Global Justice 
Information 
Sharing 
Initiative 
United States 
Department of Justice 
DEPARTMENT OFJUSTICE 
Global Justice 
Information 
Sharing 
Initiative 
United States 
Department of Justice 
DEPARTMENT OFJUSTICE 
Baseline Capabilities for 
State and 
Major Urban Area 
Fusion Centers 
A Supplement to the 
Fusion Center Guidelines 
September 2008 

Baseline Capabilities for 

State and 
Major Urban Area 
Fusion Centers 

A Supplement to the 

Fusion Center Guidelines 

September 2008 


This project was supported by Grant No. 2007-NC-BX-K001 awarded by the Bureau of Justice Assistance, in 
collaboration with the U.S. Department of Justices Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative and the 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security. The Bureau of Justice Assistance is a component of the Office of Justice 
Programs, which also includes the Bureau of Justice Statistics, the National Institute of Justice, the Office of Juvenile 
Justice and Delinquency Prevention, and the Office for Victims of Crime. Points of view or opinions in this document 
are those of the author and do not represent the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice or the 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security. 
About Global 
The U.S. Department of Justices Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative (Global) 
serves as a Federal Advisory Committee to the U.S. Attorney General on critical 
justice information sharing initiatives. Global promotes standards-based electronic 
information exchange to provide justice and public safety communities with timely, 
accurate, complete, and accessible information in a secure and trusted environment. 
Global is administered by the U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, 
Bureau of Justice Assistance. 
This project was supported by Grant No. 2007-NC-BX-K001 awarded by the Bureau of Justice Assistance, in 
collaboration with the U.S. Department of Justices Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative and the 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security. The Bureau of Justice Assistance is a component of the Office of Justice 
Programs, which also includes the Bureau of Justice Statistics, the National Institute of Justice, the Office of Juvenile 
Justice and Delinquency Prevention, and the Office for Victims of Crime. Points of view or opinions in this document 
are those of the author and do not represent the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice or the 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security. 
About Global 
The U.S. Department of Justices Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative (Global) 
serves as a Federal Advisory Committee to the U.S. Attorney General on critical 
justice information sharing initiatives. Global promotes standards-based electronic 
information exchange to provide justice and public safety communities with timely, 
accurate, complete, and accessible information in a secure and trusted environment. 
Global is administered by the U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, 
Bureau of Justice Assistance. 
Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers 


Table of Contents Table of Contents 
Introduction ........................................................................................................................................................................1 

Purpose.........................................................................................................................................................................1 

Introduction and Background ........................................................................................................................................2 

Methodology and Document Structure ................................................................................................................................5 

Methodology.................................................................................................................................................................5 

Document Structure and Use ........................................................................................................................................9 

Section I: Fusion Center Capability Areas: Fusion Process Capabilities ...............................................................................11 

A. 
Planning and Requirements Development........................................................................................................12 
B. 
Information Gathering/Collection and Recognition of Indicators and Warnings .................................................16 
C. 
Processing and Collation of Information ...........................................................................................................17 
D. 
Intelligence Analysis and Production.................................................................................................................18 
E. 
Intelligence/Information Dissemination.............................................................................................................20 
F. 
Reevaluation...................................................................................................................................................21 
Section II: Fusion Center Capability Areas: Management and Administrative Capabilities....................................................23 

A. 
Management/Governance...............................................................................................................................23 
B. 
Information Privacy Protections.......................................................................................................................27 
C. 
Security...........................................................................................................................................................30 
D. 
Personnel and Training ....................................................................................................................................31 
E. 
Information Technology/Communications Infrastructure, Systems, Equipment, Facility, 
and Physical Infrastructure...............................................................................................................................33 
F. 
Funding ...........................................................................................................................................................34 
Appendix A: Focus Group Participants ...............................................................................................................................35 

Appendix B: Baseline Capabilities Crosswalk......................................................................................................................37 

Appendix C: Glossary of Terms..........................................................................................................................................43 

Appendix D: Acronym List ................................................................................................................................................57 

Appendix E: Resources......................................................................................................................................................61 

Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers 


Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers 


Purpose 
This document identifies the baseline capabilities 
for fusion centers and the operational standards 
necessary to achieve each of the 
capabilities. It is an addendum 
to the U.S. Department of 
Justices (DOJ) Global Justice 
Information Sharing Initiatives 
(Global) Fusion Center 
Guidelines, which provide 
guidance to ensure that fusion 
centers are established and 
operated consistently across 
the country. Using the 
Fusion Center Guidelines, 
as well as identified best 
practices, federal, state, 
and local officials identified 
the capabilities and standards necessary 
for a fusion center to be considered capable of 
performing basic functions. 
By achieving this baseline level of capability, a fusion 
center will have the necessary structures, processes, 
and tools in place to support the gathering, processing, 
analysis, and dissemination of terrorism, homeland 
security, and law enforcement information. This 
baseline level of capability will support specific 
operational capabilities, such as Suspicious Activity 
Reporting (SAR); Alerts, Warnings, and Notifications; 
Risk Assessments; and Situational Awareness 
Reporting. 
The development of baseline operational standards 
is called for in the National Strategy for Information 
Sharing1 (Strategy) and is a key step to reaching one of 
the Strategys goals: Establishing a National Integrated 
Network of State and Major Urban Area Fusion 
Centers. Defining these operational standards allows 
federal, state, local, and tribal officials to identify and 
plan for the resources neededto include financial, 
technical assistance, and human supportto achieve 
the Strategys goal. 
Introduction 
Purpose 
This document identifies the baseline capabilities 
for fusion centers and the operational standards 
necessary to achieve each of the 
capabilities. It is an addendum 
to the U.S. Department of 
Justices (DOJ) Global Justice 
Information Sharing Initiatives 
(Global) Fusion Center 
Guidelines, which provide 
guidance to ensure that fusion 
centers are established and 
operated consistently across 
the country. Using the 
Fusion Center Guidelines, 
as well as identified best 
practices, federal, state, 
and local officials identified 
the capabilities and standards necessary 
for a fusion center to be considered capable of 
performing basic functions. 
By achieving this baseline level of capability, a fusion 
center will have the necessary structures, processes, 
and tools in place to support the gathering, processing, 
analysis, and dissemination of terrorism, homeland 
security, and law enforcement information. This 
baseline level of capability will support specific 
operational capabilities, such as Suspicious Activity 
Reporting (SAR); Alerts, Warnings, and Notifications; 
Risk Assessments; and Situational Awareness 
Reporting. 
The development of baseline operational standards 
is called for in the National Strategy for Information 
Sharing1 (Strategy) and is a key step to reaching one of 
the Strategys goals: Establishing a National Integrated 
Network of State and Major Urban Area Fusion 
Centers. Defining these operational standards allows 
federal, state, local, and tribal officials to identify and 
plan for the resources neededto include financial, 
technical assistance, and human supportto achieve 
the Strategys goal. 
Introduction 
1 The National Strategy for Information Sharing was 
developed in partnership with Global and other state and local 
officials, to include fusion center officials. 

Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers 


The Strategy recognizes the sovereignty of the 
state, local, and tribal governments that own and/ 
or are considering operating a fusion center. The 
missions of fusion centers vary based on the 
environment in which the center operatessome 
have adopted an all-crimes approach, whereas 
others have also included an all-hazards 
approach. 2 The Strategy supports and encourages 
these approaches, while respecting that a fusion 
centers mission should be defined based on 
jurisdictional needs. 
In support of the Strategys goal, the federal 
government agreed that a sustained federal 
partnership with state and major urban area fusion 
centers is critical to the safety of our nation, and 
therefore a national priority. While not all fusion 
centers receive federal grant funding, most fusion 
centers receive other types of support from the 
federal government, including technical assistance, 
training, colocation of federal personnel, and 
access to federal information and networks. This 
document will help the federal government better 
identify how to support fusion centers. The federal 
government does not intend to use this document 
for punitive purposes; rather, a common set of 
capabilities is needed in order for the 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), 
DOJ, and other federal agencies to ensure that 
they are providing the right types of resources 
in a consistent and appropriate manner. The 
capabilities also assist in ensuring that fusion 
centers have the basic foundational elements for 
integrating into the national Information Sharing 
Environment. 
It is recognized that at the time of writing this 
document, most fusion centers are in the process 
of achieving these standards and capabilities. 
Since resources vary greatly from center to center, 
it is expected to take a period of one to five years 
to achieve all of the baseline capabilities. It is also 
expected that some capabilities may not need to 
be housed or performed within a fusion center 
itself; instead, the center may rely on another 
fusion center or other operational entity to provide 
the capability. This approach is particularly 
appropriate, since one of the founding principles 
of the Fusion Center Guidelines is to leverage 
existing resources and expertise where possible. 
2 See Glossary for definition of all-crimes approach 
and all-hazards approach. 
Purpose (continued) 
The Strategy recognizes the sovereignty of the 
state, local, and tribal governments that own and/ 
or are considering operating a fusion center. The 
missions of fusion centers vary based on the 
environment in which the center operatessome 
have adopted an all-crimes approach, whereas 
others have also included an all-hazards 
approach. 2 The Strategy supports and encourages 
these approaches, while respecting that a fusion 
centers mission should be defined based on 
jurisdictional needs. 
In support of the Strategys goal, the federal 
government agreed that a sustained federal 
partnership with state and major urban area fusion 
centers is critical to the safety of our nation, and 
therefore a national priority. While not all fusion 
centers receive federal grant funding, most fusion 
centers receive other types of support from the 
federal government, including technical assistance, 
training, colocation of federal personnel, and 
access to federal information and networks. This 
document will help the federal government better 
identify how to support fusion centers. The federal 
government does not intend to use this document 
for punitive purposes; rather, a common set of 
capabilities is needed in order for the 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), 
DOJ, and other federal agencies to ensure that 
they are providing the right types of resources 
in a consistent and appropriate manner. The 
capabilities also assist in ensuring that fusion 
centers have the basic foundational elements for 
integrating into the national Information Sharing 
Environment. 
It is recognized that at the time of writing this 
document, most fusion centers are in the process 
of achieving these standards and capabilities. 
Since resources vary greatly from center to center, 
it is expected to take a period of one to five years 
to achieve all of the baseline capabilities. It is also 
expected that some capabilities may not need to 
be housed or performed within a fusion center 
itself; instead, the center may rely on another 
fusion center or other operational entity to provide 
the capability. This approach is particularly 
appropriate, since one of the founding principles 
of the Fusion Center Guidelines is to leverage 
existing resources and expertise where possible. 
2 See Glossary for definition of all-crimes approach 
and all-hazards approach. 
Purpose (continued) 
Introduction and Background 

Improving information sharing constitutes a cornerstone of 
our national strategy to protect the American people and 
our institutions and to defeat terrorists and their support 
networks at home and abroad. 

In 2003, DOJs Global Justice 

Information Sharing Initiative 

Solutions and approaches fora cohesive plan to improve ournations ability to develop andshare criminal intelligence 
October 2003 
United StatesDepartment of Justice 
(Global) developed the 

National Criminal Intelligence 
Sharing Plan (NCISP).3 
The NCISP provides law 

enforcement with solutions 
and approaches to improve 

the nations ability to 

develop and share criminal 

intelligence. The NCISP 

provided the foundation 

for the development of the 

Fusion Center Guidelines, 

issued in 2006. The Fusion Center 

Guidelines4 were developed collaboratively between DOJs 

Global and DHSs Homeland Security Advisory Council. 

The purpose of the Fusion Center Guidelines is to provide 

guidance on the establishment and operation of fusion 
centers at the federal, state, local, and tribal levels. 

In 2004, the Information Sharing Environment (ISE) was 
established by the President and the Congress for the 
sharing of terrorism information in a manner consistent 
with national security and with applicable legal standards 
relating to privacy and civil liberties.5 The ISE supports 
five communitiesintelligence, law enforcement, defense, 
homeland security, and foreign affairsby leveraging existing 
capabilities and aligning policies, standards, and systems to 
ensure that those responsible for combating terrorism have 
access to timely and accurate information. An improved ISE 
is being constructed on a foundation of trusted partnerships 
among federal, state, local, and tribal governments; the 
private sector; and our foreign allies. Numerous national 
initiatives have been set forth that provide guidance to the 
development of the ISE, including the December 2005 
Presidential Memorandum, which outlines guidelines and 
requirements to further the development of the ISE. Many 
of the results of this Memorandum were incorporated by the 
Program Manager of the Information Sharing Environment 
into the Information Sharing Environment Implementation 
Plan issued in November 2006. 

3 The NCISP is available at 
http://it.ojp.gov/documents/NCISP_Plan.pdf. 
4 The Fusion Center Guidelines document is available at 
http://it.ojp.gov/documents/fusion_center_guidelines.pdf. 
5 Section 1016, Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention 
Act (IRTPA) of 2004. The IRTPA also established the position of Program 
Manager for the Information Sharing Environment. 

Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers 


The Presidents Memorandum is also significant in that it 
declared for the first time that state and local governments 
should be treated as full and trusted partners with the federal 
government in our nations efforts to combat terrorism.6 The 
President directed that a framework be developed to enable 
that goal, and the results were embraced in the Information 
Sharing Environment Implementation Plan and, most recently, 
in the Presidents National Strategy for Information Sharing 
issued in October 2007. 

The National Strategy for 
Information Sharing calls 
for a national information 

sharing capability through the 
establishment of a national 
integrated network of fusion 

centers. Since 2001, the federal 
government has provided 
significant grant funding, 

training, and technical 
assistance to support the 
establishment of fusion 

centers owned and operated 
by states and major urban areas. 

The Strategy builds on these efforts and provides 
a federal government-wide approach to interfacing and 
collaborating with these fusion centers. Additionally, 
Appendix 1 of the Strategy outlines the federal, state, local, 
and tribal governments roles and responsibilities for the 
establishment and continued operations of state and major 
urban area fusion centers: 

The roles and responsibilities outlined in the Strategy 
were developed in partnership with state, local, and 
tribal officials and represent a collective (federal, 
state, local, and tribal) view. The Strategy recognizes 
the sovereignty of state and local governments, and 
thus the roles and responsibilities are delineated 
with the understanding that state and major urban 
area fusion centers are owned and managed by 
state and local governments. Furthermore their 
incorporation into the ISE takes into account that 
these centers support day-to-day crime control 
efforts and other critical public safety activities. 
Interlinking and networking these centers will create 
a national capacity to gather, process, analyze, 
and share information. Incorporating these centers 
into the ISE will be done in a manner that protects 
the information privacy and other legal rights of 
Americans and corporations, as provided for under 

U.S. law. [Appendix 1, Page A-1] 
To carry out the roles and responsibilities identified in the 
Strategy, state and local governments must first define and 

Guideline 2, Guidelines and Requirements in Support of the 
Information Sharing Environment, Presidential Memorandum of 
December 16, 2005. 

document how each state intends to carry out intrastate 
efforts to gather, process, analyze, and disseminate terrorism 
information, homeland security information, and law 
enforcement information. This process is commonly known 
as the Fusion Process. States with multiple fusion centers 
will be asked to designate a statewide fusion center to 
coordinate statewide information sharing efforts. In states 
with major urban area fusion centers, their activities should 
be incorporated into the statewide Fusion Process. If the 
Urban Areas Security Initiative (UASI) does not have a 
fusion center (referred to as a major urban area), the states 
homeland security advisor should work to determine the 
most effective manner in which to incorporate the UASI into 
the statewide information sharing framework. 

Finally, for local law enforcement 
or homeland security analysis 
centers that do not meet a baseline 
capability definition of a fusion 
center (and are not in the process 
of achieving a baseline level of 
capability), the statewide Fusion 
Process should incorporate 
these analysis centers and local 
law enforcement intelligence 
capabilities to ensure that 
information sharing efforts are 
optimized and barriers minimized. 
These analysis centers may not 
possess the ability or may not 
have the need to establish all of 
the baseline operational standards 
and roles and responsibilities as 
detailed in this document, but they 
should be incorporated into the 
states Fusion Process. 
Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers 


Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers 


Methodology and 
Document Structure 
Methodology and 
Document Structure 
Methodology 

At the request of the Office of the Program Manager, 
Information Sharing Environment, DOJ and DHS supported 
a meeting of subject-matter experts that convened on 
January 1719, 2007. The participants represented fusion 
centers across the country.7 This group was charged with 
identifying within the Fusion Center Guidelines and other 
fusion center-related documents those capabilities that 
should be considered necessary to achieve a baseline 
operational capability as a fusion center. Additional input 
was received during subsequent discussions, conference 
calls, and meetings. 

The initial list of baseline capabilities was used for the 2007 
Fusion Center Assessment and included in the 2007 and 
2008 Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP) Fusion 
Capability Planning Tool Supplemental Resource. Given the 
critical role of the baseline capabilities, it was determined 
that they would be well suited as an Addendum to the 
Fusion Center Guidelines, and the effort was expanded to 
provide further explanation on the baseline capabilities and 
include references, resources, and available best practices to 
assist with implementation. 

In addition to the Fusion Center Guidelines, the baseline 
capabilities and standards outlined in this document were 
developed using guidance provided in the following national 
policy documents: the National Strategy for Information 
Sharing, the National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan, 
the Information Sharing Environment Implementation Plan, 
and DHSs National Preparedness Guidelines and Target 
Capabilities List (TCL) (September 2007). 

 A listing of the Fusion Center Baseline Capability Focus Group 
participants is contained in Appendix A of this document. 

Overview of Comment Adjudication 

As a part of the development process, a draft of this 
document was provided to participants at the 2008 National 
Fusion Center Conference. Approximately 140 comments 
or clarifying questions were received, of which more than 
75 percent were accepted or addressed in whole or in 
part. Those that were not accepted usually addressed a 
section that had been rewritten based on other comments 
or would have added too much detail for the purposes of 
this document. A number of comments were broader than 
a particular capability, providing suggestions affecting the 
entirety of the document. These broader comments fall 
into four categories, which are discussed in greater detail 
below. Accordingly, the document was adjusted to clarify 
areas of confusion and incorporate suggested changes where 
possible. Some of these changes include the addition of a 
section on How to Use this Document, the consolidation 
of several categories of the baseline capabilities and reducing 
many of the standards and tasks under certain capabilities, 
the addition of a Privacy baseline capability category 
(described below), the addition of capabilities under the 
Analysis Capability set, and the grouping of the capabilities 
into two types: (1) those baseline steps which enable the 
fusion center to conduct each step of the Intelligence Process 
and (2) those administrative capabilities which enable the 
proper management and functioning of a fusion center. 

Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers 


Addition of a Set of Privacy-Related 
Capabilities 

During the comment process, the ISE Privacy Guidelines 
Committee (PGC) reviewed the document and made 
recommendations to 
enhance the privacy-
related capabilities, 
in order to assist 
the incorporation of 
fusion centers into the 
Information Sharing 
Environment. The following information is background on 
their methodology: 

A core requirement for participation in the 
Information Sharing Environment (ISE) is that 
agencies and the PM-ISE will work with non-
federal entities seeking to access or provide 
protected information through the ISE to ensure that 
such non-federal entities develop and implement 
appropriate policies and procedures that provide 
protections that are at least as comprehensive as 
those in these Guidelines. 8 

To support this requirement, 
the ISE PGC, which is made 
up of ISE Privacy Officials 
from the federal agencies 
participating in the ISE, 
formed a working group 
to examine the privacy 

issues relative to state, 
local, and tribal entities, 
including fusion centers, 

interfacing with the ISE. 
The PGC State/Local/ 
Tribal Working Group 
(SLT WG) began with 
the existing guidance 

found in the Fusion Center Guidelines, 
specifically Guideline 8, Develop, publish, and adhere 
to a privacy and civil liberties policy, and performed a 
gap analysis to identify where the guidance to the fusion 
centers did not include the requirements of the ISE Privacy 
Guidelines. While some of the concepts and requirements 
of the ISE Privacy Guidelines are referenced in Guideline 8, 
noteworthy gaps were identified, in part because protected 
information shared in the ISE is given enhanced privacy and 
civil liberties protection under the ISE Privacy Guidelines. In 
order to provide the most comprehensive guidance, the gap 
analysis compares Guideline 8, the ISE Privacy Guidelines, 
and 28 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 23, since all 

Section 11 of the Presidentially approved Guidelines to 
Ensure That the Information Privacy and Other Legal Rights of Americans 
Are Protected in the Development and Use of the Information Sharing 
Environment (ISE Privacy Guidelines or Guidelines). 

address privacy concerns and are relevant to the fusion 
centers. The gap analysis developed by the SLT WG 
provides detailed operational guidance that assists fusion 
centers in formulating their ISE privacy policies. 

The PGCs recommendations have been integrated with the 
privacy-related capabilities, and the resulting capabilities 
were placed in a new stand-alone category for privacy 
capabilities. Adherence to these privacy capabilities will 
ensure that a fusion centers privacy policy is at least 
as comprehensive as the ISE Privacy Guidelines. The 
capabilities are keyed to the sections of the ISE Privacy 
Guidelines, the full text of which can be found at www.ise 
.gov. As is the case for federal agencies participating in the 
ISE, each fusion center will need to document its existing 
policy or establish a new or revised policy or procedure 
for meeting each baseline requirement. This process will 
result in a fusion center privacy protection policy that 
meets the Section 12.d. requirement of the ISE Privacy 
Guidelines. The Guidelines, along with the Privacy and 
Civil Liberties Implementation Guide (the Guide) and other 
resource materials on the ISE Web site, should be consulted 
for details on the ISE Privacy Guidelines requirements that 
must be addressed in fusion center ISE privacy policies. 
Further, it is highly recommended that fusion centers 
also use the Key Issues Guidance papers in the Guide on 
Redress; Data Quality; Data Security; Notice Mechanisms; 
and Accountability, Enforcement, and Auditwith special 
attention to the core elements sectionin formulating 
their ISE privacy policies. 

In addition to the ISE Privacy Guidelines, the privacy 
capabilities are based on the requirements laid out in 
Globals Privacy and Civil Liberties Policy Development 
Guide and Implementation Templates. In many cases, the 
privacy baseline capabilities exceed the requirements of 
the ISE Privacy Guidelines, because fusion centers address 
information types and activities that extend beyond the 
scope of the ISE. 

Addition of Capabilities Under the 
Intelligence Analysis and Production 
Capability Set 

Recognizing that the focus on the analytic components 
of fusion centers has not been as strong as it needs to 
be, the International Association of Law Enforcement 
Intelligence Analysts (IALEIA) provided substantial comments 
to strengthen this section. They noted that if we fail in 
that area, the utility of fusion centers will be in question. 
Information sharing in and of itself is not a solution to our 
public safety and homeland security issues. To enhance 
the Intelligence Analysis and Production capability set, 
IALEIA suggested capabilities that would strengthen the 
management of the analytic function, as well as the 
capabilities of analysts. 

Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers 


General Comments Applying to 
Whole Document 

The general comments typically fell into one of four 
categories, often with conflicting suggestions. Outlined 
below are general comments and the resolutions that were 
incorporated into this document. 

1. 
References to All Crimes, All Hazards inthe Baseline Capabilities Document 
The nature of the comments revealed different 
understandings of the terms; therefore, definitions of the 
all-crimes and all-hazards approaches were added to the 
Glossary. 

Several comments were received regarding the references 
to all hazards in the capabilities. One center suggested 
that each fusion center or state needs to decide whether to 
include all hazards in its center, and therefore it should 
not be in this document. Another center suggested that 
all hazards should be the responsibility of emergency 
management and not a fusion center. Consistent with these 
comments, the document was adjusted to reflect that the 
use of an all-hazards approach is not a baseline capability. 
Instead, the baseline capabilities call for the governance 
body of the center to take under consideration and make a 
decision whether it will incorporate an all-crimes and/or all-
hazards approach. 

As explained in the Purpose section of this document, 
the National Strategy for Information Sharing supports and 
encourages these approaches, while respecting that a fusion 
centers mission should be defined based on local needs. 

When responding to questions in annual assessments, if a 
fusion center has decided not to use an all-crimes or all-
hazards approach, the center will need to document this 
decision and its justification. 

2. 
Role of Critical Infrastructure and KeyResources (CIKR) and the Private Sector 
Several comments recommended removing references to 
the private sector; others suggested that support to critical 
infrastructure and key resource protection activities should 
not be considered a baseline capability. Accordingly, the 
document was edited to ensure that the center: 

1. 
Can disseminate alerts, warnings, and notifications 
and other relevant analytic reports to the affected 
critical infrastructure or private sector entity; and 
2. 
Has mechanisms in place to receive tips and leads 
relevant to the centers mission (terrorism, threats, 
crime, etc.). 
The mechanisms used to pass information to and from 
these entities will vary, and there is no requirement that the 

fusion center be the owner of the information sharing 
mechanism. If a state or major urban area already has a 
CIKR information sharing capability that is managed by 
another organization, the fusion center can simply provide 
information to that entity as needed. The emphasis in the 
baseline capabilities is ensuring that these matters have been 
considered and planned for. 

The capabilities also encourage consideration of the 
private sectors input through an Advisory Board or some 
other mechanism but do not make it a requirement. 

For those centers interested in incorporating the support 
of CIKR into their Fusion Process, an appendix to this 
document is being developed that will outline the baseline 
capabilities for a CIKR capability. Please refer to the Critical 
Infrastructure and Key Resource Protection Capabilities for 
Fusion Centers (CIKR Protection Capabilities for Fusion 
Centers), an appendix to the Baseline Capabilities for State 
and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers, for more information 
and guidance on the recommended actions necessary 
to successfully integrate these activities, as well as the 
resources available to effectively do so. The CIKR Protection 
Capabilities for Fusion Centers has been jointly developed 
by the DHS Office of Infrastructure Protection and the 
State, Local, Tribal, and Territorial Government Coordinating 
Council (SLTTGCC) and will be available in fall 2008. 

Background on Critical Infrastructure and Key 
Resources in Homeland Security Preparedness 

Efforts to support the protection of CIKR are an essential 
component of any overarching homeland security program. 
In accordance with the National Infrastructure Protection 
Plan (NIPP) risk management framework, as well as the 
benchmarks and requirements identified in the FY2006 and 
FY2007 HSGP, state governments are responsible for building 
and sustaining a statewide/regional CIKR protection program. 
This program must include the processes necessary to 
implement the NIPP risk management framework at the state 
and/or regional level, including urban areas, as a component 
of the states overarching homeland security program. 

Additionally, the national priorities identified in the 
National Preparedness Guidelines help guide the nations 
preparedness efforts to meet its most urgent needs. With 
the inclusion of NIPP9 implementation as one of these 
overarching national priorities, CIKR protection programs 

9 The NIPP is the comprehensive risk management framework that 
clearly defines critical infrastructure protection roles and responsibilities 
for all levels of government, private industry, nongovernmental agencies, 
and tribal partners. The NIPP lays out the plan for setting requirements for 
infrastructure protection, which will help ensure our government, economy, 
and public services continue in the event of a terrorist attack or other 
disaster. The NIPP was released on June 30, 2006. The purpose of the NIPP 
is to build a safer, more secure, and more resilient America by enhancing 
protection of the nations CIKR to prevent, deter, neutralize, or mitigate the 
effects of deliberate efforts by terrorists to destroy, incapacitate, or exploit 
them; and to strengthen national preparedness, timely response, and rapid 
recovery in the event of an attack, natural disaster, or other emergency. 

Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers 


form an essential component of state, territorial, local, tribal, 
and sector-specific homeland security strategies. Achieving 
that national priority requires meeting objectives that include 
understanding and sharing information about terrorist 
threats and other hazards, building security partnerships, 
implementing a long-term risk management program, and 
maximizing the efficient use of resources. To achieve these 
efforts, CIKR security partners should have the following: 

 
Coordinated, risk-based CIKR plans and programs in 
place addressing known and potential threats; 
 
Structures and processes that are flexible and 
adaptable, both to incorporate operational 
lessons learned and effective practices and also 
to adapt quickly to a changing threat or incident 
environment; 
 
Processes in place to identify and address 
dependencies and interdependencies to allow for 
more timely and effective implementation of short-
term protective actions and more rapid response 
and recovery; and 
 
Access to robust information sharing networks that 
include relevant intelligence, threat analysis, and 
real-time incident reporting.10 
These objectives are inherent in the information sharing and 
intelligence cycle processes that occur within fusion centers 
on a daily basis, and therefore there is a natural tendency for 
fusion centers and CIKR protection programs to coordinate 
and integrate their efforts so that they can more successfully 
leverage resources and integrate the gathering, analysis, and 
sharing of CIKR-related information and intelligence with 
all other threat information, whether criminal, homeland 
security, or counterterrorism in nature. The coordination 
and integration of these efforts also support achievement 
of the Expand Regional Collaboration and Strengthen 
Information Sharing and Collaboration national priorities 
noted in the National Preparedness Guidelines. 

Therefore, fusion centers are strongly encouraged to 
consider the integration of federal, state, local, and private 
sector CIKR protection efforts in their current operational 
capabilities. The integration of CIKR capabilities should 
not be separated from all other ongoing intelligence and 
information sharing activities, but rather the CIKR capabilities 
should be integrated throughout every step of the 
intelligence process. This will ensure that CIKR information 
is appropriately coordinated and integrated with other 
federal, state, local, and private sector threat information, 
whether criminal, homeland security, or counterterrorism 
in nature. The incorporation of CIKR-related information 
throughout the intelligence processes occurring in the fusion 
center will provide a more comprehensive understanding of 

See National Preparedness Guidelines. 

the threat, vulnerabilities, potential consequences of attacks, 
and the effects of risk-mitigation actions. It will also allow 
fusion centers to more successfully plan for and support the 
development of preventive and protective measures to deter, 
disrupt, and/or mitigate threats. 

3. 
Concerns of Rural/Small States 
Several fusion centers indicated concerns that the baseline 
capabilities would not be achievable for those fusion centers 
with one or two staff members and limited budgets. As 
noted in the Background section, it is expected that there 
will be local law enforcement or homeland security analysis 
centers that may not possess the ability or may not have the 
need to establish all of the baseline operational standards 
and roles and responsibilities as detailed in this document. 
Though these entities may not be considered fusion centers, 
they are an important part of the Fusion Process and should 
be incorporated into the statewide Fusion Process to ensure 
that information sharing efforts are optimized and barriers 
minimized. 

In the few cases in which a states center does not intend 
to meet the baseline capabilities definition of a fusion 
center, it is important to note that the capabilities performed 
through an intelligence unit or analysis center are considered 
important components of the national Fusion Process. These 
states should consider partnering with an adjacent states 
fusion center and ensure appropriate connectivity with 
federal partners and other regionally based information 
sharing systems. 

4. 
Suggestions to Tier Baseline Capabilities 
Suggestions were made to tier the capabilities. During 
revisions, efforts were made to scale back or consolidate the 
details of the capabilities. As noted above, it is recognized 
that the application of these capabilities will vary depending 
on the unique environment in which the fusion center 
operates. However, a common definition is needed to 
support the development of an assessment and resource 
process that will support fusion centers. Therefore, it was 
determined that this document would remain focused on 
one set of baseline capabilities needed to operate a fusion 
center successfully. 

It is expected that each center will need to evaluate these 
capabilities and determine whether they apply within 
its unique environment. It is also expected that some 
capabilities may not need to be housed or performed 
within a fusion center itself; instead, the center may rely on 
another fusion center or other operational entity to provide 
the capability. That is particularly appropriate, since one of 
the founding principles of the Fusion Center Guidelines is to 
leverage existing resources and expertise where possible. 

Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers 


Future Versions 

This report should be viewed as a living document and will 
be periodically updated. Those charged with developing 
and implementing the baseline capabilities will continue to 
solicit input on improving fusion center operations from law 
enforcement and homeland security communities, national 
organizations, and other government and public safety 
entities. Individuals and organizations are invited to submit 
recommendations and comments regarding this document 
via the National Criminal Intelligence Resource Center 
(http://www.ncirc.gov) e-mail address: information@ncirc 
.gov. 

The Baseline Capabilities 
Are in Two Sections 
I. Fusion Process Capabilities 
These capabilities outline those 
standards necessary to perform the 
steps of the Intelligence Process within 
a fusion center. These areas are: 
Planning and RequirementsA. 
Development 
Information Gathering/Collection andB. 
Recognition of Indicators and Warnings 
Processing and Collation of InformationC. 
Intelligence Analysis and ProductionD. 
Intelligence/Information DisseminationE. 
ReevaluationF. 
II. Management and 
Administrative Capabilities 
These capabilities enable the proper 
management and functioning of a 
fusion center. These areas are: 
Management/GovernanceA. 
Information Privacy ProtectionsB. 
SecurityC. 
Personnel and Training D. 
Information Technology/ E. 
Communications Infrastructure, 
Systems, Equipment, Facility, and 
Physical Infrastructure 
Funding F. 
Document Structure and Use 
Document Organization 

The baseline capabilities are organized into two sections: 

I. Fusion Process Capabilitieswhich outline those 
standards necessary to perform the steps of the Intelligence 
Process within a fusion center, and II. Management and 
Administrative Capabilitieswhich enable the proper 
management and functioning of a fusion center. 
For the purposes of this document, the steps of the 
Intelligence Process provide the foundation of the 
capabilities needed to perform the Fusion Process. For 
example, step one of the Intelligence Process is Planning 
and Direction, which involves identifying the need for 
data; agencies should engage in a process of deciding what 
they want to know before they collect it.11 Similarly, fusion 
centers should engage in a planning and coordination step 
when determining the types of information they should 
collect, including suspicious activity; alerts, warnings, and 
notifications; and situational awareness information. While 
it is acknowledged that the Intelligence Process is different 
from the Fusion Process, the basic foundational steps of 
the Intelligence Process can be applied to identifying the 
baseline capabilities fusion centers should strive to achieve in 
regards to information and intelligence collection, collation, 
analysis, and dissemination. 

The Intelligence Process is defined in the NCISP and 
incorporated into Guideline 1 of the Fusion Center 
Guidelines. 

The Intelligence Process 

11 Fusion Center Guidelines, p. 20. 

Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers 


For purposes of baseline capabilities, the Fusion Process 
capability areas are modified to be: 

1. Fusion Process Capabilities: 
 
Planning and Requirements Development 
 
Information Gathering/Collection and Recognition 
of Indicators and Warnings 
 
Processing and Collation of Information 
 
Intelligence Analysis and Production 
 
Intelligence/Information Dissemination 
 
Reevaluation 
2. Management and Administrative Capabilities: 
 
Management/Governance 
 
Information Privacy Protections 
 
Security 
 
Personnel and Training 
 
Information Technology/Communications 
Infrastructure, Systems, Equipment, Facility, and 
Physical Infrastructure 
 
Funding 
How to Read the Baseline Capabilities 

Each of the 12 capability areas identifies the baseline 
capabilities and standards or tasks necessary to achieve the 
capability. This document does not prescribe the method of 
implementation; instead, it provides references to existing 
and forthcoming documents that describe best practices 
and guidance on implementation (e.g., the Fusion Center 
Guidelines, the NCISP, and Globals Privacy and Civil Liberties 
Policy Development Guide and Implementation Templates). 

Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers 23 
Fusion Center Capability AreasManagement andAdministrative Capabilities 
Management/GovernanceA.
Fusion centers will have many demandsplaced on them, and it is important to haveclear priorities.Guideline 2, Fusion CenterGuidelines, p. 23.
Establishing a governance structure creates asupported environment that frames the abilityfor the center to function and operate, assigntasks, allocate and manage resources, anddevelop and enforce policy.Guideline 3,
Fusion Center Guidelines, p. 25. 
1. Governance StructureFusion centersshall have a governance structure thatprovides appropriate representationfor the jurisdictions and disciplinesin the centers area of responsibility.
(Guidelines 3, 4, and 5, Fusion Center 
Guidelines) 
Examples of how to include the privatesector in the governance structure:
Including representatives from the 
Sector Coordinating Councils (SCC), theInformation Sharing and Analysis Centers(ISACs), or InfraGard.
Coordinating with an existing critical 
infrastructure or private sector advisorycouncil that provides advice to the stateor major urban area homeland securityadvisor, emergency manager, or lawenforcement agency.
Leveraging the expertise of local sector 
associations or coalitions.
Ensure that stakeholders have the opportunitya. 
to provide input into the establishment ofthe governance structure. (See Section II.A.3.
regarding identifying stakeholders.)
The centers governance body should includeb. 
representatives from the state and local lawenforcement and public safety disciplines. 
II. 
Refers to the 
second section 
of baseline 
capabilities 
One of six 
subcategories 
in the second 
section 
Numbered 
text with a 
line above 
is a baseline 
capability 
A consolidated list of these references is included in 
Appendix E. 

Each capability either draws from or builds on one or a few 
of the Fusion Center Guidelines. For ease of reference, each 
capability highlights the most relevant guidelines. 

Suggestions, notes, and examples are included in text boxes 
to the side, top, or bottom of the capabilities. If the term 
consider or consideration is used, the text thereafter 
should be read as a strong suggestion but not a required 
baseline capability. 

How to Use This Document 

This document is designed to be used by fusion center 
managers, staff, and stakeholders, as well as state and 
local executive and legislative officials with oversight and 
budgetary responsibilities, for the purpose of assisting in 
the identification, prioritization, and allocation of resources 
to achieve baseline levels of capability based on locally 
identified needs. 

It will be valuable for state and major urban area fusion 
centers to take into account the capabilities they have 
achieved, as well as identify capability gaps and the plans to 
mitigate those gaps, when preparing funding requests and 
investment justifications (e.g., DHS and DOJ grant funds, as 
well as state and local funding). 

Likewise, this document will help the federal government 
identify how to support fusion centers through training, 
technical assistance, human resources, access to information, 
and grant funds in a consistent and appropriate manner. 
The federal government intends to update its annual fusion 
center assessment to reflect this version of the baseline 
capabilities. This will allow for a greater understanding of 
the current capabilities and capacity that exist at regional 
and national levels and enable the federal government to 
target resources to ensure that capabilities are achieved and 
sustained. 

As noted in the Purpose and Methodology sections, there 
will be instances in which a capability is not needed at the 
fusion center because it is either outside the scope of the 
centers mission or is already addressed by another agency. 
When responding to questions in future annual assessments, 
if a fusion center lacks a particular capability and the 
capability is not under development or being planned for, 
the center will need to document the reason why it will not 
house the capability andas appropriate to the question 
identify whether any other outside state or local agency 
might be addressing the capability. 

10 

Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers 


Fusion Center Capability Areas 

Fusion Process CapabilitiesI. 
Adhere to the National Criminal Intelligence 

Sharing Plan (NCISP) and other sector-specific 

information sharing plans, and perform all steps of 
the intelligence and fusion processes. 
Guideline 1, Fusion Center Guidelines. 

The Fusion Process capabilities identify those capabilities and 
standards necessary to perform the steps of the Intelligence 
Process within a fusion center, including the gathering, 
analysis, and dissemination of information and intelligence. 
Though the steps and actions of the Fusion Process do not 
comprehensively mirror the steps of the Intelligence Process, 
the Intelligence Process provides the foundation to carry 
out the Fusion Process and assist in the identification of 
the capabilities needed to successfully complete the Fusion 
Process. 

The Intelligence Process 

The Intelligence Process is defined in the NCISP and 
incorporated into Guideline 1 of the Fusion Center 
Guidelines. 

For purposes of baseline capabilities, the Fusion Process 
capability areas are modified to be: 

 
Planning and Requirements Development 
 
Information Gathering/Collection and Recognition 
of Indicators and Warnings 
 
Processing and Collation of Information 
 
Intelligence Analysis and Production 
 
Intelligence/Information Dissemination 
 
Reevaluation 
The following capabilities address the plans and their 
associated policies, standards, processes, and procedures 
(collectively procedures) needed to perform various 
aspects of the Fusion Process: the gathering, processing, 
analyzing, and disseminating of terrorism, homeland 
security, and law enforcement information. For these 
capabilities to be considered achieved or accomplished, 
the plans and procedures should be documented and 
provided to appropriate center personnel and partners. 
Though the types of plans and procedures are broken 
down by topic, they are in practice integrated aspects of 
the Fusion Process; therefore, many of these plans should 
be developed concurrently to the extent possible. In 
many cases, the resulting plans and procedures may not be 
separate documents but may be individual components of a 
larger document, such as a centers Concept of Operations, 
Standard Operating Procedures, or Policies and Procedures 
Manual. 

The following capabilities do not include capabilities 
that are otherwise addressed in Section II. Management 
and Administrative Capabilities (e.g., Information Privacy 
Protections, Security, Information Technology). 

Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers 


2. 
A. 
Planning and 
Requirements 
Development 
The Planning and Requirements Development 
stage lays the foundation for the types of 
information that will be collected. 
Guideline 1, Fusion Center Guidelines, p. 21. 

1. 
Intrastate CoordinationIn developing 
and implementing all Fusion Process-
related plans and procedures, the center 
shall coordinate with other fusion 
centers (the designated state fusion 
center and/or any UASI fusion center(s)) 
within its state to identify the roles and 
responsibilities of each center in carrying 
out the Fusion Process (gathering, 
processing, analyzing, and disseminating 
of terrorism, homeland security, and law 
enforcement information) on a statewide 
basis. 

a. 
Identify and incorporate local and tribal law 
enforcement, homeland security, or other 
discipline analytic centers that do not meet the 
definition of a fusion center but are within the 
fusion centers geographic area of responsibility, 
and develop and maintain coordination 
procedures and communication methodologies. 
b. 
The plan should address the further dissemination 
of federally generated alert, warning, and 
notification messages, bulletins, and situational 
reports, including the identification and 
establishment of a communications platform 
to support the timely dissemination of these 
products. 
c. 
The plan should clearly identify who is responsible 
for disseminating what types of products and to 
whom (which local, tribal, and federal authorities; 
the private sector; and the general public, as 
appropriate), in order to reduce duplicative 
dissemination to the extent possible. 
Risk AssessmentFusion centers shall 
conduct or contribute to a statewide and/ 

or regional risk assessment that identifies 

and prioritizes threats, vulnerabilities, 
and consequences at regular intervals. 

a. 
Use available national and statewide risk 
assessments and other relevant products that 
identify patterns and trends reflective of emerging 
threats in the development of statewide and 
regional risk assessments. 
b. 
Develop site-specific and topical risk assessments 
as appropriate. 
c. 
Provide the risk assessment or a summary 
and/or briefings on the risk assessment to law 
enforcement and homeland security officials with 
planning, resource allocation, and budgeting 
responsibilities, including appropriate elected 
officials from the executive and legislative 
branches. 
d. 
Maintain mechanisms to contribute information of 
value to other state, multistate, and national-level 
risk assessments. 
Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers 


3. 
Information RequirementsThe 
information requirements for the fusion 
center shall be defined, documented, 
updated regularly, and consistent with 
the centers goals and objectives as 
defined by the governance structure 
and reflect the risks identified in 
the statewide and/or regional risk 
assessment. 

a. 
Use the risk assessment to identify and prioritize 
the information requirements in order to 
address the risks (threats, vulnerabilities, and 
consequences) posed in the centers geographic 
area of responsibility. 
b. 
Create a formal process to define, communicate, 
and modify intelligence requirements and 
intelligence gathering. 
c. 
Establish goals and objectives for collecting, 
producing, and sharing information. 
d. 
Review and consider including relevant 
requirements from the national intelligence 
requirements as provided by DHS and the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI). 
e. 
Coordinate with the state and major urban 
area homeland security advisors and the 
DHS Protective Security Advisor(s) to ensure 
coordination and support of the National 
Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP). 
f. 
Coordinate information requirements with other 
interested agencies (local FBI Field Intelligence 
Group [FIG], Joint Terrorism Task Forces [JTTF], 
High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas [HIDTA], etc.) 
as appropriate. 
4. 
Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR) 
Fusion centers shall develop, implement, 
and maintain a plan to support the 
establishment of a suspicious activity 
and incident reporting process for their 
geographic area of responsibility, in a 
manner consistent with the Findings 
and Recommendations of the Suspicious 
Activity Report (SAR) Support and 
Implementation Project.12 Specifically, 
The Major Cities Chiefs Association, Global, DOJ, and DHS 
supported the development of this report, which describes the all-crimes 
approach to gathering, processing, reporting, analyzing, and sharing of 
suspicious activity by the local police agency. 

centers shall have the ability to receive, 
process, document, analyze, and share 
SARs in a manner that complies with the 
ISE-SAR Functional Standard.13 

a. 
Adhere to the state and local responsibilities for 
SARs outlined in Appendix 1 of the National 
Strategy for Information Sharing (page A1-6). 
b. 
The fusion centers SAR process should 
complement and support the SAR processes 
established or being established by state or local 
law enforcement agencies within the fusion 
centers geographic area of responsibility. 
c. 
In cooperation with state or local law enforcement 
agencies within the fusion centers geographic 
area of responsibility that have developed or are 
developing a SAR process, the fusion center shall 
support: 
i. 
Defining and documenting the process to be 
used by the originating agency to ensure that 
suspicious activity reporting is made available 
to fusion centers and local JTTFs in a timely 
manner. 
ii. 
Developing outreach material for first 
responders, public safety, and private sector 
partners and the public to educate them 
on recognizing and reporting behaviors 
and incidents indicative of criminal activity 
associated with international and domestic 
terrorism. 
d. 
The fusion center, in the absence of a specified 
threat or risk, should utilize SARs to analyze 
data trends and identify any potential terrorism 
linkage or activity (including precursor activity) 
and disseminate to the JTTF and other appropriate 
federal, state, and/or local entities. 
e. 
The designated statewide fusion center shall 
coordinate an effort or support existing efforts 
to identify system requirements for the states 
designated shared space14 that will support 
13 For additional information regarding the ISE Functional Standard 
for SAR, visit http://www.ise.gov/pages/ctiss.html. 
14 The ISE Shared Spaces concept is a key element of the ISE 
Enterprise Architecture Framework and helps resolve the information 
processing and usage problems identified by the 9/11 Commission. ISE 
Shared Spaces are networked data and information repositories used by 
ISE participants to make their standardized terrorism-related information, 
applications, and services accessible to other ISE participants. ISE Shared 
Spaces also provide an infrastructure solution for those ISE participants with 
national security system (NSS) network assets, historically sequestered with 
only other NSS systems, to interface with ISE participants having only civil 
network assets. Additionally, ISE Shared Spaces also provide the means for 
foreign partners to interface and share terrorism information with their U.S. 
counterparts. For more information about the ISE Shared Spaces concept, 
reference the ISE Enterprise Architecture Framework and the ISE Profile 
Architecture Implementation Strategy at www.ise.gov. 

Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers 


statewide reporting, tracking, and accessing of 
SARs in a manner that ensures consistent use 
of data elements and collection procedures. 
(Refer to Section II.E. Information Technology/ 
Communications Infrastructure, Systems, 
Equipment, Facility, and Physical Infrastructure; 
the ISE-SAR Functional Standard; and the Findings 
and Recommendations of the Suspicious Activity 
Report (SAR) Support and Implementation Project.) 

f. 
Fusion centers should support or develop training 
for law enforcement and nontraditional partners 
to identify and appropriately report suspicious 
activities, indicators, and warnings. 
5. 
Alerts, Warnings, and Notifications 
Fusion centers shall ensure that 
alerts, warnings, and notifications are 
disseminated, as appropriate, to state, 
local, and tribal authorities; the private 
sector; and the general public. 

a. 
Fusion centers shall develop and implement 
a written policy outlining standard operating 
procedures to govern the receipt of further 
dissemination of federally generated alert, 
warning, and notification messages, consistent 
with the intrastate coordination plan called for by 
Section I.A.1. 
b. 
In response to federally generated alert, warning, 
and notification messages and/or significant 
events, the fusion center shall support or facilitate 
the identification of actions that were taken by 
state, local, and tribal authorities and the private 
sector and report those back to the appropriate 
federal agency. 
c. 
Adhere to the state and local responsibilities 
for alerts, warnings, and notifications outlined 
in Appendix 1 of the National Strategy for 
Information Sharing (page A1-8). 
6. 
Situational Awareness Reporting 
Fusion centers shall develop processes 
to manage the reporting to key officials 

and the public of information regarding 

significant events (local, regional, 

national, and international) that 

may influence state or local security 

conditions. 

a. 
Fusion centers shall develop and implement 
a written policy outlining standard operating 
procedures to govern the receipt and further 
dissemination of federally generated information 
bulletins and other situational awareness messages, 
consistent with the intrastate coordination plan 
called for by Section I.A.1. 

b. 
Adhere to the state and local responsibilities 
for situational awareness reporting outlined 
in Appendix 1 of the National Strategy for 
Information Sharing (page A1-9). 
7. 
Data SourcesFusion centers shall 
identify and document data sources and 
repositories needed to conduct analysis 
based on the mission of the center, 
the findings of the Risk Assessment, 
and the centers defined Information 
Requirements. 

a. 
Refer to Section II.E. Information Technology/ 
Communications Infrastructure, Systems, 
Equipment, Facility, and Physical Infrastructure to 
further develop plans for access to data sources 
based on the fusion centers defined mission and 
core business processes. 
8. 
Coordination With Response and 
Recovery OfficialsFusion centers shall 

identify and coordinate with emergency 
managers and appropriate response 
and recovery personnel and operations 
centers to develop, implement, and 
maintain a plan and procedures to 
ensure a common understanding of roles 
and responsibilities and to ensure that 
intelligence and analysis capabilities 
can be leveraged to support emergency 
management operation activities, as 
appropriate, when events require such a 
response. 

a. 
Ensure that the center has identified its intelligence 
and analytical roles and responsibilities 
in accordance with the National Incident 
Management System (NIMS) and Incident 
Command System (ICS). 
b. 
The plan should identify roles, responsibilities, 
and protocols to govern the timely reporting of 
significant events occurring within state or local 
jurisdictions to federal authorities and, when 
appropriate, other states, localities, or regional 
entities. 
Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers 


c. 
Ensure that the plan addresses the contingency 
10. 
ExercisesFusion centers should
and continuity-of-operations (COOP) planning 

during an emergency. (See Section II.E.) 
conduct or participate in another 

9. 
Coordination With Private Sector and 
Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources 
(CIKR) Information SharingFusion 
centers, in partnership with locally 
based federal authorities, shall develop, 
implement, and maintain a plan and 
procedures for sharing information with 
owners of CIKR and, in general, the 
private sector, in a coordinated manner. 
a. 
All centers shall include in the plan the procedures 
to disseminate alerts, warnings, and notifications 
and other relevant analytic reports to critical 
infrastructure sectors and/or private sector entities 
that are affected by the threat. 
b. 
The plan should document the decision of the 
centers governance structurebased on the 
centers mission, risk assessment, and information 
requirementswhether the center will establish 
a CIKR capability to integrate and analyze threat, 
vulnerability, and consequence data and enable 
and support state, local, and private sector 
decision making and activities to protect CIKR. 
Note: At a minimum, the baseline capabilities 
require fusion centers to have the capability to receive 
information from the private sector and disseminate 
critical information to members of the private 
sector. Beyond those baseline capabilities, some 
fusion centers are encouraged, but not required, to 
incorporate the needs of the CIKR protection activities 
into their Fusion Process. This option should be 
considered by the governance structure as a part of 
the mission development process. (See Section II.A.) 

References: For those centers interested in 
incorporating the support of CIKR into their Fusion 
Process, an appendix to this document is being 
developed that will outline the fusion center 
capabilities for supporting CIKR protection activities. 

agencys scenario-based tabletop and live 
training exercises to regularly assess their 
capabilities. 

a. 
Exercises should include simulations, games, 
tabletops, functional exercises, and full-scale field 
exercises. 
b. 
Exercises should involve all relevant center 
personnel and constituents and should contribute 
to understanding the value of the statewide Fusion 
Process, the centers collection plan, the SAR 
process, analytical products, the centers role in 
the Information Sharing Environment, and the 
centers role in response and recovery activities in 
accordance with NIMS and ICS. 
c. 
Centers should use the exercises to validate center 
operations, policies and procedures, and training 
activities and develop action plans to mitigate any 
identified gaps. 
Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers 


B. 
Information Gathering/ 
Collection and 
Recognition of Indicators 
and Warnings 
The stage in which the planning and 
requirements development stage becomes 
operationalinformation is collected from 
various sources, including law enforcement 
agencies, public safety agencies, and the private 
sector. This stage is essential for fusion centers 
to be effective.Guideline 1, Fusion Center 
Guidelines, p. 21. 

1. 
Information-Gathering and -Reporting 
StrategyFusion centers shall develop, 
implement, and maintain an information-
gathering and -reporting strategy that 
leverages existing capabilities and shall 
identify methods for communicating 
information requirements and the 
overall information-gathering strategy to 
partners, to include any applicable fusion 
liaison officers. 

a. 
Clearly outline the collection process, including 
how the collectors of information are identified 
and taskedor if the center lacks the authority 
to task, identify how such requests are made to 
partners. 
b. 
Leverage and/or coordinate with the JTTF and 
other federal, state, local, tribal and private sector 
information sharing and counterterrorism efforts. 
c. 
Clearly outline the processes that partner 
organizationsincluding law enforcement, public 
safety, private organizations, and the publicuse 
to report information to the fusion center. 
d. 
The strategy and associated processes shall be 
consistent with the governance structures defined, 
agreed-upon, and auditable privacy policy. 
(Reference Section II.B.) 
2. 
Feedback MechanismFusion centers 
shall define and implement a feedback 

mechanism that: 

a. 
Provides the reporting entity an acknowledgement 
of the receipt of its information and, to the 
extent possible, provides feedback on the value 
of the information and actions taken with the 
information. 
b. 
Allows collectors to make suggestions to improve 
the strategy, plans, or processes, as well as seek 
clarification on information requirements. 
c. 
Allows recipients of information or products to 
make suggestions to improve products. 
3. 
Collection and Storage of Information 
Fusion centers shall define the policies 

and processes and establish a mechanism 
for receiving, cataloging, and retaining 
information provided to the center. 

a. 
Ensure that policies, processes, and mechanisms 
comply with the centers privacy policy 
particularly regarding data retention, purging, and 
redress. (Reference Section II.B.) 
b. 
Fusion centers should reference the Commission 
on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies 
(CALEA) Standard 51.1.1 regarding intelligence 
collection and the types of information to collect, 
methods for purging out-of-date or incorrect 
information, and procedures for the utilization of 
intelligence personnel and techniques.15 
c. 
Adhere to the Law Enforcement Intelligence Unit 
(LEIU) Criminal Intelligence File Guidelines16 
15 Additional information regarding CALEA Standard 51.1.1 
Criminal Intelligence is available at 
http://www.calea.org/online/newsletter/no79/criminalintelligence.htm. 
16 LEIU Criminal Intelligence File Guidelines 
http://www.it.ojp.gov/documents/LEIU_Crim_Intell_File_Guidelines.pdf. 

Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers 


and the LEIU Audit Checklist for the Criminal 
Intelligence Function17 for the maintenance of 
criminal intelligence files. 

d. 
Adhere to the collection, storage, and retention 
requirements of 28 CFR Part 23. 
e. 
Establish processes to routinely identify progress 
achieved against individual information 
requirements and the overall information-
gathering strategy, and provide summary 
assessments to fusion center partners, 
management, and the governance body on a 
routine basis. 
f. 
The mechanism used to catalog and retain 
information shall enable timely retrieval by the 
centers analysts. 
g. 
Develop protocols to ensure the archiving of all 
appropriate data, information, and intelligence to 
support future efforts. 
h. 
To the extent the processes and mechanisms are 
automated, adhere to the Information Technology/ 
Communications Infrastructure, Systems, 
Equipment, Facility, and Physical Infrastructure 
capabilities. (Section II.E.) 
C. 
Processing and Collation 
of Information 
Processing and collation involves evaluating 
the informations validity and reliability. 
Collation entails sorting, combining, 

LEIU Audit Checklist for the Criminal Intelligence Function 
http://it.ojp.gov/documents/LEIU_audit_checklist.pdf. 

categorizing, and arranging the data collected so 
relationships can be determined.Guideline 1, 
Fusion Center Guidelines, p. 20. 

1. 
Information CollationFusion center 
analysts shall use the necessary and 
available tools to process and collate 
information and intelligence to assist 
with accurate and timely analysis. 
a. 
Fusion center analysts should consider utilizing 
the appropriate tools identified in Globals Analyst 
Toolbox to assist in the collation of information. 
b. 
Fusion center analysts should reference IALEIA and 
Globals Law Enforcement Analytic Standards when 
developing the processes for collating information. 
c. 
Fusion centers should consider the development 
or utilization of an intelligence collection system 
that allows for the collection, processing, collation, 
and storage of information related to the mission 
of the center. 
2. 
Levels of ConfidenceFusion centers 
shall liaise with partners to ensure that 
information collected is relevant, valid, 
and reliable. 
a. 
Fusion center personnel should consider regular 
meetings with information providers to discuss 
information collection requirements. 
b. 
Fusion center personnel should ensure that 
partners are aware of the various levels of 
confidence of information provided to the center. 
i. 
28 CFR Part 23 states, Information shall be 
labeled to indicate levels of sensitivity, levels 
of confidence, and the identity of submitting 
agencies and officers. 
ii. 
Levels of confidence relate to reliability, 
validity, and relevancy. 
Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers 


D. 
Intelligence Analysis and 
Production 
Analysis transforms the raw data into products 
that are usefulthe goal is to develop a report 
that connects information in a logical and 
meaningful manner to produce an intelligence 
report that contains valid judgments based on 
analyzed information. One of the goals of the 
fusion center during this stage is to identify 
trends or information that will prevent a 
terrorist attack or other criminal activity. 
Guideline 1, Fusion Center Guidelines, 

pp. 20-21. 

1. Analytic ProductsFusion centers shall 
develop, implement, and maintain 
a production plan that describes the 
types of analysis and products they 
intend to provide for their customers 
and partners (which, at a minimum, 
include Risk Assessments; Suspicious 
Activity Reporting; Alerts, Warnings, 
and Notifications; and Situational 
Awareness Reporting [see Sections 
I.A.2, 4, 5, and 6 for further details on 
these product types]), how often or in 
what circumstances the product will be 

produced, and how each product type 
will be disseminated. 

a. 
Adhere to the tenets in IALEIA and Globals 
Law Enforcement Analytic Standards booklet,18 
particularly Standards 17, 20, and 21, which 
address Analytic Product Content, Report, and 
Format standards. 
b. 
The production plan shall be prioritized based on 
the centers mission, information requirements, 
and priority functions. 
c. 
Identify stakeholders and customer base for 
specific product lines and request feedback from 
customers to guide future products. 
d. 
Ensure the production of value-added intelligence 
products that support the development of 
performance-driven, risk-based prevention, 
protection, response, and consequence 
management programs. 
2. 
Fusion Process ManagementAn 
intelligence commander/manager should 
be designated to oversee the management 
of the Fusion Process (including the 
collection, collation, analytic function, 
dissemination, and reevaluation of 
information and intelligence) within the 
center. 
a. 
The commander/manager should address the day-
to-day intelligence management functions of the 
center. 
b. 
The commander/manager should prioritize critical 
intelligence products and ensure that the critical 
outputs of the fusion center are accomplished. 
c. 
The commander/manager should have the 
necessary skill sets to oversee the production of 
intelligence products that are effective, efficient, 
and permissible under state and federal laws and 
regulations. 
d. 
The commander/manager should have previous 
experience and management training. 
i. 
Training should include the intelligence cycle, 
analytical training, intelligence management, 
the role of the fusion center, and legal issues. 
18 IALEIA and Globals Law Enforcement Analytic Standards booklet 
is available at 
http://www.it.ojp.gov/documents/law_enforcement_analytic_standards.pdf. 

Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers 


3. 
Enhancing Analyst SkillsThe fusion 
center should develop and implement a 
Training and Professional Development 
Plan to enhance analysts critical 
thinking, research, writing, presentation, 
and reporting skills. 
a. 
The supervisor of the analytic function should 
work with each analyst to draft a Training and 
Professional Development Plan. Components of 
the plan should include training and mentoring 
opportunities for learning new subject matter/ 
areas of expertise and exposure to new analytic 
techniques and technologies. 
i. 
The initial training goal should be the 
completion of the Foundations of Intelligence 
Analysis Training program or its training 
equivalent and the certification of analysts. 
ii. 
Adhere to the tenets in IALEIA and Globals 
Law Enforcement Analytic Standards booklet,19 
particularly Standards 1-7 for analysts. 

iii. Utilize IALEIA and Globals Law Enforcement 
Analytic Standards and the National Criminal 
Intelligence Sharing Plan in the development of 
the training plan. 
b. 
Analysts should be provided routine opportunities 
to present their analytic findings and receive 
feedback on the quality of their written reports 
and oral presentations. 
c. 
Performance evaluations should be conducted at 
least annually, and the Training and Professional 
Development Plan updated accordingly. 
4. 
Information LinkingFusion centers 
shall ensure that analysts are able to 
understand and identify the links 
between terrorism-related intelligence 
and information related to traditional 
criminal activity so they can identify 
activities that are indicative of precursor 
behaviors, terrorist activities, and threats. 
(Guidelines 12, 13, 14, Fusion Center 
Guidelines) 
a. 
Training regarding precursor activities of terrorists 
should be provided to analysts and relevant fusion 
center personnel following the standards outlined 
in the Minimum Criminal Intelligence Training 
IALEIA and Globals Law Enforcement Analytic Standards booklet 
is available at 
http://www.it.ojp.gov/documents/law_enforcement_analytic_standards.pdf 

Standards for Law Enforcement and Other Criminal 
Justice Agencies in the United States.20 

b. 
Ensure that analysts receive training on the analytic 
process, analytical writing and briefing skills, and 
reporting skills. 
5. 
Strategic Analysis ServicesFusion 
centers shall develop the capability to 
provide strategic analysis services for 
the jurisdiction served. (Guideline 14, 
Fusion Center Guidelines.) 
6. 
Open Source Analysis Capability 
Fusion centers shall establish an open 
source analysis capability utilizing the 
free training and tools provided by the 
federal government. 
7. 
Analyst SpecializationFusion centers 
should assign accounts or specialties 
to analysts based on the priorities of the 
fusion center, to allow the development 
of analytic depth. 
8. 
Analytical ToolsFusion centers shall 
provide the necessary tools to analysts 
for the analysis of information and data. 
(Guidelines 11 and 14, Fusion Center 
Guidelines) 
a. 
Fusion centers should provide all tools outlined in 
Globals Analyst Toolbox document. 
b. 
Training should be provided for the identified 
analytic tools so that relevant personnel are 
proficient in their use. 
c. 
Analysts shall be provided with routine 
mechanisms to communicate with other fusion 
center analysts within the state or region. 
(Examples include chat rooms available via 
Homeland Security State and Local Intelligence 
Community of Interest [HS SLIC] or other 
collaborative networks or regular phone calls.) 
d. 
Analysts shall have access to and understanding of 
where to find information sources and available 
expertise to support the information priorities of 
the fusion center. 
20 The Minimum Criminal Intelligence Training Standards for Law 
Enforcement and Other Criminal Justice Agencies in the United States is 
accessible at http://www.it.ojp.gov/documents/min_crim_intel_stand.pdf. 

Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers 


E. 
Intelligence/Information 
Dissemination 
The process of effectively distributing analyzed 
intelligence utilizing certain protocols in the 
most appropriate format to those in need of the 
information to facilitate their accomplishment 

of organizational goalsDefinition of 

Dissemination, Criminal Intelligence Glossary. 

1. 
Dissemination PlanFusion centers 
shall develop a high-level dissemination 
plan that documents the procedures 
and communication mechanisms for 
the timely dissemination of the centers 
various products to the core and ad hoc 
customers. 
a. 
The plan should be consistent with the intrastate 
coordination plan. (See Section I.A.1.) 
b. 
Consider a variety of methods to distribute 
information, including Web site; 
e-mail; secure portal; regional and national 
information sharing systems such as Regional 
Information Sharing Systems. (RISS), Homeland 
Security Information Network (HSIN), Law 
Enforcement Online (LEO), and HS SLIC; pager; 
fax; telephone; video teleconferencing system; 
and personal contact. (Reference Guideline 6, 
Fusion Center Guidelines, for further suggestions.) 
2. 
Reporting of Information to Other 
CentersFusion centers shall develop 
the processes and protocols for ensuring 
that relevant and vetted priority 
information is reported to fusion centers 
in other states and localities to support 
regional trends analysis. (Guideline 7, 
Fusion Center Guidelines) 
3. 
Reporting of Information to Federal 
PartnersFusion centers shall 
develop the processes and protocols, 
in coordination with the FBI and DHS 
Office of Intelligence and Analysis 
(I&A), for ensuring that relevant and 
vetted priority information is reported to 
the JTTF and other appropriate federal 
agencies to support its inclusion into 
national patterns and trends analysis. 

a. 
In addition to the priority information processes 
(SAR; Alerts, Warnings, and Notifications; 
and Situational Awareness Reporting), share 
information to address national security and 
criminal investigations. 
b. 
Ensure that information provided to the federal 
government is shared according to the fusion 
centers privacy policy. (See Section II.B.) 
c. 
Utilize the protocols established in the SAR report, 
National Information Exchange Model (NIEM), 
and Information Exchange Package Documents for 
information exchange. 
Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers 


F. Reevaluation 
Reevaluation assesses current and new 
information, assists in developing an awareness 
of possible weak areas as well as potential 
threats, and strives to eliminate previously 

identified weaknesses that have been hardened 

as a result of the Fusion Process. Overall, 
this step provides an opportunity to review 
the performance or effectiveness of the fusion 
centers intelligence function.Guideline 1, 
Fusion Center Guidelines, p. 20. 

1. 
Performance EvaluationFusion centers 
shall develop and implement a plan to 
reevaluate the centers performance of 
the intelligence cycle on a regular basis. 
a. 
Develop mechanisms to receive stakeholder 
feedback on all parts of the intelligence cycle. 
b. 
Incorporate feedback from training and exercises. 
c. 
Update plans and procedures as appropriate. 
2. 
Fusion Center Processes ReviewFusion 
centers shall establish a process to review 
and, as appropriate, update the centers 
information requirements, collection 
plan, and analytic production strategy on 
a regular basis and any time one of the 
following is received: 
a. 
New threat or vulnerability information; 
b. 
New federal or state standing or ad hoc 
information requirements; 
c. 
Federal or state alerts, warnings, or notifications or 
situational awareness bulletins; and/or 
d. 
Updated risk assessment. 
Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers 


Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers 


Fusion Center Capability Areas 

Management and 
Administrative CapabilitiesII. 
A. Management/Governance 
Fusion centers will have many demands 
placed on them, and it is important to have 
clear priorities.Guideline 2, Fusion Center 
Guidelines, p. 23. 

Establishing a governance structure creates a 
supported environment that frames the ability 
for the center to function and operate, assign 
tasks, allocate and manage resources, and 
develop and enforce policy.Guideline 3, 
Fusion Center Guidelines, p. 25. 

1. 
Governance StructureFusion centers 
shall have a governance structure that 
provides appropriate representation 
for the jurisdictions and disciplines 
in the centers area of responsibility. 
(Guidelines 3, 4, and 5, Fusion Center 
Guidelines) 
a. 
Ensure that stakeholders have the opportunity 
to provide input into the establishment of 
the governance structure. (See Section II.A.3. 
regarding identifying stakeholders.) 
b. 
The centers governance body should include 
representatives from the state and local law 
enforcement and public safety disciplines. 
i. 
If the mission of the center is primarily law 
enforcement-focused, the center should 
include representation from the public safety 
Examples of how to include the private 
sector in the governance structure: 
Including representatives from the 
Sector Coordinating Councils (SCC), the 
Information Sharing and Analysis Centers 
(ISACs), or InfraGard. 
Coordinating with an existing critical 
infrastructure or private sector advisory 
council that provides advice to the state or 
major urban area homeland security advisor, 
emergency manager, or law enforcement 
agency. 
Leveraging the expertise of local sector 
associations or coalitions. 
Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers 


discipline in at least an advisory capacity. This 
will enhance the centers ability to perform key 
baseline capabilities, including: 

a) Receiving tips from and disseminating 
alerts, warnings, notifications, and 
relevant analytic products to public safety 
organizations; and 

b) Supporting emergency management, 
response, and recovery planning activities 
based on likely threat scenarios and at-risk 
targets. 

c. 
The centers governance body should include 
representatives from the federal government in at 
least an advisory capacity. 
i. 
Include local representatives from the FBI (i.e., 
the JTTF and FIG) and appropriate components 
of DHS (i.e., Protective Security Advisor, 

U.S. Coast Guard, Federal Emergency 2. 
Management Agency [FEMA], 
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
[ICE], United States Secret Service [USSS], etc.). 
ii. 
Also consider including or coordinating with 
the following efforts as appropriate to the 
centers mission and location: HIDTAs and the 
U.S. Attorneys Offices Anti-Terrorism Advisory 
Council (ATAC). 
d. 
Consideration should be given to include 
the perspectives of the private sector, where 
appropriate, in at least an advisory capacity. 
e. 
Ensure that the governance body is composed of 
officials with decision-making authority, capable of 
committing resources and personnel to the center. 
f. 
Ensure that bylaws for the operations of the 
governance structure are developed and adopted 
by the governance body. 
g. 
The governance body shall clearly define the 
management and command structure of the 
center. 
h. 
The governance body should develop and approve 
key fusion center policies, including the centers 
privacy and security policies. (See Sections II.B. 
and C. for more information on Information 
Privacy Protections and Security capabilities). 
i. 
The governance body shall receive at least annual 
reports on the centers compliance with the 
defined privacy and security policies. 
j. 
Develop communication mechanisms to provide 
the governance body with feedback from center 
management and personnel, stakeholders, and 
recipients of information within the state or region. 
k. 
The governance body should include 
representation from and ensure that the fusion 
center management coordinates with other fusion 
centers within the state (the designated state 
fusion center and/or any UASI fusion center(s)), 
in order to identify the roles and responsibilities 
of each center in carrying out the Fusion 
Process (gathering, processing, analyzing, and 
disseminating of terrorism, homeland security, 
and law enforcement information) on a statewide 
basis. 
l. 
Review the governance structure and membership 
at regular intervals to determine whether 
additional organizations or disciplines should be 
included based on the current risk assessment and 
the fusion centers mission. 
Mission StatementFusion centers 

shall have a defined mission statement 

that is clear and concise and conveys the 
purpose, priority, and roles of the center. 
(Guideline 2, Fusion Center Guidelines) 

a. 
The governance body shall develop and adopt the 
mission statement, unless it has been predefined 
by law or executive order. 
b. 
In defining the mission statement, consideration 
should be given to the risks identified in the 
centers geographic area of responsibility. 
c. 
In defining the mission statement, the governance 
body should consider using an all-crimes approach 
and/or an all-hazards approach (see Glossary 
for definition of these terms), recognizing that 
precursor crimes or incidents may have national 
security implications. 
i. 
If the governance body determines that the 
center will incorporate certain public safety 
disciplines into the fusion centers mission 
and/or determines the center will use an all-
hazards approach, centers shall adhere to the 
forthcoming appendices to this document, 
which will outline the baseline capabilities for 
incorporating the following disciplines into the 
center: 
a) Fire Service 
b) Public Health 
c) Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources 
ii. 
If the fusion center utilizes an all-crimes 
approach, the center should liaise with 
applicable agency and multijurisdictional task 
forces and intelligence units, including: 
Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers 


a) Gang task forces and intelligence units, 
as well as the National Gang Intelligence 
Center (NGIC)21 

b) Narcotic-related task forces and intelligence 
units, as well as the National Drug 
Intelligence Center (NDIC) 

c) 
Violent crime/fugitive task forces and 
intelligence units 

d) Economic crime task forces and intelligence 
units 

d. 
The governance body shall provide oversight to 
ensure that the mission statement, the most recent 
risk assessment, and the identified customer 
needs inform the Planning and Requirements 
Development process. (See Section I.A., 
particularly the prioritizing of fusion center 
functions and tasks.) 
3. 
Collaborative EnvironmentFusion 
centers shall identify the organizations 
that represent their core (permanent) 
and ad hoc stakeholders and the roles 
and responsibilities of each stakeholder 
and develop mechanisms and processes 
to facilitate a collaborative environment 
with these stakeholders. (Guidelines 4 
and 5, Fusion Center Guidelines) 
a. 
Review the most recent risk assessment, if 
available, and identify relevant stakeholders 
that should be included to address the highest 
identified risks. 
b. 
Include the identification of entities and 
individuals responsible for planning, developing, 
and implementing prevention, protection, 
response, and consequence-management efforts 
at the state, local, and tribal levels. 
c. 
When identifying the roles and responsibilities 
of core and ad hoc stakeholders, identify their 
needs as a customer of the center, as well as their 
contributions to the center (for example: providing 
resources such as funding, personnel, and access 
to expertise or providing access to information or 
databases). 
d. 
After a governance structure has been established 
and a mission statement approved, review 
the identified stakeholders and their roles and 
responsibilities to determine whether any 
Those fusion centers utilizing an all-crimes approach that includes 
gang-related criminal intelligence are encouraged to consult Globals 
Guidelines for Establishing and Operating Gang Intelligence Units and Task 
Forces to assist in the coordination and/or implementation of their efforts. 

additional organizations should be included or 
whether roles and responsibilities need to be 
revised based on the centers defined mission. 

e. 
Develop standard processes and mechanisms 
to facilitate communication between the 
stakeholders and center personnel, to include in-
person meetings and briefings on operational and 
administrative matters, as needed. 
f. 
Develop and implement a Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU) or Agreement (MOA) 
and, if needed, nondisclosure agreements (NDA) 
between the center and each stakeholder who 
intends to participate in or partner with the fusion 
center. (Review Guideline 5 for further details.) 
g. 
Ensure that appropriate legal authorities review the 
agreements before signature. 
h. 
Identify the organizations with executive and 
legislative oversight and funding responsibilities, 
and provide routine briefings on the establishment 
and operations of the center. 
Recommended Resources 

 
Refer to Appendix C: 
Functional Categories, Fusion 
Center Guidelines, for a list of 
organizations, disciplines, and 
functions to consider including 
as stakeholders. 
 
See Guidelines 4 and 5, Fusion 
Center Guidelines, for issues 
to consider when developing 
MOUs, MOAs, and NDAs. 
Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers 


e. 
To the extent possible, leverage systems and 
4. 
Policies and Procedures ManualFusion databases to statistically capture, store, and report 
centers shall develop a policies and performance. 
procedures manual for center operations. f. Publicize performance to the public, policymakers, 
(Guideline 15, Fusion Center Guidelines) and customers. 

a. 
Include the centers mission, goals, policies, 
6.
procedures, rules, and regulations. 

b. 
Include the centers privacy policy and its 
physical and information security policies within 
the manual, which should include guidance on 
the use of information specifically for criminal 
investigations and compliance with local and 
state confidentiality laws and how to safeguard 
information. 
c. 
Outline the roles and responsibilities of all entities 
involved in the center and their function. 
d. 
Outline the day-to-day management and 
command structure of the center. 
e. 
Include in the manual the relevant processes 
developed in accordance with the Planning and 
Requirements Development capabilities (Section 
I.A.), to include outlining how and from whom 
intelligence requirements are developed. 
f. 
Implement an annual review of center directives, 
and purge or revise outdated policies and 
procedures. 
5. 
Center PerformanceFusion 
centers shall define expectations, 

measure performance, and determine 
effectiveness of their operations. 
(Guideline 16, Fusion Center Guidelines) 

a. 
Develop outputs and outcomes that measure 
expected performance of identified mission, goals, 
and objectives. 
b. 
Coordinate the development and review of 
measures and performance with participating 
agencies. 
c. 
Create internal measures pertaining to 
administrative matters and external measures to 
evaluate the performance of the intelligence cycle. 
(See Section I.F., Reevaluation.) 
d. 
Utilize participation in a regular cycle of exercises 
to evaluate capabilities and assess performance. 
(See Section I.A.10.) 
OutreachFusion centers shall establish 

a policy to govern official outreach 

and communications with leaders and 
policymakers, the public sector, the 
private sector, the media, and citizens 
and develop a plan to enhance awareness 
of the fusion centers purpose, mission, 
and functions. (Guidelines 12 and 13, 
Fusion Center Guidelines) 

a. 
Outreach efforts should include information about 
the centers privacy policy, the Fusion Process, and 
the types of information that should be reported 
to law enforcement or the fusion center and how 
to do so. 
b. 
If there is more than one fusion center operating 
within the state, the centers should jointly 
determine how to communicate the value, 
roles, and responsibilities of each of the centers, 
consistent with the plan required by Section I.A.1. 
c. 
Develop a process to liaise with and educate 
elected officials and community leadership to 
promote awareness of center operations. 
d. 
Train personnel on communications policy. 
Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers 


B. 
Information Privacy 
Protections22 
Develop, publish, and adhere to a privacy and 
civil liberties policy.Guideline 8, Fusion 
Center Guidelines. 

Protecting the rights of Americans is a core 
facet of our information sharing efforts. While 
we must zealously protect our Nation from 
the real and continuing threat of terrorist 
attacks, we must just as zealously protect the 
information privacy rights and other legal rights 
of Americans. With proper planning we can 
have both enhanced privacy protections and 
increased information sharingand in fact, 
we must achieve this balance at all levels of 
government, in order to maintain the trust of 
the American people.National Strategy for 
Information Sharing, p. 27. 

These capabilities were developed to ensure that the privacy 
policies that fusion centers develop are at least as comprehensive as the ISE 
Privacy Guidelines (see the Methodology section for further background). 
The achievement of these capabilities will result in a fusion center privacy 
protection policy that meets the Section 12.d. requirement of the ISE 
Privacy Guidelines. 

1. 
Privacy OfficialFusion centers shall 
designate an individual to serve as 
the privacy official and/or establish a 
privacy committee to be responsible 
for coordinating the development, 
implementation, maintenance, and 
oversight of the privacy protection 
policies and procedures. (ISE Privacy 
GuidelinesSection 12) 

a. 
If the privacy official is not an attorney, the 
fusion center shall have access to legal counsel to 
help clarify laws, rules, regulations, and statutes 
governing the collection, maintenance, and 
dissemination of information and assist with the 
development of policies, procedures, guidelines, 
and operation manuals. 
b. 
The privacy official or committee should review 
all other fusion center policies and procedures to 
ensure consistency with the privacy policy. 
c. 
The privacy official or committee shall coordinate 
with the centers designated security officer to 
ensure that security measures provide the proper 
protection to information in compliance with all 
applicable laws and the centers privacy policy 
protection policies. 
d. 
Identify stakeholders to include nongovernment 
organizations, advocates, the media, and others 
that are essential to the development and 
implementation of the privacy policy. 
i. 
To the extent possible, fusion centers should 
use existing outreach mechanisms, such as a 
state or local governments privacy advisory 
committee, or outreach conducted by the state 
or local law enforcement or homeland security 
organizations to facilitate engagement with the 
community and privacy advocacy groups. 
2. 
Privacy Policy DevelopmentIn 
developing the privacy policy, fusion 
centers shall: 
a. 
Develop guidance statements that include the 
vision, mission, values statements, goals, and 
objectives for the creation of the privacy policy. 
(ISE Privacy GuidelinesSection 3) 
b. 
Develop a project charter that will include an 
introduction, background, membership, and the 
previously drafted guidance statements. 
c. 
Analyze the flow of information and the legal 
environment for the protection of privacy 
Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers 


to identify what gaps exist between existing 
technological and legal requirements. 

i. 
Information flow analysis helps determine what 
personally identifiable information the agency 
collects, uses, maintains, and disseminates. (ISE 
Privacy GuidelinesSection 4) 
a) Identify the fusion centers data holdings 
and establish mechanisms to ensure their 
review before protected information is 
shared through the ISE. 

b) Establish mechanisms to identify the 
nature of protected information so it can 
be handled in accordance with applicable 
legal requirements. 

ii. 
All policies and procedures are compliant with 
the U.S. Constitution, the states constitution, 
applicable laws, and executive orders. (ISE 
Privacy GuidelinesSection 2) 
a) Conduct a rules assessment and adopt 
policies and procedures requiring the fusion 
center to seek, receive, or retain only the 
protected information which it is legally 
permitted to seek, receive, or retain and 
which was lawfully obtained. 

b) Establish a process to allow for the ongoing 
identification and assessment of new and/or 
revised laws, court decisions, and policies 
that impact issues related to privacy, civil 
rights, and civil liberties. 

c) 
If an issue posing a significant risk to privacy 
is identified, develop policy and procedural 
protections. 

d. 
Perform a gap analysis to identify legal and 
technological gaps. 
e. 
Vet the privacy protection policy internally and 
externally during its development by soliciting 
commentary and buy-in from stakeholders and 
agency constituents prior to finalizing the policy. 
f. 
Formally adopt a privacy protection policy to 
guide the collection, use, maintenance, and 
dissemination of personal information. (ISE Privacy 
GuidelinesSection 12.d.) 
i. 
Obtain formal adoption of the policy by the 
project team, privacy and civil liberties officer, 
the fusion centers governance structure and, if 
applicable, any legislative body. 
3. 
Privacy ProtectionsFusion centers 
shall develop and implement a privacy 
protection policy that ensures that the 
centers activities (collection/gathering, 
analysis, dissemination, storage, and 
use of information) are conducted in 
a manner that protects the privacy, 
civil liberties, and other legal rights 
of individuals protected by applicable 
law, while ensuring the security of the 
information shared. The policy shall 
cover all center activities and shall 
be at least as comprehensive as the 
requirements set forth in the Information 
Sharing Environment Privacy Guidelines 
and consistent with 28 CFR Part 23 
and DOJs Global Privacy and Civil 
Liberties Policy Development Guide and 
Implementation Templates. 

a. 
The privacy protection policy shall include 
procedures to ensure data quality. (ISE Privacy 
GuidelinesSection 5) 
i. 
Establish accuracy procedures to ensure that 
information is accurate, and prevent, identify, 
and correct errors regarding (1) protected 
information and (2) any erroneous sharing of 
information in the ISE. 
ii. 
Establish and implement a process to provide 
written error notice of any potential error 
or deficiency to the privacy official of the 
source agency when it is determined that 
the protected information received may 
be erroneous, includes incorrectly merged 
information, or lacks adequate context such 
that the rights of the individual may be 
affected. 
iii. Adopt and implement the ISE policies and 
procedures for merger of information, 
investigation, and correction/deletion/nonuse 
of erroneous or deficient information, and 
retain only information that is relevant and 
timely for its appropriate use. 
b. 
Establish criteria for types of information that 
partners can submit to the center. 
c. 
Include provisions for the use of privately held 
data systems information and commercially 
obtained data. 
d. 
Review the centers security policies and ensure 
that they are sufficient for providing appropriate 
physical, technical, and administrative measures 
to safeguard protected information. (See Section 
II.C. and ISE Privacy GuidelinesSection 6.) 
i. 
Ensure that the centers privacy and civil 
liberties policy articulates a process for 
Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers 


responding to and addressing security 
breaches, in coordination with the centers 
designated security officer. (See Section II.C.2.) 

e. 
The privacy protection policy shall include 
documentation on how the policies and 
procedures meet the following ISE Privacy 
Guidelines requirements (ISE Privacy Guidelines 
Section 12): 
i. 
Fusion centers shall adopt policies and 
procedures limiting the sharing of information 
through the ISE to terrorism, homeland 
security, and law enforcement (terrorism

5.
related) information, as defined for the ISE (see 
Glossary) and ensure that access to and use of 
protected information23 are consistent with the 
authorized purpose of the ISE.24 (ISE Privacy 
GuidelinesSection 3) 

ii. 
Fusion centers shall identify protected 
information to be shared through the ISE. 
4. 
Privacy Policy OutreachFusion 
centers shall implement necessary 
outreach and training for the execution, 
training, and technology aspects of the 
privacy protection policy. (ISE Privacy 
GuidelinesSection 9) 
a. 
Ensure that privacy protections are implemented 
through training, business process changes, and 
system designs. 
b. 
Provide ongoing training to center personnel and 
any other liaison partners on the fusion centers 
privacy policies and procedures. Training should 
be tailored to the audience (management, 
analysts, collectors, consumers of center products, 
etc.) but, at a minimum, should include: 
i. 
An overview of the policies and procedures 
for collection, use, disclosure of protected 
information, data quality, accountability, 
enforcement, auditing, and redress. 
ii. 
How to report violations of the privacy policy. 
23 The term protected information is defined in the ISE Privacy 
Guidelines, Section 1.b., for both non-intelligence agencies and members of 
the Intelligence Community. For both federal non-intelligence agencies and 
SLT agencies, it means, at a minimum, personally identifiable information 
about U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents. States are free to 
extend this definition to other classes of persons or to all persons (including 
organizations). 
24 The authorized purpose of the ISE is to share terrorism-related 
information in a lawful manner that protects the privacy and other legal 
rights of Americans between and among authorized recipients of such 
information. (ISE Privacy GuidelinesSection 3) 

iii. An overview of sanctions or enforcement 
mechanisms for failure to comply with the 
privacy policy. 
c. 
Consider and implement appropriate privacy-
enhancing technologies. 
d. 
Fusion centers shall facilitate public awareness 
of their privacy protection policy by making it 
available to the public or otherwise facilitating 
appropriate public awareness. (ISE Privacy 
GuidelinesSection 10) 
Privacy Policy AccountabilityFusion 
centers shall ensure accountability 
with regard to the privacy protection 
policy and identify evaluation methods 
for auditing and monitoring the 
implementation of the privacy policy and 
processes to permit individual redress 
and incorporate revisions and updates 

identified through the evaluation and 

monitoring as well as redress processes. 
(ISE Privacy GuidelinesSection 7) 

a. 
Fusion centers shall develop or modify policies, 
procedures, and mechanisms for accountability, 
enforcement, and auditing of the centers privacy 
protection. (ISE Privacy GuidelinesSection 7) 
i. 
Require reporting, investigating, and 
responding to violations of the centers privacy 
protection policy. 
ii. 
Encourage cooperation with audits and 
reviews. 
iii. Provide for receipt of error reports by the 
agency privacy official or committee. (See 
Section B.2., above.) 
iv. 
Implement adequate review and audit 
mechanisms to verify the centers compliance 
with its privacy protection policy. 
v. 
Incorporate the core elements of the 
ISE Privacy Guidelines Accountability, 
Enforcement, and Audit guidance into the 
fusion center ISE privacy policy. 
b. 
Fusion centers shall develop internal procedures 
for redressparticularly to address complaints 
from protected persons regarding personally 
identifiable information about them under fusion 
center control. (ISE Privacy GuidelinesSection 8) 
i. 
Incorporate the core elements of the ISE 
Privacy Guidelines Redress guidance into the 
fusion center ISE privacy protection policy. 
Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers 


c. Fusion centers should utilize the LEIU Audit 
Checklist for the Criminal Intelligence Function 
when reviewing their criminal intelligence 
function to demonstrate their commitment to 
protecting the constitutional rights and the privacy 
of individuals, while ensuring the operational 
effectiveness of their criminal intelligence 
function.25 

C. Security 
Ensure appropriate security measures are in 
place for the facility, data, and personnel. 
Guideline 9, Fusion Center Guidelines. 

1. 
Security MeasuresFusion centers shall 
establish appropriate security measures, 
policies, and procedures for the centers 
facility (physical security), information, 
systems, and personnel and visitors 
and document them in a security plan 
consistent with the NCISP, the Fusion 
Center Guidelines, Globals Applying 
Security Practices to Justice Information 
Sharing document, and 28 CFR Part 23. 
(Guidelines 8, 9, and 10, Fusion Center 
Guidelines) 
2. 
Security OfficerFusion centers 
shall designate an individual to serve 
as the security officer responsible 
for coordinating the development, 
implementation, maintenance, and 
oversight of the security plan. (Guideline 
9, Fusion Center Guidelines) 

a. 
For fusion centers colocated with other 
organizations (e.g., HIDTA, FBI), the fusion 
center can opt to use the other organizations 
security officer, provided that the officer is 
willing to perform the capabilities required of 
the fusion center security officer. If a colocated 
organizations security officer cannot or will not 
perform all of the functions, the fusion center 
should designate an individual to partner with the 
other organizations security officer to ensure that 
each of the baseline capabilities for security is met. 
b. 
Ensure that the designated security officer has 
at least some exposure to or experience with 
physical, information, systems, and/or personnel 
security. 
c. 
Ensure that the security officer receives routine 
training in the areas of physical, information, 
systems, and personnel security, to include the 
relevant DHS- or FBI-required training if the fusion 
center intends to establish and maintain a certified 
storage environment at the Secret level. 
d. 
The security officer should: 
i. 
Conduct security training and awareness on the 
centers overall security plan and the centers 
security measures, policies, and procedures. 
ii. 
Provide regular updates to the centers 
management and the governance body on 
compliance with the security plan. 
iii. Coordinate with federal security officials to the 
extent needed for facilitating federal security 
clearances for personnel, facility security 
certifications, and access to federal information 
systems. (Reference Section II.E. regarding 
security clearances for personnel.) 
iv. 
Establish and coordinate the processes 
used to conduct background checks on all 
center personnel prior to commencement of 
duties. (Reference Section II.D.2.) 
v. 
Receive, document, and investigate reports 
of security violations according to the centers 
security policies. 
LEIU Audit Checklist for the Criminal Intelligence Function, p. i. 

Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers 


3. 
Securing InformationFusion centers 
security policies shall address the ability 
to collect, store, and share classified, 
controlled unclassified, and unclassified 

information to address homeland 
security and criminal investigations. 
(Guidelines 7 and 14, Fusion Center 
Guidelines) 

a. 
In coordination with the appropriate federal 
security official, develop a process to receive, 
handle, store, and disseminate Secret-level 
information, to include establishing and 
maintaining a certified storage environment26 if 
one is not readily available.27 
b. 
Fusion centers shall follow the regulations and 
processes for security management of the certified 
storage environment, as required by the federal 
security manager (i.e., DHS or FBI), to include, but 
not limited to: 
i. 
Certification of computers and other electronic 
devices for classified information. 
ii. 
Storage of both paper and electronic media 
containing classified information. 
iii. Level of security clearance required to access 
the facility without escort. 
iv. 
Processes for certifying the security clearances 
of individuals assigned to or visiting the facility. 
v. 
Rules for access with escort for individuals 
not holding the requisite level of security 
clearance. 
vi. 
Processes for derivative classification and 
marking of classified information created 
within the facility. 
vii. Processes for dealing with any security 
incidents or violations that may take place. 
c. 
In coordination with the appropriate federal 
agencies, establish a policy to receive, handle, 
store, and disseminate federal information that 
is provided under the Controlled Unclassified 
Information Framework. (See Glossary.) 
26 Certified storage environments will either be DHS-certified Open 
Storage Secret or the equivalent FBI-certified closed storage environment. 
NOTE: The Open Storage authorization granted by DHS applies only to 
computer systems and not to document storage. 
27 DHS and the FBI have agreed to allocate the responsibilities 
for the following support to fusion centers to minimize redundancy: 
establishing operating classified work environments, getting personnel 
cleared to be able to access classified information, providing ways to 
communicate with the federal government, and other technical assistance. 
See the most recent version of the Federal Coordinated Support Plan for 
further information regarding these efforts. 

d. 
Ensure that security policies allow for timely 
distribution of the centers intelligence products to 
the centers constituency base, which may include 
daily, weekly, and monthly analysis reports and 
assessments; advisories; alerts; warnings; executive 
reports; briefings; etc. 
e. 
If a fusion center has chosen to incorporate the 
CIKR discipline, it shall have the ability to collect, 
store, and share Chemical-terrorism Vulnerability 
Information (CVI) (in accordance with 6 CFR 
Part 27), Safeguards Information (SGI), Sensitive 
Security Information (SSI) (in accordance with 
49 CFR Part 1520), and Protected Critical 
Infrastructure Information (PCII) in accordance 
with the PCII Final Rule. 
f. 
Consider whether a state law for security and 
confidentiality of public and private sector data is 
needed. 
g. 
Adopt established, accredited models for 
secure horizontal and vertical information and 
intelligence sharing (e.g., RISS, LEO, HSIN, 
OneDOJ). 
h. 
Ensure that controls and safeguards for data access 
to all appropriate systems are in place. 
D. Personnel and Training 
Achieve a diversified representation of 

personnel based on the needs and functions 
of the center.Guideline 11, Fusion Center 
Guidelines. 

1. Staffing PlanFusion center managers 
should develop a staffing plan based 
on the centers mission and goals and 
update as needed based on the current 

Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers 


information requirements, collection 
strategy, and analytic production plan. 
(Guideline 11, Fusion Center Guidelines) 

a. 
Managers should determine which positions 
require access to classified national security 
information based on the roles and responsibilities 
of the position and, through the centers security 
officer, make the request for national security 
clearances to the federal security manager.28 
b. 
Where appropriate, make clear when employment 
is contingent upon the applicants ability to meet 
the requirements necessary for receiving national 
security clearances. 
c. 
Adhere to the education and hiring standards for 
analysts in IALEIA and Globals Law Enforcement 
Analytic Standards booklet.29 
d. 
The staffing plan should address the following 
support of functions: administration, information 
technology, communications, graphics, designated 
security officer (Section II.C.), and designated 
privacy official (Section II.B.). 
e. 
The staffing plan should address the centers 
requirements to access legal counsel to help clarify 
laws, rules, regulations, and statutes governing 
the collection, maintenance, and dissemination 
of information and liaison with the development 
of policies, procedures, guidelines, and operation 
manuals. (Also required by Section II.B.2.a.) 
2. 
Background ChecksEnsure that 
background checks are conducted on 
center personnel (whether private or 
public) prior to the commencement of 
duties. (NCISP Recommendation 27 and 
Guideline 9, Fusion Center Guidelines) 
3. 
Training PlanFusion centers shall 
develop and document a training plan 
to ensure that personnel and partners 
understand the intelligence process and 
the fusion centers mission, functions, 
plans, and procedures. The plan shall 
identify the basic training needs of all 
center personnel and identify specialized 
training needed to address the centers 
28 See Footnote 21. 
29 IALEIA and Globals Law Enforcement Analytic Standards booklet 
is available at 

http://www.it.ojp.gov/documents/law_enforcement_analytic_standards.pdf. 

mission and current information 
requirements. (Guidelines 12 and 13, 
Fusion Center Guidelines) 

a. 
Reference each capability grouping for further 
details on minimum training requirements 
for particular capabilities (e.g., Analysis and 
Production, Management and Governance, 
Information Privacy Protections, and Security). 
b. 
At a minimum, all center personnel should be 
trained on: 
i. 
The intelligence process and types of 
intelligence, crime-specific training, and how 
these factors contribute to implementation 
of the centers collection plan, through the 
use of the NCISP training objectives and 
the Minimum Criminal Intelligence Training 
Standards for Law Enforcement and Other 
Criminal Justice Agencies in the United States. 
ii. 
Roles and responsibilities of intelligence and 
analytical functions in accordance with NIMS 
and ICS. 
iii. The centers privacy and security policies and 
protocols. 
c. 
Training should be provided to all fusion center 
personnel upon assignment to the center and 
include regular retraining. 
i. 
All fusion center personnelincluding analysts, 
intelligence officers, and non-law enforcement 
personnel assigned to the center (corrections, 
fire services, public health, private sector, and 
others)assigned both full-time, part-time, and 
on an as needed basis should be included in 
the training plan. 
d. 
See Guidelines 12 and 13, Fusion Center 
Guidelines, for additional information. 
Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers 


E. 
Information Technology/ 
Communications 
Infrastructure, Systems, 
Equipment, Facility, and 
Physical Infrastructure 
Integrate technology, systems, and people. 
Guideline 10, Fusion Center Guidelines. 

1. 
Business Processes Relating to 
Information TechnologyFusion 
centers shall identify and define their 
business processes prior to purchasing 
or developing information technology, 
communications infrastructure, systems, 
or equipment to handle those processes. 

a. 
Utilize the methodology and templates for 
analyzing the fusion centers business architecture 
provided by the Global document Fusion Center 
Business Architecture. 
2. Information Exchange within the 
CenterFusion centers shall establish 
an environment in which center 
personnel and partners can seamlessly 
communicateeffectively and efficiently 
exchanging information in a manner 
consistent with the business processes 
and policies of the fusion center. 
(Guidelines 6, 7, and 10, Fusion Center 
Guidelines) 

a. 
Ensure that appropriate personnel are colocated 
and/or virtually integrated within the center. 
b. 
Leverage databases, systems, and networks 
available from participating entities to maximize 
information sharing, and plan for future 
connectivity to other federal, state, local, and tribal 
systems under development. 
c. 
Utilize the latest version of NIEM for information 
exchange. 
d. 
Maintain a repository of information to be made 
available to the Information Sharing Environment, 
which will be a component of ISE Shared Spaces.30 
3. 
Communications PlanFusion centers 
shall have a plan to ensure safe, 
secure, and reliable communications, 
including policies and audit capabilities. 
(Guideline 18, Fusion Center Guidelines) 
a. 
Identify how fusion center partners will 
communicate during an incident or emergency. 
Ensure that existing communications capabilities 
are interoperable. 
b. 
Incorporate current communications plans utilized 
by law enforcement and emergency services. 
c. 
Ensure that redundancy is incorporated into the 
plan. 
d. 
Test the communications plan on a routine basis 
to ensure operability and maintenance of current 
contact information for fusion center participants. 
e. 
See Guideline 18 for recommended aspects of the 
communications plan. 
4. 
Contingency and Continuity-of-
Operations PlansFusion centers shall 
have contingency and continuity-ofoperations 
plans to ensure sustained 
execution of mission-critical processes 
and information technology systems 
during an event that causes these systems 
to fail and, if necessary, to ensure 
performance of essential functions at an 
alternate location during an emergency. 
(Guidelines 9, 10, and 18, Fusion Center 
Guidelines) 
30 See Footnote 14 or the Glossary for more information on the ISE 
Shared Spaces concept. 

Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers 


a. 
Conduct a threat/vulnerability assessment to 
determine risk to the facility, data, and personnel. 
b. 
Develop the plans in coordination with emergency 
managers and other appropriate response and 
recovery officials. (See Section I.A.8.) 
c. 
Clearly define personnel roles and responsibilities 
during emergency situations. 
d. 
Ensure that contact information for the 
constituency is up to date. 
e. 
Ensure redundancy of infrastructure, resources, 
personnel, communications, and systems. 
f. 
Establish an emergency power source. 
g. 
Conduct continuity-of-operations exercises to 
ensure the operational resiliency of the center. 
h. 
Reference Guidelines 9, 10, and 18 for 
recommended aspects for developing contingency 
and continuity-of-operations plans. 
F. Funding 
Establish and maintain the center based on 
funding availability and sustainability. 
Guideline 17, Fusion Center Guidelines. 

1. 
Investment StrategyFusion centers 
shall develop an investment strategy to 
achieve and sustain baseline capabilities 
for the centers operations, including a 
delineation of current and recommended 
future federal versus nonfederal costs. 
(Guideline 17, Fusion Center Guidelines) 
a. 
Base funding on center priorities identified by 
center leadership. 
b. 
Identify capability gaps and develop an investment 
strategy and resource plan to achieve the baseline 
capabilities. 
c. 
Establish an operational budget. 
d. 
Leverage existing resources/funding from 
participating entities and identify supplemental 
funding sources. 
e. 
Ensure that resource commitment of participating 
entities is addressed in the MOU. 
f. 
Identify return on investment for fusion center 
partners. 
g. 
Engage executive and legislative officials who have 
oversight and funding responsibilities, and provide 
routine briefings on the establishment, operations, 
and budgetary needs of the center. 
h. 
Ensure that the investment strategy is 
communicated to and coordinated with the 
state homeland security advisor (HSA) and 
State Administrative Agency (SAA) to ensure 
coordination and support of the states homeland 
security strategy and any respective state and/or 
urban area grant program investment justifications. 
Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers 


Appendix AFocus Group Participants Appendix AFocus Group Participants 
Mr. John D. Cohen 

Advisor to the Program Manager 
Office of the Program Manager, 
Information Sharing Environment 
Office of the Director of National Intelligence 

Major Daniel Cooney 

Criminal Intelligence Section 
New York State Intelligence Center 
New York State Police 

Mr. James Fullington 

Special Agent in Charge 
Georgia Information Sharing and 
Analysis Center 
Georgia Bureau of Investigation 

Mr. Van Godsey 

Director 
Missouri Information Analysis Center 
Missouri State Highway Patrol 

Captain William T. Harris 

Criminal Intelligence 
Delaware Information Analysis Center 
Delaware State Police 

Captain Richard W. Holland 

Criminal Intelligence Division 
Houston, Texas, Police Department 

Sergeant Lance Ladines 

Washington Joint Analytical Center 
Washington State Patrol 

Mr. Don R. Ladner, Jr. 

Assistant Special Agent in Charge 
Office of Statewide Intelligence 
Florida Department of Law Enforcement 

Mr. J. Patrick McCreary 

Associate Deputy Director 
Policy Office 
Bureau of Justice Assistance 
Office of Justice Programs 

U.S. Department of Justice 
Mr. Michael Mines 

Deputy Assistant Director 
Directorate of Intelligence 
Federal Bureau of Investigation 

Mr. Thomas J. OReilly 

Senior Policy Advisor for Information Sharing 
Bureau of Justice Assistance 
Office of Justice Programs 

U.S. Department of Justice 
Mr. Tim Parry 

Senior Investigator 
Counter Terrorism Center 
New York State Intelligence Center 
New York State Police 

Captain Charles Rapp 

Maryland Coordination and Analysis Center 
Baltimore County Police Department 

Mr. Robert C. Riegle 

Director, State and Local Program Office 
Office of Intelligence and Analysis 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
Mr. Kevin Saupp 

Section Chief, Prevention and Protection 
National Preparedness Directorate 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers 


Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers 


Appendix BBaseline Capabilities 
Crosswalk 
Appendix BBaseline Capabilities 
Crosswalk 
Each Baseline Capability is listed, followed by bullets 
indicating the sections of the documents related to that 
capability. 

 
TCL refers to the Target Capabilities List, September 
2007. 
 
NCISP refers to the National Criminal Intelligence 
Sharing Plan. 
 
FCG refers to the Fusion Center Guidelines. 
 
NSIS refers to the National Strategy for Information 
Sharing. 
II. Intelligence Process 
Capabilities 
A. 
Planning and Requirements Development 
1. 
Intrastate CoordinationIn developing and 
implementing all Fusion Process-related plans and 
procedures, the center shall coordinate with other fusion 
centers (the designated state fusion center and/or any 
UASI fusion center(s)) within its state to identify the roles 
and responsibilities of each center in carrying out the 
Fusion Process (gathering, processing, analyzing, and 
disseminating of terrorism, homeland security, and law 
enforcement information) on a statewide basis. 
 
TCL ComG 1.1.1 
 
TCL ComG 1.4.2 
 
TCL ComG 3.1 
 
TCL ComG 4.1 
 
TCL ComG 5.1 
 
TCL Pre.A1b 1.3 
 
TCL Pre.A1b 1.5 
 
TCL Pre.A1c 3.1 
 
TCL PreC1a 1.1 
 
FCG Guideline 4 
 
NSIS, Appendix 1, II. SLT Responsibility 5 
2. 
Risk AssessmentFusion centers shall conduct or 
contribute to a statewide and/or regional risk assessment 
that identifies and prioritizes threats, vulnerabilities, and 
consequences at regular intervals. 
 
FCG Guideline 14 
 
NSIS, Appendix 1, III. SLT Responsibility 1 
3. 
Information RequirementsThe information 
requirements for the fusion center shall be defined, 
documented, updated regularly, and consistent with 
the centers goals and objectives as defined by the 
governance structure and reflect the risks identified in 
the statewide and/or regional risk assessment. 
 
TCL Pre.A1b 1.3 
 
TCL Pre.A1b 1.4 
4. 
Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR)Fusion centers 
shall develop, implement, and maintain a plan to 
support the establishment of a suspicious activity and 
incident reporting process for their geographic area of 
responsibility, in a manner consistent with the Findings 
and Recommendations of the Suspicious Activity Report 
(SAR) Support and Implementation Project.31 Specifically, 
centers shall have the ability to receive, process, 
document, analyze, and share SARs in a manner that 
complies with the ISE-SAR Functional Standard. 
 
TCL Pre.A1b 4.1 
 
TCL Pre.A1b 4.2 
 
TCL Pre.A1b 4.3 
 
TCL Pre.A1b 4.4 
 
NSIS, Appendix 1, III. SLT Responsibilities 
5. 
Alerts, Warnings, and NotificationsFusion centers 
shall ensure that alerts, warnings, and notifications are 
disseminated, as appropriate, to state, local, and tribal 
authorities; the private sector; and the general public. 
 
TCL Pre.A1b 1.5 
31 The Major Cities Chiefs Association, Global, DOJ, and DHS 
supported the development of this report, which describes the all-crimes 
approach to gathering, processing, reporting, analyzing, and sharing of 
suspicious activity by the local police agency. 

Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers 


 
TCL Pre.A1b 1.7 
 
NSIS, Appendix 1, IV. SL Responsibilities 
6. 
Situational Awareness ReportingFusion centers 
shall develop processes to manage the reporting to 
key officials and the public of information regarding 
significant events (local, regional, national, and 
international) that may influence state or local security 
conditions. 
 
NSIS, Appendix 1, V. SL Responsibilities 
7. 
Data SourcesFusion centers shall identify and 
document data sources and repositories needed to 
conduct analysis based on the mission of the center, the 
findings of the Risk Assessment, and the centers defined 
Information Requirements. 
 
TCL Pre.A1b 5.2 
 
TCL Pre.A1c 3.2.1 
 
FCG Guideline 6 
8. 
Coordination With Response and Recovery Officials 
Fusion centers shall identify and coordinate with 
emergency managers and appropriate response and 
recovery personnel and operations centers to develop, 
implement, and maintain a plan and procedures 
to ensure a common understanding of roles and 
responsibilities and to ensure that intelligence and 
analysis capabilities can be leveraged to support 
emergency management operation activities, as 
appropriate, when events require such a response. 
 
TCL ComG 5.1.1 
 
TCL Pre.C1a 3.5.2 
9. 
Coordination With Private Sector and Critical 
Infrastructure and Key Resources (CIKR) Information 
SharingFusion centers, in partnership with locally 
based federal authorities, shall develop, implement, and 
maintain a plan and procedures for sharing information 
with owners of CIKR and, in general, the private sector, 
in a coordinated manner. 
 
TCL ComG 5.2 
 
TCL Pre.C1a 3.6 
 
TCL Pre.C1a 3.2.1.2 
 
FCG Guideline 3 
 
NCISP Recommendation 7 
10. ExercisesFusion centers should conduct or participate 
in another agencys scenario-based tabletop and live 
training exercises to regularly assess their capabilities. 
 
TCL ComG 2.2.1 
 
TCL Pre.C1a 2.2.2 
 
FCG Guideline 12 
B. 
Information Gathering/Collection 
1. 
Information-Gathering and -Reporting StrategyFusion 
centers shall develop, implement, and maintain an 
information-gathering and -reporting strategy that 
leverages existing capabilities and shall identify methods 
for communicating information requirements and the 
overall information-gathering strategy to partners, to 
include any applicable fusion liaison officers. 

 
TCL Pre.A1b 3.1 
 
TCL Pre.A1b 3.1.1 
 
TCL Pre.A1b 3.2 
 
TCL Pre.A1b 3.3 
 
TCL Pre.A1b 3.3.1 
 
TCL Pre.A1b 5.3 
 
TCL Pre.A1c 4.1 
2. 
Feedback MechanismFusion centers shall define and 
implement a feedback mechanism that: 
a. 
Provides the reporting entity an acknowledgement 
of the receipt of its information and, to the extent 
possible, provides feedback on the value of the 
information and actions taken with the information. 
b. 
Allows collectors to make suggestions to improve 
the strategy, plans, or processes, as well as seek 
clarification on information requirements. 
c. 
Allows recipients of information or products to make 
suggestions to improve products. 
 
TCL Pre.A1b 1.4 
 
TCL Pre.A1b 1.6 
4. 
Collection and Storage of InformationFusion centers 
shall define the policies and processes and establish 
a mechanism for receiving, cataloging, and retaining 
information provided to the center. 
 
TCL Pre.A1b 1.2 
 
TCL Pre.A1b 3.1.2 
 
TCL Pre.A1c 6.3 
 
FCG Guideline 6 
 
NCISP Recommendations 9 and 11 
C. 
Processing and Collation of Information 
1. 
Information CollationFusion center analysts shall use 
the necessary and available tools to process and collate 
information and intelligence to assist with accurate and 
timely analysis. 
 
TCL Pre.A1b 3.1.2 
 
TCL Pre.A1b 5.3 
 
TCL Pre.A1b 1.2 
 
TCL Pre.A1c 5.1 
 
TCL Pre.A1c 5.2.1 
2. 
Levels of ConfidenceFusion centers shall liaise with 
partners to ensure that information collected is relevant, 
valid, and reliable. 
 
TCL Pre.A1c 4.2 
Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers 


D. 
Intelligence Analysis and Production 
1. 
Analytic ProductsFusion centers shall develop, 
implement, and maintain a production plan that 
describes the types of analysis and products they intend 
to provide for their customers and partners (which, 
at a minimum, include Risk Assessments; Suspicious 
Activity Reporting; Alerts, Warnings, and Notifications; 
and Situational Awareness Reporting [see Sections 
I.A.2, 4, 5, and 6 for further details on these product 
types]), how often or in what circumstances the product 
will be produced, and how each product type will be 
disseminated. 
 
TCL Pre.A1c 1.1.3 
 
TCL Pre.A1c 1.2 
 
TCL Pre.A1c 1.3.2 
 
TCL Pre.A1c 6.2 
 
FCG Guideline 14 
2. 
Fusion Process ManagementAn intelligence 
commander/manager should be designated to oversee 
the management of the Fusion Process (including the 
collection, collation, analytic function, dissemination, 
and reevaluation of information and intelligence) within 
the center. 
3. 
Enhancing Analyst SkillsThe fusion center should 
develop and implement a Training and Professional 
Development Plan to enhance analysts critical thinking, 
research, writing, presentation, and reporting skills. 
 
TCL Pre.A1c 1.4.1 
 
FCG Guideline 12 
4. 
Information LinkingFusion centers shall ensure that 
analysts are able to understand and identify the links 
between terrorism-related intelligence and information 
related to traditional criminal activity so they can identify 
activities that are indicative of precursor behaviors, 
terrorist activities, and threats. 
 
TCL Pre.A1c 5.2.3 
 
TCL Pre.C1a 3.5 
 
TCL Pre.C1a 3.5.1 
 
FCG Guidelines 12, 13, and 14 
5. 
Strategic Analysis ServicesFusion centers shall develop 
the capability to provide strategic analysis services for 
the jurisdiction served. 
 
TCL Pre.A1c 5.2.2 
 
FCG Guideline 14 
6. 
Open Source Analysis CapabilityFusion centers shall 
establish an open source analysis capability utilizing 
the free training and tools provided by the federal 
government. 
7. 
Analyst SpecializationFusion centers should assign 
accounts or specialties to analysts based on the 
priorities of the fusion center, to allow the development 
of analytic depth. 

 
FCG Guideline 11 
8. 
Analytical ToolsFusion centers shall provide the 
necessary tools to analysts for the analysis of information 
and data. 
 
TCL Pre.A1c 5.2.4 
 
FCG Guidelines 11 and 14 
 
NCISP Recommendation 28 
E. 
Intelligence/Information Dissemination 
1. 
Dissemination PlanFusion centers shall develop 
a high-level dissemination plan that documents the 
procedures and communication mechanisms for the 
timely dissemination of the centers various products to 
the core and ad hoc customers. 
 
TCL ComG 3.1 
 
TCL ComG 3.1.1 
 
TCL ComG 4.1.2 
 
TCL Pre.A1c 1.3 
 
TCL Pre.A1c 6.1 
 
TCL Pre.C1a 4.4 
2. 
Reporting of Information to Other CentersFusion 
centers shall develop the processes and protocols for 
ensuring that relevant and vetted priority information is 
reported to fusion centers in other states and localities to 
support regional trends analysis. 
 
TCL ComG 3.1 
 
TCL ComG 4.1.1 
 
TCL Pre.A1c 1.3.1 
 
TCL Pre.A1c 3.3 
 
TCL Pre.C1a 1.1 
 
TCL Pre.A1c 6.4 
 
FCG Guidelines 7 and 14 
3. 
Reporting of Information to Federal PartnersFusion 
centers shall develop the processes and protocols, in 
coordination with the FBI and DHS Office of Intelligence 
and Analysis (I&A), for ensuring that relevant and vetted 
priority information is reported to the JTTF and other 
appropriate federal agencies to support its inclusion into 
national patterns and trends analysis. 
 
TCL ComG 3.1 
 
TCL ComG 4.1.1 
 
TCL Pre.A1b 1.4 
 
TCL Pre.A1c 3.4 
 
TCL Pre.C1a 4.1 
 
TCL Pre.C1a 4.1.1 
F. 
Reevaluation 
1. 
Performance EvaluationFusion centers shall develop 
and implement a plan to reevaluate the centers 
performance of the intelligence cycle on a regular basis. 
 
FCG Guideline 16 
Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers 


2. 
Fusion Center Processes ReviewFusion centers shall 
establish a process to review and, as appropriate, update 
the centers information requirements, collection plan, 
and analytic production strategy on a regular basis and 
any time one of the following is received: 
a. 
New threat or vulnerability information; 
b. 
New federal or state standing or ad hoc 
information requirements; 
c. 
Federal or state alerts, warnings, or notifications or 
situational awareness bulletins; and/or 
d. 
Updated risk assessment. 
 
FCG Guideline 16 
II. Management and 
Administrative Capabilities 
A. 
Management/Governance 
1. 
Governance StructureFusion centers shall have 
a governance structure that provides appropriate 
representation for the jurisdictions and disciplines in the 
centers area of responsibility. 
 
FCG Guidelines 3, 4, and 5 
2. 
Mission StatementFusion centers shall have a defined 
mission statement that is clear and concise and conveys 
the purpose, priority, and roles of the center. 
 
FCG Guideline 2 
3. 
Collaborative EnvironmentFusion centers shall 
identify the organizations that represent their core 
(permanent) and ad hoc stakeholders and the roles 
and responsibilities of each stakeholder and develop 
mechanisms and processes to facilitate a collaborative 
environment with these stakeholders. 
 
TCL ComG 1.1.1 
 
TCL ComG 1.1.2 
 
FCG Guidelines 4, 5, and 11 
4. 
Policies and Procedures ManualFusion centers shall 
develop a policies and procedures manual for center 
operations. 
 
TCL ComG 1.3 
 
TCL Pre.A1b 1.1 
 
FCG Guideline 15 
5. 
Center PerformanceFusion centers shall define 
expectations, measure performance, and determine 
effectiveness of their operations. 
 
FCG Guideline 16 
6. 
OutreachFusion centers shall establish a policy to 
govern official outreach and communications with 
leaders and policymakers, the public sector, the private 
sector, the media, and citizens, and develop a plan 
to enhance awareness of the fusion centers purpose, 
mission, and functions. 

 
TCL Pre.C1a 4.2 
 
FCG Guidelines 12 and 13 
B. 
Information Privacy Protections 
1. 
Privacy OfficialFusion centers shall designate an 
individual to serve as the privacy official and/or establish 
a privacy committee to be responsible for coordinating 
the development, implementation, maintenance, 
and oversight of the privacy protection policies and 
procedures. 
 
FCG Guideline 8 
 
ISE Privacy GuidelinesSection 12 
2. 
Privacy Policy DevelopmentIn developing the privacy 
policy, fusion centers shall: 
a. 
Develop guidance statements that include the 
vision, mission, values statements, goals, and 
objectives for the creation of the privacy policy. 
b. 
Develop a project charter that will include an 
introduction, background, membership, and the 
previously drafted guidance statements. 
c. 
Analyze the flow of information and the legal 
environment for the protection of privacy 
to identify what gaps exist between existing 
technological and legal requirements. 
d. 
Vet the privacy protection policy internally and 
externally during its development by soliciting 
commentary and buy-in from stakeholders and 
agency constituents prior to finalizing the policy. 
e. 
Formally adopt a privacy protection policy to 
guide the collection, use, maintenance, and 
dissemination of personal information. 
 
TCL ComG 1.4 
 
FCG Guideline 8 
 
ISE Privacy GuidelinesSection 12.d. 
 
ISE Privacy GuidelinesSection 3 
 
NCISP Recommendation 6 
3. 
Privacy ProtectionsFusion centers shall develop and 
implement a privacy protection policy that ensures that 
the centers activities (collection/gathering, analysis, 
dissemination, storage, and use of information) are 
conducted in a manner that protects the privacy, civil 
liberties, and other legal rights of individuals protected 
by applicable law, while ensuring the security of the 
information shared. The policy shall cover all center 
activities and shall be at least as comprehensive as 
the requirements set forth in the Information Sharing 
Environment Privacy Guidelines and consistent with 
Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers 


28 CFR Part 23 and DOJs Global Privacy and Civil 
Liberties Policy Development Guide and Implementation 
Templates. 

 
TCL ComG 1.2.1 
 
TCL ComG 3.1.2 
 
TCL Pre.A1c 3.6 
 
FCG Guideline 8 
 
NCISP Recommendations 9 and 15 
4. 
Privacy Policy OutreachFusion centers shall implement 
necessary outreach and training for the execution, 
training, and technology aspects of the privacy 
protection policy. 
 
FCG Guideline 8 
 
ISE Privacy GuidelinesSection 9 
5. 
Privacy Policy AccountabilityFusion centers shall 
ensure accountability with regard to the privacy 
protection policy and identify evaluation methods 
for auditing and monitoring the implementation of 
the privacy policy and processes to permit individual 
redress and incorporate revisions and updates identified 
through the evaluation and monitoring as well as redress 
processes. 
 
TCL ComG 3.1.3 
 
FCG Guideline 8 
 
ISE Privacy GuidelinesSection 7 
C. 
Security 
1. 
Security MeasuresFusion centers shall establish 
appropriate security measures, policies, and procedures 
for the centers facility (physical security), information, 
systems, and personnel and visitors and document them 
in a security plan consistent with the NCISP, the Fusion 
Center Guidelines, Globals Applying Security Practices to 
Justice Information Sharing document, and 
28 CFR Part 23. 
 
TCL Pre.A1c 3.6 
 
FCG Guidelines 8, 9, and 10 
2. 
Security OfficerFusion centers shall designate an 
individual to serve as the security officer responsible 
for coordinating the development, implementation, 
maintenance, and oversight of the security plan. 
 
FCG Guideline 9 
3. 
Securing InformationFusion centers security policies 
shall address the ability to collect, store, and share 
classified, controlled unclassified, and unclassified 
information to address homeland security and criminal 
investigations. 
 
TCL ComG 3.1.2 
 
FCG Guidelines 7 and 14 
D. 
Personnel and Training 
1. 
Staffing planFusion center managers should develop 
a staffing plan based on the centers mission and goals 
and update as needed based on the current information 
requirements, collection strategy, and analytic 
production plan. 
 
TCL Pre.A1c 1.4 
 
FCG Guideline 11 
2. 
Background ChecksEnsure that background checks 
are conducted on center personnel (whether private or 
public) prior to the commencement of duties. 
 
TCL Pre.C1a 1.7 
 
NCISP Recommendation 27 
 
FCG Guideline 9 
3. 
Training PlanFusion centers shall develop and 
document a training plan to ensure that personnel 
and partners understand the intelligence process and 
the fusion centers mission, functions, plans, and 
procedures. The plan shall identify the basic training 
needs of all center personnel and identify specialized 
training needed to address the centers mission and 
current information requirements. 
 
TCL ComG 2.1.1 
 
TCL Pre.A1b 2.1.1 
 
TCL Pre.A1c 2.1.1 
 
TCL Pre.A1c 1.4.1 
 
TCL Pre.C1a 1.3 
 
TCL Pre.C1a 2.1.3 
 
FCG Guidelines 12 and 13 
 
NCISP Recommendation 18 
E. 
Information Technology/Communications 
Infrastructure, Systems, Equipment, Facility, 
and Physical Infrastructure 
1. 
Business Processes Relating to Information Technology 
Fusion centers shall identify and define their business 
processes prior to purchasing or developing information 
technology, communications infrastructure, systems, or 
equipment to handle those processes. 
 
FCG Guideline 7 
2. 
Information Exchange Within the CenterFusion 
centers shall establish an environment in which center 
personnel and partners can seamlessly communicate 
effectively and efficiently exchanging information in 
a manner consistent with the business processes and 
policies of the fusion center. 
 
TCL ComG 1.2.1 
 
TCL Pre.A1b 5.1 
 
TCL Pre.A1c 3.2.1 
 
FCG Guidelines 6, 7, and 10 
Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers 


3. 
Communications PlanFusion centers shall have a plan 
to ensure safe, secure, and reliable communications, 
including policies and audit capabilities. 
 
TCL Pre.A1c 3.3 
 
FCG Guideline 18 
4. 
Contingency and Continuity-of-Operations Plans 
Fusion centers shall have contingency and continuityof-
operations plans to ensure sustained execution of 
mission-critical processes and information technology 
systems during an event that causes these systems to 
fail and, if necessary, to ensure performance of essential 
functions at an alternate location during an emergency. 
 
TCL ComG 1.2.2 
 
TCL ComG 1.4.3 
 
TCL Pre.A1c 3.2.2 
 
FCG Guidelines 9, 10, and 18 
F. 
Funding 
1. 
Investment StrategyFusion centers shall develop an 
investment strategy to achieve and sustain baseline 
capabilities for the centers operations, including a 
delineation of current and recommended future federal 
versus nonfederal costs. 
 
FCG Guideline 17 
 
NSIS Appendix 1, II. SLT Responsibility 4 
Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers 


Appendix CGlossary of Terms Appendix CGlossary of Terms 
Access (to sensitive information) 

Sensitive information and/or intelligence may be released by 
a law enforcement agency when at least one of the following 
four prescribed circumstances applies to the person(s) 
receiving the information: 

Right to Know 

Based on having legal authority, ones official position, 
legal mandates, or official agreements, allowing the 
individual to receive intelligence reports. 

Need to Know 

As a result of jurisdictional, organizational, or operational 
necessities, intelligence or information is disseminated to 
further an investigation. 

Investigatory Value 

Intelligence or information is disseminated in the law 
enforcement community for surveillance, apprehension, 
or furtherance of an investigation. 

Public Value 

Intelligence or information can be released to the 
public when there is a need to know and a right to 
know the information because of the value that may be 
derived from public dissemination, to (1) aid in locating 
targets/suspects and (2) for public safety purposes (i.e., 
hardening targets, taking precautions). 

Administrative Analysis 

The analysis of economic, geographic, demographic, census, 
or behavioral data to identify trends and conditions useful 
to aid administrators in making policy and/or resource 
allocation decisions. 

All-Crimes Approach 

An approach that incorporates terrorism and other high-risk 
threats into the existing crime-fighting framework, to ensure 
that possible precursor crimes are screened and analyzed 
for linkages to larger-scale terrorist or other crimes. This 
approach recognizes that there is a nexus between types of 

criminal activity (for example, illegal drug operations, gangs, 
money laundering, fraud, identity theft, and terrorism). 
Using an all-crimes approach does not imply that a fusion 
center must address every single crime that occurs within 
its area of responsibility. Rather, the routine risk assessment 
that a fusion center develops or supports development of 
should assist in prioritizing which crimes and/or hazards a 
state or region should address and, in the development of a 
collection plan, identify what other sources of information 
may be useful for examining possible connections with other 
crimes. 

All-Hazards Approach 

Refers to preparedness for terrorist attacks, major disasters, 
and other emergencies within the United States. (Source: 
HSPD-8, December 17, 2003.) Within the context of the 
Fusion Process, some fusion centers have defined their 
mission to include an all-hazards approach. While the 
application of this approach varies, in general, it means that 
the fusion center has identified and prioritized types of major 
disasters and emergencies, beyond terrorism and crime, that 
could occur within their jurisdiction and gathers, analyzes, 
and disseminates information which would assist the relevant 
responsible agencies (law enforcement, fire, public health, 
emergency management, critical infrastructure, etc.) with the 
prevention, protection, response, or recovery efforts of those 
incidents. A fusion center can use an all-hazards approach 
but not address in its operations every possible hazard. Part 
of the annual risk assessment a fusion center develops or 
supports development of should identify which hazards a 
state or region should prioritize within its homeland security 
planning process, as well as provide the fusion center with 
the prioritization needed to develop relevant Priority 
Information Requirements. 

Allocation 

Collection and analysis of information that shows 
relationships among varied individuals suspected of being 
involved in criminal activity that may provide insight into the 
criminal operation and which investigative strategies might 
work best. 

Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers 


Analysis 

That activity whereby meaning, actual or suggested, is 
derived through organizing and systematically examining 
diverse information and applying inductive or deductive 
logic for the purposes of criminal investigation or assessment. 

Archiving (Records) 

The maintenance of records in remote storage after a case 
has been closed or disposed of, as a matter of contingency, 
should the records be needed for later reference. 

Association Analysis 

The entry of critical investigative and/or assessment variables 
into a two-axis matrix to examine the relationships and 
patterns that emerge as the variables are correlated in the 
matrix. 

Automated Trusted Information Exchange 
(ATIX) 

Operated by the Regional Information Sharing Systems, 
ATIX is a secure means to disseminate national security or 
terrorist threat information to law enforcement and other 
first responders via the ATIX electronic bulletin board, secure 
Web site, and secure e-mail. 

Baseline Capability 

A capability provides the means to accomplish a mission 
or function resulting from the performance of one or more 
critical tasks, under specified conditions, to target levels 
of performance. A capability may be delivered with any 
combination of properly planned, organized, equipped, 
trained, and exercised personnel that achieves the desired 
outcome. (Source: National Preparedness Guidelines, p. 40.) 
Within the context of this document, a baseline capability 
for a fusion center is a capability necessary for the fusion 
center to perform its core functions of gathering, processing, 
analyzing, and disseminating terrorism, homeland security, 
and law enforcement information. 

Bias/Hate Crime 

Any criminal act directed toward any person or group as a 
result of that persons race, ethnicity, religious affiliation, or 
sexual preference. 

Capabilities-Based Preparedness 

Preparing, under uncertainty, to provide capabilities 
suitable for a wide range of challenges while working within 
an economic framework that necessitates prioritization and 
choice. (Source: National Preparedness Guidelines, p. 30.) 

Clandestine Activity 

An activity that is usually extensive and goal-oriented, 
planned, and executed to conceal the existence of the 
operation. Only participants and the agency sponsoring 
the activity are intended to know about the operation. 
Storefront operations, stings, and certain concentrated 

undercover investigations (such as ABSCAM) can be 
classified as clandestine collections. 

Classified Information/Intelligence 

A uniform system for classifying, safeguarding, and 
declassifying national security information, including 
information relating to defense against transnational 
terrorism, to ensure that certain information is maintained 
in confidence in order to protect citizens, U.S. democratic 
institutions, U.S. homeland security, and U.S. interactions 
with foreign nations and entities. 

Top Secret Classification 

Applied to information, the unauthorized disclosure 
of which reasonably could be expected to cause 
exceptionally grave damage to the national security 
that the original classification authority is able to 
identify or describe (Executive Order 12958, 
March 25, 2003). 

Secret Classification 

Applied to information, the unauthorized disclosure 
of which reasonably could be expected to cause 
serious damage to the national security that the 
original classification authority is able to identify or 
describe (Executive Order 12958, March 25, 2003). 

Confidential Classification 

Applied to information, the unauthorized disclosure 
of which reasonably could be expected to cause 
damage to the national security that the original 
classification authority is able to identify or describe 
(Executive Order 12958, March 25, 2003). 

Collation (of information) 

A review of collected and evaluated information to 
determine its substantive applicability to a case or problem 
at issue and placement of useful information into a form or 
system that permits easy and rapid access and retrieval. 

Collection (of information) 

The identification, location, and recording/storing of 
information, typically from an original source and using 
both human and technological means, for input into the 
intelligence cycle for the purpose of meeting a defined 
tactical or strategic intelligence goal. 

Collection Plan 

The preliminary step toward completing an assessment 
of intelligence requirements to determine what type of 
information needs to be collected, alternatives for how to 
collect the information, and a timeline for collecting the 
information. 

Commodity (Illegal) 

Any item or substance that is inherently unlawful to possess 
(contraband) or materials which, if not contraband, are 

Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers 


themselves being distributed, transacted, or marketed in an 
unlawful manner. 

Commodity Flow Analysis 

Graphic depictions and descriptions of transactions, 
shipment, and distribution of contraband goods and money 
derived from unlawful activities in order to aid in the 
disruption of the unlawful activities and apprehend those 
persons involved in all aspects of the unlawful activities. 

Common Terrorism Information Sharing 
Standards (CTISS) 

Business process-driven, performance-based common 
standards for preparing terrorism information for maximum 
distribution and access, to enable the acquisition, access, 
retention, production, use, management, and sharing of 
terrorism information within the ISE. Two categories of 
common standards are formally identified under CTISS: 
functional standards and technical standards. Functional 
standards set forth rules, conditions, guidelines, and 
characteristics of data and mission products supporting 
ISE business process areas. Technical standards document 
specific technical methodologies and practices to design and 
implement information sharing capability into ISE systems. 
CTISS, such as ISE-SAR, are implemented in ISE participant 
infrastructures that include ISE Shared Spaces as described in 
the ISE Enterprise Architecture Framework. 

Conclusion 

A definitive statement about a suspect, action, or state of 
nature based on the analysis of information. 

Confidential 

See Classified Information/Intelligence, Confidential 
Classification. 

Continuing Criminal Enterprise 

Any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or 
other legal entity and any union or group of individuals 
associated in fact, although not a legal entity, that are 
involved in a continuing or perpetuating criminal activity. 

Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) 

A categorical designation that refers to unclassified 
information that does not meet the standards for National 
Security Classification under Executive Order 12958, as 
amended, but is (i) pertinent to the national interests of 
the United States or to the important interests of entities 
outside the federal government, and (ii) under law or policy 
requires protection from unauthorized disclosure, special 
handling safeguards, or prescribed limits on exchange 
or dissemination. Henceforth, the designation CUI 
replaces Sensitive But Unclassified (SBU). (Presidential 
Memorandum to Heads of Executive Departments and 
Agencies, Designation and Sharing of Controlled Unclassified 
Information [CUI], May 7, 2008.) 

Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) 

Framework and Implementation 

Refers to the single set of policies and procedures governing 
the designation, marking, safeguarding, and dissemination 
of CUI terrorism-related information that originates in 
departments and agencies, regardless of the medium used 
for the display, storage, or transmittal of such information. 
The Presidents May 7, 2008, Memorandum directed all 
federal agencies to implement the CUI Framework, which 
consists of policies and standards for the designation, 
marking, safeguarding, and dissemination of any CUI 
terrorism-related information within the ISE that originates 
in federal agencies, regardless of the medium used for its 
display, storage, or transmittal. The President designated 
the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) 
as the Executive Agent responsible for overseeing and 
managing implementation of the framework, to include the 
development of CUI policy standards and implementation 
guidance. Implementation is expected to occur over a 
5-year transition period. The Memorandum designates 
that all CUI shall merit one of two levels of safeguarding 
proceduresstandard (marked Controlled) or enhanced 
(marked Controlled Enhanced)and one of two levels 
of dissemination controlsStandard Dissemination 
or Specified Dissemination. This allows for three 
combinations of safeguarding procedures and dissemination 
controls: 

(i) Controlled with Standard Dissemination 
meaning the information requires standard 
safeguarding measures that reduce the risks 
of unauthorized or inadvertent disclosure. 
Dissemination is permitted to the extent that it 
is reasonably believed that it would further the 
execution of a lawful or official purpose. 
(ii) Controlled with Specified Dissemination 
meaning the information requires safeguarding 
measures that reduce the risks of unauthorized or 
inadvertent disclosure. Material contains additional 
instructions on what dissemination is permitted. 
(iii) Controlled Enhanced with Specified 
Disseminationmeaning the information 
requires safeguarding measures more stringent 
than those normally required since the inadvertent 
or unauthorized disclosure would create risk of 
substantial harm. Material contains additional 
instructions on what dissemination is permitted. 
With regards to the CUI Frameworks application to state, 
local, tribal, and private sector entities: 

 
The CUI Memorandum applies only to federal 
Executive Branch departments and agencies that 
handle and share terrorism-related information 
or are participants in the Information Sharing 
Environment. 
Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers 


 
State and local government officials participated 
extensively in developing the framework, and many 
have indicated that they will voluntarily adopt the 
CUI Framework. 
 
The President directed NARA to develop and issue 
CUI policy standards and implementation guidance 
consistent with the Memorandum, to include 
appropriate recommendations for state, local, 
tribal, private sector, and foreign partner entities for 
implementing the CUI Framework. 
 
The Memorandum directs that federal agencies 
receiving CUI which originated from a state, 
local, tribal, private sector, or foreign partner shall 
retain any nonfederal legacy markings, unless the 
originator authorizes its removal. 
 
The Information Sharing Councils State, Local, 
Tribal, and Private Sector Subcommittee will be 
consulted during the development of procedures, 
guidelines, and standards necessary to establish, 
implement, and maintain the CUI Framework. 
(Presidential Memorandum to Heads of Executive 
Departments and Agencies, Designation and Sharing of 
Controlled Unclassified Information [CUI], May 7, 2008.) 

Coordination 

The process of interrelating work functions, responsibilities, 
duties, resources, and initiatives directed toward goal 
attainment. 

Counterintelligence 

Information gathered and activities conducted to protect 
against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, 
or assassinations conducted by or on behalf of foreign 
governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, 
or foreign persons or international terrorist activities. One 
type of intelligence included in the National Intelligence 
or Intelligence Related to National Security definitions. 
(50 U.S.C.  401a; Section 3 of the National Security Act of 
1947, as amended.) 

Covert Intelligence 

A covert activity planned and executed to conceal the 
collection of information and/or the identity of any officer or 
agent participating in the activity. 

Crime Analysis 

The process of analyzing information collected on crimes 
and police service delivery variables in order to give 
direction for police officer deployment, resource allocation, 
and policing strategies as a means to maximize crime 
prevention activities and the cost-effective operation of the 
police department. 

Crime-Pattern Analysis 

An assessment of the nature, extent, and changes of crime 
based on the characteristics of the criminal incident, 
including modus operandi, temporal, and geographic 
variables. 

Criminal History Record Information (CHRI) 

Information collected by criminal justice agencies on 
individuals, consisting of identifiable descriptions and 
notations of arrests, detentions, indictments, information, 
or other formal criminal charges and any disposition arising 
therefrom, including sentencing, correctional supervision, 
and/or release. The term does not include identification 
information, such as fingerprint records, to the extent that 
such information does not indicate involvement of the 
individual in the criminal justice system. 

Criminal Informant 

See Informant. 

Criminal Intelligence 

See Intelligence (Criminal) and Law Enforcement 
Intelligence. 

Criminal Investigative Analysis 

An analytic process that studies serial offenders, victims, and 
crime scenes in order to assess characteristics and behaviors 
of offender(s) with the intent to identify or aid in the 
identification of the offender(s). 

Criminal Predicate 

Information about an individual or his/her behavior that 
may only be collected and stored in a law enforcement 
intelligence records system when there is reasonable 
suspicion that the individual is involved in criminal conduct 
or activity and the information is relevant to that criminal 
conduct or activity. 

Data Element 

A field within a database that describes or defines a specific 
characteristic or attribute. 

Data Owner 

The agency that originally enters information or data into a 
law enforcement records system. 

Data Quality 

Controls implemented to ensure that all information in a law 
enforcement agencys records system is complete, accurate, 
and secure. 

Deconfliction 

The process or system used to determine whether multiple 
law enforcement agencies are investigating the same person 
or crime and that provides notification to each agency 
involved of the shared interest in the case, as well as 
providing contact information. This is an information and 

Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers 


intelligence sharing process that seeks to minimize conflicts 
between agencies and maximize the effectiveness of an 
investigation. 

Deductive Logic 

The reasoning process of taking information and arriving at 
conclusions from within that information. 

Deployment 

The short-term assignment of personnel to address specific 
crime problems or police service demands. 

Designated State and/or Major Urban Area Fusion 
Center 

The fusion center in each state designated as the primary or 
lead fusion center for the information sharing environment. 

Dissemination (of Intelligence) 

The process of effectively distributing analyzed intelligence 
utilizing certain protocols in the most appropriate format 
to those in need of the information to facilitate their 
accomplishment of organizational goals. 

Due Process 

Fundamental fairness during the course of the criminal 
justice process, including adherence to legal standards and 
the civil rights of the police constituency; the adherence to 
principles that are fundamental to justice. 

El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC) 

A cooperative intelligence center serving as a clearinghouse 
and intelligence resource for local, state, and federal 
law enforcement agencies. Its primary concern is drug 
trafficking; however, intelligence on other crimes is also 
managed by EPIC. 

Enterprise 

Any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or 
other legal entity and any union or group of individuals 
associated in fact, although not a legal entity. 

Estimate 

See Intelligence Estimate. 

Evaluation (of Information) 

Review of all information collected for the intelligence 
cycle for its quality, with an assessment of the validity and 
reliability of the information. 

Event Flow Analysis 

Graphic depictions and descriptions of incidents, behaviors, 
and people involved in an unlawful event, intended to 
help understand how an event occurred as a tool to aid in 
prosecution as well as prevention of future unlawful events. 

Exemptions (to the Freedom of Information Act) 

Circumstances wherein a law enforcement agency is 
not required to disclose information from a Freedom of 
Information Act (FOIA) request. 

Field Intelligence Group (FIG) 

The centralized intelligence component in a Federal Bureau 
of Investigation (FBI) field office that is responsible for the 
management, execution, and coordination of intelligence 
functions within the field office region. 

Field Intelligence Report (FIR) 

An officer-initiated interview of a person believed by the 
officer to be acting in a suspicious manner that may be 
indicative of planning or preparing to conduct criminal 
activity. 

Financial Analysis 

A review and analysis of financial data to ascertain the 
presence of criminal activity. It can include bank record 
analysis, net worth analysis, financial profiles, source and 
applications of funds, financial statement analysis, and/ 
or Bank Secrecy Act record analysis. It can also show 
destinations of proceeds of crime and support prosecutions. 

Flow Analysis 

The review of raw data to determine the sequence of 
events or interactions that may reflect criminal activity. It 
can include timelines, event flow analysis, commodity flow 
analysis, and activity flow analysis and may show missing 
actions or events that need further investigation. 

For Official Use Only (FOUO) 

A designation previously used for marking unclassified 
sensitive information. This designation has been replaced by 
the Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) Framework 
see CUI Framework for more. (Presidential Memorandum to 
Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, Designation 
and Sharing of Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI), 
May 7, 2008.) 

Forecast (as related to Criminal Intelligence) 

The product of an analytic process that provides a 
probability of future crimes and crime patterns based upon 
a comprehensive, integrated analysis of past, current, and 
developing trends. 

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) 

The Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C.  552, enacted 
in 1966, statutorily provides that any person has a right, 
enforceable in court, to access federal agency records, 
except to the extent that such records (or portions thereof) 
are protected from disclosure by one of nine exemptions. 

Fusion Center 

A collaborative effort of two or more agencies that provide 
resources, expertise, and information to the center with the 

Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers 


goal of maximizing the ability to detect, prevent, investigate, 
and respond to criminal and terrorism activity. (Fusion 
Center Guidelines, August 2006); recognized as a valuable 
information sharing resource, state and major urban area 
fusion centers are the focus, but not exclusive points, within 
the state and local environment for the receipt and sharing 
of terrorism information, homeland security information, and 
law enforcement information related to terrorism. Federal 
agencies will provide terrorism-related information to state, 
local, and tribal authorities primarily through these fusion 
centers, which may further customize such information for 
dissemination to satisfy intra- or interstate needs. Likewise, 
fusion centers enable the effective communication of locally 
generated terrorism-related information to the federal 
government and other fusion centers through the ISE. 
(National Strategy for Information Sharing, October 2007.) 

Fusion Center Guidelines, August 2006 

A nationally recognized document developed to ensure that 
fusion centers are established and operated consistently, 
resulting in enhanced coordination efforts, strengthened 
partnerships, and improved crime-fighting and anti-terrorism 
capabilities. The guidelines were developed by law 
enforcement intelligence, public safety, and private sector 
subject-matter experts through the Global Justice Information 
Sharing Initiative and the Homeland Security Advisory 
Council. The Guidelines have been endorsed by the 

U.S. Departments of Justice and Homeland Security and the 
National Strategy for Information Sharing. 

Fusion Process 

The overarching process of managing the flow of information 
and intelligence across levels and sectors of government and 
private industry. It goes beyond establishing an information/ 
intelligence center or creating a computer network. The 
Fusion Process supports the implementation of risk-based, 
information-driven prevention, response, and consequence 
management programs. The Fusion Process turns 
information and intelligence into actionable knowledge. 
(Fusion Center Guidelines, August 2006.) 

Guidelines 

See Intelligence Records Guidelines. 

Homeland Security Advisory System 

An information and communications structure designed by 
the U.S. government for disseminating information to all 
levels of government and the American people regarding 
the risk of terrorist attacks and for providing a framework to 
assess the risk at five levels: Low, Guarded, Elevated, High, 
and Severe. 

Hypothesis (from Criminal Intelligence Analysis) 

An interim conclusion regarding persons, events, and/or 
commodities based on the accumulation and analysis of 
intelligence information that is to be proven or disproved by 
further investigation and analysis. 

Indicator 

Generally defined and observable actions that, based on 
an analysis of past known behaviors and characteristics, 
collectively suggest that a person may be committing, may 
be preparing to commit, or has committed an unlawful act. 

Inductive Logic 

The reasoning process of taking diverse pieces of specific 
information and inferring a broader meaning of the 
information through the course of hypothesis development. 

Inference Development 

The creation of a probabilistic conclusion, estimate, or 
prediction related to an intelligence target based upon the 
use of inductive or deductive logic in the analysis of raw 
information related to the target. 

Informant 

An individual not affiliated with a law enforcement agency 
who provides information about criminal behavior to a law 
enforcement agency. An informant may be a community 
member, a businessperson, or a criminal informant who 
seeks to protect himself/herself from prosecution and/or 
provide the information in exchange for payment. 

Information 

Pieces of raw, unanalyzed data that identify persons, 
evidence, or events or illustrate processes that indicate the 
incidence of a criminal event or witnesses or evidence of a 
criminal event. 

Information Classification 

See Classified Information/Intelligence. 

Information Evaluation 

See Evaluation (of Information). 

Information Sharing Environment (ISE) 

A trusted partnership among all levels of government, the 
private sector, and foreign partners to detect, prevent, 
preempt, and mitigate the effects of terrorism against 
territory, people, and interests of the United States of 
America. This partnership enables the trusted, secure, and 
appropriate exchange of terrorism information, in the first 
instance, across the five federal communities; to and from 
state, local, and tribal governments, foreign allies, and the 
private sector; and at all levels of security classifications. 

ISE Shared Spaces Concept or Shared Spaces 

The ISE Shared Spaces concept is a key element of the ISE 
Enterprise Architecture Framework and helps resolve the 
information-processing and usage problems identified by 
the 9/11 Commission. ISE Shared Spaces are networked 
data and information repositories used by ISE participants 
to make their standardized terrorism-related information, 
applications, and services accessible to other ISE participants. 
ISE Shared Spaces also provide an infrastructure solution for 

Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers 


those ISE participants with national security system (NSS) 
network assets, historically sequestered with only other 
NSS systems, to interface with ISE participants having only 
civil network assets. Additionally, ISE Shared Spaces also 
provide the means for foreign partners to interface and share 
terrorism information with their U.S. counterparts. For more 
information about the ISE Shared Spaces concept, reference 
the ISE Enterprise Architecture Framework and the ISE Profile 
Architecture and Implementation Strategy at www.ise.gov. 

ISE-Suspicious Activity Report (ISE-SAR) 

An ISE-SAR is a SAR that has been determined, pursuant to 
a two-part process, to have a potential terrorism nexus. ISESAR 
business rules will serve as a unified process to support 
the reporting, tracking, processing, storage, and retrieval of 
terrorism-related suspicious activity reports across the ISE. 

Information Sharing System 

An integrated and secure methodology, whether 
computerized or manual, designed to efficiently and 
effectively distribute critical information about offenders, 
crimes, and/or events in order to enhance prevention and 
apprehension activities by law enforcement. 

Information System 

An organized means, whether manual or electronic, of 
collecting, processing, storing, and retrieving information on 
individual entities for purposes of record and reference. 

Intelligence (Criminal) 

The product of the analysis of raw information related to 
crimes or crime patterns with respect to an identifiable 
person or group of persons in an effort to anticipate, prevent, 
or monitor possible criminal activity (or investigate or 
prosecute). 

Intelligence Analyst 

A professional position in which the incumbent is responsible 
for taking the varied facts, documentation of circumstances, 
evidence, interviews, and any other material related to 
a crime and organizing them into a logical and related 
framework for the purposes of developing a criminal case, 
explaining a criminal phenomenon, describing crime and 
crime trends and/or preparing materials for court and 
prosecution, or arriving at an assessment of a crime problem 
or crime group. 

Intelligence Assessment 

A comprehensive report on an intelligence issue related 
to criminal or national security threats available to federal, 
state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies. 

Intelligence Bulletins 

A finished intelligence product in article format that 
describes new developments and evolving trends. The 
bulletins are typically sensitive but unclassified (SBU) and 

available for distribution to federal, state, local, and tribal law 
enforcement. 

Intelligence Community 

Agencies of the U.S. government identified by statute and 
Executive Order, including intelligence elements of the 

U.S. Department of Defense, that have the responsibility 
to conduct intelligence activities necessary for the conduct 
of foreign relations and the protection of the national and 
homeland security of the United States. These activities 
include, in part, the collection of information and the 
production and dissemination of intelligence. (50 U.S.C. 
 401a; Section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947, as 
amended; and Executive Order 12333.) 
Intelligence Estimate 

The appraisal, expressed in writing or orally, of available 
intelligence relating to a specific situation or condition with 
a view to determining the courses of action open to criminal 
offenders and terrorists and the order of probability of their 
adoption. Includes strategic projections on the economic, 
human, and/or quantitative criminal impact of the crime or 
issue that is subject to analysis. 

Intelligence Function 

That activity within a law enforcement agency responsible 
for some aspect of law enforcement intelligence, whether 
collection, analysis, and/or dissemination. 

Intelligence Gap 

An unanswered question about a cyber, criminal, or national 
security issue or threat. 

Intelligence Information Reports (IIR) 

Raw, unevaluated intelligence concerning perishable or 
time-limited information about criminal or national security 
issues. While the full IIR may be classified, local, state, and 
tribal law enforcement agencies will have access to sensitive 
but unclassified information in the report under the tear line. 

Intelligence-Led Policing 

The dynamic use of intelligence to guide operational law 
enforcement activities to targets, commodities, or threats 
for both tactical responses and strategic decision making for 
resource allocation and/or strategic responses. 

Intelligence Mission 

The role that the intelligence function of a law enforcement 
agency fulfills in support of the overall mission of the agency; 
it specifies in general language what the function is intended 
to accomplish. 

Intelligence Officer 

A law enforcement officer assigned to an agencys 
intelligence function for the purposes of investigation, liaison, 
or other intelligence-related activity that requires or benefits 
from having a sworn officer perform the activity. 

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Intelligence Process 

An organized process by which information is gathered, 
assessed, and distributed in order to fulfill the goals of the 
intelligence functionit is a method of performing analytic 
activities and placing the analysis in a useable form. 

Intelligence Products 

Reports or documents that contain assessments, forecasts, 
associations, links, and other outputs from the analytic 
process that may be disseminated for use by law 
enforcement agencies for the prevention of crimes, target 
hardening, apprehension of offenders, and prosecution. 

Intelligence Records (Files) 

Stored information on the activities and associations of 
individuals, organizations, businesses, and groups who are 
suspected (reasonable suspicion) of being involved in the 
actual or attempted planning, organizing, financing, or 
commissioning of criminal acts or are suspected of being or 
having been involved in criminal activities with known or 
suspected crime figures. 

Intelligence Records Guidelines 

Derived from the federal regulation 28 CFR Part 23, 
these are guidelines/standards for the development of 
records management policies and procedures used by law 
enforcement agencies. 

International Criminal Police Organization 
(INTERPOL) 

A worldwide law enforcement organization established 
for mutual assistance in the prevention, detection, and 
deterrence of international crimes. It houses international 
police databases, provides secure international 
communications between member countries for the 
exchange of routine criminal investigative information, and 
is an information clearinghouse on international criminals/ 
fugitives and stolen properties. 

Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) 

The joint operational group, led by the FBI, that leverages 
the collective resources of member agencies to prevent, 
investigate, disrupt, and deter terrorism threats that affect 
United States interests and facilitates information sharing 
among partner agencies. 

Key Word In Context (KWIC) 

An automated system that indexes selected key words that 
represent the evidence or information being stored. 

Law Enforcement Intelligence 

The end product (output) of an analytic process that collects 
and assesses information about crimes and/or criminal 
enterprises with the purpose of making judgments and 
inferences about community conditions, potential problems, 
and criminal activity with the intent to pursue criminal 

prosecution or project crime trends or support informed 
decision making by management. 

Law Enforcement Sensitive (LES) 

Sensitive but unclassified information specifically compiled 
for law enforcement purposes that, if not protected from 
unauthorized access, could reasonably be expected to 

(1) interfere with law enforcement proceedings, (2) deprive 
a person of a right to a fair trial or impartial adjudication, (3) 
constitute an unwarranted invasion of the personal privacy of 
others, (4) disclose the identity of a confidential source, (5) 
disclose investigative techniques and procedures, and/or 6) 
endanger the life or physical safety of an individual. 
Methods 

These are the methodologies (e.g., electronic surveillance 
or undercover operations) of how critical information is 
obtained and recorded. 

Money Laundering 

The practice of using multiple unlawful transactions of 
money and/or negotiable instruments gained through illegal 
activities with the intent of hiding the origin of the income, 
those who have been paid from the income, and/or the 
location of the unlawful income. 

National Central Bureau (NCB or USNCB) 

The United States NCB headquarters (INTERPOL) is located 
in Washington, DC. 

National Criminal Intelligence Resource Center 
(NCIRC) 

An Internet Web site that contains information regarding 
law enforcement intelligence operations and practices and 
provides criminal justice professionals with a centralized 
resource information bank to access a multitude of criminal 
intelligence resources to help law enforcement agencies 
develop, implement, and retain a lawful and effective 
intelligence capacity. 

National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan 

(NCISP), November 2004 

A formal intelligence sharing initiative, supported by the 

U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, that 
securely links federal, state, local, and tribal law enforcement 
agencies, facilitating the exchange of critical intelligence 
information. The Plan contains model policies and standards 
and is a blueprint for law enforcement administrators to 
follow when enhancing or building an intelligence function. 
It describes a nationwide communications capability that 
will link all levels of law enforcement personnel, including 
officers on the street, intelligence analysts, unit commanders, 
and police executives. 
National Information Exchange Model (NIEM) 

A joint technical and functional standards program initiated 
by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and 

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the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) that supports national-
level interoperable information sharing. 

National Intelligence or Intelligence Related to 
National Security 

Defined by Section 3 of the National Security Act of 
1947, as amended, as A) information relating to the 
capabilities intentions or activities of foreign governments or 
elements thereof, foreign organizations, or foreign persons, 
or international terrorist activities (known as foreign 
intelligence); and B) information gathered and activities 
conducted to protect against espionage, other intelligence 
activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted by or on 
behalf of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign 
organizations, or foreign persons, or international terrorist 
activities (known as counterintelligence), regardless of 
the source from which derived and including information 
gathered within or outside the United States, that (A) pertains 
to more than one United States Government agency; and 

(B) involves (i) threats to the United States, its people, 
property, or interests; (ii) the development, proliferation, or 
use of weapons of mass destruction; or (iii) any other matter 
bearing on the United States national or homeland security. 
(50 U.S.C.  401a) The goal of the National Intelligence 
effort is to provide the President and the National Security 
Council with the necessary information on which to base 
decisions concerning the conduct and development of 
foreign, defense, and economic policy and the protection of 
United States national interests from foreign security threats. 
(Executive Order 12333.) 
National Joint Terrorism Task Force 

A joint entity led by the FBI and composed of over 40 
agencies and established to enhance communication, 
coordination, and cooperation among federal, state, and 
local government agencies representing the intelligence, 
law enforcement, defense, diplomatic, public safety, and 
homeland security community by providing a point of 
fusion for the sharing of terrorism threats and intelligence; 
to provide operational support to the Counterterrorism 
Division; and to provide program management, oversight, 
and support for the JTTFs throughout the United States. 

National Preparedness Guidelines 

The U.S. governments guiding document for all-hazards 
preparedness, issued October 2007. The Guidelines 
established a vision for national preparedness and provide 
a systematic approach for organizing, synchronizing, and 
prioritizing national (including federal, state, local, tribal, 
and territorial) efforts to strengthen national preparedness. 
The Guidelines are umbrella documents that collate many 
plans, strategies, and systems into an overarching framework, 
the National Preparedness System. The Guidelines were 
developed in response to the Presidents Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive 8 (HSPD-8) of December 17, 2003 
(National Preparedness). The Guidelines adopt an all-

hazards approach and facilitate a capability-based and risk-
based investment planning process for preparedness. 

Network 

A structure of interconnecting components designed to 
communicate with each other and perform a function or 
functions as a unit in a specified manner. 

Open Communications (OPCOM) 

The collection of open or publicly available communications, 
broadcasts, audio or video recordings, propaganda, 
published statements, and other distributed written or 
recorded material for the purposes of analyzing the 
information. 

Open Source Information (or Intelligence) 

Individual data, records, reports, and assessments that may 
shed light on an investigatory target or event which does 
not require any legal process or any type of clandestine 
collection techniques for a law enforcement agency to 
obtain. Rather, it is obtained through means that meet 
copyright and commercial requirements of vendors, as well 
as being free of legal restrictions to access by anyone who 
seeks that information. 

Operational Analysis 

An assessment of the methodology of a criminal enterprise 
or terrorist organization that depicts how the enterprise 
performs its activities, including communications, philosophy, 
compensation, security, and other variables that are essential 
for the enterprise to exist. 

Operational Intelligence 

Information evaluated and systematically organized on an 
active or potential target, such as groups of or individual 
criminals, relevant premises, contact points, and methods 
of communication. This process is developmental in nature 
wherein there are sufficient articulated reasons to suspect 
criminal activity. Intelligence activities explore the basis of 
those reasons and newly developed information in order to 
develop a case for arrest or indictment. 

Outcome Evaluation 

The process of determining the value or amount of success 
in achieving a predetermined objective through defining 
the objective in some qualitative or quantitative measurable 
terms, identifying the proper criteria (or variables) to be used 
in measuring the success toward attaining the objective, 
determination and explanation of the degree of success, and 
recommendations for further program actions to attain the 
desired objectives/outcomes. 

Planning 

The preparation for future situations, estimating 
organizational demands and resources needed to attend to 
those situations, and initiating strategies to respond to those 
situations. 

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Pointer System or Index 

A system that stores information designed to identify 
individuals, organizations, and/or crime methodologies with 
the purpose of linking law enforcement agencies that have 
similar investigative and/or intelligence interests in the entity 
defined by the system. 

Policy 

The principles and values that guide the performance of a 
duty. A policy is not a statement of what must be done in 
a particular situation. Rather, it is a statement of guiding 
principles that should be followed in activities which are 
directed toward the attainment of goals. 

Prediction 

The projection of future criminal actions or changes in the 
nature of crime trends or a criminal enterprise based on an 
analysis of information depicting historical trends from which 
a forecast is based. 

Preventive Intelligence 

Intelligence that can be used to interdict or forestall a crime 
or terrorist attack. 

Privacy (Information) 

The assurance that legal and constitutional restrictions on the 
collection, maintenance, use, and disclosure of personally 
identifiable information will be adhered to by criminal justice 
agencies, with use of such information to be strictly limited 
to circumstances in which the legal process permits use of 
the personally identifiable information. 

Privacy (Personal) 

The assurance that legal and constitutional restrictions on the 
collection, maintenance, use, and disclosure of behaviors 
of an individualincluding his/her communications, 
associations, and transactionswill be adhered to by 
criminal justice agencies, with the use of such information 
to be strictly limited to circumstances in which legal process 
authorizes surveillance and investigation. 

Privacy Act 

Legislation that allows an individual to review almost all 
federal files pertaining to him/her, places restrictions on the 
disclosure of personally identifiable information, specifies 
that there be no secret records systems on individuals, and 
compels the government to reveal its information sources. 

Privacy Field 

A data element that may be used to identify an individual 
and, therefore, may be subject to privacy protection. (ISESAR 
Functional Standard.) 

Proactive 

Taking action that is anticipatory to a problem or situation 
with the intent to eliminate or mitigate the effect of the 
incident. 

Procedural Due Process 

Mandates and guarantees of law that ensure that the 
procedures employed to deprive a person of life, liberty, or 
property, during the course of the criminal justice process, 
meet constitutional standards. 

Procedure 

A method of performing an operation or a manner of 
proceeding on a course of action. It differs from policy in 
that it directs action in a particular situation to perform a 
specific task within the guidelines of policy. Both policies 
and procedures are goal-oriented. However, policies 
establish limits to action, whereas procedures direct 
responses within those limits. 

Profile/Criminal Profile 

An investigative technique used to identify and define the 
major personality and behavioral characteristics of the 
criminal offender based upon an analysis of the crime(s) he 
or she has committed. 

Protected Information 

Defined in the ISE Privacy Guidelines, Section 1.b.For 
federal non-intelligence agencies and state, local, and tribal 
agencies, it means, at a minimum, personably identifiable 
information about U.S. citizens and lawful permanent 
residents. States can extend this definition to other classes of 
persons or to all persons (including organizations). 

Protocol (of Intelligence Collection) 

Information collection procedures employed to obtain verbal 
and written information, actions of people, and physical 
evidence required for strategic and tactical intelligence 
analysis. 

Purging (Records) 

The removal and/or destruction of records because they are 
deemed to be of no further value or further access to the 
records would serve no legitimate government interest. 

Qualitative (Methods) 

Research methods that collect and analyze information 
which is described in narrative or rhetorical form, with 
conclusions drawn based on the cumulative interpreted 
meaning of that information. 

Quantitative (Methods) 

Research methods that collect and analyze information 
which can be counted or placed on a scale of measurement 
that can be statistically analyzed. 

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations 

(RICO) Act (or similar state statutes) 

Title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 (18 

U.S.C. Sections 19611968) provides civil and criminal 
penalties for persons who engage in a pattern of racketeering 
Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers 


activity or collection of an unlawful debt that has a specified 
relationship to an enterprise that affects interstate commerce. 

Racketeering Activity 

State felonies involving murder, robbery, extortion, and 
several other serious offenses and more than 30 serious 
federal offenses, including extortion, interstate theft offenses, 
narcotics violations, mail fraud, and securities fraud. 

Reasonable Suspicion 

The existence of information that establishes sufficient facts 
to give a trained law enforcement or criminal investigative 
agency officer, investigator, or employee a basis to believe 
that there is a reasonable possibility that an individual or 
organization is involved in a definable criminal activity or 
enterprise. 

Recommendations 

Suggestions for actions to be taken based on the findings of 
an analysis. 

Records (Intelligence) 

See Intelligence Records (Files). 

Records System 

A group of records from which information is retrieved by 
reference to a name or other personal identifier, such as a 
social security number. 

Regional Information Sharing Systems (RISS) 

RISS is composed of six regional intelligence centers 
that provide secure communications, information 
sharing resources, and investigative support to combat 
multijurisdictional crime and terrorist threats to more 
than 8,000 federal, state, local, and tribal member law 
enforcement agencies in all 50 states, the District of 
Columbia, U.S. territories, Australia, Canada, and England. 

Regional Intelligence Centers 

Multijurisdictional centers cooperatively developed within a 
logical geographical area that coordinate federal, state, and 
local law enforcement information with other information 
sources to track and assess criminal and terrorist threats that 
are operating in or interacting with the region. 

Reliability 

Asks the question, Is the source of the information 
consistent and dependable? 

Reporting 

Depending upon the type of intelligence, the process of 
placing analyzed information into the proper form to ensure 
the most effective consumption. 

Requirements (Information or Intelligence) 

The types of intelligence operational law enforcement 
elements need from the intelligence function within an 

agency or other intelligence-producing organizations in order 
for law enforcement officers to maximize protection and 
preventive efforts as well as identify and arrest persons who 
are criminally liable. 

Responsibility 

Responsibility reflects how the authority of a unit or 
individual is used and determines whether goals have been 
accomplished and the mission fulfilled in a manner that is 
consistent with the defined limits of authority. 

Risk Assessment 

Risk is defined as the product of three principal variables: 
Threatthe likelihood of an attack occurring and 
Vulnerability and Consequencethe relative exposure and 
expected impact of an attack. Risk assessment is the process 
of qualitatively or quantitatively determining the probability 
of an adverse event and the severity of its impact on an asset. 
It is a function of threat, vulnerability, and consequence. 
A risk assessment may include scenarios in which two or 
more risks interact to create greater or lesser impact. A risk 
assessment provides the basis for the rank ordering of risks 
and for establishing priorities for countermeasures. 

Risk is classically represented as the product of a probability 
of a particular outcome and the results of that outcome. 
A statewide or regional assessment of the threats, 
vulnerabilities, and consequences faced by the fusion 
centers geographic area responsibility. The risk assessment 
is used to identify priority information requirements for the 
fusion center and to support state and urban area homeland 
security preparedness planning efforts to allocate funding, 
capabilities, and other resources. 

In traditional criminal intelligence, a risk assessment means 
an analysis of a target, illegal commodity, or victim to identify 
the probability of being attacked or criminally compromised 
and to analyze vulnerabilities. 

Risk Management-Based Intelligence 

Risk management is a continual process or cycle in 
which risks are identified, measured, and evaluated; 
countermeasures are then designed, implemented, and 
monitored to see how they perform, with a continual 
feedback loop for decision-maker input to improve 
countermeasures and consider tradeoffs between risk 
acceptance and avoidance. 

An approach to intelligence analysis that has as its object 
the calculation of the risk attributable to a threat source or 
acts threatened by a threat source; a means of providing 
strategic intelligence for planning and policymaking, 
especially regarding vulnerabilities and countermeasures 
designed to prevent criminal acts; a means of providing 
tactical or operational intelligence in support of operations 
against a specific threat source, capability, or modality; 
can be quantitative if a proper database exists to measure 

Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers 


likelihood and impact and calculate risk; can be qualitative 
and subjective and still deliver a reasonably reliable ranking 
of risk for resource allocation and other decision making in 
strategic planning and for operations in tactical situations. 

Rule 

A specific requirement or prohibition that is stated to prevent 
deviations from policy or procedure. A violation of a rule 
typically results in an internal investigation and may result in 
disciplinary action. 

Sealing (Records) 

Records stored by an agency that cannot be accessed, 
referenced, or used without a court order or statutory 
authority based on a showing of evidence that there is 
a legitimate government interest to review the sealed 
information. 

Sector Coordinating Councils (SCCs) 

Serve as the governments principal point of entry into 
each sector for the purpose of addressing the entire range 
of CIKR protection and risk management issues. While 
they are supported and facilitated by DHS and the sector-
specific agency, SCCs are self-organized, self-governed 
entities composed of a broad base of sector infrastructure 
owner-operators and their representatives from sector trade 
associations. Often chaired by a sector owner-operator, 
SCCs serve as honest brokers to facilitate sector-wide 
organization and coordination of a sectors CIKR protection 
policy development, planning, and program implementation 
and monitoring activities. Each SCC identifies, coordinates 
and supports the information sharing principles, needs, and 
capabilities most appropriate for its sector as required by 
HSPD-7. 

Security 

A series of procedures and measures that, when combined, 
provide protection of people from harm, information from 
improper disclosure or alteration, and assets from theft or 
damage. (Criminal Justice Commission, 1995.) 

Sensitive But Unclassified (SBU) Information 

Refers collectively to the various designations used, prior 
to the issuance of the Controlled Unclassified Information 
framework, within the federal government for documents 
and information that are sufficiently sensitive to warrant 
some level of protection from disclosure but that do not 
warrant classification. (Presidential Memorandum to Heads 
of Executive Departments and Agencies, Designation and 
Sharing of Controlled Unclassified Information [CUI], May 7, 
2008.) 

Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) 

Classified information concerning or derived from 
intelligence sources, methods, or analytical processes that is 
required to be handled within formal access control systems. 

Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility 
(SCIF) 

An accredited area, room, group of rooms, buildings, or an 
installation where SCI may be stored, used, discussed, and/ 
or processed. 

Sensitive Homeland Security Information (SHSI) 

Any information created or received by an agency or any 
local, county, state, or tribal government that the loss, 
misuse, unauthorized disclosure, modification of, or the 
unauthorized access to could reasonably be expected to 
significantly impair the capabilities and/or efforts of agencies 
and/or local, county, state, and tribal personnel to predict, 
analyze, investigate, deter, prevent, protect against, mitigate 
the effects of, or recover from acts of terrorism. SHSI does 
not include any information that is: 

1. 
Classified as national security information pursuant 
to Executive Order 12958, as amended, or any 
successor order. 
2. 
Designated by Executive Order 12951, any 
successor order, or the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 
(42 U.S.C.  2011), to require protection against 
unauthorized disclosure. 
3. 
Protected Critical Infrastructure Information (PCII) as 
defined in 6 CFR Part 29.2. 
4. 
Sensitive Security Information (SSI) as defined in 
49 CFR Part 1520. 
Shared Spaces or Shared Space Concept 

See ISE Shared Spaces Concept 

Sources 

From an intelligence perspective, these are persons (human 
intelligence, or HUMINT) who collect or possess critical 
information needed for intelligence analysis. 

Spatial Analysis 

The process of using a geographic information system in 
combination with crime-analysis techniques to assess the 
geographic context of offenders, crimes, and other law 
enforcement activity. 

Statistical System 

An organized means of collecting, processing, storing, and 
retrieving aggregate information for the purposes of analysis, 
research, and reference. No individual records are stored in 
a statistical system. 

Strategic Intelligence 

An assessment of targeted crime patterns, crime trends, 
criminal organizations, and/or unlawful commodity 
transactions for the purposes of planning, decision making, 
and resource allocation; the focused examination of unique, 
pervasive, and/or complex crime problems. 

Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers 


Substantive Due Process 

Guarantees persons against arbitrary, unreasonable, or 
capricious laws and acts as a limitation against arbitrary 
governmental actions so that no government agency 
may exercise powers beyond those authorized by the 
Constitution. 

Surveillance 

The observation of activities, behaviors, and associations of a 
LAWINT target (individual or group) with the intent to gather 
incriminating information, or lead information, which is 
used for the furtherance of a criminal investigation. 

Suspicious Activity 

Reported or observed activity and/or behavior that, based 
on an officers training and experience, is believed to 
be indicative of intelligence gathering or preoperational 
planning related to terrorism, criminal, or other illicit 
intention. (Findings and Recommendations of the Suspicious 
Activity Report (SAR) Support and Implementation Project, 
June 2008; and ISE-SAR Functional Standard version 1.0.) 

Suspicious Activity Report (SAR) 

Official documentation of reported or observed activity 
and/or behavior that, based on an officers training and 
experience, is believed to be indicative of intelligence 
gathering or preoperational planning related to terrorism, 
criminal, or other illicit intention. (Findings and 
Recommendations of the Suspicious Activity Report (SAR) 
Support and Implementation Project, June 2008; and ISESAR 
Functional Standard version 1.0.) 

Tactical Intelligence 

Evaluated information on which immediate enforcement 
action can be based; intelligence activity focused specifically 
on developing an active case. 

Target 

Any person, organization, group, crime or criminal series, or 
commodity being subject to investigation and intelligence 
analysis. 

Target Capabilities List 

A component of the National Preparedness Guidelines, 
which describe the collective national capabilities required 
to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from 
terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies. The 
Guidelines use a capabilities-based preparedness approach 
to planning. Simply put, a capability provides the means 
to accomplish a mission. Some capabilities cut across all 
mission areas and are therefore placed in a Common Mission 
Area. Relevant Target Capabilities for fusion centers include: 

 
Intelligence/Information Sharing and Dissemination 
(Common Mission Area) 
 
Risk Management (Common) 
 
Information Gathering and Recognition of Indicators 
and Warnings (Prevent) 
 
Intelligence Analysis and Production (Prevent) 
 
Counter-Terror Investigations and Law Enforcement 
(Prevent) 
 
Law Enforcement Investigation and Operations 
(Prevent) 
In addition, some fusion centers defined missions support 
other capabilities, such as: 

 
Critical Infrastructure Protection (Protect) 
 
Epidemiological Surveillance and Investigation 
(Protect) 
 
Food and Agriculture Safety and Defense (Protect) 
 
Emergency Public Information and Warning 
(Response) 
 
Public Safety and Security Response (Response) 
 
CBRNE Detection (Prevent) 
Note on Using the Target Capabilities ListThe Target 
Capabilities List should be viewed as a reference document 
or guide to preparedness. The TCL is available for review at 
www.llis.dhs.gov. 

Target Profile 

A profile that is person-specific and contains sufficient detail 
to initiate a target operation or support an ongoing operation 
against an individual or networked group of individuals. 

Targeting 

The identification of crimes, crime trends, and crime 
patterns that have discernable characteristics which make 
collection and analysis of intelligence information an efficient 
and effective method for identifying, apprehending, and 
prosecuting those who are criminally responsible. 

Tear-Line Report 

A report containing classified intelligence or information 
that is prepared in such a manner that data relating to 
intelligence sources and methods are easily removed from 
the report to protect sources and methods from disclosure. 
Typically, the information below the tear line can be 
released as sensitive but unclassified. 

Telephone Record (Toll)/Communications 
Analysis 

An assessment of telephone call activity associated with 
investigatory targets to include telephone numbers called 
and/or received, the frequency of calls between numbers, 
the dates of calls, length of calls, and patterns of use. 

Third-Agency Rule 

An agreement wherein a source agency releases information 
under the condition that the receiving agency does not 
release the information to any other agencythat is, a third 
agency. 

Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers 


Threat Assessment 

An assessment of a criminal or terrorist presence within 
a jurisdiction integrated with an assessment of potential 
targets of that presence and a statement of probability 
that the criminal or terrorist will commit an unlawful act. 
The assessment focuses on the criminals or terrorists 
opportunity, capability, and willingness to fulfill the threat. 

Undercover Investigation 

Active infiltration of or an attempt to infiltrate a group 
believed to be involved in criminal activity and/or the 
interaction with a LAWINT target with the intent to gather 
incriminating information or lead information that is used for 
the furtherance of a criminal investigation. 

Validity 

Asks the question, Does the information actually represent 
what we believe it represents? 

Variable 

Any characteristic on which individuals, groups, items, or 
incidents differ. 

Vet 

To subject a proposal, work product, or concept to an 
appraisal by command personnel and/or experts to ascertain 
the products accuracy, consistency with philosophy, and/or 
feasibility before proceeding. 

Violent Criminal Apprehension Program (VICAP) 

A nationwide data information center operated by the FBIs 
National Center for the Analysis of Violent Crime, designed 
to collect, collate, and analyze specific crimes of violence. 

Vulnerability Assessment 

An assessment of possible criminal or terrorist group targets 
within a jurisdiction integrated with an assessment of the 
targets weaknesses, likelihood of being attacked, and ability 
to withstand an attack. 

Warning 

To notify in advance of possible harm or victimization as a 
result of information and intelligence gained concerning the 
probability of a crime or terrorist attack. 

Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers 


Appendix CAcronym List Appendix CAcronym List 
AAG Associate Attorney General 
ABA American Bar Association 
ACA American Correctional Association 
ACJA American Criminal Justice Association 
ACLU American Civil Liberties Union 
ACS Automated Case System (FBI) 
ACTIC Arizona Counter Terrorism Information 
Center 
ADA Assistant District Attorney (or Americans 
with Disabilities Act) 
AFIS Automated Fingerprint Identification System 
AG Attorney General 
APB Advisory Policy Board or All Points Bulletin 
APPA American Probation and Parole Association 
ARJIS Automated Regional Justice Information 
System 
ASAC Assistant Special Agent in Charge 
ASCA Association of State Correctional 
Administrators 
ASCIA Association of State Criminal Investigative 
Agencies 
ATAC Anti-Terrorism Advisory Council 
ATF Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and 
Explosives 
ATIX Automated Trusted Information Exchange 
ATTF Anti-Terrorism Task Force (FBI) 
AUSA Assistant U.S. Attorney 
BATFE Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and 
Explosives 
BJA Bureau of Justice Assistance 
BJS Bureau of Justice Statistics 
BOP Federal Bureau of Prisons 
BSA Bank Secrecy Act (FinCEN-related) 

CAD Computer-Aided Dispatch 
CAT Communities Against Terrorism 
CALEA Commission on Accreditation for Law 
Enforcement Agencies 
CapWIN Capital Wireless Integrated Network 
CATIC California Anti-Terrorism Information Center 
CBP U.S. Customs and Border Protection 
CBR Chemical, Biological, Radiological 
CBRNE Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, 
and Explosive 
CCH Computerized Criminal Histories 
CDC Centers for Disease Control 
CenTF Center for Task Force Training 
CEO Chief Executive Officer 
CERT Computer Emergency Response Team 
CFR Code of Federal Regulations 
CI Confidential Informant or Criminal 
Intelligence or Counter Intelligence 
(Intelligence Community) 
CIKR Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources 
CIA Central Intelligence Agency 
CICC Criminal Intelligence Coordinating Council 
CICE Criminal Intelligence for the Chief Executive 
CIO Chief Information Officer 
CIP Critical Infrastructure Protection 
CISA Criminal Information Sharing Alliance 
CISAnet Criminal Information Sharing Alliance 
Network 
CJIS Criminal Justice Information Services 
CJNet Criminal Justice Network 
CODIS Combined DNA Index System 
COI Community of Interest 
CompStat Computerized Statistics 

Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers 


ConOps Concept of Operations 
COOP Continuity of Operations Plan 
COP Community Oriented Policing 
COPS Office of Community Oriented Policing 

Services 
COT Committee on Terrorism (Intelligence 

Subcommittee) 
CT Counterterrorism 
CTD Counterterrorism Division (FBI) 
CTR Currency Transaction Report 
CUI Controlled Unclassified Information 
DA District Attorney 
DAG Deputy Attorney General 
DEA U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration 
DELJIS Delaware Justice Information System 
DHHS U.S. Department of Health and Human 

Services 
DHS U.S. Department of Homeland Security (or 

Defense HUMINT Service) 
DIA Defense Intelligence Agency 
DNI Director of National Intelligence 
DNI-U Director of National Intelligence-

Unclassified 
DOC Department of Corrections (or U.S. 

Department of Commerce) 
DoD U.S. Department of Defense 
DOJ U.S. Department of Justice 
DOL U.S. Department of Labor 
DOR Department of Revenue 
DOS U.S. Department of State 
DOT U.S. Department of Transportation 
EMS Emergency Medical Services 
EOC Emergency Operations Center 
EOP Executive Office of the President 
EOUSA Executive Office for United States Attorneys 
EPA Environmental Protection Agency 
EPIC El Paso Intelligence Center 
FAA Federal Aviation Administration 
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation 
FBI CJIS FBI Criminal Justice Information Services 

Division 

FCG Fusion Center Guidelines 
FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency 
FI Field Interview/Field Interview Card 
FIAT Foundations of Intelligence Analysis Training 
FIG Field Intelligence Group (FBI) 

FinCEN Financial Crimes Enforcement Network 
FIP Fair Information Practices 
FIR Field Interview Report 
FLETC Federal Law Enforcement Training Center 
FOIA Freedom of Information Act 
FOUO For Official Use Only information 
handling caveat 
G.R.E.A.T. Gang Resistance Education And Training 
GAC Global Advisory Committee 
GAO U.S. Government Accountability Office 
GESC Global Executive Steering Committee 
GFIPM Global Federated Identity Privilege 
Management 
GHSAC Governors Homeland Security Advisory 
Council 
GIS Geographic Information Systems 
GIWG Global Intelligence Working Group 
GJXDM Global Justice XML Data Model 
Global Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative 
GPS Global Positioning System 
HIDTA High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas 
HIDTA DIG HIDTAs Digital Information Gateway 
HIFCA High Intensity Financial Crime Area 
HIR Homeland Information Report 
HQ Headquarters 
HS Homeland Security 
HSAC Homeland Security Advisory Council 
HSAS Homeland Security Advisory System 
HSDN Homeland Secure Data Network 
HSGP Homeland Security Grant Program 
HSIN Homeland Security Information Network 
HSIN-CI Homeland Security Information Network-
Critical Infrastructure 
HSPD Homeland Security Presidential Directive 
HUMINT Human Intelligence 
IACP International Association of Chiefs of Police 
IAFIS Integrated Automated Fingerprint 
Identification System 
IAIP Information Analysis and Infrastructure 
Protection 
IALEIA International Association of Law 
Enforcement Intelligence Analysts 
IC U.S. Intelligence Community 
ICE U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
ICS Incident Command System 

Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers 


Interstate Identification Index 
IIR Institute for Intergovernmental Research or 

Intelligence Information Report 

IJIS Integrated Justice Information Systems 

ILO Intelligence Liaison Officer or Industry 

Liaison Officer or Infrastructure Liaison 
Officer 

ILP Intelligence-Led Policing 

INTERPOL International Criminal Police Organization 

IRS Internal Revenue Service or Intelligence 
Resource Specialist 

IRTPA Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
Prevention Act of 2004 

ISAC Information Sharing and Analysis Center 

ISDN Integrated Services Digital Network 

ISE Information Sharing Environment 

ISE-SAR Terrorism-Related Suspicious Activity 
Report 

IT Information Technology 

ITACG Interagency Threat Assessment and 
Coordination Group 

JAG Judge Advocate General or Justice 
Assistance Grant Program 

JIEM Justice Information Exchange Model 

JRIES Joint Regional Information Exchange System 

JTTF Joint Terrorism Task Force (FBI) 

LEA Law Enforcement Agency 

LECC Law Enforcement Coordinating Committee 

LEIS Law Enforcement Information Sharing 
Strategy 

LEISP Law Enforcement Information Sharing 
Program 

LEIU Law Enforcement Intelligence Unit 

LEO Law Enforcement Online 

LES Law Enforcement Sensitiveinformationhandling 
caveat 

LETPP Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention 
Program 

LLIS Lessons Learned Information Sharing 

MAGLOCLEN Middle Atlantic-Great Lakes Organized 
Crime Law Enforcement Network. 

MCC Major Cities Chiefs Association 

MCSA Major County Sheriffs Association 

MIPT Memorial Institute for the Prevention of 
Terrorism 

MOCIC Mid-States Organized Crime Information 
Center. 

MOU 
NACIC 

NARA 

NCB 

NCIC 
NCIRC 

NCIS 

NCISP 
NCJA 
NCSL 
NCTC 
N-DEx 

NDIC 
NDPIX 
NESPIN 

NFCCG 
NGA 

NGB 
NGIC 
NICC 
NIEM 
NIJ 
NIMS 
NIPC 
NIPP 
NJTTF 
NLETC 
Nlets 

NOC 
NPD 
NRIG 
NSA 

NSD 
NSOPR 
NSOPW 

Memorandum of Understanding 
National Counterintelligence Information 
Center 

U.S. National Archives and Records 
Administration 
National Central Bureau (U.S. contact for 
INTERPOL) 
National Crime Information Center 
National Criminal Intelligence Resource 
Center 
Naval Criminal Investigative Service or 
National Criminal Intelligence Service 
UK 

National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan 

National Criminal Justice Association 
National Conference of State Legislatures 
National Counterterrorism Center 
Law Enforcement National Data Exchange 

(FBI) 
National Drug Intelligence Center 
National Drug Pointer Index 
New England State Police Information 

Network. 
National Fusion Center Coordinating Group 
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency or 

National Governors Association 
National Guard Bureau 
National Gang Intelligence Center 
National Infrastructure Coordinating Center 
National Information Exchange Model 
National Institute of Justice 
National Incident Management System 
National Infrastructure Coordination Center 

National Infrastructure Protection Plan 

National Joint Terrorism Task Force 
National Law Enforcement Training Center 
NletsThe International Justice and Public 

Safety Network 
National Operations Center 
National Preparedness Directorate 
Northeast Region Intelligence Group 
National Sheriffs Association or National 

Security Agency 
National Security Directive 
National Sex Offender Public Registry 
National Sex Offender Public Website 

Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers 


NSOR National Sex Offender Registry 
NW3C National White Collar Crime Center 
ODNI Office of the Director of National 

Intelligence 

OEM Office of Emergency Management 

OJP Office of Justice Programs 

OMB Office of Management and Budget 

P3I Public-Private Partnerships for Intelligence 

PART Program Assessment Rating Tool 

PERF Police Executive Research Forum 

PKI Public Key Infrastructure 

PM-ISE Office of the Program Manager, Information 

Sharing Environment 

PPP Public-Private Partnerships 

RAC Resident Agent in Charge 

RCPI Regional Community Policing Institute (of 

COPS) 

R-DEx Regional Data Exchange (FBI) 

RFI Request for Information 

RFP Request for Proposal 

RFS Request for Service 

RISS Regional Information Sharing Systems. 

RISSafe RISS Officer Safety Event Deconfliction 

System 
RISS ATIX RISS Automated Trusted Information 

Exchange 

RISS DES RISS Data Exchange Specification 

RISSNET Regional Information Sharing Systems 

Secure Intranet 

RMIN Rocky Mountain Information Network. 

RMS Records Management System 

ROCIC Regional Organized Crime Information 

Center. 
RTTAC Regional Terrorism Threat Assessment 

Center 

RTTF Regional Terrorism Task Force (FBI) 

SAA State Administrative Agency 

SAC Special Agent in Charge 

SAR Suspicious Activity Report 

SBU Sensitive But Unclassified 

SCC Sector Coordinating Councils 

SCI (Top Secret) Sensitive Compartmented 

Information 

SCIF Sensitive Compartmented Information 
Facility 

SEARCH The National Consortium for Justice 
Information and Statistics 
SEOC State Emergency Operations Center 
SHSI Sensitive Homeland Security Information 
SIG Special Interest Group 
SIPRNET Secret Internet Protocol Router Network 
SLATT. 
State and Local Anti-Terrorism Training 
SLT State, Local, and Tribal 
SOP Standard Operating Procedure 
SSA Senior Special Agent (or Supervisory Special 
Agent) 
TA Technical Assistance 
TCL Target Capabilities List (DHS) 
TC Project Trusted Credential Project 
TEW Terrorism Early Warning Group 
TLO Terrorism Liaison Officer 
TPEP Terrorism Prevention Exercise Program 
(DHS) 
TS Top Secret 
TSA Transportation Security Administration 
TSC Terrorist Screening Center 
TS/SCI Top Secret/Special Compartmented 
Intelligence 
UASI Urban Areas Security Initiative 
USA United States Attorney or United States of 
America 
USA PATRIOT Uniting and Strengthening America by 
Act Providing Appropriate Tools 
Required to Intercept and Obstruct 
Terrorism Act of 2001 
USAO United States Attorneys Office 
USBP United States Border Patrol 
USC U.S. Currency, U.S. Citizen, or United 
States Code 
US-CERT United States Computer Emergency 
Readiness Team (DHS) 
USCG United States Coast Guard 
USMS United States Marshals Service 
USPS United States Postal Service 
USSS United States Secret Service or United 
States Standards Strategy 
VGTOF Violent Gang and Terrorist Organization File 
VICAP Violent Criminal Apprehension Program 
WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction 
WSIN Western States Information Network. 

Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers 


Appendix DResources Appendix DResources 
Introduction 
Purpose 

Fusion Center Guidelines 

http://www.iir.com/global/guidelines.htm 

National Strategy for Information Sharing 

http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/infosharing/index.html 

Information Sharing Environment 

http://www.ise.gov 

Introduction and Background 

Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative (Global) 

http://www.it.ojp.gov/topic.jsp?topic_id=8 

National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan (NCISP) 

http://it.ojp.gov/documents/ncisp/National_Criminal_ 
Intelligence_Sharing_Plan.pdf 

NCISP with Resource Library 

http://it.ojp.gov/documents/ncisp 

Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 

http://www.nctc.gov/docs/pl108_458.pdf 

Guidelines and Requirements in Support of the Information 
Sharing Environment, Presidential Memorandum for the 
Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, 
December 16, 2005 

http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/2005/12/wh121605-memo 
.html 

Information Sharing Environment Implementation Plan, 
November 2006 

http://www.ise.gov/docs/ISE-impplan-200611.pdf 

Fusion Center Capability Areas 

I. Fusion Process Capabilities 
A. Planning and Requirements Development 
National Strategy for Information Sharing 

http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/infosharing/index.html 

Joint Terrorism Task Forces 

http://www.usdoj.gov/jttf 

High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas 

http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/hidta 

Findings and Recommendations of the Suspicious Activity 
Report (SAR) Support and Implementation Project 

Available in fall 2008. 

Major Cities Chiefs Association 

http://www.majorcitieschiefs.org 

Information Sharing Environment (ISE) Functional Standard 
(FS) for Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR) 

http://www.ise.gov/docs/ctiss/ISE-FS 
-200SARFunctionalStandardIssuanceVersion1.0.pdf 

Information Sharing Environment Enterprise Architecture 
Framework 

http://www.ise.gov/docs/eaf/ISE-EAF_v1.0_20070830.pdf 

Information Sharing Environment Profile and Architecture 
Implementation Strategy 

http://www.ise.gov/docs/eaf/ISE-PAIS.pdf 

National Integration Center (NIC) Incident Management 
Systems Integration Division 

http://www.fema.gov/emergency/nims/index.shtm 

National Incident Management System (NIMS) Incident 
Command System 

http://www.fema.gov/pdf/nims/NIMS 
_basic_incident_command_system.pdf 

Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers 


U.S. Department of Homeland Securitys National 
Preparedness Guidelines 
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/National_Preparedness_ 
Guidelines.pdf 

Target Capabilities List (TCL) 

https://www.llis.dhs.gov/docdetails/details. 
do?contentID=26724 

Critical Infrastructure and Key Resource Protection 
Capabilities for Fusion Centers, an appendix to the Baseline 
Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers 

Available in fall 2008. 

State, Local, Tribal, and Territorial Government Coordinating 
Council 

http://www.dhs.gov/xprevprot/committees 
/gc_1177096698216.shtm 

National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) 

http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/NIPP_Plan.pdf 

NIPP Resource Center 

http://www.learningservices.us/DHS/NIPP 

National Criminal Intelligence Resource Center (NCIRC) 

http://www.ncirc.gov 

Lessons Learned Information Sharing (LLIS) System 

www.llis.dhs.gov 

B. 
Information Gathering/Collection and 
Recognition of Indicators and Warnings 
Law Enforcement Intelligence Unit (LEIU) Criminal 
Intelligence File Guidelines 

www.it.ojp.gov/documents/LEIU_Crim_Intell_File_ 
Guidelines.pdf 

C. 
Processing and Collation of Information 
28 Code of Federal Regulation CFR Part 23 

http://www.iir.com/28cfr/guideline.htm 

Global Justice Information Sharing Initiatives Analyst Toolbox 

https://it.ojp.gov/documents/analyst_toolbox.pdf 

Law Enforcement Analytic Standards 

http://it.ojp.gov/documents/law_enforcement_analytic 
_standards.pdf 

D. 
Intelligence Analysis and Production 
Law Enforcement Analytic Standards 

http://it.ojp.gov/documents/law_enforcement_analytic 
_standards.pdf 

Intelligence Analysis Training can be found at: 

http://mastercalendar.ncirc.gov 

Minimum Criminal Intelligence Training Standards for Law 
Enforcement and Other Criminal Justice Agencies in the 
United States 

http://www.it.ojp.gov/documents/min_crim_intel_stand.pdf 

Global Justice Information Sharing Initiatives Analyst Toolbox 

https://it.ojp.gov/documents/analyst_toolbox.pdf 

International Association of Law Enforcement Intelligence 
Analysts (IALEIA) 

http://www.ialeia.org 

E. 
Intelligence/Information Dissemination 
National Information Exchange Model (NIEM) 

http://www.niem.gov 

F. 
Reevaluation 
Program Assessment Rating Tool 

http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/expectmore/part.html 

Fusion Process Capability Areas 

II. Management and 
Administrative Capabilities 
A. 
Management/Governance 
Fusion Center Guidelines 

http://it.ojp.gov/documents/fusion_center_guidelines.pdf 

B. 
Information Privacy Protections 
ISE Privacy GuidelinesGuidelines to Ensure That the 
Information Privacy and Other Legal Rights of Americans Are 
Protected in the Development and Use of the Information 
Sharing Environment 

http://www.ise.gov/docs/privacy/PrivacyGuidelines20061204 
.pdf 

28 CFR Part 23 Criminal Intelligence Systems Operating 
Policies 

http://www.it.ojp.gov/documents/28CFR_Part_23.pdf 

Privacy and Civil Liberties Implementation Guide for the 
Information Sharing Environment 

http://www.ise.gov/docs/privacy/PrivacyImpGuide.pdf 

Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers 


Privacy and Civil Liberties Policy Development Guide and 
Implementation Templates 

https://it.ojp.gov/documents/Privacy_Guide_Final.pdf 

C. 
Security 
Applying Security Practices to Justice Information Sharing 

http://it.ojp.gov/documents/asp/ApplyingSecurityPractices 
.pdf 

49 CFR Part 1520 

http://ecfr.gpoaccess.gov/cgi/t/text/text-idx?c=ecfr&tpl 
=/ecfrbrowse/Title49/49cfr1520_main_02.tpl 

Enter title number 49, and search for Part 1520. 

Protected Critical Infrastructure Information (PCII) Regulations 
Final Rule: Procedures for Handling PCII 

http://www.dhs.gov/xinfoshare/laws/gc_1158333877680 
.shtm 

Chemical-terrorism Vulnerability Information (CVI) 

http://www.dhs.gov/xprevprot/programs 
/gc_1181835547413.shtm 

D. 
Personnel and Training 
Minimum Criminal Intelligence Training Standards for Law 
Enforcement and Other Criminal Justice Agencies in the 
United States 

http://www.it.ojp.gov/documents/min_crim_intel_stand.pdf 

E. 
Information Technology/Communications 
Infrastructure, Systems, Equipment, Facility, 
and Physical Infrastructure 
Fusion Center Business Architecture 

Available in fall 2008. 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security Office of 
Infrastructure Protection 
http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/structure/gc_1185203138955 
.shtm 

F. 
Funding 
Grants.gov 

www.grants.gov 

DHS Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP) 

www.fema.gov/grants 

Other 

Executive Order 12958Classified National Security 
Information, as Amended 

http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc 
.cgi?dbname=1995_register&docid=fr20ap95-135.pdf 

Designation and Sharing of Controlled Unclassified 
Information (CUI) 
Presidential Memorandum for the Heads of Executive 
Departments and Agencies, May 9, 2008 

http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2008/05 
/20080509-6.html 

Executive Order 12951Release of Imagery Acquired by 
Space-Based National Intelligence Reconnaissance Systems 

http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc 
.cgi?dbname=1995_register&docid=fr28fe95-133.pdf 

Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers 


Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers