of burglary tend to take the most 
precautions, and while these precautions may reduce the 
risk of burglary, they do not entirely eliminate it. It is also 
the case that stores often increase their security after being 
burgled. These facts could help explain why some studies 
have found little statistical relationship between stores' 
level of security precautions and their rate of burglary.17 
However, evaluations of recent crime prevention projects 
in Britain (the Safer Cities project and the Small Business 
and Crime Initiative) have concluded that improved 
security at recently burgled stores can reduce repeat 
burglaries and, as a result, overall burglary rates in 
targeted areas.18 In addition, some studies have produced 
evidence of the effectiveness of specific measures, such as 
installing burglar alarms and hiring security guards. While 
often falling short of proof, this evidence is reviewed 
below in the "Responses to the Problem of Retail 
Burglary" section. 


UnderstandingYour Local Problem 

The information provided above is only a generalized 
description of retail burglaries. You must combine the 
basic facts with a more specific understanding of your 
local problem if you are to develop an effective response. 
In most cases, your burglary problem is likely to involve 
a group of stores, such as those in a downtown area or in 
a particular mall. In other cases, your problem might be 
related to stores of the same general type (say, pharmacies 
or building supply stores). If the problem involves a 
single store (unless it is a very large store), you might 
more appropriately deal with it by offering routine crime 
prevention advice rather than undertaking a full-scale 
problem-oriented policing project. Your analysis is likely 
to focus on differential burglary risks among the stores in 
your group, and the reasons for those differences. Your 
analysis should address the risks of repeat victimization, 
as some particularly effective responses are focused on 
repeat victims. Bear in mind that registers of businesses 
may use corporate names, which may be different 
from "doing business as" names. The registers are also 
frequently out-of-date, and you might need to make your 
own list. 

 Each of these variations in retail 
burglaries deserves its own guide, 
but the information provided here 
should be sufficiently broad to 
provide assistance in all cases. 

In general, you should seek to establish what kinds of 
offenders are involved, what kinds of stores they target, 
how they gain access to the stores, how they deal with 
security measures, and, finally, how they dispose of stolen 
goods. Knowledge of these factors will help you design an 
effective response to the problem. 

Police crime reports or calls-for-service data do not 
generally distinguish the different kinds of nonresidential 
burglaries. Retail burglaries are lumped together with 




burglaries of educational institutions, medical centers, 
offices, and construction sites. Consequently, gathering 
information about your local problem can be labor-
intensive. It requires a careful review of police records 
and the identification of retail burglary incidents. 
Fortunately, the large majority of retail burglaries 
are reported to police, but it can still be difficult to 
identify repeat burglaries because locations may not be 
systematically recorded. For example, the store name 
might be included in some crime reports, and only the 
street address in others. 

In addition, many important details about the type of 
business, points of entry and nature of losses may not 
be included. Thus, you should try to gather systematic 
information about these details using other data sources. 
Because gathering and analyzing data can be time-
consuming and involve technical problems, you should 
seek help from your local university, especially one with a 
criminal justice department. Data collection methods that 
can provide useful information include the following: 

 
Interviewing store owners or managers. You can obtain 
much valuable information by interviewing store owners 
or managers, using a standard set of questions. You should 
ask about burglary incidents, burglary consequences, 
security measures in place at the time of burglary, and 
measures subsequently introduced. Unless you are dealing 
with a very large number of stores, you should try to 
conduct face-to-face interviews, since these will generally 
yield valuable information not directly covered in the 
questions. Mail or self-completion surveys suffer from low 
response rates and missing information. 
 
Reviewing store records. Some stores, particularly very 
large or chain stores, keep records of burglaries. 



 
Reviewing security company records. Large security 
companies generally maintain records of burglaries on 
client premises. Apart from asking to review these records, 
you might interview security personnel familiar with the 
stores in your group, since they often know whether or not 
a store is serious about security. 
 
Conducting site surveys. You should conduct site surveys 
of stores that have been burgled. These should cover the 
store's location on the block, the rear entrance(s) of the 
store, the businesses near the store, the amount of natural 
surveillance and street lighting the store has, the store's 
distance from main roads, and other site variables related 
to burglary risks (see "Targets" under "Asking the Right 
Questions" below). 


Kip Kellogg 
Image of rear entrance of store
Site surveys of stores should include an assessment of the natural 
surveillance, lighting and security of the stores' rear entrances.


 
Using computer mapping of incidents. Computer 
mapping of retail burglaries can reveal risk patterns and 
suggest possible reasons for those patterns. For example, 
burglaries may be clustered near a bar area, a drug market 
or a public transport hub. Or heavy clusters of repeat 
burglaries may indicate that a prolific burglar lives nearby. 
Mapping prolific offenders' addresses in relation to incident 
clusters may also be helpful. 


 
Interviewing burglary investigators. If burglary 
investigators are not part of your project team, be sure to 
interview them. They may have considerable knowledge 
gained through dealing daily with retail burglary cases. 
 
Interviewing burglars. Systematic interviews with 
arrested burglars can provide useful information about 
methods of burglary and disposal of goods.19 Here, 
assistance from your local university could be particularly 
important, because offenders generally talk more openly to 
researchers. 


Asking the Right Questions 

The following are some critical questions you should 
try to answer in analyzing your particular retail burglary 
problem. Your answers to these and other questions will 
help you choose the most appropriate set of responses 
later on. 

Offenses 

 
What is the clearance rate for retail burglaries? 
 
How often is property recovered? 
 
What is the ratio of attempted burglaries to completed 
burglaries? 
 
What are the usual entry points or methods? 
 
What proportion of burglaries have been repeat burglaries 
within the past year? 
 
What is the typical length of time between repeats? 
 
How long do burglaries take? How long are burglars in the 
building/on the property? 
 
How much is typically lost (dollar value of materials, repair 
costs, lost business, insurance premium increases)? 
 
What proportion of burglaries (and attempts) are reported 
to police? 



Offenders 

 
Are there many different offenders involved, or is a small 
group of prolific offenders responsible? 
 
How many of the prolific offenders have records for 
committing retail burglaries? How many have recently been 
released from prison? 
 
How much planning do offenders do? 
 
Do they work in gangs? How many offenders are in the 
gangs? 
 
Do they belong to any particular ethnic, occupational or 
other group? 
 
What proportion commit burglaries primarily to support a 
drug or alcohol habit? 
 
What proportion are juveniles? 
 
Do they appear to know the premises burgled? If so, how 
do they get the information? 
 
Where are they coming from, and how do they get to the 
burglary locations? On foot? In vehicles? 
 
Are they drawn to the area by burglary opportunities, or 
for some other reason? 
 
Do they specialize in commercial establishments, or more 
precisely, retail establishments? 
 
How do they dispose of stolen goods (exchange them for 
drugs, sell them at pawnshops or flea markets, sell them to 
professional fences, etc.)? 


Targets 

 
Which kinds of stores are most at risk of burglary? Which 
stores are not burgled? 
 
Which goods are burglars stealing? Are they targeting cash? 
 
Which stores are being burgled repeatedly? What do they 
have in common? 
 
How long have the stores been in business? 
 
How big are the stores? Are they part of a larger chain? If 
so, how does the burglary experience vary among stores in 
the chain? How does it compare with that of similar stores 
in other chains? 



 
What time do the stores close? Are there businesses nearby 
that are open at night and on weekends? 
 
Is the property isolated? Is lack of natural surveillance a 
contributory factor? 
 
What site features facilitate burglary? Corner location? Rear 
access? 
 
Is victim carelessness a contributory factor? 
 
Which structures on the property are most at risk? 
 
How do burglars typically gain entry? 
 
How often do they disable alarm systems? 
 
What security measures have the stores taken to prevent 
burglary? What special measures have they taken to protect 
the most valuable merchandise/equipment? 
 
Do store employees follow correct cash-handling 
procedures? 
 
Is there evidence of collusion between staff and burglars? 
 
Do security guards patrol/check stores after hours? Are 
they carefully checking the stores' vulnerable areas? 


Locations/Times 

 
When do burglaries usually occur (time of day, day of 
week, month, season)? 
 
What is the nature of the surrounding neighborhood? 
 
Is the problem part of a wider problem of commercial 
burglary affecting the whole area or jurisdiction? 
 
Where do events concentrate? Are they clustered near 
major roads? 



Measuring Your Effectiveness 

Measurement allows you to determine to what degree 
your efforts have succeeded, and suggests how you 
might modify your responses if they are not producing 
the intended results. You should take measures of your 
problem before you implement responses, to determine 
how serious the problem is, and after you implement 
them, to determine whether they have been effective. 
All measures should be taken in both the target area and 
the surrounding area. (For more detailed guidance on 
measuring effectiveness, see the companion guide to this 
series, Assessing Responses to Problems: An Introductory Guide 
for Police Problem-Solvers.) 

The following "outcome" measures can be useful in 
assessing whether your responses have impacted the retail 
burglary problem: 

 
reductions in reported retail burglaries and related calls for 
service 
 
fewer repeat victims and offenders 
 
reductions in burglary-related financial losses and insurance 
claims 
 
reductions in business closures resulting from burglary 
 
greater perception of safety among store owners and 
managers, among staff of other businesses and among 
residents (if it is a mixed-use area). 
In addition, the following "process" measures might 
provide some indication of the degree to which selected 
responses are being properly implemented: 


 
increased arrests, prosecutions and convictions of retail 
burglars 
 
higher proportion of stores following standard security 
practices, installing security devices and/or using guard 
services. 



Responses to the Problem of Burglary of 
Retail Establishments 

Your analysis of your local problem should give you 
a better understanding of the factors contributing to 
it. Once you have analyzed your local problem and 
established a baseline for measuring effectiveness, 
you should consider possible responses to address the 
problem. 

The responses discussed below provide a foundation 
of ideas for addressing your problem. These responses 
are drawn from a variety of research studies and police 
reports. Several of them may apply to your particular 
problem. It is critical that you tailor responses to local 
circumstances, and that you can justify each response 
based on reliable analysis. 

In most cases, an effective strategy will involve 
implementing several different responses. Law 
enforcement responses alone are seldom effective in 
reducing or solving the problem: you should give careful 
consideration to who else in your community shares 
responsibility for the problem and can help police better 
respond to it. Building a partnership with these various 
stakeholders can be essential to success. For example, if 
you decide to target career burglars, you may need the 
help of parole and probation officers or local prosecutors 
in securing appropriate prison sentences. If you believe 
that street lighting must be improved, you will need help 
from the city and the local utility company. Above all, 
you will need to persuade individual retailers to take the 
security measures you will surely find are needed. Local 
business associations might help you in securing retailers' 
commitment. 


Be aware that chain stores may need to get the head 
office's approval for any new security measures. Chains 
are likely to have their own security departments, and 
security staff will need to be convinced that changes in 
company practice are needed to meet local conditions. On 
the other hand, the security departments might help you 
formulate your response, or put you in touch with local 
loss prevention specialists. 

Several other important considerations should guide your 
choice of responses: 

 
You should pay particular attention to repeat burglaries, 
since focusing on these can provide important dividends 
for detection as well as prevention. 
 
You should not overlook the fact that the burglary is only 
the first stage of the crime. The burglars will subsequently 
sell or exchange the stolen goods, leading to additional 
response possibilities. 
 
You should be alert to the possibility of displacement 
resulting from the implementation of some responses. 
In particular, you might expect some displacement to 
other stores when stores that have been burgled increase 
their security. If your responses are successful, you might 
also expect some displacement to nearby areas that fall 
outside the scope of your measures. However, research 
has shown that offenders typically do not travel far, and 
that geographic displacement is rather limited. It is also the 
case that if stores with the most-attractive goods are given 
increased protection, burglars will not necessarily rob other 
stores with less-attractive goods. Finally, research has found 
that protecting an entire area from burglary can result in a 
"diffusion of benefits" to surrounding areas, so that their 
burglary rates decline as well.20 



 
You should remember that, once you have completed 
your problem-oriented project and moved on to other 
duties, some responses you have introduced might not 
be sustained. There is the added danger that a reduction 
in burglaries will induce complacency and the belief that 
the problem has been licked. There are several ways to 
deal with these threats, but an important one is to make 
relatively permanent changes in the physical environment, 
changes whose effectiveness does not depend on human 
backup. For example, a business watch program and 
strengthened doors/windows might both result in initial 
reductions in burglary, but the latter's effect is likely to last 
longer. 

 For a discussion, see Curtin et al. 
(2001). 

The responses discussed below are organized under three 
main headings according to the groups with the main 
role to play in implementing them: the police, retailers 
and city/local government. It will be clear that research 
evidence about the effectiveness of most responses is 
patchy and sometimes inconsistent. If direct evidence of a 
particular response's effectiveness is lacking, the response 
assessment is guided by accepted crime prevention 
principles. 

Police Responses 

1. Targeting repeat offenders. Police crackdowns 
can produce reductions in crime, but these reductions 
may not last long. Research has shown that after the 
police leave, it is often "business as usual" for the local 
offenders. However, a recently published study found 
that a crackdown on prolific local burglars, followed by a 
consolidation phase in which the properties most at risk 
were target-hardened, produced reduced residential burglary 
rates in one community in England. The crackdown was 
not the usual kind, involving heavy police presence in a 

 For a recent review and 
discussion, see Novak et al. (1999). 





particular neighborhood. Instead, it involved concentrated 
police attention onincluding intensified investigation 
ofburglary suspects in one local area. Police identified, 
targeted and arrested 14 suspects thought to be among 
the most prolific local burglars, resulting in a 60 percent 
reduction in burglaries. There was no evidence of any 
displacement of burglary to other crimes or to nearby 
areas; indeed, car thefts dropped in the crackdown area, 
and burglaries dropped by 50 percent in nearby areas, 
suggesting that the offenders arrested were responsible for 
many of those crimes, as well.21 A combined crackdown 
and consolidation along these lines could be equally 
effective in reducing retail burglaries. 

 For a comprehensive assessment 
of repeat offender programs, see 
Spelman (1990). 

2. Targeting repeatedly burgled stores. There is a large 
body of evidence that focusing police and crime prevention 
resources on repeatedly burgled homes can produce 
substantial declines in burglary. Similar benefits could be 
obtained by concentrating preventive resources on repeatedly 
burgled stores.22 The research also suggests that repeat 
burglaries are frequently the work of highly prolific offenders, 
who often return soon after the original burglary. Short-term 
use of measures focused on recently burgled stores might 
result in arrests of these offenders. As well as the deployment 
of directed patrols, such measures include the use of high-
tech devices such as portable, covert closed-circuit television 
(CCTV) (which records pictures and sound only during 
periods of activity); portable silent alarms (which alert the 
police when activated); proximity alarms (which loudly sound 
when premises are approached from a particular direction); 
and "forensic traps" (such as chemically treated mats to pick 
up intruders' footprints). 

 Experience with these high-tech 
devices is limited to date, but it 
appears that they can pose numerous 
practical problems. For example, 
store owners/employees often forget 
to activate the devices when they 
leave at night, or forget they are 
activated when they return (Taylor 
1999). As with conventional intruder 
alarms, portable burglar alarms also 
pose the problem of false alarms 
(see the False Burglar Alarms guide in 
this series).



3. 
Disrupting markets for stolen goods. Far too little 
is known about how offenders dispose of stolen goods, 
and too little is done to disrupt markets for the goods. It 
is true that in many jurisdictions, pawnshops are required 
to report the goods they receive to the police. While 
this requirement's effectiveness has not been properly 
evaluated, the best programs seem to be those in which 
pawnshop records are automated, downloaded daily to 
the police, and automatically searched against the police 
records database for hits on stolen property. In any case, 
burglars can dispose of stolen goods in many other ways, 
including peddling them on the street, selling them to 
friends or acquaintances, selling them through newspaper 
ads or in bars and clubs, exchanging them for drugs, and 
even selling them door-to-door. Burglars also sell goods 
to small shops, and police in many areas have undertaken 
"stings" in which they set up bogus fencing operations in 
used-goods stores. The popularity of these stings appears 
to have declined. They are expensive and time-consuming, 
and research suggests that they can lead to an influx of 
crime into the area around them.23 Alternative strategies 
to disrupt sales of stolen goods to stores include (1) 
conducting surveillance of suspect stores in your area 
to gain evidence of thieves' entering and making sales, 
so as to prosecute both the thieves and the fences; (2) 
encouraging stores that buy used goods to display signs 
stating they are part of a crime prevention program 
to reduce sales of stolen goods; and (3) implementing 
local ordinances requiring stores to establish proof of 
ownership for used goods they buy.24 

4. 
Establishing business/shop watch programs. 
Despite their popularity, there is little evidence that 
neighborhood watch programs are effective deterrents to 
burglary. Similarly, there is little evidence that business/ 


shop watch programs produce tangible results beyond 
some possible public relations benefits.25 These programs 
are also difficult to establish.26 Greater success might 
result from establishing cocoon business/shop watch 
programs in which police encourage stores close to a 
recently burgled store to exercise heightened surveillance 
for a month or two. 


Retailer Actions 

5. Upgrading external security. This target-hardening 
option covers a variety of measures, including: 

 
strengthening locks and reinforcing doors and windows 
 
installing strengthened glass, shutters or grilles in windows 
 
installing video cameras to monitor possible entry points 
 
installing security lighting at entry points 
 
installing concrete pillars or decorative planters to prevent 
ram raiding. 


Kip Kellogg 
Image of store with posts
Image of storefront with planters
Installing pillars, posts or planters in front 
of store doors helps prevent burglars 
from driving vehicles through the doors. 


As mentioned, the research evidence regarding these 
measures' value is unclear and inconsistent. Burglars say 
they find these measures of little hindrance, and from 
a police point of view, they may provide little benefit if 
they merely displace burglary to other stores. Planning 
authorities may resist some of these measures, particularly 
shutters and security lighting, because they can make an 
area less attractive.27 

That said, there is some limited evidence from recent 
studies that target hardening can be effective in preventing 
burglary of particular premises and, if perceived to be 
widespread, can also protect an entire area.28 Which 
measures to use with which stores depends on a variety of 
cost, convenience and aesthetic considerations; the advice 
of a professional security consultant might be required. 

Kip Kellogg 
Image of burglar alarm sign
Burglar alarms, private security patrols and 
safes for especially valuable merchandise, 
along with signs indicating these security 
features are present, can all help reduce 
burglary of retail establishments. 


6. 
Installing burglar alarms. Most stores have burglar 
alarms, and research suggests these can effectively protect 
the premises from burglary.29 One study has found that 
areas with a higher number of premises with burglar 
alarms have lower rates of burglary.30 However, many 
burglar alarms have unacceptably high rates of false 
alarms, and more-sophisticated thieves can disable them. 
Different systems vary considerably in their costs for 
owners and for the police. For more information on these 
topics, see the False Burglar Alarms guide in this series. 

7. 
Safeguarding cash and valuable stock. This approach 
falls under the situational prevention category of "target 
removal." It includes: 


 
removing high-value goods from window displays 
 
concealing goods 
 
minimizing stock with "just in time" deliveries 
 
using safes or secure cages for the most valuable items in 
stockrooms 
 
marking valuable goods such as computers with traceable, 
hard-to-remove identification numbers 
 
banking cash each day 
 
leaving empty cash registers open at night (to prevent their 
being broken into). 


While these techniques are good security practice, nothing is 
known from research about their effectiveness in preventing 
retail burglaries. However, cash reduction is a well-proven 
method of preventing commercial robberies, and removal 
of coin-fed fuel meters in British homes has been shown to 
prevent residential burglaries.31 

8. Locking escape routes. It is good security practice to 
make it as difficult to get out of a store after hours as it 


is to get in. (Fire exits must not be locked during normal 
business hours or when the store is otherwise occupied). 
When leaving at night, store managers should cut off the 
power supply to loading-bay doors, and make sure other 
doors and windows cannot be opened from the inside. 


9. Screening and training shop staff. It is good security 
practice (where law permits) to screen prospective 
employees for criminal records. It is also good practice 
to train staff in security measures, to clarify their 
responsibilities (particularly for key security), and to 
encourage their involvementfor example, by keeping 
watch for suspicious behavior and unfamiliar vehicles. 

Kip Kellogg 
Image of private security patrol car
Private security patrols around large shopping malls help reduce 
burglaries to retail establishments located in and around the malls.


10. Employing security guards after hours. Burglars 
say that security guards pose the greatest threat to their 
activities.32 Guards are widely employed in large malls and 
retail parks, which helps to account for the relatively low 
burglary rates of stores in these locations. An alternative 
adopted by some large stores is to employ a night crew 
that handles cleanup, restocking and display dressing. The 
store is protected from burglars while this necessary work 
gets done. 


 State or county crime prevention 
associations may provide grants to 
fund lighting improvements. 

 For a discussion, see Poyner and 
Fawcett (1995), and Painter and Tilley 
(1999). 

11. Using crime prevention through environmental 
design (CPTED). CPTED entails changing landscaping 
and design to (1) discourage access to all but intended 
users, (2) allow intruders to be spotted, and (3) establish 
the boundaries between private and public property. 
While research provides little guide as to CPTED's 
effectiveness in reducing retail burglaries, the general 
principles of this approach are widely accepted.33 If stores 
in your area are contemplating either major remodeling 
or construction of new premises, they should consider 
incorporating CPTED strategies to reduce their future 
burglary risks. A CPTED survey can be done for an entire 
area, not just for individual businesses. If a block of 
businesses or a business district cooperates in paying for a 
CPTED specialist to undertake a survey and recommend 
improvements, the cost will be minimal. Information 
about CPTED can be obtained from the National Crime 
Prevention Council (www.ncpc.org/cpted.htm) and the 
International CPTED Association (www.cpted.net). 

City Planning Measures 

12. Improving street surveillance through lighting 
and CCTV. Commercial burglars prefer targets that 
receive little surveillance,34 and they could be expected to 
avoid well-lit streets and those with CCTV surveillance. 
Consistent with this, a study in Britain found large 
reductions in shop burglaries following the introduction 
of CCTV surveillance in three downtown areas,35 and a 
study in Portland, Ore., found that improving the lighting 
on a commercial strip produced a significant drop in retail 
burglaries.36 As with all security measures, lighting has 
to be carefully designed to provide maximum benefits 
without unnecessary cost. 


13. 
Promoting "living over the shop." In an effort to 
restore downtown areas' vitality and provide after-hours 
surveillance of retail properties, the British government 
is sponsoring a program to encourage people to live in 
vacant space above shops. The program, which has been 
adopted by many towns and cities, has the additional 
benefit of increasing the supply of low-cost housing.37 
A recent evaluation, based on interviews with a variety 
of interested parties, found that most people supported 
the program and believed it helped to reduce crime in 
downtown areas. 

14. 
Promoting business improvement districts 
(BIDs). Many U.S. cities have designated BIDs formed 
by coalitions of local businesspeople. The objective is to 
promote investment in declining business areas. Similar 
initiatives in Britain fall under the title of "town center 
management." An important objective of most BIDs is to 
reduce crime and the fear of crime. To this end, initiatives 
may include improvements in street lighting, installation 
of public CCTV systems, regular cleaning of graffiti 
and repair of vandalism, dedicated patrols by police and 
security guards, and formation of a force of "city guards" 
to provide a street presence and assist visitors or tourists. 
Evaluations of BIDs are currently being undertaken in the 
United States.38 


 Though not, apparently, of most 
TCM schemes (Beck and Willis 
1995). 


Appendix 

Appendix: Summary of Responses to 
Burglary in Retail Establishments 

The table below summarizes the responses to retail 
burglaries, the mechanism by which they are intended 
to work, the conditions under which they ought to 
work best, and some factors you should consider before 
implementing a particular response. It is critical that you 
tailor responses to local circumstances, and that you can 
justify each response based on reliable analysis. In most 
cases, an effective strategy will involve implementing 
several different responses. Law enforcement responses 
alone are seldom effective in reducing or solving the 
problem. 

Response 
No. 
Page No. Response How It 
Works 
Works 
Best If 
Considerations 
Police Responses 
1. 19 Targeting repeat 
offenders 
Incapacitates 
those offenders 
responsible for a 
large portion ofburglaries 
police can 
reliably identify 
habitual 
criminals; there is 
a high proportion 
of repeat 
burglaries; courts 
are willing to 
award custodial 
sentences; and 
crackdowns are 
consolidated 
through 
environmental 
design changes 
Requires the 
cooperation of 
prosecutors, 
courts, probation 
and parole 
departments, 
and city planning 
departments 
2. 20 Targeting 
repeatedly 
burgled stores 
Concentrates 
prevention 
where it is 
most needed; 
facilitates the 
arrest of prolific 
offenders 
a small 
proportion 
of stores 
experience a large 
proportion ofburglaries, and 
measures can 
be put in place 
quickly 
Requires 
cooperation 
among police 
divisions (local 
officers, crime 
prevention 
officers, 
detectives), 
business owners 
and city officials 


Response 
No. 
Page No. Response How It 
Works 
Works 
Best If 
Considerations 
3. 21 Disrupting 
markets for 
stolen goods 
Reduces the 
incentive for 
theft by making 
it difficult for 
offenders to sell 
stolen goods 
stolen-goods 
markets are not 
widespread 
Can be difficult to 
obtain information 
about how and 
where offenders 
sell or exchange 
stolen goods; stings 
are expensive 
and of doubtful 
effectiveness; 
courts often take 
a lenient view on 
receiving stolen 
property charges 
4. 21 Establishing 
business/shop 
watch programs 
Increases 
offenders' 
risk of police 
intervention 
and/or 
subsequent 
identification 
concern about 
retail burglaries 
is widely shared 
among stores 
Can be difficult to 
enlist store owners' 
participation; a 
more effective 
alternative is to 
establish temporary 
"cocoon" watch 
programs around 
recently burgled 
premises 
Retailer Actions 
5. 22 Upgrading 
external security 
Stops or slows 
down offenders 
existing 
security is low, 
and natural 
surveillance is 
poor 
Target-hardening 
solutions need to 
be carefully tailored 
to individual stores, 
often requiring 
the advice of 
professionalsecurity consultants 
6. 24 Installing burglar 
alarms 
Increases 
offenders' risk 
of getting caught 
a high 
proportion ofstores are fitted 
with alarms, 
and alarms are 
connected to 
CCTV systems 
that allow 
private security 
companies to 
verify that a 
burglary is taking 
place before 
calling the police 
Burglars can 
disable alarms; 
there are high 
rates of false 
alarms, but 
improved systems 
are coming on the 
market 


Response 
No. 
Page No. Response How It 
Works 
Works 
Best If 
Considerations 
7. 24 Safeguardingcash and valuable 
stock 
Reduces the 
rewards of 
burglary 
burglars'principal target 
is cash or stock 
readily convertible 
to cash 
Little research 
is available on 
this strategy's 
effectiveness 
8. 24 Locking escape 
routes 
Slows offenders 
down and 
increases their 
risk of getting 
caught; limits the 
amount of stock 
offenders can 
stores are 
located in areas 
with good natural 
surveillance, and 
stolen goods are 
bulky/heavy 
A commonsense 
approach, but one 
on which little 
relevant evaluative 
research has been 
done; depends on 
well-trained and 
remove disciplined staff 
9. 25 Screening and 
training shop 
staff 
Reduces the risk 
of "inside jobs"; 
increases staff's 
responsibility for 
store security 
stores are 
located in high-
crime areas, and 
staff turnover is 
high 
Laws must permit 
screening ofpotential employees; 
employees must 
have incentives to 
share in the security 
function 
10. 25 Employing 
security guards 
after hours 
Increases 
offenders' risk of 
getting caught 
stores are 
closely clustered 
together, and 
guards are 
constantly or 
frequently present 
Burglars report 
being most deterred 
by security guards; a 
low-cost alternative 
for larger stores is 
to employ a night 
crew to handle 
cleanup, restocking 
and display dressing 
11. 26 Using crime 
prevention 
throughenvironmental 
design (CPTED) 
Makes burglary 
more difficult; 
increases 
offenders' risk of 
getting caught 
retailers are 
planning major 
remodeling or the 
construction of 
new buildings 
Incorporating 
CPTED principles 
need not be costly 
and can bring 
long-term benefits; 
CPTED surveys can 
be undertaken for 
an entire business 
district, as well 
as for individual 
premises 


Response 
No. 
Page No. Response How It 
Works 
Works 
Best If 
Considerations 
City Planning Measures 
12. 26 Improving street 
surveillance 
through lighting 
and CCTV 
Increases 
offenders' risk 
of intervention 
by police and/
or security 
guards; increases 
offenders' risk 
of subsequent 
identification 
stores are 
located in 
downtown areas 
or business 
districts 
U.S. civil liberty 
groups often 
oppose the 
installation of 
public CCTV 
systems; lights and 
CCTV equipment 
are sometimes 
vandalized in high-
crime areas 
13. 27 Promoting 
"living over the 
shop" 
Increases natural 
surveillance of 
stores at night 
and on weekends 
stores are 
located in 
downtown areas 
or business 
districts 
This initiative is 
usually part of a 
wider revitalization 
program; 
accommodations 
sometimes do 
not provide good 
surveillance of the 
stores below; this 
approach appeals 
most to singles 
and young people 
who are often away 
from home and 
therefore provide 
less surveillance 
14. 27 Promoting 
business 
improvement 
districts (BIDs) 
Increases natural 
surveillance in 
the area 
BIDs have 
dedicated patrols 
by security staff 
BIDs depend on 
widespread support 
from the business 
community; BIDs' 
crime prevention 
value has not yet 
been demonstrated 


Endnotes 

1 
Gill (1994); Shapland (1995); Felson and Clarke (1997). 

2 
Mirlees-Black and Ross (1995). 

3 
Cromwell, Olson and Avary (1991); Butler (1994); Jacques (1994); Wright 
and Decker 
(1994); Wiersma (1996). 

4 
Mirlees-Black and Ross (1995); Butler (1994). 

5 
Skogan (1990); Tilley (1993); Mirlees-Black and Ross (1995); Farrell, 
Chenery and 
Pease (1998). 

6 
Mirlees-Black and Ross (1995). 

7 
Taylor (1999). 

8 
Mirlees-Black and Ross (1995). 

9 
Mirlees-Black and Ross (1995). 

10 
Redshaw and Mawby (1996); Burrows (1997); Brown (2001). 

11 
Reiss (1969); Skogan (1990). 

12 
Butler (1994); Walker (1994); Redshaw and Mawby (1996). 

13 
Walker (1994); Mirlees-Black and Ross (1995); Perrone (2000). 

14 
Mirlees-Black and Ross (1995); Shapland (1995). 

15 
Food Marketing Institute (1997). 

16 
Hakim and Shachmurove (1996); Perrone (2000). 

17 
Mirlees-Black and Ross (1995); Shapland (1995). 

18 
Tilley (1993); Tilley and Hopkins (1998). 

19 
Cromwell, Olson and Avary (1991); Butler (1994); Jacques (1994); Wright 
and Decker (1994); Wiersma (1996). 

20 
Tilley and Hopkins (1998). 

21 
Farrell, Chenery and Pease (1998). 

22 
Tilley (1993); Tilley and Hopkins (1998); Bowers and Hirschfield (1998); 
Taylor (1999). 

23 
Langworthy and LeBeau (1992). 

24 
Clarke (1999); Sutton, Schneider and Hetherington (2001). 

25 
Beck and Willis (1995). 

26 
Tilley and Hopkins (1998). 

27 
Jacques (1994); Beck and Willis (1995). 


28 Tilley (1993); Tilley and Hopkins (1998)
.
29 Hakim and Blackstone (1997)
.
30 Hakim and Blackstone (1997)
.
31 Clarke (1997)
.
32 Butler (1994)
.
33 Crowe (1991); Poyner and Fawcett (1995)
. 
34 Butler (1994); Wiersma (1996)
.
35 Brown (1997)
.
36 Griswold (1984)
.
37 Beck and Willis (1995)
.
38 Greene and Stokes (1998)
.



References 

Beck, A., and A. Willis (1995). Crime and Security: Managing 
the Risk to Safe Shopping. Leicester (England): Perpetuity 
Press. 

Bowers, K., and A. Hirschfield (1998). "High Risk, Low 
Risk: The Use of Data in the Identification of Potential 
Targets of Commercial Crime Offenders." In M. Gill 
(ed.), Crime at Work: Increasing the Risk for Offenders, Vol. 

2. Leicester (England): Perpetuity Press. 

British Retail Consortium (1994). Retail Crime Costs: 
1992/1993 Survey. London: British Retail Consortium. 

Brown, A. (2001). A Commercial Crisis: A Report Into 
Commercial Repeat Victimization. London: Home Office 
Research, Development and Statistics Directorate, Police 
Research Award Scheme. 

Brown, B. (1997). "CCTV in Three Town Centers in 
England." In R. Clarke (ed.), Situational Crime Prevention: 
Successful Case Studies (2nd ed.). Guilderland (New York): 
Harrow and Heston. 

Burrows, J. (1997). "Criminology and Business Crime: 
Building the Bridge." In M. Felson and R. Clarke (eds.), 
Business and Crime Prevention. Monsey (New York): 
Criminal Justice Press. 

Butler, G. (1994). "Commercial Burglary: What Offenders 
Say." In M. Gill (ed.), Crime at Work: Studies in Security and 
Crime Prevention, Vol. 1. Leicester (England): Perpetuity 
Press. 

Clarke, R. (1999). Hot Products: Understanding, Anticipating 
and Reducing the Demand for Stolen Goods. Police Research 
Series, Paper 112. London: Home Office. 


Clarke, R. (ed.) (1997). Situational Crime Prevention: Successful 
Case Studies (2nd ed.). Guilderland (New York): Harrow 
and Heston. 

Conklin, J., and E. Bittner (1973). "Burglary in a Suburb." 
Criminology 11(2):206232. 

Cromwell, P., J. Olson and D. Avary (1991). Breaking and 
Entering: An Ethnographic Analysis of Burglary. Newbury 
Park (California): Sage Publications. 

Crowe, T. (1991). Crime Prevention Through Environmental 
Design. Boston: Butterworth-Heinemann. 

Curtin, L., N. Tilley, M. Owens, and K. Pease (2001). 

Developing Crime Reduction Plans: Some Examples From the 
Reducing-Burglary Initiative. Crime Reduction Research 
Series, Paper 7. London: Home Office. 

Farrell, G., S. Chenery and K. Pease (1998). Consolidating 
Police Crackdowns: Findings From an Antiburglary Project. 

Police Research Series, Paper 113. London: Home 

Office. 

Felson, M., and R. Clarke (1997). Business and Crime 
Prevention. Monsey (New York): Criminal Justice Press. 

Food Marketing Institute (1997). Security and Loss-Prevention 
Issues Survey. Washington, D.C.: Food Marketing Institute. 

Gill, M. (ed.) (1994). Crime at Work: Studies in Security and 
Crime Prevention, Vol. 1. Leicester (England): Perpetuity 
Press. 

Goodchild, B., O. Chamberlain, K. Dalgleish, and 

B. Lawrence (1997). Crime on the Home Front. York 
(England): The Joseph Rowntree Foundation. 


References 

Greene, J., and R. Stokes (1998). "Policing Business 
Districts: Problem-Solving in a Different Context." 
In S. O'Connor and A. Grant (eds.), Problem-Oriented 
Policing: Crime-Specific Problems, Critical Issues and Making 
POP Work. Washington, D.C.: Police Executive Research 
Forum. 

Griswold, D. (1984). "Crime Prevention and Commercial 
Burglary: A Time Series Analysis." Journal of Crime and 
Justice 12:493501. 

Hakim, S., and E. Blackstone (1997). Securing Home and 
Business: A Guide to the Electronic Security Industry. Boston: 
Butterworth-Heinemann. 

Hakim, S., and Y. Shachmurove (1996). "Spatial and 
Temporal Patterns of Commercial Burglaries." American 
Journal of Economics and Sociology 55(4):443456. 

Jacques, C. (1994). "Ram Raiding: The History, Incidence 
and Scope for Prevention." In M. Gill (ed.), Crime at 
Work: Studies in Security and Crime Prevention, Vol. 1. 
Leicester (England): Perpetuity Press. 

Langworthy, R., and J. LeBeau (1992). "The Spatial 
Evolution of a Sting Clientele." Journal of Criminal Justice 
20:135146. 

Mirlees-Black, C., and A. Ross (1995). Crime Against 
Retail and Manufacturing Premises: Findings From the 1994 
Commercial Victimization Survey. Home Office Research 
Study, No. 146. London: Home Office. 

Novak, K., J. Hartman, A. Holsinger, and M. Turner 
(1999). "The Effects of Aggressive Policing of Disorder 
on Serious Crime." Policing: An International Journal of 
Police Strategies and Management 22(2):171190. 


Painter, K., and N. Tilley (1999). Surveillance of Public Space: 
CCTV, Street Lighting and Crime Prevention. Crime Prevention 
Studies, Vol. 10. Monsey (New York): Criminal Justice 
Press. 

Perrone, S. (2000). "Crimes Against Small Businesses in 
Australia: A Preliminary Analysis." Trends and Issues, No. 

184. Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology. 

Poyner, B., and W. Fawcett (1995). Design for Inherent 
Security: Guidance for Nonresidential Buildings. London: 
Construction Industry Research and Information 
Association. 

Redshaw, J., and R. Mawby (1996). "Commercial Burglary: 
Victims' Views of the Crime and the Police Response." 

International Journal of Risk, Security and Crime Prevention 

1(3):185193. 

Reiss, A. (1969). "Minority Entrepreneurship." Report 
submitted to the Office of Planning, Research and 
Analysis of the Small Business Administration. Hearings 
before the Select Committee on Small Business, 

U.S. Senate, 91st Congress. Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Government Printing Office. 

Shapland, J. (1995). "Preventing Retail-Sector Crimes." In 

M. Tonry and D. Farrington (eds.), Building a Safer Society: 
Strategic Approaches to Crime PreventionCrime and Justice: 
A Review of Research, Vol. 19. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press.


Skogan, W. (1990). "Crime and Survival of Small 
Businesses in Urban Communities." Paper presented at 
the 1990 annual meeting of the American Society of 
Criminology. Baltimore, November. 


References 

Spelman, W. (1990). Repeat Offender Programs for Law 
Enforcement. Washington, D.C.: Police Executive Research 
Forum. 

Sutton, M., J. Schneider and S. Hetherington (2001). 
Tackling Theft With the Market Reduction Approach. Crime 
Reduction Research Series, Paper 8. London: Home 
Office. 

Taylor, G. (1999). "Using Repeat Victimization To Counter 
Commercial Burglary: The Leicester Experience." Security 
Journal 12(1):4152. 

Tilley, N. (1993). The Prevention of Crime Against Small 
Businesses: The Safer Cities Experience. Crime Prevention 
Unit Series, Paper 45. London: Home Office. 

Tilley, N., and M. Hopkins (1998). Business as Usual: 
An Evaluation of the Small Business and Crime Prevention 
Initiative. Police Research Series, Paper 95. London: 
Home Office. 

Walker, J. (1994). The First Australian National Survey of 
Crimes Against Businesses. Canberra: Australian Institute 
of Criminology. 

Walsh, D. (1986). Heavy Business: Commercial Burglary and 
Robbery. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 

Wiersma, E. (1996). "Commercial Burglars in the 
Netherlands: Reasoning Decision-Makers?" International 
Journal of Risk, Security and Crime Prevention 1(3):217225. 

Wright, R., and S. Decker (1994). Burglars on the Job. 
Boston: Northeastern University Press. 


About the Author 

Ronald V. Clarke 

Ronald V. Clarke is a professor at the School of Criminal 
Justice, Rutgers University. He previously headed the 
British government's criminological research department, 
where he had a significant role in developing situational 
crime prevention and the British Crime Survey. Clarke is 
the founding editor of Crime Prevention Studies, and his 
publications include Designing Out Crime (HMSO 1980), The 
Reasoning Criminal (Springer-Verlag 1986), Business and Crime 
Prevention (Criminal Justice Press 1997), and Situational 
Crime Prevention: Successful Case Studies (Harrow and Heston 
1997). Together with Herman Goldstein, he has recently 
been working on problem-oriented policing projects 
for the Charlotte-Mecklenburg (North Carolina) Police 
Department. Since 1998, he has chaired the selection 
committee for the annual Herman Goldstein Award for 
Excellence in Problem-Oriented Policing. Clarke holds a 
docorate in psychology from the University of London. 


Recommended Readings 

 
A Police Guide to Surveying Citizens and Their 
Environments, 
Bureau of Justice Assistance, 1993. This 
guide offers a practical introduction for police practitioners 
to two types of surveys that police find useful: surveying 
public opinion and surveying the physical environment. It 
provides guidance on whether and how to conduct cost-
effective surveys. 
 
Assessing Responses to Problems: An 
Introductory Guide for Police Problem-Solvers, 


by John E. Eck (U.S. Department of Justice, Office of 
Community Oriented Policing Services, 2001). This guide 
is a companion to the Problem-Oriented Guides for Police series. 
It provides basic guidance to measuring and assessing 
problem-oriented policing efforts. 

 
Conducting Community Surveys, by Deborah Weisel 
(Bureau of Justice Statistics and Office of Community 
Oriented Policing Services, 1999). This guide, along with 
accompanying computer software, provides practical, basic 
pointers for police in conducting community surveys. The 
document is also available at www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs. 
 
Crime Prevention Studies, 
edited by Ronald V. Clarke 
(Criminal Justice Press, 1993, et seq.). This is a series of 
volumes of applied and theoretical research on reducing 
opportunities for crime. Many chapters are evaluations of 
initiatives to reduce specific crime and disorder problems. 





 
Excellence in Problem-Oriented Policing:The 
1999 Herman Goldstein Award Winners. This 
document produced by the National Institute of Justice 
in collaboration with the Office of Community Oriented 
Policing Services and the Police Executive Research Forum 
provides detailed reports of the best submissions to the 
annual award program that recognizes exemplary problem-
oriented responses to various community problems. A 
similar publication is available for the award winners from 
subsequent years. The documents are also available at www. 
ojp.usdoj.gov/nij. 
 
Not Rocket Science? Problem-Solving and Crime 
Reduction, 
by Tim Read and Nick Tilley (Home Office 
Crime Reduction Research Series, 2000). Identifies and 
describes the factors that make problem-solving effective 
or ineffective as it is being practiced in police forces in 
England and Wales. 
 
Opportunity Makes the Thief: Practical Theory 
for Crime Prevention, 
by Marcus Felson and Ronald V. 
Clarke (Home Office Police Research Series, Paper No. 98, 
1998). Explains how crime theories such as routine activity 
theory, rational choice theory and crime pattern theory 
have practical implications for the police in their efforts to 
prevent crime. 
 
Problem Analysis in Policing, by Rachel Boba (Police 
Foundation, 2003). Introduces and defines problem 
analysis and provides guidance on how problem analysis 
can be integrated and institutionalized into modern 
policing practices. 








 
Problem-Oriented Policing, by Herman Goldstein 
(McGraw-Hill, 1990, and Temple University Press, 1990). 
Explains the principles and methods of problem-oriented 
policing, provides examples of it in practice, and discusses 
how a police agency can implement the concept. 
 
Problem-Oriented Policing and Crime Prevention, 
by Anthony A. Braga (Criminal Justice Press, 2003). 
Provides a through review of significant policing research 
about problem places, high-activity offenders, and repeat 
victims, with a focus on the applicability of those findings 
to problem-oriented policing. Explains how police 
departments can facilitate problem-oriented policing by 
improving crime analysis, measuring performance, and 
securing productive partnerships. 
 
Problem-Oriented Policing: Reflections on the 
First 20 Years, by Michael S. Scott (U.S. Department of 
Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, 
2000). Describes how the most critical elements of 
Herman Goldstein's problem-oriented policing model have 
developed in practice over its 20-year history, and proposes 
future directions for problem-oriented policing. The report 
is also available at www.cops.usdoj.gov. 
 
Problem-Solving: Problem-Oriented Policing in 
Newport News, by John E. Eck and William Spelman 
(Police Executive Research Forum, 1987). Explains the 
rationale behind problem-oriented policing and the 
problem-solving process, and provides examples of 
effective problem-solving in one agency. 




 
Problem-Solving Tips: A Guide to Reducing 
Crime and Disorder Through Problem-Solving 
Partnerships by Karin Schmerler, Matt Perkins, Scott 
Phillips, Tammy Rinehart and Meg Townsend. (U.S. 
Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented 
Policing Services, 1998) (also available at www.cops.usdoj. 
gov). Provides a brief introduction to problem-solving, 
basic information on the SARA model and detailed 
suggestions about the problem-solving process. 
 
Situational Crime Prevention: Successful Case 
Studies, 
Second Edition, edited by Ronald V. Clarke 
(Harrow and Heston, 1997). Explains the principles and 
methods of situational crime prevention, and presents over 
20 case studies of effective crime prevention initiatives. 
 
Tackling Crime and Other Public-Safety Problems: 
Case Studies in Problem-Solving, 
by Rana Sampson 
and Michael S. Scott (U.S. Department of Justice, Office of 
Community Oriented Policing Services, 2000) (also available 
at www.cops.usdoj.gov). Presents case studies of effective 
police problem-solving on 18 types of crime and disorder 
problems. 
 
Using Analysis for Problem-Solving: A Guidebook 
for Law Enforcement, 
by Timothy S. Bynum (U.S. 
Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented 
Policing Services, 2001). Provides an introduction for 
police to analyzing problems within the context of 
problem-oriented policing. 
 
Using Research: A Primer for Law Enforcement 
Managers, 
Second Edition, by John E. Eck and Nancy G. 
LaVigne (Police Executive Research Forum, 1994). Explains 
many of the basics of research as it applies to police 
management and problem-solving. 



Other Problem-Oriented Guides for Police 

Problem-Specific Guides for Police series: 

1. 
Assaults in and Around Bars. Michael S. Scott. 2001. 
ISBN: 1-932582-00-2 
2. 
Street Prostitution. Michael S. Scott. 2001. ISBN: 1-932582-01-0 
3. 
Speeding in Residential Areas. Michael S. Scott. 2001. 
ISBN: 1-932582-02-9 
4. 
Drug Dealing in Privately Owned Apartment Complexes. 
Rana Sampson. 2001. ISBN: 1-932582-03-7 
5. 
False Burglar Alarms. Rana Sampson. 2001. ISBN: 1-932582-04-5 
6. 
Disorderly Youth in Public Places. Michael S. Scott. 2001. 
ISBN: 1-932582-05-3 
7. 
Loud Car Stereos. Michael S. Scott. 2001. ISBN: 1-932582-06-1 
8. 
Robbery at Automated Teller Machines. Michael S. Scott. 2001. 
ISBN: 1-932582-07-X 
9. 
Graffiti. Deborah Lamm Weisel. 2002. ISBN: 1-932582-08-8 
10. 
Thefts of and From Cars in Parking Facilities. Ronald V. 
Clarke. 2002. ISBN: 1-932582-09-6 
11. 
Shoplifting. Ronald V. Clarke. 2002. ISBN: 1-932582-10-X 
12. 
Bullying in Schools. Rana Sampson. 2002. ISBN: 1-932582-11-8 
13. 
Panhandling. Michael S. Scott. 2002. ISBN: 1-932582-12-6 
14. 
Rave Parties. Michael S. Scott. 2002. ISBN: 1-932582-13-4 
15. 
Burglary of Retail Establishments. Ronald V. Clarke. 2002. 
ISBN: 1-932582-14-2 
16. 
Clandestine Drug Labs. Michael S. Scott. 2002. 
ISBN: 1-932582-15-0 
17. 
Acquaintance Rape of College Students. Rana Sampson. 2002. 
ISBN: 1-932582-16-9 
18. 
Burglary of Single-Family Houses. Deborah Lamm Weisel. 
2002. ISBN: 1-932582-17-7 
19. 
Misuse and Abuse of 911. Rana Sampson. 2002. 
ISBN: 1-932582-18-5 
20. 
Financial Crimes Against the Elderly. 


Kelly Dedel Johnson. 2003. ISBN: 1-932582-22-3 


21. 
Check and Card Fraud. Graeme R. Newman. 2003. 
ISBN: 1-932582-27-4 
22. 
Stalking. The National Center for Victims of Crime. 2004. 
ISBN: 1-932582-30-4 
23. 
Gun Violence Among Serious Young Offenders. Anthony A. 
Braga. 2004. ISBN: 1-932582-31-2 
24. 
Prescription Fraud. Julie Wartell and Nancy G. La Vigne. 2004. 
ISBN: 1-932582-33-9 
25. 
Identity Theft. Graeme R. Newman. 2004. ISBN: 1-932582-35-3 
26. 
Crimes Against Tourists. Ronald W. Glensor and Kenneth J. 
Peak. 2004. ISBN: 1-932582-36-3 
27. 
Underage Drinking. Kelly Dedel Johnson. 2004. ISBN: 1-93258239-8 
28. 
Street Racing. Kenneth J. Peak and Ronald W. Glensor. 2004. 
ISBN: 1-932582-42-8 
29. 
Cruising. Kenneth J. Peak and Ronald W. Glensor. 2004. 
ISBN: 1-932582-43-6 
30. 
Disorder at Budget Motels. Karin Schmerler. 2005. 
ISBN: 1-932582-41-X 
31. 
Drug Dealing in Open-Air Markets. Alex Harocopos and Mike 
Hough. 2005. ISBN: 1-932582-45-2 
32. 
Bomb Threats in Schools. Graeme R. Newman. 2005. 
ISBN: 1-932582-46-0 
33. 
Illicit Sexual Activity in Public Places. Kelly Dedel Johnson. 
2005. 
ISBN: 1-932582-47-9 
34. 
Robbery of Taxi Drivers. Martha J. Smith. 2005. ISBN: 1-93258250-9 
35. 
School Vandalism and Break-Ins. Kelly Dedel Johnson. 2005. 
ISBN: 1-9325802-51-7 
36. 
Drunk Driving. Michael S. Scott, Nina J. Emerson, Louis B. 
Antonacci, and Joel B. Plant. 2005. ISBN: 1-932582-57-6 
37. 
Juvenile Runaways. Kelly Dedel. 2006. ISBN: 1932582-56-8 
38. 
The Exploitation of Trafficked Women. Graeme R. 
Newman. 2006. ISBN: 1-932582-59-2 
39. 
Student Party Riots. Tamara D. Madensen and John E. Eck. 
2006. ISBN: 1-932582-60-6 



Other Gu des n Th s Ser es 

40. 
People with Mental Illness. Gary Cordner. 2006. 
ISBN: 1-932582-63-0 
41. 
Child Pornography on the Internet. Richard Wortley 
and Stephen Smallbone. 2006. ISBN: 1-932582-65-7 
42. 
Witness Intimidation. Kelly Debel. 2006. 
ISBN: 1-932582-67-3 


Response Guides series: 

 
The Benefits and Consequences of Police 
Crackdowns. Michael S. Scott. 2003. ISBN: 1-932582-24-X 
 
Closing Streets and Alleys to Reduce Crime: Should 
You Go Down This Road? Ronald V. Clarke. 2004. 
ISBN: 1-932582-41-X 
 
Crime Prevention Publicity Campaigns. 


Emmanuel Barthe. 2006 ISBN: 1-932582-66-5 

 
Shifting and Sharing Responsibility for Public Safety 
Problems. Michael S. Scott and Herman Goldstein. 
2005. ISBN: 1-932582-55-X 
 
Video Surveillance of Public Places. Jerry Ratcliffe. 
2006 ISBN: 1-932582-58-4 
Problem-Solving Tools series: 


 
Assessing Responses to Problems: An Introductory 
Guide for Police Problem-Solvers. John E. Eck. 2002. 
ISBN: 1-932582-19-3 
 
Researching a Problem. Ronald V. Clarke and Phyllis A. 
Schultz. 2005. ISBN: 1-932582-48-7 
 
Using Offender Interviews to Inform Police Problem 
Solving. Scott H. Decker. 2005. ISBN: 1-932582-49-5 
 
Analyzing Repeat Victimization. Deborah Lamm 
Weisel. 2005. ISBN: 1-932582-54-1 



Upcoming Problem-Oriented Guides for Police 

Problem-Specific Guides 
Domestic Violence 
Bank Robbery 
Drive-by Shootings 
Disorder at Day Laborer Sites 
Crowd Control at Stadiums and Other Entertainment Venues 
Traffic Congestion Around Schools 
Theft from Construction Sites of Single Family Houses 
Robbery of Convenience Stores 
Theft from Cars on Streets 

Problem-Solving Tools 
Risky Facilities 
Implementing Responses to Problems 
Designing a Problem Analysis System 

Response Guides 
Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design 

For more information about the Problem-Oriented Guides for Police series 
and other COPS Office publications, please call the COPS Office 
Response Center at 800.421.6770 or visit COPS Online at www.cops. 
usdoj.gov. 


For More InForMatIon: 

U.S. Department of Justice 
Office of Community Oriented Policing Services 

1100 Vermont Avenue, N.W. 
Washington, DC 20530 

To obtain details on COPS programs, call the 
COPS Office Response Center at 800.421.6770 

Visit COPS Online at the address listed below. 

e07063415 Updated: July 2006 
ISBN: 1-932582-14-2 


www.cops.usdoj.gov