PROTECTING YOUR 
COMMUNITY FROM 
TERRORIISM: 
Strategies for Local 
Law Enforcement 

Volume 5: 
Partnerships to Promote 
Homeland Security 


Office of Community Oriented Policing Services
Police Executive Research Forum


PROTECTING YOUR COMMUNITY FROM TERRORISM: 
The Strategies for Local Law Enforcement Series 
VOL. 5: PARTNERSHIPS TO PROMOTE HOMELAND SECURITY 

Heather J. Davies and Martha R. Plotkin 
with 
Joshua Filler 
Edward A. Flynn 
George Foresman 
Jacqueline Litzinger 
Thomas D. McCarthy 
Jane Wiseman


This project, conducted by the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF), was supported by Cooperative 
Agreement #2002-HS-WX-K001 by the U.S. Department of Justice Office of Community Oriented 
Policing Services. Points of views or opinions contained in this document are those of the authors and 
do not necessarily represent the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice or the 
members of PERF. 

The opinions expressed are generally those based on the consensus of executive session attendees. 
However, not every view or statement presented in this report can necessarily be attributed to each individual 
participant. 

Websites and sources listed provide useful information at the time of this writing, but the authors do 
not endorse any information of the sponsor organization or other information on the websites. 

Published by the Police Executive Research Forum 

U.S. Department of Justice Office of Community Oriented Policing Services 
Police Executive Research Forum 
Washington, DC 20036 
United States of America 
November 2005 

ISBN: 1-878734-90-3 

Photos courtesy of (from top to bottom): Federal Emergency Management Agency [1] 
Arlington County (VA) Police Department [2-3] 
Federal Emergency Management Agency [4-5] 
Cover Design by David Edelson, PERF 


 
CONTENTS 
Acknowledgments .................................................................................. v 
Foreword ....................................................................................... vii 

Chapters 
1. Introduction .................................................................................. 1 
2. The Mission and Responsibilities of the Department of Homeland Security ....................... 5 
3. State and Local Responsibilities and Models for Cooperation .................................. 19 
4. DHS Resources, Training and Grants ........................................................... 43 
5. Information Sharing, Alert Systems and New Technologies ...................................... 61 
6. Recommendations .............................................................................. 75 

Appendices 
A. Participants and Observers ................................................................... 83 
B. About the Authors ............................................................................ 89 
C. Contributing Authors ......................................................................... 91 
D. About the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS), 
U.S. Department of Justice ...................................................................... 95 
E. About the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) ............................................. 97


ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
THIS WHITE PAPERTHE FIFTH IN A SERIESIS BASED ON THE THOUGHTFUL 
contributions of many experts in policing, counterterrorism and other 
related fields. We thank those individuals, from every level of government, 
who came together in an executive session supported by the U.S. Department 
of Justice Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) to create 
the foundation for this writing. Those participants (listed in Appendix A) demonstrated 
that a tremendous amount of progress could be made when you get the 
right people in a room who are candid and tremendously knowledgeable. Any 
value this paper has to the field is due to their contributions.
 
Special thanks must go to the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) professionals who provided 
the latest information on joint efforts and 
opportunitiesand invited the law enforcement 
community to offer suggestions for how DHS can 
improve the services and resources they provide. 
We hope this paper reflects the commitment of all 
session participants to find new means for collaboration 
and coordination, even when it means 
giving up a bit of turf to get the job done. We 
appreciate the considerable assistance of Director 
Joshua Filler, Department of Homeland Securitys 
Office of State and Local Government Coordination 
and Preparedness, for getting the DHS executives 
involved and assisting in setting the 
agenda. A thanks is also due to then-DHS Under 
Secretary for Border and Transportation Security 
Asa Hutchinson for his informative presentation 
at the session.
 
We are, as always, grateful to COPS 
Director Carl Peed for his unwavering support for 
this project and his dedication to advancing law 
enforcement. He and his staff work tirelessly to 
help law enforcement build on the successes of 
community policing as they take on never-ending 
duties in counterterrorism. Project Monitor Amy 
Schapiros patience and assistance have been 
invaluable to the success of the working sessions 
and resulting white papers. We appreciate her 
work and her ability to brave the publications 
process.

We want to thank as well those who contributed 
to this paper by writing sidebar pieces: 
Joshua Filler, Edward A. Flynn, George Foresman, 
Jacqueline Litzinger, Thomas D. McCarthy and 
Jane Wiseman. Their articles offer interesting 
insights and practical perspectives on difficult 
issues. 


There were several researchersRob 
Davis, Jack Greene, David Klinger, Gary LaFree 
and Steve Mastrofskiwho identified research 
concerns based on the session discussion. These 
researchers and the National Institute of Justice 
grant monitor, Lois Mock, helped transform complex 
discussions into an informative dialogue for 
law enforcement agencies. The research community 
is grateful for their wisdom. 

A project team of PERF staff provided significant 
support by planning the executive session 
and reviewing drafts of this white paper. Executive 
Director Chuck Wexler was crucial in getting the 
representatives from the various agencies to the 
table as well as facilitating the session. Research 
Assistant/Event Planner Anna Berke managed the 
logistics of the two-day event. We thank Research 
Associate Stacy Osnick Milligan for chronicling the 
discussions at the session. Legislative Assistant 
Steve Loyka not only helped document the session, 
but also researched and contributed insights on sections 
that related to legal mandates and DHS 
authority. Research Assistant Alex Hayes also 
helped verify statements in this report. Thanks are 
also due to Corina Sol Brito, Gerard Murphy and 
Lorie Fridell for their willingness to review the draft 
white paper. David Edelson deserves kudos for his 
outstanding skills in the design of these white 
papers, as well as his acumen as a grammarian. 

This series is dedicated to all those in law 
enforcementat the federal, state, local and tribal 
levelswho collaborate to keep the nation safe 
from terrorism. We hope this paper, and the others 
in the series, provide you with information and 
guidance that will aid in your partnership and 
counterterrorism efforts.


FOREWORD 
AT THE TIME OF THE EXECUTIVE SESSION THAT BROUGHT LEADERS FROM THE 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) together with those from 
other federal, state, local and tribal agencies, DHS had just celebrated its 
first year in existence. In that year, it had already taken significant steps to restructure 
and reorganize 22 federal agencies, all of which brought with them their own 
distinct cultures, missions and goals. DHS has crafted a strategic plan for this new 
agency while making important strides in advancing collaboration among the tens 
of thousands of law enforcement agencies engaged in counterterrorism efforts. 


Leaders within DHS have been among the first to 
acknowledge that there is still much more work to 
be donework that depends on the strength of 
partnerships with law enforcement at all levels of 
government. It is important that readers recognize 
that, as one executive session participant put it, 
creating and running DHS has been like trying to 
put the wings on a plane as it is taking off down 
the runway. It is very much a work in progress. 

The experts who gathered for the executive 
session agreed that steady progress has not always 
been easy: duplication of efforts, lack of coordination 
and sharing, and other challenges must continue 
to be resolved as the nation develops a more 
comprehensive antiterrorism strategy. Defining 
and communicating the roles and responsibilities 
of each DHS directorate in enhancing terrorism 
awareness, prevention, preparation and response 
are the first steps in improving how that directorate 
can work effectively with other federal agencies 
and local, state and tribal law enforcement. 

This white paper is largely based on the conference 
proceedings and describes efforts to build on 
existing models of collaboration, as well as some suggestions 
for improving effective interagency coordination 
at many levels of responsibility. There are no easy 
answers to the problems facing the nations law 
enforcement and intelligence communities. It is hoped, 
however, that this paper advances the discussion on 
how best to integrate the diffuse resources and expertise 
of all those engaged in the fight against terrorism. 

The COPS Office and PERF are pleased to 
present the findings and recommendations that the 
executive session on DHS partnerships produced. It is 
not surprising that the underlying principles that will 
guide our reforms rest squarely on the progress we have 
made in employing community-policing concepts to 
solve problems and to forge meaningful collaborations. 

Carl R. Peed Director, COPS
Chuck Wexler Executive Director, PERF


CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 

ON MARCH 1, 2003, SOME 180,000 PEOPLE FROM 22 DIFFERENT FEDERAL 
agencies, or components of those agencies, came together to form the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS).1 Many agencies that comprise 
DHS came with their own astounding number of duties and mandates 
unrelated to counterterrorism, as well as new responsibilities in addressing the 
terrorist threat. Some came with long histories and cultures that have shaped 
their agencies responses and approaches, while others were created from whole 
cloth. The establishment of DHS was deemed the most comprehensive reorganization 
of the federal government since the Cold War.2 


The impediments facing those tasked with creating 
a fully integrated agency capable of preventing or 
addressing terrorism are staggering. At the heart of 
the challenge for DHS has been the need to become 
immediately competent in all areas of counterterrorism 
while retaining component agencies original 
and continuing duties. At the same time, DHS 
is being asked to think strategically about how to 
network with all relevant law enforcement agencies 
and the people in their communities.
 
The critical link between federal authorities 
and the public is local law enforcement. No 
one has better direct ties with the community to 
enhance reporting of suspicious activity, to coordinate 
local preparedness efforts and to guard 
against hate crimes and other forms of violence. 
If community policing has taught us anything, it is 
that engaging the community and collaboratively 
solving seemingly intractable problems is the only 
way law enforcement will be effectivewhether in 
controlling crime, reducing fear or identifying terrorists 
who live and operate in our cities across the 
nation. DHS and other federal agencies need to 
work with local law enforcement to make that 
happen.

Local law enforcement also is uniquely 
positioned to protect communities by identifying 
critical infrastructure in their jurisdictions that are 
vulnerable to terrorist attacks. Yet there are no simple 
solutions for how DHS or other federal agencies 
can effectively coordinate with more than 17,000 
decentralized local law enforcement agenciesand 

______________________________________________________________
1 For a history of DHSs organization see 
http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?theme=59&content=4081. 

2 White House. 2004. Remarks by the President on the One-Year
 Anniversary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 
March 2, 2004. Washington, D.C.



myriad state and tribal authoritiesand then integrate 
those efforts with all other relevant federal initiatives. 
The first step may well be to ensure that 
local law enforcement has the necessary resources, 
training, technology and means for coordinating 
with federal agencies to achieve DHSs vision. They 
must be full partners in the fight against terrorism. 

The Project: Community Policing 
in a Security-Conscious World 

The Police Executive Research Forum (PERF),3 
with support from the U.S. Department of Justice 
Office of Community Oriented Policing Services 
(COPS), has convened a series of five executive sessions 
for law enforcement chief executives, other 
policing professionals, government agency leaders 
and policymakers to explore, debate and exchange 
information. These sessions provide law enforcement 
practitioners and homeland security personnel 
with opportunities to share and develop 
effective strategies for addressing terrorism while 
continuing to enhance community policing. The 
discussions are captured in subsequent white 
papers that are widely disseminated to law 
enforcement and decision makers at all levels of 
government. 

Previous executive session discussions 
resulted in white papers on Protecting Your Community 
from Terrorism: Strategies for Local Law 
Enforcement. These sessions focused on the following 
topics:4 
 Local-Federal Partnerships (November 2002, 
Washington, D.C.); 
 Working with Diverse Communities (June 
2003, Chicago); 
 Preparing for and Responding to Bioterrorism 
(July 2003, Los Angeles); and 
 The Production and Sharing of Intelligence 
(December 2003, Washington, D.C.). 

The Fifth Executive Session 

On DHSs one-year anniversary in March 2004, 
PERF convened another executive session, Law 
Enforcement Partnerships with the Department of 
Homeland Security: Working Together to Address 
Terrorism and Enhance Community Policing, in 
Washington, D.C. Moderated by PERFs executive 
director, the day-and-a-half session featured 
discussions about what is working and what can be 
improved between law enforcement and DHS.5 
The session was marked by lively exchanges 
and frank debate about issues of notification, the 

_____________________________________________________________
3 PERF is a nonprofit membership organization of progressive 
policing professionals dedicated to advancing law enforcement 
services to all communities through experimentation and national 
leadership. Its members serve more than half the nations 
population, and the organization provides training, technical 
assistance, research, publications and other services to its 
members and the profession. More information about PERF can be 
found at www.policeforum.org. 

4 At the time of this writing, the first four white papers in the 
series are available as a free download at www.policeforum.org 
and www.cops.usdoj.gov. There will be a sixth white paper, funded 
separately by the National Institute of Justice, on partnering 
to prepare for and respond to critical incidents. 

5 All participants titles and agency affiliations are listed as 
of the time of the executive session, unless indicated otherwise. 

Quote: This is the first time since 
Ive been on the job that 
Ive been at a forum like 
this to talk to folks  who 
do this everyday, and to be 
[working on the issues] 
with the FBI here too. 
General Patrick Hughes, 
Assistant Secretary, Office 
of Infrastructure 
Protection, Department of 
Homeland Security


 
usefulness of general threat warnings, intelligence 
and data sharing, community policing principles, 
how resources should be spent, issues of trust and 
much more. Perhaps one of the earliest indicators 
that the forum was a success was participants 
statements that this was the first time authorities 
at this level, from such a diverse law enforcement 
orientation, came together in a small working 
group to identify the means for more effective 
partnerships. 

The executive session began with a discussion 
of the mission and responsibilities of DHS; 
the structure of homeland security functions at the 
local, state, tribal and federal levels; and the factors 
that comprise successful collaboration models. 
The participants discussed realistic steps that all 
represented agencies could take to improve complementary 
prevention and response strategies 
strategies and tactics that build on effective 
community policing principles.6 

The sessions goals were primarily to provide 
counterterrorism professionals and government 
policymakers with information about some 
of the challenges and approaches to addressing terrorism, 
and to elicit feedback that could inform 
DHSs long-term planning process and more 
immediate efforts. It also was structured to highlight 
areas in which DHS and other federal agencies 
may need to reduce redundancy and better 
coordinate efforts to provide improved support 
for local law enforcement. As the session closed, 
participants agreed to evaluate their approaches, as 
well as rethink the best means for contacting and 
assisting one another in light of the insights gained 
at this forum. 

Whats Ahead 

This white paper summarizes participants discussions 
at the executive session. It is written primarily 
for local, state, tribal and federal law 
enforcement agencies that have the potential to 
work closely with DHS personnel and their component 
agencies. It is also meant to provide DHS 
leaders with useful information that can guide 
their continued efforts to improve agency partnerships. 
The paper includes several sidebars to provide 
viewpoints written either by executive session 
participants or other individuals on key topics or 
concerns raised at the executive session that could 
not be fully explored in the time allotted. These 
sidebars provide a glimpse of what practitioners 
experience in implementing policy, navigating a 
labyrinth of government agencies and instituting 
reforms meant to ensure greater public safety. 

The following chapter, Chapter Two, provides 
a context in which the remaining sections of 
this paper can be considered. It reviews the DHS 
components missions and responsibilities. It is by 
no means exhaustive and only hints at how complex 
the agency is and the tremendous number of 
mandates placed upon it. The chapter also reflects 
how difficult it is to determine adequate measures 

_______________________________________________________________
6 Federal agencies at the table included the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services 
and the Department of Homeland Security. Representatives attended 
from the following DHS directorates: Homeland Security Operations 
Center, Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection, 
Federal Emergency Management Agency, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 
Office of Domestic Preparedness, Office of Research and Development, Office of 
Science and Technology, Office of State and Local Government Coordination, 
United States Border Patrol, United States Coast Guard and United States 
Secret Service. 

The local, state and tribal agencies in attendance included Appleton (WI) 
Police Department, DC Metropolitan Police 
Department, Fairfax County (VA) Police Department, Fayetteville (NC) P
olice Department, Los Angeles Police Department, 
Massachusetts Office of Public Safety, DC Metro Transit Police, Miami 
Police Department, Montgomery County (MD) 
Police Department, New York State Office of Public Security, Oregon 
State Police, Pasadena (CA) Police Department, Prince 
William County (VA) Police Department, U.S. Capitol Police and 
Yavapai-Prescott Tribal Police.



for evaluating success in countering the terrorist 
threat and in building a truly integrated national 
structure. This chapter reflects the organizational 
structure and mandates at the time of the executive 
session. There have been several reorganizations 
and proposed reforms as this paper goes to 
print that will continue to shape the evolution of 
the agency. 

Just as it is important to understand and 
improve partnerships between local law enforcement 
and DHS, it is also vital that other partnerships 
are fostered between local law enforcement 
and other nonfederal partners (state and tribal 
authorities, private security, community leaders and 
countless stakeholders). Chapter Three briefly outlines 
local and state enforcement responsibilities, 
as well as several examples of homeland security 
collaborations, to demonstrate that the complex 
and highly variable homeland security structures 
at the local and state level make a one-size-fits-all 
approach to partnerships very difficult. This chapter 
discusses some of the many stakeholders (e.g., 
transportation systems, the military, tribal police, 
colleges and universities, the private sector, building 
management and others) that law enforcement 
at all levels of government must engage to enhance 
critical infrastructure protection and public safety. 
In reviewing the roles and responsibilities of law 
enforcement in these partnerships, Chapter Three 
also clarifies the challenges tribal, state and local 
law enforcement face in addressing the threat of 
terrorism while continuing to handle traditional 
crimes, as well as how greater support for their 
long-established policing functions can benefit 
counterterrorism goals. 

Chapter Four offers examples of how local 
and state agencies are using DHS resources and 
training to enhance terrorism response capabilities. 
The chapter emphasizes the need for dual use, 
flexible grants and resources, and the need for 
regional approaches that support law enforcement 
efforts. Also discussed are training gaps for streetlevel 
officers and other needs that have not yet 
been fully addressed. Special attention is paid to 
local funding challenges and concerns about federal 
grant processes. 

Chapter Five provides an understanding of 
what the remaining problems are regarding information 
sharing between federal agencies and state, 
local and tribal law enforcement; interoperability 
and other communication concerns. The chapter 
also reviews the DHS alert systems and how that 
information is used by local law enforcement. 
There is significant consideration of how information-
sharing mechanisms can be improved, how 
new technologies can be employed, as well as the 
need to reduce redundancy and confusion among 
all involved agencies. 

The white paper concludes with recommendations 
for local, state, tribal and federal law 
enforcement agencies as they partner with DHS 
and navigate their new path in policing communities 
that are vulnerable to both traditional crimes 
and terrorism. 



CHAPTER TWO 

THE MISSION AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE 
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

MANY FEDERAL AGENCIES DEDICATED TO DOMESTIC SECURITY ISSUES ARE 
coordinated and overseen by the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS). The Homeland Security Act of 2002 and the first DHS strategic 
plan outline the vision and mission statements, core values, principles, strategic 
goals and objectives that guide daily DHS operations.7 The establishment of 
DHS was meant to provide coordinated terrorism threat information for local, 
state, tribal and private sector entities. With the first year completed, DHS has 
redoubled its commitment to have its component agencies build meaningful partnerships 
with one another, law enforcement and other first responders.8 These 
partnerships are essential to protect the nation from terrorist attacks and to 
address criminal acts that plague U.S. communities. But this effort must be reciprocal: 
law enforcement agencies at all levels of government must fully understand 
and accept one anothers resources, mandates and limitations. The executive session 
participants soon realized that others around the table had assets and guidance 
that they did not know existed or felt they could not access. It was not long 
before connections were made and obstacles to access were overcome. The following 
section provides a brief overview of DHS resources and functions to provide 
all readers with a context in which to view the recommendations for sharing 
and cooperation outlined in the remainder of the paper. 

_____________________________________________________________________________
7 At this writing, the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (H.R. 5005) is available at http://www.dhs.gov/interweb/assetlibrary/ 
hr_5005_enr.pdf. The Securing Our Homeland: U.S. Department of Homeland Security Strategic Plan (February 24, 2004) 
is available at http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/theme_home1.jsp. 
8 Secretary Ridges One-Year Anniversary Speech, delivered at George Washington University on February 23, 2004, is available 
online at: http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?content=3204. Highlights of the departments year-one accomplishments 
are also available online at http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?content=3241.



DHS Mission 
The primary mission of the Department 
is to 
(A) prevent terrorist attacks within 
the United States; 
(B) reduce the vulnerability of the 
United States to terrorism; and 
(C) minimize the damage, and assist 
in the recovery, from terrorist 
attacks that do occur within the 
United States.9 

Of note is that while DHSs primary mission is to 
address terrorism, there is no single government 
agency dedicated solely to that end. Responsibilities 
for homeland security are dispersed among 
more than 100 different government entities. 

Executive session participants discussed 
the DHS mission and agreed that the concept of a 
secure homeland should involve more than just 
preventing or preparing for terrorism. They contended 
that homeland security should entail 
addressing any criminal act that will destabilize 
U.S. communities, citing local crime issues such 
as serial shootings, gang violence and drug trafficking 
that also threaten public safety and create 
fear among community members. Terrorists may 
also engage in traditional crimes such as money 
laundering, identity theft and illegal drugs to 
finance and support their activities. Executive 
session participants encouraged DHS to continue 
to look for opportunities to more broadly define its 
mission to assist local, state and tribal government 
entities with crimes that can have an impact on 
community and national security. 

The DHS Five Major Directorates 
and Responsibilities10 

The five major DHS directorates are 
1) Information Analysis and Infrastructure 
Protection, 
2) Border and Transportation Security, 
3) Emergency Preparedness and Response, 
4) Science and Technology, and 
5) Management. 

Collectively these directorates are responsible 
for reducing Americas vulnerability, preventing 
future attacks, and responding to and mitigating 
the effects of attacks that do occur. The directorates 
assess threats and develop intelligence, guard borders 
and airports, protect critical infrastructure and 
coordinate emergency responses. There are also 
several other entities that have been brought under 
DHS authority that do not fall within a directorate 
such as the United States Coast Guard. At this 
writing, DHS is continuing to evolve, and other 
agencies may well be created or modified. Each 
agency now within DHS is tasked with helping to 
provide greater security through improved intelligence, 
coordinated efforts and cooperation. Below is 
a brief overview of each of the directorates and other 

__________________________________________________________________________________
9 See H.R. 5005-8 the Homeland Security Act of 2002. At this writing the document can be found at http://www.dhs.gov/ 
interweb/assetlibrary/hr_5005_enr.pdf. 
10 The structure of DHS described in this paper reflects its organization at the March 2004 executive session. As this paper 
goes to print, readers can access more information about how DHS will be reorganized by accessing the DHS website (see, 
e.g., Remarks by Secretary Michael Chertoff on the Second Stage Review of the Department of Homeland Security, July 13, 
2005 at http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?content=4597). These organizational changes include (1) formation of a 
new, department-wide policy office; (2) significant improvements in how DHS manages its intelligence and information 
sharing responsibilities; (3) formation of a new operations coordination office and other measures to increase operational 
accountability; and (4) an important consolidation effort that integrates the Departments preparedness mission. 


 
DHS agencies.11 It is not a comprehensive listing, 
but rather a sketch to help put in perspective the 
discussions and recommendations that follow. 

Quote: Having big-city police 
departments rotate 
through the [HSOC] watch 
desk creates relationships 
and information sharing 
between local agencies and 
DHS that fosters important 
understandings of each 
others missions. 
Richard Russell, Principal 
Deputy Director, Homeland 
Security Operations Center, 
Department of Homeland 
Security

Information Analysis and Infrastructure 
Protection (IAIP)12 

Among the IAIP components duties are information 
analysis, infrastructure protection and the 
Homeland Security Operation Center (HSOC) 
administration. The IAIP directorate identifies and 
assesses potential threat information, establishes 
relationships with the intelligence community, 
issues threat warnings and advisories through the 
HSOC, and determines and maps vulnerabilities in 
the United States. 

DHS shares with and uses information from 
all intelligence-generating agencies. These include 
the National Security Agency (NSA), the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) (including the combined efforts of 
these and other agencies that run the Terrorist 
Threat Integration Center). IAIP aggregates and analyzes 
information from multiple sources and then 
uses the intelligence to help prevent terrorist activities. 
Its HSOC is a central point of connectivity for 
intelligence in and out of DHS. The resulting threat 
analysis and warning function is meant to support 
U.S. decision makers. Executive session participants 
discussed how IAIPs timely analysis and dissemination 
of information could provide useful warnings to 
local, state, tribal and federal government agencies, 
as well as the private sector and others to disrupt and 
prevent terrorist acts. 

IAIP coordinates partnerships with government, 
private and international stakeholders. It 
develops awareness programs, information-sharing 
mechanisms and sector-focused best practices and 
guidelines to support services to these partners. IAIP 
serves as the primary contact for coordinating critical 
infrastructure protection activities within the 
federal government, including vulnerability assessments, 
strategic planning efforts and exercises.13 
Within the IAIP, there are many initiatives 
to prevent terrorist attacks beyond their intelligence 
fusion efforts. For example, the Analytic Red Cell

______________________________________________________________________________ 
11 At the time of this writing, more information on the DHS directorates and DHS organizational structure can be found on 
the DHS website (www.dhs.gov). The description in this paper of each directorate and other critical agencies was obtained 
from DHS presentations at the executive session and from the DHS website. 

12 IAIP was one of the new agencies created by DHS that did not previously exist. 

13 For example, a cyber-attack on information and telecommunications systems can affect other critical infrastructure sectors, 
including banking and finance, energy and transportation. Such an attack would likely cause widespread service disruptions, 
damage the economy and jeopardize public safety. IAIP unifies the cyber-security activities performed by the 
Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office (previously part of the Department of Commerce) and the National Infrastructure 
Protection Center (formerly within the FBI). IAIP enhances those resources with the response functions of the National 
Cyber Security Division United States Computer Emergency Response Team (US-CERT). At the time of this writing, more 
information on US-CERT can be found at www.us-cert.gov. 



Program uses an approach that exploits the talents 
of individuals from various fieldsincluding screenwriters, 
best-selling authors, psychologists, philosophers, 
academics, various terrorism experts and 
employees of the CIA and FBIin an attempt to 
bring fresh insight to problems outside their respective 
disciplines.14 Participants draw on their life 
experiences to think like terrorists and paint a picture 
when there are no specific dots to connect. The 
Red Cell Program creates products that build on best 
practices used by the defense and intelligence communities 
to help analysts anticipate when, where 
and how a terrorist might conduct an attack. 

Quote: The Information Analysis 
and Infrastructure 
Protection directorate 
issues warnings, but we 
need to learn more about 
what law enforcement does 
with that information and 
whether it has value. 
John Chase, Chief of Staff, 
Office of Information 
Analysis and Infrastructure 
Protection, Department of 
Homeland Security


Border and Transportation Security (BTS) 

BTS is responsible for securing borders and transportation 
systems, enforcing immigration laws and 
ensuring the flow of traffic and commerce. According 
to DHS representatives at the session, BTS conducts 
immigration enforcement by deterring illegal immigration, 
preventing terrorists and other criminal 
aliens from entering or residing in the United States, 
facilitating lawful entry, detecting and removing 
those who are living in the United States in violation 
of immigration laws and pursuing investigations. 
BTS includes 
 the Transportation Security Administration 
(TSA); 
 the Bureau of Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (which consolidates the Federal 
Protective Services, the Federal Air Marshals 
Service and the investigation and enforcement 
arm of the former Immigration and 
Naturalization Service); 
 the U.S. Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) 
(which consolidates U.S. Customs, the 
inspection authority of the former INS, the 
Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service 
and the entire U.S. Border Patrol); as well as 
 the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center 
(FLETC). 

TSA uses intelligence, regulations, 
enforcement, inspection, and the screening and 
education of security personnel for passenger and 
shipping carriers to protect transportation infrastructure. 
TSA also has statutory responsibility for 
the security of more than 400 airports. With so 
many duties and responsibilities, TSA looks to 
local law enforcement to share information and 
help protect transportation systems. It has reimbursed 
local law enforcement for security assistance 
at airports and hopes to advance those 
partnerships further in the future. 

The primary responsibility of CBP is the 
control and protection of the nations borders. CBP 
has authority to provide border security as well as 

_____________________________________________________________________________
14 Information on the Analytic Red Cell Program was obtained from the DHSs Homeland Headlines e-newsletter on July 
6, 2004, vol.3, no.5. 



 
Quote: As part of the Department 
of Homeland Security, ICE 
aims to work cooperatively 
with state and local law 
enforcement agencies to 
enhance public safety and 
national security. Many 
police departments contact 
ICE to request assistance 
with aliens who commit 
crimes while in the United 
States illegally while police 
departments in other 
locations operate under 
political mandates, often 
issued by city councils, 
which discourage or prohibit 
cooperation with federal 
immigration enforcement 
officers. But ensuring 
consequences for violations 
of immigration laws is an 
important tool for disrupting 
criminal organizations and 
preventing terrorist attacks. 
When ICE and local agencies 
work together to enforce 
these laws, we reduce 
criminal threats and 
significantly improve public 
safety in communities 
across the country. 
Michael Garcia, Assistant 
Secretary, Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement, 
Department of Homeland 
Security 

screen all shipments entering coastal areas, seaports 
and all other ports of entry. According to a 
session participant, the U.S. Border Patrol has 
about 11,000 patrol agents, with 10,000 located at 
the southwest border and 1,000 along the northern 
border at the time the working group convened 
(CBP has approximately 41,000 total employees). 
With so few resources, and the U.S. history of an 
open-border policy, the agency has depended on 
contributions from other law enforcement partners 
with concurrent jurisdiction. Accordingly, the 
U.S. Border Patrol created task forces and Integrated 
Border Enforcement Teams with local, state, 
tribal and other federal law enforcement agencies 
to act as force multipliers at the borders. The agency 
also relies, in part, on state and local agencies 
equipment, technology, personnel and intelligence. 

At this writing, there are an estimated 7 
million illegal aliens in the United States, while the 
Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
(ICE) has approximately 20,000 employees tasked 
with identifying, investigating and removing illegal 
aliens and contraband.15 Their efforts are meant to 
reduce crime and Americas vulnerability to terrorist 
attack. ICE agents also work on preventing certain 
financial crimes, commercial fraud and 
human rights violations. ICE maintains a number 
of partnerships with state and local law enforcement
varying in design and formality. Joint efforts 
entail regular communication through various 
mechanisms and even formal memoranda of 
understanding (MOU) in certain states. In 2002, for 
example, ICE, the State of Florida and the Florida 
Department of Law Enforcement entered into the 
first federal MOU to help improve informationsharing 
and joint immigration enforcement efforts. 
The collaboration is meant to enhance national 

_____________________________________________________________________
15 See www.ice.gov.



security and augment ICE personnel resources by 
creating a cadre of specially trained state and local 
law enforcement officersdeputized and organized 
into several task forcesunder the direction of 
regional ICE supervisors.16 

ICE also established the Law Enforcement 
Support Center (LESC)operating 24 hours a day, 
seven days a weekto coordinate information 
gathered from the National Crime Information 
Center (NCIC), the Interstate Identification Index, 
and numerous other databases and criminal history 
indexes. Serving as a national enforcement 
operations center, LESC seeks to provide timely 
information on the immigration status of foreignborn 
individuals who are under investigation or 
being detained. The LESC is not strictly a function 
of ICE, but rather a product of DHSs larger information-
sharing effort. The center also provides a 
range of informational and analytical services in 
support of multi-agency investigations. In addition 
to responding to inquiries from local, state and federal 
correctional and court systems on immigration 
status, LESC supports general queries on 
potential criminal or terrorist activity, as well as 
background checks for firearm purchases and 
employment at sites considered to be potentially 
vulnerable to terrorist attack.17 

Emergency Preparedness and Response (EPR) 

The EPR directorate is tasked with continuing the 
mission of the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA)18 and builds on its approach to 
prepare the United States for large-scale domestic 
critical incidents, natural disasters or terrorist acts. 
EPR coordinates with first responders and oversees 
federal response and recovery strategies. EPR 
efforts are meant to help prevent or minimize the 
loss of life and property and to protect institutions 
by using a comprehensive, risk-based emergency 
management program. It promotes disaster-resistant 
communities by providing federal support to 
local governments for securing infrastructures and 
protecting the public. The all-hazards approach 
is designed to enable flexibility in response, to 
reduce the risk of harm and to coordinate proactively 
with private industry, the insurance sector, 
mortgage lenders, real estate professionals, homebuilding 
associations, citizens and myriad other 
stakeholders. EPR also brings together the Nuclear 
Incident Response Team (formerly of the Department 
of Energy), the National Domestic Preparedness 
Office and Domestic Emergency Support 
Teams (formerly of the Department of Justice), and 
the Strategic National Stockpile and National Disaster 
Medical System (formerly of the Department 
of Health and Human Services). It coordinates and 
works closely with state and federal response 
teams outside the directorate, such as those at the 
National Guard and Coast Guard. 

Executive session participants representing 
DHS stressed the value of their being able to 
draw on the expertise of FEMA. FEMA offers a 
number of significant assets in their consequence 
management role, including expertise in mitigating 
the impact of emergency incidents. It brings an 
array of medical and other resources for disaster 


_____________________________________________________________________________
16 More information on the Florida MOU and similar models of cooperation can be found in the second volume of this 
series, entitled Working with Diverse Communities. A more detailed discussion of the local law enforcement role in immigration 
enforcement, and concerns about its impact on police-minority community relations is also included in that paper, 
which is available at www.policeforum.org or www.cops.usdoj.gov. 
17 At this writing, law enforcement can contact the LESC at 1-866-DHS-2ICE. 
18 At this writing more information on the Federal Emergency Management Agency can be found at www.fema.gov/. 



preparedness and response. At the time of this 
writing, state homeland security directors are helping 
the agency create more detailed plans for 
threat-specific responses that integrate various disciplines 
and levels of government. The Emergency 
Management Institute (EMI)the training division 
of FEMAhas also developed a national 
training and evaluation system aimed at improving 
the implementation of the National Incident Management 
System (NIMS) at the federal, state and 
local levels. EMI has also set standards for additional 
training and is working to determine how 
government agencies can review their progress and 
performance.19 

Science and Technology (S&T)20 

The Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) 
performs the primary research and development 
function for DHS. It provides federal, state, local 
and tribal officials with information on new technology 
and the application of existing or declassified 
technologies to protect the homeland. S&T 
also works directly with law enforcement agencies 
to identify and develop technologies to prevent, 
detect and mitigate the effects of terrorist 
attacks and other hazards. It is involved in the 
research, development and testing of vaccines, 
antidotes, and diagnostics and treatment plans to 
counter biological and chemical warfare agents 
often in collaboration with national laboratories 
and academic institutions. 

Quote: We need to recognize the 
exceptional work of DHS 
over the past year, 
especially in the areas of 
response and recovery; I 
am also pleased to see 
DHSs increased focus on 
prevention, particularly in 
the areas of information 
sharing and critical 
infrastructure hardening. 
Ronald Iden, Director, 
Office of Homeland 
Security, California 
Governors Office 

There were originally four offices within 
S&T: the Office of Programs Plans and Budget 
(responsible for the planning and coordination of 
all of the directorates research and development 
efforts), the Homeland Security Advanced 
Research Projects Agency (HSARPA), the Office of 
Research and Development (responsible for the 
administration and direction of the directorates 
laboratories and research centers) and the Office 
of Systems and Engineering Development 
(responsible for overseeing the development of 
advanced technologies systems and their implementation 
in the field). 

In September 2004, DHS launched a fifth 
S&T officethe Office of Interoperability and 
Compatibility (OIC) to oversee public safety 
interoperability programs and their effective integration 
at the federal, state and local levels.21 The 
OIC serves as a central clearinghouse for government 
agencies to gain information about and 
assistance with interoperability issues. It is 

_______________________________________________________________________________
19 More information regarding training and standards for implementation of NIMS and Incident Command Structures can 
be found at http://www.fema.gov/tab_education.shtm or http://training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/. 
20 At this writing, more information on the Science and Technology directorate can be found at www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/ 
display?theme=43&content=1087. 
21 See DHS Today, September 29, 2004 or www.dhs.gov for more information on the launch of the OIC.



responsible for supporting the development of 
standards; establishing a comprehensive research, 
development, testing and evaluation program to 
improve public safety interoperability; coordinating 
all related DHS grants and ensuring that 
states acquire the necessary funding to guarantee 
improvement of interoperability; providing technical 
assistance; as well as overseeing the administration 
of the NIMS Integration Center. 


Management 
The Management Directorate of DHS is responsible 
for its budget, oversight and human resources 
issues, including appropriations, funds expenditures, 
accounting and finance; procurement; personnel; 
information technology systems; facilities, 
property, equipment and other material resources; 
and performance measures. Management is 
responsible for ensuring that DHS employees 
understand their responsibilities and how to communicate 
with other personnel and managers. 
Within the directorate, the chief information officer 
and staff maintain the information technology 
to keep more than 180,000 employees connected 
so they can achieve their goals. 

Additional DHS Components 

A number of additional offices became part of DHS 
after its creation. These other agencies do not fall 
under a specific directorate, but instead exist as 
independent entities under the larger department. 
These components include the U.S. Coast Guard 
(USCG); U.S. Secret Service (USSS); U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration Services (USCIS); and the 
Office of the Secretarywith the last office alone 
comprised of the following: 
 Office of the Chief Privacy Officer 
 Office of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties 
 Office of Counter Narcotics 
 Office of General Counsel 
 Office of the Inspector General 
 Office of Legislative Affairs 
 Office of National Capital Region Coordination 
 Office of the Private Sector Liaison 
 Office of Public Affairs 
 Office of State and Local Government Coordination 
and Preparedness 

Quote: Those operating around 
ports need to be more 
aware of security plans. 
Jeffrey J. Hathaway, Rear 
Admiral, Director of 
Operations Policy, U.S. 
Coast Guard, Department 
of Homeland Security 

U.S. Coast Guard (USCG)22 

Prior to September 11, 2001, the USCG reported 
to the Secretary of Transportation. As of March 1, 
2003, the Commandant of the USCG has reported 
directly to the Secretary of DHS.23 According to 
participants, the move to DHS has been a positive 
one for the Coast Guard; the agency moved to 
DHS intact, has seen a 60 percent increase over its 
pre-9/11 budget, and its missions are now more 
closely aligned with the missions of its department 


_____________________________________________________________________________
22 The information for this text was obtained from executive session participants and the USCG website (www. 
uscg.mil/USCG.shtm). 
23 Consistent with existing law, upon declaration of war or when the President directs, the Coast Guard would operate in 
the service of the Department of Defense.



than they were pre-9/11 under the Department of 
Transportation. 

Executive session participants agreed that 
there has been a productive long-term partnership 
between local, state and federal agencies and the 
USCG to handle maritime homeland security 
issues. The USCG focuses its efforts on awareness, 
protection, prevention and response. 

The USCG provides multimission maritime 
operational expertise as a military and law 
enforcement organization. As one of the five 
Armed Services, its missions include protecting 
the public, the environment, and U.S. economic 
interestsin the nations ports and waterways, 
along the coast or in any U.S. maritime region, as 
well as in international watersto support 
national security. It is important to remember 
that the agency continues to have all of its search, 
rescue and other nonterrorism-related duties as 
well. USCG works particularly closely with local, 
state and federal agencies in protecting the 
nations ports. 

U.S. Secret Service (USSS)24 

Since March 1, 2003, the director of the USSS has 
reported directly to the Secretary of DHS. The primary 
mission of the USSS continues to be the 
protection of the President of the United States 
and other government leaders, but includes other 
duties as needed for securing national events, conducting 
investigations and preserving the integrity 
of financial and critical infrastructures. The 
USSS has such added responsibility as guarding 
against counterfeiting and safeguarding citizens 
from credit card fraud.
 
Executive session participants discussed 
the many new challenges for the USSS since September 
11, including an increase in the number of 
national events in which USSS holds a coordinating 
role. A governor can ask that an event be considered 
a National Special Security Event 
(NSSE) with a formal request from the governor to 
the Secretary of the Department of Homeland 
Security. The request will then be forwarded to 
the NSSE working group, which is made up of representatives 
from the USSS, FBI and FEMA. The 
working group will gather facts and make a recommendation 
to the Secretary, who will make the 
final decision.25 

Quote: When I hear you say that 
local law enforcement does 
not have close contacts 
with DHS, I think some 
people are forgetting that 
when they work with ICE, 
the Secret Service or 
others, we are DHS. We can 
also help you get to the 
right person in DHS if you 
dont know who to 
contact. 
Paul Kilcoyne, Deputy 
Assistant Director, 
Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement, Department 
of Homeland Security 

______________________________________________________________________________
24 At the time of this writing, more information on the USSS can be found at www.secretservice.gov/ and contact information 
for field offices could be found at www.secretservice.gov/field_offices.html. 
25 A more detailed discussion of NSSEs can be found on pp. 43-44 in Chapter Four.



U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services 
(USCIS)26 

While the Border and Transportation Security 
Directorate, through ICE, is responsible for 
enforcing immigration laws, USCIS provides services 
to immigrants and assists with their transition 
to citizenship. The USCIS director reports 
directly to the deputy secretary of DHS. Through 
the USCIS, DHS administers immigrant and nonimmigrant 
sponsorship, change of status, work 
approval and other permits; naturalization of eligible 
applicants for U.S. citizenship; and asylum 
or refugee processing. 

Office of State and Local Government 
Coordination and Preparedness (OSLGCP) 

Among the entities within the Office of the Secretary 
is the Office of State and Local Government 
Coordination and Preparedness. In May 2004, 
DHS merged the Office of Domestic Preparedness 
(ODP)27 with the Office of State and Local Government 
Coordination (SLGC) to create the Office 
of State and Local Government Coordination and 
Preparedness.28 The consolidation is meant to help 
DHS accurately evaluate programs, exercise federal 
oversight and disperse government-provided 
resources efficiently. States and localities benefit 
from the reorganization by being able to access a 
unified and coordinated support office within DHS. 

SLGC is meant to serve as a single point of 
contact for first responders and emergency services 
to coordinate DHS programs that affect state, local 
and tribal governments, as well as nongovernmental 
organizations and associations. SLGC facilitates 
information exchange among state, local and 
tribal homeland security personnel; identifies 
homeland security-related activities, best practices 
and processes; and uses this information to 
advance counterterrorism. 

The ODP component is responsible for 
providing training to federal, state and local first 
responders; allocating funds to purchase equipment 
for counterterrorism responsibilities; supporting 
and working with state, local and tribal 
jurisdictions to plan and execute exercises; and 
lending technical assistance to stakeholders to prevent, 
plan for and respond to terrorist activities. 


______________________________________________________________________________
26 At this writing, more information on the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) can be found at 
http://uscis.gov/graphics/. The fiscal year 2003 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, which contains a summary of immigration-
related data, is available on the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services website at http://uscis.gov/graphics/ 
shared/aboutus/statistics/ybpage.htm. The yearbook contains statistics and explanatory text covering critical DHS immigration-
related activities from border enforcement to naturalization. 
27 More information on the Office of Domestic Preparedness can be found at www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp/. 
28 More information on the Office of State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness can be found at 
www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?theme=38&content=3398.


 
MEETING THE NEEDS AND ADDRESSING THE CHALLENGES OF 
OUR STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 
by Joshua Filler, Director, Office of State and Local Government 
Coordination and Preparedness, Department of Homeland Security 
Since September 11, 2001, the President and Congress have provided almost $11.4 billion in homeland 
security funding to states, territorial and local governments. Most of those funds have been 
awarded under the State Homeland Security Grant Program (SHSGP), Law Enforcement Terrorism 
Prevention Program (LETPP), Firefighters Assistance Grant Program and the Urban Areas Security 
Initiative (UASI). When the President signed the Departments Federal Fiscal Year 2005 budget it 
allowed us to provide another $4 billion in homeland security funding, including $1.1 billion for 
SHSGP, $400 million for LETPP, $715 million for Firefighters Assistance Grant program, and $1.2 
billion for UASI. We are proud to say that this is the second consecutive year in which the administration 
has asked for funds in the LETPP program to specifically assist the law enforcement community 
in their homeland security mission. 

We have come a long way since September 11, 2001, and the subsequent creation of DHS, 
but there is much more work to be done. Federal law enforcement has been meeting with its local, 
state and tribal counterparts for years in an attempt to build stronger, more effective partnerships 
to combat crimes such as drug trafficking and organized crime. With the formation of DHS and the 
bringing together of 22 disparate agencies, the need for open lines of communication among the 
many agencies involved in protecting our homeland is essential. We have made some impressive 
strides already. 

Routinely, officials from DHS are communicating with representatives from local and state 
law enforcement discussing policy, operations and intelligence issues. We are constantly assessing 
the national situation to ensure that state and local officials have the information and resources to 
prevent, and if necessary, respond to threats and terrorist attacks. 

We are providing our state and local partners with the secure communications equipment 
(video, voice and data), so that agencies and departments at the federal level can better pass classified 
and other security information to decision makers and analysts within each state and territory. 
We provide state and local homeland security officials bulletins and real-time information 
through our information sharing portal, the Homeland Security Information Networks Joint 
Regional Information Exchange System (HSIN-JRIES). This and other systems represent the forefront 
of technological advances in real-time information turned into actionable intelligence and disseminated 
to agents and officers across the country. The Department is also working with State 
Homeland Security Advisors to grant additional Secret-level clearances to state and local government 
officials across the country.

DHS is committed to ensuring that the necessary law enforcement, medical, fire and other 
first-responder personnel are fully funded, equipped and supported as we work together to secure 
the homeland. As new priorities arise with new challenges, it is important that DHS, other federal 
law enforcement entities and their local, state and tribal counterparts continue to work together as 
we face the ongoing threat of terrorism. 



Office of Private Sector Liaison29 

Executive session participants discussed the critical 
role the private sector plays in preventing, 
responding to and recovering from incidents. The 
Office of Private Sector Liaison (within the Office 
of the Secretary) provides a direct line of communication 
between the private sector and DHS. The 
office is organized into five components: Border 
and Transportation Security, Emergency Preparedness 
and Response, Science and Technology, Information 
Analysis and Infrastructure Protection, and 
Regulation Review and Analysis. The Office of Private 
Sector Liaison provides guidance on security 
policies and regulations; works with federal labs, 
research and development centers and academia to 
develop innovative approaches and technologies; 
and promotes public-private partnerships and best 
practices. Personnel work directly with individual 
businesses and through trade associations and 
other non-governmental organizations to promote 
an ongoing dialogue and to share information, 
programs, resources and partnership opportunities. 

Measuring DHS Success 

Executive session participants discussed the work 
achieved in DHSs first year, including a complex 
management structure, a new airport security system, 
improved border operations and port security and 
much more. At the one-year mark, DHS had also 
published multiple reports, including the departments 
reorganization and strategic plans, as well 
as procedures for local and state law enforcement 
and other units of government to obtain funding. 
DHS executives faced many obstacles: the trials of 
working from temporary office space, many 
unfilled senior-level positions, union-management 
issues, under-funded mandates for DHS component 
areas and more. 

Quote: The establishment of DHS 
was like forming a large 
corporation in one year. 
Chuck Wexler, 
PERF Executive Director

With the many challenges DHS has faced 
in establishing a new department, it has simultaneously 
had to handle an anxious public and the 
immediate needs local, state, tribal and federal law 
enforcement agencies have for an integrated 
response that draws on competencies not yet 
developed. Executive session participants discussed 
the problems with how the government 
would measure DHS success, given the difficulty 


_________________________________________________________________________________
29 As this paper goes to print, more information on the Office of Private Sector Liaison can be found at www.dhs.gov/ 
dhspublic/display?theme=37&content=3363. 



in proving that terrorist acts have been averted 
through prevention and other efforts. Assessing a 
department with more than 180,000 employees 
that answers to 80 congressional committees and 
subcommittees and other oversight at this writing 
is daunting, particularly because it must address 
tremendous immediate needs while starting a new 
counterterrorism organization for the long term. 
One measure of its success will be the extent to 
which it is able to effectively enhance collaborations 
with law enforcement at all levels of government. 

CONCLUSION 

DHS is committed to enhancing local, state and 
tribal awareness of the roles and responsibilities of 
each directorate and the resources and training 
they provide. The relationship is symbiotic, as 
DHS also relies on the homeland security efforts 
at the local, state and tribal levels, including the 
private sector. Executive session participants have 
likened DHSs development to putting the wings 
on a plane as it takes off down the runway. First 
responders acknowledge that DHS is very much a 
work in progress, but also expressed urgency in 
receiving federal assistance that reflects their 
immediate needs for funding and other forms of 
support. It was evident from the session discussion 
that many state and local agencies are still 
unaware of the roles, responsibilities and 
resources offered by the DHS component agencies. 
Furthermore, even the federal agency representatives 
acknowledged the need to better define 
their duties and reduce redundancies and turf 
issues. All agreed, however, that much progress 
has been made and the benefits they will gain 
from further coordination and collaboration will 
greatly advance homeland security. A more 
detailed discussion of how local law enforcement 
has put to use some of the DHS resources described 
above, as well as other assets, is provided in 
Chapter Four.



CHAPTER THREE 

STATE AND LOCAL RESPONSIBILITIES AND 
MODELS FOR COOPERATION 

JUST AS LAW ENFORCEMENT AT ALL LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT MUST WORK WITH 
DHS and other federal authorities to secure the homeland, similar efforts to 
foster partnerships between law enforcement and other nonfederal stakeholders 
are critical. These partnerships are the focus of this chapter. The following 
sections reflect executive session participants discussions of cooperation 
among state homeland security authorities, local and state law enforcement 
agencies, and local departments initiatives with neighboring jurisdictions and 
key stakeholders. The intent is to provide a broad overview of the types of coordinated 
efforts that can advance counterterrorism work. 

This chapter discusses state homeland security 
models and plans, which vary considerably to 
meet states specific needs for homeland security 
protection. The differences among the states add 
to the complexity of developing effective cooperative 
and support efforts among all levels of government. 
State homeland security models are also 
considered because of their role in disseminating 
grants to police agencies. Based on lawmakers 
premise that the states best understand homeland 
security needs, particularly for first responders 
and emergency personnel, DHS provides funding 
to state homeland security authorities to oversee 
and distribute funds for counterterrorism efforts. 
DHS also provides states with guidance on 
improving their state and local homeland security 
plans. Accordingly, local police and state law 
enforcement need to continue building stronger 
relationships with their state homeland security 
authorities to inform the process and foster cooperative 
approaches.
 
The chapter then explores partnerships 
among all first responders (fire, police, EMS and 
others), as well as law enforcement collaborations 
with such key stakeholders as transportation 
authorities, the military, tribal agencies, colleges 
and universities, private sector and private security, 
delivery personnel and community leaders. 

Finally, local law enforcement concerns 
about how to meet counterterrorism duties while 
maintaining traditional law enforcement functions 
are reviewed, with particular emphasis on 
how community policing principles can advance 
both anticrime and counterterrorism efforts.



State Homeland Security Models 

States, just like the federal government, are designing 
and implementing homeland security agencies 
and functions. Each state is organizing itself in 
accordance with its needs and resources, resulting 
in a great deal of variation across the states. Immediately 
after September 11, each governor appointed 
a homeland security advisor to serve as a liaison 
with DHS. Subsequently states have moved in a 
variety of directions to meet the day-to-day 
demands of homeland security. Some states have 
established independent departments of homeland 
security; others have designated existing agencies, 
such as law enforcement, emergency management 
or national guard to assume homeland security 
responsibilities. Along with variation in organizational 
structures, there exist tremendous differences 
in the backgrounds, expertise and 
perspectives of state homeland security directors 
and advisors. These individuals come from many 
disciplines, including law enforcement, military, 
public health, fire, emergency management and 
even the private sector. Their professional orientation 
may well influence how they define homeland 
security, organize state resources and develop plans 
for allocating federal grant dollars.30 

State homeland security directors are still 
developing and shaping the scope of their mission, 
roles and responsibilities. Each state homeland 
security director has developed a state strategic 
plan, many of which promote public safety and 
protect critical infrastructure. According to a state 
homeland security representative at the session, 
the priorities of each state may also include such 
local crime issues as combating gang violence, car 
thefts, drug activity and burglaries. Executive session 
participants recommended that state homeland 
security directors focus on an all-hazards 
approach to preparedness that would address any 
critical incident, whether it is a wildfire, a hurricane 
or a terrorist attack. The primary focus at the 
state level should be to bring all agencies to the 
table, have an open dialogue and reach some consensus 
on implementation. State homeland security 
directors at the executive session indicated that 
they look to other states to replicate models and 
best practices. For instance, some states look to 
California because it has had extensive experience 
in multi-agency and regional partnerships to handle 
such critical incidents as large-scale fires and 
earthquakes. Participants believed DHS could provide 
valuable resources to facilitate greater information 
sharing and best practices. 

One of the greatest challenges for state 
homeland security directors has been trying to 
coordinate the many different first responders and 
other stakeholders needed to address each potential 
threat. The homeland security directors often 
have inadequate staff to fully meet operational 
goals and to handle the inestimable needs of each 
jurisdiction. 


______________________________________________________________________________
30 See www.nga.org/cda/files/homestructures.pdf for the document Overview of States Homeland Security Governance, 
which gives information on homeland security task forces, state homeland security websites, legislation, executive orders 
and other relevant sources. The National Governors Association has developed materials that provide a comprehensive 
overview of state homeland security governance and a listing of state homeland security organizational structures. 


 
HOMELAND SECURITYS MOMENT IN TIME 
by George Foresman, Deputy Assistant to the Governor, 
Office of Virginia Governor Mark R. Warner 
Ours is a moment in time is my favorite phrase to describe our collective local, state, federal and 
private sector initiatives in this post-September 11, 2001 era. It is followed closely by it is not a 
case of either or, but instead it is a matter of and when describing what we need to do to make 
ourselves safer and more secure. We must ensure the collective improvement of the wide range of 
disciplines responsible for safety and securitypolice, fire, public health and emergency management, 
to name a few, as well as similar private sector elements. We will not be successful if our 
focus is on a single element of preparedness to the exclusion of our broader capability. 

In addition to the trauma and horror associated with the terrorist attacks, first responders 
have had to grapple with a new reality in how they police and serve communities at risk of future 
terrorist attacks. There has been much angst associated with our national reaction to the events of 
September 11, 2001. The angst comes in large part from change. A new organization at the federal 
level called the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has set in motion a new way of securing 
the nation. Demands for improved coordination and information sharing vertically between 
the levels of government and horizontally among agencies within each level of government is 
requiring entire disciplines and personnel to adjust to various agency cultures. They must reorient 
to an approach in which information is gathered during a law enforcement investigation to be widely 
shared like never before for prevention instead of prosecution.
 
Change is never easy. It is made even more difficult by a continuing threat environment, 
an insatiable national appetite for highlighting the inevitable problems that come with adjustment, 
and the desire of leaders and the public to regain the sense of security Americans held before the 
September 11 attacks. 

Virginia considered these and other factors in charting a course for change as a result of the 
focus on homeland security. Our approach is simple: provide leadership for a change in culture 
among our citizens, our local governments, entire communities, disciplines and state government. 

When Governor Warner established the Office of Commonwealth Preparedness in 2002 the 
mandate was clear: We must improve Virginias preparedness for emergencies and disasters of all 
kinds, including terrorism. The idea was not to create a new bureaucracy, but rather to work with 
existing successful structures and processes to create an all-risk enterprise approach. It needed to 
be nimble enough to manage a full range of risksfrom the daily event in a single community to 
a large-scale occurrence affecting many people, including drugs, gangs, natural disasters and accidents. 
To be successful, we are reducing the stovepipes and agency turf battles to create a truly 
statewide and disciplined approach to keeping Virginians safe and secure.



The approach is one of and. Communities and myriad disciplines, the private sector and 
government, individuals and families. The effort is not about any one individual or groupbut all 
those living, visiting and doing business in Virginia. 

The enterprise approach, however, has a serious vulnerabilitythat is, it is only as strong 
as its weakest link. The goal is to advance all facets of prevention and preparedness from the ordinary 
to the extraordinary, responsive to the risks posed by terrorism while still addressing the full 
range of other risks facing Virginians every day. Equipment, education, training, exercises and planning 
are all part of the effort. 

Homeland security is less about who gets what and plays which role and more about what 
actually gets done. This is our greatest challenge in Virginia and arguably the nation. In the post- 
September 11 environment organizations are confronted with legitimate concerns about missions, 
funding and turf. That is healthy. It promotes discussion and competition. If managed effectively, 
discussion and competition are powerful tools for improvement. And improvement is what is needed 
to confront both the threat of terrorism and the need to provide a more effective approach to preventing, 
responding to and recovering from emergencies and disasters of all kinds. 

I remember September 11 vividly. I also remember September 12, 2001. This nation was 
united in common purpose. Despite our grief, we stood resolute in our determination to preserve 
the values we cherish most. Ours was, and still is, a common purpose. We draw on that common 
purpose every day to get beyond the real and very difficult obstacles to setting in motion the cultural 
change among individuals, disciplines, organizations and levels of government that is needed 
for our long-term success. We use this common purpose to move from conflict to consensus in the 
hope that we can take concepts for improvement and translate them into completion. 

We must not let the pursuit of perfection get in the way of progress. We have made great 
strides, yet there is much more that needs to be done. The effort will go on long after my contributions 
and that of others. The job right now is to put in place the solid foundation that will support 
what will certainly be a long-term endeavor. This will not be an easy transition for Virginia. 
Homeland security is not a function or an organization. It is a culture. Everyone has a role. We 
must define those roles. It is after all our moment in time. 

State Homeland Security Plans 

State homeland security directors are tasked with 
determining how to protect the public and infrastructure, 
while assessing how DHS can assist their 
efforts. Identifying the nature and scope of federal 
assistance means that states must formulate comprehensive 
plans and then detail what support is 
needed to implement them. To that end, DHS has 
requested that each state develop a homeland security 
plan based on its unique needs, resources and 
vulnerabilities. Executive session participants 
encouraged DHS to produce standards and detailed 
direction on how to best structure these state homeland 
security plans, and how to evaluate them. 


 
Planning is an iterative process in which 
information from one level of government continually 
influences the other. State and local executive 
session participants discussed the information 
they need from DHS so their agencies can develop 
meaningful security plans to prevent or disrupt a 
terrorist attack. Many local law enforcement participants 
reiterated that they need more information 
on which threats DHS considers the most 
urgent for their region (e.g., truck bombs, hijackings, 
bioterrorism, nuclear weapons), and when 
possible for their jurisdiction. They also agreed 
that states have to look at the intelligence they 
receive from federal agencies to allocate resources 
to the areas that draw the greatest threat. Recognizing 
that this is a fluid process in which threat 
levels and targets change, participants believed 
DHS could play a greater role in helping states base 
their homeland security plans and structures on 
known threats. To the extent possible, states are 
looking to DHS for guidance that is based on credible 
information and intelligence. 

Local law enforcement agencies are also 
requesting more guidance and responsiveness 
from, and stronger relationships with, their state 
homeland security authority. They want a greater 
voice in public safety plans and in how resources 
are allocated. In turn, state homeland security 
directors are requesting that local law enforcement 
agencies be patient while they formulate these 
state homeland security plans and develop relationships 
with DHS and other jurisdictions. State 
homeland security directors also request that each 
of their localities submit fully completed paperwork 
when applying for funding to ensure timely 
submission to DHS. 

Local Responsibilities and Models 
Used for Cooperation 

Ultimately, each local law enforcement department 
is responsible for addressing crime and the 
threat of terrorism for its jurisdiction. The local 
agency may obtain DHS funding and assistance 
from its state homeland security authority, but 
decisions on how to allocate the police agencys 
resources and set priorities for terrorism prevention 
and preparedness (with consideration for 
other demands for police services) fall to local law 
enforcement. The local police department personnel 
who perform the homeland security function 
largely shape those determinations, so it is important 
to understand how agencies staff these positions 
or activities, as well as how that organization 
can influence partnerships. 

There are many homeland security structures 
that can be found in local agencies. In some 
local law enforcement departments there is a 
homeland security representative who only handles 
counterterrorism responsibilities.31 In other local 
agencies, an individual fills that position, but also 
handles his or her other duties. For instance, the 
homeland security representative may be assigned 
from the intelligence unit, drug unit, gang unit or 
special tactical unit. He or she may also be the Joint 
Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) representative for that 
jurisdiction. Oftentimes the chief executive assigns 
this individual to be the primary contact for the 
state homeland security director and for DHS and 
other federal agencies. Chief law enforcement executives 
understand how time-consuming the homeland 
security representatives role can be and the 
need for adequate staffing and sufficient resources. 

________________________________________________________________________
31 In large agencies this function may be coordinated by several people.


 
Some local police participants stated they 
do not have a strong relationship with their state 
homeland security director. However, some of 
these agencies have positive interactions with DHS 
personnel or use their JTTF to obtain information 
on issues affecting their area. Some of these local 
law enforcement participants reported building 
relationships with DHS in Washington, D.C. that 
are not utilized by their states. The complexities of 
how local agencies are coordinating and planning 
with their counterparts in other local agencies, 
with their state authorities and with federal agencies 
will shape how they function and what assets 
they have to draw on. 

Some local law enforcement agencies are 
integrating their homeland security efforts with all 
other critical incident planning, such as hurricanes, 
fires, earthquakes, riots and more. The Los Angeles 
Police Departments (LAPDs) homeland security 
function was originally organized as the Counterterrorism 
Bureau. LAPD changed the bureau name 
to the Critical Incident Management Bureau to 
reflect that preparedness for terrorism is largely the 
same as it is for many other types of critical incidents. 
Participants believed the key to success again 
rests with sharing information with other jurisdictions 
and then tailoring elements of best practices 
to the unique needs of an agency and jurisdiction. 

Partnerships with Other 
Jurisdictions and First Responders 

The challenge of homeland security is building 
partnerships among diverse disciplines and multiple 
levels of government. Local law enforcement 
agencies, to varying degrees, coordinate counterterrorism 
efforts with neighboring jurisdictions, state 
and tribal agencies and engage other disciplines 
such as EMS, fire, public health and the private 
sector to enhance public safety. Executive session 
participants stated that all agencies should participate 
in developing a regional threat assessment and 
a shared response plan to critical incidents in their 
area. In areas where state authorities or local agencies 
have not already formulated regional 
approaches, executives should encourage regional 
or statewide law enforcement associations to support 
meaningful discussions about policies, practices, 
operations, plans and mutual aid in 
anticipation of a multijurisdictional incident. Each 
law enforcement agency needs to determine 
whether it can develop memoranda of understanding 
(MOUs) or other mutual aid agreements with 
area agencies.32 

State homeland security directors can assist 
local agencies and regional response teams by coordinating 
the resources and expertise that could be 
directed to problem areas and stated needs. DHS 
can also offer assets to these regional partnerships. 
Though there are many successful examples, California 
is among those that use such a strategy for 
obtaining funding and deploying resources. It has 
long engaged in regional and statewide collaborations 
for national disasters. Other statesincluding 
Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Kentuckyalso 
require regional coordination for grant applications 
and to ensure a statewide plan is supported by individual 
efforts (see sidebar on p. 55). 


______________________________________________________________________________
32 A resource for planning law enforcement responses that cross agency boundaries is Murphy, Gerard R. and Chuck Wexler 
with Heather J. Davies and Martha R. Plotkin. October 2004. Managing a Multijurisdictional Case: Identifying Lessons 
Learned from the Sniper Investigation. Washington, DC: Police Executive Research Forum. The guide includes suggestions 
for coordinating the media, shift scheduling and other functions with neighboring jurisdictions before an incident occurs.



Law enforcement executives from neighboring 
jurisdictions can conduct conference calls 
or schedule regular meetings to develop and adjust 
regional homeland security plans and to share 
what has worked and what has not in other hazardous 
incidents. Participants also suggested that 
executives hold conference calls that include government 
agencies (fire department, EMS, school 
officials) as well as other relevant stakeholder 
groups to keep them informed and involved in key 
decisions that will affect them. 

Working with Others to Protect 
Critical Infrastructure 

Protecting critical infrastructure, important assets 
and systems is vital to national security, public 
health and safety, the economy and citizens quality 
of life. The Information Analysis and Infrastructure 
Protection (IAIP) directorate is the 
primary DHS component responsible for coordinating 
critical infrastructure protection, including 
vulnerability assessments, strategic planning 
efforts, training and exercises. 

Executive session participants emphasized 
that protecting critical infrastructure is the 
shared responsibility of federal, state, local and 
tribal government, as well as the private sector. 
Unprecedented partnerships that support multijurisdictional, 
multidisciplinary efforts must be 
encouraged at every level of government to 
address key vulnerabilities across the nation. 
These collaborations must include 

 transportation systems, 
 military assets, 
 tribal authorities, 
 colleges and universities, and 
 the private sector. 

While this list is not exhaustive, these categories 
represent some of the most compelling needs 
for partnerships to address the threats of terrorism. 

Transportation Systems 

Concern that the terrorist attacks on domestic and 
international passenger systems in other countries 
(bombings in London and Paris subways, the Tokyo 
sarin gas attack, bus bombings in Israel, train 
bombings in Moscow and Spain) will be repeated 
in the United States has shaken the American publics 
sense of security. To grasp the enormity of the 
task, one only needs to consider that according to 
the Department of Transportations Federal Transit 
Administration (FTA), in one month, urban rail 
transit moves more passengers than U.S. airlines 
move in one year.33 Terrorist attacks and other disruptions 
to transportation systems can yield heavy 
causalities, damage the economy and shut down 
government and critical operations. 

Quote: There is nobody that 
knows critical infrastructure 
more than the 
chief of police and streetlevel 
officers. 
William Parrish, Liaison to 
the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, Department 
of Homeland Security 

__________________________________________________________________________________
33 At the time of this writing, more information on the FTA can be found at www.fta.dot.gov. Through the FTA, the federal 
government provides financial assistance to develop new transit systems and improve, maintain and operate existing systems. 
It also oversees and provides federal funding for training and security efforts.


Quote: Before I joined DHS Id 
take the train from DC to 
New York and look out the 
window at the sights. After 
I joined DHS and had an 
appreciation for exactly 
what critical infrastructure 
is, I was able to see just 
how many potential 
targets there are on just 
that short trip. I dont think 
most people have an 
appreciation for how much 
critical infrastructure is in 
the communities where we 
live. 
John Chase, Chief of Staff, 
Information Analysis and 
Infrastructure Protection, 
Department of Homeland 
Security 

The Transportation Security Administration 
(TSA) has regulatory authority and security 
responsibility for all modes of transportation, and 
works with the FTA and 10 other of its component 
agencies to safeguard their respective infrastructures. 
Executive session participants discussed their 
perception that TSA is being too aviation-centric 
and less visible in port security and cargo protection 
in their jurisdictions. They also recommended 
making freight and passenger rail transportation 
systems a priority. Finally, local and state session 
participants called on TSA to clarify its overall 
responsibilities and those of its component agencies 
as they relate to state and local law enforcement. 
Executive session participants also recommended 
that the DHS Science and Technology directorate 
continue to work with transportation security 
agencies across the country to provide effective 
monitoring, screening and other devices that will 
facilitate prevention, response and recovery efforts. 

One executive session participant indicated 
that some regional funding efforts, even UASI 
grant programs, could be hard for urban rail transit 
systems to access. Transportation system administrators 
need to be involved when government leaders 
and emergency management directors allocate 
homeland security resources, particularly when a 
transit system crosses jurisdiction and/or state 
boundaries. 

Since prevention efforts will not always be 
effective, local law enforcement must work with 
DHS, transportation industry authorities and 
other key players to plan and practice an effective 
response to terrorist attacks on passenger and 
shipping systems.34 While transportation officers 
would most likely be the initial responders to a 
critical incident on their systemwhether a terrorist 
attack or an accidentofficers from local 
law enforcement and other first responders would 
also be dispatched to secure the perimeter, preserve 
the crime scene and transport victims to 


________________________________________________________________________________
34 For example, the Washington, DC Metropolitan Transit Authority (WMATA) is the second largest rail transit system in 
the United States, with on average more than a half-million weekday riders. Many of these riders destinations are stations 
located within or near potential terrorist targets. These targets are located within eight jurisdictions that are served by 
approximately 25 law enforcement agencies. More information on the WMATA can be found at www.wmata.com/ 
about/metrofacts.pdf. In addition, in the event of a critical incident on the Metro transit systems, there is a high likelihood 
that Amtrak police would also respond because they share equipment and jurisdiction with Metro Transit in several stations 
located in Maryland, Virginia and the District of Columbia. Many law enforcement agencies that serve WMATA are 
developing a model that can be considered by other transportation systems around the country.



nearby hospitals. Further, numerous federal agencies 
(the FBI, DHS, TSA, DOT) and several nonpolice 
government organizations (CDC, state and 
local departments of public health) may also be 
involved, particularly if the incident involves a biological 
or radiological attack. These many players 
must plan and practice a coordinated response. 
Some local law enforcement participants stated 
that they participate in tabletop exercises and 
cross-train with transit officers, but they encourage 
collaboration that integrates all regional agencies 
across disciplines and full-scale practice exercises. 

IMPROVED RAIL SECURITY THROUGH PARTNERSHIPS 
WITH HOMELAND SECURITY 

by Jacqueline Litzinger, Commander of Infrastructure Protection, 
CSX Transportation 

The infamous terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 and subsequent threats have posed enormous 
challenges to the worlds security forces. Among these forces, the railroad industry recognized 
that the ongoing threat of terrorism must be dealt with assertively. CSX Transportation, the largest 
rail carrier in the eastern United States has played a leadership role in this war on terror. 
CSX Transportation, in conjunction with the Association of American Railroads (AAR), 
began working on a comprehensive security plan immediately following September 11 that would 
help ensure the safety and security of the U.S. rail infrastructure, its personnel, the communities 
through which it operates and the products being delivered to virtually every eastern community, 
including vital military shipments to U.S. ports for transport overseas. 
CSX is promptly complying with all federal regulations concerning the shipment of hazardous 
materials. Security plans are constantly being revised and amended to ensure all mandates are met or 
exceeded. These measures include awareness training for all employees and a plan that addresses personnel 
security, unauthorized access countermeasures, en route safekeeping of hazardous materials 
and a recordkeeping system that is updated often enough to reflect changing circumstances. 


 
Information Sharing 

CSX employs a railroad police force of commissioned or certified officers with interstate authority 
under 49 USC section 28101,35 who work very closely with numerous law enforcement agencies 
throughout the rail network. CSX police and other railroad police departments share information 
and conduct joint planning activities and operations through the International Association of 
Chiefs of Polices (IACPs) railroad police section. Personnel also work closely with other first 
responders by participating in various local domestic security task forces and intelligence groups. 
At the federal level there is a railroad industry representative serving on the FBIs National 
Joint Terrorism Task Force to ensure the flow of vital information to the rail industry. There is 
also a railroad industry representative serving at the AAR Operations Center, a 24-hour emergency 
response center that acts as a link between the railroads and the national security intelligence community. 
CSX and other members of the rail industry rely heavily on timely, accurate intelligence 
from numerous sources, including the Department of Defense (DOD), Department of Transportation 
(DOT), IACP, DHS, Transportation Security Administration (TSA), FBI, CIA, the Military Surface 
Deployment and Distribution Command (SDDC), etc. Although these entities contribute 
information to the AAR Operations Center, they often share a direct relationship with CSX as well. 
Classified information is received through secure communications.
 
Special Units 

CSX Transportation has further strengthened our rail infrastructure by creating a new Infrastructure 
Protection Unit (IPU). This unit combines the resources of the railroads police forces and hazardous 
materials professionals, aligning them to deal with the threat of terrorism. This 
collaboration will strengthen CSXs awareness and ability to respond to threats or attacks. 
CSX also created a highly specialized railroad-specific Rapid Response Team. This team is 
composed of members within the police department. The teams primary mission is to protect the 
rail infrastructure and assets against terrorist activity. The members are strategically positioned 
throughout the CSX rail network for quick response to an incident or deployment for a special security 
event. Extensive training in such anti-terrorism efforts as tactical and counter-intelligence, as 
well as how to work with canine units, hazardous materials specialists and transportation specialists, 
make this team a highly prepared SWAT force. 

CSX Transportation collects information that could be related to possible international or 
domestic terrorism. This information must be processed, analyzed, investigated and stored by the 
IPU. Information concerning security plans, threat intelligence and major event planning is 


____________________________________________________________________________________
35 State laws differ widely with regard to railroad police authority. Most states grant a special police commission 
issued by the Governor. In some states, such as Florida, railroad police take the certification examination prior to 
receiving their commission. USC 49, section 28101 allows railroad police who are employed by a rail carrier, and 
certified or commissioned under the laws of a state, to enforce the laws of any jurisdiction in which the rail carrier 
owns property. This is to protect employees, passengers and patrons of the rail carrier; property moving in interstate 
or foreign commerce; and the personnel and equipment moving by rail that is vital to our nations defense. 



disseminated by the IPU to enhance coordination among all relevant departments or agencies. The 
IPU and the rapid response team members rely on quality information and make every effort to 
contribute any knowledge they have that may be helpful to others. 

The IPU and special teams are also supported by improved surveillance mechanisms. The 
CSX Transportations Police Communications Center receives and addresses an average of 14,000 
emergency and non-emergency calls per month. A sophisticated real-time monitoring system 
enables these communications personnel, as well as others working to keep the railroad safe and to 
maintain a constant surveillance of certain critical infrastructure. The system has received acclaim 
from both international and domestic security authorities. 

Partnerships 

The keystone of CSXs security effort is not the sophisticated monitoring systems, or even its comprehensive 
security plan, but rather the partnerships that CSX shares with homeland security professionals, 
including local and state law enforcement agencies. The war on terror is one that must 
be waged in a concerted and coordinated effort among all law enforcement, security, military and 
critical infrastructure industry partners. CSX Transportation has benefited from and contributed to 
these essential collaborations. By working jointly with the TSA, security of cargo is enhanced. By 
working with the U.S. Coast Guard and the nations ports served by CSX Transportation, we are 
strengthening and protecting our bridges, waterway accesses and rail lines entering the ports. CSX 
is also partnering with U.S. Customs to better secure the shipment of cargo in transit from foreign 
shores through an agreement known as Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT), a 
joint government-business initiative to strengthen overall supply chain and border security.
 
After September 11, 2001 many communities began performing vulnerability assessments 
to determine the risk they face from terrorists who may be operating virtually anywhere. 
CSX Transportation recognized that there was a need for an adequate rail vulnerability assessment 
tool to allow communities to make informed and realistic evaluations of railroad facilities. CSX 
recognizes that the day has long passed when the railroad was a central part of every Americans 
life, when railroads were as familiar and well understood as the Internet is today. One of the tools 
that the IPU developed while working with the Florida Department of Law Enforcement and Floridas 
Orange County Sheriffs Office Homeland Security Team was a rail appendix for the Homeland 
Security Comprehensive Assessment Model (HLS-CAM).36 This is just one example of how 



____________________________________________________________________________________
36 The HLS-CAM was developed by the National Domestic Preparedness Coalition Incorporated (NDCPI). NDCPI 
is a non-profit, public/private partnership, whose leadership includes the Orange County Sheriff s Office, Orange 
County, Florida, West Virginia University School of Medicine and the West Virginia National Guard. NDCPI has 
entered into an agreement with Datamaxx Professional Services, Inc. (DPS) to provide training on the NDPCI 
Homeland Security Comprehensive Assessment Model (HLS-CAM). Under this agreement, DPS will offer nationwide 
training to public safety officials and private corporations in the application of the HLS-CAM. The HLS-CAM 
is a methodology to systematically rank the critical infrastructures, facilities and events of a chosen community, 
determine the vulnerabilities of each ranked item and provide the framework for developing a comprehensive plan 
to address those vulnerabilities. Agencies and corporations interested in registering for HLS-CAM Training Seminars 
can e-mail hlstraining@datamaxx.com or visit the DPS website at www.datamaxx.com.
comprehensive partnerships with homeland security forces are helping to improve our nations 
safety. 

Other partnerships feature training and resource sharing. CSX Transportation has provided 
training for many years and continues to educate emergency responders about the unique nature 
of the railroad operating environment and the equipment commonly used. The Railroad Security 
Awareness and Operations Course provides a hands-on training opportunity for fire department, 
law enforcement and emergency management personnel to acquaint themselves with railroad-specific 
issues before an incident occurs. 
The task of protecting Americas industrial infrastructure is a daunting challenge to all of us. 
With strong partnerships such as those mentioned here, CSX is one step closer to meeting our goal. 

 
Working with the Military to Protect Civilians 
Executive session participants discussed the 
importance of collaborating with the military to 
secure installations and to apply defense technology 
or other resources, as appropriate, to law 
enforcement operations. The BioNet program for 
examplea cooperative program between the 
DHS and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency 
(DTRA)addresses the critical issues surrounding 
the detection and response to biochemical attacks, 
and attempts to improve upon consequence management 
capabilities and military-civilian coordination 
through coordinated plans and a variety of 
standards of practice. BioNet helps the Defense 
Department and DHS maintain interoperable systems 
and manage such resources as monitoring 
and detection technologies, personnel and triage 
equipment.37 If a biochemical incident occurs, 
BioNet will help direct resources as local law 
enforcement responds. Though the posse comitatus 
limits military involvement in domestic law 
enforcement actions, the military can serve as a 
resource for critical infrastructure protection and 
security for high-threat target areas such as military 
installations and their surrounding communities. 
Executive session participants recommended 
that members of the armed forces should be 
included in training and preparedness for localized 
consequence management efforts.38 

Tribal Issues 

Tribal agencies often feel they are overlooked in 
partnerships with DHS and other federal, state and 
local agencies. Executive session participants 
emphasized the importance of DHS efforts to 
include tribal law enforcement in preparing for and 
responding to a terrorist attack. To that end, the 
Border Patrol is working with local tribal law 


______________________________________________________________________________
37 More information on the BioNet program can be found at http://bionet.calit2.net/project.php. 
38 As an aside, local law enforcement participants also emphasized that many of their employees are in the military reserve 
and have been or may be called up for duty overseas. Law enforcement agencies, in cooperation with DHS and the military, 
need to better determine how to assist agencies that are struggling with limited resources while these positions are vacant, 
particularly during periods of heightened alert when personnel are stretched to the limit trying to conduct both crime- and 
terrorism-prevention duties. Local law enforcement is committed to supporting agency personnel on active duty and their 
families, as well as working to best reintegrate these men and women when they return to work.


 
enforcement to protect tribal lands from unlawful 
entry along the more than 250 miles of borders 
adjacent to tribal lands.39 Tribal police expressed a 
need for an active representative on the relevant 
JTTFs. They are eager to participate in partnerships 
with state, local and federal law enforcement 
agencies, as well as with DHS. Executive session 
participants discussed coordination issues between 
tribal government and law enforcement that must 
be addressed. Local agencies too must work with 
tribal governments to encourage tribal involvement 
in homeland security efforts. 

DHS needs to include 
Tribal law enforcement in 
all their strategies for 
several reasons, including 
the fact that Tribal Police 
protect miles of 
international borders. 
There must be an education 
and awareness of Tribal 
Polices contributions and 
the need to enhance our 
capabilities. Limitations 
must be overcome to 
ensure our nations safety 
is not jeopardized, 
including the reality that 
close to half of Tribal Police 
agencies do not have 
access to NCIC or 
jurisdictional authority in 
cases involving non- 
Indians. 
Chief Ed Reina, Yavapai- 
Prescott Tribal Police

Colleges and Universities 

After September 11, many universities have made 
great strides in working with local, state and federal 
agencies in their region to address potential terrorist 
threats. The university representative at the 
session indicated that colleagues in college and 
university security often have a close working relationship 
with the local JTTF and an FBI Field 
Office is assigned to each university for specific 
investigations on each campus. DHS encourages 
colleges and universities to learn more about the 
resources available to assist them in preparing for 
and responding to a critical incident, including 
FEMAs Disaster Resistant University (DRU) program.
40 DHS also funds the development of training 
and resource materials at the nations higher 
learning institutions to be disseminated and used 
nationwide.41 The Homeland Security Centers of 
Excellence Office of University Programs42 is also 
working with the academic community to create 

_______________________________________________________________________________
39 The Under Secretary Asa Hutchinson, Directorate of Border and Transportation Security, Department of Homeland Security 
gave this statement before the House Select Committee on Homeland Security, U.S. House of Representatives, on June 
25, 2003. 
40 FEMA has released a report, Building a Disaster-Resistant University, to help colleges and universities identify hazards, 
assess risks and plan mitigation strategies. For more information on the DRU program, see DHS Today, November 1, 2004. 
41 For example, with funding from the Office of Domestic Preparedness, the Louisiana State University Agriculture and 
Mechanical College and the International Association of Campus Law Enforcement Administrators (IACLEA) jointly developed 
an eight-hour Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Awareness curriculum. This free training course is designed for all 
campus public safety personnel who could respond to a WMD incident. The training includes WMD properties, effects and 
methods of delivery or dispersal; decontamination procedures and other personal safety procedures; and protection for environment 
and property. Participants receive a certificate of attendance and documentation for Continuing Education Units. 
42 At this writing, more information on the Office of University Programs can be found at http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/ 
display?content=3013. 


 
learning and research environments to study areas 
critical to homeland security by becoming centers 
of multidisciplinary research. 

Executive session participants recognized 
that university security personnel are valuable partners 
in homeland security and in safeguarding the 
confidentiality and privacy interests of students and 
faculty. They offer critical research and training 
resources, assistance for translations and cultural 
diversity awareness as well.43 

Working with Private Sector Entities 

The private sector is on the front line of homeland 
security efforts and is crucial to identifying and 
locating terrorists as well as disrupting terrorist 
networks. According to DHS, the private sector also 
oversees approximately 85 percent of our nations 
critical infrastructure.44 Its security personnel are 
integral partners in local law enforcement efforts to 
protect vulnerable targets. It is the guardian of 
many critical systems and dangerous materials. 
The private sector and its security forces also provide 
information essential to law enforcements 
counterterrorism efforts. The benefits of collaboration 
are evident, but tools that would allow the private 
sector and the intelligence community to share 
information more easily while addressing privacy 
concerns are still being developed and enhanced. 
(Information sharing issues among law enforcement 
at all levels of government are addressed in 
Chapter Five.) 

Department of Homeland Security Information 
Network. To facilitate information sharing, 
the Department of Homeland Security Information 
Network (HSIN) was launched in February 2004 as 
a counterterrorism communication mechanism 
that connects 50 states, five territories, Washington, 
D.C. and 50 major urban areas to strengthen 
the exchange of threat information. This communication 
system enables private sector representatives, 
first responders and local officials to share 
sensitive-but-unclassified data with each other 
through the secure network. 

At the end of June 2004, after the 50 states 
were connected by HSIN, DHS (in partnership with 
the private sector and the FBI) launched the Homeland 
Security Information Network-Critical Infrastructure 
(HSIN-CI) Pilot Program45 in Dallas, 
Texas, modeled after the FBI Dallas Emergency 
Response Network. The pilot program includes private 
security and expands the reach of the HSIN 
program to critical infrastructure owners and operators 
in a variety of industries and locations. At the 
time of this writing, similar DHS programs exist in 
Seattle, Indianapolis and Atlanta. HSIN-CI is governed 
and administered by local experts from the 
private and public sector with the support of DHS 
Regional Coordinators. The four pilot areas formed 
Infrastructure Advisory Panels to help administer 
and govern the program, manage information sharing 
and validate the program applications. As part 
of the HSIN-CI pilot program, more than 25,000 
network members can access unclassified sectorspecific 
information and alert notifications 24 
hours a day. The FBI Tips Program works with the 
HSIN pilot cities by relaying the information it 
receives from citizens about suspicious activities. 
Information shared with DHSs Homeland Security 

______________________________________________________________________________
43 See Davies, Heather J. and Gerard R. Murphy. March 2004. Protecting Your Community From Terrorism: The Strategies for 
Local Law Enforcement Series, Vol. 2: Working with Diverse Communities.Washington, D.C.: Police Executive Research Forum. 
44 See http://www.whitehouse.gov/deptofhomeland/sect6.html. 
45 At this writing, more information on the HSIN-CI Pilot Program can be found at http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display? 
content=3748.


 
Operations Center (HSOC) is also sent to the 
HSIN-CI network to deliver targeted alerts and notifications 
in real-time to local authorities.46 The pilot 
programs were scheduled to be evaluated at the end 
of 2004 to determine reliability for other cities. 

Working with Building Staff. In some 
localities, local law enforcement is working with 
building workers, including apartment doormen, 
maintenance workers and building owners. These 
individuals who staff reception areas, hail taxis, 
open doors, fix appliances and manage rents can 
identify suspicious activity for law enforcement. 
These individuals must be aware of the threat of 
and response to suspicious packages, for example. 
They can also assist with evacuation plans and 
other efforts to support law enforcement. 

For example, in New York City, an off-duty 
police detective has taught a class to the building 
workers union.47 Each building workers employer 
pays $100 for each employee to attend. The building 
owners greatest incentive is to develop a safer 
building with trained staff. The building workers 
learn, for instance, the potential for an exterminators 
canister to be used for spraying chemical 
agents, and appropriate precautionary steps. 
Unfortunately, it is estimated that it took longer 
than a year to train 28,000 residential building 
workers in New York City. Classes were accelerated 
for workers near Madison Square Garden because of 
the Republication National Convention held at the 
end of August 2004. A one million dollar training 
fund created by a contract between the union and 
real estate management companies, who represent 
owners and renters, paid for the classes.
 
Working with Highway and Delivery Personnel. 
Millions of miles of highways, and a vast 
number of bridges, tunnels and overpasses are protected 
by the transportation system personnel who 
drive and repair them everyday. Commercial truck 
and bus drivers, school bus drivers, highway maintenance 
crews, bridge and tunnel toll collectors and 
others report suspicious activity to local law 
enforcement. The Transportation Security Administration 
(TSA) within DHS augments these efforts 
through the Highway Watch48 program, which is 
administered by the American Trucking Association 
(ATA). This cooperative agreement with ATA trains 
professionals to identify and report safety and security 
concerns. The program also provides guidance on 
how transportation professionals should respond if 
they or their cargo are the target of terrorist attacks, 
as well as how to share valuable information with 
DHS. Members of the Highway Watch program 
receive alerts from the TSA and information that can 
help prevent terrorist activity, communicate road 
safety concerns and provide aid in crisis situations.49 

TSA encourages local law enforcement to 
partner with state trucking associations and others 
in the program. Executive session participants also 
lauded efforts by local law enforcement to apply 


________________________________________________________________________________
46 The HSIN-CI network does not require additional hardware or software for information to be communicated from the 
HSOC to federal, state or local participants. If information needs to be delivered, devices such as wired and wireless telephones, 
email, fax and pagers are used. 
47 For an example of how New York City is working with doormen, see Moore, Martha T. Doormen Out Front in the War 
on Terrorism, USA Today, July 11, 2004. 
48 At this writing, more information about the Highway Watch Program can be found at http://www.highwaywatch.com/. 
For an example of how truck drivers are participating in Alabama, see MacDonald, Ginny. Truck drivers looking for trouble, 
reporting it. The Birmingham News. July 12, 2004. 
49 The Highway Watch program links transportation professionals with first responders, including law enforcement, and the 
intelligence community via TSAs Transportation Security Coordination Center (TSCC) in Virginia. A truck driver who witnesses 
a suspicious event can call the National Highway Watch Call Center, which will in turn immediately alert the TSCC. 
Local and national response teams are then alerted if necessary.



the same principles in partnering with delivery 
personnel, including food and mail delivery as well 
as contractors, private utilities or communications 
workers and others in their localities. Executive 
session participants urged program participants to 
include procedures that protect the civil liberties 
and privacy of the community it serves. 

Local Policing Concerns about Roles 
and Responsibilities 

Much can be accomplished through the types of 
collaborations described in this chapter, collaborations 
that engage federal, state, local and tribal law 
enforcement, as well as those with other disciplines, 
the community, the private sector and 
many other stakeholders. These partnerships and 
shared resources help address personnel shortages 
and the need for additional assets as local law 
enforcement agencies assume their relatively new 
roles and responsibilities in counterterrorism 
while maintaining crime control efforts.50 

Several large-city law enforcement executives 
indicated that they alone spend approximately 
20 percent of their time focused on terrorism 
preparedness. These duties have topped already 
full schedules that sagged from the weight of 
crime-control problems before September 11. The 
impact can be even greater on others in the organization. 
Chief executives have personnel tasked 
with monitoring, analyzing and recommending 
actionusually in coordination with JTTFs or area 
counterterrorism networks. Executives must take 
appropriate preparedness steps and assign personnel 
to handle homeland securitywhether it is 
patrolling high-risk targets, training staff, conducting 
exercises, establishing information networks, 
appointing specialized personnel to intelligence 
and planning or countless other tasks. Some of 
these duties are new to agencies and they are 
scrambling to develop competencies and networks, 
while they try to share other duties with outside 
agencies better positioned to provide perspective 
and expertise. 

Local executives must report to their local 
governing authority (such as the city council) on 
how resources are being allocated and justify 
increases in spending, such as the reasons for 
police funds being spent for counterterrorism 
efforts instead of handling local crimes. As 
described in the chapters on special events, local 


_______________________________________________________________________________
50 In 2002, the RAND Corporation conducted a study to assess state and local law enforcement agencies current preparedness 
for terrorism. The RAND Corporation report presents the results of the 2002 survey for state and local law 
enforcement agencies conducted one year after the September 11 attacks and prior to the establishment of DHS. See Davis, 
Lois M., K. Jack Riley, Greg Ridgeway, Jennifer E. Pace, Sarah K. Cotton, Paul Steinberg, Kelly Damphousse, and Brent L. 
Smith. 2004. When Terrorism Hits Home: How Prepared Are State and Local Law Enforcement? Rand Corporation, Prepared 
for the National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism and the Office for Domestic Preparedness, U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security. The document can be found at http://www.rand.org. 
Also, see Foster, Chad and Gary Cordner. 2004. The Impact of Terrorism on State Law Enforcement: Adjusting to New Roles 
and Changing Conditions. Council of State Governments and Eastern Kentucky University (through support from the 
National Institute of Justice). The document can be found at http://www.csg.org. 



law enforcement can also expect to expend overtime 
and other resources when there are major 
community events or threat levels rise. And even 
some of the crimes that were previously investigated 
with the help of federal partners now fall primarily 
to local law enforcement. Federal law 
enforcement, such as the FBI, also has had to 
reprioritize and has been spending more resources 
on terrorism issues than on bank robberies and 
drug- and gang-related crime at the time of the 
session. With shrinking budgets, many executive 
session participants felt that the focus away from 
traditional crimes downplays the connections they 
believe the drug networks and other crimes may 
have to financing terrorist acts. Criminal intelligence 
work on these and other offenses also can be 
very useful in identifying threats and preventing 
terrorist attacks. 

Many executive session participants stated 
that, though terrorism prevention and preparedness 
is critical, members of their 
communities are dying everyday from gang- and 
drug-related crimes, domestic violence and other 
offenses. These leaders emphasized that they cannot 
abandon their commitment to the public to 
address safety issues and other problems in favor 
of greater vigilance under a constant and vague 
terrorist threat. Some executive session participants 
stated further that the terrorist threats they 
are most worried about might originate from ecoterrorism 
factions, domestic anti-government 
groups or political extremists rather than international 
terrorists. Participants perspectives varied 
only slightly in areas that are very target-rich. 
There was a consensus on this: Local law enforcement 
must be concerned about terrorism of any 
kind, but not at the expense of abandoning their 
communities to crime and violence. 

To make the most of existing resources 
and expertise, local law enforcement has relied 
heavily on DHS, the FBI and other federal agencies 
to address many homeland security issues, 
particularly the intelligence function. Local police 
look to federal partners for more specific threat 
information. An executive session participant 
indicated that when law enforcement agency personnel 
are already on high alert it is difficult for 
them to intensify their efforts further without 
more detailed information from federal partners. 
He and his colleagues are looking to DHS and 
other federal agencies to provide threat information 
that is area-specific and indicates which targets 
or sectors are most likely to be hit.51 DHS 
representatives agreed on this goal but also asked 
that their colleagues in law enforcement be aware 
that this type of information just may not be within 
their grasp at the time and that they should be 
assured that if it becomes available, area chiefs 
will be immediately informed of threats in their 
jurisdiction. 

Local Law Enforcement as Full Partners 

Executive session participants stated that the federal 
government should be more focused on protecting 
the homeland against terrorism by building 
on local policing efforts. The U.S. Department of 
Justice Community Oriented Policing Services has 
opened networks between police and the public 
that encourage information sharing that could help 
federal agencies detect terrorists. Local policing 
efforts can disrupt financial networks and help 


________________________________________________________________________________
51 After the session, DHS did this for New York City, Newark, New Jersey and Washington, D.C. financial districts. At this 
writing, more information can be found at http://www.cnn.com/2004/US/08/02/terror.threat/.


 
identify suspicious behavior by terrorists living in 
their communities. Executive session participants 
agreed that there must be stronger federal-local 
relations and better information sharing. 

Local law enforcement has increasingly 
reported successful relations with their FBI Field 
Offices over the years, but at the time of this executive 
session understandably had little experience 
with DHS yet. Participants called for a more 
regional DHS structure that would foster the types 
of relationships needed outside Washington. Working 
together on common problems can yield longterm 
benefits for terrorism preparedness. For 
example, investigators in the Metropolitan (DC) 
Police Department worked with the FBI in years 
prior to September 11 to discuss the homicide 
problem in the city. As a result, the FBI sent agents 
to assist the departments law enforcement investigators 
in their work. These day-to-day partnerships 
in crime fighting resulted in improvements 
in communication between the two agencies that 
carried over into terrorism preparedness efforts. 
The terrorist attacks on the Pentagon also brought 
together regional agencies in new ways that could 
be drawn on again. So, too, did lessons learned 
from the 2002 D.C.-area sniper investigation 
result in local, state and federal law enforcement 
agencies having better-organized communication 
systems, data-sharing mechanisms, large crimescene 
processing protocols and improved methods 
for addressing community fear. The unprecedented 
collaborations in the D.C. area have better prepared 
law enforcement agencies at all levels of government 
to work even more effectively if there is 
another terrorist attack. Their success was predicated 
on the principles all participants understood: 
every law enforcement agency brings expertise and 
experience to the table that is to be valued and 
shared. There is no room for turf battles and local 
law enforcement must be seen as a full partner in 
collaborative efforts. 

Executive session participants are looking 
to DHS to recognize the unique role law enforcement 
has in prevention. Locals need significant 
support (e.g., resources, funding and plans) from 
the federal government to assist them in taking 
appropriate steps when the threat levels go up. Participants 
discussed that dual use for grants is a step 
in the right direction, but what is needed is a fundamental 
shift in recognizing how investigations 
in crime-fighting and criminal intelligence can 
advance homeland security. There must also be 
recognition that local law enforcement has developed 
the kind of ties with the community that will 
yield information of value to federal agencies 
tasked with putting all the pieces of information 
together to yield the big picture and the specific 
threat intelligence everyone is seeking. As discussed 
more fully in Chapter Five, local law enforcement 
also looks to DHS to be more fully integrated into 
the flow of information that is shared, enhanced, 
analyzed and returned to the user. 

Quote: We in local law 
enforcement can be 
effective force multipliers. 
We searched every public 
storage facility in two days 
when we received a federal 
alert. We just need to be in 
the loop. 
Chief Charlie T. Deane, 
Prince William County (VA) 
Police Department


 
Community Policing and Counterterrorism 
Efforts 

Since the early 1980s, local law enforcement has 
worked hard to establish community-oriented and 
problem-solving policing across the country. Jurisdictions 
have widely adopted a proactive policing 
philosophy that draws on police-citizen partnerships 
to address the underlying problems that affect 
citizens quality of life and generate repeat calls for 
police service. Executive session participants agreed 
that local law enforcement agencies committed to a 
community-policing philosophy will be more effective 
in working collaboratively to prevent terrorism 
prevention and in garnering public support.52 

Session participants advocated for homeland 
security agencies to adopt a community problem-
solving policing orientation that would help 
reconcile and better define the local law enforcement 
role in all public safety matters. Some executive 
session participants recommended the use of 
effective problem-solving tools such as the SARA 
modelwhich advocates that individuals scan all 
available resources to better define the underlying 
causes of problems, analyze all available information 
(including citizen and other stakeholder 
input), develop responses to the problems and 
assess the success of the implementation efforts 
to confront the challenges law enforcement faces 
in addressing the threat of terrorism.53 

Among its many benefits, community-oriented 
policing and problem solving assist law 
enforcement in gathering information, enlisting 
citizen cooperation and dealing with fear in the 
community. The focus of such community policing 
efforts rests properly with the street-level officers
the men and women most likely to detect 
suspicious or criminal activity. Street-level officers 
engaged in community policing can identify potential 
terrorist targets and activity in their regular 
patrol area. The potential target may be a transit 
system hub, a warehouse that stores chemicals or 
high-level government officials residences. The 
officer may well have a relationship with the owners 
and can work on target-hardening through 
environmental design or provide other guidance. 
With an established trust-based relationship, facility 
owners, business leaders and residents will be 
more likely to bring suspicious behavior to the officers 
attention. 

Accordingly, session participants expressed 
an ongoing need for more training for officers on 
what to look for, protocols for how to report potential 
terrorist activity and mechanisms to get information 
back down to officers. Participants also 
expressed concern that the positive effects of community 
policing on officer morale and effectiveness 
are being challenged by the fatigue, considerable 
overtime, postponed leave and stress associated 


__________________________________________________________________________________
52 Community policing training is available to state and local law enforcement through the U.S. Department of Justice 
Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) Regional Community Policing Institutes (RCPIs). The COPS 
Office established a network of RCPIs to provide comprehensive and innovative community policing education, training and 
technical assistance to agencies and individuals throughout the nation. The RCPIs develop cutting-edge curricula on emerging 
law enforcement issues to challenge and improve traditional training and to advance community policing. More information 
can be found at www.cops.usdoj.gov. 
In addition, the COPS Office funds the Center for Problem-Oriented Policing (POP Center), which produces the Problem- 
Oriented Guides for Police publication series (POP Guides). Resources and publications are available through the POP Centers 
website at www.popcenter.org that cover a wide range of information on the problem-solving process, POP projects and 
problem types. 
53 For more information on the SARA model, see Problem-Solving Tips: A Guide to Reducing Crime and Disorder Through 
Problem-Solving Partnerships available through the U.S. Department of Justice Office of Community Oriented Policing Services. 
PERFs community policing and problem solving resources can be found at www.policeforum.org.


 
with long-term efforts to combat terrorism.54 DHS 
participants agreed that more must be done to help 
officers and that they have many efforts in development 
along those lines. DHS recognizes that 
local law enforcement officers have had extensive 
experience with developing partnerships with 
other government, civic and stakeholder groups to 
assess jurisdiction needs and priorities. The 
essence of homeland security is the kind of collaboration 
community policing encourages across disciplines 
and levels of government. 

Quote: Street-level officers are 
not at the bottom when we 
talk about bottom-up 
information flows and they 
arent privates or foot 
soldiers; they are 
professionals and the ones 
best positioned to find a 
terrorist living in the 
community if they have the 
means to give and get 
information effectively. 
Chief Thomas D. 
McCarthy, Fayetteville (NC) 
Police Department 


Community policing encourages law 
enforcements use of outside resources. Many 
agencies, for example, rely on volunteers to support 
agency efforts. Volunteers help free officers 
from administrative tasks, allowing sworn personnel 
more time to be more proactive and preventionoriented. 
Volunteers can also contribute special 
expertise and perspectives. Executive session participants 
suggested that DHS and law enforcement 
make better use of citizen volunteers, neighborhood 
watches, police auxiliaries and other groups 
as critical partners in police efforts. Retired military 
personnel and others with experience in technologies 
and approaches that apply to both 
traditional crimes and terrorism will be tremendously 
valued, as well as the many individuals who 
assist police in other ways. 

The integration of terrorism preparedness 
and community policing is already reflected in 
some DHS programs set in motion during its first 
year. With support from FEMA, law enforcement 
can help organize Community Emergency 
Response Teams (CERTs) to help specially trained 
citizens be better prepared to respond to emergency 
situations and assist other members of the community.
55 CERT staff educates citizens about disaster 
preparedness and trains them in basic response 
skills, such as fire safety, search and rescue and 
field medical operations. The program includes 20 
hours of classroom and hands-on instruction. 
CERT members can give critical support to first 
responders, provide immediate assistance to victims 
and organize others to assist at a disaster site. 

CERT is a component of the DHS Citizens 
Corp,56 designed to increase citizen involvement 
in security through personal preparedness, training 
and volunteer programs. At the time of this writing, 
the Citizen Corps program was composed of 


______________________________________________________________________________
54 For an example of how the stress and fatigue during a high alert affects police officers, see Horwitz, Sari. Working on 
high alert strains cops. Washington Post, Sunday, November 21, 2004. At this writing, the article can be found at 
http://www.detnews.com/2004/nation/0411/22/A07-11260.htm. 
55 Information on CERT can be found at http://training.fema.gov/emiweb/CERT/. 
56 The Citizen Corps website (www.citizencorps.gov) provides more information about establishing CERT and other volunteer 
public safety programs.



more than 1,300 active county and local councils 
from all 50 states and three U.S. territories. These 
councils bring together first responders with volunteers, 
the private sector, elected leadership and 
other stakeholders. Executive session participants 
recommended localities plan exercises with members 
of CERT. An executive session participant 
indicated that the Office of State and Local Government 
Coordination and Preparedness intends 
to include CERT members in the Top Officials 
(TOPOFF) 3 National Exercises scheduled for 
spring 2005. 


THE ROLE OF COMMUNITY POLICING IN FIGHTING TERROR 
by Chief Thomas D. McCarthy, Fayetteville (NC) Police Department 
The fight against terror is one of the greatest operational challenges faced by American law enforcement. 
While it is an awesome responsibility, the police have clearly demonstrated they are up to 
the task. A combination of relatively recent reformseffective community policing, enhanced technology 
and greater accountabilityhas helped law enforcement reduce crime significantly throughout 
the United States. A successful strategy against terror will be realized if local police continue to 
enhance the skills and relationships that have made the fight against traditional crime so effective. 

Local police must also develop partnerships with state and federal law enforcement agencies 
unlike any that have existed in American history. The traditional barriers to the free flow of 
criminal intelligence among law enforcement agencies must be breached. The nation is demanding 
a far greater level of teamwork and far less parochialism than has previously been achieved among 
law enforcement at all levels of government.
 
The federal, state and local partnership against terror is in its infancy. There have certainly 
been growing pains. The early intelligence responses to possible threats of terror were often too 
vague to have local operational value. At other times, local police learned about terrorist threats 
from the media before notification from their federal partners. Despite early systemic glitches, there 
is cause for Americans to be optimistic. In its first year, the Department of Homeland Security has 
made significant strides in putting systems in place that swiftly provide law enforcement and citizens 
critical public safety information. The FBI, building on its success with joint terrorism task 
forces, has taken the lead in working with local and state police to effectively identify and investigate 
those who would commit terror within our communities. Still, there is much that remains to 
be done if local police are to become effective partners in the war against terror.



The Local Police 

During the past two decades, the police have developed strong relationships with local community 
members interested in fighting crime. Working as partners, the community and the police have 
become experts in identifying and solving crime problems. The result has been a measurable reduction 
in the fear of crime and in crime itself. Those same collaborations can prove to be effective in 
the fight against terror.
 
There are myriad resources and techniques that can further these coordinated efforts. 
Operational analysis, once a vague concept in local policing, is now a tool within many municipal 
and county police agencies. Technology, employed by a better-educated and trained cadre of employees, 
has provided the police with the ability to geographically identify crime trends, hot spots and 
even criminals. The result has been a better-informed community, increased police performance 
and, according to the FBI Uniform Crime Reports, a decrease in reported crime. 

In the 1970s, Dr. Herman Goldstein, the father of problem-oriented policing, challenged 
the manner in which the United States provided police services. While there was initial resistance 
to Goldsteins vision of problem solving, a small group of police leaders found value in his thesis. 
Through their persistence and commitment, policing in the 21st century is much different than it 
was 25 years ago. Todays officers are more than rapid responders to calls for service. They are now 
part of the communities they serve. They have demonstrated the ability to think systemically, identifying 
the sources of and solutions to underlying neighborhood problems. Local police officers, in 
conjunction with concerned and informed members of communities throughout the nation, have 
shown that thoughtful problem solving and increased operational accountability can reduce crime. 
It is on that solid foundation that the local police role in counterterrorism should be built. 

Federal Agencies 

The leaders of the FBI and DHS openly recognize that if they are going to defeat terrorism, they 
must function as a team. While the FBI will remain the federal agency directly responsible for investigating 
and arresting terrorists, its effectiveness is enhanced by DHSs assistance in analyzing and 
distributing intelligence information. 

Though operational for little more than one year at this writing, DHSs successes have been 
impressive. The agencys leadership clearly comprehend that true homeland security can only be 
realized if local, state and tribal law enforcement are directly involved. That involvement requires 
investments in intelligence sharing, training and equipment. To adequately prepare the police it will 
require resources from both inside and outside of DHS. 

The FBI has created numerous successful joint terrorism task forces. The task forces have 
had a positive impact on breaking down some of the historical barriers between federal and local 
law enforcement. Federal and local officers are working cases together everyday, building a level of



trust and respect that could never have been mandated. These task forces should be expanded 
throughout the United States. 

For community policing to really contribute to law enforcement counterterrorism efforts, 
the following should be considered: 

 Technological advances such as a direct link between terrorist databases and the National 
Crime Information Center (NCIC) for instance, should be coupled with a national automated 
fingerprint identification system using hand-held wireless technologies in order to get local 
law enforcement more involved. A system such as this might result in increased apprehensions 
and community safety. 
 Community members and police should meet to discuss what suspicious activity looks like. 
Dialogues should focus on indicators such as suspicious packages on mass transit systems 
and dispel notions of neighbors spying on neighbors. 
 There is a need to develop best practices for community reporting on suspicious activity like 
911 or alternative systems. And police need to continue to build bonds of trust with the 
immigrant and minority communities who might be suspicious of cooperating with law 
enforcement. 
 Federal law enforcement should consider conducting interviews with community members 
jointly or in cooperation with local law enforcement officers. 
 Merging community policing principles with counterterrorism investigation techniques builds 
on the existing partnerships and expertise of local law enforcementthey know and are best 
equipped to communicate with and understand the community members, heads of religious 
organizations, business leaders, and others in their jurisdictions. 

The Training Challenge 

Federal responsibility should also include continuous, up-to-date counterterrorism training for 
state, local and tribal officers. The FBI has proven to be an outstanding provider and developer of 
local law enforcement training, but the vast number of officers to be trained requires additional 
resources. Fortunately a logical forum is already available.
 
DHS and the FBI could partner with the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services 
27 regional community policing training institutes located throughout the United States. Each of 
these institutes has qualified staff with significant experience in providing various forms of quality 
training to local officers. Providing the institutes with adequate funding and appropriate training 
materials would be a cost-effective way of quickly training thousands of local police officers on the 
best practices for preventing and fighting terrorism.

Conclusion 
The prevention of terrorism in America has created unprecedented demands on local police. Success 
will require an effective partnership among federal, state, tribal and local law enforcement. It 
will also require support for enhancing the community problem-solving skills that have worked so 
well for reducing violent crime over the past two decades. Those who died on that terrible day in 
September 2001, and those who have suffered so grievously, will be honored as law enforcement 
rises to each new challenge. It is up to the leaders in American policing to ensure that the principles 
of community policing are not forgotten along the way.


 
CONCLUSION 

The lessons learned from the terrorist attacks in 
the United States could not be clearer: Any 
attempt to secure the nation will be dependent on 
law enforcements ability to coordinate not only 
among the federal, state, local and tribal levels of 
enforcement, but also with all agencies in a region 
that have a stake in the prevention of and response 
to terrorism. This presents not only the challenges 
of coordination and interoperability among first 
responders (law enforcement, EMS, fire and others), 
but also across disciplines that include universities, 
private industry, business owners, 
military base personnel, public health, citizens and 
many others. Because state homeland security 
authorities and local agencies have different structures, 
resources and strategies for addressing their 
relatively new homeland security functions, these 
are formidable tasks. 

Local law enforcement is struggling with its 
new role and responsibilities in handling counterterrorism 
issues while maintaining its crime prevention 
and control duties. As budgets for traditional crime 
control have been tightened, law enforcement faces 
significant increases in the type and volume of service 
it must provide to keep citizens safe from violence 
and from a vague, ongoing terrorist threat. 
Local law enforcement is working to be included in 
state homeland security plans and competing for 
funds with other first responders, all while developing 
or coordinating new homeland security efforts 
such as creating intelligence functions that will aid 
in terrorism prevention. 

Executive session participants believe that 
the most valued DHS programs are those that 
embrace the principles of community policing, 
including the recognition of the unique position of 
local law enforcement to form the partnerships 
needed at the local level to conduct needs assessments 
and implement responses that will both 
generate and make use of information on crime 
and terrorism. The types of programs and partnerships 
described in this chapter are the beginning of 
what is needed most: regional and collaborative 
efforts that will yield best practices that can be 
replicated nationwide. 


CHAPTER FOUR 

DHS RESOURCES, TRAINING AND GRANTS 
FAR TOO MANY RESOURCES AND TRAINING OPPORTUNITIES ARE OFFERED THROUGH 

DHS and its component agencies to review them all here, and more are 
continually being added or revised. Many of these assets were catalogued 
in Chapter Two. What follows is a general discussion of how those many assets 
and others are integrated and applied at the local level. This chapter outlines the 
issues raised by executive session participants on their needs and their experiences 
with accessing DHS assistance, training and grants.

Several of the participating local and state law 
enforcement professionals have worked with DHS 
agencies to implement operational plans for securing 
national events and conventions. Their experiences, 
described below, reveal the value of DHS 
partnerships and some of the issues or challenges 
they have faced in integrating federal assets. This 
chapter also reviews the relevance of the National 
Incident Management System (NIMS) and how it 
may be implemented by local first responders and 
emergency managers to detect, deter and mitigate 
threats. 

This chapter gives a brief overview of participants 
concerns about the training and 
resources needed to respond to terrorist threat 
warnings and advisories, including the need for 
more high-quality training for street-level officers. 
Those concerns are tied, in large part, to reductions 
in traditional anticrime funding for local law 
enforcement and to the difficulties participants 
perceive in DHS grant programs not reaching law 
enforcement quickly and in response to their 
greatest needs. DHS efforts to address those concerns 
are included as well. 

National Special Security Events 

In May 1998, President Clinton issued Presidential 
Decision Directive 62 (PDD-62), which in part 
included a classified document dealing with the 
coordination of federal counterterrorism assets 
for events of national interest that are deemed 
National Special Security Events (NSSEs).57 The 
 

______________________________________________________________________________
57 More information on National Security Special Events can be found at http://www.secretservice.gov/nsse.shtml and the 
DHS fact sheet at http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/interapp/press_release/press_release_0207.xml. 
There are only a few NSSE events every year. For events that do not meet NSSE standards, DHSs Operations Integration 
Staff (I-STAFF) established an Interagency Special Events Working Group (SEWG) to develop federal consolidated security 
plans. This new system categorizes events into Levels I, II, III and IV, which corresponds with the internal FBI Special Events 
Readiness List (SERL). The factors that contribute to the level designation include federal participation, location of event, 
available threat assessment, state and local resources available and others. DHS will publish a Special Event Standard Operation 
Procedure in 2005. 



designation of a NSSE allows the U.S. Secret Service 
(USSS), the lead agency for designing and 
implementing the operational security plan, to 
access ample resources and ensure public safety by 
forming partnerships with other federal, state and 
local law enforcement and other security and public 
safety agencies. Local law enforcement agencies 
must work with their governor to request this NSSE 
designation. As mentioned above, a governor can 
ask that an event be considered a NSSE with a formal 
request from the governor to the Secretary of 
DHS. The request will then be forwarded to the 
NSSE working group, comprised of representatives 
from the USSS, FBI and FEMA. The working group 
gathers facts and makes a recommendation to the 
Secretary, who makes the final decision. 

Quote: I thought about sending a 
request for our event to be 
a National Special Security 
Event (NSSE), but the 
federal agencies already 
were providing such 
seamless support, I didnt 
see the need. 
Chief Bernard Melekian, 
Pasadena (CA) Police 
Department

A number of factors are considered when 
designating a NSSE. First, the USSS determines 
how many dignitaries are expected to attend the 
event. Any event that may be attended by government 
officials or foreign dignitaries may create an 
independent federal interest in ensuring safety and 
increasing resources. Second, the size of the event 
may increase the need for additional security 
measures. Large events may draw the attention of 
terrorists or other criminals, increasing the attractiveness 
of the forum as a target for employing 
weapons of mass destruction. Third, the significance 
of the event may be historical, political 
and/or symbolic, which may also heighten concern 
about terrorist acts or other criminal activity. 

In 2004, DHS had designated only a few 
events as NSSEs. Of these, the session participants 
focused on events in their own jurisdictions, 
including the Democratic National and Republication 
National Conventions and the G-8 Sea Island 
Summit. These events were good examples of 
effective coordination and cooperation among federal, 
state and local homeland security and law 
enforcement resources. The DHS and its many 
component agencies have provided tremendous 
support to local law enforcement charged with 
ensuring the safety of the masses who gather for 
these types of large events in their cities. The following 
event descriptions are provided simply to 
demonstrate the range of resources DHS can garner 
to help prevent terrorist acts. 

Democratic and Republican National 
Conventions 

DHS worked with local, state and other federal 
agencies to provide public safety at the Democratic 
National Convention at Bostons Fleet Center 
located at the city center above train and subway 
stations. DHS also partnered with the New York 
City Police Department (NYPD) and other agencies 
to prepare for the Republication National Convention. 
DHS efforts were similar for both 
conventions. The USSS was instrumental in 
assisting both cities with securing the convention 
by serving as a liaison to all DHS component agencies 
and developing an overall security plan that 



drew on all relevant federal agency resources and 
expertise, and coordinated it with local authorities.58 
During the conventions, the Homeland Security 
Operations Center (HSOC)59 provided timely threat 
information, intelligence, situational awareness and 
operational information. The Federal Protective Services 
(FPS), drawing on DHS assets, helped ensure 
the publics safety and continuity of operations by 
providing such resources as dog teams, weapons of 
mass destruction (WMD)/hazmat technicians, intelligence 
analysts, undercover agents, uniformed officers 
and emergency response teams. FEMA was 
responsible for providing emergency management 
coordination and any assets that might be needed 
for a response and recovery effort. Several other 
DHS component agenciesS&T, ICE, TSA, CBP 
and USCG, among otherswere involved in securing 
the convention and screening passengers and 
shipments coming to the area. 

Quote: Terrorists goals are to 
shut down the economy 
and disrupt transportation 
and daily life. Our earliest 
security plans were so 
intrusive that we were 
basically just doing the 
terrorists job for them by 
shutting down public 
access around the Fleet 
Center. Then we worked 
with our federal partners at 
DHS and worked out an 
effective approach. 
Secretary Edward A. 
Flynn, Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts Executive 
Office of Pubic Safety

G-8 Sea Island Summit 

The G-8 Summit was held on June 810, 2004, on 
Sea Island, Georgia. The success of the safety 
measures at this event was largely due to the many 
DHS agencies that worked with local law enforcement, 
resulting in no significant incidents. Executive 
session participants indicated that DHS was a 
valuable partner in these types of security operations.
60 The U.S. Secret Service led DHS in the 
design, coordination and implementation of the 
operational plan. The Georgia Office of Homeland 
Security was the lead agency that coordinated all 
local and state law enforcement resources. ICE 
deployed agents for specialized units focused on 
different security aspectsproviding the second 
largest cadre of federal law enforcement personnel 
in support of security and public safety efforts at 
the G-8 Summit. FEMAas the lead for consequence 
management for all NSSEswas in charge 
of emergency management coordination as well as 
response and recovery plans. The Coast Guard 
provided waterside coverage by coordinating with 
state, local and other federal law enforcement, 
including maritime. Customs and Border Protection 


___________________________________________________________________________________ 
58 DHS prepared a fact sheet on activities its component agencies planned for the Democratic National Convention. At this 
writing, this fact sheet is available at www.dhs.gov. 
59 The HSOC is DHSs national-level hub for operational communication and information sharing for handling special 
events. The HSOC maintains and provides situational awareness on homeland security matters for the Secretary of Homeland 
Security, the White House Security Council and the federal community. The HSOC coordinated DHS, state and local 
partners to establish full connectivity among security personnel at the event and those personnel with HSOC. More information 
on the HSOC can be found at http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?content=3814. 
60 At this writing, more information on the roles of each DHS directorate at the G-8 Summit can be found at 
http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?content=3647.



was responsible for processing the 700 official 
international attendees that traveled to the summit. 
The Federal Law Enforcement Training Center 
(FLETC) provided logistical, training and 
contingency support to numerous federal, state 
and local agencies. The Transportation Security 
Administration (TSA) screeners assisted at various 
sites. DHSs Information Analysis and Infrastructure 
Protection (IAIP) directorate ensured real-time 
connectivity and information sharing among all 
DHS components and state and local partners, 
making use of the HSOC. The HSOC also dispatched 
three officials to the summit to establish a 
multi-agency command center that could provide 
24-hour onsite monitoring. 

Other Event Resources 

As part of its Homeland Security Information Network 
(HSIN)61 initiative, DHS announced on May 
28, 2004, that its Internet-based counterterrorism 
communications system would be used by homeland 
security officials (including the HSOC mentioned 
above), state and local leadership, and other 
first responders during the G-8 Summit. The HSIN 
initiative is supported by the Joint Regional Information 
Exchange System (JRIES), which was originally 
developed by state and local authorities in 
partnership with the federal government. At the 
request of some state and local partners, JRIES was 
adopted by DHS as the foundation for greater counterterrorism 
information sharing. This system 
allows states and major urban areas to collect and 
disseminate information among federal, state and 
local authorities. The network is a secure 24-houra-
day, seven-day-a-week, real-time collaborative tool 
that has interactive connectivity with the HSOC. 
This secure system significantly strengthens the 
immediate exchange of threat information at the 
sensitive-but-unclassified level to all users. 

According to DHS, each state and major 
urban areas homeland security advisor will receive 
software licenses, technology and training to participate 
in HSIN for information sharing and situational 
awareness. These homeland security advisors 
will employ the system to offer a variety of users 
access including federal, state and local law enforcement; 
U.S. Coast Guard; National Guard; State and 
Emergency Operations Centers; first responders; 
and others engaged in counterterrorism.
 
Whether a NSSE or other high-profile 
event, other executive session participants discussed 
the tremendous help they received from DHS and 
its agencies for protests, other large events or threat 
responses. For example, the Free Trade Area of the 
Americas (FTAA) demonstration in Miami raised 
concerns about protests, as well as terrorist targets. 
It was the areas first real field test of integrating 
DHS, FBI and other resources. In the past, there had 
been problems with over-response in engaging multiple 
federal agencies, but Chief Timoney reported 
that the response in this case was well choreographed 
and essential. D.C. Capitol Police Chief 
Gainer also discussed the significant resources and 
coordination that federal partners provided during 
the ricin investigation on Capitol Hill. General 
Matthew Broderick, director of the Homeland Security 
Operations Center, helped to coordinate all federal 
agencies including FBI forensics, Department of 
Health and Human Services and others. 

Several local law enforcement participants, 
however, expressed concern that there is not always 

____________________________________________________________________________
61 At the time of this writing, more information on the HSIN can be found at http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?content=
3350.


such clarity of command. And costs associated 
with preventing terrorist attacks may not always be 
assumed by the federal government for incidents or 
large events, which presents a challenge for local 
governments. 

National Incident Management 
System 

On March 1, 2004, DHS announced the release of 
the National Incident Management System 
(NIMS),62 the nations first standardized incident 
management approach that creates a unified structure 
for a federal, state and local government all-hazards 
response and recovery effort. NIMS builds on 
the existing Incident Command System (ICS) and 
principles of unified command. It stresses coordinated 
communication and information management for 
first responders and emergency managers across all 
agencies, disciplines and jurisdictions. In July 2004, 
FEMA unveiled a new online course to help first 
responders understand the concepts and principles 
underlying the new system and to begin incorporating 
NIMS into their planning and policies.63 

DHS has also established a National Integration 
Center (NIC), managed by FEMA, to develop 
national standards for NIMS education and 
training, and to refine NIMS as it is implemented 
nationwide. The multijurisdictional, multidisciplinary 
NIC provides valuable resources to coordinate 
the nations response to all hazards. The center 
coordinates federal, state, local and tribal incident 
management entities and emergency responders, 
and strengthens the nations response capabilities 
by identifying and integrating best practices. It also 
issues guidelines for mutual aid and resource management 
agreements. NIC provides a NIMS Implementation 
Guide to facilitate the adoption of 
NIMS principles.64 Through flexibility and the use 
of common doctrine, terminology, concepts, principles 
and processes, responders will be able to 
focus more on the operations, instead of organizing 
and staffing assignments among all authorities. 
DHS believes responses to a significant incident 
will be more consistent and coordinated. 

Counterterrorism Training and 
Related Resources for Law 
Enforcement 

DHS offers training to local, state, tribal and federal 
law enforcement agencies as well as other first 
responders, including fire and public health agencies. 
Resources are intended for use by agencies of varying 
size and vulnerability. DHS also promotes multiagency 
training as essential to counterterrorism 
coordination efforts. 


______________________________________________________________________________
62 The development of NRP/NIMS was tasked through Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5 on February 28, 2003, 
(see http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030228-9.html). DHS released NIMS on March 1, 2004. At the 
time of this writing, key elements and features of NIMS are available on the DHS website at http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/
display?content=3259. Resources are available on the following websites for local law enforcement agencies to comply 
with NIMS: http://www.fema.gov/fema/first_res.shtm or http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?theme=63. The completion 
of NIMS follows the October 2003 passage of the Initial National Response Plan (INRP), which proposed an approach for 
aligning incident management responses and actions among all federal, state, tribal and local agencies as well as the private 
sector and community leaders. A final plan is under development at the time of this writing and will replace INRP. 
63 The training experts at the Department of Homeland Securitys Emergency Management Institute (within FEMA) created 
the online course, which takes about three hours to complete. The course can be found at: http://training.fema.gov/EMIWEB/
IS/is700.asp. 
For more information on recommended compliance, see DHS Secretary Tom Ridges letter to the governors at www.nimsonline.
com/sec_ridge_letter.htm. Local, state and tribal governments are encouraged to implement NIMS during fiscal year 2005. 
These agencies must self-certify by the beginning of fiscal year 2006 and must be in full compliance by fiscal year 2007. 
64 This document can be accessed at www.fema.gov/doc/nims/nims_implementation_plan_template.doc.


Quote: We also need a commandlevel 
primer on intelligence 
as well as more analytical 
training in police departments, 
resources on 
profiling versus targeting, 
integrating with COPS 
training and terrorismrelated 
concepts. 
Chief Terrance Gainer, 
U.S. Capitol Police 

Executive session participants discussed 
the training opportunities and resources available 
for law enforcement, as well as the need to better 
share information about what type of training is 
effective, what content gaps exist, how to fill them 
and how to pay for taking officers and other personnel 
away from their duties while in training, as 
well as other associated costs. The Counter-Terrorism 
Training Coordination Working Group65 convened 
by the U.S. Department of Justices (DOJs) 
Office of Justice Programs examined tools (e.g., 
training, information-sharing databases, funding 
sources) available to law enforcement and other 
first responders and recommended the establishment 
of a central website. The working group 
reviewed current training offered by DOJ components, 
identified duplication or gaps, and recommended 
the most effective mechanisms for 
delivering training. These resources will help law 
enforcement decision makers develop strategic 
plans for training and local emergency response. 
Executive session participants recommended agencies 
browse the Counter-Terrorism Training and 
Resources for Law Enforcement website that 
includes training listings, related materials and 
website links to the relevant federal government, 
private and nonprofit organizations.66 

Executive session participants reported 
that they used their own training forums, as well as 
those presented by DHS. Training resources they 
used included those provided by ODP,67 FLETC,68 
and the Coast Guard Institute.69 A nonprofit 
organization, the National Institute for Urban 
Search and Rescue (NIUSR)70 also provides training 
and public awareness, research and engineering 
assistance. Several participants also had employed 
training offered by FEMAs National Emergency 
Training Center (NETC).71 

One example a participant offered is being 
considered for regional application elsewhere in 
the country; the NETC, which draws its experts 
from both the Emergency Management Institute 
(EMI) and the National Fire Academy (NFA),72 


______________________________________________________________________________
65 Working group participants include the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection, the Bureau of Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement, the Bureau of Justice Assistance, the Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, the National Institute 
of Justice, the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, the Office of Justice Programs, the Office of the Police Corps 
and Law Enforcement Education, the Office of Domestic Preparedness, the U.S. Army Military Police School, the U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security and the U.S. Department of Labor. Working group membership will expand to include 
other federal agencies as well as nongovernmental organizations that represent affected constituencies. 
66 See www.counterterrorismtraining.gov/. 
67 At this writing, more information on the training available at the Office of Domestic Preparedness can be found at 
www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp/training.htm. 
68 FLETC serves as an interagency law enforcement training organization for over 70 federal agencies. The DHS supervises 
its administrative and financial activities. More information on FLETC can be found at http://www.fletc.gov/. 
69 The Coast Guard Institute develops and produces innovative products and advocates, manages and supports a variety of 
programs and policies that promote excellence in education within the Coast Guard. More information on the Coast Guard 
can be found at www.uscg.mil/hq/cgi/index.html. 
70 More information on NIUSR can be found at www.niusr.org/NiusrAndPeople.htm. 
71 More information on FEMAs National Emergency Training Center can be found at http://training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/. 
72 More information on the National Fire Academy can be found at www.usfa.fema.gov/training/nfa/.


 
offers a variety of terrorism-related courses each 
year and holds regular networking meetings for 
emergency services personnel from the Washington, 
D.C. Metropolitan area. NETC, in Emmitsburg, 
Maryland, hosted a one-day course for 150 
participants in the Washington Metropolitan area 
in March 2004 to discuss how their respective 
organizations could work together to strengthen 
overall terrorism preparedness and response in 
Washington, D.C., Maryland, Virginia, Pennsylvania, 
West Virginia and Delaware. Attendees included 
hospital administrators, state and local 
emergency management officials and law enforcement 
officers, college security personnel, Army officers, 
Secret Service officials and staff from such 
other federal offices as the State Department, Environmental 
Protection Agency and the Department 
of Energy. The course reviewed how to identify suspicious 
circumstances and how to protect critical 
assets, as well as what to expect during a federal 
response to such an event. Similar courses can be 
offered to other regions across the country to 
improve their regional and multijurisdictional 
response. 

Executive session participants suggested 
that chief executives should be aware of the training 
and related assets available regionally and what 
role each federal agency can play in a crisis. This 
includes knowing how many front-line personnel 
are trained in critical incident response. To ensure 
a proper multijurisdictional response, agencies 
need to collaborate in obtaining funding to maximize 
preparedness for the region, and then in using 
that funding to train and prepare in a coordinated 
way. Executive session participants encourage their 
colleagues to bring in area agencies when conducting 
tabletop exercises. 

Training Street-Level Officers 

The previous chapter discussed the importance of 
integrating community policing principles into a 
sound homeland security strategy and outlined 
participants assertions that the success of any 
counterterrorism effort depends on the proper 
training and support of officers on the front lines 
of policing. Local, state and tribal law enforcement 
have direct contact with individuals who may possess 
important information about suspicious activities 
or with terrorists living in their communities. 
With more than 17,000 local law enforcement 
agencies in the nation, local officers are a critical 
force-multiplier for any national antiterrorism 
initiative, provided they are given adequate training 
and resources.
 
Executive session participants emphasized 
that the street-level officer is likely to be the first 
line of defense in preventing a terrorist attack, but 
may well receive only minimal training. Local law 
enforcement session participants underscored the 
need for DHS to gather and share more timely and 
detailed information on terrorist methods and 
what to look for on patrol, and to provide that 
guidance in a format they can use. They contend 
that the law enforcement intelligence community 
needs to ensure that high-quality training is provided 
to street-level officers on how to recognize, 
report and react to suspicious activity. For example, 
one participant noted that a patrol officer who 
notices a driver changing a tire near a water treatment 
plant might not think much of it. But if that 
same person is observed changing a tire near 
another high-risk facility on the list of critical 
infrastructure that same week, the participant 
would like that officer to be looking for such an 
occurrence. That patrol officer would need to 
know not only to look for such a pattern, but how


to note and share that information. Federal 
agency representatives at the session agreed that 
the definition of suspicious activity needs to be 
broadened and clearly communicated as information 
is received and packaged for state, local and 
tribal partners. 

Quote: We are not listening 
closely enough to officers 
to see what they need. 
They need to be trained 
quickly and well, perhaps 
using existing structures 
like the RCPIs. And they 
need to be taught who to 
contact and when, which is 
not clear now. 
Chief Thomas D. 
McCarthy, Fayetteville (NC) 
Police Department 

Another executive emphasized the need 
to continually talk to officers more at the local 
level about how suspicious behavior may 
change based on emerging information (for example, 
paying particular attention to use of public 
storage at odd hours after there has been an alert 
that certain dangerous materials have been 
stolen). Local agencies expressed the need for federal 
agencies to coordinate with them in developing 
the type of awareness scenarios for training 
that mesh with intelligence on methods and 
threats. 

Progress in DHS Grant Programs to 
Help First Responders 

DHS, as well as other federal departments and 
agencies, offer homeland security and public safety 
grant opportunities.73 These grants support critical 
state and local efforts to prepare first responders 
and citizens, protect public health, enhance infrastructure 
security and further other public safety 
activities. DHS allocated or awarded more than $9 
billion to first responders between September 11, 
2001 and September 31, 2004. DHS administers 
grants for its various programs through the Office 
of Domestic Preparedness (ODP), the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the 
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and 
the Office of Research and Development in the Science 
and Technology Directorate. Among the 
many other federal agency programs related to 
counterterrorism are the Department of Health 
and Human Services public health preparedness 
grants, Department of Justice grants for terrorism 
and other law enforcement activities, and Environmental 
Protection Agency grants for improving the 
security of the water supply. 

The executive session discussion on grants 
predominantly focused on ODP and first responder 
funding.74 The goal of ODP is to help state and 
local jurisdictions prevent, respond and recover 
from any terrorism acts involving chemical, biological, 
radiological, nuclear or explosive weapons 
and cyber attacks.75 In 1998, as a part of the 
Department of Justices (DOJs) increasing focus 
on terrorism prevention efforts (ODP was then an 


___________________________________________________________________________________
73 See www.dhs.gov/grants. This website provides information on grants, an overview of relevant programs for potential 
applicants, provides links for individual grant programs, and information on specific requirements and procedures. Other 
search opportunities are available at www.FedGrants.gov and www.Grants.gov. 
74 For more information on TSA and FEMA grants, see www.tsa.gov and www.fema.gov, respectively. 
75 For more information on ODP grants, see http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp/grants_goals.htm.



office in DOJ), a number of programs were initiated 
to provide funds to all 50 states76 to reduce vulnerabilities 
and increase preparedness. Current 
ODP grant programs are more focused and target 
specific program areas following the development 
of National Preparedness Goals and the National 
Strategy for Homeland Security. For example, in 
fiscal year 2004, among the grant programs that 
ODP offered were the Competitive Training 
Grants, Information Technology and Evaluation 
Program (ITEP), Urban Areas Security Initiative 
and the Homeland Security Grant Program.77 

ODP has provided Competitive Training 
Grant Program (CTGP) support to fund WMD 
training for state and local law enforcement; to 
develop capabilities for terrorism prevention including 
detection, interdiction, intelligence analysis, 
critical infrastructure protection and information 
sharing; to support training initiatives that develop 
and enhance community outreach strategies for 
local audiences through existing non-governmental 
and volunteer organizations; and to address training 
gaps related to prevention and preparedness, including 
assistance for special needs populations. 

The grant programs are continually being 
reformed and modified, but the following examples 
for 2004 offer a glimpse of the range of funding 
programs. ODP also awarded $9 million in 
competitive grants in 2004 to 12 states for information 
technology demonstration projects as part 
of the ITEP effort to foster and evaluate the use of 
state-of-the-art technologies for removing barriers 
and improving information sharing and integration 
among first responders. 

Quote: We are working with 
governors, chiefs and 
others to determine how 
the grant process is 
working and identifying 
grant best practices. We 
want the money to get into 
your hands. 
Joshua Filler, Director, 
Office of State and Local 
Government Coordination 
and Preparedness, 
Department of Homeland 
Security

The Urban Areas Security Initiative 
(UASI) grant program provided funding to address 
the needs of cities for planning, equipment, training 
and practice exercises. The funds were distributed 
to enhance and sustain area capacity to help 
first responders and state and local governments 
prevent, respond to and recover from the threat of 
WMD and other acts of terrorism. This program 
also provided funding to mass transit authorities to 
protect critical infrastructure and conduct emergency 
preparedness activities. Funds were awarded 
and distributed through the State Administrative 
Agency designated by the governor of each state. 

Every state grantee for 2004 was required 
to submit a three-year State Homeland Security 
Assessments and Strategies (SHSAS) plan to 
DHS for approval before any federal funds were 
distributed. The plans included the states critical 
infrastructure vulnerability assessment, the 


________________________________________________________________________
76 Grants were also provided to the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, American Samoa, the Commonwealth 
of Northern Mariana Islands, Guam and the U.S. Virgin Islands. 
77 ODP also administered the Assistance to Firefighters Grant Program, which was not stressed by participants, as they were 
ineligible for the funds. 


 
perceived threat to their state, a proposal on how 
the state would improve the security of their state 
and an explanation of how federal funding would 
assist preparedness. 

DHS has also administered the State 
Homeland Security Grant program, designed to 
prepare all first responders for incidents involving 
chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and 
explosive (CBRNE) devices, as well as cyber 
attacks. This program has integrated the State 
Homeland Security Program (SHSP), the Law 
Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program 
(LETPP) and the Citizen Corps Program (CCP) at 
the time of this writing.78 SHSP is intended to cover 
costs associated with implementing the SHSAS. 
The LETPP funds support law enforcement terrorism 
prevention activities through planning, organization, 
training, exercises and equipment. 

At a time when communities are calling 
for immediate readiness, there has never been a 
more pressing need for the efficient and effective 
delivery of these funds to those who need them to 
develop key competencies and to acquire adequate 
supplies, tools and technology. Some executive session 
participants stressed that the funds should be 
disseminated based on a national strategy of shared 
responsibility, accountability and leadership. 

Quote: Citizens want immediate 
responses to their 
problems and fears. Im not 
sure federal agencies have 
the same sense of urgency 
we have at the local level. 
Funding needs to be 
quicker and we need a 
more decentralized federal 
system with more 
authority given to those in 
the field who support us. 
Chief Richard Myers, 
Appleton (WI) Police 
Department 

Local Funding Challenges 

The executive session included a lively discussion 
of perceived challenges with the grant process. 
Reductions in federal funding for traditional crime 
fighting has stretched police resources to their limits, 
which puts more stress on the need for efficient 
and effective terrorism-related grants. Furthermore, 
some session participants believe that 
policymakers are failing to recognize the obvious 
connection between supporting traditional anticrime 
initiatives and advancing homeland security 
efforts. Many of the participants argued that adequate 
funding should be allocated to address traditional 
crime issues (e.g., drug operations, identity 
theft, money laundering) that affect national security. 
As a matter of practicality, when determining 
how grants will be spent, it is also not realistic to 
carve up a community police officers duties into 
those that only address terrorism and those that 
identify suspicious criminal activity, advance criminal 
intelligence gathering or many other routine 
functions. Many participants expressed the concern 
that we may be trying to win a war against 
terrorism by undercutting our commitment to 
communities to address crime, violence and fear. 

Local agencies understand that under 
counterterrorism grants their requests must fit 
into certain funding categories. One participant 


_______________________________________________________________________________
78 As of December 2, 2004, DHS further consolidated first responder grants to include UASI grants, Emergency Management 
Performance grants and the Metropolitan Medical Response System grants under the State Homeland Security Grant 
Program. Further modifications may be forthcoming.



discussed that his SWAT training for any hazard is 
the same as that for terrorist attacks. Local law 
enforcement has pushed for greater emphasis on 
such matters as an all-hazards approach for funding; 
greater flexibility of spending, particularly for 
dual uses (e.g., protective gear that can be used in 
meth labs and terrorist attacks); more standards 
and guidance on equipment79 and technology; and 
more hiring and overtime grants. 

Quote: Los Angeles has lost more 
lives to gangs than some 
wars, but the funding isnt 
there from the federal 
government for the 
community policing hiring, 
training and approaches we 
have usedthe same 
approaches that would help 
address terrorism. [At the 
time of the executive 
session] there have been 
proposals to increase 
counterterrorism funding, 
which though appreciated, 
needs to be used for 
traditional crime fighting 
as well. 
Bureau Chief John Miller, 
Counter-Terrorism and 
Criminal Intelligence 
Bureau, Los Angeles Police 
Department

Local law enforcement agencies face keen 
competition for funding. Yet unlike EMS and fire, 
they have a tremendous emphasis on prevention as 
they expend resources to guard infrastructure, 
oversee special events and much more, especially 
when alert levels rise. Local law enforcement is 
increasingly concerned about cuts that will affect 
public safety services, personnel and other critical 
areas as they struggle to provide proper responses 
to terrorism alerts and to develop their own monitoring 
and prevention efforts. Executive session 
participants indicated they are trying to think creatively 
about how to partner with other federal 
agencies, the private sector, local foundations and 
surplus programs without lowering standards or 
jeopardizing the agencys independence or integrity. 

Other concerns were much more administrative 
in nature, though given that DHS started 
just one year before, there was recognition that 
these challenges are the type found in any emerging 
organization. Some of the executive session 
participants complained that there were delays, 
and in some cases no receipt of funding for designated 
purposes in local jurisdictions.80 Executive 
session participants discussed the first years technical 
and logistical challenges. For instance, some 
executive session participants indicated that they 
have had technical problems when submitting the 


______________________________________________________________________________
79 S&T in partnership with the National Fire Protection Agency (NFPA) and the National Institute for Occupational Safety 
and Health (NIOSH) adopted in February 2004 standards on personal protective equipment (PPE) to safeguard first responders 
against chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear materials. The standards provide guidance to state and local procurement 
officials and manufacturers to provide first responders with the essential PPE. These guidelines also apply 
performance standards and test methods to manufacturers. 
80 For a discussion of the funding process, see An Analysis of First Responder Grant Funding, prepared by the staff of the 
House Select Committee on Homeland Security. At this writing, this document can be found at http://homelandsecurity. 
house.gov/files/First%20Responder%20Report.pdf. 
According to a February 2005 Government Accountability Office report, ODP established and refined the grant award procedures 
for states and localities. See United States Government Accountability Office, February 2005. Homeland Security: 
Management of First Responder Grant Programs Has Improved, But Challenges Remain. Report to the chairman, Committee 
on Appropriations, House of Representatives. The GAO Report # 05-121 can be found at www.gao.gov. 


 
strategic plans through the Internet. Others needed 
guidelines to write a strategic plan. Some stated 
that other federal agencies are asking for similar 
information and types of forms, creating redundant 
paperwork. Still others believed DHS should 
pre-approve vendors and establish product standards 
to facilitate procurement, particularly when 
there are requirements that spending be completed 
within a relatively short time period. Importantly, 
DHS session participants indicated that many of 
these problems in the grant process have already 
been addressed, and additional improvements and 
guidance are ongoing. 

Homeland Security Funding Task Force 81 

DHS executives at the session indicated that DHS 
recognizes that improvements are still needed in 
distributing homeland security funds. To address 
these problems, in March 2004 the Homeland Security 
Funding Task Force, composed of a bipartisan 
group of governors, mayors, county officials, tribal 
leaders and senior officials with experience in homeland 
security issues, examined the funding process 
to recommend ways that DHS funds could move 
quickly to local first responders.82 The task force 
distributed a report to the Secretary of DHS that 
indicates that no single issue or agency is responsible 
for the delays, but that several complicating factors 
(procurement rules, backlog of equipment 
orders from private sector vendors and others) have 
collectively slowed the funding flow. The task force 
identifies effective funding solutions for jurisdictions 
where there are obstacles to the efficient and 
effective distribution of state and local homeland 
security funds. It also documents best practices in 
delivering funds more rapidly to law enforcement 
officials, emergency managers and other first 
responders, and provides specific recommendations 
for reforms. 

As discussed later in this paper, it is apparent 
that local authorities must work strategically 
with their state and federal gatekeepers who obtain 
and distribute the funding. Some executive session 
participants expressed concern that not all local 
executives have the same influence with state officials 
who administer grants. They also believed 
that the current grant process, in some cases, is 
divisive in the way first responders from different 
disciplines vie for funding and compete with other 
law enforcement agencies in the area. 

Quote: The unintended 
consequences of the way 
the grant programs are set 
up include fostering 
divisiveness among 
disciplines and agencies as 
they compete for limited 
resources. We need a 
problem-solving approach 
to terrorism, including how 
grants are given. 
Chief Thomas D. 
McCarthy, Fayetteville (NC) 
Police Department 


_______________________________________________________________________________
81 More information on the task force is available at http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?theme=38&content=3354. The 
task force reports directly to the Secretary of DHS and operates under the guidance of the Homeland Security Advisory 
Council (HSAC) and its State and Local Officials and Emergency Response Senior Advisory Committees. 
82 As an example of grant reforms, DHS announced in January 2005 that it still had more than $4 billion in funds that had 
not been distributed to cities because of federal rules that required the money to be disbursed only to reimburse states and 
localities for expenditures they already made on antiterrorism measures. The requirement has been waived for fiscal year 
2005 to expedite the flow of funds to those in need. 


COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF 
PUBLIC SAFETY HOMELAND SECURITY GRANT PROCESS 

by Secretary Edward A. Flynn and Assistant Secretary Jane 
Wiseman, Commonwealth of Massachusetts 
Executive Office of Pubic Safety83 

The Commonwealth of Massachusetts developed a process to allocate its federal fiscal year 2004 
DHS funds that prioritizes risks and then relies on regional planning to address those risks. This 
innovative approach allows funds to be applied where they are most needed, making most efficient 
use of the federal investment in Massachusetts homeland security. Our process for developing this 
strategy was inclusive of the many different stakeholder groups from law enforcement, fire, emergency 
management, public health, transportation, public works and general government administration. 
The pages that follow provide background on the principles applied and how the outcome 
was achieved. 

The Importance of Risk-Based Allocations of Funds 

Massachusetts has often distributed federal or state grant funding to municipalities based on population, 
often making sure that every community, no matter how small, gets some minimum level 
of funding. This everyone gets something approach has served to dilute the investment in the 
areas most in need of assistance. In 2003,84 Massachusetts implemented a competitive grant program 
for distributing the funding. This was the first time funding had not been guaranteed to every 
community. Instead, only those proposals deemed most meritorious were funded. This resulted in 
a number of very disappointed communities as the conventional wisdom was turned on its head. 
So, for the 2004 funding cycle, the majority of the dollars were distributed on a risk-based formula 
that weighted critical infrastructure and verifiable potential threat elements rather than simply 
population. The overall breakout of funding was as follows: 

 20 percent for statewide projects and state grant administration 
 10 percent for a program to provide a minimal level of funding for any interested municipality 
 48 percent for risk-based allocation to regional planning groups 
 22 percent for interoperability projects in the regional planning groups 

The key innovation here is that our team introduced an information-driven, risk-based approach to 
homeland security planning and operations. The foundation of this approach was a statewide 
threat, vulnerability and risk assessment performed by the state and local police departments. This 
assessment involved the identification of critical assets, special events and potential threat elements 


_____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
83 Public Safety Secretary Edward Flynn was the Chief of Police in Arlington County, Virginia during the time of the 
September 11, 2001 attack on the Pentagon, which strongly influenced the Massachusetts model that came to be 
based on a regional approach. 
84 Unless indicated otherwise, years are for the federal fiscal year (October to October), rather than a calendar year. 



and then combining those lists to develop current threat intelligence identifying those potential 
targets that are at the greatest risk of attack. While we conducted this assessment originally to 
support the adoption of information-driven and performance-based protective and response planning 
efforts, during the process we discovered that some of the data collected and submitted to ODP 
was flawed. As a result, we worked with our local partners to validate all they had submitted. The 
validation process was critical because it allowed us to use comparable standards. Based on the validated 
information contained in the threat, vulnerability and risk assessment, we developed a corresponding 
quantitative score for each municipality. Once the statewide validation process and 
scoring was completed, funding was allocated to the regional groups based on the collective score 
of the municipalities in that region. In this way, the dollars could truly be applied to real threats, 
and the decisions about how to protect those threats using federal funds can be made at the local 
level. 

The Challenge to Regionalism 

Massachusetts is composed of 351 municipalities, many of which were established in the 17th century. 
Compared with other states, Massachusetts is exceeded by only one in the number of individual 
governmental jurisdictions. There is a long and rich history of local control by these small 
government agencies, some of which have fewer than 1,000 people to govern. Each municipality 
has its own government, and most have their own police department, fire department, schools and 
the like. 

Yet, no single entity can handle alone the challenge of responding to a large incident in the 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts. Our largest city, Boston, asked scores of municipalities in the 
region and half a dozen state agencies to help during the 2004 Democratic National Convention. 
Creating a sense of regionalism may be a formidable task, but the response to any terrorist attack 
requires a multijurisdictional approach. 

Massachusetts engaged in a six-month process of developing appropriate boundaries for the 
homeland security planning regions. We began by creating an inventory of the many different ways 
other agencies had used to divide the state: 

 4 regional law enforcement consortia provide mutual aid and other specialized law enforcement 
services to agencies through formal working relationships 
 24 fire districts provide support to municipal fire departments 
 7 public health regions support bioterrorism preparedness 
 14 counties have their own sheriff 
 11 district attorneys prosecute criminals in the 14 counties 
 8 HazMat teams cover regional areas with their equipment and staffing


 
 5 emergency management regions provide support to local emergency management efforts by 
helping to keep local emergency plans updated to changing circumstances 
 39 state police barracks provide highway patrol and other law enforcement support to communities 
and citizens 
 8 regional re-entry centers provide supervision to offenders returning to our communities 

A series of meetings was conducted with key stakeholders to discuss the various ways that 
the state could draw the lines for the homeland security regions. The eventual consensus was that 
the existing emergency management regions would be modified to accommodate the Boston-area 
homeland security planning region created for the Urban Area Security Initiative grant program 
funded by DHS. To the extent possible, other regional efforts are being aligned or at least coordinated 
with the existing homeland security footprint. 

The Importance of Building in Intelligence: The Fusion Center 

As we learned from the risk assessment, 351 municipalities may have 351 different ways of identifying, 
describing and analyzing potential threats. We decided to create a centralized, standardized 
source of information analysis and referral. To that end, our state police have developed an information 
fusion center that is our single source of homeland security information analysis and 
dissemination. We have worked with all levels of government in developing this effortincluding 
the FBI, the United States Attorney, and the first responders in all our municipalities. 

The importance of the fusion center is that information and data form the core of our strategy, 
and our operations. Threat, vulnerability and risk-related information drive all of our activities
whether the allocation and disbursement of funds or the development and implementation of 
protective, response and continuity plans. This approach stems from our philosophy that it is not 
possible to protect every potential target from every conceivable type of attack; there needs to be a 
system of prioritization and that is what we are developing. 

Strategic Management and Oversight of Funds 
Massachusetts forged a meaningful partnership between the first responder community and existing 
regional planning agencies to ensure federal funds would be effectively used for multijurisdictional 
and multidisciplinary readiness. While this seems completely logical on its face, it is a leap 
across many government stovepipes that had never worked together before. Regional planning 
agencies have long partnered with multiple jurisdictions on common interests in urban and regional 
plans for housing and economic development. But never had the law enforcement or other first 
responder community participated directly with the regional planning agencies. This new collaboration 
brings the regional planning agencies expertise in federal grant management to the challenge 
of supporting homeland security efforts in the newly designated regions. 

Planning as a Precondition for Spending 
Funding was obligated to the municipalities in the regional planning councils in a timely fashion. 
Modeling the process on the federal Urban Area Security Initiative, we mandated that funds could 
not be spent on major projects until the planning phase was completed. Regional planning councils 
were given several months to complete their strategic plan for funding priorities, working with 
their designated regional planning agency. The regional planning agencies (RPA) have served as 
fiduciary agents and taken the lead for developing the plans. The RPAs are the existing agencies that 
have done work on economic development and the like. They are new to homeland security but 
have done federal grant work for local government for a long time.
 
In particular, funds for any communications or interoperability projects could not be spent 
until the state completed its interoperability strategy. In summer 2003, Massachusetts communities 
participated in a survey that identified the existing infrastructure for first responder communications. 
Based on that picture of the environment, a committee was created and tasked with developing 
a consistent, long-term statewide strategy for interoperability of voice and data 
communications. Communities were asked to hold off on any communications-related projects 
until they could certify that the project was consistent with the statewide strategy. 

Continuous Improvement 

No system or process is perfect when it is first created. We continue to learn of ways to improve 
both the process and the way we communicate with our stakeholder community. Frequent meetings 
of all relevant stakeholders have kept a meaningful dialogue moving, and we hope to develop 
an even more refined strategy for the funding year ahead.



 
CONCLUSION 
Many local and state agencies reported having 
recent successful experiences with DHS when 
implementing operational security plans for 
national events and conventions. They have seen 
tremendous progress in how the federal agencies 
work together and applaud efforts to further reduce 
redundancy and turf issues among federal partners. 
Training resources and other support were 
similarly appreciated by executive session participants, 
though there was consensus that additional 
resources are needed, as well as more standards 
and guidance for evaluating the type and quality 
offered to local law enforcement. Though many 
representatives were unaware of NIMS at the time 
of the session, efforts to provide uniform guidance 
were also given kudos. There was some question as 
to how local law enforcement would operate within 
the NIMS structure. 

Though agencies appreciate federal support 
for equipment, technology and other purposes, 
the greatest concerns voiced at the session were 
from local law enforcement representatives who 
focused on the funding limitations for crime and 
terrorism prevention. Executive session participants 
stressed that local law enforcement is 



uniquely positioned to prevent attacks through 
proactive law enforcement work with community 
members; by drawing on trust relationships with 
diverse groups; through information collection and 
analysis that builds on previous criminal intelligence 
work; by providing a visible presence at 
potential targets; by identifying which infrastructure 
is most at risk and how to protect it; as well 
as myriad other functions. And while crime has 
decreased overall, many chiefs are concerned about 
what they see as worrisome emerging crime problems 
such as gangs, youth homicides and the rise 
of methamphetamine production and abuseall of 
which also require significant resources. Yet law enforcement 
is competing with other first responders 
and one another for limited funding that does not 
adequately address some of their greatest needs: 
overtime, hiring, greater dual use resources and 
more. 

Again, participants lauded the statements 
of federal agency colleagues at the session to redouble 
their efforts to ensure that money is getting to 
local law enforcement and that changes to the 
grant processes and parameters will reflect their 
commitment to addressing local police needs. 
Importantly, some of the issues are beyond their 
reach to fix immediately as congressional mandates, 
state processes and other factors can influence 
the success of the grant-making programs. 
The latter will require an education process that 
could take significant time.


CHAPTER FIVE 

INFORMATION SHARING, ALERT SYSTEMS 
AND NEW TECHNOLOGIES 

THERE IS PERHAPS NO MORE DIFFICULT ISSUE IN FEDERAL-LOCAL RELATIONS 
than information and intelligence sharing.85 Just as the FBI dealt with 
these issues for many years, DHS now faces formidable challenges in 
getting information down to local law enforcement and back up again as the 
process continually evolves to include new material and analysis from all 
involved players. The challenges include the growing pains associated with any 
new endeavor in which bonds of trust must be developed, the technical issues 
related to interoperability and funding for systems, the need to address redundant 
functions, the related privacy and security concerns and many others. Though 
these kinds of communications problems are expected in an agency that is just 
one year old at the time of the session, the good news is that these are issues recognized 
and being addressed by DHS. 
 
The discussion that follows offers some insights into 
possible solutions and directions that will improve 
the processes already begun by DHS. There was consensus 
that there are too many systems at work and 
that state-of-the-art secured technologies are needed 
to facilitate coordinated information sharing among 
local, state, tribal and federal agencies. Further, executive 
session participants stressed that new relationships 
and training must complement the advances 
being made with emerging technologies. 

The Homeland Security Advisory System 
(HSAS) is perhaps the most visible information 
sharing mechanism that has been implemented by 
DHS to alert law enforcement to potential threats. 
This chapter reviews how local agencies perceive 
the system and discusses their recommendations 
on how it and other information sharing systems 
can be improved. Also provided below is a brief 
overview of how existing and new technologies can 
enhance prevention, detection and response efforts. 


__________________________________________________________________________________
85 PERFs previous white paper, Protecting Your Communities from Terrorism, Strategies for Local Law Enforcement Volume 
4: Production and Sharing of Intelligence is dedicated to exploring issues in intelligence development and sharing and 
provides detailed discussions on related topics. The report can be downloaded for free from www.policeforum.org or 
www.cops.usdoj.gov. 


Quote: DHS should be the 
intelligence newsroom for 
locals. The alerts should 
take terrorism information 
from around the world and 
then translate what the 
TTIC, Ops Center and other 
analysts are talking about 
into meaningful 
information for local law 
enforcement, with priority 
items sent over 
Blackberries and cell 
phones. 
John Miller, Bureau Chief, 
Counter-Terrorism and 
Criminal Intelligence 
Bureau, Los Angeles Police 
Department


Information-Sharing Mechanisms 

Executive session participants discussed the full 
range of mechanisms DHS and other federal agencies 
use to share information with law enforcement 
partners and other government agencies. 
Several of the key issues included hearing about 
new developments in the media before being contacted 
by federal partners; information being too 
vague to guide any particular local action, while 
increasing citizen fear; and there being too many 
federal sources of sometimes-conflicting information. 
Participants discussions at the executive session 
focused largely on the last concern: Local law 
enforcement representatives emphasized the 
importance of coordinating the timing of the 
release of information (without delaying it) and 
eliminating overlapping responsibilities at the federal 
level to prevent contradictory information 
from coming to them from several federal sources 
and sometimes weeks apart. Some local law 
enforcement participants reported that they would 
get an alert from one federal agency, then they 
would contact a second federal agency only to find 
out it was the same information the second agency 
had released weeks earlier and then dismissed as 
lacking credibility. Others said they have been confused 
about whether the information from DHS or 
another federal agency was old, whether a new 
similar threat had arisen, or was inaccurate given 
interim information from other sources. Some of 
the confusion seemed to stem from the fact that 
three or four federal agencies might be analyzing 
the same information at different tempos and 
releasing the findings at different times. These 
issues are explored further in the section, Timely 
and Accurate Information. later in this chapter. 

Though participants agreed that the federal 
intelligence community has made significant 
progress since September 11 and that greater effort 
has been made to produce actionable intelligence, 
some expressed concern that remaining obstacles 
to information sharing were draining scarce 
resources and confounded more than clarified. 
Executive session participants discussed the need 
for federal agencies to do an analysis of all information-
sharing mechanisms to identify gaps and 
overlapping areas, as well as to improve processes. 

DHS has employed a number of information-
sharing approaches and expressed appreciation 
for executive session participants feedback on how 
effective they have been and how recipients used the 
information. The federal participants reiterated that 
sometimes there was a misperception that they 
were withholding specific information or actionable 
intelligence when, in fact, that information has not 
existed. Examples of the ways in which DHS has 



kept law enforcement and others informed of 
threats and other information include email 
updates; monthly conference calls; Internet resource 
sites; law enforcement networks; screening and 
integration center feedback; as well as the HSAS 
color-coded systems advisories, bulletins and alerts. 
These are described below, as well as law enforcements 
concerns about using the information for 
resource allocation and other decision making. 

Distributing an Electronic Publication 

DHS uses email to distribute an electronic publication, 
DHS Today, with information for law 
enforcement partners and other first responders. 
DHS Today is distributed to approximately 1,700 
individuals at this writing. The newsletter contains 
current DHS news, press releases and information 
on upcoming events. The Office of State 
and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness 
(SLGCP) also sends the information to 
other state, tribal and local government officials.86 

Homeland Security Information Bulletins 

DHS and the FBI also issue joint information bulletins
the Homeland Security Information Bulletin. 
They communicate issues that pertain to the 
critical national infrastructure and are for informational 
purposes only.87 

Monthly Conference Calls 

The SLGCP also hosts monthly conference calls 
with national organizations that represent state, 
tribal and local law enforcement, as well as other 
first responders. The purpose of the conference 
calls is to maintain open lines of communication 
with law enforcement partners, and to provide an 
opportunity to inform national organizations of 
current DHS initiatives. First responders can use 
these conference calls to relate their concerns, priorities 
and efforts in communities around the 
country to DHS. The monthly conference calls 
were not designed to provide a secure means of 
communication for actionable intelligence or 
threat information. Clearly other instant communication 
mechanisms have been developed to meet 
this important operational necessity. 

State Emergency Information Sharing Web 
Portal 

Executive session participants emphasized that 
learning about others successes and failures is one 
of the greatest contributions DHS can make to 
advancing state initiatives. On April 19, 2004, 
DHS launched a web portal, Lessons Learned 
Information Sharing System, to enable first responders 
and homeland security professionals to share 
information and best practices.88 Access is granted 
to authorized homeland security officials and first 
responders at the local, state and federal levels to 
share expertise on effective planning, training and 
operations. The directory of responders and homeland 
security officials provides users access to contact 
information for networking. The web portal 
serves as a central repository for homeland security-
related documents and events. The site also 
includes peer-reviewed after-action reports, exercise 
and emergency drill examples (e.g., tabletop, 
full scale), best practices and other resources. 


______________________________________________________________________________________
86 To receive this publication, requests should go via email to Sarah Fulton at sarah.fulton@dhs.gov or call 202-282-8054. 
87 More information is available about the bulletin on p. 67. 
88 DHS launched the web portal in 2004 that was developed by the National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism 
(MIPT) www.mipt.org and DFI International (http://www.dfi-intl.com/). At the time of this writing, the Lessons 
Learned Information Sharing System web portal can be found at www.llis.gov.


 
Interactive Communications Systems 
Available to Law Enforcement 

DHS uses existing communications systems traditionally 
employed to share crime information 
among local authorities, such as the Regional Information 
Sharing System (RISS), Law Enforcement 
Online (LEO) and Joint Regional Information 
Exchange System (JRIES).89 The participants 
expressed concern that there is a tendency to continually 
introduce new and better systems instead of 
improving on existing structures. They recommended 
that DHS and other federal agencies continue 
to use existing local and state networks, 
databases and mechanisms instead of introducing 
new systems when possible. There was a call, however, 
to integrate some of these systems to provide 
single-query capabilities. Session participants also 
recommended better use of the National Crime Information 
Center (NCIC) system, accessible to frontline 
officers across the country, for limited purposes. 

Terrorist Screening Center90 

Participants emphasized the need for a full and 
comprehensive picture of the terrorist intelligence 
that informs the actions of DHS and other federal 
agencies. Executive session participants discussed 
how multiple databases used to screen for terrorists 
in the United States and abroad has created 
confusion and problems for state and local authorities. 
They anticipated that once the Terrorist 
Screening Center (TSC) has been fully operational 
for a longer period it would improve information 
sharing and reduce duplicative services provided by 
federal agencies. 

The TSC was established on September 
16, 2003, and became operational on December 1, 
2003, to merge terrorist watch lists and provide 
real-time operational support for officials and entities. 
The mission of the TSC is to consolidate the 
governments approach to terrorist screening by 
creating a single comprehensive database of known 
or appropriately suspected terrorists, and to make 
this consolidated list available to local, state and 
federal screeners through the TSCs 24/7 Call 
Center.91 The TSC is overseen by the FBI and 
receives identity information about terrorists and 
suspected terrorists from two sources: international 
terrorist information comes from the Terrorist 
Threat Integration Center (TTIC) (see 
section below about TTIC and the newer National 
Counterterrorism Center) and information about 
known or suspected domestic terrorists comes 
from the FBI, based on their respective sources. 


______________________________________________________________________________
89 The RISS Program operates a secure intranet, known as RISSNET, to encourage law enforcement communication and 
the sharing of criminal intelligence information nationwide among local, state, federal and tribal law enforcement member 
agency personnel. RISSNET provides information on offender criminal activity including address, phone numbers, weapons 
used and other useful information. It is now being expanded to help disseminate and share terrorism-related sensitive-butunclassified 
information. More information on the RISS Program can be found at http://www.rissinfo.com/. 
On September 1, 2002, RISSNET interconnected with the LEO system to create a single log-on system for the exchange of 
sensitive-but-unclassified homeland security information. More information on the LEO system can be found at 
http://www.fbi.gov/hq/cjisd/leo.htm. 
JRIES serves as a secure virtual private network, connecting data sources using encrypted communications via the Internet. 
JRIES relies upon commercial, off-the-shelf technology and web-based software that enables users to access database and 
analysis applications; send secure email, including maps and graphics; and collaborate in real time. JRIES is also used to 
exchange sensitive-but-unclassified information. DHS is planning to upgrade the network security to allow the exchange of 
classified information at the secret level. For more information on JRIES, see http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/interapp/ 
press_release/press_release_0354.xml. 
90 At the time of this writing, more information on the Terrorist Screening Center can be found at http://www.dhs.gov/ 
dhspublic/display?content=1598. 
91 U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Terrorist Screening Center brochure, 2005.



At the time of the executive session, the 
TSC consolidated information from approximately 
12 databases into a single resource that federal 
security screeners, state and local law enforcement 
officers, U.S. consular officials stationed abroad, 
and in limited cases, even foreign governments 
could query. The database has improved such 
processes as accessing information for consular 
officers to determine whether to grant a visa, or for 
immigration officials to decide whether a person is 
eligible to enter the United States. The TSC 
ensures screeners are using the same unified data 
set of suspected terrorists and their associates. 

The U.S. Attorney General implemented 
procedures that are meant to safeguard information 
about U.S. persons, in coordination with the 
Secretary of DHS, the Secretary of the State 
Department and the Director of the CIA. The TSC 
was established to be consistent with law and constitutional 
requirements that protect privacy interests 
and other liberties. The TSC does not have the 
authority to collect intelligence, only to amass the 
identity information that is already being captured 
by the intelligence community and other agencies. 

Terrorist Threat Integration Center and 
National Counterterrorism Center 

At the time of the executive session, the TSC 
received the vast majority of information about 
known or suspected international terrorists from 
the information and intelligence amassed by the 
Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC). In 
August 2004, President Bush announced plans to 
create a National Counterterrorism Center 
(NCTC) in an effort to build upon the work of the 
Terrorist Threat Integration Center. The NCTC 
was formally established in January 2005 as part of 
The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention 
Act of 2004. TTICs analytical capabilities were 
folded into NCTC upon the new centers creation. 
The NCTC is also now responsible for analyzing 
and integrating intelligence acquired from all U.S. 
government departments and agencies with terrorism-
related responsibilitiesexcept intelligence 
pertaining exclusively to domestic terrorists and 
domestic counterterrorism. NCTC also has the 
authority to assign roles and responsibilities to 
departments or agencies for counterterrorism 
responsibilities as part of its strategic operational 
planning duties. The NCTC, however, cannot 
direct the execution of any resulting operations.
 
The NCTC has no independent authority 
to collect intelligence but plays a central role as a 
fusion center for the analysis of counterterrorism 
information. NCTC integrates all raw data from 
the intelligence communities to be analyzed and 
provides assessments of intelligence that are relevant 
to foreign and domestic terrorism. NCTC 
officials analyze information and determine who 
in the intelligence community needs the resulting 
analysis. The information provided by NCTC personnel 
to the TSC can be critical for ensuring that 
street officers who stop individuals will be in the 
loop to identify and hold suspected terrorists. Local 
law enforcement agencies can also participate on 
the TSC watch desk. 

With the information that TSC merges, 
personnel then incorporate the records in the 
National Crime Information Center (NCIC) database. 
The implications for local law enforcement 
include more ready access to information about 
suspected terrorists. For example, when a law 
enforcement officer runs a NCIC check on a suspect 
during a routine traffic stop or criminal investigation, 
the terminal message may indicate for the 
officer to contact the TSC Call Center and then it



guides the officer on how to handle the stop. TSC 
will guide the officer through a number of steps 
depending on TSCs level of interest in the individual.
92 All positive or inconclusive matches of 
individuals to the TSC database are forwarded to 
the FBI Counterterrorism Watch (CT Watch). The 
CT Watch directs the police response and can 
dispatch the local JTTF to provide a coordinated 
response and to report back to the TSC and originating 
agency. 

Quote: The Fairfax County Police 
Department maintains a 
positive and growing 
relationship with our 
federal partners and DHS, 
largely due to our 
commitment to the [HSOC] 
watch center. This 
assignment encourages 
the passage of critical 
information to troop-level 
users. 
Acting Chief Suzanne 
Devlin, Fairfax County (VA) 
Police Department

The TSC receives calls daily from local 
and state officers receiving NCIC messages. The 
TSC is staffed 24-hours-a-day to aid in the identification 
of these individuals. At the time of the 
executive session, if an officer wished to contact 
the TSC outside of an official hit, they could do so 
by contacting the Homeland Security Information 
Network (HSIN), contact their FBI field office, or 
contact their local JTTF. Many of the executive 
session participants stressed that they would like 
to have a single point of contact for this function 
in the future. 

At the executive session, participants 
expressed concern that established relationships 
with various federal agencies with whom they are 
comfortable sharing suspect information and intelligence 
might be undermined with the emphasis 
on the TTIC/NCTC approach. They were concerned 
about how they might affect the existing 
decentralized system of information sharing with 
the FBI and others. State and local law enforcement 
also prefer to have direct access to information 
from federal information systems. 

It is important to note that DHSs Information 
Analysis and Infrastructure Protection 
(IAIP) unit also fuses information from many 
sources as a full partner and consumer of intelligence 
from such sources as the CIA, the NSA 
and the FBI. While it acts as a fusion center, the 
information is used to protect critical infrastructure. 
NCTC, in contrast, is an intelligence fusion center 
than helps ensure all federal agencies have the 
same set of data and intelligence from which to 
work. (IAIP and NCTC personnel share information 
with one another, as well.) DHS representatives 
indicated that they are trying to work with all 
intelligence agencies to provide local, state and 

 
______________________________________________________________________________
92 The TSC brochure outlines four categories of instructions found within the text of the NCIC response. The first indicates 
the officer should arrest the individual thought to be a terrorist and to contact the TSC. The second asks the responding 
officer to detain the individual who is of investigative interest for a reasonable time and to contact the TSC for more 
direction. The third indicates that the person MAY have terrorist ties and to call the TSC for additional help in making that 
determination, but not to notify the person of the notice or arrest him or her unless there has been a criminal violation. 
The fourth category carries the same admonitions but asks the officer to collect identifying information, which the TSC 
may request at a later time, and to contact the TSC if questioning raises suspicions about possible ties to terrorist activity.



tribal agencies with timely and accurate threatspecific 
warning information. 

Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS) 

The IAIP established in March 2002 a nationwide 
Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS),93 to 
facilitate the federal governments efforts to communicate 
information quickly to local and state 
officials and the public on national threats. The 
HSAS was designed to set in motion protective 
measures when intelligence agencies receive credible 
and/or corroborated information regarding a 
specific industry sector or geographic region. The 
alert that is provided to public safety officials and 
the public is based on threat information and vulnerability 
assessments. Executive session participants 
discussed the progress made in improving 
the HSAS threat warning process, as well as the 
steps that would make it more effective. The HSAS 
encourages appropriate preparedness and preventive 
measures at the local, tribal, state and federal 
levels through three means of communication: 
Homeland Security Threat Advisories, Homeland 
Security Information Bulletins and a color-coded 
threat level system. 

Homeland Security Threat Advisories. 
(This category includes products formerly named 
alerts, advisories and sector notifications.) During 
an emergency, IAIP develops and issues national 
and sector-specific (water treatment facilities, 
nuclear plants, ports) threat warnings and advisories 
through the HSAS. Threat advisories are 
meant to provide actionable information about an 
incident involving, or a threat targeting, critical 
national networks, infrastructures, national or 
large-scale events or strategic U.S. assets. These 
advisories can also communicate recently developed 
procedures that can improve security or protection. 
The advisories may also recommend a 
change in readiness or response. Advisories are targeted 
to federal, state and local governments; private 
sector organizations and international partners. 

Homeland Security Information Bulletins. 
An alert is a more serious and specific 
threat warning, whereas a bulletin is a more general 
update. Bulletins include information for public 
safety officials that does not meet the 
timeliness, specificity or significance thresholds 
needed for alerts. Bulletins provide statistical 
reports, periodic summaries, incident response or 
reporting guidelines, common vulnerabilities and 
other information. It also may include preliminary 
requests for information. A bulletin can be distributed 
to a specific audience or more broadly, usually 
transmitted electronically or via fax. At the time 
of the executive session (one year after the establishment 
of DHS), a DHS participant indicated 
that there had been 70 issued warnings through 
bulletins.
 
Color-Coded Threat Level System. The 
color-coded threat system spans five colors and 
corresponding threat levels, including green (low 
threat risk), blue (guarded), yellow (elevated), 
orange (high risk) and red (severe threat risk). The 
color-coded threat system is meant to facilitate a 
uniform and consistent response among all agencies 
engaged in counterterrorism. This system also 
alerts the public to take suggested protective measures 
to reduce the likelihood or impact of an 
attack. But different states and jurisdictions have 
varying protocols for acting on a change in threat 
level. Some executive session participants stated 


_________________________________________________________________________________
93 More information on HSAS can be found at http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?theme=29.



that there was a need for greater specificity in the 
information that is disseminated during heightened 
threat periods. DHS responded that work is 
underway to make the system more responsive to 
sector or area alerts, so that the entire nation does 
not need to escalate its response, sometimes with 
very costly measures, if the threat is unlikely to affect 
them. Based on threat information, the system can 
place specific geographic regions or sectors on a higher 
alert status than other areas or industries.94 

Coordinated Response to Threat Warnings 

The issuance of a DHS advisory or a change in the 
threat level is meant to trigger a strong coordinated 
response among law enforcement agencies at all 
levels. DHS requests that all relevant federal agencies 
develop a general protocol to correspond with 
each color-coded level and develop more detailed 
response strategies to some of the more specific 
threat advisories that are disseminated in coordination 
with the raising of the threat level.95 DHS 
also encourages those local, state and tribal agencies 
with their own area alert system to adopt one 
that is compatible with the HSAS system and the 
federal response.96 DHS urges each locality to develop 
detailed actions for threat-specific warnings or 
for a change in the color-coded threat level that is 
consistent with the DHS response. DHS executives 
at the session indicated they are developing 
recommendations for more tailored regional 
responses. 

Local and State Concerns with the HSAS and 
Sharing Issues 

Executive session participants agreed that the 
HSAS has laudable goals, but more needs to be 
done to meet their needs. Law enforcement executives 
value threat and target-specific warnings but 
do not have sufficient details to guide responses to 
a change in threat level or issued advisories or 
warnings. Among the concerns are that alerts 
must be more specific to jurisdictions; that there is 
no detailed protocol universally adapted by police 
agencies (shift schedules, visible patrols and other 
measures may be taken by one police agency, but 
not the neighboring agency); that there is no circumstance 
that would drop it below elevated and 
so it is effectively only a three-tiered system; there 
needs to be more information about what drives an 
advisory status change; and more. Participants also 
expressed concern that community fear levels were 
being raised with insufficient information to guide 
them on how to act. They wanted to be privy to 
what was likely to be released to the public to prepare 
what advice they would offer to help their own 
officers and community members handle the 
information. 

Quote: Were concerned that you 
cant stand at attention 
forever. 
Chief Charles Ramsey, 
Washington (DC) 
Metropolitan Police 
Department



_______________________________________________________________________________
94 See footnote 51 regarding area-specific threat warnings to East Coast financial districts. 
95 DHS provides guidelines to federal agencies at the following website http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/interapp/press_ 
release/press_release_0046.xml. 
96 At this writing, the Major City Chiefs (MCC) Association is working on developing a protocol consistent with best practices 
in security preparedness and response, as well as methods to address different threat level updates. An interim report 
was released by MCC in June 2004 and is available at http://www.neiassociates.org/. 



 
Some of the confusion related to alerts to 
date has resulted in what some perceive as inaction 
by local law enforcement. Local police executives 
indicated that their jurisdictions do not always 
respond with increased activity to warnings. There 
were two primary reasons: Executives decided 
warnings were not specific to their jurisdiction and 
law enforcement leaders felt they could not be any 
more vigilant than they already were given the 
vagueness of the threat. 

It has also been difficult to gauge local 
reactions to threat warning changes because one 
agency may provide an all-out response at one 
color level and another agency responds the same 
way at only a higher level. There is no consistency 
across agencies for a specific detailed protocol. 
Some agencies also have a city threat system that 
does not always track national alerts. For instance, 
since September 11, New York has always been on 
orange alert even though it does not necessarily 
mean their response is similar to other jurisdictions 
that are on orange alert. The local response to 
a national alert change may be affected by other 
intelligence it is receiving, whether from its own 
intelligence bureau, that of larger neighboring 
agencies, the FBI field office and JTTF in the area, 
or regional or state homeland security offices.
 
DHS representatives understand the frustration 
law enforcement has experienced trying to 
translate the change in the HSAS threat level (and 
corresponding colors) to actionable information. 
The DHS executive session participants indicated 
that IAIP is working with national law enforcement 
organizations to assess and improve the 
value of the alert systems and advisories.

Who Should Be the Primary Federal Contact 

Many executive session participants stated that 
when DHS issues a warning, the chief executive 
contacts their FBI Special Agent in Charge (SAC) 
or the JTTF representative to discern whether the 
information is accurate and timely. Local law 
enforcement, in particular, felt partnerships with 
the FBI have been long established and they turn to 
them first for sharing information between federal, 
state, tribal and local law enforcement agencies. 
Many reported significant improvement over the 
years between local law enforcement and the FBI, 
particularly since September 11. Some local law 
enforcement representatives said they are now 
unclear whether DHS or FBI is the federal governments 
primary conduit for information regarding 
potential terrorist activity in their jurisdiction. For 
some, the establishment of TTIC prompted the 
need to sort out the roles of each agency because 
many local police departments have traditionally 
worked with the FBI for some time and the inclination 
is to view them as the first point of contact. 
Chiefs also were accustomed to working with 
someone in their region, as with area field offices. 
However, police agencies recognized that DHS had 
been given an important national mission and 
operational coordination role. 

Quote: We need a shared view of 
the threat and a clear 
understanding of our roles 
and responsibilities in 
countering that threat. 
Terrorists clearly have a 
shared understanding of 
the goal and the roles in 
attaining it. 
Executive Assistant 
Director Maureen Baginski, 
Office of Intelligence, FBI



Quote: We need to have a clear 
point of contact for local 
law enforcement. It has 
been the JTTF and field 
office, but now there is a 
DHS Operations Center. To 
avoid confusion and 
duplication, the JTTF should 
be the initial point of 
contact for law 
enforcement on all 
terrorism matters. We 
need to better sort out the 
overlapping jurisdictions. 
Chris Swecker, Special 
Agent in Charge, Charlotte 
(NC) Field Office, Federal 
Bureau of Investigation 

Most of the chief executives reported that 
they know their FBI SAC or resident agent but are 
unaware of who their DHS representatives might 
be in their area. Participants believed decision 
makers in each region should help determine how 
DHS fits into the area response. Many participants 
agreed that federal agencies should consider a onestop 
contact at the federal level to eliminate confusion 
and facilitate joint efforts. 

Executive session participants agreed that 
federal agencies have made progress in analyzing and 
sharing information with relevant local, state and 
tribal agencies since the first executive session on 
Local-Federal Partnerships (see white paper one in 
the series).97 Participants attributed this change to 
open dialogue and efforts to build stronger relationships. 
Session participants agreed that the same 
relationship-building process will occur with DHS 
once confidence and mutual trust is strengthened 
over time with local, state, tribal and other federal 
agencies. 

Timely and Accurate Information 

Many of the concerns described above regarding 
information sharing generally also apply to alert 
systems specifically. Local law enforcement 
emphasized that while there has been some 
improvements, threat advisories for the most part 
are still vague. To some degree, this is the nature of 
most intelligence. DHS representatives reported 
that there often is not a lot of good quality information 
to share with local and state partners. 
Local participants suggested, however, that warnings 
also be better coordinated among the federal 
agencies so that they come from one federal source 
at one time, not in stages that make the age and 
relevance of the data unknown. 

DHS representatives explained that the 
source of some of the problems with warnings, 
alerts and other information sharing is quite 
complex. In part, the issues arise from congressional 
authority. Homeland security legislation 
gave DHS authority to collect and share information, 
as well as other activities, but did not rescind 
authority for other federal agencies already 
engaged in various aspects of intelligence sharing. 
This has created overlapping jurisdiction. There 
are also limitations on DHS sharing intelligence 
that the FBI or non-DHS agencies hold. DHS participants 
expressed their desire to make their systems 
more integrated and complementary, while 
trying to guard against federal-centric views. They 


_______________________________________________________________________________
97 Murphy, Gerard R. and Martha R. Plotkin. March 2004. Protecting Your Community From Terrorism: The Strategies for 
Local Law Enforcement Series, Vol.1: Local-Federal Partnerships. Washington, DC: Police Executive Research Forum.


 
are also considering the need to better define when 
federal agencies communicate at the state homeland 
security level and when they should go directly 
to the local level. They invited local law 
enforcement to help define how DHS can add 
value to intelligence sharing efforts. Executive session 
participants from DHS agencies expressed a 
strong commitment to trying to get information 
pushed down faster and in a more usable format to 
local law enforcement. 

Local law enforcement participants also 
encouraged DHS and other federal agencies to 
consider when information they are holding will 
be of importance to local law enforcement, even 
when no immediate threat of terrorism exists. For 
example, when the federal agencies were aware 
that President Jean-Bertrand Aristide of Haiti 
would need U.S. assistance and protection when 
he resigned in the face of growing unrest and violence 
in Haiti, local law enforcement officials with 
large Haitian populations believed that they 
should have been informed. This information 
would have helped them prepare for any problems 
at planned large events at the time the United 
States intervened, as well as for any disturbances 
or demonstrations. 

The local law enforcement participants 
also urged their federal partners to focus more on 
longer-term analyses that would help them build 
their department capabilities and structures to 
face threats in the future. They are looking for 
more insights into what implications foreign intelligence 
has for their domestic policing efforts. For 
example, more information on what was learned 
from the ricin incidents in other countries could 
have value for U.S. efforts. Whether through alerts 
or other information sharing, local law enforcement 
is also looking for more information on 
trends, techniques and operations that could be 
presented to officers in roll call trainings or daily 
briefings. 

In sum, many law enforcement representatives 
indicated that they have the primary 
responsibility for preparedness and response activities 
in their jurisdictions, but are operating without 
strategic information that comes from a 
timely, coordinated federal effort. Law enforcement 
agencies are eager to obtain threat assessments 
for their jurisdiction, prevention tips to 
decrease vulnerability, guidance on responding to 
warnings, and information on what other agencies 
are doing to respond. They expressed that DHS 
has made significant progress and is trying to be 
receptive to their needs, recognizing the agency is 
still in its infancy. 

Technologies 

Executive session participants emphasized that 
agencies should take advantage of both existing 
and emerging technologies to prevent, detect and 
respond to terrorist acts. There are significant 
challenges, however, to integrating new technologies 
(information networks, detection technology 
and many others) with existing infrastructure and 
systems. The reality seems to be that it will take 
time to fully integrate technologies that advance 
information sharing and interoperability in an 
environment that demands instant solutions. 

Executive session participants discussed 
how local and state agencies have existing technologies 
that are sometimes overlooked, but that can easily 
be enhancedrather than re-inventing systems 
that may not be compatible with current systems, 
networks or related needs. Participants encouraged 
DHSs Science and Technology (S&T) directorate to 
assess and improve existing technologies as well as



develop new and innovative capabilities. The technologies 
should be capable of nationwide application 
with full compatibility and sustainability. 

On June 7, 2004, the DHS S&T directorate 
launched the Regional Technology Integration 
Initiative (RTI) to facilitate the application of 
innovative technologies and organizational concepts 
to regional, state and local counterterrorism 
efforts.98 DHS chose Anaheim, Cincinnati and 
Memphis as the first three pilot cities to share in 
the RTIs $10 million funding. All of the pilot sites 
are participating in the Homeland Security Urban 
Area Security Initiative to adopt advanced and 
innovative concepts for emergency preparedness. 
The RTI purpose is to help these cities investigate 
private-sector technology that will affect efforts to 
combat terrorism and neutralize biological and 
chemical attacks. These pilot sites will test hardware 
and organizational concepts that will provide 
the science and technology community with information 
on how to choose, deploy and manage 
these technologies. 

Executive session participants indicated 
that many local agencies are unaware of new technologies 
or do not have the funds to purchase, integrate 
and operate these systems. Planners must 
overcome obstacles such as cost and sustainability.99 
Prior to implementation, measurable objectives and 
plans for continuous evaluation also need to be 
set.100 The process should include integrating and 
sharing the lessons learned and best practices from 
other communities. Many local law enforcement 
executives encouraged DHS to aggressively compile 
promising practices and to offer training to localities 
on these technologies. 

Executive session participants briefly discussed 
the different types of technologies available, 
including the biodetection and biometric identification 
systems described below.101 Participants indicated 
that more technical assistance and education 
on these technologies is needed at the local level. 

Biodetection Systems 

Since the beginning of 2003, DHSs BioWatch102 
early-warning biodetection system has been operating 
in many cities. Specific city and site locations and 
other system details are not publicized to avoid 
compromising the system. This tool is used by 
public health agencies to notify first responders 
and citizens of the existence of harmful biological 
agents. BioWatch is based on the sample analysis 
technologies demonstrated successfully by the Biological 
Aerosol Sentry and Information System 
(BASIS) developed by Livermore and Los Alamos 


_______________________________________________________________________________________
98 At the time of this writing, more information on RTI can be found at http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/interapp/press_ 
release/press_release_0430.xml. 
99 For an overview of issues to consider in funding new technology, see Bartosh, Douglas. 2005. Ways to Fund Technology 
in Issues in IT: A Reader for the Busy Police Chief Executive. Ronald W. Glensor and Gerard R. Murphy (eds.) Washington, 
DC: Police Executive Research Forum. 
100 As part of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, Public Law 107-296, Congress enacted the SAFETY Act to provide risk 
management and litigation management protections for the sellers and others in the supply or distribution of qualified antiterrorism 
technologies. The Act is intended to encourage the development and deployment of anti-terrorism technologies 
that will substantially enhance the protection of the nation. A seller must formally apply to DHS for a potential anti-terrorism 
technology to be awarded SAFETY Act protections. DHS will perform a comprehensive evaluation to determine eligibility 
of SAFETY Act Designation or Certification. For more information see https://www.safetyact.gov/DHS/ 
SActHome.nsf/Main?OpenFrameset&67AB24. 
101 Describing the many federal efforts to leverage technology to facilitate information sharing and for myriad other uses 
are beyond the parameters of this paper, but those interested in learning more about the Science & Technology Directorates 
efforts should visit their website www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/interapp/editorial/editorial_0531.xml. 
102 DHSs BioWatch fact sheet can be found at https://www.bids.tswg.gov/hsarpa/bids.nsf/F32FE3B1449E699D 
85256DC70065EB27/$FILE/BioWatchFactSheetFINAL.pdf.



laboratories that were deployed at the 2002 Winter 
Olympic Games in Salt Lake City and other highprofile 
events.103 The BioWatch system detects 
trace elements of biochemical agents in the air that 
may be due to either intentional release or to small 
quantities in the environment. Air samples are 
routinely collecteddaily or as frequently as needed. 
However, executive session participants 
emphasized that BioWatch is only as good as the 
assays they use to detect the pathogens, and 
stressed the importance of working closely with 
experts at the state and local levels. DHS developed 
sampling devices that are placed in key locations 
nationwide. These devices are used in many 
of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Air 
Quality Monitoring Network sites in partnership 
with state and local environmental agencies.
 
The system assists public health experts in 
determining whether a biological agent has been 
released and in directing federal, state and local 
responses; medical care; and consequence management 
needs. DHS employs several federal response 
assets, such as the Strategic National Stockpile and 
the National Disaster Medical Systemwhich 
include mobile medical units, vaccines and other 
medicationsto support the public health infrastructure 
of an area with a positive detection. 
BioWatch is a partnership between local, state and 
federal agencies, and includes DHS, Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the EPA 
and the Livermore and Los Alamos national laboratories.
104 These laboratories provide technical 
expertise and training in biological detection to 
local and state agencies.
 
Biometric Identification System 

DHS, in a joint effort with the Department of Justice 
(DOJ), announced September 21, 2004, the 
integrated 10-print biometric identification technology 
that is operational in all U.S. Customs and 
Border Protection (CBP) Border Patrol stations 
throughout the country.105 This capability allows 
CBP Border Patrol agents to search the FBIs fingerprint 
database at the same time as DHS immigration 
status databases. The Integrated 
Automated Fingerprint Identification System 
(IAFIS) and DHSs Automated Biometric Identification 
System (IDENT) help identify individuals 
with criminal warrants by comparing electronic 
submissions of 10-print digital finger scans against 
a nationwide database of the fingerprints of individuals 
with outstanding criminal warrants. 

Other Technologies 

Countless other technologies are under consideration 
to compile data on suspected terrorists, highrisk 
sites, signs of bio-, chemical or nuclear activity 
and other information of interest to local law 
enforcement. Yet many local law enforcement 
agencies still lack the systems to share information 
even across jurisdictions or states. Obstacles 
remain on accessing many sources of information, 
maintaining the quality of the data and supporting 
the regional fusion centers that can make sense of 
the inputs to yield usable intelligence. Local, state 
and tribal law enforcement are increasingly looking 



____________________________________________________________________________________
103 More information on BASIS can be found at http://www.lanl.gov/worldview/news/pdf/TRCounterTerror_BASIS.pdf. 
104 More information on these laboratories can be found at http://www.universityofcalifornia.edu/labs/. And for more information 
on the Homeland Security Organization at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), see 
http://www.llnl.gov/hso/about.html. 
105 At this writing more information on the biometric identification system can be found at http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/
display?theme=43&content=4030.


 
to DHS for standards, grants, other resources and 
training, and new technologies to address these 
issues. 

CONCLUSION 

There is a critical need for local law enforcement 
agencies to analyze their information-sharing 
mechanisms to identify gaps, obstacles and redundancies, 
and to improve processes in working with 
their state, tribal and federal partners. Participants 
expressed concern that there are too many 
stovepipes for intelligence and too many databases 
and other sources that make it difficult to judge the 
credibility, relevancy and timeliness of information. 
While executive session attendees generally 
agreed that federal agencies have made significant 
progress in DHSs first year, there is still much to 
be done to improve coordination among federal 
agencies to produce actionable intelligence and to 
reduce overlapping jurisdiction. While some session 
participants acknowledged that there is some 
value to redundancy in checking the value and 
credibility of information before it is released, that 
value is lost when so much duplication leaves local 
law enforcement with a confusing series of alerts 
and advisories from multiple federal sources with 
varying views. Local law enforcement called for a 
single point of contact at the federal level for intelligence 
and information sharing. 

DHS efforts to use various means of communications 
ranging from email alerts to terrorist 
screening center feedback were applauded. Participants 
encouraged DHS to continue working with 
the other federal agencies to produce as much 
regional and threat-specific information as possible 
to better guide local initiatives. Information and 
intelligence must be packaged in ways that are useful 
to local law enforcement and better links street 
officers to the information sharing loops that 
should exist among all federal, state, tribal and 
local law enforcement. 

Local law enforcement wants information 
to flow from street officers to federal agencies and 
then down again. This is particularly important 
when there are new threat advisories. They also 
called for flexible protocols (what to donot how 
to do it) that would provide some guidance as to 
how agencies might deploy officers under various 
color alert changes or other heightened alerts. 
These protocols would allow local law enforcement 
agencies to have a better sense of how colleagues 
across their state and region are responding in 
terms of overtime, shift schedules, resource allocation 
and other key decisions. Consideration should 
also be paid to how alerts affect community fear 
levels and subsequent demands on law enforcement. 

Executive session participants also recommended 
that there be more education on the various 
available technologies and how they may 
be used. There was an emphasis on the need for 
dual-purpose solutions that could work effectively 
in a regional approach. The participants also 
stressed the advantages to building on existing 
structures and systems when possible, instead of 
creating more and more new ones. 

The challenges faced in creating interoperable, 
effective information systems and new technologies 
that will link law enforcement at all levels 
of government are formidable. Executive session 
participants, however, demonstrated a firm commitment 
to taking them on to reduce federal 
redundancies and to promote other measures that 
would facilitate effective information exchanges. 


CHAPTER SIX 

RECOMMENDATIONS 

One thing that has come of this session is that DHS and FBI 
must have a summit to clear up any confusion about our 
multiple sources of information and how we coordinate. 
Executive Assistant Director Charles Prouty, 
Law Enforcement Services, FBI


The recommendations that emerged from the fifth 
executive session reflect a theme that has run 
through every preceding white paper in this series 
on protecting our community from terrorism. It is 
simply this: Any advances in securing our nation 
from terrorism must build on the successes of 
community policing and embrace its underlying 
principles. Creating and sustaining partnerships 
with law enforcement agencies at all levels of government, 
with other disciplines and with the public 
is essential in all efforts to prevent, prepare and 
respond to terrorism. For more than 20 years, community 
policing has encouraged law enforcement 
agencies to form bonds of trust with its partners, to 
engage in problem solving, to address fear and 
community priorities and to think creatively about 
crime. Local, state, tribal and federal agencies are 
concerned that some policymakers have lost sight 
of how crime and terrorism connect and how community-
policing approaches can advance efforts to 
address both. 

DHS has engaged thousands of agencies to 
improve the preparedness and response to terrorist 
threats, and is continuing the vital task of clarifying 
each agencys role and responsibilities in 
homeland security. There is growing recognition 
that local law enforcement performs a critical function 
in counterterrorism and that community 
policing can promote effective prevention and 
response strategies. DHS has made tremendous 
progress in its first year, building a mammoth 
bureaucracy while developing immediately needed 
competencies, collaborations and structures. Still 
there is much work to be done, and local, state and 
tribal law enforcement must support the process. 
Law enforcement agencies will continue to work 
with DHS to assess and communicate their communities 
risks and vulnerabilities to a terrorist 
attack. They must clearly convey their information 
and intelligence needs, their funding problems and 
other issues. And just as it took time to develop 
contacts within FBI field offices and JTTFs, local 
jurisdictions need to work with DHS and other 
federal agencies to ensure that regional efforts are 
coordinated. Together law enforcement at all levels 
must identify priorities for prevention, preparedness 
and response that recognize that local police cannot 
abandon their traditional crime problems. A 
comprehensive and cooperative strategy is essential 
to addressing the responsibilities and resource 



allocations that DHS and law enforcement agencies 
must determine. The executive session participants 
concluded that coordinated regional approaches 
that build on best practices and that are based on 
the competencies each agency has to offer is vital. 

The participants at the executive session 
provided many suggestions on how DHS and other 
federal, tribal, state and local agencies can 
strengthen their working relationships to secure 
communities across the nation. Highlights of 
these recommendations include the following: 

DHS Component Agencies 
Missions and Responsibilities 

. DHS must continue to build on the significant 
progress made in its first year by aggressively marketing 
its capabilities and resources to all local, 
state and tribal law enforcement agencies, regardless 
of jurisdiction size or threat level. 

. DHS must continue work with other federal 
agencies to identify and reduce redundancies in 
resources, services and programs, particularly 
where agencies have been granted concurrent jurisdiction 
by Congress. Federal agencies with overlapping 
jurisdiction, especially in intelligence, should 
hold a summit to more clearly define their roles, 
reduce overlapping efforts and determine the best 
way to connect with local, state and tribal law 
enforcement. 

. DHS, in its work with state and local law 
enforcement, must recognize the connection 
between traditional crimes and terrorism. Initiatives 
should reflect that local law enforcements 
criminal intelligence/information collection efforts, 
training, equipment and many other functions 
work to address both terrorism and traditional 
crime. Accordingly DHS should share information 
and support traditional local law enforcement 
efforts that also benefit counterterrorism. DHS 
should provide grant support for law enforcement 
efforts to combat serious crimes that destabilize 
U.S. communities (e.g., serial shootings) or help 
support terrorist acts (e.g., money laundering, 
identity theft). 

. Participants recommend that DHS create a 
regional structure that would improve coordination 
with state and local law enforcement 
resources. These regions should be consistent with 
the regional efforts by other federal agencies to 
address terrorism and support existing task forces.
 
. Session participants called for DHS to redouble 
its efforts to assemble and disseminate best 
practices from across the nation. After-action 
reports from other jurisdictions, promising 
approaches for infrastructure protection, strategic 
planning and any number of protocols were also 
requested with constant updates. 

State and Local Homeland Security 
Structures and Functions 

. Each state and many local jurisdictions have 
some type of a homeland security office, director or 
function. DHS should provide guidance to state 
and local homeland security offices by collecting 
and sharing promising models and approaches for 
developing and implementing homeland security 
plans. These models should reflect a coordinated 
and regional structure that recognizes the unique 
responsibilities of local law enforcement as the primary 
prevention coordinators and information collectors 
at the community level.


 
. Executive session participants urged DHS and 
states to promote an all hazards approach to preparedness 
and response for a broad range of critical 
incidents that includes terrorism, natural disasters 
and serious crime issues. 

. State and local homeland security officials 
must work with local law enforcement agencies to 
help them meet homeland security demands and 
local crime problems. Funding for overtime and 
additional officers can alleviate some of the strain 
of responding to both demands. Problems with 
meeting these responsibilities must continue to be 
communicated to DHS. 

. State homeland security authorities should 
continue to foster strong relationships with local 
law enforcement leaders to ensure they have a 
voice in public safety plans, resource allocation and 
other aspects of homeland security strategies. 
Building Capacities for Homeland Security 
through Partnerships 

. Local law enforcement should use communitypolicing 
principles to help them meet the demands 
of homeland security. Forging partnerships with 
other emergency-service disciplines, working with 
neighboring law enforcement agencies, reducing 
fear, educating citizens about emergency preparedness 
and strengthening relationships with minority 
populations are all strategies of community 
policing that can help fulfill homeland security 
challenges. 

. Local law enforcement agencies must work with 
emergency service providers, such as fire, emergency 
management and public health, to build multidisciplinary 
teams capable of preparing for and responding 
to a multitude of terrorist incidents. 

. Local law enforcement agencies must work 
with neighboring jurisdictions to build regional 
capacities capable of preparing for and responding 
to a multitude of terrorist incidents. This includes 
developing mutual aid agreements and joint policies, 
procedures, plans and training. 

. Local law enforcement agencies must develop 
relationships with private sector interests to develop 
a comprehensive program to protect critical 
infrastructure and to prepare for and respond to 
terrorist incidents. Information sharing with the 
private sector and the use of private sector databases 
must consider privacy issues and include a 
public education effort that will clearly communicate 
how the information will be used, the limitations 
on its use and any impact on civil liberties. 

. Local agencies should continue to develop 
partnerships with and training for business leaders, 
facility owners and building staff (maintenance, 
doormen, front desk personnel), including 
residential complexes to support counterterrorism 
work. The partnerships could include target hardening 
through environmental design and other 
guidance and response procedures for building staff 
to handle suspicious people and packages. 

. Transportation security protocols should be 
applied to rail and bus systems, ports and cargo 
protection. Rail and bus transit systems often cross 
jurisdictional and state lines and present special 
challenges in coordinating protection and response 
efforts. Participants stressed the need for greater 
security measures, multidisciplinary exercises and 
training, funding and technology resources to better 
safeguard these systems.



. Local law enforcement agencies with military 
bases or facilities in their jurisdiction should develop 
partnerships with these resources for protecting 
critical infrastructure (both technology/equipment 
and personnel). In addition, local agencies should 
try to ascertain when, and to what extent, military 
resources can be used to support civil responses to 
critical incidents. 

. Local agencies should work with military commands 
to develop protocols for re-integrating 
police personnel returning from active duty, as well 
as for supporting their families during call-ups. 

. Law enforcement at all levels should support 
efforts to address legal issues that hinder coordination 
and limit tribal enforcement authority to carry 
out counterterrorism duties. Tribal law enforcement 
is essential to the protection of more than 
250 miles of borders. Obstacles to tribal law 
enforcement accessing NCIC and other basic services 
or resources also must be addressed. 
Engaging the Community in Homeland 
Security 

. Local law enforcement should remain committed 
to using a problem-solving approach to both 
crime and terrorism that builds on successful partnerships 
with citizens. Community partnerships 
and volunteers, including neighborhood watch, 
retired military and law enforcement personnel, 
Volunteers in Police Service members, police auxiliaries, 
and other individuals can provide valuable 
assistance in homeland security initiatives. 

. Police should engage in community education 
and awareness programs to discuss law enforcement 
initiatives to prevent terrorist incidents. This 
could include discussing what suspicious activity 
looks like, suspicious packages on mass transit 
systems, police information-gathering and intelligence 
procedures and more. 

. Law enforcement should share best practices 
on investigatory stops, engaging the community 
when threat levels rise, protocols on what community 
members should report to police and how that 
information is handled, employing 911 or alternative 
systems and more. 

. Federal partners should work closely with local 
agencies when conducting interviews of members 
of their community or investigating within their 
jurisdiction. 

. DHS should continue to develop the Citizen 
Corps and Community Emergency Response 
Teams to increase volunteer involvement in preparedness 
and response efforts, including their 
inclusion in some training and practice exercises. 
Law Enforcement Role and Responsibilities 

. Local law enforcement participants stressed 
that a national response to terrorism must consider 
local law enforcement a full partner in homeland 
security work, particularly given the networks they 
have established through community policing. They 
would also like more support for their unique role 
among first responders in prevention work through 
information collection and target security. 

. Adequate direct federal funding to local law 
enforcement should be considered, which has been 
reduced over several years, for traditional law 
enforcement personnel and services that not only 
advances crime-fighting efforts, but also furthers 
counterterrorism work. 



. DHS, the FBI and other federal agencies must 
work with state and local law enforcement to support 
and train street-level officers to gather information 
and detect suspicious activity. Officers need 
further insights into terrorists goals and methods, as 
well as the indicators of potential terrorist activities. 

. Local agencies must take appropriate steps to 
prepare and assign personnel to handle homeland 
security functionsor to enter into agreements 
with area agencies and others who may be able to 
provide needed supportwhile continuing to handle 
regular demands for service. 

. State and local agencies should have a 
response plan to address any officer fatigue issues, 
overtime concerns and limited resources, particularly 
when the threat level rises or in response to a 
terrorist incident. 

. Local law enforcement stressed that national 
response plans must consider designating a single 
federal coordinator to oversee all federal agencies 
during preparedness efforts and responses to critical 
incidents. 
DHS Resources and Training 

. DHS should educate state and local law 
enforcement about National Special Security Events 
(NSSEs), including criteria for NSSE designation, 
and the roles and responsibilities of participating 
agencies. 

. DHS should provide law enforcement with 
additional technical assistance and guidance for 
implementing the National Incident Management 
System (NIMS). The National Integration 
Center should provide clear direction for local law 
enforcement as well as answers to ongoing implementation 
questions. 

. DHS should solicit law enforcement guidance 
when making decisions about training programs. 
There must be an ongoing analysis of training 
needs to identify gaps and redundancies. Consideration 
should be given to problems in covering 
travel or other costs associated with sending personnel 
to training and to assess effectiveness. 
Ongoing needs assessments must be made for 
local law enforcement-specific resources and 
equipment shortages, as well. 

. Local law enforcement needs training at all 
levelsfrom line officers to command-level to the 
chief executive level. Training should address 
street-level indicators of terrorism, the nexus 
between traditional crime and terrorism, information 
analysis, targeting and profiling issues, 
privacy concerns and other important concepts. 

. DHS and local agencies must work together 
to improve awareness of DHS training resources 
and opportunities. DHS should better promote its 
training programs, and local agencies should regularly 
browse the DHS website and the Counter- 
Terrorism Training and Resources for Law 
Enforcement website to find needed training and 
related material for their jurisdiction. 

. Participants encouraged DHS to make use of 
existing training facilities and programs, such as 
the Regional Community Policing Institutes 
(RCPIs). The RCPIs and other regional facilities 
can be used to deliver programs and identify 
experts to institute standards and evaluations for 
training.



. DHS and law enforcement must work together 
to foster a greater dual use orientation for training. 
Grant Programs 

. DHS must continue to work with state and 
local governments as well as Congress to rectify 
obstacles to the quick, effective and flexible use of 
homeland security grants. 

. Participants agreed that funds should be distributed 
based on a national strategy of shared 
responsibility, accountability and leadership. The 
grants should emphasize the need for coordinated 
regional systems and address law enforcements 
greatest needs. 

. DHS should continue to work on improving 
electronic grant filings; working with other federal 
partners to develop standards for equipment, training 
and technology purchased with grants; and providing 
technical assistance for strategic plans. 

. Local law enforcement encouraged lawmakers 
and federal grants administrators to remain cognizant 
of law enforcements unique responsibilities 
for security and prevention that increase workload 
demands, particularly during elevated threat levels 
or large-scale community events. 

. State agencies must work with localities to 
improve strategies for developing plans and distributing 
funding to local agencies. Both state and 
local governments must be prepared to make 
changes in appropriations and procurement laws. 

. DHS should place a greater emphasis on an 
all-hazards and all-crimes approach for funding, 
including greater focus on dual use, and flexibility 
for spending for counterterrorism efforts that 
include handling local crime issues that affect 
public safety. 

. Local agencies should consider seeking support 
from other sources including the private sector, 
local foundations and surplus programs for homeland 
security needs. 

Information Sharing and Alert 
Systems 

. Session participants called for a summit for 
DHS, FBI and other intelligence producers and 
consumers to more clearly define roles in information 
collection, sharing, analysis and dissemination, 
including eliminating federal redundancies 
and obstacles to sharing.
 
. Though ideally local law enforcement agencies 
would like DOJ and DHS to designate a single federal 
contact for receiving information from and 
disseminating intelligence to local law enforcement, 
they understand the realities of the federal 
structure. At minimum, closer coordination 
among the federal agencies would improve the consistency 
and timeliness of information they 
receive, which would increase their confidence in 
the product. 

. DHS must cultivate relationships and build 
trust with state and local law enforcement agencies 
that have a long history of working with the FBI 
and other DOJ resources. 

. Local law enforcement recommends an allcrimes 
approach to intelligence and information 
sharingan approach that considers domestic and 
international terrorists, criminal activity that may 
be used to support or finance terrorism efforts, as



well as any other crimes and disturbances that 
threaten communities. 

. Federal officials must work with local law 
enforcement to more fully engage street-level officers 
as partners in the information-gathering and 
intelligence-generating functions. Street officers 
are uniquely positioned to interact with suspected 
terrorists or to gain information of value to intelligence 
analysts. Officers value can be increased if 
they have a better understanding of indicators of 
terrorist activity. 

. To promote compatibility and interoperability, 
federal agencies, to the extent possible, should 
build on existing networks, databases and systems. 

. Federal, state and local law enforcement must 
ensure that any information sharing initiatives 
fully consider the civil rights and privacy issues of 
citizens. A public education effort should precede 
and continue after the launch of new systems that 
are used to collect, store and disseminate information 
on individuals gathered to further public safety 
initiatives. 

. Participants urged DHS to widely disseminate 
the evaluation of the Homeland Security Information 
Network-Critical Infrastructure Pilot Program 
to determine whether it is suitable for replication 
in other areas to facilitate coordination among the 
public and private sector. 
Alert Systems 

. DHS must continue work on the Homeland 
Security Advisory System to quickly identify 
regions and/or industry sectors at greater risk; to 
provide an explanation and specific information or 
criteria for a change in the threat level; and to 
share exemplary practices used by law enforcement 
in response to various threat levels. 

. Local, state and tribal agencies in jurisdictions 
with their own citywide or statewide system 
should ensure there is compatibility with the 
national system. 

. Federal agencies should include in alerts a 
clear, single point of contact if local, state or tribal 
law enforcement have additional information 
related to the warnings. 

. Threat or warning information communicated 
to citizens should consider the potential effects on 
community reactions and the subsequent effect on 
state and local law enforcement agencies, including 
public education and community preparedness. 

. DHS and DOJ must develop clear protocols for 
communicating threat information with law 
enforcement and political authorities. Information 
releases should follow those protocols and should 
be coordinated through JTTFs or other established, 
immediate communication systems. 
Technologies 

. DHS should work with local, state and tribal 
agencies to increase their awareness of the availability, 
capabilities and funding options for new 
technologies, especially regarding interoperability, 
biodetection and biometric identification systems. 

. DHS should work with local and state agencies 
to identify existing technologies that can be 
enhanced or adapted for homeland security needs. 
DHS should solicit suggestions for new applications, 
and how to address funding and sustainability 
concerns.



CONCLUSION 
The executive session was marked by a strong 
commitment to work together to solve complex 
problems and organizational issues. One recommendation 
was that working groups should be 
formed to resolve each of the more complicated 
issues participants raised. Though DHS made significant 
progress in its first year, and in many ways 
the challenges were unprecedented, the agency is 
committed to long-term improvements that meet 
the needs of law enforcement at all levels. Participants 
at the executive session recognized that like 
any new major corporation there will be inevitable 
growing pains and hurdles that must be navigated 
together. 

Some of the remaining challenges will be 
addressed with time, collaborative efforts and the 
implementation of best practices. Others will 
require major changes in jurisdiction, organizational 
structure and ways of thinking about what 
constitutes a secure homeland. Many of these 
reforms can build on the success of community 
policinginnovative partnerships, problem solving 
and community involvement. Local law 
enforcement is uniquely positioned to detect and 
address possible terrorist threats, but cannot do so 
in a vacuum. They are looking to federal agencies 
for a coordinated approach to information sharing, 
intelligence dissemination, support and assistance. 
As roles are more clearly defined, it will become 
apparent that limited resources must address both 
traditional crimes and terrorism. 

Though participants placed a high premium 
on new technologies, grants and training 
opportunities, the greatest hope for advancement 
was premised on better communications, trust and 
respectful collaborations. Many participants indicated 
that this series of executive sessions provided 
some of the first opportunities for key players to 
openly discuss and propose changes based on recommendations 
for addressing homeland security 
issues. Local, state, tribal and federal agencies, 
including DHS representatives, challenged one 
another to continue these or similar forums to discuss 
homeland security issues and take on the 
tough issues that thwart effective, integrated 
efforts. They also challenged their colleagues to 
conduct the same types of forums at the local or 
regional level to confront turf issues, delineate 
roles and responsibilities and to ensure that limited 
resources are being used to their fullest to serve 
all our communities. 

In the final analysis, the events that 
prompted the development of DHS have created an 
urgent need for a sustainable partnership among 
local, state, tribal and federal law enforcement 
agencies to focus all of our energies and abilities on 
preventing the next terrorist incident. It is our 
hope that this publication advances those efforts.


APPENDIX A

Participants and Observers

Participants106

Assistant Secretary Parney Albright
Directorate of Science and Technology
Department of Homeland Security
Washington, DC

Executive Assistant Director
Maureen BaginskiOffice of Intelligence
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, DC

Associate Chief Todd Birdsong
United States Border Patrol
Department of Homeland Security
Washington, DC

Director General Matthew Broderick
Homeland Security Operations Center
Department of Homeland Security
Washington, DC

Chief Security Officer Douglas Callen
Transportation Security Administration
Department of Homeland Security

Chief of Staff John Chase
Information Analysis and Infrastructure
Protection
Department of Homeland Security
Washington, DC

Chief Gustavo De La Vina
United States Border Patrol
Department of Homeland Security
Washington, DC

Chief Charlie T. Deane
Prince William County Police Department
Prince William, VA

Acting Chief Suzanne Devlin
Fairfax County Police Department
Fairfax, VA

Director Joshua Filler
Office of State and Local Government
Coordination and Preparedness
Department of Homeland Security
Washington, DC

Secretary Edward A. Flynn
Executive Office of Public Safety
Commonwealth of Massachusetts
Boston, MA

Deputy Assistant to the Governor
George Foresman
Office of Commonwealth Preparedness
Office of Governor Mark Warner
Richmond, VA

Chief Terrance Gainer
U.S. Capitol Police
Washington, DC

Assistant Secretary Michael Garcia
Immigration and Customs Enforcement
Department of Homeland Security
Washington, DC

Chief Polly Hanson
Metro Transit Police Department
Washington, DC


__________________________________________________________________________
106Participants ranks and agency affiliations are listed as of the time of the executive session



Director Rear Admiral Jeffrey Hathaway
United States Coast Guard,Operations Center
Department of Homeland Security
Washington, DC

Program Manager Wendy Howe
Directorate of Science and Technology
Department of Homeland Security
Washington, DC

Assistant Secretary General
Patrick Hughes
Information Analysis
Department of Homeland Security
Washington, DC

Undersecretary Asa Hutchinson
Border and Transportation Security
Department of Homeland Security
Washington, DC

Director Ronald Iden
Office of Homeland Security
Office of Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger
Sacramento, CA

Deputy Assistant Director Paul Kilcoyne
Immigration and Customs Enforcement
Department of Homeland Security
Washington, DC

Assistant Secretary Robert Liscouski
Infrastructure Protection
Department of Homeland Security
Washington, DC

Branch Chief Michael Lowder
Federal Emergency Management Agency
Department of Homeland Security
Washington, DC

Chief Noel March
University of Maine
Orono, ME

Director Maureen McCarthy
Office of Research and Development
Department of Homeland Security
Washington, DC

Chief Thomas D. McCarthy
Fayetteville Police Department
Fayetteville, NC

Deputy Assistant Director
E. James McDermond
United States Secret Service
Department of Homeland Security
Washington, DC

Director James W. McMahon
New York State Office of Public Security
Albany,NY

Chief Bernard Melekian
Pasadena Police Department
Pasadena, CA

Director Sue Mencer
Office of Domestic Preparedness
Department of Homeland Security
Washington, DC

Bureau Chief John Miller
Counter-Terrorism and Criminal Intelligence Bureau
Los Angeles Police Department
Los Angeles, CA

Director Gerard Murphy
Homeland Security and Technology Division
National Governors Association
Washington, DC

Chief Richard Myers
Appleton Police Department
Appleton, WI

Director Frank F. Navarrete
Arizona Office of Homeland Security
Arizona Division of Emergency Management
Phoenix, AZ



Liasion to the FBI William Parrish
Department of Homeland Security
Washington, DC

Director Carl Peed
Office of Community Oriented Policing Services
U.S. Department of Justice
Washington, DC

Executive Assistant Director John Pistole
Counterterrorism and Counterintelligence Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, DC

Executive Assistant Director
Charles Prouty
Law Enforcement Services
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, DC

Director Louis Quijas
Office of Law Enforcement Coordination
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, DC

Chief Charles Ramsey
Metropolitan Police Department
Washington, DC

Chief Edward Reina
Yavapai-Prescott Tribal Police
Prescott, AZ

Deputy Director Richard Russell
Homeland Security Operations Center
Department of Homeland Security
Washington, DC

SAC Chris Swecker
FBI Charlotte Field Office
Charlotte, NC

SAC Charlene Thorton
FBI Phoenix Field Office
Phoenix, AZ

Chief John Timoney
Miami Police Department
Miami, FL

Deputy Assistant Director
James Tomsheck
United States Secret Service
Department of Homeland Security
Washington, DC

Assistant Chief Deirdre Walker
Montgomery County Police Department
Rockville, MD

Lieutenant Colonel Gregory Willeford
Oregon State Police
Salem, OR

Observers107

Director of Research Rob Davis
Police Foundation 
Washington, DC

Liaison to Bureau of Transportation and
Security Anneva DeConto
State and Local Government Coordination
Department of Homeland Security
Washington, DC

Senior Advisor for Law Enforcement
Steven Edwards
Bureau of Justice Assistance
U.S. Department of Justice
Washington, DC

Associate Deputy Director Eileen Garry
Bureau of Justice Assistance
U.S. Department of Justice
Washington, DC

Dean Jack Greene
College of Criminal Justice
Northeastern University
Boston, MA


___________________________________________________________________________
107 Observers ranks and agency affiliations are listed as of the time of the executive session.



Lieutenant Colonel Bart Johnson
New York State Police
Office of Counter Terrorism
Albany, NY

Professor David Klinger
Department of Criminology and Criminal Justice
University of Missouri-St. Louis
St. Louis, MO

Professor Gary LaFree
Department of Criminology and Criminal Justice
University of Maryland
College Park, MD

Director Steve Mastrofski
Department of Justice
George Mason University
Manassas, VA

Senior Social Science Analyst
Lois Felson Mock
National Institute of Justice
Washington, DC

Senior Law Enforcement Coordinator
Ron Parthemore
Office of State and Local Government
Coordination
Department of Homeland Security
Washington, DC

Senior Research Associate Tony Pate
COSMOS Corporation
Bethesda, MD

Director Steve Rickman
Homeland Security
CNA Corporation
Alexandria, VA

Senior Information Technology Specialist
Clark Smith
U.S. Department of Justice
Washington, DC

Senior Fellow Chips Stewart
Domestic Safety
CNA Corporation
Alexandria, VA

Special Assistant to the Assistant Director
Kathleen Timmons
Federal Bureau of Investigations
Washington, DC



Office of Community Oriented Policing 
Services Staff 
1100 Vermont Avenue, NW 
Washington, DC 20530 
Phone: 1-800-421-6770 
Fax: 202-616-2914 
Website: www.cops.usdoj.gov 

Carl Peed 
Director 

David H. Andelman 
Management Analyst 

Karl Bickel 
Senior Policy Analyst 

Michael Dillon 
Grant Monitoring Specialist 

Ward Knowles 
Management Analyst 

Frank Mathers 
Grant Monitoring Specialist 

Katherine McQuay 
Senior Project Manager 

Amy Schapiro 
Senior Social Science Analyst 

Michael Seelman 
Senior Social Science Analyst 


Police Executive Research Forum Staff 
1120 Connecticut Avenue, NW, Suite 930 
Washington, DC 20036 
Phone: 202-466-7820 
Fax: 202-466-7826 
Website: www.policeforum.org 

Chuck Wexler 
Executive Director 

Anna Berke 
Conference Coordinator 

Corina Sol Brito 
Research Associate 

Heather Davies 
Research Associate 

Joshua Ederheimer 
Senior Research Associate 

Don Faggiani 
Senior Research Associate 

Lorie Fridell 
Director of Research 

Alex Hayes 
Research Assistant 

Clifford Karchmer 
Director of Program Development 

Steve Loyka 
Research and Legislative Assistant 

Stacy Osnick Milligan 
Research Associate 

Martha Plotkin 
Communications Director 

Melissa Reuland 
Senior Research Associate



APPENDIX B 
ABOUT THE AUTHORS108 


Heather J. Davies, Ph.D. 
Research Associate 
Police Executive Research Forum 

Davies is responsible for managing national-level 
research and policy development projects. She is 
the project director of the white paper series, Protecting 
Your Community from Terrorism: Strategies 
for Local Law Enforcement, and the project on 
Community Policing in a Security-Conscious 
World. Davies is lead author of the second white 
paper in this series, Working with Diverse Communities, 
and co-author of the third white paper, 
Preparing for and Responding to Bioterrorism. She 
is one of PERFs representatives for several terrorism 
research working groups. Davies was also the 
project coordinator and contributing author of the 
Bureau of Justice Assistance-funded project, Managing 
Multijurisdictional Cases: Lessons Learned 
from the Sniper Investigation. 

Prior to joining PERF, Davies was a senior 
research associate with the American Bar Associations 
Center on Children and the Law and the 
Criminal Justice Section. She was the principal 
investigator on a project evaluating parental 
involvement practices of juvenile courts, and one 
on improving legal and judicial responses to 
parental kidnapping. Davies assisted in the analysis 
of legal services provided by the District of 
Columbias Office of Corporation Counsel to the 
Child and Family Services Agency. In addition, she 
served as the project associate on such studies as 
the implementation of the Michigan Lawyer- 
Guardian Ad Litem Statute, a national assessment 
of law enforcement and community partnerships 
for helping children exposed to domestic violence, 
and an evaluation of domestic violence no-drop 
policies. Davies is the co-author of a National Center 
for Missing and Exploited Children monograph, 
Child Pornography: The Criminal Justice 
Response. Davies holds a bachelors degree in 
sociology from Virginia Tech, and a masters 
degree and a Ph.D. in justice, law and society from 
American University. Her dissertation addressed 
Understanding Variations in Murder Clearance 
Rates: The Influence of the Political Environment. 

Martha Plotkin, J.D. 
Director of Communications and Legislative 
Affairs 
Police Executive Research Forum 

Plotkin directs PERFs publications, media and legislative 
programs. She has had extensive experience 
researching and writing on law enforcement 
matters, as well as defining and implementing a 
national policy and legislative agenda for police 
professionals. She regularly has provided information 
to congressional leaders and the national 
media on matters of public safety. Plotkin has edited 
more than 50 publications in her tenure and 
has written myriad op-ed articles, briefings and 
testimonies on issues ranging from gun safety to 
funding police services. She is the co-author of the 


_______________________________________________________________________________
108 The authors and contributing authors titles and agency affiliations are as of the time of the executive session.


 
first volume in this series, Local-Federal Partnerships. 
Her other work includes being the author of 
A Time for Dignity and other articles and training 
materials on the police response to elder abuse. 
She is also the co-author of Police and the Homeless: 
A Status Report and the editor of Under Fire: 
Gun Buy-Backs, Exchanges and Amnesty Programs. 
Plotkin was also a contributing author of the 
publication Managing Multijurisdictional Cases: 
Lessons Learned from the Sniper Investigation. 

An attorney, she also works on amicus 
briefs and other legal issues affecting police agencies. 
Plotkin has managed and continues to contribute to 
research projects on homeland security issues and 
the police response to special populations and victims. 
She completed the legal studies program at 
Brandeis University where she received her bachelors 
degree in psychology. She earned her law degree 
from The George Washington University Law 
School.


APPENDIX C 
CONTRIBUTING AUTHORS 

 
Joshua Filler 
Director of the Office of State and Local 
Government Coordination 
Department of Homeland Security 

Filler is the primary point of contact for state, local 
and tribal homeland security leaders and is responsible 
for coordinating the programs and policies of 
DHS as they relate to state, tribal and local governments 
including funding issues, information sharing 
and incident management. As such, he works regularly 
with other senior DHS officials on a wide variety 
of topics including intelligence matters, grants, 
national preparedness, and antiterrorism operations 
within the United States and its territories. 

Prior to joining DHS, he was director of 
local affairs for the White House Office of Homeland 
Security. As director of local affairs, Filler was 
responsible for coordinating with local governments 
around the country on homeland security 
matters. This included information sharing, incident 
management and response, as well as legislative 
and budget issues.
 
Before joining the White House, he served 
in the Cabinet of Mayor Rudolph Giuliani in New 
York as director of legislative affairs for the Mayor 
and chief of staff to the deputy mayor for operations. 
There he coordinated the citys operational 
agencies and all legislative and oversight issues for 
the city administration, including the NYPD, 
FDNY and the public health agencies. After September 
11, he was responsible for emergency operational 
issues and managing contacts with local, 
state and federal officials on behalf of New York 
City in connection with the attack on the World 
Trade Center. 

Prior to his government service Filler was 
an attorney in private practice in New York. He 
graduated from Boston University with a B.A. in 
political science. He received his law degree from 
St. Johns University School of Law. 


Edward A. Flynn 
Secretary of Public Safety 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts Secretary of 
Public Safety 

Secretary Flynn was appointed Secretary of Public 
Safety by Governor Mitt Romney in January 2003. 
He is responsible for the management and administration 
of a variety of public safety agencies, boards 
and commissions including the Massachusetts State 
Police, the Department of Corrections, the National 
Guard, the Department of Fire Services and the 
Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency. 
The Executive Office is also responsible for homeland 
security in the Commonwealth. The Executive 
Office of Public Safety has a budget totaling $1 billion, 
and employs more than 10,000 people. 

Prior to his appointment as secretary of 
public safety, he served for five years as the chief of 
police in Arlington County, Virginia. In his capacity 
as chief, Flynn was instrumental in the recovery 
effort at the Pentagon after the September 11 
terrorist attack, and in 2002, he participated in the 
sniper-shootings investigation in the Washington, 
D.C. area. 


 
His early career was spent in the Jersey City 
Police Department, where he served for 15 years, rising 
to the rank of inspector. He has been the chief of 
police in Braintree, Massachusetts, where he was 
credited with modernizing the department. He subsequently 
became chief of police in Chelsea, Massachusetts, 
where he helped lead the city out of 
state-imposed receivership to designation as an All 
American City. 

Flynn is a past recipient of the prestigious 
Gary P. Hayes Memorial Award for Police Leadership 
from the Police Executive Research Forum. He is on 
the board of directors of the national bipartisan anticrime 
organization Fight Crime: Invest in Kids. 

He holds a B.A. in history from LaSalle 
University in Philadelphia, a masters degree in 
criminal justice from John Jay College of Criminal 
Justice in New York and completed all course work 
in the Ph.D. program in criminal justice from the 
City University in New York. He is a graduate of 
the FBI National Academy, the National Executive 
Institute and was a National Institute of Justice 
Pickett Fellow at Harvards Kennedy School of 
Government. 


George Foresman 
Assistant to the Governor for Commonwealth 
Preparedness 
Commonwealth of Virginia 

George W. Foresman serves Virginias citizens and 
Governor Mark R. Warner as Assistant to the Governor 
for Commonwealth Preparedness, a Cabinet-level 
position. In this capacity he is the principal advisor 
and overall coordinator for homeland security, preparedness, 
and relations with military commands and 
installations throughout Virginia. Foresman chairs the 
Secure Commonwealth Panel and leads the Governors 
related initiative responsible for strengthening 
Virginias security and preparedness for emergencies 
and disasters of all kinds, including terrorism. 
He serves as Virginias principal liaison with 
the White House, Congress, U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security, and other federal entities to 
coordinate homeland security policy and programs 
as well as obtaining resources. 

Maintaining a productive relationship 
with the Department of Defense and Armed Services 
remains a priority for Governor Warner. 
Foresman serves as the Governors direct Cabinet-
level liaison with top defense and military 
officials, commands and installations. He is the 
vice-chair of the Virginia Military Advisory 
Council that serves to foster civil-military communication 
and pro-military policies across Virginia. 
Foresman also provides oversight of the 
Commonwealths activities relative to federal 
base realignment and closure process. 

He is a nationally recognized expert on 
emergency preparedness and homeland security, 
and was a member and vice-chair of the Advisory 
Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities 
Involving Terrorism, established by 
Congress in 1998 to evaluate Americas readiness 
for terrorism. The Panel delivered five 
annual reports to the Congress and President 
before completing its work in December 2003. 
More than 125 of the Panels 144 recommendations 
have been adopted in part or whole. He frequently 
is solicited for consultation on national 
policy issues. 

A native of Lexington, Virginia, Foresman 
joined state government in 1985. He possesses 
more than 20 years of experience in 
emergency management, law enforcement, fire 
and emergency medical service organizations 
ranging from operations to executive-level


leadership. He is a graduate of the Virginia Military 
Institute as well as the Virginia Executive 
Institute. 


Jacqueline Litzinger 
Commander of Infrastructure Protection 
CSX Transportation 

Litzinger has 24 years experience in law enforcement, 
having held positions in both the public and 
private sectors. Her experiences include positions 
held in the Baltimore City Police Department, the 
University of Arizona Police Department (nationally 
accredited) and CSX Transportation Police 
Department. Litzinger holds a Florida Law 
Enforcement Certification. She has previously held 
law enforcement certifications in both Maryland 
and Arizona. 

Litzinger has been with CSX Transportation 
since 1994. She is responsible for the security 
planning, deterrence and mitigation of terrorist 
threats and other hazards affecting CSX Transportation. 
Litzingers former position with CSX 
involved the supervision of railroad police special 
agents in the Jacksonville Division, whose jurisdiction 
included the States of Florida, Alabama, 
Louisiana and Mississippi. She participates in various 
law enforcement networks such as serving on 
the Executive Security Committee of JAXPORT 
and the Northeast Florida Domestic Security Task 
Force. 

Litzinger earned a master of science degree 
in management with a concentration in community 
development from the Johns Hopkins University 
at Baltimore. She is a graduate of the Police 
Executive Leadership Program at Johns Hopkins 
University. Her undergraduate degree is a bachelor 
of science in public administration from the University 
of Arizona. 


Chief Thomas D. McCarthy 
Fayetteville Police Department 

Chief McCarthy began his policing career in the 
1970s with the Newport News (VA) Police Department. 
During his tenure in Newport News he had 
the good fortune of working with Chief Darrel 
Stephens and the Police Executive Research Forum 
with one of the initial problem-oriented policing 
projects. While there, he attained the position of 
commander, leaving in 1987 to become the police 
chief of the Gaston County (NC) Police Department. 
He left in 1993 to become the Fort Lauderdale 
police chief. In 1994, at the request of the 
Gaston County Manager, he returned to Gaston 
County to become the deputy county manager and 
police chief. In 2001, he was selected as police 
chief in Fayetteville, North Carolina. 

McCarthy has a B.A. in education from 
Southwestern College in Kansas, and a masters 
degree in public administration from the University 
of North Carolina at Charlotte. He is a graduate 
of the 145th Session of the FBI National Academy 
and the 25th Session of the FBI LEEDS program. 
He is also a veteran of the United States Coast 
Guard. He has served as an adjunct faculty member 
at Thomas Nelson Community College, Methodist 
College and the University of North Carolina at 
Charlotte. At this writing, he is an adjunct professor 
at the University of North Carolina at Pembrokes 
Master of Public Administration Program. 


Jane Wiseman 
Assistant Secretary 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts Executive 
Office of Pubic Safety 

Wiseman is responsible for overseeing $100 million 
in federal and state grant funds for public safety 
and homeland security in Massachusetts. In this 



position, she oversees grant making for programs 
funded by the Massachusetts state legislature, the 
U.S. Justice Department Office of Justice Programs, 
the Office of Domestic Preparedness, the Department 
of Education and the National Highway Traffic 
Safety Administration. She previously served in 
management consulting with Accenture. During 
her first year at the Executive Office of Public Safety, 
Wiseman initiated electronic grant making and 
has automated several components of the back-end 
processing of grants. Her previous experience 
includes nearly five years at the United States 
Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice. 
During that time she worked for one budget 
season, on detail from the Justice Department for 
the U.S. House of Representatives Appropriations 
Committee, Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, 
State and Related Agencies. She has also served in 
the U.S. Office of Management and Budget. Wiseman 
holds a bachelors degree in government from 
Smith College and a master of public policy degree 
from the John F. Kennedy School of Government at 
Harvard University. 


APPENDIX D 
ABOUT THE OFFICE OF COMMUNITY 
ORIENTED POLICING SERVICES (COPS), 
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 

THE OFFICE OF COMMUNITY ORIENTED POLICING SERVICES (COPS) WAS 
created in 1994 and has the unique mission to directly serve the needs 
of state and local law enforcement. The COPS Office has been the driving 
force in advancing the concept of community policing, and is responsible for 
one of the greatest infusions of resources into state, local, and tribal law enforcement 
in our nations history.

Since 1994, COPS has invested over $11.9 billion 
to add community policing officers to the nations 
streets, enhance crime fighting technology, support 
crime prevention initiatives, and provide training 
and technical assistance to help advance community 
policing. COPS funding has furthered the 
advancement of community policing through community 
policing innovation conferences, the development 
of best practices, pilot community policing 
programs, and applied research and evaluation initiatives. 
COPS has also positioned itself to respond 
directly to emerging law enforcement needs. Examples 
include working in partnership with departments 
to enhance police integrity, promoting safe 
schools, combating the methamphetamine drug 
problem, and supporting homeland security 
efforts. 

Through its grant programs, COPS is 
assisting and encouraging local, state, and tribal 
law enforcement agencies to enhance their homeland 
security efforts using proven community policing 
strategies. Traditional COPS programs such as 
the Universal Hiring Program (UHP) give priority 
consideration to those applicants that demonstrate 
a use of funds related to terrorism preparedness or 
response through community policing. The COPS 
in Schools (CIS) program has a mandatory training 
component that includes topics on terrorism prevention, 
emergency response, and the critical role 
schools can play in community response. Finally, 
COPS has implemented grant programs intended 
to develop interoperable voice and data communications 
networks among emergency response agencies 
that will assist in addressing local homeland 
security demands. 

The COPS Office has made substantial 
investments in law enforcement training. COPS 
created a national network of Regional Community 
Policing Institutes (RCPIs) that are available to 
state and local law enforcement, elected officials 



and community leaders for training opportunities 
on a wide range of community policing topics. 
Recently the RCPIs have been focusing their efforts 
on developing and delivering homeland security 
training. COPS also supports the advancement of 
community policing strategies through the Community 
Policing Consortium. Additionally, COPS 
has made a major investment in applied research, 
which makes possible the growing body of substantive 
knowledge covering all aspects of community 
policing. 

These substantial investments have produced 
a significant community policing infrastructure 
across the country as evidenced by the fact 
that at the present time, approximately 86 percent 
of the nations population is served by law enforcement 
agencies practicing community policing. The 
COPS Office continues to respond proactively by 
providing critical resources, training, and technical 
assistance to help state, local, and tribal law 
enforcement implement innovative and effective 
community policing strategies.


APPENDIX E 
ABOUT THE POLICE EXECUTIVE RESEARCH 
FORUM (PERF) 

PERF IS A NATIONAL PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVES OF LARGE 
city, county and state law enforcement agencies. PERFs objective is to 
improve the delivery of police services and the effectiveness of crime 
control through several means:

 the exercise of strong national leadership, 
 the public debate of police and criminal justice 
issues, 
 the development of research and policy, and 
 the provision of vital management and leadership 
services to police agencies. 
PERF members are selected on the basis of 
their commitment to the organizations objectives 
and principles. PERF operates under the following 
tenets: 
 Research, experimentation and exchange of 
ideas through public discussion and debate 
are paths for the development of a comprehensive 
body of knowledge about policing. 
 Substantial and purposeful academic study is 
a prerequisite for acquiring, understanding 
and adding to that body of knowledge. 
 Maintenance of the highest standards of 
ethics and integrity is imperative to the 
improvement of policing. 
 The police must, within the limits of the law, 
be responsible and accountable to citizens as 
the ultimate source of police authority. 
 The principles embodied in the Constitution 
are the foundation of policing. 
Categories of membership also allow the 
organization to benefit from the diverse views of 
criminal justice researchers, law enforcement of all 
ranks and other professionals committed to advancing 
law enforcement services to all communities. 



Additional color copies of this report can be downloaded for free at www.policeforum.org and 
www.cops.usdoj.gov/.


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